Volume 4: Policy and Planning 9781529219067

Table of contents :
Front Cover
Series
Volume 4: Policy and Planning
Copyright information
Table of contents
List of Figures and Tables
Notes on Contributors
Acknowledgments
Preface to All Four Volumes of Global Reflections on COVID-19 and Urban Inequalities
One Introduction: Policy Making in the Face of Uncertainty and Inequality
Introduction
Public policy challenges
The pandemic exposes cracks in the social edifice
The time frames of the pandemic
COVID-19 and the city
References
Part I COVID-19 and Urban Changes
Two The Exaggerated Reports of Offices’ Demise: The Strength of Weak Workplace Ties
Introduction
Working from home: enablers and constraints
The attraction and efficiencies of offices
Conclusion: Offices, residential neighborhoods, and inequality
Note
References
Three Platform Labour in Urban Spaces after COVID-19
Introduction
Platforms in contemporary capitalism
Differences and similarities in reaction to COVID-19
Urban policy and planning
Notes
References
Four More Cycling and Road Closures, But for Whom and Where?
Introduction
Vancouver cycling during COVID-19
Findings
Funding and development cost levies
Lack of representation
Barriers to participation and representation in decision-making
Moving forward and shifting gears
References
Fiver Governing ‘the Night’ in Post-COVID-19 Lisbon: Challenges, Opportunities, and Uncertainties
Introduction
Resilient and insurgent nights during COVID times
Towards co-creative and participative governance of nightlife in post-COVID-19 Lisbon
Conclusion: Is nightlife over forever?
Acknowledgments
References
Siz Small Business Owners in Stockholm and the Anti-Lockdown Pandemic Strategy
Introduction
The importance of public space during a pandemic
Reflections on the consequences of the anti-lockdown strategy
The spatial context and increased health risk
The economic impact on different business sectors
The accessibility to governmental support
The loss of customers when people ‘work from home’
Conclusion
References
Seven Urban Inequalities and the Lived Politics of Resilience
Introduction
Pandemics, urban inequalities, and resilience
From a critique of resilience to a critical deployment of resilience
The lived politics of resilience
Towards the ontology of justice
Note
References
Part II The Pandemic, Social Inequality, and Mobilization
Eight Navigating Socio-Economic Pressures in COVID-19 Urban Kenya: A Relational Geographies’ Perspective
Introduction
Changing debt-relations and the emergence of a COVID-19 economy
Urban-rural relations, gender identities, and intimate (household) relations
COVID-19 and relational geographies
References
Nine On Standby? But for How Long? The Impact of COVID-19 Lockdown Measures on the Urban Poor of Sri Lanka
The disproportionate impact on the urban informal sector
The informal sector matters
Note
References
Ten Combatting Older Adult Loneliness: It Takes a (Blended) Village
Introduction
Loneliness, social isolation, and social distancing
Oakridge Seniors Association
References
Eleven Kindness More Contagious Than Viruses: An Inclusive and Innovative Response to Inequalities in Ankara
Introduction
The governmental response to COVID-19: from a mandatory distribution of tasks to intergovernmental conflict
The case of Ankara Municipality
In lieu of a conclusion
Notes
References
Twelve Resisting Disaster Capitalism During COVID-19 in Chile: People Fight Back
Introduction
Structural inequalities as root causes of discontent, the context of COVID-19 in Chile
Resisting responses to COVID-19 effects: a reaction to urban inequalities and slow institutional actions
Conclusion
Note
References
Thirteen Rapid Deployment of Transport Infrastructure and Urban Social Injustice: The Case of Medellín, Colombia
Introduction
Our case and its relevance for urban sustainability
Sustainability considerations
Urban justice and the role of transport
Methodology and results
Conclusion
References
Part III Municipal and Urban Policy Responses
Fourteen Transnational Experiences of COVID-19: Transferable Lessons for Urban Planning Between the Global South and the Global North
Introduction
Pandemic, lockdown, and reopening in four cities
Governing pandemics: capacity and resilience
Transferable lessons for planning
Conclusion
References
Fifteen Urban Mobility, Working Culture, and Administration During the COVID-19 Crisis: Adjustments for a Resilient City
Introduction
Crisis responses: redistribution of public space
Crisis response: changes in working culture
Crisis responses: public transport
Conclusion
References
Sixteen Public Transport Qualities and Inequalities in Pandemic Times
Introduction
User experiences and atmospheres
Challenges, government responses, fare systems
Future of public transport: long-lasting changes?
Notes
References
Seventeen COVID-19 and the Creative City: Lessons from the UK
Introduction
The creative city and inequality
COVID-19 and failures of creative justice
New possibilities for urban cultural policy in the age of pandemic
References
Eighteen Urban Regional Planning under the Pandemic: The Case of Oslo
Introduction
The (intraurban) geographies of the pandemic and related inequalities
The case of Oslo
Exploring intraurban COVID-19 impacts and potential explanatory factors across the Oslo region
Implications for urban and regional planning
References
Nineteen Distributing, De-Synchronizing, Digitalizing: Dealing with Milan Transport Inequalities in Post-COVID-19 Society
Introduction
Milan 2020 document: tactical strategies to deal with COVID-19
Two main coexistent perspectives for a more inclusive city
Conclusion
Notes
References
Twenty The View from the Socio-Spatial Peripheries: Milan, Italy and Toronto, Canada
Introduction
The socio-spatial periphery
COVID-19 in the socio-spatial periphery of Toronto
COVID-19 in the socio-spatial periphery of Milan
Conclusion: Critiquing hegemonic planning through a focus on care
References
Twenty-One Conclusion: The Pandemic and Beyond
Index
Back Cover

Citation preview

VOLUME 4: POLICY AND PLANNING PIERRE FILION, BRIAN DOUCET, AND RIANNE VAN MELIK

GLOBAL REFLECTIONS ON COVID-19 AND URBAN INEQUALITIES

COVID-19 COLLECTION



Global Reflections on COVID-19 and Urban Inequalities series Series Editors: Brian Doucet, University of Waterloo Rianne van Melik, Radboud University Pierre Filion, University of Waterloo

This timely four-volume Shorts series explores the challenges and opportunities facing cities in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Offering crucial insights for reforming cities to be more resilient to future crises, this is an invaluable resource for scholars and policy makers alike.

Titles in the series: Volume 1: Community and Society

Volume 2: Housing and Home

Volume 3: Public Space and Mobility

Volume 4: Policy and Planning

Find out more at: https://bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/global-reflections-oncovid-19-and-urban-inequalities

EDITED BY PIERRE FILION, BRIAN DOUCET, AND RIANNE VAN MELIK

VOLUME 4: POLICY AND PLANNING

First published in Great Britain in 2021 by Bristol University Press University of Bristol 1–​9 Old Park Hill Bristol BS2 8BB UK t: +44 (0)117 954 5940 e: bup-​[email protected] Details of international sales and distribution partners are available at bristoluniversitypress.co.uk © Bristol University Press 2021 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​1904-​3 hardcover ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​1905-​0 ePub ISBN 978-​1-​5292-​1906-​7 ePdf The right of Pierre Filion, Brian Doucet, and Rianne van Melik to be identified as editors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Bristol University Press. Every reasonable effort has been made to obtain permission to reproduce copyrighted material. If, however, anyone knows of an oversight, please contact the publisher. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the editors and contributors and not of the University of Bristol or Bristol University Press. The University of Bristol and Bristol University Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Bristol University Press works to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design: blu inc, Bristol Front cover image: Edward Howell/unsplash.com Bristol University Press uses environmentally responsible print partners. Printed in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

Contents List of Figures and Tables Notes on Contributors Acknowledgments Preface to All Four Volumes of Global Reflections on COVID-​19 and Urban Inequalities one

Introduction: Policy Making in the Face of Uncertainty and Inequality

ix xi xviii xix

1

Pierre Filion, Brian Doucet, and Rianne van Melik

Part I COVID-​19 and Urban Changes two The Exaggerated Reports of Offices’ 15 Demise: The Strength of Weak Workplace Ties Richard Shearmur, Manuela Parra-​Lokhorst, and Alastair Wycliffe-​Jones

three Platform Labour in Urban Spaces after COVID-​19

25

Sandro Mezzadra, Mattia Frapporti, and Maurilio Pirone

four

More Cycling and Road Closures, But for Whom and Where? Rebecca Mayers

v

35

POLICY AND PLANNING

five

Governing ‘the Night’ in Post-​COVID-​19 Lisbon: Challenges, Opportunities, and Uncertainties

47

Manuel Garcia-​Ruiz, Iñigo Sánchez-​Fuarros, João Carlos Martins, Cristiana Vale Pires, and Jordi Nofre

six

Small Business Owners in Stockholm and the Anti-​Lockdown Pandemic Strategy

59

Rosa Danenberg

seven Urban Inequalities and the Lived Politics of Resilience

69

Oleg Golubchikov and Geoffrey DeVerteuil

Part II The Pandemic, Social Inequality, and Mobilization eight Navigating Socio-​Economic Pressures in COVID-​19 Urban Kenya: A Relational Geographies’ Perspective

81

Christiane Stephan, Mario Schmidt, and Eric Mutisya Kioko

nine

On Standby? But for How Long? The Impact of COVID-​19 Lockdown Measures on the Urban Poor of Sri Lanka

91

Mohamed Munas, Lothar Smith, and Dilshani N. Ranawaka

ten

Combatting Older Adult Loneliness: It Takes a (Blended) Village Maxwell Hartt, Samantha J. Norberg, Julie Kearns, Maliha Majeed, and Barry Pendergast

vi

101

Contents

eleven Kindness More Contagious Than Viruses: An Inclusive and Innovative Response to Inequalities in Ankara

111

Özgür Sayın and Savas¸ Zafer S¸ahin

twelve Resisting Disaster Capitalism During COVID-​19 in Chile: People Fight Back

121

Claudia González-​Muzzio, Vicente Sandoval, and Carmen Paz Castro

thirteen Rapid Deployment of Transport Infrastructure and Urban Social Injustice: The Case of Medellín, Colombia

133

Carlos Cadena-​Gaitán, Alejandro Álvarez-​ Vanegas, and María Camila Flórez-​Muñoz

Part III Municipal and Urban Policy Responses fourteen Transnational Experiences of COVID-​19: Transferable Lessons for Urban Planning Between the Global South and the Global North

145

Shauna Brail, Michael Martin, Jagath Munasinghe, Rangajeewa Ratnayake, and Julie Rudner

fifteen

Urban Mobility, Working Culture, and Administration During the COVID-​19 Crisis: Adjustments for a Resilient City

159

Kerstin Stark, Julia Schuppan, Ariane Kehlbacher, Julia Jarass, and Laura Gebharbt

sixteen Public Transport Qualities and Inequalities in Pandemic Times Marcus Finbom, Wojciech Kębłowski, Wladimir Sgibnev, Louise Sträuli, Peter Timko, Tauri Tuvikene, and Tonio Weicker

vii

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POLICY AND PLANNING

seventeen COVID-​19 and the Creative City: Lessons from the UK

179

Jonathan Gross, Tamsyn Dent, and Roberta Comunian

eighteen

Urban Regional Planning under the Pandemic: The Case of Oslo

189

Lars Böcker, Per Gunnar Røe, and Elling Oftedal

nineteen

Distributing, De-​Synchronizing, Digitalizing: Dealing with Milan Transport Inequalities in Post-​COVID-​19 Society

201

Paola Pucci, Giovanni Lanza, and Bruna Vendemmia

twenty

The View from the Socio-​Spatial Peripheries: Milan, Italy and Toronto, Canada

211

Lorenzo De Vidovich, Julian Iacobelli, Samantha Biglieri, and Roger Keil

twenty-​one Conclusion: The Pandemic and Beyond

223

Pierre Filion, Rianne van Melik, and Brian Doucet

231

Index

viii

List of Figures and Tables Figures 5.1

9.1 12.1

12.2

13.1

A comparison between nocturnal scenes before (September 2019) and during the COVID-​19 pandemic outbreak (June 2020) on the world-​famous Pink Street in the Cais do Sodré neighborhood, one of Lisbon’s nightlife spots  Distribution of actual and anticipated income reduction Spatial distribution of (a) social priority, (b) life expectancy at birth in women, and (c) men in Santiago Some online maps of ‘common pots’ in the city of Santiago and across Chile. Top: ‘Ollas Comunes’ in Santiago (Google, 2020). Bottom: ‘Iniciativas ayuda alimento’ (Miranda, 2020) Location of COVID-​19 interventions and key socio-​economic variables

ix

49

93 124

127

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POLICY AND PLANNING

16.1

16.2

18.1

Word cloud summarizing responses to the survey question: ‘Following the COVID-​19 outbreak, how would you describe the atmosphere in public transport? Please provide any keywords that come to your mind.’ Responses from seven languages were translated into English and added up Responses to the survey question, ‘Do you consider public transport to be more or less safe than grocery stores?’ sorted by use of PT during the pandemic Map of COVID-​19 cases per 10,000 inhabitants (September 8, 2020) in different urban districts in Oslo (top left), and maps indicating social status (top right and middle), public transport use (bottom left), and population density (bottom right)

171

Categories of businesses surveyed Pandemic, lockdown, and reopening in four cities (and respective countries)

62 148

174

195

Tables 6.1 14.1

x

Notes on Contributors Alejandro Álvarez-​Vanegas is a Professor at Universidad EAFIT and a PhD candidate at Maastricht University, the Netherlands. Samantha Biglieri is an Assistant Professor at the School of Urban and Regional Planning, Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada. Lars Böcker is a Senior Researcher at the Institute of Transport Economics, Norway. Shauna Brail is an Associate Professor at the Institute for Management & Innovation, University of Toronto, Canada. Carlos Cadena-G ​ aitán is Transport Secretary (Commissioner) at the City of Medellín, Columbia. Carmen Paz Castro is a Professor at the Geography Department and Vice Dean of the Faculty of Architecture and Urbanism, University of Chile. Roberta Comunian is a Reader in Creative Economy in the Department of Culture, Media & Creative Industries, King’s College London, UK.

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Rosa Danenberg is a PhD student at the Division of Urban and Regional Studies at KTH Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm, Sweden. Tamsyn Dent is a Research Fellow in the Department of Culture, Media & Creative Industries, King’s College London, UK. Geoffrey DeVerteuil is a Reader in Social Geography at Cardiff University, UK. Lorenzo De Vidovich is a Sociologist at the Department of Architecture and Urban Studies at Politecnico di Milan, Italy, and a Lecturer at the University of Trieste, Italy. Brian Doucet is an Associate Professor and Canada Research Chair in the School of Planning at the University of Waterloo, Canada. Pierre Filion is a Professor in the School of Planning at the University of Waterloo, Canada. Marcus Finbom is a Traffic Planner at WSP Sweden and Research Fellow in the PUTSPACE project. María Camila Flórez-​Muñoz is a Policy Planner at the Transport Department, City of Medellín, Columbia. Mattia Frapporti is a Postdoctoral Fellow at University of Bologna, Italy, within the Horizon 2020 PLUS project (Platform Labour in Urban Spaces). Manuel Garcia- ​ R uiz is FCT Doctoral Researcher in Urban Sociology at the Centro de Investigação e Estudos de Sociologia –​Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-​ IUL), Portugal.

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Notes on Contributors

Laura Gebhardt is a Researcher at the Institute of Transport Research, German Aerospace Center (DLR), Germany. Oleg Golubchikov is a Reader in Human Geography at Cardiff University, UK. Claudia González-​Muzzio is a Consultant and Researcher in land planning and disaster risk reduction, Chile. Jonathan Gross is a Research Fellow in the Department of Culture, Media & Creative Industries, King’s College London, UK. Maxwell Hartt is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Geography and Planning at Queen’s University, Canada. Julian Iacobelli holds a Master’s in environmental studies degree from the Faculty of Environmental and Urban Change, York University, Toronto, Canada. Julia Jarass is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the DLR Institute of Transport Research (German Aerospace Centre), Germany. Julie Kearns is the Vice President of the Oakridge Community Association and the Oakridge Seniors Association, Canada. Wojciech Kębłowski is a Postdoctoral Researcher at ULB/​ VUB in Brussels, Belgium. Ariane Kehlbacher is an Econometrician at the DLR Institute of Transport Research (German Aerospace Centre), Germany. Roger Keil is a Professor at the Faculty of Environmental and Urban Change at York University, Toronto, Canada.

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Eric Mutisya Kioko is a Social Anthropologist based at the Department of Environmental Studies and Community Development, Kenyatta University, Kenya. Giovanni Lanza is a PhD candidate in Urban Planning, Design and Policy at the Politecnico di Milano, Italy. Maliha Majeed is a Policy and Program Coordinator in Transportation Services for the City of Kingston, Canada. Michael Martin is an Assistant Professor in the Section of Architecture and Design at Aalborg University, Denmark. João Carlos Martins holds a PhD in Urban Sociology and is currently a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Instituto de Ciências Sociais, University of Lisbon, Portugal. Rebecca Mayers is a PhD candidate in the School of Community and Regional Planning at the University of British Columbia, Canada. Sandro Mezzadra teaches political theory at University of Bologna, Italy, and is an Adjunct Fellow at the Institute for Culture and Society of the Western Sydney University, Australia. Mohamed Munas is a Senior Researcher at the Centre for Poverty Analysis, Colombo, Sri Lanka, and a Doctoral Candidate at Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands. Jagath Munasinghe is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Moratuwa, Sri Lanka, and the President of the Institute of Town Planners, Sri Lanka. Jordi Nofre is FCT Associate Research Professor in Urban Geography at the Interdisciplinary Centre of Social Sciences of NOVA University of Lisbon, Portugal, and coordinator of

xiv

Notes on Contributors

LXNIGHTS –​The International Research Network on the Urban Night, Lisbon, Portugal. Samantha J. Norberg is an Administrator at the Oakridge Seniors Association, Canada. Elling Oftedal is a Master’s Student in Human Geography at the Department of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo, Norway. Manuela Parra-​Lokhorst is a Graduate Student at the School of Urban Planning, McGill University, Canada. Barry Pendergast is a retired Architect and Planner and the President of the Oakridge Seniors Association, Canada. Maurilio Pirone is a Postdoctoral Fellow in ‘Labour discipline and new processes of organizing in the platform economy’ at University of Bologna, Italy, within the Horizon 2020 PLUS project (Platform Labour in Urban Spaces). Paola Pucci is a Professor of Urban Planning at the Politecnico di Milano, Italy. Dilshani N. Ranawaka is a Junior Researcher at the Centre for Poverty Analysis, Colombo, Sri Lanka, and currently reading for her Master’s in economics. Rangajeewa Ratnayake is a Professor at the Department of Town and Country Planning, University of Moratuwa, Sri Lanka. Per Gunnar Røe is a Professor of Human Geography at the Department of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo, Norway.

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Julie Rudner is a Senior Lecturer and Convenor of the Community Planning and Development Program at La Trobe University, Bendigo, Australia. Savaş Zafer Şahin is a Lecturer in Ankara Ahcı Bayram Veli University, Turkey. Iñigo Sánchez-​Fuarros holds a PhD in Cultural Anthropology and is currently Ramón y Cajal Senior Postdoctoral Researcher at the Institute of Heritage Sciences of the Spanish National Research Council (Incipit CSIC). He is also Principal Investigator of the FCT project ‘Sounds of Tourism’. Vicente Sandoval is a Consultant and Researcher on urban disaster risk governance at DRU, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany. Özgür Sayın is a Lecturer in the Department of Economics at Bilecik Şeyh Edebali University, Turkey. Mario Schmidt is a Research Associate in the ARTES Research Group Transformations of Life at the University of Cologne, Germany. Julia Schuppan is a Researcher at the Institute of Transport Research at the DLR German Aerospace Center (DLR), Germany, in the department Mobility and Urban Development. Wladimir Sgibnev is a Senior Researcher at the Leibniz-​ Institute for Regional Geography, Germany. Richard Shearmur is a Professor and Director of the School of Urban Planning, McGill University, Canada. Lothar Smith is a Human Geographer based at the Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands.

xvi

Notes on Contributors

Kerstin Stark is a Researcher at the Institute of Transport Research at the DLR (German Aerospace Centre), Germany. Christiane Stephan is a Postdoctoral Researcher in human geography at the Department of Geography at University Bonn, Germany. Louise Sträuli is a PhD candidate in the PUTSPACE ­project, Estonia. Peter Timko is a Research Fellow in the PUTSPACE project, the Netherlands. Taur i Tuvikene is an Urban Geographer at Tallinn University, Estonia. Cristiana Vale Pires is a Researcher and Lecturer at the Faculty of Education and Psychology of the Universidade Católica Portuguesa, Portugal, and is a founding member of the Kosmicare association. Rianne van Melik is an Assistant Professor at the Insitute for Management Research, Radhoud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands. Bruna Vendemmia is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Politecnico di Milano, Italy. Tonio Weicker is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Leibniz-​ Institute for Regional Geography, Germany. Alastair Wycliffe-​Jones is a Graduate Student at the School of Urban Planning, McGill University, Canada.

xvii

Acknowledgments This volume is one of four in the Global Reflections on COVID-​19 and Urban Inequalities series, edited by Brian Doucet, Rianne van Melik, and Pierre Filion. The editors of this series would like to thank Bristol University Press, in particular Emily Watt and Freya Trand, for their help and guidance while working with us to publish these books quickly. Thanks to Helen Flitton and Anna Paterson from Newgen Publishing UK for their detailed and timely work on copy-editing and production. We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of our series proposal, as well as the individual manuscripts for their helpful and constructive feedback. We would especially like to thank Brayden Wilson, an MA student in Planning at the University of Waterloo, for his coordination of the administration of this project, including his frequent and thorough correspondence with over 70 contributors that helped to keep this project on schedule. Brayden’s work was supported thanks to funding from Canada Research Chairs program, under award number 950-​231821. Territorial Land Acknowledgment –​Brian Doucet and Pierre Filion work at the University of Waterloo and reside in the City of Kitchener, which are situated on the Haldimand Tract, land that was promised to the Haudenosaunee of the Six Nations of the Grand River, and is within the traditional territory of the Neutral, Anishinaabeg, and Haudenosaunee peoples.

xviii

Preface to All Four Volumes of Global Reflections on COVID-​19 and Urban Inequalities You are currently reading one of the four volumes of Global Reflections on COVID-​19 and Urban Inequalities, which jointly explore schisms the pandemic has both revealed and widened, and measures taken to mitigate or eradicate these societal gaps. The aim of this series of edited volumes is to bring together a collection of critical urban voices across various disciplines, geographies, and perspectives in order to examine the urban challenges of COVID-​19 and its impact on new and existing inequities in cities around the world. There are two sides to the pandemic. As a highly contagious disease, given enough time and a lack of effective mitigation to restrain its spread, COVID-​19 will eventually infect a large majority of the population, regardless of income or geography. This is why many public health measures are directed at entire national (or indeed global) populations. But we have also quickly learned that COVID-​19 is selective in its effects –​for instance, based on age and comorbidity –​and that the pandemic and responses to it exacerbate fault lines traversing cities, societies, and, indeed, the world order. There is a clear urban dimension to these inequities. Some parts of the city and some populations who reside in cities are more likely to contract and spread the virus. COVID-​19 is thus an amplifier of pre-​existing social divisions. Access to medical treatment and possibilities to physically isolate from potential

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infection are unevenly distributed. So too are the consequences of policy responses, such as lockdowns, the economic impacts of the pandemic and the individual and political reactions it prompts. The pandemic has therefore increased divisions such as between young and old, rich and poor, left and right, and countless other societal dichotomies. As a result, experiences of urban life during the pandemic vary greatly. Where these impacts of the pandemic intersect with pre-​existing racism, ageism, sexism, ableism, and spatial divisions within the city, the consequences have been particularly severe. As we write this preface, vaccines are starting to be produced, distributed, and administered. This poses new questions: will we emerge from the pandemic thanks to these vaccines? How equitable will the distribution of vaccines be within countries and at the global scale? This context suggests myriad potential urban futures. The planning, policy, and political choices made in the short term will impact the medium-​and long-​term trajectories of cities and the lives of their residents. Moving forward, the challenge is how to ensure that planning and policy responses to the pandemic do not further exacerbate pre-​existing inequalities and injustices that were amplified because of COVID-​19. Therefore, there is a need for engaged, critical urban scholarship in order to ensure that issues of social justice and equity are front and center, not only in academic debates, but in rapidly evolving planning, policy, and public discussions that will shape these urban futures. Our four volumes suggest pathways that can help make this possible. Rather than speculate, however, this book, and its three companions in our series, unites well-​informed, reflective, and empirically grounded research from around the world to contextualize the new and amplified inequities brought about by COVID-​19. The divisions that are apparent during the pandemic are not treated in isolation; they are firmly situated as part of long-​term trends and broader narratives about cities, places, communities and spaces.

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Preface

Critical urban research during the pandemic The first accounts of the novel coronavirus that would become known as COVID-​19 emerged late in 2019 in Wuhan, China. Over the first months of 2020, the virus spread around the world. On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared a global pandemic. Schools and businesses closed, office workers were told to work from home, and public spaces were shut. International travel came to a virtual standstill. Varying degrees of lockdown restricted the movements of people outside of their homes. In public, keeping distance from others and wearing facemasks became the norm. While the exact timing of these measures varied by country, by the summer of 2020, the majority of the world’s population had experienced most of them. While the lockdowns did ‘flatten the contagion curve’, as restrictions of movement and activities were lifted, after a period of relative stability, infection rates took off again in the fall of 2020 and into 2021, reaching levels much higher than those experienced during the first wave. As academics, we transitioned our own work during this time by setting up home offices, switching our teaching to online platforms, and adapting our research methodologies. The specifics of our own research shifted as it became impossible to study contemporary cities without assessing the impact of COVID-​19. The more we examined our own research, however, it became apparent that the key questions and approaches driving our work remained central to interpreting this new reality. The inequities we were already examining in housing, transportation, public space, metropolitan regions, and planning systems took on new dimensions because of the pandemic. But most of the inequalities that are so central and visible during the pandemic were themselves not new; they were building, in different ways, on the pre-​existing inequalities of cities before COVID-​19. It soon became clear that COVID-​19 was exacerbating and amplifying existing

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socio-economic and spatial inequities, even more than it was creating entirely new ones. The pace of change during the pandemic poses a particular dilemma for researchers, who usually benefit from sufficient time to reflect and analyze. On the one hand, jumping too quickly to conclusions leads one to speculate rather than reflect, ‘opinionate’ rather than research. Academics are not journalists and it is not our task to provide real-​time accounts and assessment of change. On the other hand, as critical urban scholars, we must contribute to the discussions about the myriad ways COVID-​19 is reshaping urban spaces and the lives of their inhabitants. Critical voices are more important now than ever, especially since cities face such uncertain futures and the responses to the pandemic will shape cities and urban life for years to come. COVID-​19 has created urban challenges unprecedented in our lifetime. The pandemic has torn back the curtain on uneven social, spatial, and racial processes of urbanization that were previously downplayed in mainstream planning and policy debates. They have rendered visible some of what was previously invisible. This context also gives rise to new possibilities and ideas that were once at the fringes of urban debates, such as closing streets to cars, which have been put into practice in cities around the world. But again, critical scholarship and research is necessary in order to study to what extent these planning and policy responses to the pandemic play a role in impacting (and potentially augmenting) the inequalities and injustices that are central to cities in the 21st century. In short, it is simply not possible for urban researchers to ‘sit this one out’ while the dust settles. While academics may prefer to conduct research after the fact, this may be years into the future and after many important decisions have long been made. The challenge is therefore to strike a delicate balance between a slower, contemplative, and reflective approach to scholarship, while still striving to influence broader, rapidly evolving debates. We believe that our approach to

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Preface

this edited series strikes the right tone between these two important approaches. The development of this edited series Specifically, this four-​part collection emerged from a meeting between our editorial team –​ Brian Doucet, Rianne van Melik, and Pierre Filion –​and Bristol University Press in April 2020, wherein we were asked to assemble a rapid response book dealing with cities and the COVID-​19 pandemic. As an editorial team, our approach has been to balance the need to make active contributions to rapidly shifting debates, while also reflecting on the impact the pandemic was having on urban inequities. We decided that short chapters, highly accessible to a diverse audience of scholars, students, professionals, planners, and an informed public, would be most suitable. The short nature of these chapters means that they fall somewhere between a typical media piece and a full-​length peer-​reviewed article. A broad call for chapters was launched in mid-​June 2020. Throughout various listservs and on social media, we invited researchers to reflect on how COVID-​19 has impacted new and existing inequalities in cities throughout the world. We welcomed chapters that dealt with any urban topic and featured perspectives and voices not always central to mainstream scholarly, planning, or policy debates, including some co-​written by non-​academic authors. The response to our invitation was overwhelming. We received many more abstracts than containable in a single volume. After a rigorous evaluation of the abstracts, we invited selected researchers to write full chapters. Keeping the best of these chapters we found ourselves with a sufficient number of chapters for four volumes. The volumes were organized around the four main themes dominating the submitted chapters. Given the edited nature of the book, the global scale of its chapters, and the wide scope of its object of study, there are inevitable gaps in the coverage of events relating to the

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pandemic, the reactions it has prompted, and the impact of all of this on different social groups. Also, it has proven impossible to provide cases from all parts of the world. All the same, the volumes do offer broad perspectives on different aspects of COVID-​19 and their manifestation in different countries and continents. One of our goals was to include scholars from a variety of career phases, including early career researchers and graduate students, and to welcome chapters written in partnership with non-​academic colleagues, many of whom offer insightful perspectives of lived experiences during the pandemic. Each of the four volumes deals with a separate theme: Volume 1 is centered on Community and Society; Volume 2 deals with Housing and Home; Volume 3 examines Public Space and Mobility; and Volume 4 focuses on Policy and Planning. Each volume can be read as a stand-​alone book, with a coherent theme, structure, introduction, and conclusion. But when read together, these four volumes synthesize research that reflects on the different ways in which the COVID-​19 pandemic is reshaping urban inequities. While we have divided the volumes thematically, it is becoming increasingly clear that issues of housing, land use, mobility, urban design, and economic development (issues long siloed in urban debates) all need to be part of the same conversation about contemporary and future urban challenges. This is particularly true if social justice, equity, and the right to the city are to be central to the conversation. Many chapters throughout the series therefore focus on how COVID-​19 intersects with different forms of inequality and injustice. The timing for this project is particularly important. We gave contributors the summer of 2020 to write their chapters. Chapters were put together, not in the heated uncertainty of those first few months, but rather during a period when initial reflection on the pandemic’s first wave became possible. While some chapters rely on media reports or carefully reflect on the early days of COVID-​19, others draw on important

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Preface

and insightful fieldwork carried out during the spring and summer of 2020. Much will have changed between when the volumes were written and when the series is available on physical and virtual bookshelves. This edited series is not a journalistic account of the pandemic. Instead, these volumes are a collective account of the first months of the pandemic, assembled with the idea that the knowledge, voices, and perspectives found within these volumes are necessary to shaping responses to the pandemic. The chapters presented in these four volumes serve as essential documentation and analysis of how the pandemic initially manifested itself within cities around the world, cities that were already becoming more economically, socially, racially, and spatially unequal. Understanding the early phases of this global pandemic is essential to dealing with its next waves and planning for the post-​pandemic period. Likewise, understanding the consequences of how the pandemic intersects with urban inequalities is necessary in order to create more equitable and socially just cities.

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ONE

Introduction: Policy Making in the Face of Uncertainty and Inequality Pierre Filion, Brian Doucet, and Rianne van Melik

Introduction In The War of the Worlds, H.G. Wells (1898) describes the superiority of the Martian assailants over the organization and technology Earth’s civilizations can deploy against them. All the military prowess on Earth fails to dent the invasion. And then, out of the blue, the apparently invincible attack vanishes. Martians have been overcome by a silent and invisible enemy; a deadly epidemic caused by bacteria, which achieved what all the powers of Earth’s civilizations could not. Invading powers are brought to their knees by a microscopic infectious agent. Like the invaders, the COVID-​19 pandemic has seemed to be able to overwhelm nearly all the policies adopted to contain it. In the process, the pandemic brings to light flaws in governments’ policy making and fractures running through societies. This time, it is not the Martians whom Earth’s civilizations appear unable to defeat, but the type of microscopic agent (albeit in this case a virus rather than bacteria) that destroyed the Martians in the novel.

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Public policy challenges The still relatively short history of government reactions to the COVID-​19 pandemic is one of policy making in a time of uncertainty. The policy landscape is in a state of flux. The unfolding of the pandemic remains largely unpredictable; it flares up, seems to come under control for some time and then peaks again at an unprecedented level. But it is fair to say that, until now, it is generally the most pessimistic contagion scenarios that have materialized (Roberts, M. 2020). At the same time, knowledge on COVID-​19 progresses, causing changes in the perception of the disease and of the likely future of the pandemic. We know more about transmission, the different forms the disease can take, and its long-​term health consequences (Rees, 2020). As a result, public health guidelines have varied over time, causing skepticism in some constituencies about directives intended to contain contagion. Finally, public opinion about the pandemic and policy responses also changes over time, which affects compliance with sanitary guidelines (Bosman et al, 2020). At the time of writing, vaccines are raising hope about a foreseeable ending of the pandemic. Yet, questions remain. Will the vaccines be able to tackle over the medium and long term a mutating virus? How long will it take until a sufficient proportion of the global population is vaccinated to allow all aspects of the world economy to resume, including international travelling? How equitable will the distribution of vaccines be? Will it be based on the risk and danger faced by individuals or ability to pay, within and between countries? Early in the pandemic, the policy objectives seemed to be simple. Many governments imposed lockdowns and despite severe consequences on social life, personal finances, and public sector budgets, compliance was high. The message was clear: flatten the contagion curve in order to prevent hospitals from being overwhelmed by COVID-​19 patients (Roberts, S. 2020). But unable or unwilling to withstand the heavy cost

2

Introduction

of a stalled economy, governments have later relied on more targeted measures in an effort to balance contagion control with a maintenance of economic activity. Also, due to concerns about the economic and social life consequences of ongoing or intensifying confinement measures, the support of the public appeared to wane over time as COVID-​19 fatigue set in. But with the surge of cases, hospitalization, and deaths with the second wave of the pandemic, lockdowns are being imposed again in winter 2021, as vaccination is progressing at different rates according to the country. There is a great deal of variation in the success of governments in getting a grip on the pandemic. Some seem to be performing much better than others. South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, New Zealand, Japan, and perhaps China after the initial outbreak, appear to have been able to keep the contagion under control. Other parts of the world, such as South Saharan Africa, with the exception of South Africa, also appear to have avoided high contagion rates. But industrialized democracies did not perform very well. It is still too early to identify factors accounting for these variations, especially since there are considerable fluctuations in the international spread of the virus over time (Oxford, 2020). Extreme income inequality and political polarization, encountered to diverse degrees in the countries that have been worse affected, have been invoked as factors associated with the spread of the pandemic, along with an elevated average age and overcrowded living conditions (Banjamin, 2020). But caveats are in order when praising some countries for their success in controlling the pandemic and blaming others for their inability to do so. Countries that performed well during the first wave found themselves overwhelmed during the second wave and vice versa. The pandemic exposes cracks in the social edifice COVID-​19 is not an equal opportunity disease. Its symptoms are much more severe among the elderly and people with

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comorbidities. Of course, this situation is made worse when social inequalities intersect with susceptibility to COVID-​19. This is the case when old and sick people are exposed to the virus in nursing homes or crowded multi-​generational households. In many countries, racialized communities have seen high rates of COVID-​19 infection. Likewise, the elderly and people with predisposing conditions can come in contact with COVID-​19 if their work involves interacting with the public, or if they use public transit or frequent crowded spaces. And, of course, low-​income individuals often receive inferior medical care. Such situations are observed when poorly staffed nursing homes are ravaged by the pandemic, resulting in extreme mortality rates. At the same time, frontline workers, in some instances recent immigrants, register disproportional infection rates (McLaren, 2020). The economic consequences of the pandemic are felt differently according to whether people have regular or contract jobs, work in the formal or informal sector, or have access to government support programs or not. These variations can be seen within and between countries. Some countries can borrow to provide support programs to their citizens who have lost some or all income due to COVID-​19, although many still fall between the cracks of these programs. Other countries cannot or will not muster such income support resources. These countries tend to have a high proportion of their workforce employed in the informal sector (Manderson and Levine, 2020). Debates about reactions to the pandemic have become highly politicized. In a sense this was to be expected given the trade-​ off between efforts to contain contagion and the social contacts necessary to sustain economic life. But the intensity of conflicts between public health experts calling for protective measures to reduce risks of infection and some politicians who seek to minimize the scope of these measures was unexpected. Also unforeseen was the extent in many countries (especially the US and Brazil) of the mobilization of constituencies denying the gravity of COVID-​19 and the pandemic. As a result, the

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Introduction

response to the pandemic has often been shifting, and the message to the public about the need to take precautions has lacked consistency (Bright, 2020). The pandemic has given rise to a political forum discussing the nature of the pandemic and different possible political responses. Numerous perspectives gravitate around polar responses. One is about arsenals of measures to eradicate or, more realistically, control the pandemic. Its purpose is to prevent contagion as much as possible. The other, marginal within the scientific community but advanced in some political circles, is to let the virus run its course until a sufficient proportion of the population develops immunity, which would bring the pandemic to an end. Hopefully, care would be given to isolating vulnerable populations, assuming that this is possible. These conflicting approaches are grounded in conflicting scientific interpretations of the evolution of the pandemic, as well as contrasts in the priority given to health versus economic considerations. The rallying cry among proponents of limited responses to the pandemic, including those advocating the achievement of herd immunity through widescale infection, is that ‘the remedy should not be worse than the cure’ (Alwan et al, 2020). All voices are not equally heard in debates about how to react to the pandemic. Well-​organized business lobbies and public health experts dominate conversations. Within the public, opponents to constricting public health measures have received considerable attention, especially young people flaunting restrictions. Less heard are the voices and grievances from other victims of the pandemic –​including those affected by its social and economic consequences –​notably the elderly and frontline workers. The time frames of the pandemic The pandemic defies attempts to contain it in time (Hartog, 2020). In most countries the contagion reduction effects of

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lockdowns dissipated after a few months and then COVID-​19 cases after a lull surged. There are many adverse consequences to a protracted pandemic. For example, relying on ballooning deficits causing public debt levels to explode, governments may not be able to sustain for long escalating public expenditure in order to address detection and health care needs and counteract the effects of a contracting economy (Bauer et al, 2020). Other effects include growing difficulty to survive economically for businesses and their workers operating in economic sectors affected by social distancing, such as restaurants, entertainment, culture, and different forms of public transportation. There is also the risk of a generalization of the COVID-​19 fatigue phenomenon reducing adherence to pandemic containment protocols and thus exacerbating contagion. The pandemic therefore does not fit the timespans of governments and policies intended to contain it, of the economic reality confronting much of the population, or of the public’s tolerance to COVID-​19-​induced restrictions. Considering how the past affected the response to the pandemic, we see how COVID-​19 exposes the lack of preparedness, at local, national, and global scales, to the eruption of such a crisis. Looking back at the pre-​pandemic period also raises questions about how historical gains in matters of social equity can be challenged by the health, economic, and public finance sequels of COVID-​19. Additionally, the pre-​existing inequalities that were central to many cities and countries have been carried forward into the present pandemic period. The present time highlights the inadequacies of most policy responses to COVID-​19, that is, the incapacity of governments to mobilize sufficient resources and coordinate their responses. Everywhere governments have found it challenging to balance their different policy objectives with needs arising from the pandemic. And then there is the future. How long will the pandemic last? How will it end? Will the economy bounce back or will it stagnate because of the high debt burden built up during the pandemic? Will economic, social, racial, and

6

Introduction

spatial inequalities continue to exacerbate and grow? Will we be left with collective PTSD about the possibility of repeated pandemics, affecting investment in economic activities dependent on various forms of social gathering? On a more optimistic note, the pandemic could play the role of historical juncture marking a break with the past and offering an opportunity to ‘rebuild better’ (Liu et al, 2020). It could then replicate, maybe at a lesser scale, the transition that post-​World-​War-​II marked in terms of policy making. In Western Europe, rebuilding was propelled by the abundant funding released through the Marshall Fund, and both the North American and Western European economies were stimulated by Keynesian macroeconomic policies. Under the right circumstances and leadership, the post-​pandemic years could, like the post-​war period, be a time of optimism, economic growth, and increased social equity. COVID-​19 and the city If at the beginning of the pandemic an association was made between cities and the pandemic, and especially between density and contagion, the spread of COVID-​19 to all sorts of living environments has challenged this relation. But because they concentrate most of the world’s population, economic activity and policy making institutions, cities provide the stage where much of the pandemic drama unfolds. Urban settings thus expose the health, social, and economic devastation COVID-​19 causes, along with the successes and failures of policy responses to the pandemic as well as their impacts on different constituencies. Cities play a major role in tackling the pandemic because many measures are adopted at the scale of cities and involve adjustments to the way urban areas operate. Volume 4 is divided in three parts. The first part explores how the pandemic and the policies it has prompted have caused changes in how cities function. The second part describes the advancing social inequality brought on by the

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pandemic and policies intended to contain contagion and manage the economy in these circumstances. It also addresses mobilization on the part of affected constituencies to either pressure governments for favorable responses or set up self-​ help systems. Finally, the third part describes and investigates the actual municipal and urban policy responses adopted to deal with the pandemic and its consequences. Of course, the classification of the different chapters in one of the three parts is a matter of emphasis, as most of the chapters discuss at once the impact of the pandemic on cities, inequality, and mobilization and policy responses. Moreover, these chapters also intersect with the other three volumes in this series that focus in more detail on housing, social divisions, and public space. It is becoming increasingly clear that typically siloed planning and policy responses to housing, transportation, land use, and inequality need to be part of the same conversation because these issues intersect. In Part I, Chapter Two explores the present and future impact working from home will have on office buildings and surrounding districts. Shearmur, Parra-​Lokhorst, and Wycliffe-​ Jones take the view that the need for social interaction will bring a proportion of workers back to their offices when the pandemic is over. Chapter Three, written by Mezzadra, Frapporti, and Pirone, investigates the effects of the pandemic on platform economy workers in Europe. While some of them benefit from increased demand for their services, others suffer from reduced work and more stringent working conditions. Chapter Four is about the growing reliance on cycling. Mayers highlights the tendency for the City of Vancouver to provide cycling infrastructure in amenity-​r ich, well-​to-​do neighborhoods rather than where the demand for this mode is highest. In Chapter Five, Garcia-​Ruiz et al investigate how nightlife in Lisbon has been nearly obliterated by the pandemic. While this has made for quieter living areas for residents, it has had deleterious consequences for restaurant, bar, and night club owners and workers and, more generally, for the

8

Introduction

nightlife culture. Chapter Six, by Danenberg, describes how small businesses are disproportionally affected by the pandemic, even in a country like Sweden where there has not been any lockdown and where other restrictions have been more lenient than in most other European countries. Part I closes with Chapter Seven, where Golubchikov and DeVerteuil explore the concept of resilience in the context of what could become more socially equitable post-​pandemic cities. The first two chapters in Part II describe the disproportional effects the pandemic and the containment policies it triggered have had on poorer segments of society. They present the content of interviews describing these consequences and the survival strategies deployed by people engaged in the informal economy. Chapter Eight, by Stephan, Schmidt, and Kioko, and Chapter Nine, by Minas, Ranawaka, and Smith, concentrate respectively on Kenya and Sri Lanka. The next four chapters address the harsh conditions confronting disadvantaged constituencies in the context of the pandemic. But more so than Chapters Eight and Nine, they also explore responses to the suffering experienced by these groups. These reactions either take the form of self-​help, charity, or political mobilization. In Chapter Ten, Hartt et al deal with the plight of the elderly. The chapter investigates community-​based interventions in Calgary attempting to alleviate isolation. Chapter Eleven, by Sayın and Şahin, consider efforts by the Ankara municipal administration to raise money to provide assistance to groups disproportionately disrupted by the pandemic. González-​Muzzio, Sandoval, and Castro look in Chapter Twelve at political mobilization and mutual assistance networks in Chile, responding to the needs of low-​income individuals. These movements are described as ways to resist disaster capitalism. Finally, in Chapter Thirteen, Cadena-​ Gaitán, Álvarez-​Vanegas, and Flórez-​Muñoz show how pop-​up transportation interventions providing secure lanes to non-​motorized vehicles in Medellín have disproportionally benefited lower-​income groups and women.

