Volume 18, Tome II: Kierkegaard Secondary Literature (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources) [1 ed.] 9781032097862, 9781472477248, 1032097868

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
List of Contributors
List of Abbreviations
Edgar Leonard Allen, Kierkegaard: His Life and Thought
Albert Anderson, Kierkegaard: A Brief Overview of the Life and Writings of Søren Kierkegaard, 1813–1855
Alison Assiter, Kierkegaard, Metaphysics, and Political Theory: Unfinished Selves
Stephen Backhouse, Kierkegaard’s Critique of Christian Nationalism
John A. Bain, Sören Kierkegaard: His Life and Religious Teaching
Christopher Barnett, Kierkegaard, Pietism and Holiness
Christopher Barnett, From Despair to Faith: The Spirituality of Søren Kierkegaard
Lee C. Barrett, Kierkegaard
Lee C. Barrett, Eros and Self-Emptying: The Intersections of Augustine and Kierkegaard
Gregory R. Beabout, Freedom and Its Misuses: Kierkegaard on Anxiety and Despair
Pat Bigelow, Kierkegaard and the Problem of Writing
Harold Bloom (ed.), Søren Kierkegaard
John D. Caputo, How to Read Kierkegaard
Clare Carlisle, Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Becoming: Movements and Positions
Clare Carlisle, Kierkegaard: A Guide for the Perplexed
Clare Carlisle, Kierkegaard’s ‘Fear and Trembling’: A Reader’s Guide
J. Preston Cole, The Problematic Self in Kierkegaard and Freud
James Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard
Arnold B. Come, Kierkegaard as Humanist: Discovering Myself
Arnold B. Come, Kierkegaard as Theologian: Recovering My Self
George Connell, To Be One Thing: Personal Unity in Kierkegaard’s Thought
George Connell and C. Stephen Evans (eds.), Foundations of Kierkegaard’s Vision of Community: Kierkegaard on Religion, Ethics and Politics
Charles L. Creegan, Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard: Religion, Individuality, and Philosophical Method
Stephen Crites, In the Twilight of Christendom: Hegel vs. Kierkegaard on Faith and History
Thomas Henry Croxall, Kierkegaard Studies, with Special Reference to (a) The Bible (b) Our Own Age
Benjamin Daise, Kierkegaard’s Socratic Art
John Davenport and Anthony Rudd (eds.), Kierkegaard after MacIntyre: Essays on Freedom, Narrative, and Virtue
Bradley R. Dewey, The New Obedience: Kierkegaard on Imitating Christ
Mark Dooley, The Politics of Exodus: Søren Kierkegaard’s Ethics of Responsibility
Elmer H. Duncan, Sören Kierkegaard
Stephen N. Dunning, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Inwardness: A Structural Analysis of the Theory of Stages
Louis Dupré, Kierkegaard as Theologian: The Dialectic of Christian Existence
Vernard Eller, Kierkegaard and Radical Discipleship: A New Perspective
John Elrod, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Works
John W. Elrod, Kierkegaard and Christendom
Steven M. Emmanuel, Kierkegaard and the Concept of Revelation
C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard’s “Fragments” and “Postscript”: The Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus
C. Stephen Evans, Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard’s “Philosophical Fragments”
Peter Fenves, “Chatter”: Language and History in Kierkegaard
Harvie Ferguson, Melancholy and the Critique of Modernity: Søren Kierkegaard’s Religious Psychology
M. Jamie Ferreira, Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith
M. Jamie Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving: A Commentary on Kierkegaard’s “Works of Love”
Mary E. Finn, Writing the Incommensurable: Kierkegaard, Rossetti, and Hopkins
Francis W. Fulford, Sören Aabye Kierkegaard: A Study,
Rick Anthony Furtak, Wisdom in Love: Kierkegaard and the Ancient Quest for Emotional Integrity
Patrick Gardiner, Kierkegaard
David J. Gouwens, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of the Imagination
David J. Gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker
Ronald M. Green, Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt
Ronald Grimsley, Søren Kierkegaard and French Literature: Eight Comparative Studies
Ronald Grimsley, Kierkegaard: A Biographical Introduction
Luis Guerrero Martínez, The Ages of Life: Childhood, Youth and Adulthood
Anoop Gupta, Kierkegaard’s Romantic Legacy: Two Theories of the Self
Amy Laura Hall, Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love
Kenneth Hamilton, The Promise of Kierkegaard
Alastair Hannay, Kierkegaard
Alastair Hannay, Kierkegaard: A Biography
Alastair Hannay, Kierkegaard and Philosophy: Selected Essays
Alastair Hannay and Gordon Marino (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard
Edward Harris, Man’s Ontological Predicament: A Detailed Analysis of Sören Kierkegaard’s Concept of Sin with Special Reference to “The Concept of Dread”
M. Holmes Hartshorne, Kierkegaard, Godly Deceiver: The Nature and Meaning of His Pseudonymous Writings
Hector Hawton, The Feast of Unreason
Paul L. Holmer, The Grammar of Faith
Jacob Howland, Kierkegaard and Socrates: A Study in Philosophy and Faith
Elsebet Jegstrup (ed.), The New Kierkegaard
Howard A. Johnson and Niels Thulstrup (eds.), A Kierkegaard Critique
Ralph H. Johnson, The Concept of Existence in the “Concluding Unscientific Postscript”
David J. Kangas, Kierkegaard’s Instant: On Beginnings
Abrahim H. Khan, “Salighed” as Happiness? Kierkegaard on the Concept “Salighed”
Bruce H. Kirmmse, Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark
Janne Kylliäinen, Living Poetically in the Modern Age: The Situational Aspects of Kierkegaard’s Thought

Citation preview

KierKegaard Secondary Literature tome ii: engLiSh, a–K

Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources Volume 18, Tome II

Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources is a publication of the Søren Kierkegaard research centre

General Editor Jon Stewart Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, University of Copenhagen, Denmark Editorial Board Finn gredaL JenSen KataLin nun peter ŠaJda Advisory Board Lee c. barrett maría J. binetti iStvÁn czaKÓ heiKo SchuLz curtiS L. thompSon

Kierkegaard Secondary Literature tome ii: english, a–K

Edited by Jon Stewart

First published 2016 by Ashgate Publishing Published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 First issued in paperback 2021

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © 2016 Jon Stewart and the contributors Jon Stewart has asserted his right under the copyright, designs and patents act, 1988, to be identified as the editor of this work.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Publisher’s Note The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original copies may be apparent. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data a catalogue record for this book is available from the british Library The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data has been applied for. ISBN 13: 978-1-03-209786-2 (pbk) ISBN 13: 978-1-4724-7724-8 (hbk) cover design by Katalin nun

contents List of Contributors List of Abbreviations

xi xv

edgar Leonard allen, Kierkegaard: His Life and Thought Daniel M. Dion

1

albert anderson, Kierkegaard: A Brief Overview of the Life and Writings of Søren Kierkegaard, 1813–1855 Matthew Brake

5

alison assiter, Kierkegaard, Metaphysics, and Political Theory: Unfinished Selves Robert Wyllie

9

Stephen backhouse, Kierkegaard’s Critique of Christian Nationalism Thomas J. Millay

13

John a. bain, Sören Kierkegaard: His Life and Religious Teaching Daniel M. Dion

17

christopher barnett, Kierkegaard, Pietism and Holiness Jacob Given

21

christopher barnett, From Despair to Faith: The Spirituality of Søren Kierkegaard Jacob Given

25

Lee c. barrett, Kierkegaard Jennifer Potter

29

Lee c. barrett, Eros and Self-Emptying: The Intersections of Augustine and Kierkegaard Helene Russell

33

gregory r. beabout, Freedom and Its Misuses: Kierkegaard on Anxiety and Despair Geoff Dargan

37

vi

Kierkegaard Secondary Literature

pat bigelow, Kierkegaard and the Problem of Writing Michael Strawser

43

harold bloom (ed.), Søren Kierkegaard Andrew M. Kirk

49

John d. caputo, How to Read Kierkegaard Matthew Brake

53

clare carlisle, Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Becoming: Movements and Positions Claudine Davidshofer

57

clare carlisle, Kierkegaard: A Guide for the Perplexed Robert Puchniak

63

clare carlisle, Kierkegaard’s ‘Fear and Trembling’: A Reader’s Guide Michael Misiewicz

69

J. preston cole, The Problematic Self in Kierkegaard and Freud Nathaniel Kramer

73

James collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard Christopher B. Barnett

79

arnold b. come, Kierkegaard as Humanist: Discovering Myself Lee C. Barrett

83

arnold b. come, Kierkegaard as Theologian: Recovering My Self Lee C. Barrett

87

george connell, To Be One Thing: Personal Unity in Kierkegaard’s Thought Gudmundur Bjorn Thorbjornsson

91

george connell and c. Stephen evans (eds.), Foundations of Kierkegaard’s Vision of Community: Kierkegaard on Religion, Ethics and Politics J. Michael Tilley

97

charles L. creegan, Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard: Religion, Individuality, and Philosophical Method Thomas J. Millay

103

Contents

vii

Stephen crites, In the Twilight of Christendom: Hegel vs. Kierkegaard on Faith and History Christian Kettering

109

thomas henry croxall, Kierkegaard Studies, with Special Reference to (a) the Bible (b) Our Own Age Daniel M. Dion

115

benjamin daise, Kierkegaard’s Socratic Art Erik M. Hanson

119

John davenport and anthony rudd (eds.), Kierkegaard after MacIntyre: Essays on Freedom, Narrative, and Virtue Walter Wietzke

125

bradley r. dewey, The New Obedience: Kierkegaard on Imitating Christ Deidre Nicole Green

131

mark dooley, The Politics of Exodus: Søren Kierkegaard’s Ethics of Responsibility Leo Stan

137

elmer h. duncan, Sören Kierkegaard Matthew Brake

145

Stephen n. dunning, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Inwardness: A Structural Analysis of the Theory of Stages Andrew M. Kirk

149

Louis dupré, Kierkegaard as Theologian: The Dialectic of Christian Existence Curtis L. Thompson

153

vernard eller, Kierkegaard and Radical Discipleship: A New Perspective Matthew Brake

159

John elrod, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Works Dean Wm. Lauer

163

John w. elrod, Kierkegaard and Christendom Robert Wyllie

169

Steven m. emmanuel, Kierkegaard and the Concept of Revelation Kyle Roberts

175

viii

Kierkegaard Secondary Literature

c. Stephen evans, Kierkegaard’s “Fragments” and “Postscript”: The Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus Michael D. Stark

181

c. Stephen evans, Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard’s “Philosophical Fragments” Adam Buben

185

peter Fenves, “Chatter”: Language and History in Kierkegaard J.D. Mininger

191

harvie Ferguson, Melancholy and the Critique of Modernity: Søren Kierkegaard’s Religious Psychology Joseph Ballan

197

m. Jamie Ferreira, Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith Lee C. Barrett

203

m. Jamie Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving: A Commentary on Kierkegaard’s “Works of Love” Carl S. Hughes

207

mary e. Finn, Writing the Incommensurable: Kierkegaard, Rossetti, and Hopkins Gene Fendt

213

Francis w. Fulford, Sören Aabye Kierkegaard: A Study, Daniel M. Dion

217

rick anthony Furtak, Wisdom in Love: Kierkegaard and the Ancient Quest for Emotional Integrity Roberto Sirvent

221

patrick gardiner, Kierkegaard Matthew Brake

225

david J. gouwens, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of the Imagination Jennifer Veninga

229

david J. gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker Lee C. Barrett

235

ronald m. green, Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt Roe Fremstedal

239

Contents

ix

ronald grimsley, Søren Kierkegaard and French Literature: Eight Comparative Studies Carl S. Hughes

245

ronald grimsley, Kierkegaard: A Biographical Introduction Matthew Brake

249

Luis guerrero martínez, The Ages of Life: Childhood, Youth and Adulthood Rafael García Pavón

253

anoop gupta, Kierkegaard’s Romantic Legacy: Two Theories of the Self Jesus Luzardo

257

amy Laura hall, Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love Christina M. Danko

263

Kenneth hamilton, The Promise of Kierkegaard Jesus Luzardo

267

alastair hannay, Kierkegaard Thomas J. Millay

273

alastair hannay, Kierkegaard: A Biography Erik M. Hanson

279

alastair hannay, Kierkegaard and Philosophy: Selected Essays Thomas J. Millay

283

alastair hannay and gordon marino (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard Erik M. Hanson

287

edward harris, Man’s Ontological Predicament: A Detailed Analysis of Sören Kierkegaard’s Concept of Sin with Special Reference to “The Concept of Dread” Luke Johnson

293

m. holmes hartshorne, Kierkegaard, Godly Deceiver: The Nature and Meaning of His Pseudonymous Writings Joseph Westfall

297

hector hawton, The Feast of Unreason Curtis L. Thompson

301

x

Kierkegaard Secondary Literature

paul L. holmer, The Grammar of Faith Robert B. Puchniak

307

Jacob howland, Kierkegaard and Socrates: A Study in Philosophy and Faith Matthew Brake

311

elsebet Jegstrup (ed.), The New Kierkegaard Joseph Westfall

315

howard a. Johnson and niels thulstrup (eds.), A Kierkegaard Critique Matthew Brake

321

ralph h. Johnson, The Concept of Existence in the “Concluding Unscientific Postscript” Matthew Brake

325

david J. Kangas, Kierkegaard’s Instant: On Beginnings Leo Stan

329

abrahim h. Khan, “Salighed” as Happiness? Kierkegaard on the Concept “Salighed” Carson Webb

335

bruce h. Kirmmse, Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark Devon C. Wootten

341

Janne Kylliäinen, Living Poetically in the Modern Age: The Situational Aspects of Kierkegaard’s Thought Thomas J. Millay

345

List of contributors Joseph Ballan, institut for engelsk, germansk og romansk, Københavns universitet, njalsgade 130, 2300 copenhagen S, denmark. Christopher B. Barnett, villanova university, department of theology and religious Studies, Saint augustine center 239, 800 Lancaster avenue, villanova, pa 19085, uSa. Lee C. Barrett, Lancaster theological Seminary, 555 w. James St., Lancaster, pa 17603, uSa. Matthew Brake, george mason university, 4400 university dr., Fairfax, va 22030, uSa. Adam Buben, Leiden university college the hague, anna van buerenplein 301, 2595 dg, the hague, the netherlands. Christina M. Danko, department of philosophy, claremont graduate university, claremont, ca 91711, uSa. Geoff Dargan, university of oxford, regent’s park college, oxford, oX1 2Lb, united Kingdom. Claudine Davidshofer, emory university, philosophy department, 516 South Kilgo circle, atlanta, ga 30322, uSa. Daniel M. Dion, rivier university, 420 South main Street, nashua, nh, 030605086 uSa. Gene Fendt, philosophy department, university of nebraska-Kearney, Kearney, ne 68849-1330, uSa. Roe Fremstedal, university of tromsø, department of philosophy, 9037 tromsø, norway. Rafael García Pavón, Facultad de humanidades, universidad anáhuac méxico norte, av. universidad anáhuac no. 46, col. Lomas anahuac, huixquilucan, edo. de méxico, z.p. 52786 mexico.

xii

Kierkegaard Secondary Literature

Jacob Given, department of theology and religious Studies, villanova university, 800 east Lancaster avenue, villanova, pa 19085, uSa. Deidre Nicole Green, c/o Søren Kierkegaard research centre, Farvergade 27 d, 1463 copenhagen K, denmark. Erik M. Hanson, department of philosophy, university of colorado colorado Springs, 1420 austin bluffs parkway, colorado Springs, co 80918, uSa. Carl S. Hughes, texas Lutheran university, 1000 w. court Street, Seguin, tX 78155, uSa. Luke Johnson, university of georgia, philosophy department, 107 peabody hall, athens, ga 30602, uSa. Christian Kettering, Liberty university, college of general Studies, 1971 university blvd., Lynchburg, va 24515, uSa. Andrew M. Kirk, the new School, 66 west 12th Street, new york, ny 10011, uSa. Nathaniel Kramer, brigham young university, department of comparative arts and Letters, 3008 JFSb, provo, ut 84602, uSa. Dean Wm. Lauer, department of philosophy, university of ottawa, ottawa, ontario, K1n 6a1, canada. Jesus Luzardo, Fordham university, philosophy department, collins hall 101, 441 e. Fordham road, bronx, ny 10458, uSa. Thomas J. Millay, duke divinity School, box 90968, durham, nc 27708-0968, uSa. J.D. Mininger, department of Social and political theory, Faculty of political Science and diplomacy, vytautas magnus university, gedimino 44, Kaunas, 44211, Lithuania. Michael Misiewicz, philosophy department, King’s college London, Strand, London wc2r 2LS, united Kingdom. Jennifer Potter, the other church Lancaster, 118 whitney rd, Lancaster, pa 17603, uSa. Robert B. Puchniak, St. paul’s high School, 2200 grant ave, winnipeg, manitoba, r3p 0p8, canada.

List of Contributors

xiii

Kyle A. Roberts, united theological Seminary of the twin cities, 3000 5th St. nw, new brighton, mn 55112, uSa. Helene Russell, christian theological Seminary, 1000 west 42nd Street, indianapolis, in 46202, uSa. Roberto Sirvent, hope international university, 2500 nutwood avenue, Fullerton, ca, 92831, uSa. Leo Stan, department of humanities, york university, 262 vanier college, 4700 Keele St., toronto, on, m3J 1p3, canada. Michael D. Stark, School of theology, colorado christian university, 8787 w. alameda avenue, Lakewood, co 80226, uSa. Michael Strawser, department of philosophy, university of central Florida, orlando, FL 32816-1352, uSa. Curtis L. Thompson, thiel college, 75 college avenue, greenville, pa 16125, uSa. Gudmundur Bjorn Thorbjornsson, vrije universiteit brussel, department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Office 5C446, Pleinlaan 2, 1050 Brussels, Belgium. J. Michael Tilley, act, inc., 500 act dr., iowa city, io 52243-0168, uSa. Jennifer Veninga, St. edward’s university, 3001 South congress avenue, austin, tX 78704, uSa. Carson Webb, department of philosophy and religion, chapman hall 201, university of tulsa, 800 South tucker drive, tulsa, oK 74104, uSa. Joseph Westfall, department of Social Sciences, university of houston-downtown, one main Street, houston, tX 77002, uSa. Walter Wietzke, university of wisconsin, river Falls, 410 S 3rd St, river Falls, wi 54022, uSa. Devon C. Wootten, whitman college, 345 boyer avenue, walla walla, wa 99362, uSa. Robert Wyllie, department of political Science, university of notre dame, 217 o’Shaughnessy hall, notre dame, ia 46556, uSa.

List of abbreviations Danish Abbreviations B&A

Breve og Aktstykker vedrørende Søren Kierkegaard, vols. 1–2, ed. by niels thulstrup, copenhagen: munksgaard 1953–54.

Bl.art.

S. Kierkegaard’s Bladartikler, med Bilag samlede efter Forfatterens Død, udgivne som Supplement til hans øvrige Skrifter, ed. by rasmus nielsen, copenhagen: c.a. reitzel 1857.

EP

Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer, vols. 1–9, ed. by h.p. barfod and hermann gottsched, copenhagen: c.a. reitzel 1869–81.

Pap.

Søren Kierkegaards Papirer, vols. i to Xi–3, ed. by peter andreas heiberg, victor Kuhr and einer torsting, copenhagen: gyldendalske boghandel, nordisk Forlag, 1909–48; second, expanded ed., vols. i to Xi–3, by niels thulstrup, vols. Xii to Xiii supplementary volumes, ed. by niels thulstrup, vols. Xiv to Xvi index by niels Jørgen cappelørn, copenhagen: gyldendal 1968–78.

SKS

Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter, vols. 1–28, vols. K1–K28, ed. by niels Jørgen cappelørn, Joakim garff, Jette Knudsen, Johnny Kondrup, alastair mcKinnon and Finn hauberg mortensen, copenhagen: gads Forlag 1997– 2013.

SV1

Samlede Værker, vols. i–Xiv, ed. by a.b. drachmann, Johan Ludvig heiberg and h.o. Lange, copenhagen: gyldendalske boghandels Forlag 1901–06. English Abbreviations

AN

Armed Neutrality, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1998.

AR

On Authority and Revelation, The Book on Adler, trans. by walter Lowrie, princeton: princeton university press 1955.

ASKB

The Auctioneer’s Sales Record of the Library of Søren Kierkegaard, ed. by h.p. rohde, copenhagen: the royal Library 1967.

xvi

Kierkegaard Secondary Literature

BA

The Book on Adler, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1998.

C

The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1997.

CA

The Concept of Anxiety, trans. by reidar thomte in collaboration with albert b. anderson, princeton: princeton university press 1980.

CD

Christian Discourses, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1997.

CI

The Concept of Irony, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1989.

CIC

The Concept of Irony, trans. with an introduction and notes by Lee m. capel, London: collins 1966.

COR

The Corsair Affair; Articles Related to the Writings, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1982.

CUP1

Concluding Unscientific Postscript, vol. 1, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1982.

CUP2

Concluding Unscientific Postscript, vol. 2, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1982.

CUPH Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. by alastair hannay, cambridge and new york: cambridge university press 2009. EO1

Either/Or, part i, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1987.

EO2

Either/Or, part ii, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1987.

EOP

Either/Or, trans. by alastair hannay, harmondsworth: penguin books 1992.

EPW

Early Polemical Writings, including From the Papers of One Still Living; Articles from Student Days; The Battle Between the Old and the New SoapCellars, trans. by Julia watkin, princeton: princeton university press 1990.

EUD

Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1990.

List of Abbreviations

xvii

FSE

For Self-Examination, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1990.

FT

Fear and Trembling, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1983.

FTP

Fear and Trembling, trans. by alastair hannay, harmondsworth: penguin books 1985.

JC

Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1985.

JFY

Judge for Yourself!, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1990.

JP

Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, vols. 1–6, ed. and trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, assisted by gregor malantschuk (vol. 7, index and composite collation), bloomington and London: indiana university press 1967–78.

KAC

Kierkegaard’s Attack upon “Christendom,” 1854–1855, trans. by walter Lowrie, princeton: princeton university press 1944.

KJN

Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks, vols. 1–11, ed. by niels Jørgen cappelørn, alastair hannay, david Kangas, bruce h. Kirmmse, george pattison, vanessa rumble, and K. brian Söderquist, princeton and oxford: princeton university press 2007ff.

LD

Letters and Documents, trans. by henrik rosenmeier, princeton: princeton university press 1978.

LR

A Literary Review, trans. by alastair hannay, harmondsworth: penguin books 2001.

M

The Moment and Late Writings, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1998.

P

Prefaces / Writing Sampler, trans. by todd w. nichol, princeton: princeton university press 1997.

PC

Practice in Christianity, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1991.

PF

Philosophical Fragments, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1985.

xviii

Kierkegaard Secondary Literature

PJ

Papers and Journals: A Selection, trans. by alastair hannay, harmondsworth: penguin books 1996.

PLR

Prefaces: Light Reading for Certain Classes as the Occasion May Require, trans. by william mcdonald, tallahassee: Florida State university press 1989.

PLS

Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. by david F. Swenson and walter Lowrie, princeton: princeton university press 1941.

PV

The Point of View including On My Work as an Author, The Point of View for My Work as an Author, and Armed Neutrality, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1998.

PVL

The Point of View for My Work as an Author including On My Work as an Author, trans. by walter Lowrie, new york and London: oxford university press 1939.

R

Repetition, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1983.

SBL

Notes of Schelling’s Berlin Lectures, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1989.

SLW

Stages on Life’s Way, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1988.

SUD

The Sickness unto Death, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1980.

SUDP

The Sickness unto Death, trans. by alastair hannay, London and new york: penguin books 1989.

TA

Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and the Present Age. A Literary Review, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1978.

TD

Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1993.

UD

Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1993.

WA

Without Authority including The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air, Two Ethical-Religious Essays, Three Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, An Upbuilding Discourse, Two Discourses at the Communion

List of Abbreviations

xix

on Fridays, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1997. WL

Works of Love, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1995.

WS

Writing Sampler, trans. by todd w. nichol, princeton: princeton university press 1997.

edgar Leonard allen,

Kierkegaard: His Life and Thought, London: Stanley watt 1935, x + 210 pp.

the subtitle of edgar Leonard allen’s work is apt, as he offers a synthetic presentation of Kierkegaard’s life and thought in a way that sees them as completely intertwined. the main methodology of his interpretation is to use the texts at every stage to illuminate the basic biographical dimensions of Søren Kierkegaard’s life. allen uses the published texts as windows into Kierkegaard’s mind. problems confronted in his texts are construed as Kierkegaard’s own personal problems that he was confronting in his own life and spirit. Allen’s text lacks a specified thesis at the beginning, instead setting the tone of the work by identifying a two-fold dynamic that persisted, as he interprets it, throughout Kierkegaard’s life and corpus: the melancholy bestowed upon Kierkegaard by his father, and the joy he experienced (and ultimately rejected) in his engagement to regine olsen. while that joy is transformed into a religious joy of an experience of the divine, the dialectic between joy and melancholy persists and touches every work Kierkegaard produced. The final estimation is that Kierkegaard was a tortured soul whose death was a blessing, since the paradoxes he had developed had so hardened in his mind that they would never have been resolved. allen critically places Kierkegaard’s contribution (if one would even call it that) in the vein begun by Feuerbach and continued by nietzsche in which the single individual that comprehends the “truth” stands above and apart from the rest of the crowd, a characteristic allen terms “aristocratic pride.”1 The writing style is journalistic with a flair for the dramatic (see the Swenson review). Structurally, the text contains two parts roughly equal in size: (1) “the man,” containing a biography,2 and (2) “philosophy, religion and christianity,” containing a systematic overview of major contributions to the subject matter named.3 as the author highlights major elements of Kierkegaard’s life in part one, his the argumentative position is clear: the output at any given time in Kierkegaard’s life offers a direct line into the mind of the author. part one, “the man,” contains ten chapters that narrate Kierkegaard’s biography from his family background up until his death. the source material is Kierkegaard’s own writings and the journals available to allen at the time of his writing. after dealing with his childhood and youth (chapters i and ii) and the break of Kierkegaard’s edgar Leonard allen, Kierkegaard: His Life and Thought, London: Stanley watt 1935, p. 115. 2 ibid., pp. 1–117. 3 ibid., pp. 121–206. 1

2

Daniel M. Dion

engagement (chapters iii and iv), the author focuses on Kierkegaard’s literary output as the heuristic to understand his life progression (chapters v to X). the progression narrated follows in both explicit and implicit ways the progression of stages that Kierkegaard is well known for: the aesthetic, the moral, and the religious, although it is debatable whether or not Kierkegaard “reached” anything higher than the aesthetic or moral stages. the paradoxes of his thought, which, for allen, merely reflect the actual inner turmoil of Kierkegaard, reveal the persistent conflicts that “rag[ed] within.”4 even his conception of religion “is characterised…by intellectual surrender and moral severity. the law scourged us with whips, the gospel will use scorpions.”5 allen concludes this section indicating “that all this is the work of a sick soul is clear enough,” during his commentary on the final works of Kierkegaard’s corpus.6 in this terrible state, “death intervened to save him from further struggles.”7 allen completes his biographical sketch by highlighting how he sees his contribution to Kierkegaard’s reception in christian circles: “to-day, the church has appropriated him among her theologians, acclaiming in him a champion of dogmatic christianity. in so doing, she has done his memory an injustice. with all his weaknesses, he was a standard-bearer of free thought, a spirit fretting against all institutions and ambitious for the absolute.”8 part two, “philosophy, religion and christianity,” offers a brief, systematic exposition of the main elements of Kierkegaard’s thought beginning with the “road of human Life” (chapter i), which discusses Kierkegaard’s three stages of life. this is followed by a discussion of “the religion of immanence” (chapter ii), in which allen locates many of the unique concepts in Kierkegaard’s corpus: the individual, the moment, dread and despair, the subjectivity of truth, as well as a discussion of Kierkegaard’s connection with “existentialism.”9 The final two chapters before the conclusion sketch the two elements of Kierkegaard’s thought that explicitly reveal his activity as a christian theologian. chapter iii, “preacher without a pulpit,” discusses Kierkegaard’s edifying discourses and the like, which “reveals to us a personal faith which mediates between his philosophy and his theology, using a more intimate speech than the former, while less severe and rigorous than the latter.”10 chapter iv, “christianity,” is a systematic sketch of Kierkegaard’s basic theology, organized under the following headings: “Sin,” “god,” “christ,” “the offense,” “the pattern,” and “Faith.” these are all marked by Kierkegaard’s insistence on the “infinite qualitative distinction” between god and the human being, which, for allen, conveys more deeply “a symbol of the breach within himself.”11 ibid., p. 93. ibid., p. 98. 6 ibid., p. 112. 7 ibid., p. 115. 8 ibid., p. 117. 9 this last subject is not an analysis of Kierkegaard’s relation to the historical existential philosophical movement but to a philosophical analysis and evaluation of whether or not Kierkegaard’s writing can be classed as “existential.” See ibid., pp. 154–6. 10 ibid., p. 165. 11 ibid., p. 202. 4 5

Edgar Leonard Allen

3

allen’s conclusion highlights what he calls the anti-humanist streak in Kierkegaard’s thought, expressed in Kierkegaard’s judgment that christianity and modern life are irreconcilable. however, allen posits “two christianities” alongside the “two humanisms,” which contrast the heroic and the ethical in order to respond to the deep conflicts that Kierkegaard leaves between modernity and Christianity. one christianity is “of the machine” and the other “of the spirit.” allen sees another form of christianity in contrast to Kierkegaard’s “where it is social conscience and the fearlessness of truth” that guides the individual, “and the offense of the cross is not intellectual but ethical.”12 In the end, Allen’s judgment of Kierkegaard is that “he was a valiant fighter in a case he did not rightly understand,” for “he was too concerned with sacrificing his reason to the god-man to be able to follow the master.” echoing what he writes at the end of the biographical section, Allen finds “it was death which saved [Kierkegaard] from discovering how uncertain was the ground on which he stood.”13 daniel m. dion

12 13

ibid., p. 205. ibid., pp. 205–6.

reviews and critical discussions anonymous, review in Times Literary Supplement, vol. 34, no. 1757, 1935, p. 604. anonymous, review in Expository Times, vol. 47, no. 5, 1936, pp. 196–7. case, Shirley Jackson, review in Journal of Religion, vol. 16, 1936, p. 492. Forrester, donald Fraser, review in Living Church, vol. 94, no. 20, 1936, p. 629. g. d. r. (pseudonym), review in Critica, vol. 34, 1936, pp. 358–64. gregory, theophilus Stephen, review in Criterion, vol. 15, no. 59, 1936, pp. 305–7. hansen, christen, “Første bog om Kierkegaard paa engelsk,” Berlingske Aftenavis, november 1, 1935. hobhouse, Stephen henry, review in The Friend: A Religious and Literary Journal, vol. 94, 1936–7, p. 11. Kelly, hugh, review in Studies. An Irish Quarterly Review of Letters, Philosophy, and Science, 1937, pp. 609–24. pauck, wilhelm, review in Christian Century, vol. 53, 1936, p. 667. read, herbert, review in Spectator, vol. 135, no. 5596, 1935, p. 471. — review in Living Age, vol. 349, no. 4433, 1936, pp. 536–8. Sackville-west, edward, review in New Statesman, vol. 10, no. 250,1935, pp. 884–6. Selbie, william boothby, review in Spectator, vol. 135, no. 5597, 1935, p. 512. — review in Congregational Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 1, 1936, pp. 114–15. Stewart, william Kilborne, review in New York Herald Tribune Books, vol. 12, no. 47, 1936, p. 14. Swenson, david F., review in Church History, vol. 5, no. 2, 1936, pp. 191–2. woodburne, angus Stewart, review in Crozer Quarterly, vol. 13, 1936, p. 299.

albert anderson, Kierkegaard: A Brief Overview of the Life and Writings of Søren Kierkegaard, 1813–1855, minneapolis: Lutheran university press 2010, 107 pp.

albert anderson’s Kierkegaard: A Brief Overview of the Life and Writings of Søren Kierkegaard, 1813–1855 was released by Lutheran university press in 2010.1 david w. preus notes in the Foreword: “this primer is not designed as a contribution to advanced Kierkegaard studies. instead it provides a reliable point of departure for pastors, teachers, students, leaders in congregations and institutions, as well as the general reading public.”2 this text acts as an excellent “supplemental text” that clearly identifies “Kierkegaard’s key themes” to the uninitiated reader.3 one oddity of this piece is its lack of credit to many of the sources that anderson draws upon. while he acknowledges his debt to “interpreters like david F. Swenson, walter Lowrie, paul holmer, niels thulstrup, reidar thomte, [and] howard and edna hong” as well as translators like the aforementioned hongs, Julia watkin, and Todd W. Nichol, Anderson has chosen “a form with few specific credits.”4 anderson seems to indicate two reasons for this. First, he states, “as a result of so many years in the company of Kierkegaard and his interpreters, i hardly recognize my own reflections from those of others.”5 Second, anderson believes that this format is advantageous for the reader, most likely due to the smooth flow of the text. anderson’s book is really more of a review of Kierkegaard’s works than his life. other than very brief accounts of Kierkegaard’s father, regine olsen, and his collapse in the streets of denmark, anderson glosses over Kierkegaard’s biography to focus on his authorship. this latter bit he does quite well, going so far as to include an entire section devoted to Kierkegaard’s signed works and religious discourses, a part of Kierkegaard’s body of work that some other authors writing such a short albert anderson, Kierkegaard: A Brief Overview of the Life and Writings of Søren Kierkegaard, 1813–1855, minneapolis: Lutheran university press 2010. 2 david w. preus, “Foreword,” in anderson, Kierkegaard: A Brief Overview of the Life and Writings of Søren Kierkegaard, 1813–1855, p. 7. 3 ibid. 4 anderson, Kierkegaard: A Brief Overview of the Life and Writings of Søren Kierkegaard, 1813–1855, p. 10. 5 ibid. 1

6

Matthew Brake

account may normally have skipped in order to give greater attention to the more enigmatic pseudonyms. the person of Socrates was quite important to Kierkegaard, and anderson introduces him very early in his book. The first page of Chapter 1 credits Kierkegaard’s father with introducing his son to Socrates during the process of his home tutoring. From the outset, anderson attempts to establish the importance of Socrates for Kierkegaard’s work, which is particularly evident by Socrates’ continual presence throughout anderson’s book. this appears to explain anderson’s extensive treatment of The Concept of Irony in which he establishes the foundational importance of Socratic irony throughout Kierkegaard’s entire authorship. while anderson analyzes Kierkegaard’s writings mostly through the lens of the three stages (esthetic, ethical, and religious), he is able to provide a great deal of nuance about these stages in this very brief work. included in his discussion are not only the boundary zones of irony (between the esthetic and the ethical) and humor (between the ethical and the religious) but also a fairly detailed account of religiousness “a” and “b.” the uninformed reader may walk away from this book with a more detailed understanding of Kierkegaard’s three stages than some undergraduate students taking a course on Kierkegaard might. This conclusion signifies one of the great strengths of the book. Anderson has produced a brief, detailed, and nuanced account of Kierkegaard’s authorship in only 84 pages of text.6 he acknowledges that such a short work still leaves out a great deal;7 however, the reader is given a basic foundation for understanding Kierkegaard. anderson’s book does suffer from his chosen format. the lack of citation is noticeably distracting to the academic who wishes that he or she could confirm or corroborate what anderson is saying. while it does make the text easier to read, it may be frustrating for those wanting to do any follow up reading of Kierkegaard for themselves. anderson thus seems to undermine his own encouragement to his readers to read Kierkegaard on their own. anderson has provided a very helpful book for the Kierkegaardian newcomer. the book is quite readable and provides a great deal of nuance to Kierkegaard’s thought. this book is a must-read for the person wanting to learn more about Kierkegaard. matthew brake

the rest consists of the preface, foreword, acknowledgements, an index, etc. For instance, there is nothing on The Book on Adler or the works that appear in the well-known collection The Early Polemical Writings. 6 7

reviews and critical discussions chrien, Jennifer, review in Seminary Ridge Review, vol. 14, no. 2, 2012, pp. 58–9.

alison assiter, Kierkegaard, Metaphysics, and Political Theory: Unfinished Selves, London and new york: continuum 2009, xi + 144 pp.

alison assiter’s Kierkegaard, Metaphysics, and Political Theory: Unfinished Selves was published by continuum in 2009.1 Feminists since Simone de beauvoir have seen Kierkegaard as both a misogynistic provocation and a valuable intellectual resource.2 especially since the late 1990s, there has been an outpouring of feminist scholarship on Kierkegaard.3 alison assiter’s study represents a new turn in the feminist engagement with Kierkegaard. it is not a book about Kierkegaard and feminism. assiter is a political philosopher already convinced of Kierkegaard’s value to a broadly feminist agenda. moving beyond criticism, assiter puts Kierkegaard’s thought to work in her critique of the idealized subject of liberal political theory. assiter draws on Kierkegaard to provide an alternative to what she calls liberals’ “metaphysical assumptions” about selfhood.4 assiter argues that even nonmetaphysical or minimally metaphysical liberal theory, like John rawls’ theory of justice, is colored by cartesian and Kantian metaphysics of disembodied rationality.5 Thus the liberal focus on rights “presupposes a self-sufficient, egoistic individual or group who or which conceptualizes the other as boundaries or limits to its freedom.”6 the other is beyond reason. assiter shows how liberals arbitrarily determine what alison assiter, Kierkegaard, Metaphysics, and Political Theory: Unfinished Selves, London and new york: continuum 2009. 2 Simone de beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. by constance borde and Sheila malovany-chevallier, new york: vintage books 2011, p. 162; p. 203; p. 269. See also ronald m. green and mary Jean green, “Simone de beauvoir: a Founding Feminist’s appreciation of Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard and Existentialism, ed. Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate, 2011 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 9), pp. 1–22. 3 See for example, Feminist Interpretations of Kierkegaard, ed. by céline Léon and Sylvia walsh, university park, pennsylvania: pennsylvania State university press 1997; céline Léon, The Neither/Nor of the Second Sex: Kierkegaard on Women, Sexual Difference, and Sexual Relations, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2008; helen tallon russell, Irigaray and Kierkegaard: On the Construction of the Self, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2009. 4 assiter, Kierkegaard Metaphysics, and Political Theory, p. 5. 5 ibid., pp. 14–15. 6 ibid., p. 48. 1

10

Robert Wyllie

lies beyond the boundaries of rationality, from the “madness” of michel Foucault’s enlightenment-era beggars to the “evil” of modern terrorists.7 the liberal tradition of public reason, which rawls revitalized, more widely excludes “comprehensive doctrines which derive from our engagement with the world as emotional, embodied beings.”8 beyond deconstructing the implicit metaphysics of liberalism, assiter proposes a new idealization of embodied and empathetic citizens. For this project, she enlists Kierkegaard. assiter sketches a Kierkegaardian ontology of embodied, needy selves that stand before others. assiter reads Kierkegaard through the lens of emmanuel Levinas, whose emphasis on otherness she borrows.9 the knight of faith in Fear and Trembling, then, is a limit-case response to radical alterity. assiter argues: “[w]e might see it as requiring a leap beyond reason and into faith. on the other hand, it could be seen as an expression of the limitation of amorality that requires us to rely too much on being a ‘rational and autonomous self-sufficient person’ who views others primarily in the same light.”10 assiter avoids reading Kierkegaard onedimensionally; she shows how Johannes de silentio may be responding to Kant and also to hegel. against hegel’s own social and historical contextualization of the self, Kierkegaard provides an “alternative model of the self-other relation” in which others must be loved without being known.11 additionally, assiter imputes to Kierkegaard a basically “aristotelian view that human beings survive as parts of a whole.”12 in fact, Kierkegaard’s debts to Aristotle are more profound than Assiter reveals, specifically his recourse to the critique of egoistic self-love in the Nicomachean Ethics.13 Kierkegaard’s ethic of love is the core of assiter’s political theory where rights are supplanted by needs. basic biological needs are universal and objective, but, following Kierkegaard, this does not mean that assiter conceptualizes ethics as an objective calculus. instead, she argues, “if there is to be a morality of any kind at all, then what is required is an extension of human sympathies.”14 assiter quotes The Concept of Anxiety to qualify sympathy: “only when the sympathetic person in his compassion relates himself to the sufferer in such a way that he in the strictest sense understands that it is his own case that is in question…does the sympathy acquire significance.”15 recognizing suffering and need avoids what assiter calls the instrumental self–other relationship of charles taylor’s hegel-inspired “politics of recognition.”16 we can learn to sympathize starting with those closest to us. assiter defends preferential love (here, breaking with the Kierkegaard of Works of ibid., p. 39. See michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization, trans. by richard howard, abingdon: routledge classics 2001, pp. 44–6. 8 assiter, Kierkegaard, Metaphysics, and Political Theory, p. 16. 9 ibid., pp. 73–80. See emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. by alphonso Lingis, norwell, massachusetts: Kluwer academic publishers 1991. 10 assiter, Kierkegaard, Metaphysics, and Political Theory, p. 77. 11 ibid., p. 78. 12 ibid., p. 119. 13 SKS 25, 149, nb27:34 / JP 3, 2441. 14 assiter, Kierkegaard, Metaphysics, and Political Theory, p. 100. 15 ibid., p. 84. See SKS 4, 422 / CA, 120. 16 assiter, Kierkegaard, Metaphysics, and Political Theory, p. 64. 7

Alison Assiter

11

Love), turning to the prevalence of domestic violence to show that human beings are most likely to harm their closest loved ones. assiter proposes that we learn how to love starting with ourselves and our closest loved ones; perhaps, she suggests, “egalitarianism is best brought about not by developing abstract moral principles to all…but rather by considering carefully the nature of this love and affection and by treating those to whom we are close, well.”17 Kierkegaard himself is a victim of child abuse, assiter claims, who nonetheless learns to love himself and even to love his abusive father. the call for victims to love themselves and, eventually, their abusers is assiter’s most controversial move. but it returns the reader to her claim that political theory should not anathematize madness or evil. Assiter reflects: “The people who have wronged me deserve to be listened to, respected and heard and furthermore, at some level appreciated, even if they will never be fully understood and accepted by me.”18 although close enough to hear the siren call of Kierkegaard’s christianity, assiter turns to psychoanalysis to preserve a non-religious reading of Kierkegaard.19 assiter draws on Kierkegaard selectively with her own agenda in mind, especially from Fear and Trembling. She avoids more explicitly ethico-religious texts—the most obvious lacuna is Works of Love—in order to downplay the “specifically Christian dimension of his thought.”20 in Works of Love, assiter would find Kierkegaard’s claim that only love can forgive, but of course this is love commanded by god.21 there are many resources in Kierkegaard’s more explicitly religious writings to further assiter’s argument. assiter would, of course, disavow offering an exclusively Christian metaphysic of selfhood. but, one must wonder, can christianity be avoided when drawing deeply from Kierkegaard? assiter’s selective engagement is richly suggestive. Kierkegaard scholars will think of many more passages on love, forgiveness, and “ ‘the neighbor’…[that] thinkers call ‘the other.’”22 assiter might have found many more resources in Kierkegaard had she pursued a less modest exegetical agenda and been less chary of cherry-picking his religious writings. nonetheless, seeing Kierkegaard’s ideas at work in political theory, and in dialogue with ethicists and political philosophers, demonstrates his relevance to social and political thought. Other difficult and notobviously-political thinkers, Friedrich nietzsche for example, have been used productively by political theorists willing to selectively appropriate elements of his thought. in this book, assiter opens the door for political theorists to utilize Kierkegaard’s ideas about relationality and the social constitution of selfhood. robert wyllie

17 18 19 20 21 22

ibid., p. 125. ibid., p. 134. ibid., pp. 126–36. ibid., p. 65. SKS 9, 293 / WL, 295. SKS 9, 28 / WL, 21.

reviews and critical discussions Jaarsma, ada S., review in Hypatia, vol. 27, no. 4, 2012, pp. 922–8. morgan, Jamie, “beyond the Liberal Self,” Journal of Critical Realism, vol. 10, no. 3, 2011, pp. 392–409. richardson, Janice, review in European Journal of Women’s Studies, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 205–7.

Stephen backhouse, Kierkegaard’s Critique of Christian Nationalism, oxford: oxford university press 2011, xvi + 247 pp.

Explicit critical comments on love of nation flow rarely from the pen of Søren Kierkegaard.1 however, the implications of Kierkegaard’s thought often run directly counter to the beliefs of nationalism, especially the danish christian nationalism present in figures contemporaneous with him. Thus, it should be possible to reconstruct an implicit critique of nationalism that runs throughout Kierkegaard’s corpus. that is exactly what Stephen backhouse has done in this carefully articulated and well-received retrieval,2 taking a path that others have suggested but not fully developed.3 considering the lack of explicit material in Kierkegaard, backhouse is wise not to leap right into constructing Kierkegaard’s critique of christian nationalism. Instead, he devotes the first four chapters of his work to laying the groundwork for such a construction. First, a broad definition of nationalism is provided, within which identity narration and a sense of distinct historical mission are emphasized.4 Second and third, Hans Lassen Martensen and N.F.S. Grundtvig are investigated as specific instantiations of a danish christian nationalism in Kierkegaard’s time.5 nationalism is shown to be central to these figures’ theology, and Backhouse ably demonstrates the connection of said nationalism to martensen’s and grundtvig’s accounts of christology. Fourth, the philosophical toolkit that enables Kierkegaard to reject his contemporaries’ fusion of Christ and nation is briefly developed; Øieblikket and contemporaneity are the key notions here, and they allow a fundamentally different approach to christ than the one evinced by either martensen or grundtvig.6 See Stephen backhouse, Kierkegaard’s Critique of Christian Nationalism, oxford: oxford university press 2011, p. 210; p. 227. 2 For an appreciation of backhouse’s work, see especially Joshua r. Furmal, review in Theology, vol. 15, no. 2, 2012, pp. 136–7. 3 backhouse acknowledges that mark dooley and merold westphal gesture in this direction. they do not, however, make the claim (viz., of Kierkegaard as anti-nationalist) an object of extended analysis. See backhouse, Kierkegaard’s Critique of Christian Nationalism, pp. 25–9. 4 ibid., pp. 1–20. 5 ibid., pp. 34–91. 6 ibid., pp. 92–124. 1

14

Thomas J. Millay

it becomes clear in these preparatory chapters that what separates Kierkegaard from his contemporaries is precisely his differing account of christology. whereas martensen thinks that the general reconciliation between god and humanity that the incarnation displays is concretely realized in national culture,7 and grundtvig holds that the harmony christ demonstrates between nature and god is actualized through the native growth of danish folk culture (especially its language),8 Kierkegaard rejects such schemes of progressive historical development in favor of a moment of vision (Øieblikket) that makes each individual contemporaneous with the historical christ.9 in the moment, eternity breaks into temporality in such a way that organic temporal growth toward a progressively realized telos is abrogated; instead, existing within the moment, each individual is given the task of becoming contemporaneous with the god-man, the offensively paradoxical instantiation of eternity in the temporal form of a lowly man who lived 2000 years ago.10 it is to this lowly man who claims to be god that we owe our ethical response, not to any particular culture or nation that purports to represent him for the present age. backhouse goes on in chapters 5 and 6 to explain in detail how Kierkegaard’s christology subverts the identity construction and historical progressivism of nationalistic ideology. here the chief concern is consolidating and defending the critical insights gathered in chapter 4. thus, against don cupitt, backhouse shows that Kierkegaard’s notion of contemporaneity does not lead to an ahistorical view; instead, it attempts “to articulate the right relation to history.”11 against those who would like to read Kierkegaard as subscribing to a narrative of historical progress or declension,12 backhouse makes the simple but profound point that it is the worldhistorical view itself that Kierkegaard rejects.13 in a refreshing critical maneuver, backhouse then goes on to censure the “hasty defenders” of Kierkegaard’s notion of self-identity, those who are eager to absolve Kierkegaard of any charges of asocial individualism. backhouse insists that we must admit Kierkegaard’s individualism, for not to do so would be to lose precisely his distinctive contribution to an anti-

backhouse offers the following cogent summary of martensen on this issue: “the teleological aim of history is to create unity (right relations) between creator and created…. Societies with their national peculiarities can act as ‘persons’ in their own right, with nations effectively relating to god as individuals. this ultimately leads to the possibility of christian states, the highest forms of state and of christianity that can be historically developed, and the home of the individual’s highest moral framework” (ibid., pp. 47–8; cf. pp. 50–2). 8 “the relationship between the consequences of the mageløse opdagelse and grundtvig’s nationalistic theology is direct: true christianity exists only in what is expressed in the native language of a common people” (ibid., p. 69). Later on, it becomes clear that “a common people” is to be taken as the common people of denmark, with their special historical mission (ibid., p. 88). 9 See ibid., p. 104; pp. 115–17. 10 See especially ibid., pp. 121–2. 11 Ibid., p. 125; cf. pp. 126–8. Backhouse lists the specific works of Cupitt he is resisting in ibid., p. 128, note 4. 12 See ibid., p. 147. 13 See ibid., p. 149; cf. p. 160. 7

Stephen Backhouse

15

nationalistic theological position.14 however, such an individualism is not asocial: Kierkegaard’s truth-witness is always situated in society, and is always interested in communicating truth to that society.15 For these efforts, suffering is heaped upon the truth-witness; yet that does not mean the truth-witness is asocial, for he is in fact taking on the highest social task: making the eternal visible (if only indirectly).16 Backhouse’s final chapter is an extended meditation on this last point, framed in terms of neighborliness and the possibility of a Kierkegaardian ecclesiology.17 in the midst of these various defenses and developments, the central contribution of backhouse’s book is clear: it is in Kierkegaard’s distinctive christology that resources for resisting christian nationalism are to be found.18 the moment of vision that makes us contemporaneous with christ undercuts any fanciful scheme that equates the historical development of a nation with a “divine self-disclosure” that can properly situate the identity of a self.19 as backhouse’s introduction and conclusion suggest, such a critical christology is just as relevant now as it was in Kierkegaard’s day, a proposition that is certainly difficult for any American to deny.20 thomas J. millay

See ibid., p. 170. See ibid., p. 184. 16 See ibid., p. 182. 17 See ibid., pp. 198–227, and especially p. 209. gary Slater’s judgement that this section of the book is less successful than others is warranted (see his review in Expository Times, vol. 124, no. 3, 2012, p. 134). how Kierkegaard’s gestures toward a renewed ecclesiology are supposed to practically work themselves out is developed through an admittedly vague concept of neighborliness (see ibid., p. 221). of course, this is not the fault of backhouse alone; the mistake seems rather to be in pushing Kierkegaard in such a direction, as in the final chapter Kierkegaard’s claims must be stretched much further than is previously seen in this generally careful work of scholarship (see ibid., the first paragraph in particular). 18 in his review, Slater highlights how backhouse shows the relevance of the moment and contemporaneity for a critique of nationalism, and then claims that—through this— “backhouse has accomplished a genuine feat of Kierkegaard scholarship” (ibid.). though not putting it quite so precisely, the other reviews of backhouse’s work concur on this point. 19 backhouse, Kierkegaard’s Critique of Christian Nationalism, p. 160. 20 when he takes up the topic of contemporary nationalisms, backhouse tends to have a particular focus on america. See ibid., pp. 15–20; pp. 212–14; pp. 222–4. 14 15

reviews and critical discussions black, michael, review in New Blackfriars, vol. 93, no. 1047, 2012, pp. 622–3. Furnal, Joshua r., review in Theology, vol. 115, no. 2, 2012, pp. 136–7. Simmons, J. aaron, review in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 72, no. 3, 2012, pp. 229–32. Slater, gary, review in Expository Times, vol. 124, no. 3, 2012, pp. 134–5.

John a. bain, Sören Kierkegaard: His Life and Religious Teaching, London: Scm 1935, 160 pp.

John a. bain’s work aims to provide a general introduction to the life and thought of Søren Kierkegaard to an english speaking audience. its assumption is that this does not exist in any meaningful monograph so far. the author does this in a straightforward historical manner, setting the danish context in which Kierkegaard was writing, moving to his early life followed by a step-by-step exposition of major works in his corpus, and concluding with his death. he situates Kierkegaard in relation to the reception his writings enjoyed since his death: in german biblical theology from the 1860s to 1880s under the beck School, the “radical-liberal” camp under Schrempf followed by theodor haecker, as well as the emerging school of phenomenology of husserl, heidegger, and others. he even notes the interest in Kierkegaard by roman catholic circles, namely by erich przywara. the reception history extends also to the standard danish treatment of the time by hirsch and to the influences Kierkegaard had on Ibsen and the Spanish writer Unamuno. In Bain’s view, there is little evidence of Kierkegaard’s influence in Britain. The first part of the book deals with major influences on Kierkegaard’s writings: the religious environment in denmark (chapter 1), the impact of his childhood with a special focus on the influence of his father (Chapter 2), his engagement to Regine olsen (chapter 3), and the intellectual context in which Kierkegaard found himself as he began his literary output (chapter 4). chapters 5–14 each approach a different dimension of Kierkegaard’s thought as they are presented in his publication history. bain then turns to an analysis of Either/Or (chapter 5) and proceeds in publication order through Kierkegaard’s output. he relies on bohlin to establish the dominance of hegelian philosophy at the time.1 Furthermore, bain comments on the reception Kierkegaard has among danish literati who recognize the genius of his style.2 Chapter 6 briefly treats the edifying discourses that were published just after Either/Or; however, their reception, bain claims, was tepid and, although they are torsten b. bohlin, Sören Kierkegaard, l’Homme et l’Oeuvre, trans. by paul-henri tisseau, bazoges-en-pareds, vendée: chez le traducteur, 1941. 2 John a. bain, Sören Kierkegaard: His Life and Religious Teaching, London: Scm 1935, pp. 42–3. bain quotes georg brandes, Søren Kierkegaard. En kritisk Fremstilling i Grundrids, copenhagen: gyldendal 1877, at length to establish this point. 1

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given a summary treatment here, this dimension of Kierkegaard’s writings is lumped together and ignored until bain considers Works of Love (chapter 11). with the conclusion of his treatment of Fear and Trembling and Repetition (chapter 7), bain argues that the underlying apology to the regine olsen debacle is resolved in Kierkegaard’s mind, and at this point he turns his intellectual attention to the formidable intellectual force of the time: hegelian philosophy (chapter 8). bain’s main claim is that “the greater part of [Kierkegaard’s] subsequent works springs directly or indirectly from his controversy with the hegelian philosophy.”3 bain connects the polemic against hegel with Kierkegaard’s writings on sin, a theological reality absent from the hegelian system. From this, bain makes a sharp critique of Kierkegaard when he writes: “one of the most serious defects in the spiritual life of Kierkegaard was that he never understood the true evangelical meaning of the forgiveness of sin.”4 this oversight is attributed to “a well-marked tendency in [Kierkegaard’s] character to react violently from one extreme to the opposite one.”5 there is, thus, an imbalance towards religious morbidity because, in Kierkegaard’s estimation, religious believers in his age had become complacent and forgotten the pervasive presence of sin. chapter 9, “paradox,” continues by frontal attack the critique of hegelian philosophy mediated by a summary of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, which emphasizes that faith—not proof—and subjectivity—not objectivity—are the only bases of christianity: the essential presentation of christianity, that god became man, can only be grasped in a leap of faith, and the burden of that paradox is one that human beings must bear in this life. Bain identifies some ways that this paradoxical theology has been taken up anew in later times in the theology of Karl barth. interestingly, bain takes a special interest here in attending to “the root error of these theories,” namely, “the statement that there is an infinite, qualitative difference between eternity and time, and between god and man.” this error makes any hope of unity with god impossible and the quest for unity futile, for there is no analogical connection because this error “strikes at the root of all possibility of knowing anything of god and the future life.”6 the anti-hegelian narrative continues in the author’s treatment of Kierkegaard’s conceptions of Revelation and History (chapter 10). here they are conceived in direct opposition to hegel’s own formulation. where hegel’s “desire was to give religion a truly objective character,” Kierkegaard argued “that is was impossible for philosophy to give any explanation of the world of humanity on account of the existence of sin, which had brought into the world an irrationality that could not be explained or removed.”7 bain offers a condensed summary of hegel’s attempt to give philosophical objectivity to religion alongside the critique leveled by Kierkegaard. he then offers positive and negative appraisals. positively, Kierkegaard insists on the importance of a direct connection of the individual with god; negatively, he 3 4 5 6 7

bain, Sören Kierkegaard: His Life and Religious Teaching, p. 63. ibid., p. 70. ibid., p. 71. ibid., p. 77. ibid., pp. 82–3.

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ignores the historical character of the christian revelation. this leads Kierkegaard into a “deistical conception of god,” a god who “had abandoned the world to its own evil devices and intervened only in the sending of christ.”8 bain holds that such a conception is neither biblical nor is it factually possible to show such a qualitative difference between christianity and other historical religions of the world.9 The final four chapters treat Kierkegaard’s Love’s Deeds (sc. Works of Love), the Corsair affair, his attack on the church in his time, and his final days. Bain believes that the bright vision presented in Love’s Deeds, which presents a rich engagement with the gospels and the christian message, is sundered by Kierkegaard’s later days where he sank into “melancholy and pessimism and bitterness.”10 the events of the Corsair affair and his attacks on the State church are evidence to bain of the irrational turns that Kierkegaard takes in his late works, which reflect not a mature mind but one racked with scandal and, possibly, madness.11 Such a judgment preserves by deletion the genius of Kierkegaard’s earlier works without having to reconcile the later works. bain’s summary judgment of Kierkegaard’s thoughts balances the positive and negative attributes of the writer’s religious thought. he admits that in Kierkegaard you have a thinker deeply connected with the “intense realities” of Sin, the soul, and god. however, “his defects…hindered him from being a power for good in the church and community of his day.”12 the appendix contains selections from Kierkegaard’s own corpus, “to give some idea of Kierkegaard’s writings.”13 bain chooses from both philosophical and devotional works: 18 from philosophical writings, six from newspaper articles, three from edifying discourses, and prayers. they are the author’s translations from the Samlede Værker. there are brief representative texts from larger works analyzed in the book. This author connects Kierkegaard’s alleged psychological afflictions with “defects” in his thought, an insistence on irrationality that seems confusing and irresponsible, an ignorance of the social implications of the christian gospel, and the proto-existentialist philosophy that connects with nietzsche and is taken up by heidegger, Sartre, and others. the author claims that had Kierkegaard adopted his own advice (that is, to marry and socialize rather than isolate himself) he would not have suffered the afflictions that plagued him.14 In a final image, we are reminded of the figure of John the Baptist, who “call[s] on men to repent of all unreality in their religion, all sham and pretence, and to search our hearts and lives to see if we are nearer to the god who revealed himself in christ than was he who made such burning appeals to his countrymen to repent and turn to god.”15 daniel m. dion 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

ibid., p. 88. ibid., p. 91. ibid., p. 98. ibid., p. 107; p. 113. ibid., pp. 116–17. ibid., p. 121. ibid., p. 118. ibid., p. 119.

reviews and critical discussions anonymous, review in Times Literary Supplement, vol. 34, no. 1765, 1935, p. 818. anonymous, review in Expository Times, vol. 47, no. 5, 1936, pp. 196–7; pp. 215–16. anonymous, review in Protestantische Rundschau, vol. 13, 1936, p. 72. g.h. (pseudonym), review in Church Quarterly Review, vol. 122, no. 243, 1936, pp. 147–9. hobhouse, Stephen henry, review in The Friend: A Religious and Literary Journal, vol. 94, 1936–37, p. 11. Selbie, william boothby, review in Congregational Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 1, 1936, pp. 114–15.

christopher barnett, Kierkegaard, Pietism and Holiness, burlington and Farnham: ashgate 2011, xii + 230 pp.

Kierkegaard’s reception as “the father of existentialism” tends to overshadow his contribution to christian spiritual literature. however, it could be argued that Kierkegaard’s authorship aims to facilitate an inward deepening of the christian, as found in the christian mystics and pietists preceding him. Such an argument would, of course, require a rigorous historical analysis to demonstrate the dane’s continuation of the pietist tradition. christopher barnett’s Kierkegaard, Pietism, and Holiness provides one such analysis, aiming to establish both Søren Kierkegaard’s social, familial and intellectual relationship with the pietist movement, as well as the movement’s impact on his authorship.1 barnett’s work serves as a thorough, well-argued, and yet remarkably readable introduction to the historical situation of nineteenth-century danish pietism, and consequently highlights the christian spirituality behind Kierkegaard’s writing. barnett works with a concept of pietism as a transnational and transconfessional movement rooted in the works of Johann arndt (1555–1621).2 thus arndt and his followers are included as pietistic in some sense, though they precede philipp Jakob Spener (1635–1705). early on, barnett pays special attention to the mystical influences on Arndt’s thought, which will become important as he later argues that Kierkegaard adopts and refashions the german mystical tradition.3 For example, tauler, the Theologica deutsch, and thomas á Kempis’ The Imitation of Christ are all cited as key texts in arndt’s thought.4 barnett then treats Spener and the subsequent lack of consensus on the social ramifications of Pietism, exemplified in the tension between august hermann Francke’s (1663–1727) “halle pietism,” which found its expression in an institutionalized form, and the more radically separatist pietism of gottfried arnold (1666–1714), who’s Impartial History of Churches and Heretics “strongly anticipated” Kierkegaard’s attack on the danish church.5 barnett then turns his attention to zinzendorf (1700–60) and the development of the moravian diaspora, which sat in the tension of these two pietistic extremes. this seamlessly christopher b. barnett, Kierkegaard, Pietism and Holiness. burlington and Farnham: ashgate 2011, p. 111. 2 ibid., pp. 3–4. 3 ibid., p. 208. 4 ibid., pp. 11–12. 5 ibid., p. 20. 1

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blends into a discussion on denmark’s reception of pietism, with the halle pietists in the mainstream, and the moravian pietists on the fringes. barnett recounts the Kierkegaard family’s relationship to the moravians, the Brødresocietet, and the grundtvigians, and Kierkegaard’s own engagement with pietist literature, especially focusing on the imitatio Christi motif. 6 in part ii of the book, barnett moves to the handling of pietist themes in Kierkegaard’s own work. there follows a masterful exegesis of pathos in Either/Or, Stages on Life’s Way, and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, among others. this discussion turns to climacus’ handling of monasticism and Kierkegaard’s critique of pietism’s separationist tendencies, which largely parallels climacus.7 barnett then draws on A Literary Review to highlight Kierkegaard’s alternative to pietist separation, namely, suffering in the world as something “unrecognizable.”8 barnett concludes his study by bringing home the imitatio theme, which, by this point, has been traced from late medieval catholicism through pietism into Kierkegaard’s “second authorship.”9 ultimately, “the imitator is to surrender everything to the grace of god—including, in a certain sense, his will to imitate christ.”10 Kierkegaard, Pietism and Holiness is not a difficult or particularly complicated book. the layout is straightforward. barnett’s historical analysis is rigorous without being exhaustive, informing the reader without overwhelming her. but this is a merit rather than a shortcoming. his selective method provides Kierkegaard scholars with a detailed view of the necessary and sufficient historical grounding for the claim that Kierkegaard’s authorship represents a continuation of the upbuilding literature of pietism. yet he refrains from any extraneous or unhelpful divergence from this narrow focus. Further, his exegesis demonstrates a deep acquaintance with Kierkegaard’s corpus and the relevant secondary literature. barnett is sensitive to the complexities of the dane’s authorship. he masterfully navigates the perils of attempting what, at times, seems like the impossible task of understanding Kierkegaard on his own terms. Kierkegaard, Pietism and Holiness presents an underexplored facet of Kierkegaard scholarship, and this early contribution pushes boundaries in some respects, providing fertile soil for further exploration. Jacob given

6 7 8 9 10

ibid., p. 64. ibid., pp. 138–9. ibid., p. 165. ibid., p. 171. ibid., p. 188.

reviews and critical discussions Furnal, Joshua, “toward a ‘catholic’ reading of Kierkegaard,” Reviews in Religion & Theology, vol. 21, no. 4, 2014, pp. 435–43. hannay, alastair, review in Journal of Ecclesiastical History, vol. 63, no. 2, 2012, pp. 429–30. Keen, craig, review in Wesleyan Theological Journal, vol. 48, no. 2, 2013, pp. 236–7. Schreiber, gerhard, review in Theologische Literaturzeitung, vol. 137, no. 4, 2012, columns 451–45. Simmons, J. aaron, “helping more than ‘a Little’: recent books on Kierkegaard and the philosophy of religion,” International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, vol. 72, no. 3, 2012, pp. 227–42. vanden auweele, dennis, review in Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger, vol. 64, no. 2, 2011, pp. 195–7.

christopher barnett, From Despair to Faith: The Spirituality of Søren Kierkegaard, minneapolis: Fortress press 2014, xix + 215 pp.

From Despair to Faith: The Spirituality of Søren Kierkegaard is christopher barnett’s second major publication. to some degree, this volume is a conceptual deepening of his first work, Kierkegaard, Pietism and Holiness (2011). a consistent theme runs throughout the two works: a reassessment of Kierkegaard’s relationship to the christian tradition in general, and pietism in particular. but whereas barnett’s first work is largely a socio-historical examination of Kierkegaard’s situation, From Despair to Faith is a more conceptual examination of spiritual themes in Kierkegaard’s authorship, moving past the more specifically historical analysis in Barnett’s first work. As in his first work, Barnett traces Kierkegaard’s spiritual lineage through catholic mysticism and pietism.1 indeed, barnett compares Kierkegaard’s twin emphases, human desire and divine fulfillment, to the Catholic theologians Bernard of clairvaux and meister eckhart.2 barnett sketches the concepts underlying Kierkegaard’s spirituality, addressing god, the self, and the spiritual journey. he posits that the exitus–reditus scheme, so common in christian literature, is present in Kierkegaard’s thought.3 he states, “Kierkegaard’s understanding of human nature actually begins with theology. god is the origin of the self, and, for that reason, the self cannot be understood without reference to god.”4 drawing on Kierkegaard’s 1844 discourse, “to need god is the human being’s highest perfection” and The Sickness unto Death, barnett argues that Kierkegaard’s conception of the self entails the need for spiritual growth.5 Kierkegaard follows the mystical tradition of “spiritual itineraries,” spiritual works that give the reader a way to orient oneself toward such spiritual growth.6 among these itineraries, barnett identifies the “stages of existence,”7 the levels of religious deepening in climacus’ christopher barnett, From Despair to Faith: The Spirituality of Søren Kierkegaard, minneapolis: Fortress press 2014, p. 3. 2 ibid., p. 19. 3 ibid., pp. 26–7. 4 ibid., p. 27. 5 ibid., p. 38. 6 ibid., p. 39. 7 ibid. 1

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Postscript,8 and “the Ladder of despair” as represented in The Sickness unto Death.9 these all point to the dynamic journey that the self undergoes on the journey to faith, completing the reditus, the return to god. barnett then turns his attention to the division between the aesthetic and the religious. rather than critiquing Kierkegaard for driving a wedge between the two spheres, Barnett argues that “Kierkegaard both encourages and exemplifies the use of images as a means of spurring one to existential authenticity….his artwork is intended to orient the observer toward holiness, to establish contact between the observer and sacred events and lives.”10 in this sense, Kierkegaard’s aesthetics is cast as a dialectical “aesthetics of the icon.”11 with this scheme in mind, barnett devotes the remainder of the work to surveying examples of this iconography throughout Kierkegaard’s authorship, both from the natural world and from the bible. barnett is concerned with Kierkegaard as a christian spiritual author and as an inheritor of a pietist (and catholic) tradition. on this topic, barnett’s Kierkegaard, Pietism and Holiness laid much of the heavy historical groundwork, seeking to open new ways of understanding and situating Kierkegaard’s authorship. whereas this first book seemed a preliminary work for further research, From Despair to Faith moves on to the fruitful work of reading Kierkegaard in a pietist context. very quickly, one will recognize that this book is written on a fairly accessible level. however, this should not deter serious scholars from reading it. barnett’s thoughtful analysis will be of interest to anyone seeking to understand the spiritual dimensions of the dane’s work, as well as the rich christian tradition that stands behind it. barnett’s lucid style and clear argumentation make this a great introduction to Kierkegaard as a spiritual author, but the depth of insight that it contains ensures that even veteran scholars will find something of interest. Jacob given

8 9 10 11

ibid., p. 42. ibid., p. 46. ibid., p. 79. ibid., p. 81.

reviews and critical discussions Furnal, Joshua, review in Theology, vol. 118, no. 3, 2015, pp. 216–17. moser, p.K., review in Choice: Current Reviews for Academic Libraries, vol. 52, no. 6, 2015, pp. 989–90.

Lee c. barrett, Kierkegaard, nashville: abingdon press 2010 (Pillars of Theology), vii + 86 pp.

in Kierkegaard, a volume in the abingdon Pillars of Theology series, Lee barrett leads readers who may have little prior familiarity with Søren Kierkegaard on an exploration of the dane’s mind and world. Kierkegaard believed in hard work for a “deeper engagement” with one’s christian faith, and proved it by requiring much from his readers. Kierkegaard wanted his readers to sift through his works in order to make sense of his thoughts, ideas, and convictions. in his book, barrett acts as a coach to his readers while he navigates the complex world of Kierkegaard as theologian, philosopher, and creative writer. in addition, barrett ends each chapter with questions for reflection, providing the reader with opportunities to digest, wrestle with, and apply its content. In the first chapter, Barrett discusses the difficulty of reading and interpreting Kierkegaard. he not only outlines what to expect in the writings, but also suggests how the writings are to be classified, understood, and approached. Kierkegaard complicates matters by writing in several forms, including journals, signed works, and pseudonymous texts. From the outset, barrett makes it clear that he will approach Kierkegaard’s writings as Christian theological reflection. By treating Kierkegaard as an author who can be read as a theologian, Barrett’s book has affinities with the work of david gouwens, Sylvia walsh, murray rae, and david Law. while he makes his argument as to why he chooses this approach, barrett also helps the reader to understand the other options that exist concerning how to interpret Kierkegaard’s writings. barrett pays attention to the more “literary” approaches to Kierkegaard, and to the presence of irony, ambiguity, fissures, and resistance to closure. However, unlike authors like roger poole, barrett does not see these rhetorical strategies as dissolving all theological content into a sea of indeterminacy. rather, he argues that Kierkegaard’s elusive literary styles are designed to provoke the reader to wrestle with issues of faith and to develop the passionate self-concern that would make these issues come alive in the reader’s own life. in true Kierkegaardian fashion, barrett encourages the reader to determine how to read Kierkegaard for himself or herself, believing that the issues addressed by Kierkegaard are still very much relevant for contemporary individuals. chapter two examines the personal life of Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard has been hailed as both a madman and a genius, leaving the reader to decide whether his work is to be analyzed as a manifestation of psychosis or rather as a compelling illumination of the human condition. barrett spends most of the chapter going

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through what is known about Kierkegaard’s life, allowing the reader to determine the motivations for his work. regarding the question of Kierkegaard’s psychological health, barrett is ultimately content to leave tension in the debate, suggesting that even if Kierkegaard was a bit of both a genius and an eccentric, his works have a significance that transcends the quirks of his own psychohistory. the reader is introduced to the complexity of Kierkegaard’s writings in chapter three, and provided with insight into the interpretive debates that surround his work. is Kierkegaard serious? what is Kierkegaard attempting to accomplish? barrett brings clarity to the styles and methods used by Kierkegaard that were intended to evoke emotion and passion in the reader. For Kierkegaard, the emphasis was placed on how something was said, since according to him the emotional resonances of any religious concept were an essential component of its meaning. because no passionneutral perspective is available from which the relations of all these religious concepts can be surveyed, systematic theology was impossible. each religious concept required its own unique form of pathos and therefore its own communicative style. consequently, Kierkegaard relied on differing styles and voices to communicate the complexity of christian theological concepts. barrett touches on the various styles and passional strategies used by Kierkegaard throughout the chapter, allowing the reader to contextualize the body of Kierkegaard’s work in the various passions that constitute the christian life. barrett offers Kierkegaard’s critique of the modern age in chapter Four. Kierkegaard’s chief complaint about the present age was the increasing power of the herd mentality, which led to the seeming impossibility for the individual to think for oneself. the unintentional cultural side-effect was the uplifting of mediocrity. Barrett points to specific factors to help explain the cultural context of Kierkegaard’s complaints. Kierkegaard viewed the church as equally guilty and feared that popular opinions would be equated with religious truths. his complaints about christendom were a function of his conviction that one had to wrestle with and work through one’s theology. without that work, people were being lulled into a false sense of well-being. an overview of Kierkegaard’s approach to the meaning of theological concepts is given in chapter Five. barrett spends the majority of this chapter on Kierkegaard’s view of truth. Some have accused Kierkegaard of seeing truth as subjective in the sense that the strength of a conviction justifies its adoption. Barrett cites several of Kierkegaard’s works to illustrate how multiple conclusions might be reached regarding his view of truth, and ultimately advocates a specific understanding. according to barrett, Kierkegaard was proposing that the proper subjectivity is a necessary condition for understanding religious truth-claims, and an intensified subjectivity should occur in how one responds to a religious truth-claim. Kierkegaard sees tremendous significance in the truth-claim aspect of doctrines, but truth has no value without passion. passion breathes life into truth, and truth gives passion its purpose. in chapter Six, barrett provides an overview of seven theological concepts, such as god, christ, and human nature. barrett calls them theological fragments because Kierkegaard allows for tensions and uncertainties to remain in his theological explorations. barrett stresses the fact that Kierkegaard saw many christian concepts,

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such as divine grace and human responsibility, as generating dialectical tensions that can only be resolved in the specifics of an individual’s life rather than in the logic of an abstract theological system. according to barrett, Kierkegaard’s theological work, even though it is open-ended and somewhat indeterminate, is ultimately a story about love. his readers are invited through the offering of love—a love that has been and always will be—and asked to stay for a lifetime to work through what that means for his or her life. in his conclusion, barrett reminds his readers that Kierkegaard’s call was for the christian to live with passion, which means that one’s beliefs should have practical implications and should be held with heart-felt intensity. Kierkegaard opposed much of the church’s practices of the day, seeing them as contributing to the problems of apathy and indifference. people were forgetting the very problem that christianity sought to correct, and so his theological work attempted to remind people first of what the problem was and then to address the solution. in order for people to thoroughly engage this process, freedom must be incorporated into theological work, allowing the individual to move beyond the mass consensus in which there is no ownership, and towards engagement of god as he or she determines for himself or herself what to conclude. barrett’s book, though short, is rich with content. he provides the reader with material to wrestle with and absorb. barrett provides the coaching that was promised at the beginning without removing the mysteries of Kierkegaard, the work required by Kierkegaard’s readers, or the freedom to decide for oneself. barrett’s extensive knowledge of Kierkegaard comes through in both the book and its bibliography. Kierkegaard’s work can still have tremendous significance for the church, Christian individuals, and the contemporary world. his love of paradox, his sensitivity to the passional dimensions of truth-claims, and his insistence that the individual must own his or her faith remain highly relevant. whether the book serves as a window into Kierkegaard’s work broadly considered, or as a doorway leading to additional research, Kierkegaard provokes the sort of self-reflection that the Dane intended. Jennifer potter

reviews and critical discussions brandt, Lori unger, “paul: herald of grace and paradigm of christian Living,” in Kierkegaard and the Bible, tome ii, The New Testament, ed. by Lee c. barrett and Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2010 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception, and Resources, vol. 1), p. 69. carlisle, clare, review in Modern Believing, vol. 52, no. 4, 2011, pp. 106–7. walsh, Sylvia, “Kierkegaard’s theology,” in The Oxford Handbook of Kierkegaard, ed. by John Lippitt and george pattison, oxford: oxford university press 2013, p. 293.

