Verifying Nuclear Disarmament 1138103888, 9781138103887

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Modern Security Studies

VERIFYING NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT Thomas Shea

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Verifying Nuclear Disarmament

Fifty years into the nuclear non-​proliferation treaty (NPT) regime, the risks of nuclear war, terrorism, and the threat of further proliferation remain. A lack of significant progress towards disarmament will cast doubt upon the viability of the NPT. By recognizing that certain fissile materials are essential to every nuclear weapon and that controlling their usage provides the foundation for international efforts to limit their spread, this book presents a comprehensive framework for nuclear disarmament. Based upon phased reductions, Shea provides a mechanism for the disposal of weapon-​origin fissile material and controls on peaceful nuclear activities and non-​explosive military uses. He explores the technological means for monitoring and verification, the legal arrangements required to provide an enduring foundation, and a financial structure which will enable progress. This book will be invaluable to professional organizations, arms control NGOs, government officials, scientists, and politicians. It will also appeal to academics and postgraduate researchers working on security studies, disarmament diplomacy and the politics and science of verification. Thomas Shea is an adjunct, non-​resident senior fellow at the Federation of American Scientists, and is widely recognized as an expert in nuclear disarmament verification, non-​proliferation, and international safeguards. He specializes in pragmatic yet innovative approaches to verification, and has been honored for his work on Iran, the Trilateral Initiative, on a future FMCT, and on IAEA inspections in complex civil plants processing weapon-​usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium, and how those measures might be applied in the context of nuclear disarmament. Dr. Shea recently completed a FAS study supported by a MacArthur Foundation grant on the relevance of nuclear powered naval vessels to non-​proliferation and nuclear disarmament, which may have relevance for Iran and for the 2020 NPT Review Conference.

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Modern Security Studies Series editors: Sean S. Costigan and Kenneth W. Estes

This series fills a known gap in modern security studies literature by pursuing a curated, forward-​looking editorial approach on looming and evergreen security challenges. Short and long form works will be considered with an eye towards developing content that is widely suitable for instruction and research alike. Works adhere around the series’ four main categories:  Controversies, Cases, Trends and Primers. We invite proposals that pay particular attention to controversies in international security, notably those that have resulted in newly exposed and poorly defined risks to non-​state legitimacy, international or state capacities to act, and shifts in global governance. Case studies should examine recent historical events and security-​related actions that have altered present day understanding or political calculations. Trends will need to detail future yet tangible concerns in a 5–​10 year timeframe. Authors are also invited to submit proposals to our primers category for short form works on key topics that are referenced and taught throughout security studies. For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/​politics/​series/​ASHSER1437

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Verifying Nuclear Disarmament Thomas Shea

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First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 Thomas Shea The right of Thomas Shea to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-​in-​Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-1-138-10388-7 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-10246-7 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Out of House Publishing

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Contents

List of figures  List of tables  Foreword by Hans Blix  Preface  List of abbreviations and acronyms  Glossary 

ix x xi xiii xvi xvii

PART I

An overview 

1

1 Introduction 

3

1.1 General considerations  3 1.2 Two TPNW problems  5 1.2.1 Time-​bound disarmament  5 1.2.2 Financing disarmament  6

1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8

Theater-​centric verification  7 Institutional verification arrangements  9 Coping with nuclear weapon secrecy  12 The process of nuclear disarmament  12 Elimination or conversion of a nuclear weapon complex  14 Additional confidence building measures for the nuclear disarmament regime  14

PART II

Eliminating existing nuclear weapons and weapon capabilities 

19

2 The international nuclear disarmament agency 

21

2.1 Introduction  21 2.2 The nuclear disarmament council  23 2.2.1 Responsibilities  23 2.2.2 Nuclear disarmament councilors  24 2.2.3 Standing committees  25

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vi Contents 2.3 INDA secretariat  27 2.4 INDA Nuclear Disarmament Institute  28 2.5 INDA Nuclear Disarmament Verification Research and Development Center  30

3 The technical basis for nuclear disarmament verification  3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5

34

Introduction  34 Fission and fissile material  36 Fissile material in nuclear weapons  37 The Trilateral Initiative  39 Decision factors affecting the verification of classified fissile material  41 3.5.1 Information security  41 3.5.2 Disarmament value  44 3.5.3 Degree of assurance  44 3.5.4 Susceptibility to cheating  46 3.5.5 Practicality and affordability  46

3.6 Candidate verification methods for classified forms of fissile material  46 3.7 Chain of custody monitoring  48 3.8 Development and production of INDA verification & monitoring equipment  49

4 INDA inspections  4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4

52

Introduction  52 Fissile material-​related inspection activities  56 Elimination or conversion of weapon complex facilities  57 Inspection logistics  60 4.4.1 Verification equipment  60 4.4.2 Conduct of inspections  60

4.5 Inspection findings  61 PART III

Sustainable disarmament 

63

5 Preventing rearmament 

65

5.1 Introduction  65 5.2 Tasks assigned to the IAEA in the TPNW  67 5.2.1 States that do not possess nuclear weapons  67 5.2.2 States that disarm before signing the TPNW  68 5.2.3 States that do not disarm before signing the TPNW  69

5.3 IAEA capabilities and the TPNW  70

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Contents vii

6 IAEA disarmament missions 

75

6.1 Disposition of fissile material transferred from nuclear weapons use  75 6.1.1 HEU disposition  75 6.1.2 Plutonium  77 6.1.3 Disposition inspection activities  81

6.2 Conversion of mission-​critical nuclear weapon facilities to peaceful use  82 6.3 Diversion of declared stocks and undeclared production of weapon-​usable nuclear material at declared facilities  84 6.3.1 Plutonium  85 6.3.2 HEU  86 6.3.3 233U, 237Np and 241Am  88 6.3.4 Diversion of indirect-​use nuclear material  89

6.4 Clandestine production of weapon-​usable nuclear material  90 6.5 Unconventional acquisition paths for weapon-​usable nuclear material  92 6.6 Historical production, imports/​exports, and disposition of weapon-​usable nuclear material  92 PART IV

Building the nuclear disarmament regime 

97

7 Confidence-​building measures for the nuclear disarmament regime 

99

7.1 Introduction  99 7.2 Complementary bilateral arms reduction treaties  100 7.3 TPNW engagement exercises  101 7.4 Temporary monitoring of deployed or reserve warheads  101 7.5 Controls on warhead refurbishment and re-​manufacturing  102 7.6 Export/​import controls for nuclear-​armed states  102 7.7 Controls on fusion materials  102 7.8 Standardizing dismantlement and conversion facility architecture  102 7.9 Extra-​territorial siting  103 7.10 Antineutrinos  103 7.11 Subsidizing disarmament  104

8 Epilogue 

105

Legal Annexes  Annex A.1: Text of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 

109 111

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viii Contents

Annex A.2: (Suggested) Model Agreement Between A Nuclear-​Armed State and the International Nuclear Disarmament Agency  Annex A.3: (Suggested) Model Agreement Between A Nuclear-​Armed State and the International Atomic Energy Agency  Technical Annexes  Annex B.1: International Center for Nuclear Disarmament Verification Research and Development  Annex B.2: Candidate verification methods for classified forms of fissile material 

122 155 179 181 186

B.2.1 Introduction  186 B.2.2 Attribute verification with information barriers  187 B.2.3 Imaging plutonium in nuclear warheads with a thermal neutron camera  189 B.2.4 A zero-​knowledge proof protocol using active neutron interrogation  191 B.2.5 Physical cryptographic verification using nuclear resonance fluorescence  194 B.2.6 Cosmogenic muon verification with physical encryption  196

Annex B.3: Inspection procedures for classified forms of fissile material 

201

B.3.1 Level 4 inspections  201 B.3.2 Level 3 inspections  204 B.3.3 Level 2 inspections  210 B.3.4 Level 1 inspections  214

Index 

216

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Figures

.1 UK Ministry of Defence disarmament verification exercise 1 1.2 A Theater-​centric representation of nuclear arsenals and adversarial relationships 2.1 A Peacekeeper bus with MIRV warheads 2.2 Proposed organization of the International Nuclear Disarmament Agency 3.1 Fissile material removal stages 3.2 A cutaway view of a nuclear warhead 4.1 Mission-​critical nuclear weapons facilities 5.1 IAEA safeguards data wall 5.2 Servicing an IAEA surveillance system 6.1 Converting HEU from nuclear weapons into LEU fuel assemblies 6.2 International Tokomak Fusion Power Reactor 6.3 Can-​in-​canister method for plutonium disposition 6.4 Reprocessing Plant Design Information Verification Workshop B.2.1 Trilateral Initiative Attribute Verification System B.2.2 Thermal neutron imaging B.2.3 Zero-​knowledge object-​comparison using superheated droplet differential neutron radiography detectors B.2.4 Physical cryptographic verification method using nuclear resonance fluorescence B.2.5 Cosmogenic muon verification method

1 8 19 22 35 37 58 63 72 76 79 80 87 188 191 193 194 197

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Tables

1.1 1.2 3.1 5.1 B.1.1 B.3.1 B.3.2 B.3.3 B.3.4

Nuclear arsenals in the nine nuclear-​armed States Confidence-​building measures for disarmament Relationship of verification to disarmament IAEA Safeguards implementation metrics for 2016 Initial R&D taskings Level 4 Inspections Level 3 Inspections Level 2 Inspections Level 1 Inspections

8 16 45 71 183 201 204 210 214

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Foreword

In 2020 it will be 75 years since nuclear weapons destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. With no further use a taboo has gradually been building against use. Yet, we often fear the taboo may not hold, and we are conscious that as long as nuclear weapons have not been eliminated there is also a risk of attacks caused by misunderstandings and errors or detonations by accident. That the goal of a nuclear-​weapon-​free world has nearly unanimous support is heartening, but it masks the sad fact that there are sharp divisions about how and how soon the goal can be reached. In Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-​Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT) the parties commit themselves to pursue negotiations in good faith for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament. In 2020 it will be 50 years since the treaty entered into force, and while it marks a great success in consolidating non-​proliferation, there is widespread frustration that during this long period the five nuclear weapon states parties have failed to help bring about any significant nuclear disarmament. The 2020 NPT Review Conference may prove contentious between the disappointed and the reluctant. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) that was concluded in 2017 contains prohibitions that the NPT has failed to generate, including bans on the development, production, acquisition, possession, deployment and—​indeed—​use of nuclear weapons. By 2020, the treaty may be expected to be binding on a large number of non-​nuclear weapon states, underlining a world-​wide demand for nuclear disarmament. Yet, while it may contribute significantly to the development of an international norm against nuclear weapons, and to the future acceptance of a legal ban, it may not remove obstacles still seen by nuclear weapon states to such a ban. They may need first to bring the world to a new détente, to processes agreed between themselves for arms reductions and to arrangements for greater global security. Whichever way will be followed toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, verification of the dismantling of weapons, of the disposal of fissionable material, and of the destruction of installations will be required. This is no small thing. During the many years that the IAEA has operated nuclear safeguards under the NPT much experience has been gained in verifying the

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xii Foreword non-​diversion of fissionable material from peaceful purposes. Verification of nuclear disarmament—​like the Security Council mandated monitoring and control in Iraq—​is considerably more demanding. Even though in a process of nuclear disarmament confidence between the relevant parties must be based on many factors, complete nuclear disarmament will require complete confidence in the process of verification. A good deal of thought has been devoted to this challenge and more will undoubtedly be needed. One early project of relevance was undertaken at the time when I  was the Director General of the IAEA. At meetings that I had with the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, Mr. Mikhaylov, and the US Secretary of Energy, Ms. O’Leary, both showed understanding of the thought that the dismantling of nuclear weapons in which their two states were engaging was something of significance not only to themselves but also to the world at large; and both were positive about the idea of independent international (IAEA) verification. A new IAEA mission that came to be known as the Trilateral Initiative was then launched:  verifying classified forms of plutonium and highly enriched uranium released by the two States from their respective defense programs. Knowing the author of this book, Tom Shea, as a highly competent professional in the IAEA safeguards department and as a constructive thinker I named him IAEA leader in the project. In cooperation with US and Russian counterparts, technical, legal, and financial requirements for the IAEA mission were examined. A  great deal of progress was made and there was much optimism about the implementation of the project among participants, member states, and media. However, with the change in leadership in both Russia and the United States the Trilateral Initiative was concluded in 2002 with promises of follow-​on activities that were never fulfilled. In this timely book, the indefatigable Tom Shea, who has contributed much to developing the IAEA safeguards system and whom I have characterized as an innovator, has conjured a vision of how a verification system could be built and operated in conjunction with the Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons or other instrument providing for the elimination of nuclear weapons. His book should also be a valuable resource for practitioners and students of various disciplines, including international relations, nuclear law, and the science and technology of nuclear verification. Stockholm in December 2017 Hans Blix Director General Emeritus of the IAEA Former Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring and Verification Commission for Iraq Former Foreign Minister of Sweden

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Preface

Not yet ready for university studies, and facing required military service, at 18 I opted for the Navy to see the world. I first met nuclear weapons aboard the USS Intrepid, a World War II aircraft carrier that was kept in service until the 1960s and is today a fascinating museum on the Hudson River in New York City. During the Cold War, carriers assigned to the Mediterranean Fleet kept two attack planes ready to launch with a thermonuclear bomb mounted. I  helped to load these bombs under close supervision by armed Marines. Later, I  served on board the USS Enterprise, the first nuclear-​ powered aircraft carrier. Even after all those years I still miss being at sea. The Navy trained me to repair communications equipment on carrier-​ based attack planes, and in so doing, awakened my intellectual curiosity. When I left the Navy, I studied engineering physics /​electronics engineering at the University of Massachusetts, and then went on to Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute for a master of science (MS) and a doctorate (PhD) in Nuclear Science and Engineering. I have been able to devote much of my working career to non-​proliferation and nuclear disarmament. My 24.5 years at the International Atomic Energy Agency (the IAEA) involved safeguards policy and implementation—​ especially involving plutonium and highly enriched uranium fuel processing facilities. I worked extensively on safeguards implementation in Japan, China, India, Indonesia, Australia, and in Germany, when it had plutonium plants in operation. I was involved somewhat in Iraq through a UN Security Council panel, and on a range of issues related to nuclear disarmament, including a future fissile material cutoff treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and the Trilateral Initiative investigating the technical, legal, and financial aspects of a possible role for the IAEA to verify classified forms of fissile material released from nuclear weapons use in Russia and the United States. The Trilateral Initiative continued through six years and 98 meetings with Russians and Americans. During my work at the IAEA, and subsequently at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and more lately as an independent consultant, I became convinced that progress on disarmament was essential on its own merits, but also to preserve the non-​proliferation regime and to prevent nuclear

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xiv Preface terrorism. Believing that progress on disarmament would be more likely with a blue print on how disarmament might be verified, I began to scope out an approach to both sides of disarmament—​eliminating weapons and preventing rearmament—​based on fissile material controls as the foundation. With over 40 years of experience, I set out to describe how nuclear disarmament could and should be verified. The idea of writing a book on nuclear disarmament started in 2015. I proposed the book to Routledge in August of 2016, and continued writing, keeping an eye on the Ban movement, and the UN General Assembly Mandate and drafting Conference that lead to the TPNW. When the draft TPNW was approved, I revised my book to help the TPNW Parties build the verification system that will be essential for the Treaty’s success. The principles set out in my book would remain valid under the TPNW or any other treaty. I believe that my proposals are sound and should help to bring the TPNW to life, and perhaps help the International Panel on Nuclear Disarmament Verification (the IPNDV).1 I am grateful to the two IAEA directors general under whom I  served, Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei, who allowed and encouraged my nuclear disarmament work. I greatly appreciate the Foreword by Hans Blix, one of my heroes. I am grateful to my many colleagues and friends over these past fifty years, for the help they’ve given and the pleasure of knowing them, at the IAEA, in the US Government, at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and later on. They are too many to identify. I do want to give special thanks to Laura Rockwood, now Executive Director of the Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-​ Proliferation. Everything I’ve done with her has been better than what I’ve managed without her. I am also very grateful for the diplomats, scientists, engineers, national authorities, and peaceful use nuclear facility operators in the States where I was able to engage, and to the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. And a toast to the late Demetri Perricos, the best inspector the IAEA ever produced. On the subject of potential methods for verifying nuclear warheads, there are many possible combinations of methods that could and should be explored, preferably through the INDA Center for Nuclear Disarmament Verification called for in the book. I did reach out for summaries of methods of particular interest. Istvan Dioszegi summarized work at Brookhaven National Laboratory on in situ thermal neutron imaging of MIRVed warheads. Sébastien Phillipe prepared a summary of the neutron radiography method for nuclear warhead verification using bubble chambers under development at Princeton. Scott Kemp of MIT provided a summary of a nuclear warhead verification method based on nuclear resonance fluorescence. And Patrick Huber provided a description of a muon-​imaging concept for nuclear warheads under investigation at Virginia Tech. I thank them all.

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Preface xv Duncan MacArthur of Los Alamos National Laboratory (now retired) provided insights on whether there were any other methods that should be included and how the challenge of certifying templates might be addressed. The book is better for their contributions, and I am grateful. Adam Bernstein of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory continues to provide important contributions on the roles antineutrino monitoring could provide. Michele Smith of the US National Nuclear Security Administration has long been a champion of disarmament verification technology R&D and helped me to complete my manuscript. The Routledge team has helped immeasurably in shaping the book and transforming my manuscript into what you will see in the pages ahead. Special thanks to Rob Sorsby and Claire Maloney of Routledge, Nick Craggs of Taylor & Francis, Liz Davey of Out of House Publishing, and Laura Macy, copy editor worthy of great praise. Of all the colleagues, friends and family that have helped to bring this to pass, I  must dedicate this work to my beloved wife, Doris, who lives in my brain. Nuclear disarmament will not come quickly, quietly, or cheaply. But it is essential to pursue this now, before …

Note 1 See www.ipndv.org/​

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Abbreviations and acronyms

AIP Authorized Inspection Protocol CFMC Classified fissile material container CFMC/​PC Classified fissile material protective container CFMVS Classified fissile material verification system CTBTO Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, in Vienna. eV, keV, MeV Electron volt FIQ Facility Information Questionnaires IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency INDA International Nuclear Disarmament Agency (Proposed) NASLA Nuclear-​armed State Level Approach UFMC Unclassified fissile material container () UFMCVS Unclassified fissile material verification system WVS/​L3 Warhead Verification System for Level 3 WVS/​L4 Warhead Verification System for Level 4

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Glossary

Alternative nuclear material: 237Np or 241Am, acknowledged by nuclear weapon States Parties to the NPT to be suitable for use in nuclear weapons. Depleted uranium (DU) remaining after 235U has been taken away. DU is used as a tamper in nuclear weapons to hold the device together while the explosive force is building. DU is also used in armor-​piercing artillery projectiles, and as ballast in jet planes and sail boats. Direct-​use Nuclear Material: nuclear material that can be used for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices without transmutation or further enrichment. It includes plutonium containing less than 80% 238Pu, highly enriched uranium or 233U. Chemical compounds, mixtures of direct-​use nuclear material (e.g., mixed oxide (MOX)), and plutonium in spent reactor fuel fall into this category. Unirradiated Direct-​use Nuclear Material: does not contain substantial fractions of fission products; it would require less time and effort to be converted to components of nuclear explosive devices than irradiated direct-​use nuclear material (e.g., plutonium in spent reactor fuel) that contains substantial amounts of fission products (See International Nuclear Verification Series No.3 (2001), IAEA Safeguards Glossary: 2001 Edition, #4.25). Disarmed state: A former nuclear-​armed State, such as South Africa. Fissile: In physics, a nucleus that will fission when struck by a neutron of any energy (examples: 233U, 235U, 239Pu, 241Pu). Fissile Material: As used in this book, a combination of fissile and fissionable isotopes actually used in a nuclear weapon to produce explosive force. Fissile material is believed to include plutonium containing at least 80% 239Pu, and/or uranium enriched in 235U to 20% or more. Weapon nuclear material is the same as fissile material. Fissile Material Monitoring: A means to establish through verification followed by maintaining “continuity of knowledge” (an IAEA safeguards term) or a “chain of custody” (“the process of establishing

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xviii Glossary the authenticity or provenance of items, tracking their movements between facilities and confirming that they have not been altered in any way” www.nti.org/​analysis/​articles/​tags-​seals/​) that a declared action or condition conforms to a declaration provided by nuclear-​armed State. Fissile Material Verification: The act of confirming a declaration made by a nuclear-​armed State by means of methods based on sound science and applied under arrangements allowing the verification authority to be confident that the results obtained are correct and authentic. In the context of disarmament, respecting the need to protect nuclear weapon design and manufacturing secrets will limit the properties that can be verified and the amount of information that the verification authorities can obtain. Fission: Process by which the nucleus of an atom is split into two or more parts. Fission of heavy elements may occur spontaneously or upon impact of a neutron. Fissionable: A nucleus that will fission when struck by a neutron above a threshold amount of energy (examples: 238U, 238Pu, 240Pu, 242Pu, 237Np, 241 Am). Heat-​source plutonium: plutonium produced to fuel thermoelectric generators, frequently used in space applications. In IAEA safeguards, any amount of plutonium containing 80% or more of 238Pu can be exempted from safeguards. 238Pu produces heat through α decay. With a half-​life of 89 years, 238Pu produces 567 W/​kg. High-​(or highly) enriched uranium (HEU) contains 20% or more of the isotope 235U, or the sum of 233U + 235U. At very high enrichments, for example, of 93% or more, HEU is used in fission primary elements, in some naval reactors, space power reactors, or in some research reactors, or fast neutron power reactors. HEU with enrichments from 20% to 90% or more may be used in thermonuclear secondary elements in nuclear weapons, or in naval reactors, space power reactors, or in some research reactors, or fast neutron power reactors. Indirect-​use Nuclear Material: any nuclear material except that designated as direct-​use nuclear material, and hence, requiring enrichment or irradiation and reprocessing to produce weapon-​usable nuclear material. Level 1 Fissile Material Verification: Verification of unclassified forms of fissile material, allowing quantitative, high accuracy measurements of elemental composition, isotopic composition, physical form, shape, impurities, in fact, all measurements as for nuclear material in IAEA safeguards. Level 2, 3, and 4 Fissile Material Verification: Verification of classified forms of fissile material, by means of approved methods allowing both the State and INDA to agree upon security measures to prevent unauthorized access to classified information, and authentication measures to confirm the values obtained.

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Glossary xix Low enrichment uranium (LEU) is enriched to less than 20%. LEU is commonly used to fuel nuclear power reactors, research reactors and some naval reactors. Natural uranium (NU) as it comes from nature, with 0.712% 235U content. Nuclear Disarmament: A process undertaken by a nuclear-​armed State with the ultimate objective of eliminating all nuclear weapons in its possession or under its control, the complex of mission-​critical capabilities necessary for their production and use, verification of nuclear arms reductions, fissile material controls, and the elimination or irreversible conversion of its nuclear weapons complex, and the adoption of policies and acceptance of verification and monitoring aimed at assuring that the State remains without nuclear weapons henceforth. Nuclear Material (NM): Any source or special fissionable material as defined in the IAEA Statute or in the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, or in the P5 Glossary. Nuclear Weapon: A nuclear-​explosive device engineered to be a military weapon, including a designated delivery system, command and control system, and all support steps as necessary. Nuclear weapons include warheads carried on ballistic or cruise missiles, gravity bombs, torpedoes, land or sea mines, or man-​portable weapons. Nuclear weapons might also be transported in trucks, trains, ships (including commercial or military vessels, including conventionally powered submarines). Plutonium: Element 94, created primarily through neutron capture in 238U followed by two β-​decay transitions to produce 239Pu. Other plutonium isotopes are produced by neutron capture (for example, 239Pu + n → 240 Pu). Reactor-​grade plutonium: plutonium containing lower amounts of 239Pu, as produced in nuclear power reactors. Rearmament Verification: Verification of the absence of undeclared activities or materials by which a nuclear-​armed State might seek to produce or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons in violation of nuclear disarmament commitments it has undertaken. Single-​stage nuclear weapon: A nuclear weapon containing only a fission primary. The bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki contained only a fission primary. The explosive force produced by fission in the primary may be boosted by fusing deuterium and tritium introduced into the primary in gas form. Super-​grade plutonium: plutonium containing much higher percentages of 239 Pu, generally above 98%. Thermonuclear weapon: A nuclear weapon containing a primary and a secondary, which produces explosive force through fission and fusion (See Figure 3.2).

newgenprepdf

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xx Glossary Uranium: Element 92, existing in nature in abundant mineral deposits, salts and in sea water. Verification of Weapon-​usable Nuclear Material: Verification of declared amounts of weapon-​usable fissile material through nuclear material accountancy measurements in combination with containment and surveillance measures, as applied in IAEA non-​proliferation safeguards measures. Weapon-​grade plutonium: A US term, for plutonium containing 93.7% 239Pu or more. Weapon-​usable nuclear material: any combination of direct-​use nuclear material and/​or alternative nuclear material, and hence, nuclear material from which a nuclear-​armed State would be able to produce nuclear weapons, if it chose to do so.

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Part I

An overview

Figure 1.1 The UK hosted an innovative international nuclear disarmament verification exercise between nuclear and non-​ nuclear weapons states (“Project Letterpress”). The first of its kind, the exercise addresses the greatest technical obstruction to nuclear disarmament—​ the absence of an established or agreed process of checking the dismantlement of a nuclear weapon. James Franklin, Head of Nuclear Policy for the UK Ministry of Defence, said:  “International exercises of this scale are hugely important to ensure the possibility of a world without nuclear weapons. This exercise was part of our commitment made at the Nuclear Non-​ Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee 2017 and makes a tangible contribution to the UK’s commitment to Article VI of the treaty itself which remains the cornerstone of the international non-​ proliferation framework.” See www.gov.uk/​government/​news/​ uk-​hosts-​international-​nuclear-​disarmament-​verification-​exercise. Photo Credit: UK Ministry of Defense.

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1  Introduction

1.1  General considerations Nuclear disarmament will need to provide for 1)  eliminating existing nuclear arsenals, 2) eliminating mission-​critical nuclear weapon facilities, and 3) preventing nuclear-​armed States from rearming. For disarmament to succeed, nuclear-​armed States will need to engage, initially with skepticism and great caution, but eventually by endorsing the goals and aspirations of disarmament, and by driving implementation with increasing assurance as the numbers of remaining arsenals dwindle. The idea of living without nuclear weapons will need to become a shared aspiration, requiring a disarmament verification regime with legally binding commitments, institutions charged with related actions, technology able to confirm progress or detect non-​compliance, financial arrangements allowing necessary steps to be carried out, confidence building measures to sustain progress toward the ultimate aim, and public engagement. These elements of the nuclear disarmament regime will be needed under any legal framework. In July of 2017 a United Nations Conference completed drafting the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (the TPNW). (For convenience, the text of the TPNW is provided in Annex A.1 of this book.1) The TPNW was opened for signature on 20 September 2017 at the United Nations Headquarters and will enter into force when 50 States deposit their instruments of ratification. Once it enters into force, the Treaty will face two challenges: building the TPNW verification system, and convincing the nuclear-​armed States to sign on. The two are related: defining the verification system will help the nuclear-​armed States to consider how the process of disarmament would work, and what their involvement would mean. While most of this book would be equally applicable to any process of disarmament, the verification framework presented in this book is aimed at the anticipated entry into force of the TPNW. As foreseen in the TPNW, these objectives would be verified primarily through controls on fissile material2 removed from nuclear weapons, and controls on weapon-​usable nuclear materials that could be used to manufacture new weapons.3 The underlying foundation for this framework is the

4

4  An overview expectation that all nuclear weapons will continue to rely on fission energy as a fundamental constituent, either alone (fission-​only weapons) or in combination with fusion energy (fission-​fusion-​fission weapons). That assumption may not remain valid forever, but even if a new form of weapon is invented, it will still be necessary to eliminate nuclear weapons as they are currently known.4 The TPNW verification framework must address disarmament:  the process, the institutional arrangements, the technical measures, the procedures for carrying out inspections, the conclusions to be derived, the analytical capability, and a mechanism for research, development, and manufacturing verification systems as required—​especially as necessary to cope with the secrets maintained by a State related to nuclear weapon design and manufacturing knowledge. For reasons presented later in this chapter, a new organization will be needed to verify the elimination of existing nuclear weapons and to take down the nuclear weapons complex in each nuclear-​armed State. This new organization is referred to in the book as “the International Nuclear Disarmament Agency” (or INDA), recognizing that it will be up to the TPNW Parties to decide on whether a new organization is needed, and if, so, what to call it, where to base it, how to fund it, and how it should operate. In this book, INDA is assigned five missions as necessary for disarmament to succeed. As the principal institution to bring nuclear disarmament about, INDA should include a “Nuclear Disarmament Council,” which should operate in part through standing committees as proposed in Chapter 2. The INDA Secretariat would include the functions required for INDA to carry out its activities, including two autonomous INDA institutes essential for it to operate. Elements of the TPNW verification framework addressing the elimination of each existing arsenal and nuclear weapons complex are presented in Part II of the book. The TPNW verification framework addressing rearmament will—​ to a considerable extent—​resemble International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as implemented in support of the Treaty on the Non-​Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT). Just as a new institution should be created to address the elimination of existing arsenals, there are equally compelling reasons for assigning the IAEA the verification responsibilities for sustaining disarmament progress and preventing disarmed States from rearming. In the book, the IAEA is explicitly tasked with six missions in support of the TPNW. Adding the proposed rearmament mission to the IAEA is consistent with the provisions of the IAEA Statute and very closely aligned with its current safeguards methods and procedures.5 The IAEA roles foreseen are presented in Part III of the book. The TPNW, INDA, and the relevant missions assigned to the IAEA will constitute the foundation of what will become the nuclear disarmament regime. Some additional elements for this regime are identified later in this chapter and are presented in Part IV of the book. The book includes three legal annexes and three technical annexes.

 5

Introduction 5

1.2  Two TPNW problems Before presenting the verification framework, there are two provisions in the TPNW that are troubling. One would deter nuclear-​armed States from signing the TPNW; the other could limit the verification activities that should be carried out under the TPNW, which could make it impossible to maintain the integrity of completed verification activities over time, and could make equal verification impossible. There are various means through which these problems would be addressed that the Parties to the TPNW could select. 1.2.1  Time-​bound disarmament Indeed, I  believe that the practical steps I  propose to lower nuclear dangers will not gain full international support unless they are attached to a vision of ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons; likewise, I believe that this vision will never be achieved in one grand move, but in a step-​by-​ step process, each step of which makes us safer. (Former US Secretary of Defense William J. Perry)6 The language provided in Article 4 of the TPNW might be interpreted in a strict sense that could make it very unlikely that nuclear-​armed States could accept its demands. Or it might be interpreted in a more pragmatic manner, so that a nuclear-​armed State might negotiate terms and conditions leading to step-​by-​step commitments leading to the eventual elimination of its arsenal and the elimination or irreversible conversion of its mission-​critical nuclear-​ weapon facilities. It will be extremely difficult for nuclear-​armed States to commence an orderly process towards disarmament, especially taking into account that the steps involved are likely to take decades to complete. For example, Article 4.2 of the TPNW requires each State Party that owns, possesses, or controls nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to immediately remove them from operational status, and destroy them as soon as possible. For a State to remove its nuclear weapons from operational status, it would have to be confident that such a move would not invite its adversaries to take advantage of its inability to deter their attacks, or make it vulnerable to extortion, or undercut its ability to respond to protect its supreme national interests. As long as the weapons continue to exist, the ability to return them to operational status could provide some measure of deterrence. Once they are destroyed, a State could lie at the mercy of its adversaries. If one State’s adversaries take corresponding measures, then both would rely on findings provided by INDA inspections and by their national technical means that no State has a nuclear edge. Most nuclear-​armed States would likely consider such steps to be tantamount to national suicide and hence signing onto the TPNW under these conditions would be unlikely.

6

6  An overview For there to be progress, the TPNW must allow nuclear-​armed States to proceed in a deliberate but measured way to reduce their deployed nuclear weapons in steps, when each nuclear-​armed State is confident that it will not put its national security at risk. The timing of successive steps must reflect the security posture of each State, and its ability to carry out the steps involved in retiring nuclear weapons and recovering the fissile material contained. The TPNW Conference of States Parties should promote full and final disarmament as early as possible and continue to apply pressure on each nuclear-​ armed State to continue the process of divesting its arms and dismantling its nuclear weapons infrastructure. But the TPNW must help to create the conditions for nuclear-​armed States to take each next step, digest the resulting security environment, and plan for the next step. Continuing to encourage progress must remain one of the principal objectives for the INDA Nuclear Disarmament Council. Parties to the TPNW need to plan a sequential approach to disarmament, putting in place check points and chances for modifications that may be necessitated by external considerations. The Nuclear Disarmament Council and the IAEA will need to anticipate that the nuclear-​armed States may seek to delay progress whenever possible, perhaps by blaming INDA or the IAEA for failing to provide the confidence each needs to proceed. 1.2.2  Financing disarmament As provided under Article 9.3 of the TPNW, “The cost related to the implementation of verification measures required under Article 4 as well as the costs related to the destruction of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and the elimination of nuclear-​weapon programs, including the elimination or conversion of all nuclear-​weapons-​related facilities, should be borne by the States Parties to which they apply.” This arrangement could enable each nuclear-​armed State to control how and when INDA inspectors would be able to verify each nuclear-​armed State. Funds not provided by a State or provided later than needed could cripple INDA’s ability to satisfy the TPNW verification requirements by limiting the numbers of inspectors, the equipment they have on hand, funds for travel, and essential support services. This could impair their ability to perform the needed inspections and maintain continuity of knowledge of their disarmament findings, and could undermine their ability to provide an equal measure of assurance of the steps taken by all nuclear-​armed States. Losing continuity of knowledge could, at worst, place all verification results preceding such a loss as no longer assured. A more reliable funding arrangement will be needed. Just as non-​ proliferation benefits all States—​ with and without nuclear-​ arms—​so too will nuclear disarmament. Hence, all TPNW parties should finance the ongoing operations of INDA, and perhaps all TPNW-​related efforts by the IAEA, perhaps through an assessment scheme similar to that used by the IAEA.7 All TPNW Parties should share some of the verification costs and impose fees on nuclear-​armed States that will incentivize arms reductions. The

 7

Introduction 7 TPNW Parties should allow donations, recognizing that disarmament will not come cheaply. In addition to assessments on all TPNW Parties, a nuclear warhead tax (for example, of €1,000,000 for each deployed and reserve warhead) could be levied on each nuclear-​armed State when it brings the TPNW into force. Such a tax could provide working capital for INDA and incentivize nuclear-​armed States to make progress towards disarmament. The TPNW Conference of States Parties might consider higher taxes for nuclear-​armed States that fail to show any progress (e.g., €2,000,000 per deployed or reserve warhead after 15 years without progress). The amount of the nuclear warhead tax could be adjusted for inflation from the date of entry into force of the TPNW itself. The nuclear warhead tax might be re-​levied at ten-​year intervals at the inflation-​adjusted rate, on all remaining deployed and reserve warheads. Nuclear-​armed States could accelerate their arms reductions in order to save on this tax. In addition to these funding mechanisms, the costs of disarmament might also be offset by endowments from philanthropists and gifts from governments and corporations to help to bring about a world free of nuclear weapons.

1.3  Theater-​centric verification There are nine nuclear-​armed States today: China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—​some friends, some allies, some enemies, five within and four outside the NPT.8 Kristensen and Norris estimates of the current inventories of deployed and reserve nuclear warheads are shown in Table 1.1.9 These arsenals deter adversaries from aggression and protect against unknown future threats. Organizing the TPNW verification around existing adversarial relationships will make success more likely, when the verification activities are planned and executed taking into account the specific needs and prevailing circumstances in each nuclear-​armed State. INDA and the IAEA will need to imagine how each State could cheat on its commitments, and base their verification so as to detect whether or not such cheating is underway.10 Understanding how cheating might proceed will help to define the requirements to detect or block all plausible possibilities through complete coverage where possible, or weighted selection when complete coverage is not possible, or by random selection when no signals warrant selective targeting. Nuclear arsenals maintained by some adversaries (like India and Pakistan) have little to do with others (like the US and Russia); solutions that might produce progress in the India–​Pakistan coupling are not likely to directly affect other couplings. Israel is closely allied with the US, France, and the UK, but its arsenal deters Arab wars rather than aligning itself in support of the US in its adversarial relationships. And of course, some nuclear-​armed States have more than one nuclear-​armed adversary (e.g., US–​China, US–​Russia, US–​North Korea). While INDA and the IAEA should provide the verification foundation for all nuclear-​armed States, TPNW parties might engage first in bilateral

8

8  An overview Table  1.1  Nuclear arsenals in the nine nuclear-​armed states. “Deployed strategic warheads are those deployed on intercontinental missiles and at heavy bomber bases. Deployed nonstrategic warheads are those deployed on bases with operational short-​ range delivery systems. Reserve/​Nondeployed warheads are those not deployed on launchers and in storage (weapons at bomber bases are considered deployed). The military stockpile includes warheads that are in the custody of the military and earmarked for use by commissioned deliver vehicles. The total inventory includes warheads in the military stockpile as well as retired, but still intact, warheads in queue for dismantlement.” (Kristensen and Norris, Status of World Nuclear Forces) State

Deployed Strategic

Deployed Nonstrategic

Reserve

Military Stockpile

Total

Russia United States France China United Kingdom Israel Pakistan India North Korea Total

1950 1650 280 0 120 0 0 0 0 ≈4150

0 150 n.a. ? n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. ≈150

2350 2200 10 270 95 80 120–​130 110–​120 ? ≈5300

4300 4000 300 270 215 80 120–​130 110–​120 ? ≈9400

7000 6800 300 270 215 80 120–​130 110–​120 ? ≈14930

France

United Kingdom

Russia United States

China Israel

North Korea

India Pakistan

Figure 1.2 A Theater-​centric representation of the approximate number of nuclear weapons in each arsenal and the adversarial relationships between the nuclear-​armed states.

agreements and fold their arrangements into the TPNW when they are ready. Their verification measures may go beyond those that INDA and the IAEA apply, and thereby enhance the chances of successful disarmament. (For example, some nuclear-​armed States may want to verify that warheads dismantled in adversary States are not only verified as actual warheads, but

 9

Introduction 9 are identified as specific warhead models, to confirm that their adversaries are actually disarming.) The TPNW parties should encourage such bilateral arrangements as may be agreed, and create seamless transitions across the boundaries between the bilateral and INDA/​IAEA verification measures. Based on all information available to it, each nuclear-​armed State signing the TPNW will decide when it is prepared to commit to successive arms reductions and complementary steps. Its decisions will be influenced by the extent and performance of TPNW verification accepted by its adversaries and the findings of its national intelligence system. In that way, if nuclear-​armed State A  is implementing arms reductions, and if under the TPNW those reductions are confirmed and the amounts of fissile material submitted to verification are increased in proportion, and if the intel apparatus of nuclear-​ armed State B suggests that A is in fact reducing its nuclear capabilities, then nuclear-​armed State B should (hopefully) be encouraged to follow suit, confident that its matching steps will not jeopardize its national security. That assurance will be essential to sustaining progress towards disarmament within each adversarial coupling, and ultimately in all nuclear-​armed States. When they are ready to begin the process of disarmament, the nuclear-​ armed States will likely proceed with extreme caution. It would be helpful to engage the nine in initiatives and exercises that would allow them to become comfortable with the process and the verification procedures and equipment before committing to irreversible steps. Some exercises might be conducted simultaneously with all nine nuclear-​armed States, while some could be separate with individual nuclear-​armed States. Full and complete disarmament will require that each State be convinced that it no longer needs to rely on its nuclear arsenal. Disarmament will require a durable peace and a means to redress grievances without conflict. At some point, as progress towards disarmament improves their security vis à vis their respective adversarial relationships, nuclear-​armed States will (hopefully) come to see that realizing their collective security through the disarmament framework will be to their benefit and to the benefit of their adversaries as well. At that point, nuclear-​armed States would (hopefully) shift from doing whatever they can to minimize the impact of the TPNW, to demanding accelerated progress with increasingly intrusive verification. Wishful thinking, perhaps, but in a way similar to the changes experienced by a number of non-​ nuclear weapon States that gave up their nuclear weapon ambitions.

1.4  Institutional verification arrangements INDA should be assigned all responsibilities associated with the elimination of existing arsenals. It should have five missions: ( a) Encouraging nuclear-​armed States to disarm; (b) Verifying each step taken under the TPNW, including arms reductions and fissile material controls at four levels;

10

10  An overview ( c) Certifying and eliminating mission-​critical nuclear weapon facilities; (d) Verifying non-​explosive military uses of fissile material and other weapon-​ usable nuclear materials;11 and (e) Estimating the historical production or other acquisition of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and the disposition of all fissile material. The Parties to the TPNW would presumably create INDA—​or whatever name they choose the new nuclear disarmament verification authority—​by establishing its Statute. Reflecting the fundamental importance of national intelligence programs to verifying disarmament, the new Statute must include an article similar to Article VIII.A of the IAEA Statute is, which encourages IAEA Member States to “make available such information as would, in the judgment of the member, be helpful to the Agency.”12 As foreseen in Article 4 of the TPNW, the verification framework must also address the possibility that nuclear-​armed States might secretly attempt to rearm. Preventing rearmament closely parallels non-​ proliferation. It will require six missions, all eminently suited to the IAEA. These verification missions would not involve classified forms of fissile material, making standard IAEA safeguards methods and techniques appropriate. Moreover, existing IAEA Member State safeguards support programs should be available to help improve implementation in this arena. To prevent rearmament, the TPNW Parties should authorize the IAEA to carry out the six missions presented in Chapter 6: (a) Disposition of fissile material transferred from nuclear weapons use; (b) Verification of mission-​ critical nuclear weapon facilities converted to peaceful use; (c) Detection of diversion from declared stocks of direct-​use, indirect-​use, or alternative nuclear materials at declared facilities; (d) Detection of undeclared production, processing or stocks of direct-​use or alternative nuclear material at declared facilities; (e) Detection of clandestine production; and (f) Estimation and verification of historical production, imports/​exports, and disposition of nuclear material. Each nuclear-​ armed State would conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA in accordance with a model agreement approved by the IAEA Board of Governors for the purpose of preventing rearmament. The Board of Governors would approve each new safeguards agreement, following its existing practice. A suggested model agreement is shown in Annex A.3. All of the inspection procedures foreseen for the IAEA are included within the current scope of IAEA safeguards in non-​nuclear weapon States (NNWS). The NNWS have accepted these burdens while the nuclear weapon States parties to the NPT have had a free ride, and the remaining four non-​ NPT nuclear-​armed States have watched from the sidelines. Assigning these

 11

Introduction 11 tasks to any other organization than the IAEA would undermine the NPT and the ability of the IAEA to carry out its raison d’être. In principle, the IAEA could take on all of the verification and monitoring responsibilities envisioned for nuclear disarmament as well as for preventing rearmament. The IAEA has enormous technical capabilities, it already exists and it enjoys the trust of the international community. But there are compelling reasons not to assign the task of verifying the elimination of existing weapons to the IAEA: (a) The process of disarmament is certain to be contentious. The political consensus around non-​proliferation painstakingly built since the creation of the IAEA in 1957 could be at risk if the IAEA were to be tasked with the elimination of existing nuclear weapons, too. That would be a terrible outcome. (b) If verification activities related to eliminating nuclear weapons were to be assigned to the IAEA, the military nature of the undertaking and the communities with whom the IAEA would interact would be very different from those involved with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy: i. Defense ministries would intrude into the IAEA’s governance; ii. The inspection methods and equipment would have to meet different requirements and because of classification restrictions, most would not be interchangeable with non-​proliferation safeguards methods and equipment; iii. Inspector designations for disarmament in nuclear-​ armed States would likely not be open to all IAEA Member States; iv. The IAEA Board of Governors and General Conference would exercise some degree of control over the mechanics of disarmament under such an arrangement, and TPNW Parties and IAEA Member States will most likely not be identical; and v. Developing States could argue that funds spent on disarmament should justify corresponding increases in technical cooperation funds. (c) A new mission involving eliminating existing nuclear weapons would have to compete all other IAEA missions. Activities related to the elimination of existing arsenals would not get the attention needed within the IAEA. The IAEA is a multi-​mission institution with a staff of over 2500. In addition to its existing non-​proliferation safeguards mission, the IAEA engages in voluntary programs for nuclear power, nuclear safety and security, nuclear applications in medicine, industry and agriculture, and it helps to prepare States interested in securing the benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. All of these programs are important and have energetic constituencies. (d) While IAEA inspectors have to follow agreed procedures, the requirements for disarming nuclear arsenals will be very different and would complicate managing both proliferation and disarmament within one organization. Verifying the elimination of existing weapons will require working with classified forms of fissile material under strict supervision, following

12

12  An overview scripted and rehearsed procedures. The inspection equipment and the provisions under which they are employed must satisfy each nuclear-​ armed State that they cannot facilitate espionage, while at the same time provide findings that are scientifically sound and authentic. This will require the ability to design and acquire specialized verification systems that can be used to verify nuclear warheads, for example. It will demand independent means to carry out the research and development necessary to succeed, but national laboratories in nuclear-​armed States, the principal resource for continuing to develop the IAEA non-​proliferation safeguards system through the IAEA Member State support programs, might be asked by their national governments to provide technical reasons to delay or undermine nuclear disarmament verification, and one nuclear-​armed State might not trust the work of national laboratories in other nuclear-​armed States.

