Visions of Sovereignty: Nationalism and Accommodation in Multinational Democracies 9780812209617

Table of contents :
Contents
PART I. THE PARADOX OF THE INTERNAL DIFFERENTIATION IN NATIONAL MOVEMENTS
Introduction. Secessionism and Non-Secessionism in Substate National Movements
Chapter 1. Accounting for the Internal Variation in Substate National Movements
PART II. THE ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL MOVEMENTS
Chapter 2. Evolution Within the Catalan National Movement Between 1976 and 2010: The Rise of Independentist Nationalism
Chapter 3. Evolution Within the Québécois National Movement Between 1976 and 2010: The Rise of Autonomist Nationalism
PART III. SHADES OF NATIONHOOD: NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND SUBSTATE NATIONAL MOVEMENTS
Chapter 4. Shades of Nationhood and the National Consciousness of Substate Nationalists
Chapter 5. Elites, Militants, and Ideology: National Parties and National Consciousness
PART IV. VISIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY: VARIETIES OF SUBSTATE NATIONALIST IDEOLOGIES
Chapter 6. Sovereignty and Procedure: The Ideology of Independentist Substate Nationalism
Chapter 7. Fragments of Sovereignty: The Ideology of Autonomist Substate Nationalism
Chapter 8. Shared Sovereignty: The Ideology of Federalist Substate Nationalism
PART V. MULTINATIONAL DEMOCRACIES AND THE MORAL POLITY OF THE SUBSTATE NATIONALIST
Chapter 9. The Discourse and Attitudes of Substate Nationalists
Chapter 10. The Moral Polity of the Stateless Nationalist
Chapter 11. Conclusion: Substate Nationalism and Its Accommodation in Multinational Democracies
Appendix. Field Research Methodology
Notes
References
Index
Acknowledgments

Citation preview

Visions of Sovereignty

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NATIONAL AND ETHNIC CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY Brendan O’Leary, Series Editor

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Visions of Sovereignty Nationalism and Accommodation in Multinational Democracies

Jaime Lluch

U N I V E R S I T Y O F P E N N S Y LVA N I A P R E S S PHIL ADELPHIA

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Copyright 䉷 2014 University of Pennsylvania Press All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations used for purposes of review or scholarly citation, none of this book may be reproduced in any form by any means without written permission from the publisher. Published by University of Pennsylvania Press Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-4112 www.upenn.edu/pennpress Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lluch, Jaime. Visions of sovereignty : nationalism and accommodation in multinational democracies / Jaime Lluch. — 1st ed. p. cm. — (National and ethnic conflict in the twenty-first century) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-8122-4600-1 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Sovereignty. 2. Separatist movements. 3. Multinational states. 4. Nationalism. I. Title. II. Series: National and ethnic conflict in the twenty-first century. JC327.L584 2014 320.54—dc23 2014006046

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Para Isabel, Jaimito, y Jaume con muchı´simo amor y carin˜o. Para Mami y Papi, y Rober, con mucho agradecimiento por todo el apoyo.

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Contents

PART I. THE PARADOX OF THE INTERNAL DIFFERENTIATION IN NATIONAL MOVEMENTS Introduction. Secessionism and Non-Secessionism in Substate National Movements 3 Chapter 1. Accounting for the Internal Variation in Substate National Movements 13

PART II. THE ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL MOVEMENTS Chapter 2. Evolution Within the Catalan National Movement Between 1976 and 2010: The Rise of Independentist Nationalism 45 Chapter 3. Evolution Within the Que´be´cois National Movement Between 1976 and 2010: The Rise of Autonomist Nationalism 65

PART III. SHADES OF NATIONHOOD: NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND SUBSTATE NATIONAL MOVEMENTS Chapter 4. Shades of Nationhood and the National Consciousness of Substate Nationalists 93 Chapter 5. Elites, Militants, and Ideology: National Parties and National Consciousness 115

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viii Contents

PART IV. VISIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY: VARIETIES OF SUBSTATE NATIONALIST IDEOLOGIES Chapter 6. Sovereignty and Procedure: The Ideology of Independentist Substate Nationalism 143 Chapter 7. Fragments of Sovereignty: The Ideology of Autonomist Substate Nationalism 159 Chapter 8. Shared Sovereignty: The Ideology of Federalist Substate Nationalism 199

PART V. MULTINATIONAL DEMOCRACIES AND THE MORAL POLITY OF THE SUBSTATE NATIONALIST Chapter 9. The Discourse and Attitudes of Substate Nationalists 215 Chapter 10. The Moral Polity of the Stateless Nationalist 253 Chapter 11. Conclusion: Substate Nationalism and Its Accommodation in Multinational Democracies 264 Appendix. Field Research Methodology 281 Notes 287 References 301 Index 323 Acknowledgments 331

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PA R T I

The Paradox of the Internal Differentiation in National Movements

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Introduction

Secessionism and Non-Secessionism in Substate National Movements

Variation in secessionism among nationalists is part of one of the ‘‘great puzzles of ethnic politics’’ (Hale 2008: 1). Although Ukrainians and the citizens of the Baltic republics chose independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, the Central Asian republics remained bastions of nonsecessionism. Nationalists in Spain’s Basque Country, the Igbo territory in Nigeria’s First Republic, and Que´bec in Canada have historically been more inclined toward independence than nationalists in Catalonia in Spain, Yorubaland in Nigeria, or Nunavut in Canada (Dı´ez Medrano 1999; Hale 2008: 57). Most scholars who have focused on the problem of variation in secessionism have centered their attention on paired comparisons of national movements in which one case is clearly pro-secession while the other is nonsecessionist, such as comparing Ukraine with Uzbekistan or the Basque Country with Catalonia (Dı´ez Medrano 1999; Conversi 1997). They have generally failed to investigate the complex heterogeneity of political orientations within national movements and their temporal evolution. This book, by contrast, focuses instead on within-case variation, and opts for a within-case research design, choosing the relevant nationalist party (and its leaders and militants) as its primary unit of analysis. Another focus will be the within-case temporal evolution of national movements themselves. This book’s remit is national movements in states with wellestablished democracies and advanced economies. There is a dearth of systematic comparative research into the sources and patterns of internal variation in the political orientation of national movements within such states. This book examines why some nationalists

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opt for a secessionist orientation or a highly decentralizing orientation while other nationalists within the same national movement opt for a variety of non-secessionist orientations. In addition, temporal variation within these cases is examined; that is, I examine how national movements evolve over time, developing new political orientations that are secessionist or highly decentralizing and that may represent a radicalization of nationalists’ preferences, when compared to previous orientations. The aim of this study is to uncover the sources and patterns of such within-case variation in national movements.1 Variation in secessionism is also interesting because separatism ‘‘is widely held to be the culmination of national development, the peak manifestation of nationalism, reflecting a nation’s collective desire to establish or protect its own state in the international arena, one that is equal or superior in status to all other states’’ (Hale 2008: 3). Yet, we find that many nationalists opt for a variety of non-secessionist orientations. These differing orientations have a variable impact on the stability and on the continuity of state structures and institutions. Orientations can evolve over time; their strength and robustness is subject to variation, and new orientations can be created that represent a radicalization of nationalists’ preferences. Within-case variation, therefore, constitutes an unresolved and under-theorized puzzle in the study of nations and nationalism. This variation may be expressed internally within a national movement, in the typical ‘‘trifurcation’’ that I shall show occurs in a movement and in the temporal evolution of the different orientations within a national movement. It may also be expressed externally, in the cross-regional comparison between national movements. This book will have less to say about the overall orientation of national movements and the cross-regional comparison between national movements. Instead, I am primarily interested in explaining the tripartite structure in the national movements examined here and the evolution over time of the diverse nationalist orientations that make up the national movement. ‘‘Substate national societies’’2 are historically settled and territorially concentrated societies that have developed national consciousness but do not have their own sovereign state. From a demographic standpoint, they may be a cultural and linguistic minority in the state in which they are located. A substate national society or ‘‘stateless nation’’ is a dynamic political entity, not a set of static ethnographic characteristics. It is not a unitary whole; it is a field of differentiated and competing stances taken by different

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parties, movements, or politicians, each jousting to ‘‘represent’’ the relevant nation (Brubaker 1997: 61). The national movements that are currently showing renewed strength and energy are those that stem from nations without a state (Guibernau 1996:133). This kind of ‘‘peripheral nationalism’’ emerges not from the state but from nations included in a larger state, and it presents fundamental differences in ‘‘origin and purpose compared with the nationalism instilled by the state in order to create the nation’’ (De Blas Guerrero 1994:34). In the political party systems of stateless nations, there is a recurring empirical pattern. Although all nationalists pursue nation-affirming and nation-building goals, the national political parties3 of stateless nations tend to bifurcate and, at times, trifurcate into two or three basic political orientations: independentism,4 autonomism, or federalism. Thus, some nationalists seek their own fully sovereign state while others seek an autonomous special status or to become a constituent unit within a classic federation. These are competing forms of nationalism: They all agree that the nation exists, but they disagree on the degree of sovereignty the nation should seek. Hence, their different visions of sovereignty. Internal variation within national movements is an undertheorized area in the study of secessionism, and to understand it one must also study nonsecessionism among nationalists. In the social sciences, the more common research agenda has been to study ‘‘secessionism’’: how it arises and what can be done to control it (see, e.g., Hechter 2000: ch. 7; Lustick, Miodownik, and Eidelson 2004; Cornell 2002; Hale 2000). The most methodologically defensible way to study the political behavior of secessionist nationalists is precisely to compare and contrast them with the diverse varieties (and subvarieties) of autonomist nationalists and federalist nationalists. Placing variance at the center of our research agenda is more likely to provide us with the most significant advances in our understanding of secessionist nationalism and of its counterparts, autonomist nationalism and federalist nationalism (see Varshney 2002: 6; Mahoney and Goertz 2004: 653–54).5 This book is a study of the ‘‘national movements’’ of two substate national societies, Que´bec and Catalonia, and their relations with the respective states that encompass them, Canada and Spain. The focus is principally on the contemporary period (1976–2010), although some reference to earlier epochs is made. The temporal endpoint of this book is 2009– 2010. Reference is also made to the national movements of other stateless

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nations (e.g., Puerto Rico, the Basque Country, Scotland) whenever this will help to illuminate the arguments made here. Miroslav Hroch (2000) refers to ‘‘national movements’’ as movements that give an absolute priority to the values and interests of the nation, although he says that not all such movements are ‘‘nationalist.’’6 This book’s focus is on the complex rainbow of political preferences expressed by the nationalists of stateless nations. The focus here is on identifying the nationalists and the variation in their express political orientation. The book problematizes the national movement itself and places intra-national movement variation at the center of research and analysis. A national movement is a quintessentially political phenomenon, and the most methodologically fruitful way to study the institutionalized component of the politicized national movement is to investigate the political trajectory of national political parties and the discourse and attitudes of their leaders and militants. This book is less interested in addressing ‘‘what is a nation?’’ or ‘‘what is the genesis of nationalism?’’ than in studying nationalism as the end result of the jousting and wrestling among nationalists. The relevant battleground is the political party systems of the ‘‘nation(s)’’ under study; thus, if one wants to understand the behavior of nationalists and the variation in their political orientation, one must study the discourse of the political parties (and their militants and leaders) that recognize the existence of the ‘‘nation’’ and take that recognition as a vertebrating principle of their ideology and action. Here I ask how nationhood is actually lived and practiced by the nationalists in the institutionalized forms one observes in the political sphere and how nationhood is expressed as a political category, as a typological scheme, and as a cognitive framework. How do the diverse and variable nation-promoting and nation-invoking efforts of politicized nationalists negotiate or compete with each other (Brubaker 1997: 16)? I partially agree with the general spirit of Brubaker’s observation that ‘‘nationalism can and should be understood without invoking ‘nations’ as substantial entities. Instead of focusing on nations as real groups, we should focus on nationhood and nationness, on ‘nation’ as practical category, institutionalized form, and contingent event’’ (16). When studying nationalism and the national movements of a particular nation, it is especially important to avoid reifying the national movement of the nation in question. Instead, it is more useful to problematize the national movement itself and to disaggregate it, to focus on its component parts, and to compare and contrast these component parts. This book’s focus is on the component

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parts of institutionalized national movements; the political parties that represent the variable political orientations within the national movement; and, thus, ultimately, on the nationalist militants and leaders who give life to these political parties. This book begins by setting the historical context for the study of the national movements of Que´bec and Catalonia. In the early chapters, I provide an explanation of the process that led to the establishment of the contemporary tripartite structure between independentists, autonomists, and federalists in these movements. Once the tripartite structure within the two national movements was established (in 1994 in Que´bec and in 1989 in Catalonia), they maintained (until 2010) this typical tripartite diversity of political orientations, which is at the root of the ‘‘nationalists’ trilemma’’: the circumstance that the nationalists of stateless nations have three fundamental political orientations from which to choose. This book seeks to explain the political origins of the internal variation in substate national movements by first examining the political space occupied by stateless nations’ nationalists; the national consciousness of the independentists, the autonomists, and the federalists; and the role of national parties in such movements. Then I examine the visions of sovereignty held by these three varieties of substate nationalism, and I will make reference to other cases of minority nationalism beyond Que´bec and Catalonia. Finally, I explain the political origins of the variation in secessionism and non-secessionism in national movements by examining in detail the attitudes and discourse of stateless nationalists, especially in Que´bec and Catalonia. The focus on stateless nationalists and the internal variation in their national movements is an opportunity to observe how they translate their sense of identity and belonging into a political agenda. Thus, this book is an empirical investigation into the political processes by which nationalists’ conceptions of political membership are translated into a concrete program of political mobilization. The national movement of which they are a part is the sum of a variety of political mobilization efforts that are observable in the tripartite structure of the national movement but have in common a unifying sense of political membership and identity. National identity is one of the most consequential forms of political membership, often trumping other forms of identity. Nationality claims are infused with a high degree of intersubjectivity. As Max Weber ([1922] 1978: 922) noted, ‘‘ ‘If the concept of ‘‘nation’’ can in any way be defined unambiguously, it certainly cannot be stated in terms of empirical qualities

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common to those who count as members of the nation.’ The source of nationhood, for Weber, is not to be found in the objective differentiae of language and religious practice that might happen to separate the members of two different groups, but in the intersubjective awareness that the salient intergroup differences, whatever they might be, are sufficient to demarcate two nations’’ (Hechter 2000: 14). The use of intensive fieldwork techniques and of positivist-qualitative methods to study national political parties and their leaders and militants is, therefore, the most appropriate tool to elucidate these matters, as I argue in more detail in the Appendix. The approach followed here, focusing on the nationalists’ political parties and their militants, offers a promising perspective for advancing the frontiers of knowledge. For example, Lustick, Miodownik, and Eidelson (2004: 209) set out to focus on the ‘‘relationship between institutionalized empowerment of potentially secessionist groups and the appearance of secessionism.’’ They developed a modeling platform that was used to create a virtual model state, ‘‘Beita,’’ containing a disaffected, partially controlled, regionally concentrated minority; used constructivist theory to determine behaviors by specific agents in Beita; and then tested the most popular theoretical positions on this issue. Categories such as ‘‘secessionist group’’ and ‘‘regionally concentrated minority,’’ however, are overbroad and overlook precisely what matters: A ‘‘secessionist group’’ is a variable category that, in fact, is often part of a trifurcated national movement, and it is this internal variation that needs to be studied and explained. Another common research agenda in the social sciences has been to study the presence or absence of nationalist or ethnic violence and radicalism in developing societies (e.g., Varshney 2002) or the puzzle of the differing success of the mobilization strategies used by ethnic groups in less-developed countries (e.g., Yashar 2005). Regarding nationalist violence in Europe, a typical comparison has been between the Basque national movement and the Catalan national movement (e.g., Conversi 1997; Dı´ez Medrano 1999). Although studies such as these are important contributions, the cases of ethnonational violence are actually not as numerous as one might expect (see, e.g., Fearon and Laitin 1996). As Cordell and Wolff (2011: 3) put it, although ethnic conflict doubtlessly remains an important source of violence in the twenty-first century, not every conflict has regional or global repercussions, ‘‘nor are there, in fact, that many ethnic conflicts.’’ Further, as Cordell and Wolff argue, although cases such as Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, Kosovo, and Cyprus are about ethnic conflict, other cases, such as Canada,

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Estonia, Belgium, and France, are about identities and conflicting interest structures, ‘‘yet their manifestations are less violent and are better described in terms of tensions than conflict’’ (3). Much more common as a political problem, and nearly universal for stateless nations’ national movements, is the question focused on here: In democratic states, stateless nations’ nationalists have various political strategies available to them to achieve their nation-affirming and nation-building objectives; therefore, we need to investigate why some nationalists opt for a secessionist orientation while other nationalists within the same national movement opt for proautonomism or pro-federation orientations. Several scholars engaged in the study of nations and nationalism have failed to recognize the internal variance in the nationalist camp and the rich diversity of heterogenous political orientations within substate national movements. John Breuilly (1993: 2), for example, argues that nationalism is a term used to refer to political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments. The latter is a political doctrine built upon three basic assertions, including the idea that ‘‘the nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty.’’ Ernest Gellner (1983) famously wrote that ‘‘Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent’’ (see also Hobsbawm 1990: 9). Michael Hechter (2000: 7) argues that nationalism is defined as ‘‘collective action designed to render the boundaries of the nation congruent with those of its governance unit.’’ He argues, however, that ‘‘groups seeking to advance the congruence of nation and governance unit (say, by promoting national sovereignty) are unambiguously nationalist. Still, nationalism is a variable, not a constant. To the degree that a given group aims for something less than complete sovereignty—or for goals that are quite irrelevant to its attainment—then it is perforce less nationalist’’ (8; emphasis added). Hale (2008: 244) noted that separatism may not be the only strategy to deal with the dilemmas of multinationalism within the same state, but he did not elaborate, nor did he focus on that puzzle. For Neil Davidson (2002: 15), national consciousness is the more or less passive expression of collective identification within a social group, while nationalism is the ‘‘more or less active participation in the political mobilization of a social group for the construction or defence of a state.’’ Finally, for McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow (2001: 229), a ‘‘nation’’ is defined as a ‘‘body of individuals who claim to be united by some set of characteristics that

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differentiate them from outsiders, who either strive to create or to maintain their own state.’’ They only distinguish between state-led and state-seeking nationalism. The internal variation within national movements has been under-investigated, and this book fills the void.7 In this book, I center discussion on the spectrum of political preferences expressed by nationalists. As Brubaker (1998: 276) has noted, ‘‘I do not think nationalism can be well understood as nation-based, state-seeking activity. In the first place, nationalism is not always, or essentially, stateseeking. To focus narrowly on state-seeking nationalist movements is to ignore the infinitely protean nature of nationalist politics; it is to ignore the manner in which the interests of a putative ‘nation’ can be seen as requiring many kinds of action other than, or in addition to, formal independence.’’ 8 We need to look at nationality claims not just through a sovereignty lens and to acknowledge that nationality demands can, therefore, be less than the demand for an independent state but more than mere regionalism (O’Leary 1998, 69; Keating 2001: 28). Secessionist nationalism coexists with other forms of non-secessionist nationalism within substate national movements, and identifying the sources and patterns of such internal differentiation is the focus of this book. Scholars who have extensively studied the Que´bec case seem to agree that all of the political parties that are present in the province’s National Assembly are ‘‘national’’ parties. Both francophone and anglophone political scientists agree on this point. On the francophone side, Alain Gagnon has written ‘‘Que´bec’s competing minority nationalism, . . . is represented across the board by all the political parties in Que´bec’s National Assembly, and [at the time of this writing] singlehandedly by the Bloc Que´be´cois in Ottawa’’ (Gagnon 2003: 298). Politicians such as Bernard Landry, former prime minister of Que´bec and chef du parti of the Parti Que´be´cois (PQ) when I interviewed him, confirm this evaluation. Landry said that ‘‘all the political parties in Quebec are nationalist. This is why it is called the National Assembly . . . Well, there is a consensus in our society about the national fact, but some think that we can exist within Canada and some do not.’’9 On the anglophone side, Hudson Meadwell (1993: 203–4) has written, ‘‘Nationalism dominates Que´bec politics. Indeed, since the formation of the Parti Que´be´cois (PQ) in 1968, one single question has increasingly defined political discussion and action: how much decentralization should govern relations between Que´bec and Canada? Unlike most other cases in which movements have produced a single ethnoregional party (for example

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Scotland, Wales, and Brittany), both the provincial Liberals and the Parti Que´be´cois are nationalist parties that differ fundamentally on how much decentralization is desirable. This is a luxury that other movements do not often enjoy.’’ Paul Hamilton (2004: 666), writing about Que´bec in comparison with Scotland and Wales, also agrees: ‘‘As in Scotland, all of Que´bec’s political parties are nationalist, albeit with different visions of Que´bec’s relationship with the Canadian federation.’’ In Catalonia, Miquel Caminal (1998: 162) has written that all of the parties (except the Partido Popular de Catalunya) in that stateless nation are ‘‘national parties,’’ fundamentally committed to catalanism, and they all share in the affirmation and defense of Catalonia as a nation. A ‘‘national party’’ is one that assumes the existence of a political nation and identifies with it. Such parties may not be nationalist in a formal sense, in that they are not necessarily ‘‘independentist.’’ In fact, as will be demonstrated, a national party may be either independentist, autonomist, or federalist in its political orientation. All national parties are strong advocates of the political sovereignty of the party within the systems in which they operate, whether at the state or at the substate level. The federalist parties may put an emphasis on the will, while the autonomists and independentists may emphasize being (2000: 325). Political catalanism is widely diffused and present in all the ideological options that find political expression in Catalonia. It is a political patrimony held by all political forces there (Molas 1988: 14). In this book, I will henceforth refer to the parties that compose the national movements under study as ‘‘national parties.’’10 The fact that there are independentist nationalists is obviously unsurprising and uncontroversial: Their political orientation is along the lines of what one would expect of nationalist militants and activists. More novel is the study of autonomist nationalists and pro-federation nationalists. The latter two types are less examined and arguably more interesting because their orientation is contrary to the outcome that many would expect of nationalist militants and activists. The ideology of autonomist nationalists is premised on the idea—as expressed by Jordi Pujol, president of the Catalan Generalitat (government) from 1980 to 2003—that it is possible to be a nationalist without seeking the independence of one’s own nation and that nations such as Catalonia may live and develop within the framework of larger political institutions (Guibernau and Rex 1997: 151). In 1989, he stated, ‘‘We are a nation without a state. We belong to the Spanish state but have no secessionist ambitions’’ (McRoberts 2001: 67).11 This curious form

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of nationalism ‘‘stems from the assumption that it is possible for a nation to live and develop within a multinational state if this state is genuinely democratic and allows enough space for its nations to feel represented and cultivate their difference’’ (Guibernau and Rex 1997: 150). Similarly, pro-federation nationalists’ ideological stance was well expressed by Benoıˆt Pelletier (2004b), who was Minister for Intergovernmental Affairs in the Jean Charest provincial government from April 2003 to 2008, in a speech he gave on November 17, 2004 at the Catalan Parliament. ‘‘Catalonia and Que´bec are engaged in a process of affirmation. . . . These are national realities we are talking about here, and not simply regions or local collectivities. Nations are distinguished from administrative entities by their cultural effervescence, political dimension, and their predestination for autonomy. This does not mean that statist sovereignty, acquired or not within the context of secession, is a way possible for all nations. On the contrary, it is possible for nations to seek to fulfill themselves within . . . more vast structures. This is the case for Que´bec within the Canadian ensemble’’ (my translation; see also Pelletier 2004c). As we shall see in more detail later, the Que´be´cois and the Catalan political party systems are so infused by a nationalist political culture that most scholars and analysts would assert that the majority of political parties therein are ‘‘national.’’ In sum, variation in secessionism and non-secessionism inside stateless nations’ national movements is one of the remaining puzzles in the study of ethnicity and nationalism. There is a paucity of scholarship squarely centered on these issues. This book examines the political heterogeneity within the national movements of stateless nations and recognizes the full spectrum of secessionist and non-secessionist preferences available to nationalists. If we have national movements that are subdivided into a variety of political/constitutional orientations, all of which consider themselves ‘‘national,’’ then we need to account for this internal differentiation as well as the evolution over time of these orientations, and we need to explain how nationalists’ preferences are radicalized.

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Chapter 1

Accounting for the Internal Variation in Substate National Movements

If the concept of ‘‘nation’’ can in any way be defined unambiguously, it certainly cannot be stated in terms of empirical qualities common to those who count as members of the nation. —Max Weber ([1922] 1978: 922)

Within-Case Variation in National Movements The national movements of Que´bec and Catalonia are two of the most important cases of stateless nationalism encompassed by my scope conditions. The universe of cases included within this book’s focus includes stateless nations’ national movements, located in or belonging to states with well-established democracies and developed socio-economic conditions,1 where the principal causes for the divide between the majority and minority nations are differences in language, culture, history, and/or institutions. Despite some notable differences between these stateless nations,2 their national movements exhibit the same political dynamics: In many of them, the tripartite taxonomy between secessionists, autonomists, and federalists is well established,3 and the argument in this book accounts for this internal differentiation. Thus, the book’s discussion will not encompass Kashmir/India, Morocco/Western Sahara, Aceh/Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the Tamil Northeast, or the Iraq/Kurdish region conflict, for example. I am interested in the

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national movements of ‘‘national peoples,’’ which includes ethnonationalists and ‘‘national minorities,’’ as opposed to ‘‘minority peoples’’ (Gurr 2000: 16). Nationality claims are a special kind of demand: They call for specific forms of recognition and accommodation and carry with them an assertion of the right to self-determination (Keating 2001: 2). Moreover, a common characteristic of nationality demands, as opposed to other group demands or other versions of the politics of difference, is that they have a territorial base, and they are accompanied by the claims that the nation is historically constituted as a self-governing community and that its people consider themselves a nation and wish to determine their collective future as a unit. Cases are more comparable if they are in well-established democracies where the level of socio-economic development is within the same range. These are the parameters within which my theorizing is expected to be valid (Mahoney and Goertz 2004: 660). Importantly, in most of these cases of stateless nationhood, there are two or three major ‘‘national parties,’’ one being pro-independence (or genuine free-association) and the others being pro-autonomy or profederation, as shown in Table 1.1, which is a nonexhaustive list of some of the cases covered by my scope conditions. In this book, I examine both positive and negative cases. Following Mahoney and Goertz (2004: 653–54), in small-N research the researcher ‘‘seeks to explain the positive cases that possess the outcome of interest by contrasting them with negative cases that lack the outcome’’ in order to maximize leverage for making valid causal inferences. With respect to my within-case analysis, the positive cases are the independentist national parties (and their militants) because they represent the expected result: A significant part of the literature on secessionism (and the common sense notions of many laypersons) would say that most nationalists ultimately seek to create their own state, and these parties and their militants epitomize this generalized expectation. The negative cases, thus, are the proautonomy and pro-federation national parties (and their militants) because they posit a different and unexpected political outcome. Moreover, this book also examines how national movements tend to vary over time, experiencing moments of foundation, growth, development, and decay. At times, new political orientations within national movements are founded in the sphere of parliamentary politics that constitute a radicalization of nationalists’ preferences. Temporal variation within

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national movements is an important, and yet under-theorized, area. By focusing on within-case temporal variation, we can examine how the different tendencies within a national movement have evolved over time. In particular, I will examine how new varieties of nationalism that represent the radicalization of nationalists’ preferences within national movements are created. Variation over time within national movements that shows the radicalization of nationalists’ preferences can be illustrated by referring to two contemporary exemplars. The Catalan national movement has historically had two dominant currents: federalist and autonomist. Similarly, ever since the Parti Que´be´cois came to power in 1976, the Que´be´cois national movement has had in recent history two principal currents: pro-independence and pro-federalism. Yet, from 1976 to 2010, both of these national movements evolved and diversified, and both produced a new institutionalized political current within the movement, espoused by nationalist political parties, which represented a radicalization of nationalists’ preferences. These are indeed nationalist parties, but with different orientations: Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) is independentist and the Action De´mocratique du Que´bec (ADQ) was an autonomist party. ERC’s transformation into a secessionist party during the late 1980s represented the establishment for the first time in the Catalan parliamentary sphere of a genuinely secessionist formation. The ADQ’s founding in 1994, out of discontented elements of the federalist party in Que´bec, resulted in the creation of an autonomist formation that was more decentralizing in its program and nationalist animus than the federalist party out of which it emerged. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 depict the temporal evolution of the Que´be´cois and Catalan national movements, and the consequent radicalization of nationalists’ preferences, during 1976–2010. Thus, new varieties of nationalism were founded in these two societies, and formal institutions (i.e., political parties) were created that espoused the new nationalist tendencies. These two new parties represented the radicalization of nationalists’ preferences. Therefore, with respect to the variation over time in national movements, in this book I provide responses to a number of analytically significant questions: When and how do new political orientations that embody a radicalization of nationalists’ preferences within the institutional component of a national movement get successfully established? When and how do these more radical and novel

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Table 1.1. Within-Case Variation in National Movements Pro-independence parties

Pro-autonomy parties

Pro-federation parties

Catalonia

Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya

Converge`ncia Democra`tica de Catalunya; Unio´ Democra`tica de Catalunya

Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya; Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds

Que´bec

Parti Que´be´cois

Action De´mocratique du Que´bec1

Parti Libe´ral du Que´bec

Bloque Nacionalista Galego2

Partido Socialista de Galicia Flemish Socialist

Nation

Galicia Flanders

Vlaams Blok

Christian Democracy; Liberals

Corsica3

Corsica Libera

Femu a Corsica

Scotland

Scottish National Party4

Scottish Labour

Basque Country

Eusko Alkartasuna; Aralar

Partido Nacionalista Vasco5

Wales6

Plaid Cymru7

Welsh Labour

South TyrolAlto Adige

Su¨dtiroler Freiheit

Su¨dtiroler Volkspartei

Puerto Rico8

Partido Independentista Puertorriquen˜o

Partido Popular Democra´tico

Ezker Batua

Partido Nuevo Progresista

Union Valdoˆtaine; ALPE

Valle d’Aosta

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Internal Variation 17 1. In the provincial elections of March 26, 2007—to the surprise of many political observers—the ADQ came in second, beating the PQ and becoming the official opposition to the PLQ minority government of Premier Jean Charest. It obtained 30.80 percent of the vote and 41 seats in the Que´bec National Assembly. However, in the provincial elections of December 8, 2008 it lost these gains and received only 16 percent of the vote. The party has been weakened and rudderless since 2008, but it embodied autonomist nationalism from the late 1990s through 2010. This book covers the period through 2010, but it should be noted that in December 2011, the ADQ opted to fuse with a new political party led by Franc¸ois Legault: the Coalition Avenir Que´bec, a new nationalist party that promises not to demand the sovereignty of Quebec and that rejects the typical dualism between sovereigntists and federalists in Quebec (Lessard 2011). 2. The BNG invokes Galicia’s right to self-determination, and a sector within it seems to see full national sovereignty as its ultimate goal, while seeing the attainment of the greatest degree of selfgovernment as its immediate objective, using the autonomist route (Te´sis polı´ticas aprobadas en la Asamblea XII- 2006). It is an ‘‘instrumental autonomist’’ party. 3. On the Corsican case, see Bernabe´u-Casanova 1997; Loughlin 1985; Bernabe´u-Casanova and Lanzalavi 2003; Giudici 1998; Loughlin and Daftary 1999; Ravis-Giordani 2004. 4. In the past, at least one-half of independence supporters have not voted for the SNP. When independence reached its peak of support at the time of the referendum in 1997, a clear majority of these supporters would have voted for the Labour party, not the SNP. This is puzzling because it seems to indicate that a considerable portion of Scottish nationalists are supporting Labour, not the SNP, and yet Labour is pro-devolution only (McCrone and Paterson 2002). In addition, as noted by Eve Hepburn (2006: 225), in the past, every one of Scotland’s principal political parties has declared itself to be the national party of Scotland. The monopoly of the SNP over national identity politics of the 1960–1980 period has been replaced by a complexity of political actors, rivalries, and pacts over the constantly evolving ‘‘national question.’’ 5. The PNV in the Basque Country recently came forward with a proposal for genuine free association known as the ‘‘Plan Ibarretxe,’’ which was defeated in the Spanish Cortes in 2005. It has oscillated between autonomist positions and more sovereigntist stances. 6. In Wales, Labour, the Liberal Democrats, and the Conservative Party have repositioned themselves to compete within the political space occupied by the nationalist aura of Plaid Cymru (Elias 2006: 212). 7. According to Anwen Elias (2006: 193), Plaid Cymru is a party that has traditionally rejected the nineteenth-century vocabulary of sovereign statehood, and thus it is the inheritor of a postsovereigntist legacy. Yet, since the late 1980s, the party has put forward a proposal for ‘‘full national status within the European Union,’’ and in September 2003, the party’s Annual Conference voted to modify this phrase to ‘‘independence in Europe.’’ 8. The island of Puerto Rico is a special case because it is neither a classical colony at this point, in the mold of the European colonies in Africa and Asia, nor a classical ‘‘stateless nation,’’ but rather an unincorporated territory belonging to the United States that may possibly be in transition from autonomism to federalism, or may yet one day attain its independence. Yet, it is properly included within my universe of cases because it is a stateless nation belonging to the United States with close to four million U.S. citizens. The U.S. invaded Puerto Rico in 1898 and decided to keep it as a colonial possession. In 1917, the U.S. Congress passed a statute providing that all persons born in Puerto Rico are U.S. citizens. Furthermore, there are no barriers to movement between the continental U.S. and Puerto Rico, and more than four million persons of Puerto Rican descent live in the U.S. and continually move back and forth to Puerto Rico.

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1994

1976

2005

Federalism (PLQ)

> Autonomism (ADQ)

1976

Independentism (PQ)

Figure 1.1. Within-case temporal variation in Quebec, 1976–2010.

1989

1976

2005

Autonomism (CDC + UDC)

> Independentism (ERC)

1976

Federalism (PSC, later IC-V)

Figure 1.2. Within-case temporal variation in Catalonia, 1976–2010.

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varieties of substate nationalism become institutionalized? How do these more radical nationalist orientations move from the substratum of ‘‘sociological nationalism’’ to the institutionalized sphere of parliamentary politics and electoral competition?

National Movements and National Parties The following parties are studied in this book: In Que´bec, the Parti Que´be´cois (PQ); the Parti Libe´ral du Que´bec (PLQ); and the Action De´mocratique du Que´bec (ADQ). In Catalonia, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), the federation of Converge`ncia i Unio´ (CiU), consisting of Converge`ncia Democra`tica de Catalunya (CDC) and Unio´ Democra`tica de Catalunya (UDC); the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC); and Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (IC-V).4 These national movements are trifurcated into independentists (ERC, PQ), autonomists (CDC/UDC, ADQ), and federalists (PSC, IC-V, PLQ). As shown in Table 1.1, in other stateless nations, such as Puerto Rico, one finds political parties that can be classified using the same categories: Partido Popular Democra´tico (autonomist), Partido Nuevo Progresista (federalist), and Partido Independentista Puertorriquen˜o (independentist). I wish to more fully dissect this tripartite taxonomy and to highlight the further refinements that arise in it as a result of our examination of the pro-autonomy and pro-federation parties. Important subcategories exist within the category of autonomist parties. One of the key distinctions that should be made among autonomist parties is whether they are instrumental or teleological autonomists. Instrumental autonomist parties tend to see autonomy as a valuable vehicle for achieving their self-determination objectives, but in the long run they also consider the theoretical possibility that autonomy may be a way station or a stepping stone toward some other political alternative, closer to the ideal of sovereignty. Teleological autonomist parties tend to see autonomy itself as the end result of their political quest, and, even if they may make rhetorical appeals to sovereignty, they ultimately settle for autonomy. Both CDC and UDC are instrumental autonomist parties, as well as the ADQ (although its decentralizing animus is weaker than others such as CDC). Parties such as the Partido Popular Democra´tico in Puerto Rico or Femu a Corsica in Corsica are clear teleological autonomist parties.

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Within the category of pro-federation national parties, one must distinguish between traditional federalist parties like the PSC and instrumental federalist parties like IC-V. The PSC is a more traditional federalist national party than the IC-V. The party does not invoke the right to selfdetermination as frequently as the other national parties of the principate; it is more likely instead to invoke dual identities. Very few or none of its militants express sympathy for the pro-sovereignty cause, as is the case with IC-V. The PSC’s values and proposals seem to be closer to a relatively traditional conception of federalism than to a radically asymmetric one. In its programmatic statements, IC-V makes reference to the right to selfdetermination. A significant portion of its militancy declares itself confederalist. Its leaders advocate a form of asymmetric federalism, but they also emphasize the right to self-determination. It is located on the asymmetric federalism end of the continuum of pro-federation national parties. In sum, I argue that it is useful to think of the varieties of stateless nationalism as a spectrum, as presented in Table 1.2 for some of the major cases discussed in this book.

Varieties of Nationalism and Existing Theories of Secessionism How do the existing theoretical traditions in the study of secessionism explain the puzzle of the internal variation in national movements? The literature on nationalism and secessionism is interrelated, and the principal theories of separatism are rooted in underlying theories of ethnicity, but for purposes of this book, I will focus on the dominant theories of secessionism (see, e.g., Hechter 2000; Hale 2008: 57, 59; Beissinger 2002). According to Hale (2008: 32), the structure of the divide in the literature on secessionism tracks that divide in the underlying theories of ethnicity between those theorists who think ethnic identification is inherently conflictual (mainly primordialists) and those who see it as almost entirely ephiphenomenal (instrumentalists). The literature on secessionism—which generally assumes that only secessionist nationalism needs to be considered—can nevertheless be usefully surveyed in order to identify some of the arguments that have been made in relation to stateless nationalists’ diversity of political orientations. In general, the existing theories can be seen as different frames that social

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Table 1.2. Subcategories in the Varieties of Stateless Nationalism

Most decentralizing Instrumental Independentists autonomists Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya; Parti Que´be´cois; Corsica Libera; Scottish National Party; Partido Independentista Puertorriquen˜o

Least decentralizing Instrumental federalists

Converge`ncia Iniciativa per Democra`tica de Catalunya Catalunya (Ⳮ); Verds Unio´ Democra`tica de Catalunya; Action De´mocratique du Que´bec (ⳮ); Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Ⳮ)

Teleological autonomists Partido Popular Democra´tico; Femu a Corsica

Federalists Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (Ⳮ); Parti Libe´ral du Que´bec; Ezker BatuaBerdeak; Partido Nuevo Progresista

Note: A plus sign indicates that the party is on the high end of the category (in its decentralizing animus); a minus sign indicates that the party is on the low end.

scientists have used to understand the dynamics of secessionism and nonsecessionism. The principal theories of secessionism that have a bearing on the issues addressed here can be broadly classified as the culturalist paradigm (which has its roots in the primordialist tradition), the materialist paradigm (exhibiting the lineage of the instrumentalist tradition), and the structuralist paradigm.

The Culturalist Paradigm of Secessionism Roots in the Primordialist Tradition The culturalist paradigm is rooted in the primordialist tradition, which views ethnic identities as age-old and enduring. This tradition is centered on the intrinsic power of ethnic differences and argues that ethnic differences are based on ancient animosities caused by inherent differences in

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factors such as culture, language, and race. It argues that ethnicity is inherent to humanity, ‘‘meaning that all of us inevitably search for, or can be easily be made to care for, our ancestry’’ (Hale 2008: 15; see also Varshney 2002). The culturalist paradigm of secessionism is thus rooted in what Hale (2008: 16) called ‘‘Hard Ethnicity-as-Conflictual Theories.’’ In this tradition, people derive dignity, self-esteem, and belonging from being part of an ethnic group. People’s ethnic ties are inherently linked to their deepest feelings and core needs for dignity and self-esteem.

National Consciousness Arguments Theorists in the culturalist paradigm of secessionism argue that the driving force for separatism is to be found in the innate human tendency to identify with one’s national or ethnic group and to consider one’s territorial grouping as a ‘‘nation,’’ which is presumed to lead to the formation of a pro-separatism orientation. These theorists see the formation of national consciousness as the key development that will lead to the emergence of a secessionist orientation (Taylor 1994; Geertz 1967; Hale 2008: 58; Davidson 2000; Meadwell 1993: 218). The national consciousness thesis is built on theories of ethnicity that foreground culture and identity and the importance of a sense of belonging in accounting for the strength of identities. Nationalism is seen as a strongly held social bond, deeply intertwined with a person’s sense of self. The nation is a community of common ancestry with an ancient lineage, and it makes a claim for political recognition on these grounds (Smith 1998: 22). These national consciousness arguments cannot account for the internal variation in national movements. Explaining separatism is reduced to explaining the rise of national consciousness (Hale 2008: 58). A linear and mechanistic relationship is assumed to exist between the development of national consciousness and the rise of secessionism.5 For example, those posing national consciousness as the driving force of separatism are stymied by the case of the Uzbeks, ‘‘a group that was consistently unionist yet had at least as strong a sense of national distinctiveness vis-a`-vis Russians as did Ukrainians,’’ who chose the secessionist path (138). This theoretical tradition assumes the existence of a form of national consciousnessdeterminism, and it postulates that all nationalists would want to align their

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nation with a state. This is not the case: Many nationalists opt for nonsecessionism, both in its pro-autonomy and pro-federation varieties. This tradition may be able to explain how nationalist sentiment emerges out of a sense of national consciousness, but it cannot explain why and how nationalist sentiment translates into both secessionist nationalism and the complex varieties of non-secessionist nationalism.

The Materialist Paradigm of Secessionism Roots in the Instrumentalist Tradition The materialist paradigm is rooted in the instrumentalist tradition, which argues that ethnic differences are only valuable because of their instrumental value, whether for economic or political purposes, and ethnicity is instrumentalized by elites (Varshney 2002). For instrumentalists, ethnicity is basically a mask for a bundle of interests. The materialist paradigm of secessionism is thus rooted in what Hale (2008: 25) called ‘‘Ethnicity-asepiphenomenal theories,’’ which reject completely the idea that ethnicity embodies its own intrinsic value. Ethnic politics is instead a function of other, more mundane pursuits, such as power, material resources, economic status, or security. Economic and Material Interests The materialist paradigm of secessionism also assumes that most nationalists would naturally want to opt for the secessionist orientation, but it postulates that economic or material conditions may dissuade some nationalists from advocating independence (Booth, James, and Meadwell 1993; Breton, Galeotti, Salmon, and Wintrobe 1995). The materialist thesis maintains that nationalists at the microfoundational level exhibit instrumental rationality, adjusting their political mobilization goals in accordance with the expected costs of achieving their objectives (Hardin 1995; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Hechter 2000; Bates 1974; Brass 1975). The economic viability of the proposed independent state and the ‘‘costs of transition to independence are a constraint on the mobilization of support’’ for independentist nationalism (Meadwell 1993: 228; Hechter 1992; Meadwell 1989). Many in this tradition would argue that ‘‘richer regions are

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more likely to display separatism than poorer ones because they want to avoid having their resources redistributed’’ (Hale 2008: 60). Materialist approaches also assume a universal human tendency among nationalists to align their nation with a sovereign state. As in the case of the national consciousness approach discussed above, this assumption does not hold: Many nationalists opt for non-secessionism, both in its proautonomy and pro-federation varieties and sub-varieties. Moreover, a materialist approach by itself is unable to explain the attitudes and beliefs of nationalists, which are laced with noninstrumental considerations, such as ‘‘the notions of self-respect and dignity, not with a narrowly defined self-interest’’ (Varshney 2003: 91). The preference-formation processes of nationalists can hardly be explained with instrumental-rational arguments, that is, as a means to a self-interested end. A materialist approach typically misses much of what motivates ethnic or nationalist behavior. This approach lacks ‘‘sensitivity to historically inherited attitudes and power relations among groups’’ and ignores how ‘‘structured patterns of domination and subordination and a history of suffering have customarily shaped answers to these questions, not pure instrumental rationality’’ (93). In addition, a materialist approach fails to recognize that nationhood, as part of the sphere of ‘‘culture, . . . is embedded in our life; it preexists as a framework of meaning, within which human deliberation and rationality operate’’ (92). Another difficulty facing the advocates of the materialist paradigm is that recent experimental research has demonstrated the ubiquity of nonself-regarding motives, which questions the materialist paradigm’s model of the self-regarding actor. The evidence has shed light on a nexus of behaviors known as ‘‘strong reciprocity,’’ which is a predisposition to cooperate with others and to punish those who violate the norms of cooperation (Gintis et al. 2005: 8). Recent research has shown that economists and other social scientists fail to understand core questions in their fields ‘‘if they insist on the self-interest hypothesis and rule out heterogeneity in the realm of social preferences’’ (Fehr and Fischbacher 2005: 152). The research has shown that ‘‘in addition to economic self-interest, social preferences shape the decisions of a substantial fraction of people. A person exhibits social preferences if the person not only cares about the economic resources allocated to her but also cares about the economic resources allocated to relevant reference agents’’ (Fehr and Fischbacher 2005: 153). Thus, instead of assuming the existence of a single type of ‘‘profit maximizing’’ or ‘‘utility

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maximizing’’ individual, ‘‘a better foundation for explaining human behavior is the assumption that multiple types of individuals exist in most settings’’ (Ostrom 2005: 253). Thus, predictions based on ‘‘the model of the self-regarding actor often do not hold up under empirical scrutiny, rendering the model inapplicable in many contexts’’ (Gintis et al. 2005: 7). This book argues that the materialist paradigm is inadequate to explain variation in secessionism and non-secessionism.

The Structuralist Paradigm of Secessionism Macro-Level Theories and Structural Conditions Theorists in this tradition typically engage in comparative historical analysis, often developing macro-level theories that focus on socioeconomic structures (such as class). They tend to look at how historical processes mediate the relationships between socioeconomic-structural factors, political-structural factors, and the nationalist political outcomes one wants to explain (Dı´ez Medrano 1999: 14). Socieconomic-structural factors are seen as creating very different political structures and institutions, which facilitate diverse nationalist mobilization strategies. For example, ‘‘combined development and specialization in capital-goods production in the Basque Country and endogenous development and specialization in consumer-goods production in Catalonia . . . facilitated the development of very different social structures, very different attitudes towards capitalism and membership in the Spanish state, and, consequently, very different political structures [and institutions] and degrees of support for particular nationalist political organizations’’ (16). Michael Hechter’s early work on internal colonialism and the persistence of Irish, Scottish, and Welsh nationalism in the U.K. is one of the wellknown class-based interpretations of nationalism, which located the cause of nationalist mobilization in the inferior structural position of the minority nationalist group within a cultural division of labor (Meadwell 1993: 206; Hechter [1975] 1999: xiv, 119). This tradition is distinct from the materialist approach or rationality approaches in general, given that theorists in this tradition focus on macro-structural factors, long-term historical processes,

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and how these processes interact with political coalitions and class forces within national movements. Two problems emerge with respect to these structuralist approaches. First, the unit of analysis used by these approaches is inadequate to investigate the empirical puzzle I am interested in. These structuralist approaches usually focus on across-case, national movement-level variation. This unit of analysis makes it impossible for these approaches to properly investigate the heterogeneity of political orientations within national movements and the evolution of these orientations over time. One must instead focus on within-case variation and choose a sub-state research design, opting for the national party (and its militants) as one’s primary unit of analysis, instead of a broadly-conceived category of ‘‘nationalist movement.’’ Second, theorists in the structuralist tradition have tended to overemphasize structure over agency, ‘‘viewing nationalism as a logical externalization of a particular social interest or identity position embedded by prior history or emerging out of the impact of broader social forces (such as industrialization). This perspective is wholly inadequate’’ (Beissinger 2002: 451). It relies on a deterministic view of causation, which even in the natural sciences, is no longer the reigning paradigm. It misses the element of contingency in political life, and the interdependency of human actions within and across spatial contexts. ‘‘The interdependence of human activity across time and space presents a problem for deterministic, linear, or atemporal explanations of political and social phenomena’’ (Beissinger 2002: 453). The approach I take here will underscore the role of agency in nationalism, focusing on the actual discourse, attitudes, and beliefs of the nationalists of various stripes. I also present arguments that renew our appreciation of the role of political factors in accounting for the variation in secessionism and non-secessionism.

Accounting for the Internal Variation in National Movements The national consciousness and materialist paradigms of secessionism are inadequate to understand the reasons for the internal variation in national movements. The structuralist approach is equally inadequate to investigate the central concerns in this book. I propose instead a novel approach that I call the ‘‘moral polity’’ thesis.

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Stateless (that is, substate) national movements are located within multinational states, in which the central state is often controlled by the majority group that is dominant at the statewide level. The substate nationalist movements studied in this book are generally not nationalisms of exclusion, in which a dominant group in a substate society tries to exclude minority groups from power on the basis of ethnic characteristics alone. If anything, because of the majority-minority dynamic that is created in multinational states, they are exemplars of what Varshney calls the ‘‘nationalism of resistance’’ to the central state. Dignity and self-respect form the microfoundations of the latter kind of nationalism (Varshney 2003: 86; Gagnon 2003: 295). My research findings on how nationalists form their preferences for their chosen political orientation show that substate nationalists do not always exhibit instrumental rationality; instead, they show noninstrumental behavior. I further find that their nationalist discourse is intertwined with noninstrumental notions of collective dignity and self-respect, expectations of mutual reciprocity (vis-a`-vis the majority group), and a sense of identity that is enmeshed in historical memories (Varshney 2003: 91). My findings show that independentists and strong decentralizers (the strong autonomists and radical asymmetric federalists) form their preferences in part because they perceive that the central state is not able to accommodate their substate national society and because they are aggrieved by ‘‘majority nation’’ nationalism, with independentists being most discontented with the central state and the state nationalism of the ‘‘majority nation.’’ Traditional autonomists and mainstream federalists, on the other hand, perceive the central state as capable of reciprocating and accommodating their substate national society and are less concerned about state nationalism. In this sense, my account of the attitudes and discourse of stateless nationalists shows ‘‘sensitivity to historically inherited attitudes and power relations among many groups’’ (Varshney 2003: 93). Custom and culture have helped to create a general expectation of reciprocity between substate nationalists and the majority society, mediated through the institutional apparatus of the central state (Hale 2008: 80). These substate nationalists have expectations about what is fair treatment by the central state and notions about what obligations emerge due to common membership in the same state. Substate nationalists thus inhabit a ‘‘moral polity’’ in which human reciprocities are expected and notions of collective dignity, the

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commonweal, and mutual accommodation are essential (Thompson 1971). Instances of reciprocity help to generate integrative bonds, subjective feelings of solidarity, trust, and social unity (Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007). Intersubjective relations of reciprocity between substate nationalists and the majority-nation that controls the central state are critical for explaining why some stateless nationalists opt for independentism or strongly decentralizing alternatives, while others opt for varieties of nationalism that are less decentralizing. State-wide solidarity and unity may be promoted by a culture of reciprocity and accommodation between substate nationalists and the institutional matrix of the central state. These are social values that are particularly critical in multinational states. My theory draws on the work of ‘‘moral economy’’ theorists such as E. P. Thompson and James C. Scott, and thus my moral polity thesis represents a novel adaptation of the ‘‘moral economy’’ approach to a different field: the study of secessionism and the varieties of non-secessionism among substate nationalists (Booth 1994). But it also draws on three other strands of political theory. My findings show a strong affinity with the recent findings of social scientists such as Russell Hardin, Elinor Ostrom, and Margaret Levi, who are working on the role of trust and reciprocity in plural societies. It also presents linkages with theorists, such as Robert Putnam, who have explored the role of trust and norms of reciprocity as components of social capital in the functioning of democratic institutions. Finally, although my theory is derived from my empirical findings, it shares some of the normative aspirations of those political theorists who have written on plurinational democratic states, mutual accommodation and recognition between peoples, and liberal varieties of nationalism (e.g., Taylor, Kymlicka, Tamir, Miller, and Keating). The most distinguished practitioner of the ‘‘moral economy’’ approach in history has been Edward P. Thompson, but other distinguished scholars in political science and anthropology, such as James C. Scott, have written in this tradition. E. P. Thompson’s majestic oeuvre on the development of the English working class between 1780 and 1832 and how it came to ‘‘feel an identity of interests as between themselves, and as against their rulers and employers’’ (Thompson 1963: 11) and his work on the social roots of ‘‘food riots’’ in eighteenth-century England (Thompson 1971) have embodied elements of this approach. He was writing against historians who were guilty of a crass economic reductionism, which obliterated the complexities of motive, behavior, and function, and who presented an ‘‘abbreviated view

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of economic man’’ (Thompson 1971: 78). These historians presented a ‘‘spasmodic’’ view of how eighteenth-century colliers responded to economic conditions: According to the former, the latter simply clapped their hands spasmodically upon their stomachs, responding mechanistically to economic stimuli. Thompson’s approach, instead, was to focus on the moral assumptions and the moral world of a social configuration in the eighteenth century: The food riot in eighteenth-century England was a highly-complex form of direct popular action, disciplined and with clear objectives. How far these objectives were achieved—that is, how far the food riot was a ‘‘successful’’ form of action—is too intricate a question to tackle within the limits of an article; but the question can at least be posed (rather than, as is customary, being dismissed unexamined with a negative), and this cannot be done until the crowd’s own objectives are identified. It is of course true that riots were triggered off by soaring prices, by malpractices among dealers, or by hunger. But these grievances operated within a popular consensus as to what were legitimate and what were illegitimate practices in marketing, milling, baking, etc. This in its turn was grounded upon a consistent traditional view of social norms and obligations, of the proper economic functions of several parties within the community, which, taken together, can be said to constitute the moral economy of the poor. An outrage to these moral assumptions, quite as much as actual deprivation, was the usual occasion for direct action. (Thompson 1971: 79) The moral economy approach’s distinctive focus on social norms, and subordinate groups’ moral assumptions about mutual reciprocities and notions about the commonweal, presents an important theoretical framework that helps us understand subordinate groups’ social and cultural world and how these moral assumptions frame these groups’ political mobilization efforts. Although this approach was applied by Thompson to the laboring peoples of eighteenth-century England, it has been successfully exported to other spatial and temporal coordinates. James C. Scott adopted a ‘‘moral economy’’ perspective on the study of peasant politics and the historical development of agrarian society in lower Burma and Vietnam. Taking note of the centrality of the subsistence ethic

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in the peasant household, Scott focused on the moral content of the subsistence ethic. ‘‘The problem of exploitation and rebellion is thus not just a problem of calories and income but is a question of peasant conceptions of social justice, of rights and obligations, of reciprocity’’ (Scott 1976: vii). Reflecting on some of the major peasant rebellions of the 1930s, including the Saya San Rebellion in Burma, which was ultimately crushed, Scott wrote that if we ‘‘understand the indignation and rage which prompted them to risk everything, we can grasp what I have chosen to call their moral economy: their notion of economic justice and their working definition of exploitation—their view of which claims on their product were tolerable and which intolerable. Insofar as their moral economy is representative of peasants elsewhere . . . we may move toward a fuller appreciation of the normative roots of peasant politics’’ (Scott 1976: 3). Furthermore, ‘‘the peasant’s idea of justice and legitimacy, our analysis suggests, is provided by the norm of reciprocity and the consequent elite obligation (that is, peasant right) to guarantee—or at least not to infringe upon—the subsistence claims and arrangements of the peasantry. Thus, a central feature of the peasant’s reaction to the violation of his rights is its moral character’’ (Scott 1976: 188). Scott noted early on that his approach, which begins in the domain of economics, must end in the study of peasant culture and religion, and the cultural basis—within the peasantry’s ‘‘little tradition’’—of moral dissent and resistance (Scott 1976: viii, 233), which his later work fully developed (Scott 1990). The moral economy approach has, therefore, been successfully applied to diverse spatial and temporal settings. My moral polity thesis6 adapts this approach to a novel setting and delves into the moral assumptions of a social configuration: substate nationalist leaders and militants in contemporary multinational democracies who are a distinctive minority within their own state. Following E. P. Thompson, I argue against a crass economic reductionism, which obliterates the complexities of motive and behaviour and presents an ‘‘abbreviated view of economic man’’ (Thompson 1971: 78). My findings show that independentists and strong decentralizers (strong autonomists and radical asymmetric federalists) form their preferences in part because they perceive that the central state is not able to accommodate their substate national society and because they have little trust in the central state. Substate nationalists thus see the state in which they live as a ‘‘moral polity’’ in which reciprocities are expected and notions

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of collective dignity, the commonweal, and mutual accommodation are part of the implicit social compact of living together within the same state. The perception by these substate nationalists that their expectations of reciprocity have been violated by the central state is a factor that contributes to the increasing radicalization of nationalists’ political preferences. Trust and expectations of reciprocity thus play a central role in my account of the discourse and attitudes of substate nationalists. There are, in fact, gradual and expanding concentric circles of trust—a ‘‘radius of trust’’ according to Fukuyama (1996)—from the most immediate interpersonal relations to more abstract orientations directed at social objects and institutions (Sztompka 42). Social trust is thus the belief that the agents in charge of institutions have the right intentions concerning the truster and are competent to do what the truster expects them to do, which is the encapsulated interest conception of social trust (Hardin 2006: 17–19; Cook et al. 2005: 2). Trusting, reciprocity, and trustworthy behavior exhibit high variance. These are not unchanging universal attributes of all individuals but rather the result of multiple contextual attributes (Ostrom and Walker 2003: 5). ‘‘All reciprocity norms share the common ingredient that individuals tend to react to the positive actions of others with positive responses and to the negative actions . . . with negative responses’’ (Ostrom and Walker 2003: 42). With respect to the role of the state and how citizens relate to it, where asymmetries in power exist, pronounced asymmetries ‘‘will almost certainly prevent trust from arising and will lead to distrust’’ (Farrell 2004: 91). Confidence in the reciprocal animus of state agents makes citizens more cooperative with government (Cook et al.2005: 161). In this regard, Cook et al. cite the case of Que´bec: ‘‘The history of francophone Canadians offers an example of a group who believe that their interests are ill served by the central government, both by its institutions and by its leaders. . . . Their long-term solution has been to demand provincial autonomy, especially for Que´bec, and to threaten secession. . . . Although the particulars are different, within the United Kingdom, Scotland uses a similar strategy in its relationship to England’’ (Cook et al. 2005: 162). Social capital refers to ‘‘features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions’’ (Putnam 1993: 167). Most forms of social capital, such as trust, are ‘‘moral resources.’’ Trust is an essential component of social capital, and it is an asset that stimulates cooperation. Social trust in

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modern industrial societies can arise from two related sources: norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement (Putnam 1993: 169, 171; Hardin 2006: 89). The most important of the norms undergirding social trust are norms of reciprocity. Although my theory is derived from my empirical findings, some of the policy implications that can be derived from it have strong affinities with the normative aspirations of political theorists working on mutual accommodation and recognition between nations. The policy implications of my work are consonant with much of the liberal nationalist canon. According to these theorists, in multinational democracies it is a legitimate function of the state to accommodate and recognize the various nations that coexist within a state’s boundaries. ‘‘This can be done by creating public institutions which operate in these national languages, using national symbols in public life (e.g., flag, anthem, public holidays), and allowing self-government for national groups on issues that are crucial to the reproduction of their language and culture (e.g., schemes of federalism or consociationalism to enable national minorities to exercise selfgovernment)’’ (Kymlicka 2001: 39; see also Kymlicka 1995; Taylor 1994; Tamir 1993). Such liberal nationalist regimes typically have a more open and plural definition of the national community (Keating 2001). Public institutions may be stamped with a particular national character, but individuals who do not belong to that national group are not constrained from expressing their own national identity. There is a public space for the free expression of views that have diverse national allegiances. ‘‘People are free to urge the adoption of a different national language, or even to seek the secession of a region to form a separate state’’ (Kymlicka 2001: 40). The institutions of the state, in the view of liberal nationalists, ought to be willing to accommodate those minority nations that democratically insist on their national distinctiveness. Finally, my moral polity thesis finds some echo in recent research on the causes of separatism. Hale (2008: 72) argues that the key factor ‘‘determining whether a region will secede is whether or not the central government of a union state is exploitative or peaceful.’’ Variation in separatism over time and space depends on five factors, and two of these are related to the central state. The actions of the central state can notably alter regional leaders’ and masses’ perceptions of the state and whether they are likely to experience exploitation or accommodation in a future union state. Thus,

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the politics of separatism is, in large part, about shaping regional beliefs about the nature of the central government (72).7

Explaining Within-Case Temporal Variation In addition, and also consonant with the moral polity thesis, my findings with respect to temporal variation within substate national movements show that intersubjective relations of reciprocity between substate nationalists and majority nation nationalism are essential for understanding the ‘‘trigger’’ event that serves as the immediate catalyst for the founding and growth of new nationalist orientations (led by nationalist parties) that constitute the radicalization of nationalists’ preferences in substate national societies. This will be seen in Part II. My outcome variable in Part II is the tipping point at which these nationalist political parties are established. This tipping point is of analytical significance because it represents the point at which a novel political orientation in the national movement is successfully established within the sphere of formal institutional politics.8 From that point on, the supply side of nationalism has been diversified and expanded. After the tipping point has been reached, the new formations pass through a period of maintenance and growth, during which the political and constitutional orientation tends to mature, until it reaches an ideological plateau that gives it an aura of legitimacy within the national movement. I argue that four factors explain the process by which the tipping point is reached. This outcome is obtained as a result of the sequential interaction of these four factors, which can be schematically described as preexistent ideology, central state constitutional moment, impulse from civil society, and formation of leadership nucleus.

The Pre-Embryonic Period: Preexistent Ideology Preexistent ideological carriers facilitate the task of institutionalizing a new political orientation within a national movement. These preexistent carriers serve as the intellectual developers of the political and constitutional orientation incorporated by the contemporary parties and their leadership. Thus,

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it is essential to be attentive to the ideological history of the new political and constitutional orientation.

The Embryonic Period: Central State Constitutional Moment The immediate catalyst that sets in motion the process that leads to the founding of a new political and constitutional orientation within a national movement is the occurrence of a significant constitutional transformative event in the central state (e.g., Canada or Spain). Such constitutional transformative moments tend to frame the embryonic period of the formation of a new political orientation. A constitutional transformative event is a higher order constitutional event that affects the relationship between the central state—largely controlled by the majority nation—and the minority nation embedded within the same state (Ackerman 1991). It is of a higher order than ordinary legislative activity. Such ‘‘constitutional moments’’ are relatively rare, and they represent a critical event that crystallizes the nature of the relationship between the central state and the embedded minority nation. Constitutional moments are critical events because constitutions in divided societies often ‘‘constitute the very demos which governs itself under and through the constitutional regime’’ (Choudhry 2008: 5). The process of debating and negotiating a constitutional moment is critical because such moments ‘‘help to create the political community on whose existence the constitutional order which results from that process depends’’ (Choudhry 2008: 6). These critical constitutional transformative events include the adoption of a new constitution, the adoption or proposal of significant constitutional amendments, or the adoption or proposal of a new organic statute for the government of the embedded minority nation. Note that these critical constitutional transformative events may be either positive or negative in their final outcome—that is, the event could lead to the enactment of a constitutional amendment or organic statute, or the event could be the proposal of such an amendment even if it is later rejected. What matters is that the event sets in motion the public policy discussion and critical reevaluation of the relationship between majority and minority nations that coexist in a dialogical relationship within the same state.

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Constitutional moments may, under certain circumstances, be interpreted by the minority nationalists as an instance of majority nation nationalism, and, thus, these constitutional events affect the intersubjective relations of reciprocity between minority nationalists and majority nation nationalism. Intersubjective relations of reciprocity between substate nationalists and majority nation nationalism are thus important for understanding the trigger event that serves as the immediate catalyst for the emergence and growth of new nationalist political currents. These constitutional transformative events, originating at the central state level, tend to have a significant impact on the political party system of the embedded minority nation. The embryonic period of the formation of a new political orientation within the institutional component of a national movement is thus framed by a central state constitutional moment. My findings with respect to temporal variation within substate national movements show that understanding intersubjective relations of reciprocity between substate nationalists and majority nation nationalism is essential for understanding the trigger event that serves as the immediate catalyst for the founding and growth of new nationalist orientations (led by nationalist parties) that constitute a radicalization of nationalists’ preferences in stateless nations. Central state constitutional moments may be interpreted by the minority nationalists as an instance of non-accommodation and non-reciprocity and state nationalism, in accordance with my moral polity thesis.

The Impulse Period: The Contribution from Civil Society During the process that leads to the founding of a new political and constitutional orientation within a national movement, the organizations, entities, and individuals that represent sociological nationalism make a critical contribution. An impulse for the formation and founding (or de facto refounding) of these parties comes from elements within civil society. We need to be attentive to the role played by associations, extra-parliamentary political action groups or parties, organizations formed by the intelligentsia, and cultural and language affirmation groups. These organizations and entities serve as the breeding ground for cadres and leadership, as the providers of organizational skeletons, and also as the cultivators of the ideological precedents and programs that facilitate the establishment of a new

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political orientation in the sphere of parliamentary politics and electoral competition.

Consolidation of Leadership and the Founding of the New Political Orientation Once the trigger event of a central state constitutional moment has occurred and the impulse for the founding of a novel political orientation has been given by elements coming from civil society, a new nucleus of leadership needs to consolidate to steer the support being generated by sociological nationalism in the direction of founding a political party, which will be the carrier of the new political orientation. The nucleus of new leadership is also of critical importance because its political skill will determine whether it will be able to take advantage of the political opportunities presented by the central state constitutional event that set in motion this entire process. Whether the new nucleus of leadership can frame the central state constitutional moment in terms that are favorable to its plans is essential. The sequential interaction of these four factors determines whether or not the process reaches the tipping point at which these nationalist political parties get founded, or de facto re-founded.

The Time Frame for the Book As mentioned earlier, events in Catalonia and Que´bec between 1976 and 2010 form the core of this book’s discussion, although some reference will be made to earlier epochs in order to understand the historical origins of these national movements (especially in Part II). Both Catalonia and Que´bec emerged out of a period of quiescence in their national movements in the second half of the twentieth century. Thus, one reason for focusing on the 1976–2010 period is that these nations were in the same stage of development of their national movements. This was a period of growth and stability for these national movements. Miroslav Hroch is well known for his distinguishing between the three phases of national movements, according to the character and role of those active in it. In Phase A, the energies of the intelligentsia are devoted to scholarly inquiry and dissemination of the linguistic, cultural, social, and historical attributes of the non-dominant

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group. In Phase B, a new set of activists emerge, who by patriotic agitation seek to ‘‘awaken’’ national consciousness and get their compatriots to join the project of creating a fully-fledged nation. Phase C emerges when a large part of the population comes to value its national identity, and a mass movement is formed. In Phase C, the full social structure of the nation comes into being (Hroch 2000: 23; Hroch 1993: 7; Hroch 1994: 5). Most of Hroch’s comparative research has focused on the range of ‘‘social constellations at work in Phase B of the national movements of 19th-century Europe. So far, no analogous studies have been made of Phase C’’ (Hroch 1993: 13). Hroch’s typology regarding the three phases of national movements has been well received by major writers on nationalism (including Eric Hobsbawm), and it will also be useful in this book, which focuses on Phase C of the national movements in Que´bec and Catalonia (Hobsbawm 1990: 12). Therefore, one reason I concentrate principally on the 1976– 2010 period is that this is the period during which Phase C of these nations’ national movements fully blossomed.

Catalonia Phase C of the Catalan national movement developed in two moments. The first was during the short-lived Spanish Second Republic of 1931– 1936—before the Civil War of 1936–1939—during which the first Catalan Statute of Autonomy was passed in 1932. With the defeat of the Republican forces in 1939, the further development of Phase C of the Catalan national movement was interrupted until it could be fully reinitiated in the post1975 period. Thus, our analysis of Phase C will center on post-Franco political developments in Catalonia. By 1976, Catalonia was emerging out of the long period of General Franco’s dictatorship (1939 to 1975). By 1977, the Catalan Generalitat (government) had been reestablished, and the new Spanish Constitution was approved in 1978. Converge`ncia Democra`tica de Catalunya, the larger party within the nationalist federation of CiU, was founded in 1974 as a movement and in 1976 as a political party, and the smaller party, Unio´ Democra`tica de Catalunya, had its first post-Franco public Congress in 1976. The Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya was founded in 1978. Finally, the first Catalan autonomous community elections were held in 1980.

