Western Military Interventions After the Cold War: Evaluating the Wars of the West 2018029576, 9780815395249, 9781351175029, 9781351174992, 9781351175012, 9781351175005

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
List of illustrations
Notes on contributors
Introduction
General concept and purpose of the study
Structure of the book
Notes
References
1 The Gulf: the first Western war after the Cold War
1 Strategic context
1.1 The sources of the armed conflict in the Gulf
1.2 Kuwait’s strategic importance for the West
1.3 International response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait
2 Motives, justifications and aims of the Western
involvement
2.1 The declared motives
2.2 Verification of official Western interests and motives
2.3 The aims of the intervention in the Persian Gulf
2.4 The coherence of the West’s position and international
community
3 The course of the intervention
4 Legal aspects
5 Public attitudes towards the intervention
6 The outcome
Notes
References
UNSC resolutions
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina: the West in the service of the UN
2.1 Strategic context
2.1.1 The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina
before the intervention
2.1.2 Bosnia-Herzegovina’s
strategic relevance for the West
2.1.3 Initial international response to the Bosnian conflict
2.2 Motives, justifications and aims of the Western
involvement
2.2.1 The declared and actual motives
2.2.2 The aims of the intervention
2.2.3 The coherence of the West’s position on intervention and
international reaction
2.3 The course of the intervention
2.4 Legal aspects
2.4.1 The legal basis and institutional dimension of the intervention
2.4.2 NATO’s involvement in the context of international
humanitarian law (IHL)
2.5 Public attitudes towards the intervention
2.6 The outcome
Notes
References
3 Kosovo: the first war for human rights
3.1 Strategic context
3.1.1 The sources and nature of the conflict and the situation in
Kosovo right before the intervention
3.1.2 Kosovo’s strategic importance for the West
3.1.3 International response to the developments in Kosovo and
attitudes towards the idea of a military intervention
3.2 Motives, justification and aims of the Western
involvement
3.2.1 Declared motives and justification of the intervention
3.2.2 Aims of the intervention
3.2.3 The coherence of the Western position on the intervention and
the international community’s opinion of its legitimacy
3.3 The course of the intervention
3.4 Legal aspects
3.4.1 The legal basis and the institutional dimension of the
intervention
3.4.2 The engagement in Kosovo in the context of international
humanitarian law (IHL)
3.5 Public attitudes towards the intervention
3.6 The outcome
Notes
References
4 Afghanistan: the longest war, the greatest fiasco?
4.1 Strategic context
4.1.1 The situation in Afghanistan before the intervention
4.1.2 International reaction to the 9/11 attacks
4.2 Motives, justifications and aims of the Western
involvement
4.2.1 The declared and actual motives behind the intervention
4.2.2 The aims of the intervention
4.2.3 The coherence of the West’s position
4.3 The course of the intervention
4.4 Legal aspects
4.4.1 The legal basis and the institutional dimension
4.4.2 The intervention in Afghanistan in the context of international
humanitarian law (IHL)
4.5 Public attitudes towards the intervention
4.6 The outcome
Notes
References
UNSC resolutions
5 Iraq 2003–2010: a disastrous war of choice
5.1 Strategic context
5.1.1 Global dimension
5.1.2 Regional dimension
5.1.3 Iraq’s strategic importance for Western countries before the
intervention
5.1.4 Attitudes towards the intervention
5.2 Motives, justification and aims of the Western
involvement
5.2.1 Declared motives
5.2.2 Verification of the official narrative
5.2.3 Aims of the intervention
5.2.4 The coherence of the West’s position on the intervention
5.3 The course of the intervention
5.4 Legal aspects
5.4.1 The legal and institutional basis of the intervention
5.4.2 The intervention in light of international humanitarian
law (IHL)
5.5 Public attitudes towards the intervention
5.6 The outcome
Notes
References
6 Libya: when military success means state collapse
6.1 Strategic context
6.1.1 The sources of the conflict in Libya
6.1.2 Libya’s strategic importance for Western countries before
the war
6.2 Motives, justification and aims of the Western
involvement
6.2.1 The declared motives of the intervention and their verification
6.2.2 The declared and actual aims of the intervention
6.2.3 The coherence of the West’s position
6.3 The course of the intervention
6.4 Legal aspects
6.4.1 The legal basis and the institutional dimension of the
intervention
6.4.2 Violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) during
the intervention
6.5 Public attitudes towards the intervention
6.6 The outcome
Notes
References
7 Liberal interventionism of the West after the Cold War:
premises and consequences
7.1 Ideational context
7.2 A few selected interventions
7.3 Lessons learned from liberal interventionism in
recent years
Notes
References
8 Wars of the West: conflicts with no victory
8.1 Military victory-a
research field
8.2 The fog of victory. Clausewitz or Liddell Hart?
8.3 A post-heroic
theory of victory?
8.4 The theory of victory: a textbook view
1 Subjectivity in perceiving this phenomenon
2 The cost-benefit
balance in assessing victory is key
3 The time factor in assessing victory
4 Victory as a political concept
5 Omitting the analysis of the conditions to build peace does not
make it easier to understand what strategic victory is
6 Victory and defeat, while being polar opposites, do not have a binary character
7 Decreasing utility of war as a political tool
Notes
References
9 Impact of Western military interventions on the evolution of
law on use of force
9.1 Marginalisation of UN Security Council
9.2 Aggressive self-defence
9.3 Humanitarian (meaning: pro-democratic)
intervention
9.4 Conclusions: the unbearable lightness of changing the
unchangeable
Notes
References
UNGA documents
UNSC resolutions and documents
10 International humanitarian law in the context of military
interventions of the West
10.1 Civilian losses in wars of the West
10.2 Weapons employed
10.3 Qualification of military targets
10.4 The status of prisoners and their treatment
10.5 Private military companies
Notes
References
11 The significance of the resource and energy factor in
military interventions of the West after the Cold War
11.1 The perceptions of energy security of the West after the
Cold War
11.2 The oil factor in interventions in the Persian Gulf
11.3 Force for good? The resource dimension of the
intervention in Libya
11.4 The significance of Afghan mineral deposits from the
perspective of Western intervention
11.5 Conclusions
Notes
References
12 Conclusions: on the effectiveness of Western
interventions – the more we practice, the less we achieve?
12.1 Success or victory, effectiveness or efficacy and can we
measure it?
12.2 Effectiveness of Western interventions – overview
of cases
12.2.1 The Gulf (Iraq – Kuwait 1990–1991)
12.2.2 Bosnia-Herzegovina
12.2.3 Kosovo
12.2.4 Afghanistan
12.2.5 Iraq 2003–2010
12.2.6 Libya
12.3 A worrying trajectory: decreasing efficacy and
efficiency of Western military interventions
12.4 Consequences and prospects
Notes
References
Index

Citation preview

Western Military Interventions after the Cold War

This book offers an examination of the effectiveness of Western military interventions in the post-­Cold War era. It constitutes a comprehensive, interdisciplinary analysis of the conditions, conduct and consequences of post-­Cold War armed conflicts, in which Western states, acting as a multinational coalition, were engaged in a combat role as an intervening force, not as an impartial peacekeeper. The volume identifies and analyses the causes, justifications and goals of the interventions, as well as the results of such engagements. The main objective is to assess the effectiveness of the military actions of Western states in these armed conflicts. Apart from the chapters devoted to particular conflicts – such as the Gulf War, the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya – it also includes chapters in which experts summarise the legal, political, military and economic implications of all such Western-­led interventions. As a result, the book helps us to understand why these military interventions happened, how they were executed and what the results were. Taking into account the impact of these military expeditions on global security, the book offers an explanation for some of the central questions concerning the current shape of international order and power distribution on a global scale. This book will be of much interest to students of military and strategic studies, conflict studies, foreign policy and International Relations. Marek Madej is Assistant Professor and Deputy Director at the Institute of International Relations, University of Warsaw, Poland. 

Cass Military Studies

Strategy Before Clausewitz Linking Warfare and Statecraft, 1400–1830 Beatrice Heuser Special Operations Forces in the 21st Century Perspectives from the Social Sciences Edited by Jessica Glicken Turnley, Kobi Michael and Eyal Ben-­Ari Civilians and Warfare in World History Edited by Nicola Foote and Nadya Williams The Military and Liberal Society Societal–Military Relations in Western Europe Tomas Kucera Israel, Strategic Culture and the Conflict with Hamas Adaptation and Military Effectiveness Niccolò Petrelli War and Strategy in the Modern World From Blitzkrieg to Unconventional Terrorism Azar Gat Military Strategy of Small States Responding to External Shocks of the 21st Century Edström Håkan, Dennis Gyllensporre and Jacob Westberg Western Military Interventions after the Cold War Evaluating the Wars of the West Edited by Marek Madej For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/Cass-­ Military-Studies/book-­series/CMS

Western Military Interventions after the Cold War Evaluating the Wars of the West

Edited by Marek Madej

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 selection and editorial matter, Marek Madej; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Marek Madej to be identified as the author of the editorial matter, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-­in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-Publication Data Names: Madej, Marek, editor. Title: Western military interventions after the Cold War : evaluating the wars of the west / Edited by Marek Madej. Description: First edition. | London ; New York, NY : Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group, 2019. | Series: Cass military studies | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2018029576| ISBN 9780815395249 (hardback) | ISBN 9781351175029 (e-book) | ISBN 9781351174992 (mobi) | ISBN 9781351175012 (Web PDF) | ISBN 9781351175005 (ePub) Subjects: LCSH: Military history, Modern–20th century. | Military history, Modern–21st century. Classification: LCC D431 .W47 2019 | DDC 355.0209/049–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018029576 ISBN: 978-0-8153-9524-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-351-17502-9 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

Contents



List of illustrations Notes on contributors



Introduction

vii viii 1

M are k   M ade j

  1 The Gulf: the first Western war after the Cold War

9

Kamila P roni ń s k a

  2 Bosnia-­Herzegovina: the West in the service of the UN

31

M are k   M ade j

  3 Kosovo: the first war for human rights

53

A gnies z k a B ie ń c z y k - M issala

  4 Afghanistan: the longest war, the greatest fiasco?

74

M are k   M ade j

  5 Iraq 2003–2010: a disastrous war of choice

108

B oles ł aw B alcerowic z

  6 Libya: when military success means state collapse

133

A nna W o j ciu k

  7 Liberal interventionism of the West after the Cold War: premises and consequences

153

R oman Ku ź niar

  8 Wars of the West: conflicts with no victory R obert Kupiec k i

169

vi   Contents   9 Impact of Western military interventions on the evolution of law on use of force

188

P atryc j a G r z eby k

10 International humanitarian law in the context of military interventions of the West

213

A gnies z k a B ie ń c z y k - M issala

11 The significance of the resource and energy factor in military interventions of the West after the Cold War

230

Kamila P roni ń s k a

12 Conclusions: on the effectiveness of Western interventions – the more we practice, the less we achieve?

252

M are k   M ade j



Index

272

Illustrations

Figure 11.1 Changes in global oil prices between 2000 and 2011

232

Tables   4.1 The numerical strength of the international forces in Afghanistan in 2002–2006   4.2 The numerical strength of ISAF and its largest contingents   4.3 Civilian casualties of the war in Afghanistan between 2007 and 2014   4.4 Estimates of direct casualties of the fighting in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014   8.1 Mandel’s understanding of a strategic victory (criteria)   8.2 Martel’s theory of victory 12.1 Results of Western interventions in the post-­Cold War period

84 86 90 94 177 178 260

Contributors

Bolesław Balcerowicz is Professor at the Institute of Political Science, University of Warsaw, Poland. Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala is Assistant Professor at the Institute of International Relations, University of Warsaw, Poland. Patrycja Grzebyk is Assistant Professor at the Institute of International Relations, University of Warsaw, Poland. Robert Kupiecki is Associate Professor at the Institute of International Relations, University of Warsaw, Poland. He is a former Deputy Minister of National Defense for Poland. Roman Kuźniar is Professor at the Institute of International Relations, University of Warsaw, Poland. He is also a former national security advisor to the President of Poland, Bronisław Komorowski. Marek Madej is Assistant Professor and Deputy Director at the Institute of International Relations, University of Warsaw, Poland. Kamila Pronińska is Assistant Professor at the Institute of International Relations, University of Warsaw, Poland. Anna Wojciuk is Assistant Professor at the Institute of International Relations, University of Warsaw, Poland.

Introduction Marek Madej

General concept and purpose of the study After the Cold War, the risk of high intensity military confrontation on a global scale significantly diminished. At the same time, however, perhaps even more frequently, military means were used in internal conflicts, particularly in local competition between different ethnic or religious communities, often labelled as ‘new wars’.1 Furthermore, one of the consequences of accelerating globalisation was the emergence of new opportunities for using force in international relations, particularly by non-­state entities or small and weak states. The increasing wave of terrorism in recent decades provides ample evidence for that. These changes required the international community to search for an appropriate response, sometimes including the use of military measures, albeit in a manner which was sufficiently flexible and adaptable to the dynamic changes of the contemporary security environment. At that time, the states commonly referred to as ‘the West’, perceiving themselves in this context as the representative or ‘the voice’ of the whole international community, manifested both the greatest willingness to formulate a vision of such action, as well as an actual capacity to implement it.2 That approach had a source in their international position attained at the end of the Cold War (for them victorious), military and non-­military resources at their disposal and therefore the ability to influence the actions of other states and shape the international order. Also important were the attitudes of Western societies towards the use of force in international relations, including the general support for strengthening – if needed, also by the use of military measures – the normative foundations of the world order and the respect for human rights (albeit usually on the condition that such measures comply with applicable international law and are executed in a manner mitigating negative consequences for security and stability both in the regional and global dimension). Such involvement by the West, however, had met from the very beginning with a mixed reception in the world, from strong opposition by some states and societies to varied degrees of enthusiasm in support from others. A lively, and often profound, criticism of the general idea of interventionism, as well as of the motivations, justifications and methods of execution of particular military interventions (and also the

2   Marek Madej very fact of Western leadership or involvement in them) was also constantly present in Western societies themselves. This does not, however, change the fact that one of the most important characteristics of the post-­Cold War global security environment was in fact Western interventionism, even if its nature was different from the imperialistic or neo-­ colonial activities of the West (or European states) in previous centuries and decades. Furthermore, particularly since the beginning of the twenty-­first century and chiefly as a consequence of both the increase of the threat from terrorism to international security and international cooperation in the fight against this phenomenon as an aftermath of 9/11, the interventionist activity of Western states only increased. This further strengthened, also due most commonly to the partial success or even outright failure of such interventions, increasing doubts about the legitimacy and rationality of such measures among both Western populations and other members of the international community. All this makes the post-­Cold War military interventions of the West a field of research both interesting and very topical. Discovering what determines the choice of Western states to be militarily involved in various, often remote, regions of the globe, the motivations and objectives of their interventions, as well as the strategies and measures employed in their course, is crucial for the understanding of the current state of international affairs and the dynamics, direction and pace of evolution of the international order. It seems especially important in this context to identify the factors decisive for the effectiveness of military interventions of the West, as well as recognising the attitude of these states towards the norms regulating the use of force in international relations. Equally relevant is determination of the scope and intensity of the impact of Western endeavours on the status and functioning of such norms, as well as their universal acceptance. Assessing the adaptive capabilities of Western states relating to the use of force in reaction to rapid changes of international circumstances during their engagement is also important, as well as attempting to determine the nature and significance of errors made by them in the course of such interventions. These goals were the driving force behind this book.3 It is intended to be a comprehensive study of post-­Cold War military interventions of Western states, considering and analysing their circumstances, motives, objectives, conduct and most of all – broadly defined – consequences. That is why the analyses here focus primarily on the justifications for such operations, strategies and means adopted or implemented in their course, as well as the achieved results. However, the ambition of the authors was not to limit themselves merely to discussions of the political and military dimensions of such endeavours and the assessment of the degree of fulfilment of the goals officially declared by the interveners. They rather tried to encompass the consequences of the Western interventions also in the economic, socio-­cultural and normative (in particular, legal) spheres, both for the participants of such interventions and the states in which they were conducted, as well as for the international community as a whole. In other words, besides offering detailed studies of selected cases of

Introduction   3 interventions, the primary aim of the book is to assess the effectiveness of the post-­Cold War interventions of the West, albeit not understood solely as the level of achievement of declared goals (which would constitute rather the efficacy of these missions), while also taking into account all other relevant aspects, such as the possibility of the existence of additional, undeclared objectives of the use of military means (potentially in contradiction to official ones) or the presence of unintended (or merely ignored in the decision-­making phase) consequences for the interveners, hosts or the international community as a whole. Apart from that, the publication also aims to discuss the impact of Western interventions on various aspects of the international order, particularly its legal dimension in the context of use of force in international relations (including the compliance of Western activities with current regulations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and how they influenced its universal legitimacy and credibility). Thus, the book should make possible the verification of the hypothesis about the diminishing (even if initially high) general effectiveness of Western military interventions since the end of the Cold War, as well as an assessment of the justifiability of accusations against them of having a negative impact on the legal and normative regimes relating to the use of force in international relations. Due to their substantial differences when compared to military interventions from earlier periods or conducted unilaterally, this publication focuses solely on the activities of Western states after the Cold War and only those of multilateral/ multinational character. Thus, the researched interventions were selected on the basis of three criteria: (1) the aforementioned multilateral/multinational status; (2) the exclusive or central role of Western states as executors of the operations; (3) the use of military measures in a coercive manner, i.e. the presence of a combat element in the mission, currently often described in the West – quite euphemistically – as ‘kinetic’. The institutional aspect was of lesser importance in this context – the research encompasses operations conducted both by international organisations (e.g. NATO) and by ad hoc coalitions. However, all unilateral interventions have been omitted, such as British operations in Sierra Leone in 2000 or French operations in Mali in 2013, as were involvements – even extensive – of Western states in multilateral actions of a strictly humanitarian or peace-­keeping nature (such as UNIFIL in Lebanon in 2006). As a result, the publication explores six post-­Cold War military interventions of the West: (1) the Gulf War (intervention in the Iraq–Kuwait conflict under the mandate of the UN but with US leadership, 1990–1991); (2) NATO’s involvement in enforcing peace during the conflict in Bosnia-­Herzegovina (1992–1995, with particular emphasis on the Operation Deliberate Force of 1995); (3) NATO intervention in Kosovo (Operation Allied Force of 1999); (4) international involvement in Afghanistan following the 11 September 2001 attacks (Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF 2001–2014); (5) intervention of a US-­led coalition in Iraq (2003–2010); (6) operations in Libya in 2011.4

4   Marek Madej

Structure of the book The volume comprises two ‘parts’: ‘Cases’ and ‘Trends’. The first contains, as already mentioned, detailed analyses of six military interventions, presented in chronological order: the Gulf War (Kamila Pronińska), intervention in Bosnia-­ Herzegovina (Marek Madej), in Kosovo (Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala), in Afghanistan (Marek Madej), in Iraq (Bolesław Balcerowicz) and in Libya (Anna Wojciuk). To facilitate comparisons between particular cases and identification of development trends over their course, the interventions are discussed largely employing a single, standardised analytical model, while at the same time considering – to the extent it was possible and appropriate – the specific character of each of them. However, it helps also to indicate key differences between them. As such, the analysis of each of the operations is opened with the presentation of the strategic context. This section describes the nature of the conflict or – in a broader sense – the issues constituting the reasons for the intervention, along with global reactions to them and the attitudes of the international community towards an intervention even before its outset. It discusses also the importance of the state and the region where the operation is carried out from the perspective of Western states. Next, the motivations and objectives of Western involvement are examined. In addition to presenting the officially declared justifications and objectives of given missions, efforts were made to duly verify them and to ascertain the actual motivations and intentions of participants in the operations and to assess the degree of any divergence from those presented officially. For that purpose analysing the public speeches of leaders of Western states and organisations was particularly useful. At the same time, attempts were made to determine the hierarchy of motivations and objectives of Western states in a given intervention (both declared and actual), together with an indication of the importance of individual expected outcomes from their perspective. Therefore, four basic categories of motivations and resultant objectives have been identified: 1

2 3

4

‘hardcore’, ‘private’ national security interests of the intervening state(s) (primarily defence against an external threat to fundamental values, such as territorial integrity or the survival of the population, but also interests connected with the international standing and prestige of the West and particular states); economic interests (e.g. economic stability, access to natural resources, including energy sources); motives arising from humanitarian concerns or a desire to promote and strengthen universal values – or ones deemed so by the West – such as human rights (including minority rights), promoting the rule of law and democracy, humanitarian aid etc.; protection of interests of the international community as a whole (e.g. upholding international peace and security on the regional or global scale, strengthening the legal and normative order).

Introduction   5 Nevertheless, when justified, an additional, fifth category was included, if its influence was found to be relevant for the decision to intervene and affected the final hierarchy of motivations and objectives. That was the ‘private’ interests of sub-­national actors in Western states (lobbies or interest groups, political parties, and in extreme situations – i.e. war in Iraq in 2003 – even individuals). The motivations of Western states were intended to be presented jointly for them as a group, seeking common elements in the positions of individual governments and taking into account the approaches of appropriate multilateral institutions, such as NATO. However, when there was need – and as far as it was possible – attempts have been made to present differences in attitudes towards interventions between the individual Western states, especially if those differences might affect the course of a given mission. Considering that a proper determination of actual objectives of an intervention and their hierarchy is probably the key factor in assessing the rationale of individual operations, the chances of their success and their final results (and therefore the effectiveness and efficacy of action undertaken), a relatively large amount of attention has been directed to this subject in each of the chapters. A further element of the analysis of selected cases is a description of their course, particularly in the military dimension. As this element, however, is usually quite succinct, it contains primarily, aside from an outline of strategies adopted by the intervening parties, discussion of measures and resources employed, as well as a chronological presentation of major events, in particular turning points determining the evolution of the mission and its final outcomes. Next, the legal aspect of the interventions is examined. In this respect, a broad analysis of the legal basis for the action of Western states (ius ad bellum) is carried out, as is a thorough assessment of the mode of operations from the perspective of compliance with the provisions of humanitarian law of armed conflicts (ius in bello). Giving so much attention to the legal aspects of each of the interventions was justified by the impact of these issues on the final assessment of the effectiveness of the missions, particularly in the context of strengthening global normative order and stability. Owing to the nature of Western states and the extent of influence of public opinion in those countries on their governments’ actions, the research also encompasses an assessment – based primarily, but not exclusively, on the results of opinion polls – of the attitudes of societies of the involved states (and in justified cases, also of other members of the international community) towards the intervention, with due regard to any changes to them during the course of the mission and their influence on its conduct. The final element of the analysis was an assessment of the results of a given mission. Taking into account the primary objective of the book – assessing the effectiveness of Western military interventions – the authors do not restrict themselves solely to a determination of the degree of fulfilment of objectives of the intervention (both declared and actual) and the level of satisfaction of the interests underlying the decision to carry it out. They also elaborate on the costs, broadly understood, of the mission for the intervening parties. That includes

6   Marek Madej financial and demographic consequences of conducting the operations, as well as their impact on the internal stability and international position of Western states, but primarily on the situation of the countries where the intervention took place, and also on international order, including its normative element, in the regional and global dimension. Only the consideration of all of the above circumstances enables a judgement to be made on the actual effectiveness of military actions undertaken jointly by Western states in the post-­Cold War period. ‘Trends’, the second ‘part’ of this volume, has a slightly different nature. It includes questions of a more overarching nature to which the analyses contained in the first part form an ‘entry material’ or ‘base’ and an inspiration to propose conclusions of a more general character. At the same time the authors of these chapters were given a broader leeway to select particular issues raised in a given chapter and the manner of their presentation. Nevertheless, despite a greater variation in form among the chapters in this part, their central objective remains to identify the key trends in the evolution of interventionist practices by Western states after the Cold War in their most important aspects: political, military, legal and economic. In the opening chapter of this section – ‘Liberal interventionism of the West after the Cold War: premises and consequences’ – Roman Kuźniar focuses on the ideological foundations of Western interventions. He is looking for an explanation for the tendency among Western states (and societies), which was quite visible after the Cold War, to undertake such activities and the surprisingly strong conviction in the West that it is possible to successfully employ armed force in order to strengthen the world order based on values fundamental to the liberal vision of international relations – democracy, human rights and the rule of law. He also offers a critical assessment of the actual impact of the interventions undertaken on the promotion and strengthening of these values in the world, stressing in particular the negative link between the ways and methods of execution of such operations and the perception of their legitimacy, utility and effectiveness. The following chapter, ‘Wars of the West: conflicts with no victory’ by Robert Kupiecki, deals primarily with the question of defining success or failure of contemporary interventions. While referring to recent debates around the concept of the ‘theory of victory’, which was prominent among experts on strategy and war studies, the author discusses the adequacy of such terms as ‘victory’ and traditional ways of defining it to contemporary military interventions, offering an excellent point of reference for the assessment of the effectiveness of such Western endeavours after the Cold War. The next two chapters are devoted to legal aspects of the interventions, in particular the impact of such operations on the stability and recognition of normative order in the field of the use of force in international relations. The first of them, by Patrycja Grzebyk and entitled ‘Impact of Western military interventions on the evolution of law on use of force’, contains a comprehensive analysis of the current state of international law in the context of permissibility of using armed force in international relations. Particular emphasis is placed on recent

Introduction   7 changes in this area, brought about primarily by the Western interventionism itself. The chapter characterises the – generally negative – impact of recent interventions on the international position and the ability to perform its role as envisioned in the UN Charter of the UN Security Council (UNSC). It also shows how these interventions led to the reinterpretation of the scope of the right to self-­defence, as well as to changes in the understanding of the nature of humanitarian intervention and the circumstances enabling it. In the next chapter on the other hand, ‘International Humanitarian Law in the light of military interventions of the West’, the author, Agnieszka Bienczyk-­Missala, concentrates on the degree of compliance of Western interventions with applicable regulations in the field of humanitarian law of armed conflicts, in particular with respect to the protection of civilians and victims of the conflict and the obligation to observe proportionality in military action. She also assesses the impact of Western military activities on universal recognition and respect for these norms. The chapters devoted to legal aspects of Western interventionism are followed by the chapter ‘Resource and energy factor in military interventions of the West after the Cold War’, by Kamila Pronińska, which touches upon important and topical questions of the economic aspects of Western interventionism. The Western states have been frequently accused of being – when undertaking such interventions – motivated primarily by their economic interests, including the desire to increase their control over strategic resources, hydrocarbons in particular. Analysing more closely those Western interventions after the Cold War, which have been most often dubbed ‘wars for oil’ (both operations in Iraq and the engagement in Libya), the author examines the validity of such accusations, at the same time making a comprehensive assessment of the actual impact of the resources factor on the decision-­making process in Western states relating to the initiation of military interventions and the manner of conducting them. The book ends with ‘Conclusions: On the effectiveness of Western interventions – the more we practice, the less we achieve?’, by Marek Madej. The chapter summarises earlier discussions by focusing on the central question of the whole volume – the ‘utility’ of Western interventions, the value of their results, as well as the costs and consequences both for the intervening parties and the countries or regions subject to intervention, and for the international community as a whole. After outlining the outcomes of the individual interventions, the author discusses the trends in the effectiveness of such Western operations over the last two decades, as well as the sources and reasons for these changes. In addition, the chapter offer also some predictions – even if preliminary and sketchy – concerning the future of interventionism and the possible alternative to its Western (liberal) version, so dominant until recently in the post-­Cold War period. As can be seen, the objectives of this publication are ambitious. There is every possibility that not all questions have found an exhaustive answer. What is certain, however, is that the attempt to address them has been made with due diligence and the hope that they may inspire further discussion on the topic of Western interventionism and, more broadly, the role of force in international

8   Marek Madej relations. One can also hope that such discussion will not be limited solely to scientific circles, but will include also those involved in shaping political decisions and processes, including those deciding on the policies of Western states and the entire populations of such states. The political and strategic weight of military interventions and, above all, the consequences of conducting them (as well as refraining from them), not only for intervening states but also for international security and global stability, demands that.

Notes 1 For a broader analysis on this issue: M. Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (3rd edition; Stanford University Press, Stanford 2012). 2 The ‘West’ is a multidimensional and to some degree still vague concept, despite its significance for contemporary studies on international relations. It could be defined in many ways, but usually by referring to the cultural dimension of international relations when it would mean a group of countries or societies united by a specific set of norms and values common to them all, such as the rule of law, liberal democracy, individualism etc., as well as a unique historic experience and classical legacy (i.e. of ancient Greece, Roman Empire and Christianity). However, for the purposes of this book the West should be understood as a security community built not only around that set of common values and traditions, but also on a community of security interests and shared threat perception, which has its primary institutional manifestation in organisations like – above all – NATO and the EU. See: S. Huntington, The West: Unique, not universal (1996) 6 Foreign Affairs 28–46; J. O’Hagan, Conceptualizing the West in International Relations: From Spengler to Said (Palgrave, Basingstoke 2002). 3 The publication has been prepared in the framework of the research programme Wars of the West: Causes, Contexts, Conducts and Consequences of Western Military Engagements in the Post-­Cold War World, financed by the National Science Center under agreement UMO-­2012/07/B/HS5/03783. 4 The publication does not discuss in details the current air campaign being carried out on US initiative and under their leadership against the Islamic State (ISIS), which technically fulfils the adopted criteria. However, since it is an ongoing operation, it would be impossible to assess the effectiveness and outcomes of the mission or even present a full description of its course.

References Huntington S., The West: Unique, not universal (1996) 6 Foreign Affairs 28–46. Kaldor, M., New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (3rd edition, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2012). O’Hagan J., Conceptualizing the West in International Relations: From Spengler to Said (Palgrave, Basingstoke 2002).

1 The Gulf The first Western war after the Cold War Kamila Pronińska

1  Strategic context 1.1  The sources of the armed conflict in the Gulf The Gulf War broke out in the broad strategic context of the end of the Cold War and the changing balance of power in the Middle East. The reduced role of the Soviet Union (USSR) provided the United States (US) with greater possibilities of influencing the Middle East and thus transforming the existing regional order. At the same time, the limited capability of the USSR in providing assistance to the ‘friendly’ regimes significantly upset the balance of power in the Middle East.1 Yet, the West perceived the new security environment as ambiguous, and the US administration had no ‘clear and consistent Middle Eastern policy’.2 A highly significant factor in the new strategic context was the policy of the Iraqi regime and its relations with the Arab world. The Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein openly voiced his concerns regarding the possibility of a new balance of power unfavourable to Arab countries emerging in the region after the erosion of the USSR. Verbalising the concerns of the Arab countries, Saddam also offered an alternative: if these countries worked together and consolidated their resources and financial assets, the US would have to take heed of their positions and interests to a greater extent.3 The factors that induced Iraq to invade Kuwait were both of a geopolitical and an economic nature. On the one hand, Iraq never came to terms with the borders of Kuwait and had already challenged its border with Kuwait in 1938. Its territorial claims became even more significant when considerable oil deposits (the Rumaila field) were discovered close to the border. After Kuwait gained independence, Iraq consistently demanded that Kuwait return the territories given it in 1923 and regularly accused Kuwait of ‘illegally exploiting’ the oil and gas deposits in the borderland. On the other hand, Iraq’s financial problems caused by a changed situation in the oil market and by the debts from the time of the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) were also a strong impulse for the aggression. In the 1980s, there was a considerable change in the oil market, involving a sudden decrease in oil prices. Kuwait decided to increase output from the contested

10   Kamila Pronińska Rumaila field from August 1988 onwards. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) increased their output as well. By effecting a decrease in oil prices, these actions were detrimental to the indebted Iraqi economy. An important role in Saddam’s calculations concerning the success of the invasion was played by the conflict between Iraq and Iran, in which it was Iraq that received broad support from Western and Arab countries. This cemented the dictator’s belief in his own exceptionality and the power of his country, which was systematically equipped with modern arms. In addition, the regime took loans from Kuwait during the war, which it later found hard to repay in the new situation in the oil market. A confrontation in the Gulf seemed likely already in May 1990, given Saddam’s attitude at the summit of Arab countries in Baghdad. He condemned the countries that maintained artificially low oil prices thus sabotaging the Iraqi economy.4 The dispute concerning income from oil sales escalated in mid-­year. In July, after Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE agreed to decrease their production so that prices would go back to US$18 per barrel, Kuwait declared it might withdraw from the agreement. This spurred Iraqi authorities to make further claims towards Kuwait.5 In this period, the US administration kept assuring the Gulf countries of its support in the event of war. However, there was some ambiguity in the warnings given to Saddam,6 which weakened the preventive and deterring effect. Iraqi forces were amassing along the border with Kuwait already in July 1990 and they crossed the border on 2 August. Within hours, the defence crumbled, the emir fled the country and Iraqi forces began the occupation. It was a textbook example of an illegal aggression, in violation of international law. On 8 August, Iraq officially annexed Kuwait. The international community condemned the invasion and the following annexation, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) imposed a broad array of non-­military sanctions and American troops were deployed in Saudi Arabia, but all these actions did not bring about the desired reaction from the Iraqi regime. Saddam made negotiations on the withdrawal of Iraqi forces conditional on the resolution of other Middle Eastern problems, such as the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights, the West Bank and Gaza, and the Syrian involvement in the internal policy of Lebanon. This, however, was most likely an attempt to obtain support from certain Arab countries or stalling for time rather than a sign of actual readiness to withdraw forces. The crisis in the Gulf further deepened the divisions among Arab countries. At the August summit of the League of Arab States (LAS) in Cairo on joining the US-­led coalition, in a very tense atmosphere, they chose to support the coalition by 12 to 9 votes.7 Even greater escalation of the tensions took place when Saddam decided to bar Western citizens from leaving Iraq and Kuwait. On 13–17 August, in reaction to Operation Desert Shield, he announced that Western citizens staying in Iraq and Kuwait were prohibited from leaving these countries until US forces were withdrawn from Saudi Arabia.8 This crisis further stimulated the determination of US and British diplomacy and the effectiveness of their efforts towards

The Gulf   11 organising an armed response of the international community to the Iraqi aggression. With the American diplomatic offensive (especially towards the USSR and the People’s Republic of China (PRC))9 combined with an increasing presence of coalition forces in the region, on 29 November the UNSC adopted a resolution (S/RES/678) that was key to ensuring the legitimacy of a military intervention against Iraq. 1.2  Kuwait’s strategic importance for the West Due to its strategic location and rich energy resources, the Persian Gulf has traditionally been the site of competition for influence among superpowers and for access to energy resources. The West views the region as crucial for meeting the world’s energy demands and maintaining stability of the global oil market. Among the numerous international political agreements concerning Middle Eastern energy resources, the most important one was concluded at the meeting between US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the King of Saudi Arabia Abdulaziz Ibn Saud in 1945.10 It was to guarantee the stability of oil supplies, sales of oil in US$ and that the House of Saud would stay in power. Furthermore, American doctrines – especially that of President Jimmy Carter presented in 1980 – stressed that the protection of US vital interests in the Middle East, including those related to retaining unobstructed access to energy resources, could require the use of force. Apart from that, there was also a strong tradition of military presence in the region (British forces), including for the purpose of maintaining Kuwait’s independence. Until the 1970s, the British military presence was meant to rein in the expansionist ambitions of Iraqi authorities towards Kuwait, which had received military guarantees from the United Kingdom (UK) in 1961,11 when it gained independence. With the withdrawal of British forces, there was growing conviction in the US that it was necessary to ensure stability in the region. National Security Decision Memorandum No. 92 sanctioned an increase in the American military presence in the Gulf in order to decrease the threat of a conflict. Their willingness to use force to maintain stability and the status quo was to be emphasised by the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in 1980 and of the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) in 1983, responsible for military operations in Middle East, among others. In 1990, the security and stability of Middle Eastern West-­friendly regimes (especially Saudi Arabia and its neighbours) was still considered crucial for maintaining the security of energy supplies. As one of the main exporters of oil from the Persian Gulf Kuwait was important for Western energy security interests.12 Even though at that time the Persian Gulf countries were not the main source of US oil imports and despite the fact that the share of Middle Eastern oil in the Western European energy mix had decreased as well, these countries were still playing the key role in shaping the price of oil in the global market as well as in maintaining its stability.13 The West perceived the region as unstable, due to wars and the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 which had a significant impact on perception of the stability of Middle Eastern oil supplies. They also increased

12   Kamila Pronińska awareness of the vulnerability of the West to disruptions of supplies from this part of the world. 1.3  International response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait In the initial phase of the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait, before ground forces entered Kuwait, there was a proposal to find a solution by Arab states. Saudi Arabia was a strong advocate of this option and delayed consent to possible deployment of US forces in the kingdom. Arab solutions, however, would consist of diplomatic efforts only; they would not include a joint military operation. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait triggered a swift response from the international community. On 3 August, by 14 to 7 votes the LAS condemned the invasion and demanded immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. At the same time, it also requested that no external intervention be launched. On the same day, the US and USSR jointly imposed an arms embargo on Iraq and Kuwait, and the US additionally froze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets. Following US diplomatic efforts, the PRC joined the arms embargo, while the European Community and Japan backed economic sanctions.14 The system of sanctions involved a ban on imports, export or transport of Iraqi goods and exports of any products to Iraq except humanitarian or medical supplies; states were also prohibited from providing Iraq with any financial assets.15 None of this, however, prevented Saddam from annexing Kuwait, which was followed by an immediate condemnation by the UNSC (S/RES/662). At this point, the Soviets explicitly cautioned the US against launching any military action without UNSC approval.16 In subsequent resolutions the UNSC called upon Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country; it also expressed hope that it would be possible to resolve the dispute peacefully (S/RES/674 of 29 October 1990). It was systematically condemning the effects of the invasion17 and tightening the sanctions, prohibiting states from, among others, allowing aircraft to depart to Iraq or Kuwait or cross their airspace on their way there unless they carried medical or humanitarian goods or supplies for the UN Iran–Iraq Military Observer Group18 (S/RES/670 of 25 September 1990). States were also obliged to make sure that private entities respect the sanction system, stop ships or prohibit them from entering ports, as well as effectively freeze Iraqi assets and prevent Iraqi authorities from gaining access to Kuwait’s resources (S/RES/665 of 26 August 1990). Although implemented with unprecedented international support and cooperation, overall the sanctions had little impact on the risk of further Iraqi expansion. In this context, especially in the first days after Iraq’s aggression, the West’s greatest concerns regarded the possibility of an attack on Saudi Arabia. It therefore became necessary to employ military deterrence, as pointed out by Thatcher at her meeting with Bush in Aspen (2 August).19 The West was aware that even if Gulf States commenced joint military operations, they would still lack the means to counter the most powerful army in the region – the million-­ strong and well equipped armed forces of Iraq. Consequently, the US committed

The Gulf   13 itself to organise the first military operation to deter any further aggression and defend Saudi Arabia. King Fahd accepted the offer of US Secretary of State Richard Cheney to ‘host’ US forces on 6 August, and on the following day Operation Desert Shield began. With the development of the situation in the region (while Saddam was deterred from further aggression, Iraqi forces were not leaving Kuwait) international support for the idea of a military intervention was growing. On the one hand, Iraq’s actions were seen in a clearly negative light, as war crimes and violations of Article 2 Section 4 of the UN Charter; on the other hand, any alternative solutions were considered ineffective at that time. Furthermore, in this period Americans made a huge diplomatic effort to strengthen the international consensus regarding intervention.20 Admittedly, there were reports that during the debates within the UNSC representatives of the USSR and PRC proposed a regular peacekeeping operation, among other things, but given the preparations made by the US military and its future coalition allies, obviously with a military operation in mind, such proposals were of no significance whatsoever.

2  Motives, justifications and aims of the Western involvement 2.1  The declared motives In the official Western narrative, it was stressed that it was necessary to react to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait as a violation of international law. The aggression was presented as a threat to international order and security of every state as it undermined the principle of respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity. Failure to react could, as a matter of fact, become the beginning of the erosion and anarchisation of international order.21 On the other hand, an appropriate reaction was crucial to the development of a new post-­Cold War international order. The actions towards Iraq were therefore meant to show the capability and determination of the international community in creating a new order based on respect for international law, peaceful coexistence of nations and a collective security system. Planned intervention was referred to as a ‘just war’, understood as a proportional response to the scale of aggression and international law violations and aimed at restoring the previous state of affairs.22 At the same time, there were concerns that failing to stop Saddam now could lead to proliferation of the Iraqi threat in the region. The expansive and aggressive policy of the Iraqi regime was presented as a threat to the sovereignty of Middle Eastern countries and to regional security, including that of Israel. If not stopped, Iraq could have also upset the balance of power through considerable economic acquisitions, becoming a power even more influential in the region and beyond. Furthermore, this would have threatened the stability of the supply and prices of oil.23 Hence, there were concerns that Saddam would not end its conquests with Kuwait but would also strive to invade Saudi Arabia, which would have immense strategic, economic and political impact.

14   Kamila Pronińska In the official argumentation for the intervention, the second key motive was humanitarian, especially human rights violations in Iraqi-­occupied Kuwait and the suffering of the Iraqi people in consequence of the exceptionally severe sanctions imposed by the UN, for which the Iraqi regime was blamed as well. Humanitarian arguments became particularly important after Saddam decided to use foreigners staying in Iraq and Kuwait as hostages,24 which strengthened the claims about his cruelty towards the civilian population even further. On the other hand, the West purposely avoided direct reference to the ties between the intervention and the economic interests of Western countries, especially energy security. These arguments were not mentioned in the official statements addressed to global audience. But they were present in communications meant for Western societies, especially in the US, as evidenced by Bush’s speeches. In the initial phase of the crisis (August 1990) Bush claimed: ‘Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the freedom of friendly countries around the world would all suffer if control of the world’s great oil reserves fell into the hands of Saddam Hussein.’25 Later, however, he declared: ‘this [the war] is not about oil, it’s about aggression’,26 but at the same time he addressed the issue of the US becoming the world leader. Thus the content of the official communiqués changed with the changing dynamics of the conflict. The official hierarchy of Western motives for the Gulf War was as follows: (1) the interest of the international community – understood as the need to react to Iraq gravely violating international law through annexation of Kuwait and to prevent further destabilisation of the region and, second, the striving to prevent a negative impact of Iraq’s aggressive policy on the international order and thus to create conditions for the development of a new world order; (2) humanitarian concerns – the need to protect the values that the West considers universal and to react to human rights violations in occupied Kuwait, against foreigners and to a certain extent in Iraq itself as well (the rights of the Kurdish minority and of the Shia, repressions against the citizens); (3) Western security interests linked to the strategic importance of the Gulf region and the possibility for the US to consolidate its global influence; (4) economic interests related to the need to maintain stability of the global oil market, the security of supply and control of local energy resources. 2.2  Verification of official Western interests and motives The interveners’ actual interests and motives remained partially consistent with the declared ones. Concerns about violations of international law and the destabilisation of the region caused by the actions of the Iraqi regime were most probably sincere. They could indeed have been of paramount importance. Humanitarian concerns, the outrage caused by human rights violations, regardless of rhetoric, were a decidedly less important element of the Western countries’ motivation. Moreover, the non-­military measures implemented in order to force Iraq to withdraw its forces in fact harmed the civilian population. Factors that were not emphasised in the official narration at all or were stressed only to a small extent were much more important than humanitarian

The Gulf   15 reasons. These were motivations related to the security of the West, regarding both its position in the new regional and global order and its energy security. Western countries, especially the US, decided on military intervention in the Gulf out of concern for their own security interests. While the Iraqi aggression did not imply any direct threat to Western security, failing to react to it would mean a wasted opportunity to consolidate the international position and influence the shape of the new international order.27 Furthermore, no reaction or an inadequate reaction could be perceived as a sign of weakness and encourage other countries to violate the law and challenge the international order, which could then directly threaten Western security in the future. The security interests of Western citizens, on the other hand, were indeed directly affected by the actions of the Iraqi regime, such as holding foreigners hostage. In fact, however, these people were held captive only in reaction to the sanctions and the threat of intervention, and the intervention itself was not meant to free them. There are considerable doubts about the place of economic factors in the hierarchy of motivations. There is no doubt that the economic interests of Western countries were a factor in the intervention. This does not mean, however, that the Gulf War should be perceived as an ‘oil war’; this would be a gross oversimplification. Nonetheless, the fact that the first military aggression after the Cold War took place in a region of key importance to the global oil market and that a failure to react to it would mean a significant change in this market has to be seriously taken into account.28 Certainly, the very protection of Saudi Arabia, which was the aim of Operation Desert Shield, had strong economic motivations. As regards Operation Desert Storm, we need to consider the following circumstances. First, if Iraq was allowed to permanently annex Kuwait, the regime would control 30 per cent of proved oil reserves in the Middle East and 20 per cent of global reserves. Iraq’s production capacity would reach approximately 7 per cent of global production.29 For the global market, where both prices and the available production capacity were still strongly dependent on OPEC, it would be highly disadvantageous if such an aggressive regime gained much more influence on the cartel’s production levels and, consequently, on oil prices. This could increase its role as a provider of spare capacity, which is crucial for the security of supplies during crises. In OPEC itself, Iraq’s productive capacity would constitute 23 per cent of the cartel’s total production. Iraq’s voice in OPEC would therefore be the strongest after Saudi Arabia’s. Second, a considerable increase in production capacity, more influence in the oil market and much better access to the Persian Gulf and its export terminals (Kuwait’s coastline with modern infrastructure) would mean increased income from exports. This way Iraq would not only take over Kuwait’s energy, financial and military assets, but it would also gain entirely new possibilities of projecting its power in the region, which in the future could give rise to even greater threats to the security and stability of the region and, consequently, to the stability of Middle Eastern oil supply. Therefore, even though the West was much less dependent on imports of Middle Eastern oil (including from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) than in the 1970s, all the above factors had to be taken into account when making a decision as to

16   Kamila Pronińska whether to launch a military intervention to liberate Kuwait (and its oil fields). Oil from the Persian Gulf still played the key role in the global energy balance. In this context, the Saudi issue is also worth noting. While concerns about a possible Iraqi expansion into Saudi Arabia were relevant in the first months after the aggression against Kuwait, they were considerably mitigated by the deployment of troops under Operation Desert Shield. Hence, there was no serious threat of Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia immediately before the launch of the military intervention in the Gulf, but no-­one could guarantee that it would not arise once again in the future, as it was not clear how long US forces would remain on site. In purely military terms, if the occupation of Kuwait had not ended at this stage, Iraq’s aggressive actions would very likely lead to even greater armaments among Middle Eastern countries. And with the numerous unresolved territorial disputes in the region, one of which could have transformed into an armed conflict, the increased armaments could have opened a ‘Pandora’s box’. Thus the assessment of economic motivations for the intervention should take into account the fact that concerns about the long-­term consequences of this armed conflict and general destabilisation of the region for the global oil market were a major issue. To sum up, the real hierarchy of the Western countries’ motives should be as follows: (1) international order; (2) consolidation of the international position of the West and its freedom of political action, in other words – ‘hard security interests’ of Western countries; (3) economic interests combined with energy security – preserving the pre-­invasion situation regarding ownership of and control over the energy resources in the Persian Gulf, ensuring security and stability of Middle Eastern oil supply – although they might in fact have been considered equal to the Western hard security interests, and in the first phase of the conflict, when there was a real threat of an attack on Saudi Arabia, they might have even been considered a priority; (4) humanitarian reasons. 2.3  The aims of the intervention in the Persian Gulf The official goal of the intervention was the implementation of UNSC resolution S/RES/678 of 29 November 1990, which sanctioned the use of force, demanding that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait. The intervention was meant to end the occupation of Kuwait. Declarations made by Western decision-­makers, especially the US president, also included the following objectives: defending allies and ensuring stability in the region; weakening Iraq’s military power, which would prevent its government from returning to a policy of aggression and developing unconventional weapons; consolidating international law and order; improving the situation of Iraq’s civilian population; protecting the interests of Western citizens. Another objective, not officially declared but undeniably valid, was to increase political influence in the Middle East and ensure global oil market stability. It was in the interest of Western countries to maintain the status quo in the energy market; consequently, they had to ensure that friendly regimes remained in control of the Persian Gulf ’s energy resources, which were crucial for the global economy. The armed liberation of Kuwait fulfilled this objective.

The Gulf   17 It should be assumed that removing Saddam Hussein from power was perceived as a desirable but not necessarily expected outcome; it was not, however, among its objectives. If we analyse the degree to which each of the objectives was realised, it becomes clear that those initially declared – freeing Kuwait and weakening Iraq’s military potential – were achieved relatively quickly (essentially within 24 hours from the launch of combat operations). The question that remains is whether or not the continuation of the intervention on Iraqi territory was determined by striving to remove Saddam from power and liberating the oppressed minorities. In such a situation, we could speak of an adjustment of the mission’s goals to the changed reality of the intervention. It would seem, however, that the operations in Iraq were in fact leading to further consistent weakening of the country’s potential rather than to overthrowing Saddam, as also evidenced by the fact that until the end of the mission the coalition did not request any formal modifications of the mandate. 2.4  The coherence of the West’s position and international community Taking into account all the post-­Cold War experiences of military interventions and the very approach to the idea of restoring peace and security by force, we can say that Western countries were exceptionally coherent in their belief in the need for a military intervention in the Persian Gulf in 1991. This coherence stemmed from the fact that their interests coincided to a large extent, but it was also the result of US active leadership and determination to launch an armed response. Consequently, the perception of the goals of the operation was similar among the Western coalition members as well. In the early phase of the crisis, there were in fact certain differences among the Western states that resulted from different needs and capabilities to exert influence in the region. For example, Germany initially opposed what it considered excessive economic sanctions, and France proposed alternative solutions (e.g. safety guarantees to Iraq in return for withdrawal of forces from Kuwait).30 These, however, did not impact the ultimate decision on launching military intervention, supported by all the Western countries. Moreover, none of the permanent members of UNSC opposed the intervention. In the public debate, in turn, there were notes of concern about the time frame of the intervention. It was pointed out that the period between imposing economic sanctions and issuing the ultimatum to Iraqi authorities, involving a threat of the use of force, was too brief and would prevent economic sanctions from yielding the desired effects.31 Some Western experts also had reservations about the military, financial and human costs of the future intervention. Neither this debate, however, nor anti-­war demonstrations, had any significant impact on Western decision-­makers. The position of the non-­Western permanent members of UNSC and of the countries of the region (among which only Yemen was against the intervention) was essential to the ultimate justification and was an important factor in determining the

18   Kamila Pronińska goals of the coalition military operation. Mikhail Gorbachev shared the view that a decisive reaction to the Iraqi aggression was necessary. This sentiment was linked with the cooperative attitude presented by the USSR at that time towards the West as well as with the internal weakness of the country. Moreover, Saddam held Soviet advisors captive, which also encouraged the USSR to support the military intervention.32 The fact the PRC did not veto S/RES/678 was the result of the strong legal basis of the intervention and the fact that the country was not ready for strong opposition. In this context, we should also consider the economic circumstances: in the early 1990s PRC was not yet a net importer of hydrocarbons, so possible pressure connected with import dependency was therefore not an issue. Beijing was also keen to end its diplomatic isolation that had followed the Tiananmen Square massacre.33 As regards the Arab countries, as late as in spring 1990 anti-­American sentiments were still strong among their societies. This is why even after Iraq annexed Kuwait, public opinion in the Arab world remained highly divided – some societies, especially Palestinians and Jordanians, were strongly interested in seeing Iraq’s power and potential rise as a counterbalance to the influence of the US and Israel. The poorer among the Arab countries, such as Sudan, the countries of North Africa and Yemen, presented a similar approach to the issue, even if only encouraged by the prospect of redistribution of wealth. The rich oil countries of the Persian Gulf, however, were concerned about Iraq gaining significant power in the region, including influence in OPEC. In other Arab countries, e.g. in Syria, there were strong divisions in this regard. It seems that these countries were afraid of Iraqi domination, but even more so of being on the losing side in the confrontation with the US. The attitude of Saudi Arabia was particularly important as a country whose security and position in the region would have been threatened by the growth of Iraq’s political and economic influence. Saudi Arabia and the countries of the Arab Peninsula (except Yemen) largely supported the idea of the intervention, but at the same time were striving to limit the scope of its tasks and objectives, especially as regards preventing a possible continuation of the operation in Iraqi territory. The position of the Arab countries stemmed from concerns about the US gaining too much influence in the region and was, in fact, the main factor that restricted the scope and course of the intervention.34

3  The course of the intervention The military intervention, under UNSC resolution, was preceded by Operation Desert Shield, which was aimed at: achieving defence readiness to prevent Iraq from continuing the aggression; creating an integrated coalition force; ensuring that UN sanctions were enforced; potentially defending Saudi Arabia. This operation played a key role in the preparations for the military solution to the conflict. Operation Desert Shield began on 7 August 1990 under an agreement concluded a day earlier between US and Saudi Arabia, and the core idea behind

The Gulf   19 it was to deter Saddam from further aggression. On 8 August the first US soldiers (4,000) landed on Saudi Arabian territory. The credibility of the deterrence was strengthened already a couple days later by the scale of the forces amassed in the theatre – aircraft from carrier groups, warships, then bombers redeployed from other regions (B-­52), airborne units and marines. Already in the first days of the operation, the air force established control of the airspace over Kuwait. In mid-­September, the assembled force was eventually deployed in the right positions and reached sufficient strength not to worry about an Iraqi attack anymore. The next task was to build an effective military coalition. Already in the first days of August, the UK and France reinforced their fleets in the region. The UK began deploying air force units and an armoured division. France and Canada announced they would be sending ground forces into the theatre. Coalition forces were joined by units from Egypt and Syrian commandos and warships from 22 countries began a naval blockade. In mid-­September the coalition forces and military assets began outnumbering the Iraqi military, with the air force being three times larger. Within six weeks, the coalition managed to transport the largest army in military history and precisely execute the orders to prevent Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia. General Norman Schwarzkopf, who commanded the operation, could report that there was no need to fear an attack, as the Iraqi forces would not be able to attack.35 Starting from the beginning of October the coalition examined the possibility of an ‘offensive option’. The prerequisite was to reinforce the coalition force: in accordance with the American Weinberger–Powell doctrine, it was necessary to have overwhelming numbers along with UNSC mandate.36 Towards the end of 1990, the forces assembled for the offensive numbered more than 450,000 soldiers. Until mid-­January, the forces of the coalition, composed of units deployed by 29 countries, reached approximately 1 million. The largest contingent was provided by the US, approximately 700,000 soldiers, followed by Saudi Arabia (100,000), UK (45,000), Egypt (45,000), France (15,000) and Syria (15,000). Of these, some 450,000 soldiers participated in the operation directly. The coalition forces also included: more than 2,500 aircraft, 4,400 tanks, 2,200 attack helicopters, 4,170 artillery pieces and mortars, more than 270 ships.37 Operation Desert Storm was to be conducted in four stages: (1) a strategic air operation; (2) achieving air supremacy; (3) preparing the ground for a land offensive; (4) an offensive ground forces operation. During detailed planning the decision-­makers adjusted this plan as they realised that the coalition’s accumulated air power potential would make it possible to execute the first three phases of the operation at the same time. Thus the operation began with a simultaneous attack on the targets from all the categories throughout the theatre with the aim to keep the enemy believing that the main efforts of the coalition forces would be focused on directly taking control of Kuwait. In fact, however, the main thrust was to take place outside Kuwaiti territory in order to cut off the main concentrations of Iraqi forces. The allied combat operations began on 17 January 1991 with massive air strikes, with two to three air raids a day, each performed by 300–400 aircraft on

20   Kamila Pronińska average. The main effort of the air operations was aimed at eliminating the Iraqi anti-­air defence system, crippling the command system, destroying missile launchers, nuclear research facilities and chemical weapons depots. After four days of operations, the Iraqi anti-­air defence and air force was completely incapacitated. From 22 January, the main objective was to cripple the reserves of the main (southern) concentration of Iraqi forces and destroy military (and civilian) infrastructure. Given complete allied air supremacy, air raids were conducted uninterruptedly at various times of day and night. As a result of these air operations, 30–35 per cent of Iraqi forces were incapacitated. In response, Iraq followed through with its threats against Israel and launched Scud missiles on its territory.38 The air, ground and naval offensive began on 24 February. The decimated Iraqi forces were unable to offer successful resistance. The capital of Kuwait was liberated on the third day of the operation, and on the fourth day the forces of two American corps cut off the Iraqi units in Kuwait and southern Iraq. On the following day Saddam issued a decision on unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. After consultations with Collin Powell and general Schwarzkopf, President Bush announced a unilateral ceasefire on 28 February.

4  Legal aspects In the international law doctrine Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait has been commonly considered an obvious example of aggression, but UNSC referred to it (RES/660) as a ‘breach of international peace and security’. The lack of any reaction from Iraq to sanctions moved UNSC to adopt S/RES/678 on 29 November, which authorised countries ‘to use all necessary means’ to make Iraq to comply with the earlier resolutions and liberate Kuwait unless Iraq withdrew its armed forces from Kuwait by 15 January 1991. This resolution provided the legal basis for the coalition’s military intervention.39 It remains debatable, however, what was the actual scope of the mandate to use force granted by the UNSC and who was authorised to implement its will. The main challenge is therefore to verify to what extent the coalition’s intervention was conducted within the bounds of the authorisation, using only necessary means. Faced with the US ultimatum of 22 February 1991, Iraq agreed to withdraw its forces (after an earlier ceasefire), but within three weeks rather than a single week as expected by US. Therefore, some experts doubted that a ground operation was necessary.40 Moreover, the goals Americans set for themselves (to  destroy Iraq’s offensive capability) went beyond S/RES/678 in its narrow meaning.41 In the context of international humanitarian law (IHL), the US was the only country among the allies that was not party to Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1977, yet it treated many of these provisions as customary law. According to the plans, Operation Desert Storm was to focus on destroying Iraq’s military capability. According to the declarations of the US Department of Defense, airstrikes were to be as precise as possible in order to

The Gulf   21 minimise civilian losses. In practice, attacking exclusively military targets was difficult since Iraqi forces and equipment were deployed in cities, residential areas, close to mosques, heritage sites and hospitals. Moreover, the Iraqi regime practiced using civilians as human shields. During the operation, there were cases of violations of IHL, especially the principles of proportionality and differentiation.42 The destruction of Iraqi power plants was especially strongly criticised.43 The Pentagon argued that attacks against energy infrastructure were intended to cripple the base of military; it cannot be denied, however, that electricity supplies are fundamental for the livelihoods of the civilian population. After the war, the situation of civilians, deprived of proper access to water and medical services, was deemed critical.44 The destruction of energy infrastructure resulted in an increased mortality rate among people in need of medical care and children. It is estimated that epidemics of cholera, typhoid fever and other diseases caused by the lack of access to clean water took the lives of approximately 100,000 people.45 Furthermore, there were cases of airstrikes against, among others, food processing plants, sugar factories, food and seed stores – even when they were not located close to military targets. The destruction caused by the intervention deepened the already existing problems with access to food caused by the UN embargo and then the crisis in the Gulf. There were many questions, especially about the bombing of dual-­ purpose targets,46 i.e. bridges, railways, telecommunications infrastructure or the main post office. As part of the operation of destroying mobile missile launchers, there were cases of bombing civilian buses, cars or Bedouin convoys by mistake. The choice of payload was also conducive to greater civilian losses; only some 8 per cent of the bombs dropped were precision-­guided munitions (PGM),47 and the allies also used cluster bombs. The US Department of Defense argued that the operation in the Persian Gulf was the best planned air operation in history and that it was almost perfectly conducted. Studies by reliable international institutions onsite confirmed, however, that it had been impossible to reduce civilian losses to the declared minimum due to the wide scale of the air operation and the methods and measures applied. Still, compared to the size and nature of the force involved, we should consider the total balance of civilian losses relatively small. It is estimated that during the intervention the Iraqi side lost some 2,500–3,000 civilians (compared to 20,000–35,000 soldiers). But the destruction of infrastructure, especially power plants, had catastrophic humanitarian consequences.

5  Public attitudes towards the intervention In the public debate Saddam’s actions were explicitly presented as an armed aggression motivated by the desire to seize oil-­rich territory belonging to a different country, and at the same time the regime’s brutality towards the civilian population was pointed out. Western societies were under the influence of the narrative presented by Western politicians and Western media and, as was

22   Kamila Pronińska the case with the US, by legal, PR and lobbying firms hired by the Kuwaiti government.48 The Iraqi regime was presented as brutal, aggressive, undemocratic and totalitarian. In the months preceding the intervention, public opinion in Western countries was strongly divided as regards the use of force in the Persian Gulf. The Bush administration was facing a difficult task: it had to convince the public to support intervention against a dictator it had been supporting in the past and, what is more, in defence of Kuwait, a country far from observing democratic and liberal standards. Already in the first days after the Iraqi aggression, Bush suggested that Kuwait could prove just the first victim of the aggressive policy of Saddam’s regime, meaning that the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia could be threatened as well. The security of the Saudi monarchy was presented as linked to US vital interests. While preparing the public for Operation Desert Storm, the government needed to find additional strong arguments for the use of the US Armed Forces in the liberation of Kuwait. This was even more important given that according to public opinion polls in the US, between August and October the number of people who considered possible involvement a mistake had been growing.49 The media at that time compared Saddam to Hitler and emphasised that the policy of concessions towards aggressive dictators is never successful. According to media studies, the message that described the Iraqi dictator as a madman committing crimes even against his own society was especially influential. These arguments had even stronger impact combined with the information on foreign nationals being held hostage; the Iraqi regime was described as ‘terrorists’, and images of American hostages had a huge impact on public opinion. The media had to mobilise support for the war also through diminishing the significance of anti-­war protests50 and formulating a clear message supporting the idea of a military intervention.51 Of the total 2,855 minutes of broadcast dedicated to Bush’s policy in the Persian Gulf in evening time slots in the US only 29 minutes were devoted to reporting on the activity and views of the opponents of military engagement.52 Shortly after the intervention began, the support for it among the American public rapidly rose – the phenomenon was explained through the ‘rally round the flag effect’, that is, increased support for the US President during a crisis. In the UK the point of reference was the Falklands War, when criticism from the opposition contributed to public opinion’s decreasing support for the engagement. This time, the focus was on the media presenting broad political support for the coalition’s military intervention and on arguing that the intervention had to be conducted. For this purpose, strict control of information flow was implemented, the single front supporting the idea of armed engagement in the Gulf being occasionally broken by The Independent and Guardian, which presented also some sceptical views of the war. The US–UK information monopoly – especially the CNN’s monopoly on the war – was strongly criticised in France. But right before the intervention the French media policy proved highly effective in mobilising social support for

The Gulf   23 participation in the military intervention. In France the discourse focused on, among others, the need to participate for the sake of prestige. French media were more doubtful about the real reasons for the war than their Anglo-­Saxon counterparts. The reaction of public opinion in Canada is a very interesting case. Before the intervention there was no strong control of the media message. The Canadian press was rather unfavourably disposed towards the use of force against Iraq and did not play a similar role as that of the US press. As a result, the Canadian society’s support was low both before and during the intervention.53 Before the intervention in the Persian Gulf, Western public opinion was divided, but support grew with subsequent phases of the crisis and the Western military engagement. In the third week of the coalition’s combat operations, public support was strong in all Western countries.

6  The outcome The Gulf War ended in a military and largely also political victory of the Western countries and the coalition forces. Among the political objectives of the military intervention in the Persian Gulf set by US president, the following were fully achieved: complete withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait; restoring the legal authorities; and ensuring security to US citizens. The same is, however, not necessarily true of ensuring security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf region. While security and defence of Saudi Arabia was achieved through Operation Desert Shield, ensuring security in the region proved to be too broad and vague a category to unambiguously determine whether the goal was achieved. If the West understood this goal as asserting political control over the region, weakening Saddam’s regime and disarming Iraq, it failed to achieve this in full. Americans quickly made the decision to end the operation, therefore it was often referred to as the Unfinished War, especially in the context of the 2003 intervention. However, although the Iraqi regime was not overthrown, the country’s military potential was considerably weakened, and given the losses they suffered, Iraqi forces lost their offensive capability, which made it impossible for the regime to continue its aggressive policy and claim the dominant position in the region. As previously mentioned, overthrowing the regime was neither a declared nor an actual goal of the intervention. Further combat operations carried the risk of overstepping the mandate and undermining the legitimacy of the undertaken actions. This could have negative consequences for the development of the international order, which was the actual top priority. What is more, continuing the operation could cause a split in the coalition and strong opposition from Arab countries. Furthermore, for geopolitical reasons and because of the need to ensure a balance of power in the region (especially in the context of Iran), none among Iraq’s neighbours was interested in complete destruction of the Iraqi army and in overthrowing the country’s political regime. Considering the above reservations, the intervention should be evaluated as highly effective, especially as regards the primary official objectives. The extent

24   Kamila Pronińska to which the other more or less declared goals were achieved varied, however. The decisive reaction to Iraq’s aggression consolidated international law, but this effect was rather temporary. The region was partially stabilised; while Iraq retained certain destabilising potential, it no longer posed any serious threat to its neighbours. At the same time, continuous US military presence in the region, especially in Saudi Arabia, was creating new sources of tensions. The least effect – or even a negative effect – was achieved in terms of humanitarian objectives, especially as regards Iraq’s Kurdish and Shiite minorities.54 What is more, there were several violations of IHL during the intervention. What is important, however, is that the priority objectives were fulfilled to the greatest extent. We can therefore conclude that the effects of the intervention were consistent with the declared and actual key interests of Western countries. International order based on law and international cooperation was consolidated. The successful intervention was not only a warning to anyone who might contemplate a similar aggression in the future but also proved the scale of the Western countries’ – and especially the US – capability of exerting influence in the sphere of security. The key economic interests were achieved as well. Status quo ante in the distribution of oil deposits among the countries was restored, which also meant that Saudi Arabia regained its influence on the stability of the oil market and security of supplies. As a matter of fact, oil prices and supplies remained stable for the next decade, and the market was developing in line with the Western countries’ interests. The cost of Western military engagement was estimated at US$71 billion, with US$61.1 billion spent by the US, US$6 billion by the UK, and between US$1.6 and 1.8 billion by France. At the same time, capital flows to the US from the Gulf States increased considerably during the course of intervention.55 The successful intervention provided an impetus for further stabilisation of the situation in the region, including in relation to the Middle Eastern peace process. The punitive character of the intervention and its positive outcome were weakened by the fact that Saddam remained in power, proving that one can violate the principles of international law and survive. Moreover, Iraq circumvented some of the restrictions imposed on it after the war, which in time contributed to the erosion of the new international order and undermined trust in the effectiveness of the sanctions applied by the international community. Still, the sanctions against Iraq proved to be an important lesson. In the context of building a new order, promotion of Western values turned out to be a failure, especially as regards human rights and democracy. In legal terms, the intervention was an important point of reference in later UNSC practice regarding consent for the use of force. The general expression: ‘use all necessary means’ was used during the subsequent interventions as well, although some pointed out that it could become a problem because states could interpret it as a blank consent for the use of force and then use their veto power to prevent any UNSC control over the course of the operation.56 The fact that the coalition decided not to continue the offensive and overthrow the Iraqi regime

The Gulf   25 indicated that they considered it necessary to maintain proportionality in the use of force. What proved problematic in legal terms was enforcing responsibility for violations of the rules of engagement, which the UNSC mentioned in some of its resolutions. Once the intervention ended, both Bush and Thatcher emphasised that it was necessary to make Hussein and his cronies responsible for the war crimes.57 In the end, however, there was insufficient determination to put those responsible for the crimes on trial. In the economic dimension, in turn, the intervention has had positive influence on the coherence of the West. The undeniable military success consolidated the leading position of the US in the Western world and that of the West in the global security order – as guardians of international law and order, among others. With the effectiveness of the cooperation between Western countries confirmed, it was easier to define NATO’s objectives after the Cold War, and it made NATO more attractive – as an alliance of victorious military powers – for potential candidate or partner countries. A particularly important outcome of the intervention was the strengthening of the transatlantic bond through the harmonisation of the perception of the security environment in Western countries, as well as providing an additional basis for maintaining US forces in Europe – as a region directly neighbouring the Middle East.

Notes   1 L. Freedman, E. Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1991) 14–15, 31.   2 S.J. Wayne, President Bush goes to war: A psychological interpretation from a distance, in: S.A. Renshon (ed.), The Political Psychology of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh 1993) 30–31.   3 S. Telhami, Arab public opinion and the Gulf War, in: S.A. Renshon (ed.), The Political Psychology of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh 1993) 187.   4 J. Gross Stein, Threat-­based strategies of conflict management: Why did they fail in the Gulf?, in: S.A. Renshon (ed.), The Political Psychology of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh 1993) 122.   5 On 16 July Iraq demanded US$2.4 billion in compensation for oil exploited by Kuwait from the contested field and US$12 billion for losses incurred due to Kuwait’s overproduction. It demanded remission of debt it had taken from Kuwait during the war with Iran and laid claim to Bubiyan Island – strategically located in the north-­ western corner of the Persian Gulf. Gross Stein (1993) 121–123.   6 After meeting Saddam, US Ambassador April Glaspie assured that Saddam intended to find a peaceful solution to the dispute, and that she had clearly warned him that the US would protect its vital interests in the Middle East. After: ibid. 125.   7 S.J. Cimbala, P.K. Forster, Multinational Military Intervention: NATO Policy, Strategy and Burden Sharing (Ashgate, Farnham 2010) 67.   8 The first Western hostages, women and children, were freed in September, and between 30 November and 15 December the others were also given permission to leave the country. Saddam also held 1,000 Soviet advisors hostage. J. Arnold, R. Wiener (ed.), Understanding of U.S. Military Conflicts through Primary Sources (ABC-­CLIO, Santa Barbara 2016) 115.

26   Kamila Pronińska   9 More: Cimbala, Forster (2010) 67–70. 10 M.T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (Owl Books, New York 2001) 59, 75. 11 As a matter of fact, in 1923 the UK incorporated small areas of Iraq into Kuwait, including most of its coast and two islands: Bubiyan and Warbah. The situation became even more complicated with the discovery of oil deposits close to the border. Once independent, Iraq regularly issued territorial claims towards Kuwait. The UK stationed military units in Kuwait until 1971. More: J. Onley, Britain and the Gulf Sheikhdoms, 1820–1971: The Politics of Protection (2009) 4 Occasional Paper, Center of International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. 12 In 1989 Kuwait accounted for 8.5 per cent of Middle Eastern oil production. BP Statistical Review of the World Energy (BP, London 2012). 13 In 1990, the countries of the region controlled 64 per cent of the world’s documented oil deposits and 27 per cent of the global oil production. Data from: BP (2012). 14 On the first day of the aggression, Bush met with Prime Minister Thatcher, and they strengthened each others’ conviction that there was a need for a strong-­armed response. See: Wayne (1993) 33, 36. 15 These sanctions were imposed under S/RES/661 of 6 August 1990 and through S/RES/666 of 13 September 1990 UNSC called upon all countries to respect this system of sanctions. 16 Cimbala, Forster (2010) 67. 17 Including Iraq’s efforts to change the demographic composition of Kuwait (S/RES/677 of 28 November 1990), violations towards diplomatic and consular personnel (S/RES/664, S/RES/667, S/RES/674). UNSC stressed that states could not recognise the effects of the invasion (S/RES/662 of 9 August 1990, S/RES/664, S/RES/674). More on the implementation of economic sanctions: A.A. Majid, Is the Security Council working? Desert Storm critically examined (1992) 4 African Journal of the International and Comparative Law, 985–986. 18 The Group (in 1991, the military and civilian personnel of the mission consisted of 114 people) was established after the end of the Iran–Iraq War in order to supervise the ceasefire and withdrawal of armed forces to behind the borders recognised by the international community. 19 As Margaret Thatcher wrote in her memoirs, in the first days of August an immediate question was whether Saddam Hussein would go over the border and seize Saudi Arabia’s oil fields. M. Thatcher, My Downing Street Years (Harper, London 2011) 816. 20 Cimbala, Forster (2010) 68–69. 21 This was expressed by, among others, Douglas Hurd in his speech of January 1991: ‘nobody wants to live in Hussein’s anarchic world’. D. Hurd: Perspective on the Gulf War: It’s something we had to do: Saddam Hussein now has to face the consequences of his unjustified aggression. He left us no choice, 17 January 1991, http://articles. latimes.com/1991–01–17/local/me-­67_1_saddam-­hussein (accessed 10 May 2018). Similar notes can also be found in Thatcher’s speech of 2 August 1990, where she judged Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait as violating all underlying principles of the UN and added that if Saddam Hussein was allowed to succeed, no small country could feel safe; the rules of the jungle would prevail over the rule of law. Thatcher (2011) 819–820. 22 E.g. ‘The war in the Gulf is not a Christian war, a Jewish war, or a Moslem war; it is a just war’ – G.H.W. Bush, Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Religious Broadcasters, 28 January 1991, source: www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid= 19250 (accessed 10 May 2018). 23 E.g. Prime Minister Thatcher expressed the concern that further expansion would give Iraq control of 65 per cent of world oil reserves and allow it to blackmail the West – Thatcher (2011) 816–817.

The Gulf   27 24 More than 3,000 Americans were held captive in Kuwait. The media referred to them as ‘hostages’ taken by ‘terrorists’. J.S. Lawrence, The Persian Gulf and the vanishing hostages (1994) 1 Journal of American Culture, 43. 25 R.W. Apple, Jr., Bush says Iraqi aggression threatens ‘Our Way of Life’ (1990) New York Times, 16 August 1990. 26 Quoted after: S.A. Renshon (ed.), The Political Psychology of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh 1993) 85. 27 See: R. Kuusisto, Framing the wars in the Gulf and in Bosnia: The rhetorical definitions of the Western power leaders in action (1998) 5 Journal of Peace Research 603–620. 28 Klare (2001) 61–62. 29 Own calculations on the basis of data, BP (2012). 30 Cimbala, Forster (2010) 70. 31 L. Freedman, E. Karsh, How Kuwait was won: Strategy in the Gulf War (1991) 2 International Security 7. 32 Already on 8 September Gorbachev accepted that force might be used against Baghdad and agreed to withdraw Russian advisors from Iraq. Towards the end of September, Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, announced that it would support the use of force against Iraq. Furthermore, at that time USSR even declared it would join the coalition, but in the end this never happened. On 30 September, diplomatic relations with Riyadh, severed in 1939, were re-­established. Cimbala, Forster (2010) 68. 33 The PRC’s abstention during the vote on S/RES/678 was accompanied by an invitation for the Chinese minister of foreign affairs to visit Washington. Ibid. 34 Wayne (1993) 31. 35 H.N. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero (Bantam, New York 1992) 376. 36 Moreover, Powell’s doctrine was based on the principle of maximum chances with minimum losses and prominence of aircraft in combat operations. Weinberger’s doctrine of 1982 had it, in turn, that if the US chose to get its military involved, then this engagement should be complete and with a clear intention of achieving victory. 37 Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict. An Interim Report to Congress, https:// ia600508.us.archive.org/3/items/ConductofthePersianGulfConflictAnInterimReporttoCongress/Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict An Interim Report to Congress.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). 38 Israel was close to launching an armed response. After the missile attacks of 22 January, the government made the decision to attack but it was never implemented. 39 On 12 January 1991, after three days of debating, the Congress gave its consent to the implementation of the resolution by US forces, by 250 to 183 votes in the House of Representatives and 52 to 47 votes in the Senate. 40 More: J. Quigley, The United States and the United Nations in the Persian Gulf War: New order or disorder? (1992) 25 Cornell International Law Journal 12–13. 41 In the narrow interpretation of S/RES/678 intervention was to force Iraqi troops to withdraw from Iraq to predetermined positions. In the broader understanding, it authorised such measures as would ensure peace in the region. 42 Report of WHO/UNICEF Special Mission to Iraq (1991), S/22328, 4 March 1991; Human Rights Watch, Needless Deaths in the Gulf War, Civilian Casualties During the Air Campaign and Violations of the Laws of War (1991), www.hrw.org/ report/1991/06/01/needless-­deaths-gulf-­war/civilian-­casualties-during-­air-campaign-­ and-violations (accessed 10 May 2018). 43 In the first days of the intervention, 13 out of 20 power plants were destroyed or heavily damaged. In accordance with a UN Commission report, towards the end of the war only two stations were operational. Harvard Study Team (1991) Public Health in Iraq After the Gulf War 19. 44 ICRC Press Release no. 91/25, 28 March 1991.

28   Kamila Pronińska 45 K.R. Rizer, Bombing dual-­use targets: Legal, ethical, and doctrinal perspectives (2001) Air and Space Power Journal, 1 May 2001. 46 Ibid. 47 D. Jividen, Jus in bello in the twenty first century: Reaping the benefits and facing the challenges of modern weaponry and military strategy (2004) 7 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 119. 48 J.R. MacArthur, Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War (University of California Press, Berkeley 1992). 49 J. Mueller, American public opinion and the Gulf War, in: S.A. Renshon (ed.), The Political Psychology of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh 1993) 202. 50 B. Allen, P. O’Loughlin, A. Jasperson, J.L. Sullivan, The media and the Gulf War: Framing, priming, and the spiral of silence (1994) 2 Polity 257. 51 Renshon (1993) 254. 52 G. Ruffini, Press failed to challenge the rush to war, in: H. Smith (ed.), The Media and the Gulf War (Seven Locks Press, Washington, DC 1992) 282–292. 53 A.L. Hibbard, T.A. Keenleyside, The press and the Persian Gulf Crisis: The Canadian angle (1995) 2 Canadian Journal of Communication 255–266. 54 In the following years Saddam brutally suppressed uprisings of Iraqi Kurds and Shiites, to which the West did not react. 55 Saudi Arabia spent US$16.8 billion, Kuwait – US$16 billion, and the UAE – US$4.1 billion. Apart from the costs related to troop deployment, US$343.4 million was spent on covering transport costs of the coastguard and more than US$253 million on American veterans. Other financial commitments included refugee aid – the Allies provided some US$404 million for this purpose. In this case, the main contributors were Japan, Germany, the European Commission, and the Netherlands. Data: GAO Persian Gulf Burden Sharing 1991, 3 and Report #12 OMB 15 October 92, after: Cimbala, Forster (2010) 84–85. 56 Majid (1992) 988. 57 B.B. Ferencz, An International Criminal Code and Court: Where they stand and where they’re going (1992) 30 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 386.

References Allen B., O’Loughlin P., Jasperson A., Sullivan J.L., The media and the Gulf War: Framing, priming, and the spiral of silence (1994) 2 Polity 255–284. Apple R.W., Jr., Bush says Iraqi aggression threatens ‘Our Way of Life’ (1990) New York Times, 16 August 1990. Arnold J., Wiener R. (ed.), Understanding of U.S. Military Conflicts through Primary Sources (ABC-­CLIO, Santa Barbara, CA 2016). BP Statistical Review of the World Energy (BP, London 2012). Bush G.H.W., Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Religious Broadcasters, 28 January 1991, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19250 (accessed 10 May 2018). Cimbala S.J., Forster P.K., Multinational Military Intervention: NATO Policy, Strategy and Burden Sharing (Routledge, Ashgate 2010). Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict. An Interim Report to Congress, https://ia600508.us. archive.org/3/items/ConductofthePersianGulfConflictAnInterimReporttoCongress/ Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict An Interim Report to Congress.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). Ferencz B.B., An International Criminal Code and Court: Where they stand and where they’re going (1992) 30 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 375–399.

The Gulf   29 Freedman L., Karsh E., How Kuwait was won: Strategy in the Gulf War (1991) 2 International Security 5–41. Freedman L., Karsh E., The Gulf Conflict 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey 1991). Gross Stein J., Threat-­based strategies of conflict management: Why did they fail in the Gulf?, in: S.A. Renshon (ed.), The Political Psychology of the Gulf War, Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh 1993) 121–154. Harvard Study Team (1991) Public Health in Iraq after the Gulf War. Hibbard A.L., Keenleyside T.A., The press and the Persian Gulf Crisis: The Canadian angle (1995) 2 Canadian Journal of Communication 255–266. HRW (Human Rights Watch), Needless Deaths in the Gulf War, Civilian Casualties During the Air Campaign and Violations of the Laws of War (1991) www.hrw.org/ report/1991/06/01/needless-­deaths-gulf-­war/civilian-­casualties-during-­air-campaign-­ and-violations (accessed 10 May 2018). Hurd D., Perspective on the Gulf War: It’s Something We Had to Do: Saddam Hussein Now Has to Face the Consequences of His Unjustified Aggression. He Left Us No Choice, 17 January 1991, http://articles.latimes.com/1991-01-17/local/me-­67_1_ saddam-­hussein (accessed 10 May 2018). ICRC Press Release no. 91/25, 28 March 1991. Jividen D., Jus in bello in the twenty first century: Reaping the benefits and facing the challenges of modern weaponry and military strategy (2004) 7 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 113–152. Klare M.T., Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (Owl Books, New York 2001). Kuusisto R., Framing the wars in the Gulf and in Bosnia: The rhetorical definitions of the Western leaders in action (1998) 5 Journal of Peace Research 603–620. Lawrence J.S., The Persian Gulf and the vanishing hostages (1994) 1 Journal of American Culture 43–46. MacArthur J.R., Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War (University of California Press, Berkeley 1992). Majid A.A., Is the Security Council working? Desert Storm critically examined (1992) 4 African Journal of the International and Comparative Law 985–986. Mueller J., American public opinion and the Gulf War, in: S.A. Renshon (ed.), The Political Psychology of the Gulf War, Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh 1993) 199–226. Onley J., Britain and the Gulf Sheikhdoms, 1820–1971: The Politics of Protection (2009) 4 Occasional Paper Center of International and Regional Studies Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. Quigley J., The United States and the United Nations in the Persian Gulf War: New order or disorder? (1992) 1 Cornell International Law Journal 1–49. Renshon S.A. (ed.), The Political Psychology of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh 1993). Report of WHO/UNICEF Special Mission to Iraq S/22328, 4 March 1991. Rizer K.R., Bombing dual-­use targets: Legal, ethical, and doctrinal perspectives (2001) Air and Space Power Journal 1 May 2001. Ruffini G., Press failed to challenge the rush to war, in: H. Smith (ed.), The Media and the Gulf War (Seven Locks Press, Washington, DC 1992) 282–287. Schwarzkopf H.N., It Doesn’t Take a Hero (Bantam, New York 1992).

30   Kamila Pronińska Telhami S., Arab public opinion and the Gulf War, in: S.A. Renshon (ed.), The Political Psychology of the Gulf War, Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh 1993) 183–198. Thatcher M., My Downing Street Years (Harper, London 2011). Wayne S.J., President Bush goes to war: A psychological interpretation from a distance, in: S.A. Renshon (ed.), The Political Psychology of the Gulf War, Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh 1993) 29–48.

UNSC resolutions S/RES/660 (1990) S/RES/661 (1990) S/RES/662 (1990) S/RES/664 (1990) S/RES/665 (1990) S/RES/666 (1990) S/RES/667 (1990) S/RES/670 (1990) S/RES/674 (1990) S/RES/677 (1990) S/RES/678 (1990)

2 Bosnia-­Herzegovina The West in the service of the UN Marek Madej

The Western intervention in Bosnia-­Herzegovina had two closely related characteristics, which complicate the image of this involvement. The first is long reluctance of the majority of Western governments towards combat operation in Bosnia-­Herzegovina. The second, being a direct result of this reluctance, is the ‘creeping’ nature of the intervention, its gradually intensified intrusiveness and the changeability of the institutional dimension (the structures conducting the intervention).1 Western military intervention sensu stricto began with the NATO Operation Deliberate Force (ODF, August–September 1995), at the final stage of the Bosnian conflict and after years of international (also Western) military involvement under the UN framework; thus, it was a consequence of these earlier activities. Therefore, Western military engagement essentially took two forms: •

•

Participation in UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force), a UN mission composed largely of Western personnel.2 Regardless of the humanitarian and peacekeeping nature of this mission, its mandate was gradually broadened to include elements of peace enforcement, although this did not entail increasing the assets involved to match the rising complexity of tasks; ‘Proper’ Western intervention in support of UNPROFOR, executed by NATO and – to a much lesser extent – the Western European Union, which was undertaken due to the inefficiency of UNPROFOR in meeting its mandate as set by the UN. So it was a specific form of outsourcing of UNPROFOR’s tasks to Western structures (primarily NATO), as better prepared for performing them. This ‘outsourcing’ was neither complete nor exclusive (there was no sharp division of labour between UNPROFOR and NATO) and it was limited to certain tasks (monitoring the arms embargo, implementing a no-­fly zone, close air support and, finally, coercing the Serbs into peace talks by means of ODF ). Furthermore, the process was gradual and for a long time it involved retaining the role of UN bodies in the decision-­making (the ‘dual key’ decision-­making procedure on the use of force).3

Given the above, it is hard to determine precisely when the Western intervention in Bosnia-­Herzegovina actually ‘began’. It would be advisable to narrow down

32   Marek Madej the focus to ODF – as a ‘proper’ intervention. This, however, would fail to take into account a number of other Western military activities relevant to evaluating the effectiveness of Western military interventions. In this particular case, no matter how arbitrary this decision might be, it seems better to treat the launch of Operation Deny Flight (12 April 1993) as the ‘start’ of the Western intervention. NATO was given then the right to use force against the parties involved in the conflict and actually started to do this, albeit only sporadically in the beginning. Therefore, unless stated otherwise, the following discussion mainly concerns the intervention from the launch of Operation Deny Flight rather than ODF as such.