1.5  Coping with nuclear weapon secrecy Perhaps the biggest difference between verifying nuclear disarmament and verifying non-​proliferation has to do with the secrecy surrounding the design and manufacturing of nuclear weapons.13 Some of that secrecy is warranted, as no one would want the process of disarmament to lead to proliferation or nuclear terrorism, or to escalating tensions between nuclear-​armed States. That secrecy will demand special verification methods that limit what can be verified, complicate inspections, delay progress, and raise verification costs. Absent international standards, each nuclear-​armed State decides for itself what should and shouldn’t be classified.14 Classification will raise the costs of verification and make the findings less definitive than if the classification requirements are not imposed. Some nuclear weapon secrets were established for reasons that may not be worth keeping, such as the isotopic composition of the fissile material used in nuclear warheads in general, or even in specific models of warheads. And knowing the total mass of plutonium and/​or highly enriched uranium in a warhead would likely offer little advantage to anyone seeking to produce a clone. National classification authorities may claim that each bit of information represents one more piece of the puzzle of how a State’s weapons are built. All nuclear-​armed States, making certain that secrets essential to preventing proliferation or nuclear terrorism are maintained, should agree on common classification requirements. Including a mechanism within INDA to avoid unnecessary classification would benefit progress towards nuclear disarmament and enhance the value of its conclusions.

1.6  The process of nuclear disarmament Pursuant to Article 4 of the TPNW, a nuclear-​armed State should proceed through the following steps.

 13

Introduction 13 (a) Each nuclear-​armed State would conclude a verification agreement with INDA in accordance with a model agreement approved by the INDA Nuclear Disarmament Council for the purpose of verifying the elimination of the State’s nuclear arsenal and the facilities used to develop, manufacture and support its nuclear weapons program. The Nuclear Disarmament Council would approve each new agreement. A proposed model agreement is shown in Annex A.2. (b) Upon completing its entry into force requirements, a nuclear-​ armed State would declare its existing nuclear arsenal, its reserves of nuclear warheads, warhead components, and its remaining stocks of fissile material committed to use in nuclear weapons. It would agree to an initial reduction in its arsenal, and henceforth agree to limit its deployed and reserve warheads, reserve pits and secondaries, and agree to further reduce those numbers when it believes that such reductions would not jeopardize its national security. Each nuclear-​armed State party to the TPNW would declare all changes to its initial arsenal thereafter. (c) Each nuclear-​armed State would agree to limit its stocks of fissile material committed to nuclear weapon use to the minimum needed to sustain its remaining declared arsenal, and to transfer any fissile material in excess of the minimum to a disposition path, after removing any classified properties. This process would commence upon first accepting participation in the TPNW disarmament regime, with further transfers in proportion to each subsequent nuclear arms reduction. (d) Each nuclear-​armed State would agree to accept INDA verification and monitoring on the fissile material released from nuclear weapon use in conjunction with its steps towards disarmament, beginning with the verification of unclassified forms of fissile material released from weapon use (Level 1), moving up to classified forms of fissile material in nuclear warhead components and related materials (Level 2), then up to nuclear warheads (Level 3), and finally, to deployed nuclear warheads (Level 4). Once this latter step is in place, verification would extend to nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of a nuclear-​armed State and deployed outside the territory of that State, as may apply. (e) Verification related to a nuclear-​armed State’s military programs that are not connected to the State’s nuclear weapons program should be assigned to INDA, recognizing that non-​proscribed military uses of nuclear material in NNWS would be subject to arrangements called for in Paragraph 14 of each NNWS comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreement.15 (f) A nuclear-​armed State would agree that once fissile material is submitted to verification at any level, verification would continue as the fissile material progresses down through the steps identified, and would thence be transferred to a disposition path under the new safeguards agreement concluded with the IAEA pursuant to Article 4.3 of the TPNW.16 (g) Each nuclear-​ armed State would agree not to produce or otherwise acquire any weapon-​usable nuclear material for use in any nuclear weapon or any other nuclear explosive, or for any undeclared purpose.17

14

14  An overview

1.7  Elimination or conversion of a nuclear weapon complex Each nuclear weapon facility that is to be irreversibly converted to non-​nuclear use or to a non-​nuclear weapons use should be verified jointly by INDA and the IAEA. INDA would certify that a given facility had in fact been used for the declared nuclear weapon purposes. The IAEA would verify its conversion and subsequently that it is no longer being used for any nuclear weapon purpose or for any other purpose that could be used by the State to reconstitute its nuclear arsenal. For each facility that a nuclear-​armed State declares as having been used for a critical function in support of its nuclear weapon program, INDA should confirm first:  that the facility was actually used in that State’s nuclear weapons program as declared by that nuclear-​armed State; and that documents, photographic records, and interviews with relevant personnel selected by INDA corroborate the factual basis for its construction, operation, and de-​commissioning. The State should provide a Facility Information Questionnaire (FIQ) for each facility to be eliminated or converted.18 INDA should be able to call upon experts knowledgeable in each type of weapon complex facility from a roster approved for such purposes by the INDA Nuclear Disarmament Council. For each such facility that is to be eliminated, INDA should witness and confirm the removal and destruction of key equipment from the facility, and witness the destruction of the facility. The State should provide an IAEA Facility Information Questionnaire (FIQ) for the facility reflecting its new mission following its conversion. INDA and the IAEA should carry out the initial design information verification and witness the conversion and confirm that the post-​conversion operation of the facility is as declared by the State. For facilities that are converted to peaceful nuclear use, the IAEA should establish an appropriate safeguards approach consistent with its post-​conversion peaceful nuclear operations thereafter. For facilities that are converted to non-​explosive military nuclear use, INDA should establish an appropriate verifications approach to provide assurance that the military program does not contribute to the nuclear weapons-​related activities thereafter. Nuclear weapon facilities that were eliminated or converted before the TPNW enters into force in a nuclear-​armed State, or former nuclear-​armed State, should be verified to the extent possible according to the provisions above.

1.8  Additional confidence building measures for the nuclear disarmament regime The disarmament framework presented in this book is intended to help the TPNW Parties develop the verification framework called for in Article 4 of the TPNW. It is limited in scope to how controls on fissile materials could be

 15

Introduction 15 used in relation to eliminating existing nuclear weapons, and how controls on weapon-​usable nuclear materials can be used to prevent a nuclear-​armed State from rearming. The approach pursued draws on the non-​proliferation regime and IAEA safeguards applied in non-​nuclear weapon States pursuant to Article III of the NPT. The military sensitivity and the secrecy surrounding nuclear weapons require significant departures from the safeguards applied in NNWS during the elimination of each nuclear warhead, but the steps that follow aimed at preventing a nuclear-​armed State from secretly rearming are intentionally very similar to the safeguards aimed at preventing proliferation by an NNWS. The principal objective of verification must be to convince each nuclear-​ armed State and its adversaries that taking a step in the direction of nuclear disarmament will not endanger their national security or the prospects for peace between them. Verification will also enable INDA and the IAEA to meet their respective objectives pursuant to the TPNW, provide TPNW parties with evidence that the nuclear-​armed States are in fact taking steps towards the eventual elimination of their nuclear weapons, and suggest how to encourage additional steps, and how to convince reluctant nuclear-​armed States to participate. Achieving disarmament will depend on the credibility of the TPNW verification system, together with other means, including intelligence gathering. Progress via the verification steps proposed for INDA and the IAEA would be more likely if the emerging nuclear disarmament regime is made more robust by incorporating additional supportive confidence building measures such as those shown in Table 1.2 and presented in Chapter 7. One rather fundamental issue centers on the fate of fissile material removed in the process of nuclear disarmament and other forms of weapon-​usable nuclear material. As long as such materials remain immediately available in storage, then a State could seize those materials and attempt to reconstitute some nuclear capability in a short time. As long as such materials remain in use, then a State has a seemingly legitimate means available for continuing to keep its processing skills up to the task, and to continue to develop relevant processing technological improvements. See Chapter 6. While certain to be contentious, verifying disarmament, preventing rearmament, preventing proliferation, and preventing nuclear terrorism will be far simpler to accomplish and ensure if all parties to the TPNW agree to: (a) Ban all HEU use and phase out all remaining HEU usage for military and civil use, stop all production, retrieve all remaining stocks, and down blend all remaining stocks of HEU to LEU. And, (b) Ban all peaceful uses of plutonium—​both coming from nuclear weapons and arising from nuclear power programs, and dispose of plutonium in deep bore hole repositories or excavated geological repositories beyond the reach of man. If the TPNW cannot secure a plutonium ban, then a moratorium should be sought for a period of not less than 75 years.

16

16  An overview Table  1.2  Suggested confidence-​building measures to strengthen the verification of nuclear disarmament and provide greater encouragement for participation, and greater assurance of progress towards disarmament #

Description

Relevance

1

Complementary bilateral arms reduction treaties

2

TPNW engagement exercises

3

Temporary monitoring of deployed or reserve warheads Controls on warhead refurbishment and re-manufacturing Export/import controls for nucleararmed states

Could provide enhanced engagement and verification of sensitive operations, e.g., warhead dismantlement Facilitate detailed understanding of disarmament verification workings before entry into force Provide added assurance and facilitate later commitments Additional mechanism to inhibit rearmament No sound arguments for such use, no shortage of LEU, prospects for fusion power Additional mechanism to inhibit rearmament Facilitate ease of verification and standardization of verification practices in all nine nuclear-​armed States Facilitate standardization of practices across nuclear-​armed States, especially useful for fissile material disposition and final phase of eliminating nuclear arsenals Provide a means to monitor all declared nuclear reactors, and a method for detecting clandestine reactors. Facilitate and accelerate progress when States are limited by financing

4 5 6

Controls on fusion materials

7

Standardizing dismantlement and conversion facility architecture

8

Extra-​territorial siting

9

Antineutrinos

10

Subsidizing Disarmament

Notes 1 A/​CONF.229/​2017/​L.3/​Rev.1, Draft treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, www.undocs.org/​en/​a/​conf.229/​2017/​L.3/​Rev.1, accessed 11 July 2017. 2 For ease of understanding, I chose to use the term “fissile material” when speaking of nuclear disarmament, meaning only plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) actually used in nuclear weapons or set aside for that purpose. The term “fissile material” is italicized to make this distinction. Plutonium used as fissile material contains high fractions of 239Pu (typically above 90%), and uranium enriched in 235U to 20% or more. Other nuclear species could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons in addition to Pu and HEU, and when considering new weapons that a State might produce in violation of nuclear disarmament

 17

Introduction 17 commitments it might agree to, the broader term weapon-​usable nuclear material will be used. Weapon-​usable nuclear material hence includes fissile material, plus any combination of plutonium isotopes having a concentration of 238Pu of less than 80%, or 233U, 237Np, or 241Am. 3 Recalling that the United States and the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation have been able to agree to arms control measures based on weapon delivery systems, the parties to the TPNW should consider venues in addition to controls on fissile material and nuclear material to encourage progress towards the ultimate goal of removing all nuclear weapons. Such other venues are, however, not within my expertise. 4 See, for example, Andre Gsponer (2008), Fourth generation nuclear weapons: military effectiveness and collateral effects, Geneva, Switzerland, Independent Scientific Research Institute, ISRI-​05-​03. See https://​arxiv.org/​pdf/​physics/​0510071.pdf 5 The IAEA Statute anticipates that the IAEA might engage in activities in relation to nuclear disarmament. Specifically, Article III.B.1 of the Statute provides that “In carrying out its functions, the Agency should: Conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations to promote peace and international co-​operation, and in conformity with policies of the United Nations furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide disarmament and in conformity with any international agreements entered into pursuant to such policies.” See www.iaea.org/​about/​statute. 6 W. Perry (2015), My Journey at the nuclear brink (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press). 7 The IAEA has existing financing arrangements, and as IAEA verification of the TPNW would be according to new safeguards agreements, it would be up to the IAEA Board of Governors to decide whether this new mission should be included within its existing safeguards financing arrangements. 8 INFCIRC/​140 (1970), The Treaty on the Non-​Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, www.iaea.org/​sites/​default/​files/​publications/​documents/​infcircs/​1970/​infcirc140. pdf, accessed 19 July 2017. 9 H. Kristensen and R. Norris (2017), Status of World Nuclear Forces, Federation of American Scientists, https://​fas.org/​issues/​nuclear-​weapons/​status-​world-​nuclear-​ forces/​, accessed 18 November 2017. 10 The IAEA currently carries out its safeguards inspections under a State Level Approach tailored to each State to cope with proliferation scenarios that are considered to be plausible. 11 There is no compelling reason for INDA to have this responsibility vs. adding it to the tasks to be assigned to the IAEA, as presented in Chapter 6, especially taking into account paragraph 14 of INFCIRC/​153. Note that if a non-​nuclear weapon State opts for naval reactors or other military programs not involving nuclear weapons, it could be possible to assign INDA those verification responsibilities as well. Further study will be needed. 12 The Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, www.iaea.org/​about/​ statute, accessed 19 July 2017. 13 US Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (2016), Nuclear Matters Handbook, Appendix G, Classification, www.acq.osd.mil/​ncbdp/​ nm/​nmhb/​docs/​NMHB2016_​AppG_​web.pdf, accessed 19 March 2018. 14 Differences in the classification laws and regulations between the Russian Federation and the United States were identified during the Trilateral Initiative,

18

18  An overview including classification of the isotopic composition of plutonium used in, or created for use in, nuclear weapons. 15 T. Shea (2017), The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Challenges of Naval Nuclear Propulsion, Federation of American Scientists Special Report, https://​fas.org/​wp-​ content/​uploads/​media/​The-​Nonproliferation-​and-​Disarmament-​Challenges-​of-​ Naval-​Nuclear-​Propulsion.pdf, accessed 28 October 2017. 16 Monitoring warheads and other items on a temporary basis might contribute to progress towards disarmament. See Chapter 7. 17 To repeat for clarity, in this book, the term weapon-​ usable nuclear material will include the fissile material (weapon-​grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium) actually used in nuclear weapon primary and secondary components, plus the IAEA categories of direct-​use nuclear material and alternative nuclear material from which nuclear weapon primary and secondary elements could also be manufactured. 18 The IAEA uses design information questionnaires (DIQ) and has developed design information verification (DIV) procedures for NNWS parties to comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreements. INDA and the IAEA should create FIQs to reflect the historical nuclear weapons related missions of the nuclear weapon facilities to be eliminated or converted.

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Part II

Eliminating existing nuclear weapons and weapon capabilities

Figure 2.1 A Peacekeeper warhead bus with multiple independently targeted re-​entry vehicles (MIRV). Source: US Department of Defense.

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 21

2  The international nuclear disarmament agency

The States Parties shall designate a competent international authority or authorities to negotiate and verify the irreversible elimination of nuclear-​ weapons programs, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-​weapons-​related facilities in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article. TPNW Article 4.

2.1  Introduction A note to readers: the technical basis for verifying disarmament is presented in Chapter 3. Given the choice of whether the technical basis should precede the introduction of INDA, I chose to start with INDA and then describe the technical measures that it would employ. For the reasons cited in Chapter 1, the International Nuclear Disarmament Agency (INDA)1 will be essential for progress in nuclear disarmament to be made under the TPNW. As anticipated in Article 4 of the TPNW, the TPNW Parties should address this topic first, as so much of what would then follow would depend on it. INDA should serve as the centerpiece of the international nuclear disarmament regime, encouraging successive commitments from the nuclear-​armed States toward the final elimination of all existing arsenals and verifying that the States are taking the steps declared, that the steps are authentic, and that the State does not attempt to deceive or circumvent the verification measures applied. INDA should have five missions: ( a) Encouraging nuclear-​armed States to begin to disarm; (b) Verifying each step taken under the TPNW, including arms reductions and fissile material controls at four levels; (c) Certifying and eliminating mission-​critical nuclear weapon facilities; (d) Verifying non-​explosive military uses of fissile material and other weapon-​ usable nuclear materials; and (e) Estimating the historical production or other acquisition of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and the disposition of all fissile material.

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22  Eliminating existing nuclear weapons TPNW CONFERENCE OF STATES PARTIES NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT COUNCIL

DIRECTOR GENERAL

NDC STANDING COMMITTEES

THREAT REDUCTION VERIFICATION & M0NITORING

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT INSTITUTE

WEAPON FACILITY CERTIFICATION & ELIMINATION

VERIFICATION R&D CENTRE

WEAPON COMPLEX CERTIFICATION & ELIMINATION NUCLEAR WEAPONS SAFETY & SECURITY

VERIFICATION & M0NITORING

VERIFICATION & M0NITORING R&D

DATA PROTECTION

CLASSIFICATION SECRETARIAT OPERATIONS BUDGET & FINANCE

Figure 2.2 Proposed organization of the International Nuclear Disarmament Agency.

INDA should be created as a related organization of the United Nations family with a direct connection to the UN Security Council (as for the IAEA and the CTBTO). It should have separate membership comprising all Parties to the TPNW. The Conference of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons would create INDA. A  Preparatory Commission would be established by the Conference to draft the Statute of the International Nuclear Disarmament Agency, defining its objectives, scope, and essential functions.

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International nuclear disarmament agency 23 To carry out its appointed missions, INDA should be organized as suggested in Figure 2.2. To take advantage of the diplomatic presence and the existing infrastructure devoted to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the World Institute of Nuclear Security, INDA should have its headquarters in Vienna, Austria. Even more so than for non-​ proliferation, national technical means employed by other States would be critical for INDA assurances to be credible. The INDA Statute should include a provision similar to the one in the IAEA Statute:2 ARTICLE VIII: Exchange of information A. Each member should make available such information as would, in the judgment of the member, be helpful to the Agency.3

2.2  The nuclear disarmament council Under the approval of the Conference of States Parties, the Nuclear Disarmament Council would govern INDA and direct its resources, and would pursue progress toward the elimination of all nuclear weapons with resolute diplomacy. 2.2.1  Responsibilities The INDA Statute should specify the Nuclear Disarmament Council responsibilities as follows: (a) Assess the prevailing risks of nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, and proliferation arising from existing nuclear arsenals and take any and all measures possible to diminish such risks. (b) Task the INDA Secretariat and the INDA Institute of Nuclear Disarmament (the Institute) to carry out urgent and essential investigations to determine and propose sequential steps tailored to each nuclear-​ armed State toward the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. The Institute should take into account the relationships between each nuclear-​ armed State and its adversaries. It should update the performance targets at intervals not to exceed three years, and whenever a significant international development warrants. (c) Determine whether each nuclear-​armed State remains in compliance with its undertakings and determine remedial actions, as appropriate. (d) Promote the universality of the TPNW and, in particular, encourage all nuclear-​armed States to sign the TPNW and participate in the governance and functioning of INDA. (e) Nominate a candidate for the position of INDA Director General for approval by the TPNW Conference of States Parties; select and approve all INDA Deputies Director General appointments, approve all INDA

24

24  Eliminating existing nuclear weapons division director appointments, and terminate any of these appointments for cause when necessary. (f) Approve a model to be used for concluding the verification agreement between INDA and each nuclear-​armed State covering the rights and responsibilities of each in relation to INDA disarmament verification and monitoring, and the verification of each mission-​critical nuclear weapon facility when it is eliminated or converted to serve a mission not associated in any way with nuclear weapons or any proscribed use of nuclear material. (See the proposed model in Annex A.1.) (g) Establish performance requirements for INDA monitoring and verification activities and modify those requirements in the light of geopolitical circumstances, available resources, and progress in meeting established disarmament goals. (h) Determine the readiness of INDA, the IAEA, the CTBTO and the Nuclear Suppliers Group to carry out their respective nuclear disarmament missions and request remedial actions as required, and coordinate their actions as appropriate through consultations with the IAEA Board of Governors, the CTBTO governing body, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. (i) Approve inspection plans proposed by the Director General for each nuclear-​armed State, and the level(s) at which verification by INDA inspectors may be carried out, and establish a plan to resolve remaining issues that would allow inspections at the next level. (j) Authorize INDA inspectors to verify the certification and elimination of mission-​critical nuclear weapon facilities and the certification of mission-​ critical nuclear weapon facilities chosen to be irreversibly converted to non-​nuclear weapon uses. (k) Review and approve of inspection findings and conclusions as requested by the Director General. (l) Review and approve successive INDA State of Disarmament Reports to be submitted by the Nuclear Disarmament Council to each TPNW Conference of States Parties, TPNW Review Conference or NPT Review Conference. (m) Approve all financial assessments to INDA Member States and all expenditures from the Nuclear Disarmament Fund. 2.2.2  Nuclear disarmament councilors A total of 24 Councilors should be named to the Nuclear Disarmament Council: (a) One Councilor should be chosen by each nuclear-​armed State, whether or not the State is a party to the TPNW. Nuclear-​armed State Councilors would have the right to vote only when their State becomes a bona fide party to the TPNW.

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International nuclear disarmament agency 25 (b) The TPNW Conference of States Parties should select nine Councilors from interested TPNW States Parties that do not possess nuclear weapons. Each of these Councilors would serve as a disarmament partner to a specific nuclear-​armed State, whether or not the corresponding nuclear-​ armed State is a party to the TPNW, or whether or not said nuclear-​ armed State chooses to participate. (c) Each State party to the TPNW that has possessed nuclear weapons and has given them up shall name one Councilor each; at present:  South Africa, Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine. (d) The Nuclear Disarmament Council should nominate to the TPNW Conference of States Parties, one Councilor to serve as the President of the Nuclear Disarmament Council for a term of four years, and a second Councilor to serve as the Deputy President of the Nuclear Disarmament Council for a term of four years and thereafter to succeed as President of the Nuclear Disarmament Council for the following four years. Reflecting the importance of its work, each Nuclear Disarmament Councilor should, if possible, have served his or her nation as Head of State, deputy Head of State, or foreign minister. Each should be supported by a resident Councilor with the rank of Ambassador, who should be stationed in Vienna, Austria, and a designated senior military officer on, or recently retired from, active duty involving nuclear weapons. 2.2.3  Standing committees The Nuclear Disarmament Council should organize its ongoing work through standing committees, which should be defined in the INDA Statute. The Standing Committees suggested and the purposes they should serve are as follows. (a) The Threat Reduction Committee would identify alternative ways and means through which crises potentially leading to conflict and adverse relations may be improved, thereby promoting opportunities for steps towards nuclear disarmament. The Threat Reduction Committee would propose specific steps to the Nuclear Disarmament Council for each nuclear-​armed State, whether or not that State is a party to the TPNW. It would supervise the INDA International Disarmament Institute, including tasking, staffing, and reviewing reports and other products and findings, and make specific recommendations to the Nuclear Disarmament Council for adoption. (b) The Nuclear Disarmament Verification and Monitoring Committee would supervise the INDA Inspectorate. It would review INDA verification and monitoring outcomes and recommend corrective measures, as it deems appropriate.

26

26  Eliminating existing nuclear weapons (c) The Elimination or Conversion of Weapon Complex Facilities Committee would supervise the development of a plan describing each nuclear-​armed State Weapons Complex, identifying mission-​ critical facilities in each nuclear-​armed State engaged in the production or processing of fissile materials, manufacturing operations associated with nuclear warhead components, maintenance and remanufacturing of nuclear warheads or nuclear warhead components, facilities producing or processing deuterium, tritium, enriched lithium, or beryllium for use in nuclear warheads, facilities producing nuclear grade capacitors, krytron or other fast triggering devices, neutron initiators, specialized shaped high explosive charges for use in nuclear weapons, high speed photographic and imaging systems, specialized laboratory test facilities, and nuclear explosive test facilities. It would review and approve INDA Secretariat plans for verifying each such facility in each nuclear-​armed State’s nuclear weapon complex—​ depending on whether it is designated for elimination or conversion, in order to confirm its name, location, and history, the removal of specialized nuclear weapon-​related equipment, physical examination of the facility prior to its elimination or conversion—​for witnessing the destruction of facilities so designated, or for cooperation with IAEA inspectors for facilities designated to be converted from nuclear weapon use to nuclear use not associated with nuclear weapons or non-​nuclear use. It would also review the status of relevant actions undertaken by the INDA Secretariat. (d) The Nuclear Weapon Safety and Security Committee would coordinate exchanges of information regarding terrorism involving any nuclear-​ armed State, and on physical protection methods for nuclear weapons, warheads and fissile material, on mechanisms to ensure that nuclear weapons only function when authorized by the duly appointed governmental leaders in each nuclear-​armed State, including permissive action links, nuclear warhead safety measures against fire and explosion, and on measures to mitigate any potential vulnerability to single point detonation of a nuclear warhead’s high explosives. (e) The Data Protection Committee would oversee efforts within the INDA Secretariat regarding the protection of information obtained or produced in relation to nuclear disarmament, including, inter alia: sensitive information provided by nuclear-​armed States related to their own nuclear facilities, sensitive information provided by other INDA member States, including intelligence information related to another nuclear-​ armed Stated; sensitive information provided to and from CTBTO; and protection of facility information and verification and monitoring information within the INDA Secretariat. (f) The Classification Committee would endeavor to harmonize nuclear weapon-​ related classification practices in nuclear-​ armed States as a means to simplify INDA verification and monitoring practices, and to protect against specious classification with the intention to delay or complicate monitoring and verification.

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International nuclear disarmament agency 27 (g) The Nuclear Disarmament Research and Development Committee would supervise the International Center created within INDA for this purpose, which would carry out investigations into generic verification and monitoring methods and procedures applicable to nuclear disarmament, vulnerability testing, authentication approaches, equipment and procedures, approval of proposed methods, equipment and procedures; equipment procurement and life cycle management. The Committee would approve investigations related to a specific nuclear-​ armed State verification and monitoring, including the adoption of specific methods, equipment and procedures, and implementation planning. The Committee would approve proposed acquisitions to enable the Center to fulfill its missions, and would approve the Center’s arrangements for a network of cooperating laboratories and institutions. (h) The Secretariat Operations Committee would approve INDA personnel guidelines, principal staff appointments, career appointments, promotions of staff to P5 and above, and termination of staff for cause or unsatisfactory performance, acquisition and use of facilities and principal items of equipment, staff training, and exchanges of INDA staff with the IAEA and CTBTO. (i) The Budget and Finance Committee would review and propose each INDA budget for approval to the Nuclear Disarmament Commission. It would control all INDA income and expenditures. It would review and approve assessments of TPNW parties, implementation of the nuclear weapons tax, encourage and receive philanthropic donations or endowments to encourage and sustain nuclear disarmament, and any other income as the Nuclear Disarmament Commission may deem to be appropriate. The Committee would propose the creation of and supervise the operation of the Nuclear Disarmament Fund for subsidizing nuclear disarmament. It would select auditors, organize periodic audits and review the findings of each INDA financial audit. The Nuclear Disarmament Council would create additional committees it deems necessary.

2.3  INDA secretariat The Preparatory Commission to establish INDA should seek to adopt successful practices existing in the IAEA, the CTBTO and the OPCW, and consult with Austrian authorities regarding establishing INDA Headquarters in Vienna. It should consult with representatives of the nuclear-​armed States and with bodies engaged in the pursuit of nuclear disarmament to determine how to structure, staff, and operate INDA. INDA should adopt a confidentiality provision under which any staff member would be informed in a clear manner of their obligations and responsibilities to protect sensitive information, and of the rights of INDA and of

28

28  Eliminating existing nuclear weapons any State damaged by the unauthorized release of such information, and the legal means that could be pursued should such a situation occur. The INDA Director General would be chosen and approved by the Nuclear Disarmament Council and would serve subject to the approval of the Council. Several issues would be important to resolve early on. First, under what conditions should one nuclear-​ armed State accept inspectors from another nuclear-​ armed State—​ ally or adversary? These conditions may well change as progress is made towards the elimination of all remaining nuclear weapons, and it would be useful to fix the possibilities so that choices can be made when the time is right. Also, no inspectors should inspect any nuclear programs or facilities in their home countries, and no nuclear-​armed State should accept only inspectors from friendly States. Second, all INDA inspectors should have as a minimum, a university education in science, technology, engineering, or mathematics equivalent to Bachelor of Science degree, and relevant experience. It may be advantageous to employ as inspectors candidates having working experience in nuclear weapons, and perhaps in intelligence related to such weapons. What training should the inspectors be given before being sent on an inspection? What additional training would prepare them for leadership positions? Third, the concentration of work in nuclear-​armed States may make it efficient to base inspectors for extended stays near to where they would work. It may be appropriate at some point to create district headquarters in the capital each of the nuclear-​armed States, with offices at key installations where substantial amounts of inspection work would be carried out.4 Fourth, it may be appropriate to maintain a roster of specialists who could participate in inspections when and as needed, without being permanently on the INDA payroll. This may be especially useful in relation to the INDA responsibility for eliminating mission-​critical facilities in the nuclear weapon complex of a nuclear-​armed State pursuing disarmament. Many other needs will no doubt arise as the nuclear disarmament regime is erected and subjected to the need to make progress in an environment of extreme security, distrust, and suspicion, where adversaries watch each other continuously using any means available.

2.4  INDA Nuclear Disarmament Institute The INDA Nuclear Disarmament Institute (hereinafter referred to as “the Institute”) would serve as the in-​house think tank to support the workings of the Nuclear Disarmament Council and the TPNW Conference of States Parties. The Institute would, in addition, carry out, cooperate in, or sponsor investigations, conferences, and publications relevant to all matters affecting nuclear disarmament. Corresponding to each nuclear-​armed State, whether a party to the TPNW or not, there should be a designated unit within the Institute for carrying out

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International nuclear disarmament agency 29 investigations into the State of disarmament in each nuclear-​armed State and special topics of a highly confidential character. Each team assigned to State of Disarmament Assessments for individual nuclear-​armed States should comprise a minimum of six staff members: at least one from a nuclear-​armed State—​except that no citizen of a nuclear-​armed State should hold the regular position on the team for her or his own State—​and at least one from a State which does not possess nuclear weapons. Each team could also include temporary staff, including: ( a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

Cost-​Free Staff Seconded from Member States; University Professors on Sabbatical Leave; Post-​Doctoral Fellows; Graduate Students working on Masters and PhD Theses; and Undergraduate Student Interns.

These units could be granted access on a need-​to-​know basis to sensitive information provided by INDA Member States, by the IAEA or CTBTO, as may be appropriate, subject to approval by the Nuclear Disarmament Council. INDA should adopt a confidentiality provision under which any staff member would be informed in a clear manner of their obligations and responsibilities to protect sensitive information, and of the rights of INDA and of any State damaged by the unauthorized release of such information, and the legal means that could be pursued should such a situation arise. The Institute should maintain a small additional regular staff as approved by the Nuclear Disarmament Council for conducting research and studies. This additional staff may be augmented by temporary staff as shown in relation to the State of disarmament units. INDA, IAEA, and CTBTO staff members involved in monitoring and verification operations and related support should be encouraged to transfer to the Institute for terms not to exceed one year. The Head of the Institute should make all assignments, maintain schedules, review products, and assess the performance of all contributing regular and temporary staff. The Institute should educate future leaders in nuclear disarmament diplomacy, law and technology, and serve the purposes of the TPNW by carrying out analyses and research into the reasons why nuclear-​ armed States possess arsenals and steps that could be taken by each nuclear-​ armed State towards their elimination. The INDA Deputy Director General and Head of the Institute should be responsible for staffing, curriculum, and operation of the Institute. The Institute could establish a Council of Elders (COE) representing the domains of nuclear diplomacy, law, and technology relevant to disarmament. The Head of the Institute could nominate members of the COE to serve for fixed terms. The Nuclear Disarmament Council, the TPNW Conference of States Parties, and the Director General of INDA may request the Council of Elders to investigate issues relevant to the implementation of the Treaty in

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30  Eliminating existing nuclear weapons all of its aspects and dimensions through the Threat Reduction Committee of the Nuclear Disarmament Council. The Head of the Institute and the COE may also suggest activities to be undertaken. The COE should meet at least once per year to review work and to plan activities for the forthcoming year. Members of the COE should form project teams to carry out approved projects. The Head of the Institute and the COE should decide upon expenses and remuneration in accordance with approved project plans. The Head of the Institute may create separate departments for diplomacy, law, and technology, and determine the faculty and physical plant required to graduate future leaders in each area. The Institute should publish a Nuclear Disarmament Journal on a periodic basis, and books on nuclear disarmament and occasional reports, as may further progress towards the objectives of the TPNW.

2.5  INDA Nuclear Disarmament Verification Research and Development Center An independent technology development laboratory would be essential to implement the measures identified in Chapters 3 and 4. The INDA Center for Nuclear Disarmament Verification Research and Development (hereinafter referred to as “the R&D Center”) should be included in the INDA Statute. Its organization and suggested list of initial topics is shown in Annex B.1. Given the need to protect the integrity of the process of verifying nuclear disarmament and the need to make it possible for all TPNW parties to contribute to their shared objective, it would be urgent and essential to create the R&D Center an international center for nuclear disarmament research, development, test, and evaluation, to serve INDA’s verification and monitoring needs. The unique restrictions and conditions associated with verifying classified forms of fissile material require a mechanism that can engage the international community and find solutions that would meet the security requirements of each nuclear-​armed State possessing nuclear weapons before inspections can commence. Creating an international center to coordinate such activities is important; creating the R&D Center would be essential for solving the specific requirements imposed by each nuclear-​armed State as part of INDA’s due diligence. In executing its role in relation to verifying compliance of non-​nuclear weapon States under the NPT, the IAEA must assure that its methods are beyond reproach before it questions the integrity of a sovereign State. States have cheated on their NPT commitments; no one should be shocked if a State possessing nuclear arms chooses to violate its TPNW commitments. Noting that false IAEA non-​proliferation accusations could spur conflict, draw into question the honor of a sovereign State, or impugn the IAEA, the IAEA does not rely on a single source of information to make such an accusation, and would seek to support its findings through all venues open to it.

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International nuclear disarmament agency 31 Cheating on disarmament could have far more consequential outcomes, possibly including preemptive nuclear strikes. Hence, the methods and equipment employed to verify disarmament and the absence of rearmament would be subject to greater demands and operate under more demanding limitations than for non-​proliferation. Moreover, safeguards equipment developed by national laboratories and commercial firms would need to be viewed with a wary eye to ensure that other nuclear-​armed States are not attempting to gain an advantage, or to subvert the verification and monitoring to achieve national objectives contrary to those sought through disarmament. Some nuclear-​armed States would likely refuse to allow INDA to use equipment developed by other nuclear-​armed States, suspecting espionage or intentional efforts to suggest cheating even where none exist. The technology used by the IAEA to safeguard nuclear material continues to evolve. Some 21 IAEA Member States now make it possible for the IAEA to improve its verification sensitivity (making it possible to find smaller indications of non-​compliance), effectiveness (making it possible to expand its reach within limited resources), and robustness (by developing interesting concepts into enhanced verification capabilities). The R&D Center would support INDA verification through the following ways and means: (a) Investigating concepts, technologies, and approaches for verifying fissile material in Levels 2–​4, including physical methods, attributes, templates, and information barriers. (b) Developing verification equipment adequate for proof-​ of-​ principle testing. (c) Developing prototype generic measurement systems and containment and surveillance systems incorporating features as necessary for use under the intense security arrangements anticipated at locations where States possessing nuclear weapons hold classified forms of fissile material. (d) Developing mock-​up verification arrangements anticipated in connection with implementation for Levels 2–​4, selecting candidate approaches and equipment for potential use, and carrying out demonstration exercises and adversarial reviews. (e) Developing procurement policies and arrangements for consideration in each participating nuclear-​armed State, including policies and procedures for selecting promising technologies, carrying out formal design, specifying manufacturing requirements, monitoring production, specifying the life-​cycle plan for procuring each item of equipment selected, providing for standby and/​or replacement components to be produced under monitored production, all within a sustainable management program, including ongoing testing and evaluation, including the selection of pieces of equipment for destructive analysis. (f) Anticipating that INDA inspectors would implement the monitoring and verification provisions of each agreement concluded with each

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32  Eliminating existing nuclear weapons nuclear-​armed State, the INDA R&D Center would create technical teams of experts to support INDA operations implementation in each nuclear-​armed State. Each technical team would be involved in developing nuclear-​armed State-​specific proposals for verification equipment, qualifying equipment suppliers in the host State, defining the procurement arrangements for the equipment selected, monitoring the production of equipment to be deployed in the State, certifying each item of equipment, and providing inspector training. The INDA R&D Center should serve as the hub of a network of laboratories and universities interested in supporting or cooperating with the INDA R&D Center, including through the participation of experts from the partner laboratories and universities in work at the INDA R&D Center and in joint projects. Network leaders and scientists should conference at three-​ year intervals to review progress in closed and open sessions. Every other conference should be held in Vienna; alternate conferences may be held according to the wishes of the TPNW States parties. The INDA R&D Center should avoid the need to have any fissile material or radioactive materials at the Center by make extensive use of simulators to mimic the properties of fissile material, and by teaming with network laboratories when necessary or advantageous. There would be no classified objects at the INDA R&D Center. The INDA R&D Center may make use of commercially available accelerators to serve as the basis for verification measurements of highly enriched uranium, and, for example, for investigations into zero-​ knowledge proof systems for the verification of nuclear warhead, components and appropriately packaged items containing weapon fissile material with classified properties. The scope of work of the INDA R&D Center should include, inter alia: (a) Theoretical studies aimed at developing verification concepts and approaches associated with the four Levels introduced in Chapter 1, and reflecting the INDA model verification and monitoring agreement once approved by the INDA Nuclear Disarmament Council; (b) Architectural investigations for warhead dismantlement installations and fissile material conversion facilities, recognizing the complementary requirements for security and authenticity; (c) Theoretical and experimental physics, chemistry, material science, and computer science, as they relate to the functions of the R&D Center; and (d) Engineering and manufacturing of verification devices and methods appropriate for maintaining continuity of knowledge on items subject to verification under relevant INDA agreements, and in locations where activities related to nuclear weapons are carried out. Suggestions for physical installations and initial tasks for the R&D Center are provided in Annex B.1.

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International nuclear disarmament agency 33

Notes 1 As noted in Chapter 1, I have chosen to refer to this new organization as INDA. The TPNW Parties will decide on what to name the organization that they create or name to carry out the functions associated with eliminating nuclear arsenals. Note that if a non-​nuclear weapon State opts for naval reactors or other military programs not involving nuclear weapons, it could be possible to assign INDA those verification responsibilities as well. 2 In relation to Iran, the IAEA received intelligence information from more than 10 States. See T. Shea (2015), Assuring Effective IAEA Verification of the Iran—​P5+1 Agreement, Search for Common Ground, www.sfcg.org/​wp-​content/​uploads/​2015/​ 07/​Shea_​Paper_​Final-​3.pdf, accessed 15 April 2017. 3 IAEA Statute, www.iaea.org/​about/​statute, accessed 22 May 2017. 4 Extended assignments could make inspectors more vulnerable to counter-​ intelligence efforts by the State they are inspecting. Addressing such concerns up front could help to maintain the integrity of the inspection process over time.

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3  The technical basis for nuclear disarmament verification

3.1  Introduction Each nuclear-​armed State maintains an arsenal of deployed nuclear weapons and the infrastructure necessary to maintain its arsenal. It may hold reserve nuclear warheads ready for deployment, reserve fissile material primaries and/​or secondaries, and stocks of fissile material committed to use in nuclear weapons. Its fissile material stocks may include various forms, some pure, some rejected metal parts, some scrap, some waste and some hold up on process equipment and surrounding enclosures. It will maintain its nuclear warhead assembly/​disassembly facilities, its testing, repair and maintenance facilities, its manufacturing complex for all required parts, and its fissile material production complex. As disarmament proceeds, all of these will be eliminated or irreversibly converted under INDA verification. The principal INDA verification and monitoring mission is to confirm that declared arms reductions are in fact carried out, and that declared fissile materials are accepted and remain under the verification and monitoring procedures agreed by the State and INDA. Progress towards nuclear disarmament will be based on controls on fissile materials, augmented by additional confidence-​building measures. Each step taken towards disarmament must be irreversible, meaning that once an item or group of items containing fissile material is entered into the verification and monitoring system, and credit is given to the State for that step, the fissile material must perforce remain within the verification and monitoring system as it progresses through the weapon complex to disposition through peaceful use, or through military use not involving nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.1 For the purposes of disarmament verification, these steps can be separated into four levels as shown in Figure 3.1. The steps include: (a) Formal acceptance by INDA of items presented by a nuclear-​armed State in accordance with official declarations made to INDA; (b) Establishing and maintaining a chain of custody over the accepted items while stored or transported;

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The technical basis for verification 35

Figure 3.1 Fissile material will be removed from the nuclear weapon complex following the stages shown. Note that for levels 1–​3, fissile material additional to that obtained by disarming a specific weapon may exist, which could be introduced into the verification and monitoring system at the level corresponding to its properties.

(c) Monitoring the extraction of the pits and secondaries (as appro priate) from each warhead when nuclear warheads are dismantled, and maintaining the chain of custody on the nuclear warhead components removed from nuclear warheads dismantled under INDA monitoring, using appropriate methods as agreed between INDA and each nuclear-​ armed State; (d) Maintaining INDA monitoring as classified forms of fissile material are processed to remove all classified properties; and (e) Maintaining INDA monitoring of stocks of fissile material recovered from nuclear weapon use or from stocks committed to nuclear weapon use until the designated stocks are transferred to an appropriate pathway to either dispose of that fissile material or to modify their properties so that they are less well-​suited to the manufacture of new nuclear weapons. (The disposition of the fissile material recovered from disarmament steps is addressed in Part III.) INDA would anticipate that a State might choose to cheat and avoid detection by various means, e.g., by substituting bogus warheads, components, or bogus fissile material, or by bypassing or deceiving the verification and monitoring

36

36  Eliminating existing nuclear weapons procedures. The verification and monitoring practices it employs would take into consideration plausible means for cheating and concealing cheating.