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In Part III, Chapters Fourteen, by Brail et al, and Fifteen, by Stark et al, compare strategies adopted by different cities: in the first case, concerning the imposition and lifting of lockdowns by cities from different countries and, in the second case, the adaptation of transportation to the pandemic in German cities. The next two chapters concentrate on a specific policy area. In Chapter Sixteen, Finbom et al consider passenger reactions to public transit during the pandemic in European cities and the policy responses adopted by the planners and operators of these systems. The attention of Chapter Seventeen is on the poor performance of the creative city model in UK cities during the pandemic. Gross, Dent, and Comunian lament the lack of compensation and stimulus directed at artists. The last three chapters focus on the relation between urban planning and the geographical patterning of social inequality. Böcker, Røe, and Oftedal explore in Chapter Eighteen the relation between the pandemic and low-​income status in Oslo to demonstrate that it is social inequality, rather than density and public transport use, that is most associated with contagion. Chapters Nineteen and Twenty present two scales of a same reality. In the former, Pucci, Lanza, and Vendemmia describe attempts in Milan to take advantage of the pandemic to improve living conditions, in large part by making more space available to pedestrians and cyclists. In Chapter Twenty, De Vidovich et al are more critical of planning adaptations to the pandemic by using a comparative study of Milan and Toronto to demonstrate that that these adaptations tend to take place in the center rather than the peripheries of metropolitan areas, where contagion is often most active. The chapters in this volume fulfill different purposes. Some provide snapshots that chronicle multiple aspects of how the pandemic affected cities and how governments responded to this crisis. Others reflect on themes driving pandemic-​related urban policies and draw lessons from comparisons between approaches taken by different cities –​identifying what worked and what failed. Throughout the volume, success is defined through the lens of social equity. A foremost lesson to emerge

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Introduction

from the volume is that the pandemic has accentuated social inequality, but while some policy responses have exacerbated this situation other reactions from governments and community efforts have alleviated this effect of the pandemic. The volume thus plays a key role in informing socially equitable urban policies dealing with the later waves of the pandemic and the post-​pandemic period. References Alwan, N.A. et al (31 authors) (2020) ‘Correspondence: scientific consensus on the COVID-​19 pandemic: we need to act now’. The Lancet, October 15. https://​doi.org/​10.1016/​S0140-​6736(20)32153-​X Banjamin, H.M. (2020) ‘The COVID-​19 pandemic: why are some countries coping more successfully than others?’ Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration, 42(3): 153–​69. https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​ 23276665.2020.1784769 Bauer, L., Broady, K.E., Edelberg, W. and O’Donnell, J. (2020) Ten facts about COVID-​1 9 and the US economy. Washington, DC: Brookings. www.brookings.edu/research/ ten-facts-about-covid-19-and-the-u-s-economy/ Bosman, J., Mervosh, S. and Santora, M. (2020) ‘As the coronavirus surges, a new culprit emerges: pandemic fatigue’. The New York Times, October 17. www.nytimes.com/​2020/​10/​17/​ us/​coronavirus-​pandemic-​fatigue.html Bright, R. (2020) ‘Opinions: I couldn’t sit idly and watch people die from Trump’s chaotic, politicized response, so I resigned’. The Washington Post, October 7. www.washingtonpost.com/​ opinions/r​ ick-b​ right-t​ rump-c​ oronavirus-r​ esponse-​nih/​2020/​10/​ 07/​3ed36cb4-​08c3-​11eb-​859b-​f9c27abe638d_​story.html Hartog, F. (2020) L’Occident aux prises avec le temps [The Western World Confronting Time]. Paris: Gallimard. Liu, A., Berube, A. and Parilla, J. (2020) Rebuilding better: a framework to support an equitable recovery form COVID-​19. Washington, DC: Brookings. www.brookings.edu/​research/​rebuild-​better-​a-​ framework-​to-​support-​an-​equitable-​recovery-​from-​covid-​19/​

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Manderson, L. and Levine, S. (2020) ‘COVID-​19, risk, fear, and fall-​out’. Journal of Medical Anthropology, 39(5): 367–​70. https://​ doi.org/​10.1080/​01459740.2020.1746301 McLaren, J. (2020) Racial disparity in COVID-​19 deaths: seeking economic roots with census data. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research (Working Paper 27407). https://​nber.org/​ system/​files/​working_​papers/​w27407/​w27407.pdf Oxford (University of Oxford, Blavatnik School of Government) (2020) Coronavirus Government Response Tracker. www.bsg.ox. ac.uk/research/ ​ research-​ p rojects/​ c oronavirus-governmentresponse-​tracker Rees, M. (2020) ‘What are the long-​term effects of COVID-​19?’ Medical News Today, Newsletter, September 29. www.medicalnewstoday. com/​articles/​long-​term-​effects-​of-​coronavirus#severe-​cases Roberts, M. (2020) ‘Winter wave of coronavirus “could be worse than first” ’. BBC News, July 14. www.bbc.com/​news/​ health-​53392148 Roberts, S. (2020) ‘Flattening the coronavirus curve: one chart explains why slowing the spread of the virus is nearly as important as stopping it’. The New York Times, March 27. www.nytimes. com/​article/​flatten-​curve-​coronavirus.html Wells, H.G. (1898) The War of the Worlds. London: William Heinemann.

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PART I

COVID-​19 and Urban Changes

TWO

The Exaggerated Reports of Offices’ Demise: The Strength of Weak Workplace Ties Richard Shearmur, Manuela Parra-​Lokhorst, and Alastair Wycliffe-​Jones

Introduction In mid-​March 2020, Canadian society pivoted from business-​ as-​normal to lockdown and social distancing. By the end of March, 39 percent of Canada’s workforce was working from home (Deng et al, 2020), leading some to declare that ‘this might just be the end of the office as we knew it’ (Vasel, 2020). Indeed, the percentage mentioned in Deng et al’s report appears large, especially if one assumes the number was close to 0 percent before the pandemic: but such an assumption would be inaccurate. There has been a slow but steady increase in remote work (from home, but also cafés, co-​working spaces, cars, and so on) over the last 30 years (Felstead and Henseke, 2017; Ojala and Pyöriä, 2018; Putri and Shearmur, 2020). Depending on how it is estimated, about 20 to 30 percent of the workforce did not regularly work in a ‘usual place of work’ pre-​pandemic. Furthermore, it had become common for people officially

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assigned to a usual place of work –​such as an office –​to work part of the time (typically one day a week) from home (Ojala and Pyöriä, 2018; Shearmur, 2020). In this chapter, we suggest that working from home will become more common, but that offices will remain relevant. There are two related reasons for this. First, working away from the office was already common for many office workers, without offices disappearing: rather, office space has been evolving (often towards shared spaces), and this will continue as businesses become more familiar with remote work –​the pandemic did not start this trend. Second, although workers will more frequently work from home, they will not do so 100 percent of the time: gathering workers in a single location at specific times generates and reinforces social ties, coordination, and intra-​office communication, which make economic sense and produce efficiencies that erode when work is remote. These arguments rest upon previously reported analyses and surveys (for example Putri and Shearmur, 2020; Shearmur, 2020) and upon 40 in-​depth interviews conducted in Montreal, Calgary, and Vancouver between May and July 2020 with people working from home. These interviews are not yet formally analyzed: nevertheless, some preliminary insights emerge that are discussed later. The first section illustrates the aforementioned trends, showing that many –​but not all –​workers and workplaces had implemented some workplace flexibility before the pandemic, while others have now discovered that this is feasible. The second section discusses some limits of working from home: there are economic and competitive constraints on generalized work from home (WFH). In conclusion, we highlight three urban and work-​related topics for further exploration: neighborhood-​level consequences of increased daytime activity, the future of traditional office zones, and the exacerbation of workplace inequalities.

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The Exaggerated Reports of Offices’ Demise

Working from home: enablers and constraints Before the pandemic, many interviewees either worked from home occasionally or were at least equipped for remote work: the switch to WFH posed few technical problems, and their familiarity with remote work eased the transition: ‘[B]‌ecause I was a consultant, I’m used to working from home, so I was already set up […] So, when they told me I would have to work from home […] for me it went seamless’. (R10) ‘So, we had all these things before […] The main office is in [Montreal suburb], but there are offices in Quebec City and in Vancouver, and there are a few guys from Vancouver that we work with pretty closely. So, we would … like video call them’. (R11) In contrast, others rarely worked from home either because their employers did not permit it or because it posed logistical problems: ‘No, we didn’t have access to telework because the bank was very very uncomfortable to give us access to remote work’. (R13)*1 ‘I currently operate in a 12 by 12 room that is in a non-​ ideal work location…. I had to buy a new laptop stand, new keyboards, new mouse, new ergonomic chair, new chair mat. …. I had to move bedrooms in order to facilitate the addition’. (R22) ‘In my apartment, I do not have the space to add a new desk’. (R19)*

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Despite difficulties in working permanently from home, workers who were permitted by their employer did so occasionally previously: however, this was when it suited them and/​ or when their flatmates or family were not around. Not surprisingly, having a large house with extra space makes working from home far more comfortable: ‘So we have an office actually that is upstairs. My wife had commandeered it for her painting, but I have now commandeered it for work. […] The only things I had to do was I did go down to the [corporate] office and I did bring in a second monitor for home’. (R30) Whereas housing-​related constraints that some workers face cannot easily be overcome, employers’ attitudes towards WFH are evolving: ‘Our executives said multiple times that they were shocked about how well working from home went, I don’t think they were expecting it to be that smoothly and for people to be that productive. So they’ve communicated that they’re definitely open to a more flexible work from home policy’. (R37) ‘… before it was more limited …. there was a certain fear. It’s like a myth that if you work at home you work less…. I think that after all this experience we’ve just lived, it opens the possibility …. to say it’s possible to do your work from home’. (R19)* All interviewees were asked, at the end of the interview, what their preference would be for the future. Almost all would like the freedom to work partly from home and partly in an office: there is a quasi-​consensus (irrespective of the respondents’

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The Exaggerated Reports of Offices’ Demise

housing situation) that about two (maybe three) days at home and three at the office would strike an appropriate balance. This consensus can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, it indicates that despite constraints faced by some, there are advantages to working from home, such as reduced commuting (a key advantage for many respondents), ability to focus, and combining household tasks –​such as running the laundry or cooking –​with work. On the other hand, it indicates that almost all interviewees wish to work outside home for about three days per week, raising an important question: what is so attractive about working in an office? The attraction and efficiencies of offices Many interviewees mention certain office items (such as printers, chairs, and screens), activities (walking, breaks), and interpersonal dynamics that they miss at home. Most mention these as inconveniences: however, these inconveniences point to wider issues should WFH become the new normal. Their current status as ‘inconveniences’ may partly be due to WFH’s novelty and partly to interviewees being grateful for having a job during the pandemic: many mention friends or family who have lost their job, and they feel lucky by comparison. Informal conversations and chit-​chat are no longer possible. While video-​conferencing functions well for meetings with a clear agenda, informal exchanges with colleagues and fleeting water-​cooler connections with co-​workers are missed: ‘The social aspect of speaking to your peers and, you know, the idle chatter, banter that would happen in the lab certainly kept you more, how do you say, more sane during your hours and not having that and only having to chat via text is certainly a little bit more depressing’. (R15)

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The lack of social interaction can also have impacts on creativity and the generation of new ideas: ‘I would say like, all the creative aspects [are more difficult from home] …, because I felt like something that was really specific to us is like the creative process. There was like an inclusivity or like this conversational aspect or just like bouncing ideas from each other. It was really helpful and constructive in some ways, and since most of our [current, remote] meeting groups or calls are more centered on the logistics or like, making sure that like, plans and the schedule is okay, right, but less on the creative aspects, so I think that kind of affects that aspect of my work…’. (R8) Many interviewees raise the question of productivity, most of whom report being more productive at home: ‘You’re more productive when you’re at home, to be honest. Other than the things that you can’t do because of the server. […] like it’s easier to focus. […] when I’m at work I’m at a desk and whenever someone needs anything they just pass by and stop like, “Hey, do you have a minute, I want you to look at something?” or, “Oh, do you want to come here, I have something to show you?” And so like, yes, at work it’s easier to work because of the screens, the server works quick, you have all of the documents that you need… But, at work, you could also get distracted like that’. (R1) Such increased productivity is a two-​edged sword: the extra focus and uninterrupted concentration that occurs at home means that people take fewer breaks, work longer hours, interact less with colleagues, and have difficulty switching off at the end of the day. Research on workplace productivity emphasizes how important micro-​breaks are, especially if these

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The Exaggerated Reports of Offices’ Demise

short breaks (five to ten minutes) are spent with other people and not merely consulting social media (Rhee and Kim, 2017). Long-​term worker health and productivity depends on micro-​ breaks during the day and on the capacity to switch off and recuperate for longer periods (Patterson, 2013). Our interviews reveal that working from home can reduce the capacity of workers to take breaks, hinting at longer-​term issues should working from home become the norm. Other limits to working from home are mentioned, in particular, difficulty in developing new personal relationships or in discussing complex issues with unknown people: ‘I lost that personal connection with the clients, because I wasn’t able to spend time with them in person and feel the room as well as you can over a conference call. It’s just harder to build strong relationships over Teams and conference calls’. (R40) A related item that may limit WFH is the inefficiency of video-​conference meetings and e-​mails. Notwithstanding the increased productivity mentioned by many interviewees –​ often linked to performing specific tasks –​the effectiveness of communication has often decreased. There can be delays in responses to simple enquiries as well as misunderstandings: ‘I would pop in once a month to our commercial lines team, just like see how things are going on down there. Right now, there’s no obvious way for me to collect that information. […] I don’t want what they would write down, I want what they would say like in a group’. (R29) ‘Sometimes we have many misunderstandings when we send messages […] sometimes it is rather time-​consuming. I think it is too time-​consuming, that you send a message, that you understand, that you get back to them […] We work more to get to the same result’. (R19)*

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Conclusion: Offices, residential neighborhoods, and inequality Overall, our evidence suggests that people working from home during the pandemic enjoy the experience and would like to retain the option after the pandemic subsides, but miss the social interaction, ease of communication, light physical activity, bouncing of ideas, and dedicated workstations that classic office space provides. Some interviewees mentioned that leaving home each morning made them feel part of society and that dressing up for work and going out was an important ritual. Only one interviewee said they wanted to work exclusively from home post-​pandemic. From the perspective of employers, whether to abandon office space is a difficult decision. In the short term, office-​ based businesses and organizations seem to function well remotely, so a shift to more permanent remote arrangements appears to make economic sense. Nevertheless, there are signs in our interviews that working from home distends teams, leads to feelings of isolation and depression, and suppresses the weak workplace ties –​similar to Granovetter’s (1983) weak social ties –​that bind organizations together over the long term. The preferred solution of our interviewees, working about two days a week from home and the rest in an office, may also be the most efficient for employers. However, increasing work from home –​even by about 20 percent (that is, all office workers spending one extra day a week at home) –​will have consequences. We will briefly evoke three of them: • Residential neighborhoods: if people increasingly work from home, neighborhood services, informal workspaces, and digital infrastructure will need to adapt, as will the zoning and planning rules that tend to separate residential from other functions.

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The Exaggerated Reports of Offices’ Demise

• Downtown and other office centers: downtown (and other office sub-​centers) will remain an attractive office location, but, with fewer workers in offices at any specific time, businesses will require less space. Marginal and older office space will be harder to let. Furthermore, businesses that rely upon daytime workers as clients will need to rethink their business models. Moreover, less frequent use of downtown office space will have implications on public transit use (see Chapter Sixteen) and the retail and service sector ecologies of downtowns and sub-​centers (see Chapter Eighteen). • Equity: not everyone can work comfortably from home, nor does everyone have the requisite broadband and communications equipment. If working from home becomes a requirement, then younger, lower-​paid or poorly housed workers will find it increasingly difficult to acquire and hold down ‘office’ jobs. It will also place more burden on women who, when at home, tend to perform more of the household work: ‘you can’t really expect everyone to have the same at-​ home work setup and the same availabilities. Which is, I think, markedly different than when you’re in the office full time […] everyone kind of comes into work [at the office] and everyone’s equal’. (R34) Note 1

Respondents are identified as Rxx. A star indicates that the quote has been translated from French.

References Deng, Z., Morisette, R. and Messacar, D. (2020) Running the economy remotely: potential for working from home during and after Covid-​19. Ottawa: Statistics Canada. Catalogue no. 45280001. Felstead, A. and Henseke, G. (2017) ‘Assessing the growth of remote working and its consequences for effort, well-​being and work-​life balance’. New Technology, Work and Employment, 32(3): 195–​212.

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Granovetter, M. (1983) ‘The strength of weak ties: a network theory revisited’. Sociological Theory, 1: 201–​33. Ojala, S. and Pyöriä, P. (2018) ‘Mobile knowledge workers and traditional mobile workers’. Acta Sociologica, 61(4): 402–​18. Patterson, J. (2013) ‘Switching off’. Occupational Health, 65(6): 15–​17. Putri, D. and Shearmur, R. (2020) ‘Workplace mobility in Canadian urban agglomerations, 1996 to 2016: have workers really flown the coop?’ The Canadian Geographer, https://​doi.org/​10.1111/​ cag.12622 Rhee, H. and Kim, S. (2017) ‘Effects of breaks on regaining vitality at work: an empirical comparison of “conventional” and “smart phone” breaks’. Computers in Human Behavior, 57: 160–​7. Shearmur, R. (2020) ‘Conceptualizing and measuring the location of work: work location as a probability space’. Urban Studies, https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​0042098020912124 Vasel, K. (2020) ‘This might just be the end of the office as we know it’. CNN Business, June 17. www.cnn.com/​2020/​06/1​ 7/s​ uccess/​ end-​of-​office-​coronavirus/​index.html

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THREE

Platform Labour in Urban Spaces after COVID-​19 Sandro Mezzadra, Mattia Frapporti, and Maurilio Pirone

Introduction The COVID-​19 pandemic, urban lockdown containment measures and national economic crises are impacting in a large way both urban spaces and platform labor. Cities are transforming the way to live in, while platforms are adapting to these new background conditions. In this chapter we provide an overview on how platform labor was affected by COVID-​19 and the implications this brings for urban planning and policies in the next months.1 We will make use of some results from the Horizon 2020 PLUS project (Platform Labour in Urban Spaces) investigating four main disruptive platforms (Uber, Airbnb, Helpling,2 and Deliveroo) in seven European cities (Barcelona, Berlin, Bologna, Lisbon, London, Paris, Tallinn). First, we will introduce the effects of platform economy on labor and cities. Second, we will focus on specific case studies framed in a trans-​urban comparison to highlight commonalities and differences in platform labor transformations and urban challenges. Finally, we will consider implications for urban

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policy, highlighting the potential role of local administrations in platforms’ management. Platforms in contemporary capitalism Platforms are ubiquitous in the contemporary world. In the time of the COVID-​19 pandemic this is more apparent than ever. Just think of the use of such platforms like Zoom or Teams not only for work purposes but also to manage social relationships during the lockdown, and the expansion of app-​ driven food delivery, let alone the further entrenchment of the operations of an inventory giant like Amazon, which has become a full-​fledged logistics company. The profits and stock market value of many platforms have consequently boomed in a spectacular way, and it is safe to predict that they will emerge from the current crisis as winners. Platform capitalism will continue to be a growing component of contemporary capitalism in the near future, although some platforms –​notably the ones associated with the tourism industry and short-​term rentals, like Airbnb –​are clearly ravaged by the current reduced mobility. A reorganization of the world of platforms is underway and deserves close scrutiny. What we call platform capitalism has a relatively short history. Its emergence is closely connected to another crisis, the financial crisis of 2007–​08. As Nick Srnicek demonstrates, the generalized low-​interest rate environment in the wake of the earlier crisis reduced the rate of return on a wide range of financial assets and created the conditions for the investment of venture capital needed for the development and further refinement of platforms (Srnicek, 2017: 30). Born in the context of a deep crisis of capitalism, platform capitalism is today mutating and becoming more prominent in the course of an even deeper crisis, which challenges the current formation of capital and has radical and partially unpredictable political, social, and anthropological implications. This means that analyzing the transformations and developments of platform

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capitalism is not only an urgent task in itself, but allows identifying wider trends and processes that have reshaped capitalism over the last decade –​with crucially important implications for the near future. In general, there is much to be learned from an investigation of platform capitalism that does not limit itself to considering platform capitalism as a (however relevant) sector of the economy. We take a simple definition of platform, considering it as a device of social intermediation. It should be easy to see, reflecting upon such a definition, that the operations of platforms take place in a field that has momentous social and political relevance. To put it in the terms of Michel Foucault (2014, 12), platforms perform key roles in the ‘conduct of conducts’, which means that they generate governance effects. Elaborating on such questions, Benjamin H. Bratton (2015) has described the emergence of a specific kind of ‘platform sovereignty’, further expanding the investigation of the political dimension of platforms. In a different although related way, Shoshana Zuboff’s work on ‘surveillance capitalism’ (2019) also sheds light (an unsettling light, indeed) on that dimension. Platforms signal the emergence of a new type of business model, predicated on the extraction of data, which resonates with wider trends in the development of contemporary capitalism (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2019). Even more importantly, platforms blur the boundary between labor and life, while effectively propelling the actualization of the logistical dystopia of a 24/​7 regime of productivity (Crary, 2013). Platforms reorganize in new and even extreme ways ‘digital labor’, they perform (for instance in the case of riders or Uber drivers) an algorithmic management and control of labor that is spreading well beyond the sectoral boundaries of platform capitalism. They further exacerbate a crisis of ‘free’ wage labor, which has been underway for a long time. The implications of the emergence and further entrenchment of platforms are momentous, reaching well beyond the boundaries of an economic ‘sector’.

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Urban spaces are where most operations of platforms take place. The phrase ‘platform urbanism’ is widely used in current debates (see for instance Rodgers and Moore, 2018). Cities are reshaped by platforms, new ‘ways of life’ have emerged over the last decade, tourism and the real estate market have been profoundly transformed by Airbnb, while thousands of young adults (often migrants) work for platforms as drivers and delivery people. At the same time, cities are the sites where experiments with democratic control and cooperative management of platforms, along with unionization and other forms of organized resistance of riders and drivers, have proliferated in recent years. This is why it is so important to undertake an investigation of the impact on platforms of the COVID-​19 pandemic taking place in cities. Differences and similarities in reaction to COVID-​19 Even though the socio-​political effects of the COVID-​19 pandemic are ongoing, we can present a preliminary picture of the aftermath of the first wave of the pandemic in urban spaces, based on the seven European cities and the four platforms investigated by the Horizon 2020 PLUS project (Chicchi et al, 2020). We may start by acknowledging that countries experienced variable lockdown periods, even though all the cities under consideration adopted mobility restrictions from around mid-​ March until the end of May when the lifting of restrictions began. Almost everywhere, people were allowed to leave their home only for essential needs. Smart working was adopted where possible and production was limited to activities ‘essential to the nation’, while schools and restaurants were closed, and public events were suspended. Several measures of social distancing were implemented. During the lockdown, Airbnb basically collapsed. In March and April, 90 percent of reservations were cancelled, and in some cases, like that of Berlin, local regulation prohibited

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touristic short-​term rentals until the end of May. Although not all cities under study offer reliable data, we saw a huge rise in proprieties listed for long-​term rentals basically due to two reasons. On the one hand, almost nowhere did hosts receive any public support despite their requests for such help. The case of London is representative. The UK government introduced the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (that provided 80 percent of payments to companies forced to close –​like Airbnb) and the Self-​Employment Income Support Scheme (which provided 80 percent coverage of previously declared earnings and made changes to the Universal Credit system to cover living costs of the self-​employed). Airbnb hosts, just like other platform workers, did not qualify for any of these schemes. On the other hand, in some cities like Paris, Barcelona, or Lisbon, mayors announced further restrictions to Airbnb once the situation returned to ‘normality’. In the cities where Helpling has an important market share, we register a situation similar to that of Airbnb. Domestic workers and cleaning decreased or ceased during lockdown, but Helpling workers were unable to access social welfare programs. In a second phase, Helpling organized webinars concerning cleaning and extra hygienic measures during COVID-​19 (like in the case of London) and workers could go back to work without any mobility restrictions (like in Bologna where workers could confirm their work commitments following the anti-​COVID-​19 measures). However, in some cases, like that of Berlin, the company attempted to sell masks to workers instead of handing them out, a measure that was reversed after organized worker protests. Even if it was not forced to close and never suspended its service, Uber experienced a sharp drop in demand in all investigated cities, although in some cases (like in Lisbon) it was considered a service of public interest and Uber drivers were categorized as ‘essential workers’ according to the State of Emergency Decree. In any event, Uber workers obtained no or very low social support, which pushed many Uber

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drivers to join the Uber Eats food delivery service (in Lisbon, Paris, or Tallinn) which reported high activity in April (like in Italy). In some cases (like in Berlin) Uber introduced bonus programs (such as fare reductions of 50 percent) to relaunch traffic in the city. Deliveroo is different from the other cases. While, as we have reported, other platforms drastically reduced or ceased their activities, Deliveroo experienced considerable growth. Where data are available, like in Italy, we see that Deliveroo reported a 40 percent increase in the number of restaurants registered on the platform in March 2020 and, more generally, a rise in orders. Our data suggest that only in London did Deliveroo face a decline, at least at the beginning of the lockdown period. In most of the investigated cities, Deliveroo imposed drastic revisions of working rules. In some cases, like in Barcelona, limitations, such as not booking more than 40 hours per week and relying on pre-​booked timetables, were removed. Similarly, in Paris, just before the lockdown, Deliveroo decided to remove schedules and introduce ‘free shifts’. In terms of workers’ security, Deliveroo introduced ‘zero contact delivery’, which in practice was difficult to respect, for example in restaurants or supermarkets. Requests by riders for Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) were not always honored by the platform. If in some cases, like in London, Deliveroo made free masks and hand sanitizer available to ‘any rider who has completed at least one delivery in the past three weeks and has an active rider account’. In other places, like in Bologna, no PPE has been provided to workers apart from the ones originating from the local riders’ association, the Riders Union –​the PPE came from the local municipal administration. Urban policy and planning It is evident that the pandemic is radically influencing the development of the platform economy in ways that will inevitably

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impact urban planning. We hypothesize that COVID-​19 is accelerating some labor and urban transformations while representing new local challenges to municipal administrations and civil society in general. Since the pandemic, services provided through apps have become key factors influencing urban social reproduction and causing a sharp crisis with consequences in terms of unemployment, social safety, and urban planning. Indeed, while we note a general tendency towards labor digitalization, not all platform services in urban spaces experienced the same outcomes: last-​ mile logistics as food delivery have been reinforced during lockdown, tourism industry as short-​term rentals experienced falling demand, triggering a deep crisis. Since the late 1980s, city administrations moved from managerialism to entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 1989): The entrepreneurial city considers urban governance more in terms of economic development and the attraction of investment than of welfare and the provision of services. These circumstances intensified the hierarchization and division of urban space (Hall and Hubbard, 1996) by attributing a leading role in urban policy to private actors. In the contemporary smart city –​considered as a juncture between processes of planetary urbanization (Brenner, 2018) and the spread of digital technologies worldwide –​‘cities are being reimagined, quite literally, as an extension of the data extraction apparatus of the larger platforms’ (Srnicek, 2019) while municipalities increasingly depend on such companies. The impact of COVID-​19 and the urgency to plan a post-​ pandemic society accentuate the need for a further engagement of local administrations in urban policy involving the economic regulation of platforms. To conclude, we identify three main challenges: platforms’ data extraction calling for more public data access and protection; the intensive value accumulation creating social fractures in terms of workers’ rights and urban impact; and the hierarchical platform governance eroding democratic decision-​making processes.

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Notes 1

2

The research reported in this chapter was funded by the European Union, Horizon 2020 research and innovation program, ‘Platform Labour in Urban Spaces: Fairness, Welfare, Development’ (https://​project-​plus. eu), Grant Agreement No. 822638. The views and opinions expressed in this publication are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission/​Research Executive Agency. Helpling is a platform for cleaning services. Helpling is ‘an intermediary platform that helps match customers […] with self-​employed cleaners’, www.helpling.co.uk/​

References Bratton, B. (2015) The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Brenner, N. (2018) ‘Debating planetary urbanization: for an engaged pluralism’. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 36(3): 570–​90. Chicchi, F., Frapporti, M., Marrone, M. and Pirone, M. (2020) COVID-​19 Impact on Platform Economy. A Preliminary Outlook. Bologna: AMS Acta. Crary, J. (2013) 24/​7 . Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep. London: Verso. Foucault, M. (2014) On the Government of the Living: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1979-​1980. London: Palgrave-​Macmillan. Hall, T. and Hubbard, P. (1996) ‘The entrepreneurial city: new urban politics, new urban geographies?’ Progress in Human Geography, 20(2): 153–​74. Harvey, D. (1989) ‘From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: the transformation in urban governance in late capitalism’. Geografiska Annaler, 71(1): 3–​17. Mezzadra, S. and Neilson, B. (2019) The Politics of Operations: Excavating Contemporary Capitalism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Rodgers, S. and Moore, S. (2018) ‘Platform urbanism: an introduction’. Mediapolis: A Journal of Cities and Culture, 3(4), www.mediapolisjournal. com/​2018/​10/​platform-​urbanism-​an-​introduction/​ Srnicek, N. (2017) Platform Capitalism. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

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Srnicek, N. (2019) ‘Rethink the smart city’. Barcelona Metropolis, www.barcelona.cat/​metropolis/​en/​contents/​rethink-​smart-​city Zuboff, S. (2019) The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power. New York: Public Affairs.

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FOUR

More Cycling and Road Closures, But for Whom and Where? Rebecca Mayers

Introduction Widespread ‘stay at home’ orders, closures of indoor exercise spaces, and risks of exposure to COVID-​19 in public transit have prompted a significant uptake in cycling. With more cyclists on the road, the pandemic has renewed focus on the lack of safe cycling infrastructure within our cities (Hertel and Keil, 2020). Cycling infrastructure is unequally distributed, a fact now further evidenced by the pandemic, with road and lane closures for cycling occurring primarily in wealthy neighborhoods. Despite the reliance of low-​income residents in ‘low-​growth’ neighborhood on transit, cycling, and walking, the majority of investment remains in ‘high-​g rowth’ higher-​ income neighborhoods with ample access to transportation options (Hoffmann, 2016; Grisé and El-​Geneidy, 2018) (see Chapters Thirteen, Fourteen, and Fifteen for further examples of attempts to adapt urban space to active transportation during the pandemic).

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Inequitable distribution of transportation infrastructure is inextricably linked to issues of race, class, gender, and capital (Stehlin, 2019; Yasin, 2020), and comes at a dire cost. Individuals who have lower-​income jobs are less likely to ‘work from home’ or drive a vehicle during the pandemic. Therefore, low-​income individuals are at a greater risk of infection because they have to leave their residence and take riskier modes of transportation, such as public transport. Moreover, cycling in areas with limited infrastructure increases the chance of accidents (Mayers and Glover, 2021; Tucker and Manaugh, 2018; De Vos, 2020). Despite the high level of cycling participation by lower-​ income individuals, they are largely excluded from conversations about cycling safety. Hoffmann (2016) showed that a lack of representation by lower-​income individuals within powerful cycling advocacy groups is a key cause of inequitable distribution. To equitably distribute cycling infrastructure, researchers and practitioners must understand this process and its outcomes to effect change. To do so, this chapter investigates the inequities in the cycling infrastructure decision-​making process in the City of Vancouver, critiquing where resources are allocated and why. The chapter relies on qualitative semi-​structured interviews. Participants were selected based on their role and involvement in the cycling infrastructure decision-​making process and recruited via email. Snowball sampling as outlined by Noy (2008), whereby each participant suggested other potential interviewees, was also used to recruit participants. All interviews took place online over Zoom or by phone. The findings indicate that development cost levies and a lack of representation in the decision-​making process result in an inequitable distribution of safe cycling infrastructure. Inequitable distribution increases the risk of low-​income individuals contracting COVID-​19 by providing them with inadequate and unsafe transit options, highlighting the systemic inequity in transportation access.

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Vancouver cycling during COVID-​19 The City of Vancouver has one of the largest cycling mode shares of transportation in Canada (HUB, 2019). According to the City of Vancouver’s 2015 transportation panel survey, the percentage of cycling trips ranges from 1 percent to 16 percent of all trips, depending on the area of the city (City of Vancouver, 2017). Cycling has become a burgeoning activity in Vancouver, and expanding the cycling network is a prominent goal in both the ‘Greenest City Action Plan’ and ‘Transportation 2040’ plan (City of Vancouver 2012; 2015b). During the pandemic, cycling participation in Vancouver has increased significantly, prompting residents to demand more dedicated cycling space (Copsey, 2020). The city’s response to increased cycling during the pandemic was rapid, closing down lanes to cars in order to make more space for cyclists and pedestrians (Copsey, 2020). However, COVID-​19 lanes for cycling are situated only in the West End area, such as in the popular Stanley Park, with 7 percent cycling participation (City of Vancouver, 2017). There are no new lane closures in Strathcona, the lower-​income area that has the highest percentage of cycling participation in the city at 16 percent (City of Vancouver, 2017). To examine the cycling infrastructure decision-​making process, I conducted a qualitative case study on the City of Vancouver and interviewed 19 participants. Participants were those who work for the City of Vancouver (for example, transportation engineers, planners, councilors), and others from private engineering firms, advocacy groups, business improvement associations (BIAs), and bike co-​op mechanics who work with low-​income individuals. All participants are anonymous; pseudonyms are used for these findings. Findings The findings from this research suggest that: (i) how cycling infrastructure is funded, and (ii) the lack of representation in the

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decision-​making process lead to an inequitable distribution of cycling infrastructure and higher safety risk for low-​income individuals. Failure to acknowledge the political-​economy nature of these decisions rules out safe cycling for those who need it most. Funding and development cost levies In the pursuit of economic growth and increasing housing stock, the City of Vancouver requires developers to pay ‘development cost levies’. These levies are used to fund developments in the area to support residents who move there. For example, proceeds from the development cost levies are allocated to projects such as schools, roads, sewage and water, community centers, hospitals, and transportation. As these levies are collected and applied within area-​specific districts called ‘DCL Districts’ (City of Vancouver, 2015a) rather than across the whole city, they reinforce inequities in development. Concretely, as high-​growth neighborhoods continue to develop and thus benefit from further infrastructure improvements, low-​ growth neighborhoods languish. This inequity in economic investment has left low-​income areas with a poor cycling environment, and increases the risks of cycling during the pandemic. Nick, a transportation engineer, who previously worked for the City of Vancouver, described how growth-​related projects result in piecemeal infrastructure development. He explained: ‘Vancouver right now has a substantial amount of money, and it’s all linked, a lot of it is linked to development … A lot of these projects are actually funded through what we call development cost levies and they’re supposed to be growth-​related projects… And it’s difficult to build piecemeal’. Similarly, Emma, a city councilor, explained how small pieces of infrastructure don’t always improve the cycling

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experience because they are disconnected and frustrate cyclists. She elaborated: ‘There was a brand-​new rental development that was put in the corner of East Hastings … but when they put in the development, the parking access to the development is off the side street, and they decided to create this … quasi-​separated bike lane that runs six feet … it kind of does this little jog near the building, and then it stops’. Mia, a woman on the transportation advisory committee for the City of Vancouver, explained that the piecemeal infrastructure would be difficult to connect. Moreover, disadvantaged lower-​income and lower-​development neighborhoods would not see any infrastructure improvements unless the city connects the infrastructure. She stated: ‘It’s frustrating because you have this lovely infrastructure, and that’s what there should be everywhere, but it’s only this one block. And then it just ends … It’s going to take decades for those little, tiny dotted lines to actually turn into solid lines of a network … If you’re not building a high-​r ise, then you don’t get those buildings, and they aren’t going in everywhere … the lower kind of development areas are not getting that’. Mia’s experience cycling through the city reflects the piecemeal infrastructure and highlights how a disconnected cycling network relies on future development to be connected later. Those who work for the city are keenly aware of the lack of equity in the development of infrastructure. A transportation engineer previously at the city reflected on the pressure to incorporate social outcomes of their transportation plans, such as equity, accessibility, and safety. However, the city relies

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on housing projects for funding, which is usually the impetus for transportation development. He stated: ‘If you’d ask[ed] people two years ago upfront, “How do you think this addresses equity?” I think they’d kind of have the standard elevator pitch in terms of, “These are more affordable types of transportation options, and they’re closer to where people can live and work”, and those sorts of things, but it required a more detailed and thoughtful answer that gets into gender and all sorts of factors …“Oh, well, you can only do this project because you got funding from that development down the street which displaced a whole bunch of social housing”, or something like that … I think the foundations of what we do around sustainable transportation are really well aligned with equity and accessibility and safety. The Downtown Eastside is a hotspot. It’s probably got like half of the top ten intersections for pedestrian collisions and fatalities’. In the past few years, the City of Vancouver has seen a shift towards promoting equity. Staff have begun to discuss how cycling infrastructure is not simply about the affordability of cycling as a mode of transportation and recreation, but rather part of a social ecosystem that heavily relies on development plans. Further complicating the matter of equity and cycling, the city-​planning process lacks representation from the low-​ income, low-​growth neighborhoods. Lack of representation The cycling infrastructure decision-​making process lacks representation. Representation is critical, as those most impacted by the pandemic require safe and affordable transportation options and must be consulted in the decision-​making

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process. Jen, an advocate and consultant on cycling infrastructure projects, asserted: ‘Representation is the biggest downfall … in a lot of Western cities, planners and engineers are still largely White, largely male … because of this lack of representation, there is a lack of understanding of the needs in general, which has two potential problems. Obviously, the big one is that you’re not hearing what the needs are from those communities that are different from you. You also run the risk of putting something into the communities that they don’t want to begin with, that they don’t understand’. Alex, a member of a cycling advocacy group, echoed the lack of representation in cycling advocacy. He critiques the current lack of representation and communicates the need for change. He added: ‘We have an all-​White board … it’s not quite even male, female, but it just skews older. We don’t have enough young people. We don’t have enough people of color. We don’t have enough people in poor communities, don’t have enough geographic representation. We still have a lot of improving to do. We’re still a bit of a holdover from a different time’. The City of Vancouver’s Active Transportation Advisory Board requires gender parity among its members. However, Mia, one of the members on the board, stated that participation in the board requires a certain level of privilege. She found: ‘Compared to a lot of the sort of consultation or activism stuff, it’s relatively diverse, ethnically, there’s definitely LGBTQ members, there’s a wide range of ages. The

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main thing that isn’t very diverse is that everybody’s fairly well-​educated and most are comfortable financially … the cycling advocacy and people who work with the city and the whole thing is all very … it tends to be heavily weighted toward middle-​aged White men’. Solving this problem of representation is challenging, as targeted policies such as gender parity on a board do not necessarily translate into more representation due to barriers to access. To increase participation, committees must investigate and eliminate the barriers that preclude residents from participating. Barriers to participation and representation in decision-​making Within the advisory committee, Mia commented on one of the other members who has a disability and uses a wheelchair, needing to negotiate many barriers simply to arrive at the meeting room. She stated: ‘For her to get [to this meeting], she needed to use a HandyDART (door-​to-​door shared ride service for those with physical or cognitive disabilities offered by Translink) and book one of them ahead of time. And then I think there’s still a fee that you have to pay. For someone who’s on disability, bus fare is a significant amount of money … So if you’re poor and a transit user … seeing what that really means to someone who is from one of those equity-​seeking groups … a poor and disabled woman trying to be part of this committee … I understand why there’s not more people in that position’. Jen stressed the importance of including these voices when planning for cycling and that planners need to be willing to step outside the status quo:

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‘For a long time, women’s needs weren’t being met because of the lack of representation. Now we have that same challenge with people of non-​Western backgrounds or immigrant communities from anywhere where they live a little bit differently. They have different needs, but we don’t understand how to cater to them because we don’t have them as part of the conversation’. Participants suggested that steps must be taken to enable underrepresented groups to participate in the cycling infrastructure decision-​making process. Without these groups’ participation, the City of Vancouver will fail to meet the needs of everyone in the city and further reinforce inequitable access to transportation. Moving forward and shifting gears COVID-​19 and Vancouver’s response to the pandemic has brought the inequity in the cycling infrastructure decision-​ making process into sharp relief, demonstrating the disturbing health implications of this inequity during the pandemic. While reimagining the streets in a post-​pandemic world, decision makers must better recognize that cyclists have differing resources, needs, and capabilities. More research should focus on equity in transportation and city planning to understand the outcomes of inequitable cycling infrastructure decision-​ making processes. The City of Vancouver is on the right track by increasingly incorporating equity into their plans. Nevertheless, the policies requiring economic growth and development cost levies to build cycling infrastructure and the lack of representation in the planning process stymie these goals. Until adequate funding structures for cycling investment and incentives for representation in decision-​making exist, we will continue to reinforce inequitable transportation systems and stifle participation in cycling.

