Voting in a Hybrid Regime: Explaining the 2018 Bangladeshi Election 978-981-13-7956-7

Table of contents :
Acknowledgments......Page 7
Contents......Page 8
List of Figures......Page 10
List of Tables......Page 11
Chapter 1: Introduction......Page 12
Bibliography......Page 17
Chapter 2: What Is a Hybrid Regime?......Page 19
Bibliography......Page 27
Chapter 3: Bangladesh: From an Electoral Democracy to a Hybrid Regime (1991–2018)......Page 30
Bibliography......Page 39
Chapter 4: Manufacturing a Climate of Fear......Page 41
Bibliography......Page 48
Chapter 5: Does Election Matter in a Hybrid Regime?......Page 51
Bibliography......Page 62
Chapter 6: The Mechanism of Manipulation......Page 65
Bibliography......Page 73
Chapter 7: The Election Day: Fear, Exclusion, and Persecution Come Together......Page 76
Bibliography......Page 86
Chapter 8: Election Results: A Victory Too Big to Believe?......Page 89
The Base Abandoned the BNP?......Page 91
Vanishing Secured Seats of the BNP?......Page 94
EVM Results Point to a Different Turnout?......Page 97
Bibliography......Page 98
Chapter 9: Mutation of Hybrid Regime and Quo Vadis Bangladesh......Page 99
Bibliography......Page 103
Candidates by Alliance Affiliations......Page 105
Appendix B: Bangladesh Parliamentary Elections 1973–2014—Fairness Index......Page 107
Index......Page 109

Citation preview

POLITICS OF SOUTH ASIA

Voting in a Hybrid Regime Explaining the 2018 Bangladeshi Election Ali Riaz

Politics of South Asia Series Editors Sumit Ganguly Department of Political Science Indiana University Bloomington Bloomington, IN, USA Ronojoy Sen Institute of South Asian Studies National University of Singapore Singapore, Singapore Neil DeVotta Department Politics and International Affairs Wake Forest University Winston-Salem, NC, USA Katharine Adeney School of Politics & International Relations University of Nottingham Nottingham, UK

This book series focuses on the contemporary politics of South Asia. To that end it covers a range of subjects including but not limited to electoral politics, party systems, political economy, social movements, ethnic and religious conflicts, foreign policy, inter-state dynamics and migration. Publications in the series are theoretically grounded with intellectual rigor, combining propositions from the fields of political science and international relations, with sound regional and area knowledge. The series publishes full-length monographs, edited volumes, as well as shorter Palgrave Pivots, that are cutting edge, as well as accessible. More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/15911

Ali Riaz

Voting in a Hybrid Regime Explaining the 2018 Bangladeshi Election

Ali Riaz Politics and Government Illinois State University Normal, IL, USA

ISSN 2523-8345     ISSN 2523-8353 (electronic) Politics of South Asia ISBN 978-981-13-7955-0    ISBN 978-981-13-7956-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7956-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover Image: © Elvele Images Limited / Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Pivot imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-­01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

The form of government that is usually termed mixed has always appeared to me a mere chimera … When a community actually has a mixed government—that is to say, when it is equally divided between adverse principles—it must either experience a revolution or fall into anarchy. —Alexis de Tocqueville (1835). Democracy in America. Vol. I. New York: The Library of America. 2004, p. 289

Acknowledgments

I am deeply indebted to Professor Neil DeVotta of Wake Forest University, NC, for persuading me to write this book. Without encouragement and patience of Vishal Daryanomel, the Commissioning Editor of Palgrave Macmillan, this book wouldn’t have seen the light of the day. I thank him sincerely. I am immensely grateful to my colleague and friend Professor Nancy Lind of Illinois State University for reading various versions of the manuscript. Her suggestions have significantly improved the contents. Two of my research assistants at ISU, Md Mizanur Rahman and Zunaid Almamun, provided invaluable help. I thank both from the bottom of my heart. Comments of anonymous reviewers were helpful and encouraging. Anushangi Weerakoon of Palgrave Macmillan had to bear with my unusual requests and excuses. Jeevan Jaganath was very helpful through the production process. I can’t thank them enough. My wife, Shagufta Jabeen, who has always been supportive of my work, deserves my heartfelt gratitude. Despite their support, they do not bear any responsibility for the contents of the book; the errors and omissions are entirely mine.

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Contents

1 Introduction  1 2 What Is a Hybrid Regime?  9 3 Bangladesh: From an Electoral Democracy to a Hybrid Regime (1991–2018) 21 4 Manufacturing a Climate of Fear 33 5 Does Election Matter in a Hybrid Regime? 43 6 The Mechanism of Manipulation 57 7 The Election Day: Fear, Exclusion, and Persecution Come Together 69 8 Election Results: A Victory Too Big to Believe? 83 9 Mutation of Hybrid Regime and Quo Vadis Bangladesh 93

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CONTENTS

 Appendix A: Bangladesh Parliamentary Election 2018 Basic Facts 99  Appendix B: Bangladesh Parliamentary Elections 1973–2014—Fairness Index101 Index103

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Fig. 2.2 Fig. 2.3 Fig. 8.1 Fig. 8.2 Fig. 8.3

The number of hybrid regimes (2006–2018). Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Democracy Index, Various Years Hybrid regimes as percentage of countries (2006–2018). Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Democracy Index, Various Years Percentages of population under hybrid regimes (2006–2018). Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Democracy Index, Various Years Popular vote share, 1991–2018 BNP popular vote trendline BAL popular vote trendline

16 16 17 86 87 87

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List of Tables

Table 5.1 Table 8.1 Table 8.2 Table 8.3 Table 8.4 Table 8.5

Selected hybrid regimes 50 Election results 2018, by number of seats 85 Popular votes of the BAL and the BNP, 1991–2018 86 Seats with more than 80% votes in favor of the BAL alliance 89 Three percentage differences in 2008 and percentages differences in 2018 90 Secured and considerably secured seats of major political parties91

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Abstract  Discussion of regimes which are ostensibly democratic but essentially authoritarian, described as Hybrid Regimes, abounds. Extant studies have analyzed various aspects of these emergent regimes and underscored the importance of elections as a tool in the continuation of the system. However, these studies have seldom examined the mechanisms of the manipulation of the election in detail. This chapter addresses this gap and employs the framework in analyzing the 2018 parliamentary election in Bangladesh which delivered an unprecedented victory for the incumbent Bangladesh Awami League (BAL). The chapter also summarizes the key arguments of the remaining eight chapters of the book. Keywords  Election • Bangladesh • Bangladesh Awami League • Bangladesh Nationalist Party Since the introduction of the concept of hybrid regime in the early 2000s, defined as a system of governance which is ostensibly democratic but essentially authoritarian, much has been written on them. The growing body of literature has ‘focused either on the study of their origins, on the theorizing about their functioning, or on the analysis of their ability to survive’ (Cassani 2012). Scholars of all three strands agree that elections play a pivotal role in hybrid regimes, from emergence to survival. Elections pose serious dilemma for the leaders of hybrid regimes, while contested © The Author(s) 2019 A. Riaz, Voting in a Hybrid Regime, Politics of South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7956-7_1

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elections bolster their claims of democracy and augment their legitimacy, they ‘create political uncertainty that can threaten authorities’ ability to stay in power’ (Petrov et  al. 2014). Under such circumstances, ‘hybrid regime rulers react to the dilemma of elections neither by accepting free and fair elections nor by eliminating elections. Instead, they manipulate elections and find other ways to minimize the chances that the population will oust them’ (Petrov et al. 2014). Exactly how do these manipulations take place? How do hybrid regimes conduct elections which overcome the uncertainty and deliver victory? What roles do state institutions play? There are not too many studies which have addressed these questions in detail and laid out the modus operandi of managed elections. This book attempts to fill in this gap through an exploration of the parliamentary elections in Bangladesh held on December 30, 2018. The 2018 Bangladeshi election has delivered an unprecedented victory to the incumbent Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) and its allies who secured 288 of 300 seats (The Guardian 2018). The election has been described by the New York Times Editorial Board as ‘farcical’ (The New York Times 2019), the Washington Post warned that the result was ‘bad for democracy’ (Slater and Majumder 2018) and a CNN analysis suggested it was the beginning of ‘dangerous new era’ for the country (Kugelman 2019). The Economist has written an obituary to democracy in Bangladesh (The Economist 2019). Similar sentiments have been expressed by a number of independent analysts (Milam 2019; Dyer and Spectator 2019). The country, which embarked on a democratic path in 1991, and still has the all the perceptible signs of democracy such as opposition political parties, regular elections, and a plethora of media, held two consecutive controversial elections and is sliding toward authoritarianism. This book provides a brief account of the political developments which entangled democracy and authoritarianism and paved the way for the consequential election of 2018. Therefore, it is also about this reverse journey of democracy in Bangladesh in the past decades at a time when democracy is in retreat throughout the world. As we are aware, it is a time of paradox: ‘there are more elections than ever before, and yet the world is becoming less democratic’ (Cheeseman and Klaas 2018). My primary objective is to understand the mechanism of an election manipulation in a hybrid regime. This book will describe how the election was rigged by the ruling party activists in connivance with the members of the civil administration, law enforcement agencies, and the electoral commission as well as how the

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boundary between state and party became blurred in an endeavor to win an election. This introduction is followed by eight chapters. It starts with an exploration of the concept of hybrid regime which has been in use since the late 1990s in the context of the growing number of countries which have democratic and authoritarian institutions concurrently. Chapter 2 examines the variations among hybrid regimes. Contextualizing the genesis within democratization studies, the chapter shows that the path-­dependent transition theories of the early 1990s failed to comprehend that democratization process can be stalled by the beneficiaries of the downfall of authoritarian governments. The euphoria of democratization, such as the proclamation of ‘the end of the history’, paid little attention to the experience of Latin America in the 1970s which led O’Donnell and Schmitter to warn that transition from authoritarianism can result in a liberalized authoritarian regime (dictablanda) or a restrictive, illiberal democracy (democradura) (O’Donnel and Schmitter 1986, 9). The discussion also shows that the particular form of the hybrid regime is contingent upon the institutional arrangements, because there is no single archetype of hybrid regime. The conceptual clarification of this chapter sets the scene for the discussion of the case of Bangladesh which is the topic of Chap. 2. Chapter 3 examines the political history of Bangladesh, especially since the democratic era began in 1991. While the chapter does not delve into the intricate details of political events, it provides the key moments of the transformation of the system of governance. It argues that the country was transformed into an electoral democracy after two decades of civilian and military authoritarianism. The optimism of democracy has been dashed since then and the regimes transformed over the years under two major political parties—the Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). The political history is viewed through the prism of regime transformation. Between 1991 and 2014, Bangladesh transformed from an electoral regime to semi-authoritarian to competitive authoritarianism to electoral authoritarianism. Neither of the two parties which alternated in state power developed the democratic institutions; instead, they tried to manipulate the constitution to achieve short-term benefits. The rancor between these parties resulting in a trust deficit cost the possibility of democratic consolidation. While other institutions, including the parliament, were quite ineffective, inclusive fair elections held under the caretaker government system incorporated into the constitution,

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hold the system. The BNP failed to manipulate the system in 2006 and inadvertently created a situation for an all-out assault on this effective institution. The BAL removed the system altogether in 2011 and made the last move toward creating a situation wherein election becomes an instrument for authoritarianism instead of democracy. The process of transformation which began in 2011 accentuated after the 2014 election which was boycotted by the opposition. The process of regime transformation, in other words, the progressive attenuation of democratic pretense, was not only limited to the constitutional arena but various legal and extralegal measures were employed to this effect. Chapter 4 discusses these measures such as persecution of opposition parties, indiscriminate use of existing draconian laws, muzzling of the press, incidences of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, and creating further restrictive laws. It is worth mentioning that the opposition, particularly the BNP, acted aimlessly and became alienated from the citizens, which served as an enabling factor for a hybrid regime like in Russia, Venezuela, and Tanzania. Thus, the chapter is an account of the creation of a climate of fear. In Chap. 5, the question that is addressed is whether the BNP and the opposition made a mistake when they decided to contest in the 2018 election. Neither the overall political environment nor the organizational situation was favorable to the opposition. Experiences of the local election did not provide any hopeful scenario. Yet, the question is whether they had any other option. The experience of the 2014 boycott weighed heavily on them. The question is, however, intrinsically connected to the larger theoretical question—does election matter in hybrid regimes? Considering the importance of elections in the survival of hybrid regimes, the elections are open to manipulation by the incumbent with the help of state machinery. In this exploration, I show that in the case of hybrid regimes, contrary to the arguments of Lindberg and his colleagues (Lindberg 2009), many elections do not create a path for democratization but instead help institutionalize flawed elections and help the regime thrive. Chapter 6 documents the events between the announcement of the schedule and the election day. How did the state machinery and the election commission (EC) join together to the detriment of a fair election is discussed. From cancelation of the candidacy of opposition candidates to the delay in allowing foreign election observers, the EC played the role of handyman for the incumbent; the law enforcement agencies were not only silent spectators when the opposition candidates were attacked by the

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r­uling party activists but it was instrumental in lodging frivolous cases against candidates and activists and arresting them daily. The courts, unfortunately, became an instrument in this machination process. What happened on the day of the elections? Media reported that the polling centers were eerily festive and peaceful. Because, ‘the signature of AL was all over the places so much so that the polls looked to be participated by none but one party. Gatherings of AL men outside polling centres [sic], voting slips of AL candidates, polling agents of AL and journey from gates of polling centres [sic] to booths looked after by AL were the features of the day’ (The Daily Star 2018). Chapter 7 provides snapshots of the day based on narratives of reporters of various media and the monitoring report of Transparency International Bangladesh. In addition to these scenes, there was ballot stuffing the night before, which one of the allies of the BAL also formally acknowledged. Chapter 8 examines the results of the election. The overall picture that the incumbent BAL and its allies were elected to 288 seats is only the tip of the iceberg, as I will show through comparison of election results between 2001, 2008, and 2014. The incredulity resides not only with the overall scale of victory but also with further exploration which shows that in more than 50 seats winners obtained more than 90% of the votes. Chapter 9, the conclusion, examines the potential trajectory of the country’s politics. It responds to questions such as: What are the implications of this managed election? Where does the nation go from here? The larger question that this chapter deals with is the mutation of a hybrid regime. At the beginning of the democracy’s global spread, especially since the 1990s, the impression was that the hybrid regimes are in transition: they will gradually move toward democratic consolidation. Instead of the expected mutation, as the Bangladesh case shows, it is regressing, and the institutions are being hollowed out. This study of a hybrid regime only highlights one institution, the election, and even in this discussion, I have focused on the endogenous aspect only. From this point of view, this study is limited in its scope. The emergence and the resilience of hybrid regimes are not only dependent on the manipulation of electoral arenas, although it is central; there are other important domains too. While I refer to some of them in the concluding chapter, this study exclusively focuses on the 2018 election considering its significance. In discussing the election, I have excluded the role of other countries, and reactions of the international community, which was surprisingly muted (Islam 2019; Hasan and Ruud 2019). Neither the space

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nor the scope of this book allowed me to address these issues. These issues warrant extensive examination as they are important in understanding the future of Bangladeshi politics and state on the one hand, and the hybrid regime as a system of governance, on the other. Perhaps, there will be another opportunity to delve deep, but this study expects to lay the groundwork through examination of the making of a managed election in 2018 which is the topic of the chapters to follow.

Bibliography Cassani, Andrea. 2012. “Hybrid what? The contemporary debate on hybrid regimes and the identity question.” Italian Society of Political Science, Roma. Cheeseman, Nicholas, and Brian Klaas. 2018. How to Rig an Election. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Dyer, Gwynne, and Hamilton Spectator. 2019. In Bangladesh, a struggling democracy is effectively dead. January 02. Accessed February 24, 2019. https://www. thespec.com/opinion-story/9106131-in-bangladesh-a-struggling-democracy-is-effectively-dead. Hasan, Mubashar, and Arild Engelsen Ruud. 2019. The Geopolitics of the 2018 Parliamentary Elections in Bangladesh. February 6. Accessed February 6, 2019. https://www.e-ir.info/2019/02/06/the-geopolitics-of-the-2018-parliamentary-elections-in-bangladesh/?fbclid=IwAR1SJoyFdBdReYrtQfpJyKkW1NQDbWBx2exR_6UKZB_SjvPTwfYBI9omxA. Islam, Arafatul. 2019. West’s ‘worrying’ support for Bangladeshi PM Sheikh Hasina. January 10. Accessed February 08, 2019. https://www.dw.com/en/westsworrying-support-for-bangladeshi-pm-sheikh-hasina/a-47019921. Kugelman, Michael. 2019. A disputed election and a dangerous new era for Bangladesh’s politics. January 01. Accessed January 1, 2019. https://www.cnn. com/2019/01/01/opinions/bangladesh-election-oped-intl/index.html. Lindberg, Staffan I. 2009. Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Milam, William B. 2019. “Civilian Coup d’etat.” The Friday Times. January 11. O’Donnel, Guillermo, and Phillippe Schmitter. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Petrov, Nikolay, Maria Lipman, and Henry E. Hale. 2014. “Three dilemmas of hybrid regime governance: Russia from Putin to Putin.” Post-Soviet Affairs 30 (1): 1–26. Slater, Joanna, and Azad Majumder. 2018. Why Bangladesh’s landslide election result is bad for its democracy. December 31. Accessed January 01, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/12/31/why-bangladeshslandslide-election-result-is-bad-its-democracy/?utm_term=.96578871f2b3.

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The Daily Star. 2018. As we saw. December 31. Accessed February 08, 2019. https://www.thedailystar.net/bangladesh-national-election-2018/snapshotsof-bangladesh-election-day-2018-as-we-saw-1681003. The Economist. 2019. Obituary of a democracy: Bangladesh. January 30. Accessed January 31, 2019. https://espresso.economist.com/0390aff9c68eeb7b64fbe be21c878de3. The Guardian. 2018. Bangladesh PM Hasina wins thumping victory in elections opposition reject as farcical. December 31. Accessed January 2, 2019. https:// www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/30/bangladesh-election-pollsopen-after-campaign-marred-by-violence. The New  York Times. 2019. Bangladesh’s Farcical Vote. January 14. Accessed January 15, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/opinion/editorials/bangladesh-election-sheikh-hasina.html.

CHAPTER 2

What Is a Hybrid Regime?

Abstract  After decades of proliferation of democracy around the world as a part of the ‘Third Wave’, by the early 2000s, the democratization process stalled in many countries and a new form of governance emerged in some countries either by choice or by default. This new form, while having some democratic institutions, is essentially authoritarian in its nature. It became evident to researchers that these regimes are not in transition. They are neither subtypes of autocracy nor of democracy, but instead are a regime type of their own. They are called hybrid regimes. This chapter traces the emergence of the concept of hybrid regime, explores its defining features, and examines the spread of such regimes around the world. Keywords  Democratization • Transition paradigm • Third wave • Hybrid regime The publication of Samuel Huntington’s seminal study in 1991 about the ‘third wave of democracy’ (Huntington 1991) renewed the long tradition in political science of differentiating between democratic and non-­ democratic systems of governance and the processes of democratization. For a long time, the perception that democratic governance is a binary thing: that a country is either a democracy or a non-democracy, was predominant not only among the common public but also among political scientists. Sartori (1987), Alvarez et al. (1996), and Linz (1975, 184–185), © The Author(s) 2019 A. Riaz, Voting in a Hybrid Regime, Politics of South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7956-7_2

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in some variations, have postulated such dichotomous categorization. Of course, various forms of non-democratic states were considered and discussed: for example, monarchical state, personal rule, military dictatorship, one-party state, to name a few. But the idea that there could be different variants of democracy was less entertained. Few political scientists had recognized that there are variations in democracy, as such Dahl (1971), Bollen and Paxton (2000) argued for gradation. Samuel Finer’s typology of world’s government in 1970 did mention façade democracy and quasi-democracy (Finer 1970, 442), but nuanced categorization of democratic regimes was not in vogue. It is against this background that taxonomies of democratic regimes began to emerge in the 1990s. Quite a few of them tried to locate democratic regimes within a continuum of autocracy and democracy. Based on what was considered as the defining characteristics of democracy, Doorenspleet identified a four-fold typology of the regimes. This was meant to help a meaningful comparison of regimes at the international level. The regimes were categorized as liberal democracies, minimal democracies, authoritarian systems, and interrupted regimes: A liberal democracy is a regime in which there is meaningful and extensive competition, sufficiently inclusive suffrage in national elections, and a high level of civil and political liberties. Minimal democracies are those political regimes with competition and inclusive suffrage but without a high level of civil liberties. Authoritarian regimes are those political regimes that fail to meet the first requirement of competition and/or the second requirement of inclusiveness. Finally, a country will be classified here as an interrupted regime if it is occupied by foreign powers during wartime, or if there is a complete collapse of central authority, or if it undergoes a period of transition during which new politics and institutions are planned. (Doorenspleet 2000, 389)

This framework categorizes various regimes, makes distinctions between democratic and non-democratic regimes and between democratic regimes. Samuel Huntington argued that the world has witnessed three waves and reverse waves of democracy beginning in 1828 (Huntington 1991). Granting voting rights to a majority of white males in the United States as the marker of the beginning the first wave, he contends that it continued until 1926. During this period, 29 countries became democratic. The wave was followed by a reverse wave, or a sustained decline of democratic

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states. The reverse wave began in 1922 with the rise of the Fascist regime in Italy under the leadership of Benito Mussolini. For more than two decades, the number of democratic states continued to decline. The number of democracies came down to 12 countries. However, after the end of the Second World War, a new wave, described as the Second Wave of democracy, commenced. In a period of two decades, the number rose to 36. But then a reverse wave hit in 1962. The span of the second reverse wave was shorter than the previous two. In 12 years, the number of democratic states came down to 30. Huntington argued that with the downfall of the Estado Novo regime in Portugal in 1974, the third wave began and continued in force through the 1990s. Huntington considered a country democratic based on the level or extent of open, free, and fair elections; limitations on political power; institutionalization and stability; and electoral competition and widespread voting participation. The notion that the Third Wave made democracy a ‘global phenomenon’ (Diamond 2011) dominated the early discussions. Optimism was the order of the day. The central thrust of the argument was borne out by the number of countries that have abandoned autocratic systems of governance and moved toward some form of electoral system since the mid-1970s. In 1973, slightly more than a quarter of countries could be categorized as democratic. In 1980, the share was about one-­ third, in 1992 about half, and three-fifths by 2000 (Diamond 2011). The wave reached its peak in 2006 when about 64% of all countries (123 out of 193) were described as democracies by the Freedom House (Freedom House 2013, 29). With the proliferation of democratic regimes, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the transition of the East European countries toward democracy in the 1990s, the ‘theories of democratic transition’ emerged. While the number of countries moving away from dictatorship was growing, the transition thesis adopted, or at least suggested, a path-dependent model. The implicit assumption was that once on the road to democracy, a country will eventually reach the destination of a consolidated democracy. Some authors were focusing on the conditions of democratization, while others were exploring how the consolidation could take place. In the initial discussions, seldom was it expressed that there could be a different outcome, let alone backsliding, although O’Donnell and Schmitter, drawing on experience of democratization in Latin America, warned in 1986 that transition from authoritarianism can result in a liberalized ­authoritarian

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regime (dictablanda) or a restrictive, illiberal democracy (democradura) (O’Donnel and Schmitter 1986, 9). Soon the weakness of this path-dependent model became palpable; in some instances, the transition process from an autocratic regime to a democratic regime was stalled before consolidation. Thomas Carothers noted in 2002: The almost automatic assumption of democracy promoters during the peak years of the third wave that any country moving away from dictatorship was “in transition to democracy” has often been inaccurate and misleading. Some of those countries have hardly democratized at all. Many have taken on a smattering of democratic features but show few signs of democratizing much further and are certainly not following any predictable democratization script. The most common political patterns to date among the “transitional countries”—feckless pluralism and dominant-power politics—include elements of democracy but should be understood as alternative directions, not way stations to liberal democracy. (Carothers 2002, 14)

The primary euphoria associated with the ‘third wave’ had subsided by the beginning of this century, and a wide range of studies demonstrated that while several countries had progressed toward democratic systems, some had since regressed to authoritarianism, and others had remained stagnant either by choice or by default. Carothers, proclaiming the end of the transition paradigm, laid out the extant picture: what is often thought of as an uneasy, precarious middle ground between full-fledged democracy and outright dictatorship is actually the most common political condition today of countries in the developing world and the post communist world. It is not an exceptional category to be defined only in terms of its not being one thing or the other; it is a state of normality for many societies, for better or worse. (Carothers 2002, 18)

It was also noted in 1988 that ‘the boundary between democratic and nondemocratic is sometimes a blurred and imperfect one, and beyond it lies a much broader range of variation in political systems’ (Diamond et al. 1989, xvii). In addition to the work of Carothers, Ottaway (2003a, b), and Nathan (2003) in the early 2000s drew attention to the emerging phenomenon of declining democracy and the emergence of new kinds of regimes.

