War, Revolution & British Imperialism in Central Asia 0863720021, 9780863720024

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgment
Introduction
Chapter One: Persia and the Collapse of Anglo Russian Co-operation
Chapter Two: The Bolshevik Revolution and the Problem of Self-Determination
Chapter Three: The Debate on Intervention: Caucasia or Persia?
Chapter Four: The Formation of the Eastern Committee
Chapter Five: The Failure of Military Intervention
Chapter Six: The Collapse of Turkey and the Problem of Defining British Policy
Chapter Seven: The Resolution of the Eastern Committee and the Hesitation of Lloyd George
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

War, Revolution & British Imperialism in Central Asia Frederick Stanwood

Ithaca Press London 1983

The Author and Publisher gratefully acknowledge the support of the British Academy in the production of this book.

©

1983

Frederick Stanwood

First published in 1983 by Ithaca Press 13 Southwark Street

London SEI

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Stanwood, Frederick War revolution and British imperialism in Central Asia. I.Near East— Politics and government--- History — Sources 2.Near East--- Foreign relations --- Soviet Union--- Sources 3.Near East -- Foreign relations— — Great Britain--- Sources 4.Soviet Union--- Foreign relations--- Near East Sources 5- Great Britain--- Foreign relations-Near East-- ßOurces I.Title 956'.03 DS62.8 ISBN 0-86372-002-1

Printed in England by Anchor Press Ltd and bound by Vfcn Brendon & Sons Ltd both of Tiptree Essex

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements Introduction

Chapter One:

Chapter Two:

Chapter Three:

Persia and the Collapse of Anglo Russian Co-operation

12

The Bolshevik Revolution and the Problem of Self-Determination

41

The Debate on Intervention: Caucasia or Persia?

63

The Formation of the Eastern Committee

104

Chapter Five :

The Failure of Military Intervention

146

Chapter Six:

The Collapse of Turkey and the Problem of Defining British Policy

182

Chapter Four:

Chapter Seven:

The Resolution of the Eastern Committee 218 and the Hesitation of Lloyd George

Conclusion

247

Bibliography

254

Index

259

CENTRAL ASIA TRANS -CA S PIA

Bokhanäb

AFGHANISTAN

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT S

I would like to thank the following for permission to quote from copyright materials in their possession: The Public Record Office Foreign Office Papers;

for Cabinet Papers and

The British Library, India Office Library and Records, for Crown-copyright material which appears by permission of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office and for the Curzon Papers which appear by permission of Lord Scarsdale; The British Library, Department of Manuscripts, for the Balfour Papers; Mr. A. J. P. Taylor, on behalf of the Beverbrook Foundation, for the Bonar Law and Lloyd George Papers. I would also like to thank the many people whose task it was to fetch and carry the innumerable volumes of papers and documents which have gone into the writing of this book. The skill and patience

of

Ms.

Marika

St.

George,

who

typed

the

final

manuscript, has been a great asset, removing from my shoulders to her own a great burden. I am extremely grateful.

Finally, I wish to express my gratitude to the British Academy for their assistance in making possible the publication of this book.

INTRODUCTION The years of World War from 1914 to 1918 witnessed the beginnings of a nationalist war in Asia which continued until virtually

the

present

day.

The European Empires,

unable

to

restrict nationalism to Europe, found themselves faced with a nationalist

challenge

all

over

the

globe.

This

study

is

concerned with the consequences for British imperial policy of the conjunction of Persian and Central Asian nationalisms and social

revolution

in

Russia,

the

product

of which was the

tendency for British anti-nationalism to assume the guise of anti-communism. A

study

of

the

interaction

of

nationalism with

anti­

communism in Central Asia^ must begin with an examination of the

diplomatic

Persia.

relationship between

I have attempted,

the

British

Empire

and

however, to describe not only the

diplomatic events but to penetrate the motives and prejudices which lay at the core of British policy and which, after their failure in Persia, impelled the British northward in an attempt to supplant the Russians and thus re-envelope Persia in the imperial cocoon. Britain's ostensible political and imperial interests were strategic, the

fear

defence

1

growing out of European rivalries, and defensive, of

of

disorder India,

by

on

the

1914

periphery a

of

touchstone

the worn

Empire. smooth

The by

I have chosen to regard Persia as part of Central Asia in order to distinguish it from the largely separate problem of Mesopotamia and the Arab Middle East. Central Asia was a distinct problem for British imperial diplomacy related more to the collapse of Russia and the ensuing revolutionary and nationalist turmoil than to the more straightforward wartime opportunism practiced by Britain in the Arab states.

2

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

generations

of

British

imperialists,

expressed

both

considerations and had resulted in the expansion of British power from the subcontinent into the Asian heartland where it encountered

the

southward

expansion

of

the

Russian

Empire*

Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, AngloRussian imperial rivalry was a fact of life: the Germans had been so convinced that the conflict was permanent that they made it a primary element in the theory of Weltpolitik. This proved

to be

a

serious

miscalculation

as the expansion of

German power moved the British and Russians to conclude an accord in Asia which, by formally postponing their outstanding conflicts, enabled both to face the German problem in Europe. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 established a buffer zone between the two Empires stretching from Persia in the west to Tibet in the east. The Convention, though a stand-off in terms of

European

diplomacy,

marked

the

creation

of

an

condominium in Central Asia, particularly for Persia.

uneasy In it,

each country recognised the concessions which the other had extorted from the Persians over the years and agreed not poach on one another's sphere of influence. The Convention divided Persia into three spheres: Russia took the north, Britain the south, while in the centre balance

the

imperial

'independent'

scales

as

best

Persia was left to it

could\

Though

technically the Tehran Government retained dominion throughout the country, Anglo-Russian control of Persia's military forces and finances completely compromised the country's sovereignty. Despite persistent doubts in London about the wisdom and effectiveness of the Convention, when war began in August 1914 the arrangement proved its value. British and Russian troops were able to safeguard Persia's

1

'neutrality' without serious1

A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1918, (London, 1954), pp.441-6.

1848-

INTRODUCTION

3

complication or recrimination, though in cases only by actual occupation, as in Tabriz. The real test of the partnership came in the spring and summer of 1916 when German and Turkish agents deployed

throughout

Persia

in

an

attempt

Islamic, and tribal resentments into flame.

to

fan

national,

Their efforts very

nearly succeeded and only large-scale military action by the Russians

in northern Persia prevented Tehran from wriggling

free

the grasp of Anglo-Russian

of

imperialism and allying

itself with Germano-Turkish imperialism. Thenceforth, Persia's imperial protectors set out to enforce Persia's isolation from the

European

conflict

by

enveloping her

within

a military

cordon and by wresting additional compromising concessions from the hapless and incompetent Shah. It had been Anglo-Russian practice at difficult moments in the past to coerce the Persian Government into acknowledging appropriate portions of the Convention in an attempt to attach legitimacy to the condominium. Following the collapse of the 'offensive' of 1916, the allies sought to impose more stringent control on Persian finances and to secure Persian recognition for the creation of the British equivalent of the Russian's Persian Cossack Brigade, the South Persian Rifles1. Though the Rifles were formed, the Persian Government which had carried out the negotiations in August 1916 collapsed under the weight of

public

position

indignation

the

paramount

leaving

recognition

problem

of

the

de

facto

for Anglo-Persian diplomacy.

Characteristically, the British subsequently referred to these abortive negotiations as the August Agreement. British ended

in

diplomatic

fiasco:

the

efforts Treaty

of

in

Persia

1919

is

not

infrequently

merely

the

most

impressive example. The Persian state at the beginning of the

1

The S.P.R. was one of a number of anamolous military forces operating in the vicinity of the Persian Gulf which were technically private armies of the British Foreign Secretary.

4

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

twentieth century was the scene of multifarious pressures and interests representing landlords, mullahs, tribal chiefdoms,the bazaar,

various

nationalists

and constitutionalists,

regions

and so on. The net product was a state which had constantly to struggle against its own centrifugal tendencies.

The Persian

Revolution of 1906 had momentarily reversed the process, but by 1916, parliamentary reforms survived only as a legacy, though a potent one. The Shah,

having destroyed the constitution and

dispersed

had neither the

the

ability

to

appears

to

Majlis,

make

himself

have

been

a

despot

to

intelligence nor the

and

maintain

his

primary

himself

in

concern

power

and

financially solvent in the face of internecine warfare within the

Persian

ruling

class,

the

agitation

of

various

nationalists, religious devines, tribal and regional leaders, and

the

perverse

Governments

whim

of

the

European

powers.

thus operated within narrow limits and normally

contented

themselves

survival.

Ministers

with were

attempting selected

to

for

find

their

a

path

to

abilities

as

mediators among the myriad conflicting interests. the

Prime

Persian

Minister was to

square the circle:

The task of consequently,

though he might survive temporarily by favouring one faction or another, in the long term the system was inoperable.

Persia

thus passed from cabinet crisis to cabinet collapse without making any genuine impact on her social and political problems. At

the

same

time

that

centrifugal

forces

eroded

the

authority of central government, however, nationalist sentiment in the guise of major public demonstrations served to forestall the ultimate collapse of the state either into the arms of tribal and regional leaders or those of the imperialists. This was

an

aspect

of

incomprehensible^.

1

Persian

politics

which the British

found

For Britain, nationalism was the principal1

R.W. Cottam, Nationalism especially Chapter 11.

in

Iran

(Pittsburgh,

1964),

INTRODUCTION complication assumed

in

for

their

London

the

central reified

Asian

policies,

form of more

though

5 it

comprehensible

dangers: German or Turkish imperialism, pan-islam, pan-Turan, or simply 'extremism'^. Had Asian nationalism been no more than the agency of other imperialisms, it would not have presented such an intractable problem. In reality, nationalist movements expressed

deep-seated

and

pervasive

resentment

of

foreign

domination and interference. As such, it threatened to overcome the divisive communal conflicts which plagued Asia, enabling large numbers of people to unite in opposition to European imperialism. The reconciliation of Turan and Iran, for example, made

plausible

by

the

Hindu-Muslim

promised nightmarish consequences

Lucknow

Pact

of

1916,

for the British Empire in

Asia. Throughout Central Asia nationalist movements were active and

relatively

mature,

particularly

Azerbaijan which tended to interact. as

supranational

language

and

ideologies, religious

hoped

groups

those

of

Iran

and

Pan-Turan and pan-Islam, to weld under

together

the

larger

banners

of

conservative, restorative ideas which were more attractive to defeated traditional states such as Bokhara, or in periods of nationalist

decline

constitutionalists.

as Thus

in

Persia

when

war

after

the

began,

defeat

various

of

groups

the of

nationalists were poised, prepared to exploit any opportunity to break

the Anglo-Russian

Russian Central Asia in

imperial hold on the region.

In

1916, the Muslim population rose in

revolt against attempts to recruit Muslims into the Russian army

in

February

what

was

a

prelude

to

the

1917. In Persia, nationalists,

Russian

Revolution

of

gambling on a German

victory in Europe, threw in their lots with the Germans or the

1

Cf. FO 45/40710/1220, Greene to Balfour, 6 January 1917» Cab 24/36/G.T. 3041, Note by Shuckburgh, 13 December 1917» HMSS 29, Hardinge to Balfour, 17 February 1917.

6

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

Turks, depending on their political convictions* At the sane tine it nust be stressed that the lack of cohesion amongst the nationalist groupings was a fundamental weakness in the face of Russian and British power,

or even

British power on its own. The single issue uniting all groups was the struggle against foreign domination, which néant that most of the population, including, for instance, the Shah of Persia,could

call

thenselves

nationalists*

Within

this

nationalism could be found a broad spectrum of opinion ranging from traditional

Islam dominated by ulamas

to more

radical

democratic elements* It is clear, I think, that despite their hostility to the Qajar dynasty, the democratic and constitutional nationalists in Persia were the only group which steadfastly stood for the maintenance Britain, policy:

and

this

strengthening

posed

London

the

sought

of

central a

strong

the

central

dilemma

for

state

which

state. their

For

Persian

excluded

the

nationalists and their nationalism. British policy simply and impossibly contradicted the reality of Persian politics* The British were inclined to distinguish nationalists on the basis of their malleability:

'extremists' were those who

could be neither bullied nor bribed. After early 1917 the two most important groups of extremists were the regional Iranian nationalists of Azerbaijan and Gilan. Both were established and radical movements which had been important in the making of the 1906

revolution.

Russian

and

towards

Tehran

The

Persian and

Azerbaijanis

were

divided

empires

had,

before

the

and

British

to

protect

between 1917,

them

the

looked

from

the

predations of the Russians. The Russian Revolution profoundly altered the situation and the British began to fear that the entire northwest region of Persia would associate itself with the newly self-determined state of Azerbaijan which was centred at Baku.

INTRODUCTION Gilan,

however,

was

to

pose

the

greatest

7

difficulty*

There, under the leadership of the nationalist Mirra Kuchik Khan, the Gilanis controlled the mountainous region north of Tehran and the important Caspian seaport of Enzeli.

Usually

referred to as the Jangalis, a «ford derived from 'jungle', the followers of Kuchik Khan were the most troublesome nationalist fofce

in

Persia

largely because,

after February

1917,

they

emerged as an armed and fairly effective guerilla band. MajorGeneral L.C. Dunsterville, who commanded the British forces in northwest Persia, described Kuchik Khan as 'an honest, wellmeaning idealist'. But Dunsterville, like most Britons in the Bast, had no sympathy for such idealism: His programme includes all the wearisome platitudes that ring the changes on the will-'o-the-wisp ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. 'Persia for the Persians' and 'Away with the foreigners' are often obvious items, a further enumeration of «fhich is not necessary in view of the fact that they are all obvious^ all fallacies and the world is already tired of them all. The Jangalis became even more important in 1918 owing to their

association

remember

that

with

when

the

the

Bolsheviks.

British

It

is

complained

necessary of

to

Bolshevik

expansion in Persia, they were referring to Kuchik Khan, which illustrated their utter failure to comprehend the energy which lay within nationalist ideology.

More seriously, by refusing

to credit the will-'o-the-wisp ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity,

the British failed to anticipate the potentially

explosive fusion of nationalism with social revolution. British

attitudes

towards

nationalism

indicate

defence of imperial interests was not their sole concern.

that If

twentieth century warfare has promoted the growth of national liberation, imperialism has thrived no less.

The 1914/18 war

1

Adventures

Major-General L.C. Dunsterville, Dunsterforce, (London 1920), p.28.

The

of

8

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

was no exception and, by the end of 1918, the British Empire had achieved its territorial apex\ Despite efforts to disguise the extent of imperial acquisitions behind a variety of 'fig2 leaves' , Britain had extended her dominion in a great arc around the shores of the Indian Ocean from Cape Town through Egypt and India, to Wellington. Haphazard as a Braque painting, British imperialism functioned through the agency of military exigency and the ambitions of men on the spot not to create a specific imperial programme, but to nurture a set of imperial expectations. As in the past, British statesmen were prepared to

do

little

actively

to

extend

the

Empire:

instead,

the

expansion of Empire was regarded as a natural law. By the end of the war, the workings of British imperialism had accomplished a great deal. As Thornton put it: The British in the east, presented with an opportunity whose magnitude they could scarcely gauge, found that their original and conservative intention of safeguarding the road to India led them into radical and indeed revolutionary fields of action. Setting out to do their best to improve an occasion, they did at the end what Palmerston had always refused to jlo: they obtained the lease of 'all of the inns on the way' . Why they should have done so, especially as their grasp of so many of the leases was precarious, is a question which takes us out of the realm of British politics and into that of world politics.

The British were clearly responding to Lenin's call

for social revolution,

punctuated by the publication of the

secret treaties, and to that particularly sanctimonious version of American capitalism articulated by President Wilson which

1

See Max Beloff, Imperial Sunset, Vo. I, Britain's Liberal Empire, 1897-1921 (London, 1969) and W.R. Louis, Great Britain and Germanyrs Lost Colonies, 1914-1919, (Oxford, 1967).

2

Taylor, Struggle for Mastery, pp. 375-6f.

3

A.P. Thornton, The Imperial Idea and its Enemies: A Study in British Power, (London, 1959), p. 154.

INTRODUCTION

9

was so ambivalent in its view of national liberation. Though neither Leninism nor Wilsonianism were fixed features of world politics

in

indicators

1918, of

to the British they constituted important

the

structure

of

the

post-war

world.

One

consequence of these new features was that British imperial ideology began to be articulated in response to the alternative and conflicting visions of Lenin and Wilson. Its spokesmen were, for the most part, men who had come to power with Lloyd George in December 1916 and who were connected to the Empire through Lord Milner. Their influence was confined to the War Cabinet and to the new secretariats which Lloyd George

had

policy, remained

organised^.

Thus,

imperial ideologues in

politicians

the of

hands

the the

of

couldnot the

established

Foreign

Office,

deeply

resented 1amateur'

though

more

they

could

direct

it.

prosaic

departments

Direction

officials

of

India Office and the War interference.

influence

state Office

Lord

-

and the

- who

Hardinge,

Permanent Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, wrote in June 1971 that 'you must never be surprised at anything, as we have two diplomacies - one of the Foreign Office and the 2 other 'amateur', running side by side". And, of course, the most dangerous of the amateurs was Lloyd George himself. Thus, despite

official resistance, the

imperial ideologues became

serious contenders in the struggle to determine British policy.1 2

1

The most important were Hankey, Kerr and Amery. A number of biographies and autobiographies testify to the importance of these individuals: M. Hankey, The Supreme Command, 19Id1918, two volumes, (London, 1961); S. Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets, Vo.l I., 1977-1918, (London, 1970); L.C.M.S. Amery, My Political Life, Vol; II, (London, 1953); J. Davies, The Prime Minister's Secretariat, 1916-1920, (Newport, 1951); J. Butler Lord Lothian, (London 1960).

2

HMSS 33, Hardinge to Buchanan, 25 June 1917. See also: HMSS 32, Hardinge to Rodd, 18 May 1917; HMSS 31, Hardinge to Bertie, 27 April 1917; Zara S. Steiner, Thé Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914, (Cambridge, 1969).

10

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM In what follows, I have attempted to examine the motives

and policies which lay at the root of British efforts to secure the lease of the Persian and Central Asian inns. The study is mainly concerned with the formulation of British policy in the departments of state responsible for the area, including the Government of impact

of

idealism

India.

the and

It is also an attempt to assess the

relatively Bolshevism

new

on

ideologies

imperial

application to decision-making.

of

nationalism,

attitudes

and

their

Though the study is limited in

scope, it deals with the development of attitudes and policies in

the

West

generally

which

are

relevant

to

today's

relationship between the European powers, including the United States, and the underdeveloped nations of the Third World. The significance of the growing ideological challenge to the British Empire was

interpreted to be a tangible threat

which required practical counter-measures. In fact, it would be fair to say that British policy-makers were less concerned with the

intellectual

content

of

any

of

the

major

ideological

challenges than they were with the direct power implications of each. The Empire, after all, had surrounded its own expansion and existence with words, and many British officials believed that

the

ideological

footsteps

youngsters

would

by making clear territorial

follow

in

demands.

their

own

I have not,

therefore, attempted to explore the intellectual content of any ideology,

but

have

confined

understanding and opinion.

the

study

to British

official

It was upon their own beliefs that

the British built policy: that they often missed the point is perhaps the most characteristic feature of official thinking. Though British

this

study

imperialism,

it

concentrates is

not

my

on

the

purpose

mechanisms

of

to belittle the

malign impact which imperialism has had on the politics and political formations of Central Asia. The current struggles in Iran and Afghanistan illustrate this all too well. That crucial

INTRODUCTION understanding and opinion.

11

It was upon their own beliefs that

the British built policy: that they often missed the point is perhaps the most characteristic feature of official thinking. Though British

this

study

imperialism,

concentrates

it

is

not my

on

the

purpose

mechanisms

to belittle

of the

malign impact which imperialism has had on the politics and political formations of Central Asia. The current struggles in Iran and Afghanistan illustrate this all too well. That crucial British misapprehension in Persia - that they could devise a non-nationalist solution to the problem of how to create strong centralised

states

- had

disastrous

consequences

for

Iran.

Quite simply, it opened the door to the Pahlavi dictatorship: through

that

States.

In imposing an illusion by force, Britain undermined

and

opposed

institutions,

door

the

walked

Britain,

development

tolerated

an

followed

of

by

democratic

illiberal

and

the

United

forms

and

oppressive

dictatorship, and thus presided over the deepening deformation of

Iranian

politics.

The

consequence

has

been

the

Iranian

Revolution and the imposition of the most peculiar politics of all, the rule of the Ayetollahs.

CHAPTER ONE:

PERSIA AND THE COLLAPSE OF ANGLO-RUSSIAN CO-OPERATION

By the beginning of 1917 Britain's position in Persia had come to depend on the Russian troops who policed the cordon on either side of the Caspian Sea. British statesmen and diplomats thus found themelsves dependent on the very forces which, in the past,

they had most feared.

The Russians served a dual

purpose: their presence guarded against enemy incursions into Persia and

it helped to

still nationalist ferment.

For Sir

Charles Marling, the British Minister at Tehran, this appeared vital

if Britain was to counter expected enemy support for

Persian nationalism. Throughout

the

British 'policy

in

first half of Persia

was

to

1917,

the main object of

preserve

the

status

quo.

Marling realised that this could be accomplished only if the Russians were encouraged to maintain the cordon and if he could get the Persian Government to recognise the August Agreement. The Persians, however, proved uncooperative. The revolution in Russia in February 1917, though it did not immediately alter the position, encouraged Tehran to believe that they would be able to avoid recognition altogether. Despite the obstacles, however, Marling was optimistic. wrote

to

the

Secretary

of

In the middle of March, he

State

for Foreign Affairs,

A.J.

Balfour, that the British military victories on the Somme and at Baghdad led him to hope that the Persians would give their assent^. But the Russian Revolution cast a longer shadow over the

negotiations

March,

he

than

Marling had

reported that the

supposed.

At the end of

Russian Revolution was

causing

serious trouble in Persia and that the Shah had claimed to see1

1

10 3131/1917:1706, Marling to Balfour, 21 March 1917.

COLLAPSE OF ANGLO-RUSSIAN CO-OPERATION

13

a fundamental harmony between the goals of the Revolution and the

demands

of moderate

Persian nationalists,

many of whom

hoped that the new government at Petrograd would reverse the Russian

Government's policy

Persia altogether^. idealist

of

expansion

and withdraw

from

The Persians had been encouraged by the

pronouncements

which

accompanied

the

revolution.

Marling,

in a letter to Lord Hardinge, pointed out that the

Persians

expected

and,

more

force

'Republican Russia'

important,

Britain

out

as

that

Russia's

well.

He

to reverse its policy action would

ultimately

feared that the pro-British

Cabinet in Tehran would be unable to withstand the pressure from the 'democrats' and pleaded for an immediate resumption of 2 Anglo-Russian co-operation . The extent to which Russia's ability to act in Persia had been

weakened

by

mystery.

Milyukov,

inclined

to

the

Revolution

was

still

something of

a

the Russian Foreign Minister, was himself

maintian

Russian

claims

but

was

powerless

to

implement an active policy because of political opposition in Petrograd^. He could offer no more than passive support when what Britain required was direct military pressure which would restore the situation to what it had been in the autumn of 1916. Despite repeated efforts, no diplomatic formula could be found which would alter the events

in Persia

had

fact that Russian influence on

begun to wain and that,

in the near

future, Britain would be left alone to face the hostility of Persian national feeling. Because

British

policy

was

assumed

to

be

based

upon

considerations of imperial security, the real dilemma tended to1 3 2

1

FO W34/66162/65390, Marling to Balfour, 28 March 76294/65390, Buchanan to Balfour, 29 March 1917.

2

HMSS 30, Marling to Hardinge, 29 March 1917.

3

FO W34/88432/65390, Buchanan to Balfour, 30 April 1917.

1917;

14

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

be

obscured*

There

was

in

the

first

place

the

perfectly

straightforward danger of enemy military action, though it generally realised in London that the logistical difficulties involved

virtually

precluded

the

campaign by the Central Powers* other hand,

possibility

of

a

massive

Persian nationalism, on the

posed a more persistent and direct challenge to

British paramountcy* As a consequence of 1916, it was assumed that there was a connection between the two, though in reality they were discrete problems. Britain's strategic orientation, however, made it difficult for Foreign Office officials who handled

the

daily

business

of

Anglo-Persian

relations

to

distinguish clearly between the military and political aspects of the problem. Another officials

complication

had

resented

little

nationalist

domination.

was

sympathy efforts

Austen

that

British

politicians

and

for

Persian

aspirations

and

to

free

Chamberlain

Persia

from

attributed

British

Britain's

difficulties in Persia to Oriental mulishness. In a letter to Hardinge

on

solution: will

1

April

1917,

he

recommended

the

traditional

"As to the kahzuds they badly need a licking, but

anyone

stand

more

fighting

when

this

war

is

over?"

Chamberlain was doubtful and like Marling hoped that Russian assistance would be forthcoming: "Can you keep this new Russian Government sake

straight about Persia?",

let Buchanan make

German"1.

Thus

he asked.

it clear that

blinded,

British

"For goodness

in Persia Democrat

policy-makers

failed

* to

appreciate that a political settlement with moderate Persian nationalism might be an advantage and instead remained intent upon maintaining themselves at Tehran. They were convinced that Britain must

take up the

reins of power as they fell from

Russian hands and, characteristically, continued to formulate policy in European political terms when,

1

in fact, they were

HMSS 31, Chamberlain to Hardinge, 1 April 1917.

COLLAPSE OP ANGLO-RUSSIAN CO-OPERATION dealing

with

acquired

insurgent

additional

struggle,

nationalisa,

momentum

nevertheless

had

as

its

a

which, result

origins

though of

in

it

the

a

15 had

European

purely

Asian

experience. The first real signs that serious trouble lay ahead came in

the

second half

of April

1917,

with

the news

that the

Russians had begun to lose control of their troops in northern Persia. troops

Simultaneously, became

more

revolutionary activity among Russian

frequent.

The

Foreign

Office

found

the

situation 'very disquieting' when it learned of the creation of Russian Workmen's and Soldiers' Committees which endeavoured to take

control

of

all

Russian

services

in

Persia^.

This

revolutionary agitation could not fail to affect the people of northern Persia who had always been in the vanguard of the nationalist movement. Any relaxation of Russian control would undoubtedly be enough to revive the movement: as it turned out, the Russian dissidents and the Persian nationalists had begun to

fraternise.

insistence

the

circumstances,

Russian 2 action was a little naive • The

that

Under the

Russians,

meantime,

Government

were

Marling's be

induced

becoming weaker.

repeated to

take

It was,

after all, the failure of Anglo-Russian cooperation which had created the situation in the first place. Though Marling had thought that the diplomatic and financial pressure which he had brought

to

Persians,

bear

on

Tehran

would

bear

realising their weakness,

Agreement,

two months

Revolution

had

later

introduced

it was

radically

fruit

and

that

the

would accept the August clear new

that

the Russian

factors

into

his

calculations. For a time, the Russians were capable of making diplomatic

gestures

in Persia,

but nothing had happened to1 2

1

FO W34/82228/65390, Marling to Balfour, 20 April 1917.

2

FO W34/85602/65390, Marling to Balfour, 25 April 1917.

16

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

suggest that the crisis had passed or that the Russian troops in Persia would accept discipline. As bad news continued to pour

in

from

Petrograd

during

April,

one

Foreign

Office

official, Lancelot Oliphant, observed that "in a short time we may well find the Russians supporting any Persian proposal for the sole reason that the previous Russian Government opposed it"\

But

he

cooperation.

could

It

was

propose "very

no

alternative

unfortunate",

he

to

added,

Russian "but

in

present circumstances we are powerless; we can only hope that local influence may keep some of the more violent nationalists 2 out". By placing the ball in Marling's court Oliphant hoped that British control over Persian finance and patronage could be put to good use. Oliphant

realised,

It was a not unfounded hope, though as the

best

Britain

could

hope

for was

a

moderate nationalist cabinet which would not be anti-British. This

first

hesitant

step

toward

conciliation

with

the

nationalists was thus the result of official frustration. Marling himself believed that only direct action against Persian finances could prevent the Shah from giving rein to his fear of a republic and lead him to resist the nationalists. On 7 May he proposed that a threat to cut the subsidy should be 3 made. The Foreign Office agreed on the 13th. The result was an immediate

but

little more

short-lived

than

a week, 4 unsatisfactory state.

improvement affairs

in

relations.

After

reverted to their

former

It was perhaps inevitable that Marling should emphasise the pro-German element in Persian nationalism even though it1

1

FO W34/88432/65390, Minute by Oliphant, 2 May 1917.

2

FO W34/91328/65390, Minute by Oliphant, 5 May 1917.

3

FO W34/93350, Marling to Balfour, 8 May 1917.

4

FO W34/96511, 99848, 101754, Balfour, 11 to 28 May 1917.

106871/65390,

Marling

to

COLLAPSE OF ANGLO-RUSSIAN CO-OPERATION

17

was quite clear to him that much of the agitation during April and May was inspired by the Revolution of 1906. Yet there was more to the crisis than demands for democratic reform and a change of Government. The end of May witnessed the beginnings of intermittent terrorism directed at Persian conservatives who supported the British. On 24 May, the editor of Tehran's proBritish newspaper was assassinated by what the Persians claimed were Caucasian or Russian anarchists in the hire of powerful 2 Persian politicians . Whether or not the assassination had to do with political principle or political place, it proved to be the

last

straw for the tottering Persian Government and it

resigned on 27 May 1917. The threat to Persia's finances had proved a gamble which had not paid off and the failure left Marling in a more difficult position than before. Marling ascribed his failure to the Russians. Accustomed to the expansion of the Russian Empire, he seemed to resent imperial threat

failure.

He even despaired of using the

effectively

paralysed

[the]

because

political

"now

that

capital

of

Russian [the]

financial

influence democrats

is and

nationalists consists in Anglophobia and a demarche by me would be seized upon as providing justification for their attitude." He concluded from this that Britain must keep clear of Persian 2 politics in order to allow a new cabinet to be formed . In a letter to Hardinge at the end of May, Marling wrote that with Russia's weakness displayed, a democratic Government in Tehran would regard Britain as its principal antagonist, and that once free of Russian pressure, their hostility

at

the Persians would direct all of

foreign control

and manipulation

1

10 3131/1917:2141, Marling to Balfour, 24 May 1917.

2

IO 3131/1917:2325, Marling to Balfour, 31 May 1917.

at the1 2

18

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

British^.

In another

letter to Hardinge,

Marling complained

that things are going very badly, the cry being Persia for the Persians, down with all foreign interference with Persian affairs and in particular down with the August 1916 Agreement I It is a great pity we let Russia hustle us into it, for all the odium now recoils on us* Renewed result*

pressure

Moreover,

in

the

Petrograd

Persians

produced

had

grasped

no

significant

Russia's

real

weakness and were intent upon exploiting the situation* The new Persian Governemnt of Ala-es-Sultaneh which was formed on 6 June

1917 began to put pressure on Petrograd to extend the

benefits of democracy to Persia, and more seriously, refused to allow any increase in the numbers of the Cossack Brigade.^ Persia to challenge

For

the authority of her protector in this

manner was unheard of and heralded increased difficulty for Britain in the future« It was clearly impossible for Marling to go on as though the

1907 Convention were still in operation.

On

17 June he

proposed a change of policy* He argued that if the Russians adopted

a

course

away

from

their

traditional

policy

of

agression and expansion, Britain should use the opportunity to re-establish before

the

accepted

the

Anglo-Persian

Convention.

Britain's

friendship which had existed

Persian

defensive

opinion,

motive

in

he

asserted,

making

the

had 1907

Convention and the August Agreement, but with Russia in eclipse this justification no longer served and Marling urged that the British Government spontaneously offer to "tear up" the 1907 Convention

and

to renegotiate

the August Agreement*

If the

change were not made, he warned, responsibility for enforcing1

1

HMSS, Marling to Hardinge, 24 May 1917.

2

HMSS, 32, Marling to Hardinge, 14 June 1917.

3

10 3131/1917:2506, Marling to Balfour, 14 June 1917.

COLLAPSE OF ANGLO-RUSSIAN CO-OPERATION

19

the old system would require the presence of British troops# a step which Marling regarded as contrary to British principles. As the Persian course led to anarchy# it was vital that Britain intervene politically to alter the course by supporting the few native

elements

actually

working

for

progress.^

Marling#

having exhausted what he considered to be the normal methods of dealing with the Persians# had ended up proposing a departure from official policy in the direction of an accommodation with moderate Persian nationalism. Any lingering hope Marling might have had about the future policy of Russia was removed on the 19th of June. A report from Petrograd of a conversation with the Russian Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated that the latter had "expressed [the] opinion and that in [the] present circumstances it was impossible

to

oppose

the

Democrats"

necessary to work with them. seems pretty clear [that] Persia

and

therefore

it

was

The report concluded that "it

if we are to take a strong line in

we

must be prepared to rely entirely on our own 2 resources." But the fact was that in June 1917 the British

Government

saw neither the need nor the advantage in using

force to

impose

unrelated

to

the

its will war

on Persia.

in Europe#

Though Persia was

it was

still

regarded

not as

primarily an imperial problem which had been aggravated by the Russian Revolution. While Persia was vital to the security of thé Empire# in practical terms# the dissentions of June did not threaten

that

security.

Thus

the

position

Russians appeared to support Marling's

adopted

by

the

recommendation for a

change of policy. Simultaneously# the Government of India intervened in the debate. India was# of course# directly concerned in the entire change of policy.1 2

1

10 3131/1917:2506, Marling

to Balfour, 17 June 1917.

2

10 3131/1917:2506# Buchanan to Balfour# 19 June 1917.

20

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM Simultaneously, the Government of India intervened in the

debate. India was, of course, directly concerned in the entire problem

and

though

policy,

India

the

was

Foreign

entitled

Office was

to

express

responsible

for

opinions.