2.1  Strategic context 2.1.1  The situation in Bosnia-­Herzegovina before the intervention The conflict in Bosnia-­Herzegovina was a consequence of the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) due to rising nationalist sentiments, especially in Slovenia and Croatia. Strong centrifugal tendencies in the SFRY resulted from the country’s ethnic and religious diversity, disparities in development between the constituent republics, as well as from the Yugoslav nations’ difficult historical experience of coexistence, especially dramatic in the twentieth century.4 Undoubtedly, these tendencies had already been present during communist rule in Yugoslavia, introduced after its restoration in 1945. However, under charismatic leader Josip Broz Tito the authorities managed to suppress them effectively, although at the price of internal terror and an authoritarian regime (despite Yugoslavia’s independence from the Soviet Union). The dissolution of the Eastern Bloc and the end of the bipolar order hastened the disintegration of Yugoslavia, stimulating a drive to independence in its constituent republics. This coincided with the gradual dissolution of the authoritarian state structures after Tito’s death (in 1980) and rising economic problems. As a result, despite attempts made at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s to develop a new format of Yugoslavian statehood, Slovenia and Croatia, the most advanced in the process of gaining sovereignty, declared independence on 25 June 1991. This forced a reaction from the central Yugoslav government in Belgrade, and also from the Serb minority in Croatia (11.6 per cent according the 1981 census) who were opposed to Croatia’s independence, and strove to retain ties with Belgrade and possibly become independent from Zagreb.5 What ensued were armed clashes between proponents of independence, and the Yugoslav army and those who opted for preserving the unity of the state on the other. In Slovenia this led to a week of low-­intensity fighting, but in Croatia turned into an intense armed conflict. In Bosnia-­Herzegovina, similar changes took place, although later than in Slovenia and Croatia, and following a much more complicated course, due to the specific characteristics of this republic, including its ethnic and religious diversity, unique even for Yugoslavia. The largest ethnic group (1,905,000 out of 4,365,000 inhabitants – 43.47 per cent – in 1991) were mostly Bosnian Muslims

Bosnia-Herzegovina   33 (Bosniaks). When Yugoslavia dissolved, their national identity was still not fully formed, which allowed the other ethnic groups in the republic – Serbs (1,369,000, 31.4 per cent) and Croats (756,000, 17.3 per cent), or at least some of their political leaders – to contest it to a certain extent.6 In addition, these main ethnic groups usually did not inhabit a single coherent territory, but were scattered across the republic. Furthermore, despite some industrial investment from the communist period (e.g. an ironworks in Zenica, car factory Unis in Sarajevo), Bosnia-­Herzegovina was one of the least economically developed parts of Yugoslavia.7 Therefore, the independence movement enjoyed major support only among the Muslim population and – to a certain extent – among Croats (who, however, were more interested in unification with the emerging Croatia than in independence). Bosnian Serbs (supported by Belgrade) strongly opposed independence. Consequently, when following the independence referendum held on 29 February and 1 March 1992 (99.43 per cent of votes ‘for’, with a turnout of 63.4 per cent; Bosnian Serbs boycotted it) the de facto Muslim authorities of Bosnia-­Herzegovina headed by Alija Izetbegović declared independence on 3 March 1992, armed clashes broke out. Initially fighting was between Bosniaks and the forces of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-­Herzegovina (proclaimed already on 9 January 1992), but later evolved into clashes between all three ethnic groups. The Serbs, mostly owing to support from Belgrade and access to military equipment of the former Yugoslav People’s Army, started to prevail and until November 1992 controlled over approximately 70 per cent of Bosnia-­Herzegovinian territory. When NATO launched Operation Deny Flight, Serbs had control over more or less the same area. At that time, Croats and Bosniaks were fighting against the Serbs, but also against each other. When Operation Deliberate Force began, the situation had already changed; although Serbs still controlled most of the country’s territory, and were besieging Sarajevo, they had already lost military superiority (primarily because of long-­lasting sanctions, loss of support from Belgrade and Bosniaks and Croats’ capability improvement). Moreover, establishing the Bosniak–Croat Federation (March 1994) ended fighting between the Bosniaks and the Croats and the conflict turned into a bilateral one (the Federation vs. the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-­Herzegovina).8 2.1.2  Bosnia-­Herzegovina’s strategic relevance for the West For the West, until the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the geostrategic significance of the Western Balkans, including Bosnia-­Herzegovina, was limited. The specific status of the SFRY (a communist country, but outside the USSR-­controlled Eastern Bloc, and one of the leaders of the Non-­Aligned Movement) made possible its closer economic and social relations with the West. However, actual economic and political ties between Western countries and the emerging sovereign Bosnia-­Herzegovina were limited and of low importance. This was certainly further exacerbated by the fact that there are virtually no significant deposits of attractive natural resources, including energy resources, in Bosnia-­ Herzegovina. Germany (the FRG) was the main foreign investor in this republic

34   Marek Madej before the collapse of Yugoslavia, although for Germans these investments were certainly marginal; their later interest in the situation in Bosnia-­Herzegovina was determined therefore rather by historical factors, just as in the case of Austria (the period of the Austro-­Hungarian Monarchy, World War II). Other economic partners of Bosnia-­Herzegovina included France and Italy. In this context, important for the West was simply the outbreak of fighting in Yugoslavia (not only the Bosnian conflict), which was considered – quite justifiably – a source of destabilisation in Europe. Moreover, the post-­Yugoslav wars, including the Bosnian one, happened at a time of global geostrategic turmoil: after the end of the Cold War many local conflicts resurfaced, not only in Europe, while simultaneously the new post-­Cold War order was forming, with the US and its Western allies taking a central position. 2.1.3  Initial international response to the Bosnian conflict The international efforts to mitigate the conflict in Bosnia-­Herzegovina and its humanitarian and political consequences, and eventually to end it, constituted a continuation of earlier attempts to solve the problems caused by the dissolution of Yugoslavia, conducted under the aegis of the UN.9 Initially, they were focused on ending the fighting in Croatia, but when the conflict there decreased at the turn of 1991 and 1992 and tensions in Bosnia-­Herzegovina rose emphasis was shifted to the events in the latter. When fighting began in March 1992, the Bosnian territory was under an embargo on exports of arms to countries of the former SFRY (S/RES/713 of 25 September 1991). Furthermore, Bosnia-­ Herzegovina was included in the mandate of the UNPROFOR peacekeeping mission (initially established under S/RES/743 of 15 February 1992 to bring the situation in Croatia under control). This resulted in the deployment of the first UNPROFOR observers to Mostar in April 1992. After that, UNPROFOR’s mandate was gradually expanded and its numerical strength increased (albeit never reaching the numbers that the mission actually needed).10 Unfortunately, neither the activity of UNPROFOR nor the diplomatic efforts of the UN in cooperation with European institutions (primarily the EU) yielded substantial results, so the conflict remained intense, mainly due to the relative freedom of operation that Serb units, relatively stronger than their opponents, enjoyed in the theatre. That, in turn, increased the likelihood of the launch of military intervention by other external actors (although in coordination with the UN and UNPROFOR). Although the decision to launch such intervention took time, once fully defined, the idea of military intervention itself did not meet with any strong opposition. Given the growing humanitarian and political costs of intensive conflict, the international community essentially did not challenge the legitimacy of the intervention, even with combat elements. Some opposition to Western – NATO in particular – leadership in it was manifested primarily by the Russian authorities (because of their traditional pro-­Serb attitude and their desire to rebuild Russia’s international position).11 The conflict, however, was happening

Bosnia-Herzegovina   35 in Europe and came right after the West’s success in the Cold War, so acceptance from non-­European countries of Western leadership in the resolution of the crisis was more common. Moreover, subsequent, increasingly intrusive activities of the West were usually undertaken in response to the deteriorating situation, and often belated. Hence, they were also somewhat expected or awaited.12 In such circumstances, more important was the prolonged unwillingness of Western political elites to commit to a full-­fledged military intervention, evident essentially until 1995. Moreover, from the launching of Operation Deny Flight to initiating ODF, Western actions were limited merely to support for UNPROFOR. This restraint resulted from a number of factors. France and the UK, which contributed large contingents to UNPROFOR, were concerned about the safety of their troops. The US political elites commonly saw the conflict as strategically irrelevant for Washington. Due to constitutional constraints Germany was unable to take more decisive action. In addition, there was a widespread belief that any more radical steps could potentially lead the conflict to ‘spill over’ beyond Bosnia-­Herzegovina or even beyond the Western Balkans.13 Importantly, even Greek opposition toward intervention had limited impact (Greece decided not to participate in NATO’s military operations). Hence, only the UNPROFOR failure, evident particularly in 1995 (the Srebrenica massacre, the shelling of Sarajevo), forced the key Western countries to change their position on the intervention. The actual fiasco of UNPROFOR essentially also decided the institutional format of the intervention. Given the UN mission’s continuous organisational problems and the shortage of personnel and equipment, effective transformation of this originally peacekeeping operation into peace enforcement was deemed unfeasible.14 This, in turn, resulted in the gradual outsourcing of combat operations to other structures: first (starting with Operation Deny Flight) to support the implementation of UNPROFOR’s mandate, and later (August 1995) to force the warring factions (in fact Bosnian Serbs) to agree to peace negotiations. And in this case only NATO had the necessary planning, equipment and personnel capacity to deliver. The alternative would have been an ad hoc coalition, but this would surely have comprised most NATO countries anyway and, given that some of them, including the US, were keen on ‘testing’ NATO in a new role (see section 2.2.1), trying this alternative seemed less functional in light of the objectives of the intervention.

2.2  Motives, justifications and aims of the Western involvement 2.2.1  The declared and actual motives There were two main and equally important groups of factors that justified both the intervention, broadly defined, and ODF in particular. The first were the needs of the international community: to end the negative impact of the conflict on international order, to stop the fighting and make the regional balance of power

36   Marek Madej more stable (the conflict was not perceived as capable of threatening global stability), even if simultaneously favourable for the West). This also included ensuring the observance of international law, including inviolability of internationally recognised borders (regardless of the fact that Bosnia-­Herzegovina itself was admitted to the UN only on 22 May 1992). Such arguments, referring to the needs of the international community and protection of the post-­Cold War normative order, appeared in speeches of the various Western leaders (e.g. US Secretaries of Defence and State, NATO Secretary General, the leaders of the UK and France).15 They were also present in the expert debate on the situation in Bosnia-­ Herzegovina and in the Western press.16 This explains also the attachment of Western leaders to UN support for the operation as the most trustworthy and legally sanctioned representative of the international community’s will. The second group of highlighted motives were humanitarian concerns, the need to protect civilians, provide aid and prevent war crimes in Bosnia-­ Herzegovina. Moreover, in the initial phase of the conflict these concerns seemed to be treated as central, which resulted in the focus on UNPROFOR activities, only complemented by supporting NATO ‘enforcement’ operations. In time, however, especially before ODF, the need to protect the international order grew in importance. Moreover, while European governments were concentrating on the humanitarian aspects, in Washington, especially since the founding of the Bosniak–Croat Federation (March 1994), the emphasis was placed on preserving the international order. The possible reason was that the US, as the major global superpower after the Cold War, was more anxious than European allies about the impact of the conflict’s escalation on international stability (and consequently for the credibility of Washington as its main guarantor). Furthermore, it was also believed that the failure to provide a solution to the Bosnian conflict could encourage states and non-­state actors keen on revising the existing order to challenge it in other regions as well.17 ‘Hard’ security interests were also mentioned as grounds for the intervention, although secondary, especially for the US.18 Moreover, they concerned the potential impact of the influx of refugees and immigrants and the threat of lasting destabilisation in the neighbourhood of Western Europe, not directly the security of any Western state.19 Economic issues proved irrelevant – because of the aforementioned economic insignificance of Bosnia-­Herzegovina for the West (of the entire western Balkans, as a matter of fact). What in this regard was actually taken into account – albeit neither considered serious nor addressed in official statements – were the possible costs of lasting destabilisation of the Balkans (the economic consequences of migrations from Bosnia-­Herzegovina or former Yugoslavia, an economic slow-­down in the region, etc.). It also seems that the officially declared reasons behind Western involvement were the actual ones. Even the ‘slow’ pace of the intervention, which was initially limited to attempts to ‘stop the bleeding’ and minimise the humanitarian consequences of the conflict by non-­combat activities, seems to prove that, as does the long-­lasting desire to preserve (at least formally) the UN’s decision-­ making primacy, despite the increasingly evident failure of UNPROFOR. As for

Bosnia-Herzegovina   37 motives rooted more in ‘national interests’ (direct threats to the security of Western states or their economic interests), decisive action would come much sooner. As a result, given the prevalence of ‘utilitarian’, in a sense, motives for involvement, the West did not have to leave much unsaid in the official narration to be able to seek common consent and support for the intervention.20 Still, since Western countries, especially the US, occupied a central position in the post-­Cold War international order, even though this position involved greater responsibility, they were interested in its consolidation. Consequently, the reaction of the US and other Western countries was presumably determined also by concerns over their prestige and desire to strengthen their international credibility. While advocating the consolidation of the international order, the West (again, especially the US) emphasised the preservation of international stability rather than strengthening international law.21 Quite importantly, the decision on intervention was also linked to the intra-­ Alliance discussions on the future of NATO. It was seen as an opportunity to prove NATO’s usefulness in the new international reality, where its role would no longer be limited to collective defence against aggression and would include strengthening international stability by crisis management beyond the treaty area. Still, once again the consistent emphasis on the central role of the UN in solving armed conflicts, including the Bosnian one, and the ‘creeping’ nature of the intervention prove that the Alliance’s desire to ‘prove’ itself in the role of stabiliser of (at least) European security was not the key motive for action.22 Internal factors were somewhat important, especially in the case of the US. The initial passiveness of G.H.W. Bush’s administration in the Bosnian context was criticised by Bill Clinton in his 1992 presidential campaign.23 Nevertheless, after assuming office Clinton adopted a similar approach and did not push for intervention (although he proposed such initiatives as ‘lift and strike’ – see below). This, however, exposed him to criticism from the Republican opposition, and after the Republicans’ victory in the mid-­term Congressional elections in 1994 the further lack of US involvement might make the Bosnian conflict an issue in the coming presidential campaign. So, to avoid being accused of neglecting the interests of the US as a global power, the Clinton administration chose to take a more active approach.24 As for France, even personal issues could be essential (although rather as a delaying factor): president François Mitterrand (in office until February 1995) believed that the Serbs had in fact already won the war, while his successor, Jacques Chirac, known for his unique political temperament, took a very emotional approach to events such as Serbs using French UNPROFOR troops as human shields (July 1995).25 2.2.2  The aims of the intervention Given that the motives for intervention declared by the Western countries were close to the actual ones, we can assume similar cohesion in case of the objectives. The decision by the Western countries to launch the intervention was not motivated by hopes for specific political or economic gains; generally speaking,

38   Marek Madej it was meant to put an end to the bloody conflict. Indeed, if it had been successful, the international position of the West as an effective guarantor of the international order could have improved. Nevertheless, given the prolonged character and high intensity of the conflict (despite international efforts to stop it, orchestrated primarily by the West) it was realistic to expect that this could only prevent further losses to their image. Still, there is no doubt that strengthening its international position was not the main aim of the West’s (NATO’s) involvement. It should rather be assumed that the minimum goal of the intervention (broadly defined, i.e. starting with operations in support for UNPROFOR) was to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of the conflict and at least help UNPROFOR to perform its tasks, including humanitarian aid and the protection of the civilian population. The maximum goal (strategic, in a sense) was to reduce and eventually end the fighting and create suitable conditions for negotiations that would provide a lasting solution to the conflict. In the context of ODF, in turn, the primary and minimum objective was in a way to punish the Bosnian Serbs for repeated violations of the UN-­ imposed prohibition of attacks on safe areas under UNPROFOR protection (including Sarajevo, as it was the shelling of this city on 22 August 1995 that directly spurred the international community to act militarily) and force them to respect UN decisions; the optimum result of the mission, fully defined when the operation was already in progress – in fact in coordination with a simultaneous Bosniak–Croat offensive – was to weaken the Bosnian Serb military forces in order to force them to engage in peace talks under conditions determined by the international community (i.e. in fact, the West). Thus the purpose of the Western intervention was not a victory in the Clausewitzian sense (militarily defeating the opponent) but rather creation of conditions conducive for elaboration of a lasting solution by peaceful means. 2.2.3  The coherence of the West’s position on intervention and international reaction Seemingly, there was an overall agreement among Western countries on the justifications and objectives of the intervention. Differences concerned merely specific modes and strategies of operation and not the necessity of and reasons behind the reaction. Initially, however, during the G.H.W. Bush presidency and in the first year of Clinton’s term, the US position was slightly ‘isolationist’, while some European allies, particularly France and the UK, believed in its necessity, but rather in a primarily humanitarian mission, with no coercive elements.26 The situation changed in mid-­1993, when President Clinton proposed a ‘lift and strike’ strategy – that is to abolish the arms embargo for Bosniak troops and simultaneously launch selective attacks against Serb forces – to end the fighting.27 However, Clinton’s proposal was criticised, especially by France and the UK, who were concerned about the safety of their contingents already deployed to Bosnia-­Herzegovina as UNPROFOR forces.28 Some differences among Western states concerned also the degree to which peace proposals took into account the interests of the conflicting parties. After

Bosnia-Herzegovina   39 Clinton’ election, the US was gradually leaning towards Bosnian Muslims, the UK tried to maintain a measured position, and France was probably the most willing to recognise Serb arguments. This dispute became non-­existent, however, by summer 1995. Following Serb attacks on safe areas since spring 1995 – including the massacre in Srebrenica and the shelling of Sarajevo – and cases of taking UNPROFOR personnel hostage by Serbs, the support for coercive measures against them grew substantially.29 Directly before the launch of ODF (July 1995) disputes no longer concerned anything but how to provide security for the UNPROFOR personnel on the ground (who might become the target of retaliatory actions), which was advocated by France and the UK, and operational issues, including the selection of targets to be attacked.30 At the same time, the position of external (non-­Western) actors – besides the UN – did not influence significantly the decision to launch the intervention or its strategy. Due to the duration of the Bosnian conflict no-­one openly questioned the legitimacy of a potential military intervention given the humanitarian and political consequences of the war. The conflict was taking place in Europe, so the Western states – being also the providers of appropriate military resources – were perceived as acceptable leaders of the intervention. That is why the non-­Western permanent members of the UNSC did not attempt to block the decisions allowing NATO to take enforcement actions. In most key UNSC resolutions envisaging the use of force in reaction to Bosnian conflict (S/RES/770, S/RES/816) China abstained (and even supported S/RES/836), and Russia, despite its pro-­Serb sentiments and concerns about NATO’s actual intentions (expressed, for example, after the adoption of S/RES/816 of 31 March 1993 allowing the use of force to enforce the no-­fly zone),31 did not oppose the Western-­led intervention.

2.3  The course of the intervention Initially, the international military involvement in Bosnia-­Herzegovina went solely through UN structures. In response to the fighting that started there towards the end of March 1992, UNPROFOR, originally created to keep the ceasefire in Croatia, were deployed to Bosnia-­Herzegovina in June 1992 (initially as a strength of 1,100 soldiers, mainly from Western countries).32 Pursuant to S/RES/758 of 8 June 1992 (on legal issues see section 2.4.1), their task was to supervise the delivery of humanitarian aid through the airport in Sarajevo and monitor the heavy weapons depots of the conflicted parties. In August UNPROFOR’s mandate expanded to use all means necessary to protect humanitarian aid and UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) personnel. UNPROFOR was supported by other organisations in implementing the UN’s decisions, including NATO and the WEU, which had monitored the observance of the arms embargo to former Yugoslavia and trade sanctions against FRY (NATO – Operation Maritime Monitor, WEU – Operation Sharp Fence) from July 1992 to June 1993 (when these missions merged). In October 1992 NATO launched Operation Sky Monitor to control the airspace over Bosnia-­Herzegovina.

40   Marek Madej These initiatives, however, were not of combat nature. Considering that they failed to stop or limit the fighting, the UNSC decided to change its position on the use of force by international forces. The first manifestation of that was S/RES/816, imposing a total ban on flights over Bosnia-­Herzegovina and allowing the use of force to enforce it. On this basis, on 16 April 1993, NATO launched Operation Deny Flight to monitor Bosnian airspace by NATO aircraft; initially, however, it did not go beyond threats to use force.33 When the UNSC established the safe areas for Bosnian Muslims (S/RES/819 of 16 April 1993 and S/RES/826 of 6 May 1993)34 and when the international forces were given the right to use force to protect them, UNPROFOR proved unable to implement this mandate due to limited numbers, lacking equipment, and legal and organisational problems (concerning, for example, political control by the contributors’ governments and the rules of engagement). Therefore the UN requested NATO to broaden the scope of Operation Deny Flight and provide close air support to UN troops when necessary. The aim behind NATO’s readiness for that was to deter Bosnian Serbs, the dominant party in the conflict, from taking aggressive actions. And indeed, during the Sarajevo crisis of February 1994 (when the city was shelled by Serb artillery), the very threat of NATO air raids was sufficient to convince the Serbs to withdraw heavy equipment from around the capital. However, on 28 February, NATO aircraft actually used force against the Serbs, shooting down their four planes violating the no-­fly zone over Bosnia. In April some limited air strikes were conducted against Serbian troops attacking Goražde, and in June, faced with an offensive against Bihać, NATO launched a more complex operation – an air raid comprising 39 aircraft against Serb forces participating in the attack and Udbina airfield (controlled by the Serbs at that time, but formally within the borders of Croatia).35 NATO actions (politically supervised by the UN under the dual key procedure) induced Bosnian Serbs to change their tactics: refraining from air operations, limiting the use of heavy equipment and, from November 1994, taking UNPROFOR soldiers hostage and using them as human shields for Serb forces. In response the Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO, General Wesley Clarke, advocated intensification of combat operations, but the proposal was rejected. As a result, NATO temporarily suspended Operation Deny Flight; this and the temporary ceasefire negotiated in December 1994 (this time between Bosnian Serbs and the Bosniak–Croat Federation, established in March of the same year) caused a brief decrease in the fighting.36 The situation changed again with an offensive launched by Bosnian Serbs, who, in the meantime, had lost the support of the FRY due to international pressure and because of tensions in relations with Belgrade. From April 1995, they intensified attacks on territories controlled by Federation forces, especially on safe areas (Tuzla, Goražde, Sarajevo). In response, NATO renewed air strikes against Serb positions, attacking, among others, ammunition depots located close to the Bosnian Serb capital of Pale after Serb refusal to withdraw heavy weapons from the surroundings of Sarajevo. The Serbs reacted by taking further hostages – some 400 UNPROFOR soldiers – and launching further attacks against safe areas. Following that, on a French initiative, several NATO countries (but not

Bosnia-Herzegovina   41 the US) decided to form a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF ) to protect (sic!) the remaining UNPROFOR personnel (S/RES/998 of 16 June 1995).37 Some allies, including the US, also advocated intensifying the air strikes. None of this deterred the Serbs from continuing their attacks on safe areas (partially, however, due to the slow pace of RRF deployment). The attacks culminated in the Serb seizure of Srebrenica and later mass killings of civilians there (12–16 July 1995, 6,838 dead).38 One might have expected the Serbs to become more conciliatory given the international outrage, the military advance of Bosniak–Croat Federation forces supported by Croatian troops and the threat of intensification of NATO air strikes after the seizure of another safe area – Goražde (21 July) – but such was not the case. In July, however, the UN civilian representative competences within the framework of the dual key procedure on decision-­making on NATO air strikes were transferred to the commander of UNPROFOR in the theatre of operations (the British general Rupert Smith), which made the process smoother and allowed NATO greater freedom in target selection. What finally spurred NATO to launch ODF, a part of Operation Deny Flight that involved intensive bombardment of Serb forces by NATO aircraft and RRF artillery, was the 28 August Serb mortar attack on a marketplace in Sarajevo, which resulted in 37 deaths. Next day the UN and NATO jointly decided to commence air strikes (although command of the mission was left in NATO’s hands), starting from 30 August, after UNPROFOR forces had been withdrawn. Initially, the operation aimed only at forcing the Serbs to cease their attacks on the safe areas, and end the siege of Sarajevo. This is why the bombardments were suspended already on 1 September and Serbs were presented with an ultimatum.39 They rejected the demands, however, so on 5 September the attacks were resumed, lasting for the next nine days, until 14 September. They were aimed against the Serb units deployed close to safe areas, but also against more distanced targets – supply lines and counter-­air defence, the command structure, even against civilian infrastructure used for military purposes. Although ODF (formally concluded on 20 September) did not bring the fighting to an end, it helped Croat–Bosnian forces to take the initiative and capture most of the territory previously held by the Serbs. The fighting finally ended on 22 October owing to successful diplomatic efforts and advances of the Federation forces. Although ODF included only 11 days of air strikes, it engaged personnel from 11 NATO countries, more than 400 combat aircraft from 18 bases in five countries (including Aviano Air Base, Italy) and three aircraft carriers in the Adriatic. Of more than 3,500 combat flights some 40 per cent were strike missions. With 25 per cent, the US contributed the majority of the forces used.40

2.4  Legal aspects 2.4.1  The legal basis and institutional dimension of the intervention In general, all intervention activities in Bosnia-­Herzegovina were somehow envisioned in UNSC resolutions. Moreover, the UN Charter (Article 48) gives

42   Marek Madej the UNSC the right to name states and entities that should participate in actions addressing threats to peace and security. Therefore, launching an international military intervention, including NATO operations, seems to have a solid legal basis. What remains up for discussion, however, is the scope of the mandate to use force granted by the UN, as well as the entities authorised to use force in implementing the UN’s will. Initially, the UNSC presented a guarded approach to the issue of the use of force in resolving the Bosnian conflict. While reference to Chapter VII of the UN Charter appears already in S/RES/713 of 25 September 1991 introducing an embargo on exports of arms to the territory of the former Yugoslavia (SFRY), it concerns non-­military measures and does not automatically imply the right to use force to enforce it. Moreover, after Bosnia-­Herzegovina was included in the mandate of UNPROFOR (S/RES/743 of 21 February 1992), the possibilities of using force to implement the decisions of the UNSC were broadened in subsequent resolutions only gradually, not at once. Starting with S/RES/770 of 13 August 1992, which addressed the need to secure humanitarian aid to the theatre, the UNSC called upon the member states and organisations concerned to support the efforts aimed at implementing its decisions; this, however, does not automatically imply a use of force authorisation. Nonetheless, S/RES/816 of 31 March 1993 authorised the member states to use ‘all means necessary’ (in coordination with UNPROFOR and in line with the principle of proportionality) to  prevent violations of the no-­fly zone (established in 1992) over Bosnia-­ Herzegovina. On this basis NATO launched Operation Deny Flight as the first operation with an enforcement element conducted by an external actor in support of UNPROFOR. Using the same format of appeal to the member states and organisations concerned for support, in its subsequent decisions (especially S/RES/836 of 4 June 1993) the UNSC expanded the scope of admissibility of the use of force, also by external actors.41 Therefore, NATO’s kinetic actions in Bosnia-­ Herzegovina were perceived as legitimised by relevant UNSC resolutions, especially S/RES/816 and S/RES/836. NATO or any individual states were not, however, specifically mentioned in these documents; moreover, only S/RES/836 explicitly speaks of the admissibility of the use of armed force.42 What remains problematic is whether the scope and intensity of NATO operations remained within the boundaries set by UNSC resolutions. Regarding the level of coordination of NATO actions with relevant UN bodies, NATO involvement seems to fully fit within these limits. Even though the North Atlantic Council (NAC) was deciding on the details of NATO combat operations, this was done at the request of the Secretary General for support for UNPROFOR, or at least with his consent.43 Furthermore, at least until the start of ODF, the dual key procedure was observed when deciding on the use of force. Admittedly, NATO’s autonomy in target selection increased after abolition of that procedure and the transfer of decision-­making competences to the military commands of UNPROFOR and NATO in the last phase of the intervention, during ODF. This, however, had no considerable impact on the legitimacy of the intervention, which – given the involvement of the UN – invariably remained high.44

Bosnia-Herzegovina   43 It is more difficult, however, to assess the conformity of NATO’s kinetic operations, especially ODF, with the requirement of proportionality and of providing support to UNPROFOR forces. For example, although S/RES/836 granted the right to use force for protecting the safe areas essentially only in their vicinities, during ODF NATO launched attacks on targets that, although militarily relevant, were far away from these zones (e.g. air defence positions located in the heart of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-­Herzegovina). This could be seen as overstepping the boundaries set out in UNSC resolutions. Given, however, that NATO’s operations were accepted by the relevant UN bodies, such accusations do not seem strongly justified. 2.4.2  NATO’s involvement in the context of international humanitarian law (IHL) NATO’s involvement took place in circumstances of severe violations of human rights and IHL by the parties in the Bosnian conflict. All NATO operations were, however, planned and conducted in accordance with IHL principles and with relative focus on avoiding collateral damage (and even minimising the losses among enemies’ military personnel). Although NATO limited its involvement to air operations, which might increase the risk of collateral damage among civilians, all missions were consistently planned and executed in accordance with very strict principles concerning the use of force; this meant not only attacking solely military targets but also conducting operations at a time when the risk of presence of civilians or even large numbers of military personnel in the vicinity of the target was as low as possible. The emphasis placed on avoiding civilian casualties was reflected in great diligence and care during the planning phase as well as during the individual attacks (including frequent or prolonged target surveillance, cancelling missions due to increased risk of collateral damage). As a result, according to the ICRC, NATO’s activities during ODF caused only around 30 civilian deaths.45 The great emphasis placed on the use of precision weaponry compared to Operation Desert Storm was also important. Among the interveners, such weaponry was in the arsenals of the US, the UK, Spain and France. The percentage of precision munitions in the total of the ordnance dropped was eight time greater than in Iraq in 1990–1991, and their number exceeded by far the number of non-­ precision ordnance used.46 Taking into account the scale of NATO’s military engagement as well as such factors as urbanisation levels, proximity between civilian and military targets and the strategic necessity to attack targets used for both military and civilian purposes (e.g. bridges), the intervention in Bosnia-­Herzegovina should be assessed positively in terms of IHL.

2.5  Public attitudes towards the intervention In Western countries, and to a certain extent also elsewhere, public opinion was in favour of international involvement to resolve the conflict in Bosnia-­Herzegovina.

44   Marek Madej There was also considerable support – especially after the Srebrenica massacre – for a military intervention, including deployment of ground forces (although an air operation was clearly preferred, especially in the US). Of course, there were differences between individual countries and changes in the degree of support for a military action over time. Still, from mid-­1994 the support for intervention was, at least in the West, rather stable.47 Importantly, support for both humanitarian and combat activities (including use of ground troops) was generally higher in Europe (in the UK and France, but also in Germany, traditionally reluctant towards use of force, and Italy, geographically close to the Balkans). Moreover, it sometimes proved higher than what the authorities had expected – especially in the US, but also in Italy, where the government justified its hesitance over the intervention by an assumed public opposition to it.48 Western societies, however, clearly supported primarily humanitarian and multilateral actions; the idea of a unilateral operation without UN authorisation was widely rejected, also in the US. This relatively high public support for military intervention, at least in 1995, was determined by a number of factors. Certainly, the awareness of the gravity of the conflict and its consequences was crucial. The invariably high support for humanitarian actions and the efforts of the UN towards conflict resolution were also important – prolonged failure of such efforts in a way legitimised more decisive actions. Yet another significant factor was the distinctly negative image of Bosnian Serbs as the main (or even sole) party responsible for the outbreak of war and, even more importantly, for the war crimes committed in its course.49 Seemingly, however, the ultimate rise of support for the intervention in 1995 was not the result of governmental activities or media campaigning but rather the consequence of the actual conviction of a large share of Western societies that launching a military operation motivated by humanitarian reasons is necessary and the probability of its success is high.

2.6  The outcome It is difficult to assess the results of the Bosnian conflict and, by implication, the effectiveness of the Western intervention, especially if treated as a whole and not reduced solely to ODF. Since the fighting was eventually stopped and later peace negotiations were held, offering the chance to finally stabilise Bosnia-­ Herzegovina and the entire region, it could be seen as a success. Such results, however, were achieved only after years of ineffective international efforts, countless civilian casualties and utter destruction of Bosnian state structures. Furthermore, Western activities (including military actions) were not the only factor – and not necessarily the key one – that led to change. Nevertheless, as far as ODF alone is concerned, a positive assessment seems justified. While it was not the only factor that led to a ceasefire and peace negotiations, its direct goals – to force the Serbs to stop attacks on safe areas and withdraw heavy weaponry – were indeed achieved. Moreover, it happened after just less than a dozen days of attacks on Serb positions, with minimal losses (only a single French fighter was shot down, at the very onset of the operation, and its

Bosnia-Herzegovina   45 two pilots were taken prisoners by the Serbs) and very few civilian casualties (probably around 30, which is one per 30–40 of ordnance dropped).50 Nor was the cost of the operation for participants high,51 and the lasting damage can be considered marginal, especially compared to the consequences of the Bosnian conflict itself.52 Hence, the main goals behind ODF, that is humanitarian concerns (protection of safe areas, decreasing the intensity of the fighting) and creation of conditions conducive to restoring international stability, were met to the degree that was possible in the given circumstances.53 Assessing the intervention defined broadly is a more complex task. Although the final phase of Western armed involvement (Deliberate Force) was relatively successful, all Western enforcement activities conducted earlier in support of UNPROFOR, including Deny Flight, brought about merely partial successes (temporary decreased intensity of the fighting or reversible concessions made by the parties, mainly Serbs) and had moderate impact on the course of the conflict. In other words, essentially until mid-­1995 the enforcement activities undertaken by the West proved ineffective in restoring international stability or even significantly reducing the humanitarian consequences of the conflict (civilian casualties, refugee numbers), as well as freedom of action of fighting parties. It cannot be ruled out that without these initiatives the conflict would have lasted even longer and would have been even bloodier. However, this ineffectiveness of previous efforts obviously affects the assessment of ODF, which in this context seems like a much belated success, especially because over the course of the conflict there had been opportunities to take more decisive action much sooner than in 1995. With this, from a comprehensive perspective Western activities seem much less of a success, especially in humanitarian terms. Another issue is the influence of the intervention on the global international order. On the one hand, the intensive conflict taking place in Europe and the UN’s long-­lasting inability to stop it – despite the consensus reached in the UNSC and the latter’s efforts – undermined the international normative and institutional order in the security domain. Moreover, even the very need to involve the West (NATO) as a ‘subcontractor’ of the UN in order to hasten the end of the fighting indirectly proved its limited effectiveness. On the other hand, however, maintaining high levels of legitimacy during the intervention (the requirement of UN authorisation for NATO operations and the UN’s supervision, even if softened with time) and restricting combat operations to the framework set out by relevant UN decisions consolidated this order, just as the fact that peace talks were eventually held (to which the enforcement actions had contributed) and that these talks were multilateral and enjoyed the support of the international community (although Western countries, the US in particular, played the leading role). As regards the economic effects of the intervention, given that it was not the reason behind the Bosnian conflict but only a reaction to it (albeit rather belated), it would hardly be justified to claim that the economic cost – and especially its consequences for the Bosnian and regional economy – was primarily the result of the intervention itself. Certainly, if the intervention had been conducted

46   Marek Madej sooner and more effectively, it could have slowed down or even prevented the economic downturn of Bosnia-­Herzegovina and the Western Balkans, but it is rather unlikely that it would have caused any significant additional costs. Moreover, the economic, social and political problems suffered later by Bosnia-­ Herzegovina were of a structural and long-­term nature and can also hardly be considered a consequence of the use of force by the West.54 They probably are rather the damage caused by the war as such and the consequence of the Dayton peace agreement, which did not sufficiently take into account the complexity of Bosnian statehood. The intervention, however, seemingly had a positive impact on the cohesion of the West and its international position. The fact that the West ultimately agreed to conduct a joint operation meant, on the one hand, that despite some concerns the US would remain involved in European issues, and, on the other, that Western countries recognised NATO as the main structure of security cooperation. The intervention in Bosnia-­Herzegovina was also an opportunity for NATO to redefine its tasks and thus to adapt to the new international reality. Moreover, despite differences in both political and military readiness to execute new tasks among NATO members (the so-­called ‘transatlantic gap’ between the US and ‘NATO Europe’ in capabilities), these changes were accepted essentially by all allies. And due to the role of NATO (especially the US) in bringing fighting to an end and subsequently developing and implementing a peace agreement, the central position of the Alliance and the West in the international security system was recognised, at least on the regional scale, by other entities, including the UN (which, at the same time, accepted rather limited supervision over future NATO activities) and even – although certainly without much enthusiasm – Russia.

Notes   1 Furthermore, because of the ‘creeping’ nature of the intervention, the interveners were ‘constantly late’, allocating assets inadequate to the rapid changes in the conflict zone and taking action belatedly.   2 As of 30 November 1994, units of NATO countries accounted for 48.3 per cent of UNPROFOR personnel (18,322 out of 37,915). France sent the largest contingent (4,676 troops), and the top ten contributors included five more NATO countries (the UK, Canada, the Netherlands, Turkey, Spain). Altogether 12 NATO members participated in the mission (excluding Germany, Greece, Iceland and Luxembourg), as well the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland, who were striving for NATO membership at that time. The mission’s command structure was based on NATO commands and, after evolving into peace-­enforcement, the mission was commanded by generals from France (Janvier) and the UK (Smith). The United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia, 4 Department of Public Information Reference Paper (1995) 31.   3 The requirement for obtaining consent for the use of force from both the relevant commander of NATO forces and the UN representative. The latter was initially the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-­General to the former Yugoslavia (Yasushi Akashi), and from July 1995 the Commander-­in-Chief of UNPROFOR. T.  Findlay, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations (SIPRI-­Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002) 234–235.

Bosnia-Herzegovina   47   4 Noteworthy here are the internal tensions in the inter-­war period in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – since 1929, Yugoslavia – mainly related to fears of Serb domination; and the Axis occupation during World War II, including fighting among the Yugoslav nations, of which some allied themselves with the occupiers (Croats and Albanians from Kosovo) and others were often divided – like Serbs – into proponents of communist parties and of the monarchy. C. Bennet, Yugoslavia Bloody Collapse: Causes, Courses, Consequences (Hurst & Co., London 1998) 33–51.   5 The general census of 1981 was the last national census before the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Ibid. 113.   6 In particular, Serbs considered Bosniaks to be ethnic Serbs Islamicised under Ottoman rule. R. Ali, L. Lifschultz, Why Bosnia? (1994) 3 Third World Quarterly 367–401.   7 In 1990, Bosnia’s GDP per capita amounted to US$2,365 (exchange rate of 2004), compared to Slovenia’s US$7,610, Croatia’s US$4,468, Serbia’s US$3,379, Montenegro’s US$2,484 and Macedonia’s US$2,282. The relative socio-­economic underdevelopment is also proven by the level of illiteracy (22.2 per cent, compared to the average of 13.7 per cent in the SFRY). N.S. Kalyvas, N. Sambanis, Bosnia’s civil war origins and violence dynamics, in: P. Collier, N. Sambanis (eds), Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, vol. 2 (World Bank, Washington 2005) 191–229.   8 T.B. Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 61–65.   9 J.M.O. Sharp, Dayton Report Card (1998) 3 International Security 101–137; J. Goodby, When war won out: Bosnian peace plans before Dayton (1996) 3 International Negotiations 501–523. 10 S/RES/758 in June 1992 included into the mandate protection of Sarajevo airport, from August 1992 it included providing escort to humanitarian convoys in Bosnia-­ Herzegovina, and from September the protection – while retaining the status of a peacekeeping mission (also with regard to the use of force) – of safe areas, established to protect the civilian population. In October, S/RES/781 (October 1992) introduced a  no-­fly zone over Bosnia, and in November border control was enacted under S/RES/787. Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR, www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/ unprof_b.htm (accessed 10 May 2018). 11 For example, they argued that the actual objective of NATO’s Operation Deny Flight could be to facilitate supplies of military equipment to Western-­backed Bosnian forces rather than declared humanitarian reasons (see section 2.2). Still, eventually even Russia’s position was relatively cooperative – Russia did not block UNSC resolutions giving NATO the mandate to use force; it even explicitly backed some of them, e.g. S/RES/816. A. Domagała, Interwencjonizm humanitarny NATO (OWEM, Bydgoszcz 2014) 90. 12 Surprisingly, the shift to more coercive actions by NATO was most opposed by the very structures of the UN. Especially the Secretary-­General’s Personal Representative for the war in the former Yugoslavia, Yasushi Akashi, who, given his function, played an important role in the decision-­making process, was against pressuring Bosnian Serbs by force. Sharp (1998) 111. 13 M.P. Roch, Military intervention in Bosnia-­Herzegovina: Will world politics prevail over the rule of international law? (1996) 24 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 471. 14 In fact, from the very beginning UNPROFOR was essentially doomed to achieve only partial success at best; it was in principle a peacekeeping operation, but initiated during ongoing intensive hostilities. 15 D. McCourt, Embracing humanitarian intervention: Atlanticism and the UK interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo (2013) 2 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 246–262; C. Cogan, Mitterrand, France, and NATO: The European ­transition (2011) 3 Journal of Transatlantic Studies 265–266; W.C. Morales, US

48   Marek Madej intervention and the New World Order: Lessons from Cold War and post-­Cold War cases (1994) 1 Third World Quarterly 91–92. 16 R. Kuusisto, Framing the wars in the Gulf and in Bosnia: The rhetorical definitions of the Western leaders in action (1998) 5 Journal of Peace Research 603–620; Y. Auerbach, Y. Bloch-­Elkon, Media framing and foreign policy: The elite press vis-­à-vis US policy in Bosnia, 1992–95 (2005) 1 Journal of Peace Research 83–99. 17 Morales (1994) 92–94; R. Kokta, Sharing risks, burdens and benefits: American Foreign policy in the Balkans (2003) 2 Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 202–203. 18 As James Baker (Secretary of State in the G.H.W. Bush administration) said: ‘the US have no dog in this fight’, quoted from: J. Dumbrell, President Bill Clinton and US transatlantic foreign policy (2003) 3 Journal of Transatlantic Studies 270. President Clinton’s Secretary of Defence William Perry spoke, in turn, on 10 March 1994 about the America’s ‘real’ but ‘limited’ interests in Bosnia (focusing on the need to restore international stability and responding to the humanitarian consequences of the fighting). W. Perry, United States Military Objectives. Bosnia-­Serbia, Speech delivered before the National Security Industrial Association, Washington, 10 March 1994. 19 Initially (1992–1994), there were concerns about conflict spill-­over, which would drag in Greece or Turkey. W. Pfaff, Invitation to war (1993) 3 Foreign Affairs 108; P. Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th ed., Routledge, London 1997) 415. 20 It is no coincidence either that in the press releases and official speeches of the leaders of the US, France and the UK, the Bosnian war was presented as ‘a quagmire’ of irrational ethnic conflicts. That made it easier to justify an only limited reaction (one doesn’t walk into a quagmire unless it is indispensable), as well as to show that intervention was designed to ‘end the nightmare’, not getting a share of the spoils. Kuusisto (1998) 610–612. 21 This was partially due to the fact that the conflict in Bosnia highlighted the contradictions between internationally recognised principles of the right to self-­determination and of the inviolability of established borders. Moreover, attempts to reconcile a conflict through an ethnic division of Bosnia (therefore respecting primarily the former principle – the Carrington–Cutileiro plan, March 1992; the Owen–Stoltenberg plan, July 1993) simply failed. Auerbach, Bloch-­Elkon (2005) 93–94. 22 R.D. Asmus, R.L. Kugler, F.S. Laarabee, Building a new NATO (1993) 4 Foreign Affairs 28–40. 23 This passivity was mostly caused by the aforementioned widespread view in Washington that Balkan issues were a European problem (requiring a reaction from Europeans, not the US) as well as by the growing disappointment with the UN peacekeeping operations as an instrument of crisis resolution after their failures in such places like Angola or Somalia in the beginning of the 1990s, and, even more importantly, the financial and political costs of them for the US. W.C. Banks, J.D. Straussman, New imperial presidency? Insights from U.S. involvement in Bosnia (1995) 2 Political Science Quarterly 211–212. 24 Dumbrell (2010) 270–271. 25 Cogan (2011) 265–266. 26 S.J. Cimbala, P.K. Forster, Multinational Military Intervention: NATO Policy, Strategy and Burden Sharing (Ashgate, Farnham 2010) 103–105. 27 Bosnian leader Alija Izetbegović proposed the ‘lift and strike’ strategy already in 1992, and Clinton mentioned it during the presidential campaign in the very same year but then chose not to pursue it. L. Silber, A. Little, The Death of Yugoslavia (Penguin Books, London 1996) 254. 28 However, in Germany, which had no soldiers in UNPROFOR and consistently supported the drive towards independence by former Yugoslav republics, the proposal was welcomed. Sharp (1998) 109–110. 29 Cimbala, Forster (2010) 109–111.

Bosnia-Herzegovina   49 30 European countries’ suggestions that the attacks should be limited to Bosnian Serb military infrastructure and installations with the avoidance of victims among soldiers were largely adopted by the US. K. Larsdotter, The development of a NATO-­strategy in Bosnia-­Herzegovina, in: H. Edstrom, D. Gyllensporre (eds), Pursuing Strategy: NATO Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddafi (Palgrave, Basingstoke 2012) 75–78. 31 The Russian representatives suggested that the actual goal of NATO’s combat operations against Bosnian Serbs was to make it possible to provide arms to the Muslim forces and not to ensure supplies of humanitarian aid. Malanczuk (1997) 414; Cimbala, Forster (2010) 104–105. 32 Already in April 1992, 40 UNPROFOR military observers had been sent to Mostar, but they were withdrawn due to fierce clashes between Bosniaks and Croats. Cimbala, Forster (2010) 100. Later the size of UNPROFOR increased: in June 1993 (after S/ RES/836) it was 7,600, while in March 1995 it was 38,599 soldiers and policemen. Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR, www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_ b.htm (accessed 10 May 2018). 33 Cimbala, Forster (2010) 101. 34 Safe areas were established in Srebrenica, Goražde, Tuzla, Bihać, Žepa and Sarajevo. The Fall of Srebrenica. Report of the Secretary-­General pursuant to the General assembly resolution 53/35, A/54/549 (15 November 1999) 16–20. 35 Larsdotter (2012) 72. 36 Cimbala, Forster (2010) 109–110. 37 RRF was to number 12,500 soldiers, and the resolution was adopted with Russia and China abstaining. Ibid. 111. 38 Srebrenica was protected by a lightly armed Dutch contingent of about 400 UNPROFOR soldiers, which faced approximately 4,500 Serbs. Having no air support (because of concerns about the well-­being of the prisoners the Serbs had taken) Dutch troops were forced to withdraw without putting up resistance. The Fall of Srebrenica (1999) 63–70. 39 Serbs were to cease attacks on safe areas, withdraw heavy weapons at least 20 km from Sarajevo, guarantee free movement to UN forces and convoys with humanitarian aid and reopen the airport in Sarajevo. D. Leurdijk, The United Nations and NATO in Former Yugoslavia: Limits to Diplomacy and Force (Netherlands Atlantic Commission, The Hague 1996) 81. 40 D.L. Dittmer, S.P. Dawkins, Deliberate Force: NATO’s First Extended Air Operation: The View from AFSOUTH (CNA Occasional Paper, Alexandria 1998) 18–47. 41 S/RES/836 allowed UNPROFOR and the supporting actors to use force in order to protect the safe areas and to ensure the execution of the other tasks of UNPROFOR (no-­fly zone, border control, observance of sanctions). 42 T. Gazzini, NATO coercive military activities in Yugoslav crisis (1992–1999) (2001) 3 European Journal of International Law 395–400. 43 Larsdotter (2012) 69–70. 44 Ibid. 75, 78. 45 R.C. Owen, Summary, in: R.C. Owen (ed.), Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning (Air University Press, Maxwell AFB 2000) 522 (fn. 104); T. Seybolt estimates Bosnian Serb losses during ODF at approximately 200 people. Seybolt (2008) 68. 46 R.L. Sargent, Weapons used in Deliberate Force, in: R.C. Owen (ed.), Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning (Air University Press, Maxwell AFB 2000) 265–266. 47 R. Sobel, Poll trends: U.S. intervention in Bosnia (1998) 2 Public Opinion Quarterly 250–251. 48 In this context, the results of opinion polls in the US are interesting: they showed lower acceptance of the administration’s policies in the Bosnian conflict when it was passive and a surge of support when the government was more active. In France,

50   Marek Madej where authorities preferred to focus on diplomacy, already in 1993 the majority of the society supported military operation. The Italians also manifested a more pro-­ intervention attitude than their own government (although with a generally low interest in the issue). R. Sobel, E. Shiraev (eds), International Public Opinion and the Bosnia Crisis (Lexington Books, Lanham 2003) 105–107, 206. 49 Certainly one of the reasons for this was that Western media highlighted Serb violations of IHL rules, especially from March 1994 (the end of Bosniak–Croat fighting). Still, appalling events such as taking UNPROFOR personnel hostage or attacking safe areas (even if their demilitarised status was violated by all parties) simply made a ‘black and white’ view on the conflict among Western societies more convincing. Auerbach, Bloch-­Elkon (2005) 93–96. 50 R.C. Owen, Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia, 1995: Humanitarian constraints in aerospace warfare, in: A. Walter Dom (ed.), Air Power in UN Operations: Wings for Peace (Ashgate, Farnham 2014) 233. The precise number of casualties on the Serb side has never been established, but it was most probably not very high either. 51 Although no adequate comprehensive data on the costs of ODF are available, it seems that they did not grossly exceed the cost of the earlier Operation Deny Flight; in the UK official statistics even give the costs of both operations as a single value (GBP 31 million in 1995). For comparison, the cost of international military involvement in Bosnia between 1992 and 1998 (UNPROFOR and NATO missions) was estimated at US$19 billion. A.K. Talentino, Bosnia, in: M.E. Brown, R.N. Rosecrance (eds), The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena (Rowman & Littlefield, New York 1999) 27. 52 The best documented estimates speak about 100,000 deaths (exactly 97,207, according to The Bosnian Book of Dead, Research and Documentation Center (RDC) in Sarajevo, 2007; 104,732 – ICTY, 2003), of which some 40 (RDC) to 55 per cent (ICTY) were civilians. Some, however, speak even of 200,000 victims (but this number had already been mentioned in 1993 and is definitely inflated). T.B. Seybolt, J.D. Aronson, B. Fischhoff, Introduction, in: Counting Civilian Casualties: An Introduction to Recording and Estimating Nonmilitary Deaths in Conflict (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013) 4. When the fighting stopped, there were already up to 1.2 million refugees and 1 million internally displaced persons. Going Nowhere Fast: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1997), ICG Bosnia Report No. 23 (1 May 1997) 9. 53 Although ODF laid the ground for the Dayton negotiations, their result was hard to predict when they began. Moreover, a further NATO military presence in Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR) was necessary to maintain peace and stability. It is therefore arguable as to whether the intervention alone brought about any lasting solution to the conflict. E. Milano, Security Council action in the Balkans: Reviewing the legality of Kosovo’s territorial status (2003) 5 European Journal of International Law 117–118. 54 In the first years after the Dayton Accords, the Bosnian economy was growing fast, mainly because of its low starting point (due to the conflict, GDP fell from US$10.25 billion in 1991 to US$2.79 billion in 1996 and to US$4.45 billion in 2000) and the influx of foreign aid. That suggests that the economic slowdown in Bosnia-­ Herzegovina from the beginning of the twenty-­first century is not the consequence of interveners’ actions but of other factors, including the deficiencies of state structures. M. Zupcevic, F. Causevic, Case Study: Bosnia and Herzegovina (2009), CDAS, McGill University-­World Bank, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCONFLICT/ Resources/BosniaFinal.pdf, (accessed 10 May 2018).

Bosnia-Herzegovina   51

References Ali R., Lifschultz L., Why Bosnia? (1994) 3 Third World Quarterly 367–401. Asmus R.D., Kugler R.L., Laarabee F.S., Building a new NATO (1993) 4 Foreign Affairs 28–40. Auerbach Y., Bloch-­Elkon Y., Media framing and foreign policy: The elite press vis-­à-vis US policy in Bosnia, 1992–95 (2005) 1 Journal of Peace Research 83–99. Banks W.C., Straussman J.D., New imperial presidency? Insights from U.S. involvement in Bosnia (1995) 2 Political Science Quarterly 197–219. Bennet C., Yugoslavia Bloody Collapse: Causes, Courses, Consequences (Hurst & Co., London 1998). Cimbala S.J., Forster P.K., Multinational Military Intervention: NATO Policy, Strategy and Burden Sharing (Ashgate, Farnham 2010). Cogan C., Mitterrand, France, and NATO: The European transition (2011) 3 Journal of Transatlantic Studies 257–267. Dittmer D.L., Dawkins S.P., Deliberate Force: NATO’s First Extended Air Operation. The View from AFSOUTH (CNA Occasional Paper, Alexandria 1998). Domagała A., Interwencjonizm humanitarny NATO (OWEM, Bydgoszcz 2014). Dumbrell J., President Bill Clinton and US transatlantic foreign policy (2010) 3 Journal of Transatlantic Studies 268–278. Findlay T., The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations (SIPRI-­Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002). Former Yugoslavia – UNPROFOR, www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_b.htm (accessed 10 May 2018). Gazzini T., NATO coercive military activities in Yugoslav crisis (1992–1999) (2001) 3 European Journal of International Law 391–435. Going Nowhere Fast, Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ICG Bosnia Report No. 23, 1 May 1997. Goodby J., When war won out: Bosnian peace plans before Dayton (1996) 3 International Negotiations 501–523. Kalyvas N.S., Sambanis N., Bosnia’s civil war origins and violence dynamics, in: P. Collier, N. Sambanis (eds), Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis, vol. 2 (The World Bank, Washington 2005) 191–229. Kokta R., Sharing risks, burdens and benefits: American foreign policy in the Balkans (2003) 2 Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 185–208. Kuusisto R., Framing the wars in the Gulf and in Bosnia: The rhetorical definitions of the Western leaders in action (1998) 5 Journal of Peace Research 603–620. Larsdotter K., The development of a NATO-­strategy in Bosnia-­Herzegovina, in: H. Edstrom, D. Gyllensporre (eds), Pursuing Strategy: NATO Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddafi (Palgrave, Basingstoke/New York 2012) 60–82. Leurdijk D., The United Nations and NATO in Former Yugoslavia: Limits to Diplomacy and Force (Netherlands Atlantic Commission, The Hague 1996). Malanczuk P., Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th ed., Routledge, New York/London 1997). McCourt D., Embracing humanitarian intervention: Atlanticism and the UK interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo (2013) 2 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 246–262. Milano E., Security Council action in the Balkans: Reviewing the legality of Kosovo’s territorial status (2003) 5 European Journal of International Law 999–1022.

52   Marek Madej Morales W.C., US intervention and the New World Order: Lessons from Cold War and post-­Cold War cases (1994) 1 Third World Quarterly 77–101. Owen R.C. (ed.), Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning (Air University Press, Maxwell AFB 2000). Owen R.C., Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia, 1995: Humanitarian constraints in aerospace warfare, in: A. Walter Dom (ed.), Air Power in UN Operations: Wings for Peace (Ashgate, Farnham 2014) 231–240. Perry W., United States Military Objectives. Bosnia-­Serbia, Speech delivered before the National Security Industrial Association, Washington, 10 March 1994. Pfaff W., Invitation to war (1993) 3 Foreign Affairs 97–109. Roch M.P., Military intervention in Bosnia-­Herzegovina: Will world politics prevail over the rule of international law? (1996) 24 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 461–487. Sargent R.L., Weapons used in Deliberate Force, in: R.C Owen (ed.), Deliberate Force. A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning (Air University Press, Maxwell AFB 2000) 279–297. Seybolt T.B., Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008). Seybolt T.B., Aronson J.D., Fischhoff B. (eds), Counting Civilian Casualties: An Introduction to Recording and Estimating Nonmilitary Deaths in Conflict (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013). Sharp J.M.O., Dayton Report Card (1998) 3 International Security 101–137. Silber L., Little A., The Death of Yugoslavia (Penguin Books, London 1996). Sobel R., Poll trends: U.S. intervention in Bosnia (1998) 2 Public Opinion Quarterly 250–278. Sobel R., Shiraev E. (eds), International Public Opinion and the Bosnia Crisis (Lexington Books, Lanham 2003). Talentino A.K., Bosnia, in: M.E. Brown, R.N. Rosecrance (eds), The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena (Rowman & Littlefield, New York 1999) 25–53. The Fall of Srebrenica. Report of the Secretary-­General pursuant to the General assembly resolution 53/35, A/54/549, 15 November 1999. The United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia (1995) 4 Department of Public Information Reference Paper. Zupcevic M., Causevic F., Case study: Bosnia and Herzegovina, CDAS, McGill University-­World Bank, 2009, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCONFLICT/ Resources/BosniaFinal.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018).

3 Kosovo The first war for human rights Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala

3.1  Strategic context 3.1.1  The sources and nature of the conflict and the situation in Kosovo right before the intervention In their dispute over Kosovo, Albanians and Serbs invoked historical reasons. They tried to prove who had been the first to settle in the territory of Kosovo and thus who had the moral right to the area. The province was an integral part of opposing nationalist visions of the order in the Balkans: ‘Greater Albania’ and ‘Greater Serbia’. After World War I, Kosovo became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes; after World War II, it became an autonomous province of the Republic of Serbia as part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). In 1946, the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija was established. In 1974, as a result of changes in the constitution, Kosovo was given extended autonomy, but the Albanian inhabitants did not find this status satisfactory. On 23 December 1989, the Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës – LDK) was formed, headed by Ibrahim Rugova. The newly formed party demanded the right to self-­determination for the province. The crisis reached its peak on 26 June 1990, when the Serbian parliament placed Kosovo under its direct control. On 5 July, the provision on the territorial autonomy of Kosovo was removed from the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. The Serbian authorities also disbanded the parliament and the government of Kosovo. In view of the declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia, in September 1991 Albanians organised a referendum, in which 87 per cent of voters opted for independence. They proclaimed the independent Republic of Kosovo, which was recognised only by Albania. Ibrahim Rugova was elected the president.1 Kosovo’s declaration of independence led to intensification of repressions by the Serbian authorities. In 1996, the Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës – KLA) became active and began to organise killings of Serbs as well as some Albanians who were loyal to the Belgrade authorities. The conflict escalated after the KLA attack on a Serbian police station on 28 February 1998. The regular FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)2 armed forces, together with

54   Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, launched a military action with the aim of eliminating the KLA. Violence took the form of ethnic cleansing.3 On 16 July 1998 the Kosovar Albanians announced the establishment of an independent state of Kosovo. One of the resolutions recognised the KLA as the legitimate armed forces. Ibrahim Rugova, who had firmly supported independence, was once again sworn in as president. The FRY authorities never recognised these decisions. Meanwhile, in the autumn, the Western world heard rumours of Albanian mass graves. A deterioration in sentiments towards Yugoslavia was caused in particular by the discovery on 15 January 1999 of a mass grave of 45 Albanians in the village of Račak.4 Another problem was the big influx of refugees. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 460,000 Albanians left their houses between March 1998 and the beginning of the NATO intervention in Kosovo in March 1999, going mainly to neighbouring Macedonia.5 3.1.2  Kosovo’s strategic importance for the West It is hard to say whether Kosovo, with a territory of 10,908 square kilometres and a population of around 2 million people, could be of major strategic importance for the West. The NATO intervention in Kosovo was launched after the weaknesses of the United Nations (UN) in the Balkans and Africa in the 1990s had been exposed and UN involvement had decreased. At the same time, NATO was evolving, and operations going beyond Article 5 of the Washington Treaty became one of the pillars of the new strategic vision. The military operation in Kosovo could be an opportunity to test it. One factor that played a significant part in shaping the approach of the West to the possibility of a military intervention in Kosovo was the position of Washington, with its considerable advantage over other countries in the global arena. The US was the economic and military leader of the Western world and sought to shape the international order in a way that would benefit itself.6 The intervention in Kosovo could consolidate the international order in a form suiting the interests of the West and its leader, the US, including by confirming the leading role of the latter in the world and its ability to enforce its own vision of the international order. At that time Russia, traditionally interested in the affairs of the region, was perceived by the West as a country struggling with internal problems and unable to take effective counteraction in the Balkans. 3.1.3  International response to the developments in Kosovo and attitudes towards the idea of a military intervention For a long time, the problem of Kosovo did not raise much international interest. The European Community’s diplomatic efforts of the early 1990s only partially referred to the situation in Kosovo. While the agreement proposed by Lord Carrington on 18 October 1991 provided for a special status for Kosovo, the author

Kosovo   55 later gave up this idea in order to gain the favour of Serbia and Montenegro.7 Albanians were disappointed.8 One possible example in which interest was shown was the case of sending OSCE observers to Kosovo in 1992 to monitor the dialogue between Serbs and Albanians. The West did not use the Dayton negotiations of 1995 to bring up the problem of Kosovo and perhaps prevent future escalation of violence; the Serb side protested against raising this subject.9 The interest in Kosovo grew with the intensification of hostilities in 1998. In February, the US envoy Robert Gelbarg met with Slobodan Milošević and tried to convince him to start negotiations with the insurgents (KLA), maintaining that Kosovo should remain within the FRY. The Contact Group established on 9 March was composed of the US, the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia. By S/RES/1160 of 31 March 1998, the UNSC imposed economic sanctions and an arms embargo on the FRY; by S/RES/1199 of 23 September 1998 it condemned the violence and called on the parties to commence negotiations, while confirming the right of the FRY to territorial integrity and Kosovo’s right to autonomy. In response, in April the government of the FRY closed the borders with Macedonia and Albania and announced a nationwide referendum on 23 April with the aim of rejecting international mediation. In May, Christopher Hill became the US Special Envoy to Kosovo, while Richard Holbrook, the Special Envoy to the Balkans, went to Belgrade and set up the first meeting between Milošević and Rugova on 15 May. The talks, however, did not put a stop to military action. In late May, Rugova and Kosovar representatives went to Washington for consultations. On 1 June in New York, Rugova asked the UN and NATO to intervene. On 23 September, given that international calls for a peaceful resolution of the dispute had been consistently ignored, the UNSC (United Nations Security Council) adopted S/RES/1199, in which, among other things, it called for an immediate ceasefire and for the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo. It threatened that it would implement measures to restore peace unless all the conditions set out in the Resolution were met. The UNSC very strongly emphasised the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the region. At that time American politicians had already clearly indicated the possibility of an armed NATO involvement.10 Representatives from Kosovo were therefore no longer interested in talks with the Yugoslav authorities, which could only concern autonomy. They interpreted the threat of the use of force as a sign of support for Kosovo’s independence. Meanwhile, in October 1998, as a result of the threat of NATO air raids and of numerous negotiation efforts made by, for example, the Contact Group and Richard Holbrooke, President Milošević agreed, among others, to reduce the Yugoslav military forces in Kosovo to 15,000 soldiers, lower the number of police officers and make it possible for refugees to return home. He announced the resumption of negotiations with the Albanians and agreed to the deployment of 2,000 observers of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-­operation in Europe) Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), which was supposed to monitor the situation, as well as to a NATO supervisory air campaign.

56   Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala These arrangements began to be implemented, but on 15 January 1999 the situation was aggravated, as mentioned above, by the discovery of the mass grave near the village of Račak. William Walker, who was leading the KVM, immediately attributed the crime to Serbian security forces, while the Yugoslav authorities claimed that the incident had been arranged by the KLA to gain support from the outside. Two days later, the North Atlantic Council threatened to start a military intervention. The last attempt to solve the dispute by diplomatic means were the Rambouillet negotiations, which began on 6 February, with the participation of international negotiators representing the Contact Group. The proposed agreement, providing for a three-­year transitional period for Kosovo followed by the final determination of its status by means of a referendum, was signed only by the Albanian delegation, hoping for further support of the US. Yugoslavia rejected the agreement, fearing that it did not guarantee the preservation of its future territorial integrity. There was also strong opposition against the last-­minute proposal for the soldiers of the 30,000 strong NATO contingent to be allowed to roam freely not only in the territory of Kosovo but also in the rest of Yugoslavia. According to the Serbian delegation, this would be, in practice, an occupation of the country. Russia also disagreed with this provision. The agreement also imposed an obligation on the Serbs to release political prisoners and carry out democratic elections in Kosovo, to ensure the return of refugees, to establish a local police force and to increase the powers of the local authorities. On 21 March in Belgrade Halbrooke presented an ultimatum to President Milošević: either accept the Rambouillet Agreement or NATO would take military action. The Serbian side did not accept the agreement.11 As a result, negotiations broke down and fighting was resumed. OSCE observers were withdrawn from the territory of Kosovo, and on 24 March NATO air strikes began. The NATO intervention was launched without the authorisation of the UNSC. Russia and China were against military action. Admittedly, they agreed to the provision of S/RES/1199 on considering ‘further action and additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region’, but in no way could this be considered a consent to the use of force against Yugoslavia. Russia was the main critic of the intervention. It justified its position by stressing the inconsistency of the actions of the West with the fundamental principles of international relations, especially the principles of national sovereignty and non-­intervention. It also questioned the concept of the right to military intervention in response to mass violations of human rights, which was being discussed at that time, and the legitimacy of this solution in the case of Kosovo. Its position undoubtedly resulted partly from the traditionally close relations with Serbia and the desire to maintain influence in the region.12 Similarly, China primarily stressed the non-­compliance of the intervention with international law, but its position was to a large extent the effect of tensions with Western countries, especially the US.13 Hence, in both these cases, the resistance was partly an expression of opposition to the dominance of Western countries in matters of international security.

Kosovo   57 Also some other non-­European countries, developing or belonging to the Non-­Aligned Movement, were sceptical towards the military intervention in Kosovo, as were a few European countries, including two states that are culturally close to Serbia – Ukraine and Greece. The latter, being a NATO member after all, was worried about the possible impact of the intervention on the region, including on its own safety, such as migration or a revival of separatism. At the same time, which is important, the majority of the Balkan states (Bosnia-­ Herzegovina, Albania, but also Hungary, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Croatia, Slovenia and Romania) supported the intervention, as did a considerable number of Muslim countries (e.g. Morocco).

3.2  Motives, justification and aims of the Western involvement 3.2.1  Declared motives and justification of the intervention When formally justifying the decision on launching the humanitarian intervention, Western leaders enumerated three reasons. First, they referred to humanitarian considerations, including a desire to stop mass violations of human rights and refugee flows of the Albanian population from Kosovo. President Bill Clinton spoke about the moral imperative of saving innocent people,14 while Prime Minister Tony Blair stressed that a humanitarian disaster was inevitable in the absence of international action.15 This approach was largely the result of the experience in Bosnia-­Herzegovina, where the military intervention came too late to prevent mass crimes and disaster.16 Second, they expressed concerns about the risk of destabilisation in the region in the event of a prolonged crisis in Kosovo.17 It was considered that a lasting conflict might contribute to the destabilisation of neighbouring countries. It was also emphasised that the conflict in Kosovo between ‘Orthodox aggressors’ from Serbia and ‘Muslim Albanian victims’ could cause serious consequences in the Islamic countries of the Middle East and North Africa.18 The third declared motive was the desire to strengthen the credibility of NATO itself, which in the light of its previous position on Serbia and the failure of diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict, including the Rambouillet talks, was forced to demonstrate its ability to act decisively.19 These declared motives of the intervention in Kosovo can mostly be considered valid. Although there were some divergences in the assessment of how serious the humanitarian situation in Kosovo actually was and of the actual scale of human rights violations, Operation Allied Force was indeed launched mainly for humanitarian reasons. Admittedly, the scale of repressions, including the number of killed and refugees, was lower than in many conflicts that had not triggered such a determined reaction by the West, especially those in Rwanda or Sudan, but this does not mean that in the case of Kosovo humanitarian arguments were merely declarative and used instrumentally. The West, which had been accused of ineffectiveness in previous years, in particular in relation to the

58   Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala massacre in Srebrenica in July 1995, wanted to avoid the mistake of a belated or insufficient response. President Slobodan Milošević was perceived as a leader capable of ordering mass crimes. The less exposed element of justifications of the mission, in turn, associated with the desire to strengthen NATO as an organisation and to increase its internal cohesion and consolidate its central position in the European security system, could actually be more important than has been formally admitted. Confirming NATO’s credibility through effective military action against a country that went against the expectations of the Alliance had to contribute to the confirmation of the dominant role of the West in shaping the international order in Europe. Considering Kosovo’s minor economic importance, economic motives were indeed not a stimulating factor for the military involvement in the province. It also seems that the other possible motives proposed by those who seek to undermine the humanitarian justification for the operation in Kosovo – from domestic issues (the Monica Lewinsky scandal in the US) to the supposed aspirations of the US to build a ‘Muslim bloc’ in the Balkans that would constitute a counterweight to the anti-­Western countries of the Middle East, or the desire to improve the perception of the West in Muslim countries – were of secondary importance, if any.20 3.2.2  Aims of the intervention The aims of the intervention corresponded to the motives analysed above: indeed, in the political dimension, in light of the declarations of NATO leaders, the most important objectives of the mission were definitely of humanitarian nature.21 This implied the need to take action to prevent the escalation of the anti-­Albanian offensive in the province by the Serbian forces and to ensure immediate cessation of human rights violations. The aim of the operation was also to create conditions for the safe return to places of origin for all refugees and internally displaced persons. The second category of political objectives concerned preventing destabilisation of the region that could be caused by escalating tensions in Kosovo and their aftermath (including in particular the exodus of the Albanian population), which could in turn lead to the spread of the conflict to other areas or give rise to other local crises (e.g. in Bosnia). This was indicative of the seriousness of the situation and the threat of rapid expansion of tensions to other areas as well as, consequently, the risk of destabilisation on a pan-­European scale. These arguments had to give rise to doubts because it is difficult to clearly prove that such risks actually existed at that time, especially on a scale that would justify military action. In practical terms, these two groups of objectives boiled down to demanding that the Serbian side cease the use of force against the Albanian population and withdraw excessive military and police forces from the province, as well as approve the Rambouillet peace terms, including the presence of international forces in Kosovo and their free movement around the area of Yugoslavia. The

Kosovo   59 risk that the conflict would spread and the humanitarian disaster would escalate was also supposed to be mitigated by the weakening of Serbian military potential, but this was a military rather than a political objective of the mission. Moreover, the objectives mentioned in official speeches, especially those by US President Bill Clinton and (to a lesser extent) NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, included demonstration of resolve and unity of the Alliance, which was meant to strengthen its international credibility.22 We could assume that the aims of the operation presented in official statements were indeed its actual aims. Their official hierarchy, however, did not fully correspond to the real one. The desire to demonstrate the unity and resolve of the Alliance as the central institution of the European security system was probably slightly more important than officially declared. Another issue was whether NATO intended to also effect a change of power in Serbia, first of all by removing President Milošević from power. The intention was certainly never declared explicitly, although some of the speeches given by representatives of NATO countries (including Madeleine Albright)23 would suggest that it was in fact expected. This was not, however, an aim of the operation. The objectives of the intervention did not change fundamentally over its course. Throughout the whole period, the will to prevent a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo was of utmost importance. In addition, the interveners sought to weaken the Milošević regime and its military potential, bearing in mind the risk of destabilisation in the region or even in all of Europe. The unexpected prolongation of the operation and the difficulties encountered by the Alliance in the fight against Yugoslavia increased the need to demonstrate the unity and efficiency of the Alliance and to maintain its credibility as an institution stabilising the European order in the sphere of security. 3.2.3  The coherence of the Western position on the intervention and the international community’s opinion of its legitimacy From the beginning of the discussion on a possible NATO military intervention in Kosovo, there were some discrepancies among the positions of the member states, although without any significant impact on NATO’s final decision on the issue. The strongest proponents of the military operation were the US and the UK. This direction of action was also supported by Germany and even by France. The majority of other members, including newly accepted countries, supported the position of the NATO leaders without much reservation, although with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Greece, as mentioned above, was reluctant about the intervention from the very beginning but it did not block the decision of the North Atlantic Council to intervene.24 Italy and Hungary were also concerned about the intervention, but to a lesser extent than Greece. Although they took into account the risks of destabilisation in the region and the worsening of the situation of the Hungarian minority in Serbia, they decided to actively support the operation. Hungary made its air

60   Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala bases available to NATO, and Italy took a direct part in the air raids. As the operation continued, disagreements within the Alliance concerning strategy grew. Some countries questioned, albeit gently, the gradual approach imposed by the US, leading to a gradual escalation of the conflict and to the extension of the area of operations beyond Kosovo. The growing doubts were arising due to the humanitarian consequences of the intervention and to its protracted character. Starting from the second half of April 1999, especially since the NATO Summit in Washington, the notion of a possible ground operation was also increasingly discussed. It was supported primarily by the UK and France and opposed mostly by the US. Moreover, as the bombing continued, scepticism towards the mission and fear of its regional ramifications grew in Italy, bringing the country’s leader to suggest that the operation should be ended as soon as possible. The position of the West was not affected by the critical attitudes of Russia and China – permanent members of the UNSC. Russia supported the Serbs, as it usually had, and rejected the notion of humanitarian intervention as at variance with the Charter of the United Nations (UNC). Its negative position contributed to some extent to a delay in the decision-­making process on the intervention, encouraging NATO members to try more diplomatic initiatives before moving on to military action.25 It is also possible that the consistent and determined opposition of Russia and China (especially the former) to the intervention, which increased after the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade on 7 May 1999, contributed to NATO softening its position and expectations towards Serbia already during the operation, although it certainly did not play the key role in this respect.26

3.3  The course of the intervention The NATO military intervention, which started on 24 March 1999, was the decisive phase of the ethnic conflict between Serbs and Albanians. The majority of NATO countries took part in it, including the US, the UK, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Spain. Since the general aim of the operation was to force President Milošević to accept the draft peace agreement discussed in Rambouillet,27 in military terms this meant striving to eliminate the Serbian forces’ capability of conducting military operations against Albanians in Kosovo and Yugoslavia’s neighbours by diminishing or eliminating the Yugoslav forces’ capability of launching any greater military operation.28 NATO was planning to increase the intensity of its airstrikes in order to gradually raise the pressure on Yugoslav authorities by destroying key targets. About 400 aircraft of various types from 13 member countries had been earmarked for the operation, of which two-­thirds were US aircraft. This number, however, is the number of aircraft always available to operation command; it does not take into account rotation. The total number of aircraft engaged was more than 1,000.29 The majority of the allied air forces (some 60 per cent) was

Kosovo   61 stationed in bases in Italy. The naval forces, operating primarily in the Adriatic Sea, numbered 50 vessels (three aircraft carriers, two cruisers, nine destroyers, ten frigates, three submarines, three amphibious warfare ships).30 While the plan of the operation did not provide for the use of ground forces, during the course of the operation the US created Task Force Hawk, the core of which was made up of helicopter battalions and Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) units. The task force, 5,300 troops strong, reached operational capability on 26 April, but in the end it did not practically participate in the operation. At the start of the operation, the Yugoslav armed forces numbered little more than 90,000 soldiers, of which about 20,000 were engaged in fighting the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The ground forces had 1,270 tanks, 820 infantry combat vehicles and armoured personnel carriers, and 1,400 artillery pieces.31 In addition, the Yugoslavian air force had around 170 aircraft, of which only about 90 were operational. Its equipment was mostly outdated, and it was lacking spare parts and fuel. The air defence forces had equipment from the 1970s, but ground force units and formations had relatively modern anti-­air defence systems at their disposal. The course of the operation can be divided into three stages. The first one, from 24 to 27 March, was mainly a classic struggle for air dominance, the main goal being to disable the country’s anti-­air defence thus ensuring a certain degree of safety to own aircraft. In this period attacks were conducted primarily against elements of the anti-­air defence system, command posts, anti-­air missile positions and airfields. This activity, meant to show the determination of the Alliance, proved insufficient to pressure President Milošević into concessions. What is more, they had an unforeseen consequence – increased repressions against the civilian population in Kosovo (Albanians). As a result, the attacks were intensified. The second stage began in the second week of the operation and lasted until late April–early May 1999. From then on attacks were aimed at units of the Yugoslav army, ammunition depots and other military targets in Kosovo, and later also against the main communication lines. NATO expanded its list of airstrike targets to include those outside the territory of Kosovo, that is military leaders, command centres, weapons depots, fuel depots and other targets in the area of Belgrade as well as some installations in other parts of Yugoslavia (e.g. bridges in Novi Sad). At that time, the scale of the problem of refugees fleeing Kosovo increased to that of a humanitarian disaster. Yugoslav authorities reacted to Operation Allied Force with further and even stronger repressions, including intensified ethnic cleansings, which the Alliance was unable to prevent or alleviate through military pressure; NATO’s decision to refrain from launching a ground operation did not help either. Thus it became necessary to launch a humanitarian operation, and Operation Allied Harbor began on 14 April as part of Operation Allied Force. In the following weeks of April the number of targets for airstrikes was constantly increasing, and they were located virtually all over Yugoslavia. Apart from military installations, airstrikes were conducted against such targets as: fuel

62   Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala depots, government buildings, airfields (including civilian ones), communications equipment, fuel terminals, post offices, railway stations, factories, and even – albeit by mistake – a passenger train and a bus with passengers. Given the increased scale of operations in late April and early May, it is safe to consider this the beginning of the third stage of the intervention. The intensity of the operations reached an apogee on 12 May, when 600 sorties were conducted by many aircraft.32 In this period, Yugoslavia’s electrical power system was attacked on two occasions (on 3 and 24 May) using graphite bombs (Blackout Bombs), the second attack denying electricity to 80 per cent of the country. On the night of 7–8 May, US aircraft bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and due to the ensuing crisis airstrikes against targets in Belgrade were suspended for two weeks. On 26 May, KLA forces went on the offensive, but NATO did not wish to provide air support for the Albanian ground operations. In the period of the most intensive airstrikes, that is early June, former Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, who had been sent to the Balkans, and the EU representative Martti Ahtisaari presented the president of Yugoslavia with an ultimatum. Milošević accepted the peace offer, and on the following day the agreement was ratified by the Yugoslav parliament. For 72 hours after the ratification, the activity of NATO air forces was limited, and only some scattered forces of the Yugoslav army were attacked. The military details of the ultimatum were agreed on 9 June, and the war ended. On 10 June 1999, the UNSC adopted S/RES/1244, recognising Yugoslavia’s consent to immediately cease the use of force and withdraw its military, police and paramilitary units from Kosovo. The resolution was passed by 14 votes, China having abstained. The UNSC entrusted governance of the province to the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and security was to be ensured by NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR).33 NATO forces had overwhelming numerical and technological advantage in the operation, and in terms of air combat – even absolute dominance. The operation lasted 78 days; 35,000 combat flights were made over its course and more than 23,000 bombs were dropped.34 The initial positions of NATO forces were particularly favourable. Even before the operation, the enemy had already been surrounded, and the area of combat operations had been virtually completely isolated. Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania all allowed NATO forces to use their territories and airspace. The territory of Albania, in turn, was a ‘neutral’ base for the fighters of the Kosovo Liberation Army.

3.4  Legal aspects 3.4.1  The legal basis and the institutional dimension of the intervention The use of force against the FRY by the Western countries had no clear legitimacy under international law, especially under the Charter of the United Nations.

Kosovo   63 It was not justified by the right to self-­defence under Article 51; neither was it authorised by the UNSC. Nevertheless, the Council rejected the proposal for resolution (S/1999/328) of 26 March 1999, submitted by Russia, Belarus and India, which, among others, would have condemned the use of force by NATO without UNSC authorisation as a flagrant violation of the UN Charter, including Article 2(4), Article 24, Article 53 and the previously established no-­fly zone. The draft resolution also included a demand to immediately cease the use of force and an urgent call for a return to negotiations. Only Russia, China and Namibia voted in favour of the draft resolution. However, the UNSC issued a presidential statement, in which it condemned the bombing of the Chinese embassy.35 The intervention in Kosovo was preceded by a discussion on the relationship between respect for state sovereignty and observance of human rights and the rules of humanitarian intervention. After international institutions had been criticised for being ineffective against the mass crimes in the Balkans in the 1990s and then for their passive attitude towards the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the increasingly popular view was that in a situation of massive violations of human rights, sovereignty cannot be considered more important than the need to save the population. Some researchers also pointed out certain contradictions with regard to the use of force found in the UN Charter. First, it mentions cooperation in the field of human rights among the goals of the organisation. Second, its Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force ‘against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state’. Humanitarian interventions should not be directed against these values either. They were supposed to be used as an instrument for protecting the rights of the population and providing humanitarian aid.36 While there was no authorisation from the UNSC, the military action was undertaken by decision of the relevant NATO authorities. On 30 January, the North Atlantic Council issued a statement in which it recognised that the NATO Secretary General might authorise air operations in accordance with the expectations of the international community.37 Thus, in this case NATO considered itself a representative of the entire international community, acting on behalf of it and in its interest. According to the Alliance’s authorities, this approach was justified by the consistency between NATO’s demands towards Serbia in the Kosovo case with the demands of the relevant international structures. Furthermore, it was pointed out that the earlier threat of NATO action in the absence of collaboration on the part of Serbia had not met with any international opposition, which could imply a tacit acceptance of NATO’s competence to make the decision to intervene. Another factor was the similar role played by NATO in the Bosnian conflict, with the consent and encouragement of the United Nations, in forcing the Serbs to negotiate peace. NATO also invoked the concept of the right to humanitarian intervention. Nevertheless, regardless of the motives used to justify it, the power of NATO bodies (the North Atlantic Council) to make the decision on the intervention remained only ‘a self-­granted authority’ based on their own assessment of the situation and the rules included in the strategic concept of NATO of 1991.

64   Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala 3.4.2  The engagement in Kosovo in the context of international humanitarian law (IHL) The main basis for the assessment of compliance of the actions taken by the coalition forces are the Geneva Conventions (GC) of 1949, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, as well as customary law. In contrast to other allies, the US was not party to the Protocol, but in fact considered many of its provisions customary law.38 Only an air operation was planned, which, however, was primarily intended as a way to minimise own losses. Most aircraft flew above 4,500 m, in order to avoid losses caused by surface-­to-air missiles. Air raids were carried out both by day and by night. In many cities and towns they lasted continuously for 24 hours. The use of such methods of warfare inevitably led to difficulties in respecting principles of IHL: with distinguishing civilian from military targets and with respecting the principle of proportionality, especially given that with time the share of precision-­guided munitions in the total number of munitions used fell from 90 to 10–20 per cent.39 There were also doubts about the qualification of targets as legitimate military objectives. In light of the declared humanitarian aims of the war, some were wondering whether, for instance, the militia in Kosovo should be considered a legitimate military objective. Was destroying military infrastructure in Kosovo and attempts to force the Yugoslav army to leave it justified, considering that most of the infrastructure and most of these armed forces had never been used against civilians? Another controversy concerned the bombing of dual-­use targets: broadcasting stations, railways, bridges, electric tractions and transformers, telecommunications centres and lines, factories and other facilities essential to the lives of civilians. The discussion concerning dual-­use targets intensified when NATO forces bombed the Radio-­televizija Srbije (RTS) broadcasting station in Belgrade on 23 April 1999, as a result of which 16 people were killed and another 16 were injured. The members of the coalition justified the attack by claiming that the media were used for war propaganda.40 During this period, the coalition conducted 10,484 raids and delivered 23,614 air munitions.41 According to the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, more than 20,000 laser- or satellite-­guided munitions were used and a total of 79,000 tonnes of explosives. NATO forces made extensive use of cluster bombs: it was confirmed that they used 1,392 bombs of this type, containing 289,536 submunitions.42 During the operation, there were numerous incidents with civilian casualties, most of which occurred during bombings of military facilities, telecommunication centres and anti-­air defence installations as well as industrial and oil facilities. The greatest civilian losses were caused by (accidental) attacks on convoys with civilians and bridges. Therefore, in most cases, civilian casualties were collateral damage caused by strikes against military targets and the result of the fighting methods and weapons

Kosovo   65 used; civilians were not warned about the airstrikes. However, the Independent International Commission on Kosovo accused NATO of some intentional attacks on civilian targets. During its on-­site mission, Human Rights Watch (HRW) confirmed 90 incidents leading to civilian casualties. In total, some 500 civilians were killed and approximately 800 were injured as a result of NATO operations.43 The US did not agree with the negative assessment of NATO operations by non-­governmental institutions such as HRW or Amnesty International. Secretary of Defense William Cohen called it ‘the most precise application of air power in history’.44 The intervention in Kosovo was investigated by a special committee established by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. In its final report, the committee examined the incidents in which ten or more civilians had been killed; it also recognised the HRW data on more than 500 civilian deaths as credible, adding that it was consistent with the Yugoslav government data.45 The committee found that the amount of civilian losses proved that NATO’s military actions had not targeted civilians deliberately. While in many cases the identification of military targets was quite loosely approached and there were a few cases of errors, the committee found no grounds to initiate any proceedings.46

3.5  Public attitudes towards the intervention The attitudes of public opinion in the countries that participated in the intervention against the FRY were to a great extent shaped by the media, which painted the Serbs as the main party responsible for the conflict in Kosovo, guilty of oppressing Kosovar Albanians. Decision-­makers and the media alike focused on the humanitarian motives behind the operation and presented it as a humanitarian intervention, supposedly necessary given the mass violations of human rights. In order to maintain the favourable opinion of the intervention among the public, decision-­makers avoided showing the destruction caused by air raids, as they were concerned that the awareness of their consequences, and especially of the high number of casualties, would cause social support to shrink. Public attitudes evolved alongside the changing situation in Kosovo. From March to early May, the support in the US was at over 60 per cent.47 Diminishing support was also the result of the diplomatic scandal following the aforementioned bombing of the Chinese embassy, as well as of the fact that Western societies were slowly becoming aware of the civilian casualties caused by the air raids. There was an increasingly strong belief that the intervention was unsuccessful; this belief was accompanied by a discussion on a possible ground operation. Already a week after the launch of the operation, approximately 60 per cent of Americans were convinced that the White House had made a mistake by initially ruling out a ground operation.48 The humanitarian aspects of the intervention were convincing for the public in the other intervening countries as well. In the UK, the second-­largest contributor to the intervention in Kosovo, 65 per cent of respondents claimed that the

66   Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala humanitarian situation in Kosovo could not be ignored,49 87 per cent believed that their country had the moral responsibility to intervene, and 69 per cent expressed support for its participation in the intervention.50 Furthermore, there was considerable support for a possible ground operation, and 63 per cent of respondents did not consider it possible to end human rights violations without the use of ground forces.51 According to the results of a comparative survey published in The Economist and presenting data collected between 26 March and 17 April 1999, the greatest support among NATO countries was declared by the citizens of: Denmark (74 per cent), the US (68 per cent), the UK (68 per cent), Norway (64 per cent), Germany (57 per cent), France (54 per cent) and Italy (47 per cent). Among the new NATO members, the greatest support was observed in Poland (54 per cent), followed by Hungary (48 per cent) and the Czech Republic (35 per cent). It is worth noting that overall the support for the intervention was the highest in Croatia (82 per cent), and the smallest in Russia (2 per cent) and Ukraine (4 per cent). Slightly different conclusions were drawn by David Auserwald, who had conducted a comparative analysis of public attitudes to the Kosovo War in five NATO countries. He deduced that the support for the intervention was the greatest in the UK and France, followed by Germany and the US, and the lowest in Italy, where only 20 per cent of the population supported it (even though the highest support there was approximately 40 per cent).52 Public opinion in Serbia itself was strongly against any violation of Serbian sovereignty and territorial integrity. It supported the use of force by the Serbian government against the KLA, who were referred to as terrorists striving to tear a part of Serbia away from the rest of the country. In the first phase of the war, the society consolidated and support for Milošević grew. Serbs reacted with anger towards the aggressor.53 The sentiments changed in early May, when public opinion started suffering from war-­weariness and support for Milošević waned.

3.6  The outcome NATO’s strategy, which was to gradually increase the intensity of the air raids and raise the pressure on Belgrade by destroying key targets, proved effective in fulfilling both political and military goals. NATO won a victory in Kosovo, suffering exceptionally low losses: two aircraft and two soldiers. Yugoslav forces, in turn, suffered relatively high losses: around 80 aircraft (including six in air) and some 1,200 dead (including more than 300 security forces officers).54 Immediately after the Kosovo War, chaos ensued. Some 100,000 Serbs fled to Yugoslavia, including former officials, political functionaries, judges, policemen and representatives of the qualified workforce, who mostly had Serbian origins.55 The war further worsened the already poor economic situation of Kosovo.56 After the war, in 2000, GDP per capita was approximately US$650, compared to as much as US$2,443 in 1990.57 The involvement of international institutions contributed to the establishment of independent state structures in Kosovo and helped fulfil the independence

Kosovo   67 aspirations of Kosovar Albanians, who declared independence on 17 February 2008. Furthermore, the operation had consequences in the regional dimension. It contributed to removing President Milošević from power and strengthening the aspirations of the Albanian population in neighbouring countries, which eventually gave rise to a conflict in Macedonia in 2001. In the context of humanitarian aims, the operation gave rise to much controversy. It did not stop ethnic cleansings: according to NATO sources, as many as 1 million people may have left Kosovo over the course of the operation and some half a million have been internally displaced persons.58 The mission managed to only partially alleviate their effects: some 600,000 refugees returned within two weeks of its conclusion.59 The NATO operation caused a considerable increase in the intensity of the fighting, which in turn significantly increased the numbers of refugees. It led to the destruction of not only strictly military infrastructure but also some key civilian infrastructure. What is more, the crimes committed by Albanians did not meet with a comparable reaction from Western powers and international organisations. Critics believed that by refraining from launching a ground operation the interveners delayed the achievement of the war’s goals and contributed to increased numbers of civilian casualties. Air raids were a very harmful way of fighting from the perspective of civilian safety, and NATO did not exhibit due diligence in this respect. Apart from the humanitarian consequences of the NATO operation in Kosovo, controversy also arose in relation to the role of the UNSC and the divisions within it, as well as the legal and moral justification for the intervention. It played an equally important role in the debate on the desirable instruments for reacting to mass-­scale human rights violations as the earlier lack of reaction to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Was the extent of human rights violations in Kosovo sufficient to warrant a violation of the sovereignty of Yugoslavia and a military intervention?60 Had the intervention not been launched, would Kosovo have become the site of mass-­scale international crimes? Concerns about marginalisation of the UN and hegemony of the US were yet another catalyst for the discussion.61 In this context, the conceptual focus of the discussion on humanitarian intervention shifted towards responsibility to protect (R2P). In its 2001 report, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) chose not to use the phrase ‘humanitarian intervention’, and instead preferred to refer to it as a ‘military intervention for human protection purposes’. They believed that a military intervention will always be controversial in humanitarian terms and lead to charges of hypocrisy.62 For NATO, the operation in Kosovo was the second victorious war. It proved that NATO was able to conduct effective military action and that it had a clear advantage over the rest of the world in terms of capability. And at the same time, it consolidated US primacy in the organisation, highlighting its ability to act as the hegemonic leader of the Alliance.

68   Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala On the other hand, the operation lasted longer that it had initially been assumed. The legitimacy of the intervention was weak and its effectiveness limited, which, combined with the disputes arising between Western countries, highlighted the differences between individual NATO members even while the operation was in progress, especially as regards the approach to the fundamental principles of international relations (non-­interference, the use of force without UNSC mandate) and humanitarian intervention. What is more, the differences in technological and military potentials of the allies that were clearly revealed during the intervention, with the huge advantage of the US over its allies, led to some irritation in the US about the issue of unequal burden-­sharing, and at the same time hastened the efforts towards developing the European military potential under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). For some European countries, this was a chance to become at least partially independent from the US in the sphere of active international security policy, while for others it involved the risk of relaxing the transatlantic bond. As a result, the degree of mutual mistrust in the relations between Western countries increased, although they retained a sense of special mutual bond and their capability to adopt a common position and cooperate in matters of international security. The disputes concerning the legitimacy of the intervention and the criticism of the strategy chosen for the mission weakened the international order and its fundamental principles, thus harming the interests of the West, which much rather strives to strengthen the said order. The intervention was rather more beneficial to the interests of Western countries related to the strengthening of European stability in the sphere of security, giving them a privileged position by limiting the room for manoeuvre available to Milošević. It undermined, however, the international credibility of NATO as a responsible stabiliser of the international situation which refrains from any action that is not clearly justified and does not have broad international support.

Notes   1 M. Tabin, Kosowskie państwo podziemne: nadzieje i dylematy, in: A. Jasińska-Kania (ed.), Trudne sąsiedztwa. Z socjologii konfliktów narodowościowych (Scholar, Warszawa 2001) 92–97.   2 After the break up of the SFRY, the FRY consisted of Serbia and Montenegro.   3 Kosovo War Crimes Chronology, www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/kosovo98/time line.shtml (accessed 10 May 2018).   4 The Daily Telegraph, 30 June 2001.   5 UNHCR, Kosovo Update Crisis, 11September 1999.   6 S. Huntington, The lonely superpower (1999) 2 Foreign Affairs 35–49; W.C. Wohlforth, The stability of a unipolar world (1999) 1 International Security 5–41.   7 Arrangements for General Settlement (also referred to as: Carrington Draft Convention), in: S. Trifunovska (ed.), Yugoslavia Through Documents: From its Creation to its Dissolution (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht 1994) 357–365.   8 R. Caplan, International diplomacy and the crisis in Kosovo (1998) 4 International Affairs 749–750.