Lee c. barrett, Eros and Self-Emptying: The Intersections of Augustine and Kierkegaard, grand rapids: william b. eerdmans 2013, xiv + 414 pp.

Eros and Self-Emptying: The Intersections of Augustine and Kierkegaard analyzes significant compatibilities and divergences between Saint Augustine and Søren Kierkegaard on major themes in christianity, concluding with an extended treatment of each thinker’s view of divine love as kenotic and the human vocation to conform to this divine love. barrett’s engagement with this topic has been brewing since his article in 1985 on Kierkegaard’s anxiety and augustine’s original sin.1 this 2013 book provides a well-researched and much needed resource for several fields: Augustinian studies, Kierkegaard studies, and historical and constructive theology. it has enjoyed positive critical responses from book reviews, references in other books and articles, and panel discussions. This influential book has spawned more interest and scholarship in the area of the relationship of Kierkegaard with roman catholic thinkers in general as well as with augustine in particular. prior to this book, there had been few critical studies that bring these two creative geniuses of christianity into dialogue. another noteworthy feature of the book is barrett’s careful attention to differentiating between Kierkegaard’s various pseudonymous authors as well as his “veronymous” works in his explications. after describing the multiplex nature of the connections between Kierkegaard and augustine, barrett reviews the concrete historical connections from augustine to Kierkegaard. his well-researched and meticulous treatment of the (often skewed) influences upon Kierkegaard’s reading of Augustine is evident throughout the book. in part one of the book, barrett sets the stage in two main ways. First, he suggests a metaphor of a journey of faith to frame his analysis of the convergences and divergences of augustine and Kierkegaard, and, second, by highlighting the significant role that desire and passion play for both religious thinkers. For both, faith is not merely a destination, but a process. not only do they think of the Lee barrett, “Kierkegaard’s anxiety and augustine’s doctrine of original Sin,” in The Concept of Anxiety, ed. by robert perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1984 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 8, pp. 35–61.

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phenomenon of christian faith as a journey, but also their authorships themselves are best understood as journeys, almost travelogues, of their spiritual and vocational pilgrimages. For Kierkegaard, this notion of making progress in faith is a break in understanding with Martin Luther’s commonly understood faith and justification as a once and for all. using this model opens the door for fruitful dialogue between Kierkegaard and augustine among others in the roman catholic heritage. a second theme of barrett’s analysis is divine desire. barrett highlights the similarities between augustine’s famous plea for god’s love to give rest to his restless heart and his unquenchable quest for knowing god, on the one side, and, on the other, Kierkegaard’s passion for eternal happiness in his struggle toward being transparently grounded upon the power that constitutes the self and the christian duty to love the neighbor in and through a loving relationship with god. For both thinkers, religious desire, loving god, becoming like god, and knowing god are all entwined. barrett’s thesis is that this common wellspring of the desire for god is the key for understanding the intersections of both their personal faith and their theological insights, culminating in what barrett argues is their shared and most profound insight, which is that eros, of god and for god, entails the kenotic selfemptying and surrender. In the second and largest section of his book, Barrett focuses on six specific theological doctrines as signposts for his deeper study of the resonances between augustine and Kierkegaard: god’s love, sin, grace, christology, salvation, and the church. Barrett treats their intersection for each specific doctrine and its particular motifs carefully and distinctly while also making several generalizations as well. eros, or passion, is the core issue throughout the book: passion for god and god’s passion for us. the essence of being human is to search and long for god. we are incomplete without knowing and loving god. and knowing god entails selfsurrender. this is the key for each of the doctrines barrett addresses. For example, in the chapter on god’s love, barrett reveals the profound commonality between augustine and Kierkegaard even in the midst of their important divergences. augustine’s corpus is flush with his speculations about the nature of god’s internal relationships with god’s self and augustine’s postulations of several theories of theodicy. contrarily, Kierkegaard refrains from such contemplation of god’s inner life and warns against human attempts at second guessing god’s purposes and the mechanisms of divine providence. barrett concludes, however, that the crucial differences between augustine and Kierkegaard’s conceptualizations of god lie not in their core understandings, but rather in their “strategies for edification.”2 Kierkegaard’s strategy focuses on the function of god’s love in “the passionate religious life of the individual,”3 limiting our theological engagement to a doxological context. augustine, by contrast, seeks to understand god in all possible contexts including especially metaphysical speculations. yet they are in agreement

Lee c. barrett, Eros and Self-Emptying: The Intersections of Augustine and Kierkegaard, grand rapids: william b. eerdmans 2013, p. 204. 3 ibid. 2

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that god’s love is most apparent in god’s kenosis. it is only if we do likewise and surrender with God in an “eros for agape,” that we can be fulfilled essentially.4 barrett develops this theme more fully in the conclusion of his book. he shows that both augustine and Kierkegaard assert that desire and eros for god are composed of two movements. Loving God is only the first movement of love/faith. the second movement is love of neighbor. both movements are part of the journey of faith through which one is transformed toward becoming more like god. the second movement of love/faith involves knowing god so intimately that a person is conformed to god’s kenosis and imitates christ’s self-emptying in her or his love for the neighbor. the follow-through for loving god is surrender. Loving god is the goal and surrendering is the means. in other words, a person can love god fully by actively refocusing his or her life upon this longing for god. but this action essentially entails surrendering his or her control to this love and its demands. barrett views this two-part movement of love as instructive in understanding the way that both of these religious writers resolve the dialectical tension between human effort and responsibility and reliance upon god’s grace. Further this tension can best be addressed in the edifying context of the practice of christian living. when eros is understood and practiced in the life of faith as both desire for god and self-emptying love, then these divisions are overcome. as barrett eloquently summarizes: “the seemingly irreducible dialectical tensions between such polar theological themes as sin as corruption and sin as an act, or faith as a gift and faith as a task, may be resolved in the living of a life when they cannot be in texts.”5 in his conclusion, barrett reconsiders the many divergences between Kierkegaard and augustine. most of these differences, including the differences in content, stem from a categorical difference in their regard for philosophical speculation, different historical contexts, and different attitudes and roles toward the church. in spite of these significant differences, however, Barrett asserts that Kierkegaard and Augustine exhibit several fundamental correspondences, including similar experiences of wrestling with god in the journey of faith toward becoming (transparently) grounded upon and conformed to god; common vocational goals focused on the practice of christian living (although they sometimes employ opposite techniques); and most intriguingly, they both posit that the essential insight of christianity is about desire and that “the ultimate object of desire is the self-giving love of god.”6 In conclusion, this book not only reflects careful research and provides clear and thorough analysis of each of thinker, but also, it deepens the reader’s understanding of the dialectic between understanding christian life as a task and understanding christian life as a gift. helene russell

4 5 6

ibid., p. 205. ibid., p. 396. ibid., p. 392.

reviews and critical discussions barnett, christopher b., review in Horizons, vol. 41, pp. 393–5. barrett, Lee c., “the intersections of augustine and Kierkegaard revisited,” Toronto Journal of Theology, vol. 31, no. 1, 2015, pp. 91–4. Furnal, Joshua, “toward a catholic reading of Kierkegaard,” Reviews in Religion and Theology, vol. 21, no. 4, 2014, pp. 435–43. gonwa, Janna, “eros, agape, and neighbor-Love as ontological gift,” Toronto Journal of Theology, vol. 31, no. 1, 2015, pp. 84–93. gouwens, david, “introduction: critical responses to Lee barrett’s Eros and SelfEmptying,” Toronto Journal of Theology, vol. 31, no. 1, 2015, pp. 55–6. hughes, carl, “contrasting augustine and Kierkegaard as theologians of desire,” Toronto Journal of Theology, vol. 31, no. 1, 2015, pp. 75–83. — review in Interpretation, vol. 69, no. 3, 2015, pp. 371–2. Kolbet, paul, “augustine, Kierkegaard, and the Seduction of the word: rediscovering an unfamiliar theological Style” Toronto Journal of Theology, vol. 31, no. 1, 2015, pp. 57–65. martens, paul, review in Review of Metaphysics, vol. 68, no. 1, 2014, pp. 155–6. russell, helene, review in Augustinian Studies, vol. 45, no. 2, 2014, pp. 293–9. — “the passion of Faith and the works of Love: barrett, augustine and Kierkegaard,” Toronto Journal of Theology, vol. 31, no. 1, 2015, pp. 66–74.

gregory r. beabout, Freedom and Its Misuses: Kierkegaard on Anxiety and Despair, milwaukee: marquette university press 1996, x + 192 pp.

gregory beabout’s Freedom and Its Misuses: Kierkegaard on Anxiety and Despair was originally published in 1996 by marquette university press. it is the twelfth publication in the marquette Studies in philosophy series. a second edition, with corrections and a new preface by the author, was published in 2009. while the book’s initial reception appears to have been rather muted,1 it has become a key text in contemporary Kierkegaard studies, due to its status as the first secondary work in english to provide an extensive comparison of the terms anxiety and despair in The Concept of Anxiety and The Sickness unto Death. beabout’s goal in Freedom and Its Misuses is to analyze the relationship between anxiety and despair under the broader heading of freedom.2 he begins by asserting that although freedom has become one of the most influential concepts in modernity, there remains a great deal of confusion over what freedom really means. this leads to a paradox: “Left with freedom’s promise and no clear blueprint as to what to do with it, freedom becomes enslavement.”3 The flaws in our common understanding of freedom, according to Beabout, “stem principally from the attempt to define freedom without an adequate understanding of the human self.”4 thus, the Kierkegaardian themes of anxiety and despair are meant to help clarify our conception of selfhood, which in turn provides the opportunity to strengthen our understanding of freedom. beabout notes that both anxiety and despair “are central to Kierkegaard’s conception of self and freedom.”5 accordingly, it makes sense to talk about The Concept of Anxiety and The Sickness unto Death together. indeed, the texts are intertwined, and the latter seems to build on the former. For instance, both talk extensively about sin. however, although sin is discussed in great detail in The Concept of Anxiety, it is never fully delineated in itself. according to beabout, “what Kierkegaard means by sin is only made clear with his explanation of the Several varied online searches for reviews of the book produced no results. gregory r. beabout, Freedom and Its Misuses: Kierkegaard on Anxiety and Despair, milwaukee: marquette university press 1996, p. 8. 3 ibid., p. 2. 4 ibid., p. 3. 5 ibid., p. 5. 1 2

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concept of despair in The Sickness unto Death.”6 So, it is reasonable to claim that The Concept of Anxiety and The Sickness unto Death ought to be read together in order to fruitfully draw out the implications of both texts. beabout’s analysis of anxiety is, in part, a response to gregor malantschuk. beabout believes that malantschuk “makes anxiety out to be a misrelation in the self, whereas for Kierkegaard, anxiety is not itself a misrelation.”7 moreover, “malantschuk claims that anxiety occurs only at the mental-physical level,” while for Kierkegaard “anxiety can occur at the spiritual level.”8 according to beabout, several other prominent scholars have followed this interpretive path, and thus a pattern of response has emerged in Kierkegaard scholarship that views anxiety as a misrelation, and despair as a heightened, more intense version of that same misrelation. but, as beabout points out, if this is true, then anxiety and despair are merely quantitatively different, which conflicts with Kierkegaard’s assertion in The Sickness unto Death that despair is sin, whereas in The Concept of Anxiety we are told that anxiety is not sin. this difference implies a qualitative shift that is not apparent in malantschuk’s reading. So one of beabout’s primary claims is that anxiety is not a misrelation of the self; rather, it is “an ontological structure in which the self is both attracted to and repulsed from the nothingness of future possibilities.”9 he also argues that the second half of The Concept of Anxiety does not contain an implicit account of the despair made explicit in The Sickness unto Death, but rather describes the anxiety of the person in despair. there is a direct link between the two texts, but prior commentators have misinterpreted that link. beabout spends the next four chapters developing his case. he rightly notes that Kierkegaard’s description of anxiety as “spirit relating itself to itself” seems to indicate “a structure of human being, that is…an ontological structure.”10 but he also admits that Kierkegaard’s descriptions of anxiety vary in significant ways: sometimes they refer to “a feeling or range of feelings,” and sometimes “the structure of human being that gives rise to that feeling,” and sometimes both.11 while this complicates things, it at least points to the fact that taking anxiety merely to be a misrelation is a mistake. Further, he states, while “the immediate goal of The Concept of Anxiety is to clarify the meaning of anxiety….a discussion of actual sin, however, lies outside the scope of the book.”12 this seems to give credence to the view that anxiety and sin are not members of the same species, in which case it would follow that the same holds true for anxiety and despair. additionally, says beabout, vigilius haufniensis (the pseudonymous author of The Concept of Anxiety) “is not describing a sickness” when he describes anxiety.13 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

ibid., p. 7. ibid., p. 9. ibid. ibid., pp. 10–11. ibid., p. 18. ibid. ibid., pp. 28–9. ibid., p. 48.

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haufniensis argues that if such were the case, then either “adam is not innocent prior to the fall,” or “the fall is a logical development of a prior case.”14 but haufniensis rejects both of these options. this means that anxiety “is the normal state of the innocent person.”15 if this is so, then it is reasonable to conclude that anxiety and despair cannot be quantitatively different expressions of the same quality, since sin is quite clearly not the “normal state” of an innocent person. however, the fact that haufniensis is responding to a doctrinal category (sin) using a “psychological” method means that, although there are extensive descriptions of the anxiety found in persons who are sinners, there is no precise definition of sin. This is why the second half of The Sickness unto Death is so beneficial; it provides the lacking definition, and offers further insight on the relationship of the two terms. beabout’s commentary on The Sickness unto Death is similarly insightful, and highlights several key issues at work in Kierkegaard’s conception of despair. He states that the first and second parts of the work should not be separated into a false dichotomy of “phenomenological” and “theological” accounts of despair; rather, both halves inform each other. beabout also helpfully outlines the differences between the “aesthetic,” “ethical,” and “religious” selves and the ways in which these build on one another. his description of the self’s religious nature also seems correct: “the self is freedom in the sense of right relation to oneself, to others, and to god. this kind of freedom is not merely procedural, as freedom of choice, but is substantive. Since the self is self-reflexive, social and religious, freedom is…taking responsibility for one’s choices while living and acting in right relation to others and to god.”16 in contrast to anxiety, despair “is a technical term used to describe a misrelation in the self.”17 despair, he continues, “is a sickness of the self that is brought about through one’s own wrongful use of freedom.”18 but no one is necessarily in despair; rather, “if despair continues, it is because…the self continues to misrelate itself to itself.”19 how, then, can one overcome the misrelation? one must accept oneself. That is, one must face oneself as oneself, instead of either attempting to “flee” from oneself or “defiantly attempting to be a self that one is not.”20 of course, this presumes that a person has enough awareness of who they are to be able to recognize the difference between genuinely being oneself and being in a misrelation to oneself. and, “to be consistent, the most that anti-climacus can claim is that all who have misused freedom are actually in despair. he cannot claim that all human beings are in despair and that despair is essential to being human, else despair would not be the fault of the individual.”21

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

ibid. See SKS 4, 332–41 / CA, 25–34. beabout, Freedom and Its Misuses: Kierkegaard on Anxiety and Despair, p. 48. ibid., p. 92. ibid., p. 93. ibid., p. 96. ibid., p. 97. ibid., p. 98. ibid., p. 101.

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in chapter Six, beabout turns to consider the implications of the relationship he has outlined between anxiety and despair. His first point is simply to reiterate that both are related to misuses of freedom (though only despair is a misuse). beabout asserts that “this is the key to understanding Kierkegaard’s contribution to a fuller understanding of human freedom.”22 theologically, anxiety and despair are “central to comprehending Kierkegaard’s interpretation of the relationship between original sin and sin.”23 and psychologically, they provide the locus for Kierkegaard’s understanding of “the connection between environmental conditioning and personal responsibility.”24 but these are all implicit claims that must be drawn out of the texts. to do this, he turns to further analysis, showing us the way in which The Sickness unto Death makes use of, and even refers directly to, The Concept of Anxiety. beabout’s strength here lies not in developing creative new interpretations of the texts, but rather in outlining in a clear and convincing manner what the texts are meant to convey. In the final chapter, Beabout outlines four senses in which Kierkegaard makes use of the word “freedom.” these are freedom from a force outside of one’s control, freedom of choice, freedom as selfhood (“the self is freedom”), and christian freedom (“christ is our freedom”).25 recognizing these different kinds of freedom helpfully clarifies the account of Kierkegaardian freedom developed so far (one may wonder why this section was not placed near the beginning of the text). anxiety and despair are not related to just any kind of freedom; they specifically catalyze and draw upon the third and fourth kinds of freedom, both of which are tied to the individual’s task of self-actualization. beabout also argues that macintyre’s critique of Kierkegaard is critically flawed since it fails to distinguish between freedom of choice, which is the “possibility of possibility” that emerges from reflective self-consciousness, and freedom of self-actualization, which is the freedom that recognizes the need to make responsible decisions based in the awareness of striving to enact one’s best possibilities as a self. the latter involves the sort of ethical decision-making that macintyre accuses Kierkegaard of lacking.26 beabout concludes that self-actualizing freedom “is more akin to harmony than it is to decision-making ability.”27 this is due to the recognition that if everyone always chose to be “themselves” in the right way, then all self-actualization would be consonant with the actualization of the other. but obviously, this is not the case. instead, what happens is that a self, that is, an “organism with free choice,” misuses its freedom and “chooses to be something other than itself….what began as selfactualization becomes a kind of spiritual self-destruction.”28 So, says beabout, the ibid., p. 115. ibid. 24 ibid. 25 ibid., pp. 135–46. 26 ibid., pp. 142–3. he concludes, “the irony in this is not only that macintyre viciously twists Kierkegaard to further his own argument about virtue, but that he ends up missing Kierkegaard’s emphasis on virtue and the importance of forming one’s character” (ibid., p. 143). 27 ibid., p. 144. 28 ibid., p. 145. 22 23

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self “entangle[s] itself in its own misuse of freedom, so that each new attempt to actualize itself is a failure…any current success at self-actualization that fails to rectify past failure is itself a failure.”29 the question, then, is whether or not we can surmount our past failures such that our existence is a success. there are several ways to think about this, but beabout focuses on the one that Kierkegaard most fully elaborates on: the need for christian faith. here, it seems that beabout could have expanded his commentary, developing in more depth just what this christian faith entails. rather, he notes that Kierkegaard’s views about how one becomes a self in relation to others remain somewhat unclear. Likewise, beabout thinks that Kierkegaard has misconstrued the self’s relationship with other selves, but this is not to say that Kierkegaard was an egoist or radical subjectivist.30 in the end, “the self is a self among other selves, and a self in relation to god. when the self chooses to become itself, to live in right relation to itself, to others and to god, then the self is freedom. this actualization is the fundamental meaning of freedom.”31 naturally, the exemplar for this kind of actualization is, for Kierkegaard, found in the god-man, Jesus christ. the challenge is to understand how we can best inhabit this self-actualization for ourselves, and that remains our task. geoff dargan

29 30 31

ibid. ibid., p. 150. ibid., p. 155.

reviews and critical discussions undetermined.

pat bigelow, Kierkegaard and the Problem of Writing, tallahassee: Florida State university press 1987, xii + 228 pp.

pat bigelow’s phenomenological study, Kierkegaard and the Problem of Writing, is one of four monographs published in the “Kierkegaard and postmodernism” series from the now defunct Florida State University Press. The fifth and unfortunately final book published in this series was the first English translation of Kierkegaard’s Prefaces. mark c. taylor served as the general editor of this series, with Louis mackey and e.F. Kaelin serving as associate editors. Kaelin’s blurb on the back cover offers a concise and insightful statement that both describes bigelow’s text, while also alluding to its purpose: “if you can read Finnegans Wake, this should be a breeze; if you can’t, then reading this may help you to.” thus, bigelow’s text concerns the limits of language and saying what cannot be said in writing; it is concerned with what Joyce refers to as “broken heaventalk,”1 or what bigelow calls “the other of meaning,”2 “the unthought(—)of difference” (chapter 5). of course, such a concern is central to Kierkegaard’s writing, and Bigelow does a fine job of helping readers to see this. “the Kierkegaardian gambit: to say by unsaying and unsay by saying. in writing. this is the deconstructive force of Kierkegaard’s ‘indirect communication.’ ”3 So begins the preface to bigelow’s text, which takes Kierkegaard as the philosopher and the writer, who responds to the gambit and powerfully performs the act of saying the unsayable. while undoubtedly illuminating Kierkegaard’s relationship to postmodernism, Bigelow’s work goes even further in very specifically aligning Kierkegaard’s writings with the phenomenological tradition and is therefore highly relevant to contemporary discussions of Kierkegaard as a phenomenologist. the introduction is entitled “the phenomenology of antiphenomenality,” and those phenomena treated in the text that resist expression in language and evince the problem of writing are silence (chapter 2), boredom (chapter 3), time (chapter 4), and difference (chapter 5). to attempt to write about these phenomena “is simply to refer to that fact that one cannot write about them,” and it is “these phenomena that are treated so incisively in 1 James Joyce, Finnegans Wake, new york: viking press 1958, p. 261. Quoted in pat bigelow, Kierkegaard and the Problem of Writing, tallahassee: Florida State university press 1987, p. 103. 2 bigelow, Kierkegaard and the Problem of Writing, p. 208. 3 ibid., p. 3.

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the Kierkegaardian text, for Kierkegaard’s genius consists precisely in his decisive sensitivity to the question of writing.”4 because bigelow’s central concern is to exhibit the problem of writing in all its fullness, he does not endeavor to carry out any straightforward comparison of Kierkegaard and any specific phenomenologists. instead, in his writing about the Kierkegaardian gambit, bigelow interweaves phenomenological analyses from husserl, heidegger, and derrida, and for the most part these are developed relatively seamlessly, although readers may still wish for a more direct discussion of Kierkegaard and phenomenology. in order to ground the discussion of the phenomenology of antiphenomenality, bigelow begins with a lengthy analysis of husserlian phenomenology (with no reference to Kierkegaard from page 12 to the bottom of page 52), which focuses on the nature of reflection, intentionality, and consciousness (including timeconsciousness), and he demonstrates a deep knowledge of husserl’s unpublished manuscripts, as well as the published german works and english translations. a fundamental insight of prime importance here is that it is possible to be conscious of an “object meant in its absence,” to intend it “emptily,” and that this possibility “is the enabling condition for intending the object expressively, that is, in language.”5 what is absent in reflection (and language) for Kierkegaard is “the immediacy of the world shining forth.”6 this, according to bigelow, is Kierkegaard’s “one lone thought”7— that there is a radical “breach between reflection and immediacy,”8 an insight husserl realized only late in his life, but one that fundamentally conditions Kierkegaard’s writing. as bigelow explains later, “the one lone thought of Kierkegaard is to seek out the trace of the completely other in the rupture of thinking from reality.”9 each of bigelow’s chapters opens with multiple epigraphs, and in chapter 1, “the praxis of parapraxis,” the question of the meaning of writing is brought to the fore as bigelow asks whether an ontology of writing is possible. Following derrida and addressing the themes of representation, referentiality, forgetfulness, and repression, we learn that such an ontology could only be possible “on the condition that it overturns the ontological venture.”10 Let us pass over chapter 2, “the poetic poaching of Silence,” and its treatment of Fear and Trembling in silence, and let us maintain that chapter 3, “the ontology of boredom,” which considers “the rotation method” from Either/Or, part 1, The Concept of Anxiety, and Heideggerian existential reflections, is boring. Bigelow would surely consent. given its title, the central themes of chapter 4, “repetition and the petition for time,” are clear enough, but the importance for bigelow of what Kierkegaard designates by the word “repetition” cannot be overstated. Kierkegaardian repetition, like derridian différance, is notorious for being “neither

4 5 6 7 8 9 10

ibid., p. 11. ibid., p. 19. ibid., p. 55. ibid., p. 53 and p. 58. ibid., p. 56. ibid., p. 95. ibid., p. 64.

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a name nor a concept.”11 what repetition marks, if this can be understood, “is the coincidence of the world with the intelligibility of the world.”12 bigelow concludes his text suitably by returning to his writing on repetition, and he writes that “repetition is where writing knows itself as something coinciding with the absence of writing.”13 although not explicitly stated by bigelow but surely performed throughout his text, an argument that follows from Kierkegaard and the Problem of Writing is that ultimately any attempt at direct communication within Kierkegaard’s writings is doomed to failure. thus, readers may wonder how bigelow would respond to the supposed claims to direct communication within Kierkegaard’s signed writings and specifically Christian truth claims. Initially Bigelow may appear to offer readers no answer, as he ends his preface with this comment: “no doubt we will contest that this has something essential to do with Christianity. No doubt. But as is befitting, i leave this unsaid.”14 although bigelow spends most of his time focused on Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writings, Kierkegaard and the Problem of Writing is not limited to the study of these texts, but rather presents a point of view for all of Kierkegaard’s work as a writer. while bigelow refers occasionally to several of Kierkegaard’s signed texts, he quite frequently cites from and discourses on Works of Love. These citations occur at highly significant places, thus suggesting that Works of Love (and by extension all of Kierkegaard’s writings) is also conditioned by the breach between language and immediacy. Consider, first, Chapter 1 where Bigelow raises the possibility of the ontology of writing. here he protests that “surely there is some hidden connection between the maieutic practice of Works of Love and the feat or fact of writing,”15 and he even suggests that “a unique theory of writing” is “intimated on every page of Works of Love.”16 then, at the end of the important chapter 4, where deliberations on repetition and time ultimately lead to a discourse on the eternal, bigelow offers readers lengthy quotations from Works of Love. Finally and fittingly, Works of Love figures prominently at the end of Bigelow’s text,17 and here readers may no doubt infer that the breach is expressed through “the hidden life of love”18—a hidden source, which is thus experienced as sourcelessness. bigelow writes: if to think truly is to leave unthought the unthought by getting leave from it to take leave of it, if to think truly is to own up to the sourcelessness of the thinker owning his thought as that which always is yet to be thought, then to think truly is to take up one’s existence and make of it christianly works of love … .19

ibid., p. 166. ibid., p. 167. 13 ibid., p. 208. 14 ibid., p. 8. 15 ibid., p. 65. 16 ibid. 17 See ibid., pp. 198–205, where the discussion focuses on Works of Love. 18 See the first chapter of Works of Love, “Love’s hidden Life and its recognizability by its Fruits” (SKS 9, 5–18 / WL, 5–16). 19 bigelow, Kierkegaard and the Problem of Writing, p. 201. 11

12

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Further, “the essential characterization of love, then, is that the thinker, in thinking truly, renounces himself as the source for the resources of selfsameness and thereby comes into infinite indebtedness to the endearing nearness of sourcelessness.”20 the breach is thus maintained, for as one performs works of love truly, one breaks with reflection and with one’s ego (one’s self) in the immediacy of loving. Thus, verily speaking, we cannot truly speak about love, which is “essentially inexhaustible” and “essentially indescribable.”21 Overall, Bigelow presents readers with a remarkably rich, dense, and difficult non-book, one that re-petitions “in writing, the phenomena, that have lapsed into the obstruction of themselves.”22 according to bigelow, repetition is that unique relation to every book’s other, to what is de-scription in the book, a scripturary demand beyond discourse, beyond language. we call this the “absence of the book” and by this term designate the sole future of writing, a future that will never come to pass.23

Perhaps its intractable difficulty accounts for the limited attention Bigelow’s work has received. nevertheless, Kierkegaard and the Problem of Writing is important for helping us to see that any writing on Kierkegaard that fails to take into account the phenomenological problem of writing and instead attempts to communicate directly Kierkegaard’s meaning is at best pretentious, ridiculous, or both. at worst it is non(-) Kierkegaardian. michael Strawser

20 21 22 23

ibid., p. 203. SKS 9, 3 / WL, 3. bigelow, Kierkegaard and the Problem of Writing, p. 209. ibid., p. 209.

reviews and critical discussions poole, roger, “the unknown Kierkegaard: twentieth-century receptions,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, ed. by alastair hannay and gordon d. marino, cambridge: cambridge university press 1998, pp. 69–70. Shakespeare, Steven, “Kierkegaard and postmodernism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Kierkegaard, ed. by John Lippitt and george pattison, oxford: oxford university press 2013, pp. 475–6.

harold bloom (ed.), Søren Kierkegaard, philadelphia and new york: chelsea house publishers 1989, viii + 252 pp.

harold bloom’s Søren Kierkegaard is an impressive collection of essays essential to understanding the reception of Søren Kierkegaard in twentieth-century philosophy.1 containing essays by such luminaries as Jean-paul Sartre, theodor adorno, Karl Jaspers, Sylviane agacinski, and Stanley cavell, this collection enables a number of views on Kierkegaard by heavy hitters in philosophy to sit together. bloom’s volume is a well-assembled panoply of philosophers that allows all of these thinkers to be considered together in how they contend with the thoughts of Kierkegaard, whether they are marxists, psychologists, existentialists, deconstructionists, or from a number of other schools of thought. adorno and Sartre provide a pair of essays that show the negative and positive receptions of Kierkegaard, respectively. Sartre’s address “Kierkegaard: the Singular universal” honors the danish philosopher and holds him up as an exemplar of antiphilosophy through many of his works.2 adorno, for his part, attacks Kierkegaard as a dangerous figure through Works of Love, arguing that his concept of the neighbor is dangerous.3 For adorno, to “love thy neighbor” in the way Kierkegaard professes in Works of Love disables the possibility of advocating for social equality because of a “fictitious, merely inward doctrine of equality.”4 For adorno, the way Kierkegaard emphasizes the religious seems a complete sticking point, yet this adds to bloom’s collection of essays of itself through the negative critique of Kierkegaard. by contrast, Sartre sees in Kierkegaard something useful even to Sartre’s professed atheism.5 on his view, Kierkegaard breaks apart systems even in as much as he remains christian. Sartre’s Kierkegaard is entrenched in the problem of how the absolute comes into the historical and thus is able to be radically individualized.6 harold bloom (ed.), Søren Kierkegaard, philadelphia and new york: chelsea house publishers 1989. 2 theodor w. adorno, “on Kierkegaard’s doctrine of Love,” in Søren Kierkegaard, p. 23. 3 Jean-paul Sartre, “Kierkegaard: the Singular universal,” in Søren Kierkegaard, p. 84. 4 theodor w. adorno, “on Kierkegaard’s doctrine of Love,” in Søren Kierkegaard, p. 27. 5 Jean-paul Sartre, “Kierkegaard: the Singular universal,” in Søren Kierkegaard, p. 96. 6 ibid., p. 76. 1

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in each of these essays, the issue is the individual taken from radically differing perspectives. in this way, it allows the reader to see the richness of Kierkegaard’s thought as it can be appropriated through the same content into completely different philosophical projects. important for understanding Kierkegaard broadly, the relationship between him and g.w.F. hegel takes much of the space in the work. many of the authors comment on this relationship. indeed, bloom opens the work by asserting that, just as we are post-Freudians, Kierkegaard was always a post-hegelian and thus needed to exist in relation to him.7 it is important to always keep in mind the relationship between Kierkegaard and the towering figure of Hegel to whom he responds. In bertel pedersen’s essay “Fictionality and authority,” he compares the difference in dialectic between hegel and Kierkegaard as monological and dialogical respectively.8 the importance of this distinction cannot be overstated. Kierkegaard’s dialogical discourse allows for the paradox to come into existence and to be simply a contrast of two ideas. For hegel, the dialectic was between a thesis and its negative, where the antithesis was merely the negative reflection of the thesis. Kierkegaard places theses in competition, not a thesis and its negative antithesis. as such, Kierkegaard’s dialectic does not allow the tidy synthesis of hegelian dialectic, where everything is simply reconciled without contradiction or paradox. Sylviane agacinski notes that Kierkegaard reworks many of hegel’s concepts and redeploys them against hegel,9 yet Sartre notes that in his death hegel regained possession of Kierkegaard.10 Though Kierkegaard’s project is a radical one, deconstructing the Hegelian artifice, hegel’s mark remains on Kierkegaard. this is not to make Kierkegaard a hegelian who simply comes from a different path, but shows that hegel simply is a part of the world of Kierkegaard. paul ricoeur notes, though, that even in as much as Kierkegaard remains in the hegelian enthrallment, he makes hegelian language not into an answer but into a deeper and more significant problem. The definition of the self in The Sickness unto Death “bears the mark of the hegelian dialectic. but as a difference from hegel, this relation that relates itself to itself is more problem than an answer, more a task than a structure.”11 puzzling though riceour’s distinction may be, it is that puzzlement that is at the heart of the Kierkegaardian thought. the hegelian mark remains on Kierkegaard not in a triumphant form but instead as an abased and deconstructed abasement. the pseudonyms are the locus of distinction between hegel and Kierkegaard. as they are considered throughout the volume, the pseudonyms pop in and out for their importance to the overall Kierkegaardian project. pedersen examines this to show the distance between Kierkegaard and himself as an author.12 Kierkegaard is harold bloom, “introduction,” in Søren Kierkegaard, p. 3. bertel pedersen, “Fictionality and authority: a point of view for Kierkegaard’s work as an author,” in Søren Kierkegaard, p. 107. 9 Sylviane agacinski, “on a thesis,” in Søren Kierkegaard, p. 126. 10 Jean-paul Sartre, “Kierkegaard: the Singular universal,” in Søren Kierkegaard, p. 81. 11 paul ricoeur, “Kierkegaard and evil,” in Søren Kierkegaard, p. 55. 12 bertel pedersen, “Fictionality and authority: a point of view for Kierkegaard’s work as an author,” in Søren Kierkegaard, p. 110. 7 8

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without authority even over his own works. we must even take the works written in his own names with a consideration of the depths of Kierkegaard’s irony. even with The Point of View Kierkegaard does not enter into the scene and become the authoritative author of his works, but produces a work of secondary literature as the first reader of his texts. We cannot, as Adorno did, attribute to Kierkegaard a weight and content absent from his entire schema. pedersen does not want to become mired in the hermeneutics of the pseudonyms to find a “real” Kierkegaard, but he wants to “outline under what conditions writing (and hence its ‘meaning’) takes place.”13 though it is not a settled debate in this volume, it is a matter for intense consideration. what do we make of Kierkegaard, a philosopher of paradox, in order to find meaning in his works? Bloom’s volume gives a variety of possible answers to this, but the reader is left in the complexity of Kierkegaard’s works, forever considering how they work together. bloom’s Søren Kierkegaard is a deep volume spanning a variety of interpretations and considerations of Kierkegaard. with the sheer weight of the thinkers on display in the volume, Bloom allows his reader to find many interpretations of Kierkegaard that show the depths of the problems of his relationships with hegel, his pseudonyms, and himself. At the heart of this volume we do not find Kierkegaard as writer but Kierkegaard at a distance from his own works. the reader comes away with the depths of his irony and the distance he puts between himself and other readers of his work. andrew m. Kirk

13

ibid., p. 102.

reviews and critical discussions Salemohamed, g., review in Modern Language Review, vol. 87, no. 2, 1992, pp. 521–3.

John d. caputo, How to Read Kierkegaard, London: w.w. norton 2007, x + 132 pp.

John d. caputo’s How to Read Kierkegaard was published in 2007 as part of the How to Read series, which includes volumes on, among others, heidegger, Sartre, and derrida.1 Simon critchley, the series editor, notes the differences between the How to Read series and other such short introductory works. whereas “[m]ost beginners’ guides to great thinkers and writers offer either potted biographies or condensed summaries of their major works or perhaps both,”2 this series “brings the reader face-to-face with the writing itself in the company of an expert guide.”3 the strategy of this series is for the author of each work to select “ten or so short extracts from a writer’s work and [look] at them in detail as a way of revealing their central ideas.”4 the extracts may not be from “a thinker’s most famous passages” but ones that “offer a series of clues of keys that will enable readers to go on and make discoveries of their own.”5 the book is broken into ten chapters, not including caputo’s brief introduction (which will be discussed later). chapter 1 is entitled “the truth that is true for me” and explains Kierkegaard’s conviction that knowledge must have existential value, or that it must relate to the concrete existence of individuals. caputo relates this point to Kierkegaard’s criticism of hegelian philosophy in denmark which Kierkegaard accused of reducing the single individual to a spectator of life. the next three chapters of caputo’s book take on a familiar element to those familiar with such short introductions of Kierkegaard, covering Kierkegaard’s three stages: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. chapter 2 covers the aesthetic stage, with caputo noting that Either/Or, part one was written to mock hegelian philosophy in the form of the indecisive pseudonym, “a.” chapter 3 discusses the ethical stage whose inherent despair leads into an explanation of the religious stage and the knight of faith. chapters 5–8 address different key elements in Kierkegaard’s thought and writings. chapter Five mainly deals with the Concluding Unscientific Postscript and John d. caputo, How to Read Kierkegaard, London: w.w. norton 2007. Simon critchley, “Series editor’s Foreword: how am i to read How to Read?” in caputo, How to Read Kierkegaard, p. viii. 3 ibid. 4 ibid. 5 ibid. 1 2

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explores the ideas of subjective truth and religiousness “a” and “b.” in chapter 6, caputo explains Kierkegaard’s use of the pseudonyms, their relationship to his personal life, and the way in which his later interpreters have understood them. chapter 7 provides insight into Kierkegaard’s fear of a modern world in which the single individual would be absorbed into the crowd and lose what made him unique, a process that he called “leveling,” a process that is mirrored in chapter 8’s discussion of commanded love. it is the commanded love of god that provides a true and eternal leveling. As Caputo addresses Kierkegaard’s later life, specifically referencing the concept of the self in The Sickness unto Death in chapter 9 and the so-called attack on christendom in chapter 10, he observes Kierkegaard’s increasingly darker tone. caputo notes that Kierkegaard, in his earlier writings, kept eternity and time in a dialectical equilibrium, but in his later writings, caputo sees Kierkegaard’s rejection of all worldly pleasure, particularly that of sexual desire and marriage, as an indication of “time [being] overwhelmed by eternity.”6 For caputo, “if that is what Christianity finally means, then Christianity, too, is despair.”7 caputo’s work has a number of interesting qualities, two of which i will mention here. First, while Caputo does reference Regine’s influence on Kierkegaard’s life and authorship, almost no mention is made of Kierkegaard’s father, aside from a brief passing reference.8 The second and more highly significant quality is Caputo’s active criticism of Kierkegaard throughout the book. i have already mentioned caputo’s criticism of Kierkegaard’s later religious views, but perhaps of greater significance is caputo’s criticism of Kierkegaard’s interpretation of the abraham story in Fear and Trembling. He writes that it is here that “we see the first signs of a distorted conception of religion that emerges in the last years of his life, where the demands of God above are so overwhelming that they can completely annul the significance of life on earth.”9 Caputo then provides a reading he finds more acceptable, that of Jacques derrida, as an alternative to Kierkegaard’s own interpretation. derrida’s interpretation of Fear and Trembling aside, it is this comparative tendency throughout derrida’s writing that provides one the book’s greatest strengths, and simultaneously, its greatest weakness. in his introduction, caputo indicates his proclivity toward demonstrating how Kierkegaard prefigures the arrival of later phenomenological, existentialist, and postmodern thought. the book is full of comparisons to martin heidegger, Friedrich nietzsche, Jean-paul Sartre, and Jacques derrida. these comparisons are helpful for showing how pervasive Kierkegaard’s influence is in the history of contemporary philosophy. caputo’s greatest strength, comparing Kierkegaard’s thought to other thinkers, may also be his greatest weakness, but maybe caputo cannot help himself. after all, his biography does say that he studies “the interface between postmodern thought and contemporary religion.”10 comparing thinkers is part of what he does. where it 6 7 8 9 10

caputo, How to Read Kierkegaard, p. 110. ibid. ibid., pp. 1–2; p. 11. ibid., p. 52. ibid., p. i.

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becomes a problem in this volume is figuring out if this work is about knowing how to read Kierkegaard or if it is about knowing how to compare Kierkegaard to others. overall, this is a very strong work. Kierkegaard’s thought can often be somewhat daunting to a new reader. while caputo may bring too many other voices to the table, he still provides the new reader with valuable insight for understanding Kierkegaard’s authorship. matthew brake

reviews and critical discussions abramson, neil remington, “Kierkegaardian confessions: the relationship between moral reasoning and Failure to be promoted,” Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 98, no. 2, 2011, p. 200; pp. 202–5; p. 207; p. 210. collins, brian h., “a voice and Something more: Jigsaw as acousmêtre and existential guru,” in To See the Saw Movies: Essays on Torture Porn and Post9/11 Horror, ed. by James aston and John wallis, Jefferson, north carolina: mcFarland & company 2013. pp. 92–3. Sæverot, herner, “Kierkegaard, Seduction, and existential education,” Studies in Philosophy and Education, vol. 30, no. 6, 2011, pp. 559–60. tilley, J. michael, “Kierkegaard and recent continental philosophy of religion,” Philosophy Compass, vol. 8, no. 4, 2013, p. 402.

clare carlisle, Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Becoming: Movements and Positions, albany: State university of new york press 2005, xi + 173 pp.

clare carlisle’s book, Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Becoming: Movement and Positions, was published in 2005 by State university of new york press. the main goal of Carlisle’s book is to answer the following question: what is the significance of movement in Kierkegaard’s writing?1 carlisle maintains that, for Kierkegaard, “inwardness” is synonymous with movement, and so she devotes the book to showing what inwardness is, why inwardness is a kind of movement, and why becoming is inextricably bound up with becoming inward, with becoming a fully actualized self.2 carlisle divides the work into three main parts: 1. “history,” an overview of theories of movement throughout the history of philosophy, 2. “commentary,” a close reading of Either/Or, Repetition, and Fear and Trembling, three texts linked by the themes of becoming and becoming inward, and 3. “analysis,” applications to other texts and other philosophers. To situate Carlisle’s book in the literature, it is the first full-length monograph in english devoted to an in-depth study of the theme of movement in Kierkegaard’s work. given that becoming and becoming a christian pervade Kierkegaard’s texts, it is clear that carlisle addresses an obvious gap in the literature. her book is unique because it puts Kierkegaard into conversation with the history of philosophy— most notably with aristotle and hegel—and she shows how Kierkegaard’s view of movement is influenced by and a response to these philosophers’ theories of movement. She is one of the few scholars to treat Kierkegaard as a serious philosopher within the history of philosophy, while also showing his rather ambivalent attitude toward philosophy in general. in part one, carlisle gives an overview of several philosophers’ theories of movement (heraclitus through hegel), focusing primarily on aristotle and hegel, since these theories were debated in denmark during Kierkegaard’s day. carlisle maintains that Kierkegaard adopts much of aristotle’s conceptual framework, especially his definition of movement as kinesis, a process that actualizes a potentiality, and the grounding of movement in the principle of non-contradiction. by moving clare carlisle, Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Becoming: Movement and Positions, albany: State university of new york press 2005, p. 3. 2 ibid., p. 2. 1

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the “plane of motion”3 from the aristotelian cosmos to inside the existing individual, carlisle maintains that kinesis and contradiction are the principles that guide the movement of inwardness. hegel, however, replaces the law of non-contradiction with mediation. contradictions reside in everything, and contradictions cause continual movement because we can dissolve, or mediate, them into a new unity, a new context of meaning. According to Carlisle, Kierkegaard is dissatisfied with mediation, because its abstract ideas do not help him to move in daily life. She says that Kierkegaard is like an adolescent son rebelling against his father (hegel).4 A clear strength of Part One is Carlisle’s treatment of Aristotle’s influence on Kierkegaard. She addresses a noticeable gap in the literature because, as she herself notes, no one in the english-speaking world since george Stack (in 1974) has studied the influence of Aristotle’s view of movement on Kierkegaard.5 carlisle convincingly sustains her case that kinesis and contradiction are fundamental to the movement of inwardness throughout the rest of her book. perhaps less strong is carlisle’s treatment of hegel. in chapter 3, “Kierkegaard’s critique of hegel,” hegel himself is virtually absent. it is mostly about the danish hegelians’ application of mediation to christianity6—which does little to show why Kierkegaard thinks mediation does not explain movement—and Kierkegaard’s personal, psychological state of mind during his student years.7 carlisle says that Kierkegaard feels personally disappointed by mediation because it does not help him to move in daily life. but why does Kierkegaard think mediation fails to produce movement? does he have a philosophical critique of hegel? mediation is supposed to produce movement everywhere, so why does Kierkegaard make the curious claim that mediation does not produce movement? carlisle gives us the conclusion, but not the steps leading to it. this also happens later in chapter 4 in her discussion of Either/ Or. She claims that mediation causes the aesthete to dissolve contradiction, and so he cannot move. but hegel thinks that it is precisely in dissolving contradiction that we move forward. why does the aesthete, and hegel, falter? Since carlisle’s study is bookended by aristotle and hegel, a more philosophical critique, not merely a biographical—historical critique, might have been helpful. in part two, carlisle provides close readings of Either/Or, Repetition, and Fear and Trembling. these texts are linked by the themes of becoming, becoming inward, and the progression involved in becoming inward. Either/Or, carlisle explains, dramatizes the debate between hegelian mediation and aristotelian contradiction, showing that movement always requires that the individual recognize the difference between his life choices and not simply mediate them.8 carlisle explains that the moment of choosing, of affirming difference, is a radical kinesis of the self. the individual’s inwardness, his power for freedom, decision, and movement itself, ibid., p. 17. ibid., p. 36. 5 george Stack, “aristotle and Kierkegaard’s existential ethics,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 12, 1974, pp. 1–19. 6 carlisle, Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Becoming, pp. 40–5. 7 ibid., pp. 36–9. 8 ibid., pp. 49–58. 3 4

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is actualized for the first time.9 in Repetition, we learn that the individual must continually repeat this kinesis of inwardness. he must continually re-actualize this power for movement, continually intensify and deepen inwardness itself.10 carlisle also claims that the entire text is another dramatization of the impotence of abstract, Hegelian philosophy (personified by Constantin Constantius) pitted against the movement of inwardness (the young man).11 in Fear and Trembling, carlisle explains, inwardness reaches its highest intensity in religious faith. the kinesis to faith is another radical transformation of the self. the individual actualizes his highest power: his capacity to make a transcendent movement, to choose a loving relationship with god, to perform the double movement of faith—resigning earthly happiness and receiving the finite world back as God’s gift.12 carlisle’s commentary on these texts is nuanced and insightful. She convincingly supports her main claims in each of the three texts—namely, that the becoming of inwardness is a kind of aristotelian kinesis and that Kierkegaard continually dramatizes the debate between the impotence of abstract (hegelian) philosophy and the movement of existential-religious inwardness. her claim that repetition is the movement of inwardness is also effective, because it shows that the individual remains constant amidst the flux of existence by re-actualizing himself in different contexts and different moments, by continually becoming what he already is over and over throughout time. the richness of carlisle’s commentary does, however, inspire some lingering questions for the reader. how does the individual make these transitions to different intensities of inwardness? can he will the kinesis or does he need help, either from man or from god? what makes the aesthete undergo the kinesis to ethical consciousness and the ethicist undergo the kinesis to religious consciousness? also, carlisle uses many different terms to talk about inwardness—freedom, decisionmaking, commitment-keeping, power for movement,13 passion,14 fidelity,15 and love.16 Sometimes these terms come a bit quickly, and the reader has a hard time putting them all together. are these terms all interchangeable ways of describing the same inwardness? how are they connected? is inwardness as love the same as inwardness as decision-making, for example? more sustained analysis on how each is the becoming of inwardness and how they fit together might have been helpful. in part three, carlisle goes further and applies the inwardness of faith to the edifying discourses. She then concludes by pointing out other philosophers who are interested in the connection between power and movement, like Spinoza and nietzsche, and the principle of repetition, like nietzsche and heidegger. the book

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

ibid., pp. 58–62. ibid., pp. 76–8. ibid., pp. 78–89. ibid., pp. 99–110. ibid., pp. 59–62. ibid., p. 99. ibid., p. 92. ibid., p. 105.

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comes to a close nicely by once more situating Kierkegaard’s theory of movement within the larger history of philosophy. overall, carlisle’s book makes valuable contributions to Kierkegaard studies. carlisle offers an in-depth, nuanced treatment of Kierkegaard’s pervasive, elusive, and little-studied theory of becoming and becoming inward. She brings Kierkegaard into conversation with the history of philosophy, making a strong case for aristotle’s influence on Kierkegaard. She also opens up the possibility of exploring the relation between Kierkegaard’s theory of movement and that of other philosophers, like Spinoza, hegel, nietzsche, and heidegger. the clear, engaging tone of the book makes it accessible to the experienced scholar and the more casual reader alike. claudine davidshofer

reviews and critical discussions benton, matthew a., review in Religious Studies, vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 488–92. Stan, Leo, review in Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses, vol. 35, 2006, pp. 581–2.

clare carlisle, Kierkegaard: A Guide for the Perplexed, London and new york: continuum 2006, ix + 166 pp.

Clare Carlisle’s introduction to the life and ideas of Søren Kierkegaard was first published in 2006 as a volume in the Guides for the Perplexed series issued by continuum.1 carlisle’s intention, in her own words, is to offer “an accessible introduction to Kierkegaard’s thought,” but “instead of simplifying his philosophy… [she] will illuminate its difficult, perplexing aspects.”2 carlisle consistently demonstrates respect for the complexity of Kierkegaard’s authorship and acknowledges that she is unlikely “to make Kierkegaard’s philosophy effortlessly understandable,”3 an impossible task in a volume of such modest length, if at all. her book aims instead to cultivate an appreciation of Kierkegaard in her readers, who might then “approach his texts with a better grasp of their background and significance, and with a better idea of who their author was, and what he was trying to achieve.”4 carlisle, presently of King’s college London, focuses her attention on Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works published in the 1840s, rather than the edifying discourses and later polemics against the danish church. her rationale for this choice is because “the pseudonymous works tend to be more frequently read and debated, and they have certainly had a greater impact on modern philosophy.”5 carlisle structures her book with chapters on Kierkegaard’s biography, his literary style and methods of communication, his critique of hegel (“which underlies his entire philosophy,” she argues),6 Kierkegaard’s idea of subjectivity, the christian notion of sin, and then commentaries on two key works, Fear and Trembling and Philosophical Fragments. carlisle situates Kierkegaard along with nietzsche as two nineteenth-century writers “who were ahead of their own time” and who both “identify apathy and nihilism as the greatest dangers of modern life.”7 the portrait of Kierkegaard that emerges from carlisle’s biographical sketch is of a man deeply influenced by his father, prone to episodes of depression and melancholy, and conflicted over his relationship with Regine Olsen. The decisive clare carlisle, Kierkegaard: A Guide for the Perplexed, London and new york: continuum 2006. 2 ibid., p. 2. 3 ibid. 4 ibid. 5 ibid., p. 3. 6 ibid., pp. 3–4. 7 ibid., p. 5. 1

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moment of Kierkegaard breaking off his engagement was, in carlisle’s words, a choice that cut him off “from the possibility of a respectable, conventional life as a husband, father, and pastor.”8 he was a man completely devoted to writing. Further, he was a philosopher unlike other philosophers, in that, Kierkegaard challenged “the traditional ideal of philosophy as impersonal and objective”; rather, “he pours his own life—his personality, his emotions, his deepest concerns—into his writing.”9 although carlisle reads Kierkegaard primarily as a philosopher, she notes that “his most basic question is about how to live a happy, meaningful life, which is for him inseparable from the question of how to become a true christian.”10 regarding the parallels between Kierkegaard’s own life and his philosophy, Carlisle fleshes out several key elements in his writing that reflect his biography, including: (1) the “inner tension between his extremely reflective, analytical mind and his passionate religious sensibilities,”11 (2) his “notoriously individualistic” philosophy,12 (3) his emphasis on choice and responsibility, (4) his willingness “to confront and to investigate his suffering,”13 (5) every individual’s existence as “becoming, of changing,”14 and (6) Kierkegaard’s commitment to continuously search for meaning. carlisle also mentions the troubling issue for his readers about identifying the “real” Kierkegaard, given the wide variety of voices one encounters in his writings. in the end, she warns us to “tread carefully” when discerning this matter.15 carlisle’s investigation into Kierkegaard’s methods of indirect communication highlight a number of vital ideas. First, Kierkegaard saw his function as a writer as making “his reader aware that he or she exists.”16 he does this through the process of “double reflection,” that is, to initially understand a text at an intellectual level and then to relate it to one’s existence.17 the pseudonyms employed by Kierkegaard allow for “a certain freedom of expression, and enables Kierkegaard to present different views of life without judging them from a moral point of view.”18 Kierkegaard, in carlisle’s estimation, “attempts to write philosophy in such a way as to expose its limitations, its failure to understand certain aspects of life.”19 this is where carlisle situates Kierkegaard’s attack on hegelianism, for “hegelian philosophy, like the aesthete, is stuck in the sphere of reflection and cannot transform ideas, or possibilities, into actuality.”20 Throughout Kierkegaard’s works, she asserts, the reader finds the claim: “from an existential point of view, intellectual reflection alone is unable to reach the

8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

ibid., pp. 10–11. ibid., p. 15. ibid., p. 16. ibid. ibid., p. 17. ibid., p. 19. ibid., p. 21. ibid., p. 22. ibid., p. 25. ibid., p. 27. ibid., p. 34. ibid., p. 35. ibid., p. 60.

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goals of ethical and religious life. religious faith is presented as a greater task and a rarer achievement than rational thought.”21 the middle chapters of this book explore the central themes in Kierkegaard’s work of subjectivity and human sin, in light of Kierkegaard’s insistence that faith, inwardness, and passion are much more essential to human existence than mere knowledge; how one lives being more important than what one knows. Kierkegaard sees theoretical abstraction as a “movement away from existence.”22 what makes him an unusual philosopher is his attention to authenticity, fidelity, and honesty in the pursuit of actualizing truth.23 this will demand, carlisle witnesses in her reading of Kierkegaard, that an individual must “resist a rationalist—and especially an hegelian—interpretation of christianity.”24 regarding the different “stages” or “spheres of existence” (aesthetic, ethical, and religious) that Kierkegaard outlines, carlisle states: “it is the fact that we have possibilities at all that marks us out from other creatures.”25 mirroring this idea, she contends that “in a sense Kierkegaard’s authorship is at once aesthetic, ethical, and religious….he attempts to perform, as an author, a kind of therapeutic action that seeks to improve the spiritual health of the reader.”26 in carlisle’s discussion of Kierkegaard’s ideas on human sinfulness, she positions him within the augustinian–Lutheran tradition as an author not concerned with challenging their interpretations on the subject, but rather as someone who differs from augustine and Luther (and their emphasis on the biological transmission of sin from adam) so as to “present it in a way that allows the individual to understand her sinfulness more clearly.”27 what Kierkegaard loathed was the slightest hint in these authors of the sort of determinism that forfeits an individual’s freedom. in her further examination of the specific texts, Fear and Trembling and Philosophical Fragments, carlisle continues along the train of thought that witnesses Kierkegaard resisting hegelian philosophy. in the end, she asserts that “the ideas that most interest Kierkegaard are ideas about the future: they are possible ways of being or courses of action, which are turned into reality by being chosen, and kept real by repeating this choice continually.”28 the uniqueness of Kierkegaard, according to carlisle, is found in the personal elements in his philosophy, which she sees as “a reaction against the increasing professionalism of philosophy…[that] modern philosophy had become dry, lifeless, and too worldly.”29 What one finds in Kierkegaard: A Guide for the Perplexed are many of the ideas that were first explored in Carlisle’s earlier work, Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of

21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

ibid., p. 61. ibid., p. 68. ibid., p. 71. ibid., p. 76. ibid., p. 77. ibid., p. 85. ibid., p. 93. ibid., p. 153. ibid., p. 156.

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Becoming: Movements and Positions,30 and then developed in her more recent book, Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: A Reader’s Guide.31 carlisle’s interpretation, here in this short volume, is neither interested in how Kierkegaard’s ideas fit into the history of western christianity or its philosophical tradition, nor how his legacy shaped later philosophy (aside from the very brief mention of heidegger and Sartre, who found an “existentialist” account of the human condition in Kierkegaard),32 but that is not her stated purpose, in what remains an accessible and interesting introduction to the philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard. robert puchniak

clare carlisle, Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Becoming: Movements and Positions, albany: State university of new york press 2005 (SUNY Series in Theology and Continental Thought). 31 clare carlisle, Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling: A Reader’s Guide, London and new york: continuum 2010. 32 carlisle, Kierkegaard: A Guide for the Perplexed, p. 156. 30

reviews and critical discussions ballan, Joseph, review in Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, no. 53, 2008, pp. 27–9. turnbull, Jamie, review in Philosophy in Review, vol. 27, no. 5, 2007, pp. 323–4.

clare carlisle, Kierkegaard’s ‘Fear and Trembling’: A Reader’s Guide, London and new york: continuum 2010, xi + 212 pp.

in her contribution to the continuum Reader’s Guide series, clare carlisle remains faithful to the declared mission of the series to provide “clear, concise and accessible introductions to classic works of philosophy.”1 indeed, as carlisle mentions in the Foreword, the availability of a clear guide should be especially welcome in the case of this famously “challenging and enigmatic text.”2 does this mean that previous attempts to meet this need have fallen short of the desired level of clarity? not at all. carlisle directs the reader, for example, to edward mooney’s Knights of Faith and Resignation and John Lippitt’s Kierkegaard and Fear and Trembling, which remain “highly recommended” starting points for anyone approaching this difficult text.3 but it is not for the sake of clarity alone that carlisle sets out again on this well-travelled road. For there is also a general reason, “to discover that the text is more difficult than i thought it was,” as well as a more particular one, “in order to think about courage.”4 while these reasons are personal, they are also—and for that very reason—consistent with Kierkegaard’s own insistence on the intrinsically personal nature of taking up a task. So we should not be surprised to find as many guides to Fear and Trembling as there are those willing to take up the task, each guide offering its own “possible interpretation” while inviting a unique response from each of its readers.5 the book is divided into three principal chapters, entitled “overview of Themes and Context,” “Reading the Text,” and “Reception and Influence.” As carlisle makes clear, the “majority of this book is expository and exegetical,”6 and the lion’s share of this is to be found in the second chapter. those who prefer “a shorter overall discussion” are invited to skip this substantial middle chapter, but 1 clare carlisle, Kierkegaard’s ‘Fear and Trembling’: A Reader’s Guide, London and new york: continuum 2010. 2 ibid., p. viii. 3 edward F. mooney, Knights of Faith and Resignation: Reading Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, albany: State university of new york press 1991; John Lippitt, The Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kierkegaard and Fear and Trembling, London and new york: routledge 2003. 4 carlisle, Kierkegaard’s ‘Fear and Trembling’: A Reader’s Guide, p. x. 5 ibid. 6 ibid.

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to do so would be to risk missing out on much of the detail and insight of carlisle’s close reading of the text.7 That close reading is prefigured in the first chapter by an introduction of the central themes of Fear and Trembling together with their relation to Kierkegaard’s wider oeuvre, as well as by a discussion of the historical, intellectual, and biographical context surrounding the text’s publication. the third chapter surveys the subsequent legacy of Fear and Trembling, with considerable attention given to twentieth-century thinkers who have been shaped by or who in turn have reconfigured Kierkegaard’s thought in their own way. introducing the principal themes, carlisle begins uncontroversially with what must be the starting point for any reading of the text, that “most immediately and obviously, the subject-matter of Fear and Trembling is the story of abraham’s response to God’s command to sacrifice his son, Isaac.”8 the biblical story of the “akedah,” or “binding,” triggers in the pseudonymous author, Johannes de silentio, a painful series of reflections on the nature of faith and the personal relationship one stands to enter into with god. carlisle joins an established interpretive tradition according to which Kierkegaard deploys the “akedah” in this way in order to shock or “provoke genuine reflection on the task of becoming a Christian,”9 particularly among his nineteenthcentury contemporaries, who, he thought, had complacently lost sight of this personal and harrowing ordeal lying at the threshold of an authentically religious existence. Lest this form of Kierkegaard’s polemic should deter any secular readers, carlisle does well to show how this task can be made equally urgent in a non-religious sense. after all, in Johannes de silentio’s account, “it is difficult to distinguish between Abraham’s relationship to god and his relationship to himself,” so much so that abraham’s ordeal could just as well be conceived through the lens of “being true to oneself” or that of “contending with self-doubt,” for example, “whether he really does love isaac more than he loves himself,” but the reader may be surprised by carlisle’s passing suggestion that a secularization of this kind may even extend as far as the concept of sin.10 carlisle is again on safe ground with the importance that she ascribes to Kierkegaard’s broken engagement with regine olsen in revealing “another dimension to the text,”11 the philosophical value of which is not thereby in danger of being reduced to the accidental or biographical. Both Abraham’s decision to sacrifice isaac and Kierkegaard’s decision to break off his engagement with regine invoke a structurally similar conflict between the commitment to one’s love, the commitment to oneself and the weight of fidelity with which each is burdened. Carlisle will later go on to probe this dimension of the text in her reading of the third “problema,” in which the pseudonym recounts the “stories of various couples who face the decision of whether or not to marry.”12 at this stage, carlisle also introduces the relationship between the religious and the ethical as it features in Fear and Trembling, and in particular raises the 7 8 9 10 11 12

ibid. ibid., p. 3. ibid., p. 4. ibid., p. 6. ibid., p. 9. ibid., pp. 130–71.

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crucial question of the possibility of a “teleological suspension of the ethical” as that imposes itself on abraham.13 these preliminary orientations draw to a close with a contextualization of Fear and Trembling within the milieu of nineteenth-century copenhagen, acknowledging the polemical yet complex relationship in which Kierkegaard stood to the prevailing authority of hegel’s philosophy. the modern age as Kierkegaard perceived it is recollected here as “ ‘a reflective and passionless age’ that ‘leaves everything standing but cunningly empties it of significance,’ ” and in which the integrity of christendom—and with it christianity itself—can be seen to be eroding away from within.14 the chapter concludes with a helpful discussion of the question of pseudonymity in general, and of the “character” of Johannes de silentio in particular. the second chapter is usefully arranged into a section-by-section exegesis of Fear and Trembling, mindful of the pseudonym’s “dreadful premonition” that his book will one day be subject to “zealous criticism” or that “one or another enterprising summarizer…will cut him up into paragraphs.”15 carlisle avoids these pitfalls by unpacking the text in a judicious and methodical spirit, unafraid to question the authority of the pseudonym where it overstretches itself, as when Johannes de silentio, with “unlikely bravado,” seems to “claim that the hopelessness of life without faith is itself an argument for…the falsity of the secular hypothesis.”16 in the course of her close reading of the text, carlisle returns to her special interest in the role of courage and its connection to love and suffering, which together are said to comprise three different “forms of open-heartedness.”17 Johannes de silentio claims to be able to make the first movement towards faith, that of a complete renunciation of the temporal and finite, the realm of worldly love. To do so requires a “purely human courage”; however, “it takes a paradoxical and humble courage to [subsequently] grasp the whole temporal realm…by virtue of the absurd, and this is the courage of faith.”18 as carlisle puts it, “resignation gives up expectations of fulfillment within this life, while the movement of faith holds onto this expectation.”19 this “extra movement is paradoxical because in a sense an individual can do nothing more than renounce everything,” exposing a limit to what can be achieved by the individual alone and calling for trust in something other, something “absurd.”20 it is in the thick of complexities such as these that the reader will be grateful to have as lucid and friendly a guide as carlisle, who has succeeded in writing a remarkably clear introduction to Fear and Trembling, while bringing into focus certain hitherto unexplored layers of the text. michael misiewicz 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

SKS 4, 148–59 / FT, 54–67. carlisle, Kierkegaard’s ‘Fear and Trembling’: A Reader’s Guide, p. 21. ibid., p. 39. ibid., pp. 56–7. ibid., p. 70. SKS 4, 143 / FT, 49. carlisle, Kierkegaard’s ‘Fear and Trembling’: A Reader’s Guide, p. 83. ibid.

reviews and critical discussions hannay, alastair, review in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2011 (online journal). powell, matthew, review in The Heythrop Journal, vol. 53, no. 1, 2012, pp. 168–9. Sych, Stephen, review in Symposium: The Canadian Journal of Continental Philosophy, vol. 15, no. 2, 2011, pp. 213–15.

J. preston cole, The Problematic Self in Kierkegaard and Freud, new haven and London: yale university press 1971, x + 244 pp.

the central assertion in J. preston cole’s 1971 The Problematic Self in Kierkegaard and Freud is that Kierkegaard’s views of the self and Freud’s psychoanalysis, rather than being incompatible or at different purposes, fundamentally complement one another. what makes cole’s book far more interesting than an explanation of their similarities is that cole sees both Kierkegaard and Freud as fundamentally at the same task: that of comprehending what it means to be a self. the basis for the differences between Kierkegaard and Freud, according to cole, resides in the fact that both were conditioned and thus limited by the intellectual and cultural constraints of their respective periods. For cole, Freud depends on a “vitalistic” ontology leading to a mechanistic view of nature and is therefore conditioned by a naturalistic conception of the human being. this dependence results in, for example, a radical determinism as well as a reductionism that pervades Freud’s thinking. however, cole sees these difficulties as “the result of Freud’s attempt to express the historical reality of human existence within a naturalistic framework” and not necessarily an inherent flaw in Freud’s conception of the self.1 indeed, he claims that Freud’s various models of the self and his ongoing development of such models “is indicative of his quest for an adequate conceptuality.”2 Kierkegaard is likewise hampered, according to cole, by an incomplete conceptual framework in his exploration of the self. unlike Freud, however, Kierkegaard’s limitations are the effects conditioned by his response to hegel and a philosophical tradition dealing with issues of not just selfhood but the question of freedom. Kierkegaard is thus limited by the “historical” just as Freud is confined to the biological. yes, both seek to break free from the limitations placed on them, and this is to their credit for cole, but each remain inescapably caught within their respective traditions and a thinking of the self colored by their own cultural and intellectual dispositions. that these two thinkers realize the limitations of their traditions in attempting to get at what a self is brings them into a kind of congruence, a congruence that serves as the basis for cole’s book. J. preston cole, The Problematic Self in Kierkegaard and Freud, new haven and London: yale university press 1971, p. 3. 2 ibid. 1

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an early foray into the relationship between the two thinkers, cole’s book returns to his 1964 ph.d. dissertation from drew university, Kierkegaard’s Concept of Dread with Constant Reference to Sigmund Freud, but represents a more focused and tightly knit development of these same themes. the title of the dissertation suggests the importance of anxiety or dread in the relation between the work of Kierkegaard and that of Sigmund Freud, and this interest in anxiety provides an important part of the groundwork in the comparison. cole is quite careful in his analysis of the two to treat each on their own terms and then in a concluding chapter in each part to develop comparisons between the two conceptual models each proposes. this allows for a rather sophisticated treatment of each, one that relies heavily on primary texts and a careful and articulate description of the conceptual models of both figures. The Problematic Self is divided into three parts, with each part containing three chapters. The chapters within each part are arranged such that the first chapter treats Kierkegaard’s approach to the topic at hand, followed by a second chapter which treats the comparable topic in Freud, and the third and final chapter of each part (cole calls these chapters “interpolations”) contains cole’s explanation as to how the two might be reconciled, or at last how to explain the similarities of the two thinkers. The first part is titled “The Dialectic of Selfhood” and deals with Kierkegaard’s and Freud’s conception of selfhood. where Kierkegaard’s understanding of self depends on a conception of Spirit, Cole finds in Freud’s notion of Libido a parallel to Kierkegaard’s Spirit. in fact, cole concludes in his “interpolation,” with the idea that sexual components of Freud’s Libido are actually transcended in Freud’s conceptual evolution of Libido into eros, thus nearing Kierkegaard’s conception of Spirit. cole writes: “i wish to maintain that Libido is Spirit viewed from the perspective of nature, and Spirit is Libido viewed from the perspective of history.”3 the second part is titled “the Loss of Selfhood” and deals in the main with Kierkegaard’s conception of despair and then Freud’s theorizing of neurosis and psychosis as comparable topics to Kierkegaard’s despair. For both Kierkegaard and Freud, the self or ego are not simply given. rather, they arrive out of a dialectical struggle for existence, and that inherently conflict-riddled struggle for selfhood involves the very real possibility of the loss of self. as expected, cole relies heavily on Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety from The Concept of Anxiety. in the case of Freud, cole uses a variety of Freud’s papers including many from the earliest history of psychoanalysis, but also the later Civilization and its Discontents and The Ego and the Id. Similar to the previous section, Cole also finds striking similarities. Freud, who is often charged with a biological determinism, actually nuances his view and develops a psychosomatic component to his theories of neurosis and psychosis. Likewise, in Kierkegaard, one determination of the self in despair is a failure to recognize the human being as a synthesis of body and spirit. where “Freud approaches the sickness psychosomatically, i.e. he treats it as a libidinal phenomenon, Kierkegaard’s approach, on the other hand, is pneumatic, which is to say, he treats it as a spiritual phenomenon.”4

3 4

ibid., p. 59. ibid., p. 127.

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The third and final part treats the notion of therapy, or more generally the possibility of the restoration of selfhood. cole begins with a discussion of recollection and repetition, which for cole brings into focus the historical dimension of human existence. through repetition the restoration of selfhood can begin to take place since repetition rejects the finite and opens onto the eternal. This movement into repetition further opens onto a religious experience involving resignation and suffering that leads ultimately to a therapeutic rooted in faith. cole then explores Freud’s conception of therapy, focusing on the problems of resistance and transference in the therapeutic process with an emphasis on Freud’s notion of “working through.” cole concludes his book with a curious tenth chapter titled “conclusion: implications for psychotherapy and theology” which is not a summary of the foregoing, but an overview of what he terms as a “unifying theory of the self.”5 this unifying theory would be, according to cole, a “genuine synthesis of psychoanalysis and existential analysis.”6 what such a synthesis looks like is not exactly clear though it necessarily moves away from Freud toward Kierkegaard and ultimately to an existential theology. In the final pages of the book, Cole briefly reviews Barth’s and tillich’s theological contributions and sees them as largely repetitions of the historical/naturalist dichotomy that governed the Kierkegaard and Freud relationship. what is both particularly interesting and also very surprising in this conclusion is that Cole seemingly departs from his careful balancing act in the first three sections and embarks on a foray into the necessity of the religious for an understanding of selfhood, a view more Kierkegaardian than Freudian. the conclusion advocates a dialectical progression from a theology of god as father, to god as holy Spirit, and finally to God as Christ. cole’s book is a relatively early intervention into the psychological dimensions of Kierkegaard’s work. For example, The Problematic Self predates Kresten nordentoft’s landmark Kierkegaards psykologi from 1972, reviewed in this volume, and was published the same year as adi Shmuëli’s Kierkegaard and Consciousness.7 as such, it is very much a part of the milieu of the 1960s and 1970s that dominated Kierkegaard studies. this milieu involved a strong interest in the psychological dimensions of Kierkegaard’s thought and how it related to the emerging fusion of psychoanalysis, depth psychology, and existential philosophy. cole’s book thus also emerges from the revision of Freud’s ideas pursued by the anti-Freudians and the neo-Freudians which took place during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. in particular, The Problematic Self is very much a part of the existential and humanist revision of Freud significant amongst Allport, Viktor Frankl, Abraham Maslow, Rollo May, and others. the book also merges with the existential psychoanalysis of norman brown and ernst becker. The Problematic Self certainly bears the marks of its historical moment and in that sense is a rather dated treatment of both Freud and Kierkegaard. to describe Freud in terms of naturalist ontology and biological determinism, while not inaccurate, 5 6 7

1971.

ibid., p. 217. ibid. adi Shmuëli, Kierkegaard and Consciousness, princeton: princeton university press

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positions him in only one of the many historical traditions he was heir to. at least one contemporary reviewer also takes issue with what he sees as the rather narrow and unexamined paradigm cole uses. Stengren, in an early review of cole’s work, challenges the paradigm of Kierkegaard as not interested in biology by asking after “the tension between freedom and necessity, mind and body, eternity and time” that is very much a part of Kierkegaard’s thought.8 Kierkegaard also becomes in cole’s book a rather uniform and resolutely philosophical figure insofar as Cole selects from a relatively small group of texts to make his argument, namely, The Sickness unto Death, The Concept of Anxiety, and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. cole is furthermore not interested in the problem of pseudonymity and the complications this introduces into any notion of a monolithic philosophy attributed to Kierkegaard. not only is such a view of Kierkegaard problematic by today’s standards, but one might see Freud in many other ways too, especially those influenced by the linguistic turn and hence the poststructuralist tradition which is rooted in Lacan’s reconceptualization of Freud, a tradition that not only bears little resemblance to cole’s Freud but challenges it directly. Despite its shortcomings, Cole’s book has seemingly had a significant impact in fields even relatively distant from Kierkegaard studies and remains a consistent touchpoint even in contemporary discussions of Kierkegaard and Freud. this is no doubt due to it being a very thorough and tightly argued book that draws the two figures together in close proximity. rather than attempting to reconcile Freud and Kierkegaard into a third possibility, cole leaves his version of both Freud and Kierkegaard as not reconciled. instead, he suggests that “we are blessed with a kind of binocular vision which may permit us to have something of a three-dimensional view of man.”9 nathaniel Kramer

george L. Stengren, review of “the problematic Self in Kierkegaard and Freud,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 13, no. 1, 1975, p. 117. 9 cole, The Problematic Self in Kierkegaard and Freud, p. 6. 8

reviews and critical discussions perkins, robert L., “always himself: a Survey of recent Kierkegaard Literature,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 12, no. 4, 1974, pp. 539–51. Simon, ulrich, review in Theology, no. 75, 1972, pp. 262–3. Stengren, george L., review in Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 13, no. 1, 1975, pp. 117–19.

James collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard, chicago: henry regnery company 1953, xiv + 304 pp.

James collins’ monograph The Mind of Kierkegaard was first published by the henry regnery company in 1953. it was updated in 1965. almost two decades later, princeton university press reissued the 1965 edition,1 though it did not contain any changes to the main body of the text. rather, collins substituted a new preface, in addition to a reworked commentary on Kierkegaardian literature. a key purpose of this “annotated bibliographical note,” explains collins, is to “point out many of the scholarly aids available for making an independent study of [Kierkegaard’s] writings.”2 though straightforward, this remark nevertheless harks back to collins’ original intention in penning The Mind of Kierkegaard—to establish Kierkegaard as a thinker worthy of serious reflection, indeed, as one of history’s outstanding minds. almost sixty years hence, with Kierkegaard’s place among the greatest western thinkers widely accepted, it is easy to forget that it was not always so. and yet, as collins recalls, Kierkegaard’s status very much hung in the balance at the midpoint of the twentieth century: “even as late as 1950, it was not unreasonable to surmise that interest in Kierkegaard in the english-speaking world might be grounded only in extrinsic considerations.”3 yes, walter Lowrie’s groundbreaking biographies on Kierkegaard had appeared,4 and scholars such as theodor haecker, eduard geismar, and david Swenson had issued what would prove to be lasting studies of the dane’s thought.5 but skepticism regarding Kierkegaard’s thinking prevailed. while his ostensible association with existentialism gave him a modish popularity, it also encouraged critics to cast him as “an adjunct to a historical movement.”6 Similarly, while the peculiarities of his authorship (such as his use of pseudonyms) invited curiosity, they also suggested a lack of sincerity, rigor and, finally, staying power. James collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard, princeton: princeton university press 1983, xiii + 314pp. all subsequent references to this text are taken from the 1983 edition. 2 ibid., p. xiii. 3 ibid., p. vii. 4 walter Lowrie, Kierkegaard, new york: oxford university press 1938, and walter Lowrie, A Short Life of Kierkegaard, princeton: princeton university press 1942. 5 See, for example, theodor haecker, Søren Kierkegaard, trans. by alexander dru, new york: oxford university press 1937; eduard geismar, Lectures on the Religious Thought of Søren Kierkegaard, minneapolis: augsburg publishing house 1937; david Swenson, Something about Kierkegaard, minneapolis: augsburg publishing house 1941. 6 collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard, p. viii. 1

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collins sums up this sort of impression with humor: “it was fascinating to delve for a while in this literary and religious hobbitland, before one moved along to other and more fashionable landscapes.”7 The Mind of Kierkegaard not only seeks to counteract such interpretive tendencies, but also hopes to forge new “avenues”8 in Kierkegaard research. it sounds like a bold aspiration, but, for most of the book, collins is content to offer a sound, if unassuming, exposition of what might be deemed the “big issues” in Kierkegaard studies. The first chapter, “Kierkegaard the Man,” is a biographical account. The next several chapters explore Kierkegaard’s theory of the stages of human existence, which Collins calls “Kierkegaard’s most influential doctrine, the one contribution with which he is usually credited by general histories of philosophy.”9 accordingly, Collins devotes significant time to each stage. The aesthetic and the ethical each receive a chapter, while the religious—including the transition into the religious— garners even more space. indeed, chapters 4–7 look at various aspects of Kierkegaard’s understanding of the religious. as with so many commentators both before and after him, collins gives a great deal of attention to the thought of Johannes climacus—the pseudonym to whom Kierkegaard ascribed Philosophical Fragments and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments. as climacus’ “‘philosophical writings’ bring us to the portals, but do not carry us across the threshold, of authentic christian existing,”10 so does this emphasis conduct the reader to The Mind of Kierkegaard’s penultimate chapter, “becoming a christian in christendom.” there collins argues that the “ultimate lesson which the study of existence in its entire range teaches us” is that life’s perfection consists of the existing individual’s union with the “loving presence and power” of Jesus christ.11 yet, for all of their helpfulness, the foregoing chapters are best seen as a springboard into what persists as the book’s most ambitious and decisive section, wherein collins strives to locate Kierkegaard’s philosophical standing. notably, Collins had flagged this interest in an earlier work, The Existentialists: A Critical Study.12 in that text, collins argues that, while Kierkegaard certainly contributed to existentialism, he should not be conflated with it willy-nilly. He returns to such considerations in the last chapter of The Mind of Kierkegaard, which is entitled “Kierkegaard and christian philosophy.” collins begins by registering his dissatisfaction with the current “either/or” in Kierkegaardian interpretation—namely, the one between “existentialist philosophers” and “crisis theologians.”13 the problem, he adds, is that each group privileges a small segment of Kierkegaard’s thought, “picking and choosing” to such an extent ibid., p. vii. ibid., p. xii. 9 ibid., p. 42. 10 ibid., p. 172. 11 ibid., p. 240. 12 James collins, The Existentialists: A Critical Study, chicago: henry regnery company 1952. 13 collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard, pp. 242–3. 7 8

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that “very little of the original subject remains after such arbitrary dissection.”14 in contrast, collins thinks it better “to accept all that [Kierkegaard] has to offer and attempt criticism of his beliefs in the light of a comprehensive philosophy,”15 which, in this case, especially means the christian thinking of thomas aquinas. collins’ frustration at the narrow appropriation of Kierkegaard’s legacy, in addition to his desire to put the dane in dialogue with thomas, is not wholly novel.16 what is unusual, however, is to see an anglophone author, writing for a general audience, undertake such a task. He proceeds by isolating five “test cases” that will illustrate the relationship between thomism and Kierkegaard’s thought: (1) the starting-point of cognition, (2) the modes of being, (3) the nature of systematic speculation, (4) the integrity of man, and (5) the relation between faith and reason.17 the results are ambiguous, precisely because collins is chary of falsely synthesizing the two thinkers. but he does show that Kierkegaard and thomas share a notable expanse of common ground, and he thereby illumines the possibility of future comparative studies. in the end, then, The Mind of Kierkegaard might be seen as an introduction in service to an invitation. And if, in the first sense, it remains useful to students of Kierkegaard, in the second sense it remains challenging. For whatever new paths it has forged remain, to this day, available for further clearing. christopher b. barnett

ibid., p. 243. ibid., p. 244. 16 See, for example, erich przywara, S.J., Das Geheimnis Kierkegaards, munich: verlag von r. oldenbourg 1929. 17 collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard, p. 245. 14 15

reviews and critical discussions anonymous, review in United States Quarterly Book Review, vol. 10, no. 1, 1954, pp. 63–4. broudy, harry S., review in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 15, no. 3, 1954–55, pp. 443–5. dobsevage, alvin p., review in The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 53, no. 10, 1956, pp. 336–40. duhrssen, alfred, review in Ethics, vol. 66, no. 3, 1956, pp. 230–1. Ferré, niels F.S., review in Christian Century, vol. 71, no. 1, 1954, p. 19. hare, v.c., review in Philosophy of Science, vol. 21, 1954, p. 269. harper, ralph, review in New Scholasticism, vol. 28, 1954, pp. 349–51. harrington, michael, review in Commonweal, vol. 59, no. 11, 1953, pp. 289–90. holmer, paul L., review in Meddelelser from Søren Kierkegaard Selskabet, vol. 5, no. 1, 1954, pp. 1–8. Kaufmann, walter, review in Kenyon Review, vol. 16, no. 3, 1954, pp. 486–90. Kelley, alden drew, review in Anglican Theological Review, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 302–4. mullaney, J.v., review in Thomist, vol. 17, no. 2, 1954, pp. 261–4. niebuhr, reinhold, review in New York Times Book Review, vol. 59, no. 6, 1954, p. 6. phelps, robert, review in Yale Review, vol. 44, no. 1, 1954, p. 137. rhoades, d.h., review in The Personalist, vol. 35, 1954, p. 400. thomas, J. heywood, review in Hibbert Journal, vol. 54, 1955–56, pp. 207–8. thulstrup, niels, review in Vendsyssel Tidende, vol. 20, no. 3, 1954. — review in Berlingske Aftenavis, vol. 22, no. 4, 1954. wild, John, review in Modern Schoolman, vol. 32, no. 2, 1955, pp. 186–90.

arnold b. come, Kierkegaard as Humanist: Discovering Myself, montreal and Kingston: mcgill-Queen’s university press 1995, ix + 483 pp.

arnold come’s exhaustive tome on Kierkegaard’s view of the self was the fruit of his half-century long fascination with Kierkegaard. the author, whose career included being a seminary professor and president, confesses that his project was motivated by a desire to comprehend the elusive nature of the self. come had intended to compose a single volume articulating Kierkegaard’s anthropology, but as his research proceeded he became increasingly convinced that the bifocal nature of Kierkegaard’s literature required a division of his project into two volumes.1 Although this first volume was published in 1995 after the influential “literary turn” in Kierkegaard studies initiated by Louis mackey, come nevertheless treated Kierkegaard as a thinker whose diverse remarks could be taken as referential propositions about life in the world that could be arranged in a comprehensive system. this made come’s work distinctive, for by the mid-1990s the effort to interpret Kierkegaard’s entire authorship as an exercise in systematic theology or philosophy had become rare. come set out to answer the most fundamental question in Kierkegaard scholarship: what was the basic nature of Kierkegaard’s project? was he primarily a philosopher? or was he principally a christian theologian? come answered that he was both. according to come, Kierkegaard’s focus on the self had two distinguishable dimensions. one was the underlying structure of selfhood, while the other was the conditions for the fulfillment of the self’s entelechy in a community of love.2 consequently, come distinguishes Kierkegaard as a “humanist,” someone who develops a phenomenological analysis of the most basic features of human existence, from Kierkegaard as a christian theologian, someone who exposits the basic motifs of the christian faith. he claims that Kierkegaard’s pages contain an anthropological ontology that is detachable from his christian convictions, and which possesses a certain plausibility quite apart from such convictions.3 in spite of the distinction of Kierkegaard the humanist and Kierkegaard the theologian, come by no means wanted to suggest that Kierkegaard’s anthropology arnold b. come, Kierkegaard as Humanist: Discovering Myself, montreal and Kingston: mcgill-Queen’s university press 1995, pp. xvii–xxii. 2 ibid., p. xvii. 3 ibid., p. 13. 1

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and his theology are entirely disconnected. although the anthropology is independent of christian commitments, it does bear a complex dialectical relation to christianity. For one thing, the universal dynamics that it describes must be actualized before an individual can embrace christianity. moreover, the anthropological dynamics contain intimations of Christianity and point to their fulfillment in Christian faith.4 the dynamics are present implicitly in all individuals, but they may not be operating at the level of self-consciousness. in christian faith they become overt and conscious, and because of this clarity their existence prior to faith can be retrospectively discerned. come proposes that the key to Kierkegaard’s anthropology is to be found in the opening section of The Sickness unto Death, where a sketch of spiritual health is schematically presented. according to come, the writings of climacus and haufniensis, particularly those concerning the stages of life and anxiety, must be used to flesh out this schema. More surprisingly, Come claims that Works of Love, ostensibly a specifically Christian book, provides a more detailed description of the ground and telos of these dynamics of selfhood. according to come, the key to Kierkegaard’s anthropology is anti-climacus’ celebrated contention that the self is a relation that relates itself to itself. the self is the capacity to attempt to integrate the polarities of infinitude and finitude, the temporal and the eternal, and freedom and necessity. The first term of each polarity suggests a dimension beyond the immediate environment, a dimension available to the imagination. the second term indicates an aspect of the realm of fortuitous givens that characterize life in space and time. Infinitude points to the ultimacy of ethical and religious imperatives, while finitude points to the concrete situation of the individual agent. the eternal suggests the comprehensive and enduring nature of the demand, while the temporal suggests the specificities of the moment. Necessity indicates the constraining factors of the individual’s context, while possibility points to a future that is not determined by the past. come adds that Kierkegaard’s description of selfhood is not complete without emphasizing the need to depend upon the power that posited the self. in other words, Kierkegaard’s descriptive phenomenology is implicitly religious. here come differs from the earlier work of John elrod, who construed Kierkegaard’s ontology of selfhood as being ethical but not religious.5 according to come, Kierkegaard’s anthropological ontology necessarily includes a reference to a religious “other.” the self experiences itself as having been created by something other than itself, to which it must relate itself. Kierkegaard’s self thus attains self-awareness in the ethical-religious sphere of climacus’ religiousness “a.” come adds that for Kierkegaard the most painful aspect of selfhood is that this struggle to integrate the polarities inevitably fails. in the religious sphere the individual recognizes her inability to consistently and unconditionally enact the happy synthesis of the finite and the infinite. Consequently, generalized guilt and despair are intrinsic and universal features of the human condition. however, ibid., p. 352. John elrod, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Works, princeton: princeton university press 1975, pp. 19–20. 4 5

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come claims that Kierkegaard discerned in the religious sphere itself a preliminary resolution to this tragic dilemma. the self can still relate to the absolute, but only negatively, by admitting its own impotence. by so doing, the self opens itself to help from a power from beyond the self, which can be accessed by embracing the nothingness in the depths of the self. no revelation, no paradoxical savior, and no supernatural grace are necessary here. Perhaps Come’s most significant conclusion is that immanent religion itself can involve a comprehensive breach with ordinary human life and a religious leap, without any reliance upon specifically Christian teachings. religiousness “a” has its own variant of a leap of faith and reliance upon god. to clarify the difference from christian faith, come adds that in this scenario the individual still discovers its own nothingness and the interior divine empowerment through its own agency. a distinctive characteristic of come’s construal of Kierkegaard’s humanism is his identification of radical love as the absolute telos of the self and as the content of self-integration.6 the polarities can only be integrated through the pursuit of a life of non-preferential and unconditional love. The desire to enact this kind of unselfish regard for the neighbor is the essence of the “self” that has been structured into all human beings. consequently, Works of Love is not primarily an exposition of christian moral teachings but a description of the goal of human life that can be discerned within religiousness “a.”7 come’s work, magisterial and intriguing though it is, leaves the reader with several disquietudes. First, his effort to downplay the literary features of Kierkegaard’s texts minimizes the importance of Kierkegaard’s strategies of indirection. Second, Come’s tendency to conflate themes from different books may not do justice to Kierkegaard’s sensitivity to the particularities of different contexts of communications. third, Kierkegaard’s pervasive attention to subjectivity as a requisite for genuine religious communication raises doubts about the wisdom of abstracting Kierkegaard’s alleged phenomenological description from the context of pathos. Finally, except for noting a shift after Kierkegaard read trendelenburg, come tends to ignore questions of Kierkegaard’s development, or the possibility of fissures and tensions in the authorship. Lee c. barrett

6 7

ibid., p. 335. ibid., pp. 324–97.

reviews and critical discussions Barnett, Christopher, “The Mystical Influence on Kierkegaard’s Theological anthropology,” in Kierkegaard and Human Nature, ed. by andrew burgess et al., toronto: Kierkegaard circle, university of toronto and nitra, Slovakia: central european research of Søren Kierkegaard 2013 (Acta Kierkegaardiana, vol. 6), p. 105; p. 107; p. 118. Khan, abrahim, review in Studies in Religion, vol. 27, no. 3, 1998, pp. 332–3. Law, david, Kierkegaard’s Kenotic Christology, oxford: oxford university press 2013, p. 3; p. 6; p. 138; p. 220. Loder, James, review in Theology Today, vol. 54, 1997, pp. 130–1. mooney, edward, review in Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, no. 35, 1998, pp. 7–12.

arnold b. come, Kierkegaard as Theologian: Recovering My Self, montreal and Kingston: mcgill-Queen’s university press 1997, ix + 387 pp.

Kierkegaard as Theologian: Recovering My Self is the second in arnold come’s two-volume exposition of Kierkegaard’s corpus as a whole.1 While the first volume, Kierkegaard as Humanist: Discovering My Self had treated Kierkegaard as a phenomenologist of generic human experience,2 this subsequent book presents him in the role of a specifically Christian theologian. against interpreters like Louis mackey who construed Kierkegaard as being primarily a poet or an ironic provocateur, come contends that Kierkegaard employed his considerable literary talents to clarify the morphology of the christian faith.3 Kierkegaard was first and foremost a theologian who subordinated poetry to the service of theology. come asserts that poets deal with images, while theologians deal with concepts, and concludes that Kierkegaard was mostly in the business of conceptual clarification. Kierkegaard’s overarching purpose was to present the contours of the christian life clearly so that the reader would be enabled to intentionally adopt it. according to come, Kierkegaard as theologian made explicit the implicit connections among christian concepts, and detected an underlying pattern: the self as a gift, the self as a failure, and the self in need of the eternal. in spite of his celebrated attention to passion, Kierkegaard was convinced that rigorous reflection played an important role in illuminating the Christian ideal. Kierkegaard regarded this crucial definition of the foundational concepts of Christianity as a “dialectical” enterprise, not just a rhetorical one. Sometimes, come argues, Kierkegaard even wrote as if the sheer formulation of clearer concepts would lead directly to the inward deepening that genuine faith requires.4 Come carefully qualifies these claims with the reminder that Kierkegaard did not reduce faith to cognitive assent to doctrinal propositions. he insists that for Kierkegaard christianity is not a speculative doctrine to be understood, but is rather arnold b. come, Kierkegaard as Theologian: Recovering Myself, montreal and Kingston: mcgill-Queen’s university press 1997. 2 arnold b. come, Kierkegaard as Humanist: Discovering Myself, montreal and Kingston: mcgill-Queen’s university press 1995. 3 Louis mackey, Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet, philadelphia: university of pennsylvania press 1971. 4 come, Kierkegaard as Theologian, p. 9. 1

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a way of life to be enacted. Kierkegaard’s central goal was to awaken individuals in the church who had become complacent and spiritually somnolent. consequently, he did use indirect communication and sophisticated rhetorical strategies to foster specifically Christian dispositions in the reader and to encourage a decisive commitment to the christian life. but, come insists, Kierkegaard always returned to the theme that christian pathos is shaped by the distinctive concepts of the christian tradition.5 in spite of his vitriolic attacks on the amalgamation of the danish church and danish culture, Kierkegaard continued to exhibit devotion to the church as the bearer of tradition. consequently, Kierkegaard assumed the authority of the doctrinal tradition of the church, the authority of the biblical revelation upon which it is based, and the actuality of certain revelatory events in history. come suggests that Kierkegaard related doctrines and pathos, or objectivity and subjectivity, in three different ways. Sometimes Kierkegaard treated doctrines as factual claims that are the necessary conditions for the development of certain forms of pathos. For example, he assumed that the incarnation was an objective occurrence without which joy over god’s solidarity with humanity would have no basis. Similarly, gratitude for the forgiveness of sins is linked to convictions about historical events such as the crucifixion of Jesus. However, at other times Come treats subjectivity and objectivity in Kierkegaard’s writings as parallel but different sources of theological reflection. Sometimes theology articulates the essence of a Christian passion, and sometimes it describes a concept. come suggests that Kierkegaard regarded theology as having an objective source in the authoritative tradition and a subjective source in the inwardness of the believer. in yet other contexts come proposes that in Kierkegaard’s writings subjectivity is the raw material that is given a more definite shape by Christian concepts. In these portions he insists that Christian concepts presuppose the presence of the more diffuse religious subjectivity that he had outlined in his previous volume. For example, come asserts that the generic human sense of being a moral and spiritual failure is intensified and sharpened through the appropriation of the concept “sin.” the capacity of christian teachings to give more specificity to universal subjectivity is due to a correspondence between universal human yearnings and their particular actualization the christian life.6 it is this last way of integrating pathos and the teachings of christianity that most captures come’s attention. this strategy of treating Kierkegaard as both a humanist and as a theologian enables come to reconceptualize Kierkegaard’s contributions to the history of theology. most importantly, his analysis of subjectivity provides the basis for a very personalistic view of god in which god’s love becomes more central than god’s metaphysical perfections. also, Kierkegaard transcended long-standing protestant debates about the relationship of faith and works of love by seeing them as two dimensions of the same phenomenon. Furthermore, Kierkegaard resolved the antinomy of god’s unconditional grace and human responsibility by implicitly affirming the Arminian position that God offers grace, which the individual must freely accept. Finally, come proposes that although Kierkegaard may have 5 6

ibid., p. 40. ibid., p. 372.

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had an inadequate appreciation of the church as an institution, his affirmation of intersubjectivity in Works of Love provides the basis for a more robust sense of religious community than is usually ascribed to him. in all these instances Kierkegaard’s anthropological analysis is seen as regulating his exposition of christian doctrines. in come’s view, Kierkegaard did have a foundational anthropology that served as the lens through which christianity must be viewed. in many ways, come’s approach to Kierkegaard was typical of many american scholars from the 1960s to the 1980s who teased an existential metaphysics out of Kierkegaard’s pages. Since then, objections have been raised to the sharp distinction of Kierkegaard’s rhetorical and theological dimensions, and to the differentiation of Kierkegaard as a humanist and as a christian writer. the interplay of pathos and concepts, and of irony and edification, may be more subtle than come portrays. Lee c. barrett

reviews and critical discussions hall, ronald, review in International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, vol. 47, no. 2, 2000, pp. 121–4. Sponheim, paul, review in Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, no. 36, 1998, pp. 6–8.

george connell, To Be One Thing: Personal Unity in Kierkegaard’s Thought, macon; georgia: macon university press 1985, xvi + 197 pp.

in 1985, george connell published his ph.d. thesis from vanderbilt university: To Be One Thing: Personal Unity in Kierkegaard’s Thought. connell’s work was received at the time as an “important contribution to Kierkegaard research”1 and as a “success in placing Kierkegaard’s work in its intellectual context.”2 almost thirty years later, the work remains significant, as it offers a new perspective on Kierkegaard’s approach to unity: the underlining of personal unity as an ongoing theme in Kierkegaard’s overall authorship, ranging from his earliest writings until his latter christian writings. in this important work, connell sees Kierkegaard as an author who sought to express the interrelationship of unity and selfhood in his writings, thereby trying to elucidate the human condition. according to connell, the theme of unity is not bound to a single work of Kierkegaard, but is recurrent throughout his letters, journals, and published works (both the pseudonymous and signed texts). even though the notion of unity had been noted in Kierkegaard research prior to this publication, connell argues for a development of the theme throughout the whole authorship, making his work the first of its kind. It is safe to agree with Connell’s assertion that before the publication of To Be One Thing Kierkegaard’s idea of unity had not been seen “in its unity.”3 he compiles the different and scattered descriptions of unity in Kierkegaard’s works, from unity within the arts and sciences, to the essential oneness of the christian self. he calls for the understanding that Kierkegaard’s various forms of oneness have a connection; they display a dialectic in which one concern with oneness leads to the next. Connell’s method is threefold. In the first part he approaches the young Kierkegaard and his early attempts to find an essential unity of thought. In the second part, the focus shifts to the rebellious self of the aesthete, chiefly in Either/Or, robert L. perkins, review in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol. 57, no 1, 1989, p. 181. 2 Lee c. barrett, review in Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 21, no. 1, 1987, p. 55. 3 george connell, To Be One Thing: Personal Unity in Kierkegaard Thought, macon, georgia: macon university press 1985, p. xvi. 1

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part one. Finally, connell moves to Kierkegaard’s predominantly religious writings, concluding that the subject of unity is a foundational theme in Kierkegaard’s thought, from the very beginning. For Kierkegaard, the properly ordered self is derived from two different poles, the temporal and the eternal; a notion pivotal to connell’s task. when the synthesis of these two poles takes place within the self, it becomes truly unified and at one with itself. Becoming one thing is therefore impossible if the object of the self does not have the qualities of the good (god).4 if the object is a worldly goal, or a unity of worldly goals, the task of becoming one thing becomes futile. connell begins by observing the young Kierkegaard in the mid-1830s, and his struggle to find personal unity in the current intellectual thought about art and science. here, connell sees in Kierkegaard—prior to the launch of his authorship proper—a passion for the individual self and also a sense of disbelief that a systematic unity of science could be counted as a model for human oneness. in order for the self to become one thing, a particular sort of life-view has to be present. connell argues that as a young man, Kierkegaard had already felt a deep struggle and displayed a passion for finding a project that will unify and direct his life. As is apparent from his writings during his stay in gilleleje in the summer of 1835, the young Kierkegaard was not satisfied to juxtapose systematic unity of knowledge with personal unity, since unity of a system of knowledge could never bring about the unity of the individual subject. this gives connell, and other scholars such as malantschuk,5 a reason to think that the development of Kierkegaard’s thought had been essentially complete at the beginning of his authorship. the young Kierkegaard also recognized every true work of art as a display of unity. in his criticism of h.c. andersen’s work and his lack of coherent life-view, connell sees Kierkegaard’s passion for unity on display. For Kierkegaard, a work of art has to embrace essential unity; he considered the unity of the product—the work of art—incorporating the unity of the artist as a person. andersen did not portray such a personal development of a life view. in part two, connell shifts his focus to Either/Or, part one, in order to elucidate the development of unity throughout the work, from “the immediate Stages of the erotic” to “the diary of a Seducer.” the shifting between the immediate and the reflective aesthetic views presented in Either/Or, part one echoes the discontinuity of the aesthetic life. the aesthete cannot maintain a self-identity, and by carefully scrutinizing the underlying structure of Either/Or, part one, connell underlines how peculiar the aesthete’s agenda with change truly is. connell is critical of scholars who focus on the object side of the subject–object relationship, around which Either/ Or, part one is built, and therefore fail to see changes that take place within the relationship of the aesthete as a subject and the aesthete as an object.6 he sets out to prove that these two pleas gradually mediate into an identity. therefore connell asserts and emphasizes that the aesthete’s relation to change differs from essay to essay, in relation to a subject–object structure. ibid., p. 189. gregor malantschuk, Kierkegaard’s Thought, trans. by howard v. hong and edna h. hong, princeton: princeton university press 1971, p. 7; p. 8; p. 12. 6 connell, To Be One Thing: Personal Unity in Kierkegaard Thought, p. 54. 4 5

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in the “immediate Stages of the erotic,” change moves from the immediate, and therefore implies something about change and changelessness in the aesthetic stage, that the other essays continue to develop. in the “rotation method,” connell sees a “radical antithesis” to the vision presented in “immediate Stages of the erotic” when it comes to the relation of the aesthete to change. whereas before change was presented as a natural force, vivid in don Juan, in the “rotation method,” change becomes a “product of principle-governed action.”7 in “the diary of a Seducer,” connell sees a more seamless mediation of subject and object than in the preceding essays. he sees the diary as an account that shifts emphases and changes aspects drastically in the development of a relationship between the subject (Johannes) and the object of attention (cordelia); this makes the diary stand out from the essays because it completes the dialectics that have been unfolded throughout the rest of the work. By pointing out, in Part Two, how immediacy slowly gives way to reflection, connell continues his journey to point out how a oneness of self is to be found on a path the aesthete does not walk. in the third part, connell shifts his focus to Kierkegaard’s claim that the self becomes unified when it actualized a relationship with God. This is a transformational process of the self, and the self possesses the possibility of a transformation into a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal. For connell, the Kierkegaardian notion of repetition characterizes two of the four forms of genuine selfhood discussed by Kierkegaard (the “ethical” and the “christian”). the other two (the “ironic” and the “immanent religious”) are more fundamentally characterized by recollection. in these four forms of genuine selfhood, connell sees a developmental relationship: each form of self has its own expression of oneness that betters the weaknesses of its predecessors. as the study progresses from the ironic to the ethical, from the immanent religious to the christian self, we come to see that only in the christian self can the demand for oneness be truly met. The ethical self and the Christian can reconstitute the finite temporal dimension of the self by means of repetition, and thereby become positively unified as individuals, whereas the ironist and the religious self constantly renounce the finite and thereby adopt a negative stance towards it. the unity these two types of selves achieve is therefore the only one which is available to it, according to connell. he places considerable significance upon the contrast between the nonessential repetition of selves related to the eternal through recollection, and the genuine repetition of the ethical and Christian selves. The infinite is used to transform and unify the finite. however, connell rightly points out that a purely ethical existence fails in its transformation of a new selfhood, since the ethical self tries to uphold a positive relationship to the finite and to God at the same time. the essential link, connell claims, between the central idea of Kierkegaard’s christian ethics (the neighbor and the theme of personal unity) is to be found in how the christian self is immediately postured towards and wholly about expressing love, whereas merely “human love” is always divided from within.8 when the self expresses its relationship to god, it becomes wholly present to the given situation. 7 8

ibid., p. 78. ibid., p. 189.

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connell’s argument is therefore fairly clear-cut: personal unity is in the center of Kierkegaard’s concerns. it has a foundational role, and connell claims that if we pay close attention to it, we come to see a “structure and meaning where disorder and ambiguity ruled previously.”9 personal unity is not a given reality but something that has to be won through time and personal striving. To Be One Thing is an elucidating work, which focuses upon Kierkegaard’s own text without relying too heavily on secondary literature. in doing so, it provides the reader with a noteworthy approach to Kierkegaard’s overall authorship and his task as an author. gudmundur bjorn thorbjornsson

9

ibid., p. 192.

reviews and critical discussions anderson, thomas c., review in Modern Schoolman, vol. 67, no. 1, 1989, pp. 86–7. barrett, Lee. c., review in Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 21, no. 1, 1987, pp. 55–6. Figal, günter, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 15, 1991, pp. 160–1. perkins, robert L., review in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol. 57, no 1, 1989, pp. 181–2.

george connell and c. Stephen evans (eds.), Foundations of Kierkegaard’s Vision of Community: Kierkegaard on Religion, Ethics and Politics, atlantic highlands, new Jersey: humanities press 1992, xxii + 245 pp.

this volume is a collection of essays edited by george connell and c. Stephen evans; they were originally presented as papers at the 1988 international Kierkegaard conference hosted at St. olaf college. the essays are for the most part strong, and they reveal a turn in Kierkegaard scholarship toward communal, social, and political matters alongside Kierkegaard’s Christian commitments and his reflections on self, choice, and individuality. The volume contains three parts—the first two parts deal with Kierkegaard’s religious ethics in both his pseudonymous and second authorship. the third part addresses Kierkegaard’s more direct contributions to social and political matters. The first set of essays focuses on Kierkegaard as a religious thinker. Plekon’s “Kierkegaard the theologian”1 challenges the “superprotestant” reading of Kierkegaard where his attention to the single individual, the one-to-one god relation, and his attack on the danish church are not understood in the context of his concern for the christian faith and practice, the community of saints, and the church. he draws heavily from Works of Love to offer an alternative to the received view of Kierkegaard as asocial and apolitical. in his “Kierkegaard on authority,” dunning argues that Kierkegaard’s understanding of authority is neither blind, unreflective obedience nor an abandonment of authority in deference to human reason.2 rather, it is a recognition of god’s active work in the person of faith as he or she recognizes the authority of revelation by the divine work of faith. mark Lloyd taylor describes the story of abraham in Fear and Trembling and Job in Repetition as indirect communication that is not intended as a direct example for the religious person to michael plekon, “Kierkegaard the theologian: the roots of his theology in works of Love,” in Foundations of Kierkegaard’s Vision of Community, ed. by george connell and c. Stephen evans, atlantic highlands, new Jersey: humanities press 1992, pp. 2–17. 2 Stephen n. dunning, “who Sets the task? Kierkegaard on authority,” in Foundations of Kierkegaard’s Vision of Community, pp. 18–32. 1

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model.3 These three essays constitute the first section, “The Religious Vision,” of the volume, and they indicate how the religious dimension of Kierkegaard’s thought lies at the base of his social and political thought. the second section of essays addresses Kierkegaard’s ethical views. connell’s contribution shows the continuity and discontinuity between Judge william’s and Kant’s ethical views.4 he challenges the view that the ethical standpoint involves a radically free choice and instead argues that the Judge’s ethic is grounded in the relation to god by means of a movement to stand alone before god and is completed as the person returns and embraces the world and other people. mooney’s essay returns to Fear and Trembling and argues that the movement of faith is not the suspension or abandonment of ethics.5 rather, it is the return of isaac, the embracing of family life, the world, and ethics that is the movement of faith. the movement of resignation and suspension are crucial for reflecting on and distancing oneself from cultural and ethical conventions, but the movement of faith returns to these features of human life holding them without thinking them an absolute rule of conduct. Keeley’s “Subjectivity and world in Works of Love” is a critique of Louis mackey’s “the Loss of the world in Kierkegaard’s ethics” with special attention to Works of Love.6 Her interpretation exemplifies the dialectical structure of both movements described in the prior two essays: she argues that the interiority of love entails a movement to express and practice love. each of these three essays draws a similar conclusion about the nature of ethical commitments between human beings—that is, they all argue that Kierkegaard’s thought has an unmistakable subjective dimension essential for ethical reflection, yet this is not the end of the story. The reflective ethical standpoint, the subjective self, will return and embrace the concrete particularities of his or her social and ethical commitments. the third part is by far the largest section in the volume—about the same length as the previous two sections combined, and it concerns Kierkegaard’s social and political thought more directly than the others. the essay from the collection that has had the most lasting influence in contemporary Kierkegaard scholarship is the first essay in this section: merold westphal’s “Kierkegaard’s teleological Suspension of religiousness b.”7 in it, he argues that Kierkegaard lays out three religious stages— the first two A and B in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript and the third, which westphal labels c, in his second or religious ethic. in the same way that religiousness b dialectically negates and develops religiousness a, religiousness c dialectically negates and develops religiousness b. it is not a fundamental break with the previous religious stage but instead a realization that what was previously understood as 3 mark Lloyd taylor, “ordeal and repetition in Kierkegaard’s treatment of abraham and Job,” in Foundations of Kierkegaard’s Vision of Community, pp. 33–55. 4 george b. connell, “Judge william’s theonomous ethics,” in Foundations of Kierkegaard’s Vision of Community, pp. 56–70. 5 edward mooney, “getting isaac back: ordeals an reconciliations in Fear and Trembling,” in Foundations of Kierkegaard’s Vision of Community, pp. 71–95. 6 Louise carroll Keeley, “Subjectivity and world in Works of Love,” in Foundations of Kierkegaard’s Vision of Community, pp. 96–109. 7 merold westphal, “Kierkegaard’s teleological Suspension of religiousness b,” in Foundations of Kierkegaard’s Vision of Community, pp. 110–29.

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absolute and complete is contextualized and understood anew. More specifically, the paradoxical one-to-one god-relation is understood in the context of Kierkegaard’s later religious ethic where faith is lived out and inevitably results in public persecution and suffering for the gospel. eric ziolkowski and michele nicoletti’s contributions,8 like westphal’s, offer a critique of modern political ideologies that absolutize a given social arrangement. both essays portray Kierkegaard’s conception of religion as an antidote to complete immersion in modern political life. Kierkegaard, however, does not merely offer a critical assessment of contemporary political phenomena. as Stephen crites argues, the concept of the self articulated in The Sickness unto Death is essentially social. it is appropriate to apply this analysis to contemporary social institutions. bruce Kirmmse’s contribution presents Kierkegaard in his immediate historical context within the confines of the Danish golden age, and Kirmmse argues that the political changes in denmark surrounding the bloodless 1848–49 revolution shaped Kierkegaard’s later authorship.9 both nicoletti and Kirmmse see Kierkegaard’s thought as a response to the secularization and democratization in modern political life. The final two essays, authored by Wanda warren berry and charles bellinger, speak to contemporary social and political issues.10 the former offers a framework for rejecting Kierkegaard’s penchant for misogyny while appreciating the relevance of Kierkegaard’s thought for understanding gender relations. the latter explores how Kierkegaard’s thought can be applied to global political issues. The volume was one of the first scholarly works in English to significantly challenge the “long prevailing conception of Kierkegaard as the great spokesman of asocial individualism.”11 although there were some works prior to this volume that highlight these features of Kierkegaard’s thought, this collection of essays functions as a barometer revealing a new area of Kierkegaard’s thought pertaining to historical and contemporary social and political issues. Furthermore, it provided a number of foundational essays that have spurred further work in this burgeoning area of Kierkegaard scholarship. despite the merits of this collection, this set of essays is limited in what it can accomplish. Since the volume is a collection of essays from a variety of scholars often addressing a relatively small set of Kierkegaard’s texts (e.g., Fear and Trembling and Works of Love are central in a large number of essays), there is no eric J. ziolkowski, “don Quixote and Kierkegaard’s understanding of the Single individual in Society,” in Foundations of Kierkegaard’s Vision of Community, pp. 130–43. michele nicoletti, “politics and religion in Kierkegaard’s thought: Secularization and the martyr,” in ibid., pp. 183–95. 9 bruce h. Kirmmse, “call me ishmael—call everybody ishmael: Kierkegaard on the coming-of-age crisis of modern times,” in Foundations of Kierkegaard’s Vision of Community, pp. 161–82. 10 wanda warren berry, “Finally Forgiveness: Kierkegaard as a ‘Springboard’ for a Feminist theology of reform,” in Foundations of Kierkegaard’s Vision of Community, pp. 196–217. charles bellinger, “toward a Kierkegaardian understanding of hitler, Stalin, and the cold war,” in ibid., pp. 218–30. 11 george connell and c. Stephen evans, “introduction,” in Foundations of Kierkegaard’s Vision of Community, p. xx. 8

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unified, coherent picture of Kierkegaard’s social and political thought. Connell and evans concur and openly acknowledge that the volume is neither an “exhaustive” nor a “systematic” treatment of Kierkegaard’s thought regarding these issues.12 Furthermore, a significant amount of the work is exegetical and provides little in the way of an overarching framework for understanding these seemingly isolated social and political aspects in Kierkegaard’s thoughts. the essays that are suggestive about a larger portrait of Kierkegaard’s social and political thought (e.g. connell’s and evans’ introduction and westphal’s essay) are still too fragmented to offer a larger interpretive strategy for engaging and evaluating Kierkegaard’s social and political thought. Foundations of Kierkegaard’s Vision of Community has marked a shift in Kierkegaard scholarship. it describes and presents a Kierkegaard whose concerns with christianity, faith, and the god-relation do not detract from social and political engagement but enhance it. It also contains some highly influential essays that will continue to be important for Kierkegaard scholars in the future. of course, it is neither the final nor a complete word on these matters. Rather, it invites more reflection on these crucial features of Kierkegaard’s thought, and this is perhaps the chief merit of the volume. J. michael tilley

12

ibid.

reviews and critical discussions cain, david, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 17, 1994, pp. 165–70. calhoun, david h., review in Ethics, vol. 104, no. 4, 1994, p. 931. Fletcher, david b., review in Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, no. 29, 1994, pp. 10–12. matuštík, martin J., “Kierkegaard as Socio-political thinker and activist,” Man and World, vol. 27, no. 2, 1994, pp. 211–24. pattison, george and Steven Shakespeare (eds.), “introduction,” Kierkegaard: The Self in Society, new york: St. martin’s press 1998, pp. 1–23.

charles L. creegan, Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard: Religion, Individuality, and Philosophical Method, London and new york: routledge 1989, vi + 158 pp.

as might be expected from its title, charles L. creegan’s Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard: Religion, Individuality, and Philosophical Method is a comparative text. in its pages, wittgenstein and Kierkegaard are placed in dialogue for the purpose of mutual illumination.1 Since the publication of creegan’s text, several comparative studies of these thinkers have appeared.2 in contrast to this subsequent proliferation of texts, not many comparative studies of the two thinkers had been attempted at the time of Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard, as creegan himself points out.3 it should be mentioned, however, that there were more comparative studies of Kierkegaard and wittgenstein than creegan admits in his introduction.4 nevertheless, creegan is certainly correct that the kind of fullcharles L. creegan, Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard: Religion, Individuality, and Philosophical Method, London and new york: routledge 1989, p. 6: “[t]his study depends on a mutual relation of suggestiveness. Both in the wider problem of method and the specific problem of faith, the terms which Kierkegaard employed (such as ‘without authority’ and ‘the individual’) often clarify a dimension in wittgenstein’s life and work. wittgenstein’s categories (such as ‘form of life’ and ‘showing’) give new reach and grounding to Kierkegaard’s project.” 2 For example, Stephen mulhall, Inheritance and Originality: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, oxford and new york: oxford university press 2001; mariele nientied, Kierkegaard und Wittgenstein: “Hineintäuschen in das Wahre,” berlin and new york: walter de gruyter 2003 (Kierkegaard Studies Monograph Series, vol. 7); onno zijlstra, Language, Image and Silence: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein on Ethics and Aesthetics, bern and new york: peter Lang 2006; genia Schönbaumsfeld, A Confusion of the Spheres: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein on Philosophy and Religion, oxford and new york: oxford university press 2007; and michael g. harvey, Skepticism, Relativism, and Religious Knowledge: A Kierkegaardian Perspective Informed by Wittgenstein’s Philosophy, eugene, origen: pickwick publications 2013. 3 creegan, Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard, pp. 1–2. 4 For instance, wylie Savanas Quinn’s 1976 ph.d. thesis, “Kierkegaard and wittgenstein: the ‘religious’ as a ‘Form of Life,” duke university; a volume edited by r.h. bell and ronald e. hustwit titled Essays on Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein: On Understanding the Self, wooster, ohio: the college of wooster 1978; r.h. bell’s article “Kierkegaard and wittgenstein: two Strategies for understanding theology,” Illif Review, vol. 31, 1974, pp. 21– 34, all of which appear in creegan’s bibliography, but are not mentioned in his “introduction,” 1

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length comparison of wittgenstein and Kierkegaard he attempts was not as well developed a field as it is at present. At any rate, Creegan’s attempt to remedy this relative paucity of literature is undertaken with the conviction that the similarities and differences a comparative study of the two thinkers reveals will generate a better understanding of both thinkers. creegan devotes a large portion of this brief text to biographical sketches of wittgenstein and Kierkegaard.5 This serves a specific point Creegan wants to make: in both Kierkegaard and wittgenstein, there is an explicit connection between life and work.6 in fact, beyond the particular shape this connection takes in regard to each author, both make the relation between life and work a primary principle of their philosophy as well. both grasp “the understanding of the close connection of lifestyle and philosophical ideas.”7 this theoretical or formal resonance between Kierkegaard and wittgenstein has a direct bearing on grasping similarities in the content of each author’s life. one of the most perceptive of creegan’s notations of similarity is his observation that, like Kierkegaard, wittgenstein possesses a certain severity of “demeanor,”8 and that the “root of each man’s unease lies in religious concern.”9 though such resemblances are undoubtedly difficult to prove, any reader familiar with the life and thought of wittgenstein and Kierkegaard will recognize the intuitive adequacy of creegan’s observation, and a surprising consonance of the lifestyles of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein is the result. This fits entirely with Creegan’s practice of a “suggestive, rather than a reductive method.”10 in addition to similarity of lifestyle, the inextricable connection between life and works in Kierkegaard and wittgenstein leads to two key consonances of thought that creegan emphasizes. First, they share the pedagogical method of indirect communication. discussing indirect communication is unsurprising when it comes to Kierkegaard, as he explicitly discusses the use of this method. creegan provides an appropriately brief synopsis of Kierkegaard’s theory, with particular reference to The Point of View.11 much more space is devoted to establishing the presence of a where he describes the state of the field of comparative Kierkegaard–Wittgenstein research. there is also a series of essays edited and introduced by r.h. bell, The Grammar of the Heart: New Essays in Moral Philosophy, San Francisco: harper & row 1988, though it should be noted that it is possible this last text appeared too late to be incorporated into creegan’s text. most importantly, there are the incisive studies of paul L. holmer, two of which are later cited directly in the text by creegan, though they are not mentioned in the introduction (creegan, Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard, pp. 34–7; holmer’s studies are listed in creegan’s bibliography). 5 creegan, Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard, pp. 8–29. 6 ibid., p. 4: “the integration of life and works is a feature which each author understood and cultivated. their lives are important reminders in the showing of their purposes.” cf. ibid., p. 112; p. 114. 7 ibid., p. 28. 8 ibid., p. 20. 9 ibid., p. 28. 10 ibid., p. 4. 11 ibid., pp. 35–7.

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parallel method in Wittgenstein, who rarely offered explicit theoretical reflections on his own pedagogical strategies.12 Still, it is fairly easy to demonstrate the presence of such a method in the Philosophical Investigations since its dialogical character is clearly intended to “lead” readers from one place to another without explicitly telling them where to go.13 creegan, however, is not content with such a demonstration, but presses on to consider wittgenstein’s great early work, the Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus. The attempt to find a parallel to Kierkegaard’s indirect method in the Tractatus is a daring venture, as Creegan well knows: “At first glance, it might seem difficult to fit the Tractatus into this mold. it appears to be systematic and all-embracing”14—in other words, it appears to be a direct communication of the truth. this is to ignore, however, the deeper purpose of the Tractatus. to elucidate this deeper purpose, creegan cites a letter wittgenstein wrote to his publisher Ludwig von Ficker, where wittgenstein explains that the true aim of the Tractatus is ethical, not logical.15 yet, as creegan perceptively observes, if “[t]he audience suggested by the form of the book is logicians” this means that “in order to help them to find out the truth one must lead them from logic to ethics.”16 in the end, the truly perceptive reader of the Tractatus sees that it is ethics that grounds the work as a coherent and integrated whole. the fact that the Tractatus ends in ethics and silence is thus no aberration, as creegan demonstrates in an illuminating summary of his interpretation: wittgenstein’s actual method is to make statements which are (strictly speaking from within the final [ethical] result) nonsensical. The listener’s role is to “transcend” these propositions, in order to reach a vantage point from which he can “see the world aright.” this remains an indirect mode of communication.17

beginning with the explicit theory of Kierkegaard, creegan thus shows that wittgenstein has a parallel practice of indirect communication, and this is shown in such a way that a greater coherence is granted to wittgenstein’s work. even in the seemingly systematic propositions of the Tractatus, nothing is understood without recognizing that these seemingly direct statements indirectly point toward a personal or ethical appropriation of the truths only intimated (not captured) by the Tractatus.18 the second consonance of thought creegan explores in wittgenstein and Kierkegaard is their shared emphasis on the “primacy of activity.”19 For both thinkers, action is primary and words are secondary. words are limited realities that

creegan himself registers this difference between the two authors (ibid., p. 36). ibid., pp. 37–8. 14 ibid., p. 38. 15 ibid., pp. 38–9; cf. “Letters to Ludwig von Ficker,” ed. by allan Janick, trans. by bruce gillette, in Wittgenstein: Sources and Perspectives, ed. by c.g. Luckhardt, ithaca: cornell university press 1979, pp. 94–5. 16 creegan, Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard, p. 39. 17 ibid., p. 41. 18 ibid., p. 98; p .113; p. 120. 19 ibid., p. 78. 12 13

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can only point towards life or activity but never capture it.20 this means that both authors deny the certainties of systematic or metaphysical thought.21 at this point, creegan notes certain sclerotic interpretations of both Kierkegaard and wittgenstein, and adroitly uses each author to unsettle the false systematic interpretations of the other. thus, seeing that wittgenstein’s examination of private languages has been reified into an argument for the impossibility of the individual, creegan shows that Kierkegaard and wittgenstein in truth share a similar respect for the individual (it is the individual, after all, who participates in playing the multiple language games described in the Philosophical Investigations).22 in like manner, creegan notes a scholarly tendency to reify Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works into a metaphysics of the stages (complete with strict dividing lines between each stage).23 creegan then utilizes wittgenstein’s understanding of forms of life (with all their attendant aspects of becoming and ephemerality) to show the fluidity of Kierkegaard’s theory of stages.24 the stages are intended to cause a personal appropriation of truth, not to give a metaphysically static description of clearly divided realms of actuality.25 If language games always depend on the fluid form of life of which they take part, the language game of christianity must always depend on the changing situation in which it is articulated, and the stages must be transcended (like logic in the Tractatus) toward the actuality of one’s own form of life. it is by such strategies that creegan achieves his goal of mutual illumination through comparison, and therapeutically treats some malformed tendencies in Kierkegaard and wittgenstein scholarship along the way. one especially gains from the book an appreciation for the fact that both of these authors require a certain complicated type of reading that refuses the easy solutions of a systematic (or purely propositional) hermeneutic,26 attending instead to the complex interrelationship between life and thought. any interpretation of either Kierkegaard or wittgenstein that ignores this fact is simply inadequate. thomas J. millay

ibid., p. 33; p. 70. ibid., p. 4. 22 ibid., pp. 63–4; cf. pp. 53–60 for a detailed overview of the private language section of wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. 23 ibid., p. 64. 24 ibid., p. 67. 25 ibid., p. 70. 26 cf. ibid., p. 51. 20 21

reviews and critical discussions high, dallas m., review in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 34, no. 1, 1993, pp. 58–60. phillips, d.z., review in Modern Theology, vol. 6, no. 2, 1990, pp. 215–16.

Stephen crites, In the Twilight of Christendom: Hegel vs. Kierkegaard on Faith and History, chambersburg, pennsylvania: american academy of religion 1972, 107 pp.

Stephen crites’ aim in his book In the Twilight of Christendom, written in 1972, is to note the importance of G.W.F. Hegel’s influence on Søren Kierkegaard’s thought as well as to place the nature of this influence in the context of the history of philosophy and theology. Specifically, in the framework of a conceptual analysis, Crites’ tries to highlight and further develop the discussion of hegel and Kierkegaard’s respective positions on faith and the movement of humankind since the advent of christ, namely, the relation between history and faith. Specifically, Crites begins with a discussion of domesticity and therefore the familial bond in light of marriage’s role in the ethical and religious categories. crites highlights both hegel and Kierkegaard’s positions. crites states: “For Kierkegaard the religious lies decisively beyond the bond as such, and indeed beyond any ethico-social relationship as such.”1 and, he states further: “we shall wish to conduct our dialogue between hegel and Kierkegaard against the backdrop of this complex religio-cultural phenomenon of christendom.”2 he adds: “hegel and Kierkegaard both lived during the long twilight of christendom. each of them still lived in Christendom, but had enough critical distance from it to reflect on it as an historical development that had reached a kind of completeness.”3 His initial point in contrasting these two important figures is to offer an introduction to the unique developments of philosophy during the life of hegel; thus crites’ methodology is one of macro-contextual focus. he begins by building the historical backdrop of philosophy in relation to domestic life, and the historical origins of christendom since the time of constantine, all within the framework of hegelian and Kierkegaardian thought. within this context of domesticity, or the nature of philosophy’s immersion into society and even the married life of the philosopher, hegel serves as a unique portrait of one who successfully wedded his philosophical pursuits to domestic life. crites notes, in seeking to parallel the positions of both hegel and Kierkegaard, “at any rate, falling in love and getting married were no embarrassment to hegel as a philosopher, for he had already raised Stephen crites, In the Twilight of Christendom: Hegel vs. Kierkegaard on Faith and History, chambersburg, pennsylvania: american academy of religion 1972, p. 16. 2 ibid., p. 16. 3 ibid., p. 20. 1

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marriage and family life to philosophical status,” and “a couple of decades later Soren Kierkegaard remarked that there is something ludicrous in the idea of a married philosopher.”4 crites then proceeds to the Kantian backdrop of hegelian and Kierkegaardian thought, discussing hegel and Kierkegaard in relation to this general context of the relationship of christendom and the greater society. crites presents hegel and Kierkegaard’s subsequent reactions to Kantian categories as the mutual backdrop of both hegel and Kierkegaard’s concepts of subjectivity, objectivity, faith, and the movement of history.5 crites states that “so far as the theoretical sphere is concerned, hegel at once greatly amplified and thoroughly historicized the a priori conditions of objective knowledge.”6 crites seems to be alluding to the hegelian movement from a Kantian notion of an immaterial non-empirical a priori to a material, or empirically developed, a priori composed of a collective of historical actions. in juxtaposing hegel to Kierkegaard in relation to Kant, crites then notes of Kierkegaard: “he therefore denied, even more emphatically than Kant would have, that the world that presents itself to our knowledge can ever coincide with what we will as agents.”7 thus crites notes Kierkegaard diverging from Kant’s theoretical philosophy in a way that is opposite to that of hegel. crites sees Kierkegaard as maintaining a strict empiricism and skeptical view of objective knowledge by minimizing Kant’s constitutive role of the a priori in relation to the knowing subject. crites’ method continually goes back and forth between hegel and Kant in relation to the topics of his particular and overall interest. he seeks to show further key distinctions in the thought of hegel and Kierkegaard in relation to Kant. crites spends a substantial amount of space in his brief book developing hegel and Kierkegaard’s mutual inheritance of Kantian thought.8 crites sees Kant’s concept of practical reason as a lynch pin in understanding hegel and Kierkegaard’s mutual inheritance. he sees their diverging responses to the inherited concept of Kantian practical reason as an essential point in each thinker’s comprehensive thought, as well as in their philosophical separation from one another. crites notes that, with regard to Kantian practical reason, hegel and Kierkegaard both diverge sharply from Kant as well as each other. while Kant saw praxis of the self-active agent directed to obedience to universal duty, “hegel and Kierkegaard, in their divergent ways, took precisely the Kantian formulation of free, self-active, self-productive praxis, as opposed to objective knowledge as such, for the point of ibid., p. 8. ibid., p. 106. crites’ language and discussion of historical contexts, as he himself confessed, have hegelian undertones. 6 ibid., p. 22. 7 ibid.. 8 michelle Kosch, “Kierkegaard’s ethicist: Fichte’s role in Kierkegaard’s construction of the ethical Standpoint,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 88, 2006, pp. 261–95. J.g. Fichte does not seem to be a key interest for crites in this work. this insight has only become widely accepted in very recent years. That is not to say Fichte was not identified as part of the bridge for Kantian thought to hegel and Kierkegaard at a much earlier point in Kierkegaard scholarship, but simply that this has only recently been more widely accepted. crites’ book would serve as an example of this point. 4 5

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departure from which they constructed their most highly developed conceptions.”9 crites highlights that the mature hegel moved from the free self-active, selfproductive praxis to his conception of absolute spirit. Likewise, from the same point of departure Kierkegaard formulated the existing individual.10 the opposing movements of hegel and Kierkegaard from a Kantian heritage, as noted by crites, are quite stark. while crites argues that hegel and Kant diverge in their reaction and implementation of Kant’s conceptions such as the a priori and also the knowledge of practical reason; he seeks to show areas of agreement as well or in the least a mutuality of starting points. given the time-period of this work by crites his desire to emphasize similarity or areas of initial unity in the thought of hegel and Kierkegaard is important to note. crites distinguishes hegel and Kierkegaard together from Kant as he writes: “For neither hegel nor Kierkegaard is religious truth a matter of objective fact, of opinions about possible objects of cognition standing in an external relation to the believer.”11 he also writes: “to express this inner, practical relation, both Kierkegaard and, particularly in his early writings, hegel as well use the term ‘subjectivity.’ ”12 although crites goes on to discuss further the concept of subjectivity and the inevitable separation in hegel and Kierkegaard, in terms of the movement or evolution of Kierkegaard scholarship it is important not to overlook this underlying theme in crites’ book, the theme of mutuality between hegelian and Kierkegaardian thought. crites also notes that in hegel’s early period both he and Kierkegaard found themselves faced with a similar question: “how could such an historical revelation be appropriated in a manner proper to a religious truth, subjectively?”13 crites is keen to note that gotthold Lessing was a thinker who attempted to answer this question before both Hegel and Kierkegaard. On the issue of the historical influence of christianity and subjective appropriation crites sees the early thought of hegel as very similar to that of Kierkegaard’s position: “in the earliest fragments…hegel takes the position that christianity is intrinsically a ‘private religion,’ and hence its projection into the role of Volksreligion could only be disastrous.”14 once again crites is sure to note that although this is an initial area of agreement between the early thought of hegel and the thought of Kierkegaard, there is mutuality for different reasons. this early position of hegel seems to be prior to his acceptance of the ability to mediate Lessing’s ditch.15 Kierkegaard found the idea of a Volksreligion to be a sign of the ruination of true apostolic christianity.16 So it seems crites sees the early hegel in agreement with Lessing, while Kierkegaard too could be seen in agreement, for both thinkers seek to overcome Lessing’s “ditch”; Kierkegaard sees crites, In the Twilight of Christendom, p. 23. ibid., p. 23. 11 ibid., p. 24. 12 ibid. 13 ibid., p. 34. 14 ibid., p. 38. 15 Lessing’s “ditch” is symbolic of his time and thus also the Kantian limitation of metaphysics in their reaction to the dogmatic philosophy of their predecessors. 16 crites, In the Twilight of Christendom, p. 40. 9

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himself doing it in a way quite distinct from hegel. For Kierkegaard, it would seem, Lessing’s ditch is not overcome per se, but rather it remains to provide the possibility of faith. crites notes that, for Kierkegaard, christianity had evaporated into christendom, and this evaporation was not the result of hegel’s thought.17 the question to Lessing’s “ditch” was overcome in hegel in that the positivity of the revelatory events proclaimed in the gospel “was mediated by the consciousness of the christian community, in doctrine and cultus. the christian consciousness, in turn, was mediated by its 1800-year history. but that history was mediated by its ‘result,’ by Protestant culture and finally by speculative philosophy itself.”18 This book by Crites was certainly not the first to be written on the relation of hegelian and Kierkegaardian thought. however, as has been highlighted, it is significant in Kierkegaard scholarship given the time when it was written and thus the prior emphasis of Kierkegaard as the utter antithesis of Hegel. The significance is found in crites’ underlying interest in noting and developing areas of mutuality between the comprehensive thought of hegel and Kierkegaard. this short work by crites can be seen as continuing the interest of a more thorough investigation of Kierkegaard’s reaction to hegelian thought. christian Kettering

17 18

ibid., p. 59. ibid., p. 60.

reviews and critical discussions burbidge, John w., review in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol. 42, no. 4, 1974, p. 782. desmond, william, Hegel and His Critics Philosophy in the Aftermath of Hegel, albany: State university of new york press 1989, pp. 101–2. mueller, d. L., review in Review & Expositor, vol. 71, no. 1, 1974, pp. 125–6. outka, gene, “equality and individuality: thoughts on two themes in Kierkegaard,” The Journal of Religious Ethics, vol. 10, no. 2, 1982, pp. 171–203. r. L. p., review in Review of Metaphysics, vol. 27, no. 1, 1973, p. 122. Smart, ninian, Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West, cambridge: cambridge university press 1985, p. 117. taylor, mark c., review in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol. 42, no. 3, 1974, pp. 572–3.

thomas henry croxall, Kierkegaard Studies, with Special Reference to (a) the Bible (b) Our Own Age, London and redhill: Lutterworth press 1948, 227 pp.

Kierkegaard Studies, not to be confused with other texts of the same name, stands out in its presentation because it intentionally avoids even a brief biographical introduction as a reaction to the dominance of personality analysis that the author sees in many works on Søren Kierkegaard in his time. his goal, instead, is to explore the main ideas of Kierkegaard’s philosophy in order to shepherd the potential reader of Kierkegaard through available english translations. a student of eduard geismar, thomas henry croxall offers a systematic presentation of the overarching themes of Man, Christianity, and God with, as the subtitle reflects, special concern for “The bible” and “our present age.” The thesis and foci revealed in the introduction and in the “Significant Postscript” at the end of the text indicate the author’s goal to offer a deeper encounter with Kierkegaard’s writings themselves, “to share the treasure” with a potential reader. Following in the footsteps of Kierkegaard’s own “maieutic” style, croxall sees himself as a guide through specific topics of importance in Kierkegaard’s writings. his main intention in producing the book is to serve as a guide to Kierkegaard himself. croxall focuses on the bible because of a common critique of Kierkegaard’s complex and dialectical philosophical writing: why would one bother with Kierkegaard’s writing when the bible itself, and certainly the new testament, has stated clearly what needs to be stated? why bother with Kierkegaard at all? the other subtopic, “our age,” connects to Kierkegaard’s engagement with hegelianism for croxall. he holds that the intelligent minds of his own day, either consciously or not, are imbued with hegelianism, which is what makes Kierkegaard all that much more relevant for consideration. part one, “man,” deals with the basic philosophical and theological anthropology that is inherent in Kierkegaard’s writings. what is presented includes a gathering of topics that inform Kierkegaard’s basic doctrine of the human being. the “man” chapters are “Choice,” “Music,” and “Philosophy.” The first chapter in the section, “choice,” is a discussion of the human person in relation to the stages of life Kierkegaard develops. croxall begins with the aesthetic stage and connects the

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powerful philosophy of choice to the movement from stage to stage described in Kierkegaard’s thought. the presentation of each section delivers on croxall’s promise to give special attention to the role of the bible and “our age” in the exposition of each life stage. as croxall moves through the material, he cites key passages from the bible, particularly from the new testament, that are connected to Kierkegaard’s thought at any particular point. Furthermore, he often cites and explains key concepts and other connections Kierkegaard has to hegelian philosophy. croxall develops the major concepts surrounding the theme of choice—talent, mood, the leap, freedom, repentance, and suffering—all in an effort to show how these major elements are taken up and transformed as the human person “moves” through the stages of life’s way. instead of taking up the matter of the stages here, he focuses on the unique choice the human person faces, for it is the choice of the individual to “despair of myself—of my finite self” that moves one beyond the aesthetic stage.1 this explains the topic of the second chapter: “music.” For croxall hopes to show how, for Kierkegaard, music is taken up and transformed in religious life. Furthermore, croxall highlights a contemporary concern, namely, the debate about the need for musical education in england during his own time.2 croxall uses this chapter to discuss the more general place that art should play in a complete religious life. And the final chapter in Part One focuses on philosophy. Here Croxall is addressing the question of Kierkegaard’s relationship to philosophy and whether it is appropriate to call him a philosopher at all. croxall connects Kierkegaard to the philosophical tradition while also indicating what makes him stand out from it— such as when he connects Kierkegaard to existentialism but distinguishes him from later philosophers like heidegger and Jaspers. part two, “christianity,” develops the central concept and thus the great contribution that christianity makes to the self-understanding of the human person: the concept of Sin. In keeping with the progression model established in the first chapter, a model that characterizes the reader’s experience of Kierkegaard’s works according to croxall, the topics in part two progress as the consciousness of the single individual moves in Kierkegaard’s works: dread and despair (chapters 4 and 5), paradox, hope, time-eternity, and repetition (chapters 6–9). the analysis of despair follows the progression downwards to the highest form of despair leading to paradox, the unique characterization that Kierkegaard makes of christianity itself. the presentation here follows another progression, from Kierkegaard’s understanding of the transformation of the intellect, where the analysis focuses on Kierkegaard’s critique of hegelian philosophy; to ethics, which focuses on the unique gloss on the story of the binding of isaac in Fear and Trembling; and finally to religion, in which (following his teacher and mentor) Croxall argues that Kierkegaard’s christology of the absolute paradox is in full compliance with the ancient athansian creed,3 drawing out several practical corollaries for the preacher, thomas henry croxall, Kierkegaard Studies, with Special Reference to (a) the Bible (b) Our Own Age, London and redhill: Lutterworth press 1948, p. 30. 2 ibid., p. 41. 3 ibid., p. 129. 1

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pastor, and ordinary christian “today.” chapters 7–9 deal with the positive elements offered within christianity: hope, time-eternity, and repetition. the concluding section, “god,” contains a presentation of representative texts and interpretations of Kierkegaard on the trinity: “the Father” (chapter 10), “the god-man” (chapter 11), and “the holy Spirit” (chapter 12). the chapter on the Father is the longest and builds upon the idea of Father as “giver.” it is broken into six sections, organized around six classes of people who “receive” from the Father, taken from James 1:17–22: sufferers, the inconstant, the humanists, the proud giver, the humble receiver, and the ordinary pilgrim. the analysis articulates the counsels that can benefit these individuals, another example of the practical dimensions of croxall’s own approach as he explicates Kierkegaard’s writings. the next chapter, “the god-man,” although unwieldy in organization as stated by the author,4 traverses ground typically ignored by later philosophers who took up Kierkegaard’s writings, namely, christology. Finally, croxall turns to a brief exposition of Kierkegaard’s pneumatology in chapter 12, the holy Spirit. relying on texts from Judge for Yourselves!, Christian Discourses, For Self-Examination, and others, croxall draws out useful teachings from Kierkegaard’s writings that address the problematic talk of “spirit” or “world-spirit” discourse that was common in his own day. although there is no explicit conclusion, croxall ends the work with “an Appendix to Part Three with a ‘Significant Postscript.’ ” Here Croxall reinforces what he takes to be the greatest advantage to reading Kierkegaard in his “own age”: the way in which it is eminently practical, both in terms of how the doctrines are presented (as related to the individual human being in their subjectivity and thus their concrete existence) and in terms of its usefulness for those committed to the ministry of christian preaching and the ordinary life of everyday christians. croxall sums up his perspective on Kierkegaard’s unique usefulness for christian theology nicely when he writes that Kierkegaard’s “aim throughout all his writings is to bring these two, god and the individual, together; or rather to show the necessity for each man to bring god and himself together, into a personal, intimate, and vivid bond of unity.”5 the character of the analysis, while it reveals a close engagement with Kierkegaard’s texts, is laced with apologetic and theological concerns of croxall’s own context. often this is revealed in footnotes or other explicit references to dialogue partners that croxall has in mind, but other times the analysis turns away from Kierkegaard explicitly and treats the subject matter as if it is above the context of Kierkegaard’s thought. the analysis, while interesting, turns into an apology for the concepts that Kierkegaard presents as uniquely relevant to certain confusions and problems in theological and religious understanding of his own day. daniel m. dion

4 5

ibid., p. 209. ibid., p. 222.

reviews and critical discussions chaning-pearce, melville, review in Theology, vol. 52, no. 345, 1949, pp. 113–14. drever, James, review in Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 1, 1950, no. 1, pp. 90–1. d.t.S., review in Irenikon, vol. 21, 1948, p. 336. Fairweather, alan m., review in Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 1, 1950–51, p. 90. Jørgensen, alfred theodor, review in Kristeligt Dagblad, January 15, 1949. Lindström, valter, review in Meddelelser fra Søren Kierkegaard Selskabet, vol. 2, 1950, nos. 3–4, pp. 56–8.

benjamin daise, Kierkegaard’s Socratic Art, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1999, x + 134 pp.

of the constellation of philosophers that preceded Søren Kierkegaard, perhaps none proved more inspiring to him than Socrates, a fact that is not lost on his commentators.1 however, benjamin daise, in his Kierkegaard’s Socratic Art, was arguably the first to investigate Kierkegaard’s appropriation of Socrates’ sense of vocation and method of communication in a full-length, philosophical monograph.2 daise operates on a two-fold premise: Kierkegaard claimed that christendom was in need of a (Socratic) “mid-wife,” and he knew how to be one.3 daise’s focus is Kierkegaard’s pseudonymously published Philosophical Fragments, which he uses to illustrate Kierkegaard’s appropriation of Socrates’ calling and communicative style. in chapter 1, “indirect communication,” daise offers an illustration of Kierkegaard’s Socratic art with an appeal to plato’s Meno, to introduce a pragmatic and an ethical rationale for indirect communication to draw out christian faith. the pragmatic rationale consists in the fact that, when a person presumes to have faith (like meno presumed to know what virtue was), the indirect method reveals that they may have nevertheless misunderstood its nature.4 however, the ethical rationale presumes that the highest relationship between two people is one of equality.5 communicating directly about matters of objective knowledge places the giver and the receiver on an unequal level with respect to the object of knowledge. however, when it comes to the ethical, both have equal access to it. the teacher cannot offer knowledge without coercion if direct communication is used; but no such coercion is entailed when the communication is indirect.6 daise offers an analysis of the “ostensible method” used in Kierkegaard’s account of indirect communication, in chapter 2, “the Question of the Fragments.” but what is the question of the Fragments? is it the question on the title page, or by way of example, see richard poole, Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication, charlottesville: university of virginia press 1993, and Jacob howland, Kierkegaard and Socrates, new york: cambridge university press 2006. 2 benjamin daise, Kierkegaard’s Socratic Art, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1999. 3 ibid., p. vii. 4 ibid., pp. 23–4. 5 ibid., pp. 25–6. 6 ibid., pp. 27–30. 1

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is it the opening question in the first paragraph of the text? Daise addresses the second question first as a means of explaining the “ostensible” (Eleatic) method: “can the truth be learned?”7 The first step is to answer the question proposed from the Socratic perspective (e.g., everyone has the truth) [Φ]. The second step, to elicit the implications of that view (e.g., no person is of more than mere occasional significance to another) [if Φ then Ψ]. The third step negates the Socratic perspective by the denial of one of its implications by modus tollens [not-Ψ so not- Φ]. The fourth step is that the teacher, who is now the savior, provides an un-Socratic alternative (e.g., conversion and repentance) [Since not-Φ, then Θ].8 the questions of the title page appear to be strictly metaphysical questions, but they have ethical (and existential) import: “can a historical point of departure be given for an eternal consciousness; how can such a point of departure be of more than historical interest; can an eternal happiness be built on historical knowledge?”9 because climacus’ concern in the Fragments is not cognitive and theoretical, but rather concerns how to attain an eternal happiness, he presupposes that the eternal has already occurred.10 What seems difficult to reconcile is that “the god” would become a teacher. the relationship between the god and the would-be learner is one that is essentially unequal and resolved only when the god becomes a person (the “absolute paradox”).11 rationally, the notion of the absolute paradox is irresolvable. climacus’ solution requires a change in which the place of the intellect in self-understanding is fundamentally altered, “distinct from merely altering some element of the intellect.”12 it is a new kind of life to which the teacher calls the student. but is the new life one that constitutes the search for an “eternal happiness,” or is the condition for an “eternal happiness” one that is attained only when this earthly life is complete? chapter 3, “the concern of the Fragments,” defends the former. an eternal happiness is constitutive of christian faith in a god-relation, the case for which requires the appeal to the method of indirect communication. the relation requires a radical affirmation of the non-identity between the God of the Bible and the view of god as an explanatory necessity (i.e., the god of the philosophers).13 For the greek mind, “the god is no externality, to which one is to turn to find guidance. Rational self-knowledge is knowledge of the god, or ‘god-knowledge.’ ”14 however, the “leap” from immanent religiousness to transcendent religiousness is a rejection of the view of god as an object to which an individual relates cognitively. in christianity, the eternal cannot be worked out by the laws of nature and thought, but is instead embodied in a human being within time. it is not an internal relation, but a relation of the individual to the external. it only becomes internal until faith ibid., p. 42; SKS 4, 218 / PF, 9. daise, Kierkegaard’s Socratic Art, pp. 39–40. SKS 4, 222–8 / PF, 9–19. 9 SKS 4, 213 / PF, 1. 10 daise, Kierkegaard’s Socratic Art, p. 47. 11 ibid., p. 48. 12 ibid., p. 61. 13 daise follows pascal’s distinction, ibid., p. 63; see blaise pascal, Pensées, trans. by w.F. trotter, new york: e.p. dutton 1958, number 555. 14 SKS 4, 220 / PF, 11; see daise, Kierkegaard’s Socratic Art, p. 71. 7 8

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is attained, when the individual is a “new creation” and god is once again in the person.15 climacus’ belief that christian faith is a form of knowledge rests on the Concluding Unscientific Postscript’s infamous claim that truth is subjectivity. Sympathetic readers and critics of Kierkegaard who assume a blunt reading of his work appear to agree that the Postscript offers the following argument: (1) Faith involves an act of will. (2) will is subjective. (3) Faith is required for truth. (4) truth is subjective. Since (1) can be ascribed to climacus, and (2) is, on the whole, uncontroversial, the premise on which the controversial argument hangs is (3). what is at stake in the argument is that supporters see it as profound and affirm it, but its detractors reject it as ludicrous.16 in any case the argument is seen “as a gambit in defense of christianity.”17 yet such a blunt reading mistakenly assumes that the arguments in the Fragments are for the sake of persuasion through direct means, and that (3) is making a traditional epistemological claim about truth (e.g., robert nozik’s view that truth is tracked by belief).18 but the concept of truth in the Fragments does not operate on an epistemic level. hence both sides of the assumption that Kierkegaard’s argument offers an epistemic defense of christian faith miss the point entirely. in chapter 4, “the ethics of persuasion,” daise argues for why the ethical might need to be communicated indirectly, rather than directly. indirect communication assumes that the ethical is universally known, and that not only does every person have the potential to become self-realized, but also one person would know what is necessary for another to also become equally self-realized.19 however, this assumes that there is a singular ideal that provides a basis for ethical equality. But not only is it difficult to establish the presence of an ideal as universal, but it would also seem presumptuous for a person to impose one particular version of the ethical upon another. to do so would make ethical instruction impossible.20 It is possible that the other is in defiance of the ethical, and indirect communication may be pragmatically required, even if not ethically required.21 in his consideration of the ethical, Kierkegaard was concerned with how christianity was understood by his nineteenth-century danish audience. his pseudonymous authorship offered an

daise, Kierkegaard’s Socratic Art, pp. 90–1. See richard popkin, “Kierkegaard and Skepticism,” in Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. by Josiah thompson, garden city, new york: doubleday 1972, p. 368; paul edwards, “Kierkegaard and the truth of christianity,” Philosophy, vol. 46, no. 176, 1971, p. 93; c. Stephen evans, “Kierkegaard and plantinga on belief in god: Subjectivity as the ground of properly basic religious beliefs,” Faith and Philosophy, vol. 5, no. 1, 1988, p. 31. 17 daise, Kierkegaard’s Socratic Art, p. 92. 18 See robert nozik, Philosophical Explanations, cambridge, massachusetts: harvard university press 1971, p. 149. 19 daise, Kierkegaard’s Socratic Art, p. 117. 20 ibid., pp. 124–5. 21 ibid., p. 126. 15 16

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engagement with christian faith to move his readers beyond the “prevailing conceits of deceits” of his day.22 The significance of Daise’s monograph is that, by developing Kierkegaard’s method of indirect communication as inspired by Socrates, it offers an innovative contribution to the debate over how to understand Kierkegaard’s dictum that “truth is subjectivity,” and challenges the charge that he was irrationalist. For george pattison, daise correctly observes that how an individual conceives of one’s relation to society affects both the propriety of and need for indirect communication.23 however, pattison is not convinced of daise’s view that, because our society does not share the homogeneity of Kierkegaard’s day, direct communication of the ethical is more appropriate today than in nineteenth-century denmark.24 erik m. hanson

ibid., p. 130 george pattison, review in Literature and Theology, vol. 14, no. 4, 2000, p. 451. Similarly, Howland affirms Daise’s recognition of the Fragments and the Postscript as “exercises in direct communication,” but laments Daise’s failure to look into the significance of Socrates within Kierkegaard’s texts. See howland, Kierkegaard and Socrates, p. 5, n. 6. 24 daise, Kierkegaard’s Socratic Art, pp. 451–2. 22 23

reviews and critical discussions backhouse, Stephen, Kierkegaard’s Critique of Christian Nationalism, new york: oxford university press 2011, p. 30, p. 99. pattison, george, review in Literature and Theology, vol. 14, no. 4, 2000, pp. 451–2.

