Vietnam's Foreign Relations: Dynamics of Change 9789814377867

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgements
I. Introduction
II. Domestic Reform and Vietnam's Changing International Outlook
III. Vietnam and the Asia-Pacific Major Powers
IV. Vietnam and Southeast Asia
V. Vietnam, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific Region
VI. Conclusion
Notes

Citation preview

PACIFIC STRATEGIC PAPER 8

FRANK FROST, Ph.D., is Director of the Foreign Affairs Group in the Parliamentary Research Service, Canberra, and is the author of Australia's War in Vietnam (1987) . He has recently pursued research as Visiting Fe llow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, and as Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, Griffith University, Brisbane.

The Pacific Strategic Papers focus on current issues in the field of strategic studies pertai ning to the Asia- Pacific region. The series is aimed at a broad readership that ranges from the serious academic specialist to the well-informed observe r in the corporate and public sectors. Many of the Pacific Strategic Papers originate from studies conducted by the Regional Strategic Studies Programme (RSSP) of the Institute. The Regional Strategic Studies Programme (RSSP) was set up in 1981 to encourage study of various security issues and deve lopments affecting the Asia-Paci fic region . The Programme is based at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies under the overall supervision of its Director , who is guided by a regional committee , a Programme Planner, and a Coordinator. The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established as an a utonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia, particularly the many-faceted problems of stability and security , economic development , and political and social change. The Institute is governed by a twenty-two-member Board of Trustees comprising nominees from the Singapore Government , the National University of Singapore, the various Chambers of Commerce, and professional and civic organizations. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is chaired by the Director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer.

PACIFIC STRATEGIC PAPERS

VIETNAM'S FOREIGN RELATIONS Dynamics of Change FRANK FROST

Regional Strategic Studies Programme INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES

Published by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Heng Mu.i Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 0511 All rights reserved . No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. © 1993 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies The responsibility {or {acts and opinions expressed in this publication rests exclusively with the author and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Parliamentary Research Service, Canberra, or the Institute or its supporters.

Cataloguing in Publication Data Frost , Frank, 1947Vietnam's foreign relations: dynamics of change. (Pacific strategic papers; no. 6) 1. Vietnam - Foreign relations. 1. Title. 11. Series. DS501 1598 no. 6 1993 ISBN 981-3016-65-5 ISSN 02 18-1924 Typeset by Superskill Graphics Pte Ltd Printed and bound in Singapore by Scapa Pte Ltd

sls93-67834

Contents

Acknowledgements

V

I.

Introduction

1

11.

Domestic Reform and Vietnam's Changing International Outlook • Economic Change and Reform • Political "Renovation" and Its Limits • Vietnam's Changing Foreign Policy Outlook and "World-View" since 1945

18

Ill.

Vietnam and the Asia-Pacific Major Powers • The Decline of the Soviet Union • China • The United States and Japan

24 24 30 41

IV.

Vietnam and Southeast Asia • Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos • Vietnam and ASEAN

49 49 58

V.

Vietnam, Europe, and the Asia-Pacific Region

67

VI.

Conclusion

75

Notes

3 3 12

79

Acknowledgements

The Pacific Strategic Papers are issued by the Institute's Regional Strategic Studies Programme (RSSPJ, which has received support in the form of grants from several foundations. The Institute would like to take the opportunity here of especially thanking the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations for the core grant of the Programme. This paper is a revised and expanded version of an earlier paper first presented at the workshop Major Asian Powers and the Security of Southeast Asia: The Security Impact, held in Singapore in December 1990. The paper is based partly on research by the author in Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore in NovemberDecember 1990, and in Vietnam and Cambodia in September-October 1992. The author would like to express his appreciation to the National Centre for Social Sciences of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam for their generous and extensive assistance during his visits in 1990 and 1992. The author would also like to thank Dr Chandran Jeshurun (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies) for the invitation to present the initial version of the paper and Professor Carlyle Thayer (Australian National University), Professor Nancy Viviani (Griffith University), and Dr David Marr (Australian National University) for their assistance and advice in preparing and revising the paper. The views expressed are those of the author. This paper was completed at the end of November 1992. Unless otherwise stated, all currency values are U.S. dollars.

I. Introduction

For many years after the end of the Second Indochina War Vietnam remained in a state of international isolation and economic debilitation. Although geographically part of the dynamic Southeast Asian region, Vietnam's economy has faced ongoing poverty, low rates of growth, capital shortfalls, and massive infrastructure deficiencies. These conditions, while deriving partly from post-war debilitation and other internal causes, were interlinked with Vietnam's substantial foreign relations problems from the late 1970s, particularly the impasse in relations with China, the conflict over Cambodia, and the continuing United States-sponsored economic embargo. Since the mid-1980s, changes both within Vietnam and in the pattern of regional and international relations, while imposing some additional dilemmas, have opened up new prospects for wider and more productive international relationships. This paper examines the processes of change in Vietnam's foreign relations in this period. Having emerged from thirty years of conflict in 1975 as a poor but self confident Marxist-Leninist state, Vietnam achieved reunification in 1976 but only a brief respite from conflict. Tensions and hostilities engendered during the First and Second Indochina wars helped fuel a new phase of bitter conflict in which Vietnam came into dispute with the ultra-radical Democratic Kampuchea regime and with China, culminating in Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and ejection of the Khmer Rouge regime and in China's "limited" but highly damaging invasion (of February- March 1979). In this period Vietnam sought to base .its foreign policy on a very close relationship with the Soviet Union and on a "strategic alliance" with its two neighbours in Laos