Kosovo   69   9 P. Russell, The exclusion of Kosovo from the Dayton negotiations (2009) 4 Journal of Genocide Research 487–511. 10 R.C. Hendrickson, NATO’s Operation Allied Force: Strategic concepts and institutional relationships, in: H. Edström, D. Gyllensporre (eds), Pursuing Strategy: NATO Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddafi (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2012) 86. 11 Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-­Government in Kosovo, https://1997–2001. state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html (accessed 10 May 2018). 12 O. Antonenko, Russia and the Deadlock over Kosovo (NIC Center, Paris 2007). 13 See also Y. Sakaguchi, K. Mayama, Significance of the war in Kosovo for China and Russia (2002) 3 NIDS Security Reports 1–23. 14 B. Clinton, Statement on Kosovo, 24 March 1999. 15 T. Blair, Statement in the Commons, 23 March 1999. 16 A. Roberts, NATO ‘humanitarian war’ over Kosovo (1999) 41(3) Survival 108; J. Solana, NATO’s success in Kosovo (1999) 6 Foreign Affairs 115–116. 17 Clinton (1999); Blair (1999); J. Solana, Press Statement, 23 March 1999; J. Fisher, Speech at the Green Party Congress in Bielefeld, 13 May 1999. 18 Ibid. 19 S.B. Redd, The influence of advisers and decision strategies on foreign policy choices: President Clinton’s decision to use force in Kosovo (2005) 1 International Studies Perspectives 131–132. 20 R. Singh, American perception, in: M. Buckley, S.N. Cummings (eds), Kosovo: Perceptions of War and Its Aftermath (Continuum, London 2001) 62. 21 Clinton (1999); Blair (1999); Solana (1999). 22 US Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen formulated three priority goals of the intervention: stability of Eastern Europe; preventing ethnic cleansing; credibility of NATO. See Report to Congress: Kosovo/Allied Force After-­Action Report (DoD, Washington 2000) 3. 23 ‘… we believe that the Serb people would be better served by having a democratically elected government’. Press Briefing on the 50th Anniversary N.A.T.O. Summit by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, and National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, 20 April 1999, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ ws/?pid=47858 (accessed 10 May 2018). 24 K. Brown, D. Theodossopoulos, The performance of anxiety: Greek narratives of war in Kosovo (2000) 1 Anthropology Today 3–8. 25 D. Cadier, M. Light, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Ideas, Domestic Politics and External Relations (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2015) 191. 26 C. Bjola, Legitimising the Use of Force in International Relations: Kosovo, Iraq and the Ethics of Intervention (Routledge, New York 2009) 98, 116. 27 M.W. Lamb, Operation Allied Force: Golden Nuggets for Future Campaigns (USAir University, Maxwell AFB 2002) 10–11. 28 Ibid. 2–7. 29 Report of Department of Defense provides exact number – 1,031. Kosovo Allied Force After-­Action Report (2000) 31. 30 NATO Operation Allied Force, archive.defense.gov/specials/kosovo (accessed 10 May 2018). 31 The Military Balance (IISS-­Oxford University Press, London 1998) 99–100. 32 In the first weeks of the operation, no more than 50 sorties were launched daily. 33 UNSC S/RES/1244. 34 Lamb (2002) 56–66. 35 UNSC Draft Resolution of 14 May 1999, S/PRST/1999/12. 36 R.B. Lillich (ed.), Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville 1992). 37 Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Kosovo, NATO Press release, 30 January 1999.

70   Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala 38 M.J. Matheson, United States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (1987) 2 The American University Journal of International Law and Policy 419–427. 39 W. Clark, Remarks to the American Enterprise Institute Regarding Military Action in Yugoslavia, 31 August 1999. 40 J.A. Burger, International Humanitarian Law and the Kosovo crisis: Lessons learned or to be learned (2000) 837 International Review of the Red Cross 129–145; P. Rowe, Kosovo 1999: The air campaign – have the provisions of Additional Protocol I withstood the test? (2000) 837 International Review of the Red Cross 147–164. 41 G. Robertson, Kosovo: An Account of the Crisis (MoD, London 1999); according to other sources 28,000 – M.S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment (RAND, Santa Monica 2011) 219. 42 Explosive Remnants of War: Cluster Bombs and Landmines in Kosovo (2000) ICRC Report 6. 43 HRW, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign (2000) HRW Report 11. 44 Cited in: Lambeth (2011) 239. 45 NATO Crimes in Yugoslavia, 1–2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report, 24 March–24 April 1999 and 25 April–10 June 1999. 46 Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ICTY, 13 June 2000. The report gave rise to controversy as insufficiently thorough and detailed. More: N. Ronzitti, Is the non liquet of the Final Report by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia acceptable? (2000) 840 International Review of the Red Cross. 47 According to the ABS survey published in the Washington Post on 5 April 1999, 68 per cent of respondents in the US supported air raids. The support ratio decreased to 59 per cent according to a survey conducted on 16 May. According to a Gallup poll of 13–14 April, 61 per cent supported the air raids, while a survey of 7–9 May showed support had fallen to 55 per cent; 38 per cent of respondents opposed an intervention. On 13–14 April, a CBS poll showed that 59 per cent of Americans supported the air raids, but on 11 May it was only 49 per cent, with 36 per cent opposing. 48 PIPA, Americans on Kosovo: A Study of US Public Attitudes, 27 May 1999. 49 Gallup/Daily Telegraph, 24–28 March, 1999. 50 MORI/Mail on Sunday, 26–27 March, 1999. 51 Ibid. 52 D. Auserwald, Explaining wars of choice: An integrated decision model of NATO policy in Kosovo (2004) 3 International Studies Quarterly 631–662. 53 G. Dinmore, Daily life in Belgrade teeters under strikes, Washington Post, 5 April 1999. 54 J. Coopersmith, R.D. Launius, Taking Off: A Century of Manned Flight (American Institute of Aeronautics, Reston 2003) 54. 55 UNHCR, Kosovo: Situation of Minority Groups Becoming Critical (1999) UNHCR Briefing Notes 9 July 1999. 56 IMF, The Economic Consequences of the Kosovo Crisis: An Updated Assessment (1999), www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/kosovo/052599.htm (accessed 10 May 2018). 57 R. Corker, D. Rehm, K. Kostial, Kosovo: Macroeconomic Issues and Fiscal Sustainability (IMF, Washington 2002). 58 More: UNHCHR Mary Robinson, Report on Human Rights Situation in Kosovo, presented at the 55th session of the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, 30 April 1999. 59 B.R. Nardulli, W.L. Perry, B. Pirnie, J. Gordon IV, J.G. McGinn, Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo (RAND, Santa Monica 2002) 224–230. 60 It is estimated that the Serbian offensive of summer 1998 claimed the lives of 1,500 Kosovar Albanians and caused 300,000 to abandon their homes – Roberts (1999) 112.

Kosovo   71 61 See also W. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat (Public Affairs, Cambridge 2001); N.J. Wheeler, Humanitarian intervention after Kosovo: Emergent norm, moral duty or the coming anarchy? (2001) 1 International Affairs 113–128; C. Guicherd, International law and the war in Kosovo (1999) 2 Survival 1999 19–34. 62 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect (ICISS, Ottawa 2001) 9.

References Antonenko O., Russia and the Deadlock over Kosovo (NIC Center, Paris 2007). Arrangements for General Settlement (also referred to as: Carrington Draft Convention), in: S. Trifunovska (ed.), Yugoslavia Through Documents. From its Creation to its Dissolution, (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht 1994) 357–365. Auserwald D., Explaining wars of choice: An integrated decision model of NATO policy in Kosovo (2004) 3 International Studies Quarterly 631–662. Bjola C., Legitimising the Use of Force in International Relations. Kosovo, Iraq and the Ethics of Intervention (Routledge, New York 2009). Blair T., Statement in the Commons, 23 March 1999. Brown K., Theodossopoulos D., The performance of anxiety: Greek narratives of war in Kosovo (2000) 1 Anthropology Today 3–8. Burger J.A., International Humanitarian Law and the Kosovo crisis: Lessons learned or to be learned (2000) 837 International Review of the Red Cross 129–145. Cadier D., Light M., Russia’s Foreign Policy: Ideas, Domestic Politics and External Relations (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2015). Caplan R., International diplomacy and the crisis in Kosovo (1998) 4 International Affairs 745–761. Clark W., Remarks to the American Enterprise Institute Regarding Military Action in Yugoslavia, 31 August 1999. Clark W., Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat (Public Affairs, Cambridge 2001). Clinton B., Statement on Kosovo, 24 March 1999. Coopersmith J., Launius R.D., Taking Off: A Century of Manned Flight (American Institute of Aeronautics, Reston 2003). Corker R., Rehm D., Kostial K., Kosovo, Macroeconomic Issues and Fiscal Sustainability (IMF, Washington 2002). Dinmore G., Daily life in Belgrade teeters under strikes, Washington Post, 5 April 1999. Explosive Remnants of War. Cluster Bombs and Landmines in Kosovo (2000) 6 International Committee of the Red Cross Report. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ICTY, 13 June 2000. Fisher J., Speech at the Green Party Congress in Bielefeld, 13 May 1999. Guicherd C., International law and the war in Kosovo (1999) 2 Survival 19–34. Hendrickson R.C., NATO’s Operation Allied Force: Strategic concepts and institutional relationships, in: H. Edström, D. Gyllensporre (eds), Pursuing Strategy. NATO Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddafi (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2012) 82–95. HRW (Human Rights Watch), Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign (2000). Huntington S., The lonely superpower (1999) 2 Foreign Affairs 35–49. ICISS (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty), The Responsibility to Protect (ICISS, Ottawa 2001).

72   Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala IMF (international Monetary Fund), The Economic Consequences of the Kosovo Crisis: An Updated Assessment (Washington, 1999), www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ kosovo/052599.htm (accessed 10 May 2018). Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-­Government in Kosovo, https://1997-2001.state. gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html (accessed 10 May 2018). Kosovo War Crimes Chronology, www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/kosovo98/timeline. shtml (accessed 10 May 2018). Lamb M.W., Operation Allied Force Golden Nuggets for Future Campaigns (AU, Maxwell AFB 2002) 10–11. Lambeth M.S., NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment (RAND, Santa Monica 2011) 219. Lillich R.B. (ed.), Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville 1992). Matheson M.J., United States position on the relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (1987) 2 The American University Journal of International Law and Policy 419–427. Nardulli B.R., Perry W.L., Pirnie B, Gordon IV J., McGinn J.G., Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo (RAND, Santa Monica 2002). NATO Operation Allied Force, archive.defense.gov/specials/kosovo (accessed 10 May 2018). NATO Crimes in Yugoslavia, 1–2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report, 24 March–24 April 1999 and 25 April–10 June 1999. Press Briefing on the 50th Anniversary N.A.T.O. Summit by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, and National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, 20 April 1999, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47858 (accessed 10 May 2018). PIPA (Program on International Polity Attitudes), Americans on Kosovo: A Study of US Public Attitudes, 27 May 1999. Redd S.B., The influence of advisers and decision strategies on foreign policy choices: President Clinton’s decision to use force in Kosovo (2005) 1 International Studies Perspectives 129–150. Report to Congress: Kosovo/Allied Force After-­Action Report (DoD, Washington 2000). Roberts A., NATO’s ‘humanitarian war’ over Kosovo (1999) 3 Survival 102–123. Robertson G., Kosovo: An Account of the Crisis (MoD, London 1999). Ronzitti N., Is the non liquet of the Final Report by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia acceptable? (2000) 840 International Review of the Red Cross 1017–1027. Rowe P., Kosovo 1999: The air campaign – have the provisions of Additional Protocol I withstood the test? (2000) 837 International Review of the Red Cross 147–164. Russell P., The exclusion of Kosovo from the Dayton negotiations (2009) 4 Journal of Genocide Research 487–511. Sakaguchi Y., Mayama K., Significance of the war in Kosovo for China and Russia (2002) 3 NIDS Security Reports 1–23. Solana J., NATO’s success in Kosovo (1999) 78(6) Foreign Affairs 115–116. Solana J., Press Statement, 23 March 1999. Singh R., American perception, in: M. Buckley, S.N. Cummings (eds), Kosovo: Perceptions of War and Its Aftermath (Continuum, London 2001) 61–78. Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Kosovo, NATO Press release, 30 January 1999.

Kosovo   73 Tabin M., Kosowskie państwo podziemne: nadzieje i dylematy, in: A. Jasińska-Kania (ed.), Trudne sąsiedztwa. Z socjologii konfliktów narodowościowych (Scholar, Warszawa 2001) 79–127. The Military Balance 1998/99 (IISS-­Oxford University Press, London 1998). UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Kosovo: Situation of Minority Groups Becoming Critical, UNHCR Briefing Notes, 9 July 1999. UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Kosovo Update Crisis, 11 September 1999. UNHCHR Mary Robinson, Report on Human Rights Situation in Kosovo, presented at the 55th session of the Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, 30 April 1999. UNSC Draft Resolution of 14 May 1999, S/PRST/1999/12. UNSC S/RES/1244 (1999). Wheeler N.J., Humanitarian intervention after Kosovo: Emergent norm, moral duty or the coming anarchy? (2001) 1 International Affairs 113–128. Wohlforth W.C., The stability of a unipolar world (1999) 1 International Security 5–41.

4 Afghanistan The longest war, the greatest fiasco? Marek Madej

The intervention in Afghanistan was the most complex Western military operation in the post-­Cold War period. It could even be treated as two separate missions. The first would be Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF ), launched on 7 October 2001 by the US-­led coalition of the willing and focused on destroying terrorist groups of Islamic fundamentalists based in Afghanistan. The second would be International Security Assistance Force (ISAF ), conducted under UN mandate (UNSC resolution S/RES/1386 of 20 December 2001) and being, at least initially (until its extension to the whole of Afghanistan in 2006), a non-­ kinetic, state- or nation-­building mission in support of the newly emerged Afghan authorities. Given, however, that these two tasks – fighting terrorists and rebuilding the country – were considered somewhat complementary to each other and that both missions eventually merged, it seems justified to treat them – as is done here – as a single continuous intervention, although substantially complex in terms of its objectives and strategies.

4.1  Strategic context 4.1.1  The situation in Afghanistan before the intervention Al-­Qaeda’s terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 (9/11) were undeniably the trigger for the intervention in Afghanistan. The organisation’s command centre, led by Osama bin Laden, at that time was ‘hosted’ by the Taliban, who controlled – although not de iure – almost the entire territory of Afghanistan. That is why they were deemed co-­responsible for the attacks. In contrast to the missions in the Balkans in the 1990s, the intervention was not a response to an internal clash in Afghanistan, although the conflict there had determined its local context. The fighting in Afghanistan lasted almost uninterruptedly from 1978 and the Saur Revolution, when a group of Marxist-­oriented Afghan officers overthrew President Mohammed Daoud Khan.1 The increasing instability induced the USSR to intervene in 1979. That lasted eventually more than a decade and ended in a fiasco, in most part due to mujahideen insurgents, at that time supported financially mainly by Pakistan and the US. Once Soviet forces withdrew (February

Afghanistan   75 1989), the government of president Mohammad Najibullah, which they had been supporting until then, managed to stay in power in Kabul until April 1992, when it was overthrown by the mujahideen.2 That opened a period of chaotic civil war among the various mujahideen factions. From 1994 the so-­called Taliban (Koranic students) began to be active; they were recruited from Afghani Pashtun refugees in Pakistan and promoted a fundamentalist version of Sunni Islam (i.e. the Deobandi movement of the Hanafi school of Islam).3 The support from the Pakistani government – the patron of the Taliban – as well as the Pashtuns (the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan), enabled them to gain an advantage in the Afghan civil war. In 1994 they took control of the areas around Kandahar, in 1996 entered Kabul, and after capturing in 1998 Mazar-­i-Sharif in the north, they directly or indirectly (through local leaders loyal to them) controlled some 90 per cent of Afghanistan.4 The only significant opposition then was the Northern Alliance, dominated by Tajiks (the second largest ethnic group) and headed by Ahmad Shah Massoud (the military commander) and Burhanuddin Rabbani (formally the legal president of the country).5 The Alliance was supported by Russia, Iran and – less directly – India, but not on a scale similar to Pakistani support of the Taliban, who still dominated in the conflict. However, military success did not translate into international legitimacy of the Taliban radical regime – only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates recognised them as the legal Afghanistan government.6 At the same time, however, their radicalism won them sympathy among Muslim (Sunni) fundamentalists, swelling their ranks in the Afghan conflict. This, in turn, together with Osama bin Laden’s financial support for Taliban, explains the move of Al-­Qaeda central structures to that country when they were forced to leave Sudan due to international pressure in 1996.7 The protracted conflict had damaging effect on the economy, one of the least developed in the world even before the Saur Revolution. Directly before Western intervention (2001), GDP per capita of Afghanistan, a country of approximately 28 million, was US$455 (at purchasing power parity, according to 2012 prices).8 Afghanistan had almost no industry and very scarce transport infrastructure (also due to the harsh geographic conditions of mountainous, often desert terrain). Before 2001, Afghanistan had essentially not mined any natural resources, also because they were poorly explored and documented. The economy was based on agriculture, but from the 1990s the share of poppy, used for the production of opium, was rapidly growing and with time became the main agricultural product and source of income for a large share of the population.9 The quality of life and the effectiveness of its administration were also low – the HDI (Human Development Index) was 0.431 in 2000 (169th among 175 countries), life expectancy around 42.5 years.10 Afghanistan’s internal situation was further complicated by ethnic diversity. The most numerous were Pashtuns (probably some 38 per cent in 2001), dominant in the southern and eastern provinces. The second largest group were Tajiks (25 per cent), who lived primarily in the north, trailed by Hazars (19 per cent) and Uzbeks (6 per cent).11 A complex ethnic structure was further intensified by strong attachment to tribal and clan ties, especially among Pashtuns.

76   Marek Madej Approximately 80 per cent of the population were Sunni and the largest religious minority were Shia (mainly Hazaras).12 Despite the long conflict, before 2001 the international community had been showing little interest in the fate of Afghanistan. Virtually the only country interested was Pakistan, which saw Afghanistan as the source of ‘strategic depth’ in its relations with India. This, along with the dispute concerning the border between the two countries, which Afghanistan did not recognise, and the fact that the borderland was inhabited by Pashtuns, was why Pakistani authorities considered it vital to maintain a friendly government in Afghanistan and, consequently, supported the Taliban. Some Iranian interest in the situation in Afghanistan was caused by the shared border and Shia Hazara minority. Despite concerns about the Islamic fundamentalism in the region, Russia (and the Central Asian Republics) showed only minor attention, partly because of the negative experience of the Soviet intervention.13 Still, the successes of the Taliban in the mid-­1990s and rapid development of fundamentalist terrorist groups (including Al-­Qaeda) on Taliban-­controlled territory increased international concerns about the impact of the situation in Afghanistan on regional and global stability.14 As a result, after Al-­Qaeda’s attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (7 August 1998, a total of 224 dead), Washington conducted airstrikes against terrorist training camps in Afghanistan (20 August 1998) and the UN imposed sanctions on the Taliban as responsible for supporting Al-­Qaeda (S/RES/1267 of 15 October 1999).15 Concerning also was the growing radicalism of the Taliban, as manifested by the destruction in spring 2001 of the Buddha statues in Bamyan province, listed as world heritage by UNESCO.16 Nonetheless, despite all these changes and protracted internal conflict, before 9/11 the international community did not contemplate any military intervention in Afghanistan, whether a strictly external action (with or without UN mandate) or support for the opposition (Northern Alliance). 4.1.2  International reaction to the 9/11 attacks The Al-­Qaeda’s attacks of 9/11, in which 2,973 people (plus 19 perpetrators) lost their lives and which caused heavy material losses, brought about a radical change in the international approach to Afghanistan.17 On the very same day, the US announced that those behind the attacks would be punished, deeming the  attacks an act of war. On the following day the UNSC passed resolution S/RES/1368, deeming terrorist acts a threat to international peace and security, recognising the right of self-­defence and advocating all necessary measures to be taken to combat terrorism and in order to apprehend those responsible.18 On the same day, NATO also decided to invoke the Alliance’s collective-­defence clause.19 In the following days, the US was seeking support for a possible international military operation against Al-­Qaeda and Afghanistan’s Taliban authorities that supported it.20 Finally, on 20 September, in a speech to the US Congress, President George W. Bush demanded that Afghan authorities hand over Osama bin Laden and the other Al-­Qaeda leaders and close all terrorist training camps.21

Afghanistan   77 Despite international pressure, also from some Muslim states, the Taliban rejected the ultimatum. As a result, on 7 October the US (with limited support from its allies, primarily the UK) launched airstrikes against the Taliban and Al-­ Qaeda in Afghanistan. Immediately after the attacks, with the UNSC having sanctioned (although not explicitly – see section 4.4) the US right to self-­defence in response, the legitimacy of an intervention in Afghanistan was not challenged. No country officially deemed the strikes against Al-­Qaeda camps in Afghanistan – or the plans to overthrow Taliban rule – as overstepping the limits of acceptable self-­defence. Possibly it was a manifestation of ‘pragmatic opportunism’; given the US determination to respond militarily to the attack and the adoption of a Manichaean perspective, expressed in declarations that no country could remain neutral and everyone had to choose a side,22 any opposition entailed the risk of becoming an enemy to Washington. There was, however, fairly widespread sympathy for the US as the victim of terrorism. Some, individual observers much rather than states, questioned the need for such forceful reaction and criticised presenting the intervention in Afghanistan as just a first stage of a broader ‘Global War on Terrorism’ (GWOT).23 Nevertheless, since the intervention was seen as an acceptable form of self-­ defence, no one looked for an alternative to the US-­led operation as a response. The US could in fact have chosen between three options: a unilateral intervention, a NATO action, or an ad hoc coalition (although most probably based on NATO). The first one, for reasons of practical (time pressure given the desire for a quick response, the need of support from the countries in the region) and political (the value of international support) nature was soon deemed a ‘reserve option’ at best. A NATO operation, despite invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, was not preferred in Washington given the experience from Kosovo (the US viewed it as a ‘war by committees’, in which Americans were, despite offering the largest share of assets, bounded by allies in the decision-­making process). Moreover, it had the same flaws as the unilateral option (no plans and armed forces ready, logistical dependence on the countries of the region). Therefore, ultimately the best option – at least initially – was a flexible US-­led coalition of the willing (‘the mission determines the coalition’) that would offer Washington both control over the operation and relatively high international legitimacy.24 There was even less international opposition to ISAF forces, launched later, after overthrowing the Taliban regime, and until 2006 essentially of non-­combat nature. ISAF establishment was decided at the international conference on the future of Afghanistan held in Bonn (27 November–5 December 2001), upon a request from the newly formed Afghan government, and was subsequently sanctioned by the UNSC in S/RES/1386 (20 December 2001). Hence, the mission enjoyed solid legitimacy and international support. Because of the UN’s insufficient organisational and military capabilities to organise the mission, as well as due to the lack of regional structure capable to conduct such an operation, organisation of ISAF was ‘outsourced’ to a coalition of those willing and capable to execute it. And the coalition was dominated by Western countries, which from 2003 formally operated through NATO.25

78   Marek Madej

4.2  Motives, justifications and aims of the Western involvement 4.2.1  The declared and actual motives behind the intervention 4.2.1.1  The initial declared motives The trigger for the intervention in Afghanistan were the attacks of 9/11. Hence, at least initially (OEF before the establishment of ISAF ) and for its main initiator (the US), the operation was justified primarily as an act of self-­defence in response to these attacks and a form of ‘punishment’ for the violation of international law. It also served to prevent further terrorist acts by Al-­Qaeda or other terrorist groups and state sponsors of terrorism.26 As a response to the armed attack (‘punishment’), the operation was therefore aimed at protection of US national security interests (and indirectly their allies as well) through rebuilding their status of a global superpower, which had been tarnished by the very fact that 9/11 attacks happened.27 The initial justifications also invoked the need to stabilise the international system, as well humanitarian concerns. First, it was stressed that terrorism constituted a threat to human rights and global order in general, not only to the US.28 Being aimed against terrorists and their sponsors, the intervention was therefore directed against a global threat.29 Second, the Taliban regime was considered oppressive to the Afghan population, so overthrowing it was seen as ‘freeing’ the Afghan people. Nonetheless, although ensuring greater international support for the mission, such arguments were invoked rather to complement the main reason behind the intervention: the necessity to react to the attack. ISAF ’s mandate, as defined in S/RES/1386, gave priority to combating terrorism, overthrowing the Taliban and stabilising Afghanistan. All that was seen as enhancing global stability, not only of Western countries. Still, involvement of Western countries – crucial for the mission – was based on the assumption that a stable, democratic (or at least non-­Taliban ruled) Afghanistan was indispensable for eliminating the terrorist threat (i.e. ‘hard security interests of the West’). Importantly, economic arguments were not used to justify the operation.30 Hence, at least in the initial phase, the official hierarchy of the underlying motives seems to indicate the primacy of ‘hard’ security interests (response to the threat), complemented by the need to defend the interest of the international community (combating terrorism as a global threat) and by humanitarian concerns (help for the Afghan people). 4.2.1.2  Declared motives vs. actual motives Given the context of 9/11 attacks, we should assume that the declared motives (as well as their hierarchy) were largely consistent with the actual ones. Especially for the US, it was indeed a retaliatory and pre-­emptive operation meant to

Afghanistan   79 prevent further attacks. For other Western countries, the concern about possible further attacks, although present, may have been less pronounced, and its extent was certainly varied from country to country. For many, however, including Poland, the key reason for involvement was the desire to show solidarity with the US and strengthen the transatlantic bond (and sometimes also bilateral ties with Washington). Thus they were in fact also guided mainly by their national security interests, although with a somewhat different focus (strengthening of own security guarantees and international position through closer ties with the US rather than fighting terrorism).31 Furthermore, it seems that the other officially declared motives, namely rebuilding international stability and humanitarian concerns, were not merely ‘camouflage’ meant to help obtain acceptance for the intervention (both external and domestic) but a real reason for it (albeit of secondary importance). Long before 2001, Western countries, especially the US, had been stressing in the UN and in other forums the gravity of the threat to international security posed by terrorists (including Al-­ Qaeda).32 In this context, the declarations of willingness to mount a decisive response to what had been the gravest terror attack known in history in order to consolidate international security seem believable. And taking into account the negative opinions of Taliban governance in Afghanistan (human rights violations, introduction of a strict and repressive form of Sharia, destruction of cultural property, fight against the opposition, including the Northern Alliance), humanitarian concerns were also a logical justification for the intervention (although until 9/11 insufficient to initiate a military operation).33 Their importance is also confirmed by the beginning of the comprehensive reconstruction of Afghanistan soon after the overthrow of the Taliban, as well as attention given to such issues like women’s rights and their political representation already during the conference in Bonn.34 4.2.1.3  The evolution of motives and justifications Given the duration of the Western military involvement in Afghanistan and the changing situation on the ground, it is understandable that the hierarchy of the underlying motives, both the declared and the actual ones, was evolving as well (although not radically). Initially the objective that had grown in importance after some of the interveners’ goals – i.e. overthrowing the Taliban and disrupting Al-­Qaeda – were seen as almost fulfilled was the need to rebuild Afghanistan, primarily to re-­establish regional stability.35 As insurgency intensified, however, and especially after the ISAF mandate was expanded to all of Afghanistan (which was linked with the necessity of combat operations), the interveners – not negating humanitarian and development-­related aspects – once again started to emphasise the security needs of the Western countries, which required stabilisation of Afghanistan and elimination of the armed groups active there. Although the necessity of ‘defending Europe on the Hindu Kush’ was mentioned already in 2002 (by, among others, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder), it began to be emphasised in 2006–2008, after the security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated.36 

80   Marek Madej Another motive that was becoming increasingly important, primarily for Europeans, was the desire to uphold the credibility of NATO as ‘an international security builder’ (‘ISAF as a test of the alliance’).37 Briefly, when the West was the most involved (2009–2011), and therefore suffered the most losses, there were even attempts to invoke economic motives – probably in an attempt to obtain (unsuccessfully) public support for the intervention – by suggesting that Afghanistan had ‘vast mineral riches’ and was an important location on transit routes.38 In the final phase, especially after the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, the emphasis was again rather on the responsibility for the interest of the international community and for stability in the region. In reality, however, given the decreasing hopes for success in Afghanistan among both political elites and societies of the West (see section 4.5), it is likely that the main motive for continuing the intervention then was the desire to retain the credibility of the participants and NATO (or rather minimise the damage in this regard). The fact that the intervention was, in a sense, turning into ‘a face-­saving operation’ is evidenced by the ‘Afghanisation’ of the conflict since 2010: the focus was no longer on fighting insurgents and attempts to reconstruct the country but rather on developing the capacity of the Afghan security forces to control the situation in the country on its own and effectively operate once international forces withdraw.39  We can therefore assume that although in the last phase of the intervention the ‘hard’ security interests of Western countries still remained the main motive behind it (complemented by humanitarian concerns and the interests of the international community in general), they were linked with attempts to retain the credibility and prestige of NATO and the intervening countries in the international arena (as well as in the eyes of their own citizens) rather than combating a direct threat posed by Afghan insurgents or terrorists. 4.2.2  The aims of the intervention 4.2.2.1  The initially declared and the actual aims of the intervention The initial official objectives of the intervention were presented quite clearly by President George Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair in the speeches informing about the launch of the operation. The objectives included bringing the perpetrators of 9/11 to justice (which meant apprehending or killing the leaders of Al-­ Qaeda and breaking up its structures) as well as defeating and overthrowing the Taliban regime and ‘liberating’ the Afghan people from its oppressive rule. This, however, implied the need for regime change in the country, so the long-­term goal of the operation was to build a stable, democratic and developing Afghanistan to ensure that it would not become once again a breeding ground for terrorism.40 It seems that both the declared aims and the initial hierarchy thereof, in light of which primacy was given to destroying the structures of Al-­Qaeda and the Taliban regime, were close to the actual ones. It is evidenced by, among others, the wording of the US ultimatum to the Taliban of 20 September 2001, including

Afghanistan   81 the demand to hand over Osama bin Laden, remove ‘terrorist infrastructure’ and stop supporting terrorism.41 At the same time, US authorities certainly assumed, already when issuing the ultimatum, that it was rather unlikely for the demands to be met. This means that they probably indeed considered a regime change (albeit not necessarily followed by building new state structures) the ‘proper’ aim of the intervention. It also suggests that an additional goal – although never directly expressed – could be to make a show of power in order to deter other actors who posed a threat similar to that of Al-­Qaeda and rebuild the prestige of the ‘wounded’ superpower. On the other hand, the fact that other Western countries focused on acting within the framework of ISAF could indicate that they considered rebuilding Afghan statehood and ensuring its lasting stability to be of similar importance as eliminating terrorist structures. Undeniably, given their limited interests in Afghanistan and the region, for many Western countries it was important to strengthen the transatlantic bond and security ties with Washington through participation in intervention.42 4.2.2.2  The evolution of the declared and actual aims of the intervention Over the course of the mission, both its declared and actual aims evolved in an interesting way: highly ambitious initial plans were gradually adjusted to the reality in Afghanistan and the available resources. After the relatively quick success in overthrowing the Taliban and disrupting Al-­Qaeda networks in Afghanistan by late 2001, one of the two initial goals of the mission, namely to ‘punish’ those responsible for 9/11, became less significant and was reformulated to striving to permanently eliminate the terrorist and insurgent groups active in Afghanistan. What became the primary task at that time was building a politically and economically stable Afghan state, to ensure that the country would no longer become the source of terrorist threat. This aspect of the international engagement was, however, primarily realised through non-­military activity, or ISAF operations, and only to a limited extent through OEF (e.g. the activity of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRT – see section 4.3).43 Given increasing armed resistance against the Afghan government, but also because of difficulties with modernisation and transformation of the state, its economy and society, combating the insurgents (mainly the Taliban, but also other anti-­ government groups, e.g. the Haqqani network) once again became the top priority. This did not mean abandoning the plan for country reconstruction, pursued alongside the combat operations, but it showed that the latter was the priority.  The culmination of the process was US President Barack Obama’s (and, as a result, NATO leaders’) announcement on a new strategy towards Afghanistan on 1 December 2009. According to the new strategy, the main objective of the mission was to dismantle Al-­Qaeda and eliminate the terrorist threat to the US, its allies and international stability; however, in order to achieve this goal, the interveners would have not only to destroy terrorist networks but also stabilise and rebuild the country.44 As the actions undertaken in the following years were

82   Marek Madej unsuccessful, the interveners further reduced their aspirations and eventually no longer declared the desire to destroy terrorist and insurgent groups but merely to damage some of their capabilities. Moreover, they stopped emphasising the responsibility to establish a sustainable, democratic Afghanistan in favour of helping it to build capability to deal with its internal problems on its own once the intervention forces withdrew.45 In order to achieve that, the interveners intended, first of all, to develop the potential of Afghan security forces, and this is why in the final years of the intervention this particular objective became effectively the key one on the operational level (also because it allowed the interveners to at least partially achieve their ‘covert’ strategic goal, that is to maintain international credibility and minimise the losses resulting from the ‘Afghan failure’).46 4.2.3  The coherence of the West’s position In 2001–2006, that is until ISAF expansion to the whole of Afghanistan and its (initially partial) integration with OEF, the differences between Western countries regarding the aims and course of the intervention manifested themselves primarily in the division of tasks between the allies. The US focused on combating Al-­Qaeda and anti-­government insurgents within the OEF framework. The other Western countries (e.g. the UK, France, Germany, Turkey, Italy, Canada) concentrated on assistance in (re)building Afghanistan under ISAF.47 This division of roles, however, was quite flexible: certain state-­building activities were also executed by the US under OEF, while European special forces were participating (but usually discreetly) in anti-­terrorist/counterinsurgent operations. A bigger impact on the course of the intervention was, however, due to differences among allies in the Iraqi operation. This even led to attempts to use the ‘good’ war in Afghanistan (i.e. accepted by the entire West) to ‘mend’ transatlantic relations by presenting European involvement in ISAF as a contribution to the fight against terrorism, thus justifying extension of their mandate – initially advocated strongly by Germany – to the whole territory of Afghanistan48 When, however, the ‘merger’ of OEF and ISAF took place in October 2006, the differences between the visions of intervention were fully revealed and started to grow. For Washington, the top priority was still to fight the insurgents and terrorists; comprehensive reconstruction of Afghanistan was seen as merely a means to such an end. For many European NATO members, in turn, and for some other ISAF members (e.g. Australia, Sweden, Asian countries), rebuilding Afghanistan was a central objective in its own right.49 Tensions among the allies diminished with the adoption of ISAF ’s Strategic Vision at the NATO Summit in Bucharest (April 2008, complemented by the secret Comprehensive Strategic Political Military Plan – CSPMP), and even more after the development of the new strategy of involvement in Afghanistan in 2009. Although US authorities formulated the strategy on their own, its main principles suited the other allies. Therefore, from that moment on, and especially once the members of ISAF and Afghan authorities launched the Inteqal process, the differences among the allies

Afghanistan   83 decreased and were related to rather technical issues (e.g. the pace of withdrawing the forces and of transferring competences to the Afghan National Security Forces – ANSF ).

4.3  The course of the intervention The military intervention in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom), began on 7 October 2001 with US air force airstrikes. After destroying really meagre Taliban anti-­air defence (achieved within days), these were aimed primarily against major concentrations and bases of Taliban forces, to prepare conditions for a successful ground offensive. Such an offensive was, however, conducted mainly by the local forces of the Northern Alliance (approximately 20,000 fighters, against 80,000–100,000 Taliban soldiers), supported by US special forces, marines and CIA agents (approximately 1,800 personnel in October, 7,050 in December 2001) as well as small units from other allies (the UK, Canada, Australia).50 It began in early November, and the breakthrough happened on 10 November when forces commanded by Abdul Rashid Dostum took Mazar-­i-Sharif in northern Afghanistan. A day later Taliban forces in the Bamyan and Herat provinces surrendered, on 13 November Kabul was taken without resistance, and on 26 November, after a 12-day siege, the allied forces captured Kunduz, defended by some 5,000 Taliban fighters. Subsequently the fighting moved to Kandahar, a bastion of the Taliban. It was captured on 7 December, but the Taliban leader Mullah Omar managed to flee to northern Pakistan. Already during the fighting in Kandahar the Bonn conference on future of Afghanistan was held, during which the plan for the country’s comprehensive reconstruction was formulated and Hamid Karzai, the leader of one of the smaller Pashtun clans, was chosen to be acting president (5 December).51 The intensive clashes lasted until 17 December, in the mountainous area of Tora Bora at the border with Pakistan, where Osama bin Laden was supposedly hiding; however, he was not apprehended then. This initial phase of the intervention ended with the establishment of the ISAF by the UNSC (S/RES/1386, 20 December 2001) and the new Afghan authorities’ swearing-­in ceremony (22 December 2001).52 In the next phase (2002–2006), Western involvement was simultaneously executed within OEF and ISAF. The first, conducted primarily by Americans, retained a strictly kinetic character. Its main objective, especially under the status of anti-­terrorist mission until the end of 2004, was to combat Al-­Qaeda and other terrorist groups rather than countering Taliban influence or state reconstruction.53 The activity of ISAF, in turn, was aimed at the rebuilding of Afghanistan, and the biggest contingents were provided by Canada and European NATO members (Germany, UK, Italy, France, Turkey, the Netherlands). ISAF was not very large, however (Table 4.1), and until 2003 the scope of its operations was limited to the area of Kabul. Immediately after the fall of the Taliban, the situation in Afghanistan seemed close to lasting stability, but already at the end of 2002 the resistance from

84   Marek Madej Table 4.1  The numerical strength of the international forces in Afghanistan in 2002–2006 Year

OEF (US troops)*

ISAF**

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

  5,200 10,400 15,200 19,100 20,400 (until October 2006)

  5,000   5,000 10,000 10,500 20,000 (October 2006) + 14,000 US troops

Source: author’s own compilation on the basis of: I.S. Livingston, M. O’Hanlon, Afghanistan Index (Brookings Washington, 31 July 2015) 5; A. Belasco, Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001–FY2012: Cost and Other Potential Issues (CRS Report, 2 July 2009) 9. Notes * Average monthly numerical strength of the forces deployed in Afghanistan (boots on the ground, BOG). ** Maximum numerical strength of ISAF in the given year (taking into account the overlapping rotation of the various contingents).

Taliban and other anti-­government groups started to grow. One prominent factor in this was the Iraqi crisis that eventually led to an intervention launched in March 2003. The crisis ‘drew away’ both the attention and resources of Washington and many of its allies from the seemingly ‘almost concluded’ war in Afghanistan. Equally important, however, was the rather small size of the forces involved there (light footprint) and inefficiencies of the model of ‘parallel engagement’. The process of rebuilding the country was slow (also because ISAF was initially deployed only to Kabul), OEF was overly focusing on forceful actions and capturing terrorists, and there was little coordination between the two operations.54 There were attempts to change that, not only by increasing the numbers of troops (despite the involvement in Iraq) but also by: the decision to launch the Provincial Reconstruction Teams under OEF (joint civilian and military reconstruction teams executing assistance and infrastructure programmes in selected provinces, although initially mainly in the relatively stable ones); takeover of ISAF command by NATO (11 August 2003); and expanding the ISAF mandate beyond Kabul (S/RES/1510 of 13 October 2003).55 Such expansion was implemented in stages, starting with the relatively stable northern provinces (1 October 2004), through the western ones (1 September 2005), to the most troubled southern (31 July 2006) and eastern provinces (October 2006).56 In the last two phases, some American units previously under OEF were put under NATO command, thus partially integrating the two missions and their tasks. As a result, ISAF became more kinetic in character, which the UNSC neither explicitly sanctioned nor opposed.57 These changes did not stop the growth of anti-­government activities, and in May 2005 the small-­scale movement turned into a full-­scale insurgency. As a result, in October 2006, Afghanistan was experiencing an intense conflict, and some areas, especially close to the border with Pakistan, were controlled by the rebels.58 The next phase of the intervention began in autumn 2006, when ISAF started launching combat operations, and lasted until the end of 2009. The intensity of

Afghanistan   85 the fighting increased considerably, as did the number of interveners’ troops (from 20,000 in 2006 to more than 53,000 in December 2008). Although foreign forces (ISAF plus OEF ) at that time successfully countered Taliban efforts to launch an open offensive (as proven by, for example, Operation Medusa, conducted in Kandahar in September 2006), the intensity of insurgency was constantly growing, which led to an even bigger reliance on kinetic solutions.59 Still, a number of allies, especially those whose contingents were deployed to the ‘calm’ northern and western provinces (Germany, Italy, Spain), continued to perceive ISAF primarily as a peace-­building mission, maintaining (although gradually abolishing) caveats on the use of their troops and remained unwilling to answer the increasingly urgent calls of the US or NATO structures for a greater contribution to the fight with the insurgents. Moreover, even the proponents of the ‘hard approach’ had discussions over the strategies employed (e.g. the US–UK dispute on the proportion between kinetic and non-­kinetic aspects of the counterinsurgency).60 In addition, the international (regional and global) context became more complicated as well: the conflict in Afghanistan had a destabilising impact on Pakistan (crucial to the success of ISAF as the mission’s main supply route and due to the ties between Pakistani authorities and the insurgents), where fighting between the local factions of the Taliban (including Pashtuns) and government forces broke out in the north of the country. This, as well as cases of violating Pakistan’s sovereignty by some interveners (including drone attacks conducted by the US from 2004 and intensified in 2008, which were being justified as part of the ongoing war on terrorism), made cooperation with Pakistan difficult, resulting in temporary blockades of ISAF ’s supply lines, among others. Additionally, the mission in Afghanistan was complicated by the deteriorating relations between the West and Russia (which was naturally drawing attention away from Afghan issues) and the growing weariness of Western countries (i.e. the strain put on their budgets) and their citizens caused by the long conflict, further intensified as of summer 2008 due to the financial crisis. As a result, despite intensified efforts by ISAF, towards the end of 2008 the situation in Afghanistan was deteriorating.61 A new approach to the mission was required. The direction of the changes had been signalled in ISAF ’s Strategic Vision adopted at the NATO Bucharest Summit (April 2008),62 but they were fully implemented only in 2009, after Obama assumed office as the US President. Obama presented the new strategy on 1 December 2009, thus symbolically opening the next phase of the conflict (2010–2012).63 The strategy was built on the idea of a temporary increase of the intensity of the fighting (for 18 months, until July 2011, with more than 130,000 soldiers between November 2010 and July 2011). The aim was to substantially weaken the insurgents and create conditions that would enable a focus on developing the Afghan structures’ capability to manage the situation on their own.64 This, in turn, would open the path to implementing the interveners’ exit strategy, under which the responsibility for the situation in the country would be gradually transferred to Afghan authorities. After adoption of the new strategy, ISAF was reinforced by an additional 30,000 US troops and almost 10,000 allied

86   Marek Madej troops and an anti-­Taliban offensive was launched in February 2010 in the south of Afghanistan. However, since the insurgents had a safe haven in northern Pakistan, virtually outside of the control of Islamabad (ambivalent in its attitude towards Taliban and the West), and given limited assets, the 2009–2011 offensive was only partially successful.65 Despite certain achievements in the south (albeit at the cost of heavy losses: 711 dead in 2010, 566 in 2011), as well as the elimination of Osama bin Laden himself (killed in Abbottabad in Pakistan on 2 May 2011; this act was, however, mainly symbolic and irrelevant for the developments in Afghanistan), the interveners were unable to prevail conclusively.66 This, however, did not dissuade them from continuing withdrawal as scheduled, marking 2014 as the end of the operation.67 In the second half of 2011 the intervention entered the final phase, with gradual reduction of combat involvement and greater emphasis on training the Afghan forces and preparing the country’s political structures to take full responsibility for the security in the country. This reduced ISAF ’s losses (402 dead in 2012, 161 in 2013, 75 in 201468), but not the casualties among Afghan forces or the civilian population. The Inteqal process initiated in 2011 was advancing regardless of the instability in many parts of the country, frequent acts of terrorism, poor performance of the ANSF, failure of economic and social reconstruction of the country, as well as deteriorating relations between the authorities in Kabul (especially President Karzai, whose term in office, however, was due to end in 2014) and Western governments, especially the US. From the end of 2012, the allies ceased their direct combat involvement, limiting themselves to training and assistance to ANSF. In 2013, the strength of ISAF was substantially reduced (Table 4.2), and in 2014 its last major task (performed successfully) was to secure the presidential elections, which were won by Ashraf Ghani (but only after additional negotiations with his main rival, Abdullah Abdullah). Finally, on 28 December 2014, the ISAF mission was ended and Table 4.2  The numerical strength of ISAF and its largest contingents Month/year

ISAF

US forces

British forces

November 2006 January 2007 November 2008 October 2009 February 2010 November 2010 January 2011 September 2011 September 2012 August 2013 April 2014 November 2014

32,800 35,460 51,100 67,700 85,795 130,930 132,381 130,670 112,579 87,201 51,178 28,360

11,800 14,000 19,950 31,855 47,085 90,000 90,000 90,000 74,400 60,000 33,500 18,180

6,000 5,200 8,745 9,000 9,500 9,500 9,500 9,500 9,500 7,700 5,200 2,837

Source: author’s own compilation on the basis of NATO ISAF Placemats, 2006–2014, www.nato. int/cps/en/natohq/107995.htm (accessed 10 May 2018).

Afghanistan   87 replaced with Operation Resolute Support, a much smaller training and advisory mission.69

4.4  Legal aspects 4.4.1  The legal basis and the institutional dimension It is commonly acknowledged that military intervention in Afghanistan had a sound but unique legal basis and a strong institutional legitimacy as engagement based on UNSC resolutions. Moreover, even more importantly, these resolutions (as well as the speeches delivered by the leaders of the US and other Western countries justifying the operation) directly invoked the right to individual and collective self-­defence guaranteed by the Charter of the United Nations (Article 51).70 As regards OEF, it is agreed that the international legal basis for the operation was the right of states to self-­defence, confirmed in this specific case by S/RES/1368 (12 September 2001) and S/RES/1371 (28 September 2001). The said documents condemned the 9/11 attacks as acts of terrorism constituting a threat to international peace and security, reminded the members of their responsibilities concerning combating terrorism and, above all, underlined the inalienable right of states to self-­defence. Consequently, although the resolutions did not explicitly state that the attacks were an act of aggression justifying the use of force, the very fact that they mentioned the right to self-­defence was interpreted in this way, especially (but not solely) by Washington.71 That was further solidified by the fact that NATO members and Australia invoked the obligation to provide assistance in the event of aggression (on 12 and 14 September, respectively, the latter under ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty)). Even less controversial issue is the legal and institutional legitimacy of ISAF, which were established under S/RES/1386 referring to Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the final conclusions of the Bonn conference on Afghanistan (Annex A, Paragraph 3).72 Still, certain implications of this interpretation of the intervention’s legal and institutional basis seem controversial. First, there are doubts whether actions of non-­state actors can in fact be deemed an act of aggression. Traditionally, in the doctrine of international law the notion of aggression referred exclusively to the activities of states. After 9/11, however, a new approach (rather revolutionary given its implications for the international legal order) gained popularity: that in light of S/RES/1368 and S/RES/1371 it is admissible to deem the actions of non­state actors an act of aggression, which would legitimise a military operation against the perpetrators as a form of self-­defence. However, even rejection of this view would not necessarily have undermined the justification for the intervention in Afghanistan based on right to self-­defence. In the case of the 9/11 attacks, not only Al-­Qaeda was deemed responsible, but also the Taliban government of Afghanistan, which, while not directly involved in the attacks,

88   Marek Madej p­ rovided support to Al-­Qaeda. This, in turn, would mean that the criterion of treating the attacks of 9/11 as an act of aggression committed by a state was met.73 However, considering the September attacks an act of aggression, and especially deeming the Taliban co-­responsible, gave rise to questions concerning the proportionality of response. For example, treating the Taliban as co-­responsible was not in line with the previously accepted standards of attributing actions or negligence under the articles developed by the International Law Commission concerning responsibility for actions at variance with international law.74 In this context, legal admissibility of a military response aimed not only at destroying the Al-­Qaeda network in Afghanistan but also at overthrowing the Taliban is not obvious.75 The period during which the right to self-­defence could remain the valid justification for the intervention in Afghanistan also required interpretation. For the US and the other countries participating in the operation, the continuity of fighting in Afghanistan after 2001, which varied in intensity but was essentially uninterrupted, as well as the unchanged identity of the enemy (terrorist groups and the Taliban) justified invoking the right to self-­defence throughout the duration of the operation, regardless of the changes to its organisational form.76 Furthermore, the legitimacy of the actual integration of the OEF and ISAF could cause doubts. Whereas in autumn 2006, when the decision was adopted, the subject was not disputed to any extent, the relevant UNSC documents speaking of the functioning of the two forces do not settle the issue, even though the merger in fact meant transforming ISAF into a combat-­oriented operation. S/ RES/1510 (13 October 2003), which is considered to have sanctioned this change, allowed for the extension of the ISAF mandate to include areas beyond Kabul and allowed the participants to use all means available to fulfil the goals of the mission, but it did not directly speak of the right to use force or transforming the operation into de facto combat mission.77 Despite all these doubts, there was no strong international criticism of the interveners’ actions and no attempts to question their legitimacy, either at the time when the intervention was launched, or during the operation. On the contrary, they were sanctioned, as were their consequences for Afghanistan (e.g. NATO’s taking charge of ISAF or extending the legal mandate to the whole territory of Afghanistan) by subsequent UNSC decisions extending the timeframe of ISAF or ordering cooperation and coordination of the actions of UN structures with the interveners’ forces. The legal basis and institutional legitimacy of the intervention in Afghanistan were therefore essentially never significantly challenged. 4.4.2  The intervention in Afghanistan in the context of international humanitarian law (IHL) Generally speaking, despite the complexity of the task, the assessment of the degree of compliance of the intervention in Afghanistan with the international law of armed conflict must be negative due to a number of violations of IHL over its course. Only some of them involved the intervening forces violating certain standards of conducting war without questioning their validity. Others were somewhat

Afghanistan   89 systemic and resulted from attempts – mainly by the US – to impose a specific interpretation of certain IHL provisions suiting the needs of the intervention as an element of GWOT (e.g. concerning the status of prisoners of war and belligerents) or even to challenge the relevance or binding power thereof in this conflict. This was partially the result of the complexity and changeability of the legal context – until the overthrow of the Taliban regime OEF was an international conflict between a US-­led coalition and the Taliban government of Afghanistan. But essentially, from the conference in Bonn (December 2001), and formally, from the formation of the first permanent government of Afghanistan (June 2002), it became a non-­international conflict, in which external forces assisted the new Afghan authorities (even if initially provisional) in combating armed opposition. As for ISAF, according to ICRC, it was subject to peace operation standards.78 This legal context remained in force until the partial integration of ISAF and OEF (autumn 2006), when the external involvement as a whole started to constitute support of a commonly recognised central Afghan government in internal armed conflict. At the same time, however, almost from the onset of the operation, the United Sates strived to have the operation in Afghanistan recognised as an element of GWOT, a special case, different from both international and non-­international conflicts, which would allow it to challenge the applicability of at least some principles of IHL;79 and although in the end no such additional category of conflict has been established in humanitarian law, the very fact that the US advocated its recognition influenced the course of the engagement in Afghanistan.80 4.4.2.1  Civilian losses and IHL violations during the operation One of the key issues in the humanitarian evaluation of the conduct of any intervention is the scale of casualties among the civilian population. There is, however, no complete record of these losses for the whole intervention (especially not for the years 2003–2005), and it is even more difficult to find precise data concerning the extent to which the intervention forces were responsible for civilian casualties. Still, according to some estimates, between 2001 and 2014 approximately 26,270 civilians lost their lives (and 29,970 were wounded) as a direct result of the fighting.81 In the initial phase of the intervention (overthrowing of the Taliban – 2001), direct civilian casualties of air bombardments under OEF (caused solely by Western countries) were estimated at 1,000–1,300 lives.82 Additional casualties were caused by ground operations conducted mostly (but not exclusively) by local forces. There were certainly IHL violations during these operations as well.83 Data for 2001–2006 concerning civilian losses and IHL violations by Western forces are fragmented and imprecise. The number of civilian casualties and IHL violations was probably not high due to the low (albeit growing) intensity of the fighting. However, at that time the interveners relied on measures that entailed considerable risk of IHL violations and civilian losses, often taking advantage of air support for ground operations (also because of the small size of the ground force), as well as conducting ‘night raids’ and ‘search and capture/destroy’

90   Marek Madej ­ issions to apprehend or eliminate suspected terrorists or insurgents, justified by m the then anti-­terrorist nature of OEF.84 These practices were continued also after integration of ISAF and OEF (years 2006–2008), when, in addition, the intensity of the fighting was rapidly growing. The negative consequences of the tactics used (including in the context of the local population’s support) induced the interveners to change them, and starting especially from mid-­2009, when General McChrystal formulated the new ISAF strategic approach (see section 4.3), the intervention forces reduced their dependence on air support for ground operations to limit their negative impact on the civilian population (Table 4.3).85 Table 4.3  Civilian casualties of the war in Afghanistan between 2007 and 2014 Year

Fatalities

Fatalities caused by antigovernment forces

Other Fatalities caused by progovernment and international forces [by air strikes]

2007

1,523

    700 (46%)

2008

2,118

  1,160 (55%)

2009

2,412 (5,978)*

  1,630 (67%) (n.a.)*

2010

2,777 (7,120)*

  2,080 (75%) (5,446)*

2011

3,133 (7,842)*

  2,332 (75%) (5,981)*

2012

2,754 (7,559)*

  2,179 (79%) (6,131)*

2013

2,959 (8,615)*

  2,311 (78%) (6,374)*

2014

3,699 (10,548)*

  2,643 (71%) (7,489)*

2007–2014

21,375 (47,662)**

15,035 (31,421)***

  629 (41%) [n.a.]   828 (39%) [552]   596 (25%) (n.a.)* [359]   440 (16%) (840)* [171]   410 (13%) (745)* [235]   316 (12%) (587)* [125]   341 (12%) (956)* [118]   622 (17%) (1,477)* [104] 4,182 (4,605)*** [1,664]

  194 (13%)   130 (6%)   186 (8%) (n.a.)*   257 (9%) (834)*   391 (12%) (1,116)*   259 (9%) (841)*   307 (10%) (1,285)*   434 (12%) (1,582)* 2158 (5,658)***

Source: author’s own compilation on the basis of annual UNAMA reports Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict for years 2007–2014. Notes * Killed and injured in total. ** Years 2009–2014. *** Years 2010–2014.

Afghanistan   91 As a result, from 2009 to 2012 the numbers of civilian casualties caused by the pro-­government forces decreased (even despite the considerable growth in overall civilian casualties due to intensive fighting between 2009 and 2011). The fact that this trend was reversed in the last two years of the intervention could be attributed to the taking over of responsibility for the kinetic actions by the local forces (at that time ISAF was conducting only limited combat operations). 4.4.2.2  IHL and human rights violations over the course of the GWOT86 Assuming that the intervention in Afghanistan, especially in its initial phase, was an element of GWOT and that the latter clearly differs, also in legal terms, from what is traditionally understood as an armed conflict (both international and non-­international), the US government argued (albeit without explicit support and even with opposition of some of their allies) that a special legal status should also be attributed to the members of anti-­government groups in Afghanistan: the Taliban, Al-­Qaeda and other groups that were considered terrorist. Pointing out that the Taliban government had no international recognition (including by the US) and that terrorist groups are by definition illegal and do not constitute a regular military, the US demanded the right to treat members of these formations as ‘unlawful combatants’.87 This would mean they would lose the protection to which they were entitled as civilians because of their involvement in the fighting; and having this ‘illegal’ status they would also have no right to enjoy the privileges granted to soldiers (including prisoner-­of-war status).88 Even though the concept of ‘unlawful combatants’ was at variance with the Geneva Conventions89 and was not internationally accepted, US forces treated members of those formations as if this status was applicable to them, especially until combat operations were conducted almost exclusively under OEF. This resulted in gross violations of human rights and IHL in relation to the captured Taliban and the alleged members of Al-­Qaeda and other terrorist groups, including, first of all, illegal, baseless and indefinite detention of said individuals in prisons or penal institutions in Afghanistan (e.g. in Bagram and Kandahar) or abroad (including, from 2002, in the US Guantanamo Bay detention camp in Cuba and a network of secret CIA prisons – ‘black sites’ – located in various countries90). The detainees were also denied the right to due process and fair trial91 and were tortured during interrogations. Importantly, the practice of inflicting torture (including waterboarding, sleep deprivation, beatings, etc.) was a structural problem: by decision of relevant US authorities it was legalised under US internal law as ‘extensive interrogation techniques’.92 Moreover, individuals apprehended in Afghanistan were transferred to countries suspected of practicing torture. Cases of torture in Afghanistan were especially frequent between 2002 and 2004, before world media (including Western) published information on these practices in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and in Baghram (May 2004).93

92   Marek Madej

4.5  Public attitudes towards the intervention The evolution of public support for the mission had a substantial impact on the course of the intervention and eventually led to a redefinition of its goals.94 Initially, the intervention was widely supported in the participating countries, especially in the US (93 per cent in October 2001). But already in 2002, the support of Western societies (including American) for continuing the mission once the Taliban were removed from power started to decline, slowly but steadily.95 Nonetheless, until 2006 and the actual integration of OEF and ISAF the support for the involvement remained stable, although after the launch of the operation in Iraq it attracted much less public attention.96 When ISAF took over the brunt of responsibility for the operation (fall 2006) the support for the mission temporarily increased (except in the US, where the decline only slowed down), but considerable differences in this regard were also revealed between Europe (and Canada) and the US, which eventually proved important for the course of the operation. Although the engagement in Afghanistan was still received well in almost all the participating countries, most European societies were at the same time strongly against European participation in combat operations.97 Thus, the growing intensity of the fighting in Afghanistan, especially with the meagre achievements, translated into negative predictions regarding the prospects for success. As a result, in 2010 only in the US did the majority of society keep supporting the intervention (but just 51 per cent).98 Further war fatigue among Western societies was not mitigated even by changes in mission strategy from the end of 2009 and NATO decision to transfer responsibility for security over to Afghan authorities by 2014, which would in fact mean the end of the intervention. Despite some positive signs (such as growing acceptance of training activities in Afghanistan among some allies), both general support for the mission (in 2011 supporters were in the minority even in the US) and optimism regarding its possible outcome were dropping, which resulted in demands for withdrawal of the forces deployed.99 Furthermore, from 2012, public interest in the situation in Afghanistan started waning. As a result, in the last years of the operation (2013–2014) support fell to its lowest level, even in the US it was only a mere 20 per cent of society, and Europeans especially started believing that it was not worth it.100 The reasons behind this decrease in public support were complex and varied depending on the country. However, what seems common for all of them is the gradual but irreversible loss of faith in the success of the Western engagement. This, in turn, was caused by the situation in Afghanistan: the increasing intensity of the fighting despite the intervener’s growing outlays and losses, the Taliban having managed to regain their position, growing economic difficulties and disillusionment of society, also due to corruption and the weakness of the central authority, which was also increasingly ambivalent towards the West.101 Additionally, important for almost all the participants was the changing nature of the declared goals of the mission.102 In some countries, yet another possible factor were negative positions on the intervention in Iraq. Apart from that, especially in

Afghanistan   93 some European countries (like Poland), the intervention was viewed as overly long and most probably unsuccessful, which created concerns about its impact on NATO and the stability of the transatlantic or bilateral relations with the US.103 The importance of widespread pessimism regarding the success of the mission is also evidenced, albeit indirectly, by the changes in attitudes towards intervention after the strategic adaptation of late 2009 and the decisions on the Inteqal process. The limited increase in positive assessments of some aspects (like support for shifting the emphasis to training activity) was probably the result of what we might describe as Western societies resigning themselves to failure and supporting the actual reduction of the interveners’ ambitions, which might help to minimise losses and bring about a fairly responsible end to the engagement.104

4.6  The outcome Obviously, it is risky to assess the results of the intervention in Afghanistan shortly after the conclusion of ISAF and with ongoing Western military involvement in the country (in form of training mission Resolute Support). Nevertheless, it seems to be a failure. Yes, some objectives of the intervention have been almost fully completed: Al-­Qaeda structures in Afghanistan have been dismantled and most of its leaders have been eliminated (including Osama bin Laden – although as late as in 2011, when his role in the organisation was marginal); the Taliban government has been overthrown.105 Moreover, these objectives had in fact been achieved in the initial phase of the intervention. At the same time, however, the interveners failed to put a definite end to the internal conflict in Afghanistan and establish stable statehood, based on the rule of law and democratic principles and with a relatively efficient, sustainable economy. Furthermore, although the intervention was to help tame terrorist activity in the world, that was not achieved either. While it indeed considerably weakened Al-­ Qaeda (although not destroying it completely), it simultaneously contributed to a surge of terrorist activity on the local scale (before 2001 virtually absent in Afghanistan), and also stimulated (although not as the sole or even the major factor) terrorism by Islamic extremists in other parts of the world.106 Moreover, troubles encountered over the course of the mission significantly caused reduction of its goals, to merely ‘relative stabilisation’ of Afghanistan and providing the country – mainly through the development of its security forces and through financial assistance – with the capability of countering armed opposition without external support. Still, in the end even the less ambitious plans have not been fully realised. Some positive, although rather limited results have been achieved in the context of state reconstruction. Chiefly due to international efforts (but more thanks to development assistance than military actions alone), the condition of the Afghan economy was improved, as evidenced by the growth of Afghanistan’s GDP and the development of infrastructure.107 Furthermore, citizens’ living conditions improved as well.108 The Afghan security force was expanded

94   Marek Madej (built up from scratch, in fact) to the level of 340,000.109 The state political system started to be somewhat more functional and effective, having some democratic elements, such as relative freedom enjoyed by political parties (or rather factions) and, at least periodically, regular parliamentary and presidential elections (albeit plagued by considerable deficiencies).110 However, all these achievements are conditional. The massive fraud during the 2014 presidential elections (the outcome of which had to be eventually settled by an extra-­constitutional agreement between the two main candidates arranged by the US) and the postponement of the 2015 parliamentary elections due to an unstable situation in the country might indicate that progress in the democratisation of Afghanistan, meagre though it was, will turn out to be just temporary and ‘reversible’ and that the country is already unable to maintain rudimentary democratic electoral procedures.111 Although noticeable, the economic growth has not translated into any considerable social advance of Afghanistan (e.g. in the HDI ranking it ranks the same as before the intervention – 169th), and the state structures established after the intervention are marked by widespread nepotism, corruption and inefficiency. Moreover, there are at least two reasons why these achievements are unlikely to be lasting. First, Afghanistan remains heavily dependent on international financial assistance and financial benefits from the very presence of international forces in the country (e.g. in the form of customs fees or the revenue of local companies from servicing them), and at least the latter will inevitably decrease after 2014.112 Second, the insurgents managed to retain some military potential and capability to destabilise the country. As a result, in 2015 and later, the intensity of clashes and, more importantly, the scale of the problems it caused for the civilian population remained essentially the same and the Taliban even managed to take control of some districts (around 30 per cent of the country’s territory at the end of 2015, according to Afghan officials).113 Finally, evaluating of the effectiveness of the intervention should take into account the costs (of all kind) incurred to achieve these limited results. The international forces lost almost 3,500 soldiers in the operation (Table 4.4). Although Table 4.4  Estimates of direct casualties of the fighting in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014

US forces Other international forces Personnel of private military and security companies (PMCs) Afghan police and armed forces (ANSF) The Taliban and other rebel groups Civilians (citizens of Afghanistan and international personnel) Total Source: Crawford (2015). Notes * Data incomplete. ** Data for UK, Canadian, French and German contingents.

Killed

Injured*

2,357 1,139 3,401 23,470 35,000 26,626 91,993

20,067 3,800** 13,480 17,000 15,000 3,229 72,576

Afghanistan   95 it is rather impossible to precisely assess the total cost of the military engagement of all intervening parties, the direct outlays probably exceeded, by far, a trillion dollars, given that US costs alone are estimated at approximately US$718 billion.114 The development aid for Afghanistan should be also taken into account – according to World Bank data, the country received at least US$52.8 billion in aid (mainly from the West).115 A separate problem is the impact of the intervention on the cohesion of the West and on its international position. Undoubtedly, especially ISAF were meant to manifest solidarity and unity of Western countries in light of contemporary threats (it is not a coincidence that all members of NATO participated in it, and including the partners the total number of countries was 51). Over the course of the mission, however, there were a number of tensions among the participants. In the first years of the involvement, they were primarily caused by unilateral US actions, using allied support only to a small extent (even when they could offer substantial assets). Later, Western cohesion was already strongly affected both by differences in the hierarchy of the priorities (the combating terrorism vs. rebuilding Afghanistan dispute between the US and Europe) and the strategies and methods used. These divergences resulted in considerable differences in the scale and nature of the involvement – especially military – in Afghanistan, which further exacerbated disproportionate burden-­sharing among the participants, in particular NATO members. That led to even greater differences in perceptions of the ‘fairness’ of burden-­sharing between the allies, especially the US and Europe.116 Additionally, Afghani intervention seriously drained the defence budgets of NATO countries, causing slowdown of the modernisation of military potentials, particularly of the Europeans, and further widening the gap between them and the US. Finally, this massive but eventually unsuccessful intervention considerably decreased Western countries’ credibility as the guarantors of international stability. All in all, the intervention in Afghanistan, being the largest Western undertaking of this kind in the post-­Cold War period, did not contribute essentially to either improving the intervener’s security or increasing international stability on the regional and global scale.

Notes    1 Mohammed Daoud also took power in 1973 by overthrowing king Mohammad Zahir Shah. S.G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (W.W. Norton, New York 2010) 11–18.    2 J. Modrzejewska-­Leśniewska, Talibowie (WSH, Pultusk 2001) 9–17.    3 J. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York 2003) 109–111.    4 Jones (2010) 57–63.    5 J. Modrzejewska-­Leśniewska (2001) 28–38; Apart from that, the Taliban were locally opposed by some local warlords, including Ismail Khan (Herat Province) and General Abdul Rashid Dostum (leader of the Uzbeks from the north).    6 Modrzejewska-­Leśniewska (2001) 95.    7 R. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (Berkley Trade, New York 2003) 52–61.

96   Marek Madej    8 Afghanistan, Human Development Report 2013, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/ files/Country-­Profiles/AFG.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). According to IMF, in the financial year 2001/2002 the country’s GDP was merely US$2.463 million, and GDP per capita was US$123. Islamic State of Afghanistan. IMF Country Report 5/34 (2005) www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr0534.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018).    9 In 1999, Afghanistan produced approximately 4,600 tonnes of opium (79 per cent of global production). In 2000 (after a drought and after the Taliban introduced an official ban, which was however de facto their monopoly on poppy cultivation) it was approximately 3,300 tonnes (70 per cent of global production). Back in 1989 it was approximately 1,200 tonnes (35 per cent of global production). Global Illicit Drug Trends 2001 (UN ODCCP, New York 2001) 32–38.   10 Human Development Report 2014 (UNDP, New York 2014) 166. Only 36 per cent of the adult population (approximately 19.7 million in 2000) were literate, 70 per cent of the population were malnourished, and the scholarisation index was at roughly 30 per cent. World Development Indicators: Population Dynamics, http:// wdi.worldbank.org/table/2.1 (accessed 10 May 2018).   11 An even bigger Pashtun population lives in northern Pakistan, while Tajiks live also in Tajikistan.   12 CIA World Factbook 2001 (‘Afghanistan’), www.cia.gov/library/publications/down load/download-­2001/index.html (accessed 10 May 2018).   13 Jones (2010) 46–53.   14 For example, UNSC S/RES/1076 of 22 October 1996 called for an end to the fighting, expressing concerns that otherwise it would contribute to the development of terrorism.   15 The resolution imposed a ban on flights and froze Taliban financial assets outside Afghanistan (earlier, in UNSC S/RES/1214 of 8 December 1998, the UNSC demanded the Taliban hand over Osama bin Laden). In the following years, due to the uncooperative attitude of the Taliban, the sanctions were gradually broadened (UNSC S/RES/1233 of 19 December 2000 and S/RES/1363 of 30 July 2001).   16 Jones (2010) 62.   17 Two days earlier, Ahmad Shah Massoud, the leader of the Northern Alliance, was killed in a successful Al-­Qaeda attack. Gunaratna (2003) 67.   18 The provisions of UNSC S/RES/1368 were considerably expanded by S/RES/1373 of 28 September 2001.   19 The decision was implemented on 2 October, after confirming the external inspiration of the attacks.   20 I.H. Daalder, J.M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Wiley, Hoboken 2005) 98–104; B. Woodward, Bush at War (Simon & Schuster, New York 2002) 65–66, 113–120.   21 The conditions of the ultimatum were non-­negotiable. G.W. Bush, Address to the joint session of the 107th Congress, 20 September 2001.   22

Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. […] any nation that continues to harbour or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime. (Ibid.)

  23 D. Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (Harper, New York 2008) 47–50.   24 S. Rynning, NATO in Afghanistan: The Liberal Disconnect (Stanford University Press, Stanford 2012) 75–80; B. Schreer, The evolution of NATO’s strategy in Afghanistan, in: H. Edstrom, D. Gyllensporre (ed.), Pursuing Strategy: NATO Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddafi (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2012) 143–144.

Afghanistan   97   25 Rynning (2012) 83–87.   26 D. Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act (USIP, Washington 2014) 135; W. Chin, Britain and the War on Terror: Policy, Strategy and Operations (Routledge, Farnham 2013) 145–146.   27 G.W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Operations in Afghanistan, 7 October 2001; T. Blair’s statement, 7 October 2001, www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/07/ afghanistan.terrorism11 (accessed 10 May 2018).   28 Even before 9/11 the UNSC has frequently deemed terrorism a threat to peace and human rights.   29 ‘We defend not only our precious freedoms, but also the freedom of people everywhere to live and raise their children free from fear’ – G.W. Bush (2001a). In the speech of 20 September, Bush mentioned other countries (e.g. Pakistan, Israel, India, Iran, Mexico) whose citizens died in the World Trade Centre and emphasised that terrorists were striving to overthrow the governments in Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, among others.   30 Speaking on 7 October 2001, Blair mentioned the damage the 9/11 attacks caused to the British and world economy (the tourism industry, airlines) and the need to prevent further production of drugs in Afghanistan (being a source of 90 per cent of heroine consumed in the UK). Thus the UK’s PM indicated certain economic motives for the intervention, albeit primarily to complement and strengthen other elements of the justification, especially for the domestic audience.   31 See Yost (2014) 135–141; Rynning (2012) 71–75.   32 See, for example, C. de Jonge Oudraat, The role of Security Council, in: J. Boulden, T.G. Weiss (eds), Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11 (Indiana University Press, Bloomington 2004) 156–157.   33 More: Modrzejewska-­Leśniewska (2001) 98–136.   34 In the context of the mission’s effectiveness raising such a controversial issue in the traditionalist Afghan society was risky, since it could provoke an opposition from local political and social elites. J. Burke, The 9/11 Wars (Penguin, London 2012) 82. The consistency of the declared motives with the actual ones is also confirmed somewhat by the fact that before the 9/11 attacks, neither the US nor other Western countries had prepared any plans for a military operation in Afghanistan. This means that the country had not been perceived as a source of serious and direct threat requiring a military response. Daalder, Lindsay (2005) 98–99.   35 This shift of emphasis was evidenced by the small number of troops engaged in the combat actions within the framework of OEF, as well as its composition (mainly the US, which indicates that the other allies had little interest in this kind of involvement in Afghanistan), while at the same time the outlays on non-­military aspects of rebuilding Afghanistan were increasing. Jones (2010) 115–124.   36 J. Ringsmose, S. Rynning, NATO’s New Strategic Concept: A Comprehensive Assessment, DIIS Report 46 (2011) 2; Interestingly, the impact of production of drugs in Afghanistan on the security of Western states was seldom highlighted, probably because the allies were reluctant to combat this phenomenon, fearing the economic consequences of it for a large share of the Afghan population. D. Korski, Afghanistan: Europe’s Forgotten War (2008) 4 ECFR Policy Paper 13–14.   37 S.J. Cimbala, K.P. Forster, Multinational Military Intervention: NATO Policy, Strategy and Burden Sharing (Ashgate, Farnham 2010) 153.   38 See, for example, J. Risen, U.S. identifies vast mineral riches in Afghanistan (2010) New York Times, 13 June 2010.   39 This is evidenced not by the decision to gradually hand over the responsibility for security in the country to Afghan structures (the Inteqal – ‘transition’) but rather by the fact that the ‘fixed’ date of concluding the operation in 2014 had been adopted already in 2010 and by the implementation of the consecutive phases of the Inteqal, formally depending on a suitable security situation in the country and the degree of

98   Marek Madej

  40   41

  42   43   44

readiness of the relevant local institutions, essentially regardless of the extent to which the criteria set out earlier had been met (or even if not met at all). In other words, although the transfer of responsibility was to depend on the situation in the individual parts of Afghanistan, in fact it was taking place regardless of the situation (see section 4.3). S. Biddle, Afghanistan’s legacy: Emerging lessons of an ongoing war (2014) 2 The Washington Quarterly 80–82. Bush (2001), Address to the Joint Session and Address to the Nation; Blair (2001). According to some sources (e.g. Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense under President Bush), the US administration (DoD) did not consider building stable Afghan statehood, although it was desirable, a strategic goal of US involvement. Especially the ‘hawks’ among neo-­conservatives (Chenney, Rumsfeld) called for serving a merely supporting role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan after the conflict (justifying this by the reluctance shown by Afghans towards externally imposed solutions). Feith (2008) 101; G. Rose, How Wars End: Why We Fight the Last Battle. A History of American Intervention from World War I to Afghanistan (Simon & Schuster, New York 2010) 283. The strongest proponents of such a view were countries of NATO’s Eastern Flank, but such arguments were raised by the other European allies as well. Yost (2014) 141–143. Schreer (2012) 144–146. Our overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-­ Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future. To meet that goal […] we must deny Al-­ Qaeda a safe-­haven. We must reverse the Taliban’s momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government. And we must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s Security Forces and government, so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan’s future.  (B. Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Westpoint, 1 December 2009)

  45 See, for example, documents concerning Afghanistan from the NATO Summits in Lisbon (20 November 2010) and Chicago (21 May 2012).   46 A. Cordesman, Afghanistan at Transition: Lessons from the Longest War (CSIS, Boulder/New York/London 2015) 7–10.   47 Schreer (2012) 142.   48 In this period (especially in 2003 and 2004), France was the one to show the greatest scepticism of US actions within OEF, at the same time being very interested in the success of ISAF. More: Rynning (2012) 87–110.   49 Because of that the US sharply criticised its ‘passive’ allies for ‘avoiding a fight’. R. Gates, Speech at the 44th Munich Conference, 10 February 2008. There was a joke popular among American soldiers in which ISAF stood for ‘I Saw Americans Fight’.   50 As early as in mid-­September CIA (the Jawbreaker team) and US special forces personnel were deployed on territory controlled by the anti-­Taliban opposition in order to win support (also through bribery) of the Northern Alliance and some local leaders (e.g. Abdul Rashid Dostum, Ismail Khan). Using mainly local forces for ground operations lowered the financial and political cost of the intervention and made earlier launching possible (deploying large forces from Western countries would require long preparations and diplomatic efforts). Jones (2010) 89–91; Woodward (2002) 51–53, 140–144.   51 Rynning (2012) 41–44.   52 Jones (2010) 91–95.   53 D. Barno, Fighting ‘the other war’: Counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan 2003–2005 (2007) 5 Military Review 33–34.

Afghanistan   99   54 Yost (2014) 139–141; Cimbala, Forster (2010) 156–166.   55 V. Morelli, P. Belkin, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance (CRS Report, 3 December 2009) 9–14, 23–30.   56 Rynning (2012) 50.   57 After the decision of 2003 to extend the mandate of ISAF to areas beyond the capital, the UNSC prolonged the Force’s mandate every six months, even though ISAF operations in the south and east involved direct combat against the insurgents (see section 4.4).   58 Cimbala, Forster (2010) 152–153.   59 Despite the partial merging of ISAF and OEF and increase in numerical strength, the foreign forces remained relatively small (substantially smaller in relation to the country’s area and population than in the case of the operations in Kosovo or Bosnia-­Herzegovina, and even the intervention in Iraq). Yost (2014) 140; Cimbala, Forster (2010) 156–159.   60 The concern was that focusing on kinetic operations, as advocated by the US, combined with the attempts to destroy the drug industry as the main source of enemy’s funding (but also a source of income for 3.5–5 million people), would eventually alienate society and make it impossible to conduct successful negotiations between the parties to the Afghan conflict. S. Cowper-­Coles, Countering the Afghan insurgency: Three lessons learned, in: P. Dixon (ed.), The British Approach to Counter­ insurgency: From Malaya and Northern Ireland to Iraq and Afghanistan (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2012) 338–342.   61 Cimbala, Forster (2010) 155; Schreer (2012) 147.   62 Alongside NATO’s secret CSPMP, it set out the specific goals of the involvement within the framework of the four pillars of NATO’s comprehensive strategy in Afghanistan: ISAF combat operations; ANSF development; development of civilian structures (especially the judiciary, putting a curb on opium, administration); regional diplomacy (especially cooperation with Pakistan and the countries of Central Asia). It did not involve, however, decisions on the strengthening of the force deployed to Afghanistan. Rynning (2012) 144–151.   63 It was based on the Commander’s Initial Assessment of the state of the operation in August 2009, drawn up by General Stanley McChrystal, commander of ISAF from June 2009. Declaring ‘[t]he situation in Afghanistan is serious; neither success nor failure can be taken for granted’, McChrystal proposed focusing on providing security to the population instead of on controlling territory. He advocated expanding the Afghan military and police as well as developing their cooperation with ISAF. This, however, required previous intensification of counterinsurgency activities, possible after reinforcing of ISAF with an additional 40,000–80,000 soldiers, in line with the surge strategy implemented in 2006 in Iraq. Commander’s Initial Assessment, 30 August 2009, www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/090830mcchrystal.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018).   64 The strategy also emphasised the significance of combating terrorists (Al-­Qaeda) and, in the long run, expanding the ANSF, improving the situation of the general population and quality of governance. It also stressed the importance of the regional context of the mission, especially the situation in Pakistan. Obama (2009).   65 Reinforcing with merely 40,000 troops (some 38,000 actually deployed) made it impossible to conduct the offensive simultaneously in the most unstable south and east of Afghanistan. So it was limited to the south, which allowed the Taliban to safely withdraw from there primarily to the eastern provinces bordering on Pakistan. That resulted in a much slower advance of the ISAF offensive: for example, the fight for the town of Marjah in Helmand lasted four months instead of four weeks (as planned). Biddle (2014) 75–78.   66 Moreover, the Taliban had not only survived, but also brought conflict to regions previously quite calm (the north) and intensified terrorist attacks, such as, among

100   Marek Madej

  67

  68   69   70

  71

  72   73

  74

  75   76   77   78   79

  80   81

others, that on Burhanuddin Rabbani (head of the Peace Council, responsible for peace negotiations with opposition) in Kabul (20 September 2011). Afghan peace council head Rabbani killed in attack, www.bbc.com/news/world-­southasia-­14985779 (accessed 10 May 2018). Officially, all the time frames agreed upon were ‘condition based, not calendar driven’ (‘2014 as a goal, not a guarantee’). In fact, the allies interpreted them as binding, regardless of the situation in Afghanistan, indicating their weariness with the mission. R. Chaudri, T. Farell, Campaign disconnect: Operational progress and strategic obstacles in Afghanistan, (2011) 2 International Affairs 290. www.icasualties.org (accessed 10 May 2018). See Cordesman (2015) 23–58. However, if the 9/11 attacks were an act of aggression against the US, Washington could execute the right of individual or collective self-­defence regardless of the position of international bodies, on the basis of the decision of the national authorities – President and Congress. More: Terrorist Attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon (2002) 1 The American Journal of International Law 237–255. When commenting on the adoption of S/RES/1368, the US representative to the UN stressed – referring to President Bush’s statement on the day of the attacks – that ‘no distinction would be made between those who committed those acts and those who harboured the criminals’, while the Russian representative Sergey Lavrov declared that the US had become the target of an unprecedented act of aggression [italic added – MM]. Security Council condemns, ‘in strongest terms’, terrorist attacks on the US, UNSC Press release SC/7143, 12 September 2001. Rynning (2012) 43–44. More: M. Kowalski, Armed attack, non-­state actors and a quest for the attribution standard (2010) 30 Polish Yearbook of International Law 101–130. It is worthy of note, however, that the Taliban were not recognised as Afghanistan’s legal government by the US, or by the vast majority of UN members. Tolerating the presence of terrorist groups on own territory does not imply approving their actions and does not give them the status of state organs. F. Mégret, ‘War’? Legal semantics and the move to violence (2002) 2 European Journal of International Law 383–384; A. Cassese, Terrorism is also disrupting some crucial legal categories of international law (2002) 5 European Journal of International Law 993. J. Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and Use of Force by States (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004) 145. D. Bethlehem, Principles relevant to the scope of a state right of self-­defense against an imminent or actual armed attack by nonstate actors (2012) 106 American Journal of International Law 1–8. The resolution itself speaks of close cooperation between ISAF and OEF, but still as separate entities. UNSC S/RES/1510 (2003). Afghanistan. Applicable international law, www.rulac.org/browse/conflicts/non-­ international-armed-­conflicts-in-­afghanistan#collapse2accord (accessed 10 May 2018). Some American lawyers advocated for the introduction of a third category of conflict to IHL – namely ‘non-­international armed conflict’ (conflict between a state and a transnational entity taking place on the territory of third countries). P. Alston, Report of Special Raporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, Addendum, Study on targeted killings (2010) UN GA A/HRC/14/24/ Add.6, 17. Note that there are also differences between Western countries in terms of acceptance of the individual IHL standards; for example, the US is not a party to the additional protocols of 1977. N.C. Crawford, War-­Related Death, Injury and Displacement in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2001–2014, COW Project, 22 May 2015, http//watson.brown.edu/­

Afghanistan   101   82   83

  84   85

  86   87

  88   89

  90

  91

  92

costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2015/War Related Casualties Afghanistan and Pakistan 2001–2014 FIN.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). C. Conetta, Strange Victory: A Critical Appraisal of Operation Enduring Freedom and the Afghanistan War (PDA, Cambridge 2002) 7. The most serious violations of IHL took place – in the presence and partially with participation of Western (US) personnel – in the area of Mazar-­i-Sharif, where approximately 400 people were killed during the suppression of a riot of captured Taliban and foreign volunteers (25–26 November 2001); the operation was the consequence of the death of a CIA agent, the first American killed during the intervention. Furthermore, several sources claimed that towards the end of 2001 at least 1,500–3,000, perhaps even as many as 5,000, out of the 7,500 prisoners of war from Mazar-­i-Sharif transported to the Qala Zaini prison never made it to the destination. L. Finnegan, Questions Asked: News Coverage Since 9/11 (Praeger, London 2006) 116; Burke (2012) 89. The latter practice was accompanied by unjustified violence against the civilian population, including beatings and humiliating suspects (setting dogs on them, etc.). Burke (2012) 71–72. It was recommended to avoid civilian casualties even when this increased the risk to ISAF personnel (a practice referred to as ‘courageous restraint’). P. Dixon, Bringing it all back home: The militarisation of Britain and the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, in: P. Dixon (ed.), The British Approach to Counterinsurgency: From Malaya and Northern Ireland to Iraq and Afghanistan (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2012) 137–138. These issues are discussed in detail in Bieńczyk-Missala’s Chapter 10 in this volume. Other term used in this context were ‘enemy combatant’ and, later, ‘unprivileged belligerent’, an expression used by US military lawyers already in the 1950s. A.M. Danner, Defining unlawful enemy combatants: A centripetal story (2007) 1 Texas International Law Journal 2–8; K. Dörmann, The legal situation of ‘unlawful/ unprivileged combatants’ (2003) 849 International Review of the Red Cross 45–74. R. Wedgwood, The law’s response to September 11 (2002) 1 Ethics and International Affairs 8–13; G.A. Lopez, The style of the new war: Making the rules as we go along (2002) 1 Ethics and International Affairs 21–26. For example, no special tribunals were established for determining the status of prisoners in case of doubt, as provided for by Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention. G. Monbiot, Bush and Rumsfeld had better watch their back (2003) Guardian, 23 March 2003. In response to reports by the media from 2005 on, US authorities confirmed the existence of such prisons and in 2006 committed to shut them down. J. Symonides, Debates and Controversies Concerning International Legal Aspects of the Struggle against Terrorism (Scholar, Warsaw 2008) 27–29. Between 2002 and 2006 more than 200 Afghans and many foreigners captured in Afghanistan (including Westerners, such as the American John Walker Lindh) were sent to Guantanamo. Burke (2012) 89. On 13 November 2001 President Bush appointed special tribunals tasked with trying those suspected of terrorism from outside the US, but in 2006 the US Supreme Court challenged their legitimacy. In October 2006 a new regulation to address this matter was adopted, which denied US courts the right to investigate appeals from the judgements of the special tribunals and the right to invoke before them international law, including conventions. Amnesty International, US Military Commissions Act of 2006: Turning Bad Policy into Bad Law (2006) AMR 51/154/2006. It was only in 2009 that US authorities officially admitted that some of these practices indeed constituted torture and banned them. White House, Executive Order on Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, 22 January 2009, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-­ 2010-title3-vol.1/pdf/CFR-­2010-title3-vol.1-eo13491.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018).

102   Marek Madej   93 Burke (2012) 91–94.   94 The data on Western public opinion attitude towards the intervention in Afghanistan are highly incomplete. Except for the US and Canada, studies on that were conducted sporadically, especially before 2006. Moreover, Transatlantic Trends polls, for example, surveyed rather the attitudes to the participation of forces from a given country than opinions on the intervention as a whole. J. Reifler, H.D. Clarke, T.J. Scotto, D. Sanders, M.C. Stewart, P. Whiteley, Prudence, principle and minimal heuristics: British public opinion toward the use of military force in Afghanistan and Libya (2014) 1 British Journal of Politics and International Relations 28–55.   95 Some experts believe this to be caused, at least in US society, by the change of the mission’s nature from ‘a straightforwardly defensive restraint mission to a nation-­ building exercise’, which made the connection to the 9/11 attacks less obvious to the public. C.A. Miller, Endgame for the West in Afghanistan? Explaining the Decline in Support for the War in Afghanistan in United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, France and Germany (SSI USAWC, Carlisle 2010) 18–19.   96 Even then, however, signs of discouragement were visible – although in 2004 an average of 52 per cent of Europeans supported participation in the mission (69 per cent in the US), in Poland it was only 24 per cent, in Portugal and Turkey 41 per cent, in Spain 48 per cent, and in the UK 50 per cent. Transatlantic Trends 2004 14.   97 In 2007, 64 per cent of respondents on both sides of the Atlantic had supported the involvement in Afghanistan, but in Europe only 30 per cent among them accepted participation in combat missions (68 per cent in the US). In 2008 support for stabilisation activities, training of Afghan forces and anti-­drug operations was 70 per cent among European NATO members (while 68 per cent in the US), but at the same time combat operations enjoyed the support of 76 per cent Americans and only 43 per cent Europeans. Transatlantic Trends 2007 17–18; Transatlantic Trends 2008 13.   98 Transatlantic Trends 2010, 15. In 2008–2011, the majority of Americans believed the mission in Afghanistan was heading in the wrong direction; in 2009 only 38 per cent and in 2010 only 23 per cent of respondents positively assessed progress of ISAF (in Germany only 10 per cent). Transatlantic Trends 2009 15; Transatlantic Trends 2010 16; Gallup Afghanistan Historical Trends, http://archive.is/or3Me (accessed 10 May 2018).   99 In 2012 the majority of the population of the EU Member States involved in Afghanistan (53 per cent) believed all forces should be withdrawn from this country; this included such large contingents’ contributors as Poland (62 per cent), France (61 per cent), Italy (53 per cent), the UK (52 per cent) and Germany (51 per cent). Transatlantic Trends 2012 36. 100 In 2013 more than 50 per cent of Poles, French, Britons, Germans and Italians considered the intervention a mistake. In October 2014, this view was shared by the majority of Americans, with only 28 per cent supporting the view that the intervention had improved US national security. Transatlantic Trends 2013 34; Cordesman (2015) 54–55. 101 Noteworthy, in the individual countries decreases of support for the mission were rather poorly correlated with the periods when their contingents took greater losses. Miller (2010) 55, 75–76, 90–91. 102 Somewhat paradoxically, the attempts to redefine the reasons behind the engagement during its course – e.g. emphasis on humanitarian issues by the governments of France, the UK or Canada in 2008 and 2009, the debate on Afghanistan’s natural resources in the US in 2010 – were in fact meant to increase public support. More: Miller (2010) 126–129. 103 M. Pietraś, Poland’s participation in NATO operations, in: J.H. Matlary, M. Petersson (eds), NATO’s European Allies. Military Capability and Political Will (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2013) 210–212.

