Volume 8, Tome III: Kierkegaard's International Reception – The Near East, Asia, Australia and the Americas: Tome III: The Near East, Asia, Australia ... Research: Sources, Reception and Resources) [1 ed.] 9780754664024, 9781138257320, 0754664023

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title
Copyright
Contents
List of Contributors
List of Abbreviations
PART I THE NEAR EAST
Turkey: The Reception of Kierkegaard in Turkey
Israel: Kierkegaard's Reception in Fear and Trembling in Jerusalem
The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World
Iran: Kierkegaard's Reception in Iran
PART II ASIA AND AUSTRALIA
China: The Chinese Reception of Kierkegaard
Korea: The Korean Response to Kierkegaard
Japan: Varied Images through Western Waves
Australia: An Archaeology of Silence of Kierkegaard's Philosophical Reception
PART III THE AMERICAS
Canada: Kierkegaard on the Canadian Academic Landscape
The USA: From Neo-Orthodoxy to Plurality
Mexico: Three Generations of Kierkegaard Studies
Hispanophone South America: Kierkegaard's Latin American Reception, An Oxymoron
Brazil: Forty Years Later
Index of Persons
Index of Subjects

Citation preview

Kierkegaard’s International Reception Tome III: The Near East, Asia, Australia and the Americas

Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources Volume 8, Tome III

Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources is a publication of the Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre

General Editor Jon Stewart Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, University of Copenhagen, Denmark Editorial Board Katalin Nun peter Šajda Advisory Board IstvÁn CzakÓ FINN GREDAL JENSEN David D. Possen Joel D. S. Rasmussen Heiko Schulz

This volume was published with the generous financial support of the Danish Agency for Science, Technology and Innovation

Kierkegaard’s International Reception Tome III: The Near East, Asia, Australia and the Americas

Edited by Jon Stewart

First published 2009 by Ashgate Publishing Published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © 2009 Jon Stewart Jon Stewart has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the editor of this work.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Kierkegaard’s international reception Tome 3: The Near East, Asia, Australia and the Americas. – (Kierkegaard research : sources, reception and resources ; v. 8) 1. Kierkegaard, Soren, 1813–1855 I. Stewart, Jon (Jon Bartley) 198.9 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kierkegaard’s international reception / edited by Jon Stewart. Tome 3: The Near East, Asia, Australia and the Americas p. cm. – (Kierkegaard research ; v. 8) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7546-6402-4 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Kierkegaard, Soren, 1813–1855. I. Stewart, Jon. 198’.9–dc22

ISBN 9780754664024 (hbk) isBn 9781138257320 (pbk) Cover design by Katalin Nun.

Contents List of Contributors List of Abbreviations

vii ix

Part I The Near East Turkey: The Reception of Kierkegaard in Turkey Türker Armaner

3

Israel: Kierkegaard’s Reception in Fear and Trembling in Jerusalem Jacob Golomb

25

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World Habib C. Malik

39

Iran: Kierkegaard’s Reception in Iran Ramin Jahanbegloo

97

Part II Asia and Australia China: The Chinese Reception of Kierkegaard Wang Qi

103

Korea: The Korean Response to Kierkegaard Pyo Jae-myeong

125

Japan: Varied Images through Western Waves Satoshi Nakazato

149

Kierkegaard’s International Reception

vi

Australia: An Archaeology of Silence of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Reception William McDonald part iii

175

the americas

Canada: Kierkegaard on the Canadian Academic Landscape Abrahim H. Khan

197

The USA: From Neo-Orthodoxy to Plurality Lee C. Barrett

229

Mexico: Three Generations of Kierkegaard Studies Leticia Valadez

269

Hispanophone South America: Kierkegaard’s Latin American Reception, An Oxymoron Patricia Carina Dip

285

Brazil: Forty Years Later Alvaro Luiz Montenegro Valls

319

Index of Persons Index of Subjects

329 341

List of Contributors Türker Armaner, Department of Philosophy, Galatasaray University, Ciragan caddesi, No: 102, 80840 Ortaköy/Istanbul, Turkey. Lee C. Barrett, Lancaster Theological Seminary, 555 W. James St., 17603 Lancaster, PA, USA. Patricia Carina Dip, Facultad de Filosofia y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Puan 480. Jacob Golomb, Department of Philosophy, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem 91905, Israel. Pyo Jae-myeong, Department of Philosophy, Korea University, Anam-dong, Seongbuk-gu, Seoul, 136–701, Korea. Ramin Jahanbegloo, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, 29 Rajpur Road, Delhi, 110054, India. Abrahim H. Khan, Trinity College, University of Toronto, 6 Hoskin Avenue, Toronto, Ontario M5S 1H8, Canada. William McDonald, School of Social Science, University of New England, Armidale, NSW, 2351, Australia. Habib C. Malik, History & Cultural Studies, Humanities Division, School of Arts & Sciences, Lebanese American University, Byblos Campus, Lebanon. Satoshi Nakazato, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Lterature, Tokyo University, 5-28-20 Hakusan, Hunkyo-ku, Tokyo 112–8606, Japan. Wang Qi, Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 100732 Beijing, China. Leticia Valadez, Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos, Aldama 45, casa 4 Col. Tepepan, 16020 Mexico, D.F., Mexico.

viii

Kierkegaard’s International Reception

Alvaro Luiz Montenegro Valls, Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos Programa de Pós-Graduaçâo em Filosofia, Av. Unisinos, 950, CEP 93022–000, São Leopoldo, RS, Brazil.

List of Abbreviations Danish Abbreviations B&A

Breve og Aktstykker vedrørende Søren Kierkegaard, ed. by Niels Thulstrup, vols. I–II, Copenhagen: Munksgaard 1953–4.

Bl.art. S. Kierkegaard’s Bladartikler, med Bilag samlede efter Forfatterens Død, udgivne som Supplement til hans øvrige Skrifter, ed. by Rasmus Nielsen, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel 1857. EP

Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer, vols. 1–9, ed. by H.P. Barfod and Hermann Gottsched, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel 1869–81.

Pap.

Søren Kierkegaards Papirer, vols. I to XI–3, ed. by Peter Andreas Heiberg, Victor Kuhr and Einer Torsting, Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, Nordisk Forlag, 1909–48; second, expanded ed., vols. I to XI–3, by Niels Thulstrup, vols. XII to XIII supplementary volumes, ed. by Niels Thulstrup, vols. XIV to XVI index by Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1968–78.

SKS

Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, vols. 1–28, K1–28, ed. by Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Joakim Garff, Jette Knudsen, Johnny Kondrup, Alastair McKinnon and Finn Hauberg Mortensen, Copenhagen: Gads Forlag 1997ff.

SV1

Samlede Værker, ed. by A.B. Drachmann, J.L. Heiberg and H.O. Lange, vols. I–XIV, Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandels Forlag 1901–6. English Abbreviations

AN

Armed Neutrality, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1998.

AR

On Authority and Revelation, The Book on Adler, trans. by Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1955.

ASKB The Auctioneer’s Sales Record of the Library of Søren Kierkegaard, ed. by H. P. Rohde, Copenhagen: The Royal Library 1967.



Kierkegaard’s International Reception

BA

The Book on Adler, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1998.

C

The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1997.

CA

The Concept of Anxiety, trans. by Reidar Thomte in collaboration with Albert B. Anderson, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1980.

CD

Christian Discourses, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1997.

CI

The Concept of Irony, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1989.

CIC

The Concept of Irony, trans. with an Introduction and Notes by Lee M. Capel, London: Collins 1966.

COR

The Corsair Affair; Articles Related to the Writings, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1982.

CUP1 Concluding Unscientific Postscript, vol. 1, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1982. CUP2 Concluding Unscientific Postscript, vol. 2, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1982. EO1

Either/Or, Part I, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1987.

EO2

Either/Or, Part II, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1987.

EOP

Either/Or, trans. by Alastair Hannay, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1992.

EPW

Early Polemical Writings, among others: From the Papers of One Still Living; Articles from Student Days; The Battle Between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars, trans. by Julia Watkin, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1990.

EUD

Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1990.

FSE

For Self-Examination, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1990.

List of Abbreviations

xi

FT

Fear and Trembling, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1983.

FTP

Fear and Trembling, trans. by Alastair Hannay, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1985.

JC

Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1985.

JFY

Judge for Yourself!, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1990.

JP

Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, ed. and trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, assisted by Gregor Malantschuk, vols. 1–6, vol. 7 Index and Composite Collation, Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press 1967–78.

KAC

Kierkegaard’s Attack upon “Christendom,” 1854–1855, trans. by Walter Lowrie, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1944.

KJN

Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks, vols. 1–11, ed. by Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Alastair Hannay, David Kangas, Bruce H. Kirmmse, George Pattison, Vanessa Rumble, and K. Brian Söderquist, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2007ff.

LD

Letters and Documents, trans. by Henrik Rosenmeier, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1978 (A translation of B&A).

M

The Moment and Late Writings, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1998.

P

Prefaces / Writing Sampler, trans. by Todd W. Nichol, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1997.

PC

Practice in Christianity, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1991.

PF

Philosophical Fragments, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1985.

PJ

Papers and Journals: A Selection, trans. with introductions and notes by Alastair Hannay, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1996.

PLR

Prefaces: Light Reading for Certain Classes as the Occasion May Require, trans. by William McDonald, Tallahassee: Florida State University Press 1989.

xii

Kierkegaard’s International Reception

PLS

Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1941.

PV

The Point of View including On My Work as an Author, The Point of View for My Work as an Author, and Armed Neutrality, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1998.

PVL

The Point of View for My Work as an Author including On My Work as an Author, trans. by Walter Lowrie. New York and London: Oxford University Press 1939.

R

Repetition, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1983.

SBL

Notes of Schelling’s Berlin Lectures, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1989.

SLW

Stages on Life’s Way, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1988.

SUD

The Sickness unto Death, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1980.

SUDP The Sickness unto Death, trans. by Alastair Hannay, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1989. TA

Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and the Present Age. A Literary Review, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1978.

TD

Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1993.

UD

Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1993.

WA

Without Authority including The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air, Two Ethical-Religious Essays, Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, An Upbuilding Discourse, Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1997.

WL

Works of Love, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1995.

PART I The Near East

C\ Taylor & Francis ~Taylor & Francis Group

http:/ / taylora ndfra ncis.com

Turkey: The Reception of Kierkegaard in Turkey Türker Armaner

This article is an attempt to evaluate the conceptual history of Kierkegaard in Turkey, and briefly to examine the terminological change in Kierkegaard studies. A comparison of the four fundamental interpretations of Kierkegaard is related to the various definitions of “cultural identity,” and the changes in these definitions lead to the modifications in the philosophical terminology. The emphasis on the Sufi tradition between the 1930s and 1970s, as a possible counterpart of Kierkegaard, fades away in the last quarter of the century. Nevertheless the terms such as “daimon,” “death,” “anxiety,” and “time” remain “problematic.” Until the end of the first quarter of the twentieth century, it seems that Kierkegaard did not really attract the attention of the thinkers of the Ottoman and Republican period. This is a partial element of a large and highly complex situation, arising from the political, religious, cultural, and linguistic conditions, which is too broad to be discussed within the limits of an article. This article consists of four main sections, and a “paralipomena” between the last two. The first section is an exposition of the doctoral dissertation of Hüseyin Batuhan defended in the mid-twentieth century. In all his career, Batuhan has investigated the relation between the philosophical sphere and the scientific one, and related to this, taught courses at the university in the field of symbolic logic. He acquired his habilitation with a work entitled “The Development of the Idea of ‘Tolerance’ in the Western World”; and until the end of his career he worked on the conception of “objective knowledge” and examined the conditions of “real science.” The second section explores one of the outcomes of the “identity crisis” in Turkey during the upheavals of continental Europe. Nurettin Topçu and the journal Fikir ve Sanatta Hareket fundamentally oppose the Westernization of an Eastern culture, the tendency that disregards the element of belief in the scientific research, and the modernist projects which shake the fundamental values of a conservative society. Kierkegaard, in this approach, is taken as a “revolt” against the way of living imposed by the official organ, a high authority elevating the religious way of living, and a theoretician of subjectivity and innerness despising the superficial physical world. Despite the fact that Batuhan and Topçu approach Kierkegaard from different angles, they both agree on one point: the chief characteristic of Kierkegaard’s works bear the mark of “action” rather than mere “contemplation.” Batuhan poses the concept of “action” as “subjectivity” against “objective knowledge.”



Türker Armaner

The last point that is mentioned with respect to Topçu also establishes a connection between his circle and Hilmi Ziya Ülken, who is discussed in the third section. Both Ülken and Topçu intend to take Kierkegaard and the Islam mystics (Sufism), especially Hallaj Mansur, as counterparts. The nationalist aspect of Topçu is more obvious, while Ülken, by contrast realizes this comparison in a more “textual,” and even in a “sociological” way. As is argued in the paralipomena, Kierkegaard scholars of the last quarter of the century seem to abandon the necessity of finding counterparts. Due to many dynamics in the country as well as in the world, the Orient/Occident dichotomy is reshaped, and fewer people are interested in Sufism (the term “interest” is used in the “scholarly” sense, as with Ülken). For research on Kierkegaard, French and German translations of Kierkegaard are mostly replaced with the English and Turkish editions, and very rarely with the original Danish ones. The reflection of Kierkegaard’s and other existentialist thinkers’ ideas in literature, painting, plastic arts, and cinema is quite interesting to mention. In this last phase Kierkegaard, besides being a “religious philosopher,” became one of the investigators of the “modern solitude” in Turkey. The distinction between “theist” and “religious” existentialism is much less frequently indicated, and research on Kierkegaard’s works stopped taking it in the context of a “nationalistic” framework. In the concluding section, by mentioning an article by Şerif Mardin, a book by an economist, Sabri Ülgener, and a book by a contemporary literary author and scholar of Turkish language and literature, Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, I shall try to examine the idea underlying the attitude that interprets Kierkegaard either as a mirror-image of Sufism, or as a tool to justify “nationalism.” None of the three talks about Kierkegaard in the referred texts, but they all display the structure of this attitude. I. A Dissertation on a Dissertation: Hüseyin Batuhan Hüseyin Batuhan (1921–2003), known as one of the leading academics in the domain of symbolic logic and philosophy of science, acquired his doctoral degree in 1953 with a dissertation which focused on a subject entirely different from his reputation: The Concept of Irony in Kierkegaard. Batuhan, in this dissertation, claims that Kierkegaard is a philosopher who cannot be placed within a fixed philosophical system, but belongs solely to the tradition of “non-systematic” philosophers such as Epictetus, St. Augustine, Montaigne, Pascal, Hamann, and Nietzsche; for Kierkegaard’s major concern was the interior life of man, underlining the moral and religious problems. For Batuhan, Kierkegaard was a religious Christian before being a philosopher. According to Batuhan’s understanding, classical philosophy which culminates in Hegel’s system was an inquiry into the nature of “being” and elevates “reason” and “totality,” while Kierkegaard, on the other hand, elaborates on “existence” and takes his point of departure from the celebrated dictum: “Know thyself.” Hence Hüseyin Batuhan, Kierkegaard’da İroni Kavramı, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Istanbul 1953. Batuhan, after completing this work, never returned to Kierkegaard. Osman Kafadar, Türkiye’de Kültürel Dönüşümler ve Felsefe Eğitimi [Cultural Changes and the Education of Philosophy in Turkey], Istanbul: İz 2000, pp. 453ff. 

Turkey: The Reception of Kierkegaard in Turkey



Kierkegaard, Batuhan elaborates, also diverges from the, in Batuhan’s terms, “socalled existentialist philosophers” of the epoch such as Heidegger, Jaspers, and Sartre. Because in the works of these thinkers the author does not appear as a human being, the concept of “existence” remains an abstraction, yet Kierkegaard provides a concrete content to this concept. Batuhan, in spite of the fact that he admits Kierkegaard’s “later” divergence from Hegel, frequently underlines the Hegelian impact on this “early” text of Kierkegaard. The threefold approach to Socrates—Xenophon, Plato, and Aristophanes—is one of Batuhan’s evidences. While the first asserts a thesis, Plato constitutes an antithesis, and finally, Aristophanes achieves the synthesis. Batuhan asserts that Kierkegaard, in his research on “irony,” criticizes Socrates in Hegelian terms, which he finds unfair. Batuhan’s analysis of The Concept of Irony proceeds from references and comparisons of some other books by Kierkegaard. In the “Introduction” of his dissertation, he draws attention to a certain date in the journals, August 1, 1835, which is, according to Batuhan, significant as a threshold in Kierkegaard’s life. Thus Batuhan, interpreting Kierkegaard’s attitude towards philosophy as “subjectivity,” carries on his research on Kierkegaard in the style of, in a sense, “monograph writing.” This “subjective act,” which leads to the acquisition of the knowledge of “I,” at the same time, renders the subject “conscious of God.” Thus the subject, obeying the dictum “Know thyself,” obtains awareness of God as well. Referring to The Concept of Anxiety and The Sickness unto Death, Batuhan draws the conclusion that Kierkegaard synthesizes Christianity’s construction of “human being” and that of idealism. The training of the soul is the striving of the “finite I” to transcend itself and attain the “infinite I,” an inner path from the “real I” to the “ideal I.” Though Batuhan admits that this approach is reminiscent of Kant’s distinction between the “empirical I” and the “transcendental I,” he rejects regarding Kierkegaard entirely in a Kantian way. The ground of this rejection is the relevance of “irony” to the real/ideal dichotomy. Batuhan claims that irony, in a moral sense, is the initial point of the awareness concerning this duality. Therefore irony is the beginning of ethical life, i.e., its “theoretical” condition. “Irony is to see the ‘ideal,’ but not to realize it; irony is to possess the ‘possibility’ of the ethical idea, not the ‘reality’ of it.” “Know thyself,” Batuhan asserts, was reformed by the Christian “ethos” and transformed into “Know thy Lord” in Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard’s biographical turning points in the journals equip Batuhan to evaluate the philosopher’s work on irony with respect to the concept of “melancholy.” The “melancholic” detachment from everything that is immediate, according to Batuhan, is an indication of the philosopher’s reflective attitude towards life, mainly,  Kierkegaard, Über den Begriff der Ironie, trans. by H. Heinrich Schaeder, Munich: Oldenbourg 1929.  Kierkegaard, Journal (Extraits 1834–1846), trans. by Knud Ferlov and J.J. Gateau, Paris: Gallimard 1942.  Kierkegaard, Le Concept de l’Angoisse, trans. by Knud Ferlov and J.J. Gateau, Paris: Gallimard 1935.  Kierkegaard, La Maladie à la mort, trans. by Paul-Henri Tisseau, Bazoges-en-Pareds: Le Traducteur 1948.  Batuhan, Kierkegaard’da İroni Kavramı, p. IX.



Türker Armaner

his decision to break his engagement with Regine Olsen. But being an ironist himself, Batuhan continues, Kierkegaard hides his melancholic attitude, which can be observed most obviously in his pseudonyms. These names, for Batuhan, are the outcomes of a certain method: indirect communication. Batuhan, empathizing with Kierkegaard, or rather, trusting the philosopher’s indications, asserts that the concept of “irony,” besides being a philosophical problem, was a “form of life” for Kierkegaard. Batuhan seems to be quite convinced that Kierkegaard, as a flesh and blood human being, was directly connected with his subject-matter: “irony.” “World-irony,” in Batuhan’s exposition of Kierkegaard, denoting the Romantics’ conception, can be avoided by Tawakkul (in Turkish transliterated as Tevekkül). Selected for a correspondence to “apathy” (Antipathie), Batuhan uses this term for Kierkegaard’s attitude against the Romantics, which signifies a resignation from the destructive assaults of “world-irony.” Batuhan criticizes Kierkegaard’s comments on the Romantics by implying that Kierkegaard had imperfect knowledge of Fichte, Schelling, and Schlegel. This imperfection, to Batuhan, originates from the above-mentioned Hegelian influence. The only work by Schlegel that concerns Kierkegaard, Batuhan emphasizes, is Lucinde, which again, according to him, Kierkegaard misinterpreted. Batuhan, commenting on Kierkegaard, asserts that the main goal of Kierkegaard was not to defend Hegel’s system, but to use this system as a shield for protecting—even detoxicating—himself from the Romantic residues. Batuhan argues that the spiritual ties that connect Kierkegaard to Socrates and to the Romantics are equally solid, and while attempting to refute Socratic subjectivism, he nevertheless was craving to transcend his own subjectivism. Thus Kierkegaard’s criticism of Socrates is a self-critique. Likewise his attitude towards the Romantics, in Batuhan’s illustration, resembles a man singing after overcoming his fear of darkness. The “daimonic” faculty of man, which was developed by the Romantics as a creative capacity, is elaborated by Batuhan as a reason for saving the Romantics from Kierkegaard’s criticisms. Batuhan leaves the term daemon as it is, without suggesting a translation. Batuhan observes how Kierkegaard ended his career: “Dr. Kierkegaard’s ironist Socrates is replaced by the ethicist Socrates in Johannes Climacus’ Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments.” Tawakkul might be a key word for reflecting the mental climate of the 1940s and 1950s. It has an Arabic origin, frequently appearing in the texts of the medieval mystics (Sufism) and the commentators of Sufist literature who, as an imperative, assign their followers the task of putting a conscious distance between themselves and the material realm. Nurettin Topçu’s examination of Kierkegaard and Hilmi Ziya Ülken’s mentioning of Kierkegaard as a possible counterpart of Hallaj Mansur, whose ideas shall both be explored below, are major examples for this attitude. Batuhan never talks about Sufism, and I believe he does not mean it, but the appearance of this term in the context of a quite different interpretation of Kierkegaard than Batuhan, Kierkegaard’da İroni Kavramı, p. 4. Here Batuhan refers to Himmelstrup’s Sören Kierkegaards Sokratesauffassung, Neumünster: Wachholtz 1927.  Kierkegaard, Post-Scriptum, trans. by Paul Petit, Paris: Gallimard 1941. 

Turkey: The Reception of Kierkegaard in Turkey



Topçu’s and likewise Ülken’s, I think, proves that the intellectual paradigm of the mid twentieth century in Turkey, like any other paradigm, was not able to escape the domination of Zeitgeist totally. II. Kierkegaard from a Particular Nationalist Aspect: Nurettin Topçu and the Journal Hareket The 1930s witnessed conflicts about the definitions of “cultural identity” in Turkey. Taken in Fichtean terminology, the proposition “I = I,” an expression of the relation of identity, was explored in diverse ways by various intellectuals. Nurettin Topçu (1909–76), who received a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Sorbonne, and who was strongly influenced by the thoughts of Maurice Blondel, took part on one side of these debates following his return to Istanbul in 1934. In 1939, Topçu published the first issue of the journal Hareket, which continued more than forty years and gave rise to numerous discussions concerning cultural problems. The core argument of Topçu and the journal Hareket in general is that the tendency of the “young republic” inclined towards an occidental direction which led to the corruption of society’s morality, in the sense that individuals have lost—or forgotten—to master their wills. With respect to this view, a crucial role is assigned to philosophy for regaining this ability to master the will, alongside the return to “original” cultural identity. In this context, according to the theoreticians of the above-mentioned journal, the chief function of philosophy is to provide the individual with guidelines for using his or her reason. In conformity with the rules of reason, the subject is supposed to achieve “spiritual harmony” and thus become a moral being. Philosophy defined in this way, according to this approach, is the author of the political order in which the democratic virtues flourish in the “original” way, that is, the democracy that should be established should arise from its “original” roots, from the national culture. Hence philosophy, which stands in the way of a chaotic situation both for society and the individual, is indispensable; its absence is the loss of freedom and the beginning of disorder. Philosophy, in their assertion, can only arise in a country where the inhabitants have beliefs, history, and sorrows in common, which also sketch the framework of the economic principles of this system. Hareket entitles this system “Anatolian socialism,” and later “Islamic socialism.” Living in such a system, it claims, will enable the Anatolian people, mostly agriculturalists, to be the owners of the soil that they cultivate. The Koran, the sacred scripture for Muslims, is the main reference text underlying this construction.10 Existentialist philosophy, specifically that of Kierkegaard, found a place in the mental realm of this nationalist and religious approach. Topçu, commenting on existentialist philosophy, claims that classical philosophy, until the nineteenth  The exact title is Fikir ve Sanatta Hareket. Roughly translated, it means “Action in Thought and Art.” The word hareket, besides “action,” also corresponds to “motion” or “movement.” But in this context, “action” correctly depicts Topçu’s approach. For the core thought underlying Blondel’s influence on Topçu, as we learn from his own words, is la philosophie d’action developed by the former. 10 Hareket, ed. by Nurettin Topçu, January 1966, pp. 4–5.



Türker Armaner

century, can be called “essentialist,” in opposition to existentialist philosophy which asserts the proposition “Existence precedes essence.”11 Topçu, following the realist/ nominalist dichotomy, divides “essentialism” into two groups: theological (Plato, St. Augustine) and conceptualist (Aristotle, St. Thomas).12 Kierkegaard’s concept of “innerness” is taken by the journal Hareket as the virtue of a conservative society; modesty, respect, mercy, in short Tawakkul, “trust in God” are the basic compulsory obligations of the representation of a conservative society.13 Topçu recognizes Kierkegaard as the avant-garde of existentialist philosophy and asserts that “A Kierkegaard reader should reveal what he did not express in his texts.” According to Topçu’s reading, “Kierkegaard evaluates abstract thinking as the attempt to capture concrete reality through abstract methods. Nevertheless, existentialist philosophers make an effort to grasp the abstract entities by concrete methods. That is why the existentialists, instead of philosophical texts, prefer to write novels or theatrical works.” According to Topçu, the existentialists in general and Kierkegaard in particular view “existence” not as a “state,” but as the act of transgressing from possibility to actuality. With this approach, Topçu continues, “Our essence is what we are. Existence preceeds essence, because man chooses his own essence by himself.”14 Mehmet Ulaş,15 another writer in Hareket, resumes Topçu’s account together with his view of the contemporary world. Ulaş grants Fichte’s philosophy its status as the founder of the journal’s approach and claims that materialist philosophy has always strived to separate science, philosophy, and religion from each other instead of leaving them in their unity. Pascal, Blondel, and lastly Topçu, Ulaş elaborates, have achieved this unity, by depicting the dignity of “man” and the perfect order of the universe.16 The depression of twentieth century, on this approach, is the outcome of the separation of religion from the human realm. Scientific inquiries, though necessary, are insufficient on their own and are unable to provide an exhaustive explanation for the inner realm, the spirit of man. Thus, metaphysics, religion, and morality seem to be different aspects of the same sphere. It is not solely with rational thinking but also with “mystical awakening,” intuitive knowledge, that human beings can realize the order in themselves and on earth.17 Depicting the “ideal situation” in this way, Kierkegaard is located in this context as a strong supporter. In this journal, Kierkegaard’s attitude towards philosophy is considered as giving a religious explanation of the universe and inquiring into the subjective problems of human beings.18 Topçu, as can be supposed, strictly opposes Sartre among the existentialists. “What Sartre calls ‘freedom’ is not freedom at all.” Topçu and one of his colleagues in the journal, Hasan Hüsrev, blame Sartre for reducing man to a “valueless” being. Hareket, February 1966, pp. 7–8. Hareket, March 1966, pp. 14–16. 13 Hareket, May 1970, pp. 18–20. 14 Hareket, April 1966, pp. 8–11. 15 This author publishes only in this journal and his name appears as Mehmet Ulaş. His birth and death dates are not found anywhere, he is probably younger than Nurettin Topçu. 16 Hareket, November 1968, pp. 21–31. 17 Hareket, March 1969, pp. 17–20. 18 Hareket, April 1970, pp. 12–15. 11

12

Turkey: The Reception of Kierkegaard in Turkey



In a comparison between Sartre’s philosophy and some verses of the Koran, Hüsrev concludes that the Koran does not leave man abandoned in the world; on the contrary, man is supervised by God in his every action. For it is God who showed man the gate, but it is man who will open it. Man, alone with his belief in God, is responsible to his Lord and to himself for what he does on earth. Following these ideas, we can claim that the Topçu circle does not see human beings forsaken on earth.19 Though being a Muslim believer, Topçu sympathizes more with Christian existentialism than its “atheistic” version. In his eyes, modern existentialist philosophy, with the exception of Sartre’s version—along with Beauvoir’s and Bataille’s—was born in a Christian cradle. Kierkegaard’s name, with respect to religious existentialism, is mentioned together with Marcel and Unamuno. The concept of “anxiety,” in the Kierkegaardian sense, is what makes the individual aware that beyond daily practices, there is a metaphysical realm which can only be attained by “belief.”20 Topçu elaborates on the element of “belief”: the “genuine” Christian has an inner and a personal contact with God. Therefore, modern existentialism was originally proclaimed by Pascal, improved by Gabriel Marcel in Catholicism and by Kierkegaard in the Protestant world. Topçu frequently quotes from Kierkegaard phrases related to “act” or “action,” the crucial term in his approach, such as: “Truth is the act of our freedom.”21 But the central point in this interpretation is that Topçu is interested in Kierkegaard’s idea of the “withdrawal of reason”: The free act, according to Kierkegaard, is an unconscious leap into the “unknown.” The mover of this effort is the ambition of the “infinite.” That which is “real” cannot be grasped by reason, because all I perceive in this world is a contradictory realm. Life is a contradictory act and the only shelter is the “belief.” Belief in God cancels the contradictions. God is not an “idea” and thus cannot be proved.22

Topçu seeks and sees a justification of mystical Islamic thought in Kierkegaard’s thought. Hence Topçu’s opponent turns out to be the “atheistic” Occident, together with its Oriental allies; and paradoxically, while attempting to establish a national culture, the “genuine” Turkish culture founded on the mystical version of Islamic philosophy, namely Sufism, avails itself of the benefits of the methodological devices of Christian and “Occidental” philosophies, especially that of Kierkegaard. Topçu’s criticism of Sartre and “atheistic existentialism” later led him to a defense of “metaphysics,” or rather, a refutation of the rejection of metaphysics. This rejection, according to Topçu, has been carried out by the “positivists,” and initially by Auguste Comte. “All great civilizations,” says Topçu in his article entitled simply “Metaphysics,” “begin with a certain metaphysics. The religious metaphysics developed by Indian and Chinese cultures, likewise the Koran-based mystical metaphysics established by Islamic culture, are the appropriate instances of this claim.”23 According to Topçu’s definition, metaphysics is reason’s disclosedness Hareket, June 1967, pp. 23–4. Hareket, March 1971, pp. 18–21. 21 Hareket, May 1966, pp. 22–4. 22 Ibid. 23 Hareket, April 1968, pp. 20–2. 19 20

10

Türker Armaner

to the cosmos and, comprehending it in its totality, a non-empirical foundation of sciences. Topçu regards art and morality in the same way; an artist, facing factual events, is a metaphysician who retreats to his inner realm. By the same token, morality is the metaphysical origin of human actions. Being an “enemy” of metaphysics, for Topçu, means being immoral; outside metaphysics there lies only total disorder. Topçu, surprisingly in agreement with Fichte’s Addresses to the German Nation although without referring to him, adamantly claims that the nations which could not develop their proper metaphysics, far from residing in a “genuine” culture, live in an imitative way; the individuals who reject their own metaphysics lose their characters and personalities. This means rejecting their spirit, their God, their past, history, and lastly rejecting themselves.24 Kierkegaard’s denial of Hegelian metaphysics is affirmed by Topçu as “a challenge to a foreign culture,” and Kierkegaard’s opposition to the domination of the “universal” and emphasizing the “particular” is seen as “the conservation of the personality against the imposition of the State politics,”25 which, according to him, is nothing but the Westernization of an Eastern culture. Topçu assumes life as a polarized tension between “love” and “death,” and claims that it is not our ideas which regulate life but our “will.” He refers to Hallaj and Gandhi as colossal examples of people who use their will in an immense way and test the limits of their endurance.26 “Inwardness,” as introduced by Kierkegaard and as has been achieved by Hallaj, according to the journal Hareket, is the source of the “spiritual force,” the space of “purification.” Belief, the sole means for appropriating moral qualities, is the borderline of the material world, the obstacle to exploitation. Disconnecting from the material realm, in Topçu’s understanding, is the precondition for being a “real” human being. In this sense trade, as well as “hedonist” life-styles, are treated by Topçu in a critical manner. The Socratic dictum “Know thyself,” for Topçu, signifies the attitudes of Yunus Emre and Hallaj, the two eminent mystics; the former claims the inner “I” to be the real one, while the latter utters An’al Haqq which means “I am the God.”27 Nevertheless, the idea of putting at a distance the external, material sphere, and considering the “physical realm” to lie on the surface of “reality” by providing a space for this “debauchery” is a typical feudal residue, and Kierkegaard has been adopted by this journal as a religious alternative to capitalist society, to a “corrupt” world supposedly menacing the Islamic community in Turkey. In the conclusion some of the implications of these ideas shall briefly be discussed. For Topçu and the journal Hareket, Kierkegaard signifies a cynical figure, a hermit perhaps, for they always appraise his spiritual strength, his loathing of social assemblies, his indifference to earthly goods, and mostly, his solitude. This can be evaluated as an “ascetic” attitude, for the more the individual suffers, the more he bears the burden of agonies, he is closer and closer to metaphysical reality, and retreats from the pleasures, wealth, and the quality of sociability. Solitude, in this respect, is the only way to salvation, and the spiritual strength that will accompany him during this difficult journey is his belief. Thus, Muhiddin Arabi, Sadrettin Konevi, Ibid. Hareket, March 1947, pp. 3–6. 26 Ibid. 27 Hareket, July 1971, pp. 18–20. 24 25

Turkey: The Reception of Kierkegaard in Turkey

11

Mawlana Jalaluddin Rumi, Hallaj Mansur, Yunus Emre, and lastly Kierkegaard, in this approach, all share a similar conception. III. Hilmi Ziya Ülken and the Exposition of the History of Philosophy It is impossible for a work concerning the reception of any philosopher in Turkey to avoid the comprehensive texts of H.Z. Ülken (1901-74). For the present article I will consider two of his books: Being and Becoming28 and The History of Turkish Thought.29 Ülken, in his earlier work The History of Turkish Thought classifies the history of thought in general under three rubrics: “collective thought,” having no particular author and consisting of “cosmogonies, theogonies, mythologies, and sagacity”; “individual thought,” including “philosophy, mysticism, and literature”; and lastly “technical thought,” the “objective” way of thinking, denoting “science, economics, and administration.”30 Ülken, in his work Being and Becoming, describes the design of the text which is the outcome of three principal phases. Initially, the book was conceived in 1933, in Berlin, based on Spinoza’s philosophy, specifically on an interpretation of Spinoza’s thoughts on the “creative aspect of desires.” The next phase was from 1933 to 1934, during his lectures at Istanbul University concerning “Philosophy of History.” The last one comprises the lectures on “Epistemology,” “Philosophy of Values,” and “History of Logic,” which were given in collaboration with Professor Ernst von Aster. In these years, Ülken emphasizes, his own system was quite distanced from that of Hegel, and, in a sense, this last step was “a return to Plato and Schelling.” Finally, following a series of other considerations, the book was published in 1968. Ülken presents the ultimate version by means of a triad: the novelties in modern physics, the Platonic concept of “dyad,” and the unity of the controversial dichotomy of “subject and object,” developed by phenomenology, pioneered by Husserl. Ülken’s edification, constructed on these three pillars, “was not in agreement with the notion of ‘identity’ in Schelling’s sense, nor with the Hegelian idea, that is, the ‘synthesis of the contradictions.’ ”31 The concept of “being,” in Ülken’s understanding, necessitates an “essence,” “attributes,” and “modalities.” The Aristotelian notion of “ousia,” signifying both “substance” and “essence,” according to Ülken, does not give a clue for distinguishing the two meanings. Ülken claims that medieval philosophy, especially that of Averroës, Hilmi Ziya Ülken, Varlık ve Oluş, Ankara: Ankara University Publications 1968. Ülken, Türk Tefekkürü Tarihi, Yapı Kredi Publications 2004 [Galatasaray: Galatasaray High School Student Union 1933–4]. 30 Ülken, being a francophone writer, indicates these terms together with French words corresponding to them. The last one, which I translated into English as “Sagacity,” is originally “Hikmet” (sagesse). Ülken emphasizes the importance of this concept by the following definition: “Sagacity is the practical and social world-view derived from the collective experiences. In this aspect, though resembling ‘morality,’ they differ from each other. For ‘morality’ solely concerns actions; ‘wisdom,’ on the other hand, belongs to the sphere of praxis and world-view of men mediated by the relationship between human beings and Being.” Cf. Ülken, Türk Tefekkürü Tarihi, pp. 7ff. 31 Ülken, Varlık ve Oluş, pp. 1–3. 28 29

12

Türker Armaner

Avicenna and, in the “Occident,” Aquinas, Scotus, and Suàrez achieved the distinction, and elaborated on the concept of “essence”; though neglected in modern philosophy, this consideration has been revived by Hegel, and later by phenomenology. Nevertheless, Ülken points out: Hegel was deceived by Heraclitus’ idea of “perpetual flux.”…“Logos” is not a Being, but a ground for Becoming which is in need of being grounded itself. If one implies a sort of logic by “Logos,” then he finds himself in the domain of dogmatic metaphysics just as Hegel who, while criticizing Aristotelian logic, replaces it with a more absolute and more tyrranical one. For this reason, he was attacked, albeit for different aspects, by both Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard.32

In criticizing the Hegelian concept of “contradiction,” Kierkegaard is the first and foremost ally of Ülken, who frequently refers to the journals, the Postscript, and The Concept of Irony. He argues that “it is ontologically impossible to synthesize two contradictory terms.”33 Hegel’s system, according to Ülken, remained insufficient for explaining the concept of “nothingness,” and in this respect, it contributed almost nothing to what was already said in Plato’s Parmenides, Sophist, and Statesman. Considering “man” as “a finite being surrounded by the darkness of the concept of anxiety,” in Ülken’s words, it is only Heidegger who provided a profound sense to the idea of “nothingness.” Ülken regards Heidegger’s philosophy as “atheistic,” in distinction from Gabriel Marcel and Karl Jaspers who are considered “theist existentialists.” Notwithstanding, according to Ülken, Heidegger’s “atheism” is considerably different from that of Nietzsche and Hartmann. For “Heidegger never disregards God, but fights with him. This atheistic view, though, ends up on the opposite pole, and has never cut its genealogical roots from Kierkegaard’s theist philosophy.”34 This “theist attitude” of Kierkegaard, in Ülken’s interpretation, led him to the concept of “anxiety,” 35 and Heidegger’s and Sartre’s diverse “atheistic” approaches led them to the concepts of “sorrow” (Sorge) and “nausea” (Nausée) subsequently.36 According to Ülken’s understanding of the Kierkegaardian concept of “anxiety,” the following point must be noted: since it is problematic to find a corresponding word in Turkish for“Angest” (or “Angst,” “angoisse,” “anxiety”), Ülken hits upon a far-fetched solution. When he refers to this concept (or to Kierkegaard’s book), he uses the term “fear of death” [Ölüm Korkusu], which does not seem appropriate. Ülken relates this idea to the concept of “consciousness,” specifically “self-consciousness,”37 for “this concept is the initial characteristic of ‘human being’ who survives in the unity of body and soul. Ibid., p. 112. Ibid., p. 317. 34 Ibid., p. 139. 35 The French version of The Concept of Anxiety that Ülken used was translated by Knud Ferlov and Jean J. Gateau, and published among Gallimard editions in 1935. 36 Ülken, Varlık ve Oluş, p. 269. 37 Ülken, apart from “Self-consciousness,” asserts that there exists a “consciousness of cosmos” as well. According to him, consciousness (Şuur) can solely be grasped in cosmos 32 33

Turkey: The Reception of Kierkegaard in Turkey

13

Each consciousness concerning life is the consciousness of becoming, change, and corruption. Hence it is the awareness of decline and termination.”38 “Nothingness,” as observed, is interpreted by Ülken as the termination of consciousness; and “anxiety,” the awareness of this termination, as the fear of death. Yet Kierkegaard’s work itself hesitates to admit Ülken’s definition. In the conclusion of this article I will attempt to demonstrate that the confusion (or deliberate transformation) between Frygt and Angest is closely related to the difference in the understanding of “time” in various cultures. Ülken regards the Kierkegaardian conception of “time” as originating from that of St. Augustine. In short, the “past does not exist anymore, and the future has not come into existence yet.” This later gave way to “existentialism,” continued by Heidegger—“the discourse wizard”—and Jaspers. “According to these philosophers [sc. Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Jaspers], time is not a measurement, but something that belongs to human existence.”39 Ülken denies and admits some points in modern existentialism which developed mostly under Kierkegaard’s influence. Existentialist philosophy, according to Ülken, has, with the exception of Gabriel Marcel, disregarded the existence of a “transcendental being.” This position, considered “unacceptable” by Ülken, has depicted the “human being” as living in an irreconciable solitude. These philosophers reserve “history” only to “man,” not to “nature.” But Ülken grants the existentialist conclusion that man is open to the possibilities and projects his existence on to future.…But the idea that we can never be in agreement is that, this philosophy considers “time” as finite.…The fact that man is mortal can never take him to despair, for he, as Nietzsche wrote, transcends himself by his “will to power.”…The ideas of effort, labor and progress have been born from this capacity. The Koran, in many verses, appraises labor as the greatest capacity of man.40

Labor, for Ülken, is the sole gate to “freedom,” and it is constructed by ignoring death; in other words, overcoming the fear of dying. Selfhood or consciousness of self (self-reflection), to Ülken, is acquired by one’s capacity to produce. Education and culture, in this respect, enable man to transcend himself, and the consciousness of “infinity” is the superiority of his soul. But, according to Ülken, the content of the soul is inaccessible by human understanding. To strengthen his claim, he refers to the Koran: “They ask thee concerning the Spirit (of inspiration). Say: ‘The Spirit (cometh) by command of my Lord: of knowledge it is only a little that is communicated to you, (O men!).’ ”41 Quoting from Either/Or, Ülken claims that the mutual relation between selfhood and freedom in this text can be interpreted as defining freedom as a consequence of human existence rather than as a moral postulate. Ülken admits this Kierkegaardian approach, for he asserts that in order to ascribe “responsibilities” (Âlem) and by cosmos; and the main feature of consciousness is “being realized in time.” The becoming being, in consciousness, takes the shape of “consciousness of time.” 38 Ülken, Varlık ve Oluş, pp. 267–9. 39 Ibid., p. 407. 40 Ibid., pp. 414–15. 41 Koran, XVII 85 Bani Isra-il (the Children of Israel).

14

Türker Armaner

to man, an externally imposed moral freedom should be recognized as insufficient. By contrast, Heidegger’s and Sartre’s notion of “freedom” are entitled by Ülken “ontological freedom,” which leaves no room for “responsibility,” but only values “self-responsibility.”42 Existentialist philosophy, in Ülken’s exposition of the history of philosophy, is a consequence or a reply to the antinomy of “realism and idealism.” Antinomies of thought, the dilemma of Sic et Non, for Ülken, is a problematic, arising from common sense, science, physics, biology, human sciences, or philosophy. The dichotomy of “one and many” is the first antinomy that philosophy poses; “experience-reason” is the second, and “realism-idealism” is the third. “The realm of ‘experience’ has been transformed into empiricism by Democritus and Epicurus, and that of ‘Reason’ into rationalism by Parmenides, Heraclitus, and later by Plato.”43 Ülken evaluates Plato as the starting point of realism, and sophists as that of idealism. Passing through realism/nominalism in the Middle Ages, this dichotomy employed new actors: Bacon’s and Locke’s realism, Descartes’ earlier idealism and later realism, a more obvious idealism of Leibniz in opposition to Spinoza’s realism, Kant’s attempt to reconcile both and its failure in favor of idealism, the elaboration of idealism by Kant’s critical followers (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, the neo-Kantians), and finally Schopenhauer’s effort to escape from idealism. This effort became “existentialism” in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.44 Pragmatism, in Ülken’s exposition, was a no-man’s-land on this battlefield. Departing from Nietzsche (without being named) and championed by Pierce, William James, and John Dewey, “pragmatism,” according to Ülken, has been the second grandiose reply to Hegel’s “Absolutism.” The first one was realized by Kierkegaard. Nevertheless, pragmatism, locating pluralism against monism, and empiricism against rationalism, could not succeed by staying neutral in this mental arena.45 Ülken considers the “mystical way of resolution” as one of the suggestions for solving the above-mentioned antinomies. This method of explanation annihilates the antinomies by dissolving them in an indefinite unity. This absolute totality is not accessible by reason or mental faculties, or by the senses. Ülken underlines the fact that the relationship between religious belief and Absolute Being should not be confused with the one between mysticism and the Absolute Unity. For the former succumbs to the Absolute without claiming to comprehend it, while the latter, mysticism, calls upon grasping the mystical truth by “irrational” ways, namely, pleasure, wisdom, love, etc. Thus, the mystics were not on good terms with science or religion. According to Ülken, this might be the principal reason for Islam’s negative reception of mystics like Hallaj, Junayd of Baghdad, and Bayazid of Bistam. On the other hand in Christianity, Ülken asserts, there is no big gap between the mystery of religion and the great mystics. “Because paradoxically, this religion (Christianity) is founded on a mystical essence. Kierkegaard, in his The Sickness unto Death, frequently emphasized

Ülken, Varlık ve Oluş, pp. 438–41. Ibid., p. 458. 44 Ibid., pp. 460–1. 45 Ibid., p. 485. 42 43

Turkey: The Reception of Kierkegaard in Turkey

15

this mystical essence of Christianity against Reason.”46 Ülken likens Islam mysticism to Indian mysticism for the reason that both claim to attain the sacred secret, mystical truth (Gayb, İrfan) through a path other than the rational one.47 This work of Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, was mentioned by Ülken in The History of Turkish Thought in a similar context. Admitting that it might be a vague analogy, he nevertheless asserts Kierkegaard to be the “Occidental” counterpart of an eminent Islam mystic, Hallaj Mansur, whose name was mentioned above. This analogy suggests a textual comparison between Kierkegaard’s book and Hallaj’s Kitab al tawasin: Hallaj’s mysticism is “subjectivist”; and just like Kierkegaard, he departs from the assumption that man is imperfect, insufficient, with a never-ending desire for uniting with the Absolute Being.…But Kierkegaard’s philosophy led him to an irrational existentialism instead of a “unificationism” (like Hallaj). But there are many similarities between Hallaj’s understanding of “Pharaoh” and “Satan” and Kierkegaard’s idea of “Sin” and “Despair,” which encouraged us to make this analogy.48

In the “Introduction” to his book, Ülken explains the reasons for inquiring into the actors of “Turkish thought” in comparison with their “Occidental” counterparts: In the course of the production of this text, we are confronted with many problems. First of all, the subjects that are taken here are quite untouched; thus, the work turned out to be an inquiry through the original sources which was more than an exposition. Consequently, this inquiry necessarily led us to a comparison with other nations’ “history of thought,” in order to trace the “Occidental” mental roots of some “Oriental” authors.49

IV. Paralipomena Comparative research concerning Kierkegaard in recent years mostly considers Heidegger, and Abraham’s story is constantly reiterated in the context of existentialist philosophy. In relation to this fact, an increasing interest is observed in phenomenology—particularly Husserl, Heidegger, and Gadamer—and hermeneutics. Kierkegaard’s location, shifting from an ally of mystical thought, a legitimation for the “subordinate morality,” for the appraisal of the “thrown individual’s solitude,” can in some ways be interpreted as a change in the general ethos of interpretation. Abraham’s “suspension” is examined as an analysis of a story, a possible, fictitious human condition, or as the ontology of “making choices.” Academic works on Kierkegaard in the last twenty years focus on the different aspects of his works; roughly classified: aesthetical, religious, and ontological. The concept of “irony,” taken in its educative function, produced a series of analytical studies on Kierkegaard, as well as Hegel and the “German Romantics,” mostly in the sphere of aesthetics. As far as I could observe, in this last period scholars have Ibid., pp. 492–3. Ibid., pp. 492ff. 48 Ülken, Türk Tefekkürü Tarihi, p. 277. 49 Ibid., pp. 9ff. 46 47

16

Türker Armaner

conducted their research on this issue in a more “technical” way, in the sense that the domain in which the inquiry is carried on is more specified. A thesis on “irony,” for instance, can easily find the possible “counterparts” of Kierkegaard in the “Orient,” and related to this fact, the invented Orient/Occident dichotomy is mentioned much less. In other words, the last phase of Kierkegaard’s reception in Turkey, is quite “Kierkegaard qua Kierkegaard.” Works on the “religious” aspect of Kierkegaard, by the same token, constitute the “theological reading” of Kierkegaard’s texts and attempt to locate some of his crucial concepts, for example, “anxiety,” “fear,” “despair,” “sin,” “truth,” “subjectivity,” in the context of Christianity. The medieval question “Can belief be rationally grounded?,” in addition to the realism/nominalism debate, became one of the kernels in Kierkegaard studies in the recent academic climate of Turkey, and this was mirrored in theology departments. The relationship between “reason and belief” is thus considered in parallel to the relation between “religion and science.” There is some comparative research on this issue concerning the ideas of Wittgenstein on “religion” by figures such as P. Winch, N. Malcolm, James Conant, K. Nielsen, and D.Z. Phillips.50 Considering a methodological resemblance between Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein, this approach tends to apply Wittgenstein’s ideas to “religious epistemology” and count both figures as “fideist” thinkers alongside St. Augustine and Gazali. “Fideism” is understood in two versions, namely radical and moderate, and Kierkegaard is placed in the former, as representing the most sophisticated version of Tertullian (“Credo quia absurdum”), and St. Augustine in the latter (“Credo ut intelligam”) as a forerunner of Wittgenstein. Concluding the research, although the author admits the “subjectivism” of Kierkegaard, he evaluates this view as being too radical; and with respect to Wittgenstein, his attempt to erase the borderline between “theoretical” and “practical” is seen as failed. The ontological sphere, so to speak, comprises mostly the comparison between Hegel and Kierkegaard with respect to the laws of logic, specifically “tertium non datur” (the law of excluded middle). This law, together with the law of identity, and the law of non-contradiction, are regarded as an expression of the ontology of “making preferences.” At this point, to my mind at least, younger Kierkegaard scholars tend to interpret his philosophy as an “exposition of life,” and that of Hegel as “logical research.” The possibility of containing two contradictory attitudes is granted to the “living person,” and Nietzsche is appealed to for support. This might be the outcome, or a reciprocal condition at least, of the fading away of the sharp East/West dichotomy. V. Kierkegaard from a Literary and Artistic Point of View The reception of Kierkegaard in the domain of literature and fine arts illustrates one of the most interesting pictures. A small but significant remark by an eminent 50 Recep Alpyağıl, Dini Epistemolojide Fideizm [Fideism in the Religious Epistemology], unpublished M.A. thesis, Samsun: On Dokuz Mayıs University 2002. (A chapter in this thesis was latterly published as a book by the same author: Kierkegaard ve Wittgenstein’dan Hareketle Din Felsefesi Yapmak [Conducting Philosophy of Religion Departing from Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein].)

Turkey: The Reception of Kierkegaard in Turkey

17

contemporary literary author, Oğuz Atay (1934–77), in his novel Tutunamayanlar [Beautiful Losers] (1972)51 is worth mentioning: A journalist, following his return to work after two years abroad, finds an envelope on his desk. It was written by an engineer who disapeared some time ago, with it being unknown whether he was dead or alive, and sent to the journalist with the intention of its being published, after receiving the consent of each person in the file, for the work had been composed collaboratively. In addition to this, he informs the journalist that they once met during a train journey and had a conversation. In the second layer of the novel, the engineer is depicted by a third character. He, the lost engineer, is in grief because of the unexpected death of a very close friend who committed suicide. The engineer visits his belated friend’s mother to present his condolences, and asks her permission to look at her son’s private room where he finds a bunch of notes, a sort of diary. The first note is entitled What is to Be Done? (with an allusion to Lenin’s book), the second one is a piece of paper, telling about a clumsy and accidental dialogue with someone in the street. At the foot of the paper was written “Boredom” in capital letters, together with some cartoons drawn nearby. The third paper that the engineer draws from his friend’s notebooks is entitled “The philosophers and literary authors that have to be read most carefully,” and it follows: Søren Kierkegaard, Oswald Spengler, Franz Kafka, Friedrich Nietzsche. At the bottom of the page was written in English: “The Tragic Aspect.” Depicting the middle-bourgeoisie of 1970s with a subtle irony and equipped with highly-developed literary techniques, Atay’s insertion of Kierkegaard in this fictitious context is quite appropriate. The personification of major figures in Tutunamayanlar reflects, in a sense, the ironic suspension that Kierkegaard suggests. That is to say, the engineer who fell into the trap of middle-bourgeois living practice, is on the edge of a knife which is sharp on both sides; either he will sacrifice the “cosy” atmosphere of a family apartment and take into account staying in a state which is solitary, nevertheless open to self-reflection, isolated from the average but largely accepted social aura; or he will continue living in the suffocating, kitsch, unaesthetic, but comforting celllike apartment. Either he will victimize the aesthetic face of the world for the moral order, or he will victimize himself for the sake of his proper desires: the suspension of the ethical life, or obedience to public morality. Three years after the appearance of Tutunamayanlar, the contemporary poet Behçet Necatigil (1916–79) mentions the name of Kierkegaard in an essay on Hans Christian Andersen: About a century ago, you could have encountered three figures strolling in the streets of Copenhagen. Those people were the eminent contributions of Denmark to world culture, namely, the priest N.F.S. Grundtvig, one of the chief representatives of the Danish romantic movement; the famous philosopher Søren Kierkegaard; and Hans Christian Andersen [the author of around a hundred and seventy tales]. Grundtvig would be recorded in the history of pedagogy as a genious folk educator, and Kierkegaard, strolling in the streets with his umbrella was an “agora philosopher” like Socrates, the master of irony....Kierkegaard

51



Oğuz Atay, Tutunamayanlar, Istanbul: İletişim Publications 1998 [1972].

18

Türker Armaner later on began to influence the international intelligentsia, and once he became widely known, his philosophy belonged to the property of the crème de la crème.52

One should note that Necatigil, besides being a significant poet, was also an essayist and a translator. Having a profound acquaintance with the German language, he translated many novels including ones by K. Hamsun. Literary and philosophical circles in Scandinavian countries were among Necatigil’s particular interests, and in this essay mentioned above he briefly introduces Andersen’s tale “Snow White,” specifically focusing on the “Satanic aspect.” The reflection of Kierkegaard’s philosophy in the visual arts, cinema, painting and sculpture, retrospectively speaking, might have been the most favourable context for Kierkegaard’s reception. A doctoral dissertation concerning a particular analysis of certain movies focuses on the concept of the “moment” in Kierkegaard, and interprets it as a “temporal interval determined by the authentic life.”53 Ingmar Bergman’s film The Seventh Seal, classified under the category of “auteur” cinema, according to this work, elaborates on the concept of “anxiety” in the Kierkegaardian sense. The interval, the lonely moment which belongs to a sole subject, filled out with the concrete encounter with a fear that has no determinate object, is Bergman’s cinematographical sequence of emancipation. In this dissertation, the dialogue between death and the knight in Bergman’s film, is interpreted as a perfect expression of what Kierkegaard intended in The Sickness unto Death. VI. Conclusion If the reception of Kierkegaard is thought to be a matter for “intellectuals,” then this title is in need of specification. Şerif Mardin, in an article dated 1984, calls to mind a crucial distinction, that is, that between “literati” and “intellectuals.”54 Mardin depicts “literati” as belonging to traditional societies and likens their way of conserving knowledge to a sort of “guild spirit.” Thus, the “literatus,” whose profession is “to know,” has the duty of both preserving and transferring the basic values of society to the future generations. In this sense, the acquisition of knowledge is supposed to be realized within the borders of a certain space and hidden from people who are foreign to that community. This definition of “literatus” can be appropriately attributed to the Sufi orders, for example. According to Mardin, this situation of the “literati,” mastering the written material and controlling it for the stability of society’s “essential culture,” is closely related to traditional societies’ attitude of ignoring or never being aware of the “daimonic Behçet Necatigil, “Sonsuzluğunu Masallarla Garantileyen Andersen: Çok Yönlü Bir Dünya” [Andersen, One Who Assures His Eternity With Tales: A Multilateral World], in Bütün Eserleri 5 [Complete Works, vol. 5], ed. by Ali Tanyeri and Hilmi Yavuz, Istanbul: Cem Publications 1983, pp. 314–23. 53 Hakan Savaş, Sinema ve Varoluşçuluk [Cinema and Existentialism], unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Anadolu University, Eskişehir 2001. 54 Şerif Mardin, “Aydınlar Konusunda Ülgener ve Bir İzah Denemesi” [Professor Ülgener and Turkish Intellectuals], Toplum ve Bilim, vol. 24, 1984, pp. 9–16. 52

Turkey: The Reception of Kierkegaard in Turkey

19

creative faculty” of the individual. Mardin, in his evaluation of Ülgener’s account, asserts that this lack of “daimonic cult,” grasping the “daimonic” only in its external form, and taking it as an equivalent of “Evil” (Şer) and “Satan” (Şeytan) have been among the chief features of the Ottoman mentality, which also explains the absence of works on Fichte and Schelling, who sought the riddle of the cosmos in the human being, while the “literati” and the thinkers of the “enlightenment” searched for it in the universal picture. Mardin concludes, One of the most evident features of Islamic culture, apart from Sufism, is not admitting— and even vehemently denying—that the daimonic side of men might be a creative faculty. Despite all our “modernism,” I suppose that this belief has been recorded to the official theses of modern Turkey. In this respect, the most leftist, the most “radical” thinkers of Republican Turkey are by no means different from the Ottoman “literati.”55

The “cultural problematic” arising from the term “daimonic” causes translation problems as well. This difficulty is mentioned in the preface of the translation of The Concept of Anxiety56 and in an article on Kierkegaard. Viewed in this way, it can be claimed that Topçu and his journal utilize Kierkegaard’s defense of the particular against the universal in order to justify the high rank of the universal (Islamic culture) above the particular (Muslim fidel). Moreover, Kierkegaardian—or broadly “theist”—existentialism serves the conservative projects of Topçu as a “mystical” ground, an “Occidental” ally for defending “Oriental” values. The texts of the Sufi tradition have long been the sources of the “overwhelming ethos,” as mentioned in the previous section. Sabri Ülgener (the economist that Şerif Mardin examined in the above-mentioned article), in his work The Moral and Intellectual Issues of the History of Our Economic Decline interrogates the possible reasons for the Ottoman Empire’s failure to transform itself into a capitalist society.57 In the present article, this research shall briefly be taken in its aspect concerning “Islamic mysticism” (Sufism). For the asserted affinity between this cult and Kierkegaard might be clarified after an examination of the common denominator underlying the fundamental texts of Sufism. Ülgener considers Sufist literature as an expression of medieval morality. He thus distinguishes between “medieval mentality” and “medieval morality,” which correspond to “is” and “ought to.” The most significant characteristic of medieval morality, depicting the “ideal life” and represented in Sufist literature, is defined by Ülgener as follows: This idealized life is not quite different from the “meta-economical” approach that grounds generally the “pre-capitalist” phases....a lifestyle, introverted, calm and modest, that requires wide distances in the individual’s conscience against the physical world.... Hence it can be supposed that the medieval morality is a “distance-consciousness.”58

Ibid., p. 16. Kaygı Kavramı, trans. by Türker Armaner, Istanbul: İş Kültür Publications 2003 [2nd ed., 2004]. 57 Sabri Ülgener, İktisadi İnhitat Tarihimizin Ahlak ve Zihniyet Meseleleri, Istanbul: Istanbul University Publications 1951. 58 Ibid., pp. 57–9. 55 56

20

Türker Armaner

Ülgener elaborates on this indication of “distance-consciousness” with respect to both space and time; at this point we shall focus on the latter. Reserving a distance to the temporal sphere in the consciousness, in Ülgener’s examination, leads the individual to an indifference to the future; by the same token, the economic undertakings are not concerned with anything beyond the present moment. Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, a contemporary literary author and professor of Turkish Language and Literature, introduces a similar view on this issue by referring to Massignon. He claims, “In the Orient there is no continuous time, but merely discrete moments.”59 At this point, it can be claimed that “Orient” and “Occident” are not geographical locations, but determinations or modifications of consciousness. That is to say, rather than the physical territories, it is the medieval imagination, carrying pre-capitalist feudal traces, which depicts the Oriental realm. Medieval morality, in this sense, presents the picture of a static image of life, and suggests a carelessness “beyond the neighbourhood and today.”60 The admission of these definitions reveals a paradoxical attitude of the “literati” who consider Kierkegaard and Sufism to be compatible. Kierkegaard, especially in The Concept of Anxiety, asserts that we grasp life retrospectively, but live by looking at the future. Considering man as a synthesis of temporal and infinite (among other syntheses), and present time as eternity itself, Kierkegaard describes the concept of “anxiety,” in its relation to “time,” as concerning the future. Being anxious about a disillusion that happened in the past, in Kierkegaard’s account, arises from the fact that the individual views it as a possibility that might be repeated in the future, rather than a past event left behind. Kierkegaard, as known, suggests that if one really thought that it was something belonging to the past, one would have felt regret, instead of anxiety. Hence the account concerning Kierkegaard and Sufism as counterparts, if it is permitted to say so, evaluates Kierkegaard as one-sided, and disregards the fact that the concept of the “moment” in Kierkegaard is a subjective entity, not a shared, communitarian temporal interval. Another point that Ülgener raises is our second reason for hesitating in taking Sufism together with Kierkegaard. In his book mentioned above, it is claimed that “authority and hierarchy are two indispensable conditions for medieval life.”61 This applies both to religious and commercial practices: it is not possible to attain divine grace, to master a profession without a mediacy. In the religious orders, in order to grasp celestial truth, it is a sine qua non to yield to the authority of the leader; likewise, in a guild, one cannot be a master in the absence of the guidance of a former one. Sufist literature, one of the major ideological sources for medieval morality, according to Ülgener, praises abstaining from the knowledge of the physical world. Kierkegaard’s emphasis on “immediacy,” and the compulsory mediation in the religious orders, their apparent “anti-individualistic” character, encourage us to say that the “non-hierarchical and immediate conception of belief” in Kierkegaard is not compatible with the “rank-based hierarchy” and “mediated fidelity” in the orders. Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, 19. Asır Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi [The History of NineteenthCentury Turkish Literature], Istanbul: Çağlayan Publications 1997 [1949], p. 16. 60 Ülgener, İktisadi İnhitat Tarihimizin Ahlak ve Zihniyet Meseleleri, pp. 56–62. 61 Ibid., p. 83. 59

Turkey: The Reception of Kierkegaard in Turkey

21

Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar evaluates Sufism as an “exit” for the Oriental individual.62 According to him, Sufism was not expanding the mental aspect of life, but suggesting living in abstinence from the physical world. Sufism, in Tanpınar’s interpretation, relieves human beings and annihilates anxiety from the individual’s world; for that reason, considering the world as aspects of the one Being, the mystical tradition leaves no room for the emergence of “tragedy.” Ülgener and Tanpınar agree on one crucial point—that the absence of the bourgeoisie and the lack of “tragic cult” are two reciprocal conditions that determine each other. “The Orient was forcing the drawn borders, but never transgressing them.”63 Consequently, as far as I can see, despite the changes in the reception of Kierkegaard in Turkey, some presuppositions continue to be maintained in the past fifty years, and among them the crucial ones can be summed up as follows. As mentioned above, the term “daimon” remained in its obscurity, likewise the “daimonic aspect” of the individual is still ignored in everyday practice, chiefly in the process of the “production of knowledge.” To exemplify this assumption, which takes its support from the quoted texts of Mardin, Ülgener, and Tanpınar, one notes that one who expresses an individual, “daimonic” creativity, might still be regarded as the bearer of an “evil conduct.” In this sense, the distinctions between “daimonic,” “satanic,” and even “diabolic” in Turkey are vague and somehow equated. A second ongoing hindrance for the examination of Kierkegaard is the conception of death. Ülken, in the 1960s, mentioned the concept of “anxiety” as the “fear of death,” and in a very recent reference to Kierkegaard, the “sickness unto death” appears as “despair as a mortal sickness.” The last obstacle, an item that perhaps comprises everything, is the understanding of “time.” There are two words for this term in Turkish, Vakit and Zaman, which seem frequently equivalent, but this is not the case. While the former indicates a continuity, a duration, the latter is a “conceptualized” form of this duration. One can take another person’s Vakit, but not his or her Zaman, for instance. Following this confusion, the tendency to relate “anxiety” immediately to “death,” and thus cancel the projection of the “non-existing possible future moments” can be more comprehensible.

62 63

Tanpınar, 19. Asır Türk Edebiyatı. Ibid., p. 30.

Bibliography I. Turkish Translations of Kierkegaard’s Works “İlim Dışı Eklenti” [Philosophical Fragments (translation of a short passage of the work)], trans. by Vahap Mutal, ed. by F.N. Magill, Fikir ve Sanatta Hareket, July 1970, pp. 11–14. “Ya / Ya da” [Either/Or (translation of a short passage of the work)], trans. by Oruç Aruoba, in Kara Mizah Antolojisi [The Anthology of Black Irony], ed. by Enis Batur, Istanbul: Hil Publications 1987, pp. 38–40. “Diapsalmata,” trans. by Güven Savaş Kızıltan, Gergedan, June 1988, p. 133. “İbrahim’e Methiye” [Eulogy to Abraham (translation of a passage from Fear and Trembling)], trans. by Oruç Aruoba, Metis Çeviri, vol. 1, no. 3, 1988, pp. 113–19. Korku ve Titreme [Fear and Trembling], from English trans. by N. Ekrem Düzen, Ankara: Ara Publications 1990. “Regine’ye Mektuplar” [Letters to Regine (translated from French, Lettres fiançailles, Paris: Falaize 1956)], trans. by Sema Rifat, Cogito, Spring 1995, pp. 214–16. Baştan Çıkarıcının Günlüğü [“The Seducer’s Diary”], from English trans. by Süha Sertabiboğlu, Istanbul: Ayrıntı Publications 1996 [2nd ed., 2002]. Ölümcül Hastalık Umutsuzluk [The Sickness unto Death], from French trans. by Mehmet Mukadder Yakupoğlu, Istanbul: Ayrıntı Publications 1997 [2nd ed., 2001]. Kahkaha Benden Yana [The Laughter is on my Side], from English trans. by Nedim Çatlı, Istanbul: Ayrıntı Publications 2000. (Originally as The Laughter is on my Side: An Imaginative Introduction to Kierkegaard, ed. by Roger Poole and Henrik Stangerup, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1989.) Korku ve Titreme [Fear and Trembling], from English trans. by İbrahim Kapaklıkaya, Istanbul: Anka Publications 2002. İroni Kavramı [The Concept of Irony] from English trans. by Sıla Okur, Istanbul: İş Kültür Publications 2003 [2nd ed., 2004]. Kaygı Kavramı [The Concept of Anxiety], from Danish and English trans. by Türker Armaner, Istanbul: İş Kültür Publications 2003 [2nd ed., 2004]. Ölümcül Hastalık Umutsuzluk [The Sickness unto Death], from French trans. by Mehmet Mukadder Yakupoğlu, Istanbul: Doğu-Batı Publications 2004. II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard in Turkey Akyağıl, Recep, Kierkegaard ve Wittgenstein’dan Hareketle Din Felsefesi Yapmak [To Conduct Philosophy of Religion Departing From Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein], Istanbul: Anka Publications 2002.

Turkey: The Reception of Kierkegaard in Turkey

23

Armaner, Türker, “Kierkegaard’da ‘Özne’ Kavramı” [The Concept of “Subject” in Kierkegaard], Yeditepe’de Felsefe, July 2003, pp. 174–90. Atasoy, Kamil, “Tanrı, İbrahim ve Kierkegaard” [God, Abraham and Kierkegaard], Birikim, May 1997, pp. 50–4. Bahadırlı, Ayse Serpil, Søren Aabye Kierkegaard’ın Felsefesinde “Estetik Varoluş” un Anlamı [The Meaning of “Aesthetical Existence” in Kierkegaard], unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Istanbul University, Istanbul 1992. Batuhan, Hüseyin, Kierkegaard’da İroni Kavramı [The Concept of Irony in Kierkegaard], unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Istanbul University, Istanbul 1953. Becermen, Metin, Søren Aabye Kierkegaard’da Felsefe ve Mitos İlişkisi [The Relationship Between Philosophy and Myth in Kierkegaard], unpublished M.A. Thesis, Uludağ University, Bursa 2001. Çınar, Ruhi, “Dindar Bir Varoluşçu Søren Kierkegaard” [Søren Kierkegaard as a Religious Existentialist], Hisar, October 1965, pp. 11–13. Demirhan, Ahmet (ed.), Kierkegaard ve Din: Jacques Derrida, Søren Kierkegaard, Emmanuel Levinas, John Milbank, Dorota Golwacka, Hent de Vries [Kierkegaard and Religion: Jacques Derrida, Søren Kierkegaard, Emmanuel Levinas, John Milbank, Dorota Golwacka, Hent de Vries], Istanbul: Gelenek Publications 2003. Deren, Seçil, “Angst ve Ölümlülük” [Anxiety and Mortality], Doğu-Batı, April 1999, pp. 101–15. Gökel, Nazım, The Concept of Either/Or, unpublished B.A. Thesis, Yeditepe University, Istanbul 2002. Gülsoy, Aliye, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Irony, unpublished M.A. Thesis, The Middle East Technical University, Ankara 1995. Hüsrev, Hasan, “İnsanoğlunun Soylu Yalnızlığı,” [The Noble Solitude of the Human Being], Fikir ve Sanatta Hareket, June, 1967, pp. 23–4. Kurtoğlu, Demet, Hegelian Contradiction in Thought and Kierkegaardian Contradiction in Life: An Attempt to Demonstrate the Relation between Logic and Life, Ankara: The Middle East Technical University 1999. Mutal, Vahap, “Egzistansiyalizme Dair” [On Existentialism], Fikir ve Sanatta Hareket, March 1971, pp. 18–21. Necatigil, Behçet, “Sonsuzluğunu Masallarla Garantileyen Andersen” [Andersen, One Who Assures His Eternity With Tales: A Multilateral World], Milliyet Sanat, vol. 124, July 1975 (republished in Bütün Eserleri 5 [Complete Works, vol. 5], ed. by Ali Tanyeri and Hilmi Yavuz, Istanbul: Cem Publications 1983, pp. 314–23). Soykan, Ömer Naci, “Varoluş Yolunun Ana Kavşağında: Korku ve Kaygı— Kierkegaard ve Heidegger’de Bir Araştırma” [Fear and Anxiety: Kierkegaard and Heidegger on the Crossroads of the Way to Existence], Doğu-Batı, April 1999, pp. 35–53. Topçu, Nurettin, “İradenin Davası” [The Struggle of the Will], Fikir ve Sanatta Hareket, March 1947, pp. 3–6. —— “Existentialisme,” Fikir ve Sanatta Hareket, February, 1966, pp. 7–8. —— “Existentialisme II,” Fikir ve Sanatta Hareket, March, 1966, pp. 14–16. —— “Existentialisme IV—Allahsız ve Dinci Existentialisme,” Fikir ve Sanatta Hareket, May 1966, pp. 22–4.

24

Türker Armaner

—— “Varoluş Felsefesi” [The Existentialist Philosophy], Fikir ve Sanatta Hareket, April, 1966, pp. 8–11. —— “Metafizik” [Metaphysics], Fikir ve Sanatta Hareket, April, 1968, pp. 20–2. —— “Bahtiyar Belde” [Felicitious Country], Fikir ve Sanatta Hareket, June 1970, pp. 4–6. —— “İnsan” [The Human Being], Fikir ve Sanatta Hareket, July 1971, pp. 18–20. —— “Kuvvet” [The Force], Fikir ve Sanatta Hareket, June 1971, pp. 18–22. —— “Ruh Kuvveti” [The Spiritual Force], Fikir ve Sanatta Hareket, August 1971, pp. 18–20. —— “Mevlâna’da Alem ve İnsan” [The Universe and the Human Being in Mawlana Jalaluddin Rumi], Fikir ve Sanatta Hareket, January 1974, pp. 53–9. Ulaş, Mehmet, “Asrımız ve Felsefe” [Our Age and Philosophy], Fikir ve Sanatta Hareket, November 1968, pp. 21–31. Ülken, Hilmi Ziya, Varlık ve Oluş [Being and Becoming], Ankara: Ankara University Publications 1968. —— Türk Tefekkürü Tarihi [The History of Turkish Thought], Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Publications 2004 [Istanbul: Galatasaray High School Student Association 1933–4]. Yıldırım, Tamer, Kierkegaard’ın Din Felsefesi [Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Religion], unpublished M.A. Thesis, Marmara University, Istanbul 2002. III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Reception in Turkey None.

Israel: Kierkegaard’s Reception in Fear and Trembling in Jerusalem Jacob Golomb

In this survey of Kierkegaard’s presence in Israel and the study of his thought (approximately from the independence year of 1947), I will also speculate about certain reasons for his somewhat delayed and sometimes ambivalent reception in Zion. The first scholarly edition of Kierkegaard translated from Danish appeared as late as 1986. Before that, a collection of arbitrarily chosen passages from some of his writings, translated from German and hence involving a double infidelity, had appeared in 1954. There was also the aesthetically pleasing but fragmentary Letters to Cordelia: From the Diary of the Seducer. The same deplorable situation prevailed in Israeli scholarship on Kierkegaard, which only in the last thirty years has really begun to flourish, as is documented by the bibliography to this article. How can we account for the somewhat slow and at first quite reluctant reception of Kierkegaard in Israel? Unlike many other European thinkers (notably among them Nietzsche), Kierkegaard was less attractive to Jews in the first days of modern Israel because his religiously existential objectives clashed with the mainstream agenda of Zionism, which viewed the history of the Jewish people in secular terms and prescribed for the “new Jews” (namely, the “first Hebrews”) an atheistic, most frequently even socialist, point of view. This ideological thrust was also viewed, mainly by Central and Western European Zionist leaders and intellectuals, as one of

This stands in contrast to the much more enthusiastic and earlier, though no less ambivalent, reception of Nietzsche in Zion. Some think that the main reason for this delay was the language barrier: unlike German, few Israelis know Danish. However, technical reasons alone cannot adequately explain the discrepancy between Kierkegaard’s and Nietzsche’s reception by the Israeli-Jewish public, as I claimed in “Kierkegaard in Zion,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 19, 1998, pp. 130–7. Cf. also Jacob Golomb, Nietzsche and Zion, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2004.  Hil Ureada [Fear and Trembling], trans. from Danish by Eyal Levin, ed. by Jacob Golomb, Jerusalem: The Hebrew University Magnes Press 1986 (2nd ed., 1993).  Mivhar Ktavim [Selected Writings], ed. by Josef Shechter and Ilan Karoh, Tel-Aviv: Dvir 1954 (2nd enlarged ed., 1991). And see my critical review (in Hebrew) of the second edition of this unscientific selection (1991) in Iton 77: Literary Monthly, vol. 140, pp. 26–8, under the title “Betrayal of Authenticity.”  Selected and translated by Shmuel Tamari, Tel Aviv: Eked 1961. 

26

Jacob Golomb

the more effective means to fight the intolerable syndrome of “Jewish marginality” that most of the Western European acculturated Jews barely endured. The term “marginal Jews” refers to prominent Jewish men of letters such as Morris Cohen (alias the great Jewish-Danish literary critic and sage Georg Brandes (1842–1927)), Arthur Schnitzler (1862–1931), Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), Stefan Zweig (1881–1942), Alfred Döblin (1878–1957), Franz Kafka (1883–1924), Walter Benjamin (1892–1940), and many others. They were Grenzjuden in the spiritual sense since they had lost their religion and the tradition of their forefathers and yet still were not fully accepted into European secular society. Thus, the problem of personal identity and authenticity was acutely present for them and became a distressing and fundamental existential issue. For some, the hatred of the ancestral roots within their personality led them to self-destruction or self-dissipation. They were tragic because they were homeless and without a stable identity: doomed to create from their own resources new and authentic selves. They often rejected their affinity with the Jewish community and were, at the same time, unwelcome among their non-Jewish contemporaries. Political, cultural, spiritual, and socialist versions of Zionism attempted, among other things, to solve this unbearable state of double alienation. The first Zionist leaders and intellectuals, like Theodor Herzl (1860–1904), Max Nordau (1849– 1923), Martin Buber (1878–1965), Gershom Scholem (1897–1982), and many others believed that the creation of Jewish solid national identity would put an end to this syndrome of existential marginality. Moreover, as I have shown in another work, the European acculturated Jews tried to shed their religion and heritage to become sole authors of their new life. The weakening of religious sentiments among them by the end of the nineteenth century attracted them to such staunch atheists as Nietzsche, who, against the religious gospels of salvation from the hardships of life, posited their antithesis: salvation from these transcendental types of salvation by incitement to create an authentic self and live a “healthy” atheistic life. On the other hand, in the midst of Jews who were undergoing the painful process of secularization and the search for a new personal identity, there also appeared the no less enticing thought of Søren Kierkegaard. In the crucial matter of religion, Kierkegaard seemed to them less radical than other thinkers. Thus, for example, Kierkegaard (like Nietzsche) stressed personal experience and the authentic pattern of life, but he did this under the auspices of faith in God and within his embrace. For an elaboration, see Jacob Golomb, “Nietzsche and the Marginal Jews,” in Nietzsche and Jewish Culture, ed. by Jacob Golomb, London and New York: Routledge 1997, pp. 158–92 and “Nietzsche und die ‘Grenzjuden,’ ” in Jüdischer Nietzscheanismus, ed. by Werner Stegmaier und Daniel Krochmalnik, Berlin und New York: Walter de Gruyter 1997, pp. 228–46.  On Herzl’s marginality and its overcoming see my “Thus Spoke Herzl: Nietzsche’s Presence in Herzl’s Life and Work,” Leo Baeck Year Book, vol. 34, 1999, pp. 97–124.  See Golomb, Nietzsche and Zion.  For a more extensive treatment of these themes, see the “Conclusion” of my Nietzsche’s Enticing Psychology of Power, Ames: Iowa State University Press 1989, pp. 267–331.  See Jacob Golomb, “Kierkegaard’s Ironic Ladder to Authentic Faith,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 23, 1991, pp. 65–81. 

Israel: Kierkegaard’s Reception in Fear and Trembling in Jerusalem

27

The marginal Jews, threatened by their marginality, could thank Kierkegaard for providing them with a less radical solution to their identity problem. His solution enabled them to keep their new, delicately balanced, identity intact. This was an identity of believing Jews, who strayed from their forefathers’ tradition and from the Rabbinical Jewish orthodoxy that insisted on observing all the religious commandments that the marginal Jews were not able or not willing to follow in letter and in spirit. Kierkegaard was less radical than Nietzsche in matters of faith, though he was no less radical in matters of religion: both rejected the social-institutional framework that believers all over the world work for in order to maintain and spread the rituals of their faith. This was Kierkegaard’s main charm for Zionist intellectuals and philosophers like Gershom Scholem, Martin Buber, and Hugo Bergman (1883– 1975), as well as for religious Zionists in contemporary Israel, most notably the late Prof. Isaiah Leibowitz (1903–94), one of the most influential Jewish thinkers in Israel, some aspects of whose thought recall that of Kierkegaard.10 The latter also vehemently rejected the attempts to mobilize the Jewish religion for the cause of nationalist fanatics and untiringly struggled for a clear separation of the state from religion and faith. The still controversial issue regarding the relation between the state of Israel and the Jewish religion plagued Israeli society almost from its inception. Thus, not surprisingly, as can be seen from the bibliography below, the first discussions of Kierkegaard in Hebrew focused on the “Akeda of Isaac [the sacrifice of Isaac].” This sacrifice gave serious headaches to the greatest interpreters of the Bible, and their exegeses dealt extensively with the problem of how to reconcile the demand for human sacrifice with the strict forbiddance of it from the beginning of the Hebraic religion. The natural curiosity about how Kierkegaard dealt with this problem and how he regarded the relation between ethics (namely the ethos of the state) and faith prompted many of first investigations of his thought in Israel. Undoubtedly, Gershom Scholem, Martin Buber, Hugo Bergman, and Isaiah Leibowitz were the four towering figures who significantly facilitated the introduction of Kierkegaard to Palestine and then to Israel. Even a quick glance at the bibliography of Kierkegaard in Israel gives the impression that these four figures were the most inspiring sources for his contemporary reception and the ever-increasing scholarship and debates on different aspects of his thought. Hence, a more elaborated exposition of the respective contributions of these four thinkers to Kierkegaard scholarship in Israel is called for. The young Gershom Scholem emerges from his recently published diaries as a young man who is not religious according to the laws of the Torah (the Jewish Law) but is trying, at first hesitantly, to find his own unique way to an authentic Jewish faith. It was difficult for him to pray, and indeed to whom could this highly talented, deeply marginal Jew pray? “I could only seek after God, but could not pray to him,” he confesses. Thus, one should not be surprised to learn that Scholem identified himself with the Danish religious thinker and poet who, like him, wanted to create his genuine personal identity by forging for himself an authentic faith. This common See, for example, Avi Sagi (Schweitzer), “The ‘Akeda’—A Comparative Study of Kierkegaard and Leibowitz,” Daat: A Journal of Jewish Philosophy and Kabbalah, no. 23, 1989, pp. 121–34 (in Hebrew). 10

28

Jacob Golomb

existential ground enables one to understand the reason for Scholem’s enthusiasm when he read Brandes’ book on Kierkegaard.11 It is not a mere coincidence (since, as stated earlier, Brandes was also one of the most outstanding marginal Jews) that through this 1877 essay many Jewish intellectuals became acquainted with Kierkegaard. In his diary entry of November 1914, Scholem ecstatically states: “Søren Kierkegaard! I looked for him and I found him!...The seeker of God! Few have such grandiose religious feelings as his,”12 and he goes on to make some intimately personal “comparisons between him and myself.”13 Nonetheless, he also frequently refers to Martin Buber, whom he admired most for his Zionist activities in Germany but also for his monumental work on Hasidism. Thus Scholem also became influenced by Buber’s attitude to Kierkegaard, but before dwelling on Buber’s attitude toward Kierkegaard, it will be quite instructive to explicate here a recurring pattern. What happened to Buber with regard to Kierkegaard is paradigmatic of the character of the relations that Jewish intellectuals had toward this great thinker. When some of the marginal Jews solved in one way or another their identity problems, they became more attracted and responsive to Kierkegaard. In other words, when they had overcome the mental schism between European culture and their attraction to Zion, where they hoped to return to the genuine Jewish faith, i.e., when they had already completed the existential as well as the geographical move expressed so poignantly by the title of Scholem’s book From Berlin to Jerusalem: Memories of my Youth,14 they became more attentive to and preoccupied with Kierkegaard. The latter presented them with a poetical model of authentic faith: Abraham, the “Knight of Faith” with whom they were already familiar from their youth. Moreover, when the more or less secular identity of the Israeli Jews qua Israeli was relatively secured and solidified by the sense of belonging to a new and thriving society of its own making, many Israeli intellectuals dared to begin their journey to recover their lost religious sentiments. In other words, when the state of Israel became a reality, those intellectuals moved in the opposite direction from before, namely, not from Jewish religiosity to secular Hebraism but from secularity to more pronounced feelings of a deepening identity with Jewish religiosity. Then, of course, Kierkegaard, instead of being seen as an enemy of Jewish Zionist secularization became a loyal ally for the processes of the existential return to religious Judaism. Martin Buber was the most prominent case in point for this existential pendulum; he began the significant shift, which he made from the idol of his youth—Nietzsche—to the more serious appreciation and sober evaluation of Kierkegaard, more extensively Georg Brandes, “Søren Kierkegaard (1877),” in his Gesammelte Schriften, vols. 1–20, Munich: Langen 1902–7, vol. 3, pp. 258–445. 12 Gershom Scholem, Tagebücher: nebst Aufsätzen und Entwürfen bis 1923, ed. by Karlfried Gründer and Friedrich Niewöhner, Frankfurt am Main: Jüdischer Verlag 1995, p. 41. 13 Ibid., see especially pp. 42–4. 14 Originally in German as Von Berlin nach Jerusalem: Jugenderinnerungen, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1977. (In English as From Berlin to Jerusalem: Memories of my Youth, New York: Schocken Books 1980; revised and enlarged Hebrew ed., Tel-Aviv: Am Oved 1982.) 11

Israel: Kierkegaard’s Reception in Fear and Trembling in Jerusalem

29

in his mature days in Israel. One may even speculate that Kierkegaard played a very significant role in Buber’s “liberation” from Nietzsche. And thus it is highly significant that Buber’s intellectual autobiography ends with a discussion of Kierkegaard. 15 As the result of Buber’s relatively early exposure to the Austrian-German culture of his age, he became estranged for a time from his Jewish roots. Hence the motif that recurs frequently in his writings is his longing for a return. In Hebrew this notion is known as teshuvah (‫ )תשובה‬literally, an answer. This term, however, also contains the root shuv, which means coming back after taking a leave. In Buber’s case, it means a return to his Jewish roots. But his was not a regressive return to what one was— his return did not entail a faithful adoption of the antiquarian heritage accumulated by the Jewish people for thousands of years. He attempted instead to recreate his heritage for productive use in the present. He sought to establish a new, more personal meaning in Judaism by emphasizing different trends in its rich past. By propagating his personal and humanist Jewish religion, Buber sought to overcome the catastrophic consequences—for his people and for Europe as a whole—of what he called the Eclipse of God—rather than the death of God, as Nietzsche proclaimed it.16 The eclipse of God is a temporary event; its passing enables one to return to him and to his renewed glory. However, the way toward God presents itself to Buber less as the renewal of the entire Jewish tradition and more as one’s own personal, creative path. And thus, Buber enlists certain motifs from Kierkegaard and propagates the return to faith and to the I-God relationship that will secure the dominance of the authentic I-Thou relationship in an age where “the It-world...seemed to dwarf man’s small strength with its uncanny power...of the particularization and alienation.”17 We ought to return to the “essence” of “the spirit” and recreate our fundamental and absolute relation to the Divine Thou. Buber sees the “redemption” from our “falling off” by means of “the return.”18 We should assist “grace” by “fundamental return” to the “essence.” This will bring us closer to the realm of truly authentic relations to the Absolute. But it would be a grave mistake to think that Buber regards faith as a means to “regain” our personal authenticity. Like Kierkegaard, he regards authentic faith as an absolute, unconditional, unmediated relation to the Almighty. When Kierkegaard states that “the purity of the heart is to will one thing,”19 Buber reiterates: “The free man...

15 Martin Buber, “Autobiographical Fragments,” in The Philosophy of Martin Buber, ed. by Paul Schilpp, La Salle, Illinois: Open Court 1967. Cf. Jacob Golomb, “Buber’s ‘I and Thou’ vis-à-vis Nietzsche and Kierkegaard,” Existentia, vol. 12, 2002, pp. 413–27. 16 Martin Buber, Eclipse of God: Studies in the Relation between Religion and Philosophy, trans. by Maurice S. Friedman et al., New York: Harper 1952. 17 Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. by Walter Kaufmann, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons 1970, p. 107. 18 “das Abgefallensein,” see ibid., p. 110. Buber clearly is sensitive enough to the theological meanings of this term that he used several years before Heidegger. For details see my analysis of Sein und Zeit (from 1927) in chapter 5 of In Search of Authenticity from Kierkegaard to Camus, Tel Aviv: Schocken 1999, and in “Heidegger on Authenticity and Death,” Existentia, vol. 11, 2001, pp. 457–72. 19 SKS 8, 138 / UD, 24.

30

Jacob Golomb

has only one thing.”20 Genuine authenticity and community in themselves are the required conditions and necessary means for attaining human legitimate existential aims, but with our genuine faith in God they might also become (though not necessarily) the happy outcomes of our “return”: “The purpose of relation is the relation itself—touching the You. For as soon as we touch a You we are touched by the breath of eternal life.”21 Unlike Kierkegaard, who made the encounter with God the necessary condition for attaining one’s personal authenticity, Buber reverses the order and makes authenticity a primary event, which may or may not be fully or partly actualized in I-You relations or, even more significantly, in the I-Eternal Thou encounter. He stresses this point in several places, believing that this essential difference makes him less Kierkegaardian than he is usually considered to be. And thus he argues (against Kierkegaard) that personal authenticity precedes I-God relations, and, for the sake of the actual authenticity of a person, it is not to be “immersed” within the divine circles.22 Nonetheless, following Kierkegaard, Buber accepts Kierkegaard’s idea of an authentic faith: our relation to God is intentionally created in our hearts, though we obey him as ontologically aloof in heaven. In other words, God needs us to create him (i.e., our intentional relations toward the transcendental entity); but we need him to be creative. This is about the closest we can come to understanding what kind of “reciprocity” and “mutuality” prevails between the I and God, which is constructed by Buber on the model and extrapolation of the I-You relations. This basic question bothered Buber, as attested in his 1957 “Postscript” to this essay, where he admits: “The existence of mutuality between God and man cannot be proved any more than the existence of God.”23 As we have seen above, Buber’s “return” to authentic faith in God was performed under the auspices of the most influential existentialist religious thinker and poet of the modern age—Søren Kierkegaard. And indeed, together with the personal and highly individual ramifications of religiousness that resemble Kierkegaard, Buber also stressed the universalistic dimensions of the authentic faith with which all kinds of believers in one absolute God could identify, be they Christians, Moslems, or Jews. An authentic faith does not distinguish between colors, language of the prayers, the theological contents of different creeds, and so on. Thus just as Kierkegaard could use Abraham’s attempt to sacrifice his son Isaac to exemplify the “knight of faith,” so also Buber could use the example of Jesus for the same purpose.24 This does not mean, however, that Buber accepted Kierkegaard’s existentialist faith without any Buber, I and Thou, p. 109. Ibid., pp. 112–13. See also “History is a mysterious approach to closeness. Every spiral of its path leads us into deeper corruption and at the same time into more fundamental return. But the God-side of the event whose world-side is called return is called redemption.” (Ibid., p. 168). 22 Ibid., p. 137. 23 Ibid., p. 182. 24 “How powerful, even overpowering, is Jesus’ I-saying, and how legitimate....For it is the I of the unconditional relation in which man calls his You ‘Father’ in such a way that he himself becomes nothing but a son.” (Buber, I and Thou, p. 116). 20 21

Israel: Kierkegaard’s Reception in Fear and Trembling in Jerusalem

31

reservation. He expressed his criticism in two main publications: in his essay “The Question to the Single One,”25 and in his lecture from 1951 “On the Suspension of the Ethical.”26 First, in his famous essay “The Question to the Single One” Buber accuses Kierkegaard of an “acosmic worship of a God.”27 Against this definitely individualistic goal of Kierkegaard “to become a Single One,”28 Buber claims that “God wants us to come to him by means of the Reginas he has created and not by renunciation of them.”29 Secondly, in his other important statement on Kierkegaard, in a lecture from 1951, “On the Suspension of the Ethical,” Buber attacks one of Kierkegaard’s most controversial theses that deals with the “teleological suspension of the ethical” announced in Fear and Trembling. It seems that Buber’s objection to this thesis stems not only from his firm roots in the making of a new society and state but also from his deep identification with the Hasidic community in whose highest hours the separate spheres of religion and ethics merge into human holiness. Referring to Kierkegaard’s interpretation of Abraham’s attempt to sacrifice Isaac, Buber does not deny Kierkegaard’s starting point: God’s command to Abraham was a unique revelation by God that could not be put into any framework of universal morality. But Buber objects that Kierkegaard takes for granted what even the Bible could not, namely that the voice one hears is always and undoubtedly the voice of God, that the only right response is obedience. Speaking amidst an emerging new society and being deeply involved in its creation, education, and ethos, Buber could not abruptly sever the bonds between religion and ethics. I cannot elaborate on this here, but it suffices to point out that this Buberian critique of Kierkegaard reopened a lively dispute between him and the other founder of Israeli philosophy—Shmuel Hugo Bergman (1883–1975), who in the most extensive Hebrew treatment of Kierkegaard until then, took the side of the Danish philosopher against Buber.30 Not surprisingly, Bergman devoted to Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling quite an extensive treatment. And though his term “dialogical philosophy” was undoubtedly taken from Martin Buber, and despite the fact that he too, like Buber, was committed to religious faith, he made several critical observations regarding Buber’s criticism of Kierkegaard. (1) Referring to Buber’s article discussed above, “On the Suspension of the Ethical,” Bergman claims that “Buber’s intention is not clear when he observes that, for Martin Buber, “The Question to the Single One,” in his Between Man and Man, trans. by Ronald Gregor Smith, New York: Macmillan, 1948, pp. 42–82. 26 Martin Buber, “On the Suspension of the Ethical,” in his Man’s Face: Studies in Philosophical Anthropology, Jerusalem: Bialik Institute 1962, pp. 311–15. 27 Buber, “The Question to the Single One,” p. 52. 28 Ibid., p. 50. 29 Ibid., p. 52. 30 Shmuel Hugo Bergman, “Søren Kierkegaard,” in his Dialogical Philosophy from Kierkegaard to Buber, Jerusalem: Bialik Institute 1974, pp. 9–163. (English edition translated by Arnold A. Gerstein, Albany: State University of New York Press 1991, pp. 1–139.) The references here are to page numbers of the English edition. 25

32

Jacob Golomb

Kierkegaard, a Christian, it is obvious that the only one to demand the sacrifice is God. Is this not also obvious to the Jews? Is it not clearly written, ‘And God tried Abraham?’ ”31 (2) Referring to Buber’s observation that for the people in biblical times it was clear when God was speaking and when it was Satan with all his deceptive voices, Bergman protests that already during the biblical period the distinction between the voice of God and the voice of Satan was not a simple one, and “even the example Buber himself gives attests to the difficulty of this distinction.”32 (3) Then Bergman offers a more general objection to Buber’s exposition of Kierkegaard’s version of the sacrifice of Issac, saying that, for Buber, the insecurity of Abraham and his terrible responsibility occurs “only when one no longer knows how to take in with assurance the presence of God.”33 And though Bergman refers to Buber’s passage in his abovementioned article that mentions Nietzsche’s words, “God is dead,” we can detect in Buber’s wavering faith the syndrome of the “marginal Jew” presented above. We should not forget that Buber emigrated to Palestine in 1938, while Bergman did so in 1920 and from then onwards was strongly committed (in practice and in theory) to the Zionist cause. Bergman’s more solid Israeli identity and his more active commitment to Israeli affairs and to the solution of the problem of religion versus the state made his religious commitments more steady, and hence he did not write such treatises as Buber’s Eclipse of God.34 (4) Hence, Bergman was, more than Buber, concerned with and sensitive to the fundamental problem that Kierkegaard posited in his discussion of Isaac’s sacrifice, namely, to the possibility of a conflict between faith and ethics. Thus, he concludes his criticism of Buber’s exposition of Fear and Trembling by focusing on Buber’s final remark about the “fundamental ethical”: From these words of Buber, one must conclude that he does not recognize the problem posed by Kierkegaard and does not acknowledge the possibility of a conflict between God’s demands and morality. God requires of man “not more than the fundamental ethical.” These remarks appear unsatisfactory. They provide no solution to Abraham’s problem. The question remains, can there be an incompatibility between the morality of man and the decrees of God?35

Here Bergman definitely sides with Kierkegaard’s exposition of Abraham’s ordeal, making it into a universal and contemporary problem: “Kierkegaard rightly points out that…whether the ethical injunction can be suspended is as vital a question today as ever.”36 According to Bergman, this is one of “life’s most crucial problems. In our own time, murder and the breakdown of communal life are widely seen as a sacred obligation and a divine command.”37 Here, amazingly, Bergman foresaw the recent terrorist acts committed against humanity by religious fanatics. He continues: Ibid., p. 91 (my emphasis). Ibid., p. 92. 33 Ibid. 34 Buber, Eclipse of God. 35 Bergman, “Søren Kierkegaard,” p. 92. 36 Ibid., pp. 92–3. 37 Ibid. 31 32

Israel: Kierkegaard’s Reception in Fear and Trembling in Jerusalem

33

“those who do not hear the divine command can only rely on ethics or common universal morality. From the standpoint of universal imperatives, Abraham is lost since reliance upon a divine command is meaningless to those who have not heard it.”38 I have no doubt in my mind that by this last remark Bergman, who together with Prof. Nathan Rotenstreich (1914–93) translated Kant’s three (sic) Critiques into modern Hebrew, indirectly referred to the famous passage in Kant’s Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone where he considers the same issue presented by Kierkegaard’s discussion of Abraham. And thus, Kant asks whether or not a father could be “ordered” by God “to kill his son who is, so far as he knows, perfectly innocent.”39 He concludes that since the moral law, being universal, cannot grant any exception to its maxims, and since such a command contradicts morality, it “cannot, despite all appearances, be of God.”40 This view is, of course, rejected by Kierkegaard as too easy a way out of the paradox of faith. And here Bergman, who in matters of philosophy was rationalist like Kant but in matters of faith was definitely Kierkegaardian, sides more with the latter, exclaiming: We must not belittle Kierkegaard’s conclusion to the Isaac story, i.e., that the suspension of morality, of the universal, for the religious category, is always the prerogative of the individual, of the extraordinary person. This suspension is fraught with dangers. There can be no true resolution to the dilemma. We can only reduce the danger by keeping our dependence to a minimum. The man who hears the voice…must be conscious of the tremendous responsibility that he takes upon himself when he rebels against common universal imperatives. Kierkegaard specifically stressed such responsibility when he emphasized the risk and solitude which are the destiny of the person to whom God speaks.41

Since both Buber and Bergman had many students, the dispute between their respective images of Kierkegaard is still going on, as some recent Israeli publications on Kierkegaard show. Especially notable are Abraham Sagi’s and Ran Sigad’s works. Whereas Sagi, in only the second book on Kierkegaard in Hebrew so far, writes from a Jewish religious perspective and hence emphasizes Kierkegaard’s religious experience and strives to find some synthesis in Kierkegaard’s thought between existentialism and religion,42 Sigad, the secular Israeli, emphasizes the existentialist dimensions of authenticity in Kierkegaard’s thought.43

Ibid., 93. Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. by T.M. Green and H.H. Hudson, New York, Harper & Row 1960, p. 82 (see also the reference to the Abraham– Isaac story on p. 175). 40 Ibid. 41 Bergman, “Søren Kierkegaard,” p. 93. 42 Abraham Sagi (Schweitzer), Kierkegaard: Religion and Existence—The Voyage of the Self, Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik 1991. 43 Ran Sigad, “Kierkegaard as Existentialist,” in his Studies in Existentialism, Jerusalem: Bialik Institute 1975, pp. 82–117. See also his “Abraham’s Faith according to Kierkegaard,” in his Philo-Sophia: On the Only Truth, Tel-Aviv: Dvir 1983, pp. 123–32; Ran Sigad, Truth as Tragedy: Nietzsche, Spinoza, Kierkegaard, Marcus Aurelius, Jerusalem: Bialik Institute 1990, pp. 175–226. 38 39

34

Jacob Golomb

To conclude, in Israel today the public awareness of Kierkegaard has been on the rise, and his few, alas too few, books published in Hebrew are widely read.44 In May 1996, to celebrate the Hebrew appearance of Kierkegaard’s Enten/Eller,45 a whole issue of an Israeli literary monthly—Iton 77—was dedicated to articles dealing with various aspects of Kierkegaard’s thought, including an essay by Bruce Kirmmse.46 Thus, after some unfortunate delays described above, today Kierkegaard’s thought is very much alive in Israel, and there are good reasons to hope that he will continue to flourish in a land that was so close to his heart.

As the bibliography clearly shows. Either/Or, vol. 1, trans. from Danish by Miriam Eytan, ed. and introduction by Jacob Golomb, Jerusalem: The Hebrew University Magnes Press 1996 (Philosophical Classics Series, vol. 50). Eytan’s translation won high acclaim, and she was awarded the prestigious Tchernihovski prize for literature for it. 46 A Hebrew translation (by Miriam Eytan) of his “Kierkegaard, Jews, and Judaism,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 17, 1994, pp. 83–97. 44 45

Bibliography I. Hebrew Translations of Kierkegaard’s Works .1954 ,‫ דביר‬:‫אביב‬-‫ תל‬,‫ ערך יוסך שכטר ואילן כרוך‬,‫ מבחר כתבים‬:‫[ סרן קירקגור‬Mivhar ktavim [Selected Writings], ed. by Josef Shehter and Ilan Karoh, Tel Aviv: Dvir 1954.] .1961 ,‫ עקד‬:‫אביב‬-‫ תל‬,‫ בחר ותרגם שמואל תמרי‬,‫ מיומנו של מפתה‬:‫[ מכתבים לקורדליה‬Mihtavim le-Kordelia: mi-jomano shel mepate [Letters to Cordelia: From the Diary of the Seducer], trans. and ed. by Shmuel Tamari, Tel Aviv: Eked 1961.] .1983 ,‫ אשמורת‬:‫ ירושלים‬,‫ תרגם והביא ביוגרפיה קצרה אייל לוין‬,‫[ חיל ורעדה‬Hil ve-reada [Fear and Trembling], trans. and ed. by Eyal Levin, Jerusalem: Ashmoret 1983 (includes also a short biography).] ‫ הוצאת מאגנס של האוניברסיטה‬:‫ ירושלים‬,‫ ערך והקדים יעקב גולומב‬,‫ תרגם אייל לוין‬,‫חיל ורעדה‬ .1986 ,42 ‫[ העברית ספרי מופת‬Hil ve-reada [Fear and Trembling], trans. from Danish by Eyal Levin, ed. by Jacob Golomb, Jerusalem: The Hebrew University Magnes Press 1986 (Philosophical Classics Series, vol. 42).] ‫ בעריכת יוסף שכטר ואילן‬,‫ מהדורה חדשה ומורחבת‬,‫ האסתטי והדתי‬,‫ האתי‬:‫ מבחר כתבים‬:‫קירקגור‬ .1991 ‫ דביר‬:‫אביב‬-‫ תל‬,‫[ כרוך‬Mivhar ktavim [Selected Writings], new enlarged edition, ed. by Joseph Shehter and Ilan Karoh, Tel Aviv: Dvir 1991.] .1996 ,50 ‫ ספרי מופת‬,‫ ירושלים הוצאת מאגנס‬,‫ תרגמה מרים איתן‬,‫או‬-‫[ או‬O-O [Either/Or] (Part 1), trans. from Danish by Miriam Eytan, ed. by Jacob Golomb, Jerusalem: The Hebrew University Magnes Press 1996 (Philosophical Classics Series, vol. 50).] .19–16 ‘‫ עמ‬,1996 ,195 ‫ חוברת‬,77 ‫ עתון‬,‫ תרגמה מרים איתן‬,“‫[ ”האומלל ביותר‬Ha-umlal be-yoter [The Unhappiest Man], trans. by Miriam Eytan, Iton 77: Literary Monthly, vol. 195, 1996, pp. 16–19.] II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard in Israel .7–3 ‘‫ עמ‬,1973 ,30 ,‫ גזית‬,“‫ ”תפיסת האלוהים בשסטוב ובקירקגור‬,‫ אדיר‬,‫[ כהן‬Adir, Kohen, “The Conception of God in Shestov and in Kierkegaard,” Gazith: Art and Literary Journal, no. 30, 1973, pp. 3–7.] ,‫ הפילוסופיה הדיאלוגית מקירקגור עד בובר‬:‫ בספרו‬,“‫ ”סרן קירקגור‬,‫ שמואל הוגו‬,‫ברגמן‬ .163–9 ‘‫ עמ‬,1974 ,‫ מוסד ביאליק‬:‫[ ירושלים‬Bergman, Shmuel Hugo, “Søren Kierkegaard,” in his Dialogical Philosophy from Kierkegaard to Buber, Jerusalem: Bialik Institute 1974, pp. 9–163.] (In English edition translated by Arnold A. Gerstein, Albany: State University of New York Press 1991, pp. 1–139.) :‫ ירושלים‬,‫ ערך עלי יסיף‬,‫ עקדת יצחק‬:‫ ב‬,“‫פי סרן קירקגור‬-‫ ”עקדת יצחק על‬,‫ שמואל הוגו‬,‫ברגמן‬ .1976 ,‫[ מקור‬Bergman, Shmuel Hugo, “The Sacrifice of Isaac according to Søren

36

Jacob Golomb

Kierkegaard,” in Akedat Issac [The Sacrifice of Isaac], ed. by Eli Yasif, Jerusalem: Makor 1976.] .1986.10.31 ,‫ הארץ‬,(‫ ”על הדרך להר המוריה“ )סקירת חיל ורעדה‬,‫ יורם‬,‫[ ברונובסקי‬Bronowski, Yoram, “On the Road to Mount Moriah (Review of Fear and Trembling), Haaretz (Israeli Daily), October 31, 1986.] .1997.9.19 ,‫ הארץ‬,(‫ או‬-‫ )סקירת או‬,“‫ נסיך דנמרק‬:‫ ”קירקגור‬,‫ יורם‬,‫[ ברונובסקי‬Bronowski, Yoram, “Kierkegaard the Prince of Denmark” (A Review of the Hebrew Either/ Or), Haaretz, (Israeli Daily) February 21, 1997.] ,1959 ,‫ מוסד ביאליק‬:‫ירושלים‬, ‫ בסוד שיח‬:‫ בספרו‬,“‫ ”השאלה שהיחיד נשאל‬,‫ מרדכי מרטין‬,‫בובר‬ .210–155 ‘‫[ עמ‬Buber, Mordechai Martin, “The Question to the Single One,” in his Dialogue on Man, Jerusalem: Bialik Institute 1959, pp. 155–210.] ,‫ מוסד ביאליק‬:‫ ירושלים‬,‫ פני אדם‬:‫ בספרו‬,“‫ ”על הדחיה אחת של המוסרי‬,‫ מרדכי מרטין‬,‫בובר‬ .15–311 ‘‫ עמ‬,1962 [Buber, Mordechai Martin, “On One Suspension of the Ethical,” in his Man’s Face: Studies in Philosophical Anthropology, Jerusalem: Bialik Institute 1962, pp. 311–15.] .21–18 ‘‫ עמ‬,1997 ,35 ,‫ פסיפס‬,“‫[ ”ראיון עם מרים איתן על תרגומה העברי של או–או‬Interview with Miriam Eytan on the Hebrew Translation of Either/Or, Psifas, no. 35, 1997, pp. 18–21.] ,‫ רב סולובייצ’יק“ הדואר‬,‫ רב קוק‬,‫ קירקגור‬:‫ ”שלוש גישות כלפי העקדה‬,‫ אהרון הלוי‬,‫פיצניק‬ .10–709 ‘‫ עמ‬,1970 [Fitznik, Aharon, Halevi, “Three Approaches toward the Akedah: Kierkegaard, Rav Kook, Rav Soloveichik,” Ha-doar, 1970, pp. 709–10.] .1986.10.10 ‫ דבר‬,(‫ שואה ואמונה?“ )סקירת חיל ורעדה‬:‫ ”חיל ורעדה‬,‫ משה‬,‫[ גלבוע‬Gilboa, Moshe, “Fear and Trembling: Shoah and Faith?” (Review of Fear and Trembling), Davar (Israeli Daily), October 10, 1986.] .23–20 ‘‫ עמ‬,1997 ,213 ,77 ‫ עתון‬,“‫ ”קירקגור שלי—אותו היחיד‬,‫ לאה‬,‫[ גלוזמן‬Gluzman, Leah, “My Kierkegaard,” Iton 77: Literary Monthly, no. 213, 1997, pp. 20–23.] .51–50 ‘‫ עמ‬,1985 ,35 ,‫ מאזנים‬,“‫ ”קפקא בין קירקגור וניטשה‬,‫ יעקב‬,‫[ גולומב‬Golomb, Jacob, “Kafka between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche,” Moznaim: Literary Monthly of the Hebrew Writers in Israel, no. 53, 1985, pp. 50–51.] .210–177 ‘‫ עמ‬,39 ,1990 ,‫ עיון‬,“‫ ”הסולם האירוני של קירקגור לאותנטיות האמונה‬,‫ יעקב‬,‫גולומב‬ [Golomb, Jacob, “Kierkegaard’s Ironic Ladder to Authentic Faith,” Iyyun, no. 39, 1990, pp. 177–210.] ‘‫ עמ‬,1991 ,140 ,77 ‫ עתון‬,(‫ ”בגידה באותנטיות“ )סקירה ביקורתית של מבחר כתבים‬,‫ יעקב‬,‫גולומב‬ .8–26 [Golomb, Jacob, “The Betrayal of Authenticity,” (A Critical Review of Selected Writings, ed. by Joseph Shehter and Ilan Karoh, 1991), Iton 77: Literary Monthly, no. 140, 1991, pp. 26–8.] ,‫ שוקן‬:‫אביב‬-‫ תל‬,‫ בחיפושי האותנטיות מקירקגור עד קאמי‬:‫ ”קירקגור“ בספרו‬,‫ יעקב‬,‫גולומב‬ .126–93, 1999 [Golomb, Jacob, “Kierkegaard,” in his In Search of Authenticity from Kierkegaard to Camus, Tel Aviv: Schocken 1999, pp. 93–126.] ,195 ,77 ‫ עתון‬,“‫ אבי האקזיסטנציאליזם הדתי‬:‫ ”קירקגור‬,‫ראיון של יעקב בסר עם יעקב גולומב‬ .15–14 ‘‫ עמ‬,1996 [Yaacov Beser’s interview with Jacob Golomb, “Kierkegaard: The Father of Religious Existentialism,” Iton 77: Literary Monthly, no. 195, 1996, pp. 14–15.] (Concise version of the Interview was published in Davar Rischon, April 12, 1996.)

Israel: Kierkegaard’s Reception in Fear and Trembling in Jerusalem

37

,(18/17) ,‫ עלי –שיח‬,“‫ ”סרן קירקגור ומרטין בובר על הטוב ורע ועל החטא הקדמון‬,‫ זאב‬,‫לוי‬ .219–196 ‘‫ עמ‬,1983 [Levi, Zeev, “Søren Kierkegaard and Martin Buber on Good and Evil and Original Sin,” nos. 17–18, Aley-Siah, 1983, pp. 196–219.] .36–115 ‘‫ עמ‬,49 ,2000 ,‫ עיון‬,“‫ ”וויטגנשטיין על משמעות החיים‬,‫ יובל‬,‫[ לוריא‬Lurie, Yuval, “Wittgenstein on the Meaning of Life,” Iyyun, no. 49, 2000, pp. 115–36.] .6–3 ‘‫ עמ‬,2002 ,76 ,‫מאזנים‬, “‫ ”נגד קירקגור וסיפור העקידה‬,‫ צבי‬,‫[ לוז‬Luz, Zvi, “Against Kierkegaard and the Story of the Akedah,” Moznaim, no. 76, 2002, pp. 3–6.] ,“‫ בין קירקגור לחסידות‬:‫ ”פרשת עקדת יצחק במחשבתו הדיאלוגית של מרדכי מרטין בובר‬,‫ אפרים‬,‫מאיר‬ ,‫ יוחנן סילמן‬,‫ חנה כשר‬,‫ משה חלמיש‬:‫ ערכו‬,‫ דמותו בראי ההגות לדורותיה‬:‫ אברהם אבי המאמינים‬:‫בקובץ‬ .93–281 ‘‫ עמ‬,2002 ,‫אילן‬-‫ הוצאת אוניברסיטת בר‬:‫[ רמת גן‬Meir, Ephraim, “Akedah in the Dialogical Thought of Martin Buber: Between Kierkegaard and Hassidism,” in Abraham the Father of the Believers, ed. by Moshe Halamis, Hanah Kaser and Johanan Silman, Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press 2002, pp. 281–93.] ‫ פילוסופים קיומיים יהודים‬:‫ בספרו‬,“‫ על היחיד לפני האל ועל הנוצרי האותנטי‬:‫ ”סרן קירקגור‬,‫ אפרים‬,‫מאיר‬ .17–14 ‘‫ עמ‬,2004 ,‫ מאגנס‬:‫ ירושלים‬,‫שיח‬-‫[ ברב‬Meir, Ephraim, “Søren Kierkegaard: On the Individual Before God and the Authentic Christian,” in his Jewish Existentialist Philosophers in Dialogue, Jerusalem: Magnes Press 2004, pp. 14–17.] .1997.9.19 ,‫ מעריב‬,(‫או‬-‫פעם“ )סקירת או‬-‫ ”יותר רלבנטי מאי‬,‫ יורם‬,‫[ מלצר‬Melzer, Yoram, “More Relevant than Ever” (A Review of the Hebrew Either/Or), Maariv (Israeli Daily), September 19, 1997.] .1997 ,‫ האקדמיה‬:‫ ירושלים‬,‫ שלש חשכות‬:‫ בספרו‬,“‫ ”קירקגור עלטת הצער‬,‫ גדעון‬,‫[ עפרת‬Ofrat, Gideon, “Kierkegaard: The Thick Darkness of Grief,” in his Three Darknesses, Jerusalem: Academy 1997.] .7–182 ‘‫ עמ‬,1950 ,4 ,‫ מולד‬,“‫ ”קירקגור וסארטר‬,‫ ישעיהו‬,‫[ רבינוביץ‬Rabinowitz, Yeshiahu, “Kierkegaard and Sartre,” Molad, no. 4, 1950, pp. 182–7.] .1996.11.1 ,‫ מעריב‬,“‫ ”מישנת הפילוסוף צמחה מחייו הפרטיים‬,‫ ארי‬,‫[ ריקין‬Rikin, Ari, “The Thought of the Philosopher originated from his Private Life” (A Review of the Hebrew Either/Or), Maariv, November 1, 1996.] ‘‫ עמ‬,1958 ,‫ דביר‬:‫אביב‬-‫ תל‬,‫ הוגים ובעיותיהם‬:‫ בספרו‬,“‫ ”סרן קירקגור בחוית זמננו‬,‫ צבי‬,‫רודי‬ .35–311 [Rodi, Zvi, “Søren Kierkegaard in our Contemporary Experience,” in his Thinkers and Their Problems, Tel Aviv: Dvir 1958, pp. 311–35.] .203–179 ‘‫ עמ‬,36 ,1987 ,‫ עיון‬,“‫ ”חינוך והתגברות עצמית‬,‫ אליהו‬,‫[ רוזנוב‬Rosenow, Eliyahu, “Education and Self-Overcoming,” Iyyun, no. 36, 1987, pp. 179–203.] .27–209 ‘‫ עמ‬,38 ,1989 ,‫ עיון‬,“‫ ”תפיסת החינוך של קירקגור‬,‫ אליהו‬,‫[ רוזנוב‬Rosenow, Eliyahu, “Kierkegaard’s Concept of Education,” Iyyun, no. 38, 1989, pp. 209–27.] ,‫ עיונים בחינוך‬,“‫ ”הרהורים אחדים על המסר החינוכי של סרן קירקגור‬,‫ אליהו‬,‫רוזנוב‬ .2–51 ,40–29 ‘‫ עמ‬,1989 ,(‫[ )חיפה‬Rosenow, Eliyahu, “Some Thoughts on the Educational Message of Søren Kierkegaard, Studies [Iyyunim] on Education, Haifa, 1989, pp. 29–40, pp. 51–2.] .23–20 ‘‫ עמ‬,1996 ,195 ,77 ‫ עתון‬,“‫פי קירקגור‬-‫ ”החינוך לאותנטיות על‬,‫ אליהו‬,‫[ רוזנוב‬Rosenow, Eliyahu, “Education toward Authenticity according to Kierkegaard”, Iton 77: Literary Monthly, no. 195, 1996, pp. 20–23.] ,‫ מעריב‬,(‫ )סקירת מבחר כתבים‬,“‫ ”הספור העצוב על סרן קירקגור ורגינה היפה‬,‫ פנחס‬,‫שדה‬ .1991.8.9 [Sadeh, Pinchas, “The Sad Story about Søren Kierkegaard and the Beautiful Regine” (Review of Mivhar Ktavim [Selected Writings], 1991), Maariv (Israeli Daily), August 9, 1991.]

38

Jacob Golomb

,‫ מוסד ביאליק‬:‫ ירושלים‬,‫ דת ואקסיסטנציה—המסע של האני‬:‫ קירקגור‬,‫ )שוויצר( אברהם‬,‫שגיא‬ .1991 [Sagi (Schweitzer), Abraham, Kierkegaard: Religion and Existence—The Voyage of the Self, Jerusalem: Bialik Institute 1991.] .62–248 ‘‫ עמ‬,1988 ,‫ עיון‬,“‫ ”העקדה – בעיית הציות או בעיית השמיעה בין קירקגור לבובר‬,‫ אבי‬,‫שגיא‬ [Sagi, Avi, “Kierkegaard and Buber on the Dilemma of Abraham in the ‘Akedah’ [The Sacrifice of Isaac],” Iyyun, no. 37, 1988, pp. 248–62.] ‘‫ עמ‬,(23) 1989 ,‫ דעת‬,“‫ ”נסיון העקדה–עיון משווה בהגותם של קירקגור וליבוביץ‬,‫ אבי‬,‫שגיא‬ .34–121 [Sagi, Avi, “Akedah: A Comparative Study of Kierkegaard and Leibowitz,” Daat (A Journal of Jewish Philosophy and Kabbalah), vol. 23, 1989, pp. 121–34.] .1986.7.25 ,‫ על המשמר‬,(‫ ”חרדת הקיום האותנטי“ )סקירת חיל ורעדה‬,‫ גדעון‬,‫[ סגל‬Segal, Gideon, “The Fear of the Authentic Existence” (Review of the Hebrew edition of Fear and Trembling), Al ha-Mishmar (Israeli Daily), July 25, 1986.] ,‫ מוסד ביאליק‬:‫ ירושלים‬,‫ אכסיסטנציאליזם‬:‫ ”קירקגור כאכזיסטנציאליסט“ בספרו‬,‫ רן‬,‫סיגד‬ .117–82 ‘‫ עמ‬,1975 [Sigad, Ran, “Kierkegaard as Existentialist,” in his Studies in Existentialism, Jerusalem: Bialik Institute 1975, pp. 82–117.] :‫אביב‬-‫ תל‬,‫ ערכו אסא כשר ויעקב לוינגר‬,‫ בספר ישעיהו לייבוביץ‬,“‫ ”לייבוביץ וקירקגור‬,‫ רן‬,‫סיגד‬ .7–42 ‘‫ עמ‬,1982 ,‫[ פפירוס‬Sigad, Ran, “Leibowitz and Kierkegaard,” in Book of Yeshiahu Leibowitz, ed. by Asa Kaser and Yaakov Levinger, Tel Aviv: Papirus 1982, pp. 42–7.] ,‫ דביר‬:‫אביב‬-‫ תל‬,‫ על האמת האחת‬:‫סופיה‬-‫ פילו‬:‫פי קירקגור“ בספרו‬-‫ ”אמונת אברהם על‬,‫ רן‬,‫סיגד‬ .32–123 ‘‫ עמ‬,1983 [Sigad, Ran, “Abraham’s Faith according to Kierkegaard,” in his Philo-Sophia: On the Only Truth, Tel-Aviv: Dvir 1983, pp. 123–32.] ‘‫ עמ‬,1990 ,‫ מוסד ביאליק‬:‫ ירושלים‬,‫ אמת כטרגדיה‬:‫ בספרו‬,“‫ נצרות כטרגדיה‬:‫ ”קירקגור‬,‫ רן‬,‫סיגד‬ .226–175 [Sigad, Ran, “Kierkegaard: Christianity as Tragedy,” in his Truth as Tragedy, Jerusalem: Bialik Institute 1990, pp. 175–226.] .2000 ,‫ מודן‬:‫אביב‬-‫ תל‬,‫ קירקגור‬,‫ פול‬,‫[ סטרתרן‬Starathan, Paul, Kierkegaard, Tel Aviv: Modan 2000.] ‫ ערכו יובל דרור‬,‫ פואמה הפדגוגית של אברהם אורן‬:‫ב‬, “‫ ”יוסף שכטר וקירקגור‬,‫ ישעיהו‬,‫תדמור‬ .75–251 ‘‫ עמ‬,1995 ,‫ אורט‬:‫ ירושלים‬,‫[ ושמעון אורן‬Tadmor, Yeshaiahu, “Joseph Schechter and Kierkegaard,” in The Pedagogic Poem of Abraham Oren, ed. by Yuval Dror and Shimon Oren, Jerusalem: Ort 1995, pp. 251–75.] .1997.6.13 ,‫ הצופה‬,(‫או‬-‫ )סקירת או‬,“‫ ”החיפוש אחר האמת הצרופה‬,‫ עקיבא‬,‫[ צימרמן‬Zimmerman, Akiva, “The Search for the Pure Truth” (A Review of the Hebrew Either/Or), Ha-Zofeh, June 13, 1997.] III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Reception in Israel .31–28 ‘‫ עמ‬,1996 ,195 ,77 ‫ עתון‬,“‫ ”קירקגור בציון‬,‫ יעקב‬,‫[ גולומב‬Golomb, Jacob, “Kierkegaard in Zion,” Iton 77: Literary Monthly, no. 195, 1996, pp. 28–31.] Golomb, Jacob, “Kierkegaard in Zion,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 19, 1998, pp. 130–37. Kirmmse, Bruce, H. “Kierkegaard, Jews and Judaism,” in Hebrew, translated by Miriam Eytan, Iton 77: Literary Monthly, vol. 195, 1996, pp. 24–27. (Originally in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 17, 1994, pp. 83–97.)