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Initially noted as a defining feature of some of the new democracies was the absence of essential elements of liberal democracy: unrestrained civil liberties, guarantee to political rights, accountability, inclusiveness, and incorporation of voices of citizens in governance. The adoption of constitutionalism and multiparty electoral processes created an impression that they are at the procedural democracy stage (Dahl et  al. 2003, ix), and thus, were in transition. However, transition presupposes a gradual movement, which appeared to be missing in these new democracies. The extant typologies and definitions were inadequate in capturing the nature of these new forms of governance. A consensus emerged among the scholars that this type of ‘governance’ should be identified as ‘regime’ because it represents a ‘more permanent form of political organization’ (Fishman 1990) than a government, and that both formalized and informal government institutions and norms were important in understanding this new form of governance. The principal aspect of any definition of regime is that it is a set to rules. These rules are meant to establish control over three main aspects of the political life. These three aspects are (1) the number and type of actors allowed to take part in the selection of the individuals who fill the principal governmental offices, namely the position of chief executive and the membership of the legislative body, if any; (2) the methods of access to such positions; and (3) how power is exerted. Fishman explained the use of regime saying: “A regime may be thought of as the formal and informal organization of the center of political power, and of its relations with the broader society. A regime determines who has access to political power, and how those who are in power deal with those who are not” (Fishman 1990). Additionally, he made a clear distinction between regime and the state: “Regimes are more permanent forms of political organization than specific governments, but they are typically less permanent than the state. The state, by contrast, is a (normally) more permanent structure of domination and coordination including a coercive apparatus and the means to administer a society and extract resources from it” (Fishman 1990). Beginning late 1990s, various adjectives were being used to describe these regimes; for example, illiberal democracy (Zakaria 1997), feckless pluralism (Carothers 2002), competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2002, 53), electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2002, 36–37, 41–46), semi-authoritarianism (Ottaway 2003a), semi-democracy, virtual democracy, electoral democracy, pseudo democracy, and semi-authoritarianism

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(Levitsky and Way 2002). These characterizations were not free from ­criticism. For example, Armony and Schamis argued ‘this effort is carried out on the basis of inconsistent definitions of the various types and subtypes, producing a taxonomical system with blurred boundaries’ (Armony and Schamis 2005, 114). Larry Diamond has broadly described these new systems of governance as ‘hybrid regimes’ (Diamond 2002). The genesis of the term ‘hybrid regime’ can be traced back to the notion called ‘grey zones’ used by Karl (1995). He, however, meant a set of regimes occupying “some middle hybrid terrain” between consolidated democracy and blatant authoritarianism. This broad concept later transformed, especially in the early 1990s, when it was noticed that there are regimes which are not only located in the middle—the ‘grey zone’—but also have various systems of governance. This is what led to the various adjectives-laden forms of democracy I mentioned before. In the primary formulation, authors were trying to tie these new regimes to a root or base concept and. For example, when Fareed Zakaria introduced the notion of ‘illiberal democracy’, evidently it was tied to democracy and lacking one or more qualities of democracy, which became the defining feature. As such, this characterization implied that this was a diminished type of democracy. The same is true of Merkel’s (2004) suggestion of four types of ‘defective democracy’—that is, exclusive democracy, domain democracy, illiberal democracy, and delegative democracy. Contrary to this mode of characterization was the use of the phrase ‘electoral authoritarianism’, for example, by Schedler (2006), where authoritarianism is the base concept in understanding the nature of the emergent regime. In addition to these two strands, there were a few other threads identifying these emergent regimes that emerged. Some authors insisted that this new kind of governance should be considered as ‘transitional situations’ with the possibility of moving in either direction of democracy or authoritarianism (Armony and Schamis 2005). As noted by Mufti, gradually the third strand emerged, which insisted on a ‘residual’ category (Mufti 2018). By her account, one of those was the trichotomous differentiation—democracy, semi-democracy, and authoritarianism ((Mainwaring et  al. 2001) and the other was ‘mixed’ (Bunce and Wolchik 2008)). However, the term hybrid regimes gained currency. Increasingly it has become accepted that hybrid regimes are neither a subtype of autocracy nor of democracy but a regime type on their own; they are not to be confused with regimes in transition (Diamond 2002). Hybrid regimes are a particular type of regime whereas a regime in

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t­ransition is precisely that a regime changing from one type to another (Diamond 2002). Mufti has correctly noted, ‘hybrid regimes are also not a transitional state that is expected to quickly amend itself and become either a democracy or an authoritarian regime. In fact, what we have found is that hybrid regimes are often quite durable and need to be understood for what they truly are and that the terminology used to refer to such regimes should reflect this’ (Mufti 2018, 115). The essential point of a hybrid regime is that it is characterized by a mixture of institutional features of democracy with institutions of an autocracy. There is no single institutional arrangement; instead, they are often sui generis to each country (Robertson 2010). Therefore, there is neither a single definition nor a single type of ‘hybrid regime’. These regimes are defined by Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) as countries where  Elections have substantial irregularities that often prevent them from being both free and fair. Government pressure on opposition parties and candidates may be common. Serious weaknesses are more prevalent than in flawed democracies—in political culture, functioning of government and political participation. Corruption tends to be widespread and the rule of law is weak. Civil society is weak. Typically, there is harassment of and pressure on journalists, and the judiciary is not independent. (EIU 2016)

In the past decade, despite debates on the clarity of the term, researchers have focused on three aspects of hybrid regimes; they are: the origins (Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2002); the functioning (Lust-Okar 2004; Gandhi 2008; Boix and Svolik 2013); and the durability (Epstein et al. 2006; Brownlee 2009). The growing number of studies on hybrid regimes was predicated by the fact that these Janus-faced systems were on the rise. Data gathered over the past 12 years by the EIU show that the number of hybrid regimes has increased along with the decline in full democracies. The number of hybrid regime increased to 39 in 2018 from 30 in 2006, which means that 23% of total number of countries is with 16.7% of global population (Figs. 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3). Experiences of these countries show that ‘the legitimacy of policies enacted by the ruling party solely comes from its victory in elections— whether the elections are fair or not’, that ‘the opposition is suffocated by the ruling party who accuse them of being traitors, disloyal, oligarchic etc.’ and ‘deprived of any kind of means and platforms to express itself, the

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70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Authoritarian regimes

Hybrid Regimes

Flawed democracies

Full democracies

2018

2020

Fig. 2.1  The number of hybrid regimes (2006–2018). Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Democracy Index, Various Years 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Authoritarian regimes

Hybrid Regimes

Flawed democracies

Full democracies

2018

2020

Fig. 2.2  Hybrid regimes as percentage of countries (2006–2018). Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Democracy Index, Various Years

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50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

2014

2016

Authoritarian regimes

Hybrid Regimes

Flawed democracies

Full democracies

2018

2020

Fig. 2.3  Percentages of population under hybrid regimes (2006–2018). Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Democracy Index, Various Years

opposition succumbs into vegetarian life, as if it is a body still alive yet dysfunctional’ (Kilinc 2017).

Bibliography Alvarez, Mike, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limogni, and Adam Przeworski. 1996. “Classifying Political Regimes.” Studies in Comparative International Development 31 (2): 3–36. Armony, Ariel C., and Hector E.  Schamis. 2005. “Babel in Democratization Studies.” Journal of Democracy 16 (4): 113–128. Boix, Carles, and Milan W. Svolik. 2013. “The foundations of limited authoritarian government: Institutions, commitment, and power-sharing in dictatorships.” The Journal of Politics 72 (2): 300–316. Bollen, Kenneth, and Pamela Paxton. 2000. “Subjective Measures of Liberal Democracy.” Comparative Political Studies 33 (1): 58–86. Brownlee, Jason. 2009. “Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affects Democratic Transitions.” American Journal of Political Science 53 (3): 515–532. Bunce, Valerie, and Sharon Wolchik. 2008. “Mixed Regimes in Postcommunist Eurasia: Tipping Democratic and Tipping Authoritarian.” Workshop on “Democratization in European Former Soviet Republics: Limits, Obstacles and

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Perspectives.” Florence: Workshop on “Democratization in European Former Soviet Republics: Limits, Obstacles and Perspectives.” June 13. Carothers, Thomas. 2002. “The End of the Transition Paradigm.” Journal of Democracy 13 (1): 5–21. Dahl, Robert A., Ian Shapiro, and José Antonio Cheibub. 2003. The Democracy Sourcebook. Boston: MIT Press. Dahl, Robert. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven and London: Tale University Press. Diamond, Larry Jay. 2011. “Democracy’s Third Wave Today.” Current History 110 (739): 299–307. Diamond, Larry Jay. 2002. “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes.” Journal of Democracy 13 (2): 21–35. Diamond, Larry Jay, Juan José Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. 1989. Democracy in Developing Countries. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Doorenspleet, Renskee. 2000. “Reassessing the Three Waves of Democratizaton.” World Politics 52 (3): 384–406. EIU, Economist Intelligence Unit. 2016. Democracy Index 2015: Democracy in an age of anxiety. Accessed December 17, 2018. https://www.yabiladi.com/ img/content/EIU-Democracy-Index-2015.pdf. Epstein, David, Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen, and Shayrn O’Halloran. 2006. “Democratic Transitions.” American Journal of Political Science 50 (3): 551–569. Finer, Samuel E. 1970. Comparative Government. London: Allen Lane. Fishman, Robert M. 1990. “Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe’s Transition to Democracy.” World Politics 42 (3): 422–440. Freedom House. 2013. Freedom In The World 2013: Democratic Breakthrough In The Balance. Washington, DC: Freedom House. Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. Political institutions under dictatorship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Karl, Terry Lynn. 1995. “The Hybrid Regimes for Central America.” Journal of Democracy 6 (3): 72–87. Kilinc, Faith Resul. 2017. What we see in Venezuela is the faith of hybrid regimes. August 27. Accessed December 10, 2018. http://foreignpolicynews. org/2017/08/28/see-venezuela-faith-hybrid-regimes/. Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. 2002. “Elections without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism.” Journal of Democracy 13 (2): 51–65. Linz, Juan. 1975. “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes.” In Handbook of Political Science, edited by Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, 184–85. Boston: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. Lust-Okar, Ellen. 2004. “Divided they rule: The management and manipulation of political opposition.” Comparative Politics 36 (2): 159–79.

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Mainwaring, Scott, Daniel Brinks, and Anibal Perez-Linan. 2001. “Classifying Political Regimes in Latin America 1945–1999.” Studies in Comparative International Development 36 (1): 37–65. Merkel, W. 2004. “Embedded and defective democracies.” Special issue on consolidated or defective democracy? Problems of regime change. Democratization 11 (5): 33–58. Mufti, Mariam. 2018. “What Do We Know about Hybrid Regimes after Two Decades.” Politics and Governance 6 (2): 112–119. Nathan, Andrew J. 2003. “Authoritarian Resilience.” Journal of Democracy 14 (1): 6–17. O’Donnel, Guillermo, and Phillippe Schmitter. 1986. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Ottaway, Marina. 2003a. Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Ottaway, Marina. 2003b. “Promoting Democracy after Conflict: The Difficult Choices.” International Studies Perspectives 4 (3): 314–322. Robertson, Graeme B. 2010. The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes: Managing Dissent in Post-Communist Russia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sartori, Giovanni. 1987. The Theory of Democracy Revisited. London: Chatham House Publications. Schedler, Andreas. 2006. Electoral Authoritarianism  – The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Schedler, Andreas. 2002. “The Menu of Manipulation.” Journal of Democracy 13 (2): 36–50. Zakaria, Fareed. 1997. “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” Foreign Affairs 76 (6): 22–23.

CHAPTER 3

Bangladesh: From an Electoral Democracy to a Hybrid Regime (1991–2018)

Abstract  The democratization process in Bangladesh began in 1991, after two decades of civilian and military authoritarian rule. Various features of an electoral democracy became the hallmarks at the auspicious beginning. However, within the following two decades, the quality of democracy deteriorated, and the country became an electoral authoritarianism, a variant of the hybrid regime. A manipulated general election in 2014, boycotted by all parties, paved the way for a reversal of democracy. This chapter discusses the political developments between 1991 and 2018, the backsliding of democracy, and the progressive attenuation of inclusive governance as a background to the 2018 election. Keywords  Electoral democracy • Competitive authoritarianism • Electoral authoritarianism • Caretaker government • Violence Bangladesh, which emerged as an independent country in 1971, experienced one-party civilian rule and military authoritarianism until 1990 when a popular uprising deposed the military regime. The 1972 constitution introduced a unicameral parliamentary system based on First-Past-­ The-Post (FPTP) system with 300 directly elected seats. But most of its first two decades the country was ruled under a presidential system introduced in early 1975 when the country was turned into a one-party state. A brutal military coup d’etat in 1975, which killed the founder President © The Author(s) 2019 A. Riaz, Voting in a Hybrid Regime, Politics of South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7956-7_3

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Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, most of his family members and his associates, began the era of military and pseudo-civilian rule. During the period between 1972 and 1990, democratic practices were limited at best. Four parliamentary elections were held, but none was free and fair. Widespread rigging, manipulation of the electoral processes, denying the opposition the space for campaigning and using state apparatuses including state media were the defining characteristics of these elections. The system of governance that emerged in 1991 at the beginning of democratic transition in Bangladesh had all the hallmarks of electoral democracy. The defining characteristics of the electoral democracy, as described by the Freedom House, are following: ‘A competitive, multiparty political system; Universal adult suffrage for all citizens (with exceptions for restrictions that states may legitimately place on citizens as sanctions for criminal offenses); Regularly contested elections conducted in conditions of ballot secrecy, reasonable ballot security, and in the absence of massive voter fraud, and that yield results that are representative of the public will; Significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the media and through generally open political campaigning’ (Freedom House 2012). Drawing on an agreement reached during the pro-democracy movement (1982–1990) among political parties of all persuasions—from right-wing Islamists to left-wing socialists and all parties in-between—a system of fair election was put in place, a competitive multiparty system with almost equal opportunities for all parties came into existence, and the independence of judiciary was promised. The most significant step was the reintroduction of the parliamentary system in 1991. It stripped off the President of unrestrained power, but unfortunately it also created the opportunity for amassing power in the hands of the Prime Minister. After the first inclusive fair election in 1991, which delivered a victory to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the opposition Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) was unwilling to play by the rule, which unfortunately continued in the subsequent rounds of elections although the roles of two parties—the Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)—reversed every five years (Schaffer 2002). The trust deficiency among major political parties, especially BAL and the BNP engendered acrimony, street agitation, and violence, and the incessant wrangling between these two parties made the parliament dysfunctional. The incorporation of the caretaker government (CTG) in the constitution in 1996 to ensure credible elections reflected the trust deficiency but

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allowed establishing a system of peaceful power transition. Few points regarding the CTG are worth recalling here: first, the incorporation of the CTG was demanded by the opposition BAL and vehemently opposed by the ruling BNP; second, the parliament which finally incorporated the CTG provision was held under the BNP and boycotted by the opposition. A parliament with questionable legitimacy amended the constitution without any direct input from the opposition parties, civil society, higher courts, or constitutional experts. Nevertheless, increasingly the formal democratic institutions began to lose its importance. Regular elections between 1991 and 2001, which allowed alteration of power between the BNP and the BAL, held under caretaker governments remained the only effective democratic institution (Riaz 2014b). Instead of consolidating democracy, building democratic institution, creating ways for vertical and horizontal accountability, and ensuring space for dissent, an all-powerful ‘Prime Ministerial System’ was created (Molla 2000, 10), and incumbents practically institutionalized a neopatrimonial system of governance where corruption became endemic. Neopatrimonialism, a system where patrons use state resources to secure the loyalty of clients in the general population, became the defining feature (Islam 2013). Major political parties, which remained undemocratic and mostly dynastic (Riaz 2010; Amundsen 2016) turn out to be the vehicle of accruing power and wealth. This vitiated the entire administrative and political structure and ‘partyarchy’ became the rule of the game. As noted by Hassan, the only way the ruling party related to state institutions and autonomous constitutional bodies was the ‘monopolistic partyarchal governance’. Additionally, ‘partisan control over the civil bureaucracy, state-owned electronic media, law enforcement agencies, institutions of horizontal accountability (Public Service Commission, Anti-Corruption Commission), the lower judiciary and—more recently—also the higher judiciary’ (Hassan 2013) was normalized. These tendencies of the political parties, which produced an intolerant political culture, resulted in a gradual tilt toward authoritarianism. In previous decades, along with a de facto two-party system, a vibrant civil society became a prominent actor in the socio-political arena. By the beginning of the fourth decade of independent Bangladesh, what became the defining features of the governance were ‘rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy, … (and some) political space for political parties and organizations of civil society to form, for an independent press to function to some

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extent, and for some political debate to take place’; they are the key features of a semi-authoritarian regime, according to Ottaway (2003). The competition between two parties, each with about 40% of popular votes (Riaz 2016, 241) as their base, increasingly became more vicious and the use of state power to persecute opponents through judicial and extrajudicial manners became the norm. Perhaps no other incident exemplifies the ruling party’s penchant for extrajudicial measures better than the assassination attempt of the opposition leader Sheikh Hasina in August 2004 in a public rally. The cover-up by the government was easily discernable after the incident. A court verdict, in 2018, revealed the connivance of members of the ruling party and state machinery in the attack (The Daily Star 2018a). The opposition, on the other hand, through the period had adopted the strategy of repeated street agitations instead of making the parliament as the center of politics. Due to the competitive nature of politics, Bangladesh’s semi-­ authoritarian system of governance took the shape of competitive authoritarianism. ‘In competitive authoritarian regimes, formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of obtaining and exercising political authority. Incumbents violate those rules so often and to such an extent, however, that the regime fails to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy’ (Levitsky and Way 2002, 52). In these kinds of situation, election becomes a high-stake event because ‘the legitimacy of policies enacted by the ruling party solely comes from its victory in elections—whether the elections are fair or not’ (Kilinc 2017). This became palpable when the incumbent BNP tried to manipulate the caretaker system in 2006. As the constitution stipulated that the immediate past Chief Justice (CJ) will be the head of the caretaker government, the incumbent raised the retirement age of the justices to ensure that its preferred retired CJ can be appointed. The opposition political parties under the leadership of the BAL vowed not to accept him and launched street agitations. When the former CJ declined, the President assumed the position of the head of the government in addition to his responsibility of the head of the State. Although legally permissible, it became evident that he was acting on behest of the BNP to influence the elections scheduled in early 2007. Street agitations, heightened violence, and international pressure paved the way for the military to step in and install a caretaker technocratic government. After two years of military-backed caretaker government’s rule, election was held in December 2008. Armed with a two-thirds majority, the

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Bangladesh Awami League and its allies removed the caretaker proviso from the constitution in 2011. Although the BAL insisted that it was a verdict of the highest court which prompted its decision to scrap the system, it cannot be further from the truth. On May 10, 2011, the Supreme Court issued a verdict on a case challenging the constitutionality of the existing CTG system.1 The summary verdict stated that ‘The Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 1996 (Act 1 of 1996) is prospectively declared void and ultra vires the Constitution.’ But it also made observation that ‘The election to the Tenth and the Eleventh Parliament may be held under the provisions of the above mentioned Thirteenth Amendment.’ The court suggested that the parliament amend the constitution to make sure that former chief justices or any other Supreme Court judges are not chosen as heads of caretaker governments in case the system is kept for another two parliamentary elections. During the hearing, the court heard opinions of eight amici curiae (friends of the court) of whom seven supported the continuation of the system. Despite the enormous significance of the verdict and its implication, unfortunately, the court took 14 months to deliver the full text of the verdict—it was signed and delivered on September 16, 2012. The full text of the verdict revealed that there was no consensus among the justices as to whether the 13th amendment was unconstitutional. Of the seven judges of the apex court, four were in favor of declaring the caretaker provision unconstitutional, two dissented, and one opined that the matter should be left to parliament. But there was unanimity on two issues. Firstly, the system should be kept for two more elections. Secondly, in their joint observation, the judges concurred with the concerns of the amicus curiae that an election under a party government is a recipe for disaster. The judges observed: ‘The senior lawyers of the country expressed apprehension that there would be anarchy if the ensuing election is held under party government. And we cannot ignore their view.’ 1  The caretaker system was first challenged in 1996 (Writ Petition No. 1729 of 1996) in the High Court Division. The High Court rejected the petition. In January 2000, a Supreme Court lawyer challenged the 13th amendment again in the High Court in a writ petition saying the change distorts the principle that the republic will be governed by an elected government. The High Court rejected the petition in 2004 (57 DLR 171). However, after the petitioner died, another Supreme Court lawyer filed an appeal in June 2005 against the High Court ruling in the Supreme Court. In 2011, the Supreme Court heard the appeal beginning March 1. For 10 days, opinions and arguments from eight amici curiae and the counsels for both sides of the appeal were heard before the verdict was reached.

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Although these observations and the grounds of the dissenting opinions were important and had serious consequences, they became moot because, before the complete verdict was made public, the parliament had already annulled the system. As for the parliament’s decision to annul through an amendment of the constitution, it began long before the Court’s summary verdict was issued. A 15-member constitution amendment parliamentary committee was appointed in July 2010, in which the BNP declined to participate. The proceedings of the committee show that it had unanimously concluded that the CTG system should be maintained and that a strict limit of 90 days be imposed on its tenure. In its 27 meetings between July 21, 2010, and May 29, 2011, the committee gathered opinions from 3 former chief justices, 10 constitutional lawyers/experts, representatives from 6 political parties (including the AL, which was represented by the PM), 18 intellectuals, editors of 18 newspapers and media, and the leadership of the sector commanders forum (an organization of the commanders of the freedom fighters of 1971). Most of them urged the committee to look into the inadequacies of the caretaker system; only a few suggested a complete abolition of the system. Accordingly, the committee formulated its recommendation on May 29, 2011, regarding Article 58(B) and 58(D). It recommended that no more than 90 days be added to 58 (B) as the tenure of the CTG. Additionally, it recommended that clause 58(D)(3) be added that forbids the CTG to sign new agreements with any foreign governments. The government will be allowed to renew any existing agreement if its term expires, but the renewal will have to be placed before the parliament for its ratification after a new parliament is elected. A day later, the committee met the PM and decided to make a U-turn: Article 58 will be scrapped altogether (Majumdar 2013). A bill to that effect, the 15th amendment to the constitution, was placed before parliament. In the absence of the opposition, the bill was passed by a 291–1 vote; the lone dissenter was Mohammad Fazlul Azim, the only independent Member of Parliament. The 15th amendment of the constitution removed the CTG system and stipulated that the parliamentary election will be held within 90 days prior to the completion of the tenure (or within 90 days of the dissolution of parliament, if the parliament is dissolved before completion of its tenure). It was implied that the incumbents in cabinet will continue to serve up to the time of the election, and that the parliament will continue to function. It also stipulated that an election will be held while the previously elected parliament will remain effective, which is contrary to the

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level playing field necessary for ensuring an acceptable election and common practices of parliamentary system around the world. Bangladesh’s history between 1973 and 1991 showed that elections under an incumbent had performed only one function: delivering a victory to the incumbent. It was a classic move to turn the country into an electoral authoritarian regime: ‘Electoral authoritarian regimes play the game of multiparty elections by holding regular elections for the chief executive and a national legislative assembly. Yet they violate the liberal-­ democratic principles of freedom and fairness so profoundly and systematically as to render elections instruments of authoritarian rule rather than “instruments of democracy”’ (Schedler 2006, 12). An Electoral Authoritarian regime, to ensure its access to power, effectively strips the efficacy of elections. As such, the 15th amendment of the Bangladeshi constitution was neither a response to the abuse of caretaker system by the previous government nor the Supreme Court’s verdict, but a way to make the elections ineffective. The controversial 2014 election did exactly that. The decision of the BNP and other parties to boycott the election was expected by the regime. The failed violent movement to halt the election by the BNP, and its alliance with the Islamist party Jamaat-i-Islami (JI),2 played into the hands of the ruling party. But these  should not undermine the facts that the regime was already mutating and that structurally the election was designed to favor the incumbent. Notwithstanding the pre- and post-election violence (Riaz 2014a, 2014b, 2015), the 2014 election became one of the most consequential election in the history of the country. Ironically it had the least voter turnout, and more than half of the members of the parliament was ‘elected’ unopposed—without a single vote being cast (Ahmed 2014). The BAL government insisted on holding the 2014 election as a constitutional necessity, because it was well aware that would provide them the cover for holding a non-inclusive election. The party which completely disregarded the constitutional requirement in 1995–1996 and 2006 and insisted that extraconstitutional measures should be taken to meet its demand for the sake of inclusive election became the champion of constitutional provision which was created by itself, that too ignoring the 2  The JI opposed the founding of Bangladesh during the war of independence in 1971. Some of its leaders have been convicted by the International Crimes Tribunal established by the BAL in 2010, and five leaders have been executed between 2013 and 2015. The party has been deregistered by the Election Commission in 2013.