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References City of Vancouver (2012) Transportation 2040, https://​vancouver.ca/​ streets-​transportation/​transportation-​2040.aspx City of Vancouver (2015a) 2014 Annual report on development cost levies, http://​former.vancouver.ca/​ctyclerk/​cclerk/​20150624/​ documents/​ptec3.pdf City of Vancouver (2015b) Greenest city action plan, https://​vancouver. ca/​green-​vancouver/​g reenest-​city-​action-​plan.aspx City of Vancouver (2017) Walking and cycling in Vancouver, https://​ vancouver.ca/​files/​cov/​cycling-​report-​card-​2017.pdf Copsey, J. (2020) ‘Following heated debate, Vancouver park board votes to open Stanley park to one lane of traffic’. Global News, June 19, https://​globalnews.ca/​news/​7084017/​ stanley-​park-​reopening-​traffic/​ De Vos, J. (2020) ‘The effect of COVID-​19 and subsequent social distancing on travel behavior’. Transportation Research Interdisciplinary Perspectives, 100121. Grisé, E. and El-​Geneidy, A. (2018) ‘If we build it, who will benefit? A multi-​criteria approach for the prioritization of new bicycle lanes in Quebec City, Canada’. Journal of Transport and Land Use, 11(1): 217–​35. Hertel, S. and Keil, R. (2020) ‘After isolation: urban planning and the COVID-​19 pandemic’. Ontario Professional Planners Institute. https://​ontarioplanners.ca/b​ log/p​ lanning-e​ xchange/​may-​2020/​ after-​isolation-​urban-​planning-​and-​the-​covid-​19-​pandemic Hoffmann, M.L. (2016) Bike Lanes are White Lanes: Bicycle Advocacy and Urban Planning. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press. HUB (2019) Benchmarking the state of cycling in Metro Vancouver report. Vancouver, BC: HUB Cycling. https://​hub-​intellectsolutio. netdna-​ssl.com/​sites/​default/​files/​hubtl-​cyclingreport-​2020-​ 02-​27_​v5.pdf Mayers, R. and Glover, T. (2021) ‘Safe cycling space: how it is produced and experienced by cyclists’. Journal of Leisure Research, 1–​23, DOI: 10.1080/​00222216.2020.1864685

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Noy, C. (2008) ‘Sampling knowledge: the hermeneutics of snowball sampling in qualitative research’. International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 11(4): 327–​44. Stehlin, J.G. (2019) Cyclescapes of the Unequal City: Bicycle Infrastructure and Uneven Development. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Tucker, B. and Manaugh, K. (2018) ‘Bicycle equity in Brazil: access to safe cycling routes across neighborhoods in Rio de Janeiro and Curitiba’. International Journal of Sustainable Transportation, 12(1): 29–​38. Yasin, A. (2020) ‘Whose streets? Black Streets’. The Tyee. https://​ thetyee.ca/​Analysis/​2020/​06/​18/​Whose-​Streets-​Black-​Streets/​

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FIVE

Governing ‘the Night’ in Post-​ COVID-​19 Lisbon: Challenges, Opportunities, and Uncertainties Manuel Garcia-​Ruiz, Iñigo Sánchez-​Fuarros, João Carlos Martins, Cristiana Vale Pires, and Jordi Nofre

Introduction As a result of the COVID-​19 pandemic and the unprecedented lockdown imposed by several national governments, the nighttime leisure industry has stalled in many cities worldwide. In Lisbon, Portugal’s capital city, an increasing number of voices from the nightlife industry have aired their concerns regarding the profound consequences that the indefinite interruption of this economic activity caused by the pandemic might have for the sector, as well as for ancillary industries such as tourism, beverage companies, DJs, artists, and so on. Along with the gradual destruction of thousands of jobs, and the consequent growing financial imbalance in the sector, there is the definitive closure of a significant number of clubs and discotheques. From the perspective of institutional and social actors such as the City Council, the governing bodies of civil parishes, residents’ associations from the city center, and

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anti-​touristification movements, the indefinite closure of nightlife venues has placed the problems caused by the expansion of tourism-​related nightlife, regulated or not, on hold. In this sense, livability in central Lisbon’s nightlife districts has improved significantly since the lockdown. This is the case for Bairro Alto and Cais do Sodré, two historic neighborhoods transformed into crowded nightlife spots over the past two decades. In these two areas, nocturnal silence has become the most appreciated intangible benefit brought to the areas’ residents by the COVID-​19 lockdown. As the Portuguese journalist, Catarina Nunes, reported in late April: Goodbye to people drinking and shouting outdoors, to street musicians playing with amplifiers, to gang brawls, to drug dealers, to raids and to sirens of patrol cars, ambulances and firefighters, during the day and at night, which not even double-​glazed windows can keep out. (Nunes, 2020, translated from the original by authors) One could argue that the pandemic has addressed what both the City Council and local actors of the urban night had not been able to achieve in recent years: namely, the peaceful coexistence of the ‘right to party’ with ‘the right to a peaceful night’s sleep’ in areas characterized by an intense nightlife. More importantly, it highlights the City Council’s inadequacy in governing the ‘Nocturnal Tourist City’ (Giordano et al, 2018) following the first wave of touristification (Sequera and Nofre, 2019) and studentification (Malet Calvo, 2018) that swept through Lisbon in the late 1990s. The absence of either local or national cultural policies recognizing and enhancing nightlife as an integral part of the cultural sector in Portugal has favored the emergence of an uncertain post-​pandemic scenario for the national nightlife scene. At the time of writing, this scenario is generating more uncertainty and concern than ever (for other examples of how sectors of the economy have been devastated by the pandemic see Chapters Three, Six, and Seventeen).

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Qualitative data discussed in this chapter come from an ongoing study, which started with the Declaration of the State of Emergency on March 18, 2020, about the multiple impacts of the COVID-​19 pandemic on Lisbon’s nightlife. For the purposes of this chapter, indirect observation has been relied upon due to COVID-​19-​related mobility restrictions. In this sense, systematized data compilation about (i) ad hoc measures and legislation, and (ii) TV and press news, was conducted, and all data generated from this process were stored in an internal database. Furthermore, other qualitative information was also generated through informal conversations held online and/​or by telephone with some of the main informants, who had already participated in the in-​depth ethnography on nightlife and urban transformation in the center of Lisbon carried out by the authors of this chapter over the past decade. Finally, discrete fieldwork was conducted by collecting visual material of those areas that, up to the pandemic outbreak, had been the main nightlife spots of the city (namely, the historical neighborhoods of Cais do Sodré and Bairro Alto).

Figure 5.1: A comparison between nocturnal scenes before (September 2019) and during the COVID-​19 pandemic outbreak (June 2020) on the world-​famous Pink Street in the Cais do Sodré neighborhood, one of Lisbon’s nightlife spots

Source: Third and fifth’s photograph archives

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Resilient and insurgent nights during COVID times After closing for five months from March 13, 2020, nightlife venues finally resumed operations under certain restrictions that raise the skepticism and concerns of nightlife industry representatives (SIC Notícias, 2020). From August 1, 2020: bars, other drinking establishments without shows and drinking establishments with dancefloors remain closed, but they can now function as coffee or pastry shops, without the need to change the respective classification of economic activity, if they follow DGS [Directorate-​ General of Health] rules and spaces intended for dance remain unusable for the purpose. (Council of Ministers –​ XXII Government –​Portuguese Republic, 2020) This means that, in order to operate beyond the 8pm closing time applied to drinking establishments without food services in the Lisbon Metropolitan Area (which, at the time of writing, continues under the State of Contingency), nightlife venues must offer food or light snacks. Although some places opted to continue with a simplified furlough regime, several venues re-​organized their infrastructure and re-​oriented their services to resume activity, radically changing the city’s nightscapes. For instance, traditional nightlife districts like Bairro Alto and the so-​called Pink Street in the Cais do Sodré neighborhood are now dotted with terraces, and all establishments are serving meals or snacks to remain open after 8pm. Some clubs are now restaurants, and restaurants have turned into cocktail bars (Neves, 2020). Other places have decided to hire out their facilities for private parties with limited capacity (for example, O Bom, o Mau e o Vilão in Cais do Sodré) or re-​invent themselves as pop-​up open-​air venues (for example, Lugar do Capitão) with a regular program of live music. In turn, there are places that continue to organize music events, sunset parties, dinners with DJ sets (for

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example, Lisbon Village Underground). All these adaptations demonstrate the resilience of a business sector that is struggling with the economic impacts and uncertainty imposed by the pandemic outbreak. Most businesses have seen their income decrease considerably, have had to lay off employees, and are currently asking artists to lower fees for their performances. These changes have also had implications for night goers. For instance, they have to plan their night activities in advance, since they have to book places beforehand, and are obliged to be seated at a dinner table inside venues instead of dancing. As the most international club in Lisbon (LUX) stated on its social media channels after informing its customers of its reopening (or ‘half-​opening’ as it called it) in early September: ‘No dancing, limited places, following the recommended physical distancing, with seated places and wearing a mask. Let’s do it?’ Moreover, representatives of independent live music venues have decided to create a collective platform to advocate for the support needed to guarantee the survival of this sector: the Portuguese Association of Live Music Venues will be launched in September (Sarafa, 2020). While local stakeholders and venues are adapting to the so-​ called ‘new normality’, informal circuits located in private, isolated, and peripheral areas seem to be expanding since the lockdown on nightlife. This is the case of reported cases in some of Lisbon’s peripheral neighborhoods such as Jamaica (Lusa, 2020), Moscavide (Diario de Noticias, 2020) or observed by us in Zona J. With an effective lack of nightlife venues, and a strong tradition of the youth occupying public spaces and using portable boomboxes to play hip hop, the lockdown imposed by the national government has been broken by hundreds of young people, resulting in police intervention due to resident complaints. Similarly, we also experienced firsthand the attempt to celebrate the annual street festivities in Lisbon in June, the Santo Antonio at the Graça viewpoint, with more than 200 people drinking alcohol and dancing to the sound of portable boomboxes, not observing social distancing, and sharing

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beverages. As a result, strong police intervention put an end to the informal party just a couple of hours after it started. Today, despite the ban on alcohol consumption in public spaces, it is still possible to see informal vendors selling beer to small groups gathering to have fun and enjoy sightseeing in Lisbon. Some groups organize private parties with their friends at home, or by renting short-​term tourist apartments or caravan parks within or outside the Lisbon Metropolitan Area. Other groups organize informal parties in peripheral or hidden areas of the city with more than the recommended capacity. Institutional concerns and public moralizing around parties and large gatherings of young people in public spaces are becoming the norm. In this sense, the role of the national media is eloquent in constantly criminalizing informal youth events while reporting police intervention triggered by young people drinking informally in public spaces during nighttime hours. Faced with this situation, the Lisbon City Council has displayed billboards across the city with the message: ‘You know who else doesn’t want to miss an illegal party? This Virus. COVID-​19 still has no cure. Don’t put your parents “and grandparents” lives at risk.’ Towards co-​creative and participative governance of nightlife in post-​COVID-​19 Lisbon Until the COVID-​19 pandemic outbreak, the expansion of tourism-​oriented nightlife in the historic neighborhoods of Lisbon city center had often caused certain unwanted effects. These contributed to a deterioration of living environment in central neighborhoods and caused a displacement of their residents. Health conditions within these areas were affected by garbage, urine, noise pollution, and high traffic levels. What is more, they witnessed sporadic episodes of insecurity and violence along with manifestations of socio-​spatial segregation, xenophobia, and racism. The character of these sectors was affected, increasing conflicts among actors of the urban

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night including residents, venue owners, and partygoers (for example, Nofre et al, 2019; Nofre, 2020). The present and near future of nightlife in Lisbon is currently uncertain. The return to normality in the ‘Nocturnal City’ –​to use Rob Shaw’s terminology (2018) –​raises numerous doubts and uncertainties. Firstly, restrictions imposed on dance bars, nightclubs, and discotheques, as well as the adoption of (new) health and hygiene measures, will cause financial stress for these establishments, with a particular impact on small venues that do not usually receive the support of real estate investment funds or of business groups involved in the nighttime leisure sector. This is especially critical for the few alternative underground LGTBQI+ venues existing in Lisbon, whose economic cushion before COVID-​19 was already almost nonexistent. Secondly, social distancing and the need to control behavior in an attempt to contain contagion –​and, therefore, governing the movement and location of bodies in ways that prevent proximity (Füller, 2016) –​pose a challenge of unimaginable magnitude for the nighttime leisure industry. The creation of governance forums for discussion among local stakeholders and the local community, such as the Lisbon Nightlife Commission, is thus intended to become an excellent tool for governing post-​COVID-​19 nights in Lisbon. Through horizontal, co-​creative, and participative governance principles, the Lisbon Nightlife Commission is designed to rely on the active participation of venue owners, representatives of nightlife workers (DJs, artists, bartenders, security staff, and so on), municipal and national authorities (including health authorities), residents’ associations, representatives from civil parishes, police commanders, NGOs acting in the environment and minority rights fields, and cultural associations with an interest in ensuring safer and healthier nightlife spaces under current (post-​)COVID-​19 times. More specifically, the Lisbon Nightlife Commission would (i) ensure and control the strict compliance with opening hours licensing, noise pollution, and COVID-​19-​related health and

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hygiene measures until a return to normality; (ii) promote and provide quality standards including professional training for venue staff (bartenders, security staff, managers, and so on) especially regarding COVID-​19-​related hygiene protocols and changes to their work tasks; (iii) promote and perform harm reduction activities targeting people who consume alcohol and other drugs outdoors and/​or indoors; (iv) support the implementation of improvements in the overall health and safety conditions of venues as well as in the availability of both hygiene and harm reduction materials; (v) design new strategies, mechanisms, and actions in the field for the pacification of the public space in nightlife spots in order to ensure practices that respect residents during nighttime hours; and (vi) periodically collect quantitative and qualitative data regarding a range of spatial, social, cultural, economic, and public health issues related to the development of nightlife in Lisbon under current (post-​)COVID-​19 times in order to create and monitor social, economic, and public health indicators to be reported directly to the commission’s coordinator, municipal authorities, and national government. In sum, the creation of the Lisbon Nightlife Commission is not only an urban economic impulse for the city in (post-​) COVID-​19 times, but a source of socio-​emotional well-​being, a community building catalyst and motor for the inclusion and mutual support for local communities harshly affected by quarantine and social isolation. Conclusion: Is nightlife over forever? There is no doubt that the enormous (and still uncharted) socio-​economic effects of the COVID-​19 pandemic outbreak are added to their psychological and emotional impacts, especially among the hundreds of thousands of people who, in these times of digital entrepreneurship, big pharma, and advanced technology industry, are still living in poverty. The ‘night’, formal and informal, institutional and non-​institutional, and all its individual and collective meanings, can constitute

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Governing ‘the Night’ in Post-COVID-19 Lisbon

an efficient mechanism for socio-​emotional well-​being and mutual psychological support within our communities, following a period of prolonged confinement and isolation. However, the absence of state-​led economic support and the indefinite lockdown imposed by the national government is causing businesses to confront unaffordable losses. The disappearance of the nightlife sector in Portugal seems to be more real than ever. In particular, the silence maintained by government agencies as this sector declines can be seen as a manifestation of ‘no politics as politics’. Using the pandemic as a way of addressing the negative impacts derived from the expansion of tourism-​oriented nightlife, without public debate and without planning a careful transition to a ‘new nocturnal city’, can have dire socio-​economic consequences, including high numbers of lay-​offs and venue closures. More efficient governance of ‘the night’ under pandemic times is needed, and should include (i) more information campaigns especially oriented to adolescents and youngsters by avoiding a criminalization approach; (ii) the creation of a multi actor task force to ensure the survival of the nighttime leisure industry under pandemic times by combining financial aid and new regulations to allow nightlife venues to operate under strict COVID-​19 health safety measures as occurs with institutional cultural sector; and (iii) the creation and implementation of the Lisbon Nightlife Commission for designing a post-​pandemic relaunching of the Lisbon nightlife sector that could allow the implementation of new strategies towards healthier, safer, more inclusive, and more egalitarian nights. Acknowledgments This work was supported by individual and project research granted by the Portuguese Foundation for Science & Technology (SFRH/​BD/​121842/​ 2016; PTDC/​ART-​ PER/​32417/​2017; CEECIND/​01171/​2017). This work was also supported by the Portuguese Foundation for Science & Technology within the scope of the project ‘UIDB/​04647/​2020’ of CICS.

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NOVA –​Interdisciplinary Centre of Social Sciences of Universidade Nova de Lisboa.

References Council of Ministers –​ XXII Gover nment –​ Portuguese Republic (2020) Statement of the Council of Ministers of July 30, 2020, www.portugal.gov.pt/ ​ p t/ ​ g c22/​ g overno/​ comunicado-​de-​conselho-​de-​ministros?i=363 Diario de Noticias (2020) ‘Agentes da PSP recebidos a tiro quando tentavam acabar com festa em Moscavide’, www.dn.pt/​pais/​ agentes-​da-​psp-​recebidos-​a-​tiro-​quando-​tentavam-​acabar-​com-​ festa-​em-​moscavide-​12204080.html Füller, H. (2016) ‘Pandemic cities: biopolitical effects of changing infection control in post-​SARS Hong Kong’. The Geographical Journal, 182(4): 342–​52. Giordano, E., Nofre, J. and Tataranni, E. (2018) ‘Night-​time economy, tourism and conflicts: Barcelona and Lisbon’, in E. Marra and M. Melotti (eds) Mobilities and Hospitable City. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, pp 86–​100. Lusa (2020) ‘Covid-​1 9: Encerrados oito estabelecimentos no Bairro da Jamaica no Seixal’, www.lusa.pt/ ​ a rticle/ ​ _​ OC1fy~VYidHTwgq_​ x HdcTMSZM5iuSI1/ ​ c ovid- ​ 1 9-​ encerrados-​oito-​estabelecimentos-​no-​bairro-​da-​jamaica-​no-​ seixal Malet Calvo, D. (2018) ‘Understanding international students beyond studentification: a new class of transnational urban consumers. The example of Erasmus students in Lisbon (Portugal)’. Urban Studies, 55(10): 2142–​58. Neves, C. (2020) ‘Noite de Lisboa. A pandemia criou um novo conceito: o restaurante cocktail bar’. Diário de Notícias, www.dn.pt/ ​ p ais/​ n oite-​ d e-​ l isboa-​ a -​ p andemia-​ c riou-​ u m-​ novo-​ c onceito- ​ o - ​ restaurante- ​ c ocktail- ​ b ar- ​ 1 2564798.htm l?fbclid=IwAR2HCGjDhkF0CFpwlOatbGz6cIsdSgQY-​ JETUrilWfepbvN5VeSSk6NAWrk

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Nofre, J. (2020) ‘Party tourism, pub crawls and crazy nights in Bairro Alto, Lisbon: celebrating cosmopolitanism in a racialized heterotopic pleasurescape’. IS Working Papers, 87, 1–​13. Nofre, J., Martins, J.C., Vaz, D., Fina, R., Sequera, J. and Vale, P. (2019) ‘The “Pink Street” in Cais do Sodré: urban change and liminal governance in a nightlife district of Lisbon’. Urban Research and Practice, 12(4): 322–​40. Nunes, C. (2020) ‘O melhor da quarentena? O silêncio’. Expressso, April 23, https://​expresso.pt/​sociedade/​lifestyle/​ 2020-​04-​25-​O-​melhor-​da-​quarentena--​O-​silencio Sarafa, N. (2020) ‘Salas de Concertos unidas (para evitar colapso)’. Arte Sonora, https://​ a rtesonora.pt/ ​ f eatured/​ salas-​de-​concertos-​unidas-​para-​evitar-​colapso/​ Sequera, J. and Nofre, J. (2019) ‘Touristification, transnational gentrification and urban change in Lisbon: the neighbourhood of Alfama’. Urban Studies, https://​ d oi.org/​ 1 0.1177/​ 0042098019883734 Shaw, R. (2018) The Nocturnal City. London: Routledge. SIC Notícias (2020) ‘Covid-​19. Proprietários de bares e discotgecas consideram que reabertura com horário reduzido (e sem pista de dança) é absurda’. https://​ e xpresso.pt/​ e conomia/​ 2020-​07-​31-​Covid-​19.-​Proprietarios-​de-​bares-​e-​discotecas-​ consideram-​que-​reabertura-c​ om-h ​ orario-r​ eduzido-​e-​sem-​pista-​ de-​danca--​e-​absurda

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SIX

Small Business Owners in Stockholm and the Anti-​ Lockdown Pandemic Strategy Rosa Danenberg

Introduction While numerous countries around the globe imposed severe restrictions on their people’s freedom of movement in response to COVID-​19, the world watched as Sweden took a different approach. Sweden avoided a nationwide mandatory lockdown, choosing instead to formulate a response strategy relying more heavily on individual responsibility and expert knowledge from government agencies (Regeringen, 2020). This unique strategy may have benefited the economy in a variety of ways; however, public life on the street has changed dramatically. As a consequence, a large proportion of street-​based economic activities have been significantly affected. The impact of this anti-​lockdown strategy for already vulnerable small business owners in the inner city of Stockholm may deepen urban inequalities.

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The Minister of Finance expects the economy of Sweden to shrink, although the economic establishments that require physical contact or social interaction, such as hairdressers, hotels, and restaurants, should be ultimately less affected compared to other countries (Erdbrink and Anderson, 2020). As Swedes are able to roam freely while following their country’s guidelines, the economic damage has been expected to be somewhat limited. The elevated death toll raised concerns about whether the strategy was chosen to prioritize economic benefit over public health (Goodman, 2020). Sweden’s GDP for Q2 2020 turned out to be more positive than that of other European countries. However, other Scandinavian countries that have enforced stricter lockdowns are currently less economically affected (Eurostat, 2020). In Sweden, these strategic responses have been led by health authorities and experts, granted independent power to make decisions usually in the hands of politicians. Culturally, Sweden has a tradition of communicating recommendations rather than imposing restrictions. Sufficient support for government’s decisions on the part of Sweden’s population reflects high trust in the authorities as well as in its fellow citizens (Erdbrink and Anderson, 2020). Inevitably, the recommendations for people to stay home, keep distant, and work from home have greatly impacted smaller independent businesses (Lifvendahl, 2020). These businesses are of particular interest because they contribute to a neighborhood’s identity and are celebrated for generating socio-​spatial value as ‘third places’. Therefore, Stockholm serves as a unique case to study how the anti-​lockdown strategy has challenged business owners who operate through storefronts. For instance, the solidarity initiative to ‘support your local’ has created a paradoxical tension with the government’s instructions to ‘stay home’. Based on 126 short interviews with small business owners conducted face to face during May and June 2020, this chapter reflects on the inequalities amplified by Sweden’s COVID-​19 response strategy.

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The importance of public space during a pandemic The response to the pandemic spurred considerable changes in the way people move and interact within the public realm. Nonetheless, it certainly has not altered the desire for people to socialize with others outside of one’s household. The results from a global online survey by Gehl on the use of public space during the pandemic demonstrate that two thirds of the respondents have continued to use public space (O’Connor, 2020). This rigorous change in the use of space, distance, and frequency of interaction has led to a redefinition of sociable space (Mehta, 2020). The key messages on COVID-​19 and public space presented by UN-​Habitat (2020) emphasize the importance of public space for containing the spread of the virus: ‘Public spaces are an important asset in a time of crisis’ which require a ‘well-​connected and integrated system of public spaces including streets’ (p 2). In the long term, it is crucial to ‘build social resilience’ (p 4) where the urban fabric supports socializing and community building. Third spaces, the semi-​public places outside one’s home and work, frequently function as anchoring places for local communities. Commercial establishments such as bars, hair salons, and corner shops form sociable spaces as part of people’s daily life; however, those places have struggled to function. As these places provide a sense of belonging, they have been actively missed during the pandemic (Low and Smart, 2020). These places became even more important during the pandemic. However, the financial and health risks that come with the challenge to remain open are unprecedented, imposing inequal conditions on small business owners. Reflections on the consequences of the anti-​ lockdown strategy In order to give greater voice to the perspectives of small business owners, 126 short interviews (ranging from five to 30

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Table 6.1: Categories of businesses surveyed Product-​oriented businesses: •

16 clothes and fashion including shoe stores, hat stores, luggage stores, and vintage clothing

•

4 convenience stores selling tobacco and chocolate

•

3 food specialty stores selling fish and cheese

•

4 hobby shops: art supplies, bookstore, fishing equipment, vinyl records

•

12 interior design stores including furniture, vintage, and home renovation

•

2 variety stores: gifts and health products

Service-​oriented businesses: •

18 beauty salons including hairdressers and barber shops

•

42 restaurants including cafés, lunch delis, bakeries, restaurant-​ bars, salad bars, ice cream shops, and (lunch) restaurants such as Italian, Indian, Sushi, Thai, Vietnamese, Chinese, and Tapas

Mixed product and service-​oriented businesses: •

14 repair service shops including tailors, shoemakers, mobile phone repair stores, dry cleaners, clockmakers, and bike repair shops

•

4 jewelry designers and goldsmiths

•

3 opticians, 1 pet store, 1 florist, and 1 funeral director

minutes) were conducted in May and June 2020 in the inner city of Stockholm. From the collection of stories, four themes emerged that provide reflections on the consequences of the anti-​lockdown strategy. These themes are reflected on later. Table 6.1 presents the categories of businesses from which respondents originated. The spatial context and increased health risk Spatial segregation is an increasingly common phenomenon in European cities (Nijman and Wei, 2020). Stockholm is

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not an exception when it comes to rising inequality based on social status, spatial context, and ethnicity (Legeby, 2009). The varying living conditions and economic opportunities for residents from different city districts have considerably sharpened during the pandemic (Tottmar and Lundborg, 2020). Shopkeepers traditionally lived near their shop. However, spatial segregation has increasingly separated home and work. During the pandemic, the need to use public transportation to reach the inner city imposed an unavoidable risk exposure to the virus. This is especially true for ethnic entrepreneurs who in growing numbers open small-​scale businesses in the inner city of Stockholm, such as takeaway restaurants, corner shops, and beauty salons (Danenberg et al, 2018). The risk has been experienced by shop owners, as a tailor who has worked in his profession since 1970 states: “I’m putting myself and others at risk every morning by taking public transportation to be able to keep my business running”. A survey by Stockholm’s health authorities showed a concentration of cases in immigrant-​ dense suburbs. It has been reasoned that the native culture and collectivist structures that produce high trust and individual responsibility are not necessarily aligned with foreign cultures prevalent among the increasingly diverse population. Alternatively, these areas account for a high representation in low-​skilled jobs which potentially have a higher exposure to the virus (Rothschild, 2020). Crowdedness in the inner city represents both a risk and an economic opportunity for small business owners. The global survey on public space usage during the pandemic survey by Gehl shows that people are walking more (66 percent). The most used public spaces are immediate neighborhood streets (87 percent) followed by places for essential errands (72 percent). Places for errands experienced more crowding (59 percent) than neighborhood streets (26 percent). The main streets were used by 37 percent of respondents and were perceived as crowded by 26 percent of them (O’Connor, 2020). This shows that streets with commercial premises are particularly popular.

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One older restaurant owner revealed: “The more people on the street, the more chance they come into my restaurant, but I need to keep distance. It is a difficult situation”. The economic impact on different business sectors The pandemic has radically transformed the geography and operations of work. Technological solutions have made it possible for knowledge workers to work from home. Meanwhile many other workers, such as those employed in manufacturing, construction, retailing, and hospitality, must go to their workplace and be in contact with co-​workers and, in many cases, the public. This illustrates how the pandemic deepens inequalities between occupational categories (Nijman and Wei, 2020). The contrasting possibilities for knowledge workers and storefront owners to generate an income are striking. There are also differences across various occupational categories among small business owners. A distinction can be drawn between product-​and service-​oriented businesses. Some product stores have been able to move their wares out to the sidewalk to avoid crowding inside. Inequalities that prevail among product-​ oriented businesses have been mentioned by a clothing store owner: “The fashion in my store, everything is seasonal and has to be sold now. That’s not the same for furniture”. She also points out that she can’t just change her operation: “I’m good at what I do, which is having a physical store, it is difficult to go online”. Service-​oriented businesses in particular face limitations to shift to the digital realm. A shoemaker explains, “I need to see the shoes and talk to the customer to determine the job and the price”. Another issue prominent among those running a personal beauty service is the difficulty to follow guidelines for keeping distance. A barbershop owner observed that, “People don’t dare to go out and be physically close”, which is crucial for his profession. When the customers eventually return it rarely makes up for the missed income, as a hairdresser mentioned: “If customers have not been to the

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hairdresser for a long time, it takes more time to cut but this is not reflected in the price”. The accessibility to governmental support The governmental financial aid package intended to reduce the economic consequences for all companies economically affected by the coronavirus. However, while in the first few months limited support was available to small business owners, a generous funding package was immediately made available to hand-​picked large corporations, joint-​stock companies, and property owners (Regeringen, 2020). This uneven approach to business aid has placed many small businesses in a state of financial insecurity and personal frustration. As one of the respondents stated: “Large corporations, such as SAS [Scandinavian Airlines] have received support, but we as small business owners, we do so much for Sweden and pay so much tax, we don’t get anything”. Along with the temporarily reduced payroll taxes, the package included the availability of loans and the possibility of a deferral of taxes. The practical implication is that interest will be charged, which means that “a loan from the bank is worthless, just more interest, that moves the problem”, according to a bar owner. The type of legal entity and the size of a company have both been crucial factors in qualifying for access to financial support. Sole traders and those with a relatively small annual turnover are excluded from the possibility to apply for ‘short-​ time work allowance’ and ‘reorientation support’ (Lifvendahl, 2020). This short-​time work allowance helps companies retain their employees as they receive financial support from the government for reduced working hours, which was previously only available to legal entities. Reorientation support offers assistance to companies that have lost a large part of their income, which was only available to those with a 2019 profit larger than 200,000 SEK. A restaurant owner stated: “I have started a Handelsbolag (the type of company where

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owners are personally liable) 25 years ago, and now I realize that it was a big mistake. It was stupid to not have started an Aktiebolag (legally independent entity). Now I can’t apply for short-​time work allowance for my staff”. The legal difference that determines the access to governmental support even plays out within the same hair salon. One hairdresser told me: “I am registered as a sole trader and that prohibits me from applying for short-​time work allowance, whereas my colleagues who also rent a chair in this salon are registered as Aktiebolag and are able to do that”. Also, the owner of a tiny tobacco store of 15 square meters states: “Normally I earn all my money during the summer months. But the summer is lost. My profit is below the threshold to apply for reorientation support, so I’m excluded”. The loss of customers when people ‘work from home’ The sudden transition towards home-​based office work has impacted the spatial dynamics of movement and consumption (see Chapter Two on the tendency for office employees to work from home). Spatial focus of retail promptly shifted from the greater city and office locations towards neighborhoods and the digital realm. It has become clear that people have radically reduced their mobility. Consequently, neighborhood streets and local amenities surrounding the home are more intensively used. The economic performance of certain businesses is tied to their geographic location. The work culture in Sweden typically involves going out for lunch. A lunch restaurant owner strategically located near large office buildings states: “I have heard that the big offices around here will continue to work from home in the fall, I don’t know what to do, they were my customers”. Conclusion The new sociable space has challenged people to adjust to the current circumstances. However, it has also deepened the

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‘inequalities in society that will require fundamental structural changes’ (Mehta, 2020). Small businesses have not been able to adjust as easily based on already unequal urban conditions, such as social and spatial segregation. Government support has reinforced this inequality by not protecting sole traders from the start. These small business owners are vulnerable economically and personally, especially concerning their financial and health risk. This points to the increasing gap between high-​and low-​skill workers, which ultimately increases urban inequality (Nijman and Wei, 2020). The most desirable strategy to address all impacts of the pandemic is difficult to define as long as it is ongoing. Nonetheless, one restaurant owner contended: “A lockdown would have been better, then everything would just be closed and we all would have more equal opportunities to survive”. (For other discussions of the economic devastation of certain sectors of the urban economy by the COVID-​19 pandemic see Chapters Three, Five, and Seventeen.) References Danenberg, R., Mehaffy, M., Porta, S. and Elmlund, P. (2018) ‘Main street plot scale in urban design for inclusive economies: Stockholm case studies’. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers –​Urban Design and Planning, 171(6): 258–​67. Erdbrink, T. and Anderson, C. (2020) ‘“Life has to go on”: how Sweden has faced the virus without a lockdown’. The New York Times, April 28, www.nytimes.com/2​ 020/0​ 4/2​ 8/w ​ orld/e​ urope/​ sweden-​coronavirus-​herd-​immunity.html Eurostat (2020) ‘GDP down by 12.1% and employment down by 2.8% in the Euro area’, https://​ec.europa.eu/​eurostat/​ Goodman, P. (2020) ‘Sweden has become the world’s cautionary tale’. The New York Times, July 7, www.nytimes.com/​2020/​07/​ 07/​business/​sweden-​economy-​coronavirus.html Legeby, A. (2009) ‘Accessibility and urban life: aspects on social segregation’, in D. Koch, L. Marcus, and J. Steen (eds) Proceedings of the 7th International Space Syntax Symposium. Stockholm: KTH, pp 1–​11.

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Lifvendahl, T. (2020) ‘Fokus på småföretag, sade finansministern’. SvD, www.svd.se/​fokus-​pa-​smaforetag-​sade-​finansministern Low, S. and Smart, A. (2020) ‘Thoughts about public space during COVID-​19 pandemic’. City and Society, 32(1): 1–​5. Mehta, V. (2020) ‘The new proxemics: COVID-​19, social distancing, and sociable space’. Journal of Urban Design, 25(6): 669–​74. Nijman, J. and Wei, Y.D. (2020) ‘Urban inequalities in the 21st century economy’. Applied Geography, 117(February): 102188. O’Connor, E. (2020) ‘Public space plays vital role in pandemic’, https://​ gehlpeople.com/​blog/​public-​space-​plays-​vital-​role-i​ n-p​ andemic/​ Regeringen (2020) ‘För företagare med anledning av COVID-​19’, www.regeringen.se/r​ egeringens-p​ olitik/r​ egeringens-a​ rbete-m ​ ed-​ anledning-​av-​nya-​coronaviruset/​foretag/​ Rothschild, N. (2020) ‘The hidden flaw in Sweden’s anti-​lockdown strategy’. Foreign Policy, April 21, https://f​ oreignpolicy.com/2​ 020/​ 04/​21/​sweden-​coronavirus-​anti-​lockdown-​immigrants/​ Tottmar, M. and Lundborg, B. (2020) ‘Segregation och dynamik viktiga frågor efter corona’, www.dn.se/​ s thlm/​ segregation-​och-​dynamik-​viktiga-​fragor-​efter-​corona/​ UN-H ​ abitat (2020) UN-​Habitat key message on COVID-​19 and public space, https://​unhabitat.org/​sites/​default/​files/​2020/​05/​unh_​ covid-​19_​ps_​key_​message.pdf

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SEVEN

Urban Inequalities and the Lived Politics of Resilience Oleg Golubchikov and Geoffrey DeVerteuil

Introduction In an age of COVID-​19, with the urban crisis revealing itself in the new epidemic form, the notion of urban resilience has once again become prominent. It remains a central component to the pressing questions of what mechanisms facilitate or impede cities’ abilities to withstand the crisis, whether cities can ever return to ‘normal’ after the pandemic and whether a return back to the old normal is even desirable.1 However, the concept of resilience has been accused by critical scholars of being post-​political, ‘normalizing’ crisis, propping up the status quo, and neutralizing calls for transformation. This chapter queries the possibility of deploying urban resilience as a critical concept to interrogate the politics of urban crisis, like that faced with COVID-​19. In so doing, we offer a framework for a critical epistemological deployment of resilience to actual urban practices that may re-​politicize the very conditions leading to cities being resilient, through the notion of the lived politics of resilience. Urban resilience in this reading is viewed not merely as a system’s mechanistic or naturalistic

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traits (that is, the abilities to withstand a disturbance) or a set of normative principles (how to boost such abilities), but rather as the actually experienced processes and politics of conditioning, negotiating, and surviving an ordeal. The chapter explores possibilities of reconciling the theoretical, practical, critical, and lived perspectives on (urban) resilience. Pandemics, urban inequalities, and resilience Originating in engineering and ecological sciences, the idea of resilience can be defined as ‘…the ability to absorb change and the capacity for re-​organization or adaptation in the face of disruption’ (Cretney, 2014: 629). More specifically, urban resilience ‘…refers to the ability of an urban system –​ and all its constituent socio-​ecological and socio-​technical networks across temporal and spatial scales –​to maintain or rapidly return to desired functions in the face of a disturbance, to adapt to change, and to quickly transform systems that limit current or future adaptive capacity’ (Meerow and Newell, 2019: 315). For most policy makers, like in the case of the financial crisis of 2008, COVID-​19 demonstrates the importance for cities to develop resilience –​or a city’s abilities to withstand shocks of different kind and nature in a way that does not threaten the city’s well-​being and prosperity. But both crises have highlighted that these abilities are structurally uneven. The spread of COVID-​19 and the effects of containment measures have exposed and exacerbated pre-​existing social, spatial, and economic inequalities. Both the disease itself and the economic plight caused by lockdown measures have disproportionally affected the most vulnerable groups of society. Not only are the economic consequences of COVID-​19 lockdown likely to far exceed those of the financial crisis of 2008, but they are also likely to affect the poorest much more. This is because lockdown measures have seriously affected those with precarious, temporary employment or those relying on

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informal activities in the domestic, low value added, already financially fragile service sector directly affected by lockdown restrictions. The impacts on the vulnerable groups have been particularly strong in those societies that are more spatially and ethnically segregated, such as Anglo-​Saxon or Latin American countries. For example, government statistics in the UK identified that amid the peak of the COVID-​19 outbreak in March 2020, people living in more deprived areas had experienced mortality rates (deaths involving COVID-​19 per 100,000 people) more than double those living in less deprived areas (Office of National Statistics (UK), 2020). Similarly, data from the US highlighted a strong spatio-​racial divide. Relative to the total population, African Americans were twice as likely to die from the disease as their White, Latinx, and Asian American compatriots; in some states, and in Washington DC, the disparity in death rate between Blacks and Whites exceeded six times (APM Research Lab Staff, 2020; Pilkington, 2020). Out of the ten ZIP codes with the highest death rates in New York City, eight had populations that were predominantly Black or Latinx (Schwirtz, 2020). In Canada, some of the worst-​ hit places in spring 2020 were inner suburbs featuring large immigrant populations, working poverty, overcrowding, and a built environment composed of high-​r ise residential towers (Saunders and Katsarov, 2020). COVID-​19 will have a more lasting economic impact on economically weaker cities. While the recovery of the larger centers is more imminent, weaker cities have interconnected underlying problems, which cumulatively undermine their capacities to cope with each new crisis, exacerbating the impact of each new shock. In this context of structural social and spatial inequalities, how far can one meaningfully and ethically use the language ‘resilience’? Does the evidence of uneven suffering from the crisis among different communities and cities imply that those more badly affected lack sufficient resilience? Is resilience a

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useful epistemological construct or a smokescreen to hide social divisions and to shift responsibility in an unjust society? From a critique of resilience to a critical deployment of resilience Many scholars are deeply suspicious of the resilience concept’s top-​down and even post-​political connotations that entrench the pre-​e xisting status quo, detract attention from systemic social problems, and neutralize political struggles. As MacKinnon and Derickson (2013: 258) have strenuously argued, ‘resilience is fundamentally about how best to maintain the functioning of an existing system in the face of an externally derived disturbance… the existence of social divisions and inequalities tends to be glossed over when resilience thinking is extended to society’. Indeed, resilience can be a pretense for government abandonment and the casting-​off of vulnerable places and communities, in that ‘the vacuous yet ubiquitous notion that communities ought to be “resilient” can be seen as particularly troubling in the context of austerity and reinforced neoliberalism’ (MacKinnon and Derickson, 2013: 262). This ‘cast-​off’ resilience necessarily intersects with state responses to place-​based need, in the form of reinforcing a top-​down hegemony which frequently involves foreclosure of choice and an abandonment of impacted communities, of decreasing state involvement to places in need, and of reducing political struggles to mere survivability. Yet alternative perspectives on resilience are used by critical scholars, for example, one that accounts for bottom-​up resilience. This approach is based on the understanding that the ‘cast-​off’ model is but one of many political ontologies that mobilize resilience. We have noted elsewhere that ‘there is nothing inherently negative or positive about resilience, as it is entirely contingent on who is wielding it, and for what political purposes’ (DeVerteuil and Golubchikov, 2016: 144). This relational view is anchored by Simon and Randalls (2016),

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who contend that resilience is inherently multiple, invoking differing spatialities, temporalities, and political implications, and that this multiplicity is fundamental to how resilience works in practice. As Folke (2006: 259) further argues, resilience provides adaptive capacity, which is not simply about being robust to disturbance, but also ‘about the opportunities that disturbance opens up in terms of recombination of evolved structures and processes, renewal of the system and emergence of new trajectories’. In this sense, resilience can be about ‘bouncing forward’, not just ‘bouncing back’. The adaptive capacity suggests that resilience is political rather than post-​political, a site of struggle rather than anodyne, and negotiated rather than inherent and inert, while adaptive capacity also recognizes the abuse of resilience by the powers-​that-​be. These different epistemological gazes actually open crucial gaps around whether, in the context of the ‘resilient city’ framework, the bottom-​up and top-​down readings of resilience can be used relationally to better understand the multi-​scalar politics and dynamics of urban communities under stress as well as factors, agency, possibilities, and pathways of their eventual recovery (or absence of recovery) from the stress. The lived politics of resilience One way to flesh out a politicized, co-​constituted top-​down (cast-​off) and bottom-​up resilience is through the notion of the lived politics of resilience. This notion recasts resilience from the abstract and rhetorical abilities to withstand externally induced shocks to the real-​life manifestations of resilience, ‘actually existing’ resilience on the ground, including the experiences of endurance and socio-​political dynamics conditioning these experiences. All of these notions apply to the current COVID-​19 crisis. We see the lived politics of resilience as a product of multi-​scalar relationships, simultaneously part of the larger

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socio-​political orders, circumstances and happenstances, and part of the embodied private and collective experiences and negotiation of social life at city-​wide and individual, bodily scales. This resonates with Hall’s (2019) focus on the lived experience of austerity, in that large-​scale crises are always felt viscerally and as such become personal crises, centering on everyday life and living as its key arenas. Along those (essentially Lefebvrian) lines, crises are not only part of the broader context but are personally ‘felt, lived and experienced’ (Hall, 2019: 482). Acute disasters condense the lived politics of resilience, in that they underline the ‘who’ of resilience –​who determines what is desirable, whose resilience is prioritized, who is included and excluded (Meerow and Newell, 2019). All of these are deeply political questions that involve trade-​offs before, during, and after the disaster. These questions map onto elements of ‘resilience-​as-​survival’ which aligns with the top-​down, cast-​ off version of resilience, and ‘evolutionary resilience’, which maps on to the bottom-​up version of resilience (Davoudi et al, 2013). With disaster resilience, responsibility is often devolved to the community and the individual ‘without appropriate resourcing as part of a wider strategy of self-​responsibilization and a reduction in the role of the state’ (Cretney, 2019: 511). But disaster resilience can allow for evolution, feeding into a ‘politics of possibility’ (Simon and Randalls, 2016). Such a lived politics of resilience is, for example, articulated by Jon and Purcell (2019) in terms of a more radical, immanent, and bottom-​up resilience in the face of state abandonment, using the example of post-​disaster New Orleans. To them, ‘radical resilience exists when people mobilize their ability to manage their affairs for themselves’ (Jon and Purcell, 2019: 235). Jon and Purcell locate bottom-​up resilience in the cracks, moving beyond contestation and resistance to recover some of the positive characteristics that pervaded the community before the disaster, which includes day-​to-​ day survival but also renewal, and even improve upon the

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pre-​disaster conditions. This disaster resilience is more than just stopgap, but an opportunity to gain some freedom away the previous status quo (DeVerteuil, 2015), ‘continually fashioning a new, provisional equilibrium into the future’ that ‘implies a whole different set of planning procedures –​less rigid and more adaptable over time –​to pursue it’ (Jon and Purcell, 2019: 236). Politicizing the resilient city through the lens of resilience-​as-​ experienced necessarily brings to the fore the relationality and agency of resilience: how resilience is constructed, negotiated, and resourced, at which temporal and spatial scale, with what political antecedents, consequences, and power struggles, and how these experiences talk about the nature of society and social change more generally. Towards the ontology of justice Our emphasis on critically exploring actually existing events and agency does not preclude forward-​looking normative and practice-​oriented resilience, but it does require a different ontology, the ontology of justice. In this sense, COVID-​19 could produce a more just city by exposing inequalities and leading to long-​term solutions. Or the post-​COVID-​19 era will simply involve a return to ‘business as usual’ and all of its attendant social and spatial gaps, themselves wider in the wake of the pandemic. As Vale (2014: 199) argued, ‘resilience-​ seeking practices will always entail a more continuous process rather than some sort of achieved endpoint… however, if researchers and practitioners cannot be explicit about the equity dimension of the endpoint, the processes will lack a moral compass’. Ziervogel et al (2017: 127) call for incorporating rights, entitlement, and justice in all aspects of resilience planning, which ‘places emphasis on urban governance, and suggests that a revisioning of governance is required for resilience, not simply a layering of new projects onto existing institutions, practices and mandates’.