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Que´bec The national movement in Que´bec underwent significant transformations during the 1960s as a result of the ‘‘Quiet Revolution.’’ Until 1960, nationalism in Que´bec was mostly the characteristic of a small elite, and the masses remained indifferent to the entire phenomenon (Dion 1976: 170). In Hroch’s scheme, Phase C in the history of the national movement began after 1960. This new political phase was inaugurated by the Liberal government of Premier Jean Lesage. For example, the Lesage government—at the end of its first term in office—shifted from its earlier stance of promoting equality of all the provinces to one of promoting a special status for Que´bec (153). During the Union Nationale administration of 1966–1970, a strong bi-national autonomist theme was emphasized, seeking to make the provincial government the protector of the rights and interests of the Que´be´cois (Gagnon and Montcalm 1990: 155). Under the Liberal administration of 1970–1976, Premier Bourassa sought a ‘‘reformed federal system designed to give Quebec special powers and the resources needed to facilitate the ‘preservation and development of the bicultural character of the Canadian federation’ ’’ (157). Significantly, in 1968, the first major separatist party, the Parti Que´be´cois (PQ), was formed under the leadership of Rene´ Le´vesque (Coleman 1984: 4). Most important for our purposes, the PQ won the 1976 provincial elections on a platform of ‘‘sovereignty association,’’ and for the first time in Que´bec’s history, a pro-independence party came to power at the provincial level. In sum, until the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, the Que´bec national movement had been nearly dormant, but with the founding of the PQ in 1968 and its electoral victory in 1976, the national movement blossomed. Thus, in both Que´bec and Catalonia, the 1970s was a decade of political ferment and transformation in their national movements, and by the mid1970s, both of these national movements had entered a new and very distinctive phase, significantly different from what they had exhibited at any other point in their history

Evidence I have engaged in extensive field research on the national movements of Que´bec and Catalonia.9 I have gathered every significant party document

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from 1976 to 2010 by visiting the libraries and archives of each of eight national parties in Que´bec and Catalonia. I have conducted forty-two interviews with top-level leaders of each of these parties. Also, I conducted fifteen focus group interviews with base-level militants10 of these parties. The average focus group interview had about five militants, but the range spanned from three to twelve. In some cases, I made direct contact with the militants, and in other cases, the party referred me to the contact persons. Most of the focus group interviews took place in neighborhoods in Barcelona and Montre´al, and one took place in the Catalan locality of Torroella de Montgrı´. The interviews in Que´bec and Catalonia were conducted in French and Catalan. In all cases, I made the arrangements for the focus group interviews myself. I also distributed a questionnaire among the militants of these parties and received their responses directly. This questionnaire was qualitative and open ended in nature, designed to enable me to understand what they thought about their motivations, their ideology, the national movement, their party, and their political orientation. In total, I have received 370 completed questionnaires from the party militants in Que´bec and Catalonia. Two techniques were used to distribute the questionnaire. Whenever possible, I went to party congresses or assemblies and, with the permission and cooperation of the party, I distributed my questionnaire in person and received the responses the same day directly from the militants. In other cases, the party distributed the questionnaire by e-mail to an e-mail list of their militants. I also interviewed twenty-one intellectuals and academics whose expertise is relevant to my work. For more details, please refer to the Appendix. The questionnaire was essentially the same in both cases, allowing for some minor local variations, and was written in Catalan and French. The questions also tracked the questions I asked the militants in the focus groups. As in the method of structured, focused comparison, I made every effort to ask a set of standardized, general questions developed to reflect the research objective and theoretical focus of my work, in order to guide and standardize the process of data collection, ‘‘thereby making systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible’’ (George and Bennett 2005: 67–69). In the case of the CDC, I attended the special congress on the draft European Constitution in Barcelona, attended by more than 1,500 party militants, on October 2, 2004. In the case of the PSC, I attended the IV National Conference in Barcelona on the New Challenges of the Welfare

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State, attended by more than 1,000 militants, on November 19, 2005. In the case of the PQ, I attended the Fifteenth Party Congress in Que´bec City on June 3–5, 2005, attended by about 2,000 militants. In the case of ERC, I attended their National Congress held in July, 2004 in the city of Lleida. With respect to UDC, IC-V, ADQ, and PLQ, I used another technique to distribute the questionnaire, given that I was not able to distribute it in person at a party congress or assembly. The parties cooperated graciously and sent my questionnaire by e-mail to various e-mail lists of party militants, and the militants sent their answers directly to me. I have been very fortunate to have been able to interview notable figures in the contemporary political life of Que´bec and Catalonia, including Artur Mas, Jordi Pujol, Jacques Parizeau, Bernard Landry, Josep A. Duran i Lleida, Benoıˆt Pelletier, Jean Allaire, Jaume Bosch, and Joan Puigcercos. The interviews with top-level politicians complement the focus group interviews with rank-and-file militants in neighborhoods and the questionnaire responses by the militants who attended party congresses. I have sought to draw a composite portrait of the attitudes and opinions of the members of the eight national parties by conducting in-depth interviews with the top-level leadership of these parties, and also by doing focus group interviews with the base-level militants of these parties and obtaining direct questionnaire responses from them. Using these interviews and questionnaires, I sought to understand how these nationalists think, their ideology, their views on nation and identity, how they view their party’s place in the national movement, how they define their political orientation, and how they form their preferences. I set out to interview leaders and militants who were articulate and prototypical exponents of their political/constitutional orientation (proindependence, autonomy, or federation). I was successful in interviewing the best exponents of their political orientation by selecting my interviewees according to the orientation of the political party they became militant in, by interviewing key figures in the recent political history of these societies, by conducting focus group interviews with randomly chosen groups of militants from various neighbourhoods, and by attending key party congresses and assemblies where the most militant activists could be found. I have sampled both upper-echelon party leaders and base-level militants who do not have positions of leadership within the national parties. By focusing on base-level militants, I have centered my attention on these parties’ hard-core militants and hence the ‘‘true believers’’ in their parties’ ideology. This two-fold approach provides us a view of nationalism from

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below and from above, allowing me to cross-check the responses from elites and militants and to present a cross-strata portrait of these nationalists’ discourse.

A Road Map: The Chapters Ahead This chapter has served to present the political puzzle at the heart of this book, a review of the existing and relevant theories of secessionism, an overview of my argument, and the case selection rationale. Part II of this book has two chapters. In Chapters 2 and 3, I examine the recent development and evolution of the internal political orientations in the national movements at issue in this book, focusing on the period 1976–2010. I explain how the different components of these national movements evolved during this recent period. I show how the political parties that were the ideological carriers of independentist nationalism, autonomist nationalism, and federalist nationalism evolved during this period, setting the stage for the rest of the analysis in the book. In Chapters 2 and 3, I present an account of how the tripartite structure within the two national movements was established (in 1994 in Que´bec and in 1989 in Catalonia). Since then, these national movements have maintained through 2010 this typical tripartite diversity of political orientations. In Chapter 4, I set out to delimit the political space occupied by stateless nations’ nationalists. In the process, I hope to clarify the frontier between a politicized nationalist and any other persons who may live and work in a nation but who do not identify as nationalists of the nation in question. In doing that, I hope to also clarify the dividing line between national parties and other types of parties that may more properly be labeled regionalist parties, anti-national parties, or majority nation nationalist parties. This will also help us understand, with more clarity and rigor, the component parts of a national movement and why such movements are very specific and clearly delimited political phenomena that merit our study and analysis. In Chapter 4, I also present my arguments against the national consciousness thesis, based on the evidence from my research. In Chapter 5, I will shift the focus to the political parties themselves—and their institutional positioning—in order to complement the previous chapter. My aim is to show how parties and their leadership, building on the militant base they have, shape nationalist ideological discourse and actual practice. Thus, the principal objective of Chapter 5 is to finesse the effort to delimit the political space of stateless nations’ national

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movements by examining how national parties as institutions insert themselves into the nationalist political space. The national movements at issue here exhibit a tripartite internal taxonomy, representing three basic political orientations: independence, autonomy, and federalism. In Part IV, which has three chapters, I examine these varieties of substate nationalist political ideologies. In Chapters 6, 7, and 8, I explain what each of these basic political orientations represents, what subvarieties of each of them exist, and how to clearly distinguish between them. I review the three principal substate nationalist ideologies (independentist, autonomist, and federalist nationalism), each embodying a distinctive vision of sovereignty. I also explain how one may identify the basic political orientation of a national political party, and I suggest a typology for classifying national political parties in terms of their basic political orientation. Moreover, I examine the ideological development of the national political parties of Que´bec and Catalonia, with some reference to other minority nations, and place them within the suggested typology. Part V centers its analysis on the tripartite taxonomy-in-itself and on the actual nationalist militants and their leaders and examines their attitudes and beliefs, seeking to understand and to explain the political origins of the variation in their positioning. In Chapter 9, I present the empirical data that I use to argue against the materialist thesis, showing that it is inadequate to explain the internal variation in substate national movements. In Chapter 9, I also present a portrait of the tactical and strategic discourse of substate nationalists. I present a view of nationalism from below by focusing on the attitudes and discourse of the militants, but I also present the discourse of the leadership. Thus, Chapter 9 will focus on the demand side of nationalism: what it is that the nationalists want, what strategies they seem to be following to achieve their aims, and what factors seem to explain their choice of political and constitutional orientation. I present evidence from the interviews with the top-level leaders, the focus group interviews, and the questionnaire responses, which establish that norms and expectations about reciprocity (i.e., ‘‘moral polity’’ considerations) help to explain why some nationalists opt for independence or strong forms of decentralization while others opt for less decentralizing orientations. Chapter 10 complements Chapter 9 by presenting more fully my moral polity thesis and serves as the conclusion to Part V. Chapter 11 is the conclusion to the book. There is an Appendix in which I discuss my field research methodology.

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PA R T I I

The Origins, Development, and Evolution of National Movements

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Chapter 2

Evolution Within the Catalan National Movement Between 1976 and 2010: The Rise of Independentist Nationalism

Catalanism in all its variants has sought throughout the 20th century an autonomist and particularist solution: securing the selfgovernment of Catalonia, leaving in a secondary plane the generalization of autonomy for all of Spain. ´s Marı´n (2004: 101) —Xavier Arbo

Evolution Within National Movements The internal currents within national movements tend to vary over time, experiencing moments of foundation, growth, development, and decay. At times, new political orientations within national movements are founded in the sphere of parliamentary politics. In particular, I examine in this chapter and the next how new1 varieties of nationalism that represent the radicalization of nationalists’ preferences within national movements are created. Variation over time within national movements that shows the radicalization of nationalists’ preferences is an undertheorized area in the study of national movements. By focusing on within-case temporal variation, we can examine how the different tendencies within a national movement have evolved. In particular, this approach enables us to focus on how new varieties of nationalism that represent the radicalization of nationalists’ preferences within national movements are created.

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This chapter and the next provide responses to a number of analytically significant questions: When and how do new political orientations that represent the radicalization of nationalists’ preferences within the institutional component of a national movement become successfully established? When and how do these new varieties of nationalism become institutionalized? How do these nationalist orientations move from the substratum of ‘‘sociological nationalism’’ to the institutionalized sphere of parliamentary politics and electoral competition? From 1976 to 2010, both the Catalan and Que´be´cois national movements saw the foundation and growth of new political orientations within the institutional component of the national movements. As previously noted, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya’s (ERC) transformation into a secessionist party during the late 1980s represented the establishment for the first time in the Catalan parliamentary sphere of a genuinely secessionist formation where none had existed before.2 The ADQ’s founding in 1994, out of discontented elements that had been part of the federalist party in Que´bec, resulted in the creation of an autonomist formation that was more decentralizing in its program and nationalist animus than the federalist party out of which it emerged.3 Using the cases of two nationalist parties in two different national movements that have successfully established new political orientations (albeit of different sign) that represent the radicalization of nationalists’ preferences within their national movements, we will explore the political origins of this form of temporal variation within national movements. As detailed in the previous chapter, these two cases share a number of key explanatory factors that help to explain a common outcome: the establishment of a novel political orientation within the national movement.

The Origins and Development of the National Movement in Catalonia According to Eric Hobsbawm, Miroslav Hroch’s work ‘‘opened the new era in the analysis of the composition of national liberation movements’’ (Hobsbawm 1990: 4). Hroch’s typology regarding the three phases of national movements will be useful in helping to delineate key phases in the development of these national movements. In the ‘‘mid-19th century a vibrant cultural and linguistic renaissance occurred in Catalonia, in consonance with the romantic and nationalist

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movements elsewhere in Europe and sparked by the great economic changes in Catalonia, which Catalanists juxtaposed with the political and economic stagnation in Madrid’’ (Laitin 1989: 301). The Renaixenc¸a had its precursors in the early nineteenth century when a number of Catalan intellectuals started to elaborate the basis for the economic, literary, and political history of Catalonia, starting with the medieval epoch. They ‘‘realized a labor in favor of the recuperation of the self-esteem and the cultural identity of Catalonia’’ (Balcells 1999: 21). As the number of potential readers began to grow, Catalan had the possibility of becoming a living literary language again. The dispersed elements of the effort to recuperate literature in the Catalan language began to take cohesive form with the publication in 1843 of the poetry of Joaquim Rubio i Ors. With the renewal of the Floral Games in Barcelona in 1859, Catalan literature, now reborn, obtained a public platform. In the 1860s, theater in the Catalan language experienced a renewal, with figures such as Serafi Soler and Pitarra (22). This period of the Renaixenc¸a corresponds to Phase A of Hroch’s typology of stages for national movements, given that the energies of the intelligentsia were devoted to scholarly inquiry and dissemination of the linguistic, cultural, and social attributes of the Catalans. Phase B of the Catalan national movement developed during the late nineteenth century. Valentı´ Almirall was the founder of the first political catalanism. In 1883, he founded the Centre Catala`, which in its Memorial de Greuges of 1885 protested against the encroachment on Catalan civil law and defended the Catalan textile industry. It was the first unitary mobilization of catalanism (34). But, note that in this phase, catalanism did not acquire a sufficient social base to be a true alternative, political force. The Centre Catala` splintered in 1887 and some of its supporters founded the Lliga de Catalunya. In 1879, the first Catalan daily newspaper was founded, and in 1880 the first Catalan Congress was organized. In 1891, the Unio´ Catalanista was founded, and it elaborated the first proposal for a project of autonomy for Catalonia. It is absolutely clear that it did not propose a break with the Spanish state. In 1901, just before the general elections in 1901, a splinter group from the Unio´ Catalanista formed the Lliga Regionalista de Catalunya, which was able to win catalanism’s first electoral victory in 1901. Between 1892 and 1918, catalanism evolved following a strategic logic: to offer the autonomous route as the solution to the Catalan quagmire, but as a model for all of Spain.

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Phase C of the Catalan national movement developed in two moments. The first was during the short-lived Spanish Second Republic of 1931–1936, during which the first Catalan Statute of Autonomy was passed in 1932. With the defeat of 1939, the further development of Phase C of the Catalan national movement was interrupted until it could be fully reinitiated in the post-1975 period. In 1977, the Generalitat (the Catalan government) was reestablished. In the first Catalan elections in 1980, a coalition led by Jordi Pujol, Converge`ncia i Unio´ (CiU), became the first ruling party of Catalonia within the newly created Spanish democratic state. CiU (currently a federation composed of two parties: CDC and UDC) was in power during 1980–2003 in the Generalitat and has been hegemonic in the national movement. CiU has offered (through 2010) a nationalist discourse that does not propose independence from Spain. ‘‘The novelty of its message lies on the insistence on Catalan identity within the framework of the Spanish state. CiU’s nationalism insists on the distinct character of Catalonia when compared with the rest of Spain and claims further levels of self-government for the Catalan nation’’ (Guibernau and Rex 1997: 143). CiU’s founder, Jordi Pujol, has had for many years a nationalist discourse that is centered on the idea that ‘‘Catalonia possesses a differentiated identity based on language, culture, social cohesion, collective consciousness, common project and country pride, opposing absorption and homogenizing policies’’ (144). Pujol’s ‘‘nationalist discourse suggests that if the nation can restore itself by regaining and invigorating its own identity, then people will feel more motivated and their actions will increase in initiative and achievement’’ (144). His definition of who is a Catalan includes two elements: territory and will. Thus, a Catalan is someone ‘‘who lives and works in Catalonia and wants to be a Catalan’’ (134). Pujol’s nationalism does not contemplate the establishment of an independent Catalan state (as of 2010).4 This tension ‘‘between the acceptance of Catalonia as part of Spain and the desire to extend its degree of autonomy thus emphasizing its distinctive character lies at the core of Pujol’s nationalist discourse. . . . He defines Catalonia as a nation, but he does not question the unity of what he regards as multinational Spain’’ (148; see also Pujol 1996: 35, 255; Pujol 1978; Pujol 1997; Pujol 1999). As the distinguished historian Joan B. Culla remarked, the Catalan national movement since the late nineteenth century has had a very weak independentist component. It has instead oscillated between two associationist orientations: federalism and autonomism.5 As the distinguished

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political scientist Isidre Molas also remarked, the Catalan national movement has not had (historically) the explicit purpose of forming an independent state (Molas 2000: 180; Dı´ez Medrano 1999: 3). ‘‘The weak force of the politically organized Catalan separatism is the most constant characteristic in the history of Catalanism, and, undoubtedly too, of the Republican period [1931–1936]’’ (Molas 1977: 91; Rubiralta i Casas 2004). Yet it has not been able to reshape the Spanish state in the form of a plurinational federation, which would make possible a more appropriate recognition of the distinctiveness of the Catalan nation (Molas 1988: 11). There have been two visions of the prospects for self-government: federalist and autonomist. As Gonza´lez Casanova (1974: 9) wrote, federalism and the vision of a federal and multinational Spain has been the other face of political catalanism, when it was not putting forward proposals for autonomism, throughout 1868–1938.

The Rise of Independentist Nationalism in Catalonia (1976–2010) Preexistent Ideology Estat Catala` was the separatist party during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923–1930), combining nationalist and social radicalism. Francesc Macia` was its principal leader, and in 1931 he decided to integrate the party into the newborn ERC. Dissenting elements within Estat Catala` did not integrate into ERC and instead maintained their independent status. Another dissenting sector briefly joined ERC then left it and formed Elements d’Estat Catala`, which in 1932 became the Partit Nacionalista Catala`, an independentist formation. The latter participated only in Catalan elections and thus was present at the Catalan Parliament elections of November 1932 and the municipal elections of January 1934; it remained an extremely marginal political force. The sector that never joined ERC eventually formed the group Estat Catala`-Partit Proletari, but it was also an extremely marginal political force. ERC was founded in 1931. During 1930, the republican parties had met to consider forming a new party, to create an alternative to the regionalist Lliga and to Lerrouxisme. These parties included Estat Catala` of Francesc Macia`, Accio´ Catalana, Partit Comunista Catala`, Partit Republica

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Catala`, and the group organized around L’Opinio´. Three basic tendencies contributed to the formation of ERC. First, there was traditional republicanism, which constituted the majority, and which was well represented in the comarcas. They tended to be catalanists and federalists, without being overzealous nationalists. They also tended to identify with the workers and peasants and with the Left in the Spanish state, having Lluı´s Companys as one of its principal leaders. Second, there was the separatist sector, which was always minoritarian. It was well represented in the youth organizations and in the city of Barcelona, having Francesc Macia` as its main leader. There was a third bloc, a centrist and governmental sector open to the middle classes, that was represented initially by the group coming from L’Opinio´ and later by the followers of Carles Pi i Sunyer (Alque´zar, Marı´n, and Morales 2001: 86). In the end, Estat Catala`, Partit Republica Catala`, and the group from L’Opinio´ joined together to form ERC on March 17–19, 1931 (Molas 1972: 81). The first directory of the new party was integrated by Francesc Macia` and Jaume Aguade´ of Estat Catala`, Joan Lluhı´ i Vallesca` of the L’Opinio´ group, and Lluı´s Companys and Marcelli Domingo of Partit Republica Catala`. The statutes of the new party defined the following basic principles: ‘‘the national personality of Catalonia,’’ ‘‘federation with the other Iberian peoples,’’ and ‘‘socialization of wealth to benefit the collectivity’’ (82). ERC won the municipal elections of April 12, 1931 and from that point onward became the hegemonic party during the Second Republic (1931– 1936; Ivern i Salva` 1988: vol. 1, 76). ERC was the party that formed the government during the entire period of the Second Republic, and its two principal leaders were the two presidents of the government: Francesc Macia` and, after his death in late 1933, Lluı´s Companys, until the defeat of the Republic in the Civil War (Molas 1972: 88). The party was always divided into three wings reflecting the three tendencies that came together to found it: Estat Catala`, the republicans, and the group from L’Opinio´. ERC during the Second Republic had a program that had been approved at the Conferencia d’Esquerres in March 1931: It called for the formation of a ‘‘Catalan State’’ that would then form a federation with the other peoples of the Iberian peninsula. Thus, the state would be an Iberian federal state or a Hispanic federal state, all of which were terms that the party’s program used indistinctly. This federal state would be structured according to a pact between the Catalan State and the other constituent states of the federation (Ivern i Salva` 1988: vol. 2, 393). This was the

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program of a party in opposition to the system, but once the party found itself in government and the hegemonic force in the Second Republic, its actual trajectory was more moderate. For example, on April 14, 1931, President Francesc Macia` made a dramatic declaration of the ‘‘Catalan Republic,’’ but three days later—after the provisional government rejected it—the Catalan government backed down and instead opted to accept the reestablishment of the Generalitat and to follow the autonomous route, eventually leading to the adoption of a Statute of Autonomy for the principate, enacted by the Spanish Parliament on September 9, 1932 (Ivern i Salva` 1988: vol. 2, 400; Rubiralta i Casas 2004: 213). It has been said often that Catalan independentism is a relatively new constitutional and political orientation that was born during the period of the democratic transition (1975–1981). Once the Spanish Constitution was enacted in 1978 and the Catalan Statute of Autonomy was approved in 1979, several independentist organizations were born, including Terra Lliure and Comites de Solidaritat amb els Patriotes Catalans. Before that, one can also point to the existence of organizations such as the PSAN and FNC. But, in general, political catalanism from the nineteenth century to the democratic transition of 1975–1982 was not a movement of separation; it was a movement of the reform of the Spanish state. It is hard to find evidence of an unambiguous independentist tendency within the national movement before the war of 1936–1939, in spite of the existence of individual radical pronouncements or the appearance of Estat Catala` (Bassa et al. 1994: 19). The military coup of July 18, 1936, the revolution undertaken by the popular classes, and the war of 1936–1939 represented a rupture. The physical annihilation of intellectuals, politicians, public opinion leaders, and militants of popular and catalanist organizations was widespread. The repression of linguistic and cultural rights during the dictatorship of General Franco and the massive immigration from Southern Spain promoted by the regime during the 1960s further fed the rupture with the past. In fact, during the Franco years, it was the PSUC and the PCE that were the protagonists in the resistance. Most notable is the appearance of a party that combined a clear independentist orientation with socialism. This was the Partit Socialista d’Alliberament Nacional (PSAN), which had emerged from the Front Nacional de Catalonia (FNC). The PSAN incorporated a new generation, which had not lived through the war. It was also inspired by the national liberation movements of less-developed countries and the cultural revival promoted by initiatives such as the Gran Enciclopedia

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Catalana (1966–1972), the Universitat Catalana d’Estiu (1969), and the publication of Joan Fuster’s Nosaltres Els Valencians. Yet, the PSAN was not able to energize a mass national movement around the independentist banner. Plagued by internal divisions, the PSAN gave birth to the Partit Socialista d’Alliberament Nacional-Provisional (PSAN-P) in 1974. But the creation of a clear independentist option would be the task of another generation—those who were politically incorporated without having formed part of the anti-Franco struggle. The embryonic period of the independentist current in Catalonia was thus between 1975 and 1982 (22).

Central State Constitutional Moment The Spanish Constitution was approved on December 8, 1978 with the opposition of Catalan independentists (Bassa et al. 1994: 26). The Catalan independentists were organized in the Comite Catala` Contra la Constitucio´ Espanyola, which was the first step in the articulation of a militant independentism (Vilaregut Sa´ez 2004: 71). The independentists argued that the new Constitution imposed a framework that was inimical to the collective rights of the Catalan people, denying their right to self-determination. Article 2 reads: ‘‘The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, common and indivisible country of all Spaniards, and recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions that integrate it and solidarity between them.’’6 Article 138.1 provides for the forcible division into separate autonomic communities: ‘‘In no case will the federation of the autonomous communities be admissible.’’7 It set up a King and an Army as the guarantors of the indivisible unity of the state in Article 8.1: ‘‘The Armed Forces [of which the King is chief] . . . have as their mission the guarantee of the sovereignty and independence of Spain, defending its territorial integrity and its constitutional order.’’8 It also recognizes the free market as the only possible system (Article 34) and limits the right to unionization and to strike (Article 26). In the view of the secessionists, a rupture with the Francoist past was needed, but the Constitution ultimately approved in 1978 was very distant from that. This led them to embark on an effort to create an independentist/socialist project outside of the political structures that were being created (Vilaregut Sa´ez 2004: 67). The Comite´ Catala` Contra la Constitucio´ Espanyola was promoted by the PSAN-P. This committee was the embryo of a process of confluence of

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revolutionary independentism (Renyer Alimbau 1995). It was focused on the opposition to the new Spanish Constitution, which was thought to be contrary to the national interests of Catalonia because it blocked the free exercise of its right to self-determination. Moreover, it was seen as a Constitution embodying continuity with the Francoist institutions, the monarchy, the apparatus of state security, the army—all of which maintained their pattern of repression against the popular independentist movement (58). The committee disappeared once the Carta Magna was enacted, but it served to give shape to a radical independentism, which crystallized in the creation in the spring of 1979 of the Independentistes dels Paı¨sos Catalans (IPC), born out of the fusion of the PSAN-P and the Organitzacio´ Socialista d’Alliberament Nacional de la Catalonia Nord. In fact, after the enactment of the Constitution, with the participation of autonomist and federalist political parties in Catalonia, the independentist extraparliamentary political organizations were orphaned, and many of these organizations—FNC, BCT, and PSAN—disappeared or were debilitated. The secessionist political space was increasingly filled by radical organizations such as Terra Lliure. Thus, in the brief period between 1974 and 1978, the independentist organizations initially participated fully in the Assemblea de Catalunya until it was replaced by the dynamic of the parliamentary process. Once the Constitution was enacted, the isolation and marginalization of the independentist forces increased, providing a space for the rise of radical intransigent groups such as Terra Lliure (58). The creation of the platform against the 1978 Constitution by the PSAN-P and other independentist organizations was the first step in the effort to give ideological cohesion to the independentist sentiment in view of the new juridical superstructure established by the constitutional moment of 1978–1979 (Renyer Alimbau 1995: 33; Vilaregut Sa´ez 2004: 71). The Committee mobilized people throughout the principate in opposition to the new Spanish Constitution of 1978 and was the medium through which new cadres of independentists were formed. This social and political milieu formed the political ideology concretized in the book La Lluita per la Independencia. A group of independentist militants from Reus organized the First Meeting of Independentists in the summer of 1978, and in 1979 the Independentistes dels Paisos Catalans (IPC) was founded. At the Fossar de les Moreres on September 11, 1979, a considerable sector of the independentists called for the rejection of the new statute of autonomy (Bassa et al. 1994: 33). Moreover, in December 1978, a new organization emerged, the Bloc

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d’Esquerra d’Alliberament Nacional (BEAN), in order to present themselves at the March 1, 1979 elections. BEAN obtained only 46,800 votes, but one of its spokespersons, Xavier Romeu, declared that it wasn’t just an electoral coalition but the embryo of a movement of national liberation (35). In 1979, a number of independentists were arrested by the Spanish police, and in response the Comites de Solidaritat amb els Patriotes Catalans (CSPC) was formed. The latter would be the most successful organization in this early period in bringing together a fair number of independentists. It was the ‘‘organization that is going to generate an independentist consciousness during this initial period, a conscience that is going to spread rapidly in different social movements’’ (37). For the elections of May 1980, the BEAN and a new organization, the Nacionalistes d’Esquerra (NE), presented themselves separately, and, thus, the independentist-progressive space was divided, and in total they obtained about 60,000 votes (39). The new statute of autonomy was approved on October 15, 1979, and it was also opposed by the independentist popular movement, which considered it another instance of the domination of the Spanish state and contrary to popular interests (Bassa et al. 1994: 27). Given the ambiguous positioning of the left wing sectors on this matter and the dissolution of the Assemblea de Catalunya9 in 1977, the political space was now open to the creation of new organizations that channeled the independentist sentiment generated in reaction to the constitutional moment of 1978–1979. Framed by this central state constitutional moment, the embryonic period of 1975–1982 that nurtured the independentist tendency attained its full potential after 1979. The embryonic period of 1975–1982 was also marked by the enactment of the Ley Orga´nica de Armonizacio´n del Proceso Autono´mico (LOAPA) in 1982, which was successfully challenged as unconstitutional by the Catalan and Basque governments. The LOAPA was a highly unpopular statute among the substate nationalists because it had a homogenizing and uniformizing effect and failed to recognize the specificity of the historic substate nationalities. The full growth potential of independentist nationalism was, therefore, attained after 1982.

The Impulse from Civil Society ERC in the early 1980s was not an independentist political party (Buch 2001: 186). It was, at that time, still far from embodying an independentist

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orientation and was still immersed in the indefinition and ambiguity of this early period (Rubiralta i Casas 2004: 184, 224). In the early 1980s, the independentist political space in Catalonia was occupied by three blocs, which at times seemed to have little relation to each other (Alque´zar, Marin, and Morales 2001: 186–87). It should be noted that all three of these blocs could well be regarded as constitutive elements of ‘‘sociological nationalism.’’ The first bloc was radical independentism, which developed from the groups that gravitated towards the Independentistes dels Paisos Catalans (IPC), which came from the PSAN-P. This sector believed that in light of the new constitutional superstructure existing between Spain and Catalonia, it was necessary to insist on a rupturist strategy. This sector was given organizational momentum by the Comites de Solidaritat amb els Patriotes Catalans (CSPC), by the actions of Terra Lliure, and by the creation of the Moviment en Defensa de la Terra (MDT). Terra Lliure was an armed organization that during the course of its existence performed close to 150 actions, with a balance of one dead person and tens of injured; four of its militants were killed, and 300 people were arrested. The organization was founded in 1978. The idea for the formation of the group emerged in a meeting of independentist militants held in Catalonia Nord (on the French side of the border); they wanted to found an organization to counteract the nascent autonomic process (Vilaregut Sa´ez 2004: 46). Its formation was made public during an action organized at the stadium of the Futbol Club Barcelona by La Crida a la Solidaritat en Defensa de la Llengua, la Cultura i la Nacio´ Catalanes on June 24, 1981 (see below). Terra Lliure was an organization born out of the conviction of many anti-Franco militants that it was necessary to go beyond the purely political struggle. The cadres that formed the new organization came from the PSAN-P, EPOCA, the Front Nacional de Catalonia, and, further on, the PSAN, and from the youth wing of Estat Catala` (46). On July 13, 1991, the organization dissolved itself through a communique´: ‘‘Terra Lliure, the military organization that struggles for the total independence of Catalonia, addresses itself for the last time to the Catalan people to announce the following agreements: in light of the good progress being made in the political negotiations established between leaders of ERC and Catalunya Lliure [a very small political party aligned with Terra Lliure], and having corroborated the sense of profound responsibility of ERC in the round of talks, the executive directorate of Terra Lliure has decided to . . . approve our

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self-dissolution’’ (110). Soon thereafter, many of the sectors supporting Terra Lliure shifted their support to ERC. The creation of the Moviment en Defensa de la Terra (MDT) was made public on September 11, 1984 at the Fossar de les Moreres.10 It was meant to bring about the organic unity of the various organizations of radical independentism. According to its own documents, published between 1984 and 1988, the MDT saw itself as a front of national liberation, struggling to unify the Paisos Catalans, freed from the French and Spanish states and liberated from capitalist oppression. In its manifesto of 1984, it stated that ‘‘autonomism is useless, it does not face up to the aggressions against our nation, limits itself to beg for transfers that never arrive, and cries every time Madrid shows little appreciation’’ (Moviment en Defensa de la Terra 1988: 146). During 1984–1986, it was able to bring together the various organizations and to galvanize many thousands of youngsters in a politicized independentist milieu. In 1986, the MDT divided itself into two organizations, MDT-PSAN and MDT-IPC, and subsequently other offshoots emerged, such as Maulets, Joves Independentistes Revolucionaris, and Endavant (Buch 2001: 186). The second bloc was formed by Nacionalistes d’Esquerra, a group formed in 1980 with the intention of participating in the electoral process. It was formed by a group of intellectuals associated with Jordi Carbonell and the most moderate sector from the PSAN. It defined itself as an alternative movement of the left and an advocate of self-determination for the Paisos Catalans. It later changed its name to Entesa dels Nacionalistes d’Esquerra, initiated an approach to the PSUC, and eventually dissolved itself into Iniciativa per Catalonia. The party suffered a series of continuous electoral setbacks and was unable to move out of the extraparliamentary sphere (Alque´zar, Marin, and Morales 2001: 187). The third bloc was civic independentism, that is, organizations and entities of the civil society that were proponents and supporters of independentism. The most prominent of these organizations was La Crida a la Solidaritat en Defensa de la Llengua, la Cultura i la Nacio´ Catalanes (La Crida), which was a cultural and linguistic pressure group. It was a dynamic social movement that aimed to strengthen the level of national consciousness in Catalan society, through direct action campaigns and mass public acts. It aimed to be active in civil society, renouncing all ambition to attain institutional power, and it did not aim to transform itself into a political party. On March 12, 1981, a group of writers and intellectuals living and

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working in Catalonia published in Cambio 16 a manifesto with 2,300 signatures claiming that the Castilian language was marginalized and discriminated against in the principate. This manifesto led to a number of responses from politicians and political parties. Civil society’s response was especially notable. Omnium Cultural, for example, denounced the Manifesto as an attempt to create confusion, with a demagogic and anticatalanist intent. Finally, in response, the Centre Internacional Escarre´ per a les Minories E`tniques i Nacionals (CIEMEN) published in Avui on March 17, 1981 a formal response titled ‘‘Crida a la Solidaritat en Defensa de la Llengua, la Cultura i la Nacio´ Catalanes,’’ with 130 signatures, calling for a public act of reflection and an assembly to be held at the University of Barcelona. Out of this public assembly emerged the first secretariat of the newborn La Crida, with A`ngel Colom as its coordinator. Thus, what seemed to be a temporary development eventually became La Crida, which then became an organization, and part of the civil society component of the Catalan national movement (Monne´ and Selga 1991: 32). Among the many organizations that supported La Crida were Omnium Cultural, Xarxa Cultural, Orfeo Catala`, Club d’Amics de la UNESCO, Centre Excursionista de Catalunya, and Coral Sant Jordi (19). In 1981, La Crida undertook three major activities of national affirmation: the Sant Jordi 1981 mobilization, the action ‘‘We Are a Nation’’ at the field of the Futbol Club Barcelona, and the September 11, 1981 action in celebration of the Catalan National Day. For the Catalan National Day,11 La Crida mounted a campaign advocating the right to self-determination, the existence of the Catalan nation, and opposing the LOAPA (the Law of Harmonization of the Autonomic Process). The Spanish state passed the LOAPA in 1981 to promote the harmonization and uniformization of the seventeen autonomous communities. In response, a huge demonstration was held in Barcelona on March 14, 1982, organized by La Crida, ERC, CiU, and CCOO (55). Between 1983 and 1986, La Crida moved to a strategy of nonviolent direct action, at the same time that it maintained large-scale base level campaigns. In 1984, La Crida also initiated a campaign titled ‘‘Defending Labeling only in Catalan,’’ given that the Spanish government had imposed sanctions on companies that labeled only in Catalan. It organized a Labeling Fair and public Lunch Time Labeling events. Its militants also pressed the labeling issue by pressuring big companies, such as Telefo´nica and El Corte Ingle´s. At the same time, the organization used the holidays of September 11 (National Day) and April 23 (Sant Jordi Day) during the years

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1984–1986 to put a greater accent on its campaign for the right to selfdetermination (Monne´ and Selga 1991:117). From its inception to 1986, when he left La Crida to join ERC, its principal and most charismatic leader was A`ngel Colom. ERC’s transformation began in October, 1986 when Colom joined that historic party, ‘‘giving an impulse to the process of independentist refounding of ERC, supported by its historic president, Heribert Barrera’’ (Rubiralta i Casas 2004: 224; emphasis added). The idea was to crystallize the independentists’ long-sought objective of attaining parliamentary representation, which had been denied them during the transition period (1975–1981). ERC’s new independentism put an end to its historic indefinition and ambiguity and was consolidated in 1989. The new ERC of A`ngel Colom, after its transformation into an independentist party in 1989, was able to consolidate its new project by benefiting from the sociological independentism that had been generated during the 1980s, thanks to the activism of many organizations, including CSPC, Terra Lliure, IPC, PSAN, MDT, La Crida, and other cultural/linguistic affirmation groups (Vilaregut Sa´ez 2004: 113). Thus commenced a process of unloading militants from the various small organizations of popular, civic, and militant independentism onto ERC. In June 1993, La Crida announced its self-dissolution, and a considerable portion of its members joined ERC (Rubiralta i Casas 2004: 204).

Consolidation of Leadership and the Founding of the New Political Orientation By 1987, sociological independentism had been gaining force, especially among the youth. Among the young, it was an independentism with a weak ideological component, but full of symbology, such as the use of the estelada flag (Bassa et al. 1994: 100). Although it was clear there was a demand for an independentist political party, sociological independentism had not yet succeeded in establishing its own party with a presence in the Catalan Parliament. Thus, independentists started considering whether ERC, the party closest to their ideals and one with distinguished historical credentials, could be somehow transformed and effectively refounded. Therefore, let us examine the process that led to ERC’s transformation and de facto refounding. In the first elections for the Catalan Parliament held in 1980, ERC decided to support the winning party in that election,

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CiU. Heribert Barrera negotiated ERC’s support of CiU in the government that was formed, which was presided over by Jordi Pujol. This pact with CiU in 1980 initiated a period during which ERC essentially was in its shadow (Lucas 2004: 99). This period of ERC’s subordination to CiU ended in 1987, when a new team of leaders came to dominate the party and rejected the policy of collaboration with CiU. According to an interview with Josep Lluis Carod Rovira (the former president of ERC) conducted in early 2003 by the journalist Vicent Sanchis, in 1984 Carod was in the small extra-parliamentary party known as Nacionalistes d’Esquerra, which he had helped to found in 1980. They participated in the elections that year, obtaining very meager results. Subsequently, in 1986, Carod was able to meet with Heribert Barrera, the secretary general of ERC at that point and one of the historic figures of the party, a member of parliament and the only conseller of ERC in the government at that time. Barrera and Carod agreed that his proposal for refounding ERC was feasible and he should disseminate his idea widely, and the opening salvo would be the publication of an article in the newspaper Avui, which he titled ‘‘A Vital Necessity: Refounding Esquerra Republicana de Catalonia.’’ In the article, Carod criticized the dualism that had been established in the political party system between CiU and PSC and urged all who wanted to create a catalanist and progressive alternative, a ‘‘national left,’’ to do so through a renovated and refurbished ERC. There was no need to found a new party: He proposed taking the historic legacy of ERC, reviving it, and re-founding it with new energy and a new direction. He wrote that the new ERC would be a party that believed the national question is ‘‘our first question because it is exclusively ours’’ (Avui, November 1, 1986). After the publication of the article, A`ngel Colom, the coordinator of La Crida, and Carod met several times to discuss their plans for refounding ERC, and then they met again with Heribert Barrera. They agreed that ERC was a party in trouble, without its own political personality and with a leadership with the highest median age of any in the parliament. Four of its five members of parliament were over 60 years of age. Despite this general outlook, they decided it was worth trying to resuscitate ERC, giving it a new political and generational profile. Then, they published in Avui on December 24, 1986, a manifesto titled ‘‘Crida Nacional a Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya’’ (Sanchis 2003: 90). They urged ERC to organize by the fall of 1987 a special congress in which all sectors could attend, effectively

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serving as a channel for the growing independentism (Avui, December 24, 1986). From this point on, Colom and Carod met with Barrera several times to determine how best they could enter the party. Barrera had announced that he would no longer be the secretary general. At the Fifteenth Congress held in 1987, Joan Hortala was elected secretary general, with a promise to incorporate Carod and Colom and the leadership that had promoted the Crida Nacional a ERC. A month later, Carod and Colom officially joined ERC. Colom set out to develop a style of tireless activism, similar to what he had done at La Crida. He set himself the mission of rebuilding ERC, taking on the task of attracting as many people as possible to it. They would set out on long trips, visiting many towns and cities and running a schedule of nonstop meetings. Slowly people started adhering to their proposed plan. The new adherents came from three sectors. First, militants from the Nacionalistes d’Esquerra who came with Carod. These included Ernest Benach and eventually Josep Huguet. Benach has recently served as President of the Catalan Parliament and Huguet as a prominent conseller in the tri-partite government of ERC-PSC-ICV. Second, an important group coming with Colom from La Crida, including many who went on to occupy top posts in the party, such as Jordi Portabella and Xavier Bosch (Lucas 2004: 119). Finally, independent militants, who saw in this proposed plan an occasion to rejuvenate and energize a sagging and fragmented independentist movement. In this category was, for example, Joan Puigcercos, a young militant at that time, who has since become the secretary general of the party. Because Joan Hortala was at the time the secretary general of ERC, one of the conditions demanded by Carod and Colom for entering ERC was that the party would exit from the government (which it did) because in the following year new elections were scheduled (Sanchis 2003: 93). In the Catalan Parliament elections of 1988, ERC improved slightly its position, increasing from five to six members of parliament. Both A`ngel Colom and Carod Rovira became members of parliament. This new parliamentary group openly broke with CiU, accusing it of ‘‘defending the most conservative mechanisms of the country.’’ It also criticized the presence of the Spanish King in the public acts of the Generalitat and called for a ‘‘methodical independentism’’ (Lucas 2004: 126). In 1989, the party celebrated its Sixteenth Congress in Lleida, one of the most important in its recent history. Colom won the post of secretary general by the narrowest of margins (thirty-four votes), with the support of

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Barrera and Carod, and he remained in the post until he left ERC in October 1996 (Lucas 2004: 134). Under A`ngel Colom’s leadership, ERC developed a monothematic, unswerving, and intransigent independentist discourse. The party shifted its focus to the identity/national axis. The social and political economy axes were nonexistent in ERC’s discourse during the period of A`ngel Colom’s leadership (Sanchis 2003: 95). However, even Carod Rovira has recognized that A`ngel Colom’s unswerving independentism helped ERC to re-create and re-found its image, playing a positive role. It also helped to advance the independentist message among the citizenry, disassociating it from violence (98). With the party’s new independentist message, the door was open for all sectors of independentism to enter the party. In the months following the Lleida Congress, the party received a wave of affiliations. Slowly, there was a movement of incorporation of many elements coming from radical independentism (Alque´zar, Marin, and Morales 2001: 190). After the election of A`ngel Colom, the renovated and refounded ERC, experienced an unparalleled generational change, a rapid growth in its militant ranks, and a profound transformation in the profile of its leadership. For example, a study conducted by the Universitat Auto`noma de Barcelona of the militants who attended the Nineteenth Congress of ERC in 1993 showed that a third of them were between twenty-five and thirty-four years of age, and another third were between thirty-five and fifty—quite a different profile than the pre-1989 gentrified party. The median age of the leaders with posts in the party was 37.3. In 1993, the data showed that 66.8 percent of the attendees had entered the party since 1989. Only 15 percent of the attendees had been in the party before the ‘‘Crida Nacional a ERC.’’ Among those who stated they had a post of high responsibility, more than half had joined the party after 1989, attracted by the new independentist orientation. They comprised 75 percent of those in party posts at the local section level, 66 percent of those in posts in the comarcal federations, 60 percent of those in posts in the regions, and 56 percent of the national leaderships (executive and national council). It was also determined that 70 percent of the attendees had come to ERC from other independentist (extra-parliamentary) parties and organizations. Only 7.8 percent had come from CiU. Thus, from 1989 on, ERC had become the political formation in which independentists coalesced. Finally, the study showed that most of the militants considered themselves slightly more to the left than the official line of the party

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(Lucas 2004: 137). The new leadership quickly gave concrete institutional shape to its new orientation, obtaining the approval in the Catalan Parliament of a resolution asserting the right to self-determination. The resolution stated that Catalonia formed part of a national reality distinct from the state to which it belonged and that the current institutional framework did not signify the renunciation of the right to self-determination through the gradual increase of quotas of self-government (Lucas 2004: 140). In 1990, A`ngel Colom (a professed pacifist) and other leaders of ERC initiated conversations with Terra Lliure, the armed organization. They were able to persuade a significant sector of the organization to renounce the armed struggle and to join ERC as the vehicle for the expression of their independentism. On July 8, 1991, a significant sector of Terra Lliure’s leadership announced their intention to abandon the armed struggle and join ERC (Lucas 2004: 146). At the XVII Congress of ERC in 1991, the party developed a document in one of its working groups that clearly stated that ERC was an independentist formation. That Congress turned out to be an independentist apotheosis. For the 1992 Catalan Parliament elections, the party concentrated on an exclusively independentist message. Its slogan for the 1992 election was ‘‘Toward Independence’’ (151). ERC repeatedly made the point during the campaign that CiU had renounced completing the national project of Catalonia and that ERC was the best positioned to take over from CiU as standard bearer of political catalanism. The message seemed to reach the electorate: In 1992, ERC received nearly double the number of votes it had received in the 1988 election, and with eleven members of parliament it became the third political force (153). Yet, that year (1992), CiU obtained an absolute majority and was able to form a government by itself. ERC nevertheless voted against the investiture of Jordi Pujol. In the 1993 elections for the Spanish Parliament, ERC obtained its best results since 1977: 186,784 votes (Alque´zar, Marin, and Morales 2001: 175). It can be said that ERC has grown and strengthened itself from the membership and the militancy of previous independentist organizations, that is, from sociological nationalism. ERC became the dominant expression of moderate independentism (Bassa et al. 1994: 156). The entry into ERC of independentists from all ranks is dramatized by an analysis of ERC’s members of parliament who were active during the IV (1992), V (1995), and VI (2000) legislatures of the Catalan Parliament. Of a total of twentyone members of parliament active during this period, only two had entered ERC before 1987, while the majority had entered the party between 1987

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and 1992. Four of them had been active in radical independentist organizations before joining ERC. Seven of them had been active in La Crida or civic independentism. Five of them had been active in Nacionalistes d’Esquerra. In total, thirteen of the twenty-one members of parliament had come from extra-parliamentary independentist organizations. None came from the orbit of CiU (Alque´zar, Marin, and Morales 2001: 192).

Conclusion The independentist political space of the early 1980s was occupied by three blocs: the bloc of the radical independentism of Terra Lliure and others working at the outer edges of the system, the bloc of the small extraparliamentary political parties (such as Nacionalistes d’Esquerra) working within the system, and the bloc of civic and cultural nationalist associations such as La Crida. It may be said that the consolidation of the leadership nucleus that led to the refounding of ERC incorporated elements from all three blocs. In particular, A`ngel Colom brought with him the contribution of the civic and cultural nationalist organizations’ bloc, and Josep Lluis Carod Rovira embodied the contribution from the small extra-parliamentary political parties’ bloc. Once the party had been re-founded, after 1989 a sector from the third bloc was incorporated by the party. Again, it should be noted that all three blocs were constitutive elements of sociological nationalism.12 In the early 1980s, the Catalan national movement did not have an independentist national political party in the Catalan Parliament. Only two political orientations within the national movement existed in the sphere of parliamentary politics: autonomist nationalism and federalist nationalism. Thus, independentism at that time existed only in the sphere of sociological nationalism, living a marginal existence, and was largely absent from the sphere of parliamentary politics. In the late 1980s, for the first time in the history of political catalanism, this situation changed dramatically. The tipping point, that is, the juncture at which a new political orientation is successfully established in the arena of electoral competition and parliamentary politics, was reached in 1989. Thus, the national movement diversified and expanded, and now three political and constitutional orientations within the national movement are represented in the sphere of formal party politics.

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I have traced the process through which this tipping point was reached. It was a temporal sequence that evolved in four periods that can be labeled the pre-embryonic period, the embryonic period (from 1975 to 1982), the impulse period, and the formation and founding period. In each of these periods, a key factor was involved: a preexistent ideology, a central state constitutional moment, an impulse from civil society, and the consolidation of a new leadership nucleus. Understanding the intersubjective relations of reciprocity between substate nationalists and majority nation nationalism is essential to understand the trigger event that led to the founding and growth of independentism in the parliamentary sphere in Catalonia. The central state constitutional moment of 1975–1982 was interpreted by the minority nationalists in Catalonia as an instance of non-accommodation and non-reciprocity. This is consistent with the central thesis in this book: Substate nationalists inhabit an imagined community that is a ‘‘moral polity’’ in which reciprocities are expected and notions of collective dignity, the commonweal, and mutual accommodation are essential. The perception by these substate nationalists that their expectations of reciprocity have been violated is a factor that contributes to the increasing radicalization of nationalists’ political preferences. Independentism in Catalonia is now part of the mainstream of the national movement and has acquired an aura of legitimacy and permanence within the national movement. Once the tipping point has been reached, the newly institutionalized political orientation then undergoes a period of maintenance and growth. During this period of maintenance and growth, the independentist political and constitutional orientation matures and reaches an ideological plateau that gives it the imprint of permanence and legitimacy within the national movement. Nationalists in Catalonia now have a clear independentist alternative coexisting with the other two historically dominant political orientations, autonomist nationalism and federalist nationalism. We have examined the case of the transformation and de facto refounding of ERC and the rise of independentist nationalism in Catalonia in the 1980s. In the next chapter, we will examine the case of the formation and founding of the ADQ and the rise of autonomist nationalism in Que´bec in the 1990s, and we will draw further conclusions from the analysis of both substate national societies.

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Chapter 3

Evolution Within the Que´be´cois National Movement Between 1976 and 2010: The Rise of Autonomist Nationalism

‘‘‘The fatherland, for us, is the whole of Canada, that is to say: a federation of distinct races and autonomous provinces.’’’ —Henri Bourassa (1904)

In Chapter 2, we examined the transformation and de facto refounding of ERC and the rise of independentist nationalism in Catalonia in the 1980s, events that constituted a radicalization of nationalists’ preferences within the Catalan national movement. In this chapter, we will examine the case of the formation of Action De´mocratique du Que´bec (ADQ) and the rise of autonomist nationalism in Que´bec in the 1990s. By 1976, a major realignment had taken place in Que´bec’s political party system, with the independentist Parti Que´be´cois (PQ) replacing the Union Nationale (UN) as the Parti libe´ral du Que´bec’s (PLQ) chief rival (Lemieux 1993: 11). In fact, in the elections of 1970 and 1973 the PQ had replaced the formerly dominant UN as the main alternative to the federalist nationalism of the PLQ (Rocher, Rouillard, and Lecours 2001: 192; Tanguay 2003: 254). ‘‘Since the early 1970s, party competition in Que´bec has pitted the left-leaning, technocratic, ´etatiste and nationalist Parti Que´be´cois against the centre-right, free-market and federalist Que´bec Liberal Party’’ (255). The Que´be´cois national movement since 1976 has historically had two dominant currents: independentism and federalism. The two major parties

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(the PQ and the PLQ) have won at least 85 percent of the popular vote in every provincial election since 1973, with the sole exception being the 1976 election.1 In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Que´be´cois national movement did not have an autonomist national political party in Que´bec’s National Assembly. Only two political and constitutional orientations within the national movement existed in the sphere of parliamentary politics and electoral competition, independentist nationalism (PQ) and federalist nationalism (PLQ). I am interested in tracing the process by which the ADQ was formed: how the tipping point was reached at which this autonomist nationalist political party was founded. The ADQ’s founding in 1994, formed by discontented elements that came out of the federalist party in Que´bec, resulted in the creation of an autonomist formation that was more decentralizing in its program and nationalist animus than the federalist party out of which it emerged.

The Origins and Development of the National Movement in Que´bec From the Conquest in 1759 until the 1820s, the collective identity of the people of Lower Canada had not yet coalesced into a proto-national movement. There were no self-styled patriotes (patriots) in the 1790s, but by the 1830s they were unmistakable (Trofimenkoff 1982: 50). By the 1830s, a new middle class had emerged, ready to cloak their political ambitions in nationalist garb. They were notaries, surveyors, lawyers, doctors, small merchants, and journalists. As the power of the seigneurs and the clergy declined, this new middle class began to imagine itself as a nation (54). In 1806, several assembly members backed one of their own, Pierre Bedard, in founding the first solely French language newspaper, Le Canadien (60). By the 1820s, the political debate in Canada was channeled into two opposing political groups. On one side was a loose grouping calling itself the English Party and on the other a slightly more coherent grouping calling itself the Parti Canadien. Neither was as ethnically pure as its name implies. The Parti Canadien, for one, although predominantly French and middle class, attracted some English-speaking journalists, doctors, and the occasional merchant. The two groupings were more distinguishable by their interests and behavior than by their ethnic origin (62). The people who gathered around the Parti Canadien, led by Louis-Joseph Papineau, slowly began to call themselves members of the Parti Patriote (64). Papineau was Lower

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Canada’s first nationalist leader, with all the charisma usually displayed by such figures. ‘‘Papineau’s magic was a heady mix of democratic logic, popular uneasiness, liberal rhetoric, habitant indocility, and nationalist dream’’ (70). The Parti Patriote was more prosaic. It was never as united as Papineau might have wished, and it had a hazy and diffuse program (70). In November and December 1837, a number of patriotes staged a short-lived rebellion, which turned into a small, localized fiasco. Out of a population of 450,000 French Canadians in Lower Canada, the actual rebellion involved only 500 to 600 people (77). By the 1840s, institution building had become a greater priority. In 1844, Etienne Parent founded the Institut Canadien, which set itself the task of preserving French Canadian identity (Trofimenkoff 1982: 93). Members of the Institut founded the newpaper L’Avenir with the same end in mind. The followers of the Institut and L’Avenir were known as les rouges (98). Phase A of the Que´be´cois national movement, therefore, lasted from the 1830s until the mid-nineteenth century. Confederation in 1867 was the sixth attempt at having French and English live together in the same territory (Trofimenkoff 1982: 100). Certainly, by this time, Phase B of the Que´be´cois national movement was in full course, given that a vocal minority of patriots was trying to awaken a sense of nationhood among their compatriots. The French Canadian elite was divided between bleus and rouges. The rouges (Liberals) opposed Confederation, saying that the proposed arrangement would lead to the eventual domination and absorption of the French Canadian nation by English protestants. The bleus (Conservatives), led by George Etienne Cartier, thought the arrangement would protect French Canada’s distinctiveness (Gagnon and Montcalm 1990: 136). During the first thirty years of the twentieth century, there was a growing emphasis in Que´bec on provincial autonomy, thanks to the leadership of Que´bec premiers Gouin (1905– 1920) and Taschereau (1920–1936) and Henri Bourassa, who was a Liberal member of parliament during the early years of the twentieth century. Bourassa was a cultural nationalist concerned with the cultural distinctiveness of Que´bec, but he was also a Canadian nationalist and thus opposed to political sovereignty for Que´bec (142–43). This quest for provincial autonomy within Confederation was also continued by Premier Maurice Duplessis of the UN from 1936–1939 and 1944–1959. Yet during all these years between Confederation in 1867 and the midtwentieth century, the national movement in Que´bec exhibited a conservative nationalism. Essentially, anglophone and francophone elites worked

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out a system of elite accommodation that became an elite ‘‘nonaggression pact.’’ The elements of this ‘‘linguistic entente’’ included the following: Francophones would run the provincial political system, with the ability to protect French Canadian distinctiveness, while anglophones would continue to dominate the economy of the province (Levine 1990: 30; see also Gagnon and Montcalm 1990: 104). ‘‘The dominant ideology from the mid19th century to the mid-20th century was a conservative nationalism strongly influenced by clerical values. This was not a separatist nationalism but one which sought to preserve the identity of the French-Canadian nation within the federation . . . Identity was to be defended behind the protective walls of religion and isolation: the key issue was survivance’’ (Keating 1996: 66). Between 1867 and 1956, none of the Que´bec political party platforms mentioned the language question (Gagnon 1989: 175; see also Dion 1976: 114–18). Wedded to this conservative, rural, and clerical form of nationalism, French Canadians had yet to develop a systematic strategy for grappling with the internal dynamics of anglophone influence that many were seeing as a threat to the French language and culture (Levine 1990: 38). During all this period covered by Phase B of the Que´be´cois national movement (1860s to 1960)—in which elites worked out a system of elite accommodation and ‘‘linguistic detente’’—the national movement in Que´bec was conservative and seemed to have an autonomist orientation. The national movement in Que´bec did not become thoroughly massified until the 1960s, as a result of the ‘‘Quiet Revolution.’’ Until 1960, nationalism in Que´bec was mostly characteristic of a small elite, and the masses remained indifferent to the whole phenomenon (Dion 1987: 170). Thus, Phase C began after 1960. This new political phase was inaugurated by the Liberal government of premier Jean Lesage. For example, the Lesage government—at the end of its first term in office—shifted from its earlier stance of promoting the equality of all the provinces to one of promoting a special status for Que´bec (153). During the UN administration of 1966– 1970, a strong binational autonomist theme was emphasized, seeking to make the provincial government the protector of the rights and interests of the Que´be´cois. Under the Liberal administration of 1970–1976, Premier Robert Bourassa sought a ‘‘reformed federal system designed to give Que´bec special powers and the resources needed to facilitate the ‘preservation and development of the bicultural character of the Canadian federation’ ’’ (Gagnon 1989: 157). In 1968, the first contemporary separatist party, the Parti Que´be´cois (PQ), was formed under the leadership of Rene´ Le´vesque

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(Coleman 1984: 4). He won the 1976 provincial election on a platform of ‘‘sovereignty-association,’’ proposing a referendum on this formula. He lost it in 1980, but the PQ was nonetheless reelected the following year with 49 percent of the vote. While in power during 1976–1985, the PQ softened its stance on independence in 1984, only to have that position reformulated and reaffirmed in 1988 under Jacques Parizeau. The 1989 campaign indicated a renewal of the pro-sovereignty mood. After the failure of the Meech Lake Accord in June 1990, support for sovereignty increased spectacularly at the polls. It increased from 27 percent to 42 percent between October 1985 and August 1989, and peaked at about 65 percent in some polls during the latter part of 1990 (Dion 1995: 120). Another important aspect of these political developments in Que´bec since 1960 has been that nationalism has become a hegemonic set of ideas in the province. This does not mean that everyone is a separatist, but rather that issues are debated largely within the context of Que´bec and from the point of view of their impact on its interests. All tendencies within the Que´be´cois national movement are thus forced to play on the nationalist field (Keating 1996: 77).

The Rise of Autonomist Nationalism in Que´bec (1976–2010) The Pre-Embryonic Period: Preexistent Ideology Before the 1960s, most of the political parties of Que´bec were autonomist, or autonomist-federalist, in their political and constitutional orientation. They opposed, with more or less intensity, the Canadian federal government’s appropriation of the competences that belonged to the provinces. In the nineteenth century, one of the fathers of Que´be´cois autonomism was prime minister Honore´ Mercier (1887–1891), who made the defense of the autonomy of Que´bec and the rest of the provinces one of his principal political objectives. He was the first to call a conference of the provinces to demand from the central government respect for provincial competences. In August 1887, the Liberal leader Wilfrid Laurier endorsed provincial autonomy. He went as far as recognizing the need for the federal government to increase the direct revenues of the provinces to safeguard their liberty (ADQ 2004: 5). During the 1920s, the Que´be´cois prime minister

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Alexandre Taschereau denounced the federal effort to exercise competences in the field of natural resources and contested its intrusions in the new field of radio communications. He declared at an interprovincial conference in 1927, ‘‘My government believes that the factor that will best safeguard the future of Canada is the respect for provincial autonomy, within a fidelity to the federal pact’’ (ADQ 2004: 6). The two major parties of the province (UN and PLQ) had contrasting identities at the end of the 1950s. The UN was committed to the defense of the autonomy of the province, just like the PLQ had been before it. Even secessionists such as Rene´ Le´vesque, the founder of the PQ, recognized the UN’s credentials as a conservative nationalist party, which was steadfast in its quest to obtain more autonomy for the province (Cardinal, Lemieux, and Sauvageau 1978: 253). This is best exemplified by the UN’s struggle to give the provincial government the power to tax and to share this power with the federal government. This struggle culminated in the adoption by the provincial government of a 15 percent tax on revenue in 1954 (256). But the UN was a strictly provincial party, without an equivalent at the federal level. In contrast, the PLQ had an alliance with the Liberal Party of Canada until 1964. The success of the UN, from 1944 to 1956, is due in part to its strategy of denouncing the association of the PLQ with the federal Liberal Party that governed Canada (Bernier, Pinard, and Lemieux 1997: 23). In that sense, the UN was the more autonomist party, more dependent on its nationalist allies in the interior of Que´bec. In contrast, the PLQ was more federalist, and its principal ally was the federal government in Ottawa, which had been Liberal since 1935. The PLQ, in addition, had its electoral base in both the francophone and anglophone communities, while the UN had its electoral base only in the francophone community (Bernier, Pinard, and Lemieux 1997: 6). Maurice Duplessis had founded the UN and had given it, by the force of his remarkable personality, its sense of identity. It was born out of an electoral alliance in 1935 between the Parti conservateur du Que´bec of Duplessis and the Action libe´rale nationale of Paul Gouin (Cardinal, Lemieux, and Sauvageau 1978: 20). Duplessis was a committed patriot, convinced of the wisdom of the autonomist route. He said in 1946, ‘‘The great problem of the hour is how to safeguard the liberties and other prerogatives of the province.’’ In addition, he said in the 1940s that ‘‘the autonomy of the province is the soul of the people. . . . For this cause, it is

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necessary to form a sacred union [i.e., national solidarity]’’ (ADQ 2004: 6). Duplessis was never an independentist, refusing to make of the province of Que´bec a ‘‘banana republic without bananas’’ and refusing to cast the province into such an adventure. He had always believed instead that within the Canadian federation it would be possible to live in peace with the other provinces, as long as the provincial rights guaranteed by the Constitution were respected, the necessary legislative and fiscal liberties were granted, and the language and religious specificities were respected. The death of Duplessis in 1959, followed shortly thereafter by that of Paul Sauve´, explains, in part, the defeat of the UN in 1960. In addition, the autonomist vindications of the UN against the Liberal federal government of Ottawa had lost their purpose, after the loss of the federal Liberals in the federal elections of 1957 and 1958. The PLQ had won the provincial election of 1960, and with this new government a new political era was inaugurated. The most notable of its initial measures was the nationalization of the electricity companies after the provincial elections of 1962 (Bernier, Pinard, and Lemieux 1997: 7). The new E´tat du Que´bec started affirming its distinctiveness vis-a`-vis the other provinces by using the opting-out formula. In this sense, its most significant success is, without a doubt, the recognition of its competence to manage its own re´gime de rentes (pension regime). Slowly, during the 1960s within the most advanced nationalist circles the quest for sovereignty or independence was substituted for the quest for autonomy (8). With respect to the first key factor—the existence in the past of antecedent ideological carriers that espoused the political orientation—I have outlined above how autonomist nationalism is a tendency within the national movement of Que´bec that existed at various points in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, through the 1960s. But the task of building the contemporary institutional embodiment of this political and constitutional orientation would be left to a younger generation in the 1990s. The embryonic period of the contemporary institutional expression of the autonomist political orientation would be from 1982 to 1992, as explained below.

The Embryonic Period: Central State Constitutional Moment The immediate catalyst of the founding of a new political and constitutional orientation within a national movement is the occurrence of a significant

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constitutional transformative event at the central state (i.e., Canada or Spain). Such constitutional transformative moments tend to frame the embryonic period of the formation of a new political orientation. In the case of Que´bec, this embryonic period lasted from 1982 to 1992. Three remarkable central state constitutional transformative events occurred during this period: the final ‘‘patriation’’ of the Canadian Constitution and the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, the negotiation and ultimate failure of the Meech Lake constitutional Accord during 1987 to 1990, and the proposal and ultimate failure of the Charlottetown Accord in 1992.

The ‘‘Patriation’’ of the Canadian Constitution in 1982 In 1968, Pierre Elliott Trudeau was elected Canada’s prime minister. The leader of the Liberal Party of Canada, he remained prime minister (except for a nine-month hiatus) until 1984. Trudeau was the son of a French Canadian father and an English Canadian mother of Scottish descent, and, thus, he acquired early on a degree of bilingualism that is rare not only in Canada but in any part of the world. He was unable or unwilling to identify exclusively with either English Canada or French Canada. Instead, he developed a notion about the supremacy of the individual. Thus, from his early youth, Trudeau seemed to develop an ambivalence and ultimately an estrangement from French Canada. The early death of his father accentuated this ambivalence. English became the principal language of the household, and the traditions of his French Canadian relatives increasingly seemed out of place, in his world view. According to various Trudeau biographers, during his education at the Universite´ de Montre´al (law), Harvard (social science), Paris, and the London School of Economics and Political Science, the young Trudeau continued to feel marginalized from his French Canadian background (McRoberts 1997: 56). Returning to Montreal in 1949 after his university studies, ‘‘Trudeau remained uncomfortable with French Que´bec. It simply did not measure up in terms of the post-war liberal world view in which he had been confirmed’’ (57). He dedicated himself to the task of making French Canadians aware of their ‘‘backwardness.’’ Trudeau was critical of Duplessisme and the UN regime of 1944–1960, but he remained a strong supporter of provincial autonomy in

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Que´bec. By 1962, according to Trudeau, the Jean Lesage government and public opinion in the province had elevated autonomy to a dogma and was attempting to reduce federal power to a minimum. Trudeau entered federal politics ‘‘to defend federalism’’ in 1965 as a member of the Liberal Party of Canada, which at that time had lost its majority and was advocating an ‘‘open federal system’’ (Trudeau 1968: xix). Trudeau was a strong opponent of Que´be´cois nationalism, viewing it as reactionary. In a 1965 essay, Trudeau wrote, ‘‘I believe that a definition of the state that is based essentially on ethnic attributes is philosophically erroneous and would inevitably lead to intolerance. Moreover, this definition seems to me strategically unacceptable. If Que´bec defines itself constitutionally as the ‘national state of French Canadians’ on the grounds that it contains the majority of French-speaking Canadians, the same logic—the logic of numbers—would lead all the other provinces, and indeed the federal state itself, to define themselves . . . as the national states of Englishspeaking Canadians’’ (Trudeau 1968: 30). Trudeau rejected dualism as it was generally understood in the province, that is, the notion that Canada was composed of two nations (and a third nation of natives). For Trudeau, Canada was composed simply of individuals, some of whom spoke French, some of whom spoke English, and some of whom spoke both (McRoberts 1997: 64). Trudeau had a vision of a ‘‘coast to coast’’ bilingual Canada, in which minority language rights would be framed in a constitution and in which francophones’ language and culture could flourish while becoming integral participants in the Canadian state (Levine 1990: 90). [Trudeau] dedicated his career as prime minister of Canada to the struggle against the idea of a Que´bec . . . [distinct] society. He always presented himself as a champion of federalism. But to him, a federal system did not imply sharing of sovereignty and allegiances. Que´bec was a province like the others. . . . He repudiated provincialism; the concept of two nations or of a bi-national Canada. . . . In order to unite the country and make French-speaking Que´becers feel as comfortable in all of Canada as in Que´bec, he promoted bilingualism in all federal services across the Canadian ‘‘nation’’; he never doubted that Canada was one indivisible nation. He was implicitly asking his fellow Que´becers to trade their identity as a people against the promise of bilingualism. (Baltazhar 1995: 47)

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Thus, in 1969 the Trudeau government promulgated the Official Languages Act, which federalized French and English as Canada’s two official languages and created bilingual districts in areas where francophones and anglophones both exceeded 10 percent of the population. In 1981–1982, Trudeau brilliantly maneuvered to bring home Canada’s Constitution from Britain—a ‘‘patriation’’ representing a final act of severance. In April 1982, Queen Elizabeth proclaimed a new Canadian Constitution in Ottawa, which became known as The Constitution Act, 1982, without the consent of the government of Que´bec. The Constitution Act, 1982 as proposed and ultimately enacted is composed of two principal parts. First, it presents an amending formula by which some items require the unanimous consent of parliament and all the provincial legislatures, while most items require only the approval of parliament and only two-thirds of the provincial legislatures, amounting to half the population. Second, it presents a Charter of Rights and Freedoms that, along with the standard political and civil rights, protects and recognizes linguistic rights, mobility rights, and equal treatment before the law. Interpretive clauses state that the interpretation of the document must take into consideration the rights of native peoples and the multicultural nature of Canada. In the eyes of many francophones, the Constitution Act, 1982 represented the imposition by the Trudeau government of its own particular vision and conception of Canada. Seen from the viewpoint of Que´be´cois nationalists, Pierre Elliott Trudeau became the greatest champion of Canadian nationalism in the twentieth century. Building the Canadian nation has always been one of the main tasks of the proponents of a strong federal government in Canada, and the central state’s contribution to nation building goes back to Confederation (Laforest 1995: 131). As noted by Philip Resnick (in Laforest 1995: 132), the invention of a Canadian national tradition by the federal state has progressed in stages. First there was the international recognition that the Canadian state received through membership in the League of Nations, the Commonwealth, and the United Nations. Second, there were the nation-building activities undertaken by crown corporations, such as the Canadian National Railways, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, and so on. Third, there is the sense of national solidarity engendered by the social activism of the state—old age pensions, unemployment insurance, and family allowances. Fourth, there are the

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symbolic validations of post-1945 Canadian nationalism: the Canadian Citizenship Act of 1947, the Canada Council of 1957, the adoption of the new Canadian flag in 1965, and the patriation of the Canadian Constitution in 1982. As Resnick stresses, the symbols of nationhood and the sense of identity of English Canada are associated with the Canadian state. ‘‘ ‘From mounted police to railway projects to armed forces to national broadcasting, social programs, or the flag, the route for English Canadians has entailed use of that state’ ’’ (133). The Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Constitution Act, 1982 can therefore be seen in light of this progression, by which the central state and its political institutions have given form to the Canadian nation. ‘‘The fundamental objective of the authors of the 1982 constitution seems to have been to promote throughout Canada (including Que´bec) a political culture capable of reinforcing in each citizen the feeling of belonging to a single Canadian nation’’ (Laforest 1995: 133). The Charter served as a unifying symbol. It framed in a constitutional document the values shared by all Canadians, underscoring the importance of the freedoms and institutions they share in common. The Charter also served to promote the unification of Canada, given that it homogenized policies across the country, especially language policy. Thus, ‘‘this Canadian nationalism directly contradicted the vision of a federal, dualist Canada with distinct societies and multiple identities, which had been so important to generations of Que´bec francophones’’ (McRoberts 1997: 172). The first constitutional moment that framed the embryonic period of the formation of the contemporary embodiment of autonomist nationalism in Que´bec was the negotiation and enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982. This constitutional event embodied a pan-Canadian nationalism, and it had several repercussions in Que´bec. First, it may have provoked a reaction among the Que´be´cois reinforcing the independentist current within the national movement (McRoberts 1997: 174). Second, the national unity strategy of the Trudeau government incurred the ‘‘opposition of not just sovereigntists but also a good share of federalist opinion in Que´bec. Indeed, Que´bec federalists were to remain badly divided for years to come’’ (emphasis added; McRoberts 1997: 174). In short, the Constitution Act was badly out of step with majority opinion in Que´bec, given that it was based on an idea of Canada that most Que´bec francophones did not share. It set in motion a political reaction in the province that was compounded by the reaction

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to the next two constitutional moments during the 1982–1992 period. The end result, as we will see, is that a crisis was provoked within the federalist nationalist camp, which ultimately led to the birth of the contemporary institutional embodiment of autonomist nationalism, the ADQ. The Meech Lake Accord Process of 1987–1990 Pierre Trudeau left the federal political scene when he retired in June 1984, opening up the opportunity to repair the frayed relations between the Canadian state and Que´bec and to try to obtain the province’s consent to the Constitution Act. Brian Mulroney of the Progressive Conservative Party swept the federal election of 1984 with a promise to try to bring Que´bec back into the fold. But the initiative was actually taken by Premier Robert Bourassa of the federalist PLQ, who had won the provincial election of 1985. His government reiterated that even though they considered themselves federalists, they insisted that the Constitution Act, 1982 as it was enacted was unacceptable to the Que´bec government. The Bourassa government in Que´bec released a five-point plan, outlining the conditions under which the Constitution Act, 1982 would be acceptable to Que´bec: (1) a veto over constitutional change affecting Que´bec, (2) recognition of Que´bec’s status as a ‘‘distinct society,’’ (3) limitation of the federal spending power, (4) participation in the Supreme Court nominations, and (5) recognition of Que´bec’s existing powers relating to immigration (McRoberts 1997: 191). After several tours of provincial capitals by both federal and Que´be´cois officials, Prime Minister Mulroney identified what he thought could be the basis for a consensus, and the premiers of the provinces met at Mulroney’s residence on the shore of Meech Lake. Their discussions resulted in the Meech Lake Accord of April 30, 1987, a set of constitutional revisions incorporating all of Que´bec’s five proposals and adding a sixth. This package was formally approved by the premiers on June 13, 1987 (McRoberts 1997: 192). Although the Accord proposed a modest package of constitutional changes, the element of the Accord that caused the greatest controversy was the ‘‘distinct society’’ clause. This was a clause providing that the courts should interpret the Constitution in a way that was consistent with ‘‘the recognition that Que´bec constitutes within Canada a distinct society.’’ In addition, it affirmed that ‘‘the role of the legislature and Government of Que´bec is to preserve and promote the distinct identity of Que´bec’’ (McRoberts 1997: 193).