3.2  Fission and fissile material Every nuclear weapon requires the release of explosive energy achieved through the process of nuclear fission. Fission involves splitting the nucleus of an atom into two or three lighter nuclei, while freeing a few neutrons. The neutrons emitted in one fission event may in turn cause additional fissions to occur. A sustainable chain reaction can be designed in which the fission process is controlled so as to produce a constant amount of power over an extended period, as in a nuclear power reactor generating thousands of megawatts of electricity for as long as two years before requiring refueling. Alternatively, a chain reaction can take place very rapidly, producing more energy than can be constrained. A nuclear weapon blows itself apart after about 20 generations of fission some microseconds after being initiated. Of the 92 elements found in nature, only one naturally occurring element, uranium, and only one of its naturally occurring nuclides, 235U, fissions at a rate enabling it to be used to make nuclear reactors or nuclear weapons. Fissioning one kilogram of 235U in a nuclear weapon produces an explosive force equal to about 17,000 tons of TNT. The explosive force of the uranium bomb dropped on Hiroshima was about 15,000 tons of TNT; the explosive force of the plutonium bomb dropped on Nagasaki a few days later was about 21,000 tons of TNT equivalent.2 In this book, fissile material means the plutonium and/​or highly enriched uranium that is actually used in the primary fission elements and/​or in the thermonuclear secondary elements of nuclear weapons, and other plutonium and HEU with the same properties and committed to use in nuclear weapons. Any other plutonium, or any fissile material that is not committed to nuclear weapons use is referred to in this book as weapon-​usable nuclear material, which is addressed in Part III.

•

• •

Plutonium used in nuclear weapons typically contains more than 90% 239 Pu, and sometimes more than 98%. However, some nuclear-​armed States may use lower concentrations. In this book, until the exact figures are known, the plutonium used in nuclear weapons is assumed to contain ≥80% 239Pu. Uranium ranging from depleted to highly enriched is used in nuclear weapons. Depleted uranium metal, with a density of 19.1 times that of water, is used as a tamper to hold the weapon together longer, enabling a greater explosive force to be produced before the device is blown apart. Highly enriched uranium (HEU) used in the fission primary elements of nuclear weapons (in lieu of or in addition to plutonium) typically contains more than 90% of the isotope 235U. However, the HEU enrichment may be significantly lower in the secondary element of a nuclear weapon. Again, until the exact figures are known, the HEU used in nuclear weapons will

 37

The technical basis for verification 37 begin at 20% and include any higher values (which happens to be the defined value for HEU in IAEA safeguards).

3.3  Fissile material in nuclear weapons A nuclear weapon comprises a nuclear warhead and its delivery system. The delivery systems can be very complex, as in warheads mounted on intercontinental ballistic missiles, or far simpler, as might be delivered in a truck or a ship, for example. Disarmament will need to address all varieties of nuclear warheads maintained by a State, including, as appropriate, warheads mounted on intercontinental ballistic missiles, intermediate or short-​ range missiles, incorporated within nuclear-​capable cruise missiles, gravity bombs, torpedoes, undersea drones, sea mines, nuclear artillery, and man-​portable devices. Not all arsenals include such variety, but some do or did earlier, and some nuclear-​armed States are working on new nuclear weapons.3 The thermonuclear warhead illustrated in Figure 3.2 is at the top of this collection.4 Mounted on an intercontinental ballistic missile, it is designed to travel thousands of kilometers to destroy military or civilian targets. For the purposes of this book, it is assumed that the general features of other types of nuclear warheads are similar enough to allow Figure 3.2 to be used as a general reference. While fission involves breaking up heavy nuclei, fusion involves combining light nuclei to produce a heavier one. From the viewpoint of disarmament (and fusion power for generating electricity), the principal fusion reaction

Figure 3.2 A cutaway view of a nuclear warhead. This view was first published in the United States House of Representatives Cox Report (see Reference 3), and was redrawn for clarity by the International Panel on Fissile Material (IPFM) (http://​fissilematerials.org/​). The IPFM drawing is included with the permission of Z. Mian, co-​chair of IPFM.

38

38  Eliminating existing nuclear weapons involves two isotopes of hydrogen, 2H (Deuterium) and 3H (Tritium). When they fuse, they produce a helium nucleus 4He and a free neutron. The amount of energy from a single fusion reaction is far less than for a single fission reaction (≈17 MeV vs. ≈200 MeV), but on an equal weight basis, fusion produces substantially more explosive force than fission. As illustrated, a thermonuclear warhead includes a fission primary component and a thermonuclear secondary component. The fission primary contains plutonium and/​or HEU. A primary may contain tritium and deuterium gas to boost the primary fission explosive yield through nuclear fusion. The secondary may use lithium deuteride (LiD) as a means to supply the tritium (T) and deuterium (D) needed for the fusion reaction. A neutron striking the nucleus of a 6Li atom causes the nucleus to split into an α-​particle (4He) and a 3 H tritium nucleus, which is then available to fuse with a D nucleus. Additional HEU may be included in a secondary for an added fission energy boost.5 Producing and maintaining nuclear warheads involves a chain of required actions with specialized processing, equipment and materials. Figure  3.1 shows the functions carried out in nuclear arsenals that involve fissile material. The diagram divides these functions into four levels for the purpose of facilitating disarmament verification. Every nuclear arsenal will include fissile material in each of these stages, and disarmament will, eventually, need to address all. Progress towards the eventual elimination of existing weapons will be faster if the verification system allows fissile material to be submitted at any stage shown in Figure 3.1, once the security needs of the nuclear-​armed State and the authenticity needs of INDA have been met. Also, advancing up the chain means that the information coming from the verification activities can be more closely tied to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Every nuclear weapons program is likely to include fissile material at all levels shown in Figure 3.1, so disarmament could ultimately include all such levels and forms. As emphasized earlier, once submitted, the fissile material should remain under verification as it moves down through the levels below, until it is transferred to a specified disposition path as described in Chapter 7. Quantitative verification of unclassified fissile material at Level 1 provides assurance that the fissile material is typical of that used in nuclear weapons, and that that fissile material will never be available again for use in nuclear weapons. Moving up this diagram to Level 2 would allow disarmament to proceed at a faster pace, and could allow verification that the fissile material either came from nuclear weapons or could have been used in nuclear weapons.6 Level 2 verification would require that the nuclear-​armed State and INDA agree on the verification concept, the procedures for implementation, verification equipment design, equipment procurement and control, maintenance, and how the results of the verification measurements will be analyzed and reported. Possible methods that might be further improved for verifying classified forms of fissile material are considered in the next section.

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The technical basis for verification 39 Moving up to Level 3 would allow disarmament to proceed at an even faster pace, and includes the possibility that verification could determine that an object presented for verification is in fact a nuclear warhead, or even a warhead of a given model. This increased richness in disarmament-​related information would come with additional scrutiny, given the secrecy inherent in nuclear warheads. Moving up to Level 4 would allow the verification system to proceed at the fastest possible pace, and could make it possible that INDA verification could confirm that a specific warhead mounted on a military delivery system would be identified and thereafter could be maintained under continuous chain of custody arrangements until each detached warhead can be verified using the methods established for Level 3.  Verification at Level 4 could involve individual warheads or a group of warheads, as for example, in a weapon system with multiple independently targeted re-​entry vehicles (MIRVed warheads). Verification at Level 4 would provide the greatest assurance to a nuclear-​armed State’s adversaries that arms reductions are taking place as agreed and that the fissile material has been irreversibly committed to verification and disposition. Hence, the proposed disarmament framework functions by transitioning unclassified and classified forms of fissile material from nuclear weapon purposes to a disposition process to ensure that that fissile material will no longer be suitable for, or available for use in nuclear weapons. This venue would be well matched with complementary disarmament controls focusing on the elimination of weapon delivery systems. A nuclear-​armed State may submit fissile material at all four levels shown in Figure 3.1. INDA will complete a full and accurate accounting for the disarmament process combining information from all levels engaged by the State and INDA. Nuclear disarmament could wait until all of the fissile material has been processed to remove all classified properties, relying only on Level 1. That would delay the process unnecessarily for decades, especially for the fissile plutonium.

3.4  The Trilateral Initiative The verification and monitoring methods proposed for the TPNW begin with the work carried out under the Trilateral Initiative.7 During the 1990s and especially following the 1995 indefinite extension of the NPT, the United States and the Russian Federation pursued several areas involving increased cooperation on nuclear issues. At a meeting with Russian Minatom Minister Mikhailov and the American Secretary of Energy O’Leary in 1996, IAEA Director General Hans Blix asked if the two States envisioned a role for the IAEA in relation to disarmament. Both agreed, and so began a trilateral investigation that would carry on for six years, involve several hundred scientists, engineers, lawyers and diplomats, and include technical workshops in the Russian Federation, the United States, Japan, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Substantial progress was made through 98

40

40  Eliminating existing nuclear weapons trilateral technical workshops, legal negotiations to work out a model verification agreement, and management review meetings, under the direction of annual ministerial meetings. After six years, at the IAEA General Conference in 2002,8 The parties concluded that the task entrusted to the Trilateral Initiative Working Group in 1996 had been fulfilled. The work completed has demonstrated practical approaches for IAEA verification of weapon-​ origin fissile material designated as released from defence programmes in classified forms or at certain sensitive facilities. The work included the examination of technical, legal and financial issues associated with such verification. The removal of weapon-​origin fissile material from defence programmes of the Russian Federation and the United States is in furtherance of the commitment to disarmament steps undertaken by the two States pursuant to Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-​Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). IAEA verification of the materials declared excess to nuclear weapons programmes and made subject to this Initiative would build international confidence that this material will never again be used in nuclear weapons. Minister Rumyantsev, Secretary Abraham and Director General ElBaradei recognized the value of the groundbreaking work completed over the last six years. The scope of the study included warhead components and other forms of fissile material that contain classified properties.9 Under the Trilateral Initiative, the IAEA, the US and the Russian Federation agreed on a technical approach based on attribute verification (see Section 3.6, below and Annex B.2), and subsequently developed a model verification agreement that could be used by Russia or the US to implement the agreed arrangements, if Russia or the United States were to decide to proceed. During the time that it was underway, the international community gave the Trilateral Initiative full encouragement.

• •

The 2000 NPT Review Conference called for the Trilateral Initiative to be completed and implemented.10 The IAEA Board of Governors discussed the Trilateral Initiative in a 3.5-​hour meeting and the Board welcomed this possible mission. “The IAEA Secretariat submitted two GOV/​INF documents to the Board of Governors in June 1999. The first of those, entitled “IAEA Verification of Weapon-​Origin Fissile material in the Russian Federation and the United States of America” (GOV/​INF/​1999/​8), was a report by the Director General on the progress that had been made on preparatory activities related to the Trilateral Initiative that had taken place since the inception in 1996. It also provided preliminary information on the additional

 41

The technical basis for verification 41 work required to enable the IAEA to engage in the verification of weapon origin fissile material, including work on related to legal issues (the development of a Model Verification Agreement) and financial arrangements (the estimation of costs and identification of financing mechanisms). Simultaneously, the Secretariat also submitted a report to the Board entitled “Financing IAEA Verification of Nuclear Arms Control and Reduction Measure” (GOV/​INF/​1999/​8).11 The IAEA, the United States, and Russia declared the Trilateral Initiative to have been a success. The final report concluded that the methods developed could serve as the basis for such verification, and that the scope could in principle expand to include other forms of fissile material, including warheads. Following completion of the Trilateral Initiative, Russia and the United States did complete a prototype verification system at a Russian nuclear weapon laboratory following the agreed principles and methods from the Trilateral Initiative. While the possibility to resurrect this early work remains, neither State has opted to move ahead to date.

3.5  Decision factors affecting the verification of classified fissile material When a State and INDA are able to agree to Level 4 verification, then INDA would verify the dismantling of each warhead and the processing of the recovered fissile material components to remove those classified properties. These steps, together with storage and transportation, may take years.12 Protecting nuclear weapon secrets requires extraordinary caution to prevent acts of espionage or sloppy security. At Level 2, the concerns are significant, but even more so as complete warheads are considered. Even though Level 1 fissile material does not contain any classified properties, if the verification is carried out at sites where classified forms of fissile material are present nearby, the nuclear-​armed State may rule out some verification technologies that could otherwise be useful, especially systems designed for remote monitoring with secure communications capabilities. The following considerations will determine which verification methods are selected and how they are applied. 3.5.1  Information security Information security is the most fundamental requirement affecting nuclear disarmament verification. Two seemingly contradictory objectives must be met. First, no verification activity, equipment or procedure can enable or facilitate unauthorized access to classified nuclear weapons design or manufacturing information. Any attempt to acquire such information would likely be considered by a nuclear-​armed State to be an act of espionage with egregious consequences. Second, the verification and monitoring methods must

42

42  Eliminating existing nuclear weapons be based on sound scientific principles and be implemented in such a way as to enable INDA to make independent, authentic findings. INDA must be able to apply instruments in which it has confidence. Otherwise, the verification would be dubious at best, and hardly worth securing. Each nuclear-​armed State and INDA must accept the legitimacy of both of these requirements, and must agree to cooperate in finding ways and means through which both requirements can be satisfied. Why can’t IAEA equipment be used to verify classified forms of fissile material? Under its non-​proliferation safeguards program, the IAEA has created over 100 measurement and monitoring systems, some of which are intended for plutonium and highly enriched uranium encountered in the peaceful use of nuclear energy in non-​nuclear weapon States parties to the NPT.13,14 Peaceful use programs are not classified and hence there are no restrictions limiting the properties that the IAEA routinely measures as part of routine NPT safeguards implementation in NNWS. If these IAEA methods were used to measure classified forms of fissile material, some could—​without question—​reveal classified nuclear weapon design or manufacturing secrets. Such instruments and methods cannot be used for verifying (or monitoring) classified forms of fissile material. Couldn’t INDA procure suitable verification and monitoring systems from commercial suppliers, or through national laboratories outside of the State where they would be used? In principle, this sounds reasonable, but during the Trilateral Initiative, Russian participants noted that, in order for that to happen in Russia, each and every piece of equipment would have to be turned over to Russian security authorities for examination before its use could be allowed. The Russian participants stated that each examination could take on the order of 18 months. If the equipment were to be found to be not acceptable, the IAEA would be informed—​but not the reasons why—​and the equipment might not be returned to the IAEA. If it were found to be acceptable, the equipment would need to be kept within Russia under appropriate security measures. After the Russian examinations, the IAEA would need to determine whether or not the equipment had been altered and hence that the equipment would function as intended. But if the IAEA were to carry out such examinations, the Russian security authority might rescind its security approvals. It is reasonable to anticipate that any nuclear-​armed State would impose similar demands; hence this route is simply not practical. This leaves two options for developing verification and monitoring systems for classified forms of fissile material. First, finding acceptable technologies that are not able to reveal classified information. Or second, accept that converting the sensitive information to answer unclassified questions could use technologies able to reveal classified information. This would require agreeing on detailed design features and then jointly manufacturing verification equipment under arrangements that would prevent such equipment from revealing classified information.

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The technical basis for verification 43 The second approach, while agreeable in principle, would be very difficult to pursue successfully. Modern computerized verification or monitoring systems incorporate electronic components. In IAEA safeguards systems, computer equipped unattended safeguards systems are integrated into the routine operations of nuclear facilities. They provide many practical advantages, such as allowing 100% verification coverage without having inspectors present, and collecting, sorting, analyzing, and evaluating data, and communicating verification data and/​or findings to the IAEA, routinely, efficiently, and unobtrusively. A major focus of IAEA non-​proliferation safeguards R&D activities has been to prove that these systems provide reliable and authentic results. In a situation where classified forms of fissile material are involved, the properties that can be measured must be restricted, and the means through which measurements are made, and how the findings are communicated, must also be restricted to meet the security concerns of each nuclear-​armed State. Both INDA and the nuclear-​armed State would need to confirm—​on a continuous basis—​that the only operations the equipment could perform would be as agreed, and that the equipment could not be bypassed, have trap-​door functions, or be susceptible to hacking by either party—​or by any third party.15 Making such systems for use on classified forms of fissile material would require a joint development and procurement program between INDA and each nuclear-​armed State. They would need to develop agreed designs, qualify potential suppliers within each participating nuclear-​armed State, and jointly oversee the production of the agreed systems with sampling throughout the manufacturing process to ensure that the equipment is true to the jointly approved design. They would need to stockpile multiple copies of each system to be maintained on monitored standby, and change out systems as required for maintaining functionality and confidence in the reliability of the approved systems. Due to the costs and intrusiveness of producing systems under such arrangements, the equipment would then have to remain in service for extended times—​perhaps 25 years or so—​until a new generation of equipment would be required. A failure along the way, for any reason, could be catastrophic. And along the way, INDA could be blamed for any failures, which could derail nuclear disarmament progress. With a substantial R&D program, this second approach might be able to work, but it wouldn’t be sensible to start out seeking such equipment. This was the approach provisionally adopted under the Trilateral Initiative, and perhaps one of the reasons why the Trilateral Initiative didn’t succeed. So, at least in the beginning, verification methods should be chosen that cannot acquire classified information. Avoiding any use of electronics will simplify the security evaluations. For example, monitoring might start with film cameras with mechanical shutters, passive security seals, dosimeters, and measurement systems that don’t use electronics. Begin there, and then pursue alternative ways building on a working foundation. Recent work suggests that detached bubble chamber detectors consisting of containers holding certain liquids could be used to record properties relevant

44

44  Eliminating existing nuclear weapons to nuclear warheads or warhead components. After the measurements, the containers would be taken to a location away from the nuclear warheads or components to be evaluated. The evaluation would use electronic systems, but nowhere near the classified objects.16 Alternative possibilities for verifying classified forms of fissile material are identified in the next section. For now, we continue with the decision factors affecting verification of fissile material with classified properties. 3.5.2  Disarmament value Fissile material in Levels 3 and 4 could be directly connected to warheads being eliminated, which would likely be of considerable importance to adversaries. At level 2 the connection becomes less immediate in connection with arms reductions but remains important in the broader context. From a disarmament viewpoint, the verification of fissile material with classified properties should provide as much information relevant to disarmament as possible. Table  3.1 shows questions that verification might set out to answer, beginning with basic information and advancing to very specific information regarding each item presented for verification and monitoring. Advancing downward in the table brings additional important disarmament information, but each step will likely mean increased intrusiveness, higher costs and a greater potential risk of having the ability to breach the nuclear-​ armed State’s security system. Within the context of an adversarial pairing, the nuclear-​armed States may be motivated to advance in order to gain additional assurance of the bona fides of their counterparts, and that motivation could bring a willingness to examine the prospects for advancing along the steps shown in Table 3.1. 3.5.3  Degree of assurance When a batch of similar items is presented for verification, depending on the questions in Table 3.1 to be answered, the same verification methods might be applied to all items in the batch, or a gross defect test might be applied to all or a large sample, together with a more exacting verification method to provide greater assurance. For example, suppose State A presents 100 items for verification, say containing plutonium pits. A gross defect test could be a thermal neutron detector, which might be applied to all 100 containers to show that each holds a neutron source (like 240Pu in each plutonium pit). Now suppose that an attribute verification system has been approved for this purpose, like that introduced in the Trilateral Initiative. A sample of these 100 is selected, and for each the results show that the neutron source is in fact plutonium, that its isotopic source is typical of that used in nuclear weapons, and that the amount of plutonium in each is greater than a specified value. The assurance that can be drawn from the verification of items presented by a nuclear-​armed State for verification and monitoring will depend on the

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The technical basis for verification 45 Table  3.1  The relationship of specified verification activities to disarmament. The verification process anticipates increasingly pertinent questions to be answered. Each question provides additional disarmament information. How far the process should extend would depend on the willingness of each nuclear-​armed State, authorization by the Nuclear Disarmament Council, and the encouragement of the international community Question # Nuclear Disarmament-​Related Information Group 1: Basic Information 1 Does the object contain plutonium and/​or highly enriched uranium? 2 Is the isotopic composition of the plutonium and/​or HEU in the object typical of that found in nuclear weapons? 3 Does the mass of plutonium and/​or HEU within the object exceed a minimum level set for such objects at the facility where the verification activities are taking place? Group 2: Quantitative Information 4 If the object does not contain a warhead or warhead components, does the measurement give the exact mass of plutonium and/​or HEU and the isotopic composition of both? 5 Does the measurement allow for placing the results in bins: e.g., for plutonium, ≤ 1kg; 1–​2 kg; etc.? 6 Does the measurement allow estimates to be made of the total amount of plutonium and/​or HEU under verification and monitoring? Group 3: Disarmament Information 7 Does the measurement allow confirmation that the object contains a nuclear warhead, a physics package, warhead components, or other fissile materials associated with nuclear weapons? 8 Does the verification allow the specific model identity of a nuclear warhead, a physics package, or pits and/​or secondaries to be confirmed?

probability that a defective item would be selected for verification, and if the verification procedure is followed and the equipment functions as it should, the probability that if a defective item is selected, it would be correctly identified. Random sampling requires that all items in a group have an equal chance of being selected according to a random sampling algorithm. In such cases, the results obtained by verifying a small number of items can be extrapolated to the overall group.17 Sometimes 100% verification is necessary because the conditions required for random sampling cannot be met or are impractical, or 100% verification may be attractive as a means to reduce inspection intrusiveness or costs (as when unattended monitoring systems are used). When these conditions do not hold, or the demands made for classification reasons make unattended verification and monitoring unworkable, verification based on random sampling will be important for making the disarmament process affordable and manageable.

46

46  Eliminating existing nuclear weapons In nuclear disarmament, when addressing classified forms of fissile material, if a defective item is identified, the measurement should be repeated and the equipment checked to assure that it is functioning properly. If the problem remains, unless there is an alternative verification method approved as a backup, the defective item must be rejected and the use of random sampling must also be modified or abandoned. Under the Trilateral Initiative, using 1% of a given population as the detection target was adopted as a working hypothesis.18 If a State submits, say, 1000 items to be included in the verification and monitoring system, then INDA could verify all 1000, or it might select a number of samples at random assuming that 1% of the 1000 items offered may be defective (a total of 10 out of 1000 in this example). If INDA verifies 206 items chosen at random, and if all 206 were found to be acceptable, then INDA could State with 90% confidence that had there been 10 or more defects in the 1000 items, at least one defective item would have been selected for verification and identified correctly as a defect.19 If 50% confidence is deemed by the INDA Nuclear Disarmament Council to be acceptable, the sample size could be reduced to 67 samples. Re-​verification over time would expand the initial sample size and the overall assurance to be derived. 3.5.4  Susceptibility to cheating Given enough time and the proper resources, every control measure defined by humans can probably be deceived or circumvented. Design features and unique identification features can make cheating difficult and make attempts easier to detect, and the use of redundant or complementary systems or components can provide a high degree of assurance against tampering. Over time, the methods developed for nuclear disarmament verification and monitoring will make cheating increasingly difficult to carry out. 3.5.5  Practicality and affordability The verification and monitoring equipment and the inspection procedures associated with its use must be usable, sustainable, and successful. Every item of equipment and every procedure will entail costs to the nuclear-​armed State and to INDA, some of which will be one-​time costs, while others continue over the life cycle of the equipment and/​or procedure.

3.6  Candidate verification methods for classified forms of fissile material Fissile material with classified properties used in nuclear warheads or committed to such use may be in the form of precisely manufactured items or in bulk material forms of high purity, or it may be in a variety of impure forms including metal, oxide, or solutions. Nuclear weapons are at the top of

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The technical basis for verification 47 the pyramid, and every weapon removed from an arsenal is one less available for potential use. Eventually, disarmament will need to extend to all levels shown in Figure  3.1, for all forms of fissile material held by each nuclear-​ armed State. Depending on agreement between INDA and each nuclear-​ armed State, verification may seek to answer the specific questions posed in Table 3.1. No verification methods, equipment, or procedures are ready today for use for verifying classified fissile material (in manufactured objects or bulk forms), but some promising concepts have been proposed and some are undergoing testing. INDA will need to develop jointly with each nuclear-​armed State verification methods and procedures that each nuclear-​armed State will be able to approve for use in its facilities. Verification of nuclear disarmament should begin with Level 1 unclassified fissile material, adapting existing IAEA equipment to meet any requirements imposed by a nuclear-​armed State depending on the site where the verification will take place and any sensitive nuclear operations carried out nearby. As implementation of Level 1 verification gets underway in a State, efforts should begin to resolve the issues for Level 2, then Level 3, then Level 4. The methods under consideration for classified forms of fissile material are based on attribute or template verification.20 In attribute verification, unclassified questions as shown in Table  3.1 are asked and answered with simple yes or no answers. The questions are answered by measuring the corresponding properties using instruments that could reveal classified properties; the classified measurements are compared to unclassified attributes using information barriers. The results are then displayed to the inspectors in the form of red or green lights providing simple yes or no answers. The first three attribute questions in Table 3.1 defined the full scope of the Trilateral Initiative. In principle, attribute verification could be extended to the more immediate disarmament questions shown in Table 3.1. While the more direct capabilities would contribute greater assurance of progress toward disarmament, every nuclear-​armed State will have fissile material in all four levels, and even the basic tests incorporated in the Trilateral Initiative would be difficult to implement, given their reliance on electronic signal processing. Template verification involves comparing an unknown item to a reference standard. Two common problems determine the suitability of template methods. First, how are the reference standards certified? And second, can it be proven that the data measurement methods cannot obtain classified information? It would be necessary for the State and INDA to each satisfy its own requirements that the objects are bona fide, that no means is introduced to deceive or circumvent the verification process associated for each application. If the measurement method involves electronics, the electronic components of the measurement system might still allow either the State or the inspectors, or possibly a third party, to manipulate the verification process for unauthorized purposes.21

48

48  Eliminating existing nuclear weapons Even methods incorporating zero-​knowledge proofs may raise questions. First, even if the promise were true, a nuclear-​armed State would have to convince itself to accept the proofs offered, in effect trusting the developer against the natural tendency to be suspicious. And second, the system, as described, requires an appropriate neutron source and a detection system. INDA and the nuclear-​armed State would need to be convinced that the system did not have additional controls or capabilities that might be accessed by one or the other, and that it would not be vulnerable to hacking. Templates work best when the objects to be verified are essentially exactly like the reference standard(s), meaning that template methods could be suitable for nuclear warheads or the fissile material components of nuclear warheads, but not for containers of feed material or scrap, for example.22 Attribute methods might be used for containers with irregular contents. Each type of object would need to be considered separately, and a method or combination of methods chosen accordingly. Note that, as yet, there is no accepted method for certifying template reference standards. There are other approaches that might be useful. For example, if the population of identical items is large, then the internal consistency of the results could in a sense be self-​authenticating. Such an approach would be most appropriate if INDA could select individual containers to be processed and subsequently made available for measurement. No nuclear-​ armed State would allow any verification or monitoring method or equipment anywhere near its classified forms of fissile material without satisfying itself using its own experts and its own testing methods that the method and equipment will only serve its intended verification purpose and no other. Five methods are summarized in Annex B.2. They will need careful, competitive research to decide which should be chosen initially, how and when each might be applied alone, when combinations of complementary methods would be attractive, and how and when improvements should thereafter be adopted.

3.7  Chain of custody monitoring Verifying disarmament will also require the use of monitoring to maintain chains of custody, enabling INDA to perform its mission in a practical manner.23 While monitoring equipment may not need to verify classified properties, the methods, equipment, and procedures to be used for monitoring will be subject to the same intensive security and authenticity requirements as verification, meaning that until there are solutions to the concerns raised about the use of electronics, they should be used only when no other methods are available. Under that restriction, monitoring may be achieved by inspector observation (expensive and not infallible) in combination with:

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The technical basis for verification 49 (a) Film surveillance using mechanical timers or mechanical triggering devices; and/​or (b) Position-​ sensing based upon mechanical phenomena, i.e., not using electronics. The IAEA has developed an extensive catalogue of containment and surveillance systems, almost all of which today incorporate electronics to gain expanded coverage, reduce the intrusiveness of inspections into routine operations of legitimate peaceful use facilities, and reduce the costs of IAEA inspections. It will be necessary to invent new devices that will be allowed into the facilities where nuclear disarmament takes place.

3.8  Development and production of INDA verification & monitoring equipment Given the need to protect the integrity of the process of verifying nuclear disarmament and the need to make it possible for all TPNW parties to contribute to their shared objective, it will be urgent and essential to create an INDA Center for Nuclear Disarmament to serve INDA’s verification and monitoring needs, as presented in Chapter 2, and as described in Annexes B.1 and B.2

Notes 1 Note that while disarmament should require irreversible commitments, one of the confidence-​building measures identified in Chapter  7 would allow temporary monitoring activities that could serve as a precursor to submitting fissile material to verification without the possibility of withdrawals. This could allow a State to try out the requirements before making an irreversible commitment. 2 Atomic Heritage Foundation (2014), Little Boy and Fat Man, www.atomicheritage. org/​history/​little-​boy-​and-​fat-​man, accessed 21 July 2017. 3 US Department of Defense (2018), Nuclear Posture Review, www.defense.gov/​ News/​Special-​Reports/​0218_​npr/​, accessed 4 February 2018. 4 Select Committee of the United States House of Representatives (1999), The Cox Report:  The Unanimous and Bipartisan Report of the House Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing), p. 78. 5 Controls on fusion materials are considered in Chapter 9 as a confidence-​building measure that will become increasingly important as nuclear arsenals reach very low levels. 6 Verification under the Trilateral Initiative would have demonstrated that: a) plutonium was present in each object presented for verification; b) the isotopic composition of the plutonium was typical of that used in nuclear weapons; and c) that the mass of plutonium contained in each item exceeded a threshold amount established for each facility. It would have allowed all of the plutonium to be included in the PMDA to be taken into the verification system and stored, processed to remove any classified properties, then transferred into the verification provisions foreseen in the PMDA.

50

50  Eliminating existing nuclear weapons 7 T. Shea and L.  Rockwood (2015), Nuclear Disarmament:  The Legacy of the Trilateral Initiative, Deep Cuts Commission Working Paper No. 4, See http://​ deepcuts.org/​images/​PDF/​DeepCuts_​WP4_​Shea_​Rockwood_​UK.pdf. 8 IAEA (2002), IAEA Verification of Weapon-​Origin Fissile Material in the Russian Federation and the United States, IAEA Press Release PR 2002/​13, 16 September 2002, 46th IAEA General Conference. 9 The United States was prepared to offer plutonium pits pursuant to the Trilateral Initiative; the Russian Federation recast its pits into balls containing about 2 kgs Pu per ball and discussed applying the Trilateral Initiative at a fissile material storage facility at Mayak. The Russian Federation stated that while the 2 kg metal spheres had no classified shape properties, the isotopic composition of the plutonium remains classified under Russian law. 10 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-​Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, item 8, page 15, NPT/​CONF.2000/​28 (Parts I and II). See www. reachingcriticalwill.org/​images/​documents/​Disarmament-​fora/​npt/​revcon2000/​ docs/​2000FD.pdf, accessed 10 May 2017. 11 L. Rockwood (2014), The Trilateral Initiative: The Legal and Financial Issues, 2014 IAEA Safeguards Symposium, www.iaea.org/​safeguards/​symposium/​2014/​home/​ eproceedings/​sg2014-​papers/​000275.pdf, accessed 23 November 2017. 12 A bilateral Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) was concluded by the Russian Federation and the United States in 2000. The parties agreed to each manage and dispose of 32 tons of plutonium from their respective nuclear weapon programs. The plutonium would be processed to remove all classified properties before quantitative verification would be allowed. It was agreed that the plutonium would be made into fuel for nuclear reactors and irradiated such that the plutonium would no more be suited to use in nuclear weapons than the plutonium in normal spent reactor fuel. Had all gone as planned, it would have taken at least 17  years to process that plutonium. Under the PMDA, no connection to any specific nuclear weapons would have been possible. 13 STR-​368 (2010), International Target Values 2010 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials, IAEA, Vienna. 14 International Nuclear Verification Series No. 1 (Rev.2) (2011), Safeguards Techniques and Equipment: 2011 Edition, IAEA, Vienna. 15 M. Kütt and A. Glaser of Princeton University explore the use of primitive electronic equipment as a means to obtain “trusted processors” in Vintage Computing for Trusted Radiation Measurements and a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, www. youtube.com/​watch?v=38mTnnR4dSI, accessed 31 December 2017. 16 S. Philippe, R.J. Goldston, A.  Glaser, and F.  d’Errico (2016), A Physical Zero-​ Knowledge Object-​Comparison System for Nuclear Warhead Verification, Nature Communications 7, www.nature.com/​articles/​ncomms12890, accessed 12 May 2017. 17 T. Krieger and T.  Burr (2016), “Comparison of an Exact to an Approximate Sample Size Calculation for Attribute Testing,” Journal of Nuclear Materials Management, 44, No. 3, pp. 45–​48. 18 Shea and Rockwood, Nuclear Disarmament:  The Legacy of the Trilateral Initiative. 19 The sample size was calculated using the IAEA algorithm n = N(1-​ß1/​10) given in the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, item 10.8. In this case, N=1000 and ß=0.1. 20 As I write this book, the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) has concluded its Phase I  studies and has defined its

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The technical basis for verification 51 program for Phase II. (See www.ipndv.org/​.) Under Phase I, IPNDV have completed, inter alia, a very useful interactive identifying the steps involved in verifying the dismantlement of nuclear warheads, which I highly commend. (See www.ipndv.org/​learn/​dismantlement-​interactive/​.) The IPNDV identification of potential physical methods for such verification is far more complete than I have shown, and all such methods should be considered under the auspices of the International Centre for Nuclear Disarmament Research and Development called for in this book. IPNDV has not addressed other non-​uniform holdings of fissile material, and seems more certain than I that electronic systems should be pursued from the outset. 21 It might be possible to encrypt verification and monitoring information at source so as to satisfy both parties that the verification and monitoring activities are limited to their intended purpose, and that the results are authentic. R. Garwin (2003), “Technologies and procedures for verifying warhead status and dismantlement,” in Transparency in Nuclear Warheads and Materials: The Political and Technical Dimensions, edited by N. Zarimpas (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 22 Note that it might be possible to build reference standards containing different amounts of plutonium or HEU, and determining that a container submitted for verification might lie between two of the reference standards. Further work on such a possibility is needed to determine how this might work for both attribute and template verification concepts. 23 In IAEA safeguards implemented pursuant to the NPT (see INFCIRC/​153, para. 29), containment and surveillance are stipulated as important complementary mechanisms supporting nuclear materials accountancy. In relation to nuclear disarmament, the term “monitoring” has a similar role, but is constrained by the demands of the security and authenticity necessary to protect nuclear weapon classified information, and hence is referred to as the means to secure a chain of custody over items submitted for INDA verification.

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4  INDA inspections

4.1  Introduction INDA would be responsible for verifying the removal of fissile material from nuclear weapon use, verifying the certification and elimination of mission-​ critical nuclear weapon facilities,1 and, in collaboration with the IAEA, verifying the conversion of nuclear weapon facilities from nuclear weapon use to uses not proscribed by the TPNW. A nuclear-​ armed State party to the TPNW would inform the INDA Director General of its intention to execute the provisions of the TPNW. INDA and the State should then begin the process of concluding a verification and monitoring agreement following the model approved by the Nuclear Disarmament Council for that purpose (see Annex A.2 for a suggested draft of the model). When that agreement has entered into force, the State would inform INDA of its intended steps related to arms reductions, its schedule for submitting fissile material for verification and monitoring, and its intentions in relation to dismantling its nuclear weapons complex. As noted in Chapter 1, this interaction is likely to proceed through a series of steps, with changes reflecting evolving security considerations. Fissile material would be segregated according to the four levels identified earlier: Level 1, unclassified fissile material; Level 2, fissile material contained in nuclear warhead components and other miscellaneous forms of fissile material with classified properties; Level 3, nuclear warheads designated for disarmament; and Level 4, nuclear warheads mounted on delivery systems designated for disarmament. Where a nuclear-​armed State is not able to delineate a precise schedule for eliminating its arsenal and weapons complex, the State should provide as a minimum a three-​year schedule, identifying the facilities where such verification and monitoring should take place, the timing for its intended fissile material submissions, the anticipated amounts of Level 1 unclassified fissile material, the numbers of containers of Level 2 classified forms of fissile material, Level 3 warheads, or Level 4 deployed nuclear weapon systems to be included, and the dates and preferred schedules for commencing INDA verification and monitoring.

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INDA inspections 53 Before a nuclear-​armed State has agreed to verification arrangements for classified forms of fissile material, the State should consider the temporary monitoring confidence-​building measures proposed in Section 7.4. For each facility where INDA would be asked to carry out inspections, the State should submit facility information to INDA following a facility information questionnaire (FIQ) that would be provided by INDA. INDA and the nuclear-​armed State should then agree on the methods and procedures to be employed at each facility identified by the State to verify each FIQ, taking into account the need to respect the classification restrictions imposed by the State. INDA and the State should then agree on the inspection methods and procedures for each facility. Verification procedures and equipment should be chosen for each nuclear-​armed State to answer specific questions from Table  3.1 that have been approved by the Nuclear Disarmament Council and accepted by each nuclear-​armed State. The relevant questions may differ among the nuclear-​armed States depending on the commitment of each State to disarmament and agreement reached by INDA and the State on the Level approved for verification to proceed. INDA and the State should specify the administrative arrangements to be followed, identify the inspectors designated for inspections in the State, jointly prepare authorized inspection protocols (AIPs) for each verification and monitoring activity identified, designate the verification and monitoring equipment to be employed, agree upon arrangements for procuring the equipment and approving its use, and for approving the AIPs. For facilities where classification restrictions apply, the inspection procedures should be rehearsed at the INDA R&D Center and again at each facility before INDA inspectors are allowed to be in proximity to classified forms of fissile material. The State or INDA may request additional training and rehearsals as either shall believe is warranted. As verification and monitoring equipment to be used at a given facility are agreed, a protocol should be prepared for acquiring the equipment, where it should be tested, maintained and stored pending its use. All items of equipment agreed for use should be transported to the facility in advance of a pending inspection, installed and commissioned, and accepted by the State and INDA, and placed under INDA monitoring to preserve their authenticity. Equipment spares should be provided as agreed to allow the inspection activities to proceed without interruption. The State should satisfy itself that the equipment itself and any use of that equipment should not provide access to its nuclear weapon design or manufacturing secrets. The nuclear-​armed State should inform INDA of its intention to submit items containing fissile material at a specified facility according to a specified schedule. INDA should inform the State of the inspection arrangements, the specific inspectors participating, their travel arrangements to the State and within the State during and following the inspection, their lodging arrangements, the inspection activities planned, and the equipment the

54

54  Eliminating existing nuclear weapons inspectors plan to use. INDA should agree to provide the number of inspectors needed and to extend the duration of inspections, including round-​the-​clock presence, as needed to meet the State’s requirements. The State should make available a suitable workspace for the inspectors near to each facility, which the inspectors should be able to use without eavesdropping or interference.2 INDA inspections should be carried out under the presumption that the State is seeking to get “credit” for its disarmament steps, and hence INDA should verify that the items submitted are as declared, and thereafter remain under INDA monitoring and verification under an unbroken chain of custody. INDA should verify the State’s declaration according to the Levels introduced Chapter  2. Implementation should begin with Level 1.  Noting that Level 1 fissile material contains no classified properties, INDA should verify the mass of plutonium, the mass of uranium, and the isotopic composition of each item presented by the nuclear-​armed State, using radiometric non-​destructive assay systems similar to those used by the IAEA for similar materials.3,4 Verification of classified forms of fissile material should proceed to Levels 2–​4 only when the nuclear-​armed State and INDA are satisfied that the security and authenticity requirements are met for each Level. INDA should verify 100% of all items presented when it is able to do so, or it should use a random sampling plan if 100% coverage isn’t possible or practical. The State should invite INDA to verify specific items and to monitor them thereafter to confirm that the State is honoring its commitments. Because of the classification restrictions, the AIPs for each Level 2–​4 site should be carefully prepared, tried out, and, when found acceptable, put down into hard and fast requirements. While neither inspectors nor facility operators should be able to change those agreed procedures without a formal review and revision process, either side should be able to stop an inspection when it believes it must. When 100% of all items are to be verified, if a verification test performed on a given Level 2–​4 item is not acceptable, the verification test should be repeated. If there is an approved alternative measurement system, that alternative system should be used to resolve inconclusive or negative results. If these measures are not successful, INDA should reject the item and the State should withdraw the item in question and remove it to a location where the State can determine in private the cause of the inconclusive or negative verification results. If INDA is using a random sampling plan and a defective item is encountered, INDA must abandon the random sampling plan and revert to 100% verification coverage to determine whether other defective items may be present in the population of items submitted for verification and monitoring. INDA should establish common procedures for each of the Levels identified and with each nuclear-​armed State, adapting the common procedures to meet specific circumstances presented in each nuclear-​armed State. All inspection steps should be described in detail in an AIP governing each sequential step at each location. Each AIP should be approved by INDA and the specific

 55

INDA inspections 55 nuclear-​armed State. Approved AIPs become part of the inspection manual for each facility in that nuclear-​armed State. Each AIP should include preparatory actions before any fissile material is introduced, the normal inspection activities that have been approved, and back-​up inspection activities to cover abnormal or unusual circumstances, including equipment malfunctions or any disruptions (e.g., as for safety or security events). Before monitoring and verification activities are carried out, INDA inspectors should review the facility FIQ provided by the nuclear-​ armed State and verify that the facility information provided and the actual facility remain consistent. They should then install, commission, and calibrate all equipment, and jointly confirm in writing that both the State and INDA are prepared to proceed with the inspection. The Nuclear Disarmament Council would approve the authorized steps and the equipment and procedures to be employed and by the nuclear-​armed State before INDA inspectors begin their activities. Prior to each Level 2–​ 4 inspection, the relevant AIP should be rehearsed by the INDA inspection team at a mock-​up facility at the site to be inspected, or at the Center. Representatives of the nuclear-​armed State should be present during these pre-​inspection rehearsals, and at the facility during all inspections. When implemented, the actions of the inspectors and State personnel should be observed and filmed jointly by INDA and State security personnel to assure that there are no deviations from the AIPs. INDA should maintain custody of the film records it makes of each inspection, which it should be authorized to remove from the facility at the completion of each inspection. Annex B.3 shows the monitoring and verification activities anticipated. A nuclear-​armed State would begin by submitting weapon fissile material under Level 1. Beginning at Level 1 should allow progress to be made while sorting out the more complicated issues associated with classified forms of fissile material. When the State is convinced that the verification activities on unclassified fissile material would not undermine its national security, and when INDA is satisfied that the verification of unclassified fissile material is proceeding routinely, then the State and INDA should agree to transition the verified unclassified fissile material to peaceful use under an IAEA disarmament safeguards agreement which shall already be in force. The State may then decide that it is ready to submit Level 2 classified fissile material to monitoring and verification under its agreement with INDA. Once the monitoring and verification arrangements are fixed for the storage of classified forms of weapon fissile material—​and for the conversion operations necessary to remove the classified properties—​the State and INDA should commence monitoring and verification under Level 2. Later, once the State and INDA are satisfied with monitoring and verification at Level 2, they should agree to advance to Level 3 and eventually to Level 4. A State may, at any time, choose any on-​ramp depending on the prevailing circumstances and the State’s preferences. For Level 4, INDA should verify the designated warheads by visual examination and a gross defect test on the

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56  Eliminating existing nuclear weapons deployed warheads to be disarmed, and create the chain of custody to provide assurance when the warheads are moved to a location where normal verification is practical.