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Court’s observations and Parliamentary committee’s deliberation. The boycott of the opposition was in the making of the 15th amendment of the constitution in 2011 and the appointment of a subservient election commission. The politicization of administration, although not new in Bangladesh, reached the zenith before the election was scheduled. The failure of the opposition parties to devise an effective strategy to stop this on track helped the incumbent in some measures. Whether the participation of the opposition in the election would have made any difference is a moot point. But what is clear is that since the election of 2014 the BAL was hell-bent on decimating its archrival BNP. Many argue that the 91 days of violent movement of the BNP in the wake of the first anniversary of the election is to blame for the plight of the opposition. Without condoning the strategy and tactics of the BNP during the 2015 movement which cost at least 138 lives and an economic loss of $2.2 billion, it is necessary to raise two questions: firstly, does an opposition party’s ‘misdeed’ justify indiscriminate use of force by the state and depriving citizens of their democratic rights? Secondly, if the BNP had not launched the violent movement, would the ruling party have allowed enough space for them? The writing was on the wall well before the movement commenced; Zafar Sobhan predicted in a commentary on January 1, 2015, that ‘There can be only One.’ Sobhan wrote: ‘2014 marked the end of the compact of co-existence that was forged between the AL and BNP at the end of the 1980s, and that has provided the pattern for the past quarter century of political life. … The gameplan for the ruling AL is clear. … The AL plan for the coming year is therefore straightforward: Continue to squeeze the life out of the BNP’ (Sobhan 2015). By May 2016, the Strategic Forecast identified one of the two trends that would shape the future Bangladesh as ‘its descent toward single-party authoritarianism’ (Strategic Forecast 2016). Therefore, it was quite evident that after the 2014 election, the road was not leading to, rather away from, democracy. Beyond the electoral arena, there are two aspects important in understanding the nature and scope of hybrid regimes: they are the executive and legislative arena, and the judicial arena (Ekman 2009; Levitsky and Way 2002, 52). The electoral arena serves as the foundation to the other two arenas, but they have their own dynamics. In case of Bangladesh, the incumbent Bangladesh Awami League acted stealthily to create a favorable dynamic by bringing them under its control.

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As for executive-legislative relations, weak and ineffective parliaments serve the purpose of the regime. The Bangladesh parliament, since 1991 had limited effectiveness, thanks to repeated boycotts by opposition members, constitutional provision limiting the independence of the members (Article 70), and the structure of various oversight committees; yet it did provide a semblance of check on the executive. The tenth parliament elected in 2014 essentially had no opposition party, because the Jatiya party which took the opposition seat had three members in the Cabinet and the head of the party, General Ershad, was appointed a special envoy of the Prime Minister. Under such circumstances, the thin line between the executive and legislature was completely blurred. Subordination of the judicial arena is almost a prerequisite for the maintenance of the hybrid regime. Levitsky and Way argue that this is often done by means of bribery and extortion, and, if possible, by appointing and dismissing judges and officials (Levitsky and Way 2002, 52). According to Brown and Wise, institutions such as the Supreme Court or constitutional courts tend to function not only as arbiters of constitutionality and legal principles but also as advocates of the current regime (Brown and Wise 2004). This is true of any hybrid regime; the removal of the Lord President (the highest judicial figure) of Malaysia by Mahathir in 1988 and curtailment of power of Venezuelan Supreme Court under the Chavez government (1992–2012) (Urribarri 2011) are cases in point. The 16th Amendment of the Bangladesh Constitution passed by the parliament in September 2014 which has empowered the parliament to impeach judges of the Supreme Court for incapability or misconduct falls within this kind of effort. The insalubrious rhetoric of the ruling party leaders after it was struck down by the High Court (May 2016) and the Supreme Court (July 2016) is indicative of the mindset to establish complete control over the higher courts. This is what led to the ‘resignation’ of the Chief Justice S. K. Sinha, who also left the country (Dhaka Tribune 2017). The CJ, in his memoir published a year later, claimed that he was forced to resign and was exiled (Bergman 2018). Similarly, retaining the power of appointment, administration, and removal of lower court judges in the president’s hands as opposed to the Supreme Court through the Bangladesh Judicial Service (Discipline) Rules 2017 contravenes the spirit of the separation of executive and judiciary (The Daily Star 2018b). From an institutional perspective, by the beginning of the Election Year of 2018, the nature of the Bangladeshi state was completely transformed

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into a hybrid regime. Combined with other actions of the regime, for example, using draconian laws to stifle dissenting voices, a variant of the hybrid regimes—electoral authoritarianism, was firmly in place.

Bibliography Ahmed, Farid. 2014. Bangladesh ruling party wins elections marred by boycott, violence. January 06. Accessed December 6, 2018. https://www.cnn. com/2014/01/06/world/asia/bangladesh-elections/index.html. Amundsen, Inge. 2016. “Democratic dynasties? Internal party democracy in Bangladesh.” Party Politics 22 (1): 49–58. Bergman, David. 2018. Bangladesh: Ex-chief justice alleges he was ‘forced’ to resign. September 28. Accessed December 1, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/ news/2018/09/bangladesh-chief-justice-alleges-forced-resign-180927 103453932.html. Brown, Trevor L., and Charles R.  Wise. 2004. “Constitutional Courts and Legislative-Executive Relations: The Case of Ukraine.” Political Science Quarterly 119 (1): 143–69. Dhaka Tribune. 2017. Sinha resigns as chief justice. November 11. Accessed December 26, 2019. https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2017/11/ 11/chief-justice-sk-sinha-resigns/. Ekman, Joakim. 2009. “Political Participation and Regime Stability: A Framework for Analyzing Hybrid Regimes.” International Political Science Review 30 (1): 7–21. Freedom House. 2012. Methodology. Accessed January 17, 2019. https:// freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2012/methodology. Hassan, Mirza. 2013. Political settlement dynamics in a limited-access order: The case of Bangladesh. Working Paper, Manchester: ESID, 62. http://www.effective-states.org/wp-content/uploads/working_papers/final-pdfs/esid_ wp_23_hassan.pdf. Islam, Mohammad Mozahidul. 2013. “The Toxic Politics of Bangladesh: A Bipolar Competitive Neopatrimonial State.” Asian Journal of Political Science 21 (2): 148–168. Kilinc, Faith Resul. 2017. What we see in Venezuela is the faith of hybrid regimes. August 27. Accessed December 10, 2018. http://foreignpolicynews. org/2017/08/28/see-venezuela-faith-hybrid-regimes/. Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. 2002. “Elections without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism.” Journal of Democracy 13 (2): 51–65. Majumdar, Badiul Alam. 2013. Which Constitution? Whose Constitution (in Bengali). October 28. Accessed December 11, 2018. https://www.prothomalo.com/ home/article/58858/%E0%A6%95%E0%A7%8B%E0%A6%A8-%E0%A6%B8%E

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0%A6%82%E0%A6%AC%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%A7%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%A8%E0%A6%95%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%B0-%E0%A6%B8%E0%A6%82%E0%A6%A C%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%A7%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%A8. Molla, Gyasuddin. 2000. Democratic Institution Building Process in Bangladesh: South Asian Experience of a New Model of a ‘Care-taker Government’ in a Parliamentary Framework. Working Paper, Department of Political Science, South Asia Institute, Heidelberg: University of Heidelberg, 15. Ottaway, Marina. 2003. Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Riaz, Ali. 2014a. “A Crisis of Democracy in Bangladesh.” Current History 113 (762): 150–156. Riaz, Ali. 2016. Bangladesh: A Political History. London: I. B. Tauris. Riaz, Ali. 2014b. “Bangladesh’s Failed Election.” Journal of Democracy 25 (2): 119–130. Riaz, Ali. 2010. “‘Dynastic Politics’ and the Political Culture of Bangladesh.” Journal of International Relations 8 (2). Riaz, Ali. 2015. The Troubled Democracy of Bangladesh: ‘Muddling Through’ or ‘a Political Settlement’? Special Report, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, Heng Mui Keng Terrace: Institute of South Asian Studies, 17. Schaffer, Howard B. 2002. “Back and Forth in Bangladesh.” Journal of Democracy 13 (1): 76–83. Schedler, Andreas. 2006. “The Logic of Electoral Authoritariansim.” In Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, by Andreas Schedler (ed.), 1–24. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner. Sobhan, Zafar. 2015. There can be only one. January 01. Accessed June 2, 2018. https://www.dhakatribune.com/uncategorized/2015/01/01/there-canbe-only-one. Strategic Forecast. 2016. Bangladesh’s Descent Into Authoritarianism. May 31. Accessed July 12, 2018. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/bangladeshsdescent-authoritarianism. The Daily Star. 2018a. August 21 attack: ‘State-backed crime’ punished. October 11. Accessed January 7, 2019. https://www.thedailystar.net/august-21carnage/21-august-grenade-attack-verdict-tarique-rahman-awarded-life1645090. The Daily Star. 2018b. Lower courts’ freedom undermined by 3 rules. January 02. Accessed December 27, 2018. https://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/ lower-courts-freedom-undermined-3-rules-1513600. Urribarri, Raul A.  Sanchez. 2011. “Courts between Democracy and Hybrid Authoritarianism: Evidence from the Venezuelan Supreme Court.” Law and Social Inquiry 36 (4): 854–884.

CHAPTER 4

Manufacturing a Climate of Fear

Abstract  Beginning mid-2015, Bangladesh experienced a dramatic decline in the space for dissent, and freedom of expression and assembly became highly restricted. The main opposition party, Bangladesh Nationalist Party, was pushed to the corner after its mass movement failed and was weakened as its leaders faced frivolous criminal changes. The overall social and political climate became more restrictive. Various methods, such as extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, were employed to create a climate of fear among the citizens. Media was muzzled through co-optation and unwritten censorship. Existing draconian laws were used and new restrictive laws were introduced to curb online activities. Two non-partisan grassroots movements were quelled through heavy-handed measures. This chapter describes the overall fearful situation before the election cycle began. Keywords  Fear • Media • Enforced disappearance • Extrajudicial killing • Digital Security Act The Bangladesh constitution, pursuant to the post-15th Amendment proviso, stipulated that unless the parliament was dissolved before completion of the term, election will be held sometime between November 2018 and January 2019. Therefore, the incumbent Bangladesh Awami League appears to begin taking steps from mid-2015 for an ‘election without © The Author(s) 2019 A. Riaz, Voting in a Hybrid Regime, Politics of South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7956-7_4

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choice’ by all measures. As an electoral authoritarian regime tends to do, the BAL tried to create an aura of invincibility. In the absence of moral legitimacy after the 2014 election, coercion was the only tool left in its political strategy tool box. Through various measures, the regime ensured that a culture of fear permeates the society which will not only deter the political opposition from taking to the streets, but the members of civil society will be afraid of persecution and humiliation. The opposition, particularly the BNP, was not allowed to hold any public gathering. Their requests were denied on suspected potential of violence from the gathering. Using the failed movement of the BNP which gripped the nation between January and March 2015 as a pretext, the government adopted a heavy-handed approach toward the party. As its close ally, the Bangladesh Jamaat-i-Islami, was already pushed to the corner through the trials against its leaders for their involvements with the war crimes of 1971, the BNP was facing an uphill task. The number of cases, in most instances without any evidence, continues to mount against its leaders and activists. The frivolous nature of these cases can be understood from cases filed against top leaders of the BNP including Khaldea Zia and Mirza Fakhrul Islam. In some instances, they were sued for arson attacks on public buses. The BNP soon fell into disarray and became rudderless. Devoid of an effective strategy to face the government, the party unwittingly helped the hybrid regime thrive. Ekman, in his study of three hybrid regimes— Tanzania, Russia, and Venezuela—found both structural and political cultural elements as enabling forces. Among the structural factors ‘a weak or ineffective political opposition’, and ‘lack of interplay between ordinary citizens and opposition parties’ (emphasis in original) were present in all three cases (Ekman 2009). The situation in Bangladesh between 2015 and 2018 became identical to these three countries. Other opposition parties, particularly on the left, had shunned the BNP due to its alliance with the JI, and the BNP was hardly making an appeal to the citizens. The weakening of the political forces was matched by erosion of space for dissent. For example, in 2016, the editor of the Daily Star Mahfuz Anam became a target of harassment. After admitting to a lapse in editorial judgment during the 2007–2008 military-backed caretaker government, 79 cases were filed against him by the ruling party activists. The PM’s statement against him and Matiur Rahman, the editor of the largest circulated Bengali newspaper Prothom Alo, encouraged filing of these cases (Galhotra 2016). Article 57 of the Information and Technology Act (2006

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amended in 2013), which allowed arrests of any person without any warrant, became a tool for sending a message to all that any dissent was unacceptable and would have severe consequences. In seven months of 2017, more than 300 cases were filed (Abrar 2017). The call of the BAL Secretary General to its activists to exercise restraint in using the law show how widespread the phenomenon had become (The Daily Star 2017). In October 2018, the government replaced the ICT Act, but only with a harsher and more draconian law called the Digital Security Act (DSA). The vaguely worded law provided more arbitrary power to the police and the government. It practically criminalized free speech. The government remained unfazed by the public outcry, international condemnation, and the unprecedented public rally of editors. The impact of the law didn’t take time to be felt. Reuters, after interviewing 32 journalists and editors across print, digital and broadcast media, reported on December 12, 2018, that ‘the vast majority said the recent strengthening of defamation laws with a new Digital Security Act (DSA) has spread a climate of fear in the industry’ (Paul et al. 2018). While muzzling the freedom of assembly and the freedom of expression were serious matters with grave consequences, they were pale compared to the rising incidences of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. According to the Human Rights Group, Odhikar, 153 people became victims of extrajudicial killings in 2017. The numbers were 178 in 2016, 186 in 2015, and 172 in 2014, and 329 in 2013 (Odhikar 2019). Although the extrajudicial killing started under the previous BNP government, it became normalized as the government euphemistically called them, ‘crossfires’, ‘encounters’, and so on. According to another human rights organization, Ain O Salish Kendra (ASK), 437 people became victims in ten months of 2018, prior to the election, the highest ever extrajudicial killing in one year in Bangladesh (Hasan 2018). Concurrent to this was the growing number of enforced disappearances. In 2017, 139 people were abducted, allegedly by the plain-clothed members of law enforcing agencies, according to the Odhikar. The number was 139 and 151 in 2016 and 2015, respectively. Although these incidents were on the rise since 2010, the victims were largely the activists of the opposition parties until 2017. In the second half of 2017, the number of enforced disappearances increased so precipitously that the head of the country’s National Human Rights Commission acknowledged that people are living in fear of being a victim at any time (Kasem 2017). Between August and November, a businessman, a journalist, a university professor,

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a book importer, a banker, a student of a Canadian university, and a former diplomat were among the victims. Although some of them returned unharmed but highly traumatized, many are yet to be found. The government, which rejected any suggestions of its involvement, had shown no interest in investigating these disappearances. Instead, messages from government officials tended to undermine the gravity of the situation. The Home Minister claimed that some people disappear willingly to embarrass law enforcers (The Financial Express 2017). The police chief insisted that disappearances have been taking place since the British colonial period, and Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina conflated missing persons with enforced disappearances saying that enforced disappearances take place in Britain and in the United States (bdnews24.com 2017). The shift in the target and the government’s attempt to normalize them sent a chilling message to almost everyone: nobody is safe. Defying this fearful situation, two grassroots non-partisan social movements by youth rocked  the country in 2018. The movement for the reform of the quota system in the public service in April and the road safety movement in August rocked the country (Riaz 2018). These movements were quashed with heavy-handed measures. Pro-government activists were unleashed to quell the demonstrations (Anam 2018). It is at the height of the road safety movement  in August  that internationally acclaimed photojournalist Shahidul Alam was arrested (Meixler 2018) and allegedly tortured after giving an interview to Al Jazeera Television criticizing the government. He was released on bail after detention for more than 100 days. Although it may sound preposterous to quantify fear, there could be ways to gauge the extent of fear among the citizens. I offer two examples: one of which provides a picture over time, while the other is a snapshot around the 2018 election. The state of politics and public perception of the freedom of expression can be gleaned from a series of surveys conducted by international organizations such as the Asia Foundation, International Republican Institute (IRI), and Democracy International (DI). In October 2016, Democracy International conducted a survey of 1453 respondents via telephone. The survey, conducted between 23 and 31 October, revealed that there has been a surge among the respondents who felt that the country is moving in the right direction (70% compared to 14% in April 2013). However, when it came down to the question as to whether most people in the area

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where they live feel free to express their political opinions, 38% ­respondents responded negatively, and 8% decided not to respond. The poll shows that 35% of respondents didn’t want to reveal who they would have voted for if the election was held on that day. The number was astounding since almost five years ago, in December 2014, it was only 5%. Besides, 14% said they ‘Don’t Know’ compared to only 1% in another survey of the Democracy International (DI) in 2014 (Democracy International 2018a). A survey conducted by the Asia Foundation between October and November of 2015 with 3200 respondents reported that ‘a third of respondents did not feel free to express their political opinions or were unsure’ (The Asia Foundation 2016). The DI survey informed us that 38% of respondents have said that most people in the area where they live do not feel free to express their political opinions. The response to a similar question in the 2015 Asia Foundation survey revealed that 30% of the respondents said people in their locality felt the same way. The Asia Foundation survey summarized the prevailing atmosphere saying, ‘Freedom of speech has [sic] declined significantly since 2006’ (The Asia Foundation 2016, 6). That the number of people preferring to remain silent on sensitive questions has increased significantly over the years; data gathered by the International Republican Institute (IRI), which periodically conducts surveys in Bangladesh, is testimony to a climate of fear. The IRI survey conducted between April 10 and May 21, 2018, recorded that 21% of respondents preferred the ‘Don’t Know’ option when asked, ‘Overall, how would you rate the current level of political stability in Bangladesh?’ The percentage of ‘Don’t Know/Don’t Respond (DK/DR)’ was 15% in 2017, and only 3% in September 2014—three months before the 2014 election. The steep increase is significant in a span of four years. In a similar vein, in response to the question ‘Overall, how would you rate the current security situation in Bangladesh?’, the share of DK/DR rose to 13% from 3% in the previous year. The most telling was the non-response to the question: ‘On a scale from one to five, to what extent do you think that people in Bangladesh feel free to publicly express their political opinions, with one being they do not feel free to express their opinions at all, and five being they feel completely free to express their opinions?’ In a 2018 survey, 21% of 5000 respondents remained silent. In an open-ended question: ‘Thinking now about the national elections, if the parliamentary elections were held next week, for which party would you vote?’ a stagger-

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ing 62% decided that they would rather not reveal their preference. The precipitous increase from 27% in September 2014 carries a message (International Republican Institute 2018). The last survey before the 2018 election, about the state of politics in the country, was conducted jointly by UK Aid, USAID, and Democracy International (DI) between September 1 and September 12, 2018. The sample was 2200 adult population. Concurrently 14 focus groups were held. The report was not made public but circulated among selected stakeholders of these organizations. The author obtained a copy through a reliable source. The report laid out the overall situation as caveats, By a number of measures, the political space in Bangladesh is closing. The results of the survey and focus group research in such closing democratic spaces must be viewed through this distorted lens. Urban focus group respondents, particularly men, in several cities (Dhaka, Chattogram, Sylhet, Barisal) offered clearly articulated reasons why they were reluctant to offer their true opinions on the political environment of the country or criticize the ruling party in any way in a group setting. Many discussants ultimately did, particularly in Chattogram, once their confidence in the confidentiality of the space was assured and if they could find a way to do so indirectly. Participants were heard saying they were not giving their true opinion at times when the moderator was not present, or they believed they were not being overheard. (Democracy International 2018b)

In the survey, 62% of respondents didn’t respond to the question, ‘Thinking now about the national elections, if the parliamentary elections were held next week, for which party would you vote?’ One of the findings of the focus groups was perhaps the best summary of the situation prior to the election: According to focus group participants, space for free expression in Bangladesh is closing. Participants are frustrated because they “live in a free country” but feel they are unable to express their political opinions in public. They are particularly hesitant to speak about the ruling party, a theme that repeated itself through several groups. Participants mentioned real consequences to expressing their views online or publicly: they feared cases opened against them, arrests and jail sentences. In one of the most riveting exercises of the groups, at the very end, the moderator asked participants what they would say to a leader of AL and a leader of BNP, if they were sitting in the room. Participants in all divisions, men and women, urban and rural (though more

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urban than rural) said they would not even consider doing so to a leader of the ruling party, out of fear of retribution. A few offered policy suggestions or mild criticism but most would not. Fewer, but still some, participants had the same response when asked what they would say to or ask a BNP leader: they said they would keep their mouths shut out of fear. Others issued a blanket statement that they would not speak to a leader of either party. A few said they would offer only positive things. Although the impact on the election is difficult to quantify, this reluctance to speak out or even offer an opinion to a party leader reflects serious erosion of democratic principles in Bangladesh. (Democracy International 2018b)

These surveys and the focus group clearly show that a sense of fear overwhelmed the citizens across the country which precluded them from expressing their opinion, let alone participating in political activism. The second example regarding quantification of fear is derived from presence in cyber-space. The use of social media, particularly the use of Facebook, can be used as an indicator of the extent of fear among common people. In a report published in the TRT, Yashab Rahman informs of a dramatic reduction in the use of Facebook ahead of the election: Fiber@Home, one of the leading international internet gateway operators in the country, found that Facebook usage had fallen by 30 percent in only one month. Whereas in October, Facebook data usage was around 28 Gigabits per second (Gbps), it fell to around 18 Gbps by December 16, 14 days before the election. (Rahman 2019)

This significant drop took place in the background of the government’s enhanced surveillance of social media and arrests for making critical comments. Although there have been incidents of arrests in the previous years for posting on Facebook (Human Rights Watch (HRW) 2018), the number increased considerably during and after the road safety movement in August 2018. Among the charges filed by the police against internationally acclaimed photojournalist Shahidul Alam was that of making ‘provocative comments’ on Facebook (Olivier 2018). In September 2018, a University professor was suspended and arrested (NDTV 2018). During the August ‘road safety’ movement, the government alleged that ‘rumors’ are being spread through social media and made arrests of suspected individuals. On August 9, police claimed to have identified 1000 Facebook accounts for ‘inciting violence’ during the protest and arrested 12 people (Timesnownews.com 2018). A newspaper report published on January

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15, 2019, informs: ‘at least 63 people, including online and cultural activists and journalists, have been arrested under the Digital Security Act between October 2018 and January 2019, mostly for their activities against the prime minister, her father and the government on social networking sites, especially Facebook and YouTube’ (Rashid 2019). A city, ‘which was ranked second among the cities with the highest number of active Facebook users by We Are Social and Hootsuite’ and had ‘around 22 million active users’ in 2017 (Rahman 2019) had experienced a sudden drop in the usage ahead of a very important election is by itself indicative of a fearful environment. Add to these the rise of pro-­government social media accounts with suspicious contents. On 22 December, social media giants Twitter and Facebook announced that they have removed ‘a small number of accounts in Bangladesh after an initial investigation suggested they had undisclosed links to state-sponsored actors’ (Molin 2018). Although the number was quite small—Twitter suspended a total of 15 accounts while Facebook removed nine pages and six accounts—it was worrying that ‘this activity is linked to individuals associated with the Bangladesh government’ according to the Facebook (Molin 2018). These series of separate incidents, from denying the opposition permission to hold rallies to muzzling press to wanton extrajudicial killings to enforced disappearances to chocking cyber-space, all created a climate of fear. A sense of anxiety set in day by day. Fewer voices were heard, but the silence began to speak volumes.