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The Accord was well received in Que´bec, given that in the eyes of many francophones it did away with the systematic refusal to meet Que´bec’s demands that had been the hallmark of constitutional negotiations during the fourteen years of the Trudeau era. It was ratified by the Que´bec National Assembly on June 23, 1987, and then it was subject to a threeyear process of ratification in the federal parliament and in all the provincial legislatures. Each of the ten provincial legislative assemblies was required to endorse the unanimous agreement that had given birth to the Accord (Laforest 1995: 108). Between May 1987 and June 1990, a battle was fought for the hearts and minds of anglophone Canada, to try to sway its opinion regarding the Accord. Throughout the summer and fall of 1987, the federal Liberal Party and the English-speaking Canadian intelligentsia mobilized against the Accord. Despite this opposition, the ratification procedure was set in motion. First, the federal parliament in Ottawa approved the Accord in 1987, and then it was left to the ten provincial legislatures to approve the Accord (Laforest 1995: 120). By the fall of 1988, public opinion in English-speaking Canada seemed to be turning against it. Then, in December 1988, the Que´bec government of Robert Bourassa passed Bill 178, which seemed to confirm some of the worst fears of English-speaking Canadians. Bill 178 reinstated a slightly modified version of the commercial signs law that had been declared unconstitutional by the Canadian Supreme Court. Invoking the ‘‘notwithstanding clause’’ of the federal Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the government of premier Bourassa was able to resurrect the provision of Law 101 (the Charter of the French Language) that required commercial signs to be in French only. In the rest of Canada, Bill 178 provoked a strong reaction. In the eyes of many anglophones, this measure was a direct challenge to the ideal of a coast-to-coast bilingual Canada that many anglophones had adopted, and Que´bec seemed to be violating an implicit agreement it had entered into with the rest of Canada (McRoberts 1997: 202). In the end, the Accord was not adopted; the legislatures of two of the provinces, Manitoba and Newfoundland, had not yet approved the Accord when the three-year limit expired. This result was in part due to sheer bad luck and in part due to the personalities involved. Two of the original signatories of the Accord, the premiers of Manitoba and New Brunswick, lost their reelection bids before their legislatures had ratified the Accord. In the case of Newfoundland, ratification had actually been rescinded under their new premier, Clyde Wells, who became premier in that province on

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April 20, 1989 (McRoberts 1997: 203). Wells, like Trudeau, was an unyielding advocate of the equality of citizens and the uniformity of the provinces within a single Canadian nation (Laforest 1995: 122). Therefore, on June 23, 1990, the Meech Lake Accord expired, and the April 1987 compromise achieved on the shores of Lake Meech was defeated. That same evening, the premier of Que´bec, Robert Bourassa, gave a speech before a solemn National Assembly in which he declared, ‘‘No matter what anyone says or does, Que´bec has always been, is now and will always be a distinct society, free and capable of taking responsibility for its destiny and development’’ (Tanguay 2003: 262). This disappointing end for the Accord also initiated a period of crisis in the political party system in the province and, in particular, within the federalist PLQ and those who composed its most nationalist wing, which ultimately led to the formation of the contemporary institutional carrier of autonomist nationalism in the province, namely, the ADQ. Guy Laforest was the president of the ADQ from October 2002 to September 2004, and he believes ‘‘the birth of the ADQ in 1994 must be understood as one of the consequences of the failure of the Meech Lake Accord in June 1990’’ (Laforest 1995: 307).

The Post-Meech Period and the Charlottetown Accord Process of 1992 The failure of the Meech Lake Accord process during 1987–1990 was a major disappointment among francophones. Support for Que´bec sovereignty reached unprecedented heights immediately after the failure of the Accord. By November 1990, it had reached 64 percent among Que´bec residents, with only 30 percent opposed (McRoberts 1997: 204). In some public opinion surveys, seven out of ten persons pronounced themselves in favor of sovereigntist positions (Lemieux 1993: 173). The Bourassa government announced it was withdrawing from any further constitutional talks. After this defeat, the federalist PLQ found itself without a constitutional program. In order to develop new positions, the party created an internal committee popularly known as the Allaire Committee, presided over by Jean Allaire, a corporate attorney from Laval who was a well-respected militant of long standing in the PLQ. In addition, on September 4, 1990, the government announced it was creating a parliamentary commission of the

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National Assembly on Que´bec’s constitutional and political future, popularly known as the Be´langer-Campeau Commission (Gagnon and Latouche 1991: 37).2 This was a major initiative undertaken by both of the major parties in the Assembly (PQ and PLQ). Most of the experts and groups testifying before the Commission took sovereigntist positions. Within the Allaire Committee, these sovereigntist stances were taken by Liberals who were disappointed by what they saw as a betrayal by forces outside the province they once considered to be their allies. The Allaire Committee’s Report was published at the end of January 1991, and it proposed a ‘‘minimal’’ federalism, wherein the competences of the federal government would be reduced to defense and security, customs and tariffs, currency and the debt held in common, and pe´re´quation (equalization).3 For the province, it proposed exclusive competences in urban affairs, agriculture, unemployment insurance, communications, culture, regional development, education, social affairs, energy, environment, housing, industry and commerce, language, sports and leisure, family policy, labor training, research and development, natural resources, health, public security, income security, and tourism. Shared competences between the provincial and federal governments would include aboriginal affairs, fiscal and revenue, immigration, justice, financial institutions, fisheries, foreign policy, post and telecommunications, natural resources, and transport (Gagnon and Latouche 1991: 485). The Allaire Report constituted a radical shift from the Liberal Party’s 1980 Beige Paper. Reflecting the nationalist animus of the PLQ at that time, the Congress of the PLQ of March 1991 adopted the Allaire Report with minor modifications. Two-thirds of the delegates at the Congress voted to adopt the Allaire Report as the official position of the PLQ (Be´liveau 2002: 48). Nevertheless, in an attempt to limit the extent of the internal shift within the PLQ, Premier Bourassa closed that Congress with the declaration that the party had, in actual fact, ‘‘chosen Canada’’ and that ‘‘our first choice must be to develop Que´bec within Canada, in a federal structure’’ (McRoberts 1997: 206). At the end of March 1991, the Be´langer-Campeau Commission published its report. This report did not have a specific set of recommendations about the division of powers between the province and the federal government; instead, it affirmed that a new political and constitutional arrangement should recognize and respect the Que´be´cois and their right to be different; guarantee Que´bec’s right to exclusive authority in regard to the

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matters and sectors that already formed part of its sphere of exclusive competences; and grant Que´bec exclusive competences linked to its social, economic, and cultural developments as well as those in the domain of language policy (Gagnon and Latouche 1991: 486). But the principal recommendation of the Commission’s Report was that a law should be passed establishing a procedure for the determination of the political and constitutional future of the province. This law would provide for a referendum on sovereignty to be held in 1992, the creation of a parliamentary commission to look into the questions pertaining to the accession of Que´bec to sovereignty, and the creation of another commission dedicated to evaluating any new offers of constitutional partnership that may be formulated by the Canadian government. Following these recommendations, Bill 150 was, in fact, passed by the National Assembly in June 1991, requiring the government to hold a referendum on sovereignty either in June or October of 1992. Throughout this process, it had seemed that Premier Robert Bourassa was a sincere supporter of the Allaire Report, the Be´langer-Campeau Commission Report, and Bill 150, but at times it seemed as if he was more interested in buying time in order to enable the federal government of Brian Mulroney to come up with some compromise that would result in a face-saving resolution of the constitutional quagmire (Tanguay 2003: 229; Lise´e 1994). In 1992, the Mulroney government initiated a new round of constitutional negotiations between itself, provincial governments, territorial leaders, and leaders of the four main aboriginal groups. The new round was circumscribed by two circumstances: first, the Allaire Report had already set the tone for Que´be´cois expectations in any future constitutional round. Second, any new set of recommendations had to be acceptable to the rest of Canada, and amenable to the Trudeauesque vision of Canada, much more than the Meech Lake Accord had been (McRoberts 1997: 207). An agreement was reached on July 7, 1992 between the federal government, nine provincial governments (excluding Que´bec), two territories, and four aboriginal groups. The new agreement reiterated the distinct society clause, requiring constitutional interpretation to consider Que´bec’s distinctiveness, with some significant modifications. This time, the clause would not apply to the whole Constitution, only to the Charter. There was also a reference to ‘‘distinct society’’ in a ‘‘Canada Clause’’ that would ‘‘express fundamental Canadian values.’’ The clause would also appear as one among eight different ‘‘characteristics’’ that should serve as guide for the courts in interpreting

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the Constitution (McRoberts 1997: 208). With respect to the division of powers, the agreement left intact Ottawa’s prerogatives (209). By August 1992, Premier Bourassa had agreed to return to the constitutional negotiating table, and he participated in the negotiations between federal officials, the provincial premiers, and indigenous leaders in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island. On August 26, 1992, all the parties subscribed to what became known as the Charlottetown Accord. By that time, Bourassa was able to convince most of the PLQ—with the important exceptions of Jean Allaire and Mario Dumont (leader of the PLQ’s youth wing, Commission-Jeunesse)—to accept and support the Charlottetown Accord as a genuine reform of the Canadian Constitution. All the Liberal members of Parliament except one followed Bourassa (Tanguay 2003: 229). The October 1992 referendum would not be on sovereignty but on the package of reforms known as the Charlottetown Accord. The two most notable leaders of the nationalist and autonomist wing of the PLQ, Jean Allaire and Mario Dumont, and many members of the youth wing of the Liberal Party formed Le Re´seau des Libe´raux pour le Non and supported the ‘‘No’’ vote in the referendum now proposed for October. This solidified Allaire’s and Dumont’s position as dissidents within their own party and further advanced the consolidation of a nationalist/autonomist nucleus of dissent within the federalist PLQ. On October 26, 1992, the referendum was held, with an 83 percent participation rate in Que´bec. Of these, 56.6 percent voted ‘‘No’’ and 43.4 percent voted ‘‘Yes.’’ It was estimated that 15–20 percent of the voters who preferred the PLQ over the independentist PQ voted ‘‘No.’’ Outside Que´bec, 54.3 percent voted against the Accord and 45.7 percent voted ‘‘Yes.’’ The proposal was approved only in Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, and Ontario (narrowly, with 50.1 percent of the vote). In the eyes of many francophone Que´becers, the Charlottetown Accord represented a step backward from the original Meech Lake proposal (Laforest and Gibbins 1998). The third constitutional moment that framed the embryonic period of the formation of the contemporary embodiment of autonomist nationalism in Que´bec was the negotiation and failure of the Charlottetown Accord in 1992. Although the PLQ has remained the most federalist party within the political party system of Que´bec in its political and constitutional orientation, it has had periods when it has been strongly autonomist in orientation, such as immediately following the failure of the Meech Lake agreement in 1990 (Lemieux 1993: 201). The clearest expression of this

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latent autonomist nationalism within the PLQ in the early 1990s was the Allaire Report and its formula for a radical devolution of powers to Que´bec. The two most notable leaders of this internal current within the PLQ at that time were Jean Allaire and Mario Dumont. The position of the nationalist/ autonomist nucleus within the party had become untenable, especially after they supported the ‘‘No’’ side in the campaign leading up to the October 26, 1992 referendum. In a sense, the autonomist nationalist political orientation had its embryonic period within the federalist PLQ between 1982 and 1992. But by 1992, its possibilities within the PLQ itself had been exhausted and another institutional carrier had to be found for the expression of the contemporary embodiment of autonomist nationalism. Let us examine the final two phases in this process.

The Impulse: The Contribution from Civil Society The third key factor in the process leading to the formation of the contemporary embodiment of autonomist nationalism within the Que´be´cois national movement is the nexus with civil society. During the process that leads to the founding of a new political and constitutional orientation within a national movement, at least some of the organizations, entities, and individuals that represent sociological nationalism make a critical contribution. At the August 29, 1992 special Congress of the PLQ at which the party decided to support Premier Bourassa’s constitutional plan to back the Charlottetown Accord and to campaign in its favor in the October 26, 1992 referendum, Jean Allaire and Mario Dumont found themselves isolated. By September, Jean Allaire had resigned from the executive of the party and went ahead with the plans to organize Le Re´seau des Libe´raux pour le Non, campaigning for the ‘‘No’’ side in that referendum (Be´liveau 2002: 67). The twenty-two-year-old Mario Dumont, leader of the party’s CommissionJeunesse, announced, after some hesitation, on September 15, 1992 that he would join Jean Allaire’s campaign for the ‘‘No,’’ although he had not yet resigned from his post as chief of the party’s Commission-Jeunesse (71). With the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord in the October 26, 1992 referendum, Allaire and Dumont initially seemed to think that now the PLQ would amend its ways and would go back to adopting the Allaire Report as its official stance, and they would eventually return to their posts in the

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party. Far from that, many in the PLQ hierarchy seemed to think that the referendum was lost because of the campaign for the ‘‘No’’ led by the two dissidents. Close to 20 percent of PLQ supporters had voted ‘‘No’’ (Be´liveau 2002: 84). On November 26, 1992, the executive of the PLQ decided to kick out Mario Dumont. Thus, by November 1992, Jean Allaire—a member of the PLQ for thirty-six years and an acquaintance of Premier Bourassa for forty years—and Mario Dumont—a very young leader of the PLQ—found themselves in a political desert, devoid of a party. Jean Allaire has pointed out that at the root of the decision to form and found the ADQ was the outreach they did to elements from civil society and the feedback they received. In January 1993, Jean Allaire and Mario Dumont took the initiative to bring people together from all the regions of Que´bec and from all the political tendencies in a group to reflect on the future of Que´bec. This became known as the Groupe Re´flexion Que´bec. The idea was to bring together a group of people to shed a new light on Que´bec’s problems and the possible solutions. As Jean Allaire recounts it: I decided to form a think tank. Mario Dumont was there and others from the PLQ and Alain Gagnon who is a sovereigntist. I just wanted to think about Que´bec and about Que´bec-Canada. We were called the Monday club. We had different committees. And finally we came up with a document. We tried to find a solution for Que´bec and we published a report in an inexpensive format. At the end of 1993, there was pressure to have a new political party. The people met at Trois-Rivie`res in the Fall of 1993 and decided to found a new political party and they wanted me as a leader. And I agreed. And we had a convention with about 700 people and I was elected. After that I had a heart attack and I retired, and then Mario took over. So that is the origin of the party. But the position paper [developed by the Groupe Re´flexion Que´bec] was instrumental in the formation of the new party for developing the new platform.4 In the fall of 1993, the Groupe Re´flexion Que´bec published a document titled ‘‘Un Que´bec Responsable,’’ which was widely distributed by the journal Agora, directed by Jacques Dufresne. The document’s introductory page, subscribed by Jean Allaire and Dumont, explained that the group was ‘‘neither a political party nor an embryo of a political party. . . . After having confirmed the impossibility of pursuing unimpeded reflection within the

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political parties, we decided to organize a group of reflection independent of the organized political parties. The organization of the group was undertaken at the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993. . . . The conditions for admission into the group included not being an active member of a political party’’ (Agora 1993: 3). According to Guy Laforest, who became a member of the ADQ in February 2000 and its president from October 2002 to September 2004, the foundation of the ADQ was closely related to the report released by the Groupe Re´flexion Que´bec (Laforest 2004: 309). As Laforest recounts it, ‘‘the ADQ emerged after the failure of Lake Meech, and [Jean Allaire], Mario Dumont and his people, the nationalist wing of the PLQ who thought that the nationalist orientation of the PLQ was not sufficient. . . . I was part of a research group that was at the origins of the ADQ. It was called Groupe Re´flexion Que´bec, and a document was produced.’’5

Consolidation of Leadership and the Founding of the New Political Orientation During the period that the participants in the Groupe Re´flexion Que´bec met in early 1993, what seemed evident is that the participants were interested in elaborating a new project for Que´bec society capable of bringing together many people from diverse strands of society. A ‘‘third way’’ seemed to be in the making, but it wasn’t clear yet that this process would culminate in the formation of a new party. Once the report of the Group had been published it dissolved itself, and it wasn’t clear what would follow it. One option was simply leaving it at that and having each one return to his or her chores. Another option was to turn it into a foundation for a movement or a pressure group to express its opinion about topics of current interest, without taking any concrete, practical action. A third option was to turn it into the foundation for a new political party, responding to the demand that was felt among the population for a ‘‘third way.’’ Among the participants of the Groupe Re´flexion Que´bec, there were advocates of all three options (Allaire 1994: 53). On October 2, 1993, it was decided to turn the group of reflection into Groupe Action Que´bec, with a mandate to take the group’s report to the population to discuss and publicize the result. An intensive tour of the entire province was undertaken, during

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which more than thirty meetings were held and more than 2,000 persons were consulted (55). On December 13, 1993, Allaire announced the formation of a new political party, the Action De´mocratique du Que´bec. A declaration of principles was adopted at Trois-Rivie`res on December 12, 1993 by an assembly of 165 delegates. They adopted the following principles: putting Que´bec above everything at the top of their priorities; respecting the citizen; managing the public finances of Que´bec in a responsible fashion; promoting openness and solidarity among the Que´be´cois, and so on. On January 18, 1994, the Director General of Elections in Que´bec authorized the formation of the ADQ. The ADQ held its first Congress on March 5–6, 1994 (Allaire 1994: 57). Jean Allaire was selected as chef of the party and Mario Dumont as president. Shortly thereafter, Allaire announced that he would not be able to continue because of a cardiac condition, and Dumont replaced him. In the 1994 provincial election, the new party received 6.5 percent of the vote, and Dumont became a member of the National Assembly. The PQ won that election with a comfortable majority in the National Assembly, and PQ Premier Jacques Parizeau set course for holding a second referendum on sovereignty in 1995. The new party formed part of the coalition for the ‘‘Yes’’ (the pro-independence option) in the referendum on sovereignty held on October 30, 1995, forming a triple alliance with the independentist formations, the PQ, and the Bloc Que´be´cois on June 9, 1994 (Beliveau 2002: ch. 10). After the defeat of the pro-independence proposal by a narrow margin in the 1995 referendum, the ADQ came to believe the Que´be´cois people did not, at the moment, want a radical rupture with Canada and deplored the constitutional obsession in Que´be´cois politics. The party decided to adopt a ten-year moratorium on the age-old constitutional dilemma between independentists and federalists (ADQ 2004: 11). The classic independence-federalism dichotomy was in need of revision and rethinking. The ADQ argued that the province, more than ever, needed a strong autonomist voice, a current of autonomist thought, and an institutional carrier for the autonomist political orientation. During 2000 and 2001, the party undertook a programmatic consolidation, developing a more coherent set of values and principles. In the provincial election of April 14, 2003, the party obtained 18 percent of the vote and took (only) five seats in the National Assembly, due to the distortion caused by the electoral system. The party has continued to be the carrier of autonomist nationalism in the province throughout 2004–2010, and it represents the

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elusive third way, according to Guy Laforest, in between the politics of identity of the PQ and the politics of interest of the PLQ (Laforest 2004: 321; ADQ 2004).

Conclusion: How Nationalism Evolves In this chapter, we have examined the case of the founding of Action De´mocratique du Que´bec and the rise of autonomist nationalism in Que´bec in the 1990s. In the 1980s, the Que´be´cois national movement did not have an autonomist national political party in the National Assembly. Only two political orientations within the national movement existed in the sphere of parliamentary politics, independentist nationalism and federalist nationalism. Thus, autonomism at that time was politically marginal and was largely absent from the sphere of parliamentary politics. This situation changed dramatically in the 1990s. The tipping point—that is, the juncture at which a new political orientation is successfully established in the arena of electoral competition and parliamentary politics—was reached in 1994. Thus, the national movement diversified and expanded, and now three political and constitutional orientations within the national movement are represented in the sphere of formal party politics. Autonomism in Que´bec is now part of the mainstream of the national movement and has acquired an aura of legitimacy and permanence within the national movement. Independentist nationalism in Catalonia and autonomist nationalism in Que´bec are now well-established within their respective national movements. My findings point us toward a renewed appreciation of the relevance of political and social factors in understanding how a novel nationalist political orientation is successfully established in the parliamentary sphere. Several of the findings we have derived from our study of the Que´be´cois and Catalan national movements point us toward broader conclusions applicable to several other cases of stateless nationhood, encompassed by my scope conditions. I will briefly discuss below some examples of the broader applicability of the comparative perspective offered here. I have shown that the embryonic period of the formation of a new nationalist political orientation is framed by a central state constitutional moment, which itself is interpreted by the minority nationalists as an instance of majority nation nationalism. Such constitutional moments affect the intersubjective relations of reciprocity between minority

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nationalists and majority nation nationalism. Statewide solidarity and unity may be promoted by a culture of reciprocity and accommodation between substate nationalists and the majority nation. Thus, intersubjective relations of reciprocity between substate nationalists and majority nation nationalism are essential for understanding the trigger event that serves as the immediate catalyst for the founding and growth of new nationalist orientations (led by nationalist parties) that constitute the radicalization of nationalists’ preferences in substate national societies. This is consistent with the central thesis in this book: Substate nationalists conceptualize the multinational democracy they inhabit as a ‘‘moral polity’’ in which reciprocities are expected and notions of collective dignity, the commonweal, and mutual accommodation are essential. The perception by these substate nationalists that their expectations of reciprocity have been violated is a factor that contributes to the increasing radicalization of nationalists’ political preferences. Sovereign states are themselves engaged in a process of majority nation building aimed at producing a common national identity across the entire territory of the state. Constitutional moments are critical periods, given that ‘‘constitutions have played a central role in this process [of majority nation-building], both in the regulative sense of creating institutions with statewide authority to permit the creation and enforcement of these policies, and in the constitutive sense of projecting an image of political community meant to be internalized by citizens’’ (Choudhry 2008: 30). In the Basque Country during the last decade, for example, the political parties that oppose the Basque nationalists of the Partido Nacionalista Vasco, Aralar, and Eusko Alkartasuna (and now Bildu) call themselves ‘‘constitutionalists’’ to signal their defense of the constitutive project represented by the 1978 Constitution of Spain. In Catalonia, from 2006 to 2010 a new constitutional moment configured itself, as the substate nationalist parties had been uneasily awaiting the decision by Spain’s Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of the new Catalan Statute of Autonomy. The nullification of key provisions of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy of 2006 by the Spanish Constitutional Court in July 2010 is another instance6 of non-accommodation, as interpreted by the Catalan nationalists. The constitutional moment of 2006–2010 has had an impact on substate nationalists’ perception of non-accommodation and non-reciprocity. Even a long-standing autonomist such as former President Jordi Pujol, who during his entire career has defended the autonomist

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cause, declared that he was now inclined to independence because the vision of a ‘‘plural Spain’’ has failed (see La Vanguardia 2011: 3).7 As Artur Mas (CiU) declared, the Spanish Constitution has become a ‘‘wall against which the national aspirations of Catalonia smash themselves’’ (Avui 2009: 7). My analysis highlights the influence of central state constitutional transformative events on minority nations’ national movements, underscoring the dynamic and fluid nature of nationalism and its contingent and nondeterministic nature. We have also seen that immediately following the embryonic period, another process came into play to give shape to the new political current. A critical contribution was made by social networks of nationalists. These networks of nationalists serve as a breeding ground for cadres and leadership and also as the incubator of the ideological precedents that facilitate the establishment of a new political orientation in the sphere of parliamentary politics. Social networks of nationalists include associations, cultural groups, pressure groups, and consciousness-raising political action groups. The associations they form may include cultural and linguistic affirmation ` mnium Cultural, Plataforma per la Llengua, Correllengroups (such as O gua, the Socie´te´ Saint Jean Baptiste, or the Mouvement National des Que´be´cois), cultural institutions (Ateneu Barcelone´s or Palau de la Mu´sica Catalana), and associations formed to celebrate specific events (such as the Association of Neighbors that organizes the Festa de Gra`cia in the catalanist neighborhood of Gra`cia in Barcelona every August or the groups that organize events on the Saint Jean Baptiste holiday in Que´bec every June). The ferment created by this rich associationism generally serves as a bulwark of nationalism, although at times some of these associations may adopt adversarial positions vis-a`-vis mainstream nationalist organizations or they may be co-opted. Social networks of nationalists also form small, extraparliamentary political parties (such as Nacionalistes d’Esquerra or Entesa dels Nacionalistes d’Esquerra), which generally remain outside the mainstream political process. These groups tend to be as concerned about the ethno-symbolism of nationhood as they may be about politics or their right to self-determination, but they play a critical role in how nationalism evolves, as we have seen here, and in several other cases of substate nationhood. In Scotland, for example, the Scottish National Party (SNP) emerged out of the fusion of elements coming from the sphere of sociological nationalism. The Scots

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National League (SNL) was the first organization calling for complete independence. It was founded in 1919 and merged with the Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA) in 1928 to form the National Party of Scotland, which was the immediate forerunner of the contemporary SNP (De Winter 1998: 106). Also, Plaid Cymru in Wales was not able to develop fully as a modern independentist party with parliamentary ambitions until 1962, when several of its members founded the Welsh Language Society to engage in direct action on cultural and language issues. The support provided by this linguistic action group, in turn, enabled Plaid Cymru to establish itself as a modern and mature regionalist party, rather than a cultural movement, and to compete more successfully in the British electoral system (De Winter 1998: 126). My findings also indicate that following the contribution made by social networks of nationalists, eventually a new nucleus of leadership coalesced, which steered the process of founding the new nationalist political currents. A collective study of twelve ethnoregionalist parties (including the Su¨dtiroler Volkspartei and Volksunie) also concluded that leadership was an important factor accounting for the emergence and growth of such parties (more than party organization), especially during the first phase of these parties’ development (De Winter 1998:13, 222). Constitutional moments, social networks of nationalists, and leadership nuclei are the key to explaining how a novel nationalist political orientation emerges and is successfully established in the parliamentary sphere. Temporal variation within national movements, therefore, can be explained if we avoid deterministic accounts of nationalism and instead recognize that nationalism follows a political logic and is embedded in cultural contexts, social networks, and intersubjective relations of reciprocity. In this Part, I have presented an account of how the tripartite structure within the national movements of Que´bec and Catalonia was established in the contemporary period (in 1994 in Que´bec and in 1989 in Catalonia). Since then, these national movements have maintained through 2010 this typical tripartite diversity of political orientations. In the pages that follow, I will center my analysis on the present-day tripartite structure within the national movements in Que´bec and Catalonia and on the discourse of the actual nationalist militants and their leaders, and I will examine their attitudes and beliefs, seeking to explain the political origins of the variation in their positioning. As a threshold issue, I will also seek to delimit the political space occupied by stateless nations’ nationalists

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and to probe the depth of the national consciousness exhibited by substate nationalists. This will lead us to examine the three principal substate nationalist ideologies (independentist, autonomist, and federalist nationalism), each embodying a distinctive vision of sovereignty. In the final Part of the book, I focus on the actual discourse of these nationalists, drawn from the empirical research I did during 2003–2006 on the attitudes and opinions of nationalist militants and leaders. I sought to understand the political roots of the internal differentiation in these national movements. We will seek to understand the reasons for the diverse political orientations adopted by nationalists and national political parties in Que´bec and Catalonia and elsewhere.

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PA R T I I I

Shades of Nationhood: National Consciousness and Substate National Movements

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Chapter 4

Shades of Nationhood and the National Consciousness of Substate Nationalists

National Consciousness, Nationalists, and Nationalism The previous chapters presented an account of the establishment of the tripartite structure within the national movements of Que´bec and Catalonia in the contemporary period (1994 in Que´bec and 1989 in Catalonia). We can now examine the internal heterogeneity of political orientations in substate national movements by looking at the political space occupied by stateless nations’ nationalists. This chapter probes who forms part of substate national movements and why autonomists and federalists, alongside independentists, are the main actors on the stage of substate nationalism. In doing that, I will clarify the dividing line between substate nationalist parties and other types of parties that may more properly be labeled ‘‘regionalist parties,’’ ‘‘antinational parties,’’ or ‘‘majority nation nationalist parties.’’ This will also help us understand the component parts of substate national movements and why such movements are very specific and clearly delimited political phenomena that merit our study and analysis. The bulk of this work is dedicated to the study of the boundaries between the various political orientations within stateless nations’ national movements, but this chapter will be an exploration of the nationalist/nonnationalist boundary and will show why autonomists and federalists, alongside secessionists, are on the ‘‘national’’ side of the boundary. In addition, in this chapter I argue against national consciousness-determinism, that is, the notion that the variation in the political orientation within stateless nations’ national movements can be explained by reference to variations in divergent degrees

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of national consciousness between independentists, autonomists, and federalists. As I noted in Chapter 1, part of the existing literature on secessionism foregrounds the national consciousness thesis that all nationalists would want to align their nation with a state. I will show that this is not the case: Many nationalists opt for nonsecessionism, both in its pro-autonomy and pro-federation varieties. Based on the empirical work I did, I argue that national consciousness is a form of collective self-awareness and identification with a people that is derived from a shared sense of commonality due to the existence of a shared language, culture, history, or institutions. A well-developed national consciousness links that sense of self-awareness with a sense of belonging to a particular territory, usually already inhabited by the community of people in question. A nation exists whenever and wherever a social group has acquired national consciousness. I would argue that a nationalist is a person who exhibits national consciousness and who therefore advocates the existence of her or his nation and engages in efforts to promote the language, history, culture, or political institutions that embody the imagined community at issue. Accordingly, nationalism is the advocacy of the existence of a nation and all the associated efforts to promote its language, culture, history, institutions, and so on. In order to achieve nationalism politicized nationalists engage in political mobilization efforts, and the sum total of these efforts is called nationalist politics. Note that all efforts by nationalists to promote their language, history, culture, or political institutions are efforts to selfdetermine. Of course, the ultimate and most ambitious effort to selfdetermine is the demand for sovereignty, but not all nationalists aim for the ultimate political pinnacle of sovereign statehood. The political mobilization efforts by nationalists can have diverse political/constitutional orientations, and that internal variation is the subject of this book. Before proceeding to examine these diverse orientations in all their complexity, we need to settle a threshold question: Who is a substate nationalist, and, ultimately, how can we delimit the political space occupied by substate national movements? Hence, how do we define the substate national political space, and how do we know what are the component parts of substate national movements? In order to give an adequate response to these questions, rather than relying on a priori definitions, we need to study the nationalists empirically and study the individuals and groups that belong to the political parties that make up the institutionalized component of the substate national movements at issue. Thus, all of the definitions and conceptualizations I will formulate in this chapter will be based on my empirical work.

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Scholars have argued that many people fail to distinguish between the political character of nationalism, and the specific political demands it makes, and the sense of mutual recognition and identity that nationalism can provide (Davidson 2000: 14). The general argument in this book is consonant with this principle. The sense of belonging and the sense of collective identity from which nationalism develops is a sign of national consciousness, and this shared sense of belonging is the prerequisite for the mobilization efforts we call nationalism. Someone can be a nationalist only if he or she has national consciousness. Most minority-nation nationalists, moreover, are active in promoting the language, history, culture, or political institutions that embody their imagined community, even if not all of them see separate statehood as their final goal. The political mobilization efforts by substate nationalists can, indeed, have diverse political/constitutional orientations. Based on the empirical work I did, the following are key elements in the criteria used herein for identifying a substate nationalist: (1) a substate nationalist is one who thinks her people are a nation or (2) one who has a relatively strong national identification with her substate national identity, even if she may also exhibit a dual national identity. In addition, most substate nationalists are engaged in efforts to promote the language, history, culture, or political institutions of the nation. In this book, a substate nationalist is a person who exhibits substate national consciousness and who therefore advocates the existence of her or his substate nation.

Who Is a Substate Nationalist? It is obvious that all independentists are nationalists, but this also needs to be documented empirically, and I will do so for both Que´bec and Catalonia. Moreover, I wish to reveal the extent and depth of the nationalist consciousness of independentists in all its qualitative splendor. In many ways, it is the standard against which other nationalists need to be compared. By exploring the strength and quality of the independentists’ national consciousness, I will be able to contrast it with that of autonomists and federalists. My aim is to show that most substate autonomists and many substate federalists express a clear national consciousness, just as independentists do. With respect to self-identification, in my in-depth interviews and in Part I of my questionnaire, I asked militants (1) whether they considered their substate national society to be a nation, (2) what the characteristics

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were that distinguished their substate national society for them, (3) what the majority nation (i.e., Canada or Spain) was for them, (4) how they identified in terms of their national identification, (5) whether they thought their nation was a political1 or a cultural one,2 and (6) whether they thought national consciousness was well diffused in their stateless society. In another section of the questionnaire, I asked directly whether they considered themselves nationalists and whether they considered their party a nationalist party. I also asked them, in another section of the questionnaire, which institutions, organizations, entities, individuals, and parties were part of the national movement in their society and what were the political parties that were nationalist in their society. Table 4.1 summarizes my findings regarding the national consciousness of the militants of the eight substate national parties examined here. The table reflects only the quantifiable portions of the responses.

Are Independentists Nationalists? Que´bec: The Militants of the Parti Que´be´cois (PQ)3 Affirming Que´bec Is a Nation Ninety-nine percent of PQ militants identified Que´bec as a nation. A few preferred to use the term ‘‘distinct society,’’ a term of art in Que´bec that was used during the Meech Lake Accord process as a terminological proxy for ‘‘nation.’’ Ninety-nine percent also saw the PQ as a nationalist party. Ninety-five percent of respondents identified as Que´be´cois, not Canadian. Three percent identified as more Que´be´cois than Canadian. Two percent identified as French Canadians. Ninety-five percent of respondents identified as nationalists, and 5 percent refused to use that term, preferring to identify themselves only as independentists or sovereigntists. Of those who identified as nationalists, they also identified as sovereigntists or independentists. Practically all of the respondents thought that Que´bec is a political nation, or, in the alternative, they thought that it is both a political and cultural nation or is a cultural nation on the path to becoming a political nation. In this respect, one militant typically stated, ‘‘It is a cultural nation that has a project of political nationhood in construction.’’ Others

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Table 4.1. National Consciousness Among Substate Nationalists: Responses from PQ, ERC, CDC/UDC, ADQ, PSC, PLQ, and IC-V militants (N⳱370)

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Quebec/Catalonia is a nation (or distinct society?) Yes No

PQ % (N⳱77)

ERC % (N⳱40)

99 1

100 —

95

100

3

CDC/UDC % (N⳱88)

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PSC % (N⳱35)

PLQ % (N⳱18)

68 16

88.5 —

78 22

97 3

78.5

15

3

—

32.3

—

16

37.5

42.8

—

38.2 20.5

100 —

ADQ % (N⳱80)

IC-V % (N⳱35)

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National identification Only C/Q More C/Q than Spanish/ Canadian Equally C/Q and Spanish/ Canadian More Spanish/Canadian than C/Q Only Spanish/Canadian Other (French-Canadian)

—

—

—

23.7

42.8

98

— — 2

— — —

— — 21 (also European)

5 2.5 17

8.5

2

Cultural or political nation? Only political Only cultural Political/cultural

93 — 7

92 — 8

29 5.6 60

22.5 53.7 20.5

37 21 28.5

11 66 16

23.5 8 64.7

100 — —

100 — —

68.7 — 22

92 8

66 — 33

87.9 2.9 11.7

Identifies as a nationalist (or catalanist?) Yes No Other

100 — —

8

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specified that with the National Assembly, Que´bec was already a political nation. Regarding the characteristics that define the Que´be´cois nation, the open-ended nature of the questions prompted the militants to provide revealing responses. Although many emphasized language especially, others emphasized culture and history. One summarized it this way: ‘‘Our manner of speaking is unique in the world. If one doesn’t understand this, one cannot comprehend what happens here, our culture, our humor, our belonging to the territory.’’ Yet others stressed the sentiment of belonging to a country (i.e., Que´bec). One defined the Que´bec nation as ‘‘a people of French origin living in the territory of Que´bec and having a distinctive culture.’’ Moreover, several militants expressed that ‘‘ethnic tolerance, the French language, sentiment of belonging to the French fact, progressive culture’’ defined the Que´be´cois nation. This theme was echoed by another who said that the social democratic model of Que´bec, the openness, and the tolerance of the society were what distinguished Que´bec, aside from language and culture, which are always preeminent.

Catalonia: The Militants and Leaders of Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC)4 During the course of my interviews with ERC’s leaders, some made reference to their conception of the nation. Pere Aragone´s, for example, the leader of ERC’s youth wing (JERC) at the time I interviewed him, expressed the following in response to my question about how the nation was defined by Catalans: ‘‘It goes beyond the language and the culture. In ample sense, it is not only culture; it is the way of doing things and an economic mode, a set of values. It is all this ensemble of elements that define what is a nation in other countries as well. A key element here . . . [though] is the language, which is a symbol of our identity.’’5 Affirming Catalonia Is a Nation One hundred percent of the respondents identified Catalonia as a nation. The defining traits of the nation are language, sentiment of belonging, and culture. One representative comment: ‘‘Catalonia is a nation

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because it is a territory where there lives a society sufficiently differentiated in many aspects from other societies of the world. It has its own idiosyncrasy, a culture, a language that gives it personality.’’ Others stressed the role of history. For example, ‘‘even though the concept of nation does not appear until the modern age, it is doubtless that Catalonia possesses all the characteristics to be one; we may consider it to be one of the oldest nations of Europe and recognized as such by all the sovereignties of the time. It should be said also that we can consider it a nation because of its own will to be one, which is manifest in the last 800 years.’’ Along the same line, one wrote, ‘‘Because all along its history it has manifested itself as such, . . . having stopped being one by force, it has been vindicating itself for the last 300 years, with different degrees of intensity. And because even though it lost its own political and juridical structures, it has conserved its differentiating sociological and cultural traits, which indicates that a substrate has remained for these 300 years.’’ Note that a few respondents also emphasized the fact that the nation is not just the principate of Catalonia, but the Paı¨sos Catalans, the pancatalan cultural and linguistic region encompassed by the principate, Northern Catalonia (within present-day France), the territory of Valencia (now one of the seventeen autonomous communities of Spain), and the Balearic islands. All the respondents saw Catalonia as a political nation or a cultural nation on its way to becoming a political one. All the respondents identified as only Catalan, not Spanish. In addition, 45 percent (18) also identified as European or Mediterranean-European. Eighty-three percent of respondents consider themselves nationalists, while the rest preferred to label themselves as independentists or as catalanists. Note that many ERC militants eschew these labels and prefer to call their party a national party that advocates the independence and self-determination of their imagined community.

Summar y: The Independentist Parties The militants of the PQ and ERC are unambiguously nationalist, consonant with their independentist orientation. The militants from these two parties are virtually indistinguishable in their expression of national consciousness.

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Are Autonomists Nationalists? Que´bec: The Militants of Action De´mocratique du Que´bec (ADQ)6 Affirming Que´bec Is a Nation Sixty-eight percent of ADQ militants affirmed that Que´bec is a nation, and 18 percent said it was not one. Another 16 percent stated that Que´bec was a ‘‘distinct society’’ or a ‘‘different society.’’ Thus, a strong majority affirms Que´bec is a nation or a distinct society. Again, the principal distinguishing characteristics of Que´bec are seen as its language, culture, and history. A number of illustrative comments by the militants will be useful. One statement summarizes the tone of most militants: ‘‘This society is distinct because of its language, its culture, and its sentiment of belonging; its language being the most important.’’ As another put it, ‘‘At the base it is a francophone community that has survived within a milieu which is majoritarian anglophone. All the other traits end up following from this difference.’’ One militant noted that ‘‘the culture of Que´bec is the principal difference with the English. To say it this way, we have one and the English have never had one. Perhaps you will find me an extremist, but this is the sad truth: The English originated from the barbaric tribes that colonized Europe through war and massacres at the start of the Middle Ages, and their attitude has remained that of the conqueror. They do not think of culture, only of profits. They do not think of the common good, only of their own person. That is all of their culture. Today, they have been completely assimilated by the USA. I cannot here elaborate further on all the traits of our culture; I would need to write you a novel.’’ One stressed that it was culture above everything, combined with Catholic traditions, and it was, more than anything, a ‘‘vision of the world, very different from the more rigid Anglo-Protestant one.’’ With respect to national identification, the results showed that 15 percent identified as only Que´be´cois, 37.5 percent identified as more Que´be´cois than Canadian, 23.7 percent identified as equally Que´be´cois and Canadian, 5 percent as more Canadian than Que´be´cois, 2.5 percent as Canadian only, 2.5 percent as other (e.g., citizen of the world), and 11 percent as French Canadian, and a few did not respond to the question. A

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majority of ADQ militants (52.5 percent), therefore, have a strong identification with their imagined community, and a portion of them profess to have dual identities. One illustrative comment may help to clarify the latter choice: ‘‘I feel as much Que´be´cois as Canadian. Que´bec is my homeland (patrie) and Canada is my country (pays).’’ Yet, their identification is more moderate, when compared with the independentist parties. However, an overwhelming number of militants (85 percent) identified their party as a nationalist party, while 7.5 percent said it was not one, and the rest did not reply. This was explained by one militant, who wrote, ‘‘All the parties in Que´bec are in some way nationalist given that each individual has a certain love for her nation, without being necessarily sovereigntist. The ADQ is for example a nationalist party. The PLQ shows it a little less, yet it is one.’’ Contrary to the situation with the independentist parties, 53.7 percent said that Que´bec was only a cultural nation, and only 22.5 percent said it was a political nation, while 20 percent wrote that it is both. Moreover, 68.7 percent of militants identified as nationalists, and 22 percent said they were not, and the rest did not respond. In terms of political orientation, 60 percent of militants identified as autonomists, 21 percent as independentists, 11 percent as federalists, 5 percent as both autonomists and independentists, 1 percent as both federalist and autonomist, and the rest did not respond.

Catalonia: The Militants and Leaders of Converge`ncia Democra`tica de Catalunya (CDC)7 CiU is a federation composed of two parties: CDC and UDC (Unio´ Democra`tica de Catalunya). We will first examine the data on the leaders and militants of CDC and then the data on UDC. Carme Vidal was vice-secretary of CDC for welfare, identity, and culture when I interviewed her, and she subsequently became a member of parliament. During the course of my interview with her, she discussed her views on the nation and identity: ‘‘I would never ask a Spaniard not to look out for the interests of her language and culture, etc., but I ask the same for my own language and culture. . . . What I don’t understand is why a Spaniard does not respect my will to be, which can’t be that of a Spaniard because we have a different language, our own imagery as a people, and our culture is different.’’8

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The militants who participated in CDC Focus Group 4 also discussed their view on the nation and identity. One stressed that history, language, and culture gave them the elements of nationhood. Another said that what formed the Catalan nation was the culture, given that they have shared a peculiar history. This also includes everything from their cuisine, theater, and poetry to the way they express themselves and dance. It is true that many other regions of Spain have their peculiarities, but they haven’t had the sentiment of nationhood that Catalans have, said this militant.9

Affirming Catalonia Is a Nation One hundred percent of CDC respondents declared that Catalonia is a nation. Among the traits that defined the Catalan nation are ‘‘defined territory, its own language, civil law, a sentiment of identity. We are Catalans because we have a history.’’ Another wrote, ‘‘We have our own, different history during the last 1,000 years, a government, a spirit of having our own country (pais), the catalan differential fact, and the will to be a country.’’ In the same spirit: ‘‘The common characteristics of history, language, and culture on which is based the catalan national sentiment creates the need to be something more than a mere remnant of a state.’’ All respondents, except one, declared that they identified as Catalan, not Spanish. Twentynine and one-half percent also identified as Europeans. Thirty-six percent expressed that Catalonia is a political nation, while 52 percent said it was both, or a cultural nation on the path to becoming a political nation. Four and one-half percent wrote it was only a cultural nation. One hundred percent of respondents wrote that CDC is a nationalist party. We should remember, in this regard, that 52 percent of ERC militants saw CiU as a nationalist formation, while 62 percent saw it as catalanist. All the militants of CDC identified as nationalists. Only 4.5 percent of the militants identified CDC as an independentist party outright, and only 11 percent identified it as an autonomist formation. Another 20 percent said it is a ‘‘sovereigntist’’ party, and 9 percent stated that the party is most resolutely not independentist but its militants are. Most of the militants, 54.5 percent, wrote in essence that it is a de facto instrumental autonomist party that seeks increasing quotas of sovereignty. One militant explained, ‘‘All nationalist parties have as their ultimate

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objective, whether they declare it openly or not, the freedom for their country.’’ Another wrote that the party ‘‘does not define itself as independentist, but the finality of nationalism is full national sovereignty.’’ So, another expressed, ‘‘it is not an independentist party but it ought to be one.’’ In addition, 9 percent identified as autonomists, 9 percent as sovereigntists, (a very high) 63 percent as independentists, 9 percent as federalists, and 2 percent as confederalists. The militant base of CDC is strongly independentist, even though the party leaders in their declarations and public stances have not been so, at least through 2010. In actual political practice, the party has been strongly nationalist, but it is autonomist in its official stance. This has been the case throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and in general through 2010, albeit by 2010 a sovereigntist turn could be detected in its official declarations.

The View of Independentists In Catalonia, people sometimes use the terms nationalist and catalanist interchangeably. There is a very subtle, fine line between these two positions. Some will say that they are distinct, while others will assert that, in principle, they are the same phenomenon, and that the effort to distinguish between the two is an artifice motivated by electoralist ambitions. There is no ultimate authority to appeal to in order to distinguish between these two terms, nor is there an unambiguous consensus on this matter.10 The majority position seems to be that nationalist indicates a higher degree of commitment to advancing the interests of Catalonia and catalanist indicates a slightly lesser commitment. I asked the militants of the independentist party (ERC) two separate questions: Which are the nationalist parties and which are the catalanist parties in Catalonia? The ERC militants replied as follows, with respect to the catalanist parties: 62 percent (25) thought that CiU was a catalanist formation, 77 percent (31) that ERC was one, 47 percent (19) for IC-V, and 42 percent (17) for the PSC. With respect to the nationalist parties, 52 percent (20) thought CiU was one; 62 percent (25) labeled their own party, ERC, as a nationalist party; and 7 percent (3 each) saw both IC-V and PSC as nationalist parties. Fifteen percent (5) also saw Estat Catala` and other formations from the past as nationalist.

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´ Catalonia: The Militants and Leaders of Unio Democra`tica de Catalunya (UDC)11 Josep Antoni Duran i Lleida is the President of UDC, and with Artur Mas of CDC, part of the top leadership that currently leads CiU. During the course of my interview with him, he explained his party’s views on nation and identity: ‘‘What is a nation? It is a natural community that in our judgment has a language in common, a set of rights in common, and above everything else that has a will to be, and that will to be is configured by persons. For us there is no nation if there aren’t people. Therefore our nationalism is personalist. . . . [Moreover] our nationalism is profoundly cultural. There are national movements in the world that are based on ethnic or religious proposals, [but not ours].’’12

Affirming Catalonia Is a Nation One hundred percent of the UDC militants identified Catalonia as a nation. One explained, ‘‘Catalonia is a nation because there exists a collective conscience of a people, with the will to be and to endure through time, a community of people marked by a series of identity elements such as language, the law, cultural elements in common, the existence of an associative web with enough national consciousness, among others. The sentiment of belonging to a people is a very intimate sentiment; it is the will to be and the feeling of being united with a common project.’’ Another respondent usefully distinguished between region, territory, autonomous community, and nation: ‘‘The term region makes reference to a part of a whole geographically speaking. A territory is a zone without being part of the whole. An autonomous community is an artificial concept created to fit into the mold of the 1978 Constitution, concretely to manifest that the sovereignty belongs to the state. The concept of nation means that the competencies belong to the nation and it is the latter that cedes its competencies and part of its sovereignty to the state. A nation is defined by a concrete territory, a differentiated language, a people, and a will to govern oneself by one’s own means.’’ A further 22.7 percent said their society is a political nation, 68 percent said it is both a political and a cultural nation, and 6.8 percent said it was only a cultural nation. One illustrative statement helps to understand the distinction: ‘‘Catalonia is a political nation that after the near annihilation of its

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political existence after a war and the resulting conquest is reconstructed from its core as a cultural nation, which serves to reaffirm a national consciousness that then helps to feed a political will that since the end of the nineteenth century works for and struggles for . . . the recovery of a lost political identity.’’ Another stressed what many others pointed out: ‘‘Without a doubt the traditions and the language proper of Catalonia are the basic pillar of our existence.’’ With respect to identity, 56.8 percent of respondents identified as only Catalan, 31.8 percent as more Catalan than Spanish, and 11 percent also identified as European. Ninety-one percent of the militants identified the UDC as a nationalist and catalanist formation, while 9 percent said it was catalanist only. Regarding the political orientation of the party, only one respondent wrote outright that it is an independentist party; 22.7 percent wrote it is an autonomist party, always emphasizing its nationalist credentials; 29.5 percent expressed it is a federalist party; 15.9 percent of the militants were of the opinion that it is a sort of unorthodox autonomist party, holding forth an unorthodox form of autonomism and seeking greater quotas of sovereignty as its ultimate objective, even if at present sovereignty is not its priority. This cluster of militants also emphasized it is a party that values and promotes the right to self-determination. A further 15.9 percent of the militants stated it is a confederalist party, 4.5 percent labeled it a ‘‘sovereigntist’’ party, and another 4.5 percent said that only its militants and its youth wing are expressly independentist, while its mainstream supporters and the hierarchy of the party are not. The militants, in their personal capacity, stated that 15.9 percent of them are catalanists, while 83 percent stated they consider themselves nationalists. They expressed a rainbow of orientations in their personal capacity: 22.7 percent stated they were independentists, 31.8 percent wrote they are federalists, 13.6 percent said they are autonomists, 11.3 percent wrote they are confederalists, and 2.2 percent wrote catalanist. The rest (18.4 percent) did not respond. The militant base of UDC has a sizable independentist contingent and another sizeable federalist/confederalist faction, even though the party leaders in their declarations and public stances, and actual political practice, are basically autonomists. However, in its statutes, the party professes confederalist ambitions. Note, however, that the party in actual political practice has been steadfastly nationalist and basically autonomist in its orientation within the CiU federation (until 2010).

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Summary: The Autonomist Parties The militants of the ADQ strongly identified Que´bec as a nation or as a distinct society and their own party as a nationalist party. Compared to the independentist parties, however, they were less inclined to identify their nation as a political nation. Most were inclined to identify strongly with Que´bec, but they were less monolithic than the independentists in their self-identification, given that some were willing to express a dual identity. Still, the number of ADQ militants expressing a strong Que´be´cois identity were a majority. The militant base of the two Catalan parties, CDC and UDC (joined together within CiU), were strongly nationalist in their responses on all the criteria. In essence, their responses are virtually indistinguishable from the independentists’ responses. In fact, many of them identify as unorthodox independentists, even though their federation, in actual political practice, has been autonomist. Even the independentists of ERC and the PQ recognize, in considerable part, that the ADQ and the federation of CiU are nationalist entities. Thus, the autonomist parties of ADQ and CDC/UDC are properly included within a study of these substate nations’ national movements. In addition, I would argue that the difference in terms of national self-identification between autonomists and independentists is negligible or small, and, thus, the difference in political orientation between these nationalists cannot be explained by reference to a simplistic, deterministic argument about the correlation between national consciousness and choice of political orientation. Most autonomists, in sum, are not any less nationalist than most independentists. Their choice of orientation responds to strictly political factors, and there is no mechanistic, deterministic relation between national self-identification and choice of political orientation.

Are Federalists Nationalists? Que´bec: The Militants and Leaders of the Parti Libe´ral du Que´bec (PLQ)13 Benoıˆt Pelletier was the minister responsible for Canadian Intergovernmental Affairs and one of the most prominent members of the PLQ government

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of Premier Jean Charest at the time I interviewed him. In response to one of my questions, he explained, First of all, I think there is no doubt that Que´bec is a nation by itself, and the question is whether the PLQ agrees with that principle, and the answer is yes. We believe Que´bec is a nation. Second, how do we define a nationalist in Que´bec? We define nationalist as someone who agrees with the fact that Que´bec is a nation and who wants the blossoming of that nation. Of course, there are different ways to make that nation blossom. One of the ways is full sovereignty, which is what the PQ is promoting, blossoming through state sovereignty. In our case we are promoting the blossoming of Que´bec as a nation through its adhesion to the Canadian federal system. So, I would describe myself as a federalist nationalist. And the supporters of the PQ would be sovereigntist nationalists. [Being a nationalist] is not pejorative here. It is something that is seen as a very legitimate option. Being a nationalist here is someone who is very sensitive to, I would say, the strengthening of Que´bec as a political entity. . . . Now is the PLQ a nationalist party? I think it is. Is it a party that accepts all the dimensions of Que´bec identity? The answer is yes.14 In another part of the interview he elaborated, ‘‘I, myself, see Que´bec as a society with a single identity. But politically speaking, Que´bec is part of Canada, and then there are some people who consider themselves to be as much Canadians as Que´be´cois. But, culturally speaking, when we refer to identity, when we talk about political structures and allegiances, then of course we should recognize that Que´bec is not a country. First of all, it is part of Canada politically speaking, and many Que´be´cois do, of course, see themselves as Canadian. But in my view, it’s more a form of political allegiance than identity. In terms of identity, in my view, Que´bec is a single identity.’’ Recently, this view was echoed by former Premier Jean Charest of the PLQ, when he was interviewed by a Catalan newspaper on the occasion of a visit to the Catalan Parliament. In response to a question about the current electoral fortunes of ‘‘nationalists’’ in Que´bec, he responded, ‘‘I am a nationalist . . . A prime minister of Que´bec is forcibly a nationalist! But I am also a federalist. I believe profoundly in the participation of Que´bec in

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the larger ensemble of Canada. Que´bec benefits in being a part of Canada’’ (La Vanguardia, 2011: 20). Line Beauchamp was the Minister of Culture and Communications in the PLQ government of Premier Jean Charest when I interviewed her. Although she personally identified as Que´be´cois, she emphasized that one can also have dual identities and identify with being Canadian also. ‘‘I see no contradiction in the identities that a citizen can accumulate. . . . Identities are not mutually exclusive. . . . One can have a loyalty toward Que´bec as well as a loyalty toward Canada.’’15

Affirming Que´bec Is a Nation Sixty-one percent of PLQ respondents wrote that Que´bec is a nation, 16.6 percent wrote it is a distinct society, and 22 percent wrote it is not. The nation is distinguished by language and culture as the two major elements, followed by history, according to the respondents. Furthermore, 66 percent of respondents wrote Que´bec is only a cultural nation, while 11 percent expressed it is a political nation, and 16 percent wrote it is both. One wrote it is neither. All respondents, except one, stated that they identified as equally Que´be´cois and Canadian. One identified as French Canadian. Eighty-eight percent wrote that the PLQ is a nationalist party, and 12 percent thought it was not one. Seventy-seven percent thought that the PLQ is a federalist party, while two respondents thought it is a federalistautonomist party, and one wrote it is a confederalist party. Sixty-six percent considered themselves nationalist and thirty-three percent said the opposite. Eighty-three percent identified as federalists in their political orientation, while two respondents said they were autonomists, and one respondent identified as a confederalist.

Catalonia: The Militants of the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC)16 Affirming Catalonia Is a Nation In response to my questionnaire, 88.5 percent of the militants affirmed that Catalonia is a nation and 11.5 percent said the opposite. Thirty-seven

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percent said it is a political nation, 28.5 percent wrote it is both a political and a cultural nation, 31 percent wrote it is only a cultural nation, and 8.5 percent chose to say it is neither. The nation is said to exist because ‘‘there is a sentiment of ascription to an exclusive territory with unique and special characteristics.’’ The most important characteristic is thought to be ‘‘language. National sentiment passes in the first place through language and after through culture and sentiment.’’ Another wrote that the Catalan nation is defined by ‘‘language, history, and culture. But the most important of all is the need and will to define its own future through its own government.’’ For many, as one wrote, it is a political nation, given that ‘‘there is national consciousness which exists because of the Catalan differential fact.’’ With respect to identity, 42.8 percent of respondents wrote they identified as more Catalan than Spanish, 42.8 percent identified as equally Catalan and Spanish, 5.2 percent expressed they had dual identities but had no ordinal preference, 8.5 percent wrote they were more Spanish than Catalan, and 17 percent also identified as European. Seventy-four percent of the respondents expressed that the PSC is a catalanist party, while 20 percent wrote it is a catalanist-nationalist party. One wrote it is a nationalist party, and one simply wrote it is a party that respects Catalonia. All the respondents identified the PSC as a federalist party. Sixty-eight and one-half percent of the respondents identified as catalanist, while 11.4 percent identified as catalanist-nationalist and 5.2 percent as nationalist only. Eight percent did not identify as catalanist or nationalist. All the respondents (except one) identified as federalists. One identified as an autonomist.

Catalonia: The Militants and Leaders of Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (IC-V)17 Jaume Bosch, the vice-president of IC-V, explained the nature of his party as follows: We define ourselves as a national party, which is a meaningful selfdefinition. Within IC-V there are militants that define themselves as nationalists, even as independentists, and there are others that are federalists. We, as a party, have elected to call ourselves a ‘‘national party’’ because Catalonia is a nation and we are a sovereign party.

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We define ourselves as catalanists, and with respect to nationalism, we don’t reject it. After all, one of our founding organizations was Entesa [an independentist formation]. . . . CiU has overused the theme of nationalism, and we believe it is better to define ourselves as a national party. In colloquial terms, to define ourselves as nationalists does not make us uncomfortable, but we believe the term ‘‘national party’’ describes us better.18

Affirming Catalonia Is a Nation Ninety-seven percent of respondents expressed that Catalonia is a nation, 64.7 percent wrote that it is both a cultural and political nation, 23.5 percent said it is a political nation, and 8 percent wrote it is just a cultural nation. With respect to identity, 32.3 percent wrote they identified as Catalan only, 38.2 percent wrote they identified as more Catalan than Spanish, 20.5 percent wrote they identified as equally Spanish and Catalan, and 8 percent wrote ‘‘other.’’ The nation exists for them, they wrote, because it ‘‘has its own culture based in the Catalan language and a common history as a people. These paradigms constitute a common symbolic imaginary, Catalonia as an imagined community of shared values.’’ Another explained, ‘‘Because it has always been an independent territory until the invasion of the troops of Philip V in the eighteenth century, and since then, we have been in invasion after invasion. And in spite of the secular intentions of annexation, the will of the half or more of Catalans that see things differently has never been taken into consideration, as we can see actually. I think Catalonia and Spain are two different peoples that could coexist within a confederation, but these are two very different identities.’’ Of the respondents, 20.5 percent wrote that IC-V is a nationalist party, 35.2 percent believe it is a nationalist-catalanist party, 38.2 percent wrote it is a catalanist party, and 8.8 percent that it is a national party. One militant explained, ‘‘IC-V is a nationalist and catalanist party. What happens is that the word nationalist has contradictory resonances with the fact of being left-wing. . . . IC-V is a catalanist party that defends Catalan culture and its differential value, in a framework of integration, dialogue, and tolerance that poses above everything class consciousness and the search for a more just and egalitarian world.’’ Ninety-four percent of respondents wrote it is

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a federalist party (emphasizing the asymmetry of the federalism that is sought), and the rest said ‘‘other.’’ With respect to identity, 17.6 percent of the militants stated they were nationalists, 26.4 percent were nationalist/ catalanist, 44 percent were catalanist, 2.9 percent nonnationalist, and 11.7 percent other. Of the respondents, 73.5 percent identified as federalist, 2.9 percent as autonomists, 2.9 percent as independentists, and 11.7 percent as confederalists. Many respondents emphasized the plurinational and asymmetric nature of the federalism they advocate. As one wrote, ‘‘It is a model of coexistence useful for advancing the recognition of the plurinational character of the Spanish state and the right to self-determination.’’

Summary: The Federalist Parties The militants of the PSC and IC-V overwhelmingly identified their society as a nation and their parties as catalanist-nationalist formations. The IC-V militants strongly identified with Catalonia, and the PSC ones slightly less so. Of all the party militants examined in this chapter, the PLQ militants expressed the weakest national identification with Que´bec, even though an overwhelming number of them identified their society as a nation or a distinct society and their own party as a nationalist party. Still, even in the case of the PLQ, I would argue it is properly included in this study, for the reasons I outline below and in the next chapter. Moreover, I am quite certain that the other federalist parties in this study, the PSC and IC-V, are nationalist parties, with the majority of the militants in those parties strongly identifying as nationalist/catalanist. With respect to my argument against the national consciousness thesis, the responses of the majority of IC-V militants show that federalists can have a strong sense of minority nation national identification, which is not significantly different from the national consciousness expressed by the militants in the substate autonomist and independentist parties.

Conclusion: The Inadequacy of the National Consciousness Thesis Substate independentists, autonomists, and federalists all have a strong sense of substate national consciousness.

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Substate Independentists and Their National Consciousness The militants of the PQ and ERC are strongly nationalist in their discourse. As Table 4.1 shows, the militants of the PQ and ERC are unambiguously nationalist, consonant with their independentist orientation. The militants from these two parties are virtually indistinguishable in their degree of national consciousness.

Substate Autonomists and their National Consciousness The autonomist parties of Catalonia, CDC and UDC, have a militant base that is clearly strongly nationalist. They express a high level of national consciousness, and their parties are properly included within the confines of this study. The same is true, for the most part, with respect to the ADQ, when compared to the PQ or ERC. ADQ militants also rank high in affirming Que´bec is a nation, and most of them seem to identify strongly with Que´bec and identify their own party as a nationalist one, even if they are less monolithic in their national identification with Que´bec. I feel comfortable in concluding that a substantial number of ADQ militants are nationalists, and thus, their party has been properly included in this study of substate national movements. The difference in national consciousness between autonomist and independentist militants is negligible or small. Most autonomist militants, in sum, are not any less nationalist than independentists.

Substate Federalists and Their National Consciousness With respect to the federalist parties, the PLQ has a militant base that overwhelmingly identifies Que´bec as a nation or a distinct society. Yet, we found that 66 percent of them wrote that Que´bec is only a cultural nation, and their substate national identification with Que´bec is less monolithic than what we observed in the case of the independentist and autonomist militants. They are properly included in this study because they show a clear substate national consciousness. In addition, as we will see in the next chapter, the party itself and its leadership, from the Jean Lesage years to the recent leadership of Charest-Pelletier, has inserted itself into the arena of

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national politics in Que´bec. It has articulated a discourse and an official party line that is most definitely national in its tone and character. Thus, parties and their leadership are important in shaping nationalist discourse and debate. A mainstream federalist party like the PLQ is properly included in this study, even if its militants’ substate national identification with Que´bec is less monolithic than what we observed in the case of the independentist and autonomist militants. I will dedicate the next chapter to studying the parties and their leadership, precisely in order to understand how it is that their discourse and practice may be assertively national (as is the case with mainstream federalist parties), even if their militant base is less so. In relation to the PSC, a majority (69 percent) sees Catalonia as a political nation, showing a relatively high level of national consciousness. Close to 86 percent identified in a fairly strong manner with Catalonia, in terms of their national identification. I would argue the PSC and its militants, with their catalanist (a form of moderate nationalism) federalist discourse, are properly included in this study. Regarding the IC-V, the militants showed a strong identification with Catalonia as a political nation, and thus a high level of national consciousness, as well as a relatively strong identification with the nation. Moreover, most militants of traditional federalist parties (PSC and PLQ) have the discourse and attitudes that are typical of militants of ‘‘national parties,’’ even if some of them express dual national identities and are less monolithic in their national identification with their substate society. It would seem, therefore, that both the PSC and IC-V are, indeed, substate national parties. Finally, the evidence shows that the difference in political orientation between the militants of these parties cannot be explained by reference to the national consciousness thesis. Most autonomist militants, in sum, are not any less nationalist than most independentist militants. The same is true for a federalist formation like the IC-V vis-a`-vis independentists or autonomists. As I argued in Part I, the theorists in the culturalist paradigm of secessionism argue that the driving force for separatism is to be found in the innate human tendency to identify with one’s national or ethnic group, which is presumed to lead to the formation of a pro-separatism orientation. These theorists, who have contributed to the secessionism literature, see the formation of national consciousness as the key development that will lead to the emergence of an independentist orientation.

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In this chapter, I have shown that national consciousness arguments cannot account for the internal variation in substate national movements. Our examination of the attitudes and discourse of independentists, autonomists, and federalists has demonstrated that their choice of political/constitutional orientation responds to other considerations, and there is no mechanistic, deterministic relation between the level of national consciousness among these substate nationalist militants and their choice of political orientation. In sum, a constant (widely held substate national consciousness among substate nationalists) cannot explain the puzzle of the internal variation in national movements.

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Chapter 5

Elites, Militants, and Ideology: National Parties and National Consciousness

It has already been shown that a general sentiment of indifference towards the management of its own affairs is natural to the crowd, even when organized to form political parties. —Robert Michels (1962: 105)

The previous chapter explored the question of who is a nationalist in order to delimit the political space occupied by substate national movements. It focused on the militants and leaders of national parties and, referring to their attitudes and opinions, showed the inadequacy of the national consciousness thesis and developed instead an argument about how one can set the boundaries of minority nations’ national movements. This chapter shifts the focus to the political parties themselves—and their institutional positioning. My aim is to show how parties and their leadership, building on their militant base, shape nationalist ideological discourse and actual practice. I will show that the national parties at issue here are all ‘‘national parties,’’ forming part of the institutional component of the national movements of their substate national societies. Thus, the principal objective of this chapter is to examine how national parties as institutions insert themselves into the nationalist political space. I will also show that the ideology, discourse, and actual political practice of national political parties and their top leadership may have a hegemonic influence in the national movement, at times overpowering the influence of these parties’ militant base. While examining autonomist and independentist parties, I am also interested in

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understanding especially the federalist parties, and I will demonstrate they have articulated a discourse and an official party line that is most definitely national in its tone and character. Thus, because national parties and their leadership are very effective in shaping nationalist discourse and debate, I will show that in the case of mainstream federalist parties such as the PLQ in Que´bec, their discourse and practice is assertively national, which reinforces and strengthens the ‘‘national’’ animus of its militant base. We may recall from the last chapter that the hard-core militant base of a traditional federalist party such as the PLQ in Que´bec was found to be less monolithic in its national consciousness, when compared to autonomist and independentist militants, albeit clearly showing a high level of substate national consciousness.