John davenport and anthony rudd (eds.), Kierkegaard after MacIntyre: Essays on Freedom, Narrative, and Virtue, chicago: open court 2001, xxxiv + 416 pp.

alasdair macintyre’s classic, After Virtue, is an important contribution to the revival of virtue ethics that has occurred during the last half of the twentieth century.1 macintyre narrates the history of western philosophy according to the ascension and decline of a robust ethical tradition that reached its apex in medieval thomistic thought but began to crumble after enlightenment thinkers tried (and failed) to establish a new foundation for morality based on reason alone. the current moral landscape is now primarily characterized by emotivism, the shallow view that moral judgments are simply expressions of an individual’s personal subjective feelings. macintyre therefore writes with a reconstructive goal in mind. human beings are, first of all, the types of beings who tell stories about themselves; in MacIntyre’s terms, we can understand our lives in narrative form. in order to recover the lost conception of human flourishing we must then situate our narratives within wider, socio-historical traditions. it is on the basis of this rich socio-historical framework that any conception of the virtues is possible since virtues are expressions of goods that are embedded within traditions. MacIntyre presents Kierkegaard as the first philosopher who correctly diagnoses the current crisis in moral philosophy but nonetheless embraces its implications. For macintyre, Either/Or’s account of the transition between the aesthetic and the ethical is the first appearance of emotivism, as the transition is defined by a “criterionless choice.” it is a choice for which no authority other than the agent’s own will can be given, which we can further trace to the agent’s arbitrary, subjective feelings.2 Radical, criterionless choice signifies the complete breakdown of any authority macintyre thinks could sustain the virtues. Kierkegaard thus stands in the way of any possibility for recovering the traditions that nourish human flourishing. whatever their differences, virtually all the essays collected in the volume Kierkegaard After MacIntyre agree that macintyre’s critique of Kierkegaard is

alasdair macintyre, After Virtue, 3rd ed., notre dame: university of notre dame press 2007 [1981]. 2 ibid., pp. 39–43. 1

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significantly flawed.3 Although these essays do not always agree on what the specific flaws are, there seem to be two basic perspectives on MacIntyre that the contributors have. First of all, the majority of essays evaluate the particular claims that macintyre attributes to Kierkegaard, most of them centering on the issue of criterionless choice. another group of essays takes a look at Kierkegaard’s place in the wider history that After Virtue tells. the biggest controversy that After Virtue creates seems to be that it portrays Kierkegaard as the quintessential advocate for emotivism. in response, many contributors to Kierkegaard After MacIntyre make the point that an account of practical, rational activity as it is developed throughout Kierkegaard’s authorship shows how the choices agents make are, in fact, based on reasons grounded either in external, socio-historical circumstances, or in a conception of human nature that is in principle understood by all human agents. incidentally, these are the same standards that MacIntyre employs, and so should suffice to render the allegation of criterionless choice unfounded. Peter Mehl begins the volume by arguing how Kierkegaard’s work defines human beings as the types of beings who must respond to moral-spiritual needs that naturally arise within human experience.4 mehl sketches an account of human agency governed by the demands of a human telos (the overriding good for a human being as such), which was something macintyre had also claimed. anthony rudd agrees with this account of agency, and takes the comparison with macintyre even further by arguing that a narrative view of agency based in a wider tradition is necessary for satisfying our telos.5 gordon marino discusses the problem of criterionless choice from a different angle by clarifying how one’s experience of despair can indicate good reasons for choosing a higher form of life over another.6 all of these essays, in sum, demonstrate how demands inherent to human nature guide human practical 3 Kierkegaard after MacIntyre: Essays on Freedom, Narrative, and Virtue, ed. by John davenport and anthony rudd, chicago: open court 2001. macintyre has his defenders, however. See bruce ballard, “macintyre and the Limits of Kierkegaardian rationality,” Faith and Philosophy, vol. 12, no. 1, 1995, pp. 126–32; and ian duckles, “a (partial) defense of macintyre’s reading of Kierkegaard,” Idealistic Studies, vol. 36, no. 2, 2006, pp. 141–51. 4 See peter mehl, “Kierkegaard and the relativist challenge to practical philosophy,” in Kierkegaard After MacIntyre, pp. 3–38. 5 See anthony rudd, “reason in ethics: macintyre and Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard After MacIntyre, pp. 131–50. rudd’s essay also touched off a debate over the merits of narrative theory in understanding the distinction between the aesthetic and the ethical. For critiques of rudd’s view, see John Lippitt, “telling tales: Johannes climacus and ‘narrative unity,’ ” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2005, pp. 71–89; John Lippitt, “getting the Story Straight: Kierkegaard, macintyre and Some problems with narrative,” Inquiry, vol. 50, no. 1, 2007, pp. 34–69; and ian duckles, “Kierkegaard’s irrationalism: a response to davenport and rudd,” Southwest Philosophy Review, vol. 21, no. 2, 2005, pp. 37–51. rudd’s considered response follows in anthony rudd, “Kierkegaard, macintyre and narrative unity—reply to Lippitt,” Inquiry, vol. 50, no. 5, 2007, pp. 541–49; anthony rudd, “reason in ethics revisited” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2008, pp. 179–99; and anthony rudd, Self, Value, and Narrative: A Kierkegaardian Approach, oxford: oxford university press 2012. 6 See gordon marino, “the place of reason in Kierkegaard’s ethics,” in Kierkegaard After MacIntyre, pp. 113–27.

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activity and provide the same standard of rationality to our moral life that macintyre expects. John davenport and marilyn piety have a somewhat different approach. taking a cue from harry Frankfurt, davenport argues that the choice between the aesthetic and the ethical follows the same structure as that capacity to identify with ethical motives over any aesthetic motives an agent also has, and so should not be confused with an arbitrary decision.7 For her part, piety explains that in order for a choice such as that for the ethical to even qualify as such, deeply rooted passions and interests inevitably lead one to view elements of the world as meaningful.8 in both cases, the rationality of a choice hinges on its appeal to various integral elements of an agent’s set of motivations. edward mooney also has a different critique of criterionless choice.9 contrary to macintyre’s assertion that there is no overlap between the aesthetic or the ethical, mooney explains that the proper methodological context to the Judge’s letters establishes the continuity between these two life-views, therefore preventing the choice from being arbitrary or criterionless. criterionless choice is not the only problem, however. norman Lillegard and Jeffrey Turner offer reflections on how agents fall into self-deception, a problem for both Kierkegaard and macintyre. as Lillegard explains, it is possible to some degree to choose the aesthetic; sometimes the aesthetic does involve commitment to certain goods, and therefore certain virtues.10 nevertheless, various techniques lead us to shirk responsibility for properly ethical choices. Turner raises a specific problem with narrative theory: there is the threat that we will fall under the spell of beautiful narratives over those that are good or true.11 both of these essays raise the question of whether it is possible that agents could be so self-deceived that they could not recognize the purported claims of a telos—an issue addressed in recent literature.12 another group of essays focuses more on how After Virtue situates Kierkegaard in the history of western culture. richard Johnson and davenport (in his second essay) 7 See John davenport, “the meaning of Kierkegaard’s choice between the aesthetic and the ethical: a response to macintyre,” in Kierkegaard After MacIntyre, pp. 75–112. davenport has subsequently become an advocate for narrative theory as well. See John davenport, Narrative Identity, Autonomy, and Mortality: From Frankfurt and MacIntyre to Kierkegaard, new york: routledge 2012. 8 See marilyn piety, “Kierkegaard on rationality,” in Kierkegaard After MacIntyre, pp. 59–74. 9 See edward mooney, “the perils of polarity: Kierkegaard and macintyre in Search of moral truth,” in Kierkegaard After MacIntyre, pp. 234–64. 10 See norman Lillegard, “thinking with Kierkegaard and macintyre about virtue, the aesthetic, and narrative,” in Kierkegaard After MacIntyre,, pp. 211–32. For a response to macintyre along lines similar to mooney’s (and thus more to the problem of criterionless choice), see also norman Lillegard, “Judge william in the dock,” in Either/Or, Part II, ed. by robert perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1995 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 4), pp. 83–111. 11 See Jeffrey Turner, “To Tell a Good Tale: Kierkegaardian Reflections on Moral narrative and moral truth,” in Kierkegaard After MacIntyre, pp. 39–58. 12 in particular see the exchanges between Lippitt and rudd.

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think that the logic of Kierkegaard and macintyre’s respective positions makes a compromise between the two necessary.13 but others do not see the same possibilities for constructive dialogue. For bruce Kirmmse, Kierkegaard and macintyre represent two distinct traditions in christianity: Kierkegaard’s augustinian, danish protestantism on the one hand, and macintyre’s thomistic, catholic moral tradition on the other. hence, it is no surprise that macintyre treats Kierkegaard unfavorably since they come from fundamentally different understandings of western culture.14 Karen carr takes this incommensurability even further, maintaining that Kierkegaard belongs to a tradition of christian theologians who are suspicious of philosophy because of its tendency to dilute the authority of christian revelation. under this view, it is dubious to even include him in the western philosophical canon.15 in general, however, the volume as a whole resolutely speaks against carr’s thesis. whatever Kierkegaard made of the western philosophical tradition, most of the essays in Kierkegaard After MacIntyre make an excellent case that his work has much to contribute to contemporary debates in anglo-american moral philosophy. moreover, as i have noted this volume itself sets the stage for several recent developments in Kierkegaard studies. For these reasons, then, Kierkegaard After MacIntyre stands as one of the most significant achievements in Anglo-American Kierkegaard research to date. walter wietzke

See John davenport, “towards an existential virtue ethics: Kierkegaard and macintyre,” in Kierkegaard After MacIntyre, pp. 265–323; and richard Johnson, “neither aristotle nor nietzsche,” in Kierkegaard After MacIntyre, pp. 152–72. 14 See bruce Kirmmse, “Kierkegaard and macintyre: possibilities for dialogue,” in Kierkegaard After MacIntyre, pp. 191–210. 15 See Karen carr, “after paganism: Kierkegaard, Socrates, and the christian tradition,” in Kierkegaard After MacIntyre, pp. 173–90. 13

reviews and critical discussions cruysberghs, paul, Johan taels, and Karl verstrynge, “descriptive bibliography: recent Kierkegaard Literature: 2000–2004,” Tidschrift voor Filosofie, vol. 67, no. 4, 2005, pp. 767–814; see pp. 806–7. davenport, John, Narrative Identity, Autonomy, and Mortality: From Frankfurt and MacIntyre to Kierkegaard, new york: routledge 2012, pp. 91–168. duckles, ian, “Kierkegaard’s irrationalism: a response to davenport and rudd,” Southwest Philosophy Review, vol. 21, no. 2, 2005, pp. 37–51. — “a (partial) defense of macintyre’s reading of Kierkegaard,” Idealistic Studies, vol. 36, no. 2, 2006, pp. 141–51. Khan, abrahim, review in Religious Studies and Theology, vol. 20, no. 2, 2001, pp. 74–6. Lippitt, John, review in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers, vol. 22, no. 4, 2005, pp. 496–502. — “getting the Story Straight: Kierkegaard, macintyre and Some problems with narrative,” Inquiry, vol. 50, no. 1, 2007, pp. 34–69. — “telling tales: Johannes climacus and ‘narrative unity,’ ” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2005, pp. 71–89. mercer, david, review in Philosophy in Review, vol. 22, no. 4, 2002, pp. 265–7. possen, david, review in Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, no. 44, 2002, pp. 17–19. rudd, anthony, “Kierkegaard, macintyre and narrative unity—reply to Lippitt,” Inquiry, vol. 50, no. 5, 2007, pp. 541–9. — “reason in ethics revisited,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 2008, pp. 179–99. — Self, Value, and Narrative: A Kierkegaardian Approach, oxford: oxford university press 2012, pp. 173–227. Schroeder, Steven, review in Essays in Philosophy, vol. 3, no. 2, 2002, pp. 1–4. whittaker, J.h., review in Philosophical Investigations, vol. 26, no. 1, 2003, pp. 89–93.

bradley r. dewey, The New Obedience: Kierkegaard on Imitating Christ, washington, d.c. and cleveland: corpus books 1968, vii + 247 pp.

bradley r. dewey’s book, The New Obedience: Kierkegaard on Imitating Christ, was published by corpus books in 1968. the Foreword is written by his mentor at yale divinity School, paul L. holmer. the book was based on dewey’s ph.d. thesis, The Imitation of Christ in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard, completed at yale in 1964. in 1962–63, dewey had a Fulbright scholarship at university of copenhagen. he completed the book while a professor at Franklin and marshall college, where an award for outstanding scholarship bears his name. previously, little had been published in the united States on Kierkegaard’s christian thought.1 For this reason, Dewey’s work contributed significantly to Kierkegaard studies at the time. The book is for both scholars and general readers interested in what it means to follow christ in a contemporary context.2 employing Kierkegaard to offer a perspective on christ that counters the projects of modernity, dewey assumes that there is a correct way to be a christian follower in Kierkegaard’s thought.3 he uses Kierkegaard’s view of christ and the call to imitation to ameliorate what he considers to be erroneous approaches in his own milieu. after recounting abuses of Kierkegaard, especially in twentieth-century america, dewey calls for a clearer explication of Kierkegaard’s primary works, asserting that scholars should be familiar with the complete corpus before focusing on particular themes.4 rather than offering a critique or his own argument, dewey sets out Kierkegaard’s interpretation of christian imitation—a theme that seemed anachronistic in his context due to its “superficial view of the self, its frequently stylized view of christ, and its simplistic view of the world”; by contrast, Kierkegaardian imitation

1 Similar works include vernard eller, Kierkegaard and Radical Discipleship: A New Perspective, princeton: princeton university press 1968 and herbert c. wolf, Kierkegaard and Bultmann: The Quest of the Historical Jesus, minneapolis: augsburg 1965. 2 dewey also published “Kierkegaard and the blue testament,” Harvard Theological Review, vol. 60, no. 4, 1967, pp. 391–409 and “walker percy talks about Kierkegaard: an annotated interview,” vol. 54, no. 3, 1974, pp. 273–98. 3 paul L. holmer, “Foreword,” in bradley r. dewey, The New Obedience: Kierkegaard on Imitating Christ, washington, d.c. and cleveland: corpus books 1968, p. xi. 4 dewey, The New Obedience: Kierkegaard on Imitating Christ, p. xx.

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is “dramatically relevant to and congruent with the contemporary world.”5 dewey divides the book into three parts: first, the candidate imitator, in which he lays out Kierkegaard’s notion of the self and freedom; second, the one imitated, in which he analyzes Jesus as a concrete person; and, third, the praxis of imitation. here, he analyzes three modes of imitating: facsimile imitation, ascetic imitation, and Kierkegaard’s approach, following after christ. in part one, dewey analyzes the nature of the self (the candidate imitator) in Kierkegaard. he holds that Kierkegaard criticizes a lack of self among his peers as a necessary propaedeutic to awaken them to full selfhood.6 Since Kierkegaard views the self as elusive and dynamic, to define selfhood too concretely in his thought leads to misreadings that undermine his project. he analyzes selfhood for christian ends— Kierkegaard’s existential concerns interpermeate christianity within the category of the individual. As the self’s fulfillment can only be realized theologically, extricating Kierkegaard’s notion of self from its christian context is erroneous. as Kierkegaard emphasizes imitation so strongly, the title of christian is reserved for those who willingly face the “terror of the demands.”7 Since an immature self cannot see her individuality and so cannot become christian, mature selfhood is a prerequisite for becoming a theological self. only when it views itself as existing in a world defined by Christian categories and the requirements of New Testament discipleship can the self find its fulfillment. Imitation of Christ is the ideal lifepattern for the christian, yet Kierkegaard maintains a relationship of “radical choice” between the potential christian and christian life.8 he aims to assist people in crossing the threshold of radical choice into christian imitation. he aims both to show that christendom is an imposter of new testament christianity and to revive true christianity by a call to imitate.9 part two emphasizes Kierkegaard’s defense of the concrete life and words of Jesus to preserve and vivify christian imitation. the historical presupposition is essential to Kierkegaard’s thought on christ—all dehistoricization of Jesus amounts to self-deception. much is at stake in the historical Jesus because if his life was concrete, then the life of imitation can and ought to be as well. analyzing Kierkegaard’s method to rehistoricize Jesus, dewey shows that Kierkegaard’s christ is one we can both relate to and encounter. the encounter with Jesus is the starting point for the concrete life of imitation. a personal relation with Jesus is crucial on Kierkegaard’s view since christ’s atonement is for each individual. dewey observes that christianity may elicit offense in three zones: the empiric zone (when truth claims are made without empirical evidence); the logic zone (when claims such as “christ is both god and human” are made); and the comfort zone (when christians are asked to forego self-indulgence). that Kierkegaardian christianity falls in this final category evinces that imitation is the central point of Christianity for him. christian life entails joy as well as suffering as christ is simultaneously 5 6 7 8 9

ibid., pp. xxv–xxvi. ibid., pp. 3–4. ibid., p. 19. ibid., p. 29. ibid., p. 39; p. 43.

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“the impossible demand and the compassionate savior.”10 Kierkegaard’s christian imitation maintains the tension between joy and suffering, attraction and repulsion, almost till it breaks. this attraction–repulsion polarity is maintained since the impetus for imitation is a gratitude born of redemption. in part three, dewey differentiates between facsimile imitation, ascetic imitation, and Kristi Efterfølgelse, following after Christ. The first attempts to be Christ and amounts to self-deification. Dewey discusses both Christ’s concrete individuality and that of each follower to specify the type of christian imitation he promotes. in order to prevent facsimile imitation, Kierkegaard allows for “exceptions, improvisations, innovations,” so that he motivates imitation without demanding “slavish conformity to a restricting stereotype.”11 with respect to ascetic imitation, dewey argues that while suffering and sacrifice are intrinsic to Christian life for Kierkegaard, he is more descriptive than prescriptive on this point. on Kierkegaard’s view, enjoying the world need not contradict christianity—the point is to live in the world in an absolute relation to the absolute, rather than in a relation of immediacy. it seems that for dewey, in a society that emphasized independence and challenged traditional ideas on self-restraint, Kierkegaardian imitation offered a way to maintain individuality and enjoy the world. he states that at most, Kierkegaard can point toward the mystery of christ as prototype—beyond that, imitation comes only through one’s “personal volition and idiosyncratic practice.”12 elaborating on Jesus as encounterable, dewey observes that following is a “response evoked by an encounter with one’s savior.”13 this encounter can be perpetuated: as one discerns and appropriates christ’s pattern through obedience, suffering, and dying to the world, one increasingly experiences his presence.14 dewey discusses this demanding lifestyle in terms of grace, repentance, and becoming, clarifying that one can only ever claim to attempt to become a christian. as that which eludes, becoming impels one to continue following christ. Further, repentance motivates the personal maturation necessary for appropriating christian life, in which grace is present alongside rigor. god’s grace and commands are not mutually exclusive; rather, they interpermeate one another so that grace abides along the entire continuum of following.15 concluding that Kierkegaard’s understanding of Jesus is highly relevant for issues facing the twentieth century, dewey holds that Kierkegaard’s notion of following christ offers a valid option given the problem of the historical Jesus and the need for a viable biblical ethic. dewey’s work is thoroughly researched and well grounded in Kierkegaard’s religious thought. one reviewer observed that although the work is sound both logically and theologically, it failed in its attempt to enliven christianity because the will to imitate as well as Kierkegaard’s authority had already lost allure in the

10 11 12 13 14 15

ibid., p. 99. ibid., p. 107; p. 109. ibid., p. 126. ibid., p. 128. ibid., pp. 137–50. ibid., pp. 155–61.

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uSa.16 perhaps this is why dewey is at pains to emphasize that Kierkegaardian imitation allows for concrete individuality and variation in the way in which one follows christ. in denmark, the book was also respected for its scholarship although its tone was perceived as preachy at times.17 yet, danish theologian p.g. Lindhardt remained skeptical of its relevance there since its critical points were found with greater nuance and breadth directly in Kierkegaard and danish literature.18 this critique is not surprising for a work the explicit purpose of which is to revive twentieth-century american christianity through Kierkegaard. deidre nicole green

anonymous, Kirkus Reviews, September 15, 1968, p. 1034. rudolph arendt, “amerikaner om Kierkegaard,” Berlingske Aftenavis, august 20, 1969, p. 4. 18 p.g. Lindhardt, “glæden et hovedmotiv,” Jyllands-Posten, april 26, 1969, p. 11. Lindhardt specifies that for Kierkegaard joy and positive commandments are vital aspects of christianity, yet dewey does not elaborate on this as much as he could. 16 17

reviews and critical discussions anonymous, review in Choice: Current Reviews for Academic Libraries, June 1970, p. 557. anonymous, review in Kirkus Reviews, September 15, 1968, p. 1034. arendt, rudolph, “amerikaner om Kierkegaard,” Berlingske Aftenavis, august 20, 1969, p. 4. holm, Søren, “Kierkegaard på amerikansk,” Berlingske Tidende, June 29, 1969, p. 6. Lindhardt, p.g., “glæden et hovedmotiv,” Jyllands-Posten, april 26, 1969, p. 11. prag, thomas S., review in Review for Religious, vol. 28, no. 5, 1969, pp. 852–3.

mark dooley, The Politics of Exodus: Søren Kierkegaard’s Ethics of Responsibility, new york: Fordham university press 2001, xxiv + 285 pp.

The Politics of Exodus is part of a long series of studies that attempt to rescue Kierkegaard from the indictments of such intellectual icons as theodor adorno, georg Lukács, martin buber, and emmanuel Levinas. what particularizes mark dooley’s argument is its deconstructionist slant in tandem with an idiosyncratic redefinition of Christianity. Still, Dooley’s principal thesis―that Kierkegaard’s proto-deconstructionist philosophy is conversant with, if not intimately related to, postmodern ethics―is not news. So far, this conjecture has had a mixed history in Kierkegaard scholarship, attracting both enthusiastic advocates and stern opponents. the author warns us from the outset that his overall interpretation coheres with the spirit rather than the letter of Kierkegaard’s writings. he also acknowledges that he has “taken certain liberties in [his] reading of Kierkegaard,”1 occasionally pushing it in a direction that Kierkegaard himself would not have been very enthusiastic about. in an even more polemical vein, dooley would not mind if his “text sticks in the throat of those purists and disciples who would unreservedly privilege the letter over the spirit of [Kierkegaard’s] work.”2 apart from dooley’s rigid dualism between alleged conservative literalists and free-spirited exegetes, one will still wonder just how much one could sacrifice from the letter of the text in order to let the fragrance of its spirit come forth. in dooley’s case the answer is, quite a bit, so much so that at the end the reader may suspect that the spirit has very little to do with its letter. the book’s intentions are comparative as well as corrective. comparatively, dooley claims that Kierkegaard’s “religious bent amounts to an ethics of responsibility strikingly similar in tone to that evoked by derrida of late.”3 the most cogent in this philosophical kinship are Kierkegaard’s and derrida’s appraisal of repetition, their anti-hegelian understanding of subjectivity, their open confrontation with the status of the written sign,4 and their sense of the ethical virtues of irony. mark dooley, The Politics of Exodus: Søren Kierkegaard’s Ethics of Responsibility, new york: Fordham university press 2001, p. xv. 2 ibid., p. xvi. 3 ibid., p. xx. 4 this is perhaps the most valuable part of the book, and it could be read in conjunction with pat bigelow, Kierkegaard and the Problem of Writing, tallahassee: Florida State university press 1987; mark c. taylor, Altarity, chicago: university of chicago press, 1987; 1

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moving to his corrective teleology, dooley makes a compelling case against critics who view Kierkegaard as an acosmic or solipsistic thinker who is politically irrelevant and cavalier towards ethical matters. the author suggests that there is enough room in Kierkegaard’s thought for an authentic community nurtured by the “selfless love for the other.”5 More specifically, it is argued that similarly to Derrida, Kierkegaard endorsed an “obligation to the singular other that overrides one’s obligation to the universality of the law.”6 thus, both philosophers successfully account for the otherness of the human other by highlighting the imperative “response to the other whose singularity is not guaranteed by the prevailing orthodoxy.”7 undeniably, dooley’s contribution to the Kierkegaard–derrida dialogue is constructive and comes as a welcome complement to the research of merold westphal, John d. caputo, mark c. taylor, edward mooney, John Llewelyn, david goicoechea, and many others. the most questionable side of The Politics of Exodus, however, issues from its reformulation of the scope, meaning, and purpose of religion in Kierkegaard’s thought. very early on, while putting derrida and deconstruction to one side, Dooley finds inspiration in a theological movement whose relevance for postmodern ethical theories can only be guessed. that movement is liberation theology. probably most of the freedoms dooley adopts vis-à-vis the letter of Kierkegaard’s text originate in this hermeneutic shift which is not devoid of arbitrariness. after all, one does not necessarily have to appeal to liberation theology to initiate a conversation between Kierkegaard and derrida.8 dooley’s stern conviction, however, is that liberation theology helps us understand why the Kierkegaardian religiosity and derrida’s notion of justice manage to “lift the burden of the universal order so as to affirm ‘the priceless dignity of others.’ ”9 on this account, Kierkegaard would encourage the reader to imitate the christ of liberation theology because our nature is quintessentially temporal, and therefore the only way to relate to the god-man is through his worldly abasement. but here dooley introduces a portentous twist. Specifically, he interprets the divine incarnation as indicative of (a) the exclusive identification of Jesus with the poor, the silenced, the downtrodden, and the oppressed, and (b) christ’s continual instigation to “social change”10 which is to be reenacted in the present. dooley’s broader conjecture is that Kierkegaard values the social praxis of the militant church whose objective is to realize a “radical

vanessa rumble, “Love and difference: the christian ideal in Kierkegaard’s Works of Love,” in The New Kierkegaard, ed. by elsebet Jegstrup, bloomington: indiana university press 2004, pp. 161–78. 5 dooley, The Politics of Exodus, p. xiv. 6 ibid., p. xx. 7 ibid. 8 dooley forgets that there are christian traditions radically different from liberation theology, which entertain a similar negative attitude towards the status quo. 9 dooley, The Politics of Exodus, p. 21. if this hypothesis is valid and if Kierkegaard happens to be an incipient deconstructionist, then dooley should clarify to what extent derrida resonated with christianity. otherwise, dooley’s parallelisms remain purely speculative. 10 ibid., p. 19.

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egalitarianism.”11 thus, according to dooley, Kierkegaard’s “primary vocation”12 was the establishment of the ethical community which represents the realization of the promised kingdom in the here and now. despite its surprising angles and subversive goals, such perspective is beset by considerable oversimplifications. An initial problem issues from one of Dooley’s hidden sources: Karl marx’s critical philosophy of social emancipation, which, irrespective of its major impact on liberation theology, is completely left aside in the present volume. that could be because the divorce between the ruthless marxian assault on religion and Kierkegaard’s upholding of christianity is so profound that not even deconstruction is able to reveal their recondite connections. nonetheless, certain segments of The Politics of Exodus do imply that Kierkegaard’s spirituality may not be incompatible with a socialist reform of society. For example, dooley declares that no religious attitude, including Kierkegaard’s, can afford not to speak “against those who cause suffering and misery, and for those whom the body politic has denied a voice.”13 that being so, dooley appreciates only that kind of religiousness which coheres with either an absolute ethics or a liberationist politics. accordingly, the pivotal function of dooley’s god is to deliver us from “the clutches of tradition (universality, established order, given actuality)”14 and to summon everyone to a responsible interaction with others. being “the highest of all ethical standards”15 and acting as “a cohesive force between individuals,”16 god additionally institutes the injunction to renounce earthly possessions for the well-being of the underprivileged. consistent with his willingness to go beyond the letter of Kierkegaard’s text, dooley disregards here a capital fact. namely, that Kierkegaard never questioned the classical doctrinal postulates of christianity, which proclaim god as the transcendent creator of everything seen and unseen; the redemptive, omnipotent father; and the rigorous judge of humankind, whose dealings with the world oftentimes supersede, when not directly contradict, the need for moral dictates, political reforms, and social activism. dooley’s representation of christ is dominated by the same language of subversion, generalized equity, and ethical absolutism. consequently, for him, fundamentally instructive about Jesus’ life is the insight that “social institutions are founded on an exclusionary gesture.”17 to the extent that he surrounded himself predominantly with lepers, prostitutes, paralytics, and other marginals, Jesus incarnates “the highest ethical criterion and goal,”18 the ultimate prototype in the struggle to unfetter the chained. as a result, the historical christ becomes the paramount social emancipator 11 ibid., p. 20; p. 23. See also mark dooley, “risking responsibility: a politics of the Émigré,” in Kierkegaard: The Self in Society, ed. by george pattison and Steven Shakespeare, new york and London: St. martin’s press 1997, pp. 139–55. 12 dooley, The Politics of Exodus, p. 75; emphasis mine. 13 ibid., p. 135. 14 ibid., p. 122. 15 ibid., p. 123. 16 ibid., p. 85. 17 ibid., p. 137. 18 ibid., p. 126.

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“who challenged the established order in the name of the nuisances and nobodies, in the name of justice and radical egalitarianism.”19 with that in mind, the author notes that Kierkegaard’s christianity, too, appears as “a militant force in the midst of political and religious complacency.”20 that is why Kierkegaard’s God-man is “the figure who rallied to the cause of all those who labor and are burdened.”21 christ’s life, therefore, must be interpreted as a means of enacting immediate ethical and social reforms. dooley thereby limits the imitation of Christ―originally conceived by Kierkegaard as an expiatory and redemptioncentered task―to a genuine interaction with the émigré, and thus to a heterodox attitude intent upon undermining the prevalent, totalizing orthodoxies of the day. in dooley’s eyes, Kierkegaard purportedly admits that Jesus’ was a life of endless subversion, the lesson for those who seek to redress social wrongs. it is interesting to note just what dooley thereby chooses to leave behind: namely, the fairly pivotal fact that Kierkegaard’s christ is at the same time the omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent savior, the expected messiah, and the eschatological judge. Just as debatable is dooley’s suggestion that Kierkegaard’s ecclesia militans be interpreted as envisaging a radical egalitarianism.22 problematic here is not necessarily the preoccupation with ways to combat exploitation and discrimination but rather the divergent meaning Kierkegaard and dooley assign to equality.23 it is ironic, albeit suggestive, that in spite of his egalitarian concerns, dooley treats dismissively all those who hold economic and political power, those who nurture and conserve inherited traditions, and those who live by quietistic ideals. even if dooley is perfectly justified in opposing the abusive and unjust policies of the powers that be, it is not always to his advantage routinely to invoke Kierkegaard in support of a worldly liberationist crusade. Pace the spirit of dooley’s interpretation, Kierkegaard warns that every individual must be treated primordially as neighbor (Næsten), that is, as a singular self in need of salvation, existing before a love-driven, though infinitely unknown, God. Implicitly, Kierkegaard’s Næsten supersedes each and every mundane difference, and cannot be identified solely with the victim of oppressive government systems, unfair economic exchanges, and exclusionary social habits.24 ibid., p. 23. ibid., p. 18. 21 ibid., p. 18; see also p. 135. dooley does not contemplate the equally plausible possibility―which is clearly supported by the primary texts―that Kierkegaard developed, via the pivotal motif of the suffering savior, a theology of divine kenosis which is radically at odds with any revolutionary social praxis. 22 contrast with “the tyranny of the equal” which Kierkegaard associates with a subtle form of “slavery” and even with the “evil spirit” (SKS 8, 418 / UD, 327). See also SKS 8, 103 / TA, 109, where the levelling performed by the crowd is also deemed evil. dooley cannot guarantee that the pursuit of mundane egalitarian ideals would never entail such levelling. 23 See in this sense Kierkegaard’s caveat that worldly “similarity, if it were possible, is not christian equality” (SKS 9, 78 / WL, 72). equally noteworthy is Kierkegaard’s suspicion that earthly injustice and inequality cannot but persist in the absence of an unmediated relationality to god (SKS 9, 77–84, 126–31, 263–77 / WL, 72–8, 123–8, 264–79). 24 Contrast with Dooley’s affirmation that the true Christian is obligated to love “especially those for whom the established order provides no welfare and security.” The 19 20

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From Kierkegaard’s vantage point, whether literally or analogically understood, there is no reason why, granted the unconditioned equality of spirit, one should focus primordially on the preponderantly material gap between the impoverished and the well-off. Kierkegaard never excludes the rich and the bureaucrat from the feast of neighbor love (Kjerlighed) since the latter’s primary telos is to ensure the individual’s, spiritual or salvific, equal worth before God.25 had Kierkegaard thought otherwise, that is, had he acknowledged the existence of certain groups or individuals more worthy of love than others, then he would not have distinguished so sharply between Kjerlighed and preferential love (Elskov). That agape should be specifically tailored to social, political, and economic emancipation is at best a mode of wishful thinking. For Kierkegaard repeatedly warns that when practicing Kjerlighed, christians without exception are to rid themselves of the relative differences between the ruling and the ruled, the sick and the healthy, the impecunious and the rich, or friend and stranger.26 Furthermore, what dooley conveniently bypasses are Kierkegaard’s warnings against the “distinguished corruption”27 of those who obstinately cling to their unfortunate lot as an excuse to shirk the commandment to love every other (including the fortunate and the privileged) as neighbor. predictably enough, dooley also refrains from dealing with Kierkegaard’s unambiguous rebuttal of immanentist egalitarian utopias.28 Finally, dooley’s relentless insistence on the ultimacy of the ethical remains unconvincing as long as it completely does away with the numinous facet of Kierkegaard’s religiosity. dooley refuses to even consider the possibility―abundantly confirmed in Kierkegaard’s authorship―that by dint of its transcendent, redemptive substratum, religion may subvert the politics of exodus as a whole; hence, his persistent avoidance of Kierkegaard’s negative evaluation of politics as such. moreover, dooley has nothing to say about the propitious role that suffering plays in Kierkegaard’s christianity. whereas he presumes that Kierkegaard’s ethic urges us to provide the disadvantaged with the welfare they are habitually denied, Kierkegaard, in fact, interprets the inner and outer tribulations of every single individual as meaningful and even religiously formative.29 moreover, provided his quintessentially offensive nature, Kierkegaard’s christ is the occasion for manifold tribulations to all followers,30 be they from within or without the established order. despite its deeply reductionistic tableau of Kierkegaard’s christianity, The Politics of Exodus did gain a distinct place in the ongoing effort to dismantle the myth that the danish thinker was socially insouciant, politically acquiescent, and Politics of Exodus, p. 237; emphasis added. See also ibid., p. 133; p. 142. 25 SKS 5, 143–5 / EUD, 141–3. 26 SKS 9, 96–136 / WL, 91–134. SKS 11, 198–9 / SUD, 85–6. 27 SKS 9, 80–7 / WL, 74–81. See also SKS 9, 128, 312–26 / WL, 125, 315–30. 28 See SKS 9, 78, 138 / WL, 71–2, 136. SKS 8, 417–19 / UD, 326–7. 29 See, for instance, SKS 10, 99–166 / CD, 93–159. SKS 4, 115–6 / FT, 19. 30 that happens because of the multifarious evils of sinfulness. in this sense, one should note dooley’s pelagian understanding of sin which, while insisting solely on the cognitive component, goes against Kierkegaard’s emphasis on volition. See dooley, The Politics of Exodus, p. 82; pp. 104; ff. p. 131.

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ethically myopic. readers interested in derrida’s rapports with Kierkegaard may profit from the volume’s hypotheses thereof. Equally profitable are Dooley’s stark rejoinders to emmanuel Levinas’ (mis)reading of Kierkegaard. Leo Stan

reviews and critical discussions cruysberghs, paul, Johan taels, and Karl verstrynge, “descriptive bibliography: recent Kierkegaard Literature: 2000–2004,” Tidschrift voor Filosofie, vol. 67, no. 4, 2005, pp. 767–814; see p. 788. pattison, george, review in Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, vol. 44, 2002, pp. 12–15. wassenaar, michael, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 23, 2004, pp. 236–9.

elmer h. duncan, Sören Kierkegaard, waco, texas: word books 1976, 155 pp.

elmer duncan’s book, Sören Kierkegaard, was published in 1976 by word books. it is part of the Makers of the Modern Theological Mind book series. the series asks the question, “who are the thinkers that have shaped christian theology in our time?”1 the books in this series attempt to appeal both to the informed layman as well as someone at the doctoral level. elmer duncan himself, a professor of philosophy at baylor university, wrote his doctoral dissertation on Kierkegaard and seems to have initially considered converting that dissertation into a book format for this series; however, having written his dissertation in 1962, he notes that he had to take into account fresh perspectives in the field of Kierkegaard studies (at his time) that were not available to him when he initially completed his doctoral work more than ten years prior. duncan also admits that he himself is not a theologian, but a philosopher, and he holds that Kierkegaard is best understood “as a philosopher who has had a terrific impact on contemporary theology.”2 as duncan admits, he feels comfortable explicating Kierkegaard’s philosophical thoughts, but he asked a dan walker, “a doctoral candidate in religion at baylor university,”3 to write “a chapter on Kierkegaard’s influence on contemporary theology.”4 the layout of the book is simple enough, six main chapters, a conclusion, a postscript, and a bibliographical essay. chapter 1 consists of a brief biographical account of Kierkegaard. Since duncan’s goal is a study of Kierkegaard’s thought and not necessarily his biography, he attempts to establish a few of the most notable aspects of Kierkegaard’s life, including his father’s background and the supposed “family curse,” the nature of Kierkegaard’s sense of divine mission as it related to his writing, the engagement to regine olsen, and his attack on christendom. chapters 2–5 provide a brief examination of Kierkegaard’s work focusing mainly on Either/Or, Fear and Trembling, Philosophical Fragments, and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. duncan proceeds to use the three spheres of existence (the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious) to analyze Kierkegaard’s writings, stating 1 bob e. patterson, “editor’s preface,” in elmer h. duncan, Sören Kierkegaard, waco, texas: word books 1976, p. 11. 2 duncan, Sören Kierkegaard, p. 13. 3 ibid., p. 14. 4 ibid.

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that “the three spheres of existence constitute the heart of Kierkegaard’s thought.”5 chapter 2 focuses on the identity of “a,” the Seducer and the boredom of the aesthetic, with duncan comparing the aesthetic stage to the caricature of hegelian philosophy as a spectator sport that refuses to engage with actual existence. included in this chapter is also a section explaining why Kierkegaard is often referred to as “the first existentialist.”6 duncan, in attempting to help the reader understand what is meant by “existentialism,” compares Kierkegaard’s thought to that of Jean-paul Sartre. Chapter 3 discusses Kierkegaard’s view of the ethical as personified by Judge william in Either/Or, part two. duncan maintains that the ethical is best understood as a kind of Kantian view of duty over inclination. this discussion of the ethical quickly becomes a mere transition point to the religious sphere, which duncan notes is higher than the ethical and outside of the domain of Kantian moral reasons. as in the previous chapter, duncan makes another digression to look at another thinker Kierkegaard had an influence upon. In this case, it is the playwright Henrik Ibsen,7 who had read Fear and Trembling and wrote a play, Brand, about a character who is forced to make a similar decision regarding his son as abraham was forced to do with isaac. in chapter 4, duncan offers some preliminary considerations for understanding Kierkegaard’s religious sphere. The first thing he emphasizes is that Kierkegaard was writing in a christian context, and so duncan argues that Kierkegaard was not interested in proofs of god’s existence. he was interested in encouraging the already converted to live like christians. the second thing duncan makes note of is Ludwig Feuerbach’s influence on Kierkegaard’s work, and Duncan notes that one cannot understand the problem of the absolute paradox without an understanding of Feuerbach’s thought. Finally, duncan explains Kierkegaard’s idea of subjective truth as being a relationship to the truth as opposed to it referring to some form of relativism. chapter 5 focuses mainly on Philosophical Fragments and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. duncan begins by explaining Kierkegaard’s use of plato (he equates Socrates with plato) and the idea of recollection, contrasting it with the idea of the god providing truth and the condition for its acceptance to the believer. in the remaining two sections, duncan explores the meaning and purpose of the Postscript, its message, and its focus on the passionate inwardness of the believer. Chapter 6 brings the reader to a discussion of Kierkegaard’s influence on contemporary theology. It begins by explaining Kierkegaard’s early influence upon the works of Karl barth, noting that barth’s debt to Kierkegaard may be most seen in the former’s christology and idea of revelation. the chapter then moves on to discuss how Heidegger’s philosophy influenced the work of both Rudolph Bultmann and paul tillich. as brief introduction to the thought of Kierkegaard, this book serves well enough, but as an introduction to Kierkegaard as a maker of modern theological thought, 5 6 7

ibid., p. 30. ibid., p. 47. ibid., p. 69.

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it falls woefully short. while it is true that “much…of Kierkegaard’s theological influence came first through the medium of philosophy,”8 duncan spends more time discussing Kierkegaard’s influence on philosophy than on theology. This may in part be understandable since he himself admits to lacking some of the competence to write about that topic, which is why he asked dan walker to be his co-writer; however, even the chapter on contemporary theology is woefully disappointing. while it is true that the sixth chapter covers such significant figures as Barth, Bultmann, and Tillich, it spends its entire second to last paragraph trying to justify not giving any space to martin buber, gabriel marcel, emil brunner, reinhold niebuhr, and later even rudolf otto. in the opinion of the reviewer, this seems unacceptable. the readers of this volume would have been better served if duncan had left out his explications of Sartre and ibsen to leave more room for the discussion of other contemporary theological thinkers like brunner and niebuhr. duncan’s work is an accessible resource for the layman wanting to learn about Kierkegaard. while it may have been better for a theologian to write this volume given the series’ purpose, duncan adequately introduces us to many relevant elements of Kierkegaard’s life and thought. matthew brake

8

ibid., p. 118.

reviews and critical discussions hermann, andrew F., “Kierkegaard and dialogue: the communication of capability,” Communication Theory, vol. 18, no. 1, 2008, p. 72. Knight, pamela damron, review in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol. 46, no. 1, 1978, pp. 87–8. Lawry, edward g., review in Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 8, no. 2, 1977, pp. 197–8. perkins, robert L., review in Journal of Church and State, vol. 19, no. 2, 1977, p. 355.

Stephen n. dunning, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Inwardness: A Structural Analysis of the Theory of Stages, princeton: princeton university press 1985, xvii + 323 pp.

in Stephen northrup dunning’s work, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Inwardness: A Structural Analysis of the Theory of Stages, he analyzes the major pseudonymous works of Kierkegaard in order to examine them through the dialectic of g.w.F. hegel.1 Dunning’s work finds a deep Hegelian dialectic not only in the ironic places where Kierkegaard may have intended a snide parody of hegel, but also throughout his life’s work as an overall project for the entire theory of the stages.23 After first noticing the Hegelian dialectic in Either/Or, part one,4 Dunning finds that Kierkegaard’s entire pseudonymous corpus can be read through the lens of hegelian dialectic, though he is quick to caution that this does not mean that Kierkegaard is endorsing hegel by use of his dialectic nor is it a negative and ironic distancing. For dunning, it is a subconscious and more insidious hegelianism that infected Kierkegaard and never left in his theory of the stages. dunning gives an exhaustive reading of Kierkegaard’s works from The Concept of Irony up until Practice in Christianity, with a careful and well-sourced reading of the major pseudonymous works as they relate to the progression of the dialectic. dunning begins his exhaustive analysis of the major pseudonymous works with The Concept of Irony. He examines the explicit dialectic of the first section of the work before turning to the more intensive work on Either/Or and Stages on Life’s Way. all of the major pseudonymous works display, at least in some constellation, these dual dialectics. the pseudonyms themselves are not disposed of in this analysis either, with dunning arguing his particular analysis allows us to read the pseudonyms as each having an importance. dunning disagrees with the reading that argues the stages are ways of life, but instead focuses on the structures of the works to see how Stephen n. dunning, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Inwardness: A Structural Analysis of the Theory of Stages, princeton: princeton university press 1985. 2 ibid., p. 5. 3 dunning explicitly uses the theory of stages because he claims this is how Kierkegaard’s theory is generally known, therefore allowing him to use the more hegelian sounding term over the later “spheres” (ibid., p. 12). 4 ibid., p. xi. 1

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one is moved from one stage to the next by the logic of the dialectic. with dialectic, the progression to the religious becomes a necessary moment of self-contradiction. dunning reads the hegelian structure as a continuity through Kierkegaard’s oeuvre. dunning sees the dialectical structure as a way into the whole of Kierkegaard’s theory of the stages. Kierkegaard’s primary dialectics for dunning are the inner/ outer and self/other.5 these dual dialectics are explicated throughout the corpus with different works focusing on one or the other dialectic. For example, dunning uses the dialectic to see The Concept of Anxiety as expressing the self/other dialectic.6 this enables him to build a greater continuity than just, as is often done, isolating The Concept of Anxiety as dealing with the external. dunning’s novelty is in using the hegelian structure to dig out seeming lacunae in the work by unveiling it as a text of the religious stage and dealing with internalization in the works by placing them in a larger context of the inner/outer dialectic. no work is isolated from the hegelian influence. To this end, Dunning imports the Hegelian language of the Aufhebung to explain the moments of mediated immediacy in his understanding of Kierkegaard’s dialectic as the moment of contradiction. dunning hews as closely as possible to hegel’s language even where Kierkegaard does differently.7 though dunning’s writing is often dry, he supplies the reader with charts at different points throughout his work. these eight charts do much of the lifting for dunning in laying out his understanding of Kierkegaard, giving an outline to the movement from the inwardness in-itself of the aesthetic to the inwardness for-itself of the aesthetic, culminating in the inwardness in-and-for itself, that is the religious and absolute paradox.8 the charts outline much of dunning’s argument and give the larger sense of how he sees the movement of Kierkegaard’s system. dunning shows his work throughout the book enhancing the power of his understanding of the hegelian dialectic by plotting it out in diagram form. though there are only eight in the work, these graphics do a lot to show the intensity of dunning’s examination of the dialectic. in dunning’s analysis, the ethical stage takes up the least space of the stages.9 though Judge william is given space in dunning’s analysis, it is ultimately to show he is not a dialectical thinker, while also showing dunning’s struggle to understand the ethical stage. the structure dunning sees in part two of Either/Or and “various observations about marriage” is not a dialectical one; indeed, he doubts that there is any structure at all. though the Judge is, in his character, an explicitly hegelian thinker in Kierkegaard’s parody, he does not follow the careful structure seen throughout the part one of Either/Or or “in vino veritas.” the scattered nature of his work forbids dunning from applying a deeper structure to his arguments. dunning sympathizes with critics of the ethical stage as a specific stage, but ultimately he brings to bear an understanding of the ethical where the Aufhebung is found in selfrevelation. 5 6 7 8 9

ibid., p. 4. ibid., p. 143. ibid., p. 9. ibid., p. 251. ibid., p. 74.

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the majority of the book frames the aesthetic and religious stages, though this is also due to the major pseudonymous works, which focus less on the ethical than the religious and aesthetic. the analysis of these stages and their related works is deeply textual and digs into the meat of the corpus. the analyses of both of these stages allow dunning to show both his deep appreciation for Kierkegaard’s work with the hermeneutic of each of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms. dunning explicates each pseudonym via the hegelian dialectic, paying attention to the Kierkegaardian themes of the works as well as those where he finds the dialectic present. In Dunning’s view, the examination of the different pseudonyms plays into the dialectic not as specific lives but as a complex playing out of the dialectic. particularly in “in vino veritas,” the dialectical movement from the young man to Johannes the Seducer allows all of the pseudonyms to contribute meaningfully to the dialectic. dunning’s argument is if nothing else novel in his commitment to the hegelian schema for all of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous work. he assumes hegel as part of Kierkegaard unconsciously and that reading his work through the hegelian dialectic will give a deeper, more considered, understanding of the theory of stages. dunning’s work depends on the implicit Hegelian influence on Kierkegaard’s works. If one does not agree with dunning that, in the back of Kierkegaard’s mind, there was a Hegelian influence, then his argument loses its force. Independent of that, while the argument is striking in its presentation and ingenious in its use of hegel’s dialectic, it struggles against more common readings of Kierkegaard but also Kierkegaard’s explicit rejection of hegel. andrew m. Kirk

reviews and critical discussions donnelly, John, review in Review of Metaphysics, vol. 40, no. 3, 1987, pp. 570–2. evans, c. Stephen, review in Faith and Philosophy, vol. 5, 1988, pp. 93–5. hall, ronald L., review in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 21, no. 1, 1987, pp. 57–60. mccarthy, vincent, review in Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, no. 17, 1987 pp. 7–11. piety, marilyn g., review in Owl of Minerva, vol. 21, no. 2, 1990, pp. 205–8. Schweiker, william, review in Journal of Religion, vol. 67, no. 4, 1987, pp. 563–5. Stack, george J., review in Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 26, 1988, pp. 162–7. vardy, peter, review in Religious Studies, vol. 23, no. 3, 1987, pp. 427–8.

Louis dupré, Kierkegaard as Theologian: The Dialectic of Christian Existence, new york: Sheed and ward 1963, 229 pp.

Louis dupré gave the Kierkegaardian research program a marvelous gift in his book on Kierkegaard as a theologian. the profundity of one’s interpretation of a great thinker depends upon the depth and scope of the interpreter’s humanity. dupré’s expansive humanity enables him to offer us an insightful view of Kierkegaard’s contributions as a theologian. this book was published in dutch in 1958,1 and an English translation first appeared in 1963.2 born and educated in belgium, dupré turned to Kierkegaard after researching and writing on Karl marx. motivation for this book came from his conviction that Kierkegaard was a theologian who needed to be studied as such. dupré, a roman catholic, believed that protestants and catholics alike could learn much from Kierkegaard. the author was writing at a time when documents were being prepared for the Second vatican council (1962–65). the theme of ecumenicity was in the air and questions about the relation of roman catholics to protestants were being considered. in his introduction, dupré asks whether Kierkegaard was operating in the protestant or catholic tradition. Kierkegaard’s context was Lutheran, but his harsh criticisms of protestantism resonated with elements of catholic doctrine. dupré concluded that Kierkegaard’s dialectic of existence is possibly the most consistent application of the reformation principle ever made. the author views the dane as a valuable contributor to catholic–protestant dialogue. Kierkegaard could help bring clarity to the dialogue through his theological emphases on subjectivity, freedom, passion, and faith. The book dedicates five chapters to themes in Kierkegaard’s dialectical probings. The first chapter looks at Kierkegaard’s psychology in relation to his religious ideas. the account substantiates dupré’s idea that the psychographic approach could lead to important conclusions. Kierkegaard’s father, fifty-six when he was born, established a somber atmosphere in the household. Living with melancholia and guilt, the father tried to protect the youngest son from evil and to educate him into Louis dupré, Kierkegaards theologie of de dialectiek van het christen-worden, utrecht: het Spectrum; antwerp: Standaard 1958 (Theologische bibliotheek). 2 Louis dupré, Kierkegaard as Theologian: The Dialectic of Christian Existence, new york: Sheed and ward 1963. 1

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the rigors of christian faith at a young age. this resulted in ambivalent feelings of revering the father while unconsciously desiring to cast off him and the heavy yoke lain upon him. his childhood left Kierkegaard with tensions in his personality. Dupré sees the conflict between desiring spontaneous behavior and the dread of yielding to such wishes as leading to complex types of self-torture. an intricate eroticism together with a strong commitment to life’s spiritual element resulted in Kierkegaard’s split self that was also aware of having a weak body that was illequipped for supporting a daring spirit such as his own. with spiritual resources aplenty, but with physical capacity lacking, Kierkegaard fled into the ironic attitude that made him a spectator of himself, uncomfortable with immediate or spontaneous relating to others. taking on the guilt of the father brought further trauma. all these issues complicated his engagement to regine olsen. dupré thinks Kierkegaard could never come to terms with sex. Self-imprisoned, he could only love regine within himself. As psychologically immature, he could exist in life’s reflective dimension but not in life’s immediacies. Residing in reflection prevented an actual relationship with regine; however, he could experience this relationship by remembrance. it was religion that brought Søren back to reality. the actions of a neurotic person came to acquire religious meaning. thus, Kierkegaard’s psychology provided the condition for his religious and philosophical discoveries. his numerous psychological weaknesses led him to religious insights. interior sufferings made possible profound inquiries into the Christian faith. That is why Dupré entitled this first chapter “The ascent to the religious Level.” dupré’s knowledge of hegel and Kant affords him the vantage point for grasping fine points of Kierkegaard’s dialectical anthropology, at the center of which is sin. Kierkegaard knew that to understand sin is to misunderstand it, because understanding sin is dealing with it as a possibility, and a possible evil is no evil. the human is sinful only when a subjectively conscious awareness of oneself as sinful is in place. two works, The Concept of Anxiety and The Sickness unto Death, most explicitly develop the anthropological account in which the reality of sin’s origin and actuality are treated. the human is created with many possible ways of relating itself to other realities, and its health, wholeness, or salvation depends upon how it negotiates the task of realizing its possibilities in these various relationships. Freedom, as the very essence of the human, chooses how the self as dynamic spirit relates to its structured possibilities and chooses itself in a process of becoming. each miscue made in these choices can lead to a form of despair. most fundamental of the self’s structured possibilities is that of relating to god. the individual human becomes itself in the highest sense only by relating itself to god. the notion of “sin” points to the misrelation characterizing one’s life before god. dupré’s respective accounts of original sin and anxiety and the sinful act are most insightful. the second chapter on “the dialectic of Sin” prepares the way for the third on “Judgment and grace.” Kierkegaard struggled with the role of grace in religious experience. he focused on the subjective dimension of appropriating grace existentially, on the conditions needed for the reception of grace. taking seriously ethics is one important condition, for apart from the anguished conscience the individual is not in a position to experience the redemptive message of grace

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and forgiveness. although there are exceptions, the general purpose of ethics in Kierkegaard is to bring about despair. with ethics sublated, the immanence of religiousness “a” leads to guilt as humanly measured and the transcendence of religiousness “b” leads to sin as divinely revealed. consciousness of sin makes the relation to oneself into a relation with God. This first step of sin-recognition establishes the interiority that opens the door for redemption’s grace to come to the individual through god’s presence. religious suffering as an internal struggle to relate appropriately to god involves the twin aspects of grace and task. For the Lutheran Kierkegaard, the priority of god’s initiative is never at issue, but for him one is justified as one becomes justified. Kierkegaard’s emphasis on freedom leads him to affirm what Dupré regards as a true synergistic theory of grace that applies to the whole unfolding relationship of the human with god. grace constitutes a relationship requiring two sides, and Kierkegaard makes bold to lift up the need for active response from the human side. Freedom functions in faith, which is both gift and act. the next two chapters summarize Kierkegaard’s views of “the dialectic of the act of Faith” and “the imitation of christ.” Faith, for Kierkegaard, involves the dialectic of subject and object. by its leap, faith takes the human beyond the arena of rational thought into a new world. the existential willing that constitutes faith means that it is an immediacy; however, unlike hegel’s immediacy, faith is immediate in a way that thinking can never sublate it. For Kierkegaard, the truth of faith’s act resides more in the how, or the manner of relating to its object, than in the what, or the contents of its belief. Faith’s truth consists in committing oneself and risking one’s life for a truth one does not possess, but which truth is posited by one’s very commitment. Faith reaches its highest passionate intensity in relation to the absolute paradox, the christ. therefore, christian faith’s object is a person in whom one trusts rather than a doctrine. the act of faith makes one a genuine contemporary of christ. this is a possibility because the christ comes close to the person of faith, as close as he had come to his contemporaries. through prayer, which involves a total surrendering to god, the issue becomes not what i do but what god does. dupré discusses the move away from ethical interiority to the post-1847 external actualization of the christian life. works here become more featured as the person of faith becomes an imitator of christ. Faith becomes centered in christ’s forgiveness and life in christ’s imitation. the last chapter, “the protest against the church,” gives an intriguing interpretation of Kierkegaard’s attack upon christendom. included are assessments of whether Kierkegaard’s stance is more roman catholic or protestant. covered are the issues of authority’s dialectic, the militancy of the church, Kierkegaard’s witness as being without authority, and Kierkegaard’s understanding of protestantism. dupré interprets Kierkegaard’s dialectical attack against everything in the light of his whole existential dialectic. He assesses Kierkegaard’s final critique as the concluding protests of one who was consistently protesting, calling into question a christian church that needed a corrective. therefore, the judgment is that, even though Kierkegaard placed himself outside the confines of the Protestant church, in all his antics he never abandoned the protestant principle. that principle contributed to his theological dialectic. we can say that dupré’s book succeeds as

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it does in its analysis because he, from his roman catholic perspective, operates with a comparably rich theological dialectic. he has powerfully made the case for “Kierkegaard as theologian.” curtis L. thompson

reviews and critical discussions Brookfield, C.M., review in Union Seminary Quarterly Review, vol. 19, 1964, pp. 176–8. clarke, J.a., review in Library Journal, vol. 88, January 1, 1963, p. 105. gerber, r.J., review in America, vol. 108, may 25, 1963, p. 775.

vernard eller, Kierkegaard and Radical Discipleship: A New Perspective, princeton: princeton university press 1968, xii + 445 pp.

vernard eller’s Kierkegaard and Radical Discipleship was published by princeton university press in 1968. it is based on eller’s reworked doctoral dissertation that he completed in 1964 at Pacific School of Religion in Berkeley, California. The emphasis of the work is on the relationship between Kierkegaard and sectarianism, a study whose inception may be traced to when eller was at bethany biblical Seminary and wrote a paper on “exploring the affinity between Kierkegaard and Pietism.”1 at the outset of his book, eller establishes that Kierkegaard is best understood as a religious author concerned with the divine–human relationship, which finds its best expression in lived-out actions. eller goes so far with this argument as to assert that starting with the later religious works and reading backwards is the best way to understand Kierkegaard’s entire authorship. this is in contrast to the tendencies in scholarship to understand Kierkegaard as “a philosopher, a psychologist, a social critic, an aesthete, or whatever.”2 according to eller, these are ways of reading Kierkegaard, which are “precisely contrary to his wishes and his own selfunderstanding.”3 Eller even finds “theologian” to be an inadequate way of describing Kierkegaard since theology is often more thought-centered than action-centered. eller does take note of some of his contemporaries who, like him, are seeking to provide what he sees as a more faithful reading of Kierkegaard. He identifies Perry LeFevre,4 paul holmer,5 niels thulstrup,6 william barrett,7 and L. harold dewolf,8 1 vernard eller, Kierkegaard and Radical Discipleship: A New Perspective, princeton: princeton university press 1968, p. vii. 2 ibid., p. 5. 3 ibid., p. 6. 4 perry d. LeFevre, The Prayers of Kierkegaard, chicago: university of chicago press 1956. 5 paul L holmer, “on understanding Kierkegaard,” in A Kierkegaard Critique, ed. by howard a. Johnson and niels thulstrup, new york: harper and brothers 1962, pp. 40–53. 6 niels thulstrup, “the complex of problems called ‘Kierkegaard,’ ” in A Kierkegaard Critique, pp. 286–96. 7 william barrett, Irrational Man, garden city: doubleday 1958. 8 L. harold dewolf, The Religious Revolt Against Reason, new york: harper and brothers 1949.

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as well as a collaborative effort by william earle, James m. edie, and John wild.9 what all of these authors have in common is a recognition of an action-centered irrationalism in Kierkegaard’s writings, based on the authority of the new testament, that stands opposed to any form of christian or philosophical rationalism. another contemporary whom eller draws attention to is emil brunner. eller credits brunner with the insight that Kierkegaard “was molded by and should be understood in the context of continental pietism.”10 it is this connection to pietism (itself a sectarian movement), along with Kierkegaard’s adherence to the new testament as the standard for christian life over and against the traditions and dogmas of the established church that causes eller to surmise that Kierkegaard should be located in what he calls “classic protestant Sectarianism.”11 to inform his study, eller uses the church of the brethren (his own tradition and itself a sectarian movement) as a point of comparison in order to defend his assertion that Kierkegaard himself is best understood as a sectarian. the book is divided into three parts. part one establishes the background of Kierkegaard and the church of the brethren. part two contains the core of the book in which eller compares Kierkegaard and the church of the brethren in their views on the single individual, the place of sociality in the christian life, christology, and the authority of the bible. part three consists of a brief conclusion. while eller’s treatment of the single individual, christology, and the bible are detailed but familiar subjects for Kierkegaard studies, his treatment of the place of sociality in Kierkegaard’s thought is a thorough treatment of this neglected and misunderstood topic, and this is one of the great strengths of the book. eller draws a distinction between two types of sociality: the church and the world. the difference is “that whereas the church is constituted of man-to-man relationships for the sake of god, the world is constituted of man-to-man relationships for the sake of man,”12 although both require the single individual to live “before god.”13 eller proceeds to divide each of these socialities into two categories: the positive and the negative. this distinction helps make clear the difference between healthy relationships and the “crowd mentality”14 that Kierkegaard often polemicized against. perhaps the greatest weakness of this book (and it is not a big one) is the problem of eller’s own bias as “dunker” himself. the tendency can often be to try and make the material say what one wishes it would say. Fortunately, eller recognizes this bias, and while his work comes across as an obvious attempt to make Kierkegaard as much like the church of the brethren as possible, the integrity of the scholarship in the book is not compromised.

william earle, James m. edie, and John wild, Christianity and Existentialism, evanston: northwestern university press 1963. 10 eller, Kierkegaard and Radical Discipleship, p. 9. 11 ibid., p. 14. 12 ibid., p. 210. 13 ibid. 14 ibid. 9

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eller has provided a valuable resource for understanding Kierkegaard’s religious thought as well as an interesting comparative study between Kierkegaard and the church of the brethren. this book provides valuable insight to those researching Kierkegaard’s connection to the moravians and other forms of sectarian piety. matthew brake

reviews and critical discussions barrett, Lee c., Eros and Self-Emptying: The Intersections of Augustine and Kierkegaard. grand rapids: william b. eerdmans 2013, p. 6, p. 374. collins, James, review in Modern Schoolman, vol. 46, no. 1, 1968, pp. 63–4. gustave, Semeese, review in Revue Philosophique de Louvain, vol. 67, no. 96, 1969, p. 665. holmer, paul L., review in Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, vol. 9, no. 1, 1970, pp. 67–70. Langan, thomas, review in Theological Studies, vol. 29, no. 4, 1968, pp. 800–802. mackey, Louis, “philosophy and poetry in Kierkegaard,” Review of Metaphysics, vol. 23, no. 2, 1969, p. 317. Søe, n.h., review in Kristeligt Dagblad, april 23, 1968. thulstrup, marie mikulová, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 7, 1968, pp. 206–7.

John elrod, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Works, princeton: princeton university press 1975, x + 271 pp.

John elrod’s Being and Existence in Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Works proposes a certain structure of the self that is the organizing principle behind human existence. the mechanics of this principle are remarkably systematic, and the importance of this system echoes throughout the book. it is also what underlies the book’s significance in Kierkegaardiana. The book, however, is demanding, and it takes work from the reader to surmise some of Kierkegaard’s more difficult insights. i would like to make three general points about elrod’s book. on one hand, the project is a faithful, technical investigation into Kierkegaard’s existentialism that is well supported by strong argumentation, yet leads to (point one) an unconventional conclusion: Kierkegaard is more indebted to dialectical philosophy than previously thought. on the other hand (point two), as a secondary source, the author’s language and style do not break from the rigor of Kierkegaard’s prose and so is of limited use to all but the Kierkegaard scholars of the world. Finally (point three), elrod avoids anecdotes of Kierkegaard’s personal life and directs his analysis to the consistency of ideas in the pseudonymous works, which is a welcome move. that i suggest the author’s interpretation is a faithful reading of Kierkegaard’s project relates to the book’s most controversial thesis—that is, reading Kierkegaard as a kind of hegelian system builder is legitimate. it also attests to elrod’s strength of argumentation in accomplishing such a thesis. John elrod’s approach in 1975 was original, and this makes the volume memorable. as exacting as it was provocative, elrod made two substantial moves in Being and Existence. the most notable move was to appropriate Kierkegaard under the mantle of the hegelianism. in light of Kierkegaard’s professed disdain for speculative philosophy, it seems to make sense that we take Kierkegaard at his word and reject the positive influence of German metaphysics on his philosophy. but, of course, to accept this claim without verifying it through further examination would be superficial—and Being and Existence is anything but superficial as Elrod sets out a painstakingly close argument of the texts to support this thesis. we know Kierkegaard owes a formative influence to Hegel, whose voice was booming across europe at the time and in whom, via Johan Ludvig heiberg, Kierkegaard was schooled.

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The influence of Schelling was no less, given Kierkegaard’s attendance at some of Schelling’s berlin lectures. herewith, we have the thesis of elrod’s work—that the individual self is premised on a dialectical development that matures in the quest for personal understanding. this quest for the self takes the form of an exploration of existence, and “this exploration of existence gives rise to an ontology,”1 and not only an ontology, but again one still fastened to a “triadic self-structure…which is the constitutive structure, the ontological principle”2 that underlies the meaning of our individual struggle for self-achievement. consequently, the author discloses a thesis of dialectical moments, which found the condition for the possibility of selfhood itself. this somewhat anti-Kierkegaardian (dialectical) claim motivates the entire movement of the book. could it be that we have got the basic mechanism of Kierkegaard’s view of existence wrong? apparently so. The first chapter of the book is devoted to showing the dialectical transformation of the self in five synthetic movements: finite—infinite; body—soul; reality— ideality; necessity—possibility; and time—the eternal. i appreciated the analytic deconstruction of the self and the labor the author must have used to dissect and organize this material out of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous narratives, as well as its substance in supporting the book’s claims. but this chapter and all of part one of the book are about as dense as academic philosophy gets. in summarizing what Kierkegaard means by the concept of action, elrod writes: “therefore, when, as self-conscious, the self appears to itself as possible and the interest of spirit emerges as the freedom to realize this self, the self’s knowledge of itself as free remains hypothetical until the act of freedom is consummated in existence.”3 unfortunately, the accompanying footnoted quotation from the Concluding Unscientific Postscript is far clearer. there are multiple cases where elrod’s writing is cloudier than Kierkegaard’s famously elliptical prose. this is disappointing and makes the reading forbiddingly abstract, save for the Kierkegaardians of the world. yet, i want to distinguish between what i characterize as difficult writing and the sound, novel ideas in the work. There is no doubt the work is meticulously argued and pioneering in its approach to the dialectical/systematic vestiges in Kierkegaard’s thought about being. another pioneering aspect of the effort, and one that is, perhaps, still not appreciated enough, is the close inspection of Kierkegaard’s philosophical concepts alone. i enjoyed this orientation of elrod’s research. the usual inclusion of Kierkegaard’s life in expositions about his philosophy is a product of his belief that inwardness and subjectivity are essential to the stages of life, self-understanding, and philosophy in general. without doubt it has a place in the literature. but i found elrod’s text refreshing as it gives Kierkegaard’s writing the respect, as it were, that other philosophers get, addressing the coherence of ideas on their own terms without watering them down with biographical details or raising ad hominems.

John elrod, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Works, princeton: princeton university press 1975, p. 19. 2 ibid. 3 ibid., p. 78. 1

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Most significantly however, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Works makes a strong case for a nuanced but, at the time, radical interpretation that Kierkegaard appropriated the basic ontology of existence from hegel, roughly speaking, and that this ontology shapes the development and expression of human life on earth. dean wm. Lauer

reviews and critical discussions barrett, Lee c., “the uSa: From neo-orthodoxy to plurality,” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, tome iii, The Near East, Asia, Australia and the Americas, ed. by Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), pp. 229–68; see pp. 240–1; p. 264. blake, david c. and staff, review in Review of Metaphysics, vol. 30, no. 1, 1976, pp. 126–7. come, arnold b., Kierkegaard as Humanist: Discovering My Self, Kingston and montréal: mcgill-Queen’s press 1995, p. 60; p. 467; pp. 470–2; p. 478; p. 481. daise, benjamin, review in International Studies in Philosophy, vol. 8, 1976, pp. 259–61. dalin, george, review in Library Journal, vol. 100, issue 16, 1975, p. 1633. Deede, Kristin, K., “The Infinite Qualitative Difference: Sin, the Self, and Revelation in the thought of Søren Kierkegaard,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 53, no. 1, 2003, pp. 25–48; see p. 36. dewey, bradley, r., review in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol. 46, no. 3, 1978, pp. 404–6. dunning, Stephen n., “the dialectical Structure of consciousness: the anticlimacus writings,” in Søren Kierkegaard: Epistemology and Psychology: Kierkegaard and the Recoil from Freedom, ed. by daniel w. conway, London: routledge 2002 (Søren Kierkegaard: Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers, vol. 2), pp. 49–71; see pp. 69–70; p. 78; p. 92. gabriel, merigala, Subjectivity and Religious Truth in the Philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2010, p. 33; pp. 35–8; pp. 67–8; p. 70; pp. 128–9; p. 184. LeFevre, perry, “on interpreting Kierkegaard,” Journal of Religion, vol. 61, no. 1, 1981, pp. 88–93. Lorentzen, Jamie, Kierkegaard’s Metaphors, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2001, p. 73; pp. 78–9; p. 173; p. 183. Lynes, david a., “understanding Kierkegaard: the challenge of Faith for objective thought,” Soundings, vol. 73, no. 1, 1990, pp. 129–48. marsh, James L., review in Modern Schoolman, vol. 55, no. 3, 1978, pp. 318–20. mehl, p J., “despair’s demand: an appraisal of Kierkegaard’s argument for god,” International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, vol. 32, no. 3, 1992, pp. 167–82; see pp. 168–9. plekon, michael, “beyond existentialist caricatures: new views of Kierkegaard,” Human Studies, vol. 4, no. 1, 1981, pp. 87–95. popkin, richard h., review in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 8, no. 3, 1977, pp. 206–9.

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Sheil, patrick, Kierkegaard and Levinas: The Subjunctive Mood, aldershot: ashgate 2010, p. 39. S.p., review in Review of Metaphysics, vol. 30, 1976, pp. 126–7. thomas, J. heywood, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 11, 1980, pp. 281–4. Qi, wang, “china: the chinese reception of Kierkegaard” in Kierkegaard’s International Reception, tome iii, The Near East, Asia, Australia and the Americas, ed. by Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 8), pp. 103–23; see p. 116.