4.2  Fissile material-​related inspection activities Inspection activities for fissile material are set out in Annex B.3 While initial implementation begins at Level 1 and advances upward as the means are agreed, once accepted, fissile materials progress downward from their entry Level until all classified properties are removed and they are ready for disposition. Hence, Annex B.3 begins at Level 4 and advances downward to Level 1, assuming that INDA and a nuclear-​armed State give their approvals. Prior to each inspection, the State would provide a declaration listing the actions to be taken and the date, place, and timing allotted for the INDA verification and monitoring activities, and citing the AIP(s) covering the actions declared. Depending on the prevailing conditions in a nuclear-​armed State, once the classified properties have been removed and the State acts to remove that fissile material from its commitment to nuclear weapon use, the State would transfer that fissile material to a disposition pathway involving peaceful use, or direct disposal, or use in non-​explosive military applications. Fissile material disposition is addressed in Chapter 6. If the disposition facilities are ready to receive a consignment of unclassified fissile material, it could be transferred directly from the Level 2 processing facility. If not, it could be transferred to a Level 1 storage facility, which might be operated within the nuclear weapons complex. In this case, the nuclear-​ armed State may determine that nearby activities at that site involve classified fissile material, or that other sensitive actvities vital to the national security interests of the State are underway at that site, and hence that restrictions may apply to the verification activities that INDA may carry out. Such concerns would likely focus on the use of measurement or monitoring equipment which might be able to capture information not specifically allowed at that site.5 In principle, it should be possible for INDA to make use of IAEA non-​ destructive assay systems designed for use on unclassified forms of plutonium and/​or HEU. In such cases, representatives of a nuclear-​armed State could witness preoperational testing of such equipment at an INDA facility, witness its packing into shipping containers, and apply its own seals in addition to INDA seals. The nuclear-​armed State could then take responsibility for shipping the equipment to the designated facility where it would be used, or to a storage facility for spare equipment in the event needed. If considered necessary a nuclear-​armed State or by INDA, the measurement equipment could be housed in a Faraday cage designed to prevent the transmission of

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INDA inspections 57 electromagnetic signals into or out of the cage. When INDA inspectors are present, the State could unpack the equipment and together, the State and INDA could commission its use according to the relevant AIP. In addition to fissile material from disarmament as provided in the preceding sections of this chapter, Level 1 inspections could also apply to unclassified fissile material recovered from warhead manufacturing, or feed stocks of fissile material released from potential use in nuclear weapons and declared by the State as material to be submitted to monitoring and verification in relation to nuclear disarmament. The State should declare the composition of the fissile material in all items to be submitted to INDA verification and monitoring in reports to INDA, showing in each group or batch of containers to be submitted, the total amount of plutonium, the total amount of uranium, and for each container: a. The mass of plutonium, its isotopic composition, chemical form, and the amount of 241Am present as of the date of the declaration; and b. The mass of uranium present, its chemical form, and the enrichment of the uranium.

4.3  Elimination or conversion of weapon complex facilities Each nuclear-​armed State creates its nuclear weapons complex to meet its specific needs. Some may have redundant facilities to handle production demands or as a means to protect their mission-critical nuclear weapon facilities against attacks. Certain facilities are essential to the design, manufacture, assembly, testing, stockpiling, maintenance, and repair of the State’s deployed or reserve nuclear warheads, or fission primaries or thermonuclear secondaries.6 Eliminating its mission-​critical nuclear weapons facilities as part of its disarmament obligations would make it impossible for a State to create replacements for its nuclear arsenal. If a nuclear-​armed State has hidden nuclear weapons, or decides to rearm, then it would require at least some mission-​critical capabilities for such an effort. Those capabilities must remain hidden, and the personnel involved must remain loyal to the government of the State. A suggested list of nuclear weapon mission-​critical facilities is shown in Figure 4.1. Some nuclear weapons contain thousands of parts, and the supply chain might involve many suppliers in a given State.7 Some nuclear weapon facilities, such as the Pantex Facility in the United States, combine several functions.8 A nuclear-​armed State would declare its nuclear arsenal and its nuclear weapons complex when it joins the nuclear disarmament system as a TPNW State party. The Nuclear Disarmament Council, acting through the Threat Assessment Committee, should request the Nuclear Disarmament Institute to complete its initial dossier on that State based on all information it is able

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58  Eliminating existing nuclear weapons

Figure 4.1 Mission-​critical nuclear facilities. As nuclear weapons typically contain thousands of parts, concentration of the responsibilities of INDA to certify the functions and history of mission-​critical nuclear facilities should concentrate on the facilities shown here, plus the nuclear weapons test facilities used by each nuclear-​armed State.

to acquire regarding, inter alia, the arsenal of that State, its mission-​critical nuclear weapons complex, estimates of its fissile material inventory, and its historical production of nuclear weapons and fissile material. When it is ready, the State should propose a schedule for when INDA should carry out its verification activities and inform INDA of its intention to eliminate or convert a facility it has used to support its nuclear weapons program. INDA should be prepared to carry out its responsibilities according to the schedule proposed by the nuclear-​armed State. The inspection team assigned to this task should be approved by the State, trained and equipped with information and capabilities. The inspection team should limit its activities to the mission-​critical nuclear weapons facility or facilities identified by the State.9 The inspection team should be briefed on relevant features typical for such facilities.10 The inspection team should procure satellite imagery of the specific mission-​critical nuclear weapons facility or facilities, including imagery from

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INDA inspections 59 commercial suppliers and from other TPNW States parties. Multi-​spectral imagery should be obtained, where appropriate. The inspection team should be prepared to verify the location coordinates of the facility or facilities, and to document its verification through the use photographs and digital recordings, as allowed by the State. INDA might request the State for permission to employ drones to video the features of a declared site. For facilities with complex piping networks, a 3-​D laser scanning system used by the IAEA for design information verification may be useful. Environmental sampling inside and outside of mission-​critical nuclear weapons facilities may also be useful depending on the prevailing circumstances and the willingness of the State.11 The task of confirming the elimination of a mission-​ critical nuclear weapon facility should be simple to achieve and certain in its results. INDA should certify that the facility is, or was, as declared by the State, and then verify the status of the facility, observe the removal and destruction of critical equipment, and then witness its destruction. INDA’s ability to complete this will depend on steps taken before INDA is invited to verify, and the cooperation of the State. INDA’s findings must reflect what it is and what it is not able to verify. It should be up to the Nuclear Disarmament Council to determine the disarmament status of each nuclear-​armed State in relation to progress towards the final elimination of all nuclear weapons and the creation of sustainable measures to prevent their renewal. For facilities that the State destroys or converts before engaging INDA, INDA should attempt, as best it is able, to determine that the facility in question was, in fact, engaged in the functions declared by the State, and that it no longer exists or has been converted to a non-​proscribed nuclear or non-​nuclear use. Given the investments made in a nuclear weapon complex, a State may well seek to convert its jewels from nuclear weapon missions to other uses, nuclear and non-​nuclear, that are not proscribed by the TPNW. In those cases, the verification of the nuclear weapon-​related characteristics of a facility to be converted would be the responsibility of INDA, while the converted facility—​ whether nuclear or non-​nuclear—​would be verified by the IAEA. The use of HEU in naval reactors exists in some nuclear-​armed States, and such extensive usage of HEU could complicate and delay progress towards nuclear disarmament. A naval reactor program using HEU could be used by a nuclear-​armed State to justify additional HEU production in existing or even in new facilities. Other military or peaceful uses of HEU are possible, for research reactors dedicated to military programs, or space power reactors for military purposes. Because such military programs involve defense ministries and uniformed services, verification activities addressing such issues should also be assigned to INDA. A quid pro quo proposal to the 2020 NPT Review Conference describes how this issue could be addressed.12 Specific provisions are included in the INDA model verification agreement provided in Annex A.2.

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60  Eliminating existing nuclear weapons

4.4  Inspection logistics 4.4.1  Verification equipment Level 1 presents a special case, and it should be possible to agree on how standard IAEA equipment can be used while meeting the State’s requirements. Faraday cages blocking electromagnetic signals from coming in or going out of a verification enclosure would be the obvious place to begin. As described in Section 4.2, commencing inspections on unclassified fissile material may require specialized equipment if the fissile material is located near any activities deemed to be sensitive in relation to the national security interests of the nuclear-​armed State. If that is not the case, then verification should begin with the IAEA applying disarmament safeguards as presented in Chapter 6. For all other verification and monitoring as presented in Section 4.2, specialized equipment will need to be designed, developed, tested, and approved both by INDA and the State before inspections can commence. Moving up to Levels 2, 3, and 4 should require comparative investigations into concepts that could be acceptable, prototype systems to prove the concepts individually or in combination, and then tailoring systems to meet the needs identified for Level 2, first, then for Level 3, and then for Level 4, as and when appropriate. Part of this process should be to mock-​ up the arrangements under which the equipment should be delivered to the State, unpacked, inspected, installed, commissioned, used for inspection(s), data collection and analysis, equipment removal or storage, evaluation and determination of findings. The International Center for Nuclear Disarmament Research and Development as presented in Chapter  2 should be designed to meet these objectives in a manner that serves the needs of the INDA inspectorate, nuclear-​armed States where the inspections should be carried out, and the international community. 4.4.2  Conduct of inspections INDA would need to agree with each nuclear-​armed State on when an inspection would be triggered, its scope and purpose, beginning and duration, staffing, equipment, and travel and lodging arrangements for the inspection team. Given the need for an inspection, once agreed, to be carried out according to the inspection plan agreed by the State and INDA, INDA must be staffed, trained, equipped, and ready to go. Some inspections called by the State may be for a single event, and such inspections might be concluded within a short time. Others may be ongoing, perhaps round the clock, perhaps for a day or a week or a month; others may be ongoing with no defined ending. INDA must plan for the human requirements, and for mishaps that might make it impossible for inspectors scheduled to participate to do so. And given the security restrictions, in general, it may not be possible to substitute an inspector at the last minute.

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INDA inspections 61 All inspection plans should need to incorporate prudent fallback measures for those circumstances when the inspections cannot proceed as originally anticipated. The inspection teams that are fielded may need to include extra inspectors fully prepared to step in. In those cases where the schedule for inspections should allow, INDA inspectors may reside in Vienna, for example, and travel to the State where an inspection is scheduled in time to be ready to proceed according to the schedule. In other cases, it may be advantageous for INDA inspectors to remain in the State or nearby for an extended period (e.g., a month) before being replaced by the next team. In all such cases, it should be essential to emphasize that the State, having agreed to accept INDA inspections on its territory in relation to its nuclear weapons program, and in so doing agrees to cooperate with INDA in specifying the activities it would allow and all related actions. For its part, INDA must carry out its activities in strict observance of the relevant AIPs approved by the State and INDA. The State must protect its national security and INDA must carry out its mission using sound science implemented in such a manner as to provide independent and authentic findings.

4.5  Inspection findings INDA would need to establish a language for communicating the outcomes of its verification activities in a manner that speaks truth, objectivity, and reinforces decisions taken by nuclear-​ armed States. The principal communications channels will be: a. Communications from the INDA inspectorate to the nuclear-​armed State; b. Communications from the INDA inspectorate to the Nuclear Disarmament Council via the Director General; c. Communications from the INDA Nuclear Disarmament Council to the IAEA, CTBTO, NSG, and WINS; d. Communications from the INDA Nuclear Disarmament Council to the TPNW Conference of States Parties; e. Communications from the INDA Nuclear Disarmament Council to the United Nations Security Council; and f. Communications from INDA to the general public. The model verification agreement put forward in Annex A.2 is an attempt to include all appropriate legal provisions.

Notes 1 Article 4.2 of the TPNW calls for “the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-​weapons-​related facilities.” As that could include administrative offices and other spaces serving no mission-​critical purpose, the term mission-​critical

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62  Eliminating existing nuclear weapons nuclear weapon facilities is used in this book to identify bespoke activities necessary to support a nuclear arsenal, recognizing that the Conference of TPNW States Parties is responsible for all such interpretations and definitions. 2 Inspector work spaces may be needed within the controlled areas at facilities under inspection, outside, or both. Depending on the working arrangements, it may become useful for INDA to establish regional offices in nuclear-​armed States, and to base some of its inspectors a nuclear-​armed State. 3 STR-​368 (2010), International Target Values 2010 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials, IAEA. 4 International Nuclear Verification Series No. 1 (Rev.2) (2011), Safeguards Techniques and Equipment: 2011 Edition, IAEA. 5 The use by INDA of unattended monitoring equipment that is able to record and transmit information such as routinely used by the IAEA might be problematic for the State for any location where sensitive nuclear operations are carried out. 6 The selection of mission-​critical nuclear weapons facilities is limited to those affecting the nuclear explosion caused by a warhead. Many other system components are also mission-​critical, including the weapon delivery system, nose cone, fusing system, etc. States parties to the TPNW should also consider the relevance of such other system elements in the context of Article 4.2 of the TPNW. 7 Union of Concerned Scientists (2012), The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Major Facilities, www.ucsusa.org/​nuclear-​weapons/​us-​nuclear-​weapons-​policy/​us-​nuclear-​ weapons-​facilities.html#.WfXGsxNSzcM, accessed 29 October 2017. 8 https://​pantex.energy.gov/​mission, accessed 27 July 2017. 9 Obtaining assurance that a State is not attempting to reconstitute its arsenal while disarming or later on is part of the assignment to the IAEA, as described in Chapter 6. 10 These technologies may be proliferation-​ sensitive, and if so declared by the nuclear-​armed State being inspected, or by the Nuclear Disarmament Council, the composition of the inspection team should be limited to nationals of the nuclear-​ armed States parties to the TPNW. 11 Noting again that the attitudes of nuclear-​ armed States towards intrusive inspections may change as progress toward the elimination of nuclear arsenals proceeds. At some point, a nuclear-​armed State should seek increasingly intrusive measures to provide assurances to its adversaries that it is taking such steps and expects its adversaries to do no less. 12 T. Shea (2017), Nuclear Navies, Non-​Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament, Federation of American Scientists Special Report, https://​fas.org/​pub-​ reports/​t he-​n onproliferation-​a nd-​d isarmament-​c hallenges-​o f-​n aval-​nuclear-​ propulsion/​.

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Part III

Sustainable disarmament

Figure 5.1 IAEA safeguards analyst S.  Robb using a data wall to bring together diverse information on a proliferation threat to determine where inspectors should go and what they should look for. Photo: Dean Calma /​ IAEA.

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5  Preventing rearmament

Such a State Party shall conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency sufficient to provide credible assurance of the non-​ diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in that State Party as a whole. TPNW Articles 4.2 and 4.3.

5.1  Introduction The verification framework envisions six missions for the IAEA as the foundation for sustaining progress toward the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons and for maintaining a nuclear-​weapon free condition thereafter. The six are: (a) Disposing of fissile material from disarmament in a manner that it would not be (readily) available for reuse in nuclear weapons; (b) Verifying the irreversible conversion of mission-​critical nuclear weapon facilities; (c) Detecting the diversion of weapon-​usable nuclear materials from peaceful use, or undeclared production of weapon-​ usable nuclear material in peaceful use facilities; (d) Detecting clandestine production or processing of weapon-​usable nuclear material at any location; (e) Detecting any other means through which a nuclear-​armed State might acquire any weapon-​usable nuclear material including legitimate imports, extorted imports, black market acquisitions, or seizures; and (f) Estimating the historical production, imports, use and exports of all weapon-​usable nuclear material to enable the IAEA and INDA to create a full and accurate picture of each State’s past activities and present capabilities. The IAEA role, as foreseen, is to prevent or deter any nuclear-​armed State from setting up a secret program to make new weapons. The steps taken in

66

66  Sustainable disarmament pursuit of this objective will also affect the robustness of the non-​proliferation regime, and international efforts to block nuclear terrorism. To rearm, a nuclear-​armed State would require weapon-​usable nuclear material meeting the requirements for use in its proven warhead designs, or close enough for modified designs to succeed. The IAEA role would deny a State the possibility of acquiring weapon-​usable nuclear material by implementing a system that covers all plausible means that such a State might use, with a combined detection capability that should convince the State that the likelihood of its detection would be high. Detection could be by verification measures applied by the IAEA directly, or by national intelligence services, or by bodies that monitor the availability of goods and services essential for manufacturing nuclear weapons. A State seeking to rearm would probably choose to make use of the nuclear warhead designs it had tested and certified—​if the fissile material (transitioned from disarmament) or any other weapon-​usable nuclear material (any uranium containing 20% or more of 233U and/​or 235U, and any plutonium containing less than 80% 238Pu, and/​or alternative nuclear material (237Np or 241Am) it is able to obtain is sufficiently close to the relevant specifications. If not, it should be assumed that a nuclear-​armed State could design new warheads making use of the weapon-​usable nuclear material available to it, adapting its proven designs based on its nuclear weapon design and manufacturing experience, or that it could improve the quality of the available weapon-​usable nuclear material taking benefit of its proven manufacturing capabilities and the information gleaned through testing carried out as part of its nuclear weapon development program. Any nuclear-​armed State would be capable of completing such tasks more successfully and more quickly than any non-​nuclear weapon State deciding to proliferate. The risks of being caught out would be substantial, and if discovered, the consequences could be catastrophic. Discovery could come through leaks, spies, other States’ national technical means, or through verification pursuant to the TPNW. If a hidden cache of weapons were to be revealed early in the process, the State might conceivably argue that it had intended to disarm those weapons very soon, but the longer the cache remains hidden before being revealed, the harder it will be to explain away. It would be even more difficult to explain away the discovery of a hidden weapon production capability, especially an active one. If a State were to choose to secretly rearm, the weapons it builds would have to give it a military advantage sufficient to offset the risks and consequences of getting caught. More weapons would provide greater assurance, but more weapons would come with a greater risk of discovery. How large a rearmament stockpile a nuclear-​armed State might gamble on would depend in part on how confident the State is regarding the functionality, safety, and security of all nuclear weapons available to it—​vs. those confronting it.

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Preventing rearmament 67

5.2  Tasks assigned to the IAEA in the TPNW The TPNW includes specific tasks for the IAEA. It requires a State Party to conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency sufficient to provide credible assurance of the non-​ diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole. The TPNW specifically tasks the IAEA to carry out three safeguards missions intended to prevent former or present nuclear-​armed States from secretly building or hiding nuclear weapons. The TPNW paragraphs have been subdivided below to add clarity on the IAEA assignments. 5.2.1  States that do not possess nuclear weapons Under Article 3.1 of the TPNW, Each State Party to which Article 4, paragraph 1 or 2, does not apply shall, at a minimum, maintain its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards obligations in force at the time of entry into force of this Treaty, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future.1 Under Article 3.2 of the TPNW, Each State Party to which Article 4, paragraph 1 or 2, does not apply that has not yet done so shall conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency and bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/​153 (Corrected)). Negotiation of such agreement shall commence within 180 days from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. Each State Party shall thereafter maintain such obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future. These obligations strengthen the non-​proliferation regime and provide a mechanism for States not holding nuclear-​arms to participate in the process of nuclear disarmament. It is regrettable that the obligations on States not possessing nuclear weapons do not include a requirement to conclude an Additional Protocol pursuant to INFCIRC/​ 540. The assurances possible under any existing IAEA safeguards agreement absent an Additional Protocol will never be equal to those that do, provided that the Additional Protocol concluded in such cases is complete in all aspects of INFCIRC/​540. Additional Protocols in States possessing nuclear weapons currently include

68

68  Sustainable disarmament restrictions that limit the scope and intensity of possible verification measures, and hence are not adequate for the purpose of verifying the provisions of the TPNW. Accordingly, States parties to the TPNW which do not have in force a full comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA incorporating all provisions of INFCIRC/​153, plus an Additional Protocol incorporating all provisions of INFCIRC/​540, should conclude a new agreement based on the model presented in Annex A.3. If the verification system to be adopted by the parties to the TPNW reflects the considerations presented in this book, perhaps the NPT parties objecting to the Additional Protocol might rethink their objections. 5.2.2  States that disarm before signing the TPNW Under Article 4.1 of the TPNW, Each State Party that after 7 July 2017 owned, possessed or controlled nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and eliminated its nuclear-​weapon program, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-​weapons-​related facilities, prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for it, shall cooperate with the competent international authority designated pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Article for the purpose of verifying the irreversible elimination of its nuclear-​ weapon program. The competent international authority shall report to the States Parties. States disarming before signing the TPNW should be inspected to provide assurance that they have in fact disarmed, that all fissile material previously committed to use in nuclear weapons has been recovered, removed and transferred to a disposition path, and that all mission-​critical nuclear weapon facilities have, in fact, been eliminated or irreversibly converted to a use that is not related to nuclear weapons. As specified, the negotiation of such an agreement shall commence within 180 days from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. That State Party shall thereafter, at a minimum, maintain these safeguards obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future. Nuclear-​armed States would enter into two agreements, one between each nuclear-​armed State and INDA covering the process of disarmament and the elimination or irreversible conversion of mission-​critical nuclear weapon facilities, according to the model presented in Annex A.2, and a separate

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Preventing rearmament 69 agreement to be concluded between each nuclear-​armed State with the IAEA to provide assurance against any effort that might be undertaken by a nuclear-​ armed State to rearm would be detected. Having disarmed before concluding these two agreements does not remove the obligations on INDA or the IAEA to verify that the declared steps taken by the State have in fact occurred, that there are no secret warheads ready to use, or that the State does not maintain a hidden production weapons complex. The IAEA Secretariat would produce a model for the Board of Governors to consider. Some thoughts on what that model might contain are suggested in Annex A.3. 5.2.3  States that do not disarm before signing the TPNW Paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the TPNW states that: [para.  2]Each State Party that owns, possesses or controls nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices shall immediately remove them from operational status, and destroy them as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the first meeting of States Parties, in accordance with a legally binding, time-​bound plan for the verified and irreversible elimination of that State Party’s nuclear-​weapon program, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-​weapons-​related facilities. The State Party, no later than 60 days after the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party, shall submit this plan to the States Parties or to a competent international authority designated by the States Parties. The plan shall then be negotiated with the competent international authority, which shall submit it to the subsequent meeting of States Parties or review conference, whichever comes first, for approval in accordance with its rules of procedure.2 A State Party to which paragraph 2 above applies shall conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency sufficient to provide credible assurance of the non-​diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole. Negotiation of such agreement shall commence no later than the date upon which implementation of the plan referred to in paragraph 2 is completed. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months after the date of initiation of negotiations. That State Party shall thereafter, at a minimum, maintain these safeguards obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future. Following the entry into force of the agreement referred to in this paragraph, the State Party shall submit to the Secretary General of the United Nations a final declaration that it has fulfilled its obligations under this Article.

70

70  Sustainable disarmament As noted in 5.2.2, and in conformance with Article 4.6 of the TPNW,3 nuclear-​armed States should enter into two agreements, one covering the process of disarmament and the elimination or irreversible conversion of mission-​ critical nuclear weapon facilities, which would be concluded between each nuclear-​armed State and INDA according to the model presented in Annex A.2, and a separate agreement to be concluded between each nuclear-​armed State with the IAEA to provide assurance against any effort that might be undertaken by a nuclear-​armed State to rearm. The same model agreement proposed for States disarming before signing the TPNW applies, as set forth in Annex A.3.4 The model agreement includes detection activities that are intended to provide assurance that a disarming nuclear-​armed State is not actively engaged in activities in breach of its TPNW commitments. It also includes activities that would make it more difficult for it to rearm. Some of these measures would also strengthen the non-​proliferation regime.

5.3  IAEA capabilities and the TPNW Since its creation in 1957, the IAEA has continued to develop and improve its nuclear material safeguards system. While early agreements covered specific facilities, equipment or material, since 1970 the IAEA has implemented comprehensive safeguards pursuant to non-​proliferation commitments accepted by non-​nuclear weapon States under Article III of the NPT. The NPT has been remarkably successful in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, and today 191 States are parties to the NPT. Its ability to prevent proliferation has not been fully successful, but in response to its earlier shortcomings, today’s IAEA safeguards system has been strengthened following the discovery of cheating in Iraq and North Korea,5 and by taking benefit of information provided through the assistance and cooperation of South Africa6 following its unilateral decision to scrap its nuclear weapons, and by the verification experience gained by the IAEA in Iran under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.7 Table  5.1 provides a summary of the metrics of IAEA safeguards implementation.8 The first step taken in strengthening the safeguards system incorporated changes that were approved by the IAEA Board of Governors that could be applied under the existing comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreements.9 The second step went beyond the limitations of the existing safeguards agreements by introducing a new “Additional Protocol” (AP) to the safeguards agreements.10 The AP gives IAEA inspectors increased access to information, locations and officials in non-​nuclear weapon States party to the NPT that conclude an AP. These improvements were needed to enable the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities that could be part of a nuclear weapons program. Without an AP, the IAEA is limited in what it is able to do, meaning that the IAEA is not empowered to be as effective as needed to provide convincing assurance against future attempts at proliferation.11

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Preventing rearmament 71 Table 5.1  IAEA Safeguards implementation metrics for 2016 Topic

Outcome

Safeguards Conclusions

In 69 States, all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities. In 104 States, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities. In 3 States, nuclear material, facilities, or other items to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities. In 5 States, nuclear material in selected facilities in which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities. 181 States with Safeguards Agreements in force. 129 States with Additional Protocols in force. 204,073 significant quantities of nuclear material. 1,290 nuclear facilities and locations outside of nuclear facilities. 1,037,156 nuclear material reports collected and evaluated. 1,436 surveillance cameras installed in 266 facilities. 25,044 seals installed on nuclear material, facility critical equipment or IAEA safeguards equipment at nuclear facilities. 1,057 non-​destructive assay systems deployed. 474 environmental samples and 603 nuclear material samples collected and analyzed. 122 facilities remotely monitored. €135,000,000 + €40,500,000 extra-​budgetary 932 staff and contractors from 96 countries

Legal Framework Coverage Verification

Resources

In today’s non-​proliferation safeguards system, The IAEA develops a State-​level safeguards approach (SLA) for States on the basis of a structured, technical method used to analyze the plausible paths by which nuclear material suitable for use in a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device could be acquired. On this basis, technical objectives associated with the steps along a path are established and guide the planning, conduct and evaluation of safeguards activities for that State.12 The IAEA brings all of these capabilities to the essential task of preventing rearmament, in particular to activities that might be taken by a State to conceal a clandestine nuclear weapons program. Preventing rearmament will require a similar nuclear-​armed State level approach (NASLA) for each nuclear-​armed State, tailored to the motivations and capabilities of each nuclear-​armed State to prevent it from rearming. The disarmament safeguards measures the IAEA should apply in each nuclear-​ armed State should have State-​specific goals, and inspection planning should reflect the State’s disarmament progress, its adversarial geopolitics, its existing peaceful nuclear infrastructure, plus information derived by the IAEA and INDA, together with information provided by IAEA Member States pursuant

72

72  Sustainable disarmament to Article VIII.A of the IAEA Statute. The verification activities should verify declared activities and data, but also approach the States through a forensic perspective, using all information available to determine whether or not suspicion is warranted. Each NASLA should cover the safeguards missions posited in the next section. The IAEA should be able to pursue questions that arise that might take them anywhere—​military bases, warships, residences of political leaders, religious institutions—​in short, anywhere on the territory of a State, or anywhere else where a nuclear-​armed State might be able to carry out prohibited activities with or without the knowledge of the State in which the activities are implemented, on land, at sea, under sea or in space. The IAEA should be able to choose inspection activities to address any plausible path by which it has reason to suspect that a nuclear-​armed State might acquire, store, process or use direct-​use nuclear material and/​or alternative nuclear material. On this basis, technical objectives associated with the steps along each path that a State might follow would be established, guide the planning, execution and eventually the evaluation of disarmament safeguards activities in each nuclear-​armed State. The IAEA disarmament safeguards system should begin with existing stocks of weapon-​usable nuclear materials that could most readily support

Figure 5.2 An IAEA Safeguards inspector is shown servicing a surveillance video system at a nuclear power reactor in an NPT non-​nuclear weapon State, to detect an undeclared removal of irradiated fuel containing plutonium. Photo: D. Calma /​ IAEA.

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Preventing rearmament 73 rearmament and expand to cover acquisition steps requiring longer times and providing greater opportunities for detection. Ultimately, coverage should extend to indirect-​use nuclear material (including depleted, natural, and low enriched uranium, and thorium), thereby creating a mechanism for all States to eventually come under uniform standardized safeguards requirements. IAEA disarmament verification performance accomplishments and revised requirements for each nuclear-​armed State should be reviewed annually at a joint session of the INDA Nuclear Disarmament Council and the IAEA Board of Governors, taking into account declarations made by the State, findings from INDA and IAEA inspections, relevant information made available to the IAEA and INDA, INDA and IAEA historical production estimates, disposition progress, and annual nuclear weapon threat assessments produced by the INDA Institute of Nuclear Disarmament Research. These findings should be published openly.

Notes 1 Article 3.1 does not provide a legal alternative for non-​nuclear weapon States Parties to the NPT IAEA safeguards based on INFCIRC/​153. Participation of NNWS in the TPNW is intended to provide a mechanism for such States to participate in the elimination of nuclear arsenals. 2 My views on this paragraph are given in Chapter  1. The stated requirements—​ if maintained—​will make it likely that no nuclear-​armed State would ever join the TPNW. 3 Article 4.6 of the TPNW States: “The States Parties shall designate a competent international authority or authorities to negotiate and verify the irreversible elimination of nuclear-​weapons programs, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-​weapons-​related facilities in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article.” 4 Noting again that Annex A.2 and Annex A.3 are intended to facilitate the official drafting of both model agreements by providing a starting point for each. 5 At the time of writing this book, the ability of the NPT regime to prevent proliferation was being tested and contested in Iran, where it is working, and in North Korea, where it is not. Anticipated bilateral meetings between North Korea and the United States could provide a hopeful opportunity. 6 N. Von Willeigh and L.  Von Willeigh-​Steyn (2015), The Bomb:  South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Programme (Pretoria: Litera). 7 See United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, www.iaea.org/​sites/​default/​ files/​unsc_​resolution2231-​2015.pdf, accessed 30 April 2017. 8 See www.iaea.org/​sites/​default/​files/​sg_​infographic.pdf, accessed 03 December 2017. 9 GOV/​2863, Strengthening the Effectiveness and Improving the Efficiency of the Safeguards System, IAEA, 03 May 1996, www.iaea.org/​About/​Policy/​GC/​GC40/​ Documents/​gov2863.html, accessed 30 April 2017. 10 IAEA (1198), Model Protocol Additional to the Agreements between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, Vienna, INFCIRC/​540 (Corrected).

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74  Sustainable disarmament 11 There is a provision in each comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreement that gives the IAEA the right to carry out special inspections when its suspicions are raised. Decisions made in relation to the Additional Protocol have all but eliminated this provision from being a practical measure, raising the political specter of suspicion with steps to implement a special inspection, thereby effectively denying it any potential role. 12 www.iaea.org/​safeguards/​safeguards-​in-​practice/​development-​of-​a-​safeguards-​ approach, accessed 22 May 2017.

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6  IAEA disarmament missions

This chapter addresses the six responsibilities that should be assigned to the IAEA in relation to the TPNW (or any other nuclear disarmament framework).

6.1  Disposition of fissile material transferred from nuclear weapons use As presented in Chapter 4, fissile material from the nuclear weapons complex would be released from use for nuclear weapons after all classified properties have been removed, and after the fissile materials have been physically transferred to disposition under the new safeguards agreement to be concluded with the IAEA. Continuing to stockpile these fissile materials could enable possible breakout scenarios, worry nuclear adversaries, provide encouragement for would-​be proliferator States, and leave targets for terrorists to obtain fissile materials through force or guile. Hence, for sustainable disarmament, it will be necessary to ensure that fissile material from disarmament cannot be reused by the State—​or any other party—​to manufacture new or replacement warheads. This can be accomplished by modifying the fissile material to make it at least no more usable than other forms of fissile material available to the State through its peaceful nuclear activities, or better, to dispose of it in a manner that will make it practicably irrecoverable. 6.1.1  HEU disposition High enriched uranium (HEU), or highly enriched uranium as I prefer, is currently used in nuclear weapons, as fuel for some nuclear powered naval vessels, as fuel in some research reactors, as fuel in Russian fast breeder reactors, as fuel in some space power reactors, and as target material for the production of 99mTc for medical imaging purposes. In the past, HEU was also to be used to fuel high temperature gas cooled reactors such as the Fort St. Vrain reactor, which was not successful.1

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76  Sustainable disarmament While initially seen as appropriate for widespread use, after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the dangers inherent in HEU came to be seen as too risky to pursue. Alvarez’s claim says it all: With modern weapons-​grade uranium … terrorists, if they had such material, would have a good chance of setting off a high yield explosion simply by dropping one half of the material onto the other half … Even a high school student could make a bomb in short order.2 Responding to this realization, international efforts to remove HEU have included replacing HEU fuels with LEU in research reactors,3 and repatriating remaining stocks of HEU to their providers.4 The disposition of HEU from disarmament should not lead to its use for any other purpose. As HEU is produced by enriching the amount of 235U from the amount contained in as-​mined “natural” uranium to much greater amounts (i.e., from 00.712% to 90+ %), it is both technically possible and financially profitable to down blend HEU down to 3–​5%, enabling it to be used as fuel in the most common nuclear power reactors. The United States purchased 500t of HEU released from the Russian nuclear weapons program.5 Figure 6.1 shows the diagram for HEU down blending process.6

Figure 6.1  Converting HEU from nuclear weapons into LEU fuel assemblies.

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IAEA disarmament missions 77 Down blending should be the universal TPNW disposition strategy for all HEU. Given the international concerns regarding access to HEU, nuclear disarmament should include efforts to eventually ban all uses of HEU and to down blend all remaining stocks.7 Note that most nuclear-​armed States probably have the capability required to down blend their HEU. They may be hesitant to make use of capabilities that might be provided by TPNW through the IAEA, taking benefit of an extraterritorial arrangement assuring the interests of all involved. But others might benefit from the availability of the operations shown in Figure 6.1.8 6.1.2  Plutonium Compared to HEU, plutonium disposition is a far less straightforward. First, no amount of isotopic dilution or irradiation can render plutonium taken from nuclear weapons physically incapable of supporting a fast fission chain reaction, thereby allowing it to be removed from the category of weapon-​ usable fissile material. Blending weapon plutonium to “reactor-​grade” plutonium isotopics would make its use in weapons somewhat more complicated, but not impossible. In NPT safeguards in non-​nuclear weapon States, the IAEA (at the insistence of the NPT nuclear weapon States), applies the same safeguards intensity to all plutonium encountered in peaceful use programs. The only exception is heat source plutonium containing 80% or more of the isotope 238Pu, producing 567 watts per kilogram of 238Pu contained, where any amount of such plutonium can be exempted from safeguards because of this heat complication. In addition, while the technology does not currently exist, it would be possible, at least in principle, to enrich any plutonium to weapon-​grade or perhaps even super grade levels. “States have been willing to make large investments in some cases to acquire weapon-​grade rather than reactor-​grade plutonium: the United States, for example, in the 1980s, considered spending billions of dollars on the Special Isotope Separation facility to enrich reactor-​ grade plutonium to weapon-​grade.”9 Next, steps can be taken that would increase the time and effort required to recover the plutonium for use in nuclear weapons. Blending natural or depleted uranium with the plutonium to produce a 1:1 mixture of Pu and U enables the mixture to be used as-​is for making mixed oxide fuel for nuclear power reactors, by adding additional natural or depleted uranium to obtain the required plutonium content (typically 3–​5% in light water reactors, and as much as 30% in fast neutron reactors).10 A mixture of plutonium and uranium could be separated to recover the Pu for use in nuclear weapons, but that would require another process stage, which could provide another possible opportunity for detection. If a State is going to use its plutonium for making reactor fuel, then blending to produce a 1:1 Pu:U mixture for storing the plutonium should be undertaken until it is required—​especially if the mixing and the storage facility is managed under an extra-​territorial arrangement.11

78

78  Sustainable disarmament If taken by a terrorist organization, mixed Pu/​U could create a significant impediment to its use. Third, weapon plutonium can be used to make fuel for nuclear power reactors, and when it is irradiated to a minimum level, the plutonium becomes qualitatively the same as plutonium produced as a natural byproduct of using LEU fuels, or used to fuel fast reactors.12 But with additional effort within the reach of all nuclear-​armed States, the plutonium remaining after irradiation could still be used to manufacture nuclear weapons. Fourth, disarmament could boost plutonium fuel usage, but should it? If so, the objective would be to render weapon plutonium not better for use in nuclear weapons than any reactor-​grade plutonium. The TPNW Parties and NPT Parties should consider whether any use of plutonium as fuel is appropriate under any condition, or whether the world would be better served with a global zero plutonium usage strategy. Plutonium usage was originally sold on the premise that uranium supplies would soon be exhausted, but “Uranium resources and production are on the rise with the security of uranium supply ensured for the long term,” according to a recent report by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).13 Most important is the fact that despite decades of massive investment, the use of plutonium to fuel nuclear reactors has at best been marginally successful—​technologically or economically. Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom have discontinued earlier programs. Japan is struggling. Russia and China are still building their programs, and India is experimenting. Only France has achieved a measure of success, but here, too, it is likely that a no plutonium usage strategy would also benefit France and make its nuclear power program more acceptable. Without a ban on plutonium, progress in disarmament may make plutonium usage more common. Pursuing the peaceful plutonium use could provide a justification for maintaining a State’s technical competence in plutonium processing technology, which would be handy if the State were to ever reconsider its disarmament commitments. Hence, an outright ban on plutonium use, or at least a prolonged moratorium, would be sensible. If a ban or moratorium isn’t possible, then again recognizing that the interests and capabilities of the nine nuclear-​armed States are not the same, the TPNW Parties should consider the merits of extraterritorial arrangements for plutonium storage and peaceful use facilities.14 Fifth, a nuclear-​armed State (or a group of States) could intentionally make the plutonium as difficult to process as possible and then isolate it from the biosphere so that it would be impossible or at least extremely difficult to recover. This is the best strategy to pursue, for disarmament, non-​ proliferation, and the prevention of nuclear terrorism. The TPNW Parties should consider how plutonium should be dispositioned under the intention that no one should be able to extract the plutonium after that, and perhaps request the IAEA to develop the necessary ways and means.

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IAEA disarmament missions 79

Figure 6.2 International Tokomak Fusion Power Reactor. “In southern France, 35 nations are collaborating to build the world’s largest tokamak, a magnetic fusion device that has been designed to prove the feasibility of fusion as a large-​scale and carbon-​free source of energy based on the same principle that powers our Sun and stars. … In the space of one year, the Tokamak bioshield has risen 20 meters. The circular structure, as thick as 3.2 meters in some areas, is designed to protect workers and the environment from radiation generated by the fusion reaction.” (Description from ITER.org web site.) Source: ITER Organization/​EJF Riche.

The operations associated with the US “dilute and dispose” (or “can-​in-​ canister”) process should be considered as one of the technologies warranting investigation.15 That process involves converting plutonium metal to oxide, and blending it with an inert adulterant mixture of cementing, gelling, thickening, and foaming agents to make its recovery very difficult.16 The void within each canister surrounding the cans containing the adulterated plutonium would be filled with molten high-​level radioactive waste and vitrified, as shown in Figure 6.3.17 Under the US concept, canisters containing this adulterated plutonium would be placed in a repository with the intention that they would never be

80

80  Sustainable disarmament 0.6 Meter (2 feet)

High-level Radioactive Waste Glass

3 Meters (10 feet)

Cans of Immobilized Plutonium

High-level Radioactive Waste Canister

Figure 6.3 The “can-​in-​canister” immobilization concept would convert surplus plutonium to an oxide form, as needed, immobilize the plutonium oxide within a glass matrix, seal the immobilized plutonium cans, load the cans into magazines, place the magazines into canisters, and fill the canisters with vitrified high-​level waste. The filled canisters would be sealed and transferred to a repository for irretrievable storage.

retrieved. Ideally this might be in a deep bore hole repository, some 2–​3 km underground, grouted after the canisters are emplaced. The TPNW could undertake to ensure that such a conditioning/​disposal option should be used by all nuclear-​armed States, and jointly with NPT

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IAEA disarmament missions 81 Parties, to establish viable technologies for the direct disposal of plutonium transitioned from disarmament under extraterritorial arrangements and from nascent plutonium use programs.18 6.1.3  Disposition inspection activities Any plutonium designated for direct disposal should contain no classified properties, and no direct disposal facility should be located on a national security site. Hence, normal IAEA safeguards procedures and equipment can and should be employed. Under the authority of the TPNW and the specific provisions of a new safeguards agreement concluded between each nuclear-​armed State and the IAEA following the model shown in Annex A.3, the IAEA would: (a) Verify the facilities identified by the State for the storage, processing, disposal, or use of fissile material transferred from nuclear disarmament, including fissile material transferred before the entry into force of the new IAEA safeguards agreement. The State would provide design information, which IAEA inspectors would examine and verify following practices similar to those employed for IAEA safeguards in NNWS. IAEA inspectors would have the right to re-​verify the design information to assure that the safeguard measures the IAEA applies remain appropriate. (b) Based upon an initial inventory report when the new safeguards agreement enters into force, and inventory change reports submitted thereafter, IAEA inspectors would verify the amounts and characteristics of each batch of fissile material on inventory or received using standard IAEA safeguards procedures, including item counting and identification, and quantitative verification according to a sampling plan to detect gross, partial, and bias defects. The quantitative measurements would make use of weight or volume measurements, sampling for laboratory analysis, and/​or radiometric non-​destructive assay measurements. (c) IAEA inspectors would verify the storage of said materials and make use of containment and surveillance to maintain continuity of knowledge of the verified amounts pending processing and disposition, including the use of unattended monitoring systems to maintain continuous knowledge of the stored fissile material inventory. (d) Based on advance notification from the State, IAEA inspectors would verify the transfer from the storage facility to the processing facility, and verify the processing of the fissile material to prepare it for disposal or use. IAEA inspectors would verify the amounts of any nuclear material to be used to denature or dilute the fissile material declared by the State in an inventory change report; compute the characteristics of the declared mixture; verify the mixing as it occurs; verify the end product by item counting and identification, weight or volume measurement together

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82  Sustainable disarmament with sampling for laboratory analysis, the use of radiometric non-​ destructive assay measurements, application of containment, and surveillance measures; and verify the storage of the processed fissile material. (e) IAEA inspectors would verify the denaturing all plutonium released from use in nuclear weapons (and any other plutonium with the same nominal concentration of 239Pu) through a two-​step process: i. Mixing the weapon plutonium with plutonium containing more than 20% 240Pu to make the plutonium less suitable for use in established nuclear weapon designs, and ii. Mixing the plutonium with equal amounts of depleted or natural uranium so as to require additional processing before said plutonium could be used in any nuclear weapon. (f) For HEU blended down to LEU, IAEA inspectors would verify the HEU before down blending; during down blending to confirm that the declared HEU is actually being down blended; and following down blending, to confirm the transfer of the LEU product to a fuel fabrication facility. (g) Based on advance notification from the State, IAEA inspectors would verify the processed plutonium to be placed into an approved repository, the storage locations selected for the processed plutonium, and the actual emplacement of the processed plutonium into the selected storage locations; and they would secure the repository storage space in situ for each batch of processed plutonium. (h) IAEA inspectors should maintain assurance that processed plutonium remains in the repository space thereafter, by means of containment and surveillance measures including the use of seismography and satellite imagery as and when appropriate.