Bibliography Abrar, C. R. 2017. Silencing Dissent. December 08. Accessed January 16, 2019. https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/human-rights/silencing-dissent-1501744. Anam, Mahfuz. 2018. Commentary: Why this merciless beating? July 04. Accessed December 23, 2018. https://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/why-mercilessbeating-1599568. bdnews24.com. 2017. Enforced disappearance situation more grim in US than Bangladesh, says Hasina. November 24. Accessed January 26, 2019. https:// bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2017/11/24/enforced-disappearance-situationmore-grim-in-us-than-bangladesh-says-hasina. Democracy International, DI. 2018a. Democratic Participation and Reform (DPR), Bangladesh. October. Accessed December 3, 2018. https://democracyinternational.com/media/CATSS%20Bangladesh%20October%202016%20 Survey.pdf.

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Democracy International, DI. 2018b. SPL Survey: Politics and Governance in Bangladesh. Survey Report, Washington: Democracy International. Ekman, Joakim. 2009. “Political Participation and Regime Stability: A Framework for Analyzing Hybrid Regimes.” International Political Science Review 30 (1): 7–21. Galhotra, Sumit. 2016. 79 cases and counting: Legal challenges pile up for Daily Star editor who admitted error in judgment. February 23. Accessed January 26, 2019. https://cpj.org/blog/2016/02/79-cases-and-counting-legal-challengespile-up-for.php. Hasan, Kamrul. 2018. Ain o Salish Kendra: Extrajudicial killings highest in six years. November 21. Accessed January 23, 2019. https://www.dhakatribune. com/bangladesh/2018/11/21/ain-o-salish-kendra-extrajudicial-killingshighest-in-six-years. Human Rights Watch (HRW). 2018. No Place for Criticism: Bangladesh Crackdown on Social Media Commentary. May 09. Accessed February 22, 2019. https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/05/09/no-place-criticism/bangladesh-crackdown-social-media-commentary#. International Republican Institute, IRI. 2018. National Survey of Bangladeshi Public Opinion. Survey Report, Washington: International Republican Institute. Accessed 2018. Kasem, Abul. 2017. People are living in fear of disappearances. December 10. Accessed December 27, 2018. https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2017/12/10/people-living-fear-disappearances/. Meixler, Eli. 2018. Bangladeshi Photographer Shahidul Alam Has Been Released From Detention. November 21. Accessed January 17, 2019. http://time. com/5460932/bangladesh-photographer-shahidul-alam-released/. Molin, Anna. 2018. Twitter, Facebook Remove Accounts in Bangladesh for Manipulation. December 20. Accessed February 22, 2019. https://www. bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-20/twitter-facebook-removeaccounts-in-bangladesh-for-manipulation. NDTV. 2018. Bangladesh Professor Arrested For Facebook Comments on PM Sheikh Hasina. September 26. Accessed February 22, 2019. https://www.ndtv.com/ world-news/bangladesh-professor-arrested-for-facebook-comments-onprime-minister-sheikh-hasina-1922676. Odhikar. 2019. Total Extra-judicial killings from 2001–2008. January. Accessed March 3, 2019. http://odhikar.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Statistics_ EJK_2001-May-2018.pdf. Olivier, Laurent. 2018. Bangladeshi photographer Shahidul Alam arrested over ‘provocative comments’. August 06. Accessed February 22, 2019. https://www. washingtonpost.com/world/2018/08/06/bangladeshi-photographer-shahidul-alam-arrested-over-provocative-comments/?utm_term=.60be9230e564. Paul, Ruma, Serajul Quadir, and Zeba Siddiqui. 2018. In fear of the state: Bangladeshi journalists self-censor as election approaches. December 12. Accessed

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January 5, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bangladesh-electionmedia-insight-idUSKBN1OC08Q. Rahman, Yashab. 2019. Silence and self-censorship persist in Bangladesh after December 30 polls. January 07. Accessed February 22, 2019. https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/silence-and-self-censorship-persist-in-bangladesh-afterdecember-30-polls-23151. Rashid, Muktadir. 2019. 63 people held since October. January 15. Accessed March 3, 2019. http://www.newagebd.net/article/61819/63-people-held-sinceoctober. Riaz, Ali. 2018. Seeking justice in Dhaka. August 14. Accessed January 26, 2019. https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/seeking-justice-indhaka-bangladeshi-teenagers-protest-road-safety-5305195/. The Asia Foundation, AF. 2016. Bangladesh’s Democracy According to the People: A Survey of the Bangladeshi People. Survey Report, Dhaka: Asia Foundation. https://asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/BangladeshsDemocracy-Survey.pdf. The Daily Star. 2017. Don’t file cases without nod from centre. August 11. Accessed December 22, 2018. https://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/dont-file-caseswithout-nod-centre-1446925. The Financial Express. 2017. Difficult to find people willingly disappear: Kamal. November 09. Accessed January 29, 2019. http://www.thefinancialexpress. c o m . b d / n a t i o n a l / d i f f i c u l t - t o - f i n d - p e o p l e - w i l l i n g l y - d i s a p p e a rkamal-1510159297. Timesnownews.com. 2018. Bangladesh Police arrest social media activists over ­protest ‘rumours’. August 09. Accessed February 22, 2019. https://www. timesnownews.com/international/article/bangladesh-police-arrest-socialmedia-activists-over-protest-rumours/266975.

CHAPTER 5

Does Election Matter in a Hybrid Regime?

Abstract  It is well recognized in the extant discussion that election poses a dilemma to the leaders of the hybrid regimes: they want to show a veneer of democracy through a contested election but want to ensure their victory. As these elections only deliver success to the regime, the question remains of whether participation in these elections is worth for opposition. This chapter discusses the pros and cons of participation in the election in a hybrid regime, draws on various countries’ experiences, and describes the situation in Bangladesh leading to the 2018 election. Keywords  Election • Resilience • Legitimation • Manipulation

As the 2018 election approached, debates and discussions abound whether the opposition parties, particularly the BNP, will participate or there will be a repeat of 2014. Many analysts, since December 2014, voiced their criticisms of the BNP for its decision to boycott the election, although it was not only the BNP which remained away from the polls. The demand for some form of a caretaker government, interchangeably described as poll time government/neutral administration, for the supervision of the election was raised by other opposition parties before and after the 2014 election. The ruling party did not heed to the demands which impelled the question about the participation. © The Author(s) 2019 A. Riaz, Voting in a Hybrid Regime, Politics of South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7956-7_5

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Experiences of local levels elections were not encouraging for the opposition. Participated by all parties, Mayoral elections were far short of being free and fair. Election observers and media described the six city corporation elections held between 2015 and 2018 as blatantly rigged. Tim Meisburger, an election observer of the Asia Foundation described the Dhaka City Corporation election held on April 28, 2015, as a show of ‘booth capturing’ by the ruling party activists. He writes, Anyone who works in South Asia has heard of “booth capture,” where a group of thugs takes over a polling station and stuffs the ballot box, but I had never seen it in action, and had trouble imagining how it could actually happen. Now I unfortunately have first-hand experience. (Meisburger 2015)

Similar experience was recorded in the port city of Chittagong as narrated by Samia Huq (Huq 2015). On July 31, 2018, city corporation elections of Rajshahi, Sylhet, and Barishal were held. While the BNP candidate won in Sylhet, all were marred by high level of irregularities including ballot stuffing, intimidation of voters and polling agents (The Daily Star 2018a). The extent of irregularities in the Khulna City Corporation election (The Daily Star 2018b), held on May 15 2018, prompted the US Ambassador Mercia Bernicat to call for ‘full and transparent investigations’ as she expressed her disappointment (bdnews24.com 2018). The Gazipur City Corporation election, held on June 26, 2018, was no difference. However, what transpired from the Khulna and Gazipur elections was interesting and unique. The apparent peaceful atmosphere on the election day at the polling centers unlike the previous ones was deceptive, because the actual situation was far more disturbing. The intimidation of the opposition leaders, activists, and potential polling agents began weeks before the election. Frivolous cases were filed against them and arrests were made, the polling agents who showed up at the centers were picked up by plain-­ clothed police and unlawfully detained at unknown places or in police vans until the election was over. As such, a new phrase was added in the public lexicon, ‘managed election’, and it appeared that a new model of rigging has emerged (Liton 2018). A triumvirate of local administration, members of the law enforcing agencies and the party activists, with the connivance of the Election Commission, delivered the victory to the ruling party without any tangible violence on election day. With the imminent national election, the apprehension in 2018 was whether there was any possibility of a different situation. For the main

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opposition, the BNP, the conviction of its Chairperson Khaleda Zia in February on graft charges, repeated denials of her bails, as many as 34 more cases filed against her, and continued persecution of its leaders and activists added more to its dilemma. The questions were: Should the opposition participate in the election? Is there a likelihood of them winning? Can they make a point by joining the election? What benefit will it bring? These questions are, in fact, part of the larger question regarding election in hybrid regime: does election matter in hybrid regime? Risking digression, we need to delve deep into this question. The discussion which follows addresses this theoretical question drawing on the extant literature, experiences of other countries, and contending perspectives. There is no denying that election is an important component of democracy because without some form of representation of the citizens one cannot claim to have democracy. Election is also considered as a defining characteristic of a regime. In Diamond’s (2002) categorization of regimes election plays a pivotal role. In his view: ‘Closed Authoritarian regimes do not hold multiparty elections; Hegemonic Electoral Authoritarian regimes hold uncompetitive multiparty elections that are not free or fair; Competitive Authoritarian Regimes hold competitive, albeit unfair or un-­ free multiparty elections; Electoral Democracy holds free and fair multiparty elections although civil liberties are not fully protected and enforced; Liberal Democracies hold free and fair multiparty elections and broadly protect civil liberties’ (Gilbert and Payam 2011). Election has been underscored, often described as the principal indicator of, democratization in the past three decades. Since the publication of Huntington’s The Third Wave of Democracy, interest on election saw a resurgence among political scientists. Huntington also argued that ‘two turnover test’—that is, two alterations in power after the initial democratization election—marks the consolidation of democracy. The use of election as the key indicator of democracy and the assumption that elections are a sufficient measure of democracy prevalent in studies on democracy in the 1980s gave rise to the concept of ‘fallacy of electoralism’ (Karl 2000). In the words of Larry Diamond, this fallacy consists of privileging electoral contestation over other dimensions of democracy and ignoring the degree to which multiparty elections, even if genuinely competitive, may effectively deny significant sections of the population the opportunity to contest for power or advance and defend their

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interests, or may leave significant arenas of decision-making power beyond the reach or control of elected officials. (Diamond 1996)

The role of electoral system in democracy, therefore, became an issue. Chris Adcock insisted, ‘the presence of a functioning electoral system does not automatically ensure the existence of true democracy or rule out the possibility of authoritarian structures and practices’ (Adcock n.d.). Over time it became increasingly evident that the maxim ‘necessary does not mean sufficient’ is equally true to democracy and about the nature of regime. Neither election alone can encompass the various elements of democracy nor election is a proof of participation in the decision-making process. Additionally, election can be manipulated through various ways (Bollen 1980). Keeping these in mind, scholars have cautioned against unidimensional approach and insisted on taking various aspects in consideration in the determination of the nature of a regime, particularly hybrid regime. In the extant discussions and the EIU Index, multiple descriptors have been used in characterizing a regime as a ‘hybrid regime’. For example, Ekman (2009), drawing on the EIU index, used six indicators for empirically assessing the nature of hybrid regimes. They are competitive elections, corruption, lack of democratic quality, press freedom, civil liberties, and the rule of law. Additionally, even one index incorporates various sub-­ dimensions. For example, in the EIU index, an assessment of the elections is based on several aspects such as are elections for the national legislature and head of government free and fair? Do opposition parties have a realistic prospect of achieving government positions? Thus, the question became not only whether an election is held but whether the election has any significance and offers a realistic possibility of changing the holder of the state power. The question regarding the quality of election, in the early 1980s, was based on the understanding that some democracies can be ‘formal democracy’ where the formal democratic institutions are present, but they perform poorly due to lack of commitment to inclusivity or structurally flawed. In this scenario, these institutions were not meant to deceive the citizens or the international community but structurally weak and flawed to transform the system into substantive democracy. But in the recent decades, autocrats mimic democratic institutions. Holding elections, allowing political parties, and creating legislatures are done to claim a democratic credential, not necessarily for being a democrat. We now have

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entered an era when despots masquerade as democrats, and no one is ready to be called out as undemocratic. Kenneth Roth eloquently summarized the situation: Rarely has democracy been so acclaimed yet so breached, so promoted yet so disrespected, so important yet so disappointing. Democracy has become the key to legitimacy. Few governments want to be seen as undemocratic. Yet the credentials of the claimants have not kept pace with democracy’s growing popularity. These days, even overt dictators aspire to the status conferred by the democracy label. Determined not to let mere facts stand in their way, these rulers have mastered the art of democratic rhetoric which bears little relationship to their practice of governing. (Roth 2009)

Among these institutions, holding election became the most visible actions of the autocrats. Although ‘twentieth-century dictatorships often dispensed with elections entirely’ and ‘military and postcolonial dictatorships often canceled elections on spurious “national emergency” grounds’ (Puddington 2017), there were authoritarian regimes who hold elections, often on a regular basis, in the 1970s and 1980s. Seeberg writes in 2013, that ‘more than three decades ago 65 percent of authoritarian regimes already conducted elections’. The defining feature of these elections was that they were either one-party or no-party elections (Seeberg 2013). Take for example, Tanzania and Uganda. Between 1965 and 1995, one-­ party elections were conducted in Tanzania, and Uganda had no-party elections for almost two decades until 1995. Cambodia, since the UN brokered peace in 1991, had five elections but it continues to experience further erosion of democracy. Elections were used and continue to be used by authoritarian regimes as a tool to legitimize their undemocratic power and provide a veneer of democracy to their repressive measures. The classic study about elections under authoritarian regimes, Elections Without Choice (Hermet et  al. 1978) noted those in 1978. These elections under authoritarianism, for understandable reasons, delivered not only victories but supermajority to the regime. Such victory showed ‘regime invincibility and deter elites from defecting’ (Beatriz 2006, 4–10). These elections, according to Malesky and Schular, also served the purpose of dividing and co-opting the opposition (Malesky and Schuler 2010) and according to Schedler, provide a veil of public and international

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­legitimacy (Schedler 2002). However, during the third wave of democracy, particularly after the end of the cold war, there was a major change— ‘a substantial increase in the spread of multi-party elections’ (Seeberg 2013). The process, started in the 1980s, when, the strongmen, juntas, and revolutionary councils of the era realized that reasonably fair elections could no longer be avoided. Sometimes a ruling group understood that this would likely lead to an opposition victory. But usually, the incumbent leaders—and often foreign journalists and diplomats—presumed that voters in repressive settings preferred stability to uncertainty and would opt for the reassuring faces of authority. These calculations proved wildly misplaced. Opposition parties swept to victory in country after country—in Uruguay, Argentina, Nicaragua, South Korea, the Philippines, Poland. The word “stunning” made a frequent appearance in news accounts, as in the stunning rejection of the ruling party in Poland, or the stunning setback suffered by Chile’s Augusto Pinochet in a referendum on the continuation of his dictatorship. (Puddington 2017)

‘Incidents’ like these prompted the authoritarian regimes to devise ways which provide an impression that ‘free’ elections are held, but they also wanted to ensure that they are designed and managed in a manner that the likelihood of opposition victory is eliminated. These regimes have been described as ‘electoral authoritarianism’, a subtype of hybrid regimes. Schedler informs, ‘Electoral authoritarian regimes practice authoritarianism behind the institutional facades of representative democracy. They hold regular multiparty elections at the national level, yet violate liberal-­ democratic minimum standards in systematic and profound ways’ (Schedler 2015). In the words of Tlemcani: ‘Electoral authoritarianism characterises [sic] regimes that present an illusion of multi-party democracy at the local and national levels while effectively stripping elections of efficacy. The result known in advance, elections can be held frequently. … Under electoral authoritarian regimes, elections are subject to such state manipulation as to strip them of value’ (Tlemcani 2007). Examples abound. Take for example, Algeria. Since canceling the election in 1991, which was about to be won by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the regime held 12 elections. In Venezuela, under Hugo Chávez, no fewer than 17 elections, including several referenda, were held and Chávez won all but one (Corrales 2015). As the global wave of democratization began to be stalled and the Janus-faced political system, that is, concurrently having democratic and

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authoritarian elements of governance, called the hybrid regime began to become the new global phenomenon, the role of elections came under more scrutiny. ‘Are more elections always good for democratization, or do “flawed” elections in elected authoritarian regimes cause hybrid regimes to become more institutionalized rather than to move further toward democracy?’ asked Staffan L. Lindberg (Lindberg 2009). Extant literature on the durability of hybrid regime have clearly established that while hybrid regimes are more prone to political instability compared to autocratic and established democracies (Epstein et al. 2006), they are neither inherently unstable nor are they less durable compared to other regimes: from 1972 to 2010, 66 hybrid regimes have lasted at least 10  years, and 22 endured more than 20  years (Gagné 2012). These regimes have managed to survive because many have successfully used various democratic institutions, including election, to achieve their objectives. A cursory look at some of the long-lasting hybrid regimes (Table 5.1) where elections had taken place on a regular basis show that repeated elections do not necessarily democratize a country. The form of the government—presidential or parliamentary—had made no differences. Also, these regimes have produced highly populist and polarizing leaders with penchant for personalist authoritarian style of governance. Political scientists tend to consider two roles of elections in non-­ democratic countries: regime-sustaining and regime subverting (Grishin 2015). But beneath this broader dichotomy reside nuanced objectives and implications, particularly of the leaders of the hybrid regimes. For hybrid regime leaders, election poses a dilemma: ‘contested elections create political uncertainty that can threaten authorities’ ability to stay in power during election periods, but elections can also have major benefits for the incumbents, including those that in principle can help them retain or augment their power’ (Petrov et al. 2014). Contra closed authoritarian regimes, election is a necessity for the hybrid regime. In addition to the previously mentioned purposes, gaining both domestic and international legitimacy, strengthening existing patronage networks and managing elite relations (Morgenbesser 2014), and relieving popular discontent (Brumberg 2002), are other influential reasons for holding a contested election. ‘Contested elections legitimize state authority, supply a competitive mechanism for selecting candidates for public office and programs for implementation, channel social tensions and opposition

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Table 5.1  Selected hybrid regimes Form of government

The length of Last the ruling election party/President in power

Result

Parliamentary

17

2018

Bolivia Presidential Venezuela Presidential

17 14

2014 2018

Tanzania Uganda Nigeria Cambodia

54 33 4 34

2015 2016 2015 2018

Incumbent Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Incumbent Evo Morales Incumbent Hugo Chávez, followed by his VP and protégé Nicolas Maduro Incumbent Incumbent Yoweri Museveni Opposition Muhammad Buhari Incumbent Hun Sen

Turkey

Presidential Presidential Presidential Parliamentary

Leaders

Notes: (1) Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is in power since 2002 (except briefly between June and November 2015); Turkey’s constitution has been amended in 2017 to empower President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was PM from 2004 through 2013 and President since 2014; (2) In Bolivia the country’s highest court has ruled in 2018 to remove the term limit that will allow incumbent Evo Morales to run for the fourth term in 2019 and subsequent elections, although in a plebiscite in February 2016 Bolivians narrowly rejected presidential re-election; (3) Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez ruled the country from 1999 until his death in 2013. His successor Nicolas Maduro won 2013 and 2018 elections, the latter was marred by high level of irregularities; (4) Tanzania’s system has provided enormous power to the Parliament despite being a presidential system, the country was a one-party state since its independence in 1965 until 1995. Between 1964 and 1995 the country was ruled by Julius Nyrere. After multiparty system began in 1995, the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM; ‘Party of the Revolution’) has won all five parliamentary elections. All five presidential elections since 1995 have been won by the ruling party candidates; (5) Uganda had a ‘no party democracy’ for 19 years until a multiparty system was introduced in 1995. Yoweri Musaveni has been elected for the fifth term in 2016; (6) Nigeria was ruled by People Democratic Party between 1999 and 2015; it lost the presidential election in 2015; (7) In Cambodia, the leader of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) Hun Sen is the Prime Minister since 1985. The country had its first multiparty election in 1993 after the UN brokered peace in 1991. Since then the country had six elections of which last five elections have been won by the CPP. The 2018 elections were held after the main opposition party has been proscribed by the government

s­entiment in constructive rather than destructive directions, create a peaceful mechanism for resolving differences of opinion and interest in public policy, generate public interest and hence engagement in the policy process, and incentivize innovation in policymaking’ (Petrov et al. 2014). The importance of the election necessitates manipulation of elections, either in a stealthy manner or blatantly, either through constitutional measure or using extraconstitutional steps. The level of manipulation depends

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on the strength of the opposition political parties and civil society, and various other factors. Some argue that through participations in elections, oppositions can bring a change or take advantage of the ‘electoral moments’, others argue that these contribute to resilience of hybrid regime as much as it does to an authoritarian system. As for the benefit of participating in the election and joining the legislative bodies, Schedler suggested that it exposes the authoritarian regimes; by forcing the incumbent to rely on electoral manipulation and repression, the opposition succeeds in revealing the weaknesses of the government. This is particularly useful in the context of hybrid regime, he argues, because these regimes rely on a semblance of democracy and electoral legitimacy. He goes on to say, participation in elections can also be used to demonstrate that ‘the emperor is naked, that his grip on power is based on manipulation’ (Schedler 2006a, 14). Others argued that ‘elections further provide opposition groups an opportunity to connect with constituents and propagate their ideologies’ (Shehata 2009; Loidolt and Mecham 2016). Bryce Loidolt and Quinn Mecham, drawing on a host of earlier works, suggested that ‘even under hybrid regimes, opposition groups can derive benefits from holding positions in weak legislatures’. These benefits include the right to assembly and speech, and access to financial resources and rents for the benefit of the supporters. On the other hand, Kendall-Taylor and Frantz, think that such participation contributes to the longevity of authoritarian system: What explains the resilience of today’s dictatorships? Ironically, we contend that pseudo-democratic institutions are responsible, at least in part. Although the presence of these institutions in authoritarian settings is not a new phenomenon, an uptick in autocrats’ adoption of institutions such as elections, parties, and legislatures has occurred in conjunction with the rising durability of authoritarianism. Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, authoritarian incumbents have learned to more effectively manipulate these institutions in ways that enhance their power-prolonging effect. (Kendall-­ Taylor and Frantz 2013)

Their findings, especially about the impacts of elections are borne out in longitudinal studies on the survival of authoritarian regime. Drawing on data from 259 autocracies from 1946 to 2008, Knutsen, Nygård, and Wig concluded that ‘Elections are conducive to regime survival in the

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long run because they improve capacities for co-optation and repression’ (Knutsen et al. 2017). As for the repression, Kendall-Taylor and Frantz, warned us, ‘Dictators who use pseudo-democratic institutions are not necessarily less repressive than their institution-free counterparts.’ Since the 1990s, several studies have shown that hybrid regimes have rendered oppositions weak and fragile through repression to the extent that elections have become theatrics and, in the process, the very essence of democracy is neutered. In various forms of authoritarianism, except closed authoritarianism, the democratic institutions are used as means of obtaining and exercising political authority (Levitsky and Way 2002, 52). Therefore, elections become a high-stakes event, as ‘the legitimacy of policies enacted by the ruling party solely comes from its victory in elections— whether the elections are fair or not’ (Kilinc 2017). The experiences of various kinds of hybrid regimes such as electoral authoritarian and competitive authoritarianism show that their actions render elections instruments of authoritarian rule rather than “instruments of democracy” (Schedler 2006b). These issues loomed large, but were not discussed at length, as the opposition in Bangladesh continued to explore their options prior to the election in 2018. However, unfortunately, there was a lack of clarity among analysts and opposition leaders about the nature of the Bangladeshi state which gradually emerged since 2006. While the opposition continue to encounter the adverse political situation, witness the shrinking of democratic space, observe the domestication of media, and see the progressive dissipation of the civil society hardly did they recognize the paradigm shift in the governance. That a new form of regime had emerged seems to remain beyond their comprehension. How a triumvirate of civil administration, law enforcing agencies, and the ruling party has come into being and how the boundaries between deep state and political party have been blurred remain unexplored, and so were the implications of these for the forthcoming election. The BNP was overwhelmed by the state repression, gripped with the absence of its higher leadership, unwilling to introspect about its previous mal-governance and its alignment with the Jamaat-i-­ Islami which opposed the independence. Other opposition parties, particularly the left, continue to see the forthcoming election as a mode of alteration of power. History of previous regimes, political movements, and the business-as-usual mindset left the opposition with very little option. They were eventually faced with the two options: to participate or to boycott.