John w. elrod, Kierkegaard and Christendom, princeton: princeton university press 1981, xxiv + 320 pp.

John w. elrod’s study Kierkegaard and Christendom was first published by Princeton university press in 1981.1 an identical reproduction was reissued as a paperback in 2014 as part of the princeton Legacy Library series. in retrospect, Kierkegaard and Christendom stands at the fore of a generation of english-language scholarship that retrieved Kierkegaard’s social and political thought. elrod was already working on his text when the hongs published their translation of A Literary Review of Two Ages in 1978, Kierkegaard’s most obviously political publication.2 with a complete translation of Two Ages newly available in english, a group of scholars in the early 1980s—including patricia cutting, david b. Fletcher, bruce Kirmmse, robert L. perkins, michael plekon, and merold westphal—began to discuss how Kierkegaard’s views on sociality informed his entire authorship.3 in the english secondary literature, elrod’s Kierkegaard and Christendom was then the paradigmatic work on the subject. elrod argued a novel claim: Kierkegaard’s works from 1846 forward—a more directly polemical “second literature” starting with Two Ages4—develop a social critique of the modern liberal state that is corollary to his earlier pseudonymous writings on individual subjectivity.5 elrod provides a background for his discussion with a chapter on the modernization of denmark in the nineteenth century. here, Kierkegaard’s writings are placed in their social and political context: ongoing privatization of peasants’ common agricultural lands, the success of liberal reforms, an individualistic religious revival movement in the countryside, and the development and critique of a uniquely danish hegelianism (respectively represented by the theologians hans Lassen martensen and Jakob peter mynster).6 yet, elrod also helpfully shows how German idealism has deeper roots and a broader influence in Kierkegaard’s 1

1981.

John w. elrod, Kierkegaard and Christendom, princeton: princeton university press

ibid., p. 47. See, for example, Two Ages, ed. by robert L. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1984 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 14); david b. Fletcher, Social and Political Perspectives in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard, washington, d.c.: university press of america 1982. 4 elrod, Kierkegaard and Christendom, p. xi. 5 ibid., pp. 249–53. 6 ibid., pp. 4–11; pp. 25–34. 2 3

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homeland than the danish reception of hegel. For instance, Kierkegaard’s older contemporaries hans christian Ørsted and n.F.S. grundtvig owed their conceptions of scientific progress and nationalism, respectively, to Henrik Steffens. a student of F.w.J. Schelling before 1802, Steffens held that “german idealism and romanticism were both refined expressions of the individualistic spirit of protestantism.”7 elrod offers a succinct introduction to the danish context that is crucial to understanding Kierkegaard’s social thought. the main thrust of elrod’s argument is that Kierkegaard’s post-1846 authorship contains an account of selfhood that requires him to oppose genuine christianity to nineteenth-century danish “christendom.” christendom is the subsumption of ethico-religious christian categories (such as freedom, truth, and equality) into socio-political categories like historical consciousness and the state. hegel’s view of the state as a feature of ethical life is an obvious example, but danish christendom is the wider legacy of Steffens, grundtvig, Ørsted, and so forth.8 Kierkegaard saw a “confusion of categories” where freedom, equality, and truth were interpreted politically “with the consequent loss of the ethical concepts associated with them.”9 in this context, elrod argues that Kierkegaard’s lifelong “concern with the individual leads dialectically to an equally strong concern with the social.”10 becoming an individual self requires an account of “social psychology”; beyond individual anxiety and despair, there are social affects like envy and learned egotism.11 Kierkegaard indicts danish society for inculcating envy and egotism, and thus, elrod argues, he “claimed an allegiance to aristotle in his observation that most expressions of love are in fact expressions of selfish self-love.”12 citing the journals, Works of Love, and the “attack on christendom,” for example, elrod draws out Kierkegaard’s concern with a takeover of friendship, marriage, religion, and other concrete relations by egotism or “selfish self-love.”13 egotism pervaded the world Kierkegaard called “christendom,” elrod argues, requiring an ethical-religious corrective from the very christianity falsely supposed to suffuse it. elrod quotes the acerbic line of Kierkegaard’s journals that “politics is egotism dressed up as love.”14 Proper self-love, as opposed to selfish self-love, requires an ethico-religious mode of subjectivity. thus, elrod uses Works of Love to illuminate Kierkegaard’s later writings, specifically the argument that “an individual discovers in the religious relation no threat to the intrinsic value and goodness of his particularity.”15 existential transformation, existing before god and imitating christ, was necessary to be christian over and against an altogether natural arrangement like christendom. elrod imputes a radical view to Kierkegaard: “to strive to become 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

ibid., p. 13. ibid., pp. 80–4. ibid., p. 83. ibid., p. 88. ibid., p. 109. ibid., p. 92. ibid., p. 94. ibid., p. 84. See SKS 24, 248, nb23:81 / JP 4, 4206. ibid., p. 189.

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a christian in denmark was to set oneself, on religious grounds, in opposition to the modern state.”16 although elrod admits that Kierkegaard does not address “the emergence of the modern state” in “theoretical form,” elrod borrows the vocabulary of liberal theory (“state of nature” or “community of ends”) to draw out some supposedly implicit engagement.17 these terms may mislead readers. though he fulminates against liberal politics in the public sphere, Kierkegaard does not challenge political liberalism per se. he does not theorize about human society before the advent of political institutions, nor does he conceptualize ethics along the lines of Kant’s categorical imperative. by borrowing the terms of liberal political theory, elrod risks a confusion of categories of his own. it is also necessary to qualify elrod’s argument that, for Kierkegaard, “the modern state is an institutionalized extension of the individual’s tendency to love himself egotistically.”18 elrod’s Kierkegaard seems anti-liberal, or a liberal with the bizarre claim that “ethics, not politics, is the way to pass beyond the state of nature.”19 the strangeness comes from elrod’s equation of Kierkegaard’s critique of the public with a critique of the state. this obscures Kierkegaard’s view that the political has its own legitimate sphere, requiring its own forms: in his 1851 “open Letter” to the grundtvigian dr. rudelbach, he writes: “i can understand why a politician counts on free institutions as an aid to the state, for politics is externality, which by its very nature has no life in itself but must borrow it from the forms, hence this faith in forms.”20 Kierkegaard defends the integrity of the religious sphere from being subsumed by politics without attacking constitutional political theory, for which his journals show some impatience: “instead of all these hypotheses about the origin of the state, etc., we should be more occupied with the question: given an established order, how can new points of departure be created religiously?”21 elrod breaks up Kierkegaard’s authorship into the pseudonymous indirect communication that lasts through the Concluding Unscientific Postscript and a post-1846 “second literature.” while this dichotomy puts Kierkegaard’s social and political interests in sharp relief, the bisection of Kierkegaard’s authorship creates three interrelated problems: it implies a lack of continuity in Kierkegaard’s work (which elrod must then explicitly correct), it overlooks the upbuilding discourses before 1846, and it obscures other possible turning points. For instance, Kierkegaard claimed the revolution of 1848 cemented a major turning point in his thought. rather than emphasizing a change in Kierkegaard’s authorial intent, one might choose to emphasize the change in Kierkegaard’s audience. the “theocentric nineteenth century”22 criticized in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript was the prevailing attitude of the so-called hegelian intelligentsia. but this narrow educated 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

ibid., p. 192. ibid., p. xv; pp. 162–3. ibid., p. 310. ibid., p. 162 SKS 14, 113 / COR, 54. SKS 24, 243, nb23:70 / JP 4, 4205. SKS 7, 360 / CUP1, 395.

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elite was suddenly engulfed by an entire national public sphere that, to Kierkegaard’s dismay, also framed its ethical aspirations in historical socio-political terms. in 1848 he complains of a sudden sea-change: “everything that looked like a religious movement became politics.”23 in sum, trailblazing studies encounter new thickets for scholarly debate, and students of Kierkegaard’s social and political thought may wish to qualify elrod’s exaggeration of Kierkegaard’s anti-liberalism, not to mention his concept of a separate and direct “second literature.” nonetheless elrod’s paradigm, however flawed, opens up interesting ways to read the later works by the light of the concept of selfhood in Works of Love: in fact, elrod’s focus on egotism versus proper selflove sheds more light on the continuity and organic development of Kierkegaard’s work than any radical break. robert wyllie

23

Pap. iX b 63:7, p. 363.

reviews and critical discussions boozer, Jack Stewart, review in Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 21, no. 4, 1983, pp. 578–81. burgess, andrew J., review in Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, no. 10, 1984, pp. 2–4. dunning, Stephen n., review in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 14, no. 1, 1983, pp. 60–2. perkins, robert L., review in Journal of Religion, vol. 63, no. 3, 1983, pp. 305–7. Stack, george J., review in International Studies in Philosophy, vol. 17, no. 3, 1985, pp. 103–6. walker, Jeremy, review in Queen’s Quarterly, vol. 90, no. 1, 1983, pp. 255–60.

Steven m. emmanuel, Kierkegaard and the Concept of Revelation, albany: State university of new york press 1996, ix + 183 pp.

Scholars have explored in depth both Kierkegaard’s religious epistemology and his understanding of revelation but have not often considered the two together.1 Steven emmanuel’s monograph Kierkegaard and the Concept of Revelation is a bright exception.2 in this work, he aims to examine “the concept of revelation as it is developed in Kierkegaard’s philosophical writings, and then only to the extent that it shapes the way he approaches some of the central issues addressed in the authorship.”3 these central issues include the “relation between faith and reason, the relevance of historical knowledge to religious belief, the nature of religious conversion, the concept of truth, the limits of religious authority, and the special form of the religious communication.”4 To that end, Emmanuel surveys three significant Kierkegaard texts which have not been adequately utilized in determining Kierkegaard’s concept of revelation: Philosophical Fragments, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, and The Book on Adler. if one is fully to grasp the breadth and depth of Kierkegaard’s religious philosophy, one needs to reckon with Kierkegaard’s conviction that the bible conveys religious truth by mediating divine presence. emmanuel sets his interpretation opposite readings that view Kierkegaard as a forerunner of poststructuralist hermeneutics. emmanuel argues that “Kierkegaard’s understanding of what language is and how it functions is underwritten by the assumption of god’s presence.”5 the assumption of presence means that interpretation of revelation (including the bible) should be undertaken as a serious and optimistic enterprise; its meaning is not indeterminate, but accessible. This clarification is also For important exceptions, see Steven Shakespeare, Kierkegaard, Language and the Reality of God, aldershot: ashgate 2001; Jolita pons, Stealing a Gift: Kierkegaard’s Pseudonyms and the Bible, new york: Fordham university press 2004; marilyn gaye piety, Ways of Knowing: Kierkegaard’s Pluralist Epistemology, waco: baylor university press 2010. 2 Steven emmanuel, Kierkegaard and the Concept of Revelation, albany: State university of new york press 1996. 3 ibid., p. x. 4 ibid., p. ix. 5 ibid., p. 10. 1

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useful, as emmanuel points out, for understanding and interpreting Kierkegaard’s own authorship. while he did not claim the status of divine revelation for his own writing, Kierkegaard supposed his authorship to be undergirded by the backdrop of divine providence and thematically united by a religious purpose.6 emmanuel attempts to supplant “the popular conception of Kierkegaard as an irrationalist”7 with the notion that he was a “suprarationalist” in his view of revelation.8 Kierkegaard used the language of paradox to counter the hegelian subordination of the language of faith to philosophical conceptuality. on emmanuel’s account, terms like “paradox” and “absurd” function for Kierkegaard as “a conceptual means of indicating that god’s appearance in the temporal order transcends the possibilities of human knowledge, and that it cannot be grasped at a purely intellectual level.”9 while the paradoxical character of christianity does not imply irrationality, it does mean that it can only be appropriated subjectively through the passion of faith.10 this reading of Kierkegaard is now, nearly two decades following emmanuel’s book, a commonly accepted one in Kierkegaard scholarship.11 the uniqueness of emmanuel’s argument lies in his juxtaposition of Kierkegaard’s “suprarational account of revelation” with a “pragmatic account of the justification of religious belief.”12 he argues that, on Kierkegaard’s account, revelation lies beyond the grasp of epistemic warrant. the resources of rationality (objectivity) cannot be utilized to justify one’s belief that god has revealed godself, though neither can theistic belief be disproven by that same rationality.13 belief in revelation occurs by transcending the limits of rationality through the domain of faith and subjectivity. because belief in revelation requires the confrontation with a paradox (God entering history as a single individual in time), epistemic justification for believing in revelation “must finally be made on practical and ethical grounds.”14 as emmanuel points out, this involves the activation of the consciousness of sin, or the realization of one’s need for god.15 emmanuel suggests that Kierkegaard creates an “implied version of himself,” which can be seen in the totality of the authorship, as a kind of “existential dialectic in pursuit of authentic selfhood” (ibid., p. 19). 7 ibid., p. 38. 8 ibid., p. x. 9 ibid., p. 43. 10 ibid. 11 See, for example, c. Stephen evans, “is Kierkegaard an irrationalist: reason, paradox, and Faith,” Religious Studies, vol. 25, no. 3, 1989, pp. 347–62; c. Stephen evans, Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments, bloomington: indiana university press 1992; murray rae, Kierkegaard and Theology, London: continuum 2010; Sylvia i. walsh, Kierkegaard: Thinking Christianly in an Existential Mode, oxford: oxford university press 2008. 12 emmanuel, Kierkegaard and the Concept of Revelation, p. 10. 13 ibid., p. 45. 14 ibid., p. 10. 15 ibid., pp. x–xi. emmanuel writes, “revelation addresses itself to the passionate nature of human beings. it enables us to reach a decision by giving us the condition: the recognition of sin, our separateness from god, and our inability to discover god through the unaided 6

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For emmanuel, Kierkegaard’s approach to the concept of revelation anticipates george Lindbeck’s understanding of the regulative function of religious doctrine. For Lindbeck (as for Kierkegaard), the dynamics of christian faith are not contingent upon objectivist (or propositionalist) accounts of christianity; rather, they are intricately tied up with and implicated in language use and performative practices. As Emmanuel says, “Kierkegaard affirms that faith is primarily a matter of correct performance as opposed to correct belief.”16 the christian life is communally and linguistically regulated “in all its aspects by the biblical stories depicting christ’s life, teaching, death, and resurrection.”17 objectivist approaches to religion miss the extent to which passion and action are the basis of genuine, authentic religious existence.18 emmanuel intends to complicate the notion that Kierkegaard paved the way for “the derridean critique of the metaphysics of presence.”19 For derrida, the problem of signs and signifiers given to us in texts means that “we are propelled into an endless regress of meaning.”20 emmanuel suggests that Kierkegaard’s “celebrated distinction between objectivity and subjectivity” implies a belief in an “absolute truth, and that it is possible to be related to this truth in time.”21 the difference between Kierkegaard and post-structural, deconstructive criticism, on Shakespeare’s account, is that the latter “denies the existence of a grounding authenticity.”22 For Kierkegaard, while one can be misled or deceived in communication, the very possibility of deception suggests that an authorial presence is potentially mediated through texts. Authorial strategies like irony and “mystification” can be employed, but authors ought not “fall in love with mystification for its own sake”; rather they should employ “it for a higher purpose.”23 in emmanuel’s view, Kierkegaard’s hermeneutic assumes “a seriousness of commitment” called for by “a moral and theological dimension.24 emmanuel’s argument raises the debate as to how derrida and poststructuralism should be understood. if derrida has no room for any semblance of authorial presence in textuality and if meaning in poststructuralism is completely indeterminate, then emmanuel’s proposed contrast between Kierkegaard’s hermeneutic and derridean poststructualism holds up. if, however, derridean and other postructuralist hermeneutics does not undermine interpretive seriousness (especially ethical, existential, and religious seriousness) and if it allows for some element of “presence” in texts (setting aside the specific question of divine presence called for by a theology of revelation), then perhaps more affinity could be found between Kierkegaard’s intellect. Sin is therefore the ‘decisive expression for the religious mode of existence’ ” (ibid., p. 59). 16 ibid., p. 103. 17 ibid., p. 106. 18 ibid. 19 ibid., p. 11. 20 ibid., pp. 12–13. 21 ibid., p. 15. 22 ibid., p. 16. 23 ibid. 24 ibid., p. 17.

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hermeneutical assumptions and derridean poststructuralism.25 This affinity would exclude from view Kierkegaard’s optimistic conception of revelation’s potential to mediate a divine authorial presence (i.e., to mediate god’s communication to human beings. Kyle roberts

For a good example of this latter reading of derrida as being compatible with Kierkegaard’s understanding of revelation, textuality, and hermeneutics, see Shakespeare, Kierkegaard, Language and the Reality of God. 25

reviews and critical discussions clack, brian r., review in Religious Studies, vol. 32, no. 3, 1996, p. 427. Ferreira, m. Jamie, review in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 57, no. 4, 1997, p. 974. marino, gordon daniel, review in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 48, no. 3, 2000, pp. 184–6. Shakespeare, Steven, Kierkegaard, Language and the Reality of God, aldershot: ashgate 2001, pp. 228–34.

c. Stephen evans, Kierkegaard’s “Fragments” and “Postscript”: The Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus, atlantic heights, new Jersey: humanities press 1983, xiv + 304 pp.

c. Stephen evans’ book Kierkegaard’s “Fragments” and “Postscript”: The Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus was first published by Humanities Press in 1983. as the title immediately indicates, the text engages Philosophical Fragments and its sequel, the Concluding Unscientific Postscript from the pseudonym Johannes climacus. evans, who is currently university professor of philosophy and humanities at baylor university and former curator of the hong Kierkegaard Library at St. olaf college, masterfully engages these two texts at an introductory level. it can be argued that the Fragments, and especially the Postscript, are Kierkegaard’s most philosophically astute and thus challenging works. Knowing this, evans tackles the humor, irony, as well as intellectual philosophical content in an introductory manner to make new students to Kierkegaard aware of the complexity of his thought. this focus may leave more seasoned scholars wanting. the book is limited to the climacus texts and intentionally so. evans makes clear that he wants to illuminate and provide commentary on the most philosophically robust texts of the Kierkegaardian literature. Kierkegaard’s authorship is nothing if not complicated. with a number of pseudonyms presenting different perspectives, it is not surprising that there are different methodologies to interpreting Kierkegaard. Some (walter Lowrie, david Swenson, Louis pojman) largely ignore the pseudonyms and attribute most (if not all) of the writings to Kierkegaard himself. evans, however, takes seriously the pseudonyms and thus throughout this text references climacus as the author, while also noting points where Kierkegaard himself would either agree or disagree. approaching the pseudonyms in this manner adequately attributes thought in the manner Kierkegaard would find appropriate.1 Targeting an introductory audience, Evans rightly spends the first few chapters elucidating major themes in the broader Kierkegaardian corpus. For evans, to Kierkegaard makes this clear in an editorial note in an appendix in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript titled “a First and Last explanation.” also see The Point of View for an extensive look at the Kierkegaardian literature from Kierkegaard’s own authorial perspective on the pseudonyms. 1

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understand climacus correctly is also to understand Kierkegaard’s existence spheres, the necessity of the pseudonymous literature for achieving authorial goals, the impact of g.w.F. hegel during the period, and perhaps most importantly the task of becoming a self. take, for example, the lengthy discussion of the reduplication of existence, what evans calls “doubleness.” this theme plays a pivotal role in the Kierkegaardian literature. while climacus’ discussion of doubleness may be small compared to discussions elsewhere in Kierkegaard’s literature, it nonetheless establishes a framework by which the reader can better understand the major themes of the climacus texts, such as subjectivity and belief. For climacus, “coming into existence” is twofold or doubled. The first event of coming into existence is the basic metaphysical truth that everything that exists does so because some independent event caused its existence (for example, an infant does not simply appear from nowhere; rather, the infant’s existence is the result of human reproduction). in this discussion, evans challenges the reader to rethink Kierkegaard under the light of basic logical principles, and his abiding by those principles. the reader, who likely might have connected Kierkegaard with fideism or irrationalism, must question prior assumptions very early in the book. The second aspect of doubling is specific to human individuals. while brute existence is the result of a cause, each individual who results is empowered to make decisions, hold beliefs, and act upon those beliefs. this set of actions is in the realm of possibility. that is to say, each individual has the potential to actualize possibilities. once some thing is actualized, this completes the doubling effect of existence. Some creature results from a cause, and that creature lives a life of actualizing further possibilities. the aforementioned is just one Kierkegaardian category that evans sees as essential to understanding climacus. this reviewer agrees. it seems that evans is correct insofar as these ingredients lead to a proper understanding of subjectivity. when climacus frequently connects subjectivity with “appropriation” in the Postscript, one quickly realizes that these concepts are active and thereby relies on doubling. if one comes to a subjective belief in something (particularly a religious belief), then that belief, in part, is due to the actualizing of possibilities. it seems as if the underlying issue evans continually concerns himself with is subjectivity. At the time of writing, the notion of Kierkegaard as a fideist was still prevalent. The fideistic understanding of Kierkegaard is often connected to the climacus discussion of subjectivity. it is this interpretation of Kierkegaard that evans disagrees with. evans takes to task that statements, such as “truth is subjectivity,” imply some relativistic understanding of religious truth and the connection of irrationalism or fideism. Evans argues that Climacus (and Kierkegaard) say that religious truth, or “essential truth” is true in existence. that is to say, essential truth is lived out and practically applied. it implies that christianity is understood in a practical sense and is precisely subjective. when this practical component to religious belief is understood in light of the extensive backdrop evans provided in the opening chapters, one recognizes that this practicality does not negate Kierkegaard’s use of (and respect for) logic. it is frequent in philosophical discussion to position objective reasoning against the subjective. Kierkegaard is often used as an example of this fabricated battle. evans considers this a mistake. instead, evans preserves the two forms of thought and establishes clarity on the usefulness of each.

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evans’ navigation of subjectivity and religious truth establishes a more rationalistic understanding of Kierkegaardian epistemology. the infamous statement “truth is subjectivity” is not meant to apply to all forms of truth, or even all forms of religious truth. evans writes that the statement “is not intended to apply at all to logic, history, and other areas where the truth concerned does not essentially bear on existence.”2 this excludes Kierkegaard, and climacus, from being some rabid subjectivist, and thus denies irrational fideism. evans goes so far to say that climacus admits the importance of objective content. what is believed is important. yet, in regards to christianity, which is subjective, having a certain level or understanding of christianity plays little or no role in the existential working out of living christianly. evans even cites Saint James who says that faith without works is dead. For climacus, then, christianity is more about action than about mere belief. throughout the book evans claims that climacus views christianity as a hypothesis. the lens through which climacus tests, then, is conditional. if christianity is true, then it looks like X. or, if christianity is to be accepted, then X is the process by which one accepts it to be true. evans is correct in saying that climacus is an interested bystander—one who is not yet a christian. navigating the complexity of climacus’ religious philosophy is no small feat. providing a companion to climacus for an introductory audience is a task even more daunting. yet in the end evans provides a book that is introductory enough to maintain interest in a newly interested reader and challenging enough to necessitate a slowly paced, studious read. the text might best be read with two other texts on Kierkegaard’s religious epistemology: first, Chapter 3 in his 1978 book Subjectivity and Religious Belief, which examines Kierekgaard’s subjective perspective on the justification of belief,3 and second, his 1998 text, Faith Beyond Reason: A Kierkegaardian Account.4 in the latter, evans directly defends Kierkegaard against irrational forms of fideism. Yet he builds upon aspects of Kierkegaard’s “Fragments” and “Postscript” to show that Kierkegaard’s understanding of religious knowledge is fortified in faith via the recognition of rational limitations. When read in conjunction with these related texts, Kierkegaard’s “Fragments” and “Postscript” becomes part of a larger category of Kierkegaardian secondary literature that provides exhaustive commentary on his epistemology. michael d. Stark

c. Stephen evans, Kierkegaard’s “Fragments” and “Postscript”: The Religious Philosophy of Johannes Climacus, atlantic heights, new Jersey: humanities press 1983, p. 123. 3 c. Stephen evans, Subjectivity and Religious Belief, grand rapids: christian university press 1978, pp. 74–124. 4 c. Stephen evans, Faith Beyond Reason: A Kierkegaardian Account, grand rapids: william b. eerdmans 1998. 2

reviews and critical discussions dunning, Stephen n., review in Journal of Religion, vol. 71, no. 2, 1991, pp. 303–4. elrod, John w., review in Review of Metaphysics, vol. 38, no. 1, 1984, pp. 120–1. Khan, abrahim, review in Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, no. 11, 1984, pp. 3–5. roberts, robert c., review in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 16, 1984, pp. 175–6. westphal, merold, review in Faith and Philosophy, vol. 1, no. 3, 1984, pp. 345–7.

c. Stephen evans, Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard’s “Philosophical Fragments,” bloomington and indianapolis: indiana university press 1992, xii + 206 pp.

c. Stephen evans’ Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard’s “Philosophical Fragments” was published as part of the Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Religion, edited by merold westphal. the book is ostensibly a companion to, and commentary on, Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments, and in many ways that is exactly what it is. after an initial chapter that introduces the reader to Fragments’ pseudonymous author, Johannes climacus, evans explores the intricacies of each section of Climacus’ text (including the front matter, the five chapters, the appendix to chapter 3, and the “interlude” between chapters 4 and 5) in separate chapters and then ties it all together in a final summary chapter of sorts. He does a fine job of explaining climacus’ problem—to determine what it would be like if, counter Socrates (and the majority of other philosophical and religious outlooks), humans did not possess the capacity to establish a truly meaningful existence on their own— and he provides a helpful discussion of the underlying irony in the fact that climacus’ hypothetical creation bears a striking resemblance to christianity, which climacus claims no human being could have created. what Passionate Reason is really focused on, however, is the long-standing and hard-fought battle amongst interpreters of Kierkegaard, and climacus in particular, as to the relationship between faith and reason in his work. it is in the context of this battle that one can really come to appreciate the importance of evans’ book. Simply put, his primary goal is to fend off those who would claim, especially based on the climacus writings, that Kierkegaard is some kind of irrationalist in his view of faith. although such a view of Kierkegaard was widely held throughout the twentieth century, it certainly did not go unchallenged prior to evans’ work. Following in the footsteps of commentators such as david Swenson and alastair macKinnon,1 evans has become perhaps the greatest champion of the view that climacus/Kierkegaard aspects of this review originally appeared as part of a broader critique of evans that deals with his work as a whole in adam buben, “neither irrationalist nor apologist: revisiting Faith and reason in Kierkegaard,” Philosophy Compass, vol. 8, no. 3, 2013, pp. 319–21. See, for example, david Swenson, Something about Kierkegaard, revised ed., minneapolis: 1

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advocates a peaceful reconciliation of reason with faith, and that once the latter is achieved, one benefits from a transformed (or “higher”) rational capacity. Evans is opposed by the likes of alastair hannay, Louis pojman, herbert m. garelick, terrence penelhum, and alasdair macintyre, just to name a few, who argue either that Kierkegaard2 advocates belief in something known to be logically impossible (for example, the paradox of the incarnation), or that he recommends making a necessarily arbitrary choice between alternatives that are rationally unjustifiable (for example, between the aesthetic way of life and the ethical/religious).3 The difficulty with grasping the relationship between faith and reason in climacus’ Philosophical Fragments has much to do with his different, and often strongly worded, formulations of this relationship. evans makes much of climacus’ claim that “the understanding and the paradox happily encounter each other in the moment, when the understanding steps aside and the paradox gives itself…we shall call it faith.”4 but he is careful not to ignore other passages where climacus describes a much less amicable arrangement; faith in the paradox is said to be against reason as it involves “absurdity,” “contradiction,” and even “self-contradiction.”5 in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript to “Philosophical Fragments” climacus goes so far as to explain the opposition of faith and reason by saying that the former makes a martyr of the latter.6 one of evans’ primary strategies for dealing with the apparent tension between the ways climacus describes this issue—in addition to arguing that climacus only sees an apparent contradiction in the paradox and not a full-blown logical contradiction—is to suggest that what he is really opposed to is an “imperialistic reason” that tries to get every issue it encounters within its grasp, to figure everything out on its own.7 the goal then, according to evans’ reading of climacus, is not the complete destruction of reason and the embracing of irrationalist faith, but simply for reason to recognize its limits in the happy passion of faith. in this condition, reason humbly wills its own downfall on one level and in doing so augsburg publishing co. 1945 [1941]; and alastair macKinnon, “Kierkegaard’s irrationalism revisited,” International Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 9, 1969, pp. 165–76. 2 i say “Kierkegaard” here because evans points out that many of these thinkers do not distinguish Kierkegaard from his pseudonyms. 3 See, for example, alastair hannay, Kierkegaard, London: routledge and Kegan paul 1982, pp. 106–8; Louis pojman, The Logic of Subjectivity, university, alabama: university of alabama press 1984, p. 24; pp. 100–102; p. 136; herbert m. garelick, The Anti-Christianity of Kierkegaard, the hague: martinus nijhoff 1965, pp. 28–9; terence penelhum, God and Skepticism, dordrecht: reidel 1983, pp. 75–84; pp. 114–5; and alasdair macintyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed., notre dame: university of notre dame press 1984 [1980], pp. 39–47. 4 SKS 4, 261 / PF, 59. See, for example, c. Stephen evans, Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments, bloomington and indianapolis: indiana university press 1992, p. 96. Just to be clear, i should point out that evans (rightly) claims that climacus recognizes no relevant difference between “understanding” and “reason” (ibid., p. 188). 5 See, for example, SKS 4, 256 / PF, 52. SKS 4, 263–4 / PF, 61–2. SKS 4, 285 / PF, 87. See evans, Passionate Reason, pp. 97–102. 6 SKS 7, 508 / CUP1, 559. 7 See, for example, evans, Passionate Reason, p. 88; p. 90; pp. 117–18.

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it opens itself up to the possibility of revelatory help from outside itself, and an accompanying fulfillment on a higher level. even though evans vigorously defends climacus’ account of faith and reason from charges of irrationalism, he does seem to think that climacus’ rhetoric occasionally goes a bit too far in that direction. whereas climacus is more than happy to surrender claims of rationality to critics of the paradox (“to make a present of the term ‘reason’ to the opponent, and insist that christianity is not ‘reasonable’ ”), evans believes that Christians cannot “afford to be so polite,” and must rather affirm that their faith is in some sense quite rational.8 he is even willing to allow the possibility that traditional christian apologetics, including appeals to historical evidence, might actually be beneficial for Christians—something that Climacus would never admit. Evans states: “evidence might play a positive role in the process in which faith comes into being within the individual…[and] may also have value in confirming faith that is present and helping to relieve doubts and allay various objections…the claims i am making run strongly contrary to the intentions of climacus, who simply can see no value in traditional apologetics.”9 in offering suggestions of this nature, evans makes it clear that Passionate Reason is not simply a commentary on one of Kierkegaard’s most famous works; it is also a critique of this work and a vehicle for some of evans’ own views on christianity.10 one possible problem with evans’ critique is that it relies heavily upon a distinction between irrationalist readings of climacus and his more “supra-rationalist” reading. if climacus is advocating neither belief in the logically absurd nor an absolutely arbitrary choice, then he must be willing to allow that christianity makes some kind of sense (at least from a certain point of view) and that there might actually be compelling reasons for choosing it. because climacus never explicitly makes these kinds of allowances, evans concludes that he is at least guilty of imprecision, if not some greater mistake. but perhaps there are other ways of taking climacus, and Kierkegaard generally. For example, Karen L. Carr finds it helpful to view Kierkegaard as an “anti-rationalist.”11 according to this view, it is no mistake when climacus forcefully rejects historical evidence for the truth of christianity, or when Kierkegaard makes it clear that even the provision of reasons for one’s christianity is a recipe for disaster.12 For the anti-rationalist, whether or not reasons and evidence can be appealed to, for the sake of genuine faith they must not be appealed to. Faith is an existential matter; how one lives is of the utmost importance regardless of the level of factual and rational support one has for one’s way of life. because reasons and evidence of all varieties focus on increasing such support by dispelling fears and doubts, they simply miss the point and distract from the truly pressing issue. thus, ibid., p. 91. ibid., pp. 164–5. 10 These views have been influenced at key points by the work of famed philosopher of religion and modern-day christian apologist, alvin plantinga (evans, Passionate Reason, pp. 111–12; pp. 180–1). 11 Karen L. carr, “the offense of reason and the passion of Faith: Kierkegaard and anti-rationalism,” Faith and Philosophy, vol. 13, no. 2, 1996, pp. 236–51. See especially pp. 240–1, where she describes evans’ reading as “supra-rationalist.” 12 See, for example, SKS 13, 90 / FSE, 68. 8 9

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the statements that Evans finds questionable in Climacus’ account might be in line with other claims in Kierkegaard’s writings that suggest an anti-rationalist approach to christianity—an approach that evans does not seem to consider. despite these concerns, Passionate Reason plays an important role in helping to dispel the common older view that Kierkegaard condones some kind of irrationalism. while this view may still persist in some circles, evans’ work has paved the way for other interpreters who offer even more nuanced arguments that Kierkegaard ought not to be seen in this light.13 adam buben

See, for example, the collection Kierkegaard After MacIntyre, ed. by John J. davenport and anthony rudd, chicago: open court 2001. 13

reviews and critical discussions carr, Karen L., “the offense of reason and the passion of Faith: Kierkegaard and anti-rationalism,” Faith and Philosophy, vol. 13, no. 2, 1996, pp. 236–51. connell, george, “a review of two recent commentaries on Philosophical Fragments,” Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, no. 28, 1993, pp. 6–12. evans, c. Stephen, “on taking irony Seriously but not absolutely” [response to connell], Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, no. 28, 1993, pp. 13–16. grøn, arne, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 18, 1996, pp. 209–11. roberts, robert c., “response to connell: evans and roberts on Philosophical Fragments,” Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, no. 28, 1993, pp. 17–19. — review in Faith and Philosophy, vol. 11, no. 3, 1994, pp. 495–500. wisdo, david, review in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 36, no. 1, 1994, pp. 57–9.

peter Fenves, “Chatter”: Language and History in Kierkegaard, Stanford: Stanford university press 1993, xii + 312 pp.

Published in 1993 in Stanford Press’ influential Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics series, a still on-going publishing project responsible for making available in english many important works of continental philosophy and theory, peter Fenves’ “Chatter”: Language and History in Kierkegaard is an excellent book—perhaps the finest in the secondary literature—for feeding the discussion of questions resulting (1) from the application of deconstructive methods of reading and interpretation to Kierkegaard’s texts, and (2) from the argument that perhaps Kierkegaard’s entire philosophical project is proto-deconstructionist in its “meaning” and thematic content. the reasons for the book’s force as privileged intellectual fodder for a conversation about Kierkegaard and deconstruction—and perhaps Kierkegaard and the discourse of postmodernism more generally—are legion; but perhaps none so important as indicated paradigmatically in the quotation marks within which the term “chatter” is nearly always placed throughout Fenves’ text. based on the presupposition of language’s essential self-referentiality, Fenves understands “chatter” as what happens when linguistic discourse tries to capture something that cannot be reduced to language or conceptuality without betraying its own truth. For example, Fenves writes that “the course of Kierkegaard’s writing can largely be viewed as an attempt to discover a perspective from which to present various life-views as discrete ‘stages on the way of life.’ insofar as every ‘life-view’ rests on a total negation but nevertheless acknowledges ‘existence’ and presents ‘life’ in language, it cannot help but appear contradictory.”1 thus the “scare quotes” surrounding “chatter” serve to indicate a problem of representation: the impossibility of the directness of traditionally understood channels of communication, of presence and logos, of transparency of truth and intention, of conceptual internal consistency, and so forth. yet, similar to a derridean “supplement,” “chatter” persists as a kind of conceptof-the-non-conceptual, if even negatively formed and defined, and if even privileged precisely for lacking the dignity of a traditional concept that would be linguistically and thematically consistent within itself. as a kind of paradoxically structured center, “chatter” organizes the concerns of the book, which are: Kierkegaard’s peter Fenves, “Chatter”: Language and History in Kierkegaard, Stanford: Stanford university press 1993, p. 39.

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occasionally spoken and often unspoken theory(s) of language, the relation of those assumptions to problems of history and historicity, and the resultant textual tensions and strategies of a philosophy that necessarily attempts to communicate non-linguistic insights through language. according to “Chatter,” all language is potentially chatter, because “chatter” is indistinguishable from meaningful speech. “Chatter” occurs when truthful meaning fails (if it ever succeeded in the first place), yet language continues—as a kind of empty hull. however, true to his clear but rarely explicitly noted Derridean influence, Fenves insists that “chatter” is not a mere nothing: “communication cannot not take place.”2 thus, despite the manifold possible additional overdeterminations of meaning in Kierkegaard’s texts, the generic message of every direct Kierkegaardian communication is its own selfreferentiality—in other words, every communication communicates the problem of communication as such. “chatter” thus applies to all philosophical problems, but Fenves adds a historical claim which suggests the unique importance of Kierkegaard’s works. by both directly and indirectly theorizing “chatter,” Kierkegaard’s work inaugurates a historical turn in the discussion of language in philosophy in which the traditional form of dialogue is fully problematized. “Chatter” is bookended by chapters (“interrupting the conversation: From the Papers of One Still Living” and “notifying the authorities: A Literary Review”) on Kierkegaard’s own major statements of literary criticism. in other words, Fenves begins by reading Kierkegaard reading, because it is in these reviews that Kierkegaard most explicitly theorizes the category of chatter. the three middle chapters consist of very close readings of The Concept of Anxiety, Philosophical Fragments, and Fear and Trembling. Like the opening and closing chapters, these textual studies contain immense erudition, moments of exceptional insight and explication, and dexterous attention to the original danish. notable throughout, but especially in the fourth chapter (which is dedicated to Fear and Trembling) is Fenves’ expertise in Kantian philosophy, applied here to help illuminate Kierkegaard’s response to Kantian moral theory. the three chapters in the middle of the book are less a marking out of Kierkegaard’s theory of “chatter” and more an effort to chart how “chatter,” as an element of disruption and instigator of free play and excess signification, operates in some of Kierkegaard’s key philosophical texts. in general, “Chatter” demonstrates Fenves’ talent for reading Kierkegaard’s poetics, that is, coming to the what and why of Kierkegaard’s philosophy by approaching the question of how the texts produce their meaning(s). Fenves’ study of the (problem of the) production of meaning in Kierkegaard belongs to a tradition in the scholarly reception of Kierkegaard dedicated to providing a corrective to what roger poole has referred to as “blunt reading,” that is, “that kind of reading that refuses, as a matter of principle, to accord a literary status to the text; that refuses the implications of the pseudonymous technique; that misses the irony.”3 this tradition involves rhetorical readings, ibid., p. 145. roger poole, “the unknown Kierkegaard: twentieth-century receptions,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, ed. by alastair hannay and gordon d. marino, cambridge: cambridge university press 1998, p. 60. 2 3

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that is, interpretations of Kierkegaard concerned with poetics, or at the very least dedicated to seriously considering the weight of Kierkegaard’s carefully crafted construction of “indirect communication.” within this tendency, “Chatter” belongs to those books specifically dedicated to the theoretical concerns and methodological commitments of deconstruction. in the early 1970s Louis mackey’s Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet and mark c. taylor’s Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Authorship paved the way for more literary readings of Kierkegaard, and in their wake deconstructive readings of Kierkegaard emerged in the 1980s, especially through the Kierkegaard and Post/Modernism book series at the Florida State university press at tallahassee.4 perhaps the most similar in style and method to Fenves’ own study is Sylviane agacinski’s Aparté: Conceptions and Deaths of Søren Kierkegaard, published originally in French in 1977.5 Though her Freudian coordinates find no match in “Chatter,” her clear Derridean influence bears much resemblance to Fenves.’ In fact, the title of Fenves’ study bears striking resemblance to agacinski’s—both title (non-)concepts suggest a textual and conceptual aporia of meaning. roger poole’s Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication,6 published in the same year as “Chatter,” deserves mention here as well, for his study also places interpretive pressure on the “gaps” and “supplements” of Kierkegaard’s texts; however, poole reads the materiality of Kierkegaard’s language perhaps even more rigorously than Fenves, going so far as to develop strong acoustic readings in some chapters, whereas Fenves sticks more to tropes and figures, historical contexts, and intertextual and conceptual resonances. “Chatter” is not a frequently cited work, and there are no major direct responses to it in the secondary literature. only geoffrey hale, in Kierkegaard and the Ends of Language, has properly responded to the provocation that the book represents.7 however, hale does so not through a direct engagement with Fenves’ book, for there are only a few scattered references in the text and footnotes; rather, by placing Kierkegaard in conversation with adorno, rilke, and Kafka, hale attends to perhaps the most critical question to arise from studying Fenves’ book on “chatter” in Kierkegaard: what is it to be responsible for interpretation? peter Fenves’ “Chatter”: Language and History in Kierkegaard remains an important book in the history and tradition(s) of reading and receiving Kierkegaard’s texts for its unwavering dedication to post-structuralist assumptions of language and finitude. The lasting and uncompromising nature of its challenge is to ask the difficult, if not impossible, questions of whether in the first place language and conceptuality 4 Louis mackey, Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet, philadelphia: university of pennsylvania press 1971. mark c. taylor, Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study of Time and the Self, princeton: princeton university press 1975. 5 Sylviane agacinski, Aparté: conceptions et morts de Sören Kierkegaard, paris: aubier Flammarion 1977. (english translation: Aparté: Conceptions and Deaths of Søren Kierkegaard, trans. by Kevin newmark, tallahassee: Florida State university press 1988.) 6 roger poole, Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication, charlottesville: university press of virginia 1993. 7 geoffrey hale, Kierkegaard and the Ends of Language, minneapolis: university of minnesota press 2002.

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are appropriate mediums for the truths Kierkegaard wishes to address, and whether, in turn, this same problem of potential “chatter” does not equally undermine Fenves’ book, as well as our own efforts, to read and interpret Kierkegaard. J.d. mininger

reviews and critical discussions coffeen, daniel, review in Qui Parle, vol. 9, no. 1, 1995, pp. 141–50. hale, geoffrey, review in Modern Language Notes, vol. 110, no. 3, 1995, pp. 640– 74. — Kierkegaard and the Ends of Language, minneapolis: university of minnesota press 2002, p. 12; p. 187; p. 198; p. 200. pepper, thomas, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 18, 1996, pp. 212–14. perkins, robert L., review in International Studies in Philosophy, vol. 30, no. 4, 1998, pp. 120–1. rée, Jonathan, review in Radical Philosophy, vol. 75, 1996, pp. 42–4. walsh, Sylvia, review in Philosophy and Literature, vol. 18, no. 2, 1994, pp. 392–3.

harvie Ferguson, Melancholy and the Critique of Modernity: Søren Kierkegaard’s Religious Psychology, London and new york: routledge 1995, xvii + 286 pp.

harvie Ferguson’s attempt to use Kierkegaard to construct a sociology of modernity was published by routledge in 1995. much of Ferguson’s published work is concerned with “modernity” as a theoretical problem, and although he is a sociologist by training, he operates with a broad understanding of what is possible within that intellectual discipline, drawing on unconventional sociological resources such as Sigmund Freud1 and edmund husserl.2 yet his book on Kierkegaard is not merely an “application” of Kierkegaard to the problems in which he is interested or an extraction of some sociological core of Kierkegaard’s writings. instead, Ferguson regards Kierkegaard as an exemplary thinker of the essence of the many forms of melancholy that are peculiar to the secular, modern era. in particular, he thinks that Kierkegaard is a touchstone for thinking about the specifically “religious problem of modernity,”3 the loss of a meaningful framework for understanding nature and the self that results in melancholy, because Kierkegaard’s writings undertake, more than anything else, a “religious psychology of modern life.”4 according to Ferguson, melancholy is the only dimension of “depth” that remains given in modernity.5 it is the only subject position available within the modern world from which one can begin to transcend the condition of modernity, even though, as we shall see, it is a position one must eventually leave behind. For the most part, modern society is a world of surfaces and reflections without depth, and there are indeed superficial forms of melancholy such as the one enacted by the “diapsalmata” of Either/Or. as the one apparent depth dimension in this cultural situation, Kierkegaard understands melancholy as an “anticipation” and an “evidence” of harvie Ferguson, The Lure of Dreams: Sigmund Freud and the Construction of Modernity, new york: routledge 1996. 2 harvie Ferguson, Phenomenological Sociology, London: Sage 2006. 3 harvie Ferguson, Melancholy and the Critique of Modernity, new york: routledge 1995, p. 24. 4 ibid., p. 33. 5 ibid., p. xvi. 1

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the possibility of a religious way of life that lies latent within modernity.6 as such, melancholy has “positive significance” without having “positive value.” That is to say, it points to the possibility of authentic religious life, but to be melancholy is far from equivalent to being religious. melancholy, in Kierkegaard’s christian perspective, is not of value in itself. Defined by Ferguson as “sorrow without cause,”7 melancholy is a “kind of inwardness”8 that Kierkegaard knew intimately in the form of an experience of intense isolation and “lonesome inward torment.”9 Ferguson identifies this melancholic inwardness with “inclosing reserve,” suggesting that melancholy’s essential incommunicability necessitates Kierkegaard’s use of pseudonyms. because of his personal acquaintance with this veritable “way of life” but also because of the “lucidity”10 characteristic of melancholy, Kierkegaard takes it as his starting point for thinking about the modern world. the totality of the pseudonymous authorship, characterized by Ferguson as an essentially “aesthetic” undertaking, is understood in this text as a “topology” of different “modern life-forms.”11 melancholy is typically thought of as a condition affecting the individual psyche, so part of the burden of Ferguson’s project is to show that, because Kierkegaard’s category of the “individual” is a “social category”12 that is irreducible to a role supporting an ideology of individualism (and is, in fact, a critique of individualism), Kierkegaard’s religious psychology should not be understood as a theory of subjectivity in a narrowly defined sense, but of the individual construed as a “social relation.”13 the “modern life-forms” dramatized in the pseudonymous authorship are likewise so many possible ways of existing in relation to the social world. against the received image of Kierkegaard among contemporary social theorists, Ferguson’s work seeks to dispel the myth of Kierkegaard as a thinker of isolation and flight from the social world. a key term in this project of recovery is “actuality.” here Ferguson engages in some creative exegesis, first in giving to the term “actuality,” in accordance with the Kierkegaardian meaning of “individual,” a social signification, then in defining actuality as a region of existence threatened by dread and doubt as border zones between existence and non-existence. in addition to these threats, actuality ranges between ideality on the one side and sensuousness on the other.14 in modern life, “actuality” is thin because the superficiality of modernity is the superficiality of “social conventions,” and so against this tendency, Kierkegaard’s therapeutics, that is to say, his authorship construed as an attempt at working through and eventually overcoming melancholy, against the rationalist therapeutics of modern philosophy, 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

ibid., p. 216. ibid., p. xvi. ibid., p. 92. Quoted in ibid., p. 5. ibid., p. 33. ibid., pp. 85–6. ibid., p. 57. ibid., p. 58. ibid., p. 225.

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is an attempt to “ ‘thicken’ actuality.”15 Ferguson gives an account of how this “thickening” takes place when he comes to a discussion of the pseudonymous texts. the exegetical chapters of this book are, in the main, summaries of the texts under discussion, presuming little or no knowledge of Kierkegaard’s writings and offering little in the way of critical interaction with the secondary literature. yet Ferguson often goes beyond the work of summation, proposing some rather bold interpretive hypotheses, such as his synthesis of the pseudonymous works under the rubric of a spatialized understanding of the self, according to which the self’s task of becoming an individual requires pushing away “doubt” and “dread,” which Ferguson describes as melancholic border zones between existence and non-existence. this therapeutic work that the self performs on itself allows for a more expansive, actualized sphere of individual existence.16 but enlarging the sphere of the reader’s self is not the ultimate goal of Kierkegaard’s authorship. the pseudonymous writings include a variety of potential subjective forms and configurations of the self, but what is necessary for resisting and overcoming the condition of secular modernity as an individual is transformation of the self.17 and the pseudonymous writings, even those of anti-climacus, do not show how this is possible, according to Ferguson. we have already seen one interpretive hypothesis of Ferguson’s that might run against the grain of conventional wisdom about Kierkegaard, namely, that all the pseudonyms can be understood to belong to the aesthetic stage. his point here is crucial for understanding the process by which melancholy makes possible, not only a critique of the superficiality and triviality of modernity, but also an overcoming of the melancholy condition through christianity. Kierkegaard’s position as an author is in fact more deeply melancholy than that of Johannes climacus, whose melancholy is yet deeper than that of the age, yet Ferguson’s thesis is that this deeper melancholy is in fact necessary for going beyond the recognition or understanding of modern melancholy (which the pseudonymous authorship, culminating in the writings of climacus, achieves) and transcending melancholy altogether through christian subjectivity.18 the sphere of existence that the upbuilding discourses strive to bring about (by provoking “reduplication”) in the life of the individual reading them, then, “dissolves into a single reality the topological distinctness of [the various forms of aesthetic, ethical, religious] existence-spheres.”19 the “religious” as portrayed through the pseudonyms is not a form of life proper, but a state of “transition”20 that can never be realized on the social or institutional level.21 all the pseudonymous images and concepts of discontinuity (leap, transition, and the like) are ultimately products of melancholy to be overcome through the temporal continuity made possible by christianity, that is, through the christian temporality of “patience” in the present and “expectancy” as an attitude toward 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

ibid., p. 57. ibid., p. 124. See ibid., p. 191. ibid., p. 167. ibid., p. 210. ibid., p. 117. ibid., p. 166.

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the future.22 along with realizing these forms of temporality in one’s own life goes the acquisition of a kind of knowledge that is “concerned rather than indifferent or passionate. it is continually focused on actuality, and does not take the thinker away from existence because the ‘sphere’ of love is infinitely inclusive.”23 the titular “critique of modernity” offered by Kierkegaard is ultimately a critique of a specifically secular age from the standpoint of the passionate knowledge of Christian love. Ferguson frames the book as an introduction of Kierkegaard to contemporary sociologists, yet the heart of the book is a detailed exegesis of a wide selection of Kierkegaard’s writings that goes beyond the function of an introduction. the result, however, is that the thematic thread of modern melancholy sometimes gets lost as Ferguson works to develop a theory of, for example, all the pseudonymous works as essentially aesthetic productions. historically, Ferguson describes Kierkegaard as a strange kind of inheritor of a western tradition of thinking about melancholy that includes galen, plato, Ficino, montaigne, and pascal. Ferguson’s rehearsal of this history ends somewhat anticlimactically, because he admits that Kierkegaard does not position himself within that tradition.24 because it is painted (perhaps necessarily) in such broad brushstrokes, this historical section is slightly confusing on the role of modern philosophy, surely an important context for thinking about Kierkegaard’s contribution, within this tradition. Ferguson does not demonstrate with textual evidence how “descartes, Kant and hegel presupposed as a permanent condition the melancholy of modern life”25 without dealing with the problem of melancholy as such. in light of this quick denigration of the modern philosophical tradition, Kierkegaard is presented as a thinker who begins with melancholy rather than with philosophy, and rightly so, according to Ferguson, because melancholy is a condition that is “unresponsive to rational therapeutics,”26 which is all the epistemological tradition of modern european philosophy has to offer. happily, though, the exegesis of Kierkegaard’s writings at the heart of Ferguson’s book hews much closer to textual evidence than does his chapter on Kierkegaard’s place in the history of western thought on melancholy. and the book as a whole is, in general, an example of responsible social scientific engagement with Kierkegaard’s writings. Joseph ballan

22 23 24 25 26

ibid., pp. 196–7. ibid., p. 194. ibid., pp. 32–3. ibid., p. 32. ibid., p. 34.

reviews and critical discussions Ferreira, m. Jamie, review in Religious Studies, vol. 31, no. 4, 1995, pp. 537–40. Lippitt, John, review in Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, vol. 39, 2000, pp. 9–11.

m. Jamie Ferreira, Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith, oxford: clarendon press 1991, 168 pp.

Ferreira’s influential monograph critiqued and revised popular understandings of Kierkegaard on the relations of the will, imagination, reason, and passion in the transition to faith. according to Ferreira, one of the most widespread errors had been the tendency to construe faith’s “leap” as a heroic act of will and to portray Kierkegaard as a radical volitionalist.1 closely associated with this problem had been the habit of describing this transition as a criterionless choice. this older view had often implied that faith, for Kierkegaard, is impervious to all rational assessment and can only be authenticated by virtue of the intensity of the passion with which it is held. against these interpretations, Ferreira argued that Kierkegaard does not dichotomize the will and passion or the will and understanding. Qualitative existential transitions do not require a singular act of intentional decision. what we call “an act of will” is really a complex confluence of many human capacities. in order to provide a more nuanced exposition of the genesis of faith according to Kierkegaard, Ferreira emphasized the role of imagination in the works of his pseudonym Johannes Climacus. Most significantly, she reconceptualized will and decision in terms of various dimensions of imaginative activity. imagination’s role in relation to the will had only begun to be probed by such Kierkegaard scholars as david gouwens.2 this lacuna in the secondary literature was probably attributable to Kierkegaard’s ostensible negative attitude toward imagination, particularly the complaints of some of his pseudonyms that imaginative fancies and wishful thinking can be an evasion of the task of dealing with the actualities of the individual’s life. however, Ferriera objects that, for Kierkegaard, the imagination has positive value, even though the romantics did misuse it as a distraction from actuality. even more strongly, Ferreira insists that in Kierkegaard’s pages the imagination is indispensable for ethical and religious development. Faith is an imaginative transition rather than an abrupt episode of volitional exertion. the transition to faith is a shift in perspective in which the accumulation of considerations that point to a new paradigm reaches a See alasdair macintyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, notre dame: university of notre dame press 1981, pp. 39–50. 2 david g. gouwens, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Imagination, new york: peter Lang 1988. 1

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critical threshold. relying on themes from the philosophy of science and metaphor theory, Ferreira suggests that imagination holds in tension an old paradigm and a dimly perceived new one. through imagination a dialectic is established between the current actuality and a future possibility which has not yet been adopted. For climacus, the concept “paradox” suggests the incommensurability of the old and new paradigms, although the discernment of the new pattern involves continuity as well as discontinuity. going beyond the issue of faith, Ferreira advances the more general claim that imagination is crucial for all willing. this analysis of imagination enables Ferreira to explore the relation between volition and passion, or, in climacus’ language, the way in which “the leap” and “passion” qualify each other. in the popular mind, volitions are regarded as acts, while passions are occurrences. but this dualism of passive and active does not characterize Kierkegaard’s literature. Such a picture is misleading because passions are not entirely passive. rather, they are partly the fruit of ways of seeing that individuals can freely encourage. gestalt shifts are qualitative transitions in which we choose to look for something and deliberately commit ourselves to the shift. we can cultivate the transition, and we can also resist it. to say that such a paradigm shift is free is to claim that it is not compelled by any necessity in the reasoning process. on the other hand, faith is not a purely self-initiated act. Ferreira insists that for climacus the human will does not enjoy the freedom of indifference. climacus’ view of the will should be understood in terms of the classical tradition’s rational appetite and attraction rather than volition. although willing involves active construals, an individual cannot decide to interpret situations in any way he or she wants. our imaginative shifts are motivated by the factors in a situation on which our passions encourage us to focus our attention. given our particular interests, a redescription becomes attractive. The decision to adopt a new paradigm is simply an affirmation of a reorienting shift in perspective, in which one option seems to be the only possible one. in coming to have faith we allow an attraction to win out and surrender ourselves to it. Ferreira uses these considerations to deconstruct the dichotomy of reason and will. because these intentional and passion-laden transitions involve seeing the self and the world differently, they do have a cognitive component. consequently, lifechanging commitments to a new paradigm are not immune to critical appraisal. Ferreira spells out some of the theological consequences of this reading of Kierkegaard. because faith is both active and passive, the juxtaposition of faith as a free human act and as divinely given gift is a false dichotomy. while faith is not the product of human willing, god’s act of grace is not exclusive of human activity. Faith is neither something done to us ineffably by god, nor is it a pelagian-style human work. Ferreira has helped dispel one-dimensional and reductive readings of Kierkegaard on life’s qualitative transitions. but serious questions remain. it is not clear what she means by freedom when she insists that Kierkegaard does want to preserve the individual’s freedom in the transition to faith. her account of faith tends to minimize the elements of risk and resolution that are so important to climacus. also, although Ferreira asserts that divine and human agencies are not logically on a par and

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therefore are not competitive, she does write as if the divine and human dimensions can be factored out, as when she claims that for climacus god’s agency must be accepted by individuals. Finally, Ferreira introduces a provocative observation but does not develop it. She remarks that the poles with which Kierkegaard deals may not be amenable to combination in a theory, although they can be combined in a life.3 this raises the question of what sort of enterprise might count as a “theory” of qualitative transformation, and whether her own exposition of Kierkegaard might be such a theory. Lee c. barrett

m. Jaime Ferreira, Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith, oxford: clarendon press 1991.

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reviews and critical discussions burns, r.m., review in Theology, vol. 95, no. 776, 1992, p. 290. conesa, Francisco, review in Scripta Theologica, vol. 26, no. 1, 1994, pp. 340–1. elrod, John, review in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 34, no. 2, 1993, pp. 127–9. Jackson, timothy p., review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 18, 1996, pp. 214–19. Law, david, review in Journal of Religious Studies, vol. 43, no. 2, 1992, pp. 760–2. mcFayden, alistair, review in Scottish Journal of Theology, vol. 48, no. 2, 1995, pp. 266–7. morrison, John d., review in Calvin Theological Journal, vol. 29, no. 1, 1994, pp. 246–8. — review in Journal of the Evangelical Theology Society, vol. 38, no. 1, 1995, pp. 127–8. pattison, george, review in Expository Times, vol. 103, no. 7, 1992, p. 219. Simone, caroline J., review in Faith and Philosophy, vol. 11, no. 1, 1994, pp. 148– 52. walsh, Sylvia, review in Kierkegaard Society Newsletter, no. 25, 1992, pp. 5–6. westphal, merold, review in Theological Studies, vol. 53, no. 3, 1992, p. 595.

m. Jamie Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving: A Commentary on Kierkegaard’s “Works of Love,” oxford and new york: oxford university press 2001, xi + 316 pp.

In recent decades of Kierkegaard scholarship, it is difficult to think of a more needed, important, and justly influential book than Jamie Ferreira’s 2001 Love’s Grateful Striving. It may seem surprising to attribute such significance to what is at heart a chapter-by-chapter commentary on a single Kierkegaardian text. but the book offers more than mere exegesis. it corrects longstanding and pervasive misreadings of Works of Love and, by doing so, brings Kierkegaard into fresh and productive dialogue with a wide range of contemporary philosophical and theological currents. when Ferreira’s book was published some 15 years ago, Works of Love suffered from both neglect and misunderstanding. on the one hand, scholars interested in Kierkegaard’s ethics had a tendency to emphasize the more immediately provocative claims made by pseudonymous books such as Either/Or, Fear and Trembling, and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript.1 Ferreira’s commentary accords Works of Love the central place it deserves in Kierkegaard’s ethics. on the other hand, to the extent that Works of Love was discussed by previous generations, these discussions were frequently colored by the negative assessments offered by the twentiethcentury giants theodor adorno, Karl barth, martin buber, and K.e. Løgstrup. each of these writers charged Works of Love with a kind of “acosmism”—indifference or hostility to the material world and the actual human beings in it. Love’s Grateful Striving dispels unfair readings of Works of Love without ever devolving into mere pro-Kierkegaardian apologetics. “uncritical devotion is as bad as unfair criticism,” Ferreira maintains, and her tone is a model of scholarly equanimity throughout.2 even so, Ferreira makes a compelling case that Works of Love calls for a genuinely this-worldly form of ethical responsibility grounded in the love of god. 1 Ferreira cites a number of examples of this tendency, including alasdair macintyre, A Short History of Ethics, new york: macmillan 1966, pp. 215–18; george J. Stack, “Kierkegaard: the Self and ethical existence,” Ethics, vol. 83, 1973, pp. 108–25; roger S. gottlieb, “Kierkegaard’s ethical individualism,” Monist, vol. 62, no. 3, 1979, pp. 351–67; and Louis mackey, “the Loss of the world in Kierkegaard’s ethics,” in his Points of View: Readings of Kierkegaard, tallahassee, Florida: Florida State university press 1986, pp. 141– 59. See m. Jamie Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving: A Commentary on Kierkegaard’s “Works of Love,” oxford and new york: oxford university press 2001, p. 265, n.5 and p. 275, n.1. 2 Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving, p. 10.

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moreover, Ferreira also brings Works of Love into dialogue with a wide range of contemporary ethical conversations. She signals the capaciousness of her analysis early on: “analytic moral philosophy, existentialism, deconstruction, marxism, feminism—all of these are seedbeds, which generate different kinds of discussions because of their different vantage points and their different tools and methods of inquiry.”3 most secondary literature on Kierkegaard engages with one or at most two of these seedbeds (while perhaps polemicizing against the others). Ferreira engages with all of them in a sympathetic and sophisticated way, bringing to light the best insights of each. Throughout her commentary, Ferreira compares Kierkegaard with two figures in particular: Martin Luther and Emmanuel Levinas. Ferreira presents the first as furnishing an essential but often-neglected intellectual context for Works of Love; she presents the second as echoing many of Works of Love’s most distinctive intuitions in an illuminating way. the title of Ferreira’s study signals its deeply Lutheran reading of Works of Love. She uses Lutheran notions of grace, law, and gospel, and christian freedom to exposit Kierkegaard’s arguments throughout. indeed, she goes so far as to suggest as a kind of hermeneutical principle that we should “assume that Kierkegaard is not challenging Luther’s views unless he makes this explicit.”4 throughout the book, this practice is generally quite illuminating. however, there are a few points at which i would question the use to which Ferreira puts Luther’s concepts and Kierkegaard’s appropriation of them. For example, Ferreira rightly criticizes previous readings of Works of Love that see its first series as “law” and its second series as “gospel.” however, her solution to this problem is not to question such a division in the first place (as I think would be correct), but to relocate it. She argues that a shift from law to gospel occurs in the fourth deliberation of the first series. From my point of view, it is a misreading of Kierkegaard to say that he ever presents gospel—that is, love itself—in direct and independent form. after all, this contradicts his statement in the preface to Works of Love that love as such is “essentially indescribable.”5 it also contradicts Kierkegaard’s own analysis of Luther’s law/gospel dialectic in his journal, where he argues that law and gospel must always be spoken simultaneously, as a continuous expression of paradox.6 Further, Ferreira’s recurring assertion of the “fulfillability” of the love command could be nuanced through a more substantial comparison to Luther’s thought. given her Lutheran framework, Ferreira should at least acknowledge that Luther emphatically rejects the idea that the law’s “ought” implies that it can actually be fulfilled.7 The commonalities that Ferreira finds between Levinassian and Kierkegaard ethics are especially revealing. Levinas is most famous among Kierkegaard scholars ibid., p. 5. ibid., p. 11. 5 SKS 9, 11 / WL, 3. 6 SKS 26, 166, nb32:67 / JP 3, 2554. 7 Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving, pp. 122–9; pp. 190–3. For an example of Luther’s rejection of this view, see martin Luther, “on the bondage of the will,” in Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation, ed. by e. gordon rupp and philip S. watson, philadelphia: westminster press 1969, p. 192. 3 4

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for his criticism of the notion of the teleological suspension of the ethical in Fear and Trembling, but Ferreira uncovers deep similarities between Kierkegaard’s position in Works of Love and Levinas’ accounts of responsibility, alterity, and infinite desire. On this last point in particular, Ferreira provides an important analysis of Kierkegaard’s under-appreciated use of the danish word Trang, spotlighting implications of the term that would not be obvious to english speakers reading the hong translation. She shows that the word does not mean “need” in the negative sense of “lack,” but rather implies the positive sense of “yearning” or “craving”—thus anticipating in a striking way Levinas’ account of “metaphysical desire.”8 because Love’s Grateful Striving takes the form of a commentary, it is difficult to summarize everything it has to offer in an overarching way. (readers will be grateful for the high quality of the book’s index, which points the way to the sometimes scattered treatments of various themes.) in her introduction, Ferreira highlights four key “areas of concern” about Works of Love to which her commentary responds,9 and these responses can be summarized as four central theses. First, against claims that Kierkegaard demands a kind of self-abnegation or self-hatred (an especially troubling possibility from a feminist point of view), Ferreira shows that Kierkegaard portrays love of self as a necessary condition of love of neighbor. (on this point, there is at least a rhetorical contrast with Levinas, who speaks consistently of placing the neighbor above oneself.)10 Second, against claims that Kierkegaard promotes indifference or even hostility toward the actual people of the world, Ferreira spotlights the deliberation “our duty to Love the people we See,” along with other passages, in order to emphasize the this-worldly implications of Kierkegaardian ethics. She makes a strong case that Kierkegaard does not require renouncing preferential attraction as such, but rather calls for “preserving” christian love in the midst of the preferential relationships that are intrinsic and indeed unavoidable parts of human life.11 third, Ferreira takes up the marxist critique that Kierkegaard so prioritizes the spiritual well-being of the neighbor that he disparages material needs. while recognizing that this criticism has some real teeth, she draws on Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the concrete imitation of christ to show that he does indeed demand attention to the neighbor’s material circumstances. Fourth, against the view that the infinite nature of the Kierkegaardian ethical task renders it unlivable and thus irrelevant, Ferreira uses her analogy to Levinas to distinguish between “complete” fulfillment of ethical duty in individual acts and the “perfect” fulfillment of ethical duty as a veritable “task of a lifetime.”12 Many readers will find points in Ferreira’s exegesis with which to quibble; this is inevitable in a commentary that engages with the letter of Kierkegaard’s text Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving, p. 21, pp. 2–28; pp. 39–42; and pp. 103–4. on the subject of metaphysical desire, see emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. by alphonso Lingis, pittsburgh: duquesne university press 1969, pp. 33–5. 9 Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving, pp. 8–9. 10 ibid., pp. 134–5. 11 on this point, Ferreira’s analysis of John 21, ibid., pp. 103–4, is especially revealing and helpful. 12 ibid., pp. 122–9; pp. 190–3. 8

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so minutely. but without question this book has established itself as a necessary conversation partner and a valuable guide for interpreters of Works of Love. Further, in my judgment, an important consequence of Ferreira’s many insights is that Works of Love should now be seen as standing in quite urgent need of a fresh english translation. carl S. hughes

reviews and critical discussions barrett, Lee c., review in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol. 71, no. 21, 2003, pp. 442–5. cruysberghs, paul, Johan taels, and Karl verstrynge, “descriptive bibliography: recent Kierkegaard Literature: 2000–2004,” Tidschrift voor Filosofie, vol. 67, no. 4, 2005, pp. 767–814; see p. 798. glenn, John d. Jr., review in Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, vol. 45, 2003, pp. 15–16. Krishek, Sharon, “two Forms of Love: the problem of preferential Love in Kierkegaard’s Works of Love,” Journal of Religious Ethics, vol. 36, no. 4, 2008, pp. 598–611. — Kierkegaard on Faith and Love, cambridge: cambridge university press 2009, pp. 120–32. Quinn, philip L., review in Faith and Philosophy, vol. 19, no. 1, 2002, pp. 134–8. rae, murray, review in Journal of Theological Studies, vol. 54, no. 1, 2003, pp. 413–17. rubenstein, mary-Jane, review in Modern Theology, vol. 19, 2003, pp. 295–7. rumble, vanessa, review in Review of Metaphysics, vol. 56, no. 4, 2003, pp. 871–2. walsh, Sylvia, review in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 53, no. 2, 2003, pp. 115–17.

mary e. Finn, Writing the Incommensurable: Kierkegaard, Rossetti, and Hopkins, university park, pennsylvania: pennsylvania university press 1992 (Literature and Philosophy), 180 pp.

Writing the Incommensurable tells us how the poets gerard manley hopkins and christina rossetti make us feel the palpable wound of the “humanly incomprehensible god.”1 (and here the faithful waver, the faithless fable and miss). it traces the outlines of our wreckage, and hopkins,’ better than hillis miller, in his several attempts, and limns christina rossetti’s darkness more surely than several feminist readers. Though well aware that “what always turns out to be in danger of sacrifice, at least in poetry, is not the writing, but the devotion,”2 Finn shows how the structure of both hopkins’ and rossetti’s poems (and sets of poems) allow a fuller measure than recent critics consider by placing them against the structures of Repetition, Fear and Trembling, and Either/Or, and against the problem of original sin explicated in The Concept of Anxiety. the chapters which open each poet against Repetition, “wreck and Reprise: Hopkins” and “Wreck and Reprise: Rossetti” are particularly fine interessays, which readers of all three writers will find worthwhile. So much for my report. there is a superstructure which i would consider, though in its best moments the book’s metaphysical thesis—dough, crust, dust—falls to the residuary worm. the “fundamental thesis of [Finn’s] study [is] that the pseudonymous works of Kierkegaard and the poetry of rossetti and hopkins explore the disruption between the material and the divine worlds, and the isolation of the individual believer such a disruption engenders.”3 thus it follows, for example, “that ‘the wreck of the deutschland’ is about…the failure of language as the means by which the language user can communicate what he or she believes to be metaphysical or religious truth.”4 religious or poetic language user, language, event, belief or truth, one spoken to—a reader.

mary e. Finn, Writing the Incommensurable: Kierkegaard, Rossetti, and Hopkins, university park, pennsylvania: pennsylvania university press 1992 (Literature and Philosophy), p. 145. 2 ibid., p. 99. 3 ibid., p. 167. 4 ibid., p. 104. 1

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i wonder if this implied structure is (a) heuristic, and (b) agreeable to Kierkegaard, or hopkins (rossetti i do not know as well). according to a hopkins psalm “the world is charged with the grandeur of god,”5 this charge is double, the world is “charged” in at least two senses: charged, electrically—it shines forth like shook foil, and charged morally—to gather to a greatness. if this is so, then language too suffers from that same double charge—heightened, however, by this: that since a moral charge is not noticeably a natural one, it must be the charged word itself which charges the world in each sense, and so it must be that all words founder—they are funded by impossibility; impossibly underfunded for the charge they must undertake, our words fail, or they fail more entirely by refusing to take it up—attempting refusal. even refusal fails, for the great insulating earth, “which generations have trod, have trod, have trod,” is never spent, but “sheer plod makes plough down sillion / Shine, and blue-bleak embers, ah my dear, / Fall, gall themselves, and gash gold vermillion.”6 So, at least, hopkins: we cannot tread out this charge. that radically “ascetic moment” in language, that unrepayable, unrefundable charge (made visible in Michelangelo’s pre-electrical painting) is not merely figured by medieval eremites like Simon Stylites,7 but is explicitly linked to language in a writer familiar (as she notes) to all three subjects of Finn’s study: augustine: You take back what you find although you never lost it; you are never in want, but you rejoice in gain; you are never covetous yet you exact usury. excessive payments are made to you, so that you may be our debtor—yet who has anything that is not yours? you pay debts although you owe no man anything; you cancel debts and lose nothing. what have we said, my god, my life, my holy delight? or what does any man say when he speaks of you? yet woe to those who keep silent concerning you, for even those who speak much are as the dumb.8

i am not sure at all, then, that ms. Finn is correct in thinking that the problem Kierkegaard, rossetti, and hopkins share is “nineteenth century religiosity” as it appears in “the maelstrom that is nineteenth century subjectivity.”9 nor is it simply, or most precisely, that the question (“how may i, Johannes climacus, participate in the happiness promised by christianity?”) is a “profoundly personal expression,”10 but that it is raised in the charged linguistic being which both “yields art as the attempt to answer the question,” in more simple religious spirits, and also, in the more reflective—Kierkegaard, Hopkins, Rossetti—“yields art not [as the answer] to the question itself, but [as the answer] to the problem [expressed in] asking the 5 The Poems of Gerard Manley Hopkins, ed. by w.h. gardner and n.h. macLenzie, oxford: oxford university press 1970, p. 66. 6 “the windhover: to christ our Lord,” in The Poems of Gerard Manley Hopkins, p. 69. 7 See Finn, Writing the Incommensurable: Kierkegaard, Rossetti, and Hopkins, chapter 3. 8 The Confessions of Saint Augustine, trans. by John K. ryan, new york: doubledayimage 1960, i.4.4. 9 See Finn, Writing the Incommensurable: Kierkegaard, Rossetti, and Hopkins, p. 5. 10 ibid., p. 6.