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This can also mean that the conservative connotations of future proofing associated with planning for resilience and adaptation can be recast to include a more dynamic, proactive, and open-​ended adaptation. This, for example, can involve purposeful building of human and community capability and resourcefulness, reparation for past injustices, as well as participatory future-​making via future-​casting and future-​sharing. So in the case of COVID-​19, cities could move towards a future-​proof set of policies for the next pandemic. Note 1

This last question is featured in the Building Back Better (BBB) principles aimed at reducing risks associated with future crises, disasters, and shocks. BBB was described in the United Nations Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction in 2015.

References APM Research Lab Staff (2020) ‘The color of coronavirus: COVID-​19 deaths by race and ethnicity in the U.S.’, www. apmresearchlab.org/​covid/​deaths-​by-​race Cretney, R. (2014) ‘Resilience for whom? Emerging critical geographies of socio-​ecological resilience’. Geography Compass, 8(9): 627–​40. Cretney, R. (2019) ‘ “An opportunity to hope and dream”: disaster politics and the emergence of possibility through community-​led recovery’. Antipode, 51(2): 496–​516. Davoudi, S., Brooks, E. and Mehmood, A. (2013) ‘Evolutionary resilience and strategies for climate adaptation’. Planning Practice and Research, 28(3): 307–​22. DeVerteuil, G. (2015) Resilience in the Post-​Welfare Inner City: Voluntary Sector Geographies in London, Los Angeles and Sydney. Bristol: Policy Press. DeVerteuil, G. and Golubchikov, O. (2016) ‘Can resilience be redeemed?’ City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action, 20(1): 143–​51.

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Folke, C. (2006) ‘Resilience: the emergence of a perspective for social-​ecological systems analysis’. Global Environmental Change, 16(3): 253–​67. Hall, S.M. (2019) ‘A very personal crisis: family fragilities and everyday conjunctures within lived experiences of austerity’. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 44(3): 479–​92. Jon, I. and Purcell, M. (2019) ‘Radical resilience: autonomous self-​ management in post-​disaster recovery planning and practice’. Planning Theory and Practice, 19(2): 235–​51. MacKinnon, D. and Derickson, K. (2013) ‘From resilience to resourcefulness: a critique of resilience policy and activism’. Progress in Human Geography, 37(2): 253–​70. Meerow, S. and Newell, J. (2019) ‘Urban resilience for whom, what, where, when and why?’ Urban Geography, 40(3): 309–​29. Office of National Statistics (UK) (2020) Deaths involving COVID-​19 by local area and socioeconomic deprivation: Deaths occurring between 1 March and 31 May 2020, www.ons.gov.uk/​ peoplepopulationandcommunity/​birthsdeathsandmarriages/​ deaths/​bulletins/​deathsinvolvingcovid19bylocalareasanddeprivat ion/​deathsoccurringbetween1marchand31may2020 Pilkington, E. (2020) ‘Black Americans dying of Covid-​1 9 at three times the rate of white people’. The Guardian, May 20, www.theguardian.com/ ​ world/ ​ 2 020/​ m ay/​ 2 0/​ black-​americans-​death-​rate-​covid-​19-​coronavirus Saunders, D. and Katsarov, C. (2020) ‘The neighbourhood trap: the evolution of the world’s inner cities has exposed a local crisis of huge proportions’. The Globe and Mail, August 29, www. theglobeandmail.com/​opinion/​article-​the-​neighbourhood-t​ rap-​ the-​evolution-​of-​the-​worlds-​inner-​cities-​has/​ Schwirtz, M. (2020) ‘These N.Y.C. neighborhoods have the highest rates of virus deaths’. The New York Times, May 18, www.nytimes. com/​2020/​05/​18/​nyregion/​coronavirus-​deaths-​nyc.html Simon, S. and Randalls, S. (2016) ‘Geography, ontological politics and the resilient future’. Dialogues in Human Geography, 6(1): 3–​18. Vale, L. (2014) ‘The politics of resilient cities: whose resilience and whose city?’ Building Research & Information, 42(2): 191–​201.

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Ziervogel, G., Pelling, M., Cartwright, A., Chu, E., Deshpande, T., Harris, L., Hyams, K., Kaunda, J., Klaus, B., Michael, K., Pasquini, L., Pharoah, R., Rodina, L., Scott, D. and Zweig, P. (2017) ‘Inserting rights and justice into urban resilience: a focus on everyday risk’. Environment and Urbanization, 29(1): 123–​38.

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PART II

The Pandemic, Social Inequality, and Mobilization

EIGHT

Navigating Socio-​Economic Pressures in COVID-​19 Urban Kenya: A Relational Geographies’ Perspective Christiane Stephan, Mario Schmidt, and Eric Mutisya Kioko

Introduction Kenyan urbanites navigate their cities not only by moving through streets, buildings, means of transport, and other physical infrastructures. The densely intertwined social and economic landscapes of Kenyan society require them to dynamically move between different arrangements of social, economic, and material actors and actants in order to make ends meet. The need to quickly identify paths forward is exacerbated by the current predicament of living in times of the COVID-​19 pandemic. By focusing on ruptures in the socio-​economic relational space, we underline the importance of analyzing changing everyday practices against the backdrop of a massive external shock like the pandemic. Taking inspiration from Abdou Maliq Simone’s description of African cities as ‘incessantly flexible, mobile, and provisional intersections’ that ‘have depended on the ability of residents

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to engage complex combinations of objects, spaces, persons, and practices’ (2004: 407–​8), our chapter presents first findings from research based on remote ethnography supported by five local research assistants (Agnes Sambiro Mwamburi, Judith M. Kawikya, Jack Omondi Misiga, John Abwajo, and Kenneth Muga) who conducted over 200 qualitative interviews in selected urban dwellings in Nairobi and Nakuru in July and August 2020. Notwithstanding some expectable constraints of remote qualitative research, collaborating with team members on the ground while ensuring that measures of COVID-​19 containment and personal safety are respected has enabled us to gain thorough insight into emerging economic pressures felt by different social groups in urban Kenya and how these are linked to broader social dynamics of increasing inequality. In Nairobi, the interviews took place in the informal settlement of Kibera, home to roughly half a million Kenyans; Pipeline, a low-​income tenement settlement with one of sub-​Saharan Africa’s highest population densities; and Kileleswha, situated in Nairobi’s more affluent western part and home of better off Nairobians and expats. In Nakuru, one of Kenya’s central transportation and business hubs connecting Nairobi with the western part of Kenya and Uganda, our research assistants interviewed inhabitants of Ponda Mali, Rhonda, and Bondeni estates, all three of which are commonly described as slums. Our first section focuses on changing debt-​relations and the emergence of what we call the COVID-​19 economy, while the second discusses the effects of these economic changes on the social relations between the urban and the rural as well as between household members. The two sections are linked by a relational approach towards everyday socio-​economic practices inspired by critical urban geography (for example, Massey, 2004; Hall, 2019). (Chapter Nine also addresses how informal workers are affected by the pandemic in the Global South.)

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Changing debt-​relations and the emergence of a COVID-​19 economy Everyday economic life in Nairobi and Nakuru is being transformed following the COVID-​19 containment measures enforced by the national government and city councils since March 2020. In the immediate aftermath of Kenya’s first case reported on March 13, President Uhuru Kenyatta shut down air travel, introduced a nationwide night curfew, restricted movement, introduced a mask requirement, reduced passenger numbers in public transport, closed schools and institutions of higher learning, and restricted social gathering. These measures set in motion transformations that span across various networks and scales of the urban, involving, for example, landlords-​ tenants and intra-​household relationships, but also a large range of other socio-​economic arrangements like saccos (savings and credit co-​operatives), friendship groups, and affecting multiple social gathering and caring localities shut down temporarily such as sport bars, betting shops, private day-​care centers, liquor stores, and churches among others. One of the obvious and visible areas of changing debt-​ relations in the urban setting is renegotiated landlord-​tenant relations. Due to job loss that has led to drastic reductions of our respondents’ income, many interview partners from low-​ income neighborhoods have been unable to pay rent since March or April 2020. They adopt various strategies to prevent meeting landlords (for example leaving the house early and returning shortly before curfew begins) or plead for more time to pay rent. While some informants report supportive landlords allowing them to stay, others constantly fear being locked out or having their electricity cut off: ‘I have not paid rent for three months […] we usually talk, and he disconnected my electricity, the landlord has a lot of pressure […], sometimes he comes and locks the house and leaves. So we usually speak to the caretaker to

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open for us to sleep at night and leave in the morning before 8 in the morning’. (Informant B1, female, 22) Besides appealing to landlords, informants increasingly rely on formal and informal loans provided by shop owners, friends, family members, or mobile loan apps such as Tala or the recently introduced mobile money overdraft service Fuliza. While many interview partners have been able to get food on credit, the adding up of several debts aggravates pressure and has an immediate effect on how actors navigate spatial and social relations. This includes changes in practices that involve what Widlok describes as co-​presence and the ‘opportunity to demand’ (2020: 32) that increasingly needs to be warded off. Strategies employed include refusing to pick up phone calls, no longer opening the door if a neighbor knocks, or putting on face masks in public so that creditors cannot spot debtors. Respondents also report that they change routes when walking through the neighborhood. A particularly drastic strategy has been to declare oneself as dead: ‘The people from the app called me, and I refused to pick the phone. I then gave the phone to my friend […] [He] told the person on the phone that I’m at the city mortuary so that they could stop calling me […] so he told the guy to also help in contributing money towards my funeral arrangements […] From then, they have never called me’. (B2, male, 36) Alongside changing debt-​relations, we witness overarching shifts in economic livelihoods of our respondents. Many look for jobs in the informal sector such as carrying luggage for arriving passengers and other forms of ‘hustling’ (Thieme, 2018) or use their savings to start small businesses such as selling snacks along the streets. This trend is further fueled by middle-​ class anxieties to get infected, which led to the chasing away of many respondents who used to work as house-​help or washed

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richer city dwellers’ cars, shoes, or clothes. The emerging COVID-​19 economy is thus characterized by an increasing rush towards informality and self-​employment which boosts competition in both sectors: ‘Before corona, I was a house-​help in Langata […]my life since corona has changed, first, it began when my boss fired me –​reason being I will take corona with me to her house since I come from the slums (Kibera). Since then, I have been hustling. Sometimes I do laundry for people to get money for food. Life is hard because my husband and child are all here, they want food, and there is no money’. (A1, female, around 20) At the same time, some have found ways to profit or tap into newly emerging business opportunities. Respondents mention that local markets are flooded by bags of food and soap marked as ‘not for sale’, that is, donations turned into saleable goods. Other respondents have started to tailor face masks or speak about collectors of used face masks who wash and resell them. Furthermore, goods like furniture, cars, or electronics sold to get cash are now cheaper. Government schemes to reduce economic effects of the political measures, such as Kazi Mtaani (‘Work on the Street’) a program aiming to employ young citizens who clean streets and disinfect areas, present political actors with a fresh opportunity to engage in patronage and corruption. Respondents report that they have not been paid properly, that chiefs sneak in relatives from the rural area into the program, or that older people are employed in what should be a measure for the youth. Urban-​rural relations, gender identities, and intimate (household) relations The current COVID-​1 9 pandemic also reconfigures the household and nuclear family. This multifaceted

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reconfiguration process involves the physical structure and composition of the household, gender, and other social identities as well as child-​parent relationships and intimate relationships between couples. While we cannot repeat critical debates in social anthropology about the analytical value of the ‘household’ concept (see Guyer, 1981), we want to highlight that COVID-​19-​related changes in urban social arrangements (family, kinship groups, and so on) need to be looked at in light of longer-​term social changes in contemporary urban Kenya. Relevant perspectives can be found in debates on the relational economy in urban studies (Simone, 2019) and recent studies on economies of affection and gender identities in Kenya (Muinde, 2018). Furthermore, we want to explore urban economies in COVID-​19 Kenya by engaging with perspectives on the postcolonial city and postcolonial feminist citizenship that allow to ‘disarticulate the city as the site of masculinist and colonial publics’ (Varma, 2012: 2). Insight from empirical research also concerns the role of women as breadwinners, which is emphasized in some of the qualitative interviews. Conflicts over economic responsibilities seem to lead to insecurities on the part of males about their identities: ‘Love and unity have reduced in the family because men don’t know how to survive without money […] my husband’s joblessness has affected how we relate these days […] he feels insecure because I am the one providing for the family’. (B4, female, 32) ‘My husband resorts to violence a lot […] he can come home and starts beating up the children […] it’s difficult staying under one roof during this period. The stress of not having money has made him become crueler these days. So I try talking to the children convincing them to leave him alone […]’. (C2, female, 55)

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A male interview partner presents his perception of changes in the relationship with his wife as follows: ‘My wife sometimes thinks I’m making more money and I’m not giving her […], she doesn’t know the burden I have so we argue because of money […]. There is a change in income; before I used to come with a lot of money now I don’t. So sometimes she thinks there is somewhere else I’m taking that money […]. So we argue sometimes but it has not been physical’. (B5, male, 35) Relationships between parents and children are changed by COVID-​19 measures in various ways. While social distancing, hygiene measures, and fear of contracting the disease and spreading it to family members hinder practices that involve physical contact and emotional comfort, frustrations or anger of parents over failure in supplying money or food produce an atmosphere of fear in the house. The following interview quotes exemplify our empirical findings: ‘Especially when their father has come back in the afternoon from work all they want to do is jump and swing on him but he has to find a way to stay away from them because of precautions. […] By the time he is done with all that [hygiene measures] […] you see that the excitement has gone […] and that is sad because all the parents want after a long day of work is to be close to their kids […]. Even me personally I can’t get hugs from my h ­ usband’. (D2, female, 28) ‘I get angered easily and this causes tension in the house […], the kids fear me because my emotions are unpredictable these days’. (B2, male, 36) Rural-​urban relations, for example exchange in goods and money or people moving between the village and the city,

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have changed substantially since the beginning of COVID-​19 containment measures. However, first analysis of our empirical data hints at ambivalent changes in these practices which can neither be described as strengthened or weakened but rather as substantially reconfigured. A first observation is a dramatic decrease in urban-​rural travel and phone contact. While some informants report neighbors having moved to the village, this is not an option for everybody. One informant mentions that she “can’t afford to go back home” (B3, female, 32). Sending children to family members in the village is one strategy to reduce the household size. Planned visits to rural homes are cancelled even after travel restrictions have been lifted. Informants mention that it is mainly fear of COVID-​19 contraction that makes rural family members ask that people from the urban area not visit: ‘It has changed because people are seeing that people from town are taking the disease home […] I remember like my neighbor he was not allowed to greet his parents for ten days […] he was not allowed’. (D1, male, 50) At the same time, expectations from many rural family members for mobile money transfers from the city can no longer be met. This leads to a decline in telephone contacts as people prefer to be unreachable than to answer that they cannot provide support: ‘I can call home once a week […] and before that, I used to call people at home even four times a day’. (A2, male, 55) ‘These people in the rural do not want to understand that life is not easy anymore in Nairobi […]. They are even better off […], they have a farm where they can plant crops and harvest them for food. They behave as if you do not have a life of your own to take care of […]

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It is like you are a small ATM to them […] every time they expect us to send them money’. (C1, female, 30) COVID-​19 and relational geographies The empirical accounts selected from our ethnographic material give first hints towards drastic changes in the socio-​economic dynamics of urban Kenya since COVID-​19 and related measures governments launched. Intensified social and economic pressures, for example, in landlord-​tenant relationships and the dynamic mobile loan sector but also in novel strategies to deal with pressures in the COVID-​19 economy, provide insight into what influences already existing patterns of inequality in growing cities like Nakuru and the capital Nairobi. Urban geographer Doreen Massey has underscored the importance of analyzing relations between place, embodiment, and meaning, but at the same time to ‘rethink relations at a distance’ (2004: 10). We consider it crucial to further explore the various implications of relational space in COVID-​19 urban Kenya, that would allow us to co-​conceptualize social and economic practices and material arrangements like debt, economic strategies, rent and housing, household, the urban-​rural nexus, family, friends, intimate relations, and wider-​socio-​economic networks. References Guyer, J. (1981) ‘Household and community in African studies’. African Studies Review, 24(2–​3): 87–​137. Hall, S.M. (2019) ‘Everyday austerity: towards relational geographies of family, friendship and intimacy’. Progress in Human Geography, 43(5): 769–​89. Massey, D. (2004) ‘Geographies of responsibility’. Geografiska Annaler B, 86(1): 5–​18. Muinde, J.V.S. (2018) An economy of (dis)affections: Women-​headed households, cash transfers and matrilineal relations in Kenya South Coast. Doctoral thesis, Department of Social Anthropology, University of Cambridge. https://​doi.org/​10.17863/​CAM.43683

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Simone, A.M. (2004) ‘People as infrastructure: intersecting fragments in Johannesburg’. Public Culture, 16(3): 407–​29. Simone, A.M. (2019) ‘Relational economy’, in A. Orum (ed) The Wiley-​Blackwell Encyclopedia on Urban and Regional Studies. Oxford: Wiley-​Blackwell. Thieme, T. (2018) ‘The hustle economy: rethinking geographies of informality and getting by’. Progress in Human Geography, 42(4): 529–​48. Var ma, R. (2012) The Postcolonial City and its Subjects. New York: Routledge. Widlok, T. (2020) ‘Sharing, presence and the built environment’. Built Environment, 46(1): 28–​39.

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On Standby? But for How Long? The Impact of COVID-​19 Lockdown Measures on the Urban Poor of Sri Lanka Mohamed Munas, Lothar Smith, and Dilshani N. Ranawaka

Epidemics and pandemics have always had crippling effects on urban centers and cities. The World Bank forecasts that the shocks of the ongoing COVID-​19 pandemic will result in a category of ‘new poor’,1 of which over 30 percent will be residents of urban areas (Sanchez-​Paramo, 2020). The International Labour Organization (ILO) anticipates that their loss of labor may be permanent, resulting in a sustained rather than temporary increase in poverty levels in urban areas (ILO, 2020). While for Sri Lanka as a whole the poor are unevenly distributed and particularly skewed towards rural regions, including inland plantations, there is a substantial urban population working in the informal sector in Sri Lanka’s cities and towns (Turkstra et al, 2018). Because of stagnant informal

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sector income, by and large, they have profited little from the economic growth that the country has achieved over the last decade (Senanayake et al, 2015). In this chapter, we explore how the urban poor working in the informal sector, who reside in parts of the city with high population density, cramped living conditions, poor access to potable water and sanitation, and congested public transport systems, are affected by government measures, such as mobility restrictions, enforced in order to halt the spread of COVID-​19 (World Health Organization (WHO), 2020). The disproportionate impact on the urban informal sector Entrepreneurial start-​ups and small businesses can experience severe precarity in their economic viability due to the COVID-​19 pandemic. These enterprises are particularly vulnerable to the uncertainty, reduced access to sources of finance, stalled repayment of delivered services and goods, breakdowns of market linkages, as well as an overall lack of protection associated with the pandemic (Dy and Jayawarna, 2020). Most workers in the informal sector are employed without signed contracts complying with labor regulations. They are also deprived of employment and livelihood protection such as health coverage, unemployment benefits, and savings for old age. Moreover, overall demand for their services is impeded by the shrinkage of the economy caused by COVID-​19 (Benjamin et al, 2014). During the COVID-​19 curfew, the Centre for Poverty Analysis conducted an online survey to gain an understanding of the effects of the uncertainty people were facing as a result of the curfew measures enforced by the state. This survey included the views of 460 individuals from 23 districts (of a total of 25 districts) of which 50 percent were urban based. Data from the survey inform the content of the chapter.

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The following figure summarizes the key learning from the survey regarding informal entrepreneurs in the urban sector. The other categories in the graph fall under the formal sector. What can we discern from the survey results? First, in responding to the question on the impact of COVID-​19 on individual income reduction, the highest percentage (63 percent) of those belonging to the informal entrepreneurial category stated that they had faced income losses, which contrasted with the other categories of workers among whom less than half mentioned facing reduced revenues (with the exception of assistants). This could be due to restrictions the government imposed on mobility, the closure of public spaces where markets are located as well as the overall impact on linkages. A large majority of the informal entrepreneurs were highly concerned about the duration of their income reduction as it also impacted on the overall financial situation of the family. Figure 9.1 records loss of income for a period of over Figure 9.1: Distribution of actual and anticipated income reduction 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Assistant

Informal entrepreneurs

Managerial

Actual income reduction

Professional

Teaching

Anticipated income reduction

Source: Survey data, Centre for Poverty Analysis, 2020

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three months and anticipations regarding subsequent shocks due to a shrinking of the economy. It stresses the disproportional effect the crisis has on the informal sector. Second, in response to a question about managing finances in difficult situations such as COVID-​19, most urban-​based informal entrepreneurs indicated that they first utilized cash reserves at home to pay for their household needs, followed by drawing from bank savings and pawning jewelry, when they saw no possibility for earning. These entrepreneurs were well aware that, unlike those in the formal sector, consuming savings meant for investment and business expansion purposes could entail severe cash-​flow risks. Third, respondents indicated that COVID-​1 9-​related mobility and public space use constraints caused structural impediments to their livelihoods. This was especially the case for informal sector workers who needed to rely on access to public spaces to reach out to their customers. The example of the fishmonger illustrates such a situation (see Box 9.1). The

Box 9.1:  The mobile fish trader The mobile fish trader is typical of a range of petty traders who rely on a high level of mobility while operating in the urban setting. Typically, his mode of operation is such that he travels early morning to a market located on the outskirts of the city to buy fish. Bringing the fish back to his locality, he then walks around the neighborhood to sell it, using a pushcart. Although the market was still operating, but at a reduced capacity, during the curfew, the petty trader was unable to reach the market because of the unavailability of (public) transport. Complying with COVID-​19 guidelines prevented him from engaging in his trade. Additional measures, such as wearing a face mask, led to further difficulties as he needs to walk in the hot and humid conditions of the city to sell the products to the customers. Some customers, through their contacts, used alternative modes of getting fish, namely online vendors, albeit at a premium price. The fear of the street traders was that they were being put out of business, as this change could well endure beyond the crisis.

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key factor here is the ability of informal economy workers to adapt to the new situation, that is, adhering to health regulations while still being able to do their work. Some entrepreneurs were willing and able to go beyond their comfort zones to innovate and find new ways of conducting business in this new, strained environment. They joined online platforms or actively used social media platforms such as WhatsApp and Facebook to connect to customers and markets. These types of enterprises used mobility constraints to their benefit. Some even expanded their customer base. These creative informal entrepreneurs were relatively computer literate, possessed basic technical skills and capacities, and had strong social networks, all of which allowed them to adapt to new situations. There is, however, a category of informal entrepreneurs who rely heavily on a vibrant, active economy that, in normal circumstances, only requires limited literacy. These enterprises, using conventional technologies and marketing modes, were not able to find new ways to conduct their business activities in the new, constrained environment. More fundamentally, some of these activities required a physical presence, which they could not provide through another channel. Nor could these entrepreneurs readily engage in alternative activities due to a lack of necessary capital and skills. A further disaggregation of the range of informal entrepreneurial activities in urban settings can help better understand the nature of these income earning options, their underlying dynamics and logic, and the kind of people they involve. For instance, typical informal activities in urban Sri Lanka include selling freshly produced food, street vending, and petty trade, working as domestic workers, waste pickers, sanitary workers, transport service providers, home-​based workers, and own account workers. These services cannot be provided from home. The example of Shani illustrates the mobility constraints and unequal access to urban spaces incurred by the poor due to state-​imposed regulations (see Box 9.2). Even though these measures are meant to keep people healthy, they result in new

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Box 9.2:  The domestic aid Shani works as a domestic aid for a family in Colombo, the capital city of Sri Lanka, a job that cannot be performed remotely. During the curfew, many workers like her lost their jobs since public transport was suspended, the employers did not arrange alternative transport, and private forms of transport were well beyond their financial means. Shani, like many other domestic workers in the informal sector, did not possess other recognized skills to secure alternative, perhaps more formal work. It has also been hard for her to keep her job following the lockdown, as her employers had discussed with friends in their neighborhood the possible repercussions of outsiders visiting their homes after the lifting of the curfew. At the same time, she has faced severe risks in traveling to work, using crowded public transport systems which recommend physical distancing and other COVID-​19 safety precautions that were often impossible to enforce.

forms of poverty, even leading to situations of desperation and sheer hunger among a segment of the urban population, who simply cannot make a living while being at home and are unable to rely on savings. Most often the riskiest, most vulnerable, and lowest-​income workers are unskilled women (Chen, 2012). Informal support networks also fail in this situation since most of the people belonging to these networks are adversely affected. Further, these populations cannot fall back on state support and social security measures as their work is informal. During the two most severe months of the curfew, the Government of Sri Lanka did provide Rs. 5,000 (approximately US$ 27) per month as support to such families, helping them meet some basic needs. People utilized this sum to purchase essential food items to avoid starvation and sustain their basic nutritional needs. It was insufficient, however, to provide for other essential needs. The informal sector matters Although mobility was impaired during the Sri Lankan civil war for a long period of time, and people were not able to

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work at times due to high levels of insecurity, war did not result in a total island-​wide lockdown for over three months, as is the case with the current COVID-​19 crisis. Furthermore, the COVID-​19 crisis has affected the entire population, albeit with different degrees of severity. In urban settings, COVID-​19 has disproportionately impacted poor people and further exacerbated already existent and deep-​rooted socio-​economic inequalities, pushing some groups out of employment while other categories, those with sufficient socio-​cultural, human, and financial capital, have been able to innovate and survive under the ‘new normal’. What emerges from the findings is that the resilience and adaptability to a ‘new normal’ under COVID-​19 conditions is causing wide gaps between income groups, often along the lines of formal and informal employment. In fact, the distinction between formal and informal is becoming even more vague, and the terms are being redefined. Given the nature of informal work, which often requires a physical presence and the use of public spaces and public transport, informal workers are at a serious disadvantage when trying to adjust to new government-​imposed restrictions. All of this is exacerbated by a lack of alternative income-​generating opportunities, due to insufficient human, financial, and social capital. While both men and women have been affected by restrictions, the informal activities of women are particularly vulnerable. Furthermore, spending more time at home leads to some shifting of household tasks, men transferring tasks they conducted before to their wives and other adult women in the household, which further constrains their ability to engage in paid work. Given the likelihood of the adoption of new measures restricting mobility when new outbreaks emerge, there is a need for a broad-​based social security system that can help the most adversely affected to overcome income losses and avoid falling into extreme and structural poverty. Considering how enmeshed the informal and formal economy are, notably in an urban context, we strongly

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recommend that COVID-​19 measures be tailored to the nature of informal work, by looking for how health measures be maintained without jeopardizing income opportunities for the poor. This could take the form of government support for specific transport facilities to support mobile entrepreneurs. Furthermore, medium-​and long-​term employment protection policies that include the informal sector are essential to the survival of informal entrepreneurs. This would, indeed, require governments –​at all levels –​to take the informal economy seriously, and acknowledge that it is an important and enduring part of the economy, rather than conveniently turning a blind eye to it when formulating economic and social policies. This may prove to be one positive outcome of a crisis that has otherwise been harsh to the urban poor of Sri Lanka and of elsewhere in the world. (Chapter Eight discusses how informal workers are affected by the pandemic in Kenya.) Acknowledgments  e would like to express our sincere gratitude to the research team of the W Centre for Poverty Analysis (CEPA) for sharing the online survey data carried out during the COVID-19 pandemic. We also wish to thank Gayathri Lokuge of CEPA for providing input and reviewing this article.

Note 1

Those who were expected to be non-​poor in 2020 prior to the COVID-​19 outbreak but are now expected to be poor in 2020.

References Benjamin, N., Beegle, K., Recanatini, F. and Santini, M. (2014) Informal economy and the world bank (Policy Research Working Paper, No. 6888). Washington DC: The World Bank. Chen, M.A. (2012) The informal economy: Definitions, theories and ­policies. WIEGO Working Paper No. 1. WIEGO.

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Dy, A. and Jayawar na, D. (2020) ‘Bios, mythoi and entrepreneurs: a Wynterian analysis of the intersectional imapcts of the COVID-​19 pandemic on self-​employed women and women-​ owned businesses’. SAGE Journals, 38(5): 391–​403. International Labour Organization (ILO) (2020) COVID-​19 crisis and the informal economy (ILO Brief). Switzerland: ILO. Senanayake, S.M.P., Wimalaratana, W. and Premaratne, S.P. (2015) ‘Informal sector and the economy in Sri Lanka: a survey of literature’. UEH Journal of Economic Development, 22(3): 141–​60. Turkstra, J., Roberts, B. and Talpahewa, C. (2018) State of Sri Lankan cities –​2018. Colombo: UN-​Habitat. World Health Organization (WHO) (2020) Strengthening Preparedness for COVID-​19 in Cities and Urban Settings. London: WHO.

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Combatting Older Adult Loneliness: It Takes a (Blended) Village Maxwell Hartt, Samantha J. Norberg, Julie Kearns, Maliha Majeed, and Barry Pendergast

Introduction Older adults have been thrown into the spotlight of the COVID-​19 pandemic and the bright lights have exposed both societies’ admirable and deplorable traits. We have seen stories of heart-​warming compassion and deep-​rooted ageism. From the appalling #boomerremover hashtag to the calls for mandatory quarantines for those over 70 years of age, public responses to COVID-​19 demonstrate the role of age and (dis)ability in amplifying social and spatial inequalities. Although these reactions are unfounded, unethical, and have not received widespread political support, they do highlight the distressing interrelation of several truths: society at large is aging; older adults are at higher risk for developing more serious complications from COVID-​19; and the social and physical infrastructure of cities has not been built to support the needs of older adults. In addition to the risks of COVID-​19, the

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confluence of these three realities has potentially exacerbated a second public health crisis: loneliness. And as in the case of COVID-​19, older adults are particularly susceptible. In this chapter we examine the relationship between COVID-​19, social distance, social isolation, and loneliness with a focus on the older adult experience in urban and suburban environments. In addition to outlining the risks faced by older adults in times of crisis, we explore opportunities to strengthen social bonds while physically distancing through the development of blended communities or virtual retirement villages. Using the experience of the Oakridge Seniors Association in suburban Calgary, we offer targeted recommendations for community leaders and policy makers on how to minimize risk and maximize social cohesion by embracing communication technology while remembering the importance of human interaction. (Chapters Eleven and Twelve also explore the theme of self-​ organization in the face of the pandemic, but from the perspective of different national contexts and social categories.) Loneliness, social isolation, and social distancing We should differentiate between loneliness, social isolation, and social distancing. Loneliness is a subjective description of a person’s emotional state, whereas social isolation is an objective measure of a person’s lack of interaction with other people. Social distancing, as we have experienced during the COVID-​19 pandemic, refers to limiting human interaction to curb the spread of a virus. By taking part in social distancing and significantly reducing physical interactions with others, many people are becoming increasingly socially isolated. Although being alone does not always result in being lonely, habitual social isolation can give rise to loneliness over time –​especially in old age (Levitin, 2020). Loneliness can have extremely damaging mental and physical health impacts for people of all ages. Chronic loneliness is considered more damaging than smoking 15 cigarettes a day (McGregor, 2017) and could increase a

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person’s likelihood of dying within the next seven years by 30 percent (Holt-​Lunstad et al, 2015). Loneliness and social isolation can also cause hypervigilance towards social threats in the form of persistent fear, hypersensitivity, and aggressiveness (Rodriguez-​Romaguera and Stuber, 2018). Such attributes may be especially troubling during a pandemic as messaging from the government, media, relatives, and friends continues to warn older adults of the risk they take each time they leave their homes (Hartt, 2020). It can be difficult in normal circumstances for an individual to seek help to address their loneliness, let alone during a global pandemic when feelings of loneliness may feel frivolous in comparison to the extensive hardship around the world. In many cases, older adults already have concerns of being a burden on loved ones and caregivers (Cahill et al, 2009). They may see the complex responsibilities of others during a pandemic (childcare, financial instability, health concerns, unemployment, and so on) as justification to suppress their own concerns of loneliness. There are ways to prevent and counteract loneliness such as having large social networks and regular social interactions with others (Shimamura, 2017). Social reciprocity and meaningful engagement in community life are particularly important to social connectedness among older adults (Emlet and Moceri, 2012). Volunteering with local community groups, events, or institutions has been shown to be particularly effective at combating loneliness and bolstering self-​worth (Anderson et al, 2014). Unfortunately, such opportunities for daily interaction and volunteering are limited in the current state of the world. Technological solutions are increasingly called upon to supplant physical interaction as we transition into new social and working arrangements. During COVID-​19, the world has turned to videoconferencing as a tool to maintain professional and personal communication. Platforms such as Skype, FaceTime, and Zoom have become an intrinsic part of people’s everyday lives. From health checkups to virtual

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classrooms, many of us, including older adults, are interacting online for large portions of the day. This is promising, as there are great benefits of older adult internet use and connectivity including decreased depression as well as the ability for socially isolated older adults to access health care providers and social workers more frequently and cost-​effectively (Klinenberg, 2012). Although information and communications technology can help aging-​in-​place, low technology literacy among older adults and the exclusion of older adults from technology design raise significant barriers (Wang et al, 2019). Even with incremental gains in internet access for older adults, society’s oldest old are most likely to lack comfort and competency using the internet. Compounding this lack of virtual connectivity is the fact that this age group is also most likely to be widowed and may be the most vulnerable to COVID-​19. By immersing ourselves deeper and deeper in virtual interaction, we, as a society, could unintentionally be exacerbating feelings of isolation among those least connected and most vulnerable. It is more important than ever that internet access be widely available and affordable. Free information and communication technology training programs must be expanded and broadened. But access and knowledge alone are not sufficient. In order to combat loneliness, we must facilitate opportunities for blended communities that bring together virtual and in-​person interactions. The Oakridge Seniors Association, for example, is a blended community that connects older adults within a given neighborhood, city, or region, with one another both online and offline with the goal of social connectivity and inclusion. In a future full of uncertainty and potential periodic lockdowns, blended communities can allow individuals to stay connected and check in with one another. These blended interactions are critical for combatting loneliness while accruing benefits that can only come with human contact (Levitin, 2020).

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Oakridge Seniors Association Oakridge is a residential community nestled in southwest Calgary, Canada. Oakridge is a relatively recently developed community, established in 1968, though it is home to many in later life. In 2016, the proportion of residents aged 65 years and older in Oakridge (21 percent) was double that of the Calgary average (10 percent) (City of Calgary, 2019). Oakridge is a relatively high socio-​economic status community and its older residents are generally active and in fair health (City of Calgary, 2019). The Oakridge Seniors Association (OSA) is a membership organization inspired by the vision of a long-​time resident to increase social connections among older residents. This vision led to ‘building’ a virtual village that provides social activities and practical assistance to help aging neighbors comfortably remain in and enjoy their community. Virtual villages, a model that has increased in popularity in the US since being established in 2002, are non-​profit membership organizations with associated membership fees. Older adults who volunteer and participate in their village have been found to have increased social engagement and improved quality of life, which in turn enhances their ability to successfully age in place (Graham et al, 2017). The OSA was initially self-​funded in 2018 but by its second year the virtual village was supported by grants from a local community foundation and the Government of Canada. Operations are entirely virtual under the direction of a Board of Directors and the administration of one social worker. Weekly social, active living, creative expression, well-​being, and lifelong learning programming are available to members, as are supportive services delivered by local volunteers such as transportation, check-​in phone calls, and technology assistance. The website serves as a ‘gathering place’ for members to access local information and resources, register for programs and events, and request services. Communication with members is done primarily through the website and weekly email blasts

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and postal mail for those without digital connection. Members can access live support from the social worker on weekdays by phone and email. The emergence of COVID-​19 highlighted aging-​in-​place as an attractive alternative to senior care facilities. Neighborhoods are changing and older adults who remain in place may experience exclusion (Burns et al, 2012). Community exclusion is compensated by older adults’ attachment to their neighborhoods, which is influenced by local services and social connectedness to neighbors (Burns et al, 2012). A village model is a fitting solution to aging-​in-​place without social connectedness. COVID-​19 reinforced the efficacy of the OSA’s vision for a virtual village. It was a relief to not have rented a physical space, and as a result be prepared for social distancing and work-​from-​home orders. In-​person programs were successfully moved online, a transition supported by federal funding and donations to provide members with laptops, tablets, and internet connection. Members are acclimatizing to engaging primarily via technology. One member has excelled and now offers a French refresher course to other members by videoconference. It took more convincing to get another member to see the benefit of being digitally connected, though they can now email and videochat with friends and family, and view and request OSA services online. The return of face-​to-​face contact with restrictions highlighted the benefits of living in a close-​knit community as it was possible to gather (socially distant) in backyards and the beautiful green spaces which link neighborhood homes. The OSA has adapted by holding smaller, more frequent events to allow social connection with physical distance. COVID-​19 fears deter some members from attending in-​person gatherings, though many welcomed an opportunity for in-​person connection post-​lockdown, emphasizing the importance of blended interactions. Due to the OSA’s reliance on digital communication during the pandemic and the high socio-​economic status

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of many Oakridge residents, it has been difficult to identify older adults with technology needs. OSA volunteers began to assess member needs by phone, though more success was found by connecting with local organizations municipally funded to serve vulnerable populations for technology referrals. COVID-​19 caused a significant challenge in trying to reach neighbors living in multi-​dwelling buildings, including seniors’ facilities, as there are fewer opportunities to naturally interact. The OSA’s communications were adapted to include a postal mail drop to all Oakridge residents, lawn signs throughout the community, and an insert in a local paper. The OSA’s planned participatory action research has been deferred so that the methodology may be adapted to meet social distance requirements, which may include a community online survey followed by telephone and web-​conferencing meetings. Like so many other organizations at this moment, OSA volunteers and staff are continuously learning. Community building is based on personal connections. While in-​person connections are important, community building can continue by phone, digital groups, videoconferencing, and socially distanced activities. The COVID-​19 pandemic and associated restrictions remind us of the fragility of our communities and the critical need for designing sustainable, adaptable community organizations. Village sustainability is based on financial, human, and organizational resources, membership numbers, and community collaborations (Scharlach et al, 2019). The OSA is fortunate to have firm funding sources, a recently hired staff member, and a Board of Directors with expertise in business, architecture, human services, and academia, although none of them has built a social enterprise. And all will experience moments of trepidation and risk burnout as the pandemic continues to disrupt life as we once knew it. However, virtual villages like the OSA are well positioned to support members in transitioning to a post-​pandemic world more reliant on digital technology and adaptable to changing circumstances. Villages may benefit from hiring social

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workers with gerontological expertise, like the OSA has done, to identify, assess, and respond to needs (Graham et al, 2017). An engaged external network is crucial in keeping abreast of how other organizations are adapting, and providing opportunities to learn, share ideas, cover one another’s service gaps, and avoid duplication of services. A village model that supports blended interactions, both socially and practically, allows for the continuation of social connection and volunteerism during difficult times like these. And unfortunately, difficult times are likely to persist for the foreseeable future. Virtual villages are an opportunity to stave off loneliness, encourage engagement, and ultimately, create better outcomes for older adults (Graham et al, 2017). References Anderson, N.D., Damianakis, T., Kröger, E., Wagner, L.M., Dawson, D.R., Binns, M.A., Berstein, S., Caspi, E. and Cook, S.L. (2014) ‘The benefits associated with volunteering among seniors: a critical review and recommendations for future research’. Psychological Bulletin, 140(6): 1505–​33. Burns, V.F., Lavoie, J. and Rose, D. (2012) ‘Revisiting the role of neighbourhood change in social exclusion and inclusion of older people’. Journal of Aging Research, Article 148287, https://d​ oi.org/​ 10.1155/​2012/​148287 Cahill, E., Lewis, L.M., Barg, F.K. and Bogner, H.R. (2009) ‘ “You don’t want to burden them”: older adults’ views on family involvement in care’. Journal of Family Nursing, 15(3): 295–​317. City of Calgary (2019) Oakridge community profile, www.calgary. ca/​csps/​cns/​social-​research-​policy-​and-​resources/​community-​ profiles/​oakridge-​profile.html Emlet, C. and Moceri, J.T. (2012) ‘The importance of social connectedness in building age-​friendly communities’. Journal of Aging Research, Article 173247, https://d​ oi.org/1​ 0.1155/​2012/​173247 Graham, C.L., Scharlach, A.E. and Stark, B. (2017) ‘Impact of the village model: results of a national survey’. Journal of Gerontological Social Work, 60(5): 335–​54.