The

its

Vicreoy, Lord Chelmsford, made it clear that the Government of India

was

chiefly

concerned

with

the

practical

problem

defending India, and his main concern was for the S.P.R. the

same

somewhat

time,

he

beyond

possible," sympathetic

he

exhibited

Marling's:

said,

attitude

"to

The

Viceroy,

At

strategic vision which went

"It

would

anticipate

towards

possible to conciliate

a

of

[the]

seem

[the]

desirable

Russians

democrats

and

in

if [a]

so far as

[the] latter before it is too late."^

therefore,

more

than

agreed

with

Marling's

proposal and on 25 June sent to the India Office a lengthy exposition of his thinking on Persia: We view with gravest concern [the] prospect of anarchy in Persia or of [a] democratic Government definitely hostile to us, especially as [the] present wave of democratic feeling appears infinitely more genuine and widespread than any before. Results of anarchy or a democratic government hostile to our interests would involve (a) disintegration of [the] South Persian Rifles on which our military position in South Persia depends; (b) our evacuation of Shiraz at least; (c) special measures to secure [the] Gulf ports; (d) an open road for [the] Turks to Herat with [the] probable spread of war to Afghanistan and [the] Indian frontier; (e) hostile menace to oilfields and Arabistan via Laristan, thus threatening Maude's base and communications. To obviate consequences so serious from both [the] military and political standpoint, we think that every endeavour should be made to conciliate [the] de facto democratic leaders, including financial assistance, and if this be possible money should not be spared. To this end we would not hesitate to scrap [the] 1907 Convention or to reconsider [the] August Agreement. As regards [the] South Persia Rifles, we should be prepared to discuss greater measures of Persian control in the future subject to retention of British officers if Persia assumes responsibility of payments after the war. As regards joint financial control, we think that we should not press this1 1

10 3131/1917:2506, Viceroy (FD) to 10, 18 June 1917.

COLLAPSE OF ANGLO-RUSSIAN CO-OPERATION

21

matter too strongly. Would it be out of the question to bring back Schuster who is certainly persona grata with [the] democratic party? It is obvious that any attempt to continue [the] old reactionary policy is doomed to failure in Persia and can only discredit us deeply elsewhere. The telegram proved to be the first shot in a running battle between the Government of India and the Home Government. Official reaction to the Viceroy's telegram was cool. In the India Office, the Political and Secret Department, which was

responsible

Shuckburgh,

for

were

affairs

very

in

critical.

Persia,

and

Shuckburgh

its

felt

head,

that

the

Government of India had overstated the potential for evil of a democratic cabinet and pointed out that the opening of the road to Herat would depend upon the general military situation and not simply the cabinet at Tehran.

He also noted that the India

Office was opposed to any concession which would allow neutral officers to take control of the S.P.R. so long as the force was financially dependent upon Britain.^ Under-Secretary

of

State

at

the

Sir William Holderness, India

Office,

impression that the Government of India had panicked.

had 3

the

But Sir

Alexander Hirtzel took a position which was more symphatetic to the Viceroy's fears.

In a note dated 29 June, he attempted to

deal with what he conceived of as the alternatives available in Persia, holding that the Anglo-Russian Convention should not be scrapped as it was an agreement between the two powers alone and did no harm to Persia.

At the same time, he thought it

necessary to placate Persia by modifying British practice in the

direction

of

building

a

strong

and

stable

Persian1

1

10 3131/1917:2618, Viceroy (FD) to 10, 25 June 1917; F. Stanwood "Revolution and the Old Revolutionary Policy: Britain in Persia, 1917", Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 6:2 (1978).

2

IO 3131/1917:2618, Minute by Chuckburgh, 26 June 1917.

3

Ibid., Minute by Holderness, n.d.

22

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

Government which would be able to resist Russian demands in future* In Hirtzel's view, there were three courses available to Britain:

(1) to continue to secure the position in south

Persia by direct intervention - a method Hirtzel considered "morally indefensible" and possible only for the duration of the war: "This course would be disastrous in the present and impossible in the future":

(2) to somehow reactivate Anglo-

Russian co-opration in Tehran;

(3) to scrap Britain's former

policy "and throw ourselves into the arms of the democrats" as Marling had suggested, and which Hirtzel agreed was the "right and

indeed

the

only

practicable

course..."^

Hirtzel's

concurrence, however, was unique and not shared by the other senior

officials

of

the

India Office

for whom conciliating

nationalism was still too radical a departure from traditional policy to receive serious consideration. Despite a willingness to accommodate Persian nationalism the Government of India was being truly conservative.

Based

upon what was in their opinion a sensible evaluation of the realities of power in the area, the Government of India had formulated

its

case

on

familiar

tenets

of

Indian

defence.

Indian officials had an understandable tendency to look upon events in Asia with one eye cocked on India itself. departments,

notably

the

Foreign

Office,

Other

interpreted

this

concern as a symptom of a peculiar Indian malaise which induced fear and foreboding of disaster in otherwise normal Englishmen. Criticisms of the Government of India were often unfair: India wanted to have a neutral Persia because it feared that any turbulence on the Indian frontier would have serious and even revolutionary consequences

in India

itself.

More than this,

they wanted no allies for the growing nationalist movement in India and no causes which would fan the fire of resistance.1

1

10 3131/1917:2731, Note by Sir A. Hirtzel, 29 June 1917.

COLLAPSE OF ANGLO-RUSSIAN CO-OPERATION

23

Ironically, the Government of India sought to do in Persia what they adamantly refused to do in India* In order to damp the fires of nationalism in Persia, India was prepared to use whatever means if found at its disposal even if the means were contrary to accepted imperial practice* As the crisis in Persia expanded in the spring of 1917, the Government of India had come to the conclusion that Britain must

recognise

encouragement

the

and

Persian

support,

nationalists

win

and

them over

to

by a

offering

pro-British

attitude. A correspondent of Hardinge's wrote from India at the time that the war had made it impossible to take action which would quell the turbulence in the Imperial hinterland and asked whether,

in

view

of

the

serious

impact

which

the

Russian

Revolution had had in Persia, it might not be better to welcome Persia into the democratic fraternity and use the opportunity to exclude Russia from Central Asia in the future.^ respects, exclude

India

was

fighting past battles

Russia

and

Turkey

whereas

In many

in attempting to

Marling

and

the

Home

Government were concerned to stop the spread of nationalism and prohibit its contact with Britain's European enemies. The Government of India was resolute in its opposition to the "reactionary policies" of the Foreign Office and official opinion in London*

It was thus something of a lone wolf in

advocating a change of policy for Persia.

It persisted in its

advocacy despite the fact that it remained essentially alone and

unheeded*

The

Viceory

was

aware

that

his

advice

was

normally disregarded and it made him very unhappy. He wrote to Edwin Montagu on 19 July 1917 complaining that our position is most anomalous in this region. It is admitted that India has a very large concern in Persian1

1

HMSS 33, Grant to Hardinge, 5 June 1917. A.H. Grant was foreign secretary of the Government of India and probably wrote many of the despatches marked Viceroy (FD).

24

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM affairs# but we have very small say. Our opinion is asked# but is seldom heeded, and the Foreign Office is continually asking jis to assume responsibility without any real control.

Though Montagu promised support for the Government of India#

2

the India Office was often the Viceroy's most severe critic. A

second

intervention,

reaching consequences.

by

Lord

Curzon#

had

more

far-

Curzon had been a member of the War

Cabinet since its formation. He was# like Lord Milner# a grand Imperial

statesman,

shedding

his

glory

on

the

cabinet

but

basically uninterested in mundane domestic issues. Curzon was# however# keenly interested in the Empire and particularly in Asia.

His

Viceroyalty

expansionism and another

chance

saw

left him

and

he

the

last

in disgrace.

soon

established

episode

of

Indian

The War offered him himself

as the War

Cabinet's expert on Eastern affairs. He brought to his task a brilliant if limited and erratic mind filled with an extensive knowledge of British interests and a highly expansionist set of imperial were

formulae.

mainly

He soon eclipsed Balfour whose interests

European#

and

involved himself

directly in the

daily operation of the Foreign Office on Eastern matters. It must

have

struck Curzon

immediately that the machinery

for

policy-making on Eastern affairs was a muddle. A variety of departments had direct interests in the area# but as each was ignorant of# or antagonistic towards the other# the result was that

actual

policy

tended

to

follow

the

line

of

least

resistance# passively responding to a variety of anxieties but lacking any real coherence; and certainly without any momentum. Persia was a good example of administrative indecision. By the end of June 1917, Marling, despite his predilections, was moving toward the position taken by the Government of India. An1 2

1

10 MSS# Eur.D. 523/6, Chelmsford to Montagu# 19 July 1917.

2

10 MSS. Eur. D. 523/1, Montagu to Chelmsford# 21 August 1917.

COLLAPSE OF ANGLO-RUSSIAN CO-OPERATIOH accommodation

with

Persian

nationalism

was

not

a

25

pleasant

prospect for Curzon to contemplate. He was obviously upset by the tendency for official policy to drift in the wake of the men-on-the-spot whose opinions and suggestions were often made without

reference

to

larger

strategic

and

imperial

considerations. On 26 June, in an effort to stop the drift, Curzon asked for a meeting of the India Office and Foreign Office to discuss the situation in Persia.^ What Curzon wanted was

to gather

the departments

concerned with Persia into a

single responsible body charged with the formulation of policy. The initiative had first to overcome Foreign Office hesitancy« on 5 July Shuckburgh reported that the Foreign Office was still trying to make up its mind whether to refer the problem to the Mesopotamia

Administration

Committee 2 committee Curzon had suggested.

or

to

the

special

In the interim, it was obvious that Curzon's intervention had made Persia into a serious political issue. The official response to the new situation was a number of lengthy memoranda dealing with

Persia and the East generally.

Shuckburgh,

in

response to both Marling and the Viceroy, wrote on 5 July, that the importance of Persian hostility had been over-estimated and he attempted to distill

from the controversy Britain's real

interests : When it comes to the real business, the Persian 'democrat' simply does not count, and however desirable and necessary it may be for us on political or military grounds to pretend that he does, we ought at any rate to keep our own minds clear of all illusions on the subject. The primary object of all our Persian policy - assuming, as we apparently must, that the situation is now reduced to its elements - is, I take it, the protection of the western flank of our position in India. For this purpose it is necessary to secure Persia, or at least that part of it which adjoins our frontier and our maritime highway, from (1) external aggression and (2) internal anarchy.1 2 1

10 3131/1917:2618, Minute by Shuckburgh, 26 June 1917.

2

IO 3131/1917:2732, Minute by Shuckburgh, 5 July 1917.

26

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM Shuckburgh continued that the Anglo-Russian Convention had

accomplished the first in the past, while experience had taught that Britain must undertake the second herself* It therefore seemed obvious to Shuckburgh that the Persian democrats could not protect India's flank and that no matter what political reorientation might take place in Tehran Britain must not give way on the essentials unless forced to do so.^ Like his counterparts in the Foreign Office, Shuckburgh was

sceptical

elements"

to

about guard

the the

efficacy

of

relying

imperial

frontier

on

and

"native basically

suspicious of any proposal to alter the established policy of informal control in Persia. The proposals for an accommodation thus

ran

Viceroy,

counter

to

official

nevertheless,

thinking on the

subject.

The

repeated his argument emphasising the

danger of political anarchy and urged that if it were allowed to continue the Turks would be

able to molest the British

communication and supply system in Mesopotamia. We are convinced [that the] only way to check anarchy is to conciliate [the] really strong democrats and help them to establish a working Government and that adherence to^ a reactionary policy may lead to very serious consequences. Official policy was based upon Russian cooperation, but with

Russia

powerless

there

seemed

no

alternative

to what

Marling and the Viceroy had, in their different ways, proposed. Though genuine conciliation remained unpopular with officials there

appeared

no

way

for

them

to

recommdendations of the men-on-the-spot.

avoid

following

the

Marling added impetus

to the conciliatory trend on 7 July by announcing that he and the

Viceroy

different

were

arguing

reasons.^

for

Balfour,

the

same

therefore,

policy,

though

decided

1

Idem.

2

10 3131/1917:2750, Viceroy (FD) to 10, 5 July 1917.

3

10 3131/1917:2846, Marling to Balfour, 7 July 1917.

that

for the1

COLLAPSE OF ANGLO-RUSSIAN CO-OPERATION

27

"danger indicated by [the] Government of India is a very real one and I consider that we should be prepared with a definite plan

for

conciliating

nationalists" detailed

and

or

requested

suggestions

frustrating Marling

for Cabinet

to

[the]

prepare

Persian a

consideration*^

set

of

Marling's

reply, on 9 July, however, reversed many of the recommendations he had made less than a month earlier* He explained that a Constructive policy of reform present. In Persia politics are and such advocates of reform as feeble for us to work through interests of corruption. Efforts

at

interpreted by therefore policy

of

reform, the

Persians

recommended control,

in

Marling's as

a

continuing

while

at

is scarcely feasible at [a] matter of money-making exist are too few and too them against [the] vested

sign

to

the

opinion,

of weakness

pursue

same

would

Britain's

be

and he former

time making gestures

towards negotiations* If negotiations over the August Agreement proved successful, Marling thought that a further understanding could be reached which would allow Britain to turn the S.P.R* over to Tehran while continuing to protect Britain's financial 2 interests in the country* Shuckburgh noted that they were still waiting for the Foreign Office to decide on procedure, but observed that any delay on the "democrat" advantage.

His

only

concern

was

that

"the

issue was an

recent

Russian

retreat on the Khanikin-Kermanshah line...introduces a serious "3 element into the situation, which may precipitate a crisis. It appeared that the situation might reach a crisis before the Foreign Office could make up its mind. A

crisis

was

avoided

largely

because

the

Persian

nationalists in Ala-es-Sultaneh's cabinet were still attempting1 3 2

1

Ibid., Balfour to Marling, 7 July 1917.

2

Ibid., Marling to Balfour, 9 July 1917.

3

Ibid., Minute by Shuckburgh, n.d.

28

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

to find their feet. Their efforts to diminish Russia's presence had

been

their

partially

attention

notified further

of of

to

successful the

Persia18 the

and

British.

refusal

Government's

they On

to

consequently

27

July,

recognise

was

S.P.R.

and

the

uniform

military force which would

include both the S.P.R.

and the

Cossack

was

move

a

to

Marling

a

Brigade.1 The

intention

turned

form

response both to

foreign

interference and an answer to the criticism that Persia was incapable

of

defending

itself.

Marling

regarded

the

communication as an offence and refused to accept it, though simultaneously, the

Foreign

the Persian Minister in London had presented

Office

with

a

communication.

The

curiosity

as

one

India

Government

was

considering

British

for,

result

slightly was

altered version of the

something

Office

of

a

official a

note

diplomatic

observed,

which

had

the

never

officially been sent.1 It was obvious that further delay was impossible, and in the end Curzon got his way.

The Conference on Persia, which

met for the first time on 31 July, was constituted on lines suggested by Curzon: Curzon himself was chairman of the first meeting:

the

Foreign

Office

was

represented

by

Balfour,

Hardinge and Oliphant; the India Office by Montagu, Hirtzel and Shuckburgh; and the War Office by General Macdonogh, the D.M.I. The

principal

topics

for

discussion

were

the

desiderata

presented by the Persian Government in its 'unofficial' note. As these were primarily concerned with military and financial reform, there was nothing in the note which could have been considered British

extreme.

contention

In that

fact,

they

Persians

implicitly

were

accepted

incapable

of

the

ruling

themselves and only aimed at loosening Britain's hold rather than dispensing with all European assistance. The Conference,1 2

1

IO 3131/1917:3097, Marling to Balfour, 27 July 1917.

2

IO 3131/1917:3380, Minute by Hirtzel, 23 August 1917.

COLLAPSE OF ANGLO-RUSSIAN CO-OPERATION despite the Viceroy's warnings,

29

decided that the moment was

inopportune for a reconsideration of British policy or for any modification

of

the

region as a whole.1 of

all

the

international

agreements

concerning the

This conclusion flew directly in the face

evidence which

had been accumulating since the

February Revolution and represented a decision to cling to past arrangements in the hope that the Russians would be able to sort

themselves

Cooaittee

had,

out in

and

fact,

re-enter opted

to

Persian do

politics.

nothing

at

all.

The The

Persians were unlikely to accept token gestures from Britain and

thus

Curson's

official lethargy. attitudes

which,

opportunity

intervention

from

which

difficult

served

to

buttress

It was a victory for traditional imperial

for

hindsight,

might

difficulty and expense. was

merely

have

appears

saved

to

have

been

Britain

from

enormous

It is nonetheless understandable:

officials

in

London,

steeped

in

an

it the

traditions of decades, to comprehend the nature of the forces which confronted them in Persia. The Committee had not, of course, found a solution - which made the Viceroy very unhappy. He telegraphed on 16 August that we had hoped that it might be possible in the altered circumstances to win over the people who count in Persia, whether democrats or others, to a realisation of our real aims and objects and to break down the wall of prejudice and suspicion now confronting us. He realise [the] difficulties in the way of such a policy, but considering all we want of Persia is a benevolent neutrality that will exclude Persia is a benevolent neutrality that will exclude anarchial and anti-British influences and secure a reasonable degree of peace and order for the safety of our cis-borders and trade, it should be possible, by manifests or otherwise, to place our cards on the table and induce both the Persian 5 Government and people to a better understanding.1 2

1

1IO 3131/1917:3131, Minutes of Conference on Persia, 31 July 1917. In subsequent meetings the conference was called the Persia Committee.

2

10 3131/1917:3380, Viceroy (F0) to 10, 16 August 1917

30

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

On the 18th, the Viceroy again argued that it was of primary importance

to

break

down

the

distrust

of

British

actions,

especially where the S.P.R. was concerned. The Government of India wanted the British Government to agree in principle to accept

a

15,000

man

Persian

police

force

and

non-British

financial advisors, believing that the concession would not be of immediate importance as both would require a considerable amount of time to implement.^

Shuckburgh conceded that there

might be short-term advantage in the proposal, but in the long run, he have

argued, it would mean "accepting a policy which we

(presumably)

no

intention

of

ever

allowing

to

materialise." Persia might present "15,000 ragamuffins scraped together

from

German!)

somewhere

'financial

reforms.••.and

two

experts'

demand

Persian Rifles."

or

with

immediate

three a

foreign

paper

of course,

disbandment

(perhaps

project

fanciful.

of

of

S. 2 To refuse then would be a "breach of faith".

The objection was,

the

or

the

The Government of

India had based its recommendation on the immediate need to have a stable buffer for India.

If the Persians,

like their

Afghan neighbours, preferred to do this themselves, India had no objections. There was, as far as Delhi was concerned, no _a_ priori reason why Persian defences should be in British hands. But

for

London

London, had

never

India's

solution

seriously

was

unacceptable

considered

because

relinguishing

its

political and economic control over Persia. At best, as the Persia Committee had shown, it was sometimes willing to accept the status' quo. Under the circumstances, Hirtzel pointed out, 3 the Government of India was wasting its breath. The Committee's decision did nothing to ease Marling's position, which had been complicated by reports that the enemy1 3 2

1

Ibid., Viceroy (PD to 10, 18 August 1917.

2

Ibid., Minute by Shuckburgh, 22 August 1917.

3

Ibid., Minute by Hirtzel, 23 August 1917.

COLLAPSE OF ANGLO-RUSSIAN CO-OPERATION

31

was planning to attack. On 3 September, for example, the India Office

informed

the

Government

of

India

that

reliable

information had been received which indicated that the Turks and Germans planned a general offensive in which Turkish troops were

to

invade

Persia,

take

Aserbaijan

and

move

in

the

direction of Turkestan.^ The Viceroy's reaction was predictable: "I have no locus Stândl

but

importance towards

all

information

I

receive

emphasises

[the]

of

[a] radical and immediate change of attitude 2 Persia." Hardinge, however, drew the opposite

conclusion. It was his view that Britain should use its power more directly in Persia even at the risk of having to abandon Persia altogether. In a letter to Marling on 4 September, he explained that: What I feel about Persia is that there is practically nothing to be done so long as Russia is in her present hopeless state of paralysis. All that «re can do is to safeguard our own interests as much as possible by force if not by diplomacy, such force ^»eing applied solely within range of the guns of our ships. Hardinge's pessimistic letter, influenced no doubt by events in other theatres of the war, could not have given Marling much encouragement: Tehran was well out of range for Britain's naval guns. The letter, however, contained a glimpse of what was to follow. Hardinge had clearly begun to think of Persia less as a diplomatic problem and more as a military one, particularly as he became

suspicious of enemy designs on the Persian Gulf.

Marling, isolated at Tehran, and, as we have seen, unprepared to urge military intervention, drew the logical conclusion from the letter and proposed that Britain turn the S.P.R. over to the Persian Government and pull out entirely.

It seemed to him1 3 2

1

10 3131/1917:3760, 10 to Viceroy (FD), 3 September 1917.

2

Ibid., Viceroy to 10, 10 September 1917.

3

HMSS 34, Hardinge to Marling, 4 September 1917.

32

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

a reasonable policy in as much as the European threat to Persia had largely disappeared* Marling saw the difficulty as mainly caused by

nationalist aspirations which were not

likely to

subside and drew from this the conclusion that it was Persian nationalism

rather

than

enemy

Britain's position untenble.1 conclusion, analyses,

there

though

was

a

aggression

which

had

Though they had reached the same

glaring disparity between

Hardinge

made

did

not

bother

the

two

to follow up the

exchange. There

was

obviously

military situation.

some

confusion

about

the

actual

The alarming reports of Turkish activity

were followed by a much cooler appraisal of the situation by the C.I.6.S., Sir Henry Wilson. on

He informed the C.-in-C. India

14 September that there was no real evidence of Turkish

troop movements and suggested that the information had been planted in an attempt to win over the Persian Government. He continued that We may have many similar reports in future and should be careful regarding [the] amount of credibility we attach to them although at the same time we here feel that as great effort as possible will be made this winter to retake northern Mesopotamia and to stir up trouble in Persia, Afghanistan and Turkiptan by the incursion of small parties of Turks and Germans. The C.I.G.S.'s

analysis

conflicted with the D.M.I.'s belief

that the Turks would by-pass Mesopotamia altogether and march eastward across Caucasia to Persia.'*

Both men, however, agreed

that the Turks were preparing some effort in the East. The Government of India seized upon this speculation in an effort

to

lever

policy in Persia.

the Persia Committee On 20 September,

into changing British

the Viceroy sent to the1 3 2

1

HMSS 34, Marling to Hardinge, 10 September 1917.

2

10 3131/1917:3760, C.I.G.S. to C.-in-C. India, 14 September 1917.

3

FO W38/171643/15723, D.M.I. to Graham, 4 September 1917.

COLLAPSE OP ANGLO-RUSSIAN CO-OPERATION

33

India Office an analysis of Turkish military activity which concluded

that

the

Turks, despite

logistical

difficulties,

would move their main force through Tehran in the direction of Herat

and

Afghanistan.

He

argued

that

the

danger

could be

countered politically if London would agree to a change of policy which would prove to the Persians that Britain genuinely desired to preserve their independence. A change of policy on the lines already advocated by us on political grounds seems to us therefore a pressing military necessity. Now that information is hardening as to the imminence of hostilities penetrating Persia and of that country becoming a war area the tranquility of India and her frontiers depends on prompt and adequate coordination and utilisaion of all our potentialities in Persia whether political or military. We believe [that the] time has now come to regard Persia as a war area in which all action and polciy should ^e coordinated under [the] direct control of the War Cabinet. There

was

little

hope

for

the

Viceroy's

ideas

in London,

particularly as referring the matter to the War Cabinet was a transparent attempt to get round the Foreign Office. Nor was the

India Office any more

sympathetic to the Government of

India. Officials regarded the two suggestions - conciliation 2 and the declaration of a war rone - as a contradiction. The problem of implementing London's policy remained. As official opinion opposed any effort to 'tear up' the Agreement of

1907

or

'conciliating

to

have

Persian

resort

to

the

opinion'...",

other it

expedients

was

clear

for

that

no

meaningful exchange could take place until London had moderated its

position.

Marling

recognised

this

on

4

October

in

a

telegram which agreed that military considerations governed the situation

in

Persia,

and accepted the necessity of working1 2

1

10 3131/1917:3760, Viceroy to 10, 20 September 1917.

2

Ibid., Minute by Shuckburgh, 24 September 1917; Minute by Holderne88, 26 September 1917.

34

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

along the lines laid out by the Viceroy on 20 September. His methods, however, differed widely. Marling's first priority was a strong cabinet in Tehran led by the pro-British politician, Vossugh-ed-Dowleh, and he proposed to get it with a substantial bribe designed to buy off addition,

Marling was

the opposition and the

prepared

to bait

Shah.

In

the trap by making

important concessions on foreign financial control. In return, he

warned,

Britain

neutrality,

and

could expect

suggested

that

a

no

more

than

necessary

Persian

corollary

of

conciliation would be strengthening by British troops of the Eastern Cordon between Persia and Afghanistan in order to catch any enemy who might pass.^ Marling's proposals were approved by the military experts who had been preoccupied with events in Mesopotamia and who wanted

to

stay

clear

of

Persia

if

at

all

possible.

Enemy

gestures inevitably drew the War Office into the discussion of policy

and,

not

surprisingly,

the soldiers

supported

the

efforts to find a political solution. On 8 October, in response to

reports

preparations

that

a party ofGerman

to cross Persia in

agents

was

the eventof a total

making Russian

collapse, the D.M.I. argued "...a better understanding between His Majesty's Government and the Persian Government cannot fail to increase the difficulties of any German-Turkish parties who 2 may at any future time attempt to cross Persia." This was the point which the Viceroy had been making and its reception by the India Office was equally negative.

Shuckburgh gleaned from

the message the view that no real invasion was anticipated and used the information to support his contention that conciliaton was unnecessary.^

The Foreign Office resented the D.M.I.'s

intervention: Ronald Graham observed that "we are being scared1

1

10 3131/1917:3991, Marling to Balfour, 4 October 1917.

2

Ibid., D.M.I. to Hardinge, 8 October 1917.

3

Ibid., Minute by Shuckburgh, 10 October 1917.

COLLAPSE OF ANGLO-RUSSIAN CO-OPERATION and hustled into a peace-at-any-price-in-Persia policy",

2

35

while

Hardinge, who had recovered from his despair, emphasised the difficulty of the terrain in northern Persia, suggesting that only small bands, which would be of no danger to the Empire, 3 could ever succeed in crossing over* But

it

was

difficult

to

resist

the

combined

forces

of

military, Indian and local experts and in the end the Foreign Office compromised* On 11 October, Marling was instructed to open

negotiations

with

the

Persian

Government,

but

was

forbidden to commit the British Government to any change of policy.* The Persians were only too willing to negotiate* On the 12th they informed Marling of their demands: first, the removal of all British and Indian troops and the immediate transfer of the S.P.R* to the command of the pro-British Governor-General of

Farsi

purchase changes

second, of

new

to be

the

rearming

arms

paid

for

out

of

it»

of

third,

tariff

modified to provide more funds» officers

to

train

and

the

Gendarmerie the

expense

revenues

and

and of

the

the

these tariff

fourth, provision of neutral

cotmnand the

units;

and finally,

the

engagement of foreign financial experts as soon as agreement could

be

reached

on

their

country

of

origin*

The

list

of

demands was consistent with previous Persian claims and not inconsistent with the proposals made by the Viceroy and the D.M.I.

Marling,

however,

considered

them

"uncompromising

proposals" which had been made for posterity, though he thought they provided a basis for negotiations* He realised that no progress

could

be

made

while

his

hands

were

tied

by

the

instructions given him by the Foreign Office and he therefore proposed

that

no conversations

take place until

the Persia1

1

FO W34/193928/65390, Minute by Graham, 10 Octoer 1917.

2

Ibid., Minute by Hardinge, n.d.

3

10 3131/1917:4124, Balfour to Marling, 11 October 1917.

36

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

Committee had had an opportunity to review the question of changing policy in Persia.^ When

the

Persia

Committee

met

on

20

October

1917

to

consider Marling's proposal, it merely reconfirmed its earlier decision not to change the policy of the British Government. There

was

Government, promise of

to be

no transfer of

though

Marling

was

to

power.

S.P.R.

authorised

future negotiations

Vo8Sug-ed-Dowleh

the

to the Persian

to make

a

vague

if this would help to bring The

Committee

decided,

on

Shuckburgh's advice, that no value could be attached to Persian goodwill and that therefore no political sacrifices should be made in order to obtain it.

But more important, the Committee

decided to explore Marling*s earlier statement concerning the Eastern

Cordon

and

requested

from

him

an

opinion

on what

consequences would follow if British forces filled the vacuum 2 left by Russia'8 withdrawal from eastern Persia. The decision provoked a protest from the General Staff, which,

in

a

letter

to

Shuckburgh,

the

Persia

Committee's

secretary, objected to statements about the "doubtful value of Persian goodwill" and argued that despite the apparent weakness of the Persian Government it did influence many Persians. It urged that steps be taken to insure that Persia did not join the

enemy

and

proposed

that

concessions

involving

no

"substantial sacrifices" could be made which would recognise in principal Persian demands for control over their own military 3 forces. This suggestion was, of course, absolutely unacceptable to the majority of the Persia Committee, and the Foreign Office chose to ignore the protest when it communicated the Committee's decision to Marling.1

1

Ibid., Marling to Balfour, 13 October 1917.

2

Ibid., Minutes of Persia Committee Meeting, 20 October 1917.

3

10 3131/1917:4285, D.M.I. to Acting Secretary, Persia Committee, 22 October 1917.

COLLAPSE OF ANGLO-RDSSI AH CO-OPERATION Having rejected conciliation,

37

the really important step

taken by the Persia Committee was its enquiry into extending the Eastern Cordon. for some time.

Direct military action had been brewing

The Russian Revolution had presented Britain

with two alternatives in Persia:: control.

conciliation or unilateral

It was no longer possible to wait and see. For six

months, the British had been toying with conciliatory proposals and had rejected all of them. In October, the Persia Committee began

to

examine

entailed

the

absorption

seriously

rejection

of

the

of

the

second

alternative

nationalist

troublesome

territory

demands into

the

which

and

the

defensive

perimeter of the Empire. Containing Persia in a military cordon appealed to imperialists because it appeared to rationalise the imperial

frontier and thus offered a solution to persistent

problems of strategic security. Marling,

however,

saw

only

the

practical

involved in direct military intervention.

difficulties

His reply to the

Persia Committee on 2 November emphasised the need to continue cooperating with the Russians and warned that while the Russian Minister in Tehran might agree,

the Russian troops actually

manning the Eastern Cordon would resent any British attempt to move into the area.^

Marling continued to place his confidence

in a negotiated settlement with the Persians. But London was impatient with attempts at negotiation and was

inclined

towards

a

more

active

policy.

Two

factors

contributed to this mood. In the first place, the military and political ramifications of war and revolution merely served to give

added

impetus

to

Imperial

notions

which

had

been

formulated long before -1917. Thus the Persia Committee under Curzon's leadership had moved from preserving the status quo in Persia to a re-examination of British policy in the direction of increased control, if not outright expansion. On 10 November1

1

IO 3131/1917:4490, Marling to Balfour, 2 November 1917.

38

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

Curzon wrote to Oliphant listing what he considered to be the three essential requisites of British policy in Persia: (1) A Persian

Government which

was

neither

anti-British

nor pro-

German and which would not "pin-prick, thwart and annoy": (2) No concessions until the first condition had been filled: (3) Recognition by the Persian Government of the S.P.R.

in its

existing form until the end of the war and thereafter Britain would

undertake

to

negotiate

friendly Persian Government."

"in

a

friendly spirit with

a

In exchange, Curzon was prepared

to resume payment of Persia's monthly subsidy and to make up the suspended payments.^

It meant that Tehran, in exchange for

a bribe, would accept British paramountcy.

Though some Persian

politicians would undoubtedly have accepted this arrangement, the vast majority could be expected to resist. It was the War Office which attempted to dilute Curzon's mixture.

The

prepared

to

military be

experts

sympathetic

argued

that

Britain must

towards

the

formation

be

of

a

"homogeneous national army" and that after the war must discuss in a friendly manner the incorporation of the S.P.R. into that 2 army." Curzon, however, refused to be moved and carried the Persia Committee with him. conditions:

Britain

Government,

preferably

The Committee actually expanded the

demanded

the

formation

of

led by Vossug-ed-Dowleh,

a

friendly

which would

preserve British interests and accept British "representations" and

which

condition against

was

not

demanded

enemy

anti-British that

Persia

infiltration

or

pro-German:

maintain

into

the

the

effective

area

occupied

second

security by

the

collapsing Russian armies and offered to assist them with a fleet of armoured cars:

finally,

the Persian Government was

expected to recognise the S.P.R. "without further question or protest",

while

Britain,

for

its

part,

would

undertake

1

FO W34/218519/65390, Curzon to Oliphant, 10 November 1917.

2

Idem.

to1 2

COLLAPSE OP ANGLO-RUSSIAN CO-OPERATION

39

discuss the subject again after the war* Curion's financial proposals remained intact, despite a Treasury protest against a resumption of payments.^

Thereafter, the three desiderata were

Marling's guide in all dealings with Persia, though they were not so much a policy as a declaration of attitude. Again,

it was the military,

proved crucial.

or second condition, which

Ultimately, the pressures generated by British

fears of Persian nationalism and their desire to isolate Persia by keeping the military cordons intact, led to direct British intervention former

throughout

Russian

northern

Persia

The

immediate

Empire.

and,

later,

motive

in

for

the the

intervention was always muddled: the original justification had been the need to secure the Eastern Cordon against the passage of enemy agents into Afghanistan. Britain actually intervened in

northwest

Persia

for

reasons

which

could not have been

foreseen when the subject had first come up.