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question.”11 as Johannes climacus says, “the question is asked by one who does not even know what could have led him to ask it.”12 Johannes’ statement, in turn, exhibits that when, considered subjectively, the charge will appear as anxiety. it would be, then, this demand, this charge, this divine imperative exacting its usury, charging every word, which makes the religious poet’s voice “exclude itself from its own redemptive vision.”13 For in fact, the charged word of hopkins’ poem is but a reminder of our constant charge. that is all the work a poem can accomplish. it makes nothing happen. it is neither a presentation nor a representation: it has not got change left for charity to artistic causes. it is the charge that is constant: a redemptive vision is not where we, or the speaking poet, are at. as Finn says of the climactic line of Hopkins’ “Wreck” “And the word of it Sacrificed”: there is a controlling word “and the word of it” is the word “Sacrificed.” And there is not because “the word of it” has been sacrificed. The words for the “act of wording,” all “audible shadows” or “sakes” of each other and of the central “word of it” (though inadequate, being marks “of man’s make”) gather around but do not fill in the gap that may exist in the center of the stanza.14

her further remark, quoting geoffrey hartman, that in hopkins “language is shown to be contentio in essence—there is nothing disinterested or general about it; its end as its origin is to move, persuade, possess,”15 also hits the mark. it is, then, all the more surprising that she misses it in her connection to Kierkegaard. For while Kierkegaard would agree that “if the moment of salvation really arrives for a “single individual,” at that moment the individual becomes incommunicado, its story removed from the realm of publice juris, like a “book under divine confiscation,”16 there is a problem in that Finn means this statement as “the dilemma of subjective faith.”17 i think that Kierkegaard’s texts are incorrectly read in this subjectivist, existential (though religiously existential) fashion.18 rather, Kierkegaard’s texts, and hopkins’ poems open to the more terminal grammatological and/or terminally christian reading: because the world is charged, the book of the result—for any and for all—is not and cannot be publice juris (or hegel is right), but is under divine confiscation. Is that confiscation the audible shadow of grace? Dost thou hear? gene Fendt

ibid. SKS 4, 218 / PF, 9. 13 See Finn, Writing the Incommensurable: Kierkegaard, Rossetti, and Hopkins, p. 81. 14 ibid., p. 118. 15 ibid., p. 119. 16 ibid., p. 81. 17 ibid., p. 82. 18 See also ibid., p. 12, where Finn draws Kierkegaard and heidegger together, and p. 94, where hopkins’ Sermons puzzle about how language “can communicate the ‘stricter sense of self and me and mine’ as proof for a power extrinsic to myself.” Such proving is a philosophical question, but not the poet’s, or a religious writer’s. 11

12

reviews and critical discussions Fendt, gene, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 17, 1994, pp. 174–7. ruprecht, clifford holt, review in South Atlantic Review, vol. 59, no. 2, 1994, pp. 156–60. ziolkowski, eric J., review in Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, vol. 29, 1994, pp. 12–14.

Francis w. Fulford, Sören Aabye Kierkegaard: A Study, cambridge: h.w. wallis 1911, 75 pp.

this study marks one of the earliest treatments of Kierkegaard in the englishspeaking world. Francis w. Fulford’s text has all the markings of an introduction to the thought of a captivating writer who should be taken seriously. it begins with a brief biography, leading to overviews of Kierkegaard’s thought and his theological orthodoxy. Fulford includes an extensive list of Kierkegaard’s published works, although certain key texts are missing (for example, The Concept of Irony).1 the author addresses translation issues when it comes to titles, as well as Kierkegaard’s use of pseudonyms, which he explains using Kierkegaard’s own explanations.2 What is reflected in his comments is a recognition of Kierkegaard’s unusual style that may unsettle readers. For instance, he writes: “Sometimes we are reading a philosopher, sometimes a preacher, sometimes a story-teller.”3 Fulford indicates that, for the interest of his study, the religious holds front and center, because it is “part of [Kierkegaard’s] teaching which he would desire most to be remembered.”4 unlike so many english-speaking philosophers of the twentieth century, Fulford moves quickly through Either/Or in order to focus on the religious dimensions of the corpus. the work is structured systematically in a synthetic attempt to articulate the whole of Kierkegaard’s religious teaching. First, in what is called the “destructive,” Fulford summarizes Kierkegaard’s critique of the christianity of his day. the author identifies four reasons for this critique in Kierkegaard’s corpus: the protestant emphasis on the comfort of religion, the fact that christianity became an established part of the state, the influence of Hegelian philosophy on religious thought, and finally the general weakness of humanity and its “inability to suffer.”5 Fulford follows with a systematic articulation of Kierkegaard’s constructive teaching: “the religious man and the christian man in their ideal,” which consumes almost the entire 1 Fulford references the “new” 1901 “Gyldendalske Boghandel” edition, that is, the first collected edition SV1, and the barfod and gottsched edition of the “papers.” his choices of translations of the titles are interesting, for example, “philosophic Scraps,” “on the concept apprehension.” See Francis w. Fulford, Sören Aabye Kierkegaard: A Study, cambridge: h.w. wallis 1911, p. 7. 2 ibid., p. 9. 3 ibid., p. 10. 4 ibid., p. 10. 5 ibid., p. 16.

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remainder of the text.6 he begins by summarizing the three “spheres of existence”— the aesthetic, ethical, and religious—explicating all three, followed by a treatment of religiousness “a,” highlighting their positive elements (the “conviction of the nothingness of man,” “trusted contentment,” “simplicity and love”) and turning to the curious idea of repetition that Kierkegaard has developed as a transition point from religiousness “a” to religiousness “b.” it is here one receives a treatment of the concept of “apprehension” (more commonly translated as anxiety) and despair. at this point, Fulford inserts a break in the text to show the major systematic turning point that takes place between the general discussion of religiousness “b” and its explicit connections to the way of Jesus christ.7 the reader is presented with an account of Kierkegaard’s paradox of the incarnation, with an extended sketch of Practice in Christianity.8 a brief discussion of additional ideas in Kierkegaard’s corpus about Christ follows, with a final summary of the relation between God and man as taken from one of Kierkegaard’s “Papers” from 1852. One final break leads to a brief display of Kierkegaard’s treatment of the bible, which Fulford appraises by writing “we may say at once that all his thought and expression are saturated with bible thoughts and expressions,”9 although he points out that this treatment is not without its defects, highlighting Kierkegaard’s disdain for biblical criticism and “his neglect of the original text.”10 Conclusions follow, where Fulford makes four observations that specific classes of readers of Kierkegaard (namely, the average man, the liberal, the conservative, and Kierkegaard himself) could use to test the value of his thought. In his final pages, Fulford offers four points as criticism: (1) to follow the example of christ is to follow him in his joys and suffering, whereas Kierkegaard just focuses on suffering; (2) Kierkegaard’s teaching on the demands and paradoxes of faith merit careful study because they reflect the reality they are describing; (3) “if, in the mind of christ, failure to believe in god despite appearances is fundamentally sin, so also is failure to believe in man despite appearances,”11 and Kierkegaard would not agree in Fulford’s judgment; and (4) Fulford holds that Kierkegaard “limits the giving of divine help to those that desire it,” which is not the view “that the Faith of the church” espouses.12 Part of Fulford’s final evaluation is the claim that, at least for his own tastes, Kierkegaard’s great temptation is to make too much of paradox and reduce the domain of common sense to a minor role. Scholars interested in early english perspectives on Kierkegaard’s religious thought must consider this text in any evaluation. it gives a clear, systematic presentation of Kierkegaard’s religious thought based on the texts available at the time. polemics are measured and balanced, and where Fulford explicitly disagrees with elements of Kierkegaard’s thinking, the author carefully explains why without 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

ibid., pp. 17–61. ibid., p. 47. ibid., pp. 50–7. ibid., p. 61. ibid., p. 63. ibid., p. 73. ibid., pp. 67–75.

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vilifying or simplifying Kierkegaard’s own perspective. Judgments of praise and criticism are withheld until the end of the text, which makes it easy to navigate. the writing is peppered with danish vocabulary but only in service of an interpretative point or translation issue. the text does not assume agility in the danish language. Fulford’s systematic presentation is comprehensive, given then resources at his disposal, but the additional charm that this text offers to the interested reader is Fulford’s commitment to humanize Kierkegaard without falling into the same traps that later authors did in their various attempts to psychologize Kierkegaard’s corpus. Rather, Fulford is keen to reveal the man behind the text, and he does this in his final pages when he reveals Kierkegaard’s piety in the form of two prayers published from the “papers” of 1850. in fact, rather than continuing the gloss, Fulford concludes the study with Kierkegaard’s own words, solidifying the commitment he made in the beginning to focus on the religious dimensions of Kierkegaard’s thought, which he demonstrates would have been Kierkegaard’s own desire. daniel m. dion

reviews and critical discussions undetermined.

rick anthony Furtak, Wisdom in Love: Kierkegaard and the Ancient Quest for Emotional Integrity, notre dame: university of notre dame press 2005, xii + 248 pp.

emotion: moral friend or foe? most of us are all too familiar with the unfavorable manner in which emotion is presented in philosophical circles. ask immanuel Kant, and he will tell us that emotions are irrational and outside our control. if we are to be truly free in our moral judgment, he tells us, we must suppress them. only then can we act with the right motive—goodwill. this skepticism about emotion and its moral import (or lack thereof) is not uncommon amongst philosophers. we are accused of being slaves to our emotions. we are told that emotion is a sign of weakness. we are told that our emotions are erratic, rash, and unreliable. Is it not selfish, we are asked, to let such passionate and personal emotions determine our actions towards others? Should it not be their best interest and not our desires that drive morality? because of these concerns we are advised to treat emotion with relentless suspicion, lest we forget to worship on the altar of reason. in his book Wisdom in Love: Kierkegaard and the Ancient Quest for Emotional Integrity, rick anthony Furtak challenges head-on the Stoics’ “bleak” assertion that “emotional problems can be resolved only through the complete avoidance of emotion.”1 in this rich, passionate, and monumental contribution to the philosophical study of emotion, Furtak draws on the writings of Kierkegaard to provide an alternative account of the role and function of emotion in the moral life. in the process, Furtak shows that emotions can be both reliable and trustworthy. moreover, and perhaps more importantly, emotions can serve as a remarkable source of insight and can enable “us to attain a uniquely truthful way of seeing the world.”2 ultimately, Wisdom in Love challenges readers who view emotion as an impediment to moral judgment and those who call not just for its suppression but its removal. “For the person who believes this,” Furtak writes, “life becomes much easier, but only at the cost of becoming meaningless.”3 The book is divided into three parts. Part I begins by exploring and defining the concept of emotion. here, Furtak takes an axiological view that ties emotion to rick anthony Furtak, Wisdom in Love: Kierkegaard and the Ancient Quest for Emotional Integrity, notre dame: university of notre dame press 2005, p. xi. 2 ibid., p. xii. 3 ibid. 1

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value, and further develops an understanding of emotion that is less about sensations and more about “way[s] of seeing the world.”4 the book continues by describing the Stoics’ normative account of emotion. For them, Furtak tell us, emotional integrity means “complete freedom from emotion.”5 Stoics refuse to see emotions as “true” in any normative way, if only because what really matters in life are the things under our direct control. Furtak then lays out his main challenge against the Stoic claim that “emotions are false perceptions of significance that does not exist.”6 Stoic philosophy fails, Furtak argues, by positioning us as bystanders rather than participants in the world, and therefore emptying human beings of anything that is truly meaningful. part i ends by discussing the intentionality and reliability of emotion, while illuminating important questions that arise when thinking about love, care, and attachment. in part ii, Furtak relies on Kierkegaard’s Either/Or to help us navigate the complex process of discerning acceptable from unacceptable emotions. in the works of Kierkegaard, Furtak writes, we find a “passionate alternative to Stoicism” that illustrates how emotions “can be a uniquely valuable mode of perception.”7 by diagnosing the mind of Kierkegaard’s aesthete in Either/Or, Furtak shows us what it looks like when someone rejects emotional engagement and vulnerability. when the aesthete refuses to see that his emotions are significant, or, worse still, why and how they are significant, he finds himself in an existentially precarious position. This “moral zombie…may live in physical proximity to others,” Furtak observes, “but he cannot share their world.”8 Judge william, it turns out, offers a piercing critique of the aesthete’s failure to appreciate the value of her emotions. not only does the aesthete’s detachment corrupt her identity, purpose, and continuity of character, but it also prevents her from developing the habits necessary to form and cultivate virtue.9 “the achievement of Kierkegaard’s ethicist,” Furtak concludes, “is to show us how passion can be transformed into habit, how the cognition involved in an emotional response can take on lasting moral significance.”10 part iii wraps up Furtak’s case that “emotional perception is itself a valuable part of moral life, not merely an avoidable distraction.”11 to accomplish this, Furtak grounds moral agency and meaningful existence in the work of love. without love, we must ask, what would it mean to say that someone or some thing matters and matters to me? how could i speak of appreciating someone or being aware “of what is not myself”?12 indeed, would any of these words have any meaning if we took Stoic philosophy as gospel? “it is only faith in love, not a rejection of emotion,” Furtak writes, “that can save us from despair.”13 this is not to say that faith in love 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

ibid., p. 4. ibid., p. 23. ibid., p. 24. ibid., p. 41; p. 48. ibid., p. 63. ibid., p. 70; p. 87. ibid., p. 87. ibid., p. 33. ibid., p. 123. ibid., p. 117.

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can save us from suffering, but that it can reveal an awareness of human suffering as “a legitimate, significant experience.”14 to be sure, we are reminded of Furtak’s primary goal articulated in the book’s preface: “to find out how it might be possible to make the best of our condition as emotional beings, rather than attempting to deny or rise above it.”15 with this aim in mind, it is only appropriate that he let love have the last word. “the madman is not the man who lost his reason,” g.K. chesterton once quipped. “the madman is the man who has lost everything except his reason.”16 chesterton would have read Wisdom in Love with pure delight. What is significant about Furtak’s work is not just that he warns against the undervalued role of emotion in the moral life; he just as effectively warns against the exaggerated role of reason. after all, compared to how often we are advised not to get too emotional, how often are we advised not to get too rational? indeed, the default in moral philosophy is not suspicion of reason but emotion. but if “emotions are our way of perceiving significance in our lives,” Furtak writes, “then it is dispassionate cognition which ought to be regarded with distrust in the realm of human values.”17 Wisdom in Love: Kierkegaard and the Ancient Quest for Emotional Integrity is not just a book about moral wisdom; it is a book of moral wisdom. it is not just a book that changes one’s mind about emotion and vulnerability; it changes the way we relate to our emotional self. Like the works of Kierkegaard, Wisdom in Love is better read not as a philosophical treatise but as an invitation—an invitation to embrace what makes life so messy, mysterious, and meaningful. emotion, Furtak shows us, is not our enemy. it does not “get in the way.” in fact, it might just be the best friend we have. roberto Sirvent

14 15 16 17

ibid., p. 135. ibid., p. xii. g.K. chesterton, Orthodoxy, austin: John Lane co. 1909, p. 32. Furtak, Wisdom in Love, p. 16.

reviews and critical discussions hoffman, Kevin, review in Christianity and Literature, vol. 55, 2006, pp. 602–7. Kangas, david, review in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol. 75, 2007, pp. 717–20. mooney, edward, review in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2005 (online journal). roberts, robert c., review in Faith and Philosophy, vol. 26, 2009, pp. 98–104. Strawser, michael, review in Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, no. 50, 2006, pp. 27–9. watts, daniel, review in Philosophy in Review, vol. 26, no. 3, 2006, pp. 181–2. welz, claudia, review in Ars Disputandi, vol. 6, 2006 (online journal).

patrick gardiner, Kierkegaard, oxford and new york: oxford university press 1988, 120 pp.

patrick gardiner’s short book, simply entitled Kierkegaard, was first published in 1988 by oxford university press. in 2002, it was reissued as part of oxford university press’ Very Short Introduction series. gardiner’s book addresses the way in which “Kierkegaard developed his views in emphatic opposition to prevailing opinions, including certain metaphysical claims about the relation of thought to existence.”1 chapters 1–3 provide background and context for the book. chapter one provides a brief overview of Kierkegaard’s life, including his relationship with his father, his relationship with regine olsen, and his return to christianity in 1838. gardiner explains the nature of Kierkegaard’s authorship, explaining the difference between Kierkegaard’s signed and pseudonymous works. he also provides a brief account of the Corsair affair, and the chapter ends with a short recounting of Kierkegaard’s attack on the danish church. chapter 2 addresses those thinkers whose views Kierkegaard responds to throughout his authorship. gardiner summarizes the views of david hume, immanuel Kant, and g.w.F. hegel, explaining the ways in which Kierkegaard took issue with their account of ethics and religion. gardiner is also quick to address the way that Kierkegaard’s own personal life and character affected his authorship as well. chapter 3, meanwhile, addresses what Kierkegaard considered to be immorality of his age, that of the individual’s particular voice becoming lost in the crowd. chapters 4-6 all address three different types of Kierkegaardian literature and three corresponding Kierkegaardian ideas, with chapters 4 and 5 making up two of the largest sections of the entire book. chapter 4 deals with the “aesthetic works” of Kierkegaard (Either/Or, Repetition, Fear and Trembling, and Stages on Life’s Way), which are used for a discussion of the three spheres of existence. chapter 5 addresses the “philosophical works” of Johannes climacus, Philosophical Fragments and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. this chapter mainly focuses on the idea of subjectivity being truth and the inadequacy of speculative thought and history for arriving at any kind of objective certainty for one’s religious faith. Chapter 6 briefly addresses Kierkegaard’s “psychological works,” The Concept of Anxiety and The

1 patrick gardiner, Kierkegaard, oxford and new york: oxford university press 1988, back cover.

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Sickness unto Death, with gardiner examining the nature of the self in Kierkegaard’s thought. in the concluding seventh chapter, gardiner uses four pages to try to make clear that Kierkegaard cannot be understood merely as a reaction against the intellectual trends of his day. he emphasizes Kierkegaard’s desire to remind the danish church about the intensity and commitment that Christianity requires as well as the influence that Kierkegaard’s complex understanding of reason and faith had on later secular existentialists and religious thinkers like Karl barth and emil brunner. the great strength of gardiner’s brief account of Kierkegaard is the way he draws in the important thinkers who influenced Kierkegaard’s authorship. Not only does Gardiner give ample explanation for how Hume, Kant, and Hegel influenced Kierkegaard’s understanding of the ethical and religious spheres of existence, but he also addresses how other thinkers, such as g.e. Lessing and J.g. hamann, affected Kierkegaard’s view of faith and the leap. one glaring weakness of this text is gardiner’s seeming disregard for the pseudonyms, at times equating the identity of the pseudonymous authors with Kierkegaard himself. this becomes particularly problematic in his discussion of Philosophical Fragments and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript in chapter 5. gardiner states at the beginning of the chapter, “it is at least reasonable to assume that in this case the views expressed were intended to be understood as being essentially [Kierkegaard’s] own.”2 while discussing the paradoxical and offensive nature of belief, gardiner runs into the problem of establishing a consistent Kierkegaardian account of what it means to believe by nature of the absurd. he notes that the Postscript’s account of believing by the will alone seems inconsistent with the idea in the Fragments of believing according to divine grace, and he further contrasts this with Practice in Christianity’s idea of the offensiveness of belief pertaining to the “shockingly inappropriate form”3 in which god has appeared. the problem of inconsistency may simply lie in Gardiner’s conflating Kierkegaard with his pseudonyms. gardiner has provided a helpful book for understanding Kierkegaard’s writings. many short introductory books tend to focus on Kierkegaard’s biography or provide a summary of his most popular works. while gardiner has included these elements, the most significant contribution of this volume is the way in which he explicates the contemporary world of thought that Kierkegaard was addressing. matthew brake

2 3

ibid., p. 65. ibid., p. 102.

reviews and critical discussions brezis, david, review in Les Études philosophiques, no. 2, 1992, pp. 277–8. Lübcke, poul, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 15, 1991, pp. 186–7. martinez, roy, review in Teaching Philosophy, vol. 12, 1989, pp. 341–3. whittaker, John h., review in Philosophical Investigations, vol. 13, 1990, pp. 190–3.

david J. gouwens, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of the Imagination, new york, bern, Frankfurt am main, and paris: peter Lang 1989, vi + 304 pp.

david J. gouwens’ important work Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of the Imagination was published in 1989 by peter Lang.1 on the back cover, philosopher of religion Louis dupré notes that “Kierkegaard’s concept of the imagination has received little indepth attention,” and argues that “in this imaginative, balanced, and original work david gouwens uncovers the hidden continuity that links Kierkegaard’s apparently disparate texts.”2 dupré concludes his short review by expressing his hope that gouwens’ book “will receive the wide readership which it so amply deserves.”3 dupré’s initial comment that Kierkegaard’s concept of imagination had received little sustained attention was indeed the case in the 1980s. this is why gouwens’ dissertation and his later published book were such significant contributions to Kierkegaard studies at the time. in 1982 gouwens also published an article on the subject entitled “Kierkegaard on the ethical imagination,” which served as a forerunner to his book.4 other scholars had addressed elements of Kierkegaard’s concept of imagination, particularly as it related to aesthetics or poetry, but gouwens’ work offered a comprehensive and nuanced study of the imagination in Kierkegaard’s corpus that was new to Kierkegaardian studies. what was new in gouwens’ work was not only a sustained focus on Kierkegaard’s understanding of imagination, but also his attempt to broaden the concept of imagination from a narrow sense of a technical philosophical term to a capacity that affects and informs the whole human person. gouwens states that the purpose of his study is to allow Kierkegaard’s reflections on the imagination to stand out clearly and “to investigate the implications of his suggestive remark that the imagination is ‘the

1 this book drew upon his dissertation for the ph.d. program at yale university which he submitted under the same title. See david J. gouwens, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of the Imagination, ph.d. thesis, yale university 1982, 386 pp. (dai, 43a, p. 1196). 2 david J. gouwens, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of the Imagination, new york, bern, Frankfurt am main, and paris: peter Lang 1989. 3 ibid. 4 david J. gouwens, “Kierkegaard on the ethical imagination,” Journal of Religious Ethics, vol. 10, no. 2, 1982, pp. 204–20.

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capacity instar omnium [the capacity for all capacities].’”5 according to gouwens, this capacity is dialectical and includes multiple interconnected aspects. Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of the Imagination includes two parts. in part i, gouwens carefully situates Kierkegaard in the polemical context in which he reacted against both romantic and idealist understandings of the imagination. First, he offers some intellectual background on early german romanticism, focusing on Kant, Fichte, and Schelling and describes the way in which the early german romantics elevated the imagination to a redemptive capacity. he then traces Kierkegaard’s critique of the romantic imagination as it is expressed in his master’s dissertation, The Concept of Irony, maintaining that Kierkegaard opposes the romantic imagination because in its nearly exclusive focus on possibility, it lacks the actuality and ethical definition that allows for the self to be realized. gouwens also maintains that Kierkegaard levels a polemic not only against the romantics but also against the idealists—hegel in particular. in the second section of part i, then, gouwens seeks to demonstrate that in the climacean writings we find Kierkegaard’s critique of the way in which Hegel’s system denigrates feeling and imagination. in their overemphasis on thought, the idealists lack the passion and enthusiasm that is crucial for the development of the human self, and this passion is intimately tied to imagination. thus gouwens explains that to understand Kierkegaard’s position on the imagination, we must grasp how he reacted against both the romantic tendency to see imagination only as possibility, as well as the idealist tendency to reject imagination in favor of objective reflection. Gouwens writes that “Kierkegaard’s double-edged dialectic allows him to chart a new and distinctive course in forming a concept of the imagination over against those of his contemporaries, romantic and hegelian alike.”6 it is in part two that gouwens examines this new and corrective understanding of imagination suggested by Kierkegaard. in several chapters, he describes Kierkegaard’s key understanding of imagination as the capacity instar omnium and delineates the functions of imagination in each of the three stages of existence. in the aesthetic sphere, the imagination underlies the emotional life as a condition for feeling and plays a role in all four major forms of despair.7 yet gouwens argues that in the ethical sphere, the imagination for Kierkegaard becomes more dialectical. the ethical imagination relates to choice and kinesis (the movement from abstract

gouwens, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of the Imagination, p. 7. in The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard (as anti-climacus) argues that the imagination “is not a capacity, as are the others…it is the capacity instar omnium [for all capacities]. when all is said and done, whatever of feeling, knowing, and willing a person has depends upon what imagination he has, upon how that person reflects himself—that is, upon imagination.” See SKS 11, 147 / SUD, 30–1. 6 gouwens, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of the Imagination, p. 126. 7 Gouwens notes that the first two forms (infinitude and possibility) exhibit the imagination’s expansiveness and the second two (finitude and necessity) show “the narrow imagination that recoils from possibilities, yet ironically still is restlessly present in the human being.” See gouwens, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of the Imagination, p. 163. 5

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freedom to freedom’s actualization) and functions as “an organ of the concrete” as well as a key ingredient in the “inner infinity” of the ethical.8 it is gouwens’ exploration of the Kierkegaardian imagination in the religious sphere, however, that offers a new and significant analysis to the secondary literature on the topic. gouwens describes the dialectic of imagination in both the ethicoreligious sphere and in Christianity. In the Christian sphere, the imagination first experiences defeat as the suffering person encounters christ as the absolute paradox. the imagination cannot provide access to the divine, for only god can offer this grace. yet there then occurs a dialectic of “imagination of repetition and reversal” that allows the believer to encounter christ as contemporaneous and to imitate him in the life of faith.9 in the end, the imagination is not dethroned but incorporated into the religious: “how one deploys imaginative abilities determines, by and large, nothing less than the world in which one lives, what is one’s reality and truth. For Kierkegaard, the imagination, united with passion, shapes the world of the aesthetic, ethical or religious person.”10 gouwens’ book was received largely in positive terms. in their reviews, both george connell and george pattison maintain that the strongest part of the book is its examination of the dialectical role of imagination in the religious sphere.11 pattison writes: “what is at stake is nothing less than the total religious character of Kierkegaard’s work: must we—as a surface-reading might suggest—crucify the imagination in order to enter the kingdom, or, as gouwens argues, may we take our imaginations with us and go whole into the city?”12 pattison continues, however, to suggest that gouwens perpetuates an unhelpful model of the self as individualistic which should be replaced by a more relational view: “the use and abuse of imagination in self-transcendence hinges not only on its role in awakening our inner infinity of possibilities but also on its formation by, and function in, the complex matrix of a concrete community of persons in and through which alone we realise our ethical and religious identities.”13 there is some validity to this critique, although the tendency to see the Kierkegaardian self in purely individualistic terms has certainly been a trend before and after gouwens’ publication. The influence of Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Imagination can be seen in subsequent fine books on Kierkegaard, the imagination and aesthetics, including m. Jamie Ferreira’s Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith (1991) and Sylvia walsh’s Living Poetically: Kierkegaard’s Existential Aesthetics (1994).14 while they each emphasize different aspects of the aesthetic and imagination, Ferreira and walsh both draw from and reference gouwens in their gouwens, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of the Imagination, p. 194. ibid., p. 247. 10 ibid., p. 279. 11 See george connell, review in Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, vol. 23, 1991, pp. 10–11 and george pattison, review in Scottish Journal of Theology, vol. 44, no. 2, 1991, pp. 245–7. 12 pattison, review in Scottish Journal of Theology, vol. 44, no. 2, 1991, p. 246. 13 ibid. 14 m. Jamie Ferreira, Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith, oxford: oxford university press 1991 and Sylvia walsh, Living Poetically: Kierkegaard’s 8

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works.15 a 1991 reviewer wrote that gouwens’ book “will help scholars understand the historical background to the concept of imagination in Kierkegaard and to organize his use of that concept through the appropriate volumes of this work. it will come to be, i believe, one of the standard studies within Kierkegaard scholarship.”16 I would argue that twenty-five years after its publication, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Imagination continues to be a standard work for Kierkegaard scholars interested not only in imagination but also in aesthetics, ethics, faith, and the subjective life of the individual. Jennifer veninga

Existential Aesthetics, university park, pennsylvania: pennsylvania State university press 1994. 15 See Ferreira, Transforming Vision, p. 5; p. 81; p. 83; p. 149; p. 152 and walsh, Living Poetically, p. 4; p. 44; p. 115; p. 196. 16 ronald hustwit, review in Journal of the American Academy of Religion vol. 59, no. 1, 1991, p. 177.

reviews and critical discussions connell, george, review in Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, vol. 23, 1991, pp. 10–11. Ferreira, m. Jamie, Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith, oxford: oxford university press 1991, p. 5; p. 81; p. 83; p. 149; p. 152. hustwit, ronald, review in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol. 59, no. 1, 1991, pp. 176–7. pattison, george, review in Scottish Journal of Theology, vol. 44, no. 2, 1991, pp. 245–7. walsh, Sylvia, Living Poetically: Kierkegaard’s Existential Aesthetics, university park, pennsylvania: pennsylvania State university press 1994, p. 4; p. 44; p. 115; p. 196. whisenant, James, review in Modern Theology, vol. 6, 1990, pp. 411–13.

david J. gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, cambridge: cambridge university press 1996, ix + 248 pp.

In 1996 David Gouwens’ influential volume helped revivify the view that Kierkegaard was first and foremost an expositor of the Christian life.1 this understanding of Kierkegaard’s project had been challenged by interpreters who construed him either as a literary provocateur who delighted in the free play of signifiers or a purely Socratic gadfly who only encouraged the reader’s self-assumption of existential responsibility. while admitting that Kierkegaard was a Socratic provocateur, Gouwens argues that Kierkegaard had a definite theological perspective and goal, and that he employed his sophisticated literary strategies in order to urge the reader to take the christian option with passionate seriousness. gouwens, along with david Law, murray rae, and Sylvia walsh, helped keep the theological Kierkegaard in play during an era of deconstructive readings. gouwens’ work must be situated in relation to the “post-liberal” theology that flourished in the late twentieth century. George Lindbeck2 and hans Frei,3 two of gouwens’ mentors and the progenitors of this theological orientation, were intent upon protecting the central theological convictions of the historic christian tradition from over-assimilation to contemporary cultural sensibilities. convinced that christianity is a coherent and unique way of life, analogous to a cultural-linguistic system, they resisted efforts to root the faith in a foundational anthropology or an alleged religious dimension of experience. the post-liberals scorned attempts to reduce christian language to descriptions of religious subjectivity, and preferred to focus on the objective doctrinal “grammar” of the faith. the post-liberals were generally ambivalent about Kierkegaard. on the one hand, they suspected that he had subordinated the meaning of the christian faith to a prior, more foundational analysis of human subjectivity. he had, they feared, recast the christian message as the antidote to anxiety and despair, and in so doing had legitimated the self-absorbed angst of modernity. moreover, in their eyes Kierkegaard had stressed the authentic appropriation of christian pathos so much that the importance of christianity’s objective teachings had been subverted. on the david J. gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, cambridge: cambridge university press 1996. 2 george Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age, philadelphia: westminster press 1984. 3 hans Frei, Types of Modern Theology, new haven: yale university press 1992. 1

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other hand, they did recognize that Kierkegaard had insisted upon the distinctiveness of the emotions, passions, dispositions, and attitudes that constitute the christian life, and their irreducibility to any form of generic religious experience. gouwens’ exposition of Kierkegaard, inspired by the work of paul holmer,4 argued that his authorship attempted to do justice to the “how” of the subjective appropriation without jeopardizing the “what” of the objective teachings. Like holmer, gouwens tried to clarify how Kierkegaard could emphasize the subjective appropriation of the faith without reducing theology to anthropology. according to gouwens, Kierkegaard consistently resisted the assimilation of christianity to alien categories that were alleged to be more relevant and intelligible to contemporary society.5 For Kierkegaard, christian concepts are neither expressions of religious self-consciousness, nor imagistic representations of universal truths, nor mythic narratives requiring translation into pure concepts. according to gouwens, Kierkegaard’s writings treat doctrines as articulations of the proper use of the concepts that constitute the language of faith. Kierkegaard’s remarks about authentic selfhood and subjectivity did not control his understanding of the christian life. however, according to gouwens, selfhood and subjectivity are indeed necessary components of Kierkegaard’s exposition of the christian life. Kierkegaard recognized that the articulated doctrinal rules only acquire meaning when they are used in the appropriate contexts with the appropriate passions; they are not cognitive propositions that can be understood without passionate engagement. a christian concept is not intelligible until it is put to some use in giving shape to human actions and passions.6 according to Kierkegaard, a christian conviction intrinsically involves unique passions, attitudes and dispositions, and these features of subjectivity are just as crucial to its meaning as is the aptness of its articulation in theological language.7 instead of focusing on the “what” of faith, the given doctrinal content, Kierkegaard concentrated on the “how” of faith, the way in which the christian faith must be appropriated.8 christian concepts are intended to be actualized in existence; doctrines outline the contours of an existential task. meaning and truth are not properties of the doctrines treated in abstraction from their role in shaping lives. rather, the doctrines become meaningful and true only when they are used appropriately in the struggle to be faithful. gouwens shows that the passions come into play in different ways in Kierkegaard’s writings. Some passions are prerequisites for even beginning to understand the christian faith. For example, a pervasive discontent with one’s own moral and spiritual life is a precondition for grasping the doctrine of grace through Jesus christ. other passions are novel forms of subjectivity that are generated paul holmer, On Kierkegaard and the Truth, ed. by david J. gouwens and Lee c. barrett, eugene, oregon: wipf & Stock 2012. this volume is the posthumous publication of a manuscript composed by holmer in the 1960s and 1970s which served as the basis for his lectures on Kierkegaard attended by gouwens. 5 gouwens, Kierkegaard as Religious Thinker, p. 11. 6 ibid., pp. 16–20. 7 ibid., p. 144. 8 ibid., p. 142. 4

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through the effort to appropriate christian concepts. For example, learning the concept “justification by grace” involves growth in gratitude, humility, and relief. Some passions are necessary conditions for using doctrines referringly. For example, christians do refer to god as someone who exists extra nos, but the meaning of that reference only becomes clear in the activities of praising god, thanking god, and the like. the “what” (the doctrine) is the logical ground of the “how,” but the “how” (the passionate appropriation) is a necessary condition for securing the meaning of the “what.” gouwens concludes that Kierkegaard refused to separate a concern for orthodox doctrines and a concern for passionate subjectivity.9 although christian doctrines state publicly the main convictions and principles of the christian life, their meaning is only fully grasped as the individual passionately appropriates them. in effect, gouwens’ exposition of Kierkegaard shows how the seemingly countervailing themes of the objectivity of doctrines and the subjectivity of passionate existence actually require each other. his work invites further exploration of the ways in which Kierkegaard’s literary strategies invite the risk-laden pathos that can make the traditional teachings come alive. Lee c. barrett

9

ibid., pp. 12–23.

reviews and critical discussions evans, c. Stephen, review in Christian Scholar’s Review, vol. 26, no. 3, 1997, pp. 348–9. Khan, abrahim h., review in Toronto Journal of Theology, vol. 14, no. 1, 1998, pp. 138–9. Law, david, review in Expository Times, vol. 108, no. 1, 1996, pp. 29–30. malcolm, Lois, review in Modern Theology, vol. 14, no. 1, 1998, pp. 158–60. pattison, george, review in Modern Believing, vol. 38, no. 1, 1997, pp. 65–7. Schulz, heiko, review in Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, vol. 34, 1997, pp. 6–7. Shakespeare, Steven, review in Religious Studies, vol. 33, 1997, pp. 229–33. watson, Joann Ford, review in Ashland Theological Journal, vol. 31, 1999, pp. 193–4. westphal, merold, review in Theological Studies, vol. 57, no. 4, 1996, pp. 752–4.

ronald m. green, Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt, albany: State university of new york press 1992, xviii + 301 pp.

Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt is a work of ronald m. green, a Kant scholar who has published several articles on Kierkegaard and Kant (both before and after writing this monograph). Kierkegaard and Kant investigates the degree and extent to which Kant influenced Kierkegaard. Green identifies the historical point of contact between the two thinkers, as well as which works of Kant that Kierkegaard owned and can be said to have studied (chapter 1). he then gives an overview of Kant’s ethics and philosophy of religion (chapter 2) and provides an analysis of agreements and disagreements between Kant and Kierkegaard (chapters 3–4).1 Finally, green reinterprets Kierkegaard’s views on ethics and religion by setting them against the background of the Kantian ideas explored in previous chapters (chapter 5). Green’s main thesis is that Kant influenced Kierkegaard far more than what has been acknowledged by previous scholarship. Green believes that Kant’s influence on Kierkegaard has gone largely unacknowledged because Kierkegaard himself intentionally hid his debt to Kant (possibly due to “the anxiety of influence,” the fear of being regarded as derivative).2 green describes his book as a “detective story” that tries to put an end to this cover-up.3 although green hardly articulates and defends his methodology,4 it seems clear that he represents a historical approach similar to so-called contextual history of philosophy. Kierkegaard and Kant is one of the first major studies of the relation between Kant and Kierkegaard, and is the very first monograph to deal with this relation green writes: “Freedom, the rigor of the moral law, human beings’ inevitable failures before its ideality and their corresponding need for divine assistance in fulfillment of the human moral project–these were Kant’s great insights that Kierkegaard took over and made the foundation of his vigorous modern assertion of christian orthodoxy.” ronald m. green, Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt, albany: State university of new york press 1992, p. 181. 2 ibid., p. xviii; p. 212; p. 214; p. 216. cf. william c. davis, review in Religious Studies, vol. 30, 1994, pp. 119–21; see p. 120. green refers to harald bloom, The Anxiety of Influence, new york: oxford university press 1973, p. 64. 3 cf. merold westphal, review in Theological Studies, vol. 54, 1993, pp. 389–90; see p. 389. 4 this is pointed out in ulrich Knappe, Theory and Practice in Kant and Kierkegaard, berlin: de gruyter 2004, p. 5. 1

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written by an accomplished Kant scholar.5 green reacts to the tendency of earlier scholarship to see Kierkegaard as being opposed to german rationalist philosophy (including Kant and hegel).6 although green acknowledges that some aspects of his work had been anticipated by other scholars (for example, c. Stephen evans, alastair hannay, John glenn, robert perkins, and r.z. Friedman),7 he adds to the existing literature by giving a more comprehensive account of the relation between Kant and Kierkegaard. Whereas earlier scholars “confine themselves to identify conceptual parallels,” Green wants to trace Kant’s influence on Kierkegaard.8 the thesis that Kierkegaard intentionally hid his debt to Kant has been criticized since the book’s initial publication.9 green’s thesis seems problematic if Kierkegaard’s debt to Kant really is hidden, as it can hardly be falsified or tested. however, it should be noted that green claims to have shown that Kant did influence Kierkegaard, something which suggests that the debt is not completely hidden, but rather something to be uncovered by historical research (through what green describes as a “detective story”). as a response to his critics, green later writes that “the deliberate hiddenness of Kierkegaard’s debt to Kant was the least important of my claims.”10 presumably, green’s important claim is that Kierkegaard is heavily indebted to Kant, while the intentional hiddenness of the debt is relatively unimportant. in any case, most of the material green references in order to show Kant’s influence on Kierkegaard provide circumstantial evidence rather than proof. As Knappe points out, green’s “analysis consists of rather loose comparisons between quotes of Kant and Kierkegaard.”11 although green is quite successful in pointing to similarities and overlap between Kant and Kierkegaard, on the whole he fails to look for alternative (primary and secondary) sources of Kierkegaard’s ideas (for example, danish Kantianism, romanticism, danish and german idealism, or even

5 See the bibliography in r.m. green, “Kant: a debt both obscure and enormous,” in Kierkegaard and his German Contemporaries, tome i, Philosophy, ed. by Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2007 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 6), pp. 179–210; see pp. 206–10. 6 green, Kierkegaard and Kant, p. xi. 7 ibid., p. xiii. 8 ibid., pp. xiii–xiv. 9 westphal, review in Theological Studies, vol. 54, 1993, p. 390; davis, review in Religious Studies, vol. 30, 1994, pp. 120–1; Jack verheyden, “the ethical and the religious as Law and gospel,” in Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion, ed. by dewi z. phillips and timothy tessin, basingstoke and new york: macmillan and St. martin’s press 2000 (Claremont Studies in the Philosophy of Religion), pp. 153–177; eivind tjønneland, Ironie als Symptom. Eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit Søren Kierkegaards Über den Begriff der Ironie, Bern: Peter Lang 2004 (Texte und Untersuchungen zur Germanistik und Skandinavistik, vol. 54), p. 68. 10 ronald m. green, Kant and Kierkegaard on Time and Eternity, macon: mercer university press 2011, p. 2. 11 Knappe, Theory and Practice in Kant and Kierkegaard, p. 5.

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more traditional christian and platonic thought).12 thus, even when green does show overlap or agreement, he does not thereby necessarily show that Kierkegaard was influenced by Kant. Merold Westphal makes a similar point when he concludes: the case is considerably overstated, for, as green himself keeps reminding us, themes that Kierkegaard may have read in Kant are often not distinctively Kantian and were available to him from other sources as well, especially the pietistic Lutheranism to which both he and Kant were heirs and the larger augustinian tradition to which it belonged. when all these materials are set aside, what is left hardly seems as important as green’s overall presentation suggests. Still, he has called attention to an important part of Kierkegaard’s intellectual background well deserving of attention, even if only more modest claims about it are warranted.13

Aside from Green’s claim about Kant’s influence on Kierkegaard, we are left with many indications of overlap between the theories of Kant and Kierkegaard, indications which do indeed call for more contemporary investigation. much new scholarship on Kant’s philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and his anthropology has arisen since green published his study in 1992.14 Similarly, there is today much more Kierkegaard scholarship available, most notably the new critical edition of Kierkegaard’s works (Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter) and their commentary volumes. having examined much of the source material myself,15 i do not believe that there exists much promising material showing influence that Green has overlooked (with the possible exception of the danish Kantians16 and a very few secondary sources).17 thus, it is my view that the source material does not lend itself very cf. davis, review in Religious Studies, vol. 30, 1994, pp. 120–1; verheyden, “the ethical and the religious as Law and gospel,” pp. 157–66; p. 173; tjønneland, Ironie als Symptom, p. 68. 13 westphal, review in Theological Studies, vol. 54, 1993, p. 390. davis, “ronald green. Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt,” pp. 120–1 and verheyden, “the ethical and the religious as Law and gospel,” pp. 153–4; pp. 157–77, both reach a quite similar conclusion. 14 green does not try to deal with Kant’s aesthetics and anthropology in a detailed or systematic manner. 15 roe Fremstedal, Kierkegaard and Kant on Anthropology and Religion: Evil, Faith, and Hope, trondheim: ntnu 2010 (Doctoral theses at NTNU, 2010, vol. 214). 16 it does not seem probable that Kierkegaard read much of the danish Kantians, since they—for the most part—belonged to the earlier period from 1790 to 1800. however, this need not mean that these Kantians (or the early german reception) were unimportant or something left entirely behind by the 1840s. notably, many danish philosophical terms were coined by the danish Kantians. also, the early Kant reception in denmark and germany (notably reinhold) established a picture of Kant that even later thinkers (notably the german and danish idealists) relied on. regarding danish Kantianism, see harald høffding, Danske Filosofer, copenhagen: gyldendal 1909, pp. 26–7; Søren holm, “Kampen om Kant,” in his Filosofien i Norden før 1900, copenhagen: munksgaard 1967, pp. 33–43; p. 13; p. 33; anders thuborg, Den Kantiske periode i dansk filosofi 1790–1800, copenhagen: gyldendal 1951, pp. 17–18; pp. 121–49; p. 181; carl henrik Koch, Dansk oplysningsfilosofi 1700–1800, copenhagen: gyldendal 2003, passim. 17 one example of a secondary source Kierkegaard owned and could possibly have used is c.c.e. Schmid, Wörterbuch zum leichtern Gebrauch der kantischen Schriften, Jena: 12

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well to historical research into Kant’s influence on Kierkegaard—although Green does give a plausible account of Kierkegaard’s reading of Kant.18 put differently, Kierkegaard’s texts make it hard to improve upon green’s work—establishing the exact nature of Kant’s influence on Kierkegaard any more reliably or definitively proves quite difficult. Accordingly, it is my view that a systematic or thematic approach is generally more promising than a historical approach which focuses on how Kant influenced Kierkegaard. One further difficulty should be mentioned. Green tries to show that Kant’s doctrine of radical evil leads to the “need for divine assistance in fulfillment of the human moral project,” since this doctrine implies that human beings inevitably fail before the ideality of the moral law.19 green argues that Kant cannot solve this problem, and presents Kierkegaard as solving it by appealing to divine grace.20 thus, green depicts Kierkegaard’s christian religiousness as overcoming problems in Kant’s ethics and philosophy of religion. however, he hardly shows how Kant could have responded to Kierkegaard. although this is at least partially a result of Green’s methodology, I find that it leads to a somewhat one-sided presentation of the relation between Kant and Kierkegaard, a presentation which does not do full justice to the subject matter—especially to Kant’s theories and concepts. it should also be noted that green’s book involves a Kierkegaardian critique of Kant that is controversial. aside from Kant scholars who downplay the importance of radical evil, there are more recent commentators who see Kant as developing an account of divine grace that quite successfully addresses the problems Green identifies.21 these commentators would dispute green’s claim that Kant’s theory collapses and leads to Kierkegaardian religiousness. in any case, green deserves praise for showing that Kierkegaard relies on Kant’s doctrine of moral rigorism (dubbed the “ideality of ethics” by green), and that this doctrine entails that any moral failure or wrongdoing whatsoever makes one infinitely guilty and in need of divine grace.22 clearly, this is a point that is important for an understanding of how Kierkegaard interprets the relation between ethics and religion. in any event, there can be no doubt that green’s work represents a contribution to the secondary literature which remains valuable today. within Kierkegaard cröker 1798 (ASKB 770). For an example of how Kierkegaard might have used Schmid, see Fremstedal, Kierkegaard and Kant on Anthropology and Religion, p. 91 note 7. 18 green does this by distinguishing between “works of certain familiarity,” “works very likely read,” and “works for which evidence is lacking.” green, Kierkegaard and Kant, pp. 9–31. 19 See ibid., p. 181. See also p. 221. 20 For example, ibid., p. 221, pp. 167–75. 21 For example, chris L. Firestone and nathan Jacobs speak of “green’s lack of assistance in placing (and defending) Kant’s introduction of divine grace.” chris L. Firestone and nathan Jacobs, In Defense of Kant’s Religion, indianapolis: indiana university press 2008, p. 61; cf. pp. 57–61; p. 244 note 46. See also Jacqueline marina, “Kant on grace: a reply to his critics,” Religious Studies, vol. 33, 1997, pp. 379–400; Stephen palmquist, “Kant’s ethics of Grace: Perspectival Solutions to the Moral Difficulties with Divine Assistance,” Journal of Religion, vol. 90, 2010, pp. 530–53. 22 green, Kierkegaard and Kant, pp. 150–67.

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scholarship, green has called attention to, and improved our knowledge of, Kantian philosophy and theology. green’s work contributes to a more balanced and detailed assessment of the relationship between Kant and Kierkegaard by moving beyond stereotypes (rationalism vs. irrationalism, autonomy vs. heteronomy, and so on). by doing this, green has helped pave the way for new studies of the relation between Kant and Kierkegaard. green still stands as the foremost representative of a historical approach to the relation between Kant and Kierkegaard, and his Kierkegaard and Kant remains mandatory reading for anyone working on Kierkegaard and Kant. roe Fremstedal

reviews and critical discussions davis, william c., review in Religious Studies, vol. 30, 1994, pp. 119–21. emmanuel, Steven m., “recent Literature on Kierkegaard,” Religious Studies Review, vol. 20, 1994, pp. 286–91; see pp. 288–9. — Kierkegaard and the Concept of Revelation, albany: State university of new york press 1996, p. 68; pp. 74–5; p. 165; p. 179. evans, c. Stephen, review in Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, no. 27, 1993, pp. 6–8. Firestone, chris L. and nathan Jacobs, In Defense of Kant’s Religion, indianapolis: indiana university press 2008, pp. 57–61; p. 244 note 46. Fremstedal, roe, Kierkegaard and Kant on Anthropology and Religion: Evil, Faith, and Hope, trondheim: ntnu 2010 (Doctoral theses at NTNU, 2010, vol. 214), pp. 22–3; pp. 34–8; pp. 212–31. green, ronald m., Kant and Kierkegaard on Time and Eternity, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2011, p. 2; pp. 17–18; p. 96; p. 112; p. 125; p. 169; p. 186; p. 189; p. 212; p. 242. Knappe, ulrich, Theory and Practice in Kant and Kierkegaard, berlin: walter de gruyter 2004 (Kierkegaard Studies Monograph Series, vol. 9), pp. 4–6. verheyden, Jack, “the ethical and the religious as Law and gospel,” in Kant and Kierkegaard on Religion, ed. by dewi z. phillips and timothy tessin, basingstoke and new york: macmillan and St. martin’s press 2000 (Claremont Studies in the Philosophy of Religion), pp. 153–77. westphal, merold, review in Theological Studies, vol. 54, 1993, pp. 389–90.

ronald grimsley, Søren Kierkegaard and French Literature: Eight Comparative Studies, cardiff: university of wales press 1966, vii + 171 pp.

as an esteemed scholar of both French literature and Søren Kierkegaard, ronald grimsley (1937–2003) was well suited to write this volume, which was published in 1966 and continues to offer resources for scholars today. the book consists in eight more or less free-standing essays on Kierkegaard’s relationship to French literary giants—molière, Laclos, chateaubriand, montaigne, pascal, rousseau, Scribe, and vigny—as well as a general introduction and a curious appendix summarizing ways of interpreting Kierkegaard’s famous but enigmatic melancholy. grimsley chose not to put Kierkegaard in dialogue with French philosophers such as descartes and malbranche, hewing to a literary approach throughout. Further, as he states on the first page of his Introduction, his overarching purpose is not to address genealogical questions of historical influence but to compare Kierkegaard and French literature as “two different views of a single cultural problem.”1 Following this method, he brings to light Kierkegaard’s distinctiveness as an existential philosopher, and he also makes the case that there is an “existential” dimension in the French literary tradition that is not often identified as such. grimsley’s comparative analysis sheds light on a variety of literary themes: seduction, melancholy, the epistolary form, the limits of reason, the relation between nature and grace, and the vocation of the romantic poet, to name only some of the most prominent. Although Grimsley disavows the question of influence as his primary concern, he nonetheless offers considerable resources in this vein, especially his chapters on the don Juan legend and the vaudeville plays of eugène Scribe. his collation of Kierkegaard’s responses to pascal in his journal remains helpful, even if more detailed analysis of this source material can now be found elsewhere.2 grimsely’s book received positive reviews from several scholars of French literature, who found in the Kierkegaard grimsley presents a fresh and illuminating ronald grimsley, Søren Kierkegaard and French Literature: Eight Comparative Studies, cardiff: university of wales press 1966, p. 1. 2 Søren Landkildehus, “blaise pascal: Kierkegaard and pascal as Kindred Spirits in the Fight against christendom” in Kierkegaard and Renaissance and Modern Philosophy, tome i, Philosophy, ed. by Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2009 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception, and Resources, vol. 5), pp. 129–46. 1

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conversation partner. the Kierkegaard scholar who has engaged most extensively with grimsely’s book is Søren Landkildehus. in a pair of articles on blaise pascal and michel de montaigne in the present series, Landkildehus expresses respect for grimsley but reproaches him for not dealing more concretely with the Kierkegaardian source material so as to adjudicate questions of influence.3 as we have seen, grimsely largely disavows this type of project. however, Landkildehus is correct that grimsley does sometimes make claims of this nature. Landkildehus draws on the recently published danish edition of Kierkegaard’s journals to show that Grimsley at times exaggerates the degree to which figures such as Pascal and Montaigne influenced Kierkegaard directly. grimsley’s book remains a touchstone for any reader interested in Kierkegaard’s relation to French literature. at the same time, contemporary scholars will want to attend to the newly available source materials on which Landkildehus draws when pursuing historically oriented comparisons between Kierkegaard and the French figures Grimsley treats. carl S. hughes

ibid. and Søren Landildehus, “michel de montaigne: the vulnerability of Sources in estimating Kierkegaard’s Study of Essais,” in Kierkegaard and Renaissance and Modern Philosophy, pp. 113–28. 3

reviews and critical discussions alexander, ian w., “an existentialist appreciation of French Literature,” Forum for Modern Language Studies, vol. 3, no. 2, 1967, pp. 179–83. billeskov Jansen, F.J., review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 7, 1968, pp. 188–92. — review in Aarhuus Stiftstidende, august 27, 1968. moore, w.g., review in Modern Language Review, vol. 62, no. 2, 1967, pp. 338–9. Smith, colin, review in French Studies, vol. 21, no. 1, 1967, pp. 88–9.

ronald grimsley, Kierkegaard: A Biographical Introduction, London: Studio vista 1973 (Leaders of Modern Thought), 127 pp.

ronald grimsley’s book, Leaders of Modern Thought: Kierkegaard. A Biographical Introduction, was published by Studio vista in 1973. the Leaders of Modern Thought series is “primarily designed for senior school and university students” whose work brings them into contact with “the disciplines of psychology, literature and philosophy.”1 the approach of the series is biographical, although the works “are as concerned with fact as with theory.”2 the series attempts to “introduce [each] subject’s growth, development and discoveries as they relate to his background, family, friends and teachers, within the context of his life.”3 chapter 1 of grimsley’s book begins with a brief discussion of Kierkegaard’s birth and early life. grimsley is quick to introduce all of the relevant persons in Kierkegaard’s life, including his father (as well as the “great earthquake”),4 paul møller, and regine olsen. he succinctly but competently paints a picture for the reader both of Kierkegaard’s falling away from his childhood faith as well as his later conversion back to christianity. chapter 2 goes on to discuss the important works of Kierkegaard prior to his first authorship, including his critique of Hans christian andersen’s Only a Fiddler and Kierkegaard’s master’s thesis, The Concept of Irony. chapter 3 presents the reader with Kierkegaard’s broken engagement with regine olsen, an occasion whose importance for Kierkegaard’s life and authorship grimsley does not allow his reader to forget for the remainder of the book. this chapter also introduces one of Kierkegaard’s most significant works, Either/Or, the process and occasion of its writing, and Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous style of writing in general. this is the only chapter of the book to focus and be named after one particular work of Kierkegaard. all of the chapters after this one mix insights from various works with significant pieces of Kierkegaard’s biography. Chapters 4–7 focus on the rest of Kierkegaard’s “first authorship.” In Chapter 4, Grimsley notes the significance of Fear and Trembling and Repetition in regards to 1 ronald grimsley, Kierkegaard: A Biographical Introduction, London: Studio vista 1973 (Leaders of Modern Thought), p. 1. 2 ibid. 3 ibid. 4 ibid., p. 12.

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his relationship with regine. chapter 5 introduces the reader to The Stages on Life’s Way and includes a lengthy discussion about the nature of Kierkegaard’s “secret,” with a large part of the analysis addressing the question of its potentially sexual nature. chapter 6 contains an extended discussion of The Concept of Dread and the importance of dread for the movement toward faith. in chapter 7, grimsley discusses the Philosophical Fragments and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, providing a detailed summary of Kierkegaard’s ideas of subjectivity, objectivity, inwardness, paradox, and others. Chapters 8–11 cover Kierkegaard’s “second authorship” and his final years. Chapter 8 explains Kierkegaard’s conflict with the satirical newspaper, the Corsair, and its influence upon Kierkegaard’s beginning of his second authorship. This chapter also calls attention to the role of the danish pastor adler in convincing Kierkegaard of the necessity of his own religious writings in the face of a culture he viewed as being in contradiction to biblical christianity. in chapter 9, grimsley gives a brief summary of The Sickness unto Death, explains the purpose of the pseudonym anti-climacus, and contrasts the concept of despair in Sickness with the concept of dread in The Concept of Dread, explaining the difference between the two. chapter 10 provides a brief overview of Kierkegaard’s attack on christendom and the circumstances surrounding his death, with chapter 11 merely providing a few closing remarks about Kierkegaard’s similarity with or influence upon later thinkers like Friedrich nietzsche and martin heidegger. grimsley’s book has a number of strengths, one of the most impressive being his ability to fit so many details about Kierkegaard’s life and work within such a short summary. not only is he able to provide an exposition of many of Kierkegaard’s most important works, but he covers certain nuances of Kierkegaard’s thought often ignored by short biographies of this kind. an example of this can be found in his discussion of the three spheres: aesthetic, ethical, and religious (for which grimsley uses the word “spiritual”). Whereas many short biographies confine themselves to these three spheres, grimsley goes on to provide an explanation of the “ ‘boundaryzones’ between the various spheres,” irony (between the aesthetic and the ethical) and humor (between the ethical and the religious).5 another strength of grimsley’s book is its explanation of Kierkegaard’s use of pseudonyms. grimsley understands the purpose of the pseudonyms as “depicting certain aspects of existence which, though bearing some resemblance to the imaginative possibilities of his own being, never corresponded exactly to his true self.”6 grimsley rightly observes that this “set a certain distance” between Kierkegaard and his writings.7 thus, grimsley seems to respect Kierkegaard’s use of the pseudonyms, although it may be slightly problematic that grimsley seems to attribute the Johannes climacus literature to Kierkegaard himself and not to the pseudonym.8

5 6 7 8

ibid., p. 71. ibid., p. 29. ibid. ibid., p. 68.

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grimsley’s work is not without its weaknesses. the most glaring problem of the book is grimsley’s interpretation of adler’s revelation. he seems to equate adler’s revelation with “‘a hoarse voice’ telling him to burn his writings about hegel and to remain faithful to the bible. this ‘revelation’ not unnaturally brought him into conflict with the Church, and he was eventually deprived of his living.”9 however, a cursory reading of The Book of Adler will clearly reveal that this was not the totality of the revelation for which adler was dismissed from the clergy, for he claimed to have received a new doctrine. a second weakness may be more the fault of the publisher than of grimsley himself. When readers first open the book, they may notice the awkwardness of the font and page layout. the print is a bit too small, and the pages seem to be too crowded with text. Grimsley has written an impressive little book about Kierkegaard, fitting an exceptional amount of content into just 127 pages. For someone new to Kierkegaard, this book is a valuable starting point. matthew brake

9

ibid., p. 83.

reviews and critical discussions delfgaauw, bernard, review in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, vol. 36, no. 1, 1974, pp. 146–7. duncan, elmer h., Sören Kierkegaard, waco: word books 1976, p. 20; pp. 23–4. parkinson, g.h.r., “descartes to collingwood: recent work on the history of philosophy,” Philosophy, vol. 50, no. 192, 1975, p. 217. r.S., review in Journal of European Studies, vol. 3, no. 4, 1973, p. 386. thomas, J. heywood, review in Religious Studies, vol. 10, no. 4, 1974, pp. 511–12. thulstrup, niels, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 9, 1977, pp. 37879.

Luis guerrero martínez, The Ages of Life: Childhood, Youth and Adulthood, mexico city: Sociedad iberoamericana de estudios Kierkegaardianos 2000, 26 pp.

Luis guerrero martínez’s study begins by arguing that any understanding of Kierkegaard’s work has to take seriously the idea of indirect communication. This means taking into account the determinations and specific intentions of each pseudonymous author when one addresses the different issues that run through Kierkegaard’s writings. However, Guerrero clarifies that this should not fall into the other extreme, which believes that there can be no common concepts through the pseudonymous authors, because this would reduce the thought of Kierkegaard to the historical moment in which each work was created. From Luis guerrero’s point of view, the ages of life—childhood, youth, and adulthood—in Kierkegaard’s thought are the clear example of the parallelism between the various pseudonymous authors and how they complement each other to clarify the same anthropological basis, although with certain nuances according to the particularities of each pseudonymous author. thus the aim of the text is to describe these parallels in the ages of life that can be found in the texts of Fear and Trembling, The Concept of Anxiety, the Postscript, and The Sickness unto Death, as well as some of the works signed by Kierkegaard, especially Works of Love, and the journals and papers. Luis guerrero’s point of departure is the idea that can be found in several works of Kierkegaard, namely, that being human is a synthesis of body, soul, and spirit in a free dynamic of self-relationship. because of this, the ages of life do not refer to the qualitative elements of the synthesis that are given by the existential leap but to the quantitative determinations, because otherwise the becoming of the individuals would be deterministic. as Luis guerrero says: “youth does not necessarily correspond to an individual’s chronological age but to his psychological state concerning illusions and passion toward life. there are elderly people who keep themselves young and young people who were never near the spirit,”1 that is, who always seem to be old. the ages of life, taking into account their common anthropological basis and the nuances that each pseudonym brings, appear, according to Luis Guerrero, in five 1 Luis guerrero martínez, The Ages of Life: Childhood, Youth and Adulthood, mexico city: Sociedad iberoamericana de estudios Kierkegaardianos 2000, p. 10.

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manners: first, as that which in general happens to every age; second, as expressions of the ideal of every age; third, as the false conceptions of a certain age; fourth, as the temporal aspects of the age, and finally as the way each age corresponds to the unity between the temporal and the specific nature of spirit. The first section of the text concerns childhood, and Luis Guerrero seems to concentrate more on this than on the other ages of life. based on the idea of the human being as a synthesis in The Concept of Anxiety, childhood is defined by its immediacy and the state of innocence, in which the spirit is present, but as a dream, and has not yet been determined as such. this means experiencing a pleasant anxiety, because there is a lack of reflection due to which there is neither guilt nor real freedom. The child is in a beatified state that takes him away from evil, and this is why his innocence is not unlike adam’s innocence. due to this same ignorance of himself as spirit, it is difficult for the child to detach himself from objects and the environment, a fact that is expressed by giving names to objects as if they were postage stamps. Luis guerrero makes clear how in the works of Kierkegaard there abound constant references to the age of childhood as a relation to this state of original innocence. For example, in Works of Love he quotes a text that represents this as the dream of the child.2 in Repetition childhood is characterized by a lack of consideration for the other or for danger. in the journals and papers Kierkegaard explains how fantasy is the mode of the child when it faces the world, and, hence, the enigmatic and the monstrous are expressions of the child’s anxiety when it realizes the possibilities of the world. in relation to the loss of innocence, Luis guerrero presents two arguments that express Kierkegaard’s view in The Concept of Anxiety and “the expectancy of Faith”: the first, is that the innocence of the child in contrast to the despair of the one who does not know that he is in despair, is the absence of sin, because innocence can only be lost by sin. and secondly, it is claimed that this loss of innocence depends on the child’s own free will and not on the environment that corrupts it; this means that childhood is ignorance of spirit, but each child is on the way to becoming spirit, each having its own personality and freedom. Finally, Luis guerrero presents two very interesting ideas of Kierkegaard about the education of children: the first is that children should not be exposed to evil or to anxiety about the future, because this does not awaken their spirituality but makes them more vulnerable to evil. The second is that children should be educated first by reflection—because this is a category closer to their state—through the Socratic method of questioning by which they can discover things by themselves. in the second section, about youth, Luis guerrero explains why Kierkegaard thinks this is the age most appreciated by an adult man. if every man is a synthesis, youth is the age of opening for the things of the spirit, because when a child passes to the age of youth he awakens to the consciousness of being spirit, but without having the vices that are acquired over time. it is in youth that the individual best captures the idea that existence is a continual task through time that cannot be definitively settled and where immediacy is constantly opposed to spirit. So youth is the state 2

SKS 9, 284 / WL, 285–6.

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of the passion to carry out great deeds, in contrast to the possibility of losing one’s passion over the passing of time and choosing a more comfortable lifestyle. the youth is found, for Kierkegaard, in a state full of possibilities, passion, interiority, and openness to the essence of the divine, where each one of these characteristics is essential for each of the pseudonymous authors including Kierkegaard himself.3 this is why, for Luis Guerrero, “Man’s task is, definitely, to awaken the spirit and keep himself young throughout life.”4 the third section, about adulthood, is where Kierkegaard is more critical, because adulthood represents the closure of the spirit, because as time passes, what usually happens is that the internal youth is lost, and the person has learned to live comfortably, copying and imitating the life of others and taking under his control the world. adulthood is the art of knowing how to live with the requirements of immediacy. the adult does not progress naturally; he requires a determined effort to live in spiritual categories. At the end Luis Guerrero clarifies that this criticism of adulthood is only for those who live in a worldly way, but that there are older men who have been faithful to living as spirit and maintaining their own youth, so the quantitative passing of time does not produce a qualitatively irremediable category. This text by Luis Guerrero was one of the first in hispanic Kierkegaard research to consider the problem of indirect communication as a movement of reflection and to interpret the abovementioned Kierkegaardian categories. it showed the importance of understanding these categories from the position of the pseudonymous author while at the same time not reducing them to a specific historical context. rafael garcía pavón

3 4

See guerrero martínez, The Ages of Life, p. 21. ibid.

reviews and critical discussions undetermined.

anoop gupta, Kierkegaard’s Romantic Legacy: Two Theories of the Self, ottawa: university of ottawa press 2006, 131 pp.

in his monograph Kierkegaard’s Romantic Legacy: Two Theories of the Self anoop gupta is concerned with developing an original notion of selfhood through exegetical readings of Kierkegaard’s most important texts. the subtitle refers to two seemingly contradictory approaches to selfhood which gupta attempts to reconcile so as to develop his own: Kierkegaard’s “theological self” and a “sociological self” developed from the writings of Jean-Jacques rousseau, emile durkheim, and d.w. winnicott. despite their differences, what unites both approaches, according to gupta, is the influence of Romanticism, which he attempts to carry over into his own conception so as to oppose it to naturalistic (reductive) and relativistic notions of selfhood. this synthesized conception of selfhood brings together a focus on (1) subjectivity and (2) the social world, and is furthermore characterized by its (3) teleological character. gupta’s approach commendably weaves together philosophy, sociology, and psychology and is thus representative of an ongoing movement, in Kierkegaard scholarship as well as philosophy as a whole, towards greater interdisciplinarity. Gupta’s study consists of three parts, each composed of short chapters. The first part presents a general exposition of Kierkegaard’s conception of selfhood, focusing largely on the notions of despair, sin, and anxiety as discussed (pseudonymously) by Kierkegaard in The Concept of Anxiety and The Sickness unto Death. in the second part, gupta compares this conception of selfhood, which he thinks is too individualistic, to the more social conceptions of selfhood to be found in the works of Rousseau and Durkheim; Gupta finishes the second part with an exposition of D.W. winnicott’s notion of interdependence, which provides a middle ground between the so-called theological and sociological selves. Finally, the third part provides a general, historical overview of the phenomena of suicide and schizophrenia and argues that the newly developed conception of the self—which finds its closest allies in existential psychology—would provide the most appropriate approach, one which neither abstracts the subject away from her social setting nor reduces her to it. despite the various currents being discussed, Kierkegaard’s writings provide the ground for the whole study and their analysis constitutes more than half of the work. in the introductory chapter, gupta explains that the romantic movement is characterized by two defining principles: “(1) the rejection of scientism, and

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(2) the assumption of an ethic where we find our fulfillment in the world alone.”1 Gupta clarifies that while Kierkegaard’s philosophy only possesses the first of these principles, this alone is significant enough to consider him a romantic. the analysis begins with the relationship between selfhood and despair explored, under the pseudonym of anti-climacus, in The Sickness unto Death. gupta follows the general outline of the text, from the definition of the self as a set of dualities— of necessity and possibility, eternity and temporality, infinity and finitude—which relates itself to itself, to the state of despair characterized by an imbalance in one of these relations, and finally to the conception of selfhood as resting in one’s faith in God. This overview gains more specificity in the following two chapters. Gupta introduces the concepts of sin, anxiety, and freedom and formulates the trajectory of the Kierkegaardian self as: “(1) problem (sin/despair), (2) recognition of sin (anxiety), (3) cure (salvation/becoming ourselves).”2 gupta then projects Kierkegaard’s three stages of existence onto these, constituting a movement from immediacy (aesthetic), to commitment to universal law (ethical), and to individuality based on a loving relationship to god (religious). the three stages of existence ultimately provide the organizing principle for the rest of the study and thus for gupta’s juxtaposition of Kierkegaard’s philosophy with the thoughts of rousseau, durkheim, and winnicott. in the second part of the book, gupta explores rousseau’s political philosophy, focusing on his dichotomy of the state of nature and civilization, to arrive at a kind of parallel between supposed stages, starting from “(i) self-interest (the aesthete), followed by (ii) reflection, and leading to (iii) formalization (the ethical man). Kierkegaard’s god-relationship is absent from rousseau’s discourse on the self.”3 while gupta sees in rousseau’s thought a parallel, albeit more sociopolitical rather than theological, to Kierkegaard’s, he finds a break between what he calls the latter’s asceticism and the thought of durkheim, whose strong focus on social environments “falls just shy of losing the self in history.”4 thus, gupta swiftly proceeds by summarizing durkheim’s views on religion as illusory and suicide as a social phenomenon to reach the conclusion that “the romantic dilemma, thus considered, seems to cause a cleavage, to put it bluntly, between being alone (Kierkegaard) and being with others (the sociologists).”5 gupta resolves the proposed dichotomy between Kierkegaard’s individualism and durkheim’s sociality through the psychoanalyst d.w. winnicott’s developmental view of the self, which traces the subject from the dependence of infancy, to independence gained through self-consciousness, to the interdependence characteristic of mature, socially integrated people. gupta, as he did with rousseau’s stages, projects winnicott

1 anoop gupta, Kierkegaard’s Romantic Legacy: Two Theories of the Self, ottawa: university of ottawa 2006, p. 2. 2 ibid., p. 20. 3 ibid., p. 68. 4 ibid., p. 69. 5 ibid., p. 75.

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three stages onto Kierkegaard’s stages of existence: “dependence (the aesthete), independence (the ethical man), and interdependence (the religious).”6 In the overlapping of these strains of thought, Gupta finds a synthesized, romantic sense of self, characterized by the subjectivity of the Kierkegaardian self, the sociality of rousseau’s and durkheim’s self, and their unity in winnicott’s interdependent self. Gupta ends his study by finding another parallel to the dichotomy between the theological and the sociological self in the history of the treatment of schizophrenia and suicide, which gupta sees as moving from an extreme emphasis on individual morality to an equally extreme emphasis on social environments. between these treatments of schizophrenia and suicide, gupta places his balanced notion of the self, exemplified by “existential psychologists” such as Rollo May, whom he sees as clear inheritors of Kierkegaard’s philosophy. while gupta’s study is an explicit attempt to place Kierkegaard’s thought along with those of rousseau, durkheim, and winnicott, it is also an implicit attempt to move him closer to aristotelian ethics and away from Sartrean existentialism. an extended argument for this latter position is never presented. in the few instances in which the two philosophers are mentioned, however, gupta claims that there is a clear parallel between Kierkegaard’s “teleology” and that of aristotle’s ethics, which is incompatible with Sartre’s radically free, and ultimately relativistic, existentialism.7 this would place gupta’s work with that of other so-called postmacintyrean Kierkegaardians, who have—following alasdair macintyre’s seminal After Virtue—found fertile ground in interpreting Kierkegaard as a kind of virtue ethicist, often to the exclusion of the many connections to existentialist and postmodernist thought. unfortunately, gupta does not truly engage with or, for the most part, cite any relevant scholarship on Kierkegaard. in fact, there are only two secondary sources on Kierkegaard’s thought in the bibliography to the study, John w. elrod’s Being and Existence in Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Works (1975) and Josiah thompson’s Kierkegaard (1973). this lack of engagement with relevant literature stands as a possible explanation for various controversial claims for which gupta provides no evidence or objections. to account for his avoidance of Kierkegaard’s relationship to hegel, gupta explains that “Kierkegaard was no authority on hegel,” and adds that “it is unlikely he read his writings.”8 Furthermore, gupta does very little to distinguish the various pseudonymous authors attached to Kierkegaard’s books as a result of “the fact that Kierkegaard himself cites his pseudonyms as saying what he himself wants to say.”9 however, he does not engage with the many sources which explore the issue of Kierkegaard’s authorship, pseudonymity, or biography. instead, the chapter of this study in which this claim is supposed to be substantiated consists of a general account of Kierkegaard’s life, focusing on his engagement to regine olsen and his fragile psychological state, which gupta uses as evidence to blur the line between the pseudonymous authors and Kierkegaard (given the similarity between their 6 7 8 9

ibid., p. 81. ibid., p. 2. ibid., p. x. ibid., p. 2.

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personality and his) and to render his philosophy problematic.10 this blurring of works and pseudonymous identities leads to vague and suspect explanations of central concepts and relationships in the authorship, which are ultimately subsumed under an anachronistic view, given movements in contemporary scholarship, of Kierkegaard as an ascetic. the principal claim in Kierkegaard’s Romantic Legacy—that Kierkegaard’s conception of selfhood is influenced by Romanticism and that such an influence provides a common ground between his work and those of rousseau, durkheim, and winnicott—is truly fascinating. however, the arguments presented therein lack rigor in both its research and its argumentation, and thus the work can do little more than briefly present and juxtapose the many ideas, currents, and thinkers discussed in it. Jesus Luzardo

10

ibid., p. 57.

reviews and critical discussions doede, robert, review in Heythrop Journal, vol. 48, no. 4, 2007, pp. 660–1.

amy Laura hall, Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love, cambridge: cambridge university press 2002, xi + 222 pp.

amy Laura hall’s work, Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love, was published by Cambridge University Press in 2000. Selections of it first appeared as journal articles. the second chapter was published as “Self-delusion, confusion, and Salvation in Fear and Trembling with Works of Love” in Journal of Religious Ethics (vol. 28, no. 1, 2000, pp. 37–61). a version of the third chapter appeared as “poets, cynics and thieves: vicious Love and divine protection in Repetition and Works of Love,” in Modern Theology (vol. 16, no. 1, 2000, pp. 215–36). The fifth chapter was published as “Stages on the wrong way” in vol. 11 of The International Kierkegaard Commentary (ed. by robert L. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2000, pp. 9–47). the work as a whole developed out of hall’s 1999 dissertation, Treacherous Intimacy: Fallen and Faithful Engagements in Kierkegaard’s “Works of Love” and other Writings. To understand the significance of Hall’s work, one should note that, for the most part, previous scholarship was not receptive to Kierkegaard’s thoughts on love. biographers, such as walter Lowrie, explained away the pseudonymous commentaries on love as mere musings on his failed relationship with regine olsen.1 critics, such as theodor adorno, charged Kierkegaard’s conception of christian love in Works of Love as being remote from life (to the point of callousness).2 even those influenced by Kierkegaard, like Karl Barth, felt the need to soften his otherwise unrelenting depiction of human love.3 this negative reception came to signify the standard way to view Kierkegaardian love, leaving subsequent scholars either to further dissect these faults or to apologize for them. as part of the new wave of sympathetic scholarship, hall argues that Kierkegaard offers valuable philosophical insights into love. according to her, Kierkegaard 1 walter Lowrie, Kierkegaard, London: oxford university press 1938, pp. 191–231. For more information, see Sharon Krishek, Kierkegaard on Faith and Love, cambridge: cambridge university press 2009, pp. 1–2. 2 theodor adorno, “on Kierkegaard’s doctrine of Love,” in Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, vol. 8, 1939, pp. 413–29. For more information, see Krishek, Kierkegaard on Faith and Love, pp. 3–4. 3 Karl barth, Church Dogmatics, vols. 1–4, trans. and ed. by t.F. torrance and g.w. bromiley, edinburgh: t. & t. clark 1957–75, vol. 4, part 2, p. 747. Quoted in amy Laura hall, Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love, cambridge: cambridge university press 2002 (Cambridge Studies in Religion and Critical Thought, vol. 9), pp. 1–2.