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Hartt, M. (2020) ‘COVID-​19: a lonely pandemic’. Cities & Health, online early view, www.tandfonline.com/​doi/​full/​10.1080/​ 23748834.2020.1788770 Holt-​Lunstad, J., Smith, T.B., Baker, M., Harris, T. and Stephenson, D. (2015) ‘Loneliness and social isolation as risk factors for mortality: a meta-​analytic review’. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 10(2): 227–​37. Klinenberg, E. (2012) Going Solo: The Extraordinary Rise and Surprising Appeal of Living Alone. New York: Penguin Press. Levitin, D. (2020) Successful Aging: A Neuroscientist Explores the Power and Potential of Our Lives. Toronto: Penguin Random House. McGregor, J. (2017) ‘This former surgeon general says there’s a “loneliness epidemic” and work is partly to blame’. The Washington Post, October 4, www.washingtonpost.com/n ​ ews/o ​ n-​leadership/​ wp/​2017/​10/​04/​this-​former-​surgeon-​general-​says-​theres-​a-​ loneliness-​epidemic-​and-​work-​is-​partly-​to-​blame/​ Rodriguez-​Romaguera, J. and Stuber, G.D. (2018) ‘Social isolation co-​opts fear and aggression circuits’. Cell, 173(5): 1071–​2. Scharlach, A., Lehning, A., Davitt, J., Greenfield, E. and Graham, C. (2019) ‘Organizational characteristics associated with the sustainability of villages’. Journal of Applied Gerontology, 38(5): 694–​716. Shimamura, A. (2017) Get SMART!: Five Steps Toward a Healthy Brain. Scotts Valley, CA: CreateSpace. Wang, S., Bolling, K., Mao, W., Reichstadt, J., Jeste, D., Kim, H.C. and Nebeker, C. (2019) ‘Technology to support aging-​in-​ place: older adults’ perspectives’. Healthcare, 7(2): 60.

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Kindness More Contagious Than Viruses: An Inclusive and Innovative Response to Inequalities in Ankara Özgür Sayın and Savaş Zafer Şahin

Introduction COVID-​19 caught the world suddenly and unprepared and turned into a catastrophic outbreak at an unprecedented pace. Besides being a public health crisis, the pandemic also triggered a broader multi-​dimensional global crisis, whose outcomes were undoubtedly more devastating for socially and economically disadvantaged groups. Global trade almost halted, many companies closed down, massive layoffs occurred, and many countries experienced recession (see, World Bank, 2020). To combat these impacts and to protect their citizens, governments adopted different measures, varied according to their policy capacities, economic circumstances, and administrative traditions (Capano et al, 2020). In Turkey, the central government, thanks to the strong centralist administrative structure, was able to provide a quick and effective response to the early wave of the pandemic in terms of health care and lockdown measures (Bakir, 2020). Nevertheless, the fragility of

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the economy forced it to prioritize market-​oriented strategies at the expense of the social and economic support needed by impoverished classes. On the ground, this resulted in an uncodified and forced intergovernmental task-​sharing, sometimes pushing social aid policies further into the field of responsibility of local governments. For local governments, which already suffered a severe loss of income during the pandemic, this also meant a heavy economic burden that they could not manage. Unfortunately, this was the case for the metropolitan governments ruled by the opposition parties, which could not get enough financial support from the central government. The Ankara Metropolitan Municipality (AMM) was one of these metropolitan governments. Nevertheless, the Municipality was able to develop an innovative, comprehensive, participatory, and most importantly, relatively low-​cost, social support strategy during the pandemic, despite all the financial and political restraints. Put differently, in collaboration with local NGOs, the Municipality not only implemented standard measures more effectively but also encouraged and organized citizenship solidary and developed various mutual-​aid platforms so that wealthier citizens could help economically and socially vulnerable people. In the following sections, we provide background information on governmental responses to COVID-​19 with particular attention to the intergovernmental relations and then proceed with the reasons pushing the Ankara Municipality to follow a solidarity-​based strategy and provide a detailed account of the performance of this strategy. The governmental response to COVID-​19: from a mandatory distribution of tasks to intergovernmental conflict The pandemic reached Turkey on March 11, 2020, about three months after China, which prompted the central

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government in Turkey to set a strategy for combating the pandemic. A few days after the first case was detected, schools, restaurants, shopping centers, bars, and cafés were temporarily closed. Measures were then gradually tightened to mitigate the spread of the virus across the country. All international flights, domestic intercity travel via public transport, entry to and exit from metropolitan regions were banned. However, possibly worried about the fragility of the economy, the central government did not carry out a nationwide stay-​at-​home strategy but rather contented itself with partial social lockdown measures. Nationwide curfew was only imposed on citizens under 20 and over 65, who are assumed to be in the high-​r isk groups vulnerable to the effects of the disease but who at the same time remain out of the official workforce. Apart from this, an additional curfew was imposed in large cities, limited to weekends and public holidays. Moreover, the central government put a set of economic measures, called ‘Economic Stability Shield Package’, into place to stimulate the economy damaged by the pandemic (Anadolu Agency, 2020). The government, struggling with the high rate of unemployment for the last few years, has pursued a three-​fold strategy: keep private sector companies alive, prevent massive job losses, and protect incomes. The first support package, amounting to $15.4 billion, announced on March 19, 2020, introduced tax cuts, low-​interest credit provision, deferrals on some taxes, and insurance payments for the companies operating in the sectors most affected by the pandemic. The additional packages, unveiled in subsequent months, extended the support given to the private sector. Further, a temporary layoff ban was announced on April 17, 2020, and to compensate for potential income losses, short-​time work allowances (for employees shifting to partial-​working order) and wage supports (for employees on unpaid leave) were put into effect. In contrast with its success in implementing macro strategies regarding economic stability and market balance, the central government fell short of developing efficient social aid tools

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for the vulnerable parts of society (for example low-​income families, the elderly, disabled individuals, unemployed) during the pandemic. Pandemic-​related social aid remained limited to modest and mostly one-​time instruments such as extra payments for needy families and pensioners, provision of food supplies, deferral of some household bills (Çerkezoğlu, 2020). Lack of such support compelled local governments to prioritize social policy instruments, which resulted in massive extra costs crippling their budgets. Therefore, at first, many municipalities confined their social support policies to temporary, low-​cost, preferably in-​kind, aids (for example cancelling or deferral of rents on municipality-​owned properties, provision of food or some other essential need goods, free mask distribution). However, as the crisis unfolded, the growing demands of vulnerable populations increased pressures on municipalities, in particular on the metropolitan municipalities where a significant portion of the urban poor lives. Metropolitan municipalities belonging to opposition parties followed a different path than the ones led by the ruling party, which were able to work more harmoniously with the central government. On March 29, 2020, opposition metropolitan municipalities, including Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, launched donation campaigns. This maneuver caused intergovernmental tensions to stiffen since, in the last local elections, the main opposition party won control over 11 metropolitan municipalities (Selçuki, 2020). Just one day after the beginning of the local governments’ campaigns, the central government launched its own nationwide fundraising campaign. Then on the grounds that they undermined the national campaign and were unlawful, the central government cancelled municipalities’ donation campaigns and blocked their fundraising accounts. Such impediments forced opposition metropolitan municipalities to adopt new policy tools to maintain and develop social aids. Among other examples, the AMM developed an innovative strategy, making it possible to maintain social aid without incurring extra costs affecting its budget. This strategy

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involves using online solidarity platforms and participatory mechanisms, in which people can apply to fill the needs of vulnerable households (for example food, cash, public transport tickets, and so on). The case of Ankara Municipality With the arrival of the pandemic in the country, all local governments began to develop strategies within their own fiscal and political capabilities to protect vulnerable residents. Among these efforts, the AMM has attracted exceptional attention and gained nationwide popularity with its alternative policies (for all measures see, Eurocities, 2020). What made Ankara different was not only its success in developing and implementing social support policies, which was also done by myriad local governments in and out of Turkey. What differentiated Ankara was the outcome of well-​managed participatory mechanisms, practical usage of mobile and data-​driven technologies, PR strategies and particularly social media; and an ambitious organizational approach to bring citizens together so they could engage in solidarity-​motivated efforts. By doing this, the Municipality was able to adopt a comprehensive, effective, and flexible social policy strategy, which heeded financial and political circumstances and adapted to the course of the outbreak. Immediately after the arrival of the pandemic, the Municipality declared that all non-​urgent municipal investment and services should be halted and that all financial resources were to be channeled into recovery programs for local businesses, shopkeepers, impoverished and vulnerable citizens including the ones who lost their jobs because of the outbreak. At first, a relatively generic and familiar pathway was followed to compensate the pandemic-​related income losses in different local sectors, for example all rent payments on municipal properties were postponed, direct cash support was provided to local shopkeepers in need, and private operators in the public transport system were provided with free fuel.

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Further, with grassroot feedback from the Citizens’ Assembly of Ankara (CAA),1 workers who incurred income and/​or job losses because of the lockdown and curfews in sectors such as entertainment, hospitality, or textiles were identified and temporarily employed by the Municipality to work on various social support projects. These workers were especially vulnerable because they relied on daily wages, were uninsured, and often worked in informal sectors. There were two compelling examples of this type of support. First, about 2,000 musicians were hired to give concerts at different places in the city. And second, tailors and some textile workers were employed to produce masks to be distributed free of charge. The second component of the social support policy was the deliverance of necessary in-​cash and in-​kind (for example free food, meal, drug, or fuel provisions) aid to poverty-​stricken segments of the city, which immediately began after the pandemic. This was an upscaling of the long-​established social aid programs from which roughly over 100,000 city dwellers benefited before the pandemic. However, with the outbreak, the dramatic increase in the number of people in need caused a massive pile-​up in aid applications which overloaded the social aid system. To accurately identify citizens who were really in need and to take quick action, the Municipality developed a mobile application through which citizens apply for social aid that works in coordination with the other governmental agencies to cross-​check the economic status of the applicants. In this way, despite the difficult circumstances associated with the pandemic, the Municipality was able to meet the basic needs of more than 300,000 people, in a few months. All this social aid, as can be guessed, placed a massive extra burden on the budget of the Municipality whose revenues had already substantially decreased because of the lockdown. Therefore, increasingly ongoing pressures from grassroots, in particular low-​income groups, prompted the Municipality to search for alternative methods to maintain social aid. But as we have seen, the Municipality launched a donation campaign that

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was soon suspended by the central government. The money that had been collected locally was transferred into the central government’s campaign. Facing these severe fiscal and political challenges, the Mayor introduced a series of mutual-​aid campaigns. The mutual-​aid programs were among the Mayor’s commitments during the local election, initial steps having already been taken before the pandemic. With the sudden attack of the disease, these initial pursuits were easily turned into a comprehensive online mutual-​aid system. Introduced with the motto ‘kindness is more contagious than the viruses’, the campaign was launched just before the month of Holy Ramadan and was publicized through official websites and conventional and social media. At first, a website2 was constructed by the Municipality to allow people to donate iftar (fast-​breaking) meals to people in need. The collected money was added to the usual iftar deliveries of the Municipality, and all donations were compiled and made public daily. The campaign quickly spread on social media and enjoyed nationwide popularity. In addition to causing a boom in donations, this popularity encouraged the Municipality to add new tools to the mutual-​aid campaign. As the system was designed in a flexible fashion, official databases were linked to the website in order to add new features such as direct donations, cash uploads to the transportation cards, and the paying of water bills. Moreover, donations of second-​hand computers to students, who lack the necessary equipment to follow online education during the curfews, and donations of meat during Eid were also added to the system in due course. The recent numbers show that about 800,000 people in need utilized these in-​cash and in-​kind donations, which exceed 50 million TRY (approximately 7 million USD) at the time of writing (www.ankaratekyurek.com). Meanwhile, there were other innovative mutual-​a id practices, born out of the collaboration of the Municipality with the Citizens’ Assembly. An excellent example of this

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type of mutual aid was a voluntary logistic network to provide for the basic needs of citizens over the age of 65, who were subjected to nationwide curfews. In this project, two NGOs (one consisting of motorized couriers and the second a local supermarket association) were brought together so people over the age of 65 could make phone orders and be offered free deliveries. Whereas CAA undertook the coordination of the project, the Municipality provided fuel to the couriers and broadcast the list of supermarkets included in the project on its website. Such spontaneous practices led to the formation of a large volunteer platform with the participation of neighborhood-​level grassroots organizations, other NGOs, and individuals, most of whom were made aware of these projects through social media. During the pandemic, these volunteers took part in many social responsibility projects carried out by the Municipality, such as counselling and psychological support on the phone, online education, public concerts, food provision for stray animals, and so on. (See Chapters Ten and Twelve for other examples of reliance on volunteers to deal with the social consequences of the pandemic.) In lieu of a conclusion In Turkey, the metropolitan municipalities, at least those belonging to the opposition, fought not only against the pandemic but also against severe financial and political restrictions they faced while carrying out social aid programs. In sum, despite financial and political barriers, the AMM found, at least until now, ways to provide social aid for the impoverished dwellers, disadvantaged people, and local businesses who were affected by the pandemic. In doing so, it was able to develop innovative ways of supporting its residents. What is more important, the Municipality involved city residents in all social aid-​related decision-​making and policy implementation processes. It used technology to recruit and coordinate residents so they could help each other. The AMM experience

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has shown us that in the face of unexpected crises such as COVID-​19, it is necessary to push the usual boundaries of governance and service provision via innovative participatory strategies in order to provide aid to people in need. Notes 1

2

The Citizens’ Assembly is a participatory institution, established according to the Law of Municipalities in Turkey; nearly all the NGOs, universities, unions, and chambers of commerce take part. www.ankaratekyurek.com

References Anadolu Agency (2020) ‘Turkey’s economic stability package acts like shield against pandemic’. Anadolu Agency, April 4, www.aa.com. tr/​en/​economy/​turkeys-​economic-​stability-​package-​acts-​like-​ shield-​against-​pandemic/​1800889 Bakir, C. (2020) ‘The Turkish state’s responses to existential COVID-​19 crisis’. Policy and Society, 39(3): 424–​41. Capano, G., Howlett, M., Jarvis, D.S.L., Ramesh, M. and Goyal, N. (2020) ‘Mobilizing policy (in)capacity to fight COVID-​19: understanding variations in state responses’. Policy and Society, 39(3): 285–​308. Çerkezoğlu, A. (2020) ‘The impacts of COVID-​19 on the world of work in Turkey’. SEER Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe, 23(1): 31–​8. Eurocities (2020) ‘The measures taken against the COVID-​19 pandemic by the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality’. Eurocities, June 1, https://​covidnews.eurocities.eu/​wp-​content/​uploads/​ 2020/0​ 6/A ​ nkara_M ​ etropolitan_M ​ unicipality_C ​ OVIDmeasures_​ June_​2020.pdf Selçuki, C. (2020) ‘COVID-​19 donations in Turkey overshadowed by politics’. Duvar English, April 18, www.duvarenglish. com/​columns/​2020/​04/​18/​covid-​19-​donations-​in-​turkey-​ overshadowed-​by-​politics/​ World Bank (2020) Global economic prospects, June 2020. Washington, DC: World Bank.

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Resisting Disaster Capitalism During COVID-​19 in Chile: People Fight Back Claudia González-​Muzzio, Vicente Sandoval, and Carmen Paz Castro

Introduction The chapter aims to identify and analyze efforts of communities and civil society in general to resist disaster capitalism during COVID-​19 in Chile, highlighting the importance of social cohesion for coping with public health crises and other hazards in vulnerable socio-​territorial contexts. Here, disaster capitalism is conceptualized as an approach adopted by the corporate class and governments to profit from disasters such as COVID-​19 by introducing neoliberal reforms or underpinning the existing status quo (Klein, 2008; Sandoval et al, 2020). Through a comprehensive review of several sources including social networks, academic articles, governmental reports, and other gray literature, resistance responses are explored in light of socio-​spatial inequalities experienced in urban areas.

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Structural inequalities as root causes of discontent, the context of COVID-​19 in Chile The COVID-​19 pandemic started to hit Chile in March 2020 during a social crisis caused by massive discontent due to the deployment over decades of an economic development model that has deepened gaps among socially and territorially segregated populations. The model increased the socio-​ economic fragility of a large percentage of urban inhabitants who not only lacked the minimum income to survive in better times, but who in many cases lost their informal sector jobs due to the crisis. Since then, COVID-​19 has further exposed the structural inequalities of a system in which key elements of social welfare are privatized, where 70 percent of current pensions are less than the minimum wage (410 USD), while the private companies that run the system made profits of USD 236 million during the first semester of 2020. Chile is a highly centralized country with great territorial disparities between regions, between rural and urban areas, and between urban zones. The Metropolitan Region of Santiago (MR), with Santiago as the national capital, concentrates 40.5 percent of the country’s population and 42.5 percent of the national GDP. Among the urban communes that form Santiago City, life expectancy varies by up to 11 years depending on the area, which is directly associated with the socio-​economic status of the population (Valiente Deichler, 2019). The differences in life expectancy for women are much higher. It varies by as much as 18 years depending on the communes where they live (Bilal et al, 2019). The Ministry of Social Development and Family (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social y Familia) created a social priority index, which helped define indicators, related to income, education, and health, to target social spending (Ministerio de Desarrollo Social y Familia, 2019). Communes of the MR with the best indicators are given a low social priority. As expected,

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these communes register the highest life expectancy. Those communes with the highest social priority index (Figure 12.1a) are the ones with the lowest life expectancy at birth, for both women (Figure 12.1b) and men (Figure 12.1c). During the pandemic, these differences coincided with numbers of people infected and of deaths, which are related to pre-​existing health conditions, higher population density and overcrowding in homes, lower decreases in mobility during lockdowns and, therefore, higher exposure to COVID-​19 and contagion risk. These profound vulnerabilities determine the impact of disruptive events such as those caused by COVID-​19. Underlying risk factors make disadvantaged populations vulnerable to all kind of disasters. MR’s communes with the least effective reduction of mobility during lockdowns were San Ramón (-​23 percent), La Pintana (-​23.4 percent), and Lo Espejo (-​25.1 percent), three communes which record the highest social priority index. In contrast, in May 2020, the communes that most effectively reduced mobility were Vitacura (-​50.9 percent), Lo Barnechea (-​49.6 percent), and Las Condes (-​48.4 percent), which coincidently post the lowest social priority indexes (Reyes Jara, 2020). These results are associated with the precariousness and informality of employment in Chile, which prevented San Ramón, La Pintana, and Lo Espejo residents from being able to confine themselves. According to a July 2020 survey of longitudinal studies, 2.3 million jobs have been lost in one year. The employment rate for women fell by 28 percent, while for men the contraction was 23 percent. In addition, 9 percent of the employed population indicated they were temporarily suspended from their work contract and covered by the Employment Protection Law during that month, representing approximately 597,000 people who were not receiving salaries (Alonso, 2020). Moreover, during the months of July–​A ugust 2020, unemployment reached 30 percent in the MR. As for the percentages of unemployment by socio-​economic groups,

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Figure 12.1: Spatial distribution of (a) social priority, (b) life expectancy at birth in women, and (c) men in Santiago

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Source: authors, 2020, based on Ministerio de Desarrollo Social y Familia (2019) and Bilal et al (2019)

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the data show that the upper middle class registers 17 percent; middle class, 27 percent, and lower class, the most affected, 40 percent, numbers unseen since the economic crisis that affected Chile in 1982 (Agencia UNO, 2020). Resisting responses to COVID-​19 effects: a reaction to urban inequalities and slow institutional actions At first, voluntary responses focused on the provision of medical supplies, which were becoming scarce. Individuals manufactured masks, facial shields, and so on. But there were also collective actions, such as ‘Mascarillas gratis’ (free masks), where donated supplies were collected, then volunteers recruited to manufacture masks and distribute them to health personnel and to those who could not afford them. Later, due to the extent of the confinement and the progressive decrease in employment, hunger increased, and as a result the ‘ollas comunes’ (common pots) –​a collective mechanism to provide food commonly relied upon during the 1982 economic crisis as well as previous ones –​reappeared (Luna, 2020). According to an ECLAC report, more than two million people in Chile are threatened by hunger due to the crisis triggered (or worsened) by COVID-​19 (CEPAL, 2020, cited in Luna, 2020). In reaction to the failure of state aid mechanisms to reach in a timely fashion people lacking sufficient food, common pots have become popular. Neighborhood solidarity takes the form of community kitchens where people cook cooperatively using the ingredients that each person can provide. Initiated in poorer neighborhoods, they expanded to various communes and cities across the country, led by the public, as after the 2010 earthquake when they organized support networks during the emergency (González-​Muzzio, 2010). In June, in Lo Espejo, one of the communes with the most deaths per 100,000 inhabitants due to COVID-​19, there were at least 75

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points where approximately 8,000 food rations were delivered per week (Reyes Jara, 2020). In other cases, these initiatives have been led by groups that arose after the crisis of October 2019, such as ‘Amigues Social’ (social friends), which collect donations to support families in need. This kind of initiative has spread across the country, and various groups that arose in the wake of the pandemic use social networks to promote donations, circulate information, and stimulate alliances. Among them are ‘La olla de Chile’, a group of volunteers who identify and disseminate information about communal pots and have a database of 245 initiatives as of July 2020 (www.laolladechile.com); ‘Lo Común de la Olla’ provides maps and data of communal pots; ‘Olla Digna’ collects donations for communal pots and food boxes; ‘La Olla Común’ delivers data on more than 490 initiatives and receives donations; and ‘Minga1 por los Pueblos’ is committed to support families of indigenous peoples, in rural areas of southern Chile (https://​ mingaporlospueblos.org). Non-​governmental organizations (NGOs) have been affected by the pandemic as they have stopped receiving donations due to the decline in economic activity and redistributions of funds within public and private budgets. Some of these organizations have reinvented themselves to support the most vulnerable people during the crisis. An example is ‘Movidos x Chile’ (moved for Chile), an organization that emerged after the massive fires that affected the central-​south area of the country in 2017. It brings together 27 organizations in order to coordinate voluntary responses during emergencies. It is part of a network of more than 200 NGOs, which are vehicles for donations to different causes that require support (https://​ movidosporchile.cl). As of August 2020, they had raised more than USD 3 million for different social causes. Similarly, some municipalities have played a helpful role during the COVID-​19 emergency, advocating for prioritizing people’s safety while providing socio-​economic support

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Figure 12.2: Some online maps of ‘common pots’ in the city of Santiago and across Chile. Top: ‘Ollas Comunes’ in Santiago (Google, 2020). Bottom: ‘Iniciativas ayuda alimento’ (Miranda, 2020)

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to the most vulnerable families. With scarce resources but a measure of political power, they forced the government to suspend face-​to-​face classes, have distributed governmental aid (although with mixed results), and have insisted that primary health considerations be incorporated into pandemic strategies. Some have made great efforts to achieve high infection traceability capacity, well above the national average. Others have promoted initiatives to support local commerce, generating networks among local merchants and neighbors, such as ‘Locales conectados’ of the Municipality of Renca. Conclusion To tackle the emergency unleashed by COVID-​19 and exacerbated by pre-​existing socio-​economic inequalities, people have turned to their support networks, neighbors, families, and grassroots organizations. Collective and cooperative responses have long characterized Chileans and are a common reaction to disasters and crises that the country has experienced historically and in recent decades (González-​Muzzio, 2010, Sandoval and González-​Muzzio, 2015, Biskupovic, 2020). These responses, in combination with the social upheaval of 2019, underline the need for a change in the political and economic systems. Common pots are a positive experience of local organization, usually led by women in a context where the work related to taking care of families and the community is poorly recognized or valued. Since various measures adopted by the government have been insufficient and have favored large companies by maintaining the neoliberal status quo, the motto of many of these spontaneous organizations has been: ‘If the state does not take care of us, we take care of each other’, or ‘Only the people help the people’, calling for collective action. (See Chapters Ten and Eleven for other examples of collective action.)

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Emergent groups and social cohesion of local people have proven crucial to responses to, and recovery from, this crisis and other disasters (Twigg and Mosel, 2017). A trend is observed towards changing traditional patterns of governance in Chile, where the public agenda and political decisions are being influenced by the actions and demands of the population. In the context of a centralized country with a vertical governance system, where risk management takes little account of both the local level and civil society, local governments have been key actors in managing the social impacts of the pandemic. It is necessary to emphasize the active role that municipalities should play as the level of administration closest to citizens. Without seeking to control social organization, they must collaborate in the search for mechanisms to provide resources and also value the work of individuals and communities, promoting networks and alliances in order to strengthen the social fabric to respond efficiently and better prepare for future crises. Note 1

A traditional activity carried out by communities from the south of the country to provide collective help to one family by doing a specific task. For example, transporting a house from one place to another.

References Agencia UNO (2020) ‘Desempleo llega al 30% en la RM y en estratos bajos la cifra se dispara a un 40%, dice estudio’. CNN Chile, September 2, www.cnnchile.com/pais/ desempleo-30-rm-40-estratos-bajos_20200902/​ Alonso, C. (2020) ‘Encuesta UC: personas que no están trabajando en Chile superan el 30% y suman unos 2,7 millones’. La Tercera, August 13, www.latercera.com/​pulso/​noticia/​encuesta-​uc-p​ ersonas-q​ ue-​ no-​estan-​trabajando-​en-​chile-​superan-​el-​30-​y-​suman-​unos-​27-​ millones/​QAUP2TSPIJH3RGXMG5NXVCULGM/​

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Bilal, U., Alazraqui, M., Caiaffa, W.T., Lopez-​Olmedo, N., Martinez-​ Folgar, K., Miranda, J.J., Rodriguez, D.A., Vives, A. and Diez-​ Roux, A.V. (2019) ‘Inequalities in life expectancy in six large Latin American cities from the SALURBAL study: an ecological analysis’. Lancet Planet Health, 3(12): e503–​10, https://​doi.org/​ 10.1016/​S2542-​5196(19)30235-​9 Biskupovic, M.C. (2020) ‘Respuestas colectivas e institucionales a la pandemia: la sobrevivencia del más apto a cooperar’. Le Monde Diplomatique, June 1, www.lemondediplomatique.cl/​respuestas-​ colectivas-​e-​institucionales-​a-​la-​pandemia-​la-​sobrevivencia-​del-​ mas.html Comisión Económica para América Latina y El Caribe (CEPAL) ECLAC (2020) El desafío social en tiempos del COVID-​1 9, https://​repositorio.cepal.org/​bitstream/​handle/​11362/​45527/​ 5/​S2000325_​es.pdf González-​Muzzio, C. (2010) Exploring Community Resilience: Social-​ Urban Aftermath of the Biobío Earthquake. MSc dissertation, University College London. Google (2020) Ollas Comunes, www.google.com/​maps/​d/​u/​0/​ viewer?mid=1LyUOJsze9ZYZpUMuUiLmgNv69iPR8tX8 &ll=-​33.47316043281838%2C-​70.68502876203947&z=10 Klein, N. (2008) The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. Toronto: Vintage Canada. Luna, P. (2020) ‘Las ollas comunes aportan el único alimento para miles de chilenos durante la pandemia’. France 24, www.france24. com/​es/​20200805-​chile-​regreso-​ollas-​comunales-​solidaridad-​ crisis-​pandemia Ministerio de Desarrollo Social y Familia (2019) Región Metropolitana de Santiago. Índice de Prioridad Social de Comunas 2019. Seremi de Desarrollo Social y Familia Metropolitana (July 2019). Santiago: Gobierno de Chile, www.desarrollosocialyfamilia. gob.cl/​storage/​docs/​INDICE._​DE_​PRIORIDAD_​SOCIAL_​ 2019.pdf

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Miranda, M. (2020) Iniciativas ayuda alimento. May 2020, www.google.com/​ m aps/​ d /​ u /​ 0 /​ v iewer?mid=1exEIU3c BLOVGJLhQ3kyv4aNwrp1slzp5&ll=-3​ 6.5288295092412%2C-​ 56.745621057971036&z=4 Reyes Jara, J. (2020) ‘Desigualdad y ollas comunes para combatir la pandemia’. Ciper, June 19, www.ciperchile.cl/​2020/​06/​19/​ desigualdad-​y-​ollas-​comunes-​para-​combatir-​la-​pandemia/​ Sandoval, V. and González-​M uzzio, C. (2015) ‘Examining “disaster capitalism”: post-​d isaster actions in Chile’, in C. Johnson (ed) Conference Proceedings for the 7th International I-​Rec Conference: Reconstruction and Recovery in Urban Contexts. London & Montreal: Groupe de recherche IF, GRIF, Université de Montréal. www.grif.umontreal.ca/​i-​rec/​i-​Rec2015/​RT6_​31_​Sandoval_​ Examining%20Disaster%20Capitalism.pdf Sandoval, V., González-​Muzzio, C., Villalobos, C., Sarmiento, J.P. and Hoberman, G. (2020) ‘Assessing disaster capitalism in post-​ disaster processes in Chile: neoliberal reforms and the role of corporate class’. Disaster Prevention and Management: An International Journal, https://​doi.org/​10.1108/​DPM-​01-​2020-​0005 Twigg, J. and Mosel, I. (2017) ‘Emergent groups and spontaneous volunteers in urban disaster response’. Environment and Urbanization, 29(2): 443–​58, https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​ 0956247817721413 Valiente Deichler, F. (2019) ‘Expectativas de vida difieren hasta en 11 años según la comuna en que se vive’. Pauta, December 15, www.pauta.cl/​economia/​desigualdad-​geografica-​las-​comunas​mejor-​y-​peor-​evaluadas

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Rapid Deployment of Transport Infrastructure and Urban Social Injustice: The Case of Medellín, Colombia Carlos Cadena-​Gaitán, Alejandro Álvarez-​Vanegas, and María Camila Flórez-​Muñoz

Introduction Medellín has been widely touted as an example of effective urban transformation in the Global South (Castillo-​Palacio et al, 2017; Franz, 2017). It is known for efforts that have led to a sharp reduction in violent crime and well-​documented urban design innovations (Dávila et al, 2013). Notwithstanding these advances, Medellín continues to exhibit broad differences in spatial and social justice indicators across a north-​south geographical divide, as captured by longitudinal data from Medellín Cómo Vamos, in which the comunas –​the local administrative divisions –​located in the northern urban districts, such as Popular or Castilla, have historically performed worse than those located in the south and west, such as Poblado or Laureles. The

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Multidimensional Life Quality Index results for the 2010–​18 period illustrate that, in spite of a reduction in inequalities in some districts, important challenges still lie ahead for other districts (Medellín Cómo Vamos, 2019). This chapter explores the geographical and socio-​economic divide between two districts: Castilla, a predominantly lower-​ middle class district located in the north, and Laureles, an upper-​middle-​class district located in the southwest. We focus our analysis on the limits that such divides impose on access to urban mobility. Although according to data compiled by Medellín’s Transport Department, both comunas have similar transport opportunities overall, such as high levels of spatial coverage of the Public Transportation System (above 95 percent for both districts) and an average daily per-​trip travel time of 39 minutes, significant differences in their socio-​economic composition make for large differences in the accessibility and affordability of the transportation service. Over the last years, the average household in Laureles spent 8 percent of its monthly income on transportation, while the transportation expenditure for a household in Castilla was almost twice this number, representing almost a sixth of its monthly income –​14 percent. Against this background, the chapter explores how rapidly deployed transport infrastructure in the context of the COVID-​19 pandemic had an impact on urban justice indicators. Our case and its relevance for urban sustainability As a proactive reaction to a contagion crisis, the City of Medellín deployed pop-​up infrastructure promoting the use of walking and cycling along the main corridors of these two districts. These actions were justified by individual and collective traffic and transit capacity modeling, were attuned to the outcome of public participation and policy making, and are consistent with the most recent sustainable development (SD) literature prescriptions for urban transportation.

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Sustainability considerations SD can be understood as a balancing act between social and economic priorities and respect for ecological limits. It seeks to guarantee the production and fair distribution of the benefits of development in the long term so that everyone’s needs can be satisfied in a way that ensures their dignity. The widely known ‘Brundtland Report’ advocated for the satisfaction of human needs as a key concept of SD within an intra-​and intergenerational justice framework (Kopfmüller et al, 2001), that is, so that present and future generations can live decent and flourishing lives. It also emphasized that overriding priority should be given to the needs (and transport is an important need) of the world’s poor, as a way to address injustice and inequality (United Nations, 1987). The objectives of ending poverty, reducing inequalities, and transforming cities drive Agenda 2030 and its SD goals. Cities are considered not only because of their ecological footprint, but also because of their impact on living conditions and the satisfaction of human needs, including transport, as shown in Target 11.2 of Agenda 2030: ‘provide access to safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems for all, improving road safety, notably by expanding public transport, with special attention to the needs of those in vulnerable situations, women, children, persons with disabilities and older persons’ (United Nations, 2015: 21). Urban justice and the role of transport Various authors have discussed urban justice. David Harvey’s (1973) concept of a ‘just city’, Henri Lefebvre’s (1968) concept of ‘The Right to the City’, and Edward Soja’s (2009), concept of ‘spatial justice’ amount to an ongoing discussion of urban equity. On the one hand, Harvey argues that neoliberalism restored power to rich elites, concomitantly benefiting wealthier citizens while further impoverishing the poor (Harvey, 2003). Hence the need for special attention to these

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citizens, in order to cover their accessibility needs. Similarly, Lefebvre’s ‘right to the city’ has pointed attention towards exclusion from urban society. His landmark contributions have called for citizens to have a right to inhabit, to appropriate, and to demand inclusion into their city, thus shaping and reshaping personal city space (Lefebvre, 1968). Soja’s (2009) contributions have furthered this discussion by introducing a scale dimension, from the local to the global. Transport is an important aspect of urban justice and urban sustainability. As public transport fulfills a fundamental contribution to social equity (UN-​Habitat and CAF, 2014), it is important to explore the extent to which the improvement and democratization of transport opportunities influence other aspects of equity. For example, as citizens can use more convenient means of transportation, their access to urban opportunities increases (Dureau et al, 2013). Medellín offers an instructive case for this analysis. The city is known for positive innovative urban planning and management experiments, as well as for creative public transport policies. Medellín also adopted an active social agenda, strengthening the social fabric with an emphasis on public spaces as a strategy for inclusion (Brand, 2013). Methodology and results Beginning in April 2020, the City of Medellín deployed 8.9 kilometers of pop-​up transport infrastructure in Castilla and Laureles. This pop-​up infrastructure corresponds to either one full-​sized lane in a two-​or three-​lane major thoroughfare dedicated to two-​way non-​motorized transport, fully segregated with light road markers and horizontal traffic and safety signs, or bidirectional lane-​side horizontal cycling traffic signs. Both interventions operate 24/​7. Data were collected during five months along two of the four implemented corridors: Nutibara Avenue in Laureles, and Carrera 65 in Castilla (see Figure 13.1).

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Figure 13.1: Location of COVID-​19 interventions and key socio-​economic variables

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Source: Carlos Cadena-Gaitán, Alejandro Álvarez-Vanegas, and María Camila Flórez-Muñoz

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The number of new users, their general characteristics and times of use were compiled daily. Similarly, surveys were randomly carried out to gather qualitative information about user experience and personal financial impacts, thus providing the information for a robust analysis about the social and economic impacts of the implementation of unconventional transport infrastructure. We analyzed the relationship between the perceived effects of rapidly deployed transport infrastructure, the increase in use of non-​motorized modes and potential savings due to the availability of such modes in Laureles and Castilla. The empirical evidence was drawn from Medellín’s Transport Department traffic counts and user surveys (N=160; 120 for Castilla, 40 for Nutibara) carried out in the pop-​up intervention areas. The results delivered powerful evidence concerning the relationship between transport dynamics and socio-​economic features. We used traffic data from 2019 as a baseline, and then compared it with the results of traffic counts in pop-​up intervention areas. A significant increase in the total number of users along both corridors was registered, despite periods of mobility limitations during the COVID-​19 mandatory lockdown. In the northern corridor (Carrera 65) the strategy led to a 146 percent increase in the number of non-​motorized users, as compared to 2019. In the south-​west district, the Nutibara Avenue also experienced a traffic rise with a 111 percent increase in non-​ motorized modes users. We found a significant increase in women using these lanes: a three-​fold increase against the baseline in Carrera 65 and an almost 60 percent increase in Nutibara. These results imply not only that the deployed infrastructure encourages the use of non-​motorized modes in the corridors, but also that separation between modes contributes to the attraction of female users. This is consistent with the academic literature, which observes that ‘feeling comfortable using bicycle facilities was strongly positively associated with women’s bicycle use, a finding that is supported by previous research on gender differences in bicycling’ (Emond et al,

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2009: 22). Reduction of gender inequalities is an important aspect of urban sustainability, as reflected not only in the aforementioned United Nations Agenda 2030’s Target 11.2, but also in its SD Goal 5 (achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls). The higher number of users has an additional impact on social inequality mitigation. Users of the infrastructure in Castilla belonged predominantly to lower-​middle-​class households (spending 14 percent of their monthly income on transport), while in Laureles the users were predominantly from the upper middle class (spending 8 percent of their monthly income on transport). This might explain why the increase in Carrera 65 (146 percent) was higher than in Nutibara (111 percent) and this finding is consistent with the results of our surveys: in Castilla, 98 percent of the users were from the lower middle class, and 70.8 percent indicated that the use of the pop-​up infrastructure was related to saving money. In Laureles, on the other hand, 68 percent of the users belonged to the upper middle class, and only 22.5 percent counted savings as a reason for using the infrastructure. This analysis suggests positive effects of rapidly deployed transport infrastructure in making transportation accessible to lower-​income households, helping to promote urban equity and social access through mobility. (See Chapters Four, Fifteen, and Sixteen for other investigations of the social impacts of pandemic-​driven transportation interventions.) Conclusion The unusual circumstances derived from the COVID-​19 crisis in Medellín allowed for unorthodox urban experiments aiming at promoting urban sustainability, in line with current academic literature. Our analysis provides evidence that the implementation of infrastructure coherent with the sustainable urban transport literature has a positive impact on urban inequities and equality of opportunities, including a reduction in gender

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inequality. Data were collected along main road corridors turned into non-​motorized thoroughfares after pandemic-​ driven low-​cost interventions. While this extraordinary real-​ life urban experiment was in response to the pandemic, the long-​term adoption and expansion of such infrastructure can further contribute to social justice improvements. References Brand, P. (2013) ‘Governing inequality in the South through the Barcelona model: “Social urbanism” in Medellín, Colombia’. Paper given at the Interrogating Urban Crisis Conference: Governance, Contestation, Critique, Leicester: De Montford University, September 9–​11. Castillo-​Palacio, M., Harrill, R. and Zuniga-​Collazos, A. (2017) ‘Back from the brink: social transformation and developing tourism in post-​c onflict Medellín, Colombia’. Worldwide Hospitality and Tourism Themes, 9(3): 300–​15. Dávila, J.D., Brand, P., Jirón, P., Vargas Caicedo, H., Coupé, F., Eliécer Córdoba, J., Mejía, G.M.A., Agudelo, V.L., Cardona, J.G. and Sarmiento O.I. (2013) Urban mobility and poverty: Lessons from Medellín and Soacha, Colombia. Development Planning Unit, UCL & Faculty of Architecture, Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Dureau, F., Gouëset, V., Roux, G.L., Lulle, T. and Lozada, F. (2013) ‘Cambios urbanos, transporte masivo y desigualdades socio-​ territoriales en unos barrios del occidente de Bogotá’. Cuadernos de Vivienda y Urbanismo, 6(11): 44–​67. Emond, C.R., Tang, W. and Handy, S.L. (2009) ‘Explaining gender difference in bicycling behavior’. Transportation Research Record, 2125(1): 16–​25. Franz, T. (2017) ‘Urban governance and economic development in Medellín: an “urban miracle”?’ Latin American Perspectives, 44(2): 52–​70. Harvey, D. (1973) Social Justice and the City. Oxford: Blackwell. Harvey, D. (2003) ‘The right to the city’. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 27(4): 939-41.

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Kopfmüller, J., Brandl, V., Jörissen, J., Pateau, M., Banse, G., Coenen, R. and Grunwald, A. (2001) Nachhaltige Entwicklung integrativ betrachtet: Konstitutive Elemente, Regeln, Indikatoren. BadenBaden: Edition Sigma. Lefebvre, H. (1968) ‘The right to the city’, in E. Kofman and E. Lebas (eds) Writing on Cities. London: Blackwell, 63–​184. Medellín Cómo Vamos (2019) Informe de Calidad de Vida de Medellín, 2018, www.medellincomovamos.org/​sites/​default/​files/​2020-​ 01/ ​ d ocumentos/​ D ocumento%20-​ % 20Informe%20de%20 Calidad%20de%20Vida%20de%20Medell%C3%ADn%2C%20 2018.pdf Soja, E. (2009) ‘The city and spatial justice’. Justice spatiale/​Spatial justice, 1(1): 1–​5. UN-​Habitat and CAF (2014) Construction of more equitable cities. Public policies for inclusion in Latin America. Nairobi: United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-​HABITAT), https://​ unhabitat.org/​sites/​default/​files/​download-​manager-​files/​Cons tructionmoreequitablecitiessmall.pdf United Nations (1987) Our Common Future: Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (A/​4 2/​ 427). Oxford: Oxford University Press, https://​undocs.org/​ pdf?symbol=en/​A/​42/​427 United Nations (2015) Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/​RES/​70/​1). New York: United Nations, https://​undocs.org/​A/​RES/​70/​1

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PART III

Municipal and Urban Policy Responses

FOURTEEN

Transnational Experiences of COVID-​19: Transferable Lessons for Urban Planning Between the Global South and the Global North Shauna Brail, Michael Martin, Jagath Munasinghe, Rangajeewa Ratnayake, and Julie Rudner

Introduction COVID-​19 reveals that the equity dimension of planning, especially concerning the distribution of infrastructure, services, and amenities, is integral to urban resilience. While neoliberal approaches to economic and social life over the past 40 years have challenged this idea, the pandemic has helped planners to reassert the need for greater income equality and re-​establish the effectiveness of coordinated and collectivized responses to disruptions. This chapter explores these issues by focusing on transferable lessons from the experiences of Aalborg, Colombo, Melbourne, and Toronto, and on how urban planners can help address a range of inequalities and inadequacies aggravated by the pandemic. These cities were selected to demonstrate how

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city size, political institutions, and level of economic development, along with location in different parts of the world, affected reactions to the pandemic. In this chapter, we review the experience of lockdown and phased reopening in each city-​region over the first six months after the declaration of the pandemic in March 2020. We then consider the role of governance mechanisms and capacity in response to managing the devastating impacts of a public health crisis and associated economic, social, and spatial outcomes. By drawing upon examples from each city-​region on resilient planning practice, we conclude by highlighting opportunities for mutual international learning in connection to pandemic and post-​pandemic urban planning. Pandemic, lockdown, and reopening in four cities The four cities (and respective countries) experienced the pandemic and subsequent reopening of their economy in both shared and unique ways. Despite differences in overall population, density, and profile, all four territories recorded relatively low case fatalities and deaths as a percentage of population over the first wave of the pandemic (Table 14.1). Lockdowns of differing intensity occurred in all four territories, and each location has pursued gradual, phased reopening (Table 14.1). The four city-​regions all closed borders, restricted international air travel, and imposed emergency measures to suppress, contain, and mitigate the disease. However, despite these ‘shared’ responses, differences in timing, effectiveness, and circumstances highlight important distinctions in the intraurban geographies of disease. They also reveal how responses across the four territories addressed underlying and emergent inequalities. Table 14.1 shows the diverse ways in which emergency measures were implemented in each context. Corroborating Bailey et al (2020), the outbreak was spatially uneven within cities, regions, and countries, as well as between countries.

