Wahhabism and the Rise of the House of Saud 9781845199340, 9781782845782, 9781782845799, 1845199340

Table of contents :
Front Cover
Title Page
Copyright
Contents
Preface
Note on Transliteration
Introduction
1. The Rise of Wahhabism within a Tribal Society
Najd’s Geography and Ecology
Wahhabism and Tribes in Najd
The Sedentary Area of Najd as a Matrix of Wahhabism
2. The Theological and Ethical Origin of Wahhabism
The Emergence of Wahhabism
The Inspirers of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab
Purifying Islam from Alien Beliefs and Customs
3. Facing Internal and External Challenges
Subjugating Religious and Political Opposition in Arabia
The Ottoman and Egyptian Intervention
The Ability of the Saudi–Wahhabi Movement to Survive
4. Animating the Wahhabi Spark
Internalizing Wahhabi Principles in the Hearts of the Common People
The Role of ‘Abdullah Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab
The Second Generation of Religious Scholars after the Egyptian Invasion
The Rise of a New Branch of the Saudis and a New Capital
The Theocratic Rule of Turki and Faysal
5. Religion under Faysal and His Successors
Faysal’s Allies and Adversaries and the Restoration of the State
Faysal’s Territorial Sway
The Religious Aspect of Faysal’s Rule
The Role of Religious Scholars after Faysal’s Death
The Force of the the Religious Scholars’ Network
6. Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice
Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and the Takfir
The Boundaries between Tawhid (Monotheism) and Shirk (Polytheism)
Radicalizing the Takfiri Discourse
‘Abd al-Latif’s Takfiri Discourse
The Wahhabi Notion of Kufr versus Other Islamic Notions of Kufr
The Significance of Transmitting Takfiri Discourse to the Masses
Epilogue: Religion and State in Islam and the Saudi–Wahhabi Case
The Features of the Islamic State in Historical Perspective
The Islamic State versus the Western State
The Perpetual Alliance between Princes and Religious Scholars in Saudi Arabia
Notes
Bibliography
Index
Back Cover

Citation preview

Copyright © Tarik Firro, 2018. Published in the Sussex Academic e-Library, 2018. SUSSEX ACADEMIC PRESS PO Box 139, Eastbourne BN24 9BP, UK Distributed worldwide by Independent Publishers Group (IPG) 814 N. Franklin Street Chicago, IL 60610, USA

ISBN 9781845199340 (Cloth) ISBN 9781782845782 (EPub) ISBN 9781782845799 (Kindle) ISBN 9781782845522 (Pdf ) All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purposes of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. This e-book text has been prepared for electronic viewing. Some features, including tables and figures, might not display as in the print version, due to electronic conversion limitations and/or copyright strictures.

Contents Preface Note on Transliteration

vii ix

Introduction 1 The Rise of Wahhabism within a Tribal Society Najd’s Geography and Ecology Wahhabism and Tribes in Najd The Sedentary Area of Najd as a Matrix of Wahhabism

1 14 14 17 22

2

The Theological and Ethical Origin of Wahhabism The Emergence of Wahhabism The Inspirers of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab Purifying Islam from Alien Beliefs and Customs

30 30 36 44

3

Facing Internal and External Challenges Subjugating Religious and Political Opposition in Arabia The Ottoman and Egyptian Intervention The Ability of the Saudi–Wahhabi Movement to Survive

48 48 57 62

4

Animating the Wahhabi Spark Internalizing Wahhabi Principles in the Hearts of the Common People The Role of ‘Abdullah Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab The Second Generation of Religious Scholars after the Egyptian Invasion The Rise of a New Branch of the Saudis and a New Capital The Theocratic Rule of Turki and Faysal

69 69

Religion under Faysal and His Successors Faysal’s Allies and Adversaries and the Restoration of the State Faysal’s Territorial Sway

88 88

5

70 74 78 81

92

vi | Contents

6

The Religious Aspect of Faysal’s Rule The Role of Religious Scholars after Faysal’s Death The Force of the Religious Scholars’ Network

95 102 108

Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practicee Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and the Takfir The Boundaries between Tawhid (Monotheism) and Shirk (Polytheism) Radicalizing the Takfiri Discourse ‘Abd al-Latif’s Takfiri Discourse The Wahhabi Notion of Kufr versus other Islamic Notions of Kufr The Significance of Transmitting Takfiri Discourse to the Masses

112 112 117 122 124 131 139

Epilogue: Religion and State in Islam and the Saudi–Wahhabi Case The Features of the Islamic State in Historical Perspective The Islamic State versus the Western State The Perpetual Alliance between Princes and Religious Scholars in Saudi Arabia

143

Notes Bibliography Index

165 189 199

143 152 157

Preface During the preparation of this study I consulted a number of friends who are familiar with Wahhabism and was encouraged to elaborate further the main topics dealt with in my doctoral thesis, “Al al-Shaykh in the Second Saudi State, 1824–1891” (2003). This book expands the thesis discussion to include topics that would accommodate my presentation to the requirement of readers who look for an understanding of the socioeconomic, political, and religious conditions behind the emergence of the Wahhabi–Saudi movement during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, before the establishment of the modern Saudi kingdom. To do so, I provide an outline of the importance of the tribal features of Najd and elsewhere in Arabia, and describe and analyze the interrelation between religion and politics that characterized the Saudi–Wahhabi alliance from the eighteenth century onward. The present book follows the main historical events that occurred in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which constitute, in my view, the main turning points in the history of the Saudi–Wahhabi movement and still affect the political and religious life of modern Saudi Arabia. In order to explain these turning points, chapter discussions go back to socioeconomic and intellectual developments in Najd before the eighteenth century that formed the background of the movement’s emergence and its ability to survive. The study attempts to reassess the connection between Wahhabism and Hanbaliyya (Hanbalism), focusing on the salafi principles articulated in the writings of the pre-Wahhabi scholars and their influence on the preaching of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and other Wahhabi scholars. I hope that this book will provide new insights into the sociopolitical, cultural, and religious background of the modern Saudi state, and illuminate a wider canvas than a mere political history of this state. This study could not have been completed without the help of a number of friends and institutions, and I am grateful to all of them. I appreciate the assistance I received from the Middle East Department, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, where I completed my doctoral thesis. It is a special pleasure to acknowledge my gratitude to Dr Nimrod Hurvitz and Prof. Dror Zeevi, who kindled my interest in the

viii | Preface subject of Wahhabism, inspired me, and stimulated my mind with their helpful comments. I was especially fortunate during the final stages of my book to have had the help of Dr Michael Appel, ex-chairman of the Department of Middle Eastern History at Haifa University, where I spent one year of postdoctoral research. Acknowledgement is due to the directors and staff of various institutions and libraries in England. I am especially grateful to Prof. Eugene Rogan, Director of the Middle East Centre of St Antony’s College, Oxford, where I spent four months of research on this study. His suggestions and our conversations influenced and inspired my research. Last but not least, I would like to acknowledge the support of my wife Mayada, who helped and encouraged me to bring this study to fruition. In gratitude for the patience and understanding she has shown, I dedicate this book to her and to our children, Umri and Yusuf.

Note on Transliteration English transliteration of Arabic terms follows the International Journal of Middle East Studies with slight differences. Terms in Arabic are italicized without a capital letter, such as hadith, shari‘a, sunna. Names have been given according to their Arabic form in order to ensure uniformity, with only a few exceptions (e.g. Riyadh, Saud, Saudis, Karbala).

Introduction The emergence of the Wahhabi movement in the eighteenth century in Najd has occupied and still occupies researchers of modern Islam. The present research will follow the vicissitudes of this movement, investigating the religious, political, cultural, and social factors that enabled its religious and political leaders to keep it alive, despite internal and external challenges. No doubt, Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703–91), the founder of the doctrine, and his successors (Al alShaykh) played a major role in introducing religious “reforms” into Najd and other areas of Arabia. But these “reforms” could not be understood without examining the sociopolitical framework that enabled the first Wahhabis to propagate their religious convictions. The focal themes to be investigated in this study are the socioeconomic, cultural, religious, and political conditions that affected the history of the Wahhabi movement before the twentieth century. Although the study focuses on Wahhabism of the nineteenth century, it follows the development of the doctrine since its foundation in the eighteenth century, attempting to employ an integrative method based on an interdisciplinary approach. Of course, such attempts must naturally confront the fact that our study cannot cover all aspects, and that some of them have to be set aside for other studies. To reach a relatively comprehensive study, several sources have been taken together. Before dealing with the primary sources, we refer to the general sources consulted in this study. So far, only two MA dissertations have dealt directly with the political development of Arabia during the Second Saudi State. The first was written by ‘Abd al-Fattah Abu ‘Aliya at the University of Cairo in 1969, “al-Dawla alSa‘udiyya al-Thaniyya, 1256–1309/1841–1891” (The Second Saudi State, 1840–1891), and was published in Riyadh in 1985. This work is no more than a historical record of military and political activities of Faysal Ibn Turki (1788–1865) within Najd and Arabia. The second dissertation was written by Avital Ashkenazi Holdenburg, “Faysal Ibn Turki and the Second Saudi State.” Although she refers to the Wahhabi judicial system, Holdenburg follows Abu ‘Aliya’s political and military survey. In addition to these two works, two books were consulted: the first was written by Richard Bayly Winder, Saudi Arabia in the

2 | Introduction Nineteenth Century, which deals with the political development of the Second Saudi State and its relations with the Western powers and the Ottoman Empire, and the second book was written by Alexei M. Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, which follows the historical development of Wahhabism since the eighteenth century until the Kuwait War in 1990–1. Although it refers to religious aspects during the period under investigation, William Ochsenwald’s book Religion, Society, and the State in Arabia: Hijaz under Ottoman Control, 1840–1908 concentrates on the region of Hijaz rather than on Najd. The only article that deals directly with the religious dimension of the Second Saudi State was written by Michael Crawford, “Civil War, Foreign Intervention, and the Question of Political Legitimacy: A Nineteenth-Century Saudi Qadi’s Dilemma,” published in the International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 14 (1982), pp. 227–48. A few other books and articles deal in general with religious aspects of the modern Saudi state without referring directly to the role of Al al-Shaykh during the period under investigation. Additional works worth mentioning are Hamid Algar, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay; David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia; Natana Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From the Revival and Reform to the Global Jihad; Michael Cook, “The Expansion of the First Saudi State: The Case of al-Washm”; Madawi Al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation; Ayman Al-Yassini, Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; Joseph Kechichian “The Role of the Ulama in the Politics of an Islamic State: The Case of Saudi Arabia”; and Michele Kjorlien, “State and Religion in Saudi Arabia”; Muhammad al-Atawneh, “Religion and State in the Contemporary Middle East: The Case of Saudi Arabia.” In addition to these works, the study consults many other secondary sources that deal with Wahhabism, the Saudis, and Islam in general. Although these books and articles are useful for our research, their emphasis on religious and political aspects sometimes leads them to omit the socioeconomic and cultural dimensions that played an important role in the success and survival of Wahhabism. Most of them deal with socioeconomic and cultural conditions as a passepartout in order to explain religious and political aspects. The present study attempts to understand the subject from several aspects, by combining the mundane and the spiritual of the movement, placing it in its historical context and comparing it with other Islamic doctrines. To evaluate the role of Al al-Shaykh in the development of Wahhabism during the Second Saudi State, our study will rely on primary sources which can be classified into two categories: (1) Arabic

Introduction | 3 chronicles, religious writings, and biographies; (2) Western archives and travel literature. Since 1960, publishers in Saudi Arabia have been making great efforts to publish almost all the available manuscript chronicles, theological treatises and biographies written by Wahhabis and dealing with the history of Najd. Six published chronicles exemplify the Najdi historical records. (1) Ahmad Ibn Manqur (1657–1714), Tarikh al-Shaykh, Ahmad Ibn Manqur. This was edited and published by ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Khuwatir (1918–2014) in 1970. Ibn Manqur’s chronicle refers to sedentary areas of Najd before the rise of Wahhabism. (2) Muhammad Ibn ‘Umar Al-Fakhiri (1772–1860), Kaba’ir al-Akhbar al-Najdiyya. This was edited and published by ‘Abdullah Ibn Yusuf al-Shibil in the 1980s under the title al-Akhbar al-Najdiyya, and surveys historical events related to Wahhabism. (3) Husayn Ibn Ghannam (d. 1811), Rawdat al-Afkar wa-l-Ifham liMurtad al-Hal wa-l-Iman wa-Ta‘dad Ghazwat Dhawi al-Islam. This chronicle was edited and published by Nasir al-Din Asad. It focuses on the historical development of Wahhabism during the eighteenth century, and was dedicated to the founder of the doctrine. (4) ‘Uthman Ibn Bishr (1780–1873), ‘Inwan al-Majd fi Tarikh Najd. This chronicle is the most comprehensive historical essay on Wahhabism from its emergence until the period of Al al-Shaykh, and combines history and theology. (5) Ibrahim Ibn Salih Ibn ‘Isa (d. 1924), Tarikh Ba‘d alHawadith al-Waqi‘a fi Najd. This chronicle was edited and published by Hamad al-Jasir in 1965. Its importance stems from the fact that it covers the whole period of the three Saudi states. (6) ‘Abdullah Ibn Muhammad al-Bassam (1851–1927), Tuhfat al-Mushtaq min Akhbar Najd wa-l-Hijaz wa-l-‘Iraq. As its title suggests, the book deals with historical events in Najd and its neighboring regions, and covers the historical periods of Wahhabism from its emergence until the second decade of the twentieth century. In addition to published chronicles, our study consults the religious writings of the founder of the doctrine and his successors, Al alShaykh. The founder of the doctrine wrote twenty religious books and treatises covering many aspects of the Muslim creed. ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab Al-al-Shaykh (1779–1869) wrote seven religious books and his son ‘Abd al-Latif (1810–76) wrote another five books. In addition to their books, ‘Abd al-Rahman and his son ‘Abd al-Latif issued many fatwas which were collected in several volumes. In evaluating the development of Wahhabism during two centuries, the study will use these religious writings of the founder and his successors. In addition to this, our study consults the fatwas collected by ‘Abd al-Malik Ibn Husayn Ibn ‘Abd al-Malik al-‘Isami (1639–99) in four volumes, Simt al-Nujum al-‘Awali fi Anba‘ al-

4 | Introduction Awa‘il wa-l-Tawali, and by ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Muhammad Ibn Qasim al-‘Isami, (1901–72), which were collected into ten volumes under the title Al-Durar al-Saniyya fi al-Ajuiba al-Najdiyya: Majmu‘ Rasa’l wa-Masa’il ‘Ulama Najd al-A‘lam min ‘Asr al-Shaykh Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab ila ‘Asrina. The Wahabbi fatwas serve as a basis for the judicial system of Saudi Arabia today. Regarding biographies, the study will consult the six volumes of ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Bassam (1928–2002), ‘Ulama Najd Khilal Thamaniat Qurun (1998). These volumes provide information on the Najdi religious scholars before and after the establishment of the doctrine. Biographies of the Najdi ‘ulama (sing. ‘alim, a religious scholar) can also be found in Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Humayd (1820–78), al-Suhub al-Wabila ‘ala Dra’ih al-Hanabila (1996), which provides information on prominent Hanbali scholars in Arabia and other Muslim countries, and in Muhammad Ibn ‘Uthman al-Qadi, Rawdat al-Nazrin ‘an Ma’athir ‘Ulama Najd wa-Hwadith al Sinin (1989–90). Although the publishers in Saudi Arabia omitted the writings of the Wahhabis’ opponents we can find indications in the Wahhabi chronicles, biographies, and other writings in which some of the Najdi ‘ulama had criticized the doctrine of Wahhabism. For example, in his book ‘Inwan al-Majd fi Tarikh Najd, ‘Uthman Ibn Bishr refers to Muhammad Ibn ‘Ali Ibn Sallum, one of the Najdi ‘ulama who rejected Wahhabism. The biography Lam‘ al-Shihab fi Sirat Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, written by an unknown author, also deals with the historical record of the First Saudi State in a critical manner. The author criticized the way in which the Saudis invaded Hasa (al-Ahsa), Oman, Hijaz, and Yemen. His historical surveys cover the history of the Saudi state until 1817, referring to the relationship between the Saudis of Najd and Sulayman al-Muhammad, the governor of Hasa from 1736 to 1762. The author of Lam‘ al-Shihab provides valuable information about the life of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703– 91) and about the economic and political relations between the Najdi tribes and the governors of Hasa. The best chronicle to illustrate writings opposing Wahhabism is that of Ahmad Zini Dahlan (1816–86), who describes the relationship between Wahhabism and the Sharifs of Mecca, and criticizes Wahhabi religious preaching. Our study consulted Dahlan’s chronicle and looks for further opposing writings. Although the Najd area did not attract Western travelers until the end of the nineteenth century, the few archival materials and the travel literature are useful for understanding the historical development of Arabia during the period under investigation. Two Western archives are consulted: the India Office in the British Library and the Public

Introduction | 5 Record Office (PRO; now the National Archives). Most of the PRO and India Office documents refer to the period after 1902. However, the two archives contain a few valuable documents for our study. Although I consulted the two archives, I found that most of these documents were collected in ten volumes published in 1992 under the title Records of Saudi Arabia, Primary Documents, 1902–1960. The first volume of this collection contains documents related to our study. Regarding travelers, it is important to consult the books of John Lewis Burckhardt (1784–1817), Travels in Arabia and Notes on the Bedouins and the Wahabys, published in the first decades of the nineteenth century. Burckhardt’s importance stems from his description of the social life of the tribes, notably that of ‘Anza and the relations of these tribes with Wahhabism. In his Narrative of A Year’s Journey throughout Central and Eastern Arabia, 1862–1863, William Gifford Palgrave (1826–88) provides information on the Second Saudi State. Palgrave’s travel book is a sort of ethnographical observation of his journey in the regions of Ha’il, Hasa, and Riyadh. The study consults other travelers, such as Lewis Pelly (1825–92), Report on a Journey to the Wahabee Capital of Riyadh in Central Arabia; Anne Blunt (1837–1917), A Pilgrimage to Najd; and Charles Doughty (1843– 1926), Travels in Arabia Deserta. Many researchers attempt to present historical explanations for the success of a religious “reformist” movement within a peripheral area such as Najd. In contrast to Muslim urban centers, Najd lacked the tradition of schools and institutions where religious scholars taught, studied, and composed their books and treatises on religious issues. Explaining the success of Wahhabism in introducing its religious “reformist” ideas into the peripheral area of Najd, historians generally use two explanatory paradigms. The first relates to the success of Wahhabism in adjusting its theological characteristics to the ecological and geopolitical conditions of Najd in the eighteenth century. The second attempts to place Wahhabism within the modern Islamic salafi trend, which calls to return to the Islam of al-salaf al-salih (the pious predecessors of first three generations of Muslims) that had become, by the nineteenth century, the dominant approach of Muslim scholars in challenging modernity. However, placing Wahhabism within the salafi trend of the nineteenth century would lead to anachronism. The salafi principles of Wahhabism had developed in the eighteenth century in an area outside the sphere of the Western challenge. Therefore it would be inconvenient to place Wahhabism with the modern movements that emerged as a reaction to the growing challenge of the West and that subscribed to the ideal of reform that would save Islam from decline.

6 | Introduction In this study, a less ambitious project has been undertaken to provide an explanation for the emergence and success of Wahhabism. Perhaps a potential explanation may be achieved by examining the historical development of the movement in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries without adhering to a specific paradigm. The approach employed in this study will be based on the belief that an appropriate explanation of historical events and processes lies in the analysis of textual materials through which one can at least generate explanatory hypotheses. In analyzing textual materials, the study describes events and pinpoints the hallmarks of the religious principles that underlie the dynamics of the Wahhabi doctrine and its capability to survive and establish a political entity. Because the social life of the inhabitants was based on tribalism, the study will pay attention to the role of religion and its effect on the relationship between tribal society and politics and the emergence of tribal coalitions in which mundane and religious aspects were intricately intertwined. The historical record of the Wahhabis and Saudis shows that a network of religious scholars and political leaders spread the principles of the doctrine either by preaching or by military force. From its first emergence in the eighteenth century, the mundane and religious domains of the Wahhabi movement were intricately intertwined with two leaders: Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the religious dynasty of Al al-Shaykh, and Muhammad Ibn Saud (1745–65), the founder of the military and political dynasty of the Saudis. Thanks to the collaboration between the descendants of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and Ibn Saud in the early years of the nineteenth century, most of the regions in the Arabian peninsula were put under a political entity which is called by historians the First Saudi State. Although Egyptian military campaigns put an end to the First Saudi State in 1818, the Wahhabi creed managed to survive, enabling the Wahhabi– Saudi leadership at the beginning of 1820s to regain parts of the lost areas. From this time until 1843, the Wahhabi–Saudi leaders succeeded in restoring large parts of their previous domains and reestablishing the previous political entity. This is called by historians the Second Saudi State. Our study reexamines the ability of the Wahhabi creed to rehabilitate itself after suffering a harsh blow under Egyptian military control. During the period of Egyptian occupation, Wahhabi religious leaders had to confront an intellectual and polemical clash with anti-Wahhabi adversaries from inside and outside Najd that threatened to wipe the whole movement out. Encouraged by the military presence of the Egyptians, anti-Wahhabi scholars made great efforts to eradicate Wahhabism from the soil of Arabia. Most of these

Introduction | 7 scholars came from the region of al-Qasim, which had strong trade links with other urban centers of the Islamic world, and therefore its scholars were exposed to religious ideas formulated in these centers. The study focuses on the role of Al al-Shaykh’s ‘ulama in reconsolidating the Wahhabi creed and mobilizing supporters against anti-Wahhabi forces. Our investigation concentrates on the religious activities of Al al-Shaykh, notably ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1779–1868) and ‘Abd al-Latif Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman (1810–76), assessing their role in reconsolidating Wahhabism in the nineteenth century and reevaluating the changes they introduced to the basic ideas of the doctrine. To do so, this study investigates the transitional period that linked Wahhabism of the eighteenth century with that of the nineteenth century, concentrating on the first generation of Al al-Shaykh, notably ‘Abdullah (1751–1828), the son of Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab and Sulayman Ibn ‘Abdullah (1785–1818) and the grandson of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. The religious role played by these two later ‘ulama legitimized the religious leadership of the descendants of alShaykh Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the doctrine, who therefore bore the name Al al-Shaykh. The first generation of Al al-Shaykh marks the bridge between ‘ulama of the First Wahhabi– Saudi State and those of the Second State on which our study focuses. Although Najd was a peripheral area without a scholastic tradition similar to that of the major cities of the Muslim world, the first generation of Al al-Shaykh succeeded in establishing their scholastic religious center in Riyadh, creating a network of ‘ulama who were behind the revival of the creed after years of Egyptian occupation in the nineteenth century. To obtain a better understanding and comprehension of the Wahhabi flywheel effect on tribal society in this peripheral area, the study assesses the socioeconomic, religious, and political conditions existing in Najd before the emergence of Wahhabism. Such an assessment refers to the process of migration, the relationship between sedentary and nomadic populations, and the political entities that developed in the area before the eighteenth century. The first Wahhabis claimed that their religious creed did not constitute a new separate doctrine from Hanbaliyya. This claim continued to be held by the Wahhabis throughout the nineteenth century and probably continues until today. Thus the study deals with the impact of Hanbali traditional writings, notably that of Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), and investigates his influence on the issue of relations between politics and religion. Ibn Taymiyya argued that ‘ulama in Islam constitutes the main body responsible for defending al-shari‘a (divine law, Islamic religious law, and principles of jurisprudence) on which legit-

8 | Introduction imized government relies. Al al-Shaykh in the nineteenth century continued to consider the Saudis the legitimate governors. However, during the time when Saudi chiefs were competing among themselves over the military and political leadership, Al al-Shaykh attempted to determine the religious arguments through which they could legitimize the leadership of one Saudi chief against his rival from the same family. The study investigates these religious arguments, comparing them with that of Ibn Taymiyya and other Hanbali scholars. Al al-Shaykh saw themselves as the successors of their grandfather, Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhab, and as successors of Ibn Taymiyya and other great Hanbali scholars who emphasized attachment to the tradition of al-salaf. In this regard, the study investigates the attitude of Al alShaykh toward purifying Islam and removing “alien” innovations (bida‘, sing. bid‘a) as a necessary means to restore the tradition of alsalaf. The main issues to be investigated are the interpretation of Al al-Shaykh of concepts such as qiyas, ijma‘, tawhid, ijtihad, tathir ali‘tiqad, and al-tawassul in order to reevaluate similarities and differences between them and their Hanbali predecessors, including their grandfather, the founder of Wahhabism. Such an investigation attempts to connect their religious ideations with the sociopolitical context of their time, when Wahhabism challenged internal and external dangers. One of the foremost objectives of their religious and political activities – besides all the challenges they were obliged to meet – was the attempt by Al al-Shaykh to cope with the complexities that resulted from the social structure of Najdi society. The study assesses the ways through which Al al-Shaykh and other Wahhabi scholars succeeded in propagating religious ideas among the local population in order to internalize the creed in a tribal society in Arabia. Najdi society was divided into two domains, that of al-badu (the nomads) and that of al-hadr (the settled). In domains of both the nomadic and the sedentary populations tribalism prevailed, which hardened the task of political rulers to aggregate them into one political entity. The Najdi chronicles show that tribal alliances were behind the success of Wahhabis and Saudis in establishing their political entities. However, these alliances were not permanent and some of them were embroidered under compulsion. This kind of social structure, characterized by fickleness and caprice, posed a great challenge to the religious and political leaders of the Wahhabis and Saudis. The study tries to explain the role played by Al al-Shaykh in cementing religious zeal in order to form political and military coalitions based on the nomadic and sedentary elements that lay behind the sway of Wahhabism over Najd and other regions of Arabia. When the Saudis lost their ability

Introduction | 9 to unite the tribes under their leadership during the civil war (1865– 91), Al al-Shaykh intensified their religious activities to keep the Wahhabi spark alive. The study follows these activities, trying to investigate the religious means through which they could – at the end of the nineteenth century – to overcome the political disunity that enabled Saudi rivals to take over Najd. One of the means to propagate the creed among the local tribes and to keep the Wahhabi spark alive was by applying the system of mutawi‘a (a police force charged with enforcing Islamic morality in accordance with shari‘a law). The study traces the development of mutawi‘a, which served Al alShaykh to mobilize the masses in Wahhabi obedience. However, the mutawi‘a concentrated their religious activities among the sedentary population rather than among the nomads. Thus the study attempts to pinpoint events that would illustrate the role of religion in mobilizing nomads. It investigates the ways that enabled Al al-Shaykh and the Saudi chiefs to create and preserve political coalitions with the nomads during the 1824–76 period, from the appointment of ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan as the supreme religious leader of the Wahhabi religious network until the death of his son ‘Abd al-Latif. Although the Saudi chiefs and Al al-Shaykh lost their predominance in Najd for one decade (1891–1902), they succeeded in 1902 in restoring the Saudi state and expanded its sway to include many parts of Arabia. The study assesses the contribution of Al al-Shaykh in this crucial period in which the Saudis consolidated the institutions of their state to become, later in the 1930s, the basis for reestablishing the modern kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The study follows the main historical events in the nineteenth century, focusing on three successive periods, 1824–43, 1843–65, and 1865–91, each with its own importance in implanting the Wahhabi creed in Najd and other regions of Arabia. In this sense, the years 1824, 1843, 1865, and 1891 were turning points in Wahhabi–Saudi history that still affect the political and religious life of modern Saudi Arabia. In the first period (1824–34), Turki Ibn ‘Abdullah (1769– 1833) revived the Saudi political entity and restored the religious guidance of Al al-Shaykh, setting up the core of religious and political institutions that served his son Faysal in renovating the Second Saudi State. Even though the death of Faysal in 1865 introduced a setback for the further development of these institutions, Faysal’s innovations became the model for Al al-Shaykh and Saudi leaders to build up the Saudi state in the twentieth century. Although it is beyond the scope of this study to assess all the religious and political innovations from 1824 until the beginning of the twentieth century, it attempts to connect the period under discussion

10 | Introduction with the twentieth century. In other words, the study attempts to depict and explain the historical origins of contemporary Wahhabism. The main concern of the study proceeds from the assumption that, in the period under discussion, Wahhabism was rooted in the soil of Arabia to become a solid religious force and to determine its future. Thus the choice to concentrate discussion on the period between 1824 and 1902 stems from the fact that, throughout this period, Wahhabi scholars and Saudi leaders forged the basic religious and political elements of Wahhabism in the twentieth century. During this period, radical changes had taken place within the Saudi political entity in comparison with its early structure in the eighteenth century when Dir‘iyya was its political capital. In 1824, Turki Ibn ‘Abdullah Ibn Muhammad Ibn Saud succeeded in reuniting the Najdi tribes under his control in Riyadh, which became the permanent capital for Saudi states. While Riyadh marked the beginning of a new political era, the reign of Turki and the religious guidance of ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan also marked a shift within the supremacy of the Saudi and Al al-Shaykh dynasties. This supremacy continued to shape the Wahhabi–Saudi movement through Faysal, the son of Turki, and ‘Abd al-Latif, the son of ‘Abd al-Rahman. However, the new military expedition of the Egyptians in 1838 suspended Faysal’s rule for five years, during which Faysal was in jail. After the Egyptian withdrawal, Faysal resumed his religious, military, and political alliances in Najd. Thanks to his alliance with Al al-Shaykh and tribal chiefs in the area, Faysal managed to restore his rule in Riyadh in 1843, enabling him introduce “reforms” into his state. At this stage, he began to combine the religious institutions of Al al-Shaykh with the administrative legacy created by the Egyptians in Najd. Relying on the religious network of Al al-Shaykh, he ameliorated the system of taxation, set up new methods of army recruitment, and introduced Wahhabi shar‘i courts into many parts of his realm. Al al-Shaykh helped him to apply the principle of Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong. With his political and religious measures, Faysal reinforced the theocratic characteristics of Saudi–Wahhabi rule. This study, therefore, follows the process of institutionalizing Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, which had become, in the twentieth century, one of the pillars of Saudi rule in Arabia. At the same time, the study depicts the development of agriculture and commerce within the sedentary areas that had enabled Faysal to enlarge the city of Riyadh to become the permanent capital of Saudi Arabia. The civil war erupted after the death of Faysal in 1865, and the death of ‘Abd al-Rahman in 1868 posed great difficulties for keeping

Introduction | 11 alive the legacy of Faysal. Nevertheless, the religious activities of ‘Abd al-Latif, the son of ‘Abd al-Rahman, after 1865 proved to be successful in challenging the dangers that threatened to uproot the Wahhabi creed from the minds of the local population. The study refers to ‘Abd al-Latif’s religious role in keeping alive the creed that had become the core of the Third Saudi State after 1902. For one decade before 1902, Riyadh and other Arabian regions were under the control of Al al-Rashid, who succeeded in putting an end to the Second Saudi State. During this decade, Wahhabism proved that its ability to survive was stronger than the temporary political dominance of Al al-Rashid. The study refers to this survival ability despite the lack of political and military backing by Saudi chiefs. The dynastic chain of Al al-Shaykh continued to provide Wahhabism with religious zeal inherited from the founder of the creed. As in the period of Egyptian occupation, the Wahhabi legacy met the challenge of political upheaval with great success and maintained its relative hegemony as the main doctrine accepted by scholars in Najd. To explain this relative hegemony, the study follows the active role of ‘Abd al-Rahman, his son ‘Abd al-Latif and his grandson ‘Abdullah, who became in the 1880s the leading figure of Al al-Shaykh. When ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Saud (1876–1953) recaptured Riyadh in 1902 to reestablish the Third Saudi State, ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abd al-Latif was recognized by Ibn Saud and Wahhabi scholars as the religious supreme leader. Like his father and grandfather, ‘Abdullah granted Ibn Saud the religious legitimacy to rebuild a state that had begun, ever since the beginning of the twentieth century, to face the Western challenge. This same legitimacy was used in the 1930s to transform the Saudi principality into the Saudi Arabian kingdom. In order to assess the chain that links the Wahhabism of the eighteenth century with that of the twentieth century, the study presents an analysis of the development of the takfiri discourse (accusing others of being unbelievers) of Al al-Shaykh. Investigating the origin and the development of this discourse will shed new light on the ability of Wahhabism to challenge the polemics of anti-Wahhabi scholars. This investigation will provide an understanding of the ways through which religious ideas were transmitted to the masses. To follow the takfiri discourse, the study attempts to pinpoint the interrelation between religion and the sociopolitical conditions of Arabia during the period under discussion. Discussing and analyzing the sociopolitical conditions in Najd during the years from 1824 to 1876 will contribute to our understanding the motives of the takfiri discourse and its similarities with and difference from that of the first period of Wahhabism. Investigating the takfiri discourse will contest

12 | Introduction views in much of the research that regard Wahhabi scholars merely as religious figures. The study provides historical examples that testify to the role of Al al-Shaykh in consolidating the politics of the state when they took initiatives in politics and military activities. This will also explain the emergence of Ikhwan at the beginning of the twentieth century as a mass political movement that, with its religious zeal, challenged the Saudis themselves. Explaining the reasons behind the emergence of this movement will not make it fully understood without connecting it with the ways in which religious ideas were transmitted to the masses of nomadic tribes who constituted the main elements of Ikhwan. In this regard, the study argues that the transmission of these religious ideas to the masses granted Al al-Shaykh the status of an intellectual agent with sufficient influence to create a local identity in Arabia that enabled the Saudis to reestablish modern Saudi Arabia. An analysis of the language used by Al al-Shaykh will provide a basis for comparison with the language used by the modern Saudi media. Despite the continuity of the Wahhabi creed, the present book challenges many studies that emphasize the “unchangeable” elements of the Wahhabi–Saudi phenomenon and that consider the Second Saudi State as a new embodiment of the First State, with the same goals and ideology. Despite the strong connection between the First and Second Saudi States, the study provides an alternative analysis based not only on continuity but also on internal innovation introduced by cultural, social, and intellectual factors. In this sense, an important contribution of the study stems from analysis of the new ideas and concepts introduced by Al al-Shaykh into Wahhabism and the state system. A comparative study of Al al-Shaykh’s religious concepts with other Muslim ‘ulama who lived at the end of the nineteenth century constitutes an additional contribution to research. In order to offer a comprehensive historical account, the study presents the themes in chronological order. To preserve the Arabic nuances of the religious discourse of scholars, short quotations were retained in Arabic transliterated into the Roman alphabet, although the content will also be presented in English. This study falls into six chapters. The first deals with socioeconomic conditions in Najd before and after the emergence of Wahhabism, refering to the tribal society of Najd and relations between its sedentary and nomadic populations, and their impact on the development of Wahhabism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Chapter 2 deals with the theological and ethical concepts of Wahhabism. It attempts to follow the the origin of the ideas which inspired Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, comparing his concepts with those of other Hanbali

Introduction | 13 scholars and of his descendants Al al-Shaykh. Chapter 3 examines the internal and external challenges that faced Wahhabism at the beginning of the nineteenth century when Al al-Shaykh had already established their religious network that enabled the Saudi chiefs to revive the political entity they had lost after the Egyptian occupation. Chapter 4 focuses on the ability of the Wahhabi creed to survive and even to regain its force as the main factor in reviving the Wahhabi– Saudi coalition embodied in the Second Saudi State. The chapter attempts to explain the ability of religious and political leaders to reanimate the Wahhabi spark and to build up the institutions that became, later in the twentieth century, the basis for the modern state of Saudi Arabia. Chapter 5 focuses on the relationship between the Saudi chiefs and Al al-Shaykh during the reign of Faysal. It investigates the role of the religious network created by Al al-Shaykh and other Wahhabi scholars in two domains: the first concerns the ways and means of religious mobilization among the Najdi population; the second refers to the religious polemic between them and their opponents. The chapter also deals with the stance of Al al-Shaykh during the civil war that erupted after Faysal’s death. Chapter 6 examines the development of takfiri discourse during the Second Saudi State, comparing this discourse with that of the First Saudi State and with that of other Hanbalis in the previous periods and of Hanbalis of the nineteenth century. The chapter also compares the Wahhabi position toward takfir with that some other Islamic scholars who deal with the notion of takfir. An Epilogue was added to this study to deal with the ongoing debate on the role of religion in the Islamic medieval and modern states and the implication of such debate for understanding the question of state and religion in Saudi Arabia.

CHAPTER

1

The Rise of Wahhabism within a Tribal Society Najd’s Geography and Ecology The present chapter deals with the socioeconomic conditions of Najd that formed the background for the developmemt of of the Wahhabi movement from the eighteenth century. It attempts to provide an understanding of the force that enabled the first Wahhabis to spread their religious doctrine within the tribal society of the vast areas of Najd. The religious doctrine of the Wahhabism was created in the eighteenth century within Najd, the largest area of the Arabian peninsula near Hijaz, where Islam had emerged in the seventh century. The only sources that refer to Najd before the rise of Islam are found in early Arabic poetry, but they do not define its borders. The first Arab Muslim geographers to refer to the geographical aspects of Najd were al-Hasan Ibn ‘Abdullah al-Asfahani of the ninth century,1 and Abu ‘Ubayd ‘Aballah al-Bakri (el-Bekri) al-Andalusi (1040–94).2 Najd was defined as the largest area of the Arabian peninsula, which extends from al-Nufudh in the north to the edge of al-Rub‘ al-Khali (the most desolate desert in Arabia) in the south, and from Hijaz in the west to Dahnaa’ (one of wildest deserts in Arabia) in the east. Typographically, it is a hilly region in which the highlands overlook the Hijaz area in the west, and slope down toward the eastern coast of the Arabian peninsula. The weather conditions of its highlands differ from other zones in the northern parts of the Arabian peninsula. With about 100– 200 millimeters of rain per year, and an oasis that emerges within a vast region of desert, the people in Najd were able to develop agriculture and permanent sedentary settlements.3 Arab Muslim geographers divide Najd into eleven sub-regions. 1 Al-‘Arid, the central region of Najd, is located between alMahmal in the north and al-Kharj in the south and between

The Rise of Wahhabism within a Tribal Society | 15 the mountain of Tuwayq in the west and the desert of Dahnaa’ in the east. Its main source of water comes from the valley of Hanifa, one of the important valleys in Najd. Al-‘Arid comprises sedentary settlements in the areas of Riyadh, Dir‘iyya,4 ‘Uyayna, and Manfuha. 2 Al-Mihmal is located between al-Sha‘ib in the south and Sudayer, on the Tuwayq slopes. The largest settlements of al-Mihmal are Thadiq, al-Sufara, Raghaba, and al-Bir. 3 Al-Qasim is located between the Shammar mountain in the north and al-Washm region in the south. Through al-Qasim passes the valley of al-Rimah, the greatest stream in Najd. Thus, al-Qasim is the richest region of Najd with its underground water reservoir.5 The most important settlements of al-Qasim are Burayda, ‘Unayza, al-Rass, al-Shmas, and alHilaliyya. 4 Al-Washm is located west of the mountain of Tuwayq and borders al-‘Arid in the south, al-Mihmal in the east, Sudayr, and al-Qasim in the north. The most prominent settlements of al-Washm are Ushayqir, Tharmada, Shaqra, Marrat, ‘Uthayfiya, and al-Qasab. 5 Al-Sha‘ib borders al-‘Arid in the north, the mountain of Tuwayq and al-Washm in the west, and Dahnaa’ in the east. The principal settlements in this region are Huraymila and alQurayna. 6 Sudayr is situated on a plateau at the northeastern edge of the mountain of Tuwayq. Sudayr contains three streams: Wadi al-Mashaqir, Wadi al-Miyah, and Wadi al-Kalb. The most important settlements of Sudayr are al-Tuwaym, Harma, al-Majma‘a, al-Ghat, al-Zilfi, Jalajil, al-Rawda, and al-Huta. 7 Al-Kharj is situated to the south-west of al-‘Arid and contains the ancient settlements in Najd built within its fertile oases, such as al-Dilam and al-Yamama. 8 Jabal Shammar is located in the northern parts of Najd between Wadi al-Rimah and the Nufudh. The most famous settlements in Jabal Shammar are Ha’il and Qufar. 9 Al-Fur‘ is a valley called Wadi al-Fur‘, in which the water sources enabled the inhabitants to build sedentary settlements in oases such as Hutat Bani Tamim and al-Hariq. 10 Al-Aflaj is situated to the south of Wadi al-Fur‘. It is rich in underground waters,6 and contains several sedentary settlements such as al-Badi‘, Layla, and al-Hamar. 11 Wadi al-Dawasir, the southern area of Najd, borders the mountain of Tuwayq in the north, Dahnaa’ desert in the east,

16 | The Rise of Wahhabism within a Tribal Society Bisha in the west, and al-Rubi‘ al-Khali in the south. Its main settlements are al-Lidam, al-Hanabija, and Kamda.7 It is unknown when the sedentary settlements were founded in these regions of Najd. However, our sources indicate that during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries the permanent settlements attracted many nomadic inhabitants to build villages within the oases of these areas and to develop agriculture and trade suitable for a sedentary population. The commercial relationships between the sedentary areas of Najd and other parts of the Muslim world introduced into some villages and small cities those religious schools in which a new stratum of ‘ulama emerged to absorb ideas from religious centers such as Damascus, Cairo, and Mecca. Most of the researchers dealing with Wahhabi–Saudi movement indicate that the tribal society of Najd and the interrelations between sedentary and nomadic populations had a great impact on its development from its emergence in the eighteenth century until the appearance of the modern Saudi kingdom. In the conclusion of the book Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, Albert Hourani poses the following questions, relating to the connection between tribalism and state formation: what is a tribe in the Muslim world? What is the state in that world? What has been the role of tribes in the formation, maintenance, and destruction of states? And has Islam endowed these processes with characteristics of its own?8 In the same way, one can pose the following question: what is the connection between tribalism and Saudi state formation that enables tribal structure to endure in modern times? In his book Of Sand and Soil, Nadav Samin attempts to answer this question by investigating the importance of tribal identity in modern Saudi Arabia. Although he deals with “the dynamic and contingent nature of tribal identity in modern Saudi Arabia,”9 he argues that “genealogical consciousness” in Saudi Arabia “survived into the modern age relatively intact.”10 According to him, the modern genealogical culture that reemerged in the Saudi state compelled many people to rediscover or invent patrilineal affiliations to prominent Arabian tribes that would facilitate their integration within the religious and bureaucratic institutions of the state.11 Samin’s findings recall Joseph Kostiner’s article “Transforming Dualities: Tribe and State Formation in Saudi Arabia,” in which he deals with the formation and development of the third Saudi state from 1902 to the 1930s. Kostiner focuses on the interaction between the tribal structure of the society and political, religious, and military developments. Attempting to underline the role of tribal affinities in the formation of the modern Saudi kingdom in 1930s, he argues that this interaction

The Rise of Wahhabism within a Tribal Society | 17 determined the territorial and institutional features of the Saudi state. In his assessment of the role played by the tribal chiefs consolidating political power, he relies on many examples throughout the process of creating a military force and a sort of governing system based on the leadership of the tribes. Incorporating chiefs in the military and in the administration enabled the Saudi clan to extend their central control over vast territories and to introduce a process of consolidation of the state accompanied by economic, social, and political changes in the society of the Arabian peninsula. The tribal chiefs who ran the administration and military forces also benefited from the economic and social prerogatives provided by the state in order to set up a social and political system called by him “the chieftaincy.”12

Wahhabism and Tribes in Najd The Arab tribal structure is a subject matter of study in which anthropologists, political scientists, and historians are all involved. They attempt to investigate the connection between politics and tribalism. In order to evaluate the role of tribe and kinship in determining the social and political feature of premodern societies, anthropologists, and historians usually use theories that refer to tribe and kinship in general,13 and to Arab tribe and kinship in particular. Almost all researchers who deal with Arab tribes consult al-Muqadama of ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), who places kinship at the center of his theory of ‘asabiyya, which is the key concept in his theoretical ideation concerning the development of human societies.14 This section of the chapter focuses on Najdi tribal structure without expanding the discussion to features of Arab tribal structure in general, which needs more than one chapter. Although it is beyond the scope of this study to expand the discussion on Arab tribalism, it is worth mentioning that tribalism and its political impact on the Middle Eastern and North African states were the subject of studies by researchers in anthropology, social history and political science.15 Although most of these researchers – like Samin and Kostiner – examine the subject during the the twentieth century, some of their arguments are valid for understanding the relation between polity and tribe in the case of the Wahhabi–Saudi movement since its emergence in the eighteenth century. Our historical records show that Wahhabi–Saudi movement experienced up and down phases, from 1744 until its final consolidation in a “modern” state in the 1930s. Throughout the eighteenth century, tribal units, combined with the religious zeal of Wahhabism, were the

18 | The Rise of Wahhabism within a Tribal Society main force that determined its rise and fall and then its final consolidation in the twentieth century. Throughout this period, the Saudi–Wahhabi power structure relied on tribal coalitions led by the chiefs of the Saudi family and by religious scholars led by the Wahhabi family. Most of the available sources that deal with the pre-Saudi–Wahhabi movement are chronologies written by religious scholars who focus on historical events and religious issues, which cannot provide sufficient information about the tribes and their structure. As was mentioned in the introduction, there are seven published chronicles which cover the main historical events occurring in Najd from the rise of the Saudi– Wahhabi movement to the second decade of the twentieth century.16 Al-Juhany adds some unpublished chronologies that describe events before the eighteenth century, such as that of Ahmad Ibn Muhammad Ibn Bassam (d. 1630), to which modern Saudi historians have possibly had access.17 He refers also to other accounts from the eighteenth century, which were collected at the beginning of the nineteenth century by ‘Uthman Ibn Mansur (1788–1865) and later attached to ‘Inwan al-Majd fi Tarikh Najd, the famous work of ‘Uthman Ibn Bishr.18 These chronologies indirectly hint at tribalism without giving details on which historians can rely for analyzing the interrelations between tribes and the development of the religious and political Saudi–Wahhabi movement. Only a few sources refer directly to tribes. The first is an incomplete manuscript written by Hamad Ibn La‘bun al-Mudliji (d. 1839). It deals with his own clan, al-Mudlij in the region of Sudayr, and provides some information about the tribes of Arabia before and during the rise of Wahhabism, including a brief reference to the Saudi family. The second is a manuscript written by Muhammad al-Bassam al-Tamimi (d. 1830) which deals with tribes in Arabia, Syria, and Iraq. Apart from these two manuscripts, other genealogical sources deal with tribes in modern times.19 Refering to social life in Najd, these sources distinguish between two categories designated by the terms al-qabaliyun and al-khadiriyun. The first is derived from the word qabila (tribe) and refers to kinship groups whose members claim descent from one of two eponymous Arab ancestors, ‘Adnan or Qahtan, and can trace their origin to a known tribe. The second comprises tradesmen and artisans who cannot claim such descent. The Arab literature divides al-qabaliyun into superior and inferior tribes: the former claim purity of their asl (origin) and their biological kinship and the latter are tribes the purity of whose asl is suspected by the former tribes.20 The historical records – relating to the Najdi society from the eighteenth century – suggest that the terms qabila (tribe) or ‘ashira (clan

The Rise of Wahhabism within a Tribal Society | 19 within a tribe) were used to denote several social types: kinship groups, extended families, coalitions of related families, and sometimes titles of elite families, such as Saud and Rashid, among others. In ten thick volumes of his encyclopedia, Muhammad Sulayman al-Tayb consulted almost all the written sources and many oral ones related to Arab tribes. Although he claims that his constructions of tribal lineages according to the sources are reliable, he admits that such constructions cannot represent factuality. In the introduction to the encyclopedia, he summarizes these findings, indicating that tribes meant not only pure or putative kinship groups, but also extended families transferred into known tribes by the name of their ancestors. In his attempt to follow the descent of these groups called tribes, he presents many examples of tribes, whose lineage is confused since the pre-Islamic period until today, indicating that controversial accounts of lineage characterize his sources. Even when he refers to tribes of nasb sarih (true lineage), he admits that tracing lineages is an impossible task, because external genealogical elements were introduced into every tribe throughout its history. This explains why researchers of Arab tribes find Qahtani tribes mixed with genealogical ‘Adnani ones and vice versa.21 Al-Tayb’s observation fits the structure of the tribe as social unit which gathers several groups whose members claim descent from a common ancestor. In this structure, the family is a part of a larger segment of more distant relatives, and they are then part of larger segments. In this hierarchy of segments, brothers would fight against cousins, unless outsiders came to fight them, as expressed by the Arab proverb: “My brothers I against cousins, and my cousins and I against the world.” The historical record of Najd before and after the emergence of the Saudi–Wahhabi movement attests that tribes whose members settled in the area sometimes adopted new names of their ancestors and even changed their lineage affiliations in accordance with the circumstances of sedentary life. Due to constant migration since fifteenth century, the tribal structure of the area had changed. The older and the newcomer tribes were never isolated from the wider political, social, and religious culture and had a great impact on such culture.22 Investigating the shifting affiliations of tribes and extended families in the area suggests that the formation and dissolution of alliances in Najd were the result of the tribal structure. Due the constant migratory processes from and into Najd during the three centuries that preceded the emergence of the Saudi–Wahhabi movement, the tribal structure in Najd had radically changed. Although the Najdi sedentary localities comprised categories of population which cannot claim tribal descent, such as al-‘abid (slaves), artisans, and traders, and aljiran (people under protection), tribes and their sub-tribes and clans

20 | The Rise of Wahhabism within a Tribal Society continued to constitute the bulk of the sedentary population. They used to claim tribal pedigree, fostering solidarity among their members. This feature of sedentary tribes had introduced constant splits among them and the emergence of new chiefs, who made great efforts to consolidate their political and economic power. The new chiefs had always resorted to the mechanism of fostering ‘asabiyya (solidarity) among their groups by claiming tribal pedigree. The Wahhabi–Saudi movement attempted to combine the religious and political dimensions, introducing a sort of ‘asabiyya similar to that which had prevailed during the first period of the Islamic state when religion reinforced the solidarity of the Muslim umma as a force that transcended tribal affiliations. Taking an example from the first period of Islam, the Saudi leaders could use the Wahhabi mission to create the ‘asabiyya based on religious zeal and to form an alliance between the tribes in the sedentary and nomadic areas of Najd while maintaining leadership of the Saudi clan. In this sense, thanks to their close relations with Wahhabi religious ‘ulama, the chiefs (ru’asa’ legitimate leaders of the tribal coalition in which each tribe considers itself equal to the others. Thus, from its foundation, the Saudi–Wahhabi polity was based on chieftaincy, which rules the different tribes by using religious zeal as a vehicle for attenuating antagonism among these tribes. Although the rule of chieftaincy created a hierarchy, it continued to be based on tribal coalition. One tribe, or branch of a tribe, such as the Saudis, could lead by consensus of the chiefs.23 Before elaborating the issue of the interactions between polity and tribes in Najd during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, we present a short historical survey of this interaction in the preWahhabi times which will help us understand this issue. Most of the historical records refer to the tribes of Banu Hanifa, whose segments or branches had dominated the area of Yamama, the sedentary area of Najd (southeast Najd) and its surroundings. Chronicles and genealogical records attempt to trace the lineage of Banu Hanifa, relating them to an ancestor in the name of Bakr Ibn Wa’il. These chronicles and records usually refer to Banu Hanifa as tribes and not a single tribe, which comprised several subgroups. These historical records trace the appearance of Banu Hanifa back to the eve of Islam, describing them as the powerful tribes in Najd and elsewhere in the Arabian peninsula.24 It is difficult to get information about Najd before and during the first Islamic period, because all sources on the subject are retrospective Arab chronicles written later. Izz al-Din Ibn al-Athir (1160–1233) is an example of the retrospective chroniclers who refer to Banu Hanifa when he presents his account of the capture of the

The Rise of Wahhabism within a Tribal Society | 21 area of Najd in 644 by Muslim forces led by Khalid Ibn al-Walid, the famous military leader. Ibn al-Walid nominated Samara ‘Amru al-‘Anbari as wali (governor) of Najd.25 According to him, the incorporation of the area into the first Islamic state had brought stability and security, accompanied by the prosperity of commerce and agriculture in the sedentary areas of the region.26 Based on classical chronicles, Hamad al-Jasir, the modern Saudi historian, claims that Banu Hanifa had settled the area of al-Yamama two centuries before Islam, and established there their capital in a town called Hajr.27 Al-Jasir repeats the description of Ibn al-Athir concerning the prosperity of the area during the first Islamic state, which lasted as a result of the rise of Umayyad dynasty (661–750), whose first ruler moved his capital to Damascus in 661. From the Umayyad period to the rise of the Saudi–Wahhabi movement, successive central regimes failed to incorporate Najd into their administrations.28 This situation enabled a local dynasty called Banu al-Akhaydir to establish in the 860s a quasi-independent political entity in Najd. For the history of Banu al-Akhaydir from its appearance until its dissolution at the end of the tenth or eleventh centuries, our only sources are fanciful accounts, which sometimes repeat the same information.29 However, one may conclude that Banu al-Akhaydir ruled al-Yamama for three centuries, assuming that religious solidarity held the sedentary population together, rather than devotion to tribal ‘asabiyya. In other words, Banu al-Akhaydir succeeded in establishing their rule in an anarchical area of Najd thanks to a religious ‘asabiyya, in a way similar to how the Saudis–Wahhabis succeeded in forming their rule in the eighteenth century. However, these historical accounts are mute with the regard to the role of Banu Hanifa tribes during this long period of Banu al-Akhaydir rule, especially when accounts from later periods continue to mention them. In his travels to al-Yamama in 1331, the famous North African traveler Ibn Battuta (1304–69) describes the city of Hajr as the economic and political center of the area. He indicated that Hajr was the capital of its neighborhood and the headquarters of Banu Hanifa tribes, the rulers of the city. He hints at the relationship between sedentary and nomadic areas in Najd, indicating that local rulers failed to control the tribes outside the city.30 In his itinerary from the eastern coast of Arabia, he arrived at Hajr, observing that it was ecologically different from its surroundings. Like in other Middle Eastern and North African countries, the name of the capital, Hajr, was also borne by the entire country, e.g. Yamama, whose “inhabitants, for the most part, are from the tribe of Banu Hanîfa; they are ancient possessors of the district.”31 Based on the available chronicles, al-Juhany states that the Najdi

22 | The Rise of Wahhabism within a Tribal Society sedentary population in al-Yamama could not form any central authority after the disappearance of Banu al-Akhydir dynasty in the middle of the eleventh century. Chiefs of clans or tribes had controlled towns and villages separated from one another and continued to dispute the resources of the sedentary areas.32 This situation opened the door for external forces from other parts of Arabia to intervene in Najd.33 One of these external forces were Banu Khalid, the rulers of Hasa in the second half of the seventeenth century, who launched military campaigns against al-Yamama and continued to intervene in it until the rise of the Saudi–Wahhabi movement, which succeeded in preventing them from continuing their military campaigns.34 In addition to Banu Khalid, the Sharifs of Mecca, who claimed descent from the Prophet Muhammad, also began to intervene in Najd. Exploiting the anarchical situation in Najd, the Sharifs launched sporadic military expeditions with the purpose of plundering, and succeeded in subduing some Najdi localities.35 Modern Saudi historians, who describe the destruction caused by the Sharifi campaigns in the region of Najd, emphasize that the intent of all of them was looting, and squeezing agricultural crops.36 The famous chronicler Ibn Bishr counts seventeen such Sharifi raids for the same purpose from 1588 until the end of the seventeenth century. He does not mention any religious motive behind these raids, but describes the Sharifs as chiefs who launched military campaigns in the same way the other tribal chiefs in Arabia have done.37 At the end of the seventeenth century, the Sharifs slowed down their raids. Relying on al-‘Isami’s account, one can conclude that the Sharifs at this period were preoccupied with their internal disputes. Their internal conflicts had been aggravated to the point where some of them took refuge in Najd or solicited the aid of Najdi chiefs in their internal disputes.38 Al-Juhany sums up the impact of the Sharifs’ interventions in Najd, arguing that settlers as well as nomads continued to be divided into small tribal political units. These interventions did not result in any change in the country’s political system. The sedentary population and tribal groups were left alone to rule themselves as before. The Sharifs were no better than an exploiting tribal group.39

The Sedentary Area of Najd as a Matrix of Wahhabism Due to climatic conditions, the population of Najd had lived for centuries with two ecological lifestyles, divided it into two socioeconomic categories: al-badu al-ruhal (the nomads), and al-hadar (sedentary people), who cultivated the oases and built villages and

The Rise of Wahhabism within a Tribal Society | 23 cities in the midst of the desert. Although differing in their economic patterns and in their religious practices, these two types of population in many cases shared approximately the same social structure, based on tribalism. As mentioned above, the sedentary population of Najd had developed a certain degree of religious scholarship that enabled some of its ‘ulama to absorb religious ideas that characterized the urban centers in the Muslim countries. The Wahhabi doctrine emerged among the sedentary population as the cumulative result of religious studies that had begun to develop since the sixteenth century in the oasis of Najd. Although it is difficult to trace the settlement of the tribes in the oasis, the historical record of events, since the fifteenth century, testifies that tribal rivalries and alliances were the main factors in determining such events.40 These historical records note that Najd had suffered from drought and wars that caused the migration of several tribes toward the Fertile Crescent. However, the area began, from the mid-fifteenth century, to attract newcomers who built the cities of Dir‘iyya and ‘Uyayna which became important centers of the sedentary population of Najd.41 This process of settlement weakened the domination of the sedentary tribes of Banu Hanifa and gave rise to new competitors. The city of Riyadh began to develop on the site of Hajr, the old capital of Banu Hanifa. Thus toward the end of the seventeenth century, the rule of Banu Hanifa was limited to three small villages: Manfuha, Muqrin, and Dir‘iyya. As result of its decline, Banu Hanifa were split into several small sub-tribes, such as al-Murada (the Saudis claim that they are their ancestors), al-Zar‘a, al-Mdayris, al-Dughaythir (the majority of these small tribes now live Riyadh) and al-Sh‘lan, who live today in Manfuha.42 However, in their survey, the Najdi Wahhabi chronicles describe the constant wars between the area’s tribes during the four centuries before the rise of Wahhabism as a period of chaos, similar to the al-jahiliyya period before the rise of Islam.43 Although William Facey refers to these wars, he argues that the process of settlement in the oasis of Najd from the fifteenth century until the seventeenth century was behind these quarrels and the wars between several tribes that had competed over the natural resources of the area.44 In this process of settlement, three cities had become the arena of the Wahhabi–Saudi movement: Dir‘iyya, ‘Uyayna, and Riyadh. In the middle of the fifteenth century, Ibn Dir‘, the chief of Hajr and of the nearby village of Jaz‘a, decided to revive agriculture, and invited newcomers to settle the area under his control. Among these newcomers were his relatives from the tribe of al-Murada (the claimed ancestors of the Saudis) who had lived in the area of al-Qatif, on the coast of the Persian Gulf. In 1556, the tribe of al-Murada moved to

24 | The Rise of Wahhabism within a Tribal Society Hajr, proceeding to the small village of Dir‘iyya. In addition to the lands of Dir‘iyya, the newcomer sub-tribe was allocated the lands of Ghusayba and al-Mulaybid, the nearby villages. The establishment of al-Murada in the area provoked tribal strife with al-Yazid, a branch of Banu Hanifa tribes who had controlled the area for centuries. Victorious in this strife, al-Murada succeeded in ousting the rival tribe from the whole area and causing its fragmentation.45 Under the control of the Saudis, Dir‘iyya began to develop into one of the major cities of Najd.46 The rise of Dir‘iyya decreased the importance of Hajr, the old capital of the area, and during the course of the sixteenth century, Hajr became fragmented into several separate and dispersed quarters, such Muqrin, Mi‘kal, al-‘Aud, al-Sulaya, Jabra, and al-Kharab.47 However, during the sixteenth century, the sub-tribe of al-Murada split into three branches. The first one moved to Darma, a village near Jabal Tuwayq, the second occupied the village of Abu al-Kabbash, while the Ibn Man‘ branch remained in Dir‘iyya.48 It is worth noting that Saudis claimed that they are descendents of this latter branch. Accorging to al-Jasir, who accepts this claim, the branch of Ibn Man‘ succeeded at the end of the seventeenth century in consolidating its rule, enabling its chief, Muhammad Ibn Saud Ibn Muhammad Ibn Maqrun Ibn Ibrahim Ibn Musa Ibn Rabi‘a Ibn Man‘ (d. 1765) to extend his sway into adjacent areas. His alliance with Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab from 1745 resulted in the emergence of a political entity called, in Najdi historiography, the First Saudi State, which continued to rule Najd until the Egyptian occupation in 1818.49 Ever since its establishment in the fifteenth century, ‘Uyayna (seventy kilometers to the west of Riyadh) had attracted newcomers, to become, at the end of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth, one of the largest cities of Najd, where Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was born in 1703 and later grew to become one of its religious scholars and the founder of Wahhabism.50 As mentioned above, the city of Hajr had been fragmented into small, dispersed villages. This would explain why, from 1578, Najdi chroniclers stopped mentioning Hajr by name. Unlike Middle Eastern cities, Hajr constituted an extended city with several localities separated by orchards called, in Arabic, riyad.51 In the seventeenth century, the orchards around Muqrin, one of Hjar’s quarters, began to develop into separate city called Riyad, which became in the eighteenth century the center of a political entity ruled by Ibn Dawwas, who from 1740 began to build a defensive wall around it and its village.52 Until its capture by the Saudis in 1773, Riyadh was the center of the anti-Wahhabi forces in Najd. Thus the Wahhabi chroniclers portray Ibn Dawwas as an ardent enemy of Islam.53 However, as a result of its capture by the

The Rise of Wahhabism within a Tribal Society | 25 Saudis, Riyadh lost its importance. It was only from 1818 that Riyadh began to revive in importance, when the Egyptian occupiers placed their headquarters inside its walls. In 1820, the Egyptians withdrew from Riyadh, enabling Turki Ibn ‘Abdullah Ibn Saud (1769–1833) to choose it as his capital.54 In Riyadh , Turki could resume the Wahhabi– Saudi alliance based on three elements: sedentary peoples, tribal nomads, and the religious ‘ulama. Thanks to this combination, Turki succeeded in subduing rival tribes in the area and reestablishing in 1824 the so-called Second Saudi State. Combining chiefdom embodied in the Saudi family and ideology embodied in the religious preaching of the Wahhabi cluster created the Wahhabi–Saudi alliance, which merged the tribal ‘asabiyya of the Saudis with the religious ‘asabiyya of the Wahhabis. This would explain the success of Turki and his successors in keeping their political entity alive within the tribal society of Najd. Al-Swayda divides the society of Najd into three categories: nomads, semi-nomads, and the sedentary. The relationship between the latter two categories was stronger than the between nomads and the sedentary. The semi-nomads lived close to sedentary settlements and were dependant on their water sources. Due to geographical conditions, the semi-nomads occupied the valley of Safilat Najd (the lower areas) in the eastern part of Najd, near the settled populations, where they moved from one small village to another without settling in any specific locality. Only in Riyadh and its environs did sedentary localities emerge, while the rest of Najd continued to be the arena of the nomads. Economic hardship and tribal ties between nomads, seminomads, and sedentary people had created a network of mutual relationships between these three categories. Thus cooperation on the one hand and wars on the other led to the involvement of the whole population in Najdi affairs. Thanks to this network, the nomadic tribes could rely on sedentary areas for their food supplies and for agricultural and handcraft products such as dates, cereals, coffee, clothes, arms, and so on, and in exchange the nomads supplied them with meat, cheese, and leather. In general, the exchange of products took place in special markets held once a week or on certain days every month. In many cases, the same tribe was divided into a sedentary and a nomadic part.55 Al-Juhany refers to this network, emphasizing that the sedentary tribes could usually withstand the attack of the nomads, though the nomads could sometimes impose ukhawa or khuwa (“brotherhood”), a tax based on agreement between the two sides. The nomads levied such khuwa from the vulnerable small villages of the sedentary areas, as compensation for protection provided to the inhabitants of these

26 | The Rise of Wahhabism within a Tribal Society villages. However, generally speaking, the sedentary tribes had the upper hand in conflicts between nomads and the sedentary,56 because they possessed the same ‘asabiyya of the nomads, as al-Juhany and alSwayda argue. In this regard, William Facey draws similar picture. He describes the constant conflict between the two groups within Najd until the nineteenth century, emphasizing the ability of the sedentary tribes to impose their will on the nomads.57 In his research on the Najdi population, William Facey enumerates three categories in accordance with their social and economic conditions. Like other researchers, he calls the first category al-qabaliyun (tribes), whose members can trace their descent to a known tribe, whether part of it still belongs to al-badu (nomads) or all its members have settled in sedentary areas. The second category is al-khadiriyun, which comprises those who could not attribute their lineage to a known tribe. He assumes that al-khadiriyun were the first sedentary people, who in the course of centuries had lost their tribal origins and continued to constitute a small minority among the sedentary population of Najd. Although they were involved in trade and crafts, al-khadiriyun continued to be a marginal category within the tribal society that considered occupations in trade and crafts to be inferior. The third category comprised al-‘abid (slaves), who were brought from Africa to serve in the houses of the chiefs and other influential people. They also constituted a tiny population in Najd, and only small numbers of them gained their freedom. Because al-qabaliyun held socioeconomic and political domination, their al-ru’asa’ or al-shiyukh (chiefs) were viewed as the legitimate leaders of the sedentary population.58 They controlled the agricultural and pastoral land, and they had the right to invite newcomers to settle on their lands. These newcomers, who were called al-jiran (people under protection), had to allot a quarter to half of their crops to al-ru’asa’ and to provide them with warriors in time of tribal conflict.59 Despite the tribal disputes and the harsh material conditions, the description of Najdi society points out relative cooperation between the different categories of this society. Each of them benefits from relative mutual protection and common economic interests, introducing sort of division of labor. While nomadic tribes breed animals, sedentary groups deal with agriculture, trade, handcrafts, and other economic activities. Due to its ecological conditions, Najd remained outside the political and economic systems of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans failed to impose their fiscal and land systems on sedentary areas of Najd and land property and taxes were handled differently way than in other Ottoman areas. In the Ottoman Empire, land tenure was divided into three cate-

The Rise of Wahhabism within a Tribal Society | 27 gories, miri (state land), waqf (religious endowment), and mulk (private property). Apart from the lands of waqf and of mulk in the cities, miri constituted the bulk of land tenure in which the state had raqaba (legal ownership), while the peasants had only a tasrruf (the right to use the land), without full ownership. Unlike the Ottoman miri, the lands in the sedentary areas of Najd were under the control of al-ru’asa’, though the system of musha‘ (collective land) had theoretically granted the peasants the right to be part-owners of these collective lands. In general al-ru’asa’ had the right to allocate plots of land among the peasants as shurka (partners). These latter applied a system based on sharecropping rights in accordance with a sort of muzara‘a (co-cultivation contracts) imposed by al-ru’asa’. The distribution of the crops between al-ru’asa’ and the peasants depended on the kind of cultivation. In cereal cultivation, peasants could get one year of muzara‘a, by which al-ru’asa’ took one-tenth of the crops. In areas of economic and social stability, the muzara‘a could be extended for many years and even for an indefinite time, notably when the crops are tree-grown. In those areas, the crops were equally divided between al-ru’asa’ and the peasants.60 In his study on the village of Faw in Arabia, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Ansary describes an agrarian relationship which is a case study for the entirety of sedentary areas in the oasis of Arabia over centuries. According to him, a long-term muzara‘a had resulted, in many cases, in the enrichment of some peasants who had contested al-ru’asa’, demanding the dissolution of the muzara‘a. In general, the dispute between al-ru’asa’ and the rich peasants evolved over the right to benefit from water sources. Al-Ansary gives a description of the water wells not only in Faw, but in other parts of the Arabian peninsula, and the conflicts occurred over these wells.61 In his travels to Najd in the 1870s, Charles Doughty describes some of the wells he saw in the sedentary areas of al-Qasim and Burayda and in their vicinity in the desert. He writes, I saw their wells, sunk in the Nfud [Nufudh] sand, – which is not deep, and through a bluish white underlying clay, into the sand-rock: these wells, steyned with dry masonry [such in West Arabia would be reckoned works of the ancient are begun and ended every day in el-Kas m]. By-wells, of less cost, are digging like wide sand-pits to clay level; and they fence the sliding sides of sand with faggot-work. Over the wellhole, sunk square through the clay in the pit’s midst, is set up a rude frame of ethel studs, for the wheel-work of their suânies; such are commonly two-wheels pits. They steyned wells made four-square, are for the draught of four camels; and there are some double wells of six

28 | The Rise of Wahhabism within a Tribal Society or eight wheels, to water greater ground, made long-square; the camels draw out from the two sides. To the ground-water they count seven fathoms: it is eight at the summer’s end.62

Because the depth of these wells is thirty to forty meters, drawing water from them required technical means. According to Facey, the sedentary inhabitants could draw water no more than five months per year to irrigate the orchards. Camels and donkeys were used for this purpose.63 Facey describes a ruin of ancient settlement in a place called Qarat al-Faw, in the southern part of Wadi al-Dawasir. According to him, excavation in the place revealed the remains of a wealthy tribal settlement, with walls and suq (marketplace), glass, jewelry, metalwork, textiles, and woodwork.64 Although dates were the main crop, the peasants used to grow vegetables within the irrigated orchards, while the size of cereal crops fluctuated in accordance with the quantity of rain.65 To protect their crops, the peasants used to keep away their herds and horses from the orchards and from the cereals before harvest. Only at the beginning of the twentieth century did the Najdis begin to herd cattle. Sheep and black sheep were the main livestock of the Najdis. The Najdis used horses for several purposes. In addition to their military use, acquiring horses continued to signify social status.66 The chiefs of Najd used to possess great numbers of horses as a symbol of prestige in the tribal society. The traveler William Palgrave observed that when he found, in the farm of Faysal Ibn Turki (1788– 1865), the grand chief of the Second Saudi State, more than 300 steeds of high quality.67 In a society divided between two categories of population, al-qabaliyun and al-khadiriyun, it was necessary to place the Wahhabi clan among the former category, which had superiority over the latter. Relying on Ibrahim Ibn Salih Ibn ‘Isa (1853–1924) and other Saudi chroniclers of the nineteenth century, al-Juhany traces the descent of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabyya, back to a sub-tribe of Banu Tamim called al-Wuhabah, whose members settled in Ushayqir before the sixteenth century. From Ushayqir, segments of this sub-tribe scattered all over the sedentary region of Najd. Ibn ‘Isa enumerates more than sixty-five clans and families of al-Wuhabah distributed over forty localities outside Ushayqir. One of these families moved to ‘Uyayna. To this family belonged Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism.68 From the sixteenth century until the emergence of the Wahhabi movement in the eighteenth century, the new strata of ‘ulama in Najd established new schools to further promote the study of Islamic shari‘a in ways similar to those of ‘ulama in Damascus and Cairo. This educa-

The Rise of Wahhabism within a Tribal Society | 29 tional development lay behind the development of the Wahhabi doctrine in the eighteenth century. Although it is close to Hijaz, the center of Muslim holy places, Najd continued for centuries to be a region that was isolated from the Muslim centers of Damascus, Baghdad, Cairo, and others. However, the cosmopolitan characteristics of Hijaz as a center of the Muslim faith had a certain impact upon the sedentary population of Najd. Pilgrimage caravans to the holy places sometimes passed through Najd, introducing commercial activities into its sedentary settlements. However, as a peripheral area within the Muslim polity from the Umayyad period (661–750) to the nineteenth century, Najd did not attract outside forces interested in conquering and controlling its sedentary population, and therefore long enjoyed an independent status, and its polity was decided by local tribal disputes and by struggles among chieftains.