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World Habib C. Malik

One’s first thought as one prepares to chronicle the Arab reception of Kierkegaard might be that the investigation will prove rather brief in length and scope. Since the glorious era of Arab intellectual and scientific ferment in the Middle Ages when the Europeans seemed so hopelessly behind, little has come out from the Arab world that has struck a universal chord anywhere, or caused inquisitive minds across the far reaches of the globe to quiver with anticipation. The last nine hundred years of relative stagnation and insularity in Arab culture would not encourage any prospective researcher into the fortunes met by Kierkegaard’s legacy in Arabia and its surroundings to entertain high expectations. But one is dealing, after all, with twenty-two states all members of the Arab League, and so it would seem reasonable to assume that there is bound to be a story there somewhere that bears recounting as regards Kierkegaard’s reception. And indeed there is, though not one that would necessarily shatter by much the anticipated modesty of the results, or render overly unjustified the investigator’s initial caution. To begin with, the Arab world is trailing most other parts of the world including other predominantly Muslim regions when it comes to the number and quality of books translated into Arabic from foreign languages, in particular works acknowledged as belonging to the classics of the world’s shared cultural heritage. The United Nations’ Arab Human Development Report 2002 states that the Arab world (some 300 million people) “translates about 330 books annually, one fifth of the number that Greece [some 11 million people] translates.” In the area of philosophy there exist scattered translations into Arabic of entire works from the original language by such Western thinkers as Descartes, Kant, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre, but none for Kierkegaard. Acting as the new global public square, the Internet invariably features snippets of Kierkegaard in Arabic, but never an entire work, and hardly ever from the Danish original. For example, one Iraqi translator living in Denmark, ‫‘[ ﻋﺩﻧﺎن اﻟﻣﺑﺎرك‬Adnan al-Mubarak], has posted long translated excerpts from The Sickness unto Death under the heading  See the Arab Human Development Report 2002 “Creating Opportunities for Future Generations” published by the United Nations Development Program (New York, 2002), p. 78. The Arab world is lagging behind on a number of cultural, social, economic, and technological fronts and these lacunae are referred to in the report as “deficits”: the knowledge deficit, the freedom deficit, and the women’s empowerment deficit.

40

Habib C. Malik

“Anti-Climacus.” The quality of the translations is good. Another site entitled “Arabic Christian Counseling” presents a 2003 posting of a mélange of translated passages from Repetition, The Sickness unto Death, Either/Or, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, and Fear and Trembling by an undisclosed translator. The many possible variations in the spelling of Kierkegaard’s name in Arabic make Internet searches for material on, or by, him in that language particularly challenging. Teasing out whatever Arab reception there is of Kierkegaard and his thought needs naturally to go beyond the Internet, but the web often provides priceless clues to relevant authors and works—along with much coincidental trivia having only tangential bearing on the subject. Examples of the latter include the fact that Paul-Henri Tisseau, the later French translator of Kierkegaard, went to Beirut in 1919 where he taught in a school for the French military government; or that Josiah Thompson, who later wrote on Kierkegaard, commanded the frogman reconnaissance detachment of the U.S. Marines that landed in 1958 on Lebanon’s beaches; or, more substantially, that Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, the renowned Kierkegaard specialist, contributed an article on Kierkegaard to a February–March 2000 United Arab Emirates gathering at the Sharjah Museum, an event dubbed “the first presentation of Kierkegaard’s thinking in Arabic translated directly from Danish.” However, with those Arab authors who actually wrote about Kierkegaard we discover that in the majority of instances, unless it is a case of the author directly reading Kierkegaardian texts and exclusively appropriating his concepts, Kierkegaard’s reception has occurred “in company,” as it were, meaning with a host of other “existentialists” tagging along irrespective of who among them objects to the label, and who does not. Usually this sort of reception is second, third, or fourth hand. And then there are the Arab scholars (or scholars of Arab descent) who have written about Kierkegaard in languages other than Arabic. These too ought to be included in any investigation of his Arab reception even though in the nature of the case their writings can only be expected to reach the educated few among Arab intellectuals. On the other hand, greater in-depth analysis is reserved for the handful of book-length monographs written in Arabic by Arabs on Kierkegaard. There are no “experts” on Kierkegaard native to the Arab world in the sense of individuals with a passionate lifelong devotion to his thought and a loyal commitment to scholarship on him, such as one finds throughout the West or in Japan. Professors of philosophy and theology at universities and religious institutions across many Arab states do offer their pupils expositions of Kierkegaard as part of survey courses and, on rarer occasions, as the central topic of a full course or seminar. This is certainly See http://www.azaheer.org/vb/archive/index.php/t-15725. See also http://www. azaheer.org/vb/archive/index.php/f-57 for translated parts from Either/Or under the heading “Victor Eremita” by ‫[ ﺧﺎﻟﺩ ﺍﻟﺴﻌﻥ‬Khaled al-Sa’an].  See http://www.arabic-christian-counseling.com/asp/thoughts.asp?id=1086437377.  Here are some of the various possibilities for “Kierkegaard”: ,‫ ﻛﺭﻛﻐﺎﺭﺩ‬,‫ ﻛﺭﻛﻳﻐﺎﺭﺩ‬,‫ﻛﻳﺭﻛﻐﺎﺭﺩ‬ ,‫ ﻛﻳﺭﻛﻳﻐﺎﺭﺩ‬,‫ ﻛﺭ ﻛﺟﺎﺭﺩ‬,‫ ﻛﺭ ﻛﻳﺟﺎﺭﺩ‬,‫ ﻛﻳﺭﻛﺟﺎﺭﺩ‬,‫ ﻛﻳﺭﻛﻳﺟﺎﺭﺩ‬.‫ ﻛﺭﻛﻐﻭﺭ‬,‫ ﻛﺭﻛﻳﻐﻭﺭ‬,‫ ﻛﻳﺭﻛﻐﻭﺭ‬,‫ ﻛﻳﺭﻛﻳﻐﻭﺭ‬,‫ﻛﺭ ﻛﺟﻭﺭ‬ ,‫ ﻛﺭﻛﻳﺟﻭﺭ‬,‫ ﻛﻳﺭﻛﺟﻭﺭ‬,‫ﻛﻳﺭﻛﻳﺟﻭﺭ‬.  See in this order: http://www.stolaf.edu/collections/kierkegaard/newsletter/issue40/ 40007.htm; http://karws.gso.uri.edu/JFK/the_critics/The _Buffs-Trillin.html (or Calvin Trillin, “The Buffs,” The New Yorker, June 1967, pp. 41–71); and http://www.kunstakademiet.dk/ fivefromafar/text.pdf. 

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

41

true at the universities that either enjoy an active affiliation with counterparts in the French and English-speaking worlds, or that reflect a healthy pluralist mix of ethnoreligious backgrounds among both their faculty and students. I. Charles Malik One prominent pioneer in introducing young Arab university students and budding intellectuals to the summits of Western philosophy, including Kierkegaard, was the Lebanese thinker and diplomat ‫[ ﺷﺎﺭﻝ ﻣﺎﻟﻚ‬Charles Malik] (1906–87). Malik is perhaps best remembered today for his pivotal role alongside Eleanor Roosevelt, Rene Cassin, and a handful of other international luminaries in the framing of the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed on December 10, 1948 in Paris. But Charles Malik was also the earliest student from an Arab country to study philosophy at Harvard University and receive a doctorate in the field in 1937. He tutored, among others, under Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947), to whose thought he had been attracted because, like Whitehead, Malik had come to philosophy from a solid scientific grounding in mathematics and physics, which he studied at the American University of Beirut. While at Harvard, Malik was awarded the philosophy department’s highest and most prestigious travel scholarship enabling him to spend two full years anywhere he liked in the world pursuing his philosophical interests. Malik chose to study with Martin Heidegger at the University of Freiburg in Germany; however, the increasingly stifling climate in Nazi Germany during the 1930s compelled him to stay in Freiburg for a total of fourteen months at the end of which he hurried back to the safety and tranquility of Cambridge, Massachusetts. There he completed his dissertation on the metaphysics of time in the philosophies of Whitehead and Heidegger, the first such comparative investigation of its kind. His dissertation remains unpublished. Even while studying mathematics and science, and then teaching these subjects in the late 1920s at the American University of Beirut, Malik was vigorously absorbed in what became a lifelong interest in philosophical and theological questions. He read voraciously in both philosophy and theology during those formative years. Philosophically, he concentrated on Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Whitehead, and Heidegger. Having been raised as a devout Christian in the Greek Orthodox tradition, Malik retained a profound preoccupation with spiritual themes all his life. His early religious readings included the Bible, the Church Fathers, Augustine, and the medieval scholastics, principally Aquinas. More modern thinkers who treated religious themes with originality, candor, and depth attracted him early on as well, and these included Pascal, Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Bergson, Barth, Buber, and the Neo-Thomists. His first exposure to Kierkegaard occurred while at Harvard and later at Freiburg where he read German translations of some of Kierkegaard’s works. These included The Concept of Irony and some of the Edifying Charles Malik is the present writer’s late father. For more on Charles Malik’s role in the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, see Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, New York: Random House 2001.  

42

Habib C. Malik

Discourses, most notably “Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing.” He also owned a copy of Christoph Schrempf’s German translation of Stages on Life’s Way, which he apparently obtained while in Freiburg. Fresh out of Harvard in the summer of 1937, Malik prepared to return to a teaching post in his native Lebanon at the American University of Beirut. The university did not have a philosophy department then, and Malik is credited with having been the main driving force behind establishing one. In a lengthy letter dated October 28, 1937 that he wrote to Bayard Dodge, president of the American University, Malik spelled out the need to expose young students at the university to the works of the Great Masters, as he called them. He argued in favor of a program that systematically covered the thought of the towering personalities of the Western tradition: “I believe we need in the East to know this tradition at least as much as we need to produce soap and oranges, to have good roads and physicians and to have a crowd of trained young men who can function as reliable employees in the I.P.C. [Iraq Petroleum Company],” he wrote. Although Kierkegaard is not mentioned by name in the several enumerations of the West’s leading philosophical minds that Malik lists in the letter, he eventually did take his rightful place in the gallery of such thinkers when they were taught by Malik in courses he offered at the fledgling department of philosophy. In his letter to the university’s president Malik made an impassioned plea for a concentration on culture and the humanities through the study of the classics of Western thought— what he termed the Greco-Roman classical tradition and its offshoots in the Middle Ages and subsequent centuries down to our time. “The peoples of the Near East in the present critical state of their history,” he explained, “are entitled to know that the West is not only imperialism and technology and wealth and science and comforts and sex and war, but also Plato and St. Augustine and Pascal and Bonaventura and Spinoza and Kant and Goethe and Royce and Whitehead.” The first thing Malik did to launch the formal study of philosophy at the university was to assemble a two-volume compendium of selections from the ancient, medieval, and modern writings of an assortment of the West’s classical thinkers. In the lengthy introduction to the compilations he explained his reading choices, justified the compelling reasons for returning to these writings, illustrated their abiding relevance for our times, showed the importance of “wrestling with great minds”10 and why the Arab East stands to benefit enormously from such an exposure, and offered a phenomenology of man that argued in favor of “the fundamental constancy of human nature.”11 In the spirit of what he wrote in his letter to Dodge, Malik emphasized the universality of his selections: “[T]he Greco-Roman-European classical tradition of thought and being is humane before it is Western. The truth captured and expressed The edition he read is Søren Kierkegaard, Der Begriff der Ironie, Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag 1929. The various Edifying Discourses that he read were in both German and English translations.  Unpublished letter from Charles Malik to Bayard Dodge, October 28, 1937. Original found in the Charles Malik Collection at the Library of Congress in Washington, DC. 10 Charles Malik (ed.), Readings in Philosophy: Selections from the Great Masters, vol. 1, Ancient Philosophy, Beirut: American University of Beirut 1939, p. xviii. 11 Ibid., p. xxiv. 

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

43

by this tradition belongs to man as such, and not to Greece or France or Germany or America.”12 Although no text from Kierkegaard is included in the compendium, he is mentioned in the introduction as one of “the great modern thinkers who created the world of thought in which we live.” Malik concludes: “Our life is not worth living, even if it could be lived, without the knowledge of what these men saw and wanted to say.”13 Both the philosophy department and the cultural studies program at the American University of Beirut owe their existence in no small part to the efforts of Charles Malik that began in 1937. During the late 1930s and up to 1944 when Malik entered the world of politics as newly independent Lebanon’s first ambassador to Washington and the head of the Lebanese delegation to the founding conference of the United Nations in San Francisco, he taught philosophy at the university in Beirut and held a series of simultaneous informal circles of reading and discussion in which many of Lebanon’s, and some of the Arab world’s, leading intellectual figures took part. The emphasis was mainly on Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, and Heidegger. Malik also spoke regularly on spiritual themes at Sunday chapel in the university and at other places of worship around town. It was during this period that a number of young, bright, and inquisitive individuals who came in contact with Malik, either through the philosophical circles he conducted, or at the religious talks he gave, were influenced by what they read and heard to the extent that some of them experienced a radical alteration of course in their lives, with quite a few converting to Catholicism. These new converts even included former Muslims, one of whom became a Dominican priest.14 Over the years Malik’s name became associated with the tradition of Christian existential philosophy, and for good reason. One scholar writing about his role in the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights introduces him in her book as “Charles Malik, existentialist philosopher turned diplomat, a student of Alfred North Whitehead and Martin Heidegger, who steered the Declaration to adoption by the UN General Assembly in the tense cold war atmosphere of 1948.”15 Malik’s affinity to that tradition is perhaps best reflected in a critical evaluation he wrote about Heidegger from a Christian perspective shortly after the German philosopher’s passing in 1976. Here Malik speaks of the need to “theologize Heidegger” instead of the common trend of “Heideggerizing theology,” and he focuses on the direct personal-existential experience of lived faith with which a Christian believer confronts Heidegger’s philosophy of Being. In this context, he refers to Kierkegaard’s phenomenon of anxiety or dread and to Heidegger’s characterization of it in a footnote in Being and Time as “a ‘psychological’ exposition of the problem of original sin,” implying that as an existential-ontological phenomenon it can be completely denuded of its theological content. Malik proceeds:

Ibid., p. xxix. Ibid., p. xxxiv. 14 This is Father ‘Afif ‘Usseiran. For more on this period in Malik’s intellectual and spiritual development one would need to delve into his massive unpublished diary spanning the years 1928–86, which is at present stored safely in a bank vault in Manhattan. 15 Glendon, A World Made New, p. xx. 12 13

44

Habib C. Malik The truth as it appears to me is that without the traditional theological perspective neither Kierkegaard nor Heidegger could have dwelt on this phenomenon, but that whereas Kierkegaard maintained this context within his discussion both from acknowledgement of his existential sources and perhaps from faith, Heidegger, in conformity with his fundamental existential oath, weaned himself from it, perhaps from lack of faith, without acknowledging his existential-personal indebtedness to it. Without the living Christ in the living tradition neither Kierkegaard nor Heidegger would be possible, and I believe both of them know that.16

Despite an abiding admiration for Kierkegaard’s spiritual depth and powers of expression, Malik always retained a feeling of unease with respect to the extent to which Kierkegaard actually believed in the living person of Jesus Christ. Elsewhere in his Heidegger critique, Malik contrasted “the direct faith of Mary and Peter and Paul and Augustine and Teresa” with “the faith of a Bultmann or a Tillich or even a Kierkegaard, or any of the men now trying to Heideggerize theology instead of theologizing Heidegger.”17 Insofar as Kierkegaard’s faith, despite its purported supra-rational dimensions, came across in his corpus as intellectualized, this left Malik with decided reservations regarding its ultimate validity. Moreover, Malik’s strong inclination towards situating personal-existential faith in a living communal-ecclesiastical context and tradition—that of Eastern Orthodoxy and/or Roman Catholicism—caused him to cringe at Kierkegaard’s rugged Nordic and individualistic Protestantism. Again, in his Heidegger critique, Malik writes: With all the wonders of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche—personal wonders, existential wonders, spiritual wonders, intellectual wonders… —what finally judges these two men is their utter loneliness. From the sufferings of their loneliness lonely beings can discover and be many wonderful things, but the whole point is that there is something wrong in being utterly lonely without lovers and without friends, and that man is not to shatter himself to pieces—to be sure, very delectable pieces—in the sufferings of his loneliness, but to consume, and therefore to restore and find himself, in the joy and peace of actual fellowship and love.18

In fact, Malik points out, the very writing into which these lonely men pour themselves “in their melancholic loneliness is intended by them to be read and appreciated by somebody…therefore their writing is itself a mode of fellowship, though not actual fellowship but fellowship in the mode of hope.”19 Malik does recognize, however, that the existential question of loneliness is more complex than to be disposed of in this manner: “This is all very well, but a residual problem abides here: there are lonely people, there are people who after every effort at fellowship remain lonely,

Charles Malik, “To Honor Martin Heidegger (1889–1976): A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger,” The Thomist, vol. 41, no. 1, 1977, pp. 1–61, see p. 37. 17 Ibid., p. 60. 18 Ibid., pp. 35–6. 19 Ibid. 16

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

45

there are people who do express the unutterable sufferings of their loneliness in writing; and my sermonizing here cannot get them out of their loneliness.”20 Malik was well aware of Kierkegaard’s multilayered genius. In a book entitled A Christian Critique of the University, he found occasion to allude to Kierkegaard’s depiction of “the demonic” in connection with what Malik discerned as signs of the same in the form of a rampant nihilism that defines features of the contemporary age. At the end of his critical discussion of the age’s superstition, sorcery, and morbid fascination with nothingness, Malik simply quoted, and without comment, a lengthy passage from Gregor Malantschuk’s The Controversial Kierkegaard in which the author in turn quotes from Kierkegaard’s journals and analyzes Johannes de silentio’s erotic-sexual references, in order to show how they constitute a direct entry point into the demonic, and how all this is characteristic of the degeneration of Protestantism into secularism and paganism both in Kierkegaard’s day and in ours.21 The “essential anxiety” that marks the human condition was one of Malik’s central philosophical themes, and he often mentioned Kierkegaard and Heidegger together in this connection.22 For Malik, fathoming this inescapable human predicament requires what he terms a basic ontological orientation, which Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Jaspers, and others possessed. “These men…worry least about the problem of knowledge; they are plunged from beginning to end in the vast sea of being, and they do the best they can to swim safely to the shore.” “To put epistemology before ontology,” he continues, “is exactly to put the cart before the horse.”23 Malik constantly returns to the question of faith when treating the personal-existential dimensions of human life. Here he discerns a curious affinity between the atheist and the believer, and he is not always sure where Kierkegaard himself personally stands. “I sometimes feel that the atheist (e.g. Nietzsche) could turn into a believer in the twinkling of an eye, and I sometimes wonder when I read a believer (e.g. David or Kierkegaard) whether what he is saying here does not really conceal ‘an evil heart of unbelief.’  ”24 Kierkegaard’s irony and his elaborate stratagems at self-concealment are probably responsible for this skepticism on Malik’s part. Yet Malik, in another context, gives Kierkegaard’s appreciation of Socratic irony its full due:

Ibid., Gabriel Marcel, the Christian existential philosopher and a thinker greatly esteemed by Charles Malik, once wrote in seeming contrast to Malik: “The imperishable glory of a Kierkegaard or a Nietzsche consists perhaps mainly in this, that they have proved, not only by their arguments, but by their trials and by their whole life, that a philosopher worthy of the name cannot be a man of congresses, and that he deviates from his path every time that he allows himself to be torn from the solitude which is his calling. It is only by clinging to this solitude that he remains at the disposal of those who await from him, if not a lead, at least a stimulation.” See Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy of Existentialism, New York: The Citadel Press and Carol Publishing Group 1995, p. 124. 21 Charles H. Malik, A Christian Critique of the University, Downers Grove, Illinois: Intervarsity Press 1982, pp. 88–9. 22 See, for instance, Charles Malik, The Wonder of Being, Waco, Texas: Word Books 1974, p. 126. 23 Ibid., p. 32. 24 Ibid., p. 24. The biblical reference is to Hebrews 3:12. 20

46

Habib C. Malik You have to read Kierkegaard’s interpretation of his [Socrates’] irony as a determination of subjectivity, as infinite absolute negativity, as an inner attitude in which the whole given reality had lost for him its validity and he became foreign to the whole reality of substantiality…[and you have] to penetrate, with Kierkegaard, to the personal-existential depths of this conception, to comprehend how much for Socrates the entire world was radically questionable, how much it was a terrible deception and an utter deficiency.25

Had Malik confined himself through his lectures, discussions, and writings to philosophizing merely in English, his audience would for the most part have remained Western, and his place in the chronicle of the Arab reception of Kierkegaard’s thought would have been restricted to someone who reached isolated specimens of the educated Arab elite. But all his life Malik consciously desired to mediate the fruits of the Western philosophical tradition to an Arabic readership, and for this he embarked on what became his philosophical magnum opus in Arabic which he entitled ‫ﺍﻠﻣﻘﺩﻤﺔ‬ Al Muqaddimah [The Introduction]. He originally envisaged this as the introductory volume to an ambitious series of works in Arabic on a variety of philosophical topics, one of which would treat ‫[ ﺍﻟﻛﻳﺎﻨﻳﺔ‬existentialism]. During his lifetime he only managed to publish this first volume; however, much of the remaining material exists in various stages of completion in the collection of his papers that is housed at the Library of Congress in Washington. After his death it was discovered that the section on existentialism was the most complete of the unpublished philosophical drafts, and so it was decided that a new edition of Al Muqaddimah would be issued with the section on existentialism appended at the end. The section came to 120 pages and included a definition of existentialism followed by a discussion of manifestations of it in the ancient philosophers, the Hebrew prophets particularly David, St. Augustine, existentialism in the Koran (a highly original analysis), Shakespeare, Goethe, Pascal, Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Berdyaev. Buber and Heidegger are mentioned by Malik as examples of existentialists in the author’s sense of the term, but he never got around to completing a full treatment of their philosophies in this context. Deliberately excluded from the list is Sartre whose philosophy had little appeal for Malik. Also included in the section on existentialism is a meditation on the unique personhood of human individuals and the existential significance of the name. Malik’s discussion of Kierkegaard—seven pages in length—is a condensed presentation of those elements in his thought and life that merit for him the appellation “existential,” indeed “the father of all contemporary existentialism.”26 Malik informs his Arabic readers that Kierkegaard’s influence went beyond the realm of strict philosophy to impact theology, literature, and even lifestyles. Leading Protestant theologians of the twentieth century, for example, like Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, and Paul Tillich, were deeply affected by Kierkegaard’s thought. Biographically, Malik alludes in passing to Kierkegaard having been haunted by his father’s cursing of God, and to his broken engagement to Regine Olsen, the reasons for the latter 25 Ibid., p. 84. Malik relies on the German translation of Der Begriff der Ironie cited earlier. 26 Charles Malik, ‫  ﺴﻳﺭﺓ ﺫﺍﺗﻳﺔ ﻓﻟﺴﻔﻳﺔ‬:‫[ ﺍﻟﻣﻘﺩﻣﺔ‬The Introduction: A Philosophical Autobiography], 2nd ed., Beirut: Al Nahar Publishing House 2001, p. 567. All subsequent translations from Arabic or other sources into English are this author’s.

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

47

of which “were extensively philosophized by him.”27 Despite the many spins that scholars have given to it, the ultimate truth about this strange engagement, according to Malik, remains elusive. The living–dying single individual is Kierkegaard’s recurring basic philosophical theme, writes Malik. In connection with this, Malik refers to Kierkegaard’s attack on Hegel’s system, and how with Hegel “the whole utterly swallows the unique and vital part.”28 Hegel’s philosophy, he adds, neglects to account for personal freedom, and God in the end is reduced to Hegel’s own mind. Malik continues that Kierkegaard, as one of the most astute dialectical thinkers, acquired this method from Hegel and used it as a devastating weapon against him.29 In all his writings, explains Malik, Kierkegaard probes deeply the question of faith. His “leap,” while not into complete darkness, is always undertaken with an element of obscurity and risk. However, adds Malik, Kierkegaard understands St. Paul well when the latter speaks of faith in a crucified Christ as an absurdity to all except to the believer. Faith is not subject to reason, and trying to “prove” God’s existence implies the person doing this does not believe. On the issue of faith Malik ended his discussion of Kierkegaard with the following: I love him deeply, but I retain basic reservations about him, particularly with respect to fellowship and human relationships and personal familiarity and love, and also with respect to “the leap of faith.” I don’t believe, for instance, that Paul “leapt” so as to believe; nor did this peasant woman. “Leaping” is something a complicated philosopher might contemplate perhaps because he is enslaved by his complexes and needs to leap away from them.…The really pure of heart see God directly and are in no need of leaping.30

Also mentioned in Malik’s brief exposition of Kierkegaard are the inauthentic, inadequate, and ultimately enslaving aesthetic and ethical forms of existence as presented in Either/Or; the attack on the Danish Lutheran Church; the existential categories of anxiety, despair, and melancholy; the limitations of our choices versus the endlessness of abandoned possibilities; and how life becomes mechanical, dry, and empty when it is lived from the sidelines as mere objectivism. Malik asserts that Kierkegaard’s “truth is subjectivity” refers in the first instance to the free personal inner responsible choice that each one of us repeatedly makes in his or her life. Such existential freedom is defined by the courage to take personal decisions and to accept guilt for wrong decisions. No one, adds Malik, not even God, can decide for me or on my behalf.31 Malik recognizes the amazing convoluted richness and profundity of Kierkegaard’s inner self: Every inward stance and every movement represents an existential state that is expressed phenomenologically on the human level. You marvel at how he discovered and synthesized all this. You imagine him creating it all out of nothing, and as you imagine this you discern in Kierkegaard an attribute that he shares with God….Thus Kierkegaard’s pure personal

Ibid. Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid., p. 572. 31 Ibid., p. 569. 27 28

Habib C. Malik

48

inner experience, in its various colorations, informs you somewhat of God’s act of creating from nothing.32

What’s more, Malik emphasizes, one finds oneself fully in Kierkegaard if one follows him intricately and listens to him very attentively. For Kierkegaard recalls in each one of us states of being we seem to have thought of, or actually been, in some distant past. We cannot help but yearn for them at Kierkegaard’s behest. But more significantly, these Kierkegaardian evocations bespeak the underlying unity of existence, which is not an abstract idea but “a fellowship in living existence among living acting and existing persons.”33 Every simplification of Kierkegaard, insists Malik, is a distortion of him. “When you enter his world you encounter a fragile, gentle and very lonely self, a self that asks and contradicts, considers from all sides and searches and stirs—it shakes you to the very foundations.”34 Malik is completely consumed by Kierkegaard the utterly solitary self: The man is very much alone. I don’t know if he ever encountered in his life the meaning of true friendship, whether he had throughout his life one close and loving friend. I don’t wish to psychoanalyze him because I don’t believe in analyzing people in that way. God alone analyzes and gathers into a whole, and every analyst other than God is himself in need of someone to analyze him.35

Malik admits that reading Kierkegaard “is one of the greatest delights in my life,” then he quickly adds “if life were a matter purely of intellectual pleasure.”36 He continues that Kierkegaard himself of course stresses that life is not so, especially not intellectual interaction through mere reading. Malik concludes that on questions of the single living and dying individual person, on existential freedom, on responsible decision, and on the limits of reason when it comes to faith, “Kierkegaard is my teacher.”37 As a philosophical work in Arabic, Malik’s Al Muqaddimah is groundbreaking on at least two counts: it offers, as mentioned earlier, an original presentation of existential elements in the Koran, and the bulk of the book is an unprecedented discussion of phenomenology in its Husserlian and Heideggerian contours with the relevant specialized philosophical concepts and vocabulary coined for the first time in Arabic. Like many an original thinker, Malik is not one to dwell too much on documentation and footnoting; he philosophizes based mainly on synthesized impressions from a combination of extensive readings and unique lived experiences in both public and private life—all formulated through a lifetime of in-depth pondering of the timeless themes, the issues, and the problems at hand. In his analysis of the “summits of world thought,” as he was fond of referring to them, he emphasized the

Ibid., p. 571. Ibid. 34 Ibid., p. 572. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 32 33

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

49

need to spend a year or more in the company of each one reading, wrestling with, and living them to the full. II. ‘Abd al-Rahman Badawi No treatment of the Arab reception of Kierkegaard’s thought would be complete without some attention being given to the Egyptian philosophical thinker ‫ﺑدوي‬ ‫‘[ ﻋﺑد اﻟرﺣﻣن‬Abd al-Rahman Badawi] (1917–2002). Based on his own autobiography in two volumes, we learn that Badawi was born into a wealthy village family in Egypt, received his early education at a European-style school, became proficient in several languages, and eventually wrote his doctoral dissertation at Fouad the First University (formerly the Egyptian University, today Cairo University) in Cairo on French existentialism. In 1932 in Cairo he read voraciously in Islamic philosophy and translated into Arabic excerpts from Pascal, Leibniz, and Kant, and it was Pascal, as he tells us, who first got him interested deeply in philosophy.38 Later, he read Bergson, Blondel, and Maritain, and he mentions in particular two French professors teaching at the time in Cairo who made a lasting impression on him: Andre Lalande (1867–1963), who expressed an aversion towards these specific thinkers, and Alexandre Koyre (1892–1964), who did not object to Badawi’s interest in 1939 in studying the problem of death according to the existentialists.39 All in all, Badawi proved to be a prolific writer, translator, and editor with more than 120 books to his credit, mostly as edited and translated works.40 He translated extensively ancient Greek philosophers into Arabic by making use of edited and refined versions of medieval Arabic translations. He also edited and published for the first time Islamic philosophers in readable editions: al-Kindi, al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes. His works ‫ ﻓﻥ ﺍﻟﺷﻌﺭ ﻻﺭﺳﻁﻭ ﻭﺸﺭﻭﺣﻪ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻳﺔ‬,‫ﻣﻧﻁﻕ ﺍﺭﺳﻁﻭ‬, and ‫[ ﺍﺭﺴﻁﻭ ﻋﻧﺪﺍﻟﻌﺭﺐ‬Aristotle’s Logic in Three volumes, the Art of Poetry in Aristotle and its Arabic Interpretations, and Aristotle in Arabic Thought] outstripped, by his own words, much scholarship undertaken by the most astute orientalists of his day.41 He also wrote complete works in Arabic on Nietzsche, Hegel, Spengler, Schopenhauer, Schelling, and four volumes on Kant.42 Interestingly, Badawi does not have a full work on Kierkegaard despite his lifelong immersion in existential philosophy. Scattered discussions of Kierkegaard and translated excerpts from his writings, however, do figure in a number of Badawi’s philosophical works.

‘Abd al-Rahman Badawi, ‫( ﺴﻳﺭﺓ ﺣﻳﺎﺗﻲ‬1) [The Story of My Life, vol. 1], Beirut: The Arab Institute for Research and Publication 2000, pp. 44–5. 39 Ibid., pp. 63–5. 40 Ibid., p. 150. 41 Ibid., p. 180. Badawi had a way of over-inflating his achievements and downgrading his competitors. See, for example, p. 206 where he writes exaggeratedly about the fruits of a particular research: “By this great achievement for which I find no equal in the history of manuscript editing anywhere in the whole world and in any language, I accomplished a truly useful feat.” 42 Ibid., p. 181. 38

50

Habib C. Malik

Both his masters and doctoral theses evidence his early interest in existentialism. The first, completed in 1940, dealt with the problem of death in contemporary philosophy with a concentration on Heidegger. The second, which included a presentation of what he termed his own existential philosophy with Heidegger also serving as the main inspiration, was an examination of the problem of time and existence and the implications of this for ontology, logic, and ethics. The result was his dissertation entitled ‫[ ﺘﻔﺴﻳﺭ ﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩ ﺑﻭﺍﺴﻁﺔ ﻓﻛرة ﺍﻟﺯﻣﺎن‬Explaining Existence by means of the Concept of Time], which he published in 1943 as ‫[ ﺍﻟﺯﻣﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭدي‬Existential Time]. Notably, in the few pages in his autobiography where he presents the broad outlines of his existential philosophy as they appear in his dissertation, Badawi does not mention Kierkegaard once and instead singles out Heidegger’s Being and Time as the work that influenced him the most.43 Badawi, however, is keenly aware of the pioneering nature of his philosophical contributions for an Arab audience, in particular with respect to the propagation of existentialism: “By virtue of what I wrote about existentialism, it has become an essential tributary in the intellectual formation of the majority of cultured Arabs, this despite the differing levels of its comprehension, or lack thereof, among them.”44 Badawi’s interest in existential philosophy took him to many parts of Europe for extended stays. One of these was Paris where, as he remarks in his autobiography, “Sartre in 1945 transformed existentialism into a philosophical fad.” He adds disdainfully that he never had any use for Sartre as a philosopher and considered him to be only a literary writer and psychologist. He did eventually find time to translate into Arabic Sartre’s principal philosophical work Being and Nothingness, which was published in 1965 in Beirut. The problem with this fashionable aspect of existentialism, laments Badawi, is that ignorant foreigners like certain superficial Egyptian journalists who visited Paris in the period 1945–7 and went to St. Germain des Pres where they saw some young men and women openly embracing in a manner clearly unconcerned with the constraints of rigid social norms, imagined that this was what existentialism was all about: a matter of sexual liberation. To them therefore it seemed that existentialism was nothing more than a passing and degenerate trend among the youth. Consequently, they carried this erroneous impression of existentialism back to their readers in Egypt and the Arab world. “It was a case of stupidity and ignorance and false pretentiousness on their part,” writes Badawi angrily about these Egyptian journalists.45 The 1950s saw the beginnings of socialist influences in Arab politics, with Nasser’s 1952 revolution in Egypt paving the way for a cascade of militarist takeovers accompanied by sustained Marxist ideological infiltration of Arab intellectual circles. The Cold War had blown full blast into the Arab world. Badawi belonged to a more open and liberal generation, and following the Nasserist coup he See ibid., pp. 178–84. Ibid., p. 182. 45 Ibid., pp. 183–4. Badawi himself, on several occasions throughout his autobiography, does not hesitate to inform his readers about his own romantic exploits with various European women he met in places like Paris, Amsterdam, Vienna, and parts of Germany. Such adventures, he admits, contributed significantly to his love of these places. 43 44

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

51

decided to spend most of his years in Paris and elsewhere in Europe where he tended to avoid interacting with other Arabs. By his own admission, Badawi’s writings first on German philosophical idealism and then on existentialism were intended to counteract the predominant Arab leftist thought grounded in Marxist historical materialism.46 He called existentialist philosophy with its emphasis on freedom and individuality “the most potent intellectual weapon against Marxist ideology,” and he tells us that his 1961 book ‫[ ﺩﺭﺍﺳﺎﺕﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻔﻟﺴﻔﺔ ﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻳﺔ‬Studies in Existential Philosophy], which included two chapters on Kierkegaard, aimed through its focus on individual freedom at presenting a philosophical refutation of Marxist ideology.47 He adds without mentioning Kierkegaard that he deliberately resorted to the style of “indirect communication” as it is called in European works—or the “wise style” as Arabic works would term it—to get his anti-communist message across, especially to Egyptian readers living in the post-1952 era and being regularly exposed to increasing Marxist influences. After 1964 in particular it had become dangerous for anyone to confront or criticize openly “scientific” socialism and Marxism in Cairo. In 1967 Badawi took up a teaching post in philosophy at Benghazi University in Libya and became chairman of the philosophy department there from September 1969 to May 1973. He would take frequent holidays in Rome. During a visit by Libyan dictator Muammar Qadhafi to the university in April 1973 a group of philosophy students departed from the predictable behavior of the cheering crowds and began to speak out about freedom of expression and individual rights. The enraged dictator arrested Badawi, the department’s chairman, and only released him seventeen days later following an outcry by Badawi’s friends in Paris and Cairo. This was the last straw for Badawi, now thoroughly disillusioned with the repressive Arab intellectual environment, and he departed permanently for Paris.48 Badawi’s book ‫[ ﺍﻟﺯﻣﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﻭﺟودي‬Existential Time] commences with the author’s version of Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel’s philosophy. It is clear from the discussion and the footnotes that Badawi relied mainly on Jean Wahl’s (1888–1974) work Études Kierkegaardiennes (Paris: F. Aubier 1938). He underscores the fact that Kierkegaard was himself deeply influenced by Hegel and adds that all Kierkegaard’s existential categories like anxiety, death, the present, and the leap are dialectical in their essence since embedded in each one of them is a profound contradiction or contrast. Therefore, Badawi concludes, Kierkegaard criticizes Hegel’s use of the dialectic and not the dialectic itself.49 According to him, Kierkegaard saw all of existence as a permanent dialectic between the self and another; it is a union and then a separation between the finite and the infinite.50 Badawi, who is otherwise very much taken by Hegelian modes of thinking and philosophizing, says he joins Kierkegaard in what he terms “an existential critique of Hegel.”51 Echoing Wahl, Badawi asserts that Ibid., p. 354. Ibid., pp. 354–5. 48 Badawi, ‫( ﺴﻳﺭﺓ ﺣﻳﺎﺗﻲ‬2) [The Story of My Life, vol. 2], p. 143; p. 169; pp. 247–50. 49 Badawi, ‫[ ﺍﻟﺯﻣﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻱ‬Existential Time], 2nd ed., Cairo: Greenberg Press and Maktabat al-Nahda al-Masriyyah 1955, p. 29. 50 Ibid., p. 28. 51 Ibid., p. 31. 46 47

52

Habib C. Malik

Kierkegaard’s revolt against Hegel represented a major revolution in thought since Descartes’ claim that ideas determine existence and define it. “The more thought increases,” elaborates Badawi, “the more being decreases, and whenever being is enhanced objectified thought declines.”52 However, Badawi later on offers a very Hegelian criticism of both Kierkegaard’s and Nietzsche’s departures from Hegel: that “neither of them set up a clear philosophical system with definable contours on the basis of the existence of the individual subject, even if we are indebted to Kierkegaard for many of the observations and specific ideas.” Yet Badawi’s main objection paradoxically is that in their philosophizing reason continued to reign supreme, and that consequently their thought was primarily epistemological instead of being existential. Even though with both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche the subject is favored over the object, each introduced non-existential elements into their thought. Kierkegaard’s was influenced by “a religious orientation” that tied his single individual to the concept of monastic solitude and the deified saint: “from the start [Kierkegaard’s thought] was tainted by a corrective approach and outlook.” It is fine to do so, says Badawi with Heidegger clearly in mind, only after a pure existential stand has been taken that must precede all ethical or religious correctives. Badawi here seems unaware of, or at least reluctant to acknowledge, the tradition of Christian existentialism. Nietzsche for him also offers a far more radical corrective: the subject measured against the Superman; however, this too is a concept hauled in from outside the pure existentialist domain.53 Badawi’s point is that emotions and will must take precedence over reason and rational knowledge. For him the agitated inner life undertakes a movement of will steeped in emotion. Volitional impulses borrowed from Schopenhauer and Nietzsche are in evidence here, coupled eclectically with Hegelian dialectical reasoning.54 Except that for Badawi it is the dialectical opposition, the tension of opposites, that is central and not the Hegelian synthesis through Aufhebung. Hegel, according to Badawi, was not courageous enough to accept perpetual conflict, but had to fall back on reason to resolve this tension through the synthesis. Kierkegaard, on the other hand, posits the paradoxical that is not resolved through the Hegelian synthesis but remains offensive until the leap. Badawi declares this Kierkegaardian tension of opposites to be closer to his own dualistic view in which reality is divided into sets of continuously opposing pairs that are both emotional and volitional.55 Badawi is well aware of Kierkegaard’s seminal philosophical impact on subsequent thinkers like Heidegger, his favored philosopher. He says that Heidegger was influenced by Christianity generally and Kierkegaard in particular, but that Heidegger denies this claiming only the ancient Greeks, especially Aristotle, provided him with valuable insights. Kierkegaard, writes Badawi, was principally responsible for the inward turn in modern European thought and the philosophical

Ibid., p. 33. Ibid., pp. 154–5. 54 Ibid., p. 154. 55 Ibid., p. 156. 52 53

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

53

trends this spawned.56 In two places he translates into Arabic brief passages about freedom and about the self from Kierkegaard’s The Sickness unto Death, which he read in the 1939 French translation by Ferlov and Gateau.57 Further on, Badawi discusses Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety relying on a French translation of the book by the same name from which he translates selected passages into Arabic. He stresses that Heidegger followed in Kierkegaard’s footsteps when elucidating this concept. He also refers to relevant excerpts in Alexander Dru’s 1938 English translation of some of Kierkegaard’s journals. Two crucial points are made by Badawi regarding the concept of anxiety: that it is future-oriented for both Kierkegaard and Heidegger, and that it constitutes the connection between time and eternity.58 However, Badawi explains this last connection by referring to the idea of nothingness, which is found in the thought of both Heidegger and Sartre. Badawi states that Heidegger’s nothingness is preferable to Kierkegaard’s formulation, which became bogged down instead in the religious concept of sin. In a discussion of death—a lifelong philosophical preoccupation for Badawi—he stresses the need for death to retain its full tension and the power to evoke the shudder, as he calls it, or the tingle down the spine that turns into dreadful trembling. This is the truly existential confrontation with the phenomenon of death, and in this sense religious faith and salvation for Badawi become a convenient pretext for an unwarranted escape.59 It is significant that a Muslim like Badawi, who is otherwise not averse to his religious beliefs and traditions, should take this radical position that views faith as basically a cop-out when it comes to the problem of death. The courage to embrace nothingness, both a Nietzschean and a Sartrian idea arrived at by these philosophers in differing contexts, best captures Badawi’s attitude. Again, it is Kierkegaard’s religiously grounded philosophy of existence that seems to leave Badawi with distinct apprehensions. In the course of explaining his own view of existence Badawi writes in a manner reminiscent of Leibniz’s monads: Our position is that existence is composed of discrete entities separated totally from one another, each subsisting in utter independence from the other, and the isolation is so complete that every door that could connect these entities together has been tightly sealed, and the only way to establish a contact between one entity of existence and another is by means of the leap from one to the next.60

He adds that both Kierkegaard and Jaspers have emphasized this, except that Kierkegaard used it in a strictly religious context to indicate the nature of the relationship between the believer and God, “whereas I use it immanently within this existence.” So, while Kierkegaard’s leap is designed to bridge two distinct orders of existence, Badawi’s remains firmly embedded in the here and now.61 Badawi’s decided unease with the religious foundation of Kierkegaard’s thought Ibid., p. 92; p. 96. See ibid., p. 39; pp. 41–2. 58 Ibid., p. 170; p. 174. 59 Ibid., p. 174; p. 176. 60 Ibid., pp. 188–9. 61 Ibid. 56 57

54

Habib C. Malik

and with his recurring Christian allusions causes him to lean heavily in the direction of Heidegger’s position, which avoids overtly religious categories, or expressions steeped in Christian theological meaning.62 Thus Badawi the existential philosopher rejects Kierkegaard’s “higher” mode of existence in a spiritual world “outside” the self: “We don’t want in any way, and for whatever reasons, to exit from this existence to another higher one to be termed ‘an existence above this existence.’ ”63 Since we know nothing about this presumed higher existence, concludes Badawi in words that bracket off completely any Islamic faith to which he himself might adhere, we therefore overlook it totally. The historicity of existence, and hence the question of time this urgently raises, were for Badawi the crucial stuff of philosophy. Badawi uses his notion of unresolved tension within existence and the continuous creative energy that results from this tension to critique Bergson’s intuitionism. He agrees with both Kierkegaard and Heidegger and the existentialists generally who fix the present moment in a perpetual orientation towards the future. Since time is an essential component of existence, says Badawi, the future means possibilities, and unlike the case with Bergson possibility as potentiality always precedes actuality.64 In his discussion of time Badawi makes some fascinating comparisons and analyses of concepts of the temporal in both Islam and Christianity.65 The Arabic language is rich in time-related vocabulary; words like ‫[ اﻷزل‬al-Azal], ‫[ اﻷﺑد‬al-Abad], ‫[ اﻟﻶﻧﻬﺎﻳﺔ‬alLaanihaya], and ‫[ اﻟﺳﺭﻣد‬al-Sarmad] all suggest untranslatable nuances of the English words “eternity,” “infinity,” and “endlessness.” A series of lectures Badawi delivered in Beirut on areas of agreement between Islamic Sufism and existentialism was published in 1947 as part of a seminal book he entitled ‫[ اﻻﻧﺴﺎﻧﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻔﻛﺭ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻲ‬Humanism and Existentialism in Arabic Thought].66 Here Badawi blazes a crucial trail in the comparative study of Sufism and European existentialism, in particular Kierkegaard. Significantly, he also spells out with candor the real reason behind his life-long reluctance to promote Kierkegaard too strongly for Arab readers, and defends his substitute idea of Sufism as a native Islamic version of existentialism—a convenient natural portal through which Muslims could safely enter into the world of existential philosophy. Badawi says he unearthed existential elements in the modern sense in Sufism in order to use this existential content as a point of departure for formulating an Arab existential philosophical school—an Arabic existentialism—that will serve as his new philosophy of life and existence.67 He wishes to take the Sufis as fathers of a contemporary Arab existentialist revival the same way twentieth-century European existentialists took Kierkegaard as the father of their movement: “This way we can chart for existentialism origins in our own spiritual history.”

Ibid., p. 190. Ibid., p. 200. 64 Ibid., p. 210; p. 214; p. 256. 65 See Ibid., pp. 92–100. 66 See ‫( ﺴﻳﺭﺓ ﺣﻳﺎﺗﻲ‬1) [The Story of My Life, vol. 1], p. 182. 67 Badawi, ‫[ ﺍﻻﻧﺴﺎﻧﻳﺔ  ﻭﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻳﺔ  ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻔﻛﺭ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻲ‬Humanity and Existentialism in Arabic Thought], Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahda al-Masriyyah 1947, p. 96. 62 63

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

55

It is not possible, insists Badawi, to take Kierkegaard as our starting-point because he cannot be understood, and therefore have a creative impact, except within his European Christian context: “This is the great stumbling block that has so far caused me to hesitate to present a comprehensive survey of Kierkegaard’s philosophy to the Arab reader.” Badawi continues: I can only do this if I allow him free reign to roam in a purely Christian context, indeed a very specific one, namely Protestantism. In vain have I tried my utmost to separate him from this context so as to present the Arab reader with the pure existential results of his experiences free of their specific and limited religious connotations and implications, so that his thought can penetrate our Arab world and become an integral part of our spiritual existence, and we can interact with it and be stimulated by it creatively in the same way that he profoundly influenced Heidegger and Jaspers and others of the existential school.68

By his own admission then Badawi seems incapable of distilling from Kierkegaard much beyond the bare rudiments of sanitized universal existential categories. Thinkers in places like Japan and other non-Western and non-Christian cultural milieus who dealt with Kierkegaard hardly experienced the same level of hesitation and internal strife that have beset Badawi from Egypt. In fact philosophers from other Islamic settings such as Iran, for instance, have on the whole demonstrated far greater receptivity to the full scope of Kierkegaard than their counterparts in the Arab world, and they did so without being overly hampered by Badawi’s crippling considerations. To be fair to Badawi, he does recognize the danger of distorting Kierkegaard by plucking him completely out of his spiritual heritage. He writes: Despite the fact that many of the successive interpretations of Kierkegaard’s thought depart bit by bit from the active factors that have gone into constituting his philosophy, until he is presented in his stark nakedness devoid of all the ingredients of his religious experience in Christian belief, what is undeniable is that this approach entails considerable distortion of the truth of his philosophy, and therefore results in a marked loss of the power of his fertile and creative influence.69

Here Badawi pauses to interject his pet philosophical affirmation: “This by no means implies that existentialism in its ultimate assertions is necessarily religiously oriented—no. On the contrary, it is a probing in the opposite direction; however, only the points of departure in existential experiences in their distant primordial origins can be considered religious.”70 Clearly Badawi is having recurring difficulties gauging the precise identity and extent of the religious content of any existential experience. But in this he is not alone since Heidegger faces similar challenges. Recognizing this, Badawi continues: “Heidegger, for example, uses most of the Christian doctrinal categories: sin, fall, elevation, personhood, etc, but he empties them ultimately of all religious content in order to render them pure and general existential concepts.”71 Ibid., pp. 96–7. Ibid., p. 97. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid., Charles Malik, as was stated earlier, dwelled on this same noticeable feature of Heidegger’s philosophy. 68 69

56

Habib C. Malik

For his part, Badawi remained reluctant to follow in Heidegger’s footsteps when it came to sanitizing the spiritual Kierkegaard. Still, Badawi’s comparative discussion of Sufism and Kierkegaard is a serious contribution and a novel way of mediating elements of Kierkegaard’s thought to an Islamic readership. The similarities are many and the thematic connections are deep, asserts Badawi, between the Sufis and the modern existentialists as pertains to principle, methodology, and purpose. Both begin with personal existence that to them is the only true existence. Sufism in particular only acknowledges subjective (personal) existence and bases everything on it. External existence beyond the self is secondary and inferior for Sufis; it only exists because the knowing self exists. The Sufi “states” are similar to the attributes and conditions on which existentialists focus. Both speak in terms of a hierarchy of levels of existence, and with Sufis like Suhrawardi this reaches all the way to the level of deification or the possession of full knowledge. Like the existentialists, Sufis hold that existence precedes essence.72 Since it is impossible for the mystic to be God, perfect and complete existence is human existence that encompasses for the Sufi the divine, the cosmic, the whole, and the parts. The unity posited here brings existence back to God, and brings God back to the perfect human, to the highest level of subjectivity. Badawi here, again citing Jean Wahl, states that the perfect human in Sufism is precisely existentialism’s “single individual” as depicted by Kierkegaard: “All the Kierkegaardian attributes given to the single individual are the same as what we find in Sufi Islam.”73 The single individual lives alone in complete solitude “silent as the grave, still as death.”74 Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are invoked here by Badawi with similar descriptions and Teresa of Avila is quoted as well. In Sufism there is a glorification of silence: silence must be one’s country. The Sufi, says Badawi, is the victim of truth, and this in turn generates the urge in him to become a martyr. Attributed to Al-Hallaj (858–922), the most radical and most passionate of the Sufis, is the amazing statement quoted by Badawi: “As in the religion of the cross, so shall be my death.” Al-Hallaj deliberately provoked those around him to kill him, taunting them with these words: “Almighty God himself has spilt my blood, so kill me…kill me and you shall be rewarded and I shall find repose…there is nothing more urgent for Muslims in this world than to kill me!”75 Al-Hallaj was finally granted his wish and put to death in the year 922 for openly declaring: “I am the Truth.” “He who is a prey in the eyes of people,” writes Badawi after Jean Wahl paraphrasing Kierkegaard, “lives with God face to face. But when the single individual arrives, divinity is present as well for the sake of that single individual.”76 The Sufis of Islam were amazing in their coining of pregnant expressions and phrases, declares Badawi, like for instance “the mirror of existence,” but they were short on clear and detailed explanations and definitions of these expressions. For Ibid., pp. 67–8. Ibid., p. 69. 74 These words are quoted by Badawi from an Islamic mystic named ‫ﺑﻥ ﻫﻭﺍﺯﻥ ﺍﻟﻘﺸﻳﺭﻱ‬ ‫ ;ﻋﺑﺩ ﺍﻟﻛﺭﻳﻡ‬see ibid., p. 70. 75 Ibid., pp. 70–1. 76 Ibid., p. 71. 72 73

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

57

us, knowing the precise intended meaning of a Sufi expression is not always selfevident; therefore, we are responsible for our own interpretations of their enigmatic utterances.77 With this cautionary note Badawi embarks on some creative interpreting of his own that involves, among others, Kierkegaard. He begins by stating that Islam’s Sufis anticipate Heidegger.78 We know of course that Heidegger is indebted to medieval German mysticism, in particular to Meister Eckhart and later to Jakob Boehme. Also linking the Sufis to Heidegger is their shared concept of nothingness. Suhrawardi, the founder of a brand of Sufism called ‫[ اﻻﺷﺭﺍﻗﻳﺔ‬illuminationism], maintained that absolute existence and nothingness are closely bound. Badawi chooses an obscure anonymous Sufi of the illuminationist school and analyzes a manuscript by him entitled ‫[ اﻟﻣﺛل اﻟﻌﻘﻟﻳﺔ اﻷﻓﻼطوﻧﻳﺔ‬Platonic Mental Forms] in which the author brings together mystically absolute existence and nothingness.79 Badawi concludes that in his presentation this Sufi combines both Kierkegaardian and Hegelian elements, but that he comes closer to Kierkegaard because Kierkegaard sees in the single individual the unity and wholeness of existence, and he does not confine it to “absolute existence” as such, but stresses that absolute existence must depart from its absoluteness in its manifestation in individuals who embody a unity similar to that of absolute existence.80 Badawi states, at the risk of over-interpreting, that as he read this anonymous Sufi text he imagined the conflict between Kierkegaard and Hegel, with Hegel acting as both Kierkegaard’s adversary and mentor.81 Badawi sees also clear parallels between the Sufis and the existentialists on the concept of anxiety, or ‫[ اﻟﻘﻠق‬al-Qalaq]. He quotes the famous Sufi Naqshbandi on ‫اﻟﻘﻠق‬, who describes it as the discarding of patience and the yearning of the soul for the promised one without whom everything else leads to tedium and monotony. This anxiety causes one to loathe life and court death; it is a state of alienation from everything except truth; it is the embrace of solitude and the abandonment of all creation.82 These very nuanced and very rich descriptions by a Sufi bring out the ambivalence of anxiety and hence its dialectical character. This is very similar, says Badawi, to Kierkegaard’s dialectical depiction of anxiety as “a sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy.”83 Like Kierkegaard, the Sufis drew the clear distinction between ‫( اﻟﻘﻠق‬anxiety) and ‫[ اﻟﺧوف‬al-Khawf] (fear). They also spoke of gradations of anxiety in both the psychological and existential senses. Most interestingly, Badawi insinuates, Kierkegaard’s view of anxiety as connecting time with eternity and Heidegger’s anxiety unmasking nothingness are anticipated by the Sufi state of Ibid., p. 75. Ibid., p. 74. 79 Ibid., pp. 72–9. 80 Ibid., p. 80. Once again, Badawi here relies on a work by Jean Wahl entitled Le Malheur de la Conscience dans la Philosophie de Hegel (Paris: Rieder 1929) in which Wahl quotes Hegel as opposing the subject dialectically to endless multiplicity. 81 Badawi, ‫[ ﺍﻻﻧﺴﺎﻧﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻔﻛﺭ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻲ‬Humanity and Existentialism in Arabic Thought], p. 82. 82 Ibid., pp. 83–4. 83 SKS 4, 348 / CA, 42. Badawi quotes from the 1935 French translation of Le Concept de l’Angoisse. He also quotes a similar passage on anxiety from the 1938 Dru English translation of the Journals. See ibid., pp. 86–8. 77 78

58

Habib C. Malik

‫[ اﻟﺑرزخ‬al-Barzakh], that is, the ontological isthmus dividing being from nothingness wherein all mediations reside.84 Thus for the Sufis as it also stands with Kierkegaard and Heidegger, anxiety opens simultaneously unto eternity and nothingness. With Kierkegaard, says Badawi, anxiety takes on acute religious significance when it mediates the depths of sin and the heights of salvation.85 Lastly, the Sufis speak of plummeting, which echoes Heidegger’s existential free-fall as well as the Christian doctrine of the Fall that figures centrally in Kierkegaard’s philosophy.86 Badawi reiterates toward the end of his discussion of Sufism and existentialism the solution he claims to have devised for the dilemma of awakening existentialist stimulations in Arab societies, while at the same time avoiding having to serve as an inadvertent instrument for the propagation among Muslims of the overt Christian content of Kierkegaard’s thought: “This seemingly insurmountable and stubborn obstacle in the way of the Arab, and particularly the Muslim, can be eliminated once and for all by what we have demonstrated in this discussion, namely that Arabic Sufism can play the same inspirational role that Kierkegaard has played for European existentialism.” He continues in the same vein: “We maintain with confidence that the connection between contemporary existentialism and Kierkegaard does not exceed by much the similar connection between Islamic Sufism and the existential philosophical persuasion.”87 To escape sounding glib, Badawi introduces some qualifications by pointing to two handicaps besetting his charted enterprise. First, he says, we have not studied in depth Islamic Sufism, especially in its later period, in order to formulate an accurate idea about the similarities and meeting points between this Sufism and a modern philosophical school like existentialism with spiritual roots that are largely absent in Arab culture. Second, we forget, or we ignore, the fact that modern existentialism grew out of the philosophy of Kierkegaard, and instead of returning to his thoughts as presented in his own books we concentrate on the picture Heidegger offers us of him, or we turn our attention to his interpreters and critics who have strayed considerably in their arguments from his own words as they appear in his writings. Moreover, significant developments in the modern history of European thought need to be taken into account, and here Kierkegaard stands in a pivotal relationship with Hegel and takes him as his point of departure. Clearly Kierkegaard grasped the fact that Hegel represented a high point in the unfolding of the history of the European spirit, concludes Badawi.88 This tension in Badawi between a genuine admiration for the seminal power and novelty of Kierkegaard’s thought on the one hand, and an abiding wariness of plunging too deeply into, or rooting too loudly for, this same Kierkegaardian philosophy on the other, kept bringing Badawi back to the Sufis as the best chance for an existential germination among Arabs. Badawi, ‫[ ﺍﻻﻧﺴﺎﻧﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻔﻛﺭ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻲ‬Humanity and Existentialism in Arabic Thought], pp. 92–3. For a condensed philosophical description of the Sufi state of ‫ ﺍﻟﺑﺭﺯﺥ‬as it appears in Ibn ‘Arabi, see Richard K. Khuri, Freedom, Modernity, and Islam: Toward a Creative Synthesis, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press 1998, pp. 196–9. 85 Badawi, ‫[ اﻻﻧﺴﺎﻧﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻔﻛﺭ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻲ‬Humanity and Existentialism in Arabic Thought], p. 89. 86 Ibid., p. 94. 87 Ibid., pp. 97–8. 88 Ibid., p. 98. 84

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

59

In his groundbreaking discussion of Sufism, existentialism, and Kierkegaard, Badawi actually embarked on overcoming the first of his stated handicaps, namely, that more detailed investigation of the Sufi corpus is needed in order to isolate specific themes and approaches that can be termed existential. As with Kierkegaard and Plato, the Sufis use religious stories, myths, and fables to offer existential lessons and illustrations. This is precisely what Sufis like Al-Hallaj, Suhrawardi (1154–91), and Ibn ‘Arabi (1165–1240) do. Badawi offers the example of Al-Hallaj, who tried to imitate the life of Christ by living it existentially. This, says Badawi, can provide suitable and rich material for existential analysis. “Exactly as Kierkegaard lived his philosophy,” writes Badawi, “so did Al-Hallaj, and in this he exceeded all the other Islamic Sufis except perhaps Suhrawardi to some extent and Ibn Sab’een to a greater degree.”89 In this sense, adds Badawi, we can make the same distinction about AlHallaj that the critics have made with respect to Kierkegaard, namely that unlike Heidegger and Jaspers, Kierkegaard was an existential philosopher in the full sense, whereas the other two philosophized existence, or were philosophers “of” existence. To underscore this point Badawi quotes Nicholas Berdyaev (1874–1948), who says that Kierkegaard wants philosophy itself to be existence, while Heidegger and Jaspers have turned philosophy into a discourse on existence.90 So Al-Hallaj “lived what he uttered and uttered what he lived,” concludes Badawi, with his life and thought fusing into one inseparable whole “exactly like Kierkegaard.”91 Badawi published a work he called ‫[ ﺸﺧﺻﻳﺎﺕ ﻗﻟﻘﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻻﺳﻼم‬Anxious Personalities in Islam] that treated the Sufis and others through an existential analysis of their lives and beliefs. By advocating the emergence of an indigenous Arab existentialism, Badawi was in no way intending to turn his back on the great tradition of Western existentialist philosophy. He ends his discussion of Sufism and existentialism with these telling words: Let it not be understood that by calling for and working toward the establishment of an Arab existential philosophy based on the inspiration received from the Islamic Sufi tradition we are thereby promoting the renunciation of Kierkegaard and Heidegger and Jaspers and the rest of the European existentialists. How far is all this from our thoughts! Without these great thinkers there would be no existential philosophy, and we wouldn’t have been able to arrive at such a philosophy on our own by relying solely on Arab Islamic sources such as the Sufis. We need to imitate these great thinkers and relive their experiences and reformulate their thoughts and live them fully with all our powers…until such time when we are able to establish an autonomous Arab existentialism resting on solid foundations. And even then we will never reject these great pillars of existentialism, but instead we shall spread their influence to the far reaches of our Arab realm and the new cultures therein. We shall remain eternally grateful to them for having paid such fertile, innovative, and stimulating visits to our lands. We bid them farewell until we meet again in the universal spiritual arena of a unified humanity, and who knows: perhaps by then these others will have become members of our intimate tribe!92 Ibid., p. 99; p. 102. He quoted from a French translation of Berdyaev entitled Cinq méditations sur l’existence (Paris: Aubier 1936). See ibid., p. 99. 91 Badawi, ‫[ ﺍﻻﻧﺴﺎﻧﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻔﻛﺭ ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻲ‬Humanity and Existentialism in Arabic Thought], pp. 99–100. 92 Ibid., pp. 103–4. 89 90

60

Habib C. Malik

Reading these words by Badawi written in 1947 it is all the more anticlimactic to see him less than fifteen years later publish a work entitled ‫ﺩﺭﺍﺴﺎﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻔﻟﺳﻔﺔ ﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻳﺔ‬ [Studies in Existential Philosophy] in which Kierkegaard is afforded a disappointing and very one-sided treatment—something that runs against the grain of everything Badawi preached in his earlier book. This new book purports to be a primer that offers the Arabic reader a survey of existential philosophy by focusing in brief succession on a number of the movement’s leading thinkers such as Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jaspers, Camus, Unamuno, Ortega, Berdyaev, Bergson, and Sartre. The discussions are generally superficial and idiosyncratic. After paraphrasing the central issue for Kierkegaard as culled from an 1835 journal entry, namely “to find a truth for me, to find the idea for the sake of which I want to live and die,”93 Badawi gives a cursory two-page condensation of Kierkegaard’s philosophy; quotes a translated passage from Fear and Trembling; mentions freedom, risk, despair, anxiety, vertigo, and sin; and cryptically declares that all this has served as the source of inspiration for all subsequent existentialism in the twentieth century.94 Badawi attempts to situate the modern existentialist sensibility in its historical context by offering quick references to those he regards as its ancient, medieval, and early modern precursors: Parmenides, Socrates, Augustine, the Islamic Sufis, and Pascal. He translates a passage from a French edition of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript to illustrate Kierkegaard’s objection to Hegel’s abstractions.95 The twenty pages Badawi allots to Kierkegaard in this book deal mainly with his relationship to Regine and the reasons for breaking the engagement along with a discussion of the three Kierkegaardian stages expounded in Either/Or and a consideration of the question of marriage for the existential philosopher. He includes in the book a glossy reproduction of the drawing of Kierkegaard by his brother Peter Christian. Calling the first part of his presentation “Guilty…or not guilty” borrowed from the section in Stages on Life’s Way under the same title, Badawi says this question pulsated in Kierkegaard’s blood throughout his philosophical life and was precipitated by the engagement to Regine that he had to break. He goes into some detail about the relationship with Regine and in the process translates a lengthy passage from the 1942 French edition of Stages found in the section “Guilty?”/“Not Guilty?” under the heading “March 25, Morning.”96 Badawi dwells principally on the stark contrast between her innocence and Kierkegaard’s complexity. He concludes that Kierkegaard was a poet at heart even though he never composed any poetry. His entire life was that of a suffering poet and the passage about the Bull of Phalaris, taken from the beginning of the first volume of Either/Or, is translated by Badawi from the 1943 French edition to illustrate the point. Roaming the deserts of theology weighed down by a family curse on his shoulders, Kierkegaard could not bring himself to inflict such suffering on a young and innocent girl like Regine. Badawi is so taken up by this portrait that he analyzes at length “Guilty?”/“Not Guilty?” Badawi, ‫[ ﺩﺭﺍﺴﺎﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻔﻟﺳﻔﺔ ﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻳﺔ‬Studies in Existential Philosophy], Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahda al-Masriyyah 1961, pp. 3–5. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid., pp. 21–2. 96 SKS 6, 245 / SL, 262–3. See ibid., pp. 30–2. 93

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

61

in Stages and delineates Kierkegaard as the forlorn lover stalking his oblivious beloved.97 The imagery might be captivating for young Arab readers, but it hardly serves as a sufficient introduction to Kierkegaard’s thought, which presumably the little space assigned to him in Badawi’s primer is intended to offer. There are unmistakable autobiographical motivations behind Badawi’s concentration on this particular aspect of Kierkegaard’s life and its relation to his overall philosophical standpoint. Badawi himself never married and devoted much of his fairly long life to writing and translating philosophy. There are even oblique suggestions gleaned from a poetic work he wrote entitled ‫[ اﻟﺣور وﺍﻟﻧور‬Nymphs and Light] that he himself might have experienced an unfulfilled love relationship with a girl he names as Salwa, which then drove him to the lonely existence of the brooding thinker. Kierkegaard’s commitment as a philosopher to his solitary way of life, his breaking off of the engagement to the one he loved, and his consigning of married life to the second, ethical stage of existence—all resonated personally with Badawi. “The breaking of this engagement,” he writes, was the occasion for tremendous benefit to humanity both intellectually and artistically. The resulting tragedy brought forth much creativity that transformed a simple girl into far more than what history, if it had cared to remember such trivialities, would have otherwise referred to as “Mrs. Kierkegaard,” bless her soul! And all talk about her would have long ago ceased.98

He then adds: “But the essence of the matter remains: Guilty…or…not guilty?”99 Regrettably, Badawi neglects to probe this essence much further. In a few remaining pages Badawi surveys the three stages of existence—the aesthetic, ethical, and religious—as he encountered them in Either/Or. The first entails immediacy and constant novelty; the second involves memory and repetition that in turn signify responsibility and duty; and the third is beyond time opening to eternity. Badawi finds it appropriate here to quote Suhrawardi who says: “Your Lord has no morning or evening” to indicate that God is beyond time. The Sufis for Badawi operate on Kierkegaard’s religious level.100 Badawi asserts that moving from one stage to the next occurs by leaps, that there are chasms separating these states of existence, and that a single individual can pass through all three. Kierkegaard himself, says Badawi, did just that.101 For a Muslim Arab with set reservations about the extent to which he desired to expose his readership to Christian forms of writing, Badawi was himself nevertheless well versed in many of the spiritual fruits of that other tradition. For example, he read mystics like Teresa of Avila and St. John of the Cross. He also read the Gospels, Paul, and Augustine. All these figure appear in a book he wrote analyzing the problem of death, and they appear alongside a Christian religious thinker like Berdyaev and the philosophers Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Bergson, and Heidegger. Kierkegaard,

Badawi, ‫[ ﺩﺭﺍﺴﺎﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻔﻟﺳﻔﺔ ﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻳﺔ‬Studies in Existential Philosophy], pp. 33–9. Ibid., pp. 40–1. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid., p. 43; pp. 46–7. 101 Ibid., p. 49. 97

98

62

Habib C. Malik

however, is conspicuous by his absence from this particular work.102 In his book on Nietzsche, Badawi finds two occasions to draw comparisons between Nietzsche and Kierkegaard: what he calls Nietzsche’s near-mystical link to his father paralleling Kierkegaard’s lifelong dread of the curse that afflicted his father; and on the familiar theme of loneliness and solitude.103 There is no question that ‘Abd al-Rahman Badawi was a prolific and pioneering Muslim Arab thinker who braved the world of Western philosophy and existential thought in particular. The little he accepted to present of Kierkegaard to his Arabic readers, though defective on many counts, remains significant both in scope and as precedent-setting. Although a veritable powerhouse of translation from Western languages into Arabic, Badawi deliberately steered clear of placing in the hands of his readers any Arabic translation of a complete work by Kierkegaard. In many ways Badawi was an uncompromising man with set prejudices. For example, he says in his autobiography that Germany had become a “Jewish colony” during Weimar, and that Nazism was merely an expression of German rejection of Jewish power and monopolies.104 Following repeated trips to Lebanon he betrayed a tendency to get sucked into that country’s sectarian politics by expressing an aversion to its leading Christian intellectuals whom he accused of spreading hatred for Islam.105 He categorically ruled out any Christian–Muslim dialogue because of what he saw as their irreconcilability and incompatibility.106 And he seems to have made only one trip to the United States in April 1971, when he visited both Harvard and Columbia universities.107 That said, Badawi was a bold critic of the authoritarianism in his native Egypt during and after the Nasser era. In January 1953, he was chosen as a member of the Constitution Committee to draft a new constitution for Egypt, and his contribution came in the form of an emphasis on freedom and duties; however, the draft constitution was later abandoned and replaced by the 1956 constitution. On several occasions he fled the stifling Arab intellectual climate to greener pastures in the West, and then turned around and openly criticized this deplorable state of affairs. Impressively, the creative interface he conjured between Kierkegaard’s life and thought and the life and thought of the Sufis represents a fascinating way in which the Muslim world can come to appreciate some of the insights of Kierkegaard. III. Imam ‘Abd el-Fattah Imam Badawi was the closest that a Muslim Arab philosopher came to wrestling with the Kierkegaard corpus and its empirical life implications. But Kierkegaard has See Badawi, ‫[ ﺍﻟﻣﻭﺕ ﻭﺍﻟﻌﺑﻘﺭﻳﺔ‬Death and Genius], 2nd ed, Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahda al-Masriyyah 1962, 264 pages. Beyond page 31 the book meanders into eclectic territory treating Romantics, Hölderlin, Zweig, and others and dwelling on autobiographical snippets by various minor Arab and European writers. 103 See Badawi, ‫[ ﻧﻳﺗﺷﻪ‬Nietzsche], 5th ed., Kuwait: Wikalat al-Matbu’aat 1975, p. 30; p. 81. 104 Badawi, ‫( ﺴﻳﺭﺓ ﺣﻳﺎﺗﻲ‬1) [The Story of My Life, vol. 1], p. 88; p. 90. 105 Ibid., p. 165; p. 170. 106 Badawi, ‫( ﺴﻳﺭﺓ ﺣﻳﺎﺗﻲ‬2) [The Story of My Life, vol. 2], pp. 179–80. 107 Ibid., p. 227. 102

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

63

also received some attention from another quarter within the Arab world, that of the scholars and academicians. A handful of these have written works in Arabic on Kierkegaard and on the intertwining of his life and thoughts. Foremost among these � ‫ﺍﻣﺎﻡ ﻋﺑﺩ‬ is an Egyptian philosophy professor from Kuwait University named ‫ﺍﻟﻔﺗﺎﺡ ﺍﻣﺎﻡ‬ [Imam ‘Abd el-Fattah Imam]. Imam, who received his doctorate in philosophy in 1972, is essentially a Hegel scholar. He has translated Hegel’s Philosophy of Right into Arabic along with a couple of other books on the German philosopher, and he has also written a few books of his own on Hegel in that language. Concerning Kierkegaard, Imam published a two-volume study of him, the second volume of which is devoted to what the author calls Kierkegaard’s battle with Hegel and Scandinavian Hegelianism. But it is actually the first volume that is of special interest to Kierkegaard’s Arab reception. Entitled ‫ ﺣﻳﺎﺗﻪ ﻭﺍﻋﻣﺎﻟﻪ‬:‫[ ﺴﺭﻥ ﻛﻳﺭﻛﺟﻭﺭ ﺭﺍﺌﺩ ﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻳﺔ‬Søren Kierkegaard, Pioneer of Existentialism: His Life and Works], the 357-page work published in its second edition in 1983 includes an intellectual biography of sorts woven in with highlights from the history of modern European existentialism, a full listing of Kierkegaard’s works with all the titles translated into Arabic, and some 70 pages of translated selections from a number of English editions of Kierkegaard’s writings. The footnotes throughout the book reveal a heavy reliance by the author on secondary sources about Kierkegaard and existentialism mostly in English: Lowrie, Hohlenberg, Kaufmann, Thulstrup, Macquarrie, Macintyre, Warnock, Taylor, Kirmmse, Brandt, Jolivet, Collins, and Heiss are the leading names. Inevitably, Jean Wahl’s celebrated work in French is cited repeatedly as well. Imam, however, has also read extensively in the then available English editions of Kierkegaard’s oeuvre including the Dru translations from the journals and the Croxall compilation. At the end of his short introduction to the book Imam writes that an academic study of Kierkegaard is fully justified despite Kierkegaard’s own expressed “sadness” at the fate that will befall him at the hands of professors and lecturers: “With this in mind I have brought forth this book that I hope will contribute something new to the Arabic philosophical library.”108 There are four distinct features of this book by Imam that can be considered contributions in the sense intended by the author. The first is the author’s opening chapter in which he presents, and then criticizes, Walter Kaufmann’s attack on Kierkegaard in his From Shakespeare to Existentialism.109 Under the title “Was Kierkegaard a Philosopher?” Imam’s first chapter summarizes Kaufmann’s four objections to calling Kierkegaard a philosopher, and then rips these objections to shreds. Relying on frequent quotations from Kierkegaard’s journals, works like Fear and Trembling, and the Gospels, Imam argues that the new inward direction that Kierkegaard took as a reaction to Hegelian objectified epistemologically oriented systematization in philosophy, and that acted as the inspiration for twentiethcentury existentialism, is every bit as worthy of being designated a philosophy as the approach from which it consciously departs. Imam hastens to declare: 108 Imam ‘Abd el-Fattah Imam, ‫ ﺣﻳﺎﺗﻪ ﻭﺍﻋﻣﺎﻟﻪ‬:‫[ ﺴﺭﻥ ﻛﻳﺭﻛﺟﻭﺭ ﺭﺍﺌﺩ ﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻳﺔ‬Søren Kierkegaard, Pioneer of Existentialism: His Life and Works], vol. 1, 2nd ed., Beirut: Dar al-Tanweer Liltiba’ah wal-Nashir 1983 (Modern Thought Series), p. 12. 109 Walter Arnold Kaufmann, From Shakespeare to Existentialism: Studies in Poetry, Religion, and Philosophy, Boston: Beacon Press 1959.

Habib C. Malik

64

We are here by no means defending any particular theory of Kierkegaard, or adopting any of his views or positions that in itself might be resting on very shaky and philosophically indefensible grounds incapable of standing up to rigorous criticism. Nor are we neglecting the possibility that certain components of Kierkegaard’s thought might be crucially dependent on Hegel’s philosophy so that they can only be grasped if one constantly presupposes this Hegelian foundation….Nevertheless, we utterly reject that Kierkegaard be cast so cavalierly outside the ship of philosophy merely because he did not tread a methodological path that was to the liking of this or that philosophical scholar.110

Kierkegaard, continues Imam, belongs to the genre of philosophers like Pascal and Nietzsche who mingled their own lives and beliefs and even blood with their philosophizing. And to Kaufmann’s “strange justification” that if Kierkegaard himself did not consider himself to be a philosopher, why should we consider him as such, Imam replies caustically with a question: “And since when, Mr. Kaufmann, have scholars been bound by what philosophers have said about themselves…?!” Have not thinkers like Sartre and Heidegger and Jaspers and Marcel doubted, and even rejected, the designation “existential,” Imam presses on, “to describe them or their philosophies?111 If Descartes, Pascal, and Leibniz wrote and made references to Scripture and regarded themselves as religious believers and are considered to have been philosophers, then Kierkegaard merits equal treatment, continues Imam in response to another of Kaufmann’s objections.112 The relentless step-by-step demolition of Kaufmann’s critical position proceeds for some twenty pages at the end of which Imam reiterates the question that if existentialism is legitimately regarded by historians of ideas as a novel approach in philosophizing since it centers on the human person and the subject instead of on nature and the object, and if Kierkegaard is viewed as the founder of this modern philosophical trend, then by what right does Kaufmann exclude him from the realm of philosophy?113 The second feature of Imam’s book is that while he is generally fair in depicting both the intensity and the complexity of Kierkegaard’s confrontation with Hegelianism, it is impossible for him to hide his unmistakable preference for Hegel. At one point early in the book when he is facing down Kaufmann, Imam states his position bluntly: “We know of course that Kierkegaard does not measure up to even a speck of Hegel, and he is nowhere near such philosophical giants as Plato and Aristotle, and he may not be ‘great’ in the sense that Kant is great…still, none of this prevents him from being a philosopher….”114 A quick example will suffice to reveal Imam’s penchant for detecting Hegelian intimations behind a number of positions Kierkegaard ends up adopting. When referring to the sufferings of Kierkegaard as a result of the broken engagement to Regine, Imam sees in the sufferer’s expectation that what is lost temporally will be regained eternally through faith an application of the Hegelian dialectical synthesis brought on by Aufhebung.115 He might as well have Ibid., p. 25. Ibid., pp. 25–6. 112 Ibid., pp. 30–2. 113 Ibid., p. 39. 114 Ibid., p. 25. 115 Ibid., p. 144. 110 111

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

65

invoked Freud’s category of sublimation, but in Imam’s case it is Hegel who always springs to mind first. In eternity all will be healed and resolved and set right—Imam sees in this a very Hegelian movement. The third salient feature in Imam’s study of Kierkegaard has to do with the parallels he detects in, and the lessons he draws from, Kierkegaard’s attack on the sham and complacent Christianity of his day. Imam unreservedly applies these to the deplorable conditions around him in his Arab milieu. Kierkegaard’s demand for honesty and fidelity and consistency between belief and action, he says, is intended to transcend the situation in mid-nineteenth-century Denmark and speak to all of us everywhere at any time. This is very relevant for conditions prevailing throughout Arab societies where freedom is praised and liberation glorified while no trace of these can be found anywhere in sight. “So much talk [in the Arab world] about democracy and so much pride in its achievements while it has not been practiced for a single day!” writes Imam scathingly.116 He is also inspired by Kierkegaard to attack the double standard and the hypocritical behavior in his own culture: “How many times have I caught a veiled Muslim student cheating on her test, and how many times have I given a warning to an outwardly pious young men with a lengthy beard that nearly covers his answer sheet to refrain from glancing sideways at his neighbor’s examination paper?” he asks rhetorically in an appalled tone. Imam recalls the invariable surprise on their faces when he confronts them with the glaring incongruity of their position that is the result of a deep-seated personality split—the same sort of phenomenon that so incensed Kierkegaard he saw in it a “sickness unto death.”117 We are all guilty of this internal split to some degree, Imam adds. The author analyzes in some detail Kierkegaard’s view of truth and how the church of his day had distanced herself from it. Related to Kierkegaard’s attacks on what Christianity had degenerated into are a set of wider critical portrayals that betray political undertones. Imam takes up the categories of individual freedom, sin, anxiety, despair, and sickness, and in his discussion he brings out the political implications of the overall existential critique that Kierkegaard mounts in a number of his works, principally, The Sickness unto Death and A Literary Review, implications that in his opinion were quite radical in contrast to prevailing views of Kierkegaard’s politically inert conservatism. For Imam the inherently political message of much of what Kierkegaard was criticizing, despite his deliberate avoidance of the political events and issues of his day, was another example of his subtle method of indirect communication.118 In his unwavering defense of the single individual, argues Imam, and his attacks on abstract systems and abstractions in general like “the crowd” and “the people,” Kierkegaard also assailed other comprehensive yet perfectly legitimate concepts like equality, democracy, and

Ibid., pp. 198–9. Ibid., pp. 199–200. 118 Ibid., p. 218. The puzzling thing, concludes Imam, is that this “revolutionary” side of Kierkegaard did not find any practical political outlet at all: “Is this a ‘conservative’ philosophy, or is it a plainly reactionary position that refuses to countenance even the slightest alteration in the status quo of society?” See pp. 231–3. 116 117

66

Habib C. Malik

human dignity.119 Imam takes serious exception to this side of Kierkegaard, and he includes Nietzsche in his critique: both were guilty of an elitism that smacked of a shameful ignorance of the rudiments of sound political thinking.120 Throughout his analysis of this aspect of Kierkegaard’s thinking Imam inadvertently discloses his own Hegelian bias in favor of uncompromising rationalism that studiously eschews all hints of logical contradiction. Finally, the last important contribution of Imam’s book is the collection of excerpts from Kierkegaard’s writings that he translates and makes available to the reader of Arabic. They include sections from Johannes Climacus or De Omnibus Dubitandum est, “The Great Earthquake” and various other selections from the journals (taken from both the Dru and R.G. Smith English translations), selections from the last writings found in Walter Lowrie’s compilation entitled Attack upon “Christendom,” and the first forty pages of the first volume of Either/Or in the Swenson English translation.121 He organizes them into four separate categories: those about Kierkegaard’s personality, early upbringing, and relationship with his father; those pertaining to his relationship with Regine and his views of women; those that attack false religiosity, the clergy, and the institutional church; and those that convey a vivid sense of his peculiar style of writing. Kuwait University, where Imam taught, published in 1983 a 58-page monograph in Arabic by him entitled “Kierkegaard’s Concept of Irony.” It is divided into six parts and attempts a scholarly analysis of this central concept in Kierkegaard’s thinking, relying of course to a great extent on Kierkegaard’s own work by the same name. Predictably, part 3 is entitled “Hegel’s Concept of Irony,” and Imam justifies including this section by citing two principal reasons: “the incredible influence that Hegel had on Kierkegaard’s thought in general to the extent that expounding Kierkegaard’s philosophy with this Hegelian backdrop in mind greatly elucidates it…and the fact that the ‘concept of irony’ itself depends in its formulation on many Hegelian categories.”122 Imam’s conclusion at the end of the monograph, however, does not go as far as to deny all originality to Kierkegaard in defining and dissecting the concept of irony. In this he says he rejects Walter Kaufmann’s extreme assertion that Kierkegaard was “merely intruding on the territory of Hegelian wisdom.”123 But, adds Imam, Hegel’s understanding of irony was ultimately more profound than that of Kierkegaard.124 Interestingly, the only two Arabic sources he lists in his bibliography are the two works by ‘Abd al-Rahman Badawi: ‫ﺩﺭﺍﺴﺎﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻔﻟﺳﻔﺔ ﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻳﺔ‬ [Studies in Existential Philosophy] and ‫[ ﺍﻟﺯﻣﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﻭﺟودي‬Existential Time].

Ibid., p. 224. Ibid., p. 229. 121 See Ibid., pp. 285–356. 122 Imam, ‫ﺍﻟﺗﻬﻛﻡ ﻋﻧﺩ ﻛﻳﺭﻛﺟﻭر‬ ‫[ ﻣﻔﻬﻭﻡ‬Kierkegaard’s Concept of Irony], Kuwait: Kuwait � University 1983 (Annals of the Faculty of Arts, 19th Monograph, vol. 6), p. 19. The author refers to Høffding’s refusal to consider Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Irony as a work with an original idea because of the preponderance in it of Hegelian concepts and categories. 123 Ibid., p. 50. 124 Ibid., p. 51. 119

120

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

67

IV. ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Mu’ta Mohammad and Hassan Yousef Two books by two other Egyptian scholars attempt to address the religious in Kierkegaard’s philosophy. The first, by ‫‘[ ﻋﻟﻲ ﻋﺑﺩ ﺍﻟﻣﻌﻁﻰ ﻣﺣﻣﺩ‬Ali ‘Abd al-Mu’ta Mohammad], is entitled ‫[ ﺴﻭﺭﻳﻥ ﻛﻳﺭﻛﺟﺎﺭﺩ ﻣﺅﺳﺱ ﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﺴﻳﺣﻳﺔ‬Søren Kierkegaard Founder of Christian Existentialism], and the second, by ‫[ ﺣﺴن ﻳوﺳف‬Hassan Yousef], bears the title ‫[ ﻓﻟﺴﻔﺔ اﻟﺩﻳن ﻋﻧد ﻛﻳﺭﻛﺟﺎرد‬Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Religion]. The author of the first study, Mohammad, is professor of the history of philosophy at Alexandria University. His book—495 pages in length—contains the usual standard presentation for the Arabic reader: a sketch of Kierkegaard’s life, a listing of his works and a brief word about each relying exclusively on all available English editions up to the early 1980s, and a detailed bibliography all in English of works by and works on Kierkegaard including many books on existentialism.125 In addition, Mohammad discusses existentialism and surveys its leading thinkers, contrasts it with German philosophical idealism principally Hegel, explains the contours of Husserl’s phenomenology and some of Heidegger’s elaborations on it, and pinpoints Kierkegaard’s place in the history of existential thought. Paraphrasing from Paul Roubieczek’s Existentialism: For and Against,126 Mohammad writes approvingly: “Today, 120 years after Kierkegaard’s death, we can confidently say he was one of the greatest philosophers and theologians, if not the greatest thinker in our time.”127 But this endorsement does not come unqualified. Mohammad lists a number of issues on which he disagrees with Kierkegaard. Although his critique is superficial to the point of banality at times, it is worth enumerating briefly the highlights. Mohammad rejects what he calls the irrational streak in Kierkegaard: “Without reason we cannot hope to direct anyone toward faith,” he writes. Moreover, Kierkegaard for him was so absorbed in attacking Hegel that he neglected other philosophical tributaries; there were existentialist intimations long before Kierkegaard going back to the ancient Greeks, explains Mohammad, yet Kierkegaard transformed his attack on Hegel into a generalized rejection of all philosophizing. The radical separation Kierkegaard erected between Christian faith and philosophy is not shared by other modern existentialists who analyze the same categories of freedom, anxiety, despair, etc. without landing in a similar dichotomy. Also Kierkegaard, according to Mohammad, was preoccupied in a sustained critique of his own day and age to a parochial degree that detracted from the overall universal relevance of the exercise. For Kierkegaard, existential maturity led to passion, but many modern ideologies see in passion and emotions a potentially destructive force. Mohammad rejects out of hand Kierkegaard’s preference for the passionate pagan over the lukewarm Christian—reason must prevail over the passions, he confidently repeats. Kierkegaard also failed to focus on social problems ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Mu’ta Mohammad, ‫[ ﺴﻭﺭﻳﻥ ﻛﻳﺭ ﻛﺟﺎﺭﺩ ﻣﺅﺳﺱ ﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﺴﻳﺣﻳﺔ‬Søren Kierkegaard Founder of Christian Existentialism], Alexandria: Dar al-Ma’rifah al-Jami’iyya 1985, pp. 50– 7 (Kierkegaard’s works) and pp. 58–78 (a capsule description of each). 126 Paul Roubiezek, Existentialism: For and Against, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1964. 127 Ibid., p. 48; pp. 440–1. 125

68

Habib C. Malik

because he only understood society as embodying heinous collectives: the crowd, the masses, the herd, the majority, etc. By favoring the single individual to such an extent Kierkegaard became isolated, and consequently alienated, from society. And to preach indiscriminately about loving one’s neighbor, as Kierkegaard does in Works of Love, does not take into account the vast differences among neighbors, with some being utterly undeserving of such unconditional affection. Neighbor here, says Mohammad, becomes another abstraction in the mind of the one who presumably waged war against all abstractions. Mohammad agrees that Kierkegaard certainly lived his philosophy to the full and suffered for it, but this, he adds, cannot in the nature of the case apply to everyone. Lastly, the author informs us that he holds a view of history that does not explain its complex unfolding as a matter purely of free individual choices.128 Clearly Mohammad is uncomfortable with the concept of risky leaps into the unknown, as he sees it. Subjectivity can lead to subjectivism if we are not careful, he warns, especially since Kierkegaard does not offer a clear roadmap but instead demands risks that end up retaining anxiety and despair rather than dispelling them: “We’re never sure of our destiny: are we leaping into God’s hands, or into the devil’s?” Perhaps this is what Kierkegaard wanted, muses Mohammad: the perpetuation of anxiety and despair. As a Muslim, Mohammad cannot bring himself to accept a leap exclusively toward Christ as the ultimate satisfying answer.129 Despite the criticisms that he gives at the end of his book, Mohammad has spent the bulk of it expounding with some thoroughness Kierkegaard’s manysided philosophical and religious output. He hints at the outset that his is a “new” interpretation that goes against the views of the majority of Kierkegaard scholars, and even opposes Kierkegaard’s own views about his writings: “Kierkegaard has presented us with a philosophical approach that is comprehensive in its structure and beautiful in its composition.”130 In other words, Mohammad sees in Kierkegaard’s authorship an internally consistent and coherent existential philosophy with its centerpiece being the subject, or the single individual in all his anxiety and despair and sufferings and joys. This philosophy can be divided into a negative and a positive part, the former comprising Kierkegaard’s attacks on other philosophical and religious outlooks, and the latter elucidating the living and acting subject. As for faith, it is directed toward a loving, caring, and incarnated God in Christ, and the author understands that living in faith with Christ transcends the historicity of his Incarnation to become something believers experience every day. In fact, Mohammad asserts rather inconsistently, there are no contradictions in any of Kierkegaard’s See ibid., pp. 476–81. In his criticisms of Kierkegaard, Mohammad seems to rely to some extent on David Everett Roberts, Existentialism and Religious Belief, New York: Oxford University Press 1958, which he cites often. 129 Mohammad, ‫[ ﺴﻭﺭﻳﻥ ﻛﻳﺭﻛﺟﺎﺭﺩ ﻣﺅﺳﺱ ﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﺍﻟﻣﺴﻳﺣﻳﺔ‬Søren Kierkegaard Founder of Christian Existentialism], p. 481. 130 Ibid., p. 33. Mohammad here also explains why he prefers to use the Arabic spelling of Kierkegaard’s name as “‫ ”ﻛﻳﺭﻛﺟﺎﺭﺩ‬in place of “‫”ﻛﻳﺭﻛﻳﺟﻭﺭ‬. The former is closer to the way Anglo-Saxons pronounce his name, while the latter resembles the native Danish way of pronouncing it by stressing the “o” sound at the end. 128

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

69

positions, neither regarding ontology, nor epistemology, nor history, nor politics, nor ethics, nor religion, nor society.131 It is worth noting that Mohammad’s book is brimming with translated passages in Arabic from a variety of Kierkegaard’s works which he strews throughout his discourse. Also, he briefly alludes to some of the reasons for the delay in Kierkegaard’s early reception following his death.132 The second book by Yousef, who teaches at the Arts Academy in Cairo, came out of his doctoral dissertation. Although published in 2001, Yousef’s book does not make any use of the available Hong English translations and editions of Kierkegaard’s Writings. The extensive bibliography he provides at the end—works in both English and Arabic—only lists the Lowrie, Swenson, Dru, etc. editions. For him, Kierkegaard’s life was, as he puts it, a “spiritual tragedy.” Relying on both the journals and secondary sources, Yousef, as expected, starts out with a brief biographical narration in which he highlights the inherited sin (curse) of the father and the consequent gloom and melancholy that accompanied the young Søren into adulthood despite his passing through a dissipated erotic phase, as the author relates. He likens Kierkegaard’s later attack on the established Christianity of his day to what Dostoyevsky does through the “Legend of the Grand Inquisitor” in The Brothers Karamazov regarding the Catholic Church. He also analyzes Kierkegaard’s concept of the “Instant” and translates passages from Lowrie’s edition of the set of nine articles published in 1855 by Kierkegaard under the same name.133 As with Mohammad, Yousef takes special interest in Kierkegaard’s concept of faith stating that it “requires the abandonment of reason.”134 The notion that Christianity is the opposite of any rational conception is particularly arresting for Yousef, and one gets the impression from reading him and Mohammad that Christianity’s absurdity seems to reassure Muslims like these authors of its falsity. Again, the handiest comparison that comes to Yousef, as it did to Badawi, is that with the Sufis within Islam: “Kierkegaard moved from being a philosopher to becoming a religious mystic of the first order,” he writes.135 Although Kierkegaard’s discourse is religious through and through, says Yousef, it is wrapped in romantic garb. His lifelong gloom and melancholy resulted in his inability to see value in anything except if he lost it, or never had it to begin with—Regine being the prime example. Yousef detects a sexual deficiency coupled with a physical frailty behind all this.136 Many of Yousef’s conclusions are taken straight out of Imam ‘Abd el-Fattah Imam’s books, which he lists in his bibliography, and he also borrows entire translated passages of Kierkegaard’s writings from Imam. In a footnote attempting See ibid., pp. 465–76. Ibid., pp. 439–41. For a history of this early reception see Habib C. Malik, Receiving Søren Kierkegaard: The Early Impact and Transmission of His Thought, Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press 1997. 133 Hassan Yousef, ‫[ ﻓﻟﺴﻔﺔ ﺍﻟﺩﻳﻥ ﻋﻧﺩ ﻛﻳﺭﻛﺟﺎﺭﺩ‬Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Religion], Cairo: Dar el-Kalema 2001, pp. 9–21. 134 Ibid., p. 49. 135 Ibid., p. 63. Yousef stresses Kierkegaard’s mystical side and compares him to the Sufi Ibn ‘Arabi (see pp. 137–8), and he adds that Kierkegaard was deeply influenced by Plato on the question of love, i.e., Platonic idealized love. Love for Kierkegaard is elevated ultimately to a spiritual or religious plane (see p. 141). 136 Ibid., pp. 131–2. 131 132

70

Habib C. Malik

to explain theodicy in Christian theology, Yousef carries on in overt Marxist fashion about how it was used sophistically as a ruse to oppress the downtrodden classes, and he even quotes from a philosophical dictionary published in Moscow.137 Also included in Yousef’s book are cursory discussions of the Incarnation as paradox, Kierkegaard’s demotion of temporal history, individual freedom, the three stages of existence, and Don Juan. V. ‘Adnan Bin Dhurayl Several books exist in Arabic by various writers on the broad philosophical topic of existentialism. Kierkegaard is invariably mentioned in some way in the course of the discussions in these works. There is even an Arabic dictionary of existential terms that refers repeatedly to many of the leading existential philosophers, Kierkegaard included. This last book is significant because it makes a serious attempt to coin Arabic equivalents—sometimes quite technical—for the principal existential terminology and phenomenological concepts that philosophers in the West have used: existence, the existent, Existenz, Dasein, anxiety, despair, eternity, authenticity, communication, engagement, and much more. The author is named ‫‘[ ﻋﺩﻧﻟﻥ ﺑﻥ ﺫﺭﻳﻝ‬Adnan Bin Dhurayl] and his 300-page dictionary covers an impressive array of such technical terms mostly acquired from their counterparts in German or French. Even more admirable is the breadth of knowledge that the author demonstrates about a wide assembly of works by the key existential philosophers including contemporary figures like Paul Ricoeur and Maurice Merleau-Ponty as well as earlier ones like Emmanuel Mounier and Vladimir Soloviev, and his ability to pull in from several authors at once a number of differing meanings and usages for the same expression. The book also provides a comprehensive index of terms and one of names of philosophers. Among the philosophers referred to occasionally are Islamic figures like Avicenna and Averroes, and scholars such as Badawi. Typically, Dhurayl’s approach is to present first the familiar meaning of a word or expression, and then to compare and contrast a number of standard usages for it by a succession of existential thinkers. In rare instances he will mention the specific work in which a particular usage can be found. Some examples follow. On ‫[ ﺗﻛﺭﺍﺭ‬repetition] he starts off with a reference to Kierkegaard’s Either/Or concerning the relationship between first love and marriage where it is said that all the joys of first love come from living and experiencing repetition; and then he moves to Heidegger.138 On ‫أﺻﺎﻟﺔ‬ [originalité in French; authenticity in English] he says that Kierkegaard finds this best embodied in the pure of heart who are in the presence of God, and that therein lies the basic attribute of authentic existence; then again to Heidegger.139 On ‫ﺟﺎد‬ [sérieux; the serious or the earnest] the two meanings of the word as Kierkegaard explains them in The Concept of Anxiety are contrasted: limited seriousness (that of the professors) and existential seriousness wherein repetition is saved from Ibid., pp. 80–1. ‘Adnan Bin Dhurayl, ‫ ﺩﺭﺍﺴﺔ‬:‫[ ﺍﻟﻔﻛﺭ ﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻱ ﻋﺑﺭ ﻣﺻﻁﻟﺣﻪ‬Existential Thought Through its Specialized Term: a Study], Damascus: Itihad al-Kuttab al-‘Arab 1985, pp. 70–1. 139 Ibid., p. 24. 137 138

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

71

the habitual; and then he proceeds to Mounier and Sartre.140 And on ‫[ ﺧﻁﻳﺋﺔ‬péché; sin] it is closely bound for Kierkegaard, in both The Concept of Anxiety and some journal entries, with the anxiety of freedom’s possibilities and with seduction; and then a discussion of Heidegger’s conception follows.141 From periodic parenthetical references we gather that Dhurayl has relied on a few secondary sources for his knowledge of Kierkegaard in addition to having read some of his works in French translation. Many of the Arabic translators of existential tracts, says Dhurayl, confuse “existence” with “being,” which is a distinction that existentialists beginning with Kierkegaard have rigorously maintained—Dhurayl here is clearly thinking more of Heidegger, Jaspers, Sartre, and Marcel.142 Dhurayl himself has composed existential poetry in Arabic and published his poems along with explanations of their existential dimensions. Two poems in particular appeared together in one thin volume in the introduction to which the author wrote that he preferred this form of poetry as his means of expression because existence will always remain shrouded in mystery, and because in Arab culture the study of existentialism is scanty and deplorable with little agreement among scholars on the definition of specific words and phrases.143 His style combines classical Arabic format with modern usages, and the net product is appealing to both specialists and the populace at large. Voicing a lifelong preoccupation of his, Dhurayl wrote that he aimed to coin standardized Arabic words to express Western existential categories and concepts.144 In his successive explanations of both his anthem and poem he refers to “Master Heidegger” and “Master Kierkegaard” although his references to the latter are far fewer.145 It emerges that Dhurayl is a Heideggerian of sorts. The monumental effort he has undertaken with the Arabic dictionary of existential terms makes of Dhurayl an indispensable starting-point for any rigorous study of the thought of the existentialists in that language. VI. Muta’ al-Safadi and Mohammad Sa’id al-‘Ishmawi Of the books written on existential themes, or on existentialism as such, two will be taken here as samples of this sort of writing, and of the manner in which through it Kierkegaard is mediated into Arabic. The first is by the Syrian ‫[ ﻣﻁﺎﻉ ﺍﻟﺻﻔﺩﻱ‬Muta’ al-Safadi] and is entitled ‫[ ﻓﻟﺴﻔﺔ ﺍﻟﻘﻟق‬Philosophy of Anxiety]. The author, who is also known for having translated some Heidegger into Arabic, commences with a now familiar lament regarding the shoddy state of Arab philosophical investigations,

Ibid., p. 78. Ibid., p. 116. 142 Ibid., pp. 277–9. Among those Dhurayl mentions who are guilty of this confusion is Badawi. 143 Dhurayl, ‫ ﺗﻟﻳﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻘﺻﻳﺩﺓ ﺍﻟﻌﻳﻧﻳﺔ ﻓﻲﺍﻟﻧﻔﺱ‬،‫[ ﺍﻷﺭﺟﻭﺯﺓ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩ ﻭﺍﻟﻌﺩﻡ‬The Rajaz-Style Anthem on Being and Nothingness Followed by a Rhymed Poem Ending in the Letter “‫ ”ع‬on the Self], Damascus: Alef-Baa’ al-Adeeb Printers 1989, p. 7. 144 Ibid. 145 See ibid., pp. 79–80. 140 141

72

Habib C. Malik

in particular with respect to a solid acquaintance with the fruits of the Western existentialist school: Most of the learned generation of Arabs have not read a single authentic existentialist text since, among other reasons, much of what has been published on existentialism does not go beyond some poor translations, or pasteurized studies, or a few definitional illustrations of popular words and phrases vaguely related to the existentialist sensibility. Existentialism itself as it appears in the great masters of the movement such as Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jaspers, Sartre, and others remains virtually unknown.146

Like Badawi, al-Safadi deplores the stigma of bohemian degeneracy that has come to attach itself to existentialism in the popular mind throughout educated circles in the Arab Middle East.147 For this reason, adds the author, he has chosen the central theme of anxiety as the ideal means to introduce existentialism to a largely ignorant Arab readership through specific textual examples and references. He admits, however, that he has wrestled with the appropriate Arabic translations of technical terms from the philosophical lexicon of the Western existentialists, a fact that underscores the timely importance of Dhurayl’s later contribution. He specifically states that his approach deliberately avoids dealing with any literary, artistic, or sociological dimensions and implications of the question of anxiety precisely in order to maintain a rigorously focused discourse as opposed to succumbing to demagogic polemics.148 Existentialism is neither purely intellectual, nor behavioral, nor certainly sexual, he insists; it is the distillation of a serious human experience through which some great thinkers have offered philosophical and civilizational insights that have become for us the stuff of both study and living suffering.149 Al-Safadi’s principal foci throughout the book are Heidegger and Kierkegaard in that order, with some attention being given to Sartre, Marcel, Mounier, and others as well. Unsurprisingly, it is Jean Wahl once again who is a leading secondary source on both Kierkegaard and Hegel for al-Safadi. The extent to which Kierkegaard was influenced by Hegel even while departing from, and indeed rejecting, pivotal features and assertions in the Hegelian animus surely came to al-Safadi, as it did to so many others, through Wahl’s seminal work. Similarly, Wahl’s distinction between anxiety as Kierkegaard conceived of it religiously and Heidegger’s subsequent detheologized phenomenology of anxiety—a distinction partially intended to preserve the originality of Heidegger’s thought—is borrowed verbatim by al-Safadi.150 The notion of nothingness intrigues al-Safadi, and he spends pages 146 Muta’ al-Safadi, ‫[ ﻓﻟﺴﻔﺔ ﺍﻟﻘﻟﻕ‬Philosophy of Anxiety], Beirut: Dar al-Talia’ 1963, p. 6. He continues: “There isn’t in Arabic a single original philosophical work by any one of these thinkers.” This was the case in 1963, and since then little improvement has been witnessed with some translations of Heidegger and Nietzsche and a few others trickling down; however, no complete work of Kierkegaard as yet exists in Arabic. 147 Ibid., p. 7. 148 Ibid., p. 9. 149 Ibid., p. 10. 150 See ibid., pp. 47–8. On Wahl on Kierkegaard and Hegel, see pp. 16–17. For an analysis of Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety, see pp. 47–53.

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

73

delving into Heidegger’s and Sartre’s conceptions of the relationship between it and anxiety. Kierkegaard makes a brief comeback when the author’s attention shifts to the relationship between anxiety and freedom.151 The second chosen Arabic work on existentialism is by the celebrated Egyptian legal expert ‫[ ﻣﺣﻣﺩ ﺴﻌﻳﺩ ﺍﻟﻌﺷﻣﺎوي‬Mohammad Sa’id al-‘Ishmawi]. Entitled ‫اﻟﻔﻛر اﻟﺑﺷري‬ ‫[ ﺗﺎﺭﻳﺦ اﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ‬History of Existentialism in Human Thought], the book starts out with a survey of the various erroneous meanings that came to be associated with existentialism after the Second World War, the worst being that it was a sort of intellectual adolescence geared to suit passing fads and sensibilities that emerged in France during the war years. Such views, says the author, constituted “crimes against thought on the one hand and an insult to intelligence on the other.”152 He defines existentialism simply as that modern philosophical movement with deep roots in former ages that was concerned in the first order with the human person instead of abstract thought or material things.153 The first several pages of the work are spent discussing the specialized vocabulary of the existentialists, a challenge as we have seen that Arab thinkers and translators had to contend with early on. Foremost among the distinctions that need to be made is the crucial difference between ‫( اﻟﻛﻳﻧﻭﻧﺔ‬being) and ‫( ﺍﻟﻭﺟود‬existence). The author, like many others who wrote on existentialism in Arabic, prefers the term ‫ ﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻳﺔ‬to ‫ ﺍﻟﻛﻳﺎﻧﻳﺔ‬to mean existentialism.154 To distinguish between the nature of human existence and that of all other beings, the author writes: “It is man alone who lives; all other creatures merely subsist.”155 The remainder of the book is a historical survey of the existentialist sensibility throughout time as it made itself felt in a variety of cultural and civilizational contexts. Noteworthy here is the peculiar interpretation al-‘Ishmawi gives to the history of the ancient Israelites. After settling in Palestine, the Jews apparently began to develop the curious idea that somehow they were God’s chosen people favored over all other humans, says al-‘Ishmawi. He calls this “an inferiority complex” that resulted from repeated persecutions. Henceforth, God was increasingly fashioned by the Hebrew mind in the image of man instead of being the other way around as the Book of Genesis insists. God now became someone who feels jealous, expresses anger, holds a grudge, revolts with wrath, experiences remorse, acts in a loving manner at times, and with belligerence at others.156 In fact, the reader gets an advance inkling of where al-‘Ishmawi is coming from when he sees at the top of the chapter on the Israelites a caricature of David Ben-Gurion with the Star of David tattooed on the side of his head carrying a bag with a dollar sign on it. The polemical and derogatory manner in which the author carries on about the people of Israel’s accumulated complexes and many shortcomings betrays the underlying political agenda that has motivated Ibid., p. 98. Mohammad Sa’id al-‘Ishmawi, ‫[ ﺗﺎﺭﻳﺦ اﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻔﻛر اﻟﺑﺷري‬History of Existentialism in Human Thought], Cairo: al-Dar al-Qawmiyyah Printers, n.d., p. 3. 153 Ibid., p. 7. 154 Ibid., pp. 12–13. Charles Malik, on the other hand, favored the term ‫ ﺍﻟﻛﻳﺎﻧﻳﺔ‬to indicate existentialism. 155 Ibid., p. 19. 156 Ibid., p. 49. 151 152

74

Habib C. Malik

him from the outset. With the coming of Jesus, says the author, the emphasis on the value of individual human existence emerges in full force. Then, with the opposition between the orientations of Paul and James we have the conflict between faith and works in the Christian conception, all of which led some to withdraw from the world into an ascetic existence and to regard all forms of interaction with everyday existence as fundamentally evil, and therein, explains al’Ishmawi, lay the fallacy and the error.157 In the face of this closing off of the person to existence through Christian monasticism, there arose a need to reopen the human will and reconvert it to the right path, and this revival came from the Arabian Peninsula, explains our author.158 This in a nutshell is al’Ishmawi’s view of the way human history unfolded, and along with it the history of existentialism. Islam for him represents the highest expression of the existential standpoint. Interestingly, the Sufi tradition within Islam is not regarded by the author as a withdrawal from, or renunciation of, the world, but rather as a state of total overcoming in which all material barriers and fixed physical laws collapse at the feet of the determined individual will of the Sufi, who no longer abides by them, and they in turn no longer limit his behavior.159 To Kierkegaard al’Ishmawi devotes one-and-a-half pages in his survey. He was not a philosopher in the usual sense, writes the author, but a living human person in the full sense of the word: “He philosophized life, and then he lived that philosophy.” His “troubled” life, his “attack” on Hegelianism, his “subjective” philosophy in which absolute existence can reveal itself to individual existence through anxiety and suffering, and sin and remorse, and free choice—these are the main ingredients of Kierkegaard’s world. Al-‘Ishmawi concludes that Kierkegaard’s philosophy brought nothing new with it; all had been said and felt and lived before. Indeed, he confidently adds, “one line of Arabic poetry condenses the entire philosophy of Kierkegaard and the way this philosophy captures the meaning of life through striving, endurance, and suffering.”160 With Husserl existentialism acquired the methodological approach of phenomenology and thus no longer meandered in Kierkegaard’s unsystematic footsteps, says al’Ishmawi and proceeds to discuss Husserl followed by Heidegger and Sartre. So much for Kierkegaard’s place in a highly problematic history of existentialism written for the benefit of the Arabic reader. VII. Fayiz Sayigh One measure of Kierkegaard’s impact on Arab university students can be obtained through a consideration of several of the masters’ and doctoral theses that have been written on aspects of his thought at universities around the Arab world. The highest concentration of such studies by graduate students occurred in Lebanon. Whether at the American University of Beirut, the Université Saint-Joseph, or the government-run Lebanese University, a number of students over the past few decades have devoted their higher studies to Kierkegaard producing notable contributions to See ibid., pp. 55–60. Ibid., p. 61. 159 Ibid., p. 71. 160 Ibid., pp. 87–8. 157 158

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

75

scholarship. These theses, however, have all been written in either English or French, and therefore their availability has usually been restricted to a small educated cadre of Arab intellectuals. Many have not been published and sit gathering dust on the musty back shelves of university libraries. Only a few of those who wrote such theses went on to pursue a career in academia and to produce additional work on Kierkegaard. At the American University of Beirut there were the students who attended Charles Malik’s courses, or participated in his informal philosophy reading and discussion circles, in the late 1930s and early 1940s, and again in the 1960s and early 1970s. There were also the students of Hugh R. Harcourt, himself a Kierkegaard specialist who taught philosophy and cultural studies at the university during the 1960s and early 1970s before moving on to Beir Zeit University in the West Bank following the outbreak of the war in Lebanon. Some of Malik’s students took up the formal investigation of Kierkegaardian or existential themes, and for a few of these the exposure to this kind of philosophy became a life-changing experience. One of this latter group in the early 1940s was ‫[ ﻓﺎﻳﺯ ﺻﺎﻳﻎ‬Fayiz Sayigh] (1922–80), a young man from a well-known Palestinian Christian family who was living and studying at the time in Beirut. Sayigh’s name today is mainly associated with the Palestinian issue, and he is renowned for his outspoken writings on that question and for serving on the executive committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization from 1965 to 1966 during which time he founded the Institute of Palestine Studies. Less known, however, is the young Sayigh’s fascination with existentialism and his affiliation with the Malik philosophical circles of the early 1940s. As a testimony to that existential interest there stands the unpublished masters’ thesis of Sayigh that he entitled “Personal Existence: Its Contents, Its Tragedy, Its Paradox—An Essay.”161 Sayigh’s treatise, or essay as he called it, is a powerful though not unflawed defense of radical individuality and personality under the rubric of what he terms “personal existence.” It is a personalized phenomenology of personal existence with deep yet somewhat amorphous religious undertones. His references encompass a broad gallery of thinkers both religious and secular: St. Paul, St. Augustine, Böhme, Pascal, Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, Berdyaev, Buber, Brunner, Unamuno, Maritain, Chesterton, and Whitehead—in short, all names that figured prominently and repeatedly in the philosophical readings and discussion groups that were organized during this period by Charles Malik, and that Sayigh regularly attended. Borrowing heavily from Kierkegaard, and quoting him directly in several places, Sayigh probes and weaves together concepts such as inwardness, selfhood, solitude, personal freedom, indirect communication, the paradox, the absurd, the unmediated antithesis of the either-or, sham collectives like the crowd and public opinion, and the inadequacies of institutionalized religion. He also leans on Berdyaev in his contrasting of inwardness (subjectivity) with outwardness (objectivity); on Buber’s I and Thou in his analysis of otherness and the relational; on Brunner’s warnings against dogmatism, hierarchism, and objectivism in both the Catholic Church and some Protestant churches as well; on Dostoevsky’s depiction of the singularities

A bound copy of Sayigh’s thesis (430 pages) dated May 1945 is located at the American University of Beirut’s Jafet Library.

161

76

Habib C. Malik

of personal existence through the characters of the Underground Man and Prince Myshkin in The Idiot; and on Unamuno’s discourse on the tragic in life. In places Sayigh sounds like a fiery low-church Protestant preacher haranguing the Catholic Church on ecclesiology, collective prayer, the priesthood, the sacraments, mediation, and intercession. He writes with conviction about personality’s existential content: “Personality is not values—truth and beauty. Personality is the response of the self to, and its participation in, truth and beauty.”162 When discussing what he discerns as an overarching feature of the tragedy of personal existence, namely the inescapable necessity of social interaction and the resulting damage to personality, Sayigh writes: “Human intercourse unavoidably falls down to the level of impersonality in a quantitative sense. Hence the tragedy.”163 Inconsistency emerges as when he insists that God remains inaccessible to man while underscoring throughout the treatise the possibility of establishing direct rapport with the divine through personal existence in solitude and via prayer.164 In 1947, two years after completing his masters’ thesis on personal existence, Sayigh published a poignant existential essay in Arabic—his own philosophical reflection about man and the human condition written in a passionate and aphoristic style verging at times on the poetic. As will shortly be revealed, Sayigh at this point in his life was going through a turbulent period and experiencing an acrimonious rift with friends and close associates. The tragedy of the Palestinians the following year would deal him a further blow and reorient his life permanently in the direction of political activism on behalf of his people. The essay in question, entitled ‫ﻭﺍﻟﻭﺟود‬ ‫ ﻧظرات ﻓﻲ ﺍﻻﻧﺴﺎﻥ‬:‫[ ﻧﺩﺍﺀ ﺍﻷﻋﻣﺎق‬A Call from the Depths: Reflections on Man and Existence], was both a further development in Arabic of what he had commenced in his masters’ thesis, and an agonized response to the personal crisis he was facing. In the brief introduction to the essay the author writes that the human person facing the fragmenting developments of modern existence is urgently in need of rediscovering himself and reassembling the scattered parts that should make up a unified harmonious whole within each person: “The need is critical to discover the human in every person, after that human element has been dispersed and replaced by the citizen, the economic being, the social creature, or reduced to the abstract mind, the pure feelings, or the raw instincts.” “What is man without God,” he asks, “pouring himself to himself as an idol, and transforming his state or his socio-economic class into a god?”165 The area most in need of reemphasizing the human person as such, Sayigh persists, is the social arena chiefly because it is here that the greatest danger lurks to depersonalize man, rob him of his privacy, and deprive him of his individual freedom. Sayigh saw his task as reintroducing this vital existential corrective to the excesses of an age defined principally by impersonal social collectives. Fayiz Sayigh, “Personal Existence: Its Contents, Its Tragedy, and Its Paradox—An Essay,” unpublished monograph at the American University of Beirut (May 1945), p. 27. 163 Ibid., p. 228. 164 Ibid., p. 152; see also pp. 73–4; pp. 80–2, and 133–5 on prayer and inward fellowship with God. 165 Sayigh, ‫ ﻧﻅﺭﺍﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻻﻧﺴﺎﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭد‬:‫[ ﻧﺩﺍﺀ ﺍﻷﻋﻣﺎﻕ‬A Call from the Depths: Reflections on Man and Existence], Beirut: Dar al-Fikr 1947, p. 11. 162

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

77

Divided into two main sections entitled “the human person” and “the plenitude of life,” Sayigh’s essay opens with a consideration of the duality of human dignity “in the heights” and human suffering “in the depths.” In fact the human person is an intricate bundle of dualities, a unique and paradoxical double entity: “Man is a part, an imperfect part, severed: a part of society, a part of the universe. And man is a perfect whole: a whole in himself, above society and above the universe!”166 “How awesome is the human person!” he exclaims in wonder.167 He starts his essay with a Pascal-like stance of feeling utterly crushed by the incomprehensibility of the cosmos, and maintains this tone of existential urgency throughout. But he quickly directs the reader toward the inner self where the complexity is far more humbling and surpasses anything the “sky’s blue dome” has to terrify us with.168 The second section deals with the themes of human creativity and innovation, love, God, and freedom in that order. On God, for example, Sayigh reiterates his position against institutional religion with its rites and rituals and against a purely rational religion as well. Both the existential and the mystical intersect when he writes: “In the depths of every human person there resides a yearning for God, a desire to encounter and merge with the real Him.”169 He speaks about faith and personal freedom in ways that reflect how thoroughly steeped he had become in the categories of the existentialists. Neither Kierkegaard nor any of the other existentialists (save a passing reference to St. Augustine’s Confessions) is mentioned by name anywhere in the essay, yet their concepts and philosophical preoccupations and emphases cry out in compelling force from every page. With an eye out for his own activist role, Sayigh stresses the importance of heroism in the person doing his duty toward society: to be engaged rather than spectating, appreciating all the while how long and arduous the road ahead is and the constant struggles required to bring about any real change in society. Heroism is the condition for succeeding in life’s missions, and humility is the key to that success.170 Sayigh ends his essay by telling the free human person that his fate lays ultimately in his own hands: “Man’s entire humanity stands on the brink of the abyss, the abyss of inhumanity. You either take the plunge, or you save yourself: you are free, and it is a terrible freedom…. Listen well in your depths to the call of the depths!”171 What is significant in the case of Fayiz Sayigh is that he attempted to serve as a direct conduit for these same existential concepts about individuality and the emphasis on personal existence into a very unlikely corner of the local political arena in Lebanon during the mid- and late 1940s—and he got himself into trouble doing so. Between 1943 and 1947, namely, at the height of his existential period, Sayigh became temporary leader, in the brief absence of its founder, of a political party known as the Partie Populaire Syrienne (PPS). The full name of the party in Arabic is ‫ﺍﻟﺣﺯﺏ ﺍﻟﺴﻭﺭﻱ ﺍﻟﻘﻭﻣﻲ ﺍﻻﺟﺗﻣﺎﻋﻲ‬, which translates into the Syrian National-Socialist Party, and as the name suggests, it was inspired by European fascism in the 1930s. Ibid., p. 34. See ibid., pp. 32–41 for the section on the awesomeness of the human person. 168 Ibid., p. 16. 169 Ibid., p. 72. See also pp. 70–2. 170 Ibid., pp. 52–4. 171 Ibid., pp. 82–3. 166 167

78

Habib C. Malik

The party’s founder was Antoun Saadeh, a Lebanese of Greek Orthodox extraction and son of emigrants to Latin America, who displayed an overabundant sense of his self-importance and cultivated an early admiration for the nationalist ideas and regimented ways of European fascism with a strong desire to usher in this imported ideology into the Levant. For Saadeh, “Syria” became a larger-than-life ethnic and geopolitical mental construction enveloping the entire ancient land of Canaan across the eastern Mediterranean including, in today’s parlance, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, and the Palestinian territories, with some eventually expanding the concept to add both Iraq and Cyprus to the agglomeration. It is difficult to overemphasize the attractiveness back in the 1940s, particularly among young college students at and around the American University of Beirut, of this peculiar idea and the party that upheld it. So many figures in the broad spectrum of Lebanon’s later intelligentsia, along with leading Syrians and Palestinians as well, passed through this phase at some point in their early development and joined Saadeh’s party, with quite a few remaining lifelong loyal party members. The conspicuous exception to the rule, however, was Charles Malik, who swiftly detected in the party’s secular totalitarian leanings clear danger signals that threatened to smother the individual human person and do away with religious faith altogether. Malik’s brush with the suffocating environment created by Nazism in the mid-1930s when he was studying under Heidegger in Freiburg had served as a wakeup call that alerted him to the ominous features of this version of totalitarianism. One of the early enthusiasts for Saadeh’s party was Fayiz Sayegh; however, during the early 1940s Sayigh was also immersed in the Malik philosophical circles and had imbibed a sufficient dose of existential philosophy to enable him to write with passion his masters’ thesis on the topic of personal existence. The philosophical orientations of Malik and Saadeh were at loggerheads from day one, and at a time when the pioneers of the PPS around the founder were in full recruiting mode among impressionable students throughout Beirut, Malik’s philosophical gatherings were perceived by the party’s vanguard as an unwelcome source of competition pulling young men in exactly the opposite direction—that of Aristotelianism, Thomism, and Christian existentialism. The irreconcilable antagonism between the living–suffering–dying human individual person on one side and the socially-grounded and politically-obsessed ideological collective on the other was only the most apparent difference between the two philosophical approaches. Clashes of temperament and belief between Malik and Saadeh also played a central role, and this reached a climax when after two whole days in 1938 of repeated attempts by Saadeh to convert Malik to his party’s way of thinking during long walks and intense discussions in Saadeh’s ancestral mountain village of Dhour Shoueir—the same village incidentally from where Malik’s wife Eva hails—the two parted company for good after Malik made it clear to Saadeh that he could not combine two ultimate loyalties simultaneously: one to faith in God, and the other to faith in a totalitarian ideology. Apparently Sayigh was attempting to promote existential ways of looking at the world within the ranks of the very party he was entrusted to lead during the temporary absence of Saadeh. To brazenly advocate a world-view that centered on personal existence among those who were bound by their ideological party line to

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

79

allot precedence to socio-historical factors and national imperatives and collectivist impulses was nothing short of anathema. In his four-volume autobiography written in Arabic and published much later, one of the staunch and original party faithful named ‫[ ﻋﺑﺩﺍﷲ ﻓﺑﺭﺻﻲ‬Abdullah Kobrossi] devotes an entire chapter to the case of Sayigh.172 On the eventual termination of Sayigh’s involvement with the PPS Kobrossi writes: “I say it bluntly: I am inclined to the conviction that Sayigh at the time was under the influence of the philosophical school of Charles Malik, which was prevalent in the environs of the American University of Beirut and which openly preached the thought of Kierkegaard and Berdyaev.”173 He went on to explain how it was this that had caused the rift between Sayigh and Saadeh and resulted, according to Kobrossi and the PPS viewpoint, in the 1947 expulsion of Sayigh from the party because he refused to alter his position.174 Kobrossi depicts Sayigh’s “ideological distortion” as resulting from his insistence on regarding the individual human person as the nucleus of historical action while “we view the individual as melting in society and being totally absorbed therein.”175 Sayigh, according to Kobrossi, was self-centered and loved public exposure and prominence, hence his initial attraction to the existential philosophy of thinkers like Kierkegaard and Berdyaev that, in turn, fed his narcissism and boosted his ego. It got to the point, continues Kobrossi, that Sayigh began to call Saadeh “a tyrant.” To translate Kierkegaard and Berdyaev in order to introduce the Arabic reader to their ideas is one thing, says Kobrossi, but to preach these ideas openly as a responsible party official is to contradict PPS thought.176 Oddly enough, it seems, Kierkegaard had managed to make some headway into the circles of an adapted Levantine version of European fascist ideology in the form of the PPS, and that at the hands of the young Fayiz Sayigh, one of the party’s then prominent leaders. Like Sayigh, a number of well-known young poets and writers who joined the PPS and later left it belonged to Malik’s philosophical circles. Among these are names like Yusef El Khal and Fouad Suleiman (both poets), Ghassan Tueini (editor of Lebanon’s leading Arabic-language daily al-Nahar), and Fakhry Maalouf who held a high rank in the party until he converted from Protestantism to Catholicism and became a priest running his own religious community based in rural Massachusetts. Kobrossi irately refers to this group of PPS affiliates who later dropped out as “the Malik School.”177 Lacking proper archives and the necessary firsthand documents that could shed light on much of this obscure history of the PPS’s early beginnings

See Abdullah Kobrossi, ‫ ﺗﺎﺳﻳﺱ ﺍﻟﺣﺯﺏ ﺍﻟﺴﻭﺭﻱ ﺍﻟﻗﻭﻣﻲ ﺍﻻﺟﺗﻣﺎﻋﻲ ﻭﺑﺩﺍﻳﺎﺕ ﻧﺿﺎﻟﻪ‬:‫ﻋﺑﺩﺍﷲ ﻗﺑﺭﺻﻲ ﻳﺗﺫﻛﺭ‬ [Abdullah Kobrossi Remembers: The Founding of the Syrian National-Socialist Party and the Beginnings of its Struggle], vol. 2, Beirut: Fikr Institute for Research and Publication 1982. The chapter entitled “Dr. Fayiz Sayigh,” see especially pp. 192–200. 173 Ibid., p. 194. 174 Palestinians sympathetic to Sayigh maintain that in fact he himself voluntarily left the party when the falling-out occurred and before Saadeh had had a chance to formally expel him. 175 Kobrossi, ‫ ﺗﺎﺳﻳﺱ ﺍﻟﺣﺯﺏ ﺍﻟﺴﻭﺭﻱ ﺍﻟﻗﻭﻣﻲ ﺍﻻﺟﺗﻣﺎﻋﻲ ﻭﺑﺩﺍﻳﺎﺕ ﻧﺿﺎﻟﻪ‬:‫[ ﻋﺑﺩﺍﷲ ﻗﺑﺭﺻﻲ ﻳﺗﺫﻛﺭ‬Abdullah Kobrossi Remembers: The Founding of the Syrian National-Socialist Party and the Beginnings of its Struggle], p. 194. 176 Ibid., p. 200. 177 Ibid., p. 194. 172

80

Habib C. Malik

and development, party members have taken to speculating on questions such as the “existential contamination” of certain individuals in the party’s ranks. One account tries somewhat inconclusively to pinpoint the precise instances of friction between Saadeh and his party, on the one hand, and attempts at influence using Kierkegaard and the existentialists, on the other. Mention of course is made of Sayigh’s role in bringing “the teachings of Kierkegaard and Berdyaev to the party” at a time when the founder was absent and the party’s ideological direction was still awaiting further clarity from Saadeh. In addition to alluding to Malik’s pervasive philosophical impact on specific party members, as has been shown, the account relates how Malik in March 1938 had also invited Edgar Sheffield Brightman (1884–1953), a religious philosopher and professor from Boston, to lecture at the American University of Beirut, and how he had made arrangements for Brightman to meet Saadeh for a philosophical discussion at an evening gathering in Fakhry Maalouf’s house. Malik’s own first encounter with Saadeh, we are told, occurred in that same year. According to the account, Brightman and Malik were on one side of the exchange, which was over epistemology, while Saadeh was diametrically opposed. At the end of the evening, so the account informs us, Brightman gave a glowing tribute to Saadeh’s intellect and philosophical acumen. The same account also mentions another visitor to Beirut in 1938, the celebrated theologian Richard Niebuhr (1894–1962), who apparently met with both Malik and Saadeh separately.178 Niebuhr, as is well known, had been influenced early on by both Kierkegaard and Karl Barth. VIII. Sami Hawi Another of the young graduate students in philosophy at the American University of Beirut who wrote his masters’ thesis on Kierkegaard in 1966 was ‫[ ﺴﺎﻣﻲ ﺣﺎوي‬Sami Hawi] (b. 1938). Hawi is one of those who stuck with Kierkegaard well after he had finished his formal education. A professor of philosophy today at the University of Wisconsin in Milwaukee, Hawi hails originally from a Greek Orthodox family in the Lebanese mountain village of Dhour Shoueir, scene of the 1938 Malik–Saadeh face-off and the place also where in August 1947 Sayigh wrote his existential essay ‫ ﻧﻅﺭﺍﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻻﻧﺴﺎﻥ ﻭﺍﻟﻭﺟود‬:‫[ ﻧﺩﺍﺀ ﺍﻷﻋﻣﺎﻕ‬A Call from the Depths: Reflections on Man and Existence]. Nestled at over 3,500 feet above sea level among pine groves on a semicircular ridge overlooking the majestic Sannine mountain range in central Lebanon, Dhour Shoueir has attracted generations of foreign missionaries and educators as well as local intellectuals, university professors and their students, and sundry poets. Winters in Dhour Shoueir tend to be snowy and cold, but summer weather there is near-perfect and the place makes an ideal retreat for those who wish to relax, read, write, think, and commune with nature or with one another. Hawi’s masters’ thesis investigated critically the relation of faith and reason in Kierkegaard. His thesis advisor was Hugh Harcourt, to whom he wrote a dedication at the front of the work: “To Professor Harcourt, who so generously placed his For full text of this account by PPS member Yusef Mroueh, see http://ssnps.jeeran. com/yossef%20mroueh.htm. See also the PPS website www.ssnps.jeeran.com. For a more comprehensive picture one would also have to consult the private papers and unpublished diary of Charles Malik. 178

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

81

profound Kierkegaardian scholarship at my disposal, and whose comments were of great help to me.”179 On the examining committee for the M.A. was Charles Malik with whom Hawi had a mild confrontation over Abraham, but at the end Malik called Hawi’s work “a very competent, nice thesis.”180 One point Hawi stresses in his thesis is an underlying “dynamic unity” that he discerns beneath Kierkegaard’s outwardly disparate writings.181 Occasionally writing Arabic poetry “with Kierkegaard in the background,” as he says, Hawi has also published some articles on different aspects of Kierkegaard’s thought. One of these, containing reworked parts of his masters’ thesis, investigates Kierkegaard’s famous dictum “Truth is subjectivity,” and like many other Arab writers on Kierkegaard Hawi’s attention is inevitably turned toward the mystics. He points to the fact that Kierkegaard’s method of indirect communication was hardly new and that “although Kierkegaard makes a genuine use of this method to show that religious truth is annulled by using direct speech, this method is not original; it was at least used before him by Socrates and the mystics.”182 Hawi then quickly throws in a word of caution: [T]his similarity between Kierkegaard’s method of indirect communication and that of the mystics does not mean that he was a mystic or headed towards mysticism.…In fact Kierkegaard differs from the mystics in that the mystic resigns existence because existence precludes communion with the Eternal, while Kierkegaard finds this resignation an escape from the human situation, namely, existence.183

He quotes the statement in Either/Or, Part Two, wherein Kierkegaard openly declares that the life of the mystic displeases him because it is a deceit against the world in which he lives.184 In a section of a book Hawi published in 1974 entitled Islamic Naturalism and Mysticism he undertook a cautious comparative study of Kierkegaard and ‫[ اﺑﻥ ﻁﻔﻳل‬Ibn Tufayl], author of the well-known ‫[ ﺣﻲ ﺑﻥ ﻳﻘﻅﺎن‬Hayy Bin Yaqsan] story, on mystical gnosis.185 In another piece entitled “The Aesthetic Self in Kierkegaard: A Phenomenological Perspective” Hawi illustrates how Kierkegaard,

179 Sami S. Hawi, A Critical Analysis of the Relation of Faith and Reason in Kierkegaard with Particular Emphasis on Spheres of Existence and Apprehension of Truth, unpublished masters’ thesis, Department of Philosophy, American University of Beirut 1966 (176 pages), opening page. 180 From Hawi’s own personal reminiscences as he communicated them in September 2004 to this author. 181 See Hawi, A Critical Analysis of the Relation of Faith and Reason, p. 1; pp. 21–5. 182 Sami S. Hawi, “An Existential Theory of Truth,” Al-Hikmat. A Research Journal of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Punjab, Quaid-e-Azam campus, Lahore, Pakistan, December 1991, p. 21. 183 Ibid., p. 22. 184 Ibid., p. 31. 185 See Sami S. Hawi, Islamic Naturalism and Mysticism: A Philosophical Study of Ibn Tufayl’s Hayy bin Yaqsan, Leiden: Brill 1974, pp. 231–48.