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Toronto, Melbourne, and Colombo had higher infection rates and subsequent deaths than other cities and regions within their national context (Australian Government Department of Health, 2020; City of Toronto, 2020; Sri Lanka Health Promotion Bureau, 2020). In contrast, Aalborg has not experienced any excess deaths since the start of the pandemic compared to other Danish cities and regions, which have experienced up to 25 percent more deaths (Statens Serum Institut, 2020a). Differences in socio-​economic status, income polarization, and national economic performance exist among the four city-​regions (Table 14.1). However, the recorded outbreak of the pandemic and death rate in each context suggest that development indicators have less impact on the management and suppression of COVID-​19. This is particularly apparent between the Global North and Global South territories considered here. Sri Lanka, it can be argued, has contained and suppressed the disease most successfully. The government achieved these outcomes by imposing a countrywide lockdown with a strict curfew enforced by police. By comparison, the approaches taken by Australia, Canada, and Denmark –​testing systems and gradual reopenings –​have led to a resurgence in cases and localized clusters. All three city-​regions postponed the latter stages of phased reopening, with Melbourne returning first to tightened restrictions. The unprecedented impact of the global pandemic on each city-​region has required multi-​scalar leadership and urban solutions. Yet not every location has used these essential approaches, and their absence has revealed sophisticated, often entrenched, urban inequalities. The next section explores the capabilities of government to respond to these realities considering variations in governing capacities and resilience.

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Table 14.1: Pandemic, lockdown, and reopening in four cities (and respective countries) Variables

Cities (Countries) Colombo (Sri Lanka)

Melbourne (Australia)

Toronto (Canada)

Denmark: 5.8 million City of Aalborg: 136,645 (as of 2018)

Sri Lanka: 21 million City of Colombo: 612,535 (as of 2020)

Australia: 25.5 million City of Melbourne: 178,955 (as of 2019)

Canada: 37.4 million City of Toronto: 2.95 million (as of 2018)

Human Development Index Ranking2

11th of 185 countries (Denmark)

72nd of 185 countries (Sri Lanka)

6th of 185 countries (Australia)

12th of 185 countries (Canada)

Outbreak as of 09/​09/​203

Confirmed Cases/​ Deaths National: 18,356/​628 Regional (North Jutland): 185,534/​30 Local (City): N/​A

Confirmed Cases/​ Deaths National: 3,140/​12 Regional: N/​A Local (City District): N/​A

Confirmed Cases/​ Deaths National: 24,465/​781 Regional (Victoria): 19,688/​694 Local (City): N/​A

Confirmed Cases/​ Deaths National: 133,748/​ 9,153 Regional (Ontario): 43,536/​2813 Local (City): 16,361/​ 1,176 (continued)

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Aalborg (Denmark) Population1

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Table 14.1: Pandemic, lockdown, and reopening in four cities (and respective countries) (continued) Variables

Cities (Countries) Colombo (Sri Lanka)

Melbourne (Australia)

Toronto (Canada)

Pandemic Response Management4

National

National

Regional/​Local

National/​Regional/​ Local

Lockdown5

Advised

Strictly enforced

Advised/​Strictly enforced

Advised

Reopening (first six months after initial outbreak)

Gradual and controlled reopening in four phases from April 20 to August 1, 2020. Phases 1 and 2 went ahead as scheduled. Phases 3 and 4 (August) postponed due to increased cases and clusters in multiple locations nationally.

Strict curfew and restrictions on households from March 20 to May 11, 2020, enforced by police with military support.6 Partially opened by May 11 with restrictions lifted completely June 28, 2020.

Gradual and controlled reopening from June 1 until July 1, 2020. From July 7, local lockdown of Victoria and state of disaster declared within existing state of emergency (strict curfew, restrictions on movement, and enforcement by state policy with military support).

Gradual and controlled reopening in three phases from May 19 to July 31, 2020. Toronto entered Phase 1 at the same time as the rest of Ontario. It entered Phases 2 and 3 at a later date than much of the province because growth in new cases continued to remain disproportionately high. (continued)

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Aalborg (Denmark)

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Table 14.1: Pandemic, lockdown, and reopening in four cities (and respective countries) (continued) Variables Borders/​ International Arrivals

Cities (Countries) Colombo (Sri Lanka)

Melbourne (Australia)

Toronto (Canada)

Border/​travel restrictions from March 14, 2020. Effective easing of border restrictions in the EU and Schengen area, as well as the UK from June 27, 2020. Borders to countries outside of those listed remain temporarily closed.

Border/​travel restrictions from March 23, 2020 to present.

Phased border/​travel restrictions from February 1 to March 20, 2020. Trans-​Tasman bubble with New Zealand proposed but subsequently revoked.

International border restrictions in place for recreational travel starting March 22, 2020. As of August 2020, border restrictions/​ closures remain in place.

1 The

population statistics are collected from the official local government webpage for each city. The same geography is used across each context. ‘City of’ refers to the population in the administrative area of each city (not the metropolitan/​greater area population). 2 The Human Development Index (HDI), developed by the United Nations Development Programme, is a summary measure of average achievement in three key dimensions of human development: 1. life expectancy at birth, 2. mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and more and expected years of schooling for children of school-​entering age, and 3. gross national income per capita. Dimension indices are then aggregated into a composite index using geometric mean.

(continued)

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Aalborg (Denmark)

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3

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Data collected from government/​public health body webpages for each context. Recording of the COVID-​19 outbreak differs between each territory, N/​A is used where regional and local (city) statistics are not currently available. The data is collected from government/​public health body webpages at the national, regional, and local (city) levels. The figures shown are as of 09/​09/​20. 4 Pandemic Response Management refers to the tier of authority responsible for the issuing of COVID-​19 directives. 5 Lockdown refers to the closure of borders, workplaces, schools, and associated measures to stop the movement of large numbers of people. Among the four city-​regions, lockdown differs in rigidity and strictness between ‘Advised’ (that is, government restrictions issued as recommendations) and ‘Strictly enforced’ (that is, legally binding restrictions enforced by police and military). 6 Citizens whose last digit on their identity card is 1 or 2 were allowed to leave their residence for essential goods and exercise on Mondays, 3 or 4 on Tuesdays, 5 or 6 on Wednesdays, 7 or 8 on Thursdays, and 9 or 0 on Fridays.

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Governing pandemics: capacity and resilience Relatively early on, observers noted that COVID-​19 necessitated a turn towards government at the local, regional, and national levels. Across the four cities, substantial variations characterize government responsibility, affecting both the quantity of resources deployed and the place-​based specificity of responses. In Toronto, the response included significant local government engagement, albeit with financial supports from the provincial and federal governments. In Melbourne, on the other hand, ongoing conflict between federal and state governments in Australia limited the city’s response, contributing to a second wave. Conversely, in Colombo and Aalborg, local authorities did not play a significant role. Instead, national governments held sole authority for strategy, policy implementation, and enforcement. Around the world, governments have rapidly implemented a plethora of temporary actions to create capacity for emergency measures and bolster resilience (Deas et al, 2020). We examine three urban issues that the pandemic has exacerbated and that governments have struggled to address: mobility, homelessness, and inequality. Mobility trends highlight grave inequities. In the empty city streets –​one of the earliest images of lockdown –​the reduction in vehicular traffic visibly signaled economic and social distress. As public transit use declined, so did transit service. In Colombo, transit shut down completely, whereas in Aalborg, Melbourne, and Toronto, ridership declined by 80–​90 percent at the onset of lockdown, leading to service reductions. Responding quickly, governments repurposed city streets temporarily, creating cycling lanes and pedestrian zones as alternatives to transit. However, service reductions disadvantaged those who rely on public transit, including many low-​wage frontline and essential workers. Furthermore, as people choose private transport, there is concern that this shift will reverse long-​standing efforts to reduce personal automobile

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use. The shift may also affect the viability and affordability of transit systems. The pandemic has especially elevated risks to homeless populations. While Colombo arranged temporary quarantine centers for street beggars, Melbourne and Toronto temporarily provided hotels as shelters and quarantine spaces. In Aalborg, rather than making additional housing resources available, the government tested vulnerable citizens regularly. According to housing policy critics, the pandemic demonstrates that governments have always had the ability, but not always the political will, to provide shelter for homeless individuals. While experts have identified some longer-​term solutions to homelessness, governments have not committed to addressing the issue adequately. The COVID-​19 pandemic amplifies urban inequality (Bailey et al, 2020). Disadvantaged and racially segregated places bear the main burden of COVID-​19 (Berkowitz et al, 2020). In Toronto, detailed analysis of the spread of COVID-​19 clearly shows that low-​income and racialized households experience the disease and its economic consequences disproportionately (City of Toronto, 2020). The shutdown in Colombo led to loss of income for those who subsist on precarious work in the informal economy. Across Denmark, COVID-​19 spread has disproportionately affected non-​Western immigrants (Statens Serum Institut, 2020b). In Melbourne, the government compounded inequalities by locking down nine public housing towers accommodating about 3,000 residents; although the city provided social service supports, it enforced the lockdown with police. In each location, preliminary evidence indicates that citizens do not experience COVID-​19 equally. The repercussions of increasing inequality are immediate and will be prolonged, because the combination of mobility, housing tenure, and loss of income makes it harder for people and cities to recover. Next, we consider continued actions and transferable lessons to address and alleviate unequal outcomes intensified by the pandemic.

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Transferable lessons for planning As these four cities show, by how they managed the pandemic and how they reopened, no strategy is universal or perfect. Each city’s response varied depending on the location’s socio-​ economic and political differences, resulting in a mix of positive and negative outcomes. For instance, a strict lockdown with an imposed curfew was extremely effective for Colombo. However, in Aalborg, Melbourne, and Toronto, the cities considered such measures too radical at first, but they worked effectively for Melbourne the second time around (State Government of Victoria, 2020). This example pinpoints the potential limitations of phased, democratic intervention by governments. In Aalborg and Toronto, where public health now tracks racial data, the release of this information has helped the cities to develop specific policies. For instance, in Toronto, a mobile testing center visited neighborhoods where COVID-​19 had an elevated spread and where residents did not have access to hospital-​based testing. However, as shown in the Danish case, this approach can lead to increases in targeted discrimination and hate crimes –​a significant limitation (Steffensen and Laursen, 2020). One important future consideration is how to work with structurally vulnerable neighborhood environments and racial/​ethnic inequities (see also Berkowitz et al, 2020). Clearly, such inequalities expand further if authorities fail to successfully target interventions. Three key lessons arise from this discussion. First, we need evidence-​based solutions for responding to emergencies and the ongoing challenges of COVID-​19. Second, we must design cities so that residents can satisfy their needs within walkable or cyclable distances. Finally, within political discourse we must increase advocacy and education about good planning solutions. Evidence suggests that the pandemic has not drastically reformed planning institutions and practices. As Haughton et al (2020: 140) note, ‘crises […] do not automatically lead to a

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period of reflection and change, regardless of how flaws in current processes and practice are revealed. The almost automatic response [is] to get back to “normal” […] or restore previous practices, rather than create new ones’. Thus, although we may trust that effective emergency responses will lead to longer-​term changes, government behavior after past crises refutes this assumption (Deas et al, 2020). Previous critical pandemic situations such as SARS did not alter planning ideologies or procedures although authorities learned how to respond more quickly. To build more resilient and socially inclusive cities, planners must consider localism principles. Citizens need an equitable distribution of wealth, in terms of income, safe employment, access to essential infrastructure, and proximity to services. For example, to improve residents’ mental health and encourage exercise, governments should prioritize access to green infrastructure. Further, governments should advocate for and fund decent housing, given the role shelter plays in health and social justice. With some management guidelines on how to use and design public space and transport during a pandemic, governments can create more sustainable, productive, and resilient communities. Planners should work with communities to revitalize public spaces, maintain local shops, and ensure that residents can walk or cycle to essential services. Finally, we stress the need to acknowledge the political nature of planning. This recognition can help us protect previous gains to grasp opportunities for further change, and support a long-​term program of incrementalism rather than a return to ‘business as usual’. As the world’s cities are increasingly pressed to address sustainable development and climate adaptation, lessons learned from the pandemic in the contexts considered here are both relevant and transferable. Conclusion These examples demonstrate the value of national leadership, regional governance, and place-​based solutions for responding

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effectively to pandemics (see Chapter Twenty for further consideration of multi-​level governance and responses to the pandemic). Consistently, impacts transcend socio-​economic divisions. Thus, resilient cities need to support solidarity and improved accessibility to social and physical infrastructure for the most vulnerable. Significantly, it took a global pandemic to precipitate these new touchpoints of digital and interpersonal connection as the spread of COVID-​19 amplified the rapid disruption of the urban condition. Post-​pandemic planning founded on evidence-​based decision-​making and the considered use of emerging/​repurposed technologies will be a key public service to address these grave challenges. Ideally, this public service will build community trust in institutions and better citizens’ lives. References Australian Government Department of Health (2020) Coronavirus (COVID-​19) current situation and case numbers, www.health.gov. au/​news/​health-​alerts/​novel-​coronavirus-​2019-​ncov-​health-​ alert/c​ oronavirus-​covid-​19-​current-​situation-​and-​case-​numbers Bailey, D., Clark, J., Colombelli, A., Corradini, C., Propris, L.D., Derudder, B., Fratesi, U., Fritsch, M., Harrison, J., Hatfield, M., Kemeny, T., Kogler, D.F., Lagendijk, A., Lawton, P., Ortega-​ Argilés, R., Otero, C.I. and Usai, S. (2020) ‘Regions in a time of pandemic’. Regional Studies, 54(9): 1163–​74. Berkowitz, R.L., Gao, X., Michaels, E.K. and Mujahid, M.S. (2020) ‘Structurally vulnerable neighbourhood environments and racial/​ ethnic COVID-​19 inequities’. Cities & Health, https://​doi.org/​ 10.1080/​23748834.2020.1792069 City of Toronto (2020) COVID-​19: Status of Cases in Toronto. Toronto: City of Toronto, www.toronto.ca/​home/​covid-​19/​covid-​19-​ latest-​city-​of-​toronto-​news/​covid-​19-​status-​of-​cases-​in-​toronto/​ Deas, I., Martin, M. and Hincks, S. (2020) ‘Temporary urban uses in response to COVID-​19: bolstering resilience via short-​term experimental solutions’. Town Planning Review, online first, 1–​8, https://​doi.org/​10.3828/​tpr.2020.45

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Haughton, G., White, I. and Pinto, N. (2020) ‘Planning in the post-​pandemic era’. Town and Country Planning, 84(4/​5): 138–​40. Sri Lanka Health Promotion Bureau (2020) COVID-​19: Live structural analysis dashboard of Sri Lanka, https://​hpb.health.gov.lk/​ covid19-​dashboard/​ State Government of Victoria (2020) Coronavirus (COVID-​19) roadmap for reopening, www.vic.gov.au/​coronavirus-​covid-​19-​ restrictions-​victoria Statens Serum Institut (2020a) Overvågning af COVID-​19, www.ssi. dk/​sygdomme-​beredskab-​og-​forskning/​sygdomsovervaagning/​ c/​covid19-​overvaagning Statens Serum Institut (2020b) Epidemiologisk trend og fokus: Herkomst (etnicitet), Report, May 7. Copenhagen: Statens Serum Institut. Steffensen, T. and Laursen, S. (2020) Hate in public space during the COVID-​19 epidemic –​an analysis of minority experiences, Report, June 30. Copenhagen: The Danish Institute for Human Rights.

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FIFTEEN

Urban Mobility, Working Culture, and Administration During the COVID-​19 Crisis:​ Adjustments for a Resilient City Kerstin Stark, Julia Schuppan, Ariane Kehlbacher, Julia Jarass, and Laura Gebhardt

Introduction A resilient city can guarantee accessibility and mobility to its citizens and effectively mitigate adverse impacts of crises on its population and infrastructure (Holling, 1973; Holling and Gunderson, 2002). So far, the concept of ‘resilience’ has mostly been used in the context of disaster management and climate adaptation. However, during the COVID-​19 crisis, the still rather vague concept of pandemic resilience has emerged. In the context of urban mobility, it refers to, for example, the facilitation of active mobility modes and the creation of livable public spaces. To date there is little research on the impact of

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governance, administrative structures, and planning processes on pandemic resilience. Thirty-​five interviews in four German areas –​the metropolitan areas of Berlin, Leipzig, Bremen, and Stuttgart –​were conducted with decision makers and stakeholders, including local politicians and civic servants, members of civil society organizations along with both private and public sector organizations providing transport services. While responsibility for the resilience of cities and infrastructures is shared in Germany between the federal, state, and local governments, this study focuses exclusively on the municipal level. The selection of respondents was guided by their position and role within organizations involved in the introduction of crisis-​ related measures for cycling or walking. The interviews were conducted using a videoconferencing platform and lasted between 30 and 90 minutes. They were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed inductively and iteratively relying on multiple coders who developed a common coding system. Our study attempts to answer the questions: what makes a city resilient in times of crises, using the pandemic as an example, and what lessons can be learned from self-​reported issues that were encountered by actors and stakeholders in their response to the crisis? We analyze the issues that were reported by our interviewees and reflect on the problems that were experienced by municipalities. We also investigate the way in which adaptation measures were implemented during the COVID-​19 crisis and whether they improve the long-​term resilience of cities. In the following, we share some of the insights gained from our study. In response to the social distance requirements, municipalities introduced different mobility measures such as pop-​up bike lanes. We identify three types of crisis responses, and provide insights into the changes in administrative processes that were experienced by the interviewees. Furthermore, we reflect on the requirements for a resilient transport system that includes a robust public transport system.

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Crisis responses: redistribution of public space Several measures have been undertaken in German cities to respond to the needs related to the COVID-​19 crisis. These can be summarized under the heading of space redistribution. In particular, space for parking and car traffic was reduced in favor of space for bicycles and the so-​called ‘pop-​up’, that is, temporary or provisional bicycle lanes were introduced (see on this theme, Chapters Four and Nineteen). Temporary bike lanes were first implemented in one inner-​city district of Berlin (Friedrichshain-​Kreuzberg). Subsequently, these were introduced in other districts in Berlin and in other German cities. Administratively, Berlin is both a city and a federal state and its districts have a status similar to that of a city. Accordingly, districts in Berlin enjoy a high degree of autonomy, especially in the realm of urban and transport planning. In our study, we find evidence of three ideal-​typical political responses to the COVID-​19 crisis: the opportunism type, the copycat, and the non-​action type. The opportunism type is characterized by a rapid response to the crisis, recognizing and seizing the opportunity to realize pre-​existing plans and to advance political goals. The administration of the district of Friedrichshain-​Kreuzberg serves as an example. It is governed by the Green Party and the district administration is known for its commitment to sustainable transport and for occasionally using unconventional measures to achieve this goal (for example boulders in street corners to prevent illegal parking). The responsible authority acted relatively quickly when pandemic regulations on social distancing were enacted in Germany in March 2020 by introducing traffic measures framed as public health interventions to prevent infection. Several provisional bike lanes were created by separating one road (or parking) lane using bollards and dedicating it to cyclists. The stated rationale was that these additional bike lanes would allow

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for safe travelling, especially for those who now felt uncomfortable using public transport, which had reduced its services. Another stated rationale was environmental sustainability. After a few months, the district announced that the temporary bike lanes would be made permanent. The German public has perceived the district’s actions as being an unusually quick response to the pandemic, not realizing that the Friedrichshain-​Kreuzberg district was able to build its pandemic response on pre-​existing plans for the reconstruction of the given streets. For the district planning department, the crisis had created a window of opportunity that allowed it to accelerate the expansion of the cycling infrastructure. The latter is a legal requirement to be met by districts in Berlin according to the ‘Mobility Act’, a law that came to effect in 2018. Prior to the crisis, the implementation of the Berlin Mobility Act had been repeatedly stalled due to excessive planning procedures and the division of responsibilities between the district and state government. In addition, our study finds evidence of a commonly observed work ethic in transport planning that tends to over-​engineer to minimize the risk of errors. In the case of Friedrichshain-​Kreuzberg, the crisis provided an impetus to test a novel iterative approach to the creation of bike infrastructures whereby a provisional bike lane is put in place and immediately tested in practice, improved, and finally converted into a permanent bike lane. Friedrichshain-​Kreuzberg’s pioneering initiatives gave rise to public pressures to introduce pop-​up bike lanes in other districts of Berlin and other German cities. These we classified as a copycat type of crisis response. The findings from our interviews show the role of the political party membership of the responsible political actors. Cities or districts that were governed by or affiliated with the Green Party faced pressure to act. In addition, the media and cycling advocacy groups pressured other jurisdictions to follow the example of Friedrichshain-​Kreuzberg district. As a result, different temporary measures were explored by the municipalities or districts

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and in some cases implemented. Conditions for the creation of temporary bike infrastructure vary between municipalities, in particular when it comes to road space. Friedrichshain-​ Kreuzberg has multi-​lane roads, which facilitate the creation of pop-​up bike lanes, whereas other German cities or districts of Berlin mostly have single-​lane roads. The third type of crisis response we found is the non-​action type. It refers to the absence of political responses to the crisis in the transport sector. Reasons for inaction include the perception by local authorities of temporary infrastructure measures as not useful or not applicable to the requirements of their cities. In the city of Leipzig, for example, local authorities considered public transport rather than cycling as the top priority. One reason for this policy orientation was a lesser mobilization of the public in Leipzig than in Berlin around the creation of pop-​up bike lanes. Summarizing the three ideal-​typical policy response types, the opportunism type used the imperative to prevent infection as an opportunity to implement pre-​existing plans to improve bike lanes. In doing so, it created an expectation for other municipalities to follow suit, but also provided a good example of how to address the problem of increased space need during the crisis. The copycat type of municipalities introduced measures because they felt pressured by the public to commit to the political goal of a green transport transition. The planning behavior of the non-​action type municipalities had little or no impact. They did not see how the adaptive measures taken by some of the Berlin districts could relate to the achievement of their own political goal. Crisis response: changes in working culture Regardless of the ideal-​type political response of the municipality or department, administrative adaptation to the crisis essentially consisted in enabling remote working, the digitalization of document circulation, and the introduction of online

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communication channels. Particularly in the public administration in Germany, remote working had been highly uncommon prior to the COVID-​19 crisis. Solutions to allow for remote working had to be found at short notice. Employees had to learn to use new technologies such as videoconferencing. In some cases, the crisis provided an impetus for innovations in the areas of collaboration and communication, as well as for the use and acceptance of new technologies. Without digital equipment and online collaboration, work processes would have slowed down or ceased, and decision makers would have been unable to act. The findings from our interviews suggest that some of these new practices will be maintained after a return to normality. For many employees, the change in working culture and the virtualization of many activities has made work more pleasant. Crisis responses: public transport A further relevant area of crisis adaptation was the maintenance of the public transport system, albeit at reduced capacities as ridership declined (see Chapter Sixteen). Public transport suffered in terms of public acceptance. Even in Berlin and other major German cities where public transport is highly developed and intensively used, ridership dropped by more than 70 percent during the peak of the crisis in March and April (Motiontag, 2020; and interview data). Responses by interviewees suggested varied responses by municipalities. Some reduced public transport supply temporarily, while others maintained it despite lower ridership. Thus, public transport kept offering reliable services, while private mobility providers, for example electric scooters and ride pooling services, reported having temporarily withdrawn from the market during the crisis. As the crisis related to the first wave of the pandemic abated, ridership in public transport somewhat recovered, but not completely. The outlook for public transport remains

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uncertain. In the cities and districts studied, there was agreement to maintain service level or even increase the frequency of trains and buses. Different measures are in mid-​2020 being developed and discussed against the backdrop of two types of adversities. First, less money is available due to reduced fare revenues. In addition, the budget situation of cities and districts, which support public transport, has considerably deteriorated due to the crisis. Second, people are less willing to board crowded buses and trains. The concern is that the acceptance of public transport may suffer in the long term as people develop preference for more individualistic transport modes, mostly private cars. The fact that not all passengers wear masks on public transport during the pandemic is also seen as an obstacle. Conclusion We presented some insights derived from our analysis of interviews about resilience and political responses to the pandemic in different German municipalities. We conclude that the COVID-​19 crisis in Germany has exposed capacities and deficiencies of governance and administration. One crucial aspect was the functioning of communication networks and the availability of staff. In municipal transport planning departments as well as in other administrative units and organizations, private or public, digitization and increased flexibility of work had a positive impact on coping capacity. The crisis exposed dramatic deficits in providing active mobility alternatives and motivated rapid action to catch up in terms of equipment and digital infrastructure needed so as to enable remote and decentralized employment. The positive effects of these arrangements are likely to last beyond the COVID-​19 crisis and thereby to change the working culture in the long term. This may make public administration more attractive to young and/​or highly qualified professionals, thereby increasing human capital at the local government level.

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We distinguished between three ideal types of crisis responses among the investigated municipalities. We do not intend to evaluate municipal crisis responses as either positive or negative, but to give an idea of the spectrum of possible reactions. Whether it is appropriate for a municipality to act or not to act depends on conditions prevailing in a district or city, the availability of resources and on the nature of the crisis itself. However, our study finds that a crisis like COVID-​19 can create a window of opportunity for municipalities to reach goals that are otherwise elusive (Birkmann et al, 2010). The opportunism type of response in our empirical case study used crises to extend repertoires of available instruments for sustainable transport planning, and led to the development of a more rapid and result-​oriented approach to planning. In the case of the opportunism type of response, our study shows that applying a not yet proven approach to planning can be risky, resulting for example in legal uncertainties. The City of Berlin has been sued by a far-​right party in summer 2020 and the Berlin administrative court decided in the first instance that the temporary bike lanes were illegal because the city failed to provide evidence that the streets on which the lanes were installed were dangerous for cyclists. It is unclear whether the court’s decision will be upheld in the second instance. However, the court’s decision has fueled a public debate on the fair distribution of road and public spaces between motorists versus cyclists and pedestrians. Moreover, these events have shown that new approaches to planning such as provisional infrastructure solutions are under scrutiny and need to be thoroughly justified and evaluated as part of a broad societal discussion. The effects of the COVID-​19 crisis on urban mobility are ambivalent. While public spaces and especially cycling have benefited, public transport has suffered from decreased ridership and a loss in reputation. At the same time, the COVID-​ 19 crisis showed the importance of a strong public transport system as services kept running throughout, while most private mobility providers (often funded by risk capital) withdrew their

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services as demand decreased. Further research is needed to better understand differences in the crisis responses of mobility providers and public authorities and identify the long-​term effects and lessons learned from the COVID-​19 crisis effect on urban mobility, work culture, and public administration, and the impacts of all of this on urban resilience. References Birkmann, J., Buckle, P., Jaeger, J., Pelling, M., Setiadi, N. and Garschagen, M. (2010) ‘Extreme events and disasters: a window of opportunity for change? Analysis of organizational, institutional and political changes, formal and informal responses after mega-​disasters’. Natural Hazards, 55(3): 637–​55. Holling, C.S. (1973) ‘Resilience and stability of ecological systems’. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 4(1): 1–​23. Holling, C.S. and Gunderson, L.H. (2002) ‘Resilience and adaptive cycles’, in L.H. Gunderson and G. de Hollander (eds) Panarchy Synopsis: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems. Washington, DC: Island Press, pp 25–​62. Motiontag, I.A. (2020) Beobachtungen per Mobilitätstracking. w ​ ww. infas.de/​fileadmin/u ​ ser_u ​ pload/i​ nfas_m ​ obility_C ​ oronaTracking_​ Nr.02_​20200421.pdf

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Public Transport Qualities and Inequalities in Pandemic Times Marcus Finbom, Wojciech Kębłowski, Wladimir Sgibnev, Louise Sträuli, Peter Timko, Tauri Tuvikene, and Tonio Weicker

Introduction In spring 2020, the advent of the COVID-​19 pandemic caused a mobility crisis. Municipalities and operators faced novel challenges in keeping public transport systems running. Media outlets and officials stigmatized public transport as sites of potential infection, leading to unprecedented decrease of ridership, closure of transport networks, and gloomy predictions about the ‘end of public transport’ in the US (De La Garza, 2020), the UK (Clark, 2020), and Germany (Schwenn and Hauser, 2020). In response, technical-​managerial safety measures were applied, such as disinfecting vehicles or fencing off and limiting spaces to enforce physical distancing (UITP, 2020a). Yet, these responses remain only partially effective. Moreover, they have worsened working conditions for public transit staff by disregarding their needs. For instance, bus drivers in Stockholm described fearing for their lives when many of

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their colleagues contracted the virus, and some died. Despite this situation, during the first weeks of the pandemic, authorities refused closing front doors in vehicles. Policies further failed to account for the affective side of public transport and to consider users’ expectations, feelings as well as their fears and hopes regarding post-​pandemic transport futures (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 2020). The sudden breakdown of mobility networks and routines is of great social significance, as the ‘freedom of movement, as represented in popular media, politics and the public sphere, is the ideology and utopia of the twenty-​first century’ (Grieco and Urry, 2011: 4). Interrupted global supply chains, the closure of metro networks, deserted transportation hubs, and locked borders fundamentally contradict the capitalist paradigm that equates movement with individual and collective prosperity. Moreover, the impact of the pandemic on mobility appears to be socially and spatially uneven, raising questions of mobility justice (Sheller, 2018). How do hierarchies of perceived risk and stigma intersect with existing hierarchies of access and use? Who gets to move around safely, and feel safe as they move? We discuss qualities and inequalities of public transport not only by looking at ridership figures, but also by considering ambiances, mundane experiences, and power structures. To understand user perspectives, we conducted an online survey (collecting 2,164 responses to our questionnaires, 1,095 completely filled) in various European countries, and qualitative semi-​structured interviews, focusing on cities in Belgium (17), Estonia (10), Germany (10), and Sweden (10). The research was carried out from May to August 2020. While we acknowledge strong class and gender bias related to the online methodology, we argue that the method nonetheless helps to explore the affective side of public transport. Our findings are supported by an analysis of media and policy documents, which we have examined from a global perspective, while keeping the European focus of the empirical work.

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User experiences and atmospheres The pandemic and subsequent lockdown measures altered the everyday atmosphere of cities, particularly in and around public transport infrastructures. Passengers have developed mixed feelings about public transit use during the pandemic: while some felt increasing anxiety and uncertainty, others reported enjoying calm and comfort in near-​empty vehicles (Figure 16.1).​​ Among the passengers who continued using public transit after the COVID-​19 outbreak, many emphasized its anti-​ social dimension, as the probability of interacting with other passengers significantly decreased. A respondent noted: “People are sitting in silence. Suspicious and silent and self-​absorbed”1 (Tallinn, May 19, 2020). With the challenge of maintaining physical distance in the dense and closed spaces of public Figure 16.1: Word cloud summarizing responses to the survey question: ‘Following the COVID-​19 outbreak, how would you describe the atmosphere in public transport? Please provide any keywords that come to your mind.’ Responses from seven languages were translated into English and added up

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transit vehicles, face-​covering obligations were introduced, which were welcomed by many, strengthening the feelings of safety and solidarity. For others, however, this measure affected the convivial character of the transport space by hampering exchange, be it a consenting smile or the observation of other passengers, and by displaying signs of social distance. A respondent commented: ‘Of course, I can personally get used to this mask obligation. But I am honestly afraid of the consequences. I think that a very important social component is lost. Watching people’s faces somehow. Also, to observe how they smile at each other or don’t’. (Berlin, June 16, 2020) Passengers adapted their travel behavior, notably by avoiding peak hours or even leaving crowded vehicles. A respondent confessed to feeling guilty riding without “a proper reason”, taking up space from people who really needed it (Munich, May 27, 2020). Others justified their decision to stop using public transport because it was a necessity for them and they felt solidarity towards those without any other choice, thus reflecting the official policy discouraging passengers from travelling needlessly. As one user points out: ‘I haven’t used public transport since the beginning of the lockdown because I’ve always managed to get around on foot or by bike. As long as I can get by with these options, I prefer to leave my place in [public] transport to those who can’t do without it’. (Brussels, May 15, 2020) Similarly, respondents associated a perceived risk of infection with the level of cleanliness. “When it is clean you feel safer; when it is dirty right away you feel uncomfortable and […] stressed”, a respondent argues (Brussels, May 13, 2020). In this regard, the efforts of operators and local authorities, physical distancing, mask obligations, and regular disinfection were

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considered positively. At the same time, respondents describe how they now see public transport as a vector for viruses: ‘I have realized during the pandemic how many people you meet in the public transport who can be contagious, this insight will motivate me more to continue cycling instead’. (Stockholm, May 5, 2020) In parallel, users reported heightened awareness of their own behavior. One user describes the fear of “looking sick” and others mention increased efforts to show passengers that they are aware of and abiding by new distancing rules. This way, safety measures, users’ sensorial sensitivity and behavior changes have reaffirmed the shared nature of public transport as a space held in common and re-​emphasized expectations, etiquette, and fleeting interactions. A respondent from Brussels remarked: ‘I felt like people were behaving as […] with a shared consciousness that there was something in common. It’s my general feeling since the outbreak. Every time I go out, I feel like there’s something that we share when people look [at] each other’. (Brussels, March 30, 2020) Interestingly, the perceptions of the risk of contracting COVID-​19 vary unevenly according to user patterns. In comparison with grocery stores, for example, people who continued to use public transport regularly stated that they felt it is safer (Figure 16.2). A related finding is that, as household income increases, dependence on public transport for everyday activities and thus its use during a pandemic decrease. Consequently, a risk exists that privileged and occasional users may show weaker support for maintaining or increasing government subsidies for public transport. While COVID-​19 may not have killed off public transport yet, the pandemic has likely reduced the diversity of its users. Without students, parents with children, the elderly and

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Figure 16.2: Responses to the survey question, ‘Do you consider public transport to be more or less safe than grocery stores?’ sorted by use of PT during the pandemic Do you consider public transport to be more or less safe than grocery stores? (in %, n= 511) 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 public transport to be much less safe

public transport to public transport to public transport to be a little less safe be equally safe be a little safer

I have not used it

public transport to be much more safe

I have used it frequently or regularly (>1x per week)

tourists, people who are able to work from home, and deprived of participants to nightlife entertainment, public transport seems to have become increasingly a means for the working class to reach their manufacturing and service sector jobs, reflecting a growing social divide exacerbated by the pandemic. Challenges, government responses, fare systems The pandemic has generated both threats to public services and significant support for their existence. Transport operators need to navigate between maintaining quality and frequency of service with additional responsibilities for cleaning and distancing. Accomplishing this without increasing revenues via fare hikes or subsidies is difficult. Declining passenger numbers weigh heavily on operators’ budgets. While public transport systems with high public subsidies (for example Tallinn) were able to maintain services, other systems were threatened by unprecedented losses in fare-​box revenues (UITP, 2020b). The pandemic has increased public support for the state’s role as guarantor of public services, particularly in health care but also for public

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transport. Transport for London (TfL), for instance, received a £1.6bn bailout in May 2020 (BBC News, 2020). However, these occasional transfers appear unsustainable in a financial model that continues to rely on income from passenger fares. Many interviewees consider that it is the responsibility of governments, not of individual passengers, to make up for transport companies’ losses and ensure a continuous provision of service. Hence, as public transport governance is at a crossroads, many operators consider shifting to a fare-​free model. Before the outbreak, public transport was fully free in at least 120 cities. In response to the pandemic, fares or their enforcement were temporarily suspended in a further 80 localities, predominantly in the Global North (for example Berlin, Brussels, Lisbon, and Montreal), often as a strategy to protect drivers from potentially dangerous interactions with passengers. Other transport systems suspended fares for essential workers (for example Chişinau, Istanbul, London, Nizhny Novgorod, Quito). The pandemic thus appears as an opportunity to ‘do things differently’, to embrace options that have been on the table, but lacked sufficient momentum to be adopted.2 Future of public transport: long-​lasting changes? The remarkable scale and likely duration of the ongoing COVID-​19 pandemic, and the resulting perceived danger of proximity, have made administering, providing, and using public transport services particularly challenging. While public transport has been recognized as an essential public service, and a public space where people meet, the ongoing crisis highlighted that public transport usage is dependent on class, related economic and employment status, and access to private means of transport. During urban lockdowns, while some residents reduced their mobility to a minimum, others had to continue commuting in packed vehicles. In many European cities the modal share of walking and cycling has increased –​leading cities

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such as Brussels to quickly plan for expanded car-​free areas, design cycle routes, and reduce motorized traffic. Elsewhere, the return to private cars suggests that the dominance of automobility is far from challenged (Kessler, 2020). At present, in late summer 2020, it is too early to assess where this leaves public transport. Bucking gloomy predictions, our brief study shows that public transport is far from dead. It continues to serve those who depend on it. Certainly, some associate public transport spaces with increased health risk, yet many use more neutral terms to describe their feelings, as our survey and interviews indicated. A city without socially diverse and truly collective forms of transport is subjugated to a continued primacy of private mobility, which exacerbates rather than addresses social inequalities. A solution to this threat could be to render public transport services not only safer to their users, but also cheaper or free, and hence more egalitarian. Having abolished or suspended fares in response to the pandemic, many localities have tested fare-​free public transport. Moreover, in some localities the pandemic has helped articulate the importance of not only maintaining and funding public transport as a universal service, but also of attempts towards mitigating the ongoing climate crisis. Finally, the pandemic has brought to the fore the plight of transport workers, hailed as essential employees, and heroes of our time, putting their lives at risk to provide mobility to others. Thus, the COVID-​19 crisis may yield some progressive outcomes for public transport systems, but declining passenger numbers and a deteriorating image remain long-​term challenges. Notes ​ This

chapter is part of the project ‘Public transport as public space in European cities: Narrating, experiencing, contesting (PUTSPACE)’, which is financially supported by the Joint Research Programme HERA (www. heranet.info), co-​financed by AKA, BMBF via DLR-​PT, ETAg and the European Commission through Horizon 2020. ​The chapter

authors are given in alphabetical order.

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All quotes have been translated to English (from Estonian, French, German, Swedish, or Russian) by the authors. For example, the mayor of Charlotte (North Carolina, US) admits considering fare-​free PT in January 2020 (Peralta and Hopkins, 2020).

References BBC News (2020) ‘Coronavirus: Transport for London secures emergency £1.6bn bailout’. BBC News Online, May 14, www. bbc.com/​news/​uk-​england-​london-​52670539 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (2020) COVID-​19 employer information for bus transit operators. Atlanta, GA: CDC, www.cdc.gov/​coronavirus/​2019-​ncov/​community/​ organizations/​bus-​transit-​operator.html Clark, R. (2020) ‘Is this the end of the line for public transport?’ The Spectator, August 20, www.spectator.co.uk/​article/​ is-​this-​the-​end-​of-​the-​line-​for-​public-​transport-​ De La Garza, A. (2020) ‘COVID-​19 has been “apocalyptic” for public transit: will Congress offer more help?’ TIME, July 21, https://​ time.com/​5869375/​public-​transit-​coronavirus-​covid/​ Grieco, M. and Urry, J. (2011) Mobilities: New Perspectives on Transport and Society. Farnham: Ashgate. Kessler, S. (2020) ‘Coronavirus pandemic fuels comeback of cars’. Deutsche Welle, September 6, https://​amp.dw.com/​en/​ coronavirus-​pandemic-​fuels-​comeback-​of-​cars/​a-​53759607?_​_​ twitter_​impression=true Peralta, K. and Hopkins, P. (2020) ‘Coronavirus dealt an $8 million blow to mass transit in Charlotte. Can it bounce back?’ Charlotte Agenda, June 7, www.charlotteagenda.com/2​ 20534/c​ oronavirus-​ dealt-​an-​8-​million-​blow-​to-​mass-​transit-​in-​charlotte-​can-​it-​ bounce-​back/​ Schwenn, K. and Hauser, J. (2020) Die Verkehrswende steht vor dem Aus. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 2, www.faz.net/​aktuell/​ wirtschaft/​corona-​krise-​rad-​auto-​bahn-​die-​verkehrswende-s​ teht-​ vor-​dem-​aus-​16746069.html Sheller, M. (2018) Mobility Justice: The Politics of Movement in an Age of Extremes. London: Verso.

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UITP (2020a) COVID-​19 Pandemic: Resuming public transport services post-​lockdown. Brussels: UITP. UITP (2020b) OPEN LETTER: European CEOs and city representatives call for local public transport to be a key sector in the European recovery plan. Brussels: UITP.