Afghanistan   103 104 Transatlantic Trends 2013, 34; Cordesman (2015) 56. 105 In July 2015 it was revealed that Mullah Omar, Taliban leader in 2001, had died, probably in 2013 in Pakistan. Taliban Officially Announce Death of Mullah Omar, www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/30/taliban-­officially-announces-­death-of-­ mullah-omar (accessed 10 May 2018). 106 The failure in eliminating the Taliban insurgents might inspire other Muslim radicals to take up arms in other regions. Moreover, being heavily engaged in Afghanistan, Western countries had limited capability to respond to the challenges in other regions. Nevertheless, the role of Afghanistan as a training ground for terrorists was low, especially compared to the times of Soviet intervention. This was probably determined by the ‘local’ nature of Taliban goals – primarily to regain power in Afghanistan. A. Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-­Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (Cambridge University Press, New York 2009) 11–81. 107 According to World Bank data, in 2014 GNP per capita was US$670 (in 2014 values), and according to the UNDP in 2013 GNI per capita (at purchasing power parity) was US$1,904; regardless of indicator, there was approximately a fourfold increase compared to 2001/2002. Afghanistan, http://data.worldbank.org/country/ afghanistan (accessed 10 May 2018); UNDP (2014) 162. 108 In 2013, Afghanistan’s HDI was 0.468 (0.431 in 2000), the average life expectancy was 60.9 years (42.5 years in 2000), some 34 per cent of males above the age of 25 (but only 5.8 per cent women) received some form of secondary education. UNDP (2014) 166, 174. 109 These included the armed forces (ANA; 185,300 soldiers) and the police (ANP; 156,600 personnel). Afghan National Security Forces. NATO media backgrounder, October 2013. 110 Since the overthrowing of the Taliban, three presidential (2004, 2009 and 2014) and two parliamentary elections (2005, 2010) have been held in Afghanistan. Although all were recognised as valid, there were considerable doubts concerning their conduct, particularly of presidential voting in 2009 and 2014. More: Afghanistan Political Transition (2014) 260 ICG Asia Report. 111 In the Democracy Index 2014 of The Economist Intelligence Unit, the country was placed 151st (out of 167) and was classified as an authoritarian regime. Democracy Index 2014. Democracy and its Discontents, www.eiu.com/public/topical_report. aspx?campaignid=Democracy0115 (accessed 10 May 2018). 112 In 2013 and 2014, foreign assistance accounted for 60–63 per cent of Afghanistan’s budget. Quarterly Report to the US Congress (SIGAR, Washington 30 July 2014) 3. With the end of the ISAF mission in 2014 the custom revenues of Afghanistan decreased by 40 per cent. 113 In 2015, there were 11,002 civilian casualties of fighting in Afghanistan (3,545 deaths and 7,457 injured), which translates to a 4 per cent increase compared with 2014. Afghanistan. Annual Report 2015. Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts (UNAMA, Kabul 2016) 1. 114 Summary Costs of War Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan FY2001–2014, billions of current dollars, http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/figures/2014/ Summary Costs of War NC JUNE 26 2014.pdf, (accessed 10 May 2018). This value does not include such costs as outlays on taking care of veterans and some common expenses for the operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, or the indirect macroeconomic costs for the US and global economy. 115 Net official development assistance and official aid received (current USD), http:// data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD (accessed 10 May 2018). The value of the declared foreign assistance for Afghanistan was even higher – just for the period of 2001–2011 it was (according to Afghan sources) US$113 billion, but a part of this was never paid for various reasons (e.g. Afghanistan’s limited absorption capacity), and the sum included funds allocated for build-­up and operations of the

104   Marek Madej Afghan security forces (some 65 per cent). According to American data, between 2002 and 2014 the US provided Afghanistan with approximately US$104 billion (including, however, US$66 billion for security-­related purposes). Development Cooperation Report (IRA Ministry of Finance 2012) 1–2; C. Lutz, S. Desai, US Reconstruction Aid for Afghanistan: The Dollars and Sense, COW Project, 5 January 2015, http//watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2015/US ReconstructionAidforAfghanistan.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). 116 More: Rynning (2012) 207–221.

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Afghanistan   105 Cordesman A., Afghanistan at Transition: Lessons from the Longest War (CSIS, Boulder/ New York/London 2015). Cowper-­Coles S., Countering the Afghan insurgency: Three lessons learned, in: P. Dixon (ed.), The British Approach to Counterinsurgency: From Malaya and Northern Ireland to Iraq and Afghanistan (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2012) 337–352. Crawford N.C., War-­Related Death, Injury and Displacement in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2001–2014, COW Project, http//watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/ papers/2015/War Related Casualties Afghanistan and Pakistan 2001–2014 FIN.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). Daalder I.H., Lindsay J.M., America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Wiley, Hoboken 2005). Danner A.M., Defining unlawful enemy combatants: A centripetal story (2007) 1 Texas International Law Journal 1–14. de Jonge Oudraat C., The role of Security Council, in: J. Boulden, T.G. Weiss (eds), Terrorism and the UN: Before and After September 11 (Indiana University Press, Bloomington 2004) 151–172. Democracy Index 2014. Democracy and its discontents, www.eiu.com/public/topical_ report.aspx?campaignid=Democracy0115 (accessed 10 May 2018). Development Cooperation Report (IRA Ministry of Finance 2012). Dixon P., Bringing it all back home: The militarisation of Britain and the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, in: P. Dixon (ed.), The British Approach to Counterinsurgency: From Malaya and Northern Ireland to Iraq and Afghanistan (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2012) 112–147. Dörmann K., The legal situation of ‘unlawful/unprivileged combatants’ (2003) 849 International Review of the Red Cross 45–74. Esposito J., Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (Oxford University Press, Oxford/ New York 2003). Feith D., War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (Harper, New York 2008). Finnegan L., Questions Asked: News Coverage Since 9/11 (Praeger, London 2006). Gallup Afghanistan historical trends, http://archive.is/or3Me (accessed 10 May 2018). Gardam J., Necessity, Proportionality and Use of Force by States (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004). Gates R., Speech at the 44th Munich Conference, 10 February 2008. Giustozzi A., Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-­Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (Cambridge University Press, New York 2009). Global Illicit Drug Trends 2001 (UN ODCCP, New York 2001). Gunaratna R., Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (Berkley Trade, New York 2003). Human Development Report 2014 (UNDP, New York 2014). ISAF Placemats (years 2006–2014) www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/107995.htm (accessed 10 May 2018). Islamic State of Afghanistan. IMF Country Report 5/34 (2005), www.imf.org/external/ pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr0534.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). Jones S.G., In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (W.W. Norton, New York 2010). Korski D., Afghanistan: Europe’s Forgotten War (2008) 4 ECFR Policy Paper. Kowalski M., Armed attack, non-­state actors and a quest for the attribution standard (2010) 30 Polish Yearbook of International Law 101–130.

106   Marek Madej Livingston I.S., O’Hanlon M., Afghanistan Index (Brookings Washington, 31 July 2015). Lopez G.A., The style of the new war: Making the rules as we go along (2002) 1 Ethics and International Affairs 21–26. Lutz C., Desai S., US Reconstruction Aid for Afghanistan: The Dollars and Sense, COW Project, 5 January 2015, http//watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/ papers/2015/ US Reconstruction Aid for Afghanistan.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). Mégret F., ‘War’? Legal semantics and the move to violence (2002) 2 European Journal of International Law 361–399. Miller C.A., Endgame for the West in Afghanistan? Explaining the Decline in Support for the War in Afghanistan in United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, France and Germany (SSI USAWC, Carlisle 2010). Modrzejewska-­Leśniewska J., Talibowie (WSH, Pultusk 2001). Monbiot G., Bush and Rumsfeld had better watch their back (2003) Guardian 23 March 2003. Morelli V., Belkin P., NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the Transatlantic Alliance (CRS Report, 3 December 2009). Net official development assistance and official aid received (current USD), http://data. worldbank.org/ indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD (accessed 10 May 2018). Obama B., Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Westpoint, 1 December 2009. Pietraś M., Poland’s participation in NATO operations, in: J.H. Matlary, M. Petersson (eds), NATO’s European Allies: Military Capability and Political Will (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2013) 205–232. Quarterly Report to the US Congress (SIGAR, Washington, 30 July 2014). Reifler J., Clarke H.D., Scotto T.J., Sanders D., Stewart M.C., Whiteley P., Prudence, principle and minimal heuristics: British public opinion toward the use of military force in Afghanistan and Libya (2014) 1 British Journal of Politics and International Relations 28–55. Ringsmose J., Rynning S., NATO’s New Strategic Concept: A Comprehensive Assessment (2011) 2 DIIS Report. Risen J., U.S. identifies vast mineral riches in Afghanistan (2010), New York Times 13 June 2010. Rose G., How Wars End: Why We Fight the Last Battle. A History of American Intervention from World War I to Afghanistan (Simon & Schuster, New York 2010). Rynning S., NATO in Afghanistan: The Liberal Disconnect (Stanford University Press, Stanford 2012). Schreer B., The evolution of NATO’s strategy in Afghanistan, in: H. Edstrom, D. Gyllensporre (eds), Pursuing Strategy: NATO Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddafi (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2012) 139–157. Summary Costs of War Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan FY2001–2014, billions of current dollars, http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/figures/2014/Summary Costs of War NC JUNE 26 2014.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). Symonides J., Debates and Controversies Concerning International Legal Aspects of the Struggle against Terrorism (Scholar, Warsaw 2008). T. Blair’s statement, 7 October 2001, www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/07/afghani stan.terrorism11. Terrorist attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon (2002) 1 The American Journal of International Law 237–255.

Afghanistan   107 Transatlantic Trends (German Marsall Fund; years 2004–2013). UNAMA, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (years 2007–2014). UNSC Press release SC/7143, 12 September 2001. Wedgwood R., The law’s response to September 11 (2002) 1 Ethics and International Affairs 8–13. White House, Executive Order on Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, 22 January 2009, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-­2010-title3-vol.1/pdf/CFR-­2010-title3-vol.1-eo13491. pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). Woodward B., Bush at War (Simon & Schuster, New York 2002). World Development Indicators: Population dynamics, http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/2.1 (accessed 10 May 2018). Yost D. NATO’s Balancing Act (USIP, Washington 2014).

UNSC resolutions S/RES/1076 (1996) S/RES/1199 (1998) S/RES/1214 (1998) S/RES/1233 (2000) S/RES/1363 (2001) S/RES/1368 (2001) S/RES/1373 (2001) S/RES/1510 (2003)

5 Iraq 2003–2010 A disastrous war of choice Bolesław Balcerowicz

5.1  Strategic context 5.1.1  Global dimension Since President George W. Bush declared it on September 2001, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has remained the central issue in the global affairs. The war began with success: within two months, by the end of 2001, a couple of hundred special forces and intelligence operatives, working together with local insurgents and supported by heavy airstrikes, managed to overthrow the Taliban regime and disrupt the Al-­Qaeda terrorist network in Afghanistan. This probably encouraged the victors to push on. United States waged GWOT from the position of a superpower, which in addition has adopted a new, messianic, unilateralist, militarist security policy doctrine (‘the Bush doctrine’).1 In 2002, the year before the intervention, US military spending was US$364.9 billion, which amounted to 42.9 per cent of global military spending. In 2003 this increased to US$415.2 billion (45.4 per cent of global spending).2 It is important, in the context of the intervention, that the US was the largest global consumer of oil. Since 1998 it had started covering more than half of its oil demand by imports. Scenarios developed by analytical centres assumed that the trend of growing import dependence would be consolidated and further strengthened.3 Since the turn of the century, global oil prices kept growing, a rise caused by, among other things, a considerable increase in demand, and thus imports, by China and India. In 2002, however, Iraq and the possibility of intervention there were discussed primarily in the context of the fight against terrorism. Presenting the issue of countering the Iraqi threat as the most pressing challenge for global security that required a determined response was certainly the result of Washington’s efforts. In the American narrative, Iraq was a security threat on a supra-­regional scale; according to the US, Baghdad supposedly had considerable WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) capabilities (including biological and chemical weapons), making it a threat not only to its immediate neighbours.

Iraq 2003–2010   109 Under the provisions of UNSC S/RES/686 of 2 March 1991, Iraq was obliged to reveal and destroy its WMD assets, and – under S/RES/687 – to disassemble all missile systems with a range of 150 km or more. After the UNSC adopted S/ RES/1441 in November 2002, demanding from Iraq proofs of the destruction of the banned arsenals, the regime created proper working conditions for the international observers monitoring the implementation of the resolutions. The inspection conducted by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) towards the end of 2002 did not find any prohibited weapons. 5.1.2  Regional dimension Although Iraq was severely weakened by the war it had lost in 1991, it still played an important role in the regional balance of power. Due to its location between two conflicted regional powers (Iran and Saudi Arabia) and geographical conditions (the basin of the Tigris and Euphrates), Iraq constitutes the geostrategic centre of the region. It is here, more than anywhere else, that Shia and Sunni interests and influence clash with each other. In 2002, Iraq was virtually surrounded by countries that were either allies of the US (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey) or openly hostile towards it (Iran). Its international isolation, especially from the immediate neighbourhood, greatly facilitated the execution of a potential military intervention on its territory. At that time, the country’s economy was devastated; the war and sanctions caused considerable damage to all sectors, and the country had become much more dependent on oil exports. Iraq’s military potential was at least three times smaller than in 1991, and military and defence spending had fallen sharply.4 Moreover, in 1992, UNSC established two no-­fly zones for Iraqi aircraft: to the south of the 32nd parallel and north of the 36th parallel, both controlled by US and British forces. In the 1990s, the situation of the civilian population and their quality of life dramatically deteriorated. Just like the other authoritarian regimes in the region, Saddam Hussein’s oppressive regime was the source of the country’s internal stability; it stopped at nothing to ensure this stability, despite Iraq’s ethnic and religious diversity.5 5.1.3 Iraq’s strategic importance for Western countries before the intervention From the perspective of Western states, Iraq’s importance was mainly determined by two factors: its central location, the key to establishing political control in the region, and its oil deposits. The third factor, not necessarily a major one, resulted from the assumption that Iraq constituted a considerable threat to security. However, Iraq’s geographical location was a factor of strategic significance only to some Western countries: primarily the US, for whom Iraq played a

110   Bolesław Balcerowicz crucial role in establishing effective political control over the region. But it also retained some geostrategic importance for the UK, due to the British colonial past. For the other Western states the most important factor was Iraqi oil reserves (see also section 5.2). 5.1.4  Attitudes towards the intervention From the very beginning, the idea of intervening in Iraq and overthrowing Hussein’s regime met with strong and constantly growing opposition – both in the West and in the non-­Western world. The proponents of the intervention found it very difficult to convince global public opinion and governments that the country indeed posed a considerable threat to its neighbours and that an armed action was the only way to solve the Iraq issue. There was little understanding of Washington’s pleas among the other NATO members. While France and Germany were vocally opposing Bush’s warlike plans, a number of European leaders came to his aid by issuing the famous ‘letter of the eight’. Eventually, a small ‘coalition of the willing’, composed of those countries that were ready to participate in an armed operation, was created under US and UK leadership.6 The majority of UNSC permanent members – Russia, China and (from mid-­ 2002) France – was against the intervention from the very onset of the crisis. Germany (at that time a non-­permanent member of UNSC) and Belgium also opposed it, and a number of other European countries (like the Nordics, except Denmark) were reluctant to back it. Secretary-­General Kofi Annan was against the intervention as well, at least until UNMOVIC had finished its work. In addition, there was no support for it among Iraq’s Arab neighbours (with the exception of Kuwait and Jordan, although officially the latter also opposed it). The planned intervention was condemned by the League of Arab States (LAS) at the summit in Egypt (17 February 2003; Kuwait voted against the resolution).7 At an extraordinary session of the League Council (22–25 March 2003), the LAS deemed the invasion a breach of international law and a threat to regional security. In turn, the government of Turkey, concerned about the invasion’s possible impact on the situation in areas inhabited by Kurds, adopted an unequivocally reluctant attitude. Among influential Asian countries, only Japan and Singapore backed the operation, while the largest Muslim countries (Indonesia, Pakistan, Iran) opposed it. The larger Latin American countries were also against it. Canada and New Zealand did not want to back an intervention that had not been sanctioned by the UN. What is more, the societies of both Western and non-­Western countries – especially the Muslim ones – opposed the intervention; according to estimates, some 11 million people gathered in anti-­war protests in Europe in February 2003, with over a million protesters in London itself on 15 February.8

Iraq 2003–2010   111

5.2  Motives, justification and aims of the Western involvement 5.2.1  Declared motives According to the official statements justifying the military intervention, issued primarily by US leaders, the main motive for it was the willingness to eliminate the threat that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq posed to international security. This threat supposedly resulted from three factors, proving that the Iraqi regime was ‘rogue’ and explaining why, in the 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush named Iraq as one of the countries making up the ‘axis of evil’ (next to Iran and North Korea): • • •

continued illegal work on the production of WMDs, despite the bans and sanctions imposed by UNSC; involvement in supporting international terrorism, especially Islamic terrorism; consistent and serious human rights violations, especially towards ethnic minorities (Kurds) and the Shiite majority.9

Washington and London accused Iraq of having chemical and biological weapons or at least being capable of producing them, as well as of continuing work on nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. To prove these accusations, Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the UN on 5 February 2003 with detailed and comprehensive presentation of the charges against Iraq.10 However, possession of WMDs by Iraq failed to be sufficiently proven by other internationally credible sources, neither was it positively verified by UN inspectors (UNMOVIC). Nevertheless, before the intervention started these accusations had never been explicitly challenged, even by such sceptical parties as France or Russia (although they were not seen by them as a sufficient reason to start military operations).11 The claim that Iraq supported terrorism was backed by the argument that Iraqi authorities had ties to Palestinian terrorist groups. That was commonly considered as confirmed, although the Iraqi support had absolutely no impact on the capabilities of these groups. Furthermore, US authorities accused the regime of having ties with Al-­Qaeda and other Salafist groups. In less official but still public or commonly known statements – by the US president, among others – there was speculation about the Iraqi authorities’ involvement in the organisation of the 9/11 attacks.12 In this context US leaders were emphasising the gravity of the risk that the Iraqi regime could, in future, deepen cooperation with Islamic fundamentalists, including Al-­Qaeda, possibly even giving them access to WMD.13 In terms of humanitarian motives, it was stressed that there had been documented cases of the use of chemical weapons against Kurds by Saddam’s regime in the late 1980s and that Saddam had brutally suppressed a Shiite uprising in 1991.

112   Bolesław Balcerowicz In addition, some proponents of the intervention (primarily the UK government) stressed that the very fact that Iraq had been failing to fulfil its international commitments and attempting to avoid the international monitoring of its policies undermined the credibility of the UN and therefore tolerating this was erosive for international order.14 In public statements for the US audience, American authorities emphasised the threat to the country’s national security stemming from the combined factors of Iraq’s military potential, its cooperation with terrorists and the anti-­ Americanism shared by both parties of this arrangement (mainly because of the Gulf War). This allegedly led to a risk of Iraqi attack against the US and its citizens or interests, either direct or – more likely – by terrorists backed somehow by the Baghdadi regime.15 To sum up, according to the official narration, the hierarchy of the motives behind the operation was as follows. First, the intervention was to strengthen international security by eliminating the already existing and possible future (even more serious) threat to regional and global stability. Second, there were some humanitarian concerns. Third, it was pointed out that Iraq posed a threat to national security, especially as regards the US. Thus, the official narration did not include any arguments relating to economy. 5.2.2  Verification of the official narrative The official justifications for the intervention should be verified in terms of compliance with the most probable actual needs (and thus motives) of Western countries. Since the declared motives resulted primarily from the striving for international acceptance for the action, they were meant to help gain allies for the operations that were in fact undertaken for rather different reasons. However, we should not completely rule out the possibility that at that time, considering the assessments of the international situation as well as Iraq’s potential and intentions, the concerns of some of the coalition members about Iraq – primarily those related to the proliferation of WMDs – might have been real (even if unjustified). Still, the fact that the allies, in particular the US, kept ignoring options other than the use of force, including those available within the UN framework, even after the Iraqi regime declared readiness to comply with the requests of the UNSC and admit peace forces to its territory, implies that the willingness to solve the problem of WMD proliferation was actually not a main motive behind the decision to intervene.16 Due to the disparities among the interveners and the informal nature of the coalition the actual motives for involvement were more diversified than in the case of interventions organised under the framework of international institutions. Therefore the motivations of individual participants, at least the most influential, should be analysed separately.

Iraq 2003–2010   113 United States It seems that the motive for the intervention was the desire to consolidate and slightly reshape the post-­Cold War global international order, in which the US, as the only superpower, would enjoy considerable freedom of action. Despite the 9/11 attacks, it is rather unlikely that the US was truly concerned about the threat of an Iraqi attack against it or one of its allies (although it probably admitted the possibility that Baghdad could inspire terrorist attacks against US citizens outside US territory). Therefore the primary purpose of the intervention in Iraq was to manifest the US capability of effectively shaping the global order regardless of the positions of other countries (including major powers) and organisations (including the UN). Thus, it was to some degree about US security interests, but those related to the US capability of shaping world affairs in accordance with national interests and needs.17 In the regional dimension, the intention was to reshape the order in the Middle East – a region of strategic importance not only for the US – through democratisation, among other means. The process was supposed to begin with the overthrowing of Saddam Hussein’s authoritarian regime in Iraq and the introduction of democracy in the country (although the new government was to be composed of opposition leaders living in exile, which predetermined the outcome of democratic procedures).18 A successful ‘liberation’ of Iraq and its citizens from the oppressive regime and the subsequent post-­conflict reconstruction of the country was supposed to inspire other countries and societies in the region to make a similar change. It needs to be noted, however, that this idea was based on such weak premises19 that it is uncertain if and to what extent democratisation was an actual and not just declared motive behind the intervention. The future of the US military presence in the region was also important. A probable goal was to station the bulk of forces in Iraq, which could be moved there from Saudi Arabia once the Iraqi regime was changed. After 9/11 and the increase of the fundamentalist threat to the US, an alliance with the Wahhabist-­ governed Saudi Arabia supporting radical Salafist movements was becoming a challenge and a burden of sorts (to the US and the Saudis alike), especially as regards the US military presence. This thesis seems to be confirmed by the drive to remove Saddam from power regardless of his attitude, and was explicitly mentioned in one of the interviews with Paul Wolfowitz, at that time US Deputy Secretary of Defense.20 Importantly, possible relocation of US forces from Saudi Arabia to – mostly Shia – Iraq was not intended to encircle – also Shia – Iran with US bases. US authorities probably expected also the overthrowing of Saddam – due to his support for the Palestinians – to improve the geostrategic situation of Israel, but this can hardly be considered the principal motive behind the intervention. Economic issues were often listed among the central motives for the intervention In short, these were as follows: (1) to gain access to Iraqi oil reserves; (2) to gain the ability to influence oil prices and stop the – then ongoing – process of

114   Bolesław Balcerowicz de-­dollarisation of the market (a shift towards making the euro the accounting currency); (3) to boost the US economy (which at that time was going into recession);21 (4) to pursue the economic interests of lobbying groups (defence, mining and construction companies). The thesis that the intervention was motivated by economic reasons is supported by such arguments as the scale of Iraq’s oil reserves, especially given the US economy’s dependence on hydrocarbons and imports thereof, as well as the possible benefits from having control over Iraqi hydrocarbon production, also in the context of increasing US impact on the market and limiting at the same time the ability of OPEC to control prices. Regardless of the gravity of these arguments, it should be noted that already at the onset of the conflict it was obvious that: (1) a rapid increase of Iraqi oil production depended on the course of the conflict and the state of the infrastructure after the fighting; (2) the Middle East was no longer the main source of US oil imports; (3) Iraq’s voice in OPEC would not be decisive (although it could weaken Saudi Arabia’s position); (4) the US National Energy Policy (adopted in Spring 2001, before the 9/11 attacks) indicated other priorities than increasing imports from the Middle East; (5) starting a war entailed an economic risk; given the lack of an international mandate, the cost of the operation would have to be borne by the participants themselves, including the US (although for some interest groups – particularly the defence, mining and construction industries – war meant guaranteed profit and redistribution of the funds available to the US government). It is therefore hard to assess the ultimate importance of the economic motivation, but it seems that the war with Iraq was a ‘war for a new order’ rather than a ‘war for oil’. Another possible reason for the invasion were personal issues, linked to Saddam Hussein’s survival as Iraqi leader after the ‘unfinished’ Gulf War (1990–1991). The following arguments may confirm the significance of these motives: (1) the fact that the then US president, the father of President G.W. Bush, left the Gulf War ‘unfinished’ (the son would later ‘finish the task’); (2)  many of G.W. Bush close aides – including those responsible for security policy: Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz – had also held important positions in the G.H.W. Bush administration and were largely proponents of overthrowing Saddam; (3)  Saddam had supposedly been trying to assassinate G.H.W. Bush (already after the end of his term in office), which might have introduced an element of ‘personal vengeance’ to the logic behind G.W. Bush’s actions. Moreover, all these factors reacted with the specific personality of the US president – a zealous protestant, who perceived the removal of Saddam Hussein’s ‘immoral regime’ almost as his religious duty. It is difficult, however, to assess the actual significance of these arguments. United Kingdom It seems that the British government treated the official motives for the intervention – especially halting the further erosion of the international normative order

Iraq 2003–2010   115 due to Iraq’s non-­compliance with UNSC decisions and countering WMD proliferation – much less instrumental than their American counterparts. This is indirectly evidenced by London’s efforts to obtain UN consent for the operation (and initially even making its involvement conditional on these efforts, which resulted in drafting and adoption of S/RES/1441). Although assessments by British intelligence only partially confirmed the American view of the Iraqi threat, the British government considered the possible cooperation between terrorists and states possessing WMD sufficiently alarming to warrant a reaction.22 Another argument for taking action was the evaluation of the UN control regime of Iraq in 2001–2002 as eroding. This was accompanied by the officially presented conviction that although Saddam’s Iraq made some concessions (i.e. accepting UNMOVIC and handing over reports about armament programmes), they were insufficient and done reluctantly.23 Additionally, to some degree – although rather as a secondary reason – the negative moral assessment of Saddam Hussein by Tony Blair and his advisors, including Richard Cooper, who believed the threat of terrorists working with countries in possession of WMDs to be real, was also important. In the official address to parliament right before the intervention, Prime Minister Blair also pointed out that lack of action after so many warnings and even presenting Hussein with an ultimatum, would put in question the credibility not only of the West, but even the UN.24 The key factor in the UK position, however, was the importance of the strategic partnership with the US for the British and of the transatlantic bond for NATO as a whole. For Blair’s government supporting the US in this regard was in the best interest of the UK, despite the doubts about the seriousness of the threat and the preferable response to it.25 Given US determination to conduct the intervention, London considered any attempts to prevent it as pointless, especially since the operation was perceived rather useful in combating terrorism and WMD proliferation, as well as in upholding the international normative order by punishing those who disregard UNSC decisions. Other countries As for other countries (including Poland), the main motive behind their involvement was the rapprochement with the US (as a form of offensive bandwagoning), and improvement of their international standing in that way. Most members of the coalition (including those directly involved in the invasion) had no vital interests in Iraq nor were they directly threatened by it (or at least no more than the other members of the international community). They could, however, expect to benefit from rapprochement with the US in their relations with other countries. This was especially true for the newly accepted members of NATO and candidates for NATO membership. Symptomatically, the coalition (especially at the stage of stabilisation after the intervention) was composed of countries located far from Iraq, who had not engaged in any significant activity in the Middle East before.

116   Bolesław Balcerowicz Several countries, like Poland, were also hoping for economic benefits, especially those related to post-­war reconstruction efforts and possible resource exploitation. Some even expected to recoup Saddam’s loans from the new government.26 To sum up, using the classification adopted in this project, the following hierarchy of underlying motives seems to be most likely: • • • •

national interests of the interveners, although not related to countering a direct threat to their security but rather to improving their international position, impact on international order and relations with strategic partners; economic and resource-­related factors (including, especially in the US, the interests of various lobbies); attempt to consolidate international normative order and stability; humanitarian concerns (improving the situation of the Iraqi people and – in the long run – other Middle Eastern countries).

5.2.3  Aims of the intervention The officially declared aims of the intervention were presented in the statements delivered by President Bush and Prime Minister Blair directly before the launch of the military operation (on 18 March). They included: •

• •

combating the threat posed by Iraq due to its (alleged) unconventional armament programmes, its cooperation with terrorists (ongoing and possibly expanding in the future), as well as Iraq’s aggressive policy (including continuously threatening the security of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia); the main idea was to disarm Iraq of the unconventional weapons that it (allegedly) possessed, thus preventing it from using them; putting an end to the Iraqi government’s practice of violating UNSC resolutions, which was to restore the authority of this institution; improving the situation of the people of Iraq by forcing Saddam to cease the policy of repression or by removing him from power.27

Another, not fully official but in fact openly declared (by the US) aim of the intervention was to overthrow Saddam Hussein and to cause a regime change in Iraq.28 The US government considered this necessary to eradicate permanently the threat to international security posed by the Iraqi regime, since the nature of the latter was deemed to be unchangeable; in addition, regime change in Iraq would open the door to the further restructuring and stabilisation of the security landscape in the Middle East.29 The other members of the coalition did not consider this objective as important as the US. British authorities even suggested that if Iraq fully complied with UNSC resolutions, Saddam Hussein might remain in power.30 The possible motives of the interveners presented above suggested also some actual goals of the operation. The most important was to overthrow Saddam’s

Iraq 2003–2010   117 regime. It was the prerequisite for realising other objectives, since it would allow for the following: •

• • • • • •

to credibly demonstrate the capability to shape the international order on a regional and global level, which would include some form of re-­ establishment of the US as the only global superpower after the events of 9/11; to disarm Iraq of the WMD it might possess; to gain access to Iraqi natural resources and to achieve by that greater influence on global oil prices; to initiate the democratisation of Iraq and the rest of the region; to relocate a substantial part of US forces from Saudi Arabia to Iraq; on the domestic front in the US – to increase support for the authorities and (perhaps) boost the economy; regarding lobbies advocating intervention – to benefit from contracts during the war and in the post-­conflict reconstruction phase.

However, the aims of the operation were subject to somewhat radical changes over time. The main direct goals of the mission (short-­term objectives), both the actual ones (overthrowing Saddam Hussein) and the declared ones (disarming Iraq of WMD and forcing full implementation of the relevant UNSC resolutions), quickly became irrelevant as they were either achieved (overthrowing the regime) or proved to be ill-­defined and groundless (Iraqi WMD issue). As regards the long-­term objectives – both the actual ones (economic, and those related to reshaping the international order) and the declared ones (democratisation of the Middle East) – it was questioned even before the launch of the intervention whether they were achievable through military intervention. The key prerequisite for progress in this regard was quick stabilisation, rebuilding and democratisation of the country after the fighting. From 2004 (the Mahdi Army uprising and intensification of inter-­sectarian violence, particularly in Fallujah – see section 5.3), stabilisation of Iraq actually came to be the central objective of the mission. Initially, it was paired with democratisation, but after handover of responsibility for security to the Iraqi government, it was essentially reduced to stabilisation alone. This, however, did not translate into reshaping of the international order, strengthening the US and allies’ position or the possibility of fulfilling economic goals, but merely into defending the international prestige and credibility of the interveners. Already from 2004, the character of the mission was changing towards minimising losses, especially political ones (to halt degradation of international image of the US and the West as a whole) . Although the democratisation of the Middle East had been considered a long-­ term goal of the intervention in Iraq, at least from Bush’s second term in office it was preached with little faith in its feasibility. Moreover, although the withdrawal of US forces from Saudi Arabia had actually happened, it was far from what had been initially planned (Iraq was not stable enough to host them). The

118   Bolesław Balcerowicz main economic objectives, including exploitation of Iraqi resources, were in fact abandoned due to the permanently unstable situation in the country. After Obama became president, the main aim of the mission was, even more than before, to stabilise Iraq as quickly as possible to the level that would make withdrawal possible and thus regain at least some of the international prestige the US and the West lost due to the intervention. 5.2.4  The coherence of the West’s position on the intervention The differences among the main parties involved in the intervention identified in the analysis of motives and aims were essentially limited to nuances in formulating the mission’s objectives and strategies. The bandwagoning countries had no real influence in this respect and accepted the US position. The main divergences among Western countries concerned the very purpose of the intervention (whether it was actually necessary); they were serious enough to be dubbed the ‘transatlantic rift’. The Anglo-­Saxon countries were backed by some Western European states (including Spain, Holland, Denmark, Portugal, Italy), as well as the majority of new NATO members or NATO candidates from Central and Eastern Europe. The country most opposed to the intervention was Germany, supported, at least from mid-­2002, by France and Belgium. The government of Turkey was initially willing to support the US, albeit with some qualms (and for the price of increased military assistance and diplomatic backing in negotiations with the EU), but the government pulled out under pressure from society, which was strongly against the intervention. Over the course of the campaign (and the subsequent occupation), some countries that had initially supported the intervention changed their views, in most cases due to public pressure or to change of government after elections (e.g. Spain in 2004, Italy in 2006). Although there were substantial differences within the West in the assessment of the gravity of the Iraqi threat, they did not constitute the main source of the transatlantic rift. The key reason behind the opposition to the intervention, particularly in the absence of a UN mandate, were its possible implications when successful. The opponents primarily feared excessive consolidation of US global domination and freedom of action. For Germany, internal factors were also important (parliamentary elections, in which the governing social democrats were taking advantage of anti-­American sentiments and playing the Iraq Card). The leaders of the coalition – the US and to a lesser extent the UK – tried to disregard the divisions among Western countries, including by introducing the distinction between ‘old’ (failing to comprehend the need of the moment and opposing the US) and ‘new’ Europe (aware of the need to consolidate US global leadership),31 as well as by manifesting their belief that the mission could be successful even without the support of some Western countries. Importantly, such support was not necessary if the military intervention in Iraq was short; in the long run, however, the divisions among Western countries had a strong negative impact on the course of the intervention and on the ability to make adjustments to the way it was conducted.

Iraq 2003–2010   119 Impact of non-­Western states and organisations on the definition of the intervention’s tasks and goals was negligible. Decisions concerning the intervention were almost unilaterally taken by the US, with only limited participation of the UK; other contributors had essentially no impact at all. The US and UK governments simply ignored the arguments presented by diplomats and experts alike that the operation was unwarranted or premature. Attempts to obtain international legitimacy for the intervention led to greater emphasis in the official rhetoric being placed on Iraq’s violation of the ban on WMD proliferation and on the need to enforce UNSC resolutions, issues which were rather strictly formal. As the very need for the intervention was questioned, there were virtually no voices claiming that it was warranted or challenging only the justification or some of its elements. However, once the deployment happened, the international community in general was, despite agreement over the rather shaky grounds for intervention, increasingly convinced that ending the operation immediately or prematurely, before achievement of some level of stability, would also be a mistake, especially given that no alternatives for this model of engagement had been offered (e.g. a peacekeeping operation that could be conducted by the UN or some other organisation). So despite questioning the reasons behind the operation, there was rather broad consensus over the need for ‘damage control’ and limitation of the negative effects of the bad decisions taken by the interveners.

5.3  The course of the intervention The war with Iraq was preceded by months of political and military preparations. What can be considered the turning point in military terms was the resolution passed by the US Congress in October 2002 that allowed the use of US forces against Iraq.32 However, the planning for the intervention (military operation) had begun towards the end of 2001. In the last days of December, General Tommy Franks, commander of the CENTCOM, presented the president with the scenario of possible actions and the preliminary plan of the operation.33 In the phase of direct preparations, the US tried to build the coalition. While in the Gulf War in 1991 the coalition forces had comprised military contingents from 29 countries, this time the US eventually managed to convince only three countries to become directly involved. Among the US partners from NATO who refrained from joining the coalition, the position of Turkey was particularly important. The Turkish parliament did not agree to the deployment of part of the invasion forces in Turkey, which were to attack Iraq from the north. Therefore, the more advantageous variant of the operation, based on the concept of simultaneous strikes from two directions (south and north), had to be abandoned. Before the commencement of combat operations, the coalition managed to assemble more than 230,000 soldiers in the predicted combat zone and in the surrounding areas (mainly in Kuwait). Apart from that, support and supply units

120   Bolesław Balcerowicz were deployed outside the combat zone as well. In total, 467,000 US (including the support and supply forces), 43,000 British, some 2,000 Australian and 180 Polish troops were involved.34 The official military goals of the invasion were presented by General Franks, as the commander of the coalition forces. He put them into seven (eight, in fact) points, using the typical Washington rhetoric of that time. According to the general, the mission was supposed to: • • • • • • • •

‘end the regime of Saddam Hussein’; ‘identify, isolate and eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction’; ‘search for, […] capture and […] drive out terrorists from that country’; ‘collect such intelligence as we can related to terrorist networks’; ‘collect such intelligence as we can related to the global network of illicit weapons of mass destruction’; ‘end sanctions and […] immediately deliver humanitarian support to the displaced and to many needy Iraqi citizens’; ‘secure Iraq’s oil fields and resources, which belong to the Iraqi people’; ‘help the Iraqi people create conditions for a transition to a representative self-­government’.35

The necessary condition for ending Saddam Hussein’s regime was to defeat the Iraqi armed forces. Despite the severe losses suffered during the war in 1991, Iraq remained one of the regional military powers and had the largest (most numerous) armed force of almost 400,000 soldiers in active service, with a relatively large number of aircraft (approximately 320), armoured vehicles (approximately 2,600), artillery pieces (approximately 1,700) and anti-­air defence measures.36 The quality of its weapons and equipment was far below European standards and even further below American ones. While the coalition’s ground forces were less numerous, this was entirely made up for by quality. An Iraqi army of conscripts was faced by professional soldiers. No type of weapons available to the Iraqi army was on par with the American and British equivalents, and none made it possible – even if only because of their lower effective firing range – to directly engage the coalition forces on an equal footing. In addition, the coalition commenced operations enjoying absolute air dominance.37 Iraq’s strategy was determined by the overriding political goal – retain sovereignty and keep power in the hand of the governing elite. The defence concept was very different from the one adopted in the Gulf War. Given the invading forces’ overwhelming qualitative advantage, it did not predict significant resistance in the desert. The main defence line was established in the basin of the Euphrates and Tigris. Further in, defence was organised around selected cities of strategic importance to the state. A crucial role was to be played by irregular operations throughout the country. The military strategy/concept of Operation Iraqi Freedom was based on the American joint operations doctrine as in Joint Vision 2020.38 It emphasised the

Iraq 2003–2010   121 role of information superiority on the battlefield and the relevance of a network-­ centric approach to war manifested – inter alia – by joint operations. What clearly distinguished the Iraqi operation from the previous ones was that ground forces’ combat activities were launched before all preparations were completed and even before the entire force was assembled.39 The initial plan assumed launching the attack from two directions. The main direction was Kuwait–Baghdad, and operations there were to be conducted by two groups of US forces. Additionally, British forces were to take Basra, and control over the areas inhabited by Kurds in the north was to be secured by the Kurdish Peshmerga assisted by commandos from the CIA Special Activities Division and the 10th Special Forces Group.40 Military operations, which created favourable conditions for the intervention proper, had begun much earlier. For 12 years, all the infrastructure on most of Iraqi territory (up to Baghdad) had remained under control of US aircraft, and this control had even increased when American and British air forces launched Operation Southern Focus, in which patrols over zones designated by the UN as demilitarised were also used to destroy selected anti-­air defence infrastructure. From mid-­2002, attacks were also launched against ground defence objects – command centres, fortifications. A week before the beginning of the invasion (11 March), Iraqi computer networks were attacked. Four days before the deadline of the ultimatum presented to Saddam, the coalition conducted several airstrikes against radar stations, anti-­ air defence measures, artillery positions. Even before the invasion, the coalition had total air dominance and almost all the territory occupied by the enemy was under its surveillance. Just as in the case of the previous wars, the intervention began with airstrikes. This time, however, the independent air operation lasted less than 24 hours. It did not include the usual phase of securing air dominance, because the coalition already had it. Operations commenced in the early hours of 20 March with missile strikes against selected targets – command centres, communication systems and (especially) possible locations of Saddam Hussein. The goal was to disable the military command and state authorities and destroy military infrastructure, not to completely destroy enemy personnel and equipment. The ground operation began in the early hours of 21 March. In the first three days, US forces advanced by more than 100 km per day, and some units even made it 380 km into Iraq. After a few days of hiatus due to a sandstorm, the forces moving along the main axis of attack continued their fast-­paced advance (up to 100 km per day). On the seventeenth day of the invasion (6 April), US units reached the outskirts of Baghdad, and the final phase of the operation – the fight for Baghdad, Karbala and Basra – began. Baghdad came under American control on 9 April. On the same day General Franks was appointed commander of the occupation force. At that time, the north of the country was effectively controlled by Kurdish Peshmergas, who, supported by American and British special forces, took Kirkuk on 10 April.

122   Bolesław Balcerowicz President Bush announced the official end of combat operations on 1 May. This was the end of the relatively brief war with Iraq, but soon thereafter began the long war in Iraq. At the beginning of May 2003 there was no central authority in Iraq, no military and security forces and a completely disorganised police. Once the fighting ended, the Iraqi army left behind some 60 per cent of intact or unfound weapons and ammunition. Saddam Hussein, however, remained elusive for a couple more months. In March the formal occupation of the country began, with the legal basis provided by UNSC S/RES/1483. The country was divided into three, then – from September – four occupation zones: two controlled by the US, one by the UK and one by Poland (the South Central zone – 20 per cent of the territory of Iraq). At that time, the occupation forces numbered some 150,000 soldiers: 130,000 from the US and 20,000 from other countries (including 11,000 from the UK, 3,000 from Italy, 2,300 from Poland).41 Irregular armed groups had already become active in May, and with time their activity intensified. Americans and their allies seemed taken by surprise. The allied forces turned out to be unprepared for functioning in a hostile environment. During the preparations for war, military decision-­makers focused on the task of conquering the enemy, neglecting preparations for any other activities, including counter-­insurgency. The insurgency spread and was stepped up in 2004. The first spectacular battle between coalition (US) forces and the insurgents was the First Battle of Fallujah. After almost two months of fighting, which saw 2,200 marines with air support pitted against 12–14 various insurgent groups, the battle ended on 1 May with the US forces leaving Fallujah. During that battle insurgent groups in the central part of the country became active. Muqtada al-­Sadr, Shia spiritual leader and founder of the militia called Peace Companies (Sadrist Army), took charge of the rebellion in central and southern Iraq. In April, al-­Sadr’s militia controlled the cities of Kut and Najaf in the ‘Polish’ zone and captured Kufa, a city of great religious importance to Shiites.42 Operation Phantom Fury, or the Second Battle of Fallujah, which coalition (mainly US) forces fought between 7 and 16 November 2004, was much more intensive than the previous one; it also claimed more victims and created more damage. Following the intensive shelling and air strikes, a considerable portion of the city’s infrastructure was destroyed or fatally damaged; Fallujah was in ruins. In consequence of the two battles some 250,000 people had to be resettled in 2004 (before the fighting, Fallujah’s population was approximately 350,000).43 In 2004 the country was already engulfed in fighting on a scale comparable to a fully-­fledged war. In 2004, Spain and eight other countries withdrew their military contingents from Iraq, thus beginning the process of reducing the occupation forces.44 The year 2005, in turn, was a threshold for the stabilisation programme as it was then that parliamentary elections were held, sovereign rights were handed over to the Iraqi government and a provisional constitution was adopted.

Iraq 2003–2010   123 Meanwhile, the attacks against coalition forces kept rising, to the level of 35,000 per year (compared to approximately 25,000 in 2004).45 The turning point that initiated an eruption of intrasectarian violence between Shiites and Sunnis was the February 2006 terrorist attack on Al-­Askari mosque in Samarra – one of the most sacred places to Shiites. While no one was killed in the bombing, several hundred people lost their lives over the following days in the ensuing riots, and Iraq found itself on the verge of a religious civil war. In early 2007, when the trend of increasing violence seemed to persist, Americans decided to change strategy in Iraq. The new plan launched in mid-­ February included increasing the strength of the force deployed to Iraq by 21,000 (to 161,000) and intensifying military activities (the Surge). In September, the commander of the US forces in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, announced that the military goals of the plan had been achieved. At that time the numerical strength of the coalition forces reached its apogee – approximately 176,000 (more than 160,000 from the US).46 Once the key objectives of the Surge had been achieved, some units could be withdrawn.47 In 2008 the number of attacks on coalition forces decreased considerably. While in 2007 there were on average 180 attacks a day, in 2008 the number fell to over 200 per week.48 But Iraq was still ravaged by a bloody civil war. The most spectacular events of the year were the offensive of Shiite militias, the assault on Sadr City and the Battle of Basra. In February 2009, newly elected US President Barack Obama announced the intention to end combat operations and withdraw US forces by 30 August 2010. Ultimately, in early August 2010 the core of the US forces left Iraq. In October 2011, the president (quietly) announced the definitive end of the US participation in the stabilisation mission in Iraq.

5.4  Legal aspects 5.4.1  The legal and institutional basis of the intervention The mission had no institutional justification whatsoever. Although decision-­ makers pointed out Iraq’s consistent failure to observe UNSC resolutions since 1990, the UN never agreed to the use of force against Iraq. S/RES/1441 (8 November 2002) did not provide sufficient basis for that: it speaks of ‘serious consequences’ that Iraq would face if it failed to abide by its provisions rather than of ‘all necessary means’, as is usually the case in such circumstances. The next resolution was to explicitly grant a mandate for the use of force, but the draft was withdrawn in March 2003. No regional organisation, including NATO, officially sanctioned a military operation. A form of substitute for international (but not institutional) recognition of the rationale behind the mission could be found in two special letters: the Letter of the Eight (30 January 2003) and the Vilnius letter (of the nine), both  expressing support for the US in the Iraq issue. At best, however, these

124   Bolesław Balcerowicz documents created the semblance of greater support for the intervention and manifested the positions of individual countries towards it.49 The mission failed to gain recognition even after its launch. On 28 March, following a heated debate, the UNSC passed resolution S/RES/1472, concerning modification of the Oil-­for-Food Programme. It cannot, however, be considered an indirect form of consent for the intervention (as Russia and Syria had explicitly stressed in the debate over the proposal). However, S/RES/1483 (22 May 2003) recognised the military presence of the US and the UK as an occupation – this is sometimes considered a substitute form of consent for the intervention.50 5.4.2  The intervention in light of international humanitarian law (IHL) The intervention can be divided into three stages. The first, the end of which was announced officially on 1 May 2003, was an international conflict in legal terms. The binding legal instruments in this period were: the Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949, as well as the provisions of Additional Protocol I of 1977, constituting customary law. The next stage began when the allies in fact took control of Iraqi territory – this was the stage of military occupation, regulated by the provisions of the said 1907 Regulations, the First Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I. The aims of the occupation had been precisely defined in UNSC S/RES/1483 (of 22 May 2003); under this document, however, they went far beyond the rules of IHL. While under IHL the occupants are to interfere as little as possible with the functioning of the occupied country, in this case the UNSC ordered the occupying powers to: (1) make efforts to restore state institutions, including the government; (2) participate in the rebuilding of the country’s infrastructure and economy; (3) promote and protect human rights; (4) rebuild the potential of the Iraqi police; (5) promote a reform of the judiciary. In the said resolution, the UNSC referred to the US and the UK as occupying powers. Military occupation is a de facto situation that ends once the status of the territory is regulated and foreign troops are withdrawn. In this case, the UNSC announced the end of the occupation and handing over power to the Iraqi Interim Government by 30 June 2004 (S/RES/1546 of 8 June 2004). From then on, international forces remained in Iraq formally with the consent of the Iraqi government. The latter did not, however, fully control the territory, which caused some doubts regarding the applicable law. International forces supported the government in its fight against armed opposition groups. At this stage, the relevant law was that pertaining to non-­international armed conflicts: Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and customary law.

Iraq 2003–2010   125 Combat means and methods Generally coalition forces tried to avoid civilian casualties. Bombardments of military targets located close to civilian ones caused, however, considerable civilian losses. Iraqi forces also contributed to that by deploying units and military installations in mosques, hospitals and heritage sites or by using civilians as human shields. A Human Rights Watch investigation confirmed misuse of the emblems of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.51 The US and the UK used cluster bombs (including in areas inhabited by civilians).52 There was also controversy related to the use of incendiary bombs by the Americans (e.g. in Fallujah). Furthermore, bombs were dropped on dual-­use targets: civilian energy infrastructure, media facilities, etc.53 The US and its allies failed to develop a programme to efficiently restore order in Iraq, especially as regards the protection of cultural heritage. They exhibited considerable ignorance in this respect, e.g. by establishing a military base on the site of archaeological excavations in the historical city of Babylon. Because of the fighting, chaos ensued in many places and some government buildings and cultural heritage sites were ultimately plundered. Treatment of captives Initially Americans granted Iraqi soldiers the status of prisoners of war (POWs). In their search for people linked with terrorism they also detained civilians – ‘for security reasons’, as it was officially called. These people were detained in violation of human rights and handed over to Iraqi organisations known to use torture. Furthermore, there were cases of torture in prisons controlled by Americans (especially in Abu Ghraib). Reports spoke of brutal treatment of prisoners, sometimes leading to death, as well as of physical and psychic coercion during interrogations, seizure of personal possessions, and in some cases even sexual harassment.54

5.5  Public attitudes towards the intervention The issue of the intervention in Iraq caused a rift between Western countries, which probably led public opinion to become more important than in the case of other conflicts. In order to obtain public support for the intervention, governments took extraordinary efforts to influence their own and foreign public opinion alike. In the United States, society had perceived Iraq as a threat since the Gulf War. Most Americans began supporting the military intervention when it actually started. In the first days of the war, support went up to 61 per cent, but it fell again within a year to a mere 40 per cent.55 In the period between 9/11 and the attack on Iraq, half of the American society believed Saddam Hussein to have ties to terrorists, further believing that evidence was solid enough to warrant an intervention. Most Americans also

126   Bolesław Balcerowicz believed that Iraq possessed WMD. The closer it was to the invasion, the higher was the percentage of people convinced of this and the percentage of people who believed that all alternative possibilities of solving the ‘Iraq issue’ had been exhausted. The fact that no WMD were found in Iraq during the operation translated into a clear fall of trust in the Bush administration, as evidenced by numerous surveys. At the same time, it is worth noting that between May 2003 and April 2004, between 15 and 30 per cent of US citizens believed, contrary to facts, that such weapons had indeed been found in Iraq. Similar trends were recorded among the public in the United Kingdom. Before the war, only 30–40 per cent of people supported Blair’s policies. After a number of information (or even propaganda) activities the support rose (just as it was the case in the US) by 15 percentage points – to 55 per cent. When regular combat operations ended, support began to dwindle. ‘Satisfaction’ with the involvement in the conflict among Britains was invariably some 10 percentage points less than among Americans.56 The majority of public opinion in France was against the use of armed forces. With time and with progressing preparations for war, the number of opponents increased. The situation was completely different from that observed during the Gulf War, when public opinion had supported the intervention.57 Opponents of the intervention also dominated in Germany, although its proponents briefly gained some strength in summer 2003.58

5.6  The outcome In order to evaluate the results of a military intervention one has to first assess the degree to which its complex goals were achieved and to estimate its broadly perceived cost. The degree to which the declared goals of the intervention were achieved was close to zero, mainly because they had been incorrectly defined. Iraq was also not disarmed of WMD because there were simply no such weapons there at that time. Therefore, the threat the country had posed to the international system had not been great enough for the intervention to help ensure stability of the world order; as a matter of fact, it destabilised this order. The intervention also did not consolidate the authority of the UN by enforcing the UNSC resolutions violated by Iraq. Being conducted without UN mandate, it harmed the UN’s authority even further. Lasting destabilisation of Iraq also meant that despite Hussein having been overthrown, the humanitarian, economic and political situation of the Iraqi population did not improve and possibly became even worse. The only goal actually achieved was the overt albeit not entirely official one of ending the Iraqi regime. After the mission’s goals had been modified and the interveners focused on stabilising the country, they only partially managed to fulfil this goal. The intervener’s interests (which translated into actual goals) were not satisfied. The inability to stabilise Iraq in fact weakened the international position of the US (and to a certain extent that of the other participants and supporters as

Iraq 2003–2010   127 well), which lost much of its credibility. Apart from military failures, the reason for that was also the way Washington reacted to the international opposition to the intervention, and the coalition’s approach to legal standards, especially in the human rights realm, before and during the intervention. Iraq’s instability made it impossible to effectively control the exploitation of local energy resources and thus did not provide the US with any significant influence on oil prices. The costs of the long and large-­scale military mission considerably increased the American budget deficit. The intervention in Iraq had no positive influence whatsoever on democratisation in the Middle East. Moreover, it contributed to the already strong anti-­ American sentiments in the region (and to a certain extent throughout the world). It is also hard to find any geostrategic benefits of the intervention. On the global scale, terrorist activities increased, and the largest number of acts of terror was recorded in Iraq,59 but these were rather local. Virtually the entire West experienced negative economic and political effects (such as loss in international prestige), regardless of its position on the legitimacy of the intervention. Interests of the lobbies were partially fulfilled (profits of defence, mining and construction companies – mainly from the US), but the interests of the smaller members of the coalition – much less so, as they had been hoping to establish closer ties with the attractive partner in order to improve their international standing. The departure of foreign troops from Iraq did not mean a definitive end to the war. In the following years, the number of casualties caused by armed clashes and terrorist attacks exceeded the threshold of ‘major armed conflict’ (i.e. the annual combat losses amounted to more than 1,000 people).

Notes   1 I.H. Daalder, J.M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Wiley, New York 2003) 121–126.   2 In the following years, given the war in Iraq and the parallel war in Afghanistan, military spending continued to increase: to US$452.6 billion in 2004 (46.7 per cent of global spending) and US$478.2 billion in 2005 (47.8 per cent). P. Stalenheim, D. ­Fruchart, W. Omitoogun, C. Perdomo, Military expenditure, in: SIPRI Yearbook 2006 (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006) 301–305.   3 M. Klare, Blood and Oil: How America’s Thirst for Petrol is Killing Us (Hamish-­ Hamilton, London 2005) 63.   4 In the 1980s, they were on average approximately US$18.5 billion annually (between 14 and 32 billion), while towards the end of the 1990s – less than 4 billion, and in 2001 – a mere 1.4 billion; as quoted in the SIPRI Yearbook and The Military Balance, successive editions since 1980.   5 Arabs – approximately 77 per cent, Kurds – approximately 19 per cent (inhabiting mostly Kurdistan). More than 95 per cent of the population is Muslim (including approximately 60 per cent Shiites and 35 per cent Sunnis).   6 Additionally, it also included Australia and Poland and, through the presence of naval and medical units, Denmark.   7 Kuwait protest over the Iraqi statement, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_ east/2776819.stm (accessed 10 May 2018).

128   Bolesław Balcerowicz   8 P. Bennis, The Day the World Said No to War, 15 February 2003, www.ips-­dc.org/ february_15_2003_the_day_the_world_said_no_to_war (accessed 10 May 2018).   9 C. Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council, 5 February 2003, www. theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa (accessed 10 May 2018). 10 To prove his point, Powell, accompanied by the CIA’s Director of Central Intelligence G. Tenet, presented satellite photos and phone call transcripts; he also argued that Iraq had mobile laboratories for production of chemical and biological weapons. Ibid. 11

So far, the conditions for using force against Iraq are not fulfilled: While suspicions remain, no evidence has been given that Iraq still possesses weapons of mass destruction or capabilities in this field. […] While not yet fully satisfactory, Iraqi co-­operation [with the international community] is improving. (Memorandum Submitted by France, Germany, Russia, 24 February 2003, http:// edition.cnn.com/2003/US/02/24/sprj.irq.memo (accessed 10 May 2018))

‘Well, I don’t know. I have no evidence to support that.… It seems that there are no nuclear weapons – no nuclear weapons program. […] rushing into battle today is clearly a disproportionate response’ – response of Jacques Chirac to the question about Iraq’s possession of WMD, Interview on CBS News’ 60 Minutes, 16 March 2003, www.cbsnews.com/news/chirac-­makes-his-­case-on-­iraq (accessed 10 May 2018). 12 B. Woodward., Bush at War (Simon & Schuster, New York 2002) 83; Daalder, Lindsay (2003) 128–129. 13 Powell (2003); D. Feith, War and Decision: Inside Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (Harper, New York 2008) 187–188. 14 W. Chin, Britain and the War on Terror: Policy, Strategy and Operations (Ashgate, Farnham 2013) 84, 94–100. 15

The Iraqi regime has in fact been very busy enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological agents. And they continue to pursue the nuclear program they began so many years ago. These are not weapons for the purpose of defending Iraq; these are offensive weapons for the purpose of inflicting death on a massive scale. […] Many of us are convinced that Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon. (D. Cheney, Remarks by the Vice President to the Veterans of Foreign Wars. 103rd National Convention, Nashville, 26 August 2002)

16 G. Rose, How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle. A History of American Intervention from World War I to Afghanistan (Simon & Schuster, New York 2010) 255–256. 17 N. Soderberg, The Superpower Myth (Wiley, Hoboken 2005) 211–224; Rose (2010) 241–246. 18 G. Muttitt, Fuel on the Fire: Oil and Politics in Occupied Iraq (Bodley Head, London 2011) 94–103. 19 The assumptions that Iraqi society would favour liberation by external powers and lasting presence of foreign troops; that Iran would not use its influence among Shiites; that America’s allies in the region, governed by autocrats, could adopt the programme of democratisation. 20 Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, Interview with Sam Tannenhaus, Vanity Fair, 9 May 2003. 21 Muttitt (2011) 31–57; see also: R. Heinberg, The Party’s Over: Oil, War and the Fate of Industrial Societies (New Society Publishers, Gabriola Island 2005). 22

At the moment, I accept that association between them (terrorists and Saddam’s regime) is loose. But it is hardening. […] And the possibility of the two coming

Iraq 2003–2010   129 together – of terrorist groups in possession of WMD, even of a so-­called radiological bomb is now in judgment, a real and present danger. (T. Blair, Speech in the House of Commons, 18 March 2003, www.theguardian. com/politics/2003/mar/18/foreignpolicy.iraq1 (accessed 10 May 2018)) 23 Chin (2013) 79–83; Blair (2003). 24 Blair (2003). 25 The British government placed great emphasis on obtaining UN backing for the operation, and this even despite the disillusionment with its results, and directly before the launch of the intervention (on 5 March) they were supposedly asking Washington for additional time to complete the UN inspection in Iraq – as quoted in: Chin (2013) 102. 26 R. Kuźniar, Poland’s Foreign Policy after 1989 (Scholar, Warsaw 2009) 324–330. 27 ‘American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger’. G.W. Bush, Speech on Iraq, 19 March 2003, www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/19/sprj.irq.int.bush. transcript (accessed 10 May 2018). 28 Officially, in his speech on 19 March 2003, president Bush declared no intention of regime change in Iraq by saying: ‘We have no ambition in Iraq except to remove a threat and restore control of that country to its own people’. Ibid. 29 ‘The World will be much safer when the Iraqi people have a regime that they deserve instead of the regime that they have’. C. Rice, Interview for CBS (17 February 2002), quoted by Daalder, Lindsay (2003) 129. 30 ‘I have never put our justification for action as a regime change. We have to act within the terms set out in resolution 1441. That is our legal base’. Blair (2003). 31 This distinction was first made by the then US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who probably first used it publically on 22 January 2003, criticising France and Germany as countries of the ‘old’ Europe for their opposition towards a military operation in Iraq. Outrage at ‘old Europe’ remarks, 23 January 2003, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/europe/2687403.stm (accessed 10 May 2018). 32 Joint Congressional Resolution to Authorize Use of US Armed Forces against Iraq, 16 October 2002, in: J. Ehrenberg (ed.), The Iraqi Papers (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010) 85–91. 33 D. Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (Sentinel, New York 2011) 427–432; T. Franks, American Soldier (Regan Books, New York 2004) 315, 329–355. 34 T.M. Mosely, Operation Iraqi Freedom. By numbers, USCENTAF, 30 April 2003, www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/oifcentaf.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). 35 Operation Iraqi Freedom: Our Goals, www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/ iraq/2003/iraq-­030322-centcom03.htm (accessed 10 May 2018). What is surprising is a confusion of goals with tasks of different degrees of generality. Putting it in proper military terms, what might be called the operation’s military goals were: defeating (disarming) Iraq’s armed forces, establishing effective control over its territory and thus creating conditions for rebuilding/reshaping the country. 36 See The Military Balance 2003/2004 (IISS-­Oxford University Press, London 2003) 110–111. 37 Of approximately 320 Iraqi aircraft less than half were operational, and their crews were poorly trained. The coalition had some 1,800 modern aircraft (1,663 provided by the US) with well-­trained crews. 38 US DoD, Joint Vision 2020 (2000), www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/jv2020/jv2020a. pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). 39 During the Gulf War, the independent air operation lasted for five and a half weeks. The Kosovo War was in fact an air campaign (the sum of air operations). 40 Special forces units arrived on site in February 2002, and a command body was established (Northern Iraq Liason Element). B. Woodward, Plan of Attack (Simon & Schuster, New York 2004) 208–212.

130   Bolesław Balcerowicz 41 More: M.R. Gorgon, B.E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (Pantheon Books, New York 2006). 42 More: R. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle. A Soldier’s Story (HarperCollins, New York 2008). 43 In addition, of some 200 mosques (Fallujah is often referred to as the City of Mosques), 60 were turned to rubble. H. Thompson, Falluyah ‘City of Mosques’ now ‘City of Rubble’, www.rense.com/general62/rubb.htm (accessed 10 May 2018). 44 Two countries withdrew in 2005, 3 (including Italy) in 2006, 2 in 2007, 17 in 2008, and 4 in 2009. The only participants left in 2010 were the US and the UK. 45 As quoted in: T. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003 to 2005 (Penguin, New York 2007) 414. 46 Iraq War in Figures, 14 December 2011, www.bbc.com/news/world-­middleeast-­11107739 (accessed 10 May 2018). 47 President Bush declared a withdrawal of 5,700 soldiers by Christmas of 2007 and next 30,000 by summer 2008. Bush Pledges Iraq Troop Reduction, 14 September 2007, www.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6993721.stm (accessed 10 May 2018). 48 M. O’Hanlon, J. Campbell, Iraq Index (Brookings 2009) 6 (version of 22 September 2009; www.brookings.edu/wp-­content/uploads/2016/07/index20090922.pdf ) (accessed 10 May 2018). 49 The Letter of the Eight was signed by: the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the UK; the Vilnius Letter was signed by the leaders of: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia. 50 More: S.D. Murphy, Assessing the legality of invading Iraq (2004), 92 Georgetown Law Journal 173–257. 51 HRW, Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq (2003), www.hrw.org/report/2003/12/11/target/conduct-­war-and-­civilian-casualties-­iraq (accessed 10 May 2018). 52 USCENTCOM confirmed the use of 10,782 cluster bombs, which could have contained as many as 1.8 million submunitions. USCENTCOM, Executive Summary of Report on Cluster Munitions 2003 [made available to Human Rights Watch; see Human Rights Watch (2003)]. See also: HRW, U.S.: Hundreds of Civilian Deaths in Iraq Were Preventable Cluster Munitions, ‘Decapitation’ Attacks Condemned, www. hrw.org/news/2003/12/12/us-­hundreds-civilian-­deaths-iraq-­were-preventable (accessed 10 May 2018). 53 Consumers for Peace, War Crimes Committed by the United States in Iraq and Mechanisms for Accountability (2006), www.informationclearinghouse.info/pdf/war_ crimes-­iraq-101006.pdf (accessed 29 March 2018). 54 A.M. Taguba, An Investigative Report, on Alleged Abuses at U.S. Military Prisons in Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca, Iraq (2004). Examples of IHL violations regarding the handling of prisoners are presented in a confidential ICRC report, fragments of which have been published by The Wall Street Journal. 55 The data is based on surveys conducted by numerous institutions, including Gallup, CNN, CBS, New York Times, USA Today. The data has been interpreted using the following articles: A.J. Berinsky, J.N. Druckman, The polls-­review, Public opinion research and support for the Iraq War (2007) 1 The Public Opinion Quarterly 126–141; P. Everts, P. Insernia, The polls – trends. The war in Iraq (2005) 2 The Public Opinion Quarterly 264–323; R. Teixeira, What the Public Really Thinks of Iraq (21 March 2008), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-­content/uploads/ issues/2008/03/pdf/public_iraq.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). 56 Everts, Insernia (2005) 50. 57 Ibid. 46. 58 Ibid. 46. 59 Before the invasion, terrorist attacks in Iraq accounted for 0.2 per cent of all terror attacks recorded in the world; in 2003, their share was 7.8 per cent (with a 23 per cent

Iraq 2003–2010   131 share of deaths caused by terrorism), in 2005 – 47 per cent (and 76.2 per cent of victims), and in 2006 – 65.5 per cent (and 86.3 per cent of deaths) – data according to: MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, as quoted by: M. Madej, Zagrożenia asymetryczne bezpieczeństwa państw obszaru transatlantyckiego, (PISM, Warszawa 2007) 193 (fn. 168).

References Bennis P., The Day the World Said No to War, 15 February 2003, www.ips-­dc.org/ february_15_2003_the_day_the_world_said_no_to_war (accessed 10 May 2018). Berinsky A.J., Druckman J.N., The polls – review, public opinion research and support for the Iraq War (2007) 1 The Public Opinion Quarterly 126–141. Blair T., Speech in the House of Commons, 18 March 2003, www.theguardian.com/ politics/2003/mar/18/foreignpolicy.iraq1 (accessed 10 May 2018). Bush G.W., Speech on Iraq, 19 March 2003, www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/19/sprj.irq.int. bush.transcript (accessed 10 May 2018). Cheney D., Remarks by the Vice President to the Veterans of Foreign Wars. 103rd National Convention, Nashville, 26 August 2002. Chin W., Britain and the War on Terror: Policy, Strategy and Operations (Ashgate, Farnham 2013). Consumers for Peace, War Crimes Committed by the United States in Iraq and Mechanisms for Accountability (2006), www.informationclearinghouse.info/pdf/war_crimes-­ iraq-101006.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). Daalder I.H., Lindsay J.M., America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Wiley, New York 2003). Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, Interview with Sam Tannenhaus, Vanity Fair, 9 May 2003. Everts P., Insernia P., The polls – trends. The war in Iraq (2005) 2 The Public Opinion Quarterly 264–323. Feith D., War and Decision: Inside Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism (Harper, New York 2008). Franks T., American Soldier (Regan Books, New York 2004). Gorgon M.R., Trainor B.E., Cobra II: The Inside Story of Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (Pantheon Books, New York 2006). Heinberg R., The Party’s Over: Oil, War and the Fate of Industrial Societies (New Society Publishers, Gabriola Island 2005). HRW (Human Rights Watch), Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq (2003), www.hrw.org/report/2003/12/11/target/conduct-­war-and-­civiliancasualties-­iraq (accessed 10 May 2018). HRW (Human Rights Watch), U.S.: Hundreds of Civilian Deaths in Iraq Were Preventable Cluster Munitions, ‘Decapitation’ Attacks Condemned, www.hrw.org/news/2003/12/12/ us-­hundreds-civilian-­deaths-iraq-­were-preventable (accessed 10 May 2018). Joint Congressional Resolution to Authorize Use of US Armed Forces against Iraq, 16 October 2002, in: J. Ehrenberg (ed.), The Iraqi Papers (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010). Klare M., Blood and Oil: How America’s thirst for Petrol is Killing Us (Hamish Hamilton, London 2005). Kuźniar R., Poland’s Foreign Policy after 1989 (Scholar, Warsaw 2009). Madej M., Zagrożenia asymetryczne bezpieczenstwa panstw obszaru transatlantyckiego (PISM, Warszawa 2007).

132   Bolesław Balcerowicz Memorandum Submitted by France, Germany, Russia (24 February 2003), http://edition. cnn.com/2003/US/02/24/sprj.irq.memo (accessed 10 May 2018). Mosely T.M., Operation Iraqi Freedom. By numbers, USCENTAF, 30 April 2003, www. comw.org/pda/fulltext/oifcentaf.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). Murphy S.D., Assessing the legality of invading Iraq (2004) 92 Georgetown Law Journal 173–257. Muttitt G., Fuel on the Fire: Oil and Politics in Occupied Iraq (Bodley Head, London 2011). O’Hanlon M., Campbell J., Iraq Index (Brookings 2009) 6 (version of 22 September 2009, www.brookings.edu/wp-­content/uploads/2016/07/index20090922.pdf ) (accessed 10 May 2018). Operation Iraqi Freedom: Our Goals, www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/ iraq/2003/iraq-­030322-centcom03.htm (accessed 10 May 2018). Powell C., Address to the United Nations Security Council (5 February 2003) www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa (accessed 10 May 2018). Ricks T., Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003 to 2005 (Penguin, New York 2007). Rose G., How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle. A History of American Intervention from World War I to Afghanistan (Simon & Schuster, New York 2010). Rumsfeld D., Known and Unknown: A Memoir (Sentinel, New York 2011) 427–432. Sanchez R., Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (HarperCollins, New York 2008). Soderberg N., The Superpower Myth (Wiley, Hoboken 2005). Stalenheim P., Fruchart D., Omitoogun W., Perdomo C., Military expenditure, in: SIPRI Yearbook 2006 (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006). Taguba A.M., An Investigative Report, on Alleged Abuses at U.S. Military Prisons in Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca, Iraq (2004). Teixeira R., What the Public Really Thinks of Iraq (21 March 2008), https://cdn. americanprogress.org/wp-­content/uploads/issues/2008/03/pdf/public_iraq.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). The Military Balance 2003–2004 (International Institute for Strategic Studies/Oxford University Press, London 2003). Thompson H., Falluyah ‘City of Mosques’ Now ‘City of Rubble’, www.rense.com/ general62/rubb.htm (accessed 10 May 2018). US Department of Defense, Joint Vision 2020 (2000), www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/ jv2020/jv2020a.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). Woodward B., Bush at War (Simon & Schuster, New York 2002). Woodward B., Plan of Attack (Simon & Schuster, New York 2004).

6 Libya When military success means state collapse Anna Wojciuk

6.1  Strategic context 6.1.1  The sources of the conflict in Libya The external military intervention in Libya was directly triggered by the bloody suppression of mass protests against the authoritarian rule of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and the outbreak of civil war in the country. Although the protests broke out on a rising tide of similar demonstrations taking place all over North Africa, especially in Tunisia and Egypt, they were mainly the result of the deteriorating economic situation in Libya itself. The history of the domestic tensions between different groups was, however, much earlier than the Arab Spring. After international sanctions were imposed on the country in the 1990s, Libya suffered from temporary economic problems. These sanctions proved very painful for Libya, where the oil industry accounts for approximately 50 per cent of GDP and almost all the income derive from exports. This resulted in huge losses for the Libyan economy. Combined with tribal tensions, in 1993, the situation even led to an (unsuccessful) attempt to overthrow Colonel Gaddafi.1 Furthermore, Libya had a weapons of mass destruction development programme, which was illegal under international law. Only in 2003–2004, when the country completely abandoned the related research and agreed to compensate the families of the victims of the Lockerbie bombing, were the sanctions finally abolished.2 In 2006, the US also removed Libya from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. This allowed the country to rebuild its political relations with the West and improved its economic situation. Already in 2003, GDP growth reached 13 per cent, whereas in the preceding year the economy had still been shrinking. Economic cooperation started developing, especially in the energy sector, the mining sector and purchase of modern arms, the key partners being the US, France and Italy. This led to privatisation of the majority of the oil sector, attracted billions in foreign direct investments and improved the country’s economic results. The pace of Libya’s economic growth was very high, reaching 10.6 per cent in 2010, which allowed its GDP to rise to US$75 billion at that time. However, the benefits brought by economic development did not improve the quality of living of the majority of the population. Libyan society is strongly

134   Anna Wojciuk divided along ethnic and tribal lines, and this was the basis for defining the citizens’ attitude towards Gaddafi’s regime. The Colonel’s clan, Gaddafa, as well as other clans that sympathised with the regime (e.g. Megartha), had an effective monopoly on access to positions of power in state administration and the military, leaving the other clans excluded from having any influence on governance. Faster economic growth also did not translate into an improved living standard, especially in terms of the life prospects of young people; in 2010 unemployment was 20.74 per cent, and approximately 16 per cent of families had no source of income whatsoever.3 The poorly developed private sector did not offer jobs, no assistance was provided to young people entering the labour market, the investment climate was bad, and every reform was blocked by some group interested in maintaining the status quo. Given the above, social sentiments could not be improved by free but low-­quality public services – education and healthcare – or by numerous but ineffective subsidies (e.g. for housing) and regulated maximum prices of basic foodstuffs. Paradoxically, the quantitative improvement of school enrolment became one of the sources of rising frustration among young Libyans, whose newly acquired education was useless in the country’s backward economy based on natural resources. Libyan society’s dissatisfaction with Gaddafi’s corrupt authoritarian rule, as well as with unemployment and poverty, found an outlet in January 2011, when mass protests broke out in other African countries. During the Arab Spring, which began in December 2010 in Tunisia and soon spread to Egypt and Algeria, followed by a dozen other Arab countries, Libyans took to the streets. The authorities tried to win the people over by lowering taxes, but protests broke out again on 15 February, only days after mass protests forced the president of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, to step down from office.4 The demonstrations in Libya became even more intense two days later, on 17 February – the ‘Day of Rage’ – when thousands attended protests organised all across the country. Concerned by the scale of public outrage, the authorities attempted to use force to suppress the demonstrations, which led to the first armed clashes and the first casualties; according to Human Rights Watch (HRW), a total of 49 people lost their lives that day.5 The clashes polarised society. On 21 February, the regular Libyan army was deployed against the protesters; 300 people lost their lives in Tripoli when government forces were trying to contain the demonstrations. The use of the military with armour and air support and of foreign mercenaries against own citizens marked the beginning of the second stage of the conflict. On 24 February, rebels launched offensives in the east and west of the country. Regular front lines formed, and dissident forces, composed mainly of lightly armed civilians and deserters from the Libyan army, celebrated their first military victories. On 26 February the National Transitional Council (NTC) was formed as the germ of the future government. In early March, rebels controlled the entire eastern part of the country and announced a march against the capital, Tripoli. However, with their advantage in organisation and equipment, the forces loyal to Gaddafi soon started gaining the upper hand, and their counteroffensive

Libya   135 launched on 6 March pushed the rebels right back to Benghazi. In the second half of March 2011, the regime was close to quashing the rebellion for good. On 17 March, the UNSC adopted a resolution establishing a no-­fly zone over Libya, and the air forces of a number of countries began a limited military operation. Two days later, NATO launched a military intervention in Libya. 6.1.2  Libya’s strategic importance for Western countries before the war The international significance of Libya was mainly determined by its oil reserves and – to a lesser extent – natural gas reserves. Due to geographical proximity and the high quality of the resources, once sanctions against Libya were dropped most exports of energy carriers went to Europe. At the same time, the income generated by exports of oil and gas was spent on infrastructure investments and modernisation of the army. Foreign enterprises were offered lucrative contracts, and the most attractive among them concerned arms. In 2008 arms spending reached more than US$1.3 billion, and further planned purchases kept encouraging suppliers to up their offers. Another aspect contributing to Libya’s importance is its central position in the Mediterranean region and its long shoreline. Due to its geographical location, Libya serves as a buffer zone between rich Europe and the economic migrants from Africa trying to reach European shores. For many years Colonel Gaddafi stopped the migration flow to Europe, maintaining transitory camps and using them as cheap labour and mercenaries. The regime was also very successful at curbing illegal people smuggling across the Mediterranean Sea. After the country’s internal destabilisation, which caused migration to rise to unprecedented levels, it became evident just how crucial Libya’s activities in this respect had been for Europe. Libya has also long been a major route for smuggling drugs to Europe and a major ally in combating Islamist extremist groups in the region, including the Al-­Qaeda.

6.2  Motives, justification and aims of the Western involvement The countries that initiated the military intervention in Libya were France and the UK, which had not aspired to leading such operations in the Middle East since the 1959 Suez Crisis. Already on the Day of Rage (17 February 2011), Paris spoke about the need to protect French citizens in Libya, and four days later the French ambassador to the UN suggested that the activities of Gaddafi’s forces could be bearing the hallmarks of crime against humanity.6 Very soon the British joined France’s side and already on 28 February proposed establishing a no-­fly zone over Libya. Both countries started lobbying for this initiative, which at that time was still rejected by the US and most other Western countries. On 10 March France was the first to recognise the Libyan National Transitional Council and start preparing a military operation. There were, however, major differences

136   Anna Wojciuk between France’s and the UK’s visions of the planned operation. While Paris envisioned it as a French–British venture, London wanted it to be held under the aegis of NATO. Moreover, Prime Minister David Cameron did not consider Gaddafi’s regime the actual target of the planned intervention and for a long time refrained from directly supporting the rebels, while removing the Colonel from power was one of Paris’s original goals. 6.2.1  The declared motives of the intervention and their verification The official justification for the mission focused mainly on two factors, the first one being humanitarian motives. In this context the highest priority was given to the swift prevention of a humanitarian disaster that would inevitably follow the taking of the main rebel stronghold, Benghazi, by the government forces – a very likely scenario at that time. In broader terms, it was about the need to protect the civilian population put in danger by the armed conflict in Libya. This primary task of the intervention forces – to protect civilians – was set out in UNSC resolution S/RES/1973, which was considered the legal basis of the intervention. This argument was also stressed by the leaders of Western countries in their public speeches, especially in the US, France and the UK, but also by NATO representatives when they explained why the Alliance was taking over command of the operation. Although official documents concerning the intervention did not make direct reference to the concept of responsibility to protect, the general discourse remained within the spirit of this notion. The second commonly mentioned motive was the interest of the international community, involving primarily the need to ensure stability in the region and, even more importantly, to provide local communities rising up against the authoritarian order with better ways to articulate their interests. It was stressed that failing to react to the events unfolding in Libya could negatively impact the further course of the Arab Spring, contributing to the consolidation of authoritarian trends in the region. Yet another important issue, however, was the credibility of the UN as the institution responsible for world security and peace.7 ‘Hard’ national interests of the Western states were definitely a less prominent factor in the official justification. As the operation was progressing and its goals were modified – expanded to include regime change – their significance in official discourse slightly increased, and Western leaders started pointing out that if Gaddafi stayed in power, he would be able to take certain hostile steps against Europe, for example by stimulating terrorist activities in Europe (which lent credence to Libya’s earlier sponsoring of terrorism). Economic issues, in turn, were entirely omitted in the official justification for the mission. After verifying the underlying motives we can conclude that for Western countries, especially for their leaders, both humanitarian reasons and the potential impact of the events on the regional and global situation, and on the course of changes therein, were indeed important reasons to launch the military operation in Libya. In the humanitarian context, for example, British Prime Minister Cameron issued statements comparing the situation in Libya to the events in

Libya   137 ­ rebrenica during the Bosnian War and expressing the desire to prevent a similar S humanitarian disaster this time.8 Another indication of the above was the role played by individuals believing in the fundamental principles of liberal interventionism in the process of establishing support for the intervention and in initiating the decision-­making process. In France, interventionism was strongly advocated by the influential philosopher Bernard-­Henri Lévy. In the US, a considerable role was played by the US ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, and by Barack Obama’s security adviser Samantha Power, former Director of Policy Planning at the US State Department Anne-­Marie Slaughter and then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. This approach was based on the concept of R2P (responsibility to protect), the spirit of which was very much visible in the rhetoric of that time, although – as has already been mentioned – the term itself did not appear in any official documents concerning the intervention. In addition, the intervening countries kept mentioning the – unverifiable – number of 25,000 civilian casualties. The social support for the mission in the interested Western countries was also primarily based on fear that without any reaction Libya would suffer a humanitarian disaster. Whether this fear was justified and whether the disaster was indeed unavoidable is, of course, a separate issue entirely. Despite the victories of Gaddafi’s troops over the rebels that followed some initial defeats, and despite the rhetoric of the authorities (announcing that ‘no mercy’ will be shown after taking Benghazi, referring to the opponents as ‘rats’, etc.), there is no solid and reliable data showing beyond any doubt that at the point when operations in Libya were launched the number of civilian casualties had already reached the magnitude of a humanitarian disaster. While the risk that such a crime would indeed take place increased when the government launched the offensive against Benghazi, it almost certainly significantly fell in the first days of the operation, once the offensive was stopped by airstrikes; this could have weakened (but has not done so) the significance and relevance of humanitarian reasons as the main motivation behind continuing the intervention. Humanitarian motives are also confirmed by the sequence of events preceding the decision to launch a military intervention. Instead of laying the ground for the operation by making public opinion accustomed to the steps that would be taken, during a ceremony at West Point on 25 February US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates spoke about the intervention in a very sceptical tone. The Department of Defense was against becoming involved, and Gates himself cautioned against taking any action without clearly defined political goals, pointed out the gaps in the intelligence data on the rebels, including their possible links to Al-­Qaeda; he also stressed that the intervention could further lower US credibility in Arab countries. He believed that there was a high risk of unforeseen and uncontrollable consequences of the intervention. What is more, involvement in Libya would tie down US forces needed on other missions, especially in Afghanistan, which should be the top priority for the US. Gates also did not consider the no-­fly zone to be a measure capable of effectively protecting the civilians.9

138   Anna Wojciuk The second factor of those most often mentioned as a justification for the intervention, which certainly also had real influence on the decision to launch the operation, was the potential impact of refraining from any reaction on the situation in the region and, most importantly, on the further evolution of the Arab Spring. Even though there was no consensus at that time, also in the West, on whether the reasons and the potential results of the Arab Spring for the regional and global order were positive or negative, it was feared that if Gaddafi managed to suppress the rebellion in Libya, the authoritarian trends in the region would be consolidated; this might further deepen the frustration of the rebellious Middle-­Eastern societies, whose grass-­roots rising against the existing order found much sympathy among Western countries and societies, even despite their concerns about fundamentalist radicalisation and political destabilisation in the region, among others. Possible further destabilisation of the region (a surge of fundamentalist terrorism, increased migration) were giving rise to concerns related to ‘hard’ security interests, especially of southern Europe.10 Albeit important, all these factors alone probably did not constitute sufficient motive for Western countries to take as decisive an action as an intervention. There were, undoubtedly, some ‘private’ factors involved, important for the key initiators: France, and to a lesser extent, also the UK. French authorities saw the intervention in Libya as an opportunity to rebuild their international position in the Maghreb, a very important region for France, after the initial blundering reaction to the changes spurred by the Arab Spring.11 It gave President Nicolas Sarkozy the chance to present himself as a strong political leader and improve his position before the coming presidential elections. Important factors for the UK included David Cameron’s personal attitude and possibly also the desire to manifest London’s ‘sovereign’ role in its relations with the US.12 As for the US and other allies who supported the intervention, next to humanitarian and ‘international security’-related motives it is important to note the mechanism of ‘entrapment’ by France (and the UK), both of which pushed for the intervention, in line with the reasoning that if it was going to happen anyway, it would be better to have control over it. Another fact of some importance is that, irrespective of the vague ‘target state of affairs’ and military goals when the operation in Libya was launched, it was considered militarily feasible (weakness of the enemy, good geographic conditions, potential relatively low cost).13 It seems, however, that regardless of what might have been suggested by the press, and by some politicians from non-­Western countries (Arab countries, Russia), and even from some Western countries (Germany, Poland – Donald Tusk – and other countries on the eastern flank of the EU), economic factors played a marginal role. Economic relations with Gaddafi’s Libya, including those in the oil and weaponry sectors, were very good, especially for Italy and France. The UK had a relatively lower economic standing in Libya, but it would be surprising if it attempted to improve it through military intervention, especially after London’s earlier experience in Iraq. Certainly, contracts on oil exploitation with the National Transitional Council in Benghazi were concluded quickly, the first being signed already in September 2011, but this simply proves

Libya   139 that the opportunities arising during the intervention were used well rather than suggesting that this was one of the reasons behind the intervention. 6.2.2  The declared and actual aims of the intervention Officially, according to UNSC S/RES/1973, the principal declared goal of the intervention was to protect the civilian population by all means available. This is also how the main aim of the mission was presented in the public statements delivered by the leaders of Western countries and by the NATO Secretary General. At the immediate onset of the intervention, this translated into preventing government forces from taking Benghazi, but also preventing other attacks on the civilian population. At the same time, given that S/RES/1973 also called for a ceasefire and for stopping the fighting (although in this case it does not speak of using ‘all means necessary’), we may assume that this was an indirect objective of the intervention, albeit one that was not clearly defined by the mission’s initiators. Another important issue is whether we should consider the changing of the regime in Libya as one of the official aims of the operation and, if so, whether it was the interveners’ goal from the onset of the mission or whether it became a goal only when the mission was already well underway. In official statements delivered before the launch of the operation and in its first weeks (especially until its final organisational form was determined and command was given to NATO) this goal was not explicitly formulated as a justification for the use of force. At the same time, however, already in the official statements before the intervention Gaddafi’s regime was deemed to negatively impact regional security and to be incapable of meeting social expectations. On 28 February Prime Minister Cameron stated outright that Gaddafi had to go so that Libyans could enjoy the same rights that are guaranteed elsewhere, but he did not say that the military intervention should serve to remove him from power. On 28 March, President Obama, in turn, stressed that having regime change as one of the goals of the military intervention would be a mistake that would divide the coalition, but at the same time he spoke of the intervention hastening the ‘day when Qaddafi leaves power’ and about creating conditions for the Libyan people ‘to determine their own destiny’. Finally, in a joint letter of 11 April the leaders of France, the UK and the US stressed that in order to ensure effective protection of civilians in Libya Gaddafi needed to step down for good, although at the same time they explicitly denied the intention to force regime change. Therefore, even if we do not consider effecting regime change an official objective of the intervention, removing Gaddafi from power was in fact a goal – even if not pursued from the very beginning of the operation. The actual strategic and political objectives of the Western countries’ engagement in Libya largely coincided with the declared goals, especially when we consider removing Gaddafi from power a de facto official aim of the operation. They were, however, certainly not identical. The governments of France and the UK, which initiated the mission, as well as the governments of the other Western

140   Anna Wojciuk supporters of the intervention (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Sweden) indeed believed the threat of a humanitarian disaster in Libya to be real.14 It is important that the mission was undertaken in unfavourable circumstances from the point of view of Western countries – with an ongoing deep economic crisis and increasingly limited defence budgets. In this period, the interveners were significantly engaged in Afghanistan, and the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite receiving considerable funding, had not yielded the expected results, while at the same time there was growing distrust among non-­ Western countries, especially the Muslim ones, towards expeditionary missions of the West. The ‘hard’ interests of Western countries as a whole would imply a sceptical approach to the mission. Gaddafi’s Libya was not a direct threat to their security, and attacking it could increase this threat, albeit probably not dramatically so. What is more, any change of the situation in Libya, especially a regime change, could have negative economic consequences for a part of Europe (the uncertain fate of oil and arms contracts, the problem of stemming migration). Other factors that could affect the West were the risk of possible failure or protraction of the mission, the weariness of Western societies caused by the crisis and the previous interventions as well as the unclear future of Libya after the intervention. The fact that the intervention was launched seems to confirm the power of the humanitarian arguments and show that the desire to prevent a humanitarian disaster was indeed an important objective of the operation. This is also confirmed by the striving to overthrow Gaddafi; despite the earlier political rapport and development of economic cooperation, removing him from power was deemed necessary to provide effective protection to the civilian population. It is a different matter entirely whether the humanitarian aims, although important, were really decisive. The course of the decision-­making process, especially France’s role in it, might suggest that the ‘private’ goals of the respective states and even individual politicians (Sarkozy, Cameron) were a crucial factor and that they approached the intervention instrumentally, seeing in it a means to rebuild their position in the region, win national elections (Sarkozy), improve the political standing in relations with the US. These goals, however, could only be achieved if the intervention was a success, and this was determined by the effectiveness in eliminating direct threats to the civilian population. It also does not seem that the intervention had hidden economic objectives. Libya was an important producer of oil but not a key one; moreover, the West had developed its economic relations with it before the intervention. Should the rebellion be suppressed, the previously concluded contracts would not have to be automatically cancelled. Should the rebels manage to take power, supporting them could of course create opportunities to establish relations even more advantageous to the West, but this could take a long time and could possibly fall short of balancing out the costs of rebuilding the country after the war (see section 6.2.1).