The National Question and National Political Parties Three varieties of nationness may be distinguished. ‘‘Nationness’’ as a cultural referent may be defined as the belief in the existence of a cultural nation, that is, one presenting the distinctive traits of a people, like customs, language, or culture. Nationness as a statist referent may be defined as the group of persons bound by a common citizenship to a state: This is the juridical nation recognized by law. By contrast, the political nation is a subjective condition and is formed by an act of willful attachment to a human community. It is driven by a sentiment of belonging and solidarity with an imagined community, which coalesces into a collective consciousness of nationhood. The political nation, moreover, is plural in its political projection: It can encompass within its boundaries various national political projects (Caminal 1998: 48; Bariteau et al. 2002: 131). In the political party systems of stateless nations, the parties that assume the identity of the political nation, and promote its interests, are ‘‘national political parties.’’ These are the parties that are principally active within the territorial limits of the nation, although some may also have links with a larger federation of parties.1 In a certain sense, these are ‘‘nationalist parties’’ because they incorporate into their ideological program the defense of the putative nation, although possibly not in the strict sense of the term as it is commonly used (Caminal 1998: 49). Also, the constellation of national parties generally expresses the plurality of national political projects. They can have different conceptions of the proper response to the national question, from

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independentism to political autonomy to federation. Therefore, according to Caminal, a national party can be autonomist, federalist, or independentist in its political orientation (48).2 Both the top-level leadership of these national political parties and their hard-core militants have an influence on the party discourse and ideology. But, I argue that the discourse and actual political practice of the national political parties and the top-level leadership of these parties may, at times, be hegemonic within a national movement, and these orientations that are set at the top often overpower the influence of these parties’ grassroots militant base. So, how then can we explain the divergence within some national parties, that is, the fact that sometimes the leadership of these parties is able to shape the parties’ discourse to suit its political orientation, even though the militant base would not be fully representative in its attitudes and discourse of the orientation given to these parties by their leadership? To explain this divergence, I will draw on the work of one of the classics of political sociology: Robert Michels and his early work on the role of leadership and the ‘‘oligarchic tendencies’’ within political parties. Although Michels never attained the stature of his contemporaries, such as Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), Max Weber (1864–1920), E´mile Durkheim (1858–1917), or Georg Simmel (1858–1918), his work analyzed the ‘‘oligarchic tendencies’’ in group life, which is an important issue in many fields, and thus it has been regarded as a classic of modern social science. In 1911, Michels presented in his Political Parties what has come to be recognized as the major argument against Rousseau’s conception of direct popular democracy. Large-scale organizations, such as major political parties, are affected by the same phenomenon that affects contemporary democratic society: Whenever large institutions are created—such as trade unions, nation states, churches, or political parties—one finds that effective power is eventually turned over to the few who are at the helm of these institutions. In such complex institutions, according to the Michelsian argument, we find that ‘‘oligarchy, the control of a society or an organization by those at the top, is an intrinsic part of bureaucracy or large-scale organization’’ (Michels 1962: 15). Michels’ provocative theory about the incompatibility of democracy and large-scale social organization was based on his examination of the socialist parties in Germany and elsewhere in Europe (particularly in Italy

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and France), which were at the time the most committed to democratization. He did extensive empirical work on the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), which was at the time the largest socialist party in the world. Although originally formulated with a focus on the German SPD, Michels’ work poses a framework for understanding how elites generally prevail over rank-and-file members, not only in political parties but in all forms of large-scale organizations in liberal democracies. Michels’ theory ‘‘is to be understood as the work of someone who had passed over from revolutionary Marxism into the camp of elite theory; more precisely, it is a work which takes as its starting point a problem posed within a revolutionary tradition and proceeds to answer it from within a quite different theoretical framework. We could say that it offers a Right-wing answer to a Left-wing question’’ (Beetham 1981: 81; Beetham 1977). The question posed by Michels, then, originated within a Marxist tradition but was answered in the terms of elite theory (Beetham 1981: 81). Addressing the question of why elites prevail over the masses in political parties (and other organizations), Michels’ theory brought together three elements of elite theory: social biology from England (though by the turn of the century it was fairly widespread); social psychology from France and Italy; the theory of bureaucracy from Germany. Michels was responsible for bringing them together, and combining them with the specifically Italian tradition of political realism dating back to Machiavelli, which he inherited from Mosca. Where, as revolutionary, Michels’ multinational background had enabled him to interpret the experience of the socialist movement in different countries to one another, now, as elite theorist, it enabled him to combine a variety of intellectual traditions into a many-layered theory of power. (Beetham 1981: 84) According to the Michelsian view, party leaders ‘‘prevail over their members, despite the formal mechanisms of control, for a combination of reasons: because they are naturally more able and determined; because they develop expertise over time; because they appear indispensable; because of a variety of advantages available through control of the party organization; because they know how to direct the faithful when assembled en masse’’ (Beetham 1981: 86–87; Linz 2006: 48). Leaders possess many resources that

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give them an enormous advantage over rank-and-file members who may want to influence party policies. Among their advantages are ‘‘(a) superior knowledge, e.g., they are privy to much information which can be used to secure assent for their programme; (b) control over the formal means of communication with the membership . . . as full time salaried officials, they may travel from place to place presenting their case at the organization’s expense, and their position enables them to command an audience; and (c) skill in the art of politics, e.g., they are far more adept than nonprofessionals in making speeches, writing articles, and organizing group activities’’ (Michels 1962: 16). To this one can add the incompetence of the rank and file. ‘‘Any effort to sustain membership influence requires, among other things, that the members be involved in the activities of the organization, participating in meetings and being aware of and concerned with the major problems affecting the life of the movement. In actuality, however, relatively few members attend party . . . meetings. The pulls of work, family . . . , and the like severely limit the amount of actual time and . . . energy which the average person may invest in membership groups’’ (Michels 1962: 17). In addition, leaders themselves consolidate their ability to hegemonize the discourse within their political parties through a number of mechanisms. Notice that Michels ‘‘had no time for the crude hypothesis that leaders from the start seek their own personal advantage. On the contrary, they are distinguished ‘by a clearer vision, a profounder sentiment, and by a more ardent desire for the general good’ ’’ (Beetham 1981: 87). Among other factors, the internal structural needs of the organization and its maintenance come to impose their own logic on party goals, and the leadership is typically well-positioned to fulfill those needs. In contemporary terminology, the Michelsian view is that large-scale organizations develop ruling elites, and the preferences of the ruling elite tend to prevail over the preferences of the rank and file in such organizations (Linz 2006: 38). Before proceeding, it should be noted that one perspective that is reflected in recent research on the Michelsian thesis has concluded (citing Giovanni Sartori) that ‘‘Michels’ law by and large still holds, if only as a ‘bronze law’ ’’ (Teorell 1999: 376). Recent work on seven main Norwegian political parties, for example, noted that ‘‘taking low participation within parties as an indicator of oligarchy, the [rank-and-file] members appear to be marginalized’’ and that ‘‘declining membership, inactivity within the organizations and anti-party sentiments among the voters threaten the

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legitimacy of the parties and their policies’’ (Saglie and Heidar 2004: 388, 402; Rahat, Hazan, and Katz 2008: 676). Yet, other recent empirical studies have been less supportive of the Michelsian thesis. Tan (1998: 196), for example, found that ‘‘the empirical findings in this study support Michels’ proposition that intraparty participation suffers in large parties. The supposed impact of organizational complexity (resulting from large membership size) on centralization of power, on the other hand, is not supported.’’ Indeed, another view that is represented in recent empirical studies is that Michels may have overstated his case. Thus, when it comes to the selection of party leaders, in many Western democracies, ‘‘while not nearly universal, there is clear evidence of an ongoing shift in authority away from the parliamentary party towards grassroots members’’ and ‘‘the trend is away from selection by a small group of party elites towards empowerment of a party’s rank-and-file members’’ (Cross and Blais 2012: 128, 145). Also, recent ‘‘findings suggest that while it often accompanies larger polities and groups, organizational complexity actually may facilitate political participation’’ (Weldon 2006: 470). Moreover, within contemporary parties, and especially ‘‘new politics’’ parties (such as Green parties), there are increasingly decentralized party structures in which grassroots party members defy established patterns and are ‘‘elitechallenging’’ (Rohrschneider 1994: 211). Thus, ‘‘we can no longer assume that members simplemindedly follow leaders and that leaders selfishly disregard ordinary members’ interests. . . . [P]arties may begin to function on the basis of a soft law of democracy: functional hierarchics continue to exist, but this organizational necessity increasingly coincides with a predisposition to maximize the influence of the local party constituency’’ (Rohrschneider 1994: 229). In fact, among ‘‘new politics’’ parties, certain parties may be organized as plebiscitarian parties, in which grassroots members may have more space for expressing their views vis-a`-vis established party structures, especially in the election of party leaders and determination of party policy and direction (Young and Cross 2002: 678). Among the principal parties studied in this book, the main exemplar is ERC. Michels’ perspective provides an important analytical angle for explaining patterns that we observe in national parties.3 For example, because federalist national parties and their leadership are very effective in shaping nationalist discourse and debate, their discourse and actual political praxis may be emphatically national, even if their grassroots militant base is less

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monolithic in its national self-identification than those of autonomist or independentist parties. How, then, can one proceed to study national political parties? I am interested in the ideology, discourse, and the actual political practice of national parties. Examining the pertinent primary documents of these parties can afford us a view of the parties’ actual ideological trajectory. Primary documents include official reports, the official declarations and statements, the party documents produced by their National Congresses and other official party meetings, the party programs prepared for all elections for their respective national parliamentary bodies, and any other official party platforms. In the pages that follow, I will refer to the national parties’ own documents and to the statements by the parties’ leadership, in order to present a portrait of each of these national parties’ discourse on the nation and national identity. Given the notable intersubjectivity of nationality claims, I will subdivide my discussion into two parts: the parties’ stance on affirming the existence and identity of their imagined community and the parties’ views on the nature of the majority nation with which they share the same state. I have accumulated a great quantity of primary documents pertaining to each party, and I shall strive to offer a comprehensive account of their ideological evolution in recent times.

Independentist National Parties and Their Discourse on National Identity Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) Affirming Catalonia Is a Nation In the case of ERC, I collected all the key documents from each of its National Congresses between 1979 and 2004, which will constitute the bulk of my documentary evidence on this party. At its Extraordinary Congress held on December 16, 1979 and January 20, 1980, ERC produced its first ideological declaration after General Franco’s death and the transition to democracy. This document affirmed that the party’s basic principles approved in June 1931 continued to be timely, in spite of the passage of

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half a century. The ideological declaration of 1979–1980 updated the 1931 principles, adapting them to the new conditions. The declaration included a statement on the ‘‘Catalan Nation’’: ‘‘The national personality of Catalonia, made evident by its linguistic, cultural, historic, geographic, economic realities, and, especially, the indestructible will of Catalans, reiterated through the centuries, make our right to self-determination and full sovereignty non-negotiable’’ (ERC 1980). At the Thirteenth Party Congress of June 18–19, 1983, the party produced a document titled ‘‘Giving a New Impulse to the Catalan Left’’ for the Working Group for the Strategy Position Statement. Therein the party emphasized the historic existence of two types of catalanism, one being the conservative current of CiU and the other the more socially progressive tendency represented by ERC. ‘‘This is the line of Pi i Margall/Almirall/ Roca i Farreres, of a federalist and socializing character. It is this catalanism, precisely, that has, between the 1920s and 1930s, linked up with the labor movement to build a nationalist and popular left, the expression of which is ERC. We must emphasize that it was the catalanism of the left that formulated the concept of the Catalan nation before conservative catalanism did so, theorizing about the rights of peoples and, specifically, of the right to self-determination’’ (ERC 1983: 1). At the Fourteenth National Congress, held on January 19, 1985, the party prepared a document on the ‘‘Defense of the Catalan Identity.’’ Therein, the Paı¨sos Catalans are defined as a nation, as a ‘‘community having a territory, historic origin, customs, culture, and the variants of a language, even if there are minor differences in the customs held in common. We also have a conscience of this community, and a will to affirm it and demand that it be respected. Now, the degree of development of the various political elements, conscience and will, is very different in the diverse territories that compose the Paı¨sos Catalans: Catalonia of the North and South, Andorra, Valencia, the Balearic Islands, and the Pitusses’’ (ERC 1985b). During my interview with Bernat Joan, he made reference to the notion of Paı¨sos Catalans. He was, at the time, a member of the European Parliament for ERC and a professor of Catalan language and literature. Bernat Joan was born and raised in Eivissa, one of the Balearic Islands, and he mentioned there is a weak form of popular awareness of the commonalities between the Paı¨sos Catalans (including the islands, Valencia, Catalonia, and the Catalan speaking territories on the French side of the border), although this awareness has not been expressed intellectually and internalized as

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such. He believes there is a vague perception that in spite of the plurality of accents and the many localisms/regionalisms, those who have the vehicle of the Catalan language in common in the Paı¨sos Catalans share a common cultural project, even if this is not expressed politically. But it is a socially constructed reality waiting to find a vehicle of political expression.4 The Sixteenth National Congress, held on November 18–19, 1989, was a turning point for ERC: At that congress, the party opted for a clear independentist political orientation. The ‘‘Ideological Position Statement’’ of that congress states that the ‘‘extent of the Catalan nation is without a doubt the Paı¨sos Catalans and our final objective shall be the liberation of the whole nation’’ (ERC 1989: 30). ERC believes the national identity of its country has been weakened and asserts it must prioritize redressing this situation. To that end, it seeks to promote all that identifies the Catalan nation and reinforces its national unity. ‘‘First of all, language, but also our history, and all our social, cultural, political, and economic characteristic traits, and in general all that makes us a people, different from our neighbors.’’ In the ‘‘Position Statement’’ of the commission for the working group on national issues for the same congress, the party stresses again: ‘‘for a national party like ERC, the reunification of the Paı¨sos Catalans constitutes the fundamental objective and culmination of the construction of the Catalan nation’’ (6). The national identification of ERC is also influenced by another one of its ideological pillars: its emphasis on promoting a socially progressive project. Thus, for example, in its current ‘‘Ideological Declaration,’’ approved at the Nineteenth National Congress in 1993, the party clarifies that ‘‘the advance of national rights and the unity of the Catalan Nation must go accompanied by the achievement of similar levels of well-being for the majority of the population. The promotion of national solidarity with the least-favored sectors is one of the premises of the national project’’ (ERC 1993: 14).

The Nature of Spain At the Fourteenth National Congress, held on January 19, 1985, the party prepared a document on the ‘‘Defense of the Catalan Identity.’’ Therein, the party states: ‘‘Spain is not a nation, but a state, the instrument

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of domination of the Castilian nation against the oppressed nations: Galicia, the part of the Basque and Catalan nations within its borders, and the Canary Islands, etc.’’ (ERC 1985b). At the Twenty-first National Congress, held on November 23–24, 1996, the party’s ‘‘Position Statement on Strategy’’ let it be known that the party does not recognize the sovereignty of the Spanish Parliament over the Paı¨sos Catalans (ERC 1996: 18). It should be noted that ERC’s national positioning vis-a`-vis the Spanish state is influenced by another of its vertebrating principles: its Republicanism. The Spanish monarchy is seen as a backward, undemocratic element superimposed on the Spanish state. The document states, ‘‘The Borbonic monarchy was constitutionally assumed in 1978, after its implantation by Franco in 1946, and presides over the Spanish political edifice and connotes it symbolically. The parliamentary monarchy reestablished as a counterpart for the democratic liberties attained with the end of Francoism form part of the pact signed in 1977– 1979 between a segment of the democratic forces and late Francoism. This original sin is conditioning the low level of the democracy we enjoy. We live in a low-level democracy, which is reflected in the contradictory Spanish Constitution’’ (4). Along the same lines, the Twenty-second National Congress, held on July 4–5, 1998, published a ‘‘Political Position Statement,’’ which expressed the following: ‘‘The strengthening of the Spanish state, under the influence of a monarchic regime, is a fact. From the point of view of the construction of a plurinational state, the perpetuation of the monarchy installed by Francoism is an insuperable ballast. The king of Spain is a fundamental pillar of the Spanish state. The monarchy, as a regime of government, also implicates a centralist state’’ (ERC 1998: 19).

Parti Que´be´cois (PQ) Affirming Que´bec Is a Nation I also collected many of the key documents for all the PQ National Congresses from 1968 to 2005 and many of the reports and declarations that constitute milestones in the ideological history of the party. The first official ‘‘Program’’ of the PQ was adopted at the foundational congress held on October 11–14, 1968. The first few editions of the party program had a prominent section on ‘‘our cultural life.’’ Therein, pride of place was given

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to the language issue: ‘‘Language is the primary element of identity, the foundation and the expression of the culture of a nation. We must give ourselves the cultural, economic, and social conditions that will give our language the status it deserves. Que´bec will become the country of a French-speaking people’’ (PQ 1969: 7). Early on, the party saw the promotion and protection of the nation as a central task. ‘‘Four centuries of common history have made the Que´be´cois a nation. The Que´be´cois possess a clear will to live together and to preserve their own culture. Our existence as a distinct nation cannot be assured until we master completely the levers of our political life’’ (PQ 1975: 5). A sense of relative deprivation seems to have had an impact on the party’s programmatic statements: ‘‘Within a normal country, businesses use the language of the majority and the immigrants slowly integrate naturally into the majority linguistic group, which occupies the larger part of the positions of authority. In Que´bec, the situation is the opposite, resembling a colonized country: the francophones, with equal qualifications, disproportionately hold the lower paying occupations’’ (19). The opening statement on the ‘‘nation’’ undergoes some minor changes in subsequent versions of the party program. The 1982 ‘‘Program’’ states, ‘‘We are the Que´be´cois. The Que´be´cois have always perceived themselves as a distinct nation in North America. Also, the fundamental objective of the PQ is to steer the Que´be´cois people toward its full and plain sovereignty. . . . This is the only way of becoming fully adult and autonomous as a people and to fashion for ourselves the society we want to live in. Between the definitive threat facing Que´bec as a minority within Canada and sovereignty, there is no in-between point’’ (PQ 1982: 3). The ‘‘Program’’ adopted at the Tenth National Congress, held on June 12–14, 1987, declared that ‘‘Our political action is founded on the fact that there exists in North America, over a territory clearly identified, a distinct people: the Que´be´cois people’’ (PQ 1987: 2). Furthermore, it specifies, ‘‘the French character of the Que´be´cois society constitutes the foundation stone of our cultural specificity. Que´be´cois culture, influenced by the indigenous culture, has developed at the confluence between two great currents of Western civilization, that of Europe and the Americas. To remain distinct and dynamic, our culture must remain open to the numerous contributions that form part of its daily reality’’ (17). The role of history weighs heavily. ‘‘Canadians of the seventeenth century, French Canadians of the nineteenth century, and now Que´be´cois,

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rarely has one seen a people search for so long for its identity, and, hence, assume it with such intensity, once found. . . . This people was born in America and considers itself of America’’ (PQ 1989: 3).

The Nature of Canada The ‘‘Program’’ adopted by the PQ at its Ninth National Congress on June 8–10, 1984, states, ‘‘Because the federal Canadian regime, which everyday is more and more centralizing, has proved that it will discourage . . . [Que´bec’s] blossoming and that it cannot renew itself without further hindering our future’’ (PQ 1984: 4). In addition, ‘‘Canada is not the ideal federal state in which ten provinces act in autonomous fashion within the domain of their competence and trust in their general government the management of common responsibilities. This federal government is nothing but a fiction. . . . English Canada looks toward Ottawa, while the Que´be´cois look toward their national capital, Que´bec’’ (PQ 1989: 4). For the PQ, the federal government is an obstacle to Que´bec’s development and flourishing. ‘‘With its limited powers as a federated province, Que´bec has also developed its economy and its culture. However, its capacity to act is constantly disputed by the federal government’’ (PQ 1996: 2).

Autonomist National Parties and Their Discourse on National Identity Converge`ncia Democra`tica de Catalunya (CDC) Affirming Catalonia Is a Nation At the foundational Assembly of CDC, held in November 1974, a communique´ was published as follows: ‘‘All the persons who live and work in Catalonia and who integrate the Catalan community have certain national necessities that can only be satisfied by a political order that recognizes the Catalan national reality. This order is predicated on the self-government of Catalonia, starting with, as a minimum, the rights recognized by the Statute of Autonomy of the Generalitat’’ (CDC 1974: 2). The Second General Assembly of the fledgling party was held in November 1975, and it declared

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that ‘‘Catalonia, with the rest of the nationalities of the Spanish state, has the right to enjoy its own political autonomy, federated in the ensemble of the state’’ (CDC 1975). In the early years of the post-General Franco transition, the resolution of the national question, for CDC, was intertwined with the quest for democracy. Accordingly, in the Declaration of the party’s Third General Assembly of March 28, 1976, the party declared, ‘‘For us Catalans, there is no democracy but that which is produced within the framework of the recognition of the Catalan national reality, which should be translated into the reestablishment of the Statute of the Generalitat of Catalonia as a first step in the free exercise of the right to self-determination of all the peoples of the Spanish state’’ (CDC 1976). By the time of its Fourth Congress of January 15–16, 1977, CDC’s nationalist credentials figured more prominently in its ‘‘Economic and Social Program’’: CDC defines itself as a Catalan nationalist party, before everything. CDC . . . does not want to monopolize its patent on Catalan nationalism, but it must be clear that CDC makes the political recognition of the personality of the Catalan people the primordial, basic point of its program. . . . CDC . . . is not a classist party, and instead has the will to become the catalytic agent, the unifying force, the pal de paller of the ample majority of our people. CDC is a nationalist party because it believes that as Catalans we have a national reality that has not yet been able to reach some of its fundamental objectives, nor has it been able to affirm itself plainly—concretely we have not obtained the political and economic recognition of our people—and yet instead we have succeed in saving and consolidating our nationality’’ (CDC 1977). These foundational commitments led CDC, in 1977, to demand the following in its program: ‘‘the full recognition of the national personality of Catalonia; the establishment of our own organs of government and legislation, commencing with the reestablishment of the Generalitat, pursuant to what was provided in the 1932 Statute; official status for Catalan at all levels of public life; teaching in, and of, Catalan, in all schools’’ (CDC 1977: 5). By the Fifth Party Congress of April 15–16, 1978, the ‘‘Programmatic Declaration’’ of the party was positing the primacy of its nationalism: ‘‘We

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are a nationalist party; a party that makes the defense of the national framework of Catalonia the basic affirmation of its political option. That means that for us, the Catalan national reality conditions everything, impregnates everything, and, in one word, gives meaning to all our action as a party. . . . What is certain is that ours is a defensive nationalism, against aggression and oppression, to affirm and maintain the identity of a people. Our nationalism is not a theoretical product nor a transitory attitude. . . . Ours is a globalizing nationalism: we address ourselves to all the society, and we wish to solve the problems of all the society’’ (CDC 1978: 5). Moreover, in this document, Joan Colomines compares CDC with the other ‘‘important nationalist parties of the world,’’ including Plaid Cymru, the Scottish National Party, Volksunie, and the Parti Que´be´cois (22). Yet, CDC has been officially a nonindependentist national party, through 2010. As one of the participants in CDC Focus Group 1 stated, ‘‘I think we have been adjusting our language due to the times we have lived. . . . During the twenty-three years [of CiU’s government] . . . we have had to negotiate constantly with Spain. . . . Given our recent history, we did not want to risk a feud. We have had to adjust our language, and thus we have not mentioned the word ‘independence.’ But, not because we did not believe in it, simply because we have had to find another way of establishing a dialogue.’’5 Given these nationalist foundational commitments, establishing a consonant cultural policy was essential for the party. Thus, at its Sixth Congress of January 30–31, 1981, the party proposed a ‘‘Cultural Policy.’’ It states, in relevant part, ‘‘For a nationalist party like CDC, language and culture are fundamental in the process that we must undertake to build a strong Catalonia. We want a culture that is Catalan, popular, free, imaginative, and integrative. ‘Catalan’ means that it is firmly rooted in our country, expressed in our language, and participating in the universal culture . . . [and yet] it is open to everyone, especially those who live and work in Catalonia and want to be Catalans’’ (CDC 1981: 3). CDC views its nationalism as a progressive, forward-looking force, rooted in the sense of collective identity. The Seventh Congress, held on January 11–13, 1985, approved a ‘‘Position Statement’’ to that end: ‘‘It is a nationalism understood as a willingness to be, as an element of human promotion and like a factor of progress and collective liberty. It is a nationalism understood as a movement that has as an objective the harmonic and equilibrated development of the national identity of a people.’’ Moreover,

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‘‘identity is that which makes us what we are. The concept of identity is essentially positive because it is related to the idea of being. It is creative because being is the first condition for creating. It is enriching. And it is at the service of people, rather than at the service of an abstract idea’’ (CDC 1985). The identity issue is a ‘‘challenge that a nationalist party ought to assume and a task that must be undertaken constantly, independently of the instruments of self-government available. . . . The objective of generating national consciousness and self-esteem ought to be present at all times’’ (CDC 1996: 36). The Nature of Spain CDC justifies its involvement in the politics of Spain, through its representatives in the Spanish Congress of Deputies and in the Senate, because it can help to promote an acceptance of the plurinational nature of Spain. Thus, through CDC’s involvement in Spanish politics, Catalonia will find an easier fit within the reality of Spain as a state (CDC 1989: 61). ‘‘Either Spain is capable of respecting the plurinational reality of its peoples and to accept this rich potential, organizing itself based on the principle of the strict equality between the nations that compose the Spanish state, or it will fail as a common project’’ (CDC 1992: 47). The CDC asserts that all the political forces of the state (PP, PSOE, IU, and, at one time, UCD) have failed to recognize the national reality of Catalonia. ‘‘Most of the citizens of the Spanish state have not yet been able to assume the idea of an authentically plurinational state’’ (CDC 1996: 25). Moreover, CDC believes it has contributed to the modernization of the Spanish state, the development of the economy, and the growth of the welfare state. Yet, it states, the Spanish state has not reciprocated. ‘‘The political forces governing in the state continue having as their horizon mere administrative decentralization and too often opt to restrict our capacity for self-government’’ (CDC 2000: 18).

´ Democra`tica de Catalunya (UDC) Unio Affirming Catalonia Is a Nation In its ‘‘Declaration of Principles’’ of April 1963, in the midst of the Franco years, the party declared, ‘‘Catalonia, together with the other countries of Catalan language, is a human unit, social, cultural, and political

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with its own personality, which constitutes a nation. For the normal development of its collective personality . . . Catalonia needs an institutional body adapted to its characteristics’’ (UDC 1963). While defining itself as a nationalist party, UDC clarifies that ‘‘nationalism ought not to be the defining ideological element but the common denominator of all. If the only reason for UDC’s existence were its nationalism, our political project possibly never would have been born if it were meant to have filled only a nationalist vacuum and not, instead, an ideological vacuum within Catalan nationalism’’ (UDC 1990: 6). Thus, as a Christian Democratic party (now called Social Christian), UDC emphasizes that its nationalist project has a reason for being that goes beyond an ideal or dogma. Their concept of nation is closely related to the community of persons. ‘‘It is a live and evolving reality. And as such a community of persons, it has collective rights that are not only a simple sum of individual rights but derived from its condition as a national entity’’ (6). UDC proposes a communitarian nationalism6 emerging from a consideration of the primacy of human dignity and the individual person (UDC 1992: 5). As a humanist formation, UDC finds in the person and in his or her human dignity the first referent of its political activism (UDC 1997). Like CDC, UDC clarifies that its nationalism ‘‘is not and never has been ethnic or exclusionary,’’ and it wishes to include therein all persons, including those coming to live and work in Catalonia from other cultures and countries (UDC 2000).

The Nature of Spain At the Seventeenth Ordinary National Congress of March 10–11, 1990, in the principal ‘‘Position Statement,’’ the party declared that ‘‘it continues to be necessary to give our people the capacity of defense in front of the primeval Spanish nationalism that practices that which the British define as ‘expansionist nationalism,’ which is nothing more that an ambition to dominate and cultural, social, economic, and political expansion’’ (UDC 1990: 6). As the president of UDC, Josep A. Duran Lleida, told me, ‘‘[Yet,] we cannot deny a historic truth. We have lived together for many years in a Spanish project, with greater or lesser degrees of self-government. Often with great limitations on our own self-government [in fact]. We cannot deny that there exists this historic reality that conditions us.’’7 Much of the above is echoed by the remarks of one of the participants in UDC Focus

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Group 1, who said, ‘‘[For me, Spain] is a state under which I am included even though I don’t feel part of it, and I will do the best I can to change this, but I don’t deny the obvious fact that this is the situation at present. I don’t feel part of it, but I am a citizen of that state. We will do everything possible to change this, using democracy and education.’’8

Action De´mocratique du Que´bec (ADQ) Affirming Que´bec Is a Nation The ADQ was a relatively young party during the period of this study, with a shorter institutional history than the other parties in this book, which covers the period until 2010. It also seems to have had fewer organizational resources compared to the other parties. Founded in 1994, its Foundational Congress was held on March 5–6, 1994 at Laval. The document for participants at that congress, entitled ‘‘For a Responsible Que´bec,’’ starts by declaring that ‘‘the Que´be´cois have always searched to give themselves the means to guarantee their existence. Every generation has defended its right to exist and to seek to solidify its place in North America’’ (ADQ 1994: 1). After the defeat in the 1995 referendum, the ADQ programmatic statements tended to seek a middle ground between independence and federalism. Thus, in 1997, the party stated, ‘‘After the referendum of October, 1995, both the PQ and the PLQ bunkered themselves within their traditional positions, without considering what the population had just pronounced. Accepting the democratic verdict, the ADQ considered that after close to forty years of constitutional debates, particularly intense after the signing of the Meech Lake Agreement in 1987, it is now time to give ourselves a collective respite in order to direct ourselves to the task of putting Que´bec’s economy in order’’ (ADQ 1997: 24). More specifically, with respect to the national question, the party states, ‘‘It is clear that the respect for a truce in the constitutional struggles does not mean that a government of the ADQ would remain passive or leave Que´bec without a defense. The ADQ remains nationalist, and we will always defend with vigor the interests of Que´bec if these are menaced and will seize all opportunities to reinforce all the traditional vindications of Que´bec’’ (25). Two objectives remain for addressing the profound aspirations of the Que´be´cois: to be masters of their own destiny and to finally be a full partner with Canada (25).

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The Nature of Canada The ADQ aimed to present a constructive alternative to the two positions that divide the Que´be´cois and distance them from a solution to the contentious Que´bec-Canada relationship. ‘‘We formulate a proposition of constitutional peace. This reform of the political and constitutional framework that rules over Que´bec society is based on the autonomy of the National Assembly, on the reinforcement of the Canadian economic union, and on the restructuring of the Canadian political structures’’ (ADQElections 1998: 22). For the ADQ, ‘‘Que´bec is a nation. It is a home for the francophones living in North America. It possesses a unique identity of its own, a culture, a language, and traditions’’ (ADQ 2004: 37). As Eric Duhaime, counselor to Mario Dumont (chef du parti) at the time I interviewed him, told me, ‘‘[The ADQ] is a nationalist party, given that almost all Que´be´cois are nationalists, although we are autonomists.’’9 The ADQ aimed to revive the autonomist tradition in Que´bec during 1994– 2010, based on the following principles: ‘‘(1) our fidelity, our passion, and our loyalty are toward Que´bec; (2) all those who live in Que´bec are the Que´be´cois, without exception; (3) the development of Que´bec as a distinct nation is premised on the growth of our autonomy; (4) We respect the Canadians outside Que´bec, we appreciate our common history, and we consider them as our privileged partners’’ (ADQ 2004: 37).

Federalist National Parties and Their Discourse on National Identity Parti Libe´ral du Que´bec (PLQ) Affirming Que´bec Is a Nation By the 1970s, Que´bec had already undergone the Quiet Revolution and a new consciousness was emerging at the societal level. Thus, in the working document of the PLQ in preparation for the 1980 referendum, the party stated, ‘‘Before 1960, the Que´be´cois were perceived as Canadians. Some described them as French-speaking Canadians, others as French Canadians; very generally they were presented as Canadians. After 1960, many were the Que´be´cois who only identified as Que´be´cois, that is, as members of a

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national community having as its home and its natural center Que´bec, and no other part’’ (PLQ 1979: 26). Furthermore, the ‘‘PLQ is resolutely Que´be´cois. Que´bec is the home of French life in Canada, and it is a distinct society where there lives a national community forming a genuinely original entity within the Canadian political ensemble’’ (91). In the 1980 report of the PLQ’s Constitutional Commission, titled ‘‘A New Canadian Federation,’’ the party declared, ‘‘Que´bec forms a society at the interior of the federal Canadian ensemble, a distinct society by its language, its culture, its institutions, and its lifestyle. . . . Generally speaking, Que´bec perceives itself and expresses itself as a society of French language and spirit. In the midst of the Canadian political family, Que´bec society possesses all the attributes of a distinct national community’’ (PLQ 1980: 13). The more recent party programs and platforms of the PLQ are even more decisive in affirming Que´bec’s nationness. The party’s Committee on the Evolution of Canadian Federalism published a report in December 1996, ‘‘Que´be´cois Identity and Canadian Federalism: Recognition and Interdependence.’’ It stated, ‘‘Beyond any other consideration, what must be emphasized firmly is that the identity of Que´bec is not negotiable. And to the extent certain measures seem to be indispensable to assure the survival and the development of this identity, they are not subject to negotiation. Thus, the Committee recommends that the National Assembly reiterate solemnly and officially its role in the promotion and the protection of the essential characteristics of Que´bec society, notably its language, its culture, and its institutions’’ (PLQ 1996: 18). The report also stated, ‘‘Today, the great majority define themselves as Que´be´cois. Many are the federalist Que´be´cois who define themselves first of all as Que´be´cois. Those who define themselves this way are not separatists. But they want to make it clear that, in view of their identity, their first sense of belonging is to Que´bec. It is this identity we believe is compatible with belonging to Canada’’ (53). The most recent report on constitutional matters by the PLQ was produced in 2001 by the Special Committee of the PLQ for the Political and Constitutional Future of Que´be´cois Society, chaired by Benoıˆt Pelletier. The Final Report of this Committee, ‘‘A Project for Que´bec: Affirmation, Autonomy, and Leadership,’’ states, in relevant part, ‘‘For the Committee, the French fact constitutes a veritable priority, because the Que´be´cois are still greatly preoccupied by the fate of the French language and culture. The French fact is at the base of Que´be´cois particularism; this is what explains the special relationship that the Que´be´cois have with Canada; this is what

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also explains the responsibility without equal that the Que´be´cois have to assume in North America’’ (PLQ 2001: 19). As Benoıˆt Pelletier explained it, ‘‘[The PLQ] has in the past done a lot for Que´bec’s identity. We have achieved a lot in regards to culture, immigration. . . . Are we doing as much as we should now to vindicate Que´bec’s identity? . . . Not as much as we should.’’10 As the PLQ premier of Que´bec, Jean Charest, said in a 2006 interview with L’Express: ‘‘Certainly Que´bec is a nation! Besides, the first of the prime ministers of Canada, John A. MacDonald, affirmed that Canada would not have been created as a country if there had not been the recognition of Que´bec in the Constitutional Act of 1867. For him, there was a need to treat Que´bec as a nation! There is no doubt that we form a people and a nation. And I do not see any contradiction with the fact that we, the Que´be´cois, are also Canadians, like the French who are French, but also Europeans’’ (Demetz 2006). In a recent congress of the militants of the PLQ, the militants approved almost unanimously a resolution defining Que´bec as a nation (Marcil 2008). According to a historian associated with the PLQ, the former leader of the PLQ, Claude Ryan, was a Que´be´cois nationalist, and his nationalism was only limited by his commitment to liberalism and his sincere engagement with the Canadian project. Thus, in recent times, some of the principal leaders of the PLQ, including Jean Charest, Benoıˆt Pelletier, and Claude Ryan, have all had the same vision about the national question: the existence of the Que´be´cois nation, its right to self-determination, the need for its constitutional recognition, the will to correct the error of 1982, the protection of the French language, interprovincialism and the chief role to be played by Que´bec in improving Canadian federalism (Marcil 2008). Yet, even when affirming Que´bec’s distinctiveness and promoting the ´ Quebe´cois identity, the party also accepts and promotes the notion of dual identities and dual loyalties as key concepts for the survival of Canadian federalism. ‘‘Federalism is a system of government that permits an individual to belong at the same time to a natural collectivity more close to her/ him and to a greater ensemble. The force of federalism is precisely to permit and harmonize this double belonging. . . . In light of the strong attachment to Que´bec that Que´be´cois identity generates, the link with Canada, to be attractive for the Que´be´cois, must appear as a source of support for the flourishing of Que´be´cois identity and not as a substitute or a brake on the expression of this identity’’ (PLQ 2001: 24).

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The Nature of Canada The PLQ, while assuming with pride the new Que´be´cois national consciousness that has grown since the Quiet Revolution, finds that the critics of Canadian federalism have overstated their case (PLQ 1979: 33). ‘‘One of the dominating characteristics of the Canadian political system is the equilibrium that it establishes between the value of unity and the value of diversity. The Canadian federal system has often lent itself to interpretations that distance it from its full potential. In general, it rests over an equilibrium that allows the central authority to take common decisions and the exercise by the provinces of direct responsibilities over their own development’’ (49). In the matter of identities, again, the party declares that ‘‘Canadian federalism permits the reconciliation of multiple belongings. These belongings are rich in themselves. We are thus most interested in developing the full potential of our federation and the dynamic generated by this double identity. In, fact we can be at the same time Que´be´cois and Canadian’’ (51).

Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC) Affirming Catalonia Is a Nation The PSC affirms that ‘‘genuine federalism starts from a recognition of differences. Catalonia expresses its national character through its history, language, culture, law, and politics. This indispensable recognition of differences must suppose, at the same time, that the citizens of Catalonia can fully exert the rights that derive therein’’ (PSC 1999). According to the party’s electoral program for the 2003 Catalan Parliament elections, the new Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia, negotiated during 2005–2006, was to be based on the following principles: ‘‘Catalonia is a nation and its citizens are holders of the right to self-determination that confers a national will expressed repeatedly throughout its history and ratified by democratic means in the constitutional and statutory framework; the Catalans have a right to intervene in all public decisions that affect our rights and interests; the Generalitat must have the capacity to elaborate and apply policies that defend those interests and rights’’ (PSC 2003: 10).

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At its Eleventh Congress held in Barcelona on July 19–20, 2008, the PSC approved a resolution declaring that Catalonia is ‘‘a nation with a territory, a language, a culture and a history of its own that constitutes a national community,’’ integrated ‘‘by all the citizens of Catalonia irrespective of their origin or their mother tongue.’’ In the ‘‘Declaration of Principles’’ approved at the congress, the leaders and militants of the PSC stated, ‘‘We affirm our national reality,’’ which means that ‘‘we have a daily commitment to our Catalan language and culture,’’ which is plainly compatible with respect to the Castilian language, which ‘‘forms part’’ of the cultural legacy of Catalonia (Avui 2008). In that Congress, the party also emphasized that it offered the federalist alternative to the instrumental autonomism of CiU (until 2010) and demanded a constitutional reform of Spain, in order to incorporate in the Spanish constitution the ‘‘latest advances of the State of Autonomies in a federal direction’’ (Noguer 2008). The former president of the Catalan government, Pasqual Maragall of the PSC, when discussing the merits of the political debate in 2005–2006 regarding the new Catalan Statute of Autonomy of 2006, said that by approving the new statute, the Spanish Parliament was in essence putting forward a gesture of recognition ‘‘to the people of Catalonia of its category as a nation’’ (Antich 2005).

The Nature of Spain The PSC promotes its federalist political option as a mechanism for transforming Spain and the political cohabitation between the various nations that form part of the Spanish state. Thus, the party declares, ‘‘Our federalism invites the citizens to the construction of a new project for Catalonia, for Spain, and for Europe. Catalonia will be at the forefront of the process of transforming Spain. Catalonia is stronger when its reasons are understood and shared by the other peoples of Spain, and together we advance in the same direction. . . . We want a more plural and open Spain, proud of its diversity. More than ever, in Catalonia, the forces of progress are in condition to take up the old aspirations of catalanism: to propose a different vision, and with it, a different articulation of Spain (PSC 2000: 11–12).

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Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (IC-V) Affirming Catalonia Is a Nation Iniciativa per Catalunya was founded in 1987, with the participation of elements that came from the former PSUC, ENE, and unaffiliated militants, and formed a coalition with the Greens (Verds) for the first time in 1999. Verds Esquerra Ecologista merged into IC-V in 2004. In its document for attendees at the Eighth National Assembly on July 9–11, 2004, IC-V declared, ‘‘[We] consider as an inalienable right of all peoples to fully develop as sovereign nations. Emerging from the recognition of Catalonia as a nation, we manifest our will to vindicate the national rights of our country with the will to construct an open Europe without exclusions. . . . We vindicate the right to self-determination, a constitutional modification to establish a confederal and/or federal state, economic sovereignty, and the promotion of the vindication and national reconstruction of the Paı¨sos Catalans and the normalization of the Catalan language. The exercise of national rights cannot be decoupled from social and ecological rights’’ (IC-V 2004: 66). The old PSUC, one of the entities that contributed in the founding of IC-V, had a well-defined catalanist inclination. As Jaume Bosch, the vicepresident of the party and a member of the Catalan Parliament, explained it, ‘‘We locate ourselves among those sectors that are more sovereigntist. . . . We believe we are heirs of those sectors from the former PSUC that always maintained that the party had to be a ‘national party.’ ’’11 Asked whether there was any affinity with ERC, the independentist party, Jaume Bosch responded, ‘‘With ERC we coincide generally on the national question. In many concrete issues regarding the sovereignty of Catalonia, we coincide, as well as on left/right issues.’’ He also reaffirmed that on the national question they are between ERC and CiU and that contrary to the PSC/PSOE, they defend the right to self-determination. In line with these origins, IC-V has a catalanist sensibility that is reflected, for example, in the will to be a ‘‘ ‘national left,’ combined with the affirmation that the sovereignty of Catalonia resides in the people of Catalonia and in the defense of its right to self-determination’’ (Rius 2005: 27).

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The Nature of Spain Jaume Bosch reflected the views of his party’s leadership when he characterized the nature of his formation as unambiguously national: ‘‘We believe that Catalonia is a nation and that the Spanish state is a composite of various nations and defend our right to self-determination, that is, to independence, but our political option is for federalism. . . . Within IC-V, there are militants who define themselves as nationalists, even as independentists, and there are others who are federalists. We as a party have elected to call ourselves a national party because Catalonia is a nation.’’12

Conclusion The ideology and discourse of the national parties show that these are all ‘‘national parties,’’ forming part of the institutional component of the national movements of Que´bec and Catalonia. In the case of the mainstream federalist parties (such as the PLQ) and their militants, examined in previous chapters, I have demonstrated they have articulated a discourse and an official party line that is most definitely national in its tone and character. Both the top-level leadership of these national political parties and their hard-core militants have an influence on the discourse and ideology of the parties. But, I argue, the discourse and actual political practice of the national political parties and the top-level leadership of these parties may, at times, be hegemonic within a national movement, and these orientations that are set by the top-level leadership often overpower the influence of the parties’ hard-core militant base. According to the Michelsian perspective offered in this chapter, in large political parties, the leadership typically prevails over base-level militants because of their mechanisms of control over party resources, their superior knowledge, their greater expertise, and domination over the art of politics. Large-scale organizations develop ruling elites, and the preferences of the ruling elite tend to prevail over the preferences of the rank and file in such organizations. Thus, because national parties and their leadership are very effective in shaping nationalist discourse and debate, I have shown that in the case of mainstream federalist parties such as the PLQ of Que´bec, their discourse and practice is assertively

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national, which reinforces and strengthens the ‘‘national’’ animus of its militant base. The previous chapter and this one have settled the threshold questions of who is part of the national movement and what is the role of national parties, and they have set the boundaries of the political space occupied by the national movements of substate national societies. In the next few chapters, we can now examine in all their complexity the diverse nationalist ideologies, and their visions of sovereignty, within these national movements.

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PA R T I V

Visions of Sovereignty: Varieties of Substate Nationalist Ideologies

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Chapter 6

Sovereignty and Procedure: The Ideology of Independentist Substate Nationalism

The independence of Que´bec is for Que´bec and not against Canada. . . . The people of Que´bec, in accordance with our tradition, will decide the manner in which we will obtain our independence. —Bernard Landry (2005)1

The national movements of minority nations in multinational democracies often show an empirical regularity. Despite the diversity in their historical trajectory, geographic characteristics, economic conditions, demographic mix, political institutions, and political cultures, the political parties that comprise the institutionalized national movement tend, in many cases, to exhibit a tripartite taxonomy representing three basic political orientations: independence, autonomy, and federalism. These are rival forms of nationalism within the same national movement: They all agree that the nation exists and they want it to flourish, but they disagree on the political/constitutional model of sovereignty the nation should seek. In this chapter and the two that follow, I will examine what each of these basic political orientations represents, what sub-varieties of each of them may exist, and how to distinguish between them. Our purpose is to understand how these three varieties of nationalism have developed their respective preferred political orientation as a body of political ideas. Each one of these varieties of nationalism has developed its own orientation as a

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rich and multidimensional political tradition embodying a particular vision of sovereignty. I also seek to explain how one may identify the basic political orientation of a national political party and to suggest a typology for classifying national political parties in terms of their basic political orientation. Moreover, I will examine the ideological stances of the eight national political parties of Que´bec and Catalonia in relation to their visions of sovereignty, based on an examination of the official party programs and official statements emerging from their official Congresses and Assemblies, reports, manifestos, and so on.

Independentism Independentism is an ideology that seeks the realization of full political sovereignty for a nation with well-defined territorial boundaries. For minority nations who are currently part of a larger state, it, of course, seeks the attainment of separate statehood from the majority nation they have coexisted with, within the same state. Classic independence would require the following: (1) in a procedural sense, the legal and constitutional founding of a juridically constituted independent state; (2) obtaining international recognition of the achievement of separate statehood; (3) creation of a new citizenship status for all citizens within the newly independent state; (4) the creation of the apparatus of government that corresponds to the newly existing state; (5) the establishment of new political institutions (political parties, etc.) that reflect the new politics of the newly independent state; (6) in the medium to long term, a corresponding transformation in the civil society (civic organizations, associations, etc.) of these nations, reflecting new ties of social connectedness founded in view of the new political horizon; (7) in the long term, the development of new cultural patterns in an attempt to create a sense of solidarity and inclusiveness in the new state. Of the three varieties of substate nationalism examined in this book, independentists demand the most dramatic substantive changes in their constitutional status. It is to be expected that they should also be the ones that are most concerned with the procedure to be followed to achieve their aims. Major constitutional transformations call for clear procedures. Procedure matters in two ways. Independentists are concerned with the

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procedural mechanisms for accession to independence, which can vary considerably. In addition, some independentists incorporate in their programs procedures for securing the establishment of cooperative relations with the state to which they formerly belonged or other forms of association with their former state. With regard to the first category of procedural concerns, independentists have, in general, followed two procedures: the holding of a popular referendum on the question of separation and the election of a parliamentary majority that has set as its primary objective the transition to independence. According to Bariteau (2005: 30), the preferred procedure of most of the new states that have recently joined the UN has been to hold a vote by the parliamentary body, without holding a referendum. The democratic theory behind this procedure is that the parliamentary majority that votes for separation has received the votes of a majority of electors. In the former Czechoslovakia, an accord between the parlamentarians of the former state was reached to dissolve the federation and create two independent states. This was also the case in some of the countries of the former USSR. Thus, Moldavia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan declared themselves independent without having a referendum. Others decided to have a referendum, but only to ratify a unilateral declaration of independence, which was the case in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. In 1993, Eritrea also held a referendum, with 99.8 percent voting for sovereignty. In 1999, East Timor ultimately held a referendum under UN supervision, resulting in a 78.5 percent vote in favor of separation. Estonia and Lithuania initially refused to hold a referendum and preferred a majority vote by their parlamentarians between 1988–1990, although later they agreed to hold official ‘‘surveys’’ at the time of an election (34). On the other hand, in the countries of the former Yugoslavia, such as Macedonia, Slovenia, and Croatia, referenda were chosen as the preferred procedure for achieving independence. Andorra modified its constitution and submitted it to a popular referendum. In 1944, Iceland held a referendum that eventually led to its recognition as a sovereign state. The Que´be´cois independentists have generally favored a referendum as the most legitimate procedure for initiating a transition to independence (42). Referenda have been favored in Canada as mechanisms for the expression of important political choices, and the PQ incorporated this mechanism in its program in 1974. With regard to the second category of procedural concerns, I note that classic independence involves secession from an existing state and the

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founding of a new state, with all the accoutrements mentioned above. Examples of successful independence include the velvet divorce between the Czech Republic and Slovakia and, more recently, the separation of Montenegro from Serbia. Most independentists and most independentist national parties advocate this form of classic independence. However, it should be noted that independentists may also put forward other proposals that, in my estimation, are functional equivalents of the classic independence route. Therefore, some independentists incorporate in their programs procedures for securing the establishment of cooperative relations with the state to which they formerly belonged or for models of association with their former state. These include proposals for sovereignty-association, for the establishment of an associated republic or free association relationship, and proposals for the founding of a model of confederation. The Parti Que´be´cois (PQ) has, from its inception, put forward a proposal for sovereignty- association, which was the model for its proposals to the people of Que´bec in the referenda of 1980 and 1995 (Le´vesque 1968: part 2). Below I present an account of the development of the PQ’s proposals for sovereignty-association, but suffice it to say for now that it has been a constant in its programmatic statements, except for brief interludes, in which classic independence proposals dominated. The original sovereigntyassociation proposal put forward in Le´vesque’s Option Que´bec manifesto in 1968 involved accession to independence while at the same time negotiating with the Canadian state an association agreement that would have included a common monetary union and common market as well as the coordination of fiscal policies (54). The project of sovereignty-association was, in effect, a variant of an independence proposal (Bernier, Pinard, and Lemieux 1997: 13). For the referendum of 1980, for example, the PQ proposed an ‘‘independent state within its political milieu . . . even if it talked more, in a reassuring fashion, about sovereignty. The notion of association served to illustrate the fact that the independence of the [new] state would be limited by its economic and political association with the new Canada, formed without Que´bec’’ (9). The use of the formula of sovereignty-association was adopted because public opinion polls indicated this formula attracted higher levels of support than a formula of outright ‘‘separation’’ or ‘‘independence’’ (10). This variant of the independence option has been reflected in the proposals of other independentist parties. For example, the Puerto Rico Independence Party (PIP) has proposed negotiating agreements with the United States upon accession to independence. During 1989–1990,

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three versions of a bill were filed in the U.S. Senate (S.710–S. 712) by Senator Bennett Johnston, chairman of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources (in charge of Puerto Rican affairs), which called for a plebiscite sponsored by Congress on the three status formulas, as defined by each party and revised by Congress, the preferred status to become law without further action. The bill eventually died in Committee in 1991 (Trı´as Monge 1997: 134; Martı´n Garcı´a 1996). A similar process was repeated in 1997– 1998 when ‘‘A Bill to Provide a Process Leading to Full Self-Government for Puerto Rico’’ (H.R. 856) was narrowly passed by the U.S. House of Representatives but was ultimately defeated in the U.S. Senate. The hearings that were conducted during these two attempts to provide for a Congressionally sponsored mechanism for resolving Puerto Rico’s political status dilemma revealed that the independentist party was interested in a proposal for formal independence conjoined with economic and political agreements with the United States, as former metropolis. Another variant of the independence route are proposals for an associated state or a relationship of free association. These are arrangements that are part of the broad family of ‘‘federal political systems’’ but are neither classic federations nor mere colonial appendages of a central state. In federal political systems, in contrast to unitary systems, there are two (or more) levels of government, which thus combine elements of shared-rule through common institutions and regional self-rule for the governments of the constituent units. This broad genus includes a spectrum of species: unions, constitutionally decentralized unions, federations, confederations, ‘‘federacies,’’ associated states, condominiums, leagues, and joint functional authorities (Watts 1999: 7). Daniel J. Elazar (1994a: xvi) defines an associated state as an ‘‘asymmetrical arrangement similar to a federacy but like a confederation in that it can be dissolved by either of the parties under prearranged terms.’’ Hurst Hannum (1996: 17) defines associated statehood as ‘‘a relatively modern concept that has arisen out of United Nations discussions with respect to the exercise of self-determination by non-selfgoverning territories. The modern associated state is perhaps closest to a protected independent state, with an essential attribute being the ability unilaterally to terminate the ‘association’ with another state.’’ Contemporary exemplars of associated state relationships include Liechtenstein (with Switzerland), San Marino (with Italy), Monaco (with France),2 Niue Island (with New Zealand), Cook Islands (with New Zealand), and the Marshall Islands/the Palau Islands/the Federated States of Micronesia (with the

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United States) (Watts 1999: 7; Lapidoth 1997: 55, 62–63). Free association is a ‘‘form of political association which is essentially confederal in nature where separate, distinct communities of disproportionate size and resources join together for pragmatic purposes’’ (Statham 2002: 124). Thus, ‘‘a relationship of association in contemporary international law is characterized by recognition of the significant subordination of and delegation of competence by one of the parties (the associate) to the other (the principal) but maintenance of the continuing international status of statehood of each component’’ (Reisman 1975: 10). Associated state status is premised on the mutual consent of both principal and associate. The associate is interested in the relationship because it promotes its security and economic viability. It maintains full internal self-government regulated by its constitution. In certain areas, notably defense and foreign affairs, the principal may have exclusive competence, by mutual agreement. The United Nations has recognized an association as a valid act of self-determination, but only under certain conditions (Lapidoth 1997: 55). To illustrate the nature of associated states, further examination of the relationship between the islands of the former Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands with the United States is warranted. The state that we call the United States is a federal political system composed of a federation of 50 states and 130 Native American Domestic Dependent Nations, three unincorporated territories (Guam, Virgin Islands, and Samoa), and two equally unincorporated territories known as ‘‘commonwealths,’’ ‘‘autonomies,’’ or ‘‘federacies’’ (Puerto Rico and the Northern Mariana Islands), and it is a state that maintains relations with three freely associated states (the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau) (Griffiths and Nerenberg 2002: 353; Friedrich and Bowie 1954: 715). The latter are a category apart, given that these associated states ‘‘start from the premise of independent sovereigns who entered into a contractual relationship—the Compact—with the United States under which the United States was granted certain powers (primarily over defense). They are not citizens, nor do they intend to be, and the U.S. Constitution does not apply within these territories. Their direction, if the Freely Associated State is to carry out its own goal, is to establish itself as a nation among other nations at large’’ (Leibowitz 1989: 119). The status of freely associated state (FAS) was created by the Compacts negotiated between the U.S. and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau,3 and the approximately seventeen subsidiary agreements

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that each FAS negotiated with the United States (Leibowitz 1989: 595). These Compacts are generally the same, although each has some individualized provisions to meet the particular needs of the three entities. The Compact defines an ‘‘international relationship between the United States and the FAS with little precedent in international law and none in U.S. domestic practice. Under the Compact, each FAS will enjoy control over its internal affairs and its foreign relations, including the competence to enter into international agreements. Each FAS has the option to terminate the Compact’’ (595). The defense agreements provide for a U.S. defense umbrella during the duration of the free association. After approval of the Compact of Free Association, the U.S. announced on November 3, 1986 that its trusteeship of the Pacific Islands was terminated and notified the U.N. Secretary General. A controversy remains regarding whether the trusteeship could have been terminated unilaterally by the U.S. without U.N. Security Council action. The FSM and the Marshall Islands meet the generally accepted criteria for international statehood specified in Article I of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States of 1933: (a) a clearly delimited territory; (b) a permanent population; (c) an established government; and (d) capacity to conduct relations with other states (Leibowitz 1989: 600; Hannum 1996: 15). The FSM and the Marshall Islands have issued the equivalent of passports for their citizens. The U.S. is affording diplomatic recognition to the FAS as it would to any other nation state and is encouraging others to do so as well (Leibowitz 1989: 600). The Compacts between the FSM and the Marshall Islands and the U.S. were renegotiated between 1999 and 2003, including the negotiation of new subsidiary agreements. These amended Compacts were subscribed in April and May 2003 by the authorities of the FSM and the Marshall Islands, were signed into law by the U.S. president in December 2003, and were formally put into diplomatic practice in May–June 2004 (Nieves 2004: 294). The third variant of the independence route is a model of confederation. As we will see below, certain national parties in Catalonia and Que´bec sometimes propose a model of confederation. However, the usage of this term by these national parties is, at times, conceptually muddled, and it is not clear whether they are proposing a model of confederation or a model of decentralized federation. Confederations are loose associations between constituent units, in which the member states retain the locus of sovereignty and retain the majority of their powers, assigning a minimum of powers and competences to the common government. Confederations are

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more akin to alliances or leagues, but they fall short of being federations. ‘‘Typically, such confederal arrangements leave the central government dependent on the member states for revenue and with little scope for making domestic policy. Some confederations were highly successful and impressively long-lived. The United Provinces of the Netherlands endured for two centuries, 1581–1795, and the Swiss Republic functioned effectively for half a millenium, 1291–1803. Not all worked so well. The short-lived first U.S. Constitution—the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union . . . survived less than a decade from its ratification in 1781 to its replacement in 1789 and was dysfunctional for much of that time’’ (Hueglin and Fenna 2006: 34). Confederations occur where a number of pre-existing polities come together to establish a common government for limited purposes (typically, economic affairs or defense), but the common government is dependent on the constituent states, being composed of representatives from the constituent states, and, thus, having basically an indirect electoral and fiscal base (Watts 1999: 8; Elazar 1994: xvi). In sum, they are loose associations of independent states (Lapidoth 1997: 49). Contemporary exemplars include the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Independentist Political Parties and Their Visions of Sovereignty As noted in Chapter 1, it is useful to think of the varieties of substate national parties as a continuum, as presented in Table 1.2 of that chapter for some of the major cases encompassed by my scope conditions. As previously presented, a partial list of independentist national political parties covered by my scope conditions includes Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), Parti Que´be´cois (PQ), Aralar, Batasuna and its successor entities, Bildu, Partido Independentista Puertorrriquen˜o (PIP), Corsica Nazione (CN), Scottish National Party (SNP), Plaid Cymru (PC), Bloque Nacionalista Gallego (BNG), Vlaams Blok, New Flemish Alliance, and the Su¨dtiroler Freiheit. One of the key distinctions that needs to be made among independentist parties is whether they are pactist independentist formations or whether they are principled independentist organizations. Pactist independentists are those who propose negotiating pacts of political

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PNV

151

Principled

PQ

PIP

ERC

Batasuna

CN

Figure 6.1. An indicative pactist/principled independentist continuum.

or economic association with the majority nation, upon accession to independence. Principled independentists tend to put forward proposals that contemplate a complete rupture with the majority nation, without any kind of offer of partnership or association following the declaration of independence. A continuum of such parties placed along a pactist-principled independentism axis is illustrated in Figure 6.1. This is not the only relevant axis one can draw with respect to independentist formations, but it is an important one for our purposes because it helps one understand their willingness to work with the state to which they belong (upon accession to independence) and, thus, their degree of radicalization and rejection of the central state.

The PQ and Its Vision of Sovereignty The PQ has a long tradition of putting forward proposals that conjoin independence with forms of association with the Canadian state. The first official program of the PQ, published in 1969, visualized an independence that conjoined sovereignty and interdependence. They proposed that when independence was achieved, the new state would negotiate with Canada a series of agreements of economic association. These may have included a customs union (or ‘‘common market’’) and an agreement of monetary union (PQ 1969: 29). All of these efforts to establish economic agreements with Canada would take the form of a treaty and would offer the possibility of unilateral amendments. The achievement of these agreements, however, is not a requirement sine qua non for accession to independence (7). The PQ would have sought the continuation of all treaties that favor Que´bec and would have sought the abrogation of those that did not, pursuant to international norms (PQ 1973: 5; PQ 1978: 7). By the time of the referendum of 1980, the program of the party had a prominent and detailed section on sovereignty-association. The PQ

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declared that independence was inevitable, given the decreasing demographic weight of Que´bec in Canada, which, with the passage of time, reduces its influence in the federal parliament. At the time of Canadian confederation 1867, the Que´bec population was 33 percent of the total population of Canada. In 1980 it was 26 percent, and by 2000 it was 23 percent. The PQ visualized the creation, between the sovereign states of Que´bec and Canada, of a Canada-Que´bec Association composed of ministers chosen by each government and administered through a joint council. This organ would have maintained the present economic relationship between Canada and Que´bec through a treaty of association specifying the competences to be exercised jointly. Each state would collect its own taxes and would provide the funds necessary for the realization of joint projects through this council. Thus, Que´bec would have proposed to the rest of Canada an association between sovereign states that would have included the following in economic terms: the free circulation of merchandise and commerce between the two states; the joint establishment of tariffs judged to be of mutual benefit; the joint recognition of the right to protect each state’s own agricultural production, and so on; the free circulation of people between the two states, although Que´bec citizens would have their own passport; the recognition of the Canadian dollar as the sole legal currency in both states; freedom of circulation of capital between the two states; elaboration of specific agreements in matters such as trains, aerial transportation, and internal navigation; transfer of federal installations, with reasonable compensation; creation of a court of justice for the association, and so on (PQ 1980: 7; PQ 1979a, 1979b). After the 1995 referendum, the PQ again proposed a similar path to independence. Its program stated that upon attaining a favorable referendum result, the National Assembly would have a mandate to proclaim the sovereignty of Que´bec and the government would offer Canada a new economic and political partnership. The proclamation of sovereignty would be made either from the moment the offer of partnership was formulated by the National Assembly or after it determined that negotiations were not working out. One year was the time period allocated for the negotiations (PQ 1996: 4). The treaty of partnership would be for maintaining and improving the existing economic space. As a matter of priority, the treaty would provide for institutions of partnership acting in the following domains: customs union; free circulation of merchandise, people, services, and capital; a monetary policy; mobility of labor; and citizenship. It would

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have proposed the creation of common institutions, a council (formed by ministers of both states), a secretariat, a parliamentary assembly, and a court. The treaty would also provide for the rules for dividing the federal patrimony and the management of the common debt. It would provide the norms for the functioning of the common political institutions. Que´bec was to have its own citizenship and to issue its own passports, but the currency would remain the Canadian dollar (5–8).

Summary The PQ is an independentist party that is much closer to the pactist independentist end of the continuum than to the principled independentist end. Other secessionist parties, such as the ones of the izquierda abertzale in the Basque Country, are much more intransigent (or, to put it positively, principled) in their independentism and are less willing to pact with the central state.

ERC and Its Vision of Sovereignty Immediately after the democratic transition of the late 1970s, ERC seems to have been a party that vindicated its federalist past more than its independentist one. Thus, the party stated in its ‘‘Ideological Declaration’’ of 1979–1980, ‘‘federalism is the form of organization most just and most adequate for the integral development of the individual. No organism or entity of superior order should do for itself that which another entity of an inferior level can do. The municipalities, the comarcas, and the regions ought to have maximum autonomy. Centralism and bureaucratism are the principal obstacles to liberty’’ (ERC 1980). For the Fourteenth Congress of January 22, 1985, the party published the ‘‘Objectives of ERC for the Next Two Years.’’ It stated that in the field of autonomic policy, for as long as it was impossible to achieve the Constitutional reform they would prefer, the party had to push for the attainment of the maximum ceiling for competencies compatible with the 1978 Constitution, in order to advance the recatalanization that was necessary to reinforce their differential characteristics and the strengthening of the national consciousness (ERC 1985a). At the National Conference of ERC, held in May of 1986, in a resolution titled

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‘‘Left Politics in Today’s Catalonia,’’ the party declared, ‘‘Catalonia finds itself nationally subjugated and there cannot be free persons when a people is enslaved. The most basic objective of a politics of the left here has to be, therefore, to see our right to self-determination recognized and considered as a permanent right. A confederation of the nations of Iberia could be the political instrument to that end. If the other nations that compose the Spanish state were not to accept the proposal for a confederal system, then the attainment of Catalan sovereignty would require the vindication of our independence’’ (ERC 1986: 4). It would seem that around 1987, the party was debating ‘‘confederation’’ and independence, with the former apparently understood more like a radical form of asymmetric federalism than ‘‘confederation’’ in the most widely accepted sense of the word. Thus, at the Fifteenth Congress of January 24–25, 1987, the party’s position statement on its objectives for the next two years stated, ‘‘It must be clear that a nationalist politics that is absolutely radical in its principles and ends, whether it proposes confederation or independence . . . can obtain positive results’’ (ERC 1987a). The Sixteenth National Congress of November 4, 1989, held in Lleida, was a historic turning point for the party. At that Congress, the party declared itself an unambiguously independentist party. The Commission that prepared the ‘‘Ideological Position Statement’’ for the Congress prepared a document that stated rather timidly that ‘‘the final objective, necessarily, has to be the achievement of full independence, by way of the exercise of the right to self determination, a cause to which ERC commits itself to struggle for without concessions’’ (ERC 1989: 30). At the same Congress, the ‘‘Declaration’’ of the Commission that prepared the ‘‘National Position Statement’’ stated, ‘‘The objective of a nation oppressed by a state which is not its own is obviously none other than to liberate itself precisely from the situation of national oppression it suffers and to conquer its own political sovereignty. . . . Notwithstanding this, while the current situation of belonging to the Spanish state lasts, the Catalan people cannot renounce to the smallest possibility of seeing recognized its national personality and its collective rights, within the interior of the state to which one belongs, without waiting for the day of definitive liberation for the definitive resolution of its problems’’ (8). By the Nineteenth National Congress of December 18–19, 1993, the ‘‘Ideological Declaration’’ of the party had an unequivocal independentist

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orientation: ‘‘The Jacobin states installed over diverse nations systematically negate these rights, and in spite of presenting democratic forms of organization, become centers of authoritarian power. ERC proposes for the Catalan nation an independent state within the framework of a united Europe. ERC struggles for the political sovereignty of the Catalan people and works for the independence of the nation, in a peaceful and democratic way’’ (ERC 1993: 15). The Twenty-first National Congress was also historic for the party because it involved a leadership change. The team led by A`ngel Colom was replaced by the team led by Josep Lluis Carod Rovira. At the Twenty-first National Congress, held on November 23–24, 1996, ERC announced in the ‘‘Position Statement on Strategy’’ that it would have a strategy of phases. ‘‘In each phase, ERC is to have well-established political objectives and a well-defined policy of alliances’’ (ERC 1996: 14). First, the party proposed renegotiating with the Spanish state for a programmatic bloc that would have led it a few steps forward in the direction of sovereignty, without the need to reform the Constitution, because the mechanisms were already provided in it or were already present in the Basque statute of autonomy. There is a need to return to bilateral relations between Catalonia and the Spanish state, as the Basques already practice it (15). The negotiation would take place directly between the Catalan Parliament and the Spanish government, contrary to the marked presidentialism of the CiU government. ERC also sought to establish the principate as a single province—leading to the disappearance of the Diputaciones—as well as exclusive competences in public safety and labor relations and a new framework for telecommunications. Apart from a strategy for the short term, ERC wanted to re-situate a strategy for the mid- to long term. The party wanted to consider a ‘‘strategy of rupture with the regime of the transition. Also there is a need to elaborate a proposal for transition between the new statute of autonomy, with a regime of economic concert, and independence. The study of formulas of sovereignty association or transitory confederalism will permit us, without abandoning in any moment our final objective, to exercise an efficient pedagogy amidst the considerable part of the population that has internalized the dominant ideology of anti-secessionism’’ (16). At the Twenty-second National Congress of July 4–5, 1998, the party’s ‘‘Political Position Statement’’ stated that its strategy for independence was the following:

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The proclamation of the Catalan republic will be produced when the citizens of Catalonia, the Paı´s Valencia`, and the Balearic Islands, and eventually Catalonia Nord, grant their confidence to an independentist party for the respective Parliament . . . The difficult part is to arrive at a republican and independentist electoral majority, starting from our current level of national consciousness, and the actual structure of the communications media, and of the urban and sociological composition of Catalan society, and of the correlation of political forces and of electoral blocs. Evidently it is not possible to convince the majority of the population repeating monothematically the great advantages of independence. (ERC 1998: 29) The road to independence is a complex historic process, hardly easy. According to ERC, it demands (1) creation and expansion of a social base that will identify with independentism and republicanism, particularly among the popular classes; (2) delegitimizing the monarchic regime and the Constitution and the Statutes of Autonomy that derive thereof and also the social forces that support it and the large media groups that render homage to them; (3) guaranteeing the sovereignty of all the institutions and organizations that act in the country; (4) increasing their presence in democratic institutions and civil society institutions; (5) combining political action with popular mobilization; (6) creating space in the communications media that reflects the way of seeing reality of the national left; and (7) an ensemble of applicable policies (economic, social, territorial, etc.) that either stretch to the maximum the current constitutional framework or demonstrate the need for a radical change (29).

Summary ERC’s independentist stance dates only from 1989. ERC puts forward a proposal for independence but is also willing to consider decentralizing proposals (federalist or confederal) while maintaining independence as the long-term goal. As Josep Vall, the party’s secretary of organization (at the time I interviewed him) told me, with the polls showing that 30 percent of the electorate supports independence (at that time), the party does not renounce any political developments that represent an advance. They are not ‘‘all or nothing’’ independentists, like the Basque parties of the

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izquierda abertzale.4 The party has been one of three parties forming the Catalan government from 2003 to November, 2010. It has been in power in a coalition with the ‘‘national Left,’’ which includes the PSC and IC-V. While in power, especially after the 2006 election, the party moderated itself even more, and showed a pragmatic tendency during 2002–2010. Many of its militants may remain hardcore independentists, but the party itself has become more pragmatic. Thus, it is an independentist party that is much closer to the pactist independentist end of the continuum than the principled independentist end. Other independentist parties in the contemporary scene, such as the independentist parties in Flanders, are much more rigid in their independentism and are less willing to pact a transition with the central state or to seek to establish any economic or political links with the central state following accession to independence.

Conclusion: Independentism and Its Vision of Sovereignty Independentists propose the most radical restructuring of relations with the central state, so it is not surprising that the procedural aspects of their proposals become prominent in their programs. They exhibit two types of procedural concerns. First, independentists are concerned with the mechanisms for accession to sovereignty, which generally range from the holding of a popular referendum on sovereignty to the exercise of the popular will through a vote for secession by a parliamentary majority. The procedure preferred by most of the new states that have recently joined the UN has been the holding of a vote by the parliamentary body, where a plurality vote is sufficient to make a unilateral declaration of separation, without calling a referendum. In addition, some independentists incorporate into their programs procedures for securing the establishment of cooperative relations with the state to which they formerly belonged (following independence) or for models of association with their former state, to generate advantageous economic or financial conditions for both states. Thus, independentists may also put forward proposals that, in my estimation, are functional equivalents of the classic independence route, including proposals for sovereignty-association, for the establishment of an associated republic or a free association relationship, and so on.

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With respect to the vision of sovereignty held by independentist parties, I have shown the usefulness of distinguishing between pactist and principled independentist parties. Both ERC and PQ are independentist parties that are much closer to the pactist independentist end of the continuum than to the principled independentist end.