82

Habib C. Malik

in contrast to the behaviorist school, comes much closer to employing the Husserlian phenomenological method in his depiction of the aesthetic self.186 IX. Other Studies Another Lebanese who also wrote his masters’ thesis on Kierkegaard is Georges Tamer. He completed it in German at the Free University of Berlin in 1995. Entitled Schwermut und Leiden in Kierkegaards “Stadien auf des Lebens Weg,” it comes to 130 pages and remains unpublished. The author, who told this writer that he became interested in Kierkegaard’s thought through some philosophy courses he attended with professor Michael Theunissen at the Free University, adds that he was particularly captivated by Kierkegaard’s Christian existentialism. Earlier, Tamer had studied briefly under Jürgen Habermas in Frankfurt. He later completed his doctoral dissertation on Leo Strauss’ interpretation of medieval Islamic philosophy. He has plans to translate a part of his masters’ thesis on Kierkegaard into Arabic, and he hopes also to translate some of Kierkegaard’s own writings from German into Arabic. He is currently a lecturer in Arabic and Arabic Studies at FriedrichAlexander University in Erlangen. From Egypt comes another Kierkegaard devotee who later turned her attention to other pursuits. Fawzia Assaad-Mikhail is a Coptic Christian novelist currently residing in Geneva with her three children and husband who works for the World Health Organization. Part of her time is spent defending writers in prison before the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. She has a doctorate in philosophy from the Sorbonne where she studied under Jean Wahl, and she briefly taught philosophy at Cairo University. Back in 1962 Assaad-Mikhail, who was then immersed in Kierkegaard, published a book on him in Arabic entitled ‫ اﺑو ﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻳﺔ‬:‫ﻛﻳﺭﻛﺟورد‬ ‫[ ﺴورﻳﻥ‬Søren Kierkegaard: Father of Existentialism] in which she gave a summary overview of the main events in his life and the key themes in his works. Depending mainly on French sources, she considered throughout her book in particular the issue that religious faith is not linked to objective truth, but is pure subjectivity.187 She made no attempt to translate any Kierkegaard into Arabic. For a while after that she focused on Nietzsche in relation to Kierkegaard and wrote some fascinating articles for the Paris-based Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale that used to be directed by Jean Wahl.188 Her interests gradually turned away from philosophy to mythology and 186 See Sami S. Hawi, “The Aesthetic Self in Kierkegaard: A Phenomenological Perspective,” Iqbal Review. Journal of the Iqbal Academy, Lahore, Pakistan, ed. by Muhammad Suheyl Umar, April 1999, pp. 105–31. On the title page of the article Hawi pays tribute to the “deep philosophical kinship” between Mohammad Iqbal, Pakistan’s celebrated philosopher and religious thinker, and Kierkegaard. For both, he writes, “humanistic psychology is a victory over the brute facts of science and behaviorism.” 187 See Fawzia Assaad-Mikhail, ‫ اﺑو ﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻳﺔ‬:‫[ ﺴورﻳﻥ ﻛﻳﺭﻛﺟورد‬Søren Kierkegaard: Father of Existentialism], Cairo: Dar al-Ma’arif bi Misr 1962, especially pp. 34–58. 188 See in particular Fawzia Assaad-Mikhail, “Nietzsche et Kierkegaard: des possibilites d’une interpretation nietzschéenne de Kierkegaard: (dialogue des morts-vivants),” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, vol. 71, no. 4, 1966, pp. 463–82; “Mort de l’homme et subjectivité,”

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

83

the novel, and she began to write in French on the myths of ancient Egypt as well as fictional works about the complexities of Egyptian society, its women, and relations between Muslims and Copts. She always attempted to trace a thread that tied ancient Egypt to modern life in her country. Through her readings of Nietzsche, in particular Thus Spoke Zarathustra and his works on the ancient Greeks, she became drawn to an imagery she found akin to that of ancient Egypt, so she studied hieroglyphs and plunged into the world of the Pharaohs. Ironically, it was Heidegger, though he denies the existence of philosophy before the time of the ancient Greeks, who gave her in his work on Nietzsche the clue to a double interpretation: Nietzsche interpreting ancient Egyptian thought, and that same thought “interpreting” Nietzsche. Her reading of Freud provided her with new insights regarding ancient Egyptian myths.189 She exercised this technique of double interpretation on Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, and being the creative literary artist that she is, the result was a highly imaginative, though somewhat improbable, “philosophical game” of sorts. In place of the various guests (Kierkegaardian pseudonyms) at the banquet in “In Vino Veritas” of Stages on Life’s Way, Assaad-Mikhail imagines different versions of Nietzsche. Applying Kierkegaard’s divergent depictions of love, marriage, women, and more she creates the successive Nietzsche personae and thereby teases out the subtleties and nuances of Nietzsche’s own views. And all the while she is insisting on the obvious falsity and fictitiousness of the entire endeavor. She innovatively sets out to employ Kierkegaardian experiences and mimes, as she refers to them, to unmask the convoluted layers of Nietzsche’s own thought and the person behind them—a highly ambitious project in its originality.190 There is an interesting contingent of French-educated scholars and academics in Lebanon who have involved themselves in various ways with Kierkegaard’s thought. They have written everything on him, for the most part, in French, and therefore are not directly responsible for transmitting his concepts to an Arabic reading audience. Still, they themselves are Lebanese, and their analyses, for what they are worth, have entered into the admittedly limited world of the indigenous French-speaking intellectual elite. Foremost among these and perhaps the initial inspiration for a great number of them is René Habachi, originally an Egyptian Copt who adopted Lebanon as his second home until the outbreak of war there in 1975 when he moved permanently to Paris. Back in the mid-1950s, around the time of Kierkegaard’s centenary, Habachi gave a series of landmark lectures at the Institut de Lettres Orientales in Beirut that were published in four volumes between 1956 and 1960 under the general title Vers une Pensée Mediterraneenne. The subtitle for the first three volumes is Philosophie Musulmane, Philosophie Chrétienne et Existentialisme, and that of the fourth volume replaces Existentialisme with Marxisme. Kierkegaard figures prominently in the second and third volumes, while Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, and Marcel are

Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, vol. 73, no. 4, 1968, pp. 430–61; and “Kierkegaard interprete de Nietzsche,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, vol. 78, no. 1, 1973, pp. 45–87. 189 On Fawzia Assaad-Mikhail see www.geocities.com/aaa-authors/fawzia_assaad.htm. 190 See Assaad-Mikhail, “Kierkegaard interprete de Nietzsche,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, vol. 78, no. 1, 1973, p. 45; pp. 49–54; pp. 82–7.

84

Habib C. Malik

treated with varying emphases throughout the first three volumes. The fourth volume covers discussions of Aristotle, Aquinas, Hegel, Feuerbach, and Marx. Habachi’s vision is one that sees a creative coming together of the best in the European philosophical tradition with its counterpart on the Arab side under the umbrella framework of “Mediterranean thought,” and that at a time when it seemed as though the Arab world was on the verge of slipping anew into a Dark Age. Like Badawi, Habachi was subconsciously reacting to the anticipated adverse consequences for the entire region of recent political developments in his native Egypt following the 1952 military coup by Nasser. Habachi clearly feared that the rise of ideological Arabism threatened to unleash the Arab masses in a frenzy that could be detrimental both for non-Muslim minorities native to the region and for enlightened Muslims. Instead, he preached the need for a cultural awakening in place of a purely political one that can easily turn into the ostracizing of non-Muslim minority communities, or worse. The way forward for the peoples of the Near East, wrote Habachi, would be in the adoption of religious existentialism, namely, without its irrational component, along with Husserlian phenomenology as the philosophical methodology that would allow for a philosophical rediscovery of the rich past of Near Eastern thought.191 Nothing short of an existential revival for the peoples of the Arab world—a revival firmly grounded in the religious sensibility as expressed through Kierkegaard’s Knight of Faith and Marcel’s God-centered philosophy, and that faces inwardly and is pursued self-critically—can suffice to protect the Arab and Muslim peoples from the impending challenges and ravages of materialism and atheism.192 The “stimulation of existentialism” is vital at this critical juncture in the region’s history, insists Habachi.193 Muslim luminaries both medieval and contemporary, he argues, are naturally harmonized with this philosophical impetus from the Occident.194 The kind of Sartrean atheism that sprouted and has taken root in some quarters in the West “is alien to the shores of the Mediterranean,” he writes, and for this reason both Christianity and Islam, which have emerged and flourished in the Near East, are natural receptors for the religious existentialist sensibility.195 Considerable space is devoted to Kierkegaard in Habachi’s volumes. He and Gabriel Marcel represent for the author the twin pillars of Western religious existentialism and must therefore be an integral part of the quest to reclaim our shared Mediterranean intellectual and spiritual heritage which is a dynamic livinggrowing tradition.196 In volume 2 Habachi calls Kierkegaard and Nietzsche “two heroes of existence” and stresses that both in fact are religious, the one affirming

191 René Habachi, Vers une Pensée Mediterraneenne: Philosophie Chrétienne, Philosophie Musulmane et Existentialisme, vol. 3, Beirut: Institut de Lettres Orientales 1959, pp. 195–8. Only vol. 1 of the series has “Musulmane” before “Chrétienne in the subtitle, the other three have the order reversed. 192 Ibid., pp. 181–4. 193 Ibid., p. 195. 194 Ibid., pp. 182–3; p. 190; p. 194. 195 Ibid., p. 179. 196 Ibid., p. 9.

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

85

God and the other negating Him.197 Kierkegaard concentrates on the God-Man, who is Christ, while Nietzsche looks to the man-god, or Zarathustra and the Superman. Both men were exceptional, both suffered alone, both rejected systems (either of faith, or of its absence), and both were vehemently critical of Christianity as they saw it manifested around them.198 It was Kierkegaard who ushered in the age of existentialism, but paradoxically it is Nietzsche who in many ways reveals the depth and novelty of Kierkegaard to us.199 Following this, Habachi turns his attention to Abraham, Kierkegaard’s true “hero,” the Knight of Faith, and he analyzes the Abraham story as presented by Kierkegaard in Fear and Trembling. The author naturally relies on French translations of Kierkegaard’s works and on some French secondary sources as well. In volume 3 Kierkegaard is given a broader exposure. Habachi makes clear that his reading of Kierkegaard is not free of criticism since his ultimate aim is to see what can be salvaged that would have value for a religious existential position, the philosophy that is optimally suited for the Near East in Habachi’s view and that can best be mediated by Christians and Muslims from the region.200 After surveying Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel where the difference is summed up as divergence over the Socratic, Kierkegaard’s dialectic is described as one of contrasting spheres of existence.201 Relying mainly on Jolivet and Mesnard, in addition to Kierkegaard’s own journals, Habachi sketches a brief life of the philosopher and then covers the stages as they appear in both parts of Either/Or.202 What Kierkegaard most wanted to be, writes Habachi, was a witness to truth, and for him Abraham through his faith was the ultimate witness.203 But with Kierkegaard man, who is defined as a complete existential lack, is cut off from God, who is the perfect fullness of presence; herein reside the paradox and the absurdity: God is a transcendence that only the irrational can reach—this is Habachi’s chief criticism of Kierkegaard.204 Moreover, Habachi expresses reservations regarding what he infers as the solitude of the existent, the inflated role of passion, the inherent tendency in Kierkegaard’s concept of truth “for me” to become subjectivist, and the fact that perpetual crisis seems always to mark the traversing from one stage of life to the next. And yet, he adds, all the themes developed by the later atheistic existentialists had already been exhausted in one way or another by Kierkegaard along religious lines.205 Habachi does draw an analogy between Kierkegaard’s notion of God’s transcendence and the Muslim conception. Whether it is the Sufi al-Hallaj or the philosopher Avicenna, their faith in the René Habachi, Vers une Pensée Mediterraneenne: Philosophie Chrétienne, Philosophie Musulmane et Existentialisme, vol. 2, Beirut: Institut de Lettres Orientales 1957, p. 37. 198 Ibid., pp. 33–7. 199 Ibid., p. 35. Habachi relies in his discussion of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche on Wahl, Jaspers, and Henri de Lubac; see ibid., pp. 35–6. 200 Habachi, Vers une Pensée Mediterraneenne, vol. 3, p. 121. 201 Ibid., p. 127; p. 130. 202 Ibid., pp. 132–43. 203 Ibid., p. 151. 204 Ibid., pp. 158–9. 205 Ibid., pp. 160–2. 197

86

Habib C. Malik

inaccessibility of the transcendent God, and the consequent “ontological instability of man,” reveals affinities between their Islamic position and the Lutheran theology of transcendence; however, Kierkegaard differs from both in that he stresses “the scandal.”206 In the end, however, Habachi’s noble project of achieving, through the appropriation of existentialism, a Mediterranean cultural-intellectual synthesis between Christian and Muslim philosophical orientations and spiritual overlaps fails. The failure is due first to the existence of too few takers on the local end, and second to the fact that Habachi’s vision is premised on a number of flawed assumptions about the Muslim Near East, the romantic idea of there being an indigenous “bridge between East and West” that simply awaits being activated and vitalized, and the size and strength of the opposing native forces that act to foil such a synthesis. Besides, in the nature of the case Habachi can only direct his discourse to a select audience of a francophone educated elite mainly in Lebanon and a few other places in the Middle East—not a very promising prospect for such an ambitious project. When, at the start of his first volume, Habachi warns that “it is scandalous to speak of existentialism in the East,” he is guilty of fatally understating the issue.207 René Habachi wrote a short preface for a book in French about Kierkegaard that appeared in 1969 in Beirut by a graduate of the Lebanese University named Nouhad Abimrad Maalouf. Entitled Le Temoignage Chrétien de Kierkegaard: Essai analytique, the work came out of the author’s dissertation written in Montreal, Canada where she once resided. Habachi saw in the work a sign of the beginning fulfillment of his vision: that a Greek Orthodox Lebanese woman living in Canada should audaciously undertake to investigate Kierkegaard in this fashion breaks with “the timid oriental climate of hesitation between the past and the present.”208 Maalouf’s contribution is that she approaches the Protestant Kierkegaard ecumenically deriving spiritual nourishment from his authentic Christian testimony for both Orthodox traditional theology and Catholic rational theology. In the end, Maalouf is interested in how one becomes a Christian as opposed to how one speaks about, or conceives of, Christianity. In this sense Kierkegaard’s thought and life, she writes, “constitute the proper testimony to all religious thinking, even beyond the boundary of Christianity.”209 Becoming a Christian was Kierkegaard’s first and last preoccupation throughout his life, but he did not pursue this without experiencing profound and persistent anxiety to the point of precipitating in him a certain psychological instability.210 Still, Maalouf avoids psychoanalyzing him and keeps her eye fixed on the spiritual focus. Again, as with other investigations of Kierkegaard written in French by scholars of Arab descent, the circulation of such works among native Ibid., p. 167. René Habachi, Vers une Pensée Mediterraneenne: Philosophie Musulmane, Philosophie Chrétienne et Existentialisme, vol. 1, Beirut: Institut de Lettres Orientales 1956, p. 16. 208 Nouhad Abimrad Maalouf, Le Temoignage Chretien de Kierkegaard: Essai analytique, Beirut: Lebanese University Philosophical and Social Studies Section 1969, p. ix. 209 Ibid., p. 71. 210 Ibid., p. 111. 206 207

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

87

Arabs is extremely limited. What makes Maalouf’s work perhaps somewhat less restricted in its outreach is that she admits it is a personal witness on her part to the power of Kierkegaard’s writings to kindle in each one of us “a religious intuition.” Christian Arabs in particular with their plethora of churches and denominations and rites might be induced by Maalouf’s treatment to elevate their parochial perceptions of one another to a higher universal plane where, as Maalouf says, Kierkegaard’s Christian testimony ought to be encountered. At the Université Saint-Joseph in Beirut interest in Kierkegaard has flourished thanks mainly to the young and dynamic philosophical duo Jad Hatem and his wife Nicole Tambourgi-Hatem. Nicole was Jad’s student in philosophy before they married, and she wrote her dissertation on Kierkegaard. Her attention was first directed to Kierkegaard as a literary writer after she read in French his “Seducer’s Diary” excerpted from the first volume of Either/Or. Soon she plunged into his religious writings, in particular the Upbuilding Discourses. Jad, her professor, used to refer to Kierkegaard frequently in his lectures and when the time came for her to select a research topic for her dissertation he asked her to choose between Kierkegaard and Franz Rosenzweig on the concept of anxiety. She chose Kierkegaard, as she puts it, “because of his difficulty.”211 Kierkegaard allowed her to understand other genres of creative expression such as literature and films, which she then began to interpret through Kierkegaard. For her, the most important of Kierkegaard’s works are The Sickness unto Death and The Concept of Anxiety. Her husband Jad organized a circle of philosophical discussion during which The Concept of Anxiety was read and analyzed. Nicole, who is currently chairperson of the philosophy department at the Université Saint-Joseph, says she teaches Kierkegaard “with a passion” and uses him as an entry point to philosophy in her annual introductory course on the subject: “Initiation à la philosophie: L’existence.” Another course she entitles “Lectur Kierkegaardienne” in which she explains how Kierkegaard has creatively interpreted others, and demonstrates how we can use him to do the same. A number of students at the university over the years became interested in Kierkegaard following exposure to his writings through Nicole and Jad, and some of them went on to pursue further studies of Kierkegaard in Paris. One such student of Nicole’s was Mona Hamouche who wrote her masters’ thesis in 1999 on La subjectivité et la verité dans Le Post-Scriptum de Kierkegaard after which she went on to Paris to continue research in Kierkegaard. Tambourgi-Hatem has published several studies on Kierkegaard including one on Habachi’s reading of Kierkegaard and the difficulties of establishing a basis for philosophical dialogue the way Habachi envisaged.212 Both Nicole and Jad have recently been very excited about the contemporary French philosopher Michel Henry, whom they hosted at their university in Beirut during 2004, and they have written a number of studies analyzing his approach to Kierkegaard, in particular 211 Much of the information about Jad Hatem and Nicole Tambourgi-Hatem regarding their involvement with Kierkegaard came from private conversations in summer 2004 between them and this author. 212 See Nicole Tambourgi-Hatem, “Habachi-Kierkegaard ou les difficultes du dialogue philosophique,” Travaux et Jours, new series, no. 64, Fall 1999. For a full listing of writings by this author on Kierkegaard refer to the bibliography at the end of this study.

88

Habib C. Malik

to The Concept of Anxiety.213 The question of contemporaneity with Christ also preoccupied the two Hatems, as have assessments of Kierkegaard in relation to Schelling, Bergson, Sartre, Edith Stein, and St. John of the Cross. Although the work of the Hatems on Kierkegaard reaches essentially French-educated students at the Université Saint-Joseph and those few specialists on Kierkegaard in Lebanon and abroad who read French, they still represent an indigenous example of cutting-edge Kierkegaard scholarship in a francophone Arab milieu. For decades Kierkegaard has been well known and studied as a religious thinker in Christian (mainly Maronite) theological seminaries and monastic circles throughout Lebanon so that young seminarians emerging from years of study and training will have had exposure to his writings with an emphasis on the religious component. One Kierkegaard scholar in particular stands out in this context: Father Joseph Lajin of the Bassilian Salvationist Order. Father Lajin, who currently resides in Damascus, Syria, studied at Albert-Ludwig University in Freiburg in Germany between 1981 and 1983 where, after delving into The Sickness unto Death, he completed in 1983 his masters’ thesis on Kierkegaard under professor Bernhard Casper entitled Le Souci soteriologique dans l’existence et l’oeuvre de Soren Kierkegaard. Lajin then completed his philosophical and religious studies at the University of the Holy Spirit in Kasleek, Lebanon under the specialist on existentialism Father Etienne Sakr and professor Khalil El Jurr, receiving his doctorate in October 1984. His masters’ thesis, a copy of which is found at the university library in Kasleek, contains a few translated excerpts from Kierkegaard’s writings that deal with soteriology. In 1999 Lajin published an article in Arabic entitled ‫[ ﺍﻟﺭﺣﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻓﻛﺭ ﻛﻳرﻛﻳﻐﺎرد‬Mercy in the Thought of Kierkegaard] in which he investigated Kierkegaard’s concept of mercy as found mainly in his Works of Love, stressing the absence of mercy in paganism and its relative marginality as a theme in the Old Testament.214 Lajin taught a course on Kierkegaard at the university in Kasleek and another one in French on Kierkegaard while teaching in Rome during the early 1990s. If you visit any of the main bookstores in Beirut, Damascus, or Cairo and ask for something by or on Kierkegaard in Arabic, you will most likely be handed a slim paperback in the series ‫[ ﺯﺩﻧﻲ ﻋﻟﻣﺎ‬Increase my Knowledge] that is a translation of parts of the 1948 work in French on Kierkegaard by Pierre Mesnard. Inside this slender volume, which is entitled simply ‫[ ﻛﻳﺭﻛﻳﻐﺎرد‬Kierkegaard], there is a section of translated See Nicole Tambourgi-Hatem, “Michel Henry, lecteur du Concept d’Angoisse de Kierkegaard,” Revue philosophique, no. 3, 2001, pp. 339–57 (republished in Revue de Philosophie de la France et de l’etranger, September–October 2001); See also by the same author: “Contemporaneites: Tchekov, Kierkegaard, Michel Henry,” Annales de philosophie de l’Université Saint-Joseph, vol. 17, 1996; “Michel Henry, contemporain de Kierkegaard,” Annales de philosophie de l’Université Saint-Joseph, vol. 18, 1997; and “L’evenement Christ: Kierkegaard-Michel Henry,” Iris, Annales de philosophie de l’Université Saint-Joseph, vol. 23, 2002. For a listing of Jad Hatem’s articles on Kierkegaard refer to the bibliography at the end of this study. 214 See Father Joseph Lajin, ‫[ ﺍﻟﺭﺣﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻓﻛﺭ ﻛﻳرﻛﻳﻐﺎرد‬Mercy in the Thought of Kierkegaard], ed. by ‘Adil Theodore Khoury and Basil Aoun (Research Center for Christian–Muslim Dialogue in Harissa, Lebanon), Jounieh: Pauline Library 1999 (‫[ ﺍﻟﻣﺴﻳﺣﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻻﺴﻼﻡ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺣﻭﺍﺭ ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻌﺎﻭﻥ‬Christianity and Islam in Dialogue and Cooperation]), vol. 8, pp. 197–226. 213

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

89

excerpts from several of his works. The translator is the well-known Syrian writer ‫ﺍﻟﻌو�ا‬ ‫‘[ ﻋﺎﺩﻝ‬Adil al-‘Awwa] who is credited with a number of translations into Arabic of Western works, both secondary and primary, as well as works in French by such Arab writers as the Paris-based liberal Algerian thinker Mohammad Arkun. Al-‘Awwa, who died in 2003, is also the author of a few works of his own on Arabic and Islamic thought and on ethics.215 Al-‘Awwa’s translation of the Mesnard book is divided into two parts: the first involves a brief biographical sketch followed by a discussion of Socratic irony as Kierkegaard’s point of departure and then the stages of existence and ironic humor; the second offers selected excerpts in Arabic translation (from French) taken from The Sickness unto Death, The Concept of Irony, “Diary of a Seducer,” and other parts of Either/Or (both parts), Stages on Life’s Way, Philosophical Fragments, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, and one excerpt from the journals.216 Although the translations are from French editions, the quality is superior. One unexpected enthusiast for Kierkegaard’s thought is Rabab al-Sadr, sister of Imam Moussa al-Sadr, the charismatic Iran-born leader of Lebanon’s Shiites and founder of the Amal Movement, who disappeared mysteriously in 1978 while on a visit to Libya.217 Rabab al-Sadr runs the Imam Sadr Foundation based in Beirut’s southern suburbs and active in providing social services within the Shiite community. She is also completing her masters’ thesis on Kierkegaard at the Lebanese University with philosophy professor Moussa Wehbe. Her principal focus is Kierkegaard’s religious thought and her sources include the Mesnard book translated by al-‘Awwa, Imam ‘Abd al-Fattah Imam’s work, and Fawzia Assaad-Mikhail’s book. Also Rabab al-Sadr has access to Iranian sources on Kierkegaard written in Farsi since she is fluent in that language, and these include some translated works by Kierkegaard into Farsi. Although her English is not very good, she has attempted with limited success to read Fear and Trembling and Philosophical Fragments in the Hong translations. Her thesis is based on a 25-page paper she wrote in 1995 on Kierkegaard’s religious concepts. She admires Kierkegaard’s “courage, ambition, and piety” and regards him as a true striver for authenticity. She says she abhors insinuations of sexual deviance that she once read about him. She is attempting to translate into Arabic some parts of For Self-Examination, and for her as a devout Muslim anyone who takes Christ as the prototype is someone to be highly esteemed. One of her favorite Kierkegaard texts is Repetition.218 There remains one interesting instance to relate of an Arab “receiving” Kierkegaard. It is that of the Iraqi-born playwright Fadel Soudani who resides permanently in On ‘Adil al-‘Awwa, see the article by Mohammad al-Jabr in ‫[ ﺟﺭﻳﺩﺓ ﺍﻷﺴﺑﻭع ﺍﻷﺩﺑﻲ‬Literary Week Magazine], no. 858, published by the Union of Arab Writers, Damascus, May 17, 2003. http://www.station192.com/awudam2/alesbouh%20802/ind-isb858.htm. 216 Pierre Mesnard, ‫ﻛﻳﺭﻛﻳﻐﺎﺭﺩ‬, trans. by ‘Adil al’Awwa, Beirut and Paris: ‘Uweidat Publishers and Presses Universitaires de France 1983 (series ‫)ﺯﺩﻧﻲ ﻋﻟﻣﺎ‬, pp. 5–42 (discussion) and pp. 43–107 (translated selections). Cf. Pierre Mesnard, Le vrai visage de Kierkegaard, Paris: Edition Beauchesne 1948. 217 For more on Moussa al-Sadr’s story and his role in the Shiite world see Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam: Musa al-Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1986. 218 The information presented here about Rabab al-Sadr was obtained by this writer through a personal interview in September 2004. 215

90

Habib C. Malik

Copenhagen and directs The Fourth Dimension Theater acting group. He is also an occasional lecturer at the University of Copenhagen and holds a doctorate in directing and dramatic production from Sofia University in Bulgaria. He has taught dramatic arts in Bulgaria, Algeria, Libya, and now Denmark. In cooperation with the University of Copenhagen, Soudani completed the script in Arabic for a play about the imaginary nature strolls of the young Kierkegaard with his father. The script has been translated into Danish and was performed in 2004 in Copenhagen. He is a regular reader of the International Kierkegaard Newsletter put out by the late Julia Watkin from the University of Tasmania in Australia. Soudani’s Kierkegaard play does not dwell, as one might reasonably expect, on the philosopher’s early life. Instead, it deals with themes like the purity of heart and relations with the other, and the main idea in the play revolves around the relationship that the cultured person develops with his surroundings, his society, and his age. The question asked repeatedly concerns the meaning of truth and how one defends an idea. The play, entitled ‫ﺍﻟﻧﺯﻫﺎت ﺍﻟﺧﻳﺎﻟﻳﺔ‬ [Imaginary Promenades], is written in a contemporary and accessible dramatic style well suited for performances on college campuses including in the Arab world.219 Soudani knows and admires Imam ‘Abd al-Fattah Imam’s works on Kierkegaard, and he has written a laudatory review of Imam’s principal work that he posted on the web.220 In this review, which he entitles ‫[ ﺷﻳﺯﻭﻓﺭﻳﻧﻳﺎ ﺍﻟذات ﻓﻲ ﻓﻟﺴﻔﺔ ﻛﻳﺭﻛﻐﺎرد‬Schizophrenia of the Self in the Philosophy of Kierkegaard], Soudani demonstrates his competent knowledge of Kierkegaard and his appreciation of Imam’s masterful treatment of the philosopher, calling it “a breakthrough for the Arabic philosophical library.” He is particularly intrigued by a comparison Imam makes between Kierkegaard’s life stages and certain passages from the Koran. With Soudani we have the only known instance of Kierkegaard dramatized in Arabic for the theater stage. We also have here a curious case, as it were, of reverse reception: a dramatic rendition of Kierkegaard in Arabic then being translated into Danish to be performed before a live native audience back in the home country of the philosopher. The assortment of those few thinkers, scholars, artists, and academicians from the Arab world, who in one way or another have worked on Kierkegaard, features both the esoteric dabblers alongside the significant contributors, but by no means does it include the holistically exhaustive masters. Recurring laments one encounters about the poverty of Arab familiarity with the existential tradition do not appear so far to have stimulated anyone among the critics who voice them to actually buckle down and translate a complete work by Kierkegaard into Arabic. Undoubtedly, the overt Christian content in many places throughout the Kierkegaard corpus has acted as a deterrent for would-be Arab transmitters and interpreters. Their cringing before Kierkegaard, however, is not unique to him and is repeated with every major Western thinker, saint, or religious hero who happens to attract the attention of the Arab intelligentsia. If the devout Muslim scholars balk at Nietzsche while the secular iconoclasts among Arab intellectuals embrace him, the two sides tend to join forces The information about Fadel Soudani was sent to this writer by e-mail in summer 2004 courtesy of the playwright himself. 220 The review is dated June 14, 2002 and numbered 160; it can be accessed and read in full at http://www.rezgar.com/debat/show.art.asp?aid=1711. 219

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

91

in keeping Kierkegaard at arms length. This raises the question about the pivotal role that Christian Arabs can play to ease the passage of many of these hitherto neglected Western coreligionists into Arabic. In fact Christian Arabs have done precisely that with respect to a host of writers and thinkers from the West who have not been too welcome in Islamic circles. But for some reason so far Kierkegaard seems to have fallen through the cracks.

Bibliography I. Arab Translations of Kierkegaard’s Works Mesnard, Pierre, ‫ﻛﻳﺭﻛﻳﻐﺎرد‬, trans. by ‘Adil al’Awwa, Beirut and Paris: ‘Uweidat Publishers and Presses Universitaires de France 1983 (series ‫)ﺯﺩﻧﻲ ﻋﻟﻣﺎ‬, pp. 5–42 (discussion) and pp. 43–107 (translated selections from The Sickness unto Death, The Concept of Irony, “The Seducer’s Diary,” and other parts of Either/Or). (Cf. Pierre Mesnard, Le vrai visage de Kierkegaard, Paris: Edition Beauchesne 1948.) II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard in the Arab World Ajami, Fouad, The Vanished Imam: Musa al-Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon, Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1986. Al-‘Ishmawi, Mohammad Sa’id, ‫[ ﺗﺎﺭﻳﺦ ﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻔﻛر اﻟﺑﺷري‬History of Existentialism in Human Thought], Cairo: al-Dar al-Qawmiyyah Printers, n.d. Al-Safadi, Muta’, ‫[ ﻓﻟﺴﻔﺔ ﺍﻟﻘﻟﻕ‬Philosophy of Anxiety], Beirut: Dar al-Talia’ 1963. Assaad-Mikhail, Fawzia, ‫ اﺑو ﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻳﺔ‬:‫[ ﺴﻭﺭﻳﻥ ﻛﻳﺭﻛﺟورد‬Søren Kierkegaard: Father of Existentialism], Cairo: Dar al-Ma’arif bi Misr 1962. —— “Nietzsche et Kierkegaard: des possibilites d’une interpretation nietzscheenne de Kierkegaard: (dialogue des morts-vivants),” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, vol. 71, no. 4, 1966, pp. 463–82. —— “Mort de l’homme et subjectivité,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, vol. 73, no. 4, 1968, pp. 430–61. —— “Kierkegaard interprete de Nietzsche,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, vol. 78, no. 1, 1973, pp. 45–87. Badawi, ‘Abd al-Rahman, ‫[ اﻻﻧﺴﺎﻧﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻔﻛر ﺍﻟﻌﺭﺑﻲ‬Humanity and Existentialism in Arabic Thought], Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahda al-Masriyyah 1947. —— ‫[ اﻟﺯﻣﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﻭﺟودي‬Existential Time], 2nd ed., Cairo: Greenberg Press and Maktabat al-Nahda al-Masriyyah 1955. —— ‫[ ﺩﺭﺍﺴﺎﺕ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻔﻟﺴﻔﺔ ﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻳﺔ‬Studies in Existential Philosophy], Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahda al-Masriyyah 1961. —— ‫[ اﻟﻣوت ﻭﺍﻟﻌﺑﻘﺭﻳﺔ‬Death and Genius], 2nd ed., Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahda alMasriyyah 1962. —— ‫[ ﻧﻳﺗﺷﻪ‬Nietzsche], 5th ed., Kuwait: Wikalat al-Matbu’aat 1975. —— ‫[ ﺳﻳرة ﺣﻳﺎﺗﻲ‬The Story of My Life], vols. 1–2, Beirut: The Arab Institute for Research and Publication 2000. Bin Dhurayl, ‘Adnan, ‫ ﺩﺭﺍﺳﺔ‬:‫[ ﺍﻟﻔﻛر اﻟﻭﺟودي ﻋﺑر ﻣﺻﻁﻟﺣﻪ‬Existential Thought through its Specialized Term: a Study], Damascus: Itihad al-Kuttab al-‘Arab 1985.

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

93

—— ‫ ﺗﻟﻳﻬﺎ ﺍﻟﻘﺻﻳدة ﺍﻟﻌﻳﻧﻳﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻧﻔس‬،‫[ اﻷﺭﺟوزة ﻓﻲ اﻟوﺟود ﻭ ﺍﻟﻌدم‬The Rajaz-Style Anthem on Being and Nothingness Followed by a Rhymed Poem Ending in the Letter “‫ ”ع‬on the Self], Damascus: Alef-Baa’ al-Adeeb Printers, 1989. Habachi, Rene, Vers une Pensee Mediterraneenne: Philosophie Chretienne, Philosophie Musulmane et Existentialisme, vols. 1–3, Beirut: Institut de Lettres Orientales 1956–9. Hatem, Jad, “Foi et Contemporaneite dans les Miettes philosophiques de Kierkegaard,” Annales de philosophie de l’Universite Saint-Joseph, vol. 9, 1988, pp. 115–20. —— “Angoisse et Peche: Schelling et Kierkegaard,” Annales de philosophie de l’Universite Saint-Joseph, vol. 11, 1990, pp. 77–90. Hawi, Sami S., A Critical Analysis of the Relation of Faith and Reason in Kierkegaard with Particular Emphasis on Spheres of Existence and Apprehension of Truth, unpublished M.A. Thesis, Department of Philosophy, American University of Beirut, Beirut 1966. —— “An Existential Theory of Truth,” Al-Hikmat. A Research Journal of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Punjab, Quaid-e-Azam Campus, Lahore, Pakistan, December 1991. —— Islamic Naturalism and Mysticism: A Philosophical Study of Ibn Tufayl’s Hayy bin Yaqsan, Leiden: Brill 1974. —— “The Aesthetic Self in Kierkegaard: A Phenomenological Perspective,” Iqbal Review. Journal of the Iqbal Academy, ed. by Muhammad Suheyl Umar, Lahore, Pakistan, April 1999, pp. 105–31. Imam, Imam ‘Abd el-Fattah, ‫ ﺣﻳﺎﺗﻪ ﻭﺍﻋﻣﺎﻟﻪ‬:‫[ ﺳرن ﻛﻳﺭﻛﺟﻭﺭ ﺭﺍﺋﺩ ﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻳﺔ‬Søren Kierkegaard, Pioneer of Existentialism: His Life and Works], 2nd ed., Beirut: Dar al-Tanweer Liltiba’ah wal-Nashir 1983 (Modern Thought Series, general editor, Fouad Zakaria, vol. 1). ّ ‫[ ﻣﻔﻬوم‬Kierkegaard’s Concept of Irony], Kuwait City: Kuwait —— ‫اﻟﺗﻬﻛم ﻋﻧد ﻛﻳﺭﻛﺟور‬ University 1983 (Annals of the Faculty of Arts, 19th Monograph, vol. 6). Khuri, Richard K., Freedom, Modernity, and Islam: Toward a Creative Synthesis, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press 1998. Lajin, Father Joseph, Le Souci soteriologique dans l’Existence et l’Oeuvre de Soren Kierkegaard, unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of the Holy Spirit at Kasleek, Lebanon 1983. —— ‫[ ﺍﻟﺭﺣﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻓﻛﺭ ﻛﻳﺭﻛﻳﻐﺎرد‬Mercy in the Thought of Kierkegaard], ed. by ‘Adil Theodore Khoury and Basil Aoun (Research Center for Christian-Muslim Dialogue in Harissa, Lebanon), Jounieh: Pauline Library 1999 (‫ﻭﺍﻟﺗﻌﺎون‬ ‫[ اﻟﻣﺳﻳﺣﻳﺔ ﻭﺍﻻﺳﻼم ﻓﻲ اﻟﺣوار‬Christianity and Islam in Dialogue and Cooperation], vol. 8), pp. 197–226. Maalouf, Nouhad Abimrad, Le Temoignage Chrétien de Kierkegaard: Essai analytique. Beirut: Lebanese University Philosophical and Social Studies Section, 1969. Malik, Charles, Letter to Bayard Dodge, October 28, 1937 (unpublished); original found in the Charles Malik Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

94

Habib C. Malik

—— (ed.), Readings in Philosophy: Selections from the Great Masters, vols. 1–2, Beirut: American University of Beirut 1939. —— The Wonder of Being, Waco, Texas: Word Books 1974. —— “To Honor Martin Heidegger (1889–1976): A Christian Reflection on Martin Heidegger,” The Thomist, vol. 41, no. 1, 1977, pp. 1–61. —— A Christian Critique of the University, Downers Grove, Illinois: Intervarsity Press 1982. —— ‫ ﺳﻳرة ﺫﺍﺗﻳﺔ ﻓﻟﺴﻔﻳﺔ‬:‫[ اﻟﻣﻘﺩﻣﺔ‬The Introduction: A Philosophical Autobiography], 2nd ed., Beirut: Al Nahar Publishing House 2001. Malik, Habib C., Receiving Søren Kierkegaard: The Early Impact and Transmission of His Thought, Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press 1997. Mohammad, ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Mu’ta, ‫[ ﺳﻭﺭﻳﻥ ﻛﻳﺭﻛﺟﺎرد ﻣؤﺳس ﺍﻟﻭﺟﻭﺩﻳﺔ اﻟﻣﺳﻳﺣﻳﺔ‬Søren Kierkegaard Founder of Christian Existentialism], Alexandria: Dar al-Ma’rifah al-Jami’iyya 1985. Sayigh, Fayez, Personal Existence: Its Contents, Its Tragedy, and Its Paradox—An Essay, unpublished monograph at the American University of Beirut Library, Beirut 1945. —— ‫ ﻧظرات ﻓﻲ ﺍﻻﻧﺳﺎن ﻭﺍﻟﻭﺟود‬:‫[ ﻧﺩﺍﺀ ﺍﻷﻋﻣﺎق‬A Call from the Depths: Reflections on Man and Existence], Beirut: Dar al-Fikr 1947. Tambourgi-Hatem, Nicole, “Lectures sartriennes du Concept d’angoisse de Kierkegaard,” Annales de philosophie de l’Université Saint-Joseph, vol. 14, 1993, pp. 77–92. —— “Le possible retrospectif dans son rapport a la liberte: Kierkegaard et Bergson,” Annales de philosophie de l’Université Saint-Joseph, vol. 15, 1994, pp. 87–101. —— “Contemporaneités: Tchekhov, Kierkegaard, Michel Henry,” Annales de philosophie de l’Université Saint-Joseph, vol. 17, 1996, pp. 39–63. —— “Michel Henry, contemporain de Kierkegaard,” Annales de philosophie de l’Université Saint-Joseph, vol. 18, 1997, pp. 67–88. —— “Sur la suspension teleologique: Lecture kierkegaardienne de Breaking the Waves de Lars von Trier,” Annales de philosophie de l’Université Saint-Joseph, vol. 19, 1998, pp. 69–89. —— “Habachi-Kierkegaard ou les difficultes du dialogue philosophique,” Travaux et Jours, new series, no. 64, 1999, pp. 13–28. —— “Kierkegaard et le paradoxe du Menon,” Annales de philosophie de l’Université Saint-Joseph, vol. 21, 2000, pp. 69–84. —— “Michel Henry, lecteur du Concept d’angoisse de Kierkegaard,” Revue philosophique, no. 3, 2001, pp. 339–57. —— “L’evenement Christ: Kierkegaard-Michel Henry,” Iris, Annales de philosophie de l’Université Saint-Joseph, vol. 23, 2002, pp. 61–76. —— “Le Baudelaire de Fondane: une nouvelle figure kierkegaardienne?” in Une Poetique du gouffre, sur Baudelaire et l’experience du gouffre de Benjamin Fondane (Proceedings of the Colloquium in Cosenza, September 30–October 2, 1999), Rubbettino, 2003, pp. 77–99. —— “Kierkegaard et Chestov, philosophes du tragique,” Iris. Annales de philosophie de l’Université Saint-Joseph, vol. 25, 2004, pp. 121–31.

The Arab World: The Reception of Kierkegaard in the Arab World

95

Yousef, Hassan, ‫[ ﻓﻟﺳﻔﺔ ﺍﻟﺩﻳن ﻋﻧد ﻛﻳﺭﻛﺟﺎرد‬Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Religion], Cairo: Dar el-Kalema 2001. III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Reception in the Arab World None.

C\ Taylor & Francis ~Taylor & Francis Group

http:/ / taylora ndfra ncis.com

Iran: Kierkegaard’s Reception in Iran Ramin Jahanbegloo

The weak quality of the Kierkegaard reception in Iran should not be blamed on Kierkegaard himself or on his writing style, but mainly on the predominance of Marxist literature and German idealism in this country. However, after the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the decline of Communism in Europe, there has been a new and lively interest in Kierkegaard among Iranian intellectuals and scholars. Although some may give more importance to the political reason of this interest, others certainly think of it as a new way of approaching the problem of religion. Strangely, with the exception of one or two articles, everything about Kierkegard that has been written or translated in Iran has appeared during the past decade. Perhaps there are several answers for the reason of this sudden “revival,” or should we say “discovery,” of Kierkegaard in Iran. The first reason has to do with Kierkegaard himself. He is, first and foremost, a great writer with whom Iranian readers have established a magical contact. Secondly, after twenty-six years of revolution, war, and religious violence Kierkegaard is emerging as a thinker who could enable us to reopen the question of the sacred in a mood of new optimism. He has evaded all the right-wing and left-wing critiques that have been leveled against him and emerged as a powerful thinker who could remain as the best hope for a philosophical investigation after the downfall of ideologies. It goes without saying that the major problem of the reception of Kierkegaard in Iran is a hermeneutic one: why and how to read Kierkegaard in Iran? Kierkegaard’s message is clear when one reads in his essay The Moment (1855): “Beware of those who like to go in long robes.” Kierkegaard adds elsewhere: “If the clergy unreservedly and in self-denial had been willing to consult the New Testament, it would have seen that the New Testament unconditionally requires the separation of Church and State and that it had therefore been the duty of the clergy to suggest it themselves….[They would] have seen that from every sort of quarter the development of the world is pushing toward this point, the separation of Church and State….” It

SV1 XIV, 212 / M, 198. Pap. XI–2 A 414. Quoted by Bruce H. Kirmmse, “ ‘Out with it!’: The Modern Breakthrough, Kierkegaard and Denmark,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, ed. by Alastair Hannay and Gordon D. Marino, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press 1998, p. 44.





98

Ramin Jahanbegloo

seems that Kierkegaard could be read in Iran as the last best bridge between postidealist individualism and critical spiritual philosophy. In a country like Iran, where religion has been forced on individuals as a system of thought and a daily practice, it should not be a matter of surprise that the reception of Kierkegaard’s work has been an account of the ways that Iranians have reacted to their own immediate history. This is to say that the Iranian encounter with Kierkegaard’s philosophy has not been a “random” reception, but rather a “critical choice.” Kierkegaard’s “ethical self-choice” has been a true awakening of Iranian subjectivity in the middle of a torrential downpour of ideologies and violence. It has been understood by many in Iran as a taking of responsibility for oneself and towards one’s immediacy. Through Kierkegaard’s reception in Iran, Iranians, once again, can feel free to laugh at the bitterness of the evil. In sum: Kierkegaard’s challenge in Iran has been twofold. First, it is the individual reader in Iran whom he has always addressed. Second, he challenges the reader not so much to agree or disagree as to grow. Kierkegaard’s reception in Iran shows clearly that this second aspect needs to be brought to its fullest extent possible. A Kierkegaard Colloquium was organized for the first time in Iran in May 2004 with the participation of two Iranian philosophers (Dr. Ramin Jahanbegloo and Dr. Setareh Houman) and two members of the Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre at the University of Copenhagen: Dr. Niels Jørgen Cappelørn and Dr. Ettore Rocca) at the House of Artists in Tehran.

Bibliography I. Persian Translations of Kierkegaard’s Works

‫[ ﺘرس و ﻟرز‬Fear and Trembling], trans. by Hassan Fatemi, Tehran: Organization for Islamic Propaganda 1994.

‫[ ﺒﻴﻣﺎري ﺒﻪ ﺳوي ﻣرگ‬The Sickness Unto Death], trans. by Roya Monajemi, Isfahan: Porsesh Publisher 1996.

‫[ ﺘرس و ﻟرز‬Fear and Trembling], trans. by Abdolkarim Rashidian, Tehran: Ney Publisher 1997.

II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard in Iran Dastgheib, Abdolali, “‫[ ” ﮐﻴﺭﮐﻪ ﮔور ﻮ ﻣﺷﮑل ﺸﻨﺎﺨث ﺤﻘﻴﻘث‬Kierkegaard and the Problem of Knowing Truth], Keyhan-e Farhangi, vol. 183, December 2001, pp. 73–7. Farzad, Hamidreza, “‫[ ” ﺳورن ﮐﻴﺭﮐﻪ ﮔور‬Søren Kierkegaard], Iran, October 19, 2003, p. 8. Ghanbari, Bakhshali, “‫[ ” ﻣروري ﺒر ﮐﺛﺎب ﺛرس و ﻟرز‬A Review of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling], Ketab-e Mah Din, vol. 28 , February 1999, pp. 13–14. Haghi, Ali, “‫[ ” ﭘژوﻫﺷﻲ در ﺳﻟﻭک ﻗﮑﺭوي ﻮ ﻣﻌﻨﻭي ﮐﻴﺭﮐﻪ ﮔور و ﻣوﻟوي‬A Comparative Study on the Philosophical and Spiritual Thoughts of Kierkegaard and Rumi], Namey-e Mofid, vol. 24, Winter 2000, pp. 99–122. Jahanbegloo, Ramin, “‫ ﻓﻳﻟﺳوف ﺗﻧﻬﺎﻳﻲ‬: ‫[ ” ﮐﻳر ﮐﻪ ﮔور‬Kierkegaard: Philosopher of Solitude], Kheradnameh, Hamshahri, vol. 25 , July 16, 2004, pp. 10–11. Jalilian, Hossein, “‫[ ” ﮐﻳرﮐﻪ ﮔور و ﭘﺎرادوﮐس اﻴﻣﺎن‬Kierkegaard and the Paradox of Faith], Mardomsalari, vol. 17, May 2002, p. 3. Meisami, Sayeh, “‫[ ” ﮐﻳرﮐﻪ ﮔور و ﺤﻘﻳﻘث اﻳﻣﺎن‬Kiekegaard and the Truth of Faith], Surush-e Andisheh, Spring 2002, pp. 232–63. Rahimi, Pejman, “‫ از ﮐﻳرﮐﻪ ﮔور ﺘﺎ ﻫﺎﻳدﮔر‬: ‫[ ” اﮔزﻴﺳﺘﺎﻨﺳﻴﺎﻠﻳﺳم‬Existentialism: from Kierkegaard to Heidegger], Seday-e Edalat, November 2002, p. 6. Tavakoli, Gholamhossein, “‫[ ” ﮐﻳرﮐﻪ ﮔور و اراده ﮔروي‬Kierkegaard and Voluntarism], Namey-e Mofid, vol. 28, Winter 2001, pp. 27–39. Rezai, Elias, “‫[ ” ﻣﺷﻴث ﻓراﮔﻴري اﻠﻬﻲ و اﺨﺜﻳﺎر و آزادي اﻨﺳﺎن در ﻗﻠﺳﻘﻪ ﮐﻳرﮐﻪ ﮔور‬Universal Divine Providence, Free Will and Human Freedom in Kierkegaard’s Philosophy], Kalam-e Eslami, vol. 35, Fall 2000, pp. 140–47. III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Reception in Iran None.

C\ Taylor & Francis ~Taylor & Francis Group

http:/ / taylora ndfra ncis.com

PART II Asia and Australia

C\ Taylor & Francis ~Taylor & Francis Group

http:/ / taylora ndfra ncis.com

China: The Chinese Reception of Kierkegaard Wang Qi

The name “Kierkegaard” first appeared in Chinese literature at the beginning of the twentieth century and was introduced by the prominent and prestigious modern Chinese thinker and author Lu Xun (1881–1936). In 1908, Lu Xun wrote in an essay that Kierkegaard was a Danish philosopher who held being an individual in high esteem and regarded it as the highest moral principle as well. In another essay published in 1933, Lu Xun introduced Kierkegaard as “a Danish melancholiac,” whose writings often embody “grief and indignation,” while sometimes being quite humorous. He also quoted the “clown in the theater,” piece from “Diapsalmata.” It is certain that what Lu Xun read was a partially translated Japanese version of Either/ Or, entitled Philosophy of Melancholy (1930), which was translated by Koichiro Miyahara, a Japanese researcher of Danish literature who was the first to translate Kierkegaard directly from Danish into Japanese. Thus, the “clown in the theater” was the very first text from Kierkegaard’s hand ever translated into Chinese. From the late nineteenth century until the 1940s, the Chinese intelligentsia had introduced three types of Western thought into China, together with Marxism: (1) the thought of the French Enlightenment with Rousseau and Montesquieu as its leaders; (2) evolutionism and social Darwinism represented by Darwin and Huxley; (3) anarchism represented by Mikhail Bakunin and Max Stirner, as well

 Lu Xun was a prestigious thinker and productive author in the modern history of China, who wrote many essays, novels, literary and political criticism as well as translations. He once studied medical science in Sendai, Japan, but gave it up later and decided to be an author.  Cf. “文化偏至论” [On the Cultural Extremes], in 《鲁迅全集》 [The Collected Works of Lu Xun], vol. 1, Beijing: People’s Literature Press 1991, pp. 44–62.  The piece Lu Xun quotes is as follows: “In a theater, it happened that a fire started offstage. The clown came out to tell the audience. They thought it was a joke and applauded. He told them again, and they became still more hilarious. This is the way, I suppose, that the world will be destroyed—amid the universal hilarity of wits and wags who think it is all a joke.” (SKS 2, 39 / EO1, 30.) The essay is entitled “帮闲法发隐” [Ways of Being Idle Hacks]. Cf. Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 272–3.  Many thanks to Kinya Masugata, Professor of Osaka Kyoiku University, who has offered this interesting information about this pioneer Japanese Kierkegaard translator.

104

Wang Qi

as individualist philosophers, such as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Lu Xun later turned his philosophical interest to Nietzsche. A famous neo-Confucianist philosopher Mou Zongsan (1909–95) once tried to read Kierkegaard but failed. Later he turned to Kant and even translated the Critique of Pure Reason into Chinese. Since 1949 Marxism-Leninism and Maoism have become the dominant ideologies. For some years, the reading and study of other Western philosophies could only be conducted under the cover of “criticizing capitalistic ideology.” The related publications were thereby treated as “internal reference materials” and had a minimal circulation. Only when the “open policy” was launched in early 1980s did the study of Western philosophies become public and legal. One of the most popular philosophical thoughts introduced during that period of time was existentialism, and, accordingly, Kierkegaard came on the scene. He was called one of the “forefathers of existentialism.” This marks the beginning of the concrete study of Kierkegaard in China. From the 1980s on, Kierkegaard was not only viewed as a philosopher, but also as an author, and as an individualistic Dane famous for his epitaph “That Individual.” In the following, I will present the Chinese reception of Kierkegaard from three aspects: the translation of his primary texts, Kierkegaard viewed as an author, and Kierkegaard viewed as a philosopher. Finally, I will venture to say why, after twenty years, Kierkegaard studies, unlike Nietzsche or Heidegger studies, still belong to the less traveled byways in the field of Western philosophy in China. Owing to limited contact with resources from Hong Kong and Taiwan, the current presentation will focus solely on the publications that have appeared in mainland China. I. Translations Most of the Chinese translations of Kierkegaard appeared around the middle of the 1990s, a few years after the academic encounter with him. It was a time when the public’s passion for existentialism was at a low ebb while the scholarly pursuit of Western thought became much more sober and rational than before. However, Kierkegaard’s writings were not introduced in a systematic or comprehensive way, and the shortcomings were quite apparent. First, only one Chinese version of Fear and Trembling is based on the Danish original, namely the translation of Liu Ji, who once studied in Denmark. Others were translated either from English or from German, and only some of them even bother to state which editions their translations are based on. Secondly, until now there has been only one scholarly edition, “A Kierkegaard Anthology” based on the Hongs’ translation. The anthology includes three of Kierkegaard’s principal works written during different periods of his life: selections from Either/Or, The Sickness unto Death, and Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses. Each For this one can refer to Li Jie, Nietzsches Gestalt des letzten Menschen bei Lunxun, Beijing: Today’s China Press 1997.  《恐惧与颤栗》[Fear and Trembling], trans. by Liu Ji, Guiyang: Guizhou People’s Press 1994.  《克尔凯郭尔文丛》 [A Kierkegaard Anthology], vols. 1–3, ed. by Niu Hongbao, Beijing: China Worker’s Press 1997. 

China: The Chinese Reception of Kierkegaard

105

of the translators of this collection holds a doctorate either in philosophy or in literature, and they are also researchers or professors themselves. In addition, each translator has provided a critical introduction to each of the respective translated texts. The anthology aims at providing the academic reader as well as the general public with a fuller picture of Kierkegaard, and this aim has been achieved to a certain extent. By comparison, other translations of Kierkegaard are rather fragmentary since they are usually included in a special publication series, such as “World Classics,” “Modern Society and the Human Being,” “The Library of Modern Thinking,” etc. For that reason, some of Kierkegaard’s works have been repeatedly selected and translated, for instance, Either/ Or and Fear and Trembling, while the others have been neglected. Until now there are two versions of Fear and Trembling, but only one complete translation of Either/Or. Meanwhile, some individual parts of Either/Or have been translated more than once: there are five different versions of “The Seducer’s Diary,” and two versions each of “The Immediate Erotic Stages or the Musical-Erotic” and “Silhouettes.” Finally, “The Aesthetic Validity of Marriage,” “Diapsalmata,” and “The First Love” have each been translated once. Scattered fragments taken from Kierkegaard’s various works have been translated into Chinese as well. One such work is a collection of Kierkegaard’s “philosophical parables.” Another is a German-based collection of fragments from Kierkegaard’s religious writings.10 It is not easy to gain a full picture of an author like Kierkegaard by reading just one or two of his works. What is more, the picture becomes distorted when the reader only has access to select parts of one work. Thirdly, some translations have twisted Kierkegaard’s original meaning for the sake of commercial interests. The reason “The Seducer’s Diary” has been translated differently five times within ten years is simply because of its piquant title. Translators of Kierkegaard’s other works have tried to apply a similar marketing technique by changing the original title into something provocative. For example, one version of Skyggerids is transliterated as “Three Maidens who once Encountered a Man.”11 In some cases, however, the misreading of Kierkegaard owes to taking his words too literally without understanding the historical background of his writings and his “indirect communication.” An extreme example, “Diapsalmata” is transliterated and treated as parts of Kierkegaard’s journals.12 Another example is a selection of “The Immediate Erotic Stages or the Musical-Erotic” and “The Seducer’s Diary,” which is entitled Verführung der Liebe.13 In the translator’s preface, Prof. Wang Caiyong points out that, as a great thinker, Kierkegaard’s interest is 《或此或彼》 [Either/Or], vols. 1–2, trans. by Yang Jia, Chengdu: Sichuan People’s Press 1998.  《克尔恺郭尔哲学寓言集》 [Philosophical Parables of Kierkegaard], trans. by Yang Yugong, Beijing: Commercial Press 2002. The translation is probably based on Parables of Kierkegaard, ed. by Thomas C. Oden, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1989. 10 《基督徒的激情》 [Die Leidenschaft des Religiösen (Leipzig: Reklam 1953)], trans. by Lu Lu, Beijing: China Central Translation Press 1999. 11 《曾经男人的三少女》 [Selections from Either/Or and Stages on Life’s Way], trans. and ed. by Jiang Xinyi, Beijing: China Authors Press 1994, pp. 97–158. 12 Ibid., pp. 271–318. 13 《爱之诱惑》Verführung der Liebe, trans. and ed. by Wang Caiyong, Shanghai: Shanghai Social Sciences Press 2002. This work is translated from German, and for this reason the translator entitled it both in Chinese and in German. 

106

Wang Qi

in exploring man’s diverse original and immediate existence, and erotic love is one of Kierkegaard’s favorite topics of discussion. According to Prof. Wang, the selected pieces have consistently demonstrated the irresistably seductive power of erotic love over man. Furthermore, he argues, concerning love, Kierkegaard cares more for the process, especially every unrepeatable instant of the process, than for the result. Prof. Wang contends that this tendency corresponds to and even inspires a turn in the course of Western thinking of the twentieth century. While such a reading is quite original, it has clearly not sufficiently taken into consideration the historical background and the purpose of Kierkegaard’s writings. In spite of the above, Kierkegaard, as the author of “The Seducer’s Diary” and Fear and Trembling, has become a celebrity among Chinese internet users. On the website “Yahoo China” there are 8,980 search results for Kierkegaard. Surprisingly, his name even appears in chat rooms. His unhappy love affair with Regine is very well known and discussed widely. It seems that many have heard about his theory of the “three stages of life,” and classify him as a poet-philosopher. These developments stem from the current Chinese translations of Kierkegaard. Nevertheless, it is necessary to publish a comprehensive scholarly collection of Kierkegaard’s wiritings, and the project is already under way. The Søren Kierkegaard Research Center at Copenhagen University is now cooperating with the Institute of Philosophy at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences to translate and publish 10 volumes of Kierkegaard’s works, including his unpublished writings. The new edition will be based on Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, and translated directly from Danish into Chinese. The first volume, On the Concept of Irony, has already been translated by Tang Chenxi from the University of Chicago and was published in 2005.14 II. Kierkegaard as an Author In the 1990s, China Authors Press published a series of books in succession named “author’s references,” aimed at opening a window on various trends of thought in literature from throughout the world. Together with the Czech writer Milan Kundera, Kierkegaard was the favorite choice for the series. The Press published “The Seducer’s Diary” in 1992 and a selection of texts from Either/Or and Stages on Life’s Way in 1994. Jiang Xinyi is the translator for both. One can best see that Kierkegaard is viewed as an individualistic and inspiring author in China in the translator’s preface to “The Seducer’s Diary.”15 In this preface, Jiang does not give the reader an introduction to Kierkegaard’s life and writings as is customary, but tries to share his own reading experiences with the reader. In the opening paragraph, Jiang vividly depicts the author as a kind of personality, who either spends his entire life carving himself to become a full statue, or like the nymph Echo in Greek legend, who pines away for an absent love, leaving us nothing but a voice. According to Jiang, as time goes by, there are always some haunting images 14 《 论反讽概念 : 以苏格拉底为主线 / 索伦・奥碧・克尔凯郭尔著 ; 汤晨溪译》 [On the Concept of Irony], trans. by Tang Chenxi yi, Beijing: Zhongguo she hui ke xue chu ban she 2005. 15 《勾引家日记》[“The Seducer’s Diary”], trans. by Jiang Xinyi, Beijing: China Authors Press 1992, pp. 1–6.

China: The Chinese Reception of Kierkegaard

107

and voices left, and that is the case with Kierkegaard. Therefore, he no longer belongs to himself, because the reader can always see more than the statue itself. After this metaphorical beginning, Jiang presents his own reading experiences. In Jiang’s opinion, this experience goes through three stages. Before we encounter him, Kierkegaard is seen as a “lighthouse” or “boundary marker” in our mind. While reading, we try to understand him or even to grasp him, but fail in the end. In fact, we are even lost in his writings. To make things worse, we are further lost in ourselves. Obviously inspired by Kierkegaard’s well-known epitaph “That Individual,” Jiang indicates that every reader should be an individual as well; as a result, the relation between the author and the reader should be that of two individuals. The purpose of the reading is thus not to understand what Kierkegaard said, but to find out what he did not say—to discover “That Individual” behind the written text. In this six-page preface, Jiang does not mention a word about the pseudonyms employed by Kierkegaard. We can also deduce that Jiang had no idea about Kierkegaard’s “indirect communication” from the way he translated “Diapsalmata” as the journals of Kierkegaard. However, being a translator and therefore a profound reader of Kierkegaard’s texts, it seems that Jiang acutely sensed and understood this Kierkegaardian writing device. Jiang noticed Kierkegaard’s written text is open to multiple interpretations. To be an active reader is just what Kierkegaard himself wishes. After Jiang finished the translation work, he wondered in a brief postscript with obvious confusion, “Is this a real Kierkegaard we are reading?”16 The unanswered question identifies him as a normal reader and as a Kierkegaard translator, and it should not be taken lightly. It shows that even without the scholarly background, or even with some twists and mistakes, an active and keen reader can still enjoy Kierkegaard’s writings and even become enlightened by them. III. Kierkegaard as a Philosopher: Introductory Works The “official” role of Kierkegaard in China is that of a philosopher, a Hegel-critic, and the forefather of existentialism. This is clearly shown by a number of introductory works on Kierkegaard, including research papers, monographs on existentialism, and textbooks for college students on the history of contemporary Western philosophy. A. Research Papers The very first research paper about Kierkegaard’s philosophy in general was written in 1982 by Prof. Ru Xin, the former vice president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The paper was published in 1985.17 Prof. Ru now is the co-editor-in-chief with Niels Jørgen Cappelørn of the above-mentioned scholarly Kierkegaard edition in Chinese. Ibid., p. 262. Ru Xin, “克尔凯郭尔” [Kierkegaard], in 《西方著名哲学家评述》[Critical Biographies of Famous Western Philosophers], vols. 1–8, Jinan: Shandong People’s Press 1985, vol. 6, pp. 1–69. 16 17

108

Wang Qi

In this pioneering paper, Prof. Ru discusses four issues concerning the philosophy of Kierkegaard: Kierkegaard’s criticism of Hegel; the concept of existence and the related theory of the three spheres of existence; subjectivity and subjective truth; and the attacks upon Christendom. In addition, he discusses Kierkegaard’s influence on existentialism. Generally speaking, Prof. Ru, on the basis of analyzing and criticizing a wide variety of points and conclusions made by the scholars from Western countries, offers us a critical Marxist and rationalist reading of Kierkegaard. One can see this best in his critique of Kierkegaard’s criticism of Hegel and that of Kierkegaard’s religious points of view. When discussing Kierkegaard’s criticism of Hegel, Prof. Ru targets Karl Löwith’s opinion that Kierkegaard is a left Hegelian. To refute him, Prof. Ru uses Niels Thulstrup’s Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel as his main resource,18 demonstrating that Kierkegaard is no Hegelian at all. It seems that Kierkegaard criticizes Hegel’s theory of religion and thereby criticizes the right Hegelians. But in Kierkegaard’s mind, argues Prof. Ru, Hegel’s rational philosophy dilutes the suffering aspect of Christianity and thereby destroys the basis of Christian belief. In other words, Kierkegaard’s criticism of Hegel aims at defending Christianity in a comparatively unenlightened way. Therefore, one lacks any reason for grouping him with the left Hegelians. In the same direction, Prof. Ru attempts to refute Robert Heiss’ claim that Kierkegaard is on a par with Marx. According to Prof. Ru, the starting-point of Kierkegaard’s criticism of Hegel is the individual perceived by idealism. After all, Kierkegaard is an idealist, though unlike Hegel, because he concentrates on subjectivity and subjective truth. Marx not only rectifies the errors of Hegelian idealism but also reforms Hegelian dialectics with the tool of materialism. Marx’s criticism of Hegel is from the left, while Kierkegaard is from the right. Therefore, they cannot be mentioned in the same breath. In his paper, Prof. Ru also tackles the issue of Kierkegaard’s religious perspective. Prof. Ru notices a seemingly paradoxical phenomenon. On the one hand, Kierkegaard is a pious Christian, but, on the other hand, he radically attacks the Danish Church. After a careful investigation of Kierkegaard’s journals and other religious writings, Prof. Ru concludes that Kierkegaard is not a “religious atheist” as Lukacs indicates in his The Destruction of Reason.19 Kierkegaard is a religious fanatic, whose attacks on the State Church are best viewed as a divergence within the realm of Christianity. Kierkegaard blames Hegelianism for the rationalization of Christianity. Thus, he endeavors to derationalize the Christian faith. This standpoint and endeavor, in Prof. Ru’s opinion, are rather conservative and unenlightened by comparison with Hegel and the Danish Lutheran Church. Generally speaking, the Danish Church was liberal and tolerant since they tended to interpret Christianity with rationalism. As a result, Kierkegaard’s Niels Thulstrup, Kierkegaards forhold til Hegel og til den spekulative idealisme indtil 1846, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1967. (In English as Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel, trans. by George L. Stengren, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1980; in German as Kierkegaards Verhältnis zu Hegel und zum spekulativen Idealismus 1835–1846, Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer 1972.) 19 Georg Lukacs, The Destruction of Reason, trans. by Peter Palmer, London: Merlin 1980 (originally in Hungarian as Az ész trónfosztása, Budapest: Magvető Kiadó 1954). 18

China: The Chinese Reception of Kierkegaard

109

attacks on the Church cannot relieve people of the spiritual fetters of Christianity. On the contrary, it added a new burden. Needless to say, in the eyes of a Marxist-rationalist, Kierkegaard’s opinion about Christianity and religion is nothing but one big fallacy. B. Kierkegaard Chapters in Monographs on Existentialism Existentialism was one of the earliest contemporary Western philosophies introduced into China. In 1962, the Commercial Press published the Chinese translation of the French existentialist Jean Wahl’s Short History of Existentialism.20 A year later, a selection from works of famous German and French existential philosophers was translated into Chinese in order to criticize this bourgeois ideology in an efficient way. Only in the early 1980s did the study begin to progress. In 1984 a nationwide symposium on existentialism was held. Two years later, a scholarly work entitled Existential Philosophy, edited by Prof. Xu Chongwen from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, was published.21 This is the first comprehensive and systematic work on existentialism, and it received a very good reception. A total of 17,500 copies were printed, and it sold out within one year. However, when one today casts a glance at the Kierkegaard chapter, written by Chu Shaohua from the Beijing Normal University,22 its limitations are obvious. First, there are unfortunately some factual mistakes about Kierkegaard’s life. Chu states that Kierkegaard’s father, Michael Pedersen Kierkegaard, inherited a large fortune from his father’s brother in 1796 and became an upstart, but the fortune did not bring any happiness to the family, since they thought the event was too accidental, and thereby they were worried about damnation from God. As a result, the family suffered from anxiety and melancholy. Chu also described old Michael as an eccentric, who was so harsh on his children that little Søren had to help the servants to herd the flock on the hill every day. In order to put the son through the mill, old Michael even often let him suffer cold and hunger. That is why, according to Chu, Søren had such a melancholic disposition and resented life so much. No doubt the author had mixed up the father’s experience with young Søren’s. I cannot find any reason for such mistakes other than careless reading. Secondly, Chu mainly used a Kierkegaard anthology published in Princeton in 1951 and a concise dictionary of existentialism published in New York in 1960 as the main resources for Kierkegaard’s writings.23 Chu did not even indicate the publishers or editors of the two books. In the case of Kierkegaard, such practice carries a high risk of misreading. 20 Jean Wahl, Short History of Existentialism, New York: Philosophical Library 1949 (originally as Esquisse pour une histoire de l’existentialisme (suivie de Kafka et Kierkegaard), Paris: L’ Arche 1949). 21 《存在主义哲学》 [Existential Philosophy], ed. by Xu Chongwen, Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press 1986. 22 Chu Shaohua, “克尔凯郭尔” [Kierkegaard], in 《存在主义哲学》 [Existential Philosophy], ibid., pp. 41–73. 23 See A Kierkegaard Anthology, ed. by Robert Bretall, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1951 [1946] and Ralph B. Winn, A Concise Dictionary of Existentialism. Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Marcel, Heidegger, Sartre, de Beauvoir, New York: Philosophical Library 1960.

110

Wang Qi

Thirdly, as Prof. Xu indicated in the preface, the perspective of this book is Marxist ideology, and so we should expect a critical Marxist reading of Kierkegaard. But the truth is, the current reading does not agree with Kierkegaard’s case on many points. It is full of casual labels and conclusions, which are not made by scholarly analyses of historical facts or Kierkegaard’s texts, but by deduction according to a doctrinaire Marxism. For years “class analysis,” historical materialism, and dialectical materialism had been regarded as infallible laws in China, and this case presents no exception. Kierkegaard was surprisingly described as an ideological representative of the most conservative Danish bourgeoisie. In Chu’s opinion, from a political point of view, the Danish bourgeoisie was an extremely weak class which was scared of both a workers’ movement and a radical bourgeoisie democratic movement. Correspondingly, from the ideological point of view, the Danish bourgeoisie detested “bourgeois” Enlightenment thinking, materialism, Hegelian rationalism, and dialectics. In spite of all these “class limitations,” being an acute thinker and philosopher, Kierkegaard had insight into a lot of the abuse and contradictions in capitalist society and tried to reflect on them in a philosophical way. For instance, the different types of moods of mankind Kierkegaard describes—fear, boredom, melancholy, despair—stand for the pessimism of the Danish bourgeoisie. What is more, Kierkegaard promotes these particularly bourgeois moods into something universal, without taking the objective historical background into consideration. By so doing, he eternalizes capitalism and its outcome. It is really ridiculous to view Kierkegaard as a defender of capitalist society, and the blunder results from the mechanical application of Marxist dogma, which, ironically enough, runs contrary to the spirit of historical materialism itself. Corresponding to his class status and class limitations, Kierkegaard’s philosophy was then labeled “subjective idealism relating to mysticism, pessimism, and antirationalism.” Accordingly, Kierkegaard’s criticism of Hegel was translated as “subjective idealism” versus “objective idealism.” Chu claims, quoting Lenin, when one idealist is pitted against another idealist, the outcome is always favorable to the materialist. Next, Kierkegaard’s dislike and criticism of the public was viewed as “reactionary” and said to embody his idealist concept of history. Finally, Kierkegaard’s adherence to Christianity was interpreted as an addict seeking comfort in drugs since he was unable to explain the fundamental contradictions of capitalist society. Such examples are numerous in the entire text. This reading bears a strong Chinese character of the Marxist methodology employed in studies in the humanities and social sciences before and around the 1980s. I dare say such a reading has not only misread Kierkegaard but also Marxist ideology. In 1997, a new academic work on existentialism entitled the Call of Existence was published.24 The co-authors, Prof. Cheng Zhimin and Prof. Yang Shen, are from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. At that time, people’s enthusiasm for existentialism had died away and the study of postmodernism was becoming popular among the Chinese intelligentsia. Prof. Cheng and Prof. Yang had realized the situation and further oriented themselves in it. In the preface they first raise the question of whether existential philosophy still means anything in postmodern society. 24 Cheng Zhimin and Yang Shen, 《存在的呼唤》 [Call of Existence], Xi’an: Shaanxi People’s Education Press 1997.

China: The Chinese Reception of Kierkegaard

111

Then after a careful academic investigation, they argue that existential philosophy, as a link in the development of philosophy, has paved the way for postmodernism. For instance, existential philosophy had been conscious of the importance of concepts such as the “difference of cognition,” “multiplicity,” “contingency,” “ambiguity,” “fragmentation,” “relativity,” etc. long before postmodernism emerged. Meanwhile, as a social and cultural movement, existential philosophy criticized modernity and by so doing, set the stage for the emergence of postmodern society.25 With this background, the two professors offer us a purely philosophical reading of Kierkegaard as a forerunner of existentialism.26 In this short introduction, the two professors briefly discuss Kierkegaard’s creative pseudonymous writing. This is quite unusual in introductory works on Kierkegaard. In their opinion, the pseudonyms are substitutes for Kierkegaard himself, and what they have said can be treated as Kierkegaard’s own voice. Prof. Cheng and Prof. Yang then introduce Kierkegaard, like Marx, as an effective critic of Hegelianism. The starting-point of Kierkegaard’s critique is Protestant individualism, i.e., he targets the absolute rationalism of Hegel in the name of the individual in contrast to Marx’s criticism which comes from the perspective of historical materialism and in the name of the proletariat. According to the two professors, from Kierkegaard’s time on, individual freedom has been increasingly endangered by external factors such as the public, class, party, and the state. In that case, Kierkegaard’s opinions about the individual, the particular, and the exception are of great value. That is why Kierkegaard is treated as a sort of prophet, who has foreseen many problems of the twentieth century. Lastly, the two professors discuss several key terms and propositions in Kierkegaard’s writings, for instance: “angst,” “despair,” “repetition,” “existence,” and “subjectivity.” They try to demonstrate how these concepts have influenced the later existential philosophers, Heidegger, Sartre, and Jaspers. For example, they argue that Jaspers’ dialectics probably originate from Kierkegaard’s concept of existence, since the latter is dialectical by its very nature. Interestingly enough, they speak very highly of the proposition “subjectivity is the truth,” treating it as a purely philosophical proposition and a brand new evaluation of human knowledge. In their opinion, this proposition shows not only Kierkegaard’s abandonment of Hegel’s absolute rationalism but also his criticism of increasingly abstract and objective modern science. The proposition has made possible the truth for the individual, i.e., religious truth or any supra-scientific truth. On the other hand, they claim that Kierkegaard has exaggerated subjective reflection and subjective knowledge, which results in relativism and irrationalism, and runs the risk of solipsism. After all his original thoughts about the individual and the truth, Kierkegaard has neglected the relationship between the individual and the other, between the individual and the world. C. Textbooks for College Students Although there is no standard textbook for the history of Western philosophy at Chinese universities, some academic works are written to be textbooks or selected 25 26

Ibid., pp. 1–12. Ibid., pp. 15–32.

112

Wang Qi

by some universities as such. Kierkegaard is unanimously placed in the history of contemporary Western philosophy, which covers the period after Hegel up to the present time. Often he is given one section in the volume. Here I will present two samples written at different periods of time, so that one can see how Kierkegaard has been understood as a philosopher and how these interpretations change with time. The first sample is from a two-volume work Contemporary Western Philosophy written by Prof. Liu Fangtong from Fu Dan University in Shanghai. The revised version, which appeared in 1990, has been widely accepted as the textbook for courses on the same topic. The Kierkegaard section is placed in the second volume and in the chapter “Existentialism,” since he is treated as one of the forerunners of existentialism.27 After a short introduction to Kierkegaard’s life and works, Prof. Liu summarizes Kierkegaard’s contribution to the development of contemporary European philosophy. According to Prof. Liu, Kierkegaard has changed the focus of philosophy from the study of the objective world and human understanding to that of the existence of the single, irrational individual, or in other words, to the study of the individual’s irrational feelings. According to Prof. Liu, this turn stems, to a great extent, from the irrational trend of thought rising in Europe since the 1840s. The representatives of the aforementioned trend are Schelling, Schopenhauer, and Romanticism. Kierkegaard’s extremely eccentric, melancholic, and even abnormal disposition could not be dismissive of either. Next, Prof. Liu analyzes different aspects and meanings of the Kierkegaardian individual. In his opinion, Kierkegaard does not deny the existence of the others, society, or the objective world. On the contrary, every individual is in the world. As an individual who stands alone, however, one should first get rid of his or her dependence on nature, society, and others; by doing this, one can know himself or herself and the related world. To this extent, the Kierkegaardian individual is directly set against the public and cannot be taken as one part of an integrated whole. Secondly, the Kierkegaardian individual is no longer a knowing subject but an ethical subject, who enjoys absolute freedom. This freedom lies in the fact that each individual can make his or her own choices only according to his or her feelings, and not according to any rational, logical laws. Thirdly, the Kierkegaardian individual is an irrational person whose particular feelings are beyond language and logic. Fourthly, the Kierkegaardian individual is obsessed by pessimistic and decadent feelings, such as boredom, unhappiness, melancholy, nothingness, and despair. These negative feelings are the most authentic proofs that the individual exists, and they are just the reason why the existing individual should take action and make his or her own choices. Lastly, the Kierkegaardian individual belongs to God, which means that the individual can only find himself or herself when facing God. With that Prof. Liu concludes that Kierkegaard is not a solipsist on the philosophical level since his subjective philosophy leads to religious belief in the end. Another theory discussed in this section is Kierkegaard’s theory of three stages or spheres of life. In Prof. Liu’s view, Kierkegaard’s three stages / spheres of life have Liu Fangtong, “存在主义的思想先驱克尔凯郭尔的哲学” [The Philosophy of Kierkegaard, the Forerunner of Existentialism], in 《现代西方哲学》 [Contemporary Western Philosophy], vols. 1–2, Beijing: People’s Press 1990, vol. 2, pp. 580–9. 27

China: The Chinese Reception of Kierkegaard

113

formed an ascending process, i.e., the immediate aesthetic (embodied in Don Juan) → the transitional ethical (embodied in Socrates) → the highest religious (embodied in Abraham). However, not everyone will experience each of them one by one, and only a few can reach the highest stage. Actually these stages are just three different ways of living, and they can overlap. Although this theory looks like an application of Hegel’s dialectics at first glance, Prof. Liu comments, this is not the case. For Kierkegaard, “dialectics” is subjective and qualitative. It is only a means for the individual to keep in contact with God. Thus, the Kierkegaardian dialectics are equivalent to his subjectivism, irrationalism and religious mysticism. Therefore, it is not an authentic dialectics at all. As is well known, dialectics have held a high place in China for years. Therefore, to examine and discriminate the genuine dialectics from the pseudo ones has been an important project among scholars. Prof. Zhao Dunhua from the prestigious Peking University in Beijing offers the second sample. In 2001 he published a book entitled Essentials of Western Contemporary Philosophy, which is included in the “Textbook Series for the TwentyFirst Century.” This work differs from the former in many ways. 28 In Prof. Zhao’s view, Kierkegaard is not just an existentialist but also a pious religious thinker. In Kierkegaard’s thought, Christian belief, mysticism, and existentialist philosophy are all intertwined. Therefore, his work enlightens both theists and atheist existentialists. Here Kierkegaard is discussed in the very first chapter “After Hegel,” followed by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, while the “Existentialism” chapter discusses Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Camus, and the theist existentialists, Jaspers and Marcel. Prof. Zhao claims that Kierkegaard’s writings reflect his own personal experiences and mental states. In that sense, Kierkegaard is a poet-philosopher. Like Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, Kierkegaard is also an irrational philosopher, though there is no philosophical ontology in his thought. He has shown great care for life and man’s ways of living, and his writings focus on the individual, the concept of existence, and the free choice the individual has. According to Prof. Zhao, only in that sense can Kierkegaard be regarded as the first existentialist. Nevertheless, being a religious thinker, Kierkegaard’s philosophical endeavor aims at reiterating what it means to be and how to become a Christian. Therefore, Prof. Zhao attempts to see how Kierkegaard combines this religious purpose with his understanding of the concept of existence. Because Prof. Zhao focuses on how Kierkegaard combines what it means to be Christian with the concept of existence, he pays close attention to the Christian and religious aspect of Kierkegaard within four overarching themes selected from Kierkegaard’s wide range of writings. These themes are, “against Hegel,” “the concept of existence,” “the dialectics of life,” and “subjectivity is the truth.” Prof. Zhao pointed out that Kierkegaard’s criticism of Hegel proceeds from his theological and religious standpoint. Historically speaking, Hegel influenced Christianity in Germany and other Nordic countries in two aspects. First, he integrated religion into his great philosophical system, and by so doing, rationalized Christianity and theology. Second, Hegel’s theory of the state conformed to the idea and interest of the State Church. 28 Zhao Dunhua, “祈克果” [Kierkegaard], in 《现代西方哲学新编》 [Essentials of Western Contemporary Philosophy], Beijing: Peking University Press 2001, pp. 22–7.

114

Wang Qi

Consequently, it reinforced the power of the Church and made Christian life depend on the state and the collective to a greater extent. According to Prof. Zhao, both tendencies run contrary to the image of Christian life in Kierkegaard’s mind. Thus, his criticism of Hegel and other rational philosophical systems aims to rectify the abovementioned harmful directions and thereby reestablish orthodox Christian belief. Another feature of Prof. Zhao’s introduction to Kierkegaard is his positive reception of Kierkegaard’s dialectics of life. In Prof. Zhao’s opinion, Kierkegaard’s dialectics of life are dialectics in the true sense of the term, since Kierkegaard maintains two fundamental points of the dialectic. First, the individual’s existence has undergone a development from the lower to the higher. Second, the contradiction within the individual’s existence serves as the motivating power of such development. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard’s dialectics of life differ from Hegelian dialectics in the following three ways: (1) There is no place for the individual in Hegelian dialectics, while Kierkegaard’s dialectics of life are a process of realizing one’s self. (2) With Hegel the dialectical movement is promoted by rationality, while with Kierkegaard the leap from one stage to another is realized by irrational psychological changes. (3) Hegelian dialectics focus on “both-and,” while Kierkegaardian dialectics lies in “either/or.” All in all, Prof. Zhao’s short introduction offers us a full picture of Kierkegaard. He has shown insight into Kierkegaard’s philosophical endeavor and taken a positive attitude toward Kierkegaard’s religious intention. Meanwhile, it seems that Prof. Liu missed the religious aspect of Kierkegaard’s writings. His reading lacks the historical dimension and is too existentialist. Unfortunately, neither of them discuss Kierkegaard’s “indirect communication” and its wider significance. IV. Kierkegaard as a Philosopher: Books and Articles A. Books Since there are only four treatises on Kierkegaard,29 I will present each of them in turn. Prof. Weng Shaojun from the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences published the very first book about Kierkegaard in 1989. The title of this work is the Existence of the Individual—Kierkegaard as “Forefather of Existentialism.”30 Actually this is a critical biography of Kierkegaard. The influence of Walter Lowrie’s huge book, Kierkegaard, is not very hard to trace throughout the whole text. What is of great interest here is Prof. Weng’s attempt to compare Kierkegaard with an ancient Chinese Taoist philosopher Zhuang Zi (spelled Chuang-Tzu in earlier documents, ca. 365–ca. 290 bc) in the concluding remarks of the book. The issue is worthy of further investigation, although here this can only be done in a concise way. Prof. Weng starts his argument from the common impression that the mainstream of Chinese culture is rational Confucianism. Therefore, Kierkegaard, as an irrational Except Prof. Weng Shaojun’s book, the other three are all based on the authors’ doctoral dissertations. 30 Weng Shaojun, 《人的存在—“存在主义之父”克尔凯戈尔述评》[Existence of the Individual—Kierkegaard as “Forefather of Existentialism”], Beijing: Culture & Art Press 1989. 29

China: The Chinese Reception of Kierkegaard

115

philosopher, is not in harmony with the Chinese mentality. Prof. Weng tries to demonstrate that such a point of view is groundless since Taoist thinking and its representative, Zhuang Zi, are irrational in the same sense as Western philosophy is. Before the investigation, Prof. Weng first justifies the possibility of the comparison. He enumerates three points that can be compared: (1) Both Kierkegaard and Zhuang Zi lived in a period of time when great social changes were taking place, and both of them were quite anxious about those changes. (2) As conservatives who fell behind the times, both of them blamed the progression of rationalism for those social changes. As a result, they were against the advancement of both science and technology. (3) Both of them were in despair over the outside world, and they returned to their inner world as a remedy for this despair. Next, Prof. Weng starts his analyses from the angle of the subjectivity–objectivity relationship, which is influenced by Marxist methodology. (1) Both Kierkegaard and Zhuang Zi are idealist philosophers who have determined subjectivity as “mind” or “existence.” In their opinion, the essential task for a human being is to go deeper into his or her inner world. In that direction, both of them blame knowledge and try to deprive reason of any function in the field of human existence. Besides this, both philosophers try to investigate man’s psychological state. Kierkegaard paid close attention to angst (together with despair, melancholy, and solitude); while Zhuang Zi concentrated on “恬淡,” literally “indifferent to fame and wealth and thereby able to keep a tranquil mind on any occasion.” (2) From the angle of objectivity, both philosophers deny the existence of the object sphere and turn to the realm of the irrational. For Zhuang Zi, this is “Tao” (道),31 while, for Kierkegaard, it is “God”; both of these are nothing but the individual’s subjective consciousness. (3) Both philosophers deny human knowledge and further make a certain psychological state of man the absolute. It is from the absolute that “the identity of subjectivity and objectivity” can be achieved. For Zhuang Zi, the absolute lies in “去知无己,” literally “free from all thoughts and able to sit in forgetfulness.”32 In the case of Kierkegaard, the absolute lies in faith, and faith requires passion in the highest degree. Whatever the difference on this point, both of them, in Prof. Weng’s view, have exaggerated a certain psychological state of man and gone to another extreme. Therefore both of them have made mistakes that any idealist philosopher could make, such as subjectivism and extremism. Regrettably, Prof. Weng did not bother to compare the writing styles of Kierkegaard and Zhuang Zi, since both Kierkegaard and Zhuang Zi use stories and metaphors to demonstrate their views, rather than logical argumentation alone. This Zhuang Zi writes, “Tao has reality and evidence, but no action and form. It may be transmitted, but cannot be received. It may be attained, but cannot be seen. It exists by and through itself. It exists prior to heaven and earth, and indeed for all eternity. It causes the gods to be divine and the world to be produced.” Cf. Chuang Tzu, trans. and ed. by Fung Yu Lan, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press 1989, pp. 95–6. 32 In order to understand the meaning of “sit in forgetfulness,” I cite one paragraph from Zhuang Zi, where a man called Yen Hui explained the meaning of the phrase to Confucius. “My limbs are nerveless and my intelligence is dimmed. I have abandoned my body and discarded my knowledge. Thus I become one with the infinite. This is what I mean by sitting in forgetfulness.” Ibid., pp. 103–4. 31

116

Wang Qi

lack was made up for by two American scholars, who wrote and published a book in 2000 entitled The Sense of Antirationalism—The Religious Thought of Zhuangzi and Kierkegaard, 33 though there is no evidence to show that they contacted Prof. Weng on this issue. In 1995, Prof. Yang Dachun from Zhejiang University published a book entitled Perdition and Salvation—A Study of Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Spirit,34 which aims at offering a systematic study of Kierkegaard’s philosophy. In the beginning of the book Prof. Yang tries to clarify that Kierkegaard can be considered a philosopher. While discussing the issue, he had the following secondary literature in mind: Alastair Hannay’s Kierkegaard;35 John Elrod’s Being and Existence in Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Works;36 and James Collins’ The Mind of Kierkegaard.37 Prof. Yang tried to argue that Kierkegaard is a philosopher in every sense of the term, although he is not a speculative philosopher, and his writings contain a strong religious dimension. According to Prof. Yang, Kierkegaard, as a Hegel critic and one of the forerunners of modern humanism (the other two are Schopenhauer and Nietzsche), made a great contribution to the development of Western philosophy after classical German philosophy had ended. On the one hand, Kierkegaard opposes objectivism, absolutism, and the speculative standpoint of Hegel. By so doing, he tends to rebel against Western philosophical traditions. On the other hand, Kierkegaard utilizes Hegel’s dialectics and tries to reinstate many traditional ethical norms. All in all, Kierkegaard formed a connecting link between traditional and modern philosophy. He cannot simply be viewed as a forerunner of existentialism; his philosophy should be given credit on its own merits. Therefore, Prof. Yang declared the task of his book as “reconstructing the philosophical system of Kierkegaard,” because there is ontology in Kierkegaard’s thought where the concept of spirit serves as the central idea. He argues that the concept of spirit can be found in Kierkegaard if a de-constructionist methodology is applied to it. The case is very similar to that of Derrida who finds many traces of the concept of spirit in Heidegger’s works, though Heidegger seldom uses the term. Next, Prof. Yang analyzes Kierkegaard’s ontology of spirit. In his view, the concept of spirit is irrational in the context of Kierkegaard’s work, in contrast to Hegel in which the concept of spirit is rational. Kierkegaard’s concept of spirit no longer signifies a cognitive activity but the existing individual’s irrational feelings. It is not determined in the scope of world history, but only connected with the individual. What is more, the spirit in the highest degree lies in the God–man relationship. According to Prof. Yang, the above determinations of the spirit are made from the standpoint of subjectivity and inwardness. Thus, this can be viewed as a break with speculative Karen L. Carr and Philip J. Ivanhoe, The Sense of Antirationalism—The Religious Thought of Zhuangzi and Kierkegaard, New York: Seven Bridges Press 2000. 34 Yang Dachun, 《沉沦与拯救——克尔凯戈尔的精神哲学研究》[Perdition and Salvation—A Study of Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Spirit], Beijing: People’s Press 1995. 35 Alastair Hannay, Kierkegaard, London and New York: Routledge 1991. 36 John Elrod, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Works, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1975. 37 James Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1983. 33

China: The Chinese Reception of Kierkegaard

117

philosophy. But one thing that is unique about Kierkegaard’s philosophy of spirit is his discussion of the development of the individual’s personality and spirit. In earlier Kierkegaard studies, Prof. Yang notes, the meaning of the “leap” from one stage of life to another is often emphasized, but the development and continuity of the spirit is less discussed. To remedy this, he attempts to sketch the course of development of the spirit in detail. In Prof. Yang’s opinion, it is a course from perdition to salvation, and it goes as follows: sensual immediacy (melancholy, unhappiness, boredom, objective angst, objective despair) → negative spirit (angst, despair, irony) → positive spirit (the ethical) → humor → religious A → religious B. Finally, Prof. Yang concludes that the Kierkegaardian concept of spirit embodies both human and divine implications. However, the former seems more subversive than the latter. Because of this, Kierkegaard should be called a subjective idealist, an irrationalist, an extreme individualist, and a pious believer as well. These are not labels to be put on Kierkegaard lightly, but Prof. Yang was confident that Kierkegaard himself would accept them. The third book, Dr. Wang Ping’s Choices of Existence, is another attempt to systematize Kierkegaard’s philosophy.38 Dr. Wang begins with an analysis of Kierkegaard’s idea of man, using Marx’s doctrine of man and alienation, as well as Marx’s critique of religion. In Dr. Wang’s view, the core of Kierkegaard’s philosophy of man can be summed up by saying that man is a synthesis of two extremes while also viewed as a “single one.” In the first chapter Dr. Wang analyzes the above two points. In the next three chapters he discusses man in three spheres of existence, respectively. It seems that the relationship between the opening chapter and the following three chapters needs to be clarified further. Dr. Wang speaks highly of Kierkegaard’s philosophy. He regards Kierkegaard as a “milestone” in the transition from traditional philosophy to modern philosophy. Kierkegaard’s criticism of speculative philosophy opens up an important new direction for contemporary Western philosophy. He regards Kierkegaard as one of the thinkers and critics who have insight into the spiritual crisis of modern man. Nevertheless, Dr. Wang disagrees with Kierkegaard on almost every point. (1) According to Dr. Wang, man should be a synthesis of natural, spiritual, and social elements. But Kierkegaard focuses only on man’s spiritual aspect and thus denies man’s social aspect. As a result, the idea of the “single one” is wrong since it clearly leads to individualism. (2) In Dr. Wang’s opinion, Kierkegaard regards man’s spirit as passion and inwardness, and its peak can only be achieved by means of believing in God. Here Dr. Wang completely accepts Marx’s critique of religion in Introduction to a Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1844), namely, that religion is one form of man’s alienation from the self in the spiritual sense. Therefore, according to Dr. Wang, when Kierkegaard affirms man’s sinful situation and sufferings, he has already denied man. His criticism of modern society and modern times is religious and cultural in essence, while Marx’s is social and political. If one reads between the lines, one can see that Dr. Wang praises Marx’s critique over Kierkegaard’s. (3) Kierkegaard has overcorrected the deviations of speculative philosophy and his thought turns out to be irrational. Dr. Wang cites and agrees with the point in 38

Wang Ping, 《生的抉择》[Choices of Existence], Beijing: Commercial Press 2000.

118

Wang Qi

Walter Kaufmann’s popular work Existentialism: From Dostoevsky to Sartre,39 where Kierkegaard’s elimination of rationality and his dependence upon passion are called into question. Besides this, according to Dr. Wang, Kierkegaard’s irrational philosophy is a conceptual, logical, and speculative construction after all. This is one thing that is absurd about Kierkegaard’s philosophy, in Dr. Wang’s opinion. Unlike the aforementioned books, Wang Qi’s Unto the Abyss of Despair—A Study of Kierkegaard’s Aesthetic Sphere of Existence gives up the attempt to systematize Kierkegaard’s philosophy in one work,40 but ventures to make a particular study of one aspect of Kierkegaard’s thought. The book aims at finding out what Kierkegaard means by creating the aesthetic sphere of existence. In order to do this, the author first investigates Kierkegaard’s criticism of speculative philosophy and of the present age, and thereby posits Kierkegaard’s philosophical starting-point as the claim that the “individual exists in the eternal.” With that clue in mind, the author views the aesthetic sphere of existence as a link between the two poles in Kierkegaard’s thought: the individual and the eternal. On the one hand, Kierkegaard regards the aesthetic way of life as the first step toward an individual life, which for him is more important than gaining the whole world. On the other hand, the aesthetic way of living is connected with nothingness in its origin and disposition. The only way to get rid of nothingness is to “leap” to the religious, since Kierkegaard shows the possible transition from the aesthetic to the religious. Lastly, the author tentatively compares Kierkegaard’s attitude toward the aesthetic life with that of Sartre and Camus by analyzing two of their literary works: Nausea and The Stranger. The author tries to envisage a dialogue between Kierkegaard and the two French existentialists, demonstrating that besides the religious way of life, there are other possibilities of eliminating the nothingness or absurdity of human existence, for instance, by creative activities in philosophical or artistic fields. It is obvious that the perspective of the above reading is influenced very much by existential philosophy. B. Articles Until now, there have not been very many articles on Kierkegaard published in China. Dr. Zhang Liang, an Adorno scholar from Nanjing University, has tackled Adorno’s reading of Kierkegaard in two successive papers. Four out of five of Wang Qi’s published papers deal with Either/Or and Kierkegaard’s creation of the aesthetic sphere of existence. In “A Tentative Interpretation of the Concept of ‘the Ethical’ in Either/Or,”41 Wang Qi tries to analyze two different points of view about the ethical embodied by Judge William. One is the conventionally duty-centered middle-class ethics, and the other is the ethics focused on the individual’s actions and free choice. It is the latter that can be seen as Kierkegaard’s own voice. The study exaggerates 39 Walter Kaufmann, Existentialism: From Dostoevsky to Sartre, New York: Meridian Books 1956. 40 Wang Qi, 《走向绝望的深渊—克尔凯郭尔的美学生活境界》[Unto the Abyss of Despair—A Study of Kierkegaard’s Aesthetic Sphere of Existence], Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press 2000. 41 Cf.《哲学研究》[Philosophical Research], vol. 10, 1996, pp. 68–74.

China: The Chinese Reception of Kierkegaard

119

the divergence between the two views of ethics of Judge William and fails to see the connection. The next two articles, “A Study of Kierkegaard’s ‘Theory’ of Tragedy—Reflections on the Concept of the Tragic”42 and “What Does the Don Juan Myth Talk About? —Byron, Kierkegaard, Camus and Their Interpretations of Don Juan,”43 are more like active dialogues with Kierkegaard about the issue of tragedy and the legend of Don Juan than scholarly treatises on Kierkegaard. It is only in “From Philosophical Metaphysics to Religious Metaphysics”44 that the ironical way of writing employed in Either/Or is given adequate attention for the first time. The author tries to demonstrate that without the tool of irony, a piece like “The Rotation Method” would sound ridiculous and thus be beyond the grasp of Chinese scholars who are more used to speculative philosophers like Kant and Hegel. In “The Crisis of Faith in the Age of Reason and Its Way Out,”45 Wang Qi makes an inquiry into Johannes Climacus’ philosophy of religion, which, according to the author, is a complex unity of pietism and humanism. The paper first investigates Climacus’ reflection on and criticism of the present age, trying to find out what should be responsible for the secularization of the modern age, which, in Climacus’ eyes, lies in the domination of speculative philosophy. Next, the paper analyzes in detail the demonstration of the existence of God in Philosophical Fragments, arguing that Climacus’ standpoint is closer to Augustinianism than to Thomism. From the humanist point of view, such a similarity is rather unenlightened. However, when the issue of how an individual becomes a Christian is dealt with in the last part of the paper, the modernity of Climacus’ thought becomes apparent. The paper investigates three aspects of the question and draws the following conclusions: (1) Monotheist Christianity requires man to be present as “den Enkelte,” since the God– man relationship should be one-to-one. (2) As an absolute subject, God requires each individual to be present as a subject as well, though the relationship between God and man is by no means equal. (3) Only God has absolute authority over man. Individuals are in no position to judge one another because all men are equal before God. These conclusions oppose the typical and popular atheist objection to religion that religion causes the alienation of man by obliterating human value and respect. On the contrary, the paper tries to demonstrate that Climacus’ argumentation shows another possibility, namely, that it is only through God that man can be present as an individual, as the “unique one.” In addition, it is because of God that any other secular authority is eliminated, and thereby self-respect is established for each man. Moreover, Climacus has made “becoming a Christian” the individual’s lifelong appropriation to the “objective uncertainty,” a process that has no guarantee at all. What counts during this process is not what one has understood about Christianity but what one has done to become a Christian, since having faith only concerns the individual and the individual’s passionate inwardness. From the standpoint of the individual, this idea is doubtlessly modern and progressive. But coming to this point, according to the author, Climacus can hardly shake off the charge of solipsism, since Cf. 《外国美学》 [Foreign Aesthetics], vol. 17, 1999, pp. 148–74. 《外国美学》[Foreign Aesthetics], vol. 18, 2000, pp. 236–53. 44 Cf. 《哲学研究》 [Philosophical Research], vol. 9, 2002, pp. 31–6. 45 Cf. 《浙江学刊》 [Zhejiang Academic Journal], vol. 2, 2003, pp. 16–26. 42 43

120

Wang Qi

he has not made a clear distinction between institutional Christianity and personal Christianity. The author points out that the danger emerges as soon as passion begins to count in the process of becoming a Christian. The situation is just like what Climacus says in Philosophical Fragments: “the ultimate potentiation of every passion is always to will its own downfall.”46 V. Concluding Remarks Following the overview of the Chinese reception of Kierkegaard since the 1980s, we should consider why the study of Kierkegaard in China is not as popular as that of other contemporary Western philosophers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, or even Derrida. Besides the obvious language barrier, Kierkegaard’s indirect communication, his radical criticism of speculative philosophy, and the rationalist tradition seem to jar with the modern Chinese mentality, which is more used to the systematic Hegel and Marx. Kierkegaard’s esteem for the individual or the “single one” is both an attraction and a phobia for the Chinese. It is an attraction because, for many years, the Chinese were educated to be concerned more with the collective interest than with one’s own. To be an individual could be more or less viewed as connected with bourgeoisie ideology. Not everyone has enough courage to become an individual who stands alone, however, especially when the dimension of the absolute and the eternal is generally lacking in Chinese life. Next, Kierkegaard’s passion for Christianity and his idea of Christian belief are major stumbling blocks in the study of his work. Even eliminating the influence from Marxism-Leninism’s doctrines on religion in general, understanding Kierkegaard requires special efforts in learning and understanding the history and philosophy of Christianity. This is by no means an easy task. Lastly, among the Chinese born during the 1950s and the 1960s, the common psychology behind reading a certain Western philosopher or thinker is not purely scholarly. The idea of searching for the “home of being” is always intertwined with a scholarly pursuit. In this case, the question of reception has become that of identifying oneself with Kierkegaard’s thought and teaching. And this, to a certain extent, has limited the scholarly study of Kierkegaard in China. Prof. Liu Xiaofeng in the general foreword to a three-volume work, A Kierkegaard Anthology, writes that translating Kierkegaard into modern Chinese is a challenge for both the Chinese language and the Chinese way of thinking. In his opinion, the significance of reading Kierkegaard lies in the renewal of one’s self-understanding.47 This comment is right on the mark concerning the reception of Kierkegaard in China.

Cf. SKS 4, 243 / PF, p. 37. Cf.《克尔凯郭尔文丛》 [A Kierkegaard Anthology], vols. 1–3; Beijing: China Worker’s Press 1997, vol. 1, pp. 1–3.

46 47

Bibliography I. Chinese Translations of Kierkegaard’s Works 《一个诱惑者的日记—克尔凯郭尔文选》[Either/Or (consists of “The Seducer’s Diary”; “The Aesthetic Validity of Marriage”)], trans. and ed. by Xu Xinhua, Yu Lingling, Shanghai: Shanghai San Lian Bookstore 1992 (Owl Library). 《一个引诱者的手记》[“The Seducer’s Diary”], trans. from German and ed. by Wang Caiyong, Beijing: Hua Xia Publishing House 1992. 《勾引家日记》[“The Seducer’s Diary”], trans. by Jiang Xinyi, Beijing: Authors Press 1992 (Author’s Reference Series). 《恐惧与颤栗》[Fear and Trembling], trans. from Danish and ed. by Liu Ji, Guiyang: Guizhou People’s Press 1994 (Modern Society and Human Being Series). 《曾经男人的三少女》[Selections from Either/Or and Stages on Life’s Way (consists of “Silhouettes,” “Diapsalmata,” “In vino veritas,” and “Reflections on Marriage”)], trans. and ed. by Jiang Xinyi, Beijing: Authors Press 1994 (Author’s Reference Series). 《克尔凯戈尔日记选》[Selected Journals of Kierkegaard], trans by Yan Kejia and Yao Beiqin, Shanghai: Shanghai Social Sciences Press 1995. 《论怀疑者/哲学片断》 [De omnibus dubitandum est; Philosophical Fragments], trans. by Weng Shaojun and Lu Xinghua, Beijing: San Lian Bookstore 1996. 《忏悔人生—克尔凯戈尔如是说》[Selected Works of Kierkegaard], trans. and ed. by Xia Zhongyi, Shanghai: Shanghai Literature and Art Press 1996. 《克尔凯郭尔文丛》[A Kierkegaard Anthology (selected translations from Kierkegaard’s Writings)], vols. 1–3, trans. and ed. by Niu Hongbao, Beijing: China Worker’s Press 1997: —— vol. 1,《非此即彼》[Either/Or (consists of “The Immediate Erotic Stages,” ”Silhouettes,” “The First Love,” and “The Seducer’s Diary”)], trans. and ed. by Feng Zongxin, Ning Yizhong, Hao Tianhu, Limao, Na Guoyi; —— vol. 2,《致死之疾病》[The Sickness unto Death], translated by Zhang Xianglong and Wang Jianjun; —— vol. 3,《十八训导书》[Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses], trans. by Wu Qiong. 《或此或彼》[Either/Or], vols. 1–2, trans. from English (KW) by Yan Jia, Chengdu: Sichuan People’s Press 1998 (World Classic Series). 《恐惧与颤栗》[Fear and Trembling], trans. by Yi Chen, Beijing: Hua Xia Publishing House 1999 (Modern Thinking Library). 《基督徒的激情》[Die Leidenschaft des Religiösen], trans. by Lu Lu, Beijing: China Central Translation Press 1999 (Poetry and Thought Library Series)

122

Wang Qi

(originally as Die Leidenschaft des Religiösen: Eine Auswahl aus Schriften und Tagebüchern, trans. by Heinz Küpper, Stuttgart: Reclam 1953). 《克尔恺郭尔哲学寓言集》[Philosophical Parables of Kierkegaard], trans. by Yang Yugong, Beijng: Commercial Press 2000. 《爱之诱惑》[Either/Or (consists of “The Immediate Erotic Stages,” “The Seducer’s Diary”)], trans. from German by Wang Caiyong, Shanghai: Shanghai Social Sciences Press 2002. 《重复》[Repetition], trans. by Wang Baihua, Tianjin: Hundred Flowers Literature and Art Press 2002. 《颤栗与不安—克尔凯郭尔个体偶在集》[Selected Works of Kierkegaard], trans. and ed. by Yang Jia, Xi’an: Shaanxi Normal University Press 2002 (Illustrated Will to Life Classics). 《论反讽概念 : 以苏格拉底为主线 / 索伦・奥碧・克尔凯郭尔著 ; 汤晨溪译》 [On the Concept of Irony], trans. by Tang Chenxi yi, Beijing : Zhongguo she hui ke xue chu ban she 2005. II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard in China Cheng Zhimin and Yang Shen, “克尔凯郭尔”[Kierkegaard], in《存在的呼唤》 [Call of Existence], Xi’an: Shaanxi People’s Education Press 1997, pp. 15–32. Chu Shaohua, “克尔凯郭尔” [Kierkegaard], in 《存在主义哲学》 [Existential Philosophy], ed. by Xu Chongwen, Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press 1986, pp. 41–73. Liu Fangtong, “存在主义的思想先驱克尔凯郭尔的哲学” [The Philosophy of Kierkegaard, the Forerunner of Existentialism], in《现代西方哲学》 [Contemporary Western Philosophy], vols. 1–2, revised ed., Beijing: People’s Press 1990, vol. 2, pp. 580–89. Ru Xin, “克尔凯郭尔” [Kierkegaard], in 《西方著名哲学家评传》 [Critical Biographies of Famous Western Philosophers], vols. 1–8, ed. by Ru Xin, Wang Shuren, and Yu Lichang, Jinan: Shandong People’s Press 1985, vol. 8, pp. 1–69 (also in 《西方的哲学和美学》 [Ru Xin’s Selected Papers on Western Philosophy and Aesthetics], Taiyuan: Shanxi People’s Press 1987, pp. 453–96). Wang Ping, 《生的抉择》 [Choices of Existence], Beijing: Commercial Press 2000. Wang Qi, “克尔凯郭尔著述中的‘伦理’概念释义” [A Tentative Interpretation of the Concept of “the Ethical” in Either/Or], 哲学研究 [Philosophical Research], no. 10, 1996, pp. 68–74. —— “克尔凯郭尔关于悲剧的‘理论’—兼论悲剧精神的现代意义” [A Study of Kierkegaard’s “Theory” of Tragedy—Reflections on the Concept of the Tragic], 外国美学 [Foreign Aesthetics], 17, 1999, pp. 148–74. ——《走向绝望的深渊—克尔凯郭尔的美学生活境界》 [Unto the Abyss of Despair—A Study of Kierkegaard’s Aesthetic Sphere of Existence], Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press 2000.

China: The Chinese Reception of Kierkegaard

123

—— “唐璜的神话在‘说’些什么？” [What Does the Don Juan Myth Talk About?—Byron, Kierkegaard, Camus and Their Interpretations of Don Juan], 外国美学 [Foreign Aesthetics], no. 18, 2000, pp. 236–53. —— “从哲学形而上学到宗教形而上学” [From Philosophical Metaphysics to Religious Metaphysics], 哲学研究 [Philosophical Research], no. 9, 2002, pp. 31–6. —— “理性时代的信仰危机及出路——克尔凯郭尔假名写作时期的宗教哲学 思想研究” [The Crisis of Faith in the Age of Reason and Its Way Out—Johannes Climacus’ Philosophy of Religion], 浙江学刊 [Zhejiang Academic Journal], no. 2, 2003, pp. 16–26. Weng Shaojun, “我是一棵孤独的枞树” [I am a Lonely Fir Tree], in《诗人哲学 家》[Philosophers as Poets], ed. by Zhou Guoping, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press 1987. —— 《人的存在—“存在主义之父”克尔凯戈尔述评》 [Existence of the Individual—Kierkegaard as “Forefather of Existentialism”], Beijing: Culture & Art Press 1989. Yang Dachun, 《沉沦与拯救—克尔凯戈尔精神哲学研究》 [Perdition and Salvation—A Study of Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Spirit], Beijing: People’s Press 1995. Zhang Liang, “克尔凯郭尔的生存概念与唯心主义问题—读阿多诺《克尔凯 郭尔：审美对象的建构》” [The Concept of Existence in Kierkegaard and the Problems of Idealism—On Adorno’s Kierkegaard, Construction of the Aesthetic], 浙江学刊 [Zhejiang Academic Journal], vol. 2, 2002, pp. 118–24. —— “克尔凯郭尔、内在性与唯心主义问题” [Kierkegaard, Inwardness and the Problems of Idealism], Fujian Forum, no. 2, 2002, pp. 53–61. Zhao Dunhua, “祈克果” [Kierkegaard], in 《现代西方哲学新编》 [Essentials of Western Contemporary Philosophy], Beijing: Peking University Press 2001, pp. 22–7. Zhou Yiyun, “克尔凯郭尔的诱惑” [The Seduction of Kierkegaard], Du Shu, no. 1, 1996, pp. 120–24. III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Reception in China None.

C\ Taylor & Francis ~Taylor & Francis Group

http:/ / taylora ndfra ncis.com

Korea: The Korean Response to Kierkegaard Pyo Jae-myeong

I. During the Japanese Colonial Period It is usually thought to be around the end of 1920s or the early 1930s that Korean intellectuals became interested in Kierkegaard’s thought and began to read his writings. It can be said that most of them were students who studied in Japan or at the Department of Philosophy of Keijō Imperial University, which was established 1926 in Keijō [Seoul]. A little earlier, the first Kierkegaard wave had spread through the Japanese-reading world when the German edition of Kierkegaard’s writings, which was translated by Hermann Gottsched and Christoph Schrempf, was imported and read by some literary scholars. But their understanding of Kierkegaard remained rudimentary, and their concern with him was very personal. Only a few Christians including some members of the non-church movement, some philosophers, and men of letters were interested in the thought of Kierkegaard in connection with the Norwegian playwright Henrik Ibsen (1828–1906). It was, however, an epoch-making event that in 1915 there appeared a monumental publication, Søren Kierkegaard by Watsuji Tetsurō (1889–1960), the first monograph about Kierkegaard written by a Japanese scholar. Meanwhile, World War I broke out, and after the war there arose new currents of thought imbued with the growing consciousness of crisis, for example, the philosophy of existence of Heidegger and Jaspers, and the theology of crisis or dialectical theology of Karl Barth and Emil Brunner. With these thoughts, the writings of Nietzsche and Marx, and a little bit earlier, the literary works of Rilke and Kafka were introduced. In connection with this trend, the interest in Kierkegaard increased. In the atmosphere of the 1930s, many Korean students went abroad to get a higher education. Most of them went to Japan rather than Europe or America. Among them, there were some students who studied theology, literature and philosophy. These and some students who studied Western philosophy at Keijō Imperial University are thought to be the first Korean intellectuals to read Kierkegaard.

Søren Kierkegaards Gesammelte Werke, trans. and ed. by Hermann Gottsched and Christoph Schrempf, vols. 1-12, Jena: Diederich 1909–22.  和辻哲郞 [Watsuji Tetsurō], ゼーレン•キエルケゴール [Søren Kierkegaard], Tokyo: Uchida Rōkakuho 1915. 