Libya   141 6.2.3  The coherence of the West’s position The initiative to launch a military intervention in Libya in 2011 clearly divided the members of NATO. In the end only eight countries participated in combat operations,15 and a further six provided non-­combat support.16 The remaining NATO members officially voiced political support for the mission. For some of them any involvement would have been symbolic anyway, as they had no capability to provide real support. Some NATO members, however, showed explicit reluctance or far-­reaching ambivalence towards the planned operation. Germany was one of the more prominent countries that chose not to participate in the intervention at all. Not only did Berlin not send its air force over Libya, it even abstained in the vote on UNSC S/RES/1973, which was crucial for the entire operation. Some other members, especially Turkey and the countries of East-­ Central Europe, including Poland, were also reluctant towards the planned intervention. Poland not only refused to support the intervention; Prime Minister Donald Tusk also openly challenged the motivations behind it, accusing Europeans of hypocrisy with regard to human rights. If we want to protect people from dictators, reprisal, torture and prison, he explained, this desire needs to be universal and not executed only when it is convenient, beneficial or safe.17 The fact that only some of the NATO members participated in the military operation in Libya can be treated as an argument confirming that particularistic interests of the intervening countries might have contributed to the decision to launch the operation, because it would have been difficult for allies to challenge activities marked by no other motivation than the need to ‘prevent a massacre’. Strong opposition against the military intervention in Libya was also evident in countries that participated in the intervention. Before the launch of the operation, a large portion of the US administration, including Robert Gates, viewed toppling the Gaddafi regime as entailing the risk of lasting destabilisation of the country and the region, and consolidation of fundamentalist forces. However, what finally gained the upper hand among the participants was the rather unjustified expectation that, given Libya’s relatively high level of economic development, effective state institutions and a relatively well educated society, the state would be quickly restored to normal functioning. Nobody predicted Libya’s internal disintegration caused by the differences within the society, composed of more than 100 rival clans, or the dramatic deterioration of security.

6.3  The course of the intervention The key condition that had to be met for the armed NATO intervention to succeed was that Libyan government forces quickly become overpowered. In early 2011 Libya’s armed forces consisted of approximately 80,000 active soldiers, including 40,000 conscripts. They had approximately 220 combat aircraft, 35 helicopters, 2,200 tanks, 950 armoured personnel carriers and more than 40 naval vessels. It is estimated, however, that some 50 per cent of the equipment and weapons were defective or otherwise not in working order. For more than a

142   Anna Wojciuk decade before the intervention the condition of Libyan materiel had been deteriorating because of international sanctions. Furthermore, only 10,000–12,000 soldiers loyal to Gaddafi participated in the fighting because the dictator did not trust those remaining and some units quickly defected to the rebels. The regular forces were supported by battalions of mercenaries, mainly from Chad. They were opposed by approximately 17,000 volunteer fighters, among whom some 1,000 had military training. The intervening forces, an international coalition, deployed approximately 350 combat aircraft, of which half were US Air Force, and 38 warships, including 12 of the US Navy.18 The first sign of Western military involvement in the conflict in Libya was the permanent observation of Libyan airspace by AWACS aircraft that began on 10 March 2011. At that time, France also sent its fighters on monitoring missions to Libya. After the UNSC decision of 17 March 2011 on establishing a no-­fly zone over Libya, the enforcement operation was joined by several other countries, but with no unified command. Even before diplomatic talks on a coalition were concluded, France began military operations. They were subsequently joined, in a not entirely coordinated manner, by the UK and Canada, as well as the US and the other participants. At that time, Gaddafi’s forces were in the process of executing an offensive launched on 6 March. Within two weeks they recaptured a number of the important towns, pushing rebel forces back to Benghazi, which became the last bastion of organised resistance. The threat of inevitable fall of the city and the expected atrocities hastened the decision on the military intervention. On 19 March the interveners began military strikes by aircraft and missiles, initially aimed against Libyan counter-­air defence systems. Within days, the list of targets was expanded to include large concentrations of Libyan forces. On 23 March, once it had been agreed that NATO would take command of the military activities, Operation Unified Protector began. It was initially limited to the enforcement of the embargo on arms supplies to Libya, but from 25 March it also included the enforcement of the no-­fly zone. NATO took full control over the ongoing air and naval operation on 31 March.19 As a result of decisive action by the coalition, the situation of the rebels changed enough so that they could soon take the offensive. On 21–22 March, the rebels launched operations in the east of the country, pushing government forces away from Benghazi, and by the end of the month they managed to retake much of what they had lost earlier that month. At the end of March, however, the weakened government forces put up fierce resistance at Muammar Gaddafi’s hometown, Sirte, and on 29 March they launched a counteroffensive that lasted until mid-­April but failed to yield any significant success. The two following months were characterised by a relative stabilisation. After the planned three months of NATO’s air and missile attacks against government forces, the rebels managed to take control of but some 25 per cent of the country’s territory, thus the result of the civil war was still uncertain. On account of this, the interveners decided that the operation had to be continued, and there was even a declaration that the Alliance would remain active in Libya as long as

Libya   143 it is governed by Gaddafi. The operation, initially planned for three months, was thus extended for another four. At the same time, the rebels were given extensive support in the form of military advisors, supplies of modern weapons and limited assistance of foreign special forces in land operations. Thus strengthened, they launched a massive offensive in July and August, which ended with the unexpected capture of the capital, Tripoli, on 28 August. After that the rebels continued the offensive and began looking for Muammar Gaddafi, whose forces controlled only 10–15 per cent of the country in mid-­September. The last two bastions of their defence fell in mid-­October. On 20 October the last loyalist forces were defeated in Sirte and the rebels captured and killed Gaddafi. Although sporadic fighting kept breaking out until the end of November, it is generally agreed that the war ended on 23 October (formally NATO military operation lasted until 31 October). The operation lasted for a total of 218 days. In the period of the intervention, the civil war in Libya claimed the lives of some 10,000 soldiers, fighters, militiamen and members of security services, of whom most, around 6,000–7,000, were on the rebel side. Furthermore, several thousand civilians died during the fighting.21 The number of dead and wounded as a result of NATO airstrikes was not disclosed; it is known, however, that it was planned to destroy approximately 5,900 military targets, including 400 artillery and missile positions as well as more than 600 tanks and armoured vehicles. NATO did not suffer any human casualties. The intervening coalition had constant problems gathering together the necessary equipment. The problems with burden sharing reflected the internal tensions within NATO, including between Europe and America. Some European countries expected greater commitment by the US, while the US, suffering from so-­ called Iraq syndrome, tried to convince its European allies to take on greater responsibility for the operation. Europeans, however, were dependent on US assistance, especially in terms of reconnaissance, precision strikes and certain forms of logistic support, which the US eventually provided, albeit consistently trying to avoid becoming the leader of the intervention. Still, the difficulties in assembling the coalition force were not as much caused by lacking capabilities as by insufficient political support from some NATO members.22 Despite these problems, compared to other NATO missions the one in Libya was paradoxically characterised by relatively balanced contributions of the individual members. European engagement was greater this time, and the US were ‘leading from behind’. In spite of all the organisational creativity, the intervention revealed a gap between NATO’s aspirations and the actual resources at its disposal.23 Next to NATO countries, an important role was also played by Sweden and Qatar, which deployed their air forces to help with the enforcement of the no-­fly zone. 20

144   Anna Wojciuk

6.4  Legal aspects 6.4.1  The legal basis and the institutional dimension of the intervention In February, when Gaddafi’s forces first responded to protests with the use of force, media reports speaking of hundreds of dead induced the UNSC to adopt S/RES/1970 (26 February 2011), which stressed that Libyan authorities were responsible for the protection of their citizens, condemned the violence against civilians and demanded an end to the bloodshed. Furthermore, the said Resolution imposed international sanctions on Gaddafi’s regime: an embargo on arms sales, a travel prohibition for representatives of Libyan authorities and the freezing of their assets in foreign banks. The fact that the Libyan regime did not abide by the Resolution and possibly committed crimes against humanity moved the UNSC to invoke the R2P principle and pass another resolution on 17 March 2011. S/RES/1973 became the legal basis for the international military intervention in Libya. It called for an immediate ceasefire in Libya and an end to armed attacks against civilians; it also authorised an air operation with the aim of protecting civilians and enforcing the no-­fly zone. The document was unique, not only because it legitimised the first case of the use of force to implement the rules of R2P: for the first time in history, the UNSC authorised coercive measures against a country against its will in a situation that was not classified as an international conflict.24 What is more, France and the UK decided to launch the military intervention not in response to documented crimes committed by the Libyan regime but rather preemptively, in light of the very prospect of considerable casualties. Special advisers of the UN Secretary-­General for the prevention of genocide also consistently used words that showed they were uncertain as to whether crimes had indeed been committed in Libya, but the operation was to prevent such crimes from happening in the near future, when bloodshed on a mass scale seemed all but inevitable.25 The Resolution was not passed unanimously; five members of the UNSC abstained: Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia. The same countries voiced serious concern whether the solution was right, believing that it was possible to use peaceful measures to solve the dispute and because of the likely negative consequences of a military intervention.26 Towards the end of March, under UN mandate, NATO took responsibility for the conduct of the operation. Despite the initial reluctance of France and Turkey (although the latter for different reasons than the former), with the firm position of the UK and the US (the latter agreed to the intervention under the condition that it would be playing the leading role only in the initial phase of the operation) and with the acceptance (or at least lack of opposition) from other NATO members, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) decided to assume responsibility for enforcing the embargo, the no-­fly zone, and later for all the military activities conducted as part of the mission. The decision-­making process was controlled

Libya   145 by three countries: France, which took the leading role, the UK and the US. Although there was no agreement between the allies, NATO’s taking charge of the operation was supported by a number of non-­NATO members: Sweden, Jordan, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The collective, international character of the operation was also confirmed by the support it received from regional organisations: the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the League of Arab States; the only organisation that opposed it was the African Union (AU), which Gaddafi had strongly supported in the preceding years. Soon after the intervention began, there emerged doubts whether or not NATO forces were going beyond their mandate. Rather than sticking to patrolling the no-­fly zone and protecting civilians it conducted offensive operations in the form of strikes against government forces’ positions, thus openly supporting the rebels and contributing to overthrowing Gaddafi’s regime. Moreover, members of the coalition trained the rebels, helped them establish proper command structures, supported them with their special forces and provided them with weapons.27 Russia and China, assisted by the other members of BRICS – India, Brazil and South Africa – started highlighting this fact, at the same time pointing out that the NATO operation had gone beyond the bounds set by the UNSC.28 6.4.2  Violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) during the intervention Violations of IHL were investigated by a number of governmental and non-­ governmental institutions, first and foremost by the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya, established under Resolution No. S-­15/1 of 25 February 2011 by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. In May 2011 and in March 2012, the Commission published two reports summing up the results of its work, in which it deemed Muammar Gaddafi’s forces guilty of crimes against humanity and war crimes. The list of violations they were accused of included such items as murder, torture and abduction, as well as deliberate and systematic attacks on civilians. At the same time, however, the UN Commission’s reports accused the rebel forces of violating humanitarian law as well, for example of murdering detained individuals and plundering. The intervention executed by NATO forces, in turn, was deemed highly precise.29 A parallel investigation was conducted by an independent non-­governmental investigative mission, the Independent Civil Society Fact-­Finding Mission (ICS), established by Middle-­Eastern organisations protecting human rights. The ICS report, published in January 2012, also focused on violations committed by Libyan government forces and by the rebels, but NATO was accused of some infringements as well. The ICS found, among other things, that NATO’s offensive operations such as bombing cities where Gaddafi’s forces had been stationed were at variance with the task of protecting civilians set in S/RES/1973. The examples of humanitarian law violations cited in the report included the attack of 15 September 2011 in Sirte, which according to initial reports was supposed to have caused the

146   Anna Wojciuk death of 47 civilians.30 According to Amnesty International data, however, only two people lost their lives in this attack.31 Members of the mission visited numerous places, including civilian sites, that had been bombarded by NATO. According to witness accounts, most of the bombarded civilian targets were used for military purposes by Gaddafi’s forces, but the report also listed targets for which there had been no evidence of military use. Overall, however, NATO’s activities were found to had been up to very high standards, and it was also pointed out that unnecessary destruction and losses had been effectively reduced to a minimum, owing to warnings broadcasted over radio and leaflet drops, among others. Activists of Amnesty International and HRW visited all NATO bombing sites where civilians had died, identifying a total of at least 72 civilian victims of the attacks on questionable targets. Generally, on the basis of the reports investigating IHL violations during the 2011 military international intervention in Libya, we can say that it maintained high standards, primarily due to the tactic adopted by NATO, namely widespread use of precision munitions and efforts to minimise civilian losses through launching airstrikes mainly during night time, among others. NATO, however, cooperated with the investigating non-­governmental organisations only to a limited extent, and the exact number of victims of the intervention has never been determined. Although the various reports differ in their estimates, the number of victims of NATO operations they quote never exceeds 50.

6.5  Public attitudes towards the intervention Public opinion in NATO members was divided as regards support for engaging in the military intervention in Libya. In the US people were mainly concerned about American involvement and not about whether the intervention itself was justified. Considerable controversy arose over Barack Obama’s decision on joining the armed operation, which he had made without the consent of the US Congress. For this, the US President was widely and strongly criticised by Republicans and Democrats alike. American public opinion, however, did not share this sentiment and initially supported the involvement in Libya. According to a CNN survey of 22 March 2011, as many as 70 per cent of respondents supported the decision to send US aircraft to establish the no-­fly zone over Libya, while only 26 per cent were against it;32 the key factor was the form of engagement in the conflict: in the very same survey only 28 per cent of respondents supported deployment of ground forces to Libya. With time, however, as the intervention dragged on and was sharply criticised by some congressmen, support dwindled. At the onset of the operation, 47 per cent of Americans answered the question: ‘Do you approve or disapprove of the current U.S. military actions against Libya?’ with ‘Approve’ (37 per cent answered ‘Disapprove’), while three months later, only 39 per cent chose ‘Approve’, and 46 per cent answered ‘Disapprove’.33 This proves that as time passed, the support for the intervention was decreasing. On top of that, the image of President Obama suffered because of the intervention as well.

Libya   147 In France and the UK, the main initiators of the intervention, public opinion was divided as well, but there was no strong opposition. In France, support was initially rather high – according to an IFOP survey conducted in France right after the launch of the intervention (23 March), 66 per cent of the respondents supported air and missile strikes.34 The magnitude of the support was one of the key factors that induced Nicolas Sarkozy to make the decision on engagement even though the next presidential election in France was due in 13 months. In time, however, support decreased, and in June more French were against the intervention than for it.35 The British, in turn, were strongly divided from the very beginning – in March and April 2011 there were essentially as many supporters as there were opponents of the intervention, the proponents being slightly more numerous, and this situation persisted virtually until the operation in Libya was completed.36 Support among the other NATO members involved in the military operation in Libya is hard to compare because the survey questions were formulated differently. In general, the majority of the societies of NATO member states, both those participating and those not participating in the operation, supported the intervention; according to IPSOS surveys conducted between 6 and 21 April in the 12 largest NATO members, the average support was at 57 per cent.37

6.6  The outcome In military terms, all the declared goals of the international intervention in Libya were achieved, although it took much more time than the planned three months and much greater involvement than provided for in UNSC S/RES/1973; the operation was thus a success with relatively low human and financial costs. The civil war in Libya was ended and the attacks against civilians were stopped. Furthermore, the unofficial goal that was expected by some of the interveners, namely overthrowing the Gaddafi regime and thus effecting a political transformation in Libya, was achieved as well. On 23 October in Benghazi, the new Libyan government announced the ‘liberation’ of the country after 42 years of dictatorship, and the Western countries fulfilled the declared humanitarian goals of the intervention. The military solutions that proved successful during the intervention in Libya were later used by France, among others, during the operation in Mali. Owing to the use of technically advanced weapons, the losses suffered by the civilian population were smaller than in other post-­Cold War interventions. The political outcome of the intervention is less clear, however, especially given the long-­term effects of Western involvement. The lasting destabilisation of Libya and the neighbouring countries, consolidation of fundamentalist tendencies in the region and increased mass migration from Libya to Europe are evidence of the negative consequences of the operation. Another argument mentioned in this context is that if Gaddafi had stayed in power, the scale of the security problems in Mali in 2012/2013 would not have been that great and radical Islamic organisations would not have developed so much in the region.

148   Anna Wojciuk In Libya itself the intervention led to increased significance of radical, Salafist groups, whom Gaddafi’s dictatorial rule had held in check. Some of the fighters who had been on the side of the rebels, including mercenaries, moved to other countries in the region. Weapons from Libya found their way to the opposition in Syria and Central African countries such as Niger and Mali (a second intervention was necessary in the latter country, this time conducted effectively under French leadership). What is more, the lack of simultaneous reaction to a similar situation in other countries, primarily in Syria, caused losses to the West’s image, raising doubts about the purely humanitarian motives behind the military intervention in Libya. Moreover, the military intervention in Libya had a rather negative impact on the cohesion of NATO. The dispute regarding the legitimacy of the intervention and especially the course of the voting on this issue in the UNSC and the German abstention has had a negative impact on mutual trust between the members of the Alliance. The intervention in Libya also revealed differences in the priorities of the individual members, especially between the Eastern members, traditionally focusing on defending their own territory, and the more internationally active Western members, as well as the gap between their military potentials. It was once again confirmed that the involvement of the US armed forces had been necessary in order for the actions of NATO as a whole to be effective. At the same time, however, the impact of the international intervention in Libya was not all negative for NATO. The effectiveness and precision of the military operations, achieving military objectives using relatively limited assets, as well as the very fact of reacting to a civil war in a strategically located country of the Mediterranean region allowed NATO to rebuild some of its credibility, especially in the eyes of its members. What is more, the operation in Libya indirectly influenced the development of the idea of R2P, although the extent and nature of that impact is not clear. There are diametrically opposite opinions on that issue, from claims that it was a triumph of R2P, to proclaiming an utter fiasco of that approach, through various intermediate views, usually stressing that only the future will show in what direction the idea will evolve and whether difficulties with its implementation can be overcome. Another controversial issue is the very implementation of the Resolution. On the one hand, defenders of the intervention point out that the operations were effective, that the broad interpretation of the UN mandate was justified and that the mission can serve as a model for future development of R2P. On the other hand, the opponents of the intervention believe that overstepping the mandate made the operation completely illegal. The central issue of the dispute is the removal of Gaddafi from power, which many critics of the intervention did not consider a necessary step for the success of the mission of protecting the civilian population. According to some commentators, going beyond the enforcement of the no-­fly zone provided for in S/RES/1973 is the reason to consider the entire undertaking illegal and thus further decreases the West’s credibility as the intervening force in humanitarian crises.38 It is pointed out that the coalition did not

Libya   149 stop at protecting civilians but instead clearly supported the rebels. It is further highlighted that some among the intervening countries were using special forces (albeit officially outside the framework of the international military intervention, on the basis of a UNSC decision), which the aforementioned resolution did not sanction. Furthermore, the overstepping of the mandate, which is highlighted by critics, has long-­term implications for the functioning of the UNSC itself, especially as regards authorisation of the use of force. The argument is successfully used by countries that oppose the West and strive to deny it the right to intervene. In the long-­term, the operation did not contribute to improving the legitimacy of liberal interventions as an instrument of international security policy. Although the intervention managed to achieve the declared goals and probably in fact prevented Gaddafi from brutally crushing the opposition, it did not bring about lasting stabilisation of the political situation in Libya, and once the operation was over, the country’s state structures disintegrated, plunging the country into chaos and instability.

Notes   1 M. El-­Katiri, State Building Challenges in a Post-­Revolution Libya (SSI USAWC, Carlisle 2012) 4.   2 J. Hart, S.N. Kile, Libya’s renunciation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles, in: SIPRI Yearbook 2005 (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005) 630–634.   3 M.G. Guindo, B.M. García, Libia: la ‘nueva Guerra’ por el poder económico [Libya: the ‘new war’ for economic power] (2015) 109 Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals 98.   4 N. Koenig, The EU and the Libyan Crisis: In Quest of Coherence? (2011) 19 IAI Working Paper 2.   5 HRW, Libya: Security Forces Kill 84 over Three Days, www.hrw.org/ news/2011/02/18/libya-­security-forces-­kill-84-over-­three-days (accessed 10 May 2018).   6 J.W. Davidson, France, Britain and the intervention in Libya: an integrated analysis (2013) 2 Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 310–329.   7 M. Lindstrom, K. Zetterlund, Setting the Stage for the Military Intervention in Libya (SDRA, Stockholm 2012) 47–48.   8 M. Clarke, The making of Britain’s Libya strategy, in: A. Johnson, S. Mueen (eds), Short War, Long Shadow (RUSI, London 2012) 8; C.S. Chivvis, Toppling Qaddafi. Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention (Cambridge University Press, New York 2014) 51–52.   9 Chivvis (2014) 45–47. 10 Lindstrom, Zetterlund (2012) 32–34. 11 France had cooperated with the toppled regime and supported it for far too long. French politicians were in close relations with Ben Ali’s regime in Tunisia, and there was a proposal to provide support to the regime in suppressing the rebellion only three days before protesters forced Ben Ali to flee the country. Contacts with representatives of the Mubarak regime were maintained as well. In Libya, the National Transitional Council, which was at risk of dissolution due to a government counteroffensive, was quickly recognised (on 10 March) as the representative of the Libyan society, which implied breaking the previously close relations with Gaddafi’s regime. A.

150   Anna Wojciuk Cameron, The channel axis: France, the UK and NATO, in: A. Johnson, S. Mueen (eds), Short War, Long Shadow (RUSI: London 2012) 17–18. 12 Lindstrom, Zetterlund (2012) 36–40; Clarke (2012) 9. 13 Lindstrom, Zetterlund (2012) 43–44. 14 T. Heier, Is ‘Out of area’ also ‘Out of control’? Small states in large operations (2015) 1 RUSI Journal 58–59. 15 The US, Canada, the UK, France, Italy, Denmark, Norway and Belgium. 16 Romania, Bulgaria, Spain, Turkey, Greece and the Netherlands. 17 Polish PM chides Europe over Libya ‘hypocrisy’, Reuters, 9 April 2011, http:// af.reuters.com/article/libyaNews/idAFLDE73806T20110409 (accessed 10 May 2018). 18 Libya: France jet destroys pro-­Gaddafi plane, 24 March 2011, BBC, www.bbc.com/ news/world-­africa-12850975 (accessed 10 May 2018). 19 J.H. Michaels, Able but not willing, in: K. Engelbrekt, M. Mohlin, C. Wagnsson (eds), The NATO Intervention in Libya: Lessons Learned from the Campaign (Routledge, London 2014) 22–25. 20 V. Vira, A.H. Cordesman, The Libyan Uprising: An Uncertain Trajectory (CSIS, Washington 2011) 47–59. 21 There are considerable differences in the various assessments of losses. In November 2011, the new Libyan authorities estimated the number of dead at no less than 30,000 (see: Libyan estimate: At least 30 thousands died in the war, Guardian, 25 November 2011). In January 2013, the authorities reduced this number three times to 9,400 dead and 4,000 missing (see: Libya revolution casualties lower than expected, says new government, Guardian, 8 January 2013). The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, in turn, claims that 2,066 to 3,634 people died in Libya in 2011, including protesters, direct participants in the fighting and civilians (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Libya 2011, http:/www.ucdp.uu.de (accessed 10 May 2018)). 22 Michaels (2014) 17–40. 23 R. Egnell, Conclusions: lessons and consequences of Operation Unified Protector, in: K. Engelbrekt, M. Mohlin, C. Wagnsson (eds), The NATO Intervention in Libya: Lessons Learned from the Campaign (Routledge, London 2014) 224–225. 24 P.D. Williams, A.J. Bellamy, Principles, politics, and prudence: Libya, the responsibility to protect, and the use of military force (2012) 18 Global Governance 275. 25 Davidson (2013) 315. 26 A.J. Bellamy, From Tripoli to Damascus? Lesson learning and the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (2014) 1 International Politics 23–44. 27 Chivvis (2014) 3; Y.R. Kassim, The Geopolitics of Intervention: Asia and the Responsibility to Protect (Springer, Cham 2014) 5. 28 D. Silander, R2P – principle and practice? The UNSC on Libya (2013) 2 Journal of Applied Security Research 275–276. 29 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to Investigate All Alleged Violations of International Human Rights Law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 1 June 2011, A/HRC/17/2011, www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A. HRC.17.44_AUV.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). 30 Report of the Independent Civil Society Fact-­Finding Mission to Libya (2012) 45, www.pchrgaza.org/files/2012/FFM_Libya-­Report.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). 31 Amnesty International (2012) Libya: The Forgotten Victims of NATO Airstrikes, www.amnestyusa.org/reports/libya-­the-forgotten-­victims-of-­nato-strikes (accessed 10 May 2018). 32 M.A. Memoli, 70% of Americans back no-­fly operation in Libya, CNN poll finds, Los Angeles Times, 22 March 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/22/news/la-­pnlibya-­poll-20110322 (accessed 10 May 2018). 33 J. Jones, Americans shift to more negative view of Libya military action, 24 June 2011, www.gallup.com/poll/148196/americans-­shift-negative-­view-libya-­military-action. aspx (accessed 10 May 2018).

Libya   151 34 Les Français et la legitimité d’une intervention militaire en Libye, 23 March 2011, www.ifop.com/?option=com_publication&type=poll&id=1441 (accessed 10 May 2018). 35 IPOP, Approval of the military intervention in Libya, Crossed perspective between the UK and France (2011), www.ifop.com/media/poll/1558–2-study_file.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). 36 Military action in Libya – Ipsos polling in Great Britain, USA, France, Italy: Topline results, 12 April 2011, www.ipsos-­mori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/Reuters-­LibyatoplineApr11.PDF (accessed 10 May 2018); G. Dinmore, Poll shows little support for Libya intervention, 4 May 2011, www.ft.com/content/939bb0c4–74b9–11e0–8988–0 0144feabdc0 (accessed 10 May 2018). 37 Ipsos, Ipsos Global Advisory: Majority (60%) of Global Citizens Support NATO’s Military Intervention in Libya, 12 May 2011, www.ipsos.com/en-­us/ipsos-­globaldvisory-­majority-60-global-­citizens-support-­natos-military-­intervention-libya (accessed 10 May 2018). 38 A.J. Kuperman, Obama’s Libya debacle: How a well-­meaning intervention ended in failure (2015) 2 Foreign Affairs 66–77.

References Amnesty International (2012) Libya: The Forgotten Victims of NATO Airstrikes, www. amnestyusa.org/reports/libya-­the-forgotten-­victims-of-­nato-strikes (accessed 10 May 2018). Bellamy A.J., From Tripoli to Damascus? Lesson learning and the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (2014) 1 International Politics 23–44. Cameron A., The Channel Axis: France, the UK and NATO, in: A. Johnson, S. Mueen (eds), Short War, Long Shadow (RUSI: London 2012) 15–25. Chivvis C.S., Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention (Cambridge University Press, New York 2014). Clarke M., The making of Britain’s Libya strategy, in: A. Johnson, S. Mueen (eds), Short War, Long Shadow (RUSI: London 2012) 7–15. Davidson J.W., France, Britain and the intervention in Libya: An integrated analysis (2013) 2 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 310–329. Dinmore G., Poll shows little support for Libya intervention, 4 May 2011, www.ft.com/ content/939bb0c4-74b9-11e0-8988-00144feabdc0 (accessed 10 May 2018). Egnell R., Conclusions: Lessons and consequences of Operation Unified Protector, in: K. Engelbrekt, M. Mohlin, C. Wagnsson (eds), The NATO Intervention in Libya: Lessons Learned from the Campaign (Routledge, London 2014) 221–236. El-­Katiri M., State Building Challenges in a Post-­Revolution Libya (SSI USAWC, Carlisle 2012). Guindo M.C., García B.M., Libia: la ‘nueva Guerra’ por el poder económico [Libya: the ‘new war’ for economic power] (2015) 109 Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals 91–107. Hart J., Kile S.N., Libya’s renunciation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles, in: SIPRI Yearbook 2005 (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005) 629–649. Heier T., Is ‘Out of area’ also ‘Out of control?’ Small states in large operations (2015) 1 RUSI Journal 58–66. HRW (Human Rights Watch), Libya: Security Forces Kill 84 over Three Days, www. hrw.org/news/2011/02/18/libya-­security-forces-­kill-84-over-­three-days (accessed 10 May 2018).

152   Anna Wojciuk IFOP, Approval of the Military Intervention in Libya: Crossed Perspective between the UK and France, 2011, www.ifop.com/media/poll/1558-2-study_file.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). Ipsos, Ipsos Global Advisory: Majority (60%) of Global Citizens Support NATO’s Military Intervention in Libya, 12 May 2011, www.ipsos.com/en-­us/ipsos-­globaldvisory-­majority-60-global-­citizens-support-­natos-military-­intervention-libya (accessed 10 May 2018). Jones J., Americans shift to more negative view of Libya military action, www.gallup. com/poll/148196/americans-­shift-negative-­view-libya-­military-action.aspx (accessed 10 May 2018). Kassim Y.R., The Geopolitics of Intervention: Asia and the Responsibility to Protect (Springer, Cham 2014). Koenig N., The EU and the Libyan Crisis: In Quest of Coherence? (2011) 19 IAI (Istituto Affari Internazionali) Working Paper. Kuperman, A.J. Obama’s Libya debacle: How a well-­meaning intervention ended in failure (2015) 2 Foreign Affairs 66–77. Les Français et la legitimité d’une intervention militaire en Libye, 23 March 2011, www. ifop.com/?option=com_publication&type=poll&id=1441 (accessed 10 May 2018). Libya: France jet destroys pro-­Gaddafi plane, BBC, 24 March 2011, www.bbc.com/news/ world-­africa-12850975 (accessed 10 May 2018). Lindstrom M., Zetterlund K., Setting the Stage for the Military Intervention in Libya (SDRA, Stockholm 2012). Memoli M.A., 70% of Americans back no-­fly operation in Libya, CNN poll finds, Los Angeles Times, 22 March 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/mar/22/news/la-­pnlibya-­poll-20110322 (accessed 10 May 2018). Michaels J.H., Able but not willing, in: K. Engelbrekt, M. Mohlin, C. Wagnsson (eds), The NATO Intervention in Libya: Lessons Learned from the Campaign (Routledge, London 2014) 17–41. Military Action in Libya – Ipsos Polling in Great Britain, USA, France, Italy: Topline Results 12th April 2011, www.ipsos-­mori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/Reuters-­LibyatoplineApr11.PDF (accessed 10 May 2018). Polish PM Chides Europe over Libya ‘Hypocrisy’, Reuters, 9 April 2011, http://af.reuters. com/article/libyaNews/idAFLDE73806T20110409 (accessed 10 May 2018). Report of the Independent Civil Society Fact-­Finding Mission to Libya (2012) www.pchrgaza.org/files/2012/FFM_Libya-­Report.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to Investigate All Alleged Violations of International Human Rights Law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 1 June 2011, A/ HRC/17/2011, www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.44_ AUV.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). Silander D., R2P – principle and practice? The UNSC on Libya (2013) 2 Journal of Applied Security Research 262–284. UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) African Economic Outlook 2012, www.undp.org/content/dam/rba/docs/Reports/African%20Economic%20Outlook%20 2012%20En.pdf (accessed 4 May 2018). Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Libya 2011, www.ucdp.uu.de (accessed 10 May 2018). Vira V., Cordesman A.H., The Libyan Uprising: An Uncertain Trajectory (CSIS, Washington, DC 2011). Williams P.D., Bellamy A.J., Principles, politics, and prudence: Libya, the responsibility to protect, and the use of military force (2012) 18 Global Governance 273–297.

7 Liberal interventionism of the West after the Cold War Premises and consequences Roman Kuźniar

The conclusion of the Cold War brought a quite understandable hope for a safer and more peaceful development of international relations. Perhaps not quite as peaceful as attributed to Francis Fukuyama’s visions – those who ridiculed them failed to notice that his text did foresee numerous low-­intensity conflicts – but at least unburdened by the threat of massive military operations. The First Gulf War should already have been an indication how false this hope had been. It was, however, necessary to defend the values enshrined in the UN Charter (not only the interests of the US or the West), revitalisation of which after the Cold War was quite justifiably expected. This, however, was not the end. Other threats and conflicts appeared and the West almost always took one side or another, regardless of motives: security, economic interests, confirmation of international position, or ideological grounds – usually a combination of all of them. The purpose of this text to single out one of their dimensions – ideological or, depending on preference, ideational, although these two are not the same. The author intends to determine its place in conflicts fought by the West, to indicate the accompanying mistakes and consequences of military interventions undertaken for these reasons, harmful to the interests and image of Western states.

7.1  Ideational context The ideational sources of Western interventionism of the past two decades are to be sought in two overlapping concepts. The first is the liberal internationalism which appeared in United Sates’ policy soon after World War II. This was the moment when America entered the global international scene, having defeated two totalitarian powers – Germany and Japan – and having to face another, even more serious one. The Soviet Union and international communism were perceived as a mortal threat to the free world. The US, which became the leader of this group of nations, was forced, under the slogan of the defence of freedom and democracy from a totalitarian threat, to create numerous international institutions and coalitions and exhibit a readiness to use force.1 Indeed, they did so under this banner, toppling leftist governments in Latin America or waging the proxy war between the East and the West in Vietnam.

154   Roman Kuźniar The second source is the democratic peace theory in its offensive variant which fits within the broad current of thought encompassing the various forms and specific concepts of the liberal school of thought in the theory of international relations. Its main tenet is that democratic states never wage war on one another and by their very nature are not aggressive, but in exceptional circumstances may use force against authoritarian states threatening peace and security.2 The hegemony of the US in large swathes of the so-­called ‘Third World’ in the days of the Cold War pushed it to extend ‘its prerogatives’ in this respect and in compliance with liberal interventionism; the latter also contained economic and commercial justifications (free trade and open economies are conducive to peace) for the use of force but this had more to do with the interests of the US, than it did with international security. The first two decades after the Cold War were a time of extraordinary military activity justified by liberal interventionism. Several factors contributed to this. Let us name just a few of them. First, for a short time during these decades, an international environment formed which was conducive to the West undertaking such interventions. It was the time of the unipolar moment (Charles Krauthammer), i.e. an unprecedented dominance of one power, the US, in international relations.3 This was compounded by the temporarily strong position of the West as a whole. The West, including the US, was in ascendancy over the remainder of the world in an ideological, economic and strategic sense. An important role in this phenomenon was played by the transformation of NATO into an instrument capable of undertaking out-­of-area operations, and the transformation of the European Community into the EU, which also started to exhibit ambitions to shape the international order in accordance with its interests and values. The confidence of the West was bolstered by the recent victory, also an ideological one, over the communist bloc. The international standing of the West was briefly strengthened by globalisation processes which were generated by Western economies, technology, finances, development and living (consumption) model, media (the Internet, CNN), export, investments. The West became the only reference point for the rest of the world and the world seemed open to the import of Western ideals and goods. The United States attempted to facilitate this process by partially ignoring the sovereignty of states located in other regions. At that time human rights became the ideological foundation for liberal interventionism. Since the beginning of the 1990s we have witnessed an absolutely unique expansion of these rights. Earlier, i.e. after World War II, they had been suppressed by the principal matter of security in West–East relations. The human rights issue attained a right of ‘citizenship’ in international dealings and Western states became their natural promoter. Perhaps the most emblematic question for international development in this field became humanitarian intervention. The Western doctrine of humanitarian intervention proclaimed the right (‘of the international community’) to military intervention in an event of a widespread and drastic breach of human rights or a humanitarian catastrophe in a given country. In essence it pertained to the use of force against the authors of such dramatic events – regimes, governments, dictators. It was accepted that in the

Liberal interventionism   155 face of atrocities such as the ethnic cleansing or genocide in the Balkans or in the African Great Lakes region, one cannot be idle. Criticism that intervention is undertaken solely by Western states burdened by mistreatment of subjugated peoples during colonial times was met by the argument that only they have the capabilities to undertake such operations.4 A strong incentive to increase confidence in the humanitarian doctrine was provided by NATO’s military operation against the Serbs in Bosnia-­Herzegovina between 1993 and 1995, mandated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which brought an end to a conflict abundant in war crimes and ethnic cleansing. Its success was to be confirmed by a complete nation building operation. The administration of the Unites States, initially reluctant to undertake such operations, came to believe in the benefits of the use of force in the name of human rights and at the same time of the general interests of America. ‘Enlarging democracy’ was an important element of Bill Clinton’s foreign policy. This tendency was confirmed by the subsequent NATO operation, this time undertaken without qualms, in connection with the conflict in Kosovo. After it, a certain ‘paradigm’ for liberal interventionism after the Cold War was formed. It consisted of the operational capabilities of Western states, the human rights ideology, the favourable view of the majority of the international community, the readiness to undertake comprehensive nation building operations after the conclusion of the intervention, as well as an increasing nonchalance as to the legal justification of the intervention (the mandate for the use of force). The ‘righteousness’ of the operation became more important than a basis in hard and fast rules of international law. The legitimacy was provided by human tragedy, rather than a decision of an authorised international body. A major role in the forming of legitimisation was played by the active portion of public opinion – media, opinion-­forming circles, non-­governmental organisations working to promote human rights. And, of course, the most important element – situations demanding an international reaction. The period after the Cold War saw a resurgence of ethnic and religious conflicts whose main victim was the civilian population. Widespread and drastic infringements of human rights in their most atrocious form – genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass violence, war crimes and crimes against humanity – appeared almost overnight in the first half of the 1990s in the Great Lakes region and other areas of Africa, as well as the Balkans, i.e. in Europe. It had seemed that after the Cold War, which had made it impossible to react to such situations, there would be no place for them in the world. They moved the consciences of the civilised part of humanity to such a degree that they could not be tolerated.5 To borrow terminology from a different field – they created a supply which generated a demand for humanitarian interventions employing force. Armed force was resorted to, not just to safeguard or restore security, but to put an end to infringements of human rights, topple regimes responsible for such infringements (regime change), help rebuild a state – a democratic state straightaway, which was to ensure respect for such rights. A breakthrough in this process came with acknowledging human rights (their mass infringements) and humanitarian

156   Roman Kuźniar disasters as issues belonging to the question of security, as illustrated by UNSC decisions authorising the use of force in Bosnia-­Herzegovina on the basis of the reports by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, special rapporteur of the Human Rights Commission on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia. At the beginning of the twenty-­first century the theory of liberal interventionism received strong support from just war theory. This happened after the 9/11 attacks which, as it were, were carried out as a response to American military involvement in the Middle East. The justified intervention by the US in Afghanistan aiming to punish and eliminate the leaders of a terrorist organisation which had organised the attacks or bore responsibility for them was, however, met with criticism after several months. This was due not to the intervention itself, but rather because of the way it was conducted and the casualties it brought with it. It was then (in 2002) that 60 American intellectuals, university professors and illustrious publicists issued their renowned ‘What We’re Fighting For. A Letter from America’. Reaffirming their dedication to fundamental values and human rights, and acknowledging that in the past America had on occasion treated other countries with arrogance and ignorance and pursued unfair policies, the authors of this letter defended the intervention in Afghanistan by invoking just war. That is – as they stated – a war which is not only morally permitted but morally necessary, as a response to calamitous acts of violence, hatred and injustice. Such an act was, in their opinion, the 9/11 attacks. In their letter the authors supported the US war in Afghanistan ‘in the name of universal human morality’ and at the same time reminded their audience of the limitations which should be imposed on such a war.6 It is interesting to note that the school of liberal interventionism was at the time supported by Catholic intellectuals (among others, George Weigel and Michael Novak) who developed modern just war theory from its early-­Christian version promoted by St. Augustine and St. Thomas. While this theory was defendable in relation to the first phase of the Afghanistan intervention (punishing the instigators of the 9/11 attacks), the attempt to use it for the war against Iraq resulted in the ideological and theoretical humiliation of its promoters.7 One should also not forget the strong position of war itself in the civilisation and culture of the West, which has its roots in ancient times. Quite aside from all other functions, which are qualified, particularly from today’s perspective, unequivocally negatively, war in Western culture was frequently seen as an instrument of building a better social order. Such a war was often referred to as ‘holy’. Later it became a ‘just war’ and, nowadays, a democratic crusade. The secularisation of ‘holy war’ occurred during the Age of Enlightenment and since then it has been strongly present in American political philosophy and practice. We can observe it in the thinking and actions of those political powers which define themselves as revolutionary and seek to establish a new order (also in a particular region of the world) using revolutionary methods, including armed force. The most recent example were American neo-­conservatives in the first decade of the current century.

Liberal interventionism   157

7.2  A few selected interventions An introduction to a series of Western military operations in the vein of liberal interventionism was without a doubt the ‘war for Kosovo’. It was in any case seen as a paradigmatic humanitarian intervention. It was assumed at the time that the West (the ‘international community’) would carry out further interventions for largely the same reasons and in a similar manner. The human rights motivation was beyond question: a national and religious minority, i.e. Kosovar Albanians, demanded respect for their right to self-­determination. In the course of this fight, which was a continuation of the breakup of former Yugoslavia, numerous casualties were suffered. The central government in Belgrade did not want to allow the secession of this province from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Yugoslav President Milošević had already been accused of being responsible for the numerous casualties of the conflict in Bosnia-­Herzegovina. The Kosovars’ fight had the support of Western media, non-­governmental organisations and illustrious personae of the West (writers, intellectuals). Western states, and also Russia, initially attempted to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. Although talks in Rambouillet near Paris did manage to result in Western powers and Kosovar representatives working out a draft agreement, it was rejected by Belgrade because it included, among other things, the secession of Kosovo from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the longer perspective. The province was seen as historic territory belonging to Serbia which, as a result of demographic shifts (including anti-­Serb ethnic purges during World War II), had become ethnically mostly Albanian. Earlier, in the face of mounting casualties during the fighting in Kosovo, the Western powers threatened that rejection of the draft agreement might entail a military intervention by NATO (which was already present in Bosnia-­Herzegovina). Without a doubt, government forces enjoying a superiority in numbers and equipment were responsible for significantly more casualties than their adversaries – the Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës, UÇK). The latter decided to create an impression of ethnic cleansing by encouraging the populace to leave the province en masse which, as conveyed by Western media, had a great impact on public opinion in these states. Finally there were allegations – later completely disproven by a UN commission – of genocide taking place in Kosovo. The NATO intervention was initiated on 24 March 1999. The Allies decided not to seek prior approval of the UNSC. Furthermore, it was expected that in the face of such an operation, the government in Belgrade would quickly capitulate and agree to the Alliance’s demands, i.e. accept the Rambouillet Agreement. It was, however, not to be. The Alliance’s doctrine of ‘no own casualties’ meant that the attacks were limited to aerial ones (missiles, bombs) and ground operations were ruled out. This mode of waging war led to the number of casualties increasing, particularly from among the civilian population and from both sides of the conflict – Serbs and Albanians. Mounting loss of life and destruction resulting from the protracted operation turned Western public opinion against the operation. It was opposed by such respectable organisations as the International Committee

158   Roman Kuźniar of the Red Cross (ICRC), Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights (UN HCHR).8 The criticism was ignored because, as explained by NATO forces commander-­in-chief General Wesley Clark, the war in Kosovo became a war over the credibility of the Alliance. Finally, on 10 June the operation was concluded and an agreement on handing control over Kosovo to international, mainly NATO, forces was signed, which however did not stop a ruthless UÇK persecution of the Serb population after the intervention (killings, ethnic cleansing). In 2008 Kosovo declared its independence. In recent times (2014–2015) there has been an exodus of people from Kosovo to EU member states, chiefly due to hardships brought about by the governance conducted by power circles based on mafia influence and corruption. The lengthy and costly presence of NATO, OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-­operation in Europe), UN and EU missions did not bring about a normalisation of the situation, nor the introduction of the rule of law, democracy or respect for human rights. Even earlier, i.e. immediately after the conclusion of the operation, due to its course and consequences, the international community rejected the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Nor could the operation have furthered a different, normative goal – the general acceptance of the tenets of international order advocated by the West (including human rights before sovereignty).9 In spite of the highly critical opinions of experts and commentators, as well as the concerns of non-­Western states, Western politicians did not have it in them to seriously reflect upon the experiences of this first ‘war for human rights’. To the contrary, the prevalent feeling was one of self-­satisfaction and belief that the operation was a success: after all, ethnic cleansing had been stopped and the hated Milošević was forced to cede Kosovo to international control and, after the collapse of his government as a result of social unrest (in 2000), was sent to the Hague where he awaited trial before the International Criminal Court. Their superior ability to conduct out of area military operations created a faith in their utility in achieving political goals. The war for Kosovo was waged by NATO but the strategy, command and execution remained primarily American. It was a valuable experience. For this reason, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US did not hesitate for a moment before undertaking a military operation against the Taliban-­ruled Afghanistan. Washington decided not to restrict itself to capturing Al-­Qaeda leaders hiding there and thereby removing the terrorist threat they presented. The objective of the operation initiated in October 2001 was also removing the Taliban from power (regime change) and as a consequence – nation building. To achieve this, the entire territory of the country was to be occupied and all resistance to foreign intervention was to be quelled. Toppling the Taliban was an easy objective, too easy perhaps to satisfy the desire for vengeance for 9/11. It was also easy to install ‘our man in Kabul’ – Hamid Karzai. Further phases of the plan proved much more complicated: stabilisation of the situation, introducing a new political order featuring elements of democracy, human rights and security institutions (army, police). Their implementation required corrupting the local, traditional ‘ruling elites’ and using ‘overwhelming force’ against opponents,

Liberal interventionism   159 mainly the Taliban. This resulted in significant casualties, lack of respect for local traditions (which increased resistance), relieving Afghan institutions and communities of the performance of their basic functions. Local warlords often succeeded in manoeuvring US forces to settle their own scores which further worsened the attitude of the civilian population towards the intervening state. American forces, concentrated as they were on combat action, soon proved to be insufficient. NATO forces were called upon – an operation by ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) mandated by the UNSC, implemented fully in 2003 – in order to play a stabilising role. It quickly turned out that they too were forced to carry out combat action. The second half of the decade saw an intensification of fighting and increasing numbers of casualties, both from among civilians and military personnel (peaking between 2008 and 2010). The strength of ISAF and other states’ (around 40 in total) forces reached some 150,000. The mission became ‘bogged down’ and military leaders, who dictated the strategy, gladly treated Afghanistan as a training ground. American commanders went as far as to ignore politicians;10 the latter turned out to be helpless against the intricacies of a conflict waged for many years on a distant plain. Military commanders made no secret of the fact that their objective was to ‘kill as many Taliban as possible’ who, after all, did not threaten the security of the US.11 A lack of faith in the possibility of attaining the original goals pushed NATO states to set a date for concluding the operation for the end of 2014, and so it was. Prior to that, they successfully trained and equipped the sizeable army (around 300,000 men) and police of Afghanistan which were to assume responsibility for the stability and security in Afghanistan. However, concerns about the continuity of the Washington-­backed government in Kabul convinced President Barack Obama to leave a contingent of US forces, over 10,000-strong, in the country after the withdrawal of NATO. Some results as regards stability and nation building are undisputed. Afghanistan has a chance to avoid the fate of a fallen state; however, it is very difficult to adopt a definitive reference framework for success of the US/NATO operation there, particularly in relation to its timespan, the various losses it brought about, expenses incurred, the fragile situation and uncertain perspectives.12 Iraq was a perfect catastrophe in every aspect: legal, moral, humanitarian, and in relation to internal consequences and international implications. Just as in the case of the Afghanistan war, human rights were not the principle motivation, but security. From the very outset this war was accompanied by a desire to introduce regime change, overthrow Saddam Hussein and introduce a Western-­style democracy. The projected successful ‘democratisation’ of Iraq was intended by the authors of this project, American neoconservatives, to serve as a catalyst for similar processes in the ‘Extended Middle East’. The casus belli for a war initiated without the permission of the UN, with the opposition of a majority of its UNSC members and the general public, was the alleged weapons of mass destruction programmes and arsenals in Iraq, as well as the similarly alleged cooperation with Al-­Qaeda. The US attack occurred on 20 March 2003 and President George W. Bush proclaimed his famous mission accomplished as early

160   Roman Kuźniar as 1 May.13 Nevertheless, a swift military victory of the US and several supporting states was only the beginning of a protracted conflict in which the fight against an aggressor was compounded by sectarian Shia–Sunni violence, with the former being supported by Iran (and by the US who, after toppling Saddam Hussein’s Sunni – albeit in reality rather secular – regime, relied in Iraq on the Shia). Americans – with the ignominious support or inaction of their supporters – committed in this war all conceivable errors, regardless of the fact that the aggression itself was a mistake bordering on insanity. Its background was the ideology of the US governing administration who decided to employ the 9/11 tragedy to further their own hegemonic agenda. The development of the operation quickly disproved its declared motivations and goals. It turned out, which could have been discovered without a war, that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction or programmes for their production. The indiscriminate and overwhelming use of force by the US led to massive casualties among the civilian population, and the use of torture and other means of inhuman or degrading treatment of prisoners (as evidenced by the Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo detention facilities) delegitimised the supposedly humanitarian intentions behind the intervention. An initially weak opposition evolved into an uprising. The loss of life after just a few years was incomparably greater than that caused by Saddam Hussein’s more than 30-year-­long regime – it was estimated, depending on the counting method, at 200,000 to 500,000 casualties and over 2,000,000 refugees.14 The interesting fact is that American commanders themselves indicated in this instance the arrogance, incompetence and disregard for the law of civilian politicians holding the highest offices.15 The losses and resistance in Iraq were only greater due to the American administrator for Iraq, Paul Bremer, not allowing the representatives of local communities to participate in governance. The dissolution of all government and security institutions existing before the invasion led to a veritable social anomie which was expressed as a series of erupting free-­forall local wars. The strategy of increased use of violence (surge) for the physical elimination of opponents of the occupation of the country brought about a temporary calm which allowed the Obama administration to withdraw the army from Iraq at the end of 2011 (and conclude combat operations a year earlier). The collapsing country was left in the hands of a Shia group of ‘men in power’, known also in Washington for deep-­rooted corruption, cult-­like behaviour and the persecution of Sunni and Christians. The Iraqi state, unable as a result of this war to fulfil its normal functions and existing only nominally, but in reality demolished, became in 2013 and 2014 easy prey for the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant, a quasi-­state formed by Muslim jihadists on large swathes of Syria and Iraq. The Western military operation targeting Muammar Gaddafi’s regime also turned out to be a perfect catastrophe in terms of its results. The mistakes made must come as a surprise, since Western states should have known better after their experiences in the war against Iraq. The intervention was undertaken in the context of the Arab Spring at the initiative of Paris. The starting point was the

Liberal interventionism   161 threat of a bloody reckoning between government forces and the Benghazi rebels and expected civilian casualties. UNSC resolution no. 1973 of 17 March 2011 authorised the protection of the civilian population from attacks by government forces, introduced a no-­fly zone and a ban on arms supply. It directly referred to the responsibility to protect.16 The overarching motive was then to protect the civilian population from possible atrocities. The provisions of the resolution were to be implemented only ‘from the air’ (planes, missiles). The problem was that French president Nicolas Sarkozy proposed this initiative for internal reasons (improving his chances before the approaching presidential elections) and the threat to the civilian population from Gaddafi’s army was massively overestimated. Paris obtained the support of London for the implementation of the resolution, then several other European capitals and only in the end of the tarrying Obama administration; indeed the American president was the greatest sceptic in this case. The behaviour of Paris and London bore neo-­colonial overtones. Russia and China, distrustful of the West’s intentions, abstained, as did Germany, India and Brazil. The operation initiated by France and the UK was quickly taken over by NATO (air strikes against Libyan positions were coordinated by the Alliance), even though by no means all its member states participated. The error of the intervening states was going beyond the mandate of the resolution and allying themselves with the insurgents in order to topple the government in Tripoli. All truce offers and calls for negotiations were rejected by NATO. At the same time the number of civilian casualties was intentionally manipulated in order to magnify the scale of the crisis in the media and the necessity to remove Gaddafi. The aerial NATO operation lasting from March through October did indeed bring about the destruction of the power structures in Libya and in the end allowed for the killing of Gaddafi himself.17 A period of revenge on the people of the previous regime started (as well as on the tribes they came from). The new, Western-­backed authorities managed to introduce stability for a few months. Western oil companies also benefited since ‘in gratitude’ they were granted permits for oil which had been up to then subject to a virtual state monopoly. Later, ethnical and tribal divisions came to the fore and Libya’s territory became a combat arena for various militia, jihadist, terrorist or plain criminal groups. Arms from the former regime’s stockpiles were distributed to a number of states in the region where they reinforced rebel groups (e.g. in Mali). As early as 2013, Libya was being described as a model fallen state, with all the disasters this brought about for the civilian population.18 It also became an open portal for the mass transfer of refugees from Africa to Europe. In Syria, according to all probability (at least it seems this was the assumption of Western states), the Arab Spring was also to be victorious and al-­Assad’s regime was to be toppled. However, there was no victory, no toppling, and an intervention – direct military operation – was averted at the last moment. Nevertheless, from the very outset, the West backed the insurgents and extended political and financial support to the Free Syrian Army (FSA). France went as far as recognising it – on what basis is unknown – as the sole representative of the

162   Roman Kuźniar Syrian people and established diplomatic relations with its political arm, at the same time breaking them off with Damascus (!). In arrangement with the West, Saudi Arabia and Qatar (for whom this was chiefly a conflict between Sunni and Shia, and over the limiting of Iran’s influence) undertook to supply arms to the FSA. The Western powers also ‘threatened’ the adoption of a UNSC resolution, even though after the Libyan ‘debacle’ they themselves weren’t eager to intervene regardless of a possible veto by Moscow or Beijing. Syria is a large country and has no oil.… The intervention nearly took place in the summer of 2013 when al-­Assad’s army used chemical weapons against civilians. Washington backed down at the last instant and David Cameron’s UK government was refused support by its own parliament in this matter. Paris, itching to intervene, remained alone. The transformation of the insurgency into a protracted and bloody internal conflict (in 2014 the number of casualties exceeded 200,000), as well as crimes committed by both sides, opened the way for jihadist groups which formed the so-­called Islamic State (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL, or Islamic State, IS) on large swathes of Syrian and Iraqi territory. There was no Western intervention, but its earlier support of one side influenced the development of the situation in a direction leading to the expansion of IS. Both the conflict itself and the actions of the ‘Islamic State’ are marked by numerous atrocities and a humanitarian catastrophe for millions of Syria’s inhabitants, including a wave of refugees (some of them heading towards Europe).

7.3  Lessons learned from liberal interventionism in recent years The conclusions and lessons from the above-­mentioned interventions which were undoubtedly – albeit to a varying degree – motivated by an assertive brand of democratic liberalism, are numerous. They are connected by a belief, difficult to disprove empirically, that most, perhaps even all, developed poorly in their fundamental aspects from an ideological point of view. Even worse, not only did they not bring about democratic transformations and an improvement of the human rights situation, but caused a significant deterioration of security with dramatic consequences for the civilian population, often described as a humanitarian catastrophe. The chief mistake made during each of the interventions were insufficient attempts to understand the situation in the framework of which an intervention was undertaken and a lack of imagination as to its possible aftermath. Ignored in particular was the ‘principle of understanding’ put forward by a prominent expert on these issues, Jonathan Moore, even before the first of the interventions. In his 1998 book, Moore defines it as the need to understand as fully as possible what the realities (justifying the intervention) are, the need to avoid making untested assumptions or relying on superficial information but to comprehend respectfully and seriously the interrelationships of the various forces and actors in play, and most of all to

Liberal interventionism   163 comprehend the situation on the country that is being targeted to receive the tender mercies of intervention.19 Second, it was a mistake to abuse military power and continue to believe that force could be used to solve whichever problem – conflict, humanitarian emergency –one decided to tackle. It was a consequence of the conviction that in the face of superiority enjoyed by the intervening party (NATO or particular Western powers) the other side, pictured as a despicable enemy, must quickly submit – either capitulate or be defeated. Politicians made the decisions and soldiers received a task to be fulfilled. However, while politicians had in mind solving the problem, containing the crisis, to the soldiers the task appeared as a need to achieve victory. In practice, military logic triumphed over political logic. Commanders would tell politicians what needed to be done in order to have victory and ‘what needed to be done’ usually meant ‘more force’ (as in Petraeus’ surge), the consent to extend the targets for attack – from strictly military to civilian ones. After all, the credibility of the intervening party (NATO or the US) was on the line. It became the stake. Solving the problem according to its nature, its original cause, became secondary. The idea of ‘killing as many as possible’ of the opposing fighters was particularly visible in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the abuse of military force and the casualties – often euphemistically called collateral damage – which it brought about turned not only the local communities against the Western states (whole populations, ethnic and national groups), but also their own public opinion. It was symptomatic: the casualties of the intervening party (servicemen) were being counted down to the individual, whereas the casualties of the other party – human beings, too, after all – weren’t particularly considered. Due to the way Western states have conducted their wars in the last decades, Martin Shaw has put forward the concept of a risk-­transfer war. It means the transfer of the political risks of a war, including the risk of casualties among own soldiers, to the risk of losses and destruction for the party being the target of Western intervention. Shaw identified as many as 15 rules which constitute a form of a doctrine of Western risk-­transfer war (not announced publically). They included: placing the war in the perspective of a threat to Western values and principles; mitigation of risk to Western political administrations (particularly in the context of elections), economies and populations; acknowledging that wars should be short, territorially limited and waged ‘far from home’, while losses from among own units should be minimised (hence attacks should be carried out chiefly from the air); enemies are to be killed effectively, swiftly and discreetly; accidental civilian casualties should be avoided but not entirely discounted; however, the death and suffering resulting from the war should not be presented; humanitarian aid should be introduced as a compensation for the violence and losses among the human population; control over media narration should be maintained.20 Such a philosophy of waging war by Western states, admittedly close to its realities, on one hand falls into the theory of liberal interventionism (ideological context, minimisation of losses), on the other, however, contradicts

164   Roman Kuźniar it as it involves transferring its weight to the ‘opposing side’, which in terms of losses is usually the civilian population. This was, third, frequently connected with what Michael Walzer, author of the excellent Just and Unjust Wars, calls the ‘arrogance and zeal of democratic idealism’ – but also with military hubris, a characteristic of Western powers whose military techniques are superior to all others. According to Walzer, if Western states do undertake such interventions, they exhibit ‘determination and persistence’ and readiness to cause disproportionate losses in order to be 100 per cent right in a given conflict; this, however, contradicts Liddel Hart’s wise statement that ‘the objective of war is to achieve a better state of peace’.21 They also readily justify their own illegal abuse of force. The unwillingness to enter into compromise or negotiations (Kosovo, Libya) with a previously demonised enemy prolongs the fight and obstructs the return to normality, i.e. the previously mentioned nation building. Fourth, the West exhibited excessive ambitions connected with nation building during these interventions. It is a concept which fits excellently into the liberal approach to international order. Developed democratic states support the rise of democratic states in places where they previously did not exist, in regions marred by armed conflict and in place of erstwhile fallen states. This seemed feasible since it was the West that liberated a given country from tyranny or built it up from scratch (after its earlier collapse): there should, then, be no obstacles to the success of the endeavour– whether on the sands of Babylon or in the African jungle. This concept became fashionable in the second half of the 1990s. Every internal conflict whose containment in order to avert a humanitarian catastrophe required the use of military force was to be used, after its conclusion, in order to establish a state close to a democracy, respecting human rights in compliance with the expectations of the developed West. This theoretically noble intention usually ended in failure because of the disregard for local culture, political traditions and social structure or even a direct clash with them. A particular mistake was relieving the local communities of their tasks and the resultant ‘necessity’ to eliminate those who opposed it. For some of the locals it was a comfortable arrangement but unfortunately it created excellent conditions for corruption and ultimately rendered them dependent on external aid. This did little to implement the principles of the nation building project. Its fate was sombrely summed up by Sylvie Kauffman, leading publicist of Le Monde: Nation building, that great and noble idea thanks to which the most powerful democracies of the world hoped to help in the rebirth of nations in ruins by way of an intervention became a taboo word, a symbol of defeat.22 Finally, fifth, in some cases an important negative factor was the length of the intervention – especially in Kosovo and Afghanistan. During their course, over the passing years they exhibited a tendency to degrade, to forsake their original ‘humanitarian-­democratising’ sense. They are also liable to being ‘infected’ by  the specific climate arising from the contact of the operation with local

Liberal interventionism   165 c­ onditions. Pathologies first formed and then became the norm – a price for the continuing presence of the mission. Demoralising corruption appeared, as did elements of collaboration which alienated the collaborators from local communities. The prolongation of the mission and unwillingness to transfer governance to the locals create opponents and ‘force’ their elimination for the sole reason that they do not accept the civilising role of those who had come to ‘bring them freedom’. One might call this the ‘Kurz Syndrome’ after the character in Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness. As we read in this novel, ‘the wilderness had taken on him a terrible vengeance for the fantastic invasion’, namely ‘it had whispered to him things about himself which he did not know’.23 This was evidenced, among other things, by the skulls which adorned the fence of Kurz’s home in the jungle. Some researchers indicate that this is not a new phenomenon, citing as evidence the endless expedition of Alexander the Great, which eventually… ended badly.24 Naturally, apart from the aforementioned issues/lessons accompanying the West’s interventions which led to the perversion of their course and results, there were the more traditional aspects of the matter. What is meant here are considerations of a strategic and economic nature, as well as those connected with current requirements of internal politics, such as elections (for example, Sarkozy pushing for the intervention in Libya, which was supposed to improve his dismal poll results in France, which lives by the ideology of human rights, on the eve of the elections, even though in the end – despite the intervention – he lost them). A common denominator for all of them was the manner of executing the interventions in the very context of their liberal-­humanitarian and democratising narrative. The problem was not why the interventions were carried out, especially since in some instances their humanitarian justification was indisputable, but in how they were conducted, because the manner in which this was done all too often defeated and delegitimised their ideas and goals. What is worse, the liberal interventionism of the West, having failed to achieve the expected effects in its ideological dimension (human rights, democracy, etc.), brought about other negative consequences. First, the West deprived itself of the legitimacy to intervene on humanitarian grounds (R2P). Second, the majority of the aforementioned interventions created serious threats to the security of Western countries, in particular so-­called Islamic State. Now they have to be fought, at a high cost, and the end of this struggle is nowhere in sight. Third, the interventions resulted in the deterioration of the international standing of the West. Anti-­Western resentments have been deepened and these have been providing and will continue to provide ‘ammunition’ for various anti-­Western coalitions and undertakings. For liberal interventionism the damage is the greater in that it is currently hard to imagine initiating an intervention similar to those above when there is a genuine need without the mandate of the UNSC. After Libya, the West lost its legitimacy to conduct operations under R2P. This brought about a serious ‘malfunction’ of the UNSC as regards taking a decision on the use of force in order to combat grave infringements of human rights. It is particularly depressing to realise that the states which then (resolution no. 1973)

166   Roman Kuźniar abstained – from China to Brazil – regardless of their individual motivations, were right. There are many more bad and failed interventions undertaken for motivations falling within the school of assertive liberalism. What was an error or a sin of Western, liberal interventionism becomes a justification for purely empire-­ building action reflecting a shameless ‘might makes right’ logic. Such is the case with the neo-­imperial activities of Russia in recent years. The use of force against Georgia or the Ukraine and the forceful modification of borders were being ‘shielded’ by Moscow with accusations of ‘similar’ conduct of the West in Kosovo or Iraq. Each such failed intervention carries within it damage to the sincerity of international discourse and the rule of law in a democratic state. In order to carry it out it is often necessary to infringe the constitution, countenance breaking international law, ignore the position and moral instinct of public opinion, infringe citizens’ rights (the scale of wire-­tapping). The governments of democratic states intentionally pursue politics of fear in order to use the terror of the threats they themselves provoked to take decisions on limiting citizens’ rights or leniency for activities infringing the law (such as attacks by drones which result in many innocent and accidental deaths). All these matters are in contradiction with the tenets of the liberal school of international relations. One might think that the experiences of the 1989–2011 period were sufficiently discouraging to make Western democracies refrain from rash interventions in the regime change formula. The Libyan intervention firmly dispels this hope (manipulating the perception of the situation, blatant transgression of the UNSC mandate). All this, even though not only the Libyan catastrophe but also the earlier one in Iraq could have been predicted.25 The falseness of their justifications was more than obvious. Ideological wishful thinking connected with interests created an unstoppable drive towards intervention. Can the West be cured of it? The global shift in power to the disadvantage of the West will be conducive to it. The gravity of the lessons drawn from the above operations is that democratic powers may become unable to act in situations indicated by the R2P principle, unable to use force to protect humanity from great atrocities. And no one else will be willing to do it.

Notes   1 C.A. Kupchan, P.L. Trubowitz, Dead center: The demise of liberal internationalism in the United States (2007) 2 International Security 7–44.   2 See: M.W. Doyle, I. Kant, liberal legacies and foreign affairs (1992) 3 Philosophy and Public Affairs 205–235.   3 C. Krauthammer, The unipolar moment (1991) 1 Foreign Affairs 23–33.   4 S.J. Solarz, M. O’Hanlon, Humanitarian intervention: When is force justified? (1997) 4 The Washington Quarterly 2–14.   5 For a characteristic of these conflicts, see R. Kuźniar, Prawa człowieka. Prawo, instytucje, stosunki międzynarodowe [Human Rights. Law, institutions, international relations] (Warsaw 2004) 305–308.   6 What We’re Fighting For: A Letter from America (2002) Institute for American Values (among the signatories were F. Fukuyama, S.P. Huntington, M. Walzer).

Liberal interventionism   167   7 G. Weigel, Porządek świata. O czym zapomnieli katolicy (2005), M. Novak, Sprawiedliwy pokój i asymetryczne zagrożenie. Organizacja Narodów Zjednoczonych i obrona konieczna państwa ‘na nieznanym terenie’ (2005), both articles in: 3–4 Ethos 89–105 and 150–165. The entire issue of this quarterly magazine is devoted to Just War.   8 A critical stance was adopted in particular by esp. R. Kuźniar, Kosowo: Audiatur et altera pars, in: Rocznik Strategiczny 1999/2000 (Scholar, Warszawa 2000) 327–344.   9 A.J. Bacevich, E.A. Cohen (eds), War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age (Cambridge University Press, New York 2001); M. Mandelbaum, A perfect failure: NATO’s war against Yugoslavia (1999) 5 Foreign Affairs 2–8. 10 As evidenced by the example of the commander-­in-chief of ISAF forces, Gen. S. McChrystal, recalled in 2010 after his contemptuous remarks about the abilities of the highest US political leaders handling the Afghanistan conflict were made public. His successor, D. Petraeus, an advocate of the ‘overwhelming force’ strategy without regard for civilian losses, was infamous for his arrogant criticism of the Afghan president when the latter pointed out that US forces needlessly caused casualties among the civilian population. 11 D. Filkins, Half of town’s Taliban flee or are killed, allies say, International Herald Tribune, 10 February 2010. 12 P. Tomsen, The good war? What went wrong in Afghanistan – and how to make it right (2014) 6 Foreign Affairs 47–54. 13 The full text available at: www.cbsnews.com/news/text-­of-bush-­speech-01-05-2003 (accessed 10 May 2018). 14 See: UNHCR, Statistics on Displaced Iraqis around the World (2007), www.unhcr. org/461f7cb92.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). 15 R.S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (HarperCollins, New York 2008). The author was the commander of coalition forces in Iraq between 2003 and 2004. 16 S/RES/1973 (2011). 17 More: C.S. Chivvis, Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention (Cambridge University Press, New York 2014). 18 A.J. Kuperman, Obama’s Libya debacle: How a well-­meaning intervention ended in failure (2015) 2 Foreign Affairs 66–77. 19 J. Moore (ed.), Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham 1998) 5–6. 20 M. Shaw, The New Western Way of War (Polity, Malden 2005) 71–97. 21 M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (Basic Books, New York, 1977) 121. 22 S. Kauffmann, Le rêve brisé du ‘nation building’, Le Monde, 29 November 2014. 23 J. Conrad, Heart of Darkness (Penguin, London 2007) 83. 24 E.D. Samet, When is a war over?, International New York Times, 24 November 2014. 25 G. Rose, J. Tepperman, A hard education: Learning from Afghanistan and Iraq (2014) 6 Foreign Affairs 2–4.

References Bacevich A.J., Cohen E.A. (eds), War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age (Cambridge University Press, New York 2001). Chivvis C.S., Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the Limits of Liberal Intervention (Cambridge University Press, New York 2014). Conrad J., Heart of Darkness (Penguin, London 2007). Doyle M.W., I. Kant, Liberal legacies and foreign affairs (1992) 3 Philosophy and Public Affairs, 205–235. Filkins D., Half of town’s Taliban flee or are killed, allies say, IHT, 10 February 2010.

168   Roman Kuźniar Kauffmann S., Le rêve brisé du ‘nation building’, Le Monde, 29 November 2014. Krauthammer C., The unipolar moment (1991) 1 Foreign Affairs 23–33. Kupchan C.A., Trubowitz P.L., Dead center: The demise of liberal internationalism in the United States (2007) 2 International Security 7–44. Kuperman A.J., Obama’s Libya debacle: How a well-­meaning intervention ended in failure (2015) 2 Foreign Affairs 66–77. Kuźniar R., Kosowo: Audiatur et altera pars, in: Rocznik Strategiczny 1999/2000 (Scholar, Warszawa 2000) 327–344. Kuźniar R., Prawa człowieka. Prawo, instytucje, stosunki międzynarodowe [Human Rights. Law, Institutions, International Relations] (Warsaw 2004). Mandelbaum M., A perfect failure: NATO’s war against Yugoslavia (1999) 5 Foreign Affairs 2–8. Moore J. (ed.), Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention (Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham 1998). Novak M., Sprawiedliwy pokój i asymetryczne zagrożenie. Organizacja Narodów Zjednoczonych i obrona konieczna państwa ‘na nieznanym terenie’ (2005) 3–4 Ethos 150–165. Rose G., Tepperman J., A hard education: Learning from Afghanistan and Iraq (2014) 6 Foreign Affairs 2–4. Samet E.D., When is a war over?, International New York Times, 24 November 2014. Sanchez R.S., Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (HarperCollins, New York, 2008). Shaw M., The New Western Way of War (Polity, Malden 2005). Solarz S.J., O’Hanlon M., Humanitarian intervention: When is force justified? (1997) 4 The Washington Quarterly 2–14. Tomsen P., The good war? What went wrong in Afghanistan – and how to make it right (2014) 6 Foreign Affairs 47–54. UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Statistics on Displaced Iraqis around the World (2007), www.unhcr.org/461f7cb92.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). UNSC S/RES/1973 (2011). Walzer M., Just and Unjust Wars (Basic Books, New York 1977). Weigel G., Porządek świata. O czym zapomnieli katolicy (2005) 3–4 Ethos 89–105. What We’re Fighting For. A Letter from America (2002) Institute for American Values.

8 Wars of the West Conflicts with no victory Robert Kupiecki

Research on modern ‘wars of the West’ significantly lacks a solid point of reference regarding the key element of any armed conflict: victory. It would be beneficial for comparative studies and theory, useful for improvement of policies using organised violence to solve international problems. Both success and failure have their own price, as benefits of victory do not necessarily have to be obvious and lasting, while a new peace is not necessarily preferable to the state of affairs predating the outbreak of war.

8.1  Military victory-­a research field Jan Bloch presented at the threshold of the twentieth century a compelling vision of a modern war, warning against the costs of striving for victory in conflicts employing the technology and organisation of the industrial age.1 His reflections placed warfare outside rational human behaviour, thereby disparaging in a moral and practical sense the military victory. In the face of human suffering and physical destruction it simply appeared as inconceivable. Bloch, a brilliant self-­taught man, correctly spotted premises for examining victory before researchers and strategists did.2 He found that limiting it to a mechanical immediate result of armed confrontation obstructs the understanding of the rationality of war as a policy tool. The scope of the research field demonstrates the nature of the military victory, as it is easier to indicate when a war begins and identify the reasons why it begins, than to understand its conclusion and how its outcomes relate to the original objectives of the conflict.3 This is regardless of whether the victory means merely defeating the enemy in the field, their total physical destruction, breaking their will to resist or a situation in which military success allows the winner to implement their own plans. Victory is a vague, perceptive and subjective concept, viewed differently by a victorious soldier, or a politician – confirming the quality of his craft, or a triumphant nation feeling its power (‘here and now’). For the larger public, it can mean the emotion, sorrow and pride of the first days and possibly the frustration of successive years, causing problems in politics and re-­evaluating earlier sentiments. Attempts to provide objective, precise criteria for victory seem difficult, based on examination of past wars, or seeking a useful tool for assessing contemporary armed conflicts.

170   Robert Kupiecki An overtly strict understanding of victory, detached from the dynamics of conflict, capricious social emotions, or lacking broader perspective may complicate the politics. State politicians are traditionally nudged towards undue optimism in making plans and presenting them to the public, manipulating the popular perception of risk factors or outright economy of truth, particularly if the stated objectives are not confirmed by the facts. This applies both to justifying the reasons for resorting to war, as well as maintaining the popular acceptance for the associated costs. At the same time, however, understanding of the nature of strategic victory is a prerequisite for good state policy. Such reflections rarely appear in war and warfare studies, heavily focused on achieving victory in the battle, not how to use victory to remove the reasons for which wars were waged. No wonder that rulers and their subjects understood the indispensability of war, and over time mastered the knowledge of how to wage it. However, they did not have an equally advanced knowledge of how to bring about the perspective that a military victory: (1) could reduce the risk of a next conflict; (2) would not undermine the legitimacy of governments to use armed force; and (3) ensure lasting peace. Modern armed conflicts following the end of World War II, ever more infrequent in their traditional inter-­state form and usually not bringing about clear-­ cut, permanent solutions, demonstrate other dimensions of the discussed problem. Victory is becoming an ever less fitting plane of analysis, both with respect to planned and actual effects of wars.4 It is certain, however, that their objectives have to be understood in broader terms than just acts of combat.5 During the Cold War, the very prospect of a nuclear conflict blurred the difference between (unthinkable) defeat and (impossible) victory. It also shifted states’ attention to ways of preventing conflicts (as a synonym of success and a substitute for lack of defeat). On the other hand, however, it did not stop the planning for the event of victory in a nuclear conflict (even within the logic of planning to use weapons which should never be used). Classic thinkers of the first nuclear era deemed the bomb to create unrealistic expectations as to what was to take place afterwards, and sought an understanding of the problem in a deterrence strategy, combining military, economic, social, information, educational, political and diplomatic assets. This assumption dominates the strategic thinking of the West to this day. In relation to modern conflict, victory started being perceived not as an end to the fighting,6 but rather as a moment when the winner decides strategically what to do with the advantage over the losing side. Any possible choice (occupation, domination, withdrawal, self-­restricting, cooperation, partnership) carries a number of risks, financial and political costs and requires a vision of the peace and the international order (connected with the reasons why the war was fought). Naturally, it is not just important who won, but also who and when is the judge of that, and what was gained from military victory (for now and for the future, by the combatants, the international relations), how victory relates to initially declared war objectives and, if they changed, did they also modify the expected shape of the victory? What policies to employ in order to consolidate the

Victory in Western wars   171 s­ uccessful outcome of the war and, finally, what is the price of a misrepresentation of victory? This incomplete list of research questions must invariably accompany any attempt to understand the consequences of recent ‘wars of the West’. A victory can be understood simply, by what a given community decides to recognise as victory, and what can be accepted by its culture.7 This aspect of the problem manifests itself somewhat similarly over the ages and in the collective memories of various civilisations and nations, as victory must always mean profit surpassing the cost of war, and translatable into the public emotions of citizens. Gains that outweigh the costs are key for any rational action plan, but do not necessarily justify resorting to war as an optimal policy instrument. It is to be emphasised that a complete annihilation of the enemy is unacceptable in the modern world on moral and legal grounds. Transforming the enemy into an ally after the war in turn requires usually massive investment, adopting a responsibility for the situation created, reasonable self-­constraint and the cooperation of the defeated party. Among a myriad of possible conditions for ending the conflict, victory can be perceived on three levels.8 First, at the point where putting an end to a conflict lowers the risk of the resumption of fighting. Even though in the strategic perspective it can look rather modest (and mean a long-­term military ‘bogging down’ of the victor in the conflict area), the ‘wars of the West’ of the last 25 years make it a perspective worth considering. Second, victory can be treated as a state of moderate achievement of war objectives, where the creation of a stable security environment is accompanied by the rebuilding of the defeated party’s ability to govern itself or organise politically. This situation creates the perspective of returning the defeated side to international cooperation as a predictable partner. Third, victory can be perceived at its maximum – a comprehensive removal of the reasons for conflict, reconstruction of state institutions and the return of the defeated party to the international community under conditions controlled by the winner. International institutions usually support the settlement of disputes without resorting to violence, providing an alternative not only for wars themselves, but also for the perception of their results. If international de-­legitimisation of aggression and territorial conquest affects the character of wars, the victory cannot be treated the same way as centuries ago. The 24/7 news cycles and media following all army movements, transmitting live feed from the battlefield significantly restrict a soldier’s freedom in action. Educated in humanitarian law, he or she is to act effectively, minimising wartime damage. Control by public opinion makes it impossible to use violence indiscriminately, as criminal responsibility is always a reality. This necessitates a shift in the methods of achieving war objectives, beyond those of deliberate and proportionate violence, which in turn inevitably must affect the understanding of victory. It may simply become unattainable under the existing limitations. Finally, the level of public satisfaction with achieved war objectives translates into the electoral choices of peoples, thereby increasing the restraint of governments from resorting to violence and curbing the perception of advantages it might bring.

172   Robert Kupiecki

8.2  The fog of victory. Clausewitz or Liddell Hart? The results of armed conflicts of the West after 1989 encourage questions about the political, military, legal and definitional aspects of the use of force to manage the situations this community wished to resolve or mitigate. The former director of the RUSI, Michael Clarke, counted as many as 23 ‘major military operations of the West’ after the Cold War (classified as ‘minor wars’).9 They differed as to the way the armed forces were involved: peacekeeping operations, stabilisation missions, interventions with various international mandates (e.g. wars of independence – Iraq 1991, territorial conquest – Iraq 2003, various air operations – Kosovo 1999, Libya 2011). This makes it difficult to form general reflections about the outcome of ‘wars of the West’, encouraging the search for ramifications of a modern strategic victory. The results of these conflicts, as well as each case examined individually (the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, sea and aerial operations, peace-­keeping, stabilisation missions, humanitarian interventions) do, however, allow for a reflection on the way the armed forces were used, and their utility in achieving political goals by the Western community.10 This equally applies to the manner of formulating these goals, their attainability and consistency in the course of the conflict, popular reactions, and verification of the degree of their achievement. Last, but not least, it also concerns the strategic competence of the West in using war as a policy tool, understood as the ability and skill necessary for achieving victory leading to a better peace. It results from translating (the risk-­conscious) knowledge and experience into the ability to effectively plan and react to the changing wartime situation.11 Democratic societies instinctively seek such skills in their governments.12 The perceived competence of state leaders strengthens legitimacy of their actions. These issues are sometimes viewed, first, as an implication of the moment when the assessment of a given event is made by interested parties, whose ramifications reach beyond the moment of the declared success in the field. The satisfaction of governments and peoples from a declaration of victory ‘as of today’ may be verified in the light of later developments. The one felt after toppling Saddam Hussein in 2003 was quick to give way to a lengthy trauma of ‘parallel wars’ waged in successive years by the coalition in Iraq. Second, the connected and often varied perspective of the assessing entity (the victorious government, own public opinion, the defeated party or the international community) should be taken into account. The victor’s declaration of success does not necessarily mean that the opponent feels the same way about his situation, as the (objectively) defeated (but not annihilated) side may declare its own success, that can even increase its resistance against the victor.13 This is inherently due to the divergent goals characterising the specific conflict. It is understandable that these can change as the situation develops and can be viewed differently by the combatants. The scale of such changes should however encourage a greater effort in formulating the objectives of wars based on the optimal use of available information, avoiding excessive optimism and wishful thinking in planning. This in itself will not eliminate uncertainties, nor ensure an effective course of military operation, but may reduce

Victory in Western wars   173 overestimating war as a tool of politics and, as a result, a tendency to use it.14 As such, a strategist’s ‘default’ sobriety in planning war objectives and assessing their feasibility seems to be one of the most important qualities of good policy.15 On the strategic level, however, this requires more than just a simple assessment of what was achieved compared to original objectives. It should be determined whether there was a lasting improvement of the situation pre-­dating (and responsible for) the conflict. Within such optics, victory means not merely solving the problems for today that caused the use of force, but also a permanent improvement of the conditions for peace – which requires the victor to plan and undertake activities in a longer perspective than just the final gunshot. Such understanding of victory is closer to the way this phenomenon was described by Basil Liddel-­Hart than Carl von Clausewitz. The former theorist saw it as a state of peace, better after the war than before it. He even advocated waging of a conflict with consideration given to the shape of the future peace, though not going so far as suggesting a relative balance of gains for both sides of the conflict. He did, however, observe that peace negotiations may constitute a better component of victory (and lasting peace) than a ruinous fight to the end.16 Meanwhile, Clausewitz, for many researchers still the most important point of reference for deliberations on war and politics, demanded that before committing to combat, it must be clear what problem it is supposed to solve, what goals are to be achieved and how to assess their attainment. He also thought that victory was not to be understood abstractedly, but rather in relation to a particular type of war.17 This probably explains the attention he devoted to studying the nature of war, its relation to politics and the decision not to seek a (strategic) theory of victory – understood as a set of good practices whose implementations allows a swifter military (tactical/operational) success. Clausewitz did however provide a starting point for reflections on this issue, proposing his own three ‘objective’ criteria for victory: (1) the enemy sustaining greater material losses; (2) loss of morale; and (3) the abandonment of the enemy’s military objectives. Setting aside the first two ‘classic’ aspects of military victory (important to any field commander), the last criterion allows an understanding of the strategic nature of this issue. It is indicative of the continuity of the time of war and the reasons that caused it, and the time of peace, which does not have to be identical with the moment of ending the conflict.18 Perhaps, then, contrasting Clausewitz’ and Liddell-­Hart’s views on victory makes little scholarly sense if it is only brought down to registering the fact of contraposing the observations of these two theoreticians (made at different times and focused on different elements of war). Nonetheless, setting aside the fact that the Prussian general’s work was unfinished, the crux of the matter seems to lie not as much in his omission, but rather in a more developed reflection of Liddell-­Hart. Third, the scope of examination should include a search for the understanding of the essence of modern victory. Today’s war is different from conflicts in the past, due to restrictions in its legal, social (including instruments controlling the warring factions, such as 24/7 media not only providing live images from the

174   Robert Kupiecki battlefield and shaping popular emotions, but also limiting the impact of official state propaganda), technological and political (nuclear deterrence) character. A shift in the understanding of modern wars necessitates amendments in the manner of understanding victory as a requirement for peace. The circumstances of current conflicts involving the Western world create a framework for the assessment of their utility as a policy tool. This in turn might help in understanding the conditions for victory, their limitations, plans, timeframe, costs and scope of necessary state engagement. Fourth, governments of modern, democratic states and their citizens are not readily willing to come to terms with the complex nature of phenomena that prove to be culturally idealised and emotionally simplified to war and victory.19 In the face of a change in the nature of armed conflicts and the socio-­political conditions under which they are fought, the key is the question of the applicability of the very concept of victory. This problem is not solved by the creative word-­smithing practiced by politicians and researchers. It has the effect of shying away from the psychologically more satisfying, yet difficult to defend, term of ‘victory’ and retreating into attractive and useful terminological meandering, where it is easier to ascribe socially acceptable content. The following expressions are currently used as synonyms: ‘victory in war’, ‘success in war’ and ‘ending the war’.20 One should, however, draw a distinction between instances where the rhetoric of politicians serves to disguise an incomplete victory (or its outright lack) and ones where the aforementioned terms correctly reflect the situation. This applies, for example, to conflicts resulting from interventions carried out by the international community with the required legal mandate. In such situations, the achievement of objectives (success/victory) may be correctly described by other terms whose meaning is detached from the fact of defeating the enemy in the field. Maybe it is necessary to domesticate the proposition that due to existing limitations victory will never again occur in a fully satisfying/acceptable form. As early as the mid-­1960s, Thomas Schelling indicated that victory inadequately expresses what a nation wants from its military forces. Mostly it wants the influence that resides in latent force. It wants the bargaining power that comes from its capacity to hurt, not just the direct consequence of successful military action. Even total victory over an enemy provides at best an opportunity for unopposed violence against the enemy population. How to use that opportunity can be just as important as the achievement of victory itself.21 Naturally, this does not mean that the modern West should renounce armed force or war as a policy tool (for prevention, deterrence or reaction to situations leaving no better alternatives). It must, however, be prepared for the possibility that the instruments it uses will not yield unambiguous, lasting effects, or that they may not be achieved swiftly, without significant costs and with assured popular acceptance.

Victory in Western wars   175 This raises expectations of policies grounded in the realism of the planners, the responsibility of politicians and the maturity of societies. Their reference point becomes the awareness that solving the majority of post-­Cold War problems, which led and may still lead to armed conflicts, does not fit into a clear-­cut territory of victory or defeat.22 This is accompanied by the paradoxical situation of the West waging war by invoking the moral language of great national wars, while in other way resisting the status of being at war as a political condition, that is, not declaring war, not making material demands of the people directly and going to great lengths to insulate their populations from the conflict.23 It can result in distorting the public perception of the reasons causing the state to get involved in the conflict and in lowering the people’s mobilisation with consequences not only for the quality of governance but also for the social control of the leaders.

8.3  A post-­heroic theory of victory? The problem with understanding victory in modern ‘wars of the West’ can be abstracted to a set of fairly simple questions – though not necessarily ones yielding concrete answers. What was intended to be achieved and in what timeframe? What was the cost? What measures were used to achieve the goals? How did their eventual achievement consolidate the gains from the efforts made? How can the accumulated knowledge be used in the future? Determining the objectives of war must be connected with taking responsibility for the post-­war situation. In every armed conflict involving Western states in recent years, the victor was ‘stuck’ (financially, politically, militarily) for a long time in the warzone. The two largest ones – in Iraq and Afghanistan (being a long chain of various conflicts), and to a certain degree also the operations in the Balkans – still leave open questions as to whether their effects meet declared war objectives and the expected shape of victory. Perhaps the answers are influenced to a greater degree by post-­war events, whose link to the actual end of fighting is growing ever looser as time goes by. These issues are even more apparent in relation to the military intervention in Libya, in particular its political consequences for the stability in this state, North Africa and the Middle East.24 Modern conflicts have also pitted states and their coalitions against non-­state entities, culturally divergent, acting within a different logic of objectives, time and space, unburdened by the need for democratic legitimisation of their actions, unafraid of the technological and material superiority of their opponents.25 Unlike in traditional wars, where a uniformed opponent fought for ‘king and country’ and abided by the rules of warfare, this modern incarnation does not identify with any authority, has unclear motivations, and disturbingly frequently prefers death to life.26 In modern warfare, there are no acts of capitulation serving to demarcate the time of fighting and the time of peace. It is an increasing challenge to transform success on the battlefield into a long-­term political victory.27

176   Robert Kupiecki This situation necessitates seeing victory in its post-­heroic form. It also opens the field to social emotions and political manipulation, where any given level of military success may be discretionally presented as either defeat or victory. As such, in the interests of consistency and political utility, it is necessary to realise that modern victory can take many forms (and names). Researchers examining this question strive to understand its complexities in political, economic and military categories, as well as the impact of the changes brought about by victory for the victor’s policies and international relations. The knowledge gathered (theory of victory) is to be usable for the foreign and security policy of modern states, indicating the manner of mobilising their assets for the achievement of adopted goals and the scope of obligations after the conclusion of the conflict.28 This effort does not amount to a consistent and generally accepted theory. It draws upon the works on international relations theory and military history. It is cautious in its approach to generalisation of findings and prefers placing all deliberations in an appropriate background, considering the varied nature of conflicts and their cultural contexts.29 Recently the researchers have adopted a longer temporal perspective (25 years) as a prerequisite to studying the meaning of victory. An Australian scholar, Ian Bickerton, justifies this with the fact that a war shapes the emotional state of nations for at least a generation (those who waged the war, fought in it or survived it). A quarter of a century is to allow for a credible assessment of victory as a set of variables directly connected with the concluded conflict, though not always intended or planned. It affects the manner of assessing victory and defeat. Any analysis of the meaning of victory must then take up its long-­term effects, because if the terms imposed on the defeated side and their realisation did not improve the state of affairs preceding the war in a certain timeframe, then considering its cost there no victory has been achieved.30 The research on modern victory owes much to American professors Robert Mandel and William Martel. Their findings complement each other both as to the diagnosis of the fluidity of the subject and the method of examining the effects of conflicts in the last two decades, as well as suggestions for national security policies. To both of them, victory and defeat are vulnerable to subjective political assessments. According to Mandel, success on the battlefield is a necessary condition31 for strategic victory. This alone, declared only after peace is made, means that the victor achieves his own goals spread over various periods after the victory and having national, regional and global consequences. It also means a control over the defeated party, allowing reconstruction of its political and economic system, thereby guaranteeing a peaceful return to international cooperation (e.g. Germany after World War II). Mandel analyses the necessary requirements for post-­Cold War strategic victories of Western democracies, indicating the complexity of the issue and the differences to the simple and unambiguous, pre-­modern understanding of this concept. In his view, strategic victory consists of the following: taking full control over information on the conflict and the situation following it, ensuring military deterrence, supporting political self-­determination (political stability of

Victory in Western wars   177 the defeated party), economic rebuilding, social justice in the defeated state and its process of regaining external and internal respect.32 However, his conclusions begin to sound rather pessimistic when one realises that there is no example of such a clear strategic victory in modern times. At the same time, he notes that the rarity of such victory is a result of the fact that a majority of wars have limited objectives and infrequently consider rebuilding the opponent. Furthermore, modern conflicts are usually waged against non-­state entities, difficult to defeat in a clear way, ensuring stable conditions for ‘peace-­winning’. Mandel’s suggestions do however offer a framework (Table 8.1), raising awareness of the conditions for a successful termination of the war and reducing the risk of political paralysis, a return to violence and embarrassment of the victor. It can also be useful in searching for political alternatives to an armed conflict. It is from this perspective that Mandel analyses the first Persian Gulf War and the conflicts in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. In all of these cases, military victory did not lead – in his view – to a strategic victory because the victor overestimated post-­war gains, did not formulate its objectives clearly and underestimated the sources of resistance of the defeated side.33 The author does, however, propose that strategic victory is not only desirable, but also possible, though harder to achieve than military success in the field. He encourages politicians to exercise integral understanding of the methods of waging war and managing the post-­war situation, a cautious but clear formulation of war objectives, careful composition of forces necessary for achieving them and drafting credible post-­ conflict strategies. The chances for a strategic victory increase, in his opinion, Table 8.1  Mandel’s understanding of a strategic victory (criteria) Pre-modern

Modern

Defeating the enemy by force

Information control conscious of the sources of post-war instability Military deterrence ensuring the defeated party’s security by deterring possible aggressors Political stability based on a legitimised government and administration of the defeated side, acting in accordance with the victor’s interests Economic reconstruction – access to strategic resources and reintegration into the international economic system Justice – ensuring public order in the defeated state, peaceful settlement of disputes with the use of the local justice administration Legitimacy – acceptance of conducted activities by its citizens, allies, international organisations

Taking over the territory and resources of the defeated side Setting up structures and authorities subservient to the interests of the victor Ignoring the interests of the defeated party

Source: author’s own work.