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intentionally writes about the complexities of love to “burden a man’s heart.”4 in particular, he depicts the countless ways in which love goes wrong in order to reveal that more often than not our conception of love falls short of what love truly is. Kierkegaard’s aim, according to hall, is to provoke self-examination, confession, and repentance with regard to love. She explains: “it is our continued detection and prayerful confession of self-delusion, acquisition, and usurpation that repeatedly returns us to the only context wherein love can draw breath, a relation of infinite debt.”5 true love, in Kierkegaard, is akin to humility. it requires recognition of one’s fallibility and indebtedness to god. hall succinctly conveys her view: “this is a crucial facet of Kierkegaard’s entire explication of love: one must live in debt in order to love well.”6 thus, hall embraces the intensity of Kierkegaard’s vision that early scholars overlooked or dismissed. hall supports this argument by reading Works of Love alongside selected pseudonymous works—Fear and Trembling, Repetition, Either/Or, and Stages on Life’s Way. on the one hand, hall uses Works of Love as a tool: it offers the standard of neighborly love, which, when applied to pseudonymous instances of romantic love, reveals where and why they fail. Such romantic relationships do not involve god. She explains that Works of Love allows us to “dwell humbly, in excruciating detail, on the ways in which we each evade god’s command, resist confession, and eschew divine grace.”7 on the other hand, hall treats the authors and characters of the numerous pseudonymous works as concrete illustrations of misplaced love, which Works of Love criticizes and seeks to supplant. She writes: “in the pseudonymous texts, Kierkegaard gives life, voice and volition to the sketches of blunder and vice in Works of Love.”8 together the selected pseudonymous works and Works of Love offer illustrations of love and a standard for evaluation. one of the many merits of hall’s work is its sustained analysis of love in Kierkegaard. Few monographs are devoted to this topic and few among them address both Works of Love and the pseudonymous writings. hall expertly employs Works of Love’s strenuous standard for love to interrogate the love lives of pseudonymous figures—such as the baffled Johannes de silentio and the demonical merman from Fear and Trembling, the cynical constantin constantius and the poetic youth from Repetition, the smug Judge william and the forlorn “girl” from Either/Or, and the noncommittal “diarist” from Stages on Life’s Way. treating each in turn, she exposes how these characters fail to truly love their beloveds and try to evade coming to terms with this fact. by bringing together these accounts, especially in light of the criterion offered in Works of Love, hall provides a powerful portrait of the Kierkegaardian lover. this portrait acts like a mirror for the reader who is forced to confront their own love life. as such, hall’s study stands out for tackling the crucial, yet daunting task of elucidating Kierkegaard’s existential challenge.

4 5 6 7 8

hall, Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love, p. 181. ibid., p. 2. ibid., p. 132. ibid., p. 15. ibid., p. 2.

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one of the few shortcomings of hall’s work is its limited engagement with Works of Love. hall devotes one chapter to Works of Love and refers to it when she evaluates instances of love in the pseudonymous writings. given the centrality of its role in her project, it seems she could have expanded her analysis of this book. For instance, hall could have underscored that the work urges the reader to actually try to love the neighbor in addition to reconsidering what it means to do so. in fact, Sylvia walsh reveals in her review that the treatment of Works of Love was an area of hall’s dissertation that was to be expanded upon when it was turned into a book.9 hall is not unaware of this shortcoming: “to read through Works of Love in such a hurry is, inevitably, frustrating. this text, Kierkegaard’s own work of love, requires our continual rereading, and the remainder of my book is an attempt to prompt exactly that.”10 She realizes that her analysis is limited, but she is hopeful that it will invoke interest in the text. For a specialized study of Works of Love, readers should consult m. Jamie Ferreira’s Love’s Grateful Striving.11 a second shortcoming is that hall does not explicitly comment upon the status of preferential love in Kierkegaard. rather she focuses on the disparity between human love, or romantic love, and christian love and attributes this gap to the fact that the former simply does not measure up to the latter. She remains silent on the issue scholars see in Works of Love, namely, the challenge of whether it is possible to love intimately in a way that is not preferential or selfish. For more information on this issue in Kierkegaard and the debate about it in scholarship, readers should consult Sharon Krishek’s work, Kierkegaard on Faith and Love.12 Hall’s compelling and comprehensive work has played a significant role in research by embracing the intensity of Kierkegaard’s view of love and by doing so in terms of both his pseudonymous writings on love and his christian work, Works of Love. in this way, she invites one to consider a fuller conception of love in Kierkegaard. christina m. danko

Sylvia walsh, review in Journal of Religion, vol. 83, no. 4, 2003, p. 660. hall, Kierkegaard and the Treachery of Love, p. 15. 11 m. Jamie Ferreira, Love’s Grateful Striving: A Commentary on Kierkegaard’s “Works of Love,” oxford: oxford university press 2001. 12 Krishek, Kierkegaard on Faith and Love. 9

10

reviews and critical discussions cruysberghs, paul, Johan taels, and Karl verstrynge, “descriptive bibliography: recent Kierkegaard Literature: 2000–2004,” Tidschrift voor Filosofie, vol. 67, no. 4, 2005, pp. 767–814; see p. 794. Johnson, richard, review in Religion and Theology, vol. 11, no. 1, 2004, pp. 47–50. Krishek, Sharon, Kierkegaard on Faith and Love, cambridge: cambridge university press 2009, pp. 132–7. manthei, emily, review in Journal of Theological Studies, vol. 58, no. 1, 2007, pp. 357–61. pattison, george, review in Dansk teologisk Tidsskrift, vol. 66, 2003, pp. 20–1. peters, amy Leigh, review in International Kierkegaard Newsletter, vol. 46, 2003, pp. 20–1. rubenstein, mary-Jane, review in Modern Theology, vol. 20, 2004, pp. 327–30. Sonderegger, Katherine, review in Theology Today, vol. 60, no. 3, 2003, pp. 420–2. Strawser, michael, review in Religion and Literature, vol. 39, no. 1, 2007, pp. 132–6. walsh, Sylvia, review in Journal of Religion, vol. 83, no. 4, 2003, pp. 659–60.

Kenneth hamilton, The Promise of Kierkegaard, philadelphia and new york: J.b. Lippincott company 1969, 116 pp.

as the theologian martin e. marty explains in a particularly concise preface, Kenneth hamilton’s The Promise of Kierkegaard constitutes the first book of a series of introductory monographs on modern theology called “the promise of theology” (further books in the series include studies on barth, bonhoeffer, niebuhr, and tillich). marty also provides some important context for the reception of Kierkegaard’s work at the time of the study’s release. by this time, he tells us, Kierkegaard’s work had already undergone a long period of obscurity, its rediscovery in the early to mid-twentieth century, and a backlash resulting from the fame it soon gained; of particular significance is the fact that most of the study is reliant on—or in fact lives under the shadow of—the translations of walter Lowrie, david Swenson, and alexander dru, along with the scholarship of the arbaughs. at this point, howard and edna hong had only published about three translations of Kierkegaardian texts, one of which was the first volume of the Journals and Papers.1 thus, marty sees the study as emerging in a time of relative freedom from both dogmatic devotion to and knee-jerk dismissal of Kierkegaard’s work, thus allowing for a clearer and fairer perspective to emerge. the book, consisting of nine short chapters, is meant as an accessible introduction to key aspects of Kierkegaard’s philosophy, covering his method, central concepts in his views on christianity, the existence spheres, his relationship with hegel, and his influence on twentieth-century philosophy. Hamilton takes it for granted that Kierkegaard is first and foremost a Christian thinker and, as per Kierkegaard’s own explanation of the authorship in The Point of View, that the entirety of his “authorship was undertaken in the first place in order to convince people that christianity was not irrelevant.”2 hamilton thus also believes the claim made in The Point of View that the authorship began with Either/ Or, thereby excluding from it From the Papers of One Still Living and The Concept of Irony; it should be mentioned that at least the latter of these had already been translated into english at the time, and while hamilton makes a brief mention of it,

Kenneth hamilton, The Promise of Kierkegaard, philadelphia and new york: J.b. Lippincott company, 1969, pp. 112–113. 2 ibid., p. 103. 1

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he dismisses it on account of the fact that “Kierkegaard was to a large extent under the influence of Hegel” when he wrote it.3 It is largely in opposition to Hegel that Hamilton defines Kierkegaard’s philosophy. He begins this definition by contrasting notions of a “Socratic dialectic” and a “hegelian dialectic,” the former of which he takes to describe Kierkegaard’s methodology. whereas hegel’s logic claimed to be able to mediate all contradictions and thus understand all things, “including the inner life of God,”4 Socrates never failed to take into account “the ‘given’ in human existence, including his own individuality.”5 thus, hamilton explains, Kierkegaard devised a tactic— indirect communication—as a means of talking about christianity in such a way that the members of danish christendom, who would otherwise reject any direct description of the religion that differed from theirs, could be led from a discussion of their own interests into a personal engagement with his notions of christianity; thus emerged the pseudonymous, “aesthetic” writings. having concisely explored the “how” of Kierkegaard’s thought, hamilton describes the “what” as “quite obviously conceived by him along the lines of a chalcedonian orthodoxy (christ, very god and very man) with a Lutheran emphasis (faith as trust bestowing complete assurance of salvation through christ’s atoning death and resurrection).”6 expressing a view similar to that of d.z. phillips, hamilton further emphasizes Kierkegaard’s supposed orthodoxy by characterizing his critique of Hegel-dominated thought as centering on the definition and redefinition of “christian concepts.” For Kierkegaard, hamilton tells us, the concepts pertaining to christianity had their grounding in historical events—in the very paradox of the infinite coming into history which defines Christianity—and should not be abstracted away from this grounding through a redefinition by speculative thought. “the movement,” hamilton explains, “is from concrete actuality to concrete actuality,”7 that is, christianity should constitute a movement whereby the individual subjectively appropriates, through faith, the objective-historical events represented by christian concepts. the notion that these concepts represent a historical, objective reality is essential for hamilton’s description, for he wants to emphasize the “suprarational,” as opposed to irrational, character of faith.8 Faith is suprarational rather than merely rational precisely because it is the belief that the absurd, the “absolute paradox” of the incarnation actually took place in history. it is historical and objective and yet defies reason. The popular notion with which Hamilton starts, that for Kierkegaard the “how” takes precedence over the “what,” appears to break down to a degree, for here the content of christianity, the “what” that is the incarnation, is itself determinative of the “how.” thus, we must believe concretely and by virtue of the absurd precisely because the phenomenon to which our belief is directed, the 3 4 5 6 7 8

ibid., p. 34. ibid., p. 39. ibid., p. 35. ibid., p. 45. ibid., p. 47. ibid., p. 53.

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existence of the god-man, is itself both concrete and absurd. to believe concretely, in this case, is precisely to believe existentially, as opposed to abstractly, which, as defined by Anti-Climacus in Practice in Christianity, is to gain “contemporaneity” with christ.9 having explained some key aspects of the form and content of Kierkegaard’s thought, Hamilton dedicates the next two chapters to two important clarifications. First, he wants to dissuade the reader from the notion that Kierkegaard’s work was wholly abstracted from any social, cultural, or political considerations. hamilton here provides a basic context for Kierkegaard’s time and place, indicating that early to mid-nineteenth century Europe in general and Copenhagen specifically were politically exciting times, and Kierkegaard’s authorship, despite its perennial nature, is very much of its time.10 hamilton thus provides an overview of the concepts of the crowd, of leveling, and of gossip—all of which constituted the demise of passion and inwardness—as discussed in “the present age” from A Literary Review. despite depicting Kierkegaard as highly individualistic and adamantly against “the multitude,” hamilton, showing great nuance, nevertheless concludes that Kierkegaard does not, in his opposition to the masses, also exclude the possibility of a community. rather, one “must be willing to undergo the discipline of becoming an individual…far from making community impossible, the individual is the sole basis upon which community can be built.”11 Second, hamilton dedicates a chapter to the twentieth-century reception of Kierkegaard’s thought, especially to the emergence of existentialism. maintaining the notion that Kierkegaard’s opposition to hegel is truly an opposition to systematicity, hamilton argues that thinkers such as Jaspers, heidegger, and Sartre, despite the different ways in which they drew upon Kierkegaard’s work, nevertheless stand opposed to it, insofar as they ultimately commit to an abstract, speculative view of the world and thus to a system that is closed upon itself.12 in the last chapter, hamilton presents albert camus and, to a greater extent, dietrich bonhoeffer as the true inheritors of the Kierkegaardian legacy. while the former, as per hamilton’s depiction, “in spite of himself…wished to bring the christian ethic of responsibility and compassion into the absurd,”13 the latter more closely paralleled Kierkegaard’s desire for a highly subjective, paradoxical, difficult faith.14 though the study, for the most part, remains an accessible and well-written introduction to the works of Kierkegaard, it isn’t without moments of explicit anachronism. while hamilton’s comparisons of Kierkegaard with twentieth-century existentialists and phenomenologists is interesting and compelling, the chapter eventually transitions to an outdated critique of 1960s social culture in which hamilton speaks of dropouts, hippies, drugs, and discotheques as perfect examples ibid., p. 57. Since he uses walter Lowrie’s translation, hamilton refers to this work as Training in Christianity. 10 ibid., p. 65. 11 ibid., p. 67. 12 ibid., pp. 88–89. 13 ibid., p. 96. 14 ibid., pp. 100–103. 9

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of Kierkegaard’s notion of aestheticism, which is doomed to remain rampant if people continue to refuse to make the choice that hamilton sees as essential for the development of the subject beyond the aesthetic: marriage. more problematic is perhaps the very first chapter of the text, in which Hamilton provides an overview of Kierkegaard’s upbringing and adult life, focusing especially on his relationship to his father, which hamilton interprets as holding the key to Kierkegaard’s conception of faith and the many movements of his authorship. if one is prepared to bypass such arguments, however, then hamilton’s short study may in some ways be useful. Jesus Luzardo

reviews and critical discussions thomas, John heywood, review in Scottish Journal of Theology, vol. 23, 1970, pp. 236–237.

alastair hannay, Kierkegaard, London, boston, melbourne, and henley: routledge and Kegan paul 1982 (The Arguments of the Philosophers), xii + 385 pp.

hannay’s single-volume treatment of Kierkegaard’s writings is part of a series titled The Arguments of the Philosophers, edited by ted honderich. the group of books that forms the series—including volumes on plato, Sartre, russell, marx, and Kant, among others—are explicitly intended to be accounts of “the great and the influential philosophers” from an analytic perspective.1 as such, hannay’s aims here are philosophical; in fact, he positions his work as initiating the reception of Kierkegaard as a serious philosopher within the analytic sphere. it should be noted that Hannay’s effort is indeed the first sustained attempt at such a reception. In order to accomplish his goal of establishing Kierkegaard as a serious philosopher within an analytic context, hannay openly acknowledges that he will proceed in a “more compendiously coherent” and “argumentative” way than Kierkegaard himself does.2 what is offered, therefore, is a “bringing out” of “the latent structure and logical content of Kierkegaard’s writings,”3 rather than a straightforward presentation of what is therein contained. Kierkegaard’s thought is taken up and developed, as one might develop a photograph, thus “bringing to light a philosophical image which is already there.”4 does hannay, then, intend to minimize the importance of religion for Kierkegaard, thereby making him more amenable to certain camps of analytic philosophers? not at all. hannay sees Kierkegaard as having “a philosophical role precisely in respect of, and not as distinct from, his prior commitment to religion,” philosophy thus being used as “a polemical weapon” against itself in order to retain a place for the interests of religion.5 philosophy is used to draw certain boundaries around the applicability of philosophy—and, as hannay perceptively notes, “we are, of course, nowadays well prepared to accept that the view that philosophy is limited is a philosophical view.”6 Kierkegaard gives philosophy a specific, limited function.7 alastair hannay, Kierkegaard, London, boston, melbourne, and henley: routledge and Kegan paul 1982 (The Arguments of the Philosophers), p. ii; cf. p. 333. 2 ibid., p. xi. 3 ibid., p. xii. 4 ibid., p. 18. 5 ibid., p. 10. 6 ibid., p. 11. 7 ibid., p. 12. 1

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it is hannay’s task to investigate the views Kierkegaard puts forth within this realm which Kierkegaard himself acknowledges as limited. insofar as Kierkegaard certainly does participate in philosophical debate and take up certain philosophical positions—within, of course, a commitment to the priority of religion—hannay’s approach is clearly warranted. one of the most valuable and well-executed aspects of the book is the fact that the philosophical positions Kierkegaard are shown to take up are frequently placed in conversation with other major philosophers, chiefly Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Wittgenstein. Thanks to hannay’s cogent development of Kierkegaard’s philosophical views, Kierkegaard is shown to hold his own against these figures. Thus, Kierkegaard is not just placed in the historical context of hegelianism, but taken as a major dialogue partner in philosophy tout court. one must particularly appreciate the pioneering consonances hannay demonstrates in regard to the early wittgenstein, as generating a certain amount of clout within the world of analytic philosophy.8 it is not hannay’s aim to make his readers into Kierkegaardians,9 but he does succeed in the laudable task of showing that Kierkegaard is a figure to be reckoned with, philosophically speaking. this demonstration of Kierkegaard’s philosophical weight can be shown with a few selected examples, keeping in mind that hannay’s tome itself provides an almost inexhaustible fund of material. both hegel and Kierkegaard are agreed in diagnosing the unhappy consciousness as a disjunction between consciousness and world, and both assign philosophy a large diagnostic role in defining the unhappy consciousness; they only disagree over how the unhappy consciousness is to be dissipated.10 in hegel, the problem is solved by an intellectual recognition of the unity of consciousness and world that is always already present.11 in Kierkegaard, consciousness finds fulfillment in the individual will’s commitment to the eternal, creating unity between the finite and the infinite through its passionate inwardness.12 but does not Kierkegaard’s solution fail to evade hegel’s charge of the religiously unhappy consciousness, in that the self finds its worth outside itself—namely, in the eternal? Not exactly, for one’s fulfillment comes directly from the commitment of one’s own will, and the individual has a kind of blessed certainty that flows out of this commitment.13 Kierkegaard has thereby successfully sketched out a solution to the unhappy consciousness that is not purely intellectual, combating hegel’s

See especially ibid., pp. 151–3. one should note that hannay’s work precedes charles L. creegan, Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard: Religion, Individuality, and Philosophical Method, London,and New York: Routlege 1989—the first extended treatment of this comparison—by seven years. 9 hannay, Kierkegaard, pp. xi–xii. 10 ibid., pp. 20–1. 11 ibid., pp. 29–30. 12 ibid., pp. 40–3; pp. 52–3. 13 ibid., p. 46. 8

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philosophical solution with his own (in this instance quite different)14 philosophical anthropology.15 hannay’s staging of a debate between Kant and Kierkegaard is perhaps more unexpected and refreshing. both of these thinkers agree that the ethical self is a self which succeeds in willing one thing.16 For Kant, this means that every ethical act is borne out of reason and its clear view of the self’s duty in terms of the categorical imperative. “For Kierkegaard”—on the other hand—“this omits what he would consider the core of the problem of cultivation: the actual transformation of the will,”17 which involves all the intricacies traced out in works like The Concept of Anxiety, “purity of heart,” and The Sickness unto Death. the development of the self also includes Works of Love, in that the Kierkegaardian self develops to love its duty, a possibility explicitly disallowed in Kant.18 hannay’s merit here is both in considering these more explicitly religious works and in giving them philosophical muster through placing them in debate with Kant. Finally, marx. against what is perceived to be “hegelian abstraction,” both marx and Kierkegaard affirm that genuine human community cannot come about merely through a change in thought.19 Marx holds that, in order for human fulfillment to be achieved, the structures of labor in society must be changed in such a way that an individual’s work is no longer alienated by the market.20 in this view, human egoism is not itself a problem for the human community; egoism must simply be negotiated by the proper societal structures. For Kierkegaard, on the other hand, egoism is precisely the problem: how could there ever be a new society without new human beings? the transformation must therefore begin on the individual level, precisely by the single individual’s appropriation of eternity into finite life, accomplished in such a way that selfishness itself is eliminated.21 marx’s belief that equality can be achieved through change of external structures is revealed by Kierkegaard to be but a pipe dream, and attention is refocused on where any true societal revolution must begin: the individual. with considerable erudition in regard both to Kierkegaard and other major thinkers, hannay accomplishes his goal of earning Kierkegaard a spot in serious philosophical discussion. however, to this praiseworthy achievement a cautionary nota bene should be appended. in presenting Kierkegaard as holding certain

as hannay points out, there are also instances in which hegel and Kierkegaard share a similar anthropology, especially in relation to the importance of the psychological development of the self. ibid., p. 16; p. 158. 15 ibid., pp. 54–89. 16 perceptively, hannay notes that “willing one thing” is not willing one object, but instead refers to “the form the will must have if it is to be a good will” (ibid., p. 227). 17 ibid., p. 227. 18 ibid., p. 256; p. 259; p. 269. 19 ibid., p. 305. hannay notes how this is a not entirely accurate description of hegel’s thought on the matter; for hegel, certain “social and political organs” were seen to be prerequisites for the kind of change in thought he advocated (ibid., p. 304). 20 ibid., p. 306. 21 ibid., pp. 314–16. 14

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philosophical views,22 and then defending those views, hannay runs the danger of distorting the way Kierkegaard communicates what he wants to teach his readers.23 For surely what Kierkegaard intends to give his readers is not a collection of philosophical opinions, but existence communications that readers are to appropriate for their own upbuilding. what hannay grants the reader of his book is not exactly what Kierkegaard wants to say, but the conceptual ability to defend Kierkegaard’s positions amongst the panoply of philosophical options available to the modern philosopher. with this grain of salt in mind, the enduring value of hannay’s book is indisputable,24 for here Kierkegaard is indeed shown to be a serious philosopher. thomas J. millay

See ibid., p. 317, for use of this specific language. See also, passim, the use of the word “envisage.” 23 i take this to be the most serious charge against the Darstellung of hannay’s text, rather than the biographical and chapter coherence issues mentioned by richard Schacht in his review (The Philosophical Review, vol. 95, no. 2, 1986, pp. 302–5), or the general problem of “abstraction” as put forth by d.z. phillips (review in Mind, vol. 93, no. 372, 1984, pp. 610–13). 24 hannay’s text was reissued in 1991, again published by routledge. 22

reviews and critical discussions donnelly, John, review in Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, no. 9, 1983, pp. 4–5. hay, Jr., g.c., review in Philosophical Studies, vol. 30, 1984, pp. 347–9. phillips, d.z., review in Mind, vol. 93, no. 372, 1984, pp. 610–13. pojman, Louis p., review in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 15, nos. 1–2, 1984, pp. 95–6. Schacht, richard, review in The Philosophical Review, vol. 95, no. 2, 1986, pp. 302–5.

alastair hannay, Kierkegaard: A Biography, cambridge and new york: cambridge university press 2001, xvi + 296 pp.

while a study of the life of Søren Kierkegaard, in relation to his works is hardly new, the biographies that appeared prior to alastair hannay’s Kierkegaard: A Biography have generally focused on the relationship between his psychological and intellectual development.1 while they tended to place a heavier emphasis on the former, what is distinctive about hannay’s contribution is its focus on the latter. it is by his admission an “intellectual biography,” by which he explains that it is meant to signal “the fact that what we have been bequeathed is an edifice of thought.”2 For hannay, part of what distinguishes an intellectual biography and writings (graphe) from a bios, is that the latter is secondary to the subject’s intellectual development. It is for this reason that his first chapter begins in medias res, when Kierkegaard enters public intellectual life by making a speech to the copenhagen university Student union in 1835.3 over the course of his text, hannay relates Kierkegaard’s life and his troubled relationships—the subjects of which include his father, Michael Pedersen, his erstwhile fiancé, Regine Olsen, and his brother peter christian (1805–85), as well as bishops Jakob peter mynster (1775–1854) and hans Lassen martensen (1808–84)—to his personal and intellectual development. hannay includes a record from Kierkegaard’s close friend, emil boesen of his final conversation with Kierkegaard on the latter’s deathbed in Frederik’s Hospital, copenhagen, in october 1855.4 See georg brandes, Sören Kierkegaard, ein literarisches Charakterbild, Leipzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth 1879; the first full biography in English was that of Walter Lowrie, Kierkegaard, new york and oxford: oxford university press 1938, which was followed by his more readable, A Short Life of Kierkegaard, princeton: princeton university press 1941. unfortunately Lowrie’s much-loved biographies were later accused of being closer to “hagiographies.” For discussion, see c. Stephen evans, “Kierkegaard among the biographers,” Books and Culture, vol. 13, no. 4, 2007, p. 12; Josiah thompson, The Lonely Labyrinth: Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Works, carbondale, illinois: Southern illinois university press 1967. For other biographies, see vernard eller, Kierkegaard and Radical Discipleship, princeton: princeton university press 1968; and Julia watkin, Kierkegaard, London: continuum 1997. 2 alastair hannay, Kierkegaard: A Biography, cambridge and new york: cambridge university press 2001, p. viii. 3 ibid., pp. 5–22. 4 ibid., pp. 417–18. 1

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as the main focus of his biography, hannay examines the development of the larger pieces of Kierkegaard’s graphe that are well known to students of his work. he begins with a brief mention of Kierkegaard’s early published writings and the completion of his dissertation, both his pseudonymous, and non-pseudonymous authorship from Either/Or through the Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments and A Literary Review (1838–46). The final third of his book discusses Kierkegaard’s authorship from 1846 to 1855, with a chapter on Works of Love (1847), a separate chapter on The Sickness unto Death (1849), and a chapter on his polemical engagement with the danish church, including his broadsheet The Moment. his concluding chapter offers a brief assessment of Kierkegaard’s literary, historical, and philosophical significance from after his death to the end of the twentieth century. throughout his work, hannay offers sustained discussion of several almost distinctly “Kierkegaardian” leitmotifs, two of which deserve special mention: the idea of a “life-view” (Livs-Ankuelse), and the category of the individual.5 hannay suggests that the idea of a life-view had its earliest appearance in Kierkegaard’s days as an undergraduate, when upon reading georg wilhelm Friedrich hegel (1770–1831), Kierkegaard asked his professor Frederik christian Sibbern (1785– 1872) to explain to him what “relation philosophy had to actual life.”6 out of this query, Kierkegaard formulated the notion of a life-view, which provides “a key to understanding everything although not in details, and something very like an unshakeable sense of security.”7 For Kierkegaard, the absence of this in the works of hans christian andersen (1805–75) presented a critical shortcoming in his authorship. Furthermore, the notion anticipated Kierkegaard’s later distinction between his familiar “stages,” notably the ethical and religious. hannay observes that, for Kierkegaard, the search for an ultimate life-view would “inevitably end in ‘the religious.’ ”8 the category of the individual similarly begins with reference to the personal. When it first occurs in a dedication in Kierkegaard’s first two edifying discourses in 1843, addressed to “my reader, that single individual,” the ostensible reference is to regine olsen.9 but, as hannay points out in a journal entry from 1849, Kierkegaard had come to recognize the term as having a potentially wider significance.10 psychologically, it includes the individual, existential self as a subject of investigation, who as a singularity bears a multitude of outward identities.11 politically, it stands in note that to some degree, these themes had already been explored by hannay earlier; see alastair hannay, Kierkegaard, oxford and new york: routledge 1982 (Arguments of the Philosophers); see, for example, p. 38; pp. 58–63; pp. 276–308. 6 hannay, Kierkegaard: A Biography, p. 79. note also that hannay does not shy away from the importance and sympathetic reading of hegel that Kierkegaard sustained in his intellectual development prior to the publication of the Postscript in 1846. 7 ibid., p. 111. 8 ibid., pp. 106–9; pp. 176–7; p. 353. 9 ibid., p. 204. 10 ibid. 11 ibid., p. 377. 5

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contrast to the hegelian view of the state and society as instruments of “leveling.”12 religiously, it marks out the particular uniqueness of each person before god, for whom there is an obligation to practice “neighbor-love.”13 to those familiar with Kierkegaard’s life and work, hannay does not break any new ground, and there are no startling revelations. however, this is an important work since it embodies elements that make it more than merely another biography of Kierkegaard. in each chapter, he offers suggestions about the philosophical, theological, ecclesiological, and political concerns of the day addressed in Kierkegaard’s published corpus, complete with sources that the reader can investigate individually. one helpful multi-chapter discussion chronicles the literary confrontations with Kierkegaard’s contemporaries that are captured in The Book on Adler and the so-called Corsair affair. hannay shows how the sources for these engagements suggest possible motivations behind Kierkegaard’s writing of not only the Postscript, but several subsequent works, including his private journals after 1846.14 additionally, he provides suggestions about the ways in which Kierkegaard’s writings reflect challenges to his philosophical and theological predecessors and contemporaries in germany and denmark. in addition to hegel, these include gotthold ephraim Lessing (1729–81), Johan Ludvig heiberg (1791–1860), and nikolai Frederik Severin grundtvig (1783–1872). while hannay clearly offers a rich account of Kierkegaard’s intellectual life, his approach in relating the bios to Kierkegaard’s graphe unfortunately neglects a discussion of Kierkegaard’s rich religious and spiritual life that is suggested in his non-pseudonymous works and in his journals and papers.15 the upbuilding discourses and his later spiritual writings receive mention, but their themes remain relatively unexplored. despite these minor shortcomings, hannay’s Kierkegaard: A Biography offers a clear paradigm of research into the life and work of this indisputable nineteenth-century philosophical and spiritual luminary. erik m. hanson

ibid., p. 299; pp. 336–7. ibid., pp. 358–63. 14 ibid., p. 135; p. 321. 15 this concern has also been noted by more than one critic. See, for example, murray rae, review in Religious Studies, vol. 39, no. 4, 2003, pp. 482–3; evans, “Kierkegaard among the biographers,” p. 13. 12 13

reviews and critical discussions adams, noel S., review in Review of Metaphysics, vol. 56, no. 2, 2002, pp. 423–4. arrington, robert, review in Sewanee Review, vol. 110, no. 1, 2002, pp. xii–xvi. cain, david, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 23, 2004, pp. 212–22. connell, george, review in Journal of Speculative Philosophy, New Series, vol. 17, no. 1, 2003, pp. 70–2. cruysberghs, paul, Johan taels, and Karl verstrynge, “descriptive bibliography: recent Kierkegaard Literature: 2000–2004,” Tidschrift voor Filosofie, vol. 67, no. 4, 2005, pp. 767–814; see p. 773. evans, c. Stephen, “Kierkegaard among the biographers,” Books and Culture, vol. 13, no. 4, 2007, pp. 12–13. Frawley, matthew J., review in Theology Today, vol. 59, no. 3, 2002, pp. 478–82. Leib, erin, review in New Republic, vol. 226, no. 5, 2002, pp. 38–41. Lodge, david, review in Wilson Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 4, 2001, pp. 136–8. marino, gordon, review in Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, no. 44, 2002, pp. 11–12. o’donovan, oliver, review in Studies in Christian Ethics, vol. 16, no. 1, 2003, pp. 105–12. pattison, george, review in Journal of Ecclesiastical History, vol. 55, no. 2, 2004, pp. 425–7. rae, murray, review in Religious Studies, vol. 39, no. 4, 2003, pp. 480–4. reé, Jonathan, review in Times Literary Supplement, vol. 5170, may 3, 2002, p. 26. roberts, Kyle, review in Fides et Historia, vol. 35, no. 1, 2003, pp. 128–9. rumble, vanessa, review in Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 41, no. 1, 2003, pp. 134–6.

alastair hannay, Kierkegaard and Philosophy: Selected Essays, London and new york: routledge 2003, x + 257 pp.

alastair hannay positions this volume of selected essays as “a logical sequel” to his path-breaking 1982 work, Kierkegaard (in The Arguments of the Philosophers series),1 which all but inaugurated serious discussion of Kierkegaard in an analytic context.2 despite this earlier volume, hannay holds that it remains the case that “much of the discussion in accredited philosophical fora, both about Kierkegaard and around him, has lacked the backing of a close study of what Kierkegaard actually wrote.”3 Kierkegaard and Philosophy draws together essays written over several years in a further effort to remedy this situation. Hannay conceives of the collection as broken up into two parts, the first of which (“philosophy”) is devoted to close readings of Kierkegaard’s texts, and the second of which (“connections and confrontations”) participates in conversations that place Kierkegaard’s texts in dialogue with other thinkers. this distinction does not quite hold, since—for example—there are lucid readings of A Literary Review and The Sickness unto Death in the second part, and Frege, Searle, and aldrich enter the fray in the first part. Admittedly, in a general sense Hannay’s description is accurate, but this should not cause the reader to lose sight of the important work being done that perhaps does not fit the category under which it is placed. as in hannay’s previous work, we have here an attempt to read Kierkegaard in such a way that he “stands in recognizable relationship to other thinkers who undeniably qualify as philosophers.”4 despite this continuity, this is no mere repetition of the earlier work. it should be noted that between writing his singlevolume treatment of Kierkegaard and offering these selected essays, hannay translated many of Kierkegaard’s works into an english that is both elegant and accurate.5 the close textual attention required for such work results in the distilled alastair hannay, Kierkegaard, London, boston, melbourne, and henley: routledge and Kegan paul 1982 (The Arguments of the Philosophers). 2 alastair hannay, Kierkegaard and Philosophy: Selected Essays, London and new york: routledge 2003, p. 3. 3 ibid., p. vii. 4 ibid., p. 7. 5 in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, January 19, 2010 (on-line journal), david d. possen proposed that hannay’s translations occupy the aesthetic sphere, while howard 1

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clarity he is able to bring to interpreting difficult passages in Kierkegaard’s writings. whereas the earlier discussion of The Sickness unto Death spanned 24 dense pages in the 1982 Kierkegaard,6 hannay covers much the same ground in 10 pages in Kierkegaard and Philosophy, and the argument is far more easily apprehended by the reader. against the reading of michael theunissen, who claims that basic despair has always to do with willing not to be oneself,7 hannay shows by means of the example of the would-be caesar that, at its most basic level, despair is the result of not resting in god as the transcendent establishing power of the self.8 For even if the would-be caesar became caesar—thus willing to be exactly who he is—anticlimacus would still place him within the category of despair (insofar as he is still evading the self, he was created to be by the establishing power).9 these golden pages add much to a precise understanding of what Kierkegaard means by despair in its most basic sense. in the interests of charity toward the previous work, however, it should be noted that hannay’s purpose in the 1982 Kierkegaard—namely, to give to Kierkegaard’s texts a kind of philosophical coherence that they do not in themselves possess—disallowed the kind of straightforward reading we see on display in the more recent book, which is exactly what has allowed the latter’s greater degree of transparency. only by keeping these different purposes in mind will a fair assessment of the two works be possible. where Kierkegaard and Philosophy most resembles its predecessor is in the first two essays of Part I. Here we find Hannay combating Henry E. Allison’s contention that Concluding Unscientific Postscript is ultimately either nonsense or an elaborate joke.10 on the contrary, runs hannay’s rejoinder, climacus’ work takes the philosophical position that faith is a matter of the will, rather than the understanding,11 and defends this philosophical position with a virtuosic demonstration of the limits of reason—a demonstration that itself appeals to reason, for “[r]eason, surely, has a place in any attempt to set its own limits.”12 thus the Concluding Unscientific Postscript is a work of serious philosophical merit, even if it does not always treat philosophy seriously. The reader also finds Hannay drawing connections between Kierkegaard and contemporary philosophy of mind, showing once again the relevance of Kierkegaard for analytic discussions.13 one of the most striking elements of part ii is that several of the chapters resist the easy comparisons that have been made between Kierkegaard and other philosophers. and edna hongs’ are squarely in the ethical, leaving walter Lowrie’s translations to inhabit the religious stage. at any rate, the quality of hannay’s translations should surely be noted (as does, for example, m.g. piety, Ways of Knowing: Kierkegaard’s Pluralist Epistemology, waco: baylor university press 2010, p. x). 6 hannay, Kierkegaard (1982), pp. 190–204. 7 hannay, Kierkegaard and Philosophy, p. 78. 8 ibid., p. 80. 9 ibid., pp. 81–2. 10 See henry e. allison, “christianity and nonsense,” Review of Metaphysics, vol. 20, no. 3, 1967, pp. 432–60. 11 hannay, Kierkegaard and Philosophy, p. 17. 12 ibid., p. 15. 13 ibid., chapter 2, “philosophy of mind,” pp. 24–41.

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Thus Chapter 13, “Solitary Souls and Infinite Help,”14 raises significant challenges for claiming that Kierkegaard and wittgenstein operate in a similar vein in regard to the religious.15 utilizing a remark from Culture and Value,16 hannay shows that wittgenstein positions the christian religion as the solution to a problem that certain human beings possess. For Kierkegaard, the terms of the problem are quite different. there is no general problem which some people have, to which christianity then provides the solution; rather, “the Christian framework defines the problems.”17 that is to say, christianity is not a post hoc solution to an anthropological problem; but rather it defines that very problem by offering a foundational account of what a human self is, thus also defining the specific ways that the planned constitution of that self can go awry. in short, Kierkegaard offers an account of despair and faith that is, from beginning to end, fully inside a religious viewpoint, whereas wittgenstein approaches the religious solution from the outside.18 thus hannay steadfastly refuses to gain philosophical viability for Kierkegaard by simply claiming that he is similar to other, more accepted, philosophers—for he is also importantly different.19 the reward for this and other refusals is precision in understanding what Kierkegaard had to say, which is part and parcel of what the volume as a collected whole grants its readers. thomas J. millay

m. Jamie Ferreira also takes note of this chapter in her review of the text in Philosophical Investigations, vol. 27, no. 4, 2004, p. 393. 15 hannay also resists assimilating Kierkegaard to a wittgensteinian “language game” interpretation of religious knowledge claims in chapter 9, “commitment and paradox” (Kierkegaard and Philosophy, pp. 126–36). 16 Ludwig wittgenstein, Culture and Value, trans. by peter winch, oxford: blackwell, 1980; revised edition 1998, p. 53e; cited on p. 179 of hannay, Kierkegaard and Philosophy. 17 hannay, Kierkegaard and Philosophy, p. 183. 18 ibid., pp. 184–5. 19 hannay also resists simple connections between Kierkegaard and rousseau (ibid., pp. 152–62), heidegger (pp. 166–78), Lukács (pp. 200–206), nietzsche (pp. 207–17), and deconstructionists (pp. 218–20). at the same time, hannay makes an interesting connection between Kierkegaard and aquinas in ibid., chapter 10, “humor and the irascible Soul,” pp. 137–49. 14

reviews and critical discussions Ferreira, m. Jamie, review in Philosophical Investigations, vol. 27, no. 4, 2004, pp. 390–4. perkins, robert L., review in Teaching Philosophy, vol. 29, 2006, pp. 70–2.

alastair hannay and gordon marino (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, cambridge and new york: cambridge university press 1998, xiii + 419 pp.

The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, an anthology published by cambridge university press in 1998, and edited by alastair hannay and gordon marino, offers sixteen distinct and innovative readings of Kierkegaard’s work.1 according to the editors’ back cover summary, this contribution to the “cambridge companion to major philosophers” was meant to dispel a common myth about Kierkegaard’s philosophical relevance, that he was “an irrationalist who denied the value of clear and honest thinking.”2 The first three essays present an account of Kierkegaard’s published corpus, viewed both historically and synoptically. bruce Kirmmse and roger poole address Kierkegaard’s reception internationally by both his contemporaries and by several generations of readers following his death. in “ ‘out with it!’: the modern breakthrough, Kierkegaard and denmark,” Kirmmse focuses on two scandalinducing refusals on Kierkegaard’s death-bed, first to receive the Eucharist, and second to receive his older brother, peter christian.3 both contributed to Kierkegaard’s unfavorable reception by his contemporaries and publicly broadcast his troubled relationship to the church.4 by contrast, poole’s Kierkegaard, in “the unknown Kierkegaard: twentieth-century receptions,” enjoyed a more favorable reception, beginning with the german and French existentialists in the early twentieth century.5 this was followed by anglo-american translators and commentators, who took a “blunt reading” of Kierkegaard that presumed a univocal reading of his texts.6 Later The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, ed. by alastair hannay and gordon marino, cambridge and new york: cambridge university press 1998. 2 ibid., back cover. 3 bruce Krimmse, “ ‘out with it!’: the modern breakthrough, Kierkegaard and denmark,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, pp. 15–47. 4 ibid., pp. 38–9. in many ways, Kirmmse’s essay is an extension of his earlier, not exclusively biographical work on Kierkegaard in the historical and religious context of early nineteenth-century copenhagen. See bruce Kirmmse, Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark, indianapolis and bloomington: indiana university press 1990. 5 roger poole, in “the unknown Kierkegaard: twentieth-century receptions,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, pp. 48–75. 6 notably walter Lowrie (1868–1959). ibid., p. 60. 1

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commentators resisted this (now passé) hermeneutic, turning to post-modern and de-constructivist tools of interpretation that took seriously the distinction between Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous and signed works.7 a consequence of this newer hermeneutic has been to understand Kierkegaard’s own distinction in The Point of View for My Work and as Author between his pseudonymous “aesthetic” and his own signed “religious” writings as providing a key to his authorship as a whole (with the former being subordinate to the latter). But as George Pattison demonstrates in “Art in an Age of Reflection,” this does not prevent the religious from being a kind of “witness to the truth,” operating on behalf of an infinite love incognito.8 the next set of essays engages Kierkegaard’s philosophical concerns and the relationship between the aesthetic, ethical, and religious spheres. in “Kierkegaard and hegel,” merold westphal presents Kierkegaard’s engagement with the german philosopher,9 against the common misperception that Kierkegaard as a mere “antihegelian.” westphal shows that Kierkegaard appropriated hegel’s insights in his early works, but that it was not until the Concluding Unscientific Postscript that he would fully break with his predecessor, upending the latter’s claim to have produced a complete philosophical system. however, andrew cross reads this route of dialectical development differently. in his “neither either nor or: the perils of Reflexive Irony,” he shows the development of Kierkegaard’s understanding of irony as a tool that offered an existential engagement of public life that began in his university thesis and carried through to the Postscript.10 the Postscript proves useful for illuminating other philosophical issues. c. Stephen evans, in “realism and antirealism in Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript,” sees Kierkegaard as a contributor to debates about mindindependent reality in the late twentieth century.11 For evans, Kierkegaard is a kind of realist: the only concrete reality that can be thought and known is one’s own agency.12 yet thought and agency are not the only philosophical concerns found in the Postscript. with reference also to A Literary Review of Two Ages, robert c. roberts emphasizes the importance of the emotional life for Kierkegaard. in “existence, emotion, and virtue: classical themes in Kierkegaard,” he argues for the legitimacy of Kierkegaard’s focus on the emotions as a means of character development.13 See Louis mackey, Kierkegaard, a Kind of Poet, philadelphia: university of pennsylvania press 1971; but see also roger poole, Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication, charlottesville: university of virginia press 1993. 8 George Pattison, “Art in an Age of Reflection,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, pp. 76–100. 9 merold westphal, “Kierkegaard and hegel,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, pp. 101–24. 10 Andrew Cross, “Neither Either nor Or: The Perils of Reflexive Irony,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, pp. 125–53. 11 c. Stephen evans, “realism and antirealism in Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, pp. 154–76. 12 ibid., p. 165. 13 robert c. roberts, “existence, emotion, and virtue: classical themes in Kierkegaard,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, pp. 177–206. 7

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a perennial issue in the Postscript is the question of transition between religiousness “a” and religiousness “b.” the essays by m. Jamie Ferreira and timothy p. Jackson represent two such engagements. in “Faith and the Kierkegaardian Leap,” Ferreira offers a rational account of climacus’ “leap,” not as a straightforward voluntarism, but as a qualified voluntarism.14 in “arminian Edification: Kierkegaard on Grace and Free Will,” Jackson addresses Kierkegaard’s concern for meaningful freedom on the perennial question of soteriology.15 human beings share both absolute dependence on and absolute accountability to god; in this respect, Kierkegaard held a consistent “arminianism” on grace and freedom. the next four essays feature wholesale engagements with Kierkegaard’s treatment of psychological concerns: fear and trembling, faith, repetition, anxiety, and despair. these include ronald green, “ ‘developing’ Fear and Trembling,” edward F. mooney, “Repetition, getting the world back,” gordon marino, “anxiety in The Concept of Anxiety,” and alastair hannay, “Kierkegaard and the variety of despair.” green illustrates Fear and Trembling using four overlapping layers of meaning present in this reading of abraham and isaac.16 Fundamentally, Kierkegaard presents a call to christian commitment with an awareness of sin, judgment, repentance, and faith. Similarly, mooney takes up the numerous oddities that bedevil a straightforward reading of Repetition, concluding that repetition is ultimately genuine experience and not cognitively situated theory.17 again, marino examines the nature of anxiety in light of vigilius haufniensis, presenting anxiety as a form of consciousness that is available only by revelation as an explanation of fundamental human nature.18 and for hannay, addressing despair requires the model of selfhood that overcomes it—the god-man.19 Finally, three essays address the christian ethical life as a distinct religious identity. philip L. Quinn takes up the question of the relationship of the religious to the ethical in “Kierkegaard’s christian ethics,” focusing on not only the universal command to practice agape (Works of Love) but the peculiarly christian requirement to imitate christ (Practice in Christianity).20 hermann deuser, in “religious dialectics and christology,” presents the distinction between religiousness “a” and religiousness

m. Jamie Ferreira, “Faith and the Kierkegaardian Leap,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, pp. 207–34. 15 Timothy P. Jackson, “Arminian Edification: Kierkegaard on Grace and Free Will,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, pp. 235–56. 16 ronald green, “ ‘developing’ Fear and Trembling,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, pp. 257–81. 17 edward mooney, “Repetition, getting the world back,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, pp. 282–307. 18 gordon marino, “anxiety in The Concept of Anxiety,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, pp. 308–28. 19 alastair hannay, “Kierkegaard and the variety of despair,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, pp. 329–48. 20 philip L. Quinn, “Kierkegaard’s christian ethics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, pp. 349–75. 14

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“b” from an entirely phenomenological perspective.21 Finally, Klaus-m. Kodalle, in “the utilitarian Self and the ‘useless’ passion of Faith,” challenges a postmodern thesis that supports a fundamental misunderstanding about the god-relationship that reduces it to its sociological and psychological function in society.22 this anthology for its time was groundbreaking. it presented an accessible collection of work from authors who took seriously the approach, articulated by poole, to see Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authorship in the larger context of his literary goals.23 in so doing, the contributors individually and collectively offer a model of scholarship for future philosophers who would seek out Kierkegaard as a “companion.” erik m. hanson

21 herman deuser, “religious dialectics and christology,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, pp. 376–96. 22 Klaus-m. Kodalle, “the utilitarian Self and the ‘useless’ passion of Faith,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, pp. 397–410. 23 For arguable exceptions, see the reviews of norman Lillegard in Philosophy in Review, vol. 19, no. 1, 1999, p. 21; mark dooley in Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, vols. 43–4, 2001, p. 97; and mary wanda berry in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 81, no. 3, 1999, p. 350. See also reviews by James giles in British Journal for the History of Philosophy, vol. 7, no. 3, 1990, p. 527; and patrick a. goold in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 49, no. 1, 2001, p. 66.

reviews and critical discussions ake, Stacey, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 20, 1999, pp. 301–10. bates, Stanley, review in Philosophical Books, vol. 40, no. 2, 1999, pp. 106–9. calhoun, david c., review in Ethics, vol. 99, 1999, p. 946. dooley, mark, review in Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, vols. 43–4, 2001, pp. 94–8. giles, James, review in British Journal for the History of Philosophy, vol. 7, no. 3, 1990, pp. 526–9. goold, patrick a., review in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 49, no. 1, 2001, pp. 65–8. Jegstrup, elsebet, review in Teaching Philosophy, vol. 23, no. 1, 2000, pp. 74–9. Kent, John, review in International Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 1, 1999, pp. 104–6. Lillegard, norman, review in Philosophy in Review, vol. 19, no. 1, 1999, pp. 20–2. Lippitt, John, review in Religious Studies, vol. 35, no. 3, 1999, pp. 371–4. verstrynge, Karl, review in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, vol. 61, 1999, pp. 172–3. warren berry, wanda, review in Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 81, no. 3, pp. 349–51.

edward harris, Man’s Ontological Predicament: A Detailed Analysis of Sören Kierkegaard’s Concept of Sin with Special Reference to “The Concept of Dread,” Stockholm: almqvist & wiksell international 1984, 137 pp.

edward harris’ doctoral thesis analyzes with great precision Kierkegaard’s typology of sin, which harris claims had never been done prior to his publication in 1984. it is surprising how little fanfare the dissertation generated given its clarity and potential significance in Kierkegaardian studies. He demonstrates Kierkegaard’s non-orthodox view of sin and puts it into conversation with the few thinkers, such as brohlin and Lindstrom, who have done work along similar lines. harris begins his exploration of the relatively uncharted terrain concerning sin, by first defining the differences between radical humanists and revelationists. The former believe that man can come to know his fundamental potentials without a transcendent revelation, while the latter conclude no such knowledge can be had apart from revelation. harris believes Kierkegaard is a synthesis of these opposing views and articulates his first thesis as follows: “Kierkegaard advocates both a type of humanism and a form of revelationism.”1 harris ponders why Kierkegaard uses such a religiously loaded term as “sin” to describe our unactualized fundamental potentials if we can know them, in part, humanistically. why would it occur to us to label the self’s despair brought on by disrelation as sin? it would not; however, from a religious vantage point all despair is the result of a lack of faith or what Kierkegaard understands to be “sin.” this leads to his second thesis: “Kierkegaard’s designating of different phenomena with the term ‘sin’ is possible and justifiable along lines of similarity.”2 harris’ methodology for his study is to determine what Kierkegaard identifies as the phenomena of sin and how the theory of subjectivity allows us to know them. he draws extensively on The Concept of Dread, that is, the

edward harris, Man’s Ontological Predicament: A Detailed Analysis of Soren Kierkegaard’s Concept of Sin with Special Reference to “The Concept of Dread,” Stockholm: almqvist & wiksell international 1984, p. 14. 2 ibid., p. 15. 1

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earlier translation of The Concept of Anxiety, but also The Sickness unto Death and Either/Or.3 harris explains that Kierkegaard held a monistic anthropology, meaning that man is an indivisible synthesis of both his mental and physical aspects. Since the self seeks an outlet and does not unfold with law-like regularity, it must freely disclose itself. harris interprets Kierkegaard as saying there are three theoretical fundamental potentials for self-disclosing within man (spiritual activity, self-activation, and selfcreation), that when not actualized yield five types of sin-phenomena within what he calls the e-change category (read: does not require a revelatory religious encounter). harris thinks Kierkegaard’s typology of sin can largely be divided into e-change and a-change categories. harris formulates a-change in the following manner: “the single individual p a-changes when p’s attitude to life is at variance with the agapeistic way of life.”4 we will revisit what harris means by a-change, but for now our concern is understanding the enumerated types of e-change.5 Harris first examines the two types of sin-phenomena that arise from a failure to actualize our spiritual activity. the self, for Kierkegaard, is a synthesis of both our physical and mental activity. we remain in an aesthetic stage and experience some form of despair if one aspect of this unity dominates the other. the despair alerts us, without recourse to a transcendental revelation, that we are in some form of sin or error. harris properly articulates the corresponding sin-phenomena as follows: phenomenon (i): “p’s disclosing is dominated by p’s physical activity thereby prohibiting the equilibrium of personality, i.e., p is not a complete self.”6 and phenomenon (ii): “p’s disclosing is dominated by p’s mental activity thereby prohibiting the equilibrium of the personality, i.e., p’s nature does not function as a whole.”7 if the equilibrium is not attained, man makes no use of his freedom and is trapped in negative sensuousness.8 two further types of sin-phenomena/e-change occur when we fail to selfactivate, meaning fatalism or externalism is used as a cover to not choose one’s self. they are as follows: phenomenon (iii): “p’s disclosing is dominated by a force external to p’s own power, i.e., p attempts to cast off the responsibility for choice.”9 and phenomenon (iv): “p’s disclosing is subject to internal laws of goodness and rationality, i.e., p attempts to cast off the responsibility for choice.”10 The fifth type of sin-phenomenon occurs when man dismisses his power to create meaning or pursue goals, thus phenomenon v is articulated as “P’s attitude to life is not created by P himself in accordance with P’s primordial freedom, i.e., P attempts to cast off the responsibility for choice.”11 Kierkegaard, according to harris, posits primordial dread as a partial, yet necessarily incomplete explanation for why certain individuals 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

ibid., p. 12; p. 19; p. 22. ibid., p. 48. ibid., p. 30; pp. 33–4; p. 40. ibid., p. 61. ibid., p. 63. ibid., pp. 50–1; p. 55; pp. 57–8. ibid., p. 66. ibid., p. 67. ibid., p. 72.

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fail to transition from potentiality to actuality. if men have a common nature, then Kierkegaard is justified in extending this humanistic knowledge of sin-phenomena to all men.12 now we can return to what Kierkegaard believes to be “sin” in the narrowest sense. we a-change sin when we do not have agapeistic love as our attitude towards life. the only way we can free ourselves from a-change is if our life is founded upon faith in christ as god.13 we can now see how harris concludes that Kierkegaard blended the radical humanist and revelationist perspective in regards to fundamental potentials and the discovery of sin. Further, the common denominator of all forms of sin seems to be connected to individuals’ inability to overcome primordial dread and fully actualize their theoretical fundamentals. harris believes that his work offers a stark contrast to bohlin’s unreasonable incompatibilist view of Kierkegaardian sin by showing the complementary natures of e-change and a-change. harris applauds Lindstrom for not attributing an augustinian concept of original sin to Kierkegaard; however, he finds fault with Lindstrom for not being able to articulate what Kierkegaard meant by original sin. harris believes that one of the strengths of his own study is to indicate that Kierkegaard conceived of original sin as e-change.14 there is much to grapple with in harris’ fascinating exploration of sin. one has to ask if harris has really presented a Kierkegaardian alternative to the classical christian understanding of original sin. Further, one’s curiosity has to be aroused by the implications of a non-augustinian account of sin. what are the theological ramifications of Kierkegaard protesting against what many see as a central tenet of the faith? the only really egregious error with this text is harris’ categorization of Kierkegaard as someone unable to overcome the sin of a-change. harris concludes that Kierkegaard cannot be considered an individual that lived with the agapeistic attitude, given how much he lamented the difficulties of living in the Christian truth.15 this judgment seems erroneous because it is unclear how much Kierkegaard identified himself with the personal confessions of his pseudonyms and even if Kierkegaard unambiguously stated that he lived and died for the truth, only god can know the authenticity of his agapeistic attitude. Luke Johnson

12 13 14 15

ibid., p. 64; pp. 66–8; pp. 76–9; pp. 85–7. ibid., pp. 112–16. ibid., pp. 125–7. ibid., p. 99; p. 101.

reviews and critical discussions undetermined.

m. holmes hartshorne, Kierkegaard, Godly Deceiver: The Nature and Meaning of His Pseudonymous Writings, new york: columbia university press 1990, xvii + 112 pp.

m. holmes hartshorne’s (1910–88) sole monograph on Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard, Godly Deceiver: The Nature and Meaning of His Pseudonymous Writings, was published posthumously by columbia university press in 1990. the text is preceded by a brief foreword by John S. morris, president (at the time) of union college, memorializing hartshorne’s religious and professorial work, and remembering him as a colleague and a friend. the brief work (fewer than 100 pages of text) addresses the necessity of coming to terms with Kierkegaard’s literary authorial strategies— specifically, irony and pseudonymity—before engaging in an assessment of his philosophical or theological views, and finds many prior works of Kierkegaard scholarship wanting in this regard. the book is divided into six untitled chapters. each of the chapters deals centrally with one or more works of Kierkegaard: Fear and Trembling, Either/Or, Philosophical Fragments, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Works of Love, The Sickness unto Death, and The Point of View. the book concludes with an appendix in which hartshorne gives what he takes to be a brief overview of major contributions to the scholarship that deal with Kierkegaard’s pseudonymity in some way, including works by John w. elrod, mark c. taylor, c. Stephen evans, Johannes Sløk, and Josiah thompson. From very early on in the book, hartshorne establishes his view on the pseudonymous writings: “one will not discover Kierkegaard’s own beliefs in his pseudonymous works.”1 he comes to this conclusion on the basis of a deeper understanding of Kierkegaard’s authorial motives. the pseudonymous books, harsthorne argues, “were a grand deception, intended to engage, at the outset, the reader’s interest and acceptance and then, gradually, to lead him to discover that the point of view which he had accepted uncritically (and which, to some degree, had characterized his life to that point) was totally untenable.”2 the deception Kierkegaard perpetrates upon his readers is justified religiously, on Hartshorne’s m. holmes hartshorne, Kierkegaard, Godly Deceiver: The Nature and Meaning of His Pseudonymous Writings, new york: columbia university press 1990, p. xvi. 2 ibid., p. xv. 1

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reading, because Kierkegaard’s desire (again, according to hartshorne) was to provide an opportunity for those individuals who participated in state or institutional christianity—“christendom”—to see the error of their ways. thus, hartshorne notes, Kierkegaard believed that “one must start where these so-called christians actually are and address them in the categories in which they actually live their lives, and then by irony let them, if they can or will, discover the true nature of that mode of existing.”3 in so arguing, hartshorne presents (most of) the pseudonymous writings as thoroughly ironic works, never intended to be read as indicative of Kierkegaard’s own views, and part of an overall religious project, such that “the necessary starting point for any study of Kierkegaard is the recognition that he considered his entire literary activity to be a religious task.”4 From this starting point, hartshorne concludes that each of the pseudonyms he considers, with the exception of anti-climacus, differs fundamentally from Kierkegaard on basic existential and religious questions. ultimately, according to harsthorne, Johannes de silentio, a, Judge william, and Johannes climacus are not christian enough to present Kierkegaard’s own views. the approach hartshorne takes in Kierkegaard, Godly Deceiver is not a new one, and explicitly so, self-consciously so: as he notes at the beginning of his chapter 6, the “basic premise” of his book “is that Kierkegaard’s own interpretation of his authorship, given in The Point of View, is correct.”5 while this is a fairly common view amongst Kierkegaard scholars today, and has at least one predecessor in niels Jørgen cappelørn’s essay “the retrospective understanding of Kierkegaard’s total production,”6 it is important to note that, at the time of the writing and publication of hartshorne’s book, the view was much rarer in the anglophone Kierkegaard literature. due perhaps to the widespread and early availability of translations of key pseudonymous texts of Kierkegaard—Fragments, Postscript, Fear and Trembling, and the like—coupled, as hartshorne notes, with the relative unavailability in translation of the works published under Kierkegaard’s own name, some of the early american scholars of Kierkegaard (he mentions david F. Swenson and walter Lowrie by name)7 took the views expressed in those works to be something very much like, if not identical with, Kierkegaard’s own. as such, these authors take the views expressed by Johannes de silentio or Johannes climacus altogether too earnestly, as representing Kierkegaard’s considered view: they read the pseudonyms, in short, unironically. and yet, hartshorne asserts, “if the pervasive element of irony in the pseudonymous aesthetical works is overlooked, Kierkegaard’s purpose is missed.”8 nothing in the pseudonymous aesthetical works—that is, Kierkegaard’s entire pseudonymous production minus The Sickness unto Death and Practice in ibid., pp. 15–16. ibid., p. 13. 5 ibid., p. 74. 6 niels Jørgen cappelørn, “the retrospective understanding of Kierkegaard’s total production,” in Kierkegaard: Resources and Results, ed. by alastair macKinnon, waterloo: wilfrid Laurier university press 1982, pp. 18–38. 7 in this context, hartshorne also mentions eduard geismar and reidar thomte. hartshorne, Kierkegaard, Godly Deceiver, pp. 85–6. 8 ibid., p. 83. 3 4

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Christianity—is ascribable to Kierkegaard.9 although the pseudonyms might sound like Kierkegaard at times, and use some of the same words and express some of the same concerns, the meaning of what they write “varies according to the point of view of the writer.”10 interpreting Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous aesthetic writings thus becomes a matter of finding the proper point of view. that point of view, as far as hartshorne is concerned, is decidedly religious, decidedly christian. this fact complicates matters somewhat for any simplistic reading of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous authorship, however, as at least one of the pseudonyms—anti-climacus—is christian in Kierkegaard’s sense of the term. hartshorne reads the works of anti-climacus (particularly The Sickness unto Death) as not subject to an ironic interpretation, despite their pseudonymity. hartshorne’s basis for excusing anti-climacus from his ironic reading of the pseudonyms is not entirely elucidated in the book, although it does seem to hang upon Kierkegaard’s assertions that anti-climacus achieves a kind of “pure christianity”11 superior to Kierkegaard’s own. this point was noted by at least two of the book’s contemporary reviewers,12 both of whom acknowledge the problem inherent in justifying one’s agreement with Kierkegaard’s view (in The Point of View) simply by way of Kierkegaard’s assertion that it is his view. one might argue—again, as at least one contemporary reviewer of Kierkegaard, Godly Deceiver argued13—that the question of the “nature and meaning” of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works is not primarily a question of what Søren Kierkegaard actually believed, but of what beliefs the body of works we call “Kierkegaard’s writings” actually justify. in any case, hartshorne’s contribution to the discussion of pseudonymity, irony, and authorship in Kierkegaard in the anglophone world is considerable and widely acknowledged, if primarily insofar as it draws attention to important questions at a time when they were infrequently asked. Joseph westfall

this is a view, taken by itself—that the irony of the pseudonymous works demands of readers that we distinguish between what the writings say and what Kierkegaard might have believed—that occurs in a number of forms prior to the writing of hartshorne’s book. one such occurrence is in christopher norris, “Fictions of authority: narrative and viewpoint in Kierkegaard’s writing,” in The Deconstructive Turn: Essays in the Rhetoric of Philosophy, London: methuen 1983, pp. 85–106. a more egregious oversight, however, is the total lack of any reference to Louis mackey’s works in this area, see Louis mackey, Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet, philadelphia: university of pennsylvania press 1971, and Points of View: Readings of Kierkegaard, tallahassee: university presses of Florida 1986, both of which suggest (in different ways) that irony plays a central role in Kierkegaard’s authorship. 10 hartshorne, Kierkegaard, Godly Deceiver, p. 62. 11 ibid., p. 66. 12 michael Strawser, review in Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, vol. 26, 1992, p. 11; and Jerry gill, review in International Studies in Philosophy, vol. 24, no. 3, 1991, pp. 117–18. 13 Strawser, review in Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, vol. 26, 1993, pp. 11–12. 9

reviews and critical discussions Ferreira, m. Jamie, review in Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 32, no. 3, 1992, pp. 190–3. gill, Jerry, review in International Studies in Philosophy, vol. 24, no. 3, 1991, pp. 117–18. martinez, roy, review in Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 26, no. 3, 1992, pp. 449–52. müller, paul, review in Præsteforeningens Blad, vol. 81, 1991, pp. 396–7. possen, david, “the works of anti-climacus,” in Practice in Christianity, ed. by robert L. perkins, macon, georgia: mercer university press 2004 (International Kierkegaard Commentary, vol. 20), pp. 187–90. Shiflett, Ira K., review in Journal of Church and State, vol. 33, no. 3, 1991, pp. 631–2. Strawser, michael, review in Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, vol. 26, 1992, pp. 10–14. — “are the pseudonymous views completely bogus?: on hartshorne’s Kierkegaard: Godly Deceiver,” in Both/And: Reading Kierkegaard from Irony to Edification, new york: Fordham university press 1997 (Perspectives in Continental Philosophy, vol. 2), pp. 100–109. watkin, Julia, review in Literature and Theology, vol. 6, no. 4, 1992, pp. 394–5.

hector hawton, The Feast of Unreason, London: watts & co. 1952, vii + 234 pp.

hector hawton’s The Feast of Unreason was first published in 1952, and then a second edition was published in 1970.1 when Kierkegaardians write on Kierkegaard there is occasionally a lack of critical perspective that can lead to giving the danish Socrates a pass on some of his ideas and formulations that are less than edifying. a refreshing quality characterizes hector hawton’s treatment. writing as a humanist and an atheist, he had no vested interest in employing a hermeneutics of charity on this one who some regard as a “sainted” writer. the force of his criticism against Kierkegaard, though, was not directed particularly against Kierkegaard’s theism, faith, and religiosity. For hawton, what he called “the great divide” refers not to the division between atheism and theism but between reason and unreason. atheism and rationalism are not always two peas in the same pod. therefore, he blithely lumps the theists Kierkegaard and pascal together with the atheists nietzsche, heidegger, and Sartre as all requiring his strictures because of their rejection of reason and embrace of unreason. Kierkegaard’s existentialism had become fashionable in different forms and its advancement of unreason was why the movement needed to be countered. this book’s 1952 publication date means that the pessimistic mind-set of the post-World War II context was a significant factor in existentialism’s popularity. hawton periodized western history from the reformation to his present as progressing from the age of Faith through the age of doubt and the age of reason to the then-current threat of the age of despair. the despairing age called for people to turn their backs on science, reason, and vain human hopes, for disillusionment needed to be faced since rationalism had become obsolete. the cult of Kierkegaard called for a return to tertullian’s Credo quia absurdum and to viewing christianity as the absurd that nevertheless must be believed. hawton insisted that to understand the prevailing mood of the present it was essential to understand the two figures who most personified it—Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, in their fabricated heroics, their unwillingness to compromise, their romantic elevation of the individual and abhorrence of the collective, and their antagonism toward the liberal and scientific outlook. hawton wrote this book to strike back from the humanist point of view against the disillusionment that had been progressing since 1914. he was under 1 hector hawton, The Feast of Unreason, 2nd ed., westport, connecticut: greenwood press 1970.

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no illusion that he could argue with an irrationalist. attacking the philosophy of decadence threatening the time had to assume the form of accurately depicting its fraudulent way of thinking in order to let the denuded viewpoint condemn itself. a word on hector hawton (1901–75) is in order because his name is unfamiliar to many situated within Kierkegaard circles. he was a writer in the United Kingdom and one of its most significant humanists during the middle of the twentieth century. he was raised in a strict protestant family, converted to catholicism in his mid-teens as an act of rebellion, later studied science and philosophy that led him to a brief period as a marxist, and then became a humanist. He wrote many works of fiction including detective thrillers and some books verging on science fiction. For these he routinely used pseudonyms, which he also used when contributing articles to The Humanist for which he served as editor. hawton functioned as the managing director of the rationalist press association, effectively downsizing the operation so that it could survive. he participated in the establishment of the international humanist and ethical union in 1952. His writings reflected his unusually wide reading and his exceptionally lucid style of presentation. references to Kierkegaard were sprinkled throughout the book. Singular focus was given to him in the fourth chapter on “the case of Kierkegaard.” Kierkegaard’s maieutic method of the midwife as inherited from Socrates was discussed as not arguing directly but instead calling for the teacher to stimulate the student to find the answer in herself rather than forthrightly telling her the answer. in communicating essential matters to another the point was not to have the other come to know something but to come to be something. the response involved choosing and not just cognizing. in this sense, neutrality was impossible, and thus agnosticism as neutral and noncommittal was worse than atheism, which at least involved choosing. Hawton identified the main Kierkegaardian categories as being dread or anxiety, despair, the leap or choice, and existence. anxiety and despair, it was suggested, both arise out of the estrangement of the finite human from the infinite God. Dread emerged from the reality of human freedom. contemplating the possibilities one was facing in choosing, and realizing there was no way of evading this situation, a person experienced spiritual vertigo as anxiety that is apprehensiveness over what is about to happen, an uneasiness with no definite object. Despair of the weak or defiant variety can be unconscious or conscious and is regarded by Hawton as the mood most spread by irrationalism and existentialism. Leaping into the absurd, and explicitly irrational action, was also required for the christian, because christianity is an issue of the heart and the will rather than of the intellect. it is a way of living and existing instead of thinking. if Kierkegaard’s world-hating punitive deity actually existed, then the human predicament he describes might be true. but such a god is non-existent, so Kierkegaard’s anthropological analysis is illegitimate. hawton pointed out both that Kierkegaard refused to build a system and yet his teaching comes close to a system. he did not completely shed hegel’s early influence on him. The Dane’s dialectical perspective endorses the aesthetic, ethical, and religious stages. the aesthetic stage concentrates on the moment as measured

Hector Hawton

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in terms of pleasure and pain. This superficial mode of living is transcended by the second mode of the ethical, which is constituted by choosing between right and wrong regardless of pleasure. beyond the ethical sphere concerned with the cultivation of virtue as a universal lies the religious, which brings one into the arena of god, sin, and salvation. the christian religion is an existential communication. to be a christian is to exist in the existence-communication that is christianity, to expound it in existence, to reproduce it in life. this involves repentance, encounter with god, and an act of will in the leap of faith. Knowledge of the historical christ can only attain the level of an approximation, but faith has access to the contemporaneous christ who is personally encountered in the present. Faith believes the paradox of the god-human, and hawton regarded such faith as being utterly discontinuous with reason. on hawton’s interpretation of Kierkegaard, the fact of a dominating father, frustration with love, and disclosure of the father’s secret to the son were important contributing factors to a special crisis characterized by melancholy and despair. the author portrayed Kierkegaard in his youth as an extremely wayward, libertine student for a decade. on Kierkegaard’s aborted engagement to regine olsen, Hawton suggested that she was lucky to escape because her ex-fiancé was utterly ill-suited for marriage, an introvert filled with a fear of sexuality, and able to fall in love only with the idea of a woman because this enemy of ideas actually lived in the world of ideas. He finds Kierkegaard’s treatment of Regine nauseating. hawton saw the world-denying and world-hating posture hinted at in the relation to regine receiving much harsher expression in Kierkegaard’s attack against the church. here the angry prophet saw christianity as having been replaced by a christendom whose comfortable middle-class members were part of an institution that caters to the ideals of conformist propriety. For Kierkegaard, the prevailing organized religion of the day needed to hear the call for the individual to make the decision to live “before god,” and, of course, this was the call to irrationality. hawton thought this case made against the danish institutional church as not being christianity was Kierkegaard’s most important achievement. he appreciated Kierkegaard’s insistence that metaphysical systems of the hegelian type were extremely one-sided and his recognition of defective philosophical systems that attempt to view reality from the perspective of eternity, as if life was merely to be contemplated rather than lived. he is to be credited with his personal testimony that a philosopher must not allow himself to be torn from the solitude that is his calling. at the end, though, Kierkegaard’s position was far too morbid for hawton. he was a sick, neurotic human being no less than pascal and nietzsche were. Amidst the literary flourishes, one is left at bottom merely with crazy thoughts that plague marginal thinkers and claims that differ little from those of scary born-again preachers. hawton cannot agree with the strategy that demands a schizophrenic procedure as the means of unifying the personality. also, Kierkegaard’s claims that subjectivity is truth and its corollary that the crowd is the lie underestimate the value and importance of objectivity and community. Finally, the either/or presentation of the choice represents a logical fallacy of forced alternatives, for there might well be c, d, or e, and so on, as other legitimate options.

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one could engage many of hawton’s points as being over-drawn and make a case for a more nuanced interpretation of Kierkegaard. but it must be admitted that much can be learned from this book about how Kierkegaard is perceived by a humanist committed to reason. curtis L. thompson

reviews and critical discussions undetermined.

paul L. holmer, The Grammar of Faith, new york: harper & row 1978, xii + 212 pp.

paul holmer’s work, The Grammar of Faith, was first published in 1978 as an earnest response to what holmer saw as a disappointing turn in the academic study of theology. not strictly a work about Kierkegaard, its perspective is, however, fully informed by Kierkegaardian concerns. Like Kierkegaard, holmer was offended by intellectual trends that came to dominate thinking among theologians of his era. The Grammar of Faith was nothing short of a “clarion call”1 to restore practical urgency to discussions about christian faith and eternal salvation. holmer was dismayed that the study of theology had degenerated into disagreements between scholars, with their “competing ‘isms,’ contradictions, meta-views—generally an intellectual jumble.”2 theology, he was convinced, had become much too abstract, irrelevant to the lives of christians, and the preserve of isolated specialists, though plagued by conceptual confusion. rather than paying attention to the christian “life-and-death” struggles of the soul, theology in seminaries and graduate schools had become an interpretive “game” that had devolved into verbal gymnastics, historical studies, or something “journalistic” that followed the latest, most fashionable trends. what is most important, argued holmer, is “to learn to hunger and thirst for righteousness, to learn to love a neighbor, and to achieve a high degree of self-concern.”3 holmer sought to refocus academic attention upon the “divine magesterium” (what remains unchanged through the ages), as well as the “passion” of faith that is evoked within the godrelationship. taking a page from the austrian philosopher Ludwig wittgenstein, holmer examines what it means to be guided by a “grammar” that informs one’s thinking and beliefs. a “grammar” is initially a set of rules, a logic for thought and expression, that becomes a practice, the “how” everything else is done. theology, then, according to holmer, is more than merely a set of propositions, an ideology, or a creed; rather it “must always move towards a present-tense, first-person mood.”4 as Kierkegaard also stressed, christian faith must involve personal “appropriation” and the orientation of one’s very self toward god, that is, genuine “subjectivity.” 1 the term is used by durstan r. mcdonald in a review of The Grammar of Faith in Anglican Theological Review, vol. 62, no. 2, 1980, pp. 182–4. 2 paul L. holmer, The Grammar of Faith, new york: harper & row 1978, p. x. 3 ibid., p. 9. 4 ibid., p. 24.