On 9 November,

Shuckburgh, in a note for the Persia Committee, observed that Marling's negative response to the suggestion that Britain man the

Eastern

Cordon

overshadowed by henceforth

appeared

to

have

the Bolshevik Revolution.

Britain must

been

completely

He concluded that

regard as untrustworthy all of the

Russian troops in Persia and consider the northern section of 2 the Perso-Afghan border open. The Persia Committee arrived at the

same conclusion,

but for different reasons.

Despite the

fact that military intelligence indicated no reason to fear an enemy move

in

Persia,

the

Committee

acted to preclude any

action which might be taken in future. Marling, who had changed his

mind

and

supported

the

sending

of

the

armoured

cars,

telegraphed in response to a suggestion that tribal levies be raised among the local Khans, that he thought the1 2

1

IO 3131/1917:4577, Minutes of Persia Committee meeting, 10 November 1917.

2

Ibid. Note for Persia Committee by the Political Department, IO, 9 November 1917.

40

HAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM danger to be apprehended from such roving bands is that they might make use of [the] various disintegrating forces now existing here such as the disaffected tribes in [the] West and Northwest or [the] Jangalis of Gilan who are virtually masters of Resht and some 50 miles of road towards Kazvin. Combination of such forces if allowed to gather head might with help of the revolutionary elements here threaten existing regime in Tehran*..

Thus, British policy-makers agreed to military intervention but for different reasons. Only

Shuckburgh

placed any real emphasis

on events

in

Russia. For the others, having played the diplomatic game for so long without success, they were prepared in November to take more

direct

action.

As the discussion proceeded in London,

military intervention became more accepted without a genuine concensus. It is not surprising that Indian officialdom, accustomed to

thinking

should

about

the

emphasise

beginning.

the

It was,

ideological importance

therefore,

challenge of

of

pan-Islam,

Bolshevism

from

the

not unusual for Shuckburgh to

seize the October Revolution as the occasion for intervention in Persia.

At the same time,

it is clear that he was less

concerned about Bolshevism as a political concept than he was about

the

Persian

consequences

pot.

Marling,

ferment and whose

of who

taking was

the

worried

Russian about

lid

off

the

revolutionary

ideas ring of counter-insurgency,

did not

mention Bolshevism. Ultimately, what every British policy-maker feared in Persia was disorder, and Marling's telegram was very much

to

the

point

disintegration.

in

concentrating

on

the

danger

of

Where London differed from the Government of

India was in its unwillingness to sacrifice any part of its position in order to achieve security in Persia. Revolution longer wait

made for

it a

absolutely Russian

clear

that

recovery before

The Bolshevik

Britain

could

no

seeking ways

of

achieving security in Central Asia.1

1

10 3131/1917:4735, Marling to Balfour, 22 November 1917.

CHAPTER TWO: THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION AND THE PROBLEM OF SELF-DETERMINATION The deliberations in London had been interrupted by the Bolshevik Revolution in November 1917.

The first serious shock

wave from the Revolution reached Persia in the first week of December in the non-cataclysmic form of the publication of the secret treaties between Britain and Imperial Russia. Supported by Lenin's subsequent "Proclamation to the Oppressed People of the East",

the Bolsheviks intended publication to show Asia

that the war was being fought for imperialist objectives. In the

tense

atmosphere

inevitable

that

of

these

Centrial

Asian

revelations

politics,

would

it

greatly

was

inflame

nationalist opinion. There was little Britain could do to head off

the

storm.

information,

Though

the

explanation

of

Afghanistan

was

impossible

India

the

Viceroy

Office

wisely

Anglo-Russian concerned.

to put the

wanted chose

relations, As

cat back

Graham

to

suppress

to make

a

particularly observed,

it

the full

where was

in the bag. ^ The potential

danger, however, went well beyond the possibility of disrupted Anglo-Afghan

relations

and

threatened

to have

repercussions

throughout the Muslim world. At the same time that the secret treaties

exposed Europe's

imperialist aims

in Asia,

Lenin's

proclamation sought to channel national feeling by offering a nationalist solution. The British ambassador in Petrograd, Sir George

Buchanan,

Muslim

people

1

the

reported freedom

that to

Lenin live

had

within

granted their

Russia's own

laws1

FO W/38/230785/224703, Minute to file, 4 December 1917. Sir Ronald Graham, appointed to FO 1892; Paris 1893; Tehran 1897, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1 November 1916; Acting Permanent Under-Secretary of State, 1 January 1919.

42

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

and customs, and had urged the oppressed people of the East to revolt

and

Britain,

free

the

solidarity

themsleves

from

proclamation was

in

Asia

which

a

was

alien

capitalists.^

For

serious breach of European further

aggravated

by

the

attention paid to India. It was

clear that Bolshevik

support

for Asiatic

self-

determination was as dangerous as Russian imperialism had been, and the Foreign Office tended to regard the proclamation as a direct challenge to British power

in Asia.

But only a

few

officials wanted to prepare a retort: Graham accepted that "the effect will be mischievous. Sheikhs,

Notables,

etc.

On the other hand the Princes,

... who hold real power in Eastern

Countries.•• will not be sympathetically inclined to Leninist 2 doctrines and will view his declarations with suspicion." This was no doubt true, but Graham had failed to grasp that Lenin had offered the East not Bolshevism but freedom from foreign domination and he therefore neglected to consider that few of Islam's traditional leaders were any more favourably inclined

toward

Britain

Under the circumstances,

than

they

were

toward

Bolshevism.

both traditionalists and democratic

nationalists had more to fear from Britain's actual presence than from the little understood ideology to the north. For Britain, however, any threat to the Empire required serious consideration. Buchanan, clearly agitated by Bolshevik actions, reported on 5 November that ...in his appeal to Moslems, Lenin is openly inciting our Indian subjects to revolt. He and Trotski have singled us out for his attacks... Anxious as I am to avoid [a] rupture it will be difficult for us to stave it off indefinitely if they go on attacking us and I must therefore warn His Majesty's government to be prepared for such an eventuality.1 3 2 1

FO W38/321931/231931, Buchanan to Balfour, 5 December 1917.

2

Ibid. Minute by Graham, n.d.

3

FO W38/321931/231931, Buchanan to Balfour, 5 December 1917.

BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION

43

Buchanan's warning was not concerned with the material danger

posed by Russian Bolshevism but with the ideological

impact

it could be expected to have.

Russia's proximity to

British strategic interests in Central Asia made the Bolshevik Revolution relevant to British control in Asia as a whole. But, though

the

British

were

perturbed

by

the

ideological

implications of Bolshevism, their immediate fear was that the Revolution

would

complete

the

collapse

of

Russian military

power

in Northern Persia and leave Persia,

Afghanistan and

India

a prey to enemy agitation and revolutionary disorder.

Thus,

though

British diplomats

in Europe and North America 2 emphasised the ideological challenge, their colleagues in Asia never lost sight of practicalities. The two views operated in tandem:

those

strengthened

with

the

a

peripheral

tendency

to

view

view

of

Persian

Bolshevik

affairs

ideology as

a

material challenge to the Empire. Unfortunately for British policy-makers, much of Lenin's statement

regarding

self-determination

coincided with the 3 somewhat vague tenets of Wilsonian idealism. While it might have been possible for Britain to dismiss Leninism as errant misconduct, Wilson had to be handled more carefully. Thus, once the

principle

of

self-determination

had

become

popularly

accepted in Asia, Britain could not forcibly deny the doctrine without offence to both 'world systems1; all she could hope to do was repair any damage to the Empire after the fighting had ended. Internally, denying self-determination had its dangers, as any obvious step in that direction would have shattered the myth

that

imperial

rule

led

subject people naturally to a

knowledge of democratic institutions. Therefore, however much1 3 2

1

FO W38/232529/216996, Buchanan to Balfour, 5 December 1917.

2

FO 34/7738/8, Spring-Rice to Balfour, 13 January 1918.

3

N. Gordon Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: Americars Response to War and Revolution, (London,1968).

44

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

they disliked the idea, British statesmen were compelled by circumstances to seek a modus vivandi with the principle of self-determination. It is not surprising that the British were most interested in

associating themselves with the American version of the

principle*

This

financial

was

partly

dependence

conflict

over

an

Wilson's

disruptive

on

because

the

idealist

Britian's

United

precept.

politics,

States More

unaccustomed

precluded

important,

the Americans were

open

despite

in no way

advocating social revolution, whereas Bolshevik anti-capitalism threatened

more

than

imperial

turbulence.

The

British

were

aware that they lacked the power to withstand the ideological currents loosened by the war and though many hoped for a return to normalcy after the war, a few realised that many changes would

prove

permanent.

Amery,

for

example,

concluded

that

Britain would have to associate her imperial requirements with American

idealism

if

imperialist

objectives

were

to

be

achieved. A successful association was not out of the question: Wilson's

pronouncements

directed at Europe.1

on

self-determination

were

clearly

It was anyone's guess whether he would

apply them to the rest of the world. America's rape of Spain in 1898 indicated to many Englishmen that the United States was itself

on

suspected,

the

verge

probably

of

active

correctly,

colonialism.

that

once

Philip

American

Kerr

trading

rights were guaranteed in non-European territories, Washington 2 would become more cooperative. Whatever the truth was, many British

politicians

considered Wilson

were

to be

sceptical an

of

ignoramous,

American motives

and

if not a political1 2

1

Levin, Woodrow Wilson and World Politics, pp. 247-8.

2

LGMSS, P/89/1/10, Kerr to Lloyd George, 5 December 1917.

BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION charlatan.1

45

In any case, the United States Government never

clarified its attitude toward non-European self-determination and so permitted Britain's imperial speculation to continue. There remained the problem of Bolshevism which, as far as Britain was concerned, was always a more serious and immediate challenge than American idealism. Geographical proximity led to the growth of anti-communisms in British imperial thought, and created

a

continued

situation to

reflect

in

which

ideological

traditional

imperial

anti-communism thinking

which

emphasised those things which established Englishmen detested: socialism,

nationalism,

self-determination

and

Russians.

A

typical Foreign Office memorandum saw Lenin's proclamation as ...another indication of the ultimate Bolshevik policy, which is neither 'self-determination' nor the 'status quo' nor 'peace', but which exploits those formulate to overthrow the existing order all o^er the world, as it has already been overthrown in Russia. The

War

Cabinet

was

less

excitable

than

its

expert

advisors and refused to be stampeded into breaking with the Bolsheviks while there remained any chance of a reconciliation. This

was

largely Balfour's work.

In a note which he wrote

following the War Cabinet's discusison of Buchanan's alarmist telegram on 7 December, he expressed concern that certain of his colleagues had concluded that "after their recent recent proclamations,

the Bolsheviks

could only be regarded avowed

enemies, and to treat them as anything else showed a lamentable1 2

1

LGMSS, F/6/2/11, F.S. Oliver to Carson, 26 January 1917. "Now, old Wilson is a detestable, immoral, cold-blooded, hot-air materialist. In a sense he is an ass as well; but as a judge of times and seasons for pressing his policy for ending the war (i.e. at a point where the Unites States will be left financially, industrially and politically, holding the balance of power) he is an exceedingly astute old fox." Also, HMSS 29, Hardinge to Bertie, 2 February 1917.

2

FO/ W38/236313/231931, Memorandum, 12 December 1918.

46

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

incapacity to see facts as they are, and to handle them with decision." The Foreign Secretary questioned this view and argued that it was based on a misconception of Bolshevik intentions. He thinking and actions: If, for the moment, the Bolshevists show peculiar virulence in dealing with the British Empire, it is probably because they think that the British Empire is the great obstacle to immediate peace. But they are fanatics to whom the Constitution of every state, whether monarchial or republican, is equally odious. Their appeal is to every revolutionary force, economic, social, racial, or religious, which can be used to upset the existing political organisations of mankind. If they summon the Mohamedans of India to revolt, they are still more desirous of engineering a revolution in Germany. They are dangerous dreamers, whose power, be it great or small, transitory or permanent, depends partly on German gold, partly on the determiantion of the Russian Army to fight no more; but who would genuinely like to put into practice the wild theories which have so long been germinating in the shadow of the Russian Autocracy. Now, contrary to the opinion of some of my colleagues, I am clearly of the opinion that it is to our advantage to avoid as long as possible an open breach with this crazy system. If this b^ drifting, then I am a drifter by deliberate policy.•• Balfour was dominated by the fear that precipitate actions would drive the Bolsheviks into Germany's arms, and he thought it desirable to keep Russia neutral. At

the

core of Britain's difficulty with Bolshevism lay

nationalism.

The

Bolshevik breach of

imperial faith brought

matters to a head. National self-determination had been in the air since August 1914 when Britain went to war to protect the rights

of

small

nations.

It

was

only

after

the

Bolshevik

Revolution that Britain was forced to deal seriously with the concept in a non-European context.

The Revolution meant not

only the failure of Russian military power in Central Asia, it1

1

Cab 27/35:G.T. 2932, Note by Balfour, 9 December 1918

BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION appeared

to

imply Russian support

47

for pan-Islamic and pan-

Turkic nationalists throughout the region. British imperialists were as disturbed by Lenin's support for nationalism as they were by his

anti-capitalism.

Moreover, Britain found itself

pressed to find answers to questions involving not one, but a whole set of challenges, both ideological and material. Under the circumstances, it was not surprising that British policy­ makers

began

to

abandon

familiar

and

traditional

strategic

concepts in order to follow the lead of the imperial idealists who sought to articulate for British imperialism a new language of ideals. The question of Britain's attitude to self-determination was discussed at length during December 1917 and January 1918. Balfour had made his feelings on the subject perfectly plain in June

1917 when

the War Cabinet had discussed Chamberlain's

proposal for self-government in India: orientals, according to Balfour, were not suited to democracy and would therefore never qualify for self-government.^

It was a principle he applied

consistently. Lloyd George was probably more inclined to follow Hankey's more pragmatic view. wresting

from

dominions. device desires

He

the was

with which and

Hankey was mainly concerned with

Turks

and

prepared

to

to

interests

accomplish of

the

Germans use

their

non-European

self-determination

this: people

"the wishes of

these

as

a

and the countries

themselves must be the dominant factor in the settling of their 2 future government." Self-determination would mean that native people would be free to choose their own rulers. As Kerr put it: ...they should be placed under an uniform and benevolent administration whose sole purpose is the education and advancement of their inhabitants, and not their exploitation for the benefit of any European capitalists or governments.1

1

Cab 23/3/172:13, WC, 29 June 1971.

2

LGMSS, F/201/3/5, Memorandum by Hankey, 29 December 1917

3

LGMSS, F/89/1/12, Memorandum by Kerr, 30 December 1917.

48

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

These

remarkable

conditions were not meant to apply to the

British Empire. As it became increasingly evident that they would have to do something to align Britain with the prevailing idealist

current,

the

Prime

Minister's

secretarial

advisors

turned their attention to the problem of accepting idealism without sacrificing any British interests* There was never any question of making real concessions to the Asian nationalists. For example, Hankey intervened at the beginning of December to convince Cecil that a statement acknowledging the principle be dropped from a draft speech he had prepared for Lloyd George: Hankey

had

"persuaded

him

to

drop

out

adherence

to

the

principle of self-determination by pointing out what a lot of trouble it would give the British Empire."^ In

the

end,

unsatisfactory, determination

the

but

should

War

not

Cabinet

unexpected

apply

only

to

arrived

at

the

vague,

conclusion the

that 3 New Europe.

selfThis

decision was incorporated into the statement on war aims which the Prime Minister made January 1918.

to the Trades Union Congress on

5

He recognised the right to self-determination of

people in Turkish and German territory and declared that "the general principle of national self-determination is therefore as applicable in their case as in those of occupied European 4 territories." But in practice, acceptance of the broad principle

did not mean

that

Britain

was prepared to grant

independence to its own territories or to those in which it had a

direct

interest.

Government's

willingess

Thus, to

Lloyd accept

George

announced

self-determination

his in

principle but not in practice. The

British

Government had,

in

fact,

only cloaked

its

opposition to self-determination in procrastination, attempting1

1

FO W44/234125/216955, Balfour to Stevens, 13 November 1917. For discussion of U.S. role see W44/227539/216955, W44/231416/216955.

BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION

49

in the meantime to conciliate its critics by offering them a formula which put the question off until the Peace Conference* The

fact

remained,

however,

that

the

confrontation between

nationalism and established British imperial interests could produce an explosion at any time and the War Cabinet's half­ hearted formula did nothing to avoid a collision with those in Asia who were unlikely to be taken in by Britain's attempt to re-interpret self-determination. In Armenia, Britain sought to operate both idealist and traditionalist imperial policies in an attempt to establish a friendly

military

force

in

Caucasia*

Armenia,

of

course,

offered none of the logistical possibilities of the Arabian peninsula which served as the model for a number of British excursions in Central Asia. But for a number of months before the

decision

on

self-determination,

the

Armenians

had

been

pressing London for recognition of their national claims and for military and financial assistance in their struggle with the

Turks.

The

feasibility

of

providing

aid

was

highly

doubtful, but the temptation to use the Armenians in the end overcame British scruples. On 13 November, the Foreign Office offered the Armenians a vague promise of assistance and then immediately, but without success, attempted to shift the burden onto

the

United

calculations

of

States.^ political

The

gesture

expediency

was

based

upon

rather

than

upon

principled recogniton of Armenia's right to self-determination. Behind Britain's offer lay concern for imperial security in Asia. Assistance for Armenia was an attempt to shift the focus of disruption and insecurity as far to the west as possible. Though little was ever done for the Armenians, the episode is important

1

because

it

ultimately

led

to

the

formation of a1

PO W44/234125/216955, Balfour to Stevens, 13 November 1917. For discussion of U.S. role see W44/227539/216955, W44/231416/216955.

50

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

mission under the command of General L.C. Dunsterville which attempted to channel arms and money into the former Russian Empire and which ended up in Northern Persia. Amery had his security in Asia.

own extraordinary proposal for achieving In a

letter to Cecil on 27 December,

he

proposed sending a submarine through the Straits into the Black Sea where it would take control of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and, once established, make friends among the Georgians and Tartars of Caucasia in order to create a viable and stable political organisation capable of resisting the enemy.1 In this way, and at small cost, Amery hoped to achieve a revolution in Asian affairs which would extend British influence from the Black Sea to Turkestan and create an obstacle to enemy activity on the frontiers of the British Empire and its clients. But like his imperialist predecessors, Amery worked from maps and consequently his scheme was both grandiose and inaccurate. It is not

easy

to

suppose

that

Georgian

'friends'

could have

organised resistance in Turkestan, deep in civil turmoil and a thousand miles away across the Caspian Sea. His attitude toward nationalism is more interesting as it involved recognition of national rights in the hope that this would produce resistance to enemy advances. The plan was a true blending of imperialism and idealism. It is clear that one of Britain's firt reactions to the Bolshevik

Revolution

was

to

introducing British influence, Russian borderlands. Georgians,

Plans

cast

about

for

if not power,

a

method

of

into the former

to support the Armenians or the

though ambitious, were impractical and it is not

surprising that British attention drifted eastward to the area north of General Maude's force in Mesopotamia and to Persia. But in Persia, the straightforward problem of securing imperial interests from enemy attack was complicated by Britain's own1

1

FO W38/1844/840, Amery to Cecil, 27 December 1917.

BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION Interests

which

appeared

to

preclude

employing

51

nationalist

sentiment as in Arabia or Armenia. At

the

relations

end

had

of

1917,

reached

a

as

we

stalemate

have

seen,

which

Anglo-Persian

neither

side

was

sufficiently powerful to break through. The Persia Committee had been unable to find a method for maintaining an imperial presence which the Persians would consider acceptable. Though Curzon had convinced the Persia Committee to reject concession and reform, Britain still lacked the means to compel Tehran to accept its demands.

There is certainly no reason to suppose

that a solution was impossible: the rulers of Persia would have accepted a political solution which recognised certain national rights and safeguarded their own positions. They were in no sense revolutionaries. A great deal depended on how the war in Europe went for Britain. At the beginning of 1918 none of the signs

was

promising.

In

Asia,

Maude's

forces,

deprived of

Russian assistance, had been unsuccessful in their attempt to capture Mosul. At the same time, British officials argued that no understanding with Persia was possible until the situation had stabilised, a prospect which appeared to be receding. With Central Asia increasingly caught up in the collapse of Russia, British conciliators and hard-liners tended to move together in accepting

the

argument

that,

only by

taking over what had

formerly been the Russian portion of the Persian cordon, could the situation be stabilized and order restored. Then Britain would be able to solve the problem of Persia and Central Asia on a basis acceptable to the Empire. The position was a difficult one for Britain: the military experts were hesitant to commit troops to yet another Eastern 'side-show', but shared the unwillingness of their political colleagues to stand idly by while German and Turkish agitators fomented

trouble

in Russia's former

possessions.

The answer

52

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

seemed to lie in enveloping Persia in political isolation by insulating her however,

that

from disruptive neighbours. isolation

could

only

be

It was apparent,

imposed by military

means. The trend toward military involvement began to expose all

the

contradictions

in

British

policy:

Marling who

was

chiefly concerned with finding a bilateral solution which would establish British influence in Tehran, was out of step with planners in London who had begun to think in terms of wide strategic

concepts.

The

Government

of

India,

with

its

conciliatory recommendations, was anathema to them both. It

was

strategic

when

British

generalizations

policy-makers

attempted

to

to

problems

that

specific

apply the

difficulties arose. Marling had first noted the effects of the Bolshevik Revolution in Persia on 23 November. It was hardly a sinister

impact»

merely

a

report

that

the

Persians

were

begining to speculate on the consequences of the Revolution for themsleves and about the possibility of a separate peace.1 The real significance of the report was that it indicated that yet another

obstacle

to

an

Anglo-Persian

understanding

had

presented itself. Marling, however, was convinced that with the right combination of concession and threat he could get the fluid situation in Tehran to gel.

His assessment was identical

to one he had made the previous March when all of his careful preparations had been disrupted by the February Revolution. It was clear that speed was essential if Marling's efforts were not to suffer the same fate. As was to be expected, the Government of India felt that the Bolshevik Revolution strengthened its case for conciliating the nationalists. Delhi was becoming increasingly reticent in the face of London's refusal to reconsider its policy and on this occasion confined its comments to specific criticisms of

1

10 3131/1917:4735, Marling to Balfour, 23 November 1917.

BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION

53

the conclusions reached by the Persia Committee in November. Their language, however, betrayed exasperation. On the proposed financial arrangements, the Government of India did not believe ••.that a Persian Government purchased in [the] manner proposed could be either genuinely friendly or be effective in our interests so long as Persia itself is left antiBritish; (2) such [a] Government could not and doubtless would not guarantee [the] security of [the] Ispahan Caspian line. Militarily, however, Delhi agreed that armoured cars would be useful to the remaining Russians, though it wondered how the vehicles

could

military

be

supplied.

proposals,

in

the

Neither Indian

the

financial

Government's

considered the offence given to the Persians.^

nor

the

opinion,

Shuckburgh's

response to the criticism was typically unfair: "I have never understood very clearly how the Government of India would set about giving practical effect to their policy. Their language "2 on the subject has always been conveniently vague. Shuckburgh's attitude, which was typical of the views held by officials in both the India and Foreign Offices, disregarded India's contention that any successful policy in Persia must consider the feelings of the Persian people. Marling, only slightly more considerate, thought that the Government earlier;

of

India's

policy

might

have

worked

six months

he contended that Persian opinion had been totally

alienated by the publication of the secret treaties. opinion,

conciliation

would

only

exaggerate

In his

Persian

self-

importance at a time when financial strain was driving Tehran into Britain's arms.1 3 2

Marling'8 ability to manipulate the

situation developed was limited by his instructions, which had been designed to achieve capitulation rather than conciliation.

1

10 3131/1917:4869, Viceroy (FD) to 10, 3 December 1917.

2

Ibid., Minute by Shuckburgh, 5 December 1917.

3

10 3131/1917:4913, Marling to Balfour, 5 December 1971.

54

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

Marling,

however,

feared

that

the

growth

of

the

Jangalis

movement in Gilan and of nationalism generally would create anarchy

and,

therefore,

despite

his

instructions,

he

felt

compelled to suggest making unofficial promises of concession to the Shah in the hope that an acceptable cabinet would then be appointed.^ At the same time, Sir Percy Cox, probably Britain's most experienced

diplomat

in

Persia,

added

his

voice

to

those

advising concession: We know that if Russia makes [a] separate peace, Germany will do her best to upset Persia and turn her against us, and even though no serious thrust into Persia on the enemy's part may be a practicable contingency, nevertheless, it would unquestionably be useful if we could reassure Persia at this stage by a fresh announcement of (? policy) calculated to make her proof against collision with Germany. As to details....once free of [the] Anglo-Russian agreement and spheres of influence we ought not to find it difficult to satisfy [the] reasonable ambitions of the national party, though I realise that to do this ^would involve a good many changes in existing arrangements"• Marling used Cox's

conciliatory recommendations

for his own

purposes. On 16 December he informed the Foreign Office that Britain's

friends

in

Tehran

wanted

a

series

of

private

assurances, which would be made public after a new government had been formed. The required assurances ranged wider than any theretofore suggested: Britain would agree to the formation of a uniform military force which would absorb both the S.P.R. and the

Cossack

subsequent

Brigade,

agreements,

cancel

the

1907

Convention

and

all

and guarantee Persia a place at the

Peace Conference if other non-belligerents were permitted to participate.

In practical

terms,

Britain would undertake

to

under-write financially the reorganisation and re-arming of the1 2

1

10 3131/1917:4937, 1917.

Marling to Balfour,

7 and 9 December

2

10 3131:1917:5092, Cox to Viceroy (FD), 13 December 1917.

BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION Persian army and militia,

55

in exchange for which Vossugh-ed-

Dowleh would undertake to crush the democrats and rule Persia with

a

strong

hand.

The

Persian

would

also

promise

to

cooperate with Britain in whatever reforms might be initiated. Marling recommended giving the assurances as they would merely recognise

the

position.

"In

declaration)

existing any

situation without altering Britain's

case",

he

concluded,

"[a]

general

of policy can only do good and appears

(?

to me

imperative in the circumstances resulting from [the] Russian revolution."1 The situation in Persia had clearly taken a turn for the worse. Persian nationalists had been aroused by the publication of

the

secret

turbulance

treaties

culminated

and

in

the

on

17

December

assassination

the of

growing

the

chief

detective of police. The murder was so obviously political that it «ras impossible to dismiss it as another piece of political place-making. Marling warned that the Shah appeared ready to ...throw himself out of sheer terror into [the] arms of [the] democrats and appoint [an] extremist Cabinet...With such a Cabinet backed by numerous revolutionaries and Maximalist agents, who are already in Tehran and with Obeidulla as an active Turkish^ agent [a] very dangerous situation may very easily arise. This

assessment,

which played on British

fears of

internal

insurgency - Bolshevism, pan-Islam and German militarism probably calculated to strike

sympathetic chords

was

in London.

Marling himself was most concerned with internal disruption. "Not good enough Charlie", was Curzon's observation when he saw Marling's

telegram:

in

his

opinion,

Marling had

wanted

abandon a strong position.^1 3 2

1

10 3131/1917:5092, Marling to Balfour, 16 December 1917.

2

Ibid., Marling to Balfour, 17 December 1917.

3

FO H34/238610/65390, Minute by Curzon, 17 December 1917.

to

56

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM The Government of India took the opposite view: If democratic revolution at Tehran is imminent would it not be advisable even at this eleventh hour to try to win over [the] leading democrats....By securing [the] goodwill and confidence of [the] democrats we should put ourselves into a position to guide [the] revolution instead of being [the] main object of its detestation.

The suggestion that the Persian revolution could be guided by the Government of India,

not surprisingly,

was greeted with

scepticism in London. Marling,

however,

December to be

a

did not

consider his

telegram of

list of concessions at all.

16

In his view,

making concessions to the nationalists would only spur them on to fresh demands: Vossugh-ed-Dowleh could not be considered a nationalist. What Marling feared was that a democratic cabinet would be tied to the maximalists around Kazvin who had already severed the telegraphic communications with Tiflis. Under the circumtances, he recommended that as long as Mesopotamia was safely in British hands, it was an opportunity to stabilise the political situation in Tehran by despatching armoured cars and 2 troops to take over the Khanikin-Hamadan road. The following week he poured fuel on the fire by reporting that the democrats were in contact with Petrograd and had close relations with the "maximalist soldiery" which had virtually expelled the Russian consul from Kazvin. Parties of maximalists were said to be on the road to Tehran and it was feared that they would take over the

Russian

elements.

He

legation later

and

use

it

to

support

anti-British

reported that the Persian Cossacks were

being subverted and that the Jangalis were "infected with antiBritish poison". The northern insurgents were purchasing arms from Russian soldiers returning home.

On {.op of everything,

Vossugh-ed-Dowleh

Marling was

had

refused

office.

desparate1 2

1

10 3131/1917:5092, Viceroy (FD) to 10, 18 December 1917.

2

10 3131/1917:5103, Marling to Balfour, 17 December 1917.

BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION

57

he asked for permission to begin negotiations on Vossugh-edDowleh's terms and requested money with which to purchase arms for use against the Jangalis.^ At the Foreign Office, Oliphant noted his concern that the Germans would take advantage of the Bolshevik Revolution and Russian collapse to henceforth "short-circuit" Turkey and go for

Asia

via

Russia

(i.e.

Persia)*

He argued that Marling

should be given authority to make the best deal he could with the

Persians in order to keep the Shah and his retainers 2 neutral* But Hardinge was dubious and wrote that the British Government Marling,

could

not

be

"rushed

in

this manner

by

Sir

C*

who appears to have lost his nerve*" "Britain", he

continued, "must not give in without definite commitments from the Persians and he advised that they puruse a firm policy and decline to be stampeded by rumours from Petrograd and Berne, of which the foundation is not at all reliable."^ Cecil

agreed,

though Cecil was

Curzon and

inclined to take the German

threat more seriously than the others. He hoped that the RussoGerman

armistice

of

15 December would be enforced,

thereby

removing the troops of Russia, Germany and Turkey - but not Britain - from Persia and Caucasia*

Even so, he concluded that

experience had shown that only force worked in Persia and that British policy must be based on the military power of the 4 Cossack Brigade and the S.P.R. Thus, in Cecil's view at least, the turmoil in Northern Persia presented both dangers and opportunities: danger that the insurgents would prevail and the

opportunity

Caspian

Sea*

In

to extend British control northward to the either

case,

the

key

was

military power.

Marling's wish for an arrangement with Vossugh-ed-Dowleh was1

1

IO 3131/1917:5130, Marling to Balfour, 21 December 1917.

2

FO W34/242034/65390, Minute by Oliphant, 24 December 1917*

3

Ibid., Minute by Hardinge, n.d.

4

Ibid., Minute by Cecil, n.d.

58

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

obviously out of the question. The Foreign Office replied to his suggestions by saying that: Our experience of the last two years shows that the only thing that keeps the Persians straight is force. As by the recent armistice Germans, Turks and Russians are to evacuate Persia it must be our policy to take over the Persian Cossack Brigade and increase the efficiency^ of the South Persian Rifles as far as our finances permit. The reply was clearly Cecil's work, combining his faith in the use of

force with his

Powers

would

be

inexplicable belief that the Central

content

possession of Persia.

to

leave

Britain

to

urge

that

undisputed

It would be interesting to know what

Marling thought of this piece of unreality: was

in

the

concessions

which

his only response had

already

been

promised to Vossugh-ed-Dowleh be made available to moderate democrats in the hope that they would keep the extremists from 2 taking power. But the Foreign Office felt that Marling had had

enough

latitude

and

therefore

refused

to

amend

his

3

instructions.

The Persia Committee, however, proved more flexible and on 20 December the Foreign Office was obliged to authorise Marling to

negotiate

on

some

of

the

proposals:

in the

main,

the

personal bribes were agreed to and the political concessions put

off

feature

until of

after

the

the Committee's

war.

Perhaps

re-valuation,

the most

important

and the one which

followed directly from Cecil's conclusions, was the emphasis placed upon the despatch of British armoured cars to bolster 4 the weakening Russians along the northern Cordon. The Persia Committee had attempted to introduce a compromise policy which which would combine attempted to introduce a compromise policy1

1

10 3131/1917:5168, Balfour to Marling 25 December 1917.

2

10 3131/1917:5187, Marling to Balfour, 27 December 1917.

3

Ibid., Minute by Hirtzel, 29 December 1917.

4

IO 3131/1917:5092, Balfour to Marling, 20 December 1917.

BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION which

would

political

combine

limited military

concessions

in

an

attempt

operations to

with

balance

59

minor

British

interests against increasingly serious disruption. The policy, if successful, would have given away no advantage and entailed minimum expense. In the India Office there were doubts about the policy of the

Persia

Committee.

Shuckburgh

thought

that

additional

discussion was necessary in view of the Bolshevik agreement at Bre8t-Litovsk Persia.^

to withdraw

all

Russian

troops

from northern

Hirtzel considered it likely that a change of policy

in accordance with the views of the Government of India would be required and was prepared to go beyond anything the India Office had ever before considered.

He argued that increased

nationalist feeling meant that Britain must sooner or later acquiesce in a nationalist government at Tehran. Like Cecil, Hirtzel assumed that the Turks and Germans would respect their undertaking to honour Persian neutrality and that the Russians would evacuate. The Bolsheviks, Hirtzel continued, had torn up the 1907 Convention, ...made a flaming appeal to [the] Persians and all other Eastern Moslems to throw off the yoke of their oppressors, offered autonomy to Russian Moslems...Maximalist agents are at work in Persia and Turkish Pan-Turanian agents in Russian Central Asia. ..It seems to me that there are here the makings of a very awkward situation for us throughout a large portion of the Islamic world, as well as in Persia itself. Russians, Germans and Turks - a trio otherwise sufficiently discordant - act harmoniously as the friends of Moslem Persia and Great Britain is left as her only enemy. Is not that capable of being made to react on India and Afghanistan - to say nothing of Kerbela and Nejef, where General Marshall certainly does not want a focus of fanatical hostility? As regards Persia itself - if Russian and Turkish troops are withdrawn (I do not think there are any Turkish troops on Persian soil now - or, if there is, it is in the neighbourhood of Urmia), by what arguments can we defend the retention of our own otherwise than by agreement with the Persian Government?1

1

Ibid., Minute by Shuckburgh, 19 December 1917.