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and Cambodia. However, the inefficiencies of Vietnam's own economic management system, the heavy costs of efforts to secure the position of its allies in Phnom Penh, and major changes in the international environment produced intense pressures and inducements for Vietnam to revise its policies. Since the second half of the 1980s Vietnam has sought to readjust substantially key elements of both domestic and foreign policies. Domestically, Vietnam has pursued policies designed to renovate its economy while seeking to reform but retain its Marxist-Leninist political system. The economic reforms have fostered strong pressures for a greater emphasis on wider economic relationships and foreign trade. In foreign relations Vietnam has sought to reduce its isolation by normalizing and broadening its range of associations. A major stimulus for this was provided by the profound changes in its erstwhile major ally, the former Soviet Union, and by the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Vietnam's ruling Communist Party was shaken by the pace of political change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and by the dramatic impact of the transformation in economic relations which resulted, and these developments added to pressures for wider relations. In parallel with the achievement of a Cambodia settlement agreement, progress has been made in expanding associations in many areas (including Southeast and East Asia), and Vietnam has been able to pursue normalization with China. Vietnam, however, has continued to face the United States' economic embargo, which for many years restricted relations with a number of other countries, including Japan. This paper provides a survey of Vietnam's challenges and problems in foreign relations. The paper first reviews developments in Vietnam's process of political and economic "renovation" (doi moi) and highlights the influence domestic pressures for change (especially in economic policy) have had on foreign relations. The paper then considers the recent evolution of Vietnam's international outlook and world-view, and discusses in detail the process of adaptation in Vietnam's major foreign relationships, considering in turn the former Soviet Union, China, the United States, Japan, the Indochina states, the ASEAN countries, Western Europe, and states in the Asia-Pacific region. The paper argues that Vietnam has made significant progress in adjusting to a sharply changed regional and international environment but that Vietnam and the ruling Vietnam Communist Party face continuing significant problems in trying to achieve a new and secure set of international relationships in the post-Cold War environment.

11. Domestic Reform and Vietnam's Changing International Outlook

Economic Change and Reform

Since the rnid-1980s Vietnam's economy has been undergoing a major

pru

of had outpacecl the "road map· specified by the United States in Apri l: "t he reali ties of li fe are movi ng faster tha n the road map· . he commented .' •· The pace of change in U.S. policy increased in 1992. Assistant Secretary of State Solomon visited Vietnam in Ma rch and some further progress was made: Vietnam made some additional concessions over the MIA issue and the Uni ted States annou nced a commitment to a S3 m . assistance package of humanitarian aid. In April a modest re laxation of the em bargo was a nnounced . The restoration of te lecommunicatio ns links was permitted. comme rcial sales were allowed where the items involved meet basic huma nitarian needs. and restrictio ns were lifted on projects underta ken by non-profit and no n-governmental organizations. Many U.S. companies have been exploring potential op portunities in Vietnam; fo r example , airlines a nd ai rc raft manu fac ture rs have been developi ng contac ts in anticipation of futu re business. Some Vietnamese-Americans have begun to operate in Vietnam and their experience and expertise is seen as a n important asset for the United States in the future .' 51 Progress was being made o n the e motive issue of the Missing in Action bu t it still re mained a source of tension in both countries. Mr Solo mon in Ha noi made it clear that the United Sta tes was now focusing o n a limited n umbe r of cases ( 135) of servicemen last known to have been a live in Vietnam : fo r its part, Vietnam granted U .S. specia lists extensive access to data and the right to make rapid inspections.'Sl In the United States. however, tensions w ere heightened by suggestions that a number of prisoners had remained behind after the end of Ame rican involvement in 1973 while in Vietnam the U.S. searches aroused some critical reactions both at the officiaJ and popular levels in a country where approximate ly 300,000 remain missing.•SJ it had been widely expected that some fu rther progress toward s

Vietruzm and the Asitl·Paci/ic Major Powers

45

normalization might be made after the 1992 U .S. presidential eJection. A development in the MlA issue, announced just before the eJection. paved the way for such progress. During 1992. Vietnamese officials released a number of photographs of captured American servicemen to a private American researcher and in late 1992, it was announced officially that Vietnam would provide further extensive data to the United States. After a mission to Vietnam by Presidential envoy General Vessey reported favourably on these developments. President Bush said on 23 October: •1 am convinced that we can begin writing the last chapter of the Vietnam war." 154 The decision by Vietnam to release a substantial amount of additional information to the United States may have reflected a desire to speed the progress towards normalization at a time when the country's need for access to furthe r investment capital remained critical and when Vietna m was facing continuing pressure from China. Overall the development seemed likely to hasten the pace of both the U .S.· Vietnam negotiations a nd the attempt by Vietnam to attain ful l relations with the World Bank/ IMF and the Asian Development Bank, not least because it was followed by a breakthrough in the expa nsion of relations with Japan in early November.•ss With the election of Bill Clinton as President . Vietnamese officials expressed confidence that the recent co-operation with the United States would be maintained and further progress made towards normalization. 156 With the achievement of normalization in sight , it was also clear that an improved relationship with the United States would involve some significant challenges for Vietnam . There was an awareness among economic specialists that the removal of the U.S. embargo on trade and access to international financial institutions would bring an increase in business activity that would highlight the inadequacies of Vietnam's infrastructure. A rapid increase of activity wo uld place added strain on the banking and fina nce sector, and highlight the limited availability of office space and suitably skilled and trained people to a ccommodate business and investme nt operations. 157 Normalization of relations with the United States migh t also be accompanied by continuing pressure from the United States on human rights issues. In the lead-up to the elections, some attention had been given to the proposal for the establishment of a U .S. radio service for Asia w ith an emphasis on the promotion of Western political values and human rights issues; the proposal was being supported a ctively by U.S.· based Indochina lobby gro ups .t 56 Normalization of relations with the United States was none the less