CHAPTER

2

The Theological and Ethical Origin of Wahhabism The Emergence of Wahhabism As mentioned above, the socioeconomic and intellectual developments in Najd before the eighteenth century formed the background for the emergence of the Wahhabi movement. This chapter focuses on aspects related to Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s biography and his ideas, which constituted the first appearance of a religious doctrine, called by others Wahhabism. Studying these ideas would provide a better understanding of the force which enabled the Wahhabi ‘ulama to spread their religious doctrine within the vast areas of Najd. The chapter, therefore, deals with the theological and ethical concepts of Wahhabism that have enabled it to remain alive for decades through a chain of ‘ulama, even though new elements were introduced into its basic theological ideas by Al al-Shaykh (the descendants of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab) during the second half of the nineteenth century. The literature on the Wahhabi movement suggests several explanations for the emergence of its basic ideas within a peripheral area such as Najd. Relying on the sijill (registers of the Muslim shari‘a courts) to study Muslim societies, ‘Abd al-Raihim ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd alRahim (1936–2005), an Egyptian researcher, argues that Wahhabism does not differ from regular Muslim salafi movements, which basically call for abandoning many innovations added to Islam after al-salaf alsalih. Like salafi movements, Wahhabism attempted to “restore” the earliest Muslim beliefs and practices represented by God’s words in the Qur’an and the hadith (report or tradition of precedent set by the Prophet or other early authorities). According to ‘Abd al-Rahim, the main principle by which the new doctrine attempted to “restore” the earliest beliefs is al-ijtihad (the exercise or use of human reason to ascertain a rule of shari‘a law). Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his followers considered many Muslim ‘ulama to be muqallidun

The Theological and Ethical Origin of Wahhabism | 31 (imitators bound by the principle of taqlid) who, for many centuries, had abandoned the basic beliefs and practices of Islam.1 To remove al-taqlid, which distorted Islam, the founders of the doctrine resorted to al-ijtihad accompanied with strict devotion to the Qur’anic verses and hadith. Like many other previous Muslim ‘ulama who had established new doctrines throughout Muslim history, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his followers did not consider themselves founders of a new doctrine but restorers of the salaf tradition. The term “Wahhabism” had been attributed to the doctrine by outsiders and opponents, while supporters called themselves muwahhidun (Unitarians) who emphasized the monotheistic belief of Islam, or hanbaliyun, supporters of the Hanbali school of classical Islamic jurisprudence, one of the four main schools of Islam, ascribed to its founder Ibn Hanbal (d. 855). ‘Abd al-Rahim emphasizes the role of opponents in coining the term “Wahhabism.” Paradoxically, the supporters of the doctrine, whose ideas and preaching reject any addition to the basic ideas of al-salaf, were themselves accused by their opponents of inventing deceptive innovations (bida‘, sing. bid‘a). According to their opponents, the Wahhabis used bida‘ contrary to Islamic principles. Explaining the ability of the doctrine to attract new believers and to hold sway within Najd, ‘Abd al-Rahim invited scholars to investigate the success of the Wahhabi movement which had spread beyond Najd to become the dominant religious and political power in the Arabian peninsula.2 Considering the term “Wahhabism” as a collective name – probably coined by opponents of the doctrine – researchers such as ‘Abd al-Rahim used to rely on a polemic essay written during the period of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. The author of the essay was, amazingly, Sulayman Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1793), a brother of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. The essay was published under the title “al-Sawa‘iq al-Ilahiyya fi al-Rdd ‘Ala al-Wahhabiyya” (Divine Storms in Response to Wahhabism), through which Sulayman attempted to refute the ideas of his brother. In his book ‘Ulama Najd, ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahim Ibn Salih al-Bassam (1928–2002) raises doubts about the title of the essay. According to him, it was unlikely that a member of the Wahhabi family would attribute to the doctrine of his brother a term derived from the name of his own family. AlBassam speculates on the origin of the essay’s title, proposing that it was formulated either by the publisher or by someone else.3 In his recent book about the life of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, the Saudi historian Muhammad Ibn ‘Abdullah al-Sakakir refers to the same essay, admitting the existence of polemical animosity between the founder of the doctrine and his brother Sulayman. However, he rejects the explana-

32 | The Theological and Ethical Origin of Wahhabism tion suggested by ‘Abd al-Rahîm and other historians on the origin of the name of Wahhabism. Al-Sakakir is totally convinced that the name was not given by Sulayman Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. His conclusion relies on references related to the distribution of the essay in the year 1753 among ‘ulama of Huraymila, a sedentary area in Najd. According to his information, the name Wahhabism was not common within or outside Najd in this year. Al-Sakakir suggests that the Wahhabism collective name was not given by Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s opponents but by European travelers who visited the area later.4 As mentioned above, the supporters of the doctrine preferred to call themselves hanbaliyun, regarding themselves as supporters of the Hanbali doctrine. However, in addition to hanbaliyun, they called themselves by three names considered by them as reflecting the main characteristics of their preaching: al-muwahhidun (the Unitarians), Ikhwan (the brothers) attached by a strong religious bond, and al-salafiyun (sing. salafi), those who revive the puritan tradition of al-salaf al-salih of Muslims. Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s preaching and writings forged a religious community with a collective name, though modern Saudi writers and politicians avoid using the term “Wahhabism.” However, they devote much attention to the founder of the doctrine, dealing with his prominent personality, emphasizing his “pure” genealogy by going back to the first ancestor in the chain. As in many Arab societies, al-nasab (genealogy) is a source of legitimacy and should be presented with the full list of ancestral names. Thus almost all the Najdi chronicles and modern Saudi books refer to the founder of the doctrine, presenting the entire ancestral chain claimed by the Wahhabis: Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab Ibn Sulayman Ibn ‘Ali Ibn Ahmad Ibn Rashid Ibn Barid Ibn Musharraf Ibn ‘Umar Ibn Mazar Ibn Idris, from Banu Sinan, one branch of the extended tribe of Tamim. After presenting his “claimed” nasab, they refer to his birthplace and life. Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was born in the year 1703 at ‘Uyayna, one of the sedentary areas of Najd. He grew up in an educational milieu which had a great impact on his religious orientation. His grandfather, Sulayman Ibn ‘Ali, was a prominent qadi (shari‘a judge) known for his authority and scholarship within the whole sedentary area of Najd. His uncle, Ibrahim, also served as qadi and mufti (an issuer of legal opinion). His father, ‘Abd al-Wahhab, was one of the prominent religious figures of Najd whose preaching had attracted many ‘ulama of his time.5 According to Saudi–Wahhabi sources, in addition to the educational background of this family in ‘Uyayna, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab benefited from his first hajj (annual pilgrimage to Mecca) in 1716,

The Theological and Ethical Origin of Wahhabism | 33 when he was less than thirteen years old.6 After fulfilling his pilgrimage duty, he proceeded toward Medina, the second-holiest city of Islam. Because Mecca and Medina in Hijaz are the center of Islam and its religious splendor, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab extended his stay in the hope of benefiting from their religious scholars. Soon after arriving at Medina, he joined the disciples of Sheikh ‘Abdullah Ibn Ibrahim alShammari (d. 1727), a famous religious scholar who had a great impact on the educational formation of the young. Many ideas of alShammari were adopted by Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab to be elaborated later by a set of religious principles.7 However, before dealing with the sources of his inspiration, it is worth noting that two other scholars, Muhammad Sulayman al-Kurdi (1717–78) and Muhammad Hayat al-Sindi al-Madani (d. 1750), had an impact on the youngster while he was living in Medina. After his studies in Medina, Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab made his way toward Basra in southern Iraq and spent four years in study there. But after he revealed his “extreme” Hanbali ideas, the local inhabitants put great pressure on him to leave the city. When Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab rejoined his family in Huraymila, he appeared physically and spiritually more mature, assuming a high religious position among ‘ulama of Najd.8 Controversial stories have been told about the itinerary of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab from Medina to Iraq. Some authors believe that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab reached Asfahan in Persia, where he joined one of the Sufi orders of the city. The journey to Asfahan is mentioned in one of the anti-Wahhabi treatises called Lami‘ al-Shihab fi Sirat Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab written by an unknown author who claims that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab had visited, in addition to Asfahan, other places, such as Baghdad, al-Ray, Aleppo, Damascus, and Egypt. The famous two pro-Wahhabi chroniclers Ibn Ghannam and Ibn Bishr categorically deny these claims, insisting that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab had visited only three localities in search of further knowledge, i.e. Medina, Basra, and Hasa, near Najd).9 In his article “On the Origin of Wahhbism,”10 Michael Cook analyzes the conflicting accounts of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s travels prior to the inception of his “political career.” Cook finds little varation within the Wahhabi sources concerning these travels, except in matter of order: “some sources have him visit Basra before Hijaz . . . [and] one late Wahhabi source has him visit Baghdad.” After mentioning the names of scholars whom Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab met in Medina and Basra, Cook refers to the non-Wahhabi sources which deal with Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s itinerary. In addition to the anonymous source Lami‘ al-Shihab fi Sirat Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Cook analyzes other sources to conclude that their

34 | The Theological and Ethical Origin of Wahhabism accounts and testimonies “leave the question of [Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab’s] travels in some confusion.”11 However, to promote his religious point of view acquired outside Najd, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab looked for a position among Najdi ‘ulama. In Huraymila, he used to guide and preach in accordance with his religious convictions. The powerful ‘ulama of Huraymila considered Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s new ideas as preaching outside accepted religious boundaries, and as threatening to inflame the population in the city. Thus Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was forced by these ‘ulama to leave his native city for the nearby locality of ‘Uyayna, where he was born. But here he once again encountered ‘ulama who compelled him to flee. Looking for protection, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab reach Dir‘iyya in 1744 or 1745. Now, at the age of forty-four, he found full protection in Dir‘iyya, which was under the rule of Muhammad Ibn Saud (1745– 65).12 Ibn Saud not only hosted Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab but granted him a high religious position, which enabled him to promote his “reformative” religious ideas.13 Backed by the powerful chief of Dir‘iyya, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab began to propagate his religious ideas within the sedentary area of Najd, where the population were more amenable to adopting new ideas than in nomadic areas. Unlike the sedentary population, the nomads had adopted a formal Islam without abandoning their traditional habits. Apart from al-shahada (proclamation of belief in Islam), the nomads rarely fulfilled the other four pillars of Islam, i.e. the five prayers per day, the fast of ramadan, zakat (alms tax) and the hajj. Some of the Islamic concepts, such as ba‘th (the resurrection of the human souls and the last judgment) were incomprehensible to the nomads, who had rarely participated in common prayer. Unlike the sedentary population that was acquainted with the Islamic legal system based on shar‘i courts, the nomads continued to rely on their ‘urf (social or tribal custom, customary law, legal convention) in their legal system. For centuries, the sedentary population had been familiar with religious preaching in the mosques and had a tradition of practicing their religious duties. However, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab considered that the fulfilment of these duties was not sufficient for salvation, since the Muslims still adopted alien beliefs and distorted the true Islamic faith. In addition to his theological ideas, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab wanted to purify Islam from these alien beliefs. Thus he launched a campaign against the sanctuary cult, aiming to uproot it from the customs of the inhabitants. He considered the rituals and ceremonies during the visits to shrines to be shirk (polytheism), and decreed that shrines built on the site of holy graves should be destroyed. The holiness of sacred

The Theological and Ethical Origin of Wahhabism | 35 trees, stones, and wells was no more than an innovation (bid‘a), which should be removed from the minds of believers. His theological ideas and severe attacks against the sanctuary cults invited opponents among some of Najdi ‘ulama. The social and religious positions of these latter were dependent on rejecting radical change within a society of long tradition.14 In his study Najd before the Salafi Reform Movement, the Saudi historian, al-Juhany describes the intellectual and social life in the sedentary areas of Najd, claiming that ‘ulama in these areas were in a state of expectation of some religious awakening that would revive early Islam. Thus the preaching and ideas of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab were accepted by the Hanbali ‘ulama with great enthusiasm. Al-Juhany considers Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s ideas as a comprehensive plan designed to solve the problems that had divided Najdi society and had prevented them from fulfilling their religious duties. Unlike his contemporary ‘ulama, who had merely studied ’usul al-fiqh (sources or roots of Islamic law), Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab dealt with broader issues. His study journeys exposed him to a literature written by great Muslim scholars, providing him with new tools to deal with the main issues of the Islamic faith, i.e. tafsir (interpretation of the Qur’an) hadith and tawhid (monotheism). By focusing on tawhid, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab traced the monotheistic notions of the Qur’an and hadith through which he refuted the sanctuary cults. Relying on hadith, he preached the restoration of the early morality of Islam. Before investigating in detail the theological background and sources which inspired Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, it worth noting that he had a special admiration for two Hanbali scholars: Taqiy al-Din Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328) and his student Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1364). The experience of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab in Huraymila and then in his native city, ‘Uyayna, probably taught him the importance of political power for promoting religious ideas. Furthermore, his Hanbali educational background, represented by the theories of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, suggests the unification of the polity and the power of religion. His first attempt to reach such unification was in ‘Uyayna, before his escape into Dir‘iyya. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab tried to persuade Muhammad ‘Uthman Ibn Mu‘amar, the political chief of ‘Uyayna, to join him in his efforts to purify the beliefs of the inhabitants and to prohibit the rites they performed at sanctuaries. Accompanied by 600 men, Ibn Mu‘amar destroyed the holy grave of Zayd Ibn al-Khattab, which had served the inhabitants of the area as a shrine used for annual visits, votive offerings, and sacrifices. During the brief stay of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab in ‘Uyayna, Ibn Mu‘amar imposed on the local population the duty of zakat in the

36 | The Theological and Ethical Origin of Wahhabism form of a levy. Ibn Bishr, the pro-Wahhabi chronicler, indicates that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab promised his host, Ibn Mu‘amar, a predominant position in the Najdi tribes as a reward by God if he maintained support for religious reform. Nevertheless, Ibn Mu‘amar failed to seize the promised divine offer when he surrendered to the insistent pressure of the strong chief of Hasa, the nearby region of Najd, who threatened to expel Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab from ‘Uyayna. In a sort of a historical explanation for the failure of Ibn Mu‘amar’s clan and the success of the Saudis to control the whole area of Najd, Ibn Bishr claims that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab had offered the same promise to Ibn Saud, the chief of Dir‘iyya.15 The coalition between Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and Muhammad Ibn Saud in Dir‘iyya in the middle of the eighteenth century was a turning point in the history of the Arabian peninsula. This coalition was soon transformed into an Islamic militant movement, extending the political power of the Saudis beyond Dir‘iyya. By zeal of religious faith and force of arms, the Wahhabi–Saudi movement began to consolidate a sort of polity that later became, in the twentieth century, the core of a theocratic state. Although internal opposition in the Arabian peninsula and the external intervention of the Ottomans and Egyptians had disrupted the continuity of Wahhabi–Saudi rule, the movement sustained its vigor until its final success at the beginning of the twentieth century. Researchers of the Wahhabi–Saudi phenomenon have tried to explain the vigor of a movement that enabled the Saudi chiefs to overcome obstacles imposed by a harsh political constellation. It is beyond the purpose of this section to survey and analyze the different explanations suggested by researchers about the ability of the Wahhabi–Saudi movement to remain alive for centuries despite the ups and downs of the first stages of its emergence. Most of these researchers suggest general explanations regarding the role of religion and tribe in the development of the movement and its power of survival.

The Inspirers of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab As mentioned above, the followers of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab claimed that they were no more than Hanbalis who preserved the heritage of “true Islam,” and not founders of a new doctrine. This claim could not convince their opponents, who regarded Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab as an innovator of new concepts in traditional Islam. In his article “Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab,” published in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, Henri Laoust considers Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab as a Hanbali

The Theological and Ethical Origin of Wahhabism | 37 theologian whose writings are “more closely linked to the formulation of Hanbalism as found in the works of the earlier writers.”16 Criticizing this article, Cook argues that Laoust’s view would mislead readers because there is a dearth of reference in Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s writings to the view of Hanbali scholars prior to the thirteenth century. Cook adds that “even Ibn Hanbal (d. 855) himself plays no real part in the establishment of the central doctrines of Wahhabism.”17 In the same vein, ‘Abd al-Rahim, the historian mentioned above, doubted the claim of ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s followers to be Hanbalis when he examined some of the texts written by ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1751–1828), the son who had taken over the religious leadership of the movement after his father’s death.18 Textual testimony indicates that ‘Abdullah probably referred to his father’s preaching and writings as a doctrine or a school of law (madhhab) within Sunni Islam based on the legacy of the early Muslims. Although hesitant in concluding that the son of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was consistent in his usage of the term as designating a distinct doctrine, ‘Abd al-Rahim quotes the following sentence of ‘Abdullah to illustrate this usage: “madhhabuna fi ’usul madhhab ahl-al-sunna wal-jama‘a watariqatuna tariqat al-aslaf” (our school in the sources of law follows the Sunni accepted scholars and our doctrine is the doctrine of first generation of the Muslims).19 ‘Abd al-Rahim’s interpretation grants this sentence the meaning that the Wahhabi doctrine is distinct from other Sunni doctrines and has special way of practicing Islam which revives that of the first generations of the Muslim believers. He argues that because the usage of the term madhhab was unusual among the first generation of Wahhabis, ‘Abdullah’s usage of the term suggests that he referred to a “distinct doctrine.”20 However, such an interpretation would raise doubts when we consult the classical Arabic dictionaries about the meaning of the word madhhab, which has several meanings, according to context, among them “way to follow.”21 Thus the sentence would bear three meanings: “Essentially, our doctrine is the doctrine of the Sunnis and our method is the method of the ancestors,” or “our doctrine is descended from the Sunni doctrine and our path is the path of the ancestors.” If we omit the word “doctrine” and translate madhhab as “way or path to follow,” we reach the following meaning: “fundamentally”, we follow the path of the Sunnis and the Companions of the Prophet and our way of practicing is the way of the first generations of the Muslim believers. ‘Abd al-Rahim bases his interpretation on ‘Abdullah’s usage of the word madhhab(na) (“our doctrine”), which would suggest that he referred to a distinct doctrine. In order to reevaluate such an interpretation, one should consult further sources in which Wahhabi scholars use the

38 | The Theological and Ethical Origin of Wahhabism term madhhab. One of these sources is a letter of ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab to ‘Abdullah al-San‘ani, one of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab’s inspirers.22 The letter was provided by al-‘Isami, a pro-Wahhabi author who collected the correspondence between the Najdi ‘ulama from the eighteenth century until the mid-nineteenth century. The letter testifies to the great devotion of ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab to the Hanbali doctrine, as he writes the following: “madhhabuna madhhab al-Imam Ahmad [Ibn Hanbal],” which may be translated either as “We follow the doctrine of the guide Ahmad” or as “Our doctrine is the doctrine of the guide Ahmad.” In this sentence, the key word is not madhhab, but its usage with the possessive pronoun na, which means “our,” as ‘Abd al-Rahim suggests. In this sense, the son of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab probably distinguishes his own “we” group from the “other” groups in Islam. This distinction is more obvious when he states in the same letter, “we do not always follow” the judgments (ahkam) of Ibn Hanbal when they contradict the Islamic rules based on the Qur’an, sunna (the words and actions of the Prophet – the model behavior of the Prophet) and ijma‘ (the collective or consensus of opinion of authoritative ‘ulama).23 This suggests that the “doctrine” labeled Wahhabism could be conceived according to the discourse of their followers on different occasions and not as a set of constant beliefs and ideas. Although Abdullah continued to emphasize his devotion to the Qur’an and sunna, in accordance with the Hanbali heritage, his discourse would challenge the ideas of Ibn Hanbal himself. In the same sense, one can refer to the writings of Al al-Shaykh in the nineteenth century. As will be illustrated later in this study, Al al-Shaykh religious scholars, in their religious discourse, used to adopt ideas from several sources, such as the Hanbali, Maliki, Shafi‘i, and Hanafi schools of law, and even the Ja‘fari (the Shiite school of law), though they continued to admire Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyya.24 In his article “Some Reflections on the Wahhabiya and the Sanusiya Movements,” Talip Kucukcan lists three key principles drawn from Ibn Taymiyya’s theological and legal thought that played a great role in designing the Wahhabi doctrine. The first principle is connected with the relationship between religion and state. In this regard, Ibn Taymiyya considers the rulers who obey the shari‘a as legitimate and as having the right to assume political leadership. ‘Ulama are the body responsible for guiding the rulers. It seems that Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his descendants followed such principles regarding the Saudi dynasty as a representative of legitimate rule. The second principle is related to “real” Islam based on Ibn Hanbal’s doctrine. Both Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab considered Hanbalism, among

The Theological and Ethical Origin of Wahhabism | 39 the four Muslim schools, the most devoted to the Qur’an and sunna, the exclusive sources for the shari‘a. In this respect, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab saw himself as the successor of Ibn Taymiyya’s fight against false innovations which had been added over the centuries to damage the Muslim faith. According to Talip Kucukcan, the rejection of false innovations led Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab to deny the principle of qiyas (analogical reasoning that seeks new rules based on commonalities between the original and the new situations) as one of the ’usul al-fiqh in Islam. The third principle is related to the practice of Sufi rituality. Although Ibn Taymiyya had joined the Qadiriyya Sufi order, he opposed Sufi rituals of ecstasy. According to Kucukcan, Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab had interpreted Ibn Taymiyya’s opposition to rituality and ecstasy as a rejection of Sufi ceremonies practiced during visits to shrines such as venerated graves.25 Kucukcan’s explanation of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s rejection of Sufism is based on the assumption that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab could not free himself from the legacy of Ibn Taymiyya, though the latter supported a Sufi order. But careful reading of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s writings suggests that the rejection of Sufism was an authentic idea rather than a continuity of Ibn Taymiyya’s notion of Sufi rituality. Kucukcan’s speculation about the attitude of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab regarding qiyas is based on the logic that the usage of qiyas could lead its users to an extreme interpretation in the form of bid‘a. It seems that Kucukcan draws his conclusion about the issue of qiyas from late Wahhabi sources or from some modern interpretations of Wahhabism, and not from Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s writings. An assessment of the place of qiyas in the doctrine should be based on a new approach that deals with Wahhabism as a dynamic, and not a monolithic, religious movement. Although there are basic religious concepts that would characterize the movement, Wahhabi authors articulated their ideas in the course of its development according to different inspirations and their intellectual qualities. For example, many religious concepts of Al al-Shaykh in the nineteenth century could not be seen in the writings of the first generation of the Wahhabis, and vice versa. Probably the monolithic analysis of Kucukcan led him to explain some former concepts of Wahhabism by later ideas formulated in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Kucukcan even interprets Ibn Taymiyya, the “inspirer” of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, through such an approach, concluding that the qiyas was rejected by Ibn Taymiyya. A careful reading of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab suggests that both had accepted qiyas under certain conditions. For both, the qiyas still consists one of the five ’usul al-fiqh (legal sources) of Islam: Qur’an, sunna (hadith), ijma‘, and istislah (the principle of

40 | The Theological and Ethical Origin of Wahhabism jurisprudence based on the “consideration of public interest” for the elaboration of legal rules). In his Risalt al-Qiyas (Epistle of Qiyas), Ibn Taymiyya differentiates between true and false qiyas (qiyas sahih and qiyas fasid). Every qiyas which contradicts the Qur’an and sunna should be rejected as false and every qiyas which follows the instructions of the Qur’an and sunna is accepted as true. He focuses his criticism on Muslim scholars who do not rely on the ’usul al-fiqh in their qiyas, leading them to articulate false qiyas.26 Referring to the qiyas, Ibn Taymiyya supports it as it was established by previous Hanbali scholars because it did not contradict the Prophet’s hadith. He states, “I investigated the maximum legal exegesis and proofs, but I did not find any qiyas that contradicts a true hadith.”27 A reading of his collected works on the principles of faith which was published in Saudi Arabia in 1999 under the title Majmu‘at al-Tawhid testifies that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab does not call for any explicit application of qiyas, though he does not explicitly reject it. However, in his epistle Masa’il al-Jahiliyya (Questions on [Pre-Islamic] Ignorance), Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab enumerates 129 masa’il (matters) which could spur believers to the jahiliyya (pre-Islamic) mood, damaging the true faith and leading to heresy similar to that which prevailed during the preIslamic period. Only on two occasions does he refer to qiyas without dealing with its method of application, limiting himself to warning believers to be wary of al-istidlal bi-l-qiyas al-fasid (relying on false qiyas) and against inkar al-qiyas al-sahih (denying true qiyas).28 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab deals with ijma‘ in approximately the same way he refers to qiyas. He mentions ijma‘ on several occasions without giving details regarding whether ‘ulama were qualified to reach such ijma‘. Unlike his successors among the Wahhabis who differentiate between the ijma‘ of ‘ulama who lived during a certain period of time and the ijma‘ of the Prophet’s Companions during the first stage of Islam, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab uses only the phrase ijma‘ ahl al-‘lm (consensus among scholars).29 The term ahl al-‘lm would be interpreted as the Muslim ‘ulama in general, or only the qualified among them. Some of his successors attribute this qualification only to the Prophet’s Companions, coining the term ijma‘ al-sahaba (the ijma‘ of the Companions), which perhaps Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab did not use. His son ‘Abdullah was the first Wahhabi scholar to differentiate between two sorts of ijma‘: that of the Muslim ‘ulama in general and that of al-sahaba. ‘Abdullah recognizes only the second one of al-sahaba during the period of the Prophet.30 ‘Abdullah explicitly adopts Ibn Taymiyya’s method to grade the five ’usul al-fiqh when he listed ijma‘ in the third place after the Qur’an, hadith, and qiyas, as the fifth after istislah. This grading of ijma‘ as the third in line explicitly reflects the

The Theological and Ethical Origin of Wahhabism | 41 importance of ijma‘ al-sahaba within ’usul al-fiqh of Islam as conceived by ‘Abdullah. One should note that Ibn Taymiyya, as well as ‘Abdullah, grades ’usul al-fiqh in a different way from the traditional system of classification: Qur’an, sunna (hadith), qiyas, ijma‘ and istislah. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s emphasis on the Qur’an and sunna as the main sources of al-fiqh led many researchers of Wahhabism to speculate that the founder of the doctrine rejects qiyas, ijma‘ and istislah, which belong to the interpretation of ‘ulama. But Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab’s text would be better understood when one thinks also about the “absent,” which is omitted in this text. For example, when Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab deals with controversial interpretation of ’usul al-fiqh, he instructs ‘ulama to consult the Qur’an and sunna: “In [a case] of dispute [among ‘ulama] we should rely on Qur’an and sunna.”31 Referring to the dispute among ‘ulama suggests that he is referring implicitly to other principles of ’usul al-fiqh. Although Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab refers to the concepts of qiyas and ijma‘, he elaborates more two concepts: al-halal (the lawful) and alharam (the forbidden). This probably explains why his son ‘Abdullah and later Al al-Shaykh favor focusing on the permissible, and evading any further concern with qiyas and ijma‘. Relying only on the Qur’an and the sunna, they emphasize that only equivocally forbidden issues can be considered permissible. By searching for references to the permissible, scholars from Al al-Shaykh in the nineteenth century began to focus on the principle of al-maslaha, through which all controversial issues of fiqh would be resolved without resorting to the principles of qiyas and ijma‘. By omitting these two principles, Al alShaykh reduced the five principles of ’usul al-fiqh to three: Qur’an, sunna, and maslaha. However, like the founder of the doctrine, Al al-Shaykh interpret the maslaha according to their understanding of the fundamental tradition of the salaf (the first generations of Muslims), who represented pure Islam. Because they believed that a restoration of pure Islam required investigation rather than imitation, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his successors followed Ibn Taymiyya’s instructions in applying the principle of ijtihad. In this regard, they emphasized the necessity to display a talented effort in understanding the Qur’an and sunna through ijtihad. For Ibn Taymiyya as well as for the Wahhabis, reform meant removing the bid‘a that had been added to the core of Islam. To grasp this core, Ibn Taymiyya tried to apply an approach that combined three principles: ‘aql (rationality or common sense), ’usul al-fiqh as transmitted in the Qur’an and sunna, and ’irada (the will) as a spiritual experience adopted by Sufism.32 According to Ibn Taymiyya, ‘aql leads to the adoption of the attitude of al-sahaba, which represents

42 | The Theological and Ethical Origin of Wahhabism pure Islam. Removing the added innovations from pure Islam necessitates the application of common sense through ijtihad and the rejection of alien ideas added to Islam by taqlid. Adopting ijtihad and rejecting taqlid was the principle applied by Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab to purify Islam from innovations.33 Although Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his successors claimed that their religious doctrine was no more than a continuation of the Hanbaliyya, the impact of Ibn Taymiyya and others on their religious conceptions inspired them to dress some Hanbali ideas in new garb. Ibn Taymiyya’s writings and experience had inspired the Wahhabis to reshape their doctrine, and he was, probably, for them, the most important scholar in Islam to set up the borderlines between “true beliefs” and “false beliefs,” or between monotheism and heresy. Ibn Taymiyya perceived his period as one of decline that would distort the religious beliefs of the Muslim community. He considered the Mongol invasion of Muslim land at the end of the thirteenth century a destructive force against Islam. He therefore devoted great intellectual effort to combining the Muslim faith with the polity. Ibn Taymiyya was born in Harran, near Aleppo, in the year 1263. Searching for a safe haven from the Mongol attacks on his native locality, his family moved to Damascus, which was under the control of the Mamluks. When he was seven years old, Ibn Taymiyya experienced in Damascus the upheavals of the period. As a center of Hanbali teaching, the Damascene religious institutions provided Ibn Taymiyya with the basic ideas of the Hanbaliyya. With this educational background, Ibn Taymiyya gained his reputation as a defender of Islam against the “destructive” forces that threatened the “true” faith. His religious articulations still inspire many radical Muslim groups today. Although the Mongols were converted to Islam during his lifetime, Ibn Taymiyya regarded this conversion as no more that a pretence which would damage the faith. Supporting the Mamluks against the Mongols, he considered the latter infidels against whom Muslims should fight. According to him, the Mongols continued to practice their yasa (Mongol local customs) rather than the Islamic shari‘a.34 In this regard, he elaborated his concept of polity based on shari‘a through which local customs should be eliminated. He preferred a tyranny that relied on shari‘a and rejected mere political rule without the shari‘a base.35 The relationship between politics and religion was the subject of his treatise al-Siyasa al-Shar‘iyya (Government in Accordance with the Revealed Law), in which he dedicated a special treatise to his political thought. According to him, the sovereign’s prerogative stems from his supplementing the decisions of jurists with administrative measures and regulations.36

The Theological and Ethical Origin of Wahhabism | 43 Inspired by Ibn Taymiyya’s notion of political rule, Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab adopted a similar stance, by which he considered the shari‘a the most important factor in establishing an Islamic government. Like Ibn Taymiyya, who called for full obedience to the Mamluks, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab preached the support of the Saudi rulers. Believers have to tolerate the tyranny of the rulers who rely on shari‘a.37 According to him, “The Prophet . . . contested people [who deny shari‘a] and ordered to tolerate tyrannical rulers, to endure suffering, and he prescribed obeying [them]” as long as they rely on shari‘a. He emphasized that believers should oppose only tyrannical rulers who deny shari‘a and obedience toward these rulers is a sort of humiliation.38 The attitude of Ibn Taymiyya toward Christians and Jews, and heterodox communities such as the Nusayris (Alawis of Syria), the Druze, and others, had a great impact upon Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his successors.39 On many occasions, Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab referred to Jews and Christians as infidels.40 The fatwas (opinions of jurists on legal problems) of Ibn Taymiyya against the Nusayris, Druze and other Islamic batiniyya sects became the basis for the Wahhabi attitude toward heterodoxy in Islam: “The people called Nusayris, they and other kinds of batiniyya Qaramita are more heretical than Jews and Christians and even more heretical than many of the polytheists.” In another fatwa, Ibn Taymiyya included the Druze: It is accepted among the Muslims that the Druze and Nusayris are heretics who reject al-jiziya and it is forbidden for Muslims to eat their slaughtered animals and to marry their women. Breaking away from Islam, they are neither Muslims nor Jews nor Christians . . . [The Druzes] are heretics and their repentance should not be accepted, but they should be killed . . . in order to prevent others from their aberrancy and deceit.41

In his epistles, Fi Haqiqat al-Islam min al-Kitab and al-Sunna (The reality of Islam according to the Qur’an and Sunna),42 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab reiterates Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwa against the heterodox communities, adding that the Prophet ordered people “to kill those who convert their religion.”43 In the treatise Jawab ahl al-Sunna fi Naqd Kalam al-Shi‘a wal-Zaydiyya (The Answer of the Sunnis in Refuting the Speech of the Shiites and Zayidis),44 ‘Abdullah, the son of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, reiterates the same arguments with regard to the heterodox communities.

44 | The Theological and Ethical Origin of Wahhabism

Purifying Islam from Alien Beliefs and Customs From its foundation in the eighteenth century, the Wahhabi movement launched a campaign against the sanctuary cults that prevailed among the sedentary population of Najd. In his article “Tnu‘ut Hithadshut ve-Riforma ba-Islam ba-Mi’a ha-18” (Renewal Movements and Reforms in Islam in the Eighteenth Century), Nehemia Levtzion considers Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s position toward the sanctuary cults as a central factor in the Wahhabi reforms. According to him, this opposition was inspired by Muhammad Ibn Isma‘il al-San‘ani (d. 1678), whose book Tathir al-I‘tiqad (Purification of the Faith) had a great impact on Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab during his period of study in Mecca. Al-San‘ani calls for purification of the Muslim faith from “alien” beliefs such as the sanctuaries of graves, trees, and other “holy” places.45 In his efforts to purify the faith, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab attempted to convince the rulers in Najd to destroy places where people practiced the ritual acts of sanctuary cults. For him, these cults contradicted the Muslim principle of tawhid, which means that “there is only one God but Allah who has no son and no partner in His Kingdom, that He is capable of every thing, and is Master of the world.” Searching for salvation during visits to such holy places is no more than shirk (polytheism) which leads to kufr (unbelief). The concept of tawhid of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab continued to be the pivot around which Al al-Shaykh in the nineteenth century reshaped Wahhabi theology and religious practice. The result of his devotion to tawhid and his rejection of sanctuary cults led Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab to condemn the principle of tawassul (the custom of asking for salvation) instead of a direct, unmediated relationship with God. He considered the tawassul principle accepted among Najdi worshipers to be a bid‘a that contradicts the religious practice of al-salaf al-salih who used to pray directly to God without asking for external intermediaries. Through the practice of tawassul, ignorant believers had used holy tombs, caves, stones, wells, and trees as intermediaries that became partners of God. Therefore Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab ordered his followers to destroy these holy places as a means of reviving the true faith of the salaf. This attitude toward such holy sites explains the Wahhabi attack against the Iraqi Shiite city of Karbala in 1801, which resulted in the destruction of Husayn Ibn ‘Ali’s tomb.46 Consistent with their concept of tawhid and their efforts to purify the faith from bida‘, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his followers denounced the celebration of the mawlid (the Prophet’s birthday). They claimed that this ritual did not exist during the period of al-salaf al-salih. Such

The Theological and Ethical Origin of Wahhabism | 45 celebration, accompanied by ceremonies, had harmed the tradition of the Prophet himself. The same principle of purifying the faith was applied in removing ornaments from mosques. Adding ornaments to mosques is considered as bid‘a, which alienates Muslims from the Omnipotence of God. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab extended his purification of faith to include mundane habits and behavior. Interpreting the Hanbali code regarding the permitted and the forbidden in Islam, he added the prohibition of drinking alcohol, smoking, listening to music, adding adornments to clothes, and wearing silk. According to him, these alien habits and behavior had been perpetuated by taqlid prevailing among ‘ulama who had turned a blind eye to the principle of ijtihad. The taqlid tradition produced religious decadence, allowing many Muslims to adopt new deceptive innovations alien to salaf practices and ways of life. According to ‘Abd al-Rahim, the ideas of ‘Abd al-Wahhab concerning ijtihad and taqlid were criticized by his contemporary Hanbali ‘ulama such as Sulayman Ibn Suhaym, who launched an ardent attack on Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s notion of ijtihad, considering it a deviation from the mainstream of Hanbaliyya.47 Unlike some of the contemporary scholars who did not dare to introduce new ideas into the Hanbali tradition, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab used ijtihad in a way in which this tradition was reshaped. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab elaborated a new outlook concerning issues of behavior and ethics, though he followed Ibn Taymiyya’s theological concepts. The main figure to inspire his ethical concepts was his grandfather, Sulayman Ibn Muhammad (d. 1709). The Wahhabi sources claim that Sulayman was a descendant of Al Musharraf, one of the families whose scholars had contributed much to the religious life of Najd. Ibn Muhammad was born in ‘Uyayna, far away from the mainstream of Hanbalism in Damascus and Cairo, and studied Hanbalism through the mediation of ‘Abdullah Ibn Muhammad Ibn Isma‘il, the most influential scholar in Najd at that time. Due to his position as the mufti of Najd, Sulayman Ibn Muhammad (Ibn Musharraf) fed his grandson with ideas that became the principal elements in his Hanbali perceptions and later formed the layers of his religious movement.48 Sulayman’s influence was decisive on ethics rather than on the theological concepts of the Wahhabis. His book Misbah al-Asalik fî Ahkam al-Manasik, called for short al-Manasik (The Basics of Behavior)49 had become the ethical code of Wahhabism since its establishment. Ibn Humayd (1820–78), a Hanbali scholar, wrote that he “did not know of another [book] than that of al-Manasik on which the Hanbalis rely.” In addition to this book, some of Sulayman’s court rulings were collected to form the ethical code on which Ibn ‘Abd

46 | The Theological and Ethical Origin of Wahhabism al-Wahhab relied in preaching the purification of religious practices. Ibn Humayd estimates that “Sulayman’s court rulings would fill enormous volumes if one could collect them.”50 Many of these court rulings were quoted by ‘ulama of Najd to be added to al-Manasik.51 Another source for Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s ethics was three Najdi ‘ulama from the same family as Ibn Sayf al-Shammari. The first was Ibrahim Ibn Sayf al-Shammari. He was born in 1650 in the village of Majma‘a (north of Riyadh). He visited Medina at the end of the seventeenth century and there became one of the most influential scholars of his time. He established a mosque in Medina that bore his name (masjid Ibrahim). His son ‘Abdullah Ibn Ibrahim Ibn Sayf alShammari (d. 1727),52 and grandson Ibrahim Ibn ‘Abdullah (d. 1775), maintained contact with ‘ulama of Najd and had a strong influence on the ethical principles of Wahhabism. During his visit to Medina, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab joined the circle of ‘Abdullah Ibn Ibrahim whose Hanbali education had been acquired from Ibn al-Mawahib, one of the most influential Hanbali scholars of the seventeenth century. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab adopted the principles of his teacher, ‘Abdullah Ibn Ibrahim, concerning issues of halal and haram. ‘Abdullah’s epistle on denouncing smoking (Risala fi Dham al-Dukhan) inspired Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab to consider smoking a forbidden habit.53 Since the period of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, scholars of Wahhabism have continued to quote a poem from Risala fi Dham al-Dukhan in which ‘Abdullah Ibn Ibrahim denounced smoking: “You who like smoking tobacco and claim its permission, could you present your proof? To allow [smoking], could you give any reference and not philosophies, distortions, and lies?”54 Relying on this poem, the Wahhabi placed smoking within the realm of forbidden behavior and said that smokers should be punished with forty lashes.55 Ibn Bishr adds to these scholars of Medina the great scholar Muhammad Haiyat al Sindi al-Madani (d. 1749–51), who had a great impact on Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s attitude toward practicing tawassul at the grave of the Prophet. According to Ibn Bishr, al-Madani launched an attack against this habit, considering it bid‘a, and without references in the Qur’an and hadith. Ibn Bishr tells the following story: “One day, when Shaykh Muhammad [Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab] was standing near the Prophet’s room, he realized that some people were practicing [tawassul] and asking for salvation from the tomb of the Prophet.” Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab expressed his rejection of this habit, describing the practice of these people as false.56 Wahhabi scholars consider this statement of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab as a principle to support the attitude of the Wahhabis toward tawassul at the Prophet’s tomb. Because the ceremonies of the hajj included a

The Theological and Ethical Origin of Wahhabism | 47 visit to the Prophet’s tomb, the first generation of Wahhabis had to explain the principles of such a visit. For example, ‘Abdullah, the son of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, although he permits visiting the Prophet’s tomb, emphasizes that tawassul and kissing the tomb are two forbidden practices. ‘Abdullah clarifies that such a practice is similar to the worship of statues.57 He considers asking for salvation from the Prophet’s tomb a deviation from monotheism in which salvation should be requested by soliciting God directly. Such deviation is no more than al-shirk al-a‘zam (the great polytheism), which means sharing God with partners. The way to solicit God through the Prophet is to say, atawassal ilika bi-rasulik (“I solicit You by Your Prophet”). Saying such a phrase means maintaining the principle of tawhid and at the same time recognizing the Prophet as the messenger of God and not His partner.58 Although the second generation of Wahhabis emphasized their rejection of shrine visits, they were more flexible regarding visits to the Prophet’s tomb, as this study will show later on. Wahhabi principles concerning the shrine cult and some habits such as smoking show that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab had succeeded in implanting his concepts within the tribal society of Najd. Although he emphasized his devotion to Hanbaliyya, these concepts could not eliminate the shrine cult and other habits practiced by followers of Hanbalism in other places outside the Arabian peninsula. Unlike Muslim scholars in the urban centers of Damascus, Cairo, and elsewhere, from the sixteenth century the scholars of Najd developed their own interpretations of Hanbali ethics and behavior. In this regard, one may assume that Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab’s version of Hanbalism had existed before his advent, and that many of his concepts could be found dispersed among different sources. The synthesis made by Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s of these dispersed concepts became authoritative in some areas of Najd thanks to his alliance with Muhammad Ibn Saud, who helped him to consolidate his religious doctrine.

CHAPTER

3

Facing Internal and External Challenges Subjugating Religious and Political Opposition in Arabia The present chapter focuses on the role of Al al-Shaykh in consolidating the Second State after a period of the Egyptian occupation. The chapter follows the religious activities of Al al-Shaykh, who succeeded in eroding religious opposition. Thanks to the mutawi‘a system applied by Al al-Shaykh, the opposition began to die away. The combination of the military victories of the Saudis and the mutawi‘a system implanted Wahhabi principles in Najd. This chapter also surveys some of the explanatory paradigms through which modern historians attempt to assess the ability of Wahhabism to survive after the dissolution of its First State. During the three successive Saudi states, lineage relationships, economic interest, and religious zeal enabled the Saudi–Wahhabi leaders to extend their sway, creating a tribal federation bound by religious ‘asabiyya. However, their success would not have been achieved without a struggle against opposition forces within Najd and against external enemies. At the first stage of its emergence the Saudi– Wahhabi movement was challenged by Dahham Ibn Dawwas, the chief of Riyadh , and by other small chiefs in Najd. After twenty-seven years of bloody conflict, in 1773 the Saudis were able to subjugate Ibn Dawwas, forcing him to take shelter in Kharj, the southwestern region of central Najd.1 The surrender of Ibn Dawwas enabled the Saudis to rely on Wahhabi supporters, who constituted a sort of “fifth column,” to subdue opponents all over Najd.2 Wahhabi religious preaching played an important role in winning new supporters, notably among newcomers to the new settlements established in the eighteenth century. The Wahhabis used to send religious scholars to several localities outside their control on mission to teach the local people the principles of Wahhabism. These emissaries

Facing Internal and External Challenges | 49 served as missionaries charged with the special task of gaining new supporters by putting them under the Wahhabi mutawi‘a system of obedience and discipline. Wahhabi literature provides valuable information about the activities of these emissaries who propagated the Wahhabi doctrine in Najd. In his famous chronicle ‘Inwan al-Majd, Ibn Bishr describes on many occasions the role of the mutawi‘a in spreading the Wahhabism’s tenets among the Najdi sedentary and nomadic population. Ibn Bishr extends special treatment to the religious activities of Ibn ‘Isa Qasim, a mutawi‘ (Person who exircises mutawi‘a activities) who was sent in 1754 from Dir‘iyya to Riyadh. After a period of preaching among its ‘ulama and common people, Ibn ‘Isa Qasim succeeded in establishing the doctrine among the inhabitants of Riyadh and forming a Wahhabi faction whose members acted as allies of Dir‘iyya.3 According to Madawi al-Rasheed, the majority of the mutawi‘a have come from the sedentary areas of the Najdi oases. They were an already existing socioreligious group which had the special role of propagating the teachings of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. Such groups had already existed in almost every sedentary locality of Najd, even before the emergence of the religious movement of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. Due to their role in teaching the principles of the faith and Islamic rituals, some Najdi chroniclers do not make any distinction between the mutawi‘a and ‘ulama. Although its religious functions were reshaped in the course of time, the mutawi‘a system continued to play an important role in the history of Arabia. At the beginning of the twentieth century the term mutawi‘ began to bear the meaning of a man of the hadar who had acquired his religious qualification in a circle of famous scholars to become a specialist in religious ritual. In the nineteenth century, the mutawi‘a system played an important part in reviving Wahhabi religious zeal, notably after the withdrawal of the Egyptians, who had put an end to the First Saudi State. Their religious importance increased after the 1840s, when Al al-Shaykh resumed their intensive propagation of the doctrine during the Second Saudi State.4 In order to understand the way in which Al al-Shaykh succeeded in implanting the doctrine of Wahhabism in Najd, our study will further discuss the mutawi‘a system during the Second Saudi State. During the period of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Saud (1902–53), the system became a formal religious body, which continues to exist until the present day, although its functions have been reshaped.5 However, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the mutawi‘a system had two principal functions; the first was to propagate the doctrine and the second was to deal with opposing elements among the Najdi ‘ulama who criticized Wahhabism’s religious principles.

50 | Facing Internal and External Challenges Before dealing with the Ottoman and Egyptian interventions in Arabia, which resulted in the dissolution of the First Saudi State, it is worth assessing the religious and political means used by the Saudi– Wahhabi movement to deal with opposition forces inside and outside Arabia until the Egyptian occupation of Dir‘iyya in 1818. Ever since its emergence, the Wahhabi–Saudi movement has confronted political and religious opposition. In many cases, political opponents coordinated their opposition with some Najdi ‘ulama. Some local chiefs perceived the religious preaching of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and the rise of Saudi political sway as a threat to their political and moral authority. Like the Wahhabis and Saudis, who relied on the mutawi‘a system to convince the local population, Ibn Dawwas also attempted to use his mutawi‘a to mobilize religious support against Wahhabism. The most ardent opponent of Wahhabiyya in its first stage was Sulayman Ibn Suhaym (1717–67).6 He launched a religious campaign against Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, attempting to refute his religious arguments. In his recent book The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia, David Commins devotes special attention to Ibn Suhaym’s religious polemic against Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. Before moving to Riyadh, Ibn Suhaym lived in al-Majma‘a, which boasted more ‘ulama than other locality in pre-Wahhabi Najd. Commins considers him one of the earliest authors to attack Wahhabism. Ibn Suhaym’s attacks concentrated on two aspects. The first was the attitude of Wahhabism toward the sanctuary cult when its followers destroyed the tomb of Zayd Ibn al-Khattab and attempted to raze ornaments from the Prophet’s tomb in Medina and from the Grand Mosque of Mecca. The second was the Wahhabi notion of takfir, which led to the branding of “venerated Muslims” as infidels and the burning of two famous religious works for containing allegedly idolatrous expressions.7 Wahhabi sources do not deal much with the arguments of its opponents, though they refer to them by surnames that would probably testify to their celebrity in Najd during the first stage of Wahhabism. Due to his religious position as qadi and mufti in Riyadh, Ibn Suhaym was better known than the other ardent opponents of Wahhabism in its first stages. He succeeded in gathering around him several ‘ulama who preached against Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and supported Ibn Dawwas. Consulting different Wahhabi sources provides information about some of these anti-Wahhabi scholars, such as ‘Abdullah Ibn al-Muwaysi (d. 1761), who had studied in Damascus with some Hanbali scholars. Returning to Najd, Ibn al-Muwaysi served as qadi of Humra in the region of Sudayr, which harbored at least five of that town’s seven ‘ulama who opposed Wahhabism.8 The Wahhabi sources

Facing Internal and External Challenges | 51 mention the following names: Ibn Isma‘il, Ibn Rabi‘a, Ibn ‘Ubayid, Ahmad Ibn Yahiya,9 ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn ‘Idwan (d. 1765)10 and ‘Abdullah Ibn Ahmad Ibn Suhaym (d. 1761)11 as ardent opponents of the Wahhabi religious doctrine. To these religious figures, the Wahhabi literature adds Sulayman Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1793), the brother of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism. Most of Wahhabi literature shows sufficient evidence that Sulayman wrote some treatises in which he criticized his brother’s religious apprehensions, before changing his mind and joining Wahhabism.12 From 1740 until 1755, Sulayman succeeded his father as the qadi of Huraymila. Our sources are mute on his first stance toward his brother’s religious preaching and reform. He probably kept a low profile as long as the Saudis controlled this locality. But when the Saudis lost Huraymila in 1752, Sulayman revealed his opposition to his brother’s movement. In 1754, he wrote an epistle against his brother’s “deviations,” which were recited in ‘Uyayna’s public places. In response, Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab ordered that anyone who recited the epistle should be killed. He then composed an essay to rebut the arguments of his brother Sulayman. In his epistle, Sulayman had accused his brother of undertaking the independent reasoning of ijtihad without relying sufficiently on the Qur’an and hadith, leading to the takfir accusation with which Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab had branded other Muslims infidels. Sulayman relied on the writings of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim, the same sources used by his brother to refute the Wahhabi reasoning of takfir. In his response to his brother, Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab quoted from same sources to prove the truth of his convictions. In 1755, when Huraymila fell into the hands of the Saudis, Sulayman fled to Zilfi, continuing his opposition until 1781, when this locality also fell under the control of the Saudis. Sulayman was then brought to Dir‘iyya and put under house arrest until his death in 1793.13 Not only in Najd, but also in its adjacent areas, opponent ‘ulama busied themselves in refuting the Wahhabi religious creed. In the neighboring region of Hasa, Muhammad Ibn ’Abdullah Ibn Fayruz (1729–1801) wrote his anti-Wahhabi epistle, al-Risala al-Murdiya fi al-Radd ‘ala al-Wahhabiyya (The Satisfactory Epistle on the Response against Wahhabism).14 In the same region, Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn ‘Afaliq (d. 1750), wrote his epistle, Tahakum al-Muqalidin fi Mudda‘i Tajdid al-Din (To Mock the Imitators Who Claim Religious Innovation). In this epistle, he argues that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, despite his pretence of reforming religion, was essentially an imitator.15

52 | Facing Internal and External Challenges Similar attacks against the innovations of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab came from the Shafi‘i ‘ulama of the holy city of Medina in Hijaz. Relying on the religious interpretation of the Shafi‘i school, Muhammad Ibn Sulayman al-Kurdi (d. 1780), a prominent mufti and jurist, articulated his polemic, refuting the “alleged” Hanbalism of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. On the other hand, Wahhabism provoked religious polemic outside Arabia soon after its emergence. In his private letters, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab mentioned Ahmad Ibn ‘Ali al-Basri al-Qabbani, one of his opponents in Iraq, without giving details about his life and his controversial ideas vis-à-vis Wahhabism. Information about al-Qabbani’s religious attacks against Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab is obtained from ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-‘Abd al-Latif, when he refers to al-Qabbani’s manuscript of 200 pages entitled Fasl al-Khitab fi Radd Dalalat Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (The Unmistakable Judgment in the Refutation of the Delusions of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab). Al-Latif also provides information about the anti-Wahhabi ‘ulama in remote areas such as Yemen, Tunisia, and Morocco. These ‘ulama began to manifest their concerns soon after the rise of the new doctrine. ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Isa al-Kawkabani (d. 1809) was the most famous scholar to contest Wahhabism in Yemen. In Tunis, ‘Umar al-Majdub (d. 1807) wrote a polemical treatise to refute Wahhabi ideas, and in Morocco, Muhammad ‘Abd al-Majid ‘Abd al-Salam Ibn Kiran (d. 1812/13) wrote an epistle against the Wahhabi doctrine.16 In his article on the early opponents of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab, Samir Traboulsi investigates a manuscript which contains five works written by opponents of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and copied by al-Qabbani before 1745.17 The manuscript is part of the Garret collection at Firstone Library, Princeton University. Although Traboulsi focuses on one of these five works, namely Kitab Rad‘ alDalala wa Qam‘ al-Jahala (The Book of the Prevention of Error and the Suppression of Ignorance) written by ‘Abd al-Wahhab Ibn Ahmad Barakat al-Shafi‘i al-Azhari al-Tantawi, an Egyptian scholar from the town of Tanta who moved to Mecca, where in 1743 he wrote this work which was copied by al-Qabbani in the same year. According to Taboulsi, the short time span between the composition and the copying of the Tantawi text suggests that al-Qabbani was among the first to receive or read it in Basra. This is plausible because of the special role played at that time by al-Qabbani on the anti-Wahhabi scene. In the introduction to his refutation, al-Qabbani mentions two other works which he had already written on the same topic. The first is the above-mentioned work Fasl al-Khitab fi Rad Dalalat Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, which, according to Taboulsi, was widely used and publicly read by the opponents of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab in Najd and

Facing Internal and External Challenges | 53 Hasa. The the second is Kashf al-Hijab ‘an Wajh Dalalat Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (Lifting the Veil from the Face of the Delusions of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab). In his assessment of these early refutations, Traboulsi concludes that the reformist ideas of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab seemingly started to crystallize before the year 1743.18 The above survey of the religious opposition shows that at the first stage of its emergence, Wahhabism confronted many ‘ulama from within and outside Najd. However, the Saudi–Wahhabi movement reached its religious and political zenith at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, despite the death of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab in 1792 and despite the anti-Wahhabi polemic.19 Although in this later period a small group of Najdi ‘ulama continued to resist the Saudi–Wahhabi hegemony in Najd – such as Muhammad Ibn ‘Ali Ibn Sallûm (1748–1830)20 and ‘Uthman Ibn Muhammad Ibn Ahmad Ibn Sanad al-Basri (1768–1834)21 – the bulk of the religious opposition came from regions outside Najd and outside Arabia. These two scholars contested the accusation of the Wahhabis that other Muslims were infidels and heretics. Religious opposition to Wahhabism probably began to die away in Najd in the second half of the nineteenth century due to the impact of the mutawi‘a system on the local population, but it gained force outside Arabia. Combined with the military victories of the Saudis, the mutawi‘a system succeeded in implanting Wahhabi principles and in subduing opponent scholars in Najd. Such success enabled Al al-Shaykh to elaborate, during the Second Saudi State (1843–91), the original religious principles of Wahhabism, and to embed them within local culture. However, although they elaborated ideas that were accepted in Najd, Al al-Shaykh made great efforts to challenge religious attacks from outside. In Chapter 4, we shall delineate further the religious ideas of Al al-Shaykh and the polemical debates they held with opponent scholars. As already mentioned, the Wahhabi–Saudi movement combined military might and the religious mutawi‘a system to subdue its opponents in Najd. The leaders of the movement used to send mutawi‘a into the newly conquered areas in order to propagate the principles of Wahhabism. Although the Saudi forces applied the same warlike methods of tribal raids characterized by looting the enemy, they also attempted to gain victory over other tribes through the mediation of their mutawi‘a. The mutawi‘a accompanied the Saudi forces in order to convince the surrendering tribes to accept their religious doctrine. However, in the combined efforts of military raids and mutawi‘a indoctrination, military might had the upper hand. Unlike any modern state, the First Saudi State had no defined boundaries, which fluctuated according to the shifting allegiances of

54 | Facing Internal and External Challenges the tribes. Therefore, during the first stage of their movement, the Wahhabi–Saudi leaders faced the constant threat of counterattack and revolt. The main reason for such revolts was the payment of the religious zakat imposed on the local population under their control. As mentioned above, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, Dir‘iyya was a small settlement with modest sources of revenue. It was only due to the partnership between Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and its ruler, Ibn Saud (r. 1744–65), that Dir‘iyya could increase its material resources. Dir‘iyya was transformed into a powerful city when the zakat began to be levied by the Wahhabi ‘ulama.22 In her study on the emergence of Wahhabism, Madawi al-Rasheed analyzes the reasons for its success. She argues that there were four principal factors that explain the rise and the expansion of the Wahhabi movement. (1) Disunity and rivalries among the local settlements of Najd facilitated an organized force such as that of the Saudi–Wahhabis conquering new territories and defeating opponent tribes one by one. (2) Internal disputes among the chiefs of other localities outside Wahhabi rule weakened resistance against the Saudis. (3) During this period, the process of migration from Najd to the fertile regions of Iraq and Syria opened the door for anti-Wahhabi inhabitants to migrate rather than resist the rise of the new movement in Najd. Those who remained in Najd chose to surrender rather than to place their localities at the mercy of the organized force of the Saudi–Wahhabis. (4) Many religious principles introduced to pre-Wahhabi Najd facilitated the spread of the Wahhabi creed among some local elements.23 Doubtless, the alliance between Ibn Saud and Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab in Dir‘iyya created a new political situation in which even hesitant chiefs were ready to declare their allegiance to this alliance. For example, the leaders of Manfuha, Huraymila, and Darma, nearby localities, preferred to declare allegiance to the movement rather than confront it. But when these leaders realized that they had lost their independent status as tribal chiefs and had become fully subordinate, they began to resist Saudi tribal supremacy. Between the years 1750 and 1753, the leaders of Manfuha, Huraymila, and Darma decided to revoke their alliance with the Saudis.24 The case of these three localities was characteristic of many others whose tribal allegiances had fluctuated until the surrender of Ibn Dawwas, the chief of Riyadh, in 1773. As mentioned above, Ibn Dawwas continued to cause great difficulties for the Saudis, who were attempting to consolidate their control in the heart of Najd. Between the 1750s and the 1770s, Ibn Dawwas, like many tribal leaders of that time, shifted his allegiance with and against the Saudis in accordance with the balance of power, causing instability in the region. In 1773, the Saudis decided to put an

Facing Internal and External Challenges | 55 end to Ibn Dawwas’s fluctuation by mobilizing many supporters to attack Riyadh. Realizing that he could not resist the Saudi attack, Ibn Dawwas decided to evacuate Riyadh, permitting ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Saud to capture the city. The end of Ibn Dawwas’s rule in Riyadh was a turning point in the history of Arabia, inaugurating a period of successive military victories through which the Saudi–Wahhabis were able to subjugate most of the Najdi tribes and penetrate into other regions in Arabia.25 Encouraged by the capture of Riyadh, the Saudi–Wahhabis now found themselves free to subdue Zayd Ibn Zamil, the chief of Kharj in the south of al-‘Arid, the central region of Najd. In an effort to abort a possible offensive by the Saudi–Wahhabis, Ibn Zamil made a tribal covenant with the chief of Najran, south of Najd. In 1775, in order to fulfill his commitment to this covenant, the leader of Najran launched an attack against the Saudi–Wahhabi garrisons in Ha’il and Darma that were under Saudi–Wahhabi domination. But the overwhelming forces of the Saudi–Wahhabis easily defeated the attackers, weakening the Ibn Zamil tribal alliance.26 In 1774, the year in which Ibn Zamil had organized his anti-Saudi alliance, ‘Urayr Ibn Duhayn, chief of the Banu Khalid tribes in Hasa, launched an offensive against the Saudi–Wahhabi troops in Najd. He proceeded to al-Qasim, where there was a rich underground water reservoir located between Shammar in the north and al-Washm in the south. The attack posed a threat to Dir‘iyya, the capital of the Saudis. While his supporters were celebrating their success in capturing Burayda and other small localities in al-Qasim, ‘Urayr Ibn Duhayn suddenly died. His death caused a split within the Banu Khalid tribes when his two sons, Sa‘dun and Dujayn, conspired against their brother Batin, who had succeeded his father. Although the conspiracy of two sons resulted in the assassination of their brother and the ascendance of Sa‘dun, the internal split was aggravated when the latter murdered his brother Dujayn.27 In 1782, Sa‘dun attempted to resume his father’s campaign in Najd when he joined Zayd Ibn Zamil, the chief of Kharj, constituting new anti-Saudi alliance that also comprised Najdi tribes in the vicinity of Harma, al-Rawda, and al-Zalfa, which were under the rule of the Saudis. The forces of this new alliance launched their attack, besieging the Saudi garrison in al-Rawda. The Saudis soon launched a counterattack through which they succeeded in containing the attack and lifting the siege.28 As result of the Saudi success, the alliance of the attackers collapsed, forcing Sa‘dun to retreat with his forces to Hasa. Meanwhile a dispute erupted in Kharj, causing the murder of its leader, Zayd Ibn Zamil, in 1783. The effort of Barak Ibn ‘Abdullah

56 | Facing Internal and External Challenges al-Muhsin, the successor of Zayd, to resume the campaign against the Saudis failed due to internal rivalries among the chiefs of Kharj.29 Three years of drought and famine in Najd that lasted from 1783 until 1785 weakened the enemies of the Saudis, whose forces continued to conduct warfare to expand their territorial control.30 In the years 1785–92, the Saudis intensified their offensives against the remaining pockets of resistance in central Arabia around Najd. Thus, in 1792, the Saudis and Wahhabis became the paramount political and religious chiefs not only in Najd but also in adjacent areas, where other tribal chiefs had become the proxies of Dir‘iyya in their localities, either as dependants or as appointees.31 When they felt that the process of consolidating their political and religious command over Najd had been completed, the Saudis and Wahhabis conducted successive raids in all directions, reaching remote areas such as Hasa, Hijaz, Yemen, Oman, and southern Iraq, and even attacking dozen of villages in southern Syria. In a punitive campaign, the Saudis and Wahhabis launched in 1792–3 their first attack against Barak, the chief of Hasa. After losing many warriors on the battle, the chiefs of Hasa pledged their allegiance to the Saudis. Because most of the people in Hasa were Shiites and were considered by Wahhabis “heretics,” the victorious forces remained in the area for over a month, applying the mutawi‘a system to spread the Wahhabi doctrine among the local ‘ulama. To uproot religious affiliations other than that of Wahhabism, the victorious forces deprived ‘Abdullah Ibn Fayruz and Muhammad Ibn Sa‘dun, ardent religious foes of Wahhabism, of their religious positions. As in many other occupied areas, the Wahhabis destroyed holy graves and shrines. Meanwhile, the Najdi mutawi‘a continued their religious mission of converting the local inhabitants to supporters of Wahhabism.32 To avoid confrontation with the Wahhabis, the Shiites probably practiced their principle of taqiyya. The Shiite practice of taqiyya permits the practice of the outward forms of the dominant rituals in order to protect the inward Shiite faith. However, to maintain order in Hasa, the Saudis invested their former adversary, Barak Ibn ‘Abdullah al-Muhsin, with great authority, and recognized him as the paramount leader over the chiefs of the region. Barak had kept a low profile until 1796, when the Saudi–Wahhabis found themselves engaging in struggle with the Sharifs of Mecca, the rulers of Hijaz. Realizing that the latter were waging war against tribes in Najd, Barak decided to break his allegiance and attempted to expel the Saudi– Wahhabis from Hasa. But Saud Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (1759–1814) soon led his forces into Hasa in a punitive campaign, and in less than a month he managed to suppress Barak’s revolt.33

Facing Internal and External Challenges | 57

The Ottoman and Egyptian Intervention As in many previous cases, the success of the Saudi–Wahhabis in Hasa increased their appetite to expand their sway into further territories. The Saudi–Wahhabi troops proceeded from Hasa toward the north, occupying many villages in lower Iraq. Their penetration into Iraq alarmed ‘Ali Kikha, the governor of Baghdad, who dispatched his Ottoman troops into Hasa in 1798–9 and imposed a siege around the Saudi–Wahhabi garrison in the place. But the Iraqi attackers failed to defeat the fortified forces in Hasa, and returned to Baghdad emptyhanded.34 The failure of the Ottomans encouraged the Saudi–Wahhabi forces to proceed further in Iraq, in 1802 reaching the Shiite holy city of Karbala.35 According to al-Rasheed’s historical narrative, the invaders slaughtered a great number of Shiite inhabitants in the sacred city.36 In his recent book A Brief History of Saudi Arabia, James Wynbrandt believes that the Saudi attack against Karbala was of major influence in igniting the Ottomans and the Egyptians. Thus the Egyptians invaded Arabia in 1810 and put an end to the First Saudi State in 1818.37 The invasion of Karbala probably caused a serious reversal for the Ottomans, but the Ottoman–Egyptian military expedition to Arabia took place eight years after the incident in Karbala. It seems that the Saudi invasion of Hijaz in 1802 had more impact on Ottoman policy makers.38 Since the sixteenth century, successive Ottoman Sultans had assisted the Sharifs of Mecca with revenue, subsidizing their high expenditures. Dispute over the revenues among the rival clans of the Sharifs created a state of constant instability in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. In many cases, the Sharifs who were in need of more revenue obtained it through their raids into the sedentary areas of Najd. The rise of the Saudi–Wahhabi political entity put an end to the invasions of the Sharifs into Najd, causing a decline in their revenues. Encouraged by their success in Najd and elsewhere at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Saudi–Wahhabi leaders carried their military campaign against Hijaz. Controlling the holy cities was, for the Wahhabis, an imperative task that would increase their legitimacy in Arabia and elsewhere. Probably the Saudi–Wahhabi leaders had some information about the political instability that prevailed in Mecca. This instability stemmed from the dispute between Sharif Ghalib Ibn ‘Awn (d. 1817), the ruler of the city, and other rival Sharifs who were attempting to oppose his supremacy. In addition, the local population had suffered from the heavy taxes imposed by Ghalib to increase his revenues. Thus in 1802 the Saudi–Wahhabi forces launched a military campaign against Hijaz. After establishing tempo-

58 | Facing Internal and External Challenges rary rule over Ta’if in 1802, they proceeded to Mecca in 1803 and then to Medina in 1804. During the first years of their stay in the holy cities, the Saudi–Wahhabi leaders attempted to deal with the famine that afflicted the local population as a result of a terrible drought. Unable to mobilize supporters in these harsh circumstances, Sharif Ghalib announced his resignation in 1806. In order to save his skin he agreed to serve as a proxy and mere representative of the new rulers. In his traveler’s account of the political situation in Hijaz, Burckhardt notes that the Saudi–Wahhabis had invested Sharif Ghalib Ibn ‘Awn with great authority, and writes as follows: Although Hedjaz was now conquered, the Sherif’s power continued to be very great. His name and venerable office; his great talent for intrigue; and his personal influence over many Bedouin tribes, that still resist the authority of Saoud, and the valuable presents made to be latter [sic], whenever he visited Mekka, caused the Wahaby chief to connive at several of Gháleb’s proceedings.39