126

Pyo Jae-myeong

The reason for this is that in the 1930s Japanese translations, such as an abridged version of Either/Or, Selections from Kierkegaard’s Writings in 3 Volumes, and Harald Høffding’s monograph, Kierkegaard as a Philosopher, began to appear and soon became very popular. At this time, lectures on the existential philosophy of Heidegger and Jaspers were given at the Department of Philosophy at Keijō Imperial University. In addition, German versions of Kierkegaard or Høffding began to appear in the library of Keijō Imperial University. Students who had studied abroad (except those in Japan) did not leave any record of having come into contact with Kierkegaard. In the case of students who studied in Germany, the reason seems to be their social background and concern. However, for students who studied in the U.S.A. it might be because American circles of philosophy had not been introduced to Kierkegaard properly until 1935. Just at that time, however, Japan began to strengthen its military dictatorship and severely oppress the Korean peninsular to construct an advance base for the invasion of Manchuria and Mainland China. Imperial Japan claimed that there was a single nationality between Koreans and Japanese, in an attempt to eliminate Korea’s sense of national identity and to nullify its spiritual life. They regulated the use and spread of the Korean language and also oppressed research on Korean matters, and finally from 1938 they completely prohibited the use of Korean in public life. From 1935, the authorities forced Korean Christians to worship the gods of Japanese Shintoism. From February 1940, all Koreans had to have Japanese names instead of their ancestral family names. What did it mean to study philosophy in such a miserable historical situation? What was it to study literature, theology, etc.? When the March 1 Independence Movement of 1919 failed, Korean intellectuals were, by and large, divided into two groups: namely, the militants and the preparation group. Sin Chae-ho (1880–1936), the author of The Declaration of Korean Revolution (1924), was one of the powerful leaders of the militants, and Ahn Chang-ho (1878–1938) was one of the leaders of the latter group. Though these two groups were like the two sides of a coin, literary circles inclined towards the resistance. Poets missed their lost motherland and wrote songs looking forward to its restoration. Park Jong-hong (1903–76), one of the philosophers who studied Western philosophy at Keijō Imperial University from the end of 1920s and led an active life in 1930s in the field of philosophy in Korea, wrote about his starting point for philosophizing: the motive of our philosophieren is not such a modest wonder 憂愁の哲理 [A Philosophy of the Melancholy (an abridged translation of Either/Or)], trans. by 宮原晃一郞 [Kouichirou Miyhara], Tokyo: Shunju-sha 1930.  キエルケゴール選集 [Selected Works of Søren Kierkegaard in Three Volumes], ed. by 三木 淸 [Miki Kiyoshi], Tokyo: Kaizo-sha 1935. The three volumes includes the following texts: vol. 1, 不安の槪念 [The Concept of Anxiety], 現代の批判 [A Literary Review (parts of the work)] and 死に至る病 [The Sickness unto Death]; vol. 2, キリストに於ける訓練 [Practice in Christianity], 恐れと慄き [Fear and Trembling], and 誘惑者の日記 [“The Seducer’s Diary”]; vol. 3, アイロニーの槪念 [The Concept of Irony], 反復 [Repetition], and 瞬間 [The Moment].  ヘフデイング [Harald Høffding], 哲學者としてのキエルケゴール [Kierkegaard as a Philosopher], from German trans. by 鳥井博郞 [Torii Hiroo], Tokyo: Daiichishobō 1935 (originally as Søren Kierkegaard som filosof, Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel 1892). 

Korea: The Korean Response to Kierkegaard

127

(φύμάξειύ) but actual pains. The problem requires a solution through praxis. For him, thus philosophieren means earnestly “to face up the reality of this age, society and land.” That meant to present the way to regain independence from Japan by criticizing and overcoming the reality of the colonized motherland. Park Jong-hong studied philosophy in order to gain a certain knowledge of reality, which would enable him to overcome the grievous national reality. As a college student, he devoted himself to Heidegger’s philosophy of existence. At that time, Heidegger’s philosophy, together with that of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Marx, and Husserl, etc., attracted many students, who had become discontent with the philosophy of German idealism. What Park Jong-hong wanted to know from Heidegger’s philosophy was the new Being, existence. This was a philosophical concept used to overcome the crisis of time and bring a new era in European culture, which was on the verge of collapsing together with modern subjectivism. His expectation, however, did not seem to be fulfilled. Graduating from college in 1933, he wrote a thesis entitled On Sorge in Heidegger. In this thesis, he criticized Heidegger from a Kierkegaardian standpoint. It is thought to be the first monograph in which a Korean author mentions Kierkegaard. Park noticed that when Heidegger uses the expression die formal existenziale Ganzheit to understand the complete ontological structure of Dasein, his Sorge is nothing but an ontological noun given to the formal totality or to the formula. For Park, constituents of concrete Dasein were not so simple that it could easily be synthesized into the formal structure of Sorge. Here Park made a cynical remark about Heidegger’s Sorge, quoting Kierkegaard’s sarcastic comment on Hegel’s system. “When I take existence away, i.e., when I abstract, there is no aut-aut; when I take this aut-aut away from existence I also take existence away, and hence I do not abrogate the aut-aut in existence.” But a Hegelian can say with solemnity in the confessional: “I do not know whether I am a human being, but I have understood the System.” With these passages, Park intended to express his dissatisfaction with Heidegger’s concept of Sorge for its lack of actual reality and also with the system of Dasein based on it, just as Kierkegaard was opposed to Hegel’s logical system with his concrete existence as a human being. Park even sighed that he would be happy if he could say with Kierkegaard that “I for my part would rather say I know that I am a human being, and I know that I have not understood the System.” Though it is not clear how Park came to know Kierkegaard, it is obvious that he read him in connection with Heidegger’s existential philosophy, and he showed a keen insight into Kierkegaard’s existential inwardness from which Heidegger so decisively departed. Park understood that Heidegger approached the problem of existence in an existential way, and as a result he reduced the transcendence of being—which should be overcome altogether with Dasein, In-der-Welt-Sein—to a mere occurrence in a consciousness, i.e., an ideal being. As a result, Park realized that there was no concrete human being, which, in forming itself, is in severe conflict and contradiction. For Park, 朴鍾鴻 [Park Jong-hong], 朴鍾鴻全集 [Park Jong-hong’s Collected Works], vols. 1–7, Seoul: Mineumsa 1982, vol. 1, p. 330; pp. 161–205 (see especially, p. 164, n2; p. 195, n6; p. 199).  Ibid., p. 195. See SKS 7, 279 / CUP1, 305.  Ibid. See SKS 7, 283 / CUP1, 311. 

128

Pyo Jae-myeong

the authentic human being is, first of all, a social being with a physical body rather than an individual, and to transcend the external world means that such a social being confronts Zuhandensein or Vorhandensein and overcomes them. Thus no concrete history comes into being without a confrontation with a strong opposition. Such criticism of Park against Heidegger could be applied to the case of Kierkegaard. For Park, the practice of actual being seemed to be more social than that of a lonely ethical subject crouched before the abyss, as seemed to be the case with Kierkegaard. The concrete practice, which starts from such a severe agony triggered by a miserable reality and has to break through the restricted situation, is neither just a rhetorical thought of reason nor a mere expression of sentimentalism. It belongs to the area of pathos rather than that of logos, and it has a kind of positive aspect as both an emotional and social practice. At this point, we see Park’s consistent philosophical system which criticized Kierkegaard—who seemed to claim the importance of being an introspective and definable subjectivity—and his apparent existential followers and sought the unity of dialectical logic to overcome Kierkegaard and others. From the 1920s to the early 1930s, the poet Park Yong-cheol (1904-38) was studying in Japan where he learned about Kierkegaard. The reinforcement of the fascist dictatorship by Japan starting from the early 1930s eradicated the political and ideological aspect from all kinds of cultural movements including the literary, journalistic, and educational ones. It was at this time that the “Hangul (i.e., the Korean Alphabet) Movement” started with a view to preserving the Korean language containing the tradition, customs, emotion, thought, and spirit of the Korean people. Those who took part in all the cultural movements revealed their national feelings that they could not have expressed in any other way than by being involved in or supporting the Hangul movement. In this atmosphere, there emerged a literary movement led by a coterie of the “Poetical Literature” School, which stood for “pure literature.” The “Poetical Literature” School, unlike the ideologically slanted KAPF (Korea Artista Proletaria Federatio) or the School of “National Literature” which tried to revive three-stanza Korean poems called sijo under the slogan of national consciousness, sought pure lyricism and showed a particular interest in language as a medium of expression. The School published the poetry magazine Simunhak [Poetical Literature] for the first time in the history of new poetry in Korea in March 1930, and it was Park Yong-cheol who played a key role in it. Park was not only actively involved in the translation and introduction of foreign literature, but enthusiastic about understanding foreign poetry and literature on a theoretical level. Among his fields of interest was Kierkegaard. He wrote an essay titled “Verschiedene” in January 1934 in the professional literary magazine Literature issued under his editorship, in which he quoted several passages from Either/Or concerning poetry and poets: What is a poet? An unhappy person who conceals profound anguish in his heart but whose lips are so formed that as sighs and cries pass over them they sound like beautiful music. It is with him as with the poor wretches in Phalaris’ bronze bull, who were slowly tortured

Korea: The Korean Response to Kierkegaard

129

over a slow fire; their screams could not reach the tyrant’s ears to terrify him; to him they sounded like sweet music.

It is not clear when and how Park Yong-cheol came to know Kierkegaard. We can only guess that when he graduated from Aoyama Gakuin and entered the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies in Japan, the country’s intellectual milieu at the time may have brought him into contact with Kierkegaard’s works and introductory books and attracted his interest in them. What is characteristic about Park is that he did not show any concern for the country or society. He only expressed the dark inner side of human beings such as the feelings of solitude, skepticism, and melancholy, as represented in a poet who had to live in the gloomy situation of a colony. This is evident in his major poems such as “Sailing by Boat,” “After you left on a Night Train,” and “Cold-blooded Forehead.” For Park, the atmosphere arising from Kierkegaard’s aesthetic existence may have been very attractive. It had some bearing upon the bitter paradox in life that the more we seek pleasure, the more we are obsessed with melancholy, boredom, doubt, and despair. From this time on, some people in Korea started to read Kierkegaard, whose painful poetic existence arising from a divided self, along with his elegant and brilliant writing style, seemed to attract the country’s young intellectuals and give some comfort to them. Around the end of the 1930s when Park established his literary career actively, Yun Dong-ju (1917–45) was an unknown young man aspiring to be a poet without any notable literary activities. Later, after the independence of Korea, Yun attained a prominent place in the history of modern Korean literature or poetry of the late Japanese colonial period, with the publication of a posthumous anthology, Sky, Wind, Stars and Poems, in January 1948.10 Afterwards he was remembered as a poet of the resistance who wrote his poems against the dark age of Japanese colonialism, which is why he was loved by many people. When Korea lost its sovereignty, a part of the population left their country for Manchuria (the Jilian Province in Northeast China today). They lived there the lives of exiles. A number of them took part in activities of resistance, and were arrested and executed. Such was also Yun’s life and death. Yun was born in 1917 in Myeongdong village of Bukkando (the northern region of the Tumen River), Manchuria, beyond the Tumen River, and died in a prison of Fukuoka in Japan in February 1945. In fact he was not a militant activist. Rather he was a “quiet and introverted person,” of humane and gentle character. He liked to go for walks and was always delighted to see a friend. He would often be quiet and absorbed in thoughts. How did such a person come to be placed among the poets of resistance? When the darkness of his age weighed heavily on him, a desire for freedom and justice as well as a love for his brethren may have prompted him to confront the oppressing reality. He was a man of extraordinary purity and integrity. His pure heart or 朴龍喆 [Park Yong-cheol], 朴龍喆全集 [Park Yong-cheol’s Collected Works], vols. 1–2, Seoul: Donggwangdang 1939, vol. 2, pp. 186–8. See SKS 2, 27 / EO1, 19. 10 尹東柱 [Yun Dong-ju], 하늘과 바람과 별과 시 [Sky, Wind, Stars and Poems], Seoul: Jeongeumsa 1948. 

130

Pyo Jae-myeong

conscience may have made it possible that he, through an incessant self-examination, achieved a rigorous self-understanding and that he, in his existential interest in his selfaccomplishment, sought to actualize in his individual life the universal possibilities of a human being. One can easily identify his serious attitude toward life in the Prelude to his aforementioned anthology Sky, Wind, Stars and Poems: Let me have no shame Looking up to the sky till I die. Even winds among the foliage Pained my heart. With a heart that sings of the stars, I’ll love all dying things. And I must fare forth on my way That’s been assigned to me. Tonight also the stars go through the wind.11

How much does this poem remind us of Kierkegaard’s “single individual before God”! It is said that by the time Yun graduated from Yonhee College in Seoul (Yonsei University today), he was so engrossed in Kierkegaard that he talked about him to several people including his younger brother. According to his brother, his library contained the works of such writers as André Gide, Dostoyevsky, Valéry, and Kierkegaard. However, it is not known which of Kierkegaard’s works he actually read. Among the Japanese versions of Kierkegaard’s writings at the time were the aforementioned abridged translation of Either/Or—entitled The Philosophy of Melancholy12—Concluding Unscientific Postscript,13 The Sickness unto Death,14 The Concept of Anxiety,15 Practice in Christianity,16 and “The Difference between a Genius and an Apostle.”17 We can only guess that he may have read some or all of these. It is also difficult to say precisely what attracted him in Kierkegaard’s thought. We may only draw some inferences about the relation between Yun and Kierkegaard from his life and works at the time. In the early 1940s, Yun was planning to study in Japan, but nothing was clear. The situation of his country was getting worse. War was imminent. Young men were being drafted by the Japanese imperial government into the army. Censorship was strictly enforced, and the two Korean newspapers, Dong-A Ilbo and Chosun Ilbo had been forced to discontinue publishing since 1939. Any attempt to express national identity, in whatever form, could have put one in serious danger. 尹東柱 [Yun Dong-ju], 서시[Prelude] to 하늘과 바람과 별과 시 [Sky, Wind, Stars and Poems].The poem was written on November 20, 1941. 12 憂愁の哲理 [The Philosophy of Melancholy] (an abridged translation of Either/Or). 13 哲學的斷片後書 [Concluding Unscientific Postscript], trans. by 鬼頭英一 [Kito Eiichi], Tokyo: Mikasa-shobou 1938. 14 死に至る病 [The Sickness unto Death], trans. by Shinji Saitou, Tokyo: Iwanamishoten 1939. 15 不安の概念 [The Concept of Anxiety], Kyoto: Jimbunshoin 1940. 16 基督教に於ける訓練 [Practice in Christianity], Tokyo 1940. 17 天才と使徒との 相違について [“The Difference between a Genius and an Apostle”], trans. by Hashimoto Kagami, Tokyo: Nagasakishoten 1931. 11

Korea: The Korean Response to Kierkegaard

131

While things went on in this way in his country, Yun was pursuing an internal and ethical development. He struggled between his ideal and the reality of oppression and misery. And it may be at this point that he discovered Kierkegaard, who had already made a difficult journey toward the true self. Yun may also have found in Kierkegaard’s writings an individual who suffered from melancholy, despair, and guilt-consciousness, an individual with whom he could easily identify. As is well known, for Kierkegaard, to become oneself means to become the single individual, and one becomes the single individual by a dynamic movement, going from aesthetic existence, through ethical existence, to religious existence. If we regard this Kierkegaardian movement of existence as a process of ethical or internal selfaccomplishment, Yun was perhaps, through an inner necessity, pushed toward a similar movement, that is, he endeavored to achieve an ethical or internal perfection through an aesthetical development. He decided to engage himself in literature against his father’s will. When he made the choice, he perhaps was already pursuing such a selfaccomplishment. And in my view he was consistent with his initial choice when later he decided to confront the oppressing situation in which he and his compatriots lived. In his efforts towards an ethical and internal development, Yun practiced thorough self-examinations. And they were followed by a certain feeling of “shame” or a “guilt consciousness,” which we can see in his poems. Yun suffered from the distance between his ideal self and his real self; he suffered from the fact that confronted by the fierce reality of injustice, he could not fulfill his resolution to live an ethically pure life. Of this he felt ashamed and guilty. In 1942 he went to Japan to study. One night he wrote a poem in his “room of six tatami mats,” “listening to the sounds of the rain outside through the window.” The poem, entitled “Swipke ssuieojin si” [A Poem Easily Written], expresses a feeling of alienation that he had as a citizen of a colonized country, that of resistance against the oppressor, and a relentless selfcriticism reminding himself that he was nevertheless nothing but a poet. He saw himself heading for a lecture room with an envelope containing money for tuition fees and permeated with “the smell of his parents’ sweat and affection”; he saw himself “sinking,” and incapable of expressing himself in any other way than to write poems. Of all this he felt ashamed. Yun Dong-ju’s “feeling of shame” or “guilt consciousness” is closely connected with his compassion for his brethren in suffering. Although it was a success from a personal point of view that he was attending the university, reading books, and writing poems, he thought of it as shameful. When he saw himself, he realized that the “I” under the colonial system was none other than all the people around him, who, abused and oppressed, were living in misery. Perceiving the contrast between the lives of his compatriots and his own, Yun felt ashamed and guilty. To overcome this feeling of shame or guilt-consciousness, he had to act. However, it was the late Japanese colonial period, and an extremely oppressive measure was in force at that time and anyone who wanted to undertake an act of resistance had to be prepared for death. Yun made a decision for resistance in this situation, clearly aware of the possibility that he could be sacrificed. We do not know precisely what kind of action Yun had in mind then. However, we need not presume it to be a political one. He may have remained faithful to his initial choice for an aesthetic and ethical self-accomplishment. Indeed we see his resolution for an action begin to show itself

132

Pyo Jae-myeong

in his poems. Anyhow it is doubtless that he made a decision for a certain form of action. This led him to a prison, where he died at the age of twenty-seven, just some months before the liberation of his country. Around the same period as Yun was in Japan, Kim Hyeong-seok (b. 1920), Ahn Byeong-uk (b. 1920), and Ahn Byeong-mu (1922–96) were studying in Tokyo. Their contact with Kierkegaard provided an occasion to renew their awareness of themselves in the same mental circumstances that Yun faced. Their growth in thought and activity, however, bloomed in Korea only after the war. In the meantime, before them, Kim Jae-jun (1901–87), Jeon Gyeong-yeon (b. 1916), Kim Cheol-son (b. 1917), Mun Dong-hwan (b. 1921), and Mun Ik-hwan (1918–94) were studying in a divinity school in Japan. They were already reading Kierkegaard’s writings in connection with modern theology whose prominent scholars were Barth, Brunner and Gogarten. And in Seoul men of letters interested in poetry and literary criticism, including Jo Yeon-hyeon (1920–81), were reading Karl Löwith’s Kierkegaard and Nietzsche (1933) along with Kierkegaard’s works. Nothing is known about the relationship between Kim Jae-jun and Kierkegaard. But if we consider that he is a precursor of what is called the new theology movement in Korea, it is natural that he would read Kierkegaard in connection with his interest in the second edition of Barth’s The Epistle to the Romans (1922). Kim Jae-jun went to America to study after he finished the divinity school of Aoyama Gakuin, and then he got a teaching job in a divinity school in Korea after he returned home. At that time, he introduced an advanced Biblical criticism and Barth’s theology for the first time in Korean churches, which had traditionally been dominated by an orthodox theology of conservative Calvinism. And it is said that he mentioned Kierkegaard occasionally in his classes. As is seen in the case of Yun Dong-ju, the period between 1943 and 1945 was that of a series of ordeals and hardships at all levels. In particular, most young students, including those in both Japan and Korea, were worried about the pressing problems of enlisting as student soldiers instead of pursuing their lofty aspirations. Jeon Gyeong-yeon graduated from a secondary school and worked for three years before going to Tokyo in 1940 to study at the Nippon Seminary (Tokyo Seminary today). For him, Kierkegaard, along with Dostoyevsky, provided a strong basis for studying theology. In the gloom of the blackout during the American military’s bombing raid on Tokyo, he read whatever he could lay hands on, such as The Sickness unto Death, Fear and Trembling, Philosophical Fragments, “The Difference between a Genius and an Apostle,” and Practice in Christianity as well as Dostoyevsky’s Notes from the Underground. He did not become a Kierkegaard scholar; however, he ultimately became a leading scholar on Barth in Korea. Kim Cheol-son, Jeon Gyeong-yeon’s junior in school, followed Jeon to Japan, but he stopped studying and came back home one year later in order to avoid serving as a student soldier. After the war, he continued studying at the Department of Religion of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences in Seoul National University (formerly Keijō Imperial University). Kim Hyeong-seok, Yun Dong-ju’s fellow student in middle school, and Ahn Byeong-uk came to know about Kierkegaard while they were studying philosophy at Jōchi (Sophia) University and Waseda University. The lectures of their universities were still focused on the German philosophy of the nineteenth century, but there was a strong interest not only in existentialism including Heidegger but also in Marxism

Korea: The Korean Response to Kierkegaard

133

and socialism. In Kim Hyeong-seok’s case, the study of Kierkegaard was carried out as part of an interest in individual existence and the inner world of human beings and as background for understanding Nietzsche and Heidegger. Kim Hyeong-seok was immersed in the works of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and Dostoyevsky, and started to read through the major works of the great philosophers ranging from Plato to the modern philosophers. His concern, however, always revolved around Kierkegaard. Kim Hyeong-seok, a Christian from his mother’s womb, felt strongly the necessity of making a link between Christian belief and Christian life on philosophical grounds. This is why he became an ardent admirer of Kierkegaard’s thought. Of course, Kierkegaard’s understanding of Christianity and his interpretation of the Bible inevitably led to an ambivalent relationship with the established institution of the church. It was at this point that Kim considered Kierkegaard’s thought to be crucial in comprehending the conflicts between the Christian ideal and the actual church. The course of things in the surrounding world, however, did not allow him the opportunity or the freedom to read or contemplate, and he stopped studying and returned home, after which he saw his country being liberated. In the meantime, Ahn Byeong-uk, who studied at Waseda University, had a national consciousness early on and was strongly influenced by Ahn Chang-ho and Lee Gwang-su (1882–1950). He was fascinated by Kierkegaard, as he came into contact with the problem of subjectivity in existentialism, which was concerned with the subject of action not with the subject of knowledge. Kierkegaard’s questions in Gilleleje were the same as Ahn Byeong-uk’s: What am I? How do I have to live? What is the truth for which I can live and die? Is it meaningful to die in this war? Ahn Byeong-uk was also avid for knowledge: he was not only enthusiastic about reading Kierkegaard’s writings but steeped himself in the works of Nietzsche, Gandhi, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, and John Dewey. This greatly contributed to making his name known as a professor, writer, and lecturer in the future. In 1943, Ahn graduated from college and then returned home. Ahn Byeong-mu, who, carried by his mother on her back, went to Kando (the north region of the Tumen River, at the time a refuge for Koreans) from his hometown, did not have the opportunity for a proper education. He went to Japan without any preparation and obtained admission to a three-year course of studies at a little-known college, where he was absorbed in reading. He was attracted to Kierkegaard and Dostoyevsky; he read Barth’s writings but was not strongly influenced by them. In his life, he was aware of the impact of appearance, academic background, major, job, family, hometown, and nation upon the individual’s self-consciousness and character formation. He also experienced others’ judgment of him by these standards and its effect on his own self-consciousness and the resulting loss of self-esteem. It was Kierkegaard who made him free from the “eyes of others.” Ahn became highly interested in Kierkegaard’s concept of the single individual before God and in his idea “The crowd is untruth.” He was fascinated by Kierkegaard, more than anything else, since he had a negative view of the external world. In 1941 when the Pacific War broke out, he finished only the preparatory course but returned home in order to avoid being enlisted as a student soldier. During this period he was in hiding, working as a teacher of the Korean religious pioneers who were at the time on the

134

Pyo Jae-myeong

border between Russia and Manchuria. And when he returned to Kando where his mother lived, he saw Korea’s independence. Rim Chun-gap (b. 1926), who had been raised in Pyongyang, came into contact with Kierkegaard when he was around twenty years old. At that time he had been expecting to receive soon a conscription order, but, as a young man craving for intellectual things, he had already read every volume of a collection of works of world literature (that of Shinchosha, a Japanese publishing house) and was moving from literature to philosophy and the history of Western Europe. He later said that he could not forget the thumping of his heart when he found The Sickness unto Death in a bookstore. He felt a shock as if he had met his first love. The book marked a turning point in his life. He was living in uncertainty at that time: once conscripted, he would be confronted with death. And, although he had been brought up in a devout Christian family, he felt in himself a certain doubt about religion, about Christianity in particular. Looking through the table of contents of the book, he felt that it would cast a light on his life. After reading the work, however, his expectations were completely shattered, because he could not comprehend the book at all. This was Rim’s first contact with Kierkegaard’s writings, and, from that time, he began his lifelong struggle with The Sickness unto Death. II. The Period from the Independence of 1945 to the Korean War and After A. The Period from the Independence of 1945 to the Korean War On August 15, 1945, “the independence came like a thief.” Suffering and sadness in the Japanese colonial period were changed into joy, and Koreans were ecstatic at their sudden freedom. The nation, however, was divided into the north and the south, and was witness to fierce ideological conflicts. Independence brought freedom, but intellectuals found it difficult to come into contact with foreign affairs and cultural trends in the post-war chaos and the political turbulence surrounding the founding of the country (the purchase of foreign books had been stopped since 1943). In the midst of this atmosphere, American pragmatism started to spread rapidly, and Christianity recovered its dynamic after years of oppression. The introduction of Sartre’s and Camus’ existential literature attracted the interest of intellectuals. In 1947, the former Keijō Imperial University was renamed Keijō University and later became Seoul National University. Kim Cheol-son and Ahn Byeong-mu, who returned home from Japan, continued studying at this newly founded Seoul National University. In 1948, Kim Cheolson graduated with a B.A. thesis entitled Søren Kierkegaard’s Understanding of Christianity, which is presumably the first thesis on Kierkegaard written in Korean.18 Afterwards he studied Methodist theology and went to Switzerland in order to do further research on Calvin and John Wesley. He kept Kierkegaard in his heart so passionately that he placed flowers on Kierkegaard’s grave in Copenhagen on his 金喆孫 [Kim Cheol-son], 죄렌 키엘케골의 기독교 이해 [Søren Kierkegaard’s Understanding of Christianity], B.A. Thesis, Seoul 1948.

18

Korea: The Korean Response to Kierkegaard

135

way home after he had finished his studies. Kim Cheol-son talked about Kierkegaard at every opportunity and endeavored to make his thought better known, writing about him in several magazines including Sasanggae [The World of Thought] and daily newspapers. Ahn Byeong-mu majored in sociology, since he had a desire to make a new Christian community which was different from the actual churches. He graduated from the university in 1950, dreaming that he would create a new Christian community based on the New Testament. Rim Chun-gap finished a preparatory course in 1946 and majored in philosophy, while he was struggling with The Sickness unto Death. In 1948, the literary magazine Sincheonji [The New World], introduced Sartre, Camus, and Malraux in a “special issue on existentialism” (vol. 3, no. 9). In 1950, the scholars of French literature, Kim Bung-gu (1922–91) and Jeong Myeong-hwan (b. 1929), discussed Sartre and Camus, but did not mention Kierkegaard. In 1949, professors Park Jong-hong and Go Hyeong-gon (1906–2004) introduced Kierkegaard as a precursor of existentialism, each in a “modern philosophy” course focused on Jaspers’ Reason and Existence and in an “existential philosophy” course focused on Heidegger’s Being and Time. In 1949, Kim Jae-jun introduced Kierkegaard, together with Barth and Brunner, as leading figures in a new orthodox theological movement, when he gave a public lecture entitled “The Change in the Trend of Theological Thought before and after the Great War” in the first Presbyterian national convention for youth held in the Seoul Citizens’ Hall. This was perhaps the first time that Kierkegaard was mentioned in public in a religious circle. Kim Jae-jun introduced Kierkegaard as follows: The Danish theologian Kierkegaard was the greatest of modern thinkers, the greatest in aesthetics, ethics, philosophy, theology, etc. He was a predecessor of K. Barth. Opposed to Hegel’s thought on reason, he declared the bankruptcy of reason in religion. He asserted that there is “an absolute difference in quality between God and man, eternity and time, and the supernatural and nature,” which should not be seen as a monistic continuity as argued by liberalists or Thomists. To be a Christian means neither holding a belief in a certain theological system nor keeping in mind an ethical lesson. He argued that one can be a Christian only through the “contemporaneity with” Christ and a personal relationship with him.19

In general, it can be said that in the realm of ideas in Korea there was no full-scale discussion or research on existentialism or existential philosophy, not to mention on Kierkegaard. The Korean War, which broke out in June 1950, with one stroke deprived Koreans and Korean society of everything. B. From the Post-War Era to the End of the 1950s Pusan, the provisional capital located in the southern part of Korea, was full of an atmosphere of despair mixed with worry, anxiety, fear, and solitude. For Koreans existentialism was now an experience of daily life itself, not a good theory from Europe. At the battlefront, with death at hand, young people, who had already seen 金在俊 [Kim Jae-jun], 金在俊全集 [Kim Jae-jun’s Collected Works], vols. 1–17, Seoul: Hangook Theological College 1992, vol. 1, pp. 377–9.

19

136

Pyo Jae-myeong

“the end of end” or “the pit of despair,” gathered in the classrooms of a temporary settlement for college education, which was built like a refugee camp at the foot of Gudeok Mountain with coffee shops nearby. There they discussed Sartre and Camus, read Jaspers and Heidegger, recited the poems of Rilke, Eliot, and Baudelaire and talked about criticisms of their poems. There were lectures on Being and Nothingness as well as on Sartre’s literary works in the classrooms of the university. Hence, “existence” and “existentialism” became terms referring to the works of Sartre. There were several attempts to read Kierkegaard, but it was only as an introduction to a discussion of Sartre or Heidegger; there were only a few Christians who tried to read Kierkegaard himself. In this situation, there was Go Seok-gyu (1932–58), a young man interested in literature, who admired Kierkegaard. He was born in Hamheung, went south by himself when he was a secondary school student, and lived in Pusan. When the Korean War broke out, he volunteered for military service. After he retired from military service, having been wounded, he majored in Korean Literature at Pusan University and then played an active part in literary circles as a poet as well as a critic. He accepted Kierkegaard’s point of view that our limited situation of existence is in itself paradoxical. If Kierkegaard tried to overcome this paradoxical situation through thinking and religion, Go Seok-gyu tried to solve the same problem through versification and literary criticism. For him, the writer’s existence as a person could be identified with literary paradox, and thus the evaluation of the writer depends on how closely his or her problem of existence and the paradox revealed in the literary text correspond to each other. Go Seok-gyu was attentive to Kierkegaard’s concept of irony as infinite negativity as well as his view that a human being, as a sprit or a self, is a relation which relates itself to itself. He also accepted Kierkegaard’s theory of stages of life as that of the existential self-realizing movement of the human being, and took this as the starting point of his literary criticism. Although he died very young, at the age of twenty-seven, his excellent essays such as “Anxiety and Existentialism,” “A Spiritual Sketch of Yun Dong-ju,” and “A Paradox of the Poet,” show that he left a great mark on post-war literary history as an existential literary critic. Along with the return of the government to Seoul in 1953, Korean society recovered its peaceful everyday life. Since colleges also returned from their places of refuge, the academic community came to life again. The Korean Organization of Philosophy, an academic organization of college professors, was founded, and Sasanggae, a general magazine, came out and played an important role as a forum for intellectual discussion. The availability of foreign books, with the exception of Japanese and Marxist books, allowed professors and students to encounter the recent ideas and studies of Europe, and to burn with the desire for learning, despite post-war poverty and difficulties. Above all, there were, beneath the desire for learning, serious questions of what one had to do, and of how one should live. While existentialism, which had spread like a fever in the place of refuge, still remained influential among intellectuals, various kinds of academic books about English and American pragmatism, utilitarianism, logical positivism, philosophy of science, and aesthetics stimulated academic discourses in every part of society as well as in the academic community. From this point in time, full-scale academic theses started to be published, and some introductions and academic papers about Kierkegaard appeared.

Korea: The Korean Response to Kierkegaard

137

Jo Yo-han (1926–2000) graduated in philosophy from Seoul National University in 1953 with his B.A. thesis entitled Søren Kierkegaard’s Concept of Existence,20 and the next year Lee Gyo-sang (b. 1931) graduated in philosophy from the same university with his thesis entitled A Study on Kierkegaard—The Delight of Aesthetic Life and the Beatitude of Religious Life.21 The B.A. thesis of the latter, appeared in the newspaper of the university and attracted public attention from both outside and inside the university. Rim Chun-gap’s Kierkegaard’s Idea of Sin,22 Pyo Jaemyeong’s (b. 1933) Kierkegaard’s Concept of Paradox,23 and Kang Hak-cheol’s (b. 1934) Kierkegaard’s Theory of Pathos24 were submitted to the same university. When primary introductions and investigations of Kierkegaard started around 1954, Sasanggae, and Christian Thought, which was published as a monthly magazine by the Korean Christian Association, made great contributions to making him better known. Starting with Lee Gyo-sang’s “A Phase of Modern Philosophy and Literature—Immorality and Faith,” Sasanggae published several essays on Kierkegaard. Several translated books such as Hugh Ross Mackintosh’s Types of Modern Theology,25 Howard Albert Johnson’s Kierkegaard’s Existential Philosophy,26 Walter Lowrie’s A Short Life of Kierkegaard27 and Karl Löwith’s Wissen, Glaube und Skepsis28 were important as introductory texts for ordinary readers. Here we need to mention Park Jong-hong again. Park, who had experienced the horrible Korean War, published in 1954 An Introduction to Philosophy,29 which can be seen as the culmination of his thoughts on philosophy. In this book, quoting Jaspers’ statement that “insincere philosophy leads us to escape from reality, but real philosophy leads us to reality,” he argues that philosophy means understanding reality. For Park, the process of grasping reality is in itself philosophy. Philosophy, understood in this way, was going to develop as a thought of construction and creation, and would 20 조요한 [Jo Yo-han], 죄렌 키엘케골의 실존 개념 [Søren Kierkegaard’s Concept of Existence], B.A. Thesis, Seoul 1953. 21 이교상 [Lee Gyo-sang], 키엘케골 연구—미적 생활의 환희와 신앙생활의 정복 [A Study on Kierkegaard—The Delight of Aesthetic Life and the Beatitude of Religious Life], B.A. Thesis, Seoul 1931. 22 임춘갑 [Rim Chun-gap], 키엘케골의 죄관 [Kierkegaard’s Idea of Sin], B.A. Thesis, Seoul 1957. 23 표재명 [Pyo Jae-myeong], 키에르케고아의 역설의 개념 [Kierkegaard’s Concept of Paradox], B.A. Thesis, Seoul 1958. 24 강학철 [Kang Hak-cheol], 케아케고아의 파토스론 [Kierkegaard’s Theory of Pathos], B.A. Thesis, Seoul 1959. 25 Hugh Ross Mackintosh, 현대 신학의 제형 [Types of Modern Theology (New York: Scribner 1937)], trans. by Kim Jae-jun, Seoul: Ministry of Education 1956. 26 Howard Albert Johnson, 키에르케고르의 실존철학 [Kierkegaard’s Existential Philosophy], from Japanese trans. by Rim Chun-gap, Seoul: Hyeongseol Munhwasa 1958. 27 Walter Lowrie, 키에르케고르의 생애와 사상 [A Short Life of Kierkegaard (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1942)], trans. by Rim Chun-gap, Seoul: Pyeonghwa Chulpansa 1959. 28 Karl Löwith, 지식·신앙·회의 [Wissen, Glaube und Skepsis (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1956)], trans. by Rim Chun-gap, Seoul: Pyeonghwa Chulpansa 1961. 29 朴鍾鴻 [Park Jong-hong], 철학개설 [An Introduction to Philosophy], Seoul 1954.

138

Pyo Jae-myeong

contribute to the reconstruction of the country, which had fallen into extreme distress after the Japanese occupation, the division of the peninsula, and the war. Alluding to Jung’s distinction between Introversionstypus and Extraversionstypus as psychological types of human beings, Park Jong-hong distinguished two types of philosophical thought: the introverted grasp of reality and the extroverted grasp of reality. The introverted grasp of reality is characterized by the fact that the thinker turns his or her vital energy inward and is inclined to find absolute values within himself or herself. He or she thinks that the world outside has nothing to do with himself or herself, and in some extreme cases, even shows a certain hostility to it. By contrast, a thinker on the side of the extroverted grasp of reality turns his or her vital energy toward the external world, attaches value to it without scruples: for him or her everything that has significance must occur in it. He or she believes that a thought without relation with the objective world is nothing more than a fantasy. Park provides us with examples of the introverted grasp of reality, such as ethics in the later period of the ancient Greece, German mysticism in the early modern period, and German and French existentialism in the twentieth century. Examples of the extroverted grasp of reality are the ideas of the Greek Sophists, the ideas of the Renaissance in the early modern period, pragmatism and dialectical materialism since the nineteenth century. According to Park, the introverted grasp of reality becomes dominant when a country declines and society becomes insecure, whereas the extroverted grasp of reality appears when a country flourishes and society is in a time of peace. Park Jong-hong divides existential thought, as a modern type of the introverted grasp of reality, into two categories: theistic existentialism and atheistic existentialism. Park thinks that philosophers like Kierkegaard, Jaspers, and Marcel belong to the first category, and he describes Kierkegaard as “a solitary existence.” On the basis of Kierkegaard’s idea of “subjectivity = truth,” Park portrays the desperate situation of the single individual who, before God, is forced to choose either perdition or salvation. He tries to show how this existence, by virtue of the qualitative dialectic, comes to renounce its immediate self and choose its eternal self, that is, accept the paradox of the God-man, and through this qualitative leap free itself from despair and reach salvation. He argues that the Kierkegaardian existence, as the single individual standing alone before God, is through God connected to the history of every other individual, and that in this sense it opens a new history of mankind. He states that this viewpoint gives a clue about how our solitary and introverted existence is related to the external world. We can see Park’s consistent effort to define the relationship between the introverted existence and the outside world in his posthumous work Dialectical Logic, published in 1977.30 The sixth chapter entitled “Modern Philosophy and Dialectic,” which bears the subtitle “Kierkegaard: Qualitative Dialectic,” is particularly important according to his point of view. This work, unfortunately, remains in the form of a short memorandum and was never finished due to the author’s chronic disease and the pressure of the work, which dominated his last few years. Nevertheless, it reveals the limitation of the conventional understanding of Kierkegaard through Heidegger. The 朴鍾鴻 [Park Jong-hong], 辨證法的論理 [Dialectical Logic], Seoul: Pagyeongsa 1977, see pp. 249–56.

30

Korea: The Korean Response to Kierkegaard

139

work does not have any substantial argumentative development except for the fact that it mentions that the paradoxical confrontation of dialectic, deeply rooted in the inner life of existence, opens up for a new method of the qualitative dialectic, which lays the foundation for the existential dialectic and, later, for dialectical theology. Park’s understanding of Kierkegaard since the 1930s leads to his evaluation that although this existential dialectic, which is the logic of the stimulating awakening of a sincere mind and spirit, has some introverted characteristic originating from the existence of the solitary individual, it does not reach either the logic of a specific act or the logic of construction and creation. Consequently, Park saw neither Kierkegaard’s deep concern for politics and social issues as revealed in his journals and later works nor his longing for a new community based on the practice of Christian love of neighbors. We can note here that there existed some limitations in the study and understanding of Kierkegaard at that time resulting from the tendency to regard him as a precursor of existentialism. Kim Hyeong-seok, a professor of Yonsei University, published a translation of The Sickness unto Death in 1956.31 This was a very significant event in the study of Kierkegaard in Korea, along with Ahn Byeong-uk’s enlightening work, Kierkegaard’s Thought,32 since it was the first translation of Kierkegaard into Korean. Absorbed in reading and studying Kierkegaard, Kim Hyeong-seok worked as a high school teacher after he had returned from Japan. Later, he became more preoccupied with his study of Kierkegaard after he became a professor of Yonsei University. His concern with Kierkegaard was not oriented to existential theology, as in Barth’s texts, but to existential humanism. Instead of being interested in passively receiving Kierkegaard’s thought, he also wanted to have some positive and productive influence on the self-reflection of the Koreans of the day. At that time, Korean scholars were highly interested in the study of Heidegger, while a superficial understanding of existentialism was widespread among general readers as well as scholars. Despite the fact that existential philosophy was quite popular, the full-scale introduction of Kierkegaard to the Korean public had still not been accomplished. Kim Hyeong-seok, who studied philosophy as a Christian, considered it his task to study Kierkegaard’s thought and thus to lead the Korean public, particularly Christians, to it. At that time, Kim, who led a Bible reading circle in a church called Saemunan located in Gwanghwamun, attracted controversial public attention by discussing not only the Bible but also Pascal’s thought, and by giving some lectures on Kierkegaard’s The Sickness unto Death. At the time when Koreans were still not fully recovered from the wounds of the war, his lectures provided many people with some consolation and courage to live a new life. He continued his efforts to study and spread Kierkegaard’s thought and finally became a forerunner in the study of Kierkegaard through his lectures and writings such as “A Practical Structure of Time,” “The Dialectic of Despair,” “The Birth of Modern Philosophy and the

죽음에 이르는 병 [The Sickness unto Death], from German trans. by 金亨錫 [Kim Hyeong-seok], Seoul: Kyeongjisa 1956. 32 安秉煜 [Ahn Byeong-uk], 키엘케골 사상 [Kierkegaard’s Thought], Seoul: Sasanggesa 1957. 31

140

Pyo Jae-myeong

Question of Subjectivity,” “An Eschatological Structure of Time,” and books like Philosophy of Modern People and A World View for Modern People. Ahn Byeong-uk, who became a professor of Soongsil University, contributed his essay “The Genealogy of Existentialism—Kierkegaard. A Theistic Existentialist” to Sasanggae in 1955 and published in 1957 the aforementioned Kierkegaard’s Thought, the first academic work on Kierkegaard written in Korean. This book became a phenomenal success and made its author a celebrity in philosophy. How many young men, who read this book, came to recognize a new sense of life and enter the road of philosophy! Ahn Byeong-uk made consistent efforts to introduce Kierkegaard, a subjective thinker who led an authentic life and was preoccupied with self-reflection and self-examination, to the Korean public through numerous writings, lectures, and teachings. C. From the End of the 1950s to the 1980s Another translation of The Sickness unto Death by Rim Chun-gap appeared in May 1957.33 Whereas Kim Hyeong-seok’s translation of the same book, published in the previous year, was based on Schrempf’s German text, Rim Chun-gap’s translation was based on Emmanuel Hirsch’s German text, newly translated after the Second World War, and Walter Lowrie’s English text. Rim translated The Sickness unto Death fourteen years after he had encountered this book for the first time. The main reason for this is that he could not find a publisher to publish the book. He had to publish it with his own money, but something unexpected happened. Whether it was because it has a good title or because the circumstances under the dictatorship of the Liberal Party depressed people and brought about much anxiety and depression, the book was a phenomenal hit with respect to sales and was frequently reprinted afterwards. Rim Chun-gap regarded the success of the book as the result of God’s Providence and decided to keep translating every work of Kierkegaard into Korean as long as he could. From this moment to 1982, he published for 25 years, sometimes with his own money and sometimes through publishers, Kierkegaard’s fourteen major works from Either/Or to The Moment. We cannot appreciate enough the achievement that Rim Chun-gap, as a translator of Kierkegaard, has brought about for ordinary readers and Kierkegaard scholars. When we read his translated books, we cannot but feel his love and passion for Kierkegaard, notwithstanding some errors in translation and lapses coming from the changes of language. In the 1960s, after the May 16 Military Coup d’Etat in 1961, Korea entered an industrial age. Economic progress—which later was called “the Miracle of the Han River”—was remarkable. However, while the economic boom continued, human rights and freedom were seriously restricted. Nevertheless most people did not care much about it since they were preoccupied with the new economic prosperity. Fortified by the success of the Saemaul [New Community] Movement and that of the First Economic Development Policy, the government and industrialists became busier than before, and the whole of society rapidly became seized by a “fetishism” 죽음에 이르는 병 [The Sickness unto Death], from German trans. by 林春甲 [Rim Chun-gap], Seoul: Changrimsa 1957.

33

Korea: The Korean Response to Kierkegaard

141

that placed the economy above all else. This “fetishism” penetrated everywhere in society, and not even churches were free from it. In cities, churches were growing larger and larger as they absorbed the urban population which, with industrialization, was ever increasing. They became “churches of worldly happiness,” which made the adherents believe that their worldly successes meant God’s blessing. It was not long before small churches in the rural area followed the same path. In the 1960s and the 1970s, the Korean army participated in the Vietnam War, and some Korean companies worked for large construction projects in the Middle East. The economy continued to grow at a high speed, and Korea became one of the so-called “four dragons” of Asia. In the meantime an increasing number of people had a strong desire to satisfy their spiritual and cultural needs. As one of the consequences of this, many books were published. There was a boom of collected works of philosophy, literature, and general education. And one could find the name Kierkegaard in almost all of them—although many of the translations of Kierkegaard’s works they contained were done by non-specialists and hardly reliable. During this time Byeon Seon-hwan (1927–95),34 Pyo Jae-myeong, Kang Hakcheol, Hwang Pil-ho (b. 1937), Hong Sun-myeong (b. 1937), and Chae Gyu-cheol (1937–2006) appeared. These scholars, who encountered Kierkegaard for the first time in the 1950s, either came from the northern part of Korea or had the common experience of having volunteered for the Korean War. They also had the same religious background as Christians; although they all read Kierkegaard for the purpose of establishing their own identity and faith, they also sought to call upon the Korean people, who they thought were mainly concerned about material prosperity, to turn inward or to recover their true selves. Kang Hak-cheol and Pyo Jae-myeong pursued existential humanism. Hong Sun-myeong and Chae Gyu-cheol were attracted to Kierkegaard’s spiritual purity. Although Hong was a leader of the Korean Quakers (the non-church movement), it is quite surprising that unlike Japanese Quakers, who discovered Kierkegaard quite early, he only found his way to Kierkegaard in the 1960s. Chae Gyu-cheol studied in Denmark at the end of the 1960s. He found the starting point of Kierkegaard’s life and thought in Sædding, acquired the third edition of Samlede Værker, and thus became the first Korean to read Kierkegaard in Danish. In 1979, Pyo Jae-myeong, after studying in the Søren Kierkegaard Library at Copenhagen University from 1978 to 1979, brought the second edition of the Samlede Værker to Korea for the first time. By paying attention to Kierkegaard’s concern with politics and society, Pyo opened up the possibility of approaching Kierkegaard from a socio-philosophical point of view. Most of the major Korean translations of Kierkegaard’s works that we can find now are the works of Rim Chun-gap, Kang Hak-cheol, and Pyo Jae-myeong. By this time the name Kierkegaard, along with his idea: “subjectivity = truth” and his theory of three stages of life, appeared in the secondary school textbook of ethics as well as in almost every introduction to philosophy. And naturally his name was also mentioned frequently in sermons. The remarkable economic achievement and industrialization had, however, a dark side. Disadvantaged people, who were numerous, were living a difficult Byeon Seon-hwan, The Possibilities of Correlation of S. Kierkegaard and Barth based on Der Romerbrief, M.D. Dissertation, Drew University Madison, New Jersey 1967.

34

142

Pyo Jae-myeong

life, and among them urban laborers in particular worked and lived in the worst conditions. In October 1970, a shocking incident happened: a young man named Jeon Tae-il (1948–70), burned himself to death. Following Jeon, many students and laborers sacrificed themselves. With regard to their deaths, it would be more correct to say murder than to say suicide. Afterwards, Park Jong-cheol (1964–87) and Lee Han-yeol (1966–87) died. Ahn Byeong-mu, who had studied for ten years in the Department of Theology at Heidelberg in search of the “historical Christ” and who, upon returning home after his study, had said, “I come back with nothing,” saw, in these deaths of students and laborers, their funerals, and torrents of people who cried for democracy, the crucifixion and the resurrection of Christ. He thus found an answer to his lifelong question. Ahn was himself one of those who were persecuted by the military government, and in his sufferings he encountered “the people” who suffered. He eventually got out of the European frame of theology, read the Bible again in an independent way, and met a Christ he had never seen before. In his youth Ahn, influenced by Kierkegaard’s idea “the crowd is untruth” and also by the theory of the masses in sociology, had had a negative view of the masses. But he now distinguished between “the masses as untruth” and “the people as a group in suffering (Minjung).” He regarded the suffering of the people as a collective suffering, not as an individual one. He thought that a person who takes part in the collective suffering is not simply one who suffers individually but one who suffers in the place of the people. He thought that everyone who suffered under the dictatorship of the military government was “the people,” and was pained to see the sufferings they endured. He asked himself whether this suffering of the people was not precisely “Han” (한, 恨), an emotion which is said to characterize Korean people. And he found an answer to this question in the Gospel of Mark of the New Testament.35 In the New Testament there are two words which can be translated into “people” in today’s English: ὄχλος and λαός. Whereas the word λαός designates a group of human beings who have and exercise their rights within their circle, the word ὄχλος designates those who have no rights to be protected by their group, those who do not or cannot form a group of such nature that can give them a number of rights. Mark called those who followed Christ, ὄχλος. They were co-workers of Christ and his followers (Nachfolge). They were also imitators of Christ (imitatio Christi) and witnesses of him (martyrs). For Ahn, the single individual of Kierkegaard was none other than the people in suffering, and to stand alone as the single individual before God meant to come into contact with Christ, who he believed was always with the people in suffering. Thus he thought that the church on earth should be reformed and become a “community of life” of the people as well as a “community of equality” of all subjects of God, where the sacred mission (missio Dei) is carried out. His thought, which developed later into Minjung Theology [People’s Theology] through Seo Nam-dong (1918–84), Kim Yong-bok (b. 1938), and Seo Gwang-seon (b. 1931), contributed considerably to movements for human rights and democracy in Korea in the 1970s and awakened the established churches, which indulged in their privileges.

安炳茂 [Ahn Byeong-mu], 安炳茂全集 [Ahn Byeong-mus’ Collected Works], Seoul: Hanguk Theology Institute 1996, vol. 2, pp. 175–7; pp. 254–5; p. 199; pp. 206–12.

35

Korea: The Korean Response to Kierkegaard

143

D. From the 1980s to the 1990s and Beyond The struggle for democracy in Korea became fierce in the 1980s, and the movement for the unification of the two political powers on the Korean peninsula also became intense. The economy continued to grow, and Korean society began to show some characteristics of late industrial society. A growing number of the population sought a high quality of life and leisure time. People had a tendency to spend what they earned and enjoy life, and also to avoid hard work. Widespread use of color televisions and cars contributed to the appearance of the new way of life. People did not read serious books any more. Not even students read them, and so it even happened occasionally that a student confused Kierkegaard with Cicero. Even student political activists who were interested in social issues like democratization and unification, did not read the classics about Marxism and other philosophies. What they read was brochures, which seemed to be useful for democratization and unification, or guidebooks, the codes of conduct related to the strategies and tactics for the social movement, or “the Juche idea of North Korea” (i.e., the idea of self-direction, self-reliance, independence). In May 1977, the time when the aforementioned sterility of inwardness was taking place, people who were interested in the thought of Kierkegaard created the “Korean Kierkegaard Association” in order to learn more about his thought and introduce him to other people. The main activities of the Association consisted in monthly open classes, public lectures, given in many parts of the country including Seoul, and special seminars held for three days in summer and winter. The members of the Association were active, and the gatherings always ended successfully. But in the 1980s when the social and cultural conditions changed suddenly, the activities of the Association began to be hampered. People rapidly forgot Kierkegaard. Nevertheless, scholars who studied Kierkegaard abroad began to return, and socalled “Kierkegaard specialists” made an appearance in the country. Kim Madeleine was the first, with her thesis entitled Der Einzelne und das Allgemeine from Vienna University in 1980.36 The second person was Sa Mi-ja (b. 1941), with a thesis entitled A Kierkegaardian Perspective on Suffering from Drew University in 1983.37 The third was Kim Ha-ja (b. 1943), with a thesis entitled A Study on Kierkegaard’s Theory of Education from Korea University in 1984.38 The fourth was Jeon Jae-gyeong, with a thesis entitled The Relation to Education of Guilt and Conscience in the Philosophy of S. Kierkegaard and M. Heidegger from Columbia University in 1985.39 The fifth was Pyo Jae-myeong, with a thesis entitled Kierkegaard’s Concept of the Single Individual from Korea University in 1986. Then came Go Gwang-pil (b. 1947: The Grammar of the Self, Drew University 1990), Lee Seung-gu (b. 1959: The Relationship between Kim Madeleine, Der Einzelne und das Allgemeine, Vienna and Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag 1980. 37 Sa Mi-ja, Kierkegaardian Perspective on Suffering, Ph.D. Thesis, Drew University, Madison, New Jersey 1983. 38 김하자 [Kim Ha-ja], 키에르케고르와 교육 [A Study on Kierkegaard’s Theory of Education], Seoul: Sungshin Women’s University Press 2004. 39 Jeon Jae-gyeong, The Relation to Education of Guilt and Conscience in the Philosophy of S. Kierkegaard and M. Heidegger, Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University, New York 1985. 36

144

Pyo Jae-myeong

the Ethical Sphere and Christianity in the Thought of S. Kierkegaard, University of St. Andrews 1990), Rim Gyu-jeong (b. 1957: Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of the Self, Korea University 1991), Kim Yong-il (b. 1957: Existentielle Bewegung und existentielles Verstehen bei Sören Kierkegaard, University of Tübingen 1991), Rim Byeong-deok (b. 1959: Kierkegaard’s Indirect Communication, Seoul National University 1992), Song Eun-jae (b. 1961: A Study on Kierkegaard’s Paradox, Korea University 1997), Lee Yongseok (b. 1956: Existenzdialektik als Wissenschaft des Selbstverstehens bei Kierkegaard, Keimyung University 1999), Lee Min-ho (b. 1962: Socrate dans l’œuvre de Kierkegaard. L’examen de la conception kierkegaardienne de Socrate dans la thèse universitaire et l’œuvre pseudonyme de Kierkegaard, University of Paris-I 2001), and Choe Seung-il (b. 1964: A Study on the Religiousness of Kierkegaard, Korea University 2003). Around this time, although ordinary people did not pay attention to Kierkegaard any more, it seems that these academic products were the results of sincere dialogues and confrontations with Kierkegaard by individuals who were deeply concerned with the destiny of the age and human existence. In May 1992, the “Korean Kierkegaard Association” was born again with the name of “Korea Kierkegaard Academy.” The Academy changed the membership from its previous focus on general readers to a new focus on university graduates and the equivalent. They also changed their activities, giving primacy to academic studies and presentations. At the present time, they have academic meetings eight times a year and issue an academic journal annually. Among the noteworthy activities of the Academy is the International Kierkegaard Conference coorganized by the Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre in Japan, which has been held twice so far. The first conference was held at the Kwansei Gakuin University in Japan, November 27–28, 2000,40 the second at the Korea University in Korea, November 14–15, 2003.41 The current president is Dr. Lee Seung-gu (theology). The previous presidents were: Pyo Jae-myeong (philosophy), Kang Hak-cheol (philosophy), Lee Il-su (b. 1934: philosophy), Kim Ha-ja (philosophy of education), Sa Mi-ja (psychology of religion), Lee Sang-hun (b. 1954: theology) and Hwang Pil-ho (philosophy of religion). Human beings in the twenty-first century are becoming outwardly oriented and non-spiritual to such a degree that Kierkegaard’s contemporaries could not be compared to them. The progress of the sciences and new technologies, particularly, that of life science and information science technology, accelerates this current. People get lost in the “infinity of the finites” and lose themselves in virtual reality. I think it is, now more than ever before, time for us to read Kierkegaard and to learn from him about how to live hic et nunc.

40 41

At this conference there were 7 Korean and 26 Japanese participating scholars. At this conference there were 12 Japanese and 20 Korean participating scholars.

Bibliography I. Korean Translations of Kierkegaard’s Works 죽음에 이르는 병 [The Sickness unto Death], from German trans. by Kim Hyeongseok, Seoul: Gyeongjisa 1956. 죽음에 이르는 병 [The Sickness unto Death], from German trans. by Rim Chungap, Seoul: Changrimsa 1957. 유혹자의 일기 [“The Seducer’s Diary”], from English trans. by Rim Chun-gap, Seoul: Changrimsa 1960. 이것이냐/저것이냐 [Either/Or (partial translation)], from English trans. by Kim Yeong-cheol, Seoul: Hwimun Chulpansa 1962. 죽음에 이르는 병 [The Sickness unto Death], trans. by Kin Hyeon-seong, Hapdong Chulpansa 1962. 인생행로의 제단계 [Stages on Life’s Way], trans. by Lee Eun-yeong, Cheongsan Munhwasa 1962. 아름다운 고독 [Repetition], from German trans. by Song Yeong-taek, Seoul: Sinjo Munhwasa 1966. 두려움과 떨림 [Fear and Trembling], from German trans. by Kang Hak-cheol, Seoul: Hwimun Chulpansa 1966 (2nd revised ed., Seoul: Joyang Munhwasa 1973). 죽음에 이르는 병 [The Sickness unto Death], trans. by Cheong Byeong-soo, Seoul: Cheongsan Munwhasa 1968. 불안의 개념 [The Concept of Anxiety], trans. by Shim Jae-eon, Cheongsan Munwhasa 1968. 불안의 개념; 죽음에 이르는 병 [The Concept of Anxiety; The Sickness unto Death], from English trans. by Kim Byeong-ok, Seoul: Daeyang Chulpansa 1970. 이것이냐/저것이냐 [Either/Or], trans. by Rim Chan-gyou, Wangmunsa 1972. 불안의 개념; 죽음에 이르는 병 [The Concept of Anxiety; The Sickness unto Death], from German trans. by Park Hwan-deok, Seoul: Hwimun Chulpansa 1972. 공포와 전율; 반복 [Fear and Trembling; Repetition], from English trans. by Rim Chun-gap, Seoul: Pyeonghwa Chulpansa 1973. 철학적 단편 [Philosophical Fragments], from German trans. by Pyo Jae-myeong, Seoul: Pyeonghwa Chulpansa 1973. 죽음에 이르는 병; 불안의 개념; 이것이냐/저것이냐 [The Sickness unto Death; The Concept of Anxiety; Either/Or], trans. by Kim Yun-bo, Cheongsan Munwhasa 1973. 죽음에 이르는 병 [The Sickness unto Death], trans. by Park Yeong-shik, Sejong Chulpangongsa 1973. 불안의 개념 [The Concept of Anxiety], from English trans. by Rim Chun-gap, Seoul: Pyeonghwa Chulpansa 1974.

146

Pyo Jae-myeong

공포와 전율; 철학적 단편; 반복; 죽음에 이르는 병 [Fear and Trembling; Philosophical Fragments; Repetition; The Sickness unto Death], from German trans. by Son Jae-jun, Seoul: Samseong Chulpansa 1975. 유혹자의 일기; 불안의 개념; 죽음에 이르는 병 [“The Seducer’s Diary”; The Concept of Anxiety; The Sickness unto Death], from German trans. by Kang Seong-wi, Seoul: Dongseo Munhwasa 1975. 죽음에 이르는 병; 불안의 개념 [The Sickness unto Death; The Concept of Anxiety], trans. by Choi Seok-cheon, Sangseogak 1975. 그리스도교의 훈련 [Practice in Christianity], from English trans. by Rim Chungap, Seoul: Pyeonghwa Chulpansa 1978 (2nd ed., 2005). 유혹자의 일기 [“The Seducer’s Diary”], trans. By Hwang Mun-soo, Munye Chulpansa 1978. 순간 [The Moment], from English trans. by Rim Chun-gap, Seoul: Jongno Seojeok 1979. 사랑의 역사 [Works of Love], vols. 1–2, from English trans. by Rim Chun-gap, Seoul: Jongno Seojeok 1979 (2nd ed., 2005). 들의 백합 / 공중의 새 [The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air, “The High Priest,” “The Tax Collector,” “The Woman Who Was a Sinner”], from German trans. by Pyo Jae-myeong, Seoul: Jongno Seojeok 1980. 관점; 현대비판 [The Point of View for My Work as an Author; A Literary Review], from English trans. by Rim Chun-gap, Seoul: Jongno Seojeok 1980. 이것이냐/저것이냐 [Extracts from Either/Or], from English trans. by Rim Chungap, vols. 1–4, Seoul: Jongno Seojeok 1982. 죽음에 이르는 병 [The Sickness unto Death], trans. by Park Byeong-deok, Yukmunsa 1985. 죽음에 이르는 병 [The Sickness unto Death], trans. by Kim Yeong-mok, Hakil Chulpansa 1986. 죽음에 이르는 병 [The Sickness unto Death], trans. by Yun Hyeon-ju, Ilshin Seojeokgongsa 1986. 죽음에 이르는 병; 불안의 개념 [The Sickness unto Death; The Concept of Anxiety], trans. by Kim Yun-seong, Keumseong Chulpansa 1987. 불안의 개념; 죽음에 이르는 병 [The Concept of Anxiety; The Sickness unto Death], trans. by Lee Myeong-seong, Hongshin Munhwasa 1988. 죽음에 이르는 병 [The Sickness unto Death], trans. by Kim Ji-weon, Samweon Chulpansa 1989. 이것이냐/저것이냐 [Either/Or], trans. by Paek Je-uk, Hyeweon Chulpansa 1990. 철학적 조각들 또는 한 조각의 철학 [Philosophical Fragments], from English trans. by Hwang Pil-ho, Seoul: Jipmundang 1998. 불안의 개념 [The Concept of Anxiety], trans. by Rim Gyu-jeong, Seoul: Hangilsa 1999. 유혹자의 일기 [“The Seducer’s Diary”], trans. by Rim Gyu-jeong and Yeon Huiwon, Seoul: Hangilsa 2001. 들의 백합화 공중의 새 [The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air—Three Devotional Discourses], trans. by Pyo Jae-myeong, Seoul: Preaching Academy 2005. 예수께서 잡히시던 밤에 [Christian Discourses, Part IV: “Discourses at the Communion on Fridays”], trans. by Pyo Jae-myeong, Seoul: Preaching Academy 2005. 적게 사함을 받은 사람은 적게 사랑한다 [Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays; An Upbuilding Discourse; Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays], trans. by Pyo Jae-myeong, Seoul: Preaching Academy 2005.

Korea: The Korean Response to Kierkegaard

147

이방인의 염려 [Christian Discourses (Part I)], trans. by Pyo Jae-myeong, Seoul: Preaching Academy 2005. 죽음에 이르는 병 [The Sickness unto Death], trans. by Kim Yong-il, Keimyung University Press 2006. II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard in Korea 안병욱 [Ahn Byeong-uk], 키엘케골 사상 [Kierkegaard’s Thought], Seoul: Sasanggaesa 1957. 강학철 [Kang Hak-cheol], 도상의 실존 [Existence on the Way], Seoul: Daehan Gidokkyo Seohoe 1977. 표재명 [Pyo Jae-myeong], 키에르케고어의 단독자 개념 [Kierkegaard’s Concept of the Single Individual], Seoul: Seogwangsa 1992. —— 키에르케고어 연구 [A Study on Kierkegaard], Seoul: Jiseong-ui Saem 1995. 황필호 [Hwang Pil-ho], 역설의 종교 [Religion of Paradox], Seoul: Jipmundang 1996. 임병덕 [Rim Byeong-deok], 키에르케고르의 간접전달 [Indirect Communication in Kierkegaard], Seoul: Gyoyukgwahaksa 1998. 이양호 [Lee Yang-ho], 초월의 행보 [Step for Transcendence], Seoul: Damronsa 1998. 강학철 [Kang Hak-cheol], 무의미로부터의 자유 [Freedom from Meaninglessness, Kierkegaard’s Paradoxical Anthropology], Seoul: Dongmyeongsa 1999. 김종두 [Kim Jong-du], 실존사상과 현대인의 자아 이해 [Existence Philosophy and Modern Man’s Self-Understanding], M.A. Thesis, Seoul 2002. 한국키에르케고어학회 [Korea Kierkegaard Academy] (ed.), 다시 읽는 키에르 케고어 [Kierkegaard, Read Again], Seoul: Cheolhakkwahyeonsilsa 2003. 김하자 [Kim Ha-ja], 키에르케고르와 교육 [A Study on Kierkegaard’s Theory of Education], Seoul: Sungshin Women’s University Press 2004. 한국키에르케고어학회 [Korea Kierkegaard Academy] (ed.), 키에르케고어에게 배운다 [Learning from Kierkegaard], Seoul: Cheolhakkwahyeonsilsa 2003. Kim Madeleine, Der Einzelne und das Allgemeine. Zur Selbstverwirklichung des Menschen bei S. Kierkegaard, Vienna, Munich: Oldenbourg 1980. Sa Mi-ja, A Kierkegaardian Perspective on Suffering, Ph.D. Thesis, Drew University, Madison, New Jersey 1983. Jeon Jae-gyeong, The Relation to Education of Guilt and Conscience in the Philosophy of S. Kierkegaard and M. Heidegger, Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University, New York 1985. Lee Seung-gu, The Relationship between the Ethical Sphere and Christianity in the Thought of S. Kierkegaard, University of St. Andrews: St. Andrews 1990. Koh Abraham Kwang, The Grammar of the Self, Ph.D. Thesis, Drew University, Madison, NJ 1990. Kim Yong-il, Existentielle Bewegung und existentielles Verstehen bei Sören Kierkegaard, Regensburg: Roderer 1992. Lee Min-ho, Socrate dans l’æuvre de Kierkegaard. L’examen de la conception Kierkegaardienne de Socrate dans la thèse universitaire et l’æuvre pseudonyme de Kierkegaard, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Paris-I, Paris 2001.

148

Pyo Jae-myeong

III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Reception in Korea None.

Japan: Varied Images through Western Waves Satoshi Nakazato

I. The History of Kierkegaard’s Reception in Japan There are two fine studies of the history of Kierkegaard’s reception in Japan. Kierkegaard Made in Japan by Finn Hauberg Mortensen is an exhaustive study of this kind and presents us with many details of this history. “The History of Kierkegaard’s Reception in Japan” by Kinya Masugata is an essay which gives us a general view of the history of the reception. I will describe the outline of the history, generally following Masugata’s essay. He asserts that the history has five periods. The first period (1906–15) starts from the dawn of Kierkegaard’s reception in Japan and ends with the work Søren Kierkegaard, written by Tetsuro Watsuji (1889– 1960). This book had a major influence upon Japanese academic life. Kierkegaard was introduced to Japanese readers during this period. The second period (1915–23) starts from the results following the publication of Søren Kierkegaard and ends with “Song of a Drunken Man, Part 1” by Kozo Mitsuchi (1898–1924). Kierkegaard became popular during the third period (1923–45). Existentialism and dialectical theology were introduced to Japanese academic circles in this third period, which ends with Japan’s defeat in the Second World War. This defeat was a critical experience not only for Japanese politics but also for the Japanese identity among ordinary people. At that time the majority of Japanese from all social classes wanted Finn Hauberg Mortensen, Kierkegaard Made in Japan, Odense: Odense University Press 1996 (Odense University Literary and Cultural Studies, vol. 5).  Kinya Masugata, “日本に於けるキェルケゴール受容史” [The History of Kierkegaard’s Reception in Japan], in キェルケゴールと日本の仏教・哲学 [Kierkegaard and Japanese Buddhism and Philosophy], ed. by Masaru Otani and Toshikazu Ooya, Osaka: Tohou-shuppan 1992, pp. 265–85. See also Kinya Masugata’s article in English, “Kierkegaard’s Reception in Japan,” 大阪教育大学紀要 [Memoirs of Osaka Kyoiku University. I, Humanities], vol. 38, no. 1 (Osaka: Osakakyouikudaigaku), 1989, pp. 49–66.  Masugata, “日本に於けるキェルケゴール受容史” [The History of Kierkegaard’s Reception in Japan], p. 266.  Tesuro Watsuji, ゼエレン＝キェルゴオル [Søren Kierkegaard], Tokyo: Uchidarokakuho 1915 (republished, Tokyo: Chikuma-shobou 1947 and as vol. 1 in 和辻哲郎 全集第１巻 [Tetsuro Watsuji’s Complete Works], Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten 1961).  Kozo Mitsuchi, “酔歌1” [Song of a Drunken Man, Part 1], 講座 [Lectures], vol. 11, 1923, pp. 143–74. 

150

Satoshi Nakazato

to gain a new identity and obtain answers from existentialism. The fourth period (1945–70) starts with the flourishing of existentialism. Existentialism spread to different spheres including politics, literature, philosophy, theology, and the arts. Existentialism became a kind of fashion for student movements in Japan until the first half of the 1970s. The fourth period ends when the situation at the universities returned to normal. The fifth period started with the decline of existentialism, in the second half of the 1970s, and has continued until today. According to Masugata, the name of Kierkegaard was already known in Japan in the second half of the 1880s. This was due to the influence of Harald Høffding’s (1843–1931) Psychology and Georg Brandes’ (1842–1927) Ibsen. At that time, the Japanese government tried to import not only the natural sciences but also the humanities from Europe in order to develop Japan into modern state. At that time Høffding was famous internationally and a German translation of his Psychology and Ethics was translated into Japanese in 1887 and 1888, though the translations were abridged. The name of Kierkegaard was first written and published in a revised translation of his Psychology in 1897.10 The names of Ibsen and Brandes were known in the first half of 1880s. Ibsen’s drama, Brand was translated in an abridged version by Gekkou Takayasu in 1901.11 A way of thinking similar to individualism and naturalism was introduced to Japanese literary circles, and Brand became a kind of symbol for it. The English translation of Brandes’ Henrik Ibsen (1899) might be the source.12 There has long been speculation that Brandes’ model is Kierkegaard. In the first period (1906–15), Ibsen, after his death, became very popular in Japanese literary circles. Japanese intellectuals tried to find Ibsen’s fundamental thought in Kierkegaard.13 An essay by Chikusui Kaneko (1870–1937), “Kierkegaard’s View of Life,”14 was mainly an introduction to reading Ibsen. Kanzo Uchimura (1861–1930) was a famous Japanese Christian and the founder of Mu-kyuoukai (Nonchurch Independent Patriotic Christian Circle). His book, entitled How I Became a Christian (1895) was translated into German (1904), Finnish (1905), Swedish  Masugata, “日本に於けるキェルケゴール受容史” [The History of Kierkegaard’s Reception in Japan], p. 266.  Harald Høffding, 心理学, a revised trans. by Shintarou Ishida, Koubundou: Koubundou 1897 [originally as Psykologi i Omrids paa Grundlag af Erfaring, Copenhagen: P.G. Philipsen 1882].  Georg Brandes, 論文タイトル不明 [Henrik Ibsen] (the text served as an introduction to Shouyou Tsubouchi, “Ibsen”), 早稲田文学 [Waseda Bungaku], vols. 4–5, 1892 (originally as “Henrik Ibsen,” Dansk Maanedsskrift, no. 2, 1867, pp. 228–55).  Originally in Danish published as Høffding, Etik: En Fremstilling af de etiske Principer og deres Anvendelse paa de vigtigste Livsforhold, Copenhagen: P.G. Philipsen 1887. 10 Høffding, 心理学, [Psykologi i Omrids paa Grundlag af Erfaring], p. 370. 11 Ibsen, イプセン作社会劇 [Ibsen’s Social Dramas], trans. by Gekkou Takayasu, 早稲 田文学 [Waseda Bungaku], vol. 2, 1901. 12 See Masugata, “日本に於けるキェルケゴール受容史” [The History of Kierkegaard’s Reception in Japan], p. 270. 13 Ibid., p. 274. 14 Chikusui Kaneko, “キヤーケゴールドの人生観” [Kierkegaard’s View of Life], 早 稲田文学 [Waseda Bungaku], vol. 3, no. 9, 1906, pp. 113–49.

Japan: Varied Images through Western Waves

151

(1905), and Danish (1906).15 He probably received information about Kierkegaard from the translators of his book: the Dane, Maria Wolff and the Swede, W. Ludin. The image of Kierkegaard’s thought as an individualistic form of Christianity was disseminated in Japan by Uchimura. In the second (1915–23) and third period (1923–45), appeared the first single edition of the study Søren Kierkegaard which was written by Tetsuro Watsuji in 1915.16 But the influence of this book was not significant initially. Two essays by Kozo Mitsuchi, entitled “Song of a Drunken Man, Parts 1 and 2,” describe Kierkegaard’s thought as passionate subjectivity.17 Kiyoshi Miki (1897–1945) studied under Heidegger in Germany. After Miki came back to Japan, he was eager to introduce Heidegger, Jaspers, Barth and Kierkegaard.18 The first edition of Kierkegaard’s Selected Works in Japanese was supervised and published by Miki in 1935.19 Many works on Kierkegaard were rapidly published. The main sources of these were the German translations of Kierkegaard’s works by Hermann Gottsched and Christoph Schrempf. Kierkegaard’s image among the Japanese people at present was in any case fixed during this third period. It is undeniable that the special atmosphere during the war corresponded to what can be regarded as existential thinking. In the fourth (1945–70) and fifth period (1970–present), many works on Kierkegaard were written and published. The main sources were the German translations of Kierkegaard’s works by Emmanuel Hirsch, the English translations by Walter Lowrie, D.F. Swenson, and Howard Hong and especially the Danish editions. Masaru Otani (b. 1911) participated in the centennial anniversary of Kierkegaard’s death in Copenhagen in 1955. Many Kierkegaard researchers, whose special subjects are philosophy and theology, for instance Hidehito Otani (b. 1924), Jun Hashimoto (b. 1935), and Kazuhiko Ozaki (b. 1936), have gone to Copenhagen to study Kierkegaard. It is remarkable that the number of articles on Kierkegaard is again increasing. The backgrounds of the authors of the works are various. New fields to show an interest in Kierkegaard include medical science, bioethics, comparative literature, comparative thought, and the history of ideas. Several Kierkegaard researchers attempt to seek connections between Japanese Buddhism and Kierkegaard’s thought. II. Japanese Kierkegaard Societies and Centers There are today two Kierkegaard societies and one Kierkegaard center in Japan: the Kierkegaard Society in Tokyo, the Kierkegaard Society in Kyoto, and the Søren Kierkegaard Research Center. See Masugata, “日本に於けるキェルケゴール受容史” [The History of Kierkegaard’s Reception in Japan], p. 276. 16 Watsuji, ゼエレン＝キェルゴオル [Søren Kierkegaard]. 17 Mitsuchi, “酔歌1” [Song of a Drunken Man, Part 1], op. cit. and “酔歌2” [Song of a Drunken Man, Part 2], 講座 [Lectures], vol. 11, 1924, pp. 162–92. 18 See Masugata, “日本に於けるキェルケゴール受容史” [The History of Kierkegaard’s Reception in Japan], p. 280. 19 キェルケゴール選集 [Kierkegaard’s Selected Works ], vols. 1–3, ed. by Kiyoshi Miki, Tokyo: Kaizo-sha 1935. 15

152

Satoshi Nakazato

A. The Kierkegaard Society in Tokyo The Kierkegaard Society in Tokyo was first established in 1950. Its first chairman was Risaku Mutai. Among its main activities were a biannual study meeting, meetings for learning Danish, and meetings for reading Kierkegaard’s texts. Keizaburou Masuda and Hidehito Otani managed the Society mainly, and its office was in the Philosophical Department of Hosei University. Existentialism was a kind of fashion in postwar Japan. Kierkegaard’s thought became a major trend not only among students and intellectuals but also among workers and Christian laymen. The Kierkegaard Society in Tokyo was active mostly from the second half of the 1950s to the first half of the 1970s. More than 100 people attended every study meeting in 1955. But the number of members had decreased especially after the second half of the 1970s. The activity of the Society was discontinued at the end of the 1990s. The Society is still not officially dissolved but is rather in recess now. Its last chairman was Junichi Toyofuku. B. The Kierkegaard Society in Kyoto The Kierkegaard Society in Kyoto was first established by Masaru Otani and Kagami Hashimoto in 1937. The activities of the Society were discontinued by disturbances of the Second World War. Masaru Otani made a voyage to Denmark and participated in the centennial anniversary after Kierkegaard’s death in 1955. Otani tried to reconstruct the Society and in 1960 began to hold meetings to study Kierkegaard and learn Danish. He became the first chairman of the new Society in 1962. The office for the Society was Otani’s office at Osaka Gaikokugo University. The Society has been active consistently under the leadership of Masaru Otani and Kenichi Ooya. Through these two scholars many younger Kierkegaard researchers had been educated. The Society held a Kierkegaard meeting twice a year and published the annual journal, The Kierkegaard Study. The journal was first published in 1964 and suspended from 1970 to 1976. But it resumed publication in 1977, and the final number came out in 1995. The Society published 25 volumes between 1964 and 1995. Several members of the Society including Otani were eager to promote translations of Kierkegaard’s works. The Society went into recess in 1999 because of the concentration on translations. After Otani’s death, the Society was resumed in 2000. They hold meetings twice a year and publish the annual journal, The New Kierkegaard Study. Volume 4 of this journal appeared in 2004. About 60 people attend each meeting now.20 Kenichi Ooya has been the chairman from 2000 to 2002. Hidetomo Yamashita is the chairman at present. About 30 young researchers and students met together and began to read and study the literature on Kierkegaard under Kinya Masugata in the second half of the 1990s. Even now this group remains enthusiastic for Kierkegaard studies even after it became a part of the Kierkegaard Society in Kyoto in 2000. The address of the office is as follows: The Kierkegaard Society in Kyoto, c/o Kyoto Joshi University, The Faculty of Modern Sociology S302, Kyoto-shi, Higashiyama-ku, Kumano, postal code 606-8386, Japan. The telephone number and fax number is 075-531-9163. The E-mail address is [email protected]. 20

Japan: Varied Images through Western Waves

153

C. The Søren Kierkegaard Research Center The Søren Kierkegaard Research Center was first established by Jun Hashimoto in 1998. The establishment of the Center in Japan was connected with that in Copenhagen in 1994. The aim of the Center in Japan is threefold: the education of young Kierkegaard researchers, the introduction of foreign Kierkegaard studies to Japanese researchers, and the introduction of Kierkegaard secondary literature in Japanese to foreign researchers. The Centre has held meetings once or twice a year in western and eastern Japan. It also held international conferences in 2000 and 2003 under the joint auspices of the Kierkegaard Society in Korea. The bibliography Søren Kierkegaard Literature in Japan (1906–1979) was compiled by Jun Hashimoto, Takahiro Hirabayashi and Michimune Madenokouiji.21 The Center has several plans, which include the publication of Kierkegaard commentaries in Japanese and a series of Kierkegaard studies. It regards the uniqueness of Japanese culture as important when the Japanese reader attempts to understand Kierkegaard. It believes that the Japanese way of thinking should be taken into account when Kierkegaard is introduced to Japanese society. The chairman is Jun Hashimoto. The center’s office is at Kwansei-gakuin University.22 D. Others There are also the Japanese Society of Existential Thought, the Japanese Association for Religious Studies, and The Study Group of the History of Ideas in Northern Europe, where papers about Kierkegaard are often read. The Japanese Society of Existential Thought was first established in 1985. It has a prehistory of being united with the Jaspers Society in Japan. The Society was started just after the Second World War. But several papers about Kierkegaard have been read recently. The present chairman is Junko Hamada.23 It has an annual journal. The Japanese Association for Religious Studies was first launched in 1930. The number of members is over 2,000 at present. It has a national conference once a year. Around ten papers are read about Kierkegaard at the conference every year. The Association has an annual journal. The present chairman is Susumu Shimazono.24 The Study Group of the History of Ideas in Northern Europe was first established in 1998. This is a small group and has meetings to read Scandinavian philosophical and historical texts including Kierkegaard, often holding discussions about the new methodology of studying Jun Hashimoto, Michimune Madenokouji, and Hirabayashi Takahiro, Søren Kierkegaard Literature in Japan (1906–1979), Nishinomiya: Kwanseigakuin-daigaku Kierkegaard bunken sakusei kyoudoukenkyuukai, Kwanseigakuin-daigaku 1995. 22 The address is as follows: Søren Kierkegaard Reseach Center, c/o Kwansei-gakuin University Prof. Funaki office, Uegahara Ichiban-chou 1-155, Nishinomiya-shi, Hyougo-ken, postal code 662-8501, Japan. It publishes a Newsletter once or twice a year. 23 The office address is as follows: Japanese Society of Existential Thought, c/o Waseda University Philosophical Institute, Toyama 1-24-1, Shinjuku-ku Tokyo, postal code 162-8644, Japan. 24 The office address is as follows: Japanese Association for Religious Studies, RumanHongou 205, Hongou 1-29-7, Bukyou-ku Tokyo, postal code 113-0033, Japan. 21

154

Satoshi Nakazato

Scandinavian cultures especially according to the historical way of thinking. The group is now preparing to publish an annual journal in English. Its representative is Satoshi Nakazato.25

The address is as follows: The Study Group of the History of Ideas in Northern Europe, c/o Satoshi Nakazato, 48-14 Oizumi-cho, 4-chome, Nerima-ku Tokyo, postal code 178-0062, Japan.

25

Bibliography

26

I. Japanese Translations of Kierkegaard’s Works 反復 [Repetition], trans. by Keizaburou Masuda, Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten 1925 (2nd ed., 1983) (岩波文庫 [Iwanami Library]). 憂愁の哲理 [Either/Or (an abridged translation)], trans. by Kouichirou Miyahara, Tokyo: Shunju-sha 1930 (世界大思想全集 [Works of the World’s Great Thoughts], vol. 36). 使徒と天才の相違に就いて [“The Difference between a Genius and an Apostle”], trans. by Kagami Hashimoto, Tokyo: Jujikanoshinngaku-sha 1931 (十字架の神 学叢書 [Library of the Cross Theology], vol. 16). キェルケゴール選集 [Kierkegaard’s Selected Works], vols. 1–3, ed. by Kiyoshi Miki, Tokyo: Kaizo-sha 1935: —— vol. 1, 不安の概念 [The Concept of Anxiety], trans. by Goichi Itou; 現代 の批判 [“The Present Age” (from A Literary Review)], trans. by Shigeru Miki; and 死に至る病 [The Sickness unto Death], trans. by Enkichi Kan and Haruo Oomura; —— vol. 2, 基督教に於ける訓練 [Practice in Christianity], trans. by Hidenobu Kuwata; 懼れとおののき [Fear and Trembling], trans. by Eiichi Kitou; and 誘 惑者の日記 [“The Seducer’s Diary”], trans. by Kotarou Jinbo; —— vol. 3, アイロニーの概念 [The Concept of Irony], trans. by Kiyoshi Miki and Keizaburo Masuda; 反復 [Repetition], trans. by Keizaburo Masuda; and 瞬間 [The Moment], trans. by Masataka Fujimoto. 哲学的断片後書 [Concluding Unscientific Postscript], trans. by Eiichi Kitou, Tokyo: Mikasa-shobou 1938 (現代思想全書 [Modern Thoughts Series]). 死に至る病 [The Sickness unto Death], trans. by Shinji Saitou, Tokyo: Iwanamishoten 1939 (2nd ed., 1983) (岩波文庫 [Iwanami Library]). ドン＝ジュアン論 [Don Juan (an abridged translation of Part One of Either/Or)], trans. by Munetaka Ihijima, Tokyo: Hanawa-shobou 1947. 死に至る病 [The Sickness unto Death], trans. by Shinzaburou Matsunami, Tokyo: Koishikawa-shobou 1948. Chapters in books and individual articles in Japanese are too numerous to list here. Therefore, these kinds of materials are only listed for the relatively important historical periods. Most of the articles published in The Kierkegaard Study and The New Kierkegaard Study (the annual journals of the Kierkegaard Society in Kyoto) have been omitted from the bibliography, for lack of space. Articles about Kierkegaard in dictionaries and encyclopedias have also been omitted. Except for these restrictions, almost all the major secondary literature is listed in the bibliography. 26

156

Satoshi Nakazato

野の百合・空の鳥 [The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air], trans. by Yasushi Kuyama, Tokyo: Koubun-dou 1948 (アテネ文庫 [Athenian Library]) (2nd ed., Nishinomiya: Kirisuto-kyou gakuto kyoudai-dan 1963). 哲学的断片 [Philosophical Fragments], trans. by Isaku Yanaihara, Tokyo: Kadokawa-shoten 1948. 誘惑者の日記 [“The Seducer’s Diary”], trans. by Munetaka Ihijima, Tokyo: Kadokawa-shoten 1948 (2nd revised ed., ed. by Satoshi Nakazato, Tokyo: Michitani 2000). 死に至る病　[The Sickness unto Death], trans. by Tomio Yasunaka, Tokyo: Shigaku-sha 1948. 追憶の哲理 [“In Vino Veritas”], trans. by Kenichi Yoshida and Yoshie Hotta, Tokyo: Daichi-shobou 1948. 使徒と天才の相違について・人は真理のために殺される権利をもつか [Two Ethical-Religious Essays], trans. by Kagami Hashimoto and Yoshiyuki Yokoyama, Tokyo: Shinkyou-shuppan-sha 1948. 初恋、あれか＝これか第１部 [Either/Or, Part One], trans. by Munetaka Ihijima, Tokyo: Kadokawa-shoten 1948 (2nd revised ed., ed. by Satoshi Nakazato, Tokyo: Michitani 2000). 説教集 [“The High Priest,” “The Tax Collector,” “The Woman Who Was a Sinner”], trans. by Yoshiyuki Yokoyama, Tokyo: Shinkyou-shuppan-sha 1948. 愛は多くの罪を掩う [“Love Will Hide a Multitude of Sin” (from Three Upbuilding Discourses, 1843)], trans. by Yasushi Kuyama, Tokyo: Koubun-dou 1948 (アテネ文庫 [Athenian Library]). イエスの招き [Practice in Christianity (translation of No. I and II)], trans. by Yoshio Inoue, Tokyo: Kadokawa-shoten 1948. 快楽と絶望 [Either/Or (an abridged translation)], trans. by Nobuo Sumi, Tokyo: Daichi-shobou 1948. ゼエレン＝キェルケゴオル選集 [Søren Kierkegaard’s Selected Works], vols. 1–13 (in 15 tomes), Kyoto: Jimbunshoin 1948–9: —— vol. 1, あれかこれか [Either/Or, Part One], trans. by Mayumi Haga; —— vol. 2, あれかこれか [Either/Or, Part One], trans. by Mayumi Haga; —— vol. 3.1, あれかこれか [Either/Or, Part Two], trans. by Mayumi Haga; —— vol. 3.2, あれかこれか [Either/Or, Part Two], trans. by Mayumi Haga; —— vol. 4, 恐怖と戦慄 [Fear and Trembling], trans. by Shouji Ishinaka; —— vol. 5, 人生行路の諸段階 [Stages on Life’s Way], trans. by Kouki Nakazawa; —— vol. 6, 人生行路の諸段階 [Stages on Life’s Way], trans. by Yukio Takahashi; —— vol. 7, 不安の概念 [The Concept of Anxiety], trans. by Shouji Ishinaka; —— vol. 8, 哲学屑 [Philosophical Fragments], trans. by Masaru Otani; —— vol. 9, 愛について [Works of Love], trans. by Mayumi Haga; —— vol. 10, 死に至る病 [The Sickness unto Death], trans. by Yasuo Katayama; —— vol. 11, 瞬間 [The Moment], trans. by Shinnosuke Yamada; —— vol. 12, 我が著作活動の視点 [The Point of View for my Work as an Author], trans. by Gisaburo Tabuchi; —— vol. 13, 日記 [Journals], trans. by Masaru Otani;

Japan: Varied Images through Western Waves

157

—— Supplementary volume, 許嫁への手紙 [Letters to the Engaged (translation of Kierkegaardske Papirer: Forlovelsen, ed. by Regine Schlegel and Raphael Meyer, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1904 and Henriette Lund, “Mit Forhold til hende”: af Søren Kierkegaards efterladte Papirer, Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1904)], trans. by Masaru Otani. わが魂の戦ひ、自己検察の為に [For Self-Examination], trans. by Shinichi Satou, Tokyo: Kadokawa-shoten 1949. 美しき人生観、あれかこれか第１部 [Either/Or, Part One], trans. by Munetaka Ihijima, Tokyo: Kadokawa-shoten 1949 (2nd revised ed., ed. by Satoshi Nakazato, Tokyo: Michitani 2000). 結婚の美的権利、あれか＝これか第２部 [Either/Or, Part Two], trans. by Munetaka Ihijima, Tokyo: Kadokawa-shoten 1949 (2nd revised ed., ed. by Satoshi Nakazato, Tokyo: Michitani 2000). キェルケゴールの日記 [Journals (translation of Die Tagebücher, vols. 1–2, trans. and ed. by Theodor Haecker, Innsbruck Brenner-Verlag 1923)], trans. by Yoshinori Tamabayashi and Yasushi Kuyama, Tokyo: Koubun-do 1949. 神の不変性 [The Changelessness of God], trans. by Yoshiyuki Yokoyama, Tokyo: Shinkyou-shuppan-sha 1949. 聖餐式のための説話 [Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays], trans. by Yoshiyuki Yokoyama, Tokyo: Shinkyou-shuppan-sha 1949. 現代の批判 [“The Present Age” (from A Literary Review)]; 単独者－わが著作活 動に関する二つの「覚書」 [“ ‘The Single Individual.’ Two ‘Notes’ Concerning My Work as an Author”], trans. by Munetaka Ihijima, Tokyo: Sougen-sha 1949. 不安の概念 [The Concept of Anxiety], trans. by Kiyoshi Hirose, Tokyo: Kadokawashoten 1950. 不安の概念 [The Concept of Anxiety], trans. by Shinji Saitou, Tokyo: Iwanamishoten 1951 (岩波文庫 [Iwanami Library]). キルケゴール全集 [Kierkegaard’s Collected Works], vols. 1–38, with a supplementary volume, trans. by Keizaburo Masuda, Tokyo: Chikuma-shobo 1952–66 (only four volumes were published): —— vol. 2, あれか－これか第１部下 [Either/Or, Part One]; —— vol. 5, おそれとおののき [Fear and Trembling]; 一つの教化的講話 [One Upbuilding Discourse]; —— vol. 6, 反復 [Repetition]; 三つの教化的講話 [Three Upbuilding Discourses (1843)]; —— vol. 24, 死にいたる病 [The Sickness unto Death]; 「大祭司」「収税人」 「罪ある女」[“The High Priest,” “The Tax Collector,” “The Woman Who Was a Sinner”]. 婚約 [Journals (a selection from passages about Kierkegaard’s engagement)], trans. and ed. by Masaru Otani, Tokyo: Mikasa-shobou 1953 (2nd ed., Fukuoka: Sougensha 1972). キルケゴール選集 [Kierkegaard’s Selected Works], vols. 1–8 (only four volumes were published), Tokyo: Sougen-sha 1953–4: —— vol. 1, 誘惑者の日記 [“The Seducer’s Diary”], trans. by Munetaka Ihijima; —— vol. 3, 哲学的断片 [Philosophical Fragments], trans. by Masaru Otani; —— vol. 6, 死にいたる病 [The Sickness unto Death], trans. by Munetaka Ihijima;

158

Satoshi Nakazato

—— vol. 8, わが著作活動の視点 [The Point of View for my Work as an Author], trans. by Gisaburou Tabuchi; 瞬間 [The Moment], trans. by Gisaburou Tabuchi. 死にいたる病 [The Sickness unto Death], trans. by Munetaka Ihijama, Tokyo: Kawade-shobou-shinsha 1954 (2nd ed., 1982) (キリスト教古典叢書 [Series of Christian Classics]). 神への思い [An Anthology of the Upbuilding Discourses], trans. and ed. by Isao Kuramatsu, Tokyo: Shinkyou-shuppan-sha 1958 (2nd ed., 1996) (新教新書 [Shinkyou Paperback Edition]). 哲学的断片への結びの学問外れな後書 [Concluding Unscientific Postscript], vols. 1–2, trans. by Masaru Otani, Tokyo: Shinkyou-shuppan-sha 1959. 世界文学大系21 [Series of World Literatures, vol. 21] (containing 誘惑者の日 記 [“The Seducer’s Diary”]; おそれとおののき [Fear and Trembling]; 反復 [Repetition] and 死に至る病 [The Sickness unto Death]), trans. by Keizaburou Masuda, Tokyo: Chikuma-shobou 1961. 死にいたる病・現代の批判 [The Sickness unto Death. “The Present Age” (from A Literary Review)], trans. by Shinzaburo Matsunami and Munetaka Ihijima, Tokyo: Hakusui-sha 1962 (2nd ed., 1975). キルケゴール著作集 [Kierkegaard’s Selected Works], vols. 1–22, with a supplementary volume, Tokyo: Hakusui-sha 1962–8: —— vol. 1, あれか・これか第１部上 [Either/Or, Part One], part 1, trans. by Masao Asai; —— vol. 2, あれか・これか第１部下 [Either/Or, Part One], part 2, trans. by Masao Asai; —— vol. 3, あれか・これか第２部上 [Either/Or, Part Two] part 1, trans. by Masaru Asai; —— vol. 4, あれか・これか第２部下 [Either/Or, Part Two] part 2, trans. by Masao Asai; —— vol. 5, おそれとおののき [Fear and Trembling] trans. by Keizaburo Masuda; 反復 [Repetition], trans. by Keisaku Maeda; —— vol. 6, 哲学的断片または一断片の哲学 [Philosophical Fragments], trans. by Hidehito Ootani; 危機および一女優の生涯における一つの危機 [The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress], trans. by Hidehito Ootani; —— vol. 7, 哲学的断片への結びとしての非学問的あとがき 上 [Concluding Unscientific Postscript, part 1], trans. by Yoshimu Sugiyama and Keiji Ogawa; —— vol. 8, 哲学的断片への結びとしての非学問的あとがき 中 [Concluding Unscientific Postscript, part 2], trans. by Yoshimu Sugiyama and Keiji Ogawa; —— vol. 9, 哲学的断片への結びとしての非学問的あとがき 下 [Concluding Unscientific Postscript, part 3], trans. by Yoshimu Sugiyama and Keiji Ogawa; —— vol. 10, 不安の概念 [The Concept of Anxiety], trans. by Hidehiro Hikami; 序 文ばかり[Prefaces], trans. by Yoshinobu Kumazawa; —— vol. 11, 死にいたる病 [The Sickness unto Death], trans. by Shinzaburo Matsunami; 現代の批判 [“The Present Age” from A Literary Review], trans. by Munetaka Ihijima; —— vol. 12, 人生行路の諸段階 [Stages on Life’s Way], part 1, trans. by Kouichi Sato;

Japan: Varied Images through Western Waves

159

—— vol. 13, 人生行路の諸段階 [Stages on Life’s Way], part 2, trans. by Kouichi Sato; —— vol. 14, 人生行路の諸段階 [Stages on Life’s Way], part 3, trans. by Kouichi Sato; —— vol. 15, 愛の業 [Works of Love], part 1, trans. by Kazuo Muto and Takeo Ashizu; —— vol. 16, 愛の業 [Works of Love], part 2, trans. by Kazuo Muto and Takeo Ashizu; —— vol. 17, キリスト教の修練 [Practice in Christianity], trans. by Yoshimu Sugiyama; —— vol. 18, わが著作活動の視点 [The Point of View for my Work as an Author], trans. by Gisaburo Tabuchi; 野の百合、空の鳥 [The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air], trans. by Yasushi Kuyama; —— vol. 19, 瞬間 [The Moment], trans. by Shinzaburo Matsunami and Harunori Izumi; —— vol. 20, イロニーの概念 [The Concept of Irony], part 1, trans. by Munetaka Ihijima and Yasuo Hukushima; —— vol. 21, イロニーの概念 [The Concept of Irony], part 2, trans. by Munetaka Ihijima and Yasuo Hukushima; —— Supplementary volume, キルケゴール研究 [Kierkegaard Study], ed. by Munetaka Ihijima and Shinzaburo Matsunami. 死にいたる病 [The Sickness unto Death], trans. by Keizaburou Masuda, Tokyo: Chikuma-shobou 1963 (2nd ed., 1996) (ちくま学芸文庫 [Series of Literary and Artistic Achievements]). 不安の概念 [The Concept of Anxiety]. 序文ばかり [Prefaces], trans. by Hidehiro Hikami and Yoshinobu Kumazawa, Tokyo: Hakusui-sha 1964 (2nd ed., 1979). キルケゴール講話・遺稿集 [Kierkegaard’s Selected Works of Discourses and Journals and Papers], vols. 1–6, ed. by the Japanese Society of Existentialism, Tokyo: Riso-sha 1964 (only one volume was published): —— vol. 6, アドラーの書 [The Book on Adler], trans. by Tasuku Hara; 武装せる中 立 [Armed Neutrality], trans. by Hidehito Ootani; 倫理的伝達と倫理・宗教的伝 達との弁証法 [“The Dialectic of Ethical and Ethical-Religious Communication. A Little Sketch” (in Pap. VIII-2 B81)], trans. by Hidehito Ootani. 誘惑者の日記 [“The Seducer’s Diary”], trans. by Masao Asai, Tokyo: Hakusui-sha 1965 (2nd ed., 1975, 3rd ed., 1998). 誘惑者の日記 [“The Seducer’s Diary”], trans. by Keizaburou Masuda, Tokyo: Chikuma-shobou 1966 (2nd ed., 1998) (ちくま学芸文庫 [Series of Literary and Artistic Attainments]). 現代の批判 [“The Present Age” from A Literary Review], trans. by Keizaburou Masuda, Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten 1966 (2nd ed., 1981) (岩波文庫 [Iwanami Library]). 世界の大思想 24 「キルケゴール」 [Great Thoughts of the World, vol. 24, Kierkegaard] (containing おそれとおののき [Fear and Trembling], trans. by Keizaburou; 哲学的断片 [Philosophical Fragments], trans. by Isaku Yanaihara; 不安の概念 [The Concept of Anxiety], trans. by Tasuku Hara and Munetaka Ihijima and 死にいたる病 [The Sickness unto Death]), trans. by Shinzaburou Matsunami, Tokyo: Kawade-shobou-shinsha 1966.

160

Satoshi Nakazato

世界の名著 40 「キルケゴール」 [World Masterpieces, vol. 40, Kierkegaard] (containing哲学的断片 [Philosophical Fragments], trans. by Yoshimu Sugiyama; 不安の概念[The Concept of Anxiety], trans. by Gisaburou Tabuchi; 現代の批判 [“The Present Age” from A Literary Review] and 死にいたる病 [The Sickness unto Death]), trans. by Keizaburou Masuda, Tokyo: Chuoukouron-sha 1966. キルケゴールの言葉 [An Anthology of Kierkegaard’s Works], trans. and ed. by Hidehito Ootani, Tokyo: Yayoi-shobou 1969. 現代キリスト教思想叢書 5 「ヘーゲル・キルケゴール」 [Series of Modern Christian Thoughts, vol. 5, Hegel and Kierkegaard] (containing 苦難の福音 [“States of Mind in the Strife of Suffering,” from Christian Discourses] and 人 は真理のために打ち殺されることが許されるか？ [“Does a Human Being Have the Right to Let Himself Be Put to Death for the Truth” (from Two EthicalReligious Essays)]), trans. by Yoshimu Sugiyama, Tokyo: Hakusui-sha 1974. 異教徒の憂い [“The Cares of the Pagans” (from Christian Discourses)], trans. by Yoshiko Shishido, Tokyo: Shibnkyo-shppannsha 1976. 背後から傷つける思想 [“Thoughts That Wound from Behind—for Upbuilding” (from Christian Discourses)], trans. by Jun Hashimoto, Tokyo: Shinkyoushuppan-sha 1976. キルケゴール [Kierkegaard] (an anthology), trans. by Hideo Maze and Kazuhiko Ozaki, ed. by Frederik Billeskov Jansen and Fujio Makino]), Tokyo: Toukai daigaku-shuppannkai 1976 (デンマーク文学作品集 [Collected Works of Danish Literature]). 恐れとおののき [Fear and Trembling], trans. by Hideo Akiyama, Tokyo: Shuhunotomo-sha 1977 (キリスト教文学 13 [Christian Literature], vol. 13). キルケゴール講話・遺稿集 [Kierkegaard’s Selected Works of Discourses and Journals and Papers], vols. 1–9, ed. by Munetaka Ihijima, Tokyo: Shinchi-shobo 1979–83: —— vol. 1, 二つの建徳的講話 [Two Upbuilding Discourses (1843)], trans. by Yasuo Hukushima; 三つの建徳的講話 [Three Upbuilding Discourses (1843)], trans. by Yasuo Hukushima; 四つの建徳的講話 [Four Upbuilding Discourses (1843)], trans. by Masatoshi Yamada; 牧師資格取得説教 [Trial Sermon held in Trinitatis Church (February 24, 1844) (Pap. IV C 1 / JP 4, 3916)], trans. by Masatoshi Yamada; —— vol. 2, 二つの建徳的講話 [Two Upbuilding Discourses (1844)], trans. by Genpou Yamada; 三つの建徳的講話 [Three Upbuilding Discourses (1844)], trans. by Genpou Yamada; 四つの建徳的講話 [Four Upbuilding Discourses (1844)], trans. by Junko Hamada; —— vol. 3, さまざま精神における建徳的講話１, ２ [Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits], parts 1 and 2, trans. by Gisaburou Tabuchi, Keiichi Kashiwabara and Yoshiya Gotou; —— vol. 4, さまざまの精神における建徳的講話３ [Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits], part 3, trans. by Tatsurou Iwanaga; 想定された機会にお ける三つの講話 [Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions], trans. by Junichi Toyofuku;

Japan: Varied Images through Western Waves

161

—— vol. 5, 単独者 [“ ‘The Single Individual’ ” (from The Point of View for My Work as an Author)], trans. by Munetaka Ihijima; キリスト教的講話 [Christian Discourses], parts 1 and 2, trans. by Kazuhiko Nakamura; —— vol. 6, キリスト教的講話 [Christian Discourses], Part Three and Four, trans. by Nagamitsu Miura, Norihiko Mikame and Kazuhiko Nakamura; 野の百合と空 の鳥 [The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air], trans. by Kazuhiko Ozaki; —— vol. 7, 二つの倫理的・宗教的小論 [Two Ethical-Religious Essays], trans. by Masahide Kawakami, 大祭司・収税人・罪ある女 [“The High Priest,” “The Tax Collector,” “The Woman Who Was a Sinner”], trans. by Kyouichi Murakami; 一つの建徳的講話 [One Upbuilding Discourse], trans. by Shigeru Kobayashi; 金曜日の聖餐式における二つの講話 [Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays], trans. by Shigeru Kobayashi; これは言わねばならぬ、だからここ で言わせてもらう[This Must Be Said; So Let It Be Said], trans. by Kyouichi Murakami and Shigeru Kobayashi; 公認のキリスト教をキリストはいか に判断するか [What Christ Judges of Official Christianity], trans. by Shigeru Kobayashi; 神の不変性 [The Changelessness of God], trans. by Masahide Kawakami; —— vol. 8, いまなお生ける者の手記より[From the Papers of One Still Living], trans. by Hidehito Ootani; ヨハンネス＝クリマクス、またすべてのものが 疑われねばならぬ [Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est], trans. by Katsumi Kitada;　倫理的伝達の、また倫理－宗教的伝達の弁証法 [The Dialectic of Ethical and Ethical-Religious Communication. A Little Sketch] (in Pap. VIII–2 B 81), trans. by Hidehito Ootani; 武装せる中立 [Armed Neutrality], trans. by Hidehito Ootani; —— vol. 9, アドラーの書 [The Book on Adler], trans. by Tasuku Hara and Munetaka Ihijima. セーレン＝キルケゴールの日誌第１巻 [Journals] (especially passages which are about Regine Olsen], trans. by Jun Hashimoto, Tokyo: Mirai-sha 1985. 不安の概念 [The Concept of Anxiety] (Danish Texts with Translation and Annotation), ed. by Kyouichi Murakami, Tokyo: Daigaku-shorin 1985. 原典訳記念版キェルケゴール著作全集 [Kierkegaard’s Selected Works. Commemorative Original Translation Edition], vols. 1–15, ed. by Masaru Otani, Fukuoka Sougen-sha 1988–2000 (three volumes are still not published): —— vol. 1, これか－あれか第１部 [Either/Or, Part One], trans. by Sanae Oota and Masaru Otani; —— vol. 2, これか－あれか第２部 [Either/Or, Part Two], trans. by Sanae Oota and Masaru Otani; —— vol. 4, 人生行路の諸段階 [Stages on Life’s Way], part 1, trans. by Tetsuyoshi Kunii and Masaru Otani; —— vol. 5, 人生行路の諸段階 [Stages on Life’s Way], part 2, trans. by Kuniko Yamamoto and Masaru Otani; —— vol. 6, 哲学的断片或いは一断片の哲学 [Philosophical Fragments]; 哲学 的断片への結びの学問外れな後書 [Concluding Unscientific Postscript], part 1, trans. by Masaru Otani; —— vol. 7, 哲学的断片への結びの学問外れな後書 [Concluding Unscientific Postscript], part 2, trans. by Masaru Otani;

162

Satoshi Nakazato

—— vol. 8, 序言 [Prefaces], trans. by Kuniko Yamamoto; 仮装された機会での三つ の談話 [Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions], trans. by Masaru Otani; 文芸批 評 [A Literary Review], trans. by Masaru Otani; 或る女優の生涯における危機と 或る危機 [The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress], trans. by Masaru Otani; —— vol. 9, 種々の精神での建徳的談話 [Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits], trans. by Masaru Otani and Shouzou Fujiki; —— vol. 10, 愛の業 [Works of Love], trans. by Kazuhiko Ozaki and Kouji Satou; —— vol. 11, キリスト教談話 [Christian Discourses], trans. by Shouzou Fujiki; —— vol. 12, 野の百合と空の鳥 [The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air], trans. by Masaru Otani; 二つの倫理的－宗教的小＝論文 [Two ReligiousEthical Essays], trans. by Masaru Otani; 死に至る病 [The Sickness unto Death], trans. by Hidetomo Yamashita; 「大祭司」－「収税人」－「罪の女」 [“The High Priest,” “The Tax Collector,” “The Woman Who Was a Sinner”], trans. by Masaru Otani; —— vol. 14, 自省のために、現代にすすむ [For Self-Examination], trans. by Tetsuyoshi Kunii; 汝自ら審け！ [Judge for Yourself], trans. by Kinya Masugata; 我が著作家＝活動に対する視点 [The Point of View for My Work as an Author], trans. by Masaru Otani,　我が著作家＝活動について [The Point of View: On My Work as an Author], trans. by Masaru Otani, 金曜日の聖餐式における二つ の談話 [Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays], trans. by Masaru Otani; —— vol. 15, 瞬間 [The Moment], trans. by Hidehiko Kondou and Testuyoshi Kondou; これは言われねばならない、それだからこそ今それを言うこと にする [This Must Be Said; So Let It Be Said], trans. by Masaru Otani; 官公キ リスト教についてキリストの裁き給うこと [What Christ Judges of Official Christianity], trans. by Masaru Otani; 神の不変性 [The Changelessness of God], trans. by Masaru Otani. II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard in Japan Abe, Yoshishige,“可能性に対する情熱” [Passion for Possibility] and “キェル ケゴールの恋愛” [Kierkegaard’s Love], in his 山中雑記 [Notes Among among the Mountains], Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten 1924, pp. 256-263 and pp. 264-269. Abe, Youko, “G. グリーンのキェルケゴール受容” [Kierkegaard’s Reception by Graham Greene in the Case of A Burnt-Out Case], Persica. Journal of the English Literary Society of Okayama, vol. 28, 2001, pp. 57–65. Akagi, Kohei, “キェルケゴールとその個人主義” [Kierkegaard and his Individualism], 新小説 [New Literary Review], vol. 20, no. 12, 1911, pp. 20–32. Akiyama, Hideo, ニヒルと神—キェルケゴールとニーチェ [Kierkegaard and Nietzsche], Tokyo: Shakaishisou-kenkyuukai-shuppann-bu 1951. [Anonymous], キールケガールド [Kierkegaard], in 近世泰西英傑伝第５巻 [The History of Great Men of the Western World], vols. 1–5, Tokyo: Dainihon-bunmeikyoukai 1911, vol. 5, pp. 84–90. Aoyagi, Susumu, “実存主義とは何か—キルケゴールからサルトルまでの系譜 を追って” [What is Existentialism?—Tracing the Descent from Kierkegaard to Sartre], 研究紀要(宇都宮短期大学) [Bulletin of Utsunomiya Junior College],

Japan: Varied Images through Western Waves

163

vol. 10, 2003, pp. 23–54 (republished in 研究紀要（宇都宮短期大学）[Bulletin of Utsunomiya Junior College], vol. 11, 2004, pp. 31–91). Baba, Tomomichi, “主体的行為における他者との邂逅—キルケゴール『おそれ とおののき』から” [The Encounter with the Other in Subjective Action—Through Fear and Trembling], 倫理学年報 [Annals of Ethics], vol. 19, 2002, pp. 95–107. —— “キルケゴールにおける真理の現実性の問題” [The Problem of the Reality of Truth in Kierkegaard], 哲学･思想論叢 [Miscellanea philosophica: the tetsugaku shisō ronsō], vol. 21, 2003, pp. 15–25. Bessho, Umenosuke, “苦痛の福音—ヴィネとキェルケゴールド” [The Gospel of Suffering—Vigny and Kierkegaard], 聖書之研究 [Biblical Study], vol. 125, 1910, pp. 21–31. —— “苦悩の福音” [The Gospel of Suffering], in his 武蔵野の一角にたちて [Standing on the Corner of Musashino District], Tokyo: Keiseisha-shobou 1915, pp. 435–63. Chino, Shosho, “キェルケゴール” [Kierkegaard], in 世界文学講座第１１巻—北 欧文学篇 [Lectures on World Literature, vol. 11—Literature in Northern Europe], ed. by Yoshiaki Satou, Tokyo: Shinchou-sha 1930, pp. 311–20. —— “キェルケゴールの『あれか・これか』” [Either/Or by Kierkegaard], 文 藝 [Literature], vol. 3 no. 5, 1935, pp. 85–96. Doutai, Shihoko, “キルケゴールの美的領域とパスカルの肉の秩序について” [On the Aesthetic Field in Kierkegaard and the Discipline of the Flesh in Pascal], 桜美林論集 [Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities: Obirin ronshu], vol. 29, 2002, pp. 35–53. Eguchi, Satoshi, “What Makes Johannes de Silentio Sleepless? —A Universal Prescriptivist Reading of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling,” 現代社会研究 [Contemporary Society (Faculty for the Study of Contemporary Society, Kyoto Women’s University)], vol. 3, 2002, pp. 47–52. —— “Kierkegaard’s Media Critic,” 現代社会研究 [Contemporary Society (Faculty for the Study of Comtemporary Society, Kyoto Women’s University)], vol. 4, 2003, pp. 125–30. Fujieda, Shin, “信仰と理性—キェルケゴールにおける理性の限界と逆説 への信仰” [Truth and Reason—The Limit of Reason and Faith in Paradox in Kierkegaard], 倫理学研究 [Annals of Ethical Studies], vol. 31, 2001, pp. 39–49. Fujimoto, Masataka, “キェルケゴールの教会批判1-8” [Kierkegaard’s Criticism of the Church, Parts 1–8], 日本聖書雑誌 [Japanese Journal for Biblical Studies], vol. 72, 1935, pp. 25–30 (Part 1); vol. 73, 1935, pp. 36–41 (Part 2); vol. 74, 1935, pp. 27–32 (Part 3); vol. 75, 1935, pp. 25–30 (Part 4); vol. 76, 1935, pp. 33–8 (Part 5); vol. 77, 1935, pp. 39–44 (Part 6); vol. 78, 1935, pp. 30–35 (Part 7); vol. 79, 1935, pp. 30–35 (Part 8). —— キェルケゴールの教会批判 [Kierkegaard’s Criticism of the Church], Matsuyama: Dohi-shoten 1937. Hamada, Junko, キルケゴールの倫理思想—行為の問題 [Kierkegaard’s Ethical Thinking—The Problem of Action], Tokyo: Shinchi-shobou 1986. —— キルケゴール—主体性の真理 [Kierkegaard—The Truth of Subjectivity], Tokyo: Soubun-sha 1999.

164

Satoshi Nakazato

—— 歌舞伎随想—歌右衛門とキルケゴール [Essays on Kabuki—Utaemon and Kierkegaard], Tokyo: Michitani 2000. —— “キルケゴールにおける思索と生の真理” [The Truth of Thinking and Life in Kierkegaard], 関東学院大学文学部紀要 [Bulletin of Kanto Gakuin University], vol. 94, 2001, pp. 107–31. Harada, Nobuo, ケルケゴールの基督教思想 [Kierkegaard’s Christian Thoughts], Tokyo: Shinsei-do 1937. Hasegawa, Hiroshi, 格闘する理性—ヘーゲル、ニーチェ、キルケゴール [Fighting Reason—Hegel, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard], Tokyo: Kawadeshoboushinsha 1987. Hashimoto, Jun, キェルケゴールにおける「苦悩」の世界 [“Suffering” in Søren Kierkegaard’s Life and Authorship], Tokyo: Mirai-sha 1976. —— 逍遙する哲学者—キェルケゴール紀行 [The Wandering Philosopher— Kierkegaard’s Life and Authorship], Tokyo: Shinkyou-shuppan-sha 1979. —— 憂愁と愛 [Melancholy and the Unhappy Love], Kyoto: Jinbun-shoin 1985. —— “日本のキリスト教会とキェルケゴール” [Christian Churches in Japan and Kierkegaard], 神学研究 [Theological Studies (School of Theology, Kwansei Gakuin University)], special volume, 2003, pp. 85–98. Hashimoto, Kagami, “証人としてのスェレン＝キェルケグヲル1–3” [Kierkegaard as Witness, Parts 1–3], 復活 [The Resurrection], vol. 1, no. 2, 1935, pp. 8–15 (Part 1); vol. 1, no. 3, 1935, pp. 7–15 (Part 2); vol. 1, no. 5, 1935, pp. 14–22 (Part 3). —— “スェレン＝キェルケグヲルにおける証人の意義1-2” [The Meaning of Witness in Kierkegaard, Parts 12], 復活 [The Resurrection], vol. 1, no. 7, 1935, pp. 7–15 (Part 1); vol. 1, no. 9, 1935, pp. 7–15 (Part 2). Hayama, Manjirou, “キールケゴールドの耶蘇教観” [Kierkegaard’s View of Christianity], 帝國文学 [Japanese Literature], vol. 13, no. 11, 1907, pp. 13–22. —— “キールケゴールドの人格” [Kierkegaard’s Personality], 東亜之光 [Light from Eastern Asia], vol. 3, no. 1, 1908, pp. 177–82. Hirabayashi, Takahiro, “Kierkegaard on the Socratic Definition of Sin,” Kwansei Gakuin University Humanities Review, vol. 6, 2002, pp. 13–24. —— “S. キェルケゴールの心理学的方法—心理学的実験をめぐって” [The Psychological Method of S. Kierkegaard—About his Psychological Experiment], 神学研究 [Theological Studies (School of Theology, Kwansei Gakuin University)], vol. 50, 2003, pp. 105–17. Hirose, Kiyoshi, キェルケゴールの実存哲学 [Kierkegaard’s Existential Philosophy], Tokyo: Heibon-sha 1949. Honda, Kenzou, “審美的と実存的” [The Aesthetical and the Existential], 一橋文 芸　[Ikkio bungei], vol. 1, 1933, pp. 120–91. Honshou, Kashu, “キェルケゴールの『彼か此か』を読む” [Reading Either/Or by Kierkegaard], 鶴 [A Crane], vol. 1, 1934, pp. 141–4. Hosoba, Yoshiko, “キェルケゴールの女優論—『危機』についての考察” [Kierkegaard’s Argument about Actresses—Through The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress], 哲学 [Philosophy (Society of Philosophy in Hiroshima)], vol. 55, 2003, pp. 57–68.

Japan: Varied Images through Western Waves

165

Ichihasi, Akinori, “Georges Bataille et Kierkegaard, l’angoisse de l’influence dans La conjuration sacrée,” 仏語仏文学研究 [Bulletin d’études françaises de l’Université Chuo], vol. 23, 2001, pp. 147–64. Ichizawa, Masanori, “キルケゴールにおける殉教の意義” [The Meaning of Martyrdom in Kierkegaard], 清泉女学院短期大学研究紀要 [Bulletin of Seisenjogakuin Junior College], vol. 20, 2001, pp. 49–69. —— “絶対服従による至福への道—キルケゴール的思考” [A Way to the Supreme Bliss through the Absolute Obedience—Kierkegaard’s Way of Thinking], 清泉女学院短期大学研究紀要 [Bulletin of Seisenjogakuin Junior College], vol. 21, 2002, pp. 1–27. Ihijima, Munetaka, キルケゴール [Kierkegaard], Tokyo: Heibon-sha 1976 (Series of the World’s Thinkers, vol. 15). Ikejima, Shigenobu, “キェルケゴールの人間学” [Kierkegaard’s Anthropology], 浪漫古典 [Roman Classics (Showa Shobou)], vol. 7, 1934, pp. 83–9. —— “キェルケゴールと今日の文学の問題” [Kierkegaard and the Problem of our Present Literature], 文藝 [Literature], vol. 2, no. 12, 1934, pp. 135–9. —— “ニイチェとキェルケゴール” [Nietzsche and Kierkegaard], 理想 [Risou], vol. 62, 1935, pp. 88–100. Ishizu, Teruji, “ヘーゲルとキェルケゴールの対比” [Hegel and Kierkegaard in Comparison], 理想 [Risou], vol. 20, 1930, pp. 101–9. —— キェルケゴール研究 [A Study on Kierkegaard], Tokyo: Soubun-sha 1974. —— 宗教的人間 [The Religious Man], Tokyo: Soubun-sha 1980 (Studies of the Philosophy of Religion, vol. 5). Itou, Genichirou, “キェルケゴールのソクラテス的なるものにおける実存哲 学概念” [The Concept of Existential Philosophy in the Socratic by Kierkegaard], 哲学論集 [Tetsugaku ronshu: Philosophical Studies (Otani University)], vol. 2, 1935, pp. 138–82. Itou, Kiyoshi, “キルケゴールにおける義務と良心—カントとの比較を手がか りとして” [Duty and Conscience in Kierkegaard—Compared with Kant], 教 育思想 [Pedagogical Thought (Society of Philosophy and History of Education in Tohoku District)], 2001, vol. 28, pp. 17–30. —— “キルケゴールにおける教育関係の原理と構造” [The Principle and Structure of the Educational Relationship in Kierkegaard], 東北大学大学院教 育学研究科研究年報 [Annals of the Graduate School of Pedagogy, Tohoku University], vol. 50, 2002, pp. 15–30. Iwata, Yasuo, 神なき時代の神—キルケゴールとレヴィナス [God in an Age Devoid of God—Kierkegaard and Levinas], Tokyo: Iwanami-shoten 2001. Kaneko, Atsuhito, “キルケゴールとレヴィナス—他者論としての実存思想” [Kierkegaard and Levinas—The Existential Thought as the Theory of the Other], 哲学世界 [World of Philosophy (The Students’ Society of Philosophy, Waseda University)], vol. 26, 2003, pp. 21–38. Kaneko, Chikusui, “キヤーケゴールドの人生観” [Kierkegaard’s View of Life], 早稲 田文学 [Waseda Bungaku], vol. 3, no. 9, 1906, pp. 113–49. Kaneko, Takezou, キェルケゴールからサルトルへ—実存思想の歩み [From Kierkegaard to Sartre—the Development of Existential Thought], Tokyo: Shimizu-koubun-dou 1967.