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Use of election boycott as a political strategy, particularly in the developing world, has grown over time. Beaulieu and Hyde recorded that between 1990 and 2002 14% of multiparty elections have been boycotted (Beaulieu and Hyde 2009). The percentage has increased in the late 1990s and early 2000s than the previous decade. In the early 1990s, the average was 10%, but it reached an average of 18% in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Beaulieu 2006b). Overall, election boycotts have occurred in some form in 13% of all elections and 16% of elections in the developing world (Beaulieu 2006a). However, there is a paucity of studies on the effectiveness of boycott, particularly its effects on the durability of regimes. Some researchers insist on the lack of effectiveness of boycott. Gregory Weeks, for example, argued that in Latin America and North Africa, boycott may have prolonged authoritarian rule in several countries (Weeks 2013). Smith examined 264 regimes in 107 different countries between 1981 and 2006, particularly focusing on hybrid regime of various kinds with various tenures. He concludes that the major boycott does play into the game of unfair elections through the two-level game’s payoff structure. ‘The chances of immediate change by elections are greatly reduced by boycotts, but the likelihood that the incumbent will lose in a future election is significantly higher when the opposition boycotts’ (Smith 2014). For Bangladeshi opposition parties, the record of boycotting the election under a hybrid regime was not very promising, as the experience of the 2014 election demonstrated. There was also the possibility that, unlike 2014, some name-only opposition parties may join the election and provide legitimacy to the ruling party, and consequently isolate the larger opposition, particularly the BNP. Their worst fear was that if some opposition parties joined the election, these parties might be elected through government machination creating a semblance of a participatory, fair, and successful election. Besides, the international community, since 2014, tacitly discouraged any boycott. These weighed in on the opposition. Elections in Malaysia (May 9, 2018) and Maldives (September 23, 2018)—one parliamentary and another presidential—which delivered shocking victories to the opposition provided the hope that the electoral process can be the avenue to pose a successful challenge to a hybrid regime. It is against this background the opposition parties decided to participate in the election although their demands were not met and there was little possibility of any concession from the ruling party.

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Grishin, Nikolai. 2015. “The Meaning of Elections in the Russian Federation.” European Politics and Society 16 (2): 194–207. Hermet, Guy, Richard Rose, and Alain Rouquié. 1978. Elections Without Choice. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd. Huq, Samia. 2015. The Mayoral Elections in Bangladesh: Between Toxic Waste and Toxic Politics. University of Berkeley. May 01. Accessed December 12, 2018. http://southasia.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/shared/Viewpoint/ Articles/The_Mayoral_Elections_FINAL.pdf. Karl, Terry. 2000. “Electoralism.” In International encyclopedia of elections, by Richard Rose, 392. London: Macmillan. Kendall-Taylor, Andrea, and Erica Frantz. 2013. “Mimicking Democracy to Prolong Autocracies.” The Washington Quarterly 37 (4): 71–84. Kilinc, Faith Resul. 2017. What we see in Venezuela is the faith of hybrid regimes. August 27. Accessed December 10, 2018. http://foreignpolicynews. org/2017/08/28/see-venezuela-faith-hybrid-regimes/. Knutsen, Carl Henrik, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, and Tore Wig. 2017. “Autocratic Elections: Stabilizing Tool or Force for Change?” World Politics 69 (1): 98–143. Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. 2002. “Elections without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism.” Journal of Democracy 13 (2): 51–65. Lindberg, Staffan L. 2009. “Introduction.” In Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition, by Staffan L Lindberg, 432. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Liton, Shakhawat. 2018. Some insights into Gazipur Elections. June 28. Accessed January 28, 2019. https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/politics/someinsights-gazipur-elections-1596277. Loidolt, Bryce, and Quinn Mecham. 2016. “Parliamentary Opposition Under Hybrid Regimes: Evidence from Egypt.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 41 (4): 997–1022. Malesky, Edmund, and Paul Schuler. 2010. “Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament.” American Political Science Review 104 (3): 482–502. Meisburger, Tim. 2015. Booth Capture  – Observing Municipal Elections in Bangladesh. May 06. Accessed January 5, 2019. https://asiafoundation. org/2015/05/06/booth-capture-obser ving-municipal-elections-inbangladesh/. Morgenbesser, Lee. 2014. “Elections in Hybrid Regimes: Conceptual Stretching Revived.” Political Studies 62 (1): 21–36. Petrov, Nikolay, Maria Lipman, and Henry E. Hale. 2014. “Three dilemmas of hybrid regime governance: Russia from Putin to Putin.” Post-Soviet Affairs 30 (1): 1–26. Puddington, Arch. 2017. Breaking Down Democracy: Goals, Strategies, and Methods of Modern Authoritarians. Washington, DC: Freedom House, 61.

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CHAPTER 6

The Mechanism of Manipulation

Abstract  A growing body of literature has shown that non-democratic regimes, particularly autocrats, have a range of strategies in their toolbox to manipulate elections. They are employed at various stages and different state institutions are used, separately or together, to ensure a victory for the incumbent. This chapter provides a detailed description of the methods used in the 2018 election in Bangladesh. It argues that the election commission, law enforcing agencies, civil administration, and the ruling party played pivotal roles and were in cahoots with each other. Arrests of opposition activists and candidates, allowing the ruling party activists to attack the rivals in the presence of police, adopting a double standard in disqualification of candidates were the tactics used. Besides, there is credible evidence that ballots in favor of ruling party candidates were stuffed in the ballot box the previous night. Keywords  Manipulation • Integrity • Electoral exclusion • Bangladesh Election Commission In hybrid regimes, engineering of an election neither is a sporadic effort of the incumbent party nor is it done on the election day. Unlike other flawed elections, where irregularities take place due to one or more of the shortcomings such as lapse of the electoral commission, weakness or even slant of the local administration, inability of the law enforcing agencies, lack of © The Author(s) 2019 A. Riaz, Voting in a Hybrid Regime, Politics of South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7956-7_6

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institutional mechanism to stop the frauds, and/or overwhelming strength of the ruling party, elections in hybrid regime are designed and orchestrated to ensure a victory of the ruling party or a leader. Institutions which are engaged in the processes tend to act with similar objective and essentially in cahoots. Often such design becomes so obvious that one can predict the results well before the election. Parliamentary election in Cambodia, presidential elections in Russia and Turkey, all held in 2018, are cases in point. It is not too difficult to list more. However, to comprehend the nature and functioning of a hybrid regime, understanding the mechanism of the manipulation of electoral process is very important. As I have mentioned in the introduction, there are few studies that examined the nitty gritty details of uncompetitive elections. Guy Hermet, before the hybrid regime became a global phenomenon, pointed to the predilection of political scientists of avoiding uncompetitive elections: With sporadic exceptions, political scientists concentrate upon supposedly free and competitive elections while they loftily ignore those in which one candidate gains 99 per cent of the votes. The approach which justifies this bias in research is well known. On the one hand, holding free and competitive election is accepted as a sign of pluralist democracy; on the other hand, political science conceives itself as being primarily concerned with multi-­ party systems and with competitive elections. (Hermet 1978)

Indeed, the situation has slightly changed in the past decades. Schedler drew our attention to various methods of election manipulation by the authoritarian governments which had adopted liberal-democratic institutions including elections (Schedler 2002). Works of Pippa Norris and her colleagues at the Electoral Integrity Project (EIP) (Electoral Integrity Project n.d.) have paved the way to examine elections all around the world and their inadequacies and challenges. Nic Cheeseman and Brian Klaas’ book titled How to Rig an Election is a path-breaking work in this regard, especially for its focus on what they described as ‘counterfeit democracies’ (Cheeseman and Klaas 2018). This growing body of literature has shown that non-democratic regimes, particularly autocrats, have a range of strategies in their tool box to manipulate elections. These ‘tools can be substituted for each other when one becomes unavailable, or too costly’ (Cheeseman and Klaas 2018, 7). The available tools, while largely are similar, have some variations by countries especially in their importance

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and significance. Yet, it is easily discernable that several state and government institutions, irrespective of countries, are employed for the manipulation. In case of 2018 Bangladesh election, election commission, law enforcing agencies, civil administration, and the ruling party were the institutions which played the pivotal roles. The Bangladesh Election Commission (BEC), which is on paper an autonomous body, previously, had acted as subservient to the government and ruling party unless the election was held under a caretaker government. The available laws and rules provide sufficient power and authority to the BEC, but the history of Bangladesh tells us that the use of these powers is dependent on the Commissioners’, especially the Chief Election Commissioner’s (CEC), integrity and willingness. In this instance, the willingness of the BEC in holding a fair election was questionable from the outset because of its abject failure or unwillingness in the City Corporation elections (Chap. 4). The BEC announced the parliamentary election schedule on 9 November immediately after the dialogue between the government and the opposition ended inconclusively and there were demands for more time to sort out these differences (Liton and Alamgir 2018). The date of the election was later deferred, but only by a week. As the ruling party began to distribute nomination papers, festivity around the party headquarters in the capital, which was a clear violation of the code of conduct, was ignored by the BEC, but similar gathering around the BNP headquarters was reported as the violation of code and police intervention led to clashes. During the scrutiny of nomination papers on December 2, Returning Officers at the district levels canceled the candidature of as many as 786 out of 3065. Not only the number was the highest in the history of the country but it was also disproportionately high from the opposition camp. About 80 were from the opposition parties, especially the BNP, while only 3 rebel candidates of the ruling party faced the same fate; there were instances of double standards in determining the candidacy to the detriment of the opposition. Some of these candidates succeeded in reversing the decision through appeal process at the BEC, but many of those reversals were challenged at the court by the BEC, an unprecedented action. Consequently, by the election day, the BNP and the Jatiya Oikyo Front (JOF) had no candidates in 17 seats. This mode of influencing the election is described by Cheeseman and Klaas as ‘electoral exclusion’ (Cheeseman and Klaas 2018, 49–52). Electoral exclusion does not happen only by pushing candidates out of ballot through election commission i­ mmediately

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before the election, but also well before the process ensues. Cheeseman and Klaas write that ‘electoral exclusion, or the practice of illegitimately ensuring that a certain candidate is disqualified from being put on the ballot’ is used by various counterfeit democracies. ‘After all, if your opponent’s name is excluded, it is pretty much impossible for them to win’ (Cheeseman and Klaas 2018, 50). Whether exclusion of Khaleda Zia, who is facing 34 cases of which she was convicted in 2 cases before the election, and repeatedly denied bail was part of the electoral equation is open to interpretation, as it is about 25 other BNP leaders. However, what is beyond doubt is that the BEC, specifically the Chief Election Commissioner K M Nurul Huda, had paid little attention to the complaints lodged by the opposition about the absence of a level playing field. Two weeks before the election, at a time when violence against opposition candidates and activists were widely reported in the press and the JOF leader Kamal Hossain’s motorcade came under attack, the CEC claimed that ‘a level playing field was ensured for all candidates’ (The Daily Star 2018a). Even one of the five commissioners of the BEC, Mahbub Talukdar, disagreed with him saying ‘the phrase level playing field has become meaningless’ (Irani 2018). The BEC’s acquiescence to the law enforcement agencies’ excesses is demonstrated when it took no concrete action after it was reported in the press in November that police were gathering personal information, including political leanings, about potential polling officials in many districts (an issue I will discuss in a while), and opposition candidates were facing attacks from the ruling party activists. It turned a blind eye to the violations of election codes by the ruling party candidates. On the election day, as journalists brought to his attention the absence of polling agents of the opposition in almost all centers, instead of trying to investigate the anomaly, CEC responded—‘If they don’t come, how will they be seen?’ (The Daily Star 2018c). The BEC had imposed strict conditions on the media coverage of the polling. The guidelines didn’t allow reporters to take photos inside the polling centers, which practically eliminated the possibility of recording any irregularities. In a similar vein, the BEC had imposed restrictions on observers talking to media on the election day. Persecution of political opponents is not a new phenomenon in Bangladesh, neither is it unusual that innocent bystanders are caught in case of a violent incident and become victims of criminal cases. But over the past years it rose to an ominous scale as leaders and activists of the

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opposition, particularly the BNP leaders, were charged with cases, often of frivolous nature. Yet, after the summer of 2018, with the election on the horizon, hundreds and thousands of people began to become victims of criminal cases for committing violence. It became almost formulaic—the police will file a case of an incident of violence—ranging from throwing bomb to attacking the police to vandalizing vehicle to burning public transport. The cases will have a few named persons, mostly local political activists, with hundreds of ‘unnamed’ perpetrators—which were to be added later as necessary. The most outrageous part of these cases was that often the so-called violent incidents were completely made-up. According to police reports September 2018 was a very deadly month for the capital Dhaka—at least 90 incidents of attacks on police and 578 incidents of serious violent incidents took place. But the city was quite calm, and the life remained normal, because an investigation by a leading newspaper to each incident reported by the police found that none of the local people can attest to such incidents (Prothom Alo 2018a; The Daily Star 2019b). Yet hundreds were arrested and thrown in jail. Described as ‘ghost cases’ it became normal that anyone can become a victim—the deceased (Islam 2018; The Daily Star 2019b), persons already in jail, the disabled (The Daily Star 2019a), and even the blind (Bangla 2019) were not spared. It was not even necessary that an incident should have taken place or reported to have taken place; the mere suspicion that there was a secret meeting where a plot is being hatched was enough to arrest; for example, a teenage boy was arrested for a secret meeting which didn’t take place (The Daily Star 2018b). Press reports in October (The Daily Star 2018d) and in January (Prothom Alo 2019) documented that thousands accused in ‘ghost cases’ were at the High Court asking for bail—the only redress they had. These ghost cases, targeting the opposition activists and innocent people, sent a chilling message to everybody well before the election process began—be afraid, and afraid the citizens became. The number of such cases increased as the election approached and the police also played another role—becoming bystanders to the attacks on opposition candidates. According to the electoral rules, the BEC is supposed to instruct police to protect all candidates during their campaigns. But according to press reports and opposition accounts, at least 64 of its candidates were attacked, some on several occasions, in the presence of members of the law enforcing agencies. These candidates include a 25-year female to 80-year-old former cabinet minister to a cancer survivor woman

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to a decorated freedom fighter. Despite the high incidence of political violence (Parvez 2018), particularly during the election (Aziz and Razzaque 2018), the 2018 election was different because it was largely one-sided with the opposition at the receiving end. Considering that the BNP activists, in previous years, were not shy of perpetrating violence against their opponents, both as a ruling party and the opposition, one may justifiably ask why the opposition parties, particularly the BNP activists, were so timid in responding to the violence. Apparently, several factors precluded them from engaging in retaliation. Leading to the January 2014 election, particularly beginning November 2013, the party activists were engaged in violence to foil the election; the party was criticized by its detractors and sympathizers alike for acts of wanton violence. This criticism became loud after the BNP’s failed movement in 2015, on the first anniversary of the controversial election. The mass agitation and violence for about three months was costly not only for the economy and in terms of human lives but also for BNP’s support among a large section of the middle class. The party was stigmatized for its seeming penchant for violence and the government repeatedly highlighted these records for political purposes and used these incidents to lodge cases against the rank and file. The second factor was that the international community impressed upon the BNP to refrain from any violence. The party leadership didn’t want to annoy the international community hoping that they will help them in the long run. The third factor was the apprehension that retaliations will only help the government to further intensify the crackdown. Analysts have argued since 2014 that the ruling party didn’t want the BNP to participate in the election and the BNP walked into the trap. There was a common perception that the ruling party expects the same in 2018. If the BNP became embroiled in violence, the ruling party’s argument that the BNP is unwilling to participate would have gained credence. The fourth factor was the organizational weakness. Over the previous years, the BNP did lose some of its capacity to mount any formidable response to the state-supported attacks by the BAL activists, thanks to the indiscriminate arrests of the BNP activists. The final, perhaps the most important, factor was its participation in the JOF. The newly emerged alliance, particularly its leader Kamal Hossain, is known for his disapprobation of violence. The BNP leadership was in no mood to create a rift within the alliance which provided them the breathing space. In Bangladesh, the civil administration is an integral part of the election process as the members of the civil service are appointed as key election

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officials and are in charge of maintaining the confidentiality before the election, securing order on the election day, guaranteeing the proper counting of the ballots, and certifying the results. The position which has enormous significance is the Returning Officer (RO) who has the authority to appoint other officers from local government and non-government bodies. Deputy Commissioners (DC) were appointed as the RO to all but 2 of 74 districts. It is worth noting that unlike previous elections, no major reshuffling of government officials took place and the DCs and other officials were kept in the posts where they have been serving prior to the election. It was alleged that the government officials had already built close connections with the local ruling party leaders and therefore will have difficulties acting impartially. It was expected that the civil administration, BEC, and the law enforcing agencies will work in close cooperation to ensure that the citizens’ will be able to exercise their inalienable right to vote in a peaceful and conducive situation. Considering that it was a participatory election after ten years and that already a climate of fear was prevalent, it was expected by the citizens that the members of the civil administration will remain impartial. Unfortunately, it was quite the contrary. The first indication of an inappropriate cooperation between this trio came to the fore when it became known in early November that police had begun gathering information about the political affiliations of potential election officials. On election day, employees of government and semi-­ government bodies, teachers and staff of educational institutions, and officials of banks are appointed as Presiding officers, Assistant Presiding officers, and Polling officers. The local administration requests a list of potential appointees from the eligible organizations and institutions and compiles a confidential list from which the Returning Officer (RO) appoints these officials and informs the BEC accordingly. This has been the practice since 1973. Previously, these temporary appointments had been made by local civil administration without any political bias. But press reports in November revealed that information about the political affiliations was gathered this time not only of the potential polling officials but also of their family members and relatives (The Daily Star 2018e; Prothom Alo 2018b). This became a mystery as to how the police got hold of the potential list. One explanation is that the civil administration, the BEC, and the law enforcing agencies were acting in concert to prepare a ‘safe’ list of individuals who will be either supporters of the ruling party or, at least, pliable.

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The second situation which points to the ominous connivance relates to the ballot stuffing. The ROs received the ballot paper and boxes before the election, and these were supposedly kept under the strict supervision of the local civil administration and could be opened only on the day of election after polling starts. Yet, ‘Minutes before polls opened, a BBC correspondent saw filled ballot boxes at a polling centre [sic] in the port city of Chittagong’ (BBC News 2018). Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), which surveyed randomly selected 50 constituencies, found in 20 constituencies that ballot boxes were filled up even before polling started in the morning of the election day, and in 33 constituencies ballot papers were stamped the night before (The Daily Star 2019c). Interestingly, a similar allegation has been expressed by one of the members of the Grand Alliance led by the BAL.  After the election, the Bangladesh Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (BJSD), which has a member in the parliament, stated that an ‘over-enthusiastic section of the administration stuffed the ballot boxes with fake votes during the night before the polling day and indulged in many related irregularities’ (bdnews24.com 2019). This couldn’t have been done without complete cooperation of the members of the civil administration and the law enforcing agencies, the knowledge of the BEC, and cooperation of the local party units which provided the manpower to do the stamping and stuffing. Allegations of the connivance of the civil administration and the law enforcing agencies was further emphasized by another ally of the BAL. Rashed Khan Menon, a former cabinet member and the President of the Workers Party, while participating in the discussion on the thanksgiving motion on the President’s speech in the Parliament called for ‘restoring the dignity of the election’. He said that ‘if state apparatuses establish control over the country, political parties will become irrelevant not only in election but also for the governance. This is equally applicable to the opposition parties and the ruling party’ (Samakal 2019). The unprecedented phenomenon of ballot stuffing on the night before the election day was essentially acknowledged by the Chief Election Commissioner on March 8, 2019. At a training workshop of the election officials in Dhaka ahead of the fifth of Upazila Parishad elections, CEC K M Nurul Huda said that ‘the Election Commission (EC) is planning to introduce the Electronic Voting Machine (EVMs) to resist the evil attempt of filling-up ballot boxes night before elections’ (Ittefaq 2019). We may never know whether coercion and fear prompted such cooperation from the members of the civil administration, or they were willing executioners, but we surely know that they worked together to deprive the

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citizens of their inalienable rights and delivered a result which does not reflect the choice of the voters. The unholy trinity of the BEC, the administration, and the law enforcing agencies in support of the ruling party started to become clear weeks before the election. There were growing concerns that although the participation of political parties had created the semblance of a participatory election, whether the voters would be able to participate in this exercise. This concern was echoed by international Human Rights groups and election monitoring organizations. On December 22, eight days before the election, the HRW issued a report titled ‘Creating Panic: Bangladesh Election Crackdown on Political Opponents and Critics’ (Human Rights Watch (HRW) 2018), which documented the prevailing situation and called for immediate action to ensure a fair election. Fifteen Human Rights and Election Monitoring organizations, in a joint statement on the eve of election, described the situation as ‘undemocratic electoral environment’ and stated: With the climate of violence perpetrated by the security forces, the weaponization of law and judicial agencies against the opposition, the hostility against civil society, and intimidation of the media, the situation effectively places Bangladesh in a controlled environment that disregards the free will of the people, and is not in line with the principles of democratic elections. As a result of the prevailing conditions in the country, we express our doubts regarding the integrity and credibility of the upcoming election, which cannot be considered a free and fair process under any reasonable yardstick. (FIDH 2018)

The apprehension turned out to be true on December 30, the election day.

Bibliography Aziz, Syeda Salina, and Farhana Razzaque. 2018. “Role of Electoral Competition in Explaining Political Violence in Bangladesh: A District-Level Analysis.” South Asia Survey 23 (1): 35–53. Bangla. 2019. Even blind and lonely Keramat is accused of burning cars (in Bengali). February 05. Accessed February 12, 2019. https://www.bn.bangla. report/post/33331-b6Ei3Dvp9. BBC News. 2018. Bangladesh elections: Deadly clashes mar vote. December 30. Accessed February 12, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia46603113.

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bdnews24.com. 2019. Over enthusiasts in administration blemished the election: Bangladesh Jasod (in Bengali). February 04. Accessed February 12, 2019. https://bangla.bdnews24.com/politics/article1589262.bdnews?fbclid=IwAR2 d8bjE6ePouCWW_HKcWpGaAHTYepxUcj8P2YOqmGFy6_nl0qn5M1t9tsA. Cheeseman, Nicholas, and Brian Klaas. 2018. How to Rig an Election. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Electoral Integrity Project. n.d. Why elections fail and what we can do about it. Accessed February 11, 2019. https://www.electoralintegrityproject.com/. FIDH. 2018. Joint statement on the undemocratic electoral environment in Bangladesh. December 29. Accessed January 29, 2019. https://www.fidh. org/en/region/asia/bangladesh/joint-statement-on-the-undemocratic-electoral-environment-in. Hermet, Guy. 1978. “State Controlled Elections: A Framework.” In Elections without Choice, by Guy Hermet, Richard Rose and Alain Rouquie, 1–18. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Human Rights Watch (HRW). 2018. Creating Panic: Bangladesh Election Crackdown on Political Opponents and Critics. New York: HRW. Irani, Bilkis. 2018. Commissioner Mahbub: There is no level playing field. December 17. Accessed December 18, 2018. https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/election/2018/12/17/ec-mahbub-there-is-no-level-playing-field. Islam, Rafiqul. 2018. Ghost cases, again. December 16. Accessed February 12, 2019. https://www.thedailystar.net/bangladesh-national-election-2018/news/ ghost-cases-return-1674322. Ittefaq. 2019. ‘There will be no scope of Ballot stuffing the night before If EVM is introduced’. March 9. Accessed March 9, 2019. http://www.ittefaq.com.bd/ national/34998/%E0%A6%87%E0%A6%AD%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%8F%E0%A 6%AE%E0%A7%87-%E0%A6%AD%E0%A7%8B%E0%A6%9F%E0%A6%B9%E0%A6%B2%E0%A7%87-%E0%A6%86%E0%A6%97%E0%A7%8 7%E0%A6%B0-%E0%A6%B0%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%A4%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%AC%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%AF%E. Liton, Shakhawat, and Mohiuddin Alamgir. 2018. Election on Dec 23. November 09. Accessed February 11, 2019. https://www.thedailystar.net/politics/bangladesh-national-election-schedule-announcement-today-1657762. Parvez, Saimum. 2018. “Explaining political violence in contemporary Bangladesh (2001–2017).” In Political Violence in South Asia, by Ali Riaz, Zobaida Nasreen and Fahmida Zaman, 51–69. Abingdon: Routledge. Prothom Alo. 2018a. A Very Dangerous September (in Bengali). December 20. Accessed February 11, 2019. https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/arti cle/1570837/%E0%A6%8F%E0%A6%95-%E0%A6%AD%E0%A7%9F%E0%A6 %82%E0%A6%95%E0%A6%B0-%E0%A6%B8%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%AA%E0%A 7%8D%E0%A6%9F%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%AE%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%AC% E0%A6%B0.