60

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

In order to get an agreement Hirtzel recognised that it would be necessary to outbid the Germans with money and concessions. But practical

alternatives escaped Hirtzel:

he was no more

willing than his colleagues to accept neutral officers in place of British

in the

S.P.R., which he continued to regard as

essential to British security in southern Persia. All that he was prepared to concede, in fact, was recognition of a uniform force with British officers in the south. Nonetheless, Hirtzel felt

that

possible

if

a

modus

vivendi

were

achieved,

it

would

be

to tear up the Convention as "the Bolsheviks have

'torn it in shreds'. For our own ends we want to get rid of it as

regards

Afghanistan

and

Tibet.

If

there

is

ever

an

autocratic Russia again, we must, if need be, try to negotiate another and a better one•" ^

On balance, Hirtzel rejected the

concessions and put his confidence in a statement which would limit the extent of Britain's involvement in Persian affairs. It was a position very like that of the Government of India, designed to protect specific interests without incurring the wrath of the Persian nationalists. Both feared that a great Muslim

political

interference

combination

in Persia

might

and warned

grow that

out

of

Britain's

if Persia were not

reconciled, she could produce severe repercussions for Britain in the East generally. The possibility of an Indian solution, however, receded as Russia's collapse gave a certain legitimacy to British fears of German expansion. Cecil had been wrong: in fact, the Bolshevik decision

to

leave

the

war

convinced

many

Englishmen

that

Bolshevism and German militarism were hand in glove in Asia. Not

surprisingly,

the

belief

grew

that

the

Empire

was

confronted by a single monolithic challenge across Asia from Caucasia to Afghanistan.

1

Lumping the entire region together1

Ibid., Minute by Hirtzel, 20n December 1917.

BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION into

a

single

strategic

problem

simplified

things

61

from

a

military standpoint, but politically it ignored the fact that each area was a distinct problem reflecting different British interests.

Though

British

policy-makers

continued

to

take

precautions against the formation of a single Muslim policy in Asia,

military

political

apprehensions

sensibilities.

But

were the

beginning

application

to of

overcome a

single

military policy in the region held the danger of creating a single political challenge by uniting the disparate elements of Central Asia in opposition to British expansion. The

immediate

consequences

of

the Bolshevik Revolution

were thus only mildly political. Certainly the Russians had set an example for nationalists throughout Asia, and in Persia had strengthened the hand of the Democrats: but they did not create the nationalist challenge nor did they win many converts.

The

Revolution did, nevertheless, accelerate the pace in Persia by making both the Persians and the British more anxious to find a solution. For Britain,

in the final analysis, the success of

the Bolsheviks was not a disaster for ideological reasons but because

it

meant

the

end

of

Anglo-Russian

cooperation

in

Central Asia and because the Bolshevik victory heralded the end of Russian resistance to enemy advances in the region of the Black

Sea

essential

to

an

area which Britain had begun to regard as

the

security

crucial question was how

of

the

Empire.

For

London,

the

best to safeguard Britain's imperial

interests, which included paving the way for an expansion of British power.

The Empire had already begun to discover new

areas of concern throughout Central Asia and the Middle East. Curzon

and Hardinge,

for example,

Empire

must

into

1

expand

southern

shared a belief that the Persia^

and

would

not1

FO W34/219396/65390, Minute by Hardinge, n.d. "...we wish and intend to extend our sphere of influence in the South, whether recognised or not...” Curzon shared this concern. Minute by Curzon, 17 November 1917.

62

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

therefore accept the arguments of the Government of India - a satiated

power

-

for

nationalist Persia*

the

creation

of

a

strictly

neutral

For the members of the Persia Committee,

as for Marling, Persian nationalism was as much an obstacle to the

fulfilment of

action.

As

normal

imperialist enterprises

as enemy military

diplomatic methods

proven

had

themselves

inadequate to safeguard imperial interests, Cecil's advice was accepted

and

Britain

made

plans

to

accompany

its

diplomatic efforts with direct military intervention.

confused

CHAPTER THREE« THE DEBATE ON INTERVENTION: CAUCASIA OR PERSIA? The

Bolshevik

decision to use element

in

a

Revolution

force

added

in Persia,

complicated

but

situation.

urgency

to

Britain's

it remained only one In

many

ways

British

policy-makers had found it easier to find a solution than they had to define the problem. This, too, created problems. There were

in

fact

two

separate

arguments

for

intervention:

one

centred on Caucasia and the other on Persia. Lord Milner made the case for intervention in Caucasia in a memorandum for the War Cabinet at the beginning of 1918: The importance of holding Trans-Caucasia can certainly not be exaggerated, as unless we succeed in this, there is danger of the Turks not only recovering the Armenian provinces, which have been conquered by the Russians, but establishing connection with the Turkish population of Northern Persia (Azerbaijan) and with the Russian Moslems, who, as already stated, are being arduously wooed by the Bolsheviks. Such a combinaton would present a new and very real danger to our whole position in the East. On the other hand we have in the anti-Bolsheviks of Transcaucasia, the nucleus of an Army, which if organised and led would certainly fight, as it is a question of life and death to them to resist a Turkish invasion. Of all the various districts of Southern Russia, which are struggling for local autonomy, Trans-Caucasia seems thus to be both the most promising and by far^ the most vital from the point of view of British interests. Milner was prepared to risk a military debacle by sending Dunsterville into the region without delay. problems with

the proposal:

There were obvious

Milner did not say how Britain

should grant autonomy to the Tsar's former subjects. Clearly, he meant

1

self-determination

rather

than

local autonomy.

Cab. 24/38:G.T. 3275, Memorandum by Milner, n.d

His1

64

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

concern was shared by the members of the Caucasus Committee1, though they were prepared to be more flexible in countering the threat*

On 31 October 1917, the Committee decided to pay the 2 remaining anti-Bolshevik Russian troops in northern Persia.

Then, on 4 January 1918, the Caucasus Committee met again to consider means of rendering aid to the Armenians: The success of this undertaking is our most immediate and vital concern, because it is only by establishing an Armenian cordon strong enough to hold back the Turks and the Kurds that we can protect the flank of our Mesopotamian force, hope to keep Persia clear from hostile penetration, and prevent the spread of an anti-British Turanian-Moslem movement, working in German interests, from Turkey into the heart of Central Asia. The

chances

recognised

of the

Daghastani8

who

success

were

tremendous control

negligible

obstacles: Baku

appear

and

"In

the

to

be

the

Committee

Caucasus

the

Bolshevik

and

Turanian and they are in touch with the even more fanatical 3 Moslems of the Eastern side of the Caspian." The

two characteristics

of the Caucasian argument were

that the focal point of intervention tended to move eastward with the enemy advance, and, as a basically political move, it fit well with many of the ideas of the imperial idealists. The force which Dunsterville was expected to lead into Caucasia was tiny and its members chosen for their abilities as political agents rather than as soldiers, though, no doubt, the group had romantic

expectations

of

duplicating

Lawrence's

Similar expectations infected political thinkers. example,

was

exploits. Amery,

for

convinced that Germany must be prevented from1 3 2

1

The Caucasus Committee was an interpartmental committee similar to the Persia Committee.

2

FO W34/35/8, Minutes of the Caucasus Committee 31 December 1917.

3

Cab. 24/38:G.T.3243; F.O. Minutes: S.E. Russia; 7 January 1918.

DEBATE OM INTERVENTION using

Russia's

collapse to establish herself

65

in Russia and

Turkey and urged Lloyd George to launch an attack on Turkey which

would

separate

the

Turks

from Germany.^

Montagu

and

Balfour shared this belief. On the first day of the new year, Montagu had informed the Government of

India that Britain

intended to take over the

Russian portion of the East Persian Cordon. As the action would directly whether

affect the

Anglo-Afghan

Amir

of

relations,

Afghanistan

ought

Montagu to

be

inquired given

an

explanation. The Viceroy, who was opposed to any unnecessary communication

with

the

Amir,

attempted

to

put

it

off

by

replying that he knew none of the facts about the situation. On 8 January, Montagu and Balfour replied that:

The collapse of Russia has left no control over {the] native population of Turkestan. Russian moslems are reported as anti-British which is being incited by [the] enemy. Reinforced by Bolshevik policy [they] have been successful. Has spread to Persia and likely that Turkestan will fall to [the] enemy becoming a J>ase for enemy agents to use against Persia and Afghanistan.

This alarming picture of the future moved the Viceroy to write to the Amir. In the florid patois of Imperial India, he warned the

Amir

of

chaos

and

destruction

-

"anarchy

is

like

a

devouring flame which spreads rapidly from house to house" and informed him, almost in passing, that British troops would1 2

1

LGMSS, F/2/1/9, 10 Amery to Lloyd George; 29 and 30 December 1917. Smuts shared his view. F/2/1/11, Amery to Lloyd George, 12 January 1918.

2

FO W34/1935/8, Montagu to Chelmsford, 8 January 1918.

66

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

extend

the

Eastern

Cordon

northward

along the

Perso-Afghan

frontier.^ The War Office found this expansionist argument congenial: for local officers It was Irresistible. The problem was finding men to carry it out. For though it was anticipated that only a small number would be required, the advocates of the Western Front could be expected to resist any further side-shows in Asia. In addition. General Marshall, who had succeeded Maude in Baghdad, was not inclined to divert men and machines away from his attempt to take Mosul. In

conceptual

terms,

there

was

an

even

more

serious

difficulty with the Caucasian programme. Having discarded many inhibitions regarding the former Russian Empire, the British found it difficult to limit their own interests. They tended to regard the entire region between Georgia and Turkestan as part of

a

single

problem which

inevitably

entailed

intervention

against any force which troubled the stability of the area. But this meant operating in territory which Britain continued to recognise

as

Russian.

It

was

impossible

to

support both

national self-determination in southern Russia, and the antiBolshevik Russian counter-revolutionaries. For the time being, the

weakness

having

to

of

the

choose,

contesting parties

but

the

problem

saved

could

not

Britain be

from

ignored

altogether. Amery, as usual, led the pack. He began by urging* 0 1

1

FO W38/42330/3172; Chelmsford to the Amir of Afghanistan; 10 January 1918. The Amir's reply was more sensible: "I am fully aware", he wrote, "of condition of Russia, and danger of confusion spreading into Afghanistan. The joining of Turkey in the war has had a profound effect on the Moslem world. The remedy lies, firstly, in strengthening Afghanistan, and secondly, in conciliating the people of India. Afghanistan could never tolerate the entry of British troops; it must be protected by its own people, so that it may be a buffer against the enemy of India." FO W38/106758/676; Viceroy (FD) to 10; 11 June 1918. (Letter dated 10 January 1918).

DEBATE ON INTERVENTION

67

the exclusion of Russia's recent territorial acquisitions in the

south

from

consideration

of

Russia's

implications of this suggestion were vast: southern borderlands

from the

future*^

The

by excluding the

larger Russian question - in

effect, partitioning Russia - Britain would be able to seek an imperial solution in Central Asia consistent with what Amery regarded as the Empire's

strategic needs*

Though few were

prepared to accept Amery's logic totally, once it was felt that Britain must have security in Central Asia, it was difficult to resist expanding the limits of security* The Asia

alternative

was

idealists

to

seek

tended

to

seeking

security to

in

emphasise

Turkish or ideological threats,

security throughout Central Persia* the

Whereas the

seriousness

imperial

of

German,

those who wished to isolate

Persia were more concerned with hobbling Persian nationalism* For these men, the Turks and Germans were a danger only in so far as the nationalists

offered an agency through which to

promote trouble in Afghanistan and India* closely

related

to

traditional

It was a policy very

strategic

concerns

centred

primarily on the defence of India, even though in detail it was often opposed by the Government of India*

As we have seen, the

case for strategic security in Persia was put by Marling and echoed by a number of men in the Foreign Office, notably Cecil* For them, military intervention was part of a straightforward policy of intimidation and control which they hoped would make it plain to the Tehran Government and to the people of Persia, that there was no alternative to Britain's benevolent guidance* For the idealists, Marling's argument was faulty because of

his

preoccupation with

Persia

and

because he

failed to

appreciate the significance of the danger or the vastness of the

opportunity*

manoeuvre 1

around

Marling's the

critics

obstacles in

regarded his attempts to Tehran as

vacilation. In

Cab* 27/25/E.C*33, Memorandum by Amery, 14 March 1918.

68

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

fact, the fault lay with the Persia Committee; its criteria for a settlement were impossible to achieve by diplomatic means* Marling was not opposed to the use of force, though he had little reason to suppose that the British Government would be prepared

to

mount

an

intervention

sufficiently

large

to

paralyse Persian nationalism. He was, therefore, caught between the Committee's inflated political ambitions and its inability to

provide

the

troops

necessary

for

success.

Despite

its

enthusiasm, Dunstervilie's small band could not be expected to hold Caucasia or make a show of force in Persia without the acquiescence, if not the cooperation, of at least part of the local

population.

large-scale venture

As

campaign

rested

on

Britain in

had

Central

local

no

intention of waging a

Asia,

acquiescence

the

success

of

the

which

could

only

be

obtained by recognising national aspirations. traditionalists argument

full

were circle:

concerned,

this

As far as the

merely

brought

the

how could Britain recognise Caucasian

national rights and deny those of Persia when, in their view, it was

Persian nationalism which had made

the

intervention

necessary in the first place. Not

everyone

in

London

agreed

that

intervention

was

necessary. An unusual memorandum prepared by the Intelligence Bureau

of

the

Department

of

Information^,

though

it

was

primarily concerned with explaining the effectiveness of German propaganda

in

Asia,

examined

the

basis

of the

dilemma.

It

pointed out in the first place that enemy propaganda exploited the

fundamental

contradiction

between

the

democratic

institutions of Britain and the force Britain employed in the Empire. This, together with the Russian Revolution, had built the

question

of

self-determination

Britain could not safely ignore.

into a huge

The memorandum noted that in

Russia, the rupture had occurred at the1 1

issue which

The author is probably Philip Kerr.

DEBATE ON INTERVENTION

69

Asiatic instead of the European frontiers, and the new political current in Russia is likely to be conducted across these frontiers into Persia, Afghanistan, India, China, attracting the oriental populations of these countries, and especially the Moslems, towards the 'self-determination' which the Russian Moslems have been securing for themselves* It was not Bolshevism but the example of events in the formerly Russian

Muslim

regions

which

were

important,

making

it

pointless for Britain to deny that Russian Muslims had gained real freedom. The similarities of the movement in Caucasia and the All-India Muslim League meant that the two movements would interact with inevitable consequences for the Empire. The

memorandum

then

explored

the

relationship

Bolshevism and Islamic political movements.

between

To begin with, it

asserted that the real significance of Bolshevism was that it sought the friendship of Russian Muslims and recognised their right

to

self-determination.

This

link

was

strengthened

because, as internationalists, Bolsheviks and Muslims sought to protect their communities from the real enemy, capitalism. Both regarded the European middle class as the "exploiter of the labouring class in Europe and of the Moslems in the East." Experience of a common oppression and respect for one another's rights,

in

the memorandum's view,

was

sufficient reason to

suppose that the alliance would last and that it would enable both parties to influence events beyond Russia's borders. On

the

other hand,

the memorandum continued,

the real

significance of the Bolshevik recognition of the principle of 8elf-determintion

could

not

be

realised

unless

it

was

remembered that within European ruled regions, the nationalists had

been

demanding autonomy

rather

than

independence.

What

really provoked Muslim sensibilities were attempts to extend European control into independent Muslim states, particularly Turkey, wanted

Persia

and Afghanistan.

to avoid the

This meant that

spread of hostility

encroachments on Persia and Afghanistan. also provided Britain with the

it must

if Britain cease

its

But the situation

opportunity to undo

the damage

70

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

done

by

the

1907

Convention,

and

to

re-establish

"our

traditional entente with Islam". Only Anglo-American rèlations, according to the author, Britain'8

diplomatic

ranked in importance with Islam in

calculations.

There

were

three

alternatives: Britain could continue to pursue the policy of 1907 which would ultimately entail

commitments in Caucasia,

along the Don, the Volga, and the Trans-Siberian Railway and would involve Britain in an effort which would be beyond the resources of the Empire, alienate British Muslims and create Bolshevik

hostility;

secondly,

Britain

could

capitulate

to

Muslim pressure, knowing that it was impossible to allow Persia and Afghanistan to come under Turkey's sway; or, Britain could find a trustee who would be acceptable to both the Empire and the Muslims and who would lead the region towards: self-determination and forbid either German or British penetration. [The] U.S. is [the] only satisfactory solution...from our own point of view there could be no arrangement better calculated to cement the Anglo-American Alliance, which as far as the narrower 'state interests' of the British Empire are concerned, is perhaps the one consideration in the War which 1is as important as the recovery of the goodwill of Islam. The novelty of the memorandum lay in its attempt to understand the activities and aspirations of Asian nationalists and to make allowance for them in British policy. reconcile

self-determination

with

British

In attempting to interests,

the

memorandum sought to pass responsibility for maintaining the arrangement onto a safe third party, the United States. In many ways, this conclusion was based upon criteria similar to those employed by the Government of India, and it was therefore not surprising that the memorandum failed to move the members of the Persia Committee.

They

remained convinced that conflict

between shia and sunni, or Iran and Turan, was inevitable and1 1

Cab. 24/39:C.T. Information; n.d.

3224,

Memorandum

by

Department

of

DEBATE ON INTERVENTION ignored

warnings

that

political

idealism

might

71

dissolve

traditional antagonisms. As the new year began, it appeared that, despite Britain's wish to go it alone in Persia, Britain's allies , Prance and the United States, would insist on mediating between London and Tehran.

Neither was

content with Britain's handling of the

situation

and

feared

explosion

throughout

effort in Europe.

that the

inept policies East

might

which would

provoke

cripple

the

an war

On 1 January 1918, the French Government

proposed mediation around a moderate programme of concessions^ and was Though

followed the

later in the month by the United States.

British were

suspicious of French motives,

they

could not ignore the fact that unless they acted quickly in Persia,

the entire problem threatened to become a source of

Allied dissension. The best course appeared to be a meaningless diplomatic

gesture

which would

stage its military intervention.

give Britain enough time to 2

But the discrepancies in thinking between those in London who

emphasised

emphasised

the

Persia

importance remained

of

Caucasia

unresolved

and

and

those

who

threatened

to

dissipate the momentum of intervention. The severe limits on policy imposed by the small number of troops actually available meant

that

any

military

action

accompanied

by

populations.

Considerations

time-consuming of

in

Central

overtures this

nature

Asia to

must

the

were

be

local

clearly

a

factor in the War Office's plans for sending an armed force to northern

Persia.

position

taken

The in

military October

experts 1917

and

had did

not

altered

not

mean

the for

Dun8terville to engage the enemy but to operate as a political mission inside Caucasia.

If, in the course of his passage,

Dunsterville created the impression of force and so intimidated1 2 1

10 1000/1981:22, Balfour to Marling, 1 January 1918.

2

10 1000/1918:44, Marling to Balfour, 5 January 1918.

72

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

the Persians into negotiating a settlement on British terms, so (

much the better. Thus, strategic concerns in both Caucasia and Persia

had,

in

the

face

of

the

advancing

Turks,

come

to

coincide in northern Persia, giving the impression that the two problems had been integrated. happened,

though

the

In fact, nothing of the sort had

appearance

of

it

later

gave

rise

to

endless misunderstandings. But if the nature of the danger was unclear, the method for dealing with it was not.

The War Office began to make

preparations for sending Dunsterville into Caucasia and on 4 January asked the C.G.S.-India if it was possible to form a similar mission for use in Turkestan. The reply was that such a mission was impossible at that moment, but that it should be formed and held in readiness.^ reports

that

there

mission to assist.

was

no

India's hesitation was based on

government

in the

area

for

the

As the missions were political and designed

to offer assistance to local governments believed to be proBritish, India choose to hold off until the right conditions presented themselves. The

missions

were

supposed

to

complement

diplomatic

activities. As it was agreed in official circles that part of Britain's difficulty in Persia was the result of her single handed responsibility, one of the first priorities was to make a reasonable response to the note of 1 January and to share the animus

with

the

French.

With

this

in mind,

Shuckburgh and

Oliphant drafted a declaration which sought to win not only French but American support for British policy: His Majesty's Government have repeatedly expressed to the Persian Government their desire and intention to uphold the independence and integrity of Persia. They wish now to renew to Your Excellency their assurance in conjunction with the Governments of the French Republic and United States of America whose views in this matter are in entire harmony with their own, that it is the desire and "ï

FO W38/6322/3172, D.M.I. to C.G.S.-India, 4 January 1918.

DEBATE OH INTERVENTION

73

determination of the three Governments to respect the integrity of Persia and to promote the development of the country on independent and self-determined lines as soon as the abnormal conditions created by the present war have been removed* These vague and pious assurances were unrelated to the real issues and could have had no effect on Persian opinion. Nor were

they

attempt

to

meant

to:

show the

the

draft

Persians

Britain's allies for support*

declaration

that

they

amounted

could

not

to

an

look

to

London meant to avoid conflicts

of interest with the Allies which would give the Persians room to manoeuvre* The Persia Committee met to discuss the draft proclamation on 12 January. It was a timely meeting* American interest in Persia,

already

anticipated

in

the

proclamation,

became

a

reality on the same day. Spring-Rice, the British Ambassador in Washington,

Foreign Office that the State 2 Department would soon intervene. It quickly became apparent that

the

advised

political

the

members

of

the

Persia

unwilling to accept Allied advice on Persia.^ opportunity to attack past policy, London which

Committee

were

Curzon took the

arguing that it was not

required englightenment,

but the Government of

India and Marling, both of whom he accused of vacillation. Only the D.M.I. ventured to question Curzon's criticism. He proposed employing Cox's plan for using sympathetic British officers to make contact with Persian nationalist leaders and to share the responsibility for Persia with France and the United States.1 1

FO W34/10310/8, Draft Declaration to Persia, 5 January 1918.

2

FO W34/7738/8, Spring-Rice to Balfour, 12 January 1918. Spring-Rice reminded the State Department of the Bolshevik threat to Persia, Afghanistan and India.

3

In general, official opinion was that the French and American approaches were harmless, and might even be useful in improving the situation. 10 1000/1918:22 Shuckburgh minute, 2 January 1918. 10 1000/1918:44, draft letter Montagu to Balfour, 10 January 1918.

74

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

There was no support for the idea. opposed

the

introduction

of

what

Cecil joined Curzon and could

become

new

vested

interests in Persia. But it was impossible to completely ignore France

and

America

and

the

Committee

decided

to

instruct

Marling to support the moderate democrats on condition that they recognise British control of the S.P.R.

There was no

decision on the draft proclamation.^ In a sense, London gave itself more latitude in Tehran when it expanded its political horizon to Central Asia as a whole. The

apparent

reasonableness

of

the

War

Office

on

matters

relating to Persian nationalism disguised a forward policy in the region generally. Thus, no sooner had India agreed to the preparation of a military mission to Turkestan than the War Office

began

to

demand

its

despatch,

arguing

that

"every

endeavour should be made to exploit in our favour the anti2 Bolshevik and pro-autonomous sentiment.• , which it assumed prevailed

in

justification.

Turkestan. The

This

War

Cabinet's

was

an

extraordinary

statement

on

self-

determination was not a month old, and the notion that Britain should intervene against Bolshevism had barely been discussed. Under the circumstances, a policital mission sent to engage in pro-British

anti-Bolshevik

propaganda

added

an entirely

new

dimension to British policy in Central Asia. But the emergence of anti-Bolshevism as a major constituent in the formulation of British policy in the East was virtually inevitable. It was a convenient focal point for numerous official opinions ranging from monarchism to idealism.

Expansionists,

and particularly

those in the army and in European and North American capitals, soon found that there was a great deal of political mileage to 1

FO 34/10187/8, Minutes of the Persia Committee, 1918.

2

FO W38/1494/3172, WO to consented on 23 January. January 1918.

12 January

FO, 18 January 1918. Balfour WO W38/9494/3172* FO to IO 23

DEBATE ON INTERVENTION

75

be got out of anti-Bolshevism. The fact remained, however, that Bolshevism was not the cause of Britain's difficulties in the East:

the

Intelligence Bureau's memorandum had identified the

problem accurately when it pointed out that it was Britain's own activities

which

most

threatened

the

political

stability

of

Central Asia. The Government of India also questioned the feasibility of combining military intervention with political conciliation. It therefore opposed Cox's plan.^ More importantly, Cox himself had second thoughts. that

sending

On

the

11 January he reversed himself and argued officers

would

only

further

alienate

the

democrats. Instead he wanted to prepare the ground by issuing a 2 proclamation explaining that the expedition was temporary. It was too late, however; the Foreign Office had already accepted the military recommendations.

Though Oliphant observed that "we

are rather trying to combine two incompatibles: viz. to keep in with

the

Nationalists

and

at

the

same

time

to

take

active

defensive measures ourselves by the employment of troops which is anathema to the Nationalists"^, the contradiction did not trouble his colleagues.

Official preferences lay with active measures;

Hardinge noted that

"we have

throughout the war followed the

principle that military exigencies in Persia must have precedence of political considerations, and we must follow suit in this 4 case..." . He and Graham agreed that a letter from Balfour urging immediate despatch of cavalry should be sent together with 2 the proclamation recommended by Cox. The proclamation was meant to ease the tension created by the military intervention. Thus, Cox's original recommendation for garnering the friendship and 1

IO 3131/1917:5168, Viceroy (FD) to 10, 26 December 1917.

2

FO W34/10164/8, Cox to Viceroy (FD), 11 January 1918.

3

Ibid., Minute by Oliphant; n.d.

4

Ibid., Minute by Hardinge, n.d.

5

Ibid., Minutes by Hardinge and Graham, 19 January 1918.

76

HAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

support of Persian nationalism was transformed into a device for easing the passage of the British expedition. But allowing military considerations to dominate policy did not remove occasions for diplomatic embarrassment. As had been expected, the Persians sought American support. Washington had no desire to embarrass London, and so, rather than give the Persians an immediate answer, the State Department approached the Foreign Office for an explanation of British policy and offered

to

help

ease

relations

between

the

Entente

and

Persia.^. As Tehran had already involved Washington in Persian affairs,

there

was

to

join

Americans

little

Britain

Britain

and

could

do except

France

in

get the

the

proposed

declaration. On 24 January the Foreign Office concluded that there was no other alternative and the following day the Persia Committee followed suit. There was little else it could do.

As

happened so often in Central Asia, the War Office experts had underestimated the time and effort required for a successful operation. Having decided to send a force into Persia, the Army belatedly discovered that heavy rains had flooded the access roads,

making

it

impossible

to

send

troops.

The

entire

operation had to be postponed. Without any chance of pressuring Persia directly, the Committee was prepared to accept outside interference.

The

D.M.I.,

who

was

responsible

for

the

miscalculation, retreated to his former position of seeking a political American

solution, guarantee

Shuckburgh

and

supported

in Persia,

feared that the

the

plan

for

an

to which Cecil added France.

guarantee would give the United

States and France the right to interfere in Persia. reassurance

Cecil

could

Anglo-

offer

was

that

if

they

The only chose

to

interfere, they would do so without the proclamation. This was small comfort, and the Committee, having decided that there was no 1

way of keeping others out, consoled itself by deciding that1 FO W34/16176/8, Balfour to Barclay, 23 January 1918.

DEBATE ON INTERVENTION

77

Britain should be the chief beneficiary of any alteration.^ But

before

a

reply

was

the

forthcoming,

situation took a turn for the worse.

diplomatic

Though the Persians had

long since renounced the Convention of 1907, the Foreign Office had

taken

the

view

that

international agreement,

Tehran

particularly as,

Persia was not a party to it. Soviet

Comissar

calculations

for

by

responsibility

the

not

abrogate

an

strictly speaking,

But on 29 January 1918, Trotsky,

External

renouncing for

could

Affairs,

the

Russian

upset Britain's

Convention, troops

disclaiming

any

remaining on Persian

soil,

and expressing the hope that both British and Turkish 2 armies would evacaute Persia. Trotsky's abrogation of the Convention made the British position more difficult by giving new political ammunition to the nationalists and because, officially at least, the northern section

of

considered

the the

military

cordon

ceased

to

exist.

remaining

Russian

troops

in Northern

unreliable and already stretched to the limit.

Marling Persia

He concluded

that the British Government must decide whether it would take measures Marling replied,

itself.^ had

in

The Foreign Office was intrigued by what 4 mind. "I mean military measures,” Marling

"nothing else is so effective and I believe

[that]

besides securing a safe road to Enzeli [the] measure would if taken on an adequate scale stabilise [the] political situation here.”^

Marling's

concern

for the situation in Persia was

obvious. Shuckburgh placed a rather different emphasis on the1

1

FO W34/18646/8, Minutes of the Persia Committee, 26 January 1918.

2

FO W38/19930/19930, Trotsky (Petrograd)29 January 1918.

3

10 1000/1918:455; Marling to Balfour, 26 January 1918. Here again, British action preceded the Bolshevik announcement.

4

Ibid., Balfour to Marling, 28 January 1918.

5

Ibid., Marling to Balfour, 30 January 1918.

to

Persian

Ambassador

78

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

telegram, concluding that it was necessary to form a cordon to stop enemy agents, and that to accomplish this the road from Kermanshah via Hamadan, patrolled*

The

Persia

Kazvin and Resht to Enzeli must be Committee,

he

noted,

had

already

recommended the use of armoured cars, although these would not be available until the end of March, and that in the meantime, Marshall was to do what he could. The War Office reported that it had 170 British Officers and 250 N.C.O.s at Baghdad ready to go into the Caucasus when circumstances permitted^.

But the

Caucasus were not Marling's concern. It was becoming clear in London that if the cordon were to be maintained intact, it would have to be with British forces. Trotsky's declaration was followed almost immediately by the withdrawal of Russian troops from both the northern and eastern 2 cordons. Marling, however, was able to hold out hope of a political reconciliation as the Persians had, on 3 February, once again offered to negotiate the basic issues of foreign troops and foreign control of Persian finances.^

The Persians

were apparently prepared to accept the continued presence of small British consular forces and had also promised that the Persian Government would undertake to block enemy infiltration by using the Cossack Brigade to close the frontier from Kasr-iShirin to Ararat.

Marling thought that he had seen light at

the end of the tunnel and believed that the moral advantage to 4 be gained would balance the withdrawal of British troops. When the Persia Committee met on 9 February to discuss the new situation, it had to reconcile the apparent contradiction in what Marling had been recommending over the previous weeks.1 4 3 2

1

Ibid., Minute to Shuckburgh, 4 February 1918.

2

10 1000/1918:477, Marling to Balfour, 29 January 1918. 10 1000/1918:512, C.C.S.-India to the D.M.I., 2 February 1918.

3

Ibid., Marling to Balfour, 3 February 1918.

4

10 1000/1918:554, Marling to Balfour, 4 February 1918.

DEBATE ON INTERVENTION He

seemed to be urging both the withdrawal of troops

Central

79 fron

Persia and the establishment of a British force to

replace the Russians in north and east Persia, while at the sane

time

urging

the

acceptance

of

at

least

part

of

the

proposals put by the Persian Government* In British terms, the various

proposals

were

not

irreconcilable,

as

the

D.M.I.

indicated in a memorandum which he prepared on the subject. The immediate objectives of British policy, he urged, were the establishment of a friendly government, the cessation of enemy intrigue,

the

safe

passage

of

British military

units

from

Baghdad to the Caucasus, the recognition of the S.P.R. and the maintenance

of

the

Eastern

Cordon.

The

new

developments

reported by Marling seemed to the D.M.I. to satisfy a number of these.

The

existing

Persian

Government,

he

thought,

was

probably as friendly as could be hoped for, was apparently prepared to maintain the Cossacks, and might even be convinced of the need to place British officers in command. He further recommended extending the S.P.R. over the whole of Persia and using it to guard the north-west, strengthened by armoured cars and supported by a mobile British force stationed at Kasr-iShirin. It was a plan which, in the opinion of the D.M.I., was both conciliatory and economical.1 of

course,

emphasised

These speculations did not,

sort out the contradictions in policy, them.

Expansion

of

British

military

but only

commitments

might be possible if accompanied by significant concessions to the Persians.

Extending the writ of the S.P.R. obviously did

not qualify. The

Persia

Committee

largely

agreed

with

the

D.M.I.'s

memorandum. Because of the collapse of the Russian forces and because forces

the

C.I.G.S.

in places

was

where

opposed

large

to putting

small

efforts might be

British

required to

rescue them, it was decided to keep communications open along

1

Ibid., Memorandum by the D.M.I., 8 February 1918.

THE BAGHDAD-ENZELI

ROAD

80

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

DEBATE OM INTERVENTION

81

the Hamadan-Enzeli road by making a bargain with the Persian Government which would enable Britain to employ the Cossack Brigade.

In

exchange

Government was

for

Persian

cooperation,

the

British

prepared to withdraw all of its troops from

Central Persia.^ Both Marling and the Government of India were critical. The Viceroy telegraphed on 12 February that: We cordially welcome solution proposed and trust that our agreement to withdrawal of the troops may be made in terms calculated to assist Persian Government to convince democrats of sincerity of our intentions and to secure maximum political value from concession. In general, the Government of India thought that the British Government must be less uncompromising and must agree to reduce consular escorts to a minimum and to make Persia responsible for

the

eastern

cordon

as

soon

as

possible.