166

Satoshi Nakazato

Kawakami, Shoushuu, ドイツにおけるキルケゴール思想の受容—20 世紀初頭 の批判哲学と実存哲学 [Kierkegaard’s Reception in Germany—The Critical Philosophy and Existential Philosophy at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century], Tokyo: Soubun-sha 1999. —— “実存から他者へ—レヴィナス、デリダのキルケゴール読解” [From Existence to the Other—Kierkegaard Read by Levinas and Derrida], 哲学･思想 論集 [Studies in Philosophy (University of Tsukuba)], vol. 21, 2001, pp. 1–17. Kawakami, Tetsutarou, ドン＝ジョヴァンニ—キェルケゴールのモツアルト論 [Don Giovanni—Kierkegaard’s Discussions about Mozart], Tokyo: Hosokawashoten 1951. Kawamura, Eiko, キェルケゴールの研究—新しい宗教哲学的探求 [A Study of Kierkegaard—A New Investigation of the Philosophy of Religion], Tokyo: Kindaibungei-sha 1993. Kitagawa, Shin, キェルケゴールと現代の神学 [Kierkegaard and Modern Theology], Tokyo: Shinkyou-shuppan-sha 1971. Kitou, Eiichi, “キェルケゴールとハイデッガー” [Kierkegaard and Heidegger], in his ハイデッガーの存在学 [Heidegger’s Ontology], Tokyo: Toyou-shuppan 1935, pp. 183–9. Kousaka, Masaaka, キェルケゴールからサルトルへ—実存哲学研究 [From Kierkegaard to Sartre—A Study of Existential Philosophy], Tokyo: Koubun-dou 1949. Kudou, Yasuo, キェルケゴール—人と思想 [Kierkegaard—Man and Thoughts], Tokyo: Shimizu-shoin 1966. Kumano, Yoshitaka, “キェルケゴールの人と思想” [Kierkegaard’s Person and Thought], 経済往来 [The Economy Today], vol. 10, no. 5, 1935, pp. 166–75. —— “キェルケゴールの人と思想” [Kierkegaard’s Life and Thought], in his 現代 の神学 [Modern Theology], Tokyo: Shinsei-dou 1936, pp. 209–28. Kunii, Tetsuyoshi, 苦悩と愛—キェルケゴール論 [Suffering and Love—An Essay on Kierkegaard], Hukuoka: Sougen-sha 2002. —— “キェルケゴールの段階理論” [The Theory of Stages in Kierkegaard], 金蘭 短期大学研究誌 [Review of Research and Inquiries (Kinran Junior College)], vol. 33, 2002, pp. 1–13. —— “キェルケゴールの段階理論2” [Kierkegaard’s Theory of Stages, Part 2], 金蘭短期大学誌 [Review of Research and Inquiries (Kinran Junior College)], vol. 34, 2003, pp. 1–14. Kuwata, Hedenobu, “キェルケゴールの弁証法神学” [Kierkegaard’s Dialectical Theology], 理想 [Risou], vol. 62, 1935, pp. 2–21. Masuda, Keizaburou, “キェルケゴールの根本思想” [Kierkegaard’s Fundamental Thought], 理想 [Risou], vol. 62, 1935, pp. 74–87. Masugata, Kinya (ed.), 宗教と倫理—キェルケゴールにおける実存の言語性 [Religion and Ethics—The Character of Existential Language in Kierkegaard], Kyoto: Nakanishiya-shuppan 1998. Matsuduka, Toyoshige, 絶望の論理—キルケゴール『死にいたる病』の研 究 [The Logic of Despair—A Study of The Sickness unto Death], Tokyo: Kindaibungei-sha 1995.

Japan: Varied Images through Western Waves

167

Minowa, Shuuhou, キェルケゴールと親鸞—宗教的真理の伝達者たち [Kierkegaard and Shinran—Communicators of the Religious Truth ], Kyoto: Mineruvashobou 2000. —— 宗教的実存の展開—キェルケゴールと親鸞 [The Development of the Religious Existence—Kierkegaard and Shinran], Hukuoka: Sougen-sha 2000. Mitsuchi, Kozo, 酔歌 [Song of a Drunken Man], Tokyo: Koubun-dou 1948 (アテ ネ文庫 [Athenian Library]). Miyachi, Taka, 倫理と宗教の間—カントとキェルケゴールに関連して [Between Ethics and Religion—In Relation to Kant and Kierkegaard], Hiroshima: Keisui-sha 2002. Miyahara, Koichirou, “キェルケゴール” [Kierkegaard], in 大思想エンサイクロ ペヂア２—文芸思２ [Encyclopedia, Part 2—Literary Thoughts, Part 2], ed. by Toyoho Kanda, Tokyo: Shunjuu-sha 1929, pp. 325–6. —— “憂愁孤独の思想家キェルケゴール” [Kierkegaard as a Melancholy and Solitary Thinker], 思想春秋 [Philosophy Today], vol. 34, 1934, pp. 9–10. —— “キェルケゴールの芸術観” [Kierkegaard’s View of Art], 浪漫古典 [Roman Classics], vol. 7, 1934, pp. 71–82. Mizoi, Takashi, “キェルケゴールの視点から見たゲーテのメフィスト観” [Goethe’ s Mephistopheles from Kierkegaard’s Point of View], 同志社哲学年報 [Societas Philosophiae Doshisha], vol. 24, 2001, pp. 1–22. Mitsuchi, Kouzou, “酔歌1” [Song of a Drunken Man, part 1], 講座 [Lectures], vol. 11, 1923, pp. 143–74. —— “酔歌2” [Song of a Drunken Man, Part 2], 講座 [Lectures], vol. 11, 1924, pp. 162–92. Mizuta, Makoto, キェルケゴールと現代の実存—比較思想と対話の精神 [Kierkegaard and Existence in Modern Times—The Comparative Thoughts and Dialogue], Hukuoka: Soubun-sha 1998. —— “近代的個人主義の超克—漱石とキルケゴールに学ぶ” [Overcoming Modern Individualism—Through Souseki and Kierkegaard], 自然と文化 [Nature and Culture], vol. 28, 2001, pp. 19–28. Mochizuki, Reiko, 七月はKierkegaard [Kierkegaard in July], Tokyo: Shuei-sha 1995 (ヤングユーコミックス [Series of Young You Comics]). Morita, Mime, “キェルケゴールの女性論3—レギーネとキェルケゴール上” [Kierkegaard’s Argument about Woman, Part 3—Regine and Kierkegaard, Part 1], 神学と人文 [Theology and Humanities], vol. 43, 2003, pp. 53–60. Muraoka, Shinichi, “キルケゴールの時間論” [Kierkegaard’s Argument about the Concept of Time], 中央大学文学部紀要 [Bulletin of Faculty of Humanities, Chuo University], vol. 192, 2002, pp. 27–50. Murakami, Kyouichi, “キルケゴールの「パン屑」讃歌” [Kierkegaard’s Praise of a Breadcrumb], 図書 [Books], vol. 661, 2004, pp. 15–19. Murase, Manabu, 新しいキルケゴール [The New Understanding of Kierkegaard—An Essay on the Concept of the Theory of Plural Selves], Tokyo: Daiwa-shobou 1986. Murobuse, Koushin, “あれか・これか” [Either/Or], in his 青年の書 [Books for Young Men], Tokyo: Seinen-shobou 1936, pp. 1–9. Muroi, Mitsuhiro, キルケゴールとアンデルセン [Kierkegaard and Andersen], Tokyo: Koudan-sha 2000.

168

Satoshi Nakazato

Mutai, Risaku (ed.), セーレン＝キルケゴール—その人と思想 [Søren Kierkegaard—His Life and Thoughts], Tokyo: Risou-sho 1956. Mutou, Kazuo, 信仰と倫理—キェルケゴールの問題 [Faith and Ethics—Problems in Kierkegaard], Kyoto: Houzou-kan 1950. —— キェルケゴール—その思想と信仰 [Kierkegaard—His Thought and Faith], Tokyo: Soubun-sha 1967. Nakagawa, Rinsen and Chokou Ikuta, “キアルケガールドとイプセン” [Kierkegaard and Ibsen], in their (eds.) 近代思想１６講 [Sixteen Lectures on Modern Ideas], Tokyo: Shinchou-sha 1915, pp. 265–9. Nakazato, Satoshi, キルケゴールとその思想風土—北欧のロマンティークと敬 虔主義 [Kierkegaard and the Climate of the Traditional Thoughts—Romanticism and Pietism in Northern Europe], Tokyo: Soubun-sha 1994. —— “キルケゴール思想における「実存」概念解釈について—「実存」概 念の研究方法をめぐる試論” [An Interpretation of the Concept “Existence” in Kierkegaard’s Thought—An Essay on the Methodology of the Study of “Existence”], 白山哲学 [Bulletin of Tokyo University (Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature)], vol. 30, 1996, pp. 41–61. —— “キルケゴール—「単独者」概念と北欧の古法” [Kierkegaard—The Concept of the “Single Individual” and the Outlaw in Northern Europe], 宗教研 究 [Journal of Religious Studies], vol. 74, Tokyo 2001, pp. 955–7. —— “Kierkegaard’s Thought and the Outlaw Tradition—The Origin of ‘den enkelte’ and an Application of the Ideal History of Northern Europe to the Comparative Thoughts,” 東洋学研究 [Asian Studies, Tokyo University], vol. 39, 2002, pp. 440–50. Nishimura, Eshin, “禅とキェルケゴールの通路” [Zen and Kierkegaard’s Way], 駒沢大学禅研究所年報 [Annual Report of the Zen Institute, Komazawa University], vol. 13, 2002, pp. 1–10. Ogawa, Keiji, 主体と超越—キルケゴールからバルトへ [The Subject and Transcendence—From Kierkegaard to Barth], Tokyo: Soubun-sha 1975. —— キルケゴール [Kierkegaard], Tokyo: Koudan-sha 1979 (Series of the Intellectual Properties of Mankind). Okojima, Shinji, キェルケゴールの実存哲学 [Kierkegaard’s Existential Philosophy], Osaka: Kahori-shobou 1947. Oori, Masatoshi, 内村鑑三とキェルケゴール [Kanzo Uchimura and Kierkegaard], Tokyo: Eikou-shuppansha 1997. Otani, Hidehito, キルケゴール青年時代の研究、正続 [A Study of Kierkegaard’s Youth], vols. 1–2, Tokyo: Keisou-shobou 1966–8. —— キルケゴール著作活動の研究 前篇—青年時代を中心に行われた文学 研究の実態 [A Study on Kierkegaard’s Authorship, Part 1—The Realities of Young Kierkegaard’s Own Studies of Literature], Tokyo: Keisou-shobou 1989. —— キルケゴール著作活動の研究　後編—全著作構造の解明 [A Study on Kierkegaard’s Authorship, Part 2— Investigation in the Structure of the Entirety of his Works], Tokyo: Keisou-shobou 1991. Otani, Hidehito and Harunori Izumi, キルケゴール—死にいたる病 [Kierkegaard— The Sickness unto Death], Tokyo: Yuuhikaku 1980.

Japan: Varied Images through Western Waves

169

Otani, Masaru [Kiyoshi Bochi, pseud.], 神以前－ケルケゴールとの貧しき同 感 [Before God —A Piece of Sympathy for Kierkegaard], Kyoto: Jinbun-shoin 1937. —— キルケゴールにおける授受の弁証法 [The Dialectic of Indirect Communication in Kierkegaard], Tokyo: Koubun-dou 1952 (republished as vol. 1 of 大谷長著作集 [Masaru Otani’s Selected Works], vols. 1–3, Fukuoka: Sougensha 2001–2003). —— キェルケゴールにおける真理と現実性 [Truth and Reality in Kierkegaard], Tokyo: Soubun-sha 1963 (republished as vol. 2 of 大谷長著作集 [Masaru Otani’s Selected Works], vols. 1–3, Fukuoka: Sougen-sha 2001–2003). —— キェルケゴールにおける自由と非自由 [Freedom and Non-Freedom in Kierkegaard], Tokyo: Soubun-sha 1977 (republished as vol. 3 of 大谷長著作集 [Masaru Otani’s Selected Works], vols. 1–3, Fukuoka: Sougen-sha 2001–2003). Otani, Masaru and Toshikazu Ooya (eds.), キェルケゴールと日本の仏教・哲学 [Kierkegaard and Japanese Buddhism and Philosophy], Osaka: Tohou-shuppan 1992. Ooya, Toshikazu and Masashi Hosoya (eds.), キェルケゴールを学ぶひとのため に [For the People Studying Kierkegaard], Kyoto: Sekaishisou-sha 1996. Oozeki, Masujirou, “生成としての人間の存在—キェルケグヲルに関する一考 察” [Human Existence as Becoming—A Study on Kierkegaard], 教育学術界 [The Pedagogical Review], vol. 6, 1935, pp. 23–36. Saekusa, Hiroo, “キェルケゴール弁証法” [Kierkegaard’s Dialectic], in his 弁証法 談叢[Arguments about Dialetic], Tokyo: Chuuoukouron-sha 1935, pp. 199–242. Saitou, Shinji, ソクラテスとキェルケゴール—イロニーの概念 [Socrates and Kierkegaard—The Concept of Irony], Tokyo: Gakugei-shobou 1955. Soma, Gyohuu, “キャールケガァルドとイプセン” [Kierkegaard and Ibsen], in his 個人主義思想 [The Thought of Individualism], Tokyo: Tenkoudou-shobou 1915, pp. 99–118. de Sousa, Domingos, “親鸞とキェルケゴール” [Shinran and Kierkegaard], 大 谷大学大学院研究紀要 [Research Report in the Graduate School of Otani University], vol. 19, 2002, pp. 1–29. Sudou, Takaya, “キルケゴールとヨーロッパ—キリスト教の受容と改編” [Kierkegaard and Europe—Reception of and Change in Christianity], 理想 [Risou], vol. 670, 2003, pp. 24–33. Suyama, Tsutomu, キェルケゴールの思想と生涯 [Kierkegaard’s Thoughts and Life], Tokyo: Soubun-sha 1948. Suzuki, Shunkichi, “ヘフディング『パスカルとキェルケゴール』” [Pascal and Kierkegaard in H. Høffding], 倫理研究 [Ethical Studies (Tokyo University)], vol. 21, 1933, pp. 2–9. Takahashi, Wataru, 絶対と深淵—ヘーゲルとキェルケゴール－ [The Absolute and the Abyss—Hegel and Kierkegaard], Tokyo: Ikuei-shoin 1942. —— キェルケゴール [Kierkegaard], Tokyo: Shinkyou-shuppan-sha 1950. Takafuji, Naoki, キェルケゴール思想へのいざない—エロス・理性・聖性の 音楽家としての [Invitation to Kierkegaard’s Thought—A Musician of Eros, Reason and Holiness], Tokyo: Binebaru-shuppan 1996. Takenouchi, Hirobumi, “ハイデガーとキルケゴール—実存的カテゴリーの問 題をめぐって” [Heidegger and Kierkegaard—The Problem of the Existential

170

Satoshi Nakazato

Categories], 思索 [Shisaku: Meditations (Society of Philosophy, Tohoku University)], vol. 35, 2002, pp. 61–80. —— “「瞬間」[Augenblick]と「突如」[exaipnes]—ハイデガーのキルケゴー ル批判をめぐって” [The Moment and the Exaipnes—Heidegger’s Criticism of Kierkegaard], 東北大学哲学会年報 [Annual Reports of Tohoku Philosophical Association], vol. 19, 2003, pp. 29–45. Tanabe, Hajime, 実存と愛と実践 [Existence, Love and Praxis], Tokyo: Chikumashobou 1948 (republished as vol. 9 in田辺元全集第９巻 [Hajime Tanabe’s Complete Works], Tokyo: Chikuma-shobou 1963). Taniguchi, Tatsuo, キルケゴール研究 [A Study of Kierkegaard], Tokyo: Hokujushuppan 1988. Tekeshita, Naoyuki, “キェルケゴールの実存弁証法” [Kierkegaard’s Existential Dialectic], 理想 [Risou], vol. 62, 1935. Toujou, Kunihiro, “キルケゴールvs.ヘーゲル—アブラハムを巡って” [Kierkegaard against Hegel—About Abraham], 日本の科学者 [Journal of Japanese Scientists], vol. 399, 2001, pp. 181–5. Toyofuku, Junichi, ヘーゲルとキルケゴール [Hegel and Kierkegaard], Tokyo: Koubun-dou 1979. —— キルケゴールの実存思想—ヘーゲルと対比しつつ [Kierkegaard’s Existential Thought—Compared with Hegel], Tokyo: Koubundou-shuppansha 1994. Tsuruta, Hidenari, “キルケゴールの反復と固有名” [Repetition and Proper Nouns in Kierkegaard], 日本病跡学雑誌 [Japanese Bulletin of Pathography], vol. 63, 2002, pp. 64–73. Uchimura, Kanzo, “大野心” [The Great Ambition], 聖書之研究 [Biblical Study], vol. 9, no. 7, 1906, pp. 3–4. Ueda, Bin, “イブセン” [Ibsen], 早稲田文学 [Waseda Bungaku], vol. 3, no. 7, 1906, pp. 83–94. Uoki, Tadakazu, “ヘーゲルの弁証法に対するキェルケゴール並びにバルトの 修正” [Kierkegaard’s and Barth’s Correction of Hegel’s Dialectic], 基督教研究 [Studies in Christian Religion, Doshisha University], vol. 9, no. 2, 1931, pp. 184–98. Wakamatsu, Ken, 若松謙思想論集—カント・ロック・キェルケゴール [Ken Wakamatsu’s Collection of Philosophical Treatises—Kant, Locke and Kierkegaard], Osaka: Sougen-sha 1990. Watanabae, Mitsuo, 初期ヘーゲル・キェルケゴール・ティリッヒ [Kierkegaard’s and Tillich’s Relation to the Young Hegel], Tokyo: Sugiyama-shoten 1984. Watanabe, Mizuto, キェルケゴールの研究 [A Study of Kierkegaard], Tokyo: Hosaka-shuppann 1969. Watsuji, Tetsuro, ゼエレン＝キェルゴオル [Søren Kierkegaard], Tokyo: Uchidarokakuho 1915 (republished, Tokyo: Chikuma-shobou 1947 and as vol. 1 in和辻哲郎全集第１巻 [Tetsuro Watsuji’s Complete Works], Tokyo: Iwanamishoten 1961. Yamashita, Hidetomo, 絶対否定と絶対肯定—キェルケゴールと親鸞の問 題 [The Absolute Negation and Affirmation—A Problem of Kierkegaard and Shinran], Tokyo: Hokuju-shuppann 1978. Yamauchi, Seirou, “覚醒的な教師としてのキルケゴール—著作活動を通しての 伝達、フモリストがひらくトポス” [Kierkegaard as the Awakening Teacher—

Japan: Varied Images through Western Waves

171

A Communication through Authorship and the Topos which the Humorist Unfolds], in 臨床教育人間学:年報 [Clinical Pedagogy and Anthropology: Annual Report (Department of Clinical Pedagogy, Graduate School of Pedagogy, Kyoto University)], vol. 4, 2002, pp. 53–70. —— “キルケゴールの、死んでも癒されぬ病である「絶望」とは” [What is the Incurable Disease, which Kierkegaard Calls “Despair”?], 哲学論集 [Tetsugaku ronshu: Philosophical Studies (Otani University)], vol. 50, 2003, pp. 55–72. Yanagibori, Sugako, “キェルケゴール解釈における仏教とキリスト教” [Buddhism and Christianity in Kierkegaard’s Interpretation], 大正大学総合仏 教研究所年報 [Annual of the Institute for Comprehensive Studies of Buddhism, Taisho University], vol. 23, 2001, pp. 112–17. —— “日本人とキルケゴール [The Japanese and Kierkegaard], 大正大学総合仏 教研究所年報 [Annual of the Institute for Comprehensive Studies of Buddhism, Taisho University], vol. 25, 2003, pp. 110–19. Yoshimitsu, Yoshihiko, “キェルケゴール的思惟について” [On Kierkegaard’s Way of Thinking], in his 文化倫理の根本問題 [The Fundamental Problems of Culture and Ethics], Tokyo: Shinsei-shobou 1936, pp. 83–7. Yoshimura, Hiroji, キェルケゴール絶望の概念—「死にいたる病」とその周辺 [The Concept of Despair in Kierkegaard—Concerning The Sickness unto Death], Tokyo: Natsume-shoten 1947. Yura, Tesuji, “キェルケゴールの人及びその思想” [Kierkegaard’s Life and Thought], in his 人生観の問題 [The Problems of the View of Life], Tokyo: Meguro-shoten 1935, pp. 190–205. —— “キェルケゴールの人生観1–4” [Kierkegaard’s View of Life, Parts 1–4], 教 育学術雑誌 [Journal of Educational Review], vol. 9, 1935, pp. 7–22 (Part 1); vol. 10, 1935, pp. 49–67 (Part 2); vol. 11, 1935, pp. 2–21 (Part 3); vol. 12, 1935, pp. 12–30 (Part 4). Ze, Eisei, “キィルケゴオルドの恋日記” [Kierkegaard’s Diary of Love], 層雲 [A Stratus Cloud], vol. 1, no. 2, 1911, pp. 1–17. III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Reception in Japan Andreasen, Esben, “Søren Kierkegaard og Japan—religionsfilosofisk set,” Religion, no. 4, 2001, pp. 33–46. Amano, Keitarou and Michimune Madenokouji, “日本に於けるキェルケゴール 文献” [Literature on Kierkegaard in Japan], 関西大学学報 [Annual Report of Kansai University], ed. by Kansai University, Osaka, vol. 284, 1955, pp. 6–10. [Anonymous], “ケルケゴール著書・参考文献・年譜” [Kierkegaard Literature, Secondary Literature and his Chronological Record], 序説 [The Introduction], vol. 3, 1948, pp. 269–99. Handa, Ichiro, “Japan and Kierkegaard,” Meddelelser fra Søren Kierkegaard Selskabet, no. 2, 1950, pp. 38–41. Haryuu, Kiyoto, “実存思想年表” [A Chronological Table of Existential Thought], in 実存主義講座第１巻—実存思想の歴史 [Lectures on Existentialism,

172

Satoshi Nakazato

vol. 1—The History of Existential Thought], ed. by Munetaka Ihijima and Denzaburou Yoshizawa, Tokyo: Risou-sha 1968, pp. 329–401. Hashimoto, Jun, “日本におけるキェルケゴール研究 [Kierkegaard Studies in Japan], 四国学院大学論集 [Shikoku Christian College Treatises], vol. 31, 1974, pp. 17–34. —— “日本におけるキェルケゴール研究” [Kierkegaard Studies in Japan], in his キェルケゴールにおける「苦悩」の世界 [The “Sufferings” in Søren Kierkegaard’s Life and Authorship], Tokyo: Mirai-sha 1976, pp. 19–39. —— “On Japanese Resources (Translation of the Work and Research Literature)— Kierkegaard’s Upbuilding Discourses (1843–1844) and Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions (1845),” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 2000, pp. 240–6. Hashimoto, Jun, Michimune Madenokouji and Hirabayashi Takahiro, Søren Kierkegaard Literature in Japan (1906–1979), Nishinomiya: Kwanseigakuindaigaku Kierkegaard bunken sakusei kyoudoukenkyuukai, Kwanseigakuindaigaku 1995. —— “On Japanese Resources (Translation of the Work and Research Literature)— Kierkegaard’s Upbuilding Discourses (1843–44) and Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions (1845),” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2000, pp. 240–5. Kawakami, Shoushuu, “The History of the Japanese Reception of the Philosophical Fragments,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 2004, pp. 370–5. Kouzuma, Tadashi, “キルケゴール文献” [Kierkegaard Literature], 実存主 義 [Existentialism], vol. 26, 1962, pp. 123–33.—— “キルケゴール文献目録” [Kierkegaard Literature], 理想 [Risou], vol. 555, 1979, pp. 97–141. Madenokouji, Michimune, “日本におけるキェルケゴール文献” [Kierkegaard Literature in Japan], キェルケゴール研究 [Kierkegaard Studies], ed. by the Søren Kierkegaard Society of Japan (Osaka), Tokyo: Soubun-sha, vol. 1, 1964, pp. 139–49. —— “日本におけるキェルケゴール文献” [Kierkegaard Literature in Japan, Parts 1–2], キェルケゴール研究 [Kierkegaard Studies], ed. by the Søren Kierkegaard Society of Japan (Osaka), Tokyo: Soubun-sha, vol. 7, 1977, pp. 72–7 (Part 1); vol. 8, 1978, pp. 95–103 (Part 2). Masuda, Keizaburou, “文献—著作・文献目録・略年譜・解説” [Kierkegaard Literature, Secondary Literature, his Chronological Record and Commentary], 理想 [Risou], vol. 269, 1955, pp. 104–58. Masugata, Kinya, “Kierkegaard’s Reception in Japan,” 大阪教育大学紀要 [Memoirs of Osaka Kyoiku University. I, Humanities], series 1, vol. 38, no. 1 (Osaka: Osaka Kyoiku Daigaku) 1989, pp. 49–66. —— “明治時代とキェルケゴール—キェルケゴール受容史１” [The Meiji Era and Kierkegaard—Kierkegaard’s Reception in Japan, Part 1], in キェルケゴー ル研究 [Kierkegaard Studies, vol. 20], ed. by the Søren Kierkegaard Society of Japan (Osaka), Tokyo: Soubun-sha 1990, pp. 29–39. —— “明治時代とキェルケゴール—キェルケゴール受容2 [The Meiji Era and Kierkegaard—Kierkegaard’s Reception in Japan, Part 2], in キェルケゴール研 究 [Kierkegaard Studies, vol. 22], ed. by the Søren Kierkegaard Society of Japan (Osaka), Tokyo: Soubun-sha 1992, pp. 5–12.

Japan: Varied Images through Western Waves

173

—— “日本に於けるキェルケゴール受容史” [The History of Kierkegaard’s Reception in Japan], in キェルケゴールと日本の仏教・哲学 [Kierkegaard and Japanese Buddhism and Philosophy], ed. by Masaru Otani and Toshikazu Ooya, Osaka: Tohou-shuppan 1992, pp. 265–85. —— “The History of the Japanese Reception of The Concept of Anxiety,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 2001, pp. 378–96. Mortensen, Finn Hauberg, Kierkegaard Made in Japan, Odense: Odense University Press 1996 (Odense University Literary and Cultural Studies, vol. 5). Ootani, Hidehito, “キルケゴール文献目録” [Kierkegaard Literature], 理想 [Risou], vol. 360, 1963, pp. 80–94. —— キルケゴール青年時代の研究、正続 [A Study of Kierkegaard’s Youth], vols. 1–2, Tokyo: Keisou-shobou 1966–8. Otani, Masaru, “The Past and Present State of Kierkegaard Studies in Japan,” Orbis Litterarum, 18, 1963, pp. 54–9. —— “Kierkegaard-studiets historie i Japan,” Kierkegaardiana, 2, 1957, pp. 70–4. Shida, Shouzou, “実存思想の輸入と研究” [The Reception and Studies of Existential Thoughts in Japan], in 実存主義講座第１巻—実存思想の歴史 [Lectures on Existentialism, vol. 1—The History of Existential Thoughts], ed. by Munetaka Ihijima and Denzaburou Yoshizawa, Tokyo: Risou-sha 1968, pp. 241–71.

C\ Taylor & Francis ~Taylor & Francis Group

http:/ / taylora ndfra ncis.com

Australia: An Archaeology of Silence of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Reception William McDonald

The story of Kierkegaard’s philosophical reception in Australia is largely the story of his non-reception. This is because of a combination of historical untimeliness and geographical isolation, the strident secularism of the Australian education system, the attempt in the first half of the twentieth century to forge a national identity for Australian philosophy, and the more recent ideological stand-off between AngloAmerican “analytic” philosophy and European “Continental” philosophy. In tracing the Kierkegaard reception in Australia, I have examined the following surfaces of emergence of his work: (I) philosophy appointments at Australian universities; (II) Australian journals of philosophy; (III) international publications by Australian philosophers; (IV) Australian university courses in philosophy; (V) Australian Ph.D. theses in philosophy; (VI) Australian philosophy conferences; and (VII) other Kierkegaard resources, such as societies, research units, research networks, and special events. In order to understand why there has been relatively little uptake of Kierkegaard’s work in Australia, we need to examine not only these surfaces of emergence, but also the “enunciative modalities” in our archaeology of Kierkegaard reception. This involves asking the questions: “Who is speaking?”; “From what institutional site?”; and “Who is the questioning and listening subject?” We will also look at Kierkegaard reception in Australia through Foucault’s concept of “the formation of strategies.” This will focus on which theories and texts have been yoked to Kierkegaard’s in Australian philosophy. Kierkegaard is a transdiscursive author and a founder of discursivity. He writes across a variety of intersecting disciplines of knowledge, and spawns writings in philosophy, theology, literature, literary criticism, education, and psychology. He is a writer who introduces new problematics in these fields, and new concepts with which to present them. This study is restricted to Kierkegaard reception in the discourse of Australian philosophy.

Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. by A.M. Sheridan Smith, London: Tavistock Publications 1972, pp. 50–55.  Ibid., pp. 64–70. 

176

William McDonald

I. The Context of Reception Australian philosophy in the nineteenth century was neither ripe for the reception of, nor was it exposed to, Kierkegaard’s work. It was dominated by Scottish philosophy, particularly by the common sense philosophy of Thomas Reid (1710–96), by the work of Sir William Hamilton (1805–65) in which Reid’s philosophy is married with German idealism, and by the Kantian-Hegelian idealism of Edward Caird (1835– 1908). All the foundation appointments in philosophy at Australian universities in the nineteenth century were of philosophers trained in Scotland. In 1886 Henry Laurie (1837–1922), who was educated at the University of Edinburgh, was appointed to the Chair of Mental and Moral Philosophy at the University of Melbourne. In 1888 the University of Sydney created its first lectureship in philosophy, which was converted in 1890 to the Challis Chair of Mental and Moral Philosophy. The first incumbent of the Challis Chair was Sir Francis Andersen, who was educated at the University of Glasgow. At the University of Adelaide, a Chair of English Language and Literature and Mental and Moral Philosophy was created in 1874. Its first occupant, John Davidson (1834–81), was educated at the University of St. Andrews. Davidson’s most influential successor in the Chair at Adelaide, Sir William Mitchell (1861–1962), was educated at the University of Edinburgh. These appointments ensured the domination of Australian philosophy by idealism throughout the nineteenth century. William Ralph Boyce Gibson (1869–1935), appointed as the second professor of philosophy at the University of Melbourne in 1911, remarked that between “Idealistic Philosophy and Christianity—there is a profound affinity.” What Gibson had in mind was the Hegelian contention that Christianity expresses in metaphorical and symbolic form, truths that are more explicitly stated by philosophical concepts. There was little sympathy in this context for a Kierkegaardian critique of Hegelian speculative philosophy. Just as Hegel’s idealism spawned the materialism of Marx and Feuerbach, Scottish idealism contained the seeds of metaphysical realism. This realism already had its precondition in the empiricism of Hume and the common sense philosophy of Thomas Reid, but it seemed implicit in the version of idealism that filtered through to Australia. The most important appearance of “realist” principles within an “idealist” framework was in the work of Sir William Mitchell, who held the chair in philosophy at Adelaide from 1894 until 1923. Mitchell was particularly important in setting the agenda for philosophy of mind at the University of Adelaide, which later became the

S.A. Grave, A History of Philosophy in Australia, Brisbane: University of Queensland Press 1984, p. 24.  Ibid., pp. 14–15.  Ibid., p. 18.  Ibid., pp. 21–2.  W.R. Boyce Gibson, “Problems of Spiritual Experience,” Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, vol. 2, no. 2, 1924, p. 84.  Grave, A History of Philosophy in Australia, pp. 22–3. 

Australia: An Archaeology of Silence of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Reception

177

birthplace of Australian materialism about mind in the work of Ullin Thomas Place (1924–2000) and J.J.C. Smart (b. 1920). Meanwhile, in Melbourne, W.R. Boyce Gibson was a promising candidate for recognizing the importance of Kierkegaard’s work. Gibson was educated at Oxford, Jena, Paris, and Glasgow and had a life-long interest in Christian philosophy. He was the son of a Methodist minister and had been profoundly influenced by Rudolf Eucken (1846–1926), who had taught him at Jena. Gibson wrote two books on Eucken’s ideas, Rudolf Eucken’s Philosophy of Life (1906) and God With Us (1909), which articulate a form of Christian existentialism.10 W.R. Boyce Gibson nowhere mentions Kierkegaard. Presumably he was never exposed to his work. In the early twentieth century, Australian philosophers were also yearning for an expression of philosophy that was distinctively Australian. This yearning was not peculiar to philosophy, but was also a prime motivation for the direction of contemporary art and literature. Australia attained nationhood through a federation of its states in 1901. The search for a national identity, independent of Britain and appropriate to Australia’s culture and geography, was paramount. This was particularly difficult in philosophy, which was widely regarded as a discipline that deals with universal truths, transcending national borders. But Australian philosophers perceived American pragmatism as having achieved for the United States what they aspired to in Australia. Part of this was to be achieved by the appointment of a new generation of university lecturers who had received their philosophical education in Australia. Part of it was also to be achieved in the reconciliation of idealism and realism, in ways analogous to their reconciliation in pragmatism.11 In 1935 W.R. Boyce Gibson died and was succeeded in the chair at Melbourne by his son, Alexander Boyce Gibson. Alexander Boyce Gibson (1900–72) was only the second author to mention Kierkegaard in an Australian journal of philosophy (1948).12 He did not mention Kierkegaard again in an Australian journal until 1966.13 The latter article was the second mention of Kierkegaard in Sophia: A Journal for Discussion in Philosophical Theology. Sophia subsequently became the Australian philosophy journal with the greatest number of articles on Kierkegaard. Alexander Boyce Gibson’s contemporary in the chair of philosophy at the University of Sydney was John Anderson (1893–1962). Anderson was educated in mathematics, physics and philosophy at the University of Glasgow. Anderson dominated Sydney philosophy as no one else has ever done. He was the most outspoken public intellectual the nation has known. He was a rigorous empiricist and a daunting critic. Anderson held the Challis chair from 1927 to 1958. Andersonian  James Franklin, Corrupting the Youth: A History of Philosophy in Australia, Sydney: Macleay Press 2003, pp. 181–2. 10 Grave, A History of Philosophy in Australia, pp. 28–30. 11 See, for example, E. Morris Miller, “The Beginnings of Philosophy in Australia,” Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, vol. 7, 1929, pp. 241–51; W.R. Boyce Gibson, “The Problem of Real and Ideal in the Phenomenology of Husserl,” Mind, vol. 34, 1925; and Grave, A History of Philosophy in Australia, pp. 38–46. 12 A. Boyce Gibson, “Critical Notice of Between Man and Man (Martin Buber),” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 26, no. 1, 1948, pp. 46–58. 13 A. Boyce Gibson, “A Metaphysical Crotchet,” Sophia, vol. 5, no. 2, 1966, pp. 3–9.

178

William McDonald

empiricism and Melbournian Wittgensteinianism marked this as a period of debunking metaphysics (to which religion was assimilated).14 Anderson’s robust empirical realism stamped a new generation of prominent philosophers, including David Malet Armstrong (b. 1926), David Stove (1927–94), John L. Mackie (1917–81), and John Passmore (1914–2004). When this was crosspollinated with the philosophy of mind being developed in Adelaide, Australian philosophy became identified with the doctrine of central-state materialism, most forcefully articulated in the work of David Armstrong and J.J.C. Smart. This reductive theory of mind was hostile to anything that smacked of spirit or transcendence. Subsequently, in the 1970s and 1980s Australian philosophy was rent with an ideological division between Anglo-American analytic philosophy and Continental philosophy.15 Those in the former camp assimilated themselves to philosophy of science, logic, and language, while the latter were intent on exposing the unspoken political assumptions built into the analytic conceptions of philosophy. The Continental philosophers drew their inspiration almost exclusively from French philosophy, particularly the work of Althusser, Lacan, Foucault, Derrida, and Deleuze, with a later flurry of interest in French feminists such as Kristeva, Cixous, Irigaray, and Le Doeuff as well as an acknowledgement of the importance of Nietzsche to this tradition. There was little sympathy for a nineteenth-century Christian existentialist in this hardline political philosophy, which built on the work of those new left French thinkers who had rejected existentialism with Sartre. There have been some overt attempts to bridge the gulf between analytic and Continental philosophy in the past fifteen years, and the standoff between the two camps has become somewhat otiose in the twenty-first century. In 1989, the Dawkins reforms in higher education led to fundamental structural change, which converted Australian universities from public institutions to increasingly privatized corporations. This has fostered a culture of research production for production’s sake, regardless of content—as long as the resultant publications meet the federal department of education’s criteria for counting as fundable research quantum. As a result over forty per cent of all publications on Kierkegaard by Australians or in Australian journals have occurred in the past ten years. The recent expression of interest in Kierkegaard’s work has been facilitated by the breakdown of geographical isolation with global electronic communication and the relative ease of international travel. It has also been enhanced by the presence in Australia of the late Dr. Julia Watkin, who set up the Kierkegaard Society of Australia (1994), edited the Søren Kierkegaard Society Bulletin (1995–7), organized streams of papers on Kierkegaard at two annual Australasian Association of Philosophy conferences (1995, 1996), hosted the International Kierkegaard Newsletter website (1994–2005), ran an undergraduate unit on Kierkegaard and Nietzsche at the University of Tasmania (1999–2002), maintained the Søren Kierkegaard Research Unit at the same university (1994–2003), and donated the Malantschuk Memorial Grave, A History of Philosophy in Australia, p. 99. Cf. Richard Campbell, “The Covert Metaphysics of the Clash between ‘Analytic’ and ‘Continental’ Philosophy,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, vol. 9 no. 2, 2001, pp. 341–59.

14 15

Australia: An Archaeology of Silence of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Reception

179

collection of Kierkegaard books to the Joint Theological Library of Ormond College at the University of Melbourne in 2003. In December 2005 the Japanese Kierkegaard Society held its first international conference at Ormond College, mainly because the Malantschuk collection is housed there. II. The Reception in Australian Philosophy Journals and the Formation of Strategies The first mention of Kierkegaard’s work in an Australian journal of philosophy was in 1947, in a review of Guido de Ruggiero’s Existentialism.16 In that review article, A.M. Ritchie attributes the relative neglect of existentialism in Australia to geographical isolation, “an isolation aggravated by the war,” and to “political authoritarianism and a commercial and political censorship.”17 Ritchie cites the claim John Wild made of Kierkegaard in the Philosophical Review of 1940 that “it is, indeed, difficult to point to any single modern philosopher whose influence is at present being more widely felt” and observes that this claim in Australia “would still appear, in 1947, nonsensical. Indeed, even the name of Kierkegaard is still little known.”18 The next three mentions of Kierkegaard in Australian philosophy journals were also in reviews of books.19 All of these articles assimilated Kierkegaard’s work to existentialism. All, while asserting the importance of Kierkegaard’s work to this philosophical movement, were critical of Kierkegaard and focused on him primarily as a precursor of the philosophers and theologians who follow—such as Heidegger, Buber, and Jaspers. All of these review articles appeared in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Only four more review articles relating to Kierkegaard’s work have been published in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy, between 1969 and 2002. These have been, respectively, reviews of George Schrader, Existential Philosophers: Kierkegaard to Merleau-Ponty, of Jacques Derrida’s The Gift of Death, of Alastair Hannay and Gordon Marino’s (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, and of Mark Dooley’s The Politics of Exodus: Kierkegaard’s Ethics of Responsibility. There has never been a research article devoted to Kierkegaard’s work published in this journal. There have only ever been review articles. 16 A.M. Ritchie, “Critical Notice of Existentialism by Guido de Ruggiero,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 25, 1947, pp. 174–84. 17 Ibid., p. 174. A general shortage of books in wartime Britain, together with the government’s “stringent censorship of any literature that it felt might be injurious to the war effort” and the encouragement of libraries and bookshops to order only “safe” books, meant that existentialist literature was very hard to obtain in New Zealand as well as in Australia. Cf. Dale Benson, “Pop-Existentialism in New Zealand,” Kotare: New Zealand Notes & Queries—A Journal of New Zealand Studies, June 2005, p. 1. 18 Ritchie, “Critical Notice of Existentialism by Guido de Ruggiero,” , p. 174. 19 A. Boyce Gibson, “Critical Notice of Between Man and Man (Martin Buber),” pp. 46–58; G. Stuart Watts, “Review of The Perennial Scope of Philosophy (Karl Jaspers),” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 29, no. 1, 1951, pp. 58–65; and Henry Thornton, “Review of Karl Jaspers et la Philosophie de L’Existence by Mikel Dufrenne et Paul Ricoeur,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 29, no. 1, 1951, pp. 130–31.

180

William McDonald

Between May 1951 and July 1963 there was silence in Australian philosophy journals on Kierkegaard. The fifth mention of Kierkegaard’s work was the first in Sophia,20 which was to become the Australian journal with the most frequent publication on Kierkegaard’s work, with seventeen articles appearing between 1966 and 1999. Sophia has as its subtitle, “A Journal for Discussion in Philosophical Theology.”21 It is not surprising, then, that with this field of enquiry it should attract most articles published in Australia on Kierkegaard’s work. It was originally published through the University of Melbourne, but moved with its editor Max Charlesworth to Deakin University in 1975. All but two of the articles published on Kierkegaard in Sophia, however, were written by philosophers from outside Australia. The second article in Sophia that mentions Kierkegaard is a Wittgensteinian treatment of the notions of subjectivity and religious truth in Kierkegaard, by D.Z. Phillips (1934– 2006).22 The majority of articles in Sophia on Kierkegaard’s work have a title of the form: “X and Y in Kierkegaard” or “Kierkegaard on X and Y” or “Kierkegaard and X.” This signifies that, even by the 1960s in Australia, authors could not take a close knowledge of Kierkegaard’s work for granted. Instead, they had to introduce his work in relation to concepts that had some currency in analytic philosophy of religion. The vast majority of articles in Sophia are from the standpoint of logical analysis. Many articles in the first decade of its publication take as a point of reference the very influential book edited by Antony Flew (b. 1923) and Alasdair MacIntyre (b. 1929), New Essays in Philosophical Theology.23 This book includes chapters by two Australian authors, J.J.C. Smart and C.B. Martin, and two New Zealand authors, G.E. Hughes (b. 1918) and A.N. Prior (1914–69). The non-Australian contributors to Sophia in the 1960s, of articles on Kierkegaard, offer analyses in this context.24 D.Z. Phillips contrasts Kierkegaard’s position with Antony Flew’s and John Hick’s position that if “God loves mankind” is to mean anything “it must make a difference Patrick Hutchings, “Do We Talk That Nonsense?” Sophia, vol. 2, no. 2, 1963, p. 12. Hutchings only mentions Kierkegaard in a dismissive aside in this article: “it is open to the non-religious person to press the charge of absurdity against religion here. Not but that he may, in doing so, give the mildest Loadicean a moment which he does not deserve of Kirkegaardian [sic], Quixotic exultation…” 21 The subtitle of Sophia changed three times subsequently: in 1991 to “Journal for Philosophical Theology and Cross-Cultural Philosophy of Religion”; in 1997 to “International Journal for Philosophical Theology and Cross-Cultural Philosophy of Religion and Ethics”; and in 2001 to “International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysical Theology and Ethics.” 22 D.Z. Phillips, “Subjectivity and Religious Truth in Kierkegaard,” Sophia, vol. 7, no. 2, 1968, pp. 3–13. 23 Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre (eds.), New Essays in Philosophical Theology, London: SCM Press 1955. 24 D.Z. Phillips, “Subjectivity and Religious Truth in Kierkegaard,” (p. 6) refers directly to New Essays in Philosophical Theology as does John F. Miller III in “The Logic of Scientific and Religious Principles,” Sophia, vol. 12, no. 3, 1973, p. 13. Cf. George Stack, “Kierkegaard and the Logical Possibility of God,” Sophia, vol. 7, no. 2, 1968, pp. 14–19; and Leroy T. Howe, “Kierkegaard on Faith and Reason,” Sophia, vol. 8, no. 1, 1969, pp. 15–24. 20

Australia: An Archaeology of Silence of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Reception

181

to the course of a man’s life and to the course of other people’s lives.”25 But this difference is conceived by Flew and Hick in what Kierkegaard calls “the worldhistorical sense,” while for Kierkegaard himself it is conceived as “dying to…the objective world-historical view of things.”26 All the articles on Kierkegaard in Sophia in the 1960s focus primarily on the role of reason in religion and are concerned to rebut the charge that Kierkegaard can be dismissed as an irrationalist. Alexander Boyce Gibson explores the “criticisms of the attempt to commend the ways of God by the ways of reason”27 to be found in Philosophical Fragments, since he takes that text to articulate the most powerful critiques available of reason in religion. He attempts the logical reconstruction of Climacus’ critique in order to commend a “chastened defence of the role of reason in religion; the older and more confident defences having been outflanked in the pages [of Philosophical Fragments] before us.”28 In “Kierkegaard and the Logical Possibility of God,” George J. Stack (b. 1931) tries to classify the cognitive status of the claim that God exists, in Kierkegaard’s terms. He concludes that it is neither “a ‘putative’ factual claim” nor “necessarily true.”29 Rather, for Kierkegaard, “God, from the point of view of reason…is a logically possible being, a being the existence of which does not entail any contradiction.”30 However, it requires faith rather than objective reflection to believe the assertion that God exists. Stack argues that “Kierkegaard, like Kant, used reason in order to reveal the limits of reason”31 and thereby resists the common conception of Kierkegaard as a proponent of irrationalism. Leroy T. Howe (b. 1936), too, argues against interpreting Kierkegaard as an “unqualified irrationalist.”32 He argues that Kierkegaard does not deny the need to ground faith in objective truth, but “his stress…is on faith not as grounded but as lived…it is the priority rather than the possibility of objectivity which Kierkegaard questions so trenchantly. In the analysis of faith as passional, reason functions integrally as a necessary condition, although by no means as a sufficient one.”33 All the articles in the 1970s in Sophia are critical of Kierkegaard. George D. Chryssides (b. 1945) attempts “to show where the alleged semantic confusions lie in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling” with respect to the notion of “the teleological suspension of the ethical.”34 Chryssides argues that, for Kierkegaard, Abraham’s faith depends on a sharp distinction between the “universal” claims of morality and the “particular” (and overriding) obedience to God. Chryssides uses a quasiWittgensteinian argument that words can never be particular but must be universal. Thus, insofar as Kierkegaard uses words to convey the particularity of Abraham’s Phillips, “Subjectivity and Religious Truth in Kierkegaard,” p. 6. Ibid., p. 7. 27 A. Boyce Gibson, “A Metaphysical Crotchet,” p. 3. 28 Ibid., p. 3. 29 Ibid., p. 16. 30 Ibid., p. 17. 31 Ibid., p. 15. 32 Howe, “Kierkegaard on Faith and Reason,” p. 15. 33 Ibid., p. 15. 34 George D. Chryssides, “Abraham’s Faith,” Sophia, vol. 12, no. 1, 1973, p. 10. 25 26

182

William McDonald

faith, he universalizes it and thereby undoes the distinction he is at pains to draw. Chryssides charges Kierkegaard with the mistake of imposing “an unduly literalistic interpretation on what is essentially metaphorical language.”35 John F. Miller III deals with Kierkegaard only tangentially. The main focus of his paper is to critique Henry E. Allison’s “attempt to answer Flew’s challenge that religious assertions [of the sort ‘God loves mankind’] are cognitively meaningless and factually nonsensical…”36 Allison had tried to construe such religious assertions as counterfactuals, but Miller argues that such assertions are “more similar to what in science are principles in accordance with which experience is interpreted.”37 According to Miller, Allison “interprets the ‘logic of religion’ on uniquely Kierkegaardian grounds,”38 and therefore where Allison fails, Kierkegaard fails. Alfred Dewey Jensen also looks at Kierkegaard only tangentially. He too takes Fear and Trembling to be Kierkegaard’s position on Christianity, at least insofar as it posits “a difference in kind between ethics and Christianity.”39 The paper is primarily a critique of Gingell’s identification of theism with Christianity, and Jensen takes Kierkegaard’s distinction between ethics and Christianity to undermine Gingell’s identification. James Kellenberger addresses the question: “Is faith an emotion?” He wants to steer a course between the view that faith is an emotion, and the view that faith is “an assent to the truth of propositions.”40 Kellenberger takes Kierkegaard’s view to be that “religious truths can remain truths, but their truth is relegated to a position of unimportance in comparison to the passion and commitment of faith.”41 Samuel Fleischacker argues that there is a deep affinity between the writings of Kafka and Wittgenstein, which is grounded in “essentially the same problem—man’s tendency to rely too heavily on giving grounds for his beliefs and actions.”42 This is also Kierkegaard’s problem, according to Fleischacker. In his later writings, Wittgenstein comes closest to Kierkegaard’s view, “not that religious beliefs are inexpressible, but that they are absurd. They belong to the group of ideas for which one can give no grounds because they are too fundamental and too immediate to one’s thought.”43 None of the articles in Sophia before 1983 makes anything of the rhetorical structure of Kierkegaard’s authorship or of the various pseudonymous perspectives. Instead, they all attribute to Kierkegaard the views expressed in his pseudonymous texts. The texts most referred to are Fear and Trembling, Philosophical Fragments, and Concluding Unscientific Postscript. The majority of papers in the 1980s, however, pay close attention to particular texts and are sensitive to the pseudonymous points of view. Abrahim Kahn’s paper Ibid., p.16. Miller, “The Logic of Scientific and Religious Principles,” p.11. 37 Ibid., p. 22. 38 Ibid., p. 11. 39 Alfred Dewey Jensen, “Dr. Johnson, Kierkegaard and Gingell’s Dilemma,” Sophia, vol. 15, no. 3, 1976, p. 10. 40 James Kellenberger, “Faith and Emotion,” Sophia, vol. 19, no. 3, 1980, p. 27. 41 Ibid., pp. 28–9. 42 Samuel Fleischacker, “Religious Questions: Kafka and Wittgenstein on Giving Grounds,” Sophia, vol. 21, no. 1, 1982, p. 3. 43 Ibid., p. 11. 35 36

Australia: An Archaeology of Silence of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Reception

183

“sketches the essential features of Salighed in Efterskrift,”44 using electronicallyreadable text to analyze Kierkegaard’s concept of Salighed in terms of words with which it is clustered and from which it is differentiated. It is the first article in Sophia to use Kierkegaard’s Danish text as a basis for analysis. Donald Barker’s paper describes “how, for the believer in Kierkegaard’s sense, revelation bears repetition in a different way, for different reasons, than does other material which bears repetition.”45 The paper also addresses the question of how “I know whether I really have faith, really believe, really have gone from Climacus’ ‘Religiousness A’ to ‘Religiousness B.’ ”46 Martin Bertman maintains that “Kierkegaard, theologian that he is, has a strained relation to the logos. The mythos is indisputably primary; further, the logos is submerged—say against and compared to Hegel—by a romantic exalting of imagination over reason and by considering the will the spiritual substance of the self.…”47 Bertman’s article explores the relationship of logos to mythos to illuminate the concept of selfhood in The Sickness Unto Death. T.F. Morris develops “Kierkegaard’s understanding of despair through what he says in Works of Love about erotic love and friendship.”48 Morris concentrates on a single text, though having nothing to say about the status of “Kierkegaard” as author in Works of Love. The articles in Sophia in the 1990s attempt to situate Kierkegaard’s thought in relation to that of other major thinkers. Curtis Thompson explores the theme of “the end of religion” in Kierkegaard and Hegel. He takes this phrase in three senses with respect to both thinkers, to find close parallels between them: (i) end as demise; (ii) end as conclusion; and (iii) end as purpose. With respect to Kierkegaard these three ends, respectively, are: (i) Christianity ends in Christendom; (ii) Religiousness A and Religious B are sublated in Religiousness C; and (iii) the purpose of religion is to intensify passion because the degree of existential pathos amounts to the degree of selfhood.49 Abrahim Kahn is the only author to have written two articles in Sophia on Kierkegaard. His second article examines a political theory implicit in Kierkegaard’s critique of the novel Two Ages…by juxtaposing him to Locke. Basic to the theory is a notion of individuality which relies on three interlocking concepts: will, equality, and autonomy. That notion in turn supports

Abrahim H. Kahn, “Happiness in Kierkegaard’s Efterskrift,” Sophia, vol. 22, no. 1, April 1983, p. 37. 45 Donald R. Barker, “Revelation’s Repeatability and Christian Faith,” Sophia, vol. 23, no. 1, 1984, p. 25. 46 Ibid., p. 25. 47 Martin A. Bertman, “Kierkegaard: How a Clever Theologian Finds Unhappiness,” Sophia, vol. 27, no. 3, 1988, p. 32. 48 T.F. Morris, “Kierkegaard on Despair and the Eternal,” Sophia, vol. 28, no. 3, p. 21. 49 Curtis L. Thompson, “The End of Religion in Hegel and Kierkegaard,” Sophia, vol. 33, no. 2, 1994, p. 14. 44

184

William McDonald ideas of authority and leadership that throw further light on Kierkegaard’s understanding of the relation between religion and politics.…50

Matthew Jacoby’s article is a critique of Steven M. Emmanuel’s likening of “Kierkegaard’s notion of the nature of Christian doctrine to George Lindbeck’s ‘regulative theory’ of doctrine.”51 While Jacoby agrees with Emmanuel “that both [Kierkegaard and Lindbeck] stress the fact that Christianity is not primarily propositional in nature,” he objects to the idea that Christian truth for Kierkegaard is primarily concerned with rules for living. Rather, according to Jacoby, Christian truth for Kierkegaard is relational in nature.52 The article by Robyn Brothers compares Kierkegaard to Lévinas on “their complementary conceptions of identity—which posit anti-essentialist, relational notions of self—as they inform the ‘ethics of ethics.’ ”53 Brothers’ article is focused mainly on Lévinas’ criticism of Buber, and draws on work by Derrida, Irigaray, and Hegel in the process. It evaluates “the ethics of non-identity in the ethical deconstruction of Lévinas and of relational identity in Kierkegaard’s radical existentialism”54 to conclude that Buber’s use of “I-Thou” is “too spiritual.”55 All but two of the authors in Sophia who mention Kierkegaard are from outside Australia.56 Trends in interpretation of Kierkegaard in Sophia have been determined more by what was going on in the USA and the UK than in Australian philosophy. The only Australian influence discernible is the attempt by these non-Australian authors to use logical analysis to assimilate Kierkegaard’s philosophical theology to analytic philosophy (with the exception of Robyn Brothers’ article). III. International Publications by Australian Authors Australia’s most prolific authors on Kierkegaard have published much more internationally than domestically. They have also achieved more recognition internationally than domestically. For example, William McDonald has published the entry on Kierkegaard in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.57 This on-line encyclopaedia is based in California, but also has a mirror site in Sydney. In 2004 the

Abrahmin H. Kahn, “Kierkegaard on Authority and Leadership: Political Logic in Religious Thought,” Sophia, vol. 33 no. 3, November 1994, p. 74. 51 Matthew Jacoby, “Kierkegaard and the Nature of Truth,” Sophia, vol. 38, no. 1, 1999, p. 74. Steven Emmanuel’s position is articulated in his book, Kierkegaard and the Concept of Revelation, Albany: State University of New York Press 1996. 52 Jacoby, “Kierkegaard and the Nature of Truth,” p. 76. 53 Robyn Brothers, “‘Ethics of Ethics, Law of Laws’: Kierkegaard, Lévinas and the Aporia of Substantive Identity,” Sophia, vol. 38, no. 2, 1999, p. 54. 54 Ibid., p. 54. 55 Ibid., p. 86. 56 The two Australian authors are Alexander Boyce Gibson and Matthew Jacoby. 57 William McDonald, “Søren Kierkegaard,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/kierkegaard.htm (last updated November 2004). 50

Australia: An Archaeology of Silence of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Reception

185

Kierkegaard entry had the eighth highest number of visits at the California site, but only the one hundred and twenty-ninth highest at the Sydney site.58 William McDonald has a strong presence on the internet. He has published articles on Kierkegaard in three internet encyclopaedias and in one internet journal.59 Julia Watkin also has a strong presence on the internet through her invaluable resource, The International Kierkegaard Newsletter, which comprises information on international Kierkegaard institutions and societies, conferences and lectures, publications, dissertations, computer and internet resources, media events, and other news.60 Google returns 9,250 results for a search of “William McDonald Kierkegaard” and 534 results for a search of “Julia Watkin Kierkegaard.”61 Both Julia Watkin and William McDonald have translated books by Kierkegaard into English, though Julia Watkin’s book was translated before she moved from Denmark to Australia.62 Both have also published articles in the series International Kierkegaard Commentary edited by Robert Perkins.63 Both have also written Kierkegaard dictionaries.64 They are the only Australian philosophers who might be characterized as Kierkegaard scholars, rather than as philosophers with an interest in Kierkegaard.65 Statistics for the California site can be found at: http://plato.stanford.edu/wwwstat/ wwwstats.html. The statistics for the Sydney site can be found at: http://setis.library.usyd.edu. au/stanford/wwwstat/archive/wwwstats2004.html. 59 The encyclopaedias are: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and The Literary Encyclopedia; the journal is Minerva—an internet journal of philosophy. 60 Julia Watkin (ed.), The International Kierkegaard Newsletter, http://www.utas.edu. au/docs/humsoc/kierkegaard/newsletters.html, 1995–2005. 61 By way of comparison, searches in Google on Kierkegaard and Alastair Hannay, Gordon Marino, Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, and Joakim Garff yield respectively: 4,160, 3,690, 584, and 252 results. Google returns 575,000 results for a search of “Kierkegaard.” 62 Early Polemical Writings, trans. and ed. by Julia Watkin, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1990; Prefaces: Light Reading for Certain Classes As the Occasion May Require, trans. and ed. by William McDonald, Tallahassee: Florida State University Press 1989. 63 Julia Watkin, “The Letter from the Lover. Kierkegaard on the Bible and Belief,” in For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourself, ed. by Robert L. Perkins, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press 2002 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 21), pp. 287–313; Julia Watkin,“Boom! The Earth is Round!—On the Impossibility of an Existential System,” in Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, ed. by Robert Perkins, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press 1997 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 12), pp. 95–114; Julia Watkin, “Judge William—A Christian?,” in Either/Or Part II, ed. by Robert L. Perkins, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press 1995 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 4), pp. 113–24; William McDonald, “Retracing the Ruins of Hegel’s Encyclopedia,” in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, ed. by Robert L. Perkins, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press 1997 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 12), pp. 227–46. 64 Julia Watkin, Historical Dictionary of Kierkegaard’s Philosophy, Lanham, Maryland and London: Scarecrow Press 2001; Andrew Burgess, Steven Emmanuel, David Gouwens and William McDonald, A Kierkegaard Dictionary, Oxford: Blackwell, forthcoming. 65 Apart from the sheer volume of their publications on Kierkegaard, and their work in translation and with original sources, the bulk of their publications have been in the field of Kierkegaard studies. 58

186

William McDonald

Richard Campbell is the third most prolific Australian author on Kierkegaard. He has also been the Australian philosopher with the longest standing interest in Kierkegaard. His first article on Kierkegaard was published in 1966 and his last in 2001.66 He has been particularly interested in illuminating Kierkegaard’s notion of truth. In the case of his article on Lessing’s problem, Campbell addresses the question of whether historical truths can ever “become the truth of necessary truths of reason.”67 He argues that the problem as Lessing posed it is insoluble and that “Kierkegaard has restated the problem in the only way which shows any promise for a Christian theology.”68 Nevertheless, contra Kierkegaard, Campbell draws the conclusion “that faith [must] not [be] sealed off from ‘natural inquiry,’ and consequently, a serious grappling with ordinary historical problems is unavoidable in Christian theology.”69 In his article on the clash between “analytic” and “Continental” philosophy, Campbell makes the point that “Continental” philosophy is “a construct within ‘analytic’ philosophy—as its ‘other.’”70 In contrast to the Platonism at the core of “analytic” philosophy, Campbell identifies the “Continental” philosophers (including Kierkegaard) as having “all advocated some sort of turn to history in order to gain fundamental insights.…”71 This links with Campbell’s argument, developed in the paper on Lessing and elsewhere, for the importance of history to philosophical truth. The next most prolific authors on Kierkegaard in Australia work in the Catholic education system. Anthony Imbrosciano lectures at the University of Notre Dame Australia and Richard Colledge lectures at St. Paul’s Theological College in Brisbane. Both have published articles on Kierkegaard’s notion of the individual in the International Philosophical Quarterly.72 Max Charlesworth, although an academic in the state university system for his entire career, has also been one of Australia’s leading Catholic philosophers. He discusses Kierkegaard in two books which survey the philosophy of religion and in another book on the existentialists and Sartre.73 Charlesworth assimilates Kierkegaard’s philosophy of religion to that

Richard Campbell, “Lessing’s Problem and Kierkegaard’s Answer,” Scottish Journal of Theology, 1966, pp. 35–54; Campbell, “The Covert Metaphysics of the Clash between ‘Analytic’ and ‘Continental’ Philosophy.” 67 Campbell, “Lessing’s Problem and Kierkegaard’s Answer,” p. 35. 68 Ibid., p. 35. 69 Ibid., p. 35. 70 Campbell, “The Covert Metaphysics of the Clash between ‘Analytic’ and ‘Continental’ Philosophy,” p. 343. 71 Ibid., p. 350. 72 Richard Colledge, “Kierkegaard’s Subjective Ontology: A Metaphysics of the Existing Individual,” International Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 44, no. 1, 2004, pp. 5–22; Anthony Imbrosciano, “Kierkegaard’s Individual,” International Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 4, 1993, pp. 443–8. 73 Max Charlesworth, Philosophy and Religion: from Plato to Postmodernism, London: One World 2002; Max Charlesworth, The Existentialists and Jean-Paul Sartre, London: George Prior Publishers 1976; Max Charlesworth, Philosophy of Religion: The Historic Approaches, London: Macmillan 1972. 66

Australia: An Archaeology of Silence of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Reception

187

of Kant and Pascal, though he credits Kierkegaard with more consistency than Kant in drawing the limits of reason.74 IV. Teaching Kierkegaard in Australia: Undergraduate Units, Ph.D. Dissertations, and Conference Presentations There has never been an undergraduate unit in an Australian philosophy department devoted exclusively to Kierkegaard. The closest approximations have been Julia Watkin’s unit on “Kierkegaard and Nietzsche,” taught at the University of Tasmania from 1999 to 2002,75 and Richard Campbell’s unit at the Australian National University, entitled “European Philosophy A” (1998–2002), which also dealt with Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Julia Watkin and John Norris taught a unit in 1995 on “Continental Philosophy,” covering the work of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Sartre, and Derrida. The prescribed texts were R.J. Hollingdale, A Nietzsche Reader and Robert Bretall (ed.), A Kierkegaard Anthology. Julia Watkin also taught a unit in 1998 at the University of Tasmania on “Philosophy and Literature,” which focused on the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Coleridge, Kierkegaard, Nussbaum, and Derrida. Richard Colledge also teaches a unit on “Contemporary Continental Philosophy,” at St. Paul’s Theological College in Brisbane, but only the first few lectures are devoted to Kierkegaard. Other undergraduate units with a Kierkegaard component have all been on existentialism. At the University of Queensland, a unit on “Phenomenology and Existentialism” was offered from 1985 to 2001, but Kierkegaard was explicitly included only in 2001, along with Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, de Beauvoir, Merleau-Ponty, Lévinas, Irigaray, and Camus. The unit was taught by Michelle Boulous-Walker. The successor unit at the University of Queensland, taught by Aurelia Armstrong in 2004, dropped Kierkegaard, Lévinas, and Irigaray from this list. A unit entitled “Existentialism” was taught at Murdoch University in Western Australian from 1990 to 2002 and included Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, de Beauvoir, and Sartre. The unit was taught by Paul McDonald, who has also edited The Existential Reader. The successor version of the unit on existentialism at Murdoch, still taught by Paul McDonald in 2005, is entitled “Existence and Freedom” and still includes Kierkegaard. Brian Birchall taught a unit on “Philosophical Foundations of Existentialism” at the University of New England from 1972 to 1990. Each version has included some examination of Kierkegaard, but its prescribed texts and reference texts have changed considerably over time. In 1972, The Concept of Dread was a reference book. In 1973 this was replaced with M. Wyschogrod’s Kierkegaard and Heidegger: The Ontology of Existence, and in 1974 Ronald Grimsley’s Kierkegaard: A Biographical Account was added as a prescribed text in addition to Wyschogrod’s book. In 1978, when William McDonald first encountered the work of Kierkegaard as an undergraduate Charlesworth, Philosophy of Religion: The Historic Approaches, p. 129. All information about the units taught in Australian philosophy departments has been gleaned from university calendars and university web sites, except for the information about units taught by Richard Campbell, Brian Birchall, Richard Colledge, Cheryl Walsh, Bill Doniela, and William McDonald, which was provided by personal communication.

74 75

188

William McDonald

student in this unit, the Concluding Unscientific Postscript had supplanted both Grimsley and Wyschogrod as a prescribed text. Brian Birchall was introduced to Kierkegaard as an undergraduate at the University of Newcastle in the 1960s by the Lithuanian philosopher Bill Doniela, in a unit called “Hegel and his Successors.” Cheryl Walsh was introduced to Kierkegaard in the 1970s by Brian Birchall at the University of New England, and began her Ph.D. dissertation on Kierkegaard and irony at the University of Newcastle, under the supervision of Bill Doniela. Cheryl Walsh completed her PhD dissertation at Bond University, where she currently teaches a unit on existentialism, which includes a section on Kierkegaard. William McDonald taught honors units on Kierkegaard at the University of New England in 1998, 2001, and 2003. The themes were, respectively: the rhetorical structure of the authorship; irony and repetition; love and the concept of the self. William McDonald has also supervised an honors thesis on Hegel and Kierkegaard (by Stephen Arnott) and another on Heidegger and Kierkegaard (Stephen Filmer), and is currently supervising a Ph.D. thesis on Kierkegaard’s moral psychology (by Ben Dornier). William McDonald gained his own Ph.D. through the University of Sydney, though all the research for his dissertation “Aping Kierkegaard” was undertaken at the University of Copenhagen (1985–88). In 1995 and 1996 Julia Watkin and William McDonald organized a Kierkegaard stream at the annual Australasian Association of Philosophy conferences. In 1995 papers were presented by John Norris, “The Validity of A’s View of Tragedy in Either/ Or”; Julia Watkin, “The Ethics of Judge William”; William McDonald, “Confession as Mask”; Peter Vardy, “An Evaluation of Approaches to Love in Either/Or.” At the AAP Conference in 1996, papers were presented by Julia Watkin, “Boom! The Earth is Round—on the Impossibility of an Existential System”; William McDonald, “Retracing the Circular Ruins of Hegel’s Encyclopedia”; and Murray Rae, “The Predicament of Error in Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript.” Julia Watkin also founded the Australian Kierkegaard Society and set up the Kierkegaard Research Unit at the University of Tasmania in 1995. The core of the Research Unit was the Malantschuk Collection, which was subsequently donated to the University of Melbourne. In March 1993 Davis McCaughey gave a lecture entitled “Søren Kierkegaard” to the Danish–Australian Cultural Society in Melbourne. In 1997 the Danish– Australian Cultural Society held a lecture in Melbourne by Karin Christensen from Århus University, “Søren Kierkegaard for Beginners.” In 2002 the Australian Postgraduate Philosophy Conference at the University of New England had two papers devoted to Kierkegaard: Patrick Stokes, “Interested Reflection: Kierkegaard on Ethical Imagination,” and Stephen Filmer, “Truth in Kierkegaard and Heidegger: Subjectivity versus al­ethia.” A research network of Australian postgraduate students in Continental philosophy emerged from this conference and works primarily through an email list. In December 2005 the Japanese Kierkegaard Society hosted an International Kierkegaard Conference at the University of Melbourne. The theme was “Kierkegaard and Asian Thought” and was held at Ormond College, University of Melbourne, which houses the Malantschuk Collection of Kierkegaardiana, donated

Australia: An Archaeology of Silence of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Reception

189

to its Joint Theological Library in 2003 by Julia Watkin. The conference featured a panel discussion on “Perspectives on Kierkegaard in Asia” with Professor Gordon Marino (St. Olaf College), Professor Fujimoto Kiyohiko (Bukkyo University in Kyoto), Emeritus Professor Pyo Chai-Myung (Korean University in Seoul), and Dr. William McDonald (University of New England).

Bibliography I. Kierkegaard’s Works Translated by Australian Scholars Prefaces: Light Reading for Certain Classes As the Occasion May Require, trans. and ed. by William McDonald, Tallahassee: Florida State University Press 1989. Early Polemical Writings, trans. and ed. by Julia Watkin, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1990. II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard in Australia Campbell, Richard, “Lessing’s Problem and Kierkegaard’s Answer,” Scottish Journal of Theology, 1966, pp. 35–54. —— “Existential Truth and the Limits of Discourse” in Being and Truth: Essays in Honour of John Macquarie, ed. by Alistair Kee and Eugene T. Long, London: SCM Press 1986, pp. 85–110. —— Truth and Historicity, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992. —— “The Covert Metaphysics of the Clash between ‘Analytic’ and ‘Continental’ Philosophy,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, vol. 9, no. 2, 2001, pp. 341–59. Charlesworth, Max, Philosophy of Religion: The Historic Approaches, London: Macmillan 1972. —— The Existentialists and Jean-Paul Sartre, London: George Prior Publishers 1976. —— Philosophy and Religion: from Plato to Postmodernism, London: One World 2002. Colledge, Richard, “Kierkegaard’s Subjective Ontology: A Metaphysics of the Existing Individual,” International Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 44, no. 1, 2004, pp. 5–22. Collier, John, “Emergence of the Internal Perspective in Western Science,” Contemporary Philosophy, vol. 24, no. 11, 1996, pp. 355–62. Edwards, Paul, “Kierkegaard and the ‘Truth’ of Christianity,” Philosophy, vol. 46, no. 176, 1971, pp. 89–108. Imbrosciano, Anthony, A Kierkegaardian Perspective on the Education of Character, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Sydney 1989. —— “A Kierkegaardian Theory of Personality Structure,” in Humanity and the Afterlife: Some Australian Reflections, ed. by G. Moses and N. Ormerod, Sydney: Sydney College of Divinity Philosophical Association 1991, pp. 82–101.

Australia: An Archaeology of Silence of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Reception

191

—— “Kierkegaard’s Individual,” International Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 33 no. 4, 1993, pp. 443–8. —— “Inevitable Martyrdom: The Connection between Faith and Suffering in Kierkegaard’s Later Writings,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 36, 1994, pp. 105–16. Jacoby, Matthew Gerhard, “Kierkegaard on Truth,” Religious Studies, vol. 38, no. 1, 2002, pp. 27–45. McDonald, Paul (ed.), The Existentialist Reader, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2000. McDonald, William, “Review of Either/Or, Volume 1 translated by H.V. and E.H. Hong,” Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, no. 18, 1988, pp. 3–8. —— Aping Kierkegaard: A Mimetic-Demonic-Offensive Redoubling of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Rhetoric, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Sydney 1989. —— “Confession as Mask,” Søren Kierkegaard Society Bulletin, no. 1, 1995, pp. 2–10. —— “Madness in Postscript,” Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, no. 32, 1995, pp. 4–9. —— “Writing as a Technology of the Self,” Enrahonar—Revista de Filosofia de la Universitat de Barcelona, no. 25, 1996, pp. 55–67. —— “Retracing the Ruins of Hegel’s Encyclopedia,” in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, ed. by Robert L. Perkins, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press 1997 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 12), pp. 227–46. —— “Review of Sylvia Walsh, Living Poetically: Kierkegaard’s Existential Aesthetics,” Literature and Aesthetics, vol. 7, 1997, pp. 202–5. —— “Review of Alastair Hannay and Gordon Marino (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 77, no. 1, 1999, pp. 120–21. —— “Søren Aabye Kierkegaard,” in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by James Fieser and Bradley Dowden, http://www.iep.utm.edu/k/kierkega.htm, September 2002. —— “Review of Mark Dooley, The Politics of Exodus: Kierkegaard’s Ethics of Responsibility,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 80 no. 3, 2002, pp. 393–6. —— “Indirection and Parrhesia—the Roles of Socrates’ Daimonion and Kierkegaard’s Styrelse in Communication,” in Kierkegaard and the Word, ed. by Poul Houe and Gordon Marino, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel 2003, pp. 126–38. —— “Love in Kierkegaard’s Symposia,” in Minerva—an internet journal of philosophy, http://www.ul.ie/~philos/vol7/kierkegaard.html, vol. 7, November 2003. —— “Søren Kierkegaard,” in The Literary Encyclopedia and the Literary Dictionary, ed. by Robert Clark, Emory Elliot and Janet Todd, http://www.LitEncyc.com, September 2004. —— “Søren Kierkegaard,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/kierkegaard.htm, November 2004. —— “Fear and Trembling,” in The Literary Encyclopedia and the Literary Dictionary, ed. by Robert Clark, Emory Elliot and Janet Todd, http://www. LitEncyc.com, March 2005.

192

William McDonald

—— “Repetition,” in The Literary Encyclopedia and the Literary Dictionary, ed. by Robert Clark, Emory Elliot and Janet Todd, http://www.LitEncyc.com, March 2005. Norris, John, “The Validity of A’s View of Tragedy in Either/Or,” in Either/Or Part I, ed. by Robert L. Perkins, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press 1995 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 3), pp. 143–57. Stokes, Patrick, “The Power of Death: Retroactivity, Narrative and Interest,” in Writing Sampler, Prefaces and Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, ed. by Robert L. Perkins, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press 2006 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vols. 9–10), pp. 387–419. —— “Kierkegaard’s Mirrors: The Immediacy of Moral Vision,” Inquiry, vol. 50, no. 1, 2007, pp. 70–94. Walsh, Cheryl, Kierkegaard and Irony, Ph.D. Thesis, Bond University, Robina, Queensland 1996. Watkin, Julia (ed.), The International Kierkegaard Newsletter (1994–2006), hosted by the University of Tasmania (http://www.utas.edu.au/docs/humsoc/kierkegaard/ newsletters.html). —— “El problema y la realidad del ‘destino’ en El concepto de la angustia,” in Themata Revista de Filosofia: El Concepto de la Angustia, 150 Anos Despues, ed. by Maria Garcia Amilburu, Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla 1995, pp. 85–98. —— “Judge William—A Christian?” in Either/Or Part II, ed. by Robert L. Perkins, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press 1995 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 4), pp. 113–24. —— “Review of Anthony Rudd, Kierkegaard and the Limits of the Ethical,” Heythrop Journal, vol. 37, no. 1, 1996, pp. 102–3. —— “Review of Jerome Gellman, The Fear, the Trembling, and the Fire,” Heythrop Journal, vol. 37 no. 4, 1996, pp. 500–501. —— “Boom! The Earth is Round!—On the Impossibility of an Existential System,” in Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, ed. by Robert Perkins, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press 1997 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 12), pp. 95–114. —— Kierkegaard, London: Geoffrey Chapman 1997. —— Kierkegaard’s God and Hawking’s Universe, Oxford: Westminster College, 2nd series Occasional Paper 6, Religious Experience Research Centre 1997. —— “The Logic of Kierkegaard’s Misogyny 1854–1855,” in Feminist Readings of Søren Kierkegaard, ed. by Celine Leon and Sylvia Walsh, University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press 1997, pp. 69–82. —— “The Idea of Fate in Kierkegaard’s Thought,” in Kierkegaard and Freedom, ed. by James Giles, New York: St. Martin’s Press 2000, pp. 105–20. —— Historical Dictionary of Kierkegaard’s Philosophy, Lanham, Maryland and London: Scarecrow Press 2001. —— “The Letter from the Lover. Kierkegaard on the Bible and Belief,” in For SelfExamination and Judge for Yourself, ed. by Robert L. Perkins, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press 2002 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 21), pp. 287–313.

Australia: An Archaeology of Silence of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Reception

III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Reception in Australia None.

193

C\ Taylor & Francis ~Taylor & Francis Group

http:/ / taylora ndfra ncis.com

PART III The Americas

C\ Taylor & Francis ~Taylor & Francis Group

http:/ / taylora ndfra ncis.com

Canada: Kierkegaard on the Canadian Academic Landscape Abrahim H. Khan

What Marx demands, the union of theory and practice, forms the core of Kierkegaard’s “existential philosophy.” It is under Kierkegaard’s sign of “Either-Or” that these men operate, and Marx is the Either to Kierkegaard’s Or. Hegel, a false mother like the one in Solomon’s judgment, had pretended that the inner was the outer and the outer was the inner: that either half of this baby was as good as the whole.

Reid MacCallum

By the eve of World War II, Søren Kierkegaard was a name known to only a handful of Canadian academics. One or two of them may have come to know of him possibly as a result of disillusionment with the failure of idealism to provide a rational basis for theology. For much of philosophy in Canada until about 1925 functioned as a defense of religious orthodoxy. In their search for other models about knowledge of God, some academics looked to dialectical theology advanced in Europe by Karl Barth (1886–1968), Emil Brunner (1889–1966), and Paul Tillich (1886–1965). This model has an affinity with neo-orthodoxy, introduced to America primarily by the two brothers Reinhold and Richard Niebuhr (1894–1962) teaching respectively at Union Theological Seminary and Yale University Divinity School. Dialectical theology drew its inspiration from Kierkegaard, this Danish Socrates who once mused over having a hard fate—eminently intellectually gifted but born in a demoralized market town, where he had become the village idiot and was insulted  [Henry] Reid MacCallum, a philosopher at the University of Toronto, “Kierkegaard and the Levels of Existence,” The University of Toronto Quarterly, vol. 13, 1944, pp. 258–9.  Besides MacCallum others familiar with his name would include Walter W. Bryden, John Line, Étienne Gilson, and George S. Brett, who are mentioned later here. See below. Some theologians held to a model of theological education that promotes theological learning as an academic discipline and that occurs best in the location of a university setting. Bryden and Line would certainly be considered among them, the latter having taught also in the Religious Knowledge Program at Victoria College in the University of Toronto.  John A. Irwing, “One Hundred Years of Canadian Philosophy,” in Philosophy in Canada: A Symposium, ed. by John A. Irwing et al., Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press 1952, pp. 22–3.

198

Abrahim H. Khan

by street urchins and even criminals, while those at the top were secretly envying him but delighting in their victory. A hundred years later, the perception of him on the other side of the Atlantic was clearly a different one. Academics were turning to his writings as one of the sources for existentialist thought and theological insights. Further, some of the Canadian students wanting to do doctoral work in theology were heading to Union where Niebuhr was a powerful influence and Tillich had come to continue his teaching and writing. The decades that followed the onset of the war witnessed increasing interest in Kierkegaard’s ideas as more of his writings were becoming available in English translations. By the start of the last decade of the twentieth century Kierkegaard had become established as a familiar name on Canada’s academic scene. This article will discuss indications of the rising interest in Kierkegaard’s ideas, events and developments accounting for the rise, and the way that interest has contributed to scholarship on his corpus of writings. Research students and scholars in Canada have produced a rich scholarship on this particular nineteenth-century author, dialectician, ironist, poet, theologian, and philosopher who was born and lived in Copenhagen. Marking the inception of that scholarship may well be a 1944 publication by Henry Reid McCallum, introducing Kierkegaard’s thought, as one of “two violent torrents of protest” rushing away from opposite sides of that glacier of thought, the System of Hegel. McCallum’s lucid and lively essay offers an exposition on the dialectic, or as he rendered it “a new secret weapon” by which Hegel won his victories and which Kierkegaard reshaped to his own end. Publications appearing thereafter are quite diverse, and better described in terms of a tapestry rather than a style or orientation in the scholarship. For more on that scholarship, and indeed an appreciation of Canada’s reception of Kierkegaard we consider here six areas: (I) literary output and themes, (II) research directions and developments, (III) resources for methodologically close textual reading and hence for approaching analytically the cluster of problems denoted as “Kierkegaard,” (IV) forums for scholarly discussions, (V) international scholarly input and commitments, and (VI) contributions to interpretations of Kierkegaard’s thought. This is then followed by a concluding section or word on prospects for Kierkegaard research in Canada. I. Literary Output and Themes No fewer than 84 graduate theses (see the Table below) treat aspects of his thought, and no less than 26 scholarly books have been produced by Canadian publishers, to SKS 21, 363–6, NB10:199 / JP 6, 6382. MacCallum, “Kierkegaard and the Levels of Existence,” p. 258.  Ibid.  The counts for this study are based on the online data: ProQuest Dissertation and Theses, Theses Canada Portal, and the Canadian National Library and Archives holdings, the Canadian National Catalogue (Amicus), as well as the holdings at university libraries. Crosschecking is required since ProQuest and Theses Canada stop at 1996 and 2002 respectively. They do not list, therefore, all of the theses done on Kierkegaard at Brock, Université d’ Ottawa, Université de Montréal, or McGill for the search term “Kierkegaard.” The search had to be supplemented  

Canada: Kierkegaard on the Canadian Academic Landscape

199

date. These counts exclude theses written for either the Master of Theological Studies, the Bachelor of Divinity honors degrees, or the Licentiate of Philosophy. Neither do they include journal articles, festschrift essays, or audio-visual recordings. Nor does the count take into consideration publications appearing in foreign presses or journals. A. Theses The first of the 33 doctoral theses, produced in 1944, focused its investigation on the concept of individuality in Kierkegaard’s thought. Donald V. Wade wrote it under the supervision George Sydney Brett (1879–1944), the philosophy departmental chair at the University of Toronto. In subsequent years, the department produced three more theses, while the entire University including affiliated institutions produced a total of 11. Considered an academic site, Toronto has produced so far the largest number of doctoral theses treating Kierkegaard either exclusively or in a way relatively integral to the dissertation. Université d’Ottawa has produced five, and Université de Montréal four. McGill and University of Alberta have each produced three. York and McMaster have produced two each, while University of British Columbia, Queen’s, and Laval have each produced one. On examination, the topics of doctoral theses have shown considerable variation and reflect shifting disciplinary boundaries and interests in interdisciplinary studies by going to the library holdings. Further, a separate search using the term “Kierkegaardian” showed that some entries were not picked up by the first search. Count lists had to be scrutinized for duplicate entries. The count cited here is based on the search terms “Kierkegaard” and “Kierkegaardian,” occurring either in the citation or abstract. It may occur only in the abstract and not in the title, as is the case with 32 entries. The count includes those theses that address Kierkegaard in some substantial way even though his name does not occur in the titles. This is the case with two theses at University of Toronto. Seven of its theses have been done in a department other than philosophy or religious studies: education or English literature.  Four, to my knowledge, are not entered in the ProQuest or Thesis Canada database. Four of them were done in Toronto, at a member institution of the Toronto School of Theology (see note below) and University of Toronto, and one at McGill. Another, at Université de Montréal, was located by accessing the Canadian National Catalogue database. It would not be surprising to discover additional theses not written for graduate departments but for theological schools granting a degree with a thesis option. Laval, for example, lists an entry for a Kierkegaard thesis in connection with the licentiate in philosophy it offers.  The term “site” recognizes academic institutions on the main campus at University of Toronto that became incorporated in the University during the last 40 years. Two in particular are the Toronto School of Theology that now offers degrees conjointly with the University, and the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education. The first, an ecumenical enterprise consisting of seven theological colleges on the campus, was built on the foundation of the Toronto Graduate School of Theological Studies (1943–69) that was comprised of four Protestant institutions historically affiliated to the University of Toronto: Knox College, Emmanuel College, Trinity College, and Wycliffe College. The historical affiliation is an indication that theology was a subject matter engaging some Canadian academics well before the eve of World War II. The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, formed in the early 1960s, merged in 1996 with the University of Toronto and includes among its graduate speciality areas ethics, psychology, and poststructuralist and postmodern philosophies of education.

200

Abrahim H. Khan

by the start of the last two decades of the twentieth century. The topics range broadly. Some, for example, focus on analysis of philosophical or theological concepts in Kierkegaard’s texts. Others consider him in the context of issues related to the history of philosophy, exploring the influence of his thought on Heidegger (Université de Montréal). Some others examine the significance of his ideas either with respect to or for thinking about ideas of parenthood (Toronto), pedagogy and curriculum development (Alberta), and romantic illusion and existential pathology (Ottawa). Still some others treat him with respect to live musical performance (Toronto); technologies of reception on the adaptation of Latin American literature to the cinema (Université de Montréal); Irish identity and mourning (Alberta); and AfroCaribbean consciousness (York). The 51 masters’ theses expand further the range of topics discussed in relation to Kierkegaard. No doubt that range and increasing interest were due in part to the availability of English translations of his major works and a commentary series. The thesis titles reflect a growing intellectual confidence in understanding Kierkegaard’s writings to the point of discussing them in connection with the death of authority, with theory and painting, postmodern literature, postcolonial readings, or computer applications. Some titles discussed his work in the context of themes developed by, or ideas associated with, authors such as Adorno, Aquinas, Benjamin, Bhabha, Browning, Dostoevsky, Elull, Grahame Greene, Hopkins, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Nietzsche, Mark Rothko, Said, Spivak, Wittgenstein, D.Z. Phillips, Thackery, and Vernon Watkins. More than half of the M.A. theses were produced at universities situated primarily in the east of Canada: McGill nine, Laval six, Brock and Concordia five each, and Queen’s and Memorial three each. Of the remaining 20 masters’ theses, the following six schools produced two each: Calgary, Manitoba, Windsor, University of Western Ontario, Ottawa, and Sherbrooke. Finally, the following eight universities contributed one each, bringing the total to 51: Simon Fraser, Alberta, Regina, Guelph, McMaster, Toronto (Knox College), Université du Québec à Montréal, and New Brunswick. In fact, the second thesis on Kierkegaard in Canada was a M.A. in 1945 written in the Philosophy Department at McGill. At the start of this century, 23 out of at least 60 Canadian graduate schools were providing a context in terms of faculty and library resources to research either in French or English aspects of Kierkegaard’s thought. Five of them are Francophone institutions—Laval, Sherbrooke, Université du Québec à Montréal, Université de Montréal, while Ottawa is bilingual—credited with producing 20 theses, of which 13 are in French. However, when all the schools are considered, the number written in French totaled 15, for two were written at Anglophone institutions. These statistics confirm also a significant rise in interest in Kierkegaard among Canadian graduate students in the last 25 years, for prior to 1980 less than a dozen theses were produced. But the 1980s show a sharp rise to 22 theses; for the following decade the count was higher 29; and midway into the first decade of this century the count is already 21. More than half of them are at four institutions listed here

Canada: Kierkegaard on the Canadian Academic Landscape

201

in the order of output: McGill, Toronto, Laval, Ottawa, Brock, and Concordia.10 The two universities that have produced the largest number of theses are McGill and Toronto, 12 each. At McGill, seven are in the Faculty of Religious Studies, and three of the seven are at the doctoral level. At Toronto one is at the masters’ level (at Knox College), and the remaining 11 are at the doctoral level, of which four are in the Department of Philosophy. Theses Completed at Graduate Schools in Canada, 1944–2006 University

Ph.D./Th.D.

Total

M.A.

McGill

12

9

3

University of Toronto

12

1

11

Laval

7

6

1

Université d’ Ottawa

7

2

5

Concordia

5

5

-

Brock

5

5

-

University of Alberta

4

1

3

University de Montréal

4

-

4

Queen’s

4

3

1

McMaster

3

1

2

Memorial

3

3

-

University of Windsor

2

2

-

University of Sherbrooke

2

2

-

University of Manitoba

2

2

-

University of Calgary

2

2

-

University of Western Ontario

2

2

-

York

2

-

2

10 These six universities account for 48 of the 84 theses. The order changes when only the 33 doctoral theses are considered. Toronto (including the Toronto School of Theology) produced 11; Ottawa five, McGill, Montreal and Alberta three each. The remaining two universities have produced no doctorate thesis on Kierkegaard. Brock, in fact, does not offer a doctoral program in the area.

Abrahim H. Khan

202 University

Total

M.A.

Université du Québec à Montreal

1

1

-

Guelph

1

1

-

Simon Fraser

1

1

-

University of British Columbia

1

University of New Brunswick

1

1

-

University of Regina

1

1

-

84

51

33

Total

Ph.D./Th.D.

1

B. Books Canadian scholars tend to be subdued and conservative in their research and to take optimal time in deciding when to publish. Their publications on Kierkegaard appear in national and international presses and journals. By foreign presses, some examples of titles issued include those of Kenneth Hamilton,11 Ralph Henry Johnson (b. 1940),12 Alastair McKinnon (b. 1925),13 and Harry A. Nielsen (b. 1924).14 Most distinctive in the set of titles is McKinnon’s multi-volume Indices, a massive publication consisting of 3,680 pages, mostly folio size, of information about the nearly two million words15 contained in the Kierkegaard corpus or Samlede Værker. Nielsen’s book is of note for style and content in laying out the algebraic problems comprising the Philosophical Fragments. Its author is a philosopher, trained in the Anglo-American analytic tradition, who drew inspiration from O.K. Bouswma. The book offers, in short, a commentary on that text, and the problems raised by its fundamental question: How is human thinking to come to terms with that which comes from outside reason—revelation? Smaller pieces have appeared in foreign journals or as essays in collections published abroad. They include contributions by David Demson, David Goicoechea, R.Z. Friedman, Robert Gibbs, Abrahim Khan, Arthur Krentz, Avron Kulak, Joseph C. McLelland, Alastair McKinnon, Graeme Nicholson, Brayton Polka, Donald Wade, Jeremy Walker, and Bernard Zelechow spanning the last sixty years. But the 26 titles by Canadian publishers also tell of the reception Kierkegaard enjoys in Kenneth Hamilton, The Promise of Kierkegaard, Philadelphia: Lippincott 1969. Ralph Henry Johnson, The Concept of Existence in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1972. 13 Alastair McKinnon, Kierkegaard Indices, vols. 1–4, Leiden: Brill 1970–5. 14 Harry A. Nielsen, Where the Passion Is, Tallahassee: Florida State University 1983. 15 The exact number is 1,942,032 words or, more accurately, word-tokens, consisting of 54,239 wordtypes. 11

12

Canada: Kierkegaard on the Canadian Academic Landscape

203

Canada, and hence the level of intellectual investment that is made in Kierkegaard scholarship across the country. Contributions to that end by the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences through publication grants, to Anglophone and Francophone presses, are of note. The main publication venues for many of the 26 titles are not surprisingly university presses: Dalhousie,16 Ottawa,17 McGill-Queen’s,18 and Wilfrid Laurier University.19 Another, non-commercial but highly specialized and small publisher, is Inter-Editions, in Montreal.20 II. Research Directions and Developments At first glance the titles above may intimate the richness in approaches to Kierkegaard and even a diffusion of influences coming from different disciplines. But in fact, there is among some of the titles, evidence of a tendency to work closely with texts in the original Danish for the purpose of conceptual analysis. Directions of the work by three scholars in particular McKinnon, Walker, and Khan, reflect that style and may come close to characterizing what might be distinctive in our contribution to Kierkegaard studies at the international level. That characterization is better understood in a broader context of some events and developments indicating that Kierkegaard scholarship in Canada has at least two distinct phases A. Phase One The inception of the first phase predates the end of World War II, and that of the second phase is the 1960s. In the early 1940s the stirring of interest in Kierkegaard is See, for example, Maurice Carignan, Individu et société chez Kierkegaard, Halifax, Nova Scotia: Dalhousie University Press 1977. 17 See, for example, Carignan, Essai sur l’Intermède de Kierkegaard, Ottawa, Ontario: University of Ottawa Press 1995; W.A. Shearson, The Notion of Encounter, Ottawa, Ontario: University of Ottawa Press 1980 (Canadian Library of Philosophy); Anoop Gupta, Kierkegaard’s Romantic Legacy: Two Theories of the Self, Ottawa, Ontario: University of Ottawa Press 2005. 18 See, for example, Jeremy D.B. Walker, To Will One Thing, Montreal, Quebec: McGillQueen’s University Press 1972; Walker, Kierkegaard: The Descent into God, Kingston, Ontario: McGill-Queen’s University Press 1985; Arnold B. Come, Kierkegaard as Humanist: Discovering My Self, Montreal, Quebec: McGill-Queen’s University Press 1995; Arnold B. Come, Kierkegaard as Theologian: Recovering My Self, Montreal, Quebec: McGill-Queen’s University Press 1997; David E. Mercer, Kierkegaard’s Living Room: The Relation between Faith and History in Philosophical Fragments, Montreal, Quebec: McGill-Queen’s University Press 2001; George Pattison, The Philosophy of Kierkegaard, Montreal, Quebec: McGillQueen’s University Press 2005. 19 See, for example, Gregor Malantschuk, The Controversial Kierkegaard, Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press 1976; Abrahim H. Khan, “Salighed” as Happiness? Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press 1985. 20 See, for example, Arnold B. Come, Trendelenburg’s Influence on Kierkegaard’s Modal Categories, Montreal, Quebec: Inter-Editions 1991. 16

204

Abrahim H. Khan

linked to philosophers and theologians on the campus at the University of Toronto and to a move of freeing philosophy from religious entanglements by taking a historical approach to its teaching. In the 1930s Walter W. Bryden (1883–1952), lecturing at Knox College (a Presbyterian theological school),21 referred to Kierkegaard in connection with his interest in Barth. His lectures stirred Donald Wade to pursue a doctorate on Kierkegaard at the University of Toronto that he earned in 1944 under the supervision of George Brett in philosophy, possibly the last thesis supervised before his death that year. Subsequently, Wade was appointed in 1947 to teach theology at Knox and had as one of his students Joseph C. McLelland (b. 1925) who from 1957 taught philosophy of religion at the Presbyterian College that was affiliated to the Faculty of Religious Studies at McGill. Another student at University of Toronto in the mid 1940s was Emil Fackenheim (1916–2003). Coming from Europe in 1940 and appointed Rabbi at a synagogue in Hamilton, he gave on January 19, 1945, a lecture on Kierkegaard to the Philosophical Society at McMaster University. His interest was in the post-Kantian 21 Some Canadian theologians took their intellectual bearing partly from either the Church of Scotland or thinkers at Princeton Theological Seminary. Bryden spent the year 1908 studying theology in Scotland and would have heard of Kierkegaard though influential thinkers such as James Denny, P.T. Forsyth, and H.R. Mackintosh. These are names in the United Kingdom who during the first two decades of the twentieth century, knew of each others’ writings and were acquainted with Kierkegaard through German translations. Forsyth referred to Kierkegaard as the “Pascal of the North,” in a major work The Principle of Authority (London: Hodder and Stoughton 1913, p. 79) and cited from Either/Or in his The Soul of Prayer (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 1916, p. 29, available on NetLibrary). Forsyth, according to Stanley Russell who considers that it is easy to portray Forsyth as “Kierkegaard redivivus,” may have drawn also on The Sickness unto Death, The Concept of Anxiety, and Philosophical Fragments. See Russell, “Spoiling the Egyptians: P.T. Forsyth and Hegel,” in Justice the True and Only Mercy, ed. by Trevor Hartt, Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1995, pp. 225–6; p. 235. Furthermore, Bryden mentions Kierkegaard in the preface to his The Christian’s Knowledge of God (Toronto, Ontario: Thorn Press 1940, p. xi). Not just Presbyterian scholars in Canada looked to Denny and Forsyth, but also some in the United Church in Canada that came into existence as a result of a 1925 Church Union, and has as its theological institution Emmanuel College, on the campus of the University of Toronto. However, a third of the Presbyterians in Canada chose to remain outside the Union and stay Presbyterians, with Knox College as one of their institutions. The point here is that through the influence of Denny and Forsyth on theological thinkers such as Bryden at Knox and John Line at Emmanuel and Victoria, Kierkegaard would have been a familiar name to some in English Canada even before the first World War, and much earlier if one considers the essay by H.R. Mackintosh, “A Great Danish Thinker,” Expository Times, vol. 13, 1902, p. 404. Bryden and Line were considered widely read scholars, in the renaissance mode. They would surely have known about Kierkegaard through either the Church of Scotland thinkers or the Princeton educated John A. Mackay who included Kierkegaard in his 1932 Merrick Lectures at Ohio Wesleyan University, on the series “Prophetic Thinkers.” Four years later Mackay accepted an invitation to become president of Princeton Seminary and remained there for 23 years. A seminary graduate in 1915, Mackay immediately left on a graduate fellowship for Europe to study with the Spanish existentialist Miguel de Unamuno who introduced him to Kierkegaard’s writings. Thus, some Canadian scholars may have heard of Kierkegaard prior to Barth’s reference to him in 1919. See “Memorial Minute: John Alexander Mackay (1889– 1993),” Theology Today, vol. 40, no. 4, 1984, pp. 453–6.

Canada: Kierkegaard on the Canadian Academic Landscape

205

tradition, and on completion of the doctorate three years later, Fackenheim was invited to join the Philosophy Department at University of Toronto. In 1946, that department added to its roster Lawrence Edward Lynch (b. 1915) who lectured on Kierkegaard’s thought in the existentialism course that Alastair McKinnon took. One of Lynch’s colleagues in the department was Étienne Gilson (1884–1978) whose study on the concept of being spans from Parmenides to Kierkegaard in his publication Being and the Philosophers (1949). Gilson, a French historian of philosophy, was invited in 1929 to head the Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto.22 It courses were accepted at the graduate level in the Philosophy Department, and by the 1940s they were well integrated into the curriculum of that department. Not to be overlooked is John Line (1885–1970), university theologian at Emmanuel College (theological), University of Toronto, during the 1940s and ’50s. As teacher of philosophy of religion, Line had become interested in existential theologians such as Niebuhr, Tillich, and Brunner. Together the scholars in Toronto constituted a loose cluster at one location referencing Kierkegaard’s ideas in their lectures and writings. Those in philosophy saw Kierkegaard as a source for or part of a philosophical movement or style—French existentialism. Those in theology recognized him as central to the development of dialectical theology that is considered an aspect of neo-orthodoxy, or as attuned to a Scottish common-sense school of philosophy that provided the basis for an epistemology and for apologetics. However, despite these developments, the Department of Philosophy at Toronto waited fifteen years for its second thesis (1970) on Kierkegaard. In Quebec, interest in Kierkegaard was also stirring. Ralph McInery at Université Laval had turned out the country’s second doctorate thesis on Kierkegaard (1954) and moved on to distinguish himself as an Aquinas scholar. At McGill’s Philosophy Department in 1946, a M.A. thesis on Kierkegaard was written under Roderick D. MacLennan. Four years later, MacLennan hired Alastair McKinnon who had just completed a doctoral thesis at Edinburgh on Kierkegaard’s critique of rationalism. The second year into his appointment, McKinnon was asked to take charge of the staff seminar that had elected to discuss that year the Kierkegaard text, Either/Or, and later became supervisor for a thesis, a second M.A. on Kierkegaard at McGill, completed in 1954. By 1964, McKinnon had clearly envisioned the direction for his intellectual effort and hence much of his Kierkegaard project that involved computational analysis. In a sense his conceptualizing of that project may reflect to a degree the emphasis of the philosophy department where he completed his undergraduate studies—the University of Toronto. George Brett who helped shaped the direction of the Philosophy Department at University of Toronto up to the mid 1940s had introduced realism into Canada’s approach to philosophy and refused to separate rigidly philosophy and science.23 He argued for the importance of science. The impact of that emphasis may have been felt by some of his students. McKinnon 22 Attached to the University of St. Michael’s College in the University of Toronto, it was designated as “pontifical” in 1939, and hence was called “Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.” 23 Irwing, “One Hundred Years of Canadian Philosophy,” p. 15. For more on Brett, see also John Slater, “A Capsule History of the Department,” for the Department of Philosophy at University of Toronto, on website http://philosophy.utoronto.ca/graduate/.

206

Abrahim H. Khan

was among the select handful of first year students in the last group that Brett had expected to take through to their graduation. The honors course required studying philosophy with a firm footing in another discipline, either English or History but not both. McKinnon opted for English. Though it is not quite certain that exposure to Brett’s approach to philosophy may have in some way influenced McKinnon’s conceptualization of the Kierkegaard project, one thing is clear, however: the start of the Kierkegaard project marked an end to one phase and the inception of another in Kierkegaard studies in Canada. The phase that ended with the mid ’60s might best be characterized as introducing and making intellectual connections with Kierkegaard’s thought and influence, especially as an existentialist thinker. B. Phase Two The second phase, starting around 1967, made available to researchers a new way to ask questions about the Danish texts and the Samlede Værker as a whole. McKinnon undertook a mini-project on Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms and introduced it in his 1969 publication “Kierkegaard’s Pseudonyms: A New Hierarchy,” in The American Philosophical Quarterly. The publication marked a new turn in Kierkegaard scholarship, and set the trajectory for developing supplementary resources and tools. The “pseudonymous project” was aimed at ranking the pseudonyms in the corpus and thus validating Kierkegaard’s account of his relationship to them, by the use of a computer and statistical applications. That is, it involved a move from the relative frequency of the use of a term to its importance. It was not a far jump from producing machine-readable Danish texts to creating a concordance, one of four volumes in the Kierkegaard Indices (1970–5) that includes lexical and statistical analysis of the words contained in the 34 texts comprising the Samlede Værker. The constructed concordance gives page and line correlations between the two most recent Danish editions and the most widely available translations in English, French, and German. From the Indices, another step was taken to developing a method for authorship identification, and then a method for identifying terms associated with different accounts of an object. Finally, another step employing more sophisticated statistical applications using microcomputers produced a method for viewing Kierkegaard texts in terms of dimensions and thereby to identifying areas of thought that were hitherto inaccessible in our endeavor to gain a better grasp of his writings. Canada invested in this line of research through grants from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, and one from the Quebec Government. But what is more important about the line of work McKinnon was pursuing is that its results—or literary output—were generating interest and discussions at home and abroad, not just among scholars with interest in Kierkegaard but also among those interested in the emerging field of computer-assisted textual analysis. At home, McKinnon’s research stirred the interest of two people in particular. One was Jeremy D.B. Walker (b. 1936) who became his colleague by 1968 and contributed to the understanding of the ethical foundations of Kierkegaard’s thought. He acknowledged how “illuminating and thought provoking,” he found McKinnon’s stream of articles on computer applications and Kierkegaard. His analytical skills honed at Oxford, Walker published a collection of essays that are reflections on the

Canada: Kierkegaard on the Canadian Academic Landscape

207

Purity of Heart discourses, under the title To Will One Thing (1972), and later another set The Decent Into God (1985), both with McGill-Queen’s Press. The other individual stirred by computer research was Abrahim H. Khan, McKinnon’s student who went on to teach in the mid 1970s at the University of Toronto in the department for the study of religion where Donald Wade was also teaching at that time. Khan used the machine-readable texts and computer application techniques to study the similarities and differences between Religiousness A and Religiousness B, and later for the analysis and modeling of concepts—especially “Salighed/happiness,” “Lidenskab/passion,” “Herlighed/glory, “Spøg/jest,” and “Svaghed-Trods/despair,” and to identify themes in texts.24 Khan’s research on Kierkegaard continues in that vein, showing broader influences of Jeremy Walker in ethics, Joseph McLelland in philosophy of religion, and Paul Holmer at Yale in language/conceptual analysis. It should be noted that the Faculty of Religious Studies at McGill took an interest in Kierkegaard research, for Khan wrote his thesis on Kierkegaard at that faculty. Furthermore, as McLelland observed about the historical background, the dean of the faculty in 1954 stated that the “new appreciation of Kierkegaard is not a revival but a discovery.”25 Supportive of developments in the second phase is an academic context that can be described in terms of two phenomena, one in Ontario the other in Quebec, related to faculty resources. In Ontario, Brock University was established in 1964. Its Department of Philosophy placed the emphasis on continental and eastern philosophy as a way of breaking out of the confines of Thomistic or analytic philosophy that had come to characterize the philosophy done at Toronto and represented by the Canadian Journal of Philosophy. In 1967 the department appointed David Goicoechea, who had just completed his doctorate on Kierkegaard at the Jesuit Loyola University in Chicago. Having started his education as a seminarian, he had sympathy for certain strands of Kierkegaard’s thought that could be brought into relation with Thomistic philosophy of love understood as complacency and concern. Goicoechea, throughout a career of nearly 40 years, taught Kierkegaard at different levels—from introductory courses on existentialism to intermediate, and then to graduate ones—as well as supervising M.A. theses on Kierkegaard. The academic context, including yearly conferences by the Brock Philosophical Society under the guidance of Goicoechea, Abrahim H. Khan, “Kierkegaard’s Religion A and Religion B,” Studies in Religion, vol. 6, no. 2, 1976–7, pp. 58–62; “Salighed” as Happiness?, Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press 1985; “Lidenskab in Efterskrift,” in Kierkegaard: Resources and Results, ed. by Alastair McKinnnon, Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press 1982, pp. 105–18; “Kierkegaard and the Glory of our Common Humanity,” Joyful Wisdom: Glory and an Ethics of Joy, vol. 3, 1994, pp. 14–32; “Kierkegaard and Jest—Changing Emphases and Preoccupations,” Søren Kierkegaard Society Bulletin, vol. 7, January 1999, pp. 1–16; “Kierkegaard’s Two Forms of Conscious Despair: Svaghed and Trods,” (co‑authored with Alastair McKinnon), Studies in Religion, vol. 14, no. 4, 1985, pp. 435–54; “Kierkegaard as Fire Chief in post‑1848 Denmark: What says the Chief in Judge for Yourselves!” Religious Studies, vol. 25, no. 4, 1996, pp. 445–58; and “Four Edifying Discourses (1843): A Dimensional Analysis,” Tópicos. Revista de Filosofia, vol. 111, no. 5, 1993, pp. 235–70. 25 See J.C. McLelland, “Some Historical Background,” in Kierkegaard Resources and Results, ed. by Alastair McKinnon, p. 2. Recall, too that McLelland himself was influenced by Kierkegaard, having had Donald Wade as one of his teachers at Knox in Toronto. 24

208

Abrahim H. Khan

helped to sustain interest in Kierkegaard. That context in Ontario was expanded further with the University of Windsor adding to its Philosophy Department in the early 1970s two faculty members, Harry Nielsen and Ralph Johnson, both with very active interests in Kierkegaard. In Quebec, a similar expanding scholarship network with respect to philosophy of religion was forming in the 1970s and with particular interest in Kierkegaard’s philosophy of religion. That network may also explain the wider range of development of topics and approaches that universities were facilitating. Besides McGill scholars, Concordia in Montreal added to its department of religion two US trained scholars whose doctoral theses engaged aspects of Kierkegaard’s thought: Michael D. Oppenheim (b. 1946), and Michel Despland (b. 1936). At the Université de Montréal was Venant Cauchy who with McKinnon edited the International Society for Computer Research and Philosophy journal Cirpho, and supervised graduate work on Kierkegaard. At Ottawa, Maurice Carignan was publishing on Kierkegaard in French. In addition to its faculty interests in existential thought, Laval was home for Laval théologique et philosophique, a journal of three issues per year that continues to publish frequently on Kierkegaard. The new bilingual journal, Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses appeared in 1971, with editors in Quebec. It provided scholars with yet another avenue to sustain interest in research work on Kierkegaard, considering such research interests as part of the philosophy of religion sub-field comprising the academic study of religion. In fact, a tendency in the 1970s among a new generation of scholars in Canada helping to shape the fast emerging field of the academic study of religion, was to emphasize a scientific approach, akin to Religionswissenschaft as opposed to Glaubenswissenschaft. McKinnon’s computer project was perceived as being consonant with a philosophy of religion in the objective genitive sense, a sub-field in the academic study of religion, and hence the kind of studies that the new bilingual journal would gladly accommodate. In fact, in Anglophone Canadian philosophy there was and is a sustained interest in analytic philosophy of religion. Of course, this kind of rational approach to Kierkegaard taken by McKinnon appealed to both Anglophone and Francophone scholars who would likely distance themselves from issues related to existentialism and/or theological thinking—Glaubenswissenschaft. Such developments bode well for studies on Kierkegaard on two counts at the least. There was a critical mass of scholars, Ontario and Quebec considered together, with shared interest in the Danish Socrates. In addition, and more importantly, a wider forum became available in the form of learned societies to disseminate and discuss work in progress. Besides the Canadian Philosophical Society, and the Canadian Theological Society, there was also the Canadian Society for the Study of Religion, and the Association for the Advancement of Scandinavian Studies in Canada. McKinnon presented at one or the other societies by invitation or submission from time to time, tailoring his work to fit the theme or agenda of the particular society in question.

Canada: Kierkegaard on the Canadian Academic Landscape

209

III. Resources Three resources in particular had become available to Kierkegaard research scholars as a result of McKinnon’s intellectual efforts, especially during the 1980s. One is an electronic version of texts comprising the Samlede Værker and parts of the Papirer, with programs and data files that facilitate modeling and dimensional analysis of texts or sets of texts. In this connection a list of Danish title codes for texts has been constructed and is now widely accepted in referencing them. Starting with word distributions in each of the texts in the corpus, McKinnon used multivariate analysis (techniques of Jean-Paul Benzècri promoted by Michael Greenacre in the Englishspeaking world) to map the words and works of the 34 texts comprising Kierkegaard’s corpus into multi-dimensional space, so as to determine the major themes of the corpus as a whole. In short, McKinnon has created a multidimensional concordance for understanding Kierkegaard’s writings not as a string of linear texts but as vision to transmit from author to reader.26 To take this approach to Kierkegaard requires having access to two sets of program files. One contains the 34 texts with page and line identification and gives the corresponding page references in the English, German, and French translations. The other set of program files are for doing statistical operation on the texts. Both sets are contained on a CD-Rom for use on a microcomputer.27 Another resource consists of bibliographic tools: Kierkegaard Resources and Results,28 A Key to Kierkegaard’s Abbreviations and Spellings by Julia Watkin,29 Dating Kierkegaard’s Battles with Fate, which contains code titles and periods of composition for the different works, by Alastair McKinnon,30 and Søren Kierkegaard Bibliographies: Remnants, 1944–1980 and Multi-Media, 1925–1991, compiled by Calvin D. Evans.31 A more comprehensive bibliography known as International Kierkegaard Bibliographic Database, compiled by Stéphane Hogue, is for microcomputer use.32 It consists of all the important Kierkegaard bibliographies covering the period 1835–1990. Two library collections comprise a third resource that Canada offers for Kierkegaard research. In 1980 McGill acquired what is now the Kierkegaard– Malantschuk Collection. Gregor Malantschuk (1902–78), who thought highly of the Kierkegaard Indices and understood the possibilities for computers in future research, wanted his collection deposited at McGill University. His treasured 1,000 For more details on the application see Abrahim H. Khan, “The Challenge of Information Technology for Literary Studies,” A Journal of Religious and Theological Information, vol. 2, no. 2, 1996, pp. 59–72. 27 The Kierkegaard Computer Workshop (electronic resource), Montreal, Quebec: InterEditions 1999. 28 Kierkegaard Resources and Results, ed. by Alastair McKinnnon. 29 Julia Watkin, A Key to Kierkegaard’s Abbreviations and Spellings, Montreal, Quebec: Inter-Editions 1981. 30 McKinnon, Dating Kierkegaard’s Battles with Fate, Copenhagen: Munksgaard 1986. 31 Søren Kierkegaard Bibliographies: Remnants, 1944–1980 and Multi-Media, 1925– 1991, ed. by Calvin D. Evans, Montreal, Quebec: McGill University Libraries 1993. 32 International Kierkegaard Bibliographic Database, version 1.2, ed. by Stéphane Hogue, Montreal, Québec: Department of Philosophy, McGill University 1990. 26

210

Abrahim H. Khan

volume collection includes six books actually having belonged to Kierkegaard, a partial reconstruction of Kierkegaard’s library at the time of his death, and copies of works that he actually had in his library, and of others that scholars presumed that he had.33 The other Kierkegaard collection, donated in 1968 to Knox College, Toronto, is comprised of 35 single bound volumes that are original first editions containing 39 titles. These resources, however, have yet to be properly tapped or explored by national and international Kierkegaard researchers. They await the attention of future Kierkegaard scholars anywhere. IV. Forums: Conferences and the Kierkegaard Circle International conferences provide a forum for Canadian Kierkegaard scholars to disseminate and discuss their research work. Canada has hosted four of them to date. In June 1976, Harry Nielsen in philosophy at the University of Windsor organized a conference whose theme was Canadian Studies on Kierkegaard. Giving invited papers were Jeremy Walker, Alastair McKinnon, Donald Wade, Ralph Johnson, and Josiah Thompson (Haverford University). In June 1980 followed another such conference, on the theme “Resources and Results in Kierkegaard Studies,” convened at McGill University to mark the reception of the Kierkegaard–Malantschuk Collection. Its invited speakers included Walker, Khan, Carignan, Harry Nielsen, Niels Jørgen Cappelørn and Peter P. Rohde. In December 1986, a third conference was convened by Abrahim Khan at Trinity College, University of Toronto and had for its theme “Problems and Perspectives in Kierkegaard’s Acknowledged Works.” Invited international speakers included John Heywood Thomas (England), Julia Watkin (Australia/Denmark), and Vanina Secchi (Italy/Canada). In November 1994, the Brock Philosophy Society and the Kierkegaard Circle in Toronto jointly convened a fourth Kierkegaard conference, held at Brock University. The theme selected, “The Agony in the Garden of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling,” fitted into the Joyful Wisdom Series conference Brock was hosting. In fact, papers on Kierkegaard have been given at each of the yearly conferences Brock ran either on the Joyful Wisdom Series or the Love Series, stretching over a ten-year period from 1990 to 2000. Conference presentations suggest clearly that Canadian academics or researchers on Kierkegaard take different perspectives or approaches to their studies, their perspective often reflecting the researcher’s training and philosophical penchant. Presentations and publications considered, styles and themes vary from theological, philosophical, psychological, and literary criticism to historical, computational, phenomenological, and educational, and to film and theatre. Analyzing ideas, commenting on passages, rereading of influence or connection, and appropriating his ideas by cognate disciplines of philosophy and theology seem to characterize a general style associated with Canadian scholarship on Kierkegaard. This plurality of perspectives includes as well critiques of Kierkegaard, especially with respect to his fideism. Of course, there are those, few and far between, who see him as For more detailed description, see Hans Moller, “Availability of the KierkegaardMalantschuk Collection,” in Kierkegaard: Resources and Results, ed. by Alastair McKinnon.

33

Canada: Kierkegaard on the Canadian Academic Landscape

211

destructive to either the philosophical or theological enterprise. Less harsh are the critiques or polemical interrogations intended to elucidate the principles of reading and interpreting texts. Brayton Polka is one such critic, interrogating, for example, with respect to whether modernity is religious or secular. The plurality of methodological preferences may appear to be richness. But it may also be indicative of a drawback with respect to advancing Kierkegaard studies or training future Canadian Kierkegaard researchers as opposed to having academics with interest in Kierkegaard. To train such research scholars, courses have to be available and thus appointments have to be made in the area of Kierkegaard studies. Sadly, this has not been a priority in the arts curriculum across the country. Save for the author’s own institution, Trinity College at the University of Toronto, course offerings at either the graduate or undergraduate level in Canada do not include any course that treats solely Kierkegaard’s thought or ideas, in contrast to courses that may select Kierkegaard as author or a text of his for discussion on a particular issue. Treatments accorded to him are either in the context of a philosophical movement, historical situation, style in analysis, or in connection with appropriating his ideas for an explanatory background or launching pad for a particular idea or theme in a different disciplinary context. Such treatments have no doubt led to the occasional reference to him by the media on billboards, in subway trains or stations. The Kierkegaard Circle at Trinity College, University of Toronto, instantiates the persistence of a high level of serious interest in probing and exploring Kierkegaard’s thought. Established in 1986 by Abrahim Khan, the Circle is a forum for scholarly discussions in Canada, engaging scholars from the University of Toronto and the surrounding universities: York, Brock, McMaster, and Trent. A core group of scholars, meeting once per academic term, includes such names as David Demson, David Goicoechea, Danny Goldstick, Alastair McKinnon, Graeme Nicholson, Henry Pietersma, Brayton Polka, Victor Shepherd, Peter Slater, and Donald Wiebe. On the list of presenters the Circle has welcomed are scholars from outside Canada, including Martin Andic, Lee Barrett, Bruce Kirmmse, Gordon Marino, and Vincent McCarthy. It has received various requests from other Kierkegaard groups or scholars outside Canada. It has hosted the Søren Kierkegaard Society of the USA when it met as part of the American Academy of Religion Congress in 2002. As mentioned earlier it joined with Brock Philosophical Society to host a conference in 1994.34 Finally, it is at the Circle that McKinnon proposed the radical hypothesis regarding Kierkegaard and homosexuality, and Polka offered a trial run of his paper mentioned below. Clearly, no lull in interest is shown in his ideas, judging from the Kierkegaard Circle’s activities and the increase in the number of academic theses over the last 25 years. Canadian scholars continue to be creative, probing Kierkegaard’s thoughts, analyzing his ideas, making interdisciplinary linkages. Some recent examples of this include Anna Makolkin, “Russian, Stalinist and Soviet Re-Readings of Kierkegaard: Lev Shestov and Piama Gaidenko,”35 Brayton Polka, “Who is the Single Individual? For details of the Circle, see its website, http://www.utoronto.ca/kierkegaard. Anna Makolkin, “Russian, Stalinist and Soviet Re-Readings of Kierkegaard: Lev Shestov and Piama Gaidenko,” Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue canadienne des slavistes, vol. 44, nos. 1–2, 2002, pp. 79–96.