6.2  Conversion of mission-​critical nuclear weapon facilities to peaceful use As presented in Part I, INDA would be responsible for certifying that a given facility at a stipulated location was actually used to provide the declared mission-​critical services declared by the State to design, manufacture, test or maintain its nuclear arsenal. INDA would also confirm when the State decides to eliminate a weapon facility, i.e., by physically demolishing the structure, when a nuclear-​armed State so decides. The IAEA will make certain that mission-​critical nuclear weapon complex facilities that are not going to be eliminated, but are to be converted to peaceful use, non-​explosive military nuclear use, or to non-​nuclear applications, are, in fact, converted to such use and are not subsequently returned to nuclear weapon use. A facility that is converted to non-​nuclear use will be easier to verify than one converted to nuclear use for non-​nuclear weapon programs. In either case, the IAEA must ensure that there are no hidden capabilities within such a structure, or access ways (i.e., tunnels, for example) that could allow the

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IAEA disarmament missions 83 facility to mask a hidden capability. The IAEA should be able to require the State to take specific steps as necessary to render the facility irreversibly converted away from weapons use. IAEA verification would determine that the facility has been modified to perform its new mission and reconfirm this new use from time to time. For this purpose, the IAEA should make use of satellite imagery, environmental sampling, and ground penetrating radar, and should also make use of short-​ notice on-​site inspections, as it may deem appropriate. If the IAEA believes that environmental sampling could provide additional assurance, then it should obtain baseline samples and thereafter take samples within and around the facility to detect any activities that would not be consistent with the new mission identified by the State. For a facility that will be converted to a non-​explosive nuclear program, the IAEA will need to assess the risk that the facility poses in relation to possible undeclared use to support nuclear weapons activities and devise a safeguards approach to assure that that does not happen. IAEA inspectors will need to consider each facility in each nuclear-​armed State as part of the NASLA for that State. While most former weapon facilities should not pose complicated safeguards challenges, three types of facilities may: (a) Plutonium production reactors may be converted to isotope production missions for medical and industrial applications. The reactor should be modified as necessary to only produce plutonium containing 20% or more of 240Pu. As such, they will still continue to produce plutonium, requiring safeguards to assure that all such production is declared, that the reactor(s) are not used for undeclared irradiation to produce plutonium (or 233U), and that spent fuel remains under safeguards and is not diverted thereafter. (b) Reprocessing plants that extract plutonium from low burn-​up fuels for weapons use may be used long after the end of production to process any backlog of spent fuel, or to clean up left over materials in part for waste management purposes; or they might be operated to reprocess spent fuel from research reactors, naval reactors, or even nuclear power reactors with whatever modifications are needed. If so, the reprocessing plants must be safeguarded as for plants designed for peaceful use, noting that weapon reprocessing plants were generally not designed to facilitate inspections by a third party, nor have they been designed to cope with the radiation environments typical of high burn-​up LEU reactor fuel. Reprocessing plants present significant challenges for safeguards, and re-​ purposed reprocessing plants are certain to be difficult to safeguard and likely to produce results that are always in question. (c) A nuclear-​armed State could declare that one or more of its enrichment plants that had produced HEU would need to continue to operate to produce HEU to fuel its warships or to sustain the operation of its

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84  Sustainable disarmament specialized research reactors or nuclear-​ powered military satellites. HEU enrichment plants might operate intermittently, when and as such requirements arise, being maintained on operational standby, preserving the ability to operate when needed. Or HEU enrichment plants might be redesigned to produce LEU. The safeguards methods for such instances will need to take into consideration that HEU particles will remain in the plant, making the use of environmental sampling questionable.

6.3  Diversion of declared stocks and undeclared production of weapon-​usable nuclear material at declared facilities This section addresses the diversion of weapon-​usable nuclear material that could be used to manufacture nuclear weapons without reprocessing or further enrichment. These weapon-​ usable nuclear materials include existing stocks of any plutonium containing less than 80% 238Pu, any stocks of HEU, 233 U, 237Np, or 241Am, as might exist in nuclear-​armed State in any program other than the State’s nuclear weapon program. This section includes the production of such materials within such programs, and the possible misuse of facilities dedicated to such programs for the undeclared production of weapon-​usable nuclear material for use in nuclear weapons (or for other nuclear explosives or for purposes unknown), should the State decide to rearm. IAEA non-​ proliferation safeguards already include this mission, and hence, the role of the IAEA to meet this requirement will be essentially the same as for non-​nuclear weapon States parties to the NPT. The effort required of the IAEA and of the nuclear-​armed States to meet this requirement will be substantial, and it may be necessary to begin modestly and expand as and when appropriate. In non-​proliferation, the safeguards system is organized to detect the diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material, and “significant” is understood to correspond to the amounts required for a non-​nuclear weapon State to build its first nuclear weapon. In the case of disarmament, the amount that is “significant” for one nuclear-​armed State may be “insignificant” to another. And the amount that is significant to a nuclear-​armed State may change depending on various factors. Hence, the verification system performance requirements must be targeted to each nuclear-​armed State, and be adjusted from time-​to-​time to assure that they remain meaningful. That said, the methods to be applied are the same, and the safeguards literature created since the IAEA opened for business is largely applicable. IAEA publications and the proceedings of IAEA Safeguards Symposia, ESARDA (European Safeguards Research & Development Association), and INMM (Institute of Nuclear Materials Management) annual meetings provide rich resources for understanding the specifics of traditional IAEA safeguards implementation.

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IAEA disarmament missions 85 Some of the nine nuclear-​armed States also have extensive nuclear power programs. Applying traditional IAEA safeguards will require a substantial inspection effort, possibly doubling the current IAEA Safeguards Department. It will require adapting safeguards to some facilities that are already in operation, modifying some facilities where the existing arrangements would not allow effective safeguards to be applied, and special arrangements for design information verification or for the installation of safeguards equipment usually used in such facilities when the facilities are highly contaminated and essentially inaccessible. For two nuclear-​armed States, France and the United Kingdom, the safeguards arrangements could also require defining shared activities with Euratom.19 6.3.1  Plutonium Note that heat source plutonium containing 80% or more of 238Pu has been used in radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) for military and non-​ military space use. No other military applications of plutonium are known (other than nuclear weapons). Aside from Japan, which is not a nuclear-​armed State, efforts to make use of plutonium for nuclear energy purposes have been pursued mainly by nuclear-​armed States. Their programs vary greatly.

• • • • • • •

France has seen the greatest success, and has sold reprocessing technology to Japan, Pakistan, and perhaps to Israel. Three commercial reprocessing plants were built in the United States, and a fourth was in planning when the US Government decided to prohibit reprocessing. Russia operates a medium size reprocessing plant and has had a large plant under construction for more than a decade. China does not seem to have decided. India operates two small reprocessing plants. North Korea has a small reprocessing plant which was central to its cheating on its safeguards obligations. The United Kingdom built a large plant (THORP) that was financed through contracts with non-​nuclear weapon States. It has not been without significant technical problems, and THORP will soon be decommissioned.

It is not clear whether disarmament would encourage the nuclear-​armed States to pursue peaceful uses of plutonium. Their reasons for not following France are not due to shortages of uranium. Each would have to examine the overall costs of disposal vs. peaceful use, which would likely differ from State to State. As the nuclear-​ armed States sign onto the TPNW and conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, the IAEA may go through several steps to fully implement the safeguards on the State’s peaceful nuclear energy

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86  Sustainable disarmament programs where plutonium is used or produced, or could be produced, or could be substituted for plutonium diverted from other activities so as to make detection more difficult.20 Implementation should be in accordance with the NASLA for that State, which should be updated annually. Inspection activities might focus first on the existing stocks of plutonium and the operational modalities of the reprocessing plant(s), plutonium conversion operations (plutonium nitrate to oxide, or mixed Pu:U nitrates to MOX), and MOX fuel fabrication plants. At some point, the scope of verification should address accumulated spent fuel assemblies in the State. The verification parameters should be intensified from time to time as progress toward the elimination of the State’s nuclear weapons comes about. The IAEA Board of Governors in consultation with the INDA Nuclear Disarmament Council should decide these adjustments. IAEA safeguards at reprocessing plants21,22 and MOX fuel fabrication plants23 in NNWS are very demanding in terms of technical challenges, manpower, and equipment costs.24 The methods used are limited in their sensitivity and for large scale plants, the ability to detect the diversion of enough plutonium to make one bomb cannot be assured by focusing solely on a reprocessing plant. In a nuclear-​armed State, where safeguards would have to be designed around operating plants with high contamination, the capabilities as related to the reprocessing plants alone would be less sensitive. Implementing IAEA safeguards at existing, highly contaminated reprocessing plants will pose additional challenges. Nuclear materials accountancy serves as the foundation for safeguarding reprocessing and MOX plants. Applying IAEA safeguards at operating plants in the nuclear-​armed States will require significant funding for the specialized equipment required and several years to obtain, install and commission the safeguards equipment for the required capabilities. IAEA verification of direct-​use plutonium would extend to MOX production and to any reactor that operates on fuel containing plutonium. As noted earlier, keeping an option open would enable a State to continue working with plutonium, which to some extent would better enable it to revert to nuclear weapons, if it so decided. And such programs would, to some extent, continue to fuel proliferation aspirations and possibly enable nuclear terrorism. With no shortage of uranium, with the costs for renewable energy production becoming increasingly competitive, and with the prospects for fusion power promising, plutonium use does not seem to be justified. If a decision is made to ban (or at least postpone) the peaceful use of plutonium, then these limitations would go away, the certainty associated with verifying disarmament would be significantly improved, and the costs for disarmament verification will be dramatically less. 6.3.2  HEU While a few non-​nuclear weapon States Parties to the NPT enrich uranium (Japan, Germany, the Netherlands), none produce HEU.

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Figure 6.4 Reprocessing Plant Design Information Verification Workshop, Dounreay Reprocessing Plant, 1989. Verifying design information in reprocessing plants enables IAEA inspectors to understand how plutonium might be diverted, or how a plant might process amounts of plutonium in excess of declared values. As disarmament proceeds, the IAEA will be required to inspect reprocessing plants in all nuclear-​armed States, including old plants built with little thought given to international inspection. © Dounreay Site Restoration Ltd and NDA. Reprinted with permission from Dounreay Site Restoration Ltd and NDA.

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union essentially gave away HEU fueled research reactors. Since 9/​11, substantial progress has been made to remove HEU from non-​nuclear weapon States and return it to the supplier nuclear-​armed States; reduced usage of HEU in nuclear-​ armed States has focused on research reactors that are not operated by the governments of those States. Such reactors were often poorly protected against possible HEU theft, and for the most part, modest design changes make it possible for most of those reactors to use LEU fuels. Under each new safeguards agreement concluded between a nuclear-​armed State and the IAEA, verification should include: (a) Existing stocks of HEU, including remaining HEU stocks for use in research reactors, possible space power reactors in civilian programs, remaining stocks of HEU set aside for fuel manufacturing and HEU at peaceful use reactor fuel manufacturing plants;

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88  Sustainable disarmament (b) Surplus HEU stocks set aside for use in non-​ explosive military applications;25 (c) Confidence-​building measures to demonstrate that any other military programs are bona fide, in particular the use of neutron fluence tabs installed adjacent to each reactor to confirm that the HEU is used only for its declared mission; (d) New production of HEU arising from cleaning out, dismantling, and decommissioning HEU enrichment or utilization facilities, including modification of HEU reactors to LEU fuels; (e) Transition from HEU to LEU for all non-​explosive military applications; (f) Imports from or exports to any other State of HEU; and (g) Possible undeclared HEU production in any declared enrichment plant on the territory of the nuclear-​armed State or anywhere under its control. The IAEA has extensive experience in applying safeguards at peaceful use centrifuge enrichment plants in URENCO plants in Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and in other plants in Japan and in China.26 While much of this experience would be immediately applicable, remaining contamination at plants that have produced HEU could make the use of environmental sampling problematic for detecting new HEU production. 6.3.3  233U, 237Np and 241Am U has been used in experimental nuclear explosions.27 The United States detonated an experimental device with a plutonium/​233U composite pit in the 1955. The first hydrogen bomb detonated by the Soviet Union contained a fissile core of 235U and 233U. And India detonated an experimental 233U device in 1998. 233 U has a higher fission cross section than 235U. It can be produced in unlimited amounts by irradiating thorium in nuclear reactors. A  233U fuel cycle is being pursued in India,28 and private interests propose that a thorium-​233U fuel cycle offers distinct benefits over a uranium-​plutonium fuel cycle.29 The main reason it isn’t used more commonly30 is that when thorium is irradiated, 232 U is also produced, and as 232U decays, one of its daughter products, 208Tl, emits a 2.7 MeV gamma ray. This gamma ray is very penetrating and poses a substantial radiation dosage risk to anyone nearby. 233 U does not have an appreciable spontaneous fission rate, like 240Pu, for example, and hence could be used in a gun-​type nuclear weapon, or, more efficiently, in an implosion weapon. The United States inadvertently informed the IAEA of the potential use of 237Np or 241Am in nuclear weapons, and subsequently, IAEA safeguards in non-​nuclear weapon States were modified to include these “alternative nuclear materials.” An open web search reveals no indication that either 237Np or 241Am have been used in a nuclear explosive. 233

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IAEA disarmament missions 89 237 Np is produced in nuclear reactors through neutron capture in 235U producing 236U, then neutron capture in 236U producing 237U, which decays by β emission to produce 237Np. The amount of 237Np produced in this way is on the order of a percent of the plutonium produced. 237Np is also produced through α decay of 241Am. The critical mass of 237Np is slightly higher than 235U (56 vs. 53 kgs), but the average number of neutrons released per 237Np fission is higher than for 235 U fission, and Np compresses more readily than uranium. The spontaneous fission rate is low, and hence, 237Np might be used as a substitute for HEU in gun-​type or implosion weapons.31 241 Am is produced through several mechanisms during irradiation, and as the daughter product of 241Pu, which decays by β emission. The half-​life of 241Pu is 14.3 years, and hence each year, about 5% of the remaining 241Pu decays to 241Am. α decay of 241Am produces about 110 W/​kg of heat (as compared with 567 W/​kg for 238Pu), requiring a possible weapon to include a heat rejection capability. 233 U, 237Np and 241Am could be used in nuclear weapons. Their properties are not as compelling as Pu containing high fractions of 239Pu, or HEU. However, as progress toward the elimination of existing nuclear arsenals proceeds, nuclear-​armed States might be tempted to make use of these materials, out of desperation—​or in the belief that the chance of getting caught would be significantly less than if the State opts for Pu and/​or HEU usage. IAEA disarmament safeguards should therefore require each nuclear-​ armed State report separated inventories of 233U, 237Np and 241Am, their existing separation and utilization technologies, and the IAEA should verify those existing stocks and any programs specifically intended to separate these nuclides, or to use them in appreciable amounts.

6.3.4  Diversion of indirect-​use nuclear material As a nuclear-​armed State’s arsenal drops below a certain level (say 10% of its initial declaration, for example), the relevant provisions of the disarmament safeguards agreement should be extended to include all remaining nuclear materials, including reprocessed, depleted, natural, and low enriched uranium, and thorium. INDA and the IAEA will need to determine how to phase in coverage and how and when to intensify the verification efforts as additional assurances become essential for disarmament to proceed. At that point in the process, transitioning to a single nuclear material control regime applicable to all States should be anticipated, using the standard contained in all IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements for NNWS: detecting the diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.32

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6.4  Clandestine production of weapon-​usable nuclear material A nuclear-​ armed State, if it would consider cheating on its TPNW commitments, would probably resort to a clandestine production program taking all steps to avoid discovery. For the IAEA inspectors to detect such cheating and inform the Board of Governors, the Nuclear Disarmament Council, and the UN Security Council of its findings in time to allow for an intervention, the IAEA must be able to essentially go anywhere where suspicions point, and implement inspection procedures that will quickly clarify the circumstances. Information prompting the IAEA to seek access to a suspected location might originate from a wide range of IAEA inspection activities carried out at declared facilities in the nuclear-​armed State (or another State), from environmental samples or satellite imagery obtained by the IAEA, from other information arising from other IAEA programs, information provided by Member States (including intelligence information), information from corporate transaction partners, suppliers of sensitive equipment, or possibly from the public keeping a watchful eye. However such information arrives at the IAEA, the Agency will need to determine how it should be considered, whether or not an investigation is warranted, whether or not visits to specific locations should be pursued, and whether questions should be posed to the State officials responsible or to individuals who may be complicit in an attempt to rearm. The IAEA would assess all new items of information from all sources, determine actions it should take to determine whether or not a State might be pursuing rearmament, and act on that information with all due speed. The penalties for false suspicions may be embarrassing, but for missing signals of an actual attempt at rearming the penalties may include missing a chance to avert nuclear conflict. The ability of a nuclear-​armed State to succeed in pursuing a clandestine program could involve locating some or all such activities on the State’s military bases. While the IAEA must have the authority to go anywhere to resolve any questions or suspicions as might arise, this will be the single most difficult verification mission for the IAEA to carry out and for the nuclear-​armed State to allow. To detect clandestine facilities, undeclared stocks of fissile material, or any related production or processing activities, the IAEA must know where to look, have the authority to send inspectors to the locations identified, have access to those locations, and have verification methods available to substantiate whether or not the State is in fact carrying out the clandestine activities in question and whether any facilities, materials, or processing activities discovered might be aimed at secretly reconstituting the State’s nuclear arsenal. Every nuclear-​armed State will be especially wary of espionage regarding its military capabilities and its possible vulnerabilities, and will hence be inclined to reject or severely limit IAEA inspector access and the verification activities that the inspectors would be allowed to carry out.33

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IAEA disarmament missions 91 Information provided by IAEA Member States to the IAEA should be honest and factual—​but it may not be.34 States have been known to provide bogus information to raise unwarranted suspicions. The IAEA (and INDA) must continue to challenge such information until IAEA (or INDA) inspectors have confirmed its veracity. The IAEA must be allowed to receive sensitive information if it is to detect rearmament, and it must be able to handle such information in accordance with strict guidelines that should be clearly specified. Where the information is valid, and IAEA inspectors are permitted to carry out inspection activities at such sites, if the IAEA discovers something suspicious, it would have not only be able to define the specifics in each case, but might also have to determine whether or not the nuclear-​armed State carried out the suspicious activities before or after the TPNW entered into force in that nuclear-​armed State, and before or after the new safeguards agreement between the nuclear-​armed State and the IAEA entered into force. The following steps will help to make this element of the disarmament verification system successful at any suspect location, including military bases, private property or any governmental location: (a) The IAEA could offer rewards to incentivize individuals to come forward with information regarding violations by a nuclear-​armed State of its obligations under the TPNW or the new safeguards agreement concluded between the IAEA and a nuclear-​armed State. (b) Each nuclear-​armed State should declare to the IAEA all locations at which it stored, produced, processed or used any weapon usable nuclear material for any purpose. Finding such material anywhere else would then constitute prima facie evidence supporting an allegation of non-​ compliance with the IAEA safeguards agreement, and with the TPNW. (c) The IAEA should establish a verification baseline at each such facility that would enable it to distinguish between any weapon usable nuclear material introduced or activity occurring after completing its baseline verification. (d) The IAEA should seek corroborating information to support each accusation from other IAEA Member States regarding any suggestion of cheating. (e) The IAEA should secure relevant satellite imagery from other IAEA Member States and from commercial satellite imagery sources before confronting the nuclear-​armed State. (f) The IAEA might one day be authorized to employ drones for video surveillance and for measurements relevant to a Stated enquiry when deemed necessary to determine whether or not a nuclear-​armed State is in compliance with its new IAEA safeguards agreement at a suspected location. (g) The safety of the inspectors must be assured, and they must be able to communicate as needed, securely, and reliably.

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6.5  Unconventional acquisition paths for weapon-​usable nuclear material A State may become so desperate to improve its security position that it might resort to desperate measures, and the IAEA should include such possibilities in its scope of responsibilities, including nuclear black-​market operations, extortion, embezzlement, or even forcible seizures. Addressing these concerns will require the IAEA to cooperate with crime fighting organizations, including Interpol and national investigative bodies having domestic and international reach.35

6.6  Historical production, imports/​exports, and disposition of weapon-​usable nuclear material For the international community to have confidence in the process of disarmament, the IAEA and INDA will need to create a complete and accurate dossier on each nuclear-​armed State, including the amounts of weapon-​usable nuclear material potentially available to the State if it were to rearm. Each dossier will be developed separately and be updated as new information becomes available, starting with the entry into force of the TPNW and the IAEA and INDA agreements. The IAEA and INDA will jointly carry out forensic investigations of each nuclear-​armed State to determine—​as best they are able—​the amounts of fissile material produced or acquired by each State for use, or possible use, in its nuclear weapons program, and the subsequent disposition of that material. The IAEA forensic investigations should include and the amounts of weapon-​usable nuclear material produced through its peaceful use programs, or otherwise acquired.36 These investigations will include the amounts of weapon-​usable nuclear material consumed or exported. These investigations will involve inter alia, declarations made by each nuclear-​ armed State; modeling and computations; sample-​taking at all current and past enrichment, reprocessing, and plutonium or uranium metal production and processing facilities and associated waste management facilities; relevant domestic records and reports; and interviews with persons responsible for such programs at any time in the history of the State’s nuclear weapon enterprise, and with workers engaged in all relevant areas. These investigations will differ in scope and complexity from State to State, and will be all the more difficult because of the time and circumstances associated with past production. To try to converge to the extent possible, the initial report and the initial estimates will be compared after three years. The State will include any new information that has come to light since the original estimates were provided. The State, INDA, and the IAEA will then consult to understand the basis for the other’s work and to revise their respective figures as they feel justified. This process may be repeated three, six, and nine years following the initial submissions. By ten years following the entry into

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IAEA disarmament missions 93 force of the IAEA disarmament safeguards agreement, the State, INDA, and the IAEA shall conclude that their combined estimate reflects a full and comprehensive Statement of the amounts of weapon-​usable nuclear material produced, imported, exported, consumed, removed by radioactive decay, processed as waste, or remaining on inventory, with estimated uncertainty associated with each such species.

Notes 1 M. Fisher (1997), Fort St. Vrain Decommissioning Project, IAEA, see www.iaea. org/​inis/​collection/​NCLCollectionStore/​_​Public/​29/​059/​29059906.pdf, accessed 10 December 2016. 2 See W. Potter (2008), “Nuclear Terrorism and the Global Politics of Civilian HEU Elimination,” The Nonproliferation Review, 15: pp. 135–​158. 3 See www.rertr.anl.gov/​, accessed 10 December 2016. 4 See www.nti.org/​analysis/​articles/​past-​and-​current-​civilian-​heu-​reduction-​efforts/​, accessed 10 December 2016. 5 W. Broad (2014), “From Warheads to Cheap Energy:  Thomas L.  Neff’s Idea Turned Russian Warheads into American Electricity,” New  York Times, 26 January 2014, www.nytimes.com/​2014/​01/​28/​science/​thomas-​l-​neffs-​idea-​turned-​ russian-​warheads-​into-​american-​electricity.html, accessed 9 December 2016. 6 See Turning Nuclear Weapons into Nuclear Fuel, Interesting Engineering (2017), https://​interestingengineering.com/​turning-​nuclear-​warheads-​into-​nuclear-​fuel, accessed 8 June 2018. 7 HEU is currently used to fuel nuclear-​powered naval vessels in the United States and the United Kingdom (at 93% enrichment), and in Russia and India (at about 40%) enrichment. If Russia deploys nuclear-​armed undersea drones, these would likely be powered by small HEU fueled reactors. Stocks of HEU will be needed as fuel reserves until States using HEU can shift to LEU fuels. 8 T. Shea and F.  Morris (2009), Extra-​Territorial Siting of Nuclear Installations, PNNL-​SA-​67207, Proceedings of the 2009 Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Abstract 105. 9 US Department of Energy (1997), Reactor-​Grade and Weapons-​Grade Plutonium in Nuclear Explosives, See www.ccnr.org/​plute.html, accessed 10 December 2016. 10 In Japan, plutonium reprocessed from spent nuclear reactor fuel is in the form of a mixed nitric acid solution containing equal amounts of plutonium and uranium, which is subsequently converted using a microwave denitration process to mixed oxide (Pu+U)O2. This step is a non-​proliferation and an anti-​terrorism measure. 11 Shea and Morris, Extra-​Territorial Siting of Nuclear Installations. 12 Under the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement concluded between Russia and the United States in 2000, each would convert 34 ton of weapon plutonium into fuel for nuclear reactors and irradiate the fuel in nuclear power reactor to the extent that the weapon plutonium would be essentially equivalent to plutonium in normal spent reactor fuel. The facilities were to process 2 tons per year, meaning that under the best circumstances the process would have required 17 years to complete, plus the time to build the necessary facilities and to keep them in operation. See Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the

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94  Sustainable disarmament Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation (as amended by a 2010 Protocol), http://​fissilematerials.org/​library/​PMDA2010.pdf. The PMDA was suspended in 2016. See “Putin Suspends Russia–​U.S. Plutonium Disposition Agreement,” www.rferl.org/​a/​russia-​plutonium-​deal-​-​suspended/​28028737.html, accessed 28 May 2018. 13 NEA and IAEA (2016), Uranium 2016: Resources, Production and Demand, www. oecd-​nea.org/​ndd/​pubs/​2016/​7301-​uranium-​2016.pdf. 14 Shea and Morris, Extra-​Territorial Siting of Nuclear Installations. 15 US Department of Energy (2015), Final Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement, DOE/​EIS-​0283-​S2, www.energy. gov/​sites/​prod/​files/​2018/​02/​f48/​DOE%202015_​SPD%20SEIS%200283-​S2.pdf, accessed 4 June 2018. 16 T. Mason, et.al. (2015), Final Report of the Plutonium Disposition Red Team, www.energy.gov/​sites/​prod/​files/​2018/​02/​f49/​Pu-​Disposition-​Red-​Team-​Report-​ 081315vFinal-​SM%5B1%5D.pdf, accessed 28 May 2018. 17 NNSA (2012), Draft Surplus Plutonium Disposition Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement, DOE/​EIS-​0283-​S2, July 2012. 18 Shea and Morris, Extra-​Territorial Siting of Nuclear Installations. 19 The IAEA and Euratom have agreed to cooperation arrangements for safeguarding nuclear facilities within the European Union, which are applied in all States of the European Union, including peaceful use facilities in France and the United Kingdom. At present, the IAEA does not inspect reprocessing plants in those two States, or their MOX fuel production plants, plutonium stores, or their MOX-​ fueled reactors. Note that as the United Kingdom leaves the European Union, these understandings will probably need to be rethought. 20 S. Johnson (2009), The Safeguards at Reprocessing Plants under a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty, Princeton University, IPFM Research Report No. 6, http://​ fissilematerials.org/​publications/​2009/​02/​the_​safeguards_​at_​reprocessing.html, accessed 12 June 2016. 21 S. Johnson and M. Ehinger (2010), Designing and Operating for Safeguards: Lessons Learned from the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant (RRP), PNNL-​19626, http://​ large.stanford.edu/​courses/​2017/​ph241/​solitario2/​docs/​pnnl_​19626.pdf, accessed 12 June 2016. 22 P. Durst, I.  Therios, R.  Bean, A.  Dougan, B.  Boyer, R.  Wallace, M.  Ehinger, D.  Kovacic and K.  Tolk (2007), Advanced Safeguards Approaches for New Reprocessing Facilities, PNNL-​16674, www.pnl.gov/​main/​publications/​external/​ technical_​reports/​pnnl-​16674.pdf, accessed 12 June 2016. 23 T. Sampei, K.  Hiruta, J.  Shimizu, and K.  Ikegame (2014), Current status of J-​ MOX safeguards design and future prospects, IAEA Safeguards Symposium 2014, www.iaea.org/​safeguards/​symposium/​2014/​home/​eproceedings/​sg2014-​papers/​ 000054.pdf, accessed 12 June 2016. 24 It is rumored that the costs to enable IAEA safeguards implementation at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant were on the order of $100M. 25 As noted, naval reactors are included under the responsibilities of INDA and are treated in Part II. 26 Two enrichment plants in China were equipped with Russian centrifuges under conditions that required China to make those facilities available for IAEA inspection as a condition of those sales. The IAEA, in cooperation with Russia and

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IAEA disarmament missions 95 China, developed a safeguards approach for one of the plants (Hanzhong) and continues to apply safeguards at that plant. 27 Wikipedia, Uranium-​233, https://​en.wikipedia.org/​wiki/​Uranium-​233, accessed 12 December 2106. 28 S. Patel (2017), India Gears Up to Expand Fast Breeder Reactor Fleet, Power, www.powermag.com/ ​ i ndia- ​ g ears- ​ u p- ​ t o- ​ expand- ​ f ast- ​ b reeder- ​ reactor- ​ f leet/ ​, accessed 15 June 2016. 29 http://​energyfromthorium.com/​lftr-​overview/​, accessed 15 June 2016. 30 India has extensive reserves of thorium but very limited uranium resources. It has in place a program to develop a breeder reactor based on 233U. During the George W.  Bush Administration, a new nuclear deal was concluded that allows India to import uranium, which is changing India’s approach to utilizing its thorium resources. 31 D. Albright and K. Kramer (2005), Neptunium and Americium: World Inventories and Proliferation Concerns, ISIS Reports, http://​isis-​online.org/​uploads/​isis-​ reports/​documents/​np_​237_​and_​americium.pdf, accessed 16 June 2016. 32 This is the safeguards objective for all non-​nuclear weapon States parties to the NPT as set forth in paragraph 28 of INFCIRC/​153. Adopting this goal would merge the safeguards requirements of all States as disarmament nears success. See www.iaea.org/​inis/​collection/​NCLCollectionStore/​_​Public/​44/​089/​ 44089080.pdf. 33 B. Gellman (1999), “U.S. Spied on Iraq Via U.N.,” The Washington Post, 2 March 1999, www.washingtonpost.com/​wp-​srv/​inatl/​daily/​march99/​unscom2.htm, accessed 08 February 2018. 34 S. Hersh (2003), “Who Lied to Whom? Why did the Administration endorse a forgery about Iraq’s nuclear program?” The New  Yorker Magazine, 31 March 2003. www.newyorker.com/​magazine/​2003/​03/​31/​who-​lied-​to-​whom, accessed 08 February 2018. 35 Perhaps the remit of the Proliferation Security Initiative might be expanded to be relevant to such considerations. 36 Note that 237Np may be extracted from uranium irradiated to produce fissile plutonium, and that 241Am is produced from 241Pu ß decay and separated when fissile plutonium is recycled, for example.

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Part IV

Building the nuclear disarmament regime

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7  Confidence-​building measures for the nuclear disarmament regime

7.1 Introduction In its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR),1 the United States sets out its program to modernize its nuclear arsenal and nuclear weapons complex in response to what it sees as increasing threats from Russia, China and North Korea. Quoting the NPR, The international security environment has deteriorated since 2010. Many previous assumptions are no longer valid. Strategic competition among states characterizes today’s environment as Russia, China, North Korea and Iran attempt to expand their influence. • RUSSIA ‒ Russia has increased its reliance on nuclear capabilities and is building a large, diverse, and modern arsenal of strategic and non-​ strategic weapons; and its doctrine emphasizes the coercive and military value of nuclear weapons. • CHINA ‒ China’s rapid military modernization, growing and diversifying nuclear arsenal, and assertive approach to expanding its geopolitical power at the expense of the sovereignty of its neighbors undermine the stability of the Indo-​Pacific region. ‒ China is rapidly modernizing its strategic and non-​strategic nuclear weapons as part of its efforts to prevent the United States from defending its allies and partners in the region. • NORTH KOREA ‒ North Korea’s continued pursuit of nuclear weapons, combined with threats against the United States and our South Korean and Japanese allies, are a major challenge to peace and security in Northeast Asia and around the world. ‒ North Korea has dramatically increased its missile flight testing, including recent ICBM tests, and has conducted six nuclear tests since 2006. Starting the process of disarmament probably couldn’t come under more challenging circumstances.

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100  Building the nuclear disarmament regime Fifty States signing the TPNW must complete their ratification processes to bring the Treaty into force. The Parties must then decide on the verification framework (INDA and IAEA). They must then create INDA and open its doors for operation, scaling up as its activities expand. The Parties should create the International Center for Nuclear Disarmament Research and Development and commence work on promising methods to solve the problems that it will confront. As the TPNW enters into force, the Parties to the TPNW, the Treaty itself, and its verification framework will serve as the foundation for the future nuclear disarmament regime. Getting the first nuclear-​armed State to begin the long march will require a sustained effort and patience. Beyond the steps identified earlier in the book, the TPNW Parties should consider additional measures to encourage the nuclear-​armed States to participate. They should seek to establish and promote a common ethic moving away from nuclear weapons. The confidence building measures suggested in this chapter might be adopted within the scope of activities that the Parties approve, as in the Statute for INDA or the assignments the Parties provide to the IAEA. Or nuclear-​armed States, acting unilaterally or in unison, might undertake such steps in support of nuclear disarmament. Some might be incorporated into bilateral agreements between nuclear-​armed States. Today the nine nuclear-​armed States are not prepared to consider phasing out their nuclear arsenals. When they finally do begin to engage in the process of disarmament—​more likely than not with one trailblazer followed eventually by others—​they will seek to limit their involvement to the absolute least. But disarmament, like non-​proliferation has for many states, will hopefully expand to provide nuclear-​armed States to engage more fully in the belief that greater security might be achieved through détente and disarmament than by accepting the costs and attendant risks of keeping their arsenals. Here, then, are ten suggestions for such additional confidence-​building measures.

7.2  Complementary bilateral arms reduction treaties Treaties and agreements between adversaries provide the most common means used to move from confrontation to hostility. The international nuclear disarmament regime should encourage such practices as mechanisms for providing the atmosphere necessary for nuclear-​armed States to begin the process of securing peace; promoting peaceful engagement and building bonds that will allow progress toward the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. As the perpetrators of any future nuclear conflict, the nuclear-​armed States have a moral imperative to avoid conflict and find peace. As the future victims of any nuclear conflict, the international community, and in particular, the Parties to the TPNW have a mandate to seek such opportunities through all possible mechanisms. Such treaties and agreements could follow the steps taken by the United States and the Soviet Union and later the Russian Federation. These enabled

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Confidence-building measures 101 the two States to cut back on their deployed arsenals, ban atmospheric testing, ban missile defense, and agree to steps to manage the disposition of plutonium from nuclear weapons. Some of these treaties remain in force and are scrupulously followed. Others have been rescinded or have failed to make it into practice. Relations between the Russian Federation and the United States are strained at present, with each taking steps to reinforce and expand their arsenals, rather than finding ways to build on their past success. Nuclear adversaries could explore practical means to gain additional assurance in those areas of disarmament that pose the greatest challenges, including warhead dismantlement, detection of clandestine production and processing of weapon-​usable nuclear material, and estimating past production of plutonium and HEU for use in nuclear weapons. Before joining the TPNW, nuclear-​armed States could support the INDA infrastructure that will be needed, in particular by helping to create, equip, and staff the INDA Center for Nuclear Disarmament Verification Research and Development. Seeking such opportunities would seem to fit the mandate proposed for the Nuclear Disarmament Council, engaging all nine nuclear-​armed States.

7.3  TPNW engagement exercises Before nuclear-​armed States are prepared to sign onto a treaty commitment that allows them no way out, it may be helpful if INDA could arrange exercises to contribute to the factual understanding of the steps each nuclear-​armed State should expect, and identify both obstacles to implementation and possible suggestions that might be examined under appropriate arrangements. Some of these might be combined exercises intended for all of nuclear-​armed States (or selected groups), possibly at the INDA Center for Nuclear Disarmament Verification Research and Development. Other exercises might be tailored to and carried out within each nuclear-​armed State.

7.4  Temporary monitoring of deployed or reserve warheads While a commitment to disarmament must involve an irreversible process leading to the eventual elimination of all existing nuclear warheads and warhead components within a State, it could be helpful to provide conditions under which a nuclear-​ armed State could submit weapons, warheads or components to INDA monitoring under the normal verification arrangements, but with the understanding that the State would maintain the right to withdraw such items if it so decided. Such a step might be helpful in convincing the adversary(ies) of a nuclear-​armed State to take measured steps providing confidence in their bona fides and encouraging reciprocal commitments. Such steps should encourage full commitments to disarmament, and should be time limited (seven years at most).

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7.5  Controls on warhead refurbishment and re-​manufacturing At some stage in the elimination of nuclear weapons within a State, it will be necessary to verify that each State is refurbishing only declared warheads or warhead components from its declared arsenal. This could mean that inspections are organized around each such facility and inspection practices adopted to provide assurance that all such operations conform to declared operations.

7.6  Export/​import controls for nuclear-​armed states The Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee regulate commerce in materials, facilities, equipment, and know-​how within the non-​proliferation regime. They control access to objects that could assist a State attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. As progress is made toward the elimination of existing nuclear weapons, it would be appropriate to introduce appropriate export/​import controls as part of the nuclear disarmament regime. At some point, the two regimes should be combined for simplicity and fairness. The organization implementing these controls could be set up as a regulatory body, issuing permits when and as appropriate. Further, the granting of such permits could require the payment of fees according to an agreed schedule by the parties that would serve to benefit from each such transaction: the supplier and the recipient/​user. These fees could cover the costs of States participating and make the overall process more effective and efficient.

7.7  Controls on fusion materials Every nuclear weapon which includes fusion energy will require deuterium, tritium and for thermonuclear weapons, enriched lithium. Controls on these materials could provide another mechanism to encourage progress towards disarmament, and another mechanism to detect cheating. Tritium gas is used in the primary elements of most nuclear weapons to boost the fission energy yield of the primary. Tritium decays by β emission with a half-​life of about 12.5  years. From time to time, the tritium charge for a nuclear weapon requires replenishment for the boosting to produce the desired outcome. A study could be undertaken by INDA to determine the cost and benefits of controlling fusion materials, including when during the process of nuclear disarmament it would be most important to introduce appropriate controls as nuclear arsenals shrink.

7.8  Standardizing dismantlement and conversion facility architecture INDA verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement and the processing of classified forms of fissile material will require special provisions in each facility

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Confidence-building measures 103 where those operations will be carried out. Given that nine States possess nuclear weapons, it would be best if standardized architectural features could be agreed that could be implemented in all nine States. Such facilities might in due course be organized under extraterritorial arrangements, as described in Section 7.9 below. It might be appropriate to have INDA finance such facilities as a means to promote progress and verification effectiveness.

7.9  Extra-​territorial siting2 Extraterritorial arrangements might be used to provide additional assurance and to assure that the nine nuclear-​armed States are treated in an equal manner. Extraterritorial facilities could be established within all nuclear-​ armed States, or could be set up so that each such facility could serve the needs of several nuclear-​armed States. Individual State facilities would be best for disarmament purposes, but consolidated extraterritorial sites might provide a practical means for States to disposition fissile material from disarmament, for example, especially facilities to condition and dispose of plutonium in suitable geological repositories. If peaceful uses of plutonium from disarmament are allowed, then carrying out such activities under extraterritorial arrangements could provide access to States that could not afford to proceed alone, including nuclear-​armed States and non-​nuclear weapon States Parties to the NPT.

7.10  Antineutrinos Elementary particle physics may provide important capabilities to detect clandestine plutonium (or 233U) production in support of disarmament and non-​proliferation. Antineutrinos are the anti-​matter partners to neutrinos. They carry no electrical charge and whiz through the universe, through stars, planets and interstellar space—​mostly without interacting. When they do interact, they provide a unique signature, which could not be spoofed through any practical means. Antineutrinos (electron antineutrinos, to be specific) are emitted in the process of radioactive nuclei decay by β emission. When fission occurs, the fission fragments decay by β decay to transmute to more stable species. For every fission event, about six antineutrinos (symbol ¯νe ) are emitted. Antineutrinos do interact sufficiently to provide useful methods for a) detecting undeclared plutonium (or 233U) production in declared nuclear power reactor, or b) finding evidence of a clandestine plutonium production reactor. Antineutrino detectors are in operation today that could show when a declared reactor is operating, the power it produces over time, and importantly, when a refueling takes place. It would be reasonable and practical to monitor all declared nuclear power reactors, and all research reactors able to produce significant quantities of plutonium. A detector designed for this

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104  Building the nuclear disarmament regime purpose could be installed outside of each reactor containment building, with no connections to any reactor system. Doing so would provide a means to assure that known reactors are not misused for the production of plutonium for nuclear weapon purposes. This independent, ex-​core method would not interfere with the operation of a reactor, and the measurement results might find complementary benefits. In the second application, a very large antineutrino detector weighing on the order of 20,000 tons could be used for far field monitoring. Such detectors could rule out the existence of operating production reactors within a 25 km radius. Detectors covering larger distances, or intended to detect lower power reactors, could be on the scale of megaton, as are now being contemplated for physics purposes.3 A group of physicists have created an “International Workshop on Applied Antineutrino Physics” to further the development of antineutrino monitoring (www.aap.sympnp.org/​). This group could become the focal point for developing a standardized design for antineutrino monitoring systems that might be deployed first on a limited basis, but eventually, in all declared nuclear power and research reactors, and as a resource for far field applications.

7.11  Subsidizing disarmament Progress towards disarmament may on some occasions depend on the availability of funding available to a nuclear-​armed State. In such cases, it may be useful to lend money to the State or provide a grant to have progress proceed.

Notes 1 US Department of Defense (2018), Nuclear Posture Review, https://​media.defense. gov/​2018/​Feb/​02/​2001872886/​-​1/​-​1/​1/​2018-​NUCLEAR-​POSTURE-​REVIEW-​ FINAL-​REPORT.PDF. 2 Nuclear disarmament poses many problems for which extra-​territorial siting could be the best solution. Introducing such a concept would benefit from finding a situation where all parties were willing, and then proceeding, perhaps on a trial basis. Once one arrangement is adopted, other applications will likely follow. 3 This far field monitoring application was suggested by Adam Bernstein of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

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8  Epilogue

Nuclear weapons enable nuclear war, stimulate proliferation, and may one day be provided by nuclear-​armed States to terrorists, or produced by terrorists obtaining fissile material by stealth, force or guile through inadequate protection or through human failings. Eliminating existing nuclear arsenals would greatly benefit global efforts to prevent these outcomes. But it clearly isn’t that simple. Advocates of nuclear weapons argue that nuclear weapons deter aggression and provide the ultimate resource should all other means fail. As such, nuclear weapons—​in the minds of defense planners in nuclear-​armed States and in their allied States—​remain essential for international security. Against such threats, nuclear-​armed States are not going to engage until they have to. The security benefits associated with nuclear weapons would be more widely appreciated: (a) If nuclear weapons were universally recognized to be so destructive that no State possessing a nuclear arsenal would ever contemplate actually using them.1 There has been a long-​standing understanding that nuclear weapons should not be used, but provocations arise. While the United States and North Korea trade threats,2 the risks of nuclear conflict seem greater now than since Pakistan and India went to the brink, or during the 45 years the United States and the Soviet Union waged a Cold War. The 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review calls for lower yield devices to make nuclear weapons suitable (appropriate?) for use against a wider spectrum of threats.3 Those opposed see no means to control escalation, only making it easier to cross the barrier with no end in sight. (b) If nuclear weapons were so safe and secure that no weapon could ever detonate accidentally. But in one known US accident, somehow a nuclear weapon went through all but the last barrier to an explosion. With the many accidents and near misses that have happened, with nine nuclear-​ armed States, the absence of accidental detonations also seems somehow miraculous.