178   Robert Kupiecki when there is a willingness to implement human intensive strategies (increasing costs and risks), rather than ones based primarily on technological superiority. This helps the victor to adapt to post-­war conditions, to devote more attention to the prevention of destabilisation and violence, as well as foster a civic society in the defeated state. Martel’s research of the issue of victory in war is clearly oriented towards the practical policy needs and is less interested in creating a universal theory. His position is that the modern use of violence for political goals – the peace operations, stabilisation missions, promotion of democracy, pre-­emptive activities, etc. – require a new approach to the question of victory. He proposes four criteria for its analysis. The first criterion pertains to the level of analysis. The author identifies the tactical, political-­military and grand strategy levels. This is not intended to correspond with levels of military activities (tactical, operational, strategic), but rather relates to the scale and consequences of victory. ‘Tactical’ – in his view – integrates the military tactical and operational levels, i.e. the results of individual battles and campaigns. ‘Political-­military’ corresponds to the military strategic level relating to one side achieving all or a portion of its objectives. Victory at a grand strategy level does not equal ‘grand strategy’ as integration of all the national resources for the achievement of set goals. Martel defines it as a victory causing significant changes to the international system. The value of this approach lies not in giving new meanings to familiar terms, but rather in extending the understanding of possible consequences of victory. Martel’s second criterion is the scale of the change made to the status quo by the victor. It may be limited, to the effect of changing the opponent’s conduct (effect of NATO strikes against Serbia in 1999), or profound, leading to the elimination of an enemy regime (consequence of the war in Iraq in 2003). The third criterion relates to the costs of war: the scope of national mobilisation of political, economic and social resources for the needs of the war. The fourth one is the scale of post-­war obligations of the winning side (economic aid, political support), which may either be limited in time, or be permanent. Martel’s model of victory draws most from the examination of success in World War II. His postulates (Table 8.2) have been confronted with the effects of post-­Cold War conflicts involving America and her allies. Table 8.2  Martel’s theory of victory Military defeat of the enemy – destroying or rendering resources supporting him unusable Extending control over the territory of the defeated side Introducing political and structural changes Rebuilding the economy and infrastructure of the defeated state Changing the defeated side’s foreign policy to one beneficial to the victor Establishing new strategic relations with the erstwhile enemy Source: author’s own work.

Victory in Western wars   179 In many instances, Martel’s model of victory is similar then to the premises adopted by Robert Mandel. This applies especially to the post-­war involvement of the victor, rebuilding the defeated state after the conflict and its reintegration with the international system as a guarantee of lasting peace.

8.4  The theory of victory: a textbook view The American John Boone Bartholomees correctly calls victory the most important theoretical challenge for strategic studies, noting the problems of its conceptualisation and the shortcomings of existing works on this subject. Facing this challenge, he drafted a concise textbook view of the problem to teach to US officers.34 It can be summarised in seven points. 1  Subjectivity in perceiving this phenomenon  This is strongly determined by the stance of the assessing entity, rather than by fulfilling a certain condition. Perception relates to the effects of war (after the conclusion of the conflict), rather than the effort made (measured by the scale of destruction inflicted upon the enemy). The subjective aspect makes it impossible to comprehend victory objectively, since it introduces variables dependent on conditions and perspectives of the assessing entity. As a result, military victory or any other significant prize is neither necessary, nor sufficient for it to be deemed a strategic victory: not necessary, because a victory so perceived may be announced regardless of net losses, and not sufficient, because not even significant gains can guarantee a lasting victory. The fact that one side of the conflict achieves a victory does not have to mean the opponent sees its situation the same way. 2  The cost-­benefit balance in assessing victory is key  It needs to be ‘worth’ the costs and efforts made. This otherwise rational approach conceals an important dilemma, whose crux is whether, in a given situation, it is better to fight or to stop the fighting. Ending the war may be a better solution than its continuation or a prolonged stalemate – but does not have to mean victory. A lack of defeat is naturally preferable to defeat, and a lack of victory may be preferable to a pyrrhic victory. It is clear, however, that a war cannot end until the warring sides start perceiving peace as an alternative, preferable to continued fighting. In the traditional, general view, the measure of victory is that the victorious side is better-­off after the conflict than before it. Nevertheless, researchers accept the responsibility of the victor for the defeated side and the shape of international relations emerging from the post-­war situation. 3  The time factor in assessing victory  Social associations with victory are culture-­based irrespective of the fact that over the centuries, with the development of international law, the media and

180   Robert Kupiecki humanitarian reflections, the methods of waging war and their conditions, and with them, the perception of victory and defeat, changed. This is a point of reality clashing with expectations, which has serious consequences, since wars often do not bring clear-­cut solutions, nor lead at least to the understanding of their own positions by the warring nations. Hence, if war is a multidimensional phenomenon, then victory must also be one. A criterion limiting, although not completely eliminating, the influence of subjectivity in perception is a sufficiently long timeframe of the assessment of its impact on the post-­war situation. 4  Victory as a political concept  The lack of unambiguously beneficial political consequences deforms the perception of victory. Napoleon’s victories did not change the social order of defeated countries (Prussia, Austria, Russia). After World War I, a military victory was not transformed into a lasting strategic solution because the decision was made not to interfere with the internal situation in Germany. Hence, military victories do not per se determine the political outcome of the war. They merely provide opportunities for the victor, limited by circumstances beyond his control. This ‘political dimension’ of victory stems from the assessment of the state of affairs made both by the victorious and the defeated side. 5  Omitting the analysis of the conditions to build peace does not make it easier to understand what strategic victory is A comparison of major armed conflicts after 1954 shows that over half of them brought about a new wave of violence after the conclusion of the initial fighting and reduced regional stability. This conclusion can also be extended to the effects of some of the post-­Cold War conflicts of the West (Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya). Researchers are usually in accord that a strategic victory (at least in inter-­state conflicts) occurs if in the post-­conflict phase the victor: • • • • •

creates foundations of political balance in the defeated country, conducive to cooperation and solving the problems arising from post-­war chaos; controls (in the sense of influence and access) sources of information on factors potentially threatening the building of post-­war stability; retains the internal and international mandate to act; is involved in the long term in the post-­war rebuilding of the defeated state; guarantees its safety.

This, however, does not lead researchers of victory to advocate full effectiveness in all of the aforementioned matters. What is meant instead is ensuring a correlation between successes in those areas that comprise a strategic victory.

Victory in Western wars   181 6  Victory and defeat, while being polar opposites, do not have a binary character There are many intermediate states describing a level of success (below victory) understood as the degree to which the war solved problems leading to it. Literature on this subject proposes a seven-­grade scale measuring victory, encompassing both the positive and negative elements of this phenomenon: disaster – defeat – lack of victory – lack of resolution – lack of defeat – success – victory. In this scale, (strategic) victory means the full realisation of set objectives, solving all problems relating to the war, whereas disaster means a catastrophe. The other stages merge elements of success and defeat. Success, possible without the full realisation of set objectives, is however not the same as victory. Some researchers go even further in the taxonomy of victory, proposing various scales of measuring different levels of military triumph.35 7  Decreasing utility of war as a political tool This is a consequence of the consciousness of the clash between the historic (total) and modern (limited) perception of victory. Its objective is not full domination over the enemy, but rather an effective impact on his intentions, international conduct and internal situation. Modern victors prefer a compromise or limited gains on a certain accepted level of costs incurred. In practice this means: • • • • • •

not forcing an unconditional surrender, but rather bringing about an end to violence; not destroying and subjugating the enemy, but rather neutralisation and prevention of aggression; not dominating, but rather creating conditions for good governance; not exploiting the local resources, but rather supporting post-­war rebuilding; not imposing a certain social model, but rather fostering social transformation; not acting alone, but rather with legitimacy and aid of allies and on the basis of international law.

Post-­Cold War conflicts involving Western states do not grant researchers the necessary distance for a comprehensive analysis of their consequences. Analyses of the outcomes of individual conflicts should be carried out to find the answers to the questions as to whether, and to what extent, military victories of the West offered conditions for solving pre-­war problems, as well as to how they contributed to the improvement of peace. One can assume that it will not be easy to conduct such an analysis in a methodologically consistent way, convincing for scientists (that they have appropriate research instruments), politicians (that it is useful in the decision-­making process) and public opinion (that an objective assessment of an analyst is consistent with the popular perception of a given

182   Robert Kupiecki situation). However, it is worth continuing effort in this area, not only for scientific purposes, but also for more rational, restrained and effective policies of the Western community. And if the current armed conflicts involving the West seem to be unending, then – in the words of Michael Clarke – ‘victory and defeat will probably not mean an end to the fighting, but will certainly mean a beginning of disputes’.36

Notes   1 J.G. Bloch, The Future of War in its Technical, Economic, and Political Relations (Ginn & Co., Boston 1903). 2 Bloch’s contemporary, Norman Angell wrote about the economic non-­viability of war and the illusory nature of victory, see N. Angell, The Great Illusion (G.P. Putnam, New York 1910).   3 P.L. Sullivan, At what price victory? The effects of uncertainty on military intervention duration and outcome (2008) 1 Conflict Management and Peace Science 49–66.   4 Victory is not to be viewed in its extreme form (total victory), but rather through its limitations; the objectives of war are changeable, with them the expectations as to the shape of victory also evolve; opposing objectives of the warring parties may converge over time up to the point of ceasing fighting. This last matter naturally promises very little regarding chances for lasting peace, see M. Motten (ed.), Between War and Peace: How America Ends Its Wars (Free Press, New York 2011).   5 F.C. Ikle, Every War Must End (Cambridge University Press, New York 1991) 14.   6 M. Dudziak, War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013).   7 R.C. Eichenberg, Victory has many friends: US public opinion and the use of military force 1981–2005 (2005) 1 International Security 140–177.   8 R. Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge University Press, New York 2004).   9 M. Clarke, The ending of wars and the ending of eras (2015) 4 The RUSI Journal 6–7. 10 This text does not dwell on the ‘end of all war’ theory seen as an alternative to the ‘theory of victory’. See J. Mueller, Retreat from the Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (Basic Books, New York 1989); R. Varynen (ed.), The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates (Routledge, London 2005); J. Horgan, The End of War (McSweeney’s, San Francisco 2014). Systematic statistical data demonstrate a consistent drop in the general number of armed conflicts after 1989 (particularly international ones). This overarching trend is not changed by the fact that in 2014 the largest number of wars were being waged since the beginning of the twenty-­first century, SIPRI Yearbook (2015) 99. See also C.T. Call, M. Cousens, Ending wars and building peace: International response to war-­torn societies (2008) 9 International Studies Perspectives 5–6. It is worth noting, however, how researchers of the ‘end of all war’ theory attempt to take over the concept of victory understood as a war alternative. Suggestions in this respect include effective individual or collective self-­defence, employing a minimal amount of violence, as well as limiting the extent of casualties and material losses. Gerald Schlabach proposes that instead of wars, ‘just activities of a policing nature’ be employed to shift the focus and scope of violence from achieving military objectives to the protection of human life, refraining from killing in favour of putting the offenders on trial and moving by states from fanning the flames of war to reducing social emotions appropriate for policing activities, see G. Schlabach, Just Policing, Not War: An Alternative Response to World Violence (Michael Glazier, Collegeville 2007). 11 American researchers define the competence of leaders in the field of war as the ability and willingness to foresee the future in the sense of considering the welcome

Victory in Western wars   183 and unwelcome consequences arising from one’s own actions and possible alternatives, the ability to discuss such matters and accept different opinions: J.L. Amoreux, B.J. Steele, Competence and just war (2014) 1 International Relations 67–87. 12 M.C. Desh, Democracy and victory (2003) 1 International Security 180–194. 13 During the first Persian Gulf war, both the US-­led coalition and Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi government announced their victory. The former asserted that it comprised liberating Kuwait and routing Iraqi forces, the latter – the survival of the regime in Baghdad, D. Byman, M. Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002) 34–35. In May 2003, the US President announced victory in the second war against Iraq (‘mission accomplished’). Tactical and operational military objectives had been achieved, but an old war transformed into a new one – with new rules of play and participants. After Bush’s declaration, combat losses amounted to over 7,000 American and coalitions soldiers and, according to various estimates, 137,000–165,000 Iraqi civilians (estimates based on US governmental data, corroborated by R.D. Hooker, J.J. Collins, Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War (National Defense University Press, Washington 2015) 424–430. Similarly divergent perceptions concerned the consequences of NATO’s 1999 air operation in former Yugoslavia. The allies felt that they had achieved their goals, while the government in Belgrade that it managed to avoid a ground operation of the West and even greater material losses. 14 D. Altman, The strategist’s curse: A theory of false optimism as a cause of war (2015) 24 Security Studies 284–315. The core of the author’s idea of ‘false optimism’ as a cause of war is the assumption that ‘if the two sides could foresee the outcome of a war accurately, why would they not agree to something like it without enduring the costs of fighting’. 15 The influential researcher of this issue elaborated on the difference between a strategist’s optimism and pessimism: ‘optimism is apt to kill with greater certainty. Whereas pessimism may inspire a grand strategy, and especially defence preparation […] optimism has the potential to risk national safety and even international order more generally’, C.S. Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare (Phoenix Press, London 2005) 34. 16 B.H. Liddell-­Hart, Strategy (Plume, London 1991) 353–357. Such an approach may be appropriate to warring factions in particular situations, yet modern research questions the universal value of peace negotiations (agreements) as a guarantee of a ‘better’ peace – in (civil) wars waged between 1940 and 2000, negotiated peace terms prevented the continuation of the fighting in 22 per cent, while only 12 per cent of conflicts settled on the battlefield flared up again, see M. Duffy-­Toft, Ending civil wars: A case for rebel victory (2015) 4 International Security 7–36. Also see: D. Reiter, How Wars End (Princeton University Press, New Jersey 2009) who avoids the term ‘victory’, and writes of ‘an end to war’ (fighting). 17 That is because each of them has a specific set of restrictions on conducting military activities, winning conditions and preserving the benefits arising from victory, B. Bond, The Pursuit of Victory. From Napoleon to Saddam Hussein (Clarendon Press, New York 1998). 18 Identifying the essence of victory as a fact transcending the moment of ending the fighting encourages drawing a distinction between military theory and theory of victory. The former concentrates on the methods of achieving military victory through tactical and operational success. The latter approaches this issue on a strategic (grand strategy) level, seeing victory as going beyond the time of war itself. 19 If war, as an instrument of politics, changes, so too should the comprehension of victory follow. Definitions such as ‘overcoming specific obstacles for the achievement of a predetermined objective’ are not helpful in understanding its essence. The issue is not only the vague nature of such a definition applicable to any field of study. It lies

184   Robert Kupiecki also in its static character, detached from the fact that the objectives of the conflict may be unclear or different for the warring sides, may change in the course of the fighting or the fact that, for example, overcoming obstacles for the achievement of an improperly or too optimistically defined objective can hardly be seen as reasonable. Two decades ago, Edward Luttwak noticed that wars in our times would be much like those of the eighteenth century, not ending in lasting victories or having a protracted character: E.N. Luttwak, Toward post-­heroic warfare (1995) 3 Foreign Affairs 109–122. 20 These terms provide little indication as to the shape of the world after the war and its utility for achieving conditions better than those preceding the outbreak of the conflict. Colin Gray proves that ‘victory’ should be replaced by ‘strategic success’ and ‘strategic advantage’, and sees decisive victory as a concept which at the tactical level describes battles won, at the operational level – campaigns won, at the strategic level – wars won, and at the political level allows for the transition into the post-­war stabilisation period, see C.S. Gray, Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory (SSI USAWC, Carlisle 2002). 21 T. Schelling, Arms and Influence (Yale University Press, New Haven 1966) 31. 22 For an assessment of ‘wars of the West’ it is crucial to analyse the policies of the US. There are allegations that it is ‘possessed by an unhealthy obsession with victory’, which is to distort the perception of threats, drive the US to undertake military activities deteriorating the situation and obstruct pursuing foreign policy, see A.T. Thrall, E. Goepner, The US obsession with victory is dangerous, Time 4 September 2015, http://time.com/4021442/victory-­foreign-policy (accessed 10 May 2018). It is also worth looking at a thorough analysis of American wars of the twentieth and twenty-­ first centuries: G. Rose, How Wars End: Why We Fight the Last Battle. A History of American Intervention from World War I to Afghanistan (Simon & Schuster, New York 2010). He proves the existence not so much of an ‘obsession with victory’ but an insufficient integration of military and political aspects of American strategy. For an interesting examination of the lack of ‘clean’ victories in US conflicts after the Korean War, see: D. Tierney, The Right Way to Lose War: America in the Age of Unwinnable Conflicts (Little, Brown and Company, New York 2015). 23 P. Porter, Soldiers fighting alone: The wars of the market security state (2015) 3 Parameters 5. The author proves that financing of US post-­Cold War wars was done largely not through mobilisation of the people, issuing of war bonds or introduction of special taxes, but rather by the use of capital markets and contracting services out to private specialists. 24 A.J. Kuperman, Obama’s Libya debacle: How a well-­meaning intervention ended in failure (2015) 2 Foreign Affairs 66–77. 25 The ‘jihadi theory of victory’ reconstructed by a British scholar is composed of six elements: (1) the ability to be constantly fighting; (2) an obligation of every faithful to fight the enemies of Islam; (3) a martyr’s death in the name of religion and the institutionalisation of martyrdom; (4) maintaining own identity through the branding and combating of enemies; (5) pride, unity and fraternity of jihadi fighters; (6) achieving a situation in which the enemies of Islam suffer as much as believers under their oppressors. See J.B. Cozzens, Victory from the prism of jihadi culture (2009) 1 Joint Forces Quarterly 86–91. 26 A. Curth-­Cronin’s book: How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton University Press, Princeton 2009) relates to experiences of the West in fighting movements resorting to terrorism as a method of fighting and recalls successful strategies: elimination of leaders, including some of them in the political process; fostering an internal split; forceful elimination of the entire movement; supporting the transformation of the movement into a different (less radical) form of violence. The author notes that the understanding of victory in the war on terror must be grounded in social education, elimination/isolation of terrorists,

Victory in Western wars   185 building an alternative identity condemning atrocities and depriving fanatics of a martyr’s splendour. See also A.B. West, The future of warfare against Islamic jihadism: Engaging and defeating nonstate, nonuniformed, unlawful enemy combatants (2016) 1–2 Military Review 39–44. 27 T. Franks, S. Biddle, P.C. Choharis, J.M. Owen, D. Pipes, G. Rosenau, D. Zakheim, Is this victory? A symposium (2006) 86 The National Interest 8–29. 28 R. Kupiecki, The meaning of military victory: In search of a new analytical framework (2014) 2 Security and Defence Quarterly 7–28. 29 The most important works are: W.C. Martel, Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007) and Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Strategy (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2011); R. Mandel, The Meaning of Military Victory (Lynne Rienner, Boulder 2006); I. Bickerton, The Illusion of Victory: The True Costs of War (Melbourne University Publishing, Melbourne 2011); J. Angstrom, I. Duvesteyn (eds), Understanding Victory and Defeat in Contemporary War (Routledge, London 2007). 30 Bickerton (2011) 18. The author analyses the long-­term effects of modern wars for both sides of the conflict. Victory, he concludes, must be seen through the lens of long-­term restrictions and determinants built into it. Absolute victory does not exist and its costs may increase with time both for the victors and for the defeated. War, after all, is a risky venture, giving no guarantees of achieving the intended goals. 31 In order for it to create conditions for a strategic victory, it must fulfil four criteria: effectiveness – defeating the enemy with minimal cost; quality – limiting the future capabilities of the defeated foe to conduct a war of aggression; trust – building a potential for the defeated side’s self-­defence; limiting of hostility – minimising damage to local infrastructure and losses among the civilian population, see Mandel (2006) 15–16. 32 Mandel (2006) 17–29. 33 The application of the above six-­point model of victory is presented by the author in chapter 4 of Mandel (2006), indicating the traps within the decision-­making process based on unrealistic, wishful assumptions, plans and calculations. It is worth comparing his observations with matters brought up earlier in the present text, relating to the excessive optimism and competences of decision-­makers. 34 J. Boone Bartholomees, A theory of victory, in: J. Boone Bartholomees (ed.), US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle 2010) vol. 1, 79–94. 35 Bartholomees also presents more detailed scales of the ‘measuring’ of victory. They involve the assessment of two elements: consequences (inflaming the situation – significant deterioration of the situation – possible deterioration of the situation – status quo – possible solution – partial solution – solution) and gains (none – questionable – meagre – limited – measurable – significant – absolute). See Bartholomees (2010) 82–83. 36 Clarke (2015) 8.

References Altman D., The strategist’s curse: A theory of false optimism as a cause of war (2015) 24 Security Studies 284–315. Amoreux J.L., Steele B.J., Competence and just war (2014) 1 International Relations 67–87. Angell N., The Great Illusion (G.P. Putnam, New York 1910). Angstrom J., Duvesteyn I. (eds), Understanding Victory and Defeat in Contemporary War (Routledge, London 2007).

186   Robert Kupiecki Bickerton I., The Illusion of Victory: The True Costs of War (Melbourne University Publishing, Melbourne 2011). Bloch J.G., The Future of War in its Technical, Economic, and Political Relations (Ginn & Co., Boston 1903). Bond B., The Pursuit of Victory: From Napoleon to Saddam Hussein (Clarendon Press, New York 1998). Boone Bartholomees J., A theory of victory, in: J. Boone Bartholomees (ed.), US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle 2010). Byman D., Waxman M., The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002). Call C.T., Cousens M., Ending wars and building peace: International response to war-­ torn societies (2008) 9 International Studies Perspectives 1–21. Clarke M., The ending of wars and the ending of eras (2015) 4 The RUSI Journal 4–8. Cozzens J.B., Victory from the prism of jihadi culture (2009) 1 Joint Forces Quarterly 86–91. Curth-­Cronin A., How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton University Press, Princeton 2009). Desh M.C., Democracy and victory (2003) 1 International Security 180–194. Dudziak M., War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013). Duffy-­Toft M., Ending civil wars: A case for rebel victory (2015) 4 International Security 7–36. Eichenberg R.C., Victory has many friends: US public opinion and the use of military force 1981–2005 (2005) 1 International Security 140–177. Franks T., Biddle S., Choharis P.C., Owen J.M., Pipes D., Rosenau G., Zakheim D., Is this victory? A symposium (2006) 86 The National Interest 8–29. Gray C.S., Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare (Phoenix Press, London 2005). Gray C.S., Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory (SSI USAWC, Carlisle 2002). Hooker R.D., Collins J.J., Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War (National Defense University Press, Washington 2015). Horgan J., The End of War (McSweeney’s, San Francisco 2014). Ikle F.C., Every War Must End (Cambridge University Press, New York 1991). Kuperman A.J., Obama’s Libya debacle: How a well-­meaning intervention ended in failure (2015) 2 Foreign Affairs 66–77. Kupiecki R., The meaning of military victory: In search of a new analytical framework (2014) 2 Security and Defence Quarterly 7–28. Liddell-­Hart B.H., Strategy (Plume, London 1991). Luttwak E.N., Toward post-­heroic warfare (1995) 3 Foreign Affairs 109–122. Mandel R., The Meaning of Military Victory (Lynne Rienner, Boulder 2006). Martel W.C., Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007). Martel W.C., Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Strategy (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2011). Motten M. (ed.), Between War and Peace: How America Ends Its Wars (Free Press, New York 2011). Mueller J., Retreat from the Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (Basic Books, New York 1989). Paris R., At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge University Press, New York 2004).

Victory in Western wars   187 Porter P., Soldiers fighting alone: The wars of the market security state (2015) 3 Parameters 5–12. Reiter D., How Wars End (Princeton University Press, New Jersey 2009). Rose G., How Wars End: Why We Fight the Last Battle. A History of American Intervention from World War I to Afghanistan, (Simon & Schuster, New York 2010). Schelling T., Arms and Influence (Yale University Press, New Haven 1966). Schlabach G., Just Policing, Not War: An Alternative Response to World Violence (Michael Glazier, Collegeville 2007). Sullivan P.L., At what price victory? The effects of uncertainty on military intervention duration and outcome (2008) 1 Conflict Management and Peace Science 49–66. Thrall A.T., Goepner E., The US obsession with victory is dangerous, Time 4 September 2015, http://time.com/4021442/victory-­foreign-policy (accessed 10 May 2018). Tierney D., The Right Way to Lose War: America in the Age of Unwinnable Conflicts (Little, Brown and Company, New York 2015). Varynen R. (ed.), The Waning of Major War: Theories and Debates (Routledge, London 2005). West A.B., The future of warfare against Islamic jihadism: Engaging and defeating nonstate, nonuniformed, unlawful enemy combatants (2016) 1–2 Military Review 39–44.

9 Impact of Western military interventions on the evolution of law on use of force Patrycja Grzebyk

The end of the Cold War brought with it hope of a full implementation of the principles pertaining to the use of force (ius contra bellum) and a reinvigoration of the United Nations, particularly the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Under the new order which would at least respect the rules agreed upon in 1945, the powers were to act together for the benefit of all, striving towards world peace and security.1 A swift (within 48 hours) adoption of resolutions condemning Iraq’s aggression against Kuwait in 1990 and imposing sanctions on the aggressor2 brought hope that the UN would finally start fulfilling its primary purpose – maintaining peace and security.3 The world powers showed that once again they recognised the necessity of obtaining a prior authorisation from the UNSC if they planned a military intervention.4 The chief principle of ius contra bellum is the prohibition of the use of force,5 to which however the United Nations Charter (UNC) introduces two exceptions. The first is the authorisation of military measures granted by the UNSC,6 in which, incidentally, among the five permanent members who can block any substantive decision,7 three are Western states – the US, the UK and France. The second exception is the right to individual or collective self-­defence which is framed not only by the UNC (Article 51) but also by customary law.8 Furthermore, for a number of years there has been a debate over the legality of humanitarian intervention, i.e. a military intervention in a third state, without its consent, in order to contain or eliminate grave and mass infringements of human rights in that country. The purpose of this chapter is to examine to what extent the practice of the use of force by Western states influenced the understanding of the above exceptions from the prohibition of the use of force, as well as the functioning of the UNSC – the body bearing the primary responsibility for maintaining peace and security.9

9.1  Marginalisation of UN Security Council Already during the first post-­intervention of Western states undertaken as a response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the conduct of Western states contributed to undermining the role of the UNSC. Operation Desert Storm was authorised by

Impact on evolution of law on use of force   189 the UNSC on the basis of S/RES/678 which mentions the use of all necessary means, unless Iraq complied with all previous resolutions by 15 January 1991.10 This general clause had been agreed upon between the US and the USSR. Neither of the powers was in any doubt that it included also the use of armed force.11 S/RES/678 was adopted with merely 12 approving votes with a dissenting vote of Yemen and Cuba and abstaining of China. This way the Cold War era practice of interpreting that the abstention of one of the permanent members of the UNSC (with approving votes of at least nine other members) does not negatively affect the validity of the resolution was fully upheld.12 In the case of S/RES/678 there were brought up procedural irregularities in the form of not qualifying the situation as an act of aggression, breach of the peace or even a threat to the peace, which is a perquisite for activating the UNSC’s instruments13 and providing a general reference to Chapter VII, rather than invoking a specific provision of the UNC. In subsequent situations, the UNSC opted for at least the vaguest of possible qualifications (‘threat to the peace’) but still preferred to invoke Chapter VII UNC as a whole instead of indicating a specific provision of this Chapter as the basis to take certain measures. This probably resulted from the desire to secure more freedom as to the nature of the measures implemented and circumvent the rule that the appropriate measures are to be applied in sequence (the first not involving the use of force, only next, as a rule, those of a military character).14 Due to a lack of agreements under which UN member states would make part of their armed forces available to the UNSC,15 the basis for the intervention against Iraq had to be the forces of an ad hoc coalition.16 The creation of UN armed forces was, according to the literal meaning of the UNC, necessary for the implementation of military measures. Nevertheless, in accordance with the case-­ law of the International Court of Justice, it was possible to adopt other solutions in order to ensure the enforceability of the UNC.17 Hence (and the 1991 operation against Iraq was significant here), the possibility of forming coalitions or employing regional agreements in order to use military measures authorised by the Council is nowadays not subject to serious legal doubts.18 It is, however, telling that already during the 1991 intervention, the US and their coalition members ruled out the possibility of the entire operation being commanded or controlled by the UN (via the Military Staff Committee), even though this course of action is provided for by the UNC.19 Operation Desert Storm was not carried out under a UN flag (as was the case in Korea) and its course was not consulted with the Secretariat.20 As such, it can be of little surprise that then-­UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar emphasised that the intervening armies could not be described as UN forces.21 The unwillingness to cede control of the operation to the UN resulted from a desire to ensure full operational freedom by Western states.22 A similar situation occurred with the Libyan intervention in 2011, where UN control was limited to examining perfunctory reports presented by the intervening states.23 In this way, Western states contributed to establishing a model under

190   Patrycja Grzebyk which the role of the Council is limited to giving authorisation for the use of force with no real control over the manner in which it is used. However, the West found out on the occasion of the intervention in Bosnia-­ Herzegovina that decision-­making based in UN structures could negatively affect the effectiveness of a given intervention. The NATO intervention in Bosnia-­Herzegovina in 1995 is being regarded as relatively effective; nevertheless, the procedure of consulting actions (double key) between NATO and the UN employed in the months preceding it, inhibited or even made it impossible to conduct effective operations.24 This intervention also demonstrated that where the use of military measures is necessary, it is not sufficient merely to strengthen the mandate of the peace-­keeping mission by changing the legal basis and the nature of the tasks for its participants to be able to enforce peace. In the case of UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force, the peace-­keeping mission on the territory of former Yugoslavia) the mandate was extended (the authority to provide armed escort to humanitarian convoys, no-­fly zones protection, protection of places of refuge)25 but was not accompanied by a significant increase in resources and manpower.26 It is telling that the US did not wish to finance UNPROFOR, expressing in this way their opinion as to the usefulness of the operation.27 It is little wonder, then, that the mission could not have fulfilled its mandate but, even worse, it could not ensure the safety even of its participants, let alone put a stop to genocidal practices.28 In effect, Western states won the argument that leaving the matter of enforcing peace to a peace-­keeping mission must end in catastrophe. In this way, merely two to three years after the announcement of Boutros Boutros-­Ghali’s ‘Agenda for Peace’,29 UNPROFOR proved that peace-­keeping missions cannot effectively fulfil peace enforcement tasks and therefore the burden of intervention must fall to individual states and their coalitions. Both in the case of the intervention against Iraq in 1991 and in Libya in 2011 there were strong arguments that the scope of authorisation was overstepped. With S/RES/678 the Council did indicate that the purpose of employing ‘all necessary means’ was forcing Iraq ‘to uphold and implement S/RES/660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area’. Hence, due to the fact that Iraq consented to the withdrawal of its forces (albeit within three weeks, not one week as the Americans wanted), one can raise the argument that a military operation (at least to the extent it was actually carried out) was not necessary.30 The Desert Storm intervention did confirm that with a broad authorisation to use any means it is not a perquisite to wait for the results of diplomatic sanctions or effects of economic sanctions, if the deadline for complying with obligations imposed by the Council is not observed. On the one hand, the text of S/RES/678 does not clearly indicate that the Council meant solely a withdrawal to positions from before the invasion. On the other hand, the interpretation that ensuring peace required the destruction of Iraq’s military potential has also not found acceptance among some of the members of the UNSC.31 Therefore the allegations of action disproportionate to the threat are not surprising, since while the intervening parties were conscious

Impact on evolution of law on use of force   191 that the Council had not authorised them to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime, they did much to weaken this regime, so that it no longer posed a threat not only to Kuwait, but also to other countries in the region.32 In this context particular controversies were caused by attacking targets in Baghdad (justified by the need to destroy the Iraqi army’s supplies) or units withdrawing from Kuwait.33 In the case of the situation in Libya in 2011, the Council attempted to be more precise and it seemed clear that the authorisation pertained to the use of all necessary measures solely to ‘protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack’. In the same resolution the Council ruled out the possibility of foreign occupation in any form of any part of Libyan territory. Such a formulation did not exclude the possibility of employing ground forces since occupation within the meaning of Article 42 of the Hague Regulations of 18 October 1907 is a situation when a territory is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army (the authority is established and can be enforced), not merely a situation when a hostile army is present within a territory. The way NATO’s operation in Libya (Unified Protector) was conducted quickly gave rise to doubts as to the clarity of intentions of the intervening parties and the proportionality of measures employed. NATO attacked the positions of government forces or the residence of Muammar Gaddafi, thereby supporting the insurgents and contributing to the toppling of this leader’s regime. Additionally, coalition countries provided training to the opposition, aided them in creating appropriate command structures, supported them with their own special forces units and supplied arms,34 none of which they were authorised to do under the UNSC resolution.35 It thus became obvious that the objective of Western states was regime change.36 Of course, one could raise the argument that only a regime change would guarantee a lasting protection of the civilian population and the provision prohibiting occupation by land forces was not breached by Western states. The interventions in Iraq in 1991 and in Libya made it clear to the members of the Council that the authorisation to use force, once given, may be abused both as to the measures employed and the timeframe. It is distinctive that American attacks carried out against selected targets in Iraq after the conclusion of the intervention were still (in spite of criticism) being justified with S/RES/678 and the need enforce observance of no-­fly zones.37 What is more, the 2003 operation was also justified by invoking the same resolution38 even though interpretation of this legal act in good faith had to lead to a conclusion that its purpose was only restoring Kuwait and not the complete elimination of Iraq’s capability to conduct military operations.39 The issue, however, is that, first, there are no strict rules for interpreting UNSC resolutions40 and, second, it is accepted that the authorisation is valid until it is revoked by the Council, which in turn may be blocked by a veto of a permanent member (so-­called reverse veto) involved in the military action.41 The Council should have exercised caution, mindful of the experiences with the open-­ended nature of resolution S/RES/678. In the case of Libya, the UNSC also initially did not provide a temporal limitation for authorisation to use force, but subsequently adopted a resolution

192   Patrycja Grzebyk expressly indicating the deadline for the use of military measures it authorised.42 The Libyan example also demonstrates that, when there is a lack of agreement between members of the UNSC, it is necessary not only to exclude certain measures but also to provide a clear explanation what the Council means by ‘all necessary measures’ if one wishes to avoid discussions over the breach of the conditions of the authorisation.43 Undoubtedly, the UNSC could use some instruments for the verification of realisation of its resolutions, but while they are not in place, the Council is forced to formulate the mandates for any missions very cautiously and strictly, as in the resolutions pertaining to Bosnia-­Herzegovina.44 It is symptomatic that in the case of this particular operation there were no allegations that the scope of authorisation was exceeded (or they were minimal). Naturally, the discussions over exceeding the scope of authorisation granted by the UNSC in the case of Iraq in 1991 and Libya did not have such a destructive influence on the authority of the Council as did the intervention in Iraq in 2003 or in Kosovo in 1999. In these two cases, Western states resorted to a premeditated use of force,45 despite a lack of an express authorisation by the UNSC. In both instances the intervening states invoked UNSC resolutions (S/RES/1441; S/RES/1199 and S/RES/1203 respectively) declaring the existence of a threat to the peace in a given situation and therefore the existence of an implied authority for Western states to conduct military operations. However, the qualification of a situation as a threat to the peace does not automatically mean the authorisation to use force.46 In its Chapter VII, the UNC clearly states that the UNSC not only determines the existence of any threat to the peace but also decides on the nature of the measures to be used in such a situation. Western states on the other hand seemed to argue that with the inactivity of the Council (or, to be more precise, the Council not submitting to the will of Western states), they can themselves decide on the use of given measures if the situation amounts to a threat to the peace.47 It is also worth noting that in the case of the 2003 intervention in Iraq, the US acted inconsistently since, on the one hand, they sought the authorisation of the use of force by the UNSC but, on the other, they maintained that such authorisation already existed.48 They disregarded the clear objection of the Council to a military intervention in Iraq (visible not only in a lack of support for a draft resolution authorising the use of force but also in the cautious expressions used in resolution 1441 which ruled out the automatic use of force)49 which serves as a blatant example of marginalisation of the Council with regard to legitimising intervention.50 In both cases – the Kosovo intervention and the 2003 Iraq intervention, the intervening parties attempted to obtain some form of sanctioning of their actions in the form of a UNSC resolution determining the direction of changes in the states in which the intervention took place. Indeed, the Council did adopt resolutions relating to the situation after the conclusion of military operations – S/RES/1244 (1999) and S/RES/1483 (2003) respectively – which to some serve as post factum authorisation.51 However, the simple fact that the relevant resolutions do not contain condemnation of Western military interventions does not

Impact on evolution of law on use of force   193 mean that other members have accepted their legitimacy and only shows that there was no chance to express any criticism due to a threat of veto by one of the P-­5. It would also be difficult to expect the Council to refrain from deciding on the situation in a given state or region when finally there was a chance for a consensus. The aforementioned resolutions, very carefully worded, do not contain any statement justifying either of interventions,52 hence they cannot serve as post factum authorisation, as was the case for example with the Economic Community of West African States’ operation in Sierra Leone in 2007.53 This is evidenced by the fact that even though the situation in Iraq following the official conclusion of military operation still required the use of military measures, the Council did not decide to use ‘all necessary measures’ in order to ensure security.54 One could attempt to argue that the adoption of S/RES/1244 and S/RES/1483 is evidence that the Council did not deem the Iraq and Kosovo interventions to be aggression, since if that was the case, in accordance with international law (due to a breach of a peremptory norm, i.e. one binding absolutely), it would have to refrain from recognising the results of such operations.55 Nevertheless, such a conclusion is unfounded as even if there is aggression, the Council must take steps to restore peace and security, which however does not mean acceptance of the reasons which forced it to take action. The above resolutions do, however, suggest that some Western states may have treated the UNSC as a means to an end, using its authority to legitimise their own activities and consolidate the changes made by the West in a given region.

9.2  Aggressive self-­defence In the context of the evolution of the right to self-­defence, the most important is the intervention in Afghanistan, ongoing since 2001 and the closely connected, primarily in the view of the US, operation in Iraq of 2003. As a response to the 11 September 2001 attack against targets in the US, UNSC adopted S/RES/1368 and S/RES/1373 (2001) relating to the necessity of combating terrorism with all available measures and recognising it as a threat to the peace. The resolutions mentioned the right to self-­defence, both individual and collective, which could be perceived as an unprecedented recognition of the right to self-­defence as a response to terrorist attacks on behalf of non-­state actors.56 It must be stressed, then, that the intervention in Afghanistan which took place within a month after the 9/11 attacks was justified not by an authorisation by the UNSC but by the right to self-­defence which the Council merely confirmed.57 Article 51 UNC allows for self-­defence in the event of an armed attack. It does not precisely state whether the attack can be perpetrated solely by a state or also by a non-­state actor. However, taking into account the French text of the Charter referring to an armed aggression which, in accordance with applicable regulations, can only be perpetrated by a state,58 and recalling the case law of the International Court of Justice (including decisions passed after 2001),59 one can infer that self-­defence activities on the basis of Article 51 UNC may only be

194   Patrycja Grzebyk taken in the event of an armed attack by a different state. Furthermore, the aforementioned S/RES/1368 and S/RES/1373 do not provide that a strike by a non-­ state actor amounts to an armed attack,60 but merely declare that terrorist acts are a threat to the peace which, in any case, the Council had also done before.61 The UNC does, however, mention the inherent right to self-­defence whose scope is determined by customary law. It can be thus accepted that the action against Al-­Qaeda and acceptance thereof by the majority of states led to the emergence of a norm of customary law, according to which a state may undertake defensive action in response to an armed attack performed by a non-­state actor, at least as far as acts considered terrorist in nature are concerned.62 The problem is that in order to strike against a given terrorist group it is necessary to use force on the territory of a different state. The practice of states following 2001 indicates that the operation of a terrorist group within the territory of another state is treated as evidence of the inability or unwillingness of that state to combat terrorism (to which it is obliged, not least on the basis of the aforementioned UNSC resolutions) and by that, acquiescence to a military intervention on its territory against terrorist groups.63 As a consequence, the legal permissibility of attacking terrorists on the territory of a third state without any attempt to obtain its consent was being accepted, which was not the case prior to 2001.64 However, considering the fact that there is no universal, legally binding definition of terrorism, and states often brand their opponents terrorists in order to discredit them, the emergence of the aforementioned norm really means undermining the principle of prohibition of the use of force in international relations. Furthermore, since 2001 the US have been waging a continuous war on Al-­Qaeda and its allies which means that all attacks against terrorists (whether in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia or Syria) are being presented as belonging to that one same conflict. As such they justify those attacks with the exercise of a continuous right to self-­defence.65 The operation in Afghanistan was conducted not only against Al-­Qaeda but also against the Taliban government. The issue is that referring to the attribution of responsibility principles identified in the case law of either the International Court of Justice (the effective control principle, according to which only in the case of sending armed groups, or in a situation where a given state not only finances, coordinates or oversees the activities but also issues specific orders as to the directions adopted by such groups and the types of activities, can their actions be attributed to a state; mere aid is not sufficient)66 or even the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (the principle of overall control, according to which for the attribution of responsibility it is sufficient to demonstrate that a given state was involved in the planning and oversight of activities but it is not required to demonstrate that it issued specific orders or instructions relating to individual operations),67 it is impossible to attribute the actions of Al-­Qaeda to the Taliban regime. The Taliban did not direct the activities of Al-­Qaeda, nor did they control it or recognise the actions of this organisation as their own.68 Nevertheless they did tolerate its presence within the territory of Afghanistan and cooperated with it, e.g. in combating the opposition.

Impact on evolution of law on use of force   195 The tolerance for terrorists alone does not necessarily mean approval of their actions or accepting that they act in the name of the state as its quasi-­bodies.69 The US, however, have clearly stated that they have no intention of differentiating between those committing terrorist attacks and those granting them shelter.70 It is conceivable to accept then that the Americans actually attempted to broaden the principles of responsibility of a state for the actions of a non-­state actor operating on its territory. In this way the responsibility of a state would arise not only in the case of active support to terrorists but also in the case of merely tolerating their presence within its territory.71 While it is understandable that a state would bear responsibility for aiding terrorists, just as it bears responsibility for aiding a third state in committing an act prohibited by international law, armed force cannot be used against the offending state in contravention of applicable law.72 The West sought to topple the Taliban government of Afghanistan and to this end attacked a number of targets (having no connection to Al-­Qaeda) on the territory of the entire state. As such, there are serious doubts whether, when enjoying their right to self-­defence, Western states acted in accordance with the proportionality and necessity principles.73 While it can be assumed that the attack on the territory of Afghanistan was necessary, since the authorities of that state did not want to surrender terrorists,74 the toppling of the Taliban regime is difficult to justify. The objective of self-­defence should be resisting an attack, not a regime change. Neither is an objective of self-­defence the creation of conditions for peace and security, as this is the responsibility of the UNSC.75 This conclusion is supported by the negative reactions to the 2003 intervention in Iraq. One of the official justifications of the operation was the fact that Iraqi authorities were sheltering terrorists. It is worth noting, however, that while resolutions 1368 and 1373 did emphasise that states cannot support terrorism, they did not indicate that a breach of this obligation automatically enables the use of force against them. Operation Iraqi Freedom was, primarily, the first instance of implementing Bush’s doctrine of anticipatory self-­defence.76 While Americans used the term ‘pre-­emptive self-­defence’, which in the view of many lawyers is permissible if an attack is imminent and serious,77 they in fact meant preventive self-­defence.78 The difference lies primarily in the temporal perspective of the threatened attack and the probability of it occurring. Whereas pre-­emptive self-­defence seeks to strike before an attack which would inevitably fall within a short period of time, the objective of preventive self-­defence is the elimination of the capacity to conduct an attack which only potentially could be carried out in the future. Such right to preventive self-­defence was to apply particularly in the event when the use of weapons of mass destruction is threatened. It was not without cause that in the official argumentation, the Americans stressed not only the connections between Iraq and terrorist groups but also the possibility of these groups obtaining weapons of mass destruction from the Iraqi authorities.79 The concept of anticipatory self-­defence is contested on the grounds of the UNC as, in accordance with the literal meaning of Article 51, a state must receive the first blow before it can respond with armed force. It does not mean

196   Patrycja Grzebyk that one should sit idly while another state (or terrorist group, as it may be) develops the capacity to strike with weapons of mass destruction. In such instances the decision on the use of appropriate measures should be taken by the UNSC, however in the US strategies adopted in 2002 and 2006 no role for the Council had been foreseen.80 The supporters of anticipatory self-­defence emphasise that the UNC (signed before the atomic attack on Hiroshima and Nagasaki) cannot be treated as a suicide pact,81 particularly where the use of weapons of mass destruction is threatened or there is the ‘battered woman syndrome’, i.e. a situation in which a state undertakes pre-­emptive action against another state which has on numerous occasions infringed its obligations.82 By way of precedent, the bombing by Israel of the constructed Osirak nuclear reactors in 1981 was cited. It is worth remembering, however, that this attack was unanimously condemned by the UNSC.83 As for the 2003 intervention in Iraq, paradoxically this demonstrated the dangers associated with the allowance of anticipatory self-­defence, even in the event of a threat of a weapons of mass destruction attack,84 particularly where there are no clear rules for the assessment of evidence.85 Nevertheless, the consistent86 advocacy by Americans of a change in the understanding of the right to self-­defence is affecting the conduct of other states.

9.3  Humanitarian (meaning: pro-­democratic) intervention In nearly every instance of an intervention by Western states, humanitarian issues were raised as justification of the military intervention, hence the armed operations of Western states contributed greatly to the development of the right to humanitarian intervention and subsequently the military dimension of the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine. In the case of both wars in Iraq it was brought up that the necessity of intervention arose due to atrocities committed by Saddam Hussein’s regime, although it must be stressed that in both instances – in 1991 and in 2003 – humanitarian issues had a secondary significance. The humanitarian aspect was supposed merely to strengthen the legitimacy of the intervention, rather than being its primary driving force. It was also important that the UNSC in its successive resolutions, e.g. 688 (1991), recognised the issue of infringements of human rights but decided against granting authorisation to employ even limited military measures; this, however, did not prevent Western states from imposing no-­fly zones in order to protect, inter alia, the Kurdish population. During the intervention in Bosnia-­Herzegovina in turn the need to ensure humanitarian aid and the protection of the civilian population was the primary concern and Operation Deliberate Force itself played a pivotal role for the development of the humanitarian intervention concept.87 First of all, the Bosnia-­Herzegovina intervention confirmed that it is possible to treat infringements of human rights as a threat to the peace and security.88 As a consequence, human rights were finally no longer treated as an internal matter of a state with which other states and organisations should not interfere in accordance with Article 2 (7) UNC. Even China, despite some initial hesitation, finally voted in

Impact on evolution of law on use of force   197 favour of resolution 836, which served as a primary basis for the use of force for humanitarian reasons by NATO forces. By this the Council confirmed that military measures being at its disposal in accordance with Chapter VII can be used in order to protect the population.89 Second, it was the first NATO intervention outside the territory of its member states and it was for humanitarian reasons which was indicative of a new role the Alliance and Western states could play. Third, this intervention sparked discussions on the existence of a further exception to the prohibition of the use of force, namely intervention in the event of infringements of human rights.90 Without Bosnia, there certainly would have been no operation in Kosovo, at least not in such a short period of time.91 It should then come as no surprise that despite earlier condemnation of unilateral (unauthorised by the Council) interventions on humanitarian grounds, Western states concluded that their intervention in Kosovo was not only morally, but also legally justified. The legitimacy was to follow directly from the UNC which, after all, lists promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all as one of the objectives of the organisation.92 Furthermore, the prohibition of the use of force set out in Article 2(4) was to pertain only to aggressive action, conducted in order to occupy a territory, not to the event of implementing human rights (i.e. motivation was to be the most important factor).93 The problem, however, is that military intervention is always connected with an infringement of territorial integrity.94 The legality of the operation was also to stem from the fact that in the face of infringements of human rights and the exhaustion of other means of reaction, there was no other option but to intervene using force, since the UNSC in its earlier resolutions had recognised that there was a threat to the peace95 – however, as already mentioned, a determination that there is a threat to the peace does not automatically mean an authorisation for the use of force. Such authorisation was also to stem from customary law built on the experiences of both conducted and non-­conducted (as in the case of Rwanda in 1994) operations.96 The support of Secretary General Kofi Annan for the notion of humanitarian intervention was not immaterial either.97 Western states, however, must have realised that there was no established opinio iuris relating to the existence of the right to humanitarian intervention, since if there was, they could have sought a relevant resolution by the General Assembly (GA) in accordance with the Uniting for Peace procedure – which the West itself created and which provides for the possibility of recommending the use of forceful measures by the UNGA.98 The reasons why this option was not employed are obvious – no guarantee that the draft resolution would garner the required two-­ thirds majority, in which event Western states would have found it difficult to justify their operation.99 What is also characteristic is how it was argued that some interventions may not be lawful, but certainly are legitimate.100 However, the purpose or rather result of this distinction was to muddy the waters in relation to the applicable legal norms.101 In the case of the Kosovo intervention, even assuming that humanitarian interventions are permissible, it is however not obvious whether the prerequisites

198   Patrycja Grzebyk usually identified in the literature as mandatory for the justification of such action were actually fulfilled.102 This is because doubts were raised as to the existence of mass atrocities before the intervention and the fact that the intervention itself contributed to a humanitarian catastrophe.103 Additionally, there were questions whether NATO in its activities really observed the principle of proportionality, as well as the issue whether the operation was in fact necessary to prevent further infringements. Nevertheless, the intervention in Kosovo (as well as the later one in Libya, this one conducted with the Council’s authorisation) proved that sovereignty is not a shield protecting a state in the event of breaching of human rights, at least in some (selective) cases.104 The possibility of treating the Kosovo intervention as a precedent105 did however encourage Western states to approach the matter of humanitarian intervention more narrowly, as was evident in the works on the so-­called responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine. The idea of R2P appeared in a report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).106 The ‘Responsibility to protect’ report initiated works on R2P principles within the United Nations.107 The result was that after Kosovo, the concept of humanitarian intervention did not disappear but was rather absorbed by the military dimension of R2P.108 The caveat was that documents adopted by the UN emphasised that even in the case of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide or ethnic cleansing, it is still necessary to observe the limitations to the right to use force, i.e. force may be used only in self-­defence or under authority from the UNSC. As a consequence, responsibility to protect did not obtain the status of a legal norm constituting a further exception from the prohibition of the use of force enshrined in the UNC, but rather a guideline, or at most – a doctrine, to be implemented by UN bodies (particularly the UNSC) in their activities. Actually, R2P did not grant new powers to the UNSC, but rather by underlining that it is the Council that may take decisions on the use of force in the event of infringements of human rights, ruled out the possibility of unilateral intervention by any state under humanitarian pretexts.109 It is worth noting that until 2011, the idea of R2P did not provoke major controversies among states,110 but the intervention of Western states in Libya very nearly killed R2P (at least its military dimension).111 As already mentioned, the Libyan intervention was undertaken on the basis of a UNSC resolution and initially treated as a primary example of the realisation, or even triumph, of the responsibility to protect doctrine.112 It was emphasised that finally the Council managed to fairly swiftly take the decision on the use of force to protect the civilian population and provided a set of instruments sufficiently strong to fulfil this mandate.113 In the case of Libya, however, while there was indeed authorisation by the Council for the use of force, the problem was the manner of implementing the military intervention which indicated that from a certain point onwards, its primary objective was not the protection of civilians, but rather regime change.114 This was evidenced chiefly by the investment of France and the UK in training, organising and arming the opposition. Not only the objective of the operation was called into question, but also the fulfilment of other prerequisites for intervention in accordance with the

Impact on evolution of law on use of force   199 R2P principles. It was not clear whether the R2P idea might be invoked whereas the Council in its resolution 1973 mentions only the possibility of committing crimes against humanity and such crimes had not yet taken place – it should be recalled here that the idea was that military intervention was the ultimate means of reaction, not prevention. The response to the threat was criticised as disproportionate, considering the length and scale of the operation. And finally, the legitimacy of the operation was undermined by its final result which comprised the destabilisation of the region, proliferation of arms and a massive wave of refugees. The 2011 intervention in Libya also provokes the question whether Western states after 1989 did not in fact promote the idea of humanitarian intervention, but rather a pro-­democratic intervention, i.e. one which leads to the creation of a democratic regime, respecting the rule of law, including human rights. Such interventions were undertaken by Western states, often without prior authorisation by the UNSC,116 and certainly such was the nature of the interventions in Afghanistan in 2001, in Iraq in 2003 and in Libya in 2011, described in this volume.117 States, emphasising the right of the population to regime change, attempted to support such populations where there was an actual chance of introducing democratic governance.118 115

9.4  Conclusions: the unbearable lightness of changing the unchangeable In the case of a majority of interventions by Western states, accusations of aggression were made (in particular in relation to the 2003 intervention in Iraq).119 This is quite normal, after all, the country targeted with intervention and countries supporting it would use legal arguments to undermine the position of the intervening party (lawfare) and for this very aim the definition of aggression was created.120 Nevertheless, rejecting the rhetoric to which some states resorted during the discussions over a given situation in the UNSC, one cannot fail to observe that Western states on many occasions overinterpreted or breached outright the rules on the use of force or attempted to set up new boundaries of customary law relating to its use by infringing the erstwhile ones (making by breaking). In the case of the use of force this would, however, involve a change of ius cogens121 which can only be achieved by adoption of a norm of the same nature. This gives rise to the dilemma: when is a breach of the law merely tolerated which does not mean recognition of a new legal norm122 and when does it constitute a precedent giving rise to a new norm whose absolute effect is not contested by states? The interventions by Western states and the accompanying argumentation certainly contributed to lowering the authority of the UNSC whose role was a priori disregarded in national defence strategies, adopted, for example, by the US. The practice of Western interventions promoted a dangerous interpretation according to which states may undertake unilateral action if the UNSC examined a given situation in the past. Furthermore, Western states contributed to the extension of the right to self-­defence – in contravention of the literal text of the

200   Patrycja Grzebyk UNC – not only to cover responses to attacks carried out by non-­state actors, but preventive action as well. The West created precedents in the form of interventions, then termed as ‘humanitarian’, but undertaken without authorisation by UNSC, and in those to which it was actually authorised (e.g. Libya) it conducted overstepping the mandate, forcing a regime change to a democratic one. The Western intervention in Libya all but destroyed the R2P idea and nowadays it falls to states such as China or Brazil to provide a reminder of the principles enshrined in the UNC. It is characteristic, though, that even in cases which are commonly recognised as breaches of international law, such as the 2003 operation in Iraq, the intervening states would invoke the United Nations Charter as the principal document regulating the use of force, as well as individual resolutions of the UNSC. Nevertheless, by exploiting vague terms, the lack of judicial review of UNSC decisions and the possibility of blocking unfavourable resolutions, Western states demonstrated how flexible the rules on the use of force really are and how easy it is to circumvent them in practice.123 Western states, in particular the US, seem to be convinced of their unique role124 but they forget that the rules on the use of force that they have thrown off balance will be (and already are being) exploited by other states. This way we are slowly regressing to a state of lawlessness where the bigger and stronger may do more. It is irrelevant how good the intentions of Western states were, they had already paved their road to hell with them.

Notes 1 See G.H.W. Bush, Address before a Joint Session of Congress, Washington, DC, 6 March 1991 (2 pt1 Department of State Dispatch 161): Now, we can see a new world coming into view, a world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a world order in which the principles of justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong.    2 S/RES/660 and S/RES/661 (1990).    3 Article 1 (1) of the United Nations Charter (UNC), 1 UNTS XVI.    4 As an example, in 1989 the US did not even seek to obtain UNSC approval for their intervention in the Philippines or in Panama, see J. Quigley, The United States and the United Nations in the Persian Gulf War: New order or disorder? (1992) 25 Cornell International Law Journal 44.    5 Article 2 (4) UNC.    6 Article 42 UNC.    7 Articles 23 and 27 UNC.    8 J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace (6th edition; ed. Sir H. Waldock, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1963) 416–417.    9 Article 24 UNC.   10 S.L. Silliman, The Iraqi quagmire: Enforcing the no-­fly zones (2001–2002) 36 New England Law Review 767–773.   11 Quigley (1992) 3–4.   12 Article 27 UNC requires that in all non-­procedural matters a majority of at least nine approving votes, including all permanent members, is required for a decision.

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However, instances of abstaining by permanent members of the UNSC had taken place nearly from its very inception, starting with S/RES/4 (1946) and did not affect the validity of the resolution. See R. Wedgwood, Unilateral action in the UN system (2000) 11 European Journal of International Law 354. It must be stressed though that none of the permanent members questioned the legality of adoption of the Iraqi resolution. The situation was similar with S/RES/1973 (2011) authorising the use of force in Libya when Russia and China abstained, along with three non-­permanent members – Germany, India and Brazil. Article 39 UNC. Articles 40–42 UNC. The rule of employing measures available to the UNSC in sequence is not absolute, since according to Article 42 UNC the Council may resort to military measures should it ‘consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate’. Article 43 UNC. The legal basis for such a solution can be found in Articles 48–49 or 106 UNC. ICJ, Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter) 20 July 1962, 167: ‘It cannot be said that the Charter has left the UNSC impotent in the face of an emergency situation when agreements under Article 43 have not been concluded’. I. Johnstone, When the Security Council is divided: Imprecise authorisations, implied mandates, and the ‘unreasonable veto’, in: M. Weller (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015) 233; Quigley (1992) 24. Articles 42 and 47 UNC. See also A.A. Majid, Is the Security Council working? Desert Storm critically examined (1992) 4 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 987; G.S. Swan, Presidential undeclared warmaking and functionalist theory: Dellums v. Bush and operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (1991) 1 California Western International Law Journal 95. N. Blokker, Outsourcing the use of force: Towards more Security Council control of authorised operations?, in: M. Weller (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015) 205–206, 218. Majid (1992) 986. Quigley (1992) 27. Compare with S/RES/1973 (2011), para. 10 which provided for an obligation of tight cooperation with the Secretary General. R.C. Hendrickson, NATO’s Secretary General and the use of force: Willy Claes and the air strikes in Bosnia (2004) 31 Armed Forces and Society 100; M.P. Roch, Military intervention in Bosnia-­Hercegovina: Will world politics prevail over the rule of international law? (1996) 24 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 481. See in particular S/RES/743 (1992), S/RES/749 (1992), S/RES/758 (1992), S/RES/761 (1992), S/RES/770 (1992), S/RES/776 (1992), S/RES/781 (1992), S/RES/786 (1992), S/RES/787 (1992), S/RES/816 (1993), S/RES/819 (1993), S/RES/824 (1993), S/RES/836 (1993), S/RES/844 (1993), S/RES/900 (1994), S/RES/913 (1994). Roch (1996) 471. C. Aoi, Legitimacy and the Use of Armed Forces: Stability Missions in the Post-­ Cold War Era (Routledge, London 2011) 55. P.C. Forage, Bombs for peace: A comparative study of the use of air power in the Balkans (2002) 28 Armed Forces and Society 214. A/47/277, 17 June 1992 (in particular para. 44). Quigley (1992) 8ff. Swan (1991) 95; Blokker (2015) 215. J.H. Westra, International Law and the Use of Armed Force: The UN Charter and the Major Powers (Routledge, London 2007) 112; Silliman (2001–2002) 771.

202   Patrycja Grzebyk   33 Quigley (1992) 12ff.   34 Y. Razali Kassim, The Geopolitics of Intervention: Asia and the Responsibility to Protect (Springer, Cham 2014) 5ff; N. Ronzitti, NATO’S intervention in Libya: A genuine action to protect a civilian population in mortal danger or an intervention aimed at regime change? (2011) 21 Italian Yearbook of International Law 14.   35 O. Corten, V. Koutroulisy, The illegality of military support to rebels in the Libyan war: Aspects of jus contra bellum and jus in bello (2013) 18 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 59.   36 Ronzitti (2011) 10ff.   37 H. Neuhold, Collective security after ‘Operation Allied Force’ (2000) 73 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 92ff; A.J. Bellamy, International law and the war with Iraq (2003) 4 Melbourne Journal of International Law 506.   38 See the Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2003/351, 21 March 2003, as well as Tony Blair’s speech to Parliament on 18 March 2003, www.publi cations.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo030318/debtext/30318–06.htm (accessed 10 May 2018). See also: Debate: Adjudicating Operation Iraqi Freedom (29 March–1 April 2006), 100 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 180 (R. Wedgwood intervention); Johnstone (2015) 240; Bellamy (2003) 499; Westra (2007) 144.   39 E. Papastavridis, Interpretation of Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII in the aftermath of the Iraqi crisis (2007) 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 112; O. Corten, Opération Iraqi Freedom: peut-­on admettre l’argument de l’autorisation implicite du Conseil de Securité? (2003) 36 Revue Belge de Droit International 224ff.   40 Papastavridis (2007) 86.   41 Majid (1992) 988; T. Hostovsky-­Brandes, A. Zemach, Controlling the execution of a Security Council mandate to use force: Does the Council need a lawyer? (2013) 36 Fordham International Law Journal 666.   42 S/RES/2016 (2011).   43 Institut de Droit International in its resolution on the Authorization of the Use of Force by the United Nations of 9 September 2011 stressed that the UNSC should determine the objective, scope but also the methods of controlling any measures undertaken on the basis of the authorisation, which in turn should be interpreted and implemented strictly. See www.idi-­iil.org/app/uploads/2017/06/2011_rhodes_10_D_en.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018).   44 Hostovsky-­Brandes, Zemach (2013) 679ff.   45 Westra (2007) 131ff.   46 C. Schreuer, Is there a legal basis for the NATO intervention in Kosovo? (1999) 1 International Law Forum du droit international 151; Corten (2003) 212.   47 It was not without reason that the earlier example of genocide in Rwanda and a lack of swift reaction by the UN was invoked. In the case of Kosovo it was also important that the military protection of the populace had the support of the Secretary General. See Secretary’s General Annual Report to the General Assembly, Press Release SG/SM7136, GA/9596, 20 September 1999.   48 G. Corn, D. Gyllensporre, International legality, the use of military force, and burdens of persuasion: Self-­defense, the initiation of hostilities, and the impact of the choice between two evils on the perception of international legitimacy (2010) 30 Peace Law Review 497ff.   49 Bellamy (2003) 510–511.   50 C. Gray, The US national security strategy and the new ‘Bush Doctrine’ on preemptive self-­defense (2002) 1 Chinese Journal of International Law 444.   51 Neuhold (2000) 100.   52 Johnstone (2015) 232.

Impact on evolution of law on use of force   203   53 S/RES/1132 (1997) and S/PRST/1998/5 (1998).   54 S/RES/1483 (2003).   55 See Article 41 of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001 (annex to the A/RES/56/83, 2001) and Article 42 of the Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations, 2011 (annex to A/RES/66/100, 2011).   56 J. Kranz, Między wojną a pokojem: świat współczesny wobec użycia siły zbrojnej, in: J. Kranz (ed.), Świat współczesny wobec użycia siły zbrojnej. Dylematy prawa i polityki (EuroPrawo, Warszawa 2009) 129. Compare with S. Preiser, ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ and the UN Charter: The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent military response (2004) 8 International Peacekeeping 223–225.   57 See Letter of the Permanent Representative of the United States to the President of the UNSC or the invocation by NATO of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty which pertains to self-­defence. More information on the reactions of international organisations to the 9/11 attacks: G.K. Walker, The lawfulness of Operation Enduring Freedom’s self-­defense responses (2002–2003) 37 Valparaiso University Law Review 499.   58 See, for example, A/RES/3314 (1974) and also Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 90. Article 8 bis was adopted by the Assembly of States Parties resolution no. RC/Res.6 of 11 June 2010. See also P. Grzebyk, Criminal Responsibility for the Crime of Aggression (Routledge, London 2013) 117ff.   59 See, for example, ICJ, Judgment in case on Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 27 June 1986, para. 195; ICJ, Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 2004, para. 139; ICJ, Judgment in case of Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 19 December 2005, para. 106ff. More: M. Kowalski, Armed attack, non­state actors and a quest for the attribution standard (2010) 30 Polish Yearbook of International Law 101.   60 L. Mills, Bereft of life? The Charter prohibition on the use of force, non-­state actors and the place of the International Court of Justice (2011) 9 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 48.   61 S/RES/405 and S/RES/419 (1977).   62 Kranz (2009) 131.   63 See R.L. Van Steenberghe, Self-­defence in response to attacks by non-­state actors in the light of recent state practice: A step forward? (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 183–184, 206ff. (Inter alia the following operations were mentioned there: Israel’s 2006 attack against Hezbollah on the territory of Lebanon, Turkey’s 2008 operation against the PKK on the territory of Iraq and Israel’s operation in 2008/2009 in Gaza). It is also telling that the African Union Non-­Aggression and Common Defence Pact (2005) provides that not only sending but also supporting armed groups constitutes an act of aggression (Article 1).   64 R. Sifris, Operation Iraqi Freedom: United States v Iraq: The legality of the war (2003) 4 Melbourne Journal of International Law 537–538.   65 T. Stein, Preemption and terrorism (2005) 9 International Peacekeeping 161.   66 ICJ, Military…, paras 115–116.   67 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, IT-­94–1-A, 15 July 1999, para. 137.   68 R.T. Williams, Dangerous precedent: America’s illegal war in Afghanistan (2011–2012) 33 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 570ff. Compare with B.A. Feinstein, Operation Enduring Freedom: Legal dimensions of an infinitely just operation (2001–2002) 11 Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 216.   69 See Articles 8 and 11 of the Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2011). See also F. Mégret, ‘War’? Legal semantics and the move to  violence (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 383; A. Cassese,

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­ errorism is also disrupting some crucial legal categories of international law (2002) T 12 European Journal of International Law 993. See, for example, SC/7143 or S/2001/946 (2001). Sifris (2003) 534; D. Jinks, State responsibility for the acts of private armed groups (2003) 4 Chicago Journal of International Law 88; W.K. Lietzau, Old laws, new wars: Jus ad bellum in an age of terrorism (2004) 8 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 414. Article 50 of the Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2011). J. Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and Use of Force by States (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004) 145; Preiser (2004) 238ff. C.M.S. Holcomb, Operation Enduring Freedom: The use of force in self-­defense against Al Qaida and the Taliban (2001) 40 Military Law and Law War Review 119. N. Ronzitti, The expanding law of self-­defence (2006) 11 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 352. The so-­called Bush doctrine was expressed in the National Security Strategy of 17 September 2002. See more in Gray (2002) 439ff.; C. Henderson, The Bush Doctrine: From theory to practice (2004) 9 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 3; Lietzau (2004) 402. A/59/565, paras 188–192. Ronzitti (2006) 347. SC/7658 of 5 February 2003. It is telling that on 20 January 2003 (a mere couple of weeks before Colin Powell’s speech at the meeting of the UNSC on 5 February 2003 during which he gave the ‘Iraq: Failing to Disarm’ presentation), the Council adopted resolution 1456 which paid particular attention to the threat posed by the use of weapon of mass destruction by terrorists. C. Gray, The Bush Doctrine revisited: The 2006 National Security Strategy of the USA (2006) 5 Chinese Journal of International Law 563. C. Pierson, Preemptive self-­defense in an age of weapons of mass destruction: Operation Iraqi Freedom (2004) 33 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 161; J. Nyamuya Maogoto, Rushing to break the law? The ‘Bush Doctrine’ of pre-­ emptive strikes and the UN Charter on the use of force (2003) 7 University of Western Sydney Law Review 1–2. M. Skopets, Battered nation syndrome: Relaxing the imminence requirement of self-­ defense in international law (2006) 55 American University Law Review 761. S/RES/487 (1981). Sifris (2003) 531; Gray (2006) 561. M.E. O’Connell, Lawful self-­defense to terrorism (2001–2002) 63 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 889. Condoleezza Rice stressed that US ‘has long affirmed the right to anticipatory self-­ defence – from the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 to the crisis on the Korean Peninsula in 1994’, Condoleezza Rice Discusses President’s National Security Strategy, Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York, 1 October 2002, http://georgewbush-­whitehouse. archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021001–6.html (accessed 10 May 2018). See also J. Dearsley, The use of force in international law: A case study – the invasion of Iraq, 2003 (2004) 10 Canterbury Law Review 139ff. It is telling that President Barack Obama did not fully reject the Bush Doctrine, see C. Gray, President Obama’s 2010 United States National Security Strategy and international law on the use of force (2011) 10 Chinese Journal of International Law 35. Hendrickson (2004) 95. See S/RES/713 (1991), S/RES/743 (1992) or S/RES/815 (1993). As other examples of recognising infringements of human rights as a threat to the peace see e.g. S/ RES/688 (1991) – Iraq; S/RES/733 and S/RES/794 (1992) – Somalia; S/RES/940 (1994) – Haiti; S/RES/918 (1994), S/RES/929 and S/RES/955 (1994) – Rwanda.

Impact on evolution of law on use of force   205   89 Aoi (2011) 54.   90 Roch (1996) 477; A. Pellet, Brief remarks on the unilateral use of force (2011) 11 European Journal of International Law 385–386.   91 See W. Clinton, Address to the Nation on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 24 March 1999, www. presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57305 (accessed 10 May 2018) in which he stated: We learned some of the same lessons in Bosnia just a few years ago. The world did not act early enough to stop that war, either. And let’s not forget what happened: innocent people herded into concentration camps, children gunned down by snipers on their way to school, soccer fields and parks turned into cemeteries, a quarter of a million people killed, not because of anything they have done but because of who they were. Two million Bosnians became refugees. This was genocide in the heart of Europe, not in 1945 but in 1995; not in some grainy newsreel from our parents’ and grandparents’ time but in our own time, testing our humanity and our resolve.   92 Article 1(3) UNC. See also N.J. Wheeler, Reflections on the legality and legitimacy of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo (2000) 4 The International Journal of Human Rights 148.   93 B. Simma, NATO, the UN and the use of force: Legal aspects (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 1ff.   94 J.I. Charney, Anticipatory humanitarian intervention in Kosovo (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 834–835.   95 See the Statement of the Permanent Representative of the UK to the UN on 24 March 1999: The action being taken is legal. It is justified as an exceptional measure to prevent an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe. […] Every means short of force has been tried to avert this situation. In these circumstances, and as an exceptional measure on grounds of overwhelming humanitarian necessity, military intervention is legally justifiable. The force now proposed is directed exclusively to averting a humanitarian catastrophe, and is the minimum judged necessary for that purpose. (SC/6657)   96 K.W. Alexander, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo: The legal case for violating Yugoslavia’s national sovereignty in the absence of Security Council approval (2000) 22 Houston Journal of International Law 417ff.; F. Harhoff, Unauthorised humanitarian interventions: Armed violence in the name of humanity? (2001) 70 Nordic Journal of International Law 84ff.   97 K.J. Kille, R.C. Hendrickson, Secretary-­General leadership across the United Nations and NATO: Kofi Annan, Javier Solana, and Operation Allied Force (2010) 16 Global Governance 505ff.   98 See also A/RES/377(V) (1950). See also A.J. Carswell, Unblocking the UN Security Council: The uniting for peace resolution (2013) 18 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 453.   99 See: Corten (2003) 237ff.; A. Orakhelashvili, Changing ius cogens through state practice? The case of the prohibition of the use of force and its exceptions, in: M. Weller (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015) 174; N.D. White, The relationship between the UN Security Council and General Assembly in matters of international peace and security, in: M. Weller (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015) 309ff. 100 Kranz (2009) 141. 101 See also T. Iwanek, The 2003 invasion of Iraq: How the system failed (2010) 15 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 89–90.

206   Patrycja Grzebyk 102 Harhoff (2001) 109ff. 103 J. Reed Struble, R.A.C. Alton, The legacy of Operation Allied Force: A reflection on its legality under United States and international law (2012) 20 Michigan State International Law Review 315ff. 104 T. Dingott Alkopher, Fighting for Rights: From Holy Wars to Humanitarian Interventions (Ashgate, Farnham 2013) 128; C. Powell, Libya: A multilateral constitutional moment? (2012) 106 American Journal of International Law 300. 105 J. Currie, NATO’s humanitarian intervention in Kosovo: Making or breaking international law? (1998) 36 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 305; W.G. Sharp, SR, Operation Allied Force: Reviewing the lawfulness of NATO’s use of military force to defend Kosovo (1999) 23 Maryland Journal of International Law and Trade 314; Alexander (2000) 406. 106 ICISS, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: The Responsibility to Protect (ICISS, Ottawa 2001). 107 A/59/565, para. 203; A/59/2005, 21 March 2005, para. 7, 132, 135; A/60/1, paras 138–139. 108 F.A. Holst, M.D. Fink, A legal view on NATO’s campaign in Libya, in: K. Engelbrekt, M. Mohlin, C. Wagnsson (eds), The NATO Intervention in Libya: Lessons Learned from the Campaign (Routledge, London 2014) 68. 109 D. Berman, C. Michaelsen, Intervention in Libya: Another nail in the coffin for the Responsibility-­to-Protect? (2012) 14 International Community Law Review 345. 110 R. Thakur, Reconfiguring the UN system of collective security, in: M. Weller (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015) 196. 111 Berman, Michaelsen (2012) 337ff. 112 Ibid., 350; Thakur (2015) 195. 113 P.R. Williams, C. (Betsy) Popkent, Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya: A moment of legal and moral clarity (2011) 44 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 227ff. 114 J.H. Michaels, Able but not willing, in: K. Engelbrekt, M. Mohlin, C. Wagnsson (eds), The NATO Intervention in Libya: Lessons learned from the Campaign (Routledge, London 2014) 17 (the author does however stress the lack of premeditation); Blokker (2015) 204. 115 R.A.C. Alton, J. Reed Struble, The constitutionality and advancement of international humanitarian ideals in Libya by NATO and United States’ Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector (2014) 23 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 22ff. 116 Examples of such interventions include operations in Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989 and Haiti in 1994. See more: S. van den Driest, Pro-­democratic intervention and the right to political self-­determination: The case of Operation Iraqi Freedom (2010) 57 Netherlands International Law Review 39ff. (the author emphasises that the idea of pro-­democratic intervention – including therapeutic occupation – was incorporated into the American defence strategy of 2002 as part of the nation building concept). 117 See also Corten (2003) 207. 118 M. Payandeh, The United Nations, military intervention, and regime change in Libya (2012) 52 Virginia Journal of International Law 388; see also para. 2 of S/RES/1973 (2011). 119 See, for example, Quigley (1992) 47. 120 See: C.S Bartman, Lawfare: Use of the Definition of Aggressive War by the Soviet and Russian Federation Governments (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle 2010) passim. 121 More in Orakhelashvili (2015) 165ff.; Iwanek (2010) 92. 122 PCIJ, Advisory Opinion on Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube, 8 December 1927, 14 PCIJ Advisory Opinion (Ser. B) 36–37.

Impact on evolution of law on use of force   207 123 It is worth recalling the words of Madeleine Albright (US Secretary of State in 1999) to Robin Cook (UK Foreign Secretary) when he expressed his concerns over the legality of the Kosovo intervention. Albright dismissed his objections with a curt: ‘Get yourself some new lawyers’ – K. Annan, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace (Penguin, New York 2012) 94. 124 M.E. O’Connell, American exceptionalism and the international law of self-­defense (2002–2003) 31 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 43ff.

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208   Patrycja Grzebyk Corten O., Opération Iraqi Freedom: peut-­on admettre l’argument de l’autorisation implicite du Conseil de Securité? (2003) 36 Revue Belge de Droit International 205–247. Corten O., Koutroulisy V., The illegality of military support to rebels in the Libyan war: Aspects of jus contra bellum and jus in bello (2013) 18 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 59–93. Currie J., NATO’s humanitarian intervention in Kosovo: Making or breaking international law? (1998) 36 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 303–333. Dearsley J., The use of force in international law. A case study: The invasion of Iraq, 2003 (2004) 10 Canterbury Law Review 121–151. Debate: Adjudicating Operation Iraqi Freedom (29 March–1 April, 2006) 100 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 179–202. Dingott Alkopher T., Fighting for Rights: From Holy Wars to Humanitarian Interventions (Ashgate, Farnham 2013). Feinstein B.A., Operation Enduring Freedom: Legal dimensions of an infinitely just operation (2001–2002) 11 Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 201–295. Forage P.C., Bombs for peace: A comparative study of the use of air power in the Balkans (2002) 28 Armed Forces and Society 211–232. Gardam J., Necessity, Proportionality and Use of Force by States (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004). Gray C., The US national security strategy and the new ‘Bush Doctrine’ on preemptive self-­defense (2002) 1 Chinese Journal of International Law 437–448. Gray C., The Bush Doctrine revisited: The 2006 National Security Strategy of the USA (2006) 5 Chinese Journal of International Law 555–578. Gray C., President Obama’s 2010 United States National Security Strategy and international law on the use of force (2011) 10 Chinese Journal of International Law 35–53. Grzebyk P., Criminal Responsibility for the Crime of Aggression (Routledge, London 2013). Harhoff F., Unauthorised humanitarian interventions – armed violence in the name of humanity? (2001) 70 Nordic Journal of International Law 65–119. Henderson C., The Bush Doctrine: From theory to practice (2004) 9 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 3–24. Hendrickson R.C., NATO’s Secretary General and the use of force: Willy Claes and the air strikes in Bosnia (2004) 31 Armed Forces and Society 95–117. Holcomb C.M.S., Operation Enduring Freedom: The use of force in self-­defense against Al Qaida and the Taliban (2001) 40 Military Law and Law War Review 115–146. Holst F.A., Fink M.D., A legal view on NATO’s campaign in Libya, in: K. Engelbrekt, M. Mohlin, C. Wagnsson (eds), The NATO Intervention in Libya: Lessons Learned from the Campaign (Routledge, London 2014) 63–100. Hostovsky-­Brandes T., Zemach A., Controlling the execution of a Security Council mandate to use force: Does the Council need a lawyer? (2013) 36 Fordham International Law Journal 657–705. ICISS (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty), Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: The Responsibility to Protect (ICISS, Ottawa 2001). ICJ (International Court of Justice), Advisory opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), 20 July 1962. ICJ (International Court of Justice), Judgment in case on Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 27 June 1986.

Impact on evolution of law on use of force   209 ICJ (International Court of Justice), Advisory opinion on Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 2004. ICJ (International Court of Justice), Judgment in case on Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 19 December 2005. ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia), Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, IT-­94–1-A, 15 July 1999. Institut de Droit International, Resolution on Authorization of the Use of Force by the United Nations, 9 September 2011. Iwanek T., The 2003 invasion of Iraq: How the system failed (2010) 15 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 89–116. Jinks D., State responsibility for the acts of private armed groups (2003) 4 Chicago Journal of International Law 83–95. Johnstone I., When the Security Council is divided: Imprecise authorisations, implied mandates, and the ‘unreasonable veto’, in: M. Weller (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015) 227–250. Kille K.J., Hendrickson R.C., Secretary-­General leadership across the United Nations and NATO: Kofi Annan, Javier Solana, and Operation Allied Force (2010) 16 Global Governance 505–523. Kowalski M., Armed attack, non-­state actors and a quest for the attribution standard (2010) 30 Polish Yearbook of International Law 101–130. Kranz J., Między wojną a pokojem: świat współczesny wobec użycia siły zbrojnej, in: J. Kranz (ed.), Świat współczesny wobec użycia siły zbrojnej. Dylematy prawa i polityki (EuroPrawo, Warszawa 2009) 81–242. Lietzau W.K., Old laws, new wars: Jus ad bellum in an age of terrorism (2004) 8 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 383–455. Majid A.A., Is the Security Council working? Desert Storm critically examined (1992) 4 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 984–990. Mégret F., ‘War’? Legal semantics and the move to violence (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 361–399. Michaels J.H., Able but not willing, in: K. Engelbrekt, M. Mohlin, C. Wagnsson (eds), The NATO Intervention in Libya: Lessons Learned from the Campaign (Routledge, London 2014) 17–40. Mills L., Bereft of life? The Charter prohibition on the use of force, non-­state actors and the place of the International Court of Justice (2011) 9 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 35–68. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 17 September 2002. Neuhold H., Collective security after ‘Operation Allied Force’ (2000) 73 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 73–106. Nyamuya Maogoto J., Rushing to break the law? The ‘Bush Doctrine’ of pre-­emptive strikes and the UN Charter on the use of force (2003) 7 University of Western Sydney Law Review 1–34. O’Connell M.E., Lawful self-­defense to terrorism (2001–2002) 63 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 889–908. O’Connell M.E., American exceptionalism and the international law of self-­defense (2002–2003) 31 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 43–57. Orakhelashvili A., Changing ius cogens through state practice? The case of the prohibition of the use of force and its exceptions, in: M. Weller (ed.), The Oxford Handbook

210   Patrycja Grzebyk of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015) 157–178. Papastavridis E., Interpretation of Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII in the aftermath of the Iraqi crisis (2007) 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 83–118. Payandeh M., The United Nations, military intervention, and regime change in Libya (2012) 52 Virginia Journal of International Law 355–403. PCIJ (Permanent Court of International Justice), Advisory Opinion on Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube, 8 December 1927. Pellet A., Brief remarks on the unilateral use of force (2011) 11 European Journal of International Law 385–392. Pierson C., Preemptive self-­defense in an age of weapons of mass destruction: Operation Iraqi Freedom (2004) 33 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 150–178. Powell C., Libya: A multilateral constitutional moment? (2012) 106 American Journal of International Law 298–316. Preiser S., ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ and the UN Charter: The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent military response (2004) 8 International Peacekeeping 213–240. Quigley J., The United States and the United Nations in the Persian Gulf War: New order or disorder? (1992) 25 Cornell International Law Journal 1–49. Razali Kassim Y., The Geopolitics of Intervention: Asia and the Responsibility to Protect (Springer, Cham 2014). Reed Struble J., Alton R.A.C., The legacy of Operation Allied Force: A reflection on its legality under United States and international law (2012) 20 Michigan State International Law Review 293–326. Roch M.P., Military intervention in Bosnia-­Herzegovina: Will world politics prevail over the rule of international law? (1996) 24 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 461–487. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998). Ronzitti N., The expanding law of self-­defence (2006) 11 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 343–359. Ronzitti N., NATO’S intervention in Libya: A genuine action to protect a civilian population in mortal danger or an intervention aimed at regime change? (2011) 21 Italian Yearbook of International Law 3–21. Schreuer C., Is there a legal basis for the NATO intervention in Kosovo? (1999) 1 International Law Forum du droit international 151–154. Secretary General’s Annual Report to the General Assembly, Press Release SG/SM7136, GA/9596, 20 September 1999. Sharp W.G. Sr., Operation Allied Force: Reviewing the lawfulness of NATO’s use of military force to defend Kosovo (1999) 23 Maryland Journal of International Law and Trade 295–329. Sifris R., Operation Iraqi Freedom: United States v Iraq – the legality of the war (2003) 4 Melbourne Journal of International Law 521–560. Silliman S.L., The Iraqi quagmire: Enforcing the no-­fly zones (2001–2002) 36 New England Law Review 767–773. Simma B., NATO, the UN and the use of force: Legal aspects (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 1–22. Skopets M., Battered nation syndrome: Relaxing the imminence requirement of self-­ defense in international law (2006) 55 American University Law Review 753–783.

Impact on evolution of law on use of force   211 Stein T., Preemption and terrorism (2005) 9 International Peacekeeping 155–171. Swan G.S., Presidential undeclared warmaking and functionalist theory: Dellums v. Bush and operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm (1991) 1 California Western International Law Journal 75–125. Thakur R., Reconfiguring the UN system of collective security, in: M. Weller (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015) 179–201. van den Driest S., Pro-­democratic intervention and the right to political self-­ determination: The case of Operation Iraqi Freedom (2010) 57 Netherlands International Law Review 29–72. Van Steenberghe R.L., Self-­defence in response to attacks by non-­state actors in the light of recent state practice: A step forward? (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 183–208. Walker G.K., The lawfulness of Operation Enduring Freedom’s self-­defense responses (2002–2003) 37 Valparaiso University Law Review 489–540. Wedgwood R., Unilateral action in the UN system (2000) 11 European Journal of International Law 349–359. Westra J.H., International Law and the Use of Armed Force: The UN Charter and the Major Powers (Routledge, London 2007). Wheeler N.J., Reflections on the legality and legitimacy of NATO’s intervention in Kosovo (2000) 4 The International Journal of Human Rights 144–163. White N.D., The relationship between the UN Security Council and General Assembly in matters of international peace and security, in: M. Weller (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015) 293–313. Williams P.R., Popkent C. (Betsy), Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya: A moment of legal and moral clarity (2011) 44 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 225–250. Williams R.T., Dangerous precedent: America’s illegal war in Afghanistan (2011–2012) 33 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 563–613.

UNGA documents A/47/277 (1992) A/59/565 (2004) A/59/2005 (2005) A/RES/377(V) (1950) A/RES/3314 (1974) A/RES/56/83 (2001) A/RES/60/1 (2005) A/RES/66/100 (2011)

UNSC resolutions and documents S/2001/946 (2001) S/2003/351 (2003) S/PRST/1998/5 (1998) S/RES/4 (1946)

212   Patrycja Grzebyk S/RES/405 (1977) S/RES/419 (1977) S/RES/487 (1981) S/RES/660 (1990) S/RES/661 (1990) S/RES/678 (1990) S/RES/688 (1991) S/RES/713 (1991) S/RES/733 (1992) S/RES/743 (1992) S/RES/749 (1992) S/RES/758 (1992) S/RES/761 (1992) S/RES/770 (1992) S/RES/776 (1992) S/RES/781 (1992) S/RES/786 (1992) S/RES/787 (1992) S/RES/794 (1992) S/RES/815 (1993) S/RES/816 (1993) S/RES/819 (1993) S/RES/824 (1993) S/RES/836 (1993) S/RES/844 (1993) S/RES/900 (1994) S/RES/913 (1994) S/RES/918 (1994) S/RES/929 (1994) S/RES/940 (1994) S/RES/955 (1994) S/RES/1132 (1997) S/RES/1199 (1998) S/RES/1203 (1998) S/RES/1244 (1999) S/RES/1368 (2001) S/RES/1373 (2001) S/RES/1441 (2002) S/RES/1483 (2003) S/RES/1456 (2003) S/RES/1973 (2011) S/RES/2016(2011) SC/6657 (1999) SC/7143 (2001) SC/7658 (2003)

10 International humanitarian law in the context of military interventions of the West Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala

Western states had a key influence in the emergence and development of international humanitarian law (IHL) of armed conflicts and they were also the first signatories to the Geneva Conventions (GCs) and Hague Conventions, both before World War II and after its conclusion. They are all parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and all, except the US, ratified the 1977 additional protocols (APs) to them. Any differences arising from this fact as to the scope of treaty obligations were to a large extent moderated by the standards of customary international law. The specific nature of the approach of the greatest military power to international law was the chief reason for a lack of a consistent Western approach to IHL in the period of 1989–2015. This issue only increased after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the beginning of the war in Afghanistan. Terrorism and combating it, or, according to President George W. Bush, the ‘war on terror’, became the greatest challenge for IHL in the examined timeframe. In the US in particular there occurred a change in the interpretation of the provisions and own obligations which contributed to significant changes in the tactics employed. Speaking of a common, Western approach to IHL has, as such, limited utility. A reasonable assessment of the relation of the West to IHL would require an analysis of the practice within the context of individual obligations of all Western states which took part in wars after 1989, as well as of NATO as a Western organisation conducting international missions. Such goals significantly exceed the limitations of the present text. As such, selected problems and trends have been examined, ones apparent in wars of the West after 1989. The greatest attention has been paid to the US which was the chief power involved in all of the operations.