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COVID-​19 and the Creative City: Lessons from the UK Jonathan Gross, Tamsyn Dent, and Roberta Comunian

Introduction Since the 1990s policy makers have paid increasing attention to ‘creativity’ as a potential source of job creation, urban renewal, and post-​industrial growth. Within this context the ‘creative city’ became an influential idea. It describes an approach to urban development that takes account of the rising significance of the creative economy and seeks to make planning processes themselves more creative (Florida, 2002; Landry, 2008). Creative city thinking has been widely critiqued, yet its influence persists. In this chapter, we consider the implications of COVID-​19 for the creative city ‘script’ and explore what the pandemic reveals about the need for new approaches to urban cultural policy. (Chapters Five and Six also address sectors of the economy that are disproportionally ravaged by the pandemic.) The creative city and inequality In the last two decades, the creative city has become a popular branding and policy script for cities all over the world. The

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‘creative’ tag is associated with a range of feel-​good factors, evoking opportunities for self-​expression, imagination, and human connection. However, in the case of the creative city, there is now a broad literature suggesting that ‘creative’ is not used in these human-​centered ways (Pratt, 2011). Instead it is used to mobilize specific political priorities: promoting GDP growth via creative economy, global competition among entrepreneurial cities, and top-​down intervention to redevelop urban spaces. A range of authors have intervened to unmask these neoliberal agendas. Chatterton (2000) was one of the first, characterizing the creative city as a branding exercise that does not involve citizens in defining their role in the places they live and work. Others consider the contradiction between the fact that artists and creatives shape cities, and are encouraged to do so, but then become victims of processes of redevelopment, gentrification, and top-​down intervention that reduce their space and civic agency (Novy and Colomb, 2013; McLean, 2014). Ultimately these tensions between different stakeholders –​each interested in their city and its future –​are grounded in diverging priorities and values. There is a continuous struggle to reconcile the interests and views of cultural producers, and possibilities for everyday citizenship, with neoliberal agendas which do not prioritize urban inclusivity and long-​term sustainability. The research shows that ‘creative cities’ are often an image exercise rather than a reality, and the transformative value of creativity in place has frequently remained unfulfilled. Where top-​down creative city policies have prevailed, this has often increased inequality, making many spaces in the city exclusionary and unaffordable (McCann, 2007). Before COVID-​19, urban cultural policy required radical rethinking. The pandemic has made this even more urgent. COVID-​19 and failures of creative justice While creativity has been celebrated as a source of GDP growth, urban renewal, and ‘good’ jobs, a growing body

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of research demonstrates that creative work is marked by inequality, exploitation, and precarity. COVID-​19 has laid bare the failures of the creative city script to deliver what Banks calls ‘creative justice’ (Banks, 2017). The pandemic has intensified pre-​existing inequalities operating across urban creative economies. In the early days of the outbreak, multiple surveys were distributed across Europe, investigating the impact of COVID-​19 on the cultural and creative workforce. These studies revealed a widespread and critical loss of income for an already vulnerable workforce. There have been varying degrees of state intervention to manage the impact, with some European countries delivering substantial financial packages to mitigate cultural and creative workers’ loss of earnings in the first months of the pandemic. In the UK, Arts Council England announced a £160 million emergency package in April 2020, followed by the UK government’s £1.57 billion ‘investment’ in the cultural sector announced in July 2020. However, this was already too late for some organizations, such as the Nuffield Southampton Theatre, which went into administration in May 2020. Such closures mean the loss of many jobs, and potentially long-​term damage to urban communities. Banks describes creative and cultural workers as having ‘low immunity’ to the economic consequences of the pandemic (Banks, 2020: 3). While the UK experienced a decade of reductions in public funding for arts and culture, and the erosion of legal rights and protections for the cultural and creative workforce, the creative economy and the creative city have emphasized their value in terms of entrepreneurialism and innovation. These discourses have been criticized as symptomatic of systemic moves towards deregulated employment models, helping to accelerate conditions of precarity not only within the creative economy but more widely. Creative and cultural work is, in this sense, the canary in the mine of neoliberal labor relations (McRobbie, 2016; Scharff, 2016), with significant physical and mental impacts on workers (Carey et al, 2020), and particularly unjust consequences for women

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and minority/​minoritized groups. While these inequalities are likely to have been further exacerbated by COVID-​19, little attention has been given in the sector surveys to the disproportionate impact the pandemic might have on earnings and livelihoods with respect to gender, race, disability, and social class (Comunian and England, 2020). Of all economic sectors, some sections of the creative economy are among the most badly affected by social distancing measures. The performing arts, for example, including live music, theatre, dance, and comedy, have interpersonal encounter at their heart. These kinds of activities make crucial contributions to urban life, as sources of employment, entertainment, community, and collective identity. One of the distinctive ways in which COVID-​19 is an urban crisis lies in its undermining of these kinds of cultural and creative work, and the forms of sociality that they make possible. But, of course, the cultural and creative life of cities is not only about cultural and creative work. It is also about opportunities for new experiences –​as audience members, participants, and creative citizens. Here the limitations of the creative city script as a model of urban cultural policy have been exposed by the pandemic, demonstrating the effects of long-​standing inequalities in government cultural funding. A report by the Fabian Society lays bare regional discrepancies in local public spending on the arts and culture in the UK. These are largely due to the unequal effects of the fiscal austerity enforced by the Conservative-​Liberal Democrat coalition government from 2010, and intensified following the Conservative party’s majority in 2015. In 2009–​10 local authorities across England spent more than £2.2bn on arts and culture, supporting local libraries, theatres, museums, public entertainment, and heritage. In the following decade, this annual expenditure fell in real terms by over £860m to just under £1.4bn (Cooper, 2020), but the effects were unevenly spread. Before COVID-​19 there was considerable regional disparity in terms of the allocation of public funds through

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direct funding to local government and through Arts Council England, with the West Midlands, East of England and the North East experiencing the largest cuts. A particularly problematic finding from the Fabian analysis is how funds raised through the National Lottery program are distributed by the Arts Council, with the majority supporting organizations based in London and the South East, which, given its purpose of supporting local community arts, is ‘difficult to justify’ (Cooper, 2020: 18). One of the key recommendations from the report is that the remaining £258 million of the recovery package should be directly transferred to local government in a fair distributive model that enables local rejuvenation of public spaces, including the high street, placing culture at the heart of a localized economic recovery (Cooper, 2020). Like the failures of creative justice experienced by the cultural and creative workforce, the spatial inequalities of government funding pre-​COVID have been exacerbated by the pandemic, with the most prominent cultural institutions in the biggest cities the most protected. As a result of these existing inequalities, and the failure of the British government to provide swift, large-​scale, and sustained support for the cultural sector in response to the pandemic, many smaller organizations, particularly in towns and smaller cities, are likely to close. New possibilities for urban cultural policy in the age of pandemic The limitations of existing approaches to urban cultural policy have been made plain by COVID-​19. What might new frameworks look like? We are currently undertaking fieldwork in ten European cities as part of Developing Inclusive and Sustainable Creative Economies (DISCE), a Horizon 2020 research project. We are exploring the question of what ‘development’ can mean for creative economies beyond GDP and measures of employment. One aspect of this is to

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undertake detailed interviews with a deliberately wide range of people within the cultural life of each of our ten locations. Our research design is explicitly ‘ecological’, treating cities as cultural ecosystems in which the publicly funded arts, profit-​ making creative industries, education institutions, and everyday (or amateur) creativity are deeply interconnected and interdependent (Gross and Wilson, 2018). Unlike approaches to urban cultural policy that lay primary emphasis on the ‘creative class’, ours is a systematically inclusive framework, taking the broadest possible view of what the cultural and creative life of the city is constituted by, and why it matters. In addition to this ecological perspective, our work further challenges the prevailing terms of economic analysis by addressing the role of care within cultural ecosystems. We include questions about care and caring responsibilities within our interviews. How have people been cared for and encouraged? What do they care about? What and who do they have caring responsibilities for? What skills are involved in these practices of care? With this approach to data collection, we then use theorizations and categorizations of care such as those developed by Tronto (2013) –​who identifies four moral dimensions of care: attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness –​to analyze our data. We are thereby building up a picture of how cultural ecosystems are constituted by diverse practices of care, and how the power dynamics that shape who cares for what conditions the processes by which cultural ecosystems are developed, and by who. What might be the implications of this ecological and care-​ centered analysis for urban cultural policy, including policies seeking to address creative (in)justice in the age of COVID-​19? As part of DISCE, we are exploring new approaches to evaluating and ‘indexing’ the development of cultural ecosystems (Wilson et al, 2020), working in collaboration with our research participants to explore what this can and should look like. One of the starting points is the need to place value on the extent to which populations within a given locality have capabilities

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(real freedoms) to care for and co-​create the cultural life of their city (Gross and Wilson, 2018; Wilson et al, 2020). This work was begun before the pandemic but we are struck by its timeliness, as COVID-​19 has laid bare the need for radically new approaches to creative justice. The pandemic is revealing and extending existing inequalities within cultural ecosystems, and the creative city script is inadequate to the task of responding to these challenges. New approaches to urban cultural policy in the age of pandemic need to be sensitive to how existing and new forms of inequality play out. This is, of course, a fast-​moving situation. It is also one in which there is the opportunity to do things differently. Building on the strong emphasis on deliberation advanced by Amartya Sen’s ‘capability approach’ to human development (Sen, 1999), within DISCE we are exploring possibilities for embedding new processes of participatory decision-​making within urban cultural policy (Wilson et al, 2020). Part of the urgent need here is to make possible ongoing processes of knowledge production with regards to what inequalities operate within a cultural ecosystem. Only via sustained conversation and deliberation can the lived experiences of inequalities be collectively understood and addressed. Moreover, only through the opportunity to take part in the policy processes are people fully free to contribute to the cultural life of their city. Beyond the growth of GDP and jobs, ‘development’ of urban creative economies can be understood as constituted by the expansion of cultural opportunity. But this not only means the capability to engage in the specific cultural activities of one’s choosing, across the interconnections of the publicly funded arts, the profit-​making creative industries, education institutions, and everyday creativity. The expansion of cultural opportunities also means the extent to which a city’s population enjoys real freedoms to participate in cultural decision-​making. In the age of COVID-​19, beyond the creative city script, urban cultural policy needs to prioritize the processes of deliberation through which cultural ecosystems can be democratically

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stewarded. This requires institutional arrangements sensitive to the ways in which cultural life is constituted by ecological interdependencies and practices of care through which inequalities can either be reproduced or challenged. In response to the pandemic, it is in developing new processes of democratic cultural governance that there is the greatest need –​and the greatest possibility –​for urban cultural policy to be creative. References Banks, M. (2017) Creative Justice: Cultural Industries, Work and Inequality. London: Rowman & Littlefield. Banks, M. (2020) ‘The work of culture and C-​19’. European Journal of Cultural Studies, https://​doi.org/​10.1177/​1367549420924687 Carey, H., Wilkes, M. and Florisson, R. (2020) The looking glass: Mental health in the UK film, TV and cinema industry. Lancaster, UK: Management School, Lancaster University. www.lancaster. ac.uk/​media/​lancaster-​university/​content-​assets/​documents/​ lums/w ​ ork-f​ oundation/​TheLookingGlassFinalReport-1​ 3Feb19. pdf Chatterton, P. (2000) ‘Will the real Creative City please stand up?’. City, 4(3): 390–​7. Comunian, R. and England, L. (2020) ‘Creative and cultural work without filters: COVID-​19 and exposed precarity in the creative economy’. Cultural Trends, 29(2): 112–​28. Cooper, B. (2020) Cultured Communities. The Crisis in Local Funding for Arts and Culture. London: Fabian Society. https://​fabians.org. uk/​publication/​cultured-​communities/​ Florida, R. (2002) The Rise of the Creative Class. New York: Basic Books. Gross, J. and Wilson, N. (2018) ‘Cultural democracy: an ecological and capabilities approach’. International Journal of Cultural Policy, 26(3): 328–​43, DOI: 10.1080/​10286632.2018.1538363 Landry, C. (2008) The Creative City: A Toolkit for Urban Innovators (2nd edition). Oxford: Earthscan. McCann, E.J. (2007) ‘Inequality and politics in the creative city-​ region: questions of livability and state strategy’. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 31(1): 188–​96.

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McLean, H.E. (2014) ‘Cracks in the creative city: the contradictions of community arts practice’. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 38(6): 2156–​73. McRobbie, A. (2016) Be Creative: Making a Living in the New Culture Industries. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Novy, J. and Colomb, C. (2013) ‘Struggling for the right to the (creative) city in Berlin and Hamburg: new urban social movements, new “spaces of hope”?’. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 37(5): 1816–​38. Pratt, A.C. (2011) ‘The cultural contradictions of the creative city’. City, Culture and Society, 2(3): 123–​30. Scharff, C. (2016) ‘The psychic life of neoliberalism: mapping the contours of entrepreneurial subjectivity’. Theory, Culture and Society, 33(6): 107–​22. Sen, A. (1999) Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tronto, J. (2013) Caring Democracy: Markets, Equality and Justice. New York: New York University Press. Wilson, N., Gross, J., Dent, T., Conor, B., Comunian, R., Jacobi, S. and Burlina, C. (2020) Re-​Thinking Inclusive and Sustainable Growth for the Creative Economy: A Literature Review. Turku, Finland: DISCE Publications, https://​disce.eu/​wp-​content/​ uploads/​2020/​01/​DISCE-​Report-​D5.2.pdf

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Urban Regional Planning under the Pandemic: The Case of Oslo Lars Böcker, Per Gunnar Røe, and Elling Oftedal

Introduction COVID-​19 presents our most serious global health threat in over a century. Unprecedented mobility restrictions have become a foremost means around the world to suppress COVID-​19 mortality and relieve health care demand. Even though the pandemic is a global phenomenon, the economic, health and social implications of the virus are highly differentiated geographically and societally. This is due to the location of outbreaks and transnational mobility, but also to countries’, places’, and people’s coping capabilities and societal capacities to deal with the pandemic. There has been a strong focus on the differences between countries, with travel bans, disruptions affecting supply chains, transportation, and the functioning of international trade and tourism, as well as on changes in the attractiveness of cities and hinterlands, fueled for instance by the temporary exodus of residents from high-​rent places like New York City (Ruiz, 2020). In contrast, differences in COVID-​19 vulnerability within cities have received much less attention. This is remarkable given that urbanization, income, health, and mobility inequalities, digital

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divides and the uneven access to reliable information flows have produced parallel vulnerabilities within cities, which are now intersecting with and amplifying the impacts of COVID-​19. As such, the pandemic itself, the confinement interventions, and their joint societal impacts intersect strongly with urban, regional, and transport planning: that is, the location and form of housing, workplaces, services, and amenities, as well as the social and physical infrastructures that have determining effects on people’s everyday life. In this chapter we explore the intraurban geographies of epidemic vulnerability in the Norwegian capital Oslo, and investigate how these intersect with urban form, public transport habits, and pre-​existing inequalities in socio-​economic status, health background, and the housing situation. Drawing on this knowledge, we provide a discussion on the epidemic vulnerabilities and accessibility inequalities as well as the sustainability and health benefits of the dominant planning paradigms in this region, which, as in many other urban regions (most notably in Europe) concentrate on densification and transit-​ oriented nodal development. By doing so we aim to provide recommendations to integrate health and epidemic resilience into sustainable and socially inclusive city-​regions. Our discussions are based on descriptive geographic explorations of existing data on the spread of COVID-​19 cases, population density, income, education, the distribution of leave-​related social benefits, and travel surveys, as well as document analyses of current policies and plans for the spatial development of a growing city (Ursin et al, 2020). (Chapter Twenty also discusses the disproportional vulnerability to the pandemic and its consequences of non-​central medium density sectors.) The (intraurban) geographies of the pandemic and related inequalities Confinement has led to a dramatic reshuffling of the organizational (that is, regulations, opening hours), capability (that is,

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one’s biological ability to participate in activities) and coupling constraints (that is, the necessity to meet others to partake in activities) that limit and condition the participation in activities and travel (Hägerstrand, 1970). Confinement also generates fear and stress, and affects overall well-​being. Restrictions of everyday travel may impact on well-​being and mental health as they limit many activities, but also because of experiences of fear (for example of infection, of economic uncertainty). All of this happens in conjunction with the (dis)trust (for example in others’ sanitary and social distancing discipline, or in the information on risks one receives) related to travelling in the context of COVID-​19. The closure of kindergartens and schools, with severe implications for families lasted for a short period (they closed on March 12, 2020 and started reopening on April 20, 2020). Many workplaces and businesses either closed or introduced working from home for their employees, and this situation had only partly changed in September 2020. Especially in the lockdown period, housing (that is, size, layout, and the presence of private outdoor spaces) and local amenities (access to services, shops, parks, and so on) became particularly important, as adults and children spent a lot time at home. As a result of this enhanced prominence of the immediate residential environment, the built environment, land use, and infrastructure become even more important than in the past in framing everyday activities. Over the last decades, population density, land and building use diversity, fine-​g rained street designs, public transport access, and the proximity to city centers, jobs and services at the place of residence have been found to contribute to the use of public transport, non-​ motorized modes and the reduction of car dependency and overall travel. The popularity of these objectives explains the broad adoption of the compact city-​planning model (also in Oslo, Næss et al, 2011). Observers have argued that the COVID-​19 pandemic may signal the end of the compact city (Tavernise and Mervosh, 2020), but the relationship between density and the spread of virus is complex. Compact built

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environments may heighten epidemic exposures due to the catalytic effect of density on potential transmitters and the challenges of keeping distance, but may also provide close access to facilities and services required to sit out the epidemic with only a limited need for physical travel. Urban sprawl, the opposite of compact city development, is in the long run a problematic strategy because it creates car dependency and possible sedentary lifestyles with severe health implications, and it reduces resilience regarding future reductions in energy supply and policies for decarbonization. The dissolution of dense cities would have severe social implications, because only the economic and cultural elites would have the opportunity to relocate (or have multiple homes) and still keep their jobs. The role of factors such as socio-​economic, cultural, and health backgrounds of inhabitants, including housing size and access to amenities and services, highly affects coping capabilities and risk factors. The case of Oslo Oslo is the capital and the largest city of Norway. While nearly 700,000 people live within the City of Oslo (as at January 2020), the continuous built-​up area covering several suburban municipalities has a population of approximately one million inhabitants. The state policy for urban sustainability is based on the compact city model and a poly-​nuclear approach. This includes plans for the transformation of the suburban landscape of Greater Oslo (Luccarelli and Røe, 2012). The main approach is to densify the central and transit-​oriented parts of the city-​region and its suburban regional towns to create a network of interconnected compact and multi-​functional centers (mini-​cities) that are highly accessible by public transport. Jenks et al (2000) claim that a compact city with a functional mix will be sustainable, liveable and socially diverse. However, an increasing number of observers argue that the compact city strategy, within a neoliberal planning regime, reproduces or

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creates social inequalities (Fainstein, 2010; Tonkiss, 2013), for example in access to housing, public transport, and high-​ quality public spaces. The attractive and liveable city, created in accordance with Florida’s (2005) theories about the urban creative class, is not accessible to all. This is because of rising housing prices in the central city (lacking inclusive housing policies), a public transport system organized to serve the urban cores (where massive investments, smart innovations, and high frequencies create spaces of hyper-​connectivity), and because high-​quality amenities and spaces are increasingly concentrated in the urban core, in some cases not accessible as true public spaces (because of privatization and surveillance). This is the case for Oslo, where inequalities are defined by an east-​west divide. Oslo has had historically a relatively clear divide between western districts housing the middle and upper classes, and the eastern districts traditionally dominated by the working class, inhabitants with lower socio-​economic status, and in recent decades also immigrants and minority ethnic (Ljunggren et al, 2017). One notable exception is the district of Nordstrand, which has been a middle-​class stronghold in the east. Gentrification in parts of the inner east and eastern inner suburbs (see Huse, 2014) has weakened the east-​west divide and contributed to a centrality tendency, similar to that found in other European cities experiencing rising housing prices in their central parts. These social geographies of the city seemed to impact infection rates in the early stages of COVID-​19. Exploring intraurban COVID-​19 impacts and potential explanatory factors across the Oslo region Different city districts encounter diverse infection rate trajectories. While initial infection rates appeared to correlate with higher socio-​economic status (related to international transmissions, because of residents’ high travel mobility), infection rates seemed to pick up more rapidly in lower

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socio-​economic status neighborhoods at later stages (related to local transmissions). Thus, the cumulative infection rate in each city district paints a diverse picture, when presented on a map (see Figure 18.1). The infection rate is high in the inner and outer east parts of the city of Oslo (especially Gamle Oslo, Alna, Stovner, Grorud, and Søndre Nordstrand), and low in the western districts (especially Vestre Aker, Nordre Aker, St. Hanshaugen, Sagene) and Nordstrand (the mentioned anomaly). The physically dense former working-​class districts of Sagene and Grünerløkka, which have been gentrified over the last decades, post low rates compared to the rest of the eastern districts. In Figure 18.1 we have included maps presenting data about socio-​economic factors. There seems to be a strong negative correlation of area average income with rates of COVID-​19 cases, which is not surprising. Low-​income areas have higher infection rates. The same correlation can be seen for the other factors representing social status we have mapped. The districts with a high percentage of the population with higher education have low infection rates, including the gentrified district of Sagene. These correlations may reflect lower awareness of sanitary practices, language barriers, and insufficient public outreach about COVID-​19, as well as higher shares of jobs that require physical presence, as compared to the higher educated whose typical office jobs are more easily done from home offices with advanced digital equipment (in many cases provided by or paid for by the employer). The percentage of residents receiving social aid (because of health conditions, sick leave, support for single-​headed families, unemployment benefits, and so on) seems to correlate strongly with the rate of COVID-​19 cases. Reception of these benefits also relates to pre-​existing inequalities in physical and mental health, enhancing vulnerability to COVID-​19. Our maps in Figure 18.1 indicate that public transport share may not have a negative effect on COVID-​19 infection

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Figure 18.1: Map of COVID-​19 cases per 10,000 inhabitants (September 8, 2020) in different urban districts in Oslo (top left), and maps indicating social status (top right and middle), public transport use (bottom left), and population density (bottom right)

Sources: all maps drawn by authors and based on register data for 2018; ‘Statusrapport COVID-​19’ and ‘Statistikkbanken’, Oslo Municipality; with the exception of public transport data (bottom left) from 2013, National Travel Survey

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rates. The district of Alna at the high end of infection rates has for example low public transport rates, while Sagene has a high public transport dependency, but a low infection rate. So the argument that public transport dependency in neighborhoods generates COVID-​19 vulnerability may be a myth. The same can be said about population density. There is no apparent correlation between high population density and infection rates. The inner city and dense neighborhoods of St.Hanshaugen, Sagene, and Grünerløkka have all relatively low infection rates. However, population density does not necessarily reflect crowding. Brattbakk (2020) has published a recent study of the housing situation in Oslo, focusing on ‘overcrowding’ (defined as homes with fewer living and sleeping rooms than persons), for families under lockdown in a socially diverse suburban district in Oslo (based on an online survey with 602 respondents). Bad housing conditions and overcrowding, more prevalent among low-​income families, may affect the possibility for rest and privacy and induce stress. Brattbakk found that families in overcrowded homes encountered challenging living conditions. Compared to other households, these families experienced severe restrictions with respect to digital meetings and internet access, children’s activity, access to transport, and social isolation. They suffered increased family stress due to crowding and worries over economic concerns. Comparing the overcrowding data (from Brattbakk’s study) with population density data and infection rates reveals that the district Alna with high infection rates and relatively low population densities registers a high percentage of families in overcrowded homes. It seems that the overall population density is not the critical factor, but the density in homes is, which again correlates with income and education. In sum, the conditions related to social inequality seem to be decisive, more so than the compactness of the city as built form.

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Implications for urban and regional planning In the data presented, we do not find support for the argument that the compact city model should be replaced in the face of the present and possible future pandemics. In the same vein, we do not observe a better adaptation of car-​based strategies and urban sprawl to conditions required to contain contagion. Moving to low-​density areas, which will raise physical mobility and reliance on digital communication, is not a realistic option for a large share of the population and would cause transportation problems at the scale of the urban region. Our finding is that vulnerability towards COVID-​19 seems to be more related to underlying socio-​economic inequalities than to density and public transport usage. All of this has important implications for regional, urban land use, housing, and transport planning. We do not support calls to abandon transit-​oriented and densification policies. We rather argue for policies and plans aiming at mitigating social and geographic inequalities in socio-​economic status, and the often attendant socio-​economic segregation, which may contribute to high infection rates in specific parts of the city. Municipal master and zoning plans are key tools to foster equitable urban development. These plans regulate how much housing can be built and where, how residential development can align with schools, jobs, and amenities. Master and zoning plans can also set building height, outdoor space, and apartment size requirements. These plans can thus affect neighborhood quality, housing price, segregation, and welfare inequalities. Knowing this, planning authorities should, when operating within the planning process and negotiating with private developers and builders, aim at ensuring safe, healthy, and inclusive neighborhoods, assuring the consideration of access to and quality of the ‘social infrastructure’ of the city, including schools, parks, kindergarten, playgrounds, streets, health care (Klinenberg, 2017).

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Many of these factors have important implications for social distancing capabilities and vulnerability to the pandemic. However, we do not know how the numerous private and public actors involved in complex planning processes (characteristic of current entrepreneurial and network-​based urban planning) relate to these vulnerabilities. Pandemic vulnerability represents a complex problem that needs to be dealt with alongside numerous other issues arising in the planning processes. The possibility of future pandemics will confront planning authorities, political decision makers, developers, and other actors to the implications of epidemic resilience alongside housing needs, neighborhood change, residential segregation, welfare inequalities, and sustainable mobility. An important challenge is how to address epidemic resilience, in tandem with the affordability of housing, residential segregation, welfare inequalities, and sustainable mobility. There may be a need for developing new land use planning instruments or improving existing ones. References Brattbakk, I. (2020) ‘Trangboddhet og barnefamiliers hverdagsliv i koronaens tid’. Tidsskrift for boligforskning, 3(1): 7–​31. Fainstein, S. (2010) The Just City. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. Florida, R. (2005) Cities and the Creative Class. New York: Routledge. Hägerstrand, T. (1970) ‘What about people in regional science?’ Regional Science Association, 24(1): 6–​21. Huse T. (2014) Everyday Life in the Gentrifying City: On Displacement, Ethnic Privileging and the Right to Stay Put. Farnham: Ashgate. Jenks, M., Burton, E. and Williams, K. (eds) (2000) The Compact City: A Sustainable Urban Form? London: E & FN Spon. Klinenberg, E. (2017) Palaces for the People: How to Build a More Equal and United Society. New York: Penguin. Ljunggren, J. (ed) (2017) Oslo –​ulikhetenes by. Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk.

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Luccarelli, M. and Røe, P.G. (2012) ‘Introduction: nature, urbanism and liveability’, in M. Luccarelli and P.G. Røe (eds) Green Oslo: Visions, Planning and Discourse. Farnham: Ashgate, pp 1–​24. Næss, P., Næss, T. and Strand, A. (2011) ‘Oslo’s farewell to urban sprawl’. European Planning Studies, 19(1): 113–​39. Ruiz, M. (2020) ‘A tale of two New Yorkers: those who left during the pandemic, and those who stayed’. Vanity Fair, June 17, www.vanityfair.com/​style/​2020/​06/​new-​yorkers-​ who-​left-​and-​stayed-​during-​the-​pandemic Tavernise, S. and Mervosh, M. (2020) ‘America’s biggest cities were already losing their allure. What happens next?’ The New York Times, April 23. Tonkiss, F. (2013) Cities by Design: The Social Life of Urban Form. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Ursin, G., Skjesol, I. and Tritter, J. (2020) ‘The COVID-​19 pandemic in Norway: the dominance of social implications in framing the policy response’. Health, Policy and Technology, 9(4): 663–​72.

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Distributing, De-​Synchronizing, Digitalizing: Dealing with Milan Transport Inequalities in Post-​ COVID-​19 Society Paola Pucci, Giovanni Lanza, and Bruna Vendemmia

Introduction The COVID-​19 pandemic has impacted how we perceive and shape our living environment (Klaus, 2020; Shenker, 2020), questioning economic and social inequalities in cities. As the pandemic spread, reflections proposed in the international debate have suggested three possible effects for the future of cities. The first –​paraphrasing the title of an article by Arundhati Roy, ‘the pandemic is a portal between one world and the next’ (Roy, 2020) –​interprets the pandemic as an opportunity for rethinking the urban condition, spatial dimensions, and the forms of conviviality, shedding new light on the social divide. In this perspective, the measures ensuring social distancing tested during the emergency and then in the post-​lockdown can be thought of as policies to promote a lasting urban turn. The outcome could be a city that is environmentally sustainable,

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de-​carbonized, and more socially just in terms of the distribution of services. The second perspective considers the pandemic as an accelerator for innovative projects that could be tested, thus taking advantage of the COVID-​19 constraints. Some ‘temporary’ emergency measures implemented to deal with social distancing may become permanent policies to improve urban quality from an environmental and equity point of view. The third interprets the pandemic as a lesson for addressing future disruptive changes, refining our predictive tools for governing interrelated and complex processes under emergency conditions. The changing conditions impose a reframing of the urban scenarios and their evaluation on a different time horizon that calls into question longer-​term planning policy. The chapter describes three approaches driving a Milan plan adopted in April 2020 to deal with the pandemic (Chapter Twenty also addresses adaptation to the pandemic in Milan). One involves a ‘distribution’ of public space so as to reduce the presence of the car and encourage other uses of road and parking space. The second approach consists in ‘de-​ synchronizing’ activities so as to avoid rush hour crowding. Finally, a ‘digitalizing’ strategy aims at improving access to electronic means of communication. The chapter demonstrates that the plan echoed the orientation of an earlier pre-​pandemic document. In this sense, the pandemic is perceived as an accelerator that propelled the implementation of measures that would have otherwise taken much longer to see the day. Milan 2020 document: tactical strategies to deal with COVID-​19 The City of Milan published in April ‘Milano 2020. Strategia di Adattamento’ (AS),1 suggesting target scenarios and necessary conditions for the recovery and the reactivation of the city in the coming phases of COVID-​19. The proposed vision concerns the affirmation of a ‘new ordinary’ in urban lifestyle

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and rhythms in response to the limits induced by the pandemic, through a radical rethinking of the city’s times, spaces, and supply, ensuring access to the primary services and workplaces. Urban mobility and accessibility consequently become a central issue, defining future scenarios of coexistence with the virus. Three main goals to deal with the pandemic’s impact on mobility and accessibility emerge and are summarized as the ‘3Ds’: the Distributing, Desynchronizing, Digitalizing of Milan. Distributing reflects on reorganizing public spaces and transport, promoting active mobility, and proposing a change of scale in urban density inspired by the ‘accessibility by proximity’ concept. ‘Social distancing’, including contact bans, has become the key means of slowing the spread of the disease, putting the quality of current urban life into question and challenging densification objectives by suggesting measures of spatial dispersion. Following this constraint, the measures proposed in Milan 2020 deal with a reprioritization of city street spaces, favoring active mobility such as walking and cycling, a sharing of mobility services, and a decentralization of activities. New bike lanes (35 km projected), in place of parking, are changing the perception of public spaces, along with the reallocation of spaces from cars to pedestrians, through a tactical urbanism project (‘Strade aperte’) (see Chapters Four and Fourteen). Simultaneously, measures have been introduced to implement accessibility by proximity on a district scale. Following the idea that ‘on the whole, density is a good thing’ (Sennett, in Shenker, 2020), these measures may create the conditions for a more inclusive city, supporting the spread and redistribution of urban services at a neighborhood scale, based on the socio-​demographic profiles of the inhabitants and their needs, ultimately establishing a different relationship between attractiveness and density. De-​synchronizing involves measures aimed at reorganizing the times of the city, by promoting flexible schedules, coordinating the opening/​closing times of urban activities, and

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redistributing traffic flows over the day, in order to improve the efficiency of transport networks. Rethinking times and schedules of the city, distributing mobility demand, and avoiding crowds through applications of queue management and heat mapping tools are relevant goals for changing urban rhythms. As learned by the experience of Piano degli Orari,2 remodeling urban rhythms is a complex task, led by the municipality, that requires integrated measures and a shared process among stakeholders. In order to support this process, a partnership between Comune di Milano and Politecnico di Milano has defined the conditions for a desynchronization policy, involving municipal offices, some large firms, high schools, and universities to ensure a safe reopening by reducing commuter crowds on the public transport system. These conditions, which require negotiation processes between the various stakeholders, find a fertile field of experimentation in Milan, based on previous experiences of “lavoro agile” and coordination among local universities. Last, digitalizing refers to measures that support digital technologies to reduce journeys by increasing virtual mobility. These measures promote smart working/​learning, e-​commerce, and delivery services. Consistent with the 2016 Plan for digital transformation, these measures pose relevant challenges in terms of fair access to digital devices. The pandemic highlighted the strong imbalances in the access to digital networks which, in the case of Milan, refer largely to low levels of digital literacy among some groups. Looking only at the distribution of users of on-​demand delivery services during the lockdown, we see a map of inequality similar to the socio-​economic geography of the city, although the shops offering on-​demand delivery during the lockdown3 are quite evenly distributed in the city. The offer of digital networks and digital info-​mobility platforms is insufficient on its own to assure access to these delivery systems because digital literacy and the availability of digital devices are also needed.

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In addition to its proposals, the Milan 2020 AS promotes a participatory process and provides both a short-​term tactical dimension and a strategic longer-​term time perspective. If the tactical dimension emerges in the policies that were implemented, the document defines strategic guidelines, mainly concerning the transport system’s organization, the design of public spaces, and the distribution and functioning of urban activities. In this sense, the document is the first step of a process in which citizens are directly involved in the definition of the interventions to be implemented to deal with the COVID-​19 crisis. Citizens’ engagement is achieved through an online portal created for this purpose. Milan 2020 AS aims to create a participatory planning process whereby the tactical actions it proposes are in line with the objectives of the statutory pre-​pandemic plan. Two main coexistent perspectives for a more inclusive city Analyzing policy measures in Milan, we identify two main concurrent perspectives: the implementation of time-​effective and low-​cost ‘tactical’ measures acting as experiments (Nevens et al, 2013; Roorda et al, 2014) and the adoption of a ‘post-​car city’ strategic perspective that may change the understanding of the concept of Milan as a ‘more inclusive city’ by introducing accessibility by proximity measures. The pandemic has both revealed and exacerbated some of the city’s critical issues already known to planners and policy makers. The present goal can be to create a portal to a more inclusive city. The implementation of this goal can thus be perceived as an extraordinary challenge testing the resilience and flexibility of city government when planning for the future, a window of opportunity to be seized to accelerate an already shared vision for the future of Milan. This vision has been described in the Milan PGT Documento di Piano,4 a strategic plan defining the urban planning policy for

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Milan 2030 and approved a few weeks before the lockdown. Even though Milan 2020 and Milan 2030 were produced by the same government and adopted two months apart (Milan 2030 before Milan 2020), they base their assumptions on different circumstances. The PGT (the Milan 2030 strategic plan) was drawn up before the pandemic in a particularly successful period for Milan in which, in addition to showing significant demographic, economic, and urban growth compared to the rest of the country, the city had consolidated itself as Italy’s foremost representative in the network of global cities thanks to its ability to attract people and generate innovation. The prevailing narrative in the PGT presents Milan as a hub linking the Lombardy region, Italy, and the world, as a multicentric city, made up of significant poles of attraction and sectors of excellence, ensuring dynamism, concentrations of available opportunities, and the ability to adapt to change. By Italian planning norms, the PGT is flexible, promoting temporary reuse, densification in public transport accessibility nodes, different forms of mobility, and mixed-​use. At the same time, the plan recognizes urban issues, such as the negative effects of agglomeration, the economic and social gap between the center and peripheries, differences in accessibility levels, and the unequal provision of public services. For this reason, one of the main objectives of the PGT is to promote a more inclusive city that can reap the benefits of the global network in which it is embedded and redistribute them more evenly among city districts. Therefore, a more local vision is also promoted (which sees the 88 neighborhoods, NIL_​Nuclei di Identità Locale, as the geographical and cultural contexts for the organization), as is the regeneration of public spaces and services capable of guaranteeing an inclusive local life, in a logic of proximity. Likewise, the plan highlights participation in the formulation of its objectives and the provision of local services. We can, therefore, observe a degree of continuity between the contents of Milan 2020 AS and the PGT 2030. Similarities comprise socially inclusive mobility, welfare, housing policy,

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as well as innovative planning tools and participative measures, in line with international experiences (Barcelona, Paris, New York). These proposals strengthen the city’s image as a laboratory of global relevance for urban experimentation and innovation (Laker, 2020). Meanwhile, there are differences between the two plans’ narrative of the city and its future. In Milan 2020 AS, the role of the city as a regional and global attractor seems to lose importance relative to a focus on the local scale, where the operational solutions (the 3Ds) work to guarantee material and immaterial access to urban opportunities for citizens in the COVID-​19 era. Accordingly, while Milan 2020 AS strengthens the guidelines of the PGT by promoting visions and concrete actions inspired by the same values, as regards implementation, the Milan 2020 AS is more radical, leveraging the temporary nature of solutions, which could become permanent if their effectiveness is proven. In this sense, the concept of accessibility by proximity and the goal of a post-​car city, which is a general PGT long-​term guideline, are now translated into policies to be implemented immediately. Thus Milan 2020 AS becomes an operational compendium of the 2030 plan, enhancing its purpose. Conclusion Milan’s experience shows that the city is pursuing an ambitious and challenging path of innovation and renewal. Actions inspired by the 3Ds have addressed the problems generated by the pandemic causing proposals that had been in the books to be implemented earlier than otherwise. COVID-​19, in this sense, has acted as an accelerator for the experimentation of innovative solutions, legitimizing the use of a bolder approach to urban policy making. In doing so, Milan 2020 AS is promoting a more radical change in the lifestyle of residents, focusing on the local dimension, but also experimenting with innovative solutions at different scales with the potential of

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creating value and providing worldwide visibility to Milan. If this change of direction proves to be durable, COVID-​19 will have effectively represented a portal to a new, more inclusive, and sustainable idea of the city. Notes 1

2

3 4

Milano 2020. Strategia di adattamento. Documento aperto al contributo della ittà. www.comune.milano.it/ ​ d ocuments/ ​ 2 0126/ ​ 9 92518/​ S trade+ A p e r t e _ ​ I T _ ​ 2 0 0 4 3 0 _ ​ rev. p d f / ​ a 1 0 0 d 0 4 c - ​ 6 b 5 5 - ​ a e 7 4 - ​ e 0 f 8 -​ b52563e07822?t=1589460655416. The city of Milan developed in 2013 a time plan –​piano degli orari –​activating a municipal control room and a technical committee to manage urban rhythms. The plan focused on two strategic actions: ‘progetto scuola’ and ‘lavoro agile’. Among the main outcomes of the plan: the implementation of a national law and the organization of the city smart working week every year, since 2014. https://g​ eoportale.comune.milano.it/​portal/​apps/​webappviewer/i​ ndex. html?id=8331c92136d2417eb20e9916d0d36664 Comune di Milano (2020). PGT Milano 2030, Documento di Piano, Relazione generale. www.comune.milano.it/​aree-​tematiche/​urbanistica-​ ed-​edilizia/​pgt-​approvato-​e-​vigente-​milano-​2030#navpageinside.

References Klaus, I. (2020) ‘Pandemics are also an urban planning problem’. Bloomberg City Lab, March 6, www.bloomberg.com/​news/​articles/​ 2020-​03-​06/​how-​the-​coronavirus-​could-​change-​city-​planning Laker, L. (2020) ‘Milan announces ambitious scheme to reduce car use after lockdown’. The Guardian, April 2 1 , w w w. t h e g u a r d i a n . c o m / ​ wo r l d / ​ 2 0 2 0 / ​ a p r / ​ 2 1 /​ milan-​seeks-​to-​prevent-​post-​crisis-​return-​of-​traffic-​pollution Nevens, F., Frantzeskaki, N., Gorissen, L. and Loorbach, D. (2013) ‘Urban transition labs: co-​creating transformative action for sustainable cities’. Journal of Cleaner Production, 50: 111–​22. Roorda, C., Wittmayer, J., Henneman, P., van Steenbergen, F., Frantzeskaki, N. and Loorbach, D. (2014) Transition management in the urban context: guidance manual. Rotterdam: DRIFT, Erasmus University Rotterdam.

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Roy, A. (2020) ‘The pandemic is a portal’. Financial Times, April 3, www.ft.com/​content/​10d8f5e8-​74eb-​11ea-​95fe-​fcd274e920ca Shenker, J. (2020) ‘Cities after coronavirus: how COVID-​19 could radically alter urban life’. The Guardian, March 26, www.theguardian.com/ ​ world/ ​ 2 020/ ​ m ar/ ​ 2 6/ ​ l ife- ​ a fter​coronavirus-​pandemic-​change-​world

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The View from the Socio-​Spatial Peripheries: Milan, Italy and Toronto, Canada Lorenzo De Vidovich, Julian Iacobelli, Samantha Biglieri, and Roger Keil

Introduction At first, the virus causing COVID-​19 spread from Wuhan in much the same way as its predecessor, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), did in 2003: through the network of global industrial and financial centers that define the structure of the world economy. But the trajectory of COVID-​19 turned out to be more complex: the new virus proliferates nearly everywhere, including in urban peripheries that have characterized recent urbanization trends. The environments of COVID-​19 transmission in the global urban peripheries coalesce into multifaceted and complex geographies characterized by health care system (in)equality, lack of infrastructures, overcrowding, low-​wage labor, racism, vulnerability of age/​living in an institution, and so on. While posing a major challenge to public health systems around the world, the pandemic has thrown the contemporary challenges

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for the responses to outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases into sharper view, especially with reference to the accelerated extension of urban processes and forms into regions that had previously not been urbanized. But twelve months into the pandemic, as it has now rolled over most settled regions around the world, places in the global urban world and the spaces between them have generated complex, and often contradictory, outbreak and reopening narratives. Urbanists have weighed residential density, degrees of informality, transportation modes, housing form, availability of park space, and a host of other factors in determining patterns in the proliferation of COVID-​19. Social scientists have pointed to race, class, age, disability, and gender as important determinants. Students of public policy and institutions have pointed to insufficiencies in public health pandemic preparedness and catastrophic negligence in long-​term care homes. Labor researchers have highlighted the lack of state regulation and oversight at precarious workplaces such as meatpacking plants, in the agricultural sector, and in long-​term care homes. How those factors add up across cities and urban networks specifically will be important to understand as this pandemic continues and as the urban world prepares to face the next, possibly still unknown, contagion that will pose a systemic threat. Put simply, the health crisis due to the COVID-​19 pandemic is highly associated with processes of urbanization and globalization but in nonlinear and unpredictable ways. We follow the virus to the Italian metropolis of Milan and the Canadian urban region of Toronto. Milan was the European epicenter of the first wave, next to the Spanish capital of Madrid. The Toronto region, previously hit by the SARS outbreak of 2003, was one of the worst affected areas in Canada. But differences and inequities across space, society, and institutional fabric were significant in the two regions. We will focus here on the notion of socio-​spatial peripheries to cast a light on the effects of the virus. Milan and Toronto –​both complex and diverse urban regions of massive

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post-​suburbanization –​saw higher numbers of COVID-​19 cases in their socio-​spatial peripheries, which create openings for infection as well as the interstices in which ‘urban life will be remade’ (Simone, 2020). The socio-​spatial periphery When speaking of the socio-​spatial periphery, we have in mind both the socio-​economic marginalization of particular groups in societies (that are becoming increasingly neoliberal) and the geographical outskirts of cities. Institutional peripheries (precarious workplaces, care facilities, prisons, and so on) overlap with both dimensions of the socio-​spatial periphery. In urban studies and planning, it has long been assumed that with increasing urbanization, first considered a driver of infectious disease occurrence, cities became largely immune to contagion thanks to increased public health and hygiene measures and the availability of hard and soft infrastructures. While such an assumption may be true to some extent in the industrialized countries of the Global North, the rapid spread of urbanization in less developed countries in the Global South has recently led to recurring doubts about this developmental path. The question of whether urbanity, density, and related aspects of modern life inhibit or enable the spread of disease has been at the center of recent urbanism and planning debates. Unsurprisingly, the COVID-​19 outbreak has led to renewed conversations around the relationships of urban form and life with emerging infectious disease. Hamidi et al (2020) find in their US-​based study that low-​ density areas are more likely to post higher mortality rates from COVID-​19. They postulate that this might be due to more health care services in denser communities as well as the presence of people who are more likely to follow physical distancing protocols. Further, they infer that after borders were closed and lockdowns were enacted in the first wave of the pandemic, the most significant predictor of COVID-​19 mortality

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was connectivity within megaregions. While density played a pivotal role in the spread of COVID-​19 in the Netherlands, and both specific demographic and geographical factors were associated with the pandemic (Boterman, 2020), so-​called ‘forgotten densities’, that is, the kinds of densities that are experiencing increased vulnerabilities to COVID-​19 due to overcrowding and perilous living conditions, have borne the brunt of the disease’s impact (Pitter, 2020). In the same vein, we argue that the virus concentrates in the periphery of the city and of society, and that this particular social geography of contagion presents fundamental challenges for the landscape of care in the peripheries of urban society, space, and institutions. Recasting our view from privileged forms of dense urbanity, often in the gentrified central city, to the forgotten densities of the periphery is a deliberate methodological move that has consequences for the analysis of the present pandemic, the pathway of reopening and ultimately the initiation of pandemic preparedness planning for the next pandemic event. On the one hand, we experience active debates among urbanists and urban planners about the new uses of public spaces during lockdown and after reopening. Much of the focus of these discussions is on the reduction of space for cars in favor of restaurant patio space and cycling infrastructure with a particular eye towards the more visible, socio-​spatially privileged spaces that tend to stand in for the entire image of ‘the city’. On the other hand, the suburban constellations ringing the core or splattered across the extended forms of urbanization common to regions like Milan and Toronto, seem to be hidden from view, although they present significant insight about emerging socio-​spatial inequalities. Echoing and expanding Boterman (2020), we stress that the social and spatial peripheries of urban society are massively affected by the latest COVID-​19 pandemic, prime among them are the forgotten densities and uneven landscapes of housing, care, and work.