Early in 1803, when they arrived in Hijaz, the Wahhabi mutawi‘a began their religious mission to propagate their creed among the local inhabitants. Applying their principle of purifying Islam from shrine rituals, they ordered the destruction of the graves of martyrs in the area that were considered holy places. According to some sources, they even dared to destroy the dome over the Prophet’s grave to prevent Muslims practicing ritual at the site similar to those practiced at other holy shrines.40 It is worth noting that Ibn ‘Isa, the famous Wahhabi chronicler, overlooks the Wahhabi treatment of the holy shrines in Hijaz. Ibn Bishr, another prominent chronicler, includes the victory of the Saudis against the Sharifs and the destruction of graves, but omits the destruction of the dome above the Prophet’s grave.41 This latter incident was reported by John Lewis Burckhardt, the Western traveler who visited Hijaz at that time,42 and by Ahmad Dahlan, an antiWahhabi chronicler who interweaves his historical account with the polemical ideas he uses in his attempts to refute Wahhabi religious convictions.43 Their military presence in Mecca and Medina enabled the Saudi– Wahhabi troops to control caravan routes including that of al-hajj (the pilgrimage) to Mecca. Therefore the Saudi–Wahhabi presence in Hijaz posed a challenge for the Ottomans, who considered themselves the protectors of the holy Muslim sites in Mecca and Medina. Their anger further increased when, in 1807, Saud Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz fulfilled his duty of hajj for the fourth time, accompanied by his warriors and men of his entourage.44 In his description of the pilgrimage to Mecca in

Facing Internal and External Challenges | 59 1807, Ibn Bishr estimates that 100,000 warriors and men accompanied Saud on his hajj. Despite the anger of the Ottomans, Saud continued to make a yearly pilgrimage until 1815, when Egyptian invaders of Arabia ousted the last Saudi–Wahhabi followers from Medina.45 The Ottomans, who had been watching Saudi–Wahhabi advancement into many territories, began to speculate about appropriate measures to halt their progress. While they were consolidating their rule in Hijaz, the Saudi–Wahhabi forces advanced into Hawran, near Damascus.46 Ottoman policy makers were further alarmed when, in 1808–10, the Saudi–Wahhabi warriors penetrated into the northern parts of the Syrian territories, reaching the villages of Aleppo and spreading panic in the main cities of Syria.47 Until 1810, the Saudi–Wahhabi movement succeeded in extending its sway over almost all the Arabian peninsula, including Yemen, Oman, and Bahrain. In fierce fighting at the end of 1809, they conquered the forces of ‘Abd al-Wahhab Ibn ‘Amir al-Muthami (known by his nickname, Abu Nuqta), the chief leader of Yemen, killing a large number, including Abu Nuqta himself.48 Meanwhile, the Saudi–Wahhabi forces intensified their raids in the Persian Gulf, gaining new territories. Their presence in this area goes back to 1780 when they seized Qatif, and 1797 when they imposed their rule on the chiefs of Qatar.49 At the beginning of the 1790s, they had penetrated deeply into the southern part of the Persian Gulf, reaching Oman. In 1795, they launched an offensive to capture Oman, exploiting the Sunni Abadi sectarian rivalries.50 The religious origin of the Abadi community goes back to the Khawrij, who emerged after the battle of Sifin in the year 657, causing the schism between Sunnis, Shiites and Khawarij. Before launching their attack, the Saudis sent a letter to Omani Abadi leaders, demanding their submission to the Wahhabi creed. But the Abadi chiefs rejected the demand, showing a defiant stance of resistance. Due to this resistance, the subjugation of Oman by Saudi–Wahhabi forces lasted from 1795 until 1808–9.51 In 1810, the Saudi–Wahhabi forces finally completed their control over the Persian Gulf when they removed the chief leader of the Khalifa dynasty in Bahrain. To maintain their rule in Bahrain, they appointed ‘Ali Ibn Muhammad Ibn Khalifa as proxy.52 Since the 1780s the Ottomans had been watching the victories of the Saudi–Wahhabi movement in Arabia with great concern. But at the beginning of the nineteenth century, their concerns rose even further when the movement’s expansion reached Ottoman possessions in Hasa, Hijaz, and some areas in Syria and Iraq. The victories of the movement in these areas evoked the fear of some local ‘ulama, prompting them to urge Istanbul to take action against the Najdi

60 | Facing Internal and External Challenges threat. In 1793, an Ottoman qadi in Medina collected the signatures of more than fifty officials, urging the Ottomans to subdue the Wahhabis. The signatories compared the Wahhabis with the Shiite Qarmatians who had seized the holy black stone of Ka‘ba in the tenth century. By 1802, the Ottomans had launched a religious campaign against Wahhabism, mobilizing ‘ulama from Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco.53 The Saudi–Wahhabi conquest of Mecca and Medina was a great blow to the prestige of the Ottomans, who since the sixteenth century had used the holy places in Arabia to legitimize their rule over all Muslims. It is worth noting that when Sultan Salim I conquered Hijaz in 1517, the Ottomans invested their Sultan with the title khadim al-haramayyin al-sharifayyin (Servant and Protector of the Holy Places). After establishing their rule in Hijaz, the Ottomans proceeded into the eastern parts of Arabia to occupy Qatif, Bahrain, and Hasa. The chiefs of these regions declared their submission to Sultan Sulayman the Magnificent (r. 1520–66). In addition, the Ottomans were able to extend their rule for a short time to the southern parts of Arabia: Yemen and Oman. Thereafter, Saudi–Wahhabi forces captured all the provinces of Arabia that had nominally been under Ottoman domination.54 Although the Sharifs continued to rule the holy places from the sixteenth century until the Saudi–Wahhabi conquest, they did so as proxies of the Ottoman Sultans. During the period of Sultan Salim II (r. 1566–77), the Ottomans attempted to turn Mecca and Medina into cites suited to worldwide Muslim pilgrimage, investing about 110,000 gold coins in building materials and metals that were conveyed to Mecca through Egypt.55 To gain the support of the Sharifs, the Ottomans provided them with revenue. Consequently, the number of the families whose members claimed Sharifi origins grew larger in the course of time, causing a shortage in the distribution of the revenue. The Ottomans forced the dominant Sharifs to share the revenue with other families. For example, Sharif Idris Ibn Hassan (r. 1601–24) had to share revenue with a great number of Sharif relatives in order to appease the Ottomans, who sought their religious backing.56 At the end of the seventeenth century, the ruling Sharif had to share threequarters of the Ottoman revenue with other members of the Sharif clans.57 The dispute between the Sharifs over this revenue split them into factions. To overcome the shortage of revenue, Sharifi chiefs used to launch raids into other regions of Arabia for purposes of looting. In many cases, disputes among the Sharifs resulted in the assassination of competitors.58 Munir al-‘Ajlani, the Saudi historian, estimates that

Facing Internal and External Challenges | 61 a dominant chief of the Sharifi strata could not rule the holy places for more than one or two years as result of the frequent murders among this strata.59 Since the seventeenth century, the ruling chiefs of the Sharifs used to impose heavy taxes on agricultural products in Hijaz, especially in times of drought, as well as to raid oases outside Hijaz, notably of Najd.60 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Wahhabism put an end to the Sharifi raids into Najd, and their rule in Mecca and Medina was by grace of the Saudi–Wahhabi forces. The Sharifis lost Ottoman backing and became the proxies of the new rulers. At this time, the Ottomans were not prepared to use military force to subdue the Saudi– Wahhabi movement that threatened to deprive their Sultan both of the title khadim al-haramayyin al-sharifayyin and of control of the route of the hajj. The Ottomans became more upset when Saudi–Wahhabi forces expelled Ottoman employees and officers from the holy places.61 In the years 1806–7, the central government in Istanbul was engaged in internal strife that erupted when the Janissaries assassinated the reformist Sultan Salim III. In order to preserve their privileges, the Janissaries dictated their choice in the takeover by Sultan Mustafa IV, known for his antireformist orientation. But the latter was soon assassinated by reformists. Mahmud II (r. 1808–39), a prominent reformist, took over as Sultan and inaugurated a new era in Ottoman history. The first task of Mahmud II was the war against Russia, and then to restore the authority of the central government in the provinces, most of which had a considerable measure of autonomy. However, he was forced to concede autonomous status to Muhammad ‘Ali, who had made himself master of Egypt.62 Preoccupied by Ottoman internal affairs, Sultan Mahmud II requested Muhammad ‘Ali (r. 1805–48) to conduct a military campaign into Arabia to subdue and expel Saudi–Wahhabi forces from the holy places. Muhammad ‘Ali acceded to the request, but in return he demanded from the Sultan a great amount of money in order to pay his soldiers and to bribe tribal chiefs, who soon joined the Egyptian military campaign, which began in 1811.63 Seven years of bloody confrontation between the Egyptian army and Saudi–Wahhabi forces in several places in Arabia put an end to First Saudi State. By plundering Dir‘iyya, the Saudi–Wahhabi capital, the Egyptian campaign even succeeded in ejecting Wahhabi ‘ulama from the holy places. Probably the death of ‘Abd al-Aziz, the powerful leader of the Saudis, in 1814 had facilitated the task for the Egyptians. His successor and son, ‘Abdullah Ibn Saud (r. 1814–18) was unable to face the Egyptian challenge when many of his father’s allies deserted him. The dissolution of the First Saudi State occurred after three

62 | Facing Internal and External Challenges consecutive offensives by the Egyptians. The first was that of Tusun, Muhammad ‘Ali’s son, who led the army into Hijaz in 1811. Despite the fierce resistance of Saudi–Wahhabi forces, the Egyptians succeeded in evicting their enemies from many parts of Hijaz.64 In 1813, another dispatched army led by Muhammad ‘Ali himself completed the takeover of the whole region of Hijaz. Three years later, Ibrahim, the eldest son of Muhammad ‘Ali, launched his military campaign into Najd, the heart of the Saudi state. With more than a thousand cavalrymen, thousands of soldiers, and heavy weapons, Ibrahim’s forces reached Dir‘iyya in March 1818. After seven months of siege lasting until September, the Saudi–Wahhabi capital surrendered.65 According to Philby, Ibrahim’s expedition had cost the Egyptian–Ottoman forces some 12,000 dead, about 10,000 of whom fell in the battle for Dir‘iyya.66 In an attempt to uproot the Wahhabi creed, the Egyptian forces massacred Wahhabi ‘ulama, many of them from Al al-Shaykh (the successors of Ibn ‘Abd al Wahhab), and those who survived the massacre were exiled to Egypt.67 Among the exiles was ‘Abdullah, the ruling Saudi chief, who was sent to Istanbul, where he was beheaded by the Ottomans.68 The massacre and exile of many Wahhabi ‘ulama and the occupation of Dir‘iyya, the capital of the Saudis, resulted in the final dissolution of the First Saudi State, arousing among Wahhabism’s opponents in Hijaz and Najd the hope of eliminating it. Immediately after the fall of Dir‘iyya to the Egyptians, many nomadic tribes in Najd switched their allegiance and joined the Egyptian army.69

The Ability of the Saudi–Wahhabi Movement to Survive At this stage, after the fall of Dir‘iyya, it was hard to imagine that the Wahhabi movement could regain its strength and establish its hegemony within Najd society. But its revival after the partial withdrawal of the Egyptians poses questions amongst historians about the socioeconomic and cultural factors that generated the emergence of the Saudi–Wahhabi movement in the eighteenth century and its ability to survive despite the harsh blow it had suffered at the dissolution of the First Saudi State. It is beyond the scope of this study to survey the historiography that deals with the Saudi–Wahhabi phenomenon and to pinpoint the different approaches by which historians have attempted to explain its emergence and ability to survive. However, three historians – al-Uwaidah al-Juhany, Michael Cook, and Abdulaziz al-Fahad – are good representatives of this historiography.

Facing Internal and External Challenges | 63 Although their explanations are not always incompatible, their different approaches deserve a survey. In their explanations, the three historians combine economic, social, cultural, and religious factors. As mentioned above, al-Juhany, the Saudi historian, argues that Wahhabism was profoundly rooted in Najd due to a historical process that had begun in the sixteenth century and lasted until the eighteenth. According to him, the rise of the movement in the eighteenth century was related to a process of immigration into Najd during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This immigration led to the emergence of new settlements where Wahhabism propagated its creed and where the Saudis formed their first political entity. During this demographic process, the traditional tribal system of the area changed, enabling the Wahhabi–Saudi movement to hold sway. Socioeconomic processes from the sixteenth century had introduced changes in the intellectual life in the sedentary areas of Najd. The rise of religious teaching prepared generations of scholars who were in a state of expectation for some religious awakening and were ready to support the Wahhabi– Saudi movement that created the First Saudi State. Religious scholars were looking for a religious movement that would salvage the people of Najd from a moral crisis by reviving early Islam.70 In his chapter “The Expansion of the First Saudi State: The Case of Washm,” Michael Cook traces the historical events that enabled the Wahhabi–Saudi movement to extend its sway within the seven main settlements of the al-Washm region as a case study for the expansion of the movement in other regions. Cook’s survey contests al-Juhany’s “speculation” that Najd in the eighteenth century was ready to accept the Wahhabi–Saudi movement. While al-Juhany emphasizes the demographic, economic, and social changes that had taken place during immigration as the main factor in determining the rise of the First Saudi State, Cook argues that the creation of a pan-Najdi state was very much an uphill struggle, slow and unsteady. Unlike other local chiefs who had competed for supremacy in Najd, the Saudis had more persistence and faith. While other chiefs fought for immediate human goals and were liable to get exhausted, the Saudis “fought for God.” Although he does not exclude the possibility that something along the lines of al-Juhany’s thesis is substantially correct, Cook is still skeptical about such an explanation due to the limited sources that researchers can use to measure the demographic, economic, and social changes and their impact on religion and politics. Although he does not dismiss the hypothesis that long-term historical change lies behind the emergence of the First Saudi State, Cook emphasizes the persistence of the Saudis and the faith of the Wahhabis as playing a major role in the formation of a state in Najd.

64 | Facing Internal and External Challenges In this sense, Cook prefers to investigate religious and military activities rather than to speculate on the demographic, economic, and social processes that facilitated the spread of the Wahhabi mission during the eighteenth century. The historical survey – presented in Chapter 1 of this book – supports Cook’s theory on the ability of the Wahhabi–Saudi movement to challenge numerous oppositional forces during its development. However, neither Cook’s chapter nor this study omits or lessens the value of the socioeconomic factors of al-Juhany. It is true that the political and religious zeal of the Wahhabis and Saudis had played great role in consolidating the movement, but they could only do so within a society with special characteristics, such as Najd. Although it is difficult to follow the changes that took place in this society and to speculate about the long-term historical processes that had enabled the Wahhabis and Saudis to implant their movement in the soil of Najd, one cannot ignore the socioeconomic background, which enabled the movement to survive even after the Egyptian occupation. In this sense, one cannot see the origin and expansion of the Saudi state as an act of those who “fought for God”71 without referring to long-term factors which facilitated the formation of the state in the eighteenth century, and its revival after the Egyptian withdrawal. As will be illustrated later, the historical events that took place during the period of restoring the Wahhabi mission after 1824 show that Al al-Shaykh and the Saudis had acted within the same social context, utilizing the same tactics and methods as in the eighteenth century. The rise of a new Saudi political entity under the leadership of Faysal Ibn Turki in the years 1834–8 and in 1843–65, and his sons in the years 1865–91, faced approximately the same challenges as the First Saudi State.72 Al-Juhany’s “hypothesis” on the historical processes that changed the demographical and economic features of Najd society and led to the emergence of the religious movement needs more data for verification. Probably al-Juhany’s explanation is based on the assumption that a religious movement, such as Wahhabism, can emerge only after a long socioeconomic process. Although Abdulaziz al-Fahad adopts a similar approach in his explanation, he deals with the long-term factors in another way. He attempts to discern the stable features of the society in which Wahhabism emerged and survived from the eighteenth century despite external and internal setbacks. Al-Fahad refers to the long-term factors as “givens” that had existed in Najd for centuries. His survey and analysis recall the French Annales school of history writing. Fernand Braudel, one of the leading figures of this school, places emphasis on long-term factors to understand history, arguing that historical time has three units of varying duration

Facing Internal and External Challenges | 65 according to the rate at which change occurs in its various sectors. The first time span is the short one taken by events. The second time span refers to an intermediate rate of change called by him conjunctures. This is the time taken by the broader movements of economies, social structures, political institutions, and civilizations. Such a phase lasts from five to fifty years. The third time span is the one of longest duration, the longue durée, where time is almost stationary and the historian needs the perspective of centuries in order to recognize and plot any change at all. The history of the longue durée deals with structures that time takes very long to erode.73 In his chapter “The Imama vs. the ‘Iqal: Hadari–Bedouin Conflict and the Formation of the Saudi State,” al-Fahad accepts al-Juhany’s theory that Wahhabism was the response to a profound crisis that Najdi society had been experiencing in the eighteenth century. But, al-Fahd emphasizes that this crisis was the result of socioeconomic and political conditions that had existed in Najd for centuries, even before the rise of Islam in the seventh century. Al-Fahad’s analysis focuses on the interrelationship between the sedentary and nomadic populations in Najd in a long-term historical development. According to his analysis, with the destruction of Banu Hanifa’s tribes in the early Islamic period, the sedentary population of Najd had gradually lost any meaningful tribal organization and was reduced to a mélange of small communities, where every town in Najd boasted a number of large families, often of different genealogical origins. For centuries before the rise of Wahhabism, none of these towns had stable rule. Historical records show that bloody struggles had always characterized the history of these towns. In the nomadic areas of Najd, a persistent state of flux had characterized the nomads. For centuries, tribes moved into and out of Najd, either seeking new pastures or looking for shelter from enemies. As a result of this incessant process, some of the ancient genealogies had been lost, which resulted in alliances between the fragmented tribes to rebuild new imagined and invented genealogies to be taken as real. In such an incessant process, the dominance of tribes was dependant on military prowess and those who failed to maintain their military strength were gradually reduced to an inferior status, paying khuwa tribute to the stronger tribes and in the process losing their asil (pure lineage). Through such a process, many tribes became “outcasts” and the alleged asil tribes ceased to intermarry with them. However, in this process, the sedentary population, which had historically paid khuwa to strong tribes, maintained their “alleged” genealogies, including the ability to intermarry with the asil Bedouins. The only group in the sedentary society who were excluded from pure genealogy was al-khadariyyun, or Banu Khadar,

66 | Facing Internal and External Challenges whose members could not intermarry with those of asil origin. The sedentary population of non-asil social groups had been the most overlooked element within the Wahhabi–Saudi coalition, despite their critical contribution to the process of state formation, in which they were major beneficiaries.74 However, al-Fahad discerns that despite these genealogical distinctions, the collective identities of the sedentary population in Najd were defined by their towns. A territory based on the definition of sedentary communities had taken hold. Despite such territorial identities, sedentary communities before the rise of Wahhabism failed to overcome their internal rivalries in order to protect their livestock, agricultural produce, and trade routes from Bedouin ghazu (attacks), without paying khuwa. However, the tribal system would weaken or strengthen this territorial identity according to the internal balance of forces. In areas with stable tribal formation, most inhabitants of settlements were co-tribesmen of a dominant group, relying on genealogical politics. For this reason, they would be exempt from the payment of khuwa.75 From the start, Wahhabism relied on the sedentary population of al-‘Arid, which had a relatively minor nomadic population compared with other areas of Najd. From ‘Uyayna, the largest town in the region, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab began to rally supporters, relying on Ibn Mu‘ammar, with whom he shared the lineage of the Tamim tribe. But because ‘Uyayna was economically dependent upon the Banu Khalid, Ibn Mu‘ammar withdrew his support, compelling Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab to seek shelter in Dir‘iyya, which was under the rule of the Saudis. Al-Fahad argues that the genealogical origins of the Saudis had been the main contributory factor to the success of Wahhabism. Unlike many historians who ascribe to the Saudi family a genealogy that ensured its strong tribal/Bedouin identity, al-Fahad argues that the relative insignificance of the family at that time was behind its success and its gradual achievements. In general, chroniclers ascribe the family to ‘Anza’s tribe or to the remnants of Banu Hanifa. According to alFahad, this controversial ascription solves the puzzle of the prominence of the family and the success of Wahhabism. The Saudi family was neither Bedouin nor affiliated with a large tribe that would have allowed it to build an effective sedentary coalition, which eventually defeated its many opponents, the most serious of whom had considerable Bedouin and tribal backing. Although some Bedouin tribes supported the Saudis, their role was opportunistic and subsidiary. In the course of its development, the First Saudi State was successful in forging sedentary unity and Bedouin pacification. As a result of the Egyptian occupation in 1818, towns became independent again and the Bedouins reverted to their pre-Wahhabi state.76

Facing Internal and External Challenges | 67 Although consistent in his long-term explanation of Wahhabism’s ability to expand after the Egyptian occupation, al-Fahad seems to belittle the religious factor in the revival and expansion of Wahhabism during the Second Saudi State, in which Al-al-Shaykh played an important role. Probably the sedentary and nomadic societies and their political culture maintained their original characteristics, but still al-Fahad does not give answers to the fundamental questions: why did Wahhabism emerge in the eighteenth century and not before or later? How did the Saudis and Wahhabis succeed in restoring the movement and its political entity during the nineteenth century? Certainly, the explanations of al-Juhany, Cook, and al-Fahad illuminate our understanding, and each of these three historians offers a somewhat different emphasis in their explanation. However, no one can ignore the role of the historical actors whose religious and political activities were behind the success of the movement’s emergence and sustainability. Cook is perfectly correct in emphasizing the religious zeal and the persistence of the Saudi elite to keep the movement alive in harsh social and political conditions. Such zeal and persistence constituted a vehicle of Wahhabism to move forward within a society that continued to bear the same characteristics for centuries. As mentioned above, the fall of Dir‘iyya put an end to the first political entity established by Saudis in the eighteenth century. Some members of Al al-Shaykh were already killed during the Egyptian campaign, among them Sulayman Ibn ‘Abdullah Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, one of the most notorious figures in the family, who suffered torture and was then shot in Dir‘iyya.77 His brother, ‘Ali, the prominent qadi who was known all over the area, was also killed in combat at al-Dilam in 1819.78 Those from Al al-Shaykh who survived the campaign, including other leading figures of Najd, about 400, were exiled to Egypt.79 Al al-Shaykh continued to suffer persecution until the middle of 1819, when drought and famine exhausted the Egyptian garrisons, compelling them to withdraw from Najd.80 In the 1820s, the Egyptians released part of the exiled ‘ulama, but kept in exile the most prominent ‘ulama of Al al-Shaykh. The Egyptians probably thought that by doing so they might eradicate Wahhabism from Najd. While Sulayman and his brother ‘Ali, sons of ‘Abdullah and grandsons of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, were killed during the campaign, ‘Abdullah himself and his brothers ‘Ali81 and Ibrahim82 never returned to Najd and died in Egypt.83 Despite the massive killings, exile, and other measures taken by the Egyptians to eradicate Wahhabism from Najd, the Saudi chiefs and Al al-Shaykh’s ‘ulama who survived found ways to return to the area, and in the course of three decades they were able to resume their religious

68 | Facing Internal and External Challenges activities and renew their traditional alliance. They succeeded in coping with the social fabric and with economic conditions created by the Egyptian occupation when towns became independent again and Bedouins returned to their pre-Wahhabi political behavior. Thus explaining the revival of Wahhabism after 1820 only by focusing on socioeconomic conditions and on long-term factors would be a futile task that would omit the activities of the actors. To follow the activities of these actors, the next chapter will depict some biographical aspects of Al al-Shaykh ‘ulama and Saudi chiefs who led the movement after 1820. The personal activities of the actors at this stage will shed light on the ability of the Wahhabi–Saudis to revive their movement.

CHAPTER

4

Animating the Wahhabi Spark Internalizing Wahhabi Principles in the Hearts of the Common People In order to deal with the personal activities of historical figures, this chapter traces the role played by the descendants of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. Thanks to their religious activities, the spark of the creed was again ignited after the Egyptian occupation and the destruction of the First Saudi State. Although the descendants of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab had been confronted since 1820 with a new constellation in which there were many opponents, they made great efforts to overcome the unstable conditions that prevailed after the Egyptian withdrawal. They proved their ability to challenge the long-term conditions characterized by internal strife among the sedentary and nomadic populations. As illustrated above, it took several decades to establish the Saudi–Wahhabi political entity in Arabia during the First Saudi State.1 During these decades, the dynasty of Al al-Shaykh gained legitimacy to guide the spiritual domain in the state thanks to the fact that they were descendants of al-Shaykh Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the doctrine. Al al-Shaykh gained their religious legitimacy not only for their scholarship, but also due to their claimed genealogy as scions of an ancestry going back to a family that had played a great role in the religious affairs of Najd even before the religious mission of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Wahhabi family claimed that its ancestor came from Al Musharraf’s clan, one of the branches of the Tamim tribe. Although information on the line of ‘ulama descent of the family before the emergence of Wahhabism is not available, the sources provide some details about Sulayman Ibn ‘Ali (Ibn Musharraf), grandfather of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, who was the paramount religious figure in Najd in his time.2 Sulayman

70 | Animating the Wahhabi Spark strongly influenced his grandson Muhammad’s ideas, which survived and were sustained thanks to the descendants of Shaykh Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab, known as Al al-Shaykh. Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab had six sons, ‘Ali (d. 1829),3 Husayin (d. 1809),4 ‘Abdullah (1751/52– 1826),5 Hasan,6 Ibrahim,7 and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz.8 All the descendants of Al al-Shaykh are from the first four sons of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab, since the two younger sons did not have any male children. In his monumental book on the famous ‘ulama of Najd, Ibn Bishr lists the names of Hasan and ‘Abd al-‘Aziz among these ‘ulama, although he does not refer to treatises or books written by them. But he does devote special attention to ‘Ali, Husayin, ‘Abdullah, and Ibrahim, portraying them as important contributors to the propagation of the Wahhabi creed among the sedentary population during the first stage of Wahhabi–Saudi sway in Najd and other parts of Arabia in the late eighteenth century. To propagate the creed, they used to travel through several areas as delegates of the movement in Dir‘iyya.9 Unlike the scholars of Damascus, Cairo, or other Muslim cities, the sons of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab could not develop study centers in the form of madaris (sing. madrasa), or large religious institutions such as al-Azhar. However, they could spread the learning in small schools called majalis, similar to the kuttab in which teachers and students gathered either in houses or inside mosques.10 Ibn Bishr indicates that ‘Ali, Husayin, ‘Abdullah, and Ibrahim had contributed to the propagation of the creed among many students who came to Dir‘iyya from Yemen, Oman, Najd, and other parts of Arabia to attend their teaching sessions in such majalis.11 By establishing these majalis, the sons of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab transformed Dir‘iyya into an educational center which attracted many students from Najd and other parts of Arabia to become, later, the main center for the propagation of Wahhabism. Among these students was Husayn Ibn Abu Bakr Ibn Ghannam (d. 1810), the prominent scholar who came from Hasa. According to al-Bassam, before coming to Dir‘iyya, Ibn Ghannam was a Maliki. It was only through studying in these majalis that he became one of the famous Wahhabi scholars who contributed much toward the propagation of the creed.12

The Role of ‘Abdullah Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab ‘Abdullah Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1751–1828) was the most prominent scholar of all Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s sons.

Animating the Wahhabi Spark | 71 ‘Abdullah had probably inherited the religious leadership from his elder brother Husayn, as Ibn Bishr claims,13 but most of the sources consider ‘Abdullah the paramount leader of Al al-Shaykh soon after the death of his father and until the end of the First Saudi State. Thanks to his broad knowledge of religious subjects, ‘Abdullah was recognized by his family members as an authoritative scholar who would lead the Wahhabi movement after his father’s death. His religious authority gained him special appreciation among the common people, who used to address him in terms of the highest religious esteem. Through his instructions, advice, and recommendations, ‘Abdullah raised a new generation of disciples who disseminated and implanted the principles of the Wahhabi creed and practice throughout Najd. The main issue which ‘Abdullah emphasized in his teaching was the duty of forbidding wrongdoing. In his book Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought, Michael Cook considers ‘Abdullah the most prolific scholar in the First Saudi State to elaborate ideas about this duty. According to Cook, ‘Abdullah describes an ancient clash of opinion within the Sunni schools over the degree of activism appropriate in carrying out religious duties. The context of ‘Abdullah’s reference to these duties was a scholastic dispute with a Zaydi polemicist regarding Sunni attitudes to the rebellion of Husayn Ibn ‘Ali (d. 680), the second Shiite Imam.14 In their Majmu‘at al-Rasa’il wa-l-Masa’il al-Najdiyya, the scholars of Najd collected most of ‘Abdullah’s epistles in which he issued fatawa (sing. fatwa) related to specific subjects concerning the faith and social and religious practice. A reading of these fatawa suggests that ‘Abdullah is responding to questions addressed to him by the common people and ‘ulama regarding faith and practice, including issues of marriage, divorce, inheritance, the sharing system in agriculture, the duty of forbidding wrongdoing, and many other practices.15 Through the masa’il (questions) and his jawabs (responses), one can obtain a strong impression about the relationship between the mundane and the religious domains with which common people and ‘ulama in that period were concerned. Combining the duty of “forbidding wrongdoing” with theology and jurisprudence, ‘Abdullah reshaped the basic Wahhabi creed. Probably, because the Wahhabism of his time had expanded into areas inhabited by Shiites and Zaydis, ‘Abdullah dedicates an entire treatise to unorthodox sects in a very long epistle, notably on the Shiite faith and religious practice. In his long epistle Jawab Ahl al-Sunna fi Naqd Kalam al-Shi‘a wa-l-Zaydiyya (The Response of the Sunnis in Refuting the Shiite and Zaydi Speech), ‘Abdullah elaborates the concepts of his father on al-rafida (the Rejectionists), the collective name attributed by him to the Shiites and

72 | Animating the Wahhabi Spark Zaydis. Although his father considered the tenets of the Shiites and Zaydis to be deviations from Islam, he abstains from using the term kuffar (heretics). He enumerated examples of Shiite deviations from their emergence until the beginning of the nineteenth century. ‘Abdullah contests the claim of the Zaydis that his father considers the Zaydis and the Shiites to be heretics, emphasizing that the Wahhabis “consider only polytheists who share the faith in God with others to be heretics.”16 It is worth noting that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s epistle on al-rafida refers to all issues which differentiated the Shiite creed from that of the Sunnis, emphasizing the controversy over the legitimacy of the first caliphs, the controversy over some Qur’anic texts and other issues of the faith and practice of the Shiites.17 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab placed his polemic with the Shiites within the context of al-firqa al-najiya (“the saved sect”). Based on the Prophet’s hadith: “my umma [nation] will be divided into seventy-three sects and all of them are in the hell apart from one,” the Muslim scholars use the term al-firqa al-najiya to signify the one that has been saved from being in hell.18 Although he followed his father’s attitude toward the Shiites, ‘Abdullah placed the Shiites at the top of the list of liars among such Islamic sects.19 Therefore he does not call for applying the principle of jihad (holy war) against the Shiites but exhorts them to practice tawba (repentance), which would save them from punishment.20 ‘Abdullah’s attitude toward the Shiites and Zaydis probably stems from the fact that he had witnessed the Wahhabi campaigns against the Imamate Shiites in Hasa and Zaydi Shiites in Yemen. In this regard, devoting a long epistle to refuting their tenets had a practical goal; that is to say, to persuade them to reach the state of tawba rather than to declare jihad against them. However, the animosity of ‘Abdullah against the two sects was developed later on in the second half of the nineteenth century by Al al-Shaykh to bear new connotations in which al-rafida were identified as heretics. In addition to his contribution to religious practice, ‘Abdullah elaborates ideas concerning social and moral rejuvenation through strict adherence to tawhid (monotheism). His preaching and writings inspired his son Sulayman and his brothers to continue their mission of propagating the Wahhabi creed among the local population. While the Wahhabis, during the period of the founder, claimed that they had remained within the realm of traditional Hanbaliyya, the period of ‘Abdullah, his brothers and his son was marked by strict demarcation of Wahhabism from other Hanbali trends. At this stage, the term “Wahhabis,” or “supporters of al-Shaykh,” took on a distinct connotation that portrayed the doctrine as independent from other Muslim

Animating the Wahhabi Spark | 73 doctrines and granted its supporters a “we” group identity as against the “others.” Thanks to ‘Abdullah, his brothers, and his son, the Wahhabi creed became even more rooted in Najdi society, where external and internal opponents failed to eradicate it. From the end of the eighteenth century until the Egyptian occupation, the voice of internal opponents was muted. Even after the occupation, when these voices rose again, it was too late to make a radical shift in the religious convictions of the locals, who had internalized the Wahhabi creed. Probably, controversial Wahhabi actions in Karbala, Hijaz, and other places exemplify the independence of the doctrine from others, and shed light on the self-image of its ‘ulama, notably those of Al al-Shaykh, who viewed themselves as puritans with a mission. Through the polemical writings with respect to controversial Wahhabi actions, ‘Abdullah and contemporary Al al-Shaykh scholars introduced answers to the locals concerning many problematic themes in the religious and social fields. Although they elaborated ideas discussed by the founder of the doctrine, they certainly emphasized new issues concerning society and its morality that Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab probably had no time to elaborate. Since ‘Abdullah’s time, Al al-Shaykh had become an established strata whose influence was no longer limited to ‘ulama but included the common people as well. This would explain why the Egyptian occupation failed to put an end to the Wahhabi mission and why the first generation of Al al-Shaykh and their descendants continued to assume a leading position in guiding the believers and propagating the doctrine. This also explains the ability of Al al-Shaykh to utilize their socioreligious position in order to strengthen their political participation in Saudi policy from the time of the Second Saudi State until today, to become a religious dynasty alongside the Saudi one. To maintain the continuity of the religious dynasty, Sulayman Ibn ‘Abdullah (1785– 1818) was recognized by the Wahhabi ‘ulama as the successor of his father and as the dominant figure of Al al-Shaykh even when the latter was still alive. Sulayman was the first to interpret the book of al-Tawhid written by his grandfather Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab. The book of al-Tawhid consists of many quotations from the Qur’an and hadith on the idea of monotheism without a full interpretation of these quotations. The main contribution of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was the collection and arrangement of the quotations into sixty-six abwab (chapters).21 Sulayman discussed fifty-nine of these abwab, broadening them with his interpretation on the monotheist concepts of his grandfather. His interpretation became the basic Wahhabi idea on tawhid.22 Like his father’s, Sulayman’s writings had a strong impact on the Wahhabi ‘ulama, who continued to implant

74 | Animating the Wahhabi Spark the doctrine in Najd. But the death of Sulayman during the Egyptian attack against Dir‘iyya in 1818 put an end to the supremacy of ‘Abdullah’s descendants,23 transferring the leadership to the descendants of Hasan, his brother. Soon after his return from exile in Egypt in 1825–6, ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan (1779–1868) began to revive the movement and became its spiritual leader during the reigns of Turki Ibn ‘Abdullah Ibn Muhammad Ibn Saud in the years 1824–34 and Faysal Ibn Turki in the years 1834–8 and 1843–65. ‘Abd alRahman Ibn Hasan was one of the Wahhabi ‘ulama who survived after the Egyptian occupation. As mentioned above, the number of ‘ulama rose steadily until the Egyptian occupation.24

The Second Generation of Religious Scholars after the Egyptian Invasion In his chronicle, Ibn Bishr indicates the destructive effect of the Egyptian occupation of Dir‘iyya in 1818 and its significant impact on the religious and political order of the city and its environs. Although he does not give details about the fate of the entire strata of ‘ulama, Ibn Bishr states that many descendants of the Al Saud and Al al-Shaykh families had been killed, while others were exiled to Egypt or hid in safe places in Arabia.25 Our concern in this section is to follow those ‘ulama who survived after the occupation and evaluate their role in reviving the Wahhabi mission in a constellation that resulted from the partial Egyptian withdrawal. As mentioned above, one of the results of the Egyptian occupation was the disappearance of the branch of ‘Abdullah Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab as paramount among the clan of Al al-Shaykh, and the emergence of a new branch led by his brother Hasan, whose members have continued to be the leaders responsible for Saudi religious affairs until today. This shift in the leadership from ‘Abdullah’s branch occurred when Sulayman Ibn ‘Abdullah was killed in 1818. Since he had succeeded his father as the paramount spiritual leader of Al al-Shaykh, the death of Sulayman created a temporary vacancy in the leadership.26 The most dominant ‘ulama of Al al-Shaykh, ‘Ali, Ibrahim, and ‘Abdullah, the sons of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab were exiled to Egypt, where they died before the return of other Al al-Shaykh ‘ulama to their native country. After Sulayman Ibn ‘Abdullah was killed, his brother ‘Abd al-Rahman (1804–57) was exiled with his father and continued to live there until his death. During his stay in Cairo, he soon integrated into the strata of the Egyptian ‘ulama to

Animating the Wahhabi Spark | 75 become one of the prominent Hanbali scholars in al-Azhar mosque. His sons and grandsons also continued to live in Egypt and became highly integrated into Egyptian society. For example, ‘Abd al-Rahman Haqqi, a scion of ‘Abdullah, served as the head of the “Aid Society” in Cairo until his death in 1958. Due to his religious activities, ‘Abd al-Rahman Haqqi was mourned by the newspaper al-Ahram.27 Subsequently, the descendants of ‘Abdullah’s branch continued to live outside Najd. The vacancy of spiritual leadership among Al-al-Shaykh was filled when the son of Hasan Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, also named ‘Abd al-Rahman, returned from exile in Egypt in the year 1825–6. After eight years in exile, he came back to Najd, leaving his famous son ‘Abd al-Latif (1810–76) in Cairo to study at al-Azhar until 1847 before coming back to Najd. The return of ‘Abd al-Rahman and his son ‘Abd al-Latif reanimated the spark of the Wahhabi creed in Najd. Both ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan and his son ‘Abd al-Latif introduced new religious elements which they had acquired in al-Azhar and integrated them with the original concepts of Wahhabism. Thanks to their vast knowledge, they assumed the highest position among ‘ulama of Najd to guide religious affairs from 1826 onward and during the Second Saudi State. Thus the Egyptian invasion and the exile in Egypt paradoxically enriched the knowledge of ‘Abd al-Rahman, his son ‘Abd al-Latif, and probably others, allowing them to benefit from their stay in Egypt, where they acquired new religious ideas and new methods through which they could revive the Wahhabi doctrine. In addition to reviving the mutawi‘a system, they introduced new methods of religious education based on similar methods they acquired in Cairo. Ibn Bishr enumerates the names of a large number of ‘ulama who came to Riyadh to attend the teaching sessions of ‘Abd al-Rahman. In his enumeration, Ibn Bishr provides information about ‘ulama whose members constituted the strata that had conducted religious affairs during the reign of Turki. On his return to Najd, ‘Abd al-Latif brought with him a great number of religious books used in his halaqa fi al-tadris (study circle) established by him after his return from Egypt.28 ‘Abd al-Rahman and ‘Abd al-Latif trained a new generation of ‘ulama who combined the original concepts of the doctrine and the elements acquired in Cairo. This generation served as propagators of the doctrine beginning with the reign of Turki and during the Second Saudi State. While a new branch of Al al-Shaykh had emerged to lead the ‘ulama strata from 1825, the events that occurred after the Egyptian occupation also introduced a new branch of the Saudi family whose members became the leading figures of the newly reestablished state. The coali-

76 | Animating the Wahhabi Spark tion between the two branches of the Saudis and Al al-Shaykh faced the challenge imposed by the results of the Egyptian invasion and by the sociopolitical constellation in Najd throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. Immediately after the Egyptian withdrawal from Dir‘iyya, the Saudis who had fled from the town gathered some of their traditional supporters and launched a successful attack against Ibn Mu‘ammar, the Egyptian proxy in the town. Led by Turki from ‘Abdullah’s branch of the Saudi family and one of the grandsons of Muhammad Ibn Saud, the Saudis, with the help of local allies, marched into Dir‘iyya in December 1820, recapturing the town and killing Ibn Mu‘ammar and his son.29 This event marked the first step in restoring the lost reign of the Saudis in Najd. However, the reigns of Turki in 1820–34 and his son Faysal in 1834–8 and again in 1843– 65 were accompanied by constant conflict within Najdi society similar to that which had occurred during the first stage of Wahhabism in the eighteenth century. From the start, Turki had to confront centrifugal forces on several fronts that limited his sway to within a part of Najd.30 Although Turki and Faysal made great efforts to create new tribal alliances within the fragmented society of Najd, their main support came from the Wahhabi ‘ulama who kept the spark of the creed alive in many parts of Najd. The partial Egyptian withdrawal in 1820 was great relief for Wahhabi ‘ulama who took shelter in other parts of Arabia or returned from exile in Egypt. Apart from ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn ‘Abdullah, the grandson of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab who remained in Egypt to become a teacher of Hanbali law at al-Azhar,31 and his son Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman, who died early in 1818,32 most of the Al al-Shaykh ‘ulama came back to Najd. As mentioned above, the most prominent was ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan Al al-Shaykh (1779/80–68/9), who returned to his native country after eight years of exile in Egypt. In exile, he did not neglect religious learning from the authoritative Hanbali ‘ulama of Egypt. Later on, his son ‘Abd al-Latif (1810/11–76/7), who was exiled when he was five years old, returned to Najd in 1847 to become the supreme Wahhabi shaykh after his father’s death.33 Chapters 5 and 6 will elaborate in detail the religious ideas ‘Abd al-Latif and the impact that his learning had on Wahhabism in the nineteenth century. While the exiled members of Al al-Shaykh were returning from Egypt, other Wahhabi ‘ulama began to gather during the reign of Turki. Many of these had taken shelter in the years 1818–20 outside Dir‘iyya in other parts of Arabia. ‘Ali Ibn Husayn Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1841), who took shelter in Qatar and then in Oman, returned to Dir‘iyya in the early 1820s to be the first descendant of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab to attempt to revive the

Animating the Wahhabi Spark | 77 movement. His son Hasan and grandson ‘Abdullah Ibn Hasan played a major role in the religious activities of Al al-Shaykh in the late nineteenth century and after the establishment of the Saudi kingdom in 1932. Due to their religious activities, Wahhabi literature attributes to Hasan branch of the Al al-Shaykh family the special name of Al-Hasan, whose descendants played a great role in the revival of the creed.34 In addition to the exiled ‘ulama in Egypt there were great number who took refuge in remote areas of Arabia during the Egyptian occupation, some of them managing to hide in al-‘Arid or other regions of Najd itself. The most prominent of these was ‘Abd al-Malik Ibn Husayn Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, whose dates of birth and death are unknown. Although Ibn Bishr provides little information about his biographical details, he tells us that ‘Abd al-Malik was still alive in 1838/9 when Faysal Ibn Turki was defeated by his enemies before he could restore his reign in 1843. However, as in the case of ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, whose descendants were granted the name Al-Hasan, a distinct branch among Al al-Shaykh, ‘Abd al-Malik Ibn Husayn’s role in reviving Wahhabism turned his descendants into a distinct branch among Al al-Shaykh. After the Egyptian occupation, ‘Abd al-Malik fled from Dir‘iyya to hide in Hutat Bani Tamim in Najd itself. Following the takeover of Turki in Dir‘iyya, ‘Abd al-Malik did not return to his native town but preferred to stay in Hutat Bani Tamim, assuming the position of supreme qadi of the area in order to establish the Wahhabi ethical code.35 The sakan (stay) of his family in Hutat Bani Tamim caused his descendants to become a distinct branch called Al al-Shaykh sakanat Hutat Bani Tamim.36 It may therefore be assumed that kinship in Al al-Shaykh, combined with religious preaching, played a major role in reviving Wahhabism after the Egyptian occupation. In a society where kinship has the force of legitimacy, ‘ulama of Al al-Shaykh could reestablish their legitimacy when they revived the Wahhabi legacy and reshaped it during the successive Saudi rule. However, one cannot omit the role of ‘ulama descendants of other families in Najd who had faced, during the Egyptian occupation, the same fate of exile, torture, and murder. Wahhabi chronicles and treatises provide some information about the names of ‘ulama and qadis from the families of Al Musharraf,37 Al Mu‘ammar,38 Al al-Wihaybi and Al Ibn Mazru‘,39 and many others.40 Wahhabi and Saudi literature devotes special treatment to ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Abu Butayn (1780–1865/6),41 one of the prominent ‘ulama whose religious treatises had considerable influence in reviving Wahhabism in the nineteenth century. Despite the fact that he belonged to a family outside Al al-Shaykh kinship, Abu Butayn’s reli-

78 | Animating the Wahhabi Spark gious preaching and polemics played an important part in reshaping the principles of Wahhabism in the nineteenth century. Thanks to his celebrity during the later decades of the First Saudi State, he was appointed in 1805/6 the supreme qadi of Ta’if in Hijaz. During the reign of ‘Abdullah Ibn Saud (1814–18) he was dispatched to Oman to serve as the supreme qadi of the area in order to propagate the Wahhabi creed among its population. After his return to Najd during the reign of Turki, he served as the qadi of al-Washm and then of Sudayr to restore the religious authority of the Saudis in these regions.42 During the reign of Turki, and then during the first decades of the Second Saudi State (1843–91), Abu Butayn became the supreme religious figure in the region of al-Qasim.43 As one of the few Wahhabi ‘ulama who survived after the Egyptian occupation, he carried with him the religious legacy of the First Saudi State, employing it not only to revive Wahhabism but also to challenge its religious adversaries. He wrote many religious treatises and legal epistles to defend the Wahhabi creed against its religious and political opponents.44 Thus Abu Butayn was the main scholar outside Al al-Shaykh ‘ulama to contribute to the outpouring of polemical debate that erupted between the Wahhabi ‘ulama and their adversary, Daud Ibn Jirjis (1816–82),45 the Baghdadi scholar who wrote many anti-Wahhabi treatises. Abu Butayn joined ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan and his son ‘Abd al-Latif to formulate the principles of Wahhabism during the period of revival in the nineteenth century and to defend it against its opponents.46 Modern Saudi literature considers Abu Butayn one of those whose writings greatly influenced the raising of a new generation of Wahhabi ‘ulama after the Egyptian invasion which had caused such damage to the religious Wahhabi network and legacy. Like Al al-Shaykh and the Saudis, Abu Butayn learnt a lesson from the Egyptian occupation. In order to prevent another external invasion such as that of the Egyptians, Al al-Shaykh, the Saudis, and Abu Butayn concentrated their activities on dealing with the internal affairs of Najd rather than expanding their religious and military activities to remote areas.

The Rise of a New Branch of the Saudis and a New Capital Before dealing with the religious activities of the Wahhabi ‘ulama, it is necessary to survey some political events that occurred after the partial Egyptian withdrawal. During their occupation of Najd, the Egyptians appointed Muhammad Ibn Mushari Ibn Mu‘ammar a ruler of Dir‘iyya. Although they had been adversaries during the first stage of the Wahhabi movement, by the end of the eighteenth century the

Animating the Wahhabi Spark | 79 two clans of Mu‘ammar and Saud had developed family connections through intermarriage. Ibn Bishr mentions that Muhammad Ibn Mushari Ibn Mu‘ammar had direct family ties with ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Muhammad Ibn Saud (1765–1803), the paramount chief of the Saudis, and with ‘Abdullah Ibn Muhammad Ibn Saud, father of Turki, who ascended in 1820 to become the head of the family.47 These family ties between Mu‘ammar and Saud would explain some of the events that occurred in the years 1818–20. The first event is the rise of Ibn Mu‘ammar as the ruler of Dir‘iyya, the Saudi headquarters before the Egyptian occupation. Probably due to his family ties, some Saudis temporarily accepted the appointment of Ibn Mu‘ammar as the legitimate ruler in Dir‘iyya in 1818.48 However, Ibn Mu‘ammar faced some Saudi resistance in Dir‘iyya when Mushari Ibn Saud Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, brother of ‘Abdullah Ibn Saud, the last ruler of the city (in the years 1814–18) before its capture by the Egyptians, returned to Najd. In 1818, Mushari Ibn Saud Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz managed to escape from the city but reappeared shortly in Najd and afterward returned to Dir‘iyya. After his return, he attempted to restore Saudi rule in the city. In order to evade direct confrontation with Mushari Ibn Saud, the new ruler, Ibn Mu‘ammar left the city, preferring to recognize Mushari Ibn Saud as his proxy in Dir‘iyya. But, when Ibn Mu‘ammar gathered more forces, he claimed full rule in Dir‘iyya, compelling Mushari Ibn Saud to surrender and sending him to a prison where he died in 1819/20.49 Ibn Mu‘ammar failed in his attempt to legitimize his rule in Dir‘iyya after the removal of Mushari Ibn Saud. Under the leadership of Turki Ibn ‘Abdullah Ibn Muhammad Ibn Saud, the Saudi forces launched an attack to recapture their capital. With the help of locals who were still loyal to Saudis, Turki, the cousin of Mushari Ibn Saud and the grandson of Muhammad Ibn Saud, marched into Dir‘iyya. Unable to mobilize the inhabitants of the city, Ibn Mu‘ammar surrendered. In revenge for the assassination of his cousin, Turki ordered that Ibn Mu‘ammar and his son be killed.50 The Saudi recapture of Dir‘iyya invited a response by the Egyptians, who were still occupying Hijaz. Headed by Husayn Bek, one of the top officers, the Egyptian troops in the autumn and winter of 1820–1 besieged Dir‘iyya, forcing Turki to take shelter in the al-Huta district in order to reorganize his forces for resistance.51 Despite their presence in Dir‘iyya, the Egyptians failed to stabilize their rule. In this anarchical situation, the local chiefs continued to quarrel over supremacy in the city and its environs. Unable to overcome the upheavals in the area, the Egyptians decided to withdraw some of their forces. In these circumstances, Turki did not remain idle

80 | Animating the Wahhabi Spark but began to gather his followers from many parts of Najd. In 1823– 4 Turki began his campaign to restore the supremacy of his clan, exploiting the partial retreat of the Egyptians and the quarrels between local chiefs.52 He did not satisfy himself by merely recapturing Dir‘iyya, but proceeded in 1824 to expel the small Egyptian garrison in Riyadh. Turki immediately transferred his headquarters from Dir‘iyya to Riyadh, which was to become the capital of the Saudi political entity from that year until today.53 The choice of Riyadh as the new capital marks not only a geographical shift of headquarters of the Saudi political entity, but also a shift within the dominant branches of the Saudi clan. Until 1820–4, the leadership of the family came from the descendants of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Muhammad Ibn Saud. The rise of Turki switched the line in the “royal” family from ‘Abd al-‘Aziz to his brother ‘Abdullah, father of Turki. Since that time, the dynastical rule of Saudis has continued exclusively to be based on Turki’s branch. However, the rise of Turki as the paramount chief of the Saudi clan did not pass without contest among the branches of the Saudi family. In addition to external enemies, Turki had to face internal adversaries within his clan. One of these adversaries was Mushari Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Saud,54 who contested the legitimacy of Turki, even though the latter appointed him governor of Manfuha. In May 1834, Mushari overthrew Turki as leader of the clan by killing him as he was coming out after prayers in the Mosque of Riyadh.55 But Faysal, the son of Turki, was able restore the leadership to his branch after launching an attack on Riyadh, killing his close relative Mushari and reestablishing his father’s dynastic rule.56 Unlike Mushari, who relied only on lineage in his attempt to legitimize his rule, Turki and his son reinforced their legitimacy through the Wahhabi ‘ulama. Both Turki and Faysal maintained close relations with these ‘ulama, acquiring from them their religious education to become themselves an integral part of the ‘ulama strata. This would probably explain the ability of Turki’s branch to retain their supremacy among the other branches of the Saudis. Because Turki could restore the Saudi political entity with a new branch of the family and new capital in Riyadh, some historians mark the beginning of the Second Saudi State in the year 1823–4 and not 1843.57 Despite the fact that Turki and his son Faysal succeeded in reestablishing a Saudi entity in 1823, their reigns were not stable until at least 1843. After Turki’s assassination in 1834, it took one decade for his son Faysal to restore the reign of his father’s branch. In 1838, Faysal lost his throne and was exiled to Egypt until the year of 1843, marking a new era in the development of the Second Saudi State.58

Animating the Wahhabi Spark | 81

The Theocratic Rule of Turki and Faysal Apart from the challenges within Dir‘iyya and its environs, Turki had to deal with the areas on the eastern frontier of Najd where the powerful tribes of Banu Khalid had abandoned their allegiance to the Saudis. A fierce struggle commenced in 1826 and ended in 1830 when Wahhabi–Saudi forces conquered the province of Hasa to subdue Banu Khalid and other small tribes.59 Meanwhile, Turki expended much energy stabilizing the situation in Najd where disputes between the local tribes had fragmented the sedentary and nomad population. At the beginning of the 1830s, Turki succeeded in reunifying many sections of this fragmented population, making them pledge allegiance to him by paying the zakat taxes. To reach his goal of reunification, Turki used his military might to subdue ‘delinquents’ within the tribal branches of ‘Ajman,60 Qahtan,61 Mutayr, Subay‘, ‘Anza, and Banu Husayn.62 The British agent in the Persian Gulf reported that at the beginning of 1830s, Turki succeeded in expanding his sway “over Najd and the whole of Oman without shedding a drop of blood,” putting the independence of Imam Masqat, the British ally, at the mercy of the Wahhabis.63 Unlike his adversaries within the tribal society of Najd, Turki renewed the tradition of rallying around him ‘ulama whose religious zeal would propagate the Wahhabi creed. Turki therefore reinstituted a theocratic government based on the Wahhabi ‘ulama of Al al-Shaykh, who had gradually made their way back to Najd from exile in Egypt and the Persian Gulf. As mentioned above, ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan Al al-Shaykh assumed a high rank as the supreme religious authority within Turki’s political entity. Although he continued to be loyal to the legacy of his grandfather, the founder of Wahhabism, ‘Abd al-Rahman’s sojourn in Cairo during his exile had reshaped his religious education. He spent a great deal of time attending religious lessons at al-Azhar, where the Hanbali, Hanafi, and Shafi‘i schools cohabited with Sunni ‘ulama. His openness to other Sunni schools had influenced his son ‘Abd al-Latif, who spent about thirty-one years in Cairo before coming back to Najd to become the supreme religious authority during the reign of Faysal Ibn Turki. In Cairo, ‘Abd al-Rahman and his son ‘Abd al-Latif found libraries abundant with treatises and books unavailable in Najd and belonging to all the Sunni schools. In addition, ‘Abd al-Rahman met with the most influential Egyptian ‘ulama of that time. He diligently attended the religious teaching of Hasan al-Qwayani (d. 1837/8),64 the Hanbali scholar and the foremost authority among the al-Azhar ‘ulama. In addition, he attended the lessons of Muhammad Ibn Mahmud al-Jaza’iri (1775–

82 | Animating the Wahhabi Spark 1851), the Hanafi scholar, who taught him the famous treatise of al-Hafiz ‘Abd al-Haq al-Ishbili (1120–85), al-Ahkam al-Kubra. In the field of al-tafsir (interpretation of the Qur’an), ‘Abd al-Rahman attended the lessons of Ibrahim al-‘Ubaydi al-Muqri’, a famous scholar whose interpretation of the Qur’an had great impact on ‘ulama. He also took part in the teaching sessions of Yusuf al-Sawi, who taught him Kitab al-Khulasa fi Sharh alfiyat Ibn Malik, the famous book of Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn ‘Aqil (1295–1368).65 ‘Abd al-Rahman completed his knowledge of the four schools of the Sunnis by attending the religious instruction of Ahmad Ibn Salamuna, a Maliki scholar in Cairo. Thus his broad knowledge of the Hanbali, Hanafi, Shafi‘i, and Maliki schools distinguished ‘Abd al-Rahman from the Wahhabi ‘ulama of the eighteenth century whose religious concepts were based on the legacy of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the doctrine.66 During the period of restoration of the Saudi political entity from 1820 onward, Turki (r. 1820–34), his son Faysal (r. 1834–65), and then his grandson ‘Abdullah Ibn Faysal (r. 1865–91), the Saudi rulers, had relied on the broad knowledge of ‘Abd al-Rahman to defend Wahhabism. As the supreme leader of the Wahhabi ‘ulama, ‘Abd alRahman had appointed qadis and teachers in the areas under the control of the Saudis. His position as the supreme religious figure enabled him to monitor ‘ulama as well as to supervise their religious activities against adversaries. His religious treatises had become the basis for the revival of Wahhabism in the nineteenth century and the basis of the theocratic rule of the political entity, notably after 1843.67 In his revival project, ‘Abd al-Rahman devoted a special place in his treatises to dealing with the polemical debate between the Wahhabis and their opponents after 1824. He displayed his broad knowledge of the four Sunni schools to refute the religious arguments of Daud Ibn Jarjis (1816–75), the prolific Baghdadi anti-Wahhabi scholar who belonged to the Shafi‘i Islamic legal school and to the Sufi order of Naqshabandiyya-Khalidiyya. For this purpose, ‘Abd al-Rahman composed a special treatise entitled al-Qawl al-Nafis fi al-Radd ‘ala Daud Ibn Jarjis.68 In addition to external opponents such as Ibn Jarjis, the Wahhabi scholars of the nineteenth century had confronted internal opponents who had exploited the destruction of the First Saudi State to increase their religious criticism of Wahhabism. Amongst these opponents was ‘Uthman Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Mansur al-Nasiri (d. 1865/6) who was born in Najd and gained celebrity as an ardent opponent of the Wahhabis during Egyptian rule. Living in areas outside the control of the Saudis until the mid-1860s, al-Nasiri posed a challenge to both

Animating the Wahhabi Spark | 83 ‘Abd al-Rahman and his son ‘Abd al-Latif in their attempt to reestablish the creed in all parts of Najd. In his treatise Maqamat,69 ‘Abd al-Rahman displayed the knowledge he had acquired in Egypt to refute the anti-Wahhabi religious arguments of al-Nasiri. In the same vein, ‘Abd al-Rahman responded to Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd ‘Abdullah Ibn Humayd (1820–78),70 who was born in ‘Uayzna, the major town in Qasim. In the early years of his education, Ibn Humayd had attended the lessons of two Wahhabi scholars. He then took study trips to Yemen, Cairo, Damascus, and Mecca. In the two latter cities, he attended lessons of scholars known for their anti-Wahhabi convictions. In his famous book Al-Suhub al-Wabila ‘ala Dara‘ih al-Hanabila, Ibn Humayd presents a biographical dictionary of Hanbali scholars, covering about five hundred years (1349–1874), concentrating mainly on scholars from Egypt and Syria and a few from other parts of the Muslim world. He refers to only twenty-four Hanbali scholars of Arabia, all of them either indifferent or ardently opposed to Wahhabism.71 Criticizing its basic ideas, Ibn Humayd placed Wahhabism outside the Hanbali doctrine. In Chapter 5 we will elaborate further the polemical debate of ‘Abd al-Rahman and other scholars from Al al-Shaykh against Ibn Humayd. Alongside his polemical epistles against these scholars, ‘Abd al-Rahman wrote a special treatise called al-Muhijja in which he debated with ‘Abd al-Hamid al-Kashmiri, an ardent anti-Wahhabi scholar, whose polemic against Wahhabism was known in many parts of Arabia.72 In addition to his polemical treatises, ‘Abd al-Rahman made an effort to gain new adherents to the Wahhabi faith and to ensure obedience to the Saudis. After his return to Riyadh, he issued an epistle in which he set up the guidelines of the Wahhabi creed used by ‘ulama, political leaders, and qadis. He again reiterated the traditional idea of Wahhabism regarding the necessity of returning believers to “the purity” of the first generations of Islamic faith and to the “true” tawhid (monotheism) as the principal pillar of the Wahhabi mission.73 His religious preaching and writings had a great impact on Turki, who spent much time in the study of the Wahhabi creed, attending the regular Monday and Thursday lessons taught by ‘Abd al-Rahman. Turki showed strong support by encouraging Al al-Shaykh in their efforts to propagate the creed among the local population of Najd. In this sense, the leadership of Turki combined the mundane and the sacred when he himself wrote religious epistles urging the Najdi people to support the revival of Wahhabism. He addressed some of his epistles to those who had abandoned the creed after the destruction of the First Saudi State, calling upon them to return to the Wahhabi creed and to give up their “polytheistic prac-

84 | Animating the Wahhabi Spark tice.” Modern Saudi historiography indicates that Turki had established the custom for his successors to share in the task of ‘ulama by writing epistles. This historiography emphasizes one of Turki’s epistles in which he calls on Muslim believers to fear God by demonstrating their tawhid, praying, and paying the zakat.74 Combining mundane and religious authority, Turki, as well as his son Faysal, attempted to impose on their subjects the duty of Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong (al-amr bi-l-ma‘ruf wa-lnahy ‘an al-munkar), which emphasized the theocratic character of their reigns. According to Cook, references to duty were more frequent in the texts of ‘ulama during their reigns, and its role in Wahhabi life was considerably more salient during Turki’s reign than before. Turki himself diligently performed the duties of Islam, emphasizing the seriousness of neglecting them especially with regard to non-attendance at prayer. ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan, the leading scholar during Turki’s reign, expressed great concern about neglect of this duty. The same concern had occupied his son ‘Abd al-Latif, who describes this duty as one of the more binding duties of Islam. According to Cook, in addition to the elite, ordinary people were also obliged to perform this duty. Both Turki and his son Faysal wrote epistles regarding the duty, calling upon their subjects to fulfill it. Since the reign of Turki, this duty has been officially monitored by ‘ulama who were charged with investigating (tafaqqud) its performance among subjects. Turki stipulated that Muslims who obstruct the forbidding of wrong should be punished and exiled. According to Cook, vesting the duty with an official character stems from the intimate symbiosis of religious and political authority that has characterized the Saudi reign since Turki.75 According to Cook, the symbiosis of religious and political authority since Turki may have owed something to the tribal environment, and something to the political thought of Ibn Taymiyya. Relying on Ibn Bishr, Cook tells us that Ibn Taymiyya’s famous work al-Siyasa al-Shar‘iyya was one of the texts that used to be read in gatherings at the home of Turki during his reign and later in the tent of Faysal. Cook is of the opinion that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the doctrine, did not refer to this work of Ibn Taymiyya in the same manner that Turki and Al al-Shaykh did. Inspired by this work, Turki and Al alShaykh made the duty an official one that every believer should practice. In addition to Ibn Taymiyya’s inspiration, Cook argues that the most plausible explanation for granting the duty official sanction, unlike in the period of the First Saudi State, stems from historical circumstances. For leaders such as Turki and his son, unlike those of the First State, the opportunities for territorial expansion were severely

Animating the Wahhabi Spark | 85 limited and therefore the holy war against infidels outside Najd no longer possessed the same charm as a raison d’être for a Wahhabi polity. If the Saudi entity since Turki was not to lose its religious identity, it had to turn its righteousness inward. Thus forbidding wrongdoing within Wahhabi society took the place of the holy war on its frontiers. Cook cites Abu Butayn, who states that the primary duty of the ruler is to ensure the practice of forbidding wrongdoing; holy war against the infidels takes second place.76 Although tribal coalitions were important for Turki to reestablish the Saudi entity in Riyadh, his religious zeal and his official sanction of the duty of forbidding wrongdoing had become the most important basis of the theocratic regime for his son Faysal and his successors. In his attempt to restore his father’s reign in 1834, Faysal relied on a coalition comprising many tribes, including one of the branches of al-Rashid’s clan. Exploiting the local rivalries between the chiefs of Najd and its environs, Faysal succeeded in mobilizing ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Ali Ibn Rashid, the governor of Ha’il in Jabal Shammar, to recapture Riyadh and oust the Saudi branch of ‘Abd alRahman Ibn Saud from the city in 1834. Because Faysal was probably conscious of the fragility of the tribal coalitions, he began to consolidate his reign through the force of religious zeal. After killing his relative Mushari Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Saud,77 Faysal returned to his father’s way of ruling when he began to reinforce the symbiosis of religious and political authority created since Turki’s reign. Faysal immediately charged ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan with leading the Wahhabi mission. According to Ibn Bishr, after his victory against Mushari, Faysal invited most of the Wahhabi ‘ulama in Najd to attend a religious gathering held in Riyadh. Headed by ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan, Faysal hosted ‘ulama for about a month, dealing with religious affairs of the newly established rule. In addition to the famous ‘ulama of Riyadh, delegations from many parts of Najd took part in the meeting. The most prominent among them was ‘Ali Ibn Husayn Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, the qadi of Hutat Bani Tamim, and his brother ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Husayn, the qadi of al-Kharj, who led the two delegations from these two localities. In addition to scions of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, other representatives of ‘ulama affiliated to Wahhabism took part in the meeting, including Abu Butayn, whose religious epistles were used by Faysal to handle religious opposition in that period.78 Faysal Ibn Turki spent his first period (1834–8) challenging rivals inside Najd and in ‘Asir. Although he handled the challenge of the rivals without great difficulty,79 a second Egyptian invasion in 1837 ended Faysal’s rule. In 1838, the Egyptians exiled him to Egypt,

86 | Animating the Wahhabi Spark along with some of Al al-Shaykh’s ‘ulama. Before capturing Riyadh, the Egyptians applied the tactic of divide and rule among the Saudi princes. They appointed Khalid Ibn Saud Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Muhammad Ibn Saud (d. 1861) as their proxy in Riyadh.80 Exploiting the Egyptian invasion, Khalid Ibn Saud revolted against his relative Faysal, who began to withdraw his forces into Hasa before he was captured by the Egyptians. With the aid of the Egyptians, Khalid captured almost all the regions of Najd from al‘Arid to al-Qasim, driving the Al al-Shaykh ‘ulama away from Riyadh toward the southern part of Najd around the settlement of al-Hariq in al-Fur‘.81 However, neither the new Egyptian invasion nor the ascendance of Khalid Ibn Saud introduced a change in the stance of the Al alShaykh ‘ulama who continued to support Faysal Ibn Turki against his adversaries among the Saudis. Before his surrender to the Egyptians, Faysal Ibn Turki solicited advice from ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan about the appropriate way to handle the new threat of Egyptian troops. Conscious of the geopolitical reality in Najd, ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan suggested establishing a new alliance based on the nomadic tribes. According to ‘Abd al-Rahman, Faysal solicited his advice because the Egyptian invasion confronted him with two alternatives: staying in Riyadh and resisting, or leaving it to avoid bloodshed. Although ‘Abd al-Rahman advised Faysal to accept the first alternative, he suggested gaining the support of the tribes in Sudayr, al-Washm, Hasa, and Qatif. To guarantee the support of these tribes, ‘Abd al-Rahman recommended that they be supplied with food and given free access to the pastures in the region of al-Dahnaa’.82 Despite the partial success of this recommendation, the Egyptians achieved their goal, capturing Riyadh at the end of 1838 and sending Faysal to prison in Cairo for five years.83 However, the Egyptians failed to stabilize the political situation in Najd. A sudden Egyptian retreat in March 1840 opened the door for the rise, among the Saudis, of contenders against the legitimacy of Khalid Ibn Saud as the paramount chief of the family. The ardent challenger was one of the scions of the family called ‘Abdullah Ibn Thunayan Ibn Ibrahim.84 While the Saudis were quarrelling over the legitimacy of their branches, a dispute erupted between the tribes of ‘Anza in al-Qasim and Shammar tribes in Jabal Shammar,85 which added further instability in the region. In the absence of Faysal, who was in exile, some ‘ulama of the Al al-Shaykh attempted to create an alliance with tribes of Subay‘, Murra and ‘Ajman in order to legitimize ‘Abdullah Ibn Thunayan against his relative, Khalid Ibn Saud, who was considered by them a representative of the foreign Egyptian

Animating the Wahhabi Spark | 87 forces.86 The support of Al al-Shaykh enabled Ibn Thunayan to oust Khalid Ibn Saud from Riyadh in 1841, forcing him to take refuge in Hasa. Entering Riyadh, ‘Abdullah Ibn Thunayan liberated Najd from all foreign troops. He then began his campaign to subdue his opponents in al-Qasim and Jabal Shammar. However, ‘Abdullah Ibn Thunayan failed to overcome the tribal disputes and indirect Ottoman intervention that continued to raise obstacles to the stabilization of the political situation in Najd.87 In such circumstances, ‘ulama of Al al-Shaykh formed a coalition with some tribes in order to prepare the ground for the return of Faysal.88 In 1843, Faysal Ibn Turki returned to Najd under puzzling conditions. Some historians believe that ‘Abbas Pasha, Muhammad ‘Ali’s grandson, solicited the release of Faysal and sent him back to his native country.89 From May to July 1843, Faysal Ibn Turki made his way back to Najd to reorganize his forces and put Riyadh under twenty days of siege. ‘Abdullah Ibn Thunayan surrendered and died in prison two months later.90 Recapturing Riyadh in 1843 marked a second beginning in the reconsolidation of the Second Saudi State after two decades of instability that had characterized the Saudi political entity since the ascendance of Turki as the paramount head of the family. As mentioned above, our study considers the year 1843 as a turning point in the history of the Second Saudi State. From this year on, Al al-Shaykh further intensified their efforts to reconsolidate their polity and religious affairs in Najd and attempted to expand it into coastal areas of the Persian Gulf, as British agents reported to the government in Bombay.91 Gathering up the threads of this chapter shows that the Egyptian occupation and the restoration of Saudi rule from 1820s were accompanied by three results. First, the branch of ‘Abdullah Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab were no longer paramount among the clans of Al al-Shaykh, and there emerged a new branch led by his brother Hasan, whose members have continued to be the leaders responsible for Saudi religious affairs until today. Second, while until 1820 the leadership of the Saudi family came from the descendants of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Muhammad Ibn Saud, the rise of Turki as paramount Saudi leader at the beginning of the 1820s switched the line in the family from ‘Abd al-‘Aziz to his brother ‘Abdullah, father of Turki. Since that time, the dynastic rule of the Saudis has continued exclusively to be based on Turki’s branch. Third, since the year 1824 Riyadh has been the capital of the Saudi regime. When Turki expelled the Egyptian garrison from the town in that year, Turki transferred the Saudi capital from Dir‘iyya to Riyadh, which became the capital of the Saudi political entity from that year until today.