46

Vietnam's Foreign Relations

essential for Vietnam's economic prospects and would largely complete the process of ending the isolation which had inhibited the country's development for so long. Japan is a major power of substantial potential importance to Vietnam and lndochina but whose economic and political involvement has been constrained by 'the Cambodia conflict and by the desire of successive Japanese governments to follow U.S. policies to a substantial degree. By late 1992, Japanese business interest in Vietnam was expanding rapidly, the restoration of aid relations was underway, and while investment remained limited this was expected to increase, especially when Vietnam 's access to international financial institutions was restored. Japan after 1975 had pursued its relationship with Vietnam and the government offered grant aid and loans. Prime Minister Fukuda posited a role for Japan in promoting peace and dialogue in Southeast Asia in 1977. In this period , Masaya Shiraishi has observed, "Hanoi 's positive attitude towards capitalist countries was warmly received by Japanese government and business. There seemed to be a fine prospect for the steady development of harmonious relations between the two countries. "159 However, this optimism disappeared in the context of regional realignments and tension over Cambodia in 1978 and 1979. Japan in 1978 was pursuing a closer relationship with China and concluded a friendship treaty in August, shortly before Vietnam concluded its treaty with the Soviet Union. In the wake of Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, Japan fully supported ASEAN's opposition. In 1979, in several stages, Japan decided to suspend its aid to Vietnam. 160 Japan maintained normal diplomatic relations with Vietnam after 1979 and cultural and academic contacts were pursued. Japan did not follow the United States in imposing a trade embargo, but while trade continued it was limited by the lack of a supporting government aid programme. Furthermore, ASEAN discouraged Japanese involvement in Vietnam; in 1987, for example, ASEAN made a joint approach to protest about a Japanese company's projects to help Vietnam's petroleum, agricultural, and fishery development. 161 Japanese involvement in Indochina is clearly of major importance in the context of a Cambodian settlement and programmes for reconstruction. In the late 1980s Japan took an increasingly active interest in the conflict. In July 1988, Foreign Minister Uno announced to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers that Japan intended to provide financial assistance for maintaining an international peace-keeping force and to dispatch civilian personnel to support peace. Uno stated

Vietnam and the Asia·Pacific Major Powers

47

that "japan intends not only to expand its contributions in the economic field , but also to embark on new forms of contributions in the political and diplomatic fields, with a view of finding solutions to regional conflict and tensions" . 162 japan's hosting of negotiations between Khmer factions in July 1990 was a reflection of this commitment. In comments in April 1991 , Prime Minister Kaifu reaffirmed japan's interests. "Japan thinks that it is important to bring the war-ravaged lndochina region into the dynamic economic development in Asia,· Kaifu said. After a Cambodian settlement it was important to promote Indochina's stability and d evelopment because it could directly affect the stability and prosperity of Japan , the ASEAN countries and all of Asia. 1"' Vietnam is clearly inte rested in expanding its relationship with Japan . At the 6th VCP Congress in December 1986, Japan was mentioned as o ne of fi ve target countries for strengthening and expanding of fri endly relations (the others were Australia , France, Finland, and Sweden l. Japan was again among the countries specified as a priority in the expansion of Vietnam 's foreign relations in the political report by Nguyen Van Linh to the 7th VCP Congress. 1M While Japan up to late 1992 continued to adhere formally to the U.S. call for an embargo on development assistance and continued to support U.S. policy in denying Vietnam access to internatio nal financial institutions , Vietnam 's economic re latio ns wi th Japan expanded rapidly. Bilateral trade in 199 1 amounted to $709 m., making Japan Vietnam's second largest trading partner after Si ngapore, and Japan in the first ha lf of 1992 was Vietnam 's leading trade partner Y·~ Trade has been encouraged by Japan's interest in Vietnam 's oil industry; Japan has bought about 80 per cent of Vietnamese oil production. Trade fl ows we re expected to rise partly because Japan is an important alternative source of products formerl y supplied by the Soviet Union such as fertili zer, steel, and cott on. A number of counter-trade arra.ngeme nts have been developed and Japa nese firm s have pursued investment in areas including clothing, and fe rtilizer production , and have developed arrangements with state corporations for product assembly in Vietnam (for example, JVC televisionsl . 11" ' Vietnam 's Foreign Minister Thach visited Japan in October 1990, and Foreign Minister Nakayama made the first visit by a Japanese minister to Vietnam since 1975 in June 199 1. Mr Nakayama expressed Japan's support for Vietnam 's economic renovation policies and expressed his hope that Vietnam w ould create a favourable climate to attra c t more inv es tm e nt fr o m Japa n ese produ ce rs and businessmen. 167 The number of Japanese businessmen visiting Vietnam

48

Vietnam's Foreign Relations

has increased (10 ,000 visited in 1991) and the major trading corporations have recently opened new offices, including Mitsubishi , Kanematsu , Sumitomo, and Nichimen. Japan has also broken with U .S. policy on petroleum exploration with Japanese companies becoming involved in exploration agreements. 168 Japan 's continuing adherence to U.S. policies has been a major proble m for Vietnam's foreign relations. The limits on Japanese involvement in Vietnam's economy were illustrated strikingly by the fact that in June 1992 Japan's investments amounted to only about $145 m., making Japan the eighth ranking investor.t"'9 In rnid-1992, preparations for a resumption of assistance were clearly underway: in April , it was reported that Japan was planning to introduce an aid programme worth about $300 m .170 Just after the U .S. presidential e lection and in the wake of the announced progress between the United States and Vie tnam on the MIA issue, Japan announced on 6 November that it would provide a commodity loan worth 45.5 bn. yen ($370 m.). This development opened the way for Japan to upgrade substantially its involvement in the redevelopment of Vietnam 's infrastructure. It also increased prospects for Japan to support Vietnam's efforts to normalize its relations with the IMF and the Asian Deve lopment Bank. 171