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Chapter 7

Fragments of Sovereignty: The Ideology of Autonomist Substate Nationalism

These [political] configurations bring together . . . some of the elements of the State, for example a well-defined territory or important elements of governmental organization, and because of the partial nature of these elements, Jellinek considered them ‘‘fragments of State.’’ ´n (1998: 162) —Miguel Herrero de Min ˜o

Autonomism In many multinational democracies, models of federation are the preferred institutional configuration to address the complexities of multinationalism, and much of the scholarly literature echoes this preference for federation (Hechter 2000; Keating 2001; Norman 2006; Kymlicka 1998; Gibbins, LaForest, and Institute for Research on Public Policy 1998; Stepan 2001: 326; Burgess and Gagnon 1993; Elazar 1987; Watts 2008; McRoberts 1997; Griffiths, Nerenberg, and Forum of Federations 2005; Gagnon and Iacovino 2007; Karmis and Norman 2005).1 Even theorists who reject monistic conceptions of federalism seem to consider that the institutional norm in such societies is multinational federation (Karmis and Norman 2005). However, as this book has shown, in many contemporary multinational democracies there are substate national societies with autonomist national parties that reject a model of federation as an appropriate institutional design to address their needs. Instead, many stateless nationalists advocate

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territorial autonomy2 as the ideal institutional design to accommodate them. Autonomism has been under-studied, and, therefore, in this chapter we seek to understand it as an ideology of territorial order and institutional design. Our purpose is to understand how autonomist parties have developed autonomism as a body of ideas. Autonomist political parties conceive autonomism as a rich and complex political tradition that embodies a particular vision of sovereignty. In order to understand autonomism as an ideology of territorial order espoused by substate nationalists, we need to inquire whether the theory and practice of autonomism is consonant with federalist principles. A number of scholars have argued that autonomism and federalism should be seen as distinct categories, without further elaboration (Ackren 2009; Olausson 2007). In this regard, Suksi maintains that it is possible ‘‘to draw a boundary of some kind between federal forms of organization and territorial autonomies,’’ although the boundary may be fluid and subject to interpretation (Suksi 2010; see also Lapidoth 1997: 50; Rothchild and Hartzell 2000: 261). The strongest thesis has been advanced by Benedikter (2007: 31), who argues that autonomy ‘‘is a specific territorial organization having its own constituent features. It should not be confused with a subcategory of federalism. . . . [It] is a political and constitutional organization sui generis that deserves distinct attention and analysis in theory and practice.’’ My empirical findings demonstrate that autonomism as an ideology of territorial order and institutional design exhibits a number of clear antifederalist stances, but it draws inspiration from the general federalist principle that a federal political system is one in which power is at once divided and coordinated. Its antifederalist stance has four basic components: diminished predominance of dual national identities, rejection of federation’s homogenizing and uniformizing tendencies, negative perception of the possibilities for recognition and accommodation by the central structures of the state, and (in some cases) willingness to trade the value of meaningful influence on the center for the perception of more autonomy (Suksi 2010; Le´gare´ and Suksi 2008; McGarry 2002). To this dual antifederalist and federalist hybrid stance, autonomism adds a nuanced antisecessionism stance. It therefore espouses a vision of sovereignty in which full sovereign statehood is not sought, yet it seeks elements of self-government and fragments of sovereignty within existing state structures. Federalism is a normative term recommending the use of federal principles, and it favors a political system of multilevel government combining

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elements of shared-rule and territorial self-rule (McGarry and O’Leary 2007; Watts 2008). Thus, federalism is a philosophical term ‘‘to the extent it is a normative judgment upon the ideal organization of human relations and conduct’’ (Burgess and Gagnon 1993). Similarly, autonomism is a normative term that advocates the use of autonomist principles and envisions autonomy as the ideal constitutional and political framework for accommodating diversity. Autonomism has an intricate relationship with federalism but is generally distinct from it. Autonomist parties are wary of federalism because they believe it has homogenizing and uniformizing tendencies. Thus, a model of classic federation is not appealing to autonomists, according to my findings. Even relatively asymmetric federations are generally unappealing to autonomists. Yet, autonomism is the search for gradually expanding spheres of self-government within existing state structures, and thus autonomists adopt elements of the federal idea, given that they are proponents of a peculiar form of multilevel government combining elements of shared-rule and partial territorial self-rule. Moreover, autonomists may be advocates of asymmetry within a broadly understood ‘‘federal political system,’’ but not of classic federation. Scholarly efforts by comparativists and political theorists to develop theories of independentism abound (Bartkus 1999; Beissinger 2002; Hechter 2000; Hale 2008; Hannum and Babbitt 2006; Moore 1998; Murkens, Jones, and Keating 2002). We also have theories about the origins of federalism and federation (Riker 1964, 1987; Watts 1966, 2008; Wheare 1953; Stepan 2001). Yet, we have relatively little in the existing scholarly literature on autonomism as a political program and as an ideology capable of mobilizing people. This is an unfortunate gap, given that there are, in fact, important political actors in substate national societies that are proponents of models of autonomism. Existing works on autonomy and existing autonomies have not analyzed autonomism as an ideology of territorial order and institutional design, nor have they asked whether autonomism is a carrier of the federal idea (Ghai 2000; Weller and Wolff 2005; Suksi 1998; Winter and Tu¨rsan 1998). In addition, some of the classic statements by consociational theorists on ‘‘segmental autonomy’’ have failed to recognize the distinction between autonomism and federalism. Very few of the works cited above have based their theorizing on in-depth fieldwork in specific countries or empirical research into the attitudes, opinions, and discourse of autonomists who are leaders and militants of autonomist political parties, which is the approach taken in this book.

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In order to make analytic progress, we must unpack the notion of territorial autonomy by distinguishing between autonomism, autonomies, and autonomists. Autonomism is a term imbued with normative content, and it implies a commitment to forms of territorial control that challenge traditional conceptions of the nation-state and the generalized reification of statist principles. These are political statuses that generally renounce full sovereign statehood but lay claim to specific aspects of self-government (Suksi 1998). Autonomy is a grey area of territorial management of ethnic differences (Burgess 2006: 110). It may be conceptualized as ‘‘the legally entrenched power of ethnic or territorial communities to exercise public functions independently of other sources of authority of the state, but subject to the overall legal order of the state’’ (Weller and Wolff 2005). It is a people’s power to govern itself within a wider political relationship with another people, according to one seasoned practitioner of autonomism (Herna´ndez Colo´n 1991). Autonomies typically have legislative powers that are normally enumerated so that its competences in certain fields are clearly specified, while the central state’s legislature retains residual power (Benedikter 2007; Safran and Maı´z Sua´rez 2000). Autonomism does not seek independence—at least for the medium to short term—but it seeks to promote the self-government, selfadministration, and cultural identity of a territorial unit populated by a society with national characteristics (Henders 2010). Autonomism is clearly distinguishable from independentism. Autonomist proposals can also be distinguished from models of federation. Certain forms of autonomism may be described as sub-species of the general category of ‘‘federal political systems,’’ if we recognize that the latter is a broad genus including confederations, ‘‘federacies,’’ associated states, condominiums, and so on (Watts 2008). However, most autonomist proposals can be clearly distinguished from full-fledged federations. De jure symmetry is typical of most federations, which we can label as ‘‘classic’’ federations, although there are also a number of asymmetric ones (McGarry 2007; Agranoff 1999). Classic federations, in which all the constituent units typically have substantially equal powers, may not be sufficiently sensitive to the particular needs of a polity that constitutes a minority nation, which requires a greater degree of selfgovernment (Ghai 2000). Autonomist parties seek a special status and special powers within a defined geographical territory, but one that does not constitute a constituent unit of a federation nor an independent state (Olausson 2007; Ackre´n and Olausson 2008; Ackre´n 2009). Indeed, even

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models of federation that have asymmetrical elements are shunned by autonomists. Generally speaking, moreover, ‘‘autonomy is always a fragmented order, whereas a constituent . . . [unit of a federation] is always part of a whole. . . . The ties in a federal State are always stronger than those in an autonomy’’ (Suksi 1998). ‘‘Autonomies’’ are the actually existing varieties of territorial autonomies. These are models of territorial order that have been successfully established by substate territorial units, in cooperation with central state governments. In their institutional design, actually existing autonomies are the obligatory starting points of reference for giving concrete shape to the aspirations of autonomism. However, actually existing autonomies do not exhaust the ambitions or the inventiveness of the autonomist political agenda. Autonomism may also put forward models of institutional design that are currently nonexistent but that, under the right political circumstances, could become juridically and politically viable entities. ‘‘Autonomists’’ are the actual leaders and militants of autonomist political parties. Many autonomist political parties are also substate national parties, and many of their militants are nationalists. Such parties’ programs typically formulate a vision of sovereignty that reflects their ambitions for self-government and control of spheres of sovereignty. Aside from autonomist intellectuals, autonomists are the main proponents of the ideology of autonomism. Their attitudes, ideas, and programs will help us reach a better understanding of the contemporary meaning of autonomism, given that actually existing autonomies do not exhaust the autonomist political imagination. In this chapter, I am interested in presenting a portrait of the autonomist imaginary, and I rely principally on an analysis of the discourse and attitudes of the militants of the autonomist parties of Catalonia and Que´bec, with some reference to other autonomist parties.

Actually Existing Autonomies in the Contemporary World Existing autonomies do not exhaust the imagination of the autonomist political agenda, and thus we need to examine the attitudes and discourse of autonomists (see below). However, in light of our interest in the relationship between autonomism and federalism, we need to scrutinize contemporary cases of actually existing autonomies in order to understand three

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Federalist

Nonfederal autonomies

Devolutionary autonomies

Semi-federal autonomies

Puerto Rico (1952–)

Scotland (1998–)

Catalonia (1978–)

Northern Mariana Islands (1976–)

Wales (1998–)

Basque Country (1978–)

Guam (1950–)

Northern Ireland (1998–)

Galicia (1978–)

Nunavut (1999–)

South Tyrol (1948–)

Isles of Man, Jersey, Guernsey

Valle d’Aosta (1948–)

U.S. Virgin Islands

Sardegna (1948–)

Figure 7.1. Varieties of existing autonomies in federal political systems. Regarding South Tyrol, Italy is a regionalizing and federalizing union state with five autonomous regions, particularly after the Reform of Title V of the Constitution in 2001.

aspects: (1) the degree to which autonomies embody federalist elements in their institutions; (2) the relationship between autonomism and asymmetric federalism and asymmetric federation; and (3) how autonomism and federalism have been treated in consociational theory.

Federalist and Nonfederalist Elements in Contemporary Autonomies Contemporary autonomies embody in their institutional design both federalist and nonfederalist elements. Existing scholarship has failed to explore this important axis of variation among contemporary exemplars of autonomy. Thus, I present in Figure 7.1 an original typology of existing autonomies that shows a continuum between those cases with the most pronounced federalist-like elements and those with the strongest nonfederalist characteristics. Some of the cases of actually existing autonomies are very small territories or have very small populations.3 There is a wide variety of autonomies in the contemporary world (Benedikter 2007), but I will concentrate in the narrative description on some of the larger cases that are

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prototypical exemplars of autonomism encompassed by my scope conditions. In this chapter, I am interested in autonomies located in federations or federal political systems. Given that the latter term is a broad genus, at its outer edge one can find ‘‘decentralized unions with some federal features’’ (Watts 2008), a category that includes the UK and Italy.

Nonfederal Autonomies On one end of the spectrum, we have actually existing autonomies that are nonfederalist territorial units with few federalist elements that in fact exhibit a number of antifederalist characteristics. Some of these cases are ‘‘federacies,’’ and Elazar (1991) cites the Puerto Rico-U.S. relationship as the prototype of a ‘‘federacy,’’ although he mischaracterizes the nature of the relationship, as I explain below.4 There are four ways in which an autonomy such as Puerto Rico is nonfederalist. First, the powers of the autonomic unit are not constitutionally entrenched. Second, an autonomic unit is nonfederalist if it is constitutionally subordinate to the center. In other words, the division of powers between the center and the autonomy is so subaltern that, in essence, the ‘‘shared rule’’ component between the central and subunit governments is weak or practically nonexistent. Third, autonomies are nonfederalist if their influence over the policy-making institutions of the center is extremely weak or negligible. Fourth, autonomies are nonfederalist if the two orders of government are so unequal that the element of ‘‘self rule’’ in the relationship gives the autonomy a special status that is outside the federation that controls the central state. In autonomies such as Puerto Rico, the formal distribution of legislative and executive authority between the two levels of government is not constitutionally entrenched. A review of the origins of the current political status of Puerto Rico as an ‘‘unincorporated territory’’ of the U.S. demonstrates that it is a judicial and statutory creation, not a constitutionally entrenched level of government. Since 1898, Puerto Rico has been an ‘‘unincorporated territory’’ of the United States, and its people are U.S. citizens by virtue of a federal statute passed in 1917. Although the U.S. Constitution provides for ‘‘states’’ and ‘‘territories,’’ the category of ‘‘unincorporated territory’’ was sculpted by the U.S. Supreme Court, which held in a series of cases known as the ‘‘Insular Cases’’ that Puerto Rico belongs to the U.S. but is

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not part of it (Rivera Ramos 2001). In 1952, it was established as an Estado Libre Asociado (ELA), artfully translated into English as ‘‘Commonwealth.’’ Public Law 600 was passed by the U.S. Congress in 1950, and it aimed to provide constitutional government for the people of Puerto Rico. After approval by the people in a referendum, Congress ratified the Puerto Rican Constitution, and the newly baptized ELA came into effect on July 25, 1952 (Ramı´rez Lavandero 1988). Autonomies such as Puerto Rico are nonfederalist because they are constitutionally subordinate to the center. The ‘‘shared rule’’ component between the central state and the autonomous unit is weak or practically nonexistent. The power to terminate or modify the Puerto Rico-U.S. relationship rests squarely with the U.S. Congress, contrary to what Elazar (1987, 1991) asserts. During 1952–1953, the U.S. succeeded in getting Puerto Rico off the agenda of the UN Decolonization Committee, in part by arguing that the ELA was a compact of a bilateral nature whose terms may only be changed by common consent. However, soon thereafter, Congress and the Executive branch started to behave ‘‘as if no compact of any kind existed and as if Puerto Rico continued to be a territory or possession of the United States, completely subject to its sovereign will. Puerto Rico leaders would spend the rest of the century unsuccessfully trying to convince the United States to allow full decolonization’’ (Trı´as Monge 1997; Herna´ndez Colo´n 1991). Supporters of the ELA have tried on several occasions to negotiate a ‘‘culminated ELA,’’ starting with the Ferno´s-Murray bill of 1959, but they have been unable to obtain the consent of the U.S. Congress. However, Congress continues to assume that it can unilaterally exercise plenary powers over Puerto Rico under the territorial clause of the U.S. Constitution, and the U.S. government contends that sovereignty over Puerto Rico resides solely in the United States and not in the people of Puerto Rico (Trı´as Monge 1997). In the ELA-U.S. federal government relationship, there is a ‘‘higher’’ or ‘‘senior’’ level of government and a ‘‘lower’’ or ‘‘junior’’ authority. The subunit government has less sovereignty in its sphere than the federal government in its own. This violates one of the defining elements of the federal idea: that the subunit governments ‘‘have as much sovereignty in their sphere as the . . . federal government has in its’’ (Griffiths, Nerenberg, and Forum of Federations 2005). Autonomies such as Puerto Rico are nonfederalist if their influence over the policy-making institutions of the center is weak or negligible. Under the ELA, Puerto Rico has a degree of self-government, with local government

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institutions that are similar to the ones in the U.S. states. Puerto Rico enjoys fiscal autonomy, and income received from sources in Puerto Rico is not subject to federal personal income taxation. Although most U.S. federal laws apply, Puerto Rico has no effective representation in Congress, except for a token representative who has no right to vote. Nor do the residents of Puerto Rico vote for the U.S. federal executive. This is an element of the status quo that is clearly antifederalist, given that the Puerto Rican case is an extreme one: There is no real representation in the institutions of the central state (Karmis and Norman 2005). On the other hand, local governmental institutions and agencies are controlled by Puerto Ricans; some of the ethnosymbols of nationhood are present in the form of flags, hymns, institutions of culture, education system, and so on; and such matters as representation in sports teams in international events have also become subtle mechanisms of nation-building. Autonomies are also nonfederalist if the two orders of government are so unequal that the element of ‘‘self rule’’ in the relationship gives the autonomy a special status arrangement that is not on an equal footing with the core institutional apparatus of the central state. The ELA is not part of the whole, given that it is a special status that is outside the U.S. federation while being an unincorporated territory that is in a subordinate relationship to the central state. In essence, the ELA-U.S. federal government relationship has some elements of empire and nearly none of federalism. Since the 1950s, autonomism in Puerto Rico has, until recently, been the dominant political tendency, and this long-standing exemplar of territorial autonomy continues to be an acceptable model of autonomy for many in the U.S. government as well.

Devolutionary Autonomies Autonomies that are created in ‘‘union-states’’ or unitary states, undergoing a process of asymmetric decentralization or ‘‘devolution,’’ have some federal features. Those that have been created in the United Kingdom since 1998 are the most illuminating contemporary exemplars of the cases covered by my scope conditions. I will here focus on Scotland, although some of the generalizations will also be applicable to Wales, and, less so, to Northern Ireland (Loughlin 2001; Keating, Salmon, and Queen’s University 2001).

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‘‘Devolution’’ is a distinctly British term coined in the nineteenth century. It has some similarities to federal political systems but with a number of distinct features. Powers and governmental authority have been transferred to the territories and nations, but the ultimate sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament remains unaltered. ‘‘Westminster retains the constituent power and could even suspend or abolish the devolved institutions (as happened in Northern Ireland in 1972, 2000, and 2002)’’ (Keating 2005). The devolved institutions of the UK are not currently constitutionally entrenched, and Westminster could, theoretically, change them unilaterally and by ordinary law. The custom at present is that ‘‘London will ‘normally’ not overrule the Scottish Parliament on devolved matters, but it insists on a residual claim to do so’’ (Keating 2009). These are nonfederalist elements that devolutionary autonomies in the UK share with nonfederalist autonomies such as Puerto Rico because their autonomic (or devolutionary) institutions are constitutionally subordinate to the center. It also violates the general federalist principle that ‘‘federalism involves a polycentric noncentralized arrangement in which neither the constituent governments nor the general government can unilaterally alter the constitutional distribution of power’’ (Griffiths, Nerenberg, and Forum of Federations 2005). The devolved institutions in the UK have a constitutionally subordinate status rather than coordinate status. For many years a unitary state, the United Kingdom has engaged in a process of devolutionary decentralization recently (McGarry 2002). Most scholars would agree with Ronald Watts, who has questioned whether the UK is a ‘‘quasi-federation’’ and has argued that it is closer to the model of a decentralized union with some federal features (Watts 2008: 16; Trench 2007; Keating 2009). In other words, as a ‘‘decentralized union with some federal features,’’ the UK (like Italy) would be a type of ‘‘federal political system’’ only if the latter is defined very broadly (Watts 2008: 8). Moreover, the language of classic federalism may not be sufficient to understand devolutionary autonomies (Suksi 2010). In Scotland, as in federal political systems, some competences have been devolved to Scotland, some have been reserved to the center, and others are shared between the two. Yet, unlike a genuine federation, ‘‘the constitutional limits apply only to Scotland and not to Westminster, which retains the right to legislate even within devolved spheres, although under the Sewell conventions . . . this should happen only with the consent of the Scottish Parliament’’ (Keating 2005). In addition, the UK institutional arrangement is highly asymmetrical, given that ‘‘Westminster continues to

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rule directly in England and proposals for regional government there fall far short of creating units comparable with Scotland. This creates a structural imbalance since Westminster, doubling as the UK and English government, will be the predominant partner’’ (Keating 2005; Trench 2007). Moreover, as Alan Trench noted, the powers of the devolved administrations in the UK are significantly lesser than those of the UK government, which, in many aspects, is able to outmaneuver them. ‘‘Their powers are contingent, dependent on the passive restraint and non-opposition of the UK Government or its active cooperation’’ (Trench 2007: 23). The relationship between the devolved institutions and the UK government is not one of coordinate partners, and thus the name ‘‘federal’’ cannot be fully applied to a system in which the governments of the devolved administrations are subordinate to the center (Suksi 2010; Wheare 1941).

Semi-Federal Autonomies Since the nineteenth century, two visions of Spain have competed with each other: a homogeneous vision that has sought to establish congruence between state and nation and a pluralist vision, which has its roots in the republican federalist tradition (Ghai 2000; Fossas 2000; Keating 2000; McRoberts 2001; Caminal 2002). The Spanish model of state established by the 1978 Constitution is a quasi-federation consisting of seventeen ‘‘autonomous communities’’ (ACs) having the constitutional right to self-rule. Spain is not a federation in name and is not yet a fully formed federation, but it does exhibit some of the institutional characteristics of contemporary federal political systems. According to Eliseo Aja (2003), it is a federal political system because it features the constitutional recognition of the right to autonomy, the institutions of the ACs do not depend on the central state, two levels of government were created when the ACs were configured with their own institutions, and intergovernmental conflicts are resolved by the Constitutional Court according to judicial criteria. The Spanish ‘‘State of Autonomies’’ can be considered an example of ‘‘devolutionary federalism,’’ and is analyzed as such by many scholars (Griffiths, Nerenberg, and Forum of Federations 2005; Moreno 2001). Some have argued that it is in an early stage of an evolutionary path that could lead eventually to a type of asymmetric federalism (Moreno 2001). ‘‘As a unitary state engaged in devolutionary federalization within its own borders by a process characterized by

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considerable asymmetry, Spain is an interesting example of an effort to accommodate variations in the strengths of regional pressures for autonomy’’ (Watts, Queen’s University Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, and Queen’s University School of Policy Studies 1999; Karmis and Norman 2005). Decentralization in Spain is designed for all the territorial subunits, which is characteristic of federations. Yet, as Ferran Requejo Coll (2005: 24) has noted, despite the federalizing impetus of the State of Autonomies, ‘‘there are many arguments that would suggest that perhaps it would be more appropriately situated in the group of ‘regional states.’ ’’ It does not have some of the important institutional and procedural elements that usually define ‘‘federations’’ (Suksi 2010; Fossas 2001; Arbo´s Marı´n 2004). For example, the ACs are not constituent entities. The Constitution establishes ‘‘the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation’’ (Art. 2) and the ‘‘Spanish people’’ as subjects of the ‘‘National sovereignty’’ (Art. 1). In fact, some of the ACs did not even exist before 1978. In addition, the decentralization of legislative powers is unclear. The central state maintains its hegemony through the leyes de base and leyes orga´nicas that are the same throughout the state and can be developed with a centralizing animus. There may be areas of overlap between ‘‘the regulations of central and ‘autonomous’ powers in the majority of subjects without clear procedural rules of ‘shared government’ ’’ (Requejo Coll 2005: 37). Moreover, unlike the executive and legislative powers, the State of Autonomies has had ‘‘practically no effect on the structure of the judiciary, which continues to be that of a centralized state’’ (Requejo Coll 2005: 38). Finally, the State of Autonomies is a long way from any model of fiscal federalism. In sum, the de facto political evolution of the model has demonstrated that Spain still lacks some of the fundamental traits of federations, according to Requejo Coll. Therefore, autonomies such as post-1978 Catalonia, Euskadi, and Galicia are semi-federal autonomies. Of the three types of actually existing autonomies examined here, they have the most pronounced federalist elements, although they are not subunits of a federation. Hence, they are properly classified as autonomies.

Autonomism and Asymmetric Federalism Asymmetry in federal political systems arises to meet the challenges of diversity within federal societies, and it refers to the differentiation of status

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and rights between the constituent units of a federal system (Ghai 2000). In federal systems, two distinct types of asymmetry exist: de jure and de facto. De facto asymmetry refers to variations (commonly observable in most federations) in size and wealth of constituent units, geography, population, economic development, and so on. De jure asymmetry emerges out of deeply rooted historical factors and is often a response to plurinational diversity (Agranoff 1999). Forms of autonomy that are symmetrical are likely to ‘‘work unproblematically only in states that are nationally homogeneous’’ (McGarry 2007). Asymmetry may be further distinguished by whether it relates to fullfledged constituent units of a federal system or to peripheral political units. The latter may be ‘‘peripheral’’ because of geographical remoteness or because they have small populations or are a large but sparsely populated territory. Such territories have commonly required a ‘‘degree of selfgovernment and representation in the central institutions different from the full-fledged member states, thus involving considerable asymmetry’’ (Agranoff 1999: 69). Such territories may be granted a special status arrangement that may exhibit horizontal, vertical, or symbolic asymmetry (Henders 2010). While de jure asymmetry is typical of most federations, it is not universally so (Agranoff 1999; McGarry 2007; Benedikter 2007; Ghai 2000; Le´gare´ and Suksi 2008). Canada, Belgium, Malaysia, and India are the prototypes of federations with asymmetric elements (Ghai 2000; Agranoff 1999; Keating 1999). Moreover, although interest in asymmetry originally arose out of the examination of asymmetrical relations within federations (Tarlton 1965), asymmetry is also observable in the broader genus of ‘‘federal political systems.’’ Actually existing autonomies are typically exemplars of de jure asymmetric arrangements, and they may be full-fledged constituent units of a federal political system (e.g., Catalonia), peripheral units of a federal system (e.g., Puerto Rico), or they may be special status arrangements within a unitary state (e.g., Corsica; Cordell and Wolff 2004; Henders 2010; Le´gare´ and Suksi 2008). Autonomism is, by definition, asymmetrical, and the question of negotiating and sustaining asymmetry is fundamental to the design and operation of autonomy (Ghai 2000; Benedikter 2007). As Rafael Herna´ndez Colo´n, a three-time governor of Puerto Rico and president of the autonomist party for nineteen years, explained when contrasting the ideological stance of federalists with the ideology of autonomism, ‘‘[Federalists] believe that the only way that their federalism can be realized is

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symmetrically. . . . We autonomists are the ones that propose an asymmetrical approach. . . . Now, this is one of the major problems we face when we talk about a ‘‘new pact’’ [with the U.S.] . . . i.e., the symmetry . . . [of the U.S. federation].’’5 In federations and in actually existing autonomies within federal political systems, autonomist parties and their leaders and militants generally reject models of classic federation. They may be advocates of asymmetry within a broadly understood federal political system but not of federation. As one autonomist militant in Puerto Rico wrote, ‘‘The U.S. federation has little flexibility to attend the autonomist claims that Puerto Rico (or other territories) could make in its relation with the U.S.’’6 To the extent they propose a form of autonomism that exists within a broadly defined ‘‘federal political system,’’ the special status arrangement may be a highly asymmetrical form of federal system. But, they are very hesitant to support any model of federalism that resembles a federation. The United States, for example, is a federal political system composed of a symmetrical federation with fifty full-fledged constituent units and the federal capital, two ‘‘federacies,’’ a number of small unincorporated territories, and it maintains relations with three associated states (Griffiths, Nerenberg, and Forum of Federations 2005; Benedikter 2007; Le´gare´ and Suksi 2008). For more than a century, autonomists in Puerto Rico (one of the ‘‘federacies’’) have favored autonomism within the U.S. federal political system but not within the U.S. federation. Similarly, contemporary autonomists in Catalonia favor a special status arrangement within the Spanish state, but they reject a model of federation for Spain. In some contemporary federations, certain national parties of substate national societies may propose asymmetric federation. Such parties are federalist parties with a program for asymmetric decentralization of the federation. At various times since the 1960s, for example, this has been proposed by the Parti Libe´ral du Que´bec (PLQ), and it is proposed at present by the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya. These parties are not supporters of autonomism and are electoral rivals of autonomist parties, given that they are advocates of a model of federation with asymmetric elements. Federations or federal political systems, moreover, may also have national parties of substate national societies that propose autonomism. Generally speaking, autonomist proposals within an existing federation or federal system reject a model of classic federation. Even federations with elements of asymmetry are inadequate in the autonomist political imagination. They are not interested in being a constituent unit of a federation.

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Exemplars of this kind of autonomist parties are Converge`ncia Democra`tica de Catalunya (until 2010), Partido Popular Democra´tico, and the Action De´mocratique du Que´bec (ADQ). Autonomist parties are ideological rivals of parties that favor a model of asymmetric federation, such as Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (IC-V) in Catalonia. Let us recall that Jaume Bosch, the vice-president of IC-V, explained his federalist predilections as follows: ‘‘Many people would say the Spanish state is a federalizing system but in reality it is not. . . . Our starting point is the recognition of Spain as a plurinational and plurilingual state.’’7 As one prominent autonomist leader in Catalonia remarked, ‘‘As a nationalist, I want the maximum sovereignty within a realist context . . . [i.e.,] within a superior political unit.’’8 As my findings below indicate, autonomist militants reject federation because they believe that federations tend to homogenize all of their full-fledged constituent units, even those that have asymmetric features. Autonomists favor, instead, forms of autonomism that are special status arrangements, and some of these models may be asymmetrical arrangements within broadly-defined federal political systems. As Jose´ Arsenio Torres, one of the major intellectual exponents of autonomism in Puerto Rico, explained, ‘‘[The PPD] believes that the ELA represents the best of both worlds: participation in the American world, migration [opportunities], trade, federal transfers . . . [while maintaining] a cultural distance . . . and although we don’t have all the powers of sovereignty, it is a quid pro quo, and thus it is a pragmatic political status.’’9

Autonomism and Federalism in Consociational Theory In deeply divided societies, consociational principles may be usefully applied to ameliorate ethnic conflict and violence. As originally developed by Lijphart and further elaborated by O’Leary, classic consociational democracies are a general type of democracy defined in terms of four broad principles, all of which can be applied in a variety of ways: grand coalition, segmental autonomy (including nonterritorial and territorial autonomy), proportionality, and minority veto (Lijphart 2008). Consociationalism is both an empirical and a normative model (Lijphart 1977). All four consociational features can assume quite different forms, but they do not work equally well in all multi-ethnic societies with consociational institutions. Lijphart has recently emphasized that grand coalition and segmental autonomy are the most crucial principles, and the other two ‘‘occupy a somewhat

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lower position of importance’’ (Lijphart 2008: 34). For Lijphart, segmental autonomy is ‘‘minority rule over the minority itself in matters that are the minority’s exclusive concern,’’ and complements the grand coalition principle (Lijphart 1979: 25). Segmental autonomy can take the form of territorial autonomy or nonterritorial cultural autonomy. ‘‘If the segments are geographically intermixed, autonomy will have to take a mainly nonterritorial form’’ (Lijphart 1995: 36). Nonterritorial and territorial autonomy ‘‘are eminently compatible’’ and can be combined (Lijphart 1995: 37). But, ‘‘a special form of segmental autonomy that is particularly suitable for divided societies with geographically concentrated segments is federalism’’ (Lijphart 1995: 38). Lijphart recommends ‘‘territorial federalism’’ as an institutional form to accommodate substate societies, where the ‘‘segmental cleavages coincide with regional cleavages’’ (Lijphart 1977: 23). In the classical statements by Lijphart, the geographical concentration of ethnic groups in a plural society has the advantage of allowing the application of a model of federation (Lijphart 1977). In these classical statements, Lijphart failed to see the distinctiveness of autonomism as a philosophy of territorial order and as a political ideology. One does not find a recognition that autonomists’ political program is distinct from federalists’ agenda, and he offers no analysis of why autonomists envision autonomy as the ideal constitutional framework, which they differentiate from federation (Lijphart 1979). However, other scholars writing more recently in the consociational tradition have recognized the distinction between federation and the types of special status arrangements that autonomists seek (O’Leary et al. 2005; Weller and Wolff 2005; Wolff 2009). Lijphart (1979) also argued that federations embodied all of the basic consociational principles, even if in rudimentary form. In particular, federations share with consociational democracy two crucial features: the component units of federations enjoy a degree of secure autonomy, and they all share in the decision making at the central level of the state. ‘‘These are the principles of autonomy and power-sharing that are also fundamental features of consociational democracy’’ (Lijphart 1979: 23). Proponents of autonomism, however, are strong advocates of self-government, but not as constituent units of a federation. In contemporary autonomies, autonomists prefer special status arrangements that are not subject to the homogenizing tendencies of federations, as they see it. Moreover, some autonomists are willing to trade the value of meaningful influence on the center for the

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perception of more political autonomy (Le´gare´ and Suksi 2008; Suksi 2011; McGarry 2002). All consociational democracies have segmental autonomy as one of their defining features, but not all existing autonomies have adopted all four of the classic power- sharing practices. There are autonomies—such as Northern Ireland, South Tyrol/Alto Adige, or Brussels—that are regional consociations (Weller and Wolff 2005). Yet, there are also autonomies with very strong autonomist parties that have not adopted any consociational principles aside from the territorial autonomy component (e.g., the Partido Popular Democra´tico) or are located in states that are weak consociational cases. The strong consociational cases at present are Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and Iraq (Taylor 2009). Consociational arrangements at the local or central levels are likely to be found necessary in autonomies that are highly significant relative to the rest of the state and are internally heterogeneous (Wolff 2009).

Autonomists and the Ideology of Autonomist Nationalism Actually existing autonomies do not exhaust the autonomist imagination. In order to understand autonomism as an ideology of territorial order, we need to examine the evidence derived from the discourse of leaders and militants of autonomist parties, centered on four aspects of the autonomists’ credo: Autonomism and Federation. The boundary line between federation and the autonomist program for institution building can be clearly demarcated. My analysis below of the discourse of autonomists will help us see more clearly the contrast between these two models of institutional design. Autonomists are wary of the homogenizing tendencies (according to their perception) of federations. Autonomism and Secessionism. Autonomists generally reject the independence alternative. Autonomism is the search for gradually expanding spheres of self-government within existing state structures. In this sense, autonomism partakes of one element of the federal idea: Autonomism subscribes to the general federalist

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principle that multiple levels of government can lead to better governance in multinational states. Autonomism and Identity. We need to understand the parameters of national and ethnic identity that encompass the autonomist political universe. Federalism in multinational democracies thrives where there are dual national identities (Stepan 2001: 326). However, autonomists are less likely to exhibit dual national identities than mainstream federalists, as can be gleaned from this chapter and previous chapters. Autonomism and Recognition by the Central State. The attitude of autonomists to the central state is fundamental because federalism requires trust and reciprocity between the federal government and the subunit governments. Federalism thrives where there is a ‘‘federal spirit’’ (or Bundestreue) that creates a bond that unites the political community. This includes faith, mutual trust, partnership, loyalty, consent, consultation, reciprocity, tolerance, and respect. Together these principles form the moral foundation of federalism and are the animating principles guiding its evolution (Burgess 2006: 113).

Autonomism and Federation Autonomists tend to be wary of federation. Artur Mas, the president of CiU, had this to say about how CDC’s founder has viewed autonomism: ‘‘I believe that President Pujol has never been a federalist. He always tried to make the most of the statute of autonomy and the Constitution of 1978, interpreting it in a Catalanist and autonomic note. It was logical that he should do that, given that this was the only way available. He lived within that framework, within a Spanish Constitution that he helped to create.’’10 Dolors Batalla was vice-secretary of CDC for political action and strategy when I interviewed her and has also been a member of Parliament. With respect to federation, Batalla echoed the views of other CDC members: ‘‘We try to avoid at all costs any kind of federalism that leads to the homogenization of all the constituent units. . . . In reality, what we are looking for is to have a different and differentiated status within the Spanish state.’’11 As former President Pujol has often emphasized, CiU rejects a model of federation. In Pujol’s view, as he said in a conference in 1996, ‘‘We have to

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say clearly that we are not federalists because federalism, as it is normally understood . . . is a federalism that wants to emerge out of a homogeneous base that does not exist and of a will to homogenize that is unjust toward us’’ (Pujol 1997). Autonomists in Que´bec are also cautious about models of federation. The general idea behind the autonomist nationalism of the ADQ is to ‘‘obtain more power for Que´bec, but within Canada, yet taking into consideration that Que´bec is a nation. Our position is not necessarily against sovereignty nor against Canada. . . . [After two failed referendums,] our position is that the people don’t want another referendum but neither do they want the status quo. We want to see Que´bec recognized as an ‘‘autonomous state,’’ given that we are unlike the other ten provinces. We are different . . . and we want more powers in fields such as immigration and health. . . . In a certain sense, we are more confederalists than federalists.’’12 The ADQ would put into effect the institutional reforms that were recommended by the Jean Allaire Report of January 1991, originally titled Un Que´bec Libre de ses Choix (PLQ 1991). I asked what is the difference between the autonomist proposal of the ADQ and the proposals for a decentralized federalism coming from certain quarters in the PLQ. ‘‘The liberals [PLQ] want piecemeal agreements. We want a completely new [political and] social model.’’ The ADQ stresses that autonomist nationalism has historically been much stronger in the province than independentism.

Autonomism and Secessionism Most mainstream autonomists reject the independence alternative. Autonomism is the search for gradually expanding spheres of self-government within existing state structures. Autonomists seek fragments of sovereignty but not full sovereignty. Ramon Camp has been one of the most distinguished CDC members of parliament and has served as the spokesman of the party in the parliament. He said, ‘‘CDC is not a federalist party but its autonomism . . . [is clearly non-secessionist]. . . . Neither Flanders nor Scotland propose to break with their respective states. Not all nations have to find the political solution to their nationness in independence.’’13 Josep Antoni Duran i Lleida is the President of UDC and, with Artur Mas, part of the duo that

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currently leads CiU. What does UDC aspire to, according to Duran i Lleida? ‘‘Not to separate ourselves from Spain. . . . In 1931 when UDC was founded it had a confederal proposal for all the Spanish state. . . . Our aspiration is that the Spanish state will be able to configure itself as a sum of various nations and not have Spain be identified as the only nation.’’14 CDC’s public face is decidedly autonomist in orientation, even if some of its more recent internal declarations have taken on a more sovereigntist hue (Aguilera de Prat 2002; Guibernau i Berdu´n 2004; Culla 2001b). In sum, CDC and UDC are nationalist and autonomist formations that propose an asymmetric autonomism without renouncing a certain dose of supplemental sovereigntist rhetoric.

Autonomism and Identity As we observed previously with respect to substate nationalists in Que´bec and Catalonia, autonomists have a strong sense of identification with their substate national society, and my findings show that autonomist militants are less likely to exhibit dual national identities than are militants of mainstream pro-federation national parties such as the PLQ of Que´bec. Moreover, let us recall from Part III that the militants of the ADQ strongly identified Que´bec as a nation or as a distinct society and their own party as a national party. Most were inclined to identify strongly with Que´bec, albeit a minority seemed to express dual national identities. The militants of the two Catalan parties, CDC and UDC, were also strongly inclined to identify with Catalonia, and few expressed dual national identities.

Autonomism and Recognition by the Central State I asked the autonomist militants in my questionnaire about their perception of the central state and of the majority nation that generally controls the apparatus of the central state. A significant (yet minority) proportion of autonomist militants expressed negative views of the central state. Many others expressed neutral views, but relatively few expressed positive views. Thirty-six percent of the CDC militants expressed that Spain was a dominating country, an invader, a conqueror by the force of arms, and the like. ‘‘A state that does not want to let us be. A state with different nations

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on which one, the Castilian belligerent, has imposed itself,’’ commented one militant. Fifty-four and one-half percent of CDC respondents said the state was an administrative entity. ‘‘It is an entity, the sum of diverse nations. Us Catalans, we belong there only from an administrative viewpoint.’’ Twenty-five percent of UDC respondents expressed that Spain was an imposition, a conquering power, and the like. ‘‘Spain is a state with a Jacobin vocation where there coexist different nations, not always in a voluntary fashion,’’ summarizes well the sentiment of this cluster of respondents. Sixty-one percent of UDC respondents wrote that Spain was the state, in a rather neutral fashion. Rather unsympathetic views of Canada were expressed by 23.7 percent of ADQ respondents, at times emphasizing the themes of domination and subordination. One militant wrote that ‘‘it is an immense territory, of which I haven’t visited a tenth part of it, that is inhabited by persons having a culture, a language, a history, that are different from mine. I do not feel particularly close to Canada.’’ Forty-one percent of the ADQ militants expressed that Canada was the state, the juridical nation to which they belonged. The last section of the questionnaire I distributed among the militants of the autonomist parties (ADQ, CDC, UDC) asked them to evaluate the relative impact of various factors (using a ten-point scale) on their decision to opt for autonomism as their political orientation. These various factors generally represented cultural, political, and economic considerations. I asked them to sort which of these factors weigh most heavily in their decision to opt for autonomism. I considered only the responses that placed a given factor in the top three deciles in the questionnaire (i.e., 8, 9, or 10 in their response on a 10-point scale). The respondents were provided additional space and additional questions, allowing them to explain their answers (see Table 9.1 in Chapter 9). The autonomist militants indicated in their questionnaire responses and during the focus group interviews that considerations of culture, language, and identity are the primary reasons accounting for their choice of political orientation. This is not surprising: For nationalists, identity is a primary consideration. In the case of CDC, UDC, and ADQ, the second most important bloc of factors influencing their choice were political factors. Especially important was the impact of majority-nation centralist nationalism on their decision to opt for autonomism. The second most important

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political factor was their perception of central state political structures and the likelihood these could accommodate their imagined community. As one CDC militant wrote, ‘‘Our experience with the Spanish state has shown us that it makes us feel like second-class citizens.’’ This is echoed by a UDC militant, who wrote, ‘‘It is an oppressive centralism of conquerors.’’ Their counterparts in the ADQ wrote, ‘‘I am completely allergic to centralism, particularly the Canadian one, because Canada is so different [from Que´bec].’’ Autonomists have strong negative opinions about the likelihood that the political structures of the central state can accommodate them. This is corroborated by the militants’ responses to the question about their perception of the central state. The economic factors, as a bloc, came in third in the case of the Catalans and the Que´be´cois.

Autonomism as an Ideology of Territorial Order The empirical investigation I have conducted into the attitudes and discourse of the militants of three autonomist parties has yielded a rich bounty of data, which we can use to establish the general contours of autonomism as an ideology of territorial order, to understand its vision of sovereignty, and to establish autonomism’s relationship with federalism.

Autonomism and Dual National Identities Autonomism is one of the varieties of minority-nation nationalism. Federalism in multinational democracies thrives where there are dual national identities or dual identification with the two levels of government (Keating 2004; Moreno 2001; Riker 1964). Autonomists have a strong sense of identification with their substate national society as their nation, and although some do have dual national identities, many autonomist militants do not. This is one of autonomism’s antifederalist stances.

Autonomism and Federation Autonomists reject a model of federation because they believe that federations generally lead to the homogenization of all the constituent units. This

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is autonomism’s most characteristic antifederalist stance. They, therefore, advocate a third way between federation and independence, given that models of autonomism may be more flexible and adaptable to the needs of their substate national society.

Autonomism and Secessionism Most autonomists are nationalists. However, most mainstream autonomists reject the independence alternative and wish to work within existing state structures. Moreover, for some autonomists, independence and sovereignty are distinct categories. Autonomism is the search for gradually expanding spheres of self-government within existing state structures. Autonomists, therefore, seek fragments of sovereignty but shun full sovereign statehood. In this sense, autonomism partakes of one key element of the federal idea: Autonomism subscribes to the general federalist principle that advocates multiple levels of government within the same state. There may be juridical or political barriers that impede the expansion of their sphere of selfgovernment within existing state structures. Autonomism’s challenge is to find mechanisms, processes, and institutional openings that will overcome such obstacles, within extant state structures.

Autonomism and Recognition by the Central State Federalism requires trust and reciprocity between the federal government and the subunit governments. Federalism also flourishes where one can establish a sense of federal loyalty, Bundestreue, or loyaute´ fe´de´rale, which is more than the moral commitment to work together in a federal polity. It is the willingness to compromise, reciprocate, and work with one’s federal partners (Griffiths, Nerenberg, and Forum of Federations 2005). This includes faith, mutual trust, loyalty, compromise, reciprocity, and respect, which together form the moral foundation of the federation and are the animating force of its development. ‘‘It is the federal spirit that serves as the ubiquitous operative principle in the overall quest for justice, equity and equality in all federations’’ (Burgess 2006: 113). My findings show, however, that many autonomist militants have relatively little trust in the institutions of the central state and are pessimistic about the prospects for

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accommodation by the central state. This is the most profound of autonomism’s antifederalist stances.

Autonomist National Parties and Their Visions of Sovereignty As noted in Chapter 1, it is useful to think of the varieties of substate national parties as a continuum (see Table 1.2 of that chapter for some of the major cases encompassed by my scope conditions). As previously presented, the list of autonomist national political parties covered by my scope conditions includes Converge`ncia Democra`tica de Catalunya (CDC), Unio´ Democra`tica de Catalunya (UDC), Action De´mocratique du Que´bec (ADQ), Partido Popular Democra´tico (PPD), Unione di U Populu Corsu/ Unione Naziunale, Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV),15 Union Valdotaˆine (UV), ALPE, and Su¨dtiroler Volkspartei. One of the key distinctions that should be made with respect to autonomist parties is whether they are instrumental or teleological autonomists. Instrumental autonomists embody a vision of sovereignty in which autonomy is a valuable vehicle for achieving their self-determination objectives, but in the long run they also consider autonomy as a way station, as a stepping stone toward some other political alternative, closer to the ideal of sovereignty. Teleological autonomists, in contrast, espouse a vision of sovereignty that tends to see autonomy itself as the end result of their political quest, and, even if they may make rhetorical appeals to sovereignty, they ultimately settle for autonomy as an end in itself. As shown in Figure 7.2, autonomist parties can be placed along a continuum having an instrumental-teleological autonomism axis. This is not the only possible or meaningful continuum for these parties, but it is relevant for this chapter, showing the degree of commitment a party has to autonomy as an end in itself or whether autonomy is instrumentalized as a temporary way station, en route to more sovereigntist proposals.

Converge`ncia Democra`tica de Catalunya (CDC) At the foundational Assembly of CDC, held in November 1974, a communique´ was published as follows: ‘‘A federal organization of the Spanish state

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Fragments of Sovereignty 183 Instrumental

CDC

UDC

Teleological

ADQ

UV

PPD

Figure 7.2. An indicative instrumental/teleological autonomism continuum. CDC has an instrumental conception of public powers, the Statute of Autonomy, and the Spanish Constitution of 1978. In essence, this is its model of state: to build the nation with the available tools (Caminal 2001: 148). CDC and UDC separately do seem to be on the instrumental autonomist end of the scale, yet, when they present themselves together in CiU, as they do at every election, the public track record of CiU seems to be closer to the teleological autonomist end.

could be a political form that secures the liberties of Catalonia and its relations of solidarity with the other peoples of the Spanish state.’’ The new organization’s second Assembly was held on November 15, 1975 and was attended by close to 200 delegates, including historic militants of the UDC. The Assembly was dedicated to discussing statutory and programmatic elements without approving the statutes or any document (Marcet 1987: 25). The new organization was formally constituted as a party at its third Assembly of March 28, 1976, and at the fourth Congress of January 1977, the party’s formal statutes were approved and the organizational structure of the party was improved, in preparation for the elections of 1977 (49). The documents from the first few Congresses (First to Fourth) say remarkably little about the political status options favored by the party. Instead, the documents from these early Congresses focus on social and economic policy—proposing a center-left, quasi social-democratic program—and cultural policy and municipal-level proposals. In 1978, CDC was defining itself as, first and foremost, a nationalist party. It was mindful of the coexistence of two cultural-linguistic communities in Catalonia and of the need to avoid a social fracture (CDC 1978: 6). It declared that CDC was interested in ‘‘mobilizing all those who believe the first condition of our liberty is our existence as a people, meaning that we are Catalans first’’ (7). Its nationalism was interested ‘‘in having the Spanish state functioning properly, and that its institutions become stable as a guarantor of our own stability’’ (7). The nationalism of CDC joins the two branches of Catalanism: the popular branch, with its contentious and intransigent properties, rooted in the sentiments, and the politically institutionalized branch, inspired by the right to national self-determination. CDC had a clear and rotund

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nationalist message. It is an open-ended process of national liberation that, starting from the fact of the existence of the Generalitat, offers the people the development of its full potential for popular sovereignty, without falling into the trap of federal formulas. It offers a strategy based on an ´etapiste struggle, which will permit them to obtain the liberty they need in each of the successive historic moments (18). CDC’s nationalist formula was, thus, based on ‘‘an open-ended process of national liberation, sociological pluralism, ideological diversity, and the will to construct a country’’ (19). CDC saw itself as neither left nor right but as a party dedicated at all times to the nation, and its mission is not to fragment nor to question but to unify and to consolidate all the diverse forces possible (22). With the approval of the new Spanish Constitution of 1978 and the new Statute of Autonomy of 1979, the party’s attention was focused on developing the potential of this new framework. The ‘‘Position Statements’’ approved at the Seventh Congress of CDC, January 11–13, 1985, trace the nationalist political strategy of the party. CDC inserts itself within the confines of the ‘‘perspective defined by the historically majoritarian Catalanism; based on the defense of the national personality of Catalonia and, at the same time, a search for a global solution for Spain as a state, and to advance and deepen this projection toward the rest of Spain’’ (CDC 1985: 10). Outside of Catalonia, the party was concerned with intervening at the level of the Spanish state as Catalans, contributing to the social, political, and cultural development of the peoples of Spain. The historically majoritarian Catalanism has always affirmed Catalonia while holding forth a vision of Spain as a state—a vision that has always responded to a concept of pluralism, Europeism, and progressivism and a will to have the state structured in a way that will reflect the national and regional pluralism of the Spanish state and, concretely, the national personality of Catalonia (16). The ‘‘Position Paper on Nationalist Strategy’’ at the Eighth Congress, January 27–29, 1989, was already stating that although during the 1980s the nation had advanced in its self-government to the point that, according to the party, the country had reached the highest levels of institutional development during the last 250 years, the current level of self-government was insufficient to fulfill the needs of Catalonia for the near future (CDC 1989: 47). The party insisted that the cultural and linguistic profile of the nation’s national identity needed to be totally recognized and accepted (48). The Statute of Autonomy of 1979 is seen as a pact between two national realities and, as such, must be respected. But, the party believes that the

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PSOE-controlled government of the 1980s had been formulating a regressive interpretation of autonomic policy. The Spanish government had a centralist vision of the statute, incompatible with its full potential. CDC affirmed that its presence in Spanish politics has to be driven by the conviction that only a policy of insistent autonomism, with a Europeanist accent and a principled acceptance of society’s role, could lead to a better fit of the nation within the Spanish state (61). As a nationalist party, CDC’s commitment is to two fundamental ideas, which are like the two extremes of the same axis: the recognition of Catalonia as a nation and the political power that derives from this recognition. For CDC, in 1996, to promote the former, it was necessary to have a state pact between their nation and Spain, which would serve as a prolongation of the existing Constitution. The pact would recognize the national identity of Catalonia and, consequently, Spain as a plurinational state, with the component nations cooperating with each other instead of in a state of subordination (CDC 1996: 27). CiU (a federation since 2001) reached a zenith in its sovereigntist impulses in the ‘‘Declaration of Barcelona’’ of July 16–17, 1998, which was a joint declaration prepared by three substate nationalist formations: CiU, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco, and the Bloque Nacionalista Gallego. This declaration provided a joint vision of the progress made under the Spanish Constitution of 1978 and its state of autonomies toward the recognition of the plurinational nature of Spain, and it was supplemented by a ‘‘Working Statement.’’ The latter document declared that, 20 years after the new Constitution, the Spanish state had failed to recognize the plurinational nature of the peoples within it. The principle of sovereignty is qualitatively different from the principle of self-government that developed through the statutes of autonomy, which only suppose a process of political and administrative decentralization because the constitutive element of power continues to be located in the state. We have to surpass the autonomic formula because it is a privilege granted by a state, which, according to the constitutional formula, is based in a single nation, unique and indivisible, the Spanish nation, negating the plurinational character of the state and the coexistence of other nations. The Spanish state is the institution that negates our sovereignty as nations and the political space for conquering our national liberty,

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through a joint action for configuring a plurinational state of a confederal nature. (CDC 1998b) Among the concrete rights these parties claim jointly are the full and exclusive competence over language and cultural legislation, the analysis of the role of the Senate in a plurinational state, the power to name magistrates of the Constitutional Court in Madrid, and expansion of juridical competences (CDC 1998b). The ‘‘Declaration of Barcelona’’ and its accompanying ‘‘Working Statement’’ were followed by the ‘‘Agreement of Gasteiz’’ of September 16, 1998 and the ‘‘Agreement of Santiago de Compostela’’ of October 29–31, 1998 (CDC 1998a). Yet, as one analyst has pointed out, the ‘‘Declaration of Barcelona’’ was basically a nonoperating document that did not affect in any way the pact with the Partido Popular of 1996, and it was, in fact, placed in a state of dormancy by CiU (Aguilera de Prat 2002: 190). By 1999, President Jordi Pujol, in a key conference titled ‘‘Political Power in Catalonia: An Instrument at the Service of Its Citizens,’’ had steered the party (and UDC, too) back to its pragmatist and possibilist core principles (Caminal 2001: 156). Moreover, the joint ‘‘Electoral Program’’ of CDC and UDC, as CiU, for the elections to the Catalan Parliament of 1999, dedicates the first chapter to an analysis of the current autonomy arrangement. ‘‘The balance of the Spanish State of Autonomies that can be made during the last twenty years is positive’’ (CDC 1999: 24). ‘‘The autonomy of Catalonia has served to facilitate human and economic development,’’ it states (27). Although the first twenty years of autonomy have been positive, CiU maintained that more needed to be done in two areas: redress the financial insufficiency and the limitation of competencies (31–32). Although, as we have seen above, CiU’s electoral programs clearly identify it as an autonomist party, in CDC’s documents for its most recent Congresses (through 2010), one can read a more sovereigntist impulse, possibly for the consumption of its militants. In its Eleventh Congress, held in November 10–12, 2000, the Position Statement 噛1, titled ‘‘Catalonia First,’’ was chock full of sovereigntist declarations. ‘‘CDC believes that the level of self-government achieved from 1979 to 2000 is a significant achievement, but more can be obtained.’’ The new impulse for greater portions of self-government is to be ‘‘derived from the majoritarian current of political catalanism, trying to integrate the multiplicity of their perceptions of identity, but adapted to the social, economic, and political conditions of the

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present. It prioritizes the promotion of a national identity, in order to attain and develop, just as our statutes say, full national sovereignty’’ (CDC 2000: 3–4). The party’s militants stated, ‘‘We want to close an autonomic stage characterized by the need to revindicate competences and to open another stage. A new stage in which the people will have the necessary conscience to self-determine with liberty toward the exercise of state powers, with the interdependencies it wishes to accept, starting from its own sovereignty, in the context of the Europe of the peoples’’ (CDC 2000: 6). At CDC’s Thirteenth regular Congress, held in July, 2004, it produced a Position Statement 噛1, titled ‘‘Country, Politics, and Progress,’’ and therein it declared the national project of increased self-government, which CDC has developed since 1979, needs to be updated. ‘‘Our future project is to attain the full political recognition of Catalonia as a European nation and the progress of its people’’ (CDC 2004a: 2). CDC’s vision for its medium- and long-term objectives reveals its newly found sovereigntist affinities. ‘‘CDC wants to assume its new responsibilities that the people of Catalonia demand. . . . We desire to invest in our present and future in leading us toward full sovereignty . . . obtaining progressively more quotas of liberty that will take us to be a normalized independent country. . . . In other words, the militants of CDC want the right and the obligation to work for a Catalonia without limits, with full national sovereignty’’ (CDC 2004a: 62–63). Its section 3.3, ‘‘From Autonomy to Sovereignty,’’ declares, ‘‘It is necessary to give Catalonia the maximum power its citizens desire’’ (66). Furthermore, ‘‘today, there are no obstacles to advancing toward more sovereignty, in the direction of a plurinational State. . . . [However,] federalism, as it is currently proposed by certain political forces [PSC], . . . starts from a will to homogenize, which is unjust toward the Catalan people. There is nothing more unjust than to treat as equal something that is not so. The model of state CDC proposes is a confederal one’’ (68). Thus, CDC proposes a new statute of autonomy that will accept without conditions the plurinational, pluricultural, and plurilinguistic dimensions of Spain (71).

Summary: CDC and Its Vision of Sovereignty In studying the political orientation of CDC, it should be noted that the position statements that have the most sovereigntist tone are all internal

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documents of the party, typically produced at the National Congresses, and mostly for the consumption of its militants. CDC’s public face is decidedly autonomist in orientation, even if some of its more recent internal declarations have taken on a more sovereigntist hue. Furthermore, it is important to note that CDC and UDC present themselves to elections within the federation of CiU, and the public face of the federation is even more decidedly autonomist in its orientation than the individual positions of the two parties in their internal documents and position statements, through 2010. I concur with Aguilera de Prat (2002: 254), who writes that CiU cultivates a studied ambiguity and often evades clear definitions, but, in the end, it is an autonomist formation, although it reserves the right to make rhetorical references full of sovereigntist flourishes. In any case, CiU has repeatedly stated that its project of nation-building can be plainly accommodated within Spain, and, hence, its strategy is not independentist, preferring to orient itself toward the construction of a plurinational Spain (256). CiU is a nationalist formation more in an ontological sense, and it maintained its non-separatist stance in the period through 2010 (Guibernau i Berdu´n 2004: 151; Culla 2001a: 159). It is important to note that CDC’s stance has changed dramatically and swiftly since 2010, but this book covers the period through 2009. Yet, as President Pujol (1997: 75) has often emphasized, CiU rejects federalism as well. As Pujol said in a conference in 1996, ‘‘The nationalism of CDC promotes the realization of Catalonia as a nation within the framework of the Spanish state, and that sets some limits to sovereignty. Within these limits, we pretend to promote national selfaffirmation and an efficient self-government’’ (150). In sum, CiU has historically been a nationalist, yet autonomic, formation that proposes an asymmetric autonomism, without renouncing a certain dose of supplemental sovereigntist rhetoric (308). It is properly classified as an ‘‘instrumental autonomist’’ national party.

´ Democra`tica de Catalunya (UDC) Unio UDC, in its doctrinal declaration of March 1963, stated that for the diverse peoples of the Iberian peninsula the institutional structure that best can accommodate them is a confederation based on the principles of political independence, economic interdependence, and fraternal spirit.

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At the Seventeenth Ordinary National Congress, held March 10–11, 1990, the party confirmed its confederalist orientation: Unio´ has always affirmed the right of Catalonia to participate as a people in the democratic construction of a plurinational state that guarantees coexistence and solidarity. Hardly anyone can accuse UDC of political ambiguity, which has always proposed a vertebration of Spain through a federal process that guarantees the respect of the personality of all the peoples that compose it. From the selfsame foundational declaration where we defended Confederation, up to the federal positioning, throughout the constituent debate, Unio´ has never wanted to conceal its way of resolving the fit of Catalonia within the Spanish framework. We have not been in and we will not be in Spanish politics to renounce our doctrinal axes. UDC, however, is a party with governing responsibilities and has opted and will continue to opt for deepening the autonomic process. . . . We will not be stuck in an ideological debate about our rights; on the contrary, we will deepen our real framework that makes it possible. (UDC 1990: 7) At its Eighteenth National Congress, held on June 28, 1992, the ‘‘Position Statement on Political Strategy’’ of the party insisted on ‘‘claiming for Catalonia the totality of the possible transfers as well as the application of all the constitutional provisions of article 150.2 so that the Generalitat becomes the sole administrative entity of the state, whether of matters of its own ambit or by delegation. . . . The State of Autonomies is not exhausted by mere administrative decentralization of functions, but by respect for the differential fact of the historic nationalities. This is the valid interpretation of the State of Autonomies, which is a form of construction of the plurinational state en route to the ideal confederation’’ (UDC 1992: 6). UDC accepts the current statutory and constitutional framework, with the intent of having it develop immediately, so as to make progress in the recognition of the historic nationalities (12). Yet, as a long-term objective, UDC proposes the refoundation of Spain as a confederation. ‘‘The logical structure of the plurinational state is the confederation of the historic nationalities with the rest of the state, configured as a conglomeration of Autonomous Communities’’ (12). UDC gave the current statute critical and instrumental approval in 1979, but it has maintained, as a maximum

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program, a confederal articulation between the diverse peoples of Spain (Culla 2002: 50). At the Twentieth National Congress of February 1997, UDC showed signs of taking a stronger ‘‘confederalist’’ turn. It declared that in matters of identity, culture, and language, it wished to create a confederal structure for Catalonia, at both the domestic and international levels. In the economic sphere, the party would defend a federal structure. For the rest, it assumed the present autonomic constitutional structure (UDC 1997). As Joan Culla (2002: 62) writes, the latest stance of the party and of Josep A. Duran Lleida (president of the party) with respect to the political orientation of the party can be summarized by the vindication of a confederal state in matters of language, culture, and civil law, federal in economic structure, and for the rest, autonomic. The official stance of the party during 1976–2010 is more clearly evident in its position statement on ‘‘The Sovereignty of Catalonia and the Plurinational State,’’ discussed at the National Council held in May 1997 at Sant Cugat (UDC 1997). In his opening remarks, Joan Rigol i Roig, president of UDC, made reference to the original confederal vision of UDC, as seen in its Declaration of Principles of 1932. While putting forward a set of proposals to guarantee the recognition of Catalonia within the Spanish state, he insisted they were not proposals to change their ideal of confederation. The latter remains on their long-term horizon (6). He cited the words of Miquel Coll i Alentorn in 1966: ‘‘As a definitive solution UDC proposes a confederal organization of the Iberian peninsula, and as a more short-term solution we propose to obtain from a future Constitutional Court a federal organization of the Spanish state.’’ In his opening remarks, Josep A. Duran i Lleida pointed out that the proposal of UDC remains the same as it was in 1931: UDC would structure —in case the circumstances would arise to permit it—a future Spain that would become a freely pacted federation while respecting the inalienable sovereignty of the Catalan people (UDC 1997: 9). Duran stated that ‘‘even though the degree of national consciousness of the six million inhabitants has increased, it is not possible to fully realize in practice the principles that UDC has defended. We could limit ourselves to articulate a proposal of sovereignty that disposes of Spain, and to do merely a secessionist statement that UDC has never made, but this objective would not coincide with the evolution of the times, nor would it respect the numerous and diverse links of all kinds that we have with the rest of the state, nor obviously fit with

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the national consciousness of the country’’ (9). UDC instead opted for incremental steps in the direction of its objectives. In the main body of the position statement for which Duran i Lleida and Rigol i Roig gave their opening remarks, UDC’s current stance is further explained. With regard to the nationalism of UDC, the text cites again the 1934 words of Miquel Coll i Alentorn: ‘‘for UDC the national problem of Catalonia is stated in terms of national sovereignty. ‘We do not feel the hysteria of separatism, but we also do not feel the panic of separatism’ ’’ (UDC 1997: 14). Furthermore, in its ‘‘actual historic concretion and in the social and economic reality that is Catalonia today, the realization of our country’s goals could possibly not pass through having our own State, but by a series of instances and democratic structures of intermediate political power that could be opening successively and that would channel the impulse and the will for sovereignty of the Catalan people’’ (29). With regard to plurinational Spain, the same document continues, ‘‘the plurinationality of a state does not suppose its disaggregation. To the contrary, when plurality exists, its recognition is the only way of making possible the state in democracy. This is the lesson we derive from the Swiss system. . . . What does suppose a tension is the existence of a homogenizing state that wants to erase a plural reality’’ (36). In the ‘‘Political Criteria’’ section within the same document, which attempts to synthesize the current position of the party, the party states, ‘‘We know we cannot coexist within a state, Spain, as long as it is culturally homogenizing and financially centralized; it cannot be politically our national referent, but one with which we have geographic, economic, historic, familiar, and affective links of great magnitude’’ (UDC 1997: 39). Furthermore, ‘‘we vindicate for Spain a model of vertebration articulated over the respect for nations that is derived from the initial plurality of the Aragon Crown and that is going to be maintained under the personal union of the monarchy in the time of the Catholic Kings and of the Austrian dynasty. . . . UDC is loyal to its historic vindication of a ‘confederation of Iberian peoples.’ Today, however, it is necessary to translate it into a political language that is constitutionally actualized: the vindication of the national plurality of a state and its organization, starting with the existing diverse national realities. A common and shared state can guarantee to Catalonia the plain exercise of its political and spiritual sovereignty’’ (40). The formulation of a specific design is mentioned in the last section of the document: ‘‘this state should be configured to reflect a tripartite reality:

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confederal in everything that affects the identity of Catalonia and the other national realities, as well as in the policies of social cohesion; federal in economic, financial, and fiscal matters; and autonomic, but not symmetric’’ (41). This proposal for a tripartite division of powers would work as follows. As a nation, Catalonia would be sovereign and have true exclusive competence in the regulation and management of culture, of language, and of the Civil Law. In economic matters, especially fiscal and financing matters, a federal structure is sought, so that each territory contributes to the definition of a common policy. Finally, on all other matters, the party is ready to assume the current autonomic structure, so long as its original spirit of asymmetry is respected (42–44). Finally, the party believes the model of state it proposes—a hybrid that is confederal, federal, and autonomic asymmetric—‘‘fits within the current constitutional framework. Its implementation only requires some constitutional adjustments so as to make the letter of the Constitution much more coherent with the constituent spirit’’ (49).

Summary: UDC and Its Vision of Sovereignty In studying the political orientation of UDC, as is the case with CDC, it is important to note that CDC and UDC present themselves to elections within the federation of CiU, and the public face of the federation is even more decidedly autonomist in its orientation than the individual positions of the two parties in their internal documents and position statements, through 2010. As we noted above, the electoral programs of CiU from the early 1980s to 2010 are clearly autonomist in their political orientation. CiU has repeatedly stated that its project of nation building can be plainly accommodated within Spain, and, hence, its strategy is not independentist, preferring to orient itself toward the construction of a plurinational Spain. Moreover, the UDC position statements and declarations often tend to use the concepts ‘‘confederal’’ and ‘‘confederation’’ in a rather ambiguous way, sometimes seemingly using these terms to refer to asymmetric varieties of a federal political system. As Aguilera de Prat (2002: 191) notes, UDC maintains in its discourse the foundational confederal proposal of 1931, but at times with a notable conceptual confusion—which is observable, for example, in the Declaration of Barcelona—wherein it proposes a ‘‘confederal state’’. As the leader of the Unio´ de Joves (youth wing) of UDC (at the time I interviewed him) explained it,

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Most of our militants are more autonomist than independentist, and for sure they are convinced nationalists and see Catalonia as a national reality that is differentiated from the Spanish nation. . . . About the model of state, UDC says it is for confederation, and that would mean that Catalonia would become a state because confederations are composed of states . . . but since Unio´ is in a federation with CDC (within CiU), maybe this is not very well known because it doesn’t get out the door. . . . It may be that what is well known is the CiU brand that is known by the public. . . . Unio´ will never come out in public for independence, especially because Jordi Pujol [during 23 years] always said aixo` no toca,16 that we are autonomists and we will see about that later.17 It is appropriate to classify UDC as an ‘‘instrumental autonomist’’ national party.

Action De´mocratique du Que´bec (ADQ) In the working documents for the ADQ’s General Council, held on May 6–7 2006 at Granby, the party stated, ‘‘the Que´be´cois constitute today a national community formed by a French Canadian base in addition to all the residents of Que´bec that issue from other origins and who wish to form part thereof. The ADQ conceives this nation as including our official anglophone minority, the indigenous communities, and the immigrants who have freely chosen to adhere to the Que´be´cois nation, while conserving their own identity’’ (ADQ 2006: 22). Also, for the party, ‘‘the Que´be´cois share with the other Canadians a history, a geography, the political institutions of British derivation, and a common economic space. Even though we have our own collective identity, we share also with the other Canadians all form of values that distinguish Canada from the U.S. and other Western countries. These common values include the value given to social cooperation and a reticence to judicialize social conflicts, the commitment to provide all citizens with health insurance, a rejection of the death penalty, a more multilateral and less militarist position on international affairs’’ (21). The ADQ also stated, ‘‘the Que´be´cois have exercised their right to selfdetermination twice in the space of one generation and remain free to

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choose their political and constitutional future. We interpret the referendum results of 1980 and 1995 as a desire for more autonomy, within a more decentralized Canada, and we see Que´bec as one of the partner states in the Canadian Confederation. The ADQ believed another referendum would be contrary to the interests of Que´bec and would represent an error. . . . [Moreover] as the only government controlled by the Que´be´cois nation, the government of Que´bec has the particular responsibility of assuring the perpetuity and prosperity of the Que´be´cois nation in the Americas’’ (21). For the ADQ, the ‘‘autonomist project is translated into a collective will by the Que´be´cois to occupy themselves with their affairs while remaining within a bigger ensemble. It reflects the sentiment of belonging of numerous Que´be´cois to the Que´bec nation and to the country of Canada. It is concretized in the proclamation of the autonomous State of Que´bec and the adoption of a Que´bec Constitution and the exercise of governmental responsibilities. It affirms our will and our capacity to advance supporting ourselves on our own resources’’ (22). For the Fifth Congress of ADQ members, held on September 25–26, 2004 at Drummondville, the members of the Corve´e Place du Que´bec prepared the party’s most complete statement on its autonomist position to date, which was later disseminated in a document titled ‘‘Projet: L’ADQ—La Voie Autonomiste.’’ The ADQ stated, ‘‘our primary fidelity, our passion and our loyalty are toward Que´bec; all those who live in Que´bec are the Que´be´cois, without exception; the development for Que´bec as a distinct nation passes naturally by a growth in our autonomy; we respect the Canadians outside Que´bec, we appreciate our common history and we consider them like our privileged partners’’ (ADQ 2004b: 3). The ADQ estimated that it is time to ask sovereigntists if it is still pertinent to want to continue having referendums, repeatedly. More than waiting for a ‘‘yes’’ to a question to which the Que´be´cois have already said ‘‘no’’ twice, or worse risking a third ‘‘no’’ that will further weaken Que´bec, it is time to examine new approaches, to explore new avenues, to turn toward new horizons to advance the autonomy of the Que´be´cois people (3). ‘‘On the federal side, it is hardly better. The federal government has not shown any sign that it understands the need for autonomy of the Que´be´cois. . . . Apart from the federal intention, the idea of sovereignty in Que´bec will never die. We believe that the energy that is at the source of this project, which resides in the will for progress of our people, ought to be channeled in the following years to construct a strong and proud society’’ (4). The ADQ concludes,

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‘‘for a long time, the Que´be´cois have been divided between sovereigntists and federalists. Our families, our workplaces, our neighborhoods have been divided, even torn. Today, we refuse to be forced to have the label ‘sovereigntists’ or ‘federalists.’ We are ‘autonomists’ ’’ (4). The ADQ further explains its autonomist orientation18 this way: The philosophy behind the Que´be´cois autonomist movement is that a Que´be´cois autonomy ought to be exercised within a truly confederal cadre. . . . Within an ideal federation, Que´bec’s autonomy would have been able to accommodate Que´bec’s desire to expand. [Also] . . . the powers reserved to the central government would be clearly defined in accordance with our common interests and the federal institutions that are prone to intervene unjustifiably would be reformed, if not abolished. This vision is shared by the Rapport Allaire. The report ‘‘previews the political autonomy of Que´bec through the exclusive occupation of numerous camps of competence and the elimination of the federal spending power and its residual power.’’ It demands the repatriation of all the sectors touching upon the development of the Que´be´cois identity. (ADQ 2004b: 13) The ADQ proposes the adoption of a Constitution for Que´bec as an act of national affirmation. It proposes also to adopt officially the name ‘‘Autonomous State of Que´bec’’ for Que´bec. It also proposes to make the Que´bec government the sole collector of the federal taxes in the province, which would then be transferred to the federal government. The ADQ also proposes to address the fiscal disequilibrium between the federal government and the provincial government, as decried by all political forces in Que´bec, and the Rapport Seguin.19 The ADQ was founded in 1994, and its most dynamic period was from 1994 to 2008. During 2000 and 2001, the party undertook a programmatic consolidation, developing a more coherent set of values and principles. In the provincial elections of April 14, 2003, the party obtained 18 percent of the vote but obtained only five members of the National Assembly, due to the distortion caused by the electoral system, which penalizes third parties. In the provincial elections of March 26, 2007—to the surprise of many political observers—the ADQ came second in the province, beating the PQ and becoming the official opposition to the PLQ minority government of

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Premier Jean Charest. It obtained 30.80 percent of the vote and 41 seats in the Que´bec National Assembly. If it had obtained five more seats, Mario Dumont would have become the premier of the province. However, in the provincial elections of December 8, 2008, it lost these gains and received only 16 percent of the vote. In 2008, Mario Dumont resigned as party leader, and the party has had difficulty in reorganizing itself after these setbacks, but it has been the carrier of autonomist nationalism in the province for over a decade, and it has represented the elusive third way, according to former ADQ president Guy Laforest, in between the politics of identity of the PQ and the politics of interest of the PLQ. This book covers the period through 2010, but it should be noted that in December 2011, the ADQ opted to fuse with a new political party led by Franc¸ois Legault, the Coalition Avenir Que´bec, a nationalist party that promises not to demand the sovereignty of Que´bec if it wins the provincial election (Lessard 2011).