CHAPTER

5

Religion under Faysal and His Successors Faysal’s Allies and Adversaries and the Restoration of the State This chapter examines the historical development of the Second Saudi State from 1843 until its dissolution in 1891. The chapter explores the role played by Al al-Shaykh and other Wahhabi scholars to reconsolidate the religious features of the state through institutions that were lacking during the First Saudi State. The chapter, therefore, is devoted to outlining in detail the activities of Wahhabi scholars who, during this period, reshaped the doctrine and created models for Wahhabi–Saudi cooperation in the mundane and religious domains. The chapter argues that such cooperation formed the background for determining the Wahhabi–Saudi relationship in the second half of the twentieth century, the implications of which still exist today. Although the analysis focuses on religious topics, the chapter inevitably traces historical events that help us to build up a general picture of the relationship between politics and religion in this crucial period of Wahhabism. However, to avoid overburdening readers, the chapter focuses only on the main events that determined the development of the Saudi–Wahhabi movement after 1843. As we saw above in Chapter 4, the arrival of Faysal Ibn Turki in Najd raised the hopes of Wahhabi ‘ulama and supporters who kept the spark of the creed alive in many parts of Najd during a period of upheaval that lasted from 1818 until 1843. Because the area around Riyadh was under the rule of ‘Abdullah Ibn Thunayan when Faysal Ibn Turki returned from Egypt, the latter chose to proceed to Jabal Shammar before he began reorganizing his forces. Jabal Shammar was then under the rule of ‘Abdullah Al al-Rashid (1788–1848), who established a dynastic form of political supremacy for his family.1 Within less than three months, Faysal Ibn Turki had succeeded in

Religion under Faysal and His Successors | 89 renewing his alliance of Wahhabis and some tribes in Najd. With the support of Al al-Rashid, and after twenty days of siege, the new alliance recaptured Riyadh. Although the support of Al al-Rashid’s family played a significant role in Faysal’s victory, the same family became, at the end of the nineteenth century, the main obstacle to Saudi expansion in Arabia, and in 1891 the Al al-Rashid ruler put an end to the Second Saudi State.2 In order to consolidate his rule in Riyadh and challenge adversaries inside and outside Najd, Faysal continued to maintain friendly relations with Al al-Rashid, strengthening them through marriage between his son ‘Abdullah and Nura, the daughter of ‘Abdullah Al al-Rashid. At least until 1848, military cooperation between the Saudi ruler of Riyadh and the Al al-Rashid ruler of Jabal Shammar enabled both to cultivate a stable relationship against their adversaries in Arabia.3 Encouraged by his good relations with Al al-Rashid, by the renewal of the Saudi–Wahhabi alliance, and by coalitions with nomad tribes in Najd, Faysal Ibn Turki made great efforts to restore order in an area that had suffered more than thirty years of instability. For the next two decades after his arrival from Egypt, he attempted to retake more territory and reestablish the Wahhabi creed among his supporters. To do so, he invested more energy in rebuilding the central administration based on tribal chiefs and in reviving the mutawi‘a system through which ‘ulama could resume their religious role of inculcating the Wahhabi doctrine. Since its appearance in the eighteenth century and its expansion during the first decade of the nineteenth century, Wahhabism had found great opposition in the area of al-Qasim. This opposition intensified in the years 1846–7, when the Sharif of Mecca invaded Najd to impose the tribute that Najd had to pay to the Ottoman Empire. The appearance of the Sharif’s troops encouraged the chiefs and ‘ulama in al-Qasim to revive the traditional opposition of the inhabitants of the area against Wahhabism.4 Starting as an incident of dispute between the sedentary inhabitants of al-Qasim and Saudi troops, the oasis chiefs of Burayda and ‘Unayza, the main cities of al-Qasim, raised the banner of revolt against Faysal. Although the Sharif of Mecca withdrew from Najd empty-handed, Faysal had to contend with this revolt for two decades. Only at the beginning of 1860s did Faysal manage to put an end to the fierce resistance in al-Qasim when his troops finally ousted the forces of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Abu ‘Ulayyan from Burayda in 1861 and of ‘Abdullah al-Sulayman from ‘Unayza in 1862.5 Capturing the main cities of al-Qasim enabled Faysal to handle the anti-Wahhabi religious elements that had prevailed in the area since

90 | Religion under Faysal and His Successors the late eighteenth century. The anti-Wahhabi ‘ulama had transformed Burayda and ‘Unayza into safe havens for religious opposition to Wahhabism. After the fall of the First Saudi State, many anti-Wahhabi ‘ulama gathered in these cities to provide religious backing for their rulers. To explain the ability of these rulers to sustain their rebellion against Faysal for two decades, one should take into consideration not only the military means used by the belligerents involved in the revolt of al-Qasim, but also geographical and religious factors, which had a great impact on determining the course of events during the revolt. Its location between Jabal Shammar in the north and al-Washm in the south, through which the valley of al-Rimah passes, provided alQasim with a huge underground reservoir that supplied abundant water for its cities, Burayda, ‘Unayza, al-Rass, al-Shmas, and al-Hilaliyya. It was probably this special geographical importance that lay behind the persistence of Faysal to take over an area that for centuries had been the cause of dispute between chiefs in Najd over material resources. Moreover, al-Qasim’s religious opposition to Wahhabism can also be explained by its geographical location. The main trade route that connected Najd with the area of Zubayr in southern Iraq passed through the cities of al-Qasim, carrying not only commercial commodities but also religious ideas that had a great impact on ‘ulama in al-Qasim. Since the appearance of Wahhabism in the eighteenth century, Zubayr had become one of the religious centers for anti-Wahhabi religious preaching. ‘Ulama from al-Qasim who found it difficult to live under the Saudi–Wahhabi regime at the end of the eighteenth century had migrated to Zubayr. This migration strengthened the stance of ‘ulama in Zubayr, who continued to manifest great animosity toward Wahhabism. Even religious pupils from al-Qasim who had studied in Zubayr came back to their native cities with an anti-Wahhabi orientation. Attached to their tradition of visiting holy places, Zubayr’s ‘ulama rejected the Wahhabi attacks against the sanctuary cults. Zubayr itself was located around the graves and domes of holy men that were offensive to the Wahhabi creed.6 When Faysal and the Wahhabis resumed their policy of purifying Islam of sanctuary cults and imposing the Wahhabi doctrine on Najd, ‘ulama from al-Qasim took refuge in Zubayr. This recalled for them the events of 1803 when Wahhabi–Saudi forces attacked Zubayr, demolishing the domes of Talha and Hasan al-Basri, the most sacred sites in the area.7 The Egyptian invasion of Najd, which ended with the destruction of the First Saudi State, was a great relief for ‘ulama of Zubayr. They then began to revive their sanctuary cults and resume their anti-Wahhabi preaching. After 1843, Zubayr had once again

Religion under Faysal and His Successors | 91 become a safe haven for ‘ulama of al-Qasim who sought refuge from the repressive measures of Faysal and his Wahhabi allies. Ibn Humayd (1821–78) was the most prominent scholar of al-Qasim to launch a religious campaign against the reign of Faysal. His attachment to the Hanbali doctrine in its pre-Wahhabi form enabled him to pose a more effective challenge to Wahhabism than other ‘ulama of al-Qasim. He was born in the city of ‘Unayza and was a scion of a religious scholarly family whose members had good relations with Najdi scholars.8 He acquired his initial scholastic training in Zubayr, where he was influenced by anti-Wahhabi preaching. His teachers in Zubayr were Muhammad Ibn Hamad al-Hudaybi (d. 1845) and Ahmad Ibn ‘Uthman Ibn Jami‘ (d. 1868), two anti-Wahhabi ‘ulama who were born in Najd and had migrated to Zubayr to join many other opponents of Wahhabism. In his biographical dictionary, al-Suhub al-Wabila ‘ala Dara‘ih al-Hanabila, Ibn Humayd accords special place and high esteem to these two Najdi scholars in Zubayr.9 From Zubayr, Ibn Humayd proceeded to Nablus in Palestine and then to Damascus. He became integrated with the Damascene Hanbali circle of Al al-Shatti, whose members had expressed hostility and antipathy toward Wahhabism.10 Probably influenced by the Zubayr scholars, Ibn Humayd expresses in his al-Suhub al-Wabila strong criticism against the Wahhabi ‘ulama who considered the veneration of holy places a sort of heresy. He rejected the anti-Sufi ideas of the Wahhabis, claiming that Sufi practices and visits to holy places do not harm Islamic beliefs, but strengthen them. While Ibn Humayd deliberately omits Wahhabi ‘ulama from his biographical dictionary on Hanbali scholars, he explicitly mentions his antipathy toward Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab and his Al al-Shaykh successors, describing them as fanatics and as intolerant of their religious rivals. Ibn Humayd argues that intolerance led Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab to execute his religious rivals. He exemplifies this by the way Sulayman Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was treated by his brother, the founder of the doctrine. Because Sulayman had manifested certain reservations about religious ideas, Muhammad plotted against his brother, attempting to kill him. Labeling him “furtive” and “evil,”11 Ibn Humayd claimed that Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab hired a criminal to assassinate his brother Sulayman after his prayers in the mosque and far away from the eyes of people. But when this criminal approached Sulayman Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, he dropped his sword, saying, “Do not be afraid, you are a believer.”12 As mentioned above, Ibn Humayd omits most of the Wahhabi ‘ulama and Al al-Shaykh ‘ulama from his biographical dictionary,

92 | Religion under Faysal and His Successors ignoring their contribution to Hanbali scholarship. The only prominent Wahhabi ‘alim that Ibn Humayd includes among the Hanbali scholars was ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Abu Butayn, whom he describes as the indisputable supreme faqih in Najd during the nineteenth century.13 Although Abu Butayn was an authoritative scholar among the Wahhabis, Ibn Humayd singles him out in order to delegitimize Al al-Shaykh’s guidance of religious affairs, notably that of ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan and his son ‘Abd al-Latif, who provided the religious backing for Faysal’s attacks against the resistance of al-Qasim’s inhabitants. Although one cannot measure the extent of Ibn Humayd’s influence on mobilizing this resistance, his animosity toward Al al-Shaykh reflects some of the mood that prevailed in alQasim for two decades after Faysal took over Riyadh. This anti-Wahhabi mood was probably behind the religious zeal of al-Qasim’s inhabitants to resist the overwhelming force of Faysal for two decades. Despite the successive attacks of Faysal, the cities of alQasim continued to benefit from the caravans of long-distance trade that used them as their traditional commercial way station. Moreover, the rulers of these cities managed to impose their authority on some nomadic tribes of the area, collecting annual tributes from them.14

Faysal’s Territorial Sway While preoccupied with the revolt of al-Qasim, Faysal also had to handle another uprising of the nomadic tribes of al-‘Ajman, who were constantly migrating from one place to another in the area between Najd and Hasa, seeking pastures for their herds and attacking merchant caravans. In 1845, led by Mit‘ib Ibn ‘Abdullah Ibn Hathliyn, the tribes of al-‘Ajman passed through Hasa, looking for opportunities to loot the caravans on their way to Mecca. Faysal considered an attack on a pilgrims’ caravan to be an act of rebellion against Saudi order. To put an end to the state of anarchy in the hajj, Faysal launched a punitive campaign against Ibn Hathliyn. In order to legitimize his campaign by religious authority, Faysal himself led the troops, accompanied by ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan, the most prominent figure among Al al-Shaykh. The victorious campaign of Faysal succeeded in subduing the rebellion and inflicting a heavy blow on al-‘Ajman tribes, whose chiefs did not dare to irritate the Saudi–Wahhabi state for fifteen years.15 Then, while the Saudi–Wahhabis were preoccupied with internal affairs of the state, Rakan Ibn Hathliyn (d. 1892), the chief of al-‘Ajman, began a new revolt, attempting to control the commercial roads between Hasa and Najd that would threaten the

Religion under Faysal and His Successors | 93 stability of the Saudi–Wahhabi state. To restore order in the area and enforce discipline upon the rebels, ‘Abdullah, the son of Faysal, led the Saudi troops in an attack against the main tents of al-‘Ajman.16 In April 1860, the troops engaged in a fierce battle that ended, according to Philby, with devastating results for the forces of al-‘Ajman, who lost about 700 fighters.17 It seems that al-‘Ajman’s new rebellion at this stage reflected tribal dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the new norms dictated by the Saudi–Wahhabi state, which restricted the traditional authority of nomadic tribal chiefs in Najd and elsewhere. Unlike the First Saudi–Wahhabi State, in which chiefs of tribes could run their internal affairs with relative independence, Faysal had attempted to transform the land under his rule into a central entity, imposing more moral, political, and economic authority upon the nomadic tribes. Faysal’s policy had harmed the traditional nature of tribal society and its politics. Yet from 1818 until 1845, many nomadic tribes exploited the lack of a central political entity in Najd to restore their tribal independence. After a long period following the Egyptian invasion and the upheavals that prevailed after their withdrawal, Faysal introduced a new policy different from that of the First Saudi State to handle the nomadic tribal problem. During that period, the leaders and ‘ulama used to maintain and bolster a loose system of tribal independence. Faysal attempted to overcome the inconvenient structure of a polity based on a supra-tribal entity that had enabled many tribes to maintain their independence. He therefore increased the amount of tribute that tribes were forced to pay to the central authorities in Riyadh. This taxation policy of increasing the amount of tribute was described by Colonel Pelly, who visited Riyadh in 1865. Pelly mentions that members of the Bedouin tribes were forced to pay annual tribute equivalent to 114,000 dollars.18 In addition to levying this tribute, the Saudis obliged tribal chiefs to declare absolute obedience to their rule. The Wahhabi ‘ulama resumed application of the mutawi‘a system to implant Wahhabism not only in sedentary localities, but also, and more than before, among the nomads, who were instructed to practice Islamic duties in accordance with Hanbali–Wahhabi principles.19 Although the Second State failed to restore all the territories that the First State had controlled, Faysal’s religious zeal to propagate Wahhabism in sedentary and nomadic localities granted him efficient tools to consolidate his state. This may explain his restraint in invading only those territories that would not arouse external intervention. Thus he left Hijaz under the Sharifs, but made great efforts to conquer Hasa to ensure stability in the core of his state.20

94 | Religion under Faysal and His Successors It is worth noting that Saudi chronicles lack sufficient information of the whole picture through which one might be able to assess the success or failure of Faysal’s project in reconsolidating his new political entity. However, one can rely on Lewis Pelly’s description to evaluate Faysal’s project from 1843. Pelly was born in 1825, joined the British Army in Bombay in 1857, and then assumed a high position in the colonial administration of the British Empire.21 Because the Persian Gulf areas were of special strategic importance to the British, the colonial authorities in India sent Pelly in 1862 to assess the situation in these areas. Although Arabia is far from India, his experience in this latter country probably enabled him to gain some advantage in “understanding” eastern peoples. In his journey to the Gulf, Pelly realized that he would not reach this understanding without visiting Riyadh, where the politics of the Gulf were determined. Pelly arrived in Riyadh in 1865, a few months before the death of Faysal. In his assessment of the political conditions under Saudi–Wahhabi rule, Pelly describes the state as a tribal confederacy in which vast territories had been aggregated by military force. He emphasizes the role of religious ideas in welding some unity in Najd that helped Saudi–Wahhabi rule to extend its sway beyond its core in Riyadh. While leaving Hijaz outside his sway, Faysal had succeeded in dominating almost all the eastern areas along the shores of the Persian Gulf from the north to Oman in the south. Pelly notes that Riyadh had received tribute from the chiefs of Bahrain, Abu-Zabi, Dubai, ‘Ujman, al-Shariqa, Ra’s alKhayma, and Musqat. To keep these areas under close surveillance, Faysal established an advance military post at al-Buraymi. In order to stabilize the situation inside Arabia and overcome dissatisfaction among the ‘Unayza tribes, with whom he had bad relations, Faysal maintained close ties of friendship with the Jabal Shammar chiefs, who would help him to safeguard his political entity from external and internal enemies.22 Although Pelly found Faysal at this time to be seventy years old, blind, and suffering from weakness, he described him as confident and still speaking about himself in the plural form that characterizes kings. Accordingly, Pelly labels the domain of Faysal a “kingdom” that stretches over nearly the whole Arabian peninsula, from Kuwait, through al-Qatif, Ra’s al-Khayma, and down to Oman. Naming the tribes under Faysal’s rule, such as Subay‘, al-‘Umur, alSuhul, Shammar, ‘Ajman, Mutayr, Bariya, Harb, ‘Anza, al-Mura, Qahtan, ‘Utayba, and al-Dawasir, Pelly sees this kingdom as one political entity subscribing to a common religious doctrine and social customs and acting as a unified coalition in times of war and peace.23 Although the territory of the Second Saudi State never attained the scope and size of the first, which included Najd, Hasa, Oman, Hijaz,

Religion under Faysal and His Successors | 95 ‘Asir, and even some areas in Iraq and Syria, Pelly’s description gives the impression that Faysal had consolidated his state, granting it more centrality and infusing it with more religious zeal than his predecessors. The following section tries to evaluate the religious dimension of the Second Saudi State, focusing on the role played by Faysal himself and by the leading figures of Al al-Shaykh.

The Religious Aspect of Faysal’s Rule As mentioned in Chapter 4, Faysal followed his father’s policy of combining mundane and religious rule. Like his father, Faysal shared in the tasks of ‘ulama by writing epistles concerning purely religious affairs. We have seen how Faysal applied this policy in the short interval of his first rule in 1830–7. Immediately after the restoration of Saudi rule in Riyadh in 1843, Faysal resumed his efforts to impose on the sedentary and nomadic inhabitants the duty of Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong (al-amr bi-l-ma‘ruf wa-l-nahy ‘an al-munkar) as the foremost principle in his state, which was applied more strictly than it had been in the First Saudi State. He began his second reign in 1843 in the same way he had done when he succeeded his father in 1830, by addressing a religious epistle to the people of Najd.24 Although there is a great similarity between the two epistles, Faysal’s second epistle in 1843 concentrated more on religious and legal issues than he did the first, and referred less to political matters. The epistle reiterated the call to the people to be more obedient to religious dictates and abide strictly by the verses of the Qur’an in order to attain the principle of tawhid as articulated by the founder of the doctrine. Faysal also explained the meaning of purifying the faith from bida‘ that harms the notion of tawhid. Relying on the Qur’an and the sunna, he explained that purification of the faith means trusting God and depending only upon Him and not upon others, rejecting the falsehood of idol worship and emphasizing the Wahhabi principle that prohibits the seeking of protection from any deity other than God. As in his first epistle of 1830, Faysal called upon his subjects to practice the duty of five daily prayers, to pay the zakat, and to be attached to the principle of Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, considering this an imperative principle for fulfilling the Islamic arkan (pillars).25 Expressing great admiration for Faysal’s role in consolidating his rule on a religious basis, Ibn Bishr attributes to Faysal the character of a pious and worthy man who deserves to lead the believers. To illustrate his religious zeal, Ibn Bishr assigns a special place in his chronicle

96 | Religion under Faysal and His Successors to record Faysal’s constant habit of meeting the prominent ‘ulama of Al al-Shaykh and others regularly after Friday prayers. According to Ibn Bishr, despite Faysal’s intense involvement in political and military affairs, he used to attend religious meetings in the presence of paramount scholars, namely ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan Al al-Shaykh and his cousin ‘Abdullah Ibn Hasan Ibn Husayn. However, in many cases these meetings mingled politics with religion. For example, in 1845, Faysal held such a meeting to discuss the religious issues related to the military campaign that he was preparing against Ibn Hathliyn, the ruler of al-Qasim. The participants in the meeting chose to read and discuss the famous text al-Siyasa al-Shar‘iyya of Ibn Taymiyya in order to learn a lesson on religious legal politics that could be applied to the revolt in al-Qasim.26 Deeply influenced by this text, Faysal decided to reorganize his administration in accordance with the requirements of al-Siyasa al-Shar‘iyya. He therefore appointed ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn ‘Yaban as the governor of al-Washm and Sudayr, the two central regions under his territorial rule. Faysal and Al al-Shaykh had great respect for the religious role of Ibn ‘Yaban, who had acquired his education in the circle of ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan Al al-Shaykh. Ibn ‘Yaban was known to be proficient in the history of Islam, in the sira (biography) of the Prophet and in Ibn Kathir’s exegesis of the hadith.27 Like any chronicler, Ibn Bishr records events as he saw them and rarely provides explanations and interpretations for such events. But his numerous examples of their role in the process of consolidating the Second Saudi State illustrate the part played by Ibn ‘Yaban in this process. His appointment exemplifies the participation of ‘ulama in the political and military affairs of Faysal’s rule. During the First Saudi State, and even during the reign of Turki, there was certain balance between religion and politics. Relying on Ibn Bishr, one may argue that Faysal shifted this balance in favor of ‘ulama. The shift that began with Faysal’s religious epistle was accelerated during the revolt of al-Qasim. In 1845, he charged ‘Abd al-Latif Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan Al al-Shaykh with accompanying Faysal’s three sons, ‘Abdullah, Muhammad, and Saud, and his brother Jalawi, in leading the military campaign against the rebels of al-Qasim. It is worth noting that ‘Abd al-Latif was one of the leading figures of Al al-Shaykh who later became the paramount scholar among the Wahhabi ‘ulama. Ibn Bishr describes ‘Abd al-Latif as the religious leader of the campaign, infusing his troops with religious zeal and providing them with the necessary Islamic lessons according to the Wahhabi laws and creed. Ibn Bishr does not hide his admiration of ‘Abd al-Latif’s eloquence and his explanation of the meaning of tawhid.28 In addition to ‘Abd al-Latif,

Religion under Faysal and His Successors | 97 other ‘ulama joined Faysal’s troops on their way to al-Qasim. Amongst them was ‘Abdullah Ibn Jabr (d. 1852), one of the prominent Wahhabi ‘ulama from the city of Manfuha, whom Faysal appointed the qadi of the city.29 ‘Abdullah Ibn Jabr, accompanied by Ibn Bishr, joined the troops’ camp. In order to add religious legitimacy to the military campaign, ‘Abdullah Ibn Jabr chose to read texts from the famous book Siraj al-Muluk (The Oil Lamp of the Kings) written by Abu Bakr al-Tartushi al-Maliki (d. 1126).30 Although Faysal was the paramount leader of the Saudi chiefs, Ibn Bishr includes him in the strata of ‘ulama as one of the disciples of Al al-Shaykh and one of their religious circle. Because Faysal used to participate in every religious meeting and to discuss the religious masa’il, Ibn Bishr considers him the main figure in consolidating this circle. Faysal’s presence at the meetings granted the members of the circle a sense of intimacy and unity that provided them with the solidarity of a religious stratum. We shall show later that this solidarity would evaporate after Faysal’s reign, posing difficulties for Wahhabi religious unity.31 Faysal’s involvement in religious affairs gives the impression that he had transformed the circle of Al al-Shaykh and their network of the Wahhabi ‘ulama into a quasi-council that ran all the political affairs of his rule. At the end of his reign, when al-Qasim surrendered, Faysal used members of this circle to pacify the area. Instead of sending one of the Saudi chiefs, he preferred to dispatch ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Aba Butayn, one of the authoritative ‘ulama, to get a pledge of surrender and allegiance not only for the mundane rule of Riyadh but also for Wahhabi religious principles.32 Although the circle of Al al-Shaykh had maintained its alleged adherence to the Hanbali heritage, Faysal manifested certain flexibility toward other Sunni Islamic schools. Thus he showed his acceptance of the adoption of religious ideas borrowed by the Wahhabi ‘ulama from other schools that do not contradict their basic creed and that would strengthen their theocratic regime. This explains why Siraj al-Muluk of the Maliki scholar Abu Bakr al-Tartushi was accepted by Al al-Shaykh as the legal basis for Saudi rule. In this sense, one can assume that Faysal granted the circle of Al al-Shaykh certain autonomous authority to decide in religious matters and even to borrow religious ideas from other doctrines. Even in political matters, Faysal showed great respect to the viewpoint of the circle of Al al-Shaykh. In his recent book Da‘iya wa Laysa Nabiy-an, Hasan Ibn Farhan al-Maliki (1970–) provides an example of such respect when he tells a story about controversy between Faysal and ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan, the paramount leader of Al al-Shaykh, on the way in which an offending soldier should be

98 | Religion under Faysal and His Successors punished. While Faysal suggested inflicting the punishment of the soldier far from the public eyes, ‘Abd al-Rahman insisted on doing so in the suq (market) where people gather, arguing that the case of this soldier was an issue of Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong. In an act of protest, ‘Abd al-Rahman left the troops’ camp and did not come back until Faysal had accepted that the punishment be given in the suq according to the principles of Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong.33 The case of this soldier may testify to the success of Al al-Shaykh in institutionalizing the principle of Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong as autonomous. Considering himself a member of the ‘ulama strata, Faysal accepted the dictates of ‘Abd al-Rahman Al al-Shaykh, with whom he had a close relationship, sharing with him the same inspiration to create a cohesive Wahhabi network through which he could rely on the obedience of his subjects. During his reign, Faysal formed a broad network of religious strata led by Al al-Shaykh, with the membership of all the qadis, disciples, mutawi‘a, and other Wahhabi ‘ulama. Although weakened by political upheavals that took place after 1865, the network created during Faysal’s rule became the model for the Saudi state in the twentieth century, when Saudis and Al al-Shaykh began to revive Faysal’s legacy in order to reconsolidate their theocratic regime. Relying on chroniclers of Faysal’s period, one cannot draw up a clear picture of this network as an official institution. However, one may assume that the modern Saudi state followed Faysal’s legacy in institutionalizing the legal basis of regulations related to the principle of Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong. To reassess the impact of Faysal’s legacy on the modern Saudi state in the twentieth century, it would be insufficient to refer only to the revival of the role of Al al-Shaykh in leading the theocratic regime. Such a reassessment should take into account the regulations regarding punishment that the Al al-Shaykh network set up during Faysal’s rule. These regulations stipulated sentences for culprits who were found guilty of breaking the laws of shari‘a. The death penalty was generally ruled for those who avowed heresy or infidelity. In his visit to Riyadh in 1862–3, William Gifford Palgrave implicitly alludes to the existence of a religious network that can be considered an autonomous religious institution. According to him, Faysal was a zealous ruler who relied on a religious group that comprised twentytwo pious ‘ulama. Palgrave calls this group the “Zelators” or “the men of zeal,” responsible for maintaining public order within the realm of Faysal. According to him, the locals of Najd used to give these “Zelators” the title of Meddey‘yeeyah,34 Palgrave’s distorted pronunciation of the word mutawi‘a. Palgrave describes the “Zelators” or

Religion under Faysal and His Successors | 99 mutawi‘a as a group that had unlimited authority over the people. The “Zelators” had the authority to enforce penalties among the people in order to impose obedience to the rule. Absence from public prayers, smoking tobacco, wearing silk or gold, talking or joking in the house after night prayer, singing or playing on any musical instrument, swearing by any name other than God, all these were considered acts of deviation from the Wahhabi consensus.35 Palgrave ascribes to the “Zelators” an important role in organizing the society of Riyadh: The Zelators are, in fact, the real council of state; and no question of peace or war, alliance or treaty, but is suggested or modified by them. They represent what may with all due respect entitle the High Conservative party, amid that inevitable tendency of all organized society to advancement, from which not even Wahhabees are exempt.36

As mentioned above, al-mutawi‘a were partners of the religious strata composed of qadis, religious disciples, Wahhabi ‘ulama, and Al alShaykh. It seems that Palgrave uses the term “Zelators” without giving full details about their role. However, in his description their religious position overlaps the role played by al-mutawi‘a during Faysal’s rule and by the institution of the principle of Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in the modern Saudi state. This suggests that this religious network during that period lacked the distribution of functions in accordance with a clear demarcation between official religious institutions that characterizes the modern Saudi state. Although Palgrave considers the “Zelators” to be the main religious body leading the state, with great power and the influence to enforce religious order throughout the territories under Faysal’s rule, he assigns two functions to them. The first is that of Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, and the second is that of al-mutawi‘a. Meanwhile he compares the “Zelators” with policemen in his own country: These Zelators are bound to a very simple style of dress . . . they may not even wear the sword, mark of directly temporal or military authority. But in compensation, each one bears in hand a long staff, which serves the double object of official badge and instrument of chastisement, much like the truncheon of our own policemen . . . Pacing from street to street, or unexpectedly entering the houses to see if there is anything incorrect going on there, they do not hesitate to inflict at once . . . the penalty of stripes on the detected culprit . . . A similar process is adopted for those whom negligence has kept from public prayer. Similar measures were enforced throughout Nejed.

100 | Religion under Faysal and His Successors Fervent Zelators, armed with rods and Corans, and breathing out vengeance upon all “right-hand and left hand defections,” visited the various towns and villages with the happiest results; and the entire ‘Aared [al-‘Arid], Sedeyer [Sudayr], Woshem [al-Washm], Yemamah [Yamama], and their neighbours, were speedily reformed and modeled on the pattern of Riad [Riyadh].37

Palgrave exemplifies the powerful status of the “Zelators” when he tells the story of the brother of Faysal named Jalawi who was beaten with rods at the doors of Faysal’s palace for smoking tobacco. Even Jawali’s close kinsmen could not intervene to save him from the punishment.38 This story portrays the “Zelators” as the religious body that imposed the requirements of Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, and as having superior authority to the leading members of the Saudi family. While Palgrave mentions that Faysal had labored to sow discord between himself and some members of the Saudi family, he evaded confrontations with the “Zelators” whom he considered representatives of the religious strata that dominated religious and political matters, as the following passage shows: The only other human beings freely admitted to his [Faysal’s] presence are the bigoted Zelators, whose moral and even material influence he is unable to withstand, nor dares reject whatever they may impose on him, however injurious to the better interests of the empire.39

Palgrave is perhaps viewing the situation in Riyadh and in other places in Faysal’s realm through a Western prism, lacking many insights, details, and nuances that could have been added to his description. However, the narrative of his journey provides valuable information about this critical period during which the basic elements that characterized the future relationship between state and religion in modern Saudi Arabia were formed. It is unjust to accept the judgment of Richard Bayly Winder, a Western scholar who labels Palgrave a liar, who had no general conception of Arabian politics and affairs.40 Palgrave’s description fits in with Michael Cook’s argument that the principle of Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong had become severely officialized during the Second Saudi State and had taken the place of holy war against infidels outside Najd.41 Rooted in the Wahhabi legacy since Faysal’s rule, the principle of Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong was transferred by the Saudis into independent institutions when they established, in 1926 or 1928, in Mecca the Committee of Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong. Similar

Religion under Faysal and His Successors | 101 to the “Zelators” in the period of Faysal, this committee, which is still active today, was officially authorized to discipline the Muslim subjects of the state in accordance with the principles of Wahhabism on issues such as prayer, avoiding expletive words, smoking in public, and other rules of ritual morality. Relying on several sources, Michael Cook investigates the circumstances through which the committee of 1926 or 1928 was established in Mecca. Comparing these sources, Cook presents the narrative of Hafiz Wahba (d. 1967), an Egyptian who served as a retainer of Ibn Saud and played some part in the events after the First World War when the Saudi state was extending its sway to include Hijaz and other regions in Arabia. Wahba, who published his narrative many years after the events, links the establishment of the committee in 1926 with the movement of the Wahhabi Ikhwan, which in 1924 succeeded in ousting the last Sharif from Mecca and Medina and in annexing the area of Hijaz to the Saudi realm. The Ikhwan were mobilized by Wahhabi mutawi‘a from the tribal inhabitants of Najd. Wahba explains that the Ikhwan, uncouth nomads as they were, had no idea how to behave in a civilized environment; each of them considered himself individually entitled to take up his stick and execute God’s law against the hapless Meccans.42 Reviewing other sources, Cook finds that the committee in the first two years after its establishment was unstable and that Wahba’s account may be incomplete. Only in 1928 did the new institution of Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong become well established and rapidly extend its function to the rest of the Saudi state.43 Perhaps there is a certain exaggeration in describing the behavior of the Ikhwan as aggressive acts inflicted against Meccans. But it is obvious that the capture of Mecca in 1924 created the circumstances that led the Saudis to establish an official institution for Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong. It seems that Ibn Saud and the Wahhabi ‘ulama realized that a new constellation had emerged after the annexation of Muslims’ most sacred city into their realm. Probably seeking legitimacy for such annexation, they resorted to Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, which all Muslims recognize as a moral principle. Thus they created the committee in Mecca not only to discipline the Ikhwan according to this principle, but also to discipline all subjects of the state. In a society where mundane concerns are interwoven with religious affairs, the committee interfered in many aspects of daily life. In the course of its development, the committee faced the challenge of modernity notably after the Second World War, when the oil industry exposed Saudi society to Western values. For example, in order to maintain the segregation of women, in 1957 the committee issued a ban on women driving cars.44

102 | Religion under Faysal and His Successors Although it is beyond the scope of this study to follow the development of this committee until today, one can assume that its creation in 1926 revived Faysal’s legacy that had implanted the principle of Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong among the inhabitants of Najd. Al al-Shaykh, mutawi‘a, and Wahhabi ‘ulama all maintained the legacy of Faysal, enabling Ibn Saud to deliver it in a form of official institution. It is difficult to follow the way through which Al al-Shaykh, mutawi‘a, and Wahhabi ‘ulama applied the principle of Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong after the death of Faysal in 1865. As mentioned above, the death of Faysal shook the unity of the Saudi state, posing difficulties for Al al-Shaykh and the Wahhabi ‘ulama to maintain the status they had gained during his reign. His death coincided with the death of ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Abu Butayn, a prolific scholar of the Wahhabi ‘ulama whose religious activities and writings had helped to consolidate unity among the religious strata of the state. Four years later, the death of ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn al-Hasan also weakened the ability of the Wahhabi ‘ulama network to apply the principle of Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in the manner of Faysal’s time.

The Role of Religious Scholars after Faysal’s Death As mentioned above, the religious strata of Al al-Shaykh and the Wahhabi ‘ulama played an important role in consolidating and legitimizing Faysal’s rule in Najd. From the death of Faysal in 1865 until 1902 the Wahhabi religious strata faced a new constellation of political and military upheavals. Soon after the death of Faysal, a grave dispute erupted between his sons, leading to radical change in the structure of the Second Saudi State. The dispute had a strong impact on the religious strata that had lost Aba Butayn and ‘Abd al-Rahman, whose activities had contributed to the unity that characterized the rule of Faysal and granted it full legitimacy. In his narrative of the journey to Riyadh, Palgrave devotes a considerable part of it to a description of the different characters of ‘Abdullah and Saud, the sons of Faysal, and their mutual animosity. He describes ‘Abdullah as short, stout, large-headed, thick-necked, and very bullish in his appearance, while his brother, Saud was tall, slender, and handsome. When he refers to the future relationship between the two brothers, Palgrave anticipated a clash between them, using an analogy from Roman history: “Hence it is universally believed that the death of Feysul [Faysal] will prove the signal for a bloody and equally matched war between the Romulus and Remus . . . of Nejed.”45

Religion under Faysal and His Successors | 103 As the elder brother, ‘Abdullah was nominated by the dignitaries of the state the rightful heir of his father. In his assessment of the new ruler, Facey attributes to ‘Abdullah the character of a leader who was a successful military commander with a long practical experience of administration under his father.46 His half-brother Saud contested this nomination and a struggle between the two brothers began almost at Faysal’s graveside. The struggle erupted at a time of British interference in Arabia, notably in the area of the Masqat of Oman. Thus ‘Abdullah found himself dealing with a double problem: the internal dispute between him and his brother and the external one imposed by the British who were trying to expand their sphere of influence along the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf.47 At this time, Saud began to organize opposition to his brother’s nomination. As on previous occasions in the history of the Saudi family, Saud attempted to mobilize tribes against his brother. The first to which he turned for help was the ‘Ajman tribes, who had a strong hold in the areas between Najd and Hasa. As mentioned above, the ‘Ajman tribes had constituted an element of unrest at the consolidation of Faysal’s reign when the latter had to use his military might in 1845 and again in 1860 to subdue them. It is worth noting that ‘Abdullah himself led the Saudi troops in 1860 against al-‘Ajman, inflicting causalities among them. In their fresh recollections of the devastating blow they suffered at the hands of ‘Abdullah in 1860, the ‘Ajman tribes hastened to side with Saud against his brother. Moreover, because his mother was from the ‘Ajman, Saud succeeded in cultivating this family connection against his brother. To counterbalance ‘Ajman support, ‘Abdullah gained the help of the Qahtan tribes, whose members generally had bad relations with al-‘Ajman.48 Soon the struggle between the two brothers became a tribal contest. Each of them began extending his tribal coalition, gathering more forces even from remote areas of Arabia. Saud made a tour in ‘Asir at the southern edge of his father’s realm, searching for allies among the tribes of the region. To abort his brother’s effort in this area, ‘Abdullah hastened to send a deputation of ‘ulama and chiefs to Abha, the central city of ‘Asir, warning its leaders against taking sides with his half brother. While ‘Abdullah’s deputation succeeded in Abha, Saud turned to Najran, another locality in the south, soliciting its ruler, named Makrami, to side with him. Encouraged by his success in Najran, Saud proceeded to Wadi al-Dawasir at the southern edge of Najd that borders with the vast desert of al-Rub‘ al-Khali, and obtained a pledge from its ruler to mobilize supporters against ‘Abdullah.49 After completing his coalition, by which he surrounded Najd with al-‘Ajman tribes to the east and the forces of Najran and Wadi al-Dawasir to the

104 | Religion under Faysal and His Successors south, Saud took the offensive against his brother. This large coalition of forces alarmed ‘Abdullah, who feared that it might oust him from Riyadh and create in Najd a state of anarchy. ‘Abdullah therefore resorted to mobilizing the Najdi inhabitants against a coalition that was basically composed of elements from outside the core area of Najd. Because the coalition of Saud relied on non-Najdi elements, it was easy for ‘Abdullah to obtain the support of the urban and nomadic population of Najd and to win the assistance of his third brother, Muhammad, who considered Saud’s acts rebellion against the legitimate ruler. Led by his brother Muhammad, the troops of ‘Abdullah succeeded at the end of 1866 in holding back the offensive of Saud at Mu‘tala on the road between Wadi al-Dawasir and Riyadh. Defeated and seriously injured in the battle of Mu‘tala, Saud escaped from the battlefield, taking refuge in a region controlled by the Murra tribe.50 The battle of Mu‘tala was the beginning of a long civil war that eroded the Saudi realm and broke it up into small chieftaincies that continued to quarrel until the rise of the Third Saudi State in 1902.51 In his chronicle Ba‘d al-Hawadith, Ibn ‘Isa deplores this civil war that introduced disorder, famine, killing, and plunder which affected the whole society of Najd.52 Although it is beyond the scope of this study to describe all historical events until the end of the nineteenth century, it is worth noting that the long civil war invited local and external forces to take an active part in the political and military affairs of Najd. In addition to the involvement of the sedentary and nomadic tribes of Najd and other areas of Arabia, the Ottomans and the British attempted to take advantage of the upheavals of the civil war in order to promote their own interests in Arabia.53 Four years after the battle of Mu‘tala, Saud once again restored his alliance with the ‘Ajman and Murra tribes. He launched his first attack on Hasa, the strategic province that ‘Abdullah was ruling. In an attempt to restore control over this province, ‘Abdullah dispatched troops under the command of his brother Muhammad, who was defeated and captured. He remained in jail for a few weeks in al-Qatif before he was released by the Turks and returned to Riyadh. The victory of Saud in Hasa changed the balance of forces, compelling ‘Abdullah to leave Riyadh and take refuge in Jabal Shammar. Before the arrival of Saud’s troops in Riyadh, ‘Abdullah solicited the military aid of Midhat Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Baghdad and the Sharif of Mecca, and renewed his alliance with the Qahtan tribes. In April 1871, Saud decided to make a decisive move by gathering his troops and proceeding to Riyadh. Realizing that he could not resist, ‘Abdullah gave up and left the capital, taking refuge in the south of Najd where the Qahtan tribes had a strong hold. Exploiting internal

Religion under Faysal and His Successors | 105 strife between the Saudi chiefs, Midhat Pasha decided to extend Ottoman sovereignty over Hasa and Najd under the pretext that his troops had come to restore order and to reinstate the power of ‘Abdullah as the Ottoman qaimmaqam (deputy). Although the Ottoman troops failed to seize Riyadh, Midhat Pasha declared that Hasa and Najd were part of the Ottoman Empire, just as Iraq, Yemen, and Egypt were, and that ‘Abdullah as qaimmaqam was the legitimate ruler subordinate to the governor of Baghdad. The Ottoman occupation of Hasa invited the intervention of the British in the internal dispute among Saudi chiefs. Their intervention stemmed from their interest in preventing the Ottomans from holding a permanent presence in the Persian Gulf. As a result of Ottoman and British manipulation of the internal strife, Saudi rule in Riyadh entered a period of instability characterized by a cycle of violence in which Faysal’s sons and grandsons continued to quarrel until the final dissolution of the Second Saudi State.54 In the first eleven years after Faysal’s death, eight shifts in power occurred among his sons and grandsons. ‘Abdullah took over from December 2, 1865, until April 9, 1871, and was followed by his brother Saud from April 10 to August 15, 1871, then by his uncle, ‘Abdullah Ibn Turki, for two months from August 15 to October 15, 1871, before the return of ‘Abdullah Ibn Faysal to rule from October 15, 1871, to January 15, 1873. Saud again seized power until January 26, 1875, to be followed by ‘Abd al-Rahman, one of his brothers, for one year from January 26, 1875, to January 28, 1876. Then the sons of Saud succeeded in ousting their uncle from Riyadh for two months from January 28, 1876, until March 31, 1876, before the return of ‘Abdullah Ibn Faysal. At the end of the 1870s, the latter found himself caught between the Ottomans in Hasa and Al al-Rashid, who began to extend their influence in many parts of Najd. At the beginning of the 1880s, when ‘Abdullah’s rule was under the protection of Al Rashid, the sedentary and nomadic population of Najd began to break away from Riyadh. This situation encouraged the sons of Saud to capture Riyadh in 1887, compelling ‘Abdullah to solicit the aid of Al Rashid, who seized the opportunity to extend their power over the whole area that still remained under Saudi control. When the Saudi chiefs attempted, after ‘Abdullah’s death in 1889, to reconsolidate their rule, they found great difficulty in challenging Al Rashid, who established themselves in 1891 as the undisputed rulers of central Arabia until 1902.55 When the dispute between the two sons of Faysal, ‘Abdullah and Saud, erupted, ‘Abd al-Latif Al al-Shaykh used all his religious prestige to attenuate and even to prevent friction between the two brothers.

106 | Religion under Faysal and His Successors Soon after the takeover of ‘Abdullah in Riyadh, Saud began to challenge the rule of his brother. ‘Abd al-Latif, the paramount religious figure of the Wahhabis, clearly declared his support of the new ruler. In an attempt to grant ‘Abdullah religious legitimacy, ‘Abd al-Latif called the inhabitants of the Saudi state to reject fitna (civil strife among Muslims) and take an oath of allegiance to the new ruler, describing the supporters of Saud as a “blind group” whose feuding behavior recalled jahiliyya,56 the pre-Islamic period.57 It seems that ‘Abd al-Latif’s exhorting words were intended for the Wahhabi community rather than for the Saudi chiefs in order to preserve unity among the religious strata. In the epistle that he addressed to the people of al-Huta, ‘Abd al-Latif regarded the fitna as a musiba al-‘uzma (great disaster) that would threaten the unity of the Muslims in Najd.58 To convince his religious peers, ‘Abd al-Latif suggested following the legal instructions of the Hanbalis and other scholars from different schools. He emphasized especially the al-Musnaf (The Classifier) of Ibn Hubiyra (d. 1164/5), one of the famous Hanbali scholars, and the writings of Abu Muhammad ‘Ali Ibn Hazm (994–1064),59 who instructed Muslims to avoid fitna at all costs by supporting one ruler. For ‘Abd al-Latif, obedience to one ruler is an obligatory duty of Muslims, because an unjust ruler is better than fitna, as he articulated in his epistle sent to two of his pupils, Zayd Ibn Muhammad and Salih Ibn Muhammad. In his words, sultan zalum khayr-un min fitna tadum (“a temporary tyranny is better than permanent internal strife”).60 Relying on this principle, ‘Abd al-Latif condemned Saud’s attempt to take over power in Riyadh from his brother. He considered Saud’s dissent as fitna that would divide the Muslim umma. In his abovementioned epistle to his pupils Zayd Ibn Muhammad and Salih Ibn Muhammad, ‘Abd al-Latif admonished the supporters of Saud, notably Muhammad Ibn ‘Ayid, the leader of ‘Asir, considering them inciters of blind and deaf fitna that the Qur’an and hadith prohibit.61 Relying on the same principle, ‘Abd al-Latif justified in 1870 his call to support Saud, who took over power by force at the beginning of 1871. Probably, ‘Abd al-Latif wanted to avoid more internal strife that caused the hunger and death of many inhabitants of Riyadh at this time.62 Later on in 1871, ‘Abd al-Latif justified his shift in supporting the new ruler by the same religious argument used before. Because Saud had already achieved predominance and power, the people of Najd were obliged to declare obedience to the new ruler in “accordance with the principles and practice” suggested by the Hanbali scholars.63 However, it seems that ‘Abd al-Latif’s shift this time was also motivated by practical reason. He applied his religious formula of “a

Religion under Faysal and His Successors | 107 temporary tyranny is better than permanent internal strife” (fitna) to prevent Ottoman intervention in the internal affairs of Najd. ‘Abd alLatif’s support for Saud at the end of 1870 stemmed from his fear that ‘Abdullah’s relations with the Ottomans would undermine the religious convictions of the people. It seems that relations between ‘Abd al-Latif and ‘Abdullah began to deteriorate before the victory of Saud. But ‘Abd al-Latif expressed his clear disappointment in ‘Abdullah when the latter fled north to escape the vengeance of his brother and to solicit Ottoman assistance. The contact with the Ottomans was used by ‘Abd al-Latif to justify his decision to back Saud’s rule, which would guarantee his predominance among the Wahhabi ‘ulama. His decision was intended to maintain his religious and political role and even to present himself as a mediator between the rival brothers.64 In fact, contact with the Ottomans provoked debate among the Wahhabi ‘ulama. ‘Abd al-Latif did not hesitate to present his religious fatwa against any contact with the Ottomans.65 Aware of the religious power of ‘Abd al-Latif among Al al-Shaykh and the Wahhabi network of ‘ulama, ‘Abdullah sought his religious backing among some ‘ulama, such as Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim Ibn ‘Ajlan. The latter issued a fatwa that legitimized ‘Abdullah’s contact with the Ottomans. In an epistle addressed to ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Ibrahim Aba al-Ghanaym, a famous scholar of the time, ‘Abd al-Latif expressed his great disappointment and resentment at Ibn ‘Ajlan’s fatwa, labeling it hibalat al-shaytan (ropes of the devil). He considered this fatwa a “corridor” for the heresy of the Ottomans.66 In addition to his religious attacks, ‘Abd alLatif recruited one of his prominent pupils, Hamad Ibn ‘Atiq, to contest the religious arguments of Aba al-Ghanaym.67 The internal strife between the Saudi brothers inaugurated a battle of takfir through which Wahhabi ‘ulama accused other Muslims of being unbelievers. Before dealing in Chapter 6 with ‘Abd al-Latif’s takfiri discourse during the civil war, it is important to indicate that his stance in 1871 shows a lack of consistency in this discourse. His takfiri discourse against the Ottomans did not prevent him from shifting his loyalty once again in favor of ‘Abdullah, even though the latter had collaborated with the Ottomans. While the fatwa against collaborators with the Ottomans was fresh in the memory of the Najdi ‘ulama, ‘Abd alLatif hastened to declare in October 1871 his loyalty to ‘Abdullah, who had regained control over Riyadh and large parts of Najd with the help of the Ottomans. ‘Abd al-Latif was probably again resorting to his principle of accepting an unjust ruler in order to prevent fitna. But this time he justified his stance by arguing that ‘Abdullah, the new ruler, had expressed regret and penitence. Then ‘Abd al-Latif wrote to Hamad Ibn ‘Atiq, asking him to accept his apology for his previous

108 | Religion under Faysal and His Successors fatwa. ‘Abd al-Latif explained his new stance when he argued that Islam orders Muslims to promote peace and reconciliation.68

The Force of the the Religious Scholars’ Network While ‘Abd al-Latif was attempting to present religious arguments for switching his stance vis-à-vis internal strife, his concern focused on maintaining religious unity among the Wahhabi ‘ulama. Probably ‘Abd al-Latif’s slogan, “a temporary tyranny is better than permanent internal strife,” was meant to prevent religious disunity rather than to support one of the two Saudi brothers. It seems, too, that he was more concerned to prevent the intervention of the Ottomans, who would intensify their religious influence in order to undermine the unity of the Wahhabi ‘ulama network. He therefore attempted to formulate a code of behavior that ‘ulama would follow in times of internal strife. His contradictory fatwas and apologies reflected the delicate situation that religious leaders were facing. Because his main concern was religious, ‘Abd al-Latif made great efforts to maintain a special relationship with the Wahhabi community and with its constituency among the Bedouin tribes and sedentary inhabitants of Najd. ‘Abd al-Latif’s policy proved itself because Al al-Shaykh had succeeded since the reign of Turki, and especially during that of Faysal, in consolidating their status as the supreme religious authority that rulers would have to take into political consideration. The Wahhabi ‘ulama during the reigns of Turki and Faysal had institutionalized their authority to become a sort of a religious independent body with hierarchical ranks under the supremacy of Al al-Shaykh. All the Wahhabi ‘ulama at this time were included within the circle of ‘Abd al-Rahman and ‘Abd al-Latif. The latter used the network of Wahhabi ‘ulama to instruct the people about the ways in which they should behave. As we have seen, ‘Abd al-Latif continued to transmit his epistles and fatwas through “reliable” ‘ulama. At this period of internal strife, ‘Abd al-Latif focused his epistles on the danger of al-fitna, relying on al-ahkam al-shr‘iyya (legal principles), as articulated by ‘ulama throughout the history of Islam. His main objective was to revive the consensus among ‘ulama in order to establish the basis of legitimacy for any ruler who holds power. He condemned any act that would affect the consensus and the unity of Muslims and thus of the polity, as he wrote in one of his epistles to a group of ‘ulama – among them Ibrahim and Rashid Ibn ‘Uwayn and others. He therefore recalled the traditional principle that links Islamic ijma‘ (‘ulama’s consensus) with imama (leadership), as he wrote at the beginning of his epistle: “You

Religion under Faysal and His Successors | 109 [‘ulama] know that there is no Islam without consensus and there is no consensus without leadership.”69 The term imama in the religious discourse of the Wahhabis had two connotations: the first being rulers such as Turki and Faysal, and the second being the paramount religious scholar among Al al-Shaykh. At every stage of Wahhabism’s development, Al al-Shaykh needed an authoritative figure either from one of its family members or from the Saudi family to lead and guide their religious movement. Before the eruption of internal strife, the leading figures among the Wahhabi ‘ulama, such as ‘Abd al-Rahman and ‘Abd al-Latif, were preparing their successors from within the family of Al al-Shaykh. The three main figures at this time were ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman, Hasan Ibn Husayn, and Husayn Ibn Hasan Ibn ‘Ali. To gain legitimacy within the religious Wahhabi network, each of them would have to demonstrate his religious authority by writing on theology and legal issues. Hasan Ibn Husayn Al al-Shaykh gained his religious authority by his famous contribution on such masa’il (topics). He himself became the teacher of other Al al-Shaykh and Wahhabi pupils sent to serve outside Riyadh as guides.70 Husayn Ibn Hasn Ibn ‘Ali was the pupil of ‘Abd al-Latif. His contribution was in composing poetic responses against religious and political opponents of Wahhabism. He was sent to Oman to establish a Wahhabi center for the propagation of the doctrine.71 Despite internal strife, the religious Wahhabi network made great efforts to contact Muslim ‘ulama in areas outside Arabia. The best figure to exemplify these efforts was Ishaq Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman (1859–1901), the brother of ‘Abd al-Latif, who traveled to India to promote the Wahhabi creed. Before returning to Najd, he met with the two prominent Yemeni ‘ulama who lived in India: Husayn Ibn Muhsin al-Ansari (1830–1909) and his son Nadhir Husayn.72 At the request of ‘Abdullah Ibn Ahmad al-Rawaf al-Qasimi (1875–1940), Ishaq followed the example of his peers from Al al-Shaykh in writing masa’il,73 through which he described the behavioral code of “true believers” and formulated religious arguments against Wahhabism’s opponents.74 While maintaining their leadership within the Wahhabi network, Al al-Shaykh prepared an army of ‘ulama from other families of Najd who took an active part in ‘Abd al-Rahman and ‘Abd al-Latif’s intellectual circles. For example, Hamad Ibn ‘Atiq, the scholar mentioned above, was one of ‘Abd al-Rahman’s disciples. He played a great role in maintaining the unity of the Wahhabi network during a period of fitna. In addition to his religious masa’il, which dealt with the importance of tawhid, Ibn ‘Atiq issued many legal instructions concerning the necessity of following the principle of Commanding Right and

110 | Religion under Faysal and His Successors Forbidding Wrong. At this period, ‘ulama used to travel to alien countries – Ibn ‘Atiq wrote epistles on what he called “admonitions in the lands of mushrikin” (polytheism).75 Muhammad Ibn ‘Umar Al Salim (1830–91) exemplified the integration of ‘ulama from other families within the ‘Abd al-Rahman and ‘Abd al-Latif’s Wahhabi network. Ibn ‘Umar Al Salim was one of the disciples in the Al al-Shaykh circle. The following short passage illustrates how ‘Abd al-Latif used to grant his pupils official permission to become part of the Wahhabi network. ‘Abd al-Latif’s letter to Ibn ‘Umar Al Salim begins with this sentence: “I allow you to teach and issue fatwas according to the speech . . . of the salafi scholars.”76 Al-Bassam provides many examples of the way in which Al alShaykh brought many Wahhabi ‘ulama into their network. Among these strata of ‘ulama was ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Hasan Hasan al-Fadli (1816–82), who was one of ‘Abd al-Rahman’s disciples. Al-Fadli wrote on many religious topics, such as tawhid (monotheism), tafsir (exegesis), and hadith, that gave him the authority to serve as qadi (judge) at al-Mihmal.77 Another disciple was ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abdullah al-Mani‘ (d. 1870), the grandson of the famous scholar, Ibn Abu Butayn. The Risalat al-Talaq (Epistle on Divorce) of al-Mani‘ was a synthesis of ‘Abd al-Rahman’s legal opinions on the subject. Like al-Fadli, al-Mani‘ was dispatched to Qatif to became its qadi.78 The role of Sulayman Ibn Mislih Ibn Sahman (1852– 1930) was decisive in simplifying the ideas of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of the doctrine, and in propagating the ideas of Al al-Shaykh. Al-Bassam considered Ibn Sahman one of the famous scholars who had devoted most of his time to the propagation of the doctrine. Ibn Sahman wrote about fourteen literary works denouncing Wahhabism’s opponents.79 Thanks to his contribution to the Wahhabi faith, Ibn Sahman was buried in the same graveyard (al-‘ud) of Al al-Shaykh, between the grave of ‘Abd al-Latif and that of his famous son ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abd al-Latif.80 In the same vein, al-Bassam devoted special attention to the religious activities of Ahmad Ibn Ibrahim Ibn Hamad Ibn ‘Isa (1837–1909), who was born in al-Washm and came to Riyadh to be an active member of the Wahhabi ‘ulama network. Like many of his peers, he took his cue from ‘Abd al-Rahman and ‘Abd al-Latif to contribute toward explaining the principles of tawhid according to the Hanbali doctrine.81 However, al-Bassam indicates that Ibn ‘Isa’s journey to Mecca allowed him to learn more about the Shafi‘i and Maliki schools. While most of the Wahhabi ‘ulama relied on Hanbali texts to deal with internal strife, Ibn ‘Isa added Shafi‘i and Maliki religious instructions, referring to the way in which Muslims should avoid

Religion under Faysal and His Successors | 111 fitna.82 He quoted an Arabic poem that describes resentment against the civil war.83 This survey of Al al-Shaykh’s role in dealing with internal strife shows that the Wahhabi network made great efforts to keep the whole movement of Wahhabism a united body. Despite upheavals that lasted from 1865 until the end of the century, these efforts helped the Saudis at the beginning of the twentieth century revive their political rule. This network of hundreds of ‘ulama and mutawi‘a expanded the realm of Wahhabism, despite the political and military disputes among the Saudi princes. Our data show that Al al-Shaykh continued to maintain a network of scholars, with each of them creating his own network of disciples in many parts of Najd. The main religious vehicle to keep Wahhabism alive after 1865 was the development of a new takfiri discourse through which Al al-Shaykh and their disciples attempted to defend the creed and justified their religious beliefs against the attacks of their adversaries. The following chapter will discuss the topic of takfir, investigating its theoretical arguments and its application from the time of the founder of the doctrine until ‘Abd al-Latif. To attain a comprehensive understanding of the topic, the following chapter will also place the takfiri discourse of the Wahhabi scholars within the broad scholastic debate of Muslim thinkers.

CHAPTER

6

Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and the Takfir This chapter traces the Wahhabi takfiri discourse (accusing people of being infidels) of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his successors during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and its implications for the sociopolitical realm in modern Saudi Arabia, where Wahhabism has continued to serve the state to perpetuate the obedience of its citizens. The chapter argues that takfiri discourse became the main religious and political weapon by which Wahhabi ‘ulama have attempted to mobilize supporters against their political and religious adversaries during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Although, in the eighteenth century, takfiri discourse was mainly limited to scholastic polemic between Wahhabis and their scholarly opponents, it bore some political elements beyond theological issues. At this stage, the theological debate between Wahhabis and their adversaries focused mainly on the principles of tawhid as articulated by Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, the founder of Wahhabism. His theological principles of tawhid called upon his followers to become “true” Muslims by abandoning any sort of polytheism, rejecting the veneration of saints and practicing the “right” worship. The chapter also delineates and analyzes how the descendants of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab in the nineteenth century transformed takfir in to the main mechanism to defend Wahhabism and to expand the realm of the Saudi political entity. Although the chapter deals with the way Wahhabi ‘ulama in general elaborated the notion of takfir, it concentrates on leading figures of these ‘ulama, especially Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Sulayman Ibn ‘Abdullah, and ‘Abd al-Latif Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman, and later, at the beginning of the twentieth century, Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Latif. The chapter shows that these ‘ulama enlarged al-takfir al-mu‘ayan (the excommu-

Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice | 113 nication of specific individuals) to include not only Christians and Shiites, but also Sunni groups, and even some Wahhabis who were considered collaborators with foreigners and solicitors of military assistance from infidels, such as the Ottomans and the British. As mentioned in previous chapters, Wahhabism was contested in Mecca, Medina, Baghdad, and Damascus by opponents who accused Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab of being a takfiri scholar who denounced other Islamic preaching. For example, the anti-Wahhabi scholar Ahmad Zini Dahlan (1816–87) claimed that Sulayman Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, the brother of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, considered the latter responsible for adding takfir as a sixth pillar to the Islamic pillars when he declared that his opponents were kuffar whom he excluded from Islam. Dahlan recounts a discussion between the two brothers: One day, Sulayman asked his brother Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab: How many are the pillars of Islam? . . . [His brother] responded: they are five. Then, he [Sulayman] said: You already imposed a sixth pillar on those who do not follow you, considering them non-Muslims.1

The Wahhabis rejected such allegations of Dahlan, arguing that Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab never excommunicated Muslims on the basis of their oppositional ideas, but only because of their false faith and behavior. This alleged takfiri concept of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab provoked great opposition from contemporary scholars, who found ways to escape from the punitive hand of the Wahhabis. The most prominent representative of these scholars was Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn ‘Afaliq (d. 1751). Because he lived in Hasa he was probably able to launch severe attacks against the Wahhabi creed. In an epistle addressed to ‘ulama of al-amsar (scholars of the areas outside Arabia), Ibn ‘Afaliq labeled Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab a takfiri man whose “insolence” permitted him to cast all Muslims as atheists and polytheists: “This [Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab] casts the entire umma as infidels and even considers the prophets as liars, judging the people polytheists.”2 Wahhabi scholars have denounced such claims by quoting passages from Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s writings to illustrate that he never excommunicated faithful Muslims from the umma.3 They rejected claims such as those of Dahlan and Ibn ‘Afaliq with apologetic responses, emphasizing that they had no intention of excluding faithful Muslims from the umma. In his response, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab himself argued that the claims of his adversaries were based on false accusations. He defended himself by saying that such claims were motivated by the desire to distance the

114 | Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice people from Islam and the Prophet.4 However, in an epistle that he sent to one of the Iraqi ‘ulama named ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn ‘Abdullah alSuwaydi (1722–1805), with whom he had correspondence, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab defines the criteria of kufr. According to his criteria, “most of the Muslims are faithful except those who knew and accepted Islam and then changed their mind and went back on their faith, cursing the religion of the Prophet and prohibiting others from following his path.”5 In the same epistle, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab delineates also the criteria of jihad which permits Muslim believers to fight against infidels. For him, the wars of jihad are justified only against those who accepted Islam for a while and then explicitly expressed their enmity toward the religion. Apart from these justified wars, “all other wars are self-defense fought with forbearance of the breaching of the rules.”6 The position of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab presented in the above passages poses questions about the traditional historical interpretation that portrays Wahhabism as a takfiri movement that call for jihadi war against all its adversaries. In her revisionist analysis, Natana J. DeLong-Bas investigates the concepts of kufr and jihad as used by Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab in comparison with classical and modernist interpretations of the two concepts.7 She criticizes contemporary writers and commentators in the West who are still taking their cue from “essentialist” specialists in Islam who tend to project the present notion of the Saudi jihadi dissidents and groups backward in time rather than analyzing the past in its own context. They do not try to understand how the new phenomenon of jihadis has resulted in reinterpretation and even distortion of the past of the Wahhabi creed.8 Consulting Wahhabi and classical writings on the concept of jihad, DeLong-Bas concludes that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab interpreted Qur’anic verses relating to these concepts in a different way. While the classical interpretation of the verses served ‘ulama and political leaders to call for a jihadi war against enemies, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab did not use these verses to call Muslims to jihad. Instead, he placed them in their historical context, interpreting them in the light of the Qur’anic value of the importance of the preservation of life. His writings indicate that these verses served to place limitations on the violence of jihadi activities rather than to incite them. DeLong-Bas finds a similarity between Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and modernist scholars who followed the concepts of Muhammad ‘Abdu (d. 1905) and taught that jihad was permissible only as defensive warfare. According to her, both modernists and Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab have the same approach to the question of what is to be done with polytheists. In this regard, however, DeLong-Bas argues that Ibn ‘Abd

Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice | 115 al-Wahhab placed the Qur’anic verses that advocate jihad for God’s religion in a fuller intertribal context, emphasizing the importance of making peace with those who are inclined toward peace regardless of their religious status. Thus DeLong-Bas contests the idea that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s concept of jihad has great similarity with that of modern fundamentalists who tend to emphasize jihad as a means of expanding the territories of Islam and of Muslim control. She argues that while Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s jihad concept is always a defensive military action, contemporary fundamentalists emphasize the view that jihad should be an ongoing and permanent duty carried out with the purpose of eradicating kufr (unbelief) by the use of force.9 Although DeLong-Bas emphasizes the differences in approach between Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and contemporary fundamentalists, she admits that the prevalent impression remains that militant extremism and violence have been associated with Wahhabism from the early years of the movement. According to her assessment, the violence attributed to Wahhabis stems from the fact that their movement has been viewed mainly through the eyes of its opponents. These latter claimed that the Wahhabis, like the extremist Kharijis, divided the world into two spheres: the land of Islam (dar al-islam), which is the exclusive realm of the Wahhabis, and the land of unbelief (dar al-kufr), which is the domain of non-Wahhabis. Tracing historical narratives from the eighteenth century to the present time, DeLong-Bas suggests that one should be careful when relating contemporary jihadi and takfiri discourses and violence to the Wahhabi tradition as manifested in the writings of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his successors.10 A thorough reassessment of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s position against his adversaries reveals a different picture from that portrayed by DeLong-Bas. This picture takes on another color when one follows Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s writings beyond his theological and legal treatises dealt with by DeLong-Bas. In his epistles that refer to his opponents, he used to make charges of kufr without presenting legal arguments. For example, in his epistle addressed to Ahmad ‘Abd al-Karim, one of the mutawi‘a in Najd,11 Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab described Ibn Fayruz (1729–1801),12 one of his ardent opponents, as a heretic who was guilty of al-shirk al-akbar (the great polytheism).13 Ibn Fayruz was a prominent Hanbali scholar from Hasa whose legal exegesis followed the prominent Hanbali scholars, especially Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayim. Although Ibn Fayruz took his cue from the same Hanbali sources, he manifested great animosity toward the Wahhabi creed and toward Saudi political and military sway. Ibn Fayruz’s political and religious activities created a network of the antiWahhabi faction in Najd and Hasa. Ibn Fayruz’s activities posed a

116 | Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice great challenge when he wrote to the Ottoman Sultan, soliciting his intervention against Wahhabi–Saudi “aggressions.”14 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab fought the same war of words against Sulayman Ibn Suhaym (1718–1767), who was considered the most ardent enemy of Wahhabism in its early development. Ibn Suhaym launched his polemical attack when Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab was still in ‘Uyayna. While Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab used his talent to refute his religious arguments, he resorted to the language of the populace. In an epistle to one of the Najdi scholars named al-Suwaydi, Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab labeled Ibn Suhaym “a beast who does not understand the meaning of worship.”15 More germane for such cursing was Ibn Suhaym’s position against Wahhabism’s treatment of holy places. Ibn Suhaym launched a polemical campaign against Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab when the latter destroyed the tomb of Zayd Ibn al-Khattab. Ibn Suhaym added that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab considered a special prayer for the Prophet on Thursday evening and on Friday to be an innovation that should be abolished, and that he even wished to destroy the grave of the Prophet and dismantle the well-known ornamental feature of the golden waterspout on the Ka‘ba.16 Insulted by Ibn Suhaym’s criticism, Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab wrote to him an irritated response claiming that he was a “stubborn and lost man who chooses unbelief and idolatry instead of Islam.”17 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab added the following statement: inna al-rida bi-l-kufr kufr (“accepting unbelief is unbelief itself”).18 It did not suffice Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab to call him liar, infidel, and polytheist, but he added that his father, and all the people of al-Kharj (his locality), were equally infidels.19 No doubt, this sort of language is similar to the language used by the populace; whenever they accuse someone of being an unbeliever, they include his family and his compatriots, saying in Arabic anta wa-abuk wa-ahl baladak kuffar (you and your father and your compatriots are equally infidels). These two examples essentially contest the idea that Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab was careful in his accusation of takfir. In addition to his direct responses to his opponents, he transmitted his takfiri discourse through his “army” of mutawi‘a dispersed in many parts of his dominion. For example, in an epistle to ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Rabi‘a, the mutawi‘ in Thadiq, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab launched his attack against the anti-Wahhabi scholars al-Muwayyis (d. 1762),20 Ibn Isma‘i and Ahmad Ibn Yahiya,21 instructing his mutawi‘ to make great efforts to challenge these impure and infidel scholars who had abandoned the path of religion and tawahid.22 This way in which Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab attributed the term kuffar to his opponents contests part of DeLong-Bas’s arguments. Although

Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice | 117 her analysis sheds new light on the study of the Wahhabi tradition, her approach mainly treats theological treatises rather than writings that dealt with specific attacks against adversaries. No doubt DeLong-Bas illuminates the implications of the Wahhabi tradition for the modern relationship between state and religion in both Saudi and global contexts, and stimulates us to rethink the takfiri discourse that is attributed by many scholars to Wahhabism. However, she relies mainly on the writings of the founder of the doctrine, overlooking those of Al al-Shaykh and other Wahhabi scholars who kept the tradition alive and reshaped it in the course of time. In this sense, the approach of DeLong-Bas can be elaborated through more historical examples and through an analysis of the process of transmitting the Wahhabi writings to ordinary people who had no access to the written language. Before the dissolution of the First Saudi State, the first generation of Wahhabis – in their religious treatises – followed Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, adopting against their adversaries an ambivalent discourse of takfir characterized by apologetic language. In these treatises, they attempted to reject the accusation of their opponents that Wahhabism was a takfiri movement that excommunicated the “others,” and at the same time they used takfiri language to label specific opponents deviants and infidels. But as a result of Ottoman interference and the Egyptian military campaign at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the First Wahhabi–Saudi State in Najd collapsed, leaving the Wahhabi scholars deprived of the military backing of the Saudi princes. Anti-Wahhabi scholars in Arabia began to advocate wholesale preaching against the Wahhabi doctrine, leading many people in Najd and other parts of Arabia to move away from the Wahhabi creed. Defending themselves, the clandestine Wahhabi scholars, who had found shelter in some sedentary and nomadic localities, began to articulate a new version of takfir beyond the apologetic discourse of the first generation, accusing Ottomans and Egyptians and their allies among the Najdi chiefs and scholars of being infidels.