IV. Vietnam and Southeast Asia

The process o f substan tia l ch ange in Vietnam's major power relationships (especially with China and the former Soviet Union) has been accompanied by an equally significant series of changes in its interactions w ith Sou theast Asia. Vietnam after 1975 had little basis for productive co ntact wi th the non -communist states of Southeast Asia and its approach to the ASBAN states was influenced by legacies of suspicion from the Second lndochina War. In the late 1970s, in the context of its relationship w ith the Soviet Union a nd the ejection of the Democratic Kampuchea regime , Viet nam sought to develop a trilateral alliance relationship among the three Indochina states, but its presence in Cambodia produced antipathy and oppositio n from ASBAN . In the changi ng international a nd regional environment from the late 1980s, the reduction in tensions between Ch ina and the Soviet Union, the decline of Soviet power, and the progress towards a Cambodian settlement opened the way for detente between Vietnam and its ASEAN neighbours. In this environment, Vietnam has modified substantially its earlier approach both towards the states of lndochi na and the wider region . Vietnam has been able to improve bilateral relations with ASEAN me mbers to a strik ing degree and has made significant moves towards closer association with ASEAN as a group. However, Vietnam' s revision of relations with the o ther states of lndochina has involved some continuing problems, especially because of the complexity and uncertainty of the Cam bodian peace process.

Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos When Vietnamese communist groups formed a party in Ho ng Kong in February 1930 they named it the Vietnamese Communist Party .

50

Vietnam's Foreign Relations

After cntlctsm from the Comintern for displaying a narrowly chauvinist nationalism and ignoring proletarian internationalism, the party was, under Comintern orders , renamed the lndochina Communist Party (ICP) . Despite its name, the party had little presence outside Vietnam in its early years. As Nayan Chanda has observed : · Apart from the fact that the Vietnamese did not see much revolutionary potential in the Lao and Cambodian backwaters, they had a low opinion of these peoples' abilities. The ICP was a Vietnamese party in all but name , and even in Laos and Cambodia migrant Vietnamese formed the bulk of the ICP cells:m The development of resistance and armed struggle against the French led to a revision in attitudes among the Vietnamese communists. The conflict between the French forces and the Communist-led resistance was conducted by both sides on an lndochina-wide basis and the concept of cooperation among the peoples of lndochina under communist leadership was fostered. In a famous comment in 1950 General Vo Nguyen Giap w rote that: 173 lndochina is a single strategic unit. a single battlefield. For this reason and especially because of the strategic terrain, we cannot consider Vietnam to be independent as long as Cambodia and

Laos are under imperialist domination, just as we cannot consider Cambodia and Laos to be independent as long as Vietnam is under imperialist rule.

This emphasis was maintained during the Second Indochina War and when that conflict ended in 1975, Vietnam clearly envisaged that close co-operation among the lndochina states would be a desirable foreign policy goal. In a policy statement to the National Assembly in 1976, VCP General Secretary Le Duan declared that Vietnam would ·do everything in its power to strengthen the militant solidarity, mutual trust and long term co-operation and assistance in all fields " with Laos and Cambodia so that the three countries would be "forever attached to one another in the building and defence of their respective countries· . 174 Vietnam after 1975 proceeded to consolidate its already extensive relations with its fraternal party in Laos (the Lao People's Revolutionary Party) and w ith the Lao People's Democratic Republic. The two states concluded a treaty of friendship in 1977 and extensive networks of co-operation were pursued between the two governments and co mmunist parties. Vie tnam provided conside rable aid, maintained an extensive advisory network and about 50,000 troops in Laos. Laos pursued a foreign policy close, although not identical, to that of Vietnam .• 7s

Vietnam and Southeast Asia

51

Relations between Vietnam and Cambodia, however, became enmeshed in a pattern of longstanding suspicion and hostility which produced intense conflict, a major series of armed clashes and , ultimately, invasion by Vietnamese forces in late December 1978. The inauguration in January 1979 of a regime in Phnom Penh sympathetic to and dependent upon Vietnam was followed by a renewed em phasis by Vietnam on co-operation among the lndochina states. A friendship treaty was concluded between Vietnam and the People 's Republic of Kampuchea in February 1979 and a furth e r bilateral agreement was signed between Cambodia and Laos in April. Most of the co-operatio n among the lndochina states was conducted on a bilateral basis, especia lly through the twinning of loca lities and provinces and extensive personnel exchanges. Vietnam also took some steps to initiate trilateral co-operation; the lndochina states' foreign ministers me t in January 1980 for the first of what became regular meetings. In February 1983. an lndochina summit of state and party leaders was held and a programme of co-ope ration was announced including irregular summits, continuing fore ign ministe rs meetings . and the initiation of a trilate ral econo mic commissio n. The meeting took no steps towards integration of the three states and the communique emphasized the need to guard against ·any manifestation of big nation chauvinism· , and to respect each country 's "legitimate interests and indepe nde nce ·. the "equality of the three countries· and the principle of •f rec consent · _w. Vietnam in this period took only limit ed steps towards developing economic relations o n a trilateral basis and did not pursue e ither integration or a federatio n of the three sta tes. 177 Vietnam 's leade rs, however, did stress the importance of a close three-way security rela tionship, with Vie tnam in the vanguard ro le. In the ea rly 1980s. the terms "special re lationship". ·militant solidarity• , a nd "strategic alliance· were freque nt ly employed in Vietnam to characte rize relations amo ng the three sta tes: a book in 1983 on the subject by General Hoang Van Thai , a VCP Ce ntral Committee me mber, referred to the re lationship as a "regional stra tegic alliance· . 1 ;~ In a survey of Vietnam 's strategic outlook published in 1986, William S. Turley argued in a similar vein that Vietnam 's policies in Cambodia were based on the perceptio n that the three lndochina countries were ·security inter-dependent • . 17Y Th is perceptio n is expressed both privately a nd pub licly as a 'law' : because adversaries must ga in a foothold in at least o ne of the states in ord er to attack another . the three states must be