10.1  Civilian losses in wars of the West The West did not wage conflicts whose objective was the elimination of the civilian population, and declared the greatest care was exercised in observing IHL, including attacking only military targets, avoiding unnecessary military and civilian losses, as well as diligence in the planning process.1 All armed conflicts

214   Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala in which the West became involved after 1989 have, however, brought about negative consequences for the civilian population.2 The bombings were the reason for the majority of civilian losses. Civilians were killed not as a result of purposeful and direct attacks, but mainly as a result of errors, faulty equipment, and as collateral damage of fighting. Usually, both sides of the conflict were responsible for civilian casualties. Using civilian locations, such as schools, hospitals or cultural monuments, for military purposes and treating the population as living shields by the enemy, in particular in Iraq and Afghanistan, posed a serious problem the Western powers had to face.3 Unfortunately, Western states did not keep track of civilian losses other than their own citizens. They also never engaged in cooperation for the purpose of determining the number of casualties. Allegations of not responding to requests were made by, among others, the Human Rights Watch organisation4 which counts the casualties of a number of interventions, including the Libyan war, as well as the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War movement which undertook to estimate the number of casualties of the ‘war on terror’ in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.5 Western operations caused the following numbers of casualties: in the first war in Iraq in 1991: 2,500–3,000 civilians;6 in Bosnia-­Herzegovina in 1994 – about 30;7 in Kosovo in 1999 – about 500;8 and in Libya in 2011 – about 60 persons.9 The greatest difficulties in counting the number of civilian casualties occur in the second Iraq war and in Afghanistan. In the former case, data ranges from 100,000 to 180,000 civilians,10 whereas in Afghanistan it is estimated that during the first three months of American airstrikes, 1,000–1,300 civilians lost their lives.11 Up to the end of 2014, the number of casualties is quoted as at least more than 21,000.12 From the perspective of activities of Western forces, the scale of casualties depended inter alia on the length of bombardments, the urbanisation factor of the area, the location of military targets in the vicinity of civilian structures, the assessment of military necessity and a disproportionate use of force. To a greatest extent, however, it was a result of the nature of the weapons employed.

10.2  Weapons employed After 1989, the West started using precision-­guided (‘smart’) munition systems to an ever greater degree. This helped raise the effectiveness of eliminating chosen military targets and, as a consequence, allowed for less civilians to be killed as collateral damage. Precision also served to reduce the total number of attacks since it limited the necessity to repeat failed attacks against the same targets. It was possible to achieve the objectives of the operation and conclude military activities more swiftly, which from the point of view of civilians is a beneficial development.13 The ever wider use of smart missiles was helped by a positive assessment of their functionality in the first Persian Gulf War of 1991, even though at the time

International humanitarian law   215 they constituted a mere 9 per cent of the overall tonnage of weapons.14 Extensive development and technological progress allowed for their ever wider employment. During the Bosnia-­Herzegovina campaign in 1995, 98 per cent of the missiles used by the US were smart missiles, compared to 28 per cent used by other participants (Spain, France, the UK, Italy, the Netherlands). Overall they constituted 69 per cent of all missiles employed.15 Smart weapons saw limited use in Kosovo. In order to minimise own losses, avoiding losses due to anti-­aircraft missiles, the majority of pilots received orders to achieve flight altitudes of over 4,500 metres which, combined with adverse meteorological conditions, negatively affected the precision of strikes and the ability to discern targets. Bombing runs were conducted by day and by night and in the case of many cities and towns continued uninterrupted over 24 hours. Due to a longer than expected timeframe of the aerial operation, the participation of smart missiles in dropped munitions decreased from 90 to 10–20 per cent.16 At the end of the 1990s, more advanced and less expensive weapons systems appeared and could be used more widely. These primarily included Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) and AGM-­154 Joint Standoff Weapons (JSOW). They were employed by the US during the second Persian Gulf War and in Afghanistan. Naturally, the scale of American involvement in these operations dwarfed the previous ones, therefore they also caused many more casualties. The only instance where smart weapons systems were used in 100 per cent of instances was the operation in Libya. The general idea of ‘zero civilian losses’, which was helped by the low urbanisation level of the country and the fact that airstrikes were carried out chiefly at night, contributed to a more humanitarian character of this war. NATO, however, did not shy away from offensive action threatening the civilian population in the form of bombarding inhabited cities which contained Muammar Gaddafi’s forces, such as Sirte or Majer.17 The greatest criticism was directed at the use of cluster munitions which can be launched from the ground or dropped from aircraft. Due to the unreliable nature of cluster munitions, a significant number of submunitions failed to detonate and after landing in fact became anti-­personnel mines.18 Cluster munitions were used in all of the operations with the exception of the interventions in Bosnia-­Herzegovina and Libya. During Operation Desert Storm, coalition forces dropped over 61,000 cluster bombs on Kuwait and Iraq. In 1999, NATO forces employed 1,765 such bombs, containing around 295,000 submunitions, in Serbia and Kosovo. Between 2001 and 2002 in Afghanistan, the US dropped 1,228 bombs containing 248,056 submunitions, whereas in Iraq during the first three weeks of the 2003 operation, US and UK forces dropped 13,000 bombs containing between 1,800,000 and 2,000,000 submunitions.19 After the conclusion of armed operations, coalition forces left behind about 90,000 explosive remnants of war (ERWs), which for a long time posed a threat to civilians, particularly children and minors. By way of an example, between 2003 and 2005 in Iraq, children constituted 73.5 per cent of casualties caused by unexploded munitions, including anti-­personnel mines employed chiefly by the Iraqi side.20

216   Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala

10.3  Qualification of military targets According to Article 52 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, attacks should be limited strictly to military targets, i.e. objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. In general, Western states abided by this rule. Purposeful attacks on the civilian population or locations were relatively rare. An instance where it is hard to find a military justification was the bombing of factories supplying the basic needs of the population of Iraq in 1991: food processing plants, sugar factories, food and seeds warehouses and others.21 In many cases there were doubts as to the qualification of military targets. This dilemma applied also to dual-­purpose objects, which can be used by both the military and civilians: bridges, railways, TV and radio broadcasting stations and others. The military advantage in such cases may be questionable and be in contravention of the principle of proportionality. Widespread destruction of such objects occurred during the first Persian Gulf War. As part of the strategy to restrict the military capabilities of Iraq, coalition forces bombed about 50 bridges, nearly all electricity-­producing facilities, as well as communication routes. Particularly severe consequences for the civilian population were caused by the destruction of electricity lines. A United Nations Commission found that by the end of the war, only two facilities were still functional,22 generating less than 4 per cent of the pre-­war output of 9,000 megawatts.23 Basic services such as water purification plants, hospitals and medical laboratories were dependent on supplies of electrical energy. WHO and UNICEF teams which visited Iraq between 16 and 21 February described the state of access to water and sanitary facilities in Baghdad as depressing.24 The destruction contributed to a massive increase in mortality of persons requiring medical attention and children. It was estimated that the epidemics of cholera, typhoid fever and other food tract illnesses caused by the lack of access to clean water claimed the lives of about 100,000 people.25 The above dilemmas, though on a lesser scale, returned during other interventions, including in Kosovo and Libya. As an example, HRW questioned the identification of militias or military infrastructure in Kosovo, a majority of which were not used against the civilian population, as justified military targets.26 Discussions on dual-­purpose objects increased after NATO forces bombed the radio-­TV station ‘Srbije’ (Radio-­televizija Srbije, RTS) in Belgrade on 23 April 1999, which resulted in 16 people being killed and 16 more wounded. The coalition attempted to prove that the television was spreading racial hatred and war propaganda. Yet, can TV and radio stations make an effective contribution to military action? Did their destruction offer NATO forces a definite military advantage? Doubts were also raised by the bombing of factories, transformer stations and telecommunications centres, important from the point of view of daily lives of the civilian population.27 There were a number of critics, as well as people expressing understanding for the planners of NATO attacks.28

International humanitarian law   217 Significant doubts were also raised by airstrikes carried out against military targets located in densely populated neighbourhoods. Even though in the light of the principle that military targets should not be located near civilian objects, the responsibility for civilian losses rests on both sides of the conflict, Western states were on many occasions accused of breaching the principle of proportionality which often led to excessive civilian losses. In Iraq and Afghanistan the greatest civilian losses were documented in the largest cities. The Iraq Body Count report which contains conclusions on the deaths of over 67,000 civilians in the Iraqi war up to 19 March 2005 indicates that 77 per cent of the civilian casualties from the first two years of the war in Iraq were from the 12 largest cities, with the most casualties coming from Baghdad and Fallujah.29 However, when the target of attacks were terrorist groups, the assessment of the implementation of the discernment and proportionality principles was not as unambiguous. Terrorists usually hid in civilian agglomerations and directed their attacks against them.30 The majority of erroneous attacks, carried out as part of targeting Iraqi officials, constituted a clear breach of the principle of proportionality. Americans attempted to track their targets by intercepting telephone line frequencies of targeted individuals (this method allowed identification of an area with a radius of 100 m), and subsequently conducted airstrikes in civilian inhabited areas. In the search for Saddam Hussein alone, they carried out 50 such operations, none of which turned out to be successful.31 The intervention in Afghanistan was characterised by the evolution of an approach to the methods of combat with the aim of limiting civilian losses. Minutely planned aerial operations against strictly defined military targets resulted in relatively lower civilian losses. On the other hand, airstrikes conducted ‘on call’ in order to support attacked ground forces resulted in sizeable civilian losses (casualties and material damage). They were also conducted in inhabited areas without regard to due care and in breach of the principle of proportionality, e.g. when the presence of a single fighter or a group of them justified attacking an entire village. There were instances when the number of civilian casualties reached several dozen.32 The second source of civilian losses were night raids carried out chiefly by special operations forces carrying a list of persons to be apprehended (Joint Prioritized Effects List, JPEL).33 As a result of criticism, and the pleas of President Hamid Karzai, the US and ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) introduced several changes to the guidelines on military activities, inter alia at the beginning of 2007, in September 2008, December 2008, July 2009 and January 2010. It was decided, for example, to use less ammunition, reschedule attacks when the civilian population was at risk and use the Afghan army more often for searching houses. The selection of targets was widely discussed in connection with the use of unmanned combat aerial vehicles by American forces. In Afghanistan these were first used in 2002 in operations against high-­ranking Taliban, and with time they were employed ever more systematically for a discriminate elimination of enemies on the Pakistani-­Afghan border or in Somalia.34 The employment

218   Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala of unmanned combat aerial vehicles caused concerns relating to the observance of the rule of discernment, safety precautions or causing long-­term, unnecessary suffering.35 It was found, however, that the casualties of the attacks conducted in the described period were mainly random civilians. President George W. Bush authorised 50 attacks using unmanned combat aerial vehicles outside of a battlefield, whereas President Obama – over 450.36 Criticism was directed at the lack of transparency of the decision-­making process and the manner of qualifying targets. Human rights organisations tried for many years to compel the White House to publish both the decision-­making process regarding the use of drones and the numbers of casualties. The first official, albeit partial, data was announced on 2 July 2016. According to US administration reports, as a result of 473 drone operations conducted between January 2009 and December 2015, between 64 and 116 civilians and 2,581 members of armed groups were killed.37 The data published was criticised by experts38 and non-­ governmental organisations as unclear due to a lack of criteria for the identification of casualties, as well as significantly understated.

10.4  The status of prisoners and their treatment Until the start of the intervention in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001, Western states respected the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and were not contesting the status of protected groups. During Operation Desert Storm, captured persons were granted the status of prisoners of war in accordance with the Third Geneva Convention. The majority of POW camps was located on the territory of Saudi Arabia. After the terrorist attacks, American president George W. Bush called the fight against terrorism a ‘war’, at the same time declaring that terrorists do not deserve the protection granted by the Geneva Conventions.39 The American administration stressed that all activities undertaken for combating terrorism are part of a singular global conflict, the ‘war on terror’.40 As such, the question arose, what kind of a conflict is meant here and which legal norms are applicable during its course. The problem was the more complex in that it was hard to clearly determine the sides in this conflict, since while on one side one might indicate the US and its allies, then the other side should encompass Al-­Qaeda and other terrorist groups. In the light of IHL, military operations of Western states could be qualified both as conflicts of an international and non-­ international character. American authorities did not address this dichotomy, maintaining that international law, including the Geneva Conventions, is not applicable to the fight against terrorists. Recognising the detained persons as prisoners of war would make it impossible to prosecute them and, by extension, to conduct an effective fight which required new methods, appropriate to the new threats.41 On 7 February 2002, President G.W. Bush announced that Afghan Taliban would not be recognised as prisoners of war and the Geneva Conventions would not be applied to Al-­Qaeda members. A discussion started on the legal status of

International humanitarian law   219 so-­called ‘unprivileged combatants’ or ‘unlawful combatants’.42 These terms refer to persons who unlawfully participated in armed combat and did not fulfil the conditions for being prisoners of war set out in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention.43 The American decision, made with no regard to legal standards, was met with astonishment and criticism by legal experts and parts of public opinion. In accordance with Article 5 of the Third GC, should any doubt arise as to the status of persons having committed a belligerent act, their Status shall be determined by a competent court. Until that time, such persons shall enjoy the protection applicable to prisoners of war.44 Questions were raised over the motivations and consequences of the new US approach. Remaining under the protection of the Third GC does not preclude the possibility of being charged and sentenced for war crimes or other serious offences. As such, the allegation that terrorism-­related issues were not covered by IHL was largely unfounded. First, an express prohibition on resorting to terrorism was formulated (inter alia in Article 33 of the Fourth GC, Article 51 (2) of the First AP, Article 4 (2) of the Second AP) and, second, Article 37 of the First AP, which contains a prohibition of perfidious attacks, i.e. acts inviting the confidence of an adversary with intent to betray that confidence (such as feigning having a civilian, non-­combatant status), could be applied to acts of terrorism. The possibility of interrogating the detained person is also not excluded. The provision obliging a prisoner of war to give only his surname, first names and personal or serial number (article 17 of the Third GC) is not the same as a complete prohibition of questioning. The US refused to grant the Taliban, Al-­Qaeda members and other persons detained at the Guantanamo base in Cuba and other detention centres a number of rights applicable to prisoners of war and civilian persons. Objections were raised, among others, towards the conditions of transfer and detention of inmates, their treatment, failure to provide reasons for the detention,45 obstructing their access to lawyers, as well as limiting visitations by the ICRC and other organisations bringing humanitarian aid. In the light of the above practice, attempts were made to answer the question about the legal status of ‘unprivileged combatants’. Would it be a category completely removed from the protection granted by the Third and Fourth GC? Or would they be entitled to a minimum of protection? In accordance with Article 4 of the Fourth GC relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war, protection should be extended to all ‘persons who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals’. It was not specifically stated that protection is applicable only to civilians, it was however stipulated that it does not extend to persons remaining under the protection of the Third GC on prisoners of war. Additionally, according to Article 5 of the Fourth GC, the protection does not extend to spies, saboteurs or persons under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security of the state, which can also apply to unprivileged combatants.

220   Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala Nevertheless, such persons may not be deprived of humanitarian treatment and the right to a fair and due trial. The prevalent opinion among IHL experts46 is that the Fourth GC applies to ‘unprivileged combatants’ in full. The commentary on this act emphasises that any person detained by the opposing side must be granted one of the two statuses under IHL: civilian or combatant. If they are not awarded the status of a prisoner of war, they remain under the protection following from the Fourth GC. A similar position was taken by the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia in its 1998 judgment in the Delalić case.47 It is also worth keeping in mind the provisions of the First AP. Article 45 stipulates that any person who is not entitled to prisoner of war status and who does not benefit from more favourable treatment in accordance with the Fourth GC, shall have the right at all times to the protection of Article 75 of the First AP which sets out the fundamental guarantees of protection applicable to everyone who has been taken into custody, regardless of whether they committed breaches of the law of armed conflicts, or not.48 As such, those detained by the American military should enjoy a various status under IHL and it should be ascribed individually, e.g. to the Taliban and members of armed forces – the status of prisoners of war, to civilians – treatment in line with the status of civilians, keeping in mind that relocating civilians outside of the territory of the occupied state was a breach of Article 49 of the Fourth GC.49 In the case of detained prisoners of war, it was assessed that the United States were in breach of 15 provisions of the 1994 Geneva Conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war. These included, for example, poor detention conditions, and refusal to allow contacts with relatives, use outside aid, access the mess hall, to practice physical activity and others.50 The most controversial measure was the use of torture against persons suspected of connections with terrorism. The utility of such practices was discussed also in scientific circles. Professor Alan Dershowitz concluded that torture is allowed if it is employed to elicit information on a planted, ticking bomb, if thousands of innocent lives can be saved as a result.51 Judge Richard Posner, an incumbent judge on the US Court of Appeals, maintained that persons who rule out inflicting suffering on terrorism suspects should not hold higher offices.52 Servicemen transferring to Afghanistan were issued instructions that detained persons are to be treated ‘reasonably’, ‘in accordance with the Geneva Conventions’, ‘depending on military necessity’. The memoranda of Attorney General Ricardo Sanchez and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld of December 2002 and January 2003, including so-­called enhanced interrogation techniques, were however in force.53 They included beating, keeping in isolation, sensory deprivation, deprivation of sleep or light, threatening with dogs, water-­boarding and long periods of time in forced stress positions. Acquiescence to the use of violence led to the application of ever more unusual mistreatment of the detainees, such as jumping on bare feet, photographing and recording naked men and women, forcing detainees to masturbate, placing naked detainees in a pile and jumping on them or putting collars and leashes on them.54 There was also the

International humanitarian law   221 practice of transferring detainees to states employing torture, such as Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and Syria.55 Concerns from the perspective of international law56 were also caused by the transfer of detainees to Afghan governmental forces, who allegedly employed severe torture and murders. The negative, condemning even, reactions to the above abuses by European states and international organisations, as well as some of the experts and organisations in the US themselves, led to a change in conduct. The key element was the stance of President Barack Obama who, as a candidate to this office, promised an end to the torturing and the closing down of Guantanamo. On 22 January 2009 he issued an Executive Order cancelling all decisions made after 11 September 2001 which resulted in torture or inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment of detainees.57 The strengthening of the protection of detained persons was also served by the rulings of the American Supreme Court in the cases of Hamdi of 28 June 2004, Hamdan of 26 June 2006 and Boumediene of 12 June 2008. In the Hamdan judgment, the Court rejected the notion that the US is in a state of international conflict with Al-­Qaeda and recognised the applicability of legal principles pertaining to conflicts of a non-­international character, as well as customary law, including the aforementioned Article 75 of the First AP, to the war in Afghanistan waged at the time. The recognition of the conflict in Afghanistan, after the creation of the government in February 2002, as a conflict of a non-­international character and the recognition by the US of the applicability of Article 3 common to all Geneva Conventions reduced the necessity of deliberations over the status of ‘unprivileged combatants’. Nevertheless, the definition of an ‘unprivileged combatant’ was contained in the American The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operation adopted in July 2007. It is worth adding that other Western states did not support the idea of creating an additional status for the purposes of international conflicts. The only state which adopted internal legislation relating to the status of ‘unlawful combatants’ was Israel.

10.5  Private military companies After the conclusion of the Cold War, Western states’ reliance on private military and security companies (PMSCs) systematically increased. They played the greatest role in the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. They fulfilled tasks traditionally reserved for soldiers or occupying powers and the consequences of their activities were borne by persons protected under IHL conventions. Employees of PMSCs (CACI and Titan Corporation) participated in torturing and degrading treatment of inmates at Abu Ghraib,58 as well as numerous tragic incidents. According to the Human Rights First organisation, they often conducted illegal searches, opened fire on civilians in the streets or on approaching civilian vehicles.59 On 16 September 2007 Blackwater guards killed 17 people and injured a further 20 at Nisour Square in Baghdad, including women and children.60 The impunity of private contractors was a serious issue. On the basis of Order 17 of 23 June 2003 issued by the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority

222   Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala (CPA) Paul Bremer, they were not subject to Iraqi laws; they also enjoyed immunity in Afghanistan. For years they evaded criminal responsibility in the US.61 There were increased controversies over what status – combatant or civilian – is enjoyed by PMSC employees. Are they aware of IHL standards and do they abide by them? Who bears the responsibility for infringements of law? Are PMSC considered mercenaries by international law?62 The first initiative aiming to regulate the activities of private military contractors by international law was a proposal by Switzerland and the ICRC which, on 17 September 2008, led to the adoption of the Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict. The Document, which however is not legally binding, indicates that persons employed by private military companies are obliged to abide by IHL, as well as human rights standards. It also foresaw the possibility of imposing criminal liability on the superior of PMSC personnel in the event they are unable to prevent or put a stop to serious crimes committed by their subordinates. Obligations of states include the obligation to ensure that PMSCs observe IHL, a prohibition on using the companies for tasks connected with guarding protected persons, e.g. prisoners of war or detained civilians, as well as the adoption of appropriate legislation and criminal responsibility.63

Notes   1 See: US CENTCOM, Desert Storm – Rules of Engagement (1991) (Pocket Card); NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN), AJP-­3.4.4, https://info. publicintelligence.net/NATO-­Counterinsurgency.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018).   2 Only the war in Afghanistan and the second war in Iraq saw the involvement of ground forces.   3 HRW, Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq (2003), www.hrw.org/report/2003/12/11/target/conduct-­war-and-­civilian-casualties-­iraq (accessed 10 May 2018).   4 HRW, Unacknowledged Deaths: Civilian Casualties in NATO’s Air Campaign in Libya (2012), www.hrw.org/report/2012/05/13/unacknowledged-­deaths/civilian-­ casualties-natos-­air-campaign-­libya (accessed 10 May 2018).   5 International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Body Count: Casualty Figures after Ten Years of the ‘War on Terror’ (2015) 6.   6 R. Fisk, The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East (Fourth Estate, 2005) 853.   7 ICRC Report on Certain Aspects of the Conduct of Hostilities and the Consequences from a Humanitarian Point of View of NATO Air Strikes (1994).   8 HRW, Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign (2000), www.hrw.org/sites/ default/files/reports/natbm002.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018).   9 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to Investigate All Alleged Violations of International Human Rights Law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (1 June 2011), A/HRC/17/2011. 10 Iraq Body Count, www.iraqbodycount.org/database (accessed 10 May 2018). 11 C. Conetta, Operation Enduring Freedom: Why a Higher Rate of Civilian Bombing Casualties? (2002) 13 Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Report, www.comw. org/pda/0201oef.html (accessed 10 May 2018).

International humanitarian law   223 12 See Table 4.3 in this volume for civilian casualties of the war in Afghanistan between 2007 and 2014. 13 See: M.N. Schmitt, Precision attack and international humanitarian law (2005) 859 International Review of the Red Cross 445–466; M.N. Schmitt, The impact of high and low-­tech warfare on the principle of distinction, in: R. Arnold, P.A. Hildbrand (eds), International Humanitarian Law and the 21st Century’s Conflicts: Changes and Challenges (EDIS, Lausanne 2005) 169–189, 6–7. 14 R.P. Hallion, Precision guided munitions and the new era of warfare (1995) 53 Air Power Study Center Paper, http://fas.org/man/dod-­101/sys/smart/docs/paper53.htm (accessed 10 May 2018). 15 Ibid. 16 W. Clark, Remarks to the American Enterprise Institute Regarding Military Action in Yugoslavia, 31 August 1999; following: HRW (2000). 17 HRW, World Report 2012 (2012), www.hrw.org/world-­report/2012 (accessed 10 May 2018). 18 USA Today, 16 December 2003. 19 A. Feickert, P.K. Kerr, Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress (CRS Report, 13 December 2017) 1; HRW, U.S.: Hundreds of Civilian Deaths in Iraq Were Preventable Cluster Munitions, ‘Decapitation’ Attacks Condemned, www.hrw.org/ news/2003/12/12/us-­hundreds-civilian-­deaths-iraq-­were-preventable (accessed 10 May 2018). 20 Iraq Body Count, A Dossier of Civilian Casualties in Iraq 2003–2005 (2005) 14, www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/reference/pdf/a_dossier_of_civilian_casualties_ 2003–2005.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). 21 HRW, Needless Deaths in the Gulf War: Civilian Casualties during the Air Campaign and Violations of the Laws of War (1991) www.hrw.org/report/1991/06/01/needless-­ deaths-gulf-­war/civilian-­casualties-during-­air-campaign-­and-violations (accessed 10 May 2018). 22 Report of WHO/UNICEF Special Mission to Iraq S/22328, 4 March 1991. 23 Harvard Study Team (1991) Public Health in Iraq After the Gulf War. 24 Financial Times, 13 March 1991. Similarly, the International Committee of the Red Cross, which arrived in Iraq in March 1991 in order to assess the humanitarian needs of the population, indicated insufficient access to water as the greatest problem. 25 K.R. Rizer, Bombing dual-­use targets: Legal, ethical, and doctrinal perspectives (2001), Air and Space Power Journal, 1 May 2001. 26 HRW, Growing Concern about NATO Violating the Laws of War, 12 May 1999, www.hrw.org/news/1999/05/12/growing-­concern-about-­nato-violating-­laws-war (accessed 10 May 2018). 27 Ibid. 28 J.A. Burger, International Humanitarian Law and the Kosovo crisis: Lessons learned or to be learned (2000) 837 International Review of the Red Cross 129–145; P. Rowe, Kosovo 1999: The air campaign – have the provisions of Additional Protocol I withstood the test? (2000) 837 International Review of the Red Cross 147–164. 29 Iraq Body Count, Al-­Fallūjah lost the greatest percentage of its population, (2005) 2. 30 A. Bianchi, Y. Naqvi, Terrorism, in: A. Claphan, P. Gaeta, T. Haeck (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014) 588–589. 31 K. Roth, Was the Iraq War a Humanitarian Intervention? (2006) 2 Journal of Military Ethics 84–92. 32 HRW, ‘Troops in Contact’: Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan (2008) 12–25. 33 Conetta (2002). 34 See also M. Madej, Tactical efficacy: ‘Notorious’ UCAVs and lawfare; and P. Grzebyk, Who can be killed? Legal targets in non-­international armed conflicts, both

224   Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala in: S. Barela (ed.), Legitimacy and Drones: Investigating the Legality, Morality and Efficacy of UCAVs (Ashgate, Farnham 2015) 243–271 and 49–71. 35 See ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law (2009). 36 On the evolution of the policies of using combat drones by the US, see: J. Loewner, Make no drones about it: Evaluating the U.S. Drone Program based on domestic policy standards (2015) 2 Towson University Journal of International Affairs 36–49. 37 P. McLeary, D. De Luce, White House Drone release is big on numbers, short on detail, Foreign Policy, 1 July 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/01/white-­housedrone-­release-is-­big-on-­numbers-short-­on-detail/ (accessed 10 May 2018). 38 See the interview with Scott Horsley for NPR, www.npr.org/2016/07/01/484381660/ white-­house-documents-­number-of-­civilians-killed-­in-u-­s-drone-­strikes (accessed 10 May 2018). 39 R. Wedgwood, The law’s response to September 11 (2002) and G.A. Lopez, The style of the new war: Making the rules as we go along, both articles (2002) 1 Ethics & International Affairs 8–13 and 21–26. 40 J.-P. Lavoyer, International Humanitarian Law and terrorism, in: L. Lijnzaad, J. von Sambeek, B. Tahzib Lie (eds), Making the Voice of Humanity Heard. Essays on Humanitarian Assistance and International Humanitarian Law in honour of HRH Margriet of the Netherlands (2004) 261. 41 W. Nash, The laws of war: A military view (2002) 1 Ethics and International Affairs 14–17; see also J.G. Stewart, Towards a single definition of armed conflict in International Humanitarian Law: A critique of internationalized armed conflict (2003) 850 International Review of the Red Cross 313–350; A. Paulus, M. Vashakmadze, Asymmetrical war and the notion of armed conflict: A tentative conceptualization (2009) 873 International Review of the Red Cross 95–125. 42 See more: M. Sassòli, The status of persons held in Guantánamo under International Humanitarian Law (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 97–98. 43 K. Dörmann, Unlawful combatants, in: A. Claphan, P. Gaeta (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014) 606; J. Callen, Unlawful combatants and the Geneva Convention (2004) 44 Virginia Journal of International Law 1025–1072. 44 The position of the American administration was contrary to the erstwhile practice of this state, e.g. from the time of the 1950–1951 Korean War, when captured PRC (People’s Republic of China) soldiers were recognised as prisoners of war, even though the PRC was a state recognised by neither the UN or the US. A handbook issued by the Department of State in 1980 contained a recommendation that the Geneva Conventions be applied to captured enemies even if the opposing sides refuse to recognise captured Americans as prisoners of war. In 1980, the American Department of State issues a publication for armed forces personnel: Prisoners of War: Rights and Obligations under the Geneva Convention (DoD GEN-­35A), 1 March 1980. 45 R. Murphy, Contemporary challenges to the implementation of International Humanitarian Law (2004) 3 Connections 111. 46 See: Dörmann (2014) 605–624. 47 ICTY judgment of 16 November 1998, The Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., IT-­96-21, par. 271; see also K. Dörmann, The legal situation of ‘unlawful/unprivileged combatants’ (2003) 849 International Review of Red Cross 45–46. 48 The inclusion of such provisions was advocated in 1977 inter alia by the Americans who were concerned about the well-­being of American soldiers captured by the enemy during the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam. G. Aldrich, Prospects for the US ratification of Additional Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Convention (1991) 1 American Journal of International Law 1–20. 49 American advisors attempted to force a new interpretation of the law, allowing for a temporary relocation of civilians. October 2003 ‘Interim Guidance’ about the

International humanitarian law   225 ­ ermissibility under the Fourth Convention of Such Relocation of ‘Protected P Persons’, referred to in Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, from Jack Goldsmith III, Assistant Attorney General, Re: Permissibility of Relocating Certain ‘Protected Persons’ from Occupied Iraq, 19 March 2004. 50 G. Monbiot, Bush and Rumsfeld had better watch their back, Guardian, 27 March 2003. 51 A. Dershowitz, Want to torture? Get a warrant, The San Francisco Chronicle, 22 January 2002. 52 R. Posner, The best offense, The New Republic, 2 September 2002. 53 A.R. Gonzales, Decision re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, 25 January 2002, www.herein reality.com/alberto_gonzales_torture_memo.html#.V_k_hPT2RVg (accessed 10 May 2018); US Department of Justice Office of a Legal Counsel, Memorandum for A.R. Gonzales Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 USC, 1 August 2002, www.justice.gov/olc/file/886061/download (accessed 10 May 2018). 54 Brutal abuse of detainees was confirmed by reports of the UN Secretary General, the International Committee of the Red Cross and Amnesty International, see: Report of the Secretary-­General Pursuant to Paragraph 24 of Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003), S/2003/715; A.M. Taguba, An Investigative Report, on Alleged Abuses at U.S. Military Prisons in Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca, Iraq (2004); Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq During Arrest, Internment and Interrogation (2004). 55 P.R. Baehr, Human rights after 11 September 2001 (2002) 1 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 3–4. See also the report on torture drafted by journalists on the basis of interviews with employees of American special forces, including participants of the interrogations: Washington Post, 26 December 2002. 56 See in particular Article 3 of the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984. The US and all European states are parties to this convention. 57 Executive Order No. 13491, 22 January 2009. 58 Taguba (2004). 59 Human Rights First, Private Security Contractors at War: Ending the Culture of Impunity, www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-­content/uploads/pdf/08115-usls-­psc-final.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). 60 C. Holmqvist, Private Security Companies. The Case for Regulation (2005) 9 SIPRI Policy Paper 7. 61 P.W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Cornell University Press, Ithaca/London 2008) 250–251. 62 M.G. Janaby, The Legal Regime Applicable to Private Military and Security Company (Springer, Berlin 2016); A. Faite, Involvement of private contractors in armed conflict: Implications under International Humanitarian Law (2004) 4(2) Defence Studies 166–183; J. Elsea, Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Legal Issues (CRS Report, 7 January 2010). 63 More: The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict (2008), www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/ icrc_002_0996.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018).

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226   Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN), AJP-­3.4.4, https://info.public intelligence.net/NATO-­Counterinsurgency.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). Baehr P.R., Human rights after 11 September 2001 (2002) 1 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 3–4. Bianchi A., Naqvi Y., Terrorism, in: A. Claphan, P. Gaeta, T. Haeck (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014) 574–605. Burger J.A., International Humanitarian Law and the Kosovo crisis: Lessons learned or to be learned (2000) 837 International Review of the Red Cross 129–145. Callen J., Unlawful combatants and the Geneva Convention (2004) 44 Virginia Journal of International Law 1025–1072. Clark W., Remarks to the American Enterprise Institute Regarding Military Action in Yugoslavia, 31 August 1999. Conetta C., Operation Enduring Freedom: Why a higher rate of civilian bombing casualties? (2002) 13 Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Report, www.comw.org/ pda/0201oef.html (accessed 10 May 2018). Dershowitz A., Want to torture? Get a warrant, The San Francisco Chronicle, 22 January 2002. Dörmann K., The legal situation of ‘unlawful/unprivileged combatants’ (2003) 849 International Review of the Red Cross 45–74. Dörmann, K. Unlawful combatants, in: A. Claphan, P. Gaeta (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014) 605–624. Elsea J., Private Security Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Legal Issues (CRS Report, 7 January 2010). Executive Order No. 13491, 22 January 2009. Faite A., Involvement of private contractors in armed conflict: Implications under International Humanitarian Law (2004) 4(2) Defence Studies 166–183. Feickert A., Kerr P.K., Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress (CRS Report, 13 December 2017). Fisk R., The Great War for Civilisation; The Conquest of the Middle East (Fourth Estate, 2005). Gonzales A.R., Decision re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, 25 January 2002, www.hereinreality.com/ alberto_gonzales_torture_memo.html#.V_k_hPT2RVg (accessed 10 May 2018). Grzebyk P., Who can be killed? Legal targets in non-­international armed conflicts, in: S. Barela (ed.), Legitimacy and Drones: Investigating the Legality, Morality and Efficacy of UCAVs (Ashgate, Farnham 2015) 49–71. Hallion R.P., Precision Guided Munitions and the New Era of Warfare (1995) 53 Air Power Study Center Paper, http://fas.org/man/dod-­101/sys/smart/docs/paper53.htm (accessed 10 May 2018). Harvard Study Team (1991), Public Health in Iraq After the Gulf War. Holmqvist C., Private security companies: The case for regulation (2005) 9 SIPRI Policy Paper. Human Rights First, Private Security Contractors at War: Ending the Culture of Impunity, www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-­content/uploads/pdf/08115-usls-­psc-final.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). HRW (Human Rights Watch), Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign (2000), www. hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/natbm002.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018).

International humanitarian law   227 HRW (Human Rights Watch), Growing Concern about NATO Violating the Laws of War, 12 May 1999, www.hrw.org/news/1999/05/12/growing-­concern-about-­nato-violating-­ laws-war (accessed 10 May 2018). HRW (Human Rights Watch), Needless Deaths in the Gulf War, Civilian Casualties During the Air Campaign and Violations of the Laws of War (1991), www.hrw.org/ report/1991/06/01/needless-­deaths-gulf-­war/civilian-­casualties-during-­air-campaign-­ and-violations (accessed 10 May 2018). HRW (Human Rights Watch), Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq (2003), www.hrw.org/report/2003/12/11/target/conduct-­war-and-­civiliancasualties-­iraq (accessed 10 May 2018). HRW (Human Rights Watch), ‘Troops in Contact’: Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan (2008). HRW (Human Rights Watch), Unacknowledged Deaths: Civilian Casualties in NATO’s Air Campaign in Libya (2012), www.hrw.org/report/2012/05/13/unacknowledged-­ deaths/civilian-­casualties-natos-­air-campaign-­libya (accessed 10 May 2018). HRW (Human Rights Watch), U.S.: Hundreds of Civilian Deaths in Iraq Were Preventable Cluster Munitions, ‘Decapitation’ Attacks Condemned, Press Release 12 December 2003, www.hrw.org/news/2003/12/12/us-­hundreds-civilian-­deaths-iraq-­were-preventable (accessed 10 May 2018). HRW (Human Rights Watch), World Report (2012), www.hrw.org/world-­report/2012 (accessed 10 May 2018). ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), Report on Certain Aspects of the Conduct of Hostilities and the Consequences from a Humanitarian Point of View of NATO Air Strikes (1994). ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law (2009). ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia), Judgment of 16 November 1998, The Prosecutor v. Delalic et al., IT-­96-21. International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Body Count: Casualty Figures after Ten Years of the ‘War on Terror’ (2015). Iraq Body Count, www.iraqbodycount.org/database (accessed 10 May 2018). Iraq Body Count, Al-­Fallūjah Lost the Greatest Percentage of its Population (2005) 2. Iraq Body Count, A Dossier of Civilian Casualties in Iraq 2003–2005 (2005), www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/reference/pdf/a_dossier_of_civilian_casualties_2003-2005.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). Janaby M.G., The Legal Regime Applicable to Private Military and Security Company (Springer, Berlin 2016). Lavoyer J.-P., International Humanitarian Law and terrorism, in: L. Lijnzaad, J. von Sambeek, B. Tahzib Lie (eds), Making the Voice of Humanity Heard: Essays on Humanitarian Assistance and International Humanitarian Law in Honour of HRH Margriet of the Netherlands (Brill Academic Publishers, Leiden-­Boston 2004). Loewner J., Make no drones about it: Evaluating the U.S. Drone Program based on domestic policy standards (2015) 2 Towson University Journal of International Affairs 36–49. Lopez G.A., The style of the new war: Making the rules as we go along (2002) 1 Ethics and International Affairs 21–26. Madej M., Tactical efficacy: ‘Notorious’ UCAVs and lawfare, in: S. Barela (ed.), Legitimacy and Drones: Investigating the Legality, Morality and Efficacy of UCAVs (Ashgate, Farnham 2015) 243–271.

228   Agnieszka Bieńczyk-Missala McLeary P., De Luce D., White House Drone Release Is Big on Numbers, Short on Detail (1 July 2016) Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/01/white-­house-drone-­ release-is-­big-on-­numbers-short-­on-detail (accessed 10 May 2018). Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, from Jack Goldsmith III, Assistant Attorney General, Re: Permissibility of Relocating Certain ‘Protected Persons’ from Occupied Iraq, 19 March 2004. Monbiot G., Bush and Rumsfeld had better watch their back (2003) Guardian, 27 March 2003. Murphy R., Contemporary challenges to the implementation of International Humanitarian Law (2004) 3 Connections 99–114. Nash W., The laws of war: A military view (2002) 1 Ethics and International Affairs 14–17. Paulus A., Vashakmadze M., Asymmetrical war and the notion of armed conflict: A tentative conceptualization (2009) 873 International Review of the Red Cross 95–125. Posner R., The best offense, The New Republic, 2 September 2002. Prisoners of War: Rights and Obligations under the Geneva Convention (DoD GEN-­ 35A), 1 March 1980. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to Investigate All Alleged Violations of International Human Rights Law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (1 June 2011), A/ HRC/17/2011. Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq During Arrest, Internment and Interrogation (2004). Report of the Secretary-­General Pursuant to Paragraph 24 of Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003), S/2003/715. Report of WHO/UNICEF Special Mission to Iraq, S/22328, 4 March 1991. Rizer K.R., Bombing dual-­use targets: Legal, ethical, and doctrinal perspectives, Air and Space Power Journal, 1 May 2001. Roth K., Was the Iraq War a Humanitarian Intervention? (2006) 2 Journal of Military Ethics 84–92. Rowe P., Kosovo 1999: The air campaign – have the provisions of Additional Protocol I withstood the test? (2000) 837 International Review of the Red Cross 147–164. Sassòli M., The status of persons held in Guantánamo under International Humanitarian Law (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 96–106. Schmitt M.N., Precision attack and international humanitarian law (2005) 859 International Review of the Red Cross 445–466. Schmitt M.N., The impact of high and low-­tech warfare on the principle of distinction, in: R. Arnold, P.D. Hildbrand (eds), International Humanitarian Law and the 21st Century’s Conflicts: Changes and Challenges (EDIS, Lausanne 2005). Singer P.W., Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Cornell University Press, Ithaca/London 2008). Stewart J.G., Towards a single definition of armed conflict in International Humanitarian Law: A critique of internationalized armed conflict (2003) 850 International Review of the Red Cross, 313–350. Taguba A.M., An Investigative Report, on Alleged Abuses at U.S. Military Prisons in Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca, Iraq (2004). The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict, www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018).

International humanitarian law   229 US CENTCOM, Desert Storm – Rules of Engagement (1991) (Pocket Card). US Department of Justice Office of a Legal Counsel, Memorandum for A.R. Gonzales, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 USC, 1 August 2002, www.justice. gov/olc/file/886061/download (accessed 10 May 2018). Wedgwood R., The law’s response to September 11 (2002) 1 Ethics and International Affairs 8–13.

11 The significance of the resource and energy factor in military interventions of the West after the Cold War Kamila Pronińska The driving force behind interventions conducted by Western states after the Cold War have been factors of a political, strategic, military, economic, humanitarian and psychological nature. The present chapter focuses on one of such possible dimensions of Western interventions, i.e. interests in the field of access to strategic resources and energy security. To what extent did these factors motivate the West to undertake military interventions? Did matters such as ensuring access to strategic resource deposits and infrastructure, or affecting the balance of power on the energy market, play an important role in this context at all? The starting point is an analysis of the Western states’ perceptions of threats to energy security with respect to the changing context of the global market after the Cold War. Working under the assumption that this perception could have affected the ‘militarisation’ of the methods of ensuring energy security, the analysis focuses on the resource potential and the significance of states which have been the target of military intervention for the resource market and energy security of the West.

11.1  The perceptions of energy security of the West after the Cold War Ensuring energy security – an availability and affordability of energy in its various forms1 – is one of the priorities of the national security strategies of Western states. However, the perception of threats to energy security, as well as the rise of concerns for the stability of future energy supply, have evolved in response to events of a political and economic character, as well as supply and demand trends, which have significantly affected the structure of the global oil market and regional gas markets.2 Considering that the global market context influences the feeling of security and the perception of threats to energy security,3 it also affects the formulation of energy policy tools and can play a role in deciding on military interventions. This context is primarily composed of: stability of the global energy market; prices of oil and other resources; level of import and export dependencies; relations between individual participants of the market and their behaviour; projected supply and demand trends, as well as events which may cause temporary disruptions in the supply of energy resources.

Significance of resource and energy factor   231 Interventions of the 1990s were conducted in thoroughly different energy market realities, than those from the first decade of the twenty-­first century. During the first three decades following the Cold War, the market was subject to significant changes with respect to the supply and demand of hydrocarbons, the level of import dependencies, oil prices and the up-­stream and down-­stream technologies employed. These processes were accompanied by serious challenges to energy infrastructure of a technical, economic and political nature. The end of the Cold War came at a time of relative stability and low oil prices on the market.4 Importers purchased hydrocarbons enjoying the conditions of a buyer’s market thanks to the so-­called third oil shock.5 From the Western perspective, since the first oil shock of 1973, not only was it possible to limit overall oil import dependencies, but new import options also appeared due to the breakdown of the bipolar world order.6 At that time, Western states (or, broadly, members of the IEA7) enjoyed a dominant position among hydrocarbon importers, while Western companies were a key supplier of capital and technology for the energy sector. This situation started to change on the eve of the new millennium with the increased energy demand of rising economies, especially China and India.8 Increased competition and rivalry over exploration licences, long-­term contracts or transport routes was characteristic of the market in the first decade of the twenty-­first century. The rapid development of energy-­intensive Asian economies significantly increased the global demand for imported oil and gas, which necessitated new investment in global production capabilities. At the same time, the number of new discoveries of oil and gas deposits decreased, the issue of ageing infrastructure and underinvestment of the energy sector was often raised. Indeed, the market experienced, on one hand, a demand shock and, on the other, challenges of disruptions in oil supply as a result of natural disasters, armed conflicts or strike action in producing regions. This was accompanied by price spikes on the oil markets (Figure 11.1). As such, at the time of launching the ‘war on terrorism’ in Afghanistan and Iraq the perception of energy security was characterised by concerns over the future oil supplies, the rising costs of imported oil and a growing consciousness of the threats to energy security arising from the energy sector itself (limited production, refining and transport capabilities) and from the international security environment (inter alia the proliferation of asymmetrical threats). The drastic increase in prices after 2003 indicated that the market was subject to increased uncertainty with respect to oil prices and investment in new production capabilities.9 As a result, there was a resurgence of the peak-­oil concept, i.e. of the world quickly attaining peak oil production, and the increasing prices were being seen as an indicator of the emerging gap between supply and demand, which could increase the likelihood of conflicts over oil.10 However, it was not only trends in development of the hydrocarbon market which were raising concerns. At the same time the perception of security of supply of other strategic, non-­energy resources changed. On one hand, mineral markets were also subject to price fluctuations, on the other, their availability

232   Kamila Pronińska

Global oil prices (USD)

117.23 107.06

66.17

76.59

82.75

86.41 68.13

48.01 39.22

2000

32.71 32.97

2001

2002

37.14

2003

2004

2005 2006 Year

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

Figure 11.1  Changes in global oil prices between 2000 and 2011. Source: author’s own work on the basis of BP data, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014 (BP, London 2014).

was affected by armed conflicts in producing regions, as well as producer policies (i.e. the decision of China to decrease export of rare earth elements (REE)11). Adopting the criteria of the importance of a given mineral to Western economies and the risk connected with the stability of supply, an EU classification indicates about 20 critical raw materials, whereas according to American statistics there are as many as 30.12 It is important to note that the stability of prices and supply of certain minerals affects energy security, including long-­ term strategies. The availability of REE is a condition for the development of renewable energy technologies (including photovoltaic panels, hybrid cars and wind turbines), as well as technologies improving energy efficiency. Conventional energy technologies are also strongly dependent on availability of numerous critical minerals for the development of both the up-­stream and down-­stream sector of oil, gas and electricity. Western, in particular European, states, however, depend on external suppliers of a vast majority of such resources.13 The concerns over the availability of critical resources in conjunction with their high prices contributed to investments in new technologies (among others, offshore and unconventional deposits, renewable energy, liquefied natural gas (LNG)) which aimed to diversify the energy mix and import sources. The effects of these efforts became visible in the following decade, especially in the form of the so-­called ‘shale revolution’ in North America,14 as well as the increased LNG trade. Subsequent Western interventions were conducted in starkly different market circumstances. The financial crisis brought about a fall in the global demand for energy and then a deceleration of economic growth, not only in the West, but in countries outside of the Organisation for Economic Co-­operation and Development (OECD) as well. The perspective of peak-­oil had been averted,

Significance of resource and energy factor   233 yet resource markets faced further fluctuations of oil prices (Figure 11.1). The dependence on external suppliers, however, remained a fundamental problem. A wave of armed conflicts in regions key to the functioning of the global hydrocarbons’ market meant that questions about the stability of exporters and security of supply were raised once again. Another important factor in shaping the perception of energy security is the nature of participation in the global energy supply chain. The shape of energy policy, varied energy mix, different levels of import dependency and diversification of supply – together they indicate how individual states are prepared for crises, which affects their feeling of security. For Western states, the basic primary energy carriers are hydrocarbons: their share in the EU’s energy mix is 58 per cent and they meet 67 and 61 per cent of energy demand of the US and Canada respectively.15 The majority of OECD member states are net importers of oil and gas, at the same time being exporters of technologies and capital for the energy sector. The exceptions include Western exporters of not only technologies and capital, but also of hydrocarbons (such as the Netherlands, Norway and Canada). Yet, their position has been subject to change over the years due to the depletion of domestic deposits. Considering the structure of the global market, Western states are major importers. They are, however, no longer the largest consumers of primary energy. Since 2008, over half of global consumption comes from countries from outside the OECD.16 For the above reasons, the main focus in energy security strategies of Western states concentrates on the import dependencies question. Despite the fact that since the 1970s the share of oil in the energy mix and dependence on Middle Eastern supplies were reduced, still the reliance on imported hydrocarbons remains high, which is seen as a challenge. Securing stable prices and energy supplies is a vital security interest of the West. Considering that the access to competitive energy depends on access to imported resources, a particular importance must be ascribed to protection of the global trading system.17 Usually this is achieved through international cooperation between exporters and importers. In exceptional circumstances it can also take the form of military involvement in regions strategically important for the functioning of the international energy market. This phenomenon is known as the militarisation of energy policy.18 As the experiences of the oil crises (the combination of oil shocks and the nationalistic policies of OPEC in the 1970s and 1980s) have shown, importers have primarily sought to reduce dependency on conflict-­prone production regions. This led to development of more expensive production in other regions19 and to reshaping of the oil and gas markets. Considering the changing dynamics of the energy security environment, it is important to examine whether any of the military interventions after the Cold War were related to energy needs of the Western states and their perceptions of energy security. Addressing this question, it should be noted that among the military interventions discussed in this volume three covered states abundant in energy resources. Two of them – Desert Storm in 1991 (which was preceded by Desert Shield in 1990) and Iraqi Freedom in 2003 – took place in the Persian

234   Kamila Pronińska Gulf, i.e. a key region for the functioning of the global oil market and security of energy supply of the West. Both Kuwait and Iraq as OPEC members held a clearly defined and important place in the oil supply chain on the eve of the interventions. In 2011 the West intervened in Libya, another important OPEC member state, with a significant supply of good quality hydrocarbons. From a broader resource perspective one intervention – of 2001 – was carried out in Afghanistan, whose territory holds deposits of valuable minerals, and to a lesser degree hydrocarbons. Yet the majority of these was undeveloped. This brief comparison alone demonstrates that both the roles of the indicated states in international resource trade and their importance to the West varied. Research indicates that the existence of substantial resource deposits may, under certain circumstances, increase the likelihood of conflict or a military intervention. In theory, such military interventions may take one of two main forms. First, involvement in an already active conflict over resources or a war of a different character,20 for instance to protect own interests threatened by military activities (due to reduced production, the inability to fulfil contracts, price fluctuations, blockade of export infrastructure). Second, importer-­ countries may initiate a conflict in a region rich in resources in order to change the possession or control over deposits. The geopolitical school of thought accepts that gaining access to deposits and control over up-­stream and down-­ stream activity may take the form of the use of force21 – either an attack by a stronger importer state or states on a weaker oil-­producing state (resource scarcity conflict), or an armed conflict between the largest importers as an emanation of the contest for access or control over resources and transport routes. Empirical research of the motivations of intervening parties carried out by Bove, Gleditsch and Sekeris indicates that the likelihood of intervention increases if a state embroiled in an armed conflict holds significant resource deposits and its share in the market is relatively large.22

11.2  The oil factor in interventions in the Persian Gulf The unique role played by the Persian Gulf in the global oil market is a result not only of its hydrocarbon wealth, competitive costs of extraction or share in global production and export. It is also connected with traditional political, military and economic involvement of Western powers in this region. From among the myriad of agreements concluded with Persian Gulf states, a key role for the stability of the global oil market is played by the tactical alliance between Saudi Arabia and the US. It guarantees the security of global oil supply cleared in dollars and ensures American aid in maintaining the Saudi regime. The production capacities of the Persian Gulf, in particular the spare capacity of Saudi Arabia, plays a key role in crisis situations, i.e. a sudden drop in the supply of oil. At the same time it has been the military conflicts and political crises in this region which have in the past contributed to the greatest disruptions of oil supply to the global market.23 In 1990, despite the change in supply– demand trends on the oil market, which was becoming a ‘buyer’s market’, the

Significance of resource and energy factor   235 perception of energy security of Western states, particularly in relation to Persian Gulf states, was still under the influence of the oil shocks of the 1970s. Their consequences – economic recession and perception of dependence on external oil suppliers as a threat to security – were strongly enshrined in the thinking on energy security. It was evidenced by energy strategies aimed inter alia at diversification of oil supplies. The consequences of the annexation of Kuwait were also considered in this respect. The significance of Kuwait for the oil market in 1990 was due to its oil reserves and production capabilities, as well as access to a modern extraction and export infrastructure. In 1990, it controlled 9.4 per cent of global oil reserves, i.e. 15 per cent of Middle Eastern reserves, and provided 8.5 per cent of Middle Eastern production.24 As the fifth largest producer in the Persian Gulf (with production of 1.6 million b/d25) it was a major prize for Iraq, which was struggling with economic crisis. Export of Kuwaiti oil was supplying almost exclusively OECD markets; Kuwait also questioned the production limits imposed by OPEC, which was favourable from the perspective of importer states as it contributed to maintaining relatively low oil prices.26 Not only the victim of aggression, but also the invader had a significant share in the global reserves and production. Documented Iraqi oil reserves were estimated by the end of 1990 at 13 per cent of OPEC reserves and 10 per cent of global reserves. What is more, Iraq was a far more prominent oil producer than Kuwait, supplying the market with 2.8 million b/d a year before the aggression.27 With its aggression on Kuwait, Iraq violated international law, but it also brought about a significant change in the regional balance of power, including the oil market. Iraq’s dominion over Kuwait would mean attaining a strategic advantage in the region and a much greater control over the world oil market. After the annexation of Kuwait, Iraq would control 30 per cent of documented oil reserves in the Middle East and 20 per cent of global reserves. Moreover, thanks to the increased production capabilities – to a level corresponding to 7 per cent of global production and 23 per cent of OPEC production – it would have a greater influence on the cartel’s price policy.28 A benefit of occupation would also be a much broader access to the Persian Gulf and export terminals with modern infrastructure. The West’s response to Iraq’s aggression was a response to an armed conflict over oil29 which significantly disrupted the regional order, including the erstwhile balance of power on the oil market. From the perspective of the West, the Gulf War erupted within a broader context of a changing post-­Cold War international order and served as proof of instability in the region. Calculations connected with the new shape of the world order and the West’s place in it, with the US at its head, played a principal role in deciding on a military intervention in order to liberate Kuwait. Operation Desert Storm was, however, preceded by Operation Desert Shield, which indicates how serious were the concerns about Iraq continuing its expansionist policies and disturbing the oil market status quo. In its first public announcements, the American administration confirmed that it perceived the conflict in the Persian Gulf as a threat to the energy interests of the West and ‘our way of

236   Kamila Pronińska life’.30 During further stages of the crises, such references were avoided while the need to protect international law was more prominent.31 In accordance with the Carter Doctrine which was called upon during both interventions in the Persian Gulf, a consequence of a threat to ‘vital interests of the US in the Middle East’ was the use of any necessary means, including military ones.32 Did then Iraq’s aggression constitute a threat to ‘vital interests’ of the US in the energy sphere? In the time period considered, the US was the largest importer of oil, yet the share of the Gulf ’s oil in its energy balance was not significant. Nevertheless, it was the decisions taken by OPEC that chiefly influenced the stability of the oil market. The equivocality of official communications from the leader of the military coalition indicates the existence of a resource-­based motivation in the decision-­making process, even if such motivation could have played a greater role when there was the belief that the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia might be threatened by the Iraqi regime. For this reason, immediately after Iraqi troops entered Kuwait, the decision was made to deploy Western military units in Saudi Arabia. Operation Desert Shield was meant to discourage and prevent further expansion of Iraq whose aim was territorial revisionism and a change in the political status quo in the region.33 Operation Desert Storm, whose aim was to stop the invasion and liberate Kuwait, was carried out after it was decided that the threat to the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia had largely passed.34 Desert Storm was to pave way for a new post-­Cold War international order35 with a special role of the US. Nevertheless, it was also an intervention which aimed to safeguard the economic interests of the Western world. When ascertaining the oil dimension of the intervention one should conclude that its aim was not to safeguard commercial interests but rather the strategic interests of the West.36 The occupation of Kuwaiti deposits by Iraq could have had negative strategic implications – it would not only have disrupted the regional balance of power, but would also have given Saddam Hussein the ability to blackmail the states in the region and destabilise global oil prices, which would have had significant implications for the world economy.37 Even if Operation Desert Storm had succeeded in discouraging the Iraqi regime from entering Saudi Arabia, acquiescence to the annexation of Kuwait might have been conducive to an aggressive foreign policy of the Iraqi regime in the future and threaten the sovereignty of key (from the perspective of the energy security of the West) oil-­producing states. The mitigation of this threat required the destruction of Iraq’s military potential and its ability to project power in the future. In this way, a military intervention of the West safeguarded the long-­ term interests connected with maintaining the energy status quo and the security of oil supply to the OECD. A resource-­based conflict – Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait – put in motion a military intervention of the West which sought to safeguard strategic interests in this region crucial to the global energy market. Moreover, under the new conditions of the global oil market, the restrictions on purchasing Iraqi oil (as an element of the sanctions) did not constitute a major challenge for the energy

Significance of resource and energy factor   237 security of the West which had just started executing contracts in Central Asia, Russia and Africa. The strategic context, including the energy security environment, of the 2003 intervention in Iraq was different. Furthermore, Iraq’s role as an oil exporter had changed. The post-­war sanctions imposed on Iraq severely depleted the country’s production capabilities. As a result Iraq’s production and export were drastically reduced in the 1990s. In the first half of that decade Iraq produced an average of 400–500 thousand b/d and exported a maximum of 300 thousand b/d. The situation improved with the implementation of the UN’s Oil-­for-Food Programme38 thanks to which in 1998 production returned to the 2.1 million b/d level. A record amount of oil after the war was produced by Iraqi industry in 2000 (2.6 million b/d), even though it remained deeply underinvested. In 2003 proved Iraqi oil reserves were the third largest in the world and between 1990 and 2000 they increased by 12 per cent.39 Nevertheless, oil production could not increase proportionately to potential due to the sanctions, which made it impossible to invest in the oil sector and modernise it. As a result, after the record year of 2000, production began to decrease.40 In the strategic dimension, being weakened by sanctions, Iraq had much smaller capabilities to project power in the region than a decade prior. It was, however, accused of possessing WMD. During the time of the ‘war on terror’ Iraq could become one of its fronts. At that time the US was acting from a position of not only the leader of the West but primarily a superpower, with its military expenditure at the level of 47 per cent of global military spending41 and implementing the doctrine of pre-­emptive strike. At the same time, with increasing competition between importers over access to energy resources, the US itself began for the first time, since April 1998, to satisfy over one half of its domestic demand for oil through import. The scenarios prepared by analytical agencies predicated a consolidation of this trend in the future and the increase of American import dependency.42 The approaching energy crisis was mentioned by President Bush in his speeches in 2001, calling for the adoption of a long-­term strategy for the satisfaction of increasing import needs.43 Concerns over oil shortages became the central point of discussions on the resource dimension of the military intervention carried out in Iraq.44 Immediately before the intervention, Iraq was a petro-­state with its oil sector accounting for three-­quarters of GDP.45 Although Iraq managed to restore production levels to pre-­sanction levels, up-­stream infrastructure was largely underfunded, which meant that production of oil did not correspond with the country’s actual potential. Iraq, holding some of the largest documented, yet undeveloped, reserves in the world had a tremendous value for the oil market. Despite difficulties, it rebuilt its export position and could have become an important supplier. However, a material obstacle remained in its regime which, incidentally, in 2000 decided to introduce clearances for oil in euro.46 Despite the sanctions, Saddam Hussein’s authority was stable, though severely weakened militarily and economically and as such he was unable to continue his expansionist foreign policy. Increased export in connection with increasing oil prices, and also the

238   Kamila Pronińska fact that several states (including leaders of the Eurozone) were advocating the mitigation of sanctions while others were breaking out from them,47 could change this situation. Resource-­based motivations underlying the decision to intervene in Iraq in 2003 are subject to debate. Michael Klare, in his 2005 book,48 strongly advocates the position that through the war, the US sought to gain a broader and direct access to Iraqi deposits, i.e. concluding contracts for extraction and export of oil for American companies, and also achieve privatisation and modernisation of the oil sector. Similarly, Alan Greenspan states in The Age of Turbulence that ‘the war in Iraq was a war for oil’.49 Other researchers thoroughly contest this hypothesis.50 Addressing the arguments raised for and against the resource dimension of the intervention, one must concede that the strategic value of the Persian Gulf for the oil market alone, as well as a particularly difficult oil market situation, meant that the resource factor could have played a role in the decision-­making process. Considering that it was the US and the coalition that attacked Iraq it must be stressed that if the main thrust of the conflict was indeed about oil, then there were many other cheaper and simpler ways of achieving this goal. O’Sullivan notes that since Saddam Hussein was at the time negotiating a PSA (production sharing agreement) with Russian and Chinese corporations, the US could have made lifting the sanctions conditional on receiving concessions for American companies.51 What then could have been the connection between the decision to intervene and the resource wealth of Iraq? The Iraqi authorities, being in conflict with the West, did indeed control significant oil reserves and were capable of increasing export in the framework of the ‘Oil for Food’ programme, yet as a result of this very programme Iraq could not freely use its export funds, which made it difficult to revert to aggressive policies. Examining a different line of reasoning, i.e. the pursuit of the energy interests of the then largest oil importer, the best case scenario could have been that the intervention, by bringing about a change of government, would result in obtaining lucrative contracts for Western (mainly American) companies, significantly increasing the access of IOCs (international oil companies) to world oil reserves. In the alternative scenario, Iraqi oil would be introduced to the market under the control of the Iraqi NOC (National Oil Company);52 what is more the enjoyment by the new authorities of income from its export would not be subject to restrictions imposed in connection with international sanctions. In each of these scenarios it was crucial to create a Western-­friendly regime controlling the third largest documented oil reserves in the world, which was of particular importance in the period of worse political relations with Saudi Arabia and noticeable market trends. The West could count on an easier, even direct, access to Iraqi oil after the intervention but there was no guarantee that its prices would drop. In fact, the intervention resulted in a significant increase of oil prices which in turn increased the income of oil exporters and an unprecedented transfer of wealth to oil-­producing countries. Some Western IOCs did actually conclude contracts in Iraq, however – as the actions of the Coalition Provisional Authority showed – solutions which enabled the division of Iraqi

Significance of resource and energy factor   239 resources only after the establishment of a new democratic government were supported.53 It seems then that the commercial interests of American and Western oil corporations did not play as important a role as the strategic interests of the West connected with the elimination of perceived threats to security and international order generated by states labelled as ‘rogue’54 and primarily with strengthening the international position and the ability to shape the new international order of the ‘war on terror’ era. When analysing the resource dimension of this intervention, Daniel Yergin also argues that, while the Americans did include in their calculations the use of Iraqi resources to rebuild the country after the intervention, which after all is of tremendous value to the global market, ‘this war was not about Iraq’s oil […] oil did not play the same role as other factors in defining policy’.55 Interests connected with energy security and the oil market could be defined in the context of the 2003 intervention as strategic interests, yet it seems that in the hierarchy of motivations they were located below strategic political interests connected with international security and order in the ‘war on terror’ period. In this sense, the operation in Iraq, like the one in Afghanistan, should be described as force for order56 rather than force for oil. If one was to compare the 2003 intervention with that of 1991, it must be observed that despite much harsher market conditions in 2003, the resource factor in the motivations of the West was more pronounced in 1991. The consequences of a lack of an armed reaction to Iraq’s aggression of Kuwait for the balance of power on the oil market were severe enough from the perspective of the West that they became a factor increasing the determination to use force. In any event, though, effort was made to use the Iraqi resources to finance either humanitarian aid to the Iraqi population or, as after 2003, rebuilding following the conflict. In this last example it is worth noting that American decision-­ makers, having witnessed the impressive increase of Iraqi production before 2003, could include in their calculations on using force that the Iraqi oil sector would be a source of financing for the rebuilding and stabilising of the country after the intervention. This is evidenced by action undertaken by the American administration as early as 2002 to explore the possibilities of using Iraqi resources for this very purpose57 and also the military activities of coalition forces which attempted to secure the oil infrastructure. As such Iraq’s resources facilitated making the decision on the intervention, since Iraq could ‘pay for rebuilding itself ’.58 This, however, turned out to be a much greater challenge than anyone could have predicted due to the dreadful state of Iraq’s oil infrastructure.59

11.3  Force for good? The resource dimension of the intervention in Libya In the official narrative, the intervention in Libya was not linked with the country’s resource wealth but rather with humanitarian issues. The need to protect Libya’s civilian population was presented as the only, or at least the principal,

240   Kamila Pronińska motivation for armed engagement undertaken on the basis of UNSEC RES/1973, making it a key test of the concept of responsibility to protect (R2P).60 Deliberations over motivations other than humanitarian ones are provoked by parallel ‘revolutions’ in North Africa and the Middle East. The West decided to intervene in Libya despite the fact that at the same time the wave of civil unrest reached, among others, Syria, where the employment of the army to suppress the protests led to many civilian casualties. Moreover, in Libya the West had decided to intervene militarily in the face of a ‘perspective of significant casualties’, rather than mass atrocities actually committed (at least documented ones). When analysing the resource dimension of this intervention, it must be stressed that the strategic significance of North Africa is a result of both the oil and gas resources (at the end of 2010 it held an aggregate of 63,000,000,000 barrels of oil and 8,300,000,000,000 m3 of gas, which corresponds to 4.6 and 4.4 per cent of proven world oil and gas reserves respectively61) and geography – proximity to the EU market. North African deposits and export infrastructure play an important role in satisfying the energy needs of the West, allowing for a greater diversification from the Persian Gulf. Libya holds the largest documented oil deposits among the African states (in 2010, 48,500,000,000 barrels, i.e. 2.8 per cent of global reserves). Prior to intervention, Libyan production could reach the levels of 1,650,000 b/d which constituted 1.9 per cent of global production. As for gas, Libya held 1,500,000,000,000 m3 of proved reserves (0.8 per cent of global reserves) and production was stabilised at the 15,800,000,000 m3 level (0.5 per cent of global production). Libya’s advantages included a well-­ developed export infrastructure as well as ability to trade circumventing the Hormuz and Bab-­el-Mandeb straits and the Suez Canal. In the examined period, high-­quality Libyan oil was being transported by tanker from numerous Mediterranean terminals chiefly to European markets (80–85 per cent) but, beginning in 2004, it also stared reaching the US (2 per cent).62 In the case of gas, export (9,750,000,000 m3) was transferred via pipeline and LNG to Italy and Spain.63 The relations between Western states and the Libyan government, however, had remained tense for many years. Both France and the UK, as initiators of the 2011 intervention, had numerous historical reasons to attempt to remove Muammar Gaddafi.64 Access to Libya’s deposits was not the most important in this case. Nevertheless, intervention could not have remained without consequences for the future availability of Libyan resources to European states. Before the intervention, political and economic relations significantly improved thanks to the lifting of sanctions. A number of Western oil companies were involved in the extraction of Libyan resources, including ENI, REPSOL, Total, BP, ExxonMobil, Chevron, Occidental Petroleum, Hess, Conoco Phillips. Yet they had been counting on a greater opening of Libya after the 2004 lifting of sanctions than actually occurred and the competition from non-­Western companies for the access to Libyan deposits was strong. As a result, they invested under conditions which they perceived as starkly unfavourable. In this context, the words of the President of Conoco Philips in Libya are particularly telling; he described the investment regime (EPSA-­4) in the Libyan oil sector as the toughest terms in the world.65 The companies not only

Significance of resource and energy factor   241 invested in up-­stream activities, receiving a maximum of 12 per cent share in the production from a particular deposit, but also were denied permits for the ‘jewel in the crown’, i.e. Libyan off-­shore deposits.66 In 2010 Libya was the source of 9.98 per cent of oil imports to the EU,67 whereas for the Mediterranean states, Libyan oil was even more significant.68 The concerns about the consequences of disturbances and political chaos in Libya to the global oil market appeared as soon as the end of January. The outbreak of the rebellion in Libya in its first days alone caused a disruption in supply of 1 million b/d.69 With the intensification of the conflict, the international companies were forced to halt production. On one hand the intervention at this stage could then be seen as a factor stabilising the market – the West would have proven that it is capable of controlling the situation.70 The escalation and prolongation of the conflict meant even greater disruptions in oil supplies. On the other hand, immediately before the onset of external intervention, the civil war seemed to be close to being decided, as the situation of the rebels became critical. It seems that from the perspective of the global market it was a preferable solution (a return to the status quo ante). In fact, it was the Western intervention itself and aid provided to Libyan rebels, which led to the protraction of the conflict. The scale of challenges to the global oil market is evidenced by IEA’s decision on a coordinated release of 60 million barrels of oil from the strategic reserves).71 It is certain then that intervention alone did not lead to stabilisation of the market; to the contrary. During the operation it became apparent that the objective was to remove Gaddafi from power. From the perspective of energy interests, the Western corporations could count on contracts awarded by the new government, supported by the West, on much more favourable terms. The American press in particular pointed out how strong were the barriers to foreign investment during Gaddafi’s reign, alluding to the possibility of attaining significant commercial benefit with the overthrowing of the dictator.72 Libya’s high-­ quality oil, easy to transport to Europe, is indeed strategically important. It does not seem, however, that in the opening phase of the intervention the commercial interests of Western companies or even the strategic interests of the West connected with the oil market played a key role. Nevertheless the West could have calculated, especially during the course of the operation and evolution of the situation for the benefit of the rebels, that ousting Gaddafi could bring additional strategic benefits in the form of a friendly, democratic government with all positive consequences also in the realm of energy security. Since the intervention was underway anyway, it was possible to seek additional economic benefit, but it did not have a primary significance.

11.4  The significance of Afghan mineral deposits from the perspective of Western intervention The military intervention in Afghanistan was a direct consequence of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Western states intervened in a country which provided support to Al-­Qaeda terrorists and Osama bin Laden himself. It is then hard to seek

242   Kamila Pronińska c­ onnections between the 2001 decision to intervene and the resource wealth of the country. Afghanistan did not play a significant role from the perspective of resource markets, particularly the energy market, although it could have become an important resource base in the future, or possibly also a transit state for Caspian resources. Moreover, while historically the country had many times become an arena for the rivalry between regional and global powers, actual armed attempts to gain control failed. Western intervention, at least in its initial phase, was not a war by choice, but rather by necessity – to bring the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks to justice and prevent further attacks. However, taking into consideration the complexity of the operation, both in terms of goals and the scale of the engagement, it begs the question whether at any of its stages resource motivations played a greater role. Afghanistan has significant deposits of mineral resources (particularly copper, cobalt, iron, sulphur baryte, chrome, magnesium, silver, tin, niobium73), as well as about 1.4 million tonnes of REE74 and an estimate of 1,600,000,000 barrels of oil and 400,000,000 m3 of gas.75 The key consideration, however, is that the above data results from examination of the potential carried out by American experts after the 2001 intervention. In that year, data about Afghanistan’s resources was available chiefly from Soviet sources. During the USSR intervention, Soviet engineers conducted exploration of Afghanistan’s mineral resources and the occupied state was mined for coal, iron ore, copper and gemstones. Between 1957 and 1987, 14 deposits of hydrocarbons – 6 of oil and 8 of gas were discovered and developed.76 At that time Afghanistan produced about 170,000 barrels of oil and 57,000,000,000 m3 of gas.77 Soviet reports indicated that Afghanistan held deposits of, among others, gold and baryte, as well as the largest copper deposit in Eurasia (in Helmand Province) and unique in the global scale deposits (to the east of Kabul) of emeralds, rubies, beryllium, kunzite, hiddenite, pegmatite. There were, however, no indications that it held similar large deposits of hydrocarbons. In the 1990s, the civil war made it impossible to develop the extraction sector. In 1995, the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific published information about Afghanistan’s reserves (as part of the Atlas of Mineral Resources series), the report Gemstones of Afghanistan (Bowersox, Chamberlin, Geoscience Press 1995) was also known. The publications contained tables indicating metals, gemstone and rare earth element deposits existing in Afghanistan, as well as their distribution. Later USGS (United States Geological Survey) described these materials as inaccurate and containing numerous uncertainties. Considering the perception of Afghanistan’s resources and secondary significance of this country for the resource market in 2001, energy security, or broadly speaking, resource security, concerns did not play a role in the initial phase of the intervention. Soon after achieving the first objective – removing the Taliban from power – Americans introduced USGS geologists to estimate more precisely Afghanistan’s resource deposits.78 First stock was taken of around 1,000 of Afghanistan’s mines and mineral-­bearing areas, and subsequently the erstwhile estimates were verified using the broad-­scale hyperspectral data method.79 The

Significance of resource and energy factor   243 first, preliminary estimates on oil and gas proved that Afghanistan’s deposits are not significant in the global scale. In the case of oil it was about 0.1 per cent of global reserves, while for gas – 0.3 per cent.80 The examination showed, however, that Afghanistan does hold other strategic resources, particularly about 1,400,000 tonnes of REE, such as lanthanum, cerium, neodymium and others.81 The existence of deposits of gold, iron ores, tin and other important minerals was also confirmed. Afghanistan was being described as a future ‘Saudi Arabia of lithium’, crucial for the manufacture of, among other things, laptop and smartphone batteries.82 The discoveries coincided with a difficult situation on the resource market, as well as military difficulties in Afghanistan itself. For this reason, in subsequent phases of the war, information about the resource potential could have been used to gain support for the intervention, i.e. by presenting economic benefits arising from Afghanistan’s unique mineral wealth. This line of reasoning was invoked between 2009 and 2011, i.e. when the greatest combat losses were being suffered.83 The country’s strategic geographical location, which allowed for bringing Caspian resources onto the global market, was also brought up at that time. Resource factors could have had greater importance with the successive stages of intervention due to a difficult situation in resource markets, the perspectives of constructing the TAPI pipeline as the so-­called peace pipeline and the need to find additional justification to continue the engagement after 2009. Yet, such was not the case in 2001. Data about Afghanistan’s resource wealth was deficient at that time. The REE market was stable. Finally, even if one is to consider the transit and resource potential of the country, Afghanistan was not a particularly appealing target for a military intervention, due both to the dire state of its economy and the fact that extraction of completely undeveloped resources could present serious technical and financial difficulties. As for the transport of Caspian Sea resources, it could have been important for southern, even south-­ east, Asian states but not for the West which could have fostered more attractive alternative projects of bringing Turkmen gas to external markets. Moreover, the construction of pipelines running through Afghanistan was advocated in the 1990s by just one American company – Unocal – but the American government was not interested in the project.84 From the perspective of the West, Afghanistan in 2001 was primarily a fallen state and even previous experiences of military involvement by foreign powers in the region – none of them managed to subjugate the country – did not encourage the intervention.

11.5  Conclusions All post-­Cold War interventions of Western states carried out in strategically important regions abundant in energy resources or, as in the case of Afghanistan, precious minerals, took place under drastically different market and geopolitical conditions. On a strategic level, the position of the West both in relation to the global international order and the global energy market varied. Having assessed the market conditions of all analysed military interventions, one can determine that only Operation Desert Storm was carried out under

244   Kamila Pronińska market trends favourable for importers, such as oil prices dropping and new import possibilities opening. Nevertheless, the perception of energy security of the West itself still remained under the strong influence of the oil crises of the past two decades. The operations of the first decade of the twenty-­first century were carried out under much more difficult conditions – rising oil pieces and concerns about disruptions in oil supply. This applied in particular to the Iraq intervention. An important variable in comparison to the 1990s was increasing competition from non-­OECD importer states, which were responsible for the majority of the increase in demand for energy. Market trends of the first decade of the 2000s encouraged the search for alternative technologies to satisfy the Western states’ energy needs. Due to this, during the 2011 intervention in Libya, the West was in a better situation than during the intervention in Afghanistan or Iraq. Most importantly, the supply of American unconventional hydrocarbons increased, which created a new perspective for the energy market, and also the economic crisis weakened the world’s energy demand. In none of the examined interventions was the objective to gain access to deposits, control transport routes or ensure the stability of oil supply officially declared. Research has shown that indeed the resource factor was not the dominating one in the motivations of Western interveners. Nevertheless, it was considered in at least some of the operations, albeit to a varying degree and at different stages. It was particularly important to restore the energy status quo and ensure the stability of the oil market and security of Middle Eastern oil supply during the 1991 intervention. This was connected to an extensive degree with fears that the Iraqi regime would continue its expansionist policies and that the territorial integrity of further states, especially Saudi Arabia, would be violated. Destabilisation of this region, pivotal to energy security, necessitated a Western military intervention and an appropriate weakening of Iraq’s military potential. While the market situation of the West during the 2003 intervention was more difficult, it seems that the impulse arising from concerns about energy security was stronger in 1990. However, during the preparations for Operation Iraqi Freedom plans were drawn up to develop and employ Iraq’s oil reserves for the rebuilding and stabilisation after the conflict. It was also expected with a high degree of probability that the intervention, which would bring about lifting of the sanctions, and investments in the Iraqi oil sector, would benefit the global oil market by increasing the production and export capabilities of this state. In the Afghan context, while the 2001 intervention was an armed response to a terrorist attack carried out on US territory, the country’s mineral wealth could have played a role in subsequent phases of the military engagement. Supply– demand trends observed on the global markets, particularly the limitations imposed by China on the export of rare earth elements, contributed to an increased interest in Afghanistan’s potential. During the course of the intervention, this potential was examined and verified, and also construction projects of strategically vital transport routes for Caspian Sea resources through Afghanistan

Significance of resource and energy factor   245 were revitalised. It does not seem likely, however, that these factors had a greater impact on the decision to continue the intervention. Finally, the intervention in Libya, which in the official narrative was dominated by humanitarian concerns, leaves serious doubts as to the actual motivations of intervening states. The analysis carried out allows for the conclusion that even if the initial impulse was connected with concerns about the brutality of the regime towards the civilian population, with the onset of armed operations it became clear that one of the objectives was to remove Gaddafi from power. This would open the way for Western companies to new contracts which – considering the erstwhile investment regime – would most probably be concluded on much more favourable terms. Again, calculations relating to energy security, and in this case also connected with commercial interests of Western corporations, could have gained in significance with the progress of military engagement by the West. Assessing the consequences of all these interventions for the energy market, it must be stressed that only the 1991 intervention actually resulted in the stabilisation of the situation in the oil market and ensured the long-­term security of supply from the Persian Gulf region. Both the 2003 intervention in Iraq and the 2011 intervention in Libya had negative implications for the oil market. This was primarily due to the political chaos and rapid deterioration of internal security in both states, penetrated as they were by armed militias and terrorist groups and embroiled in an armed conflict.

Notes   1 For the purpose of this chapter, the most general of definitions of energy security has been adopted, as can be found inter alia in reports by the International Energy Agency. For more definitions see: C. Winzer, Conceptualizing energy security (2012) 46 Energy Policy 36–48.   2 More: K. Pronińska, Energy and security: Regional and global dimensions (2007), SIPRI Yearbook 2007 (Oxford University Press, London 2007) 215–239.   3 R. Skinner, R. Arnott, The Oil Supply and Demand Context for Security of Oil Supply to the EU from the GCC Countries (Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford 2005) 25.   4 Between 1987 and 1996, with the exception of a brief period during the Gulf War of 1991, oil prices remained at the level of US$13–22 per barrel (US$/b). By way of comparison, between 1996 and 2000 they were subject to fluctuations between 10 and 33 US$/b.   5 That started in December 1985 with a dramatic decrease of oil prices. W.F. Martin, R. Imai, H. Steeg, Maintaining Energy Security in a Global Context, Report to The Trilateral Commission (New York/Paris/Tokyo 1996) 13–15.   6 I.e. R.A. Manning, A.M. Jaffe, The myth of the Caspian ‘Great Game’: The real geopolitics of energy (1998) 4 Survival 112–117.   7 The West constitutes the core of OECD/IEA. The variable position of OECD member states vis-­à-vis non-­member states is in many ways a reflection of the energy situation and the place of the West in the global energy market.   8 IEA consistently warned of changing demand trends, e.g. in 2002 projected a twofold increase of global energy demand within as little as 30 years, of which over two-­thirds were attributed to developing countries. IEA, World Energy Outlook 2002 (OECD/ IEA 2002) 58.

246   Kamila Pronińska   9 See IEA (2002) 46–47. 10 E.g. C.J. Campbell, Peak oil: A turning for mankind (2001) 2–1 Hubbert Center Newsletter; K.S. Deffeyes, Hubbert’s Peak: The Impending World Oil Shortage (Princeton University Press, Princeton 2001). 11 China, which was responsible for 95 per cent of global production of REE, introduced export limits in 2010 (export of 17 minerals was decreased by 40 per cent) which resulted in a drastic increase of prices (in some cases up to tenfold). 12 The debates over the methodology of identifying critical minerals serve as evidence of increased concern over security of their supplies. The European Commission identified 14 critical minerals in its first report of 2010, four years later the list was expanded with a further six. DG ENTR, Report on Critical Raw Materials for EU (EU 2014). 13 The EU’s share in global production of critical minerals to merely 9 per cent. US and China are responsible for 10 and 30 per cent, respectively. Ibid. 8. 14 Due to unconventional oil and gas production in 2012, the US became the world’s largest producer of gas, while in 2014 – of oil as well. 15 Calculations based on BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014 (BP, London 2014). 16 Calculations based on ibid. 17 J.V. Mitchell, Renewing the Energy Security (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London 2002) 5. 18 Literature also uses the terms militarization of energy, militarization of energy policy, militarization of energy security; e.g. R. Heinberg, The Party’s Over: Oil, War and the Fate of Industrial Societies (New Society Publishers, Gabriola Island 2005); D. Moran, J.A. Russell, The militarization of energy security (2008) 1 Strategic Insights 1–13. 19 F.J. Chalabi, Middle East oil in the face of world energy transition (2000) 2 The Brown Journal of International Affairs 43. As an example, at the beginning of the twenty-­first century, the cost of increasing production capabilities by 1 million b/d in the Middle East was estimated at US$300 million. In the case of non-­OPEC states such a cost would be probably four times as high. S.R. Dadwal, The global oil market after 9/11: On a brink of a crisis? (2001) 9 Strategic Analysis 1062. 20 Le Billon indicates four types of conflicts breaking out in resource-­holding states: a coup, warlordism, secession, armed rebellion. A foreign intervention is classified as a separate type of conflict. P. Le Billon, The political ecology of war: Natural resources and armed conflicts (2001) 5 Political Geography 561–584. 21 Moran, Russell (2008). 22 M. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (Owl Books, New York 2001). Niccolo Sartori and David Victor, addressing both these scenarios in two separate publications, conclude that up until now access to hydrocarbons was ensured by the market, and analyses indicating an increased use of military measures for this purpose are a result of hyper-­pessimism. However, they do not rule out the use of force in order to address some energy security challenges (such as armed conflicts in production regions, etc.). N. Sartori, The militarization of energy: A sustainable challenge for the EU? (2011) 12–13, www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chatham house/public/Research/International%20Security/1110esdf_sartori.pdf (accessed 12 May 2016); D.G. Victor, What resource wars? (2007) 11 The National Interest 575. 23 Over 4 million b/d stopped flowing due to a political decision by OPEC in 1973, i.e. the first oil shock. Further major disruptions occurred as a result of the Iranian revolution (6 million b/d); Iran–Iraq war (around 4 million b/d) and the Gulf War between 1990 and 1991 (4 million b/d). 24 BP (2014). 25 Data for 1989: IEA, Monthly Oil Market Report 1990 (IEA/OECD 1990) 18. 26 In July 1990 Kuwait declared that it was prepared to withdraw from an agreement with Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and UAE pertaining to limiting production. This ­constituted a

Significance of resource and energy factor   247 strong impulse for the government of Iraq to extend demands on Kuwait. J. Gross Stein, Threat-­based strategies of conflict management: Why did they fail in the Gulf? in: S.A. Renshon (ed.), The Political Psychology of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh 1993) 121–123. 27 Iraq was outdone only by Saudi Arabia with its production at the level of 5.6 million b/d and Iran producing 2.9 million b/d. Data as in ibid. 28 Own calculations based on BP (2014). 29 A.M. Jaffe, R.A. Manning, The shocks of a world of cheap oil (2006) 1 Foreign Affairs 16–29; M. Ross, A closer look at oil, diamonds, and civil war (2006) 9 Annual Review of Political Science. 30 According to President Bush: ‘Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the freedom of friendly countries around the world would all suffer if control of the world’s great oil reserves fell into the hands of Saddam Hussein’, quoted after R.W. Apple Jr., Bush says Iraqi aggression threatens ‘Our way of life’ (1990) New York Times, 15 August 1990. 31 L. Freedman, E. Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1991) 9. 32 The determination of the US to maintain the energy status quo in the region can be seen in the words of President Reagan who, when confirming the security guarantees for Saudi Arabia, assured: ‘There is no way that we would stand and see Saudi Arabia taken over by anyone who would shut off the oil’. Klare (2001) 45–49. 33 S.J. Wayne, President Bush goes to war: A psychological interpretation from a distance, in: S.A. Renshon (ed.), The Political Psychology of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh 1993) 30–31. 34 H.N. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn’t Take a Hero (Bantam, New York 1992) 376. 35 Excerpts from President’s News Conference on the Gulf Crisis (1990) New York Times, 30 August 1990; S.A. Renshon, Good judgment and the lack thereof during the Gulf War: A preliminary psychological model with some applications, in: S.A. Renshon (ed.), The Political Psychology of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh 1993). 36 See M.L. O’Sullivan, The entanglement of energy, grand strategy, and international security, in: A. Goldthau (ed.), The Handbook of Global Energy Policy (Wiley-­ Blackwell, Hoboken 2013). 37 Renshon (1993) 80; O’Sullivan (2013) 33. 38 The Programme was established under UNSEC RES/986. Every six months Iraq was allowed to sell a predetermined amount of oil and two-­thirds of the income was to be allocated for the purchase of food (so-­called food baskets, i.e. a monthly allowance for the citizens of Iraq), medicine and other products for the civilian population. 39 Data as in BP (2014). At that time the US Energy Information Administration estimated that Iraqi undeveloped oil deposits (so-­called greenfields) might be the largest in the world. DOE/EIA, Iraq, 2003, after: M. Klare, Blood and Oil: How America’s Thirst for Petrol is Killing Us (Hamish-­Hamilton, London 2005) 104. 40 In 2001 EIA estimated that Iraqi production corresponded to less than 50 per cent of its capabilities. Ibid. 96. 41 E. Skons, C. Perdomo, S. Perlo-­Freeman, P. Stalenheim, Military expenditure, in: SIPRI Yearbook 2004 (Oxford University Press, London 2004) 205–239. 42 National Energy Policy Development Group, National Energy Policy, Washington 17 May 2001. 43 Prognoses showing increased import dependency served as a reference point for the final National Energy Policy document of 2001. The long-­term action plan aiming to satisfy increasing import needs was to be drafted by the National Energy Policy Development Group chaired by Vice-­President Dick Cheney. Klare (2005) 56–63. 44 E.g. Heinberg (2005).

248   Kamila Pronińska 45 D. Yergin, The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World (Free Press, London 2012) 153. 46 The decision was political in character and generated financial losses (the currency conversion was done when US$ was waxing and Euro was waning). 47 E.g. Egypt, Jordan and Syria traded with Iraq. 48 Klare (2005). 49 A. Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World (Penguin Books, New York 2007) 463. 50 D.R. Henderson, Do governments need to go to war for oil?, in: R.E. Looney (ed.), Handbook of Oil Politics (Routledge, London/New York 2012) 135. 51 O’Sullivan (2013) 33–34. 52 P. Le Billon, A. Cervantes, Oil prices, scarcity and geographies of war (2009) 5 Annals of the Association of American Geographers 840. 53 O’Sullivan (2013) 33. In the end, many non-­American and non-­Western companies were involved in oil projects in the Iraqi sector. 54 M. Chalmers, The Strategic Scorecard: Six of ten (2014) in A.L. Johnson (ed.), Wars in Peace: British Military Operations since 1991 (RUSI, London 2014) 109. 55 Yergin (2012) 143–145. 56 Chalmers (2014) 107. 57 These talks were conducted mainly in the context of using oil for the rebuilding of Iraq – for this purpose towards the end of 2002 Philip Carroll, together with a special group of advisors for oil, was appointed by the Department of Defence to draft scenarios on what would happen to the oil in the event of a war, what to do with Iraq’s oil sector, etc. Acting for the Department, Carroll became an advisor to the Iraqi ministry for oil after the intervention. Yergin (2012) 143–145. 58 O’Sullivan (2013) 33–34; Yergin (2012) 143. 59 In practice, it turned out that the dire state of Iraqi infrastructure made it difficult for Western engineers to even maintain previous production levels and restoring the infrastructure to a usable state would require massive investment. 60 M. Conder, The two towers, 2001–2013, in: A.L. Johnson (ed.), Wars in Peace: British Military Operations since 1991 (RUSI, London 2014) 77; I.H. Daalder, J.G. Stavridis, NATO’s victory in Libya (2012) 2 Foreign Affairs 2–7. 61 BP (2014). 62 Libyan oil (Medium, Heavy and Light) is highly valued, especially the light fractions which are difficult to replace and are mainly imported by the EU. 63 The loading of oil takes place at Sidra, Ra’s Lanuf, Marsa al Hariga, Zuwetina, Brega, Mellitah, Zawia (Tripoli), Bouri and Farwa, whereas of gas – at Brega. Gas is also exported by a seabed pipeline to Italy (Greenstream). 64 See, for example, C. Fermor, NATO’s decision to intervene in Libya: Realist principles or humanitarian norms? (2012) 8 Journal of Politics and International Studies 342–345. 65 Quoted after G. Chazan, For West’s oil firms, no love lost in Libya (2011) The Wall Street Journal, 15 April 2011. 66 Companies which invested in Libya prior to 2007 were forced to renegotiate the contracts under the conditions of EPSA-­4. As an example, the share of Italy’s Eni in production fell from 35–50 per cent to 12 per cent. If significant deposits were discovered (as was the case with Canada’s Vernex Energy), the company was forced to sell shares to Libya’s NOC. The companies were also forced to limit production. Ibid. 67 Own calculations on the basis of: EC, Monthly and Cumulative Crude Oil Imports into the EU 2001–2015, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/statistics/eu-­crude-oil-­imports (accessed 10 May 2018). 68 At that time, Libyan oil constituted respectively 22, 16 and 13 per cent of consumption in Italy, France and Spain. A. Cala, Europe rethinks dependence on Libyan oil (2011) The Christian Science Monitor, 22 February 2011.