The Boundaries between Tawhid (Monotheism) and Shirk (Polytheism) It is a difficult task to follow the development and the process of transforming scholarly Wahhabi preaching into a mass movement during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, the historical record, as reflected by Wahhabi and anti-Wahhabi chroniclers, does provide some information about the zeal of the masses and their

118 | Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice behavior toward their enemies. Despite the lack of data that could exemplify the language used by the masses, one may assume that Wahhabi supporters among the ordinary people who had no access to the written word generally grasped the concepts of Wahhabi kufr and iman through the statements of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab or his successors rather than through their written treatises. It is difficult to pinpoint examples from the existing literature through which one can discern the different connotations of takfiri discourse of scholars and that of the populace. But the position of the Saudi rulers probably represented some aspects of the discourse used by the masses rather than by Wahhabi scholars. To illustrate how legal issues were transmitted to the masses, one may consult the way in which the first Saudi rulers understood these issues. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Muhammad Al Saud (1721–1803) exemplified this when he responded to Muhammad Ibn Muhammad al-Qadiri, probably a Hanbali scholar from Aleppo,23 who denounced Saudi acts against adversaries. Instead of presenting legal arguments, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz responded in a style of aspersion, using swear words characteristic of the language of the populace.24 Another example of this is taken from Saud Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (1759–1814) when he addressed an epistle to Sulayman Pasha (d. 1802), the Ottoman governor of Baghdad.25 Using Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s term tawhid, he labelled the Wahhabi adversaries in Baghdad unbelievers and polytheists. After a short passage on the duty of fulfilling the requirements of tawhid, he denounced the shirk (worship of idols) of these adversaries: “The rituals of kufr [unbelief] and shirk [polytheism] are manifested among you.”26 Therefore the question that one might ask is, did Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab and his successors (Al al-Shaykh) and the Saudis present a salient and clear demarcation between kufr (unbelief) and iman (belief)? Perhaps an investigation of the Wahhabi concept of shirk (polytheism) will give part of an answer to this question. As mentioned above, equivocal and ambivalent opinions on kufr are reflected in the theological works of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, notably when he dealt with kufr as a general concept without specifying persons whom he considered kuffar (infidels). However, because Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab emphasized that only ‘pure’ Islam adhered to absolute tawhid, he denounced all types of shirk manifested by the practice of some Muslims. For this reason, he considered that the Muslim declaration of faith (shahada) alone is insufficient. Shahada must be accompanied by an understanding of its meaning, which requires a consistency between words and actions demonstrated in practice. He assigned to his movement the task of purifying Islam of all sorts of innovations that implied a denial of monotheism among many Muslims. Thus he

Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice | 119 fought with words and with swords against all kinds of shirk that associates persons or things with God or with God’s attributes. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab dedicated his Kitab al-Tawhid to refuting the exegetical writings of previous and contemporary scholars who misled Muslims and caused them to adopt the habits and customs of shirk. In his famous work Kashf al-Shubuhat, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab states that shirk in his time had expanded to include many Muslims. He compared the phenomena of shirk in his time with those of the Prophet’s times, claiming that the number of the earliest infidels (al-mushrikun alawalun) was far less than in his time. Yet al-mushrikun al-awalun had prayed to God and they rarely asked angels or sacred saints for salvation.27 But al-mushrikun (the polytheists) of his time had abandoned even the prayers and used to commit idolatry without respecting the instruction of Islam.28 Throughout Muslim history, most Muslim scholars have dealt with the issue of shirk in the context of their theological and legal writings, which rarely reached the illiterate masses in the same form. Like any other organized religion, Islam supplies much of the personal and communication channels for the diffusion of religious principles. Religious scholars have not only communicated, recorded, and transmitted these principles, but also served as guardians and conduits of religious principles through which they have linked scholars to the masses. One may assume that in eras of low literacy, scholars were able to synthesize religious principles and reinterpret peculiar terms, transmitting them to the populace in the vernacular language. Through this language, religious principles found expression and became standardized and diffused. However, more than in previous periods, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and other Wahhabi scholars placed their notion of shirk at the heart of their religious and political mobilization of the masses. In this sense, the shirk discourse of Wahhabism became one of the factors that determined the relationship between the literary text and its practical implications for ordinary people beyond scholarly polemics. Texts began to be regarded as having a wider application when Wahhabi scholars emphasized the necessity of removing shirk practices from the whole community, rather than focusing on individual cases of shirk. Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and Al al-Shaykh fought against shirk with words and swords. Shirk was always defined by them as a violation of tawhid, the main factor preserving the pure faith of the entire Islamic community. For Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab there was no room for compromise with shirk because it is the unequivocal criterion of kufr.29 Because he considered that the veneration of trees, rocks, graves, and so on is a pre-Islamic custom, he denounced all sorts of idolatry and requests for

120 | Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice intercession that cause Muslims to deviate from the belief in God as the absolute sovereign. He preached for the eradication of these customs as shirk, calling upon his supporters to fight against the kuffar who committed shirk until they adhered to monotheism.30 In this regard, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab adopted a more extremist stance than other Hanbalis who dealt with takfir. Classical sources show that a number of the early Hanbali ‘ulama were more tolerant toward saintly benediction ceremonies. The early Hanbali tradition contains more than one text that Hanbalis read around the grave of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal in a commemoration ceremony. The famous book of Ibn alJawzi, al-Hafiz Abu al-Faraj ‘Abd al-Rahman (1116–1201), Manaqib al-Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (The Merits of the Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal), was one of the works that consolidated the early legal principles used by Hanbalis in their religious polemics with others. Although Wahhabis still consult the legal exegesis of al-Jawzi’s book, they adopt the revisionist interpretations of the founder of Wahhabism that depart from many of its themes. One of these themes is the attitude of al-Jawzi toward the adoration of holy places. He describes with great respect the visitation ceremonies to the grave of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal. He even tended to accept the story of a visitor to the site who claimed that he saw creatures that seemed to him like angels sharing the ceremony: He [the visitor] said: When I was at the site [of the grave] on Friday night, I found myself in a desert or great space . . . and the doors of the sky were opened, from which angels descended, vesting people with green dresses, and then flew up into the air . . . I asked: who are those who are visiting Ahmad Ibn Hanbal’s [grave], but soon I realized what had happened, and therefore I used to visit the place several times.31

Dealing with Ibn Hanbal’s legal position toward kufr and iman, alJawzi recognized that Ibn Hanbal emphasized the criterion of iman (faith) rather than dealing with the criterion of kufr. Al-Jawzi quoted Ibn Hanbal’s statement that faith depends on two related components: qawl and ‘amal – that is to say, on a verbal announcement and on practical actions.32 While the Hanbali Sufis rely on this statement to approve their conduct, including the request for intercession, Wahhabis used it to highlight the importance of actions and behavior for the belief and practice of pure monotheism, in which there is no place for any sort of shirk leads to kufr (infidelity). Unlike the Wahhabis, al-Jawzi argued that Ibn Hanbal confined the boundaries between kufr and iman in three domains. In the first place, the procla-

Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice | 121 mation of shahada – “there is no God but Allah” – is the most important pillar of belief. But this should be accompanied by two necessary criteria to save a believer from infidelity. A believer should recognize that the Qur’an is the eternal speech of God and has not been created by human hands. Therefore anyone who argues that the Qur’an was created should be considered a kafir (infidel).33 Because ‘amal (actions and behavior) is the other side of the same coin of belief, anyone who abandons prayer is a kafir who deserves to be killed: “An infidel is [a person] who abandons prayer. There are no other abandoned actions of infidelity except the abandoning of the payer. [The person] who abandoned prayer is an infidel and it is permissible to kill him.”34 In this sense, the Wahhabi concepts of kufr and iman revised those of early Hanbali scholars when they introduced a strict interpretation of shirk that was applied to exclude opponents from the community of believers. Although many of their legal and theological interpretations continued to rely on Ibn al-Jawzi, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and Al alShaykh overlooked the passage mentioned above concerning “the other abandoned actions.” Instead, they resorted to their own interpretation of selected Qur’anic verses and hadith. In this regard, any action that did not correspond to their interpretation would be considered shirk. In his reference to the spread of shirk in his time, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab condemned what he called acts of idolatry among large segments of Najdis who still sought salvation through saints. For him they were infidels and polytheists ready to seek salvation from saints.35 As discussed in Chapter 1, the early supporters of the Wahhabi creed preferred to call themselves al-Hanabila, regardless of the different approach of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab to some principal topics of Hanbaliyya. Sulayman (d. 1793), the brother of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, contested the idea that his brother’s movement constituted a separate madhhab (doctrine), emphasizing the importance of being attached to the Hanbali tradition. Perhaps this idea explains some of his reservations and even rejection of his brother’s concepts of shirk and kufr. Although he used the same methodology of his brother’s distinction between shirk akbar (greater polytheism) and shirk asghar (lesser polytheism), Sulayman was more tolerant of shirk asghar that does not harm the essence of iman. He criticized his brother’s approach, which demonstrates intolerance of shirk asghar. Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab argued that an act of shirk asghar inevitably leads to shirk akbar. Considering the veneration of holy places shirk asghar, Sulayman rejected seeing those who practice it as kuffar because they continued to fulfill the main Islamic duties. More attached to Hanbali tradition, Sulayman asked his brother from where he had drawn the idea of considering a Muslim who committed shirk

122 | Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice asghar a kafir. He argued that his brother Muhammad was obsessed with the idea that those who did not accept his concept of shirk were infidels. For Sulayman, the shahada is a door for a believer to become Muslim, and no can exclude him from the Islamic community. He protested against the Wahhabi ‘ulama who attributed the term kafir to Muslims who committed acts of shirk asghar, though they had already proclaimed the shahada.36

Radicalizing the Takfiri Discourse While Sulayman Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab adopted a “moderate” stance toward kufr, after 1803 Wahhabi scholars began to articulate a more “extremist” position regarding takfir. In this year the Wahhabis captured Mecca, Medina, and Ta’if, opening the door for the Egyptians and the Ottomans to take part in the political and military affairs of Najd. The occupation of these cities shocked not only the Ottomans but also the non-Wahhabi scholars of Hijaz who described the capture of these cities as a violation of Islamic principles and ethics, accusing the Wahhabis of demolishing sacred places. As already mentioned in Chapter 3, after the capture of these cities the Wahhabi mutawi‘a began immediately to apply their principle of purifying Islam from shrine rituals, ordering the destruction of the graves of martyrs existing in the area as holy places. According to some sources, they even dared to destroy the dome over the Prophet’s grave.37 Most of the anti-Wahhabi sources portrayed the Wahhabis as fanatics whose intrusion into Mecca, Medina, and other cities in Hijaz reflected their attitude toward their adversaries, whom they considered kuffar (infidels). An exception to the anti-Wahhabi chorus was ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti, the famous Egyptian chronicler. In his account of the capture of Mecca and Medina, the Wahhabis are portrayed as good Muslims who respected the inhabitants even though they applied their principle of purifying Islam. But when Jabarti refers to the capture of Ta’if, he confirmed the “alleged” massacre at this city, where Wahhabi forces slaughtered the men and enslaved the women and children.38 Although it is difficult to verify historical accounts of the capture of these cities in anti-Wahhabi literature, it is worth noting that the cities of Ta’if and Medina at that time were populated partly by Shiites. This may explain why al-Jabarti referred to a massacre in Ta’if. In Chapter 4 we explained that Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his son ‘Abdullah refrained from attributing the term kuffar to Shiites, labeling them rafida who should be educated according to the “pure” faith. But when the Saudis captured the cities of Hijaz, the term kuffar

Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice | 123 began to be applied to many non-Wahhabis, even to Sunnis. This may be illustrated by the position of Sulayman Ibn ‘Abdullah (1785–1818) when he compelled ‘ulama and qadis of Mecca to give their oath of allegiance to the Wahhabi creed. These ulama and qadis protested against their treatment by the Wahhabis, who referred to them as kuffar. In answer to their protest, Sulayman Ibn ‘Abdullah confirmed that the Wahhabis considered all those who do not accept their creed to be heretics: “We considered all people of our time infidels . . . except those who are loyal to our beliefs.”39 In 1815, certain non-Wahhabi chiefs and scholars from the region of al-Qasim went to Egypt to incite the Egyptians to resume their war against the Wahhabis. In two epistles that he apparently composed during the war, Sulayman Ibn ‘Abdullah elaborated further his notion of kufr, relying on the concept of hijra (emigration) and its importance to protecting believers from idolaters. This concept is based on the Qur’anic verse of al-nisa’, which refers to the Muslims who remained in Mecca after the Prophet’s hijra to Medina. Even though they claimed to be believers, they remained living among idolaters and even sided with them in the Battle of Badr against the Prophet. Some Companions expressed remorse for those who were killed by their brothers, considering them believers. But then God sent down the verse condemning their conduct: Surely the ones whom the Angels take up, (while) they are unjust to themselves (to them) (the Angels) say, “In what condition were you?” They say, “We were deemed weak in the earth.” They (the Angels) say, “Was not the earth of Allah wide so that you could have emigrated in it?” So, the abode for those (men) is Hell, and what an odious Destiny!40

Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab probably had no practical reason to elaborate the concept of hijra beyond his statement that hijra is a duty for a Muslim who may be unable to practice his faith in full under certain circumstances. Sulayman Ibn ‘Abdullah, unlike his grandfather, regarded Egyptian and Ottoman intervention as a real threat that would disintegrate the Wahhabi mission. Relying on the concept of hijra, Sulayman argued that true believers should refrain from offering loyalty to idolaters. With the same argument, he condemned the idolatrous folk who lived in Mecca, Basra, and Hasa when those areas were at war against the Wahhabis. He viewed military confrontation between Wahhabis and their enemies merely as a struggle between monotheism and polytheism.41 Furthermore, he did not hesitate to announce that a Muslim who ignores the unbelief of infidels is also an infidel:

124 | Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice If there is anyone who suspects or ignores the unbelief of the infidels, I can provide him with references from God’s book, and from the Prophet’s tradition . . . and if he continues to . . . hesitate, he is an infidel in accordance to the consensus of ‘ulama; the suspicious in the unbelief of an infidel, he himself is an infidel.42

Sulayman added that anyone who lives with infidels and accepts their infidelity commits an action of kufr.43 The land which was occupied by Egyptian troops was regarded by him as abode of unbelief. In such a political and military situation, Sulayman radicalized his arguments on takfir, dividing the world between two separate spheres, that of the Wahhabis who represent the true believers, and that of the antiWahhabis who represent the unbelievers. When the Egyptians captured the Saudi–Wahhabi center at al-Dir‘iyya, he refused to submit, considering such submission an acceptance of kufr. His consistency with takfiri discourse cost him his life, when the Egyptians executed him in 1818. The Egyptian occupation enabled the antiWahhabi ‘ulama to resume their preaching. Meanwhile the occupation opened the door for ‘ulama to leave Najd for religious studies outside Arabia. In such circumstances, ‘ulama in Najd could more freely violate the Wahhabi taboo against travel to Ottoman provinces that were considered by Sulayman Ibn ‘Abdullah the land of idolaters. From 1820 on, anti-Wahhabi scholars became a real threat to Wahhabi scholarly preaching. When the Saudi rulers, Turki and his son Faysal, began to reconsolidate their reign after the Egyptian withdrawal, Al al-Shaykh found themselves challenging the internal ‘ulama, seeing them as more threatening to the Wahhabi uniformity of discourse than opponents from outside. The two prominent ‘ulama among Al al-Shaykh, ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan and his son ‘Abd alLatif, expended much effort in purging opposition, resorting to the same takfiri arguments of Sulayman Ibn ‘Abdullah. When Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan died in 1869, Abd al-Latif became the leading scholar to guide the Wahhabi mission.44

‘Abd al-Latif’s Takfiri Discourse In Chapter 5, we dealt with ‘Abd al-Latif’s religio-political position after the death of Faysal in 1865. The death evoked a rivalry between his two sons, ‘Abdullah and Saud, on the legitimacy of succession, which was transformed into civil war during which the ‘Abd al-Latif Al al-Shaykh and the Wahhabi religious strata faced a new constellation of political and military upheavals. After 1865, ‘Abd al-Latif used

Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice | 125 all his religious prestige to attenuate and even to prevent friction between the two brothers. Between 1865 and 1876, there were eight shifts in power,45 during which ‘Abd al-Latif changed his allegiance from one ruler to another. To justify his fluctuating position, ‘Abd alLatif resorted to the principle of la Islam illa bi-jma‘a wala jama‘a illa bi-imama (“no Islam without community and no community without political rule”), which means that there is no Islam without consensus and there is no consensus without political rule. Based on the Hanbali principle of ahkam al-jama‘a (judgments of the community), which means the collective judgments of the community represented by its scholars, ‘Abd al-Latif continued to recognize any takeover of a new Saudi ruler,46 regardless of the way in which the ruler took over. In order to avoid fitna (civil strife), he argued that it was “obligatory” for the Muslim public to declare obedience to the new ruler.47 When ‘Abd al-Latif supported ‘Abdullah in 1865, he described the supporters of Saud as a “blind group” whose feuding behavior recalled the pre-Islamic period (jahiliyya).48 ‘Abd al-Latif devoted fifteen epistles to dealing with the fitna. His exhorting words were intended to prevent disunity among the Wahhabi religious strata, as he illustrated in his epistles addressed to the scholars of al-Huta’s region, urging them to avoid fitna, considering it al-musiba al-‘uzma (a great disaster).49 In his survey of the religious activities of Mashahir ‘Ulama Najd wa-Ghayruhum (The Famous Najdi Scholars and Others), ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn ‘Abd al-Latif Ibn ‘Abdullah Al al-Shaykh (a modern Wahhabi author) dedicates a great part of it to dealing with ‘Abd al-Latif’s writings against fitna among Muslims. Considering fitna disastrous factor for the unity of the Wahhabis, this modern author reiterates the arguments of ‘Abd al-Latif which placed fitna at the top of infractions against Islamic rule. The author emphasizes ‘Abd al-Latif’s references to the classical arguments against fitna, as articulated by Ibn Hubaiyra (d. 1164/5), a famous Hanbali scholar, in his book al-Mussnaf (The Classifier). ‘Abd al-Latif used the arguments of Ibn Hubaiyra to condemn the attempts of Saud and his followers to take over power in Riyadh as long as his brother was there. He admonished the supporters of Saud, notably Muhammad Ibn ‘Ayid, the leader of ‘Asir, considering them inciters of the blind and deaf acts that the Qur’an and hadith prohibit.50 However, as mentioned in Chapter 5, ‘Abd al-Latif shifted his position several times during the civil war, supporting the takeover of any of Faysal’s sons and grandsons, who were competing among themselves for power. He proved to lack consistency in his legal arguments when ‘Abdullah Ibn Faysal was assisted by Al Shammar and the

126 | Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice Ottomans to regain the control over Riyadh in 1871. Although ‘Abd al-Latif condemned the attempt to solicit the Ottoman help, considering it as an act of kufr, he justified the help of the “infidel” Ottomans in 1871, arguing that in this specific case there are no grounds for takfir due to the circumstances of fitna and the lack of knowledge of the sources of law. Certainly, this case testifies to an inconsistency in ‘Abd al-Latif’s position toward takfir. However, singling out one case and omitting many would miss the point in assessing the entire takfiri discourse of ‘Abd al-Latif and its great impact on Wahhabi scholars and ordinary people. The single case of Al Shammar evaporates when one refers to the whole picture of ‘Abd al-Latif’s takfiri discourse and to the way this discourse was transmitted to Wahhabi scholars and ordinary people, to constitute, since the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of the Wahhabi takfiri discourse which in its several vicissitude endures until today. As mentioned above, the civil war that erupted in 1865 was a turning point to locate the takfiri discourse of ‘Abd al-Latif beyond that of his father ‘Abd al-Rahman, the foremost scholar of Al alShaykh. Until that year, ‘Abd al-Rahman had taken an ambivalent position concerning the residing of a believer among unbelievers. While he condemned travel to polytheist countries for trade, considering it balwa (disaster) and naqs (deficient act) that should be avoided, ‘Abd al-Rahman emphasized that condemnation should be made without an aggressive and cursing tone (min ghayr ta‘nif wasabb).51 He also issued fatwas that permitted Muslim believers to reside amongst polytheists if they openly practice their belief and reject the idea of labeling these Muslims infidels.52 Probably ‘Abd al-Rahman took his cue from the first Wahhabi scholars to articulate an ambivalent takfiri discourse concerning the residing of a believer in a polytheist country outside the realm of Islam. Unlike his father, ‘Abd al-Latif radicalized the takfiri discourse to include all people who lived outside the realm of Wahhabism. His takfiri discourse divided the people between two extreme categories, the believers who lived under Saudi “legitimate” rule and the “others” who lived outside this rule. By reiterating the argument of Sulayman Ibn ‘Abdullah that proclaiming shahada is not sufficient to free Muslims from kufr, ‘Abd al-Latif emphasized the idea that the “uttering of al-shahadatayn [the two proclamations] does not save people from kufr, except those who know their meaning.”53 After the death of Faysal, the Wahhabi–Saudi movement confronted not only the external threat of foreigners, but also the internal danger of disintegration when several nomadic tribes revoked their allegiance to the rulers of Riyadh. After the death of Saud Ibn

Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice | 127 Faysal in 1875, ‘Abd al-Latif realized that a nomad tribal coalition had been formed against ‘Abdullah, attacking the city of Riyadh and threatening to eliminate Wahhabi rule. Alarmed by the nomad danger, ‘Abd al-Latif launched a severe verbal attack against the nomads, using the negative connotation of the term al-a‘rab as it appears in the Qur’an. The verse in sura-t-al-tawba describes them as extreme heretics and hypocrites: al-a‘rab ashad-u kufr-an wa-nifaq-an. He follows Muslim commentators who indicate that the term al-a‘rab in this verse was attributed to the inhabitants of the desert who pretended to support the Prophet, seeking profit without accepting the Muslim faith.54 Like Sulayman Ibn ‘Abdullah, ‘Abd al-Latif considered the military strife between the Wahhabis and their enemies even among Muslims as a struggle between believers and non-believers, like al-a‘rab al-fujar (the heretic a‘rab).55 In an attempt to convince scholars who sided with the tribal coalition to take an oath of allegiance to ‘Abdullah, ‘Abd al-Latif distinguished between them and the ignorant a‘rab. He also warned these scholars not to follow the guidance of those ignorant people who refused to accept allegiance to ‘Abdullah and insisted on evoking fitna. Because the behavior of a‘rab is similar to that of Shiites, the guidance of Muslims “should not be handed over to al-jahala [ignorant people] and ghawgha’ [canaille], but to al-qudat [judges] and muftis [legal ruling scholars]” who should be careful not to follow false ideas such as the belief in the anticipated imama of the Shiites.56 Al-fitna incited by these ignorant people is a satanic act accompanied by polytheist actions, which would destroy the realm of Islam.57 Probably ‘Abd al-Latif followed Sulayman’s arguments that any shirk is intolerable and should be eliminated. As mentioned above, he also supported Sulayman’s legal instruction on the concept of hijra as a sort of kufr applied to those who live under foreign rule, and Sulayman’s usage of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ as a principle for enforcing loyalty to Wahhabism and for emphasizing the necessity of disavowing creeds inconsistent with Wahhabism that would lead to polytheism (shirk).58 The significance of ‘Abd al-Latif’s interpretation of shirk lies in its practical dimension. Unlike many Wahhabi scholars, who continued until 1869 to adopt an ambivalent approach in treating polytheists, ‘Abd al-Latif broke with this approach, emphasizing that warfare is the suitable means of interacting with them. To justify his arguments, he reinterpreted not only the writings of the founder of Wahhabism, but also those of Ibn Taymiyya and other Hanbali scholars, claiming that they permitted the killing of a polytheist according to Qur’anic verse: “Surely Allah does not forgive that (anything) should be associated with him. And forgive (anything)

128 | Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice whatever apart from that for whomever He decides.”59 ‘Abd al-Latif selected passages from the writings of Ibn Taymiyya and other Hanbali scholars to conclude that his grandfather, as well as other Hanbali ‘ulama, had called for the obligation of killing polytheists.60 The Ottoman occupation of Hasa, accompanied by the British intervention, had become an imminent threat to the Muslim faith,61 propelling ‘Abd al-Latif to expand his takfiri discourse to include great segments of the masses in Najd. More than in previous times, ‘Abd al-Latif used this discourse after 1869 as the main instrument to mobilize the masses against enemies. Through the Wahhabi network of tribal chiefs, scholars, and mutawi‘s, ‘Abd al-Latif transmitted his interpretation of kufr and shirk to the masses. He issued numerous epistles focusing on the meaning of kufr and shirk, as illustrated in the two volumes of ‘Uyun al-Rasa’il. For the purpose of this chapter, it is sufficient to select some of these epistles in which ‘Abd al-Latif dichotomized the world into two groups: Wahhabi believers and their infidel enemies. In these epistles, ‘Abd al-Latif combined the notion of hijra from the land of idolaters with his takfiri discourse against the Ottomans, the rafidis (Shiites), and the franj (Westerners). The epistles chosen here were written after 1871 when Ottoman forces occupied the Shiite area of Hasa, and when the British intensified their involvement in its political affairs. Although ‘Abd al-Latif supported ‘Abdullah Ibn Faysal, he expressed an uncompromising position against ‘Abdullah’s relationship with the Ottomans or the Westerners. In this sense, he even contested the fatwas of his father ‘Abd alRahman that permitted Muslim believers to reside among unbelievers if they openly practiced their belief. ‘Abd al-Latif averred that heretic “groups have gained control over Hasa in which shirk, kufr, rafd [Shi‘ism], Western religion and other creeds of unbelief have prevailed.” Residing in this country for trade and work was not compatible with “the true Islam, belief and religion.” A Muslim who resides in such country is “a fasiq [sinner] whom God does not save” and should be harshly punished in accordance with the Qur’an.62 In many of these epistles written after 1871, ‘Abd al-Latif used to label the Ottomans, Shiites, and British in Hasa polytheists, warning Muslims of Najd against contact with them. Without presenting his legal justification, he brought a charge of shirk against the Najdi Muslims who resided for a while in Hasa, considering them collaborators with the polytheist forces in the area. Probably ‘Abd al-Latif was aware that some Wahhabi scholars misinterpreted his father’s legal ruling concerning the issue of residing among polytheists. To convince these scholars to change their minds, ‘Abd al-Latif addressed some of these epistles to Hamad Ibn ‘Atiq, the authoritative scholar

Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice | 129 among them, urging him to adopt a similar stance vis-à-vis residing in a country of polytheists and to struggle against their Najdi collaborators. While ‘Abd al-Latif expressed great esteem for Ibn ‘Atiq, whom he considered al-‘alama al-thiqa fi al-‘aqida (the authoritative scholar in the creed),63 he urged him to manifest a more uncompromising stance against the polytheists in Najd who took sides with their enemies. Realizing that many people had accepted residing in areas under the occupation of polytheists, ‘Abd al-Latif advised Ibn ‘Atiq to condemn those Najdis who represented the majority in the area: Most of the people did not recognize [the truth]: by not recognizing [the truth], they manifested loyalty to the polytheist troops [of the Ottomans and the British], relying on them, traveling to their countries and accepting their heresies . . . the people of Najd fall under the trick of Satan. They went too far and reached the stage of accepting submission to the most infidel . . . who combined polytheism and denouncing the divine character of God.64

It seems that Ibn ‘Atiq followed the instruction of his teacher because he took a similar position to that of Sulayman Ibn ‘Abdullah concerning the notion of al-wala’ wa-l-bara’, which would induce a radical stance against opponents to be considered infidels.65 While ‘Abd al-Latif was launching his attack against the Najdis who were willing to reside in areas under the occupation of the infidels, he extended the land of infidels to include many areas outside Najd. He claimed that people in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Hadarmawt, Yemen, and especially Hijaz had fallen under polytheism when they accepted the religious and political order of the infidels.66 Enumerating the groups and lands of the infidels, ‘Abd al-Latif expressed criticism of the heretical inclination of the Shiite sects. Like many Wahhabi scholars, he returned to Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s treatise Risala fi al-Radd ‘ala al-Rafida, dressing it with a new interpretation in which he enumerated the “heretical characteristics” of all the Shiite sects, placing them outside Islam.67 He portrayed the Shiites of Iraq as practicing a faith similar to that of the Christians. According to him, “the only thing that remains for the Shiites to become Christians is to postulate Jesus instead of their imams.”68 Many Sunni scholars have used ‘ahd ‘umar, and stories from the early Islamic period, to show that ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab instructed Muslims to grant the Christians fair and good treatment. Unlike these scholars, ‘Abd al-Latif presented another picture that illustrates the animosity of ‘Umar toward the Christians. In this regard, he probably was inspired by the extreme stance of Sulayman Ibn ‘Abdullah vis-à-

130 | Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice vis the Christians. The latter relied on a story from the early history of Islam when Abu Musa al-Ash‘ari, accompanied by his scribe, met ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab. When the latter realized that the scribe did not enter the mosque, he asked the reason. Abu Musa al-Ash‘ari answered that his scribe was a Christian. ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab then expressed his anger, urging him to keep away from the Christians because “God had moved them away and humiliated them.”69 The influence of ‘Abd al-Latif’s takfiri discourse continued after his death, both in terms of his religious interpretations and in its spread among the masses of the Wahhabis. This discourse had rooted the concept of a dichotomy between the Saudi–Wahhabi political entity and the “others,” including not only Christians and Shiites but also Sunnis and even Wahhabis who accepted military assistance from infidels or lived under the rule of enemies. This takfiri discourse is evident at many junctures of Saudi–Wahhabi history. After the death of ‘Abd al-Latif in 1876, his son ‘Abdullah took his father’s position as leader of the Wahhabi religious establishment. Until his death in 1920, ‘Abdullah represented the generational bridge between the Second and the Third Saudi States. Because this period was crucial in Saudi– Wahhabi history, ‘Abdullah probably adopted at the beginning of this period the same dichotomy that divided the world between the Wahhabis, as the monotheists, and “others,” as the infidels. ‘Abdullah’s takfiri discourse may be exemplified by his attitude toward the Rashidis, who, since 1876, posed a great threat to the sway of Saudi–Wahhabi religious and political influence. Although the Rashidis did not expel Wahhabi scholars from their religious positions in Najd and showed a certain tolerance toward their preaching, ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abd al-Latif viewed the Rashidi takeover in Najd in 1891 as undermining Wahhabism. To mobilize his supporters, ‘Abdullah called upon them to apply the duty of fighting against the Rashidis as infidels and enemies of monotheism because they sought the military assistance of the Ottomans. The relative tolerance of the Rashidis toward Wahhabism lasted until 1897 when the anti-Wahhabi ‘ulama attempted to persuade the Rashidi ruler to curtail Wahhabi influence by taking action against ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abd al-Latif, accusing him and his followers of judging the common folk to be infidels with insufficient cause. The anti-Wahhabi ‘ulama claimed that Najd was full of people who considered ‘Abdullah the most authoritative religious figure and who deemed anyone who disagreed with him to be an infidel. The hostile attitude of the anti-Wahhabi ‘ulama did not change the position of the Rashidis, who continued to be tolerant toward the Wahhabi doctrine, and some of them even embraced its views on the proper form of worship. At the beginning

Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice | 131 of the twentieth century, when the Rashidi family was split into rival factions, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Saud, the new leader of the family, seized the opportunity in 1902 to restore their power in Najd, where Wahhabism was rooted among ‘ulama and the masses.70 Like other Saudi leaders in the nineteenth century ‘Abd al-‘Aziz put his stamp on the religious guidance of Al al-Shaykh to consolidate his new rule and to inject new energy into Wahhabism. However, ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abd al-Latif and other Wahhabi ‘ulama found themselves compromising the new order, They abstained from criticizing ‘Abd al-‘Aziz when he abandoned the restriction on travel to “the land of idolaters”. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz sent his sons on diplomatic missions abroad, surrounding himself with Arab advisers from the Ottoman provinces, and inviting Westerners into Najd to assist in its economic development. He abstained from treating the Shiites as idolaters when his forces recaptured Hasa. Although this tolerant policy toward Shiites and Christians enabled ‘Abd al-‘Aziz to consolidate his rule in many parts of Arabia, it invited opposition from radical elements of Ikhwan, whom he himself had created and who were mobilized by the Wahhabi ‘ulama from the tribal population of Najd. The takfiri discourse of ‘Abdullah and his father ‘Abd al-Latif was transmitted to Ikhwan, who enforced strict adherence to Wahhabi attitudes toward groups considered idolaters. At the beginning of the 1920s, emissaries of Ikhwan arrived in Hasa with the intention of dealing with its Shiite population as idolaters. The devotion of Ikhwan to the strict conception of the line dividing believers from infidels contradicted the policy of ‘Abd al-‘Aziz and led to a rebellion of Ikhwan against their own creator. From the First World War until 1930, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz formed alliances with the British, who brought him arms and funds for his struggle against his enemies in Arabia. Ikhwan regarded ‘Abd al‘Aziz’s contacts with the Christians as kufr. Representing part of the masses devoted to the takfiri discourse transmitted by the Wahhabi ‘ulama and their army of mutawi‘a, the Ikhwan revolted against ‘Abd al-‘Aziz.71 Although the latter overcame the opposition of Ikhwan and continued his “pragmatic” policy, the takfiri discourse has remained alive among large segments of the masses and religious scholars until today, though some Saudi kings and princes sometimes denounced it.

The Wahhabi Notion of Kufr versus Other Islamic Notions of Kufr Assessing the peculiarity of Wahhabi notion of kufr requires examination of the meaning of kufr as interpreted by some classical and

132 | Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice modern Muslim scholars. Throughout the history of Islam, various religious and theological schools have emerged, suggesting different interpretations of the Qur’an and hadith. ‘Ulama of each school claimed that they represented the ideal of return to the “true faith” of the pious al-salaf, dissociating themselves from the innovation (bida‘) introduced by ‘ulama of other schools. In many cases, religious and theological debate among ‘ulama of these Islamic schools took a form of mutual excommunication. In the light of what has been written on this issue, one can argue that the salafi ideal has always existed, though the terms salafi and salafiyya in modern times are used to label Islamic movements that call for purifying the Islamic faith and establishing more rigid religious criteria to challenge innovations introduced by modernity. However, since the nineteenth century, some Muslim scholars have launched their attacks against the fossilized version of Islam articulated by official scholars. In this attack, they called for a return to the “model” of first generation embodied by the Prophet and his companions. This modern return endowed the term salafiyya with new connotations, which emphasized its implications for reforming modern Islamic society. Thus modern salafi scholars have seen themselves as redeeming the meaning of salafiyya from its medieval version. Although several salafi movements have emerged since the end of the nineteenth century, the takfiri discourse of some salafi movements, in recent decades, has come close to that of Wahhabism. This also explains why Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia have sponsored many salafi movements, through which they have attempted to spread their Islamic ideals in many parts of the world.72 As mentioned above, the emergence of Wahhabism in the eighteenth century, its expansion into the holy places in Hijaz at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and its military penetration into Syria and Iraq challenged not only the Ottoman government, but also ‘ulama in Damascus, Baghdad, and other Muslim cities. Many of these ‘ulama considered the Wahhabis innovators whose religious creed was a deviation from the “true faith.” On the other hand, the Wahhabis rejected the erudition of their adversary ‘ulama, accusing them of being blind imitators within the framework of madhahib (religious schools) instead of being attached to the Qur’an and hadith. Wahhabi religious criticism was more severe against the religious rituals and practices of the Sufis and against the ritual acts of sanctuary cults. As result of Wahhabi military expansion, ‘ulama in Damascus began to express great concern over the Wahhabi takfir notion. Muhammad Amin ‘Abidin, known as Ibn ‘Abidin (1784–1836), the most prominent Hanafi scholar in Damascus, considered Wahhabism

Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice | 133 the most dangerous religious movement to menace Islam, because it charged all Sunnis except themselves with takfir. Ibn ‘Abidin labelled Wahhabis with the term Khawarij, considering them bughah (rebels) against Islam.73 The principle of takfir that was applied by Wahhabism against their adversaries aroused not only ‘ulama from the Hanafi, Shafi‘, and Maliki schools of law, but also the Hanbali ‘ulama. Probably the most eloquent exponent of such opposition came from Hasan al-Shatti (1790–1858), the leading scholar of Hanbalism in Damascus. His sons and grandson continued to oppose Wahhabism’s idea of takfir. Hasan al-Shatti dealt extensively with the Wahhabi notion of takfir in order to refute its shar‘i justification. The Wahhabis probably attempted to gain the support of Hasan al-Shatti when they sent him an epistle in which they presented their arguments against the principle of seeking intercession (tawassul) through intermediaries between Muslims and their God. The Wahhabi epistle disapproved of such a principle, declaring that any Muslim who seeks intercession should be considered kafir (an unbeliever) and should be put to the sword. Hasan al-Shatti categorically rejected the Wahhabi permission to shed Muslim blood under the pretext of takfir. He argued that the Wahhabi interpretation of takfir stems from a misunderstanding of the scriptures and was evidence of ignorance and bad faith. In his view, by accusing believers of infidelity the Wahhabis themselves became infidels.74 The Hanbali scholars of the Shatti family remained faithful to the religious ideas of their grandfather Hasan, manifesting their opposition to Wahhabism.75 For example, Mustafa al-Shatti (1855–1929), one of the grandsons of Hasan, was active during a period when Wahhabism regained its force under ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abd al-Latif Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman and other ‘ulama of Al al-Shaykh at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. Mustafa composed a special book, al-Nuqul al-Shar‘iyya fi al-Radd ‘ala al-Wahhabiyya, to refute the religious arguments of Wahhabism and to defend Sufi practices. It is worth noting that Mustafa, despite his devotion to Hanbaliyya, dared to criticize Ibn Taymiyya’s attacks on Sufi practices. Mustafa directed his severe criticism against two concepts of Wahhabism, that of shirk (association of others with God) and that of bid‘a (innovation), that lead to kufr. To refute the Wahhabi concepts, Mustafa made a distinction between two meanings of shirk, the literal sense of idolatry, and a covert one when a human being forgets his Creator. According to him, the legal ruling, approved by ijma‘, forbids declaring a Muslim a kafir (an infidel) even if he commits kabira (a grave offence). Thus it is obvious that Islamic shari‘a does not rule that those seeking the intercession of a prophet or a saint are

134 | Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice infidels as long as these seekers recognize that the real power behind them is God. He emphasized that no one can declare a man an infidel without verifying his belief. For him the Wahhabis commit a grave deviation when they overlook the instruction of the Islamic shari‘a. In a similar way, Mustafa distinguished between two concepts of bid‘a. The first is related to a religious addition to Islamic faith and worship that has no basis in the shari‘a. The second innovation pertains to custom, which would be commendable if it serves the believer to deepen his belief in God. Because Wahhabis do not distinguish between the two concepts of bid‘a (innovation), they themselves fail to escape from bida‘ (innovations).76 The polemic of the Damascene ‘ulama against Wahhabism is one example of the many Muslim scholars who argue that the Wahhabis’ concept of takfir is the main principle that characterizes their doctrine. As mentioned above, the Wahhabi concept of takfir reminds some Sunni ‘ulama of the attitude of the Khawarij vis-à-vis other Muslims in the early stages of Islam. The Wahhabi scholars, like the Khawarij scholars, claimed that they rely on Qur’anic verses and hadith that distinguish between ahl al-iman, who will be rewarded with complete happiness, and ahl al-kufr, who deserve punishment and torment and are doomed to hell. This distinction became a basis for the dispute between different Muslim scholars from the first fitna in (656–61) that led to schism between Sunna, Shi‘a, and Khawarij.77 The Khawarij – whose name derives from the verb kharaj (“went out”) – became a powerful group which emphasized, more than other groups, the distinction between ahl al-iman and ahl al-kufr. Based on this distinction, the Khawari scholars used to label anyone who rejected their dictates kafir (infidel). At the political level, the Khawarij considered that the Sunni rulers were illegitimate and that they should be resisted in order to restore legitimacy to Islam. On a moral level, they declared that a kafir is one who has committed kabira (a greater sin) and deserves to be killed.78 Some Sunni scholars criticized the Wahhabis through the legal concept of the Khawarij concerning takfir. Since the first Islamic schism, when Khawarij contested the legitimacy of Sunni established scholarship, takfir was a controversial issue. Many classical Islamic ‘ulama expressed their concern that practicing excommunication of other Muslims would penetrate into the public sphere, out of ‘ulama control. Like the classical ‘ulama, Sunni ‘ulama from the eighteenth century devoted considerable energy to refuting Wahhabism’s claims and interpretations, considering it a movement of schism. The attacks came out from several modern ‘ulama, some of them belonging to Salafi thought.79

Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice | 135 Ever since the rise of Wahhabism, those who call themselves Salafis have continued to debate among themselves to define the “true” Salafiyya. All of them rely on Qur’an and hadith. However, based on the Qur’an and hadith, one can discern that kufr versus iman is not always clear because Islam leaves a special place for tawba (repentance), which is more often mentioned in the Qur’an than kufr. The Qur’an repeats that tawba is always accepted, although it denounces those who keep rejecting the faith: Except (the ones) who repent and act righteously and ascertain the evidence; then, to those I relent, and I am The Superbly Relenting, The Ever-Merciful . . . Surely (the ones) who have disbelieved and die (while) they are steadfast disbelievers, upon those is the curse of Allah and the Angels and mankind all together.80

The notion of takfir developed in Muslim–Arabic discourse when ‘ulama began to engage in polemics over the meaning of kufr, kuffar in the Qur’an. Although the noun takfir itself does not appear in the Qur’an, it was derived from the noun kufr and from the verb kafar. Takfir, then, had become the habitual action of declaring a person kafir (an unbeliever) for his “false faith” and sometimes for bad behaviour that contradicts the shari‘a (Islamic law). In some cases, the act of takfir legalizes the killing of a kafir under the accusation of kufr. Apart from Khawarij, who launched a jihad (sacred war) against those whom they considered kuffar, it seems that Muslims in the early stages of Islam restrained themselves from declaring war immediately against other Muslims considered kuffar. They always gave room for repentance and they permitted fighting as a last resort. It seems also that attributing the term kafir to a Muslim raised controversial debate among the Muslim ‘ulama on the legal basis of kufr.81 The Encyclopaedia of Islam entry on takfir traces the origin of the term in the Arabic language to before and after the rise of Islam. According to the author of the entry, the meaning of kafir and kufr came from the verb kafar, which means “to reject.” The Qur’an applies the terms kafir to a man who rejects the truth. However, the original meaning of the verb kafar in classical Arabic before the rise of Islam is “to cover,” such as to say that a peasant covers (kafar) the seeds in the land or a knight covers (kafar) his body with weapons. Similarly, the ancient Arabs described the water of rivers, seas, and oceans as kufr (coverage) that hides everything they contain inside the water.82 This original meaning is illustrated in the Qur’an itself (57:20), where the verb kafar is used to describe a man who covers his faith like covering seeds within the soil: “Know that the present life is

136 | Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice playing and diversion, and diversion, and an adornment, and a cause for mutual multiplying in riches and children. It is as the likeness of succoring (rain) whose growth (looks) wonderful to the steadfast disbelievers [kuffar].”83 From this original meaning, kafir began to bear further connotation of an infidel who does not expose his true faith but covers it, although he declares his belief in Islam. A further philological development equates the term kafir in Arabic with the term “infidel” in the European languages that derives it from the Latin word infidelis, which was attributed to those who do not believe in religion. However, comparing Islam with the Roman Catholic Church suggests that there are some similarities in the usages of kafir and “infidel.” The Catholic Church used to attribute the term to a person who does not believe in the divinity of Jesus. Like shahada in the case of Islam, the ceremony of baptism is the formal act to enter Christianity. However, some Sunni “moderate” ‘ulama argue that an overt manifestation of Islam through the shahada is sufficient guarantee of true belief. Unlike Wahhabis, these ‘ulama are more careful and do not use kuffar to describe Muslims of other doctrines. In this sense, moderate ‘ulama treat deviant Sunnis and even non-Sunnis in the same way that the Roman Catholic Church treats other Christian sects. The Catholic Encyclopedia refers to this issue in these words: As in ecclesiastical language those who by baptism have received faith in Jesus Christ and have pledged Him their fidelity and called the faithful, so the name infidel is given to those who have not been baptized. The term applies not only to all who are ignorant of the true God, such as pagans of various kinds, but also to those who adore Him but do not recognize Jesus Christ, as Jews, Mohammedans; strictly speaking it may be used of catechumens also, though in early ages they were called Christians; for it is only through baptism that one can enter into the ranks of the faithful. Those however who have been baptized but do not belong to the Catholic Church, heretics and schismatics of divers confessions are not called infidels but nonCatholics.84

Unlike the moderates, some radical ‘ulama argue that shahada is insufficient to recognize a person as a Muslim when it “covers” alien beliefs by which he deviates from Islam, placing him in the realm of kufr. In this sense, kafir would be anyone who claims to be Muslim but is still impure.85 Thus, in certain Muslim countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Yemen, Sudan, and Afghanistan, ‘ulama use takfir as a religious tool of accusation that can sometimes lead to the execution of the alleged kafir. Although the Qur’an differentiates between the

Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice | 137 two concepts of kufr and iman, there is no unequivocal shar‘i (legal) ruling on which ‘ulama can rely to demarcate the boundaries between these concepts. However, relying on surrat al-kafirun (no. 109) and other Qur’anic verses, ‘ulama generally distinguish between four concepts of kufr: kufr al-tawhid (infidelity that comes from polytheism), kufr al-juhud (infidelity that comes from denial), kufr al-mu‘anda (infidelity that comes from intransigence), and kufr al-nifaq (infidelity that comes from hypocrisy).86 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to elaborate on the Islamic literature that deals with these four types of kufr. Our concern, however, focuses on Wahhabi takfiri thought and its political and religious implications. As discussed in the previous chapters, Wahhabi scholars placed tawhid at the center of their religious creed, considering many rituals practiced by non-Wahhabis to be manifestations of shirk that leads to kufr. More than in the early period of Wahhabism, Al al-Shaykh and their supporters among the Wahhabi ‘ulama used the weapon of takfir to challenge the rise of religious opposition that intensified after 1818, and more notably after 1840. To reestablish their religious and political legitimacy, they resorted more often than before to takfir, combining all the forms of kufr with kufr al-tawhid. They used to quote Qur’anic verses that express explicitly the combination between all sorts of kufr, such as the following: Surely, the ones who have disbelieved, it is equal to them whether you have warned them or have not warned them, they do not believe.87 So, remember me (God), (and) I will remember you; and give thanks to me; and do not disbelieve me.88

Verses interpreted by traditional Muslim scholars as manifestations of kufr al-juhud and kufr al-nifaq were placed within the realm of kufr al-tawhid, such as the following verse: And as soon as a Book came to them from the Providence Allah sincerely (verifying) what was with them – and they earlier prayed for an opening (victory) over the ones who disbelieved yet, as soon as there came to them what they recognized, they disbelieved in it; so the curse of Allah is on the disbelievers.89

Although all Muslim scholars differentiate between kufr and iman, some of them still reject the Wahhabi interpretation, arguing that the demarcation between them is a matter to be decided by God on the Day of Judgment, and that no one has a monopoly on the issue besides Him.

138 | Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice Even some of the “extremist” scholars in modern Islam were careful not to follow the Wahhabi example in attributing the term kafir to Muslims who declare shahada. For example, the Islamic “extremist” thinker Abu al-‘Alaa’ al-Mawdudi (1903–79) argues that only God has the power and right to decide who is a kafir.90 Although al-Mawdudi showed some sympathy toward the Saudis and even helped them to establish the Islamic University of Medina in 1962, his notion of takfir is different from that of Wahhabis. He articulates this notion in his famous article “Fitnat al-Takfir” (Mischief of Takfir), which was published in Tarjuman al-Qur’an in 1935. Thanks to its importance for understanding modern Islam, the article was translated into English by Dr. Zahid ‘Aziz and published in the Light & Islamic Review in 1996. Because takfiri scholars misinterpret Qur’anic verses, al-Mawdudi argues that hadith contains the best response for refuting such misinterpretation and for advocating his argument against takfiris. Quoting passages from hadith, he argues that declaring a believing Muslim a kafir contradicts the principles of Islam. Accusing a believer of being a kafir is an act that rebounds against the accuser himself. Consulting Sahih al-Bukhari and Hadith of Muslim, al-Mawdudi describes an unjust action of takfir as an act of killing a believer.91 Al-Mawdudi argues that as long as a person does not deny his basic obligation in accordance with the five pillars, it is forbidden to call him a kafir. He follows the hadith narrated by Anas Ibn Malik and mentioned in Sunan Abu Dawud. According to this, the Prophet said, Three things are the roots of faith; to refrain from (killing) a person who utters: “there is no god but Allah.” And not to declare him unbeliever, whatever sin he commits. And not to excommunicate him from Islam for his any action. And jihad will be performed continuously since the day Allah sent me as a prophet until the day the last member of my community will fight with the dajjal [Antichrist]. The tyranny of any tyrant and the justice of any just (ruler) will not invalidate it. One must have faith in Divine decree.92

Despite the explicit indications that hadith instructs Muslims to be more careful in judging kufr, it seems that Muslim ‘ulama, throughout the history of Islam, have used takfir as an instrument for political purposes. In many cases, it is sufficient to rely on a fatwa (legal ruling) of an “authoritative” Muslim scholar to issue a verdict that places a man or woman outside iman and within the realm of kufr. In this sense, takfiri discourse reflects the close interrelations of politics and religion. Meanwhile, takfir has become not only the result of such interrelations, but also a cause for hindering the separation of politics and religion.

Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice | 139

The Significance of Transmitting Takfiri Discourse to the Masses Although the takfiri discourse of the Wahhabi ‘ulama has frequently fluctuated, according to context, its importance stems from the fact that they succeeded in transmitting it to the public mind of the masses beyond the strata of the official Wahhabi ‘ulama. Successive events that occurred at the end of the nineteenth century rooted this discourse, which the Saudi princes and kings attempted to contain. As mentioned above, the revolt of Ikhwan in the 1920s exemplified the force of takfiri discourse among the masses. Another good example of the impact of the takfiri discourse on the masses is the appearance of a new movement of Ikhwan in the 1960s under the name al-Jama‘a al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba, a group that calls for Islamic sahwa (awakening). It attempted to promote a purified Wahhabism and to restore the principle of Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong according to the Wahhabi tradition. Inspired by the takfiri discourse of the nineteenth century and the first movement of Ikhwan in the 1920s, the new movement of al-Jama‘a al-Salafiyya established its religious organization in Medina to contest the internal and external policies of the Saudis and the official religious establishment. The activity of the movement reached its peak when one of its groups led by Juhayman al-‘Utaybi seized the Grand Mosque in 1979.93 In this regard, it is necessary to ask, does takfir indeed characterize traditional and modern Wahhabi–Saudi politics? Certainly the story of what has occurred from the emergence of the Wahhabi–Saudi movement in the eighteenth century until the present is so broad and multifaceted that it needs more than one section of a chapter. As a simple answer to this question, one can argue that certain factors indicate that takfir has continued to be one of the fundamental features of Wahhabi–Saudi thought and practice. It is sufficient to follow some of the recent fatwas – issued by Al al-Shaykh and other Wahhabi ‘ulama – to testify to the presence of takfir in political and religious discourse in Saudi Arabia since the nineteenth century.94 In their attempt to understand the causes of the event of 9/11 and the crisis in the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the West, some Western researchers have linked Wahhabi ideology to the radical movement of al-Qaeda whose members committed one of the most awful crimes in modern history. Although some of these researchers point out that there is no single straight line leading from Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his successors to Osama Bin Laden, they argue that Wahhabism provided the milieu in which al-Qaeda grew up and was an essential part of its formation, and that its tradition has furnished the extremist

140 | Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice ideological tools for al-Qaeda. Although the Saudi kings and princes are trying to clip the wings of the most radical elements, they cannot, however, eradicate the basic components of Wahhabi tradition and cannot afford to break with the extremist official ‘ulama, because Wahhabism is still the kingdom’s raison d’être.95 Madawi al-Rasheed argues that any attempt to reduce extremist Islamist movements in modern times to the influence of Wahhabism would be misleading, though Wahhabi ‘ulama continue to use takfiri concepts on certain occasions according to political circumstances.96 However, she admits that the Saudi regime was founded on the excommunication of other Muslims. Saudi official ‘ulama under state patronage have practiced takfir al-mujtama‘ (the excommunication of the whole of society) since the nineteenth century.97 According to her, the official Saudi ‘ulama in the twentieth century have continued to rely on the Wahhabi legacy to consolidate the political realm, using three mechanisms: hijra (migration), takfir (excommunication), and jihad (struggle in the way of God). These three mechanisms are based on religious concepts that were conducive to domesticating the population and ensuring total control over the public sphere. Hijra is a boundary-drawing mechanism that requires an individual to migrate to the realm of the pious state established by Wahhabi efforts. The tradition was invoked in the eighteenth century to distinguish between the realm created in central Arabia and other provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The second mechanism deployed in consolidating and expanding the political realm was excommunication. The practice of takfir was always directed against those whose practice of Islam does not correspond to that defined by the state ‘ulama. These latter not only controlled social and religious “deviance,” as defined by Wahhabi interpretation, but also intruded into the political realm under the pretext of correcting the blasphemy of others. In Wahhabi interpretation, jihad was defined and executed in several ways, violence being only one of them. While most Wahhabi scholars believed in peaceful da‘wa (propagation of the doctrine), they favored wars of jihad against a whole range of so-called infidels, a category that included several Muslim groups.98 Although the mechanisms mentioned above are useful to analyze the religious and political instruments through which the Wahhabi– Saudi leaders consolidated and expanded their control over the population of the Saudi states from the eighteenth century, it seems that the concepts of hijra and jihad have always stemmed from the Wahhabi concept of kufr. They became integral components of takfiri discourse that were gradually reshaped according to the moral objectives and religious reforms envisaged by Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd

Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice | 141 al-Wahhab and later by his successors (Al al-Shaykh). These later scholars addressed their religious message to Muslims, calling upon them to adhere to the “true” Islam purified of taqlid (imitation) and rituals that alienated Muslims from tawhid and led them to shirk. As mentioned above, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab depicted the case of polytheism in his time as a more dangerous phenomenon than at the beginning of the Islamic period, and the polytheists of his time were more numerous than the kuffar (infidels) at the time when the Prophet began to propagate Islam.99 As mentioned above, until the beginning of the nineteenth century, it seems that takfiri discourse, as reflected in Wahhabi treatises and legal interpretations, had mainly focused on moral objectives and religious reforms. This discourse evolved through the influence of a group of ‘ulama who revived the traditional polemic on the subject when they evoked the difference between taqlid (imitation) and purity in Islam. Similar to ahl al-hadith in the eighth, ninth, and tenth centuries, Wahhabi ‘ulama at this stage integrated takfir within their general writings on tathir al-i‘tiqad (purifying the faith). Their legal exegesis was transmitted to their disciples in the form of essays known by the name of masa’il. One can assume that it was difficult to transmit masa’il, which was written in the literary language, to large segments of people who suffered from a twofold problem: diglossia and illiteracy. In this sense, the religious ideas of masa’il had a limited effect outside the ‘ulama sphere. Nevertheless, it seems that the intensive religious activities of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his Al al-Shaykh successors found ways to transmit religious ideas to the masses. Doubtless, Wahhabism could not have crystallized as a religious movement without the geopolitical, social, and cultural factors that have already been discussed in previous chapters. But the way of transmitting religious preaching was a decisive factor in expanding its realm among the populace. It reminds us of the ways in which the major doctrines of Islam were transmitted among the populace. In this respect, it is sufficient to refer to early Hanbali doctrine, out of which Wahhabism emerged as an offshoot. In his article “From Scholarly Circles to Mass Movement: The Formation of Legal Communities in Islamic Societies,” Nimrod Hurvitz investigates the role played by al-Hasan Ibn ‘Ali al-Barbahari (d. 940), one of the prominent Hanbali scholars whose way of transmitting religious ideas transformed Hanbalism into a mass movement. Al-Barbahari presented his legal exegesis in a book under the title Sharh al-Sunna (Explanation of the Sunna) through which he peppered his explanation of legal issues with stinging remarks that placed not only non-Sunni doctrines such as the

142 | Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice Shi‘a but also other Sunni groups outside “pure” Islam. But when alBarbahari’s religious ideas were transmitted to the masses, they began to take another shape, portraying such doctrines in an extremely negative light that placed them in the realm of kufr. To expand his intellectual activism beyond scholarly circles, al-Barbahari himself engaged in the mobilization of the masses. Through volunteer agents, al-Barbahari introduced his theological ideas and his moral codes to the common people, which led to a process of extremism. His puritanical and intolerant attitude won the admiration of the populace toward Hanbalism and caused the outbreak of violent action against non-Hanbalis.100 In his discussion, Hurvitz does not elaborate further to include the attitude of al-Barbahari and his supporters among the populace toward the issue of takfir. However, his analysis of transmitting religious ideas to the masses is useful for understanding the way in which Wahhabism inculcated the concept of takfir among its supporters. Although it is difficult to know how the Wahhabi takfiri ideas were transmitted, one can assume that the populace received religious ideas through a simple spoken language and through slogans. It seems that Wahhabis used to mobilize the populace for their cause through oral transmission rather than through written literature. In oral transmission, terms such as kufr and iman would bear different connotations than in written language. Because the illiterate populace had no access to the written language, they were more susceptible to simplistic notions of religious concepts such as kufr and iman. Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his successors, Al al-Shaykh, succeeded in inducing among the masses of their supporters the conviction that they represented the faithful Muslims defending Islam against their alleged opponents, who would be placed in the realm of kufr.

Epilogue: Religion and State in Islam and the Saudi–Wahhabi Case The Features of the Islamic State in Historical Perspective This Epilogue delineates topics which are not fully consistent with the main thrust of this book. It focuses on subjects beyond the historical survey presented in the previous six chapters which describe and analyze the mechanisms that enabled the Saudi–Wahhabi movement and state to survive. It deals with the interrelation between politics and religion in the successive Saudi–Wahhabi states, in comparison with other Islamic states throughout history. It pays special attention to this interrelation in Islamic thought and its impact on the history of the Islamic states. It is a sort of synthesis that summarizes the modern literature dealing with state and religion in Islam. It also summarizes theories concerning the difference between the Islamic and the Western state. Although based mainly on secondary sources, this epilogue sheds lights on religious and political mechanisms that have determined the main characteristics of the interrelationship between religion and state in modern Saudi Arabia. Muslim ‘ulama generally pinpoint several Qur’anic verses that testify to the closely intertwined relationship between religion and state. They quote verses that refer to the religio-political ruler embodied by the Caliph, the successor of the Prophet, and to the duty of Muslims to obey their rulers, such as the following verse: “And (remember) when your Lord said to the angel: Surely I am going to make on earth a khalifa [Caliph]” (Sura-t al-Baqara, 30). On the duty of obedience to the ruler, they rely on this verse: O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger, and the ones endowed with the command among you. So in case you contend together on anything, then refer to Allah and the Messenger,

144 | Epilogue in case you believe in Allah and the Last Day; that is most charitable and fairest in interpretation. (Surat al-Nisa’, 59)

In addition, they refer to the Qur’anic concept of mulk, through which they reinforce their notion of state and religion. In this regard, they rely on two verses. The first refers to the mulk of God: “Whatever is in the heaven and what ever in the earth extols to Allah to Him belongs the mulk [kingdom], and Him be the praise, and He is the ever-determiner over everything” (Surat al-Taghabun, 1). The second verse says, And He is (The one) Who created the heaven and earth with the truth; and the day He says “Be!” and it is. His saying is the truth, and His is the mulk [kingdom] the Day the Trumpet will be blown; He is the knower of unseen and witnessed; and He is the Ever-Wise, the EverCognizant. (Surat al-An‘am, 73)

These two verses suggest that the Qur’anic term mulk encompasses the whole of God’s creation in heaven and earth. Mulk is not parallel to the concept of authority developed by Roman law that led to the division between mundane and spiritual authorities in the West. From its onset in the seventh century, until the tenth century, official Muslim ‘ulama have relied on these verses in order to endow the Caliphs with mundane and religious power. Certainly, Muslim ‘ulama could use these verses as ideological means in order to justify rulers’ authority. However, a thorough investigation of the relationship between religion and state should look for other factors beyond these two verses. Some theorists place this relationship within the sociology of religion and civilization. One of these theorists is Elman Rogers Service, who studied Latin American Indian ethnology, which led him to investigate the social systems and the rise of the state. Service refers to four levels of political organization: hunter-gatherers, tribes, chiefdoms, and states. His classification sheds light on the role of religion in the development of the first Islamic state, which emerged within a tribal society. According to him, religious changes precede the rise of state institutions when an organized religion is involved.1 Taking his cue from Service, Bassam Tibi elaborates on the subject from the point view of the monotheistic religion of Islam, arguing that for “sociologists of religion, monotheism signifies the proclamation of a comprehensive and unique source of [the Caliph’s] authority. This monotheistic claim must leave its imprint on the political order established within this context.”2 Tibi finds the assessment of Marshall G. S. Hodgson supportive of his interpretation, quoting the following passage:

Epilogue | 145 The political structure which Muhammad built was by now clearly a state structure like the states in the nations round about Arabia with an increasingly authoritative government, which could no longer be ignored with impunity. Muhammad sent out envoys who taught the Qur’an and the principles of Islam, collected the zakat, and presumably arbitrated disputes so as to keep the peace and prevent feuding.3

Although Tibi accepts this assessment, which sees the early Islamic model of state-organized and united Islamic community through religion, he notices that the tribal structure of the society led to a division which later became the salient feature of the Islamic state. Thus the general hypothesis that the social establishment of organized, monotheistic religion accompanies the grounding of a strong central state has to be modified with regard to Islamic history. Although religion had functioned as a force uniting the Islamic community, the Islamic state, from its inception, had a fragile structure because it failed to dissolve the problem of tribal division.4 One can add to this tribal division an ethnic one as a factor of this fragility. The rise of the Shiite Kurdish or Persian Buyid dynasty (1055–1194) – also known the Buwahid dynasty – and the rise of Turkish Suljuqs (1055–1194) testify to the separation between the temporal rule of these dynasties and the religious authority of the Abbasids’ Caliphs. These tribal and ethnic divisions raise some doubts concerning the essentialist notion, which argues that there has never been a distinction between religious and state authority in Islam. Maybe some modern researchers are still stuck with the essentialist stance, considering the Islamic empires – from the Umayyad dynasty to the Ottomans – theocracies based on shari‘a. It is true that Caliphs were considered guardian of the Islamic faith, but in practice Caliphs were not always checked by religious scholars, and in many cases they resorted to temporal legislation. The rise of the Buyid Sultanate in the middle of the tenth century was a turning point in the history of Caliphate, when the Caliph lost his executive power and authority, which had been handed to Sultans, who became the real rulers, though the Caliph formally continued to be recognized as the successor of the Prophet.5 Although the case of the Buyid and Suljuq dynasties contests the idea of the union of state and religion, researchers consider the two cases exceptional in premodern Islamic history, and they are still investigating the issue from many points of view. Some recall the position of classical authors, such as Abu Hasan ‘Ali Ibn Muhammad al-Mawardi (974–1058), Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058–1111) and Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406). The former wrote a legal handbook under the

146 | Epilogue title al-Ahkam al-Sultaniya (The Laws of Islamic Governance), in which he attempted to defend the Abbasid Caliphate against the Buyid warlords and against the Fatimid dynasty ruling in Egypt. The book of al-Mawardi is a sort of an administrative and political manual to guide the Caliph. It covers various aspects related to Islamic law, and the duties and responsibilities of the Caliphs. For him, the Caliph should follow the example of the Prophet in maintaining the law of religion, protecting the lands of Islam, punishing sinners and waging jihad against enemies of Islam.6 According to some Western researchers, al-Mawardi recognized the legitimacy of usurpation as a means of coming to power in the provinces. This recognition granted the usurper a power which the Caliph could not restrain. The best representative of these researchers is Hamilton Gibb, one of the first Western scholars to study al-Mawardi. Gibb argues that al-Mawardi opened the door for the eventual supremacy of political expediency over the legal order. Al-Ghazali took a position similar to that of al-Mawardi when he wished to reconcile the temporal powers of the ruler with religious authority, emphasizing the duty to obey those in power, even if unjust or impious. The position of these two classical Islamic scholars came to be consecrated in the jurist maxim “sixty years of tyranny are better than an hour of civil strife.” 7 Despite the fact that al-Mawardi and al-Ghazali belonged to the Shafi‘i school of law, Wahhabi ‘ulama have used the same jurist maxim in order legitimize some Saudi rulers and to prevent civil strife, as was explained in Chapters 5 and 6 of this book. Ibn Khaldun deals with dynasties, Caliphates and other political rules in several places in his Muqaddimah, according to the contexts of his presentation. In one place, he states that “God sent no prophet who did not enjoy the protection of his people. If this was the case with prophets, who are among human beings those most likely to perform wonders[?].”8 It is beyond the scope of this epilogue to follow Ibn Khaldun’s theory of the relationship between politics and religion, or to present a thorough comparison of it with that of al-Mawardi and al-Ghazali. However, suffice it to note that Ibn Khaldun sees Caliphs as religious and worldly rulers who should perform the functions of protecting religion, securing the borders of the state, and dealing with the temporal matters. Ibn Khaldun himself asks his readers to consult al-Mawardi for more information on the duties of the Caliph.9 Dealing with al-Mawardi’s thought, Eltigani Abdulqadir Hamid notes that the major ideas of al-Mawardi in political theory have not been seriously studied, because researchers focus solely on al-Ahkam al-Sultaniya, overlooking al-Mawardi’s book Tashil al-Nadar wa Ta‘jil al-Dafar (the correct transliteration is Tashil al-Nazar wa Ta‘jil

Epilogue | 147 al-Zafar). According to Hamid, while al-Ahkam extracts relevant material on administration and the constitutional system which would serve the Caliph as a manual for government officials, Tashil al-Nazar was an attempt to formulate a politico-religious theory on how political systems are instituted, decline, and are overthrown and replaced by others. Quoting al-Mawardi’s short passage “institutionalization of rule can be divided into three categories: religion, force, and wealth,” Hamid analyzes al-Mawardi’s theory, arguing that the latter grasps religion as “psychological” force that leads to social cohesion, rather than a legal code. In this regard, recognition of the social dimension of religion was made by al-Mawardi almost three centuries before Ibn Khaldun. However, while al-Mawardi sees religion as the major element that leads to social cohesion and political power, Ibn Khaldun attributes to religion an additional force that needed to buttress the ‘asabiyya. Though stressing the political importance of religion, al-Mawardi does not call for manipulation of religion for good of the state; rather state and religion should be mutually supportive. The rise of ‘asabiyya and laxity in religious commitment lead ultimately to political disintegration. The role of the ruler, in al-Mawardi’s theory, is to protect religion. He has to be chosen by the people as a deputy, and not someone appointed by God.10 Although some Western and Muslim writers attempt to rely on alMawardi, al-Ghazali, Ibn Khaldun, or other classical authors to investigate the nature of the Islamic state, some researchers adopt a historical approach by which they place the issue of the relationship between religion and state in historical context. These latter go back to early Islamic history, attempting to examine the implication of the heritage of early Islam for later Islamic societies. In his article on the subject, Ira M. Lapidus presents a revisionist position to the prevailing view that classical Islamic society did not distinguish between religious and political leadership. He admits that during the period of the Prophet and his first four successors, religious and political values and religious and political offices were inseparable. However, since the rise of Umayyad Caliphate (661–750), religious and political life developed distinct spheres of experience, with independent values, leaders, and organizations, reaching a turning point in the middle of the tenth century, when effective control of the Abbasid Empire had passed into hands of generals, administrators, governors, and local provincial lords. Governments in Islamic lands were henceforth secular regimes and were fully differentiated political bodies without an intrinsic religious character, though they were officially loyal to Islam. At that time, religious communities had developed independently of states under the guidance of ‘ulama who were

148 | Epilogue organized according to their religious affiliation into Sunni schools of law, Shiite sects, or Sufi orders.11 Lapidus argues that religious and political aspects came to be separated by a historical process, which begins with the rise of the Umayyad dynasty. The Umayyad Caliphs deepened political, as opposed to religious, aspects according to Byzantine and Sassanian precedents. Although the supporters of the Abbasid rebellion fought the Umayyad state under the banner of restoring the “true” Islam embodied by rulers of the Abbasid Caliphs, the new dynasty retracted the steps of the Umayyad one, paving the way for a further development separating politics from religion. This development was the emergence of religious activities independent of the actual authority of the Caliphs. However, the rise of the Caliph Abu al-‘Abbas ‘Abdullah al-Ma’mun (r. 813–33), was accompanied by his attempt to rebuild the political and religious foundations of the Caliphate by restoring unity between religious and political authorities. In the period between 819 and 826, al-Ma’mun attempted to propagate his doctrine of the created Qur’an. In 830, he declared new variations in standard prayer sequence and order, and tried to impose other new legislation, which did not fit with traditional Sunni practice. Al-Ma’mun’s interfering in the religious domain caused confrontation with ‘ulama circles, and it soon transferred into popular demonstrations led by the famous ‘ulama of the time, among them Ahmad Ibn Hanbal. This period of confrontation between Caliph and ‘ulama is called by historians al-mihna. Apart from this short period of mihna, the substance of Islamic teaching during the eighth and ninth centuries was no longer directly related to the Caliphate. Independent ‘ulama – adhering to the four religious schools of law, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi‘i and Hanbali – denied the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphs any authority in the elaboration of law, substituting for it either ijma‘ or the legal reasoning of imams. The implication of this development was manifest in the idea that the Caliph who did not follow Islam could not command obedience, and that the community represented by its ‘ulama was responsible for upholding the norms of Islam. Ibn Hanbal and his followers represented ardent supporters of the view that Islamic religious obligations derived not from the pronouncements of Caliphs, but from the Qur’an and hadith. Although the Hanbalis remained committed to the Abbasid state, they circumscribed the authority of Caliphs in religious matters. Hanbalism brought potential opposition to the Caliphate as the representation of the religious domain. At the same time, several religious communities, Sunni and Shiite, developed religiously organized forms of socio-religious life independent of that of states and empires.12