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COVID-​19 in the socio-​spatial periphery of Toronto What defines and characterizes the periphery is different in various places. Here we highlight the specific challenges faced by the socio-​spatial peripheries in the Toronto region during the 2020 pandemic. As is well documented, the COVID-​19 crisis has disproportionately impacted racialized communities across the world prompting widespread calls for more robust data collection reflecting such differentiation to better inform response and prevention strategies. In Ontario, the provincial government was slow to react to calls to collect socio-​ demographic (race-​based) data across the province and in the Toronto region. Early in the province’s pandemic response, Ontario’s Chief Medical Officer of Health effectively dismissed calls to collect race-​based data (Mulligan et al, 2020). Without any leadership from the Province, local public health units including Toronto and Peel Region began collecting their own race-​and income-​based data only to reveal stark disparities (Peel Region, 2020; Toronto Public Health, 2020a). After intense pressure from community advocates, politicians, and public health experts, the Province finally mandated the collection of race-​based data in June 2020, late into the pandemic response (Ministry of Health, 2020). In Toronto, dramatically higher infection rates were reported in the inner suburbs where racialized, poorer, and otherwise marginalized populations are concentrated (Toronto Public Health, 2020b). However, innovative solutions that explicitly target the peripheries of cities and help prevent the spread of COVID-​19 are only being proposed by local public health units and, during reopening, local school boards that have attempted to offset inequalities in resources in most affected areas through counteracting measures. For example, Toronto Public Health took proactive steps to establish quarantine/​isolation centers for individuals who are unable to safely and effectively isolate at home and improve access to testing in vulnerable communities

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that show a high incidence of COVID-​19 via mobile testing units (Toronto Public Health, 2020b). Significant histories of disinvestment, privatization, aging infrastructures, and unfavorable working conditions in long-​term care centers led to 82 percent of COVID-​19 deaths in the country being in these settings (MacCharles, 2020). As the curve began to flatten in the summer of 2020, Ontario jurisdictions attempted to re-​open gradually by ensuring that people and businesses can maintain physical distance without risking a future outbreak, bringing into focus the connection between spatial planning policies and public health. Many municipalities are approaching re-​opening by introducing popular urbanism measures such as quiet streets that limit vehicle traffic, road closures that provide room for cyclists and pedestrians, and new bike lanes along major arterials to provide alternatives to transit systems whose ridership has suffered due to fear of infection. For instance, the City of Toronto implemented its CaféTO program, which helps expand private outdoor patio spaces onto sidewalks and roads to support local businesses deeply impacted by lockdown measures. However, these types of interventions are concentrated in the central city and have been implemented without the typical community engagement requirements via special council meetings or emergency powers. While the recognition of the need of the socio-​spatial periphery has begun in Toronto, inequalities in the reach of pandemic measures have persisted –​for instance a ‘post-​pandemic recovery’ that focused on the city’s prime central spaces. In contrast, the worst-​hit areas in the periphery are left out, facing issues like crowded bus routes where level of service has not been augmented to make distancing possible (Bowden and Cain, 2020). COVID-​19 in the socio-​spatial periphery of Milan Few cases in Europe are comparable with the COVID-​19 contagion in Northern Italy and, especially, the Lombardy region

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during the first wave of the pandemic. The first European outbreaks of COVID-​19 were identified in Codogno, approximately 50 kilometers south of Milan, and Vò Euganeo, in late February 2020. A few days later, COVID-​19 affected Bergamo and its surroundings, about 40 kilometers to the north-​west of Milan. Delays in recognizing COVID-​19 in the few infected patients admitted to the small hospital in Alzano Lombardo (a peripheral suburban area northwest of Bergamo) –​and delays in activating protection measures –​allowed the virus to spread rapidly within the city of Bergamo (Fagiuoli et. al, 2020). Thus, the outbreak had a ‘suburban origin’, and spread across one of the most economically productive Italian regions, leading to a humanitarian crisis that crippled the otherwise robust regional health system of Lombardy (Nacoti et al, 2020). Furthermore, there was a sharp urban-​suburban divide in the nature of post-​lockdown recovery strategies evidenced by how institutional reactions to the impact of COVID-​19 were targeted (De Vidovich, 2021). The restarting of the Milan and Bergamo economy dominated local post-​COVID-​19 agendas, whereas the more peripheral areas at the edges of Milan (such as Codogno) and Bergamo were largely neglected by these economic strategies. The Ministerial enactment of a post-​COVID-​19 ‘mobility bonus’ to support sustainable mobility led to a rapid recasting of some car-​dominated arteries in Milan through the development of new bike lanes (see Chapter Nineteen). But such trajectories are limited to the central city, as the program Strade Aperte (‘Open Streets’) is targeted on areas within the municipal boundaries of Milan, and envisions ‘15-​minute neighborhoods’ shaped by new pedestrian areas and bike lanes, the reuse of public spaces by the patios of cafés, and accessible leisure services. Strade Aperte is mostly limited to two central areas of the city, with only a few small projects targeted at the suburban peripheries most hit by COVID-​19. During the national ‘Phase 2’ of the pandemic, Milan and Bergamo designed their own ‘Adaptation Strategies’ towards a resilient recovery that

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corresponds to the traditional understanding of the sustainable city model, while manifesting a certain ‘openness’ to civic engagement. Meanwhile, the Regional Authority formulated general guidelines for the reopening of activities (for example manufacturing, services, leisure) without specific territorial distinctions or specifications. Although peripheral towns have been the first experiencing COVID-​19 outbreaks, resilience and adaptation strategies are focused on an ‘urban recovery’ that does not include these areas. From an institutional and governmental viewpoint, no local or municipal involvement in the urban adaptation strategies to the pandemic has been identified in Codogno, or Alzano Lombardo and Nembro (both located in the north-​western periphery of Bergamo, most dramatically hit by COVID-​19). A missing link in this scenario is related to the regional entity. According to Fagiuoli et al (2020), one of the two key lessons emerging from the Province of Bergamo is that a decisive region-​wide lockdown should have been implemented early on to contain the epidemic, as this step could have flattened the number of COVID-​1 9 cases, preventing hospitals reaching overcapacity. Conclusion: Critiquing hegemonic planning through a focus on care Since the beginning of the pandemic, and into the gradual reopening of cities, there have been movements worldwide to promote ‘urbanism’ ideals, like the Canada 2020 Declaration, Milan’s Strategia di Adattamento, and the notion of the 15-​ minute city. However well-​intentioned, these ideas are ill-​ equipped to handle the challenges of the pandemic. Further, they neglect serious inequalities in social and spatial peripheries (see Chapter Eighteen). Speaking about COVID-​19 as a disease of urbanization rather than of cities redirects attention from the city center to the periphery, the region where this disease has been most active, finding its victims among the

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most vulnerable, the institutionalized, the marginalized, the forgotten. We find that COVID-​19 brought into full relief the necessity to redirect urban health governance institutions and regional planning priorities in ways that help the world recover from a disease of urbanization in general, not just of the city. The persistent and problematic orientation towards socio-​spatial centers, which has characterized pandemic preparedness and response during COVID-​19, will only serve to deepen inequalities. We offer an alternative –​studying the pandemic through the lens of care, which asks multi-​scalar questions to understand the complexity of the extended urban region and encourages governments and researchers to focus on the experiences of people living in the socio-​spatial periphery (Biglieri, De Vidovich and Keil, 2020). References Biglieri, S., De Vidovich, L., and Keil, R. (2020) ‘City as the core of contagion? Repositioning COVID-​19 at the social and spatial periphery of urban society’. Cities & Health, 1–3​ . https://d​ oi.org/​ 10.1080/​23748834.2020.1788320 Boterman, W.R. (2020) ‘Urban-​rural polarisation in times of the corona outbreak? The early demographic and geographic patterns of the SARS-​CoV-​2 epidemic in the Netherlands’. Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, 111: 513–​29. Bowden, O. and Cain, P. (2020) Black neighbourhoods in Toronto are hit hardest by COVID-​19 –​and it’s “anchored in racism”: experts’. Global News, June 2, https://​globalnews.ca/​news/​7015522/​ black-​neighbourhoods-​toronto-​coronavirus-​racism/​ De Vidovich, L. (2021) ‘Which agenda for the Italian suburbs? Debating a marginal condition in few steps’, in C. Bevilaqua, F. Calabrò and L. Della Spina (eds) New Metropolitan Perspectives, NMP 2020 –​SIST 178: 135–​46. Cham: Springer Nature. https://​ doi.org/​10.1007/​978-​3-​030-​48279-​4_​13

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Fagiuoli, S., Lorini, F.L. and Remuzzi, G. (2020) ‘Adaptations and lessons in the province of Bergamo’. New England Journal of Medicine, 382(21): e71, https://​doi.org/​10.1056/​NEJMc2011599 Hamidi, S., Sabouri, S. and Ewing, R. (2020) ‘Does density aggravate the COVID-​19 pandemic?’ Journal of the American Planning Association, https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​01944363.2020.1777891 MacCharles, T. (2020) ‘82% of Canada’s COVID-​19 deaths have been in long-​term care, new data reveals’. Toronto Star, May 7, www.thestar.com/​politics/​federal/​2020/​05/​07/​82-​of-​canadas-​ covid-​19-​deaths-​have-​been-​in-​long-​term-​care.html Ministry of Health (2020) Ontario expanding data collection to help stop spread of COVID-​19. Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario. www.ontario.ca/​ p age/​ c opyright-​ i nformation- ​ c - ​ q ueens-​ printer- ​ o ntario?_ ​ g a=2.106949057.378620366.159838073 4-​1102103808.1590104091 Mulligan, K., Rayner, J. and Nnorom, O. (2020) ‘Race-​based health data urgently needed during the coronavirus pandemic’. The Conversation, May 1, https://​theconversation.com/​race-​based-​ health-d​ ata-u ​ rgently-n ​ eeded-d​ uring-t​ he-c​ oronavirus-p​ andemic-​ 136822 Nacoti, M. et al (2020) ‘At the epicenter of the Covid-​19 pandemic and humanitarian crises in Italy: changing perspectives on preparation and mitigation’. Catalyst, New England Journal of Medicine, non-​issue content, 1(2). https://​catalyst.nejm.org/​doi/​ full/​10.1056/​CAT.20.0080 Peel Region (2020) COVID-​19 and the social determinants of health: race and occupation. Brampton, Ont.: Peel Region, August 7, www. peelregion.ca/​ c oronavirus/​ _ ​ m edia/​ C OVID-​ 1 9- ​ r ace- ​ a nd-​ occupation.pdf Pitter, J. (2020) ‘Urban density: confronting the distance between desire and dispar ity’. Azure Magazine, Apr il 17, www. azuremagazine.com/​article/​urban-​density-​confronting-​the-​ distance-​between-​desire-​and-​disparity/​ Simone, A. (2020) ‘Imagining collectives: a missive on the massive’. Discover Society, June 3, https://​discoversociety.org/​2020/​06/​03/​ imagining-​collectives-​a-​missive-​on-​the-​massive/​

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Toronto Public Health (2020a) COVID-​19 and the social determinants of health: What do we know? Toronto: City of Toronto, www.toronto. ca/​wp-​content/​uploads/​2020/​06/​9872-​SDOHandCOVID19_​ Summary_​2020June8.pdf Toronto Public Health (2020b) Toronto Public Health’s response to COVID-​19: Context, status update, and next steps. Toronto: City of Toronto, June 19, www.toronto.ca/​legdocs/​mmis/​2020/​hl/​ bgrd/​backgroundfile-​148074.pdf

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Conclusion: The Pandemic and Beyond Pierre Filion, Rianne van Melik, and Brian Doucet

The chapters of this volume explored the impacts of the pandemic from three perspectives: their contribution to changes in the way cities operate and in social inequality, and the policy responses the pandemic has prompted. Most contributions to the volume offered snapshots of situations prevailing at a specific time and place in the protracted worldwide COVID-​19 pandemic. These snapshots exposed similarities and differences in ways the pandemic intersects with most aspects of urban life and challenges the capacity of institutions. This was also the case of the comparative chapters (Three, Fourteen, Fifteen, Sixteen, and Twenty), which identified parallels and divergences between responses to the pandemic adopted in different cities. The volume was about the COVID-​19 pandemic, the reactions it triggered, and the consequences of both the pandemic and of these responses. The chapters did not benefit from much hindsight, written as they were in the heat of the pandemic, though importantly, after the initial shock of the first months had already passed. They chronicled the pandemic, responses, and consequences

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in different locales as they manifested themselves in the winter, spring, and summer 2020, without knowledge of the ensuing evolution of the pandemic and relying on the information on COVID-​19 that was available at the time. In this sense, the chapters were nearly written in real time, as the events they narrated were unfolding. Although the volume does not claim to provide a systematic overview of how the pandemic affected cities over this period, its different chapters did portray the urban impact of COVID-​19 in different parts of the world and identified major themes related to COVID-​19, its social consequences and urban policy and planning responses to the pandemic. The chapters provided an account of the decision-​making of individuals, civil society organizations, and public institutions in the time of the COVID-​19 pandemic. But they were written in the same climate of uncertainty about the future of the pandemic and limited COVID-​19 knowledge that confronted decision makers. The chapters focused on immediate issues arising from the pandemic without the benefit of a perspective on its future dynamics and the full ramifications of COVID-​19, echoing the environment in which decision-​ making was taking place at the time. In this sense, the content of the volume is largely about the need to respond to problems as they arise, even when uncertainty is high, when knowledge is limited, and there is awareness of the inevitable wanting nature of responses. Sitting it out until conditions became favorable to successful interventions was not an option. The chapters documented how institutional structures struggled to deal with the pandemic. In this matter, as Brail et al indicated in Chapter Fourteen, the level of economic development of a country and the sophistication of its institutions do not predict success in dealing with the pandemic and its consequences. One of the findings that came out of this volume is that the robustness of institutional systems does not necessarily assure the capacity to mitigate the pandemic. Mitigation effects of social cohesion can outweigh those of powerful and resource-​r ich

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institutions. This was something evident in many chapters in the other three volumes. Other themes run through the chapters. One has to do with how the pandemic modifies urban dynamics, causing transformations in movement and thus accessibility, along with changes in the activities in which people take part. A consequence of these changes is a reordering in the attractiveness and value of different urban sectors, as documented by Shearmur, Parra-​Lokhorst, and Wycliffe-​Jones in Chapter Two, due to the present tendency to work from home. In other instances, time-​specific activities are affected, such as nightlife (Chapter Five by Garcia-​Ruiz et al). In Chapter Twenty, De Vidovich et al pointed to a double spatial inequality. While the peripheral realm of the Milan and Toronto regions was worst afflicted by the pandemic during its first wave, most of the policies to adapt the city to pandemic living conditions, such as the reallocation of road space to active forms of transportation, took place in the central city rather than in peripheral municipalities. In a similar vein, in Chapter Four, Mayers demonstrated that gentrifying neighborhoods were more likely to be recipients of new cycling infrastructure during the pandemic, while other areas where dependence on cycling is higher tended to be overlooked. Another prominent theme in this volume and throughout our series concerns the numerous intersections between the pandemic and social inequalities, especially those in existence before the pandemic. Most affected by the economic sequels of the pandemic are informal workers, especially those without access to income support programs (see also Volumes 1 and 2). Informal workers may not qualify for these programs or live in countries where governments are unwilling to set up, or unable to finance, such programs. Chapters Eight, by Stephan, Schmidt, and Kioko, and Nine, by Munas, Ranawaka, and Smith, demonstrated the plight of such workers in Kenya and Sri Lanka, respectively. Also prominent among victims of the pandemic are platform workers (Chapter Three by Mezzadra, Frapporti, and Pirone) and small businesses (Chapter Six by

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Danenberg). The pandemic can be seen as a factor in continued economic polarization, as large corporations that are able to operate in ways that minimize inter-​personal contact and take advantage of massive economies of scale absorb the markets of ailing small businesses and of informal workers. This is notably the case of delivery services and big box stores. The elderly figure prominently among the social groups disproportionally affected by the pandemic. Not only are they by far the most common victims of COVID-​19 in terms of mortality, but their attempts to shield themselves from contagion isolate them from society (Chapter Ten, by Hartt et al). Reactions to the pandemic represent another theme raised by the chapters. These reactions take place at different levels: the individual level as in the case of survival strategies; the collective level consisting of self-​help, charity, and other forms of civil society organizations (Chapters Eleven by Sayın and Şahin and Twelve by González-​Muzzio, Sandoval, and Castro); and the state level as in the case of government policies and programs (Chapter Thirteen by Cadena-​Gaitán, Álvarez-​ Vanegas, and Flórez-​Muñoz). Many chapters discussing the plight of victims of the pandemic also chronicled efforts to address the consequences of the pandemic. These chapters did not paint victims as passively accepting their plight. Some victims must be responsive because their very subsistence is at stake. Chapters Eight and Nine portrayed the survival strategies of unemployed informal workers while Chapter Twelve described self-​help efforts organized in Chile to distribute aid among victims of the pandemic. Chapter Eleven followed a similar trajectory. In its case, however, support strategies relied not only on self-​help but also on charity and the involvement of public sector institutions. In its consideration of efforts to provide support to the elderly in order to overcome loneliness, Chapter Ten focused on the creative approaches adopted by a mutual-​support organization. The forms of government reactions discussed in the volume included, as expected, the imposition and lifting of lockdowns

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and other restrictive measures. These reactions were primarily discussed from the perspective of the social inequality of their impact. But the main object of inquiry in chapters dealing with state responses was transportation. The volume considered the plight of public transit, disproportionally affected by lockdowns, the pandemic-​induced reorganization of daily activities, and concern about the possibility of on-​board contagion. In Chapters Fifteen and Sixteen, Stark et al and Finbom et al concentrated on the perception of public transit during the pandemic, reduction in usage, and transit policy responses. In some cases, the strategy was to improve sanitation while maintaining service levels; meanwhile, in other instances services were adjusted to downward changes in patronage. Chapters Four and Thirteen, as well as Chapter Nineteen, by Pucci, Lanza, and Vendemmia, were about the adaptation of road space to active transportation, in part to accommodate people who prefer walking and cycling during the pandemic rather than relying on public transit. These adaptations also purport to offer former public transit passengers an alternative to the car. The attention the volume gave to transportation reflects the centrality of transportation-​related issues during the pandemic, with likely ongoing consequences for the post-​ COVID-​19 period. For many, the need to travel has changed as have attitudes towards being with strangers in closed-​in environments, all of this with disproportional consequences for public transit. These considerations intersect with those of some of the chapters contained in Volume 3. Finally, Chapters Seventeen and Eighteen, respectively written by Gross, Dent, and Comunian, and Böcker, Røe, and Oftedal, addressed how two predominant urban planning models are challenged by conditions created by the pandemic. One of these models is the compact public transit-​oriented metropolis. Early in the pandemic, there was a perceived connection between contagion and density. While the subsequent evolution of the pandemic has exposed the vulnerability of all areas irrespective of their density, there has been

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an observed tendency for some people to leave dense cities for suburban and rural areas. Chapter Eighteen attributed uneven contagion to socio-​economic inequality rather than urban form and transportation factors, thus arguing for the compact city model even in the context of the pandemic. The pandemic has been more of a blow to another popular planning model, that of the creative city. Chapter Seventeen showed the extent to which the UK artistic community has been devastated by COVID-​19 despite the existence of some support programs, thus endangering not only the cultural sector but also urban revitalization strategies based on culture. The material introduced by most chapters was about reactions to immediate circumstances, not long-​term plans for the future. One exception to the rule was Chapter Nineteen, which showed how the City of Milan took advantage of the pandemic to implement measures that had been in the books for a time and that may become permanent. If the pandemic turns out to be a historical juncture leading to profound and lasting shifts in urban policy and planning, it will likely not be because of a planned long-​term strategy but the result of the cumulative impact of the pandemic, the damage it will have inflicted, and the change in attitudes it will have caused. It will also be a function of the aggregate effect of the manifold reactions to immediate circumstances arising from the pandemic. We end by reconnecting to the theme of uncertainty raised in the introduction and echoed throughout the chapters. Uncertainty about the future of the pandemic and the nature and behavior of the virus indeed looms over the entire volume. So does the still unknown way the pandemic will end –​rapidly thanks to the rapid effect of vaccination or slowly due to a slow deployment of vaccines or a lesser than expected capacity on their part to tackle the virus. Responses to the pandemic occurring at the individual, collective, and state level bear the mark of this uncertainty. We can envision different post-​pandemic futures. First, there could be a return to normal

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without many long-​term traces of the pandemic. Second, we can envision a dystopic post-​COVID-​19 future where after a long-​lasting struggle with the virus, concerns linger about the possibility of subsequent pandemics. Such concerns would have inhibiting effects on many economic sectors. To make things worse, the intervention capacity of governments would be crippled by the large debt accumulated during the protracted pandemic, while at the same time, the pre-​existing and amplified social, spatial, and racial inequalities remain, or even grow larger. And lastly, there is the optimistic, utopian, scenario. As mentioned in Chapter Seven, by Golubchikov and DeVerteuil, resilience does not necessarily mean a return to a pre-​existing equilibrium but can rather usher in conditions that improve on the equilibrium. This better end state could be an amalgamation of rays of hope present in different chapters, notably including a redefinition of urban form and dynamics, for example with more space devoted to active transportation and other outdoor public uses, reliance on self-​help organizations and enhanced public sector institutional flexibility, and capacity to deal with future crises. If these kinds of futures are to be achieved, critical urban scholarship will be essential. Listening to and engaging with the research, analyses, and reflections of scholars, as well as the voices of lived experiences that are featured within these four volumes, is a necessary first step. The chapters in this series expose injustices, offer critical insights, and elevate voices that are rarely central to conversations about how we make and shape cities. If cities are going to progress towards achieving social justice and equity in the pandemic and post-​pandemic period, such perspectives will play a central role.

229

Index References to endnotes show both the page number and the note number (for example, 231n3). Bologna, Italy  29, 30 border closures  150 Bosman, J.  2 Boterman, W.R.  214 bottom-​up resilience  72, 73–​5 Brattbakk, I.  196 Bratton, B.H.  27 Brazil  4 Brenner, N.  31 Bright, R.  5 broadband  23 Brundtland Report  135 Brussels, Belgium  172, 175, 176 Building Back Better (BBB) 76n1 Burns, V.F.  106 buses  165, 216

A Aalborg, Denmark  145–​57 adaptive capacity  73 Africa  3 Agenda 2030  135 aging in place  104, 106 Airbnb  25, 28–​9 Alwan, N.A.  5 Amazon  26 Anderson, C.  60 Ankara, Turkey  111–​19 anti-​lockdown strategies  59–​68 apps  25–​33, 84 Arts Council England  181, 183 arts funding  181, 182–​3 austerity  72, 74, 182 Australia  145–​57

C CafeTO program  216 Calgary, Canada  101–​9 Canada  15–​24, 36–​43, 71, 101–​9, 145–​57, 175, 212, 214–​16 capability approach  185 capitalism  26–​8 see also neoliberalism car use  152–​3, 165, 176, 192, 202, 205, 214, 216, 225 care homes  212, 216 caring  184, 218–​19 cash-​flow problems  94 Castillo-​Palacio, M.  133

B Bailey, D.  146, 153 Banjamin, H.M.  3 Banks, M.  181 Barcelona, Spain  29, 30, 207 Bauer, L.  6 Belgium  170, 172, 175 Benjamin, N.  92 Berkowitz, R.L.  153, 154 Berlin, Germany  28–​9, 161–​3, 164, 166, 172, 175 Biglieri, S.  219 Birkmann, J.  166 blended communities  101–​9

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Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)  170 Centre for Poverty Analysis  92, 93, 99n1 CEPAL (Comisión Económica para América Latina y El Caribe)  125 Çerkezoğlu, A.  114 Chatterton, P.  180 Chicchi, F.  28 children  87 Chile  121–​31 Citizens’ Assembly of Ankara (CAA)  116, 117–​18 civil society organizations  160, 226 collective actions  63, 125, 128–​9, 226 Colombia  133–​41 Colombo, Sri Lanka  145–​57 community  community kitchens  125–​8 community-​building  53–​4, 61, 76, 107 virtual villages  106 compact city planning model 191–​2, 197, 227–​8 Cooper, B.  183 co-​presence  84 Copsey, J.  37 Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (UK)  29 corruption  85 Covid-​denial  4 Crary, J.  27 creative city  179–​89, 228 creative justice  180–​3, 184–​5 Cretney, R.  70, 74 critical urban geography  82 cultural ecosystems  184–​5 curfews  113, 154 cycling  bike lanes/​cycling infrastructure  35–​45, 134–​9, 152, 161–​3, 166, 176, 203, 216–​17, 225 cyclable neighborhoods  154, 155

increase in  37 pop-​ups  160, 161 redistribution of space  203, 227

D Danenberg, R.  63 data/​big data  27, 31 Dávila, J.D.  133 Davoudi, S.  74 Deas, I.  152, 155 debt  6, 83–​5, 229 decision-​making  36, 38, 40–​3, 185, 205 Declaration of the State of Emergency, Portugal  49 Deliveroo  25, 30 democracy  28, 31 Deng, Z.  15 Denmark  145–​57 densification  192, 197, 203, 206 density  63–​4, 190, 191–​2, 196, 214, 227–​8 Derickson, K.  72 de-​synchronizing activities  202, 203–​4 Developing Inclusive and Sustainable Creative Economies (DISCE)  183–​4 development cost levies  38 DeVerteuil, G.  72, 75 digital labor  27, 31 digitalization strategies  202, 204 disabilities, people with  42, 212 disaster capitalism  121–​31 disaster resilience  74–​5 displacement  52 domestic violence  86–​7 domestic workers  84–​5, 96 Dy, A.  92 dystopian imagery  229

E ecological concerns  135, 184, 192 economic consequences  debt  6, 83–​5, 229 Kenya  81–​90

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nightlife industry  47–​57 pre-​existing economic conditions  3, 4–​5 small businesses  59–​68 Turkey  112 unemployment  55, 91, 113, 115, 123 see also socioeconomic disadvantage education  117 elderly people  see older people emergency orders  162 entertainment venues  50–​1 entrepreneurialism  31, 92–​6, 180, 181, 198 environment  135, 192, 201–​2 equity  localism  155 and planning  145 and transport  136 and working from home  23 Erdbrink, T.  60 essential workers  29, 175, 176 Estonia  170, 174 ethnicity  63, 71, 154, 193 ethnographic research  82

Füller, H.  53 furlough  50 future-​proofing  76

G GDP (Gross Domestic Product)  60, 122, 180, 183, 185 gender  cultural and creative sectors  181–​2 cycling  138–​9 Kenya  85–​9 proliferation of COVID-​19  212 and transport  36, 41, 43 gentrification  180, 193, 194, 214, 225 Germany  159–​67, 169, 172, 175 Giordano, E.  48 Global South  133, 145–​57, 213 see also Chile; Colombia; Kenya globalization  212 Golubchikov, O.  72 González-​Muzzio, C.  125, 128 Goodman, P.  60 governance  new ontology of justice  75–​6 nightlife industry  53–​4, 55 pandemic resilience  159–​60 platform labor  27, 31 transferable lessons  146, 155–​6 vertical  129 government financial support  Ankara, Turkey  113–​14, 115 Chile  128 cultural and creative sectors  181, 183 development cost levies  38 Kenya  85 ‘mobility bonus’ Milan  217 platform labor  29 public transport  174–​5 small businesses  65–​6 Sri Lanka  96, 98 transferable lessons  152 Graham, C.L.  105, 108 Granovetter, M.  22

F Fabian Society  182 Fagiuoli, S.  218 families  85–​9 fast-​tracking  162 fear of contagion  191 feminist citizenship  86 15-​minute city  217 financial crisis 2007–​08  26, 70 ‘flatten the curve’  2 flexible working  18–​19 Florida, R.  193 Folke, C.  73 food distribution  26, 31, 85, 95, 114, 118, 125–​7 forgotten densities  214 Foucault, M.  27 Franz, T.  133 frontline workers  4

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green public space  197 Grieco, M.  170 Gross, J.  185 Gunderson, L.H.  159

hygiene protocols  30, 51, 53–​4, 169, 172–​3

I iftar  117 indigenous peoples  126 inequality  compact city planning model  192–​3 and the creative city  179–​80, 181 development cost levies  38 digital access  204 health inequalities  3–​4 income inequality  3 in infection rates  3–​4 intraurban inequalities  189–​99 versus the lens of care  219 and the lived politics of resilience  69–​78 pre-​existing  6, 70, 153, 182–​3, 194, 225 public transport  169–​78 racialized groups  71 small businesses  67 social inequalities  3–​5 structural inequality  70, 97, 122–​5 sustainable development  135 transferable lessons  146–​51, 154–​5 transport  36, 38 urban justice  135–​6 working patterns, changing  64 informal sectors  and income support patterns  4, 225 loans  84 lockdown impact  71 new jobs in  84–​5 nightlife industry  51–​2 and public open space  94–​5 Sri Lanka  91–​9 transferable lessons  153 interest rates  26 intergenerational justice  135

H hairdressers/​barbers  64–​5, 66 Hall, S.M.  74, 82 Hall, T.  31 Hamidi, S.  213 hand sanitizing  30 Hartog, F.  5 Harvey, D.  31, 135 Haughton, G.  154–​5 health  health inequalities  71 loneliness  102–​3 mental health  191, 194 underlying risk factors  123 workers’  21, 22 health care facilities  2, 213 Helpling  25, 29–​30 herd immunity  5 Hertel, S.  35 historic urban areas  47, 49, 52–​3 Hoffmann, M.L.  36 Holling, C.S.  159 home-​based working  15–​24, 36, 66–​7, 95, 164, 174, 194, 225 homeless people  153 Horizon 2020  25–​33, 183 ‘households’  86 housing  and the ability to work from home  18, 22 compact city planning model  193 homeless people  153 landlord-​tenant relations  83–​4, 89 overcrowding  196 and social justice  155 and transport  39–​40 Hubbard, P.  31 Human Development Index  148 ‘hustling’  84

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intergovernmental relations  111–​19 International Labour Organization (ILO)  91 internet  103–​4, 196, 204 intimate household relations  85–​9 intraurban inequalities  189–​99 Italy  201–​9, 212, 214, 216–​18, 228

local area, being restricted to 62–​4, 66 local government  112, 114, 129, 152, 165 localism  155 lockdowns  3, 6 Chile  123 inequality  70 Kenya  83 and nightlife  47, 51 Oslo, Norway  191, 196 and platform labor  28–​9 and public transport  169–​78 Sri Lanka  92, 96–​7 Sweden  59–​68 transferable lessons  146–​51, 154 Turkey  111, 113 London, UK  29, 30 loneliness  101–​9, 226 Low, S.  61 low-​income groups  Ankara, Turkey  116–​17 Colombia  139 cycling  35–​6, 37 healthcare  4 and public transport  152 resilience  71 Sri Lanka  91–​9 transport  42 see also socioeconomic disadvantage low-​skill work  63 Lundborg, B  63

J Jayawarna, D.  92 Jenks, M.  192 job losses  19, 83, 113, 116, 123 Jon, I.  74, 75

K Keil, R.  35 Kenya  81–​90 Kessler, S.  176 Kim, S.  21 kindness  111–​19 kinship groups  86 Klinenberg, E.  104, 197 Kopfmüller, J.  133

L labor rights  92 landlord-​tenant relations  83–​4, 89 Laursen, S.  154 layoff bans  113 Lefebvre, H.  74, 135–​6 Legeby, A.  63 Leipzig, Germany  163 Levine, S.  4 Levitin, D.  102, 104 licensing rules  50 life expectancy  122–​3 Lifvendahl, T.  60, 65 Lisbon, Portugal  29, 30, 47–​57, 175 literacy  95 Liu, A.  7 lived politics of resilience  69–​78 loans  84, 89

M MacKinnon, D.  72 Malet Calvo, D.  48 Manderson, L.  4 marginalized groups  213, 215, 219 masks  Ankara, Turkey  114, 116 Chile  125 Kenya  83, 84, 85 nightlife industry  51 platform labor  29, 30

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on public transport  165, 172 Sri Lanka  94 Massey, D.  82, 89 master plans  197 Mayers, R.  36 McLaren, J.  4 Medellín, Colombia  133 Meerow, S.  70, 74 megaregions  214 Mehta, V.  61, 67 Melbourne, Australia  145–​57 mental health  191, 194 metropolitan government  112, 114 Mezzadra, S.  27 middle-​classes  41–​2, 84–​5, 125, 139, 193 migration  28, 63 Milan, Italy  201–​9, 212, 214, 216–​18, 228 mobile money transfers  88 mobility justice  169–​78 Montreal, Canada  17, 175 Muinde, J.V.S.  86 multicentric cities  206 Multidimensional Life Quality Index  134 multi-​generational households  4 music venues  50–​1, 116 mutual aid  112, 115, 117, 125–​6, 226

non-​action responses  163 Norway  189–​99 Noy, C.  36 Nunes, C.  48 nursing homes  4

O Oakridge Seniors Association  104, 105–​8 O’Connor, E.  61 office-​based working  15–​24 Ojala, S.  15, 16 older people  101–​9, 173–​4, 226 ollas comunes  125–​6, 127 online shopping  64 online social interactions  103–​4 online solidarity platforms  115–​19 ontology of justice  75–​6 Open Streets  217 open-​air venues  50–​1 opportunism  161, 166, 228 Oslo, Norway  189–​99 outdoor dining  50, 214, 216 overcrowding  3, 63–​4, 172, 196 Oxford University  3

P pandemic resilience  159–​67 Paris, France  29, 30, 207 parks  197 participatory decision-​ making  185, 205 participatory research  107 Patterson, J.  21 pedestrians  203 see also walking performing arts  182 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)  30 platform capitalism  26–​8 platform labor  25–​33, 225 platform urbanism  28 policing  52 pop-​ups  50, 134–​5, 136–​9, 160 Portugal  29, 30, 47–​57, 175

N Nairobi, Kenya  82, 83 Neilson, B.  27 neoliberalism  72, 135–​6, 145, 180, 181, 192–​3 Netherlands  214 ‘new normal’  51, 69, 97, 155 ‘new poor’  91 New York City, US  189, 207 Newell, J.  70, 74 NGOs  53, 112, 118, 126 nightlife industry  47–​57, 225 Nijman, J.  62, 64, 67 Nofre, J.  48, 53

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Portuguese Association of Live Music Venues  51 postcolonialism  86 poverty  see socioeconomic disadvantage precarious employment  70–​1, 153, 181, 212 public spaces  cultural and creative sectors  183 Milan, Italy  202, 203 redistribution  161–​3, 202, 203 restrictions on access to  191 Sri Lanka  94–​5, 97 Stockholm, Sweden  61, 63–​4 public transport  Ankara, Turkey  115 buses  165, 216 centrality of  227 Colombia  133–​41 de-​synchronizing activities  204 fare-​free  175 feelings about  171–​4, 176 Germany  159–​63, 164–​5, 166–​7 inequality  169–​78 and the informal sector  97 Kenya  83 lower-​income groups  36 Oslo, Norway  191, 193–​6 resilience  159–​67 revenues  174–​5 Stockholm, Sweden  63 transferable lessons  152 and working from home  23 Purcell, M.  74, 75 Putri, D.  15, 16 PUTSPACE project  176n1 Pyöriä, P.  15, 16

relational geography  81–​90 remote working  15–​24, 164 rent payments  83–​4 re-​opening  216, 217, 218 reorientation support  65–​6 resilience  lived politics of  69–​78 Milan, Italy  205, 217–​18 nightlife industry  50–​2 Oslo, Norway  190 pandemic resilience  159–​67 small businesses  61 transferable lessons  145, 152–​3, 155, 229 restaurants  50, 66–​7, 214, 216, 217 Rhee, H.  21 ‘right to the city’  135–​6 Roberts, M.  2 Roberts, S.  2 Rothschild, N.  63 Roy, A.  201 rule-​adherence  6 rule-​breaking  51–​2 rural areas  87–​8, 91, 122, 228

S Sandoval, V.  121, 128 Santiago, Chile  121–​31 Sarafa, N.  51 SARS epidemic (2003)  155, 211 school closures  191 Selçuki, C.  114 self-​employment  85 Self-​Employment Income Support Scheme (UK)  29 self-​help/​mutual aid  112, 115, 117, 125–​6, 226 semi-​public spaces  61 Sen, A.  185 Senanayake, S.M.P.  92 Sequera, J.  48 service industry  62, 64, 71 Shaw, R.  53 Shearmur, R.  15, 16 Sheller, M.  170

R race/​racialized groups  4, 36, 71, 153, 154, 182, 212, 215 Randalls, S.  72–​3, 74 ‘rebuild better’  7 Rees, M.  2 regional planning  189–​99, 218 regulation  95, 161, 162, 212

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Shenker, J.  203 shopping  63, 64, 173 short-​time working  113 Simon, S.  72–​3, 74 Simone, Abdou Maliq  81–​2, 86 small businesses  59–​68, 84, 92–​6, 225 Smart, A.  61 smart technology  31, 204 social aid  113–​19 social class  36, 193, 194, 212 social distancing  cultural and creative sectors  182 fear of contagion  191 loneliness  102–​4 nightlife industry  51, 53 personal service industry  64–​5 and public open space  61, 63–​4 on public transport  172, 173, 216, 227 redistribution of space  203 social equity  6–​7 social infrastructure  197 social interactions  cultural and creative sectors  182 loneliness  101–​9 in the office  19–​21 public spaces for  61 social isolation  101–​9, 196, 226 social justice  133–​41, 155 social media  95, 115, 117, 118 social networks  95, 96 social priority indexes  122–​3 socioeconomic disadvantage  Ankara, Turkey  116 Chile  122, 125 Colombia  134, 139 coping capabilities  192 digital access  204 Kenya  83–​5 Oslo, Norway  193–​6 socio-​spatial divides  213–​14 Sri Lanka  91–​9 transferable lessons  153 Turkey  113–​14 socio-​spatial divides  213–​14, 215–​18

Soja, E.  135–​6 spatial justice  135 spatial segretation  62–​3 Sri Lanka  91–​9, 145–​57 Srnieck, N.  26, 31 Stanley Park, Vancouver  37 ‘stay home’ measures  59, 113 Steffensen, T.  154 Stockholm, Sweden  59–​68, 169–​70 street vendors  84, 95 structural inequality  70, 97, 122–​5 Sub-​Saharan Africa  3 suburbs  71, 192, 217, 225, 228 supply chains  170 ‘support local’  59 surveillance capitalism  27 sustainability  134–​5, 139, 161, 190, 198, 218 Sweden  59–​68, 169–​70

T Tallinn, Estonia  30 taxes  65, 113 technology  digital labor  27, 31 entrepreneurialism  95 internet  103–​4, 196, 204 older people  103–​8 platform labor  25–​33 smart technology  31, 204 social aid  115–​19 video-​conferencing  19, 21, 103–​4, 106, 163–​4, 196 virtual villages  105–​8 and the workplace  164 see also home-​based working Thieme, T.  84 third spaces  60, 61 time frames of the pandemic  5–​7 Toronto, Canada  145–​57, 212, 214, 215–​16 Tottmar, M.  63 tourism  26, 31, 48, 52, 174 traffic-​reduction  152 Tronto, J.  184

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Turkey  111–​19, 175 Turkstra, J.  91

welfare systems  29, 97, 113–​15, 122, 194 white middle class dominance  41–​2 WHO (World Health Organization)  92 Widlok, T.  84 Wilson, N.  184, 185 women  as breadwinners  86 cultural and creative sectors  181–​2 cycling  138–​9 and poverty  96 representation  41 transport  41, 43 and working from home  23 working from home  15–​24, 36, 66–​7, 95, 164, 174, 194, 225 working patterns, changing 15–​24, 64, 66–​7, 163–​4 workplace ties  15–​24 World Bank  91, 111–​12 World War II  7

U Uber  25, 27, 29–​30 UK  71, 169, 175, 179–​89, 228 UN Habitat  61 unemployment  55, 91, 113, 115, 123 United Nations  Agenda 2030  135, 139 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction  76n1 urban flight  228 urban justice  134, 135–​6 urban resilience  69–​78 urban rhythms  204 urban sprawl  192 Urry, J.  170 USA  4, 71, 105, 169, 213–​14

V vaccination  3 Vale, L.  75 Vancouver, Canada  36–​43 Varma, R.  86 Vasel, K.  15 video-​conferencing  19, 21, 103–​4, 106, 163–​4, 196 virtual retirement villages  101–​9 volunteers  103, 118, 125, 126

Y young people  informal nightlife  51–​2 representation  41

Z zero contact deliveries  30 zero Covid  5 Ziervogel, G.  75 zoning  197 Zoom  26, 103 Zuboff, S.  27

W walkable neighborhoods  154, 155, 217 walking  63–​4, 134–​5, 203, 227 Wei, Y.D.  62, 64, 67

239

“This collection is jam-packed with useful planning and policy examples of how cities across the globe responded during the early months of the pandemic.” Jill L. Grant, Dalhousie University

Offering crucial insights for reforming cities to be more resilient to future crises, this is an invaluable resource for scholars and policy makers alike.

Brian Doucet is Associate Professor and Canada Research Chair in Urban Change and Social Inclusion at the School of Planning, University of Waterloo. Rianne van Melik is Assistant Professor in Urban Geography at the Institute for Management Research (IMR), Radboud University, Nijmegen.

PIERRE FILION, BRIAN DOUCET, AND RIANNE VAN MELIK

GLOBAL REFLECTIONS ON COVID-19 AND URBAN INEQUALITIES

PIERRE FILION , BRIAN DOUCET, AND RIANNE VAN MELIK

Drawing from case studies across the globe, this book explores how the pandemic and the policies it has prompted have caused changes in the ways cities function. The contributors examine the advancing social inequality brought on by the pandemic and suggest policies intended to contain contagion whilst managing the economy in these circumstances.

Pierre Filion is Professor at the School of Planning, University of Waterloo.

VOLUME 4: POLICY AND PLANNING

Cities play a major role in tackling the COVID-19 pandemic as many measures are adopted at the scale of cities and involve adjustments to the way urban areas operate.

VOLUME 4: POLICY AND PLANNING

ISBN 978-1-5292-1904-3

9 781529 219043

B R I S TO L

@BrisUniPress BristolUniversityPress bristoluniversitypress.co.uk

@policypress

COVID-19 COLLECTION