The

actual

withdrawal of British troops from Central Persia, the Viceroy 2 thought, should be "very gradual”. Though the Viceroy's proposals had the support of the Indian Army, they left the India Office somewhat aghast.

General Cox, the India Office's

military advisory thought that the eastern cordon must not be given to the Persians, and Shuckburgh noted that perhaps the Government of India was making a joke - the Persians would never be sufficiently organised.^ Marling's reply was in a similar vein: he thought the plan impractical. The Persian Cabinet was stalling, Russians replace northern

gone, them,

incapable which

Persia,

meant

guarding

of

doing

that the

anything

the

two

road

and

and with the

to

effectively

primary

tasks

preventing

in

enemy1

1

FO W34/28050/8, Minutes of the Persia Committee, 9 February 1918.

2

10 1000/1918:599, Viceroy to I.O., 12 February 1918.

3

Ibid., Minutes by General Cox and Shuckburgh, 14 February 1918.

82

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

infiltration, would be left undone*

In these circumstances I venture to urge that we must seriously consider undertaking these two tasks ourselves. I am disposed to believe it will be sufficient to hold the road as far as Kasvin but it must be done in strength considerably greater than is necessary merely to police the road and there must be sufficient force at Kasvin to impress both on Tehran and Jangalis in Gilan that we cannot be trifled with* This was, of course, precisely the sort of endeavour to which the C*I*G*S. had objected* But Marling had more in mind for the Jangalis

and

neighbouring

indicated chiefs

to

that

he

attack

wished

and

to

destroy

stir

them.

up He

the also

recognised the contradiction in British policy when it claimed to

respect

the

independence

of

Persia,

maintained troops in the country* fears

if military action were

necesary

for

Britain to make

and

simultaneously

In order to allay Persian

taken,

Marling considered

it

a proclamation explaining the

position in detail and justifying the step* In the long run, however,

it

appeared to Marling

"that as

circumstances are

likely to compel us to use force sooner or later it would be better

to

act

at

once

rather

than

drag

entailing ever increasing concessions*"^ echoing

the

conclusion

Cecil

had

on

negotiations

Marling was merely

reached

in December*

The

problem was that a purely military show of force conflicted with the general policy of the Persia Committee and with the desire of the C.I.G.S. to avoid embarrassments. Still, it was a programme which was very much in keeping with the spirit of the Committee's deliberations and its policy of avoiding political concession where possible. for

Marling

because

the

It was a very difficult situation only

Persians

he

could

reasonably

expect to deal with could not deliver the Persian nationalists to him, which meant, of course, that any arrangement was very

1

10 1000/1918:623; Marling to

Balfour, 12 February 1918.

DEBATE OH INTERVENTION

83

likely to destroy the Government which had made it* Marling, encouraged by the Foreign Office and by promises of a show of force, wanted to bully the Persians into acquiescence.^ A policy of force was not to the taste of the Government of India. They questioned whether there was any likelihood of a Turco-German thrust,

and thought that catching enemy agents

could be left to the Cossack Brigade. Germany's failures in the past, and a political reconcilation between London and Tehran would, in their opinion, deter the Germans from future effort* India's real objection, though, was the impact such an action might have on Muslims throughout the East. If force is to be used it must be on [a] scale sufficient to completely overawe [the] country and [be] supplied entirely by ourselves as Russian cooperation appears out of the question. Such a diversion could only be justified on [the] strongest political grounds. To us there appears to be the strongest political objections. In default of serious provocation - and it would be difficult to show that such exists - such a measure would finally discredit us with Persia and bring on us [the] odium of [the] whole Moslem world. It would obviously make [the] existence of any real Persian Government impossible and would excite [the] liveliest suspicion in Afghanistan where our action against [a] neutral Moslem state whose integrity we have guaranteed would undoubtedly be misrepresented. Apart from the immediate question of policy in Persia, the Government of India was clearly distressed by the entire drift of British policy in Central Asia. Extensive commitments would inevitably grow out of the ambitions of British policy-makers, and there was little doubt about who would be expected to bear the burden of men and money for these projects. The saune day, the

Viceroy

reconsider

also

urged

on

the

India

the mission to Turkestan,

Office

the

need

to

the purpose of which,

according to the Government of India, was altogether too vague. He asked that its despatch should at least be delayed until the

1

Ibid., Viceroy to I.O., 16 February 1918

84

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

views of the Amir of Afghanistan were known.^ The

need

to

reach

a decision

of

intervention was clear to everyone.

some

sort

on military

Marling, recovered from

his brief enthusiasm for negotiations, told the Foreign Office 2 on 14 February that there should be no more negotations. The War Office, which had always favoured some sort of military intervention in Caucasia, took the opportunity to impress upon General Marshall the importance of keeping open the road from Khanikin to Resht,

though apart

from the armoured cars,

it

could offer no suggestions about how this was to be done.^ Marshall replied that he agreed completely with the War Office and promised to send as many cars as possible, adding that the 4 road "is under snow at present." This last observation was to prove of great importance, though at the time it seems to have been passed over.

Of more immediate importance for those who

wanted a show of force was the opposition of the Government of India. Marling replied to the criticism of the Viceroy on 18 February, arguing that while the Germans were not planning an invasion, their agents were seeking to bring Persia into the war against Britain, which would prove a terrible embarrassment for British prestige. In his opinion, the Cossack Brigade and the South Persian Rifles were inadequate to meet the threat and, in any case, were needed where they were. That meant a British

force.

considered question

of

that

The

main

the

"force

question required

was

its

is small.

overawing the handful of reckless

size. It

Marling is....[a]

(? factions)

whose political capital is a spurious patriotism under German1

1

FO W38/28433/3172, Viceroy to I.O., 12 February 1918.

2

10 1000/1918:636, Marling to Balfour, 14 February 1918.

3

10 1000/1918:746, C.I.G.S. to G.O.C.-Meso., 15 February 1918.

4

Ibid., G.O.C.-Meso., to C.I.G.S., 16 February 1918.

DEBATE ON INTERVENTION

85

inspiration"^. Needless to say, the India Office agreed with Marling.

It

was

clear

that

the

question

at

issue

was

increasingby the size of the force required rather than the desirability of such a force. In a note on Persia, dated

19

February, General Cox related a conversation which he had had with Colonel Steel of the War Office, in which Cox had argued the need for a decision on the action to be taken to safeguard western Persia.

He reported that the War Office considered a

large force out of the question, even though they might prefer it, and instead talked of improvising a small force of armoured cars,

cavalry

and

guns

to

constitute

a

mobile

force.

Cox

thought that if Dunsterville failed to reach Caucasia, part of his force should be used to form the line from the Caspian Sea to

Kermanshah,

Dunsterville*s

and

noted

instructions.

that It was

this

was

impossible

already

in

to leave the

situation alone, however, and the War Office was upset by the delay in reaching a decision. As Cox pointed out: It is not as if the evil results of procrastination and delay affect Persia and not interior order alone...they will be very far-reaching, and it is not too much to say that hesitation and a laisser aller policy may, and probably will, have very serious results as regards the tranquility and security of Afghanistan and consequently of India • Shuckburgh and Hirtzel agreed that the time had come to arrive at a decision, but thought that the War Office should first tell them what alternatives were available^. The emphasis placed on Dunsterville's mission by General Cox was curious.

Dunsterville was still officially going to

Caucasia by way of Tabriz. Until the mission's departure, the1

1

10 1000/1918:745, Marling to Balfour, 18 February 1918.

2

IO 1000/1918:636, Note to General Cox, 19 February 1918.

3

Ibid., Minutes by Shuckburgh, Hirtzel and General Cox, February 1918.

19

86

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

Foreign Office had kept silent, keeping the Persians ignorant of what was intended even though the mission would have to pass over Persian

territory.

In

fact,

the

fiction was maintained

that

because the mission was bound for Caucasia it did not affect Persia.

On 21 February, the Foreign Office informed Marling that

his suggestion of 12 February had been rejected because it was feared

that

northern

it

might

Persia,

develop

into

a

military occupation

a consequence which was

impossible

of

for both

'material and moral' reasons. The Foreign Office explained that it could not chance a trap or risk incurring the resentment in the Moslem world, though this did not mean that the importance of the

Hamadan-Enzeli

road

had

decreased \

The

burden

of

the

telegram was to ask Marling whether or not he could revive the negotiations which had ended the previous week.

The disparity

between military and political proposals became more apparent as intervention

became

contemplating two

a

reality.

In

separate actions,

essence,

one

Britain

in Caucasia,

was

and the

other in Persia, though the distinction was not always apparent to the policy-makers, who tended to get the two confused. Which aspect of the duality received the greatest emphasis depended very much upon the priorities set by individual officials. The limited possibilities of the situation reduced the scope of the mission

and

often

obscured

the

fact

that

Marling

and

Dun8terville, for example, were not contemplating the same thing at all in Central Asia. The

importance

of

the

question

of

Caucasia

in

British

thinking was greatly increased by the fact that Dunsterville's small force was actually on its way.

He reached Enzeli on 17

February, though the Foreign Office did not learn of it until the 23rd, and immediately turned back to Hamadan, having encountered the hostility of Kuchik Khan and the Jangalis. Dunsterville had

1

FO W34/33732/8, Balfour to Marling, 21 February 1918.

DEBATE ON INTERVENTION

87

found the road virtually impassible, and the Caucasus closed to him

unless

could

Government at Baku\

secure

the

assistance

of

the

He therefore returned to

Caucasus

Hamadan and

prepared to wait until conditions had improved enough to enable him to proceed. His action raised an interesting problem. As has been pointed out, the Persians were not informed of the mission by the Foreign Office and were somewhat surprised by it. They raised the subject in London after reports of the presence of British armoured cars had been received in Tehran. On the 21st, the same day that renewed negotiations had been suggested, the Foreign Office instructed Marling to inform the Persian Government of Dunstervilie's mission, emphasising that it was proceeding to Caucasia and pointing out that ...it is most desirable that cars should proceed. It is therefore undesirable to ask explicitly for permission of Persian Government as a difficult position would be created were the Cabinet to reply with a refusal . Dunstervilie's presence forced discussion of yet another question which previously had been avoided: who was the actual enemy in Central Asia. In the normal rhetorical sense it was naturally the Germans and Turks, but in practice the position was less clear. Kuchik Khan was, for example, friendly towards the retreating Russian forces, most of whom became Bolsheviks as soon as they reached Enzeli.

Even Dunsterville was aware of

this. But Marling warned the Foreign Office of meetings between the Jangalis and Bolsheviks at Resht, suggesting that some sort of common policy might be expected^. Oliphant took this to mean that

the

"Jangalis

have

obviously

been

dominated

by

the

Bolsheviks and while this is the case, must be expected to1

1

10 1000/1918:746, D.M.I. to C.M.A., 23 February 1918.

2

Ibid., Balfour to Marling, 21 February 1918

3

FO W34/33415/8, Marling to Balfour, 20 February 1918.

88

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

commit any outrage on our forces"

Graham recived the news

more calmly;

he did not "believe the Bolsheviks to be very 2 hostile to our efforts to maintain the Causasus front" and most of the evidence supported him. On 21 February, the British agent

in

autonomy

Turkestan had

left

reported the

are

evidence of Pan-Turanianism'*.

that

the

a quiet

Bolshevik

and

that

grant

of

there was

no

Moreover, reports from Peking a

week later indicated that the Bolsheviks were opposing both the 4 Pan-Turan and Pan-Islamic movements . In fact, what evidence there was indicated confusion rather than ideological purpose, and in any case, Bolshevism seemed to be playing a small part in it all. The crucial question remained what direction Muslim politics would take and whether it would prove to be antiBritish.

The

decision to re-open negotiations with Persia

appeared to mean that the Government of India was at last to have its way, even if it was for other reasons.

The decision

seemed to have more to do with considerations of German or Turkish attempts to invade Caucasia than with Bolshevism or nationalist

unrest.

This

was

coupled

to

fears

that

Dunsterville's small force might suffer a defeat and thus cause Britain to lose face throughout the East. This was an important consideration for Harold Nicolson, who, in a memorandum on policy in Persia, dated 22 February, argued that the defection of the Russians and the consequent impetus

to

Persian

nationalism

left

Britain

with

only

two

alternatives; force or conciliation. As a large scale military effort was not

feasible,

Nicolson

favoured conciliation.

advised abandoning north and central

He

Persia and withdrawing1

1

Ibid., Minute by Oliphant, n.d.

2

Ibid., Minute by Graham, n.d.

3

FO W38/36481/3172, Macartney to Balfour, 21 February 1918.

4

FO W38/37402/3172, Jordan to Balfour, 26 February 1918.

DEBATE OH INTERVENTION Marling,

while

advantage

at

possible.

the

same

Britain

time should

reaping

all

then

secure

of

89

the moral

the

Eastern

Cordon and the oil fields. While this action would be regarded in Asia as a nationalist victory, the shock would be easier to bear than a military defeat^. It was not a new idea: the India Office had examined and rejected it a week before. Nicolson's

suggestions

would

not

have

pleased

In fact, even

the

Government of India which, while it was interested in securing Britain's

interests

through

conciliation,

had

no

desire

to

abandon Persia altogether as Nicolson seemed to be suggesting. On the 23rd, the Viceroy criticised Marling's proposed show of force in terms which make this very clear. He was opposed to the despatch of troops which, as no enemy troops were in the vicinity, would have no military objective. Communications with Caucasia he considered to be of secondary importance now that it appeared that Dunsterville's force had failed, and he was afraid that an advance would cause widespread disorder in both Persia and Afghanistan. "We trust therefore that even at this eleventh hour methods of conciliation, which we have found profitable elsewhere in the East, may still be given [a]^ fair trial though we admit that [the] situation is serious. This was a very f«uniliar recommendation, which perhaps for the first time. Marling found difficult to refute. In reply to the Foreign Office telegram of 21 February, he confessed that he knew no alternative to conciliation as the attempt to occupy the road had apparently failed. The trouble, as he saw it, was 2 that the extremists and Jangalis were bent on making trouble . The Government of

India's argument

for concilation was

perhaps best put in a letter Chelmsford wrote to Curzon on 251 2

1

10 1000/1918:776, Viceroy to 10, 23 February 1918.

2

Ibid., Marling to Balfour, 23 February 1918.

90

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

February,

in which he acknowledged the futility of his task,

but attempted to lay out for Curzon the principle on which India based its recommendations. I have set before myself a broad but simple principle, that our foreign policy must be dependent on the military force at our disposal to support it and I think you will find that throughout my time our foreign policy whether in Persia or on the north-west frontier or in relation to Afghanistan has been consistent with that principle. It is easy to lay down a so-called strong policy and get the credit of strength but, if there is not force behind to push it through, it is futile. For Chelmsford,

recent experiences throughout Persia provided

ample evidence of the futility of ignoring this principle. While Russia was strong and Baratoff's column in being, force was on the spot to support a so-called strong policy; but with the Russian Revolution as the disappearance of the military factor in the situation was inevitable, we counselled a policy of conciliation, for we had no military force to support any other policy. Again our advice was rejected. Have events proved that we were wrong? If with the disappearance of Russia, we had at once re-established really friendly relations with Persia and Persians, I venture to say we would not be face to face with the present unsatisfactory position. The

Viceroy

also

defended

the

Government

of

India

against

Curzon's charge that they had been "persistently off the rails" and complained that "our main difficulty has been to keep pace with the changes of opinion which we get from Tehran."1 Curzon himself had made similar complaints. Despite the Viceroy's plea, the trend toward concilation proved to be largely illusory. It had been, in fact, the first response to a more difficult situation in Persia, but signified no real commitment to concession on the part of the British Government. The India Office, which might have been expected to

1

CMSS, 10 MSS. February 1918.

Eur.F.

111/426,

Chelmsford

to Curzon,

25

DEBATE ON INTERVENTION be

slightly

more

sympathetic

to

the

proposed

91

policy

of

conciliation, arrived at essentially the same conclusion as the Foreign

Office.

Shuckburgh, on

24

February,

emphasised

the

importance of the impact of the Russian Revolution. But the Russian revolution has upset all calculations. Russia, on whom we relied to control the situation in North and Northwest Persia in our joint interests, has not only ceased to be an effective ally, but has become a potential enemy of a particularly dangerous kind. Not only have her troops melted away, leaving North Persia open to the enemy, but she herself has developed internal disorders that may well prove more dangerous to us, if the contagion is allowed to spread, than the most active propaganda of the Germans and Turks. There can be no illusions about the policy of the Russian Bolsheviks in relation to India. The British Charge d'Affairs at Petrograd has recently warned us that they mean mischief there; and we have further direct evidence in the proclamation, issued at Petrograd some weeks ago, which called upon the people of India to eject the British as a necessary preliminary to 'self-determination' on Bolshevist lines." Shuckburgh had been among the first to raise the question of a possible Bolshevik threat to the Empire, though he had stressed that the danger lay in the example. The real threat, he

thought,

situation emissaries

emanated

to of

foster enemy

from an

the

Germans

"influx

description"

who

into

might

Persia

rather

than

of

use

the

hostile

undertake

a

military invasion, and he concluded that British forces must take

over

the

north-west

cordon

in

order

to

block

any

infiltration of agents. The Government of India's position was accepted in part, however.

Shuckburgh wanted to get Persian

co-operation by offering to withdraw all British troops from the interior of the country. Persia was important because it "lies across the most vulnerable flank of our Indian position, and

the

defence

of

India

must

always

be

the

governing

consideration in our Persian policy."^ Though the India Office1

1

10 L/P6S/18173, "The Persian Situation", J.E.S. (Shuckburgh) 24 February 1918.

92

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

was

prepared

to withdraw

from Central

Persia,

it urged an

increased military presence along the established cordons, and asserted that Persia was most important to India when it was ruled by a weak and corrupt government; a situation which the war only aggravated. Concern about Bolshevik support for selfdetermination

and

fear

that

the

Germans

would

exploit

the

concept, indicated that what the India Office feared most was disruption, whether it be from the pernicous effects of PanTuranianism, jihad, Bolshevism, or enemy agents. It considered the

existing

military

establishment

on

the

eastern

cordon

insufficient to meet the threat and wanted to close the main avenue of approach to Central Asia in North-Western Persia. While concession was possible, the India Office was convinced that the British Government must secure its vital interests in the area^. In practice, this meant that the Persians should be offered

a

detachment

Dunstervilie's

force

to

of

armoured

patrol

the

cars

and

part

Kermanshah-Enzeli

of road.

Dun8terville, who was officially on his way to the Caucasus, and whose presence in Persia was still regarded as temporary, had become part of the discussion of British military policy in Persia itself. The India Office's view prevailed in the Persia Committee meeting held

on

25 February.

Marling had been given the

The Committee,

concerned that

impression that London

favoured

unlimited concessions, decided to inform him of the objects of British policy: (1) maintenance of the genuine neutrality of Persia and the prevention of the entry of enemy bands or influence into the country; (2) the protection of British interests in Persia and Afghanistan and neighbouring countries, and (3) the support of a friendly Persian Government. 1

FO W34/36782/8, 1.0. to F.O., 24 February 1918.

2

FO W34/40527/8, Minutes of the Persia Committee, 25 February 1918.

DEBATE ON INTERVENTION

93

Thus, the Persian problem was officially linked to Britain's policy in a wider area of Central Asia: the quid pro quo for withdrawal of troops was Tehran's acceptance of a British force to organise the defence of the North-West, itself related to imperial strategy in the Caucasus, Without this, there would be no concessions. The Committee also suggested to Marling that troops

be

sent

towards

Hamadan

to

close

the

frontier

and

towards Isfahan or Tehran in order to control Persia itself. Clearly,

it was not neutrality that was wanted, but Persia's

informal

participation

already presence,

been

in

completely

the

war.

compromised

Persian by

neutrality

Britain's

had

military

and had become a cover for a political settlement

with the Persians which would maintain the status quo until Britain was in a position to impose a settlement. The Foreign Office's telegram to Marling, informing him of the

Persia

Committee's

decisions,

emphasised

the

military

aspects and gave the impression that London was considering immediate military action.^ Marling himself had no objections: his

position

Persian

in

Tehran

nationalists

had

began

once to

again exert

become pressure

delicate on

as

their

Government, and he feared that they would be able to prevent the creation of a moderate cabinet. He suggested simply buying 2 a friendly government and sending in troops to protect it. On the 26th, he went further: having reported that the extremists, using the example of the Bolshevik repudiation of debt and confiscation of property, with Britain,

had demanded a break in relations

Marling suggested that the only remedy for a

danger which could easily spread throughout Central Asia, was to send 10,000 British troops to occupy Kermanshah, Hamadan,1 2

1

10 1000/1918:746, Balfour to Marling, 27 February 1918.

2

Ibid., Marling to Balfour, 23 February 1918.

94

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

and possibly Kasvin as soon as the Russians withdrew* * Balfour took the suggestion seriously enough to call a meeting of the Persia Committee to discuss it. Meanwhile, military

there had been important developments in the

situation

in

northern

Persia.

As

we

have

seen,

Dunsterville had got as far as Enzeli, but had been forced to turn back to Hamadan. His force was ridiculously small; twelve officers, two clerks, and forty-one drivers for the forty-one Ford cars.

Its heaviest armament was

a

single Lewis

gun,

though, as Dunsterville noted in his account of the expedition, the Persians took the force to be more formidable than it the Persians took the force to be more formidable than it actually was. Once in Hamadan, Dunsterville, in the best tradition of the British Army, began to administer the area, a situation not covered by his instructions. He had little choice: the mission found itself in the midst of severe famine and unable to move because of adverse weather conditions. It was obliged to settle down with the remainder of the Russian forces in Persia.

A

flurry of telegrams followed on the 26th. Dunsterville wanted 2 to know if he should materially support the Russian forces , and if British officers should remain with the Russians who had been ordered to hold the Kasvin-Enzeli section of the road.^ Finally, he informed the C.I.G.S. that the only route open to Caucasia was via Tabriz, but for this he must have a larger 4 force, including cavalry. It appeared that the mission had failed.

But Dunsterville had another idea: he suggested that

he should use a small force to occupy the road from Kasr-iShirin to Enzeli, and this, of course, was exactly what Marling

1

FO W34/38116/8, Marling to Balfour, 26 February 1918.

2 3

10 1000/1918:848, Dunsterville to C.I.G.S., 26 1918. Ibid., Rowlandson to D.M.I., 26 February 1918.4

4

Ibid., Dunsterville to C.I.G.S., 26 February 1918.

February

DEBATE OH INTERVENTION

95

had bean demanding all along*' Thus, when the Persia Committee met on the First of March, there

was

virtual

agreement

on

the

need

for

a

military

expedition in North-West Persia* The way had been prepared by Graham, who, two days before the meeting, had argued that the enemy advance Caucasia

into Armenia would make the Turks masters of

unless

Britain

organised

an

opposition*

It

was

essential, in his view, for Dunsterville to get through, which, in

view

of

the

recent

events

at

Enzeli,

meant

that

the

Bolsheviks and Jangalis who blocked the route must be brought under

control*

Britain would have to control and establish

communications between Mesopotamia Hamadan-Enzeli Caucasia*

road,

or

if

not,

and the Caucasus via the be

prepared

to

abandon

Because the Persians were incompetent soldiers and

thus incapable of defending themselves, Graham reasoned that if Britain took steps to secure the road, opposition in Tehran 2 would collapse, and the Government become docile. The Committee accepted Graham's main contention that the fate of North-West Persia and the Caucasus hung in the same balance. It decided on a major military operation in Persia, and proposed to

send

a

aeroplanes isolated*

force to The

of

cavalry,

artillery,

armoured

cars

and

join Dunsterville and prevent him from being force

was

directed

to

occupy

the

road

from

Hamadan to Kasvin, postponing for the time being any attempt to control the road as far as Resht, or any effort to reach the Caucasus*

Marling

was

instructed

Government of the operation.1 3 2

to

inform

the

Persian

This decision inevitably had

far-reaching effect, not least because once the decision to use

1

Idem*

2

FO W34/41295/8, Memorandum by Graham, 28 February 1918.

3

FO W34/41145/8, Minutes of the Persia Committee, 1918.

1 March

96

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

military force had been made, political arguments and obstacles tended to melt away. The assumption that British action would intimidate

the

Tehran

Government

was

based

on a number of

highly dubious religious and racial propositions which missed the point of the nationalist movement. Having related Persia to the much more complicated problem of southern Russia, Britain made it difficult to separate the two, and thus had created a situation

in

which

a

variety

of

Muslim

movements

might

accomplish a political realignment. The British counterpart to Islamic movements was revealed by the ease with which strategic notions

could

be

stretched.

Having

discovered

increased

political interests in Persia, it was inevitable that Caucasia would drift closer to the imperial behemoth. Thus, the decision taken on 1 March was merely the first step toward an increasing commitment in Central Asia. Further efforts to take the road, and to extend the entire operation into Caucasia, were expected to follow as a matter of course. At the same time, the Committee could find no anwer to the questions of concessions in Persia, even though the presence of British troops on Persian soil appeared to make conciliation imperative. A draft statement prepared by Marling on 3 March for presentation to the Persian Government, attempted to make Persia responsible for Britain's military action by claiming that Tehran's refusal to undertake the operation on its own had forced Britain to act. Marling was prepared to promise that the troops would be withdrawn as soon as possible, and certainly at the end of the war. On the other hand, he was only prepared to accept pourparlers on the creation of a single Persian military establishment with neutral officers at the end of the war. An offer to regard the Convention of 1907 as in suspense, while making

no

objection

if

Tehran

chose

to

withdraw

its

recognition, meant very little in fact. More important was the

DEBATE ON INTERVENTION suggestion customs

that

Britain

tariff,

should

welcome

agree

Persian

to

97

a revision of the

delegates

to

the

peace

conference if other non-belligerents were invited, and offer financial assistance.^ The Viceroy persisted in urging conciliation. Referring to the Persia Committee's statement of objectives on 25 February, he pointed out that if the objectives were obtained they were "themselves...the quid pro quo for the concessions granted." The objects of policy would, through conciliation.

in his view, be obtained only

If, having accomplished its objectives,

Britain demanded counter-concessions from the Persians it would appear to be hard bargaining. Furthermore, if conciliation were to be seriously attempted, Dunsterville, a source of irritation to the Persians, would have to be withdrawn. The telegram made it clear that the Indian Government was chiefly concerned that the action directed at a neutral Muslim state would result in Indian disorder,

embarrass the Amir of Afghanistan and cast 2 suspicion on Britain's guarantee of Persia's integrity. But the Viceroy was too late. Reports that extremists, supported by Red Guards, were plotting to overthrow the Shah and establish a republic,

sent Curzon to the War Cabinet to press for the 3 despatch of troops. His mission was successful and Hardinge

was

able

to

reinforcements Balfour

report

that

despatched

and Curzon agreed

the

from

War

Office 4 Mesopotamia.

had On

ordered 5

March,

in the Persia Committee that the

decision constituted a complete change in British policy toward Persia and that Caucasia.

it had been

justified by recent events

The problem was how to tell the Persians.

1

Idem.

2

10 1000/1918:916, Viceroy to I.O. 3 March 1918.

3

FO W34/41848/8, Minute by Oliphant, 7 March 1918.

4

Ibid., Minute by Hardinge, n.d.

in

Curzon1

98

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

found Marling's explanatory draft declaration unsatisfactory. He wanted a much more uncompromising statement, and produced a draft

declaration

which,

typically,

began with a review of

Persian history, proceeded to accuse the Persians of ignoring the concessions already offered them - but made no new offers and

merely

announced

the

military

accepted by the Committee, was 2 March. The tough line had

operation.^

The

draft,

sent to Marling on the succeeded

at

last,

7th

despite

Chelmsford's warning. It was predictable that Balfour should agree with Curzon. Not only were there continuing reports of Bolshevik subversion and plots against the Shah, but it appeared to the Foreign Secretary collapse

that of

the

situation

Rumania

in Eastern Europe,

appeared

imminent,

would

where

give

the

Germany

access to Odessa and then beyond to Batoum, Baku, the Caspian and North-West Persia. On 7 March, he invited the General Staff to consider the military aspects of Germany's opportunity and to decide whether Britain's military policy in the area would have to be changed, entailing a shift in Britain's political priorities.^

On

the

same

day,

the

C.I.G.S.

submitted

a

memorandum on the subject which proposed a truly radical change in British policy.

He pointed out that German possession of

Odessa posed no new threat, as the danger had existed for some time, and added that Bolshevism had merely made it easier for Germany and more difficult for Britain to operate in Central Asia. He did predict, however, that as Egypt, the Persian Gulf and sea power had been sealed off, Germany would take advantage of Bolshevism to flow into Central Asia and to use Russia as a German supply base. Wilson thought it imperative that Britain1

1

FO W34/46806/8, Minutes of Persia Committee, 5 March 1918.

2

FO W34/43041/8, Balfour to Marling, 7 March 1918. Contains Curzon's draft. W39/44469, Memorandum by Balfour, 7 March 1918.

3

DEBATE ON INTERVENTION

99

create an effective barrier to Germany's eastward expansion, but he differed from others in arguing that Britain could not undertake the task alone and must involve both Japan and the United States in the project. His extensive programme included the

immediate

use

of

Japanese

forces

in

the

region,

the

intensification of the campaigns in Palestine and Mesopotamia, the extension of the front from Baghdad into Northwest Persia as far as the Caspian,

and once there,

the organisation of

forces with which to fight on into Caucasia to win over Armenia and to secure Turkestan,

for Britain the eastern Black Sea ports.

Wilson

wanted

to

anticipate

enemy

propaganda

In by

immediately sending in the Indian military mission. He warned that unless all of these things were done, Germany would be in a position "which will eventually lead to the downfall of our Eastern Empire."^ The idea of a new Eastern Front, for which Amery and Smuts had been pressing for some time, had at last received powerful support from a military authority. There were obvious points of difficulty in the C.I.G.S.'s proposal: India would never accept Japanese troops close to its frontiers} nor was it certain that Washington would agree to anything which would enhance Japan's power so enormously. The C.I.G.S. every

suggestion

single proposal.

ever

made

seemed to have amalgamated

respecting Central

Asia

into

a

Yet there is evidence to suggest that both

Britain and her allies were ready for this sort of thing in Asia. In London, the discussions of the Persia Committee had for two months been pointing toward large scale intervention in Central Asia. Even the Indian Government, though it remained squeamish,

was

moving

toward

the

conclusion

that

direct

military action would have to take place regardless of the political consequences. More important, in the context of the1

1

Cab. 24/44:G.T.3891, Note by C.I.G.S., 7 March 1918.

100

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

proposal, was a letter to Hardinge from the British Minister at Athens informing him that the American Ambassador there was pressing to have Japan send troops to Mesopotamia where instead of marching across the vastness of Siberia, they could take the Caucasus and advance directly into Russia*1 It appeared to the C.I.G.S. that the re-creation of the Eastern

Front

Britain'8

must

entail

administrative

a

complete

apparatus

for

reorganisation the

Asian

of

region.

British policy in western Asia and southern Russia was the business of three separate interdepartmental committeesi Middle

Eastern,

Russia

and

Persia

Committees*

Though

the some

individuals sat on all three, there were obvious problems of coordination which led inevitably to duplication and confusion. On 11 March, the C.I.G.S* recommended to the War Cabinet that a War Cabinet Eastern Committee be formed out of the departmental 2 committees. Consolidation would give the new committee more authority and make possible quicker responses to military and political developments. Another advantage of such a committee would be its ability to overcome departmental resistance to active policies in Asia. and

indecision

military kit, General

of

Complaints about the procrastination

civilians

and it seems

Wilson was

were

a

standard

likely that,

item

in

in part at

the

least,

attempting to devise an apparatus which

would be more responsive to military advice and more willing to override the political objections of civilian officials. It is, however,

difficult to sympathise with the Army's complaints.

Only the Government of India actually opposed a forward policy, and London had India

Office

learned to ignore this opposition.

and

the

Foreign

Office

Both the

could be described as1 2

1

HMSS 36, Granville to Hardinge, 10 March 1918.

2

Cab. 23/5:363(20), 1918.

Minutes of the War Cabinet,

11 March

DEBATE ON INTERVENTION enthusiastic

supporters

of

military

policy*

Marling,

101 too,

wanted intervention: in fact, he had already become impatient. On 9 March, he advised against any further delay in making the declaration

to

the

Persians

because

of

rising anti-British

feeling. He hoped that the declaration would have therapeutic results : There is of course the possibility that (the) Jangalis with Bolshevik aid may attempt la] 'coup de main' on Tehran but on the whole I believe announcement will have [a] sobering effect on them and all over Persia. Surprisingly, control

the Government of India agreed on the need to 2 Tehran from Hamadan. But failure to provide the

troops lay with the War Office. On 8 March, Marling twice asked when

troops

would

arrive

to

"dominate

the

position"^:

the

answer, which drifted through slowly,

was that the mountain 4 passes were blocked by snow and would remain closed until May. The War Office had made an incredible miscalculation. Having directed

British

policy

in

the

direction

of

military

intervention, it could neither deliver the necessary troops nor could

it maintain those

situation.

On

9 March,

already there. the C.I.G.S.

It was a remarkable

impressed upon General

Marshall the need to open communciatons with the Caucasus and asked if it would not be possible to send pack animals over the 5 mountains to Dunsterville. Finally, Marshall was simply instructed to get a force to Hamadan as soon as possible.^

But

Marling, who had been assured that a force was on its way,1 6 5 4 3 2

1

10 1000/1918:1042, Marling to Balfour, 9 March 1918.

2

Ibid., C.-in-C. India to C.I.G.S., 8 March 1918.

3

Ibid., Marling to Balfour, 8 March 1918 (two telegrams).