Epilogue | 149 Lapidus’s approach is different from the classical one that examines the question of separation and unity of state and religion in Islam, in according to the Christian model based on the notion of “church versus state.” As unofficial organized bodies, ‘ulama played a decisive role in determining the relationship between the political and the religious domains. In his reassessment of the ability of the Shiite ‘ulama to develop their organized forms of socioreligious life independent of the state, Said Amir Arjomand reinforced the evaluation of Lapidus. According to him, in the absence of Islamic religious and political rule embodied by Imam ‘Ali, his successors and the occultation of the twelfth imam,13 the religious authority of the Shiites was handed to their ‘ulama until the reappearance of their vanished imam.14 In their book God’s Caliph, Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds deal with the same topic, unfolding insights and some nuances further to those of Lapidus and Arjomand. They conclude that full union of religion and politics came to the end in the time of the fourth Islamic Caliph, and that religious authority is now dispersed among the ‘ulama. Although Caliphs and ‘ulama went their separate ways, political and religious authorities were reunited under the pious ‘Umar Ibn‘Abd al-‘Aziz (681–720). Meanwhile, the Shiites continued to regard the legitimate head of state, i.e. the Caliph ‘Ali, as having inherited not only the political, but also the religious, authority of the Prophet, though in practice he and his descendants were deprived of their political powers. Crone and Hinds find that some ‘ulama did not oppose to the union of political and religious authority of the Caliphs. At certain times ‘ulama succeeded in depriving Caliphs of their religious authority; at other times they revived the union between the two authorities, such as during the period of Abu al-‘Abbas ‘Abdullah al-Ma’mun, when some of them attempted to enforce the role of the Caliph as a guide in spiritual matters. Although the attempt of alMa’mun’s supporters among ‘ulama failed, there is no point in Islamic history at which the Caliphate can be said to have been entirely devoid religious meaning. In these ups and downs of the union and separation of the two authorities, the role of ‘ulama was decisive. Although the political power of Islamic rulers could not shape the beliefs and private lives of their subjects, and although their power remained confined to politics, ‘ulama succeeded in turning this power into a “constitutional power” based on their religious guidance to determine private and ritual law. However, the victory of ‘ulama was not definitive because they continued to collaborate with the rulers.15 It is worth noting that Crone and Hinds’s analysis is based on samples gathered from Arabic classical literature, old coins, and personal letters written by Caliphs and provincial governors. Their

150 | Epilogue findings contest the essentialist approach of Western researchers, as well as that of idealist Muslim authors who argue that relationship between religious and political power in Islam has one essential feature, which never changes. Crone and Hinds follow the changes that occurred in Caliphate institutions, concentrating on the use of two titles – khalifaht allah (heir of God) and khalifaht al-rassul (heir of the Prophet) – and their historical significance for understanding the development of the political and religious power of the Caliphate throughout the early history of Islam. At the beginning of the Abbasid period, the first Caliphs attempted to adopt the title khalifaht allah, but with no success, satisfying themselves with title khalifaht al-rassul.16 However, like Lapidus and Arjomand, Crone and Hinds consider ‘ulama the religious body, which could limit the rulers’ absolutism by controlling and defining all religious matters. ‘Ulama remained, since the Umayyad period, the matrix that has crystallized Islamic beliefs, values, and moralities. Although Lapidus, Arjomand, and Crone and Hinds deal with early Islamic societies, their historical surveys and analyses illuminate three aspects related to the Saudi–Wahhabi case. The first is related to Hanbalism, which was the main source of inspiration for Wahhabi ‘ulama to organize a religious community outside the Ottoman religious and political establishments. The second is the ability of the Wahhabi ‘ulama to internalize their creed among the populace. The third is the role of the Wahhabi ‘ulama in continuing to fulfill the functions of counseling Saudi princes and kings, interpreting and maintaining Islamic law. From the point of view of the political development of the Saudi states, ‘ulama codified the basis of the corpus of Wahhabi Islamic law and tradition, preserving their activist political involvement to legitimize and delegitimize rulers, especially in times of political dispute and civil war. Their decisive role in legitimizing and delegitimizing rulers was salient during the period of upheaval from the 1860s to the 1930s. This recalls the role of Hanbali ‘ulama who used the principle al-amr bi-l-ma‘ruf to mobilize popular demonstrations against Caliph al-Ma’mun, who attempted to impose his authority in the religious domain by claiming the doctrine of the created Qur’an. The principle of al-amr bi-l-ma‘ruf became an intrinsic principle of the Hanbali school of law.17 As was explained in Chapter 4, this principle characterizes the reign of Turki in the first half of the nineteenth century, when Wahhabi ‘ulama considered the principle a duty officially monitored by them, as charged with investigating (tafaqqud) its performance. The duty of al-amr bi-l-ma‘ruf led the Wahhabi ‘ulama in the modern Saudi state to establish special governmental institutions

Epilogue | 151 responsible for maintaining the values and behavioral attitudes of citizens toward the politics and religion of the state. Dealing with mihna during the period of al-Ma’mun and the issue of the relationship between religion and state, Nimrod Hurvitz presents the points of views of three leading researchers on the role of ‘ulama in Islam: Ignac Goldziher, Joseph Schacht, and Muhammad Qasim Zaman. Although these researchers share the idea that ‘ulama benefited from relative intellectual freedom and independence in the first periods of Islam, they came to different conclusions. Goldziher argues that Umayyad rule was secular and did not interfere in religious laws except in situations in which the rulers tried to promote governmental demands. Schacht has the view that not only the Umayyad rulers but also the Abbasid rulers were lacking spiritual authority. The Caliphs of both dynasties did not claim status based on spiritual authority, despite their granting the community the principles of Islamic law through administrative legislation, by appointing qadis who established these principles. Zaman concludes that Abbasid Caliphs had developed a system of patronage and collaboration with ‘ulama, which enabled the Caliphate to share with jurists and other religious people some religious authority.18 Zaman dedicates a special book under the title Religion and Politics under the Early ‘Abbasids to dealing with question. He notes that the purpose of his book was “to investigate a model of religion and state in the pre-modern Muslim societies,” but “to examine certain religious developments in early Abbasid society in the context of relationship between ‘ulama associated with those developments and the caliphs.” The picture emerging from his study shows that Caliphs and ‘ulama were in close mutual dependence. ‘Ulama were “among the beneficiaries . . . of the patronage of the state; and caliphs’ support for the viewpoints they represented gave them definite stakes in associating with the Abbasid state, not in separating themselves from it.”19 Zaman sees religious attitudes and activities during this period as proto-Sunni trends associated with ‘ulama. His term “proto-Sunni” designates groups which defined their identity in terms of what they saw as their adherence to the Prophet’s sunna.20 According to him, except for the mihna – during the period of al-Ma’mun – the social and political milieu in which proto-Sunni viewpoints evolved was characterized not by conflict between Caliphs and ‘ulama, but rather by growing collaboration. In his brief reference to continuities between the early Abbasid period and later periods, Zaman emphasizes that the relationship between religion and state is different from one Muslim society to another.21 If there is no overarching model for the relationship between religion and state, then collaboration between ‘ulama and rulers has

152 | Epilogue characterized many Islamic societies in different times and places. Separation and collaboration between religion and state in modern Islamic societies remain a function of the role played by ‘ulama rather by the state, and depend on the ability of ‘ulama to develop educational institutions by which they can influence cultural and social life, as Zaman explains in another study titled The Ulama in Contemporary Islam. Although he deals with ‘ulama of British India and Pakistan during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the implication of this study is useful for understanding other cases in many parts of the Islamic world. He follows the development of several groups of ‘ulama in India and Pakistan. Although these groups are united in their reverence for teachings of the Prophet, their interpretations of the sources of religious authority differ. Among these groups, there is a group called Ahl al-Hadith whose adherents deny the legitimacy not just of all practices lacking basis in scriptural texts, but even of the classical schools of law, stringently insisting on Qur’an and hadith as the exclusive and directly accessible source of guidance.22 Ahl al-Hadith’s ‘ulama had some affinity with the Wahhabis, sharing the same admiration of the works of Ibn Taymiyya.23 Dealing with the case of Wahhabi ‘ulama, Zaman notes that the Saudi state was founded on an alliance between Wahhabi ‘ulama and the Saudi ruling family. Through many vicissitudes, since the beginning of this alliance, the rule of the Saudi family has been forged, but ‘ulama have continued to be central to its conception of political legitimacy. Since 1971, Saudi ‘ulama have constituted the influential Board of Senior ‘Ulama, and in a further effort to make ‘ulama subject to greater centralized regulation, the head of this board has, since 1993, held the official position of Grand Mufti of the state. Yet given the influence and independence that ‘ulama have historically enjoyed, the Saudi government’s efforts to curtail that autonomy have, at least, been hesitant, and, after all, the Saudi state itself acknowledges the authority of ‘ulama to interpret the shari‘a. It is true that kings have attempted to introduce some changes, but they have tended to do so on terms defined by ‘ulama rather than by the state. The Saudi state has depended heavily on legitimacy derived from the leading ‘ulama, as was illustrated during the crisis of 1979. In this year the Board of Senior ‘Ulama came to rescue the Saudi regime, when a band of Wahhabi zealots, dissatisfied with the performance of the state, took control of the Ka‘ba.24

Epilogue | 153

The Islamic State versus the Western State Many modern Muslim scholars insist that there is no separation between religion and politics in Islam, and particularly not in the Saudi state. As was mentioned at the beginning of this epilogue, some Muslim scholars and Western researchers of Islam still adopt an essentialist approach in studying Islamic societies. They claim that the essentialist character of Islam explains why religion continues to be interwoven with politics today. They contrast this with Christian societies where the Roman legacy and a historical process since the medieval period have led to a radical change in relations between state and religion. In the West, the process of the emancipation of the state from religious presuppositions weakened the power and role of the church, and in many cases led to its disestablishment. Relying on this essentialist approach, some researchers of the Saudi case conclude that the Saudi–Wahhabi state does not differ from Muslim states in the premodern era. Mohammed Arkoun, a francophone Algerian researcher, criticizes those Muslim scholars who create the notion of an essentialist character of Islam in which there is no room for separation between religion and politics. He describes these scholars as traditionalists who do not offer new concepts and remain stuck with a “bizarre” notion which cannot respond to the social requests of burning contemporary issues such as the relationship between state and religion.25 He also contests Western researchers, arguing that even in the Western states the process of secularization took different routes and permitted a wide range of accommodations between religion and state. However, Western success in emancipating states from religion was carried out by the bourgeoisie and was due to several historical factors relating to economic, cultural, political, and ideological changes. In his opinion, institutional reform and secularization in the West developed linearly alongside the rise of the bourgeoisie, whose hegemonic values were imposed by these reforms on Western politics and economics. According to his analysis, the historical development of Islamic societies held back the emergence of a social stratum similar to that in the West. Comparing the historical development of the Muslim world with that of the West since the medieval period, Arkoun argues that, since the rule of the Buyids, foreigners controlled political power. These foreigners held up any reform that would have emancipated the state from religion. “Foreign” rule based its administrative and military power on religious legitimacy provided by ‘ulama. The foreigners had always appealed to religious scholars in order to legitimize their temporal rule based on “force and brutality.” The religious treatises of al-Ghazali (d. 1111), Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), and others

154 | Epilogue were the main shar‘i (religious–legal) justification for their temporal rule, which persisted in many forms until the present time.26 In his comparison between Islam and the West, Arkoun argues that the real process of separation between religion and state in the West only began during the Reformation in the sixteenth century. Even France did not succeeded in reaching a real separation between religion and state before the start of the twentieth century, despite all the attempts since the French Revolution. He contests the general view that traces this separation to the French Revolution, claiming that it reflects “a dogmatic attitude” that characterizes many Western researchers.27 The breakdown of the “the cultural political glacier” in Western countries took centuries to overturn the principles of separation.28 However, Arkoun does not explain why the separation between state and religion in the West was not completed until the beginning of the twentieth century. The question remains why there was a process of separation in the West while the Muslim world continued to adhere to the core of its traditional principles of political rule in which religion and politics are intertwined. Joseph Strayer tries to answer this question, claiming that the principle of separation between religion and politics had existed throughout Western history since the Greek and Roman periods. According to him, the ancient Greeks and Romans established their political temporal order without being subordinated to a canonical religion.29 The radical changes in the West occurred when, in the fourth century, Christianity became the official religion. By raising the idea of salvation, the church gradually overturned the social order when priesthood became more involved in community life and took away from the state a great part of its political authority. Despite this, clergymen failed to claim political power for themselves, leaving room for some independence of temporal rule. This independence later opened the way for the reintroduction of Greek and Roman principles that led to the separation between religion and state in the West.30 It is beyond the scope of this epilogue to elaborate further the discussion of the theoretical debate over the relationship between politics and religion. However, it is useful to refer to the theories of Max Weber and his supporters, which may help us to compare the West and the Muslim world. Many researchers took their cue from the Weberian paradigms to articulate an essentialist approach to analyzing the role of religion in fostering culture and affecting the mundane sphere. Although Weber’s studies of religions concentrate on Protestantism, Judaism, and Buddhism, his theoretical “types” encourage some researchers to look for an Islamic “type” through which they might attempt to investigate religion and state in Islam. Weber’s book, The

Epilogue | 155 Protestant Ethic,31 and his articles still inspire many researchers dealing with the impact of religious ideas on the practical behavior of individuals and institutions.32 According to Weber, Protestant religious belief made the development of Western capitalism possible. Although he concentrates on Western civilization, his theories on religion and its impact on society and politics are still used by many researchers. His concept of the ideal-type of the Protestant believer and the type of the Protestant initiator became the basis for comparison between religions and their influence on societies and politics. His concept of the “predesignation,” through which he explains the relationship between Protestant ethics and the mundane sphere, was translated into the practical behavior of individuals in the temporal world. In his book Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, Richard Tawney takes his cue from Weber to explore the relationship between Protestantism and economic development in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, arguing that the division between commerce and social morality led to a process of subordination of Christian teaching to material wealth. According to him, Protestantism, intersected with secularism and religious tolerance, was behind the appearance of Western capitalism.33 Although Weber and Tawney focus on religious ethics and capitalism, their essentialist theories inspired researchers to investigate the impact of religion on Western and non-Western societies. Shmual Eisenstadt presents the essentialist theory of Weber in comparative way, reassessing the impact of religious creeds on society and politics. In spite the fact that Protestantism and Wahhabism developed in different cultures, researchers use Eisenstadt’s theory to understand the commonalities and differences between the two creeds. Like Protestantism, which calls for purifying the Christian faith, Wahhabism also claimed that it came to purify the “faith” and restore the “true” beliefs of al-salaf, the first Muslims. Elaborating Weber’s theory in a deeper comparative frame, Eisenstadt examines religions and ideologies through their “transformative capacities,” or the ability of religious ideas to cause internal change and promote new social institutions, including the possibility of defining and articulating these ideas again, generating ongoing social change in the mundane sphere.34 Although Wahhabism and Protestantism share the concept of purifying the faith, an attempt to apply Eisenstadt’s theory of “transformative capacities” to Wahhabism would be misleading. The reason for this misleading stems from the different cultural contexts in which Protestantism and Wahhabism developed. While Protestantism generated radical change in the West, Wahhabism could not shake the social and political frameworks that had existed for generations in Arabia. In this sense, one can argue that Wahhabism

156 | Epilogue lacks the “transformative capacities” to produce a transformation of the society toward economic and social reforms. While Protestant Lutheranism and Calvinism introduced radical change in traditional politics, separating religion from state, Wahhabism reinforced the principle that had merged politics and religion into one domain. Even when essentialist researchers do not use Eisenstadt’s “transformative capacities,” they emphasize that the nature of the Wahhabi–Saudi state does not differ from some other Muslim states in the premodern era. Essentialists – who take their cue from Weber, Tawney, Eisenstadt, and others – would consistently argue that cultures change, and that the nature of their impact on society varies from one period to another, but that the differences in political and social development among different societies remain rooted in their different essential cultures. As was mentioned above, Arkoun rejects the essentialist approach, suggesting that the entire matter should be examined within the historical context by using modern research methodologies and not just by following “Islamic models” based selectivly on the first period of Islam.35 Contesting this essentialist approach, Sami Zubaida criticizes researchers who are still taking their cue from Weber’s supporters and still considering society as an entity based on an “essence” that stabilizes the capacity and non-capacity of its developments.36 Zubaida focuses his criticism on Bertrand Badie, one of the scholars whose study of religion and politics in modern Islamic societies relies on the essentialist paradigm. Badie argues that, unlike Christian Western states, the Muslim states failed to separate religion from politics due to the essential differences between Christianity and Islam. To elaborate further his theory of the differences between Islam and Christianity, Badie adds another framework of analysis taken from Perry Anderson’s theory of the “triangular” structure of prince, barons, and church. According to him, this structure in the West intersected with the governmental alignment of absolute rule and was established in the form of a “law-state.” This kind of combination brought about the growth of a political system with bases of resistance to the “patrimonial” tendencies of the monarch. Accordingly, in Western societies there was continuity that developed as an outcome of the essentialist character of Western culture. In contrast, the state in the Islamic world – as an outcome of an essentialist normative system – continued to be a patrimonial state based on rulers and servants. The rulers continued to stand at the head of the governmental hierarchy through their personal servants. The role of shari‘a continued to grant the government the legitimacy it needed. Unlike the Western structure, where limits were imposed between prince, barons, and church, religious legitimacy and political leadership in Islam were

Epilogue | 157 integrated. The abolition of one of these legitimacies meant the abolition of the other. Islamic philosophy and theology developed a model of an ideal form of government based on divine revelation to become the essence of both integrated legitimacies.37 Criticizing Badie’s “essentialist” conception, Zubaida rejects arguments that consider modern Islamic politics an internal “essence” installed by “Islam.” Zubaida emphasizes the importance of analyzing general socioeconomic processes in relation to the appearance of Islamic politics.38

The Perpetual Alliance between Princes and Religious Scholars in Saudi Arabia Perhaps the theory of Weber and his followers would help some researchers to make a comparison between Protestantism and Wahhabism, but this comparison would be incomplete without taking into consideration the socioeconomic and political frameworks in which the two movements developed. Although the two movements share the principle of purification of religious faith, the results were completely different. While Protestantism accelerated the development of separation between politics and religion in the West, Wahhabism maintained and reinforced the principle of merging religion with politics in Islam. These two different results in the West and in Islam cannot be explained by a mere essentialist theory, but by a thorough investigation of the historical circumstances behind the emergence of the two movements. Concentrating on the political field as a framework of surveying and analyzing the historical development of the Saudi–Wahhabi movement, the six chapters of this study examined the socioeconomic and political context that enabled the umara (princes) of Al Saud and ‘ulama (religious scholars) of Al al-Shaykh to establish a theocratic rule that has been sustained until today. Although the study depicts and analyzes this context, it follows the historical changes that reproduced at every stage a political field in which this theocratic rule operates. A serious comparison between the theocratic rule of the Wahhabi– Saudis and other Islamic states in the Middle East illustrates the limitations of essentialist theories. Most of the modern states of the Middle East lack the theocratic elements that characterize the Saudi state. Analyzing the constitutional, political, and socioeconomic development of these states shows that each of them has a unique historical development to foster its special characteristics in which Islamic legacy took different forms. No one can ignore the fact that the two clans of Al al-Shaykh and Al Saud determined the nature of the theocratic rule

158 | Epilogue that continued to be the basis for the successive Wahhabi–Saudi states from the eighteenth century until today. The two clans continued to be linked by marriage and by mutual interests. Al al-Shaykh, throughout the history of these states, provided the religious legal justification for such theocratic rule. Their scholarly treatises and fatwas became the framework of such rule when they elaborated the religious Hanbali legacy concerning the relationship between the mundane and spiritual domains. They were inspired by Ibn Taymiyya, the great Hanbali scholar who elaborated ideas on the subject. During the Second Wahhabi–Saudi State, Al al-Shaykh relied on Ibn Taymiyya more than in the First Saudi State in the eighteenth century. They found themselves quoting many passages from Ibn Taymiyya’s famous treatise al-Siyasa al-Shar‘iyya fi Islah al-Ra‘i wa al-Ra‘iyya, providing new interpretations that suited the political field in the nineteenth century. Al al-Shaykh emphasized Ibn Taymiyya’s call for the obligation of al-ra‘iyya (subjects or citizens) to obey the ruler. However, Al al-Shaykh enlarged this concept to become, at the end of the nineteenth century, the basis for defining obedience and disobedience to rulers. In their new definition, they divided people between mu’minun (believers) and kuffar (infidels). The theoretical debate that erupted between Al al-Shaykh and their adversaries around the concept of kufr (infidelity) was used as a political instrument to legitimize the theocratic rule of the two clans: Al Saud as umara and Al al-Shaykh as ‘ulama. In this respect, one can compare the structure of “prince, barons, and church” – around which the process of the relationship between state and religion evolved in the West – with the structure of ‘ulama and umara, used by Al al-Shaykh to define and redefine the relationship between religion and politics in the Wahhabi– Saudi state of the nineteenth century. While the founder of the Wahhabi movement did not provide a precise model for cooperation between ‘ulama and umara, Al al-Shaykh and the princes of Al Saud during the reigns of Turki (1824–34) and his son Faysal (1834–65) set up such a model to influence the modern state in Saudi Arabia. The cooperation between ‘ulama and umara in modern Saudi Arabia has been the subject matter of many studies, most of which overlook the historical legacy of the nineteenth century. Focusing on Al al-Shaykh in this century sheds new light on the principles of continuity and discontinuity in the historical development of the “theocratic regime” of Saudi Arabia. Investigating this cooperation in the modern Saudi state, Aharon Layish, a specialist in Islamic law, argues that the power of the Saudi ‘ulama after the Second World War faded and declined due to the westernization process, producing a new outlook and reality that differed from that which had

Epilogue | 159 existed in the First and Second States.39 Ayman al-Yassini, a Saudi scholar, indirectly confirms Layish’s findings, arguing that changes occurred in the relationship between ‘ulama and state institutions and incorporated them into the state’s administration. He considers such incorporation the symptom of a distinction between religious and political spheres, and the result of the monopoly by the state apparatus of political power and economic resources. The monopoly of the state stemmed from the fact that a modern political power cannot tolerate autonomous religious bodies that compete with the state in the domain of loyalty. Therefore the state apparatus extends its authority, utilizing religious leaders and institutions in the process of “nation building.” Al-Yassini believes that this process introduced a shift in power in favor of state institutions that, since the 1960s, had become dominant, while the Wahhabi ideologies were used as instruments subordinated to the politics of the state. The Saudi umara behaved as “secularist” rulers, attempting to introduce reforms into the political and socioeconomic conditions within the kingdom. To attain their political and socioeconomic aims, the Saudi umara showed a flexible attitude toward religious ideologies.40 In his study of Islamic legal thought during the years 1971–2000, Muhammad al-Atawneh contests the assessments of Layish and al-Yassini. Al-Atawneh finds that ‘ulama in Saudi Arabia maintained their power in the state, exercising great influence in several domains of society. They continued to hold authority on legal religious affairs as a basis for the relationship between politics and religion, expanding their control over ministries and other state institutions. They hold the upper hand in the ministries of Islamic Affairs and Endowments, Justice and Pilgrimage. Meanwhile they continued to run the Committee of Commanding Good and Forbidding Wrong and other institutions related to Islamic ethics. Through these ministries, ‘ulama expanded their power to include the mundane sphere.41 Although alRasheed admits that modernity poses new challenges for “nation building” in the kingdom, she argues that Saudi rulers have made great efforts to maintain a certain balance between religion and politics, manifesting their commitment to the Wahhabi creed. But, since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the massive presence of US troops in the region, the Saudi regime has begun to revise its policy of balance between religion and state, showing relative openness toward internal reforms according to some Western criteria. However, this relative openness has provoked criticism from religious extremists who want to preserve the traditional role played by religion.42 Obviously, the challenge of modernity inevitably introduced some forms of adaptation into Saudi society, but these forms did not alter

160 | Epilogue the entire structure of the theocratic regime of the country. Wahhabi ‘ulama are still playing a major role in politics, maintaining close ties with the ruling family. Furthermore, it seems that “modernity” reinforced the role of ‘ulama, because the Saudi family needs the assistance of the Wahhabi ‘ulama, more than ever before, in order to justify and introduce reforms. In this sense, one can argue that the apparent contradiction between ‘ulama and umara is not genuine, and that an alternative mode of politics has no chance to replace the existing mode as long as political legitimacy still relies on religious criteria. The basis of this legitimacy has been inherited from the First and Second Saudi States, when political chieftaincy and the moral codes of Wahhabism were merged to become its sole source. The crucial factor perpetuating this legitimacy occurred during the Second Saudi State, though it was characterized by military and political upheavals. Precisely because there were ups and downs in its historical development, the umara and ‘ulama made great efforts to maintain their cooperation. Both umara and ‘ulama recognized their dependant and mutual interests when the upheavals of the Second Saudi State proved that continuity of Saudi rule depends on the two pillars of dynastic heredity. Losing one of these pillars would mean the collapse of the whole Saudi–Wahhabi movement. Internal and external challenges were handled by maintaining congruence and cooperation between ‘ulama and umara. The reigns of Turki and Faysal from 1724 until 1865 implanted the principle of cooperation when the two rulers recognized the necessity of the Wahhabi creed for consolidating their political entity. The civil war in 1865 and the rise of anti-Saudi political entities in Najd at the end of the nineteenth century, which threatened to crumble the Wahhabi– Saudi movement, posed difficulties to maintaining this principle of congruence. However, just in this period of upheaval, Al al-Shaykh succeeded in keeping alive the cooperation between their clan and the Saudi clan. ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan, his son ‘Abd al-Latif, and his grandson ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abd al-Latif, the paramount scholars, used all their talents to defend Saudi legitimacy. ‘Abd al-Latif played an active role in reconsolidating the reign of Al Saud during the civil war that erupted between the sons of Faysal after 1865. Although cooperation between ‘ulama and umara remained the main tool for maintaining order within the Second Saudi State, successive events since 1865 that led to its dissolution in 1891 show that ‘ulama and umara were unable to challenge the socioeconomic conditions that constrained the continuity of the political order. The religious preaching of ‘Abd al-Latif and other Wahhabi scholars failed to overcome the tribal fragmentation and economic distress that had sharpened social and political divisions. The internal strife disturbed

Epilogue | 161 the constant interdependence between nomads and settlers in Najd. When settled life came under increasing strain as a consequence of fighting and economic distress, social and political instability prevailed. This manifested itself not in a straightforward war between the settled and nomadic populations, but in a disintegration of the social fabric of the settled areas. All these revived the old social divisions in Najd, which Al al-Shaykh and Wahhabi scholars had always attempted to eliminate. This situation enabled Al Rashid to undermine the rule of Al Saud in the second decades of the nineteenth century, which led to the complete dissolution of the Second Saudi State in 1891, though the powerful scholars of Al al-Shaykh continued to support Al Saud. However, at the beginning of the twentieth century, Al Saud succeeded in cultivating the same old social divisions to restore their rule in Najd. To reconsolidate their lost state, Al al-Shaykh’s ‘ulama and Saudi umara revived their traditional alliance. At this stage, ‘Abdullah, the son of ‘Abd al-Latif, made great efforts to legitimize the rule of Saudi umara. He revived the “eternal” cooperation between the two clans of Al al-Shaykh and of Al Saud that enabled ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Saud, from 1902, to reestablish the Third Saudi State and to expand its sway beyond Najd. From 1902 until today, the two clans have preserved the traditional alliance as the basis for the success of the Saudis in sustaining a theocratic regime. Without taking into consideration the perpetual alliance between the two clans, any explanation of such success would omit many things, distort some things, and obscure others. Essentialist theories of Islam are not appropriate tools for understanding the capability of Wahhabism to survive despite the internal and external factors that have threatened to destroy it. The historical record of the Second Saudi State that enabled the Wahhabis and Saudis to revive it in 1902 in the form of a third state lead us to contest explanations that place the movement in the realm of the essentialist theories about Islam. Wahhabism, also, cannot be placed within the modern “fundamentalist” movements that attempt to establish a new religio-political order that can challenge Western hegemony. Wahhabism is a unique phenomenon, and therefore its study requires us to follow its historical development rather than to look for theoretical paradigms to pinpoint its essentialist character. Its persistent survival as a political and religious entity stems from the perpetual alliance between Al Saud and Al al-Shaykh. At least until the middle of the twentieth century, political leaders and religious scholars from the two clans ran the country without creating impersonal institutions. Even the process of institutionalization during the second half of the twentieth century continued to be related to specific persons from the two clans similar

162 | Epilogue to that of the Second Saudi State, where the pattern of merging religion with politics was established and rooted in the political culture of the country. It worth noting that Turki and his son Faysal themselves were integrated within the strata of ‘ulama. Meanwhile, unlike the first generation of Wahhabi scholars, Al al-Shaykh of the Second State exercised great political power. They consulted and gave advice to umara regarding domestic affairs and warfare. This political role of Al alShaykh was rooted in political culture after 1865 when they found themselves adding to Hanbali religious legacy some Shafi‘i religious ideas by which they justified their interference in political affairs. They borrowed from al-Mawardi, the great Shafi‘i scholar, the principle of the responsibility assigned to religious scholars to appoint rulers of states.43 It worth noting that ‘Abd al-Latif had spent years in Egypt studying in al-Azhar with many Shafi‘i scholars before he became the paramount scholar of Al al-Shaykh after the death of his father in 1869. When ‘Abd al-Latif failed to achieve a reconciliation between the two brothers of Faysal, he chose to take sides, approving the rule of Saud in Faysal in order to put an end to the internal strife between the umara of the Saudi clan.44 The habit created by ‘Abd al-Latif was repeated by scholars of Al al-Shaykh when Saudi umara were quarreling over the legitimacy of succession within their clan. Although “modernity,” “nation building,” and relations with the West in the twentieth century added new dimensions to the succession, Al alShaykh continued to play a major role in granting legitimacy to the prince chosen by the Saudi clan to become the king of the state. In this sense, the Saudi kingdom has preserved its original features, where a separation between state and religion is blocked by the “eternal” alliance of the two clans. Although socioeconomic and cultural changes have taken place during the twentieth century, the main features of the state remain. Probably the features of the Saudi state are reflected in the symbols of the Saudi flag adopted in 1973. Although many Saudis used to decipher the color and the signs of their flag as the manifestation of a Saudi “religious and national” aspiration, it would be interpreted as a symbol of the perpetual alliance between the two clans. While the green color and the Arabic script of the Islamic declaration of faith symbolize the religious domain of Al al-Shaykh, the sword is an emblem of the political and military role of Al Saud, whose members are responsible for maintaining order and striving for the victory of the Islamic faith. However, oil wealth, especially since the 1970s, has changed the traditional feature of Saudi economy and society. As a result of these changes, modern bureaucratic bodies are dominated by technocrats

Epilogue | 163 educated outside the country. A great amount of Saudi money was invested in internal economic projects, housing, health, and social care, which have posed a great challenge to maintaining the traditional relationship between state and religion. Meanwhile, the Saudi regime has attempted to expand its religious and political influence to many parts of the Muslim world. These attempts led to the direct and indirect involvement of the Wahhabi ‘ulama in contemporary Islamist movements, including the jihadi one. Such involvement has raised certain criticism among some policy makers in the West, who have expressed their concern about the impact of Saudi religious policy on international security and on relations between Islam and the West. Internal socioeconomic developments and the external policy of expansion have confronted the official Wahhabi ‘ulama with a new constellation, which needs the adoption of an apologetic religious discourse, which would appease both internal dissatisfaction and external criticism. Although Western critical voices continue to be addressed toward the role played by the religious strata in the kingdom, symbiosis between Saudi global policy and the USA’s interests has determined relations between the two sides. Even though the first reaction of the USA and other Western countries to the events of 9/11 was critical of the role of the Wahhabi religious strata, symbiosis remained the key factor in relations between the kingdom and the West. It seems that, until now, the thirst for oil and the hunger for petrodollars have determined these relations rather than any other factors, and that symbiosis continues to be the basis of them. Such relations continue to facilitate the spread of Wahhabi religious values both in Arabia and abroad. However, Wahhabism has become more flexible to accept some innovations of modernity and to revise its traditional position toward collaboration with Western countries. But such flexibility itself leads to contestation from both radical elements and liberal ones, who have argued that official Wahhabi ‘ulama have failed to challenge modernity and deal with political and ethical issues. It seems that two parallel processes have characterized political and religious developments at the beginning of the current millennium, Wahhabi ‘ulama continue to consolidate aspects of religion in the public sphere, and Saudi politicians pursue the introduction of “secular” innovations to the state apparatus. Madawi al-Rasheed depicts the parallel processes in these words: “Saudi society and the public sphere were ‘Islamized’ while politics and the modern state remained an autonomous field beyond the reach of most senior religious scholars.”45 Al-Rasheed argues that separation between religion and state has already existed in Saudi Arabia. Certainly al-Rasheed’s assessment illuminates many aspects which researchers still debate,

164 | Epilogue but no one can ignore the fact that the Saudi–Wahhabi alliance continues to determine the relationship between state and politics. It is, therefore, early to predict the way in which this relationship will develop in the future. However, al-Rasheed’s assessment shows that the first signs of separation are appearing, attesting that Wahhabi ‘ulama are preferring to leave politics to the state, content with being monitors of ethical matters and granting the Saudi kings and princes their political legitimacy. Maybe these first signs will lead, in the future, to a full surrender of Wahhabi ‘ulama to a de facto separation between religion and politics.46 Meanwhile, no one can predict the impact of this probable separation on the Saudi princes, especially among Saudi princes who continue to compete over the legitimate successor to rule the country. The parallel processes accompanied by competition among Saudi princes will introduce changes into the traditional “eternal” alliance between the Saudi umara and the Wahhabi ‘ulama, and consequently will affect the existing relations of state and religion in Saudi Arabia.

Notes 1 The Rise of Wahhabism within a Tribal Society 1 al-Hasan al-Asfahani, Bilad al-‘Arab (ed. Hamad al-Jasir and Salih al‘Ali) (Riyadh: Dar al-Yamama, 1968), pp. 151, 336–9. 2 See Abu ‘Ubayd ‘Abd ‘Allah al-Bakri (al-Andalusi), Mu‘jam ma Ist‘ajma min Asma’ al-Bilad wa-l-Mawad‘, in Geographische Worterbuch (ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld) (Leiden, Cambridge, London, and Milan: Biblio Verlag, 1976), pp. 12, 202, 204, 427, 574; see also Abu ‘Ubayd ‘Abd ‘Allah al-Bakri al-Andalusi, Mu‘jam ma Ist‘ajma min Asma’ al-Bilad wal-Mawad‘ (ed. Jamal Tulba), 5 vols. (Bierut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘lmiyya, 1998). 3 Mahmud Taha Abu al-‘Alla, Jughrafiyat Shibih al-Jazira al-‘Arabiyya: Jughrafiyat al-Mamlaka al-‘Arabiyya al-Sa‘udiyya, 4 vols. (Cairo: Mu‘asasat Sijil al-‘Arab, 1972), vol. 2, p. 50. 4 Dir‘iyya was built in the fifteenth century; see Ibrahim Ibn Salih Ibn ‘Isa, Tarikh Ba‘d al-Hawadith al-Waqi‘a fî Najd (ed. Hamad al-Jasir) (Riyadh: Dar al-Yamama, 1996), pp. 36–7. 5 Muhammad Ibn Nasir al-‘Abbudi, al-Majma‘ al-Jughrafi, Bilad al-Qasim (Riyadh: Matabi‘ al-Farazdaq, 1990), pp. 23–4. 6 ‘Abdullah Ibn Khamis, al-Majma‘ al-Jughrafi li-l-Mamlaka al-‘Arabiyya al-Sa‘udiyya: Mu‘jam al-Yamama, 2 vols. (Riyadh: Matabi‘ al-Farazdaq, 1978), vol. 1, p. 95. 7 On the geographical regions of Najd see Munir al-‘Ajlani, Tarikh al-Bilad al-‘Arabiyya al-Sa‘udiyya: al-Dawla al-Sa‘udiyya al-‘Ula (Beirut: Dar alKitab, 1966), pp. 71–2; Uwaidah al-Juhany, Najd before the Salafi Reform Movement: Social, Political and Religious Conditions during the Three Centuries Preceding the Rise of the Saudi State (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2002), pp. 27–34. This book of al-Juhany is based on his dissertation, “The History of Najd Prior to Wahhabis: A Study of Social Political and Religious Condition in Najd During the Three Centuries Preceding the Wahhabi Reform Movement” (PhD dissertation, Washington University, Seattle, 1983). 8 Albert Hourani, “Conclusion,” in Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (eds.), Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), p. 303. 9 Nadav Samin, Of Sand or Soil: Genealogy and Tribal Belonging in Saudi Arabia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 16. 10 Ibid., p. 73. 11 Ibid., pp. 82–6.

166 | Notes to Chapter 1 12 Joseph Kostiner, “Transforming Dualities: Tribe and State Formation in Saudi Arabia,” in Khoury and Kostiner, Tribes and State Formation, pp. 226–28. 13 On kinship in premodern societies, see David M. Schneider, A Critique of the Study of Kinship (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1984); Timothy Earle (ed.), Chiefdom: Power, Economy and Ideology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Allen W. Johnson and Timothy Earle, The Evolution of Human Societies: From Foraging Group to Agrarian State (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000). 14 ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimat Ibn Kaldun (Beirut: Dar alQalam, 1986), pp. 128–31; see also A. Benson Mojuetan ‘Ibn Khaldun and his Cycle of Fatalism: A Critique’, Studia Islamica, vol. 53 (1981), pp. 93–108. 15 See, for example, Richard Tapper, “Anthropologists, Historians and Tribespeople on Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East,” in Khoury and Kostiner, Tribes and State Formation, pp. 48–73; Steven C. Caton, “Anthropological Theories of Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East: Ideology and the Semiotics of Power,” in ibid., pp. 74–108; Thomas Barfield, “Tribe and State Relations: The Inner Asia Perspective,” in ibid., pp. 153–82; Ira M. Lapidus, “Tribe and State Formation in Islamic History,” in ibid. pp. 25–47; Patricia Crone, “Tribe and State,” in J. A. Hall (ed.), States in History (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 72–3; Ernest Gellner, “Cohesion and Identity: The Maghreb from Ibn Khaldun to Emile Durkheim,” in Government and Opposition, 10 (1975), pp. 203–18. 16 For more details, see the Introduction to this book. 17 Hamad al-Jasir, “Mu’arrikhu Najd min Ahliha,” al-‘Arab, vols. 9, 10, 11 (1971), vol. 9. pp. 788–9; al-Juhany, Najd before the Salafi Reform Movement, p. 5 and note 6, pp. 164–5. 18 al-Juhany, Najd before the Salafi Reform Movement, pp. 4–5. 19 Ibid., pp. 14–15. 20 On the tribal structure of Arabia and other parts of the Arab countries, see Muhammad Sulayman al-Tayb, Mausu‘at al-Qaba’il al-‘Arabiyya: Buhuth Maydaniyya wa-Tarikhiyya, 10 vols. (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al‘Arabi, 2002). 21 Ibid., vol. I, pp. 15–16. 22 For more details, see al-Juhany, Najd before the Salafi Reform Movement, pp. 62–95. 23 On the chieftancy system and its role, see Joseph Kostiner, “On Instruments and Their Designers: The Ikhwan of Najd and the Emergence of the Saudi State,” Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 21 (1985), pp. 298–323. 24 Fred Mcgraw Donner, “The Bakr B. W¼il Tribes and Politics in Northeastern Arabia on the Eve of Islam,” Studia Islamica, vol. 51 (1980), p. 19. 25 ‘Iz al-Din ‘Ali Ibn Muhammad Ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil fi al-Tarikh (Beirut: Dar Sadir, 1965), vol. 4, pp. 200–1.

Notes to Chapter 1 | 167 26 ‘Iz al-Din ‘Ali Ibn Muhammad Ibn al-Athir, Asad al-Ghaba Fi Ma‘rifat al-Sahaba (ed. Muhammad Ibrahim al-Banna, Muhammad Ahmad ‘Ashur, and Mahmud ‘Abd al-Wahhab Fayad) (Cairo: Maktabat Ibn Taymiyya, 1970), vol. 2, p. 456. 27 Hamad al-Jasir, Madinat al-Riyad ‘Abra Atwar al-Tarikh (Riyadh: Dar al-Yamama li-l-Bahth wa-l-Nashr, 1966), p. 87. 28 Ibid., p. 61. 29 Muhammad Ibn ‘Umar al-Fakhiri, al-Akhbar al-Najdiyya (ed. ‘Abdullah Ibn Yusuf al-Shibil) (Riyadh: Jami‘at al-Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud, 1998), p. 12; al-‘Ajlani, al-Dawla al-Sa‘udiyya al-‘Ula, p. 28; Nasir-i Khusraw, Nasir-i Khusraw’s Book of Travels (Safranama) (ed. and trans. from Persian, with introduction, glossaries, and notes by Wheeler M. Thackston Jr,) (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, Inc., 2001), pp. 3, 108–11. 30 Travels of Ibn Battuta AD 1325–1354 (translated from Arabic manuscript copies by a committee of the Royal Society of Great Britain) (New York: Lenox Hill Pub. & Co. (Burt Franklin), originally published 1829, reprinted 1971), pp. 66–7. See also al-Juhany, Najd before the Salafi Reform Movement, p. 27. 31 Travels of Ibn Battuta, p. 66–7. 32 al-Juhany, Najd before the Salafi Reform Movement, pp. 91–2. 33 Ibid., pp. 51–5. 34 Ibid., pp. 66–7. 35 Madawi al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 31–2. 36 Fore example, see ‘Abdullah al-Salih al-‘Uthaymin, al-Mamlakah al‘Arabiyyh al-Su‘udiyya, 2 vols. (Riyadh: Fahrasat Maktabat al-Malik Fahid al-Wataniyya, 1995), vol. 1, p. 37. 37 ‘Uthman Ibn ‘Abdullah Ibn Bishr, Sawabiq ‘Inwan al-Majd fi Ta’rikh Najd (ed. ‘Abdullah al-Munif) (Riyadh: n.p., 2002), pp. 44–8, 54, 66, 75–6, 77, 79, 86–7, 93–4, 96–7, 106–7, 119, 121, 125–6. The book was published in 1983 in two vols.: ‘Uthman Ibn ‘Abdullah Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd fi Tarikh Najd (ed. ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn ‘Abd alLatif Ibn ‘Abdullah Al al-Shaykh), 2 vols. (Riyadh: Matbu‘at al-Malik ‘Abd al-‘Aziz 1983). 38 ‘Abd al-Malik Ibn Husayn Ibn‘Abd al-Malik al-‘Isami, Simt al-Nujum al‘Awali fi Anba’ al-Awa’il wa-al-Tawali, 4 vols. (Cairo: al-Matba‘a al-Salafiya,1959), vol. 4, pp. 512–20. 39 A-Juhany, Najd before the Salafi Reform Movement, pp. 141–4. 40 On Najd in the pre-Wahhabi period, see Tarik Firro, “The Religious and Social Origins of Wahhabism: Najd in the 16th, 17th and 18th Centuries,” MA thesis (University of Haifa, Haifa, 2003). 41 William Facey, Riyadh: The Old City (London: IMMEL Publishing, 1992), pp. 61–2; see also Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 2, p. 296. 42 ‘Abd al-Rahim, al-Dawla al-Sa‘udiyya al-’Ula, pp. 47–9. 43 See, for example, the description of al-Fakhiri, al-Akhbar al-Najdiyya, p. 79.

168 | Notes to Chapter 2 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53

54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

66 67 68

Facey, Riyadh, pp. 66–85. Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 2, p. 297. Ibid., pp. 296–7; Ibn ‘Isa, Tarikh Ba‘d al-Hawadith, pp. 36–45. al-Jasir, Madinat al-Riyad, p. 87. Ibn Bishr, Sawabiq ‘Inwan al-Majd, p. 34. al-Jasir, Madinat al-Riyad, p. 86. al-Fakhiri, al-Akhbar al-Najdiyya, p. 60. See Facey, Riyadh, pp. 67–8. al-Jasir, Madinat al-Riyad, p. 95. See, for example, Husayn Ibn Abu Bakr Ibn Ghannam, Rawdat al-Afkar wa-l-Afham li-Murtad hal al-Imam wa-Ta‘dad Ghazawat Dhawi alIslam (ed. Nasir al-Din al-Asad) (published under the title Tarikh Najd) (Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq, 1985), p. 96. See Madiha Ahmad Darwish, Tarikh al-Dawla al-Sa‘udiyya hata al-Rub‘ al-Awal min al-Qarn al-‘Ishrin (Jadda: Dar al-Shuruq, 1990), p. 58. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Swayda, Najd b-l-Ams al-Qarib (Riyadh: n.p., 1983), pp. 120–2. al-Juhany, Najd before the Salafi Reform Movement, pp. 145–7. See Facey, Riyadh, pp. 82–3. Ibid., pp. 115–17. See al-Juhany, Najd before the Salafi Reform Movement, pp. 95–100. Ibid., pp. 100–2; Facey, Riyadh, pp. 69–79. Abd al-Rahman al-Ansary, Qaryat al-Fau: A Portrait of a Pre-Islamic Civilization in Saudi Arabia (Riyadh: University of Riyadh, 1982), p. 16. Charles M. Doughty, Travels in Arabia Deserta, 2 vols. (New York: Boni and Liveright Publishers, 1926), vol. 2, p. 329. Facey, Riyadh, pp. 74–5. Ibid., p. 43. For further information about crops, agricultural techniques, and irrigation systems, see F. S. Vidal, “Date Culture in the Oasis of al-Hasa,” Middle East Journal, vol. 8 (1954), pp. 417–28; Harry St John Philby, The Heart of Arabia (London: Constable and Company, 1922), pp. 341– 4. Facey, Riyadh, pp. 78–9. William Gifford Palgrave, Personal Narrative of a Year’s Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia (1862–1863), 2 vols. (Cambridge: Macmillan and Co., 1865), vol. 2, pp. 91–93. al-Juhanay, Najd before the Salafi Reform Movement, pp. 115–17.

2 The Theological and Ethical Origin of Wahhabism 1 Taqlid is the principle of strict adherence to precedents established by the classical schools of Islamic legal thought. 2 ‘Abd al-Rahim ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Rahim, al-Dawla al-Sa‘udiyya al-‘Ula 1745–1818 (Cairo: Ma‘had al-Dirasat al-‘Arabiyya, 1969), p. 25. 3 ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahim Ibn Salih al-Bassam, ‘Ulama Najd Khilal Thamaniyat Qurun, 6 vols. (Riyadh: Dar al-‘Asima,1998), vol. 2, pp. 350–5.

Notes to Chapter 2 | 169 4 Muhammad Ibn ‘Abdullah al-Sakakir, al-Imam Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab: Hayatuhu, Atharuhu, Da‘watuhu al-Salafiyya (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Malik ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, 1999), pp. 180–1. 5 For more details, see Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From the Revival and Reform to the Global Jihad (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2004, p. 17. 6 ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn ‘Abd al-Latif Ibn ‘Abdullah Al al-Shaykh, Mashahir ‘Ulama Najd wa-Ghayruhum (Riyadh: n.p., 1974), pp. 20–1. 7 al-Bassam, ‘Ulama Najd, vol. 4, pp. 13–15. 8 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 20–1; Ibn Ghannam, Rawdat al-Afkar, pp. 81–3; see also “Wahhabiya” in Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1927), vol. 4, p. 1088. 9 On Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s journeys see al-‘Ajlani, al-Dawla al-Sa‘udiyya al-‘Ula, p. 196. 10 Michael Cook, “On the Origin of Wahhabism,” Journal of Royal Asiatic Society, Third Series, vol. 2, no. 2 (July 1992), pp. 191–202. 11 Ibid., pp. 191–8. 12 Harry St John Philby, Saudi Arabia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955), pp. 38–42. 13 ‘Abd al-Rahim, Al-Dawla al-Sa‘udiyya al-‘Ula, pp. 40–2, 47. 14 al-Juhany, “The History of Najd Prior to Wahhabis,” pp. 281–4. 15 Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, pp. 43–4; see also Al-Juhany, “The History of Najd Prior to Wahhabis,” pp. 285–9. 16 Henri Laoust, ‘Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edn, consulted online. 17 On ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab see below. 18 Cook, “On the Origin of Wahhabism,” pp. 198–9. 19 ‘Abd al-Rahim, Al-Dawla al-Sa‘udiyya al-‘Ula, p. 25. 20 Ibid., pp. 24–6. 21 See Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-‘Arab, 18 vols. (Beirut: Dar Ihya’ al-Turath al‘Arabi 1988), vol. 5, pp. 66–8. 22 On al-San‘ani see below. 23 ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Muhammad Ibn Qasim al-‘Isami, Al-Durar alSaniyya fî al-Ajwiba al-Najdiyya: Majmu‘ Rasa’il wa-Masa’il ‘Ulama Najd al-A‘lam min ‘Asr al-Shaykh Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahha ila ‘Asrina, 12 vols. (Riyadh: n.p., 1994), vol. 4, p. 17. 24 On Al al-Shaykh’s inspiration see below. 25 Talip Kucukcan, “Some Reflections on the Wahhabiya and the Sanusiya Movements: Comparative Approach,” Islamic Quarterly, vol. 37 (1993), pp. 237–41. 26 About qiyas sahih and qiyas fasid see Taqy al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya, Majmu‘at al-Fatawa (ed. ‘Amir al-Jazzar), 20 vols. (Riyadh: Maktabat al-‘Ibikan 1998), vol. 10, pp. 438–9, 458–9. 27 See Saud Ibn Salih al-‘Atishan, Manhaj Ibn Taymiyya fi al-Fiqh (Riyadh: Maktabat al-‘Ibikan), 1999, p. 87. 28 Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Majmu‘at al-Tawhid (ed. Rashid Rida)

170 | Notes to Chapter 2

29

30 31 32

33 34 35 36

37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

46 47 48 49

50 51

52 53 54 55

(Riyadh: al-Amana al-‘Amma li-l-Ihtifal bi-Murur Mi’at ‘Aam ‘ala Ta’sis al-Mamlaka, 1999), p. 128. ‘Ulama Najd (Scholars of Najd), Majmu‘at al-Rasa’il wa-l-Masa’il alNajdiyya, 4 vols. (Cairo: Matba‘at al-Manar bi-Misr, 1928), vol. 4, p. 16. al-‘Isami, al-Durar al-Saniyya, vol. 4, p. 19. Ibid., vol. 4, p. 42. See Itzhak Weismann, “ha-Moreshet ha-Politit shel Ibn Taymiyya bar’i ha-Salafiyya ha-Mikorit,” ha-Mizrah ha-Hadash, vol. 42 (2001), p. 37 (Hebrew). al-‘Atishan, Manhaj Ibn Taymiyya, pp. 74–84. Bassam ‘Atiyya Isma‘il Faraj, al-Fikr al-Siyasi ‘inda Ibn Taymiyy (Amman: Dar al-Yaqut, 2001), pp. 47–61, 251–75. Ibid., pp. 193–203. Taqy al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya, al-Siyasa al-Shar‘iyya fi Islah al-Ra‘i w-l-Ra‘iyya (ed. Muhammad al-Sharbawi) (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al‘Ilmiyya, 1988), pp. 13–22, 28–33, 137–43. al-Sakakir, al-Imam Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, p. 101. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Majmu‘at al-Tawhid, p. 126. Ibid., p. 150; Majmu‘at al-Rasa’il wa-l-Masa’il al-Najdiyya, vol. 4, p. 15. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Majmu‘at al-Tawhid, pp. 114–15. Ibn Taymiyya, Majmu‘at al-Fatawa, vol. 18, pp. 98–9. Majmu‘at Rasa‘il wa-Masa’il al-Najdiyya, vol. 4, pp. 41–6. Ibid., p. 43. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 47–222. Nehemia Levtzion, “Tnu‘ut Hithadshut ve-Riforma ba-Islam ba-Mi’a ha-18” (Renewal Movements and Reforms in Islam in the Eighteenth Century) (Hebrew), Mizrah ha-Hadash 31 (1986), pp. 48–70, 51. Ayman al-Yassini, Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), p. 6. ‘Abd al-Rahim, al-Dawla al-Sa‘udiyya al-‘Ula, pp. 33–4. al-Bassam, ‘Ulama Najd, vol. 2, pp. 366–72. Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Humayd, al-Suhub al-Wabila ‘ala Dara‘ih al-Hanabila (ed. Bakr Ibn ‘Abdullah Abu Zayyd and ‘Abd alRahman Ibn Sulayman al-‘Uthayymin) (Beirut: Mu’asasat al-Risala 1996), p. 404. Ibid., p. 404. Ibid., pp. 413–15; al-Bassam, ‘Ulama Najd, vol. 1, pp. 309–13; Ahmad Ibn Muhammad al-Manqur, Tarikh al-Shaykh Ahmad Ibn Muhammad al-Manqur (ed. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Khuwaytir) (Riyadh: Mu‘asasat alJazira, 1970), p. 44; Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 2, p. 210. al-Bassam,‘Ulama Najd, vol. 1, pp. 6–10; Ibn Humayd, al-Suhub alWabila, pp. 40–4. Ibn Humayd, al-Suhub al-Wabila, pp. 40–4. Ibid., p. 40. Majmu‘at al-Rasa’il wa-l-Masa’il al-Najdiyyaa, vol. 1, p. 215.

Notes to Chapter 3 | 171 56 Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, p. 36. 57 Majmu‘at al-Rasa’il wa-l-Masa’il al-Najdiyyaa, vol. 1, p. 68. 58 Ibid., p. 70.

3 Facing Internal and External Challenges 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

20 21

Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, pp. 120–99. Ibid., pp. 60–118. Ibid., p. 67. For more details on the system see al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 49–69. In the years 2005–6 a debate erupted among Saudi officials and ‘ulama about the abolition of the mutawi‘a system. Sulayman Ibn Suhaym served as a mufti and jurist in Riyadh during the reign of Ibn Dawwas; see al-Bassam, ‘Ulama Najd, vol. 2, pp. 381–2. See David Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (London and New York: I. B.Tauris 2006), pp. 19–22. al-Bassam, ‘Ulama Najd, vol. 4, pp. 364–70; see also Commins, The Wahhabi Mission, p. 28. Wahhabi sources do not provides the full names and dates for Ibn Isma‘il, Ibn Rabi‘a, and Ibn ‘Ubayid; see, for example, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-‘Abd alLatif, Da‘awi al-Munawi‘in li-Da‘wat al-Shaykh Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (Riyadh: Dar al-Watan li-l-Nashr 1991), pp. 33–5. Ibid., pp. 38–9; al-Bassam, ‘Ulama Najd, vol. 4, pp. 406–9; Ibn Humayd, al-Suhub al-Wabila, pp. 540–44. al-Bassam,‘Ulama Najd, vol. 4, pp. 38–40; Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, p. 88. al-Bassam, ‘Ulama Najd, vol. 2, pp. 350–7; Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, p. 210. For more details on Sulayman’s opposition to his brother, see Commins, The Wahhabi Mission, pp. 22–4. al-Bassam, ‘Ulama Najd, vol. 6, pp. 236–45; Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, p. 206; Ibn Humayd, al-Suhub al-Wabila, pp. 969–80. al-‘Abd al-Latif, Da‘awi, pp. 42–3. Ibid., pp. 43–8. Samir Traboulsi, “An Early Refutation of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab’s Reformist Views,” Die Welt des Islam, vol. 42 (2002), pp. 373–415. See ibid., pp. 375–82. See Sir Harford Jones Brydges, “Reports on the Wahhabi Movement, 1798–1838,” in Penelope Tuson and Anita Burdett (eds.), Records of Saudi Arabia, Primary Documents, 1902–1960, 10 vols. (hereafter RSAPD) (Slough and Oxford: Archive Editions and Redwood Press, 1992), vol. 1, pp. 209–39. al-Bassam, ‘Ulama Najd, vol. 6, pp. 292–303; Ibn Humayd, al-Suhub alWabila, pp. 1007–13. al-Bassam, ‘Ulama Najd, vol. 5, pp. 143–55.

172 | Notes to Chapter 3 22 On the way the zakat was levied during this period, see Brydges, “Reports on the Wahhabi Movement,” pp. 227–30. 23 al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, p. 22. 24 See Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, pp. 66–7; Ibn Ghannam, Rawdat al-Afkar, pp. 106–7. 25 See ‘Abd al-Rahim, al-Dawla al-Sa‘udiyya al-’Ula, pp. 51–63. 26 Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, pp. 125–26; Ibn Ghannam, Rawdat alAfkar, pp. 140–2. 27 Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, pp. 121–2; ‘Abd al-Rahim, al-Dawla al-Sa‘udiyya al-’Ula, p. 75. 28 Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, pp. 150–2. 29 Alexei Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia (London: Saqi Books, 1998), p. 87. 30 Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, pp. 153–6. Ibn Ghannam, Rawdat alAfkar, pp. 158–61. 31 ‘Abd al-Rahim, al-Dawla al-Sa‘udiyya al-’Ula, pp. 61–3. 32 Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, pp. 200–6. 33 Ibid., pp. 215–17; ‘Abd al-Rahim, al-Dawla al-Sa‘udiyya al-’Ula, pp. 78– 80; Ibn Ghannam, Rawdat al-Afkar, pp. 191–2. 34 According to Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, pp. 253–4, the Baghdadi troops were defeated in 1799; see also Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, p. 95. 35 Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, p. 257. The date of the attack on Karbala is 1801 or 1802; Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, p. 95, gives it as March 1802; al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, p. 22, as 1801; and Ibn ‘Isa, Tarikh Ba‘d al-Hawadith, pp. 129–30, as 1217H, which falls approximately in the year 1802. 36 al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, p. 22. 37 James Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Saudi Arabia (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 2004), p. 135. 38 See the description of these events in Brydges, “Reports on the Wahhabi Movement,” pp. 235–9. 39 John Lewis Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, 2 vols. (New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation 1967), vol. 2, p. 203. 40 See al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, p. 21; Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Saudi Arabia, p. 136; ‘Abd al-Rahim, al-Dawla al-Sa‘udiyya al-’Ula, pp. 134–6. 41 Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, pp. 285–8. 42 Burckhardt, Notes on the Bedouins, vol. 2, p. 199. 43 Ahmad Zini Dahlan, Tarikh Ashraf al-Hijaz 1822–1840 (the original title is Khulasat al-Kalam fi Bayan ’Umara’ al-Balad al-Haram) (Beirut: Dar al-Saqi 1993). 44 Harry St John Philby, Saudi Arabia, reprint (Beirut: Lebanon Bookshop, 1968), p. 108; Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Saudi Arabia, p. 137; Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, p. 104. 45 ‘Abd al-Rahim, al-Dawla al-Sa‘udiyya al-’Ula, pp. 301–13.

Notes to Chapter 3 | 173 46 Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, p. 309. 47 Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 137–8; Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 116; Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, p. 110. 48 Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, pp. 303–4; Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, p. 110. 49 al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, p. 21. 50 See ‘Abd al-Rahim, al-Dawla al-Sa‘udiyya al-’Ula, p. 94. 51 Vassilie, The History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 99–101. 52 Ibn ‘Isa, Tarikh Ba‘d al-Hawadith, pp. 134–5. 53 See Commins, The Wahhabi Mission, p. 30. 54 Richard Bayly, Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965), p. 7. 55 Gerald De Goury, Hukam Makka (translation of Ruler of Mecca) (Cairo: Matba‘at Madbuli, 2000), pp. 127–41. 56 ‘Abd al-MaliK al-‘Isami, Simt al-Nnujum al-‘Awali fi Anba’ al-Awa’il waal-Tawali, 4 vols. (Cairo: al-Matba‘ al-Ssalafiyya, n.d.), vol. 4, p. 392. 57 al-‘Ajlani, al-Dawla al-Su‘udiyya al-‘Ula, p. 263. 58 De Goury, Hukam Makka, pp. 185–6. 59 al-‘Ajlani, al-Dawla al-Su‘udiyya al-‘Ula, p. 31. 60 De Goury, Hukam Makka, pp. 163–7. 61 Said Abdulrahman, “Saudi Arabia: The Transition from Tribal Society to a Nation-State” (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Missouri– Columbia, 1979), p. 30. 62 For more details, see Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 76–8. 63 Abdulrahman, “Saudi Arabia,” pp. 30–1; ‘Abd al-Rahim, al-Dawla alSa‘udiyya al-’Ula, p. 302. 64 ‘Abd al-Rahim, al-Dawla al-Sa‘udiyya al-’Ula, pp. 289–300; Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, pp. 331–5. 65 See al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, p. 23; Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, p. 7; Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Saudi Arabia, p. 143; Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, p. 154. 66 Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 145; on the losses, see Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, pp. 418–21. 67 On their exile, see below. 68 al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, p. 23; Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, p. 422; ‘Abd al-Rahim, al-Dawla al-Sa‘udiyya al-’Ula, p. 332; Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Saudi Arabia, p. 144; Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, p. 155; Ibn ‘Isa, Tarikh Ba‘d al-Hawadith, p. 146. 69 Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Saudi Arabia, p. 145; Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, p. 23. 70 al-Juhany follows the development of religious studies in pre-Wahhabi times, relating this to socioeconomic developments introduced by immigration to Najd since the sixteenth century; see the al-Juhany, “Introduction” to “The History of Najd Prior to Wahhabis,” pp. 1–6.

174 | Notes to Chapter 3 71 Michael Cook, “The Expansion of the First Saudi State: The Case of alWashm,” in C. E. Bosworth, Charles Issawi, Roger Savory, and A. L. Udovitch (eds.), The Islamic World from Classical to Modern Times: Essays in Honor of Bernard Lewis (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1989), pp. 675–9. 72 On the revival of the Saudi state, see Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 192–201; Philby, Saudi Arabia, pp. 218–36; ‘Abd al-Fattah Hasan Abu ‘Aliyya, Tarikh al-Dawla al-Sa‘udiyya al-Thaniyya (Riyadh: Dar al-Marrikh, 1985), pp. 175–83; Darwish, Tarikh al-Dawla alSa‘udiyya, pp. 69–73. 73 On the Annales school, see Stuart Clark (ed.), The Annales School: Critical Assessment, 4 vols. (London: Routledge, 1999); see also Stuart Clark, “The Annales Historians,” in Quentin Skinner (ed.), The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985), pp. 182–3. 74 Abdulaziz H. al-Fahad, “The ‘Imama vs. the ‘Iqal: Hadari–Bedouin Conflict and the Formation of the Saudi State,” in Madawi al-Rasheed and Rober Vitalis (eds.), Counter-Narratives: History, Contemporary Society, and Politics in Saudi Arabia and Yemen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 35–9. 75 Ibid., pp. 39–42. 76 Ibid., pp. 42–5. 77 Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, p. 20. 78 Six additional judges from other clans were executed or killed in combat; see Commins, The Wahhabi Mission, pp. 255–6. Ibn ‘Isa mentioned among the ‘ulama who had been murdered by the Egyptians ‘Ali Ibn Hamad Ibn Rashid al-‘Arini, the qadi of al-Kharj; Rushayd al-Sardi, the qadi of Hutat Bani Tamim; ‘Abdullah Ibn Muhammad Ibn Suwaylm; and ‘Abdullah Ibn Ahmad Ibn Kathir. See Ibn ‘Isa, Tarikh Ba‘d al-Hawadith, pp. 147–8. 79 Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, p. 158; Commins, The Wahhabi Mission, p. 41; Facey, Riyadh, p. 120. 80 Commins, The Wahhabi Mission, p. 41. 81 One of Shaykh Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s sons, he died in Egypt, according to ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn ‘Abd al-Latif Ibn ‘Abdullah Al alShaykh; Ali died in 1829–30, his descendants are known by the denomination of Al-Muhammad, and they live for the time being in Najd. See Al al-Shaykh, Mashahir ‘Ulama Najd wa-Ghayruhum, pp. 70–1. 82 His birth and death dates are unknown. Mashahir ‘Ulama Najd waGhayruhum mentions that Ibrahim was still alive in the year 1835 and that he did not have any existing descendants in Najd; see Al al-Shaykh, Mashahir ‘Ulama Najd wa-Ghayruhum, p. 72; Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan alMajd, vol. 1, p. 190. 83 Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, pp. 432–4.