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joined in alliance to guarantee the peace and independence of each .... It is clear...that the men now in power in Hanoi cannot accept the reconstitution of Laos and Cambodia as 'neutral buffers' if that means having governments in Vientiane and Phnom Penh . that are weak, divided, and vulnerable to penetration by powers other than Vietnam.

However, the economic and political factors already outlined above combined to increase greatly the pressure on Vietnam and its strategy. Sino-Soviet moves towards detente increased the scope for dialogue over Cambodia, and the negotiations between the superpowers over the Afghanistan conflict reached a breakthrough in April 1988. The increased emphasis on economic reform within Vietnam from 1986 heightened attention on the costs of the conflict for Vietnam, which included high casualties !estimated at 221,000 including 55,300 dead) and restrictions on economic development. 180 From 1987 and 1988 extensive bilateral and multilateral discussions took place among the Khmer parties , Vietnam and the ASEAN nations, and Vietnam announced the withdrawal of its military units from Cambodia in September 1989. The regional and international moves to explore bases for negotiation for the Cambgdia conflict along with Vietnam's moves to disengage its forces from Cambodia inevitably brought into question the character of relations among the three Indochina states. While Vietnam had sought from the late 1970s to advance and develop the concept of lndochina solidarity and alliance, in 1987 the Phnom Penh regime began to depart from this concept. In a Five Point Proposal in October, the Phnom Penh regime declared its commitment to the concept of a "peaceful, independent, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea", a commitment not in keeping with the terms of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between Vietnam and Cambodia of February 1979. 181 In July 1989, shortly before Vietnam announced troop withdrawals, the National Assembly of the Phnom Penh government !now the State of Cambodia) adopted a declaration stipulating the permanent neutrality of Cambodia, and pledging that it would not join any alliance or any military organization that contradicted the neutrality of Cambodia. These commitments effectively invalidated the 1979 Treaty with Vietnam. Nhan Dan on 22 July 1989, endorsed the SOC declaration, saying that Vietnam "fully supports [it] as a friendly neighbour of the Kampuchean people and is willing to do anything to uphold the neutrality of Kampuchea along with other nations". 182 Vietnam thus moved to adopt a more flexible approach to its

Vietnam and Southeast Asia

53

concept of lndochina relationships. The special relationship with Laos was re-emphasized strongly in the same month as the SOC made its declaration on neutrality. However, in January 1989 Vietnam had dissolved the body formally charged with developing Indochinawide relations , the Commission for Economic and Cultural Cooperation with Laos and Cambodia. 183 Vietnam also moved to change substantially the character of its relationship with and presence in Laos. In 1989, Vietnam withdrew most of the troops it had stationed in Laos and most of its advisers, who had numbered about 6,000 through the 1980s. 184 Laos was now pursuing its own programme of economic liberalization and reform and was eager to broaden its range of international relationships to support this process. Vietnam clearly did not oppose Laos' moves to widen its international relations, a process highlighted by the marked improvement in Lao relations with Thailand from 1988 and improved relations with China, which were symbolized by the visit by Premier Li Peng to Laos in December 1990.' 85 In this context the special relationship between Laos and Vietnam became relatively less important. As Martin Stuart-Fox observed in early 1991: 186 The special relationship with Vietnam enshrined in the 1977 Treaty of r'riendship and Cooperation between the two states is not entirely a dead letter, but it is very much diminished in importance. The geopolitical forces ranged against Vietnam following its invasion of Cambodia proved too great for Hanoi to sustain any hegemonic ambitions with respect to Laos and Cambodia.... Any remaining Vietnamese influence is exercised through certain elements within the LPRP, the Army, and the Ministry of the Interior - those organs and institutions which formed the core of the special relationship. But criticism of Vietnam is now openly voiced - of shoddy workmanship in aid projects, of inappropriate advice, of failures of policy, and of economic weakness. The poverty of Vietnam is compared with the prosperity of Thailand, and the Lao know which they prefer.

By the end of the 1980s, the character and context of Vietnam's

relations with Laos and Cambodia had changed markedly. Vietnam's military and advisory presence was now greatly diminished, the process of market-oriented economic reform in all three countries was highlighting the need for each state to diversify its economic relations and this process was encouraged further by the rapid cutbacks in Soviet aid and assistance. Vietnam was now not in a