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106  Building the nuclear disarmament regime (c) If nuclear weapons were so strongly protected that that they couldn’t be taken by any unauthorized person or group, domestic or foreign. But how vulnerable are they to forcible seizure, extortion, guile, and deception? How good should these capabilities be? The nine States make all such decisions independently as they exercise their sovereignty. Does that make anyone comfortable? Eliminating existing arsenals would make nuclear war impossible, and should make proliferation and nuclear terrorism far less likely. Nuclear disarmament won’t come quickly, quietly, or cheaply. And regardless of the legal framework under which disarmament proceeds, three elements will be essential: (a) Phasing out and eventually eliminating all existing nuclear weapons and the weapons complex necessary to design, test, manufacture and maintain them, most likely to come as a result of incremental steps taken as and when national security assessments allow; (b) Establishing the research and development institutions needed to solve the critical technical issues facing disarmament, providing a place for all States to contribute, while checking the interests of nuclear-​armed States to delay progress; and (c) Preventing rearmament. Nuclear disarmament will require verification to assure that the arms reductions steps a State commits to are in fact carried out, and that along the way, the State does not attempt to maintain or manufacture a hedge capability to offset its declared actions. Within the scope of known methods and existing research and development, no combination of methods will ever give absolute assurance. No one knows what methods will become viable in the future, but clearly, improvements will come if we continue to look. However, progress towards disarmament proceeds, verification systems such as those proposed in this book are essential. They will provide means and opportunities for the verification authorities to detect cheating and raise alarm bells. National intelligence services will continue to examine the actions of each State’s adversaries, and given portals through which intelligence information can be acted upon independently, or introduced into the verification systems proposed in this book, the combination will—​or should—​provide confidence that cheating has a significant probability of being detected—​ hopefully enough to keep all parties on the straight and narrow. At the time of writing my book, more than enough States have signed the TPNW to bring it into force. I hope that will happen. The TPNW has two fundamental flaws identified in Chapter 1; if the States Parties to the TPNW fix those problems, then perhaps the States that are reluctant to sign on might come around.

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Epilogue 107 The TPNW has been met with resistance by a number of States including all nine nuclear-​armed States and States under their protection or influence. If these different efforts remain at odds, there will be a crisis at the 2020 NPT Review Conference. The verification system presented in this book would be equally valid for any disarmament framework. No doubt there are many points that might be improved, but whether through the TPNW or through some effort eventually emerging through another venue:

•

•

Verifying the elimination of existing nuclear weapons and the complex of capabilities required to maintain them for as long as they exist should be undertaken by a new international nuclear disarmament agency. It would be counterproductive to assign any organization other than the IAEA the responsibility of preventing rearmament, and to do so could undermine the non-​proliferation regime. An international center for nuclear disarmament verification research and development will be essential to wrest control of progress from the States with the greatest incentives to block or delay progress.

The international community will need to continue to adjust its requirements, means and capabilities as time goes on. Disarmament will not respect simple mechanistic rules; it will require recognizing that each nuclear-​armed State presents unique challenges, and while common ground should guide the way, the verification systems will need to be tailored on a State-​specific basis to provide the success needed to lead us, one day, to a world free of nuclear weapons. I salute those of you who will take up this challenge. I regret that I am not a younger man…

Notes 1 J. Borger (2018), “US to loosen nuclear weapons constraints and develop more ‘usable’ warheads,” The Guardian, www.theguardian.com/​us-​news/​2018/​jan/​09/​us-​ to-​loosen-​nuclear-​weapons-​policy-​and-​develop-​more-​usable-​warheads, accessed 15 January 2018. 2 As I was writing this chapter (March 2018), the United States accepted the possibility of direct two-​party discussions with North Korea, which may become three-​ party discussions including the Republic of Korea. Whether these discussions lead to negotiations, and whether the negotiations lead to resolving this threatening situation remains to be seen. 3 US Department of Defense (2018), Nuclear Posture Review.

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Legal Annexes

.1  Text of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons A A.2 (Suggested) Model Agreement Between A Nuclear-​Armed State and the International Nuclear Disarmament Agency A.3 (Suggested) Model Agreement Between A Nuclear-​Armed State and the International Atomic Energy Agency

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Annex A.1  Text of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (Text of the TPNW from A/​ CONF.229.2017/​L.3/​Rev.1)

The States Parties to this Treaty, Determined to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Deeply concerned about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from any use of nuclear weapons, and recognizing the consequent need to completely eliminate such weapons, which remains the only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons are never used again under any circumstances, Mindful of the risks posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons, including from any nuclear-​weapon detonation by accident, miscalculation or design, and emphasizing that these risks concern the security of all humanity, and that all States share the responsibility to prevent any use of nuclear weapons, Cognizant that the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons cannot be adequately addressed, transcend national borders, pose grave implications for human survival, the environment, socioeconomic development, the global economy, food security and the health of current and future generations, and have a disproportionate impact on women and girls, including as a result of ionizing radiation, Acknowledging the ethical imperatives for nuclear disarmament and the urgency of achieving and maintaining a nuclear-​weapon-​free world, which is a global public good of the highest order, serving both national and collective security interests, Mindful of the unacceptable suffering of and harm caused to the victims of the use of nuclear weapons (hibakusha), as well as of those affected by the testing of nuclear weapons, Recognizing the disproportionate impact of nuclear-​weapon activities on indigenous peoples, Reaffirming the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, Basing themselves on the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, in particular the principle that the right of parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, the rule of distinction,

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112  Legal Annexes the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks, the rules on proportionality and precautions in attack, the prohibition on the use of weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, and the rules for the protection of the natural environment, Considering that any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, in particular the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, Reaffirming that any use of nuclear weapons would also be abhorrent to the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience, Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources, Recalling also the first resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, adopted on 24 January 1946, and subsequent resolutions which call for the elimination of nuclear weapons, Concerned by the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, the continued reliance on nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies, and the waste of economic and human resources on programmes for the production, maintenance and modernization of nuclear weapons, Recognizing that a legally binding prohibition of nuclear weapons constitutes an important contribution towards the achievement and maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons, including the irreversible, verifiable and transparent elimination of nuclear weapons, and determined to act towards that end, Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, Reaffirming that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control, Reaffirming also that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty on the Non-​Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which serves as the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-​proliferation regime, has a vital role to play in promoting international peace and security, Recognizing the vital importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-​Test-​Ban Treaty and its verification regime as a core element of the nuclear disarmament and non-​proliferation regime, Reaffirming the conviction that the establishment of the internationally recognized nuclear-​weapon-​free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived

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Annex A.1 113 at among the States of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-​proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objective of nuclear disarmament, Emphasizing that nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of its States Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, Recognizing that the equal, full and effective participation of both women and men is an essential factor for the promotion and attainment of sustainable peace and security, and committed to supporting and strengthening the effective participation of women in nuclear disarmament, Recognizing also the importance of peace and disarmament education in all its aspects and of raising awareness of the risks and consequences of nuclear weapons for current and future generations, and committed to the dissemination of the principles and norms of this Treaty, Stressing the role of public conscience in the furthering of the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, other international and regional organizations, non-​governmental organizations, religious leaders, parliamentarians, academics and the hibakusha, Have agreed as follows:

Article 1 Prohibitions 1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: (a) Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (b) Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; (c) Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly; (d) Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (e) Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty; (f) Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty; (g) Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

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Article 2 Declarations 1. Each State Party shall submit to the Secretary-​General of the United Nations, not later than 30 days after this Treaty enters into force for that State Party, a declaration in which it shall: (a) Declare whether it owned, possessed or controlled nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and eliminated its nuclear-​weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-​weapons-​related facilities, prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party; (b) Notwithstanding Article 1 (a), declare whether it owns, possesses or controls any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; (c) Notwithstanding Article 1 (g), declare whether there are any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or in any place under its jurisdiction or control that are owned, possessed or controlled by another State. 2. The Secretary-​General of the United Nations shall transmit all such declarations received to the States Parties.

Article 3 Safeguards 1. Each State Party to which Article 4, paragraph 1 or 2, does not apply shall, at a minimum, maintain its International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards obligations in force at the time of entry into force of this Treaty, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future. 2. Each State Party to which Article 4, paragraph 1 or 2, does not apply that has not yet done so shall conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency and bring into force a comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/​ 153 (Corrected)). Negotiation of such agreement shall commence within 180 days from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. Each State Party shall thereafter maintain such obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future.

Article 4 Towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons 1. Each State Party that after 7 July 2017 owned, possessed or controlled nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and eliminated its

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Annex A.1 115 nuclear-​ weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-​weapons-​related facilities, prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for it, shall cooperate with the competent international authority designated pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Article for the purpose of verifying the irreversible elimination of its nuclear-​weapon programme. The competent international authority shall report to the States Parties. Such a State Party shall conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency sufficient to provide credible assurance of the non-​diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in that State Party as a whole. Negotiation of such agreement shall commence within 180 days from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18  months from the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party. That State Party shall thereafter, at a minimum, maintain these safeguards obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future. 2. Notwithstanding Article 1 (a), each State Party that owns, possesses or controls nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices shall immediately remove them from operational status, and destroy them as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the first meeting of States Parties, in accordance with a legally binding, time-​bound plan for the verified and irreversible elimination of that State Party’s nuclear-​ weapon programme, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-​weapons-​related facilities. The State Party, no later than 60 days after the entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party, shall submit this plan to the States Parties or to a competent international authority designated by the States Parties. The plan shall then be negotiated with the competent international authority, which shall submit it to the subsequent meeting of States Parties or review conference, whichever comes first, for approval in accordance with its rules of procedure. 3. A State Party to which paragraph 2 above applies shall conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency sufficient to provide credible assurance of the non-​diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole. Negotiation of such agreement shall commence no later than the date upon which implementation of the plan referred to in paragraph 2 is completed. The agreement shall enter into force no later than 18 months after the date of initiation of negotiations. That State Party shall thereafter, at a minimum, maintain these safeguards obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future. Following the entry into force of the agreement referred to in this paragraph, the State Party shall submit to the Secretary-​General of the United Nations a final declaration that it has fulfilled its obligations under this Article.

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116  Legal Annexes 4. Notwithstanding Article 1 (b)  and (g), each State Party that has any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or in any place under its jurisdiction or control that are owned, possessed or controlled by another State shall ensure the prompt removal of such weapons, as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by the first meeting of States Parties. Upon the removal of such weapons or other explosive devices, that State Party shall submit to the Secretary-​General of the United Nations a declaration that it has fulfilled its obligations under this Article. 5. Each State Party to which this Article applies shall submit a report to each meeting of States Parties and each review conference on the progress made towards the implementation of its obligations under this Article, until such time as they are fulfilled. 6. The States Parties shall designate a competent international authority or authorities to negotiate and verify the irreversible elimination of nuclear-​weapons programmes, including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-​weapons-​related facilities in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article. In the event that such a designation has not been made prior to the entry into force of this Treaty for a State Party to which paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article applies, the Secretary-​ General of the United Nations shall convene an extraordinary meeting of States Parties to take any decisions that may be required.

Article 5 National implementation 1. Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Treaty. 2. Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

Article 6 Victim assistance and environmental remediation 1. Each State Party shall, with respect to individuals under its jurisdiction who are affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons, in accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law, adequately provide age-​and gender-​sensitive assistance, without discrimination, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for their social and economic inclusion.

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Annex A.1 117 2. Each State Party, with respect to areas under its jurisdiction or control contaminated as a result of activities related to the testing or use of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, shall take necessary and appropriate measures towards the environmental remediation of areas so contaminated. 3. The obligations under paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall be without prejudice to the duties and obligations of any other States under international law or bilateral agreements.

Article 7 International cooperation and assistance 1. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties to facilitate the implementation of this Treaty. 2. In fulfilling its obligations under this Treaty, each State Party shall have the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties. 3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide technical, material and financial assistance to States Parties affected by nuclear-​weapons use or testing, to further the implementation of this Treaty. 4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the victims of the use or testing of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 5. Assistance under this Article may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, non-​ governmental organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, or national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, or on a bilateral basis. 6. Without prejudice to any other duty or obligation that it may have under international law, a State Party that has used or tested nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices shall have a responsibility to provide adequate assistance to affected States Parties, for the purpose of victim assistance and environmental remediation.

Article 8 Meeting of States Parties 1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider and, where necessary, take decisions in respect of any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Treaty, in accordance with its relevant provisions, and on further measures for nuclear disarmament, including: (a) The implementation and status of this Treaty;

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2.

3.

4.

5.

(b) Measures for the verified, time-​bound and irreversible elimination of nuclear-​weapon programmes, including additional protocols to this Treaty; (c) Any other matters pursuant to and consistent with the provisions of this Treaty. The first meeting of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-​ General of the United Nations within one year of the entry into force of this Treaty. Further meetings of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-​General of the United Nations on a biennial basis, unless otherwise agreed by the States Parties. The meeting of States Parties shall adopt its rules of procedure at its first session. Pending their adoption, the rules of procedure of the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination, shall apply. Extraordinary meetings of States Parties shall be convened, as may be deemed necessary, by the Secretary-​General of the United Nations, at the written request of any State Party provided that this request is supported by at least one third of the States Parties. After a period of five years following the entry into force of this Treaty, the Secretary-​General of the United Nations shall convene a conference to review the operation of the Treaty and the progress in achieving the purposes of the Treaty. The Secretary-​General of the United Nations shall convene further review conferences at intervals of six years with the same objective, unless otherwise agreed by the States Parties. States not party to this Treaty, as well as the relevant entities of the United Nations system, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and relevant non-​governmental organizations, shall be invited to attend the meetings of States Parties and the review conferences as observers.

Article 9 Costs 1. The costs of the meetings of States Parties, the review conferences and the extraordinary meetings of States Parties shall be borne by the States Parties and States not party to this Treaty participating therein as observers, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately. 2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-​General of the United Nations in the circulation of declarations under Article 2, reports under Article 4 and proposed amendments under Article 10 of this Treaty shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

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Annex A.1 119 3. The cost related to the implementation of verification measures required under Article 4 as well as the costs related to the destruction of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and the elimination of nuclear-​weapon programmes, including the elimination or conversion of all nuclear-​weapons-​related facilities, should be borne by the States Parties to which they apply.

Article 10 Amendments 1. At any time after the entry into force of this Treaty, any State Party may propose amendments to the Treaty. The text of a proposed amendment shall be communicated to the Secretary-​General of the United Nations, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Secretary-​General of the United Nations no later than 90 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the proposal shall be considered at the next meeting of States Parties or review conference, whichever comes first. 2. A meeting of States Parties or a review conference may agree upon amendments which shall be adopted by a positive vote of a majority of two thirds of the States Parties. The Depositary shall communicate any adopted amendment to all States Parties. 3. The amendment shall enter into force for each State Party that deposits its instrument of ratification or acceptance of the amendment 90  days following the deposit of such instruments of ratification or acceptance by a majority of the States Parties at the time of adoption. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other State Party 90 days following the deposit of its instrument of ratification or acceptance of the amendment.

Article 11 Settlement of disputes 1. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Treaty, the parties concerned shall consult together with a view to the settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of the parties’ choice in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations. 2. The meeting of States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute, including by offering its good offices, calling upon the States Parties concerned to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time limit for any agreed procedure, in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations.

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Article 12 Universality Each State Party shall encourage States not party to this Treaty to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty, with the goal of universal adherence of all States to the Treaty.

Article 13 Signature This Treaty shall be open for signature to all States at United Nations Headquarters in New York as from 20 September 2017.

Article 14 Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession This Treaty shall be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by signatory States. The Treaty shall be open for accession.

Article 15 Entry into force 1. This Treaty shall enter into force 90 days after the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited. 2. For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Treaty shall enter into force 90 days after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

Article 16 Reservations The Articles of this Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.

Article 17 Duration and withdrawal 1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

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Annex A.1 121 2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events that it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect 12  months after the date of the receipt of the notification of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that 12-​month period, the withdrawing State Party is a party to an armed conflict, the State Party shall continue to be bound by the obligations of this Treaty and of any additional protocols until it is no longer party to an armed conflict.

Article 18 Relationship with other agreements The implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice obligations undertaken by States Parties with regard to existing international agreements, to which they are party, where those obligations are consistent with the Treaty.

Article 19 Depositary The Secretary-​General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Treaty.

Article 20 Authentic texts The Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of this Treaty shall be equally authentic. DONE at New  York, this seventh day of July, two thousand and seventeen. _​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​_​

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Annex A.2 (Suggested) * Model Agreement Between A Nuclear-​Armed State and the International Nuclear Disarmament Agency1

The Agreement should include a Preamble, making the connections needed to the TPNW, the NPT, the CTBT and other relevant institutions.

Preamble WHEREAS is a nuclear-​armed State party to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), and acknowledges that it owns, possesses, or controls nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or has owned, possessed or controlled nuclear weapons in the past; WHEREAS agrees to remove immediately any and all deployed nuclear weapons from operational status, and to disarm and destroy its nuclear weapons as soon as possible but not later than a deadline to be agreed by and the Nuclear Disarmament Council, against which progress shall be verified; WHEREAS agrees that any change proposed by or by INDA to the disarmament schedule shall be agreed by and the Nuclear Disarmament Commission, subject to review and approval by the TPNW Conference of States Parties; WHEREAS agrees not to increase its nuclear arsenal numerically from the date of entry into force of this Agreement, or thereafter, as initial arsenal declaration is adjusted to reflect nuclear-​arms reductions verified by INDA; WHEREAS agrees not to design any new nuclear weapon; WHEREAS agrees not to produce or otherwise acquire fissile material for use in, or potential use in, a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device, to the benefit of , any other State, or any other entity or person or persons; * Author’s Note:  This Annex was written anticipating that the Parties to the TPNW would create INDA and ask INDA to prepare a model agreement to implement its responsibilities in nuclear-​armed States. This Annex is included in the hope that it might facilitate the work of the INDA Secretariat. If so desired, INDA should seek permission from Routledge to make use of this Annex for that purpose.

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Annex A.2 123 [WHEREAS acknowledges that it has or has had a military use program that makes use of fissile material not for use in, or potential use in, any nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device, acknowledges that said fissile material could be used in nuclear weapons, recognizes that such fissile material or any nuclear material of comparable quality encourages proliferation, provides a potential source for terrorist theft and malevolent use, and commits to allowing INDA verification and to steps to transition from such weapon-​usable materials to low enrichment uranium;] WHEREAS agrees to submit fissile material from existing stocks committed to nuclear weapons use, or to any other use, to verification and monitoring under the provisions of this Agreement, and once all classified properties have been removed from said fissile material, to transfer said fissile material to the jurisdiction and control of the IAEA under the provisions of a safeguards agreement to be concluded between and the IAEA;2 WHEREAS agrees to cooperate with INDA to establish and authorize verification and monitoring methods and techniques that allow INDA to begin with unclassified forms of fissile material, to progress to include classified forms of fissile material in components of nuclear weapons or in any other material form containing classified fissile material, to progress to nuclear warheads, and eventually to deployed nuclear warheads including nuclear warheads mated to military nuclear weapon delivery systems; WHEREAS agrees to allow INDA to employ such methods when is convinced that the methods will not allow INDA inspectors to gain access to information classified by reason of nuclear weapon design or manufacturing sensitivity, provided the Nuclear Disarmament Council has authorized INDA inspectors to use said methods having determined that the methods and equipment approved are based on sound scientific methods and will be applied in such a manner as to provide authentic results which enable INDA inspectors to make independent findings; WHEREAS agrees to dismantle and eliminate mission-​critical nuclear weapons facilities as declared by , or to convert said facilities to non-​explosive nuclear applications or to non-​nuclear use, in conjunction with progress towards the elimination of arsenal, and to enable INDA to verify the location, purpose, and history of each such facility, to enable INDA to verify the removal of equipment used for the purposes of producing, assembling or maintaining nuclear warheads, to enable INDA to verify the destruction of each such facility, or to enable INDA and the IAEA to verify that a mission-​critical nuclear weapon facility is modified for non-​ explosive nuclear use, or for non-​nuclear use; [WHEREAS is also a nuclear-​weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-​Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and, in accordance with Paragraph VI of the NPT, has undertaken to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,”

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124  Legal Annexes agrees to conclude this Agreement and abide by its provisions in partial fulfillment of its commitments under the NPT;] WHEREAS, pursuant to the Statute of INDA (hereinafter referred to as the “Statute”), INDA is authorized to conclude a verification and monitoring agreement at the request of a nuclear-​armed State to any of that State’s activities related to nuclear disarmament; RECOGNIZING the importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (the CTBT) and the monitoring applied by the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (the CTBTO), the importance of the IAEA, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the World Institute of Nuclear Security, and INDA agree to cooperate with these organizations to ensure success in relation to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament; WHEREAS, pursuant to the Statute, INDA shall conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations to promote peace and international cooperation, and in conformity with policies of the United Nations furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide disarmament and in conformity with any international agreements entered into pursuant to such policies; NOW, THEREFORE, and INDA agree as follows: PART I

General principles and provisions Basic undertaking 1. The Agreement shall provide that shall accept INDA verification, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, (a) On all fissile material subject to this Agreement for the purpose of confirming progress taken towards the elimination of all nuclear weapons possessed by ; and (b) On the elimination or irreversible conversion of all mission-​critical facilities created by to design, produce, test and maintain its nuclear weapons, for the purpose of confirming the elimination of such facilities or their conversion to non-​explosive military use, peaceful use, or non-​nuclear use, in order to promote international confidence that such facilities are no longer available for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices, from research, development, design or testing for such devices; and (c) On the implementation of confidence-​building measures as set forth in separate protocols to this Agreement, as agreed by and the Nuclear Disarmament Council, as intended to strengthen the universal commitment to nuclear disarmament.

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Annex A.2 125 2. The Agreement shall provide that undertakes not to remove from INDA verification under this Agreement material subject to this Agreement, except as provided for in this Agreement. INDA rights and obligations 3. The Agreement shall provide that in carrying out its rights and obligations under this Agreement, INDA shall have the right to reach independently its conclusions related to achievement of the verification objectives of this Agreement. 4. The Agreement shall provide that INDA shall have the right and obligation to verify, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, all fissile material subject to this Agreement for the sole purpose of confirming that such fissile material remains removed from use in nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices, or from research, development, design or testing for such devices, so long as the fissile material remains subject to this Agreement. 5. The Agreement shall provide that INDA shall have the right and obligation to verify, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, that mission-​critical nuclear weapon facilities declared by are as declared, that all equipment essential to the mission of each such facility is removed and destroyed, and that each such facility is eliminated or irreversibly converted subject to verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency. 6. The Agreement shall provide that INDA and may choose to implement confidence-​building measures as agreed by and the Nuclear Disarmament Council, which may be set forth in separate protocols to this Agreement. Cooperation between INDA and 7. The Agreement shall provide that and INDA shall cooperate to facilitate the effective and efficient implementation of the verification procedures and technologies required for this Agreement. Implementation of verification & monitoring 8. The Agreement shall provide that and INDA shall implement this Agreement in a manner designed to: (a) Avoid undue interference in the operation of any facility containing fissile material subject to this Agreement; (b) Prevent unauthorized access by INDA inspectors to classified information related to design or manufacturing of nuclear weapons;

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126  Legal Annexes (c) Research, develop, test and manufacture verification and monitoring equipment suitable for use by INDA to confirm the steps taken by towards the elimination of all nuclear weapons in the arsenal, the elimination or irreversible conversion of mission-​critical nuclear weapon facilities, and implementation or verification of additional confidence-​building measures agreed by and the Nuclear Disarmament Council; (d) Develop detailed authorized inspection procedures (AIPs) for each facility for each verification activity, which shall be tried out in a mock facility, critiqued and amended as deemed necessary, which shall then be formally approved by and INDA, and monitored thereafter to remain true to each AIP; (e) Provide sustainable access to verification equipment supply, maintenance and repair to assure that INDA verification findings are accurate and reliable; (f) Be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic and safe operation of such a facility; and (g) Respecting the right of INDA to reach independent conclusions under this Agreement, the Agreement shall provide that and INDA shall cooperate with a view to reconciling verification procedures, and avoiding unnecessary duplication of verification activities, under other agreements with respect to material subject to this Agreement. Provision of information 9. The Agreement shall provide that to ensure the effective implementation of this Agreement, INDA shall be provided, in accordance with the provisions set out in Part II below, with information concerning fissile material subject to this Agreement, information about the facilities relevant to verifying such fissile material, and information on mission-​critical nuclear weapon facilities to enable INDA to confirm their elimination or irreversible conversion. INDA shall be entitled to receive the information and data necessary for carrying out its responsibilities under this Agreement. 10. The Agreement shall provide that INDA shall, at the request of , be prepared to examine on premises of information for a facility which regards as being of particular sensitivity. Such information need not be physically transmitted to INDA provided that it remains available for ready further examination by INDA on premises of . 11. The Agreement shall provide that with respect to facility information referred to above, shall, in accordance with procedures developed with the Agency, make arrangements to store on premises of

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Annex A.2 127 copies of all such information, and shall facilitate access by INDA inspectors to these documents. INDA shall secure its copies of facility information and related materials using INDA seals on INDA-​ provided containment enclosures. Classified information 12. [Bearing in mind the obligation of under Article I  of the NPT, and] (N)otwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, shall not provide, nor may INDA require or seek access to, any information that considers classified due to its relationship to nuclear weapons design or manufacturing. 13. The Agreement shall provide that INDA shall not have access to other information considered by to be classified, except as may be agreed to by . 14. The Agreement shall provide that shall establish security arrangements to prevent INDA inspectors from acquiring any information that considers classified, except as may be provided in accordance with paragraph 13 above. and INDA shall review any such arrangements and agree on practical modalities to enable INDA to meet its obligations under this Agreement while respecting the security arrangements. Protection of confidential information 15. The Agreement shall provide that INDA shall take every precaution to protect commercial and industrial secrets and other confidential information identified by the State as requiring protection coming to its knowledge in the implementation of the Agreement. Except with the consent of , INDA shall not publish or communicate to any State, organization or person any information obtained by it in connection with the implementation of the Agreement. 16. The Agreement shall provide that specific information relating to such implementation in may be given to the Nuclear Disarmament Council and to such INDA staff members as require such knowledge by reason of their official duties in connection with INDA verification under this Agreement, but only to the extent necessary for INDA to fulfill its responsibilities in implementing the Agreement. 17. The Agreement shall provide that summarized information on fissile material subject to this Agreement shall be published routinely and exceptionally upon decision of the Nuclear Disarmament Council.

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128  Legal Annexes National system of accounting for and control of fissile material subject to this agreement 18. The Agreement shall provide that shall maintain a system of accounting for and control of all fissile material subject to this Agreement. INDA verification of fissile material subject to this Agreement shall be applied in such a manner as to enable INDA to verify the findings of system of accounting for and control of all fissile material subject to this Agreement. Verification by INDA shall include, inter alia, independent measurements and observations conducted by INDA inspectors in accordance with the procedures specified in Parts II, III, and IV below. 19. The Agreement shall provide that in relation to classified forms of material subject to this Agreement, should a verification test applied by INDA fail to confirm declared characteristics, and INDA shall agree on arrangements under which the item or items involved are re-​verified, and if the results remain in question, on steps to de-​list the item from the declared inventory and to remove it from the locations where material subject to this Agreement remain under verification. INDA inspectors 20. The Agreement shall provide that may inform the Director General of its intention to allow or to prohibit inspectors from specific States, consistent with its national security prerogatives. may change such provisions providing the Director General with a minimum of three months advance notice of any such change. 21. The Agreement shall provide that the Director General shall notify of the Nuclear Disarmament Council’s approval of any INDA official from an allowed State as an inspector. Such inspectors may be normal employees of INDA, or standby inspectors possessing unique knowledge or skills relevant to nuclear disarmament. Unless advises the Director General of its rejection of such an official as an inspector for for the purposes of this Agreement within three months of receipt of notification of approval by the Nuclear Disarmament Council, the inspector so notified to shall be considered designated to for the purposes of this Agreement. 22. shall take the necessary steps to ensure that INDA inspectors designated in accordance with paragraph 21 of this Agreement can effectively discharge their functions under this Agreement. 23. The Director General, acting in response to a request by or on the Director General’s own initiative, shall immediately inform of the withdrawal of the designation of any official as an inspector for for the purposes of this Agreement.

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Annex A.2 129 Visas 24. The Agreement shall provide that shall, within one month of the receipt of a request therefor, provide the designated inspector specified in the request with appropriate multiple entry/​exit and/​or transit visas, where required, to enable the inspector to enter and remain on the territory of for the purpose of carrying out his/​her functions under this Agreement. Any visas required shall be valid for at least one year and shall be renewed, as required, to cover the duration of the inspector’s designation to . Privileges and immunities 25. The Agreement shall provide that shall apply to INDA (including its property, funds and assets) and to its inspectors and other officials, performing functions under this Agreement, the relevant provisions of the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the International Nuclear Disarmament Agency. Third party liability for nuclear damage 26. The Agreement shall provide that shall ensure that any protection against third party liability in respect of nuclear damage, including any insurance or other financial security, which may be available under its laws or regulations shall apply to INDA and its officials for the purpose of the implementation of this Agreement in the same way as that protection applies to nationals of . Settlement of claims 27. The Agreement shall provide that any claim by against INDA or by INDA against in respect of any damage resulting from the implementation of this Agreement, other than damage arising out of a nuclear incident, shall be settled in accordance with international law. Financial clauses 28. The Agreement shall provide that and INDA will each be responsible for the expenses it incurs in carrying out its responsibility under this Agreement. However, if or persons under its jurisdiction incur extraordinary expenses as a result of a specific request by INDA, INDA shall reimburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in advance to do so. In any case, INDA shall bear the cost of any additional procedures that inspectors may request.

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130  Legal Annexes Resolution of discrepancies and anomalies 29. The Agreement shall provide that and INDA shall cooperate in resolving discrepancies and anomalies arising in the course of implementation of this Agreement through consultations as soon as such discrepancies or anomalies are identified. In the event that it is not possible to resolve a discrepancy or anomaly through consultations, it shall be reported to the Director General. 30. The Agreement shall provide that if the Nuclear Disarmament Council, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action by is essential and urgent in order to ensure compliance with this Agreement, the Nuclear Disarmament Council shall be able to call upon to take the required action without delay, irrespective of whether procedures for the settlement of a dispute have been invoked. 31. The Agreement shall provide that if the Nuclear Disarmament Council, upon examination of relevant information reported to it by the Director General, finds that INDA is not able to verify that fissile material subject to this Agreement remains accounted for under this Agreement, the Nuclear Disarmament Council may issue emergency reports as provided for in the Statute and may also take, where applicable, the other measures provided for in the Statute. In taking such action, the Nuclear Disarmament Council shall take account of the urgency of the matter, the degree of assurance provided by the verification measures that have been applied, and shall afford every reasonable opportunity to furnish the Nuclear Disarmament Council with any necessary reassurance. Interpretation and application of the agreement and settlement of disputes 32. The Agreement shall provide that and INDA, at the request of either, shall consult on any issue arising out of interpretation or application of this Agreement. 33. The Agreement shall provide that shall have the right to request that the Nuclear Disarmament Council consider any question arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement. 34. The Agreement shall provide that shall be invited by the Nuclear Disarmament Council to participate in the discussion of any such question by the Nuclear Disarmament Council. 35. The Agreement shall provide that any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement, except a dispute with regard to a finding by the Nuclear Disarmament Council under paragraph 31, or an action taken by the Nuclear Disarmament Council pursuant to such a finding, which is not settled by negotiation or another procedure agreed to by and INDA shall, at the request of either, be submitted to such binding third-​party dispute settlement procedure as may be agreed between the parties within 60 days of said request. In the

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Annex A.2 131 absence of such an agreement, either party may submit the dispute to the Nuclear Disarmament Council for resolution. 36. The Agreement shall provide that the rights and obligations of and INDA under this Agreement shall be superior to the rights and obligations of either party under any other agreement. Amendment of the agreement 37. The Agreement shall provide that and INDA shall, at the request of either, consult each other on amendments to this Agreement. 38. The Agreement shall provide that all amendments shall require the written agreement of and INDA. 39. The Agreement shall provide that modifications to the scope of the Agreement, the facilities included in the Agreement wherein verification will be implemented, and the designation of fissile material subject to this Agreement may be made through communications between and INDA, without amendment to the Agreement. 40. The Agreement shall provide that any other amendment shall require a vote in favor by at least 2/​3 of the Nuclear Disarmament Councilors. Entry into force 41. The Agreement shall provide that this Agreement, and any amendment thereto, shall enter into force on the date on which INDA receives from written notification that the statutory and/​or constitutional requirements of for entry into force have been met. 42. The Agreement shall provide that may, at any date before this Agreement enters into force, declare that it will apply this Agreement provisionally. 43. The Agreement shall provide that the Director General shall promptly inform all INDA Member States of any declaration of provisional application of, and of the entry into force of, this Agreement. 44. The Agreement shall provide that the Director General shall promptly inform the IAEA Director General of any declaration of provisional application of, and of the entry into force of, this Agreement, and request that he/​she inform the IAEA Board of Governors and IAEA Member States. Duration and termination 45. The Agreement shall provide that this Agreement shall remain in force indefinitely, or until all Parties to the TPNW determine that this Agreement is no longer required. 46. The Agreement shall provide that this Agreement may be terminated by if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject

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132  Legal Annexes matter of this Agreement, have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of such termination to INDA three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. PART II

Verification objectives & methods 47. The Agreement shall provide that the objective of the fissile material verification procedures under this Agreement is to confirm that fissile material subject to this Agreement is removed from nuclear weapons, from the manufacture or potential manufacture of nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices, or from research, development, design or testing of such weapons or devices, and that mission-​critical weapon facilities have been eliminated or irreversibly converted from nuclear weapons. (a) At Level 4, the objective of verification is to visually identify each warhead submitted, identify each warhead by model number and serial number, witness its de-​mating from its delivery system, and establish and maintain a chain of custody until the warhead is received at a Level 3 facility. (b) At Level 3, the objective is to verify that each warhead is a bona fide warhead of a given model, that it remains within the chain of custody until and during the dismantlement of the warhead, and that the warhead fissile material components are verified and maintained within the chain of custody until they are received at a Level 2 facility. (c) At Level 2, the objective is to verify that all fissile material in the form of nuclear warhead components and any other forms of fissile material with classified properties are bona fide, that they remain within the chain of custody until and during the processing of the warhead fissile material components to remove all classified properties, and that all unclassified fissile material subject to the Agreement is maintained within a chain of custody until received at a Level 1 facility. (d) At Level 1, the objective is to verify that all unclassified fissile material is measured quantitatively and remains within a chain of custody until it is transferred to its disposition process under the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement concluded between and the IAEA for that purpose. Fissile material verification methods 48. The use of fissile material accountancy, including agreed methods for the verification for fissile material subject to this Agreement with classified characteristics, is of fundamental importance. Containment and

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Annex A.2 133 surveillance techniques shall be used to the maximum degree practical to maintain the chain of custody to protect the integrity of the fissile material verification process. 49. The Agreement shall provide that the technical conclusion of fissile material verification activities shall be: (a) A report submitted by the Director General to the Nuclear Disarmament Council, in advance of each meeting of the Nuclear Disarmament Council; (b) A report submitted by the Director General through the Nuclear Disarmament Council in advance to each Conference of States Parties to the TPNW, in relation to fissile material subject to this Agreement, summarizing overall progress in relation to commitments to nuclear disarmament, including the numbers of items and the quantities of fissile material at each of the four Levels, confirming the reports provided by , and confirming that such fissile material remains accounted for under this Agreement; and (c) An annual report by the Director General on the global status of nuclear disarmament, progress made and problems encountered in relation to . FUNCTIONS OF THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTING FOR AND CONTROL OF FISSILE MATERIAL SUBJECT TO THIS AGREEMENT 50. The Agreement shall provide that INDA shall make use of system of accounting for and control of fissile material subject to this Agreement and shall avoid unnecessary duplication of accounting and control activities. 51. The Agreement shall provide that system of accounting for and control of all material subject to this Agreement shall be based on each item containing fissile material taking into account restrictions on classified information for the establishment of such measures as: (a) A measurement system for the determination of the quantities of material subject to this Agreement received, produced, shipped, lost or otherwise removed from inventory, and the quantities on inventory; (b) The evaluation of precision and accuracy of measurements and the estimation of measurement uncertainty; (c) Procedures for identifying, reviewing and evaluating differences in shipper/​receiver measurements; (d) Procedures for taking a physical inventory; (e) Procedures for the evaluation of accumulations of unmeasured inventory and unmeasured losses; (f) A system of records and reports showing, for each material balance area, the inventory of material subject to this Agreement and the changes in that inventory including receipts into and transfers out of the material balance area;

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134  Legal Annexes (g) Provisions to ensure that the accounting procedures and arrangements are being operated correctly; and (h) Procedures for the provision of reports to INDA in accordance with paragraphs 73 to 83 below. Subsidiary arrangements 52. The Agreement shall provide that INDA and shall make Subsidiary Arrangements which shall specify in detail, to the extent necessary to permit INDA to fulfill its responsibilities under this Agreement in an effective and efficient manner, how the procedures laid down in this Agreement are to be applied, taking into account the restrictions for classified forms of fissile material referred to in paragraphs 12 through 14 above. The Subsidiary Arrangements shall include the General Part and a Facility Inspection Manual for each facility where INDA will be requested to carry out fissile material verification and monitoring activities. Facility Inspection Manuals will include Authorized Inspection Protocols (AIPs) for each type of inspection and location within each Facility. The General Part of the Subsidiary Arrangements shall, inter alia, include the process for preparing, authorizing, and amending each Facility Inspection Manual, and each AIP. 53. The Agreement shall provide that the Subsidiary Arrangements may be extended or modified by agreement between and INDA without amendment of this Agreement. 54. The Agreement shall provide that the Subsidiary Arrangements shall be developed by INDA in cooperation with and shall enter into force at the same time as, or as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Agreement. shall provide INDA promptly with the information required for completing the Subsidiary Arrangements. Upon entry into force of this Agreement, INDA shall be entitled to verify design information provided for in paragraphs 62–​63 below.