Significance of resource and energy factor   249 69 C. Krauss, Why the disruption of Libyan oil has led to a price spike (2011) New York Times, 28 February 2011. 70 International Oil Daily warned in February that the wave of revolutions would bring about a significant increase in prices and halting supply from Libyan refineries. D.N. Gibbs, Power politics, NATO, and the Libyan intervention (2011) Counterpunch, 15 September 2011. 71 D. Glick, A look at the IEA 2011 Release of Strategic Oil Reserves (2011) www.baker institute.org/media/files/files/d7396022/IFRI-­pub-GlickStrategicOilReserves-­2011.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). 72 E.g. C. Krauss, The scramble for access to Libya’s oil wealth begins (2011) New York Times, 22 August 2011. 73 American governmental agencies estimate the aggregate value of Afghan mineral deposits as over US$900,000,000,000. C.Q. Choi, $1 Trillion Trove of Rare Minerals Revealed Under Afghanistan, 4 September 2014, www.livescience.com/47682-rare-­ earth-minerals-­found-under-­afghanistan.html (accessed 10 May 2018). For comparison, the largest reserves of REE are held by China – an estimated 55,000,000 tonnes. The second and third largest producers of such minerals, i.e. US and India, hold reserves of 1,800,000 and 3,100,000 tonnes respectively. Data for 2014 quoted after USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries (USGS, Washington 2015) 128–129. 74 USGS, Preliminary Assessment of Non-­Fuel Mineral Resources of Afghanistan (USGS, Washington 2007); A.W. Dowd, Silver Lining in Afghanistan? www. independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/afghanistans-­resources-could-­make-it-­the-richest-­ mining-region-­on-earth-­2000507.html (accessed 10 May 2018). 75 Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Oil and Gas Resources, http://mom.gov.af/en/page/4713 (accessed 10 May 2018). 76 Before the Soviet intervention, the resource sector was the field of activity of German, Italian and French companies and in 1955 the Afghanistan Geological Survey was created. In that period of time, Afghanistan was particularly renowned for lapis lazuli and emeralds. 77 Data: Ministry of Mines and Petroleum. Oil production was thus marginal and as for gas, at that time similar production levels were being reached, for example, by the Netherlands. 78 G.J. Orris, J.D. Bliss, Mines and Mineral Occurrences of Afghanistan (2002) USGS Report 3–4. 79 The first results were published by USGS in 2002. 80 Own calculations on the basis of data of the Afghani Ministry of Mines and BP. 81 USGS Report 2012. 82 J. Risen, U.S. identifies vast mineral riches in Afghanistan (2010) New York Times, 13 June 2010. 83 Ibid. 84 Yergin (2012) 79.

References Apple R.W., Jr., Bush says Iraqi aggression threatens ‘Our way of life’ (1990) New York Times, 15 August 1990. BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014 (BP, London 2014). Cala A., Europe rethinks dependence on Libyan oil (2011) The Christian Science Monitor, 22 February 2011. Campbell C.J., Peak oil: A turning for mankind (2001) 2–1 Hubbert Center Newsletter. Chalabi F.J., Middle East oil in the face of world energy transition (2000) 2 The Brown Journal of International Affairs 43–52.

250   Kamila Pronińska Chalmers M., The Strategic Scorecard: Six of ten, in: A.L. Johnson (ed.), Wars in Peace: British Military Operations since 1991 (RUSI, London 2014) 89–136. Chazan G., For West’s oil firms, no love lost in Libya (2011) The Wall Street Journal, 15 April 2011. Choi Ch.Q., $1 Trillion Trove of Rare Minerals Revealed Under Afghanistan, 4 September 2014, www.livescience.com/47682-rare-­earth-minerals-­found-under-­afghanistan. html (accessed 10 May 2018). Conder M., The two towers, 2001–2013, in: A.L. Johnson (ed.), Wars in Peace: British Military Operations since 1991 (RUSI, London 2014) 49–88. Daalder I.H., Stavridis J.G., NATO’s victory in Libya (2012) 2 Foreign Affairs 2–7. Dadwal S.R., The global oil market after 9/11: On a brink of a crisis? (2001) 9 Strategic Analysis 1059–1070. Deffeyes K.S., Hubbert’s Peak: The Impending World Oil Shortage (Princeton University Press, Princeton 2001). DG ENTR, Report on Critical Raw Materials for EU (EU 2014). Dowd A.W., Silver Lining in Afghanistan?, www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/ afghanistans-­resources-could-­make-it-­the-richest-­mining-region-­on-earth-­2000507. html (accessed 10 May 2018). EC (European Commisson), Monthly and Cumulative Crude Oil Imports into the EU 2001–2015, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/statistics/eu-­crude-oil-­imports (accessed 10 May 2018). Fermor C., NATO’s decision to intervene in Libya (2011): Realist principles or humanitarian norms? (2012) 8 Journal of Politics and International Studies, 323–361. Freedman L., Karsh E., The Gulf Conflict 1990–1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1991). Gibbs D.N., Power politics, NATO, and the Libyan intervention (2011) Counterpunch, 15 September 2011. Glick D., A Look at the IEA 2011 Release of Strategic Oil Reserves (2011) www.baker institute.org/media/files/files/d7396022/IFRI-­pub-GlickStrategicOilReserves-­2011.pdf (accessed 10 May 2018). Greenspan A., The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World (Penguin, New York 2007). Gross Stein J., Threat-­based strategies of conflict management: Why did they fail in the Gulf?, in: S.A. Renshon (ed.), The Political Psychology of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, London 1993) 121–154. Heinberg R., The Party’s Over: Oil, War and the Fate of Industrial Societies (New Society Publishers, Gabriola Island 2005). Henderson D.R., Do governments need to go to war for oil?, in: R.E. Looney, Handbook of Oil Politics (Routledge, London/New York 2012) 135–146. IEA (International Energy Agency), Monthly Oil Market Report 1990 (IEA/OECD 1990). IEA (International Energy Agency), World Energy Outlook 2002 (OECD/IEA 2002). Jaffe A.M., Manning R.A., The shocks of a world of cheap oil (2006) 1 Foreign Affairs 16–29. Klare M., Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (Owl Books, New York 2001). Klare M., Blood and Oil: How America’s Thirst for Petrol is Killing us (Hamish-Hamilton, London 2005).

Significance of resource and energy factor   251 Krauss C., Why the disruption of Libyan oil has led to a price spike (2011) New York Times, 28 February 2011. Krauss C., The scramble for access to Libya’s oil wealth begins (2011) New York Times, 22 August 2011. Le Billon P., The political ecology of war: Natural resources and armed conflicts (2001) 5 Political Geography 561–584. Le Billon P., Cervantes A., Oil prices, scarcity and geographies of war (2009) 5 Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 836–844. Manning R.A., Jaffe A.M., The myth of the Caspian ‘Great Game’: The real geopolitics of energy (1998) 4 Survival, 112–129. Martin W.F., Imai R., Steeg H., Maintaining Energy Security in a Global Context, Report to the Trilateral Commission (New York/Paris/Tokyo 1996). Ministry of Mines and Petroleum Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Oil and Gas Resources, http://mom.gov.af/en/page/4713 (accessed 10 May 2018). Mitchell J.V., Renewing the Energy Security (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London 2002). Moran D., Russell J.A., The militarization of energy security (2008) 1 Strategic Insights 1–13. National Energy Policy Group, National Energy Policy, Washington 17 May 2001. O’Sullivan M.L., The entanglement of energy, grand strategy, and international security, in: A. Goldthau (ed.), The Handbook of Global Energy Policy (Wiley-­Blackwell, Hoboken 2013) 30–47. Orris G.J., Bliss J.D., Mines and Mineral Occurrences of Afghanistan (2002) USGS Report. Pronińska K., Energy and security: Regional and global dimensions (2007) SIPRI Yearbook 215–239. Renshon S.A, Good judgment and the lack thereof during the Gulf War: A preliminary psychological model with some applications, in: S.A. Reshon (ed.), The Political Psychology of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh 1993) 67–106. Risen J., U.S. identifies vast mineral riches in Afghanistan (2010) New York Times, 13 June 2010. Ross M., A closer look at oil, diamonds, and civil war (2006) 9 Annual Review of Political Science 265–300. Schwarzkopf, H.N., It Doesn’t Take a Hero (Bantam, New York 1992). Skinner R., Arnott R., The Oil Supply and Demand Context for Security of Oil Supply to the EU from the GCC Countries (Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford 2005). Skons E., Perdomo C., Perlo-­Freeman S., Stalenheim P., Military expenditure (2004) SIPRI Yearbook 205–239. USGS (US Geological Survey), Preliminary Assessment of Non-­Fuel Mineral Resources of Afghanistan (USGS, Washington 2007). USGS (US Geological Survey), Mineral Commodity Summaries (USGS, Washington 2015). Victor D.G., What resource wars? (2007) 11 The National Interest 48–55. Wayne S.J., President Bush goes to war: A psychological interpretation from a distance, in: S.A. Renshon (ed.), The Political Psychology of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict (University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh 1993) 29–48. Winzer C., Conceptualizing energy security (2012) 46 Energy Policy 36–48. Yergin D., The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World (Free Press, London 2012).

12 Conclusions On the effectiveness of Western interventions – the more we practice, the less we achieve? Marek Madej 12.1  Success or victory, effectiveness or efficacy and can we measure it? The question of assessing Western interventions through the lens of the results they achieved is the most fundamental for this book, but simultaneously one of the most complex too. On the one hand, the effects of a given operation are a key factor in determining the validity of the intervening parties’ actions, as well as their impact on international stability, therefore pertaining to questions forming the crux of discussions on interventionism. At the same time, however, an unambiguous assessment of the results of individual operations, i.e. their efficacy and – even more – their effectiveness, is particularly difficult. First, even the current analytical and terminological framework for the description of military activities in the case of operations termed ‘interventions’ constitutes an issue. As discussed in detail elsewhere in this volume, the traditional understanding of victory, harking back to the works of Clausewitz, taken as defeating the enemy by destroying his military potential, usually constituting his centre of gravity (Schwerpunkt),1 is not particularly applicable to contemporary multilateral military interventions. Interventions are not wars in the traditional meaning of the term, in which the objective is to achieve such a victory over the enemy. These activities should aim to restore regional or global stability, e.g. by bringing about an end to the fighting or attempting to neutralise a certain threat (e.g. posed by terrorist groups or an aggressive regime) to international peace and, thus, the intervening parties themselves. In such cases, the ultimate objective is very rarely a total destruction of a military potential of a state (or non-­state entity) targeted by the intervention, nor its conquest, i.e. permanently depriving it of sovereignty and subjecting it to outside authority. Quite the contrary, an intervention, even one comprising intensive combat activities, should often foresee the inclusion of all sides to the fighting – after they have ceased their hostile activities – in the cooperation for lasting peace. So in such cases the term ‘victory’ is not particularly useful, especially when traditionally defined.2 The remedy could be – besides attempts to redefine this very idea (such as the one made in this volume by R. Kupiecki) – replacing this term with more flexible category of ‘success’ of the operation, even though some may see it as

Conclusions   253 dodging the subject. However, the term ‘success’ is flexible to a degree due to its vague, relative nature and high dependence on the context of the particular endeavour, so a final assessment of it in the case of given intervention would actually remain a hard task. Second, it is debatable whether, while discussing success of the mission, what should be assessed is the simple efficacy of the mission – i.e. the extent of achievement of set objectives, regardless of costs this incurred – or rather their effectiveness/efficiency, i.e. the degree of fulfilment of the intervening parties’ goals in relation to the contributions made by them and considering the costs and other negative consequences, both intended and unintended, in particular for the intervening parties themselves, but not excluding the results for other countries and the international community as a whole. The difference between these two categories seems obvious, since a successful mission (one which achieved its objectives) may at the same time be highly ineffective, with the costs of attaining set goals proving to be too great.3 There are many examples of such pyrrhic victories throughout history. However, it is certainly relatively easier to precisely define efficacy of the mission, not effectiveness, which can encourage using the former of these categories. Third, the question must be settled as to what to take into account when assessing both efficacy and efficiency/effectiveness. The seemingly obvious solution – verifying the objectives of the operation and checking the degree of their fulfilment – is illusory because it does not consider several factors. After all, the objectives of the mission may be faultily and ambiguously formulated, which is not only to say that they ultimately proved to be unattainable and unrealistic (as it would naturally entail ineffectiveness of the mission). Worse still is if the objectives of a given mission were formulated precisely, but – either intentionally or not – in such a way as to cause their irrelevance, meaning that even their total fulfilment would not bring the expected improvement of the situation, nor fully remove the reasons for taking action in the first place. Considering such an operation successful or effective for the sole reason that its declared results have formally been achieved would be questionable, particularly if at the time of initiating the mission (or during its course) it became apparent both that the declared intentions are incompatible with the requirements of the situation (e.g. with solving the problems underlying the intervention) and that the military action would have long-­term, negative consequences (e.g. a new conflict flaring up), undermining its – at the time merely temporal – achievements.4 At the same time, it would be a mistake to see in each of the interventions the direct source of all failures of the peace process following them, regardless of the time of their occurrence, the nature of the link with the decision to conduct an intervention, its course or manner of its conclusion.5  Undoubtedly, one must adopt an appropriate temporal perspective; this applies not only to the lasting and immediate effect of conducted activities (i.e. which of the events and processes following the intervention can be deemed inevitable, direct consequences of intervention and which are rather the outcome of decisions and activities undertaken after its conclusion) but also to the amount

254   Marek Madej of time passing between the end of the mission and the moment of its assessment. One must also keep in mind that the objectives of an operation could be modified substantially during its course, often aiming to increase the chances of success. In such cases, a verification of achievement of the initial goals would only partially enable a determination of the actual effectiveness or efficacy of the operation. Finally, it would be advisable to confront the assessments of the ultimate results of the mission in the light of their declared or actual goals with the determinable – even if by counterfactual inference – consequences of projected omission or termination of such activities. Developing tools for the assessment of effectiveness and efficacy of missions enabling the due inclusion of all of the above-­mentioned factors would however be an exceedingly complicated challenge and one which could arguably lead to readily questionable, simplifying solutions and determinations. Moreover, the complexity of the matrix of factors relevant to such assessment, as well as usually really unique characteristics of every single intervention, suggest a reliance on qualitative methods rather than efforts to built some quantitative model of analysis. Therefore, conscious of the restrictions inherent with such approach, here the starting point of the assessment of the interventions’ effectiveness would be discussion of the degree of achievement of declared and actual objectives set for individual interventions (i.e. assessment of their efficacy), supplemented, however, by consideration, wherever possible in reliable manner, of other relevant indicators, in order to make the presented conclusions as comprehensive as possible.

12.2  Effectiveness of Western interventions – overview of cases 12.2.1  The Gulf (Iraq – Kuwait 1990–1991) Among all post-­Cold War interventions carried out by the West, the operation against Iraq in 1990–1991 was probably the most successful and effective. This judgement is not changed even by the argument that not bringing about the downfall of Saddam Hussein’s regime (which, however, was more a consequence favoured by some intervening parties than an objective of the mission in itself ) means it could be deemed an ‘unfinished war’.6 The intervention objectives – both declared and (quite similar) actual ones – were achieved essentially in full. Allegations of any failures may only be formed with respect to goals considered secondary.7 Indeed, the operation did not bring about the end of Saddam Hussein’s regime, but that was not, as mentioned, its clearly defined goal. Nevertheless, Iraq was forced to withdraw from Kuwait, at the same time being significantly weakened in a military and economic sense. That had reduced its capacity to destabilise the regional and global order. This in turn enabled the creation of a more favourable – from the perspective of the international community (or at least the intervening parties) – balance of power in this strategically important region, increasing its overall stability. At the same time the results of the Gulf War, particularly the lack of a clear act of capitulation,8 the

Conclusions   255 failure of Shia and Kurdish uprisings (as mentioned, instigated to a degree by the intervening parties but ultimately not supported), the relatively swift rebuilding of the Iraqi regime, and finally the permanent presence of US forces in the region (being a cause for the spread of fundamentalist views) – all of this mitigates to an extent the positive assessment of the effectiveness of the intervention but does not invalidate it completely. The costs of the intervention, considering the scale of employed resources, and – when including Desert Shield – the duration of the entire operation, proved to be moderate, particularly with regard to casualties.9 The financial expenses could probably have been lower, were it not for the chosen strategy of obtaining overwhelming superiority – if not in numbers, then in quality – over the enemy before the intervention. This prolonged the operation and incurred additional spending, yet increased the chances of success and helped to avoid public opposition to the intervention. Furthermore, preceding Desert Storm with Desert Shield reduced the period of actual fighting and the number of casualties. At the same time the broadly understood consequences of the intervention for regional and international stability proved to be, at least in a short time, positive, especially for the intervening parties. Punishment of the Saddam Hussein regime for the aggression and liberation of Kuwait strengthened the newly established, liberal and West-­centric world order. A geo-­strategically important region was stabilised and the possibilities to control and manage oil and gas markets were broadened. This positive image is obviously marred by the negative humanitarian consequences of the intervention (particularly for Shia and Kurds in Iraq), but these issues were not a priority for the interveners and had not an imminent impact, at least on global stability. Hence, all in all, the intervention in Iraq should be considered a success, both with respect to stated objectives and actual ones. 12.2.2  Bosnia-­Herzegovina The results of Western involvement in the Bosnian conflict can be approached from two angles due to the two possible ways of understanding the scope of the intervention.10 When restricting the analysis solely to the ‘proper’ intervention, i.e. Operation Deliberate Force (ODF; summer 1995), then it was seemingly a complete success. All set objectives had been achieved, forcing the withdrawal of Serb forces from the area around Sarajevo and most other threatened positions, thereby allowing the Bosnian-­Croat forces to take the initiative in the conflict. That resulted in an end of the fighting and the consent of Bosnian Serbs to peace negotiations on terms decided chiefly by the West. Importantly enough, that was achieved swiftly (after de facto 11 days of bombardment), with almost no losses (one aircraft – from over 400 – shot down; two pilots temporarily detained) and limited collateral damage (probably no more than 30 civilian deaths caused directly by the airstrikes).11 As such, ODF was as effective as it was successful, also because it brought positive results in a broader sense, eventually reinforcing – as a key factor leading to the end of the Bosnian conflict

256   Marek Madej – international stability in the region and increasing – as a demonstration of NATOS’s ability to act (although mainly thanks to the strong US leadership) – the internal cohesion of the West. More complex would be the assessment of the effectiveness of the Western involvement in Bosnia-­Herzegovina in a broader context, including the efforts preceding ODF, made both through NATO and the UN framework. Considering that these attempts were primarily aimed at ending the conflicts raging in the Balkans, as well as at least mitigating their serious humanitarian consequences, then the fact that for a long time they did not bring any positive results suggests less positive assessment of their effectiveness. An earlier decision to act more decisively would most probably have helped to end the conflict sooner, and therefore limit the number of casualties and the scale of destruction caused. It would also have entailed lower costs of the involvement and helped to strengthen the normative order by implementing UN decisions on the Bosnian conflict earlier. Therefore, in the wider view it is harder to see the international West-­led intervention in Bosnia-­Herzegovina as an undisputed success, particularly in humanitarian terms.12 Nevertheless, chiefly due to the results of its final phase (ODF ) and the fact that ultimately its most important objectives have been achieved (even if not along the ‘simplest’, optimal path and not as quickly as might have been possible), even the Western involvement in Bosnia-­Herzegovina in a general sense should be interpreted as relatively successful. 12.2.3  Kosovo Certainly, a final assessment of Operation Allied Force’s (OAF ) effectiveness in Kosovo cannot be as positive as for those of the missions discussed so far. The Alliance’s action proved successful in the sense that they forced Belgrade to stop repressions against Albanians in Kosovo (or, to be more precise, they made it impossible by weakening the military and economic potential of Yugoslavia – and ultimately by de facto excluding Kosovo from Serbian control). That means meeting the central objectives of the operation. Moreover, small NATO losses (two aircraft and two servicemen) also suggest that a third, less clearly stated, but no less important goal of the operation – presenting the Alliance as capable of effectively shaping the international security order – was attained too. The problem however remains in the effectiveness of the operation understood broadly, i.e. its outcome in relation to the costs. This is less about the financial contributions of the intervening parties (these weren’t particularly high from their perspective, also due to the adopted strategy of exclusive reliance on airstrikes) or other economic consequences of OAF (although it is worth remembering that for the economy of Yugoslavia it was a significant blow). More importantly, however, due to the adopted strategy focused on minimising risks for intervening forces, its short-­term consequence was a dramatic deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Kosovo and a steep increase of the number of refugees (to the level of 860,000).13 Additionally, while the operation did manage to prevent the destabilisation – not very probable – of the Balkans as a

Conclusions   257 whole, it failed to ease Serbian–Albanian tensions. Quite the contrary, to some extent it created new, fortunately local, ‘hotspots’ in the Balkans (Albanian communities in southern Serbia and Macedonia).14 Furthermore, the weaknesses of NATO revealed during the course of the operation (i.e. scarcity of some key capabilities, such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)) did cast some shadow on the image of the Alliance as a central security institution in Europe. Finally, both the lack of a UN mandate for the operation and criticism of invoking the idea of a humanitarian intervention to legitimise it (particularly in the light of adopted strategies) had a negative impact on the international normative order (although its deficiencies stimulated later evolution of humanitarian intervention into the concept of ‘responsibility to protect’). Therefore OAF, despite achievement of the main objectives of the mission and due to its unplanned costs and consequences, must be assessed as only a partial success. 12.2.4  Afghanistan Although the ISAF operation has been concluded relatively recently, it is hard not to agree that it has ended in failure. Yes, the interveners did actually manage to achieve the most immediate objectives fairly quickly (over less than three months). They substantially weakened Al-­Qaeda’s structures in Afghanistan, effectively depriving that particular organisation ability to carry out a coordinated global terrorist campaign. They toppled the Taliban and at least partially rebuilt this way international perception of the US (and the West) as the military superpower, which had been tarnished somewhat by the 9/11 attacks. Lastly, they initiated the reconstruction of the Afghan political and economic system towards democracy and a market economy. However, achieving such goals was, already in the outset of the intervention, defined as merely its first, somewhat preliminary phase. Only the attainment of long-­term objectives, i.e. transforming Afghanistan into a stable democratic state, economically viable and developing, that no longer provided a safe haven for terrorists or extremists, would constitute a success in light of the original assumptions. This, however, is not the case – despite some (rather temporary) achievements, Afghanistan definitely did not become a stable democracy and thriving economy and the internal armed conflict there is still among the most intensive in the world. Moreover, although due to the complexity and durability of obstacles encountered the interveners had reduced their expectations to merely reduction of the intensity of fighting there to the level manageable for Afghan security forces, they ultimately were not able to complete even that task when ISAF ended.15 The failure of engagement in Afghanistan is even more evident when confronted with its costs (broadly defined). The number of troops involved and financial resources spent (not only by Western states), unique in the post-­Cold War period, an unprecedentedly high level of casualties among coalition forces and the local population, serious material destruction in Afghanistan itself – all this proves a very low effectiveness of ISAF, particularly in the light of the failure in achieving long-­term objectives.16 Additionally, the intervention had a

258   Marek Madej generally destabilising effect on regional (particularly) and global international relations, in time stimulating rather than inhibiting international terrorist activity and reducing both the cohesion of the West and its abilities to act effectively, also due to ‘expending’ in Afghanistan a significant portion of Western – after all, not unlimited – military (and also financial) resources.17 In this context, the intervention in Afghanistan appears as the greatest, and at least the most costly, fiasco of Western contemporary interventionism. 12.2.5  Iraq 2003–2010 The second intervention in Iraq (2003–2010) is a very peculiar case in the context of effectiveness. Since its objectives were from the very outset defined erroneously at best (or rather intentionally presented falsely), assessing their level of fulfilment would be pointless.18 Iraq could not have been disarmed of weapons it did not have; the intervention could not break Baghdad’s ties to terrorists, which were non-­existent (except for limited contacts with Palestinian groups of little importance to global security). Since the intervention was carried out without the appropriate mandate of a competent institution (the UN) and to eliminate a threat which was largely invented, the use of force in this instance could hardly find a justification in the interests of the international community. Hence, the very fact that it occurred, regardless of its final results, had negative consequences for the international normative order, thereby striking a blow against the interests of the intervening parties themselves. Nevertheless, the fake nature of the stated objectives does not necessarily mean that the intervening parties could not have attained their actual goals. Here too, however, it is hard to speak in terms of a success. Despite the successful toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the interveners did not manage subsequently to stabilise Iraq. That forced them to continue the combat military involvement much longer than planned, until 2010. Iraq’s continuous instability made achieving the majority of the most probable actual objectives of the interveners (at least of the chief initiators) impossible. It did not allow for safe and direct access to Iraq’ oil and gas reserves, nor for a relocation of American forces from Saudi Arabia. It also prohibited the democratisation of the (broader) Middle East, for which a stable, democratic, post-­Saddam Iraq was to be the stepping stone. Satisfaction – and even then, only partial – can only be related to the needs of some groups of interests (e.g. primarily US business companies interested in profits from the rebuilding of Iraq) or some members of the coalition (which wanted to strengthen their ties with the US and consequently international position as well).19 And if the majority of the original actual objectives of the intervening parties was not realised, then the success of the mission, and its effectiveness as well, prove to be miniscule. However, while the intervention lasted and difficulties grew, the objectives themselves were extensively reduced, to the building of a relatively stable Iraq (which indirectly confirmed the low effectiveness of initial efforts).20 These far less ambitious goals were also only partially attained – when the interveners’

Conclusions   259 combat activities were concluded in 2010, the intensity of the internal conflict was less than in previous years, but nevertheless substantial part of Iraq’s state structures and economy remained fragile. Hence, even if the later turn of events – including the emergence of the Islamic State in Northern Iraq and its rapid expansion in 2014 – was not completely the responsibility of the interveners (or not solely theirs), the mission should be judged as highly ineffective. The scale of contributions made and losses suffered, as well as the costs for the civilian population of Iraq and negative impact on regional and global international order are wholly out of proportion to the rather meagre results, i.e. the partial and – ultimately just temporary – stabilisation of Iraq. In essence, the intervention in Iraq was – like the mission in Afghanistan – a blatant failure. 12.2.6  Libya Intervention in Libya in 2011 is another unique case, substantially distinct from the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact, in Libya not only declared goals were generally achieved (the protection of the civilian population from the Gaddafi regime), but also some undeclared explicitly, but preferred, outcomes (i.e. toppling Gaddafi) had materialised. Moreover, the operation was rather short (though twice longer than initially planned) and its costs were relatively limited –US spending on the Libyan mission was merely slightly over US$1,000,000,000 (while in 2011 the US spent some US$113,000,000,000 on the engagement in Afghanistan).21 Most importantly, there were no casualties and very limited losses in materiel among interveners. However, judging the results of the intervention in Libya solely through the lens of its narrow, officially stated goals would be a big error. Irrespective of the limited declarations, the involvement in Libya was actually supposed to permanently stabilise the situation in the country and, as a consequence, in the entire region (if only by creating conditions for its eventual peaceful rebuilding). It was also to contribute to strengthening certain humanitarian principles, in particular the idea of responsibility to protect used for justification of the mission. However, the operation actually led to the opposite, ultimately spreading the chaos in Libya and to neighbouring countries. Moreover, it opened the way to uncontrollable migration from the region, thereby causing new challenges even for interveners themselves, at least for European ones. All that nullified any positive results of the intervention achieved in its initial phase. Additionally, the interveners, by their unprecedentedly broad interpretation of the mandate granted by UNSC resolutions (S/RES/1973 in particular), further undermined the authority of the Council (making it also harder to reach a consensus in future cases similar to the Libyan) and put in doubt the utility and feasibility of R2P.22 The outcome of the Libyan mission regarding the cohesion of the West was also not clear-­cut. On one hand, it proved that the West was still capable of operating relatively effectively in a military sense. On the other, it revealed both important political divisions among Western states and substantial gaps in military capabilities, not only between the US and Europeans, but also between

260   Marek Madej various European NATO members. Finally, even some state-­specific, individual considerations that justified the mission, important particularly for France, were achieved in part, at best.23 Hence, the intervention in Libya may be considered, although with some reservations, as at best a partial success. Moreover, it is possible to make such an assessment only thanks to a certain ‘caution’ of the intervening parties who – definitely remembering their Afghani and Iraqi experience – purposefully limited the scope of the involvement, attempting in a way to evade the responsibility for a lasting stabilisation of Libya and its post-­conflict reconstruction. Nevertheless, although the actual collapse of Libyan statehood, which was largely a result of the intervention, was not what interveners wanted to achieve, it was a rather easily predictable outcome of the military involvement. Not preparing a plan for it was rather avoiding responsibility, not prudence. Thus, the Libyan intervention brought consequences as negative as the preceding operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and its assessment could be somewhat artificially ‘improved’ only by manipulating in some way the definition of its official objectives.

12.3  A worrying trajectory: decreasing efficacy and efficiency of Western military interventions The analyses presented in this volume and summarised briefly in the previous section offer the chance to formulate some more general conclusions on the trends in the effectiveness of interventions. Probably the most striking and disturbing among them would be that in the post-­Cold War period the effectiveness of Western intervention was rather decreasing than increasing with time. Obviously, none of the Western interventions proved to be an indisputable and comprehensive success (due to – rather unintended, albeit often predictable – negative consequences and/or interveners’ underachievement). Nevertheless, whereas in the first post-­Cold War decade the interventions proved to be successful (Iraq 1990–1991, ODF in Bosnia-­Herzegovina in 1995) or at least partially effective Table 12.1  Results of Western interventions in the post-Cold War period The Gulf Bosnia-Herzegovina Kosovo Afghanistan Iraq Libya 2003–2010 1993–1995 1995 Declared S objectives Actual S objectives

PS

S

PS

F

F

PS

PS

S

PS

F

F

F

Source: author’s own work. Notes S – success (full or substantial achievement of objectives). PS – partial success (partial achievement). F – failure (no goals achieved).

Conclusions   261 (Kosovo 1999, Bosnia-­Herzegovina 1992–1995), all later Western operations ended with a clear (Iraq after 2003, Afghanistan) or relative failure (Libya).24 This tendency is particularly surprising since the experience gained during early interventions should help to avoid the mistakes similar to those made in their course. Moreover, since one of the goals of the early post-­Cold War interventions was buttressing Western dominance in the world, so the success (even partial) in this respect would have meant more favourable conditions for the activities of the West in the following years. Finally, as pointed out by enthusiasts of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the development of military technologies should increase the ability to act more precisely and therefore more effectively as well. As it turned out, however, after the ‘(relatively) successful nineties’ (although it is somehow symptomatic that the least efficient was the last intervention of that period, in Kosovo), the years after 2001 were rather a ‘long decade’ of failures. There are, however, some clear differences between the missions of the 1990s and later operations, perhaps decisive for the disparities in their effectiveness. Missions undertaken in the first post-­Cold War decade usually had clear and strictly defined objectives. They were to achieve a certain ‘end result’, which often meant putting an end to a particular situation (occupation of Kuwait, fighting in Bosnia-­Herzegovina, oppression of Albanians in Kosovo) and creating conditions for developing a peace agreement by the warring factions, not a deep reconstruction of the status quo. From the very beginning they were also connected with attempts to find a political solution to the conflict underlying the intervention, formulated with the participation of other institutions and delegates of all the main parties to the dispute, including erstwhile enemies (see the Dayton agreement or UNSC S/RES/1244 adopted after the OAF ).25 Post-­2001 missions, on the other hand, served to fulfil broader, far-­reaching goals connected with a regime change and comprehensive reconstruction of the country targeted for intervention. Consequently, they were intended to reshape the international order as well, at least in the regional dimension. This meant that the regime which was to be changed could actually not be a partner in peace negotiations and stabilisation processes after the conflict. Additionally, missions from the first post-­Cold War decade were designed to be a part of larger process. Hence, they required a follow-­up in the form of non-­military efforts for a permanent settlement of the situation in a given region carried out after their conclusion, usually by a different institution than the one organising the intervention (the UN, the EU), or alternatively a continuation of military involvement by the intervening parties, though not in the form of combat activities (IFOR/SFOR missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, KFOR in Kosovo). Post-­2001 interventions on the other hand, with the peculiar – as already noted – Libyan exception, were supposed to bring about permanent solutions and come to an end – at least according to initial assumptions – only after achieving lasting stability in the targeted country or region. As a consequence, these missions requiring a coordinated, simultaneous use of military and – significantly greater – non-­military resources. That makes them incomparably more complex, which undoubtedly

262   Marek Madej increased the difficulty of the entire endeavour. Additionally, with such over-­ arching, long-­term goals, they simply had to continue longer than those from the 1990s. It also seems, although in this respect it is harder to draw a clear and indisputable distinction between the 1990s and twenty-­first century interventions (if only because of the mission in Afghanistan), that the earlier ones were characterised by a greater degree of conformity between the actual and stated objectives. Seemingly the greater the discrepancy between declarations and actual intentions, the harder it is to obtain satisfying results, if only due to the necessity to simultaneously pursue – at least to a degree enabling the preservation of the international credibility of the intervention – not only actual objectives, but also official ones, what impedes the optimal use of the resources. This is linked to the issue of the legal/institutional legitimacy of the interveners’ actions, which in the case of missions undertaken after 2001, even if initially strong – as with the operation in Afghanistan or Libya (UNSC mandate) – gradually weakened during the course of the operation and after revealing the discrepancies between declared and actual objectives. In the case of the intervention in Iraq it was dubious even from the very beginning. Finally, the nature of the objectives of particular interventions had also to have an impact on the choice of strategies for their realisation, which in itself could affect their effectiveness. The 1990s’ missions were rather brief air campaigns or – as in the case of Iraq – air-­ground battles. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were mainly ground missions, while in Libya attacks were restricted to aerial ones partially in the hope of regaining the efficacy (at least in the military sense) typical for the interventions from the 1990s. Air campaigns, much more than ground operations, offered the possibility of employing technological superiority and limiting own casualties which, as a consequence, should – due to reducing costs – increase the chances for greater mission effectiveness. All these differences between interventions from the 1990s and those of the twenty-­first century allow us to identify some reasons for the generally lower effectiveness achieved after 2001, but they do not explain fully why these missions ended in a less or more visible fiasco in the first place. Possibly one of the main causes of failures after 2001 was the method of defining mission objectives. After 9/11 they were formulated – objectively speaking – remarkably ambitiously, especially as for missions with a primarily military character. Those conducted after 2001 focused on nation- or state-­ building, spreading democracy and regime change.26 That required comprehensive, profound transformation of the host states from authoritarian to a somewhat more democratic structure.27 However, the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan remained primarily military missions, with the main consideration – despite the complexity of interveners’ objectives and tasks – still being the employment of military means and ‘defeating the enemy’. This, in turn, essentially from the very outset, made it difficult to fully realise the intervening parties’ intentions, condemning them to, at best, a partial success or to the need for redefining their goals and limiting ambitions in the course of the mission

Conclusions   263 (with no guarantee of achieving those modified ones either). Additionally, in Iraq and Afghanistan (and most probably Libya as well), the initial conditions – i.e. the situation in the country at the outset of its reconstruction – were far from favourable to pro-­democratic changes and building firm state structures.28 As a result, interventions undertaken after 2001, with their broad and ambitious goals (which may have been somehow encouraged by the relative successes from earlier years29) were from the very inception endeavours with limited chances of success. It would have been hard to succeed even with the full determination of their participants manifested by the use of sufficiently extensive manpower and resources, not to mention a situation in which the restrictions in this respect were visible since the beginning.30 An interesting and important – in this context – regularity in Western interventions (or, to be more precise – American ones) was indicated by Gideon Rose. In the case of complex interventions intended to cause a regime change, but at the same time with a distinct, strictly combat initial phase, there is a tendency to concentrate on that ‘phase one’ in the planning and preparations, i.e. on activities seeking the defeat and toppling of the erstwhile government. Political goals of the operation – a lasting state reconstruction and stabilisation – as appearing in later stages of the involvement, draw much less attention, becoming a somewhat secondary consideration. The presence of this tendency in planning is probably inevitable to some degree since the state achieved due to implementation of ‘phase one’ would condition the interveners’ further activities. That limits the chance for development of comprehensive strategies for later phases of involvement. Nevertheless, it also means that the level of preparedness to achieve all set objectives, particularly the long-­term ones, proved to be insufficient, whereas the manner of implementing ‘kinetic’ phase one (defeating the enemy) could even preclude ultimate success.31 So, quite paradoxically, more ambitious and complex objectives were accompanied by a less precise, unfinished and not very detailed plan of achieving them.32 This in turn is connected with another ‘deadly sin’ of Western interventions in the last decade, perhaps with the exception of the brief intervention in Libya: a high fluidity of adopted strategies in the course of the operations and the reluctance to assign sufficient – in terms of quality and quantity – resources for their realisation. This changeability was not caused only by the efforts to adapt to an evolving environment. Equally important were the aforementioned unpreparedness for the mission, an insufficient understanding of the complexity of the adopted objectives and tasks to achieve them and, as a consequence, a certain ‘optimism’ when judging the possibilities of minimising the financial and human costs of the involvement. A result was a lack of strategic patience exhibited by expectations for quick results from the adopted approach, and usually premature abandonment of it when the results did not appear or if their costs proved to be high. The best example of that is the course of the largest intervention of the West – the operation in Afghanistan.33 An additional issue is the tension between the requirements on the interveners’ force protection and a successful, efficient completion of the mission objectives.

264   Marek Madej When the reasons for engaging in combat operation are different than the need to defend oneself from an immediate threat of aggression (e.g. attempts to restore international stability or promote certain values), i.e. in wars undertaken, so to speak, ‘by choice’ rather than by necessity, the tolerance for the loss of some of the resources used, particularly casualties among human personnel, is generally low. This in turn generates a tendency to minimise risks and stimulates efforts to redistribute them to other entities – the enemy, but also, if this appears inevitable (or beneficial) the civilian population in the region. Martin Shaw accurately described this as ‘risk-­transfer war’.34 This tendency leads to choosing options ‘safe for the intervening parties’, though not necessarily the most effective in the context of the mission’s objectives, as illustrated by the humanitarian intervention model conducted with either a chief or exclusive use of aircraft or long-­ range weapons (e.g. guided missiles, combat drones). This certainly minimises the threat of substantial losses (and as a consequence a likely drop in popular support for the operation, if only due to the so-­called ‘body-­bag syndrome’ or ‘casualty phobia’).35 At the same time it increases, however, the risk of collateral damage. This means that the actual effectiveness of the mission decreases, especially in the context of protecting the civilian population, making it more difficult, if not impossible, to achieve its goals. In the case of operations requiring a permanent military presence in the theatre of operations and the deployment of ground forces, such as nation-­building missions, the tendency to reduce risk will usually lead to a more heavy-­handed approach, concentrated on force protection. Such a stance – ‘shoot any suspicious targets or at least demonstrate a full willingness to do so before your enemy has the chance to attack at all’ – constitutes a measure protecting the troops of the intervening parties from casualties, and simultaneously could discourage – by indicating the possibility of severe punishment – the civilian population from supporting the enemy. Unfortunately, at the same time it will impede works on friendly relations with the local communities, actually complicating the matter of building support for the intervention forces.36 Naturally, the aforementioned factors are probably not the only ones that contributed to the low effectiveness of Western interventions over the last decade. Without a doubt, a massive, some would say decisive, obstacle preventing success in Iraq or Afghanistan was the fact that both these greatly demanding operations were – ‘wishfully’, so to speak – conducted simultaneously. That had to limit the availability of required resources. Nor can the significance of the attitudes of non-­Western members of the international community towards the intervening parties’ actions be discounted, in particular neighbouring states to the countries targeted for invasion. The existence of a ‘safe haven’ for Taliban insurgents in northern Pakistan, which was in fact tolerated by the authorities of that country, constituted a nigh-­unsolvable problem for the strategy of the operation in Afghanistan, while the aid granted by Iran to radical Shia militias in Iraq severely complicated any efforts to stabilise the country.37 The at best limited international support for Western interventions, from the very beginning (Iraq) or present at later, but still crucial stages of the involvement (Libya, Afghanistan), was definitely also not helping. Nevertheless, seemingly it was the factors

Conclusions   265 over which the intervening parties themselves could exert as full a control as possible, i.e. the manner of defining the mission objectives and strategies for achieving them, which had a key impact on the effectiveness of Western interventions.

12.4  Consequences and prospects The decreasing effectiveness of Western military interventions had a number of negative consequences not only for the West, but for the entire international community as well. The most obvious one was the exceedingly high, particularly in the light of achieved results, costs in terms of life and materials of Western involvement in stabilising international security. Failures of such activities, despite the contributions made, and in light of increasing doubts over the consistency of the stated objectives with actual intentions and interests of the interveners, affected the international credibility of Western states as being guided by utilitarian motives and a sense of duty towards the international community, as well as being capable of effectively implementing their plans. In other words, the failures (or at best the limited successes) of the West’s interventions weakened its legitimacy to hold a central position in the international system. This in turn gradually, yet distinctly, lowered the determination of Western governments and citizens not only to initiate interventions in situations where this might have appeared necessary (as evidenced by the reactions of Western societies to the events in Syria in the aftermath of the Arab Spring), but even – see the Afghani case – to consistently strive to achieve the stated objectives in already ongoing operations. Moreover, the limited success (at best) of the West’s efforts combined with the waning moral, legal and ‘practical’ (i.e. ‘ability to deliver’) legitimacy over time started to encourage other states to autonomously undertake interventions as ‘equally justified’, even if their effectiveness also prove to be meagre and the intentions are equally (at least) unclear and not necessarily utilitarian. A proliferation of interventionists’ practices (i.e. Russia in Crimea, western Ukraine and Syria, of Saudi Arabia in Yemen) means a certain lowering – not in a legal, but a practical sense – of the bar of acceptance (or tolerance) for using armed force in international relations, causing further erosion of norms relevant in this context and authority of such institution like UNSC. The often failed and controversial, from a moral and legal point of view, interventions of Western states contributed greatly to this state of affairs. In part due to the above reasons, after the failures of the recent largest interventions, the political elites, but also the societies in the West, have generally come to the conclusion that such missions, whenever possible, are to be avoided. This pertained in particular to nation-­building operations, such those in Iraq and in Afghanistan, due to the high costs of such endeavours (financial, political, social etc.), their protracted and complex nature, as well as the difficulty in achieving a clear success. The fact that such interventions could be done usually at the request of the host government and with substantial international support changes little.

266   Marek Madej Nevertheless, the ‘no more Afghanistan’ approach, tempting as it may be, cannot be a panacea for the ineffectiveness of Western interventions, just as closing one’s eyes does not remove one’s problems, but merely enables forgetting them for a while. In the end, the interventions of Western states in the post-­ Cold War period were the answer (albeit not always the most appropriate one) to real security challenges for them and the entire international community. Hence the importance of any available alternatives to the erstwhile model of Western interventions. One of the basic options here could be interventions conducted from a safe distance (‘over the horizon’), i.e. solely in the form of aerial operations, with an increasing use of unmanned vehicles (UAVs). To a certain degree, this turn is evidenced by such operations as the antiterrorist drone campaigns in northern Pakistan or Yemen or the ongoing actions of the international coalition against the Islamic State.38 The attractiveness of such a model stems from the fact that it allows use of the technological superiority of Western states (particularly the US) over the enemy and guarantees a high degree of force protection for the intervening forces, thereby redistributing the risk associated with the use of armed force to others. Nevertheless, as past experiences have shown, it is hard to prove that this way, i.e. relying solely on air forces and long-­range weapons systems, could lead to permanent solution of the problems underlying the decision to intervene. Such efforts bring to mind treatment of symptoms (e.g. by destroying terrorist cells) instead of healing the source of the disease (causes of armed conflict, terrorism etc.), thereby resulting in mediocre results and partial solutions for the crisis. Moreover, due to the resultant transfer of risk accompanying the use of force primarily to entities, including civilians, in the area of operations, they may increase the hostility towards the intervening parties among the local communities and reduce international support for an operation thus conducted. In such a case, they could in practice prove to be counter-­ productive. Another option is the return to the logic of a ‘Concert of Powers’ in which the ‘responsibility’ for stabilising given regions of the world would be shared by the West with other powers or regional organisations, having progressively greater capabilities in this respect (particularly in the military sense) and – as mentioned – already exhibiting a growing willingness to undertake such action. Nevertheless, this solution would compound even further the threat of excessive freedom of all states – often driven by their own particular interests – in deciding to intervene. It also increases the risk that interventions would be carried out in a fashion that allow the concealment or dilution of responsibility of the intervening party.39 Hence, it does not appear that such a model would be more promising for international stability. In this situation, it seems that also in the future, the West – on its own or in cooperation with other states or organisations – will not be able to avoid undertaking military intervention in response to a crisis, regardless of its past failures and dwindling effectiveness. This means that the experience gained by Western states, even though particularly in the last decade hardly satisfying, cannot serve

Conclusions   267 as a pretext to abandon an active stance towards issues, but rather should constitute an opportunity to draw conclusions for the future and learn some lessons, especially in the context of cooperation with relevant international institutions and respecting international norms concerning use of force. Apparently, also in this case, the learning will have to be taken from – often painful – mistakes.

Notes   1 Preferably, such victory being the result of a single decisive battle. See B. Heuser, Reading Clausewitz (Pimlico, London 2002) 74–76.   2 See also: R. Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (Vintage Books, New York 2008), part. 272–280, 336–348; J. Angstrom, I. Duvesteyn (eds), Understanding Victory and Defeat in Contemporary War (Routledge, London 2007).   3 S. Barela, Introduction: Legitimacy as a target, in: S. Barela (ed.), Legitimacy and Drones: Investigating the Legality, Morality and Efficacy of UCAVs (Ashgate, Farnham 2015) 17–18.   4 This is well illustrated by the case of the Libyan intervention of 2011, where the declared objectives of international forces were purposefully formulated in a way which provided chances for their fulfilment, yet making it impossible to permanently solve the problems prompting the involvement or avoid the negative consequences of military intervention (i.e. chaos in the country after toppling the erstwhile dictatorship). See Chapter 6 and further section of this concluding chapter.   5 Such thinking is visible, for example, in the frequent assertion that the anti-­American terrorism of Al-­Qaeda or the Taliban taking power in Afghanistan in the late 1990s were inevitable consequences of the US decision to support the Afghan mujahideen fighting against the Soviet intervention a decade prior. In more modern times, the emergence and expansion, beginning with 2014, of the Islamic State in northern Iraq and eastern Syria is seen in similar terms, as an inevitable consequence of the intervention in Iraq in 2003. In both cases however, irrespective of the negative influence of the aforementioned interventions, these particular developments were determined rather by decisions and activities taken after their conclusion, not necessarily by the intervening parties themselves (respectively, the involvement of the Pakistani government in building the Taliban potential and policies of the Nouri al-­Maliki government discriminating against the Sunni in Iraq in the first years of the second decade of the present century). See also S. Biddle, Afghanistan’s legacy: Emerging lessons of an ongoing war (2014) 2 The Washington Quarterly 81–82.   6 See G. Rose, How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle. A History of American Intervention from World War I to Afghanistan (Simon & Schuster, New York 2010) 233–235; M. Clarke, The ending of wars and the ending of eras (2015) 4 RUSI Journal 5.   7 This applies primarily to possible humanitarian objectives, particularly the improvement of the respect for human and minority rights in Iraq itself. In this context, it was even counterproductive since it led to unsuccessful Shia and Kurdish revolts, ending with repressions against these ethnic groups. Rose (2010) 227–228.   8 As President G.H.W. Bush said: ‘… what concerns me. It hasn’t been a clean end – there is no battleship Missouri surrender …’, quoted by Rose (2010) 226.   9 The aggregate costs of deploying forces are estimated at about US$71,000,000,000 (to which one should add the much lower additional costs, e.g. of supporting refugees). The number of coalition soldiers killed was about 1,200. S. Cimbala, K. Forster, Multinational Military Interventions: NATO Policy, Strategy and Burden Sharing (Ashgate, Farnham 2010) 84.

268   Marek Madej 10 See Chapter 2 on the intervention in Bosnia-­Herzegovina in this volume. 11 R.C. Owen, Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia, 1995: Humanitarian constraints in aerospace warfare, in: A. Walter Dom (ed.), Air Power in UN Operations: Wings for Peace (Ashgate, Farnham 2014) 233. 12 See T. Tardy, United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR – Bosnia-­Herzegovina), in: J. Koops, N. MacQueen, T. Tardy, P.D. Williams (eds), The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015) 383–395. 13 M. Mandelbaum, A perfect failure: NATO’s war against Yugoslavia (1999) 5 Foreign Affairs 3–4. At the same time, within a year, a majority of refugees had returned and the protection of minorities in the province, including the Serbs, was strengthened. C. Bjola, Legitimizing the Use of Force in International Politics: Kosovo, Iraq and the Ethics of Intervention (Routledge, New York 2009) 99. 14 The normalisation, however, depended also on the regulation of the status of Kosovo after the intervention and the implementations of the UNSC decisions on that matter (somewhat incomplete, especially in the case of disarmament and dissolution of the Kosovo Liberation Army – UCK). Therefore, the intervention in Kosovo cannot be interpreted as the only cause for conflicts (fortunately of low intensity) in southern Serbia (2000–2001) and in Macedonia (2001). 15 Considering the current direction of changes in Afghanistan (despite the still sizeable international involvement, military and non-­military), it is unlikely that this assessment could improve in the longer run. More: J. Schroden, C. Norman, J. Meyerle, P. Asfura-­Heim, B. Rosenau, D. Gilmore, M. Rosen, D. Mak, N. Hutchinson, Independent Assessment of the Afghan National Security Forces (CNA, Arlington 2014); Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan (SIGAR, Washington 2017) 107ff. 16 For the detailed data see Chapter 4 on intervention in Afghanistan in this volume. 17 S. Rynning, NATO in Afghanistan: The Liberal Disconnect (Stanford University Press, Stanford 2012) 213–216. 18 More: J.J. Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie (Oxford University Press, New York 2011) 54–63. 19 G. Muttitt, Fuel on the Fire: Oil and Politics in Occupied Iraq (Bodley Head, London 2011) 352–355. 20 More: D. Byman, An autopsy of the Iraq debacle: Policy failure or bridge too far? (2008) 4 Security Studies 610–616, 625–633. 21 D. Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act (USIP, Washington 2014) 178. 22 See Chapter 9 by Patrycja Grzebyk in this volume. 23 French prestige among Maghreb and Sahel societies, severely weakened by the initial support for the Tunisian authoritarian ruler in the first weeks of the Arab Spring, was not fully rebuilt by the support for the insurgents in Libya and defeat of Gaddafi. Nicolas Sarkozy, who was seemingly counting on beefing up his image during the presidential campaign thanks to the success of Libyan intervention, ultimately lost the vote in 2012. A. Cameron, The Channel Axis: France, the UK and NATO, in: A. Johnson, S. Mueen (eds), Short War, Long Shadow (RUSI, London 2012) 17–18. 24 The ‘relative’ nature of the Libyan fiasco was, as mentioned, primarily a consequence of the intentional concentration exclusively on those objectives which were feasible, even if their fulfilment would not necessarily bring a durable stability for Libya. 25 Even during the first intervention in Iraq in 1990, Saddam Hussein’s government remained a partner in the talks of sorts for coalition members (albeit having substantially inferior negotiating position), as evidenced by the UNSC resolution S/RES/687 of 3 April 1991 that ended the Persian Gulf War with imposition of a number of obligations on the Iraqi government and limitation of its sovereignty, but at the same time with a certain legitimisation – despite the ongoing oppression of Kurds and the Shia – of its retaining power.

Conclusions   269 26 Nation-­building is understood here as ‘creating or repairing all the cultural, social, and historical ties that bind people together as a nation’, whereas state-­building is understood as ‘creating or strengthening such government institutions as armies, police forces, judiciaries, central banks, tax-­collection agencies, health and education systems, and the like’. See: F. Fukuyama, Nation building 101, www.the atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/01/nation-­building-101/302862 (accessed 10 May 2018). 27 Although the operation plans for Libya did not foresee a military presence after the regime change, nation-­building activities were necessary to consolidate any positive outcomes of toppling the erstwhile government. 28 After analysing some historical cases (including Germany’s reconstruction after the fall of Hitler), Albert Somit and Steven A. Peterson determined ten factors in the host countries decisive in attempts to democratise them (inter alia a pro-­democratic elite; an adequate level of education and economic development; lack of religious, ethnic or racial conflicts; existence of basic liberties; internal peace), and a further nine requirements for a successful ‘democratic nation-­building’ (inter alia the willingness of the interveners to invest sufficient resources, human and financial; the readiness to maintain military presence after the conflict to secure peace; work to restore infrastructure and human capital; the ability to remove from power persons and groups clearly associated with authoritarian regimes; appreciation of the target country’s culture and avoidance of arrogance; common interests of outside entities and local communities). In Iraq, at the time Saddam Hussein’s regime was overthrown, from among the factors favourable to democratising, only a sufficient level of economic development and education were present (i.e. two out of ten), whereas in Afghanistan one (lack of religious conflicts) was present. Out of the nine conditions for a successful ‘democratic nation building’, only four were present in Iraq and two in Afghanistan (however, only if – rather controversially – Somit-­Peterson’s positive assessment of respect for the local culture is in both cases accepted). More: A. Somit, S.A. Peterson, The Failure of Democratic Nation Building: Ideology Meets Evolution (Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2005) 35–60. 29 Such a tendency was observed in relation to UN peace-­keeping operations in the early 1990s. The successes (real, or so considered) of missions from 1988 to 1992, which usually had limited objectives (e.g. monitoring the peace agreement, like in Namibia), were encouraging an extension of the tasks of subsequent missions, which quickly led to a series of failures (UNISOM in Somalia, successive missions in Angola, Rwanda, or even – despite the ultimate end to the conflict thanks to NATO support – in Bosnia­Herzegovina). A. Bellamy, P. Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping (Polity, Cambridge 2010) 193–194. 30 See, for example, A.J. Bacevich, The Limits of power: The End of American Exceptionalism (Holt, New York 2009) 161–163. 31 Rose (2010) 285. 32 T.R. Greentree, A war examined: Afghanistan (2013) 3Parameters 91–93. 33 The ‘impatience’ of the interveners was probably most evident in the middle phase of the intervention in Afghanistan, i.e. between 2003 and 2006, when the Taliban guerrillas were commonly viewed as defeated. Simultaneously, due to the start of the invasion of Iraq, resources available for the mission in Afghanistan became severely limited. At the time, the strategies of combating the guerrillas were changed every dozen or so months which made it impossible to fully implement them or assess their results. The costs of required activities were also one of the reasons for not implementing fully General McChrystal’s recommendations from 2009, as well as the replacement since 2012 of the focus on combating the guerrillas with the concentration on preparing the local security forces for this task. Biddle (2014) 79–80. 34 For more information see M. Shaw, The New Western Way of War (Polity, Malden 2005) 71–98.

270   Marek Madej 35 C. Gelpi, P.D. Feaver, J. Reifler, Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts (Princeton University Press, Princeton 2009) 8. 36 Smith (2008) 294–299; Shaw (2005) 79–80. 37 See A. Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-­Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (Cambridge University Press, New York 2009) 230–233; T.E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (Penguin Books, New York 2006) 237–241. 38 See M. Madej, Tactical efficacy: ‘Notorious’ UCAVs and lawfare, in S. Barela (ed.), Legitimacy and Drones: Investigating the Legality, Morality and Efficacy of UCAVs (Ashgate, Farnham 2015) 253–257. 39 This can take a form similar to that employed by Russia in the Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014 – of clandestine actions ‘by proxies’, purportedly local entities not organised or inspired by outside actors, according to Putin’s formula from 2014: ‘these are not our forces, you can go to a store and buy any kind of uniform’. See Vladimir Putin answered journalists’ questions on the situation in Ukraine, 4 March 2014, en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20366 (accessed 10 May 2018).

References Angstrom J., Duvesteyn I. (eds), Understanding Victory and Defeat in Contemporary War (Routledge, London 2007). Bacevich A.J., The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism (Holt, New York 2009). Barela S., Introduction: Legitimacy as a target, in: S. Barela (ed.), Legitimacy and Drones: Investigating the Legality, Morality and Efficacy of UCAVs (Ashgate, Farnham 2015) 1–25. Bellamy A., Williams P., Understanding Peacekeeping (Polity, Cambridge 2010). Biddle S., Afghanistan’s legacy: Emerging lessons of an ongoing war (2014) 2 The Washington Quarterly 73–86. Bjola C., Legitimizing the Use of Force in International Politics: Kosovo, Iraq and the ethics of intervention (Routledge, New York 2009). Byman D., An autopsy of the Iraq debacle: Policy failure or bridge too far? (2008) 4 Security Studies 599–643. Cameron A., The Channel Axis: France, the UK and NATO, in: A. Johnson, S. Mueen (eds), Short War, Long Shadow (RUSI, London 2012) 15–25. Cimbala S., Forster K., Multinational Military Interventions: NATO Policy, Strategy and Burden Sharing (Ashgate, Farnham 2010). Clarke M., The ending of wars and the ending of eras (2015) 4 RUSI Journal 4–8. Fukuyama F., Nation building 101, www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/01/ nation-­building-101/302862 (accessed 10 May 2018). Gelpi C., Feaver P.D., Reifler J., Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts (Princeton University Press, Princeton 2009). Giustozzi A., Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-­Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (Cambridge University Press, New York 2009). Greentree T.R., A war examined: Afghanistan (2013) 3 Parameters 87–97. Heuser B., Reading Clausewitz (Pimlico, London 2002). Madej M., Tactical efficacy: ‘Notorious’ UCAVs and lawfare, in: S. Barela (ed.), Legitimacy and Drones: Investigating the Legality, Morality and Efficacy of UCAVs (Ashgate, Farnham 2015) 243–271.

Conclusions   271 Mandelbaum M., A perfect failure: NATO’s war against Yugoslavia (1999) 5 Foreign Affairs 2–8. Mearsheimer J.J., Why Leaders Lie (Oxford University Press, New York 2011). Muttitt G., Fuel on the Fire: Oil and Politics in Occupied Iraq (Bodley Head, London 2011). Owen R.C., Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia, 1995: Humanitarian constraints in aerospace warfare, in: A. Walter Dom (ed.), Air Power in UN Operations: Wings for Peace (Ashgate, Farnham 2014) 231–240. Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan (SIGAR, Washington 2017). Ricks T.E., Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (Penguin Books, New York 2006). Rose G., How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle. A History of American Intervention from World War I to Afghanistan (Simon & Schuster, New York 2010). Rynning S., NATO in Afghanistan: The Liberal Disconnect (Stanford University Press, Stanford 2012). Schroden J., Norman C., Meyerle J., Asfura-­Heim P., Rosenau B., Gilmore D., Rosen M., Mak D., Hutchinson N., Independent Assessment of the Afghan National Security Forces (CNA, Arlington 2014). Shaw M., The New Western Way of War (Polity, Malden 2005). Smith R., The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (Vintage Books, New York 2008). Somit A., Peterson S.A., The Failure of Democratic Nation Building: Ideology Meets Evolution (Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2005). Tardy T., United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR – Bosnia-­Herzegovina), in: J. Koops, N. MacQueen, T. Tardy, P.D. Williams (eds), The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015) 383–395. Yost D., NATO’s Balancing Act (USIP, Washington 2014).

Index

9/11 see September 11 terrorist attacks (9/11) Abdullah Abdullah 86 Abu Ghraib prison 91, 125, 160, 221 Afghanistan intervention 74–95; 9/11 as trigger for 74; ‘Afghanization’ 80; aims, declared and actual 80–82, 156; attitude of the civilian population 159; as case of post-Cold War liberal interventionism 159; civilian casualties 89–91, 214, 217; clustered munitions, use of 215; coherence of the West’s position 82–83; costs 94–95; course of the intervention 83–87; criticisms 156; effectiveness 257–258; IHL context 88–91; impact of the Iraqi crisis 84; and international reaction to the 9/11 attacks 76–77, 87; and just war theory 156; and law on the use of force 193–195; legal and institutional context 87–88; legitimacy and international support 77; mineral deposits’ significance 241–243; motives, declared and actual 78–80; objective 158; Operation Medusa 85; options available 77; outcome and ongoing situation 93–95; pre-intervention situation in Afghanistan 74–76; prisoners, treatment of 218; public attitudes 92–93; self-defence justification 77–78, 87–88; strategic context 74–77; trigger 74, 78; UAVs, use of 217; UNSC mandate and resolutions 74, 76–77; see also International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) The Age of Turbulence (Greenspan) 238 Ahtisaari, Martti 62 airstrikes: during the Kosovo intervention

60–62, 65; in Iraq 20–21, 121; on Libya 137, 142 Albright, Madeleine 59 Algeria 134 Al-Qaeda see under Q Amnesty International 146 Annan, Kofi 197 anticipatory self-defence 195–196 anti-war protests 17, 22, 110 Arab Spring 133–134, 136, 138, 160–161, 265 Al-Askari mosque, terrorist attack 123 Auserwald, David 66 ‘axis of evil’ 111 Bamyan Buddha statues, destruction of 76 Bartholomees, John Boone 179 Blair, Tony 57, 80, 115–116 body-bag syndrome 264 bogging down 159, 171 Bosnia-Herzegovina intervention 31–46; aims of the intervention 37–38; characteristics 31; civilian casualties 214; coherence of the West’s position 38–39; and confidence in humanitarian doctrine 155; course of the intervention 39–41; effectiveness 190, 255–256; geostrategic context 33–34; human rights, role of 196; IHL context of NATO involvement 43; initial international response 34–35; international order, influence on 45; and law on the use of force 190; legal and institutional context 41–43; military engagement, forms of 31; motives, declared and actual 35–37; NATO operations 39–40; outcome 44–46; precision weaponry (smart missiles) 43, 215; pre-intervention context 32–33;

Index   273 public attitudes 43–44; strategic context 32–35; UNSC resolutions 39–40, 42 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 190 Bush, George 12, 14, 37, 114 Bush, George W. 76, 80, 108, 111, 116, 159 Bush Doctrine 108, 195 Cameron, David 136, 138–139, 162 Carter Doctrine 236 casualties, civilian see civilian casualties Charter of the United Nations see United Nations Charter (UNC) chemical weapons, used against the Kurds 111 Cheney, Richard “Dick” 13, 114 Chernomyrdin, Viktor 62 China: increased energy demands 231; PRC’s position on Gulf intervention 18; rare earth elements 246n11, 249n73 Chirac, Jacques 37 citizens’ rights, infringement of 166 civil war: in Afghanistan 75, 242; in Iraq 123; in Libya 133, 142–143, 147–148, 241 civilian casualties: Afghanistan intervention 214, 217; BosniaHerzegovina intervention 214; documentation in the Iraq war 217; estimation and documentation in Afghanistan 214; Gulf intervention 21, 214; and IHL violations in Afghanistan 89–91; Iraq war 125; Kosovo intervention 45, 64–65, 67, 214; Libya 137, 146, 214; minimising efforts in Afghanistan 217; ‘overwhelming force’ strategy and 167n10; precision weaponry and minimisation of 21, 146; public awareness 65; recording of by Human Rights Watch 214; as a result of NATO activities during ODF 43, 45; in wars of the West 89–91, 213–214 civilian population, as target of post-Cold War conflicts 155 civilians: impact of Operation Desert Storm 21; Iraqi use of human shields 125; NATO, accusations against of intentional targeting 65 Clark, Wesley 40, 158 Clarke, Michael 172, 182 Clausewitz, Carl von 173, 252 Clinton, Bill 37, 57, 59, 155 Clinton, Hillary 137 cluster munitions: criticisms 215; use of in

Afghanistan 215; use of in Operation Desert Storm 21; use of in the Iraq war 125; use of in the Kosovo intervention 64; use of in Western interventions 215 Cohen, William 65 coherence of the West’s position: Afghanistan intervention 82–83; BosniaHerzegovina intervention 38–39; on Iraq 118–119; on Kosovo intervention 59–60; on Libya 141; on military intervention in the Gulf 17–18 collateral damage 43, 64, 163, 214, 264 combatants, unlawful or unprivileged see unlawful enemy combatants Concert of Powers, the concept of 266 Conrad, Joseph 165 Cooper, Richard 115 ‘courageous restraint’ 101n85 crimes against humanity 144–145, 155, 198–199 Daoud Khan, Mohammed 74 deaths of civilians see civilian casualties Dellums v. Bush 201n19 Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës – LDK), founding 53 democratic nation-building see nationbuilding democratic peace theory, offensive variant 154 Dershowitz, Alan 220 detainees, transfer of 219, 221 discernment principle 217–218 Dostum, Abdul Rashid 83 drone attacks: and citizens’ rights 166; on Pakistan 85; published data 218; see also unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) dual-use targets: bombing of 21, 64, 125, 216; legitimacy of 216 economic interests of Western countries, as factor in Gulf intervention 15 effectiveness of Western intervention: Afghanistan 257–258; assessment methods 252–254; Bosnia-Herzegovina 190, 255–256; comparisons across interventions 260–265; consequences and prospects for the international community 265–267; First Gulf War 254–255; Iraq war 258–259; Kosovo intervention 256–257; Libya intervention 259–260; overview of cases studied 254–260

274   Index Egypt 19, 110, 133–134, 221 emerging economies, increased energy demand 231 end of all war theory 182n10, 182 enemy combatants, unlawful or unprivileged see unlawful enemy combatants energy security: and availability of rare minerals 232–233; and the concept of peak oil 231; definition 230; impact of oil shocks 231; militarisation of energy policy 233; and participation in the global supply chain 233; place of in official narrative of Gulf intervention 15; post-Cold War perceptions 230–234; role of in interventions in the Persian Gulf 233–234, 234–239; role of Persian Gulf states 234; Western focus on import dependency 233 enhanced interrogation techniques, examples of 220; see also torture ethnic and religious conflicts, post-Cold War resurgence 155 ethnic cleansing 54, 61, 67, 155, 157–158, 198 Europe, Libya’s role in migration to 135 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) 68 Euros, Hussein regime’s oil clearance strategy 237 explosive remnants of war (ERWs) 215 factories, bombing of during the Gulf war 216 failed interventions, consequences 166 false optimism theory 183n14 First Gulf War see Gulf intervention flight restrictions, as response to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 12 force protection 263–264, 266 France: contribution to UNPROFOR 35; opposition to Iraq war 110, 118; position on Gulf intervention 17; position on intervention in Libya 135–137, 160–161, 165, 240 Franks, Tommy 119–120 Fukuyama, Francis 153 Gaddafi, Muammar 133, 143 Gates, Robert 137, 141 Geneva Conventions (GCs): on the limitation of attacks to military targets 216; on prisoner status and treatment 219–220; ratification of additional

protocols 213; role in the Kosovo intervention 64 genocide 63, 67, 144, 155, 157, 198 Georgia 166 Germany: investment in pre-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina 33; opposition to Iraq war 110, 118; position on Gulf intervention 17 Ghani, Ashraf 86 global financial crisis 85, 232 Global War on Terrorism (GWOT): Afghanistan intervention as first stage 77; Bush’s declaration 108; IHL and human rights violations 91; and prisoner status and treatment 89, 218 globalisation 154 Gorbachev, Mikhail 18 Greenspan, Alan 238 ground operations, public opinion 44, 65 Guantánamo detention facilities 91, 160, 219, 221 Gulf intervention: achievement of objectives 254; Arab opinions towards 18; bombing of dual-purpose objects 216; bombing of factories 216; civilian casualties 21, 214; coalition members 19; coherence of Western and international positions 17–18; cost of Western military engagement 24; course of the intervention 18–20; effectiveness 23, 254–255; hierarchy of motivations, place of economic factors 15–16; impact on the civilian population 21; international response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait 12–13; Kuwait’s strategic importance and 11–12; and law on the use of force 190–191; legal context 20–21; motives, actual and declared 13–14, 14–16; National Security Decision Memorandum No. 92, 11; official goal of the intervention 16–17; oil, role of in 237; outcome 23–25; PRC’s position on 18; public attitudes towards 21–23; role of as motivation for Iraq war 114; sources of the conflict 9–11; strategic context 9–13; see also Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait; Operation Desert Shield; Operation Desert Storm Heart of Darkness (Conrad) 165 Henri-Levi, Bernard 137 Hill, Christopher 55 Holbrooke, Richard 55–56 Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb straits 240

Index   275 human rights: post-Cold War infringements 155; role of in BosniaHerzegovina intervention 196; role of in liberal interventionism 154 human rights violations: accusations against Iraq 111; in Afghanistan 79; in the Bosnian conflict 43; global war on terrorism and 91; in Kosovo 57–58, 67; as motivation for Gulf intervention 14; possibility of ending without use of ground forces 66; in Rwanda 67 Human Rights Watch (HRW) 65, 134, 146, 214 human shields: Iraqi use of civilians as 125; UNPROFOR soldiers used as 40; use of as problem for Western powers 214; use of French troops as 37 humanitarian operations 3 Hussein, Saddam see Saddam Hussein incendiary bombs 125 India, increased energy demands 231 international humanitarian law (IHL): Afghanistan intervention in the context of 88–91; and civilian losses 89–91, 213–214; in the context of military interventions of the West 213–222; differing standards of Western countries 100n80; Iraq war in the context of 124–125; Libya intervention, violations during 145–146; precision weaponry and 214–215; prisoners’ status and treatment 218–221; violations of in Mazar-i-Sharif 101n83; the Western approach 213 international law, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait as a violation of 13 international order: and the BosniaHerzegovina intervention 36; and the Kosovo intervention 54, 68 International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War 214 International Red Cross, misuse of emblem by Iraqi forces 125 international relations, fundamental principles 68 international security, the Iraqi threat to 111 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): establishment 77, 83; integration with OEF 82, 88–89, 92; launch of combat operations 84; legal and institutional legitimacy 87; mandate 78–79, 84, 88; outsourcing of

organisation 77; reduction in strength 86; replacement 87; scope of operations 83; UN mandate 74; see also Afghanistan intervention; Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) interventionist practices, proliferation of by non-Western actors 265 Iran–Iraq War 9 Iraq: oil production in 235; post-war sanctions and their impact 237; US-led invasion of 2003 see Iraq war; see also Gulf intervention; Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait; sanctions on Iraq Iraq and Afghanistan, role of PMSCs 221–222 Iraq Body Count 217 Iraq war 108–127; aims of the intervention 116–119; beginning of formal occupation 122; captives, treatment of 125; civilian losses, documentation 217; ‘coalition of the willing’ 110; coherence of the West’s position 118–119; combat losses, annual 127; course of the intervention 119–123; declared motives 111–112; economic motivations 113; effectiveness of Western intervention 258–259; end of combat operations, Bush’s announcement 122; global dimension 108–109; Greenspan’s war for oil hypothesis 238; hierarchy of motives 112; IHL context 124–125; impact in Afghanistan 84; Islamic State as inevitable consequence 267n5; Kurdish Peshmerga, role of 121; and law on the use of force 189, 192–193, 195–196; legal and institutional context 123–124; official military goals 120; outcome 126–127; as perfect catastrophe 159–160; Poland and other countries’ motivations 115–116; preintervention importance of Iraq for Western countries 109; pre-intervention opposition 110; public attitudes 125–126; rapprochement with the US as motivation for 115; regional dimension 109; strategic context 108–110; UK motivation 114–115; as ‘unfinished business’ 114; UNSC resolutions 109, 124; US motivation 113–114; verification of official narrative 112–116 Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait: background and driving factors 9–11; international responses 12–13; presentation as threat to international security 13;

276   Index Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait continued as resource-based conflict 236; and the undermining of the UNSC 188; UNSC responses 20; as violation of international law 13; see also Gulf intervention; Operation Desert Shield; Operation Desert Storm Islamic fundamentalism 74, 76, 93, 111 Islamic State of Syria and the Levant (ISIL) 160, 162, 165, 259, 267n5 Israel: adoption of ‘unlawful combatants’ status 221; bombing of Osirak nuclear reactors 196; Iraqi attack against 20; and the Iraqi threat 13, 20, 113 ius contra bellum 188 Izetbegović, Alija 33 jihadi theory of victory 184n25 Just and Unjust Wars (Walzer) 164 just war 13, 156 Karzai, Hamid 83, 86, 158, 217 Kauffman, Sylvie 164 Klare, Michael 238 Kosovo: declaration of independence 53; removal of territorial autonomy by Serbian authorities 53 Kosovo intervention 53–68; aims 58–59; bombing of dual-purpose objects 216; as case of post-Cold War liberal interventionism 157; China’s position 56; civilian casualties 214; coherence of Western position and international opinions on legitimacy 59–60; course of the intervention 60–62; declared motives and justification 57–58; drivers of the conflict, historical 53–54; effectiveness 256–257; forces and equipment engaged 60–61; human rights motivation 157; IHL context 64–65; and law on the use of force 192–193, 197; legal and institutional context 62–63; legitimacy 197; mass grave in Račak, discovery 54, 56; NATO losses 66; outcome 66–68; participating countries 60; pre-intervention situation 53–54; public opinion 65–66, 157; Russia’s criticism 56; smart missiles, use of 215; stages 61–62; strategic context 53–57; strategic importance of Kosovo for the West 54; UNSC responses 55–56, 62 Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA): Albania’s recognition of legitimacy 54; attacks Serbian police station 53

Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) 55–56 Krauthammer, Charles 154 Kurds: chemical weapons used against 111; human rights violations against 14; protection strategies 196; role in the Iraq war 121; Turkish concerns 110; uprisings 255 Kuwait: Iraqi invasion see Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait; significance for the 1990 oil market 235; strategic importance for the West 11–12 law on use of force: Afghanistan intervention and 193–195; and aggressive self-defence 193–196; Bosnia-Herzegovina intervention and 190; changing the unchangeable 199–200; evolutionary impact of Western military interventions 188–200; exceptions to UN prohibitions 188; Gulf intervention and 190–191; and humanitarian intervention 196–199; Iraq war and 189, 192–193, 195–196; Kosovo intervention and 192–193, 197; and the marginalisation of the UNSC 188–193; see also use of force League of Arab States (LAS) 10, 110, 145 Lebanon 3 Lewinsky, Monica 58 liberal internationalism, as ideational source of interventionism 153 liberal interventionism: intellectual support 156; role of principles in establishing support 137; see also post-Cold War liberal interventionism Libya intervention 133–149; aims, declared and actual 139–140; as case of post-Cold War liberal interventionism 160–161; civilian casualties 214; course of the intervention 141–143; declared motives/official justification 136–139; effectiveness 259–260; IHL context 145–146; initiating countries 135; and law on the use of force 191; legal and institutional context 144–145; and Libya’s military capability 141–142; outcome 147–149; pre-intervention situation 133–134; as pro-democratic intervention 199; public attitudes 146–147; sources of the conflict in Libya 133–135; strategic context 133–135; strategic importance of Libya for Western countries 135; trigger 133;

Index   277 UNSC limitations 189; UNSC resolutions 136, 139, 141, 144–145; use of smart missiles 215 Liddel-Hart, Basil 173 Lockerbie bombing 133 losses, civilian see civilian casualties low-intensity conflicts, Fukuyama’s prediction 153 Maghreb 138 Mahdi Army 117 Mali 3 al-Maliki, Nouri 267, 267n5 Mandel, Robert 176–177 Martel, William 176, 178 mass graves, Račak 54, 56 Massoud, Ahmad Shah 75 Mazar-i-Sharif, violations of IHL 101n83 Mazowiecki, Tadeusz 156 McChrystal, Stanley A. 167n10 Middle East: democratisation as long-term goal of Iraq intervention 117; political role of energy resources 11; post-Cold War balance of power 9 migration to Europe, Libya’s role 135 militarisation of energy policy 233 military intervention, coherence of the West’s position on 17–18 military targets, IHL and qualification of 216–218 military victory see victory Milošević, Slobodan 55, 58–60, 62, 66–68, 157–158 Mitterrand, François 37 Moore, Jonathan 162 motives for Western intervention: Afghanistan 78–80; Bosnia-Herzegovina intervention 35–37; Gulf intervention 13–14, 14–16; Iraq 111–112; Kosovo 57–58; Libya 136–139 Mubarak, Hosni 134 mujahideen insurgents 74 National Security Decision Memorandum No. 92, 11 nation-building 155, 158–159, 164; definition 269n26; requirements for success 269n28 NATO: accusations against of intentional attacks on civilian targets 65; civilian casualties as a result of ODF activities 43, 45; negative impact of military intervention in Libya 148; and the outcome of the Gulf intervention 25;

post-Cold War transformation 154; security cooperation, recognition as main structure of 46; strengthening of as justification for Kosovo intervention 57–59 9/11 see September 11 terrorist attacks (9/11) no-fly zones: Bosnia-Herzegovina 31, 39–40, 42, 190; for Iraqi aircraft 109, 191, 196; Kosovo 63; Libya 135, 137, 142–146, 148, 161 non-international armed conflicts 100n79, 124 non-state entities 175, 177 North Africa, oil and gas resources 240 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation see NATO Northern Alliance 75–76, 79, 83 Novak, Michael 156 Obama, Barack 81, 85, 118, 123, 139, 146, 159, 221 oil: the concept of peak oil 231; in Gulf intervention rhetoric 14; restrictions on purchase of Iraqi oil 236; role of in First Gulf War 237, 233–234, 234–239; role of in Libya intervention 135, 239–241; role of in the Iraq war 113–114, 238, 244; US consumption 108; Western companies involved in the extraction of Libyan resources 240 oil shocks: energy security impact 11–12, 231, 234–235; impact on prices 231; and the militarisation of energy policy 233 Oil-for-Food Programme 124, 237–238 Omar, Mullah 83 Operation Allied Force: effectiveness 256; humanitarian motivation 57; Yugoslav reaction 61 Operation Allied Harbor 61 Operation Deliberate Force (ODF): civilian casualties 43, 45; contribution of US 41; effectiveness 44–45; justifications 35; main goals 45; primary objective 38; scope 41 Operation Deny Flight: function and scope 40–41; launch 32–33, 42 Operation Desert Shield: aims 15, 18, 233, 235–236; costs 255; effectiveness 16, 23; Saddam’s reaction 10; start date 18 Operation Desert Storm: aims 233, 235–236; authorisation 188; cluster munitions, use of 215; IHL violations 21;

278   Index Operation Desert Storm continued impact on civilians 21; planned focus 20; prisoner status and treatment 218; public opinion 22; stages 19 Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF): integration of ISAF with 82, 88–89, 92; launch 74 Operation Iraqi Freedom: basis of military strategy/concept 120; plans for Iraqi oil reserves 244; pre-emptive self-defence terminology 195 Operation Medusa 85 Operation Phantom Fury 122 Operation Resolute Support 87 Operation Sky Monitor 39 opium, role in the Afghan economy 75 Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 15, 18, 114, 233, 235–236 Osama bin Laden, killed 86 O’Sullivan, M.L. 238 overwhelming force strategy 158, 167n10 no own casualties doctrine 157 Pakistan: drone attacks on 85; impact of Afghanistan intervention on 85; recognition of the Taliban 75; as safe haven for Taliban 83, 86, 264; support for mujahideen insurgents 74; Taliban building role 267n5; view of Afghanistan 76 parallel engagement 84, 172 peace-keeping operations 3 peak oil, the concept 231 Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier 189 Persian Gulf: conflicts in see Gulf intervention; Iraq war; Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait; role of in global energy security 234 Petraeus, David 123, 167n10 political perspectives: the decreasing utility of war as a political tool 181; victory as a political concept 180 Posner, Richard 220 post-Cold War conflicts, usual motivations 153 post-Cold War global security environment, and the growth of Western military interventionism 1–3 post-Cold War liberal interventionism 153–166; contributing factors 154; economic and commercial justifications 154; ideational context 153–156; and just war theory 156; lessons learned

162–166; role of human rights 154; selected interventions 157–162; types of armed forces involvement 172 post-Cold War military interventions, as a field of research 2 Power, Samantha 137 precision weaponry: IHL and 214–215; and minimisation of civilian casualties 21, 146; use of in Bosnia-Herzegovina intervention 43, 215 pre-emptive self-defence 195 prisoners: IHL and status/treatment of 218–221; treatment of in Afghanistan 218; treatment of in Iraq 125 private military and security companies (PMSCs) 221–222 pro-democratic interventions, legitimacy of 199 proportionality principle, breaches of during the Afghanistan intervention 217 public opinion: on Afghanistan intervention 92–93; on American designation of prisoners’ status 219; on Bosnia-Herzegovina intervention 43–44; on Gulf intervention 17; on the Iraq war 110; on Kosovo intervention 65–66, 157; on Libya intervention 146–147; as limiter of indiscriminate violence 171; role of in legitimisation of liberal interventionism 155 Al-Qaeda: acceptability of strikes against 77–78; attacks against New York and Washington 74, 76 (see also September 11 terrorist attacks); attacks on US embassies 76; claims of Iraqi ties with 111, 159; impact of Afghanistan intervention on 93, 257; possible links of Libyan rebels to 137; questions around legal status of members 218–219, 221; US’s waging of a continuous war against 194 Qatar, role in Libya intervention 143 Rabbani, Burhanuddin 75 Rambouillet Agreement 56–58, 60, 157 rare earth elements (REE): China’s introduction of export limits 246n11; reserves held by China 246n11, 249n73 Red Crescent Movement, misuse of emblem by Iraqi forces 125 refugees, and the Kosovo intervention 54, 61, 67

Index   279 regime change: expectations of in Serbia 59; as goal of Libya intervention 139, 147; as motivation for the Iraq war 117; as objective of Afghanistan intervention 80; tendencies in interventions intended to cause 263 resources and energy context of intervention 230–245; and post-Cold War perceptions of energy security 230–234; role of oil in interventions in the Persian Gulf 233–234, 234–239; role of resource wealth in Libyan intervention 239–241; significance of mineral deposits in the Afghanistan intervention 241–243; Western oil companies involved in the extraction of Libyan resources 240 responsibility to protect (R2P): as basis of Western approach to Libya 137, 144; development influence of the Libya intervention 148; the doctrine 198; impact of Libya intervention 259; and law on the use of force 198–199; Libya and the loss of legitimacy of 165; as principal motivation for armed engagement in Libya 239–240; shift towards from humanitarian intervention language 67 Rice, Susan 137 rising economies, increased energy demand 231 risk-transfer war doctrine (transfer of risk) 163, 263–264, 266 Rose, Gideon 263 Rugova, Ibrahim 53–55 Rumsfeld, Donald 114, 220 Russia: criticism of Kosovo intervention 56; interventionist practices 265; neoimperial activities 166 Rwanda 57, 63, 67, 197 Saddam Hussein: ambiguity of warnings given to 10; media representation and its impact on public opinion 22; moral assessment of 115; post-Cold War balance of power concerns 9; use of foreigners as hostages 10, 14 al-Sadr, Muqtada 122 Sanchez, Ricardo 220 sanctions: on Libya 133, 135, 240; on the Taliban 76 sanctions on Iraq: consequences for civilians 14; and energy security 236–238; impact 109; impact on

Western citizens 14–15; Iraqi reaction 20, 24; lessons of 24; and Operation Desert Shield 18; scope 12; swift imposition 188 Sarkozy, Nicolas 138, 140, 147, 161, 165, 268n23 Saudi Arabia: deployment of Western military in 10, 236; diplomatic response to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 12; economic motivations behind Western protection of 15; interventionist practices 265; position on Gulf intervention 18; tactical alliance between US and 234; US goals 113 Saur Revolution 74–75 Schwarzkopf, Norman 19 self-defence: anticipatory 195–196; as justification for Afghanistan intervention 77–78, 87–88 September 11 terrorist attacks (9/11): and the increase in Western interventionist activity 2; international reaction 76–77, 87; and just war theory 156; role of Taliban 74; speculation about Iraqi involvement 111; as trigger for intervention in Afghanistan 74; UNSC response 193; US response 158 Shaw, Martin 163, 264 Shia and Kurdish uprisings, failure of 255 Sierra Leone 3 Slaughter, Anne-Marie 137 smart missiles: use of in BosniaHerzegovina intervention 43, 215; use of in Libya intervention 215; see also precision weaponry Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), dissolution and its consequences 32 Solana, Javier 59 Soviet Union (USSR) 9, 12–13, 18, 74, 189 Srebrenica massacre 35, 39, 41, 44, 58, 137 strategic importance to the West: of Kosovo 54; of Kuwait 11–12; of Libya 135 Suez Canal 240 Sweden, role in Libya intervention 143 Syria 161–162 Taliban: defeat of as objective of Afghanistan intervention 80; impact of Afghanistan intervention on 93; legal recognition of 75; overthrow 108;

280   Index Taliban continued Pakistan’s recognition 75; retention of their position 92; role in 9/11 74; role of the Pakistan government in building 267n5; safe haven for in Pakistan 83, 86, 264; treatment of Afghan population 78–79 TAPI pipeline 243 Task Force Hawk 61 territorial integrity, connection between military intervention and infringement of 197 terrorism: claims of Iraqi support for 111–112, 116; and the jihadi theory of victory 184n25; Libya’s removal from list of state sponsors 133 terrorist attacks: and declaration of the “war on terror” 218; see also September 11 terrorist attacks (9/11) Thatcher, Margaret 12 Tito, Josip Broz 32 torture: inflicted by US institutions 91, 125, 160, 220; Obama’s efforts to end 221; role of PMSCs 221; transfer of detainees to states and organisations employing 91, 125, 221; the West’s position 141 transfer of detainees 91, 219, 221 transfer of risk (risk-transfer war doctrine) 163, 263–264, 266 Tunisia 133–134 Turkey, deployment of Iraq invasion forces in 119 Tusk, Donald 138, 141 Ukraine 166 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 39, 54 UN Security Council (UNSC): limitations related to Libya intervention 189; responses to Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 10–12; see also UNSC resolutions unexploded munitions 215 ‘unfinished business’ narrative of the Gulf intervention 114 unilateral interventions 3, 77, 198 unipolar moment, Krauthammer’s concept 154 United Kingdom (UK): military presence in Kuwait 11; motivation for Iraq war 114–115; public opinion on the Kosovo intervention 65 United Nations Charter (UNC): enshrined values, necessity of defending 153; on use of force 63, 188, 198

United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) 109–111, 115 United States (US): breaches of Geneva conventions on treatment of prisoners of war 220; concerns around influence of in the Gulf region 18; contribution to ODF 41; foreign policy impact of Bosnian conflict 155; military spending in the context of the Iraq war 108; Monica Lewinsky scandal 58; motivation for Iraq war 113–114; position on Bosnia 39; post-Cold War positioning 34; tactical alliance with Saudi Arabia 234 unlawful enemy combatants: defining 101n87; discussion on the legal status of 219–221; US’s use of the term 91, 219 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs): concerns around use of 218; increasing use of 266; use of in Afghanistan 217; see also drone attacks unprivileged enemy combatants see unlawful enemy combatants UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force): deployment to BosniaHerzegovina 39; failure 35; mandate 34, 39; participants 31; personnel taken hostage 39 UNSC resolutions: Afghanistan intervention 74, 76–77; BosniaHerzegovina intervention 39–40, 42; Iraq war 109, 124; Kosovo intervention 55–56, 62; Libya intervention 136, 139, 141, 144–145; in response to 9/11 193 uprisings, by Iraqi Kurds and Shia 28n54, 111, 255 use of force: economic and commercial justifications 154; strict principles on 43; UN Charter on 63, 188, 198; UNSC practice regarding consent 24; US willingness 11; see also law on use of force victory: Bartholomees’ textbook theory of 179–182; Clausewitz’s vs Liddell Hart’s understanding 172–175; cost-benefit balance 179; and the decreasing utility of war as a political tool 181; jihadi theory of 184n25; limitations 182n4; Martel’s model 178–179; military victory as research field 169–171;

Index   281 non-binary character of defeat and 181; as a political concept 180; post-heroic theory of 175–179; subjectivity in perception 179; time factor 179–180; understanding strategic victory 180; usefulness of the term 252 Walker, William 56 Walzer, Michael 164 war crimes 13, 25, 36, 44, 145, 155, 198, 219 war on terror 213; see also Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)

wars of the West, as conflicts with no victory 169–182 (see also victory) weapons of mass destruction (WMDs): failure to find proof of possession by Iraq 111; Iraq’s supposed capabilities 108; Libyan programme 133; public opinion 126; in UNSC resolutions on Iraq 109 Weigel, George 156 “What We’re Fighting For. A Letter from America” (various signatories) 156 wire-tapping 166 Wolfowitz, Paul 113–114