34 35

212

Abrahim H. Khan

On the Religious and the Secular in Kierkegaard,”36 and Avron Kulak, “Kierkegaard, Derrida, and the Context of Context(s).”37 V. International Scholarly Input and Commitments Canada’s reception of Kierkegaard is evidenced also by contributions to scholarship at the international level, thus making his ideas more readily accessible to a wider scholarly community. Some Canadian scholars have presented papers at Kierkegaard research centers in the USA and Denmark and at special Kierkegaard conferences such as in Sunderland, England. Some others have convened sessions at the World Congress of Philosophy, and the International Association for the History of Religions Congress. Some of them serve also on editorial boards of international publications on series related to Kierkegaard. To list a few examples, Canadian input through Abrahim Khan went into running the Kierkegaard program unit of the American Academy of Religion for five years. A Canadian Kierkegaard scholar, McKinnon, initiated discussion on having a new and better critical edition of the Samlede Værker that eventually led to a grant proposal for establishing the Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre in Copenhagen. In 1962, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation chose Kierkegaard for one of its radio talks in the Architects of Modern Thought Series, and invited Alastair McKinnon to give it. Then from 1997 he began serving on the editorial board of Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter. The film on Kierkegaard in Malcolm Muggeridge’s Third Testament Series is also noteworthy. To produce the Series in 1974, the BBC and Time-Life Films turned to a Canadian production company, Nielsen-Ferns Limited in association with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. VI. Interpretations of Kierkegaard Thus far, our accounting shows that Kierkegaard’s reception is marked by the extent of literary output on him, themes reflected in titles, phases in Kierkegaard research, tools or resources associated with the research, and contributions made at the international level. However, not much has thus far been presented about what exactly the research produced has contributed to understanding or interpreting Kierkegaard. To do so now, I focus attention on selected and representative works of scholars who focus on Kierkegaard as their primary research area or for whom Kierkegaard is significant to their theorizing or for whom he is a primary influence in their work. Three whose academic career have focused largely on Kierkegaard are McKinnon, Khan, and Walker. What do they have to say about interpreting his writings? McKinnon’s essays are concerned with clarifying many of the inconsistencies and contradictions among the various works in the corpus, and take as their point of Brayton Polka, “Who is the Single Individual? On the Religious and the Secular in Kierkegaard,” Philosophy & Theology, vol. 17, nos. 1–2, 2006, pp. 157–75. 37 Avron Kulak, “Kierkegaard, Derrida, and the Context of Context(s),” Philosophy & Theology, vol. 17, nos. 1–2, 2005, pp. 133–55. 36

Canada: Kierkegaard on the Canadian Academic Landscape

213

departure word counts. They underscore heeding the view that the pseudonymous writings are a literary device and as such are not to be taken as properly expressing Kierkegaard’s own views about human life. More than two dozen, the essays seem to move between two polarities of thought, one more philosophical, and the other more theological. The early essays show a marked preoccupation with the notion irrationalism or paradox in the corpus and represent the pole associated with philosophical themes. His 1969 essay “Kierkegaard’s Irrationalism Revisited”38 argues on the basis of the uses of two words, “Paradoks” and “Absurde,” that “the pseudonyms are a requirement of the production and the views ascribed to them must be interpreted in this light.”39 Further, it clarifies a previously formulated position that the term “Paradoks” is used in connection with Christianity so as to deal with transition to belief. The new position is that the irrationalism imputed to or associated with Kierkegaard has to be seen with respect to the pseudonyms and not him or his acknowledged writings. The account of the stages assumed by the pseudonyms cannot be properly taken as representing his own position, for he is not the literal author of conflicting views expressed among his pseudonyms. Later essays by McKinnon focused on theological themes or ideas, and thus define the other polarity in his writings. Two of them are quite illustrative of the polarity. One in 1996 argues that “God is more important and central than Christ,”40 in the Kierkegaard corpus as a whole and in its subset literature identified as the attack upon Christendom, and even in the journals. McKinnon based the argument on consideration of the frequencies of the Danish terms for God and Christ in the corpus. The second essay, mapping the space of the concept of faith, indicates that the term “God” is very close to the heart of Kierkegaard’s understanding of faith compared with the terms “Christ,” “the God,” or “the God-man,” and that neither “Jesus,” nor ‘Holy Spirit,” appears in the profiling of 131 words associated with the concept in the corpus.41 In between the two polarities, paradox/irrationality and God/faith are some essays whose subject matter tends towards one or the other. McKinnon’s essays identifying different accounts of either Socrates or Hegel would belong to this group.42 So would the essay on Kierkegaard’s perception of the Bible. The latter shows that we are to understand that Kierkegaard used the synoptic gospels to interpret the remaining books of the Bible, and that “he saw the Bible as concerned Alastair McKinnon, “Kierkegaard’s Irrationalism Revisited,” International Philosophical Quarterly, June, 1969, pp. 164–76. The essay revisits McKinnon, “Kierkegaard: ‘Paradox’ and Irrationalism,” Journal of Existentialism, vol. 11, 1967, pp. 401–12. 39 Alastair McKinnon, “Kierkegaard’s Irrationalism Revisited,” p. 176. 40 Alastair McKinnon, “The Relative Importance of God and Christ in Kierkegaard’s Writings,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 1996, p. 395. 41 Alastair McKinnon, “Kierkegaard on Faith: The Space of a Concept,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 2001, p. 432. 42 Alastair McKinnon, “A Method of Displaying Differences between Various Accounts of an Object,” Cirpho, vol. 2, no. 1, 1974, pp. 31–57; and “Similarities and Differences in Kierkegaard’s Accounts of Hegel,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 10, 1977, pp. 117–32. 38

214

Abrahim H. Khan

primarily with the historical Jesus and…his teaching.”43 In another essay, McKinnon offers evidence for the view that the accounts of faith in the three texts Fear and Trembling, Fragments, and Practice in Christianity are much less central than the other Kierkegaard accounts, and explains that they have been mistaken as central because interpreters have disregarded the fact that they are by one or another of the pseudonyms.44 The essay on Kierkegaard’s battles to conquer his inherited sense of fate or doom is based on studying shifts in his use of the three terms “Skjebne,” “Forysn,” and “Styrelse,” in both the Samlede Værker and Papirer. It shows that there are five battle periods to the conquest, starting from spring 1838 and ending with the fifth, spanning April 1848 to September 1855, when he relied entirely on Styrelse to overcome Skjebne and finally succeeds in doing so.45 McKinnon’s chapter on Kierkegaard in Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West reflect much of his research results and interpretation. Besides encompassing the two polarities, it alludes to a psychiatric theory of Kierkegaard based on Christianity as opposed to the line of thinking that has come to be associated with Freud. It shows, among other things, that the corpus contains two types of psychiatric materials. One type includes figures such as Nero and the Seducer. The other type is that of treatises known by their titles: Repetition, The Concept of Anxiety, and The Sickness unto Death. On the basis of both types, McKinnon advances the interpretation that we are to understand the corpus as providing “an extensive catalogue of various forms of illness, resulting from the failure to accept our ambiguous status.”46 The summary of his work by that chapter does not include a very recent line of McKinnon’s research, or some preliminary findings he introduced at the Kierkegaard Circle, in Toronto, suggesting a collective misunderstanding of Kierkegaard’s life and writings. Walker’s reading of Kierkegaard is quite distinctive, and is concerned more with ethical thinking. Each of his three books advances a single idea by which to view or understand Kierkegaard’s thought. Each relies on a Socratic argumentative style moving towards but not entering the realm of religious ideas. His first book To Will One Thing combines Socratic epistemological rhetoric with a Kantian ethical reading of Purity of Heart to show that the edifying discourses are quite demanding with respect to an existential reflection that may lead to a realm of ideas that challenge theologians.47 Rethinking the thought-path the text traces out, Walker finds that its discourses are held together by a pair of claims Kierkegaard argues for: (a) genuine commitment is total commitment, and (b) such a commitment is conceivable only as commitment to the Good.48 His position in To Will One Thing is that the concept of Alastair McKinnon, “Kierkegaard’s Perception of the Bible,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 11, 1980, p. 145. 44 Alastair McKinnon, “Kierkegaard’s Accounts of Faith: Their Relative Centrality,” Studia Theologica, vol. 46, 1992, p. 154. 45 McKinnon, Dating Kierkegaard’s Battles with Fate, pp. 27–8. 46 Alastair McKinnon, “Kierkegaard,” in Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West, vols. 1–3, ed. by Ninian Smart, John Clayton, Stephen Katz and Patrick Sherry, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985, vol. 1, p. 208. 47 Walker, To Will One Thing. 48 Ibid., p. 6. 43

Canada: Kierkegaard on the Canadian Academic Landscape

215

commitment is fundamental not just to Purity but to the interpreting of Kierkegaard’s thought on the whole. Walker’s second book, Descent into God, continues methodologically in the same vein and takes into consideration a wider range of discourses in the corpus.49 It consists of two groups of essays. Those that are Socratically dialectical deal with questions about belief, knowledge, self-knowledge, and truth, showing that Kierkegaard related deliberately logical and epistemological ideas to psychological and ethical issues. In fact, according to Walker, what is original about Kierkegaard is that he “boldly set out to construct a system (and theory) of edification which begins before the beginning of a general spiritual life…”50 The other group consists of essays that are more directly expository and relate to Kierkegaard’s Christian reflections. They explore the concept of agape and its connections to the formation of self—the human self is fully realized only “in accepting the full rigours of the Christian faith.”51 Of course, the essays are concerned with analyzing the way and not the goal, for their aim in general is to explore the place and role of self-examination in moral philosophy. In that exploration Walker helps his readers to see (a) that Kierkegaard as a philosopher places the topic of selfexamination at the center of ethical theorizing, and (b) Kierkegaard’s writings are a philosophical arguing, a kind of dialogue that constantly throws the reader back into Kierkegaard and into one’s own appropriate thinking about him.52 His third book, Kierkegaards sigte, shows also the Socratic argumentative approach that has come to characterize Walker’s study of Kierkegaard and ethical theory.53 More importantly, it uncovers a claim that Kierkegaard makes about his authorship, that it is united by an inner principle. Walker contends that the principle, operating in each genre of the authorship, uniting and relating them to the problem of becoming a Christian, coheres with the unity in Kierkegaard’s own life, and is revealed at the end of the life and in the way he enacted it.54 That principle is Kierkegaard’s single intention, namely, to edify his contemporaries. Altogether, Walker’s contributions show that Kierkegard’s authorship can be interpreted from the perspective of three concepts: commitment, self-examination, and edification. Further, the three concepts work towards unifying in the authorship the Socratic discourses with the Christian ones, and the authorship with his life as a whole. Concepts are also at the basis of Abrahim Khan’s interpretation of Kierkegaard contained in a book and a score of published essays, some aimed at connecting his ideas to other areas of thought. Khan’s book on the concept Salighed epitomizes much of his work that begins methodologically with word counts, moves to concepts, and then to thought.55 It considers Salighed as an important idea in Kierkegaard’s thought, unifying different genres of the authorship, and certainly crucial to the project Climacus undertakes in the Philosophical Fragments and the Postscript. Walker, Kierkegaard: Descent into God. Ibid., p. 14. 51 Ibid., p. 15. 52 Ibid., p. 22. 53 Walker, Kierkegaards sigte, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel 1986. 54 Ibid., pp. 49–50. 55 Abrahim Kahn, “Salighed” as Happiness? Kierkegaard on the Concept Salighed. 49 50

216

Abrahim H. Khan

The book traces the primary search term “Salighed” and cognates through selected titles from the aesthetic writings to the edifying ones, and finally to the religious discourses or Christian titles, in order to understand what its uses in the different selections indicate about the concept. Some of its insights have been instrumental in augmenting certain lines in the work of other scholars.56 One of the book’s conclusions is that the concept Salighed belongs to a cluster illuminating what it takes to become a genuinely human person. For Kierkegaard, Salighed is an ethical ultimate that in the religious discourses become a point of reference for interpreting human suffering and affliction as a means of grace. It can only be hoped for or believed in, since it is only by God’s grace it is receivable. A batch of Khan’s published essays takes a similar methodological approach, starting with word counts, moving to concepts, and then to thoughts constituting a picture that the author is communicating to the reader. The batch and book are indicative of a trajectory in Khan’s research work on Kierkegaard. One of the essays, on a problematic relation or intellectual dispute,57 inquires into whether there is really any striking dissimilarity between Religiousness A and Religiousness B in Kierkegaard’s thought, and finds a marked difference between the two. Each represents a different existential posture in life, one characterized by a self becoming or acquiring itself through patience, the other by a self becoming itself through humiliation, and therefore not isolated from social forces or withdrawn from society. A second essay, exploring a related concept, shows that in the religious discourses the application of glory is to the exalted Christ. On the one hand, when applied to Christ in humiliation, the earthly Christ, it is always to Christ understood as subject of faith and lord to the glory of God. That is, his glory is invisible or hidden on earth and therefore has to be believed in. On the other hand, when glory is applied to the human character it makes reference to transcendence as a constitutive factor in becoming fully a self.58 Another essay applies computer based methodology for dimensional analysis of four 1843 edifying discourses published as a single volume.59 It shows that the titles of the set of discourses clearly reflect their contents, that the discourses have an affinity for each other, but are distinguished by their emphasis on a different human disposition for the strengthening of one’s personal life, and that each sustains a tension between a spiritual loss and gain in this life. Another batch of essays from among those Khan published seek to relate Kierkegaard’s ideas to cognate areas or across disciplines, and therefore methodologically or strategically do not begin with word counts. Such is the case with the study on melancholy and irony. The essays seem to indicate an undercurrent 56 See, for example, James E. Loder and W. Jim Neidhardt, The Knight’s Move, Colorado Springs: Helmers & Howard 1992, pp. 91–2 and Romney M. Mosely, Becoming a Self Before God, Nashville: Abingdon Press 1991, pp. 93–5. 57 The apparent dispute, between Walter Lowrie and J. Weldon Smith III, is mentioned in Abrahim Khan, “Kierkegaard’s Religion A and Religion B: Same or Different,” Studies in Religion, vol. 6, no. 2, 1976–7, pp. 169–76. 58 Abrahim Khan, “Kierkegaard and the Glory of our Common Humanity,” Joyful Wisdom: Glory and an Ethics of Joy, vol. 3, 1994, pp. 22–3. 59 Abrahim Khan, “Four Edifying Discourses (1843): A Dimensional Analysis,” Tópicos. Revista de Filosofia, vol. 111, no. 5, 1993, pp. 235–70.

Canada: Kierkegaard on the Canadian Academic Landscape

217

or another trajectory in his study of Kierkegaard. One of the essays calls into question the claim that Tungsind is Melancholi at a deeper level, by showing that, on the one hand Melancholi tends to be more cerebral, is related to Greek scepticism, and is a function of irony as a standpoint of life; on the other hand, Tungsind tends to be more visceral, and associated with desire and imagination. To introduce two more such studies, a related essay discusses melancholy as an elusive form of depression.60 A third essay however, based on the critique of Two Ages, argues for Kierkegaard as a political radical in way that is analogous to Locke and relative to modern liberalism and aristocratic conservatism of the 1840s in Denmark.61 It holds that Kierkegaard is more radical than Locke on the ideas of authority and leadership in the political logic, operative in the critique. That logic suggests a political theory that is based on a notion of individuality understood in terms of will, autonomy, and equality. Another essay looks at the opposition between religion and politics in Kierkegaard’s thought and relates it to the situation in Protestant Brazil during the twentieth century. Augmenting the idea of a second trajectory in Khan’s work on Kierkegaard are manuscripts. One of them treats Kierkegaard and Iqbal on becoming self, prepared while at Harvard (1998). Another focuses on Kierkegaard and Upaya for a series on Buddhism (1998), and yet another on Kierkegaard and two accounts of marriage, presented at the Brock Philosophical Society (1999). A third manuscript is a reading of postcolonialism through Kierkegaard given at a conference on postcolonalism today (2002). A fourth one is on the relation of the ideas of good and modern identity in Kierkegaard and Charles Taylor, for the Kierkegaard section at the American Academy of Religion Congress (2002). In short, Khan’s work in part shows a positioning of the Danish Socrates for an imaginary cross-cultural dialogue with thinkers in another cultural context, a relating of his ideas to ones that are similar and across disciplinary boundaries. In the teaching and publishing careers of David Goicoechea and Brayton Polka, Kierkegaard has a quite prominent if not primary role. Goicoechea, with interests in Continental philosophy and Thomistic philosophy of love which he learned at a Catholic institution, attempts to systematize and thematize Kierkegaard with respect to either philosophies of love or to existential and post-modern thinking. His essay titles suggest that line of exposition: “Erotic Deception into Agapeic Truth,” “Kierkegaard’s Leap out of the Hermeneutic Circle,” and “The Moment of Responsibility: Derrida and Kierkegaard.”62 The reading that Polka offers concerns primarily the relationship between philosophy and theology, the secular and the sacred traditions. His critique of Kierkegaard is a step in the direction of hermeneutics. He considers, for example, the like-for-like metaphor in Works of Love as providing guidelines for both interpreting Kierkegaard and constructing

Abrahim Khan, “Melancholy: An Elusive Dimension of Depression?” The Journal of Medical Humanities, vol. 15, no. 2, 1994, pp. 113–22. 61 Abrahim Khan, “Kierkegaard on Authority and Leadership: Political Logic in Religious Thought,” Sophia, vol. 33, no. 3, 1994, pp. 74–88. 62 David Goicoechea, “Erotic Deception into Agapeic Truth,” Toronto Journal of Theology, vol. 8, no. 2, 1992, pp. 297–304. 60

218

Abrahim H. Khan

a theory of interpretation in general.63 He argues that Kierkegaard, in making the single individual the very basis of his authorship, demonstrates the hermeneutical reciprocity of the human and the divine. The essay anticipates a broader study on thinking (truth and interpretation) that treats Kierkegaard as one of four thinkers of modernity for whom thinking is understood to express truth and existence.64 Harry Nielsen is another for whom Kierkegaard is a mainstay in his teaching and publishing career. His work on Kierkegaard has been discussed above briefly. For Douglas Hall, reckoned as the premiere Canadian Protestant theologian in the Reformed tradition, Kierkegaard is one of the exemplars of the theological tradition firmly rooted in their historical context. His three-volume work, rendering an account of the substance of the Christian faith from a North American context, consisting of 1,534 pages, of which 47 make references to and or/deploy ideas of Kierkegaard in the summoning, explaining, or contextualizing the faith. The ideas that serve him in the first volume include the following: the “leap” from reason to belief, the distinction between Christian praxis (as communication of existence) and Christianity as a doctrine, the idea of thoughts which wound from behind (to express the sudden realization of the meaningfulness of a Christian teaching), and Christianity as glad tidings rather than melancholy.65 The second volume notes the importance of the category “moment,” for its kairos quality, and shows that beneath Kierkegaard’s use of irony is an indignation about comfortable Christianity that comes straight from the prophets of Israel.66 The third volume brings in his insights related to commitment, sin, purity of heart, existential guilt, angst, contemporaneity, the idea of the infinite qualitative difference between the temporal and the eternal, and Jesus of history–Christ of faith; Hall interprets Kierkegard as one of the very few in the Christian tradition to recognize the darkness or eclipse of God.67 Finally, some of Canada’s finest thinkers and theoreticians have been intellectually attracted to Kierkegaard’s writings. Bernard Lonergan, in his Insight, drew on what Kierkegaard had to say about irony and humor in presenting how one is to be persuaded to openness and genuineness when one is not yet ready for persuasion.68 George Grant was another who took note of Kierkegaard. He remarked that Kierkegaard took Socrates’ passion of inwardness in existing as analogous to faith, and that one must be wary of Kierkegaard’s ideas, but “must take the weariness as nevertheless

Brayton Polka, “Works of Love and the Structure of Interpretation: The Like-for Like of Neighbour and Metaphor,” Toronto Journal of Theology, vol. 9, no. 1, 1993, pp. 79–94. This essay was produced for the Kierkegaard Conference at Trinity College, Toronto, 1986, and mentioned above. 64 Brayton Polka, Truth and Interpretation, New York: St. Martin’s Press 1990, pp. vii–ix. 65 Douglas John Hall, Thinking the Faith, Minneapolis: Augsburg 1989, p. 20; p. 98; pp. 349–50; p. 379. 66 Douglas John Hall, Confessing the Faith, Minneapolis: Augsburg 1993, p. 34; 212; p. 445; p. 476. 67 Douglas John Hall, Professing the Faith, Minneapolis: Augsburg 1989, pp. 14–15; p. 20; p. 45; p. 139; p. 224; p. 226; p. 338; p. 376; p. 446; p. 469; p. 538; p. 546. 68 Bernard Lonergan, Insight, New York: Harper & Row 1958, pp. 624–5. 63

Canada: Kierkegaard on the Canadian Academic Landscape

219

illuminating.”69 In a Canadian philosophy department in the mid 1950s, he introduced Kierkegaard’s ideas in his lectures on existential/European thinkers. Grant had encountered Kierkegaard’s ideas earlier, while at Oxford writing a doctoral thesis on John Oman, but later read him and other existentialist thinkers searchingly as endeavoring to hold together the ideas of human freedom and transcendence. Another contemporary, Northrop Frye in his Anatomy of Criticism found Kierkegaard’s idea of repetition well suited for explaining that one of the tasks of literary criticism is the recovery of a function as opposed to a restoration of it.70 That is, for Frye, the reader is subject to the obligation to make the culture of the past anew—repetition as making anew. Not least of all are the reflections of the contemporary philosopher Charles Taylor in his reflections in Sources of the Self.71 He introduced Kierkegaard as one of three influential nineteenth-century writers, illustrating in Either/Or the notion of an affirmation of self-transformation vis-à-vis our stance towards the world. Even Marshall McLuhan, the philosopher-educator of electronic culture and mass media, took note of Kierkegaard. He remarked that the publication of the The Concept of Anxiety (1844) took place in the same year as the arrival of the commercial telegraph in the USA, and commented that the book’s mentioning of the telegraph as a reason for dread came too late.72 McLuhan drew also on Kierkegaard’s notion of the simultaneity of the inner and the outer, the tension between the two, in his discussion of reversed space, of wearing the skull inside and the brain outside, putting of the nerves outside the body by extending it around the world.73 Conclusion—Prospects The defining thinkers of Canadian intellectual thought mentioned above, in one way or another, if not ineluctably drawn to Kierkegaard’s writings, must have certainly found his ideas appealing and even crucial for shaping and conveying their own thoughts and ideas in order to discuss them as they did. In that respect their engagements of Kierkegaard suggest directions for future studies. At the same time, their interactions with his ideas have secured for Kierkegaard a place on the Canadian academic landscape for years to come. That landscape is likely to change for the better as Canada’s commitment to multiculturalism is played out fully. Hence, Kierkegaard is likely to be placed in conversation with or studied in relation to thinkers outside Collected Works of George Grant, vols. 1–2, ed. by Arthur Davis, Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto 2002, vol. 2, p. 486. See also, William Christian, George Grant: A Biography, Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press 1993. 70 Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 2000 [1957], pp. 344–6. 71 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1989, pp. 449–50. 72 Essential McLuhan, ed. by Eric McLuhan and Frank Zingrone, Toronto, Ontario: Anansi Press 1995, p. 42. 73 Ibid., p. 350. See also McLuhan’s essay on the “the Agenbite of Outwit” in McLuhan Studies, vol. 2, 1963. The reference to Kierkegaard occurs also in a recent publication by Richard Cavell, McLuhan in Space, Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press 2002, p. 196. 69

220

Abrahim H. Khan

a European cultural framework. Rabindranath Tagore and Muhammad Iqbal readily come to mind as some examples of representative thinkers of these cultures. But more importantly, there are still aspects of Kierkegaard’s thought that can be annexed in addressing challenges of our times. They relate to certain aspects of globalization; to global communications that now make it impossible for most to say that “I do not see or know”; to the meaning of sovereignty when power is curtailed, non-exercisable, or absent; to ideas of capability, development, and wellbeing; to the concept of leadership of a community or state, and to identity questions in the context of diaspora, to name a few. Likewise, Kierkegaard’s theories of existential spheres, and that of communication, his thoughts about irony, repetition, alienation, memory, and the demonic, and his understanding of what it means to be a human person, constitute a wide swath of ideas to engage scholars thinking also about artificial intelligence, and the condition and future of humankind. Further, the Kierkegaard texts themselves await investigation as a result of the computer-assisted approach that McKinnon has pioneered, and in ways that McKinnon himself may not have envisioned. Canadian scholars are well poised to undertake and sustain such research efforts, given their interests in interdisciplinarity and the nature of their society, which is one that allows for an awareness of themselves as global citizens participating in global communications.

Bibliography I. Editions of Kierkegaard’s Works in Canada Guds Uforanderlighed, ed. by Alastair McKinnon, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel and Montreal, Quebec: Inter-Editions 1982. Kierkegaards Samlede Værker (electronic text), ed. by Alastair McKinnon, Montreal, Quebec: Inter-Editions 1988. Kierkegaards Papirer (electronic text), ed. by Alastair McKinnon, Montreal and Copenhagen: Inter-Editions 1993. II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard in Canada Carignan, Maurice, Individu et société chez Kierkegaard, Halifax, Nova Scotia: Dalhousie University Press 1977. —— Essai sur l’Interméde de Kierkegaard, Ottawa, Ontario: University of Ottawa Press 1995. Come, Arnold B., Trendelenburg’s Influence on Kierkegaard’s Modal Categories, Montreal, Quebec: Inter-Editions 1991. —— Kierkegaard as Humanist: Discovering My Self, Montreal, Quebec: McGillQueen’s University Press 1995. —— Kierkegaard as Theologian: Recovering My Self, Montreal, Quebec: McGillQueen’s University Press 1997. Evans, Calvin, Søren Kierkegaard Bibliographies Remnants 1944–1980 and Multi-Media 1925–1991, Montreal, Quebec: McGill University Libraries 1993 (Fontanus Monograph Series, vol. 2, general editor, Hans Moller). Goicoechea, David, “Erotic Deception into Agapeic Truth,” Toronto Journal of Theology, vol. 8, no. 2, 1992, pp. 297–304. Grant, M. Colin, “The Power of the Unrecognized ‘Blick’: Adam and Humanity According to Søren Kierkegaard and Emil Brunner,” Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses, vol. 7, 1978, pp. 47–52. Gupta, Anoop, Kierkegaard’s Romantic Legacy: Two Theories of the Self, Ottawa, Ontario: University of Ottawa Press 2005. Hamilton, Kenneth, The Promise of Kierkegaard, Philadelphia: Lippincott 1969. Hogue, Stéphane (ed.), Kierkegaard Database: Auktionsprotokol over Søren Kierkegaards bogsamling/The Auctioneer’s Sales Record of The Library of Søren Kierkegaard, ed. by H.P. Rohde (hard-copy version published by the Royal Danish Library, Copenhagen 1967), Montréal 1991.

222

Abrahim H. Khan

Johnson, Ralph, The Concept of Existence in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 1972. Khan, Abrahim H., “Kierkegaard’s Conception of Evil,” Journal of Religion and Health, vol. 14, no. 1, 1975, pp. 63–6. —— “Kierkegaard’s Religion A and Religion B,” Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses, vol. 6. no. 2, 1976–7, pp. 169–76. —— “Contemplation: A Deception About Truth,” Communio Viatorum, nos. 1–2, 1979, pp. 91–9. —— “Happiness in Kierkegaard’s Edifying Discourses,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 12, 1982, pp. 27–37. —— “Lidenskab in Efterskrift,” in Kierkegaard: Resources and Results, ed. by Alastair McKinnon, Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press 1982, pp. 105–18. —— “Salighed in Kierkegaard’s Religious Works,” Studia Theologica, vol. 36, 1982, pp. 47–62. —— “Happiness in Kierkegaard’s Efterskrift,” Sophia, vol. 22, no. 1, 1983, pp. 37–53. —— “Melancholy, Irony and Kierkegaard,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 17, 1985, pp. 67–85. —— “Salighed” as Happiness? Kierkegaard on the Concept Salighed, Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press 1985. —— “Kierkegaard Studies and Contemporary Philosophy,” Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, no. 14, April 1986, pp. 3–6. —— “Kierkegaard’s Acknowledged Works,” Toronto Journal of Theology, vol. 8, no. 2, 1992, pp. 286–7. —— “Four Edifying Discourses (1843): A Dimensional Analysis,” Tópicos. Revista de Filosofia, vol. 111, no. 5, 1993, pp. 235–70. —— “Kierkegaard and Pathos,” in Trials of New Interpretation, ed. by Kinya Masugata, Koyoto: Showado Publishing House 1993, pp. 278–317 (in Japanese translation). —— “Opposition within Affinity between Religion and Politics with Reference to Golden Age Denmark and Brazil,” in Religious Transformations and SocioPolitical Change: Eastern Europe and Latin America, ed. by Luther Martin, Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter 1993 (Religion and Society (The Hague, Netherlands), vol. 33), pp. 189–203. —— “Kierkegaard and the Glory of our Common Humanity, Joyful Wisdom, vol. 3, 1994, pp. 14–32. —— “Kierkegaard on Authority and Leadership: Political Logic in Religious Thought,” Sophia, vol. 33, no. 3, 1994, pp. 74–88. —— “Melancholy: An Elusive Dimension of Depression?” The Journal of Medical Humanities, vol. 15, no. 2, 1994, pp. 113–22. —— “The Challenge of McGill’s Second Kierkegaard Collection,” Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, no. 30, 1994, pp. 7–11. —— “Kierkegaard as Firechief in Denmark,” Religious Studies/Sciences Religieuses, vol. 25, no. 4, 1996, pp. 445–58.

Canada: Kierkegaard on the Canadian Academic Landscape

223

—— “The Challenge of Information Technology for Literary Studies,” Journal of Religious & Technological Information, vol. 2, no. 2, 1996, pp. 59–72. —— “Religious Thinker or Theologian Kierkegaard?” Canadian Theological Society Newsletter, vol. 18, no. 1, 1998, pp. 15–16. —— “Kierkegaard and Jest—Changing Emphases and Preoccupations,” Søren Kierkegaard Society Bulletin, vol. 7, January 1999, pp. 1–16. Khan, Abrahim H. and Alastair McKinnon, “Kierkegaard’s Two Forms of Conscious Despair: Svaghed and Trods,” Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses, vol. 14, no. 4, 1985, pp. 435–54. Kulak, Avron, “Kierkegaard, Derrida, and the Context of Context(s),” Philosophy & Theology, 17, nos. 1–2, 2006. MacCallum, Henry Reid, “Kierkegaard and Levels of Existence,” University of Toronto Quarterly, vol. 13, April, 1944, pp. 258–75. McKinnon, Alastair, “Søren Kierkegaard,” in Architects of Modern Thought. 5th and 6th Series: 12 Talks for CBC Radio, Toronto, Ontario: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 1962, pp. 1–13. —— “Barth’s Relation to Kierkegaard: Some Further Light,” Canadian Journal of Theology, January 1967, pp. 31–41. —— “Kierkegaard: ‘Paradox’ and Irrationalism,” Journal of Existentialism, no. 27, Spring, 1967, pp. 401–16. —— “ ‘Miracle’ and ‘Paradox,’ ” American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 4, no. 4, 1967, pp. 308–14. —— “Believing the Paradoks: A Contradiction in Kierkegaard?” Harvard Theological Review, vol. 61, 1968, pp. 633–6. —— “Kierkegaard and his Pseudonyms: A Preliminary Report,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 7, 1968, pp. 64–76. —— “Kierkegaard’s Irrationalism Revisited,” International Philosophical Quarterly, June, 1969, pp. 165–76. —— “Kierkegaard’s Pseudonyms: A New Hierarchy,” American Philosophical Quarterly, April, 1969, pp. 116–26. —— Kierkegaard in Translation/en Traduction/in Übersetzung, Leiden: Brill 1970. —— Fundamental Polyglot Konkordans til Kierkegaards Samlede Værker, Leiden: Brill 1971. —— “Kierkegaard on Music: An Interdepartmental Memo,” Les Cahiers canadiens de musique/The Canada Music Book, Spring–Summer, 1971. —— “A Method of Displaying Differences between Various Accounts of an Object,” Cirpho, Spring, 1974, pp. 31–57. —— Index Verborum til Kierkegaards Samlede Værker, Leiden: Brill 1973. —— “Kierkegaard’s Remarks on Philosophy,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, October, 1973, pp. 513–22. —— “The Central Works in Kierkegaard’s Authorship,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie, no. 103, 1973, pp. 84–94. —— “The Conquest of Fate in Kierkegaard,” Cirpho, Autumn, 1973, pp. 47–57. —— “A Method of Displaying Differences between Various Accounts of an Object,” Cirpho, Spring, 1974, pp. 31–57.

224

Abrahim H. Khan

—— “The Increase of Christian Terms in Kierkegaard’s Samlede Værker,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 9, 1974, pp. 147–62. —— “Theological Focus in Kierkegaard’s Samlede Værker: Some Basic Data,” Studie in Religion/Sciences Religieuses, vol. 4, 1974–5, pp. 58–62. —— Computational Analysis of Kierkegaard’s Samlede Værker, Leiden: Brill 1975. —— “Two Techniques for Identifying Word Associations,” Cirpho, Autumn, 1974, pp. 49–69. —— “Aberrant Frequencies as a Basis for Clustering the Works of a Corpus,” Cirpho, Spring, 1975–6, pp. 33–52. —— “Paradox and Faith in Kierkegaard,” The Challenge of Religion Today, ed. by John King–Farlow, New York: Watson 1976, pp. 166–89. —— “From Co-occurrences to Concepts,” Computers and the Humanities, vol. 11, 1977, pp. 147–55. —— “Similarities and Differences in Kierkegaard’s Account of Hegel,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 10, 1977, pp. 117–32. —— “Most Frequent Words and the Clustering of Kierkegaard’s Works,” Style, vol. 12, no. 3, 1978, pp. 241–58. —— “Relations Between the Most Common Danish Words,” Sprache und Datenverarbeitung, vol. 2, 1978, pp. 158–70. —— “Some Minor Figures in Kierkegaard’s Works,” International Studies in Philosophy, vol. 11, 1979, pp. 165–73. —— “Aberrant Frequency Words: Their Identification and Uses,” Glottometrika, vol. 2, 1980, pp. 108–224 (Bochum). —— “Kierkegaard on Philosophy: The Geography of a Concept,” Liber Academiae Kierkegaardiensis Annuaris, ed. by Alessandro Cortese, Tomus I, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel 1980, pp. 63–105. —— “Kierkegaard’s Perception of the Bible,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 11, 1980, pp. 132–47. —— “Some Place Names in Kierkegaard’s Writings,” Thought, vol. 55, no. 218, 1980, pp. 333–45. —— Kierkegaard: Resources and Results, ed. by Alastair McKinnon, Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press 1982. —— “The Du-man Polarity in Kierkegaard’s Works,” Kierkegaard-Studiet, no. 12, 1982, pp. 81–93 (Osaka; Japanese translation, pp. 47–59). —— (ed.), The Kierkegaard–Malantschuk Collection, series 1–2, New York and London: Microforms International and Montreal: Inter-Editions 1982. —— “The Shape of Kierkegaard’s Authorship,” in his Kierkegaard: Resources and Results, Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press 1982, pp. 122–57. —— “The Sources of Awe and Reassurance in Kierkegaard’s Guds Uforanderlighed,” Empirical Studies of the Arts, vol. 1, no. 1, 1983, pp. 95–107. —— “Kierkegaard’s Interpretation of his ‘Authorship’: Some Statistical Evidence,” Inquiry, vol. 27, nos. 2–3, 1984, pp. 225–33. —— “Kierkegaard,” in Religious Thought in the Nineteenth Century, ed. by Ninian Smart et al., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985, pp. 181–213.

Canada: Kierkegaard on the Canadian Academic Landscape

225

—— “Three Conceptions of Socrates in Kierkegaard’s Writings,” Kierkegaard Oggi, Milan: Vita e Pensiero 1985, pp. 21–43. —— Dating Kierkegaard’s Battles with Fate, Copenhagen: Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab 1986. —— “Mapping the Shape of an Argument,” Proceedings of the American Society of Information Sciences, 1987, pp. 170–80. —— The Kierkegaard Text and Support Software Manual, Montreal, Quebec: InterEditions 1987. —— “Kierkegaard, Inwardness and the Computer,” Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, no. 19, 1988, pp. 4–11. —— “Mapping the Dimensions of a Literary Corpus,” Literary and Linguistic Computing, vol. 4, no. 2, 1989, pp. 73–84. —— “Could Kierkegaard Have Written ‘Literary Quicksilver’?” in The Corsair Affair, ed. by Robert L. Perkins, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press 1990 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 13), pp. 163–78. —— “McGill’s Second Kierkegaard Collection,” Fontanus, vol. 5, 1992, pp. 173–216. —— “Kierkegaard’s Accounts of Faith: Their Relative Centrality,” Studia Theologica, vol. 46, 1992, pp. 147–59. —— “Friendship in Kierkegaard’s Works: Exploring the Space of a Concept, Festschrift for Prof. Venant Cauchy, Le Dialogue Humaniste, ed. by Yvon Gauthier, Montreal: Les Presses de l’ Université 1993, pp. 41–66. —— “Kierkegaard and ‘The Leap of Faith,’ ” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 16, 1993, pp. 107–25. —— “Kierkegaard’s Attack on Christendom: Its Lexical History,” Toronto Journal of Theology, vol. 9, no. 1, 1993, pp. 95–106. —— “Kierkegaard’s Presentation of ‘the Good,’ ” Japanese translation by Kinya Masugata (first part), Kierkegaard Trials of a New Interpretation, Kyoto: Showado 1993, pp. 245–77. —— “The Multi-Dimensional Concordance: A New Tool for Literary Research,” Computers and the Humanities, vol. 27, 1993, pp. 165–83. —— “Woman in Either/Or, I & II: A Computer Analysis,” Tópicos, no. 5, 1993, pp. 69–101 (Mexico City: La Universidad Panamericana). —— “Kierkegaard munkássága: az első nyolc dimenzió [Kierkegaard’s Works: The First Eight Dimenions], in Kierkegaard Budapesten [Kierkegaard in Budapest), ed. by Nagy András, Budapest: Fekete Sas Kiadó 1994, pp. 163–90. —— “Kierkegaard’s Unfolding of Faith: The Initiation of ‘My Reader,’” in The Three Loves. Philosophy, Theology, and World Religions: Essays in Honour of Joseph C. McLelland, ed. by Robert C. Culley and William Klempa, Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press 1994 (Mcgill Studies in Religion, vol. 2), pp. 39–62. —— “Kierkegaard on Violence and Human Coexistence,” in Violence and Human Co-existence. Proceedings of the II World Congress of ASEVICO, ed. by V. Cauchy, Montreal, Ontario: Éditions Montmorency 1994–5, pp. 457–65. —— “God and Christ in Kierkegaard’s Journals: Tools for Large Texts,” Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuse, vol. 25, no. 4, 1996, pp. 425–43. —— “The Relative Importance of God and Christ in Kierkegaard’s Writings,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 1996, pp. 389–425.

226

Abrahim H. Khan

—— “Christ in Kierkegaard’s Later Writings,” Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuse, 1998, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 311–19. —— The Kierkegaard Computer Workshop, Montreal: Inter-Editions 1998. —— “Kierkegaard’s Conceptual Confusion,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 11, 1999, pp. 71–81. —— “Unfolding Kierkegaard’s Writings,” Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, no. 38, 1999, pp. 15–17. —— “Authority in Kierkegaard’s Journals: The Main Changes,” Anthropology and Authority: Essays on Søren Kierkegaard, ed. by Poul Houe, Gordon D. Marino and Sven Hakon Rossel, Atlanta, Georgia: Rodopi 2000, pp. 153–60. —— “Kierkegaard on Faith: The Space of a Concept,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 2001, pp. 414–32. —— “Kierkegaard on Hating One’s Father etc.” Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, no. 41, 2001, pp. 17–19. —— “Hun and Hende: Kierkegaard’s Relation to Regine,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 22, 2003, pp. 24–41. McKinnon, Alastair and Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, “The Period of Composition of Kierkegaard’s Published Works,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 9, 1974, pp. 133–46. —— “Kierkegaard’s Literary Production by Quarterly Rates,” Danske Studier, 1982, pp. 21–34. McKinnon, Alastair and Birgit Christiansen, “Kierkegaard’s Use of Some German Loan Words,” Scandinavian Studies, vol. 70, no. 2, 1998, pp. 251–62. McKinnon, Alastair and S. Hogue, “Uforanderlige and Uforanderlighed: More about Their Differences,” Literary & Linguistic Computing, vol. 2, no. 2, 1987, pp. 98–107. McKinnon, Alastair and Abrahim H. Khan, “Kierkegaard’s Two Forms of Conscious Despair,” Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses, vol. 14, no. 4, 1985, pp. 435–53. McKinnon, Alastair and Roger Webster, “A Method of ‘Author’ Identification,” Computer Studies in the Humanities and Verbal Behaviour, March 1969, pp. 19–23. McLelland, J.C., “Doxology as Suspension of the Tragic,” Theology Today, vol. 31, 1974–5, pp. 221–32. Makolkin, Anna, “Russian, Stalinist and Soviet Re-Readings of Kierkegaard: Lev Shestov and Piama Gaidenko,” Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue canadienne des slavistes, vol. 44, nos. 1–2, 2002, pp. 79–96. Mercer, David E., Kierkegaard’s Living Room: The Relation between Faith and History in Philosophical Fragments, Montreal, Quebec: McGill-Queen’s University Press 2001. Nielsen, Harry A., Where the Passion Is, Tallahassee: Florida State University 1983. Polka, Brayton, “Works of Love and the Structure of Interpretation: The Like-for Like of Neighbour and Metaphor,” Toronto Journal of Theology, vol. 9, no. 1, 1993, pp. 79–94. —— “Who is the Single Individual? On the Religious and the Secular in Kierkegaard,” Philosophy & Theology, vol. 17, nos. 1–2, 2006, pp. 157–75. Shearson, W.A., The Notion of Encounter, Ottawa, Ontario: Canadian Library of Philosophy 1980.

Canada: Kierkegaard on the Canadian Academic Landscape

227

Walker, Jeremy D.B., “The Idea of Reward in Morality,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 8, 1971, pp. 30–52. —— To Will One Thing, Montreal, Quebec: McGill-Queen’s University Press 1972. —— “The Paradox in Fear and Trembling,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 10, 1977, pp. 133–51. —— “Ethical Beliefs: A Theory of Truth Without Truth-Values,” Thought, vol. 55, 1980, pp. 295–305. —— “Kierkegaard, Judge William, and the Idea of Community,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 14, 1982, pp. 51–6. —— Kierkegaards sigte, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel 1986 (Søren Kierkegaard Selskabets Populære Skrifter, vol. 17). —— The Descent Into God, Kingston, Ontario: McGill-Queen’s University Press 1985. III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Reception in Canada McKinnon, Alastair, “Les études kierkegaardiennes au Canada,” Philosophique, vol. 9, no. 1, 1982, pp. 147–61.

C\ Taylor & Francis ~Taylor & Francis Group

http:/ / taylora ndfra ncis.com

The USA: From Neo-Orthodoxy to Plurality Lee C. Barrett

Kierkegaard has been an elusive presence in the culture of the United States ever since the early twentieth century. Celebrated poets and novelists have sometimes lauded him as their chief muse. Journalists have hailed him as a passionate defender of humane values against the sterility of technological rationalism. Often his work has been featured as a staple in the canon of introduction to philosophy courses, where it has typically appeared as a prologue to existentialism. Seminaries have frequently included him in their core curricula as a precursor of neo-orthodoxy. At times his name has even seeped into the vocabulary of popular culture, figuring prominently in television situation comedies as a synonym for obscure and inscrutable profundity. Given this plethora of popular receptions, it is not surprising that the American literature interpreting Kierkegaard’s authorship exhibits the same kaleidoscopic variety that has usually typified Kierkegaard scholarship throughout the world. Since the United States’ first encounter with Kierkegaard, his texts have stimulated such dramatically contrasting readings that it often seems incredible that the respective readers have been expositing the same works. For some Kierkegaard scholars, his oeuvre is a hymn to the radical ethical and epistemic autonomy of the existing individual, while for others his work is an apologia for the communal convictions of an historic religious tradition. For some Kierkegaard was the ultimate champion of irrationality and criterionless “leaps,” while for others he was a pioneer of a pragmatic justification of a certain type of religious belief. For some interpreters his texts are designed to elicit the passions and vision constitutive of a particular religious way of life, while for others they function to expose the instability of all meaning and to liberate the free play of interpretations. For some he was the consummate proponent of the transcendental ego, while for others he was the herald of the death of the author and the dissolution of the self. He has been credited with prefiguring a dizzying array of contemporary movements from existentialism to deconstruction, and from neo-orthodoxy to post-liberalism. His works have been diligently scrutinized for anticipations of contemporary trends, and almost every new hermeneutic method has been applied to his volumes to support these investigations. At the very least, his works are sufficiently multi-dimensional to lend a certain prima facie plausibility to many of these seemingly contradictory approaches. We shall attempt to untangle these diverse strands of interpretation, distinguishing the divergent types and tendencies, noting any chronological shifts, and identifying

230

Lee C. Barrett

recurrent themes, issues, and interpretive strategies. Although we shall focus on the United States, interpretive influences from other regions cannot be ignored. I. Early Receptions Kierkegaard may have been first introduced into the United States in the 1890s through references to him by Scandinavian immigrants to the northern Midwest. By the turn of the century Kierkegaard’s thought was being referenced in Scandinavianlanguage seminaries in Illinois and Wisconsin. A major impetus to the broader reception of Kierkegaard was the discovery of his work in 1898 by David F. Swenson (1876–1940), a young professor of philosophy at the University of Minnesota. By 1914 Swenson had started lecturing on Kierkegaard, and his interest in Kierkegaard’s literature was appropriated and disseminated by his students. Swenson’s contention that Kierkegaard refused to divorce matters of passion and matters of reason eventually found an appreciative audience in a generation disillusioned with idealism and positivism, and initiated an interpretive trajectory that would extend through Paul L. Holmer (1917–2004). Swenson’s Kierkegaard was not the anti-rationalist of some of the later more extreme existentialists, but a Christian philosopher who maintained that faith in an otherworldly source of meaning (a source that admittedly does transcend all procedures of objective justification) is an appropriate response to the chaos and uncertainty of human life. Swenson’s influence on English-language Kierkegaard studies would be furthered through his rather literal translation of Philosophical Fragments in 1936, and his subsequent translations often prepared with the help of Lillian M. Swenson (died in 1961) and Walter Lowrie (1868–1959). Kierkegaard’s works managed to attract the attention of Charles Williams, an editor at Oxford University Press. Through a collaborative effort with Princeton University Press, Williams commissioned Walter Lowrie, an American minister who had become acquainted with Kierkegaard through the theology of Karl Barth, to prepare translations of some of Kierkegaard’s seminal works, a series of sixteen volumes that began to appear in 1939. Williams and Lowrie both saw Kierkegaard as an essentially Christian author, whose use of curious literary strategies was intended to edify the reader and foster religious commitment and vision. Lowrie’s enormously influential 1938 biography of Kierkegaard reinforced this widespread perception of Kierkegaard as a basically Christian writer. The reviews that it received enthused about Kierkegaard as an proponent of the worth of the individual in the midst of See Lewis Lawson, “Small Talk on the ‘Melancholy Dane’ in America,” in The Legacy and Interpretation of Kierkegaard, ed. by Niels Thulstrup and Marie Mikulová Thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel 1981 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 8), pp. 178–97; see also Paul Sponheim, “America,” in Kierkegaard Research, ed. by Niels Thulstrup and Marie Mikulová Thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel 1987 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 15), pp. 9–36.  See David Swenson, Something about Kierkegaard, Minneapolis: Augsburg 1941; David Swenson Kierkegaardian Philosophy in the Faith of a Scholar, Philadelphia: Westminster Press 1949.  Walter Lowrie, Kierkegaard, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1938; Walter Lowrie, A Short Life of Kierkegaard, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1942. 

The USA: From Neo-Orthodoxy to Plurality

231

the alienation intrinsic to twentieth-century mass society. The wide circulation on both sides of the Atlantic of W.H. Auden’s (1907–73) 1952 anthology of selections from Kierkegaard’s works further fostered his popularity among those seeking an alternative to scientific pragmatism, Marxist materialism, and romantic fascism. Kierkegaard was widely seen as an uncannily prescient critic of the unholy alliance of religion, nationalism, and bourgeois cultural values that had helped spawn two world wars. This Kierkegaard was the herald of the end of Christendom, the prophetic voice of the anxiety generated by the collapse of a moribund culture, and the advocate of personal responsibility over against all collectivisms and scientific reductionisms. While some saw Kierkegaard as an ally in the effort to salvage a modern form of Christianity from the onslaught of empiricist, Freudian, and Marxist critiques, others, however, already feared that his literature pointed to a solipsistic valorization of self-transcendence and an inordinate trust in the idiosyncratic vagaries of the individual’s subjectivity. II. Existentialist Receptions After the Second World War the international vogue of existentialism spread to the United States and carried a particular interpretation of Kierkegaard with it. Kierkegaard was coupled with Nietzsche as an ancestor of the existentialist revolt against all ideologies of “essence.” In the wake of this enthusiasm for the “absurd,” Kierkegaard was construed as a maverick philosopher whose work was best understood in juxtaposition to the previous evolution of ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology. The Kierkegaard who captured the public imagination was the anti-idealist and anti-positivist Kierkegaard. It became common to cull through Kierkegaard’s work searching for the sources of Heidegger’s and Sartre’s philosophic experimentations. As part of this trend, in 1941 Dorothy Emmett presented Kierkegaard as the father of the themes of the priority of existence over essence, and freedom over necessity. In 1958 William E. Barrett (b. 1913) reinforced this characterization of Kierkegaard in his Irrational Man, highlighting Kierkegaard’s juxtaposition of subjective truth with the objective correspondence of propositions to external reality, and the juxtaposition of the struggle for authenticity with social conformity. Barrett saw this tension reduplicated in the tortured struggles of Kierkegaard’s life, thus helping to perpetuate the image of Kierkegaard as the alienated genius and existential hero. Theologians in the United States like Carl Michalson (1915–65) and Roger L. Shinn began to include Kierkegaard in general explorations of the implications of See D.V. Steere, American-Scandinavian Review, vol. 27, 1937; W.B. Blakemore, Jr., The Christian Century, vol. 60, 1943; H.A. Reinhold, Commonweal, vol. 37, 1943.  W.H. Auden (ed.), The Living Thoughts of Kierkegaard, New York: David McKay 1952.  See William Hubben, Four Prophets of Our Destiny, New York: Macmillan 1952.  See Fred Safier, The Philosophy of Soren Kierkegaard, Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1934.  Dorothy M. Emmet, “Kierkegaard and the ‘Existential’ Philosophy,” Philosophy, 1941, pp. 257–71.  William Barrett, Irrational Man, Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books 1958. 

232

Lee C. Barrett

existentialism for Christian faith.10 This interpretive trend extended well into the 1960s as philosophy professors commonly stressed Kierkegaard’s themes of the need to free one’s self from the illusion of objectivity, and the importance of commitment in the face of uncertainty. During the 1960s Robert G. Olson’s (b. 1924) widely read An Introduction to Existentialism listed Kierkegaard as one of the four great existential thinkers, all of whom shared the recognition that a completely satisfying human life, defined either as the pursuit of worldly happiness or as a detachment from mundane concerns, is impossible due to the structural tensions in the human psyche.11 Recognition of this tragic debacle can nevertheless generate a sense of value in the midst of life’s struggle itself. Existentially inclined psychologists like Rollo May (1909–94) and Victor Frankl (1905–97) added their voices to the chorus, claiming that Kierkegaard had anticipated their insights concerning anxiety and the unconscious. Waves of existentialist plays and novels, and the authors’ frequent declarations of indebtedness to Kierkegaard, helped popularize the existentialist version and make it almost canonical. Due to the work of Flannery O’Connor (1925–64), John Updike (b. 1932), and Richard Wright (1908–60) Kierkegaard was associated in the popular psyche with the rediscovery of the tragic and demonic dimensions of human life, the spiritually lethal effects of cultural conformity, the universality of suppressed desperation and anxiety, and the inexpressibility of unique individuality. Perhaps most powerfully, novelist Walker Percy (1916–90) credited Kierkegaard as the inspiration of his own rejection of scientific humanism and every other ideology that fosters the reduction of the individual to the mass.12 This existentialist construal of Kierkegaard was further advanced by the very critics of existentialism, who detected the seeds of relativism, irrationalism, and even nihilism in his work. During the beginning of the existentialist vogue in the United States, Marjorie Grene (b. 1910) claimed to discern in Kierkegaard’s works the roots of a culturally dangerous despair arising from the suspicion that humane values have no ultimate ground.13 The prolific and influential Walter Kaufmann (1921–80) disparaged Kierkegaard’s work as the rejection of critical reflection and the valorization of unexamined intuitions.14 For Kaufmann, Kierkegaard was the archetypal irrational fideist. Brand Blanshard (1892–1987) and Paul Edwards (1923– 2004) echoed the fear that Kierkegaard had embraced irrationalism, particularly in ethics.15 In the 1960s Alasdair MacIntyre’s (b. 1929) widely read A Short History of Ethics lamented Kierkegaard’s encouragement of the decline into emotivist theories of ethics and the proliferation of theories of ethical and religious commitment as See Christianity and the Existentialists, ed. by Carl Michalson, New York: Charles Scribner’s 1956; Roger Shinn The Existentialist Posture, New York: Association Press 1959. 11 Robert Olson, An Introduction to Existentialism, New York: Dover 1962. 12 Bradley R. Dewey, “Walker Percey talks about Kierkegaard: An Annotated Interview,” Journal of Religion, July, 1974, pp. 273–98. 13 Marjorie Grene, Dreadful Freedom: A Critique of Existentialism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1948. 14 Walter Kaufmann, Critique of Religion and Philosophy, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1958. 15 Brand Blanshard, Reason and Belief, New Haven: Yale University Press 1974; Paul Edwards, “Kierkegaard and the ‘Truth’ of Christianity,” Philosophy, vol. 46, 1971, pp. 89–108. 10

The USA: From Neo-Orthodoxy to Plurality

233

a criterionless choice.16 (MacIntyre’s assessment, with a bit more nuance, would influence an even wider in audience in the 1980s through the popularity of his After Virtue.17) By the mid-1960s it was not uncommon to find Kierkegaard described as a solipsist who identified “truth” with the idiosyncratic preferences of the individual and collapsed subjectivity into a thorough-going subjectivism. This view was reinforced through the influence of Adorno and the Frankfurt School, who saw Kierkegaard’s inwardness as symptomatic of bourgeois alienation from objective reality, an alienation that dissolved materiality, society, and history into mere appearance. Even such a sympathetic expositor as the neo-Thomist James Collins, who did resist the identification of Kierkegaard with irrationalism, lamented that Kierkegaard failed to appreciate the need for the mind to conform to objective reality and may have been vulnerable to a theoretic solipsism.18 Anticipating post-structuralist readings, Josiah Thompson supported the anti-rationalist picture of Kierkegaard by suggesting that Kierkegaard’s conviction that human life is shrouded in ambiguity pointed to the end of all philosophy.19 By the late 1960s the popularity of existentialism had begun to wane, undermined by a renewed sense of the social construction of reality mediated by linguistic philosophers, cultural anthropologists, neo-Marxists, and the first wave of poststructuralists. This reinvigorated appreciation of the importance of the linguistic, cultural, and material contexts of human life, and the questions it raised concerning the possibility of any transcendent, unified, self-determining subject, undermined interest in Kierkegaard, who had been branded as the apologist for a hopelessly naive view of the autonomous human self. At the dawn of the era of the death of the author and the death of the subject, Kierkegaard was displaced from a central position in English-speaking philosophical conversations. III. Neo-Orthodox and Evangelical Receptions During the early and mid-twentieth century the proto-Heideggerian Kierkegaard had not been the only version of the mysterious Dane circulating in the United States. From the earliest decades a neo-orthodox theological interpretation had vied (and sometimes overlapped) with the existentialist portrait. Even before Kierkegaard’s works were translated into English, theologians intrigued by the new theological ferment on the European continent, variously denominated “dialectical,” “crisis,” or “neo-orthodox” theology, were alerted to the existence of a nineteenth-century Danish religious thinker whose work seemed to anticipate that of Karl Barth (1886– 1968) and Emil Brunner (1889–1966). Thanks partly to the 1936 American lecture tour of Eduard Geismar (1871–1939), in the 1930s American theologians such George Warren Richards (1869–1955) and Walter Horton (1895–1966) identified Kierkegaard as the intellectual inspiration of neo-orthodoxy’s appreciation of the Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, New York: Macmillan 1966. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press 1984. 18 James Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard, Chicago: Henry Regnery Press 1953. 19 Josiah Thompson, The Lonely Labyrinth, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press 1967. 16 17

234

Lee C. Barrett

absolute otherness of God, its critique of theological liberalism’s elision of human experience and divine revelation, its rejection of liberalism’s confusion of culture and Christianity, and its attack on liberalism’s celebration of divine immanence. Kierkegaard’s voice was heard in Barth’s Epistle to the Romans with its talk of God’s qualitative difference from humanity, and the church’s need to differentiate itself from the environing cultural values. In 1936 theologian Edwin Aubrey (1896– 1956) of the University of Chicago associated Kierkegaard with the neo-orthodox themes of the paradoxical nature of faith, the incarnation, and the otherness of God.20 The post-World War I theological generation’s disenchantment with progress and its augmented sense of human depravity looked to The Concept of Anxiety to find a new way, uncontaminated by pre-modern metaphysics, to engage the doctrine of original sin. Reinhold Niebuhr’s (1892–1971) 1941 The Nature and Destiny of Man credited Kierkegaard with being a pioneer of Christian psychology, applauding his analysis of human nature as an unstable synthesis of the finite and the infinite that generates anxiety and makes self-transcendence possible.21 Simultaneously in the early 1940s Paul Tillich (1886–1965), a German immigrant to the United States, borrowed themes concerning anxiety, the self as a composite of being and non-being, and the resultant dialectical tensions intrinsic to human being from Heidegger’s and Jaspers’ appropriation of The Sickness unto Death and The Concept of Anxiety.22 Lowrie’s translations with introductions that emphasized Kierkegaard’s anti-Hegeliansism fostered this neo-orthodox reception of Kierkegaard as the opponent of all attempts to collapse Christianity into generic religiosity. In 1949 Perry D. Lefevre (died 2006) summarized this interpretive tradition by maintaining that all the key themes in Barth, Brunner, Tillich, and Niebuhr had all been anticipated by Kierkegaard’s discussion of the Absolute Paradox.23 Reading Kierkegaard in relation to the themes dear to the likes of Barth, Brunner, and Niebuhr continued even after the heyday of neo-orthodoxy. For example, the influential Arbaughs, with their synopses of Kierkegaard’s works, interpreted the essence of the “offense” as the aversion of human pride to God’s offer of unmerited acceptance.24 At the end of the 1960s Kenneth Hamilton continued to insist that Kierkegaard’s single-minded concentration on the paradox of the God-man distanced him from all theologies that sought to root Christianity in the immanent religious experience of humanity.25 At the same time, during the brief flurry of excitement about the “death of God” and “the secular city,” theologians who moved beyond neo-orthodoxy like William Hamilton (b. 1924), Thomas J.J. Altizer (b. 1927), and Harvey Cox (b. 1929), traced their lineage through Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s (1906–45) “religionless Christianity” back to its roots in Kierkegaard’s alleged Edwin Aubrey, Present Theological Tendencies, New York: Harper and Brothers 1936. 21 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, New York: Prentice Hall 1941. 22 Paul Tillich, The Courage To Be, London and Glasgow: The Fontana Library 1962. 23 Perry D. LeFevre, “Kierkegaard and His Influence on Contemporary Christian Theology,” Bulletin of Franklin and Marshall College Institute of Religion, vol. 3, no. 3, 1949. 24 George E. Arbaugh and George B. Arbaugh, Kierkegaard’s Authorship, London: Allen & Unwin. 1968. 25 Kenneth Hamilton, The Promise of Kierkegaard, New York: J.P. Lippincott 1969. 20

The USA: From Neo-Orthodoxy to Plurality

235

anti-supernaturalism and rejection of metaphysically grounded piety. Of course, for Hamilton and Altizer Kierkegaard had not gone far enough, for he seemed to retain an outmoded mythological sense of God’s availability in the self’s inner life. During the post-Second World War phase of his reception in the United States, Kierkegaard attracted the attention not only of neo-orthodox theologians but also of certain types of evangelicals. A serious ambivalence was evident in the evangelical response. Edward John Carnell (1919–67), the influential president of Fuller Seminary, exhibited this attraction/repulsion in the 1950s. On the one hand, Carnell, who hoped to liberate evangelicalism from fundamentalism’s identification of faith with cognitive assent to propositions, welcomed what he took to be Kierkegaard’s central point that faith is more the product of passionate inwardness and resolute commitment than it is of rationally compelling arguments.26 For Carnell, Kierkegaard was a useful resource from which to draw support for his own effort to create a neo-evangelicalism free of the hyper-rationalism (of a supernaturalistic sort) of conservative scholastic Protestantism. On the other hand, Carnell voiced worries that Kierkegaard’s work might point to an unrestrained irrationalism in which any religious claim could be justified if held with an appropriate degree of existential passion. Consequently, Carnell, hoping to salvage the rationality of belief, criticized Kierkegaard for totally rejecting the testimony of the “evidences” for Christian truth claims. Over the next decades many evangelicals became more skeptical of the alleged probative power of supposed evidences and arguments for Christian beliefs, and began to look even more favorably upon Kierkegaard’s work. By the 1990s the post-conservative branch of evangelical scholars like Stanley James Grenz (1950–2005) vowed to free evangelical Christianity from its unconscious bondage to the Enlightenment, and welcomed Kierkegaard’s rejection of foundationalism. Kierkegaard became a primary ally in the campaign to debunk the myth that reason could be neutral and objective. The new breed of evangelicals were prepared to embrace what they took to be Kierkegaard’s brand of fideism as long as it did not imply antirealism. IV. The Proliferation of Interpretive Methods and Close Readings As existentialism and neo-orthodoxy began to be challenged by other philosophical and theological perspectives, Kierkegaard’s work began to be examined through other lenses, with other concerns and questions coming to the fore. By the late 1960s and early 1970s the confluence of several developments in the United States began to promote a closer textual study of Kierkegaard. The appreciation of the complexity of the texts began to challenge or at least complicate some of the received existential and neo-orthodox interpretations. In 1968 Howard (b. 1912) and Edna Hong (1913–2007) received a national book award for the first volume of their translation of Kierkegaard’s journals and papers. Arranged topically, subsequent volumes appeared until 1978, making it possible for English-speakers to engage at least some of Kierkegaard’s

Edward John Carnell, The Burden of Søren Kierkegaard, Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans 1965.

26

236

Lee C. Barrett

reflections not intended for publication during his lifetime.27 Howard Hong then became the general editor of the Princeton University Press edition of Kierkegaard’s works, complete with new translations and supplementary notes. The Hongs’ translations aspired to be more faithful to the Danish originals, preferring English words with Germanic roots. To promote an intertextual exploration of concepts and themes ranging throughout the corpus, central terms were always translated in the same way. The establishment of the Kierkegaard Library at St. Olaf College in 1976 made a vast array of primary and secondary literature available to American scholars and promoted the study of Danish. C. Stephen Evans (b. 1948), its director in the early 1980s, initiated a series of international symposia, bringing together scholars from several countries and interpretive traditions. These important symposia have been continued by Evans’ successor at the Kierkegaard Library, Gordon Marino (b. 1952). In the late 1970s the prolific Robert Perkins (b. 1930) began to develop The International Kierkegaard Commentary series with Mercer University Press in order to make critical essays on Kierkegaard by both young and established scholars available to a broader public. Each volume focused on a particular text of the new Princeton University Press edition, with the first volume appearing in 1984. All of these developments contributed to the encouragement of interest in Kierkegaard as well as a new methodological self-consciousness and sophistication. At the same time, in the broader academic world a host of new hermeneutic approaches to texts were appearing in literary and philosophical disciplines. As the hegemony of neo-orthodoxy waned in theology departments, and as various forms of post-structuralism complicated the old analytic/Continental polarity in philosophy departments, an explosion of methodological options occurred. As a result, a wider array of interpretive strategies was applied to the Kierkegaardian corpus, and Kierkegaard scholarship became more methodologically differentiated. By the early 1970s many monographs on Kierkegaard would open with an obligatory introductory chapter outlining the hermeneutic spectrum and situating the current volume in it. Distinct approaches to Kierkegaard emerged, focused either on the author, the context, the text, or the reader as the anchor for meaning. In different guises and incarnations, these approaches have become seemingly permanent interpretive options. One tendency has been to focus on the influence of Kierkegaard’s personal life and psychological dynamics on the texts’ meanings. Another strategy has been to situate Kierkegaard in his historical context, either that of early nineteenth-century European philosophy or the broader cultural milieu of “golden age” Copenhagen. Another strategy has been to focus on the thematic content, structural dynamics, or intrinsic rhetorical properties of the texts themselves. Sometimes this approach has been indebted to the interpretive theory of the “New Critics” who regarded texts as autonomous objects bearing their own intrinsic meanings. More recently the reader of the texts has been introduced into the equation, with more attention being given to the rhetorical impact of textual strategies on the reader. This has fueled concentrated attention on the literary potentialities of the texts, including the use of pseudonyms and irony, and the nature of indirect communication. Given Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, vols. 1–7, ed. by Howard and Edna Hong, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press 1967–78.

27

The USA: From Neo-Orthodoxy to Plurality

237

this proliferation of methodological approaches, it is somewhat surprising that many of the same substantive issues recur with regularity, such as the significance of “subjectivity,” the exact nature of the “stages” or “spheres,” the relation of the “how” and the “what,” and the relation of “the leap” to volition and imagination. We shall attempt to organize this complex literature both according to the authors’ interpretive orientations and their stances on controverted topics. Our exploration of this secondary literature cannot pretend to be exhaustive; at most we can touch upon representative examples of each type, particularly those which have been seminal works and have spawned interpretive trajectories. V. Biographical and Historical-Contextual Approaches The biographical approach to Kierkegaard was by no means entirely new in the late 1960s. Given the impetus given to the biographical approach to Kierkegaard by continental scholars, it was almost inevitable that this strategy would have taken root quickly in the United States. For interpreters who have pursued this tack, Kierkegaard’s life is the indispensable context for interpreting his work. Some of Kierkegaard’s biographers assumed that the conscious or unconscious intention of any author is the key to all meaning, while others suggested that this may only be true of self-referential authors like Kierkegaard. From the 1930s on most introductions to Kierkegaard’s works began with an account of his life, suggesting that to some extent the meaning of the texts resides in their capacity to express the complex dynamics of Kierkegaard’s psyche. Much attention, of course, was devoted to Kierkegaard’s relation to his father, his broken engagement with Regine Olsen, and the sources of his celebrated melancholy. Walter Lowrie’s widely read biography portrayed Kierkegaard as a Christian author, whose life was the intentional sacrifice of his reputation in order to demonstrate that Christianity is a life of suffering for the gospel.28 For Lowrie, Kierkegaard’s life exhibited the development through the stages described by his pseudonymous authors. The main theological themes of Kierkegaard’s texts corresponded to actual crises in his own personal history. In stark opposition to Lowrie’s theologically driven view, in 1969 Josiah Thompson proposed that the corpus should be read as a type of autobiographical therapy for a sick soul lost in itself. For Thompson, the pseudonymous personae were the products of Kierkegaard’s illness, and the strategies of indirection were primarily the expression of his sickness and search for a cure.29 The historical/contextual approach to Kierkegaard in the United States has spent more energy in locating Kierkegaard in his intellectual and cultural environment, searching for antecedents of and provocations for his thought. The earliest practitioners of this approach focused on Kierkegaard’s relation to idealism and Romanticism, stressing his antipathy to Hegel. Stephen Crites sharpened the analysis of the differences between Hegel and Kierkegaard, identifying Hegel as the ultimate champion of a retrospective aesthetic reconciliation with actuality and Kierkegaard 28 29

Walter Lowrie, Kierkegaard, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1938. Josiah Thompson, Kierkegaard, New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1973.

238

Lee C. Barrett

as the advocate of prospective, ethico-religious life choices.30 Other authors have emphasized the importance of studying Kierkegaard in relation to his more immediate intellectual environment, including the work of such Danes as Heiberg and Martensen. More recently scholars like Jon Stewart (b. 1961) have contended that Kierkegaard’s relationship to Hegel was more complex than earlier scholars had recognized, and that many of Kierkegaard’s barbs that had been thought to be directed against Hegel may have been polemics aimed more narrowly at the Danish Hegelians.31 Stewart sets out to counter the extreme forms of the popular wisdom derived most powerfully from Niels Thulstrup that Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel was purely negative. As an alternative, Stewart identifies a three-staged evolution in Kierkegaard’s relation to Hegel, as well as points of convergence with Hegel. Some authors have considered Kierkegaard’s work in the light of major philosophers other than Hegel. Most significantly, Ronald M. Green has drawn attention to Kierkegaard’s under-appreciated debts to Kant. For Green, Kierkegaard’s celebrated rejection of idealist systems involved a tacit reappropriation of Kant’s criticism of pure reason as well as Kant’s turn to practical reason. According to Green, Kierkegaard’s themes concerning the ideality of ethics, the inevitability of sin, and the need for ethical striving to be supplemented by faith all had roots in Kant’s thought. Moreover, Kierkegaard paradoxically employed Kantian-like arguments to defend rather unKantian motifs.32 Other authors have expanded the definition of the relevant context beyond Kierkegaard’s philosophical milieu to include cultural, political, and economic factors. John W. Elrod (b. 1940) was a precursor of this trend.33 Elrod situated Kierkegaard in the context of early modernity’s valorization of egotistical power and group exclusivity, cultural trends that Kierkegaard critiqued and opposed in the name of Christian love. Bruce Kirmmse (b. 1943) has done more than anyone in the English-speaking world to interpret Kierkegaard in the light of the controversies that were transforming nineteenth-century Denmark.34 According to Kirmmse, Kierkegaard was neither an apolitical quietist nor an authoritarian conservative. Rather, Kierkegaard was an enemy of cultural elitism and a champion of the common man, who nevertheless resisted the self-deification of the revolutionary mass just as much as he rejected the glorification of the bourgeois status quo. Kirmmse’s Kierkegaard was a Lutheran of pietist leanings who aimed at the disestablishment of the church in order to liberate it from its cultural captivity. The Søren Kierkegaard Research Center’s programs for English-speaking scholars and its new edition of the Søren Stephen Crites, In the Twilight of Christendom: Hegel vs. Kierkegaard on Faith and History, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania: American Academy of Religion 1972. 31 Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press 2003. 32 Ronald M. Green, Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt, Albany: State University Press of New York 1992. 33 John W. Elrod, Kierkegaard and Christendom, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1981. 34 Bruce Kirmmse, Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark, Bloomington: University of Indiana Press 1990. 30

The USA: From Neo-Orthodoxy to Plurality

239

Kierkegaard Skrifter with the subsequent English translation have reinvigorated similar detailed explorations of Kierkegaard’s immediate Danish historical context. VI. Thematic Content Approaches By far the largest body of secondary literature concentrates more on the thematic and structural contents of the texts themselves, with less attention to biographical or cultural context. Some practitioners of this approach focus on individual volumes, but many look for unifying or contrasting motifs in the corpus as a whole, or in one set of texts, such as Climacus’ literature. This focus on the text(s) has assumed different forms, depending on different assessments of their genres and purposes. To oversimplify, the text-based approaches can be divided into those that are philosophically oriented, those that are theologically oriented, those that are literarily oriented, those that are politically oriented, and those that are hybrids. Some of these interpreters treat Kierkegaard’s texts as philosophical arguments, some as exercises in conceptual clarification, some as experiments in sustained irony, some as Christian apologetics, and some as combinations of the preceding. Depending on how the questions of genre and purpose are resolved, the interpreters either analyze the text’s argument, explore its rhetorical dynamics, investigate its doctrinal implications, or elucidate its conceptual remarks. To make matters more complex, each of these hermeneutic interests can be pursued by using different interpretive methods drawn from the current expanding methodological arsenal. By the 1950s and 1960s, it had become common to discern a unity in the whole of Kierkegaard’s thought, largely based on Kierkegaard’s own remarks about his authorship. Interpreters often followed the suggestion of George Henry Price that Kierkegaard commenced his authorship with a systematic plan, or at least that such a plan was in place by the time of the composition of the great pseudonymous works.35 This often led to a tendency to distinguish Kierkegaard’s own voice from that of his pseudonyms only in such extreme cases as Johannes the Seducer. Many adhered to Niels Thulstrup’s conviction that Climacus was a “thin” pseudonym, usually expressing Kierkegaard’s own opinions. Although these authors admit that the pseudonyms are instantiations of the stages that they respectively describe, they contend that this literary complication does not invalidate the assumption that the pseudonyms’ opinions may also be Kierkegaard’s. Although the pseudonyms do not articulate Kierkegaard’s own position in all respects, they may nevertheless express themes that are integral aspects of his own vision. The book-by-book commentary by George E. and George B. Arbaugh (1905–88) may be the paradigmatic articulation of this approach. According to their reading, throughout his entire authorship Kierkegaard consistently sought to interweave a voluntaristic conception of existence with a paradoxical understanding of human being as a synthesis of time and eternity, a synthesis that is actualized only in Christianity’s orientation to the eternal within time.36 George H. Price, The Narrow Pass: A Study of Kierkegaard’s Concept of Man, New York: McGraw-Hill 1963. 36 George E. Arbaugh and George B. Arbaugh, Kierkegaard’s Authorship, Rock Island, Illinois: Augustana College Library 1967. 35

240

Lee C. Barrett

VII. Thematic Approaches: Philosophical Many authors in this category read Kierkegaard as a philosopher of religion or philosophical theologian, either finding philosophical themes and arguments in the content of his works or philosophically relevant strategies implicit in his authorial practice. Many detect a unifying philosophical anthropology, or a phenomenology of religious experience, or a view of the meaning of religious language, or a metaethical theory, running throughout the authorship or at least in the pseudonymous literature. Sometimes these authors restrict themselves to tracing a particular motif, such as the experience of time or the experience of otherness, through Kierkegaard’s major works. Many rely on the theory of the stages as a hermeneutic key, and give interpretive preeminence to the remarks on “anxiety” in The Concept of Anxiety and on “despair” in The Sickness unto Death. Several authors provide examples of more restricted text-focused projects, concentrating on only one philosophical theme and often on one segment of the authorship. Among these themes one of the most popular has been Kierkegaard’s view of the self and its maturational dynamics. According to these authors, a philosophical anthropology can be found in Kierkegaard’s pages, particularly in the pseudonymous works. In his early work Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study of Time and the Self,37 Mark C. Taylor (b. 1945) proposed that the correlation of the structure of the self and the structure of time permeates and gives coherence to the pseudonymous literature. Different ways of relating the present to the past (actuality) and the future (possibility) is evident in each of the stages. The movement from stage to stage is motivated by a teleological drive for a more satisfying resolution of the actuality/ possibility polarity. The Christian stage emerges as the culmination of the process. In the Christian stage, faith in the incarnation (the presence of the eternal in time) enables the sinful self that had been imprisoned in temporality to become eternal without ceasing to be temporal. Healthy temporality involves the acceptance of forgiveness and the assumption of responsibility. Taylor returned to some of these themes in Journeys to Selfhood, suggesting that both Kierkegaard’s and Hegel’s projects were informed by a shared desire to oppose spiritlessness, and to provide maps for pilgrimages to more adequate actualizations of spirit.38 The difference between the two authors was that Hegel commenced his dialectical development with the opposition of the self and the other, while Kierkegaard began his journey with their confusion. Taylor himself wants to set the two patterns in a dialectic tension, recognizing that Hegel’s journey exhibited a necessary developmental pattern while Kierkegaard’s journey was contingent, with yawning gaps in the system to accommodate finitude. John Elrod also detected a pervasive anthropology with a teleological thrust in the pseudonymous works of Kierkegaard.39 For Elrod, as for the early Taylor, the 37 Mark C. Taylor, Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study in Time and the Self, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1975. 38 Mark C. Taylor, Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard, Berkeley: University of California Press 1980. 39 John Elrod, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Works, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1975.

The USA: From Neo-Orthodoxy to Plurality

241

pseudonymous literature presents a developmental view of the self’s drive toward unification, a process that culminates in Christianity. This developmental process is rooted in an underlying ontology of selfhood. The tension of eternal being and temporal being, a polar opposition that must be synthesized as spirit, is the fundamental structure of selfhood, and underlies all the ways of life exhibited in the pseudonymous works. As with Taylor, the movement through the stages is driven by the need to actualize the individual’s highest telos, which is a felicitous unification of the self’s polarities. The structural tension in the self between the actual, finite self and the infinite, ideal self is overcome in Christianity. In the Christian life the self freely rejects itself as capable of fulfilling the ideal, recognizes itself as dependent, surrenders to the action of the eternal, and thereby paradoxically attains unity. George Connell (b. 1957) also has traced one theme through all of Kierkegaard’s literature: the dialectic of personal unity, or the “will to be one thing.”40 The aesthetic characters of Either/Or exhibit varieties of discontinuity and manyness that frustrate the deepest yearnings of the incipient self. Kierkegaard’s other works illustrate a progression through various inadequate life-views propelled by the desire for personal unity. The turbulence of the inner manifold is only resolved by the attainment of the Christian self, in which the longing for oneness is satisfied. Ostensibly Hegelian dynamics inform this movement, although the Hegelian resolution in an all-embracing synthesis is displaced by the continuity of an individual’s life devoted to loving the neighbor. Perhaps the most audacious attempt to read Kierkegaard’s texts as an essay in philosophical anthropology has been Steven Dunning’s (b. 1941) work.41 Dunning, too, discovered a structural dynamic running through the pseudonymous works. Dunning argued that the maturation of the individual self through the stages does follow a dialectical pattern; the movement through the stages can be understood as a systematic development. Although Kierkegaard probably did not consciously intend it, this dialectic exhibits an Hegelian triadic structure, governed by the polarities of the inner/outer and self/other. The issue of relationality propels the entire movement. The aesthetic functions as the stage of contradiction, the ethical as the stage of reciprocity, and the religious as the paradoxical stage that unites the first two. The adequate expression of selfhood is attained in the religious stage, in which the dichotomy of the merely external or the merely internal is resolved by the paradoxical concept of the internalized other. By faith the self achieves true unity with the other based on the other’s otherness to the self. The “disciple” is the paradoxical unity of self and other, inner and outer. Vincent McCarthy (b. 1947) has approached Kierkegaard from the perspective of philosophical psychology, investigating the aesthetic literature as a type of phenomenology of “moods.”42 Employing some of Gilbert Ryle’s categories concerning the logic of mental concepts, McCarthy describes the ways in which a spectrum of 40 George Connell, To Be One Thing: Personal Unity in Kierkegaard’s Thought, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press 1985. 41 Stephen N. Dunning, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Inwardness: A Structural Analysis of the Theory of the Stages, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1985. 42 Vincent McCarthy, The Phenomenology of Moods in Kierkegaard, The Hague and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 1978.

242

Lee C. Barrett

moods characterize the aesthetic life in Kierkegaard’s works. These various moods are instantiated in the pseudonymous authors, who exhibit the aimlessness and lack of cohesion typical of a life susceptible to ephemeral psychological episodes. McCarthy concludes that for Kierkegaard the passional disequilibrium in the self can only be healed by the mastery of moods afforded by the religious life. Peter John Mehl (b. 1956) has continued this effort to sketch the outlines of Kierkegaard’s view of the self.43 According to Mehl, many of the pseudonymous authors, when taken together, can provide a composite map of the foundational anthropology that gives coherence to Kierkegaard’s authorship. Kierkegaard develops a normative picture of human flourishing, with a progressive approximation to that ideal through the existence-spheres, culminating in Christianity as the highest. The dynamic movement is propelled by a desire to synthesize our particular internal perspective upon our lives with our ability to objectify ourselves and regard our lives from the outside. Mehl criticized Kierkegaard for being a “strong evaluator” who craved complete wholeness and coherence, and thereby posited an ideal that was impossibly strenuous and impossible to justify, given the culturally and historically conditioned nature of human thought. Against this Mehl argued for a more empirical, pragmatic, and pluralistic understanding of human flourishing, and claims that many of the resources for a less foundationalist sensibility can actually be found in some of Kierkegaard’s own authorial strategies. Other authors have approached Kierkegaard with other issues in mind that typically engage philosophers of religion, issues that are not directly related to philosophical anthropology. Many have scrutinized Kierkegaard’s works for hints of any contributions he might make to the conversation concerning the justification of religious belief. Perhaps Kierkegaard’s analysis of subjectivity could be used as a sort of pragmatic criterion to adjudicate questions concerning the validity of religious convictions. One very influential author exploring this possibility, Louis P. Pojman (1935–2005), has challenged the prevalent view of Kierkegaard as the ultimate irrationalist.44 According to Pojman, Kierkegaard wavered between regarding the presence of an appropriate existential passion as a necessary condition for the truth of religious assertions, and treating the maximum degree of passion as a guarantee of the truth of religious assertions. Pojman maintains that it can be legitimately inferred from Climacus’ remarks that Christianity can be rationally justified. If maximal passion guarantees that the individual is believing a true proposition, and if Christianity raises passion to its apex, then Christianity must be true. Kierkegaard, through Climacus, was practicing a form of rational apologetics based on a teleological view of human nature that comes to fruition in Christianity. Although the absolute paradox is a logical contradiction that resists ordinary rational justification, nevertheless accepting the truth of the paradox is rationally justifiable on the basis of the individual’s maximally passionate attachment to it.

Peter Mehl, Thinking Through Kierkegaard, Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press 2005. 44 Louis Pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity: Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Religion, Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press 1984. 43

The USA: From Neo-Orthodoxy to Plurality

243

Marilyn Piety has also argued that Kierkegaard does see a role for rationality in the choice of competing interpretations of existence, but avoids Pojman’s quest for strict criteria for rational justification in Kierkegaard’s literature.45 According to Piety, Kierkegaard implicitly developed an understanding of reason as being “interested” in the quality of an individual’s life and impassioned about it. Consequently, it is entirely “rational” for an individual to chose an interpretive paradigm that provides the most adequate account of the individual’s subjective experience. As we shall see, such scholars as M. Jamie Ferreira and C. Stephen Evans have developed accounts of rationality in Kierkegaard that parallel that of Piety. Other interpreters with philosophical interests have explored Kierkegaard’s potential contributions to current discussions of the nature of freedom. Gregory R. Beabout (b. 1960) has analyzed Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous remarks about “anxiety” and “despair” with an eye to their implications for this issue.46 According to Beabout, for Kierkegaard freedom is primarily the freedom of self-actualization, and only derivatively the freedom of choice. Of course, the capacity to choose selfactualization implies the ability to also resist it. This differentiates Kierkegaard’s freedom both from the relativistic autonomy of criterionless choice and from the negation of responsibility implied by determinism. Another set of philosophical theologians and philosophers of religion, often trained in Anglo-American analytic philosophy, have used Kierkegaard as a resource in the investigation of the nature of religious discourse. According to them, Kierkegaard admittedly was not an ordinary type of philosopher of language, but he did engage in an authorial practice that has profound implications for the issues with which philosophers of language wrestle. Often borrowing from the later Wittgenstein’s remarks about “language games,” and “forms of life,” from J.L. Austin’s work on performative utterances, and from Gilbert Ryle’s account of concepts pertaining to emotions and passions, these authors have sought to clarify how religious concepts come to have meaning in Kierkegaard’s texts. Paul Holmer was one of the first pioneers of this approach, drawing attention to the way that Kierkegaard clarifies the grammar of central Christian concepts that govern the Christian form of life.47 According to Holmer, while Kierkegaard did not deny the referential force of Christian concepts, he did insist that successful reference requires an appropriate passional context in order to be intelligible. Kierkegaard sought to make Christian language come alive as he used it to awaken passions and encourage new capacities for thinking, acting, and feeling. Holmer devoted particular attention to the question of how Kierkegaard should be read, insisting that he should be engaged as a stimulus to concern about the ethical and religious quality of one’s own life. Holmer’s legacy was continued in the work of his many students, including Bradley R. Dewey (1934–89), Andrew

Marilyn Piety, “Kierkegaard on Rationality,” in Kierkegaard after MacIntyre: Essays on Freedom, Narrative, and Virtue, ed. by John Davenport and Anthony Rudd, Chicago: Open Court 2001. 46 Gregory Beabout, Freedom and its Misuses: Kierkegaard on Anxiety and Despair, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 1996. 47 Paul L. Holmer, The Grammar of Faith, San Francisco: Harper and Row 1978. 45

244

Lee C. Barrett

Burgess, David Cain, Abrahim Khan, Robert Roberts, David Jay Gouwens, Timothy Polk, Lee Barrett, and William Cahoy. VIII. Thematic Approaches: Theological Other authors who practice this textual-content approach have identified the unifying themes in Kierkegaard’s literature as being more explicitly theological, even doctrinal. Louis K. Dupré (b. 1925) introduced this interpretive interest into the United States, drawing on his extensive knowledge of the work of the Europeans Thorsten Bohlin (1889–1950), Eduard Geismar, and Hermann Diem (1900–75).48 According to Dupré, Kierkegaard synthesized the Protestant emphases of justification by grace, the prevenience of God’s agency, and the autonomy of the individual conscience with the Roman Catholic themes of the imitation of Christ, the role of freedom in the acceptance of faith, and the authority of the theological tradition. While Dupré’s reading of Kierkegaard was heavily colored by the particular ecumenical concerns of the Vatican II era, many of the interpretive issues that he raised concerning freedom and grace, justification and sanctification, and the church and the individual would continue to haunt subsequent theological analyses of Kierkegaard. Responding to Dupré’s work, in the late 1960s Paul R. Sponheim proposed that the underlying harmony in all Kierkegaard’s works is found in his Christology, the center of the authorship.49 Sponheim’s account of Kierkegaard’s Christology was more complex than that of his neo-orthodox predecessors. Rather than onedimensionally emphasizing the infinite qualitative distinction between God and humanity, Sponheim discerned the intricate interplay of two dynamics, one of diastasis (separation from God) and one of synthesis (interrelation with God), throughout Kierkegaard’s works. The sharp disjunctions of the early Barth are only one pole of Kierkegaard’s theology. Accordingly, Sponheim notes that while for Kierkegaard the incognito of God is indeed preserved in the incarnation, nevertheless the divine glory does paradoxically shine through in Christ’s humility. Arnold B. Come (b. 1918) has attempted the most ambitious interpretation of Kierkegaard as a theologian, seeking to illumine Kierkegaard’s attitude toward almost every conceivable theological topic.50 Although Come was appreciative of the literary dimension of Kierkegaard’s work, he insisted that the poetic dynamics were always employed in the service of theology. For Come, the “how” of becoming a Christian, a “how” that required all of Kierkegaard’s considerable poetic skills to communicate, does not swallow up the “what,” the discursive theological content of Christianity. In the first of two magisterial books on Kierkegaard, Come reconstructed what he took to be Kierkegaard’s view of “natural” revelation, that which can be known about God and the self apart from the specifics of Christian Louis Dupré, Kierkegaard as Theologian, New York: Sheed and Ward 1963. Paul Sponheim, Kierkegaard on Christ and Christian Coherence, New York: Harper and Row 1968. 50 Arnold M. Come, Kierkegaard as Humanist: Discovering Myself, Montreal: McGillQueen’s University Press 1997; and Kierkegaard as Theologian: Recovering Myself, Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press 1997. 48 49

The USA: From Neo-Orthodoxy to Plurality

245

revelation. Like Sponheim, Come believed that the Barthian disjunctive reading of Kierkegaard was exaggerated and one-dimensional. There is a bond of continuity between God and humanity, for love, the imago dei inscribed in human nature, mirrors God’s trinitarian life. Come concluded that according to Kierkegaard all humans even apart from revelation should be able to grasp the fact that the self is relational and self-relational. In the second book Come observed that although humanity in general can appreciate the centrality of love in human life, the uniquely Christian view of the self adds the sobering observation that in our pursuit of love we become miserable failures in need of help. The appreciation of the necessity for grace is the element of discontinuity distinguishing Christianity from generic spirituality. Come’s orientation toward the divine offer of grace led him to detect in Kierkegaard’s pages the lineaments a God who suffers in response to the world rather than the impassible divinity of classical theism. This perspective also prompted him to discern in Kierkegaard’s works the contours of a social ethic as well as a positive view of the church as a society of love. Other authors have traced more limited theological themes throughout Kierkegaard’s authorship, or at least some portion of it. For example, Vernard Eller investigated the connections between Kierkegaard’s concentration on the radical imitation of Christ and analogous themes in Anabaptist accounts of discipleship.51 In a similar way Bradley R. Dewey described the correlation between the motif of mature, intentional selfhood and the motif of following the pattern of Christ’s life in Kierkegaard’s writings as a whole.52 This strategy of reading Kierkegaard with the help of Wittgenstein and other philosophers of language contributed to a tendency evident from the 1980s among some theologians to construe Kierkegaard’s task as the clarification of the grammar of Christianity. These interpreters have viewed Kierkegaard as an expositor of some orthodox form of the Christian tradition, most typically Augustinianism in general or Lutheranism in particular. From this perspective Kierkegaard has been seen as the forerunner of the “post-liberal” or “narrative” understanding of doctrine as the non-foundational framework for shaping and interpreting all experience. According to these authors, Kierkegaard’s overall strategy was to clarify doctrinal concepts in order to promote their subjective appropriation. Kierkegaard treated doctrines not as propositions but as regulative grammatical remarks, as rules for Christian living. Because the meaning of a doctrine is displayed in its appropriate use, a doctrine’s significance cannot be divorced from the central practices of the Christian life. David Jay Gouwens, following the lead of Paul Holmer, is the most comprehensive writer in this tradition that reads Kierkegaard with the aid of Wittgensten’s cryptic remark “theology as grammar.”53 For Gouwens’ Kierkegaard, Christianity does indeed have doctrines that can be discursively stated, and Kierkegaard sets out to illumine their meaning. However, these Christian claims can only be grasped as they are subjectively 51 Vernard Eller, Kierkegaard and Radical Discipleship, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1968. 52 Bradley Dewey, The New Obedience, Washington: Corpus Books 1968. 53 David Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996.

246

Lee C. Barrett

appropriated. The logic of Christian belief is unintelligible without the requisite subjective passions. Gouwens therefore situates Kierkegaard between Barth’s more objective understanding of doctrine and the expressivism of more revisionist theologians descended from Schleiermacher. Nevertheless, concludes Gouwens, Kierkegaard is closer to Barth than to Scheiermacher, for he does not interpret faith in the light of an independently understood analysis of human experience, but rather understands human experience in terms of dogmatics. As Gouwens phrases it, for Kierkegaard Christology precedes soteriology. The difference between Barth and Kierkegaard is that for Kierkegaard the clarification of doctrine requires the concomitant transformation of pathos. Accordingly, Kierkegaard seeks to evoke religious pathos in his readers. Throughout his literature Kierkegaard elaborates Christian doctrinal concepts like “incarnation” and “trinity” by situating them in an analysis of the life of faith, hope, and love. Gouwens suggests that Kierkegaard’s treatment of faith, hope, and love is more akin to the dispositional analysis of the virtues in Aristotle and Gilbert Ryle than it is to the older existentialist view of faith as a momentary episode of “leaping.” For Kierkegaard the Christian virtues are perduring aspects of a person’s character, long-term traits and capacities, enabling an individual to attain stability and unity in the midst of passing moods, emotions, and perturbations. Gouwens concludes that Kierkegaard’s view of the Christian life is neither asocial nor privatistic. Others have similarly approached Kierkegaard as a Christian thinker intent upon clarifying the grammar of faith. Andrew Burgess’ work anticipated and parallels that of Gouwens in many ways, arguing that Kierkegaard’s attention to the “how” of faith, its quality of pathos, does not reduce the “what” of faith to purely subjective states. As with Gouwens, Kierkegaard’s attention to subjectivity only establishes the context for the meaningfulness of theological concepts, which do refer to objective states of affairs.54 David Cain (b. 1941) has shown how Kierkegaard’s remarks about divine and human agency only make sense in the context of the renunciation of accomplishment.55 Timothy Polk, adopting a similar perspective, has explored Kierkegaard’s use of Scripture.56 According to Polk, Kierkegaard assumed the basic grammar of Christianity in his engagement with biblical texts, reading Scripture according to the ancient church’s rule of faith and its hermeneutic practices. Kierkegaard’s practice honored the literary shape of the canon and the church’s liturgical and ethical uses of the canon. Like Burgess and Gouwens, Polk argues that desire for a congruence of the “how” and the “what” led Kierkegaard to treat the understanding of Scripture as a matter of ethical action and a matter of the heart. The interpretation of Scripture must be motivated by love and guided by the interpretive conventions of the Christian community. Polk claims that his reading of Kierkegaard’s practice bears certain similarities to Stanley Fish’s appeal to the Andrew Burgess, Passion, “Knowing How,” and Understanding, Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press 1975. 55 David Cain, “A Star in the Cross, Getting the Dialectic Right,” in For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourself!, ed. by Robert Perkins, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press 2002 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 21), pp. 315–34. 56 Timothy Polk, The Biblical Kierkegaard: Reading by the Rule of Faith, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press 1997. 54

The USA: From Neo-Orthodoxy to Plurality

247

practices of interpretive communities and to Brevard Child’s program of “canonical criticism.” Similarly, Steven M. Emmanuel has maintained that for Kierkegaard, as for George Lindbeck, doctrine functions as a framework governing a form of life oriented toward divine reality.57 IX. Literary Approaches Yet another major approach to Kierkegaard regards him as a primarily “literary” author and closely links the meaning of his texts to their rhetorical qualities. This manner of interpreting Kierkegaard has been assisted by the last three decades’ astonishing ferment in the world of literary theory. In the 1970s and 1980s many of the interpretive techniques of structuralism and the New Criticism, both of which assumed that a text was a sort of given datum with definable objective features, came under attack. The new movements in literary theory destabilized the notion that textual discourse could be neatly separated from other cultural and political linguistic practices, or from the interpretive conventions of a linguistic community, or from the effect of the text upon the reader. The notion that the language of a philosophical or theological text refers unambiguously to ideational “meanings” gave way to the celebration of the rhetorical character of all language. Language was conceived as an interchange taking place in an intersubjective context. In this view, language is an act just as much as it is a representation of anything. Given the influence of this interpretive revolution, more expositors of Kierkegaard began to use the tools of the newer polyglot literary criticism, drawing from the expanding arsenal of methodological options, to interpret his authorship. Many of this approach’s practitioners protested that it had been woefully misleading to treat Kierkegaard’s writings as instances of theology or philosophy. More attention was devoted to Kierkegaard’s remarks about literary practice, such as his reviews of literary pieces as well as his unpublished notes on communication. Much more consideration was given to Kierkegaard’s own literary techniques. Intertextual readings, juxtaposing Kierkegaard’s own texts to one another and even putting them in conversation with writings outside his cultural environment, became common. Rather than reading in order to determine Kierkegaard’s “position” on topics, these critics often read Kierkegaard’s work as catalysts for the ongoing drama of reinterpretion. Kierkegaard’s style of writing was prized for its ability to force the reader to assume responsibility for the reader’s choice of interpretations. With the ardor of an Old Testament prophet, Louis H. Mackey (1926–2004) has argued for the significance of this literary approach in Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet, a volume that became the clarion call for the new interpretive trend.58 According to Mackey, Kierkegaard had no cognitive “results,” no explicit philosophical or theological teachings to impart to readers. Because Kierkegaard avoided fixed univocal meanings, it is inappropriate to search for his position on specific topics dear to theologians and philosophers. The dislocations and rhetorical shifts in his texts Steven M. Emmanuel, Kierkegaard and the Concept of Revelation, New York: State University of New York Press 1996. 58 Louis Mackey, Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1971. 57

248

Lee C. Barrett

militate against any straightforward metaphysical or doctrinal reading. Kierkegaard’s style of writing frustrates the quest for one-dimensional meanings, a frustration that is highly appropriate because, according to Mackey, any honest engagement with human life cannot avoid contradiction. Kierkegaard obliquely confronts the reader with interpretive possibilities that the reader must creatively pursue. Because the texts demand a response of imagination and will in order to complete their meaning, the texts serve as a stimulus for the reader’s maturation in selfhood. Mackey’s later work, following the provocative suggestions of Henning Fenger (1921–85), went even further in denying a univocal meaning to Kierkegaard’s texts.59 Kierkegaard’s own claims in such works as the Point of View that a clear purpose governed the composition of the texts, controlling their meaning, must be rejected in the light of the many masks that frustrate any perception of authorial intention. Kierkegaard’s published account of the religious nature of his own authorship was a fictional reconstruction. Moreover, Kierkegaard had paradoxically presented himself as a neutral, third-party interpreter of his own works, a perspective which he himself had shown to be illicit. Mackey’s approach bore some inadvertent similarities to the earlier existentialist understanding of Kierkegaard in that Kierkegaard’s texts are seen as provoking the reader to take responsibility for a choice, in this case a choice of interpretations, although here the philosophical psychology that undergirded the existentialist readings has been jettisoned. Michael Stawser continued this Mackey-style program, systematically applying it to Kierkegaard’s corpus as a whole.60 Strawser challenged the received wisdom that the signed discourses are instances of direct communication, while the pseudonymous works are instances of indirect communication. For Strawser, all of Kierkegaard’s texts both edify and engage in ironic play. Indirectness permeates the signed discourses, and edification is inscribed into the pseudonymous works. The way in which the irony and the edification can be synthesized, juxtaposed, or somehow resolved is not decided by the texts themselves; the nature of the relation of irony and edification must be worked out in the lives of the readers as they appropriate the texts. Strawser is not arguing that the texts are wholly indeterminate, susceptible to any meaning that a reader might want to ascribe to them. In fact, he is certain that this creative tension of irony/edification is an objective feature of the texts, running through the entire authorship and providing its underlying structure and dynamic power. After Mackey a more radical type of literary interpretation of Kierkegaard emerged, rooted in even more sweeping questions concerning the very nature of language. Kierkegaard’s literary practice has been seen as a forerunner of deconstructive claims that truth is undecipherable and that meaning is undecidable. In the 1980s Mackey himself moved a bit closer to the interpretive practice of Jacques Derrida, treating Kierkegaard’s texts as invitations to experiment with their elusive codes and signs. At the same time Mark C. Taylor seemed to be gravitating in

Louis Mackey, Points of View: Readings of Kierkegaard, Tallahasse: Florida State University Press 1986. 60 Michael Strawser, Both/And: Reading Kierkegard from Irony to Edification, New York: Fordham University Press 1997. 59

The USA: From Neo-Orthodoxy to Plurality

249

the same direction and to delight in the possibilities of textual play.61 John D. Caputo (b. 1940), who in his classic Radical Hermeneutics drew a connection between Repetition and the work of Derrida, also viewed Kierkegaard as a practitioner of proto-deconstruction with a religious dimension.62 Christopher Norris (b. 1947), while admitting that Kierkegaard could only be regarded as deconstructive in a very qualified way because of his continuing advocacy of a subjective relation to truth, nevertheless saw in Kierkegaard’s textual strategies a precursor of deconstruction.63 For Norris, Kierkegaardian texts like The Point of View are riddled with ambiguities that undermine such juxtapositions as the polarity of the aesthetic and the religioethical. Inspired by these new currents, Mark C. Taylor and Florida State University Press launched a series of monographs on Kierkegaard and postmodernism. Their publication of an English translation of Sylviane Agacinski’s Aparté: Conceptions and Deaths of Søren Kierkegaard did much to draw scholarly attention to the deconstructive style of reading Kierkegaard.64 The anthology, Kierkegaard and Literature: Irony, Repetition, and Criticism which appeared in 1984 also drew attention to this newer style of Kierkegaard scholarship, including the tendency to read Kierkegaard in tandem with seemingly unrelated texts.65 Very quickly a spate of articles appeared, some supporting and others challenging the validity and fruitfulness of this approach. Some defended the “postmodern” Kierkegaard from the accusation of unconstrained relativism, while others critiqued him as the first step on the slippery slope to nihilism. Some saw this new interpretive style as a long-needed recognition of Kierkegaard’s sensitivity to the incommensurability of writing, while others saw this as an exercise in psychological and hermeneutic reductionism and a capitulation to the very romantic irony that Kierkegaard had combated. For some literary theorists in this camp there is no hypostasized text-in-itself or transparent authorial intention available to stabilize meaning. For the more radical enthusiasts of deconstruction the nature of writing is such that it inevitably subverts the quest for stable content. Given their rejection of any centered “self” transcending history and culture, Kierkegaard was applauded by these critics for eschewing a consistent authorial voice, and for effacing any authorial transparency. Given the iterability and intertextuality of writing, Kierkegaard was praised for renouncing authority over his own texts. Kierkegaard’s strategies of indirect communication were hailed as efforts to make the undecidability of writing evident in its very form. In this view, Kierkegaard’s indirect communication was necessitated by his understanding of language and religious meaning; indirect communication is inescapable in all matters of existential significance.

Mark C. Taylor, Altarity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1987. John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1987. 63 Christopher Norris, The Deconstructive Turn, London: Metheuen 1983. 64 Sylviane Agacinski, Aparté: Conceptions and Deaths of Søren Kierkegaard, trans. by Kevin Newmark, Tallahassee: Florida State University Press 1988. 65 Ronald Schleifer and Robert Markley (eds), Kierkegaard and Literature: Irony, Repetition, and Criticism, Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press 1984. 61 62

250

Lee C. Barrett

These motifs were articulated in a variety of places. Peter Fenves (b. 1960) attempted to demonstrate that Kierkegaard’s distinctions between chatter and authentic language are unstable.66 Lacking any foundation in the immediate presence of a word’s referent to the hearer/reader, language is always in danger of becoming chatter. For Fenves, there is always a difference between what a text says and what it performs. Kierkegaard was acutely conscious of the problem of using abstract and iterable words in specific linguistic situations. A writer always writes in a system of signs that the writer cannot entirely master. This is the case with Kierkegaard’s own verbal performance, in which a veritable labyrinth of fissures and juxtapositions defy any strategy of decoding and frustrate meaning. Other interpreters detect an ethical or religious dimension in Kierkegaard’s subversion of meaning. Pat Bigelow, who himself employed a fair number of indirect strategies in his writing, argued that Kierkegaard’s texts attempt to solicit an “Other” that can never be directly represented.67 For Bigelow, an irreducible excess in human experience evades conceptualization; in writing the “Other” can only leave a trace but can never be made immediately available. Given the tension between immediacy and reflection, honest writing can only perform the failure of words to point to the world. The Hegelian quest to sublate difference in self-sameness must be resisted. According to Bigelow, Kierkegaard’s own writing tries to enact the self-negating nature of philosophy and its inevitable loss of the world. Kierkegaardian texts enact the futility of the philosophic desire to grasp unmediated reality, for all philosophic discourse, even when it attempts to be existential, encourages ideal abstraction. The impossibility of philosophy is exposed through Kierkegaard’s performative utterances that express nothing. Ironically, it is only when this is realized that the Other’s otherness can be appreciated. In a similar manner, Mark C. Taylor’s more recent work also presents Kierkegaard as a champion of an otherness that cannot be mastered or circumscribed.68 In Alterity Taylor strongly hints that the “other” of language may also be the ethical “other,” the source of grace. John Vignaux Smyth similarly argues that Kierkegaard deconstructed authorial teleology in the interests of promoting a postmodern-like religious vision.69 Vanessa Rumble’s deconstructive reading of Works of Love suggests that even in the veronymous literature a displacement of the centered conscious subject is effected, often by describing Christian love in such a way that no human could attain it.70 As with Derrida, Kierkegaard’s whole literature gestures toward the possibility of a genuine otherness that unsettles all certainties and disrupts the “circle of the same.” 66 Peter Fenves, Chatter: Language and History in Kierkegaard, Stanford: Stanford University Press 1993. 67 Pat Bigelow, Kierkegaard and the Problem of Writing, Tallahassee: Florida State University Press 1987. 68 Mark C. Taylor, Altarity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1987. 69 John Vignaux Smyth, A Question of Eros: Irony in Sterne, Kierkegaard, and Barthes, Tallahassee: Florida State University Press 1989. 70 Vanessa Rumble, “Love and Difference: The Christian Ideal in Kierkegaard’s Works of Love,” in The New Kierkegaard, ed. by Elsebet Jegstrup, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2004, pp. 161–78.

The USA: From Neo-Orthodoxy to Plurality

251

X. Social and Political Approaches Other authors have turned not to the newer literary theories but rather to the proliferation of critical political and social theories to interpret Kierkegaard, often borrowing from anti-hegemonic varieties of cultural studies. These construals of Kierkegaard attribute to him a much more incisive political edge, rescuing him from the accusation of being overly individualistic. Even before the impact of Foucault and post-colonial studies was felt, some expositors had always contended that Kierkegaard was not as individualistic as he had appeared to be during the generation of Martin Buber. Others argued that his individualism itself implied a potent form of social criticism and generated certain social and political ideals. It had long been noted that Kierkegaard situates individuals in social contexts. For example, Walter Lowrie had already discerned the contours of a communal ecclesiology in Kierkegaard based on a vision of the church as a religious democracy.71 Michael Plekon noted that by accepting orthodox doctrine Kierkegaard implicitly recognized the shaping power of religious communities.72 Stephen Crites has long contended that Kierkegaard does not reject human sociality but relativizes the society so that it will not domesticate the sacred.73 Robert Perkins has pointed to the political and social implications of the discussion of the individual in the late writings.74 Alasdair MacIntyre’s portrayal of Kierkegaard as an ethical voluntarist whose purely formal notion of individual authenticity undermined any social ethic triggered a reaction that has emphasized aspects of Kierkegaard’s thought that call for the cultivation of social virtues. Many authors began to detect in Kierkegaard a quest for narrative unity and a psychology of the virtues that actually had overlaps with MacIntyre’s own position. Like MacIntyre, Kierkegaard saw freedom as teleologically oriented toward meaningful existence, encouraged practices involving social values, and recognized that individuals are conditioned by their historical situation. Many of these interpreters promoted Kierkegaard’s work as a corrective to MacIntyre’s perceived undialectical appeal to tradition and his eudaimonistic version of the human good. Accordingly, several Kierkegaard scholars sought to initiate a mutually enriching dialogue between virtue ethics and existentialism. Along these lines, John Davenport (b. 1966) has argued that Kierkegaard does make a case for the centrality of certain virtues in an authentically human life, only they are existential virtues that enable the teleological maturation toward true selfhood. Given this teleology of the self, ethical choices are by no means arbitrary or irrational.75 Walter Lowrie, Kierkegaard, London: Oxford University Press 1938. Michael Plekon, “Kierkegaard the Theologian: The Roots of his Theology in Works of Love,”in Foundations of Kierkegaard’s Vision of Community, ed. by George Connell and C. Stephen Evans, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Humanities Press 1992, pp. 2–18. 73 Stephen Crites, In the Twilight of Christendom, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania: American Academy of Religion 1972. 74 Robert Perkins, “Envy as Personal Phenomenon and as Politics,” in Two Ages: The Present Age and the Age of Revolution A Literary Review, ed. by Robert Perkins, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press 1984 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 14), pp. 107–32. 75 John Davenport, “Toward an Existential Virtue Ethics: Kierkegaard and MacIntyre,” in Kierkegaard after MacIntyre, ed. by John J. Davenport and Anthony Rudd, Chicago: Open Court 2001, pp. 265–324. 71 72

252

Lee C. Barrett

The tendency to emphasize the social and political dimensions of Kierkegaard’s thought has escalated with the introduction of new critical perspectives. Many of these authors maintain a dialogue with postmodern critical theory and locate Kierkegaard somewhere between the critical theory of the Frankfurt School and deconstruction. Merold Westphal has argued that Kierkegaard’s scathing attack on the amoral herd of mass society and his exposure of the idolatrous moral absolutism of Christendom serves to undermine both capitalist and communist monologic metanarratives.76 Kierkegaard’s critique of metaphysical systems leads to a subversion of the absolutization of the established order and therefore harbors the impetus for a radical politics. Kierkegaard’s critique of totalizing ideologies, the epistemological dimension of critical political theory, is parallel to the critique of totalizing cultures. Westphal posits a “religiousness C” in Kierkegaard’s thought that extends the sense of the self’s relation to and responsibility for the neighbor, a responsibility that goes beyond civic virtue and must be free of church and state control. James L. Marsh, relying on the perspectives of the Frankfurt School, agreed that Kierkegaard’s work is not a reactionary apology for the monarchy and hierarchy but can function as a resource for the disenfranchised, for it presents God as our companion in overcoming injustice.77 Marsh even saw a connection between the Kierkegaardian theme of authentic inwardness and the ideal communicative praxis of Habermas. Martin Matuštík (b. 1957) also hoped to use Kierkegaard in fostering a dialogue between Habermas’ critical theory and existentialism, seeing such a conversation as a response to the problem of being responsible as a multiculturally positioned individual.78 John Caputo has maintained that Kierkegaard distinguishes an oppressive political ethics supported by idolatrous metaphysical underpinnings from a genuine obligation to attend to the neighbor’s needs in specific concrete situations.79 Charles K. Bellinger (b. 1962) focused on the implications of Kierkegaard for the understanding of the genesis of violence, putting him in dialogue with René Girard and trauma theorists.80 Bellinger treats Kierkegaard as a proponent of a theological anthropology in which the self, terrified by the prospect of maturing into something other than it already is, resists God’s call to actualize its potential for extravagant love for the neighbor. The rejection of this spiritual telos generates internal tension, psychic disintegration, and self-hatred and fear which is then projected outward onto the social “other.” Meanwhile, feminist interpretations of Kierkegaard have multiplied, all needing to face the challenge of Kierkegaard’s perceived misogyny. Céline Léon (b. 1942) Merold Westphal, Kierkegaard’s Critique of Reason and Society, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press 1987. 77 James Marsh, “Kierkegaard and Critical Theory,” in Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity, ed. by Martin Matuštík and Merold Westphal, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1995, pp. 199–215. 78 M. Matuštík, Postnational Identity: Critical Theory and Existential Philosophy in Habermas, Kierkegaard, and Havel, New York and London: The Guilford Press 1993. 79 John D. Caputo, “Instants, Secrets, and Singularities,” in Kierkegaard in Post/ Modernity, ed. by Martin Matustik and Merold Westphal, pp. 216–38. 80 Charles Bellinger, The Genealogy of Violence: Reflections on Creation, Freedom, and Evil, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001. 76

The USA: From Neo-Orthodoxy to Plurality

253

has argued that an essentialist dichotomy of masculine/feminine is reinforced by Kierkegaard’s description of ethical existence that excludes women, because of their inherent relationality, from the autonomy that ethical agency requires.81 According to Alison Leigh Brown (b. 1959), by opposing external definitions of individual identity, Kierkegaard took the first step toward Irigaray’s reclaiming of the self’s multiplicity.82 Tamsin E. Lorraine has explored the possibility that Kierkegaard’s description of the “God-relationship” could provide a safe place for the acknowledgment of the self’s instabilities that could be even more potentially transformative than Kristeva’s psychoanalytic discourse.83 Wanda Warren Berry has argued for a mediating position in regard to Kierkegaard that hopes to avoid the Charybdis of complete rejection of past authority and abject subservience to classic authorities and readings.84 Berry notes that all liberation movements are indebted to Kierkegaard’s critique of social conditioning and suggests that such feminist theorists as Catherine Keller can benefit from a dialogue with Kierkegaard’s anti-essentialism, his sense of dialogical mutuality, and his appreciation of perduring commitments. Some interpreters remain unconvinced by these constructions of a more politically emancipatory Kierkegaard. Steven Best and Douglas Kellner (b. 1943), adopting a Marxist perspective, insist that the logic of Kierkegaard’s thought does preclude collective political action and therefore remains wedded to an essentially privatistic world-view.85 Others have wondered whether the explosion of literature on the political and social dimensions of Kierkegaard’s thought may be no more than the projection of contemporary concerns into the texts. XI. Literary/Theological Approaches A final category of approaches to Kierkegaard attempts to synthesize the content-focused and the literary-oriented styles of interpretation. In different ways, these authors take the literary form of Kierkegaard’s writing very seriously, convinced that it contributes much to the meaning of his texts, but they reject the conclusion that this literary quality leads to indeterminacy or to the subversion of theological or philosophical meaning. Rather, for them Kierkegaard employs complex literary strategies in order to promote theological and philosophical interests. The intricacies of the indirect communication Céline Léon, “(A) Woman’s Place within the Ethical,” in Feminist Interpretations of Soren Kierkegaard, ed. by Céline Léon and Sylvia Walsh, University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press 1997, pp. 103–30. 82 Alison Brown, “God, Anxiety, and Female Divinity,” in Kierkegaard in Post/ Modernity, ed. by Martin Matuštík and Merold Westphal, pp. 66–75. 83 Tamsin Lorraine, “Amatory Cures for Spiritual Dis-ease” in Kierkegaard in Post/ Modernity, ed. by Martin Matuštík and Merold Westphal, pp. 98–109. 84 Wanda Warren Berry, “Kierkegaard and Feminism: Apologetic, Repetition, and Dialogue,” in Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity, ed. by Martin Matuštík and Merold Westphal, pp. 110–24. 85 Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, “Modernity, Mass Society, and the Media in The Corsair Affair,” in The Corsair Affair, ed. by Robert Perkins, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press 1990 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 13), pp. 23–61. 81

254

Lee C. Barrett

point to theological or philosophical conclusions. Most of these authors see a relative open-endedness in the texts, a surplus of meaning that stimulates reflection along certain paths. Most of these interpreters also resist reducing the meaning of the texts to Kierkegaard’s conscious intentions. Rather, the rhetorical strategies embedded in the texts themselves, given certain conventions of communication, promote certain types of response in the reader and thereby stabilize meaning. Sylvia Walsh (b. 1937) has examined the evolution of Kierkegaard’s understanding of “the poetic,” outlining his theory of “existential aesthetics.”86 She argues that Kierkegaard was a kind of Christian poet, who regarded the poetic as an essential component of the ethical and religious life, as well as an essential dimension of the effort to communicate Christianity. She thereby distances her reading of Kierkegaard both from those earlier scholars who saw Kierkegaard as setting the poetic and the ethical/religious in irreconcilable opposition, as well as those postmodern thinkers who regard him as an advocate of ironic aestheticism. Walsh points out that such a construal of Kierkegaard collapses him into the very reflective Romanticism that he combated. Kierkegaard, she concludes, should be viewed as a philosophical and religious thinker who understood the poetic as a mode for relating ourselves to ethical and religious ideals. For Kierkegaard faith itself is a sort of work of art, in that imagination must project, embrace, and creatively enact ethical/religious ideals, giving the ideal concrete form. Ronald Hall (b. 1945) has attempted to use speech-act theory indebted to J.L. Austin to ground a literary approach to Kierkegaard that can still yield a determinate ethico-religious meaning.87 Like Walsh, he argued that Kierkegaard’s own view of the aesthetic dimensions of communication supports such a perspective. According to Hall, Kierkegaard’s texts carefully attend to the conditions necessary for the felicitous performance of a speech-act. Any existentially significant speech act must be grounded in a particular context in which one person addresses another, taking responsibility for the speaker’s own words. Kierkegaard creates these contexts and this mood of first-person address in his works, so that his works have more of the determinate quality of situated speech than they do of indeterminate writing. Steven Emmanuel also claims that philosophical and theological themes are communicated by Kierkegaard’s literary techniques, although, unlike Hall, he appeals more to George Steiner and Wayne Booth to clarify how this can be the case.88 He notes that Kierkegaard avoids the direct transmission of meaning from text to reader, and that Kierkegaard’s writing functions as an incitement to the reader’s subjective appropriation of truth, forcing the reader to turn inward, wrestle with unresolved viewpoints, and to choose from among competing world-views. Making sense of Kierkegaard requires commitment and a willingness to wager. In spite of the responsibility given to the reader, Kierkegaard does seem to ground a determinate meaning and a definite telos 86 Sylvia Walsh, Living Poetically: Kierkegaard’s Existential Aesthetics, University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press 1994. 87 Ronald Hall, Word and Spirit: A Kierkegaardian Critique of the Modern Age, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1993. 88 Steven M. Emmanuel, Kierkegaard and the Concept of Revelation, New York: State University of New York Press 1996.

The USA: From Neo-Orthodoxy to Plurality

255

by assuming two things. One is that the reader’s encounter with the text is saved from total indeterminancy by being underwritten by the presence of a grounding authenticity, namely, God. The second is that Kierkegaard created through the interrelations among his various texts, either consciously or unconsciously, an ideal author who provides the dynamic force uniting the authorship. This ideal author prods and coaxes the reader through the various stages and choices on the road to authentic selfhood. The authorship can be read in the religious way that Kierkegaard himself recommended, not because Kierkegaard as author can stipulate the meaning of his production, but because the texts have a definite shape that supports this as a good, comprehensive reading. Given this interpretive schema, Emmanuel reads Kierkegaard as affirming a suprarational account of revelation, a pragmatic justification of religious belief, a regulative theory of doctrine, and an understanding of faith that mediates volitional and non-volitional factors. M. Holmes Hartshorne may have been one of the most controversial interpreters of this type.89 According to Hartshorne, Philosophical Fragments is so saturated with irony that its main themes do not represent Kierkegaard’s own understanding of Christianity at all. Kierkgaard, through the persona of Climacus, has ironically substituted a detached aesthetic way of thinking about faith for faith itself, and, as result of this subterfuge, faith appears as an heroic effort and a leap. Confronted with Climacus’ aesthetic (and therefore distorted) reconstruction of Christianity, the reader is overwhelmed by the daunting quality of Christian belief and intimidated by its impossibility. Indirectly the frustrated and cowed reader is driven to experience the need for grace, which is precisely the aspect of Christianity that Climacus did not adequately take into account. Without directly stating any of this, the book illustrates the futility of turning faith into a good work. Ironically, “the leap” that the existentialists so valorized actually functions in the text to provoke the reader to realize that the leap is impossible. Robert C. Roberts (b. 1942), like Hartshorne, also takes Philosophical Fragments not as a straightforward theological argument but as an exercise in irony with a serious theological purpose.90 That purpose is not to convince the reader with valid arguments but to provoke the reader to recognize the incompatibilities of the Socratic paradigm with Christianity. It is aimed at the imagination, indirectly stimulating a passionate appreciation of God’s love. The literary features dispel illusions that inhibit an encounter with God’s grace. The misconstrual of Christianity is both a cognitive and a passional problem, requiring the talents of a poet and a conceptual analyst. In order to reintroduce Christianity into Christendom and liberate Christology from worldly modes of thought, Kierkegaard uses irony to destabilize entrenched positions, forcing the reader to resolve dissonances and wrestle with puzzles, and even to reconstruct the grammar of faith. The indirection is therapeutic, for the reader is led to reduplicate a kind of pathos, although not automatically. The text, if it works, awakens a hunger for something that we did not know and did not invent.

M. Holmes Hartshorne, Kierkegaard: Godly Deceiver, New York: Columbia University Press 1990. 90 Robert C. Roberts, Faith, Reason, and History: Rethinking Philosophical Fragments, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press 1986. 89

256

Lee C. Barrett

In his more recent work C. Stephen Evans has developed a reading of Climacus’ literature that is similar to that of Roberts, although it is more sanguine about the cogency of Climacus’ arguments.91 Evans insists that the literary form of the texts is essential to their meaning. Kierkegaard was not in the business of transmitting neutral information, but rather hoped to catalyze a self-knowledge that cannot be had apart from the process of acquisition. In so doing, Climacus does clarify the contours of Christianity as an existential possibility and does seek to stimulate the requisite passions. The strategies of indirection compel the reader to think through the distinctive features of Christianity, differentiating them from common cultural sense and generic religiosity. Through this process the reader should come to feel Christianity’s attraction and repulsion. Evans concludes that Climacus’ texts suggest that faith is not irrational, but that faith does involve the acceptance of the limits of reason. Evidence cannot produce faith but nevertheless is relevant. The Absolute Paradox only seems paradoxical because of humanity’s assertive epistemic pride that insists on generating the ultimate criteria of truth. Although Evans sees Climacus as implying a kind of anti-foundationalism in that reason is always perspectival and self-serving, he does not view him as embracing the anti-realism of deconstruction. While subverting foundationalism, Kierkegaard eschewed relativism by showing how our subjectivity can open up an encounter with a living reality that then can properly serve as a basic belief. Amy Laura Hall has treated Works of Love in a somewhat parallel way to Holmes’ interpretation of Philosophical Fragments.92 Once again the rhetoric of the text triggers a response at variance with the text’s apparent articulated content. When read in the light of the pseudonyms who instantiate various forms of self-deception, Works of Love is seen to present such an impossibly high ideal of love that the reader, unless the reader is self-deceived, must despair of being able to approximate it. The ethical rigor of the text drives the reader to a confession of incapacity and repentance. In true Luther fashion the law, in this case the law of love, terrifies the conscience, triggering the recognition that apart from grace the individual can do nothing at all. According to Hall, this confession of sin paradoxically creates the proper distance from the other that enables the other to be seen and valued as belonging to God rather than to one’s own self. Of course, very little of this is said by the text directly. M. Jamie Ferreira has used a close reading of the rhetorical purposes of Kierkegaard’s remarks about faith in Climacus’ literature and about love in Works of Love in order to revise their received interpretations. By considering the specific rhetorical contexts and purposes of problematic statements, a new account of the meaning of these texts emerges. In so doing she rejected the complaints of Adorno and Buber that Kierkegaard was “acosmic” and “asocial,” as well as the praises of the existentialists that Kierkegaard was a radical voluntarist. In Transforming Vision C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript: The Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press 1983; and C. Stephen Evans, Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press 1992. 92 Amy Laura Hall, Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002. 91

The USA: From Neo-Orthodoxy to Plurality

257

she criticized the picture of the leap as an heroic act of will.93 Faith is not a discretely willed act, but exhibits both passive and active aspects. Because faith involves certain desires, aspirations, and attractions, coming to faith involves an extension and modification of imaginative capacities. The resultant shifts in perspective are not the conclusions of discrete, intentional exertions of will. In Love’s Grateful Striving Ferriera argued that Kierkegaard’s exposition of neighbor love does not preclude preferential love, and does not entail a rejection of reciprocity.94 Moreover, Kierkegaard advocates attention to the concrete characteristics of the neighbor, including the neighbor’s material needs. The love commandment stabilizes our intrinsic need to love and be loved, so it is not an arbitrary heteronomous imposition. Nor is Works of Love an exercise in work’s righteousness, for the entire imperative is rooted in the reminder that we have first been loved by God. Edward F. Mooney (b. 1941), by doing a close reading of the texts and attending to their impact on the reader, concludes that Kierkegaard’s talk about “stages” does not function as a unified abstract anthropological theory, and that the self is not a centered transcendental ego arbitrarily choosing which life sphere to inhabit. The relations among the stages are not a neat teleological progression but are much more tangled and diffuse. The self is more like a musical ensemble of contrasting voices, represented by the stages; the self is the second-order concern and effort to resolve the potential discord among the first-order cares and interests. The authority of a self is like the authority of tonality in a musical piece. It is properly conceived as a fluid center of gravity, a set of tensed vectors, or a network of complexly interrelated impulses, decisions, and institutionally-linked projects. As such the self is not a pure act of self-choosing, but is just as much a self-receiving, a responsible responsiveness. God is the ultimate field of possibility, grounding our freedom and receptivity. Kierkegaard’s works serve to awaken the powers of imagination, drawing attention to the discrepant voices in the ensemble, and evoking a desire to integrate them.95 Philip L. Quinn (1940–2004) has argued for a similar view of the self as a pluralistic society of selves rather than as a perfectly integrated unit, claiming that such a view can be discerned in Kierkegaard’s works.96 In spite of the differences of methodological commitments and thematic foci, a new convergence is emerging among these authors who take both Kierkegaard’s religious interests and his literary strategies seriously. More authors are concluding that the aesthetic and edifying literatures need to be considered in tandem, and that the strategy of indirection runs throughout all the works. As a result, other aspects of Kierkegaard’s rhetorical practice are receiving attention. Mark Lloyd Taylor (b. 1953) has begun to study the corpus with an eye to probing the role of the M. Jamie Ferreira, Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1991. 94 M. Jamie Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving: A Commentary on Kierkegaard’s Works of Love, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001. 95 Edward Mooney, Selves in Discord and Resolve: Kierkegaard’s Moral-Religious Psychology from Either/Or to Sickness unto Death, New York: Routledge 1996. 96 Philip L. Quinn, “Unity and Disunity, Harmony and Discord: A Response to Davenport and Lillegard,” in Kierkegaard after MacIntyre, ed. by John Davenport and Anthony Rudd, Chicago: Open Court 2001, pp. 327–39. 93

258

Lee C. Barrett

construction of gender and the role of class-directed language.97 Lee Barrett has argued that many of the oppositions found in the history of Christianity, such as salvation by works versus salvation by grace or free will versus predestination, do not function as mutually exclusive polarities in Kierkegaard’s pages, but as rhetorical strategies specific to certain circumstances and certain purposes.98 Theological assertions that seem contradictory are actually treated by Kierkegaard as being complementary but non-synthesizable. Seemingly conflicting doctrines serve different but necessary purposes, requiring practical wisdom to know when to assert which one. Looking back at this century-long expanse of Kierkegaard interpretation in the United States, it is surprising that many of the earliest disagreements about the meaning of Kierkegaard’s literature continue to reassert themselves. Of course, the early irrationalist, existentialist, and neo-orthodox portraits have been significantly modified and nuanced, but they have not disappeared without a trace. Each of the divergent ways of reading Kierkegaard have had a tendency to reemerge in new guises. The basic interpretive traditions exhibit a surprising resilience. Old themes are articulated in new idioms, in spite of the successive “linguistic,” “hermeneutic,” and “critical” turns in the academy. For example, the early enthusiasm for Kierkegaard’s anti-idealism and anti-positivism is echoed, perhaps in a more radical way, in the deconstructive celebration of Kierkegaard’s critique of all totalizing systems. What had been described as the inability of essentialist thought to grasp concrete existence is redescribed as the failure of language to capture “presence.” Many of the concerns of the existentialist interpreters are reincarnated in some of the more recent literary critics, with the subtraction of a centered author and a reader with centered agency. The early neo-orthodox disjunction of the infinite God and finite humanity has reappeared as the discovery of an apophatic streak in Kierkegaard and perhaps even in the concern for an uncircumscribed “Other.” The tendency to situate the meaning of the texts in Kierkegaard’s life, often dismissed as the intentional fallacy, has been revived by some of the post-structuralists in an exceedingly novel way. Debates continue concerning the extent to which Kierkegaard presupposed a philosophical anthropology complete with a dialectical developmental view of the self. Champions of Kierkegaard the ironic subverter of stable meanings continue the trajectory of Kierkegaard the irrationalist, while defenders of Kierkegaard the pragmatic justifier of religious belief continue the equally venerable opposite interpretive tradition. Barthian readings of Kierkegaard are perpetuated, often with more subtlety, by post-liberal scholars. The extent to which Kierkegaard points to Mark Lloyd Taylor, “Almost Earnestness: Autobiographical Reading, Feminist Re-Reading, and Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript,” in Feminist Interpretations of Kierkegaard, ed. by Céline Léon and Sylvia Walsh, pp. 175–202. 98 Lee C. Barrett, “The Paradox of Faith in Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments,” in Philosophical Fragments and Johannes Climacus, ed. by Robert L. Perkins, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press 1994 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 7), pp. 261–85; and Lee C. Barrett “Authorial Voices and the Limits of Communication in Kierkegaard’s Signed Literature,” in For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourself!, ed. by Robert L. Perkins, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press 2002 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 21), pp. 13–37. 97

The USA: From Neo-Orthodoxy to Plurality

259

an asocial, acosmic world-view is still disputed by those who detect the basis for a profound social ethic in his works. In this history of Kierkegaard’s reception in the United States, arguments for or against a particular interpretation have seldom been decisive. In general, the themes that a scholar has discerned in the texts have been the fruits of that scholar’s hermeneutic decisions. Those decisions have been interested, rooted in the passions and commitments of the expositor. Kierkegaard’s texts have taken on different colorations depending on the exact natures of those interests. An interpreter can find unifying principles throughout the entire literature, even Hegelian ones, if the interpreter chooses to look for them. Or the interpreter can uncover undecidable fissures and gaps, if the interpreter chooses to search for them. Theological motifs, anthropological theories, ethical-religious edification, and the exposure of language’s failures can all be discovered in Kierkegaard’s corpus. Given the amenability of Kierkegaard’s literature to such a variety of interpretive perspectives, a consensus reading of his texts is certainly unlikely and probably undesirable. Perhaps it is the texts’ power to stimulate such a rich interpretive conversation that ensures their continuing status as classics.