Summary: The ADQ and Its Vision of Sovereignty The ADQ was part of the coalition in favor of the pro-sovereignty option in the 1995 Referendum. After the pro-independence option lost, the party developed its autonomist political program with more consistency. Its leaders do not seem to reject independence if it were to come, even though they promote a clear autonomist orientation. A significant portion of its militancy declares itself pro-sovereignty. According to Claude Bariteau, a respected anthropologist at Universite´ Laval, more than 50 percent of the supporters (partisans) of the ADQ were favorable to sovereignty. Thus, the ADQ is properly classified as an ‘‘instrumental autonomist’’ party, although it is considerably less ‘‘instrumental’’ than other autonomist parties such as the Partido Nacionalista Vasco or Converge`ncia Democra`tica de Catalunya, for example.

Conclusion: Autonomism and Its Vision of Sovereignty I have analyzed the attitudes and discourse of the militants and leaders of autonomist parties in a constituent unit of a relatively decentralized federation with elements of asymmetry (Canada) and in a semi-federalist autonomy that is part of an asymmetric federal political system (Spain). Despite

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the diversity in these federal systems, autonomist parties have developed autonomism as a coherent ideology of territorial order with a common core of principles. Autonomism is a powerful force in a wide variety of institutional contexts in the contemporary world. The autonomist imaginary challenges mainstream conceptions of the nation-state, sovereignty, and citizenship. Actually existing autonomies in the contemporary scene embody both federalist and nonfederalist elements in their institutional design and range from non-federal autonomies to semi-federal ones. Yet, actually existing autonomies do not exhaust the ambitions or the inventiveness of the autonomist political agenda. Autonomism may also put forward models of institutional design that are currently nonexistent. Thus, I have probed the attitudes and discourse of autonomist leaders and militants in three major autonomist parties in order to understand autonomism as an ideology of territorial order and to present a portrait of its vision of sovereignty. Autonomists seek fragments of self-government and some elements of sovereignty within existing state structures. With respect to the vision of sovereignty held by autonomist parties, I have shown the need to distinguish between instrumental autonomist parties and teleological autonomist parties. I have also shown that autonomism is a normative term that recommends the adoption of autonomist principles and opts for territorial autonomy as the ideal institutional framework for accommodating national diversity. Autonomism shares some of the normative aspirations of federalism, but it is generally distinct from federalism. Autonomists are wary of federalism because they believe it has homogenizing and uniformizing tendencies. Thus, a model of classic federation is not agreeable to autonomist parties. Autonomists also generally find that federations with elements of asymmetry do not fulfill their political agenda. Yet, autonomism is the search for gradually expanding spheres of selfgovernment within existing state structures, and thus autonomists adopt elements of the federal idea, given that they are advocates of special status arrangements, which are models of multilevel government within the same state. Moreover, autonomists may be supporters of asymmetry within a broadly understood ‘‘federal political system,’’ but not in a classic federation. The virtues of autonomism are its hybridity, malleability, and multiplicity. My empirical findings show that autonomism as an ideology of territorial order and institutional design exhibits a number of clear antifederalist stances, yet it is based on the general federalist principle that multiple levels

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of government can lead to better governance within the same state, combining elements of shared-rule with partial territorial self-rule. To this complex antifederalist and federalist hybrid stance, autonomism adds a nuanced antisecessionism stance. Its antifederalist stance has four basic components: diminished predominance of dual national identities, rejection of federation’s homogenizing and uniformizing tendencies, negative perception of the possibilities for recognition and accommodation by the central structures of the state, and (in some cases) willingness to trade the value of meaningful influence on the center for the perception of more autonomy. Autonomism succeeds as an ideology of territorial order because of its hybridity and multiplicity: It can perfectly balance its antifederalist stances with its grounding in the federalist principle of multiple levels of government within the same state apparatus, complemented by its antisecessionism stance.

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Chapter 8

Shared Sovereignty: The Ideology of Federalist Substate Nationalism

A federal tie harmonizes . . . two contending principles by reconciling a certain amount of union with a certain amount of independence. —Edward Freeman (1863: 47)

Federalism and Substate Federalists Federalism is a normative and philosophical term that sees federal principles as the ideal form of organization for human society and favors a political system of multilevel governance combining elements of shared-rule and territorial self-rule (McGarry and O’Leary 2007; Watts 2008). As Elazar (1994b: 162–68) has observed, federalism is an exercise in shared sovereignty between different levels of government and is based on the defense of federal principles vis-a`-vis processes of centralization. The success of federalism depends on the federalization of the whole territory, and its foundation stone is civil society and its web of associations. Federalism is not just a juridical-constitutional creation; it must be accompanied by a federal political culture that breathes a federal spirit into the life of federations. The federal idea is related to specific forms of human association and how we can organize human relations in order to achieve stability, efficiency, coordination, and collective welfare. Thus, the federal ideal is an organizing principle and its fundamental purpose is basically moral. ‘‘Its raison d’eˆtre is to furnish the basis for order and stability but in a framework

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that formally acknowledges, protects, and promotes human dignity, difference, and diversity. This is its moral content and purpose. Human beings forge different forms of unity, different collectivities, which are structured and institutionalized in order to convert human goals and intentions into human achievement. The creative tension that arises out of this predicament, the dual goal of unity and diversity, gives the federal principle its special appeal’’ (Burgess 2006: 4). As James Bryce indicated in one of the classics of federalism, this is a form of governance that often arises because there are communities of peoples living closely together who decide to form a closer union in a federal form (16). There is also a common set of concerns that affect all federalized states: They must secure ‘‘an efficient central government and preserve national unity, while allowing free scope for the diversities, and free play to the authorities, of the members of the federation’’ (16). Furthermore, federalism is a philosophical stance that is sensitive to the existence of powerful collective identities, and it explicitly recognizes that human beings possess both individual and group identities. ‘‘Federalism responds to these assumptions by constructing political systems in which a balance is maintained between different forms of identity, individual, local, regional, national, and, increasingly, transnational’’ (Hueglin and Fenna 2006: 37). By sharing sovereignty and dividing powers between two or more levels of government, each of which builds a direct relationship with the citizens of the polity, ‘‘federalism occupies a middle position between the single sovereignty of a unitary state and the multiple sovereignties of a confederacy’’ (53). In a confederal arrangement, the member states retain ‘‘the locus of sovereignty and retained the bulk of their powers, assigning a minimum of powers and responsible to their common government. Confederations are more than alliances or leagues, but less than federations’’ (34). In unitary states, the centralized territorial state tends to become the centralized territorial nation-state. Group identities are rarely recognized as units of political self-determination. Federalism maintains a commitment to group identity as a principle of social order while dividing powers between different levels of government. Typically, the constituent units in a federation ‘‘retain ‘traditional’ powers over culture, language, education, and welfare. The national level of government, on the other hand, assumes responsibility for the more ‘modern’ tasks of regulating trade and commerce, alongside such traditional ones as foreign policy and defence’’ (40).

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Federalists in substate national societies within multinational democracies are typically exponents of plural federalism. Whether in Canada, Spain, Belgium, the United States, or elsewhere, substate federalists are in search of models of federalism that are open to plural conceptions of the state and that are the antithesis of national federations. They see federalism as a political formula that can help to transcend the usual nationalist strictures that condition institutions in multinational democracies. Federalism will not bring about the end of the age of nationalism in the contemporary world, but according to federalists, it does provide solutions to the need for the mutual recognition of national identities and the problem of plurinational coexistence within the same state. Federalism can only serve as a tool for overcoming the confrontation between nationalisms if its juridical and institutional implementation is achieved on the basis of a federal culture. Federalism brings together peoples and nations while preserving each one’s identity. Nationalism, on the contrary, reifies nations as the modern embodiment of state power in the contemporary nation-state system. Federal culture is impossible without the ‘‘other,’’ while nationalist culture defends the ‘‘we’’ (Caminal 2002: 37). According to theorists of pluralist federalism, federal culture eschews nationalist monologues and opts for a culture of dialogue. ‘‘Just as territorial federalism demonstrated in the past that it was possible to have a ‘state of shared sovereignties or federation of governments’ vis-a`-vis the ‘sovereign state,’ pluralist federalism can open the possibility of having a ‘state or federation of nations and cultures’ in front of a model of ‘national and monocultural state’ ’’ (Caminal 2002: 37). As Pasqual Maragall, the former president of the Catalan government and leader of the PSC, explained in response to a question about how he defines his federalism, ‘‘It is neither [the] Catalan nationalism [of CiU] nor Spanish nationalism. It is the recognition of the variety and pluralism within Spain. We cannot look toward Madrid with the strange objective of forgetting it and erasing it from the map’’ (Alque´zar et al. 2003: 259). Thus, for a committed federalist such as Claude Ryan, former leader of the PLQ in Que´bec and former director of Le Devoir, there are many reasons that justify the federalists’ favorable disposition to participate in the Canadian federation: Canada is one of the world’s most advanced democracies and economically wellendowed states. Moreover, Canada is part of the history and culture of the Que´be´cois. It constitutes an important part of that which they are, and there are no good reasons for separating them from that institutional home. The

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historical experience shows that since 1867, under the federal Canadian regime, Que´bec has had the powers that have allowed it to maintain and guarantee a flourishing francophone culture for the great majority of its population. The Canadian federation has not prevented Que´bec from seeking improvements through negotiations in its political position within the federation (Ryan 2004: 72). The leadership of the PLQ has always insisted it is not just a constituent unit of the federation like the others but a distinct society, given its language, culture, its juridical system, its institutions, and its lifestyle. Hence, the federalists of the PLQ have always demanded the constitutional recognition of its specific character (73). In this regard, Ryan argues that among the constitutional successes of the federalists of the PLQ are the insertion in the Constitution Act, 1982 of a clause guaranteeing the right of withdrawal of any province regarding any constitutional modification calling for the transfer of competences from the provinces to the federal parliament; the insertion in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of a disposition specifying that the provision that guarantees that the Supreme Court must be composed of at least three civil law judges cannot be changed without the consent of Que´bec; and the insertion in the Constitution Act, 1982 of a provision guaranteeing the exclusive power of decision of Que´bec in all matters pertaining to the criteria for admission to English schools as defined in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (77). The work of Miquel Caminal has served as the intellectual foundation for the political positions of some federalists in Catalonia, in particular those who propose pluralist federalism (such as the leaders and militants of IC-V). Let us recall that Jaume Bosch, the vice-president of IC-V when I interviewed him, explained, ‘‘Our option is for a federalism . . . that has a lot in common with the ideas of Miquel Caminal on pluralist federalism.’’1 Caminal (2002: 154) has observed that ‘‘a nationalist, if she can choose, will opt for the congruence between the nation and a unitary state. This is the ideal solution [for the nationalist], and only when it is not possible does the federal option make its appearance. When there is no nationalism with sufficient force to impose the union, nor is there one that is sufficiently strong to achieve secession, then federation, or autonomy’’ can become viable mechanisms for reconciling the interests of all. A pluralist federalism implies ‘‘the recognition of social and cultural diversity, and its promotion as a positive and enriching value for civil society; it supposes a polycentric functioning and structure of the public powers, respectful of the attributions and powers of each’’ (208). Federalism needs pluralism to remind it

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of its essence. For federalist pluralists, federalism is a way of living in diversity and of conceiving the political organization of society as transcending prevalent national identities. Federalist pluralism is oriented toward cooperation between the public institutions of the different demoi that constitute the demos, and it demands a polycentrism in the territorial division of powers. Also, the notions of co-sovereignty and co-determination are part of the federalist territorial conception (235). To further illustrate the political thought of substate federalists, let us refer to federalists in Puerto Rico, a non-federal autonomy that has belonged to the United States for more than a century. Federalists there have historically echoed the political aspirations of substate federalists in Canada, Spain, and elsewhere. Although the political language used is different, reflecting their political reality, some of the historical figures in the federalist movement there have been exponents of a pluralist federalism, even before the establishment of the modern federalist movement in the 1960s. Some have observed that although the foundations of Puerto Rican federalism can be found in the Spanish and Catalan Republicanism of the second half of the nineteenth century, whose principal ideologue is the Catalan federalist Francisco Pi i Margall, after the U.S. conquest of 1898, federalist leaders adapted their principles to the new historical and political reality. In their view, the administrative autonomy that was dreamed by many in the late nineteenth century and by Pi i Margall in nineteenthcentury Spain had attained its highest development in the U.S. federal political system. In the early twentieth century, Puerto Rican federalists such as Jose´ Celso Barbosa seemed to believe that the cultural, linguistic, racial, and regional differences of Puerto Rico vis-a`-vis the U.S. federation would not impede its eventual incorporation as one of its constituent units. As the distinguished writer Antonio S. Pedreira observed, Barbosa ‘‘was never a separatist and passed effortlessly from Spanish autonomism to . . . [U.S. federalism] and continued to defend the same principles he had always defended’’ (Ramos Me´ndez 2007: 54). Between 1924 and 1940, Rafael Martı´nez Nadal was a major leader of the Puerto Rican federalist movement. He had a very ‘‘creole’’ view of the U.S. federation, and he believed that the cultural and national identity of Puerto Ricans would not be threatened by incorporation as a constituent unit of the U.S. federation. Thus, he stated in 1936, ‘‘I believe that [becoming a U.S. state] would afford Puerto Rico absolute internal sovereignty for the administration and resolution of its political, social, and economic problems, without experiencing any negative

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effects on its customs, good traditions, racial characteristics, or language. That is, [as a U.S. state] we want to be faithful to the spiritual essence of our people, without overlooking our loyalty to the [U.S. federal state]’’ (64). Thus, already in 1967, federalists in Puerto Rico were arguing that ‘‘in the federal system of government each [constituent unit of the federation] enjoys complete cultural autonomy. Federalism precisely offers the most adequate formula for bringing together peoples of different origin . . . which are brought together politically—without renouncing their identity . . . language, or [national] idiosyncrasy’’ (120). To be sure, in the contemporary federalist movement of Puerto Rico, it cannot be said that all the leaders of the federalist party there have shared this vision of plurinational federalism, and, in fact, many of its contemporary leaders seem to have reneged on this vision. But, in some of the ideological currents that contributed to its foundational discourse and ideology, the substate federalist movement there seems to have had a pluralist federalist orientation. These hopes and aspirations for a federalism of accommodation and recognition are echoed in the political thought of federalists in Catalonia. Referring to the 1978 Spanish Constitution, Arbo´s Marı´n (2004: 102) writes in the journal of the Fundacio´ Rafael Campalans (a think tank of the PSC) that ‘‘the will to recognize national diversity can be fitted within a federalist reading of the constituent process. The consensus on which it is based was forged through pacts, and let us remember that the word ‘federalism’ is derived from ‘foedus’: pact. . . . With the participation of Catalan representatives, a model was agreed upon in which self-government was adopted and was modified, reflecting the explicit will of the Catalan people. If this ‘constituent power’ is one of a people with the historic and cultural profile of the Catalans, it would be difficult to deny its national condition.’’ The same spirit is found in the expressions of Benoıˆt Pelletier (2001: 48), who elaborated the official political and constitutional position of the PLQ in 2001: ‘‘The rediscovery, in Canada, of the true sense of federalism means that it is necessary to work on the elaboration of a system of government that is respectful of the particular identities that are found in its bosom, among which the singular identity of Que´bec.’’

Actually Existing Federations and Asymmetric Federalism Classic federations constitute a particular species within the genus of ‘‘federal political systems,’’ wherein neither the federal nor the constituent units’

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governments (cantons, provinces, la¨nder, etc.) are constitutionally subordinate to the other; that is, each has sovereign powers derived directly from the constitution rather than any other level of government; each is given the power to relate directly with its citizens in the exercise of its legislative, executive, and taxing competences; and each is elected directly by its populace. There are twenty-six contemporary federations, including Argentina, Austria, Belgium, India, Malaysia, Micronesia, and Canada, covering 40 percent of the world’s population2 (Watts 1999: 7; Griffiths and Nerenberg 2005; Hueglin and Fenna 2006: 56). In a federation, each level of government has exclusive competences in certain functions, with the division of powers embodied in a written constitution. The two orders of government are assigned a constitutional distribution of legislative and executive functions and an allocation of revenue resources. Neither the federal government nor the constituent units can change the constitution unilaterally because there is usually an amending formula that requires the consent of both. Constitutional disputes are resolved by the federal state’s highest judicial court. A major feature of federations, which distinguishes them from instances of mere decentralization or regionalization, is that there is the possibility of direct participation in the decision-making process of the state as a whole through the federal second chamber (Moreno 2001: 126). There are also procedures and institutions to encourage intergovernmental collaboration in areas where governmental responsibilities are shared or overlap (Griffiths and Nerenberg 2002: 421; Watts 1999: 7; Burgess and Gagnon 1993). For our purposes in this book, we should emphasize that the Spanish model of state established by the 1978 Constitution has the traits of a quasifederal system, consisting of 17 ‘‘autonomous communities’’ having the constitutional right to self-rule. The Spanish State of Autonomies can be considered an example of ‘‘devolutionary federalism,’’ and it is analyzed as such by many academic specialists (Moreno 2001: 25; Griffiths and Nerenberg 2002: 25). ‘‘As a unitary state engaged in devolutionary federalization within its own borders by a process characterized by considerable asymmetry, Spain is an interesting example of an effort to accommodate variations in the strengths of regional pressures for autonomy’’ (Watts 1999: 31). Asymmetry in federal systems refers to the differentiation of rights and status between the constituent units of a federation. In large part, asymmetric federalism arises because national stability and good governance depends on the accommodation of diversity while containing the centrifugal tendencies of ethnonational minorities or majorities. Although de jure

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symmetry is typical of most federations, some federations exhibit degrees of asymmetry (Agranoff 1999; McGarry 2007; Benedikter 2007; Ghai 2000; Le´gare´ and Suksi 2008). As Watts (1998b: 26) notes, ‘‘asymmetry in a federal system . . . refers to a situation where the diversities within the larger society find political expression through component governments ‘possessed of varying degrees of autonomy and power.’ A component unit would have about it ‘a unique feature or set of features’ which distinguishes its relationship to the system as a whole, to the federal authority, and to each other.’’ Canada, Belgium, Malaysia, and India are important exemplars of federations with asymmetric internal relationships (Ghai 2000; Agranoff 1999; Keating 1999). As noted previously, in federal systems two distinct types of asymmetry exist: de jure and de facto (Agranoff 1999). De jure asymmetry is formally entrenched in constitutional and legal processes so that constituent units are treated differently under the law (Burgess 2006: 217). Asymmetry in federations may be further distinguished by whether it is horizontal or vertical. Horizontal, or functional, asymmetry is distinguished by whether the constituent unit enjoys self-rule in functional areas of decision making that have not been granted to other constituent units of the federation. Vertical asymmetry refers to the relationship of one level to the others, such as the federal level to the second tier of government. Vertical differences within federations or federal political systems can be present (Henders 2010: 15; Agranoff 1999: 17). Instances of de facto asymmetry exist in Canada, where the combined population of Que´bec and Ontario makes up 62 percent of the total population of ten provinces, two territories, and the recently created territorial unit of Nunavut. Similarly, in Australia, the combined population of New South Wales and Victoria represent close to 60 percent of the total population of six states and two territories, and in Germany, three constituent units—Rhine-Westphalia, Bavaria, and Baden-Wu¨rtenberg—contain approximately 50 percent of the population of the sixteen la¨nder of the federation. Given the huge variations in population size, constituent state units also vary considerably in their taxing capacity and in their overall financial resources (Burgess 2006: 218). Asymmetry may also exist in the area of democratic representation. Thus, in Canada, the combined population of the two provinces of Ontario and Que´bec enjoy de facto asymmetrical representation of 178 seats out of a total of 301 in the House of Commons, although the ‘‘regional’’ principle in the non-elected Senate has had the

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effect of counterbalancing their combined hegemony in the lower chamber. Yet, in the House of Commons, Que´bec’s predominantly francophone population has seventy-five representatives versus the 226 nominally anglophone representatives from the rest of Canada, while in the Senate it controls twenty-six seats, which are outnumbered by the eighty-one nominally anglophone representatives (219). Another type of de facto asymmetry is the role and nature of political parties in federations. Thus, for example, both the Christian Social Union (CSU) in Bavaria and the PQ in Que´bec are active only within their constituent unit, and both reflect profound territorial-cultural differences in the German and Canadian federations (220). De jure asymmetry is most commonly observable in both constitutional and legal processes when constituent state units are treated differently under the law. It is important to note that ‘‘asymmetry reflects differences; it does not create it. . . . Asymmetry can be entrenched in federal constitutions in several ways. . . . Typically it can be accommodated in the formal distribution of legislative and executive jurisdiction, but it can also be formalized in the entrenchment of a Bill of Rights, in the formal processes of constitutional amendment, in the role of constitutional courts, and in the overall evolution of the constitution via judicial review’’ (Burgess 2006: 221). Some of the most notable cases of de jure asymmetry are Que´bec and Nunavut in Canada; Bavaria in Germany; Sabah and Sarawak in Malaysia; Jammu, Kashmir, and Punjab in India; and the Germanophone language community in Belgium. Finally, in the area of law, there is no automatic convergence between federal and constituent unit law and legal processes in federations. ‘‘In Germany, for example, there is a basic uniformity between federal and state (land) law, but this is not the case in the USA where very different rules of application apply’’ (221). Canada, for example, for the first century of its existence as federal system, had clear elements of constitutional de jure asymmetry, most of which related to Que´bec, although not exclusively so. These related to the relative scope of provincial powers and autonomy, representation in federal institutions, clauses dealing with minority rights, and the varying arrangements negotiated for newly admitted provinces in the federation. Among the most important of these asymmetric elements were ‘‘the exemption of Que´bec from any provision to make property and civil rights uniform under section 94 of the Constitution Act, 1867, [and the] provisions for the civil law system only in the province of Que´bec under section 129’’ (Watts 1999: 120; Watts 1998a). In

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208 Chapter 8 Symmetric Federations

Asymmetric Federations

Weak elements of asymmetry

Strong elements of asymmetry

United States Australia Germany South Africa Argentina Austria Mexico

Canada Malaysia Belgium India Russia Spain

Figure 8.1. Varieties of existing federations and asymmetry.

the more recent contemporary period, the drive for greater asymmetry has arisen from the need to reconcile Que´bec’s impulse for greater provincial self-rule and the strengthening of its own institutions with the contrary preference of the other provinces for greater centralization and strengthening of the Canadian federal institutions (Watts 1999: 123). An illustrative continuum of some of the world’s 26 federations is presented in Figure 8.1, showing the spectrum between those federations (or quasi-federations, such as Spain) with the most notable asymmetric elements and those with the least. Among the most notable examples of asymmetry in federations in the contemporary period are Canada, Malaysia, India, Belgium, Spain, and Russia, with Canada being one of the most decentralized federations in the world (Watts 2007: 236; Watts 2000: 35; Hueglin and Fenna 2006: 56).

Federalist National Parties and Their Visions of Sovereignty As noted in Chapter 1, it is useful to think of the varieties of substate national parties as a continuum, as presented in Table 1.2 of that chapter for some of the major cases encompassed by my scope conditions. As previously presented, federalist national political parties covered by my scope conditions include Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC), Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (IC-V), Parti Libe´ral du Que´bec (PLQ), Partido Nuevo Progresista (PNP), Ezker Batua, Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams, Groen,

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IC-V

PLQ

Pro-Symmetric Federalism

PSC

PNP

Figure 8.2. An indicative symmetric/asymmetric federalism continuum.

and Partido Socialista de Galicia/PSOE. One of the most significant criteria for evaluating such parties is the degree of symmetry versus asymmetry in their proposals for federation. Thus, federalist parties can be placed in a continuum along a symmetric/asymmetric federation axis, as shown in Figure 8.2. At the extreme end of this continuum, where one finds the parties that are advocates of asymmetric federalism, one can locate IC-V. The latter is in essence an instrumental federalist party. IC-V is a party that originated in 1987 from the fusion between the PSUC, the old eurocommunist Catalan party, and the Entesa de Nacionalistes d’Esquerra, an independentist formation. It seems its leaders would not reject independence if it were to occur, even though they advocate a form of asymmetric federalism. A significant portion of IC-V’s militancy declares itself confederalist. This continuum is significant for my purposes in this chapter because it gives one an indication of the variation in the different models of federation proposed by federalist national parties.

The PSC and Its Vision of Sovereignty The PSC is a more traditional federalist national party than IC-V, the other Catalan federalist party on the contemporary political scene. The party does not invoke the right to self-determination as frequently as the other national parties of the principate. It is more likely to invoke dual identities than the other national parties in the principate. Very few or none of its militants express sympathy toward the pro-sovereignty cause, as is the case with IC-V. The PSC’s values and proposals seem to be closer to a model of federalism with weaker elements of asymmetry than to a radically asymmetric one, such as the proposals of IC-V.

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IC-V and Its Vision of Sovereignty We may recall that Jaume Bosch, the vice-president of IC-V, explained, ‘‘Many people would say the Spanish state is a federalizing system but in reality it is not. . . . Our option is for a federalism . . . that has a lot in common with the ideas of Miquel Caminal on pluralist federalism. Our starting point is the recognition of Spain as a plurinational and plurilingual state, and thus sovereignty is not in the Spanish state, but in each of the different peoples that compose the state. . . . In a certain way our model is more confederal than federal.’’3 In its programmatic statements, the party makes reference to the right to self-determination. Its leaders advocate a strong form of asymmetric federalism, but are strong catalanists. It is, in my estimation, an ‘‘instrumental federalist’’ party located on the asymmetric federalism end of the continuum.

The PLQ and Its Vision of Sovereignty The more nationalist wing of the PLQ, which subscribed to the proposals embodied in the Allaire Report, left the PLQ in 1992–1993 and was instrumental in founding the ADQ in 1994. In that schism, many of the party leaders who were proposing highly asymmetric models of federalism left the PLQ. The newly founded ADQ eventually rechristened its political orientation as ‘‘autonomist,’’ to signify its radical break with the federalism of the PLQ. The official position of the party from 2000 to 2010 is found in the ‘‘Final Report of the Special Committee of the PLQ on the Political and Constitutional Future of Que´bec Society,’’ published in October 2001 (known as the Benoıˆt Pelletier Report). Chapter 2 of the report contains most of the proposals for constitutional reform. The report recommends that the recognition of Que´bec’s specificity, as well as the role played by the Que´bec government and parliament in promoting such specificity,4 be inscribed in Article 2 of the Constitution Act, 1867 (PLQ 2001: 65). The report also calls for the reform of the Canadian Senate, a reform of the procedure for modifying the Constitution, limitations on the federal spending power in areas of exclusive competence of the provinces, and the integration within the Constitution of the MacDougall-Gagnon-Tremblay Agreement in matters of immigration.

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The PLQ itself is still putting forward proposals for renewing Canadian federalism, but certainly with weaker asymmetric elements than what the ADQ has proposed during this period, or IC-V in Catalonia.

Conclusion: Substate Federalism and Its Vision of Sovereignty Students of federalism and multinational democracies generally agree that substate national societies may be accommodated by de jure constitutional, political, and legal recognition by the central state (Burgess and Gagnon 1993; Gagnon and Iacovino 2007). Substate federalist national parties in federations or federal political systems that are also multinational democracies are interested in seeking a transformed federal spirit (or Bundestreue or federal comity) that will help nudge the central state into promoting a pluralist federalism. Bundestreue refers to the bonds that bring together a political community. It includes ‘‘faith, mutual trust, partnership, dignity, friendship, loyalty, consent, consultation, compromise, reciprocity, tolerance, and respect that together form the moral foundation of the federation and are the animating force of its evolution. . . . It is the federal spirit that serves as the ubiquitous operative principle in the overall quest for justice, equity, and equality in all federations’’ (Burgess 2006: 113). Substate federalists thus present a vision of federalism that is plural, open, and inclusive. They favor a federalism that is nurtured by a federal animus that facilitates reciprocity, accommodation, and mutual tolerance. As Charles Taylor noted with respect to Canada, a constituent unit of the federation with the cultural and linguistic characteristics of Que´bec should be recognized as ‘‘a crucial component of the country, as an entity whose survival and flourishing was one of the main purposes of Canada as a political society . . . [and] a clear recognition that this was part of our purpose as a federation’’ (in Burgess 2006: 114). For substate federalists, federalism is a normative model that guarantees spheres of sovereignty for the constituent units of the federation that are sufficiently broad and encompassing in the areas of governance that most matter to them, while maintaining a sense of loyalty and belonging to the federal state. Federalists look at the multilevel system of governance of federalism as one in which the federal level and the constituent unit level are spheres of joint co-sovereignty and

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co-determination. For them, the federal state is the locus of dialogue, deliberation, and reciprocity between peoples who are, in essence, co-sovereigns. With respect to the visions of sovereignty held by substate federalist parties, I have shown the need to distinguish between federalist parties that advocate a highly asymmetric model of federalism and others who advocate a federalism with weaker elements of asymmetry.

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PA R T V

Multinational Democracies and the Moral Polity of the Substate Nationalist

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Chapter 9

The Discourse and Attitudes of Substate Nationalists

Small wonder that substate national identities will accept the federation [and the state] as legitimate only if they perceive it to be both sensitive and sympathetic to their own cultural-ideological preferences, interests, and values. —Michael Burgess (2006: 113–14)

The approach taken in this Part will underscore the role of agency in nationalism, focusing on the actual discourse and attitudes of the nationalists of various stripes and how they mold the shape of the national movement, which is the sum total of the efforts of nationalists of all varieties. Given that ‘‘political authority governs territorially, legitimates itself within a membership community, and attempts to play a decisive role in our everyday lives, most people expect that their life chances and those of their offspring are shaped in critical respects by the configuration of the state’s territorial boundedness, its membership, and its rules of cultural intercourse. Indeed, what makes nationalism distinct from other forms of contention is precisely its focus on this distinct set of political objects’’ (Beissinger 2002: 19). States try to normalize their national orders by marginalizing alternative visions of national community, and they aim to promote the adoption of a particular vision of national community. States generally ‘‘seek to fix the boundaries, identities, and cultural rules underlying their operation and to make them appear natural, immutable, and timeless’’ (20). Minority nations’ national movements, by contrast, represent a

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challenge to this order. They affirm the existence of another national reality, distinct from that represented by the dominant state, and they seek to promote the interests of their national community within the political constraints imposed by the relationship with the central state. In this chapter, I will look at the discourse of the independentists, autonomists, and federalists in both Que´bec and Catalonia. For each of these three varieties of nationalism, I will first present the portrait of the Catalan component followed by a portrait of the Que´be´cois one. For each of these components, moreover, I will first look at the discourse of the leaders. I will refer to a representative sample of the attitudes and opinions of top leaders of the parties that represent the given political orientation. Second, I will look at the discourse of the militants of the parties. I will refer to their responses to the questionnaires I distributed and the focus group interviews I conducted with them. In the questionnaire, the militants were asked whether they considered themselves independentist, autonomist, or federalist in their political orientation and how they would classify their own party in this regard. Also, they were asked to explain the ultimate political status they desired for their society. They were asked why they chose this orientation, what were the principal reasons for militating in this particular party, and whether there was any aspect of the party’s program or statutes they disagreed with. Note that the last section of the questionnaire asked the militant to evaluate the relative impact of various factors (using a ten-point scale) on his or her decision to opt for her or his preferred political orientation. These various factors generally represented cultural/social, political, and economic considerations. In the Catalan case, the cultural/social factors included the promotion of their culture/language and the demographic situation of Catalans within the principate. The political factors included the political structures of Spain and the probability they would evolve favorably (from the respondents’ perspective), Spanish centralist nationalism, and the history of the past relationship (e.g., Francoism) between Spain and the principate. The economic factors included the economic/industrial structure and economic development in the principate, fiscal considerations, the European Union, and the phase of globalization experienced in the last twenty-five years. The respondents were provided additional space and additional questions, enabling them to explain their answers. In the Que´be´cois case, the questionnaires were nearly identical.

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I have used a uniform approach to my fieldwork in Que´bec and Catalonia, asking the same questions so that the answers are comparable. Note that the questions I asked of the militants in the focus group interviews tracked the questions I formulated in the questionnaire. The questions for the top leadership were different, practically ad hoc for each leader, although the general intent was to ask questions revolving around the themes that I explored in the questionnaire and the focus groups with militants. In Table 9.1, I present a summary of the respondents’ answers to my questionnaire. Keep in mind that the table only presents the quantifiable portions of their responses.

Portrait of the Discourse of Independentist Nationalists: Why Opt for Separatism? The Catalan Independentists: Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) The Discourse of the Leaders For independentist nationalists in Catalonia, separatism is a political option that is reached once the other two options have been discarded. Pere Aragone`s, the president of the youth wing of ERC when I interviewed him and also a member of the Catalan Parliament, explained his rejection of federalism: ‘‘I believe it is impossible for Spain to become a federal state because all federal states tend to be of two types: either they are homogenous in national terms, such as the United States, or they are heterogeneous in national terms but the different nations have a comparable weight within the state. In the Spanish state, there is one nation (Spain) that has a much greater demographic weight and power, and that has traditionally exercised a form of domination over the rest of the nations and thus has made it impossible for Spain to be federal. I would add that the deputies in the Spanish Parliament of the Basque Country, Galicia, and Catalonia would not be able to oppose homogenizing efforts by the Spanish majority.’’1 Regarding autonomism, the twenty-three years of the government of CiU (1980–2003) led by Jordi Pujol was an occasion for the construction

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60

Spanish/Canadian centralist nationalism 55

62

57

49

31

51

63

80

PQ % (N⳱77)

33.5

53

41.5

12

20

33.5

40

70

CDC/UDC % (N⳱80)

37

55

45

40

26

58

76

45

ADQ % (N⳱88)

65

34

48

28

54

48

45

57

PSC % (N⳱35)

16

22

50

44

38

44

72

50

PLQ % (N⳱18)

67

58

38

29

47

50

50

73

IC-V % (N⳱35)

Note: Percentage of responses of militants who indicated this factor was ‘‘important’’ in accounting for their decision to opt for autonomism. ‘‘Important’’ ⳱ answered 8, 9, or 10 on the 10-point scale in the questionnaire.

47

50

Political structures of Spain/ Canada

History of minority-majority nation relations

1

Globalization

40

Fiscal considerations/tax considerations 1

50

Economic or industrial development

European Union/NAFTA

83

Culture, identity, language

ERC % (N⳱40)

Table 9.1. Analysis of the Political Orientation of Substate Nationalist Militants (N⳱370)

Discourse and Attitudes 219

of the institutions of the principate. Until the 1980s, leaders such as Aragone`s would say that it was a useful period of nation-building. ‘‘If we had not experienced this period, we would be much worse off.’’ But that stage has now been almost exhausted; the next stage will be the selfdetermination phase, and ERC should only be forming alliances with parties that agree with this line. For Pere Aragone`s, the national movement in the principate, ‘‘if we understand by that all those who want more political power for Catalonia, includes practically all the political forces, including the business organizations and the labor unions, and most of the institutions, including the political parties (except the Partido Popular).’’ But, if we are referring to the ‘‘movement for national liberation, that is, those who seek the independence and unification of the Paı¨sos Catalans, that is, the sovereigntist movement, that would be only ERC.’’2 Some of the top leaders of ERC, such as Josep Huguet, a former conseller (minister) in the Catalan government, have emphasized how political catalanism has always had an important federalist current. Even though ERC itself had an independentist component during the Second Republic (1931–1936), in the post-1975 period it was initially federalist in its political orientation, but then there occurred the transformation and refounding during the 1980s that I described in Part II.3 As Josep Vall, the Secretary of Organization of the party when I interviewed him, has emphasized, ‘‘Until 1987–1989, ERC was not a clearly independentist party.’’4 Vall maintained that the Catalans have been trying for 150 years to fix the Spanish disaster, to transform Spain into a modern, democratic, and federal state. He personally gave up on that in 1978. Vall explained that the independentism of ERC is not an ideology or an obsession; it is a political objective.5 As Huguet pointed out in my interview with him, at the 2004 party Congress, ERC developed a plan with stages. Huguet said the party would follow a two-track strategy. They would first try to support all efforts to transform Spain into a decentralized, asymmetric federation, without renouncing their ultimate objective of independence at any point. If that does not work, then they favor adopting an explicit pro-sovereignty strategy, convincing the people of its advantages.6 Regarding the specific factors that make them opt for independentism, Aragone`s for one answered that (in order of importance) first there would be the desire to protect the culture and the language, then there is Spanish nationalism and the need to defend against it, then there are the opportunities offered by globalization, followed by the political structures of Spain.

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But also, these are all interrelated, he said.7 Huguet said that at the base was the matter of language, culture, and identity. But with more study, he said, one realizes these matters are epiphenomenal and that what really matters is fiscal exploitation and the great number of economic disadvantages to being a part of Spain. Then, there is also the legacy of the nefarious history of Spain in its relationship with its internal nations.8 Vall said that what most influenced him, in order of importance, were the cultural and linguistic considerations, followed by considerations of economic development, followed by the need to defend against Spanish nationalism. But, above and beyond that, he stressed that for him, in many ways opting for secessionism was an a priori decision taken the moment one acquires national consciousness. From that point on, he said, there is an ‘‘us’’ and ‘‘them’’ that tends to color everything.9

The Discourse of the Militants The responses by ERC militants to my questionnaire give us some indication of some important patterns in the attitudes and opinions of independentist nationalists. As mentioned above, the militants were asked to evaluate the factors that led them to opt for secessionism and to try to sort which of these factors weighed most heavily in their decision. The factors provided for their consideration can be usefully classified as cultural/social, political, and economic. I will consider only the responses that placed a given factor in the top three deciles in the questionnaire (i.e., eight, nine, or ten in their response on a ten-point scale). I infer these are the factors that were deemed most important by the militants. Eighty-three percent of the militants responded that the promotion of their language and culture (and identity, i.e., the will to be a Catalan10) was a strong reason for opting for independence, given that they placed this factor among the top three deciles. With respect to the political factors, 60 percent indicated that the existence of Spanish centralist nationalism was a strong reason for opting for secession. Fifty percent indicated that the political structures of Spain were a strong factor in their decision, and 47 percent wrote that the history of the relationship between Spain and the principate was a strong factor. The economic factors, as a bloc, came in third place. Fifty percent said that considerations of economic development were strong reasons for opting

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for independence, 40 percent wrote that fiscal considerations were important, and 1 percent thought that globalization or the European Union each were important. I conclude that for independentist nationalists, considerations of language, culture, and identity weight most heavily in their adoption of the secessionist cause. Second, as a bloc, come the political factors listed above. Third, as a bloc, come the economic considerations listed above. In their responses to the question ‘‘Why do you think independence is the best choice for Catalonia?’’ the respondents give us an inkling of why the three political factors mentioned above may have a heavy influence on their decision to opt for separatism. One militant wrote, ‘‘In the last 500 years, Castile (which dominates the Spanish state) has never respected us. Why would it do so now?’’ Another wrote, ‘‘ERC is a nationalist and catalanist party, from an independentist premise. Once we have achieved independence, this party will stop being nationalist and catalanist because we will be living in a normalized society. In our case, a party is ‘nationalist’ because there is a Spanish nationalism which is much stronger (4 to 1) that does not respect catalan society, and one is a ‘catalanist’ to defend the catalan culture, which is frankly given a minority treatment by the Spanish state.’’ Yet another militant expressed it this way: ‘‘I am an independentist because after 290 years of Franco-Spanish occupation, the only possibility of surviving as a collectivity is by controlling all the social, political, economic, and cultural instruments. Reality and history have shown us that the Spanish state only considers us a colony and that regarding plurinationalism, not even they believe in it.’’ Finally, another wrote, ‘‘I am an independentist because the Spanish state, both when the Left and the Right are in power, has shown that it does not want us to exist as a people or as a culture; they are only interested in the fruits of our labor and in our successes.’’ These responses illustrate the fact that independentist nationalists opt for the ‘‘exit’’ alternative in large part because they interpret the history of relations with the central state as one of non-recognition and nonaccommodation. In the focus group interviews with the militants, moreover, they expressed views similar to their leaders’ on the alternatives of federalism and autonomism. Militants in the ERC Focus Group 2, held in the ERC party office in the neighborhood of Horta-Guinardo in Barcelona, were very responsive. I asked them whether it was possible to transform Spain into a decentralized, asymmetric federation. One militant responded, ‘‘It is not

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possible because centralization forms part of the Spanish mentality. It goes against the Spanish tradition to be for federalism. After the Reconquest [against the 800-year-long Muslim presence], the Castilians started annexing territories. Their mentality has always been one of homogenizing everything. On the other hand, the crown of Aragon created a confederation of the kingdoms of Valencia, Catalonia, and Aragon, with their separate courts and languages. The only ones that have believed in a federal Spain have been the Catalans.’’ About the autonomism of CiU, another militant expressed the following: ‘‘Here there is a majoritarian sensibility that favors a form of catalanism and the catalan identity, as long as it does not lead to any major commitments. . . . [Moreover,] to maintain a sense of social cohesion, politicians have played with ambiguity. What CiU’s autonomism does is to play with this, promoting a ‘light’ consciousness, ambiguous, diffuse, something that can be accepted by all, and soon people get tired of this diffuse sensibility. . . . What is undeniable [however] is that the polls show that anywhere between 20 to 33 percent of the electorate supports independence.’’11 A participant from ERC Focus Group 1, held in the ERC local office in Santa Coloma de Gramanet, on the outskirts of Barcelona, stated, ‘‘CiU is an autonomist party, ambiguous, with an independentist component in its militant base, but it is not very clear. . . . They have tried to create a catalanism of a regionalist variety and have tried to develop language and culture in the medium range, but without ceasing to be an integral part of the Spanish state.’’12 Regarding the alternatives of autonomism and federalism, one militant wrote in his questionnaire response, ‘‘Autonomy has given us very little and has reduced us to a specific weight that is equal to any other autonomy created recently and artificially. Federalism does not seem to be such a bad alternative, I think, but real federalism is established between two equals, that is, between two states that want to federate themselves. At present, there is no political will in the Spanish state to federate itself.’’

The Que´be´cois Independentists: Parti Que´be´cois (PQ) The Discourse of the Leaders Echoing some of the sentiments of his Catalan counterparts, Bernard Landry, former premier of Que´bec and chef du parti of the PQ when I interviewed him, stated that federalism

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can work only when there is only one nation. It works well in the U.S.A., in Mexico, in Germany, but the moment one has more than one nation, the nations have to be free and equal. I don’t think the government in Ottawa should be able to dictate to Que´bec what it should do. You have mentioned some Canadian intellectuals writing about a multinational Canada. But there are twenty-five million people in Canada, and maybe there are two people thinking about asymmetry and plurinationalism like those intellectuals. The government of Canada does not recognize Que´bec as a nation. Even in Spain, now Madrid is about to recognize Catalonia as a nation [in the preamble] of their new Statute of Autonomy. But, in spite of this recognition, the Catalans have the problem that they are about to become a demographic minority in their own nation. [Our situation is different,] and this is why we will win in the next Referendum, and we may have won in the last one [1995]. But there were some illegal federal maneuvers, period.13 Bernard Landry, as an independentist, does not believe that the dualist theory of the foundation of Canada has ever been respected. ‘‘No, this is a fallacy. Except for some intellectuals that believe in this or some exceptional politicians (Lester Pearson, for example). Ask anyone on the street in Canada, in Toronto, for example, and they will say no, that Canada is one nation with eleven provinces. Some of our leaders were duped in thinking that dualism was generally accepted.’’14 Bernard Landry explained the independentist strategy of the PQ: Our party demands the full independence of our country, meaning all the legal, political, and fiscal powers that belong to a sovereign state, all our rights, all our taxes, . . . [ as in any sovereign state.] And after that, but not as a condition, we will offer Canada an association to ensure the liberty of circulation, as in Europe, of goods, services, capital, etc. What we want for two neighboring states of about 25 million people are the same kinds of institutions that exist now in the E.U. for 600 million inhabitants and 27 states. This means that if a truck leaves from Moncton and wants to go to Trenton it can do so without crossing a border, or if a grandmother wants to go visit her daughter she can do so without needing a passport. The Royal Bank of Canada with its headquarters in

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Toronto will be able to do business in Montreal as it has done before, and the Mouvement Desjardins in Que´bec will be able to do business in New London, creating a space of free economic circulation.15

The Discourse of the Militants The responses by PQ militants to my questionnaire give us some indication of the discernible patterns in the attitudes and opinions of independentist nationalists. As in the case of the Catalan independentists, the militants were asked to evaluate the factors that led them to secessionism and to try to sort which of these factors weigh most heavily in their decision to opt for secessionism. Many of these militants, while declaring themselves sovereigntists or independentists, specified that, following sovereignty, they would favor an economic association with Canada. ‘‘Sovereigntyassociation is necessary for the good economic performance of Que´bec and Canada,’’ wrote one. Another wrote, ‘‘I would like pure independence, but an economic association with Canada after independence would seem to me to be a step in the right direction.’’ Others preferred outright independence, without an association scheme. ‘‘I desire a transition within a predetermined time period in order to be able to exercise our rights as rapidly as possible. Sovereignty-association is a kind of independence for those who are afraid.’’ Eighty percent of the militants responded that the promotion of their language and culture (and identity) was a strong reason for opting for independence, given that they placed this factor among the top three deciles. With respect to the political factors, 62 percent indicated that the existence of Canadian centralist nationalism was a strong reason for opting for secession. Fifty-seven percent indicated that the limitations of the political structures (federalism) of Canada were a strong factor in their decision. A great number of these indicated they found that Canadian federalism has demonstrated its incapacity to recognize and accommodate Que´bec as a nation and shows no sign of evolving or changing. ‘‘Canadian federalism cannot be reformed,’’ wrote one. Fifty-five percent wrote that the history of the relationship between the Canadian state and the province was a strong factor. Some pointed out, in explaining their assessment of this factor, that

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they rejected the arrogance of anglophone Canada in its treatment of Que´beckers. The economic factors, as a bloc, were slightly behind the political factors, as a bloc, to account for their decision to opt for the ‘‘exit’’ option. Sixty-three percent said that considerations of economic development were strong reasons for opting for independence. A great many of these specified that they thought Que´bec could do very well economically after sovereignty. Fifty-one percent wrote that fiscal considerations were important. Many of these complained about the fiscal imbalance in Canada. Finally, 49 percent thought that globalization and 31 percent that NAFTA were important factors in opting for secession.

Summary: Portrait of the Discourse of Independentist Nationalists I conclude that for independentist nationalists, considerations of language, culture, and identity weigh most heavily in their adoption of the secessionist cause. A very high proportion of militants indicated these are important factors in making them choose independence. This is a consistent finding in the case of the independentists of Catalonia and Que´bec. Moreover, in both cases, the weight of the three political factors investigated can be felt very strongly. These three key factors are the existence of a Canadian or Spanish centralist nationalism, the perceived limitations of the political structures of Canada (federalism) and Spain (the State of Autonomies), and the history of the relationship between majority and minority nations. In addition, the weight of the economic factors ranked slightly behind the political factors. The evidence from the interviews with the top-level leaders and the focus group interviews with militants illustrate how independentists balance cultural, political, and economic factors, confirming the findings from the questionnaire responses. Independentists take as their starting point their cultural and linguistic identity and the perceived need to promote that identity. That is a given. Concerns about economic development and the industrial structure of the internal nation are also key factors. But clearly, independentists indicate strongly that they also form their preference in response to majority nation/central state nationalism. They also form their preference by reference to a perception that the political structures of the

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central state are unable to accommodate their society as a national community.

Portrait of the Discourse of Autonomist Nationalists: Why Reject Independence? The Catalan Autonomists: Converge`ncia Democra`tica de ´ Democra`tica de Catalunya Catalunya (CDC) and Unio (UDC) The Discourse of the Leaders Given that CDC and UDC are federated together in CiU, we will examine both together in this section. I will refer here to interviews with several top-level leaders of both parties. As I argued previously, CDC and UDC are ‘‘instrumental autonomist’’ parties (through 2010). Thus, one theme I want to explore is the kind of autonomist parties these are, as interpreted by the leaders themselves, and later on below by the militants themselves. We will see that both parties, and especially CDC, put forward a discourse that broadly promotes an autonomist line while at the same time views independence as a vaguely possible yet distant and ultimate goal. As mentioned in previous chapters, one of the most revealing aspects of CDC and UDC (especially the former) is that the militant base claims to be independentist, while the party itself, most of its leadership, and its voters are not. The other important theme is the principal one in this chapter: What accounts for their decision to opt for autonomy and thus to reject independentism? The aim here is to develop an empirically grounded portrait of the discourse of these nationalists, seeking to understand their attitudes and opinions in relation to their choice of political orientation and how they go about resolving the nationalists’ dilemma. The Instrumental Autonomism of the Leaders of CDC Let us recall that a considerable part of the militant base of CDC tends to declare itself independentist, while most of its top leadership during the twenty-three years of Jordi Pujol’s tenure as president of the Generalitat have constructed a party that in its actions and its trajectory since 1980 has been solidly autonomist. This is the case for the period covered by this

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study, but there has been a notable change in CDC’s vision since 2009, as I explain in the Conclusion. More importantly, the main argument in this book—the moral polity thesis—explains the reasons for this post-2010 transformation in the heart of CDC. Artur Mas is the successor to Jordi Pujol at the helm of the party, and CiU under his leadership won the Catalan elections in 2003 and 2006, only to be left in the opposition, given that a coalition composed of the PSC, IC-V, and ERC consolidated a majority in the parliament. In the Catalan election of 2010, CiU was able to form the government. During my interview with Artur Mas, he reflected CDC’s recent official position, fruit of the party’s Congress held in July 2004: ‘‘We, at the European level, are federalists because we believe in a UE of a federal sort that is a union of the European nations, and we, of course, aspire to be a European nation. At the level of the Spanish state, we could say that we are confederalists; that is, within the Spanish state we opt decidedly for a recognition of the ensemble of nations, and we thus support a plurinational state. This is not de facto independence because we believe that today, classic independence has ceased to exist and been replaced by cosovereignties and co-dependencies.’’16 Nevertheless, it is remarkable that after 2010, CDC changed its position on this matter, as we will see in the Conclusion. The leader of CDC had this to say about how the party’s founder viewed autonomism: ‘‘I believe that President Pujol has never been a federalist. He always tried to make the most of the statute of autonomy and the Constitution of 1978, interpreting it in a catalanist and autonomic note. It was logical that he should do that, given that this was the only way available. He lived within that framework, within a Spanish Constitution that he helped to create.’’ About the possibilism and pragmatism that has characterized CDC: ‘‘The majoritarian Catalan nationalism that we represent seeks to have our political project evolve at the same pace as our society. . . . I don’t see our society at this point ready to pronounce itself in favor of independence or free association because of our demographic reality and our general structure. We do politics for our present situation, not for the situation in twenty years from now. Today, Catalan nationalism has the obligation to advance the self-government of the country and to continue representing a majority in this country. Representing only 20 percent will do us no good.’’ About the militants of CDC, he explained, ‘‘We have an independentist militant base. These same independentists believe that a declaration of independence is an impossible political objective right now. They know we have to proceed by stages, one step at a time. Maybe in the

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future the conditions will be different. In our present reality we can aspire to a greater level of self-government, within the Spanish state.’’17 In 2013, as we observed, CDC changed its program, considering that the ‘‘State of Autonomies’’ had failed, and now it demands sovereignty for Catalonia, after going through a process of ‘‘national transition.’’ Francesc Homs was CDC’s chief negotiator with the other parties in the Catalan Parliament in hammering out the Catalan proposal for the new statute of autonomy in 2005–2006. He is one of the prominent young ideologues of the party, part of the new generation of leaders, some of them in their thirties and forties. In the current Catalan government led by CiU, Homs is considered to be the Number 2 leader at CDC. During the course of my short interview with Jordi Pujol,18 he personally called Francesc Homs to set up an interview with me because, Pujol said, Homs is one of the best exponents of the new generation in the party. Homs’ exposition was the best ideological portrayal of CDC’s instrumental autonomism. He eschews labels and clear-cut definitions. ‘‘I believe that people define themselves by what they do, not by what they say. I could spend the rest of my life saying that I am an independentist and not do anything. . . . If one is a nationalist, isn’t it the case that one’s ultimate objective will always be the independence of one’s country,19 in the modalities that each period of history understands as ‘independence’ for the given period? . . . The classification of [national parties] as autonomist, federalist, or independentist makes sense from the point of view of academia but cannot be applied to CDC or the Catalan case.’’20 Regarding the fact that Pujol has always defined himself as an autonomist who spurns independence, Homs said, ‘‘CDC’s option has always been in the sphere of what we do, and that is why Pujol has tried to eschew labels, and, I insist, no one believes Pujol when he says he is not an independentist [in the very long run].’’ Later on in the interview, Homs declared that they are ‘‘autonomists by convenience. We believe it is a strategy. We need to be sure to attract as many people as possible to our cause’’ (emphasis added). The instrumental autonomism of CDC, as explained by Francesc Homs, has elements of a ‘‘hidden transcript,’’ as theorized by James C. Scott (1990). It would seem to be a strategy of resistance by a subordinate group in the face of (state) power. As Homs explains it in his own words, We are a people that could have been exterminated and our language could have disappeared. After 1714, how do we explain that

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we are still alive as a people? They [the Spanish and French] have not exterminated us. Let me explain something to help you understand what you are studying. ‘‘Nen, no t’emboliquis.’’21 Don’t complicate your life. Don’t get yourself into problems. This has helped this country survive for 1,300 years and, at the same time, has left it without the mechanisms for combating the Spanish state, which has always ‘‘embolicar-se.’’ In Spain, they tell their kids ‘‘Nen, embolica’t.’’22 Be aggressive and combative. Go for it. Here, our mentality is the opposite, which leads us to prioritize business and commerce, to not speak our language in public in order not to get oneself in trouble, to not get involved in public service, [to not face power directly]. . . . Yet, in certain very concrete conjunctures, we do ‘‘embolicar-se’’ . . . but this is our episodic anarchic tradition, the rauxa, which has no order or structure and tends to be a momentary anarchic explosion, like the events of the Tragic Week of 1909 . . . and this mentality is passed on from generation to generation.23 Dolors Batalla was vice-secretary of CDC for political action and strategy when I interviewed her and since then has also been a member of parliament. She explained at length the historical roots of CDC’s instrumental autonomism. She said that in 1978, there was still the danger of a possible return to authoritarianism, and at that time there was a need to prioritize and not everything could be resolved at the same time, and the consensus was that the priority was to consolidate the nascent democracy. Thus, the moment at which CDC was born was not the moment to define itself as independentist. The strategy followed by Pujol was to recognize there was no need to define oneself or to exclude possible future scenarios. ‘‘Therefore, we did not define ourselves at that time nor have we done so now. To the question of whether he is for independence, Pujol has never pronounced himself and preferred to state that what he wants is the full recognition of the rights of our country. This is not a coincidence; this is a strategic positioning and non-electoralist. This has been the strategy of CDC.’’ Batalla went on to recount how they have governed for twentythree years, and during that time they dedicated themselves to develop the full potential of the Statute of Autonomy of 1979 and the Spanish Constitution of 1978, without feeling a need to transcend them. Batalla insisted that with respect to a scheme that classifies national parties according to whether they are autonomist, independentist, or federalist, this scheme may

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be valid for other countries, but ‘‘we do not fit into your scheme. . . . If I had to define us, I would say we are a nationalist party that seeks to obtain the maximum possible degree of sovereignty for our country.’’24 Academics tend to want to place the party into one or another box, but we don’t fit in any of these schemes, she said. CDC is about ‘‘convergence,’’ and there are liberals, social democrats, conservatives, and so on, and they are held together by the common denominator: nationalism. With respect to federalism, Batalla echoed the views of other CDC members: ‘‘We try to avoid at all costs any kind of federalism that leads to the homogenization of all the constituent units. . . . In reality, what we are looking for is to have a different and differentiated status within the Spanish state.’’25 Carme Vidal was vice-secretary of the party for welfare, identity, and culture when I interviewed her, and since then has also been a member of parliament. She earned a doctorate in Germany and lived there for five years. She is another representative of the new generation of younger leaders in the party. Regarding CDC’s instrumental autonomism, she said that ‘‘in politics one must always be guided by rationality. One must seek to find a balance between the reasons of the heart and the reasons of the mind. Thus, it is obvious that I, for example, would want independence. But then I balance my sentiments with reason and then I say that . . . before talking about independence, we need to talk about other things.’’26 In this regard, the twenty-three years of CiU’s government can be explained in the following way: When the Franco dictatorship ended, everything needed to be done. Thus, to come out in 1979 asking for independence would have been a politics motivated only by passion. People needed other things. I would say that in these twenty-three years we have not been wrong in our strategy, since after all we were able to govern for that long. But now begins a new stage and there is a new secretary general . . . I wrote [with Felip Puig] the Working Statement you cite [from the July, 2004 Party Congress] . . . and that document reflects the fact that now we are asking for more ambition. That is, we have constructed a country, we now have institutions, and basic services for citizens, etc., and now we can talk with the Spanish state one to one . . . and we can talk about a new model of state.27 Regarding the reasons for opting for her instrumental autonomist orientation, she explained the key role played by the sense of non-recognition

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by the Spanish state. ‘‘We are Catalan nationalists, and the Spanish are Spanish nationalists, and yet they apply the adjective only to nationalists of stateless nations. I would never ask a Spaniard not to look out for the interests of her language and culture, etc., but I ask the same for my own language and culture. . . . What I don’t understand is why a Spaniard does not respect my will to be, which can’t be that of a Spaniard because we have a different language, our own imagery as a people, and our culture is different. Why does the hegemonic state not want to understand my will to be?’’28 Ramon Camp has been one of the most distinguished CDC members of parliament and has served as the spokesman of the party in the parliament. He said: ‘‘CDC is not a federalist party, but its autonomism is not an ideology nor a paradigmatic system that has an all-purpose solution for the Catalan situation. The Catalan national fact takes different expressions and different routes depending on the time and the circumstances and the political will of the citizens. . . . The autonomic state [created in 1978] was a very Spanish invention that tried to find a historic formula in a given moment . . . but which lost its singularity the moment . . . it became a mechanism that tends to be uniformly applied to all the communities.’’29 According to Ramon Camp, a ‘‘strictly independentist proposal is the consequence of not finding another way of expressing the recognition and development of the society.’’ Camp believes that rupturist proposals are not necessary in the Catalan case because defending national identity and promoting self-government can be obtained through the current status quo. He said further, ‘‘Neither Flanders nor Scotland propose [so far] to break with their respective states. Not all nations have to find the political solution to their nationness in independence. . . . It is very easy to make a doctrinal declaration; it is much harder to act in reality.’’ For CDC, he says, it is important to maintain social cohesion. Contrary to the Basque Country, the nationalists of CDC have never tried to exclude anyone. Camp concludes that ‘‘as a nationalist, I want the maximum sovereignty within a realist context. For me, the ideal would be a confederal system: Catalonia would have a significant quota of sovereignty but would voluntarily decide to function within a superior political unit.’’ The Instrumental Autonomism of the Leaders of UDC Josep Antoni Duran i Lleida is the president of UDC, and with Artur Mas, part of the duo that currently leads CiU. During my interview with

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him, he explained his views on catalanism and nationalism: ‘‘For me, nationalism is not an ideology. Nationalism is a political current that groups together those who understand that Catalonia is a nation but that its rights are not being respected, and we aspire to have them respected. The maximum right of a nation is to express itself freely and thus to recognize its sovereignty. And from this point on, in the exercise of its sovereignty, which is the exercise of its right to self-determination, there will be different options. Some will opt for independence, some for the present State of Autonomies, and some for reformulating the current State of Autonomies [in a federalist direction]. . . . UDC was founded on November 7, 1931.’’30 At that time, he said, it was necessary to found another nationalist party because it was thought that in the trenches where the Catalan nation is defended, it was possible to include a party that advocated for a Christian Democratic model of society. He stressed that UDC stands for a nationalism that emerges from the person and that Catalan nationalism is profoundly cultural and thus distanced from ethnic connotations. What does UDC aspire to, according to Duran i Lleida? ‘‘Not to separate ourselves from Spain. . . . In 1931, when UDC was founded, it had a confederal proposal for all the Spanish state. Once there is a recognition of the sovereignty of Catalonia, which is our ambition as nationalists, then we decide what is it that we want for our country, and in that exercise we would opt for a confederal state as long as the recognition of the sovereignty of Catalonia is guaranteed. . . . Our aspiration is that the Spanish state will be able to configure itself as a sum of various nations and not have Spain be identified as the only nation.’’31 As I have noted in Part IV, UDC’s leadership seems to use the concept of ‘‘confederation’’ as if it were a political arrangement that does not imply the political independence of each of its constituent units, as one can see from Duran i Lleida’s remarks. But as Josep Moline´ i Soler, the president of the youth wing of UDC, Unio´ de Joves, pointed out, ‘‘about the model of state, to say that UDC is for confederation means that Catalonia would become an independent state because confederations are really composed of states, such as the European Union.’’32 Daniel Ortı´z was vice-president of sectoral policy and programs of UDC when I interviewed him, and he explained, It is true that in CiU, neither CDC nor UDC have ever come out openly in favor of independence. Having said that, one can say that

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in both CDC and UDC there are plenty of independentists. UDC does not have in its documents a program for independence, but when you meet the militants you will see there are many that hold independence as their ultimate goal. I would say, however, that CiU, and in particular UDC, has never been for independence. I interpret this as a matter of realism. The parties may think that independence is difficult or maybe impossible, and thus their strategy has been to seek more self-government, more sovereignty, more capacity to decide matters such as culture, economic affairs, international relations. . . . Within UDC, some may continue saying they are independentists despite all, and it may be that being a nationalist without being an independentist is a strategy. It is true that being a public independentist is difficult, since it provokes defensive reactions (emphasis added).33 The Discourse of the Militants The Discourse of the Militants of CDC Ignasi Guardans was a CDC member of the European Parliament when I interviewed him, and he is a grandson of Francesc Cambo´. During the interview, he stated that in order to analyze CDC, one has to distinguish between general voters and the militants who are active and participate in the party’s assemblies, and so on. He said there is an interesting disjoint between the political orientation of the majority of the militants and that of the general voters of the party, which confirms what I have found in my own research.34 Many in the militant base would identify with a proindependence orientation, at least in the medium term, he said. There is thus a disjoint between the aspirations of the active militants and the aspirations of the general voters. This is why at the party’s congresses, and in the party’s internal documents, there is a political emphasis one does not find at the level of the actual political practice and official public pronouncements of the party. Let us recall from Part III that the militants of CDC responded as follows to my questionnaire: Nine percent identified as autonomists, 9 percent as sovereigntists, (a very high) 63 percent as independentists, 9 percent as federalists, and 2 percent as confederalists. The results of large-scale quantitative surveys also tend to show that the militant base of CDC is considerably independentist, even though the party leaders in their official

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declarations and public stances are not. Moreover, the federation of CiU has embodied an unambiguously autonomist political practice. Note that for purposes of my analysis, the fact that all of these militants are active in CDC, which is an autonomist national party, leads me to consider them as de facto autonomists, even if they may express an identification with another political orientation. I argue they are de facto autonomists because their present militancy is in a political formation that is clearly autonomist in its actual political practice (through 2010). Their personal preference for another alternative remains a private preference, while their militancy and support for CDC publicly promotes autonomism. The responses by CDC militants to my questionnaire give us some indication of the discernible patterns in the attitudes and opinions of the militants of CDC, the quintessential instrumental autonomist party. As in the case of the independentists, the instrumental autonomist militants were asked to evaluate the factors that led them to their preferred political option and to try to sort which of these factors weighs most heavily in their decision to opt for a form of instrumental autonomism. I consider only the responses that placed a given factor in the top three deciles in the questionnaire (i.e., eight, nine, or ten in their response on a ten-point scale). As in the case of the independentists, the weightiest factor was the language/culture/identity bloc of factors. Seventy-nine percent of the militants wrote that considerations of language, culture, and identity weighed most heavily in their decision. The political factors, as a bloc, came in a strong second as the factors that weighed most heavily in their decision. Fifty-nine percent of the militants wrote that the existence of Spanish centralizing nationalism accounted for their decision, while 45 percent indicated that the political structures of Spain weighed most heavily, and 29 percent wrote that the history of the relationship between Spain and Catalonia accounted for their political praxis. One militant wrote that ‘‘our experience with the Spanish state has shown us that it makes us feel like second-class citizens.’’ On the other hand, in regard to the bloc of economic factors, 40 percent said that considerations about economic development or the industrial structure of the principate accounted for their option, 29 percent wrote that fiscal considerations weighed most heavily, 9 percent indicated that globalization accounted for it, while 11 percent wrote that the European Union had a strong influence on their decision. In the focus group interviews with the militants, moreover, they expressed views similar to CDC’s new generation of leaders, cited above, on the ambiguous instrumental autonomism of CDC. In Focus Group 1,

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held at CDC headquarters at Carrer Co`rsega in Barcelona, the militants were the protagonists of the following exchange: ‘‘That which you were saying that CDC is not an independentist party, I am not sure about that because there are many people in our party who are independentists.’’ Another militant then said, ‘‘I think the word she is not finding is that everybody is a nationalist, but there are degrees of shading. There are some who are very independentist, others who are federalists, and still others who see Catalonia as a region within Spain. Above everything, what unites us is our commitment to our country and its people.’’ Another militant then added, ‘‘I would say that during the twenty-three years of Jordi Pujol, we were neither regionalists nor autonomists nor federalists. Instead, we were a plain nationalist party. We did not declare ourselves as independentist, although many were.’’35 In Focus Group 2, held at the local CDC office in Las Ramblas, Ciutat Vella (‘‘old city’’) in Barcelona, one of the militants confirmed that the general perception is that at least one-half of CDC’s militants are independentists. This group of militants were the protagonists in the following illustrative exchange: ‘‘When ERC talks about independence, everything is a matter of degrees. CDC is a party of ‘light’ independentists. The people have their final aspirations, but the process of recovery of sovereignty will be very gradual. ERC is a party of independence on the fast track, provoking a rupture.’’36 Another militant then added, ‘‘CDC is more about a matter of stages, and our point is that nationalism does not need to be static, and independence does not have to be just for its own sake.’’ In Focus Group 3, held in the CDC local office in the very catalanist neighborhood of Gra`cia in Barcelona, a militant also ventured an opinion about the difference between ERC and CDC: ‘‘If you speak with your heart you can go further, like ERC, but if you speak with your head and you want to be conscious about how the average person interprets it [as CDC does], this is more like walking with your feet on the ground, but if you speak with your heart, you can say anything, and this is the difference between ERC and CDC.’’37 In another exchange, one militant assured the group that of the 50,000 militants in the party, many were independentists, but ‘‘if we defined ourselves with the label of independentists we would lose a considerable part of our voters. The CiU voter is many-sided, but the militants are not. One has to have a discourse in between everything, between independence, autonomy, and federalism.’’ I asked the militants of Focus Group 4, held in the CDC local office in Esquerra de l’Eixample, whether they thought most militants in CDC are for independence. It generated this rapid-fire exchange among them: ‘‘CDC

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is a world of people, some more realistic.’’ ‘‘For me, it is a utopia; we will not reach it because they will not let us, and not everyone here wants it.’’ ‘‘I believe if there were a referendum there would be a surprise. People would vote, especially for fiscal independence.’’ ‘‘I am not an independentist; I believe more in autonomism or some form of federalism. But as things currently are, Spain respects us very little, so it may be I may vote for independence. In this historic moment, it could be that a referendum will come out more in favor of independence than we think.’’38 The Discourse of the Militants of UDC Let us recall from Part III that according to the responses by UDC militants, they expressed in their personal capacity that 15.9 percent of them are catalanists, while 83 percent stated they consider themselves nationalists. They expressed a rainbow of orientations in their personal capacity: 22.7 percent stated they were independentists, 31.8 percent wrote they are federalists, 13.6 percent said they are autonomists, 11.3 percent wrote they were confederalists, and 2.2 percent wrote catalanist. The rest did not respond. One illustrative comment by a militant regarding her selfdefinition was as follows: ‘‘Independentist as inspirational principle of my national aspiration. This means, however, that as long as we form part of the Spanish state (which can be for a long time), I opt for a federal system with ample competences for Catalonia (much closer to a project of a confederal state).’’ The militant base of UDC has a sizeable independentist contingent and another sizeable federalist/confederalist component, even though the party leaders in their declarations and public stances, and actual political practice, are basically autonomists. As the militants who participated in UDC Focus Group 1, at UDC headquarters in Travessera de Gra`cia, expressed it, ‘‘Let’s put it this way, the party has had the tendency to introduce texts that affirm the right to self-determination. In UDC there is no one who would deny Catalonia’s right to self-determination. But they will also say it is not a good idea to present this in a public document because that could have consequences.’’39 The militants in this focus group also said that UDC was basically an ‘‘autonomist party with ambitions’’ wanting an ‘‘autonomy of a high rank.’’ They were also of the opinion that there were very few independentists among the leaders (less than 1 percent), and that among the militants, there was ‘‘a little bit of everything.’’