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position to try to maintain a regional alliance in Indochina . However, in the wake of the crises in many communist states, the VCP clearly valued the solidarity of the frate rnal parties in its Indochina neighbours. At the 7th Congress, Nguyen Van Linh declared in · his political report : "We will ceaselessly consolidate and develop the special relations of solidarity and fri e ndship between our party and people a nd the frate rnal parties and peoples of Laos and Cambodia and will re novate the procedures of coope ration and pay atte ntion to effi ciency in accordance with the principle of equality and respect for each othe r's indepe ndence, sovereignty and political interests." 187 Vietnam thus appeared to be aiming to retain close relations with the othe r two lndochina states, but not in the context of a three-way strategic alliance. While Vietna m was revising its approac h towards relations among the lndochina states, the Cambodia conflict continued to pose critical dilemmas for Vie tnam 's fo reign relations. Through the 1980s, Vietnam had opposed negotia tion proposa ls for Ca mbodia whic h would suppla nt the Phnom Penh regime. However , in a context of major powe r co-ope ration through the Permane nt Five members of the United Na tions Sec urit y Council , Vietnam moved to accept the concept of a UN-sponsored process of political transition for Cambodia w hile still clea rl y hoping that the position of its allies in Phnom Penh might be preserved. 1s8 In a n inte rview with the Vietnam News Agency on 23 August 1990, Foreign Ministe r Thach e ndorsed the concept of se lf·determination for Cambodia through free elections under interna tional supervision, citing the examples of Nicaragua a nd Na mi bia, but wa rned tha t d isma ntling the SOC administration would bring c haos to Cambodia. 189 In December, Thach re·emphasized the distinction Vietnam sa w between the international a nd internal aspects of the conflict. In an inte rview . he said: "Vietnam considers there is no big dispute ove r the proposals on the international aspects a nd it is possible to come to an agreement. But the fact that this solves the inte rnal questions of Cambodia is violating the aims and principles of the UN c harter concerning the sovereignty of its members. "''!0 In early 199 1 negotiations over the Cambodia conflict still seemed to be blocked with the SOC maintaining a series of major objections to the United Nations endorsed settlement proposals. Prospects for negotiations on the conflict improved markedly in mid-1991 , however, and the progress made by the Cambodian factions clearly reflected the improving climate in Si no-Vietnamese relations and both countries welcomed the developments. 191 While the negotiations among the

Vietnam and Southeast Asia

55

Cambodia parties were in progress from June, China and Vietnam held their own discussions on the issue. By late 1991 it appeared that Vietnam and China were intent on redefining their formerly conflicting national interests in Cambodia. The long-awaited Cambodia settlement agreement was signed in Paris on 23 October 1991 and Vietnam now gave its full support. Foreign Minister Cam stated that Vietnam would join with other signatories in implementing the international provisions in a strict and responsible manner. "We all hope that... the future Cambodia will entertain friendly relations with all countries, first and foremost the neighbouring countries and those of the region." He also expressed Vietnam's hope that with the comprehensive political settlement for Cambodia achieved, it would be possible to remove the last impediments to the implementation of Vietnam's foreign policy of normalization and diversification of its relations with all countries. 192 The achievement of the Cambodia settlement agreements was a major development for Vietnam's foreign relations prospects, opening the way for wider contacts and increased investment and ultimately, normalization with the United States. However, the character of some of the developments associated with the emerging peace process left the future of Vietnam's relationships in lndochina very uncertain. At the 7th Congress, the VCP had sought to affirm the importance of the special relations of solidarity and friendship among the three states and the three fraternal parties. Vietnam retained a close relationship with its longstanding ally in Laos, but in the context of an active Lao policy to broaden its relations, especially with China and Thailand. The association with Vietnam was reaffirmed in July 1992 on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the Friendship Treaty of 1977: the Lao President and Party chairman, Kaysone Phomvihane, extended warm greetings to the fraternal Vietnamese party and state bodies and both sides pledged to continue to implement the treaty.l 93 However, there were also indications of some tensions between the two neighbours over the activities of Vietnamese illegal migrants and exploitation of timber resources: General Secretary Do Muoi was reported to have engaged in some fence-mending during a visit to Laos in August 1992 to mark the anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship. 194 The emerging peace process in Cambodia was exerting further pressure for change to the context of the co-operation which the VCP had envisaged at the 7th Congress. Just before the signing of the Paris accords, a significant political development occurred within the ruling party in Phnom Penh. In early October 1991, the Kampuchean

56

People' Revolutio nary Party, in preparation for the signing of the peace agreeme nt fo r Ca mbodia, explicitly abandoned MarxismLenin ism as the basis fo r Cambodian poHtics and for its own o rganization. At a special congress it was decided that the Party would now be called the Cambodian People 's Party and would support a free market economy and a liberal and plwalist political system fo r Ca mbodia. The newly e lected party president, Chea Sim . sa id •the !party! pursues a democratic and free political system, a mu lt i·party system ... with a president and a national assembly elected by the people thro ugh universal suffrage• . The Party's platform now endorsed a series of liberal principles including freedom of assembly and a mar ket economy (already effect ively in operation since tha late 1980s) . ''~ The cha nge in formal policy did not involve a transformation in the orga nizatio n of the CPP w hic h clearly intended to attempt to continue to play a do minant ro le in Cambodia; the move was designed to bolster the Pa rt y's position in preparation for the involvement of the United Natio ns. None the less, the development was a landmark m the politics of lndochina in which a ruling party with a Marxist· Leninist politica l identity had formally disavowed communism . The developments within the Cambodian People's Party indicated that the concept of co-operation in lndochina pursued by Vietnam si nce 1979 based o n a n identity of interests among fraternal Marxist· Leninist parties. could no longer be sustained . In 1992. the People's Party was ope rating in an envi ronment where the United Nations was sponso ring the e mergence of a liberal and pluralist political environment in \vhich the CPP would have to compete for power with a number of other conte nders. While contacts between Vietnam and the CPP undoubtedly continued, in the new political environment in Cambodia the CPP could not continue to proclaim a frate rnal relationship with the VC P. Even if the CPP was able to emerge after elections in a domina nt position o r as part of a governing coalition, tt would need to maintain a n image of independence in relation to Vietnam a nd the VCP in order to retain political credibility. The developments in 199 1 a nd 1992 thus appeared to mark a decisive ~ hift in relations betwee n the ruling parties in Vietnam and Laos and the: Peopl e's Party in Cambodia . 1'ib After the conclusion of the Paris agreements, Vietnam in 1992 expressed its continuing support for the accords and sought to develop and maintain contacts with both Prince Sibanouk and the SOC government but the future of bilate ral relations involved considerable unccrtam t1es. Foreign Minister Cam visited Phnom Penh in late January and signed a co mmunique with Prince Sihano uk in which 1