Facility design information 55. The Agreement shall provide that pursuant to paragraph 9 above: (a) Design information in respect of facilities referred to in paragraph 47 shall be provided to INDA as early as possible to enable and INDA to agree on verification arrangements, including any modifications as necessary to assure that their respective requirements can be met in an efficient manner, and in any event not later than, the date on which the relevant initial report or a supplemental report under paragraph 75 is provided to INDA; (b) shall seek not to introduce material subject to this Agreement into such a facility until the initial verification of design

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Annex A.2 135 information has been completed and the results of that verification are included in the Subsidiary Arrangements pursuant to paragraphs 52–​ 54 unless it agrees to ad hoc inspections as provided for in paragraph 86; (c) may create a temporary facility for the verifica tion of fissile material with classified characteristics when such an arrangement will further the purposes of this Agreement; (d) Information in respect of facilities into which intends to transfer fissile material which is already subject to this Agreement shall be provided to INDA as early as possible, but not later than a minimum of 180 days in advance of such transfer; and (e) shall not introduce material subject to this Agreement into such a facility until the initial verification of design information has been completed and the results of that verification are included in the Subsidiary Arrangements pursuant to paragraphs 52–​54 unless it agrees to ad hoc inspections as provided for in paragraph 86. 56. The design information in respect of each facility referred to in paragraph 47 shall include, when applicable, and subject to the provisions of paragraphs 12–​14 above: (a) The identification of the facility, stating its general character, purpose, geographic location, and the name and address to be used for routine business purposes; (b) A description of the general plan of the facility with reference, to the extent feasible, to the form, location and flow of material subject to this Agreement; (c) Information on the facility relating to fissile material accountancy, taking into account any restrictions imposed by classified information; and (d) A description of the existing and proposed procedures at the facility for fissile material accountancy and control, with special reference to all relevant containers to be used for fissile material in Levels 1–​4, as appropriate, storage locations, warhead dismantling operations and processing areas for removing classified properties from fissile material subject to verification under this Agreement. 57. The Agreement shall provide that subject to the provisions of paragraphs 12–​14, other information relevant to verification shall be made available to INDA in respect of each facility for which facility information is required to be provided, in particular on organizational responsibility for fissile material accountancy and control. 58. The Agreement shall provide that shall make available to INDA supplementary information on the health, security and safety procedures which INDA shall observe and with which INDA inspectors shall comply at the facility. 59. The Agreement shall provide that facility information in respect of modifications relevant for verification purposes shall be provided for

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136  Legal Annexes examination sufficiently in advance for the verification procedures to be adjusted when necessary. Examination of facility design information 60. The Agreement shall provide that facility design information made available to INDA shall be used for the following purposes: (a) To identify the features of facilities and material subject to this Agreement relevant to the verification of fissile material subject to this Agreement in sufficient detail to facilitate verification; (b) To determine material balance areas to be used for INDA accounting purposes and to select those strategic points which are key measurement points and which will be used to determine flows and inventories of fissile material subject to this Agreement; in determining such material balance areas INDA shall, inter alia, use the following criteria: i. In determining the material balance area, advantage should be taken of any opportunity to use containment and surveillance to help ensure the completeness of flow measurements and thereby simplify verification and concentrate efforts at key measurement points; ii. A number of material balance areas in use at a facility or at distinct sites may be combined in one material balance area to be used for INDA accounting purposes when INDA determines that this is consistent with its verification requirements; and iii. If so requests, a special accounting area may be established to protect classified or commercially sensitive information; (c) To establish the nominal timing and procedures for taking of physical inventory for INDA accounting purposes; (d) To establish the records and reports requirements and records evaluation procedures; (e) To establish requirements and procedures for verification of the reports with respect to material subject to this Agreement; and (f) To select appropriate combinations of containment and surveillance methods and techniques and the strategic points at which they are to be applied. The results of the examination of the facility information shall be included in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Re-​examination of facility information 61. The Agreement shall provide that facility information shall be re-​examined in the light of changes in operating conditions, of developments in verification technology, or of experience in the application of verification

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Annex A.2 137 procedures, with a view to modifying the actions INDA has taken pursuant to paragraph 60 above. Verification of facility information 62. The Agreement shall provide that INDA, in cooperation with , may send inspectors to facilities to verify the design information provided to INDA pursuant to paragraphs 55 to 59 above for the purposes stated in paragraph 60. 63. The Agreement shall provide that facility information shall be re-​verified by INDA inspectors at periodic intervals to confirm that the assumptions underlying the verification approach remain valid. Records system 64. The Agreement shall provide that shall establish and maintain records to be available to INDA inspectors upon request at the location where the items will be made available for INDA verification: (a) For each warhead mated to a nuclear weapon delivery system at the time when the warhead will be inspected and accepted into verification under this Agreement, the type, model number and serial number of the nuclear weapon delivery system, the location of the delivery system at the time when the warhead or warheads mounted on it will be inspected and accepted into verification under this Agreement; (b) For each nuclear warhead delivery system to be eliminated under this Agreement, the date, time and location for such elimination, the method of elimination to be used, and provisions foreseen for INDA inspectors and/​or other inspectors to witness such elimination; (c) For each nuclear warhead to be submitted for verification under this Agreement, the model identification, serial number and any other identifying codes or markings, its date of manufacture, and its location at the time when it will be inspected and accepted into verification under this Agreement; (d) For each warhead subject to verification under this Agreement to be dismantled, the warhead model number, serial number and any additional identification codes or markings, the scheduled location, and the date and time for the dismantlement; (e) For each warhead component containing fissile material subject to this Agreement, the type of component, the model number, the date of manufacture, the location where the warhead component will be stored pending processing, the location and timing for processing to remove all classified properties, the type of processing, and the use of blend stock to remove classified properties; (f) For any other form of fissile material subject to this Agreement in which the fissile material has classified properties, the type and model

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138  Legal Annexes of container used, its serial number, whether the container holds plutonium or HEU or both, the location where the container will be stored pending processing, the location and timing for processing to remove all classified properties, the type of processing, and the use of blend stock to remove classified properties; (g) For any container of unclassified plutonium subject to this Agreement, the container type, model and serial number, the amount of plutonium contained, its chemical form, its isotopic composition and americium content as of a given date, the analytical measurement methods used to determine the mass and isotopic composition of the plutonium and americium, the sampling and measurement uncertainties involved, the location where the container will be stored pending transfer to its chosen disposition site, and the date for said transfer; and (h) For any container of unclassified highly enriched uranium subject to this Agreement, the container type, model and serial number, the amount of HEU contained, its chemical form, its isotopic composition, the analytical measurement methods used to determine the mass and isotopic composition of the uranium, the sampling and measurement uncertainties involved, the location where the container will be stored pending transfer to its chosen disposition site, and the date for said transfer. 65. The Agreement shall provide that shall arrange that records are kept in respect of each facility where verification and/​or monitoring activities are carried out under this Agreement, 66. The Agreement shall provide that the Subsidiary Arrangements shall describe the records to be kept in respect of each facility. 67. The Agreement shall provide that shall make arrangements to facilitate the examination of records by inspectors. 68. The Agreement shall provide that the records shall be retained in non-​ erasable digital storage media permanently, and in paper media during the period that fissile material subject to this Agreement remains at the facility, and thereafter, for at least five years. 69. The Agreement shall provide that the system of measurements on which the records used for the preparation of reports are based shall either conform to the latest international standards or be equivalent in quality to such standards. Accounting records 70. The Agreement shall provide that the accounting records shall set forth the following in respect of each facility: (a) All inventory changes, to permit a determination of the book inventory at any time;

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Annex A.2 139 (b) All measurement results that are used for determination of the physical inventory; and (c) All adjustments and corrections that have been made in respect of inventory changes, book inventories, and physical inventories. 71. The Agreement shall provide that for all inventory changes and physical inventories the records shall show, in respect of each batch of material subject to this Agreement: material identification, batch data and source data. Furthermore, the date of the inventory change and, when appropriate, the originating material balance area and the receiving material balance area or the recipient, shall be indicated for each inventory change. Operating records 72. The Agreement shall provide that so far as is consistent with paragraphs 12–​14, the operating records shall set forth, as applicable, in respect of each facility: (a) Those operating data which are used to establish changes in the number, identity, location or integrity of containers, the quantities and the composition of material subject to this Agreement; (b) The data obtained from the calibration of tanks and instruments and from sampling and analyses, the procedures to control the quality of measurements and the derived estimates of random and systematic error; (c) A description of the sequence of the actions taken in preparing for, and in taking, a physical inventory in order to ensure that it is correct and complete; and (d) A description of the actions taken in order to ascertain the cause and magnitude of any accidental or unmeasured loss that might occur. Reports system 73. The Agreement shall provide that shall provide INDA with reports in English as detailed in paragraphs 74–​83 below in respect of material subject to this Agreement. 74. The Agreement shall provide that reports shall be based on the records kept in accordance with paragraphs 64–​72 above and shall consist, as appropriate, of accounting reports and special reports. Accounting reports 75. The Agreement shall provide that upon entry into force of the Agreement, may specify in an initial report to INDA material of the type identified in paragraph 64 for the purpose of making it subject to INDA verification under this Agreement. The report shall include the following information:

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140  Legal Annexes (a) For containers of material subject to this Agreement for which mass cannot be declared without disclosing information requiring protection under paragraphs 12–​14: i. The total number of items or containers specified by ; and ii. The location of the items or containers, and the date as from when the containers can be verified for acceptance under the verification arrangements; (b) For each material balance area, shall provide INDA with the following accounting reports: i. Inventory change reports showing changes in the inventory of material subject to this Agreement. The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within 30 days after the end of the month in which the inventory changes occurred or were established; and ii. Material balance reports showing the material balance based on a physical inventory of material subject to this Agreement actually present in the material balance area. The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within 30 days. 76. The Agreement shall provide that the reports shall be based on data available as of the date of reporting and may be corrected at a later date as required. 77. The Agreement shall provide that inventory change reports shall specify identification and batch data for each batch of material subject to this Agreement, the date of the inventory change and, as appropriate, the originating material balance area, the receiving material balance area and the recipient. Explanatory notes shall accompany these reports: (a) Explaining the inventory changes on the basis of the operating data contained in the operating records provided for under paragraph 72 above; and (b) Describing, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, the anticipated operational program, particularly the taking of a physical inventory. 78. The Agreement shall provide that shall report each inventory change, adjustment and correction either periodically in a consolidated list or individually. The inventory changes shall be reported in terms of batches; small amounts, such as analytical samples, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, may be combined and reported as one inventory change. 79. The Agreement shall provide that INDA shall provide with statements of book inventory of material subject to this Agreement, for each material balance area, as based on the inventory change reports for the period covered by each such statement. 80. The Agreement shall provide that material balance reports shall include the following entries, unless otherwise agreed by INDA and : (a) Beginning physical inventory;

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Annex A.2 141 ( b) Inventory changes (first increases, then decreases); (c) Ending book inventory; (d) Shipper/​receiver differences; (e) Adjusted ending book inventory; (f) Ending physical inventory; and (g) Material unaccounted for, if any. 81. The Agreement shall provide that a statement of the physical inventory listing all batches separately and specifying material subject to this Agreement identification and batch data for each batch shall be attached to each material balance report. Special reports 82. The Agreement shall provide that shall make special reports without delay: (a) If any unusual incident or circumstances lead the State to believe that there is or may have been loss of material subject to this Agreement that exceeds the limits to be specified for this purpose in the Subsidiary Arrangements; or (b) If the containment has unexpectedly changed from that specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements to the extent that undetected removal of material subject to this Agreement has become possible; or (c) If any unusual incident or circumstances during international transfers lead to believe that there is or may have been loss of material subject to this Agreement, including the occurrence of significant delay during the transfer. Amplification and clarification of reports 83. The Agreement shall provide that at the request of INDA, shall supply amplifications or clarifications of any report, in so far as relevant for the purpose of verification, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 12–​14. Inspections 84. The Agreement shall provide that INDA shall have the right to make inspections to achieve the objectives identified in paragraph 47 as provided for in paragraphs 85 to 88, and 100–​115 below. 85. The Agreement shall provide that INDA may make routine inspections at a facility upon completion of the initial verification of design information and entry into force of the relevant Subsidiary Arrangements in order to: (a) Verify the information contained in reports provided pursuant to paragraphs 73–​82 above; (b) Verify that reports are consistent with records;

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142  Legal Annexes (c) Taking into account the requirements of paragraphs 12–​14, verify the location, identity, quantity and composition of all material subject to this Agreement as declared in the reports provided by the State; and (d) Verify information on the possible causes of anomalies, shipper/​ receiver differences and uncertainties in the book inventory. 86. The Agreement shall provide that upon agreement with , INDA may make ad hoc inspections for the purposes specified in paragraph 85 at any facility which contains material subject to this Agreement for which Subsidiary Arrangements are not in force. 87. The Agreement shall provide that INDA may make special inspections as approved by the Nuclear Disarmament Council: (a) In order to verify the information contained in special reports; or (b) If INDA considers that information made available by the State, including explanations from the State and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for INDA to fulfill its responsibilities under this Agreement. 88. The Agreement shall provide that for the purposes stated in paragraph 47 above, INDA may, as appropriate, taking into account the requirements of paragraphs 12–14 and following agreed procedures spelled out in the Subsidiary Arrangements: (a) Examine the records kept pursuant to paragraphs 64 to 72; (b) Conduct independently verification, item and container counting, or measurements on all fissile material subject to this Agreement; (c) Verify the identity, location and integrity of containers accepted for verification under this Agreement; (d) Verify the functioning and calibration of instruments and other measuring and control equipment; (e) Apply and make use of surveillance and containment measures; and (f) Use other objective methods that have been demonstrated to be technically feasible as agreed by . 89. The Agreement shall provide that INDA shall be enabled, where applicable: (a) To observe that samples at key measurement points for material balance accounting are taken in accordance with procedures which produce representative samples, to observe the treatment and analysis of the samples and to obtain duplicates of such samples; (b) To observe that the measurements of material subject to this Agreement at key measurement points for material balance accounting are representative, and to (c) To make arrangements with that, if necessary: i. Additional measurements are made and additional samples taken for use by INDA; ii. INDA standard analytical samples are analyzed; iii. Appropriate reference materials are used in calibrating instruments and other equipment; and iv. Other calibrations are carried out;

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Annex A.2 143 (d) To arrange to use agreed equipment for independent counting, measurement and surveillance, and if so agreed and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, to arrange to install such equipment; (e) To apply its seals and other identifying and tamper-​ indicating devices to containments, if so agreed and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and (f) To make arrangements with for the shipping of any samples taken for INDA use. Access for inspections 90. The Agreement shall provide that INDA inspectors shall have access only to the strategic points specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and to the records maintained pursuant to paragraphs 64 to 69. 91. The Agreement shall provide that inspectors shall have access to any location holding fissile material subject to the Agreement of which INDA has been notified. 92. The Agreement shall provide that until such time as the strategic points have been specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, for facilities for which has agreed to accept ad hoc inspections, INDA inspectors shall have access to any location where a report pursuant to INDA indicates that fissile material subject to this Agreement is present. 93. The Agreement shall provide that in the event of concluding that periodic safety examinations of material subject to this Agreement or any unusual circumstances require extended limitations on access by INDA, and INDA shall promptly make arrangements with a view to enabling INDA to discharge its verification responsibilities in the light of these limitations. The Director General shall report each such arrangement to the Nuclear Disarmament Council. 94. The Agreement shall provide that in circumstances which may lead to special inspections for the purposes specified above and INDA shall consult forthwith. As a result of such consultations INDA may obtain access in agreement with to information or locations in addition to the access specified for routine inspections. Any disagreement concerning the need for additional access shall be resolved in accordance with paragraphs 32–​36 of this Agreement; in case action by is essential and urgent, paragraph 31 above shall apply. Notice of inspections 95. The Agreement shall provide that INDA shall give advance notice to before arrival of inspectors at facilities as follows: (a) For special inspections pursuant to paragraph 87 above, as promptly as possible after INDA and have consulted, it being understood that notification of arrival normally will constitute part of the consultations;

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144  Legal Annexes (b) For routine inspections pursuant to paragraph 85 above, the time for advance notice shall be agreed in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and (c) For ad hoc inspections pursuant to paragraph 86, the time for advance notice shall be agreed in the General Part of the Subsidiary Arrangements. 96. The Agreement shall provide that each notice of inspections shall include the names of the inspectors and shall indicate the facilities to be visited and the periods during which they will be inspected. If the inspectors are to arrive from outside INDA shall also give advance notice of the place and time of their arrival in . Conduct and visits of inspectors 97. The Agreement shall provide that inspectors, in exercising their functions, shall carry out their activities in a manner designed to avoid hampering or delaying the construction, commissioning or operation of facilities, or affecting their safety or security. In particular inspectors shall not operate any facility themselves or direct the staff of a facility to carry out any operation. If inspectors consider that the operator should carry out particular operations in a facility, they shall make a request therefor. 98. The Agreement shall provide that when inspectors require services available in , including the use of equipment, in connection with the performance of inspections, shall facilitate the procurement of such services and the use of such equipment by inspectors, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 12–​14 of this Agreement. 99. The Agreement shall provide that representatives of must accompany INDA inspectors during their inspections, provided that INDA inspectors shall not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions. PART III

Verification Level 4: Deployed Nuclear Warheads 100. The Agreement shall provide that verification at Level 4 may commence upon joint approval by and the Nuclear Disarmament Council. 101. The Agreement shall provide that under Level 4 verification, INDA inspectors shall: (a) Visually examine nuclear warheads mated to nuclear weapon delivery systems, identify the warhead model, serial number and any additional identification markings or codes, apply unique INDA

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Annex A.2 145 identification tags or seals to the warhead in such a manner as to make access into the warhead without detection impossible, and make photographic records of each warhead, in situ, and create a disarmament dossier for each warhead; (b) Establish and maintain a chain of custody over each such warhead, observing its removal from its delivery system and its placement into a storage or shipping container, recording the identification of each such container and the specific storage location, applying unique INDA identification tags or seals, make photographic records of each warhead, and update the disarmament dossier for each warhead; (c) Maintain continuous continuity of knowledge of the stored inventory of warheads pending shipment to verify the integrity of the chain of custody; (d) At monthly intervals, re-​verify warhead containers according to a random sampling plan, examine selected containers for evidence of unauthorized movement or access, verify and replace unique INDA identification tags and/​or seals, and update the disarmament dossier for each warhead; (e) Verify each warhead container selected for shipment to a Level 3 facility, examine selected containers for evidence of unauthorized movement or access, verify and replace unique INDA identification tags and/​or seals, and update the disarmament dossier for each warhead; (f) Examine the transport vehicle for access ways and seal all such so as to prevent undetectable entry; and (g) Verify the placement of each warhead container selected for shipment to a Level 3 facility into the transport vehicle, seal the access doors with appropriate INDA unique tags and seals, make photographic records of the vehicle showing it top, bottom and all sides, and update the disarmament dossier for each warhead to be shipped. Level 3: Detached nuclear warheads 102. The Agreement shall provide that verification at Level 3 may commence upon joint approval by and the Nuclear Disarmament Council. 103. The Agreement shall provide that under Level 3 verification, INDA inspectors shall: (a) Verify each transport vehicle transferring warheads from a Level 4 facility for any evidence of access into the vehicle where the nuclear warheads are contained; (b) Verify the identity of the transport vehicle and compare this examination to the photographic records taken at the Level 4 facility;

146

146  Legal Annexes (c) Verify the identity and integrity of the INDA seals and tags applied on the access ways into the transport vehicle where the warheads are stored, make a photographic record of the access ways and the seals and tags, and update the transaction record; (d) Verify the identity and integrity of each warhead container as it is unloaded from the transport vehicle, examining the container for any signs of access, and update the disarmament dossier for each warhead; (e) Verify the storage facility at the Level 3 facility before the warheads in their containers are placed in the store, examining the store for any access ways, and for any stored inventory of warhead containers including warheads with disarmament dossiers and warheads in containers being presented for the first time; (f) Verify all warheads in containers in the Level 3 storage facility, examining each container and any INDA seals and tags applied, record each storage location, and examine and replace INDA seals and tags applied earlier, according to a random sampling plan, update the disarmament dossier for each warhead; (g) At monthly intervals, re-​verify warhead containers according to a random sampling plan, examine selected containers for evidence of unauthorized movement or access, verify and replace unique INDA identification tags and/​or seals, and update the disarmament dossier for each warhead; (h) For each transfer of a warhead to the dismantlement facility, verify the integrity of the warhead storage chamber, verify the identity and integrity of each warhead container and the INDA seals and tags applied, witness the transfer into the dismantlement facility, and update the disarmament dossier for each warhead; (i) Within the warhead dismantlement facility: i. Verify that the designated dismantlement chamber is empty of any fissile material, and apply INDA seals to any access ways to create a containment chamber for the purpose of verifying the dismantlement of the warhead; ii. Examine the warhead container for evidence of access, examine and remove all INDA seals and tags, and update the warhead disarmament dossier; iii. Witness the warhead being removed from its container, verify its model, serial number and other codes and markings, verify unique INDA seals and tags, and update the warhead disarmament dossier; iv. Witness the warhead being taken into the designated dismantlement chamber, establish and maintain the containment barrier around the chamber until the warhead is dismantled, and update the warhead disarmament dossier;

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Annex A.2 147 v. Witness the shredding or other destruction of non-​reusable warhead components, and verify that those parts contain no fissile material, and update the warhead disarmament dossier; vi. Witness the removal from the chamber of reusable warhead components not containing fissile material and verify that those materials do not contain fissile material; vii. When the dismantlement is complete, verify the containers holding the pit and secondary and any other nuclear warhead fissile material components removed from the warhead using an appropriate Level 2 verification system approved by and the Nuclear Disarmament Council, apply unique INDA seals and tags to the warhead component containers, and update the warhead disarmament dossier; viii. When the dismantlement if finished, examine the chamber for evidence of unauthorized access, remove the containment barrier, and update the disarmament dossier for the nuclear warhead; (j) Verify the integrity of the storage facility for nuclear warhead components, re-​ verify the stored inventory of warhead components, and verify the location within the component storage facility where the dismantled warhead component containers will be stored, maintain the chain of custody established for the component storage facility, and update the nuclear warhead disarmament dossier; (k) For warhead components which have not been accepted into the verification system, establish a disarmament dossier and verify the components using the authorized Level 2 verification system; (l) At monthly intervals, re-​ verify stored warhead component containers according to random sampling plans, examine selected containers for evidence of unauthorized movement or access, verify and replace unique INDA identification tags and/​ or seals, and update the disarmament dossier for each corresponding warhead or warhead component; and (m) Upon shipment of each warhead component container, verify the integrity of the storage facility, verify each container to be shipped to a Level 2 facility, verify the transport vehicle and apply INDA seals and tags to the transport vehicle compartments where warhead components will be placed for transport. Level 2: Nuclear warhead components 104. The Agreement shall provide that verification at Level 2 may commence upon joint approval by and the Nuclear Disarmament Council.

148

148  Legal Annexes 105. The Agreement shall provide that under Level 2 verification, INDA inspectors shall: (a) Verify each transport vehicle transferring nuclear warhead fissile material components from a Level 3 facility for any evidence of access into the vehicle where the nuclear warheads are contained; (b) Verify the identity of the transport vehicle and compare this examination to the photographic records taken at the Level 3 facility; (c) Verify the identity and integrity of the INDA seals and tags applied on the access ways into the transport vehicle where the warhead components are stored, make a photographic record of the access ways and the seals and tags, and update the transaction record; (d) Verify the identity and integrity of each warhead component container as it is unloaded from the transport vehicle, examining the container for any signs of access, and update the disarmament dossier for each warhead; (e) Verify the storage facility at the Level 2 facility before the warhead components in their containers are placed in the store, examining the store for any access ways, and for any stored inventory of warhead fissile material component containers including warhead components with disarmament dossiers and warhead components and other classified forms of fissile material in containers being presented for the first time; (f) Verify all warhead fissile material components in containers in the Level 2 storage facility, examining each container and any INDA seals and tags applied, record each storage location, and examine and replace INDA seals and tags applied earlier, according to a random sampling plan, update the disarmament dossier for each warhead as appropriate, and create a new record for any other warhead components or other classified forms of fissile material presented for the first time; (g) At monthly intervals, re-​verify all fissile material containers in each Level 2 storage facility according to a random sampling plan, examine selected containers for evidence of unauthorized movement or access, verify and replace unique INDA identification tags and/​or seals, and update the disarmament dossier for each warhead, as appropriate, and each other fissile material container in each Level 2 storage facility; (h) For each transfer of a fissile material container from the Level 2 storage facility to declassification processing facility, verify the integrity of the Level 2 storage chamber, verify the identity and integrity of each fissile material container selected and the INDA seals and tags applied, witness the transfer of each container into the declassification processing facility, and update the disarmament dossier for each warhead, as appropriate, and each record for any other containers holding warhead components or other classified forms of fissile material;

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Annex A.2 149 (i) For each batch of Level 2 fissile material containers to be processed, verify each container using an appropriate Level 2 verification system approved by and the Nuclear Disarmament Council and update the warhead disarmament dossier as appropriate, or update each record for any other containers holding warhead components or other classified forms of fissile material; (j) Within the fissile material declassification processing facility: i. Verify that the designated fissile material declassification processing chamber is empty of any plutonium or uranium, except as may be allowed as feed stock for the purpose of blending to remove the classification properties; ii. Apply INDA seals to any access ways to create a containment barrier for the purpose of verifying the processing of each batch of containers and establish and maintain a containment barrier around the declassification processing chamber; iii. Witness the placement of each container comprising each batch into the declassification processing chamber, and apply update the declassification processing batch record; iv. Witness the removal from the chamber of all containers used to hold classified forms of fissile material comprising each batch, verify that those containers do not contain plutonium or uranium and update the warhead disarmament dossier as appropriate, or update each record for any other containers holding warhead components or other classified forms of fissile material; v. Witness the removal from the chamber of all containers of each batch of Level 1 fissile material no longer having any classified properties, identify each container, apply INDA seals and tags, and verify the contents of each container using an authorized Level 1 verification system, measuring the amount of plutonium and/​or uranium in each container, and the isotopic composition of each, and create a batch record for each such batch; vi. Witness the removal of any containers of feed stock and verify that the properties of this feed stock are as declared; vii. When the processing is finished, examine the chamber for evidence of unauthorized access, remove the containment barrier, and update the update the warhead disarmament dossier as appropriate, or update each record for any other containers holding warhead components or other classified forms of fissile material; and (k) Verify the integrity of the storage facility for Level 1 fissile material and verify the location within the Level 1 storage facility where each container of unclassified fissile material will be stored, and update the Level 1 storage inventory records.

150

150  Legal Annexes Level 1: Unclassified forms of fissile material 106. The Agreement shall provide that verification at Level 1 shall commence upon entry into force of this Agreement. 107. The Agreement shall provide that under Level 1 verification, INDA inspectors shall: (a) Verify all containers declared by to contain unclassified forms of fissile material released from actual use in nuclear weapons or suitable for use in nuclear weapons possessed by , and declared by to be released from nuclear weapons use, by item counting and identification and the use of Level 1 verification systems approved by and the Nuclear Disarmament Council, and the application of INDA and/​ or IAEA seals and tags on all such containers, and the application of containment and surveillance to each Level 1 facility to maintain continuity of knowledge of the inventory of such fissile material; (b) Re-​ verify such inventories at monthly interval, including reverification of stored containers according to a sampling plan, and the use of a Level 1 verification system; (c) Provided that has concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA for this purpose, INDA and IAEA inspectors will verify each shipment from the Level 1 facility to the designated fissile material disposition facility as provided in the safeguards agreement between and the IAEA, INDA and IAEA inspectors will verify each shipment from the Level 1 facility, apply IAEA seals and tags and update disarmament records accordingly. 108. The Agreement shall provide that shall not export to any State any fissile material subject to this Agreement. 109. The Agreement shall provide that fissile material subject to this Agreement shall remain subject to this Agreement until such time as INDA determines that it has been transferred to its intended disposition facility and that it has become subject to the Safeguards Agreement concluded between the IAEA for this specific purpose. 110. The Agreement shall provide that unless otherwise specified by , INDA shall suspend or cease to carry out fissile material verification activities under this Agreement at a facility when INDA and have agreed that all fissile material subject to this Agreement has been removed from the facility. Verification shall be suspended when anticipates that additional fissile material will be introduced at the facility within 36  months of its notification.

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Annex A.2 151 PART IV

Elimination or irreversible conversion of mission-​critical nuclear weapon facilities 111. The Agreement shall provide that shall inform INDA of its intention to eliminate or irreversibly convert a mission-​critical nuclear weapon facility and its schedule for removing essential equipment. 112. The Agreement shall provide that shall provide INDA with historical documentation covering each such facility, from its inception, authorization, construction, commissioning, modernization, and shut-​down, including operating records, staffing, photographs, maps and plans. 113. The Agreement shall provide that will cooperate with INDA inspectors who will confirm the location, status and declared use of the facility, making use of satellite imagery, on-​site visits, survey measurements, environmental samples, and interviews with officials, staff and retired staff, as INDA shall identify. 114. The Agreement shall provide that INDA inspectors will witness the removal and destruction of essential equipment from each such facility. 115. The Agreement shall provide that for each facility to be eliminated, INDA inspectors will witness the demolition of the facility and confirm that it has been eliminated. 116. The Agreement shall provide that for each facility to be converted to a non-​nuclear mission, or to a nuclear mission not related to nuclear weapons or any form of nuclear explosives, provided has concluded a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA for this purpose, IAEA inspectors will verify that the facility has been converted to its new mission, and establish appropriate safeguards measures to provide assurance thereafter that the facility is not used to support any activities related to nuclear weapons. INDA will provide its findings on the facility as obtained through its investigations, and will provide any assistance or support the IAEA inspectors may request. Statements on INDA’s verification activities 117. The Agreement shall provide that INDA shall inform  of: (a) The results of inspections, at intervals to be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and (b) The conclusions it has drawn from its verification activities in , in particular by means of statements in respect of each material balance area, which shall be made as soon as possible after a physical inventory has been taken and verified by INDA, and a material balance has been struck.

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152  Legal Annexes

Definitions For purposes of this Agreement: 118. “Adjustment” means an entry into an accounting record or a report showing a shipper/​receiver difference, material unaccounted for or a rounding adjustment. 119. “Batch” means a portion of material subject to this Agreement handled as a unit for accounting purposes at a key measurement point and for which the composition and quantity are defined by a single set of specifications or measurements. A  batch of material subject to this Agreement may be a single container or a group of containers holding discrete items or bulk materials. 120. “Batch data” means the number of containers, items or, as appropriate, the total weight of each element, of material subject to this Agreement and the isotopic composition when appropriate, taking into account paragraphs 12–​14 of this Agreement. When reported pursuant to paragraph 75–​81, the units of account shall be as follows: (a) Grams of contained plutonium; (b) Grams of total uranium and grams of contained 235U plus 233U; and (c) For reporting purposes, where appropriate, the weights of individual items in the batch shall be added together before rounding to the nearest unit. 121. “Book inventory” of a material balance area means the algebraic sum of the most recent physical inventory of that material balance area and of all inventory changes that have occurred since that physical inventory was taken. 122. “Classified” means determined by in the interest of its national security and/​ or treaty commitments to require protection against unauthorized disclosure under the laws and regulations of as related to the design or manufacturing of nuclear weapons. 123. “Correction” means an entry into an accounting record or a report to rectify an identified mistake or to reflect an improved measurement of a quantity previously entered into the record or report. Each correction must identify the entry to which it pertains. 124. “Enrichment” means the ratio of the combined weight of the isotopes 233 U and 235U to that of the total uranium in question. 125. “Facility” means: a nuclear weapon deployment site; a storage facility for nuclear warheads, components of nuclear warheads containing fissile material, other forms of fissile material with classified properties, unclassified forms of fissile material used in, or committed to use in, nuclear weapons; a nuclear warhead dismantlement facility; or a processing facility to remove classified properties from fissile material; or any other location where material subject to this Agreement is stored, processed, tested or used.

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Annex A.2 153 126. “Fissile material” means plutonium used in the fission primary of a nuclear warhead, generally containing 80% or more of the isotope 239Pu, and HEU used in the primary or secondary components of nuclear weapons, containing 20% or more of the isotope 235U. If declares that it uses plutonium or uranium with different properties, or 233 U, americium or 237Np in its nuclear weapons, the definition of “fissile material” shall be adjusted accordingly. 127. “Inventory change” means an increase or decrease, in terms of batches, of fissile material subject to this Agreement in a material balance area; such a change shall involve one of the following, or such other inventory changes as may be agreed in the Subsidiary Arrangements: (a) Increases:  reports pursuant to paragraph 77 of fissile material to be submitted to verification under this Agreement, originating from deployed or detached nuclear warheads, from fissile material components of nuclear weapons, or from existing stocks of fissile material committed to use in nuclear weapons; (b) Domestic transfers:  shipment from one facility to another within of fissile material subject to this Agreement in relation to the process of nuclear disarmament; (c) Decreases:  shipments of fissile material not containing any classified properties to an approved disposition pathway within , transferring responsibility of said fissile material from this Agreement to a Safeguards Agreement concluded between and the IAEA for this specific purpose; (d) Measured discards:  fissile material subject to this Agreement which has been measured by and verified by INDA, or estimated on the basis of measurements, and disposed of in such a way that it is not suitable for further nuclear use; (e) Retained waste: material subject to this Agreement generated from processing or from an operational accident, which is deemed to be unrecoverable for the time being but which is stored; (f) Other loss:  for example, accidental loss (that is, irretrievable and inadvertent loss of material subject to this Agreement as the result of an operational accident) or theft. 128. “Key measurement point” means a location where material subject to this Agreement appears in such a form that it may be measured to determine material flow or inventory, and for fissile material that has classified mass, where containers may be identified, counted and relevant attributes verified. Key measurement points thus include, but are not limited to, the inputs and outputs (including measured discards) and storages in material balance areas. 129. “Material balance area” means an area in or outside of a facility such that: (a) The quantity of material subject to this Agreement, or for material subject to this Agreement which has classified mass, the number of

154

154  Legal Annexes containers of such material, in each transfer into or out of each material balance area can be determined; and (b) The physical inventory of material subject to this Agreement in each material balance area can be determined when necessary, in accordance with specified procedures in order that the material balance for verification purposes can be established. 130. “Material subject to this Agreement” means fissile material specified and submitted by the and accepted by INDA for verification under this Agreement. 131. “Mission-​critical nuclear weapon facility” means any facility necessary to for producing, testing, deploying, or maintaining nuclear weapons. 130. “Physical inventory” means the number of containers of material subject to this Agreement which have classified mass and the sum of all the measured or derived estimates of batch quantities of all other material subject to this Agreement on hand at a given time within a material balance area, obtained in accordance with specified procedures. 131. “Source data” means those data, recorded during measurement or calibration or used to derive empirical relationships, which identify material subject to this Agreement and provide batch data. Source data may include, for example, agreed attributes for material with classified characteristics, weight of compounds, conversion factors to determine weight of element, specific gravity, element concentration, isotopic ratios, relationship between volume and manometer readings and relationship between plutonium produced and power generated. 132. “Strategic point” means a location selected during examination of design information where, under normal conditions and when combined with the information from all strategic points taken together, the information necessary and sufficient for the implementation of verification measures is obtained and verified; a strategic point may include any location where attributes are verified or key measurements related to material balance accountancy are made and where containment and surveillance measures are executed.

Notes 1 The draft put forward in this chapter began with INFCIRC/​153, Draft #9 of the Model Verification Agreement developed under the Trilateral Initiative, and the Shea-​Rockwood generalization of the Trilat model in the Harvard report. It incorporates some of the provisions of the Additional Protocol. These sources are cited in Chapter 3. As an engineer with a great sense of appreciation for lawyers and diplomats, I apologize for this draft and its shortcomings, still confident that as a place to start from, it has some merit. 2 See Chapter 7.

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Annex A.3 (Suggested)* Model Agreement Between A Nuclear-​Armed State and the International Atomic Energy Agency

The Agreement should include the following Preamble, adjusted to reflect whether or not the State is a Party to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Preamble WHEREAS is a nuclear-​armed State party to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and acknowledges that it owns, possesses, or controls nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or has owned, possessed or controlled nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in the past; WHEREAS has concluded an Agreement with the International Nuclear Disarmament Agency pursuant to the TPNW to eliminate all existing nuclear weapons, to remove all fissile material from all nuclear weapons, to remove all classified properties from all fissile material committed to use in nuclear weapons, to transfer all unclassified fissile material from nuclear weapon use to an approved disposition process, and to eliminate or irreversibly convert all mission-​critical facilities from its nuclear weapons complex; WHEREAS shall conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency pursuant to the TPNW sufficient to provide credible assurance of the non-​diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in that State Party as a whole;

*  Author’s Note:  This Annex was written anticipating that the IAEA would be asked by the Parties to the TPNW to accept the verification responsibilities set forth in Part III of the book, and to prepare a model agreement to implement those responsibilities in nuclear-​armed States. This Annex is included in the hope that it might facilitate the work of the IAEA Secretariat. If so desired, the IAEA should seek permission from Routledge to make use of this Annex for that purpose.

156

156  Legal Annexes WHEREAS agrees to submit fissile material transferred from disarmament to verification, denaturing and disposal under the jurisdiction and control of the IAEA pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement; WHEREAS agrees not to produce or otherwise acquire fissile material or direct-​use or alternative nuclear material for use in a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device as from the entry into force of this Agreement; WHEREAS agrees to submit all nuclear material and alternative nuclear material to safeguards pursuant to the provisions of this safeguards agreement; WHEREAS agrees to allow the IAEA to phase in verification and control measures consistent with progress made by toward its full and complete elimination of all nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosives owned by or controlled by , and to accept IAEA verification and control requirements specific to as shall be agreed between the IAEA Board of Governors and the International Nuclear Disarmament Agency Nuclear Disarmament Council, which shall be reviewed and amended annually as the Board of Governors and the Nuclear Disarmament Council shall decide; WHEREAS agrees that once all nuclear weapons owned by have been eliminated, the verification provisions of this agreement and those for all non-​nuclear weapon states parties to the Treaty on the Non-​ Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT) shall be made equal in all relevant aspects; WHEREAS should decide to irreversibly convert certain mission-​critical nuclear weapons facilities to non-​explosive nuclear applications or to non-​nuclear use in conjunction with its commitments to the elimination of nuclear arsenal, following verification by INDA of the location, purpose, and history of each such facility, and verification by INDA of the removal and destruction of mission-​critical equipment from each such facility used for the purposes of producing, assembling or maintaining nuclear warheads, shall enable the IAEA to verify that each mission-​ critical nuclear weapon facility so identified by is and remains modified thereafter for non-​explosive nuclear use or for non-​nuclear use; [WHEREAS in addition to being a Party to the TPNW, is also a nuclear-​weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-​Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, has undertaken to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,” agrees to conclude this Agreement and abide by its provisions in partial fulfillment of its commitments under the NPT;] WHEREAS, pursuant to the Statute of the IAEA (hereinafter referred to as the “Statute”), the IAEA is authorized to conclude this safeguards agreement at the request of ;

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Annex A.3 157 RECOGNIZING the importance of the International Nuclear Disarmament Agency, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the World Institute of Nuclear Security, and the IAEA agree to cooperate with these organizations to ensure success in relation to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament; WHEREAS, pursuant to the Statute, the IAEA shall conduct its activities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations to promote peace and international cooperation, and in conformity with policies of the United Nations furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide disarmament and in conformity with any international agreements entered into pursuant to such policies; NOW, THEREFORE, and the IAEA agree as follows: PART I

Nuclear disarmament verification framework Basic undertaking 1. The Agreement should contain, in accordance with Article [IV.2] [IV.3] of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, an undertaking by the State to accept safeguards, in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, on all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities and in all non-​explosive military activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not used by the State to manufacture nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 2. The Agreement should contain, in accordance with Article [IV.1] [IV.2] of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, an undertaking by the State to accept ongoing monitoring and verification of former mission-​critical nuclear weapon facilities converted to peaceful nuclear use programs or to non-​explosive military programs, in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such facilities are not used by the State to support any activities related to manufacture nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or to supporting any aspect of the State’s nuclear weapon program. Application of safeguards 3. The Agreement should provide for the IAEA’s right and obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied, in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, on nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities and in all non-​explosive military activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere,

158

158  Legal Annexes for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. These safeguards shall include the following missions: (a) Transfer of fissile material from disarmament and disposition of that material so that it will not be available should the state decide to rearm, or denaturing it to the extent practicable so that cannot be reused in nuclear weapons without substantial weapon redesign or chemical processing. (b) Monitoring activities to make certain that mission-​critical nuclear weapon complex facilities converted to non-​ explosive nuclear applications, or to non-​ nuclear applications, are not returned to nuclear weapon use. (c) Verification activities to be implemented by the IAEA at declared nuclear installations to detect the diversion of weapon-​usable nuclear material from declared stocks, and to detect undeclared production of weapon-​usable nuclear material at declared peaceful use facilities. (d) Detection of undeclared production of weapon-​usable nuclear material or undeclared stocks of indirect-​ use nuclear material in undeclared locations anywhere under the control of the State within its territory or anywhere else. (e) Detection of acquisition of any weapon-​ usable nuclear material through any means, including imports, black market acquisitions, and seizures. (f) Estimation and verification of the historical production, imports, exports, processing, and use of all direct-​use nuclear material, alternative nuclear material, or indirect-​use nuclear material during the entire period when such activities have taken place. (g) Implementation of confidence-​building measures as may be agreed by the State and the IAEA in protocols to this Agreement. 4. The Agreement should contain, in accordance with Article [IV.1] [IV.2]  of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, an undertaking by the State to accept ongoing monitoring and verification of former mission-​critical nuclear weapon facilities converted to peaceful nuclear use programs or to non-​explosive military programs, in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such facilities are not used again by the State to support any activities related to manufacture nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or to support any aspect of the State’s nuclear weapon program. Cooperation between the IAEA, INDA and nuclear-​armed states 5. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA and the State shall cooperate to facilitate the implementation of the safeguards provided for therein.

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Annex A.3 159 6. The IAEA and the State shall agree, wherever possible, to cooperate in providing services essential to other States parties to similar Agreements, for the purpose of enabling disarmament to proceed in other former or present nuclear-​armed states. In such cases, the facilities providing such services should be sited on extraterritorial land under IAEA auspices, and the State shall participate fully in such undertakings. 7. The IAEA and INDA shall cooperate in all matters affecting the verification of disarmament within the State, and the State shall, wherever possible, facilitate such co-​operation. Implementation of safeguards 8. The Agreement should provide that safeguards shall be implemented in a manner designed: (a) To provide assurance that the nuclear disarmament-​ related commitments made by the State are honored, that the State progresses irreversibly toward the full and complete elimination of all of its nuclear weapons, that it does not engage in any activity that could help it to rearm, should it so decide, that the State does not assist any other State to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives, that the State does not support or enable any subnational entity that might use nuclear energy for malevolent purposes or attempt to facilitate such acts by any other entities or individuals; (b) While providing transparency, honor the rules established by the IAEA to control access to information obtained regarding the circumstances prevailing in the State so as to avoid providing unauthorized information to other parties including adversaries of that State; (c) Where such activities will not hamper the ability of the IAEA to implement the provisions of this Agreement, the measures applied shall, to the extent possible, avoid impacting the economic and technological development of the State or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including international imports or exports of indirect-​use nuclear material; (d) To be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities. 9. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA shall take every precaution to protect commercial and industrial secrets and other confidential information coming to its knowledge in the implementation of the Agreement. 10. The IAEA shall not publish or communicate to any State, organization or person any information obtained by it in connection with the implementation of the Agreement, except that specific information relating to such implementation in the State may be given to the Board of Governors and to such Agency staff members as require such knowledge by reason of their official duties in connection with safeguards, but only to the extent

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160  Legal Annexes necessary for the IAEA to fulfil its responsibilities in implementing the Agreement. 11. Summarized information on the implementation of this Agreement shall be published as deemed appropriate by the IAEA. The Board of Governors and the Director General of INDA, and the State shall be provided with a three-​business day period to comment on any pending publication prior to its release. 12. The Agreement should provide that in implementing safeguards pursuant thereto the IAEA shall take full account of technological developments in the field of safeguards, and shall make every effort to ensure optimum cost-​effectiveness and the application of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points to the extent that present or future technology permits. In order to ensure optimum cost-​effectiveness, use should be made, for example, of such means as: (a) Containment as a means of defining material balance areas for accounting purposes; (b) Statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear material; (c) Concentration of verification procedures on those activities involving the production, processing, use or storage of fissile material transferred from disarmament for disposition, direct-​use nuclear material and alternative nuclear material from which nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices could readily be made, and minimization of verification procedures in respect of other nuclear material, on condition that this does not hamper the IAEA in applying safeguards under the Agreement; (d) Use of weight and/​or volume measurements, sampling for laboratory analysis for elemental and isotopic composition, radiometric assay systems, video surveillance systems, solution monitoring systems, unattended monitoring systems, environmental sampling, large-​area environmental sampling, satellite imagery, and such other methods as may be approved by the Board of Governors from time to time in relation to the missions identified in Article 3 above; and (e) Use of equipment owned by the State, the operator of a facility, or a designated verification authority charged under a complementary agreement, provided all parties agree on provisions that guarantee the independence of the IAEA and the authenticity of the results obtained. National system of accounting for and control of nuclear material 13. The Agreement should provide that the State shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of all fissile material transferred

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Annex A.3 161 from disarmament for disposition, all direct-​use nuclear material and alternative nuclear material, and all indirect-​use nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement, and that such safeguards shall be applied in such a manner as to enable the IAEA to verify, in ascertaining that there has been no diversion of any such material from peaceful uses or from non-​explosive military uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. IAEA verification shall include, inter alia, independent measurements and observations conducted by the IAEA in accordance with the procedures specified below. The IAEA, in its verification, shall take due account of the technical effectiveness of the State’s capabilities and performance. Provision of information to the IAEA 14. The Agreement should provide that to ensure the effective implementation of safeguards there under the IAEA shall be provided, in accordance with the provisions set out below, with information concerning nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement and the features of facilities relevant to safeguarding such material. The IAEA shall require only the minimum amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its responsibilities under the Agreement. Information pertaining to facilities shall be the minimum necessary for safeguarding nuclear material subject to safeguards under the Agreement. In examining design information, the IAEA shall, at the request of the State, be prepared to examine on the premises of the State design information which the State regards as being of particular sensitivity. Such information would not have to be physically transmitted to the IAEA provided that it remains available for ready further examination by the IAEA on the premises of the State. IAEA inspectors 15. The Agreement should provide that the State shall take the necessary steps to ensure that the IAEA inspectors can effectively discharge their functions under the Agreement. The IAEA shall secure the consent of the State to the designation of Agency inspectors to that State. If the State, either upon proposal of a designation or at any other time after a designation has been made, objects to the designation, the IAEA shall propose to the State an alternative designation or designations. The repeated refusal of a State to accept the designation of the IAEA inspectors, which would impede the inspections conducted under the Agreement, would be considered by the Board upon referral by the Director General with a view to appropriate action. The visits and activities of the IAEA inspectors shall be so arranged as to reduce to a minimum the possible inconvenience and disturbance to the State and to the peaceful nuclear

162

162  Legal Annexes activities inspected, as well as to ensure protection of industrial secrets or any other confidential information coming to the inspectors’ knowledge. Privileges and immunities 16. The Agreement should specify the privileges and immunities which shall be granted to the IAEA and its staff in respect of their functions under the Agreement. In the case of a State party to the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA, the provisions thereof, as in force for such State, shall apply. In the case of other States, the privileges and immunities granted should be such as to ensure that: (a) The IAEA and its staff will be in a position to discharge their functions under the Agreement effectively; and (b) No such State will be placed thereby in a more favorable position than States party to the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA. Termination of safeguards Consumption or dilution of nuclear material 17. The Agreement should provide that safeguards shall terminate on material subject to the Agreement upon determination by the IAEA that it has been consumed or has been diluted in such a way that it is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards or has become practicably irrecoverable. Transfer of nuclear material out of the State 18. The Agreement should provide for notification of transfers of indirect-​ use nuclear material out of the State, in accordance with the provisions set out in paragraphs MM. The IAEA shall terminate safeguards under the Agreement on such material when the recipient State has assumed responsibility therefor, as provided for in paragraph NN. The IAEA shall maintain records indicating each transfer and, where applicable, the re-​ application of safeguards to the transferred indirect-​use nuclear material. Provisions relating to indirect-​use nuclear material subject to the Agreement to be used in non-​nuclear activities 19. The Agreement should provide that if the State wishes to use indirect-​use nuclear material subject to the Agreement in non-​nuclear activities, such as the production of alloys or ceramics, it shall agree with the IAEA on the circumstances under which the safeguards on such indirect-​use nuclear material subject to the Agreement may be terminated.