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Sixty-one percent of UDC respondents indicated that the culture/ language/identity bloc counted the most in their option for instrumental autonomism. One wrote, ‘‘because it determines the being and the not being.’’ Another wrote, ‘‘language and culture are the base for the construction of a national consciousness. Without national consciousness, there is no political will. Without political will, there is no sovereignty. Without sovereignty, there is no independence.’’ The bloc of political factors came in second place. Forty-seven percent of the respondents indicated that the existence of a Spanish centralist nationalism accounted strongly for their political option. One wrote, ‘‘It is an oppressive centralism of conquerors.’’ Another wrote, ‘‘We can’t keep on carrying the burden of a Spain that neither understands us, nor respects us, nor compensates us.’’ Thirty-eight percent wrote that the history between Spain and Catalonia accounted for their decision. In this regard, one wrote, ‘‘Recent events confirm our belief that Spain is not interested in understanding our idiosyncrasy nor our culture; it is only interested in collecting our taxes.’’ Thirty-eight percent wrote that the present political structures in Spain were a strong factor. One wrote, ‘‘the centralism is unmovable.’’ Another wrote, ‘‘Right now, it looks like the political structures of Spain will not change much.’’ Regarding the bloc of economic reasons, 40 percent wrote that considerations of economic development or the industrial structure of Catalonia weighed heavily in their decision, while 38 percent indicated that fiscal considerations were relevant, 29 percent signaled the European Union as an important factor, and 15 percent wrote that globalization was important.

Summary: Portrait of the Discourse of the Catalan Instrumental Autonomist Nationalists Two significant findings need to be highlighted in the case of CDC and UDC. First is the instrumental autonomism of these parties. The parties operate together as the federation of CiU, and during the twenty-three years of Jordi Pujol’s government, they were clearly autonomist in their political practice. After 2003 and the renovation of the leadership of CDC (and UDC also, to some extent), these parties continue to be autonomist, although in the last few years the leadership has adopted a more ‘‘sovereigntist’’ tone. Yet, the militant base of CDC (less so UDC) has a strong independentist

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component, as one can see from the questionnaire responses and the focus group interviews. Even more interesting is the instrumental autonomism of some of the leaders of these parties, as one can glean from the interviews analyzed above. The leadership of CDC (until 2010) explained the origins of their party’s instrumental autonomism by making reference to the conditions of the democratic transition around 1976–1979. The leadership of UDC (and CDC) also expresses a preference for a ‘‘confederal’’ model as an ultimate objective, but one which falls short of seeking the independence of their nation. They explain their instrumental autonomism by giving pride of place to the category of sovereignty, and they see CiU as an instrument to help them attain greater quotas of sovereignty. They also stress CDC’s (and UDC’s) fundamental commitment to action and not just semantic categories. They seem to think more can actually be achieved by short, gradual steps that expand the sphere of sovereignty, and they refuse to be limited by conceptual absolutes. For them, this is a conscious political strategy aiming to maximize their electoral possibilities. The second important set of findings is that the militants of both CDC and UDC, but especially CDC—which has a strongly independentist militant base—show a pattern of attitudes and opinions that is very similar to that of the militants of the independentist parties examined above. CDC militants indicated in their questionnaire responses and during the focus group interviews that considerations of culture, language, and identity are the primary reasons accounting for their choice of political orientation. But, the second most important bloc of factors influencing their choice were political factors. Especially important was the impact of Spanish centralist nationalism on their decision to opt for instrumental autonomism. The second most important political factor was their perception of Spanish political structures and the perceived unlikelihood that these could accommodate their imagined community. The bloc of economic factors came in third.

The Que´be´cois Autonomists: Action De´mocratique du Que´bec (ADQ) The Discourse of the Leaders According to Guy Laforest, a former president of the ADQ and a professor of political science at Universite´ Laval, the PLQ continues to be the

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hegemonic party in Que´bec politics. It is the best-financed party in the province, and it has been the standard bearer of the politics of interest in the province. Within the PLQ, Laforest said at the time of my interview with him, the principal current is still the federalist nationalism of Jean Charest and Benoıˆt Pelletier. The PQ was founded, on the other hand, to pursue the politics of identity and ultimately the politics of liberty. The PQ was highly successful in its initial years, given that only eight years after its founding it had gained power. But it has failed in getting the province truly closer to achieving its raison d’eˆtre, which is independence. The ADQ, on the other hand, represents a third way, in between the politics of identity of the PQ and the politics of interest of the PLQ.40 According to Eric Duhaime, a political counselor of Mario Dumont (chef du parti) when I interviewed him at the National Assembly, the general idea behind the autonomist nationalism of the ADQ is to ‘‘obtain more power for Que´bec, but within Canada, yet taking into consideration that Que´bec is a nation. Our position is not necessarily against sovereignty nor against Canada. . . . [After two failed referendums,] our position is that the people don’t want another referendum but neither do they want the status quo. We want to see Que´bec recognized as an ‘autonomous state,’ given that we are unlike the other ten provinces. We are different . . . and we want more powers in fields such as immigration and health. . . . In a certain sense, we are more confederalists than federalists.’’41 I asked Jean Allaire, the co-founder of the ADQ, if he, as an autonomist, would necessarily reject independence if it is realized. He answered, ‘‘No. But the main obstacle is the PQ itself. In Ottawa, they are not fools there. But maybe it could pass by one or two points this time [in the next referendum]. But I think if Ottawa keeps on this way, independence is inevitable.’’ 42 I asked Duhaime what is the difference between the autonomist proposal of the ADQ and the proposals for a decentralized federalism coming from certain quarters in the PLQ. He said, ‘‘The liberals [PLQ] want piecemeal agreements. We want a completely new [political and] social model.’’ Duhaime stressed that autonomist nationalism has historically been much stronger in the province than independentism. He personally supported the ‘‘Yes’’ option (pro-sovereignty) in the 1995 referendum. But there have already been two referendums in which the people rejected the independence option, and enough is enough. Hence the need for an autonomist third way.43

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The Discourse of the Militants According to Claude Bariteau (2005: 12), more than 50 percent of the supporters (partisans) of the ADQ were favorable to sovereignty. Let us recall from Part III that among the ADQ militants who answered my questionnaire, 68.7 percent identified as nationalists, 22 percent said they were not, and the rest did not respond. In terms of political orientation, 60 percent of the respondents identified as autonomists, 21 percent as independentists, 11 percent as federalists, 5 percent as both autonomists and independentists, 1 percent as both federalist and autonomist, and the rest did not respond. Note that for purposes of my analysis, the fact that all of these militants are active in the ADQ, which is an autonomist national party, leads me to consider them as de facto autonomists, even if they may express an identification with another political option. I argue they are de facto autonomists because their actual militancy is in a political formation that is clearly autonomist in its official program and discourse. Their personal preference for another alternative remains a private preference, while their militancy and support for the ADQ publicly promotes autonomism. Defending their autonomist orientation, one militant expressed, ‘‘Presently it is the best solution because it will permit us to put to one side the hand placed over our provincial policies by the federal government.’’ Another autonomist wrote that autonomy ‘‘takes into consideration the will of the Que´be´cois to have more control over their future, even if taking into consideration the geopolitical reality of Que´bec, of Canada, and of the world in general.’’ Regarding those who identified with two orientations, one of these militants explained, ‘‘I am federalist and autonomist, i.e., I am for a decentralizing federation.’’ Another also explained his ambiguity this way: ‘‘I would be a federalist if this were a decentralizing government, but if that is not the case, then I am truly more of an autonomist, even though I am not against sovereignty or independentism.’’ One wrote that she was ‘‘autonomist because the cost of independence is too high,’’ echoed by another who wrote that she was an ‘‘autonomist because that will permit us to affirm ourselves as a people without risking division in our society between two radical options.’’ They were emulated by another who wrote, ‘‘Autonomist with independentist tendencies because independence seems a utopia.’’ Perhaps the best explanation was provided by the following response: ‘‘The best thing that could happen to Que´bec is that the powerful centralizing liberal government of Canada [i.e., Liberal Party of Canada]

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be forced to revisit its role and its relationship with the provinces. If the government were to decide to respect the competences of the provincial governments . . . , it may be possible to refound this federation on more equitable principles.’’ The militants who answered my questionnaire indicated that economic reasons, as a bloc, were the most important in accounting for their decision to opt for autonomism. This may be due to the ADQ’s emphasis on its center-right social and economic program, in addition to its autonomist constitutional preference. Seventy-six percent of the militants indicated that considerations of economic development and the industrial structure of Que´bec account for their choice. In this regard, one wrote, ‘‘This is the most important factor. Our economic development has already been retarded enough by an excessive level of political intervention.’’ Another wrote, ‘‘Because it is with the economy that one can make social progress, and not the other way around, which is what the PQ has never understood.’’ Another added, ‘‘The economic structure is at the very base of society and it is one of the most important items of concern of a political party such as ours.’’ Fifty-eight percent indicated that fiscal considerations accounted for their preference. Forty percent explained that globalization was an important consideration. One wrote, ‘‘Que´bec needs to position itself efficiently on the world market.’’ Twenty-six percent indicated that NAFTA was an important consideration. One explained, ‘‘To experience true free trade, Que´bec needs to control all economic initiatives.’’ The political considerations, as a bloc, came in second, given that 55 percent of the militants indicated that the existence of Canadian centralist nationalism was an important reason for supporting autonomism. One wrote, ‘‘I am completely allergic to centralism, particularly the Canadian one, because Canada is so different [from Que´bec].’’ Forty-five percent indicated that the political structure of Canada (federalism) accounted for their choice. One illustrative comment: ‘‘I don’t think the situation is going to improve in the future . . . the Canadian government increasingly has the tendency to be more maternalist, infantilizing, centralizing, and antisovereignty.’’ Thirty-seven percent wrote that the history of the relationship between Canada and Que´bec accounted for their decision. One illustrative comment: ‘‘In the relationship Que´bec has always been the losing side.’’ Considerations having to do with language, culture, and identity were cited as strong reasons for their decision to identify with autonomism by only 45 percent of the respondents. One wrote, ‘‘Language and culture are

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the essence of a nation.’’ Another wrote, ‘‘because this constitutes that which we are.’’

Summary: Portrait of the Discourse of Que´bec Autonomist Nationalists With respect to the ADQ, two important findings need to be highlighted. Strong instrumental autonomist parties include CDC and UDC, and the ADQ is also in the same vein, albeit less so when compared to CDC, for example. Second, the militants of the ADQ indicated that after the bloc of economic factors, which weighed the most in their decision to opt for autonomism, the second most important factor was Canadian centralist nationalism. This is interesting because even in the case of a party such as the ADQ, which made its center-right economic and social program a pillar of its raison d’eˆtre, the impact of political factors on its militants’ choice of constitutional orientation as nationalists can be felt strongly. The importance of political factors in terms of their impact on the political orientation of independentists in both Que´bec and Catalonia and on instrumental autonomists (CDC and UDC, for example) is a key finding in this chapter.

Portrait of the Discourse of Federalist Nationalists: Why Reject Independence? The Catalan Federalists: Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC) The Discourse of the Militants Let us recall from Part III that in response to my questionnaire, all the respondents identified the PSC as a federalist party. Sixty-eight and onehalf percent of the respondents identified as catalanist, while 11.4 percent identified as catalanist-nationalist, and 5.2 percent as nationalist only. Eight percent did not identify as catalanist or nationalist. All the respondents (except one) identified as federalists. One identified as an autonomist. Federalism is seen as the best political orientation because ‘‘it combines national identity with self-management without prejudicing the right to

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difference vis-a`-vis the Spanish national identity.’’ Another phrased it this way: ‘‘It is more practical to add people. For me, nationalism is irrelevant if that is not translated into better schools, health, and life.’’ Another put it this way: ‘‘It is not only better for Catalonia, but it is also for Spain. Federalism makes institutions more efficient and better respects the sovereignty of peoples.’’ Another said, ‘‘I believe in the cohabitation of different nations that have the same territorial, social, political, and economic reality.’’ Or, as one wrote, ‘‘because being bound to a higher level entity does not have to be negative (for example, Europe).’’ Or, as another added, ‘‘The Spanish state should be modernized and should go in the direction of federalism because it is the best way of accommodating the historic nationalities.’’ The responses to my questionnaire give us an idea of what weighs most heavily in inclining a militant from the PSC to opt for federalism. Fiftyseven percent of the respondents wrote that considerations of language, culture, and identity weighed most heavily. Regarding the economic factors, 54 percent wrote that the existence of the European Union weighed most heavily in their decision to opt for federalism. Forty-eight percent wrote that fiscal considerations weighed most heavily. Forty-five percent wrote that considerations about economic development and the industrial structure weighed most heavily. Twentyeight percent wrote that globalization had a strong impact. The political factors came in third, as a bloc, except for one individual item within the bloc. Forty-eight percent indicated the political structures of Spain and the probability these could evolve was a reason for favoring federalism. Thirty-four percent indicated the existence of Spanish centralist nationalism was a reason for opting for federalism. Surprisingly, a high 65 percent of the respondents indicated that the history of the relationship between Spain and Catalonia (including the Franco dictatorship) accounted for their decision to opt for federalism. This may reflect the traditionally visceral reaction that left-wing parties in Spain still have to any reference to the repressive and anti-democratic past of the Spanish state.

The Catalan Federalists: Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (IC-V) The Discourse of the Leaders Jaume Bosch was the vice-president of IC-V when I interviewed him and has been a member of the Catalan Parliament.

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[Catalonia] is a nation and thus has a right to define itself and the Spanish state as an ensemble of nations, and we defend our right to self-determination. We have a right to define our future freely. If it opted for independence we would accept it. Because it has a right. But we believe the best option, at the present conjuncture, is genuine federalism. Many people would say the Spanish state is a federalizing system but in reality it is not. . . . Our option is for a federalism . . . that has a lot in common with the ideas of Miquel Caminal on pluralist federalism. Our starting point is the recognition of Spain as a plurinational and plurilingual state, and thus sovereignty is not in the Spanish state, but in each of the different peoples that compose the state. . . . The PSC (and the PSOE), on the other hand, would argue that sovereignty resides in the Spanish state. . . . In a certain way our model is more confederal than federal.44 I asked Bosch what were the chances that the Spanish state would evolve toward a model of asymmetric federalism. He answered, ‘‘It is evident that history demonstrates it is difficult that it will change, but on the other hand, by a calculus of possibilities, we believe the independentist option is utopian. . . . It is clear that Catalonia has its right to independence, but a referendum on independence would not be successful. . . . Maybe some day Catalonia will be independent, but not in the short term.’’45

The Discourse of the Militants As we may recall from Part III, according to the responses to my questionnaire by IC-V militants, 94 percent of respondents wrote IC-V is a federalist party (emphasizing the asymmetry of the federalism that is sought) and the rest wrote ‘‘other.’’ Of the respondents, 73.5 percent identified as federalist, 2.9 percent as autonomists, 2.9 percent as independentists, and 11.7 percent as confederalists. One of those in the latter category explained, ‘‘Yes, I am a federalist, or I guess I should say a confederalist: in a context that puts at the same level of sovereignty all the nations of Europe. There are many nations without a voice, silenced by the states.’’ Many respondents emphasized the plurinational and asymmetric nature of the federalism they advocate. As one wrote, ‘‘It is a model of coexistence useful

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for advancing the recognition of the plurinational character of the Spanish state and the right to self-determination.’’ In discussing their preference for the federalist alternative, several militants explained in more depth their political stance. One militant explained, ‘‘I think it is important to maintain a relationship with the rest of the Spanish state because that responds to the sensibility of a good part of Catalan society. But, on the other hand, we need to have a political structure that will give Catalonia the maximum space to decide its own future.’’ Another militant explained her choice this way: ‘‘I would like it if Catalonia were independent [one day], but today the option of a federal state oriented toward social justice is the most appropriate. The relationship of equality between the constituent units but with full capacity to legislate without state-imposed limits seems to me ideal.’’ Finally, another militant explained how having a present federalist orientation does not exclude evolving toward another orientation, if the non-recognition by the Spanish state continues unabated. ‘‘In principle I am a federalist, but if the incomprehension on the part of the citizens of the rest of the Spanish state continues until it reaches intolerable levels, I would not have any remedy but to become an independentist, even if I think it would be a step backward, because I think the world should evolve toward a greater social, ecologic, and political integration. But, as long as there is respect for the identity and culture of each one, without impositions.’’ Of the IC-V militants, 73 percent indicated that considerations of culture, language, and identity weighed heavily in their decision to opt for asymmetric federalism. One militant wrote, ‘‘It is the starting point.’’ Next came the political reasons as a bloc. Sixty-seven percent of respondents indicated that the historic relationship between Spain and Catalonia accounted for their federalist orientation. One illustrative comment by a militant was ‘‘I am a bit sentimental and I recognize that we can reaffirm and reconciliate ourselves with this past, even though it has been a history of confrontation.’’ Another militant wrote, ‘‘Spain has to understand that there is a need for a new relationship, and that, in large part, is the result of the repression provoked by the Franco regime.’’ Again, this may reflect the traditionally visceral reaction that left-wing parties in Spain still have to any reference to the repressive and antidemocratic past of the Spanish state. Another political factor was cited by 58 percent of the respondents, who indicated that the existence of a Spanish centralizing nationalism influenced their decision strongly. In this regard, one wrote, ‘‘I find it unbearable.’’

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Another comment was ‘‘centralist and homogenizing, it is reaching truly unbearable levels.’’ Thirty-eight percent wrote that the political structures of Spain and the probability they could evolve influenced their decision to opt for asymmetrical federalism. One wrote, ‘‘In a democratic framework, it has to be Catalan civil society that takes the initiative, and the Spanish political structures have to enter into a process of negotiation with Catalonia if they are truly democratic.’’ Another wrote, ‘‘Constitutional monarchy. No thanks!’’ Regarding the bloc of economic factors, fiscal considerations strongly influenced the decision of 50 percent of the respondents. One militant added this comment: ‘‘Catalonia cannot continue being the providential father of Spain [in fiscal matters]. There have to be limits in order not to adversely affect our development. Hence the need for a new fiscal agreement that is more just to our country.’’ Considerations about the economic development or industrial structures of Catalonia influenced strongly the decision of 50 percent of the respondents. The European Union weighed heavily for 47 percent of the respondents, and globalization was an important factor for 29 percent of the respondents.

The Que´be´cois Federalists: Parti Libe´ral du Que´bec (PLQ) The Discourse of the Leaders Benoıˆt Pelletier was the minister responsible for Canadian Intergovernmental Affairs and was one of the most influential members of the PLQ government of premier Jean Charest when I interviewed him. He spoke of the disadvantages of independence in this way: ‘‘First of all, there are many risks related to Que´bec sovereignty. There are economic risks and social risks. It is very difficult to have a province like Que´bec seceding from Canada; it is very difficult . . . constitutionally speaking and politically speaking. One of them is that Canada is a country that is respected in the world very much. It is a state that largely respects rights and liberties. It is also a country that offers a quality of life and is economically strong, so it is very difficult for one party to make secession. [In addition,] there would be political, economic and social consequences to secession.’’46 Then I asked Pelletier how he saw the Canadian federation; is it as decentralized a federation as many academic writers seem to think?

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No, I think it is a relatively centralized federation, for different reasons. For one it is that the provinces do not take part in the major federal decisions taken by the federal institutions. The federal institutions like the Canadian senate [for example, it] . . . is not a house of the provinces. The provinces are not represented as provinces. And the representatives are chosen through mechanisms that do not allow the provinces themselves to have their own representatives. . . . The provinces are not involved in the major pan-Canadian decisions either. Moreover, there is a risk of an abusive use of the federal spending power in the provinces’ fields of jurisdiction. Third, there is the question of fiscal imbalance. . . . I should add that in the Canadian Constitution of 1867 there are many provisions that could have a centralizing impact. . . . Since 1960 in my view, [the federal government] has consolidated the tendency toward centralization.47 Line Beauchamp was the Minister of Culture and Communications in the PLQ government of premier Jean Charest when I interviewed her. She was also the manager for Jean Charest’s campaign for the March 2007 provincial election. For her, federalism is a workable political option in the Que´bec case because at the ‘‘level of Canada, one finds adequate recognition that there are two founding peoples, [and this dualist thesis] is an important part of the national identity of Canadians. I think that fundamentally there is a recognition of that and there are more people learning French in anglophone Canada. . . . Of course there is some fluctuation in this, like around the time of the Meech Lake Accord [failure], but there is in the end a recognition that there are two founding peoples.’’48 The Discourse of the Militants Let us recall from Part III that in response to my questionnaire, 66 percent of respondents wrote they considered themselves nationalist, and 33 percent said the opposite. Eighty-three percent identified as federalists in their political orientation, while two respondents said they were autonomists, and one respondent identified as a confederalist. The economic factors, as a bloc, were the most important in determining the PLQ militants’ choice in favor of federalism. Seventy-two percent of the militants wrote that considerations of economic development or about the industrial structure of Que´bec weighed heavily in explaining their decision to opt for federalism. One illustrative comment referred to the

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need to maintain ‘‘economic prosperity.’’ Forty-four percent wrote that fiscal considerations were important. One referred to the need to fix the ‘‘fiscal disequilibrium.’’ Another 44 percent wrote that globalization was a key factor, and 38 percent indicated that NAFTA was a major factor. Fifty percent of the respondents indicated that considerations of language, culture, or identity accounted importantly for their decision to opt for federalism. Regarding the political factors, only 22 percent of respondents indicated that the existence of Canadian centralist nationalism explained their opting for federalism. One nonrespondent said that the mere fact that I included this item in my questionnaire indicated I was biased as a researcher. Only 16 percent wrote that the history of the relationship between Canada and Que´bec accounted for their decision. Fifty percent of respondents indicated that the political structures of Canada (federalism) and the likelihood they could evolve in the direction of more adequate accommodation explained their preference for federalism. One illustrative comment referred to the need to ‘‘solidify federalism.’’

Summary: Portrait of the Discourse of Federalist Nationalists With respect to the discourse of federalist nationalists, two key findings need to be underscored. The first finding is that one needs to distinguish between an instrumental federalist party such as IC-V and more traditional federalist political parties such as PSC and PLQ. IC-V is a party that originated in 1987 from the fusion between the PSUC, the old eurocommunist Catalan party, and the Entesa dels Nacionalistes d’Esquerra, an independentist formation.49 Its leaders do not seem to reject independence if it were to come, even though they advocate a form of asymmetric federalism. A significant portion of its militancy declares itself confederalist or would not reject independence if it were realized. Jaume Bosch, the vice-president of IC-V, explained the nature of his party as follows: We define ourselves as a national party, which is a meaningful selfdefinition. Within IC-V there are militants who define themselves as nationalists, even as independentists, and there are others who are federalists. We as a party have elected to call ourselves a national party because Catalonia is a nation and we are a sovereign party. We define ourselves as catalanists and regarding nationalism, we don’t

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reject it. After all, one of our founding organizations was Entesa, [an independentist formation]. . . . CiU has overused the theme of nationalism and we believe it is better to define ourselves as a national party. In colloquial terms, to define ourselves as nationalists does not make us uncomfortable, but we believe the term ‘‘national party’’ describes us better.50 On the other hand, more traditional federalist parties such as the PSC or the PLQ are strictly federalist formations, and they are strong opponents of independentism. The second important finding is that the militants of traditional federalist parties, such as the PSC and the PLQ,51 indicated that the existence of majority nation centralist nationalism was basically irrelevant in accounting for their decision to opt for federalism. In other words, of all the militants of all the national parties examined in this work, the militants of traditional federalist parties seem to think that Canadian or Spanish centralist nationalism is negligible and has no influence on their choice of orientation. Therefore, it would seem that traditional federalists do not see Canadian or Spanish nationalism as significant political forces influencing the political structures of the central state. Traditional federalists, it would seem, not only believe that federalism per se is a superior political orientation (versus autonomy or independence), but, in addition, their interpretation of the openness and pluralism of the political institutions of the central state is much more generous than that of independentists or instrumental autonomists. By comparison, an instrumental federalist party like IC-V has a militant base with attitudes and opinions that resemble those of independentist and instrumental autonomist parties. Thus, in the case of IC-V, 58 percent of the respondents wrote that the existence of Spanish centralist nationalism was an important factor accounting for their preference for asymmetric federalism, and 73 percent wrote that considerations of language, culture, and identity were important in their decision to opt for asymmetric federalism.

Conclusion: The Contemporary Tripartite Structure in Substate National Movements I have presented in this chapter an empirical analysis of the discourse and attitudes of independentist, autonomist, and federalist nationalists. I have

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relied on a close reading of the transcripts from my personal interviews with top-level leaders of the eight national parties studied in this book and the focus group interviews with ordinary militants. I have also used the 370 questionnaire responses I collected from the militants of these eight national parties. I have sought to understand the discourse and attitudes of stateless nations’ nationalists, in particular by placing variance at the center of my analysis. The focus in this chapter (and this Part overall) on the actual discourse of the nationalist leaders and militants has enabled me to look closely at the ‘‘demand’’ side of nationalism: what it is that the nationalists want, how they conceive the political/constitutional options they face, and what strategies they follow to achieve their aims. In the end, in this chapter I have sought to understand how stateless nations’ nationalists resolve the nationalists’ dilemma: how and why they choose between independence, autonomy, and federalism. My findings show the importance of political factors in explaining how stateless nations’ nationalists resolve their dilemma. The findings point us toward a revalorization of the primacy of political factors in understanding the origins of the contemporary internal variation in the political and constitutional orientation of minority nations’ national movements. Nationalists adopt these various orientations as part of an overarching political strategy, in the course of performing a balancing act between economic, political, and cultural factors. Part III of this book showed that the national consciousness thesis is inadequate to explain the internal variation in national movements. Furthermore, we have noted that the materialist thesis would lead us to expect that nationalists would be primarily concerned with the effect of their chosen political orientation on their economic and material well-being. The materialist thesis postulates that economic or material conditions may dissuade some nationalists from advocating independence (Booth, James, and Meadwell 1993; Breton, Galeotti, Salmon, and Wintrobe 1995). We would expect secessionist nationalists and those nationalists who hold highly decentralizing orientations to be wary of the economic consequences of their chosen orientation. Contrary to the expectations of the materialist thesis, my findings in this Part show that especially those militants who opt for secessionism and the most decentralizing alternatives have given greater weight to non-economic considerations in accounting for how they form their preference for their chosen political orientation. Independentists especially, and sovereigntist autonomists and radical asymmetric federalists, have relegated economic considerations to a tertiary role.52

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For independentist nationalists and strong decentralizers (instrumental autonomists and radical asymmetric federalists), considerations of language, culture, and identity weigh most heavily in accounting for their preferences, showing that (as one would expect of committed nationalists) considerations of identity are of primary importance. Therefore, because the levels of national consciousness are more or less comparable among the militants of these national parties (see also the discussion in Part III), we need to consider how the other factors examined here account for how they select their preferred orientation. For independentists and strong decentralizers, the bloc of political factors weighed relatively more than the bloc relating to economic and material considerations in accounting for their preference. Thus, to be specific, these militants indicated that they form their preference in response to majority nation/central state nationalism. They also perceive that the political structures of the central state are unable to accommodate their society as a substate national community. But what, exactly, is ‘‘majority-nation nationalism’’ and what is it about the political structures of the central state that upsets these substate nationalists? Militants in the ERC Focus Group 2, held in the ERC party office in the neighborhood of Horta-Guinardo in Barcelona, were very responsive. I asked them whether it was possible to transform Spain into a decentralized federation. One militant responded, ‘‘It is not possible because centralization forms part of the Spanish mentality. It goes against the Spanish tradition to be for federalism. . . . Their mentality has always been one of homogenizing everything.’’53 The militants of traditional federalist parties, such as the PSC and the PLQ, indicated that the existence of majority nation centralist nationalism was basically irrelevant in accounting for their decision to opt for federalism.54 Traditional federalists not only believe that federalism per se is a superior political orientation, but, in addition, their interpretation of the openness and pluralism of the political institutions of the central state is much more generous than that of independentists or strong decentralizers. In sum, my findings show that those nationalists who pose the greatest challenge to the institutions of the central state are asserting that a calculus of their material well-being, or economic considerations in general, are not the primary consideration for them. Instead, they indicated that political factors (their reaction against ‘‘majority-nation nationalism’’ and their perception of non-accommodation by the central state) weighed more than

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economic and material considerations in accounting for their preference. Therefore, the adequacy of the materialist thesis is in doubt. The qualitative empirical evidence I gathered points toward the important role played by central state/majority nation nationalism. It seems to play an important role in stimulating independentism and highly decentralizing political orientations. All of these findings regarding the discourse and attitudes of substate nationalists point to larger theoretical conclusions, to be presented in the next chapter.

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The Moral Polity of the Stateless Nationalist

This book has shown that both the national consciousness thesis and the materialist thesis are inadequate theoretical traditions to explain the internal variation in the national movements of substate national societies. Why do some nationalists opt for a secessionist orientation while other nationalists within the same national movement opt for a variety of nonsecessionist orientations? Nationalists who advocate secessionism and highly decentralizing alternatives do so, in large part, because they have a negative perception of the central state and of the nationalism of the majority nation—reciprocity and accommodation between substate nationalists and the institutional matrix of the central state are deemed to be unlikely.

Substate Nationalist Militants, the Central State, and Majority Nation Nationalism The militants of the substate national parties in Que´bec and Catalonia were asked in my questionnaire about their perception of the central state and of the majority nation that generally controls the apparatus of the central state (i.e., Canada and Spain).

Independentists Independentists had remarkably negative opinions of the central state and of its dominating nationalism (see Table 10.1 below), with 80 percent of

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ERC respondents and 51 percent of those from the PQ indicating their negative views. PQ militants wrote that Canada was for them a ‘‘British dominion to which we are forced to belong,’’ a ‘‘fictive country and a relic of colonialism,’’ and so on. One representative view of ERC respondents about Spain is that ‘‘it is the representation of power in its most perverse form.’’

The Nature of Canada According to the PQ The PQ militants’ views of Canada exhibited a clearly discernible pattern: Their views were mostly negative, with a minority expressing neutral views. The most sympathetic view of Canada was expressed by 21 percent (16) of respondents, who generally expressed that Canada is a neighboring country. One militant thought that Canada would become a friendly neighboring country. Another thought that Canada is ‘‘a neighboring country with which we have affective and commercial ties.’’ Another sizeable contingent of militants, 28 percent of respondents (22), expressed the view that Canada was their juridical nation or the state of which they are citizens. Those conforming to this line of thought said that ‘‘for the moment, I am juridically a citizen of Canada. I don’t feel it as my country.’’ Or, they saw Canada ‘‘as an administrative referent.’’ The third discernible cluster of opinions was far less sympathetic toward Canada. About 51 percent (39) of respondents thought that the Canadian state is an ‘‘occupying force in the last 250 years,’’ ‘‘a foreign country that has prevented Que´bec from being born,’’ a ‘‘colonizing country,’’ a ‘‘dominating empire,’’ a ‘‘fictive country,’’ a ‘‘structure of domination.’’ One representative opinion: ‘‘For me Canada is nothing less than a country that forces us to be with them for our money and our natural riches. This Canada is nothing less than a sheep (mouton) of the USA.’’ Another representative statement: ‘‘Canada is for me a foreign nation that controls several aspects of my life. An analogy with Lebanon and Syria is indeed valid.’’

The Nature of Spain According to ERC ERC militants were divided into two camps, with most expressing negative views. A minority of 20 percent of respondents said that Spain was

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the state, formally speaking. Typically, they wrote as follows: ‘‘I feel some proximity towards Valencia and Mallorca, but with respect to the rest of the state, Spain is for me the state that provides me with a passport for going to see the world . . . but I have absolutely no special esteem for it (and I try to have no animadversion, although at times they make it difficult for me).’’ Another expressed that ‘‘the DNI [identification issued by the Spanish state] states that it is my country but I don’t feel it that way. In theory, it is my juridical nation, but I see it like a neighboring country, near us, but which at times does not understand us nor does it make an effort to do so.’’ The other 80 percent (32) of respondents expressed negative views about Spain, and their views centered on the themes of domination and subjugation and conquest by force. A typical expression was ‘‘for me Spain is an occupying country that does not want to listen to us. It is the organ of control of the penitentiary center in which I find myself and that is in charge of limiting my liberty and manipulating the opinion of the external society to make me look like a delinquent.’’ Another said that ‘‘it is the representation of power in its most perverse form: the legitimation of the right to conquest, plunder, the greatest obstacle to the development of the Iberian peoples, the vampirism of the bureaucracy, the deculturation, the project of fascism/capitalist state creation, the negation of human rights and peoples, and social alienation.’’ This is echoed by another respondent: ‘‘The occupying state and invader that conquered the Paı¨sos Catalans from 1707 onwards. The state to which I belong juridically in an illegal form and under the force of arms.’’

Autonomists At least one-quarter (or more) of autonomists held negative views of the central state; most of the rest had neutral views, and few had positive views. The militants of the instrumental autonomist parties had few positive views of the central state. As one CDC militant commented about Spain, ‘‘[It is a] state that does not want to let us be.’’ The Nature of Canada According to ADQ Negative views of Canada were expressed by 23.7 percent (19) of ADQ respondents, who at times emphasized the themes of domination and

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subordination. One militant wrote that ‘‘it is an immense territory of which I haven’t visited a tenth part of it, that is inhabited by persons having a culture, a language, a history, that are different from mine. I do not feel particularly close to Canada.’’ Another wrote, ‘‘another country, constructed thanks to a project of rejection of modernity (Orangists who fled the nascent U.S.) and that has appropriated the rights and territories to the detriment of the francophone and indigenous population.’’ At one extreme of antipathy is the following: ‘‘It is an oppressive state of which we are prisoners because of our collective lack of guts.’’ Forty-one percent (33) of the militants said that Canada was the state, the juridical nation to which they belonged. ‘‘It is the country within which we live,’’ wrote one militant. Another said, ‘‘It is above everything the country that permits us to dissociate ourselves from the U.S. Globally, I consider myself a Canadian citizen, but nationally, I consider myself Que´be´cois.’’ Finally, 32.5 percent (26) of respondents had positive views of Canada. One wrote that it is ‘‘the state to which I feel a sense of belonging and pride. A bicultural state to which I belong as a member of one of the two great cultures.’’ Another expressed the same sentiment, but with a hint of ambiguity: ‘‘Canada is my country and I am proud of being a citizen thereof. Que´bec is my homeland (patrie); in English, one could say ‘Que´bec is home to me.’ ’’

The Nature of Spain According to CDC Thirty-six percent (16) of CDC militants expressed that Spain was a dominating country, an invader, a conqueror by the force of arms, and the like. ‘‘A state that does not want to let us be. A state with different nations on which one, the Castilian belligerent, has imposed itself.’’ This was echoed by another: ‘‘The state to which I belong by obligation, but not out of free will.’’ Similarly, one wrote, ‘‘The state to which I belong as a consequence of the historic events of 1714. Since then we have not been able to exercise our right to self-determination.’’ Fifty-four and one-half percent (24) of respondents said it was an administrative entity, the state. ‘‘It is an entity, the sum of diverse nations. Us Catalans we belong there only from an administrative viewpoint.’’ Another militant wrote, ‘‘A scantly and poorly defined state that has nothing to do with me.’’ Nine percent of the militants said it was a neighboring country and the like.

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The Nature of Spain According to UDC Twenty-five percent (11) of UDC respondents expressed the idea that Spain was an imposition, a conquering power, and the like. ‘‘Spain is a state with a Jacobin vocation where there coexist different nations, not always in a voluntary fashion,’’ summarizes well the sentiment of this cluster of respondents. ‘‘Spain for me is a juridical and legal imposition. Nothing more. I don’t feel Spanish at all. . . . I don’t identify with its way of acting or in anything. I respect them and recognize their difference, but I only feel Catalan and monolingual.’’ Sixty-one percent (27) of respondents wrote that Spain was the state, in a rather neutral fashion. ‘‘Spain is a state in which the Catalan nation, for historic reasons, actually is included. I do not have hatred toward everything that is Spanish. I personally don’t feel Spanish, but it would be absurd to deny that Catalonia forms part of Spain. I don’t feel Spanish at all, affectively speaking, but I don’t deny that I am a Spanish citizen.’’ Another wrote, ‘‘Spain for me is my state, a state which is plurinational and that today cradles, among others, my nation. For as long as that’s the case, we in our nation should have the right to decide how we will relate with the state and in what manner we will influence the direction of the totality.’’ The remaining 13 percent (6) of respondents expressed sympathetic views of Spain. One wrote, ‘‘A very respectable state and even a friend to which I am made to belong, but with which I don’t identify at all.’’

Federalists In contrast, the militants of the mainstream federalist parties had zero negative views of the central state, and most expressed either neutral or highly positive views of the central state. Radical asymmetric federalists were closer in their responses to the pattern expressed by instrumental autonomists than federalists.

The Nature of Canada According to the PLQ Fifty percent (9) of PLQ respondents identified Canada as their state, formally speaking. The other 50 percent also identified Canada as their state, but, in addition, they expressed very sympathetic views of the

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Canadian state and of their citizenship. Several illustrative comments follow. ‘‘I am Que´be´cois and Canadian. In the same way that an Alsacian would say that he is French as part of his identity. Canada is my state, which situates me within the world; it is the place where I live, a guarantee of a quality of life, and it is a citizenship with the added bonus of my Que´be´cois sense of belonging.’’ Another wrote, ‘‘Canada is my country of belonging, the land with which I identify and I belong to. It represents the diversity of its provinces and territories, which is one of its strengths given that it extends over a great territory.’’

The Nature of Spain According to the PSC All the PSC respondents expressed positive views of Spain, and 82.8 percent (29) wrote that Spain was the state where a plurality of nations live. They see it as ‘‘the state to which I belong as a citizen and the hope of a common homeland respectful of the national Catalan identity.’’ Thus, ‘‘Spain is a nation that now is erected as a state, where there is space for other nations, like the Catalan, without a state, but linked to the Spanish state through its organs of power, that therein establish the relations of cooperation and solidarity.’’ Seventeen percent went further and praised Spain as their nation, their neighbor, and ‘‘the space of privileged relations between brotherly peoples.’’

The Nature of Spain According to IC-V Twenty-nine percent (10) of IC-V respondents expressed negative views of Spain, again echoing the themes of conquest and domination. One exemplar: ‘‘It is a state formed by regions and nations and ruled by an undemocratic monarchy. Spain is a state that dominates by right of conquest other peoples and to which I have to belong juridically (irremediably), but I don’t have there my heart or my mind.’’ Another wrote, ‘‘Spain is the neighboring country, which, I don’t know for what absurd reason, prevents my country from expressing itself freely.’’ A further 58.8 percent (20) of respondents expressed that Spain was the state, that is, the juridical

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nation, in a rather neutral fashion. ‘‘Without a doubt it is the state to which I belong as a citizen. I am one of the ones that would have no problem accepting Spain as a nation, as long as there is a process of profound acceptance of its plurinational characteristics (a nation of nations).’’ Another expressed the sentiment of those who are the offspring of immigrants that came from elsewhere in the Spanish state: ‘‘It is my juridical nation, my state, but also something sentimental (I was born outside, and I have family in Spain), but without much intensity: I would say it is a matter of custom.’’ The remaining 11 percent (4) expressed favorable views of Spain. One exemplar: ‘‘Spain is a nation-state with which I feel completely comfortable.’’ Another wrote, ‘‘An administrative reality with which I have cultural and geographic linkages much stronger than with France or Italy.’’

Summary What is notable is the gap in the perception of the central state and of the nationalism of the majority nation between less-decentralizing nationalists and those nationalists who advocate secession and the highly decentralizing political orientations. The latter have negative or neutral attitudes toward the central state and the perceived nationalism of the ‘‘majority nation,’’ while less decentralizing nationalists (federalists and teleological autonomists) have positive or neutral attitudes toward the central state and have no grievance against majority nation nationalism. As one ERC militant wrote, ‘‘In the last 500 years, Castile (which dominates the Spanish state) has never respected us; why would it do so now?’’ And another wrote, ‘‘in our case, [our] party is ‘nationalist’ because there is a Spanish nationalism which is much stronger (4 to 1) that does not respect catalan society.’’ Moreover, the evidence presented here shows that independentists have clearly more negative opinions of the central state than even sovereigntist autonomists and radical asymmetric federalists. Thus, independentists are distinguished by their marked lack of trust in the central state and in the perceived state nationalism of the ‘‘majority nation,’’ which is more notable than what is expressed by even sovereigntist autonomists and radical asymmetric federalists, as the evidence presented in the last chapter also shows (see Table 10.1 and the discussion therein).

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`-vis the Central State Table 10.1. Substate Nationalist Militants’ Attitudes vis-a (N⳱370) Negative

Neutral

Positive

Independentists PQ ERC

51% 80%

28% 20%

21% 0%

Autonomists CDC UDC ADQ

36% 25% 23.7%

54.5% 61% 41%

9% 13% 32.5%

Federalists PSC PLQ IC-V

0% 0% 29%

83% 50% 59%

17% 50% 11%

Conclusion: The Moral Polity of the Stateless Nationalist Revisiting Substate Nationalism It is clear that substate nationalism is not exclusively an independenceseeking phenomenon and that the internal variation within national movements has been underinvestigated. I also argue that we need to reject a related dualism: The internal variation within substate nationalist movements cannot be reduced to a simplistic dualism between secessionist nationalism and nonsecessionist nationalism. Instead, we need to recognize that nonsecessionist nationalisms are complex and that there are important subcategories within the pro-autonomism and pro-federation camps. There are strong autonomist parties that have sovereigntist impulses (even if mostly rhetorical and ambiguous), while others are content with just making demands for limited self-government. Also, there are federalist parties that adopt a strong asymmetric federalist stance and assert their right to national self-determination, while others are more conservative and their proposed model of federation is more uniform and symmetric.

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Varieties of Non-secessionism Therefore, in the last chapter and this one, we have reaffirmed our findings in Part IV: Within the categories of autonomist nationalism and federalist nationalism there are important subcategories with important political consequences. Instrumental autonomist parties such as CDC and UDC (especially the former) instrumentalize their autonomist orientation in order to maximize their electoral potential. The current leadership of CDC (and UDC) express a preference for an instrumental autonomist model, but one which falls short of seeking independence (until 2010). They explain their instrumental autonomism by adopting sovereignty as one of the pillars of their ideology, and they see CiU as an instrument to help them attain greater quotas of sovereignty. Some CDC (and even UDC) leaders may even acknowledge that independence is their ultimate goal, but their political strategy for now is to maximize sovereignty in the short to medium term. They also stress CDC’s (and UDC’s) fundamental commitment to action and not just theoretical or semantic consistency. The militant base of CDC (less so UDC) is strongly independentist, as one can see from the questionnaire responses and the focus group interviews. For the most part, the ADQ is also an instrumental autonomist party, albeit less so than a strong instrumental autonomist party such as CDC. It was part of the coalition in favor of the pro-sovereignty option in the 1995 Referendum. After that Referendum failed, the party developed with more rigor its autonomist political orientation. Its leaders did not seem to reject independence if it were realized, even though they promote a clear autonomist orientation. A significant portion of its militancy declared itself pro-sovereignty. Thus, the militants from these three parties (CDC, UDC, and ADQ) are instrumental autonomists, with CDC representing a strong version of it, while the ADQ is a weaker version of instrumental autonomism. In the federalist camp, one needs to distinguish between an instrumental federalist party such as IC-V and more traditional federalist political parties such as PSC and PLQ. The IC-V has leaders who wouldn’t necessarily reject independence if it were realized, and many of their militants seem to be for a very ambitious project of asymmetric federalism, or confederalism, on their own terms. This is explained in part because one of the strong currents in the formation of the party came from an independentist milieu.

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Both instrumental autonomist and instrumental federalist parties have a militant base that, in its opinions and attitudes, resembles in some key aspects (not all) the independentist parties’ militant base.

The Inadequacy of Alternative Approaches I have demonstrated in Part III that one of the principal versions of a cultural approach, the national consciousness thesis, is unsatisfactory. Most autonomist militants exhibit levels of substate national consciousness comparable to those shown by independentists. The same is true for militants of radical asymmetric federalist parties, vis-a`-vis independentists or autonomists, and for many of the militants of mainstream federalist parties, although some of the latter may also express dual national identities. In sum, most of the leaders and militants of the national political parties examined here have comparable levels of national consciousness and value very highly their national identity and their cultural distinctiveness. All of these are also ‘‘national parties’’ that assert that the substate nation exists. The materialist thesis has also been shown to be unsatisfactory in the previous chapter and this one. My findings show that those nationalists who pose the greatest challenge to the institutions of the central state are asserting that a calculus of their material well-being, or economic considerations in general, are not a primary or even a secondary consideration for them, and thus this poses a serious challenge to the proponents of the materialist thesis.

The Moral Polity of the Stateless Nationalist Central state institutions matter, but they matter especially because what is important is the perception by substate nationalists of the nature of these institutions and whether they perceive that the central state and the majority nation (in the past and in the present) are capable of reciprocity and accommodation (Hale 2008: 80). Substate nationalists have expectations about what constitutes fair treatment by the central state and notions about what obligations emerge due to common partnership in a plurinational state. Reciprocities are expected and notions of collective dignity, the commonweal, and mutual accommodation are predominant (Thompson 1993).

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Reciprocity is a valuable social commodity because it helps to generate bonds of solidarity, social cohesion, and statewide unity. The evidence from the interviews with the top-level leaders, the focus group interviews, and the questionnaire responses confirms that norms and expectations about reciprocity help to explain why some nationalists opt for independence or strong forms of decentralization while others opt for less decentralizing orientations.1 Independentists and strong decentralizers (sovereigntist autonomists and radical asymmetric federalists) indicate they form their preference because of a perception that the political structures of the central state, influenced by majority nation nationalism, are unwilling to accommodate their society as a national community. Also, the evidence collected here demonstrates that independentists have clearly more negative opinions of the central state and of majority nation nationalism than even strong autonomists and asymmetric federalists. It seems that independentists have the lowest trust in the central state, have the most negative perception of state nationalism, and are the most pessimistic about the likelihood of reciprocity and accommodation between the center and the substate society.2 On the other hand, the militants of traditional federalist parties have considerably more trust in the institutions of the central state. Mainstream federalists and teleological autonomists assert that the political institutions of the central state are capable of reciprocating and accommodating their substate national society and have no grievances against state nationalism, whereas independentists and strong decentralizers (instrumental autonomists and radical asymmetric federalists) disagree. Thus, in a multinational democracy in which the institutions and political structures of the central state are unaccommodating, the federalist and autonomist substate nationalisms that do not strongly challenge the state’s integrity are less likely to thrive and to compete successfully with the other (more centrifugal) substate nationalisms that are its adversaries. Central state managers should encourage institutional and political developments that promote an ethos of plurinational reciprocity if they wish to promote state stability. Central state managers, if they want to encourage national movements to develop in a less radical direction—and thus to contain the proliferation of independentists and instrumental autonomists—should encourage institutional and political developments that promote plurinationalism and recognition.

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Conclusion: Substate Nationalism and Its Accommodation in Multinational Democracies

There must be something midway between the inauthentic and homogenizing demand for recognition of equal worth, on the one hand, and the self-immurement within ethnocentric standards, on the other. There are other cultures, and we have to live together more and more, both on a world scale and commingled in each individual society. —Charles Taylor (1994: 72)

Shades of Nationhood On October 30, 2003, the National Assembly of Que´bec voted unanimously to support a resolution stating that the people of Que´bec constitute a nation. The resolution was voted on by all the members of the parliament, representing all the political parties present in the National Assembly. Thus, independentists (PQ), autonomists (ADQ), and federalists (PLQ) in the Que´bec National Assembly uniformly expressed a national consensus and vindicated their status as national parties of Que´bec (Dutrisac 2003). There is a national consensus in stateless nations such as Que´bec and Catalonia, and most of the parties in their parliaments affirm the existence of the nation, even though they have different visions of sovereignty. In Catalonia,

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the same tripartite taxonomy within its national movement was dramatized in 2005–2006, during the process for the approval of the new Catalan Statute of Autonomy. After the text of the statute was approved by the Catalan Parliament on September 30, 2005 (by 90 percent of its members—only 15 members voted against it out of 135), it was submitted for consideration by the Spanish Congress of Deputies. On November 2, 2005, representatives of the three principal currents in the Catalan national movement made their presentations before the Spanish Congress. The speakers were Artur Mas (CiU), Josep Lluis Carod i Rovira (ERC), and Manuela de Madre (PSC). All three evinced the nationalist consensus among the three principal currents within political catalanism. The independentist (ERC) declared that ‘‘Catalonia is a nation and this is assumed by both the Catalan citizens that feel at the same time Spanish and others who only feel Catalan. We have maintained this consciousness of national belonging in the most difficult times of our history, and many of our compatriots lost their lives or suffered repression and we are not about to renounce this at this point, in plain democracy.’’ Mas of the autonomist CiU expressed his sentiments clearly, ‘‘I speak to you in the name of Catalonia and its seven million inhabitants. . . . A Catalonia that knows and feels that it is a nation because it is, and it is a very solidary nation as well, and one which aspires to and claims more self-government.’’ The federalist (PSC) echoed the previous two when she said, ‘‘The Catalan nation does not deny the Spanish nation, but enriches it, given that Spain is . . . a nation of nations. We want this Statute to overcome the logic of ‘one state, one nation’ . . . We are a nation that already has a state, the Spanish one, which is ours as well.’’ She added that ‘‘as federalists we believe that nobody can appropriate the patria to themselves nor its sentiments’’ (Aroca 2005). These two instances of the national consensus within the national movements of stateless nations fully display and dramatize the nature of the internal variation within such movements. I noted at the beginning of this book that variation in secessionism and non-secessionism among nationalists is one of the great puzzles of nationalist and ethnic politics. This book has examined stateless nations’ nationalism from a novel vantage point: examining the spectrum of internal variation within these national movements and their evolution over time. This work has purposefully focused on those aspects of the internal variation that illuminate the complex dynamics of national movements. By problematizing the national

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movement itself and by narrowing my focus to the examination of the national parties (and their leaders and militants), I have sought to illuminate the internal workings of stateless nations’ national movements. As discussed in the initial chapters, much of the social science literature has focused on across-case variation and, in particular, on comparative analyses that seek to understand why certain national movements are prone to develop violence and radicalism while others do not (Conversi 1997; Dı´ez Medrano 1999). Other scholars have focused on ethnic violence and have sought to explain the social and political determinants of ethnic strife. My work has taken as its point of departure the fact that for most of the stateless nations’ national movements that are encompassed by my scope conditions of democratic states, politics is not about ethnic strife or about how to obtain political capital out of a strategy of political violence. Instead, for the universe of cases encompassed by my scope conditions, the politics of nationalism is ultimately about the ‘‘nationalists’ dilemma.’’ All of the national parties I have studied, and their leaders and militants (many of whom are nationalists), must resolve the fundamental dilemma of stateless nationhood: what path to take at a political crossroads with three intersecting paths. The internal mix in a national movement between independentists, autonomists, and federalists is the most important political dimension that needs to be developed in this area of inquiry. The perspective taken here has sought to illuminate this vital field of inquiry. This work has also sought to break from the structuralist template that plagues much work on nationalist movements. I have instead sought to show how nationalism is dynamic and fluid and how agency plays a key role in animating it. My perspective leads us to a renewed appreciation of the relevance of political factors in explaining both variation over time and in understanding the origins of the internal variation itself in the political orientation of minority nations’ national movements. Neither broad macrostructural factors nor various forms of determinism—namely, national consciousness and materialist determinism—assist us in accounting for how nationalism evolves over time and the internal variation in national movements in the contemporary period. This contribution has been based on fieldwork in Canada (Que´bec) and Spain (Catalonia) and an in-depth examination of these national movements from 1976 to 2010. Yet, the perspective adopted throughout has been broadly comparative, and I have sought to place my findings with respect to these two national movements in comparison to the broader universe of

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cases encompassed by my scope conditions. I have referred to the national movements of other stateless nations in multinational democracies whenever this has helped to illuminate the arguments made here, particularly in Part IV of the book. In the end, my intention has been to create a comparative research template, which can be expanded and adapted in order to incorporate more cases. A succinct and non-exhaustive enumeration of the stateless nations included within my scope conditions would include Scotland/United Kingdom, Corsica/France, Que´bec/Canada, Flanders/ Belgium, South Tyrol/Italy, Valle d’Aosta/Italy, Wales/United Kingdom, Northern Ireland/United Kingdom, Basque Country-Catalonia-Galicia/ Spain, Puerto Rico/United States, and Faroe Islands/Denmark. Part I demonstrated that the internal heterogeneity within national movements is not just a binary competition between secessionists and nonsecessionists. There are important subvarieties of nationalism within the pro-autonomism and pro-federation camps, with distinctive visions of sovereignty. It is better to think of the varieties of substate nationalism as a spectrum that includes independentists, instrumental autonomists, instrumental federalists, mainstream autonomists, and mainstream federalists, as presented in Table 1.2 of Chapter 1 for some of the major cases covered by my scope conditions.

Accommodation and the Moral Polity of the Substate Nationalist This book has presented a novel theory: the moral polity thesis. My account of the attitudes and discourse of stateless nationalists is sensitive to historically inherited attitudes and power relations between majorities and minorities, between center and periphery, between state power and the power of identity. These are, after all, multinational democracies where for decades, custom and culture created a general expectation of reciprocity between substate nationalists and the majority society, mediated through the institutional matrix of the central state. The nationalists of stateless nations have developed expectations about what is fair treatment by the central state and notions about what obligations emerge because of common membership in the same state. These nationalists thus consider themselves to be living in a state that is a ‘‘moral polity’’ where social reciprocities are expected

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and notions of collective dignity, the commonweal, and mutual accommodation are essential to guarantee statewide solidarity and mutual understanding. Instances of reciprocity help to generate integrative bonds, subjective feelings of solidarity, trust, and social unity. Intersubjective relations of reciprocity between stateless nations and the majority nation that controls the central state are critical for explaining why some minority nationalists opt for independentism or strongly decentralizing varieties of autonomism or federalism, while others opt for varieties of nationalism that are less decentralizing. In sum, this book’s central argument has been that the perception by the nationalists of these national movements that their expectations of reciprocity have been violated is a key factor that contributes to the increasing radicalization of nationalists’ political preferences. The corollary of this argument is that statewide solidarity and unity may be promoted by a culture of reciprocity and accommodation between the nationalists of the stateless nation and the central state. In a multinational democracy, these are social values that central state managers interested in promoting state stability should want to promote. I have offered evidence that validates this thesis in two modes and two different time frames. Thus, most of the book has dealt with explaining the political origins of the tripartite structure in the national movements examined here and the evolution over time of the diverse nationalist orientations that make up these national movements.

Variation over Time in the Contemporary Period The internal currents within national movements tend to vary over time, experiencing moments of foundation, growth, development, and decay. In particular, in Part II I examined how new varieties of nationalism that represent the radicalization of nationalists’ preferences within national movements are created. Variation over time within national movements that shows the radicalization of nationalists’ preferences is a relatively unexplored area in the study of nations and nationalism. One of the striking characteristics of the Catalan national movement is that at the beginning of the period under study (1976–2010), it did not have a clearly independentist political party in parliamentary politics and electoral competition. Similarly, it is striking to note that the Que´be´cois

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national movement did not have a clearly autonomist party during the 1980s and early 1990s. Instead, both movements were dominated by two currents: autonomism and federalism in the case of Catalonia and independentism and federalism in Que´bec. The contemporary tripartite structure within these national movements did not become established until fairly recently: 1989 in Catalonia and 1994 in Que´bec. The creation of an autonomist formation in Que´bec was more decentralizing in its program and nationalist animus than the federalist party out of which it emerged. How and why did new insurgent political orientations that represent the radicalization of nationalists’ preferences get successfully established? It is very revealing that the process was analogous in both independentist nationalism in Catalonia and autonomist nationalism in Que´bec. Part II examined the tipping point at which nationalist political parties form—that is, how and when one arrives at the juncture at which a new political orientation that constitutes the radicalization of nationalists’ preferences is established in the arena of electoral competition and parliamentary politics, thanks to the founding, or de facto refounding and transformation, of a nationalist political party that serves as the ideological carrier for the insurgent political orientation. Part II explained how four key factors were present in both cases and explained the process through which the tipping point was reached. This result is obtained by the sequential interaction of four factors. In each of these phases, a key factor was involved: a preexistent ideology, the occurrence of a central state constitutional moment, an impulse from civil society, and the consolidation of a new leadership nucleus.

Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya Intersubjective relations of reciprocity between the nationalists of the stateless nation and majority nation nationalism are essential for understanding the trigger event that led to the founding and growth of independentism in the parliamentary sphere in Catalonia. The central state constitutional moment of 1975–1982 was interpreted by the minority nationalists in Catalonia as an instance of nonaccommodation and nonreciprocity. The case of the ERC shows how strictly political processes explain a transcendental political development, namely, the establishment for the

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first time in the history of political catalanism of a clearly independentist party in the parliamentary sphere. This development did not respond to macrosocial or macrostructural factors, nor did it emerge as a result of socioeconomic developments at the base. Only formally constituted political parties are able to channel the collective national consciousness generated by the diverse components of sociological nationalism into a clearly formulated political program.1 Part II showed that political factors explain how nationalism evolves and how nationalists’ preferences are radicalized. The perception by substate nationalists that their expectations of reciprocity have been violated is a factor that contributes to the increasing radicalization of nationalists’ political preferences.

Action De´mocratique du Que´bec In the case of autonomism in Que´bec, the constitutional moment of 1982–1992 framed the embryonic period of the formation of contemporary Que´be´cois autonomism. This is the period during which three central state constitutional moments occurred in Canada. In particular, the failure of the Meech Lake Accord in June 1990 initiated a period of crisis in the political party system in the province and, in particular, within the federalist PLQ and its most nationalist wing, which ultimately led to the formation of the contemporary institutional carrier of autonomist nationalism in the province, namely, the ADQ, in 1994. Strictly political processes explain an important political development: the establishment of an autonomist nationalist party in the parliamentary sphere in Que´bec, which was more ‘‘radical’’ in its decentralizing and nationalist animus than the federalist party out of which it emerged. As in the Catalan case, this development did not respond to macrosocial or macrostructural factors, nor did it emerge as a result of socioeconomic developments at the base. Again, Part II showed that quintessentially political factors explain how the supply side of nationalism is diversified. The embryonic period in the formation of a new nationalist political orientation that represents the radicalization of nationalists’ preferences is triggered and framed by a central state constitutional moment, which itself is interpreted by the minority nationalists as an instance of majority nation nationalism. Such constitutional moments impact the intersubjective relations of reciprocity between minority nationalists and majority nation

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nationalism. As noted in Part II, constitutional moments are critical periods, given that ‘‘constitutions have played a central role in this process [of majority nation building], both in the regulative sense of creating institutions with statewide authority to permit the creation and enforcement of these policies, and in the constitutive sense of projecting an image of political community meant to be internalized by citizens’’ (Choudhry 2008: 30). My analysis highlights the influence of central state constitutional transformative events on minority nations’ national movements, underscoring the dynamic and fluid nature of nationalism and its contingent and nondeterministic nature. In sum, the perception by the nationalists of stateless nations that their expectations of reciprocity have been violated is a factor that contributes to the increasing radicalization of nationalists’ political preferences.

The Internal Variation in Substate National Movements Beyond my account of how nationalism evolves through time, the principal source for validation of my moral polity thesis has been the analysis of the within-case variation in the national movements of Que´bec and Catalonia in Part V, supplemented by the analysis in Parts III and IV. The analysis centered on the present-day tripartite structure within these national movements and on the discourse and attitudes of the actual nationalist militants and their leaders, seeking to explain the political origins of the variation in their positioning. This was drawn from the empirical research conducted during 2003–2008 on the attitudes and discourse of nationalist militants and leaders.

Independentist Nationalists Part V of this work sought to understand the fundamental political dilemma of the nationalists of stateless nations: They must choose among three possible political orientations in order to advance their nationaffirming goals. Balancing Act In Part V, I indicated that for independentist nationalists, considerations of language, culture, and identity weigh most heavily in their adoption

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of the secessionist cause. Considerations of economic development also weigh in. Yet, in our cases, the weight of the political factors investigated can be felt very strongly. Clearly, independentists indicate that they also form their preference in response to majority or dominant nation nationalism. They form their preferences by reference to perceptions that the political structures of the central state are either unable or unwilling to accommodate their society as a national community. Autonomist Nationalists Nationalists’ Political Strategies Both CDC and UDC are instrumental autonomist parties. Their leaders explain their instrumental autonomism by emphasizing that theirs is a quest for greater fragments of sovereignty (not necessarily independence), and they see autonomism as an instrument to that end. On the other hand, the militant base of CDC (less so UDC) is strongly independentist, as one can see from the questionnaire responses and the focus group interviews. The ADQ is also an instrumental autonomist party (albeit less so than CDC). Balancing Act The CDC’s and UDC’s militants indicated that considerations of culture, language, and identity are the primary reasons accounting for their choice of political orientation. But, the second most important bloc of factors influencing their choices were political. Especially important was the impact of Spanish centralist nationalism on their decision to opt for instrumental autonomism. The second most important was their perception of Spanish political structures and the likelihood these could accommodate their imagined community. The ADQ’s militants indicated that the influence of political factors on their choice of constitutional orientation was second only to the bloc of economic factors. Thus, in key respects, the militant base of instrumental autonomist parties shows a pattern of attitudes and opinions that is very similar to that of the militants of the independentist parties. Federalist Nationalists Balancing Act The militants of traditional federalist parties (PSC and PLQ) indicated that the existence of majority nation centralist nationalism was basically

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irrelevant in accounting for their decision to opt for federalism. Mainstream federalists see the political structures of the central state as capable of reciprocity and accommodation. Mainstream federalists interpret the openness and pluralism of the political institutions of the central state more generously than do either independentists or instrumental autonomists. This fits well with my finding in Part V that the militants of traditional federalist parties (PSC and PLQ) have very positive views of Spain and Canada, with none expressing hostile views.

The Moral Polity and Reciprocity I showed in Part III that the national consciousness thesis is inadequate to explain the internal heterogeneity within national movements and in Part V that the materialist thesis is also inadequate. Instead, my findings point us toward a renewed appreciation of the relevance of political factors in understanding the origins of the internal variation in the political orientation of stateless nations’ national movements. Central state institutions matter, but they matter because what is important is the perception by substate nationalists of the nature of these institutions and whether there is a perception that the central state and the majority nation are willing to offer reciprocity and accommodation. Thus, this book has offered evidence that validates the moral polity thesis in two modes and two different time frames. The evidence presented in Part V drawn from an analysis of the discourse and attitudes of leaders and militants of national parties, and the evidence examined in Part II regarding both the evolution over time in the contemporary period of these national movements and their origins, fully support the book’s central argument. This is a significant conclusion because my work indicates that the perception that the political institutions of the central state are unaccommodating plays a central role in both (a) configuring the trigger event that leads to the founding of a new political orientation that represents a radicalization of nationalists’ preferences and (b) stimulating independentism and highly decentralizing varieties of nationalism, to the detriment of less centrifugal varieties of substate nationalism. The perspective offered in this book seeks to reconceptualize how we think about across-case variation in minority nations’ national movements.

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This work has shown how instrumental autonomists (and even instrumental federalists) are strongly nationalist in their sense of identity. Their political strategy leads them to prioritize the search for greater quotas of sovereignty. Moreover, their militant base is, in key respects, comparable to that of the independentist nationalists. These findings should lead us to reconceptualize the strength or weakness of a given national movement. The common wisdom seems to be that one measures the strength of a national movement by the strength of the independentist nationalist component. My findings in this book question this assumption. Instead, when we think of the nationalist ‘‘radicalism’’ of a national movement, we need to add the forces of the instrumental autonomist nationalists and the instrumental federalist nationalists to that of the independentist nationalists. Seen from this perspective, for example, the Catalan national movement is not necessarily less ‘‘radical’’ in its sovereigntist intensity than the Que´be´cois one at present, even accounting for demographic differences.

Visions of Sovereignty and Territorial Pluralism in Multinational Democracies This book has shown that there are three competing visions of sovereignty within substate national movements. Clearly, the secessionist vision is legitimate, and it would seem that it will continue to be a powerful force in societies such as Que´bec, Scotland, and the Basque Country. However, if we want to encourage the non-secessionist visions of sovereignty, then we need to encourage institutional formulas that further the goal of accommodation, according to the central findings in this book. In contemporary multinational democracies, the political aspirations of substate national societies for accommodation by the state, for greater autonomy, and for a more satisfactory representational scheme in the administrative organs of the central state have been formulated as demands for constitutional reform in the last thirty or forty years (Tierney 2004: 17). Although independentist nationalism remains a vital force in societies such as Northern Ireland, Flanders, and now Catalonia, at the same time national movements have been increasingly oriented toward seeking an autonomous special status or toward gaining greater power as a constituent unit of a fully formed federation. Non-secessionist alternatives have gained increased prominence. In fact, even when it appears a strategy of secessionism is being advanced, ‘‘the

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constitutional outcome it in fact seeks is often a heavily compromised version of statehood which bears little resemblance to the traditional Westphalian model’’ (93). The trend toward accommodation within the state has led to the rethinking and reformulation of increasingly complex constitutional models of accommodation within existing states. The search for these sophisticated institutional designs of mutual accommodation may, as a matter of fact, pose a more radical challenge to the state and its constitutional selfunderstanding than secession itself. ‘‘Such demands, if taken seriously by the state, can call into question many of the constitution’s most profound self-understandings including even the conception of unitary citizenship, which has been an article of faith for state-building processes’’ (Tierney 2004: 96). Autonomist and pro-federation substate nationalisms may question central tenets of the constitutional ideology of the central state and may lead to the development of a ‘‘metaconstitutional’’ discourse—using Neil Walker’s term—that challenges the state’s traditional constitutional discourse (Tierney 2004: 16). All of this leads to a rethinking of the possibilities for evolution and development of new models of accommodation in multinational democracies. Two sets of fundamental strategies are available to democratic states that must manage national diversity: integration or accommodation. Integration maintains differences in the private domain but involves the elimination of differences in the public sphere, aiming at national homogenization. On the other hand, accommodation uses four types of strategies to manage national diversity: centripetalism, consociationalism, multiculturalism, and territorial pluralism (McGarry, O’Leary, and Simeon 2008: 42). In the last forty years, ‘‘Spain, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and even France, have moved toward systems that accommodate minorities through autonomy, whether through pluralist federation, devolution within union states or federacies’’ (67). In many multinational democracies, models of federation are the preferred institutional configuration to address the complexities of multinationalism. However, as noted in this book, in contemporary multinational democracies, we find many examples of substate national societies with nationalist parties that reject a model of federation as an appropriate institutional design to address their needs. These autonomist nationalist parties also reject the secessionist alternative. Instead, many substate nationalists advocate a model of territorial autonomy as the ideal institutional design to accommodate them.

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Autonomy proposals are political options that generally renounce independence but seek to promote the self-government and cultural identity of a territorial unit populated by a polity with national characteristics. Autonomism is clearly distinguishable from independentism, and autonomist proposals can also be distinguished from models of federation. If we are to rethink possibilities for evolution and development of new models of autonomism or of models of asymmetry in federations, the question becomes whether the central state can accommodate the new proposals for autonomism or asymmetric federation. In Spain, the limits of autonomism under the 1978 Constitution were recently tested by the Statute of Autonomy of 2006 in Catalonia and by some of the proposals put forth by the former PNV government in the Basque Country. Clearly, in Scotland the challenge posed by the referendum on independence to be held in September, 2014 makes secessionism a real constitutional possibility. Yet, in Scotland, the Scottish National Party’s monopoly over the politics of territorial autonomy has given way to a scenario in which every one of Scotland’s major parties—including Scottish Labour and the Liberal Democrats—has put forward a panoply of constitutional proposals to advance Scotland’s territorial interests (Hepburn 2007: 57). The Scottish Liberal Democrats, for example, have favored a federal solution to the UK’s constitutional debate, whereby the component parts of the UK would have control over certain domestic matters, and the UK Parliament would retain other competences (83). A sector within the autonomist movement in Puerto Rico has for decades put forward proposals for greater autonomy within the U.S. constitutional structure (Nieves 2009), although the U.S. has signaled that some of these proposals for more autonomy would not be constitutionally feasible (President’s Task Force 2005). Similarly, moderate nationalists in Corsica—in the former UPC and its successor the PNC—argue that ‘‘autonomy provides the means to allow us to adapt to the European continental and economic context’’ (Elias 2006: 199). Autonomy is ‘‘not an alternative to Corsica’s link with the French state, a link which is not in itself contested. Rather the internal constitutional reforms of the French state are a prerequisite for an autonomous Corsica’’ (199). The moral polity thesis prompts us to shift our attention to the central state and its constitutional structure and to ask whether states such as Spain, Canada, Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and the U.S. can accommodate these proposals for autonomism, or greater selfgovernment as a constituent unit of a federation. It is time to disaggregate

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the notion of ‘‘accommodation’’ and to investigate its component parts in order to better understand how and when accommodation can be promoted.