4

Ibid., C.0.C.-Me8o, to C.I.G.S., 7 March 1918.

5

Ibid., C.I.G.S. to C.O.C.-Meso, 9 March 1918.

6

Ibid., C.I.G.S. to C.O.C.-Meso, 12 March 1918.

102

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

presented the British declaration to the Persian Government on the

11th of March. *

Office

that

"from

a

Three days later, he told the Foreign political

point

of

view

it

is

very

necessary to impress on [the] Persian mind that military action is really in progress and I trust forward movement will be made 2 without delay." Marling's trust, was, of course, misplaced and he

was

left holding the bag in Tehran.

The best that the

Foreign Office could do was urge that additional troops be sent to Isfahan in order to protect Marling at Tehran and impress the Persians,^ but neither Marling nor the Government of India supported the suggestion, the latter making it clear that it 4 would not participate in any such action. The worst of it for Marling was that the declaration had made things more difficult in Tehran where he now faced mounting nationalist agitation and the prospect that the cabinet would fall. He had reaped none of the political benefits that had been promised.^ But for the Dun8terville was supposed to be going to Caucasia, so long as he remained in Hamadan, and the War Office was happy to do the politicians a favour until the passes were open. initial

phase

of

military

intervention

in

Thus, in the Central

Asia,1

1

4 10 1000/1918:1069, Marling to Balfour, 11 March 1918.

2

Ibid., Marling to Balfour, 14 March 1918.

3

Ibid., Marling to Balfour, 11 March 1918.

4

IO 1000/1918:1212, Marling to Balfour, 20 March 1918. IO 1000/1918: 1250, Marling to Balfour, 24 March 1918, Ibid., Viceroy (FD) to IO, 26 March 1918.

5

Nor was there any chance of altering the position. In response to the C.I.G.S. enquiry about pack-animals, Marshall reported that no fodder was available along the route and that reinforcements could only be made in 'small driblets'. IO 1000/1918:1212, G.O.C. Meso. to MilitaryAttache, Tehran, 22 March 1918. General Cox wrote to Steel in the War Office about reinforcing Hamadan: 'It cannot be so impossible, for Turks and Persians scrapped all along that road this time last year.' IO 1000/1918:1069, General Cox to Steel, 19 March 1918.

DEBATE ON INTERVENTION

103

conflict between the supporters of a Caucasian mission had a Persian

show

of

force

was

avoided

because

practical

considerations focused both views on northern Persia* But the disparity between the two policies continued to promise future difficulty* Whereas the diplomats were clearly thinking of a column

in

the

imperial

tradition

of

border

disputes/

the

generals contemplated something in the nature of what we would today describe as counter-insurgency; propaganda/

money

surprises for both*

and

force.

an artful blending of

Inevitably,

the

future

held

CHAPTER FOUR:

THE FORMATION OF THE EASTERN COMMITTEE

The discussion of the intervention in northern Persia had taken place outside the War Cabinet. General Wilson's proposal to form an Eastern Committee brought the whole matter to the attention of the War Cabinet, with some surprises. Smuts, for example,

whose

devotion

to

the

campaign

in

Palestine

and

commitment to Eastern Front tactics would ordinarily have led him to support the action taken, had been convinced by the Generals in March that the Western Front must remain supreme. Thus, when it seemed that the Eastern Front's time had come, Smuts abandoned it and wrote to the Prime Minister recommending a

purely

diplomatic

alternative.

He

claimed

that

Russia's

collapse made it possible to detach Austria from Germany by luring

Vienna

away

with

offers

of

Constantinople and European Thrace. would certainly abandon Germany,

the

Ukraine,

Bulgaria,

With such bait,

Austria

leaving Berlin in isolation

and compelled to bargain for peace.^ Smuts was also concerned about the effect of intervention on 'democratic opinion' and on Britain's commercial interests in Asia if Japan were allowed to intervene against the Bolsheviks in Siberia or elsewhere

in

Asia.^ Amery,

too,

sought a political solution. Observing that

British policy had offered the Persians no real incentives, he suggested

stimulating

Persian

ambitions

by

offering

them

eastern Trans-Caucasia. By opposing Iran to Turan, he argued.1

1

LGMSS, F/45/9/10, Smuts to Lloyd George, 14 March 1918. Smuts was never more than a South African statesman, and this letter probably casts more light on what Smuts would have done than on what Vienna could be expected to do.

2

LGMSS, F/45/9/11, Smuts to Lloyd George, 15 March 1918.

EASTERN COMMITTEE

105

Britain would help to develop the Persian and Arabic elements of

Islam against the Caliphate.^ Both suggestions were far­

fetched:

London

lacked

the

diplomatic

facilities

and

the

courage to challenge the entire principle of European selfdetermination

which

is

what

Smuts

had

proposed;

and

the

Persians would never have accepted aggrandisement at the cost of national independence. Nevertheless, Amery pursued his plan in a letter to Lloyd George on 15 March in which he urged the Prime

Minister

to

bring

Persia

into

the

war

in

order

to

forestall an enemy occupation of Trans-Caucasia. Britain, he declared, had been saying 'Persia for the Persians', which now must be changed to 'More Persia for the Persians'. If Persian historical might

be

sentiment incorporated

were into

enlisted, an

Eastern

Trans-Caucasia

enlarged Persia

which 2 appear at the war's end as a pro-British Muslim power. With Dun8terville trapped at Hamadan,

would

the policy-makers

debated the merits of an advance on Isfahan. In the midst of it, General Haig staged a remarkable 'intervention' of his own when, on 15 March, he told Cecil that a small force should be sent to hold Persia. Cecil noted that "considering Sir Douglas Haig's well-known dislike of military side-shows this opinion seems of some importance."^

If nothing else, it displayed the

power of the myth of Indian defence.

It was not Haig's last

word on the the subject. When Isfahan was discussed at the Persia Committee on 22 March, Mr. Balfour enquired what, in fact, was the actual menace which the Military Authorities so greatly feared. The D.M.I. stated that Sir Douglas Haig, in a conversation two days ago, had expressed the gravest possible views regarding the situation in Persia and was of opinion that every town should be occupied by our military forces and our position 1

FO W34/50294/8, Memorandum by Amery, 14 March 1918.

2

LGMSS, 7/2/1/16, Amery to Lloyd George, 15 March 1918.

3

70 W34/49589/8, Note by Cecil, 15 March 1918.

106

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

rendered absolutely secure, failing which we must prepared for the whole defence of the Khyber to jeopardised, with the subsequent loss of India.

be be

This was nonsense. As Curzon rightly pointed out, Afghanistan was already exposed to enemy

inroads through Trans-Caspia.^

Haig's concern would have resulted in a complete occupation of Persia at a time when the War Office was unable to fulfill its minimal obligation in North-West Persia, and when the political situation

in Tehran was

politicians with

the

only

way

military

But

the caution of

increased the War Office's

Asian

experts

explosive.

affairs compelled

were

run.

dissatisfaction

Pressure

civilian

the

officials

from to

the seek

administrative solutions to their problems. On 13th March, the Government

of

India

was

instructed

to

stop repeating

its

telegrams on general policy to Tehran, clear evidence that the Viceroy's criticism had begun to irritate policy-makers in 2 London. Thus, the Government of India was the first casualty of re-organisation. The Foreign Office feared that it might be next, and Balfour, though he agreed with Wilson's proposal in general, was afraid that the Foreign Office would lose control of

daily

operations.

He

therefore insisted that

the

new

committee confine itself to broad questions of policy.^ On

21

March

Balfour

informed the

War Cabinet

that

political changes in Persia, caused by the Russian Revolution, had made

it necesary

Persia.

The Foreign Secretary blamed Russia's collapse

opening

the

area

to

forBritain

enemy

to advance

expansion

and

into Northern

allowing

for

"unruly

elements” - the Jangalis - to interfere with British efforts to reach Caucasia. He considered it imperative that Dunsterville1

1

10 1000/1918:1250, Minutes of the Persia Committee, 22 March 1918.

2

10 1000/1918:973, Montagu to Chelmsford, 13 March 1918.

3

Cab. 23/5:366(9), Minutes of the War Cabinet, 18 March 1981.

EASTERN COMMITTEE accomplish his

task

in Caucasia and,

therefore,

107

thought

necessary to intervene directly in northern Persia*

it

Curzon

supported Balfour completely. Britain, he said, had been trying to harmonise with the Persian nationalists,

but had failed.

Balfour concluded that a British force was required in northern Persia because the powers of disorder beyond the passes were gathering momentum. The general situation might be regarded as potentially very serious. Persia was unable to be effectively neutral. Germany in control of Trans-Caucasia, the Caspian and North Persia, would be a threat to India. Between them, Balfour and Curzon carried the War Cabinet. The opinion was expressed that it was of great importance to reach the Caspian and to control it. Failing this, the enemy would gain unimpeded access to Turkestan, and outflank the land route to India.^

The presentation made it appear that the challenge

to British power in Asia was military, although the possibility of a direct attack was normally discounted. Curzon,

it

seems,

Both Balfour and

conspired in creating this

illusion.

The

C.I.G.S.'s most recent notes on the subject had suggested that while Germany might be capable of a large scale undertaking around

Odessa

and

in Caucasia,

the

fact remained that

the

logistical problems involved in crossing northern Persia and Turkestan had

not altered since

1917.

What British policy­

makers really feared was the spread of political disorder and ideological conflagration into Persia, Afghanistan and India. The War Cabinet also decided that an Eastern Committee should

be

Committee.

formed

out

of

Significantly,

the the

old

Persia

Russia

and

Committee,

included in General Wilson's plan, was excluded. to

1

leave Russia out was

Cab. 23/5:369(10), 1918.

Middle-East originally The decision

in part a consequence of Curzon*s1

Minutes of the War Cabinet,

21 March

108

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

insistence

that

the

East

was

part

of

Britain's

imperial

difficulties and an altogether different problem from Russia. The

connection

between

the

Eastern

Committee

and

imperial

policies was thus clear from the beginning. The task of the Eastern Committee was to sift through the muddled and often contradictory recommendations of various experts and devise a single coherent policy. collection of talent: Balfour,

Hardinge,

This

process

required an impressive

the Foreign Office was represented by

Cecil

and Oliphant;

the

India Office by

Montagu, Islington and Shuckburgh; and the War Office by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Henry Wilson, and the Director

of Military

Intelligence,

General

MacDonogh.

The

Secretary was Mark Sykes, who though very unpopular with the Foreign Office, was one of Hankey's assistant secretaries in the War Cabinet. From the War Cabinet itself came Smuts and Curzon.

The

combination

Eastern

of

the

Committee

Persia

was

obviously

and Middle

East

more

than

Committees.

a

The

presence of Smuts, Montagu and Sir Henry Wilson gave new lustre to the deliberations and was evidence of of the significance the

Government

attached

to

affairs

in

Asia.

Even

more

significant was the purview of the new committee. Whereas the Persian and Middle East Committees had been entrusted with the care of British policy within recognisable geographical units, the Eastern Committee was charged with looking after British interests throughout the East, and though the War Cabinet had excluded the work of the Russia Committee,

it was perfectly

clear that the Committee could not avoid questions affecting the former Russian territories. Committee

was

in a

position

In practical terms the Eastern to make

decisions about basic

strategies over an area which extended from Egypt to India. Curzon dominated the Eastern Committee with his agile mind and consuming ambition. He took an interest not only in the determination of

general policy, but in the daily

operations.

EASTERN COMMITTEE

109

Nearly every member of the committee had had long experience with Aslan policy, and most were familiar

with the problems

confronting Britain* The Committee not surprisingly tended to split

along

departmental

lines,

with

Curzon

becoming

increasingly associaated with the Foreign Office. The military experts on the Committee,

despite a tendency to present the

Committee with wild and often contradictory plans, shared the overall attitudes of the Foreign Office officials, and the two worked together in harmony on most issues.

Both sought to

inject British military personnel into Central Asia to achieve political goals, and though Oliphant periodically grumbled at the delay in building up a force, the complaints had more to do with timing and emphasis, than with fundamental differences of policy. Genuine Montagu

and

opposition

came

from

the

Chelmsford

were

deeply

India

Office.

committed

to

Both

reforming

Indian politics, but both remained in touch with the realism which in the past had enabled a small number of officials to rule India.

Indian realism was truly conservative: based on

administrative necessity rather than ideological commitment, it was willing to undertake that which it considered physically possible

and

no

efficacy

of

realised

that

more.

force,

the

Asian

Therefore,

though

Government

nationalism

of

would

it

recognised

India had not

be

the

long since overawed

by

dashing British officers and it concluded from this that where real force was not available,

it would be necessary to seek

political solutions based on conciliation and recognition of national aspirations.

But the Government of India could not

force its views on the Home Government, particularly after the formation of the Eastern Committee. The

Eastern

Committee

first

turned

its

Central Asia during the third week in April.

attention

to

In the month

between the end of March and the Committee's meeting, events continued to

move rapidly. The problem of Turkestan, which had

110

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

been pushed into the background by the excitement over NorthWest Persia, reappeared in late March when it seemed that the region was about to become an arena for propaganda and even civil conflict.

There was some truth in Curson's reminder to

the Persia Committee on 22 March that India was vulnerable to the north as well as the west.^ The Indian Government could not ignore this danger. Always in the position of having to weigh the

relative

disadvantages

of

every

action,

the

Viceroy

ultimately agreed on 21 March that the mission to Turkestan 2 should proceed without waiting for the Amir's reply. It was, no

doubt,

better

to

face

the

manageable

hostility

of

the

Afghans than to encounter unexpectedly a more serious threat from Germany further north. Both Montagu and Balfour concurred 3 in sending the mission, and so by the end of March, London had committed itself to a vast region in Central Asia.

But the

nature of the commitment was still to be decided. Curson, as we have seen, had refused to be stampeded by Haig's prophecy. It was necessary to draw the line somewhere, and while taking over and strengthening the cordons in both north and east Persia was tolerable,

an outright occupation of the country was beyond

British capabilities. At the Foreign Office, where the Army's failure to produce troops was causing concern, political

possibilities

had

a hurried re-examination of the begun.

Oliphant

had

originally

brushed aside Amery's ideas on Persian expansion as being "over sanguine", but on second reading, Hardinge and Balfour were more

generous,

considering".

and

Balfour

even

found

them

"well

worth

Curson, it was reported, had mentioned the need1

1

FO 34/53372/8, Minutes of the Persia Committee, 1918.

2

FO W38/54688/3172, Viceroy to I.O., 21 March 1918.

3

Ibid., Shuckburgh to Oliphant, Shuckburgh, 29 March 1918.

25 March

22 March

and Langley

to

EASTERN COMMITTEE

111

to find good bait for Persia^ and similar suggestions had been made

concerning

Turkestan*

The

India

Office

outlined

a

suggestion that the Amir of Afghanistan be invited to take Pendjeh and other strategic locations in Turkestan, though it acknowledged that "the Kabul Government has shown no sign of 2 aggressive intentions on the Northern frontier.1 11 Even the diplomatic solutions were beginning to envisage military action by proxy. There was more to this than is at first apparent. While there was nothing particularly original in attempting to find cat's paws, in this situation any extension of Persian or Afghan

sovereignty

presumably

entailed

a

corresponding

extension of British interests. Even more interesting was the tendency to regard the military and political efforts in the two places as complementary.

Previously, British policy makers

had seen one as a substitute for the other: closing the door to Persia meant protection for Afghanistan as well. But with the Bolshevik Revolution and enemy military campaigns under way in Caucasia, Britain began to look northward as well as westward. If the threat appeared to come from the north then clearly both Persia

and Afghanistan would,

for the same

reason,

require

protection. The

Eastern

Committee

emerged

in

the

midst

of

this

controversy. The War Office apparently saw the committee as a vehicle

which

would

by-pass

the

cumbersome

delays

of

the

political departments and allow the Army to get on with the task of winning the war.

On

23 March,

General Wilson sent

Curzon a copy of a telegram which he had sent General Marshall the previous day instructing him to send a force of officers and N.C.O.s into Persia to raise Bakhtiari levies. Curzon was 1

FO W34/50294/8, Minutes by Oliphant, Hardinge, n.d., and Balfour, n.d.

22

March

1918,

2

FO W38/54690/676, Note by the Political Department, I.O., 23 March 1918.

112

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

"greatly astonished" at the telegram, and snapped bach at the C.I.G.S. that the question had not even been raised at the last Persia

Committee

attempting

to

meeting.

by-pass

the

He

criticised

Foreign

Office

the and

Army refused

for to

sanction the action, observing caustically ...that because the Caucasus Mission has apparently failed and Dunsterville and a very fine body of officers are kicking up their heels at Baghdad or elswhere, it would not be wise to set without due caution in deciding where eventually to send them. One week it is the Caucausus, the next it is Kurdish tribes. Then it is road levies; and now it is Bakhtiariland. Let us be quite sure that we get them into the right place and on the right job. Rightly employed they may render invaluable service. But the Persian problem is quite as much political as military. It was certainly a timely reminder. Rushing in to raise levies might have had considerable consequences for British policy in Persia. There was always the danger of producing the opposite effect to that desired, and finding a new group of Jangalis to contend with. Neither Marling nor the Indian Government could find anything to recommend raising levies: Marling thought it would first be necessary to secure the support of the local Khans, Britain

while in

the

Viceroy

getting to

could see no real advantage for 2 Isfahan. Curson, however, was not

inclined to follow the Viceroy's advice and asked Marling how to go about securing the Khans.

Oliphant, whose suspicions of

the military were growing apace, observed that the replies from Marling and the Viceroy "show conclusively that our military colleagues

wished

to

force

the

pace

without

adequate1

1

FO W34/54697/8, Wilson to Curzon, 23 March 1918, and Curzon to Wilson, 23 March 1918.

2

FO W34/55277/8, Marling to Balfour, 25 March 1918. 1000/1918:1250, Viceroy (FD) to 10, 21 March 1918.

10

EASTERN COMMITTEE

113

justification."^ Hardings noted simply that "the Committee is 2 having a breezy birth." Symptomatic of the confusion which surrounded Britain's Central Asian policy was London's vacillating attitude towards Bol8ehvi8m. Despite the fact that anti-Bolshevism had already been used as a device for justifying unpopular policies, the British Govememnt was not set on a firm anti-Bolshevik course. In Central Asia,

the British had no clear idea of what the

position was and knew very little about Bolshevik intentions. Among the more their

serious

inability

to

failings of British

distinguish

between

strategists was local

Bolshevik

movements and the central Bolshevik Government. The former were essentially uncontrolled by the Central Soviet Government and quite

logically

indigenous

found

Muslim

themselves

inhabitants

of

in

conflict

southern

with

Russia.

the

Despite

Lenin's proclamation, the conflict between the Russian settler population

and

the

local

people

continued with

unrelenting

fury. For Britain, deciding where to stand in this conflict was not easy as the whole issue pivoted around two strategically vital considerations. The Army maintained that Bolshevism was little more than the Russian handmaiden of German imperialism. On the other hand, the Russian settler population was the only obstacle

in Central

Asia

to

the

realisation of Muslim and

nationalist political aspirations. The choice for Britain lay between the Bolsheviks, who were politically unacceptable, and the

local population,

who were repugnant on grounds of both

religion and race. Faced with choosing the lesser of the two evils,

the

Foreign

Office

at

the

end

of

March

considered

reports indicating that enemy troops had encountered opposition throughout

the

Caucasus

and particularly

in Armenia and at1 2

1

FO W34/55277/8, Minute by Oliphant, 27 March 1918.

2

FO W34/54697/8, Minute by Hardinge, n.d.

114

HAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

Baku, which prompted one official to remark that "here is a chance for the Bolsheviks to show what they can do or desire to do."1

It required many months for lingering feelings of racial

solidarity to disappear from British minds, perhaps because it was

realised

that

no

matter

how

repellant

the

political

doctrines of Bolshevism might be, its survival could never have the consequences

for Britain that victorious nationalism in

Asia would. The dilemma had implications for the more complicated game which was being played in Turkestan. Though the despatch of the Turkestan Mission had been approved,

there were conflicting

reports on the local situation. On the 29th, information was received

from

Peking

indicating

that

the

Bolsheviks

had

defeated the Orenburg Cossacks and were in control of Russian 2 Turkestan, while on the 31st, the Viceory reported the opposite. The Government of India's interest in Turkestan was more

straightforward

than

the

Foreign

Office's.

On

this

occasion, the Viceroy saw no cause for alarm, as "in general anarchy,

political combinations such as Pan-turanism or Pan-

Islamism seem to have been temporarily forgotten", and he was 3 satisfied that there was no evidence of enemy propaganda. Choosing between Bolshevism and nationalism in Central Asia was easier for the Government of India. As their primary fear was that political disorder or political nationalism would spread southward, they preferred the Russian Bolsheviks. How long the stalemate would continue was uncertain. From Tokyo came reports that enemy prisoners of war were moving west from Siberia into Persia,

Afghanistan

propaganda

and

Baluchistan

which would make

trouble

and in

were

India.

preparing

The Amir of1 3 2

1

FO W34/55933/8, Minute to file, n.d.

2

FO WW38/57377/3712, Jordan to Balfour, 29 March 1918.

3

FO W38/58687/3172, Viceroy (FD) to 10, 31 March 1918.

EASTERN COMMITTEE

115

Afghanistan, however, was said to be holding to his alliance even

though

republic in

the

enemy

was

Baluchistan.^

freedom in the

conspiring

for

The Germans

an

independent

had more political

region than Britain had and were apparently

prepared to exploit any situation which would embarrass the British Empire. with,

were

But they,

playing

a

and the local leaders they dealt

diplomatic

game,

whereas

Britain was

rapidly expanding its military intervention. It was, as the Government of India realised, impossible to divorce politics from Britain's military actions, and they were particularly insistent about this in their periodic attempts to make

the

reason.

other

On

departments

3 April,

the

and

the

Eastern

Committee

see

India Office pressed upon the new

Eastern Committee the importance of recognising some national claims.

It

was,

in

fact,

a

general

statement

determination and Curson took it as such. straightforward

enough.

If

Britain

on

self-

The argument was

wished

to

achieve

a

satisfactory settlement in Mesopotamia and win the consent of the Peace Conference it would have to introduce local people to positions of power. found

the

Curson disagreed.

analysis too pessimistic.

In the first place he But more

important, he

observed that no note is taken of the fact that 'self-determination' as a principle of international settlement at the Peace Conference (in any case a singularly fallacious criterion) has now been heavily discounted by the action of Germany in the W. provinces of Russia. Germany will not give back those states, and in these circumstances for the Allied countries to preach or still more to practice self-determination £f it be contrary to their own interests, will be ridiculous. But this implied acceptance of a negotiated peace with Germany, a highly dubious assumption in view of the attitude commonly1 2

1

FO W38/59271/383, Greene to Balfour, 3 April 1918.

2

Cab. 27/25/76, Memorandum by Political Department, 10, and Note by Curson, 3 April 1918.

116

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

taken

by

the

Prime

Minister

and

the

British

Government

generally* Curzon's statement is evidence of the high priority he assigned to Asian affairs in the world struggle for power, and of a growing feeling at the centre of British political circles that it might be better to allow German hegemony in Europe in exchange for a vast and invulnerable British Empire around the Indian Ocean* But having made military action the key to Central Asia, the initial failure to supply troops led the War Office to make much of the reports that the Bolsheviks were willing to assist British efforts to impose order* At the beginning of April, the D.M.I

was

hopeful

that

Trotsky's

views

on

Britain

were

moderating and that he might welcome Anglo-Rusaian cooperation in Caucasia* ^

But Oliphant doubted if either the Persians or

the

Bolsheviks would allow Dunsterville to pass without 2 opposition* In Turkestan, the calm proved temporary and by late April had given way to increased political agitation from

every

conceivable

direction*

This

produced

something

of

a

crisis for the British and exposed some of the confusion in their policy*

For,

apart

from a

defined desire to control

Central Asia, Britain had no real position on the actual events taking place and instead used concepts like imperialism, selfdetermination, and Bolshevism as levers to be pulled when it suited

London's

policy*

An

example

of

the

failure

to

effectively define British attitudes may be found in the War Office's attitude toward Bolshevism*

There is no doubt that

military men found Bolshevism repelling, but at the same time they were willing to exploit it if it made their efforts to get troops into Central Asia any easier* Yet, simultaneously, the War Office recommended supporting Turkestan self-determination

1

FO W38/61627/61627, MA-Tehran to D.M.I., 2 April 1918, and D.M.I. to MA-Tehran, 1 April 1918.

2

Ibid*, Minute by Oliphant, 5 April 1918.

EASTERN COMMITTEE

117

in opposition to Bolshevism* On 20 April, the General Staff prepared

a memorandum for the Eastern Committee on British

Missions to Turkestan in which it argued that Bokhara was of crucial importance to the success of the military mission, and that British Officers should be ordered to contact the Amir of Bokhara, who was the outstanding personality of the situation in Turkestan at the present moment, and we may be certain that the enemy is losing no time in getting into touch with him in order to endeavour to divert his activities and policy (which according to our evidence are at present directed in the not unfavourable line of autonomy for a Mohamedan State) into the far more dangerous channels of pan-Turanianism and PanMohamedanism. The Amir was, as well, resisting the Bolsheviks, who were being challenged throughout Central Asia.^ When the Eastern Committee finally met on 22 April 1918 to discuss Central Asia, it was confidently expected that it would draw together the various threads of policy and weave them into a

single

cloth:

confidence

in

the

Committee

had

produced

something of a lull in London, almost as though the formation of the Eastern Committee was a solution in itself. The two problems

of

immediate

importance

were

America's

renewed

interest in Persia and Bolshevism in Caucasia. On the first, it was the feeling of the Committee that there was no need for Washington to intervene in Persian Affairs and that further interest involved

should be discouraged as in

Persia

might

prove

any other power directly embarrassing

to

British

interests. American fears grew out of the advance of Turkish troops into Caucasia which had followed the peace of BrestLitovsk. Unofficial reports indicated that the Americans feared the greater effectiveness of German propaganda if Britain did

1

Cab. 27/25/163, Memorandum by the General Staff, 20 April 1918.

118

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

anything which

might

give the appearance of establishing a

permanent occupation in Persia, and criticised the British for not making use of various American groups in Persia, mainly missionaries.^

In general,

British diplomats and officials

quite rightly distrusted the peculiar politics of missionaries. But

it

was

difficult

eventually,

to

ignore

the

State

Department

the Foreign Office decided to inform the Americans

that Britain did not intend to occupy Persia, military

and,

mission

to

North-West

Persia

and that the

would

effectively

counter any threat from the enemy. Reading, in Washington, was 2 instructed to discourage the State Department. The Eastern Committee confirmed this decision. On the more important issue of Bolshevism, the Committee considered

reports

of Bolshevik opposition to the enemy in

Caucasia and acknowledged the simple fact that there was very little Britain itself could do to stop the Turkish advance.

It

was reported to the Committee that the Bolsheviks were said to have taken the Caspian Fleet, and that the Foreign Secretary was seeking an opportunity to approach Trotsky on the question of using the decision

to

fleet to keep the Germans approach

Trotsky

grew

out

increasing tension between the Germans make

it possible

to

reopen

the

out of Baku. The of

the

hope

that

and Bolsheviks would

Eastern front with Russian

support. While the allies attempted to gain Russian support for the war in Europe, it was important not to make trouble for the Bolsheviks in Central Asia and therefore essential to avoid any provocation in Bokhara. The Eastern Committee concluded that "any

action

general

in that

policy

direction must

be subordinated to our

in relation to the Bolshevik Government.

We

could not encourage their opponents in Asia while courting them1

1

FO W34/66196/8, Reading to Balfour, 14 April 1981.

2

Ibid., Balfour to Reading, 27 April 1918.

EASTERN COMMITTEE in Europe«

119

Yet it was obviously not only in Europe that

Britain was courting the Bolsheviks; hope for restoring AngloRussian cooperation in the Bast lingered on despite Britain's unilateral military action« The Eastern Committee took up another central issue at its meeting

two

days

later,

on

24 April«

Self-determination,

though normally opposed by Britain, was also expected to serve imperial purposes in some instances, particularly as President Wilson's espousal gave the doctrine a significance which London could not ignore« Mesopotamia

was

discussion was

As not

far as the Committee was vulnerable

to

the

concerned,

idea,

though

the

relevant to all of Central Asia« Curson was

unable to muster much enthusiasm for the disucssion, but as he pointed out, "our policy might have to be adapted to certain formulae,

such as that of

'self-determination',

increasingly

used as a watchword since President Wilson's entry into the war; there was also the Prime Minister's statement«••" Of the possible Curzon

solutions and

the

construction of

which

he

Committee

could envisage, found

most

"a state with an

the

one which

attractive

'Arab facade',

was

the

ruled and

administered under British guidance and controlled by a native Mohammedan«••" The model had obvious applications in Persia and elsewhere

in

Central

Asia*

What

was

more,

the

Secretary had reassuring words on the possible

Foreign

reaction in

Washington« With respect to the policy of the "Arab facade", and its more or less specious inconsistency with the principle of "self-determination", Mr* Balfour expressed the belief that President Wilson did not seriously mean to apply his formula outside Europe* Balfour

was

convinced

that

Wilson

had

in

determination only civilised people, not Arabs«

1

mind

for

self-

He added that,

Cab« 27/24/4:1, Minutes of the Eastern Committee, 22 April 1918.

120

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

as Britain had captured most of the enemy territory in Asia, "this war might end like others in a map of the world with more red on it*" Curzon meant to assure himself of more red on the map by arranging territorial compensation for the allies order to forestall any attempt to deprive Britain of its

in

gains

through internationalisation* * It was clear from the discussion that the creation of the Eastern

Committee

intransigence

had

had

unlocked

hitherto

doors

barred*

which

Both

administrative

Balfour

and Curzon

engaged in a kind of discussion within the Committee which was impossible within the confines of the Foreign Office or in the War Cabinet. There was an obvious tendency to be carried away by the

imperial rhetoric*

But where Curzon was prepared to

pursue

actively

goals,

imperial

Balfour

was

not:

if

the

tendency for the map to turn red was natural, he was prepared to let nature take its course. Balfour's passivity contrasted with Curzon's more overtly expansionist ideas; but the Eastern Committee

proved

to

be

a

hothouse

in

which

ideas

could

flourish.

Indeed,

the existence of both new and traditional

imperial threats simplified matters* Balfour's detestation of self-determination

was

widely

applicable

to

the

political

situation in Central Asia* Reports of Pan-Turanian successes were commonplace*

In May,

for example, the British agent in

Turkestan submitted a memorandum on the movement which argued that Pan-Turaniani8m was spreading rapidly in Asia and that it offered fertile ground for Turco-German ambitions to create a large Muslim empire adjacent to India, a task made simpler by the chaos resulting from the Russian Revolution. Success would mean

the

creation of an

incredibly wealthy state,

matching

North America in resources, though what evidence there was of

1

Cab* 27/24/5:4, Minutes of the Eastern Committee, 24 April 1918.

EASTERN COMMITTEE

121

this wealth, apart from a common imperial belief that the next acquisition will prove the truly desirable one, is unclear. He supported his view by postulating that Turkey had given up in Europe, and was turning its entire attention to Asia, where it hoped to be able to make alliances with Persia and Afghanistan. Having conjured up the great fear of a pan-Islamic union in Central Asia, the agent revealed that he perceived a ray of hope in the fact that Russian Muslims were well disposed toward Britain and suggested that sending a mission might solidify them in opposition to enemy expansion.^ This memorandum, which was fairly typical of many the Eastern Committee received, must not have been easy to deal with, as it contradicted much of the intelligence relating to Turkestan received from other sources. The Committee failed to guery the assertion of friendliness among Russian Muslims and appeared not to have questioned the statement concerning the potential wealth of the region. All in all, the memorandum had a fantastic quality about it, which was compounded

by

the suggestion that a small British military

mission would be able to ruin Turco-German plans to take over an empire unique.

greater than North America. The analysis was not The

American

representative

at

Moscow

expressed

similar fears, though he saw the plot as less grandiose: Present situation in my opinion is a menace to British India in as much as German agents and prisoners are systematically teaching [the] natives in Persian Turkestan and Afghanistan that they should make Germany [the] friend and protector of Islam. [The] saune German methods as have undermined Russia are being used. The

argument

was

clinched

with

the

typically

American 2 revelation that the Germans were really after the cotton crop.

Whatever the immediate justification, however, once the search for reasons to expand strategic concerns in Central Asia began,1

1

Cab. 27/28/782, Memorandum by Btherton, May 1918.

2

FO W38/78291/3172, Reading to Balfour, 2 May 1918.

122

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

there was dangers*

virtually The

War

no

limit

Office,

to

the possibilities,

having

convinced

itself

or the that

a

military mission to Meshed would solve the political problems Britain faced in Turkestan and, having drawn the Government of India

reluctantly

along with

it,

pressed for expanding the

scope of the mission by giving it military objectives* The Viceroy had initially agreed to the mission only on condition that it gather information about Turkestan without engaging in active propaganda or actually entering Turkestan itself* Now the

military

experts

urged

that

British

officers

enter

Turkestan in order to contact potentially helpful friends who might assist in blocking the Trans-Caspian railway in the event that Germany attempted to use it* * At the same time that American diplomatic representatives were

giving

warnings

of

the

danger

to

India,

the

State

Department increased its pressure on London concerning Persia* Reading informed the Foreign Office on 7 May that the United States Government took a serious view of the Persian situation and felt that Marling was not keeping London fully informed* In

consequence,

the United

States

was

preparing to send a

mission to Persia to counteract German influence. "In American Administrative circles there is evident preoccupation in regard to [the] position in Persia and its effect on India and by their fear that we are not really alive as to what is going on. I also notice signs that they entertain some little doubt as to the genuineness of our desire t^iat Persia should be completely independent after the war* If Reading was right, then Balfour's assumption that Wilson was only interested in self-determination for Europe was incorrect* Graham was concerned because he regarded "U.S. intervention in Persian

affairs

with

misgiving

- their

information

1

FO W38/81043/3172, Balfour to Marling, 6 May 1918.