Vietnam and Southeast Asia

57

each side guaranteed to respect each other's sovereignty, to cooperate in social, economic, and cultural fields and to solve conflicts peacefully. 197 In May, Prince Chakrapong, a son of Prince Sihanouk and Deputy Premier in the SOC government, visited Vietnam and met senior Vietnamese leaders. 198 Vietnam continued to express its full support for the Paris agreements although there were some indications of unease in Vietnamese official circles at the possible outcome of the UN involvement and the government did not encourage the use of Vietnam as a transit point for UNTAC forces. 199 As the peace process developed, it was evident that there were considerable sources of tension between the two countries. The role of Vietnamese workers in Cambodia, drawn in by the economic prospects offered by the expanded international presence and by continuing high levels of unemployment in Vietnam, was a source of controversy and resentment. The situation was complicated by the lack of any effective monitoring of immigration from Vietnam to Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge continued to allege ongoing Vietnamese involvement in Cambodia and maintained that large numbers of Vietnamese military personnel remained covertly in the country. Vietnam denied the allegation in strong terms and the UN was unable to find any evidence of such an involvement.200 Tensions between Cambodians and Vietnamese were heightened by a series of attacks against Vietnamese in the country; the United Nations accused the Khmer Rouge of responsibility for at least some of these attacks. The president of the Party of Democratic Kampuchea, Khieu Samphan, suggested in an interview published in August that Vietnamese residents in Cambodia might be subject to violence if the United Nations did not act to expel them. 201 The border between the two countries was also a matter of contention. At a meeting of the Cambodian Supreme National Council on 24 August 1992, the Khmer Rouge called for a redrawing of the border as a condition for the holding of elections on Cambodia's territory. Between 1982 and 1985 Vietnam and the SOC concluded three agreements to delimit their border, but there has been considerable suspicion in Cambodia that these agreements favoured Vietnam to an unreasonable degree. Vietnam was reported to have assured Prince Chakrapong that with his father as head of state the border issue could be resolved satisfactorily, but the issue seemed likely to have considerable potential as a focus for contention.202 Vietnam in 1992 was in a state of uneasy transition in its relations with its Indochina neighbours. The close relationship with Laos continued although in a context in which both countries were pursuing

58

Vietnam's Foreign Relations

an expanded range of international associations. With Cambodia, the future of relations depended on the highly uncertain peace process. If the UN was able to successfully sponsor elections that produced a new government, Vietnam would have the opportunity to redevelop a relationship. If the peace process did not proceed effectively, Cambodia might face continuing conflict between the Khmer Rouge and other parties, and there was also a danger of ethnic conflict between Khmers and Vietnamese in the country. At the international and regional levels the Cambodian settlement was producing many benefits for Vietnam but it remained uncertain whether the bases for tension in the two countries' relations could be contained and reduced after the promised UN sponsored elections due in 1993.

Vietnam and ASEAN

Vietnam's changing relations with the major powers and with its Indochina neighbours have been accompanied by a transformation in attitudes towards and relations with the ASEAN countries. Before 1975 the Democratic Republic had very limited contacts in the ASEAN region and it wJJs hostile towards ASEAN as a regional group. Useful steps were taken to develop bilateral relationships after 1975 but these were soon impeded by the onset of the severe regional impact of refugee flows from Vietnam (especially in 1978 and 1979) and the Cambodia conflict.203 There has, however, been a relaxation in the climate of relations between Vietnam and ASEAN , a rapid increase in bilateral visits and commercial interest, the emergence of increased interests in regional co-operation and serious discussion about ultimate membership for Vietnam in ASEAN. These developments have been particularly welcome for Vietnam in a period when its major power relations have been undergoing profound and at times disquieting change. The rapprochement between Vietnam and ASEAN is striking when placed against the background of the previous two decades. There was little basis for relationships between Vietnam and ASEAN members before 1975: Indonesia and the DRV had maintained low key diplomatic relations since 1964, while Thailand and the Philippines had actively supported the U.S. war effort in Vietnam. The DRV's attitudes were dominated by its opposition to U .S. policies and to the Southeast Asian states it saw as supporting those policies. During the Second Indochina War the DRV was especially bitter about the role played by Thailand in assisting the U .S. air war. In 1972, for example,