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Prothom Alo. 2018b. Election Officials are Embarrassed by Police Call (in Bengali). November 17. Accessed February 13, 2019. https://www.prothomalo.com/ bangladesh/article/1565578/%E0%A6%AA%E0%A7%81%E0%A6%B2%E0%A 6%BF%E0%A6%B6%E0%A7%87%E0%A6%B0-%E0%A6%AB%E0%A7%8B%E0 %A6%A8%E0%A7%87-%E0%A6%AC%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%AC%E0%A7%8D% E0%A6%B0%E0%A6%A4-%E0%A6%A8%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%B0%E0%A7%8 D%E0%A6%AC. Prothom Alo. 2019. God is seeing all these. January 31. Accessed February 3, 2019. https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/article/1576894. Samakal. 2019. ‘The Dignity of the Election has to be Restored: Menon’. March 3. Accessed March 4, 2019. https://samakal.com/politics/article/1903197/ %E0%A6%AF%E0%A6%A5%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%AF%E0%A6%A5 -%E0%A6%AE%E0%A6%B0%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%AF%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%A 6%E0%A6%BE%E0%A7%9F-%E0%A6%AB%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%B0%E0%A6%B F%E0%A7%9F%E0%A7%87-%E0%A6%86%E0%A6%A8%E0%A6%A4%E 0%A7%87. Schedler, Andreas. 2002. “The Menu of Manipulation.” Journal of Democracy 13 (2): 36–50. The Daily Star. 2018a. CEC sees level playing field all around. December 16. Accessed December 17, 2018. https://www.thedailystar.net/bangladeshnational-election-2018/news/no-live-telecast-voting-booth-cec-nurulhuda-1674004. The Daily Star. 2018b. ‘Ghost Case’: 16-yr-old boy in jail. October 15. Accessed February 12, 2019. https://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/news/ghostcase-16-yr-old-boy-jail-1647112. The Daily Star. 2019a. HARD TO BELIEVE. January 23. Accessed February 12, 2019. https://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/tara-mia-deformed-right-armaccused-attacking-police-before-bangladesh-election-1691578. The Daily Star. 2018c. ‘If they don’t come, how will they be seen?’. December 31. Accessed January 01, 2019. https://www.thedailystar.net/bangladesh-nationalelection-2018/news/voting-fair-so-far-cec-says-after-casting-vote-1680760. The Daily Star. 2018d. In droves, they come for bail. October 10. Accessed February 12, 2019. https://www.thedailystar.net/frontpage/news/droves-they-comebail-1645018. The Daily Star. 2019b. No ‘ghost’ cases filed. January 16. Accessed February 12, 2019. https://www.thedailystar.net/politics/there-are-no-ghost-cases-homeminister-asaduzzaman-khan-1687858. The Daily Star. 2018e. Polling Officials: Police gathering personal info. November 15. Accessed February 13, 2019. https://www.thedailystar.net/js-polls-2018/ news/polling-officials-police-gathering-personal-info-1660774. The Daily Star. 2019c. Polls anomalies in 47 of 50 seats. January 16. Accessed February 13, 2019. https://www.thedailystar.net/bangladesh-national-election-2018/ bangladesh-election-2018-irregularities-47-out-50-seats-tib-1687840.

CHAPTER 7

The Election Day: Fear, Exclusion, and Persecution Come Together

Abstract  Blatant rigging, although one of the riskiest strategies, has remained one of the most effective manipulating mechanisms among non-­ democratic regimes around the world. This was on full display in the 2018 Bangladesh election. This chapter, drawing on press reports and personal narratives of journalists and polling agents of different political parties, has documented the events of election day, December 30, 2018. The scenes of day included absence of opposition activists on the streets, and the barring of polling agents from entering the poling centers. The Election Commission, well before the election, delayed permission to the international observers, practically ensuring no monitoring. The chapter provides a case study of one seat where the pre-election and election day manipulation strategies came together. Keywords  Observers • Polling agents • Ballot stuffing • Media

‘If you have to resort to rigging with henchmen and ballot boxes, you have already failed’ write Cheeseman and Klaas in their discussion of various strategies available to the autocrats and the leaders of counterfeit democracies (Cheeseman and Klaas 2018, 31). Undeniably, invisible rigging—which starts long before the election day and include various tools

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at the disposal of the ruling party in a hybrid regime—is the best and increasingly the most frequently used method to deal with the election dilemma. Yet, blatant rigging, that is, ballot box stuffing, ‘one the most effective’ despite being ‘one of the most risky’ (Cheeseman and Klaas 2018, 157) strategy, has not become a matter of the past. Instead, it was on full display on December 30, 2018; the election day, which was hoped to be a day when the voters will have the last say, turned out to be anything but. As discussed in the previous chapters, various ways of invisible rigging—from having a partisan electoral commission to creating a climate of fear to using electoral exclusion mechanism—were already in motion, yet it appeared that the incumbent was not in a mood to take a risk in case events took an unexpected turn. Perhaps the optimistic rhetoric of the JOF and the Left Democratic Front (LDF) that an anti-incumbency tsunami was in the making, or the repeated calls of the members of the civil society to the voters to defy the fear and deluge the centers, or the inability to gauge the mood of the millions of first-time voters who had witnessed how two grassroots movements were dealt with force by the government made the ruling party anxious. Alternatively, it could be that the entire process was franchised to local units who were out to ensure victory at any cost. The latter appears to be an unlikely explanation, because of the uncanny similarity in almost all around the country. Notwithstanding the ballot stuffing the night before, the scenes in front of polling centers on the morning were clear indications that it will be a one-sided show. Within a short time after polling started, polling centers were captured by the activists of the ruling party and ballot stuffing began in earnest, according to press reports. The TIB reported that out of 50 seats it had monitored, in 42 seats the ruling party activists were engaged in similar acts (The Daily Star 2019a). But that was only a part of the story of the day. The day was marked by complete absence of supporters and polling agents of the opposition candidates. While voters stood in line for hours as it moved at a snail’s pace, votes were being cast by a handful of people at ease inside the centers and voters were forced to cast votes for the ruling party’s symbol in front of the polling officials and the law enforcing agencies. The reporters of the electronic media who were broadcasting live from outside the centers were either clueless of the machination or too afraid to say anything or already domesticated to give a seal of legitimacy to the exercise. Word did spread through social media, but in drips and drops,

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because the government slowed down the internet ahead of the election (Jahan 2019). Taking pictures inside the centers and posting them in social media was prohibited by the electoral commission; this made it difficult to have visuals which would have shown a different scene and recorded them for future actions. Therefore, an eerie peace prevailed outside the centers, which was broadcast by the Bangladeshi television channels. The absence of the opposition activists during the election day in front of polling centers was an unusual scene for a Bangladeshi election, because election day is viewed as a day of festivity and marked by latent tensions. Supporters of the candidates usually have a significant presence to boost the morale of the voters and display their strengths. Traditionally, supporters of each candidate set up small makeshift booths to provide a piece of paper bearing the symbol of the candidate and the voters’ numbers. In previous participatory elections, streets and polling centers became places of convergence for hundreds of people from the morning. But on December 30, ‘the signature of AL was all over the places so much so that the polls looked to be participated by none but one party. Gatherings of AL men outside polling centres [sic], voting slips of AL candidates, polling agents of AL and journey from gates of polling centres [sic] to booths looked after by AL were the features of the day’ (The Daily Star 2018c). BBC reporter Yogita Limaye described the scene of the polling stations: As we went from polling booth to polling booth, one pattern became clear. People who were supporters of Prime Minister Hasina’s party were vocal, and happy to answer our questions on camera, about what issues they’d voted on. The others were mostly too scared to speak out. One man told us that several members of his extended family found that their votes had already been cast when they went to the polling booth. He said he didn’t think it was a fair election but didn’t want to be identified. It wasn’t hard to see why he felt intimidated. Outside every polling booth we went to, there were dozens of workers from the prime minister’s party, listening intently when anyone was interviewed. No-one from the opposition parties was visible.

A.K.M. Zakaria, a senior journalist of a leading Bengali newspaper, who spent the day visiting several polling centers, hardly found any opposition activists or supporters and wrote, election is often described as ‘festival of vote’ which is supposedly not for only the day of polling but through the entire

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electoral process, but at least on the day of polling. He lamented, this time around, that there was no festivity during the process, and even the polling day did not become a day of festival (Zakaria 2018). The climate of fear which was imparted in the previous weeks and months through arrests of activists, attacks on the opposition candidates, practically barring the opposition from campaigning and even shutting down the website of the BNP two days before the election, paid off. While the outside of the polling stations was under the control of the ruling party activists, the inside was no different. The polling agents of the opposition were absent. Two election commissioners, Mahbub Talukdar and Rafiqul Islam, didn’t find any agents of the JOF candidates in their respective polling centers (The Daily Star 2018a). The CEC, as I mentioned, was not fazed by this unusual scene and put the blame squarely on the opposition. There were reports that in various places, designated election agents of the BNP were picked up by the police on the night before (Palma and Ahmed 2018). In the later part of the election day and afterward it became known how the opposition polling agents were deterred from entering the centers, harassed, and driven out of these centers by ruling party activists, while the polling officials and members of the law enforcing agencies were merely silent spectators. The Army, which was deployed outside many centers, had not intervened at all. Accounts of polling agents, whether of the JOF or the LDF, were no different. For example, one polling agent of a JOF candidate described her experience to the Daily Star reporter: “I tried to set up a booth outside the Gausia Fazil Madrasah [a polling center at Dhaka city], so that I could hand out voter slips. I had a banner of Salam bhai with me, and my son was carrying a small table. A band of young men who were the same age as my son were present there as well—they snatched the banner, threw it on the ground and stomped on it,” alleged the woman, Ayesha. “I was adamant about going inside the voting centre since I was a registered polling agent, but they blocked my road. ‘Did you take my permission?’ a young man demanded to know. I replied saying I don’t need his permission, so he slapped me. Hard. Twice. I fell to the ground and they started kicking me,” alleged Ayesha. “At one point they started dragging me towards a dilapidated building. ‘You are too hyper for a woman and you need to be tamed,’ they told me. One of the boys was 16 years old at best. I escaped because my son, who was their friend, pleaded on my behalf,” claimed the BNP activist. (Islam 2019)

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This was not an exclusive experience of the JOF polling agents, but LDF polling agents also faced the same fate. Aurni Semonti Khan, a polling agent of a left candidate, described her experience of being harassed by the ruling party activists in a public post in her Facebook page on December 30. She witnessed blatant irregularities including ballot stuffing and her complaints to the election officials were completely ignored. Additionally, after she made the complaints to the official, a ruling party man came up to her and said, ‘This is Bangladesh, not America or Canada. Judging by what you have started, you will not be able to live a life here.’ She left the polling center. Accounts of polling agents—that they were threatened and thrown out and that ballot stuffing was going on inside the centers—are borne out by reporters who not only visited different centers but spent the entire day at one single center. A ‘round-the-clock watch’ of three polling centers inside Dhaka University revealed that ‘Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL) [the student wing of the ruling party] activists rigged vote spontaneously, at times even in front of the polling officials and law enforcers. Leaders and activists of the pro-Awami League student body, in groups, were seen casting “false” vote for “boat”, Awami League’s electoral symbol. And, their enthusiasm reached its peak after noon’ (The Daily Star 2018b). As these scenes were being staged all around the country, by the mid-­ day, exasperated candidates, one after another, began to declare that they were boycotting the election. The number reached more than hundred, but unfortunately the television channels which were providing live coverage of the election paid little attention to this emerging situation. How the process of climate of fear, electoral exclusion and persecution of opponents—all culminated on the election day can be understood from the series of events in one parliamentary seat—Dhaka 1 (Dohar and Nawabaganj subdistrict). The seat is in the southeastern part of the district and away from metropolitan Dhaka. The incumbent was Salma Islam, publisher and former acting editor of a daily Bengali newspaper named Jugantor, owner of a television channel called Jamuna, and Director of a business conglomerate called the Jamuna group. She was elected to the 10th Parliament as a nominee of the Jatiya Party (JP) headed by the General Ershad, a member of the ruling Grand Coalition. As the election approached, it became known that business tycoon Salman F Rahman, an advisor to the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, is the likely candidate of the Grand Alliance. Rahman’s business empire includes the largest business

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conglomerate Beximco, a bank, a television channel and a daily English newspaper. There was no obvious BNP candidate, but it was assumed that a local BNP leader will be nominated for the seat. In the 2018 election, although the JP initially gave its nod to Salma Islam’s candidacy, it later decided to give up the seat to the BAL and its nominee Salman Rahman as part of seat sharing among the coalition members. Undeterred by this decision, Islam decided to contest as an independent candidate and submitted her nomination papers. The JOF, like in a few other seats, nominated two candidates, local BNP leaders Khandaker Abu Ashfaq and Fahima Hossain Jubilee; in case one is disqualified, the other will contest as the JOF nominee. On December 2, during the screening process, both were declared disqualified by the Returning Officer (RO). In case of Ashfaq, the rationale was that he hadn’t resigned from the local council (Upazilla council) chairmanship ‘appropriately’. Although existing electoral rules do not require the resignation (Malik 2018), the EC arbitrarily made the decision that the resignation is required and insisted that he didn’t submit it properly. On appeal at the BEC, Ashfaq’s candidature was restored on December 6. On December 12, while campaigning, Ashfaq was picked up by the police and detained for hours. Five days later, in a case filed against his candidature, the High Court stayed the BEC’s decision of restoring his candidacy. Consequently he was barred from contesting. Therefore, the constituency had no candidates from the opposition. While the JOF candidate Ashfaq was fighting battles in court and spending time in police stations, the incumbent law maker Salma Islam, also an ally of the ruling party, was facing obstacles to campaigning from the police and her principal opponent. On December 25, Salma’s entourage press corps, from the Jamuna TV and the Jugantor, the two media show  she owns, came under attack after they covered her campaign. Masked men attacked the journalists at a guest house at night leaving 10 journalists injured and 35 vehicles damaged. Two days before the election, the BNP extended its support to Salma Islam. The night before the election, mysteriously the Jamuna TV channel became unavailable to audience in Dhaka and a few other districts although it was broadcasting, and the channel was available online. The cable operators decided not to carry the channel without citing any reasons. ‘Cable operators wishing anonymity said Salman F Rahman enjoys clout in the associations of cable operators’ reported a newspaper (The Daily Star 2018f).

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At mid-day, a tearful Salma Islam and her business tycoon husband Nurul Islam Babul, declared in a press conference that she was boycotting the election for the sake of the safety of her polling agents. She alleged that of 178 polling centers, she couldn’t appoint agents in 150 centers because the designated agents received ‘death threats from the ruling party leaders and activists’, ‘police had been raiding their homes and arresting them without any specific allegations’. Additionally, after 11:00  a.m., all her polling agents were driven away (The Daily Star 2018f). The election in Dhaka 1 constituency was practically over by the mid-­ day; Salman F. Rahman was declared the winner at the evening. He had secured 302,993 votes, 88.82% of the votes cast, while his opponent bagged only 37,763 votes, about 11.07%. The third candidate of the LDF received 375 votes, 0.11%, roughly 2.1 votes per center. One can justifiably ask why the egregious violation of the integrity of the election and the mechanisms of invisible and blatant rigging discussed in this and preceding chapters escaped the attention of those who monitored the election? The answer to the question is two-fold: due to the absence of international election observers and severe restrictions imposed on journalists (Nowshin 2018; The Wire 2018). The failure of Bangladeshi media also warrants a longer discussion on the political economy of mediascape: who owns media, how much freedom journalists enjoy, what political connections the owners maintain, which ideology they subscribe to and the partisan loyalty of the journalists. Neither space nor the scope of this study allow me to explore further; suffice it to mention that at least four media owners have been elected to the parliament in 2018. Over the years, as the once vibrant civil society was decimated through relentless vilification, ridicule, and mocking, the media joined the bandwagon, instead of standing up as a part of the civil society. The notion of civil society as an independent entity demanding accountability has increasingly become an alien idea. The fact that journalists are divided into two separate unions based on their party identity is telling in this regard. These preclude any serious scrutiny of the Bangladeshi politics, let alone an election. As for the election observers, there was a deliberate attempt to keep it small and under control by the BEC and the government. Unlike previous national elections, the number of international monitors during the election was significantly small. As opposed to 160,000 domestic and 600 international observers in the 2008 election, and about 218,000 domestic and 225 international observers in the 2001 election, the EC approved only 25,920 local observers for monitoring, and the actual number on the election day

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may have been far less than the approved numbers (Alamgir 2018b). The government was less than cooperative beyond its lip service. While the European Union did not send any election observers (The Daily Star 2018e), accreditation and visa of the US funded monitors of the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) were delayed forcing the ANFREL to terminate its mission (Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) 2018a) which led to a spat between the US State Department (Alamgir 2018a) and the Bangladesh Government (Quadir and Das 2018). Of course, the international observers are not the panacea for deterring managed elections, even flawed elections, but there is an agreement among scholars and policymakers alike that having election observers, both national and foreign, goes a long way in creating the possibility of a credible and acceptable election. Experiences since the 1990s and studies of past decades bore this out. The credibility of elections has become an issue of great interest to academics and international bodies in recent decades. Voters turn out in large numbers when there is a possibility of a credible election. Simpser’s excellent study provides a detailed discussion on this topic (Simpser 2014). On the other hand, absence of the possibility of a credible election discourages voters from participating in elections which leads to a post-election movement, and demonstrations. Norris, Frank, and Coma, examine several elections and conclude that ‘contentious elections end in heated partisan debates, court challenges, street protests, and legitimacy challenges’. The study shows that, ‘in some cases, disputes have been settled peacefully through legal appeals and electoral reforms. In the worst cases, however, disputes have triggered bloodshed or government downfalls and military coups’ (Norris et al. 2015). The possibility of contentious elections and its adverse impacts shaped the idea of third-party monitoring and observations of elections. The idea first emerged in the Philippines in the 1986 presidential election. The fear that then incumbent President Ferdinand Marcos may steal the election created the civic organization called the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL). Roughly half a million (500,000) citizen volunteers joined NAMFREL’s monitoring effort. The success of NAMFREL in compelling the Marcos regime to hold a free election created a global movement. Between 1986 and 2012, more than 200 election monitoring organizations emerged in 84 countries. The Global Network of Domestic Election Monitors (GNDEM) has 251 members in 89 countries. International organizations also joined the movement. In 2012, ‘The Declaration of Global Principles for Nonpartisan Election Observation and

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Monitoring by Citizen Organizations’ was adopted which include the principles and code of conduct for the election observers. Third-party monitoring becomes necessary, almost imperative, when there is a likelihood that electoral processes can become questionable and/or the credibility of the election can be compromised. The presence of election monitors tends to become necessary in the emerging democratic countries. Researchers have also noted that in countries where the electoral commissions lack credibility or acceptability among the citizens and the international community, monitoring becomes a necessity. It is also insisted upon by researchers that election monitoring is important in countries which are considered ‘hybrid regimes’ because these regimes tend to manipulate election results; consequently, opponents raise questions about the validity of it. Election monitoring by foreign observers began to increase after the 1990s. Prior to the 1990s, there were only five instances involving foreign observers in national elections, whereas between 1990 and 2010, four in each of five elections were monitored by foreign observers. Experiences of those monitoring and studies of researchers have concluded that the presence of foreign observers deters fraudulent behavior in the fear that they will be exposed, encourage the vanquished to accept the results, and provide legitimacy to the winners of the election (Hyde and Marinov 2014). In spite of, or perhaps because of, the conventional wisdom on the deterrence value of the election observers, the BEC was less interested in facilitating foreign observers. The BEC decided to exclude two major local monitoring organizations with decades of experience citing the bureaucratic processes and deadlines, but it approved organizations with political ties to the ruling party and its collation members, violating its own policy. Two of these organizations are: SAARC Human Rights Foundation and Election Monitoring Forum. One of these organizations became the center of attention during the election day and later, when some of its members retracted their earlier statements. On the election day, it was reported in the Bangladeshi press that there was an international observer team which had visited election centers and had spoken to the media. Later they held a media briefing. One of the members of the observer team was Tanya Foster (her daughter Chole Foster accompanied here). She was described in the press as ‘an observer from Canada’ (The Daily Star 2018d). She was reported to have said on the day of the election, ‘Everyone is getting access to their polling station and is able to cast their ballot and all of the officers and officials are doing

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a great job in maintaining order.’ In the days after the election, many were inquiring the credentials and whereabouts of the observers, particularly of Tanya Foster, who became the face of the ‘international observers’. Questions were also raised about the sponsoring organization, ‘SAARC Human Rights Foundation’ which was described by Bangladeshi media and pro-government activists as one of the ‘international observers’ group. It was later discovered that the Election Monitoring Forum did not have any office or a website, that the SAARC Human Rights Foundations had no affiliation with that inter-governmental body, that its office was located in obscure part of Dhaka, and that same person was Executive Director of one organization while the Secretary General of the other. The SAARC Human Rights Foundation’s Chairman and Advisors are parliament members from the BAL and the JP (The Daily Star 2019b). The statements of these ‘international observers’ has provided fodder to the pro-government activists as they argued that the election received a clean bill of health. Interestingly, less than a month after the election and providing an unqualified approval, Tanya Foster told Reuters that she regretted her involvement and comments. The report says, ‘A top official at an observer group that monitored Bangladesh’s election, as well as one of its foreign volunteers, have said they regret participating in the process’ (Siddiqui and Paul 2019). While Bangladesh had seen more than its fair share of flawed elections, never did the Bangladeshis ever experience gaining legitimacy of a dubious election by arranging ‘election observer’, not even the military rulers who arranged sham elections had employed such tactics. The deliberate measures to reduce the number of international observers as well as arranging ‘election observers’ neatly fits into the behavior of a hybrid regime which would like to hold an election but hide the blatant disregard of a free election. What happened in Bangladesh was an almost replication of a model used in Cambodia in July 2018. The Cambodian Hun Sun government arranged a sham parliamentary election which delivered the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), which has been in power for 33 years under the leadership of Hun Sun, all 125 seats. The opposition leader Kem Sokha had been jailed for treason in 2016 and pro-government courts dissolved his Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) soon after. In the 2018 election, the Cambodian government didn’t allow many external observers. The Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) was denied permission to send observers. After the election, ANFREL issued a statement:

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Pro-government ‘observers’ invited by the Cambodian government to monitor the polling claimed that Cambodia ‘has nothing to hide’ and touted a ‘vibrant’ electoral environment, where ‘people dance on the streets’ and ‘the will of the voters were expressed’. Such blatant misrepresentations of the actual electoral climate intentionally overlooked the repression experienced by human rights and democracy advocates, media, and ordinary citizens, not to mention the real opposition which was systematically outlawed and dismantled by Hun Sen’s regime. These pro-­ government observers lacked credibility, citing only stakeholders aligned with the ruling party with whom they were allowed to interact during their carefully curated tour of Cambodian polling stations (Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) 2018b). Two characteristics of this model of the election observation are to have ‘handpicked observers’ and citing their approval ad nauseam. That is what happened for days in Bangladesh. Such tactics had prevented, at least immediately after the election, a backlash, although the international media continued to describe the exercise as farcical. The election day came to an end, the election was over. Dejected voters, in some places, demonstrated and demanded that they be allowed to vote, but those protests were sporadic and too small to make any difference. The media continued to spin the story of a peaceful election, the fearful citizens retreated to their cocoons, and the opposition leaders seemed to be stunned by the turn of events and were clueless as to what their next move should be. The question loomed large: where does Bangladesh go from here?