Bibliography I. Selected Editions of Kierkegaard’s Works in the USA Selections from the Writings of Kierkegaard (excerpts among others from Either/Or, Stages on Life’s Way, Fear and Trembling, and A Literary Review), ed. by L.M. Hollander, Austin: University of Texas 1923 (University of Texas Bulletin, no. 2326, Comparative Literature Series, no. 3). Philosophical Fragments, trans. by David F. Swenson, Princeton: Princeton University Press and the American Scandinavian Foundation 1936. Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing. Spiritual Preparation for the Office of Confession, trans. by Douglas V. Steere, New York: Harper 1938. Fear and Trembling: A Dialectical Lyric by Johannes de Silentio, trans. by Robert Payne, London and New York: Oxford University Press 1939. The Point of View for My Work as an Author: A Report to History, trans. by Walter Lowrie, London and New York: Oxford University Press 1939 (revised ed. by B. Nelson, New York: Harper and Row 1962). Christian Discourses, trans. by Walter Lowrie, London and New York: Oxford University Press 1940. The Present Age and Two Minor Ethico-Religious Treatises, trans. by Alexander Dru and Walter Lowrie, London and New York: Oxford University Press 1940. Stages on Life’s Way, trans. by Walter Lowrie, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1940. Fear and Trembling, trans. by Walter Lowrie, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1941 (2nd unchanged ed., 1945; 2nd revised ed. in Fear and Trembling and The Sickness unto Death, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1954). Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. by David F. Swenson, completed after his death, introduced and ed. by Walter Lowrie, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1941. Repetition: An Essay in Experimental Psychology by S. Kierkegaard, trans. and ed. by Walter Lowrie, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1941. The Sickness unto Death, trans. by Walter Lowrie, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1941. Thoughts on Crucial Situations in Human Life. Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, trans. by David F. Swenson, ed. by Lillian Marvin Swenson, Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House 1941. Edifying Discourses by Søren Kierkegaard, vols. 1–4, trans. by David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson, Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House 1943–6.

The USA: From Neo-Orthodoxy to Plurality

261

Either/Or. A Fragment of Life, trans. by David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1944 (new ed. with a foreword by Howard A. Johnson, Garden City, New York: Doubleday 1959). For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourselves, trans. by Walter Lowrie, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1944. Kierkegaard’s Attack upon “Christendom,” trans. by Walter Lowrie, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1944. The Concept of Dread, trans. by Walter Lowrie, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1944 (2nd ed., 1957). A Kierkegaard Anthology, ed. by Robert Bretall, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1946. Works of Love, trans. by David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson, Port Washington: Kennikat Press 1946 (new ed., 1972). The Gospel of Suffering, and The Lilies of the Field, trans. by David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson, Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House 1947. Søren Kierkegaard’s Pilgrimage to Jutland, trans. by T.H. Croxall, ed. by A. Dahl, Copenhagen: The Danish Tourist Association 1948. Christian Discourses, and The Lilies of the Field and the Birds of the Air, and Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, trans. and ed. by Walter Lowrie, London and New York, Oxford University Press 1952. The Living Thoughts of Kierkegaard, ed. by W.H. Auden, New York: D. McKay 1952 (new ed., New York: New York Review Books 1999). On Authority and Revelation, The Book on Adler, trans. by Walter Lowrie, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1955. Edifying Discourses. A Selection, trans by David F. and Lillian M. Swenson, ed. by Paul L. Holmer, New York: Harper 1958. Either/Or, vols. 1–2, trans. by David F. Swenson, Lillian Marvin Swenson and Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1959. Selections from the Writings of Kierkegaard, trans. by Lee M. Hollander, revised ed., Garden City, New York: Doubleday 1960. Philosophical Fragments, trans. by David F. Swenson and Howard V. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1962. Works of Love, trans. by Howard V. Hong, New York: Harper and Row 1962. The Concept of Irony with Constant Reference to Socrates, trans. by Lee M. Capel, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1965. Diary of a Seducer, trans. and ed. by Gerd Gillhoff, New York: F. Ungar 1966 (new ed., New York: Continuum 2006). Stages on Life’s Way, trans. by Walter Lowrie, New York: Schocken Books 1967. The Crisis (and a Crisis) in the Life of an Actress, trans. by Stephen Crites, New York: Harper & Row and London: Collins 1967. Training in Christianity and the Edifying Discourse which “accompanied” it, trans. with an introduction and notes by Walter Lowrie, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1967 (new ed. by John F. Thornton and Susan B. Varenne, preface by Richard John Neuhaus, New York: Vintage Books 2004). Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, vols. 1–7, trans. and ed. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, assisted by Gregor Malantschuk, Bloomington

262

Lee C. Barrett

and London: Indiana University Press 1967–78 (vol. 7, Index and Composite Collation). Attack upon “Christendom” 1854–1855, trans. by Walter Lowrie, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1968. Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1968. Kierkegaard: Letters and Documents, trans. by Henrik Rosenmeier, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1978 (KW, vol. 25). Parables of Kierkegaard, ed. by Thomas C. Oden, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1978. Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and the Present Age, A Literary Review, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1978 (KW, vol. 14). The Concept of Anxiety, trans. by Reidar Thomte in collaboration with Albert B. Anderson, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1980 (KW, vol. 8). The Sickness unto Death, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1980 (KW, vol. 19). The Corsair Affair; Articles Related to the Writings, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1982 (KW, vol. 13). Fear and Trembling; Repetition, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1983 (KW, vol. 6). Philosophical Fragments; Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1985 (KW, vol. 7). Either/Or 1, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1987 (KW, vol. 3). Either/Or 2, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1987 (KW, vol. 4). Stages on Life’s Way, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1988 (KW, vol. 11). Prefaces: Light Reading for Certain Classes as the Occasion May Require, by Nicolaus Notabene, trans. and ed. by William McDonald, Tallahassee: Florida State University Press 1989. The Concept of Irony; Schelling Lecture Notes, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1989 (KW, vol. 2). Early Polemical Writings: From the Papers of One Still Living; Articles from Student Days; The Battle between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars, trans. by Julia Watkin. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1990 (KW, vol. 1). Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1990 (KW, vol. 5). Practice in Christianity, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1991 (KW, vol. 20). Concluding Unscientific Postscript, vols. 1–2, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1992 (vol. 1 KW, vol. 12.1; vol. 2 KW, vol. 12.2). Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1993 (KW, vol. 15).

The USA: From Neo-Orthodoxy to Plurality

263

The Mystique of Prayer and Pray-er. Søren Kierkegaard, trans. by Lois S. Bowers, ed. by George K. Bowers, Lima, Ohio: CSS Pub. 1994. Daily Readings with Sören Kierkegaard, ed. by Robert Van de Weyer, Springfield, Illinois: Templegate Publishers 1995. Works of Love, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1995 (KW, vol. 16). Christian Discourses. The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1997 (KW, vol. 17). Without Authority, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1997 (KW, vol. 18). Prefaces, trans. by Todd W. Nichol, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1997 (KW, vol. 9). The Book on Adler, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1998 (KW, vol. 24). The Moment and Late Writings, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1998 (KW, vol. 23). The Point of View, trans. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1998 (KW, vol. 22). Provocations: Spiritual Writings of Kierkegaard, compiled and ed. by Charles E. Moore, Farmington, Pennsylvania: Plough Publishing House 1999 (new ed., Maryknoll, New York: Orbis 2003). The Essential Kierkegaard, ed. by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Princeton: Princeton University Press 2000. Kierkegaard the Christian: An Anthology of Quotations, ed. by Robert B. Scheidt, Enumclaw, Washington 2003. The Humor of Kierkegaard: An Anthology. Søren Kierkegaard, ed. and introduced by Thomas C. Oden, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 2004. Fear and Trembling, trans. by Sylvia Walsh, ed. by C. Stephen Evans and Sylvia Walsh, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press 2006 (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy). Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks, vols. 1–11, ed. by Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Alastair Hannay, David Kangas, Bruce H. Kirmmse, George Pattison, Vanessa Rumble and K. Brian Söderquist, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press 2007ff. II. Selected Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard in USA Adams, Robert M., “A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness,” in his The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology, New York: Oxford University Press 1987, pp. 97–122. Beabout, Gregory R., Freedom and Its Misuses: Kierkegaard on Anxiety and Despair, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 1996.

264

Lee C. Barrett

Bell, Richard H. (ed.), The Grammar of the Heart: Thinking with Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein: New Essays in Moral Philosophy and Theology, San Francisco: Harper and Row 1988. Bigelow, Pat, Kierkegaard and the Problem of Writing, Tallahassee: Florida State University Press 1987. Cole, J. Preston, The Problematic Self in Kierkegaard and Freud, New Haven: Yale University Press 1971. Collins, James D., The Mind of Kierkegaard, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1983 [Chicago: Regnery 1953]. Come, Arnold B., Kierkegaard as Humanist: Discovering My Self, Montreal and Buffalo: McGill-Queen’s University Press 1995. —— Kierkegaard as Theologian: Recovering My Self, Montreal and Buffalo: McGill-Queen’s University Press 1997. Connell, George B., To Be One Thing: Personal Unity in Kierkegaard’s Thought, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press 1985. Connell, George B. and C. Stephen Evans (eds.), Foundations of Kierkegaard’s Vision of Community, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press International 1992. Creegan, Charles L., Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard: Religion, Individuality, and Philosophical Method, London and New York: Routledge 1989. Crites, Stephen, In the Twilight of Christendom: Hegel vs. Kierkegaard on Faith and History, Camersbury, Pennsylvania: American Academy of Religion 1972. Croxall, Thomas Henry, Kierkegaard Studies, with Special Reference to (a) the Bible (b) Our Own Age, London: Lutterworth Press 1948. Daane, James, Kierkegaard’s Concept of the Moment. An Investigation into the TimeEternity Concept of Søren Kierkegaard, Ph.D. Thesis, Princeton Theological Seminary, Princeton 1947. Daise, Benjamin, Kierkegaard’s Socratic Art, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press 1999. Dewey, Bradley R., The New Obedience: Kierkegaard on Imitating Christ, foreword by Paul L. Holmer, Washington and Cleveland: Corpus 1968. Dunning, Stephen N., Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Inwardness, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1985. Dupré, Louis, Kierkegaard as Theologian: The Dialectic of Christian Existence, New York: Sheed and Ward 1963. Elrod, John, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Works, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1975. —— Kierkegaard and Christendom, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1981. Emmanuel, Steven M., Kierkegaard and the Concept of Revelation, Albany: State University of New York Press 1996. Evans, C. Stephen, Kierkegaard’s “Fragments” and “Postscripts”: The Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus, Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press International 1983. —— Søren Kierkegaard’s Christian Psychology: Insight for Counseling and Pastoral Care, Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan Publishing House 1990. —— Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1992.

The USA: From Neo-Orthodoxy to Plurality

265

Fenves, Peter, Chatter: Language and History in Kierkegaard, Stanford: Stanford University Press 1993. Ferreira, M. Jamie, Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1991. —— Love’s Grateful Striving, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001. Gouwens, David J., “Kierkegaard on the Ethical Imagination,” Journal of Religious Ethics, Fall, 1982, pp. 204–20. —— Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of the Imagination, New York: Peter Lang 1989. —— Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996. Green, Ronald M., Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt, Albany: State University of New York Press 1992. —— “Enough IS Enough! Fear and Trembling Is NOT About Ethics,” Journal of Religious Ethics, vol. 21, no. 2, 1993, pp. 191–210. Hall, Amy Laura, Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002. Hannay, Alistair and Gordon Marino (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998. Hartshorne, M. Holmes, Kierkegaard, Godly Deceiver, New York: Columbia University Press 1990. Holmer, Paul L., The Grammar of Faith, San Francisco: Harper and Row 1978. Johnson, Howard A. and Niels Thulstrup (eds.), A Kierkegaard Critique, New York: Harper and Brothers 1962. Kirmmse, Bruce H., Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1990. —— Encounters with Kierkegaard, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1996. Léon, Céline and Sylvia Walsh, Feminist Interpretations of Søren Kierkegaard, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press 1997. Lowrie, Walter, Kierkegaard, London and New York: Oxford University Press 1938. —— A Short Life of Kierkegaard, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1942. McCarthy, Vincent A., The Phenomenology of Moods in Kierkegaard, The Hague and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 1978. Mackey, Louis, Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1971. —— Points of View: Readings of Kierkegaard, Tallahassee: Florida State University Press 1986. Marino, Gordon D., Kierkegaard in the Present Age, Milwaukee: Marquette University Press 2001. Matuštík, Martin J., and Merold Westphal (eds.), Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press 1995. Mooney, Edward F., Knights of Faith and Resignation: Reading Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, Albany: State University of New York Press 1991. —— Selves in Discord and Resolve, New York: Routledge 1996. Outka, Gene, “Equality and Individuality: Thoughts on Two Themes in Kierkegaard,” Journal of Religious Ethics, vol. 10, Fall 1982, pp. 171–203.

266

Lee C. Barrett

Perkins, Robert L. (ed.), Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: Critical Appraisals, Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press 1981. —— “Buber and Kierkegaard: A Philosophic Encounter,” in Martin Buber: A Centenary Volume, ed. by Haim Gordon and Jochanan Bloch, New York: KTAV Publishing 1984, pp. 275–303. —— (ed.), International Kierkegaard Commentary, vols. 1–24, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press 1984ff. Pojman, Louis, The Logic of Subjectivity: Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Religion, Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press 1984. Polk, Timothy, The Biblical Kierkegaard, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press 1997. Quinn, Philip, “Divine Command Ethics in Kierkegaard’s Works of Love,” Faith, Freedom, and Rationality, ed. by Jeff Jordan and Daniel Howard-Snyder, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield 1996, pp. 29–44. Roberts, Robert C., Faith, Reason and History: Rethinking Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press 1986. Rumble, Vanessa, “Eternity Lies Beneath: Autonomy and Finitude in Kierkegaard’s Early Writings,” Journal of the Philosophy of History, January 1997, pp. 83–103. —— “Love and Difference: The Christian Ideal in Kierkegaard’s Works of Love,” in The New Kierkegaard, ed. by Elsebet Jegstrup, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2004, pp. 161–78. Smyth, John Vignaux, A Question of Eros: Irony in Sterne, Kierkegaard, and Barthes, Tallahassee: Florida State University Press 1989. Soderquist, K. Brian, The Isolated Self. Truth and Untruth in Søren Kierkegaard’s On the Concept of Irony, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel 2007 (Danish Golden Age Studies, vol. 1). Stewart, Jon, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, New York: Cambridge University Press 2003. —— (ed.), Kierkegaard und His Contemporaries. The Culture of Golden Age Denmark, Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter 2003 (Kierkegaard Studies Monograph Series, vol. 10). Swenson, David F., Something About Kierkegaard, Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House 1941 (2nd ed., 1992). Taylor, Mark C., Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study of Time and the Self, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1975. —— Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1980. Thompson, Josiah, Kierkegaard, New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1973. —— The Lonely Labyrinth: Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Works, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press 1967. —— (ed.), Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays, New York: Doubleday 1972. Walsh, Sylvia, Living Poetically: Kierkegaard’s Existential Aesthetics, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press 1994. Westphal, Merold, Kierkegaard’s Critique of Reason and Society, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press 1991.

The USA: From Neo-Orthodoxy to Plurality

267

—— “Levinas, Kierkegaard, and the Theological Task,” Modern Theology, no. 8, July 1992, 241–61. —— Becoming a Self: A Reading of Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript, West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press 1996. Yanitelli, Victor, “Bibliographical Introduction to Existentialism,” Modern Schoolman, vol. 26, 1949, pp. 345–63. III. Selected Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Reception in the USA Adams, Noel S., “The Early and Recent Reception of Fear and Trembling and Repetition in the English Language,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 2002, pp. 277–90. Ake, Stacey Elizabeth, “Recent English Literature on Works of Love,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 1998, pp. 179–99. Anderson, James Maitland, “Sören Kierkegaard and the English-speaking World,” Hovedstaden, no. 4, 1913, pp. 7–8. Barrett, Lee, “A History of the Reception of Philosophical Fragments in the English Language,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 2004, pp. 328–50. Crites, S.D., “The Author and the Authorship. Recent Kierkegaard Literature,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, no. 38, 1970, pp. 37–54. Durfee, Harold A., “The Second Stage of Kierkegaardian Scholarship in America,” International Philosophical Quarterly, no. 3, 1963, pp. 121–39. Elbrønd-Bek, Bo, “Kierkegaard in America. An Interview with Howard and Edna Hong,” Scandinavian Studies, vol. 68, 1996, pp. 76–97. Fairhurst, Stanley J., “Sören Kierkegaard [bibliography],” Existentialism: A Bibliography. Modern Schoolman, no. 31, 1953–4, pp. 19–33. Fitzpatrick, Mallery Jr., “Current Kierkegaard Study: Whence—Whither,” Journal of Religion, no. 50, 1970, pp. 79–90. Heywood-Thomas, John, “The Influence of Kierkegaard’s Thought on Contemporary English-Speaking Theology,” Liber Academicae Kierkegaardiensis Annuarius, vol. 1, 1977–78, ed. by Alessandro Cortese, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel 1980, pp. 41–62. Holmer, Paul L., “Søren Kierkegaard and the University of Minnesota,” Meddelelser fra Søren Kierkegaard Selskabet, vol. 3, no. 1, 1951, pp. 73–6. Jones, W. Glyn, “Søren Kierkegaard in English Translation,” Yearbook of Comparative and General Literature, vol. 35, 1986, pp. 105–11. Lawson, Lewis A. (ed.), Kierkegaard’s Presence in Contemporary American Life. Essays from Various Disciplines, Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press 1970. —— “Small Talk on the ‘Melancholy Dane’ in America,” in The Legacy and Interpretation of Kierkegaard, ed. by Niels Thulstrup and Marie Mikulová Thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel 1981 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 8), pp. 178–97. Link, Mae M., Kierkegaard’s Way to America: A Study in the Dissemination of His Thought, Ph.D. Thesis, The American University, Washington 1951.

268

Lee C. Barrett

Lowrie, Walter, “How Kierkegaard got into English” [a bibliographical essay], in Repetition, trans. and ed. by Walter Lowrie, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1941, pp. 175–212. —— “Translators and Interpretators of Sören Kierkegaard,” Theology Today, no. 12, 1955, pp. 312–27. Perkins, Robert L., “Always Himself: A Survey of Recent Kierkegaard Literature,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 12, 1974, pp. 539–51. Rohatyn, Dennis A., “Kierkegaard: North American Dissertations 1934–1973 in the Field of Philosophy, and General Literature,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 9, 1974, pp. 390–3. Schilling, Peter Andrew, Sören Kierkegaard and Anglo-American Literary Culture of the Thirties and Forties, Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University, New York 1994. Slaate, H.A., “Kierkegaard’s Introduction to American Methodists: A Tribute,” The Drew Gateway, vol. 30, 1960, pp. 161–7. Soderquist, K. Brian, “Interpretations of The Concept of Anxiety in the Anglo-American Secondary Literature,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 2001, pp. 313–23. Sponheim, Paul, “America,” in Kierkegaard Research, ed. by Niels Thulstrup and Marie Mikulová Thulstrup, Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel 1987 (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, vol. 15), pp. 9–36. Stewart, Jon, “The Reception of Kierkegaard’s Nachlass in the English-Speaking World,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 2003, pp. 277–316. Taylor, Mark Lloyd, “Recent English Language Scholarship on Kierkegaard’s Upbuilding Discourses,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 2000, pp. 273–300. Thomte, Reidar, “Kierkegaard im amerikanischen religiösen Denken,” Lutherische Rundschau, no. 5, 1955, pp. 147–57 (Zürich). Thulstrup, Niels, “Amerika Discovers a New ‘Classic,’ ” Danish Foreign Office Journal. Special Number for the United States, 1955, pp. 19–20. Ward, Rodney A., “The Reception of Soren Kierkegaard into English,” The Expository Times, vol. 107, 1995, pp. 43–7. Woodbridge, Hensley Charles, “A Bibliography of Dissertations Concerning Kierkegaard Written in the United States, Canada and Great Britain,” American Book Collector, vol. 12, 1961, pp. 21–2. —— “Søren Kierkegaard: A Bibliography of His Works in English Translation,” American Book Collector, vol. 12, 1961, pp. 17–20.

Mexico: Three Generations of Kierkegaard Studies Leticia Valadez

Si lo sagrado es un mundo aparte, ¿cómo podemos penetrarlo? Mediante lo que Kierkegaard llama el “salto” y nosotros “el salto mortal.”

Octavio Paz Denmark and Mexico are very distant from one another. It is difficult to imagine any links between such different countries. If there is one, it is, in a way, thanks to Kierkegaard. For many of us who know little about Denmark, reading some of the works of Kierkegaard has been like walking through the streets of Copenhagen. As in many other countries, Marxism, existentialism, Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenology, analytic philosophy, and the classical tradition—especially the one inherited from Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas—were the dominant tendencies in the academic and philosophical world in Mexico during the beginning of the twentieth century. However, compared to the European reception, Kierkegaard’s arrival in Mexico was delayed by twenty years. It was only after the 1940s that some of his works were translated and read here. Ever since then and all through the twentieth century, Kierkegaard’s basic theories have been well known and respected by most Mexican philosophers, thinkers, and authors. Nonetheless, during the early years, existentialism had a greater impact on many authors, and Kierkegaard’s work was usually closely related to this movement. It is important, then, to point out that he did not have a prominent place in the academic life of the country at that time. It is not easy to distinguish among the Spanish-speaking countries regarding the reception of Kierkegaard. Since there is a common language, there is, as a logical consequence, also a strong editorial exchange and parallelism. Considering the history of Kierkegaard in Mexico, we cannot neglect some Spanish and South American works and editions. With this in mind, Kierkegaard’s reception in the Spanish language and therefore in Mexico can be divided into three periods.

I would like to thank Gina and Kevin Collins for proofreading this text.  “If what is sacred belongs to another world, how can we reach it? Perhaps we may get there through what Kierkegaard calls the ‘leap.’ In our language, we call it the ‘mortal leap.’”Octavio Paz, “El arco y la lira,” in Obras completas, vols. 1–14, Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Ecónomica 1994, vol. 1, p. 135. The writer Octavio Paz (1914–98), born in Mexico City, won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1990.

270

Leticia Valadez

The first period, from 1930 to 1961, began with the Spaniards José Ortega y Gasset (1883–1955) and Miguel de Unamuno (1864–1936). During this period, the first translations of Kierkegaard’s works and those of his commentators appeared in Spain as well as in Latin America. The main theme during this time was found in several existentialist debates because, as was noted above, most of the references to Kierkegaard by the Spanish-speaking authors are in essays on existentialism. The second phase covers the period from 1961 to the first half of the 1980s. It began with the valuable effort made by Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero to translate a large part of Kierkegaard’s works. During this period, Kierkegaard became known in a more direct way, as a whole, and less as related to the existentialist debates. Articles and dissertations about the Danish author appeared frequently during this period. The third period covers the second half of the 1980s to the present day. This was the period when researchers started to develop a special interest in the study of Kierkegaard. As a result, the first important works about him written by Spanish-speaking authors were published. The authors of these studies have been in greater contact with specialists in international centers of research on Kierkegaard and therefore have used better hermeneutic and critical criteria. In 1993, the International Symposium “Las publicaciones de Søren Kierkegaard de 1843” took place in Mexico, where Kierkegaard specialists from the Hispanophone world and elsewhere came together. I will divide this study in three parts. The first one will be a general bibliographical view of the first period mentioned above. The second part will mention those Mexican authors who have included the study of Kierkegaard in their works. The third part will be about the Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos. I. The Reception of Kierkegaard in Mexico During the First Period The first work in Spanish about Kierkegaard that arrived to Mexico was Harald Høffding’s (1843–1931), Søren Kierkegaard, published in Madrid in 1930. But it was not until the decade of the 1940s when a twenty-year period began, during which several of Kierkegaard’s works were translated into Spanish in different countries. This, however, was not done in a systematic way or in scholarly editions. The chapters dedicated to Kierkegaard’s thought in the intense debate surrounding existentialism were also numerous during this period. Due to the many existentialist concepts which were so popular during those years, several Spanish-speaking authors stressed Kierkegaard’s importance, regarding him as the father of existentialism and emphasizing his Christian view of life. In reference to this, some works written by French, English, and German authors, who presented Kierkegaard from a

I will include in this part those Spanish refugees who spent their academic life in Mexico, during and after the Spanish Civil War.  Harald Høffding, Søren Kierkegaard, trans. from German by Fernando Vela, Madrid: Revista de Occidente 1930 (originally as Søren Kierkegaard som Filosof, Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel 1892). 

Mexico: Three Generations of Kierkegaard Studies

271

Thomist point of view, were translated into Spanish. That is the case of Regis Jolivet (1891–1966), James Collins, and Theodor Haecker (1879–1945), among others. Although this study will not be about the reception of Kierkegaard in Spain or South America, in order to have a general chronological view of the first period, bearing in mind what has been said above, and as a guide for those who want to make a closer study of the reception of Kierkegaard in the Spanish language, I will give a brief account of some of the books that were published or distributed in Mexico between 1930 and 1960. These works represent the beginning of the introduction of Kierkegaard in Mexico. The most important pioneering works to explore Kierkegaard’s relation to existentialism include those by Angel González Álvarez (1916–91), Lev Shestov (1866–1938), Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–80),10 José Blanco Regueira (1947–2004),11 Vicente Fatone (1903–62),12 Juan Luis

Régis Jolivet, Introducción a Kierkegaard, trans. by Manuel Rovira, Madrid: Gredos 1950 (originally as Introduction à Kierkegaard, Saint-Wandrille: Éd. de Fontenelle 1946); Regis Jolivet, Las doctrinas existencialistas desde Kierkegaard a J.P. Sartre, trans. by Arsenio Pacios, Madrid: Gredos 1950 (originally as Les doctrines existentialistes de Kierkegaard à J.P. Sartre, Saint-Wandrille: Éd. de Fontenelle 1948); and Régis Jolivet, El existencialismo de Kierkegaard, trans. by María Mercedes Bregada, Madrid: Espasa Calpe 1952.  James Daniel Collins, El pensamiento de Kierkegaard, trans. by Elena Landázuri, Mexico City: FCE 1958 (originally as The Mind of Kierkegaard, Chicago: Henry Regnery 1953).  Theodor Haecker, La joroba de Kierkegaard, trans. by Valentín García Yebra, Madrid: Rialp 1948 (originally as Der Buckel Kierkegaards, Zürich: Thomas Verlag 1947).  This list is not part of the bibliography of this article for three reasons. First, because it contains works published in other countries, and the bibliography contains exclusively works published in Mexico. Second, this list contains several works on existentialism, and the bibliography only includes works of Kierkegaard or about Kierkegaard. Third, the objective of this section is to show a chronological view of the two decades I mentioned. If I left this list at the end of the article, this could not been seen as clearly.  Angel González Alvarez, “Kierkegaard y el existencialismo” [Kierkegaard and Existentialism], in his El tema de Dios en la filosofía existencial [The Idea of God in Existential Philosophy], Madrid: Instituto Luis Vives de filosofía 1945, pp. 67–102.  Lev Shestov, Kierkegaard y la filosofía existencial (Vox clamantis in deserto), trans. by Josep Ferrater Mora, Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana 1947 (in English, as Kierkegaard and the Existential Philosophy, trans. by Elinor Hewitt, Athens: Ohio University Press 1969) (originally as Киргегард и экзистенциальная философия (Глас вопиющего в пустыне), Paris: Sovremenniye zapiski i Dom Knigi 1939). 10 Jean-Paul Sartre, El existencialismo es un humanismo, Buenos Aires: Ensayos 1947 (originally as L’ Existentialisme est un humanisme, Paris: Nagel 1945). 11 José Blanco Regueira, Existencia y verdad: Alrededor de Kierkegaard [Existence and Truth: Around Kierkegaard], Mexico City: Universidad autónoma del Estado de México 1983. 12 Vicente Fatone, El existencialismo y la libertad creadora: una crítica al existencialismo de Jean-Paul Sartre [Existentialism and Creative Freedom. A Critique of Jean-Paul Sartre’s Existentialism], Buenos Aires: Argos 1948. 

272

Leticia Valadez

Segundo (1925–96),13 Tristão de Athayde (1893–1983),14 Armando Cuviller15 Julio Fernandez,16 Theoderich Kampmann (1899–1983),17 José Romano Muñoz,18 José Ignacio Alcorta (b. 1910),19 Fritz Heinemann (1889–1969),20 Jean Wahl (1888–1974),21 Prieto Pirini,22 and Frederick Charles Copleston (1910–71).23 The primary texts at the disposal of the Mexican reader at the time included The Concept of Anxiety,24 “The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama” from Part One of Either/Or,25 Fear and Trembling,26 “The Seducer’s Diary,”27 Stages on Life’s Way,28 excerpts from Kierkegaard’s journals,29 “The Balance between the Esthetic and Ethical in the Development of the Personality” from Part Two of Either/Or,30 The Point of View for My Work as an Author, and On

Juan Luis Segundo, Existencialismo, filosofía y poesía [Existentialism, Philosophy and Poetry], Madrid: Espasa-Calpe 1948. 14 Tristão de Athayde [Lima, Alceu Amoroso], El existencialismo, filosofía de nuestro tiempo [Existentialism, Philosophy of our Time], Buenos Aires: Emecé 1949. 15 Armando Cuviller, Las corrientes irracionales en la filosofía contemporánea [Irrational Trends in Contemporary Philosophy], Buenos Aires: Claridad 1949. 16 Julio Fernández Fausto, El existencialismo: ideología de un mundo en crisis [Existentialism: Ideology in a World of Crisis], Montevideo: Pueblos Unidos 1950. 17 Theoderich Kampmann, Kierkegaard como educador religioso, trans. by José Artigas, Madrid: CSIC 1953 (originally as Kierkegaard als religiöser Erzieher, Paderborn: Schöningh 1949). 18 José Romano Muñoz, Hacía una filosofía existencial: al margen de la nada, de la muerte y de la náusea metafísica [A Way to an Existential Philosophy: In the Margin of the Nothing, of Death, and of Metaphysical Nausea], Mexico City: Imp. Universitaria 1953. 19 José Ignacio de Alcorta y Echevarria, El existencialismo en su aspecto ético [Existentialism in its Ethical Aspect], Barcelona: Bosch 1955. 20 Fritz Heinemann, ¿Está viva o muerta la filosofía existencial? [Is Existential Philosophy Alive or Dead?], Madrid: Revista de Occidente 1956. 21 Jean Wahl, Kierkegaard, Buenos Aires: Losange 1956. 22 Prieto Pirini, Existencialismo [Existentialism], Barcelona: Luis Miracle 1957. 23 Frederick Charles Copleston, Filosofía contemporánea: Estudios sobre el positivismo lógico y el existencialismo, trans. by Eduardo Valentí Fiol, Barcelona: Herder 1959 (originally as Contemporary Philosophy: Studies of Logical Positivism and Existentialism, London: Burns & Oates 1956). 24 El concepto de la angustia, trans. by José Gaos Mexico City: Espasa-Calpe Mexicana 1940. 25 Antígona (translation of “The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama,” from Either/Or, part 1), trans. by J. Gil Albert, Mexico City: Ed. Séneca 1942. 26 Temor y temblor, trans. by J. Grinberg, Buenos Aires: Ed. Losada 1947. 27 Diario de un seductor, trans. by A. Gregori, Buenos Aires: Ed. S. Rueda 1951. 28 Etapas en el camino de la vida, trans. by J. Castro, Buenos Aires: Ed. S. Ruea 1952. 29 Diario íntimo, trans. by María Angélica Bosco, Buenos Aires: Ed. S. Rueda 1955. 30 Estética y ética en la formación de la personalidad, trans. by A. Marot, Buenos Aires: Ed. Nova 1959. 13

Mexico: Three Generations of Kierkegaard Studies

273

My Work as an Author31 and, finally, “Letter to the Reader from Frater Taciturnus” from Stages on Life’s Way.32 There are two things to point out from this. First, as was mentioned before, there has always been a constant academic, editorial, and intellectual interchange between Spain, South America, and Mexico. These works are clear evidence of this. The books mentioned here could be found in the main bookstores anywhere in the Hispanophone world. Second, the publications of translations of Kierkegaard’s works as well as of the debate surrounding his thought and existentialism were continuous year after year, from 1940 onwards. Many of these works were published as part of collections which enjoyed a wide readership and which are still being reprinted today. II. Mexican Authors who Studied and/or Wrote about Kierkegaard Antonio Caso (1883–1946) was born in Mexico City. His main interest was education, and he devoted most of his life to teaching. Among his main personal interests, existentialism and the meaning of existence had a special place. There are several references to Kierkegaard in Caso’s works. Most of them emphasize the Kierkegaardian dilemma, “to despair or to believe.” Caso thinks that this conflict established by Kierkegaard is fundamental not only to philosophy but to each individual. Many of Caso’s brief philosophical essays were published in Mexican newspapers. The first of these essays, where he points out Kierkegaard’s importance, was published in 1936. Caso calls Kierkegaard the “great Christian mystic” who does not reject life but restores man and what is human. In a very felicitous phrase, Caso states that in Kierkegaard we can find a philosophical Christianity, rather than a Christian philosophy. Making a comparison between Kierkegaard’s thought and the philosophy of the middle of the twentieth century, Caso says that the dilemma described by Kierkegaard, “to despair or to believe,” is a terrible but true dilemma from which we cannot escape. However, he continues, philosophy has preferred to remain in the several branches of despair.33 José Gaos (1900–69) arrived in Mexico from Spain in 1938 as a political refugee. In the same year he received a position as a professor at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, which is the largest and most important public university in the country. He had a very productive life as a professor, researcher, translator, writer, and tutor of many Mexican philosophers. He wrote dozens of books and translated Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit as well as Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety into Spanish. He died in Mexico City.

31 Mi punto de vista, trans. by J.M. Vellaso, Buenos Aires: Ed. Aguilar 1959 and Mi punto de vista, trans. by J.A. Míguez, Buenos Aires: Aquilar 1966. 32 El amor y la religión, trans. by J. Castro, Buenos Aires: Ed. S. Rueda 1960. 33 Antonio Caso, Obras Completas [Collected Works], vols. 1–11, Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1971–6 (Nueva Biblioteca Mexicana, vols. 14–23), vol. 1, 1971–3, p. 512.

274

Leticia Valadez

The book The History of our Idea of the World contains the last course Gaos ever gave.34 He gave this course twice in El Colegio de México. The course includes fortyfour lessons. Lesson sixteen in the second part is called “Existentialism.” Here is where he refers to Kierkegaard. He says that Kierkegaard may be compared to Marx and Nietzsche, calling them the three great critics of the nineteenth century. Marx and Nietzsche opposed religion; Kierkegaard opposed false or inauthentic religiosity.35 Oswaldo Díaz tells that in these courses at El Colegio de México, Gaos preferred Kierkegaard’s position to Heidegger’s because of its religious sensibility.36 In November 1940, the first edition of his translation of The Concept of Anxiety was published,37 however, in these editions Gaos’ name does not appear as translator. In fact, no translator is mentioned at all. Professor Luis Martínez Guerrero (b. 1957) recalls that when he was writing his doctoral dissertation back in 1990, he wanted to find out who had translated The Concept of Anxiety into Spanish. During that time, for reasons different from his dissertation, he found Gaos’ professional confessions, which is a philosophical autobiography. There, Gaos refers to his translation of The Concept of Anxiety: …of Kierkegaard, I do not know a more solid work than the one I translated from the German translation, The Concept of Anxiety. Now, I agree with Villoro’s observation about the coincidence of many of the topics in my courses and many of the ideas stressed in these and in my works, with problems that are common in Kierkegaard’s philosophy. For my part, I cannot but owe it to having lived philosophy in a similar way to Kierkegaard…38

Professor Luis Martínez Guerrero knew that Fernando Salmerón from the Institute of Philosophical Research at Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México had been Gaos’ close disciple, and so he contacted him and asked him about Espasa-Calpe’s translation and its relation to Gaos’ translation mentioned in his confessions. In his reply, Salmerón explained that they were one and the same. José Gaos could not sign his name as the translator of a work during Franco’s regime, or else the publishing house would not publish the work. It is important to stress that this is the translation that most Mexicans have read because it is available in almost any Mexican bookstore or library. Eduardo Nicol (1907–90) arrived in Mexico during the 1940s. He was born in Barcelona, but like many other intellectuals and academics, due to the Spanish Civil War, he lived in exile in Mexico. He became an important influence and guide to the students at the Department of Philosophy of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, and from 1946 until his death, Nicol was in charge of the metaphysics courses at this university. He wrote several books. In 1950, he published Historicism and Existentialism. In this work, authors such as Leibniz, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Bergson, José Gaos, Historia de nuestra idea del mundo, Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México 1994. 35 Ibid., p. 723. 36 Oswaldo Díaz, Los existencialistas mexicanos [The Mexican Existentialists], Mexico City: Ed. Rafael Giménez Siles 1982, p. 147. 37 El concepto de la angustia, trans. by José Gaos, Mexico City: Espasa-Calpe Mexicana 1940 (Colección Austral). 38 José Gaos, Confesiones profesionales [Professional Confessions], Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, p. 71. 34

Mexico: Three Generations of Kierkegaard Studies

275

Dilthey, Ortega y Gasset, and Heidegger are studied. The book has ten chapters, of which Chapter Five is devoted to Kierkegaard with the title “Dialéctica existencial.” Nicol explains the difference between Hegelian dialectics and Kierkegaardian dialectics. He points out Kierkegaard’s constant criticism of Hegel’s view of dialectics as a universal process. However, he finds that Kierkegaard held dialectics in very high esteem as something relative to the individual. Nicol calls it an existential tension with no established rhythm.39 This is a good example of how Kierkegaard was seen during those years in the Mexican academic environment. He quotes from The Concept of Anxiety, The Sickness Unto Death, and Fear and Trembling using Spanish translations, and from some English translations of works such as the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Philosophical Fragments, the journals, and Either/Or. Ramón Xirau (b. 1924) was still very young when he arrived in Mexico during Franco’s dictatorship. He acquired Mexican citizenship in 1955 and studied philosophy at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. After receiving his doctoral degree, he went on to specialize at the University of Paris. He has written many books and worked at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México as professor and researcher where he has many disciples. His Introduction to the History of Philosophy from 1964 has been used as a textbook in many national secondary schools for a long time.40 Kierkegaard appears in this work in the fourth part, called “Hegel y la caída del idealismo” [Hegel and the Fall of Idealism]. After an account of Hegel’s system, there is an analysis of six philosophers: Schopenhauer, Comte, Feuerbach, Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. This is, he says, in order to show the extreme views that arose against Hegel’s philosophy. Under the title of “Kierkegaard, o de la pasión por la existencia” [Kierkegaard or the Passion for Existence], Xirau gives a brief summary of the role Kierkegaard played in the history of philosophy in the nineteenth century. For Kierkegaard, life was primarily inwardness, and his work was precisely the expression of his own life. That is why the best spiritual biography of Kierkegaard may be found in his own works.41 Xirau points out that Kierkegaard’s production is large as well as difficult. He recommends to those readers who want to explore Kierkegaard’s spiritual biography to go to the journals. If the reader is interested in Kierkegaard’s philosophical and religious doctrine, then the works to read are Either/Or, Fear and Trembling, The Concept of Anxiety, Philosophical Fragments, and The Sickness Unto Death. In these works, Xirau says, the readers will discover how Kierkegaard inspired modern psychology. These works also show why he is the true founder of existentialism. He also recommends Repetition because of its form as a novel; the Postscript because of its philosophical style; the various edifying discourses and “What We Learn from the Lilies in the Field and from the Birds of the Air” because of their religious style. At this point, Xirau gives a brief review of the existing translations in Spanish. He also mentions the translations in English from Princeton University Press and Oxford University Press, as well as Paul Petit’s French translation of Philosophical Fragments. Eduardo Nicol, Historicismo y existencialismo, Mexico City: FCE 1950, pp. 185–225. Ramón Xirau, Introducción a la historia de la filosofía, Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México 1964. 41 Ibid., pp. 375–84. 39

40

276

Leticia Valadez

According to Xirau, Kierkegaard’s criticism of Hegel is similar to that of Marx. For Kierkegaard, as well as for Marx, it is necessary to live history; it is necessary to change man, rather than merely interpreting him. However, at this point the similarities end. The change of man that Marx proposes is social and revolutionary. The revolution proposed by Kierkegaard is personal, subjective, and spiritual. For Kierkegaard, truth does not mean avoiding the contradictions of life but living them. The true conflict of man is that of Hamlet: to be or not to be. Life is a constant act of freedom, a constant act of compromise and decision. Thus, Kierkegaard not only denies Hegel’s philosophy but also any interpretation of life that is excessively systematic. Ramón Xirau attended the international symposium organized by the Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos in 1993. His contribution can be found in the work published after this event.42 Carlos Fuentes (b. 1928) is considered one of the most important contemporary narrative writers in Mexico. He has written novels, essays, and plays, receiving several national and international prizes for his work as a writer. In 1971 he published a collection of essays, entitled Tiempo mexicano.43 There, we can find most of Fuentes’ ideas—expressed previously in other works—about the identity of that which is uniquely Mexican, its culture, its history, and its people. The first of this series of essays is called “Kierkegaard en la Zona Rosa” [Kierkegaard in the Zona Rosa]. Here he makes a comparison between Kierkegaard’s personality and “Mexico’s historical personality.” Fuentes comes to very interesting conclusions about the Mexican identity. Kierkegaard was convinced that Socrates’ irony was a result of his incompatibility with a concluded age: Socrates did not belong to his age, and, therefore, he answered with irony. Fuentes begins his essay saying that Kierkegaard found the way to keep independence of spirit and movement, in spite of the difference between his interior life, his anxieties and interests, and the social demands of the age in which he lived. By making a daily appearance at the same hours in the streets, the cafés, and the theaters, Kierkegaard convinced his contemporaries that he was a perfect vagabond; in this way, he won friendship as well as rivalry. This worldly appearance did not reflect his interior life but gave him that independence of spirit he was looking for. Kierkegaard, like Socrates, could face “his time”; however, asks Fuentes, could he, in a similar fashion, face the Mexican time? The great difference between Athens or Copenhagen and Mexico City is that the latter city has not had any concluded ages. The Mexican time is full of historical violations that have left the past something inconclusive and that demands that we go back to it in order to settle accounts with it. The Mexican identity may be just like the Wandering Jew, a ghost that can never rest until his destiny is fulfilled. Our future embraces the contradiction of hope and impossibility, and our present denies itself because it is not a present that results from a linear history. It is not a continuity of our past or the attainment of the patterns of Western development. 42 Ramón Xirau, “Mesa Panel sobre Temor y temblor,” Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía, vol. 3, no. 5, 1993, pp. 183–8. 43 Carlos Fuentes, Tiempo mexicano, Mexico City: Joaquín Mortiz 1971 [In English published as A New Time for Mexico, trans. by Marina Gutman Castañeda, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux 1996].

Mexico: Three Generations of Kierkegaard Studies

277

The Zona Rosa in Mexico City is a neighborhood quite similar to Østergade and the other streets in Copenhagen described in “The Seducer’s Diary.” Could Kierkegaard walk in our Mexican streets and face our Mexican time? Fuentes assumes the challenge and concludes his essay this way: “I accept Kierkegaard’s lesson: I show myself fighting time; that is, out of time and outdoors; and then, I hide to write, knowing full well that every line is only a difficulty.”44 S.J. Jorge Manzano (b. 1930) has not published any work about Kierkegaard. However, during the last thirty years his influence on Mexican academic life has been acknowledged, especially when reference is made to Kierkegaard’s thought. He is a Mexican Jesuit priest who received his Ph.D. in Germany where he wrote a dissertation on Bergson. During the early 1970s, due to his interest in Kierkegaard, he moved to Copenhagen. While living in Denmark, he worked as a Catholic priest in the prisons of Copenhagen for nine years. Ever since his return to Mexico, he has been teaching philosophy at the Instituto Libre de Filosofía y Ciencias in Guadalajara. In his work as a professor he is known for effectively communicating his interest in Kierkegaard. His method is to ask his students to read some selected parts of Kierkegaard’s works. Then, Dr. Manzano organizes—outside the campus— weeklong journeys of dialogue, study, and reflection based on the texts that were read: a kind of spiritual retreat. In the 1980s, along with his students, he wrote a collection of schematic summaries of each of Kierkegaard’s works, which unfortunately was never commercially published. This work, however, was disseminated and used by students of philosophy in several universities. Manzano is the author of a History of Philosophy in four volumes, which is not yet published. In the last volume, he analyzes Kierkegaard’s thought in great detail. In this part, which contains more than 250 pages, he gives a commentary on each of Kierkegaard’s works. Manzano begins with two quotations from the Papirer where Kierkegaard refers to the Jesuits. The first is as follows: “It is strange that people are so enraged by the Jesuits; in a certain sense, to the degree that a person is inspired by an idea and concentrates on its realization, he is a—Jesuit.”45 The second reads, “There is a prophetic word by her about me: You will definitely end up becoming a Jesuit. In the romanticism of youthful imagination, Jesuitism is the striving whose τέλος goes far beyond the understanding of this youthfulness.”46 According to many people related to the Jesuits in Mexico, Father Manzano and his interest in Kierkegaard have been of great influence during the last decades. Luis Martínez Guerrero defended his dissertation Fe y razón en la antropología de Kierkegaard [Faith and Reason in Kierkegaard’s Anthropology], in 1991. While doing his research, he traveled twice to Copenhagen. His mastery of Kierkegaard’s authorship was reflected in many of the courses he gave at the Universidad Panamericana where he was professor and director of the Department of Philosophy. In 1992, Guerrero “Acepto la lección de Kierkegaard: me muestro combatiendo al tiempo: es decir, a destiempo, a la intemperie; y luego me escondo para escribir, a sabiendas de que cada línea es sólo un contra-tiempo.” Ibid., p. 16. The word “contratiempo” means “difficulty” in Spanish. Here, Fuentes calls it “contra-tiempo,” giving it a second meaning, namely “against time.” 45 Pap. I A 196 / JP 2, 1770. 46 SKS, 20, 421, NB5:127 / JP 6, 6186. 44

278

Leticia Valadez

along with some colleagues and disciples got together and decided to find ways to attain a more profound knowledge of Kierkegaard, and so they founded the Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos (SIEK). Under the aegis of this society, in 2002, he organized the Colloquium “Søren Kierkegaard y Karl Marx. Convergencias y Divergencias” at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. As he has frequently stated, for Guerrero, philosophy must return to having a reference of existence. It should be something that shows every individual the existential place where he is standing, “no matter if this place may be uncomfortable, or, if it sometimes shows that reason may be limited when trying to give definite answers about existence.”47 Guerrero has written several articles about Kierkegaard for different national and international journals. Among the books he has published, Kierkegaard. The Limits of Reason in Human Existence 48 and Subjective Truth. Søren Kierkegaard as an Author49 are proofs of the command of Kierkegaard that he possesses. Professor Guerrero has participated in several conferences, reading papers about Kierkegaard. At present he is Coordinator of Postgraduate Philosophical Studies at Universidad Iberoamericana in Mexico City. There, he has had the opportunity to give several courses on Kierkegaard, for example, “Aesthetics and Passion in Existential Communication especially in Either/Or I,” “Irony and Indirect Communication in Fear and Trembling,” “The Choice of Personality in ‘B,’ ” “Psychology and Religion in The Sickness unto Death,” and “Kierkegaard and Romanticism.” For more than ten years, Guerrero’s works and classes have inspired many people to study Kierkegaard in depth. He has always encouraged his students to read Kierkegaard’s works directly. For my own part, I, Leticia Valadez (b. 1966) owe my interest in Kierkegaard to Luis Martínez Guerrero.50 He has been a constant guide in the studies I have made of Kierkegaard’s authorship. In 1992, I visited the Hong Kierkegaard Library for the first time. There, I made a study of the work Johannes Climacus or De Omnibus dubitandum est. That year I wrote an essay about doubt, a concept so important in Kierkegaard’s works, making a comparison of doubt in Descartes’ philosophy and in Hegel’s system. In 1993, I collaborated with the SIEK in the translation of Two Upbuilding Discourses of 1843. The same year, I received my Ph.D. with a dissertation entitled Verdad subjetiva y existencia en Kierkegaard [Subjective Truth and Existence in Kierkegaard]. I have also participated in and attended some national and international events related to Kierkegaard. I have, in addition, published some articles on Kierkegaard in scholarly journals. Luis Martínez Guerrero has kindly Luis Martínez Guerrero, La verdad subjetiva. Søren Kierkegaard como escritor [Subjective Truth. Søren Kierkegaard as an Author], Mexico City: Universidad Iberoamericana 2004, p. 7. 48 Luis Martínez Guerrero, Kierkegaard: Los límites de la razón en la existencia humana, Mexico City: Publicationes Cruz 1993. 49 Guerrero, La verdad subjetiva. 50 I am thankful to the late Dr. Julia Watkin and Professor Arne Grøn of the Faculty of Theology at the University of Copenhagen whose advice was always valuable. And of course, I have to mention the Hong Kierkegaard Library of St. Olaf College in Minnesota. It has always been an open house to us Mexicans in search of Kierkegaard. Cynthia Lund and Professor Gordon Marino have been there to help us on various occasions. 47

Mexico: Three Generations of Kierkegaard Studies

279

included in his book, La verdad subjetiva. Søren Kierkegaard como escritor [Subjective Truth. Søren Kierkegaard as an Author], the translation I made of “A Glance at a Contemporary Effort in Danish Literature.” Rafael García (b. 1971) is a young Kierkegaard scholar who studied to be an engineer but later turned his attention to Kierkegaard. Right now, he is Coordinator of Professional Ethics in the Humanities Department of Universidad Anáhuac in Mexico City. When he was at engineering school, he was captivated by certain philosophical authors. He attended the Symposium organized by the Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos in 1993. It was then that he decided to undertake formal studies in philosophy, and so he enrolled at the Universidad Panamericana, where he received his master’s degree defending a dissertation entitled, El problema de la comunicación en Søren Kierkegaard en El concepto de la angustia [The Problem of Communication in Søren Kierkegaard in The Concept of Anxiety]. Recently, García gave the course “Existence and Transcendence in Kierkegaard’s Thought” at the Universidad Panamericana. Because of his interest in Kierkegaard, he has traveled several times to Copenhagen as well as to the Kierkegaard Library in Minnesota. He is also writing his doctoral dissertation about Kierkegaard’s concept of contemporaneity and its influence on Gadamer’s philosophy, for which he has received advice from Luis Martínez Guerrero. Rafael García is a good example of the growing interest in Kierkegaard at universities in Mexico. While I have tried to mention the most relevant Mexican authors interested in Kierkegaard, I may have missed more than one. III. The Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos The Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos (SIEK) was legally constituted in Mexico City in 1992. The main purpose of this society has been to promote the study and dissemination of Søren Kierkegaard’s works in the Spanishspeaking countries through academic and cultural activities. It is also an open forum for the dialogue and exchange of information among professors and specialists on the work of the Danish author. The SIEK maintains regular communication with other institutions or associations, as well as with individuals. It has tried to have academic interchange with the main international researchers on Kierkegaard and to be present at the international events that work towards these purposes. During these years, the SIEK has been in touch with Spanish-speaking people of fourteen different countries who are interested in Kierkegaard’s philosophy. The members of the society who wish to be informed about the activities, publications, conferences, translations, and other international events related to Kierkegaard, receive an informative bulletin every year. There is a web site that is linked to the known “Kierkegaard on the Internet” that gives general information to the Spanish-speaking navigators.51 In 1993, as an opening activity, the SIEK organized an international symposium (“Las publicaciones de Søren Kierkegaard de 1843”) at the Universidad Panamericana 51



http://www.angelfire.com/fl3/kierkegard/siek.htm.

280

Leticia Valadez

to celebrate the 150-year anniversary of the beginning of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authorship, as well as his upbuilding authorship. Several specialists came to Mexico from different parts of the world. The papers read during the symposium were published in a special issue of the journal Tópicos in Mexico City. The SIEK also published an issue dedicated to Kierkegaard in the journal El Garabato of Mexico in 2002 which had national and international contributors. Kierkegaard is a classical author who was not totally acknowledged in his own time. But his influence in the twentieth century has been constant in different ways. This influence has been noted in the main philosophical debates in Mexico, and it certainly will continue. Many times, a simple Kierkegaardian observation enriches the arguments and the reflections of many authors and professors. But there has been a change in Mexican research concerning Kierkegaard. During the last decade, some Mexican authors have had a special interest in his works and their dissemination. The dissertations and research works about Kierkegaard have multiplied as have the courses at universities, and discussion groups at conferences. This is a sign that people in Mexico are rediscovering Kierkegaard. The recurrent topics of interest are communication, religion, the concept of time, and contemporaneity. The globalization of our time has also been of great help in terms of Kierkegaard research because it allows us more easily to receive information about works, places, and people specialized in Kierkegaard studies. All this gives a very promising future to Kierkegaard’s influence on the different aspects of Mexican culture.

Bibliography

52

I. Mexican Editions of Kierkegaard’s Work El concepto de la angustia [The Concept of Anxiety], trans. by José Gaos Mexico City: Espasa-Calpe Mexicana 1940. Antígona (translation of “The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama” from Either/Or, Part 1), trans. by J. Gil Albert, Mexico City: Ed. Séneca 1942. Evangelio de los sufrimientos [“The Gospel of Sufferings” (in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirit)], trans. by Alejo Oria León, Mexico City: Ediciones Paulinas 1973. Diario de un seductor [“The Seducer’s Diary”], trans. by Ramón Alvarado Cruz Mexico City: Ed. Juan Pablos 1984. Diario de un seductor [“The Seducer’s Diary”], trans. by Valentín de Pedro, Mexico City: Distribuciones Fontamara 1986. La espera de la fe [“The Expectancy of Faith” (from Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses)], trans. by Leticia Valadez, Mexico City: Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos 1993 (republished, Mexico City: Universidad Iberoamericana 2005). El amor y la religión [“Letter to the Reader from Frater Taciturnus” (from Stages on Life’s Way)], trans. by Juana Castro, Mexico City: Grupo Editorial Tomo 2002. Tratado de la desesperación [The Sickness unto Death], Mexico City: Grupo Editorial Tomo 2002. Diario de un seductor [“The Seducer’s Diary”], trans. by Manuel Dávila, Mexico City: Océano 2004. “La definición sócratica del pecado” [“The Socratic Definiton of Sin” (from The Sickness unto Death)], trans. by Luis Martínez Guerrero, in his La verdad subjetiva. Søren Kierkegaard como escritor [Subjective Truth. Søren Kierkegaard as an Author], Mexico City: Universidad Iberoamericana 2004, pp. 145–56. “Un vistazo a un esfuerzo contemporáneo en la literatura danesa” [“A Glance at a Contemporary Effort in Danish Literature” (from Concluding Unscientific Postscript)], trans. by Leticia Valadez, in Luis Guerrero, La verdad subjetiva. Søren Kierkegaard como escritor [Subjective Truth. Søren Kierkegaard as an Author], Mexico City: Universidad Iberoamericana 2004, pp. 185–245. An interesting historical detail, bearing in mind the importance of the pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus, is the fact that it was in Mexico where the first printing house of America was established; and that St. Juan Climaco’s La escala espiritual translated by the Dominican Juan de Estrada was the first work published at that printing house in 1536. 52

282

Leticia Valadez

En la espera de la fe. Todo don bueno y toda dádiva perfecta viene de lo alto [“The Expectancy of Faith”; Every Good and Every Perfect Gift Is from Above” (from Two Upbuilding Discourses, 1843)], trans. and ed. by Luis Guerrero Martínez and Leticia Valadez, Mexico City: Universidad Iberoamericana 2005. II. Mexican Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard Basave Fernández del Valle, Agustín, “Pascal y Kierkegaard” [Pascal and Kierkegaard], Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Iberoamericana, vol. 6, no. 17, 1973, pp. 259–66. García Pavón, Rafael, “Las obras completas de Søren Kierkegaard en inglés” [Søren Kierkegaard’s Complete Works in English], Boletín Informativo de la Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos, no. 8, 1998. —— “Kierkegaard ante la esquizofrenia de la multitud” [Kierkegaard in front of the Crowd’s Schizophrenia], El Garabato, no. 12, 2000. —— “La lectura deconstructiva de las obras de Kierkegaard. Congreso Internacional en Augusta State University” [Deconstructive Reading of Kierkegaard’s Works. International Conference at Augusta State University], Boletín Informativo de la Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos, no. 9, 2001. —— “La idea de contemporaneidad en la hermenéutica filosófica: para un diálogo entre Søren Kierkegaard y Hans-Georg Gadamer” [The Idea of Contemporaneity in Philosophical Hermeneutics: A Dialogue between Søren Kierkegaard and Hans-Georg Gadamer], Boletín Informativo de la Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos, no. 10, 2002. —— “La relación de verosimilitud entre la tragedia de Prometeo encadenado de Esquilo y La enferemdad mortal de Kierkegaard” [The Relation of Similarity between the Tragedy of Prometheus Bound by Aeschylus and The Sickness unto Death by Kierkegaard], Intersticios. Filosofía-Arte-Religión, no. 17, 2002, pp. 45–71. García Pavón, Rafael and Catalina Elena Dobre, Søren Kierkegaard y los ámbitos de la existencia [Søren Kierkegaard and the Realms of Existence], Mexico City: Centro de Filosofía Aplicada 2006. Godina Herrera, Célida, “La filosofía de Søren Kierkegaard como concepción del mundo” [Søren Kierkegaard’s Philosophy as an Idea of the World], La lámpara de Diógenes, Revista de filosofía, vol. 4, no. 7, 2003 (Mexico City: Benémerita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla). Guerrero, Luis Martínez, “Angustia y libertad” [Anxiety and Freedom], Istmo. Revista del pensamiento actual, no. 176, 1988. —— “Fe luterana y fe católica en el pensamiento de Kierkegaard” [Lutheran Faith and Catholic Faith in Kierkegaard’s Thought], Scripta Theologica, vol. 23, no. 3, 1991, pp. 983–92 (Navarra). —— “Kierkegaard: Trabajo y matrimonio como categorías existenciales” [Kierkegaard: Work and Marriage as Existential Categories], Humanismo y Empresa, no. 9, 1991.

Mexico: Three Generations of Kierkegaard Studies

283

—— “Kierkegaard y la postmodernidad” [Kierkegaard and Postmodernity], Boletín Informativo de la Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos, no. 1, 1992. —— “Reflexiones de Kierkegaard sobre la obstinación de la conciencia hermética” [Kierkegaard’s Reflections on the Hermetic Concience’s Obstinacy], Tópicos. Revista de filosofía, vol. 2, no. 2, 1992, pp. 113–26. —— Kierkegaard. Los límites de la razón en la existencia humana [Kierkegaard. The Limits of Reason in Human Existence], Mexico City: Publicaciones Cruz 1993. —— “Poesía y seducción en los escritos estéticos de ‘A’” [Poetry and Seduction in ‘A’s Esthetic Papers], Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía, vol. 3, no. 5, 1993. —— “Dos fragmentos de 1835 (Argumento hermeneútico sobre Søren Kierkegaard)” [Two Fragments of 1835 (Hermeneutic Argument about Søren Kierkegaard)], Boletín Informativo de la Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos, no. 5, 1995. —— “Kierkegaard ha vuelto a caminar por las calles de Copenhague” [Kierkegaard Goes Back to the Streets of Copenhagen], Boletín Informativo de la Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos, no. 6, 1996. —— “Los niveles de interpretación de Temor y temblor” [Levels of Interpretation in Fear and Trembling], Boletín Informativo de la Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos, no. 8, 1998. —— “Søren Kierkegaard: La comunicación existencial en una época de trivialidad” [Søren Kierkegaard: Existential Communication in an Age of Triviality], Revista de Filosofía, Universidad Iberoamericana, vol. 32, no. 96, 1999. —— “El papel de la imaginación en La alternativa de Søren Kierkegaard” [The Role of Imagination in Søren Kierkegaard’s Either/Or], in Imagen, signo y símbolo [Image, Sign and Symbol], ed. by María Noel Lapoujade, Mexico City: Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla 2000. —— The Ages of Life: Childhood, Youth, and Adulthood, Mexico City: Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos 2000. —— “Derrida deconstruye Temor y temblor” [Derrida Deconstructs Fear and Trembling], Boletín Informativo de la Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos, no. 9, 2001. —— La verdad subjetiva. Søren Kierkegaard como escritor [Subjective Truth. Søren Kierkegaard as an Author], Mexico City: Universidad Iberoamericana 2004. El garabato, no. 12, 2000, ed. by Luis Martínez Guerrero and the Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos (all articles in this issue are about Kierkegaard). Leal, J. Tarcísio, “Diálogo com Kierkegaard” [Dialogue with Kierkegaard], Latinoamérica, no. 6, 1954, pp. 322–7. Rojo, Basilio, “Mesa Panel sobre Temor y Temblor” [Discussion Group. Fear and Trembling], Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía, vol. 3, no. 5, 1993, pp. 193–7. Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía, vol. 3, no. 5, Mexico 1993 (contains all the papers read in the International Symposium “Las publicaciones de Søren Kierkegaard de 1843” organized by the Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos and the Universidad Panamericana in September 1993), ed. by Leticia Valadez.

284

Leticia Valadez

Tornero, Angélica, “El seductor esteta de Kierkegaard” [Kierkegaard’s Seducer, the Aesthete], Castálida. Revista de Instituto Mexiquense de Cultura, vol. 7, 2002. Valadez, Leticia, “El concepto de ‘espera’ en Dos discursos edificantes de 1843” [The Concept of ‘Expectancy’ in Two Upbuilding Discourses of 1843], Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía, vol. 3, no. 5, 1993. —— “La crítica a la mundanidad en El concepto de la angustia” [The Criticism of Worldliness in The Concept of Anxiety], Thémata, Revista de Filosofía, no. 15, 1995 (Spain). —— “Investigación kierkegaardiana a fines del siglo XX” [Kierkegaardian Research at the End of the Twentieth Century], Boletín Informativo de la Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos, no. 6, 1996. —— “Para saber un poco más sobre Kierkegaard” [To Know More about Kierkegaard], Boletín Informativo de la Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaadianos, no. 8, 1998. —— “Retrato hablado de un autor” [An Author’s Portrait], in Boletín Informativo de la Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos, no. 10, Mexico 2002. Valadez, Leticia and Luis Martínez Guerrero, “Obras de Søren Kierkegaard traducidas al español (1930–92) [Søren Kierkegaard’s Works Translated into Spanish (1930-1992)], Boletín Informativo de la Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos, no. 2, 1992. —— “Kierkegaard: La filosofía como vocación de escritor” [Kierkegaard: Philosophy as an Author’s Vocation], El Garabato, no. 12, 2000. Valle, Augustín Basave Fernández del, “Pascal y Kierkegaard,” Revista de Filosofia, vol. 6, 1973, pp. 261–6. Xirau, Ramón, “Mesa Panel sobre Temor y Temblor” [Discussion Group. Fear and Trembling], Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía, vol. 3, no. 5, 1993, pp. 183–8. —— “Apuntes sobre Kierkegaard” [Notes about Kierkegaard], Memoria 1998, Mexico City: El Colegio Nacional 1998. III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Reception in Mexico None.

Hispanophone South America: Kierkegaard’s Latin American Reception, An Oxymoron Patricia Carina Dip

If Hegel is right when he says that philosophy always arrives too late, it should not surprise us that it took many years before Kierkegaard started to find a voice outside of Scandinavia. Indeed, even in Germany it was not until half a century after Kierkegaard’s death that the first German translations began to appear. It was primarily the theologians who first appropriated Kierkegaard. This theological bias may account for the fact that in South America Kierkegaard was largely excluded from philosophical discussions of modernity. For example, he was omitted from the attempt to construct a post-Kantian view of subjectivity. Kierkegaard’s writings were seldom considered as a resource for criticizing the rational basis of ethics and establishing the necessity of introducing immediate psychological categories to clarify certain phenomena. Actually, stricto sensu, the concept of “reception” itself is not appropriate to describe the phenomenon that took place in South America with regard to Kierkegaard’s works. In comparison to other nineteenth-century figures such as Nietzsche and Marx, Kierkegaard represents a clear exception. Indeed, the Dane’s ideas were not of much interest to intellectual circles. Therefore, the word “reception” should be used with some reservations. It is only applicable in pointing out the limits of the framework within which Kierkegaard’s work has been understood. Even those who came to Kierkegaard only from theoretical paths, such as the followers of Heidegger and Unamuno, did not show much interest in coming directly to terms with Kierkegaard. As a result, these existentialists unintentionally contributed to the mistaken idea that Kierkegaard could only be understood as either the “father of existentialism” or as a “theologian.” Worse yet, even in religious Translation into English supervised by Fernando Piva. I want to express my gratitude to all who made this article possible: Andrés Albertsen, Martín Cremonte,Vanesa Dip, Edna and Howard Hong, Lars Kindem, John Lippitt, Tamara Monet Marks, and Fernando Piva. Special thanks to Cynthia Lund and Gordon Marino who devoted themselves to proofreading the mansucript.  The first publication of Kierkegaard’s Complete Works in German took thirteen years, from 1909 to 1922. Kierkegaard, Gesammelte Werke, vols. 1–12, trans. by Hermann Gottsched and Christoph Schrempf, Jena: Diederichs 1909–22.  As Arne Grøn says, in order to discover Kierkegaard’s philosophical power it is necessary to make a distinction between Kierkegaard and Kierkegaard’s reception. This is

286

Patricia Carina Dip

circles there was little attempt to fully examine Kierkegaard’s oeuvre directly. Instead, the theologians used Kierkegaard as a pawn in the game of supporting their own dogmatic positions. It is worth mentioning, however, that according to Reichmann, Kierkegaard was not introduced in Brazil by the existentialists. It was a writer, Octavio de Faria, who first spread the Dane’s name among the Brazilians in a book called Christ and Cesar. Kierkegaard’s reception in South America was, however, also influenced by the growing interest in psychoanalysis—especially in Buenos Aires—in the 1960s and 1970s. Unfortunately, the psychoanalysts, like the theologians, had their own agenda which in this case was determined by a fascination with Lacan and his notions of repetition and anguish. Pedro Henríquez Ureña (1884–1946) was a theorist of the process of integration of Spanish-speaking America and one of the most important critics of its culture. Even though he introduced in Latin America the most relevant European personalities of the nineteenth century, among them Nietzsche in 1907, he did not introduce Kierkegaard. Perhaps the first South American intellectual to acknowledge Kierkegaard’s genius was José Luis Pagano (1875–1964), an Argentinian drama critic of considerable renown. At a conference in 1905 Pagano argued that Kierkegaard rather than Nietzsche was the true spokesman of philosophical egotism. His conference talk is especially applicable to the relationship established between the philosopher and his reception, that is to say, the current understanding of Kierkegaard as “the father of existentialism.” See Arne Grøn, “Kierkegaard: Ética de la subjetividad,” in El garabato (Edición de la Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos), no. 12, 2000, pp. 3–5.  It is worth mentioning that the most relevant bibliography about Kierkegaard existing in Argentina is to be found in places where religious education is imparted, especially Catholic or Protestant seminaries. In the libraries of those of Devoto and Colegio Máximo (both of them in the province of Buenos Aires) it is possible to find German, Italian, and French translations of many of Kierkegaard’s books. But it is in the Isedet, a Protestant Academic Institute, where most of the direct translations from Danish are kept, together with the Danish editions, the English translations by Walter Lowrie and the bulk of the bibliography in Spanish. The Italian translation of the Diaries, i.e. Diario (Brescia: Ed. Morcelliana 1948–51; 1962–3;1980–3) by Cornelio Fabro, who tries to render a Catholic interpretation of Kierkegaard as well as showing his opposition to the existentialist “appropriation” of his philosophy, can be consulted in the seminary of Devoto. This information may help to explain the different approaches to Kierkegaard’s ideas as taken by each of the above mentioned educational centers.  Ernani Reichmann, “Kierkegaard in Brazil,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 5, 1964, pp. 78–9.  Pedro Henríquez Ureña was born in Santo Domingo. He lived in different Latin American countries, including Argentina, and taught at the University of Minnesota during the period 1916–21. In his Complete Works it is possible to find the spirit of his intellectual and political development. “I owe to Santo Domingo the substance of what I am….” “In foreign countries they may know quantitatively more but not qualitatively better.” Pedro Henriquez Ureña, Obras Completas, vols. 1–10, ed. by Juan Jacobo de Lara, Santo Domingo: Universidad Nacional Pedro Henríquez Ureña 1976–80, vol. 9, p. 342.  See Pedro Henríquez Ureña, Obra Crítica, prologue by Jorge Luis Borges, Mexico City: FCE 1960.  José Luis Pagano, “Federico Nietzsche,” Ideas, nos. 23–4, 1905, pp. 293–4. “In short, Nietzscheism results in a gross exaggeration of the principles of modern individualism, and

Hispanophone South America: Kierkegaard’s Latin American Reception

287

without doubt the first reference to Kierkegaard on record. Pagano does not hesitate to assert that Nietzsche embodies the crudest expression of individualism. He also criticizes Nietzsche’s lack of originality and holds that his most direct influence was not Ibsen’s egotism but Kierkegaard’s. During the first decades of the twentieth century, editions of Kierkegaard’s works as well as a number of articles of considerable academic importance began to appear in Buenos Aires. In most of these articles Kierkegaard is compared to other thinkers, such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Unamuno. However, in the 1950s, studies devoted exclusively to Kierkegaard’s works gave shape to an autonomous context of reception. Although great progress has been made in South America in understanding Kierkegaard, we still lag behind other countries which have had proper translations for many years. There are many serious articles from this early period. The most interesting ones were published by Carlos Astrada (1894–1970) in 1936 and Miguel Ángel Virasoro (1900–66) in 1963. In the 1970s Francisco Jarauta Marion defended his Ph.D. dissertation, Søren Kierkegaard. Estructura y dialéctica de la subjetividad, in Rome. This work was also known under the title, Kierkegaard. Los límites de la dialéctica del individuo, in Cuadernos del Valle 9. It was a landmark in Spanishspeaking Kierkegaard scholarship for two reasons. First, Jaurata discussed Kierkegaard from a “philosophical” point of view. Second, he made an effort to clarify the concept of Existenz highlighting the importance of the “constitution of subjectivity” in Kierkegaard’s work. In order to develop this project he took into account the works where philosophical insights were introduced, such as the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Philosophical Fragments, and The Sickness unto Death. Towards the end of the twentieth century, Argentina and Brazil stood out as countries in which there was not only a remarkable interest in Kierkegaard but also a deep investment in producing reliable translations from the original language. With the exception of publications by the Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos (SIEK) based in Mexico City (1993), the first dissertations, Max Nordau makes a regrettable mistake when he asserts that, while egotism found its poet in Ibsen, the egotist philosopher is undoubtedly Nietzsche. In fact, the philosopher of Norwegian egotism is Søren Kierkegaard.” (Ibid.) “Ibsen, Wergeland, Bjørnson and Strindberg, who have attempted to establish a new culture independent of ethical or religious traditions, are under the immediate influence of the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard. This thinker, the most original and paradoxical of Denmark either because of his extreme individualism (he subordinates the importance of truth to the needs of personality) or because of his never-ending fight against traditional Christianity, is a precursor of Friederich Nietzsche.” (Ibid., p. 294) “Norwegian egotism and its Danish counterpart did not find their philosopher in the German Zarathustra. Instead, it was Nietzsche who found the way paved by Kierkegaard, which explains why he was first known in Denmark and not in Germany. It must be considered that in 1888 Georg Brandes gave in Copenhagen his first lectures about Nietzsche’s philosophy. Therefore, exalting him as the philosopher of egotism, as Max Nordau does, is to pay him an honor he does not deserve.”  Francisco Jaurata Marion, Kierkegaard. Los límites de la dialéctica del individuo, in Cuadernos del Valle 9, Cali: Universidad del Valle n.d.  SIEK was responsible for celebrating in 1993 in Mexico City an international symposium called “Las publicaciones de Søren Kierkegaard de 1843” organized together

288

Patricia Carina Dip

libraries, and societies were either Argentinian or Brazilian. A history of Kierkegaard’s reception in South America10 must include mentioning the Dane’s most celebrated readers, namely Jorge Luis Borges (1899–1986) and Ernesto Sábato (b. 1911). I will also examine Kierkegaard’s emergence in the early twentieth century in Argentinian academic journals. Finally, I will address recent translations and scholarship. I. Borges’ and Sábato’s Reception of Kierkegaard In Otras Inquisiciones,11 Borges compares Kierkegaard and Kafka as follows, “The mental affinity between these writers is not a secret to anybody; that which needs to be highlighted is, as far as I know, the fact that Kierkegaard, like Kafka, abounds with religious parables of contemporary and bourgeois flavor.”12 Borges seems to be acquainted with the works of the first translator into English since he quotes Walter Lowrie’s Kierkegaard from the Oxford University Press edition where two of those parables are transcribed. One of them is the story of a counterfeiter who has to revise, always under close surveillance, the bills of the Bank of England; the other has to do with expeditions to the North Pole. In the book Hombres y Engranajes,13 which Sábato describes as a “spiritual autobiography,” he explains that his account of his life can be viewed as “a mirror in which the fall of Western civilization in a man of our times is reflected.” The crisis described in Hombres y Engranajes is not only that of the capitalist system but also includes the consequences of the changing conception of humanity that Sábato traces to the Renaissance. The most significant consequence is “the dehumanization of humanity,” which, according to Sábato, has its origin in two “dynamic and amoral forces: money and reason.” Sábato refers to Kierkegaard both in the Introduction and in a chapter titled, “The Rebellion of Man.”14 In both places he considers the Dane to be a thinker who fully understood the far-reaching effects of this crisis since

with the Facultad de Filosofia de la Universidad Panamericana. Julia Watkin and Arne Grøn participated in that event. The papers were published later in Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía, ed. by Leticia Valadez, Mexico City: Universidad Panamericana, vol. 3, no. 5, 1993 (special number dedicated to Kierkegaard). For further information on Kierkegaard’s reception in Mexico, see Leticia Valadez’s article in the present tome. 10 The limits of the concept of Kierkegaard’s reception in South America are not precise. While in certain contexts it refers to South America as a whole, in others it is used to mean only the Spanish-speaking countries. With regard to the former, I take into account Argentina and Brazil. As far as the latter is concerned, I consider the Spanish translations of Kierkegaard’s work as well as the secondary literature written in Spanish, especially in South America. For a more accurate description of Kierkegaard’s reception in Brazil, consult Alvaro Montenegro Valls’ article in the present tome. For the understanding of Kierkegaard’s reception in Spain, consult Oscar Parcero Oubiña and Dolors Perarnau Vidal’s article in tome II of the present volume. 11 Jorge Luis Borges, “Kafka y sus precursores,” in Otras Inquisiciones, Madrid: Alianza Editorial 2002 [1976, written in 1951], pp. 162–6. 12 Ibid., p. 164. 13 Ernesto Sábato, Hombres y Engranajes, Madrid: Alianza Editorial 1973. 14 Ibid., p. 18; p. 60.

Hispanophone South America: Kierkegaard’s Latin American Reception

289

Kierkegaard saw that the emerging obsession with objectivity could only lead to the total annihilation of the “I.” II. Kierkegaard’s Reception in Argentinian Academic Articles (1933–75) Carlos Astrada was a prolific Argentinian philosopher who developed a peculiar existential philosophy in which the concepts of risk and game play a central role.15 He travelled to Germany where was influenced by Edmund Husserl, Max Scheler, and Martin Heidegger. Despite the fact that Astrada is clearly inclined to Heidegger’s existentialism, his merit consists in having been one of the first intellectuals who gave an account of Kierkegaard’s work in Argentina in a very early period. In the introduction to The Existential Game,16 Carlos Astrada expresses his admiration for Heidegger by calling him “the philosopher of greatest significance in the Western world in our times.”17 In chapter four he refers to Kierkegaard as “the most disquieting and extreme expression of religious existentialism so far.”18 He cites the Postscript with a view to justifying the opposition between logic and existence and the defense of subjective thought as a crucial religious precept. Towards the end of this chapter, he comments on the influence of Kierkegaard on the Spanish thinker Miguel de Unamuno: The existential postulate, as nucleus of a particular problem inasmuch as it expresses the historical situation of our times, finds one of its most important manifestations in religious existentialism. As an instance of this there is the growing interest in Kierkegaard’s work among readers from all over the world. Clearly his philosophy appeals to them because it appears to embody their own fears and anxieties. It can be said that, especially in Central Europe, Kierkegaard is in fashion.19

In the article “From Kierkegaard to Heidegger”20 published in Sur, Kierkegaard is described as a romantic mystic and theologian who, in spite of his confessed antiHegelianism, is “ontologically” caught in the web of Hegelian ideas and remains Among his most remarkable works we can mention: Temporalidad, Buenos Aires: Cultura Viva 1943; La Revolución existencialista hacia un humanismo de la libertad, Buenos Aires: Nuevo Destino 1952; Humanismo y Dialéctica de la libertad, Buenos Aires: Dédalo 1960; Fenomenología y Praxis, Buenos Aires: Siglo Veinte 1967; La doble faz de la dialéctica, Buenos Aires: Devenir 1962; Existencialismo y crisis de la filosofía, 2nd enlarged ed., Buenos Aires: Devenir 1963; Ensayos Filosóficos, Bahia Blanca: Universidad Nacional del Sur 1963; Dialéctica y positivismo lógico, Tucumán: Universidad Nacional de Tucumán, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras 1961 (2nd ed., Buenos Aires: Devenir 1964); Humanismo y alienación, Buenos Aires: Devenir 1964; Dialéctica e historia: Hegel-Marx, Buenos Aires: Juárez 1969. 16 Astrada, El juego existencial, Buenos Aires: Babel 1933. 17 Ibid., p. 9. 18 Ibid., p. 44. 19 Ibid., p. 53. 20 Astrada, “De Kierkegaard a Heidegger,” Sur, vol. 6, no. 25, 1936, pp. 50–9. 15

290

Patricia Carina Dip

faithful to the basic principles of the ancients. This perspective on Kierkegaard has its limits. Moreover, Astrada ignores Kierkegaard’s critique of metaphysics which prescribes that the concept at stake is the “inter-being” and not “being.” Clearly, these interpretations arise as a result of Astrada’s passion for Heidegger, which leads him to give a slightly distorted image of the Dane. In his analysis of existential metaphysics, Astrada points out that it “measures the distance that separates Kierkegaard from Heidegger.”21 It is therefore metaphysics that makes it possible to differentiate the religious existentialism of the former from the existential philosophy of the latter. Following this line of thought, he jumps to conclusions of altogether dubious value for, while “Heidegger has demonstrated that the meaning of human existence is temporality itself,”22 according to Astrada, Kierkegaard turns time into a “vulgar concept.” Once again, Astrada seems only to have in mind the Postscript, and so he remains oblivious to the crucial role that “time” plays in Kierkegaard’s works. Most importantly, Astrada fails to take note of the distinction drawn between time and temporality in The Concept of Anxiety. In the article “Unamuno and Kierkegaard”23 published also in Sur,24 Erro provides a comprehensive comparison of these two authors.25 Erro observes that while Kierkegaard was almost exclusively an essayist, Unamuno was able to work in a number of different genres, producing novels as well as poetry. Hence Kierkegaard was considered a “philosopher” and Unamuno an “artist.” Nonetheless, they have something in common: “intimate discord.” Erro contends that both Kierkegaard and Unamuno possess the moral strength to oppose the regnant philosophical systems of their day: Hegelianism and positivism. Even though Kierkegaard is depicted as a thinker concerned with the idea of “faith,” his main “influence reaches only to the purely philosophical and theological domain.”26 Therefore, he cannot be said to be a believer. Considered as a representative of existentialism, he represents

Ibid., p. 59. Ibid., p. 58. 23 Carlos Alberto Erro, “Unamuno y Kierkegaard,” Sur, vol. 8, no. 49, 1938, pp. 7–21. 24 Sur, edited by Victoria Ocampo, is a well known Argentinian magazine, which first appeared in 1931. It was inspired by both the Nouvelle Revue Française created in Paris in 1909 and Revista de Occidente founded by Ortega y Gasset in 1923. It had a great influence on Argentinian literary life, and its translations made accessible to the Argentinian public many international authors. Remarkable writers such as Jorge Luis Borges, Adolfo Bioy Casares, Ernesto Sábato, and Julio Córtazar contributed articles to it. 25 Unfortunately, the comparisons between Kierkegaard and Unamuno are abundant and generated a distorted image of the Dane mediated by the tragic vein of the Spanish author. In this context, Kierkegaard was considered by the Spanish critic as a religious spirit but not as a philosopher. However, although Unamuno was impressed by Kierkegaard’s work, systematically speaking there was no contact between them. There is, indeed, a common atmosphere but not a concrete influence as far as the method is concerned. On the other hand, there is no consideration of Kierkegaard’s Papirer in Unamuno’s reading. See Jorge Uscatescu, “Unamuno y Kierkegaard o la interioridad secreta,” Arbor 103, nos. 403–4, 1979, pp. 25–40 (Madrid). 26 Erro, “Unamuno y Kierkegaard,” p. 15. 21 22

Hispanophone South America: Kierkegaard’s Latin American Reception

291

“the awareness that the world has developed of its own failure.”27 “Kierkegaard and Unamuno, as well as Dostoyevsky, Joseph of Maistre, Carlyle, Nietzsche, Leon Bloy and Charles Péguy have made an enormous contribution to the spiritual development of their time.”28 Both of them are anguished thinkers who find it hard either to believe in accordance with religious prescriptions or to let themselves be guided by the principles of reason. “In the same way Hegel goes on being the master of modern intellectual dialectics, says Jean Wahl, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are the masters of a dialectics of existence.”29 In a brief article called “El Hombre estético de Kierkegaard,”30 Dalila de Platero highlights the philosophical importance of the “The Seducer’s Diary,” a text normally valued only for its literary significance. Contra Walter Lowrie, she argues that the “Diary” contains all the necessary clues for a deeper understanding of Kierkegaard’s life and personality. That is why she goes so far as to claim that “the psychology of his [Kierkegaard’s] life is more useful to explain his philosophy than any kind of external elements.”31 Héctor Óscar Ciarlo shares with Jolivet the idea that the notion of the “instant” plays a major role in Kierkegaard’s philosophy.32 In his article he discusses the relationship between such concepts as freedom, eternity, and the instant. Ciarlo concludes, “the instant of my making a choice partakes in eternity or, to put it better, it is eternity. However, it is an eternity that, no matter how absurd it may sound, lasts only an instant for us men. The rest is just despair.”33 According to Miguel Ángel Virasoro, existence cannot be understood in isolation from the universal and the singular.34 For Virasoro, existence is by definition a three-fold transcendental process melting into the universal. Oddly enough, the first type of transcendence is called “bottom transcendence or transcendence of the origin of selfhood”; second, “oblique transcendence” consisting of the realm of intersubjectivity, and finally, “zenith transcendence or God’s transcendence.” The primary objective of existential dialectics is to describe the movements of subjectivity in relation to its different transcendences: Hegel, Jaspers and Kierkegaard, the most representative philosophers of this school of thought, are agreed on this point. All of them consider that dialectics can be interpreted as a process of interiorization that is at the same time a process of subjectivity directed to

Ibid., p. 16. Ibid., p. 20. 29 Ibid. 30 Dalila Mangariello de Platero, “El Hombre estético de Kierkegaard,” Revista de Educación, new series, vol. 3, no. 1, 1958, pp. 193–7. 31 Ibid., p. 194. 32 Héctor Óscar Ciarlo, “La noción de instante y presencia en Kierkegaard,” Philosophia (ed. by Facultad de Filosofía, Mendoza, Argentina), no. 24, 1961, pp. 34–43. 33 Ibid., p. 43. 34 Miguel Ángel Virasoro, “Etica general y ética religiosa en Kierkegaard y Hegel,” Revista de Humanidades, vol. 3, no. 6, 1963, pp. 80–113. 27 28

292

Patricia Carina Dip the absolute: Hegel’s absolute spirit, Kierkegaard’s personal God or absolute “you” and Jasper’s absolute being.35

The difference between them lies in the fact that, while Hegelian dialectics is an expression of a subjectivity which tends to accumulate synthesis and unity, Kierkegaard and Jasper’s dialectics is swept by dissolving forces. The knight of faith is Kierkegaard’s individualist answer to the advent of the “mass man,” who embodies the typical bourgeois and turns himself into the manifestation of aesthetics. Cassini considers that “the landscape that Kierkegaard had in front of him was the following: Man faced with a metaphysical necessity because of idealism, with a moral necessity due to the mass and with a physical one by virtue of a natural law. Before all this a philosophy of individuality and free will is erected.”36 Strangely enough, Raúl Vallejos’ article does not dwell on the relationship between Kierkegaard and the existentialists, as its title seems to suggest.37 In fact, it consists of a reiteration of empty formulae which serve the purpose of labeling Kierkegaard as an “anti-Hegelian and subjectivist thinker.” To make matters worse, Vallejos never quotes from any of the Dane’s works and feels free to put forward a string of unjustifiable assertions. In his opinion, there exists in Kierkegaard “a complete unawareness of the physical world that surrounds us, which is presented as something unreal that allows only personal experience to account for the process of understanding. Unfortunately, this makes an in-depth analysis of the elements of objective knowledge impossible.”38 Vallejos not only ignores the Postscript but also appears not to know very much about Kierkegaard’s philosophy, which, far from being oblivious to objective knowledge, proceeds to indicate its limits. As regards the idea of freedom of choice, Vallejos goes on to claim that “according to an interpretation that can only prove mistaken, man would be pressed by an unavoidable fate that prevents him from exerting his free will when it comes to making a free choice between good and evil.”39 Evidently, Vallejos does not acknowledge the value of the alternative, nor does he take into account the vertigo of the individual before the possibility of freedom. III. Translations The lack of reliable translations as well as the fragmentary and negligent character of the existing Spanish versions has been an obstacle to a responsible reception of Kierkegaard in South America. Up to now there does not exist a translation of Ibid., p. 82. María Cristina Cassini de Vásquez, “Kierkegaard, el caballero de la fe,” Sapientia (ed. by Facultad de Filosofía, Universidad Católica Argentina, Buenos Aires-La Plata), vol. 27, no. 105, 1972, pp. 273–84. 37 Raúl Vallejos, “Sobre Kierkegaard y el existencialismo,” Universidad (ed. by Universidad Nacional del Litoral, Santa Fe, Argentina), no. 83, 1975, pp. 13–22. 38 Ibid., p. 17. 39 Ibid. 35 36

Hispanophone South America: Kierkegaard’s Latin American Reception

293

Kierkegaard’s complete works into Spanish, either from the original Danish or from other European languages. Although since the first half of the twentieth century— especially between 1940 and 1960—many editions of Kierkegaard’s works came out in Buenos Aires, most of them are translations of sections of Kierkegaard’s books based on French and Italian versions of his oeuvre. Sometimes, these previous translations do not respect the original order of the Danish works. In addition, it is usually the case that these translations include sections of completely different Danish books. As a result of this bewildering situation, it is possible to find Spanish titles of books that Kierkegaard never intended as a unity. Although he could not finish it, Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero was responsible for the first serious attempt to translate Kierkegaard’s complete works into Spanish. As far as Rivero’s translation is concerned, Rafael Larrañeta Olleta (1945–2002) has already shown its problems in “Recepción y actualidad de Kierkegaard en España” namely, it is a translation of volumes based on different books by Kierkegaard that have been put together.40 Apart from this, the main difficulty consists in the tendency to highlight the religious aspect of Kierkegaard’s work. It is nevertheless true that its merit consists in the fact that it represents the largest effort to present Kierkegaard’s words in the Spanish language. Up until quite recently it was the only translation made directly from Danish.41 Recently, however, a complete Spanish translation from Kierkegaard’s original Danish has been in process. This version has been coming out at the publishing house Editorial Trotta since 1997.42 Unfortunately, this publishing project whose directors are Darío D. González, Begonya Sáez Tajafuerce and the recently deceased Rafael Larrañeta has not yet been completed. Therefore, the aim of translating Kierkegaard’s complete works into Spanish is still an ideal that represents a slow process without a definite schedule. Nevertheless, there are some scholars making an effort to collaborate with this ideal. The Mexican Kierkegaard society translated from English and French the first part of Three Upbuilding Discourses (1843).43 In Buenos Aires a group of Kierkegaard scholars later translated parts of The Moment and What Christ Judges of Official

See Rafael Larrañeta, “Recepción y actualidad de Kierkegaard en España,” Estudios Filosóficos, no. 105, 1988, pp. 320–21. 41 Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero’s translation consists of the following works: Obras y Papeles de Kierkegaard [Kierkegaard’s Works and Papers], vols. 1–9, trans. and ed. by Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero, Madrid: Guadarrama 1961–9 (for details about this series of translation see Oscar Parcero Oubiña and Dolors Perarnau Vidal’s article in tome II of the present volume). 42 Migajas Filosóficas o un poco de filosofía [Philosophical Fragments, or A Fragment of Philosophy], trans. by Rafael Larrañeta, Valladolid: Editorial Trotta 1997; Escritos 1, De los papeles de alguien que todavía vive [From the Papers of One still Living], Sobre el concepto de ironía [The Concept of Irony], trans. by Begonya Sáez Tajafuerce and Darío D. González, Madrid: Editorial Trotta 2000. 43 La espera de la fe. Con ocasión del año nuevo, trans. by Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos and Catalina García M., Mexico City: Ed. Mixcoac 1992. 40

294

Patricia Carina Dip

Christianity.44 In Argentina, Albertsen, Binetti, Cuervo, Fenoglio, and Gorsd are still in the process of translating The Moment. Even when the first attempts to understand the Dane in South America were related to philosophical existentialism, there was no version of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript in the Spanish language.45 On the other hand, the only available edition of his journals and notebooks is a selection based on Cornelio Fabro’s (1911–95) Italian version.46 Either/Or is the most outstanding example of the fragmentary character of Spanish translations. This work has been transformed into a real puzzle. In the second decade of the twentieth century a book was published with a selection from some sections of Stages on Life’s Way and Either/Or, translated by A.A. Vasseur (1878–1969).47 This work represents the earliest introduction of Kierkegaard into the Spanish-speaking world. Larrañeta quotes it under the title Prosas de Søren Kierkegard. The edition we consulted said simply Søren Kierkegaard. The year of publication is not clear and even Vasseur’s name is mistaken, it appears as “Vassend” instead of Vasseur. To gain a picture of the ironic way Kierkegaard was introduced in Spain, one need only read what was written by Vasseur in the first page: “I offer to the reader some pages written a bit more than half a century ago, in a previous existence. Then I lived in Denmark and was called Søren Kierkegard.” In 1961 Aguilar’s first edition of Diapsalmata, translated from Danish by Javier Armada, was published in Buenos Aires. In 1969, Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero translated from Danish what has been called Esthetical Studies I: Diapsalmata and the Musical-Erotic and Esthetical Studies II: On Tragedy and Other Essays.48 In 1973, Javier Armada translated “The Immediate Erotic Stages or The MusicalErotic.”49 Translations of “The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic in

44 Cómo juzga Cristo el cristianismo oficial, trans. by Andrés Roberto Albertsen, María José Binetti, Oscar Alberto Cuervo, Patricia Carina Dip, Héctor César Fenoglio and Pedro Gorsd, Cuadernos de Teología, vol. 21, 2002, pp. 357–64 (published also in Parte de Guerra, vol. 5, no. 17, 2002). 45 Unfortunately, this book has not been translated into Spanish yet. 46 Diario [Diary], trans. by Cornelio Fabro, vols. 1–3, Brescia: Morcelliana 1948–51 (2nd revised ed., vols. 1–2, 1962–3; 3rd revised and enlarged ed., vols. 1–12, 1980–3). 47 Prosas de Søren Kierkegaard [Prose of Søren Kierkegaard] (excerpts from “In vino veritas,” “Diapsalmata,” “The Unhappiest One,” “The Esthetic Validity of Marriage”), trans. by Álvaro Armando Vasseur, Madrid: América 1918. 48 Estudios estéticos I: Diapsalmata y el erotismo musical (translation of “Diapsalmata” and “The Immediate Erotic Stages or The Musical–Erotic” from Either/Or, Part 1), vol. 8 in Obras y Papeles de Kierkegaard [Kierkegaard’s Works and Papers], vols. 1–9, trans. and ed. by Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero, Madrid: Guadarrama 1961–9, 1969 (republished, Málaga: Ágora 1996); Estudios estéticos II: De la tragedia y otros ensayos (translation of “The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama,” “Silhouettes,” “The Unhappiest One,” “The First Love,” and “Rotation of Crops”], vol. 9 in Obras y Papeles de Kierkegaard [Kierkegaard’s Works and Papers], vols. 1–9, trans. and ed. by Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero, Madrid: Guadarrama 1961–9 (published also, Málaga: Ágora 1998). 49 Los estadios eróticos imediatos o lo erótico musical, trans. from the Danish by Javier Armada, prologue by José Antonio Miguez, Buenos Aires: Aguilar 1973.

Hispanophone South America: Kierkegaard’s Latin American Reception

295

Modern Drama” from the first part of Either/Or appeared in Mexico City in 1942 and in Buenos Aires in 1964.50 “The Seducer’s Diary” is a text edited countless times in Spanish. This fact has probably contributed to the reading of Kierkegaard in an aesthetic vein. According to Larrañeta, it first appeared in Madrid translated by Valentín de Pedro in 1922. It was published in Mexico City in 1944 and in Buenos Aires translated by Arístides Gregori in 1951.51 Valentín de Pedro’s Spanish translation is strictly accurate because he used the title “The Seducer’s Diary” (Diario del seductor) instead of “Diary of a Seducer.” Another translation of the same text appeared in 1980.52 “The Esthetic and the Ethical in the Development of the Personality” from the scond part of Either/Or was translated by Armand Marot and published in Buenos Aires in 1955.53 Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero translated from Danish “The Esthetic Validity of Marriage” and “Some Reflections on Marriage in Answer to Objections by A Married Man” from Stages on Life’s Way, entitled Two Dialogues about the First Love and Marriage.54 Osiris Troiani translated this latter text from French and published it in 1960.55 Repetition appeared in a volume together with “In vino veritas” translated from Danish by Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero.56 In 1992, Begonya Sáez Tajafuerce translated this book from Danish into Catalan.57 This edition represents a relatively new phenomenon of Kierkegaard’s works being translated into the Catalan language. “In vino veritas” and Christian Discourses are other examples of Catalan translations.58 The first translation of Fear and Trembling appeared in Buenos Aires in 1947.59 Twenty-eight years later two translations of this book were published in Spain. Antígona, trans. by Juan Gil-Albert, Mexico City: Séneca 1942 (republished Sevilla: Renacimiento 2003); Antígona: el sentido de la tragedia, trans. by Edmundo Fontana, Buenos Aires: Ed. Losange 1964. 51 Diario de un seductor, Mexico City: Sol 1944; Diario de un seductor, trans. by Arístides Gregori, Buenos Aires: Santiago Rueda Editores 1951 (several later editions). 52 Diario del seductor [“The Seducer’s Diary”], trans. by Valentín de Pedro, Barcelona: Fontamara 1980 (2nd ed., Mexico City: Fontamara 1984; 3rd ed., Barcelona: Fontamara 1985). 53 Estética y ética en la formación de la personalidad, trans. by Armand Marot Buenos Aires: Nova 1955 (2nd ed., 1959). 54 Estética del matrimonio: carta a un joven esteta. Dos diálogos sobre el primer amor y el matrimono: La validez estética del matrimonio. Referencias acerca del matrimonio en respuesta a algunas objeciones, trans. by Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero, Madrid: Guadarrama 1961. 55 Estética del matrimonio: carta a un joven esteta, trans. from French by Osiris Troiani, Buenos Aires: Dédalo 1960 (several later editions). 56 In Vino Veritas/La repetición, trans. from Danish by Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero, Madrid: Guadarrama Ediciones de Bolsillo 1976. 57 La Repetició, trans. by Begonya Sáez Tajafuerce, ed. by Norbert Bilbeny, Barcelona: Ediciones 62 1992. 58 In vino veritas, trans. by Anna Pascual, Barcelona: Llibres de l’Índex 1993; Discursos Cristians, trans. and ed. by Francesc Torralba Roselló, Barcelona: Proa 1994; see also Pregàries [Prayers], trans. into Catalan and ed. by Francesc Torralba Roselló, Barcelona: l’Abadia de Montserrat 1996. 59 Temor y Temblor, trans. Jaime Grinberg, Buenos Aires: Losada edition 1947 (several later editions at the same publisher; published also, Buenos Aires: Hyspamérica Ediciones 1985; Madrid: Hyspamérica 1985; 1987 and Barcelona: Orbis 1987; 1988). 50

296

Patricia Carina Dip

Vicente Simón Merchán and Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero were responsible for the translations.60 In 1956 Arnoldo Canclini published in Buenos Aires a translation of Philosophical Fragments based on English and French versions.61 It was not until forty-one years later that Editorial Trotta published the first translation of this book from Danish by Rafael Larrañeta.62 Some fragments of The Concept of Anxiety were translated for the first time in 1930 by José Gaos and published in Revista de Occidente and ten years later the book itself, called in Spanish El concepto de la angustia.63 Demetrio G. Rivero’s translation of this book did not come to light until thirty-five years later.64 In 1952 Juana Castro translated from French a text called in Spanish Etapas en el camino de la vida, an incomplete version of Stages on Life’s Way that lacked the last part of “Guilty? / Not Guilty?”65 In 1960 Juana Castro translated from French a volume called El amor y la religión, including the last part of the text that was missing in this work of Kierkegaard.66 “The Present Age” was translated by Manfred Svensson and published in Santiago de Chile.67 This translation takes into account the third part of A Literary Review. While “Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing,” which is one of the discourses in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirit, was translated by Luis Farré in Buenos Aires in 1979,68 “The Expectancy of Faith. New Year’s Day,” which is the first part of Two Upbuilding Discourses from 1843, was translated in Mexico City in Temor y Temblor, trans. by Vicente Simón Merchán, Madrid: Editora Nacional 1975 (2nd ed., 1981; published also in Madrid: Editorial Tecnos 1987; 1995; 2000; Madrid: Editorial Altaya 1995; Madrid: Alianza 2001 and Mexico City: Fontamara 1997). 61 Fragmentos Filosóficos, trans. from French (Les Miettes philosophiques, trans. by Paul Petit, Paris: Éditions du Livre français 1947 and Miettes philosophiques, trans. by Knud Ferlov and J.J Gate, Paris: Gallimard 1948) and English (Philosophical Fragments, trans. by David F. Swenson, New York: American-Scandinavian Foundation and Princeton: Princeton University Press 1936) by A. Canclini, Buenos Aires: La Aurora 1956. 62 Migajas Filosóficas o un poco de filosofía, trans. from Danish by Rafael Larrañeta, Valladolid: Editorial Trotta 1997 (2nd ed., 1999; 3rd ed., 2001). 63 “Fragmentos sobre la angustia” [Fragments on Anxiety] (excerpts from The Concept of Anxiety), trans. by José Gaos, Revista de Occidente, vol. 30, no. 89, 1930, pp. 204–23; El concepto de la angustia. Una sencilla investigación psicológica orientada hacia el problema dogmático del pecado original [The Concept of Anxiety. A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin], trans. from German by José Gaos, Madrid: Revista de Occidente 1930 (published also, Madrid: Espasa-Calpe 1940; 1943; 1946). 64 El concepto de la angustia, trans. from Danish by Demetrio G. Rivero, Madrid: Guadarrama 1965 (published also, Barcelona: Ed. Orbis 1984; Madrid: Hyspamerica 1985; and Buenos Aires: Orbis 1984). 65 Etapas en el camino de la vida, trans. from French by Juana Castro, Buenos Aires: Santiago Rueda Editor 1952. 66 El amor y la religión [Love and Religion], trans. from French by Juana Castro, Buenos Aires: Santiago Rueda Editor 1960. 67 La época presente, trans. by Manfred Svensson, Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria 2001. 68 La pureza del corazón: es querer una sola cosa, trans. by Luis Farré, translation revised by Alicia Rebello, Buenos Aires: La Aurora 1979. 60

Hispanophone South America: Kierkegaard’s Latin American Reception

297

1992.69 The Gospel of Sufferings was published in Mexico City in 1973.70 “The Lilies in the Field and the Birds of the Air,” “What We Learn from the Lilies in the Field and from the Birds of the Air” (1847) and “The Cares of the Pagans” (1848) from Christian Discourses and The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air: Three Devotional Discourses (1849) was translated into Spanish by Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero in 1963.71 Works of Love was translated from the original Danish into Spanish in two volumes likewise by Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero in 1965.72 There are two translations of The Sickness unto Death. The first translation of this work appeared in Buenos Aires in 1941 and was translated by Carlos Liacho.73 In 1969 a new translation by Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero was published in Madrid.74 The Point of View was translated by José Miguel Velloso and published for the first time in 1959.75 It includes two Danish texts of different periods: On My Work as an Author (1851) and The Point of View for My Work as an Author (posthumous, 1859). During the years 1946–7, 1960–1 and 1974, two religious magazines, El Predicador Evangélico and Cuadernos Monásticos, published fragments of Kierkegaard’s works without mentioning either the translator or the original source. The first of these texts is “It is the Spirit Who Gives Life” which is a part of For Self-Examination. Recommended to the Present Age.76 The second one, entitled “The Love of Christ,” is a translation of a Sermon on 1 Peter 4:7 in Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays.77 The last text is “The Care of Indecisiveness, Vacillation, and Disconsolateness,” which is a part of Christian Discourses.78 The source for this publication is the volume The Lilies in the Field and the Birds of the Air. Three Devotional Discourses, which is the third volume of Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero’s Spanish edition of Kierkegaard’s collected works between 1961 and 1969.79 The text consists in the second (pp. 205–7) and the La espera de la fe. Con ocasión del año nuevo trans. from English and French by the Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos and Catalina García M., Mexico City: Ed. Mixcoac 1992. 70 Evangelio de los sufrimientos, trans. by Alejo Oria León, Mexico City: Ediciones Paulinas 1973. 71 Los lirios del campo y las aves del cielo, trans. from Danish by Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero, Madrid: Ed. Guadarrama 1963. 72 Las Obras del amor I and II, trans. from Danish by Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero, Madrid: Ed. Guadarrama 1965. 73 Tratado de la desesperación, trans. by Carlos Liacho, Buenos Aires: Santiago Rueda 1941 (2nd ed., 1960; 3rd ed., Buenos Aires: Leviatán 1997). 74 La enfermedad mortal, trans. from Danish by Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero, Madrid: Ed. Guadarrama 1969 (2nd ed., Madrid: Sarpe 1984). 75 Mi punto de vista, trans. by José Miguel Velloso, prologue by José Antonio Míguez, Buenos Aires: Editorial Aguilar 1959 (several later editions; published also, Madrid: Sarpe 1985 and Madrid: Aguilar 1972; 1988). 76 “El Espíritu es el que da vida,” El Predicador Evangélico, vol. 4, no. 16, 1946–7, pp. 356–62. 77 “El Amor de Cristo,” El Predicador Evangélico, vol. 18, no. 69, 1960–1, pp. 59–64. 78 “La preocupación de la indecisión, de la inconstancia y del desaliento,” Cuadernos Monásticos, vol. 9, no. 29, 1974, pp. 325–40. 79 Los lirios del campo y las aves del cielo. Trece discursos religiosos, trans. by Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero, vol. 3 in Obras y Papeles de Kierkegaard [Kierkegaard’s Works and Papers], 69

298

Patricia Carina Dip

third section (pp. 229–41; pp. 264–76), which have been mixed together. In 1979, a selection from Kierkegaard’s letters and documents were translated into Spanish by Carlos Correas entitled Letters from the Engagement. 80 The source of this translation was probably a French translation from 1956. IV. Recent Scholarship As far as Spanish-speaking scholarship is concerned, Darío González (b. 1962) has become a very relevant figure not only because of his remarkable translation of The Concept of Irony into Spanish, but also because of his philosophical understanding of Kierkegaard.81 González’s insights into The Concept of Anxiety, the problem of language and the possibility of developing a science of existence, are original and indispensable contributions to Kierkegaardian scholarship. His Ph.D. dissertation also focuses on Kierkegaard.82 Félix G. Schuster, the Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy in Buenos Aires University, has also contributed to introducing Kierkegaard to Argentina by means of delivering seminars at the University and advising Patricia C. Dip’s Ph.D. Dissertation on Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein, with Jon Stewart’s participation as co-adviser.83 The Danish Church in Buenos Aires has played an important role when it comes to developing Kierkegaard studies. Andrés Albertsen has been the person in charge of the translation of some late works with contributions from: Oscar Alberto Cuervo, Héctor César Fenoglio, Pedro Gorsd, María José Binetti, and Patricia C. Dip. “Biblioteca Kierkegaard” was founded in Buenos Aires (Argentina) on December 6, 2002 with the support of Niels Jørgen Cappelørn. This Library and Isedet (Protestant Academic Institute) organized “Jornadas Kierkegaard 2005,” which was the first conference held in Buenos Aires where Kierkegaard was the main topic of discussion. During 2003 they organized different activities such as an opening speech delivered by Ana Fioravanti, a work on one chapter of The Sickness unto Death by Oscar Cuervo, and a debate on God and the Other by María José Binetti and Héctor Fenoglio. The Howard V. and Edna H. Hong Kierkegaard Library of St. Olaf College in Northfield, Minnesota has played a major role in supporting Spanish translations and scholarship. From 1997 to 2001 there were regular meetings there. During the vols. 1–9, trans. and ed. by Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero, Madrid: Guadarrama 1961–9, 1963. 80 Cartas del Noviazgo, trans. from French by Carlos Correas, Buenos Aires: Ediciones Siglo Veinte 1979. This book has probably been translated from the following French edition: Marguerite Grimault, Lettres des fiançailles, Paris: Falaize 1956. 81 Darío González is an Argentinian Kierkegaard scholar and translator. He has published many laudable articles on Kierkegaard in English. We only mention the ones he wrote in Spanish. He has worked in the Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, Copenhagen, Denmark for many years. 82 Essai sur l’ontologie kierkegaardienne. Idealité et determination, Préface de Jacques Colette, Paris: Éditions L’ Harmattan 1999. 83 Ética y límites del lenguaje en Kierkegaard y Wittgenstein, Buenos Aires: Buenos Aires University 2004.

Hispanophone South America: Kierkegaard’s Latin American Reception

299

Fourth International Conference 2001, sponsored by the Kierkegaard Library, Alvaro Valls, Professor of Philosophy at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul in Porto Alegre, Brazil, supervised a seminar for Spanish Kierkegaard scholars and translators called “Spanish Translation Seminar.” This seminar was an extension of Begonya Sáez Tajafuerce’s “Spanish Translation Group” that held a meeting at the Kierkegaard Library at St. Olaf College during the 1997 International Kierkegaard Conference. During July 17–19, 1999, the “Spanish Translation Seminar” met at the Hong Kierkegaard Library with the main purpose of discussing the translations of Kierkegaard that came out in those years, namely From the Papers of One Still Living and On the Concept of Irony.84 The Seminar was called “Seminario Ibero-americano: Escritos de Søren Kierkegaard.” The participants were Begonya Sáez Tajafuerce, the organizer, together with Darío González, Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, Copenhagen, Denmark; Alvaro L. M. Valls, Professor of Philosophy, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, Brazil; Montserrat Negre Rigol, Professor of Philosophy, University of Seville, Spain; Eliseo Pérez Alvarez, Professor, Evangelical Seminary of Puerto Rico, San Juan, Puerto Rico; Carlos Andrés Manrique, Ph.D. student, University of Bogotá, Colombia and Rafael García Pavón, Ph.D. student, Instituto Tecnológico y Estudios Superiores de Monterray, Mexico City. In addition to the Mexican Kierkegaard scholars—Luis Martínez Guerrero, Leticia Valadez and Rafael García Pavón—Eliseo Pérez Alvarez is a native of Mexico who was recently under call from the Division for Global Mission of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America to teach at the Seminario Evangélico de Puerto Rico. His Ph.D. dissertation, advised by Dr. Phil Hefner, is entitled A Vexing Gadfly: the Late Kierkegaard on Economic Matters (2000). Dr. Perez has been appointed professor of Latino theology and mission at the Lutheran Seminary Program in Austin, Texas. During the 1990s Professor Danilo Guzmán from Universidad del Valle, Cáli, Colombia spent some time at the Hong Kierkegaard Library working on a research project entitled “Kierkegaard and Language” with the aim of exploring the role of language in philosophical activity. In the context of this research he also considered Marshall McLuhan’s The Gutenberg Galaxy; The Making of Typographic Man.85 In Costa Rica, the Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica has been publishing articles on Kierkegaard since the 1970s. Among them one can mention one by Martin Zerlang who traces the relevance of the city in Kierkegaard’s work and highlights Kierkegaard’s relationship with Johan Ludvig Heiberg.86 Hernán Mora Calvo argues that Kierkegaard’s notion of dialectics lacks “synthesis” and therefore implies a constant tension only comprehensible in the context of possibilities and

Escritos de Søren Kierkegaard, I. De los papeles de alguien que todavía vive. Sobre el concepto de ironía [Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. 1, From the Papers of One Still Living, The Concept of Irony], trans. by Darío González and Begonya Sáez Tajafuerce. 85 Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy; The Making of Typographic Man, Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1962. 86 Martin Zerlang, “Søren Kierkegaard: el vigilante copenhaguense,” Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica, vol. 39, no. 99, 2002, pp. 121–7. 84

300

Patricia Carina Dip

decisions.87 Finally, Euclides Padilla’s article shows the importance of aesthetic freedom which is defined as a dialectical and paradoxical movement.88 It is dialectical because in the first sphere Figaro wishes the ideal; in the second sphere Papageno desires the singular; and in the third, Johannes the seducer is looking for the idealsingular. The paradoxical aspect is represented by Cordelia, who is an erotic and subjective object of love.

Hernán R. Mora Calvo, “Kierkegaard: su dialéctica cualitativa. Breves aproximaciones,” Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica, vol. 36, no. 90, 1998, pp. 581–9. 88 Euclides Padilla Caina, “Libertad estética de Don Juan el seductor en Kierkegaard,” Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica, vol. 16, no. 44, 1978, pp. 193–202. 87

Bibliography I. Spanish Translations of Kierkegaard’s Works in Spanish-Speaking South America89 Prosas de Søren Kierkegaard [Søren Kierkegaard’s Prose (excerpts from “In Vino Veritas,” “Diapsalmata,” “The Unhappiest One,” “The Esthetic Validity of Marriage”)], trans. by Álvaro Armando Vasseur, Madrid: América 1918.90 Diario de un seductor [“A Seducer’s Diary”], trans. by Valentín de Pedro, Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra 1922. El concepto de la angustia. Una sencilla investigación psicológica orientada hacia el problema dogmático del pecado original [The Concept of Anxiety. A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin], trans. from German by José Gaos, Madrid: Revista de Occidente 1930 (published also in Madrid: Espasa-Calpe 1940; 1943; 1946). “Fragmentos sobre la angustia” [Fragments on Anxiety (excerpts from The Concept of Anxiety)], trans. by José Gaos, Revista de Occidente, vol. 30, no. 89, 1930, pp. 204–23. Tratado de la desesperación [The Sickness unto Death], trans. by Carlos Liacho, Buenos Aires: Santiago Rueda 1941 (2nd ed., 1960; 3rd ed., Buenos Aires: Leviatán 1997). Antígona (translation of “The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama” from Either/Or, Part 1), trans. by Juan Gil-Albert, Mexico City: Séneca 1942 (republished Sevilla: Renacimiento 2003). “El Espíritu es el que da vida” [“It is the Spirit Who Gives Life” (from For SelfExamination. Recommended to the Present Age)], El Predicador Evangélico, vol. 4, no. 16, 1946–7, pp. 356–62. Temor y Temblor [Fear and Trembling], trans. by Jaime Grinberg, Buenos Aires: Losada edition 1947 (several later editions at the same publisher; published also, Buenos Aires: Hyspamérica Ediciones 1985; Madrid: Hyspamérica 1985; 1987 and Barcelona: Orbis 1987; 1988). Diario de un seductor [“A Seducer’s Diary”], Mexico City: Sol 1944. Whenever the translator is not mentioned, it means that his or her name is missing from the original Spanish edition. The same applies concerning the language from which the translation was made, the year of publication and the publishing house. 90 This is not only a confusing selection of Kierkegaard’s works (Stages on Life’s Way and Either/Or, Part 1), but it also includes texts on Kierkegaard written by H. Høffding and H. Delacroix. Sometimes it is quoted as Prosas de Søren Kierkegaard. The exact year of publication is not clear either. 89

302

Patricia Carina Dip

Diario de un seductor [“A Seducer’s Diary”], trans. by Arístides Gregori, Buenos Aires: Santiago Rueda Editores 1951 (several later editions). Diario de un seductor:arte de amar [“A Seducer’s Diary”: The Art of Love] trans.by Valentín de Pedro, Buenos Aires: Espasa Calpe 1951 (several later editions). Etapas en el camino de la vida [Stages on Life’s Way (incomplete translation; it does not include the last part of “Guilty? / Not Guilty”)], trans. from French by Juana Castro, Buenos Aires: Santiago Rueda Editor 1952. Diario íntimo [An Intimate Diary (excerpts from Kierkegaard’s journals and papers)], trans. from Italian by María Angélica Bosco, Buenos Aires: Santiago Rueda 1955 (new ed. by José Luis L. Aranguren, Barcelona: Planeta 1993). Estética y ética en la formación de la personalidad [“The Esthetic and the Ethical in the Development of the Personality” (from Either/Or, Part 2)], trans. by Armand Marot Buenos Aires: Nova 1955 (2nd ed., 1959). Fragmentos Filosóficos [Philosophical Fragments], trans. from French and English by A. Canclini, Buenos Aires: La Aurora 1956. Mi punto de vista [My Point of View], trans. by José Miguel Velloso, prologue by José Antonio Míguez, Buenos Aires: Editorial Aguilar 1959 (several later editions; published also, Madrid: Sarpe 1985 and Madrid: Aguilar 1972; 1988). Estética del matrimonio: carta a un joven esteta [“The Esthetics of Marriage”: A Letter from a Young Aesthete], trans. from French by Osiris Troiani, Buenos Aires: Dédalo 1960 (several later editions). Diapsalmata, trans. from Danish by Javier Armada, Buenos Aires: Aguilar 1961 (several later editions). El amor y la religión [Love and Religion (translation of the last part of “Guilty / Not Guilty?” from Stages on Life’s Way)], trans. from French by Juana Castro, Buenos Aires: Santiago Rueda Editor 1960. “El Amor de Cristo” [The Love of Christ (translation of Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays)], El Predicador Evangélico, vol. 18, no. 69, 1960–1, pp. 59–64. Dos diálogos sobre el primer amor y el matrimono: La validez estética del matrimonio; Referencias acerca del matrimonio en respuesta a algunas objeciones [Two Dialogues about the First Love and Marriage: “The Esthetic Validity of Marriage, in Answer to Some Objections” (from Either/Or, Part 2); “Some Reflections on Marriage in Answer to Objections by A Married Man” (from Stages on Life’s Way)], trans. from Danish by Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero, Madrid: Guadarrama 1961. Ejercitación del Cristianismo [Practice in Christianity], vol. 1 in Obras y Papeles de Kierkegaard [Kierkegaard’s Works and Papers], vols. 1–9, trans. and ed. by Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero, Madrid: Guadarrama 1961–9, 1961. Los lirios del campo y las aves del cielo [The Lilies in the Field and the Birds of the Air (translation of “What We Learn from the Lilies in the Field and from the Birds of the Air”; “The Cares of the Pagans” from Christian Discourses and The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air: Three Devotional Discourses)], trans. from Danish by Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero, Madrid: Ed. Guadarrama 1963. Antígona: el sentido de la tragedia [Antigone: The Meaning of the Tragedy (translation of “The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic in Modern

Hispanophone South America: Kierkegaard’s Latin American Reception

303

Drama” from Either/Or, Part 1)], trans. by Edmundo Fontana, Buenos Aires: Ed. Losange 1964. El concepto de la angustia [The Concept of Anxiety], trans. from Danish by Demetrio G. Rivero, Madrid: Guadarrama 1965 (published also, Barcelona: Ed. Orbis 1984; Madrid: Hyspamerica 1985 and Buenos Aires: Orbis 1984). Las obras del amor, I &II [Works of Love], trans. from Danish by Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero, Madrid: Ed. Guadarrama 1965. Los estadios eróticos inmediatos o lo erótico musical [“The Immediate Erotic Stages or the Music-Erotic”], trans. from Danish by Javier Armada, prologue by José Antonio Miguez, Buenos Aires: Aguilar 1967 (2nd ed., 1973; 3rd ed., 1977). Estudios estéticos I: Diapsalmata y el erotismo musical [Esthetical Studies I: Diapsalmata and the Musical-Erotic (translation of “Diapsalmata,” “The Immediate Erotic Stages or The Musical-Erotic” from Either/Or, Part 1)], vol. 8 in Obras y Papeles de Kierkegaard [Kierkegaard’s Works and Papers], vols. 1–9, trans. and ed. by Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero, Madrid: Guadarrama 1961–9, 1969 (republished, Málaga: Ágora 1996). Estudios estéticos II: De la tragedia y otros ensayos [Esthetical Studies II: On Tragedy and Other Essays (translation of “The Tragic in Ancient Drama Reflected in the Tragic in Modern Drama,” “Silhouettes,” “The Unhappiest One,” “The First Love” and “Rotation of Crops”)], vol. 9 in Obras y Papeles de Kierkegaard [Kierkegaard’s Works and Papers], vols. 1–9, trans. and ed. by Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero, Madrid: Guadarrama 1961–9, 1969 (published also, Málaga: Ágora 1998). La enfermedad mortal [The Sickness unto Death], trans. from Danish by Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero, Madrid: Ed. Guadarrama 1969 (2nd ed., Madrid: Sarpe 1984). Diario de un seductor [“A Seducer’s Diary”], trans. from French by Jacinto León Ignacio, Barcelona: Ediciones 29 1971 (several later editions). Evangelio de los Sufrimientos [The Gospel of Sufferings], trans. by Alejo Oria León, Mexico City: Ediciones Paulinas 1973. “La preocupación de la indecisión, de la inconstancia y del desaliento” [“The Care of Indecisiveness, Vacillation, and Disconsolateness” (from Christian Discourses)], Cuadernos Monásticos, vol. 9, no. 29, 1974, pp. 325–40. Temor y Temblor [Fear and Trembling], trans. by Vicente Simón Merchán, Madrid: Editora Nacional 1975 (2nd ed., 1981; published also in Madrid: Editorial Tecnos 1987; 1995; 2000; Madrid: Editorial Altaya 1995; Madrid: Alianza 2001 and Mexico City: Fontamara 1997). Temor y Temblor / Diario de un seductor [Fear and Trembling; “The Seducer’s Diary”], trans. from Danish by Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero, Madrid: Ediciones Guadarrama 1975. Diario de un seductor [“A Seducer’s Diary”], trans. by Demetrio G. Rivero, Madrid: Ediciones Guadarrama 1976. In Vino Veritas/La repetición [“In Vino Veritas”; Repetition], trans. from Danish by Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero, Madrid: Guadarrama Ediciones de Bolsillo 1976. La pureza del corazón: es querer una sola cosa [“Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing” (from Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirit)], trans. by Luis Farré, translation revised by Alicia Rebello, Buenos Aires: La Aurora 1979.