Notes to Chapter 4 | 175 4 Animating the Wahhabi Spark 1 See Abdulrahman, “Saudi Arabia,” p. 32. 2 al-Bassam, ‘Ulama Najd, vol. 1, p. 156. 3 Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 284–6; Al al-Shaykh, Mashahir ‘Ulama Najd waGhayruhum, pp. 70–1. 4 Al al-Shaykh, Mashahir ‘Ulama Najd wa-Ghayruhum, p. 43; Husayyin descendants were known al-Husayyin. See also Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan alMajd, vol. 1, p. 186; al-Bassam: ‘Ulama Najd, vol. 2, pp. 63–5. 5 Al al-Shaykh, Mashahir ‘Ulama Najd wa-Ghayruhum, pp. 48–69; according to al-Bassam, ‘Ulama Najd, vol. 1, p. 178, ‘Abdullah died in 1828. 6 No information is available about his birth and death dates. 7 There is no information on his death, but in 1835 he was still in exile in Cairo; see Al al-Shaykh, Mashahir ‘Ulama Najd wa-Ghayruhum, p. 72. 8 On Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s sons, see Al al-Shaykh, Mashahir ‘Ulama Najd wa-Ghayruhum, p. 33. 9 Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, pp. 185–8. 10 See also al-Juhany, “The History of Najd Prior to Wahhabis,” p. 281. 11 Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, p. 186. 12 See al-Basam, ‘Ulama Najd, vol. 2, pp. 56–8. 13 Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, p. 189. 14 Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000), pp. 171–2. 15 See examples of these issues in Majmu‘t al-Rasai‘l wa-l-Masa’il alNajdiyya, vol. 1, pp. 48–320. 16 Ibid., vol. 4, p. 97. 17 See Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s epistle: Risala fi al-Rad ‘ala al-Rafida (ed. Nasir ibn Sa‘d al-Rashid), in “Mulhaq al-Musanafat,” published in Mu’allafat al-Shaykh al-Imam Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (ed. ‘Ad al-‘Aziz Zayd al-Rumi, Muhammad Baltaji, and Sayyd Hijab), 13 vols. (Cairo: al-Markiz al-Islami li-l-Tiba‘a wa-l-Nashr 1993), vol. 13, pp. 3–56. 18 Ibid., pp. 30–1. 19 Majmu‘t al-Rasa’il wa-l-Masai’l al-Najdiyya, vol. 4, p. 64. 20 Ibid., p. 205. 21 See Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Majmu‘at al-Tawhid, pp. 19–95. 22 See examples of his interpretation: Sulayman Ibn ‘Abdullah Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Taysir al-‘Aziz al-Hamid fi Sharh Kitab al-Tawhid (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1970). 23 Al al-Shaykh, Mashahir ‘Ulama Najd wa-Ghayruhum, pp. 44–7; Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, pp. 424–5; al-Basam, ‘Ulama Najd, vol. 2, pp. 341–50. 24 Mayy al-‘Isa, al-Hayat al-‘llmiyya fi Najd (Riyadh: Darat al-Malic ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, 1996), pp. 317–21. 25 Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, pp. 431–2. 26 See Al al-Shaykh, Mashahir ‘Ulama Najd wa-Ghayruhum, p. 86. 27 See Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, p. 189; Al al-Shaykh, Mashahir

176 | Notes to Chapter 4

28 29

30 31

32 33

34

35 36 37 38 39 40 41

‘Ulama Najd wa-Ghayruhum, pp. 75–7; al-Bassam, ‘Ulama Najd, vol. 3, pp. 114–17. Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 2, pp. 42–45. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 447–9; Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Saudi Arabia, p. 149; Abu ‘Aliyya, Tarikh al-Dawla al-Su‘udiyya, p. 31; Darwish, Tarikh al-Dawla al-Su‘udiyya, pp. 57–8; Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 54–5; Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, p. 162; Philby, Saudi Arabia, pp. 152–3; Facey, Riyadh, p. 121; Amin alRrihani, Najd wa-Mulhaqatuh (Beirut: Dar al-Rrihani li-l-Ttiba‘a wa-l-Nnashr, 1964), p. 92 ; al-Jasir, Madinat al-Riyad, pp. 100–1. See al-Fahad, “The‘Imam’,” pp. 45–6. Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, p. 24. ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn ‘Abdullah was born in Dir’iyya in 1804 and died in 1857/8 in Cairo. He had three sons: the first was Ahmad, who was pharmacist in Cairo. Ahmad had a daughter, Latiyfa, and a son ‘Abd al-Rahman Haqqi. He bore a son named Muhammad who became the chief of the ambulance service for infants in Egypt during reign of King Fu’ad (1922–36) and King Faruq (1936–52). This branch of Al al-Shaykh chose a secular career, unlike the rest of Al al-Shaykh branches that continued to live by the Wahhabi creed in Najd. see Al al-Shaykh, Mashahir ‘Ulama Najd waGhayruhum, pp. 75–7. We assume that this branch kept certain connections with their relatives in Najd and probably had some links with the Wahhabi creed. Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, p. 419. ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan Al al-Shaykh and his son ‘Abd al-Latif Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan Al al-Shaykh were the major and the most notorious Al al-Shaykh ‘ulama during the Second Wahhabi–Saudi State. ‘Ali Ibn Husayn Ibn Muhammad is the great-great-grandfather to ‘Abdullah Ibn Hasan Al al-Shaykh (1870–1957/8), the prominent Wahhabi judge of the modern kingdom of Saudi Arabia after its rise in 1932. He was also the second grandfather of ‘Umar Ibn Hasan (1902– 75), who served for fifty years as the head of the Haya’t al-Amr bi-l-ma‘ruf wa-al-Nahy ‘an al-Munkar (Committee for Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong) in Najd and Hasa. These two scholars strengthened the position of Al Hasan’s branch among Al al-Shaykh. On the name of the branch, see Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, p. 187. On ‘Ali Ibn Husayn Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Bassam biography, see al-Bassam, ‘Ulama Najd, vol. 5, pp. 174–5. See Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 2, pp. 180, 43, 123, 132. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 186–7. al-Basam, ‘Ulama Najd, vol. 3, pp. 363–5. Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 2, pp. 66–7. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 451–2. For further details about these ‘ulama after the Egyptian expedition, see Commins, The Wahhabi Mission, pp. 41–3. Al al-Shaykh, Mashahir ‘Ulama Najd wa-Ghayruhum, pp. 235–8; Ibn

Notes to Chapter 4 | 177

42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49

50

51

52 53

‘Isa, Tarikh Ba‘d al-Hawadith, p. 177; ‘Abdullah al-‘Uthaymin, Tarikh al-Mamlaka al-‘Arabiyya Sa‘udiyya, 2 vols. (Riyadh: n.p., 1995), vol. 1, pp. 320–1. Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, pp. 364, 424; vol. 2, pp. 37, 57, 123, 130. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 138–9, 209, 268. Commins, The Wahhabi Mission, p. 43; al-Basam, ‘Ulama Najd, vol. 4, pp. 225–44. On the Daud Ibn Jirjis biography, see al-Sakakir, al-Imam Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, p. 220. On ‘Abd al-Latif and his father ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan’s polemical treatises, see Chapters 5 and 6 below. Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, pp. 441–2. Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Saudi Arabia, p. 148; Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, p. 54. Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, pp. 444–7; Abu ‘Aliyya, Tarikh alDawla al-Su‘udiyya, p. 31; Darwish, Tarikh al-Dawla al-Su‘udiyya, pp. 57–8; Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 50–3; Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, p. 161; Philby, Saudi Arabia, pp. 152–3; Facey, Riyadh, pp. 120–1; al-Rrihani, Najd wa-Mulhaqatuh, p. 92. Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, pp. 447–9; Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Saudi Arabia, p. 149; Abu ‘Aliyya, Tarikh al-Dawla al-Su‘udiyya, p. 31; Darwish, Tarikh al-Dawla al-Su‘udiyya, pp. 57–8; Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 54–5; Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, p. 162; Philby, Saudi Arabia, pp. 152–3; Facey, Riyadh, p. 121; al-Rrihani, Najd wa-Mulhaqatuh, p. 92; al-Jasir, Madinat alRiyad, pp. 100–1. Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 1, pp. 461–4; Ibn ‘Isa, Tarikh Ba‘d alHawadith, pp. 148–9; Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Saudi Arabia, p. 149; Abu ‘Aliyya, Tarikh al-Dawla al-Su‘udiyya, pp. 31–2; Darwish, Tarikh al-Dawla al-Su‘udiyya, pp. 57–8; Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 55–6; Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 161–2; Philby, Saudi Arabia, pp. 154–5; Facey, Riyadh, p. 121; alRrihani, Najd wa-Mulhaqatuh, p. 92; al-Jasir, Madinat al-Riyad, p. 102. On the arrival of Husayn Bek in Najd, see ‘Abd al-Rahman alJabarti, ‘Ajayb al-Athar fi al-Tarajim wa-al-Akhbar (ed. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Jamal al-ddin), 5 vols. (Cairo: Matba‘at al-Madbulli, 1997), vol. 5, pp. 1487–8. See Lieutant S. Hennell’s description of Turki’s takeover and military expansion, in RSAPD, vol. 1, pp. 253–6. Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 2, pp. 25–40; Ibn ‘Isa, Tarikh Ba‘d alHawadith, pp. 154–5; Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Saudi Arabia, p. 151; Abu ‘Aliyya, Tarikh al-Dawla al-Su‘udiyya, p. 32; Darwish, Tarikh al-Dawla al-Su‘udiyya, pp. 57–8; Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 57–63; Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 162–3;

178 | Notes to Chapter 4

54 55

56

57. 58 59

60 61 62 63 64 65

66

67

68 69

Philby, Saudi Arabia, pp. 156–7; Facey, Riyadh, p. 122; al-Jasir, Madinat al-Riyad, p. 104; al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, p. 23. On Mushari Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman, see Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 2, pp. 22–3, 97. Ibid., pp. 99–100; Ibn ‘Isa, Tarikh Ba‘d al-Hawadith, p. 161; Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Saudi Arabia, p. 151; Abu ‘Aliyya, Tarikh al-Dawla al-Su‘udiyya, p. 37; Darwish, Tarikh al-Dawla al-Su‘udiyya, p. 58; Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, p. 94; Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, p. 167; Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 167; Facey, Riyadh, pp. 126–7; al-Jasir, Madinat al-Riyad, p. 105; al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, p. 24; al-Rrihani, Najd wa-Mulhaqatuh, p. 93; Munir al-‘Ajlani, Tarikh al-Bilad al-‘Arabiyya al-Su‘udiyya: al-Dawla alSu‘udiyya al-Thaniyya (Beirut: Dar al-Nafa’is, 1994), pp. 17–22. Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 2, pp. 104–5; Ibn ‘Isa, Tarikh Ba‘d alHawadith, p. 162; Abu ‘Aliyya, Tarikh al-Dawla al-Su‘udiyyah, pp. 38–9; Darwish, Tarikh al-Dawla al-Su‘udiyyah, p. 58; Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 96–9; Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 168–9; Philby, Saudi Arabia, p. 166–8; Facey, Riyadh, p. 127; al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 26–7. See, for example, Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, p. 175. See Lieutenant A. B. Kemball’s description of events from 1832 to 1844 in RSAPD, vol. 1, pp. 256–71. Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 2, pp. 71–5; Ibn ‘Isa, pp. 157–8; Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Saudi Arabia, p. 152; Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 75–8; Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 164–5. Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 2, p. 85. Ibid., p. 59. Ibid., pp. 71–2. D. A. Blane to S. Hennell, May 22, 1833 in RSAPD, vol. 1, pp. 348–9. See Al al-Shaykh, Mashahir ‘Ulama Najd wa-Ghayruhum, p. 88. ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab [Al alShaykh], Fatih al-Majid Sharh Kitab al-Tawhid (ed. Ashraf Ibn ‘Abd al-Maqsud Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahim) (Cairo: Mu’asasat Qurtuba, 1992), p. 30. On ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan’s education at al-Azhar, see al-Basam, ‘Ulama Najd, vol. 1, pp. 186–90; Al al-Shaykh, Mashahir ‘Ulama Najd wa-Ghayruhum, pp. 87–92; ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan [Al al-Shaykh], Fatih al-Majid, pp. 29–30. See ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Qurrat ‘Uyun al-Muwahhidin (ed. ‘Imad Farrah) (Tanta: Dar al-Sahaba li-l-Tturath, 1991). On Daud Ibn Jarjis, see Rasul Muhammad Rasul, al-Wahhabiyyun waal-‘Iraq (Riyadh: al-Rrayys li-l-Nashr, 2005), pp. 147–53 . ‘Abd Rahman Ibn Hasan [Al al-Shaykh], Fatih al-Majid, p. 30; al-Basam, ‘Ulama Najd, vol. 1, p. 192.

Notes to Chapter 4 | 179 70 On his biography, see Humayd, al-Suhub al-Wabila, vol. 1, pp. 11–70; see also David Commins, “Traditional Anti-Wahhabi Hanbalisim in Nineteenth Century Arabia,” in Itzchak Wiesman and Fruma Zachs (eds.), Ottoman Reform and Muslim Regeneration (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005), pp. 82–3. 71 David Commins, “Traditional Anti-Wahhabi Hanbalisim in Nineteenth Century Arabia,” pp. 82–4; Commins, The Wahhabi Mission, pp. 56–8. 72 Al al-Shaykh, Mashahir ‘Ulama Najd wa-Ghayruhum, p. 83. 73 See footnote in Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 2, pp. 48–50. 74 Faysal Ibn Mash‘al Ibn Saud, Rasa’il A’imat Da‘wat al-Tawhid (Riyadh: Maktabat al-‘Ibikan, 2002), pp. 118–19. 75 Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, pp. 175–8. 76 Ibid., pp. 178–9. 77 Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 2, pp. 104–5; Ibn ‘Isa, Tarikh Ba‘d alHawadith, p. 162; Abu ‘Aliyya, Tarikh al-Dawla al-Su‘udiyya, pp. 38–9; Darwish, Tarikh al-Dawla al-Su‘udiyya, p. 58; Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 96–9; Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 168–9; Philby, Saudi Arabia, pp. 166–8; Facey, Riyadh, p. 127; alRasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 26–7. 78 Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 2, pp. 129–30. 79 Ibid., pp. 132–3, 135–9; Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 105–7; Philby, Saudi Arabia, pp. 174–6. 80 Khalid Ibn Saud Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Muhammad Ibn Saud was deported to Egypt after the fall of Dir‘iyya in 1818 and was educated in Egypt. He was the young son of the third ruler of the First Saudi State, Saud (r. 1803–14); see Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 2, p. 140; Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, p. 108. 81 Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 2, p. 149. Among Al al-Shaykh ‘ulama were ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan, ‘Ali Ibn Husayn Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and ‘Abd al-Malik Ibn Husayn. 82 See an epistle of ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan to Faysal Ibn Turki, in al‘Ajlani, al-Dawla al-Su‘udiyya al-Thaniyya, p. 46. 83 Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 2, p. 174; Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 118–20. 84 ‘Abdullah Ibn Thunayan was great-great-grandson of Saud (r. 1803–14). 85 In the year 1840, Muhammad ‘Ali, the ruler of Egypt (1805–48), lost large parts of his dominions in Arabia, Syria, and Crete. As an Egyptian proxy, Khalid Ibn Saud was unable to keep the peace in the region. For further information, see Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, p. 133; Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 2, pp. 193–4; Ibn ‘Isa, Tarikh Ba‘d al-Hawadith, p. 165; Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Saudi Arabia, p. 154; Abu ‘Aliyya, Tarikh al-Dawla al-Su‘udiyya, pp. 66–76; Darwish, Tarikh al-Dawla al-Su‘udiyya, pp. 60–1; Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 174–5. 86 Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 2, p. 192; Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, p. 175.

180 | Notes to Chapter 5 87 Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 2, pp. 199–202. 88 Ibid., pp. 213–14. 89 Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 175–6; Facey, Riyadh, p. 132; Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, p. 142. 90 Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 2, pp. 207–15; Facey, Riyadh, p. 132; Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 176–7; Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 144–8. 91 See S. Hennell to J. P. Willoughby, chief secretary to the government, Bombay, March 11, 1845, in RSAPD, vol. 1, pp. 381–4; S. Hennell to A. Malet, chief secretary to the government, Bombay, September 9, 1847, in RSAPD, pp. 385–6.

5 Religion under Faysal and His Successors 1 Madawi al Rasheed, Politics in an Arabian Oasis: The Rashidi Tribal Dynasty (London and New York: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd. Publishers, 1991), pp. 56–7. 2 On the rise of Al al-Rashid and the fall of the Second Saudi State, see Chapter 6 below. 3 Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, p. 188; Abu ‘Aliyya, Tarikh alDawla al-Su‘udiyya, pp. 42–3; Facey, Riyadh, p. 134; Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, p. 156. 4 Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century p. 157; Facey, Riyadh, p. 134. 5 Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 172–8. 6 Commins, The Wahhabi Mission, pp. 52–3. 7 Ibid., pp. 53–4. 8 Ibn Humayd, al-Suhub al-Wabila, vol. 1, p. 18. 9 Ibid., pp. 28–30. 10 Ibid., p. 23. 11 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 679–80. 12 Ibid., p. 680. 13 Ibid., p. 627. 14 al-Fahad, “The ‘Imam’,” p. 47. 15 Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 2, p. 233; Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, p. 170; Philby, Saudi Arabia, pp. 198–9. 16 Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, p. 181. 17 Philby, Saudi Arabia, pp. 210–11. 18 Lewis Pelly, Report on a Journey to Riyadh in Central Arabia (1865) (Cambridge: Oleander Press, 1978), p. 31; see also Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 212–13. 19 al-Fahad, “The‘Imam’,” p. 44. 20 See Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, p. 179. 21 Lewis Pelly, Report on a Journey to Riyadh, p. vi . 22 Ibid., pp. 66–7. 23 Ibid., pp. 46–7. 24 Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 2, pp. 215–19.

Notes to Chapter 5 | 181 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54

55 56

Ibid., pp. 216–18. Ibid., p. 235. Ibid., p. 236. Ibid., p. 256. See al-Bassam, ‘Ulama Najd, vol. 4, pp. 61–2. Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 2, p. 257. See Chapter 6 below. Ibn Bishr, ‘Inwan al-Majd, vol. 2, pp. 267–8. Hasan Ibn Farhan al-Maliki, Da‘iya wa Laysa Nabiyy (Amman: Dar alRazi, 2004), p. 111. Palgrave, Personal Narrative of a Year’s Journey, vol. 1, p. 408. Ibid., p. 409. Ibid., p. 413. Ibid., pp. 410–11. Ibid., pp. 412. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 73. Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, p. 222. Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, pp. 178–9. Hafiz Wahba, Jazirat al-‘Arab fi al-Qarn al-‘Ishrin (Cairo: n.p., 1961), pp. 309–12; see also Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, pp. 182–3. Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, pp. 183–7. Commins, The Wahhabi Mission, p. 109. Palgrave, Personal Narrative of a Year’s Journey, vol. 2, p. 74. Facey, Riyadh, p. 169. See Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 192–3. See Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, p. 230. Philby, Saudi Arabia, pp. 218–19. Ibid.; Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, p. 194. Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, p. 202. Ibn ‘Isa, Tarikh Ba‘d al-Hawadith, p. 171. For more details see Philby, Saudi Arabia, pp. 218–36; Vassiliev, The History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 194–206. On British and Ottoman interventions after the death of Faysal, see the British reports and documents, including Colonel Pelly’s narrative of the events from 1871 to 1892, in RSAPD, vol. 1, pp. 455–547. Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 229–71; Philby, Saudi Arabia, pp. 218–36. Literally speaking, jahiliyya has several meanings; ignorance, unwise behavior, and opposition to ‘ilm (knowledge). Because it has these meanings, Muslims labeled the whole period before Islam jahiliyya. See Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-‘Arab, 18 vols. (Beirut: Dar Ihiya al-Turath al-‘Arabi, 1988), vol. 2, pp. 402–4. It seems that ‘Abd al-Latif uses the term in a way similar to that of the modern fundamentalists such Sayd Qutb, who considers jahiliyya non-Islamic behavior that is not limited to a specific period or place but applies throughout Islamic history.

182 | Notes to Chapter 6 57 ‘Abd al-Latif Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab Al al-Shaykh, ‘Uyun al-Rasa’il (ed. Husayn Muhammad Bawa), 2 vols. (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rashid, 2000), vol. 2, p. 900. 58 Ibid., p. 940. 59 Ibn Hazm was born in Cordoba, Andalusia. He was a philosopher and theologian who wrote about 400 works, of which only forty are known, covering a range of topics such as Islamic jurisprudence, logic, history, ethics, comparative religion, and theology. He opposed the allegorical interpretation of religious texts, preferring the grammatical and syntactical interpretation of the Qur’an. 60 Al al-Shaykh, Mashahir ‘Ulama Najd wa-Ghayruhum, p. 108. 61 Ibid., p. 106. 62 See M. J. Crawford, “Civil War, Foreign Intervention, and the Question of Political Legitimacy: A Nineteenth-Century Sa‘udi Qadi’s Dilemma,” International Journal for Middle East Studies, vol. 14 (1982), p. 235. 63 Al al-Shaykh, Mashahir ‘Ulama Najd wa-Ghayruhum, p. 108. 64 See Crawford, “Civil War,” p. 236. 65 ‘Abd al-Latif, ‘Uyun al-Rasa’il, vol. 2, p. 920. 66 Ibid., p. 874. 67 Crawford, “Civil War,” pp. 237–8. 68 ‘Abd al-Latif, ‘Uyun al-Rasa’il, vol. 2, p. 898. 69 Ibid., p. 899. 70 See al-Bassam, ‘Ulama Najd, vol. 2, pp. 28–31. 71 Ibid., pp. 59–60. 72 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 557–8. 73 Ibid., p. 563. 74 Ibid., pp. 559–61. 75 Ibid., vol. 2. pp. 84–8. 76 Ibid., vol. 6, p. 340. 77 Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 315–17. 78 Ibid., pp. 184–7. 79 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 401–2. 80 Ibid., p. 404. 81 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 436–7. 82 Ibid., pp. 440–1. 83 Ibid., pp. 441.

6 Takfir in Wahhabism: Thought and Practice 1 Ahmad Zini Dahlan, al-Durar al-Saniyya fi al-Radd ‘ala al-Wahhabiya (Cairo: Maktabat al-Halabi, 1980), pp. 43–4. 2 ‘Abd al-Latif, Da‘awi, p. 163. 3 Ibid. 4 al-‘Isami, a-Durar al-Saniyya, vol. 1, p. 100. 5 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 82–3. 6 Ibid., p. 83. 7 DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam, pp. 227–79.

Notes to Chapter 6 | 183 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

28 29 30 31

32 33 34 35

36 37

38 39 40

Ibid., pp. 193–4. Ibid., pp. 227–42. Ibid., pp. 243–79. al-‘Isami, al-Durar al-Saniyya, vol. 10, pp. 63–74. On his biography, see Humayd, al-Suhub al-Wabila, pp. 969–80; alBassam, ‘Ulama Najd, vol. 6, pp. 236–45. al-‘Isami, al-Durar al-Saniyya, vol. 10, pp. 63–7. Commins, “Traditional Anti-Wahhabi Hanbalisim,” pp. 87–8. See the epistle in Mu’allafat al-Shaykh al-Imam Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, vol. 5, pp. 36–7. Ibn Ghannam, Rawdat al-Afkar, pp. 270–3. Ibid., p. 304. Ibid., p. 304. Ibid., pp. 299–300. ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Isa, also called al-Muwayyis, one of the Najdi ‘Ulama. See al-Bassam, ‘Ulama Najd, vol. 4, pp. 64–9. No biography was found of these ardent opponents of Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab. Mu’allafat al-Shaykh al-Imam Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, vol. 5, p. 167. No biography of him. Probably he belonged to Hanbali school of law. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-‘Abd al-Latif, Da‘awi, p. 47. On Sulayman Pasha, see Philby, Saudi Arabia, pp. 76, 87, 89, 91, 94, 109. al-‘Isami, al-Durar al-Saniyya, vol. 1, p. 293. Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, al-Ta‘liqat ‘ala Kashf al-Shubuhat (ed. Ahmad Ibn Salih al-‘Uthaymiyyn) (Beirut: Dar ’Uli al-Nuha, 1996), p. 64. Ibid., p. 67. Ibn Ghannam, Rawdat al-Afkar, p. 305. Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Fatawa wa Masa’il, vol. 3, p. 70. al-Hafiz Abu al-Faraj ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn al-Jawzi, Manaqib al-Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (ed. Muhammad Amin al-Khanji al-katabi) (Beirut: Khanji & Hamdan, 1973), pp. 481–2. Ibid., p. 153. Ibid, p. 154. Ibid., p. 173. Abd al-Muhsin Ibn ‘Uthman Ibn Baz, Rasa’il al-Imam Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Shakhsiyya, 2 vols. (Riyadh: Dar Ishbiliya lil-Nashr, 2000), vol. 1, p. 60. al-‘Ajlani, al-Dawla al-Su‘udiyya al-’Ula, p. 317. See al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, p. 21; Wynbrandt, A Brief History of Saudi Arabia, p. 136; ‘Abd al-Rahim, al-Dawla al-Sa‘udiyya al-’Ula, pp. 134–6. al-Jabarti, ‘Ajayb al-Athar, vol. 3, p. 373. al-‘Isami, al-Durar al-Saniyya, vol. 1, p. 229. Qur’an (trans. Muhammad Mahmud Ghali, Cairo: al-Azhar), 4:97.

184 | Notes to Chapter 6 41 For more details on Sulayman’s concept of hijra and its implication during the war, see Commins, The Wahhabi Mission, pp. 32–7. 42 al-‘Isami, al-Durar al-Saniyya, vol. 8, p. 160. 43 Ibid., p. 163. 44 On the Anti-Wahhabi ‘ulama since 1820 and their scholarly impact, see Commins, The Wahhabi Mission, pp. 50–61. 45 ‘Abdullah took over from December 2, 1865, until April 9, 1871, and was followed by his brother Saud from April 10 to August 15, 1871, then by his uncle, ‘Abdullah Ibn Turki, for two months from August 15 to October 15, 1871, before the return of ‘Abdullah Ibn Faysal to rule from October 15, 1871, to January 15, 1873. Saud again seized power until January 26, 1875, to be followed by ‘Abd al-Rahman, one of his brothers, for one year from January 26, 1875, to January 28, 1876. Then the sons of Saud succeeded in ousting their uncle from Riyadh for two months from January 28 until March 31, 1876, before the return of ‘Abdullah bn Faysal. See Winder, Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century, 229–71; Philby, Saudi Arabia, 218–36. 46 ‘Abd al-Latif, ‘Uyun al-Rasa’il, vol. 2, pp. 899–901. 47 Al al-Shaykh, Mashahir ‘Ulama Najd wa-Ghayruhum, p. 108. 48 Abd al-Latif, ‘Uyun al-Rasa‘il, vol. 2, p. 900. 49 Ibid., p. 940. 50 Al al-Shaykh, Mashahir ‘Ulama Najd wa-Ghayruhum, p. 106. 51 al-‘Isami, al-Durar al-Saniyya, vol. 8, p. 275. 52 See ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn al-Hasan, “Kitab al-Iman wal-Radd ‘ala alBida‘,” in Majmu‘at Rasa’il wa-Masa’il al-Najdiyya, vol. 2, pp. 117–19. 53 ‘Abd al-Latif, ‘Uyun al-Rasa’il, vol. 2, p. 961; ‘Ulama Najd, Majmu‘at Rasa’il wa-Masa’il al-Najdiyya, vol. 3, pp. 437. 54 Abd al-Latif, ‘Uyun al-Rasa‘il, vols. 1 and 2. 55 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 886–7. 56 Ibid., p. 888. 57 Ibid., p. 892. 58 See ibid., vol. 1, pp. 222–3, 225, 227, 245, 255, 258. 59 Qur’an (trans. Ghali), 4:48. 60 ‘Abd al-Latif, ‘Uyun al-Rasa’il, vol. 2, p. 733. 61 Commins, The Wahhabi Mission, p. 63. 62 ‘Abd al-Latif, ‘Uyun al-Rasa’il, vol. 2, pp. 210–12. 63 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 91. 64 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 925–6; al-‘Isami, al-Durar al-Saniyya, vol. 8, p. 383. 65 Joas Wagemakers, “The Transformation of a Radical Concept: Al-Wala’ wa-l-Bara’ in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi,” in Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (London and New York: Hurst & Co. and Columbia University Press, 2009), pp. 87–8. 66 al-‘Isami, al-Durar al-Saniyya, vol. 1, pp. 380–91. 67 Ibid., pp. 373–439. 68 Ibid., p. 386.

Notes to Chapter 6 | 185 69 70 71 72

73

74 75 76 77

78 79

80 81

82 83 84

85 86 87 88 89

al-‘Isami, al-Durar al-Saniyya, vol. 8, p. 152. See Commins, The Wahhabi Mission, pp. 66–70. Ibid., pp. 71–100; al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 59–60. See Bernard Haykel, “On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action,” in Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2009), pp. 33–50. Muhammad Amin ‘Abidin (Ibn ‘Abidin), Radd al-Muhtar ‘ala al-Duarr al-Mukhtar Sharh Tanwir al-Absar fi Fiqh Madhhab al-Imam al-A‘zam Abi Hanifa al-Nu‘man, 3 vols. (Beirut, 1966–9), vol. 3, p. 309; see also Itzchak Weismann, Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya, and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus (Leiden: Brill 2001), p. 74. Mustafa al-Shatti, al-Nuqul al-Shar‘iyya fi al-Radd ‘ala al-Wahhabiyya (n.p., n.d), pp. 10–11; see also Weismann, Taste of Modernity, pp. 65–6. On the family, see Weismann, Taste of Modernity, p. 232. al-Shatti, al-Nuqul al-Shar‘iyya, pp. 7–14; see also Weismann, Taste of Modernity, pp. 258–59. The first fitna (the civil war) in Islam erupted as a result of a struggle between factions over who deserves to be the successor of the Prophet as legitimate ruler. About the Khwarij, their development, and their religious ideas, see “Kharidjites,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam (1978), vol. 4, pp. 1074–7. For more details, see Madawi al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 6–7, p. 264 note 8; see also Thomas Hegghammer, “Jihadi–Salafis or Revolutionaries? On Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant Islam,” in Meijer, Global Salafism, pp. 246–7; Hamadi Redissi, “The Refutation of Wahhabism in Arabic Sources, 1745–1932,” in Madawi al-Rasheed (ed.), Kingdom without Borders: Saudi Arabia’s Political, Religious and Media Frontiers (London: C. Hurst, 2009), pp. 157–81. Qur’an (trans. Ghali), 2:160, 161, p. 24. See Sherko Kirmanj, “The Relationship between Traditional and Contemporary Islamist Political Thought,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, vol. 12, no. 1 (March 2008), p. 76. “Takfir,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, Brill Online, at http://www.brillonline.nl/public. Qur’an (trans. Ghali), 57:20, p. 540. Auguste Boudinhon, “Infidels,” Catholic Encyclopedia (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1913), Online, at org/wiki/Catholic Encyclopedia 1913) Giles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002), p. 31. See the meaning of kufr in Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-‘Arab, vol. 12, p. 119. Qur’an (trans. Ghali), 2:6, p. 3. Qur’an (trans. Ghali), 2:152, p. 23. Qur’an (trans. Ghali), 2:89, p. 14.

186 | Notes to Epilogue 90 al-Mawdudi is considered by many one of the most famous Sunni Muslim religious and political leaders of the twentieth century. He was the author of numerous books and articles on various issues in Islam, as well as being head of the al-Jama‘a al-Islamiya, the religious and political party that has great influence on politics in Pakistan and Afghanistan. 91 The article is available at http://www.muslim.org/movement/ maudoodi/art-takfir.htm. 92 Arabic text in Sunan Abi Dawud (Is a collection of hadith collected by Abu Dawud al-Sajistani), Kitab al-Jihad (Book 15, Number 2532), https://sunnah.com/abudawud/15. 93 For more information about the new Ikhwan, see Thomas Hegghammer and Stephane Lacroix, “Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-‘Utaybi Revisited,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 39, no. 1 (2007), pp. 103–22; see also Thomas Hegghammer, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 3–4. 94 See, for example, the epistle of ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan against the demurrals and the challenges made by Ibn Nabhan (one of the ‘ulama of nineteenth-century Arabia) in al-‘Isami, al-Durar al-Saniyya, vol. 8, pp. 169–204. 95 See Roger Hardy, “Ambivalent Ally: Saudi Arabia and the ‘War on Terror’,” in al-Rasheed, Kingdom without Borders, pp. 108–12. 96 See al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State, pp. 11, 34. 97 Ibid., p. 102. 98 Ibid., pp. 34–42. 99 See Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s epistle, directed to all Muslims, al-‘Isami, alDurar al-Saniyya, vol. 1, pp. 66–7. 100 Nimrod Hurvitz, “From Scholarly Circles to Mass Movement: The Formation of Legal Communities in Islamic Societies,” American Historical Review, vol. 108, no. 4 (2003), pp. 1005–7. The article is available at http://www.Historycoopirative.org/Journals.

Epilogue: Religion and State in Islam and the Saudi–Wahhabi Case 1 Elman Rogers Service, Origins of the State and Civilization: The Process of Cultural Evolution (New York: Norton, 1975), p. 297; see also Bassam Tibi, “The Simultaneity of the Unsimultaneous: Old Tribes and Imposed Nation-States in the Modern Middle East,” in Khoury and Kostiner, Tribes and State Formation, p. 135. 2 Tibi, “The Simultaneity of the Unsimultaneous,” p. 135. 3 Ibid.; the quotation from Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in the World Civilization, 3 vols. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974), vol. 1, p. 193. 4 Tibi, “The Simultaneity of the Unsimultaneous,” pp. 135–6. 5 Said Amir Arjomand, “Shi‘ism, Authority, and Political Culture,” in Said

Notes to Epilogue | 187

6

7 8

9 10

11

12 13

14 15

16 17 18

19

20 21 22

23 24 25

Amir Arjomand (ed.), Authority and Political Culture in Shi‘ism (New York: State University of New York Press, 1988), p. 2. Abu al-Hasn ‘Ali Ibn Muhammad Ibn Habib al-Basri al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniya w-al-Wilaiyat al-Diniya (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al‘Ilmiyah, 1990), pp. 5–13. See Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 9–11. ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History (trans. Franz Rosenthal), 3 vols. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), vol. 1, p. 322. See Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 3–6. Eltigani Abdulqadir Hamid, “Al-Mawardi’s Theory of State: Some Ignored Dimensions,” American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, vol. 18, no. 4 (2001), pp. 1–6. Ira M. Lapidus, “The Separation of State and Religion in the Development of Early Islamic Society,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 6, no. 2 (1975), pp. 363–5. Ibid., pp. 366–85. The twelfth imam of the Shiites is Muhammad Ibn al-Hasan al-‘Askari, who hid from the Abbasid authorities between the years 874 and 940, a period which was declared by Shiites to be the first or the short occultation (al-Ghayba), to be followed by a cosmic occultation from which he would ultimately return to fill the word with justice. Arjomand, Authority and Political Culture in Shi‘ism, p. 4. Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds, God’s Caliph: Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 1–3, 22–3, 97–110. Ibid., pp. 24–97. See Lapidus, “The Separation of State and Religion,” pp. 382–4. Nimrod Hurvitz, “Ha-Mihna, Sugiat Dat vi Midina ba Tkufa ha‘Abasit” (The Mihna: Question of Religion and State in the Abbasid Period), Ha-Mimzrah Ha-Hadash, vol. 42 (2001), pp. 18–23. Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Religion and Politics under the Early Abbasids: The Emergence of the Proto-Sunni Elite (Lieden: E. J. Brill, 1997), p. 208. Ibid., p. 1. Ibid., pp. 209–13. Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 11. Ibid., p. 40. Ibid., pp. 152–4. Nasr Abu Zayd (with the assistance of Dr. Katajun Amirpur and Dr. Mohamad Nur Kholis Setiawan), Reformation of Islamic Thought: A Critical Historical Analysis (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), pp. 83–6.

188 | Notes to Epilogue 26 Mohammed Arkoun, al-Fikr al-Islami: Qira’a ‘Ilmiyya (Beirut: Markiz al-Thaqafa al-‘Arabi, 1996), p. 81. 27 Ibid., pp. 152–3. 28 Ibid., pp. 143–58. 29 Joseph R. Strayer, “The State and Religion: An Exploratory Comparison in Different Cultures. Greece and Rome, the West, Islam,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 1 (1958), p. 42. 30 Ibid., pp. 39–40. 31 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism, reprinted edn (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958). 32 Friedrich Wilhem Graf, “The German Theological Source and Protestant Church Politics,” in Hartmut Lehman and Guenther Roth (eds.), Weber’s Protestant Ethic: Origins, Evidence, Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 31. 33 Richard Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (London: Penguin Books, 1938). 34 Shmuel Eisenstadt, “Tmurah Datit, Shinui Hevrati ve-Modernizatsia: ‘Iunim ba-Hashlakhutaiha shel ha-Tizah ‘al ha-Etika ha-Protestantit,” Ha-Akademiah ha-Israelit le-Mada‘im, vol. 3, no. 6 (1968), pp. 83–121 (Hebrew). 35 Mohammed Arkoun, al-Fikr al-Islami, pp. 143–5. 36 Sami Zubaida, Islam, the People and the State: Political Ideas and Movements in the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1993), pp. 1–3. 37 Ibid., pp. 130–3. 38 Ibid., pp. 121–80. 39 Aharon Layish, “Ulama and Politics in Saudi Arabia,” in M. Heper and R. Israeli (eds,), Islam and Politics in Modern Middle East (London and Sydney: Coomhelm Press, 1984), pp. 29–63. 40 al-Yassini, Religion and State, pp. 81–129. 41 Muhammad al-Atawneh, “Fatwas and Ifta’ in Saudi Arabia: A Study of Islamic Legal Thought, 1971–2000” (PhD dissertation, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Shiva, February 2004), pp. 53–4. 42 al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, pp. 135–86. 43 al-Mawardi, al-Ahkam al-Sultaniya, p. 5. 44 Crawford, “Civil War, Foreign Intervention,” pp. 234–5. 45 al-Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State, p. 59. 46 See ibid., p. 57.

Bibliography A: Primary Sources I. Archival Material A. Public Record Office (PRO), Foreign Office (FO) 406/20 & TI/15962. B. India Office, British Library. C. Records of Saudi Arabia, Primary Documents, 1902–1960, documents selected from the PRO [National Archives], the British Library’s Oriental and India Office Collections, edited by Penelope Tuson and Anita Burdett (Slough, England, Archive Editions) (Oxford: Redwood Press, 1992). II. Published Chronicles and Theological Treatises ‘Abidin (Ibn ‘Abidin), Muhammad Amin, Radd al-Muhtar ‘ala al-Duarr alMukhtar Sharh Tanwir al-Absar fi Fiqh Madhhab al-Imam al-A‘zam Abi Hanifa al-Nu‘man, 3 vols. (Beirut, 1966–1969). Al al-Shaykh, ‘Abd al-Latif Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman,‘Uyun al-Rasa’il, 2 vols. (ed. Husayn Muhammad Bawa) (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Rashid, 2000). Al al-Shaykh, ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan, Qurrat ‘Uyun al-Muwahhidin (ed. ‘Imad Farrah) (Tantah: Dar al-Sahaba li-l-Turath, reprinted edition, 1991). Al al-Shaykh, ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab, Fatih al-Majid, Sharh Kitab al-Tawhid (ed. Ashraf Ibn ‘Abd al-Maqsud Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahim) (Cairo: Mu’asasat Qurtuba, 1992). Al al-Shaykh, ‘Abd al-Rahman, Mashahir ‘Ulama Najd wa-Ghayruhum (Riyadh: n.p., 1974). al-Asfahani, al-Hasan, Bilad al-‘Arab (ed. Hamad al-Jasir and Salih al-‘Ali) (Riyadh: Dar al-Yamama,1968). al-Bassam, ‘Abdullah, Tuhfat al-Mushtaq min Akhbar Najd wa-l-Hijaz wa-l‘Iraq (ed. Ibrahim al-Khaldi) (Kuwait: Sharikat al-Mukhtalaf, 2000). ——, ‘Ulama Najd Khilal Thamaniyat Qurun, 6 vols. (Riyadh: Dar al-‘Asima, 1998). [Al-Bakri] El-Bekri, Abu Obied [‘Ubayd], Mu‘jam ma Ist‘ajma min Asma’ alBilad wa-l-Mawad‘, in Geographische Wörterbuch (ed. Ferdinand Wustenfeld) (Leiden, Cambridge, London and Milan: Biblio Verlag, 1976). al-Bakri (al-Andalusi) Abu ‘Ubayd ‘Abd ‘Allah, Mu‘jam ma Ist‘ajma min Asma’ al-Bilad wa-l-Mawad‘, edited by Jamal Tulba, 5 vols. (Bierut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘lmiyya, 1998). Dahlan, Ahmad Zini Dahlan, al-Durar al-Saniyya fi al-Radd ‘ala alWahhabiyya (Cairo: Maktabat al-Halabi, reprinted edition, 1980).

190 | Bibliography ——, Tarikh Ashraf al-Hijaz 1822–1840 (original title: Khulasat al-Kalam fi Bayan ’Umara’ al-Balad al-Haram) (Beirut: Dar al-Saqi 1993). ——, ‘Umara’ al-Balad al-Haram: Mundhu Awa‘ilihim fi ‘Ahd al-Rasul Hatta al-Sharif Husayn Ibn ‘Ali (Beirut: al-Dar al-Muttahida li-l-Nashr walTawzi‘, reprinted edition, 1991). al-Fakhiri, Muhammad Ibn ‘Umar, al-Akhbar al-Najdiyya (ed. ‘Abdullah Ibn Yusuf al-Shibil) (Riyadh: Jami‘at al-Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud, 1998). Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad, Majmu‘at al-Tawhid (ed. Rashid Rida) (Riyadh: al-Amana al-‘Amma li-l-Ihtifal bi-Murur Mi’at ‘Aam ‘ala Ta’sis al-Mamlaka, 1999). ——, Risala fi al-Radd ‘ala al-Rafida (ed. Nasir Ibn Sa‘d al-Rashid), in “Mulhaq al-Musanafat” (ed. ‘Ad al-‘Aziz Zayd al-Rumi, Muhammad Baltaji, and Sayyd Hijab), Mu’allafat al-Shaykh al-Imam Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, 13 vols. (Cairo: al-Markiz al-Islami li-l-Tiba‘a wa-lNashr, 1993). ——, al-Ta‘liqat ‘ala Kashf al-Shubuhat (ed. Muhammad Ibn Salih al‘Uthaymiyyn) (Beirut: Dar Auli al-Nuhay, 1996). Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Sulayman Ibn ‘Abdullah, Taysir al-‘Aziz al-Hamid fi Sharh Kitab al-Tawhid (Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami, reprinted edition, 1970). Ibn al-Athir, ‘Iz al-Din ‘Ali Ibn Muhammad, Asad al-Ghaba Fi Ma‘rifat alSahaba (ed. Muhammad Ibrahim al-Banna, Muhammad Ahmad ‘Ashur and Mahmud ‘Abd al-Wahhab Fayad) (Cairo: Maktabat Ibn Taymiyya, 1970). Ibn Bishr, ‘Uthman Ibn ‘Abdullah, ‘Inwan al-Majd fi Tarikh Najd, 2 vols. (ed. ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn ‘Abd al-Latif Ibn Abdullah Al alShaykh) (Riyadh: Matbu‘at al-Malik ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, 1983). ——, Swabiq ‘Inwan al-Majd fi Ta’rikh Najd (ed. ‘Abdullah al-Munif) (Riyad, n.p., 2002). Ibn Ghannam, Husayn Ibn Abu Bakr, Rawdat al-Afkar wa-l-Afham li-Murtad hal al-Imam wa-Ta‘dad Ghazawat Dhawi al-Islam (ed. Nasir al-Din alAsad) (published under the title Tarikh Najd, Beirut: Dar al-Shuruq, 1985). Ibn Humyid, Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman, al-Suhub al-Wabila ‘ala Dara’ih al-Hanabila (ed. Bakr Ibn ‘Abdullah Abu Zayyd and ‘Abd alRahman Ibn Sulayman al-‘Uthayymin), 3 vols. (Beirut: Mu’asasat al-Risala, 1996). Ibn ‘Isa, Ibrahim Ibn Salih, Tarikh Ba‘d al-Hawadith al-Waqi‘a fi Najd (ed. Hamad al-Jasir) (Riyadh: Dar al-Yamama, 1996). Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Hafiz Abu Faraj ‘Abd al-Rahman, Manaqib al-Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (ed. Muhammad Amin al-Khanji al-katabi) (Beirut: Khanji and Hamdan, reprinted edition, 1973). Ibn Khaldun, ‘Abd al-Rahman, Muqadimat Ibn Khaldun (Beirut: Dar alQalam, 1986). Ibn Khaldun, ‘Abd al-Rahman, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, translated by Franz Rosenthal, 3 vols. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958).

Bibliography | 191 Ibn Taymiyya, Taqy al-Din Ahmad, al-Siyasa al-Shar‘iyya fi Islah al-Ra’i wal-Ra‘iyya (ed. Muhammad al-Sharbawi) (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1988). ——, Majmu‘at al-Fatawa, 20 vols. (ed. ‘Amir al-Jazzar) (Riyadh: Maktabat al-‘Ibikan ,1998). al-‘Isa, Mayy, al-Hayat al-‘llmiyya fi Najd (Riyadh: Darat al-Malikc ‘Abd al‘Aziz, 1996). al-‘Isami, ‘Abd al-Malik Ibn Husayn Ibn ‘Abd al-Malik, Simt al-Nujum al‘Awali fi Anba’ al-Awa’il wa-al-Tawali, 4 vols. (Cairo: al-Matba‘a al-Salafiya,1959). al-‘Isami, ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Muhammad Ibn Qasim, al-Durar al-Saniyya fi al-’Ajwiba al-Najdiyya: Majmu‘ Rasa’l wa-Masa’il ‘Ulama Najd alA‘lam min ‘Asr al-Shaykh Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab ila ‘Asrina, 10 vols.( Riyadh: n.p., 1994). al-Jabarti, ‘Abd al-Rahman, ‘Ajayb al-Athar fi al-Tarajim wa-l-Akhbar, 5 vols. (ed. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Jamal al-Din) (Cairo: Matba‘at al-Madbulli, 1997). al-Manqur Ahmad, Tarikh al-Shaykh Ahmad Ibn Muhammad al-Manqur (ed. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Khuwaytir) (Riyadh: Mu’asasat al-Jazira,1970). al-Qadi, Muhammad, Rawdat al-Nazrin ‘an Ma’athir ‘Ulama Najd waHwadith al Sinin, 2 vols. (Riyadh: n.p., [1989–90]). ‘Ulama Najd (Scholars of Najd), Majmu‘at Rasa’l wa-Masail al-Najdiyya, 4 vols. (Cairo: Matba‘at al-Manar bi-Misr, 1928). III. Travelogues Burckhardt, John Lewis, Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys, 2 vols. (New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1967). Doughty, Charles M., Travels in Arabia Deserta, 2 vols. ( New York: Boni and Liveright Publishers, 1921). Ibn Battuta [Muhammad Ibn ‘Abdullah al-lawati], The Travels of Ibn Battuta A.D.1325–1354, 2 vols. (New York: Lenox Hill Pub. & Co. (Burt Franklin) [originally published 1829], 1971). Khusraw, Nasir-i, Nasir-i Khusraw’s Book of Travels (Safranama) (ed. and translated from Persian, with introduction, glossaries, and notes by Wheeler M. Thackston Jr.,) (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, Inc., 2001). Palgrave, William Gifford, Personal Narrative of a Year’s Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia (1862–1863), 2 vols. (London and Cambridge: Macmillan and Co., 1865). Widder, Payly R., Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965). B. Secondary Sources I. Unpublished Theses Abdulrahman, Said, “Saudi Arabia: The transition from Tribal Society to a Nation-State” (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Missouri-Columbia, 1979). al-Atawneh, Muhammad, “Fatwas and Ifta’ in Saudi Arabia: A Study of

192 | Bibliography Islamic Legal Thought, 1971–2000” (PhD dissertation, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Shiva, February 2004). Firro, Tarik, “The Religious and Social Origins of Wahhabiyya: Najd in the 16th, 17th and 18th Centuries” (MA thesis, University of Haifa, 2003). al-Juhany, Uwaidah, “The History of Najd Prior to Wahhabis: A study of Social Political and Religious Condition in Najd during the Three Centuries Preceding the Wahhabi Reform Movement” (PhD dissertation, Washington University, Seattle, 1983). II. Encyclopedias, Dictionaries, and Qur’an Encyclopaedia of Islam, first edition (Leiden and London: Brill, 1913–1938); second edition (Leiden: Brill, 1960–2006); third edition (Leiden: Brill, 2007–). Catholic Encyclopaedia (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1913). Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-‘Arab, 18 vols. (Beirut: Dar Ihya’ al-Turath al‘Arabi,1988). Qur’an (translated into English by Muhammad Ghali) (Cairo: Al-Azhar, 2002). III. Books and Articles in Arabic ‘Abd al-Rahim, ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Rahim, al-Dawla al-Sa‘udiyya al’Ula 1745–1818 (Cairo: Ma‘had al-Dirasat al-‘Arabiyya, 1969). al-‘Abbudi, Muhammad Ibn Nasir, al-Majma‘ al-Jughrafi, Bilad al-Qasim (Riyadh: Matabi‘ al-Farazdaq, 1990). al-‘Abd al-Latif, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, Da‘awi al-Munawi’in li Da‘wat al-Shaykh Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (Riyadh: Dar al-Watan li-l-Nashr, 1991). Abu ‘Aliyya ‘Abd al-Fattah, Tarikh al-Dawla al-Su‘udiyya al-Ththaniyya (Riyadh: Dar al-Marrikh, 1985). Abu al-‘Alla, Mahmud Taha, Jughrafiyat Shibih al-Jazirat al-‘Arabiyya: Jughrafiyat al-Mamlaka al-‘Arabiyya al-Sa‘udiyya, 4 vols. (Cairo: Mu’asasat Sijil al-‘Arab, 1972). al-‘Ajlani, Munir, Tarikh al-Bilad al-‘Arabiyya al-Su‘udiyya: al-Dawla alSu‘udiyya al-’Ula (Beirut: Dar al-Nafa’is, 1994). al-‘Atishan, Saud Ibn Salih, Manhaj Ibn Taymiyya fi al-Fiqh (Riyadh: Maktabat al-‘Ibikan, 1999). al-Jasir, Hamad, Madinat al-Riyad ‘abra Atwar al-Tarikh (Riyadh: Dar alYamama li- l-Bahth wa-l-Nashr, 1966). al-Maliki, Hasan Ibn Farhan, Da‘iya wa Laysa Nabiyy (Amman: Dar al-Razi, 2004). al-Sakakir, Muhammad Ibn ‘Abdullah, al-Imam Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab: Hayatuhu, Atharuhu, Da‘watuhu al-Salafiyya (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Malik ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, 1999). al-Suba‘i, Ahmad, Tarikh Makka, 2 vols. (Riyadh: n.p., 1999). al-Swayda, ‘Abd al-Rahman, Najd bi-al-Ams al-Qarib (Riyadh: n.p., 1983). al-Tayb, Muhammad Sulayman, Mausu‘at al-Qaba’il al-‘Arabiyya: Buhuth

Bibliography | 193 Maydaniyya wa-Tarikhiyya, 10 vols. (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-‘Arabi, 2002). al-Zahawi, Jamil Sudqi, al-Fajr al-Sadiq fi al-Radd ‘ala Munkiri al-Tawassul wa-l-Karamat wa-l-Khwariq (Istanbul: Ayshaq, 1976). Arkoun, Mohammed, al-Fikr al-Islami: Qira’a ‘Ilmiyya (Beirut: Markiz alThaqafa al-‘Arabi, 1996). Darwish, Madiha Ahmad, Tarikh al-Dawla al-Sa‘udiyya hata al-Rub‘ al-Awal min al-Qarn al-‘Ishrin (Jadda: Dar al-Shuruq 1990). Faraj, Bassam, al-Fikr al-Siyasi ‘inda Ibn Taymiyya (Amman: Dar al-Yaqut 2001). Ibn Baz, ‘Abd al-Muhsin, Rasa’il al-Imam Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Shakhsiyya, 2 vols. (Riyadh: Dar Ishbiliyah li-al-Nashr, 2000). Ibn Khamis, ‘Abdullah, al-Majma‘ al-Jughrafi li-l-Mamlaka al-‘Arabiyya alSa‘udiyya: Mu‘jam al-Yamama, 2 vols. (Riyadh: Matabi‘ al-Farazdaq, 1978). Ibn Sa‘ud, Faysal Ibn Mash‘al, Rasa’il A’immat Da‘wat al-Tawhid (Riyad, Maktabat al-‘Ibikan, 2002). Maliki, Sulayman, Bilad al-Hijaz mundhu Bidayat ‘Ahd al-Ashraf hatta Suqut al-Khilafa al-‘Abbasiyya (Riyadh: Darat al-Malik ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, 1983). Qutb, Sayyid, Ma‘alim fi al-Tarik (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1993). Rasul, Muhammad Rasul, al-Wahhabiyyun wa-al-‘Iraq (Riyadh: al-Rrayys lial-Nashr, 2005). Surur, Muhammad Jamal al-Din, al-Nfudh al-Fatimi fi Jazirat al-‘Arab (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-‘Arabi, 1964). Wahba, Hafiz, Jazirat al-‘Arab fi al-Qarn al-‘Ishrin (Cairo: Lajnat al-Ta’lif wa-l-Tarjama wa-l-Nashr, reprinted edition, 1967). IV. Books and Articles in Other Languages Abou El Fadl, Khalid, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Abu Zayd, Nasr (with the assistance of Dr. Katajun Amirpur and Dr. Mohamad Nur Kholis Setiawan), Reformation of Islamic Thought: A Critical Historical Analaysis (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006). al-Ansary, Abd al-Rahman, Qaryat al-Fau: A Portrait of a Pre-Islamic Civilization in Saudi Arabia (Riyadh: University of Riyad, 1982). al-Atawneh, Muhammad, “Religion and State in Contemporary Middle East: The Case of Saudi Arabia,” Journal of Islamic State Practices in International Law, 2.2 (2006), pp. 28–45. al-Azmeh, Aziz, Ibn Khaldun: An Essay in Reinterpretation (London: Frank Cass, 1982). al-Dakhil, Khalid S., “Wahhabism as an Ideology of State Formation,” in Mohammed Ayoob and Hasan Kosebaban (eds.), Religion and Politics in Saudi Arabia: Wahhabism and the State (London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc., 2009), pp. 23–38.

194 | Bibliography al-Fahad, Abdulaziz H., “The ‘Imam vs. ‘Iqal: Hadari–Bedouin Conflict and the Formation of the Saudi State,” in Madawi al-Rashed and Robert Vitalis (eds.), Counter-narratives: History, Contemporary Society, and Politics in Saudi Arabia and Yemen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 35–75. al-Juhany, Uwaidah, Najd before the Salafi Reform Movement: Social, Political and Religious Conditions during the Three Centuries Preceding the Rise of the Saudi State (Reading: Ithaca Press, in association with the King Abdul Asis foundation for research and archives, 2002). Algar, Hamid, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay (New York: Oneonta, 2001). Arjomand, Said Amir, “Shi‘ism, Authority and Political Culture,” in Said Amir Arjomand (ed.), Authority and Political Culture in Shi‘ism (New York: State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 1–24. Barfield, Thomas, “Tribe and State Relations: The Inner Asia Perspective,” in Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (eds.), Tribe and State Formation in The Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), pp. 153–182. Caton, Steven C., “Anthropological Theories of Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East: Ideology and the Semiotics of Power,” in Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (eds.), Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), pp. 74–108. Cook, Michael, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). ——, “The Expansion of the First Saudi State: The Case of al-Washm,” in C. E. Bosworth, Charles Issawi, Roger Savory, and A. L. Udovitch (eds.), The Islamic World From Classical to Modern Times: Essay in Honor of Bernard Lewis (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1989), pp. 661–99. ——, “The Historians of Pre-Wahhabi Najd,” Studia Islamica, 76 (1992), pp. 163–75. ——, “On the Origin of Wahhabism,” Journal of Royal Asiatic Society, Third Series, 2, 2 (July 1992), pp. 191–202. Commins, David, “Traditional Anti-Wahhabi Hanbalisim in NineteenthCentury Arabia,” in Itzchak Wiesman and Fruma Zachs (eds.), Ottoman Reform and Muslim Regeneration (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005), pp. 81–96. ——, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (London and New York: I. B. Tauris 2006). Crawford, Michael, “Civil War, Foreign Intervention, and the Question of Political Legitimacy: A Nineteenth-Century Sa‘udi Qadi’s Dilemma,” International Journal for Middle East Studies, 14 (1982), pp. 227–48. Crone, Patricia, “Tribe and State,” in J. A. Hall (ed.), States in History (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 48–77. De Gaury, Gerald, Rulers of Mecca (New York: Roy Publishers, 1951). Delong-Bas, Natana J., Wahhabi Islam: From the Revival and Reform to the Global Jihad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Donner, Fred Mcgraw, “The Bakr B. W il Tribes and Politics in Northeastern Arabia on the Eve of Islam,” Studia Islamica, 51 (1980), pp. 5–38.

Bibliography | 195 Doughty, Charles M., Travels in Arabia Deserta, 2 vols. (New York: Boni and Liveright Publishers, 1926). Earle, Timothy (ed.), Chiefdom: Power, Economy and Ideology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Eisenstadt, Shmuel, “Tmurah Datit, Shinui Hevrati ve-Modernizatsia: ‘Iunim ba-Hashlakhutaiha shel ha-Tizah ‘al ha-Etika ha-Protestantit” (Hebrew), Ha-Akademiah ha-Israelit le-Mada‘im, 3.6 (1968), pp. 83–121. Facey, William, Riyadh: The Old City (London: IMMEL Publishing, 1992). Gellner, Ernest, “Cohesion and Identity: The Maghreb from Ibn Khaldun to Emile Durkheim,” Government and Opposition, 10 (1975), pp. 203–18. Graf, Friedrich Wilhem, “The German Theological Source and Protestant Church Politics,” in Hartmut Lehman and Guenther Roth (eds.), Weber’s Protestant Ethic: Origins, Evidence, Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 27–49. Hardy, Peter, The Muslims of British India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). Hardy, Roger, “Ambivalent Ally: Saudi Arabia and the ‘War on Terror’,” in Madawi al-Rasheed (ed.), Kingdom without Borders: Saudi Arabia’s Political, Religious and Media Frontiers (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2008), pp. 99–112. Haykel, Bernard, “On the Nature of a Radical Thought and Action,” in Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2009). Hegghammer, Thomas, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). ——, “Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionries? On Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant Islam,” in Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2009), pp. 244–66. Hegghammer, Thomas, and Lacroix, Stephane, “Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-‘Utaybi Revisited,” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 39.1 (2007), pp. 103–22. Hodgson, Marshall G. S., The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in the World Civilization, 3 vols. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974). Hunter, William Wilson, The Indian Muslmans (New Delhi: Runp & Co., 2002; first published London: Trubner and Co., 1871). Hurvitz, Nimrod, “From Scholarly Circles to Mass Movement: The Formation of Legal Communities in Islamic Societies,” American Historical Review, 108.4 (October 2003), pp. 985–1008. ——, “ha-Mihna Sugyat Dat vi-Midina ba-Tkufa ha-‘Abasit” (Hebrew) haMimzrah ha-Hadash, 42 ( 2001), pp. 17–24. Ibrahim, Fouad. The Shi‘is of Saudi Arabia (London: Saqi Books, 2006). Johnson, Allen W. and Earle, Timothy, The Evolution of Human Societies: From Foraging Group to Agrarian State (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, second edition, 2000).

196 | Bibliography Khatab, Sayed, The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb: The Theory of Jahiliyyah (London and New York: Routledge, 2006). Kepel, Giles, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002). Kirmanj, Sherko, “The Relationship between Traditional and Contemporary Islamist Political Thought,” Middle East of International Affairs, 12.1 (March 2008), pp. 69–82. Kjorlien, Mechele, “State and Religion in Saudi Arabia,” Arab Studies Journal, 15.2 (1994), pp. 36–43. Kostiner, Joseph. “On Instruments and Their Designers: The Ikhwan of Najd and the Emergence of the Saudi State,” Middle Eastern Studies, 21 (1985), pp. 298–323. ——, “Transforming Dualities: Tribe and State Formation in Saudi Arabia,” in Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (eds.), Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), pp. 226–51. Lapidus, Ira M., “The Separation of State and Religion in the Development of Early Islamic Society,” International journal of Middle East Studies, 6 (1975), pp. 363–85. ——, “Tribe and State Formation in Islamic History,” in Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (eds.), Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), pp. 25–47. Layish, Aharon, “Ulama and Politics in Saudi Arabia,” in M. Heper and R. Israeli (eds.), Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984), pp. 29–63. Levtzion, Nehemia, “Tnu‘ut Hithadshut ve-Riforma ba-Islam ba-Mi’a ha18” (Hebrew), Mizrah ha-Hadash, 31 (1986), pp. 48–70. Lewis, Bernard, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, second edition, 1968). Mojuetan, B. A., “Ibn Khaldun and His Cycle of Fatalism: A Critique,” Studia Islamica, 53 (1981), pp. 93–108. Ochsenwald, William, Religion, Society, and the State in Arabia: Hijaz under Ottoman Control, 1840–1908 (Colombus: Ohio State University Press, 1984). Philby, Harry St John, The Heart of Arabia (London: Constable and Company, 1922). ——, Saudi Arabia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955). al-Rasheed, Madawi, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). ——, “The Local and Global in Saudi Salafi Discourse,” in Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2009), pp. 301–20. ——, Politics in Arabian Oasis: The Rashidi Tribal Dynasty (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1991). Redissi, Hamadi, “The Refutation of Wahhabism in Arabic Sources, 1745– 1932,” in Madawi al-Rasheed (ed.), Kingdom without Borders: Saudi Arabia’s Political, Religious and Media Frontiers (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2008), pp. 157–81.

Bibliography | 197 Samin, Nadav, Of Sand or Soil: Genealogy and Tribal Belonging in Saudi Arabia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). Schneider, David M., A Critique of the Study of Kinship (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1984). Service, Elman Rogers. Origins of the State and Civilization: The Process of Cultural Evolution (New York: Norton, 1975). Strayer, Joseph. R. “The State and Religion: An Exploratory Comparison in Different Cultures. Greece and Rome, the West, Islam,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 1 (1958), pp. 38–43. Stuart, Clark, “The Annales Historians,” in Quentin Skinner (ed.), The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences (Cambridge, London, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 182–3. —— (ed.), The Annales School: Critical Assessment, 4 vols. (London: Routledge. 1999). Talip, Kucukcan, “Some Reflections on the Wahhabiya and the Sanusiya Movements: Comparative Approach,” Islamic Quarterly, 37 (1993), pp. 237–51. Tapper, Richard, “Anthropologists, Historians and Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East,” in Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (eds.), Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), pp. 48–73. Tawney, Richard, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (London: Penguin Books, 1938). Tibi, Bassam, “The Simultaneity of the Unsimultaneous: Old Tribes and Imposed Nation-States in the Modern Middle East,” in Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (eds.) Tribe and State Formation (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), pp. 127–52. Traboulsi, Samir, “An Early Refutation of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s Reformist Views,” Die Welt des Islam, 42 (2002), pp. 373–415. Vassiliev, Alexi, The History of Saudi Arabia (London: Saqi Books, 1998). Vidal, F. S. “Date Culture in the Oasis of al-Hasa”, Middle East Journal, 8 (1954), pp. 417–28. Weber, Max, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, reprinted edition, 1958). Weismann, Itzchak, “Ha-Moreshet ha-Politit shel Ibn Taimiyya bar’i haSalafiyya ha-Mikorit” (Hebrew), ha-Mizrah ha-Hadash, 42 (2001), pp. 25–42. ——, Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya, and Arabism in Late Ottoman Damascus (Leiden: Brill, 2001). Wynbrandt, James, A Brief History of Saudi Arabia (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 2004). Zubaida, Sami, Islam, the People and The State: Political Ideas and Movements in the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993). al-Yassini Ayman, Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985).

198 | Bibliography VI. Electronic Sources http://forums.islamicawakening.com. http://www.islamtoday.net/bayan/bayan.cfm. http://www.muslim.org/movement/maudoodi/art-takfir.htm. Abu Dawud, Sunan , Kitab al-Jihad (Book 15, Number 2532), https://sunnah.com/abudawud/15. Doran, Michael Scott, “The Saudi Paradox,” Foreign Affairs (February 2004), http://www.foreignaffairs.org. “King Opens Interfaith Dialogue That Aims to Bridge Gap between Islam and Other Religions,” International Herald and Tribune (Associated Press, June 4, 2008), http://www.iht.com. Kostiner, Joseph, “State, Islam and Opposition in Saudi Arabia: The PostDesert Storm Phase,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, 1.2 (July 1997), http://meria.idc.ac.il. “Top Saudi Cleric Issues Religious Edict Declaring Shiites to Be Infidels,” International Herald and Tribune (Associated Press, December 29, 2006), http://www.iht.com.