2

FO W34/81510/8, Reading to Balfour, 7 May 1918.

is

all1

EASTERN COMMITTEE derived

from

missionary

sources."*

Balfour

123

could

only

recommend that the State Department be kept better informed. Though the episode was perhaps typical of the American attitude toward

Persia,

missionary meddling could have

only

limited

results. American diplomats did not welcome intrusions any more than

their

British

colleagues

did.

and often

echoed

their

arguments about Indian defence. Despite

British

efforts,

it had become

clear that the

increased military effort had been outstripped by events in Central Asia. 8

May.

American concern was not without foundation. On

Military

Intelligence

reported

clashes

between

Bolsheviks and locals in Turkestan in which the Bolsheviks had managed to beat off attacks from Bokhara. be

in

chaos.

The

report

offered

the

The area was said to observation

that

in

Turkestan, autonomy meant repression, with effects which could prove serious, first, because the chaos had allowed the enemy to engage in anti-British propaganda, and second, because enemy prisoners had been freed and would be allowed to filter through into

Afghanistan

where

they

could

raise

revolt

in

India.

Despite the danger, no effort had been made to strengthen antiBolshevik movements in the region because of the "unofficial relations of the British Government with the Bolsheviks." It was the judgement of Military Intelligence that the missions to 2 Turkestan had already failed. The Viceroy, however, wanted to wait

at

least

until

the

Meshed

mission

could

report

its

findings and thought that it would be politically undesirable to take any precipitate action.^

The Political Intelligence

Department of the Foreign Office took a different view. The P.I.D.

disagreed with speculation which

saw enemy plans as1

1

Ibid.. Minute by Graham, n.d.

2

Cab. 27/26/303, Memorandum by MI, 8 May 1918.

3

TO W38/88710/3172, Viceroy (FD) to 10, 15 May 1918.

124

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

elaborate

and

grandiose*

Instead

it

found

enemy

Intentions

vague* There was little doubt, in their view, that the Russian Revolution had given Germany and Turkey a good opportunity for stirring up trouble in Asia* But, seemed

to

be

rather

limited,

in fact, their objectives

appearing

to

be

directed

at

securing command of the Black and Caspian Seas* In any event, it seemed to the P*I.D.

that the Central Powers were only

prepared to use propaganda and would not use force in Northern Persia, Russian Central Asia, and Afghanistan* This less than martial

enterprise,

it

was

suggested,

was

based

on

the

calculation that a successful propaganda effort would produce sufficient dislocation to have important effects in India and China* ^ The P.I.D.'s speculation was disproved on the following day, 9 May, by Marling's report that a Turkish army was advancing into Azerbaijan and would probably take Tabriz. He suspected that the advance would create a rift in Turco-Persian relations which Britain could exploit and asked if he should encourage a 2 rupture. The Foreign Office received the suggestion with favour, though it emphasised that Marling should not commit the British

Government

reflected

Balfour's

to

anything

hesitation

definite, when

it

an

answer

came

to

which

actually

committing Britian to action.^

British policy in the region

thus

and

moved

very

much

by

fits

starts

even

though

the

inclination to act in Asia was always presentt it appeared that only a terrific scare would move London to action. This reserve on Balfour's part was understandable. The decision to occupy the Kermanshah-Hamadan section of the road, which was supposed to solve Britain's problems, had, in fact, created new ones.1

1

FO P.I.D. 116, Memorandum, 8 May 1918*

2

FO W34/83552/8, Marling to Balfour, 9 May 1918.

3

Ibid*, Balfour to Marling, 13 May 1918*

EASTERN COMMITTEE

125

not the least of which was getting the War Office, to send the troops. In the meantime, It had proved necessary to return to the former policy of attempting to find concessions which would please

the

Persians

and

not

Nobody's heart was

really

years

anxiety,

of

constant

sacrifice

British

in it. Marling, was

interests.

after nearly two

exhausted.

He

admitted

to

Hardinge that his work was going badly and that he wanted to leave Persia in the autumn, never to return.^

Communications

between the Foreign Office and the Minister at Tehran reveal a growing exasperation, the origins of which lay in the failure of the military mission. Throughout March and April, there had been growing alarm that the Jangalis would march on Tehran and establish

a

republic.

The

military

attache

at

Tehran

had

reported on the 25th of March that the Persians simply did not believe that a British force was being sent. He requested that, if

a

force

of

at

least

20,000

was

to be despatched, the 2 information be sent en clair to Marling. Expectation of so large a force was, of course, totally unreaslistic as far as London was concerned, but to the men in Tehran, it must have seemed just adequate. The announcement of the mission had not only weakened the existing Persian Government and angered the nationalists,

particularly the Jangalis,

it had offended the

Russian officers who commanded the Persian Cossack Brigade and who saw themselves as the protectors of Russian interests.

The

result was that the Russian and Russian officered troops in northern persia, which were still important to British policy in the area, became increasingly unreliable. Thus, there was no simple answer when the Foreign Office asked how Persian opinion had reacted to the military mission: "We hardly know whether we are

dealing

with

a

friendly,

hostile

or

sullen

people."-*1

1

HMSS 37, Marling to Hardinge, 20 April 1918.

2

10 1000/1918:1250, MA-Tehran to D.M.I., 25 March 1918.

3

10 1000/1918:2062, Balfour to Marling, 10 Mary 1918.

126

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

Marling answered, probably accurately, that the Prime Minister and Vossugh-ed-Dowleh were friendly, not.^

Under the circumstances,

and that the rest were

then,

it was understandable

that the Foreign Office should be attracted to the idea that Persia could be made actively anti-Turkish. was less taken with it.

Marling, however,

He remained convinced that military

force was the only answer and was therefore somewhat shocked to learn the actual size of Dunsterville's force. He telegraphed to the Foreign Office on 18 May that As [the] political situation here hinges entirely on [the] military action we have announced to Persia I endeavoured to elicit from Dunsterville what troops are to be sent and when, and his reply was so far from reassuring that it would seem that [the] operations being undertaken towards Altun Kupri are making it difficult to find sufficient transport for those in Persia so that [the] arrival of troops at Hamadan will be seriously retarded. Other small facts also seem to indicate that operations in Northwest Persia have been treated now as a quite minor consideration as compared to those across the frontier. Weather, he emphasised, no longer served as an excuse. War Office arrived at a similar conclusion.

2

The

On the same day,

it informed Marshall that the steps taken to open and maintain the Hamadan road had been inadequate and that they were sending 3 him an engineering officer to take it in hand. Yet the basic misconception

about

force remained.

the

ultimate

purpose

of

Dunsterville's

The military men were interested in Caucasia,

while Marling was concerned to have a show of force in Persia, a concern increased by the imminent collapse of the Persian Cabinet in the third week of May, and by Vossugh-ed-Dowleh's 4 refusal to accept office without British money.1

1 2

10 1000/1918:2231, Marling to Balfour, 14 May 1918. Ibid., Marling to Balfour, 18 May 1918

3

Ibid., C.I.6.S. to G.O.C.-Meso, 18 Mary 1918.

4

Ibid., Marling to Balfour, 18 Mary 1918.

BASTERM COMMITTEE

127

In the end» Marling managed to reconcile the political and military policies* that the

collapse

On 20 May» he warned the Foreign Office of

resistance

to

the Turkish advance

in

Caucasia meant that Julfa and Baku would soon fall to the enemy» enabling the Turks to carry out their plans for TransCaucasia and northern Persia* and weak»

there was

Though the enemy force was small

nothing to

stop

it

and the

political

consequence might be that Persia would join the Turks. Marling recommended a preemptive offer of alliance*

Vossugh-ed-Dowleh

appeared to be prepared for such a move» and though Marling was unsure of the terms which would be demanded» it seemed to him that they would involve territorial concessions in Kurdistan* He explained at the same time that military action was still the key to success* I need hardly point out» that this possibility makes it more than ever imperative for us to make the position safe in Tehran by [the] early arrival of our troops in Hamadan» and that any suggestion of Alliance ^t h o u t visible proof of our military power would be useless. The situation created by the Turkish advance prompted the War Office to cancel the operation against Kirkuk and to consult Dunsterville directly on what steps could be taken to stop the Turks'

eastward movement»

a

step which Marling undoubtedly

approved* ^ Marling'8

telegram

provoked

an

interesting

round

of

comments in the Foreign Office. Oliphant» who noted that the situation was not as serious as Marling had made out» observed that the 6.O.C. Mesopotamia was at last reported to be taking immediate steps to get Dunsterville moving. delays»

Oliphant's confidence

In view of past

on this occasion was strange.

Curzon was more cautious» though he» too» was prepared to wait1

1

FO W34/90436/8» Marling to Balfour» 20 May 1918.

2

10 1000/1918:2231» Balfour to Marling, 22 May 1918.

128

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

and

see what

expressed

by

military both

men

action would seemed

be taken*

to

preclude

The

interest

acceptance

of

Marling's primary recommendation that an alliance be made with Persia* Instead, they concentrated on the need to send British troops to Hamadan* Graham thought that an alliance would only prove an embarrasment and he,

too,

favoured strong military

action. Hardinge, however, was more prepared to consider the proposal seriously*

While he agreed with the others that the

alliance would be practically useless, he pointed out the moral advantage of being in alliance with two Muslim powers.

Only

Cecil thought that an alliance would be enough of an advantage to

warrant

pursuing

Marling's

suggestion*

He

succeeded

in

devising a compromise, and the reply to Marling, which Cecil drafted himself, explained that while they preferred to see the continuation of Persian neutrality, they were prepared for an alliance as a last resort.^ There was no attraction for Tehran in this:

Persia was prepared to ally only with the side it

thought would win the war*

As Britain would only offer the

Persians an alliance if they were losing the war, the chances of a successful alliance at any time were negligible* But Marling was not easily put off.

On the 24th, he again

urged London to make an alliance, adding that he thought it would have both military and political advantages, as a Muslim alliance "would have far reaching effect in Asia." This had 2 been Hardinge's argument and again Cecil agreed with it* The Eastern

Committee,

however,

refused

to

reply,

and

turned

instead to a criticism of Marling which came primarily from the military.

The

"A"

Branch,

M.I.3,

reported

to

the

Eastern

Committee that Resht must be taken in order to close the door to

the

enemy

in

northern

Persia,

though,

apparently,

1

FO W34/90436/8, Minutes to file, n*d*

2

FO W34/93412/8, Marling to Balfour, 24 May 1918

it1

EASTERN COMMITTEE

129

discounted the danger of the Persians joining the Turks*

It

did* however* recommend that Marling be replaced by a man of action.^ This was a curious criticism for the War Office to make* as the failure to act could hardly be laid at Marling's feet*

In the three months since the decision to occupy the

northern experts

cordon* are

the Army had scarcely moved*

seldom

embarrassed

by

their

own

But military inadequacies*

preferring to seek political explanations for military failure* All that the Eastern Committee would concede to Marling was his request that Vossugh-ed-Dowleh be given 2 bribe his way to power* The

Government

of

India

shared

sufficient funds to

many

of

the

Foreign

Office's doubts about the effectiveness of an alliance with Persia.

It observed that though there were obvious political

advantages* the danger was that the alliance would fail or be repudiated.

Even

if

it

were

successful*

it would

involve

Britain in a definite military commitment to Persia which the Government of India felt was undesirable.^ Shuckburgh* at the India Office* was opposed to the suggestion for another reason. Marling had assumed that the Persians would require territorial concessions opposition

in grew

exchange out

of

for

his

an

belief

alliance* that

Shuckburgh's

the Persians

were

incompetent rulers and that Britain must not bargain away other people's territory* which* in light of past experience* was a bad policy* "We have sold the lion's skin over and over again;" he commented* "but the lion goes on obstinately refusing to be 4 killed." One day* Britain would want peace* and had too many

Cab. 25/121/219* 1918.

Memorandum by "A" Branch* M.I.3*

24 May

Cab. 27/24/10:3, Minutes of the Eastern Committee * 28 May 1918. 3

10 1000/1918:2266, Viceroy (FD) to 10, 25 May 1918.

4

10 1000/1918:2231* Minute by Shuckburgh* 24 May 1918.

130

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

embarrassments to deal with as It was without adding to them. Marling's troubles seemed to multiply despite his efforts. For some time It had been feared by British officials In Tehran that Sir Percy Sykes, commander of the South Persian Rifles, would thoughtlessly provoke warfare In southern Persia. These fears were realised In the last week of May. In Marling's view, this made a subsantial British force at Kasvin all the more necessary,

and

he

was

therefore

appalled

to

learn

that

Dunstervllle had decided to move his small force to Baku in the train of Bicharakov's retiring Russian forces. In a letter to Hardinge

on

25

May,

Marling

expressed

his

despair

and

frustration. Since the end of February when H.M.G. first decided to send troops I have always looked forward to the last week in May when at length we should be in smooth water behind the break-water of our own troops. It has been a great disappointment that they are scarcely even on the road, and I must confess to feeling very sore that Marshall shd. have been told to undertake (? operations) towards Kerkuk..." He accused the military of putting "all our weight

into a

feint" and thought that even though the orders had been changed "the time can't be regained." Marling blamed Sykes for the trouble in the south because the latter had dropped the facade of Persian authority in the South Persian Rifles. He accused him of wanting to become "Sykes of Persia". Marling concluded by saying that he had been "painfully right when I said long ago that S.P.R. was a liability not an asset" and repeated his request for leave in the autumn. The Foreign Office naturally assumed that Marling objected to Dunsterville's mission to Baku, but they were mistaken. On 28 May, they informed Marling that Dunsterville's orders had been changed and that he would continue to secure the Khanikan2 Resht road, and if possible, the Caspian Sea. But, as he made1

1

HMSS 37, Marling to Hardinge, 25 May 1918.

2

FO W34/93606/8, Balfour to Marling, 28 May 1918.

EASTERN COMMITTEE

131

clear the same day, Marling thought Dunsterville should go to Baku, ^ and the following day, the 29th, confessed that he was mystified

by

the Government's

policy

and

asked to have

It

explained* It seemed to him that If the Turks were allowed to take

Baku,

then

there

was

nothing

to

prevent

them

from

exercising their influence in Persia, for despite the decision to

hold

Northwest

Persia,

the

troops

had

never

arrived*

Marling believed that both missions were necessary and required additional forces if they were to be successful. In his view, the Caspian fleet could only be controlled from Baku, where, in addition,

Dunsterville's

presence 2 situation in northern Persia* This time

would

help

to

ease

the

it was Whitehall's turn to be upset* Graham

wanted Dunsterville to proceed to Baku with a few officers because he thought a successful mission was worth the risk. In any

case,

he was

opposed to any action which

implied that

Britain had decided to abandon Caucasia to the enemy*

At

least, he thought, Dunsterville's position at Hamadan should not

be

abandoned* ^ Hardinge was

prepared

to go along with

Graham, though he was beginning to find Marling "very tiresome 2 with his weathercock opinions*” Balfour noted that not only had Marling changed his mind, but he appeared unconscious of having done so*

These criticisms were somewhat unfair: had

Britain

the

produced

troops

necessary

to

carry

out

its

announced policy, Tehran would have been manageable. Marling's position at Tehran had come to depend very much on his ability to manipulate all the power available to him* In his situation, a

threat

which

misfired

was

a

dangerous

thing,

and

his

suggestion for an alliance with Persia had clearly been based1

1

FO W34/95616/8, Minute by Graham, 29 May 1918.

2

Ibid., Minute by Hardinge, n.d*

3

Ibid*, Minute by Balfour, n.d*

132

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

on the assumption that Britain would not be able to provide a military force large enough to check the advancing Turks* News that

a

force

was

available

encouraged

Marling

to

propose

despatching a force to bolster the Azerbaijani resistance at Baku.

Curzon

and

Smuts were

also

anxious

to

establish

a

British force in a strong position* * But the Eastern Committee meeting on 31 May displayed just how muddled things actually were.

It was clear that the Eastern Committee did not know

whether it was sending a military or a political mission to Central Asia, nor was it sure of its destination or purpose. What seemed to be important was to get the mission in and once there, allow it to find a role for itself. Under the Under the circumstances, Marling's telegram appeared to give a lead and the Committee decided to allow Dunsterville to go to Baku, but as a mission rather than as a military force, and then only if local conditions permitted.

Cecil and Hardinge had favoured

actually

this

taking

Baku,

but

plan

ran

aground on

other

considerations. Montagu was adamant in insisting that nothing Dunsterville

could

do

at

Baku would

justify weakening the

Khanikan-Resht road. There was also the practical problem of the Bolsheviks.

It was British policy to allow the friendly

Bolsheviks in possession of the Enzeli section of the road to continue

providing

for

its

defence,

and

though Curzon was

dubious about trusting them, there was really little else to be done. The Committee decided that, in view of the situation at Enzeli,

any

political similar missions

attempt

rather

to

the

control the Caspian fleet must be 2 than military. The proposed mission was

one

suffered

to

Malleson in

having

was

leading

military

to

Meshed.

personnel

Both

filling

1

Cab. 27/24/10(3), Minutes of the Eastern Committee, 28 May 1918.

2

Cab. 27/24/11(1), Minutes of the Eastern Committee, 31 May 1918.

EASTERN COMMITTEE political roles,

133

an uneasy compromise which was unlikely to

impress the local populations or restrain the British officers* All this made the India Office increasingly edgy about the work of the Eastern Committee* decision

to

allow

Shuckburgh had noted that the

Dunsterville

to

proceed

had

been

based

largely on Marling's telegram of the 28th* Though he agreed that the mission was a legitimate gamble,1 the India Office insisted that the mission to Baku must not leave Northwest Persia exposed* This was not, however, their primary concern* In the two months since the Government of India had been told to stay out of Persian politics, increasingly

convinced

by

the

the India Office had been Indian

arguments*

Montagu

undoubtedly played a large part in their conversion* During his visit to India, he had discussed Persia with the Viceroy* On 31 May, he wrote to Chelmsford that At the present moment I am beginning to fight for your policy in Persia after all. They have tried theirs and it seems to me they have failed* If I don't succeed I am inclined to wash my hands of the Eastern Committee, and to tell Curson that the resources of the India Office are always available to him for consultation, but that I cannot accept responsibility for a policy which is fraught with such dangers and risks. The Eastern Committee is not a good body in my opinion, for it has no executive machinery and it is continually encroaching upon the work of the Foreign Office. What

Montagu

wanted

was

another

solution,

possibly

the

appointment of a Secretary of State for the Middle East, who would have executive functions.1 Chelmsford,

His letter crossed one from

in which the Viceroy bewailed events in Persia*

"We have alas I upon us now the inevitable consequences of what you and I agreed in regarding as the mistaken policy of his 2 Majesty's Government in Persia."1 2

1

10 MSS Eur. D.523/2, Montagu to Chelmsford, 31 May 1918.

2

10 MSS Eur. D.523/7, Chelmsford to Montagu, 30 May 1918.

134

MAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM India's concern about events in Persia and Caucasia grew

out of a preoccupation with the political elements of Islam, and these were not confined to any limited geographical area« Thus,

decisions

about

Persia

were,

in

the

view

of

the

Government of India, part of Britain's policy towards Islam generally, and seemed of particular relevance to Trans-Caspia and

Turkestan

where

India

implementing policy« But, progressively Turkestan«

worse,

Amid

stabilising,

directly

responsible

for

as the situation in Caucasia grew

there

reports

Toynbee

was

were

that

wrote

signs the

that

of

area

"the

improvement appeared

latest

Turkestan

(presumably

the

territory

victorious

"Bolshevik",

i.e.

Russian

news

to

has

be

is

that

by

the

controlled element)

in

declared

itself an independent republic and is arranging its frontiers with

the

governemnt

at

Moscow".^

Other

sources,

however,

reported more disconcerting happenings« One announced that the Khans of Bokhara and Khiva "have recently accepted a Turkish "2 invitation to enter into a 'Pan-Turanian' alliance. Neither solution was suggested,

particularly welcome,

but

as Toynbee's

minute

there was some question as to who the Bolsheviks

were. Race was an important consideration in Turkestan, where Russian administration and settlers had been imposed on the indigenous people by armed force, creating a tremendous amount of hostility between the two groups. It was, in fact, a very straightforward understandable

colonial that

occupation,

under

the

and

it

circumstances,

was the

therefore Russian

settlers felt drawn to their ancestral homeland despite the revolutionary climate* It was in these circumstances that the military experts began to urge an expanded role for the Meshed mission.

1

PO W38/89176/3172, Minute by Toynbee, 25 May 1918.

2

Idem.

One1 2

EASTERN COMMITTEE

135

suggestion, made by Redl, the military agent at Meshed, was to send an officer to Tashkent in order to arrange cooperation with the Bolsheviks in control there.^

The Viceroy opposed the

idea: Military activity of [the] Bolsheviks on [the] Russo-Afghan frontier had doubtless caused alarm and resentment in Afghanistan. If Redl's proposal to despatch a British officer to Tashkent were accepted, this would excite the liveliest suspicion in Afghanistan and might upset the whole situation. Apart from this it is difficult to see what material support we could promise [the] Bolsheviks in Russian Turkestan against Turco-German aggression. Until we can find in Russian Turkestan elements friendly and acceptable to the Amir of Afghanistan and at the same time hostile to our enemies we think there is gjave danger of trouble developing in these troubled waters.” Though

the

Viceroy

was

mainly

concerned

about

the

Amir's

objections to the Bolsheviks, India itself continued to prefer Bolshevism to pan-Islam. But the Afghan alliance appeared to offer an alternative to both and as India studiously avoided any action which would create turmoil, it was not surprising that they opposed Redl's proposal. Their cricitism was well taken. It was one thing to launch Lawrence into an area where the facilities for equipping levies existed, and quite another to stir up an area where no support was possible and where the consequences were so unpredictable.

It was a criticism which

could have been applied equally well to Dunsterville's mission. Montagu put entitled

all of these objections

"Our Policy

into a memorandum

in Persia”, in which he

asked

for

a

reconsideration of British policy, describing it as "neither a policy of conciliation nor a policy of control”, and arguing that the collapse of Russia and the threatened Turkish invasion of

Central

Asia

had

created

an opportunity for Britain to1

1

FO W38/106891/3172, Memorandum by Redl, 14 June 1918.

2

FO W38/100293/3172 Viceroy (FD) to 10, 3 June 1918.

136

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

overcome her imperialistic reputation and establish friendly relations with Tehran* As the main obstacle to reconciliation was the S.P.R., Montagu thought that Britain should hold the two cordons with

its own

forces

and abolish the Rifles.

A

friendly government at Tehran would be ample reward and would not jeopardise the position in the south* As it was, Montagu maintained,

British policy

in Persia was

out of step with

British war aims.^ The memorandum might have been written by the Government of India* Surprisingly, the Eastern Committee accepted a large part of Montagu's argument* News that TransCaucasia

had

fallen

to

the

Turks

and

that

four

German

battalions and two Turkish regiments were occupying the region, contributed to the mood of resignation which prevailed at the 5 June meeting. The expansive ideas of previous meetings gave way to a more practical assessment of possibilities, and it was concluded that the first objective of British policy should be to secure the Kermanshah-Hamadan-Kasvin road and to safeguard the line of communication to the Caspian Sea. Having reached this conclusion, the Eastern Committee turned its attention to reports that Dunsterville wanted to re-enforce the

Hamadan

personally

to

line

with

Baku

armoured

where

he

cars,

thought

and he

then

could

proceed save

the

Krasnovodsk cotton crop, the Baku oil, and gain control of the Caspian

Sea.

In

order

to

do

so,

however,

he

would

need

additional troops and this would require an alteration of the decision

taken

declared

the

circumstances,

at the previous Committee meeting which had mission

to

be

purely

political.

the Committee was not sympathetic.

Under

the

There was

considerable apprehension about the effect an enemy occupation

1

Cab. 27/27/465, Memorandum by Montagu, 5 June 1918.

EASTERN COMMITTEE

137

would have in Tehran and Curzon voiced the fear that the enemy might use

its position to gain access to the Trans-Caspian

Railway and so to all of Central Asia* But Montagu would agree to

nothing

which

would

weaken

the

defensive

line

already

established, and though Curzon attempted to convince him that Dunsterville would never be able to move, Montagu refused to be reassured* Balfour .thought there was a distinction to be drawn between the two courses, arguing that Baku had nothing to do with strategic supply or the defence of the Kasvin line* This opened the way to a compromise; it was decided that the Kasvin line was first to be secured by armoured cars, and only when this had been done, would Dunsterville be allowed to operate on his own, after first notifying the War Office and arranging to take an armed force with him. ^ The 5 June meeting accepted in principle the distinciton between the defence of Persia and military action in Caucasia* that

British

military

For Persia,

activity

on

the

the decision meant northern

cordon had

changed from an essentially political demonstration of power, designed

to

impress

Tehran,

into

an

integral

part

of

the

Empire's defensive line across the brow of the Indian Ocean* The decision, what

the

despite Montagu's support, was not really

Government

of

India

wanted

when

it

suggested

disbanding the S.P.R. Instead of creating a situation in which political reconciliation was possible, the Committee attempted to

exclude

the Persians

altogether.

Montagu got his

strong

defensive line with Balfour's somewhat vague support, though clearly the Committee would have preferred to proceed directly with

a

forward

policy

in

Caucasia*

The

decision

also

established British interest in the region east of the Caspian Sea, and particularly along the Trans-Caspian railway, despite

1

Cab. 27/24/13(1), Minutes of the Eastern Committee, 5 June 1918.

138

HAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

the Viceroy's warning of the dangers which might be encountered in Turkestan* At

the

same

time,

the

Caucasian question became

more

complicated with Germany's recognition of Caucasian national aspirations - something Britain had always refused to do* The P.I.D. thought that if Britain did not acknowledge the emerging national states in the region,

it ran the risk of allowing

Germany to reap all the political rewards of recognition in an area where national states seemed likely to survive the war in some form* But there was serious opposition to the idea in both the War Office and the Foreign Office. Sir George Clerk noted that

the

D.M.I.

opposed

giving

the

Georgians

any

sort

of

encouragement so long as they cooperated with the Germans*

As

Germany

as

had

occupied

Georgia,

Clerk

interpreted

this

opposition to the proposal.

Hardinge, however, concluded that

no action was called for.^

But Hardinge's dismissal did not

end

the matter*

wealthy area,

The Caucasus were potentially an immensely

and Germany's

control was in many respects a

greater strategic danger to Europe than it was to Asia.

The

General Staff was clearly very disturbed by the thought that Caucasia could supply Germany with "nearly every raw material she requires", and that, while available transport would limit the immediate exploitation of the region, it was still possible that Germany would manage to ease serious deficiencies in raw materials. In other words, Germany had found a way to lift the blockade.

After

the

war,

supplies

of

oil

and

other

raw

materials would be readily obtainable and would help Germany to restore her financial position: Finally and most important of all, the possession of the Caucasus would be yet another step forward in the realisation of their Eastern ambitions. A check has been put 1

FO W38/106568/40776, Minute by Clerk, 7 June 1918.

EASTERN COMMITTEE

139

on their Baghdad schemes; in the Caucasus they will find an alternative." The future implications of German expansion in the East seemed to fit well with British assumptions about the world political ambitions of German militarism. But it was Amery who put the case in its most extensive form,

emphasising in a

letter to Lloyd George,

on 8 June,

several important aspects of imperial security: ...as soon as this "little side show" in the West is over.•.we shall have to take the war for the mastery of Asia in hand seriously, and that in that quarter we can call a New World into being to redress the balance of the Old - if the Old should go wrong, which I am not prepared to admit. As a strategist you agreed, I think. But as a Welshman you put in a caveat on behalf of your sensitive Keltic virtue against that predatory Saxon instinct which would once again see us emerge from a defensive war with vastly increased territories. Don't misjudge the peaceful and unaggressive folk whom you lead, and whom, in the long run, you must lead according to their instincts and traditions. Their watchword has always been "the meek shall inherit the earth" judiciously applying it to mean that when the fray over some territory has become too hot, they have resigned their own claim to any share of the loot, and gone off to console themselves in some remote pasture, which has usually turned out to be worth far more than the whole cause of dispute nearer home. Where the aggressive and unscrupulous Kelt would raid the neighbouring Saxon country for a few sheep, the gentle Saxon goes off to the Antipodes, picks up a neglected continent and soon counts his flocks by millions, the due reward of meekness and diligence in well doing. It will be the same in this war. We have battled and will continue to battle our hardest for the common cause in Europe. But on behalf of that cause, as well as in defence of our existence, we shall find ourselves compelled to complete the liberation of the Arabs, to make secure the independence of Persia, and if we can of Armenia, and to protect tropical Africa from German economic and military exploitation. All these are objects justifiable in themselves and don't become less so because they also increase the general sphere of British influence, and afford1

1

Cab. 27/28/700, Note by the General Staff, 8 June 1918.

140

HAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

a strategical security which will enable that Southern British World which runs from Cape Town through Cairo, Baghdad and Calcutta to Sydney and Wellington to go about its peaceful business without constant fear of German aggression* The Prime Minister's thoughts on the letter are not recorded, but

Amery was certainly correct

in divining Lloyd George's

reluctance to expand the Empire, though one is left to wonder if it was wholly an aspect of his Celtic origins* It was by no means

clear

in

1918

that Jerusalem

and Baku would

be

the

successors of Montreal and Pondicherry* More importantly, Amery neglected the alternative world systems, American Idealism and Russian Bolshevism, which were already active in the areas for which Amery sought an imperialist solution* challenge

the

notion

of

For Britain to

self-determination

and

nationalism

which both America and Russia supported, was a task which the Empire could only undertake by risking the gains it had already made* Nor was it possible to discount opposition from within the British

Government.

The

India

Office

as

we

have

seen

was

opposed to any kind of contact with the disrupted territory north of India, and had only accepted the Dunsterville mission because

it

effectively

hoped

the

sealed:

northern

attempts

cordon to

of

extend

Persia the

would

be

principle

to

Turkestan encountered resistance from Shuckburgh, who, on

10

June, informed the War Office that no British officer should be sent to Tashkent until Malleson had arrived at Meshed and had had an opportunity to survey the entire situation* But he was forced

to

agree

that

it was

important

attempt to use the Trans-Caspian railway.

to

2

block

any

enemy

The question was a1

1

LGMSS, F/2/1/24, Amery to Lloyd George, 8 June 1918*

2

Cab. 27/27/509, Shuckburgh to WO, 10 June 1918.

EASTERN COMMITTEE

141

difficult one for India. On the one hand, it wished to avoid any British action in Central Asia which might compromise it with its own Muslim subjects, while, on the other hand, it was only logical to take steps which would prevent the enemy from achieving the same thing.

As Hirtzel put it: "The hopelessness

of the situation in the Caucasus and NW Persia seems to make it more urgently necessary to take steps in Russian Turkestan to put the railway out of action."^ railway

was

tantamount

to

But to agree to block the

accepting

the

entire

military

argument. It was a familiar dilemma, one in which India faced too many difficulties at one time, and found itself unable to deal effectively with any of them.

In a situation where its

opinions on self-determination and enemy expansion led to such an

obvious

contradiction

Indian advice

tended to neutralise

itself• Realisation

that

there

was

a

contradiction

was

not,

however, confined to the India Office. Anyone seeking even a partial political settlement was bound to run up against it. To a few, enemy military activity in Caucasia appeared to open up the possibility of an Anglo-Persian rapproachment, made all the more desirable by reports of the growth of a separatist movement

in

Persian

Azerbaijan

and

its

animosity

towards

Britain.

Toynbee considered the danger real enough to warrant

massive British propaganda in North Persia in an attempt to convince the Persians that Turanianism was nothing more than ancient Turkish aggression. He hoped that the Turksih invasion of western Azerbaijan could be made a vehicle for Anglo-Persian 2 understanding. Simultaneously, the French Government became sufficiently concerned about the course of events in Central Asia to complain in the Supreme War Council that Britain had1

1

FO P.I.D., 14 Minute by Toynbee, 11 June 1918.

2

10 1000/1918:2589, Minute by Hirtzel, 13 June 1918.

142

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

not properly defended the region: ...le but poursuivi par nos ennemis, dans cette region, parait etre de constituer, sous leur tutelle, une ligne des peuples mussalmans de race turque de la Russie Meridienale, du Caucase, du Turkestan et de la Perse, menaçant a la fois les Indes, la Chine et la Japon, ouvrant de nouveaux debouches economiques et permettant a la Mittel Europe d'extendre son influence sur des regions suffissement riches en resources de toute nature pour qu'elle puisse desormaisse suffire a elle-meme et defier tout blocus* Though the French had merely echoed British fears of Germany's intentions, in London the message was taken to mean that the French were interested in sharing Central Asia in much the same way as the Sykes-Picot agreement had parcelled out the Middle East. It was a classic example of Imperial paranoia, as British strategists discovered only months later when they tried to ensnare France in Caucasia. London wanted

In June, however, the last thing

in Central Asia was another partition and so

Paris was informed that everything was under control. practical

answer was an effective British force

The only

in Central

Asia, but this simply brought the problem full circle. The Eastern Committee met again on 11 June to attempt to find a way out of the dilemma.

With Dunsterville anxious to

get to Baku, and Montagu still worried that enemy troops would break through a weakened cordon, the Committee decided to send an

appreciation

of

the

situation

to

Dunsterville

-

thus

virtually handing him the power to decide - and to strengthen the cordon. Several steps were to be taken: guns were to be sent to Enzeli; if possible, mines would be laid off Enzeli? if possible, control;

the Caspian Fleet would be brought under British and

finally,

Dunsterville was

to be

instructed to

arrange for the destruction of the oil fields and pipelines at Grosny,

1

near

Baku,

again,

if

possible.