Bibliography Alamgir, Mohiuddin. 2018a. Foreign observers now even fewer. December 23. Accessed January 7, 2019. https://www.thedailystar.net/bangladesh-nationalelection-2018/news/us-disappointed-over-govts-inability-grantcredentials-intl-election-monitors-1677271. Alamgir, Mohiuddin. 2018b. Now local observers even fewer. December 28. Accessed January 11, 2019. https://www.thedailystar.net/bangladeshnational-election-2018/news/now-local-observers-even-fewer-1679902. Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL). 2018a. Anfrel Statement On The Termination Of Its Mission in Bangladesh. December 23. Accessed December 24, 2019. https://anfrel.org/anfrel-statement-on-the-termination-of-itsmission-in-bangladesh/.

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Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL). 2018b. The 2018 Cambodian Elections: Nothing But A Charade. August 02. Accessed November 05, 2018. https://anfrel.org/the-2018-cambodian-elections-nothing-but-a-charade/. Cheeseman, Nicholas, and Brian Klaas. 2018. How to Rig an Election. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Hyde, Susan D., and Nikolay Marinov. 2014. “Information and Self-Enforcing Democracy: The Role of International Election Observation.” International Organizations 68 (2): 329–59. Islam, Zyma. 2019. Where Were all the Missing Polling Agents? January 05. Accessed January 06, 2019. https://www.thedailystar.net/star-weekend/spotlight/news/where-were-all-the-missing-polling-agents-1682731. Jahan, Trisha. 2019. Bangladesh govt slows down internet around elections, restored after. January 02. Accessed January 02, 2019. https://www.medianama. com/2019/01/223-bangladesh-govt-internet-elections/. Malik, Shahdeen. 2018. Wrong Interpretation of the Election Commission (in Bengali). December 04. Accessed December 04, 2018. https://www.prothomalo.com/opinion/article/1568272/%E0%A6%A8%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6 %B0%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%AC%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%9A%E0%A6%A8-%E0% A6%95%E0%A6%AE%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%B6%E0%A6%A8%E0%A7%87%E0 %A6%B0-%E0%A6%AC%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%AF%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%96% E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%AF%E0%. Norris, Pippa, Richard W. Frank, and Ferran Martínez I Coma. 2015. Contentious Elections: From Ballots to Barricades. London: Routledge. Nowshin, Nahela. 2018. Unjustified restrictions on media and observers. December 28. Accessed January 11, 2019. https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/politics/news/unjustified-restrictions-media-and-observers-1679668. Palma, Porimol, and Bulbul Ahmed. 2018. 14 agents of BNP candidates detained. December 30. Accessed December 31, 2018. https://www.thedailystar.net/ bangladesh-national-election-2018/news/police-pick-11-agentsnatore-bnp-candidates-1680649. Quadir, Serajul, and Krishna N. Das. 2018. Bangladesh says foreign election observers welcome, rejects U.S. criticism. December 23. Accessed January 18, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bangladesh-election/bangladeshsays-foreign-election-obser vers-welcome-rejects-u-s-criticism-idUS KCN1OM0HJ. Siddiqui, Zeba, and Ruma Paul. 2019. Some in Bangladesh election observer group said they regretted involvement. January 22. Accessed January 22, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bangladesh-election-observers-exclusi/ exclusive-some-in-bangladesh-election-observer-group-say-they-now-regretinvolvement-idUSKCN1PG0MA?fbclid=IwAR3dtSBxZmQK HUT8_fsisHCdIJsUdI2FpGa0kthgXblLz3rMX6-Njky8bnI.

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Simpser, Alberto. 2014. Why Government and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The Daily Star. 2018a. ‘Saw no opposition agents at centres’. December 30. Accessed December 31, 2018. https://www.thedailystar.net/bangladesh-national-election-2018/saw-no-bnp-polling-agents-at-dhaka-centres-ec-mahbubtalukder-1680718. The Daily Star. 2018b. A team work! December 31. Accessed December 31, 2018. https://www.thedailystar.net/bangladesh-national-election-2018/ team-work-11th-general-election-2018-1681009. The Daily Star. 2018c. As we saw. December 31. Accessed February 08, 2019. https://www.thedailystar.net/bangladesh-national-election-2018/ snapshots-of-bangladesh-election-day-2018-as-we-saw-1681003. The Daily Star. 2018d. Election was peaceful. December 31. Accessed December 31, 2018. https://www.thedailystar.net/bangladesh-national-election-2018/ bangladesh-election-things-are-going-smoothly-foreign-observers-1680748. The Daily Star. 2018e. No observer this time from European Parliament. November 29. Accessed January 26, 2019. https://www.thedailystar.net/politics/news/ european-parliament-not-observe-bangladesh-election-1666279. The Daily Star. 2019a. Polls anomalies in 47 of 50 seats. January 16. Accessed January 16, 2019. https://www.thedailystar.net/bangladesh-national-election-2018/bangladesh-election-2018-irregularities-47-out-50-seatstib-1687840. The Daily Star. 2018f. Tearful Salma quits race. December 31. Accessed December 31, 2018. https://www.thedailystar.net/bangladesh-national-election-2018/ tearful-salma-islam-dhaka-1-independent-candidate-quits-race-1681069. The Daily Star. 2019b. The Saga of Two Election Monitoring Organizations (in Bengali). January 08. Accessed January 09, 2019. https://www.thedailystar. net/bangla/%E0%A6%B6%E0%A7%80%E0%A6%B0%E0%A7%8D%E0%A 6%B7-%E0%A6%96%E0%A6%AC%E0%A6%B0/%E0%A6%A6%E0%A7%81%E0 %A6%9F%E0%A6%BF-%E0%A6%A8%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%B0%E0%A7%8D% E0%A6%AC%E0%A6%BE%E0%A6%9A%E0%A6%A8-%E0%A6%AA%E0%A6%B 0%E0%A7%8D%E0%A6%A. The Wire. 2018. Bangladesh’s Restriction on Observers and Media Raises Concerns Before Elections. December 28. Accessed January 21, 2019. https://thewire. in/south-asia/bangladesh-elections-restrictions-media-observers. Zakaria, A. K. M. 2018. Not Even One Day’s Festivity (in Bengali). December 31. Accessed December 31, 2018. https://www.prothomalo.com/opinion/article/1 572609/%E0%A6%8F%E0%A6%95-%E0%A6%A6%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%A8%E0 %A7%87%E0%A6%B0-%E0%A6%89%E0%A7%8E%E0%A6%B8%E0%A6%AC%E0 %A6%9F%E0%A6%BF%E0%A6%93-%E0%A6%9C%E0%A6%AE%E0%A6%B2%E0%A6%A8%E0%A6%BE.

CHAPTER 8

Election Results: A Victory Too Big to Believe?

Abstract  The election not only delivered a landslide victory to the incumbent Bangladesh Awami League with 96% of the seats but also produced unbelievable results at the constituency level. In 51 out of 300 seats, more than 80% of the popular votes were secured by the candidates of the ruling party alliance. This chapter analyzes the results, compares them with two previously inclusive elections in 2001 and 2008, shows the trend and pattern of voting, and explains the incredulity of the loss of the opposition, particularly the BNP. The chapter also shows the discrepancies between the constituencies which used electronic voting machines (EVM) and elsewhere. Keywords  Voting pattern • Two-party system • EVM • Trendline

Immediately after the election results, the scale of victory of the Bangladesh Awami League-led Grand Alliance surprised many, especially those who didn’t follow the developments prior to the election and what happened through the election day at various centers. The Washington Post described the result, 288 out of 300 seats bagged by the ruling party, as something akin to North Korea. It writes, ‘That kind of margin of victory—96 percent—was a result one might expect in a place like North Korea, not a democratic nation such as Bangladesh’ (Slater and Majumder 2018). The © The Author(s) 2019 A. Riaz, Voting in a Hybrid Regime, Politics of South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7956-7_8

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result was unprecedented in the history of the country, except two instances when the elections were boycotted by all opposition parties. No participatory election has ever produced such an astounding victory, not even the sham elections conducted by military rulers in 1979, 1986, and 1988. However, the scale of victory painted in the broad strokes does not tell the entire story of the election results. Understanding this scale and its incredulity requires a comparison between the results of four participatory elections held in 1991, October 1996, 2001, and 2008. With the 1991 election, a de facto two-party system emerged in Bangladesh, but it also began an era of alliance politics. Both the BAL and the BNP, since 1996, had fought elections leading alliances of like-minded parties. In case of the BAL, the alliance was initially called the 14-party alliance which was formed in the 1990s and expanded in 2006 with the inclusion of the Ershad-led JP and was called the Grand Alliance (GA). BNP, on the other hand, created the four-party alliance before 2001, later brought other parties to the fold, and created the 20-party alliance. In October 2018, the BNP joined Kamal Hossain-led Jatiya Oikyo Front (JOF). Despite such alliances, it is well known that in terms of popular votes the BAL and the BNP are the ones which matter the most. Therefore, in the following discussion, we will identify these two poles as AL-led alliance and the BNP-led alliance and the comparison between the 2018 election and previous elections will be made accordingly. Due to the FPTP system, the number of seats does not always reflect the extent of support; therefore, throughout the chapter I will use the share of popular votes as the indicator of the support to the respective parties.1 The Bangladesh Election Commission has claimed that the voter turnout in 2018 was about 80%. Voter turnout has been on the rise since 1991. It rose to 75.6% in 1996 from 55.4% in 1991, followed by a slight drop to 74.9% in 2001 and a dramatic rise to 87.1% in 2008. In 2018, the BAL-led alliance secured 76.88% of popular votes (in the 298 seats declared on December 31). This is a dramatic rise compared to its 2008 performance. While the BAL’s popular support was progressively rising over the past four elections, the BNP managed to increase support until 2001. In 2008, despite its worst electoral performance in terms of seats

1  The share of popular votes used for analysis in this chapter is based on 298 seats for which election was held on December 30, 2018. Polling in two seats were postponed and held later.

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(30 seats) it secured 33% votes. It is evident that the party maintained a solid base around 30%.

The Results Table 8.1  Election results 2018, by number of seats

Grand Alliance

Bangladesh Awami League Jatiya Party (Ershad) Workers Party of Bangladesh Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal Bikalpa Dhara Bangladesh Jatiya Party (Manju) Bangladesh Tarikat Federation Jatiya Oikya Front Bangladesh Nationalist Party Gano Forum Independents

258 22 3 2 2 1 1 6 2 3

Compiled by author from newspaper reports Note: Results are of all 300 seats. Elections were held in 298 seats on December 30, 2018. Election of one seat was canceled due to the death of a candidate which took place on January 27; the BAL candidate won the seat. Polling was suspended at a few centers on December 30 after violence in another seat which was later held, making the number of BNP seats six

The Base Abandoned the BNP? According to the 2018 election results, there was a swing away from the BNP, about 21% between 2008 and 2018; this means that the base has abandoned the BNP in drove. In the absence of any reliable opinion polls conducted before the election, there is no point of reference (Prothom Alo 2018; Dhaka Tribune 2018).2 Yet, public participation in the various 2  Only opinion poll published in the newspapers prior to the election was conducted by an organization called the Research and Development Center (RDC). The organization had no prior record and was not available to be contacted after the results were published in a press conference at Dhaka on December 26, three days ahead of the election. The survey was funded by the Independent Television (a private satellite television channel) and The Independent (English newspaper), both owned by businessman and AL candidate Salman F Rahman, as well as the privatization affairs advisor to Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. Interestingly, the survey predicted 60% support for the Grand Alliance and 22% for the JOF.

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gatherings of the BNP/JOF which were very limited due to denial of permission by the government, provided no such indications. On the other hand, the AL which added 9% more support between 2001 and 2008 has gathered additional 27% support in ten years between 2008 and 2018. The difference of share of popular votes between the BAL and the BNP, in 2018 election, stands at 64.55%. On the face of it, it’s a tectonic shift in Bangladeshi politics. But it betrays the trendline analysis. Both a 21% swing away and a 27% rise in popularity are unheard of in any fairly held elections (Table 8.2; Fig. 8.1). Based on the results of the four elections between 1991 and 2008, if we examine the trendlines, both linear and exponential, we can see where these two parties were likely to stand in 2018 (Figs. 8.2 and 8.3). The projected trendlines, both linear and exponential, show that the BNP’s support should have been around 40% in 2018. Of course, the Table 8.2  Popular votes of the BAL and the BNP, 1991–2018

BNP AL The difference between the BNP and the AL

1991

1996

2001

2008

2018

30.8 30.1 +0.7

33.6 37.6 −4.0

41.40 40.02 +1.38

33.2 49.0 −15.8

12.33 76.88 −64.55

Author’s computation based on the election results of 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2008

90

76.88

80 70 60 50 40 30

30.8 30.1

37.6 33.6

49

41.4 40.02

33.2

20

12.33

10 0

1991

1996

2001 BNP

Fig. 8.1  Popular vote share, 1991–2018

2008 AL

2018

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60 50 40 30 20 10 0

1991

1996 BNP

2001 AL

2008

Linear (BNP)

2018 Expon. (BNP)

Fig. 8.2  BNP popular vote trendline 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

1991

1996 BNP

2001 AL

Linear (AL)

2008

2018 Expon. (AL)

Fig. 8.3  BAL popular vote trendline

trendline of the BAL shows that, ceteris paribus, it would have done better compared to the BNP, but its support would have been around 55–58 range, far behind the 76% of the 2018 election. Those votes, around 55%, wouldn’t have delivered 258 seats in the parliament.

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The Really Very Large Victory The extraordinary large scale of the victory is also reflected in the 51 seats where the Grand Alliance candidates have secured more than 80% of popular votes. In nine seats, 89% or above votes were secured. Among these nine seats, five seats had previously had more that 80% votes cast in favor of the BAL candidates. They were three in  Gopalganj  area, one in Madaripur, and one in Sirajganj. Gopalganj, the birthplace of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founder President of Bangladesh and father of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, has been traditionally a citadel of the BAL where Hasina had received similar support in 2008 and she contested in one of these seats in 2018. Excluding these five seats where BAL already had a record of above 80% votes, 46 seats’ vote differences are worth examining although the AL won all but three of these seats in 2008 (Table 8.3). Noticeably, the difference between 2008 and 2018 victory has been between 15% and 43%. The highest differences have been in the three seats which were previously held by BNP and/or its allies.

The Tight Contest Vanishes The lopsided competition reflected in the previous table betrays the history of elections in Bangladesh. For example, in 2001, results of 38 seats were decided within the margin of 3% of votes. Of these, 17 seats went to the BNP-led 4-party alliance, 13 went to the BAL, 3 to the JP and 1 to another party. In 2008, the number of seats decided within the 3% was 18, of which 13 went to the BAL, 4 to the BNP and 1 to the JP. In 2018, not only all seats have been won by the BAL-led alliance, the differences are surprising. In some instances, the differences have been as high as 80% (Table 8.4).

Vanishing Secured Seats of the BNP? In a two-party political system, it is common to find an unwavering support base for each party. A classic case of the two-party system is the United States where the Republican and Democratic parties enjoy a core support base. Bangladesh is not too different in this regard. As the overall picture presented in the Table 8.1 shows, these two parties have an unwavering support base of around 30% each. This support base translates into secure parliamentary seats. The data from four elections show that there are 27 seats won by the BAL in all four elections, which we have considered as a

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Table 8.3  Seats with more than 80% votes in favor of the BAL alliance Constituency

Madaripur1 Shariatpur1 Brahmanbaria6 Jamalpur3 Shariatpur2 Mymensingh10 RajbarI2 Brahmanbaria4 Sherpur2 Tangail2 Jamalpur4 Comilla11 Bhola3 Narail2 Chittagong6 Madaripur3 Chittagong1 Bogra1 Lakshmipur1 Sirajganj2 Sirajganj6 Bagerhat1 Feni2 Natore3 Lalmonirhat1 Bagerhat4 Kushtia1 Narayanganj2 Thakurgaon2 Jamalpur2 Pirojpur2 Shariatpur3 Dhaka20 Jessore6 Pirojpur1 Netrakona3 Pabna2 Chittagong7 Kishoreganj4

AL-led alliance AL-led alliance percentage 2018 percentage 2008 92.78 92.20 92.00 90.57 88.02 86.71 86.27 86.19 86.05 86.03 85.93 85.90 85.90 85.33 85.12 84.73 84.65 84.63 84.31 83.94 83.69 83.57 83.49 83.40 82.69 82.47 82.31 81.98 81.78 81.57 81.36 81.17 81.13 80.80 80.79 80.77 80.68 80.63 80.49

76.62 63.85 60.89 62.96 58.59 65.25 58.48 58.19 66.8 57.46 59.21 53.14 52.63 59.64 58.22 68.75 52.3 50.77 41.18 46.48 53.43 67.99 41.32 60.85 64.58 58.16 58.04 59.1 50.72 60.83 65.2 64.85 58.5 57.25 48.71 59.8 54.8 51.32 55.08

Winner 2008

AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance BNP-led Alliance BNP-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance BNP-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance

Percentage difference 2018 and 2008 16.16 28.35 31.11 27.61 29.43 21.46 27.79 28.00 19.25 28.57 26.72 32.76 33.27 25.69 26.90 15.98 32.35 33.86 43.13 37.46 30.26 15.58 42.17 22.55 18.11 24.31 24.27 22.88 31.06 20.74 16.16 16.32 22.63 23.55 32.08 20.97 25.88 29.31 25.41 (continued)

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Table 8.3 (continued) Constituency

Sirajganj3 Jhenaidah4 Jhenaidah1 Jessore2 Jessore1 Bhola4 Chittagong3

AL-led alliance AL-led alliance percentage 2018 percentage 2008 80.40 80.39 80.34 80.27 80.24 80.19 80.12

59.35 50.5 52.99 52.88 51.45 58.03 54.06

Winner 2008

Percentage difference 2018 and 2008

AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance AL-led Alliance

21.05 29.89 27.35 27.39 28.79 22.16 26.06

Compiled by author from Bangladesh Election Commission information. Three seats won by the BNP-led Alliance in 2008 are italicized

Table 8.4  Three percentage differences in 2008 and percentages differences in 2018 Constituency and winner in 2008

Percentage difference in 2018

Sirajganj2 (AL-led Alliance) Bogra1 (AL-led Alliance) Jhenaidah4 (AL-led Alliance) Noakhali5 (AL-led Alliance) Comilla9 (AL-led Alliance) Barisal4 (AL-led Alliance) Meherpur2 (4 Party) Gaibandha5 (JP) Sirajganj5 (AL-led Alliance) Joypurhat2 (4 Party) Jessore4 (AL-led Alliance) Thakurgaon2 (AL-led Alliance) Magura2 (AL-led Alliance) Narayanganj4 (AL-led Alliance) Barisal5 (AL-led Alliance) Dinajpur6 (AL-led Alliance) Khulna2 (4 Party) Sylhet2 (AL-led Alliance)

80.01 79.4 77.02 72.87 71.64 71.61 71.38 71.03 68.12 65.93 62.64 54.84 51.9 48.62 46.22 45.5 28.84 13.6

Compiled by author from press reports

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Table 8.5  Secured and considerably secured seats of major political parties Party

Secured seats

Secured seats (%)

Considerably secured seats

Considerably secured seats (%)

AL BNP JP

27 18 7

9 6 2.33

30 54 6

10 18 2

Author’s computation based on the election results of 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2008

‘secured seat’. The corresponding number for the BNP was 18 and for the JP was 7 (Table 8.5). The seats won in three out of four elections by the same political party are considered as ‘considerably secured seat’. The number of such seats is higher for the BNP then the BAL. In this category, AL holds 30 seats, the BNP holds 54, and the remainder 6 considerably secured seats won by JP. Save a few exceptions, the seats which are secured by AL in three elections usually turn to the BNP in the fourth election, and vice-versa.3 Of these 18 secured seats of the BNP, it managed to keep only two in 2018. One of these seats was previously contested by Khaleda Zia. In 2018, the seat was contested by BNP Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam who won in the election. Understandably, the BAL did not lose any of its secured seats.

EVM Results Point to a Different Turnout? Despite serious concerns regarding the reliability of Electronic Voting Machines in various countries and opposition of all political parties, except the ruling BAL (Riaz 2018; Mahmud 2018), the Bangladesh Election Commission decided to introduce the EVM in six constituencies. Members of the civil society and the opposition parties alleged that these machines will be used for manipulating results. The BEC touted the EVM as a tech3  However, in some cases where AL won three elections, JP secured the parliamentary seats of Sherpur1 and Hobiganj1 in 1991, CPB won Thakurgaon2 in 1996, JP won Thakurgaon3, and an independent candidate won Shariatpur1 in 2008 in the fourth election. On the other hand, in the parliamentary seats where BNP secured its victory for three election years, in 1991 BJI won the seats Bogra2, Chittagong14, and Cox’s Bazar2, in 1996 an independent candidate won Meherpur2, and, in 2008, another independent candidate won Noakhali2 in the fourth election. Nevertheless, ten seats were secured by JP in three elections, in all cases AL got elected in the fourth election year.

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nological solution to voter fraud. But it was anything but. Reports after the election documented that most of the 5045 EVMs deployed in 845 polling centers in six constituencies were blatantly abused; ‘the common complaint of voters was that their ballots were cast by someone else in their presence’ (The Daily Star 2018). Notwithstanding these complaints, what is pertinent for the election results is the significant discrepancy of cast votes between the EVM polling centers and the overall turnout. These centers recorded average 51.41% as opposed to national average of 80%. The comparison of the results between 2018 election and others, especially the 2008 election, shows that the results are inconsistent with the pattern of past decades and point to a large-scale manipulation.

Bibliography Dhaka Tribune. 2018. Survey predicts 248 seats for Grand Alliance, 49 for Oikya Front. December 26. Accessed January 1, 2019. https://www.dhakatribune. com/bangladesh/election/2018/12/26/rdc-survey-predicts-248-seats-forgrand-alliance-49-for-oikya-front. Mahmud, Faisal. 2018. Bangladesh politics divided over election use of EVMs. November 13. Accessed January 3, 2019. https://www.asiatimes. com/2018/11/article/bangladesh-political-parties-divided-over-pollsuse-of-evms/. Prothom Alo. 2018. RDC survey financed by Salman F Rahman’s institutions. December 28. Accessed December 29, 2018. https://en.prothomalo.com/ bangladesh/news/188798/RDC-sur vey-financed-by-Salman-FRahman%E2%80%99s. Riaz, Ali. 2018. EVM: A Pointless Debate. September 02. Accessed January 14, 2019. https://www.thedailystar.net/news/opinion/black-white-grey/evmpointless-debate-1627648. Slater, Joanna, and Azad Majumder. 2018. Why Bangladesh’s landslide election result is bad for its democracy. December 31. Accessed January 12, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/12/31/why-bangladeshslandslide-election-result-is-bad-its-democracy/?utm_term=.96578871f2b3. The Daily Star. 2018. EVM proves prone to abuse. December 31. Accessed January 1, 2019. https://www.thedailystar.net/bangladesh-national-election-2018/ evm-use-electronic-voting-machine-showing-problems-slowing-down-polling-1680712.