Index Aba al-Ghanaym, ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Ibrahim, 107 Abadi community, 59 ‘Abbas Pasha, 87 Abbasid Caliphate, 145, 146, 147, 148, 150, 151 ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn ‘Idwan, 51 ‘Abd al-Latif Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman (1810–76) Al al-Shaykh succession, 109 Al al-Shaykh-Al Saud alliance, 160, 162 al-a‘rab, 127 attitude toward Christians, 129–130 al-Azhar, 75, 162 death of (1876), 9, 130 duty of obedience to the ruler, 106, 107, 125 duty of prayer, 84 epistles, 106, 108–109, 125, 128–129 exile in Cairo, 75, 76, 81, 162 fatawa, 3, 107–108 fitna, 105–108, 124–127, 160, 162 hijra concept, 127, 128 Ibn Bishr’s admiration for, 96–97 Ibn Humayd’s delegitimization of, 92 ijma‘, 108–109 imama, 108–109 al-jahiliyya (pre-Islamic) period, 106, 125, 181n killing of polytheists, 127–128 kufr, 126, 127, 128 al-Nasiri’s challenge, 82–83 nomadic tribes’ threat, 127 al-Qasim revolt, 92, 96–97 relationship with Wahhabi community, 108 religious unity, 108–109 religious writings, 3 return to Najd (1847), 75, 76, 81 shifting allegiances, 125–126 Shiite sects, 127, 128, 129 shirk, 127, 128

stance against the polytheists in Najd, 128–129 study circle, 75, 109 as supreme religious authority, 9, 10, 11, 75, 76, 81, 96, 106, 107, 124, 160 takfir, 107, 112, 124–131 tawhid, 96, 110 ‘ulama training, 75 Wahhabi ‘ulama unity, 108 Wahhabism revival (post-1820), 7, 11, 75, 78, 82–83, 108–110 ‘Abd al-Malik Ibn Husayn Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, 77 ‘Abd al-Rahim, ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Rahim, 30, 31, 32, 37, 38, 45 ‘Abd al-Rahman Haqqi, 75, 176n ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn ‘Abdullah (1804– 57), 74–75, 76, 176n ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Faysal Ibn Turki, 105 ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab Al-al-Shaykh (1779–1868) Al al-Shaykh family succession, 109 Al al-Shaykh–Al Saud alliance, 160 Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, 98 death of, 10–11, 102, 124 duty of prayer, 84 Egyptian invasion (1837), 86 epistles, 83 exile in Cairo, 74, 75, 76, 81–82 fatawa, 3, 126, 128 Ibn Humayd’s delegitimization of, 92 influence on Ibn ‘Yaban, 96 knowledge of Sunni schools, 81, 82 al-Nasiri’s challenge, 82–83 offending soldier controversy, 97–98 al-Qasim revolt, 92 relations with Faysal, 98 religious gathering in Riyadh, 85 religious meetings with Faysal, 96 religious studies, 81–82 religious writings, 3

200 | Index Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan Ibn ‘Abd alWahhab Al-al-Shaykh (1779–1868) (continued) return to Najd (1825–6), 74, 75, 76 study circle, 75, 109 as supreme religious authority, 9, 10, 75, 81, 82 takfir, 124, 126 tawhid, 83, 110 teaching sessions, 75, 83 treatises, 82, 83 ‘ulama training, 75 Wahhabi ‘ulama leadership, 82, 108, 109 Wahhabism revival (post-1820), 7, 75, 78, 82–83, 85, 108–110, 133 ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Husayn Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, 85 ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Saud, 85 ‘Abd al-Rahman’s discourse, 124, 126 ‘Abd al-Wahhab Ibn Sulayman, 32 ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abd al-Latif, 11, 110, 130–131, 160, 161 ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman, 109 ‘Abdullah Ibn Ahmad Ibn Suhaym, 51 ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Ali Ibn Rashid, 85 ‘Abdullah Ibn Faysal Ibn Turki al-‘Ajman uprising, 93, 103 death of, 105 Facey’s description of, 103 fitna, 102–107, 124–127, 128 marriage to Nura, 89 nomadic tribes’ threat, 127 Palgrave’s description of, 102 al-Qasim revolt, 96 recapture of Riyadh (1871), 107, 125–126 reliance on ‘Abd al-Rahman, 82 ‘Abdullah Ibn Hasan, 77, 176n ‘Abdullah Ibn Hasan Ibn Husayn, 96 ‘Abdullah Ibn Jabr, 97 ‘Abdullah Ibn Muhammad Ibn Isma‘il, 45 ‘Abdullah Ibn Muhammad Ibn Saud (1725–1812), 79, 80, 87 ‘Abdullah Ibn Saud (d. 1818), 61, 62, 78, 79 ‘Abdullah Ibn Thunayan Ibn Ibrahim, 86–87, 88, 179n ‘Abdullah Ibn Turki, 105 Abha, 103 al-‘abid (slaves), 19, 26 Abu al-Kabbash, 24 Abu ‘Aliya, ‘Abd al-Fattah, 1 Abu Bakr al-Tartushi, 97

Abu Butayn, ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman, 77–78, 85, 92, 97, 102, 110 Abu Musa al-Ash‘ari, 130 Abu Nuqta, 59 Abu ‘Ulayyan, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, 89 Abu-Zabi, 94 ‘Adnan tribes, 18, 19 ‘Afaliq, Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al Rahman Ibn, 51, 113 Afghanistan, use of takfir, 136 al-Aflaj, 15 ahl al-hadith, 141 Ahl al-Hadith, 152 ahl al-iman, 134 ahl al-kufr, 134 Ahmad ‘Abd al-Karim, 115 Ahmad Ibn ‘Uthman Ibn Jami‘, 91 Ahmad Ibn Yahiya, 51, 116 al-Ahram newspaper, 75 “Aid Society”, Cairo, 75 al-‘Ajlani, Munir, 60–61 Ajman tribes, 81, 86, 92–93, 94, 103, 104 Al al-Shaykh ‘Abdullah Ibn Muhammad’s religious leadership, 71 alliance with Al Saud, 8, 75–76, 157, 160, 161, 162 bida‘, 8 challenge to anti-Wahhabi scholars, 124 claimed genealogy, 69 Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, 84, 98, 102 distinct branches, 77 Egyptian campaign, 67 Egyptian occupation of Dir‘iyya, 74 fatawa, 139, 158 Faysal’s rule, 10, 95–96, 97, 98, 108 fitna, 9, 108–111 Hanbali heritage, 97 Ibn Humayd’s antipathy, 91, 92 Ibn Taymiyya’s inspiration, 38, 84, 158 ijma‘, 8, 41 al-ijtihad, 8 imama, 109 iman, 118 influence among the common people, 73 influence on Wahhabism, 30 information sources, 2–3 kufr, 118, 158 leadership shift, 74, 75–76 al-maslaha principle, 41

Index | 201 mutawi‘a system, 9, 48, 49, 53 obedience to rulers, 158 Persian Gulf, 87 purification of Islam, 8 qiyas principle, 41 Qur’an, 41 religious circle, 97 religious concepts of, 12, 39, 53 religious discourse sources, 38 religious legitimacy, 69 religious “reforms”, 1 respect for Ibn ‘Yaban, 96 revival of Wahhabism (post-1820), 74–78, 83, 133 Riyadh scholastic religious center, 7 Second Saudi State (1824–1891), 49, 53, 64, 75–76, 87, 88, 102, 108–111, 158, 162 Shafi‘i religious ideas, 38, 162 shari‘a law infringements, 98 shirk, 119, 121, 141 Sulayman Ibn ‘Abdullah’s influence, 73 sunna, 41 support for Ibn Thunayan, 87 as supreme religious authority, 108 takfir, 11–12, 111, 137 al-taqlid, 141 tawhid, 8, 44, 141 Third Saudi State re-established (1902), 9 transmission of religious ideas to the masses, 141, 142 treatises, 158 ’usul al-fiqh, 41 see also ‘Abd al-Latif Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman (1810–76); ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab Al-al-Shaykh (1779– 1868) Al al-Shaykh, ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn ‘Abd al-Latif Ibn ‘Abdullah, 125 Al al-Shaykh ‘ulama after the Egyptian invasion, 74–78 exile to Egypt, 67, 85–86 Faysal’s rule, 86, 96, 97 Ibn Humayd’s writings, 91–92 Khalid Ibn Saud’s rule, 86–87 massacred by Egyptian forces, 62 return from Egypt, 67–68 self-image of, 73 theocratic government, 157, 158 tribal alliances, 86–87 Turki’s theocratic government, 81 umara alliance, 157–164 Wahhabism revival, 7

see also ‘Abd al-Latif Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman (1810–76); ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab Al-al-Shaykh (1779– 1868); ‘Ali Ibn Husayn Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Qaeda, 139–140 Alawis of Syria, 43 Aleppo, 33, 59 Algar, Hamid, 2 Ali Ibn ‘Abdullah Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, 67 ‘Ali Ibn Husayn Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, 76–77, 85, 176n ‘Ali Ibn Muhammad Ibn Khalifa, 59 ‘Ali Kikha, 57 al-shiyukh (chiefs), 17, 20, 26, 27 ‘amal, 120, 121 al-amr bi-l-ma‘ruf, 150 Anas Ibn Malik, 138 al-‘Anbari, Samara ‘Amru, 21 Anderson, Perry, 156 Annales school, 64–65 al-Ansari, Husayn Ibn Muhsin, 109 al-Ansary, Abd al-Rahman, 27 anti-Wahhabi ‘ulama, 4, 34, 35, 50–53, 124 al-Nasiri’s opposition, 82–83 Daud Ibn Jirjis’ treatises, 78, 82 Hanbali ‘ulama, 83, 133 innovator accusations, 132 al-Qasim, 89–92 takfiri discourse, 113, 115–117, 122, 130–131, 133 anti-Wahhabism, 48–56, 62 during Egyptian occupation, 6–7 emigration, 54 Hasa, 51, 52–53, 115 Riyadh as opposition center, 24–25 writings, 4 ‘Anza tribe, 5, 66, 81, 86, 94 ‘aql (rationality or common sense), 41–42 Arab tribal structure, 17, 18–19 al-‘Arid, 14–15, 55, 66, 77 Arjomand, Said Amir, 149, 150 Arkoun, Mohammed, 153–154, 156 ‘asabiyya, 17, 20, 21, 26, 48, 147 Asad, Nasir al-Din, 3 Asfahan, 33 al-Asfahani, al-Hasan, 14 ‘ashira (clan within a tribe), 18–19 asil (pure lineage), 65–66 ‘Asir, 103, 106, 125 al-‘Askari, Muhammad Ibn al-Hasan, 187n

202 | Index asl (origin), 18 al-Atawneh, Muhammad, 2, 159 al-‘Aud, 24 al-Azhar, 70, 75, 76, 81, 162 ‘Aziz, Zahid, 138 al-Badi‘, 15 Badie, Bertrand, 156–157 Badr, Battle of, 123 al-badu see nomads (al-badu) Baghdad anti-Wahhabism, 113 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s study journeys, 33 religious center, 29 ‘ulama, 132 Bahrain Ottoman conquest of, 60 Saudi–Wahhabi raids, 59 tributes to Faysal, 94 Bakr Ibn Wa’il, 20 al-Bakri (al-Andalusi) Abu ‘Ubayd ‘Aballah, 14 Banu al-Akhaydir, 21, 22 Banu Hanifa, 20–21, 23, 24, 65, 66 Banu Husayn, 81 Banu Khadar, 65–66 Banu Khalid, 22, 55, 66, 81 Banu Sinan, 32 Banu Tamim, 28, 32 baptism ceremony, 136 Barak Ibn ‘Abdullah al-Muhsin, 55–56 al-Barbahari, al-Hasan Ibn ‘Ali, 141–142 Bariya tribe, 94 Basra anti-Wahhabi manuscripts, 52 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s study journeys, 33 Wahhabi accusations of idolatry, 123 al-Basri, Hasan, 90 al-Basri, ‘Uthman Ibn Muhammad Ibn Ahmad Ibn Sanad, 53 al-Bassam, ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahim Ibn Salih, 4, 31, 70, 110 al-Bassam, ‘Abdullah Ibn Muhammad, 3 ba‘th, 34 Batin Ibn ‘Urayr, 55 batiniyya sects, 43 Bedouins, 65, 66, 68, 93 bida‘ (innovations) accusations against Wahhabism, 31 Al al-Shaykh, 8 Faysal’s epistle (1843), 95 Ibn Taymiyya’s teachings, 41 mosque ornaments, 45

Mustafa al-Shatti’s concept of, 133, 134 qiyas principle, 39 sanctuary cults, 35 shari‘a law, 134 tawassul principle, 44, 46 ‘ulama, 132 Wahhabi concept of, 134 Bin Laden, Osama, 139 al-Bir, 15 Blunt, Anne, 5 bourgeoisie, 153 Braudel, Fernand, 64–65 Britain alliances with Ibn Saud, 131 Arabian policies, 94, 103, 128 Najd civil war, 104, 105 Burayda, 15, 27–28, 55, 89, 90 al-Buraymi, 94 Burckhardt, John Lewis, 5, 58 Buyid dynasty, 145, 146, 153 Cairo ‘Abd al-Latif’s exile, 75, 76, 81, 162 ‘Abd al-Rahman’s exile, 74, 75, 76, 81–82 “Aid Society”, 75 Faysal’s imprisonment, 86 Ibn Humayd’s study journeys, 83 religious center, 16, 29, 45, 47, 70, 81, 82 see also al-Azhar Caliph/Caliphate, 143–151 Calvinism, 155 capitalism, 154–155 Catholic Church, 136 chieftaincy, 17, 20, 26, 27 Christian societies, 153 Christianity compared to Islam, 156 as official religion in the West, 154 see also Protestantism; Roman Catholic Church Christians Ibn Saud’s tolerant policy, 131 Muslim attitude towards, 43, 113, 129–130 takfir, 112–113, 129–130 Commins, David, 2, 50 Companions of the Prophet, 37, 40, 123 Cook, Michael, 2 ‘Abdullah Ibn Muhammad’s religious scholarship, 71 Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, 71, 84, 85, 100, 101 Hanbali doctrine, 37

Index | 203 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s study journeys, 33–34 Ibn Taymiyya’s al-Siyasa al-Shar‘iyya, 84 references to duty, 84 Saudi religious zeal, 67 Turki’s theocratic government, 84 Wahhabi central doctrines, 37 Wahhabi–Saudi movement, 62–64, 67 Crawford, Michael, 2 Crone, Patricia, 149–150 Dahlan, Ahmad, 4, 58, 113 Dahnaa’, 14, 86 Damascus anti-Wahhabism, 113 Hanbali schools, 42, 45, 47, 50, 91, 133 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s study journeys, 33 Ibn Humayd’s study journeys, 83, 91 religious center, 16, 29, 70 ‘ulama, 132–134 Umayyad dynasty, 21 Darma, 24, 54, 55 Daud Ibn Jirjis, 78 da‘wa, 140 al-Dawasir tribe, 94 DeLong-Bas, Natana J., 2, 114–115, 116–117 al-Dilam, 15, 67 Dir‘iyya as an educational center, 70 Banu Hanifa rule, 23 Egyptian occupation, 50, 61, 62, 67, 74, 79, 124 Egyptian withdrawal, 76, 79–80 establishment (15th cent.), 23, 165n growth and power of, 24, 54, 56 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab-Muhammad-Ibn Saud coalition, 24, 34, 36, 47, 54 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s residence, 34, 35, 66 Ibn Man‘ tribe, 24 Ibn Mu‘ammar as leader, 78–79 majalis, 70 al-Murada tribe, 24 as political capital, 10 Saudi capture of, 76, 77, 79, 80 Saudi control of, 24, 36, 66, 76 sedentary population center, 15, 23 Sulayman Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s house arrest, 51 ‘Urayr Ibn Duhayn’s offensive, 55 Wahhabi–Saudi movement, 23, 70 Doughty, Charles, 5, 27–28

Druze, 43 Dubai, 94 al-Dughaythir tribe, 23 Dujayn Ibn ‘Urayr, 55 Egypt ‘Abd al-Latif’s polytheism accusations, 129 Fatimid dynasty, 146 Faysal’s exile, 10, 80, 85–86 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s study journeys, 33 Najd military campaign (1811–1818), 6, 57, 61–62, 74, 75, 78, 79, 90 Najd military campaign (1837–1838), 10, 85–86 occupation of Dir‘iyya, 50, 61, 62, 67, 74, 79, 124 occupation of Hijaz, 62 occupation of Najd (1818–1824), 6, 24, 25, 66–68, 73, 74, 77, 78–79 partial withdrawal from Najd, 49, 62, 74, 76, 78, 79–80 Saudi attack against Karbala, 57 ‘ulama, 60, 74–75, 76, 81 Wahhabi–Saudi movement, 36, 67 withdrawal from Najd (1840), 10, 86 withdrawal from Riyadh (1820), 25 see also Cairo Eisenstadt, Shmual, 155–156 Facey, William, 23, 26, 28, 103 al-Fadli, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Hasan, 110 al-Fahad, Abdulaziz, 62–63, 64, 65, 66–67 al-Fakhiri, Muhammad Ibn ‘Umar, 3 fatawa, 3–4 ‘Abd al-Latif, 3, 107–108 ‘Abd al-Rahman, 3, 126, 128 ‘Abdullah Ibn Muhammad’s epistles, 71 against heterodox communities, 43 Al al-Shaykh, 139, 158 kufr versus iman, 138 Wahhabi ‘ulama, 139 Fatimid dynasty, 146 Faw, 27 Faysal Ibn Turki (1785–1865) al-‘Ajman uprising, 81, 92–93, 103 Al al-Shaykh alliance, 10, 95–96, 97, 98, 108 Al al-Shaykh ‘ulama, 86, 96, 97 capture of Riyadh (1834), 80, 85 capture of Riyadh (1843), 87, 89 Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, 10, 84, 85, 95, 98, 99, 102

204 | Index Faysal Ibn Turki (1785–1865) (continued) conflict within Najdi society, 76 death of, 9, 10, 102, 124, 126 defeat by the Egyptians, 10, 77, 85–86 duty of prayer, 84, 95 epistles, 84, 95, 96 exile to Egypt (1838), 10, 80, 85–86 horse ownership, 28 Ibn Taymiyya’s inspiration, 84, 96 MA dissertations, 1 nomadic tribes, 92–93 offending soldier controversy, 97–98 Pelly’s assessment of, 94 purification of faith, 95 al-Qasim revolt, 89–92, 96–97 relations with ‘Abd al-Rahman, 98 relations with “Zelators”, 100 religious dimension of his rule, 95–102 religious gathering in Riyadh, 85 religious meetings, 96, 97 religious zeal, 85, 93, 95–96 respect for Ibn ‘Yaban, 96 return to Najd (1843), 10, 77, 87, 88–89 sanctuary cults, 90 Saudi political entity established, 64, 80 shari‘a law, 10 sunna, 95 Sunni Islamic schools, 97 tawhid, 95 territorial consolidation, 92–95 theocratic government, 81, 82, 84, 85 tribal coalitions, 76, 85 ‘ulama and umara cooperation, 158, 160 Wahhabi ‘ulama, 76, 80, 88, 96, 97, 98, 102, 108, 161–162 Wahhabism revival, 74, 82, 85, 88–89, 93 Wahhabi–Saudi alliance, 9, 10 zakat, 95 see also Saudi State (Second 1824– 1891) al-firqa al-najiya, 72 First Saudi State see Saudi State (First 1744–1818) fitna (civil strife 656–61), 134, 185n fitna (civil strife 1865–1891), 10–11 ‘Abd al-Latif’s role, 105–108, 124– 127, 160, 162 ‘Abdullah’s role, 102–107, 124–127, 128

Al al-Shaykh, 9, 108–111 hadith, 106, 125 Hasa, 104, 105 Ibn ‘Isa’s teachings, 110–111 Qur’an, 106, 125 Saud’s role, 102–107, 124–125, 162 takfir, 107, 126 Wahhabi network, 108–111 Wahhabi ‘ulama, 107, 146 France, separation between religion and state, 154 French Annales school, 64–65 French Revolution, 154 al-Fur‘, Wadi, 15 Ghalib Ibn ‘Awn, 57, 58 al-Ghat, 15 al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid, 145, 146, 147, 153 Ghusayba, 24 Gibb, Hamilton, 146 Goldziher, Ignac, 151 Greek principles, 154 al-hadar see sedentary settlements (Najd) Hadarmawt, 129 hadith Ahl al-Hadith, 152 different interpretations of, 132 al-Fadli’s writings, 110 al-firqa al-najiya, 72 fitna, 106, 125 Hanbali doctrine, 148 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s preaching, 35 Ibn Kathir’s exegesis, 96 al-ijtihad, 51 Kitab al-Tawhid, 73 kufr versus iman, 135 monotheistic notions of, 35 qiyas principle, 40 takfir, 138 tawassul at the Prophet’s tomb, 46 ’usul al-fiqh, 39, 40, 41 Wahhabism, 30, 31 Ha’il, 15, 55, 85 hajj, 32–33, 34, 46–47, 58–59, 61, 92 Hajr, 21, 23, 24 al-halal (the lawful), 41, 46 al-Hamar, 15 Hamid, Eltigani Abdulqadir, 146–147 al-Hanabija, 16 Hanafi school, 38, 81, 82, 133 Hanafi ‘ulama, 148 Hanbali doctrine Abbasid Caliphate, 148

Index | 205 ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s devotion to, 38 ahkam al-jama‘a, 125 Al al-Shaykh, 97 al-amr bi-l-ma‘ruf, 150 in Cairo, 81, 82 in Damascus, 42, 45, 47, 50, 91, 133 hadith, 148 hanbaliyun supporters, 31, 32 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, 33, 35, 36–37, 38–39, 42, 47, 52 Ibn Humayd’s writings, 83, 91 Ibn Taymiyya, 38–39, 115 killing of polytheists, 127–128 one of main schools of Islam, 31, 38–39 purification of faith, 45 qiyas principle, 40 Qur’an, 38, 39, 148 sunna, 38, 39 takfir, 120 transmission to the masses, 141–142 Wahhabism, 7, 42, 72, 121, 150 Hanbali ‘ulama al-amr bi-l-ma‘ruf, 150 Caliph authority, 148 Egypt, 76 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s preaching, 35, 45 al-ijtihad, 45 killing of polytheists, 128 takfir, 120, 133 al-taqlid, 45 Hanifa valley, 15 al-haram (the forbidden), 41, 46 Harb tribe, 94 al-Hariq, 15, 86 Harma, 15, 55 Hasa al-‘Ajman uprising, 92 Banu Khalid rule, 22 conflict with ‘Uyayna, 36 Egyptian invasion, 86 Faysal Ibn Turki’s forces, 86, 93 fitna, 104, 105 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s study journeys, 33 Ibn Saud’s capture of, 131 Khalid Ibn Saud’s refuge, 87 mutawi‘a system, 56 offensive against Saudi–Wahhabi troops, 55 opposition to Wahhabism, 51, 52–53, 115 Ottoman conquest of (16th c.), 60

Ottoman occupation (1871), 105, 128 Ottoman siege (1798–1799), 57 Saudi capture, 4, 56, 57, 59 Shiite population, 56, 72, 131 ‘ulama, 56 Wahhabi accusations of idolatry, 123 Wahhabi campaigns, 72, 81 Hasan Ibn ‘Ali, 77 Hasan Ibn Husayn, 109 Hawran, 59 Hijaz ‘Abd al-Latif’s polytheism accusations, 129 center of Muslim holy places, 29 cosmopolitan characteristics, 29 Egyptian occupation, 62 emergence of Islam, 14 expansion of Wahhabism, 132 mutawi‘a system, 58 Ottoman conquest of, 60 Saudi–Wahhabi raids, 4, 56, 57–59, 73, 122–123, 132 Sharifs of Mecca control, 93 Sharifs of Mecca taxes, 61 Shiite population, 122 Wahhabi treatment of the holy shrines, 58 see also Mecca; Medina hijra (emigration), 123, 127, 128, 140 al-Hilaliyya, 15, 90 Hinds, Martin, 149–150 Hodgson, Marshall G. S., 144–145 Holdenburg, Avital Ashkenazi, 1 Hourani, Albert, 16 al-Hudaybi, Muhammad Ibn Hamad, 91 Humra, 50 Huraymila alliance with the Saudis, 54 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s preaching, 33, 34, 35 Saudi capture of (1755), 51 Saudi loss of (1752), 51 sedentary population center, 15 Sulayman Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab as the qadi, 51 ‘ulama, 32, 34 Wahhabi–Saudi movement, 54 Hurvitz, Nimrod, 141, 142, 151 Husayn Bek, 79 Husayn Ibn ‘Ali, 44, 71 Husayn Ibn Hasan Ibn ‘Ali, 109 al-Huta, 15, 79, 106 Hutat Bani Tamim, 15, 77, 85

206 | Index Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Muhammad, 70 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, ‘Abdullah Ibn Muhammad (1751–1828) attitude toward Shiites and Zaydis, 71–72 Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, 71 death of, 67 epistles, 40, 43, 71–72, 114, 115, 116 exile in Egypt, 74 fatawa, 71 Hanbali doctrine, 38 heterodox communities, 43 ijma‘, 38, 40–41 loss of influence, 74, 87 qiyas principle, 41 al-rafida, 71–72 religious leadership, 7, 37, 70–74 religious texts, 37 tawassul, 47 tawhid, 35, 47, 72 ’usul al-fiqh, 40–41 Wahhabism as a “distinct doctrine”, 37–38 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, ‘Ali Ibn ‘Abdullah ibn Muhammad, 67 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, ‘Ali Ibn Muhammad (d. 1829), 67, 70, 74, 174n Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Hasan Ibn Muhammad, 70, 74, 75, 87 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Husayin Ibn Muhammad (d. 1809), 70, 71 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Ibrahim Ibn Muhammad, 67, 70, 74, 174n Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad (1703–1792) animosity with his brother Sulayman, 31–32, 51, 91 attitude toward Christians and Jews, 43 attitude toward Shiites and Zaydis, 71–72 biography of, 4 birth (1703), 24, 32 coalition with Muhammad Ibn Saud, 6, 24, 34, 36, 47, 54 death of (1792), 53 descendants of, 30, 69–70, 76–77 ethical code, 45–47 first hajj (1716), 32–33 First Saudi State, 24 founder of Wahhabism, 6, 7, 24, 28, 30, 82 grandfather’s influence, 45–46, 69–70

al-halal, 41, 46 Hanbali doctrine, 33, 35, 36–37, 38–39, 42, 47, 52 al-haram, 41, 46 heterodox communities, 43 hijra concept, 123 Ibn Humayd’s antipathy, 91 Ibn Suhaym’s opposition, 50 Ibn Taymiyya’s al-Siyasa al-Shar‘iyya, 84 ijma‘, 39, 40, 41 al-ijtihad, 31, 41, 42, 45, 51 iman, 118 inspiration sources, 33, 35, 36–43, 45–46 istislah, 41 jihad, 114–115 Kashf al-Shubuhat, 119 Kitab al-Tawhid, 73, 119 kuffar, 113, 116–117, 118, 120, 122, 141 kufr, 44, 114, 115, 118, 119, 121–122 literature on, 32–35, 36–37 mawlid celebration, 44–45 in Medina, 33, 46 purification of faith, 44–47 qiyas principle, 39–40, 41 Qur’an, 41, 114–115 al-rafida, 71–72 religious preaching as threat to chiefs, 50 religious “reforms”, 1 religious writings, 3 residence in Dir‘iyya, 34, 35, 66 Risala fi al-Radd ‘ala al-Rafida, 129 sanctuary cult campaign, 34–35, 44 Saudi dynasty as legitimate rulers, 38 al-shahada, 118 shari‘a law, 43 shirk, 34, 44, 118–120, 121–122, 141 shrine visits, 34–35, 39 smoking as forbidden habit, 46 study journeys, 33–34, 35, 44, 46 Sufi rituals, 39 sunna, 41 al-taqlid, 31, 42, 45 tawassul, 44, 46 tawhid, 35, 44, 73, 112, 118 transmission of religious ideas to the masses, 141, 142 ‘ulama as muqallidun, 30–31 ‘ulama’s opposition, 34, 35, 50–53 ’usul al-fiqh, 39–40, 41 as al-Wuhabah tribe descendent, 28

Index | 207 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Sulayman (d. 1793), 31–32, 51, 91, 113, 121–122 Ibn ‘Abidin, 132–133 Ibn ‘Ajlan, Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim, 107 Ibn al-Athir, Izz al-Din, 20–21 Ibn al-Mawahib, 46 Ibn al-Muwaysi, ‘Abdullah, 50 Ibn al-Walid, Khalid, 21 Ibn ‘Aqil, Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman, 82 Ibn ‘Atiq, Hamad, 107, 109–110, 128–129 Ibn Bassam, Ahmad Ibn Muhammad, 18 Ibn Battuta, 21 Ibn Bishr, ‘Uthman ‘Abd al-Malik information, 77 ‘Abd al-Rahman’s teaching sessions, 75 ‘Abdullah Ibn Muhammad’s religious leadership, 71 admiration of ‘Abd al-Latif, 96–97 Dir‘iyya majalis, 70 Egyptian occupation of Dir‘iyya, 74 Faysal’s rule, 95–96 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s promise to Ibn Mu‘amar, 36 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s study journeys, 33 Ibn Saud’s hajj pilgrimage, 58–59 Ibn Taymiyya’s al-Siyasa al-Shar‘iyya, 84 ‘Inwan al-Majd fi Tarikh Najd chronicle, 3, 4, 18, 49 Mu‘ammar and Saud family ties, 79 mutawi‘a system, 49 Najd ‘ulama, 70 al-Qasim revolt, 96–97 religious gathering in Riyadh, 85 Sharifi campaigns in Najd, 22 tawassul at the Prophet’s tomb, 46 Wahhabi treatment of holy shrines, 58 Ibn Dawwas, 24–25, 48, 50, 54–55 Ibn Dir‘, 23 Ibn Fayruz, ‘Abdullah, 56 Ibn Fayruz, Muhammad Ibn ‘Abdullah, 51, 115–116 Ibn Ghannam, Husayn Ibn Abu Bakr, 3, 33, 70 Ibn Hanbal, 31, 37, 38, 120–121, 148 Ibn Hathliyn, Mit‘ib Ibn ‘Abdullah, 92, 96 Ibn Hathliyn, Rakan, 92 Ibn Hazm, Abu Muhammad ‘Ali, 106, 182n Ibn Hubaiyra, 106, 125

Ibn Humayd, Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd ‘Abdullah, 4, 45, 46, 83, 91–92 Ibn ‘Isa, Ahmad Ibn Ibrahim Ibn Hamad, 110–111 Ibn ‘Isa, Ibrahim Ibn Salih, 3, 28, 58, 104 Ibn ‘Isa Qasim, 49 Ibn Isma‘il, 51, 116 Ibn Jarjis, Daud, 82 Ibn al-Jawzi, al-Hafiz Abu al-Faraj ‘Abd al-Rahman, 120, 121 Ibn Kathir, 96 Ibn Khaldun, ‘Abd al-Rahman, 17, 145, 146, 147 Ibn Kiran, Muhammad ‘Abd al-Majid ‘Abd al-Salam, 52 Ibn Man‘ tribe, 24 Ibn Manqur, Ahmad, 3 Ibn Mansur, ‘Uthman, 18 Al Ibn Mazru‘ family, 77 Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, 35, 38, 51, 115 Ibn Rabi‘a, ‘Abd al-Rahman, 51, 116 Ibn Sa‘dun, Muhammad, 56 Ibn Sahman, Sulayman Ibn Mislih, 110 Ibn Salamuna, Ahmad, 82 Ibn Sallûm, Muhammad Ibn ‘Ali, 4, 53 Ibn Saud (1876–1953) alliances with the British, 131 capture of Mecca (1924), 101 capture of Riyadh (1902), 11, 131 Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, 101, 102 mutawi‘a system, 49 Third Saudi State re-established (1902), 11, 161 Ibn Saud, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Muhammad (d. 1803), 55, 79, 80, 87 Ibn Suhaym, Sulayman, 45, 50, 116 Ibn Taymiyya, Taqy al-Din Ahmad Ahl al-Hadith’s admiration for, 152 Al al-Shaykh admiration for, 38, 84, 158 ‘aql (rationality or common sense), 41–42 attacks on Sufi practices, 39, 133 attitude toward Christians and Jews, 43 background, 42 bida‘, 41 “foreign” political control, 153 Hanbalism, 38–39, 115 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s admiration for, 35, 45 ijma‘, 39, 40–41 al-ijtihad, 41 influence on Faysal, 84, 96

208 | Index Ibn Taymiyya, Taqy al-Din Ahmad (continued) influence on Wahhabi doctrine, 38–43 killing of polytheists, 127–128 obedience to the ruler, 38, 43, 158 qiyas principle, 39–40 “real” Islam, 38–39 relationship between religion and state, 7, 38, 152, 158 shari‘a law, 7–8, 38, 43 al-Siyasa al-Shar‘iyya, 42, 84, 96, 158 Sulayman Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s admiration for, 51 Turki’s admiration for, 84 ’usul al-fiqh, 39–40 Ibn ‘Ubayid, 51 Ibn ‘Umar Al Salim, Muhammad, 110 Ibn ‘Yaban, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, 96 Ibn Zamil, Zayd, 55 Ibrahim bin Sulayman, 32 Ibrahim Ibn ‘Uwayn, 108 Ibrahim Pasha, 62 Idris Ibn Hassan, 60 ijma‘ ‘Abd al-Latif’s teachings, 108–109 ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab teachings, 38, 40–41 Al al-Shaykh, 8, 41 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab preachings, 39, 40, 41 Ibn Taymiyya teachings, 39, 40–41 Mustafa al-Shatti, 133 Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphs, 148 ’usul al-fiqh, 39, 40–41 ijma‘ ahl al-‘lm, 40 ijma‘ al-sahaba, 40–41 al-ijtihad ‘Abd al-Rahim’s research, 30, 45 Al al-Shaykh, 8 hadith, 51 Hanbali ulama, 45 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s preaching, 31, 41, 42, 45, 51 Ibn Taymiyya teachings, 41 Qur’an, 41, 51 shari‘a law, 30, 31, 41, 42, 45 sunna, 41 Ikhwan (the brothers), 12, 32, 101, 131, 139 Imam Masqat, 81 imama (leadership), 108–109, 127 iman (belief) Ibn Hanbal’s legal position, 120–121 oral transmission to the masses, 142 versus kufr, 135, 136–137, 138 Wahhabi concept of, 118, 121

India ‘ulama, 152 Wahhabism, 109 India Office, 4–5 ’irada (the will), 41 Iraq ‘Abd al-Latif’s polytheism accusations, 129 anti-Wahhabi migrants, 54 invasion of Kuwait, 159 opposition to Wahhabism, 52 Saudi–Wahhabi raids, 56, 57, 59, 132 Shiites, 129 Wahhabi attack against Karbala, 44 see also Baghdad; Basra al-‘Isami, ‘Abd al-Malik Ibn Husayn Ibn‘Abd al-Malik, 3–4, 22 al-‘Isami, ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Muhammad Ibn Qasim, 4, 38 Ishaq Ibn‘Abd al-Rahman, 109 al-Ishbili, al Hafiz ‘Abd al-Haq, 82 Islam compared to Christianity, 156 emergence in Hijaz, 14 heterodoxy, 43 pillars of, 34, 95, 113, 138 pure form of, 8, 41–42, 44–47, 95, 122 al-shahada, 34, 118, 120–121, 122 tafsir, 35, 82 ’usul al-fiqh, 35, 39–41 Islamic batiniyya sects, 43 Islamic societies, essentialist approach, 114, 145, 149–150, 153, 154, 155–157, 161 Islamic states ethnic divisions, 145 politics and religion interrelationship, 143–153 tribal divisions, 145 versus the Western state, 152–157 istislah, 39–40, 41 Jabal Shammar, 15, 85, 86, 87, 88, 104 Jabal Shammar chiefs, 94 Jabal Tuwayq, 24 al-Jabarti, ‘Abd al-Rahman, 122 Jabra, 24 Ja‘fari school of law, 38 al-jahiliyya (pre-Islamic) period, 23, 40, 106, 181n Jalajil, 15 Jalawi Ibn Turki, 96, 100 al-Jama‘a al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba, 139 Janissaries, 61 al-Jasir, Hamad, 3, 21

Index | 209 jawabs (responses), 71 al-Jawzi, al-Hafiz Abu al-Faraj ‘Abd al-Rahman, 120, 121 (see Ibn alJawzi, p. 34 of the this index) Jaz‘a, 23 al-Jaza’iri, Muhammad Ibn Mahmud, 81–82 Jews, 43 jihad (holy war) against the Shiites, 72 Caliph responsibilities, 146 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s preaching, 114–115 Khawarij, 135 and kufr, 140 official Saudi ‘ulama, 140 reduced significance of, 84–85 Wahhabi ‘ulama, 163 al-jiran (people under protection), 19, 26 al-Juhany, Uwaidah ‘asabiyya of the nomads, 26 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s lineage, 28 mutual relationships networks, 25 Najdi sedentary population, 22, 35 Sharifi campaigns in Najd, 22 unpublished chronologies, 18 Wahhabi–Saudi movement emergence, 62–63, 64, 65, 67 Ka‘ba holy black stone, 60, 116, 152 kabira (a grave offence), 133, 134 kafar (to reject), 135–136 kafir/kuffar (unbeliever/s) abandonment of prayer, 121 ‘Abdullah Ibn Muhammad’s treatise, 72, 122 Al al-Shaykh, 158 creation of the Qur’an, 121 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab preachings, 113, 116–117, 118, 120, 122, 141 intercession (tawassul), 133–134 Khawarij, 134, 135–136 al-Mawdudi’s concept of, 138 meanings of, 136 Qur’anic meaning, 135 al-shahada, 122, 126, 136, 138 shirk asghar, 121–122 Sulayman Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s stance, 121–122 Sulayman Ibn ‘Abdullah’s concept of, 123 takfir, 135 ‘ulama, 135, 136 al-Kalb, Wadi, 15 Kamda, 16

Karbala, 44, 57, 73 al-Kashmiri, ‘Abd al-Hamid, 83 al-Kawkabani, ‘Abdullah Ibn ‘Isa, 52 Kechichian, Joseph, 2 al-khadiriyun, 18, 26, 28, 65–66 Khalid Ibn Saud Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Muhammad Ibn Saud, 86–87, 179n Khalifa dynasty, Bahrain, 59 khalifaht al-rassul, 150 khalifaht allah, 150 al-Kharab, 24 Kharijis, 115 al-Kharj, 15, 48, 55, 56, 85, 116 Khawarij, 59, 133, 134, 135 khuwa (“brotherhood”) tax, 25–26, 65, 66 al-Khuwatir, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, 3 kinship groups, 17, 18–19 Kjorlien, Michele, 2 Kostiner, Joseph, 16–17 Kucukcan, Talip, 38–39 kufr (unbelief) ‘Abd al-Latif’s teachings, 126, 127, 128 Al al-Shaykh, 118, 158 al-Barbahari’s religious ideas, 142 four concepts of, 137 hijra, 140 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s preaching, 44, 114, 115, 118, 119, 121–122 Ibn Hanbal’s legal position, 120–121 Ikhwan (the brothers), 131 jihad, 140 legal basis of, 135 Mustafa al-Shatti’s concept of, 133 oral transmission to the masses, 142 Qur’an, 135, 136–137 radical ‘ulama, 136 shari‘a law, 133–134, 135 Sulayman Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s stance, 121–122 Sulayman Ibn ‘Abdullah’s stance, 123–124, 126 versus iman, 135, 136–137, 138 Wahhabi concept of, 44, 114, 115, 118, 119, 121–122, 123–124, 131–132, 133, 137 al-Kurdi, Muhammad Sulayman, 33, 52 kuttab, 70 Kuwait, Iraqi invasion of, 159 Laoust, Henri, 36–37 Lapidus, Ira M., 147–149, 150 al-Latif, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-‘Abd, 52 Layish, Aharon, 158–159 Layla, 15

210 | Index Levtzion, Nehemia, 44 al-Lidam, 16 Light & Islamic Review, 138 Lutheranism, 155 al-Madani, Muhammad Haiyat al Sindi, 46 madaris, 70 madhahib (religious schools), 132 madhhab doctrine, 37–38, 121 Mahmud II, Sultan, 61 majalis, 70 al-Majdub, ‘Umar, 52 al-Majma‘a, 15, 46, 50 Makrami (Najran ruler), 103 al-Maliki, Hasan Ibn Farhan, 97 Maliki school, 38, 70, 82, 110, 133 Maliki ‘ulama, 148 Mamluks, 42, 43 al-Ma’mun, Abu al-‘Abbas ‘Abdullah, 148, 149, 150, 151 Manfuha, 15, 23, 54, 80, 97 al-Mani‘, ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abdullah, 110 Marrat, 15 masa’il (matters), 40, 71, 97, 109, 141 al-Mashaqir, Wadi, 15 al-maslaha principle, 41 al-Mawardi, Abu Hasan ‘Ali Ibn Muhammad, 145–147, 162 al-Mawdudi, Abu ‘Alaa‘, 138, 186n mawlid celebration, 44–45 al-Mdayris tribe, 23 Mecca anti-Wahhabism, 113 capture of (1924), 101 Committee of Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, 100–102 Grand Mosque, 50 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s study journeys, 33, 44 Ibn Humayd’s study journeys, 83 Ottoman control of, 60 political instability, 57 religious center, 16, 33 Saudi–Wahhabi control of, 57–58, 60 Wahhabi accusations of idolatry, 123 Wahhabi capture of (1803), 122 Wahhabi Ikhwan, 101 see also hajj; Sharifs of Mecca Medina al-Jama‘a al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba, 139 anti-Wahhabism, 113 Egyptian occupation, 59

Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s study journeys, 33, 46 Islamic University, 138 masjid Ibrahim, 46 Ottoman control of, 60 political instability, 57 Prophet’s tomb, 46–47, 50 Saudi–Wahhabi control of, 57–58, 60 Saudi–Wahhabi followers ousted, 59 Shafi‘i school, 52 Sharifi rule, 57, 60, 61, 101 Wahhabi capture of (1803), 122 Midhat Pasha, 104, 105 al-Mihmal, 15, 110 al-mihna, 148, 151 Mi‘kal, 24 miri (state land), 27 al-Miyah, Wadi, 15 Mongols, 42 monotheism see tawhid (monotheism) Morocco opposition to Wahhabism, 52 ‘ulama campaign against Wahhabism, 60 mosques, ornaments, 45 Mu‘ammar family, 77, 79 al-Mudliji, Hamad Ibn La‘bun, 18 mufti, 32 Muhammad ‘Abdu, 114 Muhammad ‘Ali, 61, 62, 87, 179n Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Latif, 112 Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman, 76 Muhammad Ibn ‘Ayid, 106, 125 Muhammad Ibn Faysal Ibn Turki, 96, 104 Muhammad Ibn Mushari Ibn Mu‘ammar, 76, 78–79 Muhammad Ibn Saud (1689–1765) coalition with Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, 6, 24, 34, 36, 47, 54 descendents, 76, 79 Muhammad, Prophet destruction of dome above Prophet’s grave, 58, 122 mawlid celebration, 44–45 ornaments from the Prophet’s tomb, 50 Sharifs of Mecca descendent claim, 22 tawassul at the Prophet’s tomb, 46–47 Muhammad ‘Uthman Ibn Mu‘amar, 35–36, 66 al-Mulaybid, 24 mulk (private property), 27 mulk (Qur’anic concept of), 144 muqallidun, 30–31 Muqrin, 23, 24

Index | 211 al-Murada tribe, 23–24 Murra tribe, 86, 94, 104 musha‘ (collective land), 27 Mushari Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Saud, 80, 85 Mushari Ibn Saud Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, 79 Al Musharraf family, 45, 69, 77 Musqat, 94 Mustafa IV, Sultan, 61 Mu‘tala, battle of, 104 mutawi‘a system Al al-Shaykh, 9, 48, 49, 53 anti-Wahhabism, 50 Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, 102 emissaries’ role, 49 Hasa, 56 Hijaz, 58 nomads, 9 principal functions, 49 Saudi Arabia, 101, 171n Second Saudi State, 49, 75, 89, 93, 98–99 sedentary population, 9, 49, 93 success of, 53 takfir, 116, 131 treatment of holy places, 122 ‘ulama, 49, 89, 93 Wahhabi–Saudi movement, 50, 53 Mutayr tribe, 81, 94 al-Muthami, ‘Abd al-Wahhab Ibn ‘Amir, 59 muwahhidun (Unitarians), 31, 32 al-Muwayyis, 116 muzara‘a (co-cultivation contracts), 27 Nablus, 91 Nadhir Husayn, 109 Najd ‘Abd al-Latif’s polytheism accusations, 128–129 ‘Abd al-Latif’s return (1847), 75, 76, 81 ‘Abd al-Rahman’s return (1825–6), 74, 75, 76 agriculture, 14, 16, 23, 27–28 al-jahiliyya (pre-Islamic) period, 23, 40, 106, 181n Banu al-Akhaydir rule, 21, 22 captured by Muslim forces (644), 21 drought and famine, 56, 67 Egyptian military campaign (1811– 1818), 6, 57, 61–62, 74, 75, 78, 79, 90 Egyptian military campaign (1837– 1838), 10, 85–86

Egyptian occupation (1818–1824), 6, 24, 25, 66–68, 73, 74, 77, 78–79 Egyptian partial withdrawal, 49, 62, 74, 76, 78, 79–80 Egyptian withdrawal (1840), 10, 86 Faysal Ibn Turki’s return (1843), 10, 77, 87, 88–89 first Islamic period, 20–21 geography and ecology, 14–17 horse ownership, 28 immigration, 63 lack of religious scholars’ tradition, 5, 7 livestock farming, 28 pre-Islam references, 14 published chronicles, 3, 18 rise of Wahhabism, 5, 8, 14, 30–36, 63 sanctuary cults, 34–35, 44, 50, 90 semi-nomads, 25 Sharifi campaigns, 22, 61, 89 socioeconomic conditions, 8, 14–29, 63, 64 students at Dir‘iyya majalis, 70 sub-regions, 14–16 tribal society, 8–9, 16–22 see also Dir‘iyya; nomads (al-badu); Riyadh; Saudi State (First 1744– 1818); Saudi State (Second 1824– 1891); sedentary settlements (Najd) Najran, 55, 103 Naqshabandiyya-Khalidiyya Sufi order, 82 al-nasab (genealogy), 32 nasb sarih (true lineage), 19 al-Nasiri, ‘Uthman Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Mansur, 82–83 nomads (al-badu) Al-Fahad’s analysis, 65 Egyptian army recruits, 62 Islamic faith, 34 mutawi‘a system, 9 relations with sedentary population, 16, 21, 22–23, 25–26, 65 Second Saudi State (1824–1891), 9, 92–93, 126–127 threat to Wahhabism, 126–127 tribalism, 8, 20, 22, 23 tribute payments, 93 Wahhabi–Saudi alliance, 25, 126–127 see also ‘Ajman tribes al-Nufudh, 14 Nura (daughter of ‘Abdullah Al al-Rashid), 89 Nusayris, 43

212 | Index Ochsenwald, William, 2 Oman British interference, 103 Ottoman conquest of, 60 Saudi–Wahhabi raids, 4, 56, 59 students at Dir‘iyya majalis, 70 Wahhabi center, 109 Ottoman Empire conquest of Arabia, 36, 60 control of holy places, 58, 60 Ibn Saud’s hajj pilgrimage, 59 land tenure, 27 Najd administration, 26–27 Najd civil war, 104, 105, 107, 108, 125–126 occupation of Hasa (1871), 105, 128 relations with Sharifs of Mecca, 57, 60–61, 89 Saudi attack against Karbala, 57 Saudi–Wahhabi threat, 57–61 siege of Hasa (1798–1799), 57 theocracy based on shari‘a, 145 war against Russia, 61 Pakistan ‘ulama, 152 use of takfir, 136 Palgrave, William Gifford, 5, 28, 98–100, 102 Pelly, Lewis, 5, 93, 94–95 Persian Gulf Al al-Shaykh, 87 British policies, 94, 103, 105 Saudi–Wahhabi raids, 59 Philby, Harry St John, 62, 93 Prophet’s Companions, 37, 40, 123 Protestantism, 154–155, 157 Public Record Office (National Archives), 4–5 al-qabaliyun, 18–19, 26, 28 al-Qabbani, Ahmad Ibn ‘Ali al-Basri, 52 qabila (tribe), 18–19, 26 al-Qadi, Muhammad Ibn ‘Uthman, 4 al-Qadiri, Muhammad Ibn Muhammad, 118 Qadiriyya Sufi order, 39 Qahtan tribes, 18, 19, 81, 94, 103, 104 Qarat al-Faw, 28 Qarmatians, 43, 60 al-Qasab, 15 al-Qasim, 15 ‘Abdullah Ibn Thunayan’s campaign, 86, 87 Abu Butayn as supreme religious figure, 78

Banu Khalid offensive, 55 Doughty’s travels, 27–28 opposition to Wahhabism, 7, 89–92, 96–97, 123 tribal dispute, 86 ‘ulama, 89, 90–91 al-Qasimi, ‘Abdullah Ibn Ahmad al-Rawaf, 109 al-Qatif, 23–24, 59, 60, 86, 104, 110 qawl, 120 qiyas fasid, 40 qiyas principle, 8, 39–40, 41 qiyas sahih, 40 Qufar, 15 Qur’an Ahl al-Hadith, 152 Al al-Shaykh, 41 al-a‘rab, 127 different interpretations of, 132 duty of obedience to the ruler, 143–144 as eternal speech of God, 121 Faysal’s epistle (1843), 95 fitna, 106, 125 Hanbali doctrine, 38, 39, 148 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s interpretation, 41, 114–115 al-ijtihad, 41, 51 kafar, 135–136 kafir, 135 killing of polytheists, 127–128 Kitab al-Tawhid, 73 kuffar, 135–136 kufr, 135, 137 kufr versus iman, 135, 136–137 monotheistic notions of, 35 mulk, 144 qiyas principle, 40 al-rafida, 72 relationship between religion and state, 143–144 tafsir, 35, 82 takfir, 135, 138 tawassul at the Prophet’s tomb, 46 tawba, 135 ’usul al-fiqh, 39, 40, 41 verse of al-nisa’, 123 Wahhabism, 30, 31 al-Qurayna, 15 Qutb, Sayyid, 181n al-Qwayani, Hasan, 81 al-rafida (Rejectionists), 71–72, 122, 128 ramadan, 34 raqaba (legal ownership), 27

Index | 213 Ra’s al-Khayma, 94 al-Rasheed, Madawi, 2, 49, 54, 57, 140, 159, 163–164 Al al-Rashid, 11, 19, 85, 89, 105, 130–131, 161 Al al-Rashid, ‘Abdullah, 88–89 Rashid Ibn ‘Uwayn, 108 al-Rass, 15, 90 al-Rawda, 15, 55 al-Ray, 33 Reformation, 154 al-Rimah valley, 15, 90 Riyadh ‘Abd al-Rahman’s teaching sessions, 75 anti-Wahhabi forces, 24–25 as capital city, 10, 25, 80, 87 capture by Faysal (1834), 80, 85 capture by Faysal (1843), 87, 89 capture by Ibn Saud (1902), 11, 131 capture by Saud (1871), 104 development of, 23, 24 Egyptian capture (1838), 86 Egyptian garrison expelled, 80, 87 Egyptian occupation, 25 mutawi‘a system, 49 recapture by ‘Abdullah (1871), 107, 125–126 religious gathering, 85 Saudi capture of, 24–25, 54–55 scholastic religious center, 7 sedentary population center, 15, 25 ‘ulama network, 7 Wahhabi–Saudi movement, 23, 49 Roman Catholic Church, 136 Roman principles, 144, 153, 154 al-ru’asa’ (chiefs), 17, 20, 26, 27 al-Rub‘ al-Khali, 14, 103 Russia, war with Ottoman Empire, 61 Sa‘dun Ibn ‘Urayr, 55 Safilat Najd, 25 al-sahaba, 40–42 sahwa (awakening), 139 al-Sakakir, Muhammad Ibn ‘Abdullah, 31–32 al-salaf, 8, 31, 41, 44, 45, 132, 155 al-salaf al-salih, 5, 30, 32, 44 salafi movements, 5, 30, 132, 134 al-salafiyun, 32, 132 salafiyya, 132, 135 Salih Ibn Muhammad, 106 Salim I, Sultan, 60 Salim II, Sultan, 60 Salim III, Sultan, 61 salvation (tawassul), 8, 44, 46–47, 133

Samin, Nadav, 16, 17 al-San‘ani, ‘Abdulla, 38 al-San‘ani, Muhammad Ibn Isma‘il, 44 sanctuary cults, 34–35, 44, 50, 90, 132 Al Saud alliance with Al al-Shaykh, 8, 75–76, 157, 160, 161, 162 alliance with Wahhabi ‘ulama, 152 ‘asabiyya, 20 campaigns against, 54–56 capture of Huraymila (1755), 51 chieftaincy, 17, 18, 20, 25 connections with Mu‘ammar family, 79 control of Dir‘iyya, 24, 36, 66, 76 Egyptian occupation of Dir‘iyya, 74 as elite family, 19 genealogical origins of, 66 as Ibn Man‘ branch descendents, 24 Ibn Mu‘ammar as Dir‘iyya ruler, 79 iman, 118 kufr, 118 leadership shift, 74, 75–76, 80, 87 loss of Huraymila (1752), 51 as al-Murada descendents, 23, 24 Najd state formation, 63 political power of, 36 Second Saudi State (1824–1891), 64, 75–76 theocratic government, 157, 158 Third Saudi State re-established (1902), 9 as threat to local chiefs, 50 ‘ulama and umara cooperation, 157–164 Wahhabism revival (post-1820), 67–68 see also Saudi–Wahhabi forces; Wahhabi–Saudi movement Saud Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (1759–1814), 56, 58–59, 61, 118 Saud Ibn Faysal Ibn Turki death of (1875), 126–127 fitna, 102–107, 124–125, 162 Palgrave’s description of, 102 al-Qasim revolt, 96 Saudi Arabia Board of Senior ‘Ulama, 152 challenge of modernity, 101, 159–160 Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, 98, 99, 100–102, 159 establishment (1932), 9, 11, 77, 176n external expansion policies, 162–163 Faysal’s legacy, 98, 102 “genealogical consciousness”, 16 hijra concept, 140

214 | Index Saudi Arabia (continued) jihad, 140 mutawi‘a system, 101, 171n oil wealth, 162 politics and religion interrelationship, 143–153, 157–164 relations with United States, 163 socioeconomic developments, 162–163 takfir, 136, 139, 140 takfir al-mujtama‘, 140 theocratic regime, 98, 157–161 tribal chiefs, 17 tribal identity, 16–17 umara and ‘ulama alliance, 157–164 US troops, 159 Wahhabi Ikhwan, 101 Wahhabi ‘ulama, 140, 150, 152, 158, 159–160, 163–164 Wahhabism, 139–140, 157 Saudi State (First 1744–1818) Bedouin pacification, 66 Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, 71, 95 creation of, 6, 24, 63 dissolution of, 6, 48, 49, 50, 57, 61–62, 90, 117 fluctuating boundaries, 53–54 political legitimacy, 160 politics and religion interrelationship, 96 sedentary unity, 66 takfir, 117 tribal chiefs, 93 umara and ‘ulama alliance, 160 see also ‘Abdullah Ibn Saud (d. 1818); Ibn Saud, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Muhammad (d. 1803); Muhammad Ibn Saud (1689–1765); Saud Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (1759–1814) Saudi State (Second 1824–1891) Abu Butayn’s religious authority, 78 al-‘Ajman uprising, 81, 92–93, 103, 104 Al al-Shaykh, 49, 53, 64, 75–76, 87, 88, 102, 108–111, 158, 162 anti-Wahhabism, 124 Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, 10, 84–85, 95, 98, 99, 100, 102 dissolution of (1891), 11, 160, 161 Faysal Ibn Turki’s return (1843), 10, 77, 87, 88–89 information sources, 1–3, 5 MA dissertations, 1

mutawi‘a system, 49, 75, 89, 93, 98–99 nomadic tribes, 9, 92–93, 126–127 Pelly’s assessment of, 94 political legitimacy, 160 al-Qasim revolt, 89–92, 96–97 re-establishment of, 25, 80 religious affairs leadership, 75 religious dimension, 95–102 revival of Wahhabism, 7, 11, 67–68, 74–78, 82–84, 85, 88–89, 93, 108–110, 133 Al Saud, 64, 75–76 shifts in power (1865–1876), 105, 125, 184n territorial consolidation, 92–95 ‘ulama role, 75, 96 umara and ‘ulama alliance, 160 Wahhabi ‘ulama, 93, 96–97, 98, 102, 108–111 Wahhabi–Saudi movement, 6, 88, 160, 161 “Zelators”, 98–101 see also ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Faysal Ibn Turki; ‘Abdullah Ibn Faysal Ibn Turki; ‘Abdullah Ibn Thunayan Ibn Ibrahim; Faysal Ibn Turki (1785– 1865); fitna (civil strife 1865– 1891); Khalid Ibn Saud Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Muhammad Ibn Saud; Saud Ibn Faysal Ibn Turki; Turki Ibn ‘Abdullah Ibn Saud (1769– 1833) Saudi State (Third 1902–1932), 9, 11, 16, 104, 131, 161 Saudi–Wahhabi forces attack on Karbala, 44, 57, 73 attack on Zubayr (1803), 90 Bahrain raids, 59 capture of Hasa, 4, 56, 57, 59 capture of Riyadh, 24–25, 54–55 caravan routes’ control, 58 conflict with Sharifs of Mecca, 56, 57, 58, 61 control of Mecca, 57–58, 60 control of Medina, 57–58, 60 defeat of Ibn Dawwas, 24–25, 48, 54–55 Hijaz raids, 4, 56, 57–59, 73, 122–123, 132 Iraq raids, 56, 57, 59, 132 loss of Medina, 59 Oman raids, 4, 56, 59 Persian Gulf raids, 59 Syria raids, 56, 59, 132 Yemen raids, 4, 56, 59

Index | 215 Saudi–Wahhabi movement see Wahhabi–Saudi movement al-Sawi, Yusuf, 82 Schacht, Joseph, 151 Second Saudi State see Saudi State (Second 1824–1891) sedentary settlements (Najd), 22–29 “alleged” genealogies, 65–66 collective identities, 66 development of, 14–16 First Saudi State, 66 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s religious ideas, 34, 49 intellectual life, 63 khuwa (“brotherhood”) tax, 65, 66 mutawi‘a system, 9, 49, 93 relations with nomads, 16, 21, 22–23, 25–26, 65 sanctuary cults, 44 Sharifs of Mecca raids, 57 tribalism, 8, 19–20, 65 ‘ulama, 16, 35 Wahhabi–Saudi alliance, 25, 66, 70 semi-nomads, 25 Service, Elman Rogers, 144 Shafi‘i school ‘Abd al-Rahman’s studies, 81, 82 Al al-Shaykh, 38, 162 Cairo, 81, 82 al-Ghazali’s studies, 146 Ibn ‘Isa’s studies, 110–111 al-Mawardi’s studies, 146, 162 Mecca, 110 Medina, 52 takfir, 133 Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphs’ authority, 148 Shafi‘i ‘ulama, 52, 81, 133, 148 al-shahada, 34, 118, 120–121, 122, 136, 138 al-Sha‘ib, 15 Shammar tribes, 86, 94, 125–126 al-Shammari, ‘Abdullah Ibn Ibrahim Ibn Sayf, 46 al-Shammari, Ibn Sayf, 46 al-Shammari, Ibrahim Ibn ‘Abdullah, 46 al-Shammari, Ibrahim Ibn Sayf, 46 al-Shammari, Sheikh ‘Abdullah Ibn Ibrahim, 33 Shaqra, 15 shari‘a law Al al-Shaykh regulations regarding punishment, 98 bida‘, 134 Faysal’s rule, 10 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s preaching, 43

Ibn Taymiyya’s teachings, 7–8, 38, 42 al-ijtihad, 30, 31, 41, 42, 45 kufr, 133–134, 135 kufr and iman, 137 political leadership, 38 religious schools, 28–29 sedentary population, 34 sijill registers, 30 takfir, 133 theocratic regimes, 145 ‘ulama interpretation, 7–8, 152 Sharifs of Mecca conflict with Saudi–Wahhabi forces, 56, 57, 58, 61 control of Hijaz, 61, 93 descent from the Prophet Muhammad claim, 22 Najd campaigns, 22, 61, 89 ousting of last Sharif (1924), 101 relations with Ottoman Empire, 57, 60–61, 89 relationship with Wahhabism, 4 rule in Mecca, 57, 60, 61, 101 rule in Medina, 57, 60, 61, 101 al-Shariqa, 94 Al al-Shatti family, 91 al-Shatti, Hasan, 133 al-Shatti, Mustafa, 133–134 al-Shibil, ‘Abdullah Ibn Yusuf, 3 Shiites ‘Abd al-Latif’s polytheism accusations, 127, 128, 129 al-Barbahari’s religious ideas, 141–142 Hasa, 56, 72, 131 Hijaz cities, 122 Ibn Saud’s tolerant policy, 131 imama, 127 Qarmatians, 43, 60 al-rafida, 71–72, 122, 128 relationship between religion and state, 149 Saudi–Wahhabi attack on Karbala, 57 schism with Sunnis, 59, 72, 134 takfir, 112–113, 122, 127, 128, 129, 130 taqiyya, 56 ‘ulama, 149 Wahhabi attitude towards, 56, 71–72 al-shirk al-akbar, 115, 121 al-shirk al-a‘zam (the great polytheism), 47 shirk asghar, 121–122 shirk (polytheism) ‘Abd al-Latif’s teachings, 127, 128 Al al-Shaykh, 119, 121, 141

216 | Index shirk (polytheism) (continued) Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s preaching, 34, 44, 118–120, 121–122, 141 Mustafa al-Shatti’s concept of, 133 and tawhid (monotheism), 117–122 Wahhabi concept of, 34, 44, 117–122, 127, 128, 133, 137, 141 al-Sh‘lan tribe, 23 al-Shmas, 15, 90 shurka (partners), 27 Sifin, Battle of, 59 sijill, 30 al-Sindi al-Madani, Muhammad Hayat, 33 slaves (al-‘abid), 19, 26 smoking, 46, 100 Strayer, Joseph, 154 Subay‘ tribe, 81, 86, 94 Sudan, use of takfir, 136 Sudayr, 15, 18, 50, 78, 86, 96 al-Sufara, 15 Sufi rituals, 39 Sufism, 41, 82, 91, 132, 133 al-Suhul tribe, 94 al-Sulaya, 24 al-Sulayman, ‘Abdullah, 89 Sulayman al-Muhammad, 4 Sulayman Ibn ‘Abdullah Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1785–1818) attitude toward Christians, 129–130 death of, 67, 74 epistles, 123 father’s preaching and writings, 72 hijra concept, 123, 127 kufr, 123–124, 126 religious leadership, 7, 73–74 al-shahada, 126 shirk, 127 takfir, 112, 124 al-wala’ wa-l-bara’, 127, 129 Sulayman Ibn ‘Ali (Ibn Musharraf), 45–46, 69–70 Sulayman Ibn Muhammad, 32 Sulayman the Magnificent, Sultan, 60 Sulayman Pasha, 118 Suljuq dynasty, 145 sunna Al al-Shaykh, 41 Faysal’s epistle (1843), 95 Hanbali doctrine, 38, 39 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s emphasis on, 41 al-ijtihad, 41 qiyas principle, 40 ’usul al-fiqh, 39, 41

Sunni Islam Abadi community, 59 al-Barbahari’s religious ideas, 141–142 schism with Shiite creed, 59, 72, 134 takfiri discourse, 112–113, 122–123, 130, 133, 134 ‘ulama, 81, 134, 136 Wahhabi doctrine as distinct, 37 Sunni Islamic schools, 71, 81, 82, 97 al-Suwaydi, ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn ‘Abdullah, 114, 116 al-Swayda, Abd al-Rahman, 25, 26 Syria ‘Abd al-Latif’s polytheism accusations, 129 Alawis, 43 anti-Wahhabi migrants, 54 Saudi–Wahhabi raids, 56, 59, 132 ‘ulama campaign against Wahhabism, 60 see also Damascus tafaqqud, 84, 150 tafsir, 35, 82, 110 Ta’if, 57–58, 78, 122 takfir, 112–142 ‘Abd al-Latif’s discourse, 107, 112, 124–131 Al al-Shaykh, 11–12, 111, 137 fitna, 107, 126 hadith, 138 Hanbali doctrine, 120 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s teachings, 51, 112–117 Ibn Suhaym’s attacks, 50 al-Mawdudi’s concept of, 138 mutawi‘a system, 116, 131 origin of the term, 135 Qur’an, 135, 138 radicalization, 122–124 as a religious tool of accusation, 136 salafi movements, 132, 134 Saudi Arabia, 136, 139, 140 shar‘i justification, 133 Shiites, 112–113, 122, 127, 128, 129, 130 Sulayman Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, 51, 113 Sulayman Ibn ‘Abdullah’s discourse, 112, 124 Sunni Islam, 112–113, 122–123, 130, 133, 134 transmission to the masses, 118, 139–142 ‘ulama, 134, 136, 138

Index | 217 use for political purposes, 138 Wahhabi discourse, 107, 111, 112, 124–131, 132–133, 134, 137, 142 Wahhabi ‘ulama, 107, 112–113, 131, 137, 139, 140, 141 Talha bin Zubayr, 90 Tamim tribe, 66, 69 al-Tamimi, Muhammad al-Bassam, 18 al-Tantawi, ‘Abd al-Wahhab Ibn Ahmad Barakat al-Shafi‘i al-Azhari, 52 taqiyya, 56 al-taqlid (imitation), 31, 42, 45, 141, 168n Tarjuman al-Qur’an, 138 tasrruf (right to use the land), 27 tathir al-i‘tiqad, 8, 141 tawassul (asking for salvation), 8, 44, 46–47, 133 tawba (repentance), 72, 135 tawhid (monotheism) ‘Abd al-Latif’s teachings, 96, 110 ‘Abd al-Rahman’s treatises, 83, 110 ‘Abdullah Ibn Muhammad’s preaching and writings, 35, 47, 72 Al al-Shaykh, 8, 44, 141 at center of Wahhabi creed, 137 al-Fadli’s writings, 110 Faysal’s epistle (1843), 95 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s concept of, 35, 44, 73, 112, 118 Ibn ‘Atiq’s masa’il, 109 Ibn ‘Isa’s interpretation, 110 Saud Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz’s epistle, 118 shirk, 117–122 source of authority, 144 Sulayman Ibn ‘Abdullah’s concept of, 73 Turki’s epistles, 84 Wahhabism, 31 Tawney, Richard, 155, 156 al-Tayb, Muhammad Sulayman, 19 Thadiq, 15, 116 Tharmada, 15 Third Saudi State (1902–1932), 9, 11, 16, 104, 131, 161 Tibi, Bassam, 144–145 Traboulsi, Samir, 52–53 tribalism Arab structure, 17, 18–19 ‘ashira (clan within a tribe), 18–19 nasb sarih (true lineage), 19 nomads (al-badu), 8, 20, 22, 23 qabila (tribe), 18–19, 26 Saudi state formation, 16–17 sedentary settlements (Najd), 8, 19–20, 65

state formation, 16 tribal chiefs, 17, 20, 26, 27 Wahhabi–Saudi movement, 6, 8–9, 16–22, 48 Tunisia, ‘ulama campaign against Wahhabism, 52, 60 Turki Ibn ‘Abdullah Ibn Saud (1769– 1833) Abu Butayn’s religious authority, 78 assassination of, 80 capture of Dir‘iyya, 76, 77, 79, 80 Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, 84–85 conflict within Najdi society, 76 duties of Islam, 84 epistles, 83–84 as head of the family, 79, 80, 87 Ibn Taymiyya’s al-Siyasa al-Shar‘iyya, 84 jihad, 85 religious zeal, 85 reunification of Najd, 10, 81 Riyadh as capital city, 25, 80, 87 Second Saudi State established (1824), 25, 80 tawhid, 84 theocratic government, 81, 82, 83–85 tribal coalitions, 76, 85 ‘ulama and umara cooperation, 158, 160 Wahhabi ‘ulama, 76, 80, 81, 108, 150, 161–162 Wahhabism revival, 74, 75, 78, 82, 83–84 Wahhabi–Saudi alliance, 9, 25 zakat, 84 see also Saudi State (Second 1824– 1891) Tusun Pasha, 62 al-Tuwaym, 15 al-‘Ubaydi al-Muqri‘, Ibrahim, 82 ‘Ujman, 94 ukhawa (“brotherhood”) tax, 25–26 ‘ulama Abbasid Caliphate, 148 Ahl al-Hadith, 152 Baghdad, 132 bida‘, 132 Damascus, 132–134 Egypt, 60, 74–75, 76, 81 emergence of, 16 “foreign” political control, 153 four concepts of kufr, 137 guidance to rulers, 38 Hasa, 56

218 | Index ‘ulama (continued) Huraymila, 32, 34 al-ijtihad, 45 India, 152 kufr and iman, 137 al-Majma‘a, 50 Morocco, 52, 60 as muqallidun, 30–31 mutawi‘a system, 49, 89, 93 opposition to Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, 34, 35, 50 opposition to Wahhabi–Saudi movement, 48–56, 59–60, 62 Pakistan, 152 al-Qasim, 89, 90–91 references to duty, 84 relations with Caliphs, 151 relations with Saudi clan, 20 relationship between religion and state, 143, 144, 147–148, 149, 150 religious awakening expectation, 35 religious schools, 28–29 role after Egyptian withdrawal, 74–78 role in Islam, 151–152 Saudi official, 140 sedentary settlements (Najd), 16, 23, 35 Shafi‘i school, 52, 81, 133, 148 shari‘a law, 7–8, 152 Shiites, 149 Sulayman Ibn Muhammad’s court rulings, 46 Sunni, 81, 134, 136 Syria, 60 tafaqqud, 84, 150 takfir, 134, 136, 138 al-taqlid, 45 ’usul al-fiqh, 41 Wahhabi family, 69 Wahhabi–Saudi alliance, 25 Yemen, 52, 109 Zubayr, 90–91 see also Al al-Shaykh ‘ulama; antiWahhabi ‘ulama; Hanbali ulama; ijma‘; Wahhabi ‘ulama ‘Umar Ibn al-Khattab, 129, 130 ‘Umar Ibn Hasan, 176n ‘Umar Ibn‘Abd al-‘Aziz, 149 Umayyad Caliphate, 21, 145, 147, 148, 151 umma, 20, 113 al-‘Umur tribe, 94 ‘Unayza, 15, 89, 90 ‘Unayza tribes, 94 Unitarians (muwahhidun), 31, 32

United States relations with Saudi Arabia, 163 troops in Saudi Arabia, 159 ‘Urayr Ibn Duhayn, 55 ‘urf, 34 Ushayqir, 15, 28 ’usul al-fiqh, 35, 39–41 ‘Utayba tribe, 94 al-‘Utaybi, Juhayman, 139 ‘Uthayfiya, 15 ‘Uyayna establishment (15th cent.), 23, 24 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s brief stay, 34, 35–36 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s family home, 24, 28, 32, 34 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s unification attempts, 35 sanctuary cults, 35 sedentary population center, 15, 23 Wahhabi–Saudi movement, 23, 66 Vassiliev, Alexei M., 2 Wadi al-Dawasir, 15–16, 28, 103 Wahba, Hafiz, 101 Wahhabi family ‘asabiyya, 25 Al Musharraf family descendents, 45, 69 Najd state formation, 63 al-Wuhabah tribe descendents, 28 see also Saudi–Wahhabi forces; Wahhabi–Saudi movement Wahhabi ‘ulama ‘Abd al-Latif’s leadership, 9, 10, 11, 76, 81, 96, 106, 107, 108, 109, 124, 160 ‘Abd al-Rahman’s leadership, 82, 108, 109 after the Egyptian invasion, 74–78 Al al-Shaykh, 110 alliance with Saudi ruling family, 152 Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, 101, 102, 159 contemporary Islamist movements, 163 Egyptian campaign, 61, 62 exile to Egypt, 62, 67 fatawa, 139 Faysal’s government, 76, 80, 88, 96, 97, 98, 102, 108, 161–162 fitna, 107, 146 Hanbali doctrine, 110, 150 Ibn Humayd’s writings, 91–92 jihad, 163

Index | 219 kafir Muslims, 122, 133 massacred by Egyptian forces, 62 mutawi‘a system, 93, 99 other Sunni Islamic schools, 97 partial Egyptian withdrawal (1820), 76 al-Qasim revolt, 96–97 relationship between religion and state, 146, 150 religious concepts, 82 religious gathering, 85 religious unity, 108 Saudi Arabia, 140, 150, 152, 158, 159–160, 163–164 Second Saudi State (1824–1891), 93, 96–97, 98, 102, 108–111 self-image of, 73 Sulayman Ibn ‘Abdullah’s influence, 73–74 takfir, 107, 112–113, 131, 137, 139, 140, 141 al-taqlid, 141 Third Saudi State, 131 Turki’s government, 76, 80, 81, 108, 150, 161–162 Wahhabi movement growth, 30 zakat, 54 see also ‘Abd al-Latif Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman (1810–76); ‘Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hasan Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab Al-al-Shaykh (1779– 1868) Wahhabism anti-Sufi ideas, 91, 132 attitude toward Shiites and Zaydis, 56, 71–72 Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, 10, 71, 84–85, 95, 98, 99, 100–102, 109–110, 139, 159 compared to Protestantism, 155, 157 as distinct doctrine, 37–38, 72–73 educational developments, 28–29 emergence of, 1, 14, 30–36, 62–64, 65–67, 132 essentialist theories, 161 ethical code, 45–47 and extremist Islamist movements, 140 Hanbali doctrine, 7, 42, 72, 121, 150 heterodoxy in Islam, 43 Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab as founder, 6, 7, 24, 28, 30, 82 jihad, 114–115, 140 literature on, 30–35, 37–39 as madhhab doctrine, 37–38, 121 as a mass movement, 117–118, 119

origin of the term, 31–32 politics and religion interrelationship, 155–156, 157 qiyas principle, 39 reasons for success, 54 relations with Sharifs of Mecca, 4 religious emissaries, 48–49 religious zeal of, 11, 17–18, 20, 36, 48, 49, 64 revival (post-1820), 7, 11, 67–68, 74–78, 82–84, 85, 88–89, 93, 108– 110, 133 sanctuary cults, 34–35, 44, 50, 90, 132 Saudi Arabia, 139–140, 157 shrine visits, 47, 56, 58 smoking as forbidden habit, 46, 100 tawassul at the Prophet’s tomb, 46–47 three key principles, 38–39 “transformative capacities”, 155–156 treatment of holy places, 44, 58, 116, 120, 122 violence associations, 115 Wahhabi–Saudi coalition, 25, 66, 89, 152, 157–164 Wahhabi–Saudi movement ‘asabiyya, 25, 48 chieftaincy, 20 constant threats against, 54 development of, 62–64, 65–67 mutawi‘a system, 50, 53 nomads, 25, 126–127 opposition to, 48–56, 59–60, 62 origins of, 36 political and religious zeal, 64 reasons for success, 54 reliance on tribal coalitions, 18 religious and political zenith, 53 revival (post-1820), 10, 68, 74–78 Second Saudi State (1824–1891), 6, 88, 160, 161 sedentary population, 25, 66, 70 survival ability, 62–68 three elements of, 25 tribal society, 6, 8–9, 16–22, 48 umara and ‘ulama alliance, 157–164 urban centers, 23 al-Washm region, 63 waqf (religious endowment), 27 al-Washm region, 15, 63, 78, 86, 96 Weber, Max, 154–155, 156, 157 Western states, 152–157 Al al-Wihaybi family, 77 Winder, Richard Bayly, 1–2, 100 al-Wuhabah tribe, 28 Wynbrandt, James, 57

220 | Index al-Yamama, 15, 20, 21–22 yasa (Mongol local customs), 42 al-Yassini, Ayman, 2, 158–159 al-Yazid tribe, 24 Yemen ‘Abd al-Latif’s polytheism accusations, 129 Ibn Humayd’s study journeys, 83 opposition to Wahhabism, 52 Ottoman conquest of, 60 Saudi–Wahhabi raids, 4, 56, 59 students at Dir‘iyya majalis, 70 takfir, 136 ‘ulama, 52, 109 Wahhabi campaigns, 72

Zaydi Shiites, 72 zakat (alms tax), 34, 35–36, 54, 81, 84, 95 al-Zalfa, 55 Zaman, Muhammad Qasim, 151, 152 al-Zar‘a tribe, 23 Zayd Ibn al-Khattab, 35, 50, 116 Zayd Ibn Muhammad, 106 Zaydis, 71–72 “Zelators”, 98–101 al-Zilfi, 15, 51 Zubaida, Sami, 156–157 Zubayr, 90–91

Thank you for reading this Sussex Academic e-Library book. Sussex Academic serves the international academic community and promotes learning and scholarship to a global audience. The editorial and production staff are committed to publishing to the highest standards across a wide range of academic subject disciplines in the Humanities and Social Sciences. The Press supports authors through strong editorial and development skills, and is committed to serving the world of scholarship by promoting our authors’ writing and research endeavours so that they make the maximum impact on their readership and profession. The Press publishing programme addresses issues of contemporary relevance and debate in Middle East topics, Theology & Religion, History, and Literary Criticism. University editorship and publishing cooperation with universities mostly falls under the Sussex Libraries of Study, which include Latin American, First Nations, Spanish History, and Asian studies. Full details of the Press publishing programme can be found at the Press website www.sussex-academic.com E-book availability of titles are indicated on the Press website book title pages by the logo

“Books are the treasured wealth of the world and the fit inheritance of generations and nations . . . Their authors are a natural and irresistible aristocracy in every society, and, more than kings and emperors, exert an influence on mankind.” HENRY DAVID THOREAU, –