This

Cab. 27/27/567, French note, 11 June 1918.

last

did not1

BASTERN COMMITTEE

143

necessarily mean that Dunsterville should go to Baku, but the Committee clearly assumed that he would*

Montagu regarded the

decision as the worst possible and argued that British policy in

Persia

attempting

had to

fallen

between

two

establish military

stools*

Britain

was

control without sufficient

force, and added to this, in the south. Sir Percy Sykes had begun

a war

observed

with

that

local

the

Persian

Committee

was

leaders* anxious

In to

reply,

Curzon

avoid military

commitments, and Balfour added, no less piously, that Britain had no intention of making Persia a major theatre of war. Both statements amounted to a wilful misunderstanding of Montagu's point, which was that, with the troops available, Britain could fulfil none of her objectives, much less undertake additional adventures in Caucasia* Since it was difficult to know where additional force might come from, it seemed to Montagu a better idea

to

fashion

a

policy

which

would

be

consistent

with

Britain's potential strength in the area.^ The Persians had arrived at much the same conclusion. The Persian Minister in London suggested to Oliphant, on 13 June, that

if the S.P.R.

were disbanded as evidence of

Britain's

goodwill, it would be possible to form a government in Tehran which would oppose a Turkish invasion* Otherwise, he warned, dissatifaction with Britain would continue to grow and Persian 2 public opinion would become increasingly pro-Turkish. But the Foreign

Office

was

not

interested*

Instead,

it

supported

various proposals for military missions with specific strategic objectives.

The

proposed

discussion again in

mission

mid-June,

to

Tashkent came

and was accepted* It

up

for

was also

decided to destroy the western sections of the Trans-Caspian railway as soon as possible* But as "it seems desirable that1

1

Cab. 27/24/13(1), Minutes of the E.C., 11 June 1918.

2

Cab. 27/27/576, Memo* by Oliphant, 13 June 1918*

144

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

British

connivance

cooperation

of

impossible

until

there

appeared

should

Bolsheviks

be can

a British to

be

concealed, be

officer

little

unless

obtained, proceeds

alternative

[the]

which

appears

to Tashkent",^

to

extending

the

military effort to Turkestan. Extensions of British military intervention were perfectly in keeping with general policy in Asia.

The Turkish advance

into Caucasia had made control of the imperial hinterland even more imperative, though in some respects, the threat was used to justify a policy which had been devised for other reasons. In Marling’s view, the main task continued to be the creation of

a

situation

which

would

compel

the

Persians

to

accept

British predominance; it was only later, as the Turks began to threaten

Baku,

that

Marling

Dunsterville into Caucasia. military Based

intervention

on

speculation

accepted

the

need

to

get

The calculations which had led to

in Persia were potentially about

the

nature

not

only

limitless. of

enemy

strategy, but of the possible course of a number of political movements, British policy makers found themselves confronting the same threat at every turning. upon

local

difficulties,

tended

to

Inevitably,

actions based

give way to much wider

strategic concepts, and these,

in turn, produced an Imperial

alternative

with which

to

the

ideologies

the

British

felt

themselves in contention. The only restraint on this process, and it proved to be a severe one, was the real force Britain was prepared to deploy in pursuit of the Imperial ideal.

As we

have seen, the War Office, when confronted with demands for troops,

was

slow

to

respond.

It

preferred

to

place

its

confidence in the diplomatic abilities of its soldiers; not a policy likely to find favour with the political departments of the British Government. In many ways, the political emphasis of1

1

PO W38/10689/3172, Note by Redl, 14 June 1918.

EASTERN COMMITTEE

145

the soldiers was inversely proportional to the material means available for the task.

Thus, British political interests in

Central Asia expanded as the prospect of a military solution faded* Civilian officials were powerless to stop the trend, nor, apart from the Government of India, did they really want to*

The result was the development of an expansive concern for

the

region

satisfied*

which

could

not,

with

the

force

available,

be

CHAPTER FIVE:

THE FAILURE OF MILITARY INTERVENTION

The growth of British interests and commitments in Central Asia provoked criticism from all quarters* imperialists,

it

provided

further

For the ideological

evidence

of

the

global

significance of imperial policies* Though the actual military force was small, the political expectations of the idealists were large: Amery and Milner both toyed with the idea of an extra-European war,

primarily in Asia,

and Smuts,

though no

friend of Milner's, recognised the possibility of something of the sort developing out of the great German offensive on the Western Front

in the spring of 1918.^

Amery developed the argument in a memorandum entitled "War Aims and Military Policy", which he sent to Lloyd George on 15 June* He began with a review of German Eastern European and World policies which emphasised the dangers of Berlin's attempt to establish a World Empire and predicted that, if they were sucses8ful in the West as they had been in Russia, the Germans would attempt to establish their hegemony from Antwerp to the Pamirs - or the Pacific - and from the Varanger Fjord to the Red

Sea

and

the Persian Gulf.

As

Amery

saw

it,

the most

important strategic requirement for Britain was protection of imperial interests in the East. His plan was a mirror image of what he feared the Germans might do: capture

Palestine,

satisfactory

Syria

stabilisation

and in

the first priority was to

Mesopotamia, Persia

and

and to Caucasia*

secure

a

This,

however, was only the beginning, and Amery went on to discuss the formation of a new Eastern Front stretching across Asia at

1

See F/2/1/24, Amery to Lloyd George, 8 June 1981» F/45/9/2 Smuts to Lloyd George, 24 May 1917.

MILITARY INTERVENTION 147 the Urals, or from the Caspian Sea to Yenisev or Lake Baikal: "That front*., will mark the future boundary between the German and Allied spheres of influence and power." As Amery did not think that Britain could sustain a truly bipolar system, he proposed to associate Britain's two non-European allies with the project. Japan, in exchange for Manchuria and predominance in China, would secure Siberia vintil Russia was once again on its feet, or, if Russia failed to revive, Japan, possibly in cooperation with the United States, would take all of Siberia up

to

the

"Trans-Asiatic

frontier".

Britain

would

be

responsible for the southern and western portions of the front. Amery's

inclination

to

associate

Japan

and

the United

States with British policy was reinforced by his fear that the Germans would offer Britain's European allies acceptable peace terms in Europe in exchange for colonial concessions. Such an offer would drive a wedge between the Allies, as Britain under no circumstances could allow the return of Germany's colonies or the non-Turkic parts of the Ottoman Empire. Britain might be left alone to fight on against German world imperialism. Or, a military disaster for the Allies could produce the same result. Amery

therefore

Anglo-American

emphasised the importance to Britain of an understanding.

He

suggested

several

ways

of

overcoming American apprehensions about British designs on the German colonies and the East generally and concluded that if the United

States

could be

convinced

Japanese would be sure to follow,

to act

in Asia,

the

in which case "one might

almost be tempted to say that it would be a positive advantage to us if our European Allies dropped out leaving us with the United States and Japan to continue the struggle." Though they did not share Amery's enthusiasm for Japan, many of his colleagues shared Amery's fear that Britain would be left in the lurch by its continental allies. But it did not make

much

sense to

keep Germany out by letting Japan and the

148

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

United

States

in:

Amery's

contention

prepared to pay the price — Congo

—

cannot

have

that Britain must

be

in America's case, the Belgian

impressed

the

more

traditional

imperialists.

His argument concluded with a plea to exploit

the

advantages

strategic

in

the

East

to block the enemy's

advance into Central Asia and so forbid them access to the raw materials of the Urals and Siberia.^ In many ways,

Amery

had

simply

drawn all the

logical

conclusions from the policy already being pursued in Central Asia. The need to establish an Eastern Front, for example, had been accepted: what Amery added to the idea was a unifying coherence,

a

great

deal

more

territory,

and

a

military

intervention of sufficient scale to make the whole scheme work. Ultimately, he was arguing that the war was for world power, and thus, in British terms, a monumental colonial war. As such, Amery merely emphasised a basic ambiguity in British policy» its

tendency

conflicts. past wars,

to

Though,

seek

European

solutions

in

extra-European

certainly, Britain had been successful in

there was no guarantee that having once allowed

Germany to dominate Europe, the British would ever return to challenge that supremacy. Officially at least, it was impossible to regard British efforts in Central Asia as anything other than a part of the war against the Central Powers. On 25 June, Curzon reported to the Imperial War Cabinet that: German ambitions, which had received an immense impetus since the collapse of Russia and the Treaty of BrestLitovsk, lay along two main lines of advance» a northern line through the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Caspian and Turkestan, to the borders of Chinese Turkestan» and the southern through Palestine, Mesopotamia, and through Persia and Afghanistan against India. The whole of the area between these lines was a theatre of actual or probable warfare. Germany's intentions as regards the southern line1 1

LGMSS, F/92/2/1, Memorandum by Amery, 15 June 1918.

MILITARY INTERVENTION 149 had been maturing for some twenty-five years, and had specially centred round the construction of the Baghdad Railway. Her hand with regard to Persia and Afghanistan had first been shown in the armistice preceding the BrestLitovsk Treaty, and in the treaty itself, both of which contained clauses directly challenging the British position in the East and holding out a feeler for Persian and Afghan co-operation. He went on to explain that if the Germans were successful in Caucasia, the danger to the Empire would be shifted northward to

the

Caspian

Sea

and Turkestan,

which meant

that,

where

Britain had in the past been content to block the southern line of approach,

"He were now compelled to extend our sphere of

operations to Persia, where the object of our various measures was to keep Persia out of the war and to maintain a friendly Government". Curzon assured the IWC that Britain's policy was primarily political, centering on the re-emergence of Russia, the

co-operation

Mesopotamia, loyal

and

of Japan,

the

liberation of Palestine and

the encouragement of a friendly Persia,

Afghanistan

and

a

"powerful,

loyal,

and

a

contented

India."1 But

if Curzon and Amery emphasised the danger of enemy

imperialism, from

local

they also acknowledged the need for assistance people.

Despite

fundamental

British policy and the

revolutionary

essential

policy

elements

of

had

between

the

British

predicated

on

the

cooperate with Britain

In so far as there was limited contact

Bolsheviks

Bolshevik organisation, the

between

impetus of Bolshevism,

been

assumption that the Bolsheviks would against the Germans.

antagonisms

of

Central

Asia

and

the

central

it was a correct assumption. But, as

intervention

grew,

Moscow

became

increasingly

uneasy, and finally struck out in the only way it could. The Russian Blue Book on India attacked British rule and called for1

1

Cab. 23/41/:20(5), IWC, 25 June 1918

1S0

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

revolution*

Wardorp,

the

British

Consul-General

In

Moscow,

wrote that it was a malicious attack on British rule in India...The deliberate intention of the Bolsheviks in issuing the volume is to raise against us in India, Afghanistan and elsewhere the ill-feeling of Moslem^ and to rouse Islam to such action as will benefit Germany. There is little doubt that the Bolsheviks regarded the British Empire as a major obstacle to world revolution: at the same time it was a danger to the survival of Bolshevism in Russia, and, as Brest-Litovsk indicated, the instinct to survive was strong.

It

accepted

a

is quite

likely

stand-off.

But

that

the Bolsheviks would have

British

policy-makers

were

ill-

equipped to deal with an ideological challenge in which they could find no evidence of aggrandisement. In 1918, no one could argue that Russian expansion was continuing in a new guisei rather the opposite, British

it was Britain which was expanding. The

difficulty was

compounded because Lenin's thesis on

imperialism in Asia stopped short of revolution, calling only for self-determination. Little wonder, then, that the British preferred to ascribe their difficulties to German or Islamic machinations, both of which fit the familiar political models, and to assume that Bolshevism was simply an agency of German imperialism. Against this was set not only genuine fears of Turkish or German

military

activity

in

the

Caucasus,

but

a

growing

realisation in London that self-determiantion threatened plans for the economic rationalisation of imperial raw materials and communications which were regarded as vital to Britain's post­ war recovery.

Self-determination was as serious a danger as

enemy expansion: the fact was that Britain had begun to develop direct interests in Central Asia which went beyond strategic1

1

FO W38/140052/140052, Wardorp to Balfour, 17 June 1918.

MILITARY INTERVENTION 151 security* Thus, Lenin's refusal to allow Dunsterville to pass unimpeded to Baku^ came as a shock to British plans and made much of British policy in the region meaningless* A hesitant re-examination of policy began in the Eastern Committee

on

Bolsheviks

18

facing

June* them

With in

the the

declared

East,

the

hostility

of

Committee's

the

first

response was to seek a substitute* Montagu, who had begun to share the Government of India's impatience with policy-making in London, proposed the creation of a centralised bureau which would be responsible for all of Britain's relations with Islam* It was, in a sense, a compromise, as Montagu knew perfectly well that London would never allow India to take control of all British affairs in the East*

The Eastern Committee, however,

rejected the proposal, preferring Mark Sykes' advice to avoid anything which might be construed as support for the ideas of pan-Islam* ^ In attempt

essence,

the

to preserve

question and protect

was the

whether

Britain

should

Empire by creating an

Eastern Front stretching from the Mediterranean to the Arctic Ocean, as Amery had suggested^, or to devise a policy which, in the view of many officials, British power* The C.I*G.S.

was within the capabilities of agreed that the danger warranted

immediate action but he questioned the scale of the threat. He rejected the use of Japanese and American troops and suggested instead that Britain arm the Afghans and bring them into the war

as

allies.

In

his

view,

India's

policy

of

ringing

Afghanistan had been ruined by the Russian Revolution and if India persisted as though the cordon were still in tact, the

1

Cab* 27/24/14:3, Minutes of the Eastern Committee, 1918.

18 June

2

Cab* 27/24/14, Minutes of the Eastern Committee, 1918.

18 June

3

LGMSS, F/2/1/25, Memorandum by Amery, 19 June 1918.

152

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

Amir might

be

driven

into the arms of the Turks.

As this

possibility could only be countered by political means,

the

C.I.6.S. urged the War Cabinet to override the Government of India and make direct contact with Afghanistan and Turkestan. In doing so, Britain would have to disregard the feelings not only of the Bolsheviks but of the Russians generally and urge the Afghans to occupy the Murghals Valley from Merv to Kushk and to assist the Amir of Bokhara's attempts to defend the Bokharan

railway.^

prepared

to

Thus

support

the

General

traditional

Staff

Muslim

appeared

leaders

to

against

be all

unifying forces, though at the same time, the policy would have continued Britain's expansion. India, of course, had its own complaints, and sought to deal

with

them

by

pressing

for

a

complete

administrative

reorganisation. At Montagu's request, Shuckburgh wrote that It has been felt for some time past that His Majesty's Government were suffering from a "multitude of counsellors" in Persian affairs, and, from a certain vagueness as to the limits of responsibility, etc. attaching to the various authorities concerned. He

argued

that

the

division

of

political

and

military

responsibility had been acceptable during peacetime, but that under the pressure of war,

British policy was

caught

in a

muddle of conflicting interests and responsibilities. India's main complaint was that, while the Government of India had a material stake in the operation of the Eastern Cordon, it could 2 only 'consult' on politics. India's point was well taken: in south Persia,

Sir Percy Sykes, the British commander of the

S.P.R., was fighting a war which Marling was convinced Sykes had provoked; in northern Persia, three agencies had political officers;

and

the

Meshed

Mission

had

similar

problems.1

1

Cab. 27/27/592, Note by the C.I.G.S., 21 June 1918.

2

IO 1000/1918:2923, Memorandum by Shuckburgh, 18 June 1918.

MILITARY INTERVENTION 153 Inevitably, the effectiveness of the operations diminished as conflicting interests created confusion. Though

the

Eastern

Committee

sought

to

sort

out

the

problem at its meeting on 21 June, the effort was doomed to failure because the Committee itself mirrored the confusion. It was really a matter of choosing a policy which was feasible and then pursuing it with determination. The Committee's problem was that it wanted to achieve the results contemplated by Amery with the resources proposed by the C.I.G.S. Only Montagu was prepared to reconsider the entire matter. Seizing on reports that Tehran would exchange cooperation for the abolition of the S.P.R., Montagu asserted that making the concession would bring Vossugh-ed-Dowleh

to power,

ensuring a friendly

government.

Though Hardinge and the military experts agreed, Curzon raised the curious objection that Britain could not allow 6,000 armed Persians

to

run

free

in

southern

Persia.

Montagu was

not

impressed by the objection and argued that Britain must come to terms with the real situation either by making Persia an ally or declaring it a military zone: but, as "our troubles.•.were mainly

political"

troops throughout

a military

zone would

the south.

require

occupation

He preferred removing Marling

altogether and making the Government of India responsible for all Anglo-Per8ian affairs, or at least, bringing to an end the division of responsibility. Curzon, Smuts and Balfour pointed out, quite rightly, that to place Persia in the hands of the Government Committee

of

India

would

responsibilities:

would

be

agree

to

was

Sir

Percy

to the

Sykes

court

disaster.

assignment would

be

of

All

the

specific

controlled

by

placing him under the command of either India or Mesopotamia; military control in south Persia, the Eastern Cordon, TransCaspia and Turkestan was given to the Indian Army; Dunsterville remained under the command of the G.O.C.-Mesopotamia.^

1

Cab.27/24/15, Minutes of the E. C., 21 June 1918.

It was1

154

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

ironic that the British Government, on the eve of its greatest imperial achievement, found itself arranging the partition of Asia with the Government of India. It quickly became clear that more was necessary. At the following meeting of the Eastern Committee, on 23 June, the discussion of the proposed Afghan invasion of Turkestan led to an examination of the ramifications of British actions. Montagu supported the proposal provided the Government of India also agreed,

but Curzon

feared that surrounding Afghanistan with

operations directed from India would cause trouble. Smuts and Balfour

agreed

with

him.

It

was

obvious

that

it

was

the

policies of the Government of India which were under discussion and that most of the Committee thought that India was incapable of

dealing

effectively

with

the

situation.

Smuts

asked

pointedly whether the Committee could dictate policy to India or whether it must simply offer advice. Curzon replied somewhat vaguely that the final decision lay with London. The proposed policy involved more than relations between London and Delhi, however.

Though

Balfour

would

probably

have

liked to

clip

India's wings, interfering in Turkestan raised the question of Anglo-Ru8sian relations about which the Foreign Secretary was very sensitive: he recoiled from anything which resembled the dismemberment of Russia. Curzon assured him that Turkestan was a

no-man's

land,

and

Smuts

attempted

to

establish

an

interesting principle by arguing that for Afganistan to take territory in Turkestan would be 'disannexation'• Nothing could convince Balfour that what the C.I.G.S. was proposing was not the partition of Russia,

and he expressed concern about the

reaction of what he described as the "best elements" in Russia, the

counter-revolutionaries.

allowed himself

to

be blown

Curzon,

who

along by

the

characteristically strong winds

of

imagination, argued that Britain must "set up a Moslem nexus of

MILITARY INTERVENTION 155 States to stop the German and Turkish advance." But Balfour was adamant and refused to give his consent until there had been a full review of Britain's Russian policy. Montagu wished to apply much the same argument to Persia. He pointed out that Britain had too little power to actually control Persia, but too much power to ensure the success of conciliation. The solution, he urged, was to substitute British control in the north-west for the S.P.R.: he wanted Marling to let it be known that Britain would like to negotiate with a friendly

government

and

possibly

arrange

an

suggestion was not popular with the Committee.

alliance.

The

Curzon reminded

his colleagues of the danger involved in releasing the S.P.R., though he apparently wanted some concession. pointed

out,

But as Montagu

friendship of the kind Curzon wanted required

Persia to engage in war-like acts against Germany.

The real

question, in his view, was whether Britain wanted an alliance with Persia. Smuts thought not and Curzon allowed that Britain wanted only Persian support. For Montagu, the distinction was meaningless. But, the D.M.I. explained, there was a difference: the British troops in north-west Persia were meant to keep out the enemy, while those in the south were there "in order to control local disturbances". This took Balfour by surprise; he had, he confessed, assumed that both operations were meant to discourage and capture German agents. Curzon, however, had no illusions

about

the nature of British

involvement

in south

Persia; the troops were there to "keep the roads open, and the country quiet". Balfour, if sincere, was also a bit naive. The British troops in south Persia were there to safeguard British interests against both Germans and Persians. What was more, the troops in the north-west fulfilled, in part, the same function. The War Office experts were mainly concerned to ensure that the politicians did

nothing which would

require larger numbers of

156

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

men

than

they

were

themselves

prepared

to

commit*

They

therefore favoured a policy of conciliation which would still criticism of British policy but not damage Britain's military position.

In

other

words,

they

wanted

control

without

an

alliance* But the India Office officials instead

directed

the

discussion

refused to give in and

into

an

examination

of

Marling*s competence. Marling's credit with the Committee was low, and though Balfour attempted to defend him, Curzon announced that he was losing respect for the Minister.

Montagu

naturally agreed, but he was only interested in Marling as a means

of getting at the Foreign Office.

change

in

Tehran

would

accomplish

He argued that no

much

unless

it

was

accompanied by the offer of an alliance. As the Committee was unprepared for this, it confined itself to spitefully rebuffing Marling for requesting that more troops be sent to north-west Persia. The

Eastern

Committee's

disillusionment

with

Marling

helped to disguise the really important result of the meeting, the defection of the India Office. Here-to-fore, the officials of both the India and Foreign Offices had ganged together in resisting the proposals of the Government of India. But, as Montagu wrote

to Chelmsford on

31

May,

the policy of the 2 Eastern Committee had been tried and had failed. Montagu's interest in Persia had developed during his visit to India, with the result that, though the Government of India itself had been virtually silenced, it found in Montagu a more powerful voice than before. The Eastern Committee had always been irritated by India's insistence that

it was

impossible to pursue a policy which

1

Cab. 27/24/16, Minutes of the Eastern Committee, 1918.

24 June

2

10 MSS Eur. D.523/2, Montagu to Chelmsford, 31 May 1918.

MILITARY INTERVENTION 157 could not be implemented in detail. Failure to win its point drove India into a highly defensive position, finally

the portions

of

Central Asia which were considered vital to Indian defence.

On

6 June,

attempted

to

India

and

the Viceroy telegraphed his fears about the rising

against the S.P.R. serious

dissociate

from which it

in

expression

that of

at Shiraz: Soulet's

general

"[The]

rising

Situation is the more

appears

nationalist

to

be

resentment

definite of

our

interference in Central Persia." The rising, in the Viceroy's view, was no simple tribal revolt and would probably require a major military effort to put it down. But an engagement in south Persia would be to Britain's disadvantage in Afghanistan and in the Muslim world generally, to say nothing of Persia. Britain would play right into German hands and the "...result would

be

chronic guerilla warfare.••".

He begged London to

consider the alternatives and to seek a peaceful solution by making concessions to the Persians.

All Britain must do to

protect its interests was hold the South Coast, the north-west and the Eastern Cordon* ^ Simply placing Sykes under military authority would not solve the problem, and the Government of India

consequently

refusing to

appoint

choose a

to defy the Eastern Committee by

general

officer

to command in south

Persia. It did so basically because it wanted political control of Persia: ...In Persia local political control is an impossibility. [The] Persian political centre is Teheran, and in spite of its material weakness, [the] Persian Government exercises a surprising authority throughout the country and can influence local situations everywhere. So long, therefore, as we have no voice in [the] direction of Teheran policy, we shall, in accepting [the] sphere of control allotted to us in Persia be accepting grave military responsibility without [the] authority to regulate [the] political situation within our sphere or the direction in which our forces may be used. We have no wish to raise unnecessary controversy, and we1 1

10 2000/1918:2923, Viceory (FD) to 10, 6 June 1918.

158

HAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

appreciate [the] difficulties inherent in [the] position* But we feel it right before accepting this liability to urge [that the] whole question of political control in Persia which so seriously affects India's finance, and India's military resources should be fully considered* Though the Government of India accepted military control in Turkestan

and Trans-Caspia,

it pointed out that chaos made

military action impossible*^ Marling, too, was dissatisfied with the decision of the Eastern Committee* The small number of troops in Persia and the smaller Dunsterville mission to Baku were expected to produce remarkable results, including the destruction of the Baku oil­ fields,

control

of

north-west Persia.

the Caspian

fleet,

and the policing of

The Committee had a tendency to confuse

words with deeds, though there were probably fewer troops in Persia

than

even

the

Committee

suspected.

Whatever

their

number, Marling complained on 24 June that the force was too small to do any of the tasks required of it; he wanted to know the actual number so that he could tailor his political posture 2 to suit the force available* Oliphant complained that the military

operation

had

been

"badly

mismanaged",

that

the

decision to send troops was three months old, and that Marling, having delivered the British Government's proclamation on the intervention, found himself in a difficult position* Oliphant was tired of the War Office's excuses; first it had been the weather, and more recently the difficulties of transport* He suspected that the real reason was that Dunsterville was only interested in reaching Baku, while Marshall was opposed to any 3 action in Persia at all. Hardinge, too, was displeased and he urged the War Office to make a show of force in order to enable1

1

Ibid., Viceroy (FD) to 10, 1 July 1918.

2

FO, W34/112694/8, Marling to Balfour, 24 June 1918.

3

Ibid*, Minute by Oliphant, 26 June 1918.

MILITARY INTERVENTION 159 Marling to establish a stable government in Tehran« After that« the number of men involved could be reduced to a minimum« ^ Meanwhile«

the

Foreign

Office«

following

the

Eastern

Committee's decision not to send additional troops to Persia« began to prepare concessions on two points of conflict with Persia«

the

1907

Convention

became apparent that the

and the

S.P.R.

But

it quickly

scope of the concessions would be

limited by considerations which had little to do with Persia« The original draft concessions which proposed abrogation of the Convention encountered opposition from Balfour who felt that British abrogation would recognise the Bolsheviks' "one-sided repudiation of international contracts"« Curron, who did not share

Balfour's

agreements«

concern

wanted

for

the

sanctity

of

international

to compromise by promising to press

for

abrogation of the Convention when a Russian Government had been re-established*

Oliphant

noted

that

Curzon's

draft

had

Montagu's approval« though he doubted that anything had been conceded which would make agreement attractive to the Persians« Curzon and Montagu«

however,

refused to offer more and the

telegram which Marling received informed him that the Eastern Committee sought the establishment of a friendly government, and that London was apprehensive about the uprising in South Persia, the collapse of the S.P.R. and the need for increased military intervention« It made the interesting observation that the Foreign Office had thought the troops available in Persia sufficient to hold the Hamadan-Caspian line, but, as Marling disagreed, and, as additional force would be required to pursue the

old policy,

it was

suggested

that

a

change

of

policy

designed to clear up persistent points of conflict might secure Persian friendship for the future. London was prepared to offer abrogation of the Convention and to abolish the t i t l e

1

Ibid«, Minute by Hardinge, n.d.

of the1

160

HAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

S.P.R., regarding Persian

Array,

it thenceforth

though

as

the

it would retain

first unit of

the

its British officers*

Under the circumstances, Oliphant was certainly justified in wondering what the attraction would be* In exchange, Marling was

to

get

conditions,

the Persians the

first

of

a

friendly

undertake

to

maintain.

support

agree

and most

formation

actively

to

to

important

government London

Britain

in

an extensive

the

of which was

which

also

the

Shah

demanded

South,

set

that

of the

would Persia

the North-West

and

Eastern Cordons; that Persia take steps to protect itself from enemy attack; appoint regional governors friendly to Britain; and, in general, assume a spirit of conciliation* The telegram ended with the opinion that an alliance was undesirable.^ conditions

would

have

ended

what

remained

of

The

Persian

sovereignty. In exchange for very little, Tehran was to give up its

most

valuable

political

weapon,

passive

antagonism.

Acceptance of the conditions would have left Persia little more than a British colony. Marling refused to put the proposals to 2 the Persians. There

was

a

similar

conflict

over

the

policy

to

be

followed in Turkestan and Afghanistan, where, if anything, the religious and political antagonisms were even more intense. In a memorandum on 25 June,

the P.I.D.

argued that,

though an

autonomous and moderate Turkestan was the best solution for Britian,

pan-Islamic

and pan-Turanic

ideas had spread as a

result of the Bolshevik victory and the conservative leaders of the Muslims

might

lead their

followers

into racial warfare

which would also exclude Britain. The "least disadvantegous" course, in the P.I.D.'s view, was not to get involved. Turkish pressures

in

Caucasia

were

creating

a

situation

1

FO W34/116021/8, Balfour to Marling, 28 June 1918.

2

FO W34/11613/8, Marling to Balfour, 1 July 1918.

in

which1

MILITARY INTERVENTION 161 Britain

would

be

compelled

to

act,

particularly

if

the

Armenians and Tashkent Bolsheviks sought British assistance in Baku* On balance, the P.I.D. thought that intervention with the risk

of

anti-British

feeling

among Muslims was

the

better

policy. The alternative was the C.I.G.S.'s proposal for an Afghan alliance. The Government of India, however, opposed the idea, pointing out on

1 July that as most Afghans were pro-Turk,

embroiling the Amir could result in his deposition. Promising the Afghans Russian attempt Under

to

territory would only be regarded as an

involve Afghanistan

the circumstances,

neutrality was

in

India's

border

disputes.

the Government of India concluded,

all Britain could ask of the Amir. ^

These

objections were reinforced by India's refusal to provide the Afghans with arms and money and their assertion that the danger was

not

of

an

invasion,

but

the

infiltration of political 2 agents who would try to provoke a holy war. India's objections fell on deaf ears. In London, it had

already been decided to implement a general eastward shift in Britain's military -activities. On 1 July, the Eastern Committee authorised the despatch of political officers from the Army to Tashkent and Krasnovodsk to arrange for the destruction of the Trans-Caspian Railway should the Turks succeed in crossing the Caspian.^ More importantly, the War Office instructed Marshall in Baghdad to discontinue his efforts in Mesopotamia and to concentrate on north-west Persia. The enemy,

it was pointed

out, was no longer active in Mesopotamia and the General Staff1

1

PO W38/117480/3172, Viceroy (FD) to 10, 1 July 1918.

2

FO W38/117479/676, Viceroy (FD) to 10, 1 July 1918.

3

Cab. 27/24/17, Minutes of the Easten Committee, 1 July 1918. The Tashkent mission had actually departed six weeks earlier, though the Committee only approved the mission after receiving news of its departure.

162

WAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

feared that Marshall "temporary

control

Caspian”.

Marshall

did not appreciate the need to secure

of

Baku

was

and

permanent

ordered

to

secure

control the

of

Baghdad

the to

Caspian road and to make it an all-weather route. He was also directed to provide a

large display of force for Marling's

benefit, and to assist Dunsterville's attempt to destroy Baku's oil industry and secure control of the Caspian fleet.^ The main military effort, therefore, had been transferred to Persia and Caucasia. Though the decision to concentrate on Persia was a victory for

Marling,

certainly

did

it

probably

not

increased

protect him

his

vulnerability

from criticism.

In fact,

and in

London he was generally blamed for the lack of success. At the Eastern Committee on 4 July, Curzon accused Marling of dwelling on the Army's failure to act quickly in Persia. Montagu and Cecil were more sympathetic and speculated that Marling was concerned for the safety of a friendly government if one could be

formed.

The

Army's

chief

complaint

was

that

transport

difficulties made it costly to maintain a force at Kasvin: they preferred to create a mobile force of cavalry and local levies. But, as Montagu pointed out, a mobile force could not make a convincing show of force. In the end, Montagu, Smuts and Curzon agreed that more infantry would be required in Persia, then, surprisingly,

argued

that

it

should

be

used

to

ensure

Dunsterville's success. It was a decision which did not augur well

for

Marling)

not

only

was

he

made

responsible

for

Britain's military failure, but Montagu declared that he was pessimistic about the chances of conciliation because Marling lacked the

enthusiasm to

carry

it out.

Curzon,

of course,

shared this feeling, though it went without saying that both men

1

were

referring

to

the

set

of

concessions

and

FO W34/116119/8, WO to 6.O.C., Meso., 28 June 1918.

demands1

MILITARY INTERVENTION 163 contained in the Foreign Office's

telegram of 28 June« The

D«M«I«, who resented Marling's criticism of the Army, proposed that Sir Percy Cox be sent to Tehran to replace Marling; as Cox was

already Marshall's political advisor,

combining the two

positions would satisfy Montagu's demand for the unification of military and political control« Montagu, however, was not satisfied and continued to press for a reorganisation, which he called decentralisation because it would transfer power from London to a local authority in either Baghdad or Tehran. The model was clearly the Government of

India.

Curson

disliked

the

idea

so

much

that

he

even

moderated his criticism of Marling; he was convinced that it was impossible to turn Persia over to the Government of India or anything resembling it, and preferred the existing system* But

the Committee was hesitant to attack the Government of

India

directly

opposition example, bearing

to

and confined its criticism to the Viceroy's the

doubted of

the

Afghanistan

proposals.

whether

Delhi

present

situation

The

understood in

the

the

D.M.I.,

for

"world-wide

Middle

East".

Theothers were unwilling to take the criticism much further: Montagu observed that the Committee must understand India's fears and be prepared to accept their advice, and Curzon agreed that to do otherwise would be a "grave step."^ The Viceroy explained his position in a lengthy telegram to Montagu on 9 July: We have throughout had before us the principle that policy must be dictated by [the] military force available to support it. The principle we feel has not been sufficiently borne in mind in the adoption of the policy of force recommended by [the] Minister at Teheran, who appears neither to have appreciated the force available nor understood the necessary limitations, namely - supply,1 1

Cab. 27/24/18, 1918.

Minutes

of the Eastern Committee,

4 July

164

HAR, REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

transport, etc*, to its application* The result has been failure at Teheran, combined with serious and indefinite military commitments elsewhere, which are calculated to react unfavourably throughout the Middle East especially on Afghanistan which is the pivot of the problem* The

Viceroy

complained

that

India's

opinion

had

been

disregarded and that the had been instructed to avoid sending it to Tehran altogether* With the Turco-German menace before us we considered [that] our policy should be to secure the friendship as far as possible of the countries th