304

Patricia Carina Dip

Cartas del Noviazgo [Letters from the Engagement (a selection from Kierkegaard’s letters and documents)], trans. from French by Carlos Correas, Buenos Aires: Ediciones Siglo Veinte 1979. Diario del seductor [“The Seducer’s Diary”], trans. by Valentín de Pedro, Barcelona: Fontamara 1980 (2nd ed., Mexico City: Fontamara 1984; 3rd ed., Barcelona: Fontamara 1985). Diario de un seductor [“A Seducer’s Diary”], trans. by Ramón Alvarado Cruz, Mexico City: Juan Pablo Editor 1984. Diario de un seductor [“A Seducer’s Diary”], trans. by Demetrio G. Rivero, ed. by José María Valverde, Barcelona: Destino 1988. Temor y Temblor [Fear and Trembling], trans. from Danish by Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero, Barcelona: Editorial Labor 1992. La espera de la fe. Con ocasión del año nuevo [“The Expectancy of Faith. New Year’s Day”], trans. from English and French by the Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos and Catalina García M., Mexico City: Ed. Mixcoac 1992. Diario de un seductor [“A Seducer’s Diary”], trans. by Joseph Club, Colombia: Ediciones Nuevo Siglo S.A. 1994. Tratado de la desesperación [The Sickness unto Death], trans. by Juan Enrique Holstein, Barcelona: Edicomunicación 1994. La Repetición [Repetition], trans. from Danish by K.A. Hjelmstrom, Buenos Aires: Ed. Psiqué 1997. Migajas Filosóficas o un poco de filosofía [Philosophical Fragments, or A Fragment of Philosophy], trans. from Danish by Rafael Larrañeta, Valladolid: Editorial Trotta 1997 (2nd ed., 1999; 3rd ed., 2001). La enfermedad mortal [The Sickness unto Death], Madrid: Albor Libros, S.L., published in Argentina by Impresos y Revistas 1998. Diapsalmata, trans. by Demetrio Gutiérrez Rivero, Santiago de Chile: Beuvedrais Editores, Impresos Universitaria 1999. Diario de un seductor [“A Seducer’s Diary”], trans. by Valentín de Pedro, Mexico City: Fontamara 1999. Escritos de Søren Kierkegaard, I. De los papeles de alguien que todavía vive. Sobre el concepto de ironía [Kierkegaard’s Writings, vol. 1, From the Papers of One Still Living, The Concept of Irony], trans. by Darío González and Begonya Sáez Tajafuerce, ed. by Rafael Larrañeta, Darío González and Begonya Sáez Tajafuerce, Madrid: Trotta 2000. La época presente [“The Present Age” (translation of the third part of A Literary Review)], trans. by Manfred Svensson, Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria 2001. “Cómo juzga Cristo el cristianismo oficial” [How Christ Judges Official Christianity], trans. from Danish by Andrés Roberto Albertsen, María José Binetti, Oscar Alberto Cuervo, Patricia Carina Dip, Héctor Fenoglio, and Pedro Gorsd, Cuadernos de Teología (Buenos Aires: Instituto Universitario Isedet) vol. 21, 2002, pp. 357–64 (published also, Parte de Guerra, vol. 5, no. 17, 2002). Diario de un seductor [“A Seducer’s Diary”], trans. by Carlos Liacho, Mexico City: Grupo Editorial Tomo 2002. Diario de un seductor [“A Seducer’s Diary”], trans. by Susana Aguiar, Buenos Aires: Longseller 2002.

Hispanophone South America: Kierkegaard’s Latin American Reception

305

Diario de un seductor [“A Seducer’s Diary”], trans. and prol. by Francesc Ll. Cardona, Barcelona: Edicomunicación 2003. II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard in Spanish-Speaking South America Alcorta, José Ignacio de, El existencialismo en su aspecto ético [Existentialism in its Ethical Aspect], Barcelona: Bosch 1955. —— “El constitutivo ontológico del existencialismo” [The Constitutive Onthology of Existentialism], Revista de Filosofía del Instituto “Luis Vives,” vol. 15, no. 56, 1956, pp. 5–35 (Madrid). Amaya, Ismael E., “La influencia de Kierkegaard sobre el pensamiento existencialista del siglo veinte” [Kierkegaard’s Influence on the Existential Thought of the Twentieth Century], Cuadernos Teológicos, vol. 14, no. 56, 1965, pp. 224–35. Amorós, Célia, Sören Kierkegaard o la subjetividad del caballero [Søren Kierkegaard or the Knight’s Subjectivity], Barcelona: Anthropos 1987. Aranguren, José Luis L., “Exposición de Kierkegaard” [Exposition of Kierkegaard], Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos, no. 8, 1951, pp. 41–7. —— Obras [Works], Madrid: Editorial Plenitud 1965–93. —— Catolicismo y protestantismo como formas de existencia [Catholicism and Protestantism as Forms of Existence], Madrid: Alianza 1980. —— Obras Completas [Collected Works], Madrid: Trotta 1994. Arroyo, Francisco, El existencialismo: sus fuentes y direcciones [Existentialism: Its Sources and Directions], Mexico City 1951. Artola, José María, “Situación y sentido del pensamiento hegeliano en la actualidad” [Situation and Meaning of Hegelian Thought at the Present Time], Estudios Filosóficos, no. 22, 1973, pp. 349–84. Astrada, Carlos, “De Kierkegaard a Heidegger” [From Kierkegaard to Heidegger], Sur, vol. 6, no. 25, 1936, pp. 50–9 (Buenos Aires). —— La Revolución existencialista: hacia un humanismo de la libertad [The Existential Revolution: Towards a Humanism of Freedom], Buenos Aires: Nuevo Destino 1952. —— Existencialismo y crisis de la filosofía [Existentialism and the Crisis of Philosophy], 2nd enlarged ed., Buenos Aires: Devenir 1963. Atencio, Reynaldo, “Homenaje a Søren Kierkegaard, el solitario y melancólico profeta danés, 1813–1855” [In Honor of Søren Kierkegaard, the Solitary and Melancholic Danish Prophet, 1813–1855], Lotería, nos. 346–7, 1985, pp. 31–50 (Panamá: Impresora Panamá). Ballbe, Raúl R., “Sobre el futuro en la psicoterapia” [On the Future of Psychotherapy], Escritos de Filosofía, vol. 18, nos. 35–6, 1999, pp. 231–54. Baraldi, Sonia, “Del estadio estético en Kierkegaard” [On the Aesthetic Stage in Kierkegaard], Alcalá, no. 66, 1955, p. 13. Barreiro, José Luis, “Sören Kierkegaard y las fases de la personalidad” [Søren Kierkegaard and the Stages of Personality], Compostellanum, no. 15, 1970, pp. 387–419.

306

Patricia Carina Dip

Barrio, Jaime Franco, “Un ejemplo de ‘filosofía crítica’ en el siglo XIX: Kierkegaard contra el hegelianismo” [An Example of the “Crticial Philosophy” of the Nineteenth Century: Kierkegaard Contra Hegelianism], Studia Zamorensia, no. 4, 1985, pp. 155–72. —— Kierkegaard frente al hegelianismo en el contexto de la filosofía decimonónica [Kierkegaard against Hegelianism in the Context of the Nineteenth-Century Philosophy], Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca 1986. —— “Notas y Comentarios. Kierkegaard en Español” [Notes and Remarks. Kierkegaard in Spanish], Azafea, vol. 2, 1989, pp. 211–34. —— Kierkegaard frente al hegelianismo [Kierkegaard vis-à-vis Hegelianism], Valladolid: Secretariado de Publicaciones e Intercambio Científico, Universidad de Valladolid 1996. Barrio-Maestre, José María, “Kierkegaard y el escándalo moderno ante la fe” [Kierkegaard and the Modern Scandal before Faith], Folia Humanistica, vol. 26, no. 304, 1988, pp. 351–7. Basave, Agustín, “Pascal y Kierkegaard” [Pascal and Kierkegaard], Revista de Filosofía Mexicana, vol. 6, 1973, pp. 259–66. Bernaola, P., “La moral existencial de Sören Kierkegaard” [The Existential Morality of Søren Kierkegaard], Ensayos, vol. 49, 1967, pp. 20–3. Binetti, María José, “El fundamento metafísico, ético y religioso de la libertad, en el pensamiento de Søren Kierkegaard y según la interpretación de C. Fabro” [The Metaphysical, Ethical and Religious Foundation of Freedom in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard according to the Interpretation of C. Fabro], Epimeleia, vol. 9, nos. 17–18, 2000, pp. 95–111. —— “Sobre el concepto de la ironía en constante referencia a Sócrates” [On The Concept of Irony with Continual Reference to Socrates] (A review), Epimeleia, vol. 9, nos. 17–18, 2000, pp. 213–18. —— “La existencia como libertad en acto. La concepción kierkegaardiana y la exégesis de Cornelio Fabro” [Existence as Actual Freedom. The Kierkegaardian Conception and Cornelio Fabro’s Exegsis], Analogía Filosófica, vol. 15, no. 2, 2001, pp. 77–100. —— “La libertad radical: una tesis kierkegaardiana en la exégesis de Cornelio Fabro” [Radical Fredom: A Kierkegaardian Thesis and Cornelio Fabro’s Exegesis], Logos, vol. 31, no. 91, 2003, pp. 51–74. —— El itinerario de la libertad. Un estudio basado en el Diario de Søren Kierkegaard [The Itinerary of Freedom. A Study Based on the Diary of Søren Kierkegaard], Buenos Aires: CIAFIC Ediciones 2003. —— “El sistema del concepto y el sistema de la existencia: Hegel vs. Kierkegaard” [The System of the Concept and the System of Existence: Hegel vs. Kierkegaard], Analogía, vol. 17, no. 2, 2003, pp. 49–73. Bonifaci, Consuelo Ferrer, Kierkegaard y el amor [Kierkegaard and Love], Barcelona: Herder 1963. Brenda, Julien, Tradición del existencialismo o las filosofías de la vida [The Existential Tradition or the Philosophies of Life], Buenos Aires: Siglo veinte 1958.

Hispanophone South America: Kierkegaard’s Latin American Reception

307

Brun, Miguel Ángel, El concepto de la enseñanza según Sören Kierkegaard [The Concept of Teaching according to Søren Kierkegaard], Ph.D. Thesis, Buenos Aires: ISEDET 1952. Cabrera, Isabel, El lado oscuro de Dios [The Obscure Side of God], Mexico City: Editorial Paidós Mexicana 1998. Capanaga, Victorino, “Kierkegaard y el padre Abraham de Santa Clara” [Kierkegaard and Father Abraham of Santa Clara], Mayeútica, vol. 2, 1976, pp. 61–6. Capriles, Elias, “Utopía y Praxis” [Utopia and Praxis], Latinoamericana, vol. 2, no. 2, 1997, pp. 7–46. Careaga, Virginia, “De lo real a lo posible o de lo posible a lo real” [From the Real to the Possible or from the Possible to the Real], Agora, vol. 8, 1989, pp. 93–105. Carrasco de la Vega, Rubén “Origen del existencialismo: alma y doctrina de Kierkegaard” [The Origin of Existentialism: the Spirit and Doctrine of Kierkegaard], Kollasuyo, vol. 10, no. 68, 1951, pp. 50–61 (La Paz). Cassini de Vásquez, María Cristina, “Kierkegaard, el caballero de la fe” [Kierkegaard, the Knight of Faith], Sapientia, vol. 27, no. 105, 1972 (Facultad de Filosofía, Universidad Católica Argentina, Buenos Aires), pp. 273–84. Castellani, Leonardo, De Kierkegaard a Tomás de Aquino [From Kierkegaard to Thomas Aquinas], Buenos Aires: Guadalupe 1973. Castilla del Pino, Carlos “El concepto de gravedad en Kierkegaard” [The Concept of Seriousness in Kierkegaard], Actas Luso–españolas de Neurología y Psiquiatría, vol. 10, 1950, pp. 33–7. Ciarlo, Héctor Oscar, “La noción de instante y presencia en Kierkegaard” [The Notion of the Moment and Presence in Kierkegaard], Philosophia, no. 24, 1961 (Facultad de Filosofía, Mendoza, Argentina), pp. 34–43. —— Introducción a la filosofía de la existencia [Introduction to the Philosophy of Existence], San Luis (Argentina): Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, Facultad de Ciencias 1963. Cohen, Avner, “¿Qué hay de filosófico en la psico–logía de la filosofía?” [What is the Philosophical in the Psycho-logy of Philosophy?], Teorema, vol. 11, 1981, pp. 95–134. Collado, Jesús Antonio, Kierkegaard y Unamuno, la existencia religiosa [Kierkegaard and Unamuno, The Religious Existence], Madrid: Gredos 1962. —— “Notas de una existencia: Sören Kierkegaard” [Notes of Existence: Søren Kierkegaard], Atlántida, vol. 2, 1964, pp. 198–204. —— La existencia religiosa en Kierkegaard y su influencia en el pensamiento de Unamuno [The Religious Existence in Kierkegaard and His Influence on the Thought of Unamuno], Madrid: Facultad de Filosofía y Letras 1966. Colomer, Eusebi, El pensamiento alemán de Kant a Heidegger [German Thought from Kant to Heidegger], vols. 1–3, Barcelona: Herder 1986–90. Conde, R., “Kierkegaard y el existencialismo” [Kierkegaard and Existentialism], Convivium, vol. 2, 1957, pp. 195–204. Cordua, C., “La filosofía y los puntos de vista” [Philosophy and the Points of View], Atenea. Revista trimestral de ciencias, letras y artes, no. 400, 1963, pp. 12–23.

308

Patricia Carina Dip

Cruells, A., “En torno a un fragmento del Diario de Søren Kierkegaard” [Concerning a Fragment from the Diary of Søren Kierkegaard], Estudios Franciscanos, vol. 80, 1979, pp. 91–100. Cuervo, Oscar “La desobediencia”; “Elogio de Abraham” [Disobedience: Praise of Abraham], Parte de Guerra, vol. 4, no. 14, 2001, pp. 27–28. Curtis, Mário Giordani, “Kierkegaard, pensador religioso” [Kierkegaard, Religious Thinker], Vozes, vol. 56, 1962, pp. 335–49. Derisi, Octavio Nicolás, Tratado de existencialismo y tomismo: reflexiones críticas sobre el existencialismo y los problemas de la existencia humana a la luz del realismo intelectualista de Santo Tomás [Treatise on Existentialism and Thomism: Critical Reflections on Existentialismand the Problems of Human Existence in the Light of Aquinas’ Intellectual Realism], Buenos Aires: Emecé 1956. Dip, Patricia Carina, “Nadie tiene el coraje de decir yo” [No one has the Courage to say “I”], Parte de Guerra, vol. 4, no. 14, 2001, pp. 29–31. —— “La paradoja del juicio de responsabilidad moral en Temor y Temblor” [The Paradox of the Judgment of Moral Responsibility in Fear and Trembling], Revista de Filosofía, vol. 28, no.1, 2003, pp. 171–95 (Madrid). —— “Etica y Sinsentido. Kierkegaard y Wittgenstein” [Ethics and Nonsense. Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein], Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía, no. 24, 2003, pp. 9–29 (Mexico City). Dolby Múgica, María del Carmen, “San Agustín y Kierkegaard: dos filósofos religiosos” [Saint Augustine and Kierkegaard: Two Religious Philosophers], Revista Agustiniana, vol. 36, no. 111, 1995, pp. 791–807. Doncoeur, Paul, “Como (no) se debe leer la Sagrada Escritura según Kierkegaard” [How Holy Scriptures should (not) be read according to Kierkegaard], Cuadernos Monásticos, vol. 20, nos. 73–4, 1985, pp. 219–20. Drudis, Raimundo, “Las traducciones alemanas de Kierkegaard” [The German Translations of Kierkegaard], Arbor, vol. 33, 1956, pp. 266–68. Elizalde, S., “Kierkegaard, mensaje de sinceridad religiosa” [Kierkegaard, Message of Religious Sincerity], Mensaje, no. 8, 1959, pp. 180–4. Erro, Carlos Alberto, “Sobre la influencia intelectual. A propósito de Kierkegaard y Heidegger” [On Intellectual Influence. Concerning Kierkegaard and Heidegger], La Nación (Buenos Aires), 1937, August 15th (included in Diálogo existencial, Buenos Aires 1937). —— “Kierkegaard hablando sobre Dios” [Kierkegaard’s Statements about God], Diálogo existencial, Buenos Aires 1937. —— “Unamuno y Kierkegaard” [Unamuno and Kierkegaard], Sur, vol. 8, no. 49, 1938, pp. 7–21 (Buenos Aires). Estelrich i Artigues, Joan, “El sentiment tràgic de Søren Kierkegaard” [The Tragic Sense of Søren Kierkegaard], La Revista, 1918–19, pp. 4–7; pp. 354–7; pp. 376–8; pp. 392–3; pp. 406–9; pp. 425–8 (Barcelona). —— “Kierkegaard i Unamuno” [Kierkegaard in Unamuno], La Revista, vol. 5, no. 84, 1919, pp. 83–4 (Barcelona). —— “Kierkegaard dins del pensament nòrdic” [Kierkegaard in Nordic Thought], La Revista, vol. 5, no. 84, 1919, pp. 35–8; pp. 48–50; pp. 64–8 (Barcelona).

Hispanophone South America: Kierkegaard’s Latin American Reception

309

—— Entre la vida i els llibres [Between Life and Books], Barcelona: Llibreria Catalonia 1926. —— “Kierkegaard y Unamuno” [Kierkegaard and Unamuno], Gaceta literaria, March 15, 1930 (Madrid). Farré, Luis, “Unamuno, William James y Kierkegaard” [Unamuno, William James and Kierkegaard], La Prensa, July 27th, 1952, pp. 279–99 (Buenos Aires); 2nd part, Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos, nos. 57–8, 1954, pp. 64–88 (Madrid). —— Unamuno, William James y Kierkegaard y otros ensayos [Unamuno, William James and Kierkegaard and Other Essays], Buenos Aires: La Aurora 1967. Fatone, Vicente, La Existencia humana y sus filósofos: Heidegger, Jaspers, Barth, Chestov, Berdiaeff, Zubiri, Marcel, Lavelle, Sartre, Abbagnano [Human Existence and its Philosophers: Heidegger, Jaspers, Barth, Chestov, Berdiaeff, Zubiri, Marcel, Lavelle, Sartre, Abbagnano], Buenos Aires: Raigal 1953. Fernández del Valle, Agustín B., “Pascal y Kierkegaard” [Pascal and Kierkegaard], Revista de Filosofía, vol. 6, 1973, pp. 261–6 (Mexico City). Fernández Pellicer, J.A., Tormentos de un existencialista profundamente cristiano [The Torments of a Profoundly Christian Existentialist], La Habana 1958. Fernández Pinto, Ronald, “La concepción ética de la vida en la filosofía de Kierkegaard” [The Ethical Conception of Life in the Philosophy of Kierkegaard], Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica, vol. 4, 1964, pp. 173–88. Ferreira, V., “Notas sobre Kierkegaard” [Notes on Kierkegaard], Revista Brasileira de Filosofía, vol. 1, no. 4, 1951, pp. 490–4 (Sao Paulo). Frankovitch, Guillermo, “Valery y Kierkegaard” [Valery and Kierkegaard], Filosofía y Letras, vol. 16, no. 31, 1948, pp. 27–84 (Mexico City). Frutos, Eugenio, “La enseñanza de la verdad en Kierkegaard” [Teaching the Truth in Kierkegaard], Revista de Filosofía, vol. 7, 1950, pp. 91–8 (Madrid). Gajardo, C. Fortin, “Kierkegaard y el “yo” angustial” [Kierkegaard and the Anxious “I”], Atenea (ed. by Universidad de Concepción, Chile), no. 167, 1967, pp. 61–75. García Amilburu, María, La existencia en Kierkegaard [Existence in Kierkegaard], Pamplona: EUNSA 1992 (Ph.D. Thesis, Universidad de Navarra 1991). — (ed.), El Concepto de la Angustia, 150 años después [The Concept of Anxiety. 150 Years Later], THÉMATA Revista de Filosofía, no. 15 1995 (Sevilla). García Bacca, Juan David, “Kierkegaard y la filosofía contemporánea española” [Kiekegaard and Contemporary Spanish Philosophy], Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos, vol. 151, 1967, pp. 94–105. García Chicón, Agustín, La autenticidad como sustancia de la verdad: influencia de Kierkegaard en Unamuno [Authenticity as Substance of the Truth. Kierkegaard’s Influence on Unamuno], Málaga: Impr. Montes 1987. García Pavón, Rafael, “La relación de verosimilitud entre la tragedia de Prometeo encadenado de Esquilo y La enferemdad mortal de Kierkegaard” [The Relation of Similarity between the Tragedy of Prometheus Bound by Aeschylus and The Sickness unto Death by Kierkegaard], Intersticios. Filosofía-Arte-Religión, no. 17, 2002, pp. 45–71 (Mexico City). García Vieyra, A., “Ontología de la existencia” [The Ontology of Existence], Sapientia, vol. 2, no. 5, 1947 (Buenos Aires).

310

Patricia Carina Dip

Gelabert, M., “El dogma como seguimiento. Reflexiones en torno a una polémica de Kierkegaard con Lutero” [The Dogma as Path. Reflections on a Polemic between Kierkegaard and Luther], Estudios del Vedat, vol. 11, 1981, pp. 219–38. Ginzo-Fernandez, Arsenio, “Hegel y Sócrates” [Hegel and Socrates], Revista de Filosofía, vol. 37, no. 1, 2001, pp. 7–42 (Venezuela). Gómez Ibañez, Vicente, “De ‘Kierkegaard: Construcción de lo estético’ (1929–1930) a ‘Dialéctica negativa’ (1966). Los orígenes filosóficos de la filosofía de Th. W. Adorno” [From Kierkegaard: The Construction of the Esthetic (1929–1930) to Negative Dialectics (1966). The Philosophical Origins of the Philosophy of Th. W. Adorno], Quaderns de Filosofia i Ciencia, no. 28, 1999, pp. 93–106. Gómez Palliser, P., “Leyendo a Kierkegaard. Apuntes sobre Temor y Temblor” [Reading Kierkegaard. Notes on Fear and Trembling], Taula. Quaderns de Pensament, no. 4, 1984, pp. 45–63. Gonzáles Alvarez, Angel El tema de Dios en la filosofía existencial [The Theme of God in Existential Philosophy], Madrid: Gredos 1945. —— “Kierkegaard y el existencialismo” [Kierkegaard and Existentialism], Cisneros, no. 2, 1946, pp. 29–38 (Madrid). González, Darío D., “La escritura del instante” [The Writing of The Moment], Paradoxa. Literatura/Filosofía (ed. by Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Argentina), vol. 5, nos. 4–5, 1990, pp. 21–9. —— “La repetición y su experiencia” [Repetition and its Experience], Paradoxa. Literatura/Filosofía, (ed. by Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Argentina), vol. 5, nos. 4–5, 1990, pp. 79–84. —— “Kierkegaard, filósofo” [Kierkegaard as Philosopher], Enrahonar. Quaderns de Filosofia (ed. by Departamento de Filosofia da Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona), no. 29, 1998, pp. 103–8. —— “Concordancia mínima de las obras de Søren Kierkegaard en español” [Minimal Concordance of the Works of Søren Kierkegaard in Spanish], Enrahonar. Quaderns de Filosofia (ed. by Departamento de Filosofia da Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona), no. 29, 1998, pp. 175–85. —— “Introducción” a Sobre el concepto de ironía [Introduction to “On the Concept of Irony”], Revista de Occidente, 1999, pp. 72–86. —— “Kierkegaard Hoy” [Kierkegaard Today], Parte de Guerra, vol. 4, no. 15, 2001, pp. 22–6 (Buenos Aires). —— “Kierkegaard y la pregunta por el lenguaje” [Kierkegaard and the Question of Language], in La Ética, aliento de lo eterno. Homenaje al profesor Rafael A. Larrañeta, [Ethics, Breath of the Eternal, Homage to Professor Rafael A. Larrañeta Olleta], ed. by Luis Méndez Francisco, Salamanca and Madrid: Aletheia-Universidad Complutense 2003, pp. 249–58. González Caminero, N., “Miguel de Unamuno, precursor del existencialismo” [Miguel de Unamuno, precursor of Existentialism], Pensamiento, vol. 5, no. 20, 1949. Guillermo, Echegaray-Inda, Debate sobre el yo: Hegel y Kierkegaard [The Debate about the Self: Hegel and Kierkegaard], Ph.D. Thesis, Universidad de Navarra 1993. Guerra, Luis B., “A cien años de la desaparición de S. Kierkegaard” [A Hundred Years after the Death of Søren Kierkegaard], Noticias gráficas, November 10, 1955 (La Plata, Argentina).

Hispanophone South America: Kierkegaard’s Latin American Reception

311

Guerrero, Luis Martínez, “Fe luterana y fe católica en el pensamiento de Kierkegaard” [Lutheran Faith and Catholic Faith in Kierkegaard’s Thought], Scripta Theologica, vol. 23, no. 3, 1991, pp. 983–92 (Navarra). —— “Reflexiones de Kierkegaard sobre la obstinación de la conciencia hermética” [Kierkegaard’s Reflections on the Obstinacy of Hermetic Consciousness], Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía, vol. 2, no. 2, 1992, pp. 113–26 (Mexico City). —— La verdad subjetiva. Søren Kierkegaard como escritor [The Subjective Truth. Søren Kierkegaard as an Author], Mexico City: Universidad Iberoamericana 2004. Gullón, Ricardo, “Imágenes del otro (en torno a Unamuno, Kierkegaard y Dostoievski)” [Images of the Other (Concerning Unamuno, Kierkegaard and Dostoyevsky)], Revista Hispanoamericana Moderna, vol. 31, 1965, pp. 210–21. Gurméndez, C., “La resurrección de Kierkegaard en su propio país” [The Resurrection of Kierkegaard in His own Country], El País, February 12, 1984. Gutiérrez Marín, Claudio, Dios ha hablado: el pensamiento dialéctico de Kierkegaard, Brunner y Barth [God has Spoken: The Dialectical Thought of Kierkegaard, Brunner and Barth], Buenos Aires: La Aurora 1950. Heiss, Robert, “Kierkegaard: el hechizo de la angustia” [Kierkegaard: The Enthrallment of Anxiety], Eco. Revista de la cultura de Occidente, no. 8, 1963, pp. 180–7. Herrera-Guevara, Asunción, “Lo otro del individualismo” [The Other of Individualism], in Studia Philosophica, ed. by Julian Velarde Lombrana, Oviedo: Universidad de Oviedo 2003, pp. 277–84. Igual, Luis V., “Determinación del yo y su desesperación. Nota-Comentario a La enfermedad mortal de Kierkegaard” [The Determination of the Self and Its Despair. A Note of Commentary to The Sickness unto Death by Kierkegaard], Estudios del Vedat, no. 4, 1976, pp. 345–57. Jarauta Marión, Francisco, “Kierkegaard. Los límites de la dialéctica del individuo” [Kierkegaard. The Limits of the Dialectic of the Individual], Cuadernos del Valle 9, Cali, Universidad del Valle, n.d. —— “Søren Kierkegaard, pensador subjetivo religioso” [Søren Kierkegaard, Subjective Religious Thinker], in Logos. Revista de Humanidades, 1973, pp. 25–48. —— “El problema fundamental del Postscriptum de S. Kierkegaard” [The Fundamental Problem of the Postscript by S. Kierkegaard], Stromata, no. 31, 1975, pp. 299–311. —— “Kierkegaard frente a Hegel” [Kierkegaard vis–à–vis Hegel], Pensamiento, no. 31, 1975, pp. 387–406. —— “Nota sobre la recepción de Schelling por Kierkegaard” [Note on Kierkegaard’s Reception of Schelling], Filosofía, Sociedad e Incomunicación, ed. by Universidad de Murcia, Murcia 1983, pp. 175–83. Leocata, Francisco, “Pasión e instinto en B. Pascal” [Passion and Instinct in B. Pascal], Sapientia, no. 39, 1984, pp. 37–62. López Ibor, J.J., “Angustia, existencia, vitalidad” [Anxiety, Existence, Vitality], Revista de la Universidad de Buenos Aires, July–September, 1948. López Quintás, Alfonso, “Confrontación de la figura del hombre ‘burlador’ (Tirso), el ‘estético’ (Kierkegaard), el ‘absurdo’ (Camus)” [Comparison of the Figure of

312

Patricia Carina Dip

the ‘Mocker’ (Tirso), the ‘esthete’ (Kierkegaard), the ‘absurd man’ (Camus)], Estudios, vol. 37, nos. 132–5, 1981, pp. 337–80. Maia Neto, José R., “Dúvida antiga e dúvida moderna segundo Kierkegaard” [Ancient and Modern Doubt in Kierkegaard], Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía, vol. 17, no. 2, 1991, pp. 243–57. Mangariello de Platero, Dalila “El hombre estético de Kierkegaard” [Kierkegaard’s Esthetic Man], Revista de Educación, new series, vol. 3, no. 1, 1958, pp. 193–7 (La Plata). Martínez-Posada, Jorge Eliecer, “La angustia en la posibilidad de realización del individuo según Søren Kierkegaard” [Anxiety in the Possibility of the Realization of the Individual according to Søren Kierkegaard], Franciscanum, vol. 40, no. 118, 1998, pp. 9–60. Massuh, Víctor, “Dos libros sobre Kierkegaard” [Two Books about Søren Kierkegaard], Notas y Estudios de Filosofía, vol. 4, no. 15, 1953, pp. 255–9 (Tucumán, Argentina). Melendo, Tomás, “El Ayer y el Hoy de la Prudencia” [The Yesterday and the Today of Prudence], Revista de Filosofía, vol. 8, 1985, pp. 371–90. Mora Calvo, Hernán R., “Kierkegaard: su dialéctica cualitativa. Breves aproximaciones” [Kierkegaard: His Qualitative Dialectic. Short Approximations], Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica, vol. 36, no. 90, 1998, pp. 581–9. Mounier, Emmanuel, Introducción a los existencialismos [Introduction to the Existentialisms], Madrid: Ed. Revista de Occidente 1949. Munich, Susana, Kierkegaard y la muerte del padre humano y divino [Kierkegaard and the Death of the Human and Divine Father], Santiago de Chile: Ed. Universitaria 1986. Muñoz, Arias, “Las bases ontológicas del conflicto intersubjetivo en J.P. Sartre” [The Ontological Basis of the Intersubjective Conflict in J.P. Sartre], Anales del Seminario de Metafisica, vol. 15, 1980, pp.11–54. Nicol, E., Historicismo y existencialismo [Historicism and Existentialism], Mexico City: FCE 1950. Nogueras, Luis Rogelio, Andersen y Kierkegaard: La luz y la sombra [Andersen and Kierkegaard: The Light and the Shadow], La Habana: Extramuros 1991. Ocaña García, Marcelino, “Sujeto y Subjetividad en S. Kierkegaard” [Subject and Subjectivity in S. Kierkegaard], in Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía, vol. 5, 1985, pp. 59–80. Okolova, Marina, “Algunos elementos hermenéuticos en el pensamiento de S. Kierkegaard y F. M. Dostoievsky” [Some Hermeneutic Elements in the Thought of S. Kierkegaard and F. M. Dostoyevsky], Analogía Filosófica, vol. 12, no. 2, 1998, pp. 197–219. Oroz Ezcurra, Javier, “Pasión y verdad en Kierkegaard” [Passion and Truth in Kierkegaard], Letras de Deusto, vol. 27, no. 75, 1997, pp. 207–20. Padilla, Tarcisio M. “Kierkegaard y la philosophie de l’esprit,” [Kierkegaard and the philosophie de l’esprit], Estudios, no. 20, 1964, pp. 367–96 (Madrid).

Hispanophone South America: Kierkegaard’s Latin American Reception

313

Padilla Caina, Euclides, “Libertad estética de Don Juan el seductor en Kierkegaard” [The Esthetic Freedom of Don Juan the Seducer in Kerkegaard], Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad de Costa Rica, vol. 16, no. 44, 1978, pp. 193–202. Pareyson, Luigi, El Existencialismo, espejo de la conciencia contemporánea [Existentialism, Mirror of the Contemporary Consciousness], Buenos Aires: Universidad de Buenos Aires, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras 1949. Pegueroles, Joan, “Tres notas sobre Gadamer y una reseña” [Three Notes on Gadamer and a Review], Espiritu, vol. 48, no. 120, 1999, pp. 189–97. —— “El concepto de verdad en el “Postscriptum” de Kierkegaard” [The Concept of Truth in Kierkegaard’s Postscript], Espiritu, vol. 48, no. 120, 1999, pp. 199–204. —— “La libertad y el bien, la libertad y la verdad en “El concepto de la angustia” de Kierkegaard” [Freedom and the Good, Freedom and Truth in Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety], Espiritu, vol. 49, no. 121, 2000, pp. 77–83. —— “El texto y su glosa” [The Text and Its Gloss], Espiritu, vol. 49, no. 121, 2000, pp. 233–4. —— “El instante y el tiempo, el instante y la repetición en el pensamiento de Kierkegaard” [The Moment and Time, the Moment and Repetition in Kierkegaard’s Thought], Espiritu, vol. 49, no. 122, pp. 197–202. —— “Amor, sufrimiento y alegría: Dios en el “Diario” de Kierkegaard” [Love, Suffering and Happiness: God in Kierkegaard’s Diary], Pensamiento, vol. 56, no. 216, 2000, pp. 477–89. —— “La verdad del sujeto de la existencia en el Postscriptum de Kierkegaard” [The Truth of the Subject of Existence n Kierkegaard’s Postscript], Espiritu, vol. 50, no. 123, 2001, pp. 49–58. —— “La insoportable grandeza del hombre en el cristianismo, según Kierkegaard. Algunos textos del Diario” [The Unbearable Greatness of Man in Christianity according to Kierkegaard. Some Texts from the Diary], Espiritu, vol. 51, no. 125, 2002, pp. 5–9. —— “El texto y su glosa, Kierkegaard, Dos maneras de entender” [The Text and its Gloss, Kierkegaard, Two Ways of Understanding], Espiritu, vol. 51, no. 126, 2002, pp. 271–2. —— “La verdad objetiva y la verdad subjetiva en el Postscriptum de Kierkegaard” [The Objective Truth and the Subjective Truth in Kierkegaard’s Postscript], Espiritu, vol. 51, no. 126, 2002, pp. 273–6. Pérez Alvarez, Eliseo, La Pertinencia de Kierkegaard para el Cristianismo Latinoamericano, [Kierkegaard’s Relevance for Latin American Christianity], Th.M. in Theology Thesis, Columbia Theological Seminary, Atlanta Georgia 1991. Perez Marchand, M.L., “Sören Kierkegaard, 1813–1855,” Asomante, no. 12, 1956, pp. 6–36. Petroccione, Alfredo, “La Vida estética en el pensamiento de Kierkegaard” [Aesthetic Life in Kierkegaard’s Thought], in Symposium sobre existencialismo. 4, Rosario: Universidad Nacional del Litoral, Intituto de Filosofia 1950, pp. 84–106. Plazaola, Juan, “Estética y religión en Kierkegaard,” [Aesthetics and Religion in Kierkegaard], Estudios, no. 32, 1974, pp. 301–19 (Madrid). Pucciarelli, Eugenio, “La metafísica en la situación actual” [Metaphysics in the Current Situation], Cuadernos de Filosofía, vol. 8, 1968, pp. 7–20.

314

Patricia Carina Dip

Quintas, Alfonso Lopez, “El problema de la enseñanza de la Filosofía” [The Problem of Teaching Philosophy], Humanitas, vol. 21, 1980, pp. 155–78. Rebok, María Gabriela, “La transformación de la filosofía y la problemática de la identidad” [The Transformation of Philosophy and the Problem of Identity], Escritos de Filosofía, vol. 15, nos. 29–30, 1996, pp. 157–70. Rendon Rojas, Miguel Angel, “La Estética del Romanticismo y su Análisis dentro de la Filosofía Existencial (Kierkegaard y Dostoievsky)” [The Aesthetics of Romanticism and its Analysis in Existential Philosophy (Kierkegaard and Dostoyevsky)], Analogía Filosófica, vol. 8, no. 2, 1994, pp. 139–57. Riezu, J., “Kierkegaard y la ética de situación” [Kierkegaard and the Ethics of the Situation], Estudios Filosóficos, vol. 13, 1962, pp. 219–52. Rigol, Montserrat Negre, “Fundamentación ontológica del sujeto en Kierkegaard” [The Ontological Foundation of the Subject in Kierkegaard], Anuario Filosófico, vol. 21, no. 1, 1988, pp. 51–72. Ríos, Roberto E., “Kierkegaard y el predicador” [Kierkegaard and the Preacher], Cuadernos Teológicos, vol. 4, no. 15, 1955, pp. 11–16. Rivero Astengo, Agustín, Sören Kierkegaard: el buscador de Dios. Ensayo histórico– filosófico [Søren Kierkegaard: the Seeker of God. An Essay in the History of Philosophy], Buenos Aires: Emecé 1949. Roberts, Gemma, “Un modo de la existencia religiosa en (Unamuno’s) ‘Paz en la guerra.’ Una coincidencia con Kierkegaard” [A Form of Religious Existence in (Unamuno’s) Peace in the War. A Point of Similarity with Kierkegaard], Journal of Spanish Studies: Twentieth Century, vol. 7, 1979, pp. 329–36. —— Unamuno: Coincidencias y Afinidades Kierkegaardianas [Unamuno: Similarities and Affinities with Kierkegaard], Boulder, Colorado: Society of Spanish and Spanish–American Studies 1986. Rodríguez Fouz, Marta, “La historia intempestiva”: el asalto íntimo a la conciencia religiosa en Soren Kierkegaard” [The Untimely Story: The Intimate Assault on the Religious Consciousness in Søren Kierkegaard], Anámnesis, vol. 10, no. 20, 2000, pp. 83–107. Rodriguez Rosado, Juan José, “Teodicea y Nihilismo” [Theodicy and Nihilism], Anuario Filosófico, vol. 6, 1973, pp. 241–57. —— La aventura de existir [The Adventure of Existing], Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra 1976. Rof Carballo, J., “El problema del seductor en Kierkegaard, Proust y Rilke” [The Problem of the Seducer in Kierkegaard, Proust and Rilke], Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos, vol. 35, 1958, pp. 5–30. Romanenghi de Powell, Elsie, “Kierkegaard el hombre” [Kierkegaard the Man], Compromiso cristiano, vol. 36, 1987. Romera Onate, Luis, “Existencia y Metafísica: en recuerdo de Cornelio Fabro” [Existence and Metaphysics: A Recollection of Cornelio Fabro], Espiritu, vol. 48, no. 119, 1999, pp. 5–30. Ruiz, Roberto, “La mujer de ambar y las tres etapas de Kierkegaard” [The Woman of Amber and Kierkegaard’s Three Stages], Tenth Louisiana Conference on Hispanic Language, New Orleans: Tulane University 1989.

Hispanophone South America: Kierkegaard’s Latin American Reception

315

Sabanes, Julio Rubén, “El lugar de Kierkegaard en la filosofía” [Kierkegaard’s Place in Philosophy], Cuadernos Teológicos, vol. 5, no.17, 1956, pp. 17–25. Salmerón-Jiménez, María Angélica, “Palabra y el Hombre” [The Word and the Man], Revista de la Universidad Veracruzana, vol. 106, April–June, 1998, pp. 105–20. San Miguel, José R., “En torno a Kierkegaard: posibilidad y sentido de una teología en el existencialismo” [Concerning Kierkegaard: The Possibility and Meaning of a Theology in Existentialism], Crisis, no. 4, 1957, pp. 195–204. Schnaith, Nelly, “La identidad literaria, sobre el yo del autor y la autoría del yo” [The Literary Identity of the “I” of the Author and the Auhorship of the “I”], Quimera, vol. 26, no. 12, 1982, pp. 80–4. Siebers, Bernardo, “S. Kierkegaard y el existencialismo” [S. Kierkegaard and Existentialism], Archivos de la Sociedad peruana de Filosofía, vol. 3, 1950, pp. 9–20. Sols Lucia, José, “Filosofía y teología de Gastón Fessard acerca de la actualidad histórica en el período 1936–46” [The Philosophy and Theology of Gastón Fessard. Concerning the Historical Events in the Period 1936–46], Pensamiento, vol. 53, 1997, pp. 65–88. Sotiello, Gabriel de, “Cristianismo y mundanidad. Algunos aspectos del pensamiento religioso de Kierkegaard” [Christianity and Worldliness. Some Aspects of Kierkegaard’s Religious Thought], Naturaleza y Gracia, no. 3, 1956, pp. 93–118 (Salamanca). Tornos, A.M., “Sobre Unamuno y Kierkegaard” [On Unamuno and Kierkegaard], Pensamiento, vol. 18, 1962, pp. 131–46. Torres, J.V.M., “Tiempo existencialista en Sören Kierkegaard” [Existential Time in Søren Kierkegaard], Boletín de la Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, vol. 14, 1950, pp. 163–87 (Córdoba, Argentina). Torres, S.V.M., Sören Kierkegaard, Madrid: Edit. S.G.E. de Librerías 1917. Urbina, Pedro Antoni, Søren Kierkegaard: El seductor [Søren Kierkegaard: The Seducer], Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla 1975. Urdanibia, Javier (ed.) Los Antihegelianos: Kierkegaard y Schopenhauer [The AntiHegelians: Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer], Barcelona: Anthropos 1990. Uribe, Héctor González, “Tres modelos de interioridad en la Filosofía Contemporánea: Kierkegaard, Marcel y Peter Wust” [Three Models of Interiority in Contemporary Philosophy: Kierkegaard, Marcel and Peter Wust], Revista de Filosofía, vol. 20, 1987, pp. 91–104 (Mexico City). Urmeneta F. de, “Glosas al centenario de Kierkegaard” [Glosses on the Hundred Year Anniversary of Kierkegaard], Las Ciencias, vol. 1956, pp. 273–77 (Madrid). —— “Sobre la estética kierkegaardiana” [On Kierkegaard’s Aesthetics], Revista de Ideas Estéticas, vol. 30, 1972, pp. 233–6. Valadez Leticia (ed.), Revista de Filosofía (ed. by Mexico City: Universidad Panamericana), vol. 3, no. 5, 1993 (special issue dedicated to Kierkegaard). Valle, Agustín del, “Pascal y Kierkegaard” [Pascal and Kierkegaard], Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía, vol. 6, 1973, pp. 261–6 (Mexico City). Vallejos, Raúl, “Sobre Kierkegaard y el existencialismo” [On Kierkegaard and Existentialism], Universidad, no. 83, 1975, pp. 13–22 (Universidad Nacional del Litoral, Santa Fe, Argentina). Vasseur, Alvaro Armando, Soren Kierkegaard, Madrid: Editorial América 1918.

316

Patricia Carina Dip

Vidella, J., De Kierkegaard a Sartre. El existencialismo [From Kierkegaard to Sartre. Existentialism], Barcelona: Bruguera 1963. Virasoro, Miguel Angel, La libertad, la existencia y el ser [Freedom, Existence and Being], Buenos Aires, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Instituto de Filosofía 1942. —— “Un espión al servicio de Dios: Kierkegaard” [A Spy in the Service of God], Ciencia y Fe, vol. 13, 1957, pp. 509–15. —— “Desesperación y rebeldía en la conciencia contemporánea; Kierkegaard, Rimbaud, Nietzsche, Lautréamont” [Despair and Rebellion in Contemporary Consciousness; Kierkegaard, Rimbaud, Nietzsche, Lautrémont], Bahía Blanca, 1959 (Argentina, Universidad Nacional del Sur, Extensión Cultural). —— “Etica general y ética religiosa en Kierkegaard y Hegel” [General Ethics and Religious Ethics in Kierkegaard and Hegel], Revista de Humanidades, vol. 3, no. 6, 1963, pp. 80–113 (Córdoba, Argentina). Virasoro, Mónica, De ironías y silencios. Notas para una filosofía impresionista, [On Ironies and Silences. Notes towards an Impressionist Philosophy], Barcelona: Editorial Gedisa S.A. 1997. Yutzis, Mario, Revelación y razón en el pensamiento de Sören Kierkegaard [Revelation and Reason in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard], Ph.D. Thesis, Buenos Aires: FLT 1962. Zanovello, Nevio, “Cristiandad y Cristianismo en Kierkegaard” [Christendom and Christianity in Kierkegaard], Religión y Cultura, vol. 22, 1976, pp. 113–41. —— “El subjetivismo ético-religioso de S. Kierkegaard” [The Ethical-Religious Subjectivism of S. Kierkegaard], Religión y Cultura, vol. 25, 1979, pp. 463–76. III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Reception in Spanish Speaking South America91 Bacca, Juan David García, “Kierkegaard y la filosofía contemporánea española [Kierkegaard and Contemporary Spanish Philosophy], Quadernos Americanos, no. 151, 1967, pp. 94–105. Barrio, Jaime Franco, “Notas y Comentarios. Kierkegaard en Español” [Notes and Comments. Kierkegaard in Spanish], Azafea, vol. 2, 1989, pp. 211–34. Estelrich i Artigues, Joan, “Bibliografia de S. Kierkegaard” [S. Kierkegaard Bibliography], La Revista, vol. 5, no. 84, 1919, pp. 106–8 (Barcelona). —— “Kierkegaard en España” [Kierkegaard in Spain], Destino, vol. 9, August 1947. González, Darío D., “Concordancia mínima de las obras de Søren Kierkegaard traducidas al español” [Minimal Concordance of the Works of Søren Kierkegaard Translated into Spanish], Enrahonar. Quaderns de Filosofia (ed. by Departamento de Filosofia da Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona), no. 29, 1998, pp. 175–85. The following articles, except Himmelstrup’s International Bibliografi, are concerned with the reception of Kierkegaard’s works either in Spain and Italy, or in Brazil and Mexico but none of them is specifically devoted to Kierkegaard’s reception in South America. 91

Hispanophone South America: Kierkegaard’s Latin American Reception

317

—— “Sur quelques moments de la réception de Frygt og Bæven et Gjentagelsen en espagnol,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 2002, pp. 353–63. Larrañeta, Rafael, “Recepción y actualidad de Kierkegaard en España” [The Reception and Topicality of Kierkegaard in Spain], Estudios Filosóficos, vol. 105, 1988, pp. 317–46. —— “Novedades kierkegaardianas en España” [Kierkegaard News in Spain], Estudios Filosóficos, vol. 49, 2000, pp. 329–32. Tajafuerce, Begonya Sàez, “Recent Spanish and Italian Literature on Works of Love,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 1998, pp. 199–212. Valls, Alvaro L.M., “The Concept of Anxiety in Spanish and Portuguese,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 2001, pp. 335–40.

C\ Taylor & Francis ~Taylor & Francis Group

http:/ / taylora ndfra ncis.com

Brazil: Forty Years Later Alvaro Luiz Montenegro Valls

Forty years ago the journal Kierkegaardiana published two pages by Ernani C. Reichmann (1920-84) entitled “Kierkegaard in Brazil.” This statement still deserves attention because its account was accurate. Thus the topic that will be developed here is as follows: what has changed in the last decades in the reception of Søren Kierkegaard’s work and thinking in Brazil? This has to be said, so let us say it right away: the best thing that happened in this area in Brazil is linked to the name of Ernani Reichmann. He was born in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, graduated from law school, became a professor of economy, loved literature, admired Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and Wagner. He was an original man, an atopotatos, who was characterized as one more Kierkegaard redivivus and compared to the French translator Paul-Henri Tisseau and Gregor Malantschuk by Henri-Bernard Vergote (1931–96) when they met in Curitiba, in the south of Brazil. Reichmann was able to read German, English, French, Spanish, and Portuguese. In the following passage he introduces himself: About myself, having read The Human Despair, and, soon afterward, The Concept of Anguish, I went to K. preoccupied with my own problems. I wrote some essays, which aren’t an original contribution, but they work to divulgate K.’s thought and life in Brazil. Later (1959), I could make a trip to Denmark, having learned the Danish language to read K. and his interpreters, in the original.

Leaving his daughters (Isolda and Brunilda) in Brazil, he spent one year with his wife in Copenhagen, where he established a close relationship with Malantschuk, Niels Thulstrup, and others. Later he used to say that the most quiet place in Copenhagen, an ideal place to discuss philosophy (with Malantschuk, some whose texts he translated into Portuguese), was in Tivoli in the morning. With much humor and irony, he seems to have played several tricks on the Kierkegaard scholars whom he met there. Before Reichmann, Kierkegaard was only vaguely known in Brazil by those who were familiar with German philosophy or theology and by those who were Ernani Reichmann, “Kierkegaard in Brazil,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 5, 1964, pp. 78–9. Ibid., p. 79.  In the nineteenth century, Brazil missed a golden opportunity, as Dr. Peter Wilhelm Lund (1801–80) lived in the state of Minas Gerais for several decades (and a famous letter written by Søren Kierkegaard in 1835 was addressed to him, see SKS 17, 18–30, AA:12). But  

320

Alvaro Luiz Montenegro Valls

interested in French existentialism. This was a second-hand knowledge, usually very unfaithful to Kierkegaard, with one honorable exception, Alceu de Amoroso Lima (1893–1983), a great Catholic intellectual leader, who “ex officio” combated Sartre’s existentialism but was also able, as early as in 1941, to distinguish and appreciate other positions which reflected on existence. Although the articles published in 1956 by the journal Revista Brasileira de Filosofia (the organ of the Brazilian Philosophical Society, which was not hegemonic in Brazil) to commemorate the centennial of Kierkegaard’s death were prefaced by a great jurist, Miguel Reale (1910–2006), they show only prejudices, lack of information and lack of understanding of Kierkegaard’s intentions. To give an idea of the level of these “interpretations,” suffice it to say that one of the articles explains anguish and despair on the basis of the absence of the confessional among Lutherans. But what could be known before Reichmann about this Danish philosopher who only wrote in his mother tongue? Those who could read him only in Portuguese had the following options: “The Seducer’s Diary” had been translated in 1911 in Lisbon. In the 1930s, the Portuguese poet Adolfo Casais Monteiro (1908–72) translated The Sickness unto Death under the unfortunate title of Human Despair. A short time later passable translations of The Concept of Anxiety and Fear and Trembling were published. The latter is the most readable one (and perhaps the most read one) in Portuguese, although the translator (working on the basis of the French edition) makes Abraham consider sending a message to Isaac (a misinterpretation occasioned by the French word, mensonge). Casais Monteiro, in his turn, besides translating Selv by the trivial “I,” makes a mistake at the very beginning: the formula of despair without awareness, which for Anti-Climacus represents uegentlige Fortvivlelse, is reproduced as “true despair.” Other translators would later repeat this mistake. Thus, having been led to the heart of Kierkegaard’s work by the impact of reading The Sickness unto Death, Reichmann represents a turning point in Brazil. He read Kierkegaard in several languages, went to Denmark in 1959, and delivered several lectures in southern Brazil to disseminate Kierkegaard’s thinking on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the philosopher’s birth. He read Kierkegaard with irony and imagined, as he walked through the streets of Copenhagen, that Søren would appear to him in order to tell him that the important thing to him, Reichmann, was not the apartments where Kierkegaard had lived, but the interior reality of Reichmann himself (De te narratur fabula). Therefore, besides disseminating Kierkegaard’s life and work in an agreeable and humorous prose, Reichmann persistently devoted himself to “his own experience,” to his personal problems. As a consequence, he wrote more than twenty Dr. Lund, as he is affectionately known in Brazil, never talked about his distant relative, the brother of his two sisters-in-law. He actually lived “lost to the world, excavating antediluvian fossils,” (SKS 23, 380, NB19:77 / JP 6, 6652) while Kierkegaard disinterred the concepts of Christianity in Denmark.  O diário do sedutor. Arte de amar [“The Seducer’s Diary”], trans. by Mario Alemquer, Lisbon: Livraria Clássica Editora (Teixeira) 1911.  O desespero humano, trans. by Adolfo Casais Monteiro, Porto: Tavares Martins 1936 (frequently reprinted).  O conceito de angústia, trans. by João Lopes Alves, Lisbon: Presença 1962 (2nd ed., 1972); Temor e tremor, trans. by Maria José Marinho, Lisbon: Guimarães Editores 1959 (3rd ed., 1998).

Brazil: Forty Years Later

321

volumes in which he is in dialogue with Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and living philosophers as well as some characters whom he invented himself to help him in “his experience.” However, if this were already enough to make Reichmann important from a Kierkegaardian point of view, it still would not be sufficient to ensure him an outstanding place in the research on Kierkegaard’s work and thinking in Brazil. Then, accepting the appeal of his friend and inspirer, the writer Octávio de Faria (1908–80), Reichmann translated and collected in more than 400 large pages his Selected Texts of Søren Kierkegaard, which was published in two editions, at the beginning and the end of the 1970s, and is presently out of print. This work is for the time being the most important contribution to the subject and deserves a new edition. Some corrections would be necessary because the magnitude of the task and the adverse conditions in Brazil led the translator to rely perhaps too heavily on French translations. Thus, a revision on the basis of the original language is imperative. But the revision should not substantially alter the work, because in it Reichmann gave his version of the complete work, with more than fifty pages from the Papirer, many from the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Either/Or, Fear and Trembling, The Concept of Anxiety, Philosophical Fragments, Stages on Life’s Way and, of course, The Sickness unto Death. An important innovation for Brazilian readers is the fact that the Selected Texts contain a translation of many pages from Practice in Christianity and Works of Love in addition to long passages featuring Kierkegaard’s polemics with the Danish church taken from The Moment. The main omission of this selection is the complete absence of the edifying discourses and the dissertation on irony. (Perhaps for this reason, when Vergote met Reichmann—after both had worked parallel to each other for 40 years without knowing of each other’s existence—the two of them allied themselves to entrust the author of this article with translating The Concept of Irony.) That was the situation that prevailed until the end of the 1970s. Other translations of Fear and Trembling, The Concept of Anxiety, and The Sickness unto Death published in Portuguese did not change the previous picture. A very popular and successful series of philosophical writings entitled “Great Thinkers” [Os Pensadores] republished the three best-known texts: “The Diary of a Seducer,” Fear and Trembling, and The Sickness unto Death.10 The first edition of the series “Great Ernani C. Reichmann, Escritos Completos, Curitiba: Impr. Universitaria 1947–84. A new complete edition will be published soon.  Textos selecionados de Soeren Kierkegaard, trans. and ed. by Ernani C. Reichmann, Curitiba: Editora da Universidade Federal do Paraná 1972 (2nd ed., Curitiba: Universidade Federal do Paraná 1978). A curious and significant detail: the typewritten manuscripts were lost in the publishing house, and Reichmann had to “repeat” the work da capo.  When Henri-Bernard Vergote was in Curitiba in 1983, Reichmann had already read the two volumes of Sens et Répétition, Essai sur l’ironie kierkegaardienne, published in the previous year in Paris, with immense enthusiasm. During a torrential rain he declared that if there were another Flood he would try to save at least two out of the more than 10,000 books from his library: Malantschuk’s Dialektik og Existenz hos Søren Kierkegaard and Vergote’s monumental work, O Conceito de Ironia [The Concept of Irony], which was published in Brazil in 1991. 10 Kierkegaard (selected passages from “The Seducer’s Diary,” Fear and Trembling and The Sickness unto Death), trans. by Carlos Grifo and Maria José Marinho e Adolfo Casais Monteiro, 2nd ed., São Paulo: Abril Cultural 1979. 

322

Alvaro Luiz Montenegro Valls

Thinkers” contained an Introduction by Marilena Chauí, professor at the University of São Paulo; this was a hardcover book but had an affordable price. It brought together Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer in the same volume! In subsequent editions, each author received a separate volume and the price remained affordable, but the critical quality of the texts was not improved. Perhaps at that time a deeper reading of Kierkegaard took place only in traditional schools of Protestant—i.e., Lutheran or Presbyterian—theology, whose libraries had sets of Kierkegaard’s works in German or English. For several reasons, however, the religious context in Brazil was not favorable for such studies. On the one hand, Catholicism was the traditional hegemonic religion (and Kierkegaard was regarded with suspicion by the Vatican). On the other hand, the new evangelical, charismatic, Pentecostal denominations that have been successful in Brazil never had any interest in recommending any reading (of Kierkegaard or any other serious thinker) to their members. Finally, some traditional evangelical denominations have not yet forgiven Kierkegaard for the catastrophe he provoked in the middle of the nineteenth century, although reflecting Christians realize that the situation of Christendom has been replaced by a situation of the “Diaspora,” according to the good diagnosis made by the polemist of Copenhagen, who in his time ironically advised people to read Feuerbach and Schopenhauer instead of recommending Hans Lassen Martensen’s treatises. From Portugal came another translation of some importance: the publishing house Edições 70 published The Point of View, translated from Tisseau’s French edition, and as an appendix, which was almost perfectly hidden, “Two Ethical-Religious Essays” and “Notes on the Individual.”11 Notwithstanding the acknowledgment that The Point of View is one of the possible (self-)interpretations of Kierkegaard’s work, there can be no doubt that it is a fundamental text which challenges the stereotyped, “existentialist” interpretations of the “father of existentialism” or of the “madman who fights his friends and even the church.” Finally, a small volume of Prayers12 published in Brazil certainly fosters admiration for the religious author, but the limited dissemination of this volume as well as of another, older one containing excerpts from the “diaries”13 has not succeeded in making Kierkegaard a better known author. This collection of translations—incomplete, indirect and without apparatus criticus—still does not meet the demands of academic study or of interdisciplinary discussions. For example, what is indirectly said about “sin” in The Concept of Anxiety is not helpful in a discussion with theologians, and what one can understand about the concept of “anxiety” does not satisfy the Freudian or Lacanian psychoanalysts who might be interested in these texts. The same applies for the concept of “repetition” and similar ones, such as “the moment” and the “ethical.” Also the Brazilian readers of Heidegger do not feel motivated or prepared to discover the roots of the Black Forest Ponto de vista explicativo de minha obra como escritor [The Point of View for My Work as an Author] (includes also Two Ethical-Religious Essays and the “The Single Individual”), from French trans. by João Gama, Lisbon: Edições 70 1986. 12 Das profundezas: preces [Out of the Depths: Prayers], trans. and ed. by João Francisco Régis de Morais, São Paulo: Paulinas 1990. 13 Diário de Kierkegaard, 1834 [Kierkegaard’s Journals from 1834], trans. by O. Hecke, E. Reichmann and J. Bomskow, Curitiba 1955. 11

Brazil: Forty Years Later

323

thinker in the work of the Danish philosopher, just as the Wittgenstein scholars do not have the means or resources that would enable them to discover the marks of the reading proposed by the Viennese logician (and ethicist or “mystic”). Our readers of Schopenhauer or Nietzsche completely ignore the readings done by Kierkegaard in the 1850s, and our present Lévinas scholars are not able to find parallels in the texts of Kierkegaard that are available. In this sense, the title of an article published in the feuilleton of the Folha de S. Paulo newspaper in 1983—which immediately attracted the attention of Vergote, who at that time was giving an intensive course in Rio de Janeiro—is still valid: “And Kierkegaard was not read.”14 All Brazilian universities were created in the course of the twentieth century, and in the past decades an enormous effort has been made in Brazil to implement graduate studies programs with master’s and doctoral degrees, including some programs in philosophy and theology of excellent quality. Many professors have had the opportunity to earn their Ph.D. in Europe or North America. Those who studied abroad acquired a reading ability that may be more critical and reasonably free from the traditional prejudices. Kierkegaard began to be understood through the work that he actually wrote and, as far as possible, to be read in the original language. Alvaro Valls, from Southern Brazil, went to Heidelberg to study philosophy and to learn about Kierkegaard with Professors Michael Theunissen, Helmuth Fahrenbach, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and together with Wilfried Greve and Günter Figal. His doctoral dissertation, which was completed in 1981, dealt with the concept of history in Kierkegaard’s writings. Ricardo Quadros Gouvêa, a Presbyterian from São Paulo, focused mainly on Fear and Trembling, finishing his doctorate in theology in 1998 at the Westminster Theological Seminary in the USA. Gouvêa frequented the Kierkegaard Library of St. Olaf College and the house of the Hong couple and became probably our greatest expert in works such as Fear and Trembling and Repetition as well as in the current vast secondary literature in English. Jorge Miranda, from Rio de Janeiro, went to Rome to earn his Ph.D. at the Gregorian University after having studied Kierkegaard with the Jesuit, Henri de Ternay. Cleide Scarlatelli, a Catholic from Minas Gerais, studied “Theology as a Work of Love” with the Lutherans in São Leopoldo, where she did her doctorate at the Ecumenical Institute of the Lutheran School of Theology. In April 2002 Sílvia Saviano Sampaio, a professor of the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo, defended, at the prestigious University of São Paulo, the first doctoral dissertation in philosophy about Kierkegaard in Brazil, entitled The Existential Subjectivity in Kierkegaard. Her adviser, Maria Lúcia Cacciola, is known as a great expert on Schopenhauer. Incidentally, this kind of “ecumenism” also occurred when Oswaldo Giacóia Jr., who teaches philosophy at the University of Campinas (UNICAMP) and is one of the leading Brazilian researchers on Nietzsche, acted as adviser of the doctoral dissertation of Márcio Gimenes de Paula on ecclesiological themes in Kierkegaard’s work, after having been his adviser for his master’s thesis on Socratism and Christianity. (As a reward—or vengeance—Alvaro Valls dares to be the adviser of master’s dissertations on Nietzsche, probably in order to see Alvaro Valls, “E não se leu Kierkegaard,” Folha de S. Paulo, no. 327, April 24, 1983, pp. 8–9.

14

324

Alvaro Luiz Montenegro Valls

everything summed up in a “higher madness.”) Thus in Brazil Kierkegaard has been a factor of ecumenism, creating proximity even between students and professors of universities who vigorously fought each other only a few decades ago. Two typical elements stand out. (1) The lack of academic resources forces scholars to invent non-conventional formulas of study, research, and thesis supervision. Valls and Gouvêa have been invited to participate in boards of examiners of dissertations and have formally or informally cooperated as advisors for several of them. Students spread all over Brazil at universities that do not have professors with expertise on Kierkegaard or libraries that do not have the complete works of Kierkegaard (in the translations of Hirsch, Hong, or Tisseau), are consigned to resort, even through the web, to the advice of scholars in whom they recognize some authority or competence. For her beautiful master’s dissertation on the aesthetic figures of the first volume of Either/Or, Guiomar de Grammont managed to have the Federal University of Minas Gerais accredit Alvaro Valls as her adviser, thus successfully overcoming a distance of two thousand kilometers. (2) Some dozens of scholars who have in one way or another discovered and come close to each other—and keep in touch through the Internet—founded a half-virtual, half-real society without official by-laws and established officers; yet they have already managed to get together for several years in a row and meet at philosophical congresses and the like. In this way an entity called SOBRESKI emerged. This acronym, which sounds like the family name of some Polish count or might awaken Nordic remembrances if it were read as “on-ski,” stands for the “Brazilian Society of Studies on Kierkegaard.”15 Up to now, on dates close to May 5th and November 11th, Brazilians have also had access to several issues of a bulletin that defines itself as “ironically correct” and has a deeply Brazilian name, SEVERINO.16 After Ricardo Gouvêa, Alvaro Valls, and Cleide Scarlatelli, other Brazilian students of Kierkegaard are beginning to discover the Kierkegaard Library in Northfield, Minnesota. They were followed by Márcio Gimenes de Paula and Jonas Roos, and others will follow them in the near future. These young scholars want to learn Kierkegaard’s mother tongue and read him preferably in the new critical edition, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter. Names such as Bruce Kirmmse, David Gouwens, and Merold Westphal are already references for them in their study of Kierkegaard’s cultural and religious context, as well as the names of André Clair and Hélène Politis, Hermann Deuser and George Pattison, and today they are perhaps better known than the old references to Miguel de Unamuno or Cornelio Fabro, Jean Wahl or Pierre Mesnard. Although the conditions for rigorous research are still precarious, Kierkegaard was the topic of around twenty masters’ dissertations in philosophy, theology or psychology over the past decade. The number of doctoral dissertations on the Danish thinker is still below ten. But the conditions for study have been improving and today the general picture is much more promising than forty years ago. Recently Sílvia Saviano Sampaio began to offer courses on The Sickness unto Death in São Paulo. The small number of people with a Ph.D. are doing their best to translate new Brazilian sites: www.kierkegaardbrasil.hpg.com.br or www.futurasgeracoes.com.br (link SOBRESKI). 16 The bulletin SEVERINO—An Ironically Correct Newspaper is available on the web. 15

Brazil: Forty Years Later

325

texts with some apparatus criticus. Moreover, there is intelligent life concerned with Kierkegaard also outside of the academy. Some of the personality traits of Ernani Reichmann that led Vergote to define him as a Kierkegaard redivivus are perhaps having a “repetition” (or an abbreviated “eternal return”) in the unique personality of Henri Nicolay Levinspuhl. He lives with his wife and daughter in the interior of the state of Rio de Janeiro and works a few days every week with web sites for his livelihood in order to devote himself for the remainder of the week in an unselfish and edifying manner to the task of translating into Portuguese—on the basis of the translations by Howard and Edna Hong—the nonpseudonymous works, i.e., particularly the Edifying Discourses and the Christian Discourses. Henri, in spite of being a young man, has already tried to take existentially seriously the teachings of Nietzsche, until he came to the conclusion that he had to look for the seriousness of life somewhere else. Since then he lives and works in the service of perhaps the same idea to which Kierkegaard devoted himself. Translated by Luís Sander

Bibliography I. Translations of Kierkegaard’s Works in Brazil O diário do seductor. Arte de amar [“The Seducer’s Diary”], trans. by Mario Alemquer, Lisbon: Livraria Clássica Editora (Teixeira) 1911. O desespero humano [The Human Despair (translation of The Sickness unto Death)], trans. by Adolfo Casais Monteiro, Porto: Tavares Martins 1936 (frequently reprinted). O banquete [“In vino veritas”], trans. by Álvaro Ribeiro, Lisbon: Guimarães Editores 1953 (4th ed., 2002). Diário de Kierkegaard, 1834 [Kierkegaard’s Journals from 1834], trans. by O. Hecke, E. Reichmann, and J. Bomskow, Curitiba 1955. Temor e tremor [Fear and Trembling], trans. by Maria José Marinho, Lisbon: Guimarães Editores 1959 (3rd ed., 1998). O conceito de angústia [The Concept of Anxiety], trans. by João Lopes Alves, Lisbon: Presença 1962 (2nd ed., 1972). Temor e tremor [Fear and Trembling], trans. by Torrieri Guimarães, São Paulo: Livraria Exposição do livro 1964. O conceito de angústia [The Concept of Anxiety], trans. by Torrieri Guimarães, São Paulo: Hemus 1968. O matrimônio [“The Esthetic Validity of Marriage”], trans. by Rodolfo Konder, Rio de Janeiro: Laemmert 1969. Tratado do desespero [The Sickness unto Death], trans. by José Xavier de Melo Carneiro, Brasília, DF: Coordenada-Editora de Brasília 1969. Diário de um sedutor [“The Seducer’s Diary”], trans. by Carlos Grifo, Lisbon: Presença 1971. Soeren Kierkegaard. Textos selecionados [Selected Texts of Søren Kierkegaard], trans. by Ernani Reichmann, Curitiba: Editoria da UFPR 1972 (reprinted in 1978). Kierkegaard (selected passages from “The Seducer’s Diary,” Fear and Trembling and The Sickness unto Death), 2nd ed., trans. by Carlos Grifo and Maria José Marinho e Adolfo Casais Monteiro, São Paulo: Abril Cultural 1979 [1974]. Desespero. A doença mortal [The Sickness unto Death], from Italian trans. by Ana Keil, Porto: Rés-Editora 1986. Ponto de vista explicativo de minha obra como escritor [The Point of View for My Work as an Author] (includes also Two Ethical-Religious Essays and the “The Single Individual”), from French trans. by João Gama, Lisbon: Edições 70 1986. Das profundezas: preces [Out of the Depths: Prayers], trans. by João Francisco Régis de Morais, São Paulo: Paulinas 1990.

Brazil: Forty Years Later

327

O conceito de ironia constantemente referido a Sócrates [The Concept of Irony with Constant Reference to Socrates], trans. by Alvaro Luiz Montenegro Valls, Petrópolis, RJ: Vozes 1991. O matrimônio [The Marriage] (translation of “The Esthetic Validity of Marriage” from, Either/Or, Part Two), trans. by Rodolfo Konder, Campinas, SP: Psy II 1994. Migalhas filosóficas [Philosophical Fragments], trans. by Alvaro Luiz Montenegro Valls, Petrópolis, RJ: Vozes 1995. Dois discursos edificantes de 1843 [Two Upbuilding Discourses, 1843], trans. by Henri Nicolay Levinspuhl, Teresópolis, RJ: Ad Martyras 2000. O sumo sacerdote. O publicano. A Pecadora [“The High Priest,” “The Tax Collector,” “The Women Who Was a Sinner,” from Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays], trans. by Henri Nicolay Levinspuhl, Teresópolis, RJ: Ad Martyras 2000. Quatro discursos edificantes de 1843 [Four Upbuilding Discourses, 1843], trans. by Henri Nicolay Levinspuhl, Teresópolis, RJ: Ad Martyras 2000. Três discursos edificantes de 1843 [Three Upbuilding Discourses, 1843], trans. by Henri Nicolay Levinspuhl, Teresópolis, RJ: Ad Martyras 2000. Dois discursos edificantes de 1844 [Two Upbuilding Discourses, 1844], trans. by Henri Nicolay Levinspuhl, Teresópolis, RJ: Ad Martyras 2001. Diário de um sedutor [“The Seducer’s Diary”], trans. by Jean Melville, São Paulo: Martin Claret 2002. Os lírios do campo e as aves do céu [“The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air”], trans. by Henri Nicolay Levinspuhl, Teresópolis, RJ: Ad Martyras 2002. O desespero humano [The Human Despair (translation of The Sickness unto Death)], trans. by Alex Marins, São Paulo: Martin Claret 2003. É preciso duvidar de tudo [Johannes Climacus eller De omnibus dubitandum est], trans. by Sílvia Saviano Sampaio and Alvaro Luiz Montenegro Valls, São Paulo: Martins Fontes 2003. Diário de um sedutor [“The Seducer’s Diary”], trans. by Zélio dos Santos Jota, Rio de Janeiro: Editora Melso Guanabara 2004. Do desespero silencioso ao elogio do amor desinteressado. Aforismos, novelas e discursos de Søren Kierkegaard [From Silent Despair to the Praise of Unselfish Love, “Diapsalmata,” Novels and Discourses of Søren Kierkegaard], trans. by Alvaro Luiz Montenegro Valls, Porto Alegre: Escritos 2004. As obras do amor [Works of Love], trans. by Alvaro Luiz Montenegro Valls, Bragança Paulista: Editora Universitária São Francisco and Petrópolis: Vozes 2005. II. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard in Brazil Bó, E.T., “Kerkegaard e a filosofia actual,” Revista Brasileira de Filosofia, no. 6, 1956, pp. 59–69. Ferreira, V., “Notas sobre Kierkegaard,” Revista Brasileira de Filosofia, no. 1, 1951, pp. 490–94.

328

Alvaro Luiz Montenegro Valls

Gouvêa, Ricardo Quadros, Paixão pelo paradoxo: Uma introdução a Kierkegaard [Passion for Paradox. An Introduction to Kierkegaard], São Paulo: Editora Novo Século 2000. —— A palavra e o silêncio [The Word and Silence], São Paulo: Editora Custom 2002. de Grammont, Guiomar, Don Juan, Fausto e o Judeu Errante em Kierkegaard [Don Juan, Faust and the Wandering Jew in Kierkegaard], Petrópolis, RJ: Catedral das Letras 2003. Lima, Alceu de Amoroso, O existencialismo e outros mitos de nosso tempo [Existentialism and Other Myths of Our Time], Rio de Janeiro: Agir 1956. Martins, Geraldo Majela, A estética do sedutor: uma introdução a Kierkegaard [The Seducer’s Aesthetics. An Introduction to Kierkegaard], Belo Horizonte: Mazza Edições 2000. Penna, Antonio Gomez, “Sobre os fundamentos históricos e conceptuais da psicologia existencial: acerca das contribuições de Kierkegaard,” Arquivos Brasileiros de Psicologia, vol. 37, no. 2, 1985, pp. 8–15. de Paula, Márcio Gimenes, Socratismo e cristianismo em Kierkegaard: o escândalo e a loucura [Socraticism and Christianity in Kierkegaard. The Scandal and Madness], São Paulo: Annablume FAPESP 2001. Reale, Miguel, “Kierkegaard, o seu e o nosso tempo,” Revista Brasileira de Filosofia, no. 6, 1956, pp. 181–91. Reichmann, Ernani, Intermezzo lírico-filosófico. 7a. parte [Lyric-philosophical Intermezzo, 7th Part], Curitiba: Edição do Autor 1963. —— Kierkegaard: alguns aspectos de sua vida e obra [Kierkegaard: Some Aspects of His Life and Work], Curitiba: Scientia et Labor 1963. —— O instante [The Instant], São Paulo and Curitiba: Editora da UFPR 1981. Valls, Alvaro Luiz Montenegro, Entre Sócrates e Cristo: ensaios sobre a ironia e o amor em Kierkegaard [Between Socrates and Christ. Essays on Irony and Love in Kierkegaard], Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS 2000. Vita, Luiz Washington et al., Søren Kierkegaard, Preface by Miguel Reale, São Paulo 1956 (Revista Brasileira de Filosofia, special issue). III. Secondary Literature on Kierkegaard’s Reception in Brazil Reichmann, Ernani, “Kierkegaard e o Brasil,” in his Intermezzo lírico-filosófico. 7a. parte [Lyric-philosophical Intermezzo, 7th Part], Curitiba: Edição do Autor 1963, pp. 353–71. —— “Kierkegaard in Brazil,” Kierkegaardiana, vol. 5, 1964, pp. 78–9. Valls, Alvaro Luiz Montenegro, “Notas sobre a dificuldade de ler Kierkegaard em português” [Notes on the Difficulty of Reading Kierkegaard in Portuguese], Revista do IFCH da UFRGS, nos. 1–2, 1981, pp. 153–74. —— “E não se leu Kierkegaard” [And Kierkegaard was not Read], in Feuilleton of Folha de São Paulo, no. 327, April 24, 1983, pp. 8–9. —— “The Concept of Anxiety in Spanish and Portuguese,” Kierkegaard Studies. Yearbook, 2001, pp. 335–41.

Index of Persons Adorno, Theodor W. (1903–69), German philosopher, 118, 200, 233, 256. Agacinski, Sylviane, 249. Ahn Byeong-mu, 132–5 passim, 141. Ahn Byeong-uk, 132–3, 139, 140. Ahn Chang-ho, 133. Al-‘Awwa, ‘Adil, 89. Al-Farabi (ca. 872–ca. 950), Central-Asian polymath, 49. Al-Hallaj (ca. 858–922), sufi master, 56, 59, 85. Al-‘Ishmawi, Mohammad Sa’id, 71–4. Al-Kindi (ca. 801–73), Muslim Arab polymath, 49. al-Mubarak, ‘Adnan 39. Al-Sadr, Rabab, 89. Al-Safadi, Muta’, 71–4. Alcorta, Ignacio José, 272. Althusser, Louis (1918–90), French philosopher, 178. Altizer, J.J., 234–5. Amoroso Lima, Alceu de (1893–1983), Brazilian intellectual, 320. Andersen, Francis Sir, 176. Andersen, Hans Christian (1805–75), Danish poet, novelist and writer of fairy tales, 17–18. Anderson, John (1893–1962), Australia philosopher, 177. Andic, Martin, 211. Aquinas, Thomas (ca. 1225–74), Scholastic philosopher and theologian, 8, 12, 41, 43, 78, 84, 119, 200, 205, 269. Arabi, Muhiddin, 10. Arbaugh, George B., 239. Arbaugh, George E., 239. Aristophanes, 5. Aristotle, 8, 11–12, 41, 43, 49, 52, 64, 78, 84, 187, 246, 269. Armada, Javier, 294.

Armstrong, Aurelia, 187. Armstrong, David Malet, 178. Assaad-Mikhail, Fawzia, 82–3. Astrada, Carlos (1894–1970), Argentinean philosopher, 287, 289, 290. Atay, Oğuz (1934–77), Turkish author, 17. Athayde, Tristão de (1893–1983), Brazilian philosopher and essayist, 272. Aubrey, Edwin (1896–1956), American theologian, 234. Auden, W.H. (107–73), Anglo-American poet, 231. Augustine of Hippo (354–430), church father, 4, 8, 13, 16, 41–6 passim, 60, 61, 75, 77, 119. Austin, J.L., 243, 254. Averroes (1126–98), Andalusian-Arab philosopher and polymath, 11, 49, 70. Avicenna (980–1037), Persian Muslim polymath, 12, 49, 70, 85. Bacon, Francis (1561–1626), English philosopher, 14. Badawi, ‘Abd al-Rahman (1917–2002), Egyptian philosophical thinker, 49–62, 70. Bakunin, Mikhail (1814–76), Russian political philosopher, 103. Barker, Donald, 183. Barrett, Lee C., 211, 244, 258. Barrett, William E., 231. Barth, Karl (1886–1968), Swiss theologian, 41, 46, 80, 132, 133, 135, 139, 151, 197, 204, 230, 233, 234, 244, 246. Bataille, Georges (1897–1962), French philosopher and author, 9. Batuhan, Hüseyin, 3, 4–7. Baudelaire, Charles (1821–67), French poet, 136.

330

Kierkegaard’s International Reception

Bayazid of Bistam (d. 875), Sufi master, 14. Beabout, Gregory R., 243. Beauvoir, Simone de (1908–82), French existentialist philosopher and author, 9, 187. Bellinger, Charles K., 252. Benjamin, Walter (1892–1940), German philosopher and literary critic, 26, 200. Berdyaev, Nikolai (1874–1948), Russian philosopher, 46, 59, 60, 61, 75, 79, 80. Bergman, Ingmar (1918–2007), Swedish film director, 18, 31. Bergman, Samuel Hugo (1883–1975), Zionist philosopher and intellectual, 27, 32, 33. Bergson, Henri (1859–1941), French philosopher, 41, 49, 54, 60, 61, 88, 274, 277. Berry, Wanda Warren, 253. Bertman, Martin, 183. Best, Steven, 253. Bhabha, Homi K., 200. Bigelow, Pat, 250. Birchall, Brian, 187, 188. Blanco Regueira, José (1947–2004), Spanish philosopher, 271. Blanshard, Brand (1892–1987), American philosopher, 232. Blondel, Maurice (1861–1949), French philosopher 7, 8, 49. Bloy, Leon (1846–1917), French writer, 291. Bohlin, Thorsten (1889–1950), Swedish theologian, 244. Böhme, Jakob (1575–1624), German mystic, 75. Bonaventura (also Bonaventure), Saint (ca. 1220–74), Scholastic philosopher, 42. Bonhoeffer, Dietrich (1906–45), German theologian, 234. Booth, Wayne, 254. Borges, Jorge Luis (1899–1986), Argentinean author, 288. Boulous-Walker, Michelle, 187. Bouswma, O.K., 202. Boyce Gibson, Alexander (1900–1972), Australian philosopher, 177, 181.

Boyce Gibson, William Ralph (1869–1935), Australian philosopher, 176, 177. Brandes, Georg (1842–1927), Danish literary critic, 26, 28, 150. Brett, George Sydney (1879–1944), Canadian philosopher, 199, 204–6 passim. Bretall, Robert, 187. Brightman, Edgar Sheffield (1884–1953), American religious philosopher, 80. Brothers, Robyn, 184. Brown, Alison Leigh, 253. Browning, Robert (1812–89), English poet and playwright, 200. Brunner, Emil (1889–1966), Swiss theologian, 46, 75, 132, 135, 197, 205, 233, 234. Bryden, Walter W., 204. Buber, Martin (1878–1965), Austrian-Israeli philosopher, 26–33, 41, 46, 75, 179, 184, 251, 256. Bultmann, Rudolf (1884–1976), German theologian, 44. Burgess, Andrew, 244, 246. Byeon Seon-hwan (1927–95), Korean philosopher, 141. Cacciola, Maria Lúcia, 323. Cahoy, William, 244. Cain, David, 244, 246. Caird, Erward (1835–1908), Scottish philosopher, 176. Calvin, John (1509–64), French Protestant theologian, 134. Camus, Albert (1913–60), French author, 60, 113, 118, 134–6 passim, 187. Canclini, Arnoldo, 296. Cappelørn, Niels Jørgen, 40, 98, 107, 210, 298. Caputo, John D., 249, 252. Carignan, Mauice, 208. Carlyle, Thomas (1795–1881), Scottish historian and essayist, 291. Carnell, Edward John (1919–67), American theologian, 235. Casais Monteiro, Adolfo (1908–72), Portuguese poet, 320. Caso, Antonio (1883–1946), Mexican pedagogue and writer, 273.

Index of Persons Cassini de Vásquez, María Cristina, 292. Castro, Juana. 296. Cauchy, Venant, 208. Chae Gyu-cheol (1937–2006), Korean philosopher, 141. Champbell, Richard, 186, 187. Charlesworth, Max, 180, 185. Chauí, Marilena, 322. Cheng Zhimin, 110, 111. Chesterton, Gilbert Keith (1874–1936), English writer, 75. Child, Brevard, 247. Choe Seung-il, 144. Christensen, Karin, 188. Chryssides, George D., 181, 182. Chu Shaohua, 109, 110. Ciarlo, Héctor Óscar, 291. Cixous, Hélène, 178. Clair, André, 324. Coleridge, Samuel Taylor (1772–1834), English poet and philosopher, 187. Colledge, Richard, 186, 187. Collins, James, 116, 233, 271. Come, Arnold B., 244, 245. Comte, August (1789–1857), French philosopher, 9, 275. Conant, James 16. Connell, George, 241. Copleston, Frederick Charles (1910–71), British Jesuit priest and scholar, 272. Correas, Carlos, 298. Cox, Harvey, 234. Crites, Stephen, 237, 251. Croxall, Thomas Henry, 63. Cuervo, Oscar Alberto, 294, 298. Cuviller, Armando, 272. Darwin, Charles (1809–82), English natural scientist, 103. Davenport, John, 251. Davidson, John (1834–81), Australian philosopher, 176. Deleuze, Gilles (1925–95), French philosopher, 178. Democritus, 14. Demson, David, 202, 211. Derrida, Jacques (1930–2004), French philosopher, 116, 120, 78, 179, 184, 187, 212, 248–50 passim.

331

Descartes, René (1596–1650), French philosopher, 14, 39, 52, 64, 278. Despland, Michel, 208. Deuser, Hermann, 324. Dewey, Bradley R. (1934–89), American theologian, 243, 245. Dewey, John (1859–1952), American philosopher, psychologist, 14, 133. Dhurayl, ‘Adnan Bin, 70–71. Díaz, Oswaldo, 274. Diem, Hermann (1900–1975), German theologian, 244. Dilthey, Wilhelm (1833–1911), German historian and philosopher, 275. Dip, Patricia Carina, 294, 298. Döblin, Alfred (1878–1957), German novelist and essayist, 26. Doniela, Bill, 188. Dooley, Mark, 179. Dostoevsky, Fyodor Mikhailovich (1821–81), Russian author, 41, 46, 69, 75, 130, 132, 133, 200, 291. Dru, Alexander, 53, 63, 66, 69. Dunning, Steven, 241. Dupré, Louis K., 244. Eckhart, Johannes, called Meister Eckhart (ca. 1260–ca. 1328), German mystic, 56. Edwards, Paul (1923–2004), AustrianAmerican philosopher, 232. Eliot, Thomas Stearns (1888–1965), British poet and critic, 136. Eller, Vernard, 245. Ellul, Jacques (1912–94), French philosopher, 200. Elrod, John, 116, 238, 240. Emmanuel, Steven, 184, 247, 254. Emmett, Dorothy, 231. Emre, Yunus (1238–1320), Turkish poet, 10, 11. Epictetus, 4. Epicurus, 14. Eriugena, John Scotus (ca 800–ca. 870), Irish Neoplatonist philosopher, 12. Erro, Carlos Alberto, 290. Eucken, Rudolf (1846–1926), German philosopher, 177. Evans, Calvin D., 209.

332

Kierkegaard’s International Reception

Evans, Stephen C., 236, 243, 256. Fabro, Cornelio (1911–95), Italian Kierkegaard scholar, 294, 324. Fackenheim, Emil (1916–2003), CanadianIsraeli rabbi and philosopher, 204, 205. Fahrenbach, Helmuth, 323. Faria, Octavio de (1908–80), Brazilian writer, 286, 321. Farré, Luis, 296. Father Joseph Lajin, 88. Fatone, Vicente (1913–62), Argentinian philosopher, 271. Fenger, Henning (1921–85), Danish literary scholar, 248. Fenoglio, Héctor César, 294, 298. Fenves, Peter, 250. Ferlov, Knud, 53. Fernandez, Julio, 272. Ferreira, Jamie M., 243, 256, 257. Feuerbach, Ludwig (1804–72), German philosopher, 84, 176, 275, 322. Fichte, Johann Gottlieb (1762–1814), German philosopher, 6, 8, 10, 14, 19. Figal, Günter, 323. Filmer, Stephen, 188. Fioravanti, Ana, 298. Fish, Stanley, 246. Fleischacker, Samuel, 182. Flew, Anton, 180–82 passim. Foucault, Michel (1926–84), French philosopher, 175, 178, 251. Frankl, Victor (1905–97), American psychologist, 232. Freud, Sigmund (1856–1939), Austrian psychologist, 26, 65, 83, 214, 322. Friedman, R.Z., 202. Frye, Herman Northrop (1912–91), Canadian literary critic, 219. Fuentes, Carlos (b. 1928), Mexican literary historian and writer, 276, 277. Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1900–2002), German philosopher, 15, 279, 323. Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869– 1948), major political and spiritual leader of India, 10, 133.

Gaos, José (1900–1969), Spanish-Mexican philosopher and writer, 273, 274, 296. García Pavón, Rafael, 279. Gasset, José Ortega y (1883–1955), Spanish philosopher, 269. Gateau, Jean-Jacques (1887–1967), French translator, 53. Gazali, Abu Hamid Muhammad al (1058– 1111), Persian theologian and philosopher, 16. Geismar, Eduard (1871–1939), Danish theologian, 233, 244. Giacóia, Oswaldo Jr., 323. Gibbs, Robert, 202. Gide, André (1869–1951), French author, 130. Gilson, Étienne (1884–1978), Canadian philosopher, 205. Girard, René, 252. Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von (1749–1832), German poet, author, scientist and diplomat, 42, 46. Gogarten, Friedrich (1887–1968), German theologian, 132. Go Gwang-pil, 143. Go Hyeong-gon (1906–2004), Korean philosopher, 135. Goicoechea, David, 202, 207, 211, 217. Goldstick, Danny, 211. González Álvarez, Angel (1916–91), Spanish philosopher, 271. González, Darío D., 293, 298, 299. Gorsd, Pedro, 294, 298. Go Seok-gyu (1932–58), Korean philosopher, 136. Gottsched, Hermann (1848–1916), German protestant theologian, 125, 151. Gouwens, David Jay, 244–6 passim, 324. Grammont, Guiomar de, 324. Grant, George, 218, 219. Greene, Graham (1904–91), English novelist, playwright and critic, 200. Green, Ronald M., 238. Gregori, Arístides, 295. Grene, Marjorie, 232. Grenz, Stanley James (1950–2005), American theologian, 235. Greve, Wilfried, 323.

Index of Persons Grimsley, Ronald, 187. Grundtvig, Nicolai Frederik Severin (1783–1872), Danish poet and theologian, 17. Guerrero, Luis Martínez, 274, 277–9 passim, 299. Gutiérrez Rivero, Demetrio, 270, 293–7 passim. Guzmán, Danilo, 299. Habachi, René, 83–7 passim. Habermas, Jürgen (b. 1929), German philosopher, 82, 252. Haecker, Theodor (1879–1945), German writer, 271. Hall, Amy Laura, 256. Hall, Douglas, 218. Hall, Ronald, 254. Hamada, Junko, 153. Hamann, Johann Georg (1730–88), German philosopher, 4. Hamilton, Kenneth, 202, 234. Hamilton, William (b. 1924), American theologian, 234, 235. Hamilton, William Sir (1805–65), Scottish philosopher, 176. Hamsun, Knut (1859–1962), Norwegian novelist, dramatist and poet, 17. Hannay, Alastair, 115, 179. Harcourt, Hugh R., 75, 80. Hartmann, Nicolai (1882–1950), German philosopher, 12. Hartshorne, M. Holmes, 255. Hashimoto, Jun, 151, 153. Hashimoto, Kagami, 152. Hatem, Jad, 87. Hawi, Sami, 80–82. Hefner, Phil, 299. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770– 1831), German philosopher, 4–6, 10–16 passim, 47, 49, 51, 52, 57, 58, 60, 63–7, 72, 74, 84, 85, 107–16 passim, 119, 120, 127, 135, 176, 183, 184, 188, 197, 198, 213, 237, 238, 240, 274–6 passim, 285, 289, 291, 292. Heiberg, Johan Ludvig (1791–1860), Danish poet, playwright and philosopher, 238, 299.

333

Heidegger, Martin (1889–1976), German philosopher, 5, 12–15, 39, 41, 43–6 passim, 48, 50, 52–61, 64, 67, 70–74 passim, 78, 83, 104, 111, 116, 120, 127, 128, 132–9 passim, 151, 179, 187, 188, 200, 231, 234, 269, 273–5 passim, 285–90 passim, 322. Heinemann, Fritz (1889–1969), German philosopher, 272. Heiss, Robert, 108. Henríquez Ureña, Pedro (1884–1946), Hispano-American intellectual, philosopher and literary critic, 286. Henry, Michel (1922–2002), French philosopher and novelist, 87. Heraclitus, 12, 14. Herzl, Theodor (1860–1904), Austrian journalist, 26. Heywood-Thomas, John, 210. Hick, John, 180, 181. Hirabayashi, Takahiro, 153. Hirsch, Emmanuel, (1888–1972), German Protestant theologian, 140, 151, 324. Høffding, Harald (1843–1931), Danish philosopher, 150, 270. Hollingdale, R.J., 187. Holmer, Paul L. (1917–2004), American theologian, 207, 230, 243, 245. Hong, Edna H. (1913–2007), American translator, 235, 325. Hong, Howard W. (b. 1912), American translator, 151, 235, 236, 324, 325. Hong Sun-myeong, 141. Hogue, Stéphane, 209. Howe, Leory T., 181. Horton, Walter (1895–1966), American theologian, 233. Hughes, G.E., 180. Hume, David (1711–76), Scottish philosopher, 176. Husserl, Edmund (1859–1938), German philosopher, 11, 15, 48, 67, 74, 82, 84, 127, 269, 289. Hüsrev, Hasan, 8, 9. Huxley, Aldous (1894–1963), English writer, 103. Hwang Pil-ho, 141, 144.

334

Kierkegaard’s International Reception

Ibsen, Henrik (1828–1906), Norwegian dramatist, 287. Ibn ‘Arabi (1165–1240), Sufi master, 59. Imam, ‘Abd el-Fattah Imam, 62–6, 69, 90. Imbrosciano, Anthony, 186. Irigaray, Luce, 178, 184, 187, 253. Jacoby, Matthew, 184. James, William (1842–1910), American psychologist and philosopher, 14. Jarauta Marion, Francisco, 287. Jaspers, Karl (1883–1969), German philosopher, 5, 12, 13, 45, 53, 55, 59, 60, 64, 71, 72, 111, 113, 135–8 passim, 151, 179, 234, 291, 292. Jensen, Alfred Dewey, 182. Jeon Gyeong-yeon, 132, 133. Jeon Jae-gyeong, 143. Jeong Myeong-hwan, 135. Jiang Xinyi, 106–7. John of the Cross, Saint (1542–91), Spanish mystic and poet, 61, 88. Johnson, Howard Albert, 137. Johnson, Ralph Henry, 202, 208, 210. Jolivet, Régis (1891–1966), French Catholic thinker, 85, 271, 291. Jorge Manzano, S.J., 277. José Binetti, María, 294, 298. Jo Yo-han (1926–2000), Korean philosopher, 137. Junayd of Baghdad (819–910), Sufi master, 14. Jung, Carl Gustav (1875–1961), Swiss psychologist, 138. Kafka, Franz (1883–1924), Austrian writer, 17, 26, 182. Kampmann, Theoderich (1899–1983), German theologian and literary scholar, 272. Kaneko, Chikusui (1870–1937), Japanese literary scholar, 150. Kang Hak-cheol, 137, 144. Kant, Immanuel (1724–1804), German philosopher, 5, 14, 33, 39, 41–3, 49, 64, 104, 119, 181, 187, 238. Kaufmann, Walter (1921–80), GermanAmerican philosopher, 63, 64, 66, 117, 232.

Kellenberger, James, 182. Kellner, Douglas, 253. Khan, Abrahim H., 182, 183, 202, 203, 206, 210–12 passim, 215–17 passim, 244. Kierkegaard, Michael Pedersen (1756–1838), Søren Kierkegaard’s father, 109. Kierkegaard, Peter Christian (1805–88), Danish theologian, bishop of Aalborg, 60. Kierkegaard, Søren Aabye (1813–55), From the Papers of One Still Living (1838), 299. The Concept of Irony (1841), 5, 12, 41, 66, 89, 106, 298, 299, 321. Either/Or (1843), 13, 33, 40, 47, 60, 61, 66, 70, 81, 85, 87, 89, 103–6 passim, 118, 119, 128, 130, 140, 188, 205, 219, 241, 272, 275, 278, 294, 295, 321. Fear and Trembling (1843), 31, 32, 40, 60, 63, 85, 104–6, 132, 181, 182, 210, 214, 272, 275, 278, 295, 320–23 passim. Johannes Climacus or De Omnibus Dubitandum est (ca. 1843), 66, 278. Repetition (1843), 40, 89, 214, 275, 295, 323. Upbuilding Discourses (1843–4), 104, 278, 293, 296, 325. Philosophical Fragments (1844), 89, 119, 120, 132, 181, 182, 202, 214, 215, 230, 255, 256, 275, 287, 296, 321. The Concept of Anxiety (1844), 5, 19, 20, 70, 71, 87, 88, 130, 214, 219, 234, 240, 272–5 passim, 279, 290, 296, 298, 320–22 passim. Stages on Life’s Way (1845), 42, 60, 61, 83, 89, 106, 272, 273, 294–6 passim, 321. A Literary Review of Two Ages (1846), 65, 183, 217, 296. Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1846), 6, 12, 40, 60, 89, 130, 182, 183, 188, 215, 275, 287–94 passim, 321. Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirit (1847), 296. Works of Love (1847), 68, 88, 183, 217, 250, 256, 257, 297, 321.

Index of Persons Christian Discourses (1848), 295, 297, 325. The Point of View for My Work as an Author (ca. 1848), 248, 249, 272, 297, 322. The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air: Three Devotional Discourses (1849), 297. The Sickness unto Death (1849), 5, 14, 15, 18, 39, 40, 53, 65, 87–9, 104, 130–35 passim, 139, 140, 183, 214, 234, 240, 275, 278, 287, 297, 298, 320, 321, 324. Two Ethical-Religious Essays (1849), 130, 132, 197. Practice in Christianity (1850), 130, 132, 214, 321. For Self-Examination (1851), 89, 297. On My Work as an Author (1851), 273, 297. The Moment (1855), 66, 97, 140, 293, 294, 321. Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter (1997–), 106, 212, 238f., 324. Kim Bung-gu (1922–91), Korean writer, 135. Kim Cheol-son, 132, 134, 135. Kim Ha-ja, 143, 144. Kim Hyeong-seok, 132, 133, 139, 140. Kim Jae-jun, 132, 135. Kim Madeleine, 143. Kim Yong-bok, 142. Kim Yong-il, 144. Kirmmse, Bruce H., 33, 211, 238, 324. Kiyohiko, Fujimoto, 189. Konevi, Sadrettin, 10. Koyre, Alexandre (1892–1964), FrenchRussian philosopher, 49. Krentz, Arthur, 202. Kristeva, Julia (b. 1941), Bulgarian-French philosopher and literary critic, 178, 253. Kulak, Avron, 202, 212. Kundera, Milan (b. 1929), Czech-born French writer, 106. Lacan, Jacques (1901–81), French psychoanalyst, 178, 286, 322. Lalande, Andre (1867–1963), French philosopher, 49.

335

Larrañeta Olleta, Rafael (1945–2002), Spanish philosopher, 293–6 passim. Laurie, Henry (1837–1922), Australian philosopher, 176. Le Doeuff, Michèle, 178. Lee Gwang-su (1882–1950), Korean poet, 133. Lee Gyo-sang, 137. Lee Il-su, 144. Lee Min-ho, 144. Lee Sang-hun, 144. Lee Seung-gu, 143, 144. Lee Yong-seok, 144. Lefevre, Perry D., 234. Leibniz, Baron Gottfried Wilhelm von (1646–1716), German philosopher and mathematician, 14, 49, 53, 64, 274. Leibowitz, Isaiah (1903–94), Zionist philosopher, 27. Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1870–1924), Russian statesman, 110. Léon, Céline, 252. Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim (1729–81), German philosopher, dramatist and writer, 186. Lévinas, Emmanuel (1906–95), French philosopher, 184, 187. Levinspuhl, Henri Nicolay, 325. Liacho, Carlos, 297. Lindbeck, George, 184. Linne, John (1885–1970), Canadian theologian, 205. Liu Fangtong, 112–14 passim. Liu Ji, Chinese translator, 104. Liu Xiaofeng, 120. Locke, John (1632–1704), English philosopher, 14, 183, 217. Lonergan, Bernard, 218. Lorraine, Tamsin E., 253. Löwith, Karl (1897–1973), German-Jewish philosopher, 108, 132, 137. Lowrie, Walter (1868–1959), American translator, 66, 69, 114, 137, 140, 151, 230, 237, 291. Ludin, W., 151. Lukacs, Georg (1885–1971), Hungarian philosopher, 108.

336

Kierkegaard’s International Reception

Luther, Martin (1483–1546), German religious reformer, 86, 256. Lu Xun (1881–1936), Chinese thinker and author, 103, 104. Lynch, Lawrence Edward, 205. Maalouf, Nouhad Abimrad, 86, 87. MacIntyre, Alasdair, 180, 232, 233, 251. Mackey, Louis H. (1926–2004), American philosopher, 247, 248. Mackie, John L. (1917–81), Australian philosopher, 178. Mackintosh, Hugh Ross, 137. MacLennan, Roderick D., 205. Madenokouiji, Michimune, 153. Maistre, Joseph of (1753–1821), French diplomat and writer, 291. Makolkin, Anna, 211. Malantschuk, Gregor (1902–78), 45, 209, 319. Malcolm, Norman, 16. Malik, Charles (1906–87), Lebanese thinker and diplomat, 41–9, 75, 78–81 passim. Malraux, André (1901–76), French author, 135. Manrique, Carlos Andrés, 299. Mansur al-Hallaj (ca. 858–922), Persian writer and Sufi master, 4, 6, 10, 11, 14, 15. Marcel, Gabriel (1889–1973), French existentialist philosopher, 9, 12, 13, 64, 71, 72, 83, 84, 113, 138. Mardin, Şerif, 4, 18, 19, 21. Marino, Gordon D., 179, 189, 211, 236. Maritain, Jacques (1882–1973), French philosopher, 49, 75. Marot, Armand, 295. Marquez, Gabriel Garcia (b. 1928), Colombian novelist and writer, 200. Marsh, James L., 252. Martensen, Hans Lassen (1808–84), Danish theologian, 238, 322. Martin, C.B., 180. Marx, Karl (1813–83), German political philosopher, 84, 108, 111, 117, 120, 127, 176, 197, 274–8 passim, 285. Masuda, Keizaburou, 152. Masugata, Kinya, 149, 150.

Matuštík, Martin, 252. May, Rollo (1909–94), American psychologist, 232. McCallum, Henry Reid, 198. McCarthy, Vincent, 211, 241. McCaughey, Davis, 188. McDonald, Paul, 187. McDonald, William, 184–9 passim. McInery, Ralph, 205. McKinnon, Alastair, 202–14 passim, 220. McLelland, Joseph C., 202, 204, 207. McLuhan, Marshall, 219, 299. Mehl, Peter John, 242. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice (1908–61), French philosopher, 70, 113, 187. Mesnard, Pierre (1900–1969), French philosopher, 85, 88, 324. Michalson, Carl (1915–65), American theologian, 231. Miki, Kiyoshi (1897–1945), Japanese philosopher, 151. Miller, John F. III, 182. Miranda, Jorge, 323. Mitchell, William Sir (1861–1962), Australian philosopher, 176. Mitsuchi, Kozo (1898–1924), 149, 151. Miyahara, Koichiro, Japanese translator, 103. Mohammad, ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Mu’ta, 67–70. Montaigne, Michel de (1533–92), French humanist, 4. Montesquieu, Baron de La Brede et de (1689–1755), French political philosopher, 103. Mooney, Edward F., 257. Mora Calvo, Hernán, 299. Morris, T.F., 183. Mortensen, Finn Hauberg, 149. Mou Zongsan (1909–95), Chinese philosopher, 104. Mounier, Emmanuel (1905–50), French philosopher, 70–72. Mun Dong-hwan, 132. Mun Ik-hwan, 132. Mutai, Rizaku, 152. Nakazato, Satoshi, 154. Necatigil, Behçet (1916–79), Turkish poet, 17, 18.

Index of Persons Negre Rigol, Montserrat, 299. Nicholson, Graeme, 202, 211. Nicol, Eduardo (1907–90), SpanishMexican philosopher, 274. Niebuhr, Karl Paul Reinhold (1892–1971), American Protestant theologian, 197, 198, 205, 234. Niebuhr, Richard Helmut (1894–1962), American theologian, 80, 197. Nielsen, Harry A., 202, 208–10 passim, 218. Nietzsche, Friedrich (1844–1900), German philosopher, 4, 12–17 passim, 25–9 passim, 32, 39, 41, 44, 45, 49, 52, 53, 56, 61, 62, 66, 82–5 passim, 90, 104, 113, 116, 120, 127, 133, 178, 187, 200, 231, 274, 275, 285–7 passim, 291, 319, 321, 323, 325. Nordau, Max (1849–1923), German philosopher, 26. Norris, Christopher, 249. Norris, John, 187, 188. Nussbaum, Martha (b. 1947), American philosopher, 187. O’Connor, Flannery (1925–64), American author, 232. Olsen, Regine (1822–1904), 6, 60, 64, 66, 69, 106, 237. Olson, Robert G., 232. Ooya, Kenichi, 152. Oppenheim, Michhael D., 208. Ortega y Gasset, José (1883–1956), Spanish philosopher and essayist, 60, 275. Otani, Hidehito, 151, 152. Otani, Masaru, 151, 152. Ozaki, Kazuhiko, 151. Padilla, Euclides, 300. Pagano, José Luis (1875–1964), Argentinean drama critic, 286, 287. Park Jong-hong, 127, 128, 135–8 passim. Park Yong-Cheol (1904–38), Korean poet, 128, 129. Parmenides, 14, 60. Pascal, Blaise (1623–62), French scientist and philosopher, 4, 8, 9, 41, 42, 46, 49, 60, 64, 75, 139, 187. Passmore, John (1914–2004), Australian philosopher, 178.

337

Pattison, George, 324. Paul, 47, 61, 74, 75. Paula, Márcio Gimenes de, 323, 324. Paz, Octavio (1914–98), Mexican writer and poet, 269. Pedro, Valentín de, 295. Percy, Walker (1916–90), American author, 232. Pérez Alvarez, Eliseo, 299. Perkins, Robert L., 185, 236, 251. Petit, Paul (1893–1944), French translator of Kierkegaard’s works, 275. Phillips, Dewi Zephaniah (1934–2006), American philosopher, 16, 180, 200. Pietersma, Henry, 211. Pierce, William, 14. Piety, Marilyn, 243. Pirini, Prieto, 272. Place, Ullin Thomas (1924–2000), Australian philosopher, 177. Platero, Dalila de, 291. Plato, 5, 8, 11, 12, 14, 41–3, 59, 64, 133, 187. Plekon, Michael, 251. Pojman, Louis P. (1935–2005), American philosopher, 242. Politis, Hélène, 324. Polk, Timothy H., 244, 246. Polka, Brayton, 202, 210, 211, 217. Price, George Henry, 239. Prior, A.N., 180. Pyo Chai-Myung, 189. Pyo Jae-myeong, 137, 141, 143, 144. Quadros Gouvêa, Ricardo, 323, 324. Quinn, Philip L. (1940–2004), American philosopher and theologian, 257. Reale, Miguel (1910–2006), Brazilian jurist, 320. Reichmann, Ernani (1920–84), Brazilian writer and translator, 286, 319–21 passim, 325. Reid, Thomas (1710–96), Scottish philosopher, 176. Richards, George Warren (1869–1955), American theologian, 233. Ricoeur, Paul (1913–2005), French philosopher, 70.

338

Kierkegaard’s International Reception

Rilke, Rainer Maria (1875–1926), German poet, 136. Rim Byeong-deok, 144. Rim Chun-gap, 134, 135, 137, 140, 141. Rim Gyu-jeong, 144. Ritchie, A.M., 179. Roberto Albertsen, Andrés, 294, 298. Roberts, Robert, 244, 255, 256. Rocca, Ettore, 98. Romano Muñoz, José, 272. Roos, Jonas, 324. Rotenstreich, Nathan (1914–93), Israeli philosopher, 33. Rothko, Mark, 200. Rosenzweig, Franz (1886–1929), German Jewish theologian and philosopher, 87. Roubieczek, Paul, 67. Rousseau, Jean Jacques (1712–78), French philosopher, 103. Royce, Josiah (1855–1916), American philosopher, 42. Ruggiero, Guido de, 179. Rumble, Vanessa, 250. Rumi, Mawlana Jalaluddin, 10. Ru Xin, 107, 108. Ryle, Gilbert (1900–1976), British philosopher, 241, 243, 246. Sábato, Ernesto (b. 1911), Argentinean writer, 288. Sáez Tajafuerce, Begonya, 293, 295, 298. Sagi, Abraham, 33. Said, Edward W. (1935–2003), PalestinianAmerican literary theorist and cultural critic, 200. Salmerón, Fernando, 274. Sa Mi-ja, 143, 144. Sampaio, Sílvia Saviano, 323, 324. Sartre, Jean-Paul (1905–80), French philosopher, 5, 8, 9, 12, 14, 46, 50, 56, 64, 71–4 passim, 83, 88, 111, 113, 118, 134–6 passim, 178, 186, 187, 231, 271. Sayigh, Fayiz (1922–80), Palestinian philosopher, 74–80. Scarlatelli, Cleide, 323, 324. Scheler, Max (1874–1928), German philosopher, 289.

Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von (1775–1854), German philosopher, 6, 11, 14, 19, 49, 88, 112. Schlegel, Friedrich von (1772–1829), German Romantic writer, 6. Schleiermacher, Friedrich (1768–1834), German theologian, 246. Schnitzler, Arthur (1862–1931), Austrian author and dramatist, 26. Scholem, Gershom (1897–1982), GermanIsraeli philosopher, 26–8. Schopenhauer, Arthur (1788–1860), German philosopher, 12, 14, 49, 52, 61, 104, 112, 113, 116, 127, 133, 275, 322, 323. Schrader, George, 179. Schrempf, Christoph, (1860–1944), German Protestant theologian, 125, 140, 151. Schuster, Félix G., 298. Secchi, Vanina, 210. Segundo, Juan Luis (1925–96), Jesuit priest and theologian, 271f. Seo Gwang-seon, 142. Seo Nam-dong, 141. Shakespeare, William (1564–1616), English dramatist, 46. Shepherd Victor, 211. Shestov, Lev (1866–1938), UkrainianFrench philosopher, 211, 271. Shimazono, Susumu, 153. Shinn, Roger L., 231. Sigad, Ran, 33. Simón Merchán, Vicente, 296. Slater, Peter, 211. Smart, J.J.C., 177, 178, 180. Smith, R.G., 66. Smyth, John Vignaux, 250. Socrates, 5, 6, 17, 60, 81, 113, 213, 218, 276. Soloviev, Vladimir (1853–1900), Russian philosopher, 70. Song Eun-jae, 144. Soudani, Fadel, 89, 90. Spengler, Oswald (1880–1936), German writer, 17, 49. Spinoza, Baruch (1632–77), Dutch philosopher, 11, 14, 42. Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty, 200. Sponheim, Raul R., 244, 245. Stack, George J., 181.

Index of Persons Stawser, Michael, 248. Stein, Edith (1891–1942), German philosopher and writer, 88. Steiner, George, 254. Stewart, Jon, 238, 298. Stirner, Max (1806–56), German journalist and philosopher 103. Stokes, Patrick, 188. Stove, David (1927–94), Australian philosopher, 178. Strauss, Leo (1899–1973), Germanborn Jewish-American political philosopher, 82. Suàrez, Francisco (1548–1617), Spanish Scholastic philosopher and theologian, 12. Suhrawardi (1154–91), Sufi master, 56, 57, 59, 61. Svensson, Manfred, 296. Swenson, David F. (1876–1940), American philosopher, 66, 69, 151, 230. Swenson, Lillian M., 230. Takayasu, Gekkou, 150. Tambourgi-Hatem, Nicole, 87. Tamer, Georges, 82. Tang Chenxi, 106. Tanpınar, Ahmet Hamdi (1901–62), Turkish author, 4, 20, 21. Taylor, Charles, 219. Taylor, Mark C., 240, 248–50 passim. Taylor, Mark Lloyd, 257. Teresa of Avila (1515–82), Spanish mystic, Carmelite nun, 56, 61. Ternay, Henri de, 323. Tertullian (ca. 160–235), church father, 16. Theunissen, Michael, 82, 323. Thomas, see “Aquinas.” Thompson, Curtis L., 183. Thompson, Josiah, 40, 210, 233, 237. Thulstrup, Niels (1924–88), Danish theologian, 108, 238, 239, 319. Tillich, Paul Johannes, (1886–1965), German-American theologian and philosopher, 44, 46, 197, 198, 205, 234. Tisseau, Paul-Henri (1894–1964), French translator of Kierkegaard’s works, 40, 319, 322, 324.

339

Tolstoy, Leo (1828–1910), Russian writer and philosopher, 133. Topçu, Nurettin (1909–74), Turkish author, 3, 4, 6, 7–11, 19. Toyofuku, Junichi, 152. Troiani, Osiris, 295. Uchimura, Kanzo (1861–1930), Japanese Christian philosopher, 150, 151. Ulaş, Mehmet, 8. Ülgener, Sabri, 4, 19, 20, 21. Ülken, Hilmi Ziya (1901–74), Turkish philosopher, 4, 6, 7, 11–15, 21. Unamuno, Miguel de (1864–1936), Spanish philosopher, novelist and essayist, 9, 60, 75, 76, 269, 285–91 passim, 324. Updike, John (b. 1932), American novelist and poet, 232. Valadez, Leticia, 278, 299. Valéry, Paul (1871–1945), French poet and essayist, 130. Vallejos, Raúl, 292. Valls, Alvaro Luiz Montenegro, 299, 323, 324. Vardy, Peter, 188. Vasseur, Álvaro Armando (1878–1969), Uruguayan poet, 294. Velloso, José Miguel, 297. Vergote, Henri-Bernard (1931–96), French Kierkegaard scholar, 319, 321, 323, 325. Virasoro, Miguel Ángel (1900–1966), 287, 291. Wade, Donald V., 199, 202, 203, 207, 210. Wagner, Richard (1813–83), German composer, 319. Wahl, Jean (1888–1974), French philosopher, 51, 56, 63, 72, 82, 109, 272, 291, 324. Walker, Jeremy, 202–7 passim, 210, 212, 214, 215. Walsh, Cheryl, 188. Walsh, Sylvia, 254. Wang Caiyong, 105, 106. Wang Ping, 117. Wang Qi, 118, 119. Watkin, Julia, 178, 185–9 passim, 209, 210.

340

Kierkegaard’s International Reception

Watkins, Vernon (1906–67), British poet, 200. Watsuji, Tetsuro (1889–1960), Japanese historian and philosopher, 149, 151. Weng Shaojun, 114–16 passim. Wesley, John (1703–91), Anglican clergyman and evangelist, 134. Westphal, Merold, 252, 324. Whitehead, Alfred North (1861–1947), English mathematician and philosopher, 41–3, 75. Wiebe, Donald, 211. Wild, John, 179. Williams, Charles, 229. Winch, Peter, 16. Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1889–1951), Austrian philosopher, 16, 182, 200, 243, 245, 298, 323. Wolff, Maria, 151. Wright, Richard (1908–60), Afrian-American author, 232.

Wyschogrod, M., 187. Xenophon, 5. Xirau, Ramón, 275, 276. Xu Chongwen, 109, 110. Yamashita, Hidetomo, 152. Yang Dachun, 116, 117. Yang Shen, 110, 111. Yeon-hyeon, 132. Yousef, Hassan, 67–70. Yun Dong-ju (1917–45), Korean poet, 129–32 passim. Zelechow, Bernard, 202. Zerlang, Martin, 299. Zhang Liang, 118. Zhao Dunhua, 113, 114. Zhuang Zi (ca. 365–ca. 290 BC), Chinese Taoist philosopher, 114, 115. Zweig, Stefan (1881–1942), Austrian author, 26.

Index of Subjects absurd, the, 75, 85, 231. actuality, 8, 54, 240. alienation, 57, 117, 119, 233. anxiety, 9, 12–21 passim, 43, 47, 51, 53, 57–8, 60, 65–74 passim, 109, 111, 115, 117, 232, 240, 243, 322. apathy, 6. atheism, 12. Aufhebung, 52, 64. authenticity, 30, 33, 70. authority, 20. autonomy, 14. belief, 9, 255. Bible, 213. boredom, 110, 112, 117, 129. Buddhism, 151. Christianity, 176, 182, 184, 213–14, 218, 234, 237–46 passim, 254–8 passim, 273. Christology, 244, 246, 255. communication, 70. indirect, 6, 51, 65, 75, 81, 105, 107, 114, 236, 248–9, 253. Confucianism, 114. contemporaneity, 88, 280. crowd, the, 68, 75, 133, 142. daimonic, the, 6, 18–19, 21, 45. death, 3, 10, 12–13, 18, 21, 49–53 passim, 61, 233. deconstruction, 229, 252, 256. despair, 15–16, 47, 60, 65–70 passim, 110–12 passim, 115, 117, 129, 131, 138, 183, 240, 243, 291, 320. dialectic, 51, 52, 64, 110, 113–16 passim, 139, 275, 291, 292, 299. dialectical theology, 139, 149, 205. Don Juan, 70, 113, 119.

doubt, 129. earnest, the, 70. eternity, 20, 53, 54, 57, 58, 61, 65, 70, 135, 239, 291. ethics, 251. excluded middle, law of, 16. existence, 4, 5, 70, 108, 111, 115. existentialism, 4–9 passim, 13–15, 19, 33, 46, 49–51, 54–60, 63, 64, 67, 70–74 passim, 77, 85, 86, 104, 107–13 passim, 116, 118, 127, 132–9 passim, 149–52 passim, 179, 184, 187, 188, 205, 229, 231–5 passim, 251, 252, 269, 270, 273–5 passim, 285, 290, 320, 322. atheistic, 85, 113, 138. religious, 9, 52, 78, 82, 84, 113, 138, 177, 178. faith, 44, 45, 47, 48, 53, 69, 74, 77, 80, 115, 181–3 passim, 214, 215, 218, 232–41 passim, 244, 246, 254, 256, 257, 290. Fall, the, 58. finite/infinite, 51, 54. freedom, 8, 13, 14, 47, 48, 51, 53, 60, 65, 67, 70–77 passim, 111, 112, 243, 244, 251, 292. Frankfurt School, 252. grace, 29, 216, 244, 245, 250, 255, 256. hermeneutics, 15. Hong Kierkegaard Library at St. Olaf College, 236, 278, 279, 298, 299, 323, 324. humor, 89, 117, 218. idealism, 5, 14, 51, 108, 110. German, 67, 97, 127, 176.

342

Kierkegaard’s International Reception

imitation of Christ, 245. incarnation, 68, 70, 234, 240, 244, 246. instant, the see moment. International Kierkegaard Commentary, 185, 236. International Kierkegaard Newsletter, 185. inner/outer, 75, 241. irony, 5, 6, 15, 16, 117, 119, 136, 188, 216–18 passim, 236, 248, 255. romantic, 249. Socratic, 45, 46, 89, 276. irrationalism, 113, 117, 181 213, 232, 233. isolation, 53. Koran, the, 7, 9, 13, 46, 47, 89. language, 299. leap, 47, 51–3, 68, 117, 118, 138, 218, 237, 255, 257. logos, 12. love, 77, 256. Christian, 250, 255, 257. Malantschuk Memorial Collection, 178, 188, 209, 210. martyr, 56. Marxism, 50, 51, 69, 97, 103, 110, 115, 132, 136, 231, 269. melancholy, 5, 6, 47, 109, 110, 112, 115, 117, 129, 131, 216, 217, 237. moment, the, 18, 20, 69, 218, 291, 322. monasticism, 74. mysticism, 14, 57, 77, 80, 113, 138. Naqshbandi, 57. negativity, infinite absolute, 46, 136. nihilism, 45. offense, 234. paradox, the, 70, 75, 85, 138, 213. absolute, the 234, 242, 256. passion, 85, 115, 242. phenomenology, 11, 12, 15, 48, 67, 70, 72, 74, 82, 84. positivism, logical, 136. possibility, 8, 54, 240. postmodernism, 110, 111, 249. Pragmatism, 14, 134, 136, 138, 177, 231.

Protestantism, 45. pseudonyms, 6, 83, 107, 111, 206, 213, 214, 236, 239, 256. religiousness A and B, 117, 183, 207, 216. repetition, 70, 111, 219, 286, 322. revelation, 202, 245, 255. Romanticism, 6, 112, 237, 254. German, 15. sickness, 65. silence, 56. sin, 15, 16, 58, 60, 65, 69, 74, 256, 322. single individual, the, 56, 57, 65, 68, 120, 130, 131, 133, 138, 142. Sociedad Iberoamericana de Estudios Kierkegaardianos (SIEK), 278–80, 287. solitude, 10, 52, 62, 85, 115, 129. Søren Kierkegaard Library at the University of Copenhagen, 141. Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre at the University of Copenhagen, 98, 106, 238. soteriology, 88, 246. speculative philosophy, 117–20 passim. stages, 61, 70, 89, 106, 112, 136, 141, 237–41 passim, 257. subjectivism, 5, 6, 16, 68, 85, 113, 127. subjectivity, 47, 68, 108, 111, 133, 151, 180, 242, 292. Sufism, 3, 4, 6, 9, 18–21, 54, 56–62, 69, 74. suspension, 15. Taoism, 115. teleological suspension of the ethical, 31, 181. time, 3, 5, 13, 20, 21, 32, 41, 50, 51, 53, 54, 57, 61, 66, 135, 239, 240, 280, 288, 290. tragedy, 119. transcendence, 85, 86. trinity, 246. truth, subjective, 108. upbuilding discourses, 87. Utilitarism, 136. Wandering Jew, 276.