CHAPTER 9

Mutation of Hybrid Regime and Quo Vadis Bangladesh

Abstract  In the concluding chapter, two questions are addressed: What is the pathway of a hybrid regime? What are the possible scenarios of Bangladeshi politics? The first has remained unexplored in the extant literature on hybrid regimes. This chapter argues that the hybrid regime has the possibility of mutating into an authoritarian system of governance. As for the future of Bangladeshi politics, two scenarios are considered: further sliding toward authoritarian with the hollowing of institutions like elections or restraint of the incumbent’s penchant for coercion as the mode of governance and striving for national reconciliation and unity. Keywords  Resilience • Mutation • Authoritarianism • Reconciliation

With the growing recognition that hybrid regimes are not regimes in transition, rather a specific type of governance, the question emerged—do they remain static or are they open to mutation? Those who have studied the durability and resilience of hybrid regimes showed that although hybrid regimes are neither inherently unstable nor less durable compared to other regimes, hybrid regimes are more prone to political instability compared to autocratic and established democracies (Epstein et al. 2006). As such, mutation via political instability is a possibility that looms large over hybrid regimes. In the discussions of hybrid regimes, at least in the © The Author(s) 2019 A. Riaz, Voting in a Hybrid Regime, Politics of South Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7956-7_9

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first generation, the possibility of transition was considered. However, transition was presupposed as transition to democracy, thanks to the teleological bias of the democratization literature. The possibility that it could rather be the reverse, descending into authoritarianism, received little attention; but it is now accepted that a hybrid regime can gradually discard the democratic pretenses. The democratic institutions and practices, such as elections, which keep the country within the hybrid regime classification, may entirely be bereft of their significance, and so can be the fate of other institutions such as media. The annual report of the Freedom House has recorded such deterioration; for example, the status of Nicaragua and Uganda have declined from ‘partly free’ to ‘not free’ in 2018 (Freedom House 2019). Therefore, closer attention to the hybrid regimes’ pathway and trajectory are warranted. The designation of a system of governance as hybrid regime, which is ostensibly democratic, can serve only as a point of departure. The scope of this study didn’t allow me to explore them at length in the Bangladesh case, but almost decimation of the electoral system should ring a warning bell and further exploration of the Bangladeshi regime involving these aspects is wanting. The emergence, survival, and resilience of hybrid regime cannot be understood by looking at one institution, let alone the election only. As researchers had suggested, it is necessary to examine the executive and legislative arena, and the judicial arena (Ekman 2009; Levitsky and Way 2002, 52). I argue that two other aspects demand our attention: state’s mobilization capacity and state’s ability to construct an ideology. The state’s mobilization capacity is important for the hybrid regimes because the ruling party’s ability to mobilize its supporters is a key enabler. As the elites of hybrid regimes do not enjoy monopoly over the streets, ‘rulers in contemporary hybrids have to be creative in order to find ways to mobilize support’ (Robertson 2010, 31). In case of post-communist Russia, ‘shadier organizations’ like Nashi, Molodata Gvardia were created by the regime to ‘dominate streets’ and ‘seize political initiatives away’ from anti-­ government social and political movements (Robertson 2010, 31). Similar measures had been adopted by Chavez government. As for the construction of the ideology, we must be cognizant that state is an agency of hegemony and that ideology justifies the raison d’être of the state. Ideology rationalizes the very existence of certain political institutions and regulates relations among elites, and between the rulers and the ruled. The ideology’s role is also important to cultivate support from intellectuals and the civil society.

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In Bangladesh, in the past years, independent civil society organizations and movement have been decimated, and a concerted effort to demean intellectuals and members of the civil society is palpable. The obliteration of civil society organization was made possible by decades of politicization and fragmentation of many organizations and labor unions by various political parties, particularly by the BAL and the BNP. The partisan affiliation of intellectuals has tied them deeply with the existence of the regime. Additionally, the regime has ‘creatively’ co-opted any grassroots movements—the Shahbag movement in 2013 is a case in point (Zaman 2016). A spontaneous movement alleging leniency to the war criminals by a special tribunal appointed by the government was transformed into a pro-­ government mass mobilization. The ruling party showed equal aptness in co-opting the conservative Islamist movements named the Hefazat-i-­ Islam (Dhaka Tribune 2018). The selective use of religion, as predicted by the Strategic Forecast in 2016 (Strategic Forecast 2016), has increased in the past years to boost support. The phrase ‘spirit of liberation’ (muktijuddher chetona), meaning of which remains unclear and is continually shifting at the will of the ruling party supporters, has been used as a tool for mobilization and differentiation. The larger normative questions regarding the trajectory of any hybrid regime notwithstanding, this study also raises particular questions regarding the future of Bangladeshi politics. After the managed election of December 30, 2018, the question that Bangladesh faces is where the country goes from here. The country was founded with the promise for equality, human dignity, and social justice and its first constitution included democracy as one of the four state principles, yet the tumultuous history of the nation shows that it has moved further away, over time slowly but steadily. The recent developments demonstrate that the pace has been accelerated. The election was another example of the mission adrift; it was another example that inclusivity and popular sovereignty, the fundamental ideals of a democratic nation, are fading. Notwithstanding these ideals, the immediate questions are: Would the progressive attenuation of democratic space be the trajectory of the nation? Will Bangladesh become another country where democracy is only an empty word without the institutions to practice it? Of course, those who are in power will point to the edifice of parliament and other similar institutions, which are, as of now, hollowed out. There will be political parties who will continue to operate, as it is in many other hybrid regimes. There will be elections, at local levels, as a proof of

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democracy, but will those offer a choice is a different matter altogether. The argument, as we have heard since the 2014 election, will be that development should precede democracy. The false dichotomy between democracy and development with a preference for the latter by regime supporters to justify the democracy deficit is likely to become louder than it has been since 2014. ‘Development’, in this discourse, will be defined within the narrow confines of ‘economic growth’ which does not offer equality, but contributes to growing inequality and is bereft of any inclusivity. The exponents of the incumbents will point to the opposition, particularly to the BNP’s checkered history of mal-governance and its inability to reorganize, for the absence of any viable opposition. But can they avoid the question as to why the citizens will have to be stripped of their fundamental rights for the purported misdeeds of one single party? The situation that has emerged after the 2018 election is not only an absence of democracy but also a situation where the politics has gone missing. What has appeared as the ‘new normal’ of political governance is built on four pillars, according to Hossain Zillur Rahman (Rahman 2019): ‘marginalization [sic] of those at the grassroots, political encroachment on social space, economic governance run on crony principles and entrenched corruption, and relentless empowerment of the security establishment over civic rights’. That is why the by-election of the mayor of Dhaka North City Corporation (DNCC) held on February 28, 2019, less than two months after the general election, became an empty show of electoral exercise, a ritual at its best. Boycotted by the opposition parties, the election had the lowest number of voter turnout in as many years. While the government claimed that there was decent turnout, media reports showed empty polling centers. The absence of the voters was a display of no-­ confidence on the election commission and the current arrangement of the electoral process. But one can also argue that this is what the 2018 election was intended to do—create an impression that electoral process has no meaning, thereby essentially shattering the citizens’ faith in the electoral system. The hollowing out of an indispensable element of democracy, the gradual dismantling of institutions like the electoral system, is the way to depoliticize a society, upon which a hybrid regime thrives. The post-election calm, absence of any protest and the failure of the opposition parties to offer a clear pathway may bolster a sense of confidence of the ruling party. Indeed, ‘people at large have chosen to grieve and despair in private rather than engage in protest and publicly vent their anger at the systematic loss of their sense of being citizens with rights’

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(Rahman 2019); but the current mood of ‘impotent anger, withdrawal and pursuit of private agendas’ (Rahman 2019) should not be seen as the end of the road. Instead, it should be recognized that the country is standing at the crossroads. The incumbent can choose to halt the sliding toward authoritarianism, restrain its penchant for coercion as the principal mode of governance, and opt for a national reconciliation and unity. The culture of fear, which has permeated the society, can be reversed, if democratic space is created, for the political parties and the members of the civil society including the media. This means that the country returns to the path it promised to its citizens during its war of independence. As the report of the Freedom House shows, countries have upgraded themselves from ‘not free’ standing. This is a tall order, perhaps an unlikely scenario, but not an impossible task. The other road is the continued descent toward authoritarianism, ‘diffusing and exhausting the opposition’ and thereby ‘human rights, freedom of speech, and political equality remain under pressure’ (Hasan and Ruud 2019). It is the likely scenario but does not make it right. Such scenario is also contingent upon the opposition political forces of Bangladesh, the feeble voices from the civil society, and the international community. Do the opposition parties realize the ongoing transformation of the nature of the regime? Can they overcome their differences—ideological and other? Can the fragmented opposition devise a common platform? Answers to these questions will have no less influential role than the behavior of the incumbent party and the government.

Bibliography Dhaka Tribune. 2018. PM Sheikh Hasina branded as ‘Mother of Qawmi’. November 04. Accessed May 07, 2019. https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/ dhaka/2018/11/04/pm-hasina-lauded-as-mother-of-qawmi. Ekman, Joakim. 2009. “Political Participation and Regime Stability: A Framework for Analyzing Hybrid Regimes.” International Political Science Review 30 (1): 7–31. Epstein, David L., Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen, and Sharyn O’Halloran. 2006. “Democratic transitions.” American Journal of Political Science 50 (3): 551–569. Freedom House. 2019. Democracy in Retreat, Freedom In The World 2019. February 05. Accessed February 09, 2019. https://freedomhouse.org/ report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019.

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Hasan, Mubashar, and Arild Engelsen Ruud. 2019. The Geopolitics of the 2018 Parliamentary Elections in Bangladesh. February 6. Accessed February 6, 2019. https://www.e-ir.info/2019/02/06/the-geopolitics-of-the-2018-parliamentary-elections-in-bangladesh/?fbclid=IwAR1SJoyFdBdReYrtQfpJyKkW1NQDbWBx2exR_6UKZB_SjvPTwfYBI9omxA. Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. 2002. “Elections without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism.” Journal of Democracy 13 (2): 51–65. Rahman, Hossain Zillur. 2019. A ‘New Normal’? March 3. Accessed March 3, 2019. https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/governance/news/new-normal-1709551. Robertson, Graeme B. 2010. The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes: Managing Dissent in Post-Communist Russia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Strategic Forecast. 2016. Bangladesh’s Descent into Authoritarianism. May 31. Accessed March 15, 2018. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/bangladeshs-descent-authoritarianism. Zaman, Fahmida. 2016. “Agencies of Social Movements: Experiences of Bangladesh’s Shahbag Movement and Hefazat-e-Islam.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 53 (3): 1–11.

Appendix A: Bangladesh Parliamentary Election 2018 Basic Facts

Voters: Around 104.4 million voters, of which 52,371,620 were men and 51,455,203 women. A total of 12.1 million new voters registered for the 11th general election. Of the total voters, 42 million were aged between 18 and 35 years. Candidates: 1861 candidates. Of them, 1733 were nominated by 39 registered political parties. The remainder, 128 were independent candidates.

Candidates by Alliance Affiliations Grand Alliance (GA): The Grand Alliance is led by the Bangladesh Awami League (BAL). The alliance comprised an alliance called 14-Party Alliance and Jatiya Party (JP) led by H.  M. Ershad, Bikalapdhara. The 14-party alliance comprised BAL, Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) led by Hasanul huq Inu, Bangladesh JSD led by Sharif Nurul Ambia, Workers Party led by Rashed Khan Menon, Gono Azadi League, Sammobadi Dal, Tariqat Federation, Gonotontri Party, Bangladesher Somojtantrik Dal (BSD), National Awami Party, Jatiya Party (JP, led by Anwar Hossain Manju), Gonotantrik Majdoor Party, Communist Kendro and Sramik Krishak Samajbadi Dal. Under the banner of GA, 272 candidates of the ruling Awami League and 16 of its allies contested the election.

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APPENDIX A: BANGLADESH PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION 2018 BASIC FACTS

Jatiya Oikyo Front (JOF): The JOF came into being in October 2018 under the leadership of Kamal Hossain. The members are Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), Gono Forum, Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal-JSD (led by ASM Abdur Rab), Nagorik Oikya, Krishak Sramik Janata League, Jatiya Oikya Prokriya. The JOF nominated a total of 282 nominees, of which 257 were from the BNP. Although the Bangladesh Jamaat-i-Islami is not a member of the alliance, 22 of its members were nominated as BNP nominee. Left Democratic Front: This comprised Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB), Revolutionary Workers Party, Gonoshonghoti Andolon, United Communist League of Bangladesh, Basad (Marxist), Ganatantrik Biplobi Andolon and Samajtantrik Andolon. The alliance nominated 147 candidates in 131 constituencies. Bangladesh Islamic Movement: Islamist party contested in 299 seats.

Appendix B: Bangladesh Parliamentary Elections 1973–2014—Fairness Index

Year

Incumbent

Percentage of seats secured by the incumbent party

Level of fairness

1973

Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)∗ Jatiya Party (JP) ∗∗

97.6

Significantly rigged

69.6

Extensively rigged

51.05

1988

Jatiya Party (JP)

83.7

1991 1996 (Feb)

∗∗∗ BNP

∗∗∗ 84.3

1996 (June) 2001 2008

∗∗∗

∗∗∗

Extensively rigged, boycotted by the BNP, its allies and the Left Parties; participated by the BAL and its allies Extensively rigged, boycotted by major political parties including the BNP, the BAL Fair Extensively rigged, boycotted by all major political parties including the BAL Fair

∗∗∗ ∗∗∗

∗∗∗ ∗∗∗

Fair Fair

1979

1986

(continued)

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APPENDIX B: BANGLADESH PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 1973–2014—FAIRNESS…

(continued) Year

Incumbent

Percentage of seats secured by the incumbent party

Level of fairness

2014

BAL-led alliance∗∗∗∗

95.0

Extensively rigged, boycotted by all major political parties including the BNP

Source: Compiled by the author based on the election results, newspapers reports, observations and personal interviews Notes: ∗ The election was held under the military regime of Ziaur Rahman who founded the BNP in early 1979 for participating in the election; ∗∗ The election was held under the military regime of H. M. Ershad who founded Jatiya Party in early 1986 to contest in the election. ∗∗∗ The election was held under caretaker government, there was no incumbent. ∗∗∗∗ Except for the 15 seats won by independent candidates, 285 seats were won by the ruling alliance, and the BAL won 78% of the seats

Index1

A Accountability, 13, 75 horizontal, 23 Adcock, Chris, 46 Administration local, 44, 57, 63 neutral, 43 Alam, Shahidul, 36, 39 Algeria, 48 Alvarez, Mike, 9 Anam, Mahfuz, 34 Anarchy, 25 Asia Foundation, 36–38, 44 survey, 36–38 Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL), 76, 78, 79 Assassination, 24 Authoritarian institutions, 3 Authoritarian regimes, 10, 15, 47, 48, 51 closed, 45, 48, 49 competitive, 24

electoral, 27, 34 liberalized, 3 Authoritarianism, 1–5, 11–14, 24, 47, 48, 51, 52, 93–97 blatant, 14 closed, 52 competitive, 3, 13, 24, 52 military, 3, 21 semi, 13 single-party, 28 Autocracy, 10, 14–15, 51–53 Autocrats, 47, 51, 58, 69 B Bangladesh Awami League (BAL), 1–4, 22–25, 27n2, 28, 33, 64, 74, 78, 84–92, 95 activists, 62 alliance, 89–90 candidates, 88 government, 27 Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL), 73

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

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INDEX

Bangladesh Constitution, 29, 33 Bangladesh Election Commission (BEC), 59–65, 74–77, 84, 91 Bangladesh Government, 40, 76 Bangladesh Jamaat-i-Islami (BJI), 91n3 Bangladesh Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (BJSD), 64 Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), 3, 22–28, 34, 38, 39, 43–45, 52–53, 59–62, 72–74, 84–92, 91n3, 95–96 boycott, 4, 27, 28, 43, 53 effectiveness of, 53 government, 34 leadership, 62 BBC, 71 Bias, 58 political, 63 teleological, 94 C Cambodia, 47, 58, 78, 79 Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), 78 Candidates exasperated, 73 left, 73 rebel, 59 Caretaker government (CTG), 22–27, 43, 59 military-backed, 34 Carothers, Thomas, 12–14 CEC, see Chief Election Commissioner Chavez, 29, 94 Cheeseman, Nic, 2, 58–60, 69, 70 Chief Election Commissioner (CEC), 59–60, 64, 72 Chief justice (CJ), 24, 29 Civil bureaucracy, 23 Civil liberties, 10

Civil society, 15, 22–24, 34, 49–52, 65, 70, 75, 91, 94–97 organization, 95 Coercion, 34, 64, 97 Consolidation, democratic, 3–5 Constitution, 3, 21–28 Corruption, 15, 23, 46 entrenched, 96 Court apex, 25 challenges, 76 higher, 23, 29 highest, 25 pro-government, 78 verdict, 24, 25 CTG, Caretaker Government Culture, 34, 97 political, 15, 23 D Daily Star, 5, 24, 29, 34, 44, 60–64, 70–78, 92 Democracy consolidated, 11–14 counterfeit, 58–60, 69 declining, 12 defective, 14 deficit, 96 delegative, 14 façade, 10 flawed, 15 formal, 46 illiberal, 3, 11–14 minimal, 10 new, 13–14 pluralist, 58 pseudo, 13 semi, 13, 14 substantive, 46 transition to, 94

 INDEX 

Democracy International (DI), 36–38 Democratic principles, 39 regimes, 10–12 Democratic institutions, formal, 22–24, 46 Democratization, 1–4, 9–12, 45, 48, 49 Deputy Commissioners (DC), 62–63 Dhaka, 38, 64, 73–78, 85n2 capital, 61 city, 72 metropolitan, 73 Dhaka Tribune, 29, 95 Dhaka University, 73 Diamond, Larry, 10–15, 45, 46 Dictators, 52 overt, 47 Dictatorships, 11, 12, 47, 51 military, 10 postcolonial, 47, 51 twentieth-century, 47 Digital Security Act (DSA), 35, 40 Disappearances, 35, 36 enforced, 4, 35–36, 40 Doorenspleet, Renskee, 10 E Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), 15 Electoral authoritarianism, 13 Ekman, Joakim, 28, 34, 46, 94 Election City Corporation, 59 competitive, 46, 58 contentious, 76 corporation elections, 44 credible, 22, 76 dilemma, 70 managed, 2, 5, 44, 76, 95

105

manipulation, 2, 50, 58 monitoring, 76, 77 monitors, 77 multiparty, 27, 45, 53 parliamentary, 2, 22, 25, 26, 37, 38, 58, 78 participatory, 63–65, 71, 84 Election Commission (EC), 4, 27n2, 28, 44, 58–60, 64, 72–76, 84, 91, 96 Election observers, 44, 75–79 foreign, 4 international, 75 and media, 44 Electoral authoritarianism, 3, 14, 30, 47 commission, 2, 57, 70, 71 contestation, 45 democracy, 3, 13, 22, 45 exclusion mechanism, 70 Electoral Integrity Project (EIP), 58 Electronic Voting Machine (EVMs), 64, 91, 92 Elites, 47, 94 Environment, 40 controlled, 65 political, 4, 38 Epstein, David, 15, 49, 93 Ershad, General, 29, 73 Extrajudicial killing, 4, 33–35 F Facebook, 39, 40 accounts, 39 usage, 39 Fear, 4, 33–40, 63–65, 69–77, 97 FIDH, 65 First-Past-The-Post (FPTP), 21 system, 84 Fishman, Robert, 13

106 

INDEX

Force, 11, 28, 34, 70 political, 34, 97 security, 65 Foster, Tanya, 77, 78 Freedom House, 11, 22, 94, 97 Freedom of expression, 33–37 G Ghost case, 61 Governance, 1–6, 9–14, 23, 24, 48–52, 64, 93–97 democratic, 9 economic, 96 monopolistic partyarchal, 23 political, 96 Government, 13–15, 24–28, 33–36, 40, 46–51, 58, 59, 62–63, 70, 71, 75, 76, 86, 94–97 local, 63 machination, 53 Grand Alliance (GA), 73, 84, 85n2, 88 H Hasina, Sheikh, 24, 36, 73, 85n2, 88 Hefazat-i-Islam, 95 Hermet, Guy, 47, 58 Hossain, Kamal, 62 Human Rights Watch (HRW), 39–40, 65 Huntington, Samuel, 9–11, 45 Hybrid regime leaders, 1, 49 resilience of, 5, 51, 93, 94 survival, 4 I Ideology, 51, 75, 94 Institutions educational, 63

effective, 4 political, 94 pseudo-democratic, 52 International Crimes Tribunal, 27n2 International Republican Institute (IRI), 36–38 IRI survey, 37 J Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), 27, 27n2, 52 Jamuna TV, 74 Jatiya Oikyo Front (JOF), 59–62, 70–74, 84–86, 85n2 Jatiya Party (JP), 29, 73, 74, 78, 84, 88, 91, 91n3 Jugantor, 73, 74 K Karl, Terry, 14, 45 Kendall-Taylor, Andrea, 51, 52 Kilinc, Faith Resul, 17, 24, 52 Klaas, Brian, 2, 58–60, 69, 70 L Latin America, 3, 11, 53 Law defamation, 35 restrictive, 4 rule of, 15, 46 LDF, 75 Legitimacy, 2, 15, 22–24, 47, 48, 51–53, 70, 77, 78 challenges, 76 electoral, 51 international, 47–51 moral, 34 Levitsky, Steven, 13–15, 28, 29, 52, 94 Liberal democracies, 10–13, 45 Lindberg, Staffan, 4, 49

 INDEX 

M Maldives, 53 Malesky, Edmund, 47 Manipulation, 1–6, 22, 47–51, 58, 59 electoral, 51 large-scale, 92 Marginalization, 96 Mechanism, institutional, 58 Media, 1–5, 22, 26, 44, 52, 60, 65, 74–79, 93–97 broadcast, 35 coverage, 60 international, 79 owners, 75 social, 40, 70, 71 Menon, Rashed Khan, 64 Monitoring, 75–78 Movement conservative Islamist, 95 failed, 34, 62 global, 76 grassroots, 70, 95 political, 52, 94 post-election, 76 pro-democracy, 22 Mussolini, Benito, 11 N Nathan, Andrew, 12 New York Times, 2 Nicaragua, 48, 94 Norris, Pippa, 58, 76 North Korea, 83 O Observers, 60, 76–79 external, 78 foreign, 77 handpicked, 79 local, 75

107

Observer team, 77 international, 77 Odhikar, 35–37 O’Donnell, Guillermo, 3, 11 Opponents persecute, 24 political, 60, 65 Opposition fragmented, 97 real, 79 seat, 29 sentiment, 50 Organizations civic, 76 human rights, 35 independent civil society, 95 international, 36, 76 Ottaway, Marina, 12–14, 24 P Parliament, 3, 22–29, 33, 64, 73–75, 87, 95 Parties, 1–4, 22–24, 27–29, 34–36, 43, 44, 48, 51–53, 62, 70, 71, 83–92 Partyarchy, 23 Party identity, 75 Paxton, Pamela, 10 Petition, writ, 25n1 Philippines, 48, 76 Police, 35, 39, 59–63, 72–75 plain-clothed, 44 Political violence, 62 Politicization, 28, 95 Polling agents, 5, 44, 60, 70–75 potential, 44 registered, 72 Power, undemocratic, 47 Prothom Alo, 34, 60–63, 85 Public Service Commission, 23 Puddington, Arch, 47

108 

INDEX

R Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur, 22, 88 Regime invincibility, 47 military, 21 semi-authoritarian, 24 subverting, 49 survival, 51 type, 14 Returning Officer (RO), 59–63, 74 Rights civic, 96 fundamental, 96 human, 65, 79, 97 inalienable, 65 political, 13 Russia, 4, 34, 58 Ruud, Arild Engelsen, 97 S Samakal, 64 Schedler, Andreas, 13, 27, 47, 48, 51, 52, 58 Seeberg, Merete Bach, 47, 48 Slater, Joanna, 2, 83 Sobhan, Zafar, 28 South Asia, 44 Space cyber, 40 democratic, 38, 52, 95, 97 political, 23, 38 social, 96 State, 2, 6, 12–13, 22–24, 28, 52, 59, 94 apparatuses, 22, 64 institutions, 23 monarchical, 10 one-party, 10, 21 Subordination, 29 Supermajority, 47 Supreme Court, 25–29 System authoritarian, 10, 51

democratic, 12 electoral, 11, 46, 94 multi-party, 58 neopatrimonial, 23 non-democratic, 9 presidential, 21 quota, 36 T Talukdar, Mahbub, 60, 72 Tanzania, 4, 47 Third Wave, 9–17, 45 Transition, 3, 5–6, 9–15, 94 paradigm, 12 peaceful power, 23 process, 12 regime in, 14–15, 93 Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), 5, 64, 70 Turkey, 58 Twitter, 40 U Uganda, 47, 94 UK Aid, 38 USAID, 38 V Venezuela, 4, 34, 48 Voter fraud, 92 turnout, 27, 84, 96 Votes cast, 70, 92 center, 72 fake, 64 false, 73 popular, 24, 84–88 rigged, 73 rights, 10 voting, 5, 71

 INDEX 

W War crimes, 34 War criminals, 95 Waves first, 10 global, 48 new, 11 Weeks, Gregory, 53

Wolchik, Sharon, 14 Workers Party, 64 Z Zakaria, Fareed, 13, 14 Zaman, Fahmida, 95 Zia, Khaleda, 34, 45, 60, 91

109