* * *

This book has examined political dynamics in contemporary multinational democracies, based on a study of the national movements of Quebec and Catalonia. While the Quebec-Canada situation has not undergone any dramatic transformation in recent years,2 the national movement of Catalonia, and its relationship with Spain, has been rapidly evolving since 2010, and here I want to briefly evaluate how these important new trends may affect the central arguments in this book. Spain between 2006 and 2013 became a virtual natural experiment in which to observe the effects of Spanish constitutionalism on the internal variation in the Catalan national movement. The tension between Spanish constitutionalism and substate nationalism is expressed in two varieties: first, in the clash between an organic statute of autonomy and a constitution—that is, the Catalan Statute of Autonomy (CSA) of 2006 versus the interpretation of the Spanish Constitution expressed in the Spanish Constitutional Court decision of June 2010. The new CSA proposal sought (1) the recognition of Catalonia as a ‘‘nation’’ and to increase the symbolic, linguistic, and identity elements of Catalonia within the Spanish state; (2) the protection of the Catalan self-government powers vis-a`-vis the central government’s constitutional powers; and (3) the improvement of the finance system in order to limit the ‘‘solidarity’’ contribution. This political drama has been playing itself out since 2006. The second clash is in the case of constitutive referendums: the constitutional standoff between the Catalan government (which proposes to hold a referendum on independence in late 2014) and the Spanish government (which insists that this is not constitutionally permissible). Each of these two varieties has an important effect on substate and state nationalisms. In the last few years, there has been a remarkable shift in Catalan public opinion about constitutional preferences. I argue that the constitutional moment of 2006–2010 was the trigger event and the immediate catalyst for this dramatic growth. Spanish constitutionalism has had a concrete political effect: it shows how politics and law actually interact, and constitutional law

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developments can serve as a catalyst for the growth of the pro-secessionism orientation in substate nationalism in multinational polities. What is a constitutional moment? It is a higher-order constitutional event that impacts the relationship between the central state—largely controlled by the majority nation—and the minority nation embedded within the same state (Ackerman 1991). It is of a higher order than ordinary legislative activity (Lluch 2010). Such constitutional moments are relatively rare, and they represent a critical event that crystallizes the nature of the relationship between the central state and the embedded minority nations. These critical constitutional transformative events include: the adoption of a new constitution, the adoption or proposal of significant constitutional amendments, the adoption or proposal of a new organic statute for the government of the embedded minority nation, the proposal and organization of a referendum on sovereignty for a substate territorial unit, and so on (Lluch 2010). The very process of debating and negotiating a constitutional moment is critical because such moments ‘‘help to create the political community on whose existence the constitutional order which results from that process depends’’ (Choudhry 2008: 6). After 2009, it would seem that many Catalans have perceived that Spanish constitutionalism had exhausted its alternatives and that the Spanish state and its model of the State of Autonomies were not capable of accommodating Catalonia’s distinctiveness as a substate national society. This perception at many levels of Catalan society seems to be at the root of the radicalization of political catalanism between 2010 and 2013. Recent data indicate that there has been a dramatic change in the citizenry’s political orientation. The pro-independence alternative grew from 13.9 to 46.4 percent in 2013. Correspondingly, the pro-autonomism orientation (which represents the status quo—the State of Autonomies) suffered a drop from 38.2 in 2006 to 20.7 percent in 2013. The pro-federalism orientation has also suffered a dramatic descent, from 33.4 to 22.4 percent (Argelaguet forthcoming 2014). These events also help to validate the main theoretical argument made in this book: substate nationalists inhabit an imagined community that is a ‘‘moral polity’’ where reciprocities are expected and notions of collective dignity, the common weal, and mutual accommodation are essential. The perception by these substate nationalists that their expectations of reciprocity have been violated is a key factor that contributes to the increasing radicalization of substate nationalists’ political preferences.

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These recent events serve to validate the correctness, accuracy, and adequacy of the typology I presented in Chapter 1 of this book (see Table 1.2, on the subcategories in the varieties of substate nationalism). Therein, I argued that it is useful to think of the varieties of substate nationalism as a continuum, ranging from independentists to instrumental autonomists, instrumental federalists, teleological autonomists, and federalists. In my typology, I classified Catalonia’s CDC and UDC as instrumental autonomist parties, with CDC having a plus factor. The recent events in Catalonia have seen the radicalization of CDC, and of elements in UDC, therefore validating the wisdom of this typology because my definition of ‘‘instrumental autonomist party’’ contemplates the possibility of the radicalization of these parties, whenever the right conditions emerge. Both of these parties (and especially CDC) have now opted for a pro-sovereignty orientation, and many of their leaders have shifted their discourse accordingly. The same can be said about IC-V, which I classify as an instrumental federalist party. It is now a party that is strongly supporting the ‘‘right to decide,’’ and this development is contemplated by the notion of an ‘‘instrumental federalist’’ party. Like all books, especially the ones in the social, political, and juridical sciences that study specific institutions or social/political movements, the present book is delimited in time and explicitly presents a political snapshot based on the time period studied by its author. Thus, there is no need to revise the statements by the political party leaders and militants of Catalonia in the main text of the book, because these represent their views and opinions during the historical period covered by this book, especially in the portrait I present of the attitudes and opinions of substate nationalists in Catalonia, that is, in the mid-2000s and up to 2007–2008. However, it needs to be recognized that after the trigger event of the constitutional moment of 2006–2010, other factors came into play that had an additional effect on the growth of substate secessionism in Catalonia. Some of these factors concern strictly political issues such as election results and formation of new governments or they are related to public policy (bills, public investment in the area) . . . or economic factors (the economic crisis and its impact on the finances of the Government of Catalonia, with all its consequences); or, even, they affect some symbolic elements (expressions of opposition to the action of the Head

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of the State, for example). Also, this process is completed with the structuring of a wide social movement in favor of independence since 2010, which showed a high capacity for action in the public sphere and to exert pressure on political parties. (Argelaguet forthcoming 2014) From 2012 to the present, there has been a constitutional standoff between the Catalan government (which proposes to hold a constitutive referendum on independence in late 2014),3 and the Spanish government (which insists that this is not constitutionally permissible). Chapter 3, Section 148 (17), of the Spanish Constitution states that ‘‘authorization of popular consultations through the holding of referendums’’ is one of the prerogatives of the central state. A new constitutional moment is configuring itself during 2013–2014 and beyond. Unlike the Scottish case, where an agreement between the Scottish prime minister, Alex Salmond, and the British prime minister, David Cameron, was signed on October 15, 2012 in order to provide the legal framework for the holding of Scotland’s independence referendum, the Spanish government led by Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy (People’s Party) has taken a stand against the Catalan proposal to hold a referendum on independence (the ‘‘right to decide’’). The Spanish government’s strong opposition is supported by the interpretation of the Spanish Constitutional Court defending the most restrictive point of view on the issue of the right to selfdetermination of the stateless nations currently existing within the Spanish state (Lopez Bofill forthcoming 2014). What is the normative status of constitutional referenda within multinational polities, which may call into question fundamental constitutional presuppositions of existing states? Is there a right to hold constitutional referenda in multinational polities? How do we determine what is the demos that is entitled to participate in such a referendum? (Tierney 2012). These are some of the questions that will be on the constitutional and political agenda in Spain and Catalonia in the years to come.

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Appendix

Field Research Methodology

In-depth fieldwork has been central to my work. Fieldwork can make an important contribution to a scientific research program by making systematic empirical description possible, and by laying the foundation for theory building and the creation of falsifiable hypotheses, and hypothesis testing. It can help us understand ‘‘different societies on their own terms rather than merely testing hypotheses developed elsewhere’’ (Loaeza 2005: 9). Qualitative methods ‘‘allow us to build theory through respondents’ own self-interpretations and the observation of their everyday practices’’ (JonesCorrea 1998: 203). In total, I received 370 answered questionnaires from the base-level militants of the political parties studied in this book, between 2003 and 2006. I interviewed more than forty-two top-level leaders of these substate national parties, conducted fifteen focus group interviews with base-level militants of these parties, and carried out twenty-one interviews with intellectuals and academics whose expertise is relevant to my work. The average focus group size was five militants, but the range spanned from three to twelve. All of the interviews served two purposes. First, I sought to understand how these nationalists think, what their motivations are, what their ideology is, what their views are on nation and identity, how they view their party’s place in the national movement, how they see the other components of the national movement, how they define their political orientation and what factors explain their orientation, and finally what the basic contours of their biographical background were. Second, I sought to learn more about the history and trajectory of the nationalist political parties and of the national movements of these societies. In other contexts, one may be concerned about the political or situational bias or unreliability of one’s interviewees

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(Jones-Luong 2002: 21). In my work, however, given the nature of my research questions and puzzle, I wanted to interview leaders and militants who were genuine, truthful, and articulate exponents of their political orientation (independence, autonomy, or federalism). By selecting my interviewees according to the orientation of the political party they militated in, by interviewing key figures in the recent political history of these societies, and by attending key party congresses and assemblies where the most militant activists could be found, I think I was successful in interviewing the individuals who are the best exponents of their political orientation. Moreover, interviews offer one the possibility of doing live process-tracing, forcing one to re-evaluate one’s early hunches and intuitions when confronted with ethnographic and archival empirical data (Kalyvas 2003: 10).

Personal Interviews with Leaders and Focus Group Interviews with Militants I. Catalonia A. Political Party Leaders

B. Focus Groups with Militants

CDC 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Jordi Pujol Artur Mas Carme Vidal Dolors Batalla Ignasi Guardans Ramon Camp Francesc Homs Joaquim Colominas Jordi Cuminal

1. 2. 3. 4.

Focus 1: Carrer Co´rsega Focus 2: Ciutat Vella Focus 3: Gra`cia Focus 4: Esquerra de l’Eixample

1. 2. 3. 4.

Focus 1: Santa Coloma Focus 2: Horta Guinardo´ Focus 3: Torrello´ Focus 4: Nou Barris

ERC 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Joan Puigcercos Bernat Joan Marina Llansana Pere Aragone´s Pilar Dellunde Josep Huguet Josep Vall Teresa Aragone´s

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UDC 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

1. Focus 1: Travessera de Gra`cia 2. Focus 2: Horta Guinardo´

Josep A. Duran Lleida Josep M. Pelegrı´ Daniel Ortiz Josep Moline Benet Maimi

PSC 1. 2. 3. 4.

1. Focus 1: Fundacio´ Rafael Campalans

Josep Maria Sala Victor Francos Gabriel Colome´ Joan Marcet

IC-V 1. Jaume Bosch 2. Dolors Camats 3. Marc Rius II. Que´bec A. Political Party Leaders

B. Focus Groups with Militants

PQ 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Jacques Parizeau Bernard Landry Jonathan Valois Daniel Turp Osvaldo Nunez (BQ)

1. Focus 1: Rue Vendome 2. Focus 2: 13me Ave.

PLQ 1. 2. 3. 4.

Benoıˆt Pelletier Ivan Bordeleau Line Beauchamp Franc¸oise Gauthier

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1. Focus 1: C.J. a` rue St. Denis 2. Focus 2: C.J. a` rue St. Denis

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ADQ 1. Jean Allaire 2. Guy Laforest 3. Eric Duhaime

Total Number of Answered Questionnaires Received Catalonia PSC ICV UDC ERC CDC

35 34 40 41 44 194

Que´bec PQ ADQ PLQ

77 81 18 176

Grand Total: 370

Congresses and Assemblies Attended Converge`ncia Democra`tica de Catalunya: 13th Party Congress, July 2004, and 14th Special Congress, October 2, 2004 Unio´ Democra`tica de Catalunya: distribution by Marta Vidal, December 2005 Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya: 24th National Congress, July 3–4, 2004, and distribution by Josep Vall, September 2004 Iniciativa per Catalunya-Verds: distribution by Enric Rius, December 2005

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Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya: 10th Party Congress, July 23–25, 2004, and IV National Conference (on the Welfare State), November 19–20, 2005 Parti Que´be´cois: 15th Party Congress, June 3–5, 2005 Parti Libe´ral du Que´bec: distribution by Catherine Cosgrove, July 2005 Action De´mocratique du Que´bec: distribution by Pierre Morin, July 2005

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Notes

Introduction 1. In comparative politics, the internal variation in substate national movements is to be contrasted with across-case variation in substate national movements (Lluch 2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b). 2. They are also referred to as ‘‘stateless nations,’’ ‘‘internal nations,’’ ‘‘national minorities,’’ or ‘‘minority nations.’’ These terms will be used interchangeably in this book; however, my preferred terms are ‘‘substate national society’’ or ‘‘stateless nation,’’ given that, as Michael Keating writes, the term ‘‘national minority’’ more often refers to a ‘‘people within a state whose primary reference point is a nation situated elsewhere’’ (Keating 2001: x; Brubaker 1997: 57). 3. A ‘‘national party’’ is one that assumes the existence of a political nation and identifies with it. Such parties are not necessarily secessionist in their political orientation, and some of them may not consider themselves nationalist, in accordance with the common usage of the term, although certainly they are national parties (Caminal 1998: 49). 4. The term independentism refers to secessionism, and thus independentists are secessionists. In romance languages, the term used is independentism. In English, the terms independentism or independentist may yet be neologisms, but I think their meaning is easily grasped. Moreover, there are advantages to using the terms independentism or independentist: They faithfully reflect the self-understanding of the political party leaders and base-level activists I have been studying. None of these independentists refer to themselves as ‘‘secessionists’’: Generally, when self-referencing, they use the term independentists. 5. The usefulness of an approach along the lines proposed here is endorsed by Ian Lustick, who writes that ‘‘whether through diachronic treatment of one separatist movement through several stages of struggle or via cross-cultural treatment of several movements at the same stage, one interesting focus for research would be variation in the character and consequence of separatist violence [or movements]’’ (Lustick 1993: 448). 6. I use here the terminology of Miroslav Hroch (1993: 6), who refers to ‘‘national movements’’ as organized endeavors to achieve all the attributes of a fully fledged

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nation. Not all such movements are ‘‘nationalist,’’ he claims, because ‘‘nationalism stricto sensu is something else: namely, that outlook which gives an absolute priority to the values of the nation over all other values and interests.’’ National movements tend to pursue three aims: (1) the development of a national culture based on the native language; (2) the achievement of civil rights and political self-administration (autonomy or independence); and (3) the creation of a complete social structure out of the ethnic group (Hroch 1994:4). Moreover, the term national movement has a significant advantage over the term nationalism because it refers to empirically verifiable activity by concrete individuals, and it is possible to observe their goals and demands, their numbers and social composition (Hroch 1998: 95). 7. In addition, some scholars have recognized that not all nations desire an independent state and that independentism is a variant of substate nationalism, but they have failed to recognize the tripartite diversity of political orientations within substate national movements. For example, Sorens confusingly considers that the phrase ‘‘secessionist political parties’’ includes both autonomist and independentist parties (Sorens 2012: Appendix), and he fails to recognize that minority national groups can sometimes express a pro-federation preference, which is distinct from irredentism, autonomy, or regionalism (10). He may have meant that some autonomist parties can be ‘‘instrumental autonomists,’’ the term I use in this book. For instrumental autonomist parties, autonomy is defended as a stepping stone toward greater quotas of sovereignty. 8. Jack Snyder (2000: 23) would also seem to agree with Brubaker, given that he defines nationalism as a ‘‘doctrine that a people who see themselves as distinct in their culture, history, institutions, or principles should rule themselves in a political system that expresses and protects those distinctive characteristics.’’ 9. Bernard Landry, interview with the author, May 25, 2005, National Assembly of Que´bec, Que´bec City. 10. With respect to the national character of the Catalan parties, Kenneth McRoberts (2001: 88–89) would seem to agree that all of them, except the Partido Popular, are ‘‘national parties,’’ including, at the outer edge, the P.S.C. 11. As I state in the Conclusion, this statement by Pujol reflects his views during the 23 years he was in power as President, but it should be noted that very recently (after 2009 or so), Pujol has come out publicly with a very different discourse, one which is now explicitly pro-sovereignty. This is true for many of the political party leaders and militants I will cite in this book, especially those of CDC, UDC (less so), and to some extent IC-V with respect to some of its most catalanist leaders and militants, and even to some extent the catalanist wing of the PSC as well. Therefore, some of the views and opinions reported here are current until 2009, and I hereby recognize (as well as in the Conclusion) that the views of some of the leaders and militants cited here (especially the ones of CDC) have changed and now are more pro-sovereignty.

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Chapter 1 1. It is difficult to compare non-democratic polities with democratic ones. For example, the politics of nationalism in Uzbekistan in the fall of 1991 was distorted by the absence of a democratic ethos (Hale 2008: 188). My argument is bound to be valid within these scope conditions in substate national societies located in federations or federal political systems (Watts 2008), but also in unitary states, except that in the latter federalists are unlikely to exist, and the internal differentiation in the latter is only between secessionists and autonomists. These scope conditions encompass a number of national movements throughout the world, including the national movements of Galicia, the Basque Country, Flanders, Puerto Rico, etc. 2. Canada is one of the world’s oldest and most asymmetrical federations (while Spain is a young federal political system, and many would argue it has been recentralizing in the last few years). It is one of the world’s most enduring liberal democracies (while Spain was just able to inaugurate it in the late 1970s). Currently, the proportion of native francophones in Quebec is much higher than the proportion of native Catalan speakers in Catalonia. The secessionist party in the parliamentary sphere dates from 1968 in Quebec, while in Catalonia it emerged only in the late 1980s. 3. The trifurcation in national movements that I found (between independentists, autonomists, and federalists) has been echoed by other authors. Eve Hepburn (2010: 49), for example, found that the ideal types of constitutional goals available to substate political parties include independence, federalism, and devolution (a form of autonomism); and then she also lists unionism (a territorial strategy found in the U.K.) and unitarism (no substate national political parties favor this territorial strategy). Moreover, all substate political parties must balance their goal of gaining more autonomy or fragments of sovereignty with the desirability of maintaining their capacity to influence the central state. The classic work by Rokkan and Urwin (1983: 141) also asserts that the constitutional strategies of peripheral mobilization may aim for goals that include regional autonomy, federalism, confederalism, and independence. Another classic, the work of De Winter (1998: 205), states that ethnoregionalist parties’ programs may differ according to the degree of radicalism of their claims for selfgovernment: protectionism, autonomism, federalism, independence, and irredentism. 4. CiU, Converge`ncia i Unio´ (Convergence and Union), is a moderate nationalist coalition consisting of the Democratic Convergence of Catalonia and Democratic Union of Catalonia. ERC, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Republican Left of Catalonia), is a pro-independence and leftist party. PSC, Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (Party of the Socialists of Catalonia) is a federalist party with links to the PSOE (PSOE), ICV-EUiA, Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds–Esquerra Unida i Alternativa (Initiative for Catalonia Greens–Alternative and United Left) is a coalition between a postcommunist and green party with a coalition of leftist groups led by the Party of

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the Communists of Catalonia (PCC). Other parties not studied here are the Popular Party of Catalonia, a Spanish nationalist party and branch of the Spain’s Popular Party, and C’s, Ciudadanos–Partido de la Ciudadanı´a (Citizens–Citizenship’s Party), which is a Spanish nationalist and populist party. 5. Ernest Gellner’s theory, for example, ‘‘too generally assumes that the general case, that the political nation and the cultural nation must be one, is the universal and, in the long run, the irresistible tendency’’ (O’Leary 1998: 65). 6. An early version of my moral polity has been formulated by Brendan O’Leary, who wrote: ‘‘In short, the political regime within which national minorities operate, rather than their material or cultural grievances, may best explain their predispositions to be secessionists, federalists or consociationalists’’ (O’Leary 1998: 65). 7. A large-N study of secessionist movements argues that if a government cannot commit credibly to ‘‘adopting policies beneficial’’ to substate national societies, then ‘‘autonomy or independence becomes a desirable solution to at least some members of the minority community’’ (Sorens 2012: 6). Moreover, a conciliatory central state that is willing to concede decentralization may actually help to moderate secessionist impulses (152), and constitutionalizing the right to secession may also help to contain secessionism (155). 8. Previous scholars who have investigated regionalist and ‘‘ethnotregionalist’’ parties agree with me that this ‘‘tipping point’’ is analytically important, and they have therefore focused on asking ‘‘why and how ethnic sentiments were converted into organizational structures’’ (Winter and Tu¨rsan 1998). 9. I have also done similar fieldwork in other cases of stateless nationhood, such as the Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico (belonging to the United States) and the Regione Autonoma Valle d’Aosta and the Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano-Alto Adige (within Italy). 10. The term militant is used in romance language countries to refer to the most committed and active members of political parties. Often, these are the party members that participate in party congresses and assemblies, and they may pay annual dues. The term militants as used in this book is shorthand for ‘‘base-level activists.’’ Chapter 2 1. Please note that these insurgent orientations are ‘‘new’’ in the sense that they may have been present in sociological nationalism and in extra-parliamentary small groups or parties, but they did not have a significant presence in the arena of parliamentary politics and electoral competition. Thus, for example, autonomism arguably may have been the political legacy of the Union Nationale regime of premier Maurice Duplessis, which began in 1936 and ended with the Quiet Revolution in Que´bec after 1960. But more recently, it is the ADQ, founded in 1994, that has represented this political and constitutional orientation in the Que´bec National Assembly. In Catalonia, independentism may have been present in all kinds of associations and small extra-parliamentary parties before 1989, but only with the transformation and de facto

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re-founding of ERC in 1986–1989 has it become an ideological force represented in the Catalan Parliament and competing successfully in the electoral arena. 2. In a prologue to a 1995 book, the former president of ERC, Josep Lluis Carod Rovira, argues that the transformation of ERC in the 1980s led to a historic novelty in political Catalanism: For the first time, a clearly independentist party was present in the Catalan Parliament and was able to strengthen the independentist orientation within the national movement (Renyer 1995: 5). 3. The de facto re-founding of ERC during 1986–1989 is functionally equivalent to the founding of a new party, as in the case of the ADQ in 1994. 4. This is Pujol’s view until 2009 or so. After 2010, he changed his public discourse, which is now more pro-sovereignty. 5. Joan B. Culla, interview with the author, July 13, 2004, Universitat Auto`noma de Barcelona. 6. ‘‘La Constitucio´n se fundamenta en la indisoluble unidad de la nacio´n Espan˜ola, patria comu´n e indivisible de todos los espan˜oles, y reconoce y garantiza el derecho a la autonomı´a de las nacionalidades y regiones que la integran y la solidaridad entre todas ellas.’’ 7. ‘‘En ningu´n caso se admite la federacio´n de Comunidades Auto´nomas.’’ 8. ‘‘Las Fuerzas Armadas . . . tienen como misio´n garantizar la soberanı´a e independencia de Espan˜a, defender su integridad territorial y el ordenamiento constitucional.’’ 9. It had been formed in November 1971 and asserted four principal points: general amnesty for prisoners and political exiles, respect for political and civil liberties, the provisional reestablishment of the Statute of Autonomy of 1932 as a mechanism for the exercise of the right to self-determination, and the coordination among all Iberian peoples of the democratic struggle (Vilaregut Sa´ez 2004: 62). 10. The Fossar de les Moreres is an emblematic site for nationalists in Barcelona. Located adjacent to the church of Santa Maria del Mar, it was the place where the invading Bourbon troops of 1714 buried many of the dead who had been involved in the defense of the city against the forces besieging the city. 11. September 11 is a day of remembrance of the defeat of the Catalan troops at the end of the War of Spanish Succession in 1714. 12. The segment of substate national movements that is based on civil society. Chapter 3 1. In the 1976 election, the Union Nationale experienced a brief renaissance, given that in the two previous elections (1970 and 1973) it seemed to be destined to electoral insignificance (Tanguay 2003: 255). 2. Michel Belanger used to be chief of the National Bank of Canada and Jean Campeau used to direct the Caisse de depot et placement du Que´bec. The Commision also included representatives from labor, municipalities, and academe.

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3. This is a formula used by the Canadian government to redistribute funds to the poorer provinces so that citizens will be able to enjoy comparable public services throughout the country. For further details, see the following: ‘‘La pe´re´quation permet a` Ottawa de redistribuer des fonds aux provinces plus pauvres afin que les citoyens be´ne´ficient de services publics comparables a` la grandeur du pays. Actuellement, Ottawa calcule la richesse fiscale de chaque province en fonction de ses revenus et fixe une norme a` partir de la moyenne de cinq d’entre elles: le Que´bec, l’Ontario, le Manitoba, la Saskatchewan et la Colombie-Britannique. Hormis l’Ontario, l’Alberta et la Saskatchewan, toutes les provinces se trouvent en dec¸a` de la norme et rec¸oivent donc des versement de pe´re´quation. ‘‘La plupart des provinces sont favorables a` une norme calcule´e a` partir de la moyenne des 10 provinces. En effet, les provinces plus pauvres recevraient alors plus d’argent. Plus toˆt cette anne´e, la publication d’un rapport commande´ par le fe´de´ral recommandait que la moitie´ des revenus des provinces tire´s des ressources naturelles soient inte´gre´s dans le calcul de la pe´re´quation—une position que favorise le Que´bec’’ (Le Devoir, January 10, 2007: 1). 4. Jean Allaire, interview with the author, June 22, 2005, at UQAM, Montreal. 5. Guy Laforest, interview with the author, June 3, 2005, at Universite´ Laval, Que´bec City. 6. Even today, many Catalan nationalists still reject the Spanish Constitution of 1978. For example, Alfons Lo´pez Tena, the president of the Cercle d’Estudis Sobiranistes, recently stated in response to the question of why he rejects the Spanish Constitution, ‘‘Because it is Spanish. It says very clearly that there is only one sovereign nation: the Spanish one. . . . The Constitution created a unitary state, uninational, and monolingual: it is based on only one sovereign nation’’ (Avui, March 24, 2009:8). 7. See La Vanguardia, March 30, 2011, p. 3. A 2011 study by the Centre d’Estudis d’Opinio´ revealed that pro-independence sentiment in Catalonia is at a historic high: Forty-three percent of Catalans would now vote for independence (La Vanguardia, June 30, 2011, p. 15; El Paı´s, June 30, 2011, p. 17; Prof. Jordi Argelaguet, director of the CEO, personal communication to the author, June 30, 2011). Chapter 4 1. Defined as one presenting a political will combined with a national consciousness. 2. Defined as one presenting the distinctive traits of a people, like customs, language, or culture. 3. The data I obtained based on questionnaire responses of PQ militants was collected at the Fifteenth Party Congress in Quebec City, held on June 3–5, 2005. Thousands of militants were in attendance, and I distributed 300 questionnaires in person. A total of seventy-seven responses were received. 4. The questionnaire for ERC militants was distributed by e-mail to a list of about 300 militants by Josep Vall, secretary of organization, in September 2004. I received

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directly forty responses. A few of the questionnaires I distributed myself during November 2004 among militants of some local sections of the party in the city of Barcelona, especially in the sector of Horta-Guinardo. 5. Pere Aragone´s, interview with the author, October 26, 2004, at JERC headquarters, Carrer Canuda, Barcelona. 6. The questionnaire data on the ADQ was obtained during June and July 2005, when Pierre Morin of the ADQ parliamentary group at the National Assembly sent my questionnaire by e-mail to 5,193 ADQ militants. I received eighty responses directly from the militants. 7. The questionnaire data for CDC were obtained on October 2, 2004, when I went to the Special Congress of CDC to discuss the draft treaty of a constitution for the European Union. This was a one-day Congress held in Barcelona, with thousands of militants in attendance, and I personally distributed 300 questionnaires among the militants and received forty-four responses. 8. Carme Vidal, interview with the author, October 4, 2004, at CDC headquarters. 9. CDC Focus Group 4, December 12, 2005, Esquerra de l’Eixample, Barcelona. 10. See the responses offered by one hundred Catalan intellectuals when asked, among other matters, whether ‘‘they felt implicated by terms such as nationalism or catalanism’’ and ‘‘what would be the most appropriate formulation for our time’’ (Fundacio´ Acta: 1990). 11. The questionnaire data on UDC was obtained during November and December 2005, when Ms. Marta Vidal, the secretary of Internal Communications, Militants, and Participation, sent my questionnaire to an e-mail list of ‘‘hundreds of militants’’ of the party. I received forty-four responses directly from the militants, by e-mail and by regular mail. 12. Josep A. Duran i Lleida, interview with the author, December 2, 2004, at UDC headquarters, Barcelona. 13. The questionnaire responses for the PLQ were obtained during June to November 2005, when Ms. Catherine Cosgrove, Directrice, Contenu Politique, at the Montre´al headquarters of the PLQ, sent the questionnaire to an e-mail list of militants. I received eighteen responses directly from the militants. 14. Benoıˆt Pelletier, interview with the author, June 9, 2005, at the National Assembly, in Quebec City. 15. Line Beauchamp, interview with the author, July 6, 2005, in her office in Montreal. 16. The questionnaire responses were obtained at the Fourth National Conference of the PSC on ‘‘Old and New Rights of the Welfare State,’’ held in Barcelona, November 19–20, 2005. I personally distributed 300 copies of the questionnaire and received thirty-five completed responses. 17. The questionnaire responses were obtained during December 2005, when Enric Rius, official in charge of communications for the party and director of Treball

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at the IC-V headquarters in Barcelona, sent it to an e-mail list of militants. I received thirty-five responses directly from the militants. 18. Jaume Bosch, interview with the author, December 3, 2004, at IC-V headquarters, Carrer Ciutat, Barcelona. Chapter 5 1. Although, if they are completely subordinated to a state-level party, they are unlikely to behave as national parties. 2. Other scholars have put forward similar definitions. Aguilera de Prat studied ‘‘substate nationalist parties,’’ which are parties that have a specific territorial base, purport to represent a population that is supposed to have a unique and common identity, and which follow a strategy of claims aiming to maximize the degree of selfgovernment (Aguilera de Prat 2002: 32). I believe the definition I use, which I borrow from Caminal, is better formulated, more universal, and expresses more clearly the defining characteristics of these parties. 3. Mainstream instrumentalist perspectives in the study of nationalism and ethnicity are less useful to account for my observations. Generally, such perspectives argue that leaders strategically manipulate ethnic or national feelings among the masses principally for the sake of holding on to power. They adopt an instrumental approach to identity, it is argued. Elites seek to maximize their power by mobilizing ethnic or national identity among the masses, without actually adhering to it themselves (Varshney 2002: 29; Hardin 1995; Smith 1998). First, my findings show that the ‘‘masses’’ (the hard-core grassroots militants of national parties) can often be non-instrumentalized with respect to their position on national identity. Many of them seem to be actually non-instrumental with respect to their identity and have their own conceptions of national identity that seem to be genuinely held. They don’t seem to be victims of the instrumental manipulations of elites. Moreover, in the case of federalist national parties, it would seem that it is the leadership of these parties that puts forward a more ‘‘nationalist’’ perspective (which seems to genuinely held) than the rank-andfile militants of these parties. Therefore, a Michelsian perspective is more useful to address some of the patterns uncovered by my empirical research. 4. Bernat Joan, interview with the author, November 26, 2004, at Pati Llimona, Ciutat Vella, Barcelona. 5. CDC Focus Group 1, November 2, 2004, at CDC’s main office on Carrer Corsega, Barcelona. 6. The party also refers to it as ‘‘personalist nationalism.’’ 7. Josep A. Duran Lleida, interview with the author, December 2, 2004, at UDC headquarters, Travessera de Gracia, Barcelona. 8. UDC Focus Group 1, December 19, 2005, at UDC headquarters, Travessera de Gracia, Barcelona. 9. Eric Duhaime, interview with the author, June 10, 2005, at the National Assembly, Que´bec City.

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10. Benoıˆt Pelletier, interview with the author, June 9, 2005, at the National Assembly, Que´bec City. 11. Jaume Bosch, interview with the author, December 3, 2004, at IC-V headquarters, Carrer Ciutat, Barcelona. 12. Ibid. Chapter 6 1. Bernard Landry, interview with the author, May 25, 2005, National Assembly, Que´bec City. 2. Other scholars have classified Liechtenstein, San Marino, and Monaco as ‘‘protected independent states,’’ which is a state that has ‘‘delegated certain of its powers by treaty to a protecting or guardian state, but it retains full domestic autonomy and its general right of control over foreign relations, except insofar as that control has been delegated by specific treaty provisions’’ (Hannum 1996: 16). 3. Although 62 percent and 67 percent of the people of Palau voted to approve their Compact in two separate referenda in 1983 and 1984, the Compact has been mired in litigation because it is alleged that a minimum of 75 percent of the eligible voters was required for approval (Leibowitz 1989: 624; see also Leibowitz 1996). 4. Josep Vall, interview with the author, September 15, 2004, ERC headquarters, Barcelona. Chapter 7 1. However, a number of scholars are critics of a model of federation (Hale 2004; Treisman 2007; Roeder 1991), and others recognize its possible benefits but are wary of some of its features (Horowitz 2007). 2. I am interested in territorial autonomy, not in cultural nonterritorial autonomy. All of the substate national societies I am interested in are territoriallyconcentrated. ¨ land 3. Contemporary instances of existing autonomist relationships include A Islands/Finland, South Tyrol/Italy, and Faro¨e Islands/Denmark (Suksi 1998; Lapidoth 1997; McGarry 2002). 4. Puerto Rico is a non-federal autonomy that is officially an unincorporated territory belonging to the federal political system that is the United States and is subject to the plenary powers of the U.S. Congress under the Territorial Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Burnett and Marshall 2001). It is not a ‘‘free-associated’’ state (Keating 2009; Benedikter 2007). 5. Rafael Herna´ndez Colo´n, interview with the author, May 13, 2006, Ponce, Puerto Rico. 6. Militant response to questionnaire distributed by the autor at PPD Convention of 2008, Fajardo, Puerto Rico. 7. Jaume Bosch, interview with the author, December 3, 2004, at IC-V headquarters in Ciutat Vella, Barcelona.

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8. Ramon Camp (MP for CDC), interview with the author, September 23, 2004, at the Catalan Parliament, Barcelona. 9. Jose´ Arsenio Torres, interview with the author, March 22, 2005, San Juan, Puerto Rico. 10. Artur Mas, interview with the author, November 19, 2004, at CDC headquarters, Carrer Corsega, Barcelona. 11. Dolors Batalla, interview with the author, September 23, 2004, at CDC headquarters, Barcelona. 12. Eric Duhaime, interview with the author, June 10, 2005, at the National Assembly, Que´bec City. 13. Ramon Camp, interview with the author, September 23, 2004, at the Catalan Parliament. 14. Josep A. Duran i Lleida, interview with the author, December 2, 2004, at UDC headquarters, Barcelona. 15. The PNV has historically oscillated between proposals for autonomism and more sovereigntist proposals. In recent times, to the extent it puts forward a proposal for genuine free association, such as the Plan Ibarretxe, which was rejected by the Spanish Congress of Deputies in 2005, one may say it is a sovereigntist autonomist party that has shown a lot of fluctuation in its orientation. 16. Roughly translated as ‘‘This is not the time to deal with that.’’ 17. Josep Moline´ i Soler, Unio´ de Joves, UDC, interview with the author, December 5, 2005, at UDC headquarters, Barcelona. 18. The ADQ has been criticized by its rival, the PLQ, for not being sufficiently precise and clear about its autonomist program. In fact, Benoıˆt Pelletier of the PLQ has criticized the ADQ for ‘‘stealing’’ the concept of autonomy from the federalists, and in particular from the Pelletier Report of 2001 (Robitaille 2007). 19. Given the explosion of social costs, especially in education and health, Que´bec needs more fiscal resources to attend these costs, the ADQ asserts. Chapter 8 1. Jaume Bosch, interview with the author, December 3, 2004, at IC-V headquarters in Ciutat Vella, Barcelona. 2. This includes quasi-federations such as Spain and South Africa. 3. Jaume Bosch, interview with the author, December 3, 2004, at IC-V headquarters in Ciutat Vella, Barcelona. 4. Benoıˆt Pelletier (2004a) insists that the Canadian constitutional structure contains, at present, elements of asymmetry. Chapter 9 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Pere Aragone`s, interview with the author, October 26, 2004. Ibid. Josep Huguet, interview with the author, October 6, 2004. Josep Vall, interview with the author, September 15, 2004. Ibid.

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6. Josep Huguet, interview with the author, October 6, 2004. 7. Pere Aragone`s, interview with the author, October 26, 2004. 8. Josep Huguet, interview with the author, October 6, 2004. 9. Josep Vall, interview with the author, September 15, 2004. 10. Several militants decided to add in the ‘‘Other’’ column a note about how the ‘‘will to be [a Catalan]’’ was the strongest factor pulling them in the direction of secessionism. 11. ERC Focus Group 2, November 29, 2004, Horta-Guinardo, Barcelona. 12. ERC Focus Group 1, October 5, 2004, Santa Coloma de Gramanet, Barcelona. 13. Bernard Landry, interview with the author, May 25, 2005, at the National Assembly, Que´bec City. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Artur Mas, interview with the author, November 19, 2004, at CDC headquarters, Carrer Co`rsega, Barcelona. 17. Ibid. 18. My interview with Jordi Pujol on November 4, 2004 at his private office at the central Passeig de Gra`cia in Barcelona lasted about twenty minutes. He did not answer any of the questions on my long list and instead referred me to Homs. 19. Jordi Cuminal, the president of the youth wing of CDC when I interviewed him, known as the Joventut Nacionalista de Catalunya (JNC), stated the same thought when he said that ‘‘being a nationalist is having independence as one’s ultimate objective. In the meantime, we have to take small steps to get ourselves closer to that goal.’’ Jordi Cuminal, interview with the author, August 3, 2004, at JNC headquarters, near Carrer Corsega, Barcelona. 20. Francesc Homs, interview with the author, November 11, 2004, at the Catalan Parliament, Barcelona. 21. ‘‘Kid, don’t get yourself in trouble.’’ 22. ‘‘Kid, get yourself in trouble.’’ 23. Francesc Homs, interview with the author, November 11, 2004, at the Catalan Parliament, Barcelona. 24. Dolors Batalla, interview with the author, September 23, 2004, at CDC headquarters, Barcelona. 25. Ibid. 26. Carme Vidal, interview with the author, October 4, 2004, at CDC headquarters, Carrer Co`rsega, Barcelona. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Ramon Camp, interview with the author, September 23, 2004, at the Catalan Parliament, Barcelona. 30. Josep A. Duran i Lleida, interview with the author, December 2, 2004, at UDC headquarters, Travessera de Gra`cia, Barcelona. 31. Ibid.

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32. Josep Moline´ i Soler, interview with the author, December 5, 2005, at Carrer Valencia, Barcelona. 33. Daniel Ortiz, interview with the author, November 30, 2004, at Carrer Valencia, Barcelona. 34. Ignasi Guardans, interview with the author, October 8, 2004, at CDC headquarters, Carrer Co`rsega, Barcelona. 35. CDC Focus Group 1, November 2, 2004, at Carrer Co`rsega, Barcelona. 36. CDC Focus Group 2, November 18, 2004, at Ciutat Vella, Barcelona. 37. CDC Focus Group 3, November 29, 2004, at Gra`cia, Barcelona. 38. CDC Focus Group 4, December 12, 2005, at Esquerra de l’Eixample, Barcelona. 39. UDC Focus Group 1, December 19, 2005, at Travessera de Gra`cia, Barcelona. 40. Guy Laforest, interview with the author, June 3, 2005, at Universite´ Laval, Que´bec City. 41. Eric Duhaime, interview with the author, June 10, 2005, at the National Assembly, Que´bec City. 42. Jean Allaire, interview with the author, June 22, 2005, at UQA`M, Montreal. 43. Eric Duhaime, interview with the author, June 10, 2005, at the National Assembly, Que´bec City. 44. Jaume Bosch, interview with the author, December 3, 2004, at IC-V headquarters, Ciutat Vella, Barcelona. 45. Ibid. 46. Benoıˆt Pelletier, interview with the author, June 9, 2005, National Assembly, Que´bec City. 47. Ibid. 48. Line Beauchamp, interview with the author, July 6, 2005, at her office in downtown Montre´al. 49. Jaume Bosch, interview with the author, December 3, 2004, at IC-V headquarters, Carrer Canuda, Barcelona. 50. Ibid. 51. Only 22 percent of PLQ respondents and only 34 percent of PSC respondents indicated that Canadian or Spanish centralist nationalism is a significant factor to take into consideration in order to explain their option for federalism. In addition, 50 percent of PLQ respondents and 57 percent of PSC respondents stated that considerations of language and culture were important in explaining their decision. 52. In the case of a party such as the ADQ, which has made its center-right economic and social program a pillar of its raison d’eˆtre and which has a weaker decentralizing animus than the other autonomist parties (see Table 9.1 in this chapter), they indicated that economic factors were very important. Second was the bloc of political factors. 53. ERC Focus Group 2, November 29, 2004, in Horta-Guinardo, Barcelona.

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54. The militants of the PSC did indicate that ‘‘history of relations between minority and majority nations’’ was a very important factor accounting for their decision to opt for federalism, but in the illustrative comments added by the militants, it is clear that they are referring to the history of repression and persecution of the Left during the long years of the Franco dictatorship, and thus this is not really indicative of a rejection of the central state per se. Chapter 10 1. A recent example of substate nationalists’ perception of non-accommodation and non-reciprocity by the central state is the perception by many Catalans that the nullification of key provisions of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy of 2006 by the Spanish Constitutional Court in July 2010 was an instance of non-accommodation. Even a long-standing autonomist such as former President Jordi Pujol declared that he was now inclined to independence because the vision of a ‘‘plural Spain’’ had failed (La Vanguardia, March 30, 2011, p. 3). A 2011 study by the Centre d’Estudis d’Opinio´ revealed that pro-independence sentiment in Catalonia is at a historic high: 43 percent of Catalans would now vote for independence (La Vanguardia, June 30, 2011, p. 15; El Paı´s, June 30, 2011, p. 17; Prof. Jordi Argelaguet, personal communication, June 30, 2011). 2. The results from the quantifiable portions of my questionnaires support all these findings, which are notable. However, I recognize that the fact that two preferences appear together cannot be used to demonstrate unequivocal causality. I would add, however, that the additional comments from the open-ended questions by the militants, as well as the tens of in-depth interviews with top leaders and militants, also help to support my findings. Chapter 11 1. Sociological nationalism is a term used in Spain and Catalonia to denote the nationalism that is generated by civil society organizations, social movements, and other society-based agents. 2. Except that it should be noted that in December 2011, the ADQ opted to fuse itself with a new political party led by Franc¸ois Legault, the Coalition avenir Que´bec. Denis 2011. In addition, in the most recent provincial elections of September 4, 2012 in Quebec, the PQ was able to regain power by a narrow margin and form a minority government, and now the PLQ is the official opposition. 3. On the possible constitutional avenues for holding a referendum, see, for example, several recent reports by the Institut d’Estudis Autono`mics (Institute of Autonomic Studies) of the Catalan government, such as ‘‘Informe Sobre els Procediments Legals a Trave´s dels Quals Els Ciutadans i les Ciutadanes de Catalunya Poden Ser Consultats Sobre Llur Futur,’’ of March 11, 2013. Also, reports by the Consultative Council for the National Transition of the Catalan government, especially the report ‘‘La Consulta sobre el Futur Politic de Catalunya,’’ of July 25, 2013.

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Index

accommodation, 32, 87–88, 263, 264–80, 299n1; elites, 68; integration vs., 275; substate nationalists, 267–73 Action De´mocratique du Que´bec (ADQ), 15, 17n1, 19, 46, 66, 76, 78, 83–86 passim, 131–32, 177–80 passim, 210, 211, 272, 296n18, 298n52, 299n2; Canada, view of, 255–56; development, 270–71; leaders, 238–39; militants, 100, 101, 240–42; nonsecessionism, 261; sovereignty, visions of, 193–96 agency, role of, 26 Agreement of Gasteiz, 186 Agreement of Santiago de Compostela, 186 Aguade, Jaume, 50 Allaire, Jean, 81–85 passim, 239 Allaire Report, 79–83 passim, 177 Almirall, Valentı´, 47 alternative approaches, 262 Aragone´s, Pere, 217, 219 Arbo´s Marı´n, Xavier, 45, 204 Assemblea de Catalunya, 53 associated states, 148 asymmetry: de facto, 206–7; de jure, 206, 207 autonomism/autonomists, 5, 15, 19, 86, 159–64, 216, 255–57, 265, 276, 290n1; antifederalist stance, 198; central state, recognition and, 176, 178–80, 181–82; consociational theory, 173–75; devolutionary, 167–69; dual national identities, 180; federalist, 164–65; federation and, 175, 176–77, 180–81; identity and, 176, 178; instrumental, 19, 226–38, 288n7; nationalists and, 100–106, 237–38; nonfederalist elements, 164–67; relationships, 295n3; role, 274; secessionism and,

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INDX

175–76, 177–78, 181; semi-federal, 169–73; sovereignty, visions of, 16–98; Spain, 276; substate nationalism, 159–98; territorial order, 180–82, 295n2; traditional, 27; virtues, 197–98 autonomist nationalism, 11, 86, 175–80, 272–73; discourse, 226–42; Que´bec, 65–90 autonomist parties, 19, 106; national identity and, 126–32; sovereignty, visions of, 182–98; teleological, 19 autonomous communities, 104, 205 L’Avenir, 67 Avui, 57, 59 Bariteau, Claude, 196, 240 Barrera, Heribert, 58, 59 Basque Country, 17n5, 87, 276 Batalla, Dolors, 176, 229–30 Beauchamp, Line, 247 Bedard, Pierre, 66 Beita, 8 Be´langer-Campeau Commission, 79–80 Belanger, Michel, 291n2 Benach, Ernest, 60 Bloc d’Esquerra d’Alliberament Nacional (BEAN), 53–54 Bloc Que´be´cois, 85 Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG), 17n2, 185 Bosch, Jaume, 109–10, 138, 202, 210, 243–44, 248 Bosch, Xavier, 60 Bourassa, Henri, 65, 67 Bourassa, Robert, 68, 76–80 passim Breuilly, John, 9 Brubaker, 6, 8, 10 Bryce, James, 200

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324 Index Bundestreue, 211 Burma, 29–30 Cambo´, Francesc, 233 Cameron, David, 270 Caminal, Miquel, 11, 202, 210 Camp, Ramon, 177, 231 Campeau, Jean, 291n2 Canada, 289n2; bilingualism, 73; de facto asymmetry, 206–7; de jure asymmetry, 207–8; flag, 75; formula to redistribute funds, 292n3; nature of, 126, 132, 135; PLQ views, 257–58; PQ views, 254 Canadian Citizenship Act, 75 Canadian Constitution, 72, 74, 75 Carbonell, Jordi, 56 Carod Rovira, Josep Lluis, 59–63 passim, 155, 265, 291n2 Cartier, George Etienne, 67 Casanova, Gonza´lez, 49 Catalan national movement, 45–64; currents, 15 Catalan Parliament, 58–59, 62, 63 Catalan State, 50–51 Catalan Statute of Autonomy, 37, 48, 51, 277, 299n1 catalanism/catalanists, 45, 103; political, 11 Catalonia, 5–6, 7, 11, 12, 19, 36, 37, 48, 98–99, 277–80; autonomists, 176–77, 237–38; CDC, 102–3, 126–29; ERC, 98–99, 121–24; IC-V, 110–11, 137; independentists, 103; militants and leaders, 101–3; PSC, 108–9, 135–36; UDC, 104–5, 129–30; within-case temporal variation, 13–14, 18 [figure] Catalunya Lliure, 55 CDC. See Converge`ncia Democra`tica de Catalunya central state, 276–77, 290n6; autonomy and, 176, 178–80, 181–82; institutions, 262, 273; perception, 259; substate nationalist militants’ attitudes, 260 [table] Centre Catala`, 47 Centre Internacional Escarre´ per a les Minories E`tniques i Nacionals (CIEMEN), 57 Charest, Jean, 12, 17n1, 107, 134, 196, 239, 246, 247 Charlottetown Accord, 78–82 Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 75, 77

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CiU. See Converge`ncia i Unio´ civic independentism, 56 civil society, 35–36, 54–58, 64, 291n12; contributions from, 82–84 Coalition Avenir Que´bec, 17n1 Coll i Alentorn, Miquel, 190, 191 Colom, A`ngel, 57–63 passim, 155 comarcas, 50 Comite Catala` Contra la Constitucio´ Espanyola, 52–53 Comites de Solidaritat amb els Patriotes Catalans (CSPC), 51, 54, 55 Companys, Lluı´s, 50 confederation/confederalists, 149–50, 190 conservative nationalism, 67–68 consociational theory, autonomy and, 173–75 Constitution Act, Canada, 74, 75, 76, 202, 207, 210 constitutional moment, 34–35, 64, 89, 277, 278, 279; Catalonia, 87; Que´bec, 71–78, 87 constitutional orientation, 34–35 constitutional structure, 276–77 continuity, state structures and institutions, 4 Converge`ncia i Unio´ (CiU), 19, 37, 48, 59–63 passim, 88, 176–78, 185, 186, 234, 265, 289n4 Converge`ncia Democra`tica de Catalunya (CDC), 19, 37, 101–4 passim, 126–29, 176–80, 234, 235, 272, 279; leaders, 226–31; militants, 233–36; non-secessionism, 261; sovereignty, visions of, 182–88; Spain, view of, 256 Corsica, 276 La Crida a la Solidaritat en Defensa de la Llengua la Cultura i la Nacio´ Catalanes (La Crida), 56–60 CSPC. See Comites de Solidaritat amb els Patriotes Catalans Culla, Joan B., 48–49 cultural nation, 96, 292n2 Cuminal, Jordi, 297n19 custom and culture, 27–28 Davidson, Neil, 9 decentralizers, strong, 27, 251, 263 Declaration of Barcelona, 185, 186 de facto asymmetry, 206–7 de jure asymmetry, 206, 207

INDX

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Index 325 Democra`tica de Catalunya, 37 devolution: autonomy and, 167–69; federalism and, 205 dignity, 27; collective, 27–28 distinct society, 76 Domingo, Marcelli, 50 dual national identities, autonomism, 180 Dufresne, Jacques, 83 Duhaime, Eric, 132, 239 Dumont, Mario, 81–85, 132, 196, 239 Duplessis, Maurice, 67, 70–71, 290n1 Duplessisme, 72–73 Duran i Lleida, Josep Antoni, 104, 130–31, 177–78, 190, 191, 232 economy, 23–25, 241; electricity companies, nationalization, 71 Elazar, Daniel J., 147 Elements d’Estat Catala´, 49 Elias, Anwen, 17n7 elites, 294n3; accommodation, 68 empirical pattern, stateless nations, 5 England, eighteenth-century, 28–29 English Party, 66 Entesa dels Nacionalistes d’Esquerra, 56 equalization, 79 Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC), 15, 19, 46, 49–63 passim, 98–99, 121–24, 235, 265, 289n4, 290n1, 291n2; development, 269–70; leaders, 217, 219–220; militants, 218 [table], 220–22; refounding, 64, 291n3; sovereignty, vision of, 153–57; Spain, view of, 254–55, 259 Estat Catala`, 49, 50, 51 Estat Catala`-Partit Proletari, 49 ethnicity, 23, 290n8; epiphenomenal theories, 23; identities, 21–22; mainstream instrumentalist perspectives, 294n3; violence, 8–9 ethnonationalists, 14 federal political systems, 147–48 federalism/federalists, 5, 19, 65, 73, 111, 181, 199, 216, 257–59, 265; asymmetric, 205–8; autonomy and, 164–65, 169–73; Catalan, 15; consociational theory, 173–75; ideal, 199; mainstream, 27; nationalism/nationalists and, 66, 106–12, 242–49, 272–73; semi-federal, 169–73; substate ideology,

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199–212; symmetry vs. asymmetry, 209 [figure] federalist parties, 111; instrumental, 20, 209; national identity and, 132–38; sovereignty, visions of, 208–11 federations: asymmetric, 208 [table], 289n2; autonomism and, 175, 176–77, 180–81; continuum, 208 [figure]; existing, 204–5; models, 275, 295n1; symmetric, 208 [table] fieldwork, methodology, 281–85 food riots, social roots, 28–29 Franco, 51, 276 free association, 148 freely associated state (FAS), 148–49 Freeman, Edward, 199 Front Nacional de Catalonia (FNC), 51 Fuster, Joan, 52 Gagnon, Alain, 10–11, 83 Galicia, 17n2 Gellner, Ernest, 9, 290n5 Germany, de jure asymmetry, 207 Gouin, Paul, 70–71 Groupe Action Que´bec, 84–85 Groupe Re´flexion Que´bec, 83, 84 Guardans, Ignasi, 233 Hamilton, Paul, 11 Hannum, Hurst, 147 Hardin, Russell, 28 Hechter, Michael, 9, 25–26 Hepburn, Eve, 17n4, 289n3 Herrero de Min˜o´n, Miguel, 159 Hobsbawm, Eric, 46 Homs, Francesc, 228 Hortala, Joan, 60 Hroch, Miroslav, 6, 46, 287n6 Huguet, Josep, 60, 219 IC-V. See Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds identity: autonomy and, 176, 178; promoting, 225 ideological carriers, 33–34 ideology, 64 independentism/independentists, 5, 11, 15, 19, 27, 63, 64, 65, 144–50, 216, 253–55, 263, 265, 287n4, 288n7; Catalonia, 49–52; continuum, 151 [figure]; methodical, 60; militant, 53; national parties, 121–26;

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326 Index independentism/independentists (continued ) nationalism/nationalists, 66, 86, 96–99, 217–26, 251, 271–72; parties, 99, 150–57; political space, 63; Que´be´cois, 222; radical, 63; sovereignty, vision of, 157–58; substate nationalism, ideology, 143–58 Independentistes dels Paı¨sos Catalans (IPC), 53, 55 Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (IC-V), 19, 56, 109–11, 137–38, 209, 248, 279, 289n4; leaders, 243–44; militants, 244–46; nonsecessionism, 261; sovereignty, vision of, 210 instrumental autonomism, 288n7; CDC, 226–31, 233–36, 237–38; continuum, 183 [figure]; parties, 19; UDC, 231–33, 236–38 instrumental federalist parties, 20, 209 instrumentalist tradition, roots of, 23 insurgent orientations, 290n1 integration, 275 intelligentsia, 36–37 internal nations, 287n2 internal variation, 5, 7, 26–33, 287n1 Joan, Bernat, 122–23 Johnston, Bennett, 147 Keating, Michael, 287n2 labeling, Catalan, 57–58 Laforest, Guy, 84, 196, 238–39 Landry, Bernard, 10–11, 143, 222–24 language, 32, 47, 68, 73, 89, 125, 224, 241–42 Laurier, Wilfrid, 69 Law of Harmonization of the Autonomic Process (LOAPA), 57 leaders, 98–99; ADQ, 238–39; Catalonia, 101–3; CDC, 226–31; ERC, 217, 219–20; IC-V, 109–11, 243–44; PLQ, 106–12, 246–48; PQ, 222–24; UDC, 231–33 leadership, 64; consolidation, 36, 58–63, 84–86 Legault, Franc¸ois, 17n1, 299n2 Lesage, Jean, 38, 68, 73 Le´vesque, Rene´, 38, 68–69, 146 Levi, Margaret, 28 Ley Orga´nica de Armonizacio´n del Proceso Autono´mico (LOAPA), 54 linguistic detente, 68 linguistic entente, 68

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Lliga de Catalunya, 47 Lliga Regionalista de Catalunya, 47 Lluhı´ i Vallesca, Joan, 50 Lo´pez Tena, Alfons, 292n6 Lustick, Ian, 287n5 MacDonald, John A., 134 Macia`, Francesc, 50, 51 de Madre, Manuela, 265 majority nation nationalism, 27, 251 Maragall, Pasqual, 201 Martı´nez Nadal, Rafael, 203–4 Mas, Artur, 88, 104, 176, 177–78, 228, 231–32, 265 materialist approach, 23–25 McRoberts, Kenneth, 288n10 MDT. See Moviment en Defensa de la Terra Meadwell, Hudson, 10–11 Meech Lake Accord, 76–78, 80 Mercier, Honore´, 69 metaconstitutional discourse, 275 Michels, Robert, 115, 117–20 middle class, Canada, 66 militants, 8, 61, 98–99, 100, 290n10; ADQ, 100, 101, 240–42; attitudes, 260 [table]; Catalonia, 101–3; CDC, 233–36; central state institutions, trust in, 263; ERC, 218 [table], 220–22; IC-V, 109–11, 244–46; independentist, 53, 60; nationalist, 11; PLQ, 106–12, 246–48; PQ, 96, 98, 224–25; PSC, 108–9, 242–43; substate national parties, 253–59; UDC, 104–5, 236–37 minority nations, 14, 273–74, 287n2 Miroslav Hroch, 36–37 Molas, Isidre, 49 moral economy, 28–32 moral polity, 27–28, 64, 87, 278, 290n5; reciprocity and, 273–74; stateless nationalists, 253–63; substate nationalists, 267–73; thesis, 32, 33, 42 moral resources, 31–32 Moviment en Defensa de la Terra (MDT), 55, 56 Mulroney, Brian, 76 Nacionalistes d’Esquerra (NE), 54, 56, 60 nation, 7–8, 9–10, 22 national community, 32 national consciousness, 9, 22–23, 37, 93, 94–95, 97 [table], 273; inadequacy as a thesis, 111–14; internal variation, 22

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Index 327 national identity, 7–8, 37, 121–26 national movements, 5–6, 19–20, 42, 63–64, 287n6; Catalan, 45–64; component parts, 6–7; evolution within, 45–46; internal variation, 26–33; minority nations, 143; origin and development, 66–69; political heterogeneity, 12; Que´be´cois, 46, 65–90; stateless nations and, 5; well-established democracies and advanced economies, 3 national parties, 11, 14, 19–20, 116–21, 138, 287n3, 288n10 National Party of Scotland, 89 national peoples, 14 national unity, 75 nationalism/nationalists, 3–4, 6–7, 9, 22, 93, 94–95, 110–11, 288n8, 291n10; activists, 11; agency, role of, 215; autonomists and, 100–106; Catalonia, 103; centralist, 298n51; conservative, 67–68; demand side, 42; dilemma, 266; evolution, 86–90; federalists and, 106–12; independentists, 96–99; mainstream instrumentalist perspectives, 294n3; majority nation, 259; militants, 11; peripheral nationalism, 5; perspective, 294n3; political preferences, 10; political process, 7; political strategies, 272; Que´bec, 69, 73; regimes, 32; resistance, 27; separatism and, 4; stateless nations’, 265–66; varieties, 20–22; violence, 8–9 nationality, 10; claims, 14 nationhood, shades of, 264–67 nationness, 116 networks of civic engagement, 32 non-democratic polities, 289n1 non-secessionism: nationalists, 10, 11–12, 23; orientation, 4; variation, 12, 261–62 non-self-regarding motives, 24 nonaggression pact, 68 noninstrumental behavior, 27 Nosaltres Els Valencians, 52 O’Leary, Brendan, 290n5 Official Languages Act, 74 oligarchic tendencies, 117 Organitzacio´ Socialista d’Alliberament Nacional de la Catalonia Nord, 53 Ortı´z Daniel, 232–33 Ostrom, Elinor, 28

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Paı¨sos Catalans, 56, 122–24 Palau, 295n3 Papineau, Louis-Joseph, 66–67 Parent, Etienne, 67 Parizeau, Jacques, 69 Parti Canadien, 66 Parti Libe´ral du Que´bec (PLQ), 19, 65, 66, 70, 76–83, 101, 108, 132–34, 177, 178, 202, 204, 238–39, 296n18, 298n1; Canada, view of, 257–58; militants and leaders, 106–12, 246–48; sovereignty, vision of, 210–11 Parti Patriote, 66–67 Parti Que´be´cois (PQ), 10–11, 19, 38, 65–70, 85, 124–26, 146; Canada, view of, 254; currents, 15; leaders, 222–24; militants, 96, 98, 224–25; sovereignty, vision of, 151–53 Partido Independentista Puertorriquen˜o, 19 Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), 17n5, 185, 296n15 Partido Nuevo Progresista, 19 Partido Popular Democra´tico, 19 Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC), 19, 20, 37, 135–36, 265, 289n4, 298n1, 299n54; militants, 108–9, 242–43; sovereignty, vision of, 209; Spain, view of, 258–59 Partit Nacionalista Catala`, 49 Partit Republica Catala`, 50 Partit Socialista d’Alliberament Nacional (PSAN), 51–52, 56 Partit Socialista d’Alliberament NacionalProvisional (PSAN-P), 52–53 Party of Communists of Catalonia (PCC), 289n4 patriation, 72, 74, 75 patriotic agitation, 37 peasant rebellions, 28–30 Pedreira, Antonio S., 203 Pelletier, Benoıˆt, 12, 106–7, 133, 134, 204, 239, 246, 296n18 pe´re´quation, 79 Pi i Margall, Francisco, 203 Pi i Sunyer, Carles, 50 Plaid Cymru, 17nn6–7, 89 PLQ. See Parti Libe´ral du Que´bec PNV. See Partido Nacionalista Vasco policy implications, 32 politics: institutions, perception, 273; internal heterogeneity, 93; nation and, 96, 292n1; nationalist preferences and processes, 7, 10; orientation, 27, 93;

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328 Index politics (continued ) orientation, founding, 36, 58–63, 84–86; role of, 26; stateless nation preferences, 6 political parties, 8; nationalists, 6; stateless nations, 5 Portabella, Jordi, 60 PQ. See Parti Que´be´cois preferences, formation, 24, 27 primordialist tradition, 21–22 pro-autonomism orientation, 9 pro-federation orientation, 9; nationalists, 12, 20; Que´be´cois, 15 pro-independence, Que´be´cois, 15 protected independent states, 295n2 PSAN. See Partit Socialista d’Alliberament Nacional PSAN-P. See Partit Socialista d’Alliberament Nacional-Provisional PSC. See Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya PSOE, 289n4 PSUC, 209 public institutions, 32 public space, 32 Puerto Rico, 17n8, 19, 204, 295n4; substate federalists, 203–4 Puerto Rico Independence Party (PIP), 146–47 Puigcercos, Joan, 60 Pujol, Jordi, 11–12, 48, 59, 176–77, 186, 188, 217, 228, 235, 288n11, 291n4 Putnam, Robert, 28 Que´bec, 5–12, 19, 36, 38; affirming as a nation, 96, 98, 100–101, 107, 108, 124–26; ADQ, 131; autonomists, 177; autonomist nationalists, 238–42; political and constitutional orientations, 66; trust, 31; PLQ, 132–34; within-case variation, 13–14. See also Action De´mocratique du Que´bec Que´bec Liberal Party, 65–66 Que´be´cois National Movement, 65–90 questionnaire, 39 Quiet Revolution, 38, 68 radicalism, 8–9 Rajoy, Mariano, 270 rebellion: Canada, 67; Saya San, 30 reciprocity, 31, 64, 87, 262–63, 268, 299n1; Catalonia, 269; expectation of, 27; moral

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polity and, 273–74; norms of, 32; strong reciprocity, 24 recognition, 32 referendum, constitutional avenues for holding, 299n3 regionalism, 104, 290n8 Renaixenc¸a, 47 Resnick, Philip, 74 Rigol i Roig, Joan, 190, 191 Romeu, Xavier, 54 les rouges, 67 Rubio i Ors, Joaquim, 47 Ryan, Claude, 134, 201, 202 Salmond, Alex, 270 Sanchis, Vicent, 59 Sauve´, Paul, 71 Saya San Rebellion, 30 Scotland, 11, 276, 270; trust, 31 Scots National League (SNL), 88–89 Scott, James C., 28, 29–30, 228–29 Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA), 89 Scottish Liberal Democrats, 276 Scottish National Party (SNP), 17n4, 88–89, 276 secessionism/secessionists, 3, 250, 297n10; autonomy and, 175–81; central state and, 290n6; culturalist paradigm, 21–22; literature, 20–21; materialist paradigm of, 23–25; nationalism, 10; non-secessionism vs., 265–66; orientation, 9; party, 289n2; research agenda, 5; structuralist paradigm, 25–26; theories of, 20–23; trifurcation and, 8–9; variation, 4, 12 self-regarding actors, 25 self-respect, 27 semi-federal, autonomy and, 169–73 separatism: movements, 287n5; nationalism and, 4; variation in, 32–33 Snyder, Jack, 288n8 SNP. See Scottish National Party social capital, 31–32 social networks of nationalists, 88–89 social preferences, 24 social trust, 31–32 sociological nationalism, 88–89, 299n1; Catalonia, 55 sovereignty: association, 38; degree of, 5; multinational democracies, 274–77; shared, 199–212

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Index 329 Spain, 277–80; autonomy, 276; CDC view, 256; ERC view, 254–55; IC-V view, 258–59; nature of, 129, 130–31, 136, 138; PSC view, 258; UDC view, 257 Spanish Civil War, 50–51 Spanish Constitution, 51–54, 87, 88, 184, 185, 204, 292n6 Spanish Second Republic, 37, 48, 50 stability, state structure, 4 stateless nations, 4–5, 287n2; empirical pattern, 5 stateless nationalism/nationalists, 7; moral polity, 262–63; subcategories, 21 [table] states, associated, 148 Statute of Autonomy, 184–85, 265, 276, 291n9 strong decentralizers, 27, 251, 263 structuralist approach, secessionism, 25–26 subsistence ethic, 29–30 substate autonomists, national consciousness, 112 substate federalism: national consciousness, 112–13; sovereignty, vision of, 211–12 substate national movements, internal variation, 271–73 substate national societies, 4–5, 287n2 substate nationalism/nationalists, 94, 95–96; accommodation, 267–73; accommodation in multinational democracies, 264–80; discourse and attitudes, 215–52; moral polity, 260, 267–73; movements, 27; nationalist parties, 294n2; political orientation, 218 [table] survivance, 68 Taschereau, Alexandre, 70 Taylor, Charles, 211, 264 teleological autonomist parties, 19 temporal variation, 3, 4, 14–15, 16 [table], 89, 268–71; Catalonia, 18 [figure]; withincase, 18 [figure], 33–36

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Terra Lliure, 51, 53, 55, 62, 63 territorial order, autonomy and, 180–82, 295n2 territorial pluralism, in multinational democracies, 274–77 territory, 104 theory, evidence for, 38–42 Thompson, Edward P., 28–29 tipping point, 33, 86, 290n8; Catalonia, 64 transformation, 64 trifurcated national movement, 4, 19, 289n3; contemporary, 249–52; secessionist group, 8–9; structure, 7, 89, 269; taxonomy, 42, 264–65 trigger event. See constitutional moment Trudeau, Pierre Elliott, 72–78 trust, radius of, 31 typology, 279 Ukrainians, 22 Unio´ Catalanista, 47 Unio´ Democra`tica de Catalunya (UDC), 19, 37, 104–5, 129–30, 177–80, 272, 279; leaders, 231–33; militants, 236–37; sovereignty, visions of, 186, 188–93; Spain, view of, 257 Union Nationale (UN), 65, 70, 71, 291n1 Universitat Catalana d’Estiu, 52 Uzbekistan, 22, 289n1 Vall, Josep, 156, 219, 220 Vidal, Carme, 101, 230–31 Vietnam, 29–30 Wales, 17n6, 89 War of Spanish Succession, 291n11 Weber, Max, 7–8, 13 Wells, Clyde, 77–78 Welsh Language Society, 89

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Brendan O’Leary and Rogers M. Smith for all their unswerving support in the last few years. Since 2012, the intellectual environment at the Penn Program on Democracy, Citizenship, and Constitutionalism has nurtured and stimulated my interdisciplinary research agenda. I have been inspired by the scholarship and the commitment to the ideals of university education of James C. Scott, Rogers M. Smith, and Brendan O’Leary. All three are exemplary scholars and teachers, and they have shown me that the study of politics can be engaging, lively, stimulating, imaginative, cross-disciplinary, and relevant. I also have to thank Alain-G. Gagnon of UQAM, who was a source of support and encouragement during the early stages of this project. I would also like to thank Michael Keating of the European University Institute (in Florence, Italy) for all his ideas and comments, especially during my stay at the EUI in 2003. I would like to thank Rainer Baubo¨ck for his support and intellectual encouragement when I was at the EUI during 2007–2009, when I was the NSF Visiting Fellow at the Max Weber Program and the SPS Department. My thanks to the European University Institute for hosting me in 2003 and in 2007–2009. There are many persons and institutions that were instrumental in helping me during the embryonic period of this work. The greater part of my field work was done during 2002–2006, although shorter trips were taken before and after that period. During my various stays in Quebec and Catalunya during 2002–2006, I was privileged to receive the help of many individuals and institutions. In Catalunya, at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, I have to thank Ferran Requejo, Klaus-Jurgen Nagel, Robert Fishman, Josep Santdiumenge, and Jacint Jordana. At the Universitat Autonoma de Catalunya, I have to thank Jordi Argelaguet, Salvador Cardu´s, and Joan B. Culla.

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332 Acknowledgments

At the Universitat de Barcelona, I have to thank Miquel Caminal. In Quebec, I have to thank Guy Laforest of Universite´ Laval and Alan Patten and Maurice Pinard of McGill. Also, I would like to thank Guy Lachapelle of Concordia University and Michel Seymour of the Universite´ de Montre´al. I also thank the Political Science Departments at Universitat Pompeu Fabra and the Universitat Autonoma de Catalunya, and at UQAM the CREQC, for the office space provided during my research visits. I also have to thank hundreds of individuals who are leaders and militants of the substate national parties I have studied, for their time and their willingness to form part of this research project. At Yale, I would like to thank Kay Mansfield of the Agrarian Studies Program for all the letters she sent on my behalf. Also at Yale, I would like to thank Matt Light and Willem Maas for their friendship and support and Enric Martinez of the EUI for his comments and ideas. At Nuffield College, University of Oxford, I was the Yale Exchange Scholar during the 2001–2002 academic year, and I would like to thank Laurence Whitehead for his encouragement during the very early stages of this project. At St. Antony’s College (University of Oxford) during 2010– 2011, where I was the Santander Fellow in Iberian and European Studies, I would like to thank Kalypso Nicolaı¨dis for her support and encouragement. At Collegio Carlo Alberto in Turin, Italy, where I was the URGE postdoctoral scholar (2009–2010) and also a Visiting Fellow in Italian Studies (2011–2012), I would like to thank Stefano Sacchi, and the staff at this wonderful institution, especially Elisa Clauser. Also, thanks to the staff of the Centro Studi sul Federalismo at Collegio Carlo Alberto. For their financial support during various stages of this project, I would like to thank the Ford Foundation, Yale University, the National Science Foundation (grant number SES-0706689 for 2007–2009), and the Department of International Relations of the Quebec Government. If, in spite of all this generous help I received, this work still contains deficiencies, these are due to my own errors and omissions.

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