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holmer employs Kierkegaard’s categorical distinctions between an “apostle” and a “genius” to analyze the contemporary (academic) dilemma. he leans, as one would expect, toward the importance of apostolic witness and the god-relationship that christianity demands, and away from the jargon and “systems” that distract from christianity’s imperative. in his criticisms, holmer does name names. Some theologians, he argues, are overly concerned with abstract thought, “schemes,” and technical analysis (those in the line of g.w.F. hegel, paul tillich, wolfhart pannenberg, and perhaps Karl rahner),5 others with “demythologizing” (rudolf bultmann),6 and others yet with “scientific” analysis (Anders Nygren).7 holmer prefers to remind the reader that theology can, and should have, the capacity to introduce the “terrifying holiness” of god and call one to conversion.8 the “critics” have their preoccupations, but they are not those of ordinary christians, and what they might believe. he cares about personal assimilation of the gospel, “contriteness of Spirit, the broken hearts, the pathos and felt need.”9 the “learned” study of the history of ideas (“typically objective and disinterested, detached and neutral”) cannot deliver this; it merely satisfies curiosity, not social demands or personal needs. The very purpose of theology, and its attention to the “grammar of faith,” is “to intensify and to purify religious passion.”10 Theologians, then, have a difficult task—to overcome theology as merely semantics, to go deeper than abstract language, to undertake “an exercise in concreto.”11 holmer was not, however, advocating for a “religion of experience” that would forsake theology or doctrine; these he saw as essential. instead, he wanted theology to serve christianity as “the language of the faith, and not about it.”12 there ought to be an appreciation, he argued, for the connections between concepts and their meanings; as wittgenstein said, concepts “lead us to make investigations,”13 that is, they are intimately connected to how we live. while some concepts do emerge and change and perhaps fade in significance (or fashion), the central concepts of christian faith have an enduring and non-historical character. they have the power to “explain, praise, and curse…[and] even attain peace of mind and forgiveness of sins.”14 importantly, holmer distinguishes between “philosophical theism” and its systems of ideas (what does battle in debate with atheists), and “the essence of christianity,”15 which he places squarely on the shoulders of “obedience

ibid., p. 41. ibid., p. 54. 7 ibid., p. 59. 8 ibid., p. 36. 9 ibid., p. 51. 10 ibid., p. 67. 11 ibid., pp. 132–3. 12 ibid., p. 138. 13 ibid., p. 141. 14 ibid., p. 152. 15 ibid., p. 161. cf. Ludwig wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. by g.e.m. anscombe, p.m.S. wiley, and Joachim Schulte, oxford: wiley-blackwell 2009, no. 570, p. 159. 5 6

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and following, loyalty and suffering,” rather than bald theism.16 holmer was selfconscious of appearing “anti-intellectual” in raising these concerns, but was also aware of sharing company with wittgenstein and Kierkegaard in resisting an academic prejudice that treats ideas or concepts as “purely mental and only in the mind.”17 the language of faith found in Scripture and in liturgy, he insisted, was the sort of “first-person language” where a practicing Christian can find a home.18 An understudy of David Swenson, one of the first Americans to translate Kierkegaard into english, holmer is remembered for his “sustained Kierkegaardian critique of contemporary religiosity,” someone who served as “a gadfly on the current theological scene.”19 he was also called “a superb iconoclast” who loved to smash the idols of metaphysics, philosophy, and theory.20 holmer sought to emphasize the gospel’s transformative claim on the individual: “ideas become important when they have a context in our lives, our cares and passions, our longings and hopes.”21 He was interested in theology not because it satisfied his intellectual curiosity, but instead because he felt it made a demand upon him, and all sympathetic readers. holmer has been credited with “developing a different strategy for understanding the nature of religious language,” one that addressed the human heart and the need for subjectivity.22 The Grammar of Faith has been lauded as “invaluable” and “exciting,” “illuminating” and “fascinating” for forcing the reader “to face the topsy-turvy world as mortals rather than as gods, and to look at the world from the viewpoint of fallen, limited, finite, and sinful human beings rather than sub specie aeternitatis.”23 while holmer’s work serves the current reader as a reminder of the perils of over-intellectualizing existential matters of christian faith, his polemical work is rooted in a particular academic context, one that prevailed in academic faculties of theology in the 1970s. that notwithstanding, “it seems wise to read holmer as a rather individual thinker, rather than as an instance of some movement or other.”24 he can be credited with bringing both Kierkegaard and wittgenstein into further conversation with contemporary christian theology. robert b. puchniak

holmer, The Grammar of Faith, p. 162. ibid., pp. 169–70. 18 ibid., pp. 192–3. 19 Mark Horst, “Disciplined by Theology: A Profile of Paul Holmer,” Christian Century, october 12, 1988, pp. 891–5. 20 h.a.d., review in Review of Metaphysics, vol. 34, no. 3, 1981, p. 611. 21 Horst, “Disciplined by Theology: A Profile of Paul Holmer,” p. 892. 22 richard h. bell, “culture, morality, and religious belief,” in The Grammar of the Heart: New Essays in Moral Philosophy & Theology, ed. by richard h. bell, San Francisco: harper & row 1988, p. xiii. 23 cornel west, review in Union Seminary Quarterly Review, vol. 35, nos. 3–4, 1980, pp. 279–85. 24 John m. Frame, review in Westminster Theological Journal, vol. 42, no. 1, 1979, pp. 219–31. 16 17

reviews and critical discussions bell, richard h., “culture, morality, and religious belief,” in The Grammar of the Heart: New Essays in Moral Philosophy & Theology, ed. by richard h. bell, San Francisco: harper & row 1988, pp. xi–xxviii. burrell, david b., review in Journal of Religion, vol. 61, no. 2, 1981, pp. 211–12. cooper, b., review in New Review of Books and Religion, vol. 3, no. 6, 1979, p. 5. currie, thomas w., “grace, not method,” Interpretation, vol. 33, no. 3, 1979, pp. 308–11. Frame, John m., review in Westminster Theological Journal, vol. 42, no. 1, 1979, pp. 219–31. h.a.d., review in Review of Metaphysics, vol. 34, no. 3, 1981, p. 611. Horst, Mark, “Disciplined by Theology: A Profile of Paul Holmer,” Christian Century, october 12, 1988. mcdonald, durstan r., review in Anglican Theological Review, vol. 62, no. 2, 1980, pp. 182–4. padgett, a., review in Theological Students Fellowship Bulletin, vol. 5, no. 1, 1981, pp. 22–3. perkins, robert L., review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 12, 1982, pp. 117–21. robbins, Jerry K., review in Christian Century, vol. 96, no. 7, 1979, p. 225. ross, robert r.n., review in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol. 47, no. 4, 1979, pp. 689–90. tilley, terrence w., review in Theological Studies, vol. 40, no. 3, 1979, pp. 541–3. wells, d.F., review in Christian Scholar’s Review, vol. 10, no. 1, 1980, pp. 84–5. west, cornel, review in Union Seminary Quarterly Review, vol. 35, nos. 3–4, 1980, pp. 279–85. wood, charles m., review in Perkins Journal, vol. 32, no. 4, 1979, pp. 52–3.

Jacob howland, Kierkegaard and Socrates: A Study in Philosophy and Faith, cambridge: cambridge university press 2006, xii + 231 pp.

in Kierkegaard and Socrates: A Study in Philosophy and Faith, Jacob howland has provided his readers with a valuable resource on the relationship between faith and philosophy in the writings of Johannes climacus with a special focus on Philosophical Fragments. howland notes that his intended audience consists of the “educated amateur” and the “scholars of philosophy and religion.”1 This book claims that it is “the first book to focus on the role of Socrates in this pseudonymous volume, and…the significance of Socrates for Kierkegaard’s thought in general.”2 regarding this latter claim, howland cites benjamin daise’s work, Kierkegaard’s Socratic Art,3 as an example. he notes that while daise’s work does read climacus’ works “as Socratic exercises in indirect communication,” it does “not examine the significance of the figure of Socrates within these texts.”4 however, there are a number of resources available, which bring this book’s claim of being the first one to focus on Socrates into question.5 methodologically, howland notes that one should view the Socrates in climacus’ texts as the Socrates of the platonic dialogues. the reader should also keep in mind that climacus’ aim is not to provide “an accurate representation of the historical Socrates”6 nor does climacus attempt to make sure “that his interpretation of

Jacob howland, Kierkegaard and Socrates: A Study in Philosophy and Faith, cambridge: cambridge university press 2006, p. 7. 2 ibid., back cover. 3 benjamin daise, Kierkegaard’s Socratic Art, macon, georgia: mercer university press 1999. 4 howland, Kierkegaard and Socrates, p. 5, note 6. 5 See wolfdietrich von Kloeden, Kierkegaard und Sokrates. Sören Kierkegaards Sokratesrezeption, rheinland-westfalen-Lippe: evangelische Fachhochschule 1991 (Schriften-reihe der Evangelischen Fachhochschule Rheinland-Westafalen-Lippe, vol. 16); Jens himmelstrup, Søren Kierkegaards Opfattelse af Sokrates. En Studie i dansk Filosofis Historie, copenhagen: arnold busck 1924; Sophia Scopetea, Kierkegaard og græciteten. En kamp med ironi, copenhagen: c.a. reitzel 1995. 6 howland, Kierkegaard and Socrates, p. 8. 1

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Socrates is textually well founded.”7 climacus’ goal is to focus on “ideas rather than their pedigree.”8 howland provides a very helpful overview of the background for Kierkegaard’s climacus literature. he gives a very brief account of St. John climacus, “or John of the Ladder,” climacus’ namesake, who wrote “one of the most well-known books of eastern christendom,”9 The Ladder of Divine Ascent.10 howland observes the similarities between the saint and Kierkegaard’s own climacus, including their philosophical natures, love of wisdom, and acknowledgement of god’s mysterious self-revealing nature. howland gives his reader a helpful summary of Kierkegaard’s De Omnibus Dubitandum est, which sketches a brief account of Johannes climacus’ life. this account helps the reader to understand climacus’ motives in writing Philosophical Fragments and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, as a critique of dispassionate, “objective” hegelian philosophy as well as an encouragement for the philosopher to passionately live the philosophy one advocates. the majority of the book provides a detailed commentary of the Philosophical Fragments along with a brief excursion in chapter 10 into the Postscript, in which climacus attempts to provide closure to his account of Socrates in the Fragments, which howland observes he is not quite able to do. throughout the book, howland attempts to provide an account of the relationship between philosophy and faith. at times, this relationship seems at odds with itself. at other times, howland seems to provide an account that demonstrates a continuity between faith and philosophy. in the end, however, howland notes that the relationship between faith and philosophy in Climacus’ works is left unclarified. one important contribution this book makes beyond its focus on Socrates and its commentary on the Fragments is its emphasis on Socrates’ philosophical eros. Howland finds that this “eros stands at the center of climacus’ consideration of the relationship between philosophy and faith,” yet “scholars have paid little attention to its role in Fragments.”11 this eros is a “human and divine” element drawing “the soul upward no less than it drives it forward.”12 while climacus never completely explains this eros, it does seem that “philosophical eros is an analogue of the passion of faith, and a stepping stone to understanding this passion. yet one is left with the paradoxical impression that…they nonetheless remain worlds apart.”13 one oddity worth noting is the lack of references to The Concept of Irony aside from a brief reference on pages 15–16. while howland does make clear that this work is focused primarily on the climacus pseudonym, this book does claim to account for “the significance of Socrates for Kierkegaard’s thought in general.”14 as ibid., p. 42. ibid. 9 ibid., p. 11. 10 John climacus, The Ladder of Divine Ascent, trans. by colm Luibheid and norman russell, new york: paulist press 1982. 11 howland, Kierkegaard and Socrates, p. 5. 12 ibid. 13 ibid., p. 204. 14 ibid., back cover. 7 8

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such, one would expect more engagement with Kierkegaard’s dissertation, in which Socrates plays a dominant role. Howland has provided a very important contribution to the field of Kierkegaard studies with this work, especially as it relates to understanding Socrates’ role in climacus’ discussion of the relationship between faith and reason. howland does not gloss over the complexities within climacus’ works, but he offers the reader detailed exposition and commentary on the material. matthew brake

reviews and critical discussions evans, c. Stephen, review in Review of Metaphysics, vol. 65, no. 3, 2012, pp. 654–6. garner, rod, review in Reviews in Religion and Theology, vol. 14, no. 1, 2007, pp. 115–16. malesic, Jonathan, review in Modern Theology, vol. 23, no. 3, 2007, pp. 492–5. manthei, emily, review in Journal of Theological Studies, vol. 58, no. 2, 2007, pp. 772–4. nelson, christopher, review in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 65, no. 1, 2009, pp. 53–7. oakes, edward t., review in First Things, no. 171, 2007, p. 52. pattison, george, review in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2006 (online journal). possen, david d., review in Review of Politics, vol. 70, no. 1, 2008, pp. 158–61. turnbull, Jamie, review in Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 45, no. 3, 2007, pp. 503–4.

elsebet Jegstrup (ed.), The New Kierkegaard, bloomington and indianapolis: indiana university press 2004, xii + 266 pp.

The New Kierkegaard, a collection of “deconstructive readings” of Kierkegaard edited by elsebet Jegstrup, was published in 2004 by indiana university press in their series, Studies in Continental Thought, edited by John Sallis.1 the volume contains essays by thirteen scholars, most of whom had established themselves in the field as deconstructive readers of Kierkegaard before the collection’s publication, although in at least three cases the authors were better known for their work on Jacques derrida and deconstruction than on Kierkegaard.2 although deconstructive interpretations of Kierkegaard and analyses of the relationship between Kierkegaard and postmodernism or deconstruction had been available for some time before the publication of Jegstrup’s collection, The New Kierkegaard anthologizes different approaches to deconstructing Kierkegaard in a fashion that is unique in the literature. It thus serves readers well as the first resource for approaching Kierkegaard and deconstruction; as Jegstrup notes, she edited the book “so that more young continental philosophers might begin to read this extraordinary philosopher as a bona fide contributor to the philosophical tradition whose work falls within both modern and post/modern thinking.”3 the purpose, then, is not simply to deconstruct Kierkegaard, but to show that Kierkegaard is a predecessor, if not a practitioner, of deconstruction. the volume originated in a conference on deconstructive readings of Kierkegaard’s Either/Or at augusta State university in 2001, but a number of the book’s chapters were not based on papers delivered at the conference. this gives the collection a decidedly fragmentary character, but Jegstrup both acknowledges and embraces this fragmentation. She writes, “the intention is to forestall a reductive reading of the present essays on Kierkegaard….generally speaking, they have been located in a non-hierarchical sequence that presupposes no connections, no links, no relationships.”4 this not only lends the volume a remarkable diversity across chapters, but also leaves the reader without any decisive or final determination as to 1 The New Kierkegaard, ed. by elsebet Jegstrup, bloomington and indianapolis: indiana university press 2004, p. ix. 2 i am thinking in particular here of the chapters by John d. caputo, david wood, and richard Kearney. 3 The New Kierkegaard, p. ix. 4 The New Kierkegaard, p. 10.

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(a) what “deconstruction” is, or (b) how Kierkegaard is related to it. although these might be considered the operative questions binding the thirteen chapters together into a single book, final answers to those questions remain elusive throughout. the chapters are perhaps best understood as falling into two loosely organized groups: those which deal centrally with the question of Kierkegaard’s relationship to deconstruction and/or derrida, and those which deconstruct one or more of Kierkegaard’s works. the chapters in the latter group are indispensable resources for coming to terms with the various deconstructive approaches to Kierkegaard, but are numerous and diverse enough to prevent serious examination of each of them within the limited scope of a review. the group, however, is constituted by the following essays: Joakim garff, “the esthetic is above all my element” (a deconstruction of Either/Or that posits a possible new role for Judge william’s wife in readings of the book, pp. 59–70); elsebet Jegstrup, “a rose by any other name… ” (also on Either/Or, and concerned deeply with the significance of pseudonymity, pp. 71–87); John Llewelyn, “on the borderline of madness” (a comparative examination of Kierkegaard, Foucault, and derrida on the relationship of madness to philosophy, pp. 88–111); Jacob bøggild, “revocated trials: on the indirect communication in two of Kierkegaard’s early religious discourses” (a deconstruction of two of the Upbuilding Discourses, “the Lord gave and the Lord hath taken away, blessed by the name of the Lord” from 1843, and “the thorn in the Flesh” from 1844, pp. 112–127); david wood, “the First Kiss: tales of innocence and experience” (a reconsideration of the relationship between the aesthetic and the ethical in Either/ Or, pp. 128–140); robert gibbs, “i or you: the dash of ethics” (a deconstructive commentary on selected passages from Works of Love, in which the relationship for Kierkegaard and derrida between reading, commentary, responsibility, and ethics is demonstrated, pp. 141–160); vanessa rumble, “Love and difference: the christian ideal in Kierkegaard’s Works of Love” (a deconstruction of Works of Love with particular reference to the notion of the gift in derrida, pp. 161–178); John Vignaux Smyth, “Art, Eroticism, and Sadomasochistic Sacrifice in Søren Kierkegaard and isak dinesen” (a reading of dinesen’s Ehrengard as a response to “the diary of a Seducer” in Either/Or, pp. 179–198); Jason wirth, “empty community: Kierkegaard on being with you” (a deconstructive examination of the role of community in Kierkegaard, pp. 214–223); and richard Kearney, “Kierkegaard on hamlet: between art and religion” (a derridean reading of the political significance of Kierkegaard’s comments on William Shakespeare’s Hamlet, 224–243). naturally, a list of this sort cannot do any of the contributions (or their authors) justice, but it can serve to reiterate Jegstrup’s introductory note, that the diversity of the contributions that constitute The New Kierkegaard cannot be, or at least was not meant to be, reducible to any single set of questions or themes—aside, obviously, from the commitment each author has made to give in his or her chapter what they take to be a deconstructive reading of Kierkegaard.

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the remaining authors—John d. caputo, roger poole, and mark dooley5—as well as Jegstrup herself, in the introduction,6 take upon themselves the somewhat more basic task of elucidating the nature of deconstruction either in relation to or as it appears in the works of Kierkegaard. true to Jegstrup’s word, they do this in different ways. in the introduction, Jegstrup devotes considerable space to depicting deconstruction as a response or in contrast to what she dubs “logocentrism.” asserting that “Kierkegaard is himself, for all intents and purposes, a deconstructive philosopher,”7 Jegstrup accuses much of the history of commentary on and interpretation of Kierkegaard—perhaps especially biographical interpretations and the readings produced by contemporary analytic philosophers—of failing to read Kierkegaard with an adequate degree of attention to his thoughts on existence. She understands the origin of this inadequacy to lie in the absence of an interest in or concern for irony, including Kierkegaard’s uses of pseudonymity and other forms of indirect communication. drawing the contrast between such “logocentric” readings and deconstructive readings, Jegstrup writes: “deconstruction celebrates singularity, celebrates the ambiguities of human experience in the world and thus discloses the tensions so characteristic of existence. in contrast, logocentrism rests on a systemic approach that promises to expose truth, promises to reveal reality, promises one unitary meaning that has its ground in a logical understanding of textual evidence.”8 Jegstrup’s account of deconstruction remains in the realm of the negative, delineating its differences from logocentrism but rarely hazarding to posit anything of deconstruction itself—and this, it seems, for good deconstructive reasons. as she warns in the introduction, “deconstruction is not one thing.”9 the characterizations of deconstruction in the other theoretical chapters— those by caputo, poole, and dooley—help to make this point. caputo presents deconstruction as derridean “undecidability,” and attempts to show how the Kierkegaardian authorship prefigures Derrida when undecidability is understood as irony—although, for caputo, Kierkegaard’s christian irony and derrida’s deconstructive (or “khoral”) irony are irreconcilably different.10 poole emphasizes the way in which Kierkegaard’s writings demand a personal, purely subjective response on the part of the reader, making any sort of objectivizing (hegelian or “logocentric”) understanding of his works impossible.11 and dooley, in reading Kierkegaard alongside derrida and emmanuel Levinas, argues that, like Levinas and derrida (but in contrast to non-deconstructive readings), “Kierkegaard’s John d. caputo, “either—or, undecidability, and two concepts of irony: Kierkegaard and derrida,” in The New Kierkegaard, pp. 14–41; roger poole, “reading Either—Or for the very First time,” pp. 42–58; and mark dooley, “Kierkegaard and derrida: between totality and Infinity,” pp. 199–213. 6 Jegstrup, “introduction,” in The New Kierkegaard, pp. 1–13. 7 ibid., p. 1. 8 ibid., p. 2. 9 ibid., p. 5. 10 caputo, “either—or, undecidability, and two concepts of irony: Kierkegaard and derrida,” in The New Kierkegaard, pp. 25–33. 11 poole, “reading Either—Or for the very First time,” in The New Kierkegaard, p. 53. 5

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notion of identity is predicated upon an openness to others.”12 thus, the four more theoretical approaches to Kierkegaard and deconstruction leave us with four aspects of derridean deconstruction: undecidability, the inescapability of subjectivity, ethics as openness to the other, and a consistent opposition to logocentrism. read in this way, then, The New Kierkegaard is not only a display of some of the ways in which Kierkegaard and deconstruction intersect, but also a sort of primer—for readers of Derrida, on the significance of Kierkegaard for contemporary continental philosophy, and for readers of Kierkegaard, on some of the ways in which we might come to understand deconstruction as having an important—some might say necessary—relationship to Kierkegaard. Joseph westfall

Dooley, “Kierkegaard and Derrida: Between Totality and Infinity,” in The New Kierkegaard, p. 203. 12

reviews and critical discussions Ferreira, m. Jamie, review in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 58, no. 2, 2005, pp. 125–128. matuštik, martin beck, review in Philosophy in Review (Comptes rendus philosophiques), vol. 25, no. 2, 2005, pp. 114–116. Simmons, J. aaron, review in Teaching Philosophy, vol. 28, no. 2, 2005, pp. 191– 194.

howard a. Johnson and niels thulstrup (eds.), A Kierkegaard Critique, new york: harper and brothers 1962, 311 pp.

Johnson and thulstrup’s work, A Kierkegaard Critique, was compiled as “a service to those…who can read english and are interested in Soren Kierkegaard.”1 at time of publication, Johnson was canon theologian of the cathedral church of St. John the divine in new york city and former professor of religion at columbia university. thulstrup was pastor of St. nikolai church in holbæk, denmark and secretary of the Søren Kierkegaard Society. the editors note that the essays appearing in this volume have been “locked up” from broad circulation in two ways. First, the essays in this work “originally appeared in danish, French, german, italian and Swedish, and have hitherto been ‘locked up’ in those languages.”2 Second, these essays “had first been published in learned journals and quarterlies of a technical character—and usually of a severely limited circulation.”3 the “fairly obscure” nature of many of the original periodicals in which these essays appeared all but ensured that many of these studies “might easily escape the attention of scholars in other lands.”4 what Johnson and thulstrup provide here is what they describe as an “international roundup” of quality scholarship on Kierkegaard.5 Johnson and thulstrup cite four criteria for their determination of which articles would be included. First, they note that “novelty” was one of their criteria, in that they wanted articles which (at that time) “had something fairly new to say about Kierkegaard.”6 Second, they looked for articles that discussed familiar subjects but went “deeper than is common in such discussions or else [suggested] a quite different line of interpreting data already known.”7 third, Johnson and thulstrup offer “the principle of correlation”8 as another factor in their selection process. in 1 A Kierkegaard Critique, ed. by howard a. Johnson and niels thulstrup, new york: harper and brothers 1962, p. 1. 2 ibid. 3 ibid. 4 ibid. 5 ibid. 6 ibid., p. 2. 7 ibid. 8 ibid.

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other words, many of the featured articles consist of the “ ‘Kierkegaard and…’ type (e.g., and nietzsche, and Sartre).”9 Finally, they wanted to make sure that their work contained “a balanced representation, one which would reflect…that Kierkegaard was not only a theologian or a philosopher or a poet but all three.”10 many of the essays appearing in this work “stem from the year 1955, the centenary of Kierkegaard’s death.”11 these “centennial studies”12 were originally gathered in 1956 with original plans to publish them in 1957; however, many problems delayed their publication. Regarding these essays finally being made available for broad circulation, Johnson and thulstrup remark tongue-in-cheek, “better late than never.”13 many of the essays of the “Kierkegaard and” variety seek try to compare and contrast Kierkegaard with other relevant historical figures by demonstrating a point of departure between Kierkegaard and them. in his essay, “Kierkegaard and Luther,”14 Johannes Sløk notes that while martin Luther and Kierkegaard are similar, differences in their perspectives are due to the different times in which they lived. gregor malantschuk’s essay, “Kierkegaard and nietzsche,”15 regards the turbulent influence of Kierkegaard’s relationship with his father upon his spiritual life as the deciding difference between Kierkegaard’s lifelong devotion to christianity and Nietzsche’s rejection of it. Regin Prenter observes that while Kierkegaard influenced Jean-paul Sartre’s conception of freedom, the latter differed from the former in that Sartre’s view of freedom is more akin to Kierkegaard’s aesthetic stage than to his concept of freedom found in ethical continuity. a number of essays in this work provide a cross-examination of concepts in Kierkegaard that are often misunderstood even today. For example, the articles of both Liselotte richter16 and howard Johnson17 address the concept of the “the masses” or “the crowd” in Kierkegaard’s writings with richter focusing on its applicability to the religious life and Johnson on its applicability to its political dimensions. On the topic of faith, one finds essays from James Collins,18 cornelio

ibid. ibid. 11 ibid. 12 ibid. 13 ibid. 14 Johannes Sløk, “Kierkegaard and Luther,” in A Kierkegaard Critique, pp. 85–101. 15 gregor malantschuk, “Kierkegaard and nietzsche,” in A Kierkegaard Critique, pp. 116–129. 16 Liselotte richter, “Kierkegaard’s position in his religio-Sociological Situation,” in A Kierkegaard Critique, pp. 54–73. 17 howard a Johnson, “Kierkegaard and politics,” in A Kierkegaard Critique, pp. 74– 84. 18 James Collins, “Faith and Reflection in Kierkegaard,” in A Kierkegaard Critique, pp. 141–55. 9

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Fabro,19 and n.h. Søe20 that address the often confusing relationship in Kierkegaard between faith and reason. one of the particular strengths of this work is thulstrup’s own essay, “the complex of problems called ‘Kierkegaard.’ ”21 this essay provides insight into the problems with Kierkegaard studies. thulstrup is right to point out that responsible Kierkegaard research requires studying the thousand historical threads that connect Kierkegaard to his era, the psychological works which form the background of The Concept of Anxiety, for example, as well as other philosophical and literary works, and not just Kierkegaard’s own view of those works. he also notes the problems associated with studying particular concepts that Kierkegaard uses in isolation. thulstrup reminds scholars to examine the complex historical situation in which they find any historical figure whom they wish to evaluate and to avoid taking any easy shortcuts in their scholarship. while this volume contains many strong pieces on Kierkegaard, there is one work that seems to lack the quality of the others. I refer to the final essay, “Thanksgiving as a Synthesis of the temporal and the eternal” by paul S. minear.22 while the essay is well written, one wonders why it was included. it is not necessarily contrived, but while the author does cite thanksgiving and gratitude as his priority, the focus oscillates between that and prayer. one wonders if this piece might have been more coherent if it had focused on prayer and discussed thanksgiving as a supporting point in the overall argument. minear, for his part, writes as a man fully convinced of the importance of thanksgiving and gratitude in Kierkegaard’s life and work, but the piece reads like a personal epiphany for minear himself. i am not sure that others will share minear’s passion for his insight. overall, Johnson and thulstrup put together a very strong collection of essays on Kierkegaard. They fulfilled their goal of providing a collection of high-quality, although obscure, international works on Kierkegaard to an english-speaking audience. given that most of these essays give attention to the historical context and do not simply read into Kierkegaard’s works ideas that are not there, this collection remains relevant even today. matthew brake

cornelio Fabro, “Faith and reason in Kierkegaard’s dialectic,” in A Kierkegaard Critique, pp. 156–206. 20 n.h. Søe, “Kierkegaard’s doctrine of the paradox,” in A Kierkegaard Critique, pp. 207–27. 21 niels thulstrup, “the complex of problems called ‘Kierkegaard,’ ” in A Kierkegaard Critique, pp. 286–96. 22 paul S. minear, “thanksgiving as a Synthesis of the temporal and the eternal,” in A Kierkegaard Critique, pp. 297–308. 19

reviews and critical discussions c.d., review in Review of Metaphysics, vol. 16, no. 4, 1963, p. 809. LeFevre, perry, review in Theology Today, vol. 20, no. 1, 1963, pp. 112–14. ross, w. gordon, review in Religion in Life, vol. 31, no. 4, 1962, p. 642. van til, cornelius, review in Westminster Theological Journal, vol. 25, no. 1, 1962, pp. 84–93.

ralph h. Johnson, The Concept of Existence in the “Concluding Unscientific Postscript,” the hague: martinus nijhoff 1972, xvi + 226 pp.

ralph Johnson’s The Concept of Existence in the “Concluding Unscientific Postscript” was published by martinus nijhoff in 1972. as the title indicates, Johnson gives special attention to the concept of existence in the Postscript which he insists had not been adequately addressed at that time. this book is based on his dissertation from notre dame university. Johnson levels certain criticisms against the confusion within the Kierkegaard scholarship of his day, including the tendency to read Kierkegaard’s works too biographically, with so much focus on “Kierkegaard’s eccentricities that they never get to his writings.”1 in this way, “exegesis [becomes] psycho-analysis.”2 Johnson also notes the problem of reading modern existentialist ideas back into Kierkegaard’s writings. While he acknowledges Kierkegaard’s influence on existential thought, Johnson admonishes against any retroactive interpretations of Kierkegaard using modern existentialist thought. what has emerged in Johnson’s day is a picture of Kierkegaard as “an eccentric, enigmatic, proto-existentialist who advocated a subjectivist view of life.”3 Johnson, in agreement with bradley dewey,4 observes that part of the problem of interpreting Kierkegaard stems from a lack of “familiarity with the complete works,”5 but also from “Kierkegaard’s various pseudonymous masks, his indirect communication, not to mention his demanding prose, [which has] discouraged close and thorough scholarship.”6 Johnson holds to the view that many misunderstandings in interpreting Kierkegaard can be cleared up by adhering to the criteria of interpretation that Kierkegaard himself provides. he makes two interpretive commitments in this ralph Johnson, The Concept of Existence in the “Concluding Unscientific Postscript,” the hague: martinus nijhoff 1972, p. 1. 2 ibid. 3 ibid., p. 3. 4 bradley dewey, The New Obedience: Kierkegaard on Imitating Christ, washington, d.c.: corpus publications 1968. 5 ibid., p. xx, cited in Johnson, The Concept of Existence, p. 4. 6 dewey, The New Obedience: Kierkegaard on Imitating Christ, p. xx, cited in Johnson, The Concept of Existence, p. 3. 1

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regard. First, he accepts Kierkegaard’s own explanation of his authorship in The Point of View as being a religious enterprise. Second, in response to what he sees as the dominant tendency in the field, Johnson does not attribute the Postscript to Kierkegaard, but to Johannes climacus in keeping with Kierkegaard’s own wishes.7 regarding this second commitment, Johnson maintains that this interpretive strategy is “long overdue in the history of Kierkegaard-research,”8 and he views his work as possibly the first time “an investigation of an important concept (existence) in a pivotal work (the Postscript) is being carried out using the frame of reference suggested by Kierkegaard himself (referring the work to the pseudonym).”9 while Johnson admits that he will “lack the scope of others who refer now to this work, now to that, attributing all the texts to ‘Kierkegaard,’ ” he hopes that “what is lost in scope will be recovered in accuracy and intelligibility.”10 Key to Johnson’s argument is what he refers to as the “forgetting-claim” whereby people have “forgotten what it means to exist.”11 Johnson argues “that no study of climacus’ treatment of existence can be satisfactory unless it accords primacy to the forgetting-claim.”12 Johnson claims that his study is the only one to take the forgetting-claim seriously, noting that while there “are numerous studies on Kierkegaard’s concept of existence, yet very few of these exhibit more than a superficial awareness of the forgetting-claim.”13 in order to understand the forgetting-claim, one must take note of the contrast between the individual and the philosophical community. the community functions as a timeless, cognitive, public entity whose mode of existence is different from that of the individual in that the community exists solely to pursue objective knowledge. The individual, by contrast, is finite, both public and private, and not exclusively cognitive. a human being forgets how to exist as an individual when he allows himself to become single-minded in the pursuit of objective knowledge. Such a person becomes absorbed into the community and speaks with the voice of the community, but he forgets how to speak with his own voice. Johnson provides a helpful analogy for the contemporary reader who is unfamiliar with the hegelian philosophical community of Kierkegaard’s own day, and he uses the modern scientific community as a stand-in. For Johnson, the analogy is apt because Hegelianism and the modern scientific community both seek objective knowledge, and they can continually incorporate new knowledge into Johnson notes two exceptions to this tendency: herbert m. garelick, The AntiChristianity of Kierkegaard, the hague: martinus nijhoff 1965,, and henry e. allison, “christianity and nonsense,” Review of Metaphysics, vol. 20, 1967, pp. 432–60, cited in Johnson, The Concept of Existence, p. 9, n. 35. 8 Johnson, The Concept of Existence, p. 10. 9 ibid., pp. 10–11. 10 ibid., p. 11. 11 ibid., p. 13. 12 ibid. 13 ibid., p. 116. Johnson here cites one such work, hermann diem, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Existence, trans. by harold Knight, London and edinburgh: oliver and boyd 1959, p. 53, although he notes that diem makes only one reference. See Johnson, The Concept of Existence, p. 116, n. 1. 7

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the community indefinitely because the community will outlast the individual. A scientist need not fear the unknown because eventually the community will resolve all mysteries in the future even though the individual scientist has passed on. the community’s mode of existence may allow it to speak of resolving all mysteries at some indefinite future moment, but the individual cannot exist in this mode of objective, cognitive timelessness. those who try, have forgotten what it means to exist as finite individuals. when one has forgotten what it means to exist as an individual, that person must be reminded. one cannot confront someone directly with his or her forgetfulness; rather, one must remind them indirectly since, according to climacus’ analysis of Socrates, one individual cannot impose on another’s subjectivity. indirect communication must be patiently employed in such a way that individuals can come to the realization of their forgetfulness by themselves. this communication takes the form of a dialogue in which it is hoped that the one who has forgotten how to exist may discover his or her own individual voice again. in this book, Johnson has provided a valuable resource for research on the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. his emphasis on the forgetting-claim provides a sharp focus to his book, and his use of the scientific community as an analogue for nineteenth-century danish hegelianism helps make climacus’ argument more intelligible to the modern reader. matthew brake

reviews and critical discussions hughes, edward J., “how Subjectivity is truth in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript,” Religious Studies, vol. 31, no. 2, 1995, pp. 204–7. perkins, robert L., “always himself: a Survey of recent Kierkegaard Literature,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 12, no. 4, 1974, pp. 548–9. welstead, adam, “Kierkegaard’s movement inward: Subjectivity as the remedy for the malaise of the contemporary age,” Heythrop Journal, vol. 55, no. 5, 2014, pp. 812–14.

david J. Kangas, Kierkegaard’s Instant: On Beginnings, bloomington and indianapolis: indiana university press 2007 (Studies in Continental Thought), x + 235 pp.

the goals of Kierkegaard’s Instant are both justifiable and revolutionary. In its less original parts, the book documents Kierkegaard’s intricate, yet definitive, subversion of the egocentric, self-sufficient, and self-grounding view of subjectivity, which is found in Kant, Fichte, early Schelling, and hegel. the book’s interpretive novelty, however, comes from somewhere else. in trying to portray Kierkegaard as the thinker of beginnings, Kangas develops an equally complex and compelling argument. he conjectures that in Kierkegaard’s thought, the realms of autarkic selfhood, full presence, representational temporality, and teleological metaphysics are secondary. They are preceded—and continually subverted—by an anti-foundationalism defined along the following lines: the abyssal, ever withdrawing otherness of God; a fideism revolving around kenosis and self-renunciation, which is consistent with meister eckhart’s Gelassenheit; an understanding of subjectivity as constitutively broken or structurally split; and the postulation of an “originary time”1 defined by futurity and unrepresentable transcendence. what Kangas intends to delineate thereby is Kierkegaard’s unique ability to reveal, from within, the multiform gaps and hidden dead-ends of idealism. equally notable are the rather eclectic roots of this volume. besides neoplatonism and the mystical tradition of meister eckhart and Jacob boehme, its theoretical perspective is decisively informed by emmanuel Levinas and Jacques derrida, with discernible echoes from martin heidegger, Jean-Luc nancy, gilles deleuze, and reiner Schürmann. Focusing on six different pieces, dated between 1841 and 1844, Kangas insightfully elaborates numerous expressions of Kierkegaard’s sweeping assault on what heidegger called onto-theology, derrida, the metaphysics of presence, and Levinas, totalitarian egology. the book begins with an in-depth analysis of The Concept of Irony. its protagonist, Socrates seems driven by a negativity which undermines the postulation of any absolute principle whatsoever, including subjectivity and the platonic forms. the agent of this negative force is, more exactly, the Socratic irony, whose meaning is to explode “the closed immanence

david J. Kangas, Kierkegaard’s Instant: On Beginnings, bloomington and indianapolis: indiana university press 2007 (Studies in Continental Thought), p. 115.

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of recollection”2 and to relativize the ultimacy of all ontological predicates. that happens because by means of his infinite irony Socrates envisages “an originary and non-negatable gap…between essence and phenomenon.”3 the next two chapters target a’s “diapsalmata” and De omnibus dubitandum est. in the former, Kangas detects a different way in which subjectivity is denied the power of bringing anything real into existence. To be specific, the detrimental experiences of sorrow, world alienation, melancholy, anxiety, and boredom that imbue A’s diaristic confessions confirm, via negativa, that subjectivity is not identical with itself and never could autonomously posit itself. otherwise stated, through the aesthete Kierkegaard deconstructs the idealist model of ipseity by postulating “an originary nonidentity that dispossesses subjectivity of its status as ground.”4 moving to De omnibus, Kangas claims that therein, consciousness appears contingent upon a break within immediacy, more exactly, that its origins are traumatic. that is to say, consciousness comes into being, not only in pain or in “a moment of loss,”5 but also as divided against itself; and this constitutes the very condition for doubt. Kangas’ conclusion goes a step further, alleging that the skeptical attitude entails “a subjectivity that does not originally have a hold on itself, but is rather exposed to transcendence as the very condition for its self-relation.”6 whereas De omnibus merely alludes to the problematic of transcendence, Repetition tackles it head-on, while assigning it a very particular meaning. “the task of Repetition,” Kangas writes, is “to present, in an experimental way, the transcendence that belongs to movement, or to temporalization, as precisely the real.”7 to make his case, Kangas avails himself of the notion of freedom. he maintains that instead of being an act of independent positing or a pure origin, freedom may constitute a transcendent gift. however, Kangas ties this possibility, not necessarily with the transcendence of god, but with a new understanding of temporality. he argues that repetition hinges on a primordial time, passively undergone in patience. in this way, repetition invariably interrupts the customary or “posited time”8 and thus invalidates the realm of projects and life plans, where subjectivity reigns supreme. this view of freedom as heteronomous resurfaces in The Concept of Anxiety. autonomy here connotes receptivity or, to put it more elaborately, the indirect— and once again traumatic—opening to what destabilizes the self and encumbers its self-originating capacities. Specifically, it is anxiety that mediates this encounter and occasions freedom’s “contact with the originary and irrecuperable instant of its ibid., p. 14. however, this thesis contradicts Socrates’ depiction from Philosophical Fragments as the paragon of a recollection-centered epistemology. it is, indeed, strange that Kangas excluded this particular work from his analysis especially since it belongs to his temporal frame and explicitly tackles the problem of temporality. a comparable omission is Judge William’s reflections, from Either/Or, part two, on the intricate interaction between eternity and historicity. 3 ibid., p. 29. 4 ibid., p. 64. 5 ibid., p. 85. 6 ibid., p. 88. 7 ibid., p. 99. 8 ibid., p. 106. 2

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enabling.”9 moreover, because anxious, the subject remains constitutively linked to nonbeing. therefore, not unlike doubt or irony, anxiety obstructs a complete identity with oneself and perpetuates the primordial inward fracture. additionally, Kangas specifies that in anxiety the subject becomes exposed to an excessive future which can be intuited in the experience of the instant. in its truest sense, then, the instant denotes a radical futurity which makes the present possible, and before which freedom remains continually anxious. in the last chapter, Kangas wishes to show that the religious thinking that buttresses Fear and Trembling has surprising affinities with the mystical theology of Meister Eckhart. That is because, first, the deity that towers over this work is a “divine other,”10 who holds himself in reserve “from every general order of meaning, intelligibility, presence.”11 at the same time, on the human side, the requirement is “to hold oneself open to god’s withdrawal”12 or “to let oneself be absolved from the sovereign, ethical order of self-consciousness.”13 this resonates perfectly with the eckhartian notion of Gelassenheit, whose pantheon thus gains an unexpected member: abraham. on this view, the father of faith, far from assuming the hubris of self-creation, embraces an attitude of kenotic release and unconditional generosity, which cannot be comprehended in terms of rational representation and ontological transparency. For Kangas, Abraham is a figure of Afgrund (un-ground or void): he disrupts the continuity of manifest phenomena; he points to the heteronomous origins of the subject; and he assimilates individuation to the self-denial and acquiescent receptivity of faith. despite its robust philosophical tenor and interpretive originality, Kierkegaard’s Instant is too limited in its text selections and too eclectic in its background to be without problems. to begin with, when asking whether Kierkegaard’s Socrates is compatible with apophatic theology, Kangas poignantly remarks that the Socratic dialectic lacks “the positive or analogical moment of reconstruction.”14 ironically, the same criticism can be brought to his overall approach which drastically downplays the cataphatic dimension of Kierkegaard’s religion. Kangas forgets too often that Kierkegaard dialectically related the negative motifs of deus absconditus and divine incognito to the positive thematic of god’s revelation and manifestation. to exemplify, while taking the Kierkegaardian god to be the “creative non-ground,”15 Kangas ignores that the same deity is also, amongst others, the only bedrock of life, the sole nurturing power of creation, and the absolute, ordering power of the universe. even more, The Sickness unto Death calls god the ultimate cause or ground of selfhood, a theme whose resonances actually date back to 1844.16 one may argue, however, that these themes appear in places other than those targeted by ibid., p. 181. ibid., p. 126. 11 ibid., p. 126. 12 ibid., p. 126. 13 ibid., pp. 126–7. 14 ibid., pp. 36–7. 15 ibid., p. 100. 16 See the edifying discourse “think about your creator in the days of your youth,” SKS 5, 233–49 / EUD, 233–51. 9

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Kangas. yet, even in the books he analyzes, we can still identify certain cataphatic aspects which are arbitrarily left aside. the most conspicuous example here is Fear and Trembling, where abraham does not seem to cultivate an exclusively kenotic stance or an objectless Gelassenheit. instead, Silentio warns us, abraham believed that by virtue of his fidelity, God will give him something very specific in return, namely, a blessed son and the forefather of the elected people. another arguable issue is temporality. in a rather non-Kierkegaardian spirit, Kangas displays a propensity towards absolutizing the temporal. he invests the “originary time” with transcendent qualities,17 and deems coming into existence as “the really real.”18 as regards eternity, Kangas, on the one hand, equates it with nothingness19 and, on the other, ascribes it ungrounding powers.20 the problem here is that, for Kierkegaard, eternity’s subversive capacities are due mainly to the epochal emergence of sinfulness into the world. and in a soteriological horizon, time as such becomes untruth, an observation explicitly made in The Concept of Anxiety.21 it is for no other reason that temporality’s relation to the eternal is one of utter heterogeneity and conflict.22 another regrettable absence from Kangas’ study is Kierkegaard’s discussion of “sacred history”23 (den hellige Historie) from Practice in Christianity, which may be paralleled with the category of originary time. however, had he chosen to deal with Practice in Christianity, Kangas’ absolutization of the future vis-à-vis the instant would have been made problematic by Kierkegaard’s clear statement that “in relation to the absolute, there is only one time, the present.”24 the overemphasis on the negative to the detriment of all positivity is questionable in a soteriological horizon, as well. when speaking of salvation, Kangas links it to a view of the absolute as “sudden, nondiscursive, immediate, and ultimately objectless.”25 the disputable words here are objectless and nondiscursive because Kierkegaard’s soteriology is essentially Christian, and thus underpinned by very particular postulates. Kangas thus passes too quickly over the importance of doctrine, and thus of discursiveness, in Kierkegaard’s religious psychology—an aspect too often ignored by interpreters who are entranced by negative theology. From a genealogical viewpoint, Kangas’ eckhart hypothesis is complicated by the fact that Kierkegaard is somewhat indebted to augustine, tertullian, Johannes

See Kangas, Kierkegaard’s Instant, p. 124; p. 143; p. 147. ibid., p. 197. 19 ibid., p. 182. 20 ibid., p. 185. 21 SKS 4, 395–6 / CA, 92–3. 22 See in this sense SKS 4, 385 note, 390–1, 392 / CA, 84 note, 87, 89. the contentious dissimilarity between the eternal and the temporal as a whole survives until late in Kierkegaard’s authorship. See SKS 10, 110 / CD, 98. SKS 8, 131–2, 174, 183 / UD, 16–17, 66, 76. SKS 16, 200 / JY, 150–1. 23 See SKS 12, 40 note, 44–5; 75–6; 216–17 / PC, 25 note, 30, 64, 221. 24 SKS 12, 75 / PC, 63. interestingly, the same idea can be found in Christian Discourses in connection with the instant; see SKS 10, 238 / CD, 231. 25 Kangas, Kierkegaard’s Instant, p. 187. 17 18

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tauler, and thomas à Kempis.26 in addition, a strong emphasis on the eckhartian allegiance risks obfuscating Kierkegaard’s drastic criticisms of mysticism from Either/Or, Part Two, particularly the mystic’s acosmic relation to time and finitude. in the same perspective, the insistence on passivity and the self-mortifying receptivity of Gelassenheit does not do justice to the normative and active sides of Kierkegaard’s fideism. to conclude, Kangas puts forward, not only a highly creative hermeneutic, but also a self-standing phenomenology of time. in this sense, his accomplishment is indeed remarkable. the author manages to assimilate a host of disparate ideas, and by fruitfully combining them, he draws an unexpected image of Kierkegaard. nonetheless, this image remains quite impressionistic and partial, a sign that perhaps, Kierkegaard’s Instant is the beginning or promise of a vista even more surprising, if not ineffable. Leo Stan

For an exhaustive account of Kierkegaard’s actual knowledge of the pre-modern christian theology, see Kierkegaard and the Patristic and Medieval Traditions, ed. by Jon Stewart, aldershot: ashgate 2008 (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 4). 26

reviews and critical discussions Fratoni, mark J., review in Janus Head, vol. 11, no. 1, 2008, pp. 183–7. gregor, brian, review in Philosophy in Review, vol. 28, no. 2, 2008, pp. 125–8. nelson, christopher a.p., review in Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, no. 53, 2008, pp. 29–31. Lee, robyn, review in Symposium, vol. 13, no. 2, 2009, pp. 211–13. Stokes, patrick, review in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, vol. 65, no. 3, 2009, pp. 177–82.

abrahim h. Khan, “Salighed” as Happiness? Kierkegaard on the Concept “Salighed,” waterloo, ontario: wilfrid Laurier university press 1985, xiv + 148 pp.

abrahim Khan’s “Salighed” as Happiness? Kierkegaard on the Concept “Salighed” was published in 1985 by wilfrid Laurier university press in The Kierkegaard Monograph Series, edited by alastair mcKinnon. to date, Khan’s study remains the only monograph devoted wholly to Kierkegaard’s concept Salighed. while references to the work can be found in most studies that make even passing reference to the role of happiness or blessedness in Kierkegaard’s thought, it has unfortunately not yet been treated in detail in any of the secondary literature. Khan’s approach is most visibly influenced by Alastair McKinnon’s method of computational analysis,1 which Khan applies to the term Salighed and its three major variants (Saligheds, Saligheden, Salighedens), or what Khan designates “Salighed (3),”2 in order to produce an objective account of the concept Salighed and any conceptual changes it undergoes in Kierkegaard’s authorship. roughly 78 percent of the occurrences of Salighed (3) are found in only five titles from Kierkegaard’s authorship,3 which Khan treats in three groups: Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses; Concluding Unscientific Postscript; and Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, Works of Love, and Christian Discourses. each group of texts is submitted to a three-phase process. First, sentences containing Salighed (3) are extracted from a machine-readable version of the third edition of Kierkegaard’s Samlede Værker and reassembled to produce a “synthetic mini-text”4 for each of the three sets of danish texts. From each mini-text a word-frequency list is created that highlights “differential terms,” or terms associated with Salighed (3) that are statistically alastair mcKinnon, “a method of displaying differences between various accounts of an object,” Cirpho Review, vol. 2, no. 1, 1974, pp. 31–57. alastair mcKinnon, Kierkegaard Indices, vols. 1–4, Leiden: e. J. brill 1970–75. 2 abrahim h. Khan, “Salighed” as Happiness? Kierkegaard on the Concept of “Salighed,” waterloo, ontario: wilfrid Laurier university press 1985, p. 8. 3 ibid., p. 9, n. 27. it should be noted that there are marginal differences between the number of occurrences for some of the terms that Khan provides and the number of occurrences attained by searching the electronic text of Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter. these slight differences would not alter Khan’s observation that the overwhelming majority of occurrences of Salighed (3) are found in these five titles. 4 ibid., p. 13. 1

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different in one set of texts. this is especially important for Khan since part of his project is to determine how Kierkegaard’s conception of Salighed changed over time. Second, a computer is used to generate a three-dimensional model of each mini-text. The models produced by the first two steps are helpfully reproduced in fifteen pages of tables, graphs, and charts following the final chapter. And third, the models have to be interpreted by someone with knowledge of the primary texts. This method is therefore not a substitute for first-hand familiarity but a guide for one’s understanding of a text with which one is already familiar. as Sylvia walsh notes, it might seem to many Kierkegaard scholars that striving for objectivity in one’s interpretation is to miss the personal encounter with the text that was so important for Kierkegaard, but every interpretation does strive for a measure of objectivity, lest it be seen as capricious.5 the computational method employed in the text thus differs quantitatively, not qualitatively, from other approaches. Khan acknowledges this quantitative difference when he compares his method to others, noting that, relative to other approaches, his method contains “greater objectivity, order and methodological rigor.”6 unfortunately, Khan then immediately implies a qualitative distinction between his method and others when he claims that these other methods are unlike his in that they rely “arbitrarily…on hunches or intuition.”7 Khan demurs from stating which approaches he has in mind because he believes his method “does not require a discussion of existing approaches to the writing: it suffices to note that there are different approaches, discussed elsewhere, and that there is no standard one.”8 because it is unlikely that multiple traditions of interpretation can establish and sustain themselves on either hunches or intuition, it seems likely that Khan has erected a straw man against which his own method can inevitably come out the victor. Khan devotes one chapter to each of the three sets of texts in order to answer the question of whether Kierkegaard’s vocabulary shifts in relation to shifts in the concept. Khan answers the question affirmatively but noting that “there is a definite continuity of meaning within the change, a continuity that rules out any claim to radical change and that serves to sharpen the meaning of the concept.”9 this conceptual sharpening begins in Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, where the wish for eternal Salighed, an ethical ultimate before which one deposits one’s entire personality, stirs and maintains the earnestness Salighed requires. in the Postscript climacus posits Salighed as part of an understanding of the self that prioritizes the personality’s capacity for passion inculcated through the development of guiltconsciousness and the relation to a paradoxical historical datum. this foreshadows the specifically Christian account of Salighed in the religious works, which emphasize the believer’s full reliance on grace and the believer’s maintaining a love Sylvia i. walsh, “ ‘Salighed’ As Happiness? Kierkegaard on the Concept ‘Salighed,’ by abrahim h. Khan. waterloo, ontario: wilfrid Laurier university press, 1985,” Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, vol. 16, 1987, p. 3. 6 Khan, “Salighed” as Happiness? Kierkegaard on the Concept of “Salighed,” p. 5. 7 ibid., p. 5. 8 ibid., p. 5. 9 ibid., p. 73. 5

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for god despite the suffering that necessarily follows. the development of Salighed thus proceeds from lesser to greater degrees of specificity. Finally, Khan discusses the theological and philosophical importance of the concept. theologically, through Salighed’s balance of earnestness and grace Kierkegaard rehabilitates the relationship between grace and the work of faith that had become distorted in the danish church of his day. philosophically, the importance of Salighed is that it provides an account of passionate moral commitment without epistemic certainty, which is not to say that Kierkegaard rejects epistemology altogether. instead, he is incisive enough to recognize the epistemological value of passion and inwardness. Khan succeeds in accomplishing his objective and admirably demonstrates the potential of a thoughtful application of computational analysis, but i have two reservations pertaining to the restricted lexical and historical-contextual scope of the study. First, Khan notes that “the concept Salighed is not identical with the word. indeed, the concept might be expressed through other labels or words. but in this study the aim is to arrive at an understanding of the concept with respect to the use of the word.”10 this excludes terms such as salig and Glæde that might be relevant to an understanding of the concept but that are either not found in sentences containing Salighed (3) or are not differential terms. thus, it is less the concept Salighed that is being studied than the relationship between the terms constituting Salighed (3) and the concept they signify. had other terms (Glæde, for example) been used in the first phase of the analysis, it might have revealed a conceptual overlap between Salighed and related terms that could highlight where precisely Salighed stands out as a unique concept. Second, the lack of historical context leaves the reader wondering why Kierkegaard would gravitate toward Salighed rather than some other concept as his “archimedean point.”11 as Khan suggests, one reason is Kierkegaard’s immersion in the new testament, for which μακάριος (blessed) is important.12 but it would be surprising if Kierkegaard were not also informed by or responsive to the interest in conceptions of happiness expressed by a number of danish and german authors of the previous two generations, which could account for the centrality of the concept for Kierkegaard. not to allow this historical context to inform one’s understanding of the concept Salighed is to prevent its many-sidedness from coming to light. this is not a consequence of the computational analytic method but an example of how it can be helpfully applied to other authors for whom a central concept is Salighed (or conceptually related terms and their german equivalents) in order to produce a fuller picture of how Kierkegaard’s understanding of the concept is historically situated. it must be noted that these are not the carefully articulated and delimited objectives Khan set for his study, and it would be unfair to criticize an author for failing to accomplish goals that were not his own. Khan notes that “there is room to advance further the study of the concept.”13 it is hoped that the reservations 10 11 12 13

ibid., p. 8. ibid., p. 4. ibid., pp. 88–90. ibid., p. 115.

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expressed above will be seen as suggestions for those who wish to build on the estimable foundation Khan has laid for an understanding of Salighed and related terms in Kierkegaard’s authorship and its context. Khan’s efforts to draw attention to the importance of Salighed for Kierkegaard’s thought are valuable for anyone interested in such a project. carson webb

reviews and critical discussions connell, george, review in Philosophy of Religion, vol. 20, 1986, p. 173. Khan, abrahim h., “walsh on “Salighed” As Happiness?” Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, vol. 16, 1987, pp. 6–9. mcLelland, Joseph c., review in Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses, vol. 15, no. 1, 1986, pp. 105–6. mongrain, denis, review in Laval théologique et philosophique, vol. 42, no. 3, 1986, pp. 404–5. nielsen, h.a., review in Dialogue, vol. 26, no. 2, 1987, pp. 374–6. walsh, Sylvia i., review in Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, vol. 16, 1987, pp. 3–6.

bruce h. Kirmmse, Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark, bloomington and indianapolis: university of indiana press 1990, xi + 558 pp.

there are two reasons to praise bruce Kirmmse’s Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark. First and foremost, Kirmmse’s study should be recognized for its attempts to contextualize Kierkegaard’s writings within the social, political, and religious conditions of their emergence. at the time of its publication, the secondary literature was shaking off deconstruction, and Kirmmse’s text functioned as a necessary and welcome corrective. Secondly, Kirmmse’s focus on Kierkegaard’s later works, including A Literary Review, The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress, Works of Love, and Practice in Christianity, shed a much-needed light on texts whose significance had yet to attract the critical attention they deserved. Kirmmse’s main thesis is that Kierkegaard’s works, unlike those of the majority of his Golden Age contemporaries, “reflect the real tension of his society…a society emerging from elite rule and poised on the edge of the democratic unknown.”1 Kirmmse positions his argument as a refutation of those who argue that Kierkegaard had “no politics at all, or, what amounts to the same thing, as having embraced a nostalgic, traditionalist, and irrational authoritarianism.”2 against these charges of conservatism, Kirmmse claims that Kierkegaard’s texts illustrate a sustained engagement with the liberal and populist transformations occurring in nineteenthcentury denmark. The first section of Kirmmse’s study provides an extended survey of the economic, religious, and social events that preceded the political upheavals of golden age denmark. having established the historical context, Kirmmse then turns to a direct and detailed examination of the age’s major political and religious figures. Kirmmse moves chronologically; he begins with adam oehlenschläger (1779–1850) and Jakob peter mynster (1775–1854), moves to Johan Ludvig heiberg (1791–1860) and hans Lassen martensen (1808–84), and concludes with n.F.S. grundtvig (1783–1872), henrik nicolai clausen (1793–1877), and orla Lehmann (1810–70). Kirmmse positions each of these figures according to their orientation to culture (mandarin or populist) and history (romantic or agnostic). oehlenschläger, mynster, heiberg, and martensen are posited as mandarin romantics, grundtvig as a populist romantic, and clausen and Lehmann as mandarin agnostics. into this cultural and bruce h. Kirmmse, Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark, bloomington and indianapolis: university of indiana press 1990, p. 3. 2 ibid. 1

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historical milieu emerges Kierkegaard, whom Kirmmse positions as “an agnostic on the significance of History, a populist on the locus of Culture, and a genuinely modern…alternative to the ancient régime world-view of the golden age.”3 this is Kirmmse’s main point of comparison—Kierkegaard’s modern, politically engaged liberalism vis-à-vis “the elitist politics and social vacuum of golden age culture.”4 Kirmmse asserts that given Kierkegaard’s sustained critique of the philosophical and theological underpinnings of danish christendom, it is unlikely that he shared his contemporaries’ political views. inasmuch as christendom “was the matrix in which the luxuriant cultural life of the golden age had blossomed,”5 Kirmmse finds in Kierkegaard’s critiques of Danish Christianity a wholesale rejection of the age’s political and social conservatism. thus, against those who attribute to Kierkegaard the elitism and social conservatism of his age, Kirmmse posits that his political views “are better described…as variants of liberalism and populism.”6 Kirmmse’s procedure is to map the religious critiques in Kierkegaard’s post-1845 texts onto the social and historical events of the time. Kirmmse’s analysis of Kierkegaard’s post-1845 texts in terms of their political resonances is problematic. though Kirmmse’s political reading of Kierkegaard’s texts is suggestive, ultimately, his analyses fail to connect Kierkegaard’s religious and theological critiques to their specific social and historical context. Thus, whereas Kierkegaard’s discussion of the equality of believers before god may exhibit certain structural similarities to the equality of individuals within a democratic society, the suggestion that there exists an identifiable relationship between text and history is exceedingly difficult to establish. chapter 17, in which Kirmmse discusses Kierkegaard’s A Literary Review, illustrates the difficulties of his project. Whereas Kirmmse calls A Literary Review Kierkegaard’s “most specifically political work,”7 the work’s specifically political character seems to evade his analysis. Kirmmse begins this chapter by noting Kierkegaard’s differentiation between the “present age” and the “revolutionary Age.” According to Kirmmse, Kierkegaard finds in the passion of the Revolutionary age “the proper basis for ‘real’ politics.”8 one may grant Kirmmse this point; however, the relevance of Kierkegaard’s articulation of the basis of “real” politics remains frustratingly abstracted from the specific political and social trends of golden age denmark. thus, whereas Kirmmse claims that in A Literary Review Kierkegaard illustrates the “the chasm between his own position and the speculative idealism espoused by the aristocratic conservatism of the present,” concrete textual evidence of this relationship is not forthcoming.9 though Kirmmse attempts to situate Kierkegaard’s texts in relation to the social, economic, and religious realities of the golden age, his methodology 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

ibid., p. 247. ibid., p. 5. ibid., p. 3. ibid., p. 4. ibid., p. 265. ibid., p. 268. ibid., p. 269.

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tends to undermine his goal. Having divided his study into two parts—the first an eminently readable introduction to golden age denmark, the second an analysis of Kierkegaard’s post-1845 texts—Kirmmse inadvertently divorces Kierkegaard’s texts from the historical conditions of their emergence. considering the historical scope of Kirmmse’s project, this approach seems natural enough; unfortunately, the concrete details that would serve to connect Kierkegaard’s texts to the sweep of history are lost. For example, in chapter 27, Kirmmse seems correct when he notes the “anticlerical” focus of Kierkegaard’s articles in The Moment; however, Kirmmse fails to establish any concrete linkage to the political events of the time. he asserts merely that Kierkegaard’s position was informed by “his understanding of the political and social ferment that had resulted in popular sovereignty.”10 any number of productive comparisons between Kierkegaard’s writings and specific Golden Age texts are passed over in favor of generalizations. ultimately, Kirmmse’s study is hobbled by its ambition. in its attempt to connect specific Kierkegaard texts to the overarching historical, political, and social upheavals of the danish golden age, Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark cannot help but fall short. at the same time, Kirmmse’s study represents a momentous shift in Kierkegaard studies. gone are the days when Kierkegaard’s texts could be abstracted from their historical context. Kirmmse’s study illustrates how important is it to read Kierkegaard’s texts in light of the specific social, political, and cultural conditions of their emergence. devon c. wootten

10

ibid., p. 480.

reviews and critical discussions billeskov Jansen, F.J., review in Politiken, July 25, 1991. glebe-møller, Jens, review in Berlingske Tidende, december 13, 1990. grøn, arne, review in Kierkegaardiana, vol. 16, 1993, pp. 142–6. Käher, carl, review in Historie/Jyske Samlinger, ny række, vol. 19, issue 3, 1991, pp. 588–9. Khan, abrahim h., review in Theological Studies, vol. 52, 1991, pp. 561–3. massengale, James, review in Scandinavian Studies, vol. 64, 1992, pp. 462–7. perkins, robert L., review in Søren Kierkegaard Newsletter, vol. 23, 1991, pp. 4–7. Summers, richard m., review in Scandinavica, vol. 30, 1991, pp. 245–7. tjalve, Lars, review in Kristeligt Dagblad, november 2, 1991. tøjner, poul erik, review in Weekendavisen, august 31, 1990.

Janne Kylliäinen, Living Poetically in the Modern Age: The Situational Aspects of Kierkegaard’s Thought, helsinki: university of helsinki 2009 (Philosophical Studies from the University of Helsinki, vol. 24), 657 pp.

coming out of research undertaken at the university of helsinki (with visits to the Søren Kierkegaard research center in copenhagen and the hong Kierkegaard Library in minnesota),1 Janne Kylliäinen’s weighty tome is both expansive and focused. the great majority of Kylliäinen’s book is devoted to careful and lucid exegesis of a number of Kierkegaard’s primary texts.2 within the manifold detail such an approach necessitates, however, there is also a unifying theme that runs throughout the text. Kylliäinen proposes that the concept of “living poetically,” taken from Kierkegaard’s dissertation, can be utilized to illuminate a consistent approach to situating the subject that recurs throughout Kierkegaard’s corpus.3 it is openly acknowledged that this is extending the concept far beyond its actual linguistic usage;4 as a work of scholarship, Living Poetically in the Modern Age is, then, an example of creative exegesis that intentionally develops a concept the original author used only in a limited setting. the creative exegesis on display here has a clear purpose. against those who would interpret Kierkegaard as individualistic and ahistorical,5 the concept of living 1 See Janne Kylliäinen, Living Poetically in the Modern Age: The Situational Aspects of Kierkegaard’s Thought, helsinki: university of helsinki 2009 (Philosophical Studies from the University of Helsinki, vol. 24), p. 9. 2 See ibid., p. 123 and p. 565, where he explicitly labels his work “exegesis.” 3 ibid., p. 17: “the basic hypothesis is that there is consistency in the way Kierkegaard situates the subject into its context and that this consistency could be captured and explicated with the help of the ethical-religious conception of living poetically that Kierkegaard presents in his dissertation.” 4 See ibid., p. 24; p. 37. 5 in ibid., p. 18, Kylliäinen explicitly names the work of torsten bohlin, györgy Lukács, edo pivcevic, gregor malantshuk, mark c. taylor, and Louis mackey as falling under the umbrella of an individualistic, ahistorical interpretation of Kierkegaard (bibliographic information can be found at ibid., pp. 646–6). alastair macintyre and Lev Shestov are added to the list (pp. 623–4).

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poetically shows that (a) inwardness is always pictured as situated in a certain context, and (b) that context is essential to the dynamics of Kierkegaardian selfdevelopment. the poetic movement of life is precisely the realization of the inward self in an external situation; Kierkegaard consistently views the self absent of such movement as improperly aborted. Kylliäinen is thus able to preserve both sides of the equation: without inwardness, there would be no grounding possibility for living poetically; without concrete realization, there would be only an irresponsible abstract escapism, not a truly poetic life. Such a general schema is broadly present across Kierkegaard’s writings, though each work realizes it in a particular way. although much previous historical-critical scholarship has labored to expand our knowledge of the historical figures surrounding Kierkegaard,6 Kylliäinen attends to the specific manner or style in which each work of Kierkegaard pictures living poetically in relation to its socio-historical context; he builds upon the new wealth of information—the what—to get at the style of relating to that—the how. in this way, Kylliäinen is engaged in a different project to that of Sylvia walsh, who also made living poetically a thematic focus of her exegetical work, but who did not utilize the theme to discuss the socio-historical situating of the self in Kierkegaard’s writings.7 Kylliäinen’s book is structured around the observation that the overwhelming attention to the Concluding Unscientific Postscript in Kierkegaard scholarship has contributed to the lack of attention to how Kierkegaard understands the subject to be historically situated. because the majority of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript is devoted to the issue of how the self develops inwardly through various existence spheres, Kierkegaard scholarship, taking its cue from climacus’ work, has reflected this preoccupation.8 Kylliäinen combats such a trend not by ignoring the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, but by situating it in the context of its surrounding Kierkegaardian works that pay more attention to the historical context of the self. Kylliäinen then proceeds to demonstrate the continuity of the concepts at work within the Concluding Unscientific Postscript with these texts that pay more attention to the historical situation of the subject. climacus’ magnum opus is thus amplified in such a way that the present socio-historical situation of the self—which remains implicit throughout the Concluding Unscientific Postscript—is brought to the fore. Kylliäinen achieves this through alternating chapters on The Concept of Irony, Either/Or, part two, The Concept of Anxiety, and Philosophical Fragments with chapters on the various existence spheres in the Postscript (namely, immediate, commonsense, ironic; ethical, religious, humorous; and christian), thereby showing the rich situation context that stands behind and around the subject of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript.

6 in ibid., p. 18 note 7, Kylliäinen lists the work of bruce h. Kirmmse, george pattison, Joakim garff, alastair hannay, Jon Stewart, peter tudvad, and the many editors of the Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter series. 7 See ibid., pp. 22–23, and Sylvia walsh, Living Poetically: Kierkegaard’s Existential Aesthetics, university park, pennsylvania: pennsylvania State university press 1994. 8 See Kylliäinen, Living Poetically in the Modern Age, p. 191; p. 364.

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this overall structure of alternating chapters is initiated by a remarkably clear treatment of living poetically as it first appears in The Concept of Irony. in the introduction, Kylliäinen quickly describes the ideational context of the concept and how it shifts in Kierkegaard: “Kierkegaard appropriates the ideal of living poetically from the romantic ironists and gives it an ethical-religious meaning.”9 this general summary is then born out in detail in the first chapter, which focuses exclusively on The Concept of Irony. there we see that the romantic ironists (for example, Friedrich von Schlegel) are characterized by failing to situate themselves in relation to their environment: the romantic attempts to poetically compose his self (at digte sig selv)10 out of his own independent lyrical resources, which leads to a lack of continuity and a playful relation to actuality, that is, in the end, boredom, or the constant chromatic shifting of moods.11 in contrast, the ethical-religious individual lets himself be poetically composed (at lade sig digte).12 the historical situation is appropriated as a divinely given task by the self in its inwardness.13 against hegel— who also critiques the romantic ironists’ irresponsibility, but who wants to get rid of the idea of living poetically14—Kierkegaard “cherishes the ideal of living poetically itself and just gives new ethical and religious content to it.”15 Like the romantic ironists, Kierkegaard also finds bourgeois common sense a petty finitization of the infinite, and wishes to get away from such common sense through living poetically; it is only in conceiving what living poetically means that the differences arise.16 in sum, whereas the romantic ironists live poetically by poetizing their concrete relationships into art so as aesthetically to enjoy them, “a genuine religious individual lets himself be poetically composed by obeying and following the divine in his life and by letting the divine transform the self.”17 Such is the basic form of living poetically for Kierkegaard. this general schema then receives a variety of specific situations in which the self is concretely engaged as Kierkegaard’s authorship progresses, the accent constantly being on how the subject is situated in these different situations. Kylliäinen patiently tracks these situations in minute detail in Either/Or, part two, The Concept of Anxiety, Philosophical Fragments, The Sickness unto Death, and Practice in Christianity. Some of the most significant situations delineated are the social situation of spiritless that prevails in contemporary christendom,18 the historical situation of the eternal touching the temporal in the moment,19 and the general situation of sin that effects all movement and development of the self within time.20 Finally, and most significantly, we are 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

ibid., p. 24. SKS 1, 316 / CI, 280. Kylliäinen, Living Poetically in the Modern Age, p. 34. SKS 1, 316 / CI, 280. Kylliäinen, Living Poetically in the Modern Age, pp. 34–6; pp. 66–7. ibid., pp. 68–9. ibid., p. 70. ibid., pp. 59–63. ibid., p. 70. ibid., p. 266, p. 411. ibid., pp. 231–233, pp. 345–346. ibid., p. 243, pp. 277–284.

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situated not so much in christ as by christ: our self is poetically composed by the god-man. what this ends up looking like, for the most part, is poetry as suffering: the christian self is poetically actualized in the self’s socio-historical reality by suffering in imitation of christ.21 however, ultimately it is governance who decides the specifics of what such imitatio Christi entails.22 Like Kierkegaard himself, Kylliäinen reads all but the last of these situations as containing internal contradictions that eventually lead us to the ultimate,23 which is the poetic self as composed by christ, the subject whose lines are dictated by the god-man, and realized in the concrete historical givens in which each individual is placed. imitation of christ is the only consistent way to realize the eternal in the temporal, to realize the infinity of the given self in our finite reality, and it is thus the true meaning of living poetically. Since living poetically means the realization of the self’s inwardness in sociohistorical actuality,24 it is indeed a concept rich enough to span the whole compass of Kierkegaard’s writings—even if he does not use the concept in such a manner himself. in the end, Kylliäinen shows why it is worth extending the concept in such a way, for he is able to demonstrate the viability of poetically realizing the self in such a way, over against philosophical, common sense, and scientific ways of actualizing the human self that stand in competition with the christian poetic vision.25 the compelling vista one glimpses when surveying Kierkegaard’s authorship with this concept in mind is that it is possible for the self to be composed poetically in such a way that an “infinite religious enjoyment”26 satisfies any and all aspirations of the given human self, and that Kierkegaard has showed us how to do so—in the modern age no less. thomas J. millay

ibid., p. 393; pp. 436–7; pp. 440–1; p. 452; p. 457; p. 459. ibid., p. 409; pp. 554–8. 23 it is impossible to canvas all the examples Kylliäinen gives here. one prominent illustration is Judge william, whose sunny harmony between the ethical-religious and the ethics of a given society (Sittlichkeit) is shown not to countenance the true otherness of the eternal, an otherness that may give tasks not able to be subsumed under universal ethical norms. thus, Judge william’s ethical-religious sphere does not contain what it thinks it contains: namely, the eternal in the temporal. See ibid., pp. 359–63. 24 perhaps the best summary of the idea is to be found in ibid., pp. 378–9. 25 Such a concern was part of the origin of Kylliäinen’s research: see ibid., p. 13. Such themes return at the conclusion of the book: see ibid., pp. 623–1. 26 ibid., p. 499. 21 22

reviews and critical discussions undetermined.