Vietnam and Southeast Asia

59

Nhan Dan charged that Thailand had become "a great American reserve of mercenaries, playing a strategic role in the Nixon doctrine". The Thai leadership was described as "a clique dreaming of dirty glory, that will have to reply for the blood spilled in Indochina by American planes that take off from their territory and by Thai mercenaries operating in Laos and Cambodia•.zo• ASEAN was described by Nhan Dan in December 1971 as being •a product of U.S. aggressive and interventionist policy• and the newspaper stated that true peace and neutralization in the region could only result if all U.S. intervention ended and all U.S. and "satellite" forces were withdrawn from Vietnam . The DRV refu sed the invitations occasionally extended by the ASEAN foreign ministers to attend their meetings as an observer. 205 After 1975, Vietnam's suspicions and reservations about ASEAN continued. Vietnamese comments about ASEAN 's first heads of government summit in Bali in February 1976 were strongly critical ; Quan Doi Nhan Dan said on 22 February that the United States had tried to use ASEAN , "w ith Indonesia as main prop" to pursue its interests and that the Bali summit "is actua lly prompted by the United States".206 Although Vietnam's hostmty towards ASEAN abated in the period after the Bali meeting it was une nthusiastic about any proposal for association with the regional group. Vice Foreign Minister Phan Hien in an interview in June 1977 said: "Since the end of the war in Indochina, a new situation exists in Southeast Asia. Why should we be absorbed into an already existing organization whose past is known?" 207 Despite Vietnam's suspicions about ASEAN as a regional group, progress was made from 1976 in developing bilateral relations and some bases for co-operation. Malaysia initiated co-operation with Vietnam in 1977 in several areas and agreed to provide aid to Vietnam's rubber and palm oil industries and in January 1978 a trade agreement was concluded.208 Relations with the Philippines were initiated in 1976 and progress was also made in Thai-Vietnam relations; during Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh's visit to Bangkok in January 1978 agreements were concluded on civil aviation and trade and economic relations.209 ASEAN on a joint basis was conciliatory towards Vietnam; the foreign ministers welcomed the unification of the country in 1976 and in a statement in August 1977 they declared that ASEAN would extend friendship to the Indochina states "now and always•.210 The prospects for dialogue and co-operation after 1975 were replaced by a highly critical reaction within ASEAN to the influx of

60

Vietnam 's Foreign Relations

refugees from Vietnam (which rose rapidly from mid-1978). The invasion of Cambodia ended its position as a buffer between Vietnam and Thailand and the presence of Vietnamese forces now made Thailand a frontline state . ASEAN pursued a strategy to reject the legitimacy of Vietnam 's presence and of the regime in Phnom Penh a nd to exert pressure on Vietnam to review its position and withdraw its forces. ASEAN mobilized opinion in the United Nations in a highly effective way and its members gave tacit and some active support to the resistance guerrilla forces. ASEAN also played a leading role in sponsoring the formation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea in 1982. 2 11 The ASEAN countries' response to Vietnam after 1979 was consistently marked by a degree of pluralism. ASEAN maintai ned effective joint stands on Vietnamese policy in relation to Cambodia, while its members simultaneously pursued individual policy approaches with somew hat differing emphases. Indonesia thus pursued dialogue with Vietnam through the 1980s (including academic exchanges and visits by senior military leaders) and extensive trade relations were pursued by Singapore. 212 International and regional changes transformed the climate for Vietnam-ASEAN relations from the late 1980s. While a Cambodia settlement continued to be at the centre of ASEAN's concerns through the 1980s, Vie tnam's withdrawal of its formed military units from Cambodia, the Soviets' phase down of military activity in Vietnam , and reductions in Soviet aid and involvement overall eased regional tensions significantly.213 The climate for regional dialogue was also enhanced by the achievement of normalization of relations between China a nd Indonesia and Singapore in 1990. Changes in the emphasis of Thai policy provided a further significant stimulus. From late 1988, Prime Minister Chatichai moved to broaden Thai policies towards Indochina by emphasizing the potential for productive economic relations. In an aide-memoire presented to President Bush in Fe bruary 1989, Chatichai called for U.S. and Thai "common e ndeavours in trade with and investment in third countries, particularly the lndochinese countries and Burma. This would help in strengthening the fabric of peace and prosperity in the region in the long term•. Commercial relations and bilateral exchanges with Vietnam both increased after the policy shift. 2 14 Vietnam's own changing policy emphases gave it an increased interest in pursuing relations with the ASEAN states. A Vietnamese commentary in 1990 on Southeast Asia emphasized the high economic growth rates of the ASEAN states (notably Thailand). The commentary noted that all the countries in the region faced major economic

61 c halle nges in trade relations with Burope , North America, and Japan and advocated a strengthening of regional economic co·operation . The commentary concluded that ·sconomically , ASEAN countries are in varying respects ahead of lndochinesc countries .... JTJhcir economies could supplement each othe r in many fields , on the principle of mutually beneficaal co-operat ion . · m The interes t in Vietnam in ASEAN countncs as amportant models for Vietnam ' s own economic development was reflected by an expansion in discussions and exchanges between offacaals and academics. In June 199 1. for example . a group of Va(•tnnmcsc econ omists held discussions wit h Thaa ~tovcrnmcnt a~tennc:s and private com panacs on the operations o f thc Thaa econom y a \ ' ac tnnme&c Bmbass)' spokesman said thot Thaaland 's cxpcncnce m the fr ee-market system was a good cxamplt· to study m A further nutuhlc: eumplc of Vietnamese mterest an ASEAN states devcloprncnt c:xpcnencc was the announcemen t in October 1992 that the' \'Cl' w ou Id send se-veral dclcjtotlons of l>CniOr cadre~ to Thoaland Mn ln)'\HI nnd Sangaporc: tu study economac managC'mcnt aMut'' · From late 1990 the pote of nunastcnal vuuts between Vactnom and ASEAN membc:n ancrca\al m~ukcdl y A num~r uf Vactnamc.-sc manuters va&ated the ASEAN rcR•on ancludang Vo Van Kac t. who made hts first forcagn va&at u Prcnuer to lnd oncsaa Maloysua. and Smgapo~ an November 1991 and who had va'\atc:d all A liAN members by earl)• 1992 110 lndont'sHt e. Presadent Socharto va\atcd Vaetnam 10 November 1990 and tht' \'Uit the first b)• an ASEAN member countr,• s head o ( &tatt' sance I q;s WM regarded a.\ Mgnafacant by hoth sades The two countne~ agrc:"