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Annex A.3 163 Finance 20. The Agreement should contain one of the following sets of provisions: (a) An agreement with a Member of the IAEA should provide that each party thereto shall bear the expenses it incurs in implementing its responsibilities thereunder. However, if the State or persons under its jurisdiction incur extraordinary expenses as a result of a specific request by the IAEA, the IAEA shall reimburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in advance to do so. In any case the IAEA shall bear the cost of any additional measuring or sampling which inspectors may request; or (b) An agreement with a party not a Member of the IAEA should in application of the provisions of Article XIV.C of the Statute, provide that the party shall reimburse fully to the IAEA the safeguards expenses the IAEA incurs thereunder. However, if the party or persons under its jurisdiction incur extraordinary expenses as a result of a specific request by the IAEA, the IAEA shall reimburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in advance to do so. Third party liability for nuclear damage 21. The Agreement should provide that the State shall ensure that any protection against third party liability in respect of nuclear damage, including any insurance or other financial security, which may be available under its laws or regulations shall apply to the IAEA and its officials for the purpose of the implementation of the Agreement, in the same way as that protection applies to nationals of the State. International responsibility 22. The Agreement should provide that any claim by one party thereto against the other in respect of any damage, other than damage arising out of a nuclear incident, resulting from the implementation of safeguards under the Agreement, shall be settled in accordance with international law. Measures in relation to verification findings 23. The Agreement should provide that if the Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action by the State is essential and urgent in order to ensure that the verification missions identified in Paragraph 3 are implemented according to the provisions of the Agreement, and that the findings support a conclusion that the State is honoring its commitments under the Agreement, the Board shall be able to call upon the State to take the required action without delay, irrespective of whether procedures for the settlement of a dispute have been invoked.

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164  Legal Annexes 24. The Agreement should provide that if the Board upon examination of relevant information reported to it by the Director General finds that the IAEA is not able to verify that the State is in compliance with its obligations and that the findings of the IAEA in relation to all objectives defined in Paragraph 3 have been met, the Board shall inform the INDA Nuclear Disarmament Council, and may make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute and may also take, where applicable, the other measures provided for in that paragraph. In taking such action the Board shall take account of the degree of assurance provided by the safeguards measures that have been applied and shall afford the State every reasonable opportunity to furnish the Board with any necessary reassurance. Interpretation and application of the agreement and settlement of disputes 25. The Agreement should provide that the parties thereto shall, at the request of either, consult about any question arising out of the interpretation or application thereof. 26. The Agreement should provide that the State shall have the right to request that any question arising out of the interpretation or application thereof be considered by the Board; and that the State shall be invited by the Board to participate in the discussion of any such question by the Board. 27. The Agreement should provide that any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application thereof except a dispute with regard to a finding by the Board under paragraph 23 or 24 above or an action taken by the Board pursuant to such a finding which is not settled by negotiation or another procedure agreed to by the parties should, on the request of either party, be submitted to an arbitral tribunal composed as follows: each party would designate one arbitrator, and the two arbitrators so designated would elect a third, who would be the Chairman. If, within 30 days of the request for arbitration, either party has not designated an arbitrator, either party to the dispute may request the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint an arbitrator. The same procedure would apply if, within 30 days of the designation or appointment of the second arbitrator, the third arbitrator had not been elected. A  majority of the members of the arbitral tribunal would constitute a quorum, and all decisions would require the concurrence of two arbitrators. The tribunal would fix the arbitral procedure. The decisions of the tribunal would be binding on both parties. Final clauses Amendment of the Agreement 28. The Agreement should provide that the parties thereto shall, at the request of either of them, consult each other on amendment of the Agreement.

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Annex A.3 165 All amendments shall require the agreement of both parties. It might additionally be provided, if convenient to the State, that the agreement of the parties on amendments to Part II of the Agreement could be achieved by recourse to a simplified procedure. The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of any amendment to the Agreement. Suspension of application of Agency safeguards under other agreements. 29. Where applicable and where the State desires such a provision to appear, the Agreement should provide that the application of IAEA safeguards in the State under other safeguards agreements with the IAEA shall be suspended while the Agreement is in force. If the State has received assistance from the IAEA for a project, the State’s undertaking in the Project Agreement not to use items subject thereto in such a way as to further any military purpose shall continue to apply. Entry into force and duration 30. The Agreement should provide that it shall enter into force on the date on which the Agency receives from the State written notification that the statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met. The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of the entry into force. 31. The Agreement should provide for it to remain in force as long as the State is party to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. PART II

Implementation 32. The Agreement should provide: (a) That the purpose of Part II thereof is to specify the procedures to be applied for the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I; (b) That the IAEA is authorized to acquire information, plan and execute inspections, and draw conclusions related to each objective stated below; (c) That the IAEA is authorized to maintain a roster of designated inspectors adequate to meet all anticipated requirements; and (d) That the IAEA should publish an annual report for public distribution on the anniversary of the entry into force of the TPNW, summarizing the implementation of the Agreement and all similar agreements in force, addressing each of the Missions defined in the Agreement, and presenting the findings separately for each nuclear-​armed State.

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166  Legal Annexes #1. DENATURING AND DISPOSITION OF FISSILE MATERIAL

Safeguards Objective #1. 33. The Agreement should provide that safeguards Objective #1 is quantitative verification of all fissile material transferred from disarmament, and For plutonium, (a) Denaturing of by blending with high-​burnup plutonium to increase the fraction of 240Pu to at least 15%; and (b) Blending with depleted, natural or reprocessed uranium to achieve a nominal 1:1 Pu:U mixture; and (c) Permanent disposal by verifying the amounts of plutonium and its properties, verifying its conditioning, loading into specialized containers, and its placement into a repository approved by the Board of Governors, sealing all access to the repository, and maintaining the repository under continuous monitoring thereafter; or (d) Peaceful use under an extraterritorial arrangement approved by the Board of Governors and operated under IAEA supervision and control, within the confines of the State or in another State, subject to IAEA safeguards as for Mission #3, below. For HEU, (a) Down blended with depleted, natural, reprocessed or low enrichment uranium such that the end product contains less than 20% 235U; and i. Transitioned to peaceful use subject to Mission #4; or ii. For amounts of HEU approved by the Board of Governors, transferred to non-​explosive military use subject to Mission #3. For 233U transferred from disarmament, as may arise, (a) Disposal as for plutonium, or (b) Dilution with depleted, natural, reprocessed or low enrichment uranium such that the end product contains less than 20% of the combined amounts of 233U and 235U, and transition to peaceful use subject to Mission #4. For 237Np or 241Am transferred from disarmament, as may arise, (a) Disposal, as for plutonium, or (b) Transition of amounts to peaceful uses deemed to be beneficial to mankind and so approved by the Board of Governors.

Safeguards implementation of Mission #1 34. The Agreement should provide that the State shall initiate consultations as early as possible regarding how it wishes to dispose of its fissile material to be transferred from disarmament. 35. The Agreement should provide that the State shall provide design information on each location to be used to store, process, use, or dispose of fissile material transitioned from disarmament. The design information

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Annex A.3 167 should be provided following IAEA questionnaires supplied by the IAEA and be kept secure by the IAEA. 36. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA has the right to examine the design information provided and to verify each such location and facility identified by the State, for the purposes of determining how the IAEA should implement its verification and monitoring activities, and thereafter to enable the IAEA to remain confident that the safeguards approach established for each such location and facility remains valid. 37. The Agreement should provide that the State provide reports to the IAEA on each campaign executed under Mission #1, including advance information on planning, and thereafter, information on the execution of the steps taken. 38. The Agreement should provide that the State shall maintain complete and accurate records on all fissile material covered under Mission #1, and that all measurement methods and results for all such measurements conform to current international standards. 39. The Agreement should provide that the State recognizes the right of the IAEA to receive information from INDA regarding each transfer of fissile material to disposition, and to make use of joint INDA–​IAEA seals and surveillance capabilities in determining how the IAEA will verify each such consignment. 40. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA has the right to request the State to install IAEA safeguards equipment, to commission such equipment for inspection use, and to maintain said equipment as necessary thereafter to ensure its proper function. 41. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA shall carry out Mission #1 inspections of all such fissile material transferred from disarmament to verify that all such fissile material is properly accounted for and either transitioned to Mission #3 or #4, as appropriate, or is disposed of and monitored thereafter to provide assurance that said fissile material is not returned to use in nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices, or to any other undeclared use.

Reporting findings of safeguards implementation of Mission #1 42. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA shall inform the State and INDA of its findings from its implementation of Mission #1 at quarterly intervals, including the amounts of fissile material received, stored, denatured, disposed of, or transitioned to peaceful use, or to non-​ explosive military use. 43. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA shall report to the General Conference, to the TPNW Conference of States Parties, to each Review Conference of the NPT, and to the United Nations General Assembly on all matters associated with this Agreement, including Mission #1. These reports shall identify the circumstances surrounding implementation in all nuclear-​armed States.

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168  Legal Annexes #2. MONITORING OF MISSION-​CRITICAL NUCLEAR WEAPON FACILITIES IRREVERSIBLY CONVERTED TO NON-​NUCLEAR USE OR TO NON-​EXPLOSIVE NUCLEAR USE

Safeguards Objective #2. 44. The Agreement should provide that safeguards Objective #2 is to make certain that mission-​critical nuclear weapon complex facilities converted to non-​explosive nuclear applications, or to non-​nuclear applications, are not returned to nuclear weapon use.

Safeguards implementation of Mission #2 45. The Agreement should provide that the State should inform the IAEA of its intention to irreversibly convert a mission-​critical nuclear weapon facility to a non-​nuclear use or to a non-​explosive nuclear use at least two years before said conversion is to be carried out. 46. The Agreement should provide that the State should describe the new mission for each such facility, the steps the State will take to convert each such facility from its former nuclear weapons mission to its future mission, and the schedule for such modifications. The State should describe how each conversion will make the facility “irreversible” in terms of its reconversion to performing any mission-​critical nuclear weapon-​ related function. 47. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA shall receive from INDA its certification of the nuclear weapon-​ related mission of each such facility, its location, history, and reports of inspections carried out by INDA inspectors. 48. For each facility to be converted to a non-​nuclear use, the IAEA shall have the right to inspect the facility before, during and following its conversion, and thereafter to inspect the facility as may be required pursuant to Mission #5. 49. The Agreement should provide that the State shall provide design information on each facility to be converted to non-​explosive nuclear use and shall transition the implementation of safeguards to Mission #3.

Reporting findings of safeguards implementation of Mission #2 50. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA shall inform the State and INDA of its findings from its implementation of Mission #2 as and when the State declares its intention to irreversibly convert a mission-​critical nuclear weapon facility to a non-​nuclear mission, or to peaceful use, or to non-​explosive military use. 51. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA shall report to the General Conference, to the TPNW Conference of States Parties, to each Review Conference of the NPT, and to the United Nations General Assembly on

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Annex A.3 169 all matters associated with this Agreement, including Mission #2. These reports shall identify the circumstances surrounding implementation in all nuclear-​armed States. #3. VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES TO BE IMPLEMENTED AT DECLARED NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS

Safeguards Objective #3. 52. The Agreement should provide that safeguards Objective #3 implemented by the IAEA at declared peaceful use and non-​explosive military use facilities is to detect: (a) The diversion of weapon-​ usable nuclear material, or indirect-​use nuclear material from declared stocks; (b) The presence of undeclared stocks of weapon-​usable nuclear material, or indirect-​use nuclear material at declared facilities; and (c) The undeclared production of weapon-​ usable nuclear material at declared facilities.

Safeguards implementation of Mission #3 53. The Agreement should provide that the State should provide an initial report within six months of the entry into force of this Agreement, identifying all nuclear facilities currently in operation, on operational standby, or under construction, to store, process, use, or dispose of waste materials associated with all weapon-​usable nuclear material, for peaceful use and for non-​explosive military use. 54. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA should make use of all available information in developing a State Level Approach for the State, including, inter alia, information acquired through IAEA safeguards activities and other IAEA programs, from open-​source data mining, from commercial firms sharing information or providing relevant information on a contractual basis, including satellite imagery and sensitive nuclear equipment, and information made available to the IAEA pursuant to Article VIII.A of the Statute. 55. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA, in consultation with INDA, should employ a State Level Approach to establish an implementation plan for applying safeguards under the Agreement, taking into account the relative ease of using direct-​use nuclear material or alternative nuclear material with different properties in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Agreement should provide that the Director General should approve the State-​ Level Approach and the verification performance requirements as guidelines for safeguards inspections in the State, reflecting all relevant circumstances for each year in advance to guide safeguards implementation and planning.

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170  Legal Annexes 56. The Agreement should provide that the State and the IAEA should consult on bringing those facilities under IAEA safeguards pursuant to the implementation plan, making adjustments as circumstances dictate. Implementation of safeguards pursuant to Objective #3 shall be in accordance with the Subsidiary Arrangements to the Agreement. 57. Following the agreed implementation plan, the Agreement should provide that the State provides design information according to dates agreed in the implementation plan, that consultations commence forthwith to agree upon a safeguards approach for each such facility, including actions to be taken by the State and the IAEA addressing reporting, services to be provided by each facility to facilitate safeguards implementation, safeguards equipment to be provided by the IAEA, anticipated inspections for relevant purposes and ongoing consultations to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of implementation of Mission #3. 58. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA should employ verification methods, equipment and procedures based upon sound scientific principles and implemented in such a manner as to enable the IAEA to be certain that the results obtained are independent and authentic. The Agreement should provide that the primary material accountancy for each species of weapon-​usable nuclear material, and indirect-​use nuclear material, and that containment and surveillance shall be important complementary safeguards measures. The IAEA may make use of any and all measures, procedures and equipment employed in non-​nuclear weapon States parties to the NPT under comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreements, including, inter alia, (a) Weight and volume measurements using IAEA equipment or operator equipment authenticated by the IAEA; (b) Sample taking for laboratory analysis under direct IAEA inspector supervision, and maintaining continuity of knowledge of the integrity of said samples until they arrive at a designated IAEA safeguards analytical laboratory; (c) Operation of an IAEA on-​site analytical laboratory at each spent fuel reprocessing complex; and (d) Use of installed IAEA instruments and sensors to measure and/​or monitor material subject to Objective #3, including quantitative assay systems and physical parameter monitoring systems to establish and maintain knowledge of the amounts and locations of all weapon-​ usable nuclear material, and indirect-​ use nuclear material subject to Objective #3, including systems equipped with encrypted remote monitoring capabilities. 59. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA may introduce new methods, equipment and procedures as and when appropriate to improve the effectiveness or efficiency of its verification.

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Annex A.3 171

Reporting findings of safeguards implementation of Mission #3 60. The Agreement should provide that the technical conclusion of the Agency’s verification activities shall be a statement, in respect of each material balance area, of the amount of material unaccounted for over a specific period, giving the limits of accuracy of the amounts stated, together with a listing of anomalies detected and actions taken or pending to resolve those anomalies. 61. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA shall inform the State and INDA of its findings from its implementation of Mission #3 at periodic intervals as agreed by the three parties, and as deemed important by the IAEA, the State, or INDA. 62. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA shall report to the IAEA General Conference, to the TPNW Conference of States Parties, to each Review Conference of the NPT, and to the United Nations General Assembly on all matters associated with Mission #3. These reports shall identify the circumstances surrounding implementation separately in each nuclear-​armed State. 63. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA should publish an annual report for public distribution on the anniversary of the entry into force of the TPNW, summarizing the implementation of the Agreement and all similar agreements in force. These reports shall address each of the Missions defined in the Agreement, and shall present the findings separately for each nuclear-​armed State.

#4. VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES TO BE IMPLEMENTED AT UNDECLARED LOCATIONS

Safeguards Objective #4. 64. The Agreement should provide that safeguards Objective #4 implemented by the IAEA is to detect: (a) Undeclared stocks of weapon-​usable nuclear material, or indirect-​use nuclear material; or (b) Undeclared production, processing, or use of weapon-​usable nuclear material, in undeclared locations anywhere on the territory of the State or anywhere else under its control, except as required by the State to maintain its remaining nuclear arsenal, as declared to INDA, and for 241Am, except for gram quantities approved by the IAEA Board of Governors for uses deemed to be beneficial to mankind.

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172  Legal Annexes

Safeguards implementation of Mission #4 65. The Agreement should provide that the State should provide an initial report within 12 months of the entry into force of this Agreement, identifying all locations within the State or under its control anywhere, identifying the amounts of weapon-​usable nuclear material, or indirect-​use nuclear material present at each location identified as of a specified date, the intended purposes for such materials, the capabilities present at such locations to store, process or use such materials, and whether the State intends to submit the location for routine inspection under the provisions of Mission #3. 66. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA has the right to gather information, send IAEA inspectors, visually examine, interview personnel, make measurements and take samples to determine that said locations do not constitute prima facie evidence of non-​compliance by the State with the provisions of the Agreement. 67. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA has the right identify other locations where it has reason to believe that the State may hold undeclared stocks of weapon-​usable nuclear material, or indirect-​use nuclear material, or where undeclared nuclear facilities may be in operation, on operational standby, or under construction, to store, process, use, or dispose of waste materials associated with all weapon-​ usable nuclear material, for any undeclared purpose. 68. The Agreement should further provide that the IAEA has the right to gather information on such locations where it believes that the State may hold undeclared stocks of weapon-​usable nuclear material, or indirect-​use nuclear material, or where undeclared nuclear facilities may be in operation, on operational standby, or under construction, to store, process, use, or dispose of waste materials associated with all weapon-​usable nuclear material, for any undeclared purpose, to send IAEA inspectors to examine such locations and the surrounding environs, to interview persons, make and record measurements and take samples to determine that said locations do not constitute prima facie evidence of non-​compliance by the State with the provisions of the Agreement. 69. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA has the right to gather information from the State, from any activity carried out by the IAEA, by INDA, by the CTBTO, by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, from any other State (by name or in camera), commercial entity or private individual. 70. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA should gather information on such locations and make a preliminary finding before committing to investigate its suspicions. Upon making such a determination, the IAEA should plan and staff its investigation, secure the resources it deems necessary, proceed in confidence, and at the appropriate time, inform the

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Annex A.3 173 State of its enquiry and formally request its cooperation and assistance, as appropriate in each circumstance. The Agreement should provide that upon such a request, the State should facilitate the IAEA inspection within a time period chosen by the IAEA in relation to the nature of the enquiry and the accessibility of the location identified. 71. The Agreement should provide that during such an inspection, the IAEA has the right to establish 24/​7 ingress/​egress controls on movements of vehicles into or out of a location, and may secure satellite imagery, employ helicopter or drone surveillance, and collect air, water and vegetation samples, or swipe samples from surfaces, as it deems appropriate. 72. The Agreement should provide that the State will provide for the safety and security of the IAEA inspection team, and provide for transportation and helicopters for area surveillance during the enquiry. 73. The Agreement should provide that any anomalies observed by the IAEA inspection team resulting from an enquiry shall be considered to be prima facie evidence of possible non-​compliance by the State of the Agreement, and that said allegation should be considered by the IAEA, and informed to the INDA Nuclear Disarmament Council. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA shall have the right to pose specific questions to the State in relation to its findings, and that the State should provide its initial responses within 48 hours of receipt of the questions. 74. The Agreement should provide that in the event of such suspicions, the IAEA Board of Governors may instruct the Director General to implement a special inspection of the locations identified, and the information obtained, engaging experts from a pre-​approved roster as deemed necessary, under the supervision of the Deputy Director General responsible for the implementation of the Agreement. The Agreement should anticipate that the scope of the special inspection might pursue any unresolved issues identified during the special inspection. The Agreement should provide that such a special inspection should continue until the IAEA has completed its work.

Reporting findings of safeguards implementation of Mission #4 75. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA shall report its findings of inspections carried out to confirm information provided by the State in respect of locations declared by the State to hold weapon-​usable nuclear material, or indirect-​use nuclear material, and the capabilities present at such locations to store, process or use such materials. The IAEA will report its findings to the State, and provide summary reports to the Board of Governors and to the INDA Nuclear Disarmament Council. 76. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA shall report forthwith to the IAEA Board of Governors and to the INDA Nuclear Disarmament Council the particulars of any location it identifies and confirms as holding undeclared stocks of weapon-​ usable nuclear material, or indirect-​ use

174

174  Legal Annexes nuclear material, and/​or the capabilities present at such locations to store, process or use such materials. 77. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA shall report forthwith to the IAEA Board of Governors and to the INDA Nuclear Disarmament Council the findings of any special inspection carried out at a designated location or locations as authorized by the IAEA Board of Governors in relation to suspected undeclared stocks of weapon-​usable nuclear material, or indirect-​use nuclear material, and/​or the capabilities present at such locations to store, process or use such materials. The Director General will brief the Board and the Nuclear Disarmament Council during the conduct of a special inspection and receive additional guidance and instructions in relation to the completion of a special inspection. 78. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA Board of Governors and the INDA Nuclear Disarmament Council should decide upon public disclosures associated with a special inspection. 79. The Agreement should provide that IAEA Board of Governors and the INDA Nuclear Disarmament Council may convene an emergency meeting of the TPNW Conference of States parties in relation to the findings of a special inspection. 80. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA Director General should report a special inspection to the United Nations Security Council, when and as directed by the IAEA Board of Governors, or as directed by the Security Council. 81. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA Director General should report activities carried out under Mission #4 to the TPNW Conference of States Parties, to the IAEA General Conference, and to the NPT Review Conference, and summarize such activities in the annual report of IAEA implementation of the TPNW.

#5. DETECTION AND INTERVENTION OF UNDECLARED ACQUISITION

Safeguards Objective #5. 82. The Agreement should provide that safeguards Objective #5 is to detect the acquisition or attempted acquisition of any weapon-​usable nuclear material, or indirect-​use nuclear material by the State through any means, including imports, black market acquisitions, or seizures, to intervene to prevent such acquisitions, and to identify the parties involved.

Safeguards implementation of Mission #5 83. The Agreement should provide that should the IAEA receive information from any source regarding the acquisition or attempted acquisition of

 175

Annex A.3 175 any weapon-​usable nuclear material, or indirect-​use nuclear material by the State through any means, including imports, black market acquisitions, or seizures, the IAEA should consider the merits of the information and seek corroboration through all means available to it. 84. The Agreement should provide that when the IAEA is sufficiently concerned that the information, and all corroborating information available to it, has sufficient merit to warrant further action, the IAEA should inform the IAEA Board of Governors. 85. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA Board of Governors may, depending on the circumstances, call upon the State and any other States the IAEA suspects may be involved to provide immediate steps to shut down any such operation, and instruct the Director General to initiate special inspections in the State and in any other State Party to the TPNW, and in all States Parties to comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreements concluded pursuant to INFCIRC/​153 (Corr.), to determine the nature and extent of each such State’s involvement. 86. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA Board of Governors may, depending on the circumstances, instruct the Director General to cooperate with Interpol and other law enforcement authorities as the Board may decide, the Proliferation Security Initiative, and the International Court of Justice, depending on the nature of the information, with the aim of interdicting an ongoing operation and/​or bringing the parties involved to justice.

Reporting findings of safeguards implementation of Mission #5 87. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA shall report its findings of Mission 5 Inspections and associated enquiries carried out to confirm information received regarding the undeclared acquisition or attempted acquisition of weapon-​usable nuclear material, or indirect-​use nuclear material, to the Board of Governors and to the INDA Nuclear Disarmament Council. 88. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA shall report forthwith to the IAEA Board of Governors and to the INDA Nuclear Disarmament Council the particulars of any allegation that is confirmed by the IAEA acting alone or in cooperation with another institution or party, regarding the undeclared acquisition or attempted acquisition of weapon-​usable nuclear material, or indirect-​use nuclear material. 89. The Agreement should provide that when deemed appropriate, the IAEA Board of Governors or the INDA Nuclear Disarmament Council should convene an emergency meeting of the Conference of States Parties to the TPNW to consider whether or not the States involved should be found to be in violation of its TPNW undertakings. 90. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA Board of Governors and the INDA Nuclear Disarmament Council should decide upon public

176

176  Legal Annexes disclosures associated with a specific allegation of undeclared acquisition or attempted acquisition of weapon-​usable nuclear material, or indirect-​ use nuclear material. 91. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA Director General should report activities carried out under Mission #5 to the TPNW Conference of States Parties, to the IAEA General Conference, and to the NPT Review Conference, and summarize such activities in the annual report of IAEA implementation of the TPNW. #6. HISTORICAL PRODUCTION AND ACQUISITION

Safeguards Objective #6. 92. The Agreement should provide that safeguards Objective #6 is to estimate and verify the historical production, imports, exports, processing, and use of all weapon-​usable nuclear material, or indirect-​use nuclear material owned by the State or any party authorized by the State during the entire period when nuclear activities have taken place.

Safeguards implementation of Mission #6 93. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA should receive from the State a formal declaration of all weapon-​usable nuclear material, or indirect-​use nuclear material acquired by the State through any means, including indigenous production, imports, loans or any other means, the amounts of weapon-​usable nuclear material, or indirect-​use nuclear material processed, used, consumed, exported, or disposed of as nuclear waste, and the amounts of weapon-​usable nuclear material, or indirect-​use nuclear material remaining on inventory as of the date of the declaration. 94. The Agreement should provide that the initial comprehensive declaration should be submitted to the IAEA within 18 months of the entry into force of the Agreement. The declaration should address each species of weapon-​usable nuclear material, or indirect-​use nuclear material, the history of the species, the methods used to estimate and/​or measure the amounts, the locations where such material species were located when the estimates and measurements were made, the locations where the remaining inventories are located, the methods employed, and the names and contact information of the persons involved. 95. The Agreement should that the IAEA should provide its assessment of the initial declaration by the State for each species of weapon-​usable nuclear material, or indirect-​use nuclear material, the corroboration and verification by the IAEA of the history of the species, the estimates provided by the State and the measurements declared by the State of the amounts,

 177

Annex A.3 177 verification of the locations where such material species were located when the estimates and measurements were made, the methods employed, and the names and contact information of the persons consulted in this process. 96. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA should complete its review of the initial declaration within two years of its receipt, describing the methods employed by the IAEA and cooperation with INDA, and CTBTO. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA provide the State with the initial IAEA findings and requests for clarifications of the State’s initial declaration, and that the State should then provide the IAEA with its complete and final declaration not later than one year following receipt by the State of the IAEA findings and any requests by the IAEA for further clarifications. 97. The Agreement should provide that the IAEA may continue to request further clarifications in relation to Mission #6 as it deems appropriate, based upon new analyses or additional information. Author’s note:  When the IAEA develops a draft model agreement, the Secretariat will refer to all articles included in INFCIRC/​153 to determine whether or not they are to be included with appropriate modifications.

178

 179

Technical Annexes*

B.1 International Center for Nuclear Disarmament Verification Research and Development B.2  Candidate verification methods for classified forms of fissile material B.3  Inspection procedures for classified forms of fissile material

* Author’s Note:  These Annexes were written anticipating that the Parties to the TPNW would create INDA and the International Center for Nuclear Disarmament Research and Development, and would define standard routine inspection activities for facilities in nuclear-​ armed States according to the four-​level scheme presented in the book. These Annexes are included in the hope that they might facilitate that work. If so desired, INDA should seek permission from Routledge to make use of these Annexes for those purposes.

180

 181

Annex B.1  International Center for Nuclear Disarmament Verification Research and Development Physical Installations and Initial R&D Tasks Physical Installations in Support of Implementation Levels: Level 1:  No specific physical installations are deemed necessary for Level 1 implementation. Level 2: Work on Level 2 physical installations should begin as early as possible. The following installations are foreseen: a. A supply of typical containers used by States possessing nuclear weapons for use with pits, secondaries, and other forms of fissile material with classified characteristics; b. Object receiving station for visual examination, verification, and application of approved containment and surveillance systems; c. Storage for classified objects, including both palletized storage of containers and storage of containers in engineered vertical or horizontal storage enclosures; d. Structure housing a secure processing facility (constructed as per agreement on architectural requirements for facilities for removing classified characteristics from fissile material subject to verification) to enable perimeter control verification and monitoring of classified receipts, verification and reverification of process area to confirm absence of undisclosed ingress or egress, verification of unclassified product, and application of containment and surveillance on unclassified forms of fissile material before its transfer to Level 1; and e. Transfer capabilities to move dummy containers in relation to inspection mock-​up exercises. Level 3: Work on Level 3 involving physical installations should begin as progress is demonstrated on Level 2 work. a. A supply of dummy warheads and associated transport and shipping containers used by States possessing nuclear weapons; b. Nuclear warhead receiving station for visual examination, verification, and application of approved containment and surveillance systems; c. Storage for nuclear warheads including realistic provisions for security controls;

182

182  Technical Annexes d. Structure housing a secure nuclear warhead dismantlement facility (constructed as per agreement on architectural requirements for dismantlement) to enable perimeter control verification and monitoring of nuclear warhead receipts, verification and reverification of process area to confirm absence of undisclosed ingress or egress, verification of pits and secondaries, application of containment and surveillance on containers holding pits and secondaries, screening of transfers of high explosive, other valuable materials not containing fissile material, witnessing crushing of remaining warhead parts, and witnessing transfers to Level 2; and e. Transfer capabilities to move dummy containers in relation to inspection mock-​up exercises. Level 4:  Work on Level 4 physical installations should begin as progress is demonstrated on Level 3 work. a. A supply of dummy warheads, and dummy bomb housings, and missiles, and associated transport and shipping containers used by States possessing nuclear weapons; b. Nuclear warhead demounting station for visual examination and verification of nuclear warhead demounting and application of approved monitoring systems; c. Interim storage for nuclear warheads including realistic provisions for security controls; d. Transfer of verified warheads to Level 3. Suggested projects for the Center related to INDA are identified in Table B.1.1 below.

 183

Annex B.1 183 Table B.1.1  Initial R&D taskings Level

Scope of Activities

R&D Projects

1

Unclassified Forms of Pu and HEU in storage at sensitive sites

1.1. Identify verification performance requirements for IAEA verification of unclassified fissile material following transfer to peaceful use; 1.2. In consultation with nuclear-​armed states, develop monitoring capabilities as required for implementation on Level 1 materials at sensitive sites. 1.3 In consultation with nuclear-​armed states, develop verification capabilities as required for implementation on Level 1 materials at sensitive sites, considering specially shielded measurement chambers allowing use of IAEA non-​destructive assay equipment, movement of selected containers to allow use of IAEA equipment, and redesign of IAEA equipment as necessary to enable quantitative verification of Level 1 materials. 1.4. In the event that arrangements cannot be agreed for use of non-​destructive assay equipment in a specific nuclear-​armed state, investigate options for weighing sample containers, taking random samples for laboratory analysis, and shipping samples to the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory at Seibersdorf, Austria, or to a transportable IAEA on-​site analytical laboratory to be established for this purpose.

2

Storage of pits, secondaries, and other classified fissile material; conversion to remove classified characteristics

2.1 Identify verification approaches beyond those identified in Annex B.2. 2.2 Examine alternative verification candidates identified in Annex B.2 for application to Pu and HEU warhead components, taking into account all decision factors identified in section 3.5, together with consideration of secure equipment procurement arrangements (3.5.1) and arrangements for producing and certifying templates (3.6), as appropriate. Rank order candidates to facilitate initial selection by INDA Nuclear Disarmament Council. 2.3 For promising candidates, proceed through proof-​ of-​principle to prototype Level of development. As instructed by the Nuclear Disarmament Council, proceed to final development and testing to facilitate implementation selection by the Nuclear Disarmament Council. 2.4 Repeat 2.1 for monitoring systems for Level 2 material. 2.5 Repeat 2.2 for monitoring systems for Level 2 material. 2.6 Create a mock-​up facility for storage of Level 2 materials to test and demonstrate selected systems. (continued)

184

184  Technical Annexes Table B.1.1  (Cont.) Level

Scope of Activities

R&D Projects 2.7 Undertake architectural studies for a model conversion facility suitable for all nuclear-​armed states, designed to facilitate effective INDA verification. 2.8 Design verification for facilities to remove all classified properties from fissile material, including verification of processing areas and perimeter control verification on inputs and outputs. 2.9 Create a mock-​up facility of the model conversion facility to test and demonstrate selected verification approach. 2.10 Carry out vulnerability studies to determine any deficiencies in the storage, transfer, or conversion of Level 2 materials.

3

Storage and dismantlement of intact nuclear warheads or nuclear weapons (e.g., bombs, mines, torpedoes, mobile charges, artillery) or physics packages removed from such items

3.1 Identify verification approaches and equipment for storage and dismantlement of nuclear warheads and physics packages beyond those appropriate for Level 2 identified in Annex B.2. 3.2 Examine alternative verification candidates identified in Annex B.2 for application to Pu and HEU warhead components, taking into account all decision factors identified in section 3.5, together with consideration of secure equipment procurement arrangements (3.5.1) and arrangements for producing and certifying templates (3.6), as appropriate. Rank order candidates to facilitate initial selection by the INDA Nuclear Disarmament Council. 3.3 For promising candidates, proceed through proof-​of-​principle to prototype Level of development. As instructed by the Nuclear Disarmament Council, proceed to final development and testing to facilitate implementation selection by the Nuclear Disarmament Council. 3.4 Repeat 3.1 for monitoring systems for Level 3 material. 3.5 Repeat 3.2 for monitoring systems for Level 3 material. 3.6 Create a mock-​up facility for storage of Level 3 materials to test and demonstrate selected systems. 3.7 Undertake architectural studies for a model warhead dismantlement facility suitable for all nuclear-​armed states, designed to facilitate effective INDA verification. 3.8 Design alternative verification approaches for the model warhead dismantlement facility, including verification of processing areas and perimeter control verification on inputs and outputs.

 185

Annex B.1 185 Table B.1.1  (Cont.) Level

Scope of Activities

R&D Projects 3.9 Upon approval by the Nuclear Disarmament Council, construct a mock-​up of the model warhead dismantlement facility to test and demonstrate each selected verification approach. 3.10 Carry out vulnerability studies to determine any deficiencies in the storage or transfer of Level 3 materials, the dismantlement of Level 3 materials, and the storage and transfer of recovered fissile material to Level 2.

4

Warheads mounted on 4.1 In consultation with nuclear-​armed states, missiles, or bombs, determine options for exercising Level 4 mines, torpedoes, verification. mobile munitions, 4.2 Consistent with 4.1, develop approaches for or artillery subject identifying objects marked for disarmament, for to military control, visual examination, photographic recording, and identified for sealing Level 4 materials. disarmament 4.3 Consistent with 4.2, develop approaches to commence chain of custody at the starting point agreed between INDA and each nuclear-​armed state, and covering, as agreed, in situ storage, demounting, transfer for temporary storage, temporary storage, transfer from military control to the government authorities responsible for Levels 3, 2 and 1. 4.4 Mock-​up the operations foreseen in Level 4 for test, demonstration and training purposes. 4.5 Carry out vulnerability investigations of all operations and systems to be employed for Level 4 materials.

186

Annex B.2  Candidate verification methods for classified forms of fissile material

B.2.1 Introduction Fissile material with classified properties could be presented for verification in conjunction with steps related to nuclear disarmament when INDA and each nuclear-​armed State so agree. The verification objective in each case would be stipulated by the Nuclear Disarmament Council by the type and form of fissile material being presented, and by the questions posed in Table 3.1 that are to be answered. The inspection activities would reflect the outline given in Annex B.3, and the specialized verification systems would be developed or vetted by the INDA Nuclear Disarmament Verification Center as presented in Chapter 2 and in Annex B.1. Verification equipment and procedures that are acceptable to INDA and each nuclear-​armed State may be required for each of the following cases, noting that the fissile material might be plutonium, HEU, or both, in the following physical forms: Level 4: An individual warhead mounted on or within a missile re-​entry vehicle, gravity bomb, cruise missile, torpedo, sea mine or land mine, artillery charge, or a man-​portable device; A number of nuclear warheads mounted on single delivery system (for example, a MIRVed warhead bus, or a pod holding a number of air-​launched cruise missiles); or An individual warhead or a group of warheads contained in a single storage or shipping container. Level 3: An individual warhead or a group of warheads contained in a single storage or shipping container; A single warhead presented for dismantlement; or A pit and/​or a secondary in a storage or shipping container. Level 2: A pit and/​or a secondary in a storage or shipping container; Fissile material with classified properties in the form of metal pieces, powders, or liquids; or Blend stock to remove classified isotopic properties, as might pertain.

 187

Annex B.2 187 There is a substantial need for the R&D activities to commence as early as possible, as there are at present no verification methods, equipment, or procedures that are ready for use for verifying classified fissile material, and it will likely take some years before suitable systems can be agreed. Note that as yet, there is no accepted method for certifying template reference standards. There are other approaches that might be useful. For example, if the population of identical items is large, then the internal consistency of the results could in a sense be self-​authenticating. Such an approach would be most appropriate if INDA could select individual containers to be processed and subsequently made available for measurement. No nuclear-​ armed State would allow any verification or monitoring method or equipment anywhere near its classified forms of fissile material without satisfying itself using its own experts and its own testing methods that the method and equipment will only serve its intended verification purpose and no other. The five methods summarized below will need careful, competitive research to decide which should be chosen initially, how and when each might be applied alone, when combinations of complementary methods would be attractive, and how and when improvements should thereafter be adopted. Note that two of the five methods rely on spontaneous fission from the even isotopes of plutonium, and one relies on cosmogenic muons. The remaining two require interrogation sources. None will solve all of the verification challenges noted in Annex B.3, and hopefully other ideas will be discovered.

B.2.2  Attribute verification with information barriers This method could—​in principle—​be used to verify warheads, pits, secondaries, and bulk forms of fissile material containing classified properties. The attribute verification method is based on the notion that if enough indirect information is presented about a declared object, at some point it becomes reasonable to conclude that the object is, in fact, as declared. The example usually cited involves a duck: If it walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, and swims like a duck, then maybe it is a duck. Additional attributes could provide added assurance to the duck inference: if it has a beak like a duck, weighs what ducks normally weigh, sheds water like a duck, when cooked tastes like a duck, … . In the context of verifying nuclear warheads or fissile material nuclear warhead components, suggested attributes were identified in Table 3.1. Questions could, in principle, be asked and answered by making measurements and then using the essence of the findings to answer a yes/​no question regarding each attribute. The actual measurement results (which would be classified because they could reveal the object’s classified properties) would be converted to a yes/​no answer by means of an information barrier. For example, under

188

188  Technical Annexes the Trilateral Initiative, three questions were posed for a container holding classified plutonium:1 ( a) Is plutonium present in the object presented? Yes or No? (b) Is the plutonium isotopic composition typical of that used in nuclear weapons? Yes or No? (c) Does the mass of plutonium in the object exceed a threshold amount for objects at the specific facility? Yes or No? There are many properties that could be measured and many techniques that could be applied. The Trilateral Initiative agreed on a specific combination of Attribute Verification by Neutron and Gamma ray assay, or AVNG.2,3 The AVNG system combines a high-​resolution gamma ray spectrometer that can measure individual gamma rays from the isotopes of HPGe detector on platform

Amplifier / Discriminator Moduels 3

He-counter

Detector doors with Polyethylene moderator

Graphite reflector

Door rotation support Main frame Polyethylene moderator

Detector supports

Figure B.2.1 In the Trilateral Initiative, the attribute verification concept was adopted for use on classified forms of plutonium. This “AVNG” system is based on neutron-​multiplicity measurements (to measure the amount of 240Pu present) and high-​resolution gamma ray spectrometry (to measure the abundance of the plutonium isotopes). These two measurements would determine whether a container presented for verification actually contained plutonium, whether the plutonium isotopic composition was typical of that used in nuclear weapons, and the mass of plutonium present. These measurement results would be compared with unclassified bench marks to determine whether the item should be accepted into the verification system. A  host-​state operator would position a special container in the measurement system within the enclosure, close it up, and start the verification measurement. The inspectors would record the identification of the container, the time and date of the verification measurement, and the verification comparison results as displayed on a yes/​no panel.

 189

Annex B.2 189 plutonium and compute its isotopic composition, plus a neutron multiplicity detector that can measure the spontaneous fission rate from the plutonium (mostly coming from 240Pu).4 An AVNG includes a purpose-​built computer to analyze the measurement data and combine the gamma ray and neutron measurement data as needed. The results are compared with the unclassified parameters in the three questions above to provide yes or no answers. The information barrier blocks inspector access to the sensitive measurement data.5 A prototype AVNG was built and tested according to the principles established under the Trilateral Initiative. Russia and the US agreed that this method could be used; the IAEA agreed in principle. With the limitations of the Trilateral Initiative, the attribute verification system with information barriers provides no specific nuclear disarmament information beyond the first three questions of Table 3.1. Attribute methods could in principle be used on all classified forms of fissile material in Table 3.1. Limiting its application to the first three questions in Table 3.1 makes it possible to produce calibration standards from unclassified forms of fissile material, which makes this method perhaps easier to authenticate than a system designed for the higher numbered questions in Table 3.1. However, it would still be necessary to provide assurance to the State that an AVNG could not disclose classified information to INDA inspectors, and to assure INDA that the results obtained using an AVNG system would be authentic and reliable, especially proving that the computer processor serving as the information barrier performs only the agreed operations, has no trap doors, and cannot be hacked into. It may be possible to use attribute verification methods if their security requirements can be managed, to verify precision manufactured items that must be essentially exactly alike (e.g., warheads and warhead components), but also for irregular forms of classified fissile material that differ from item to item (bulk feed material, intermediate products, scrap, waste).

B.2.3  Imaging plutonium in nuclear warheads with a thermal neutron camera6 This method could—​ in principle—​ be used to screen warheads and warhead components containing plutonium for gross defects pending verification using a method able to provide additional disarmament information. The thermal neutron imaging method developed at Brookhaven National Laboratory could provide a gross defect verification test to screen warheads or plutonium-​bearing warhead components, in combination with a complementary verification method. Disarmament verification would benefit by the ability to screen individual warheads identified for disarmament for gross defects. Such warheads might be mounted on single warhead delivery systems, in storage or shipping containers, or

190

190  Technical Annexes mounted with additional warheads. The screening test could confirm that each item contains a neutron source, which should be essentially identical for all items of a given type. The test would not reveal any sensitive information about the warheads themselves. It may be possible to devise a system using neutron dosimetry film badges, neutron activation foils in place of the detectors employed as a means to avoid the use of electronics. Further study is required to determine how such systems could be optimized. Nuclear warheads containing plutonium7 emit neutrons produced through spontaneous fission of 240Pu. These neutrons are slowed down from their initial energy (on the order of 1 MeV) in hydrogenous materials, such as high explosives, and most will leave the warhead as thermal neutrons (with and energy on the order of 0.025 eV), the speed of molecules in the surrounding air). The method developed at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) detects thermal neutrons and processes the spatial source characteristics to create low-​resolution images of the locations of plutonium sources in the item (or items) being verified. The rate of neutron emission from an object depends on the amount of plutonium present, the isotopic composition, multiplication occurring when a neutron causes a fissile material nuclide to fission, and the amount and hydrogen content of high explosives used in a warhead, or other hydrogenous material nearby warhead components containing plutonium. Coded-​aperture thermal neutron imaging devices have been explored at BNL. The early versions were based on the use of a 3He-​filled position sensitive neutron detector in a cadmium enclosure box.8 In front of the detector is a coded aperture mask. The mask contains pixels made of cadmium, which are opaque for thermal neutrons (cadmium absorbs the thermal neutrons), and open pixels on aluminum backing (the aluminum is transparent for thermal neutrons). The arrangement of the pixels is such that the multiple images created by the individual open pixels (like using a pin hole camera with multiple pin holes) can be processed using an appropriate computer code and the original image can be reconstructed. For a given mask-​to-​detector spacing, the size of the pixels determines the angular resolution. The original wire chamber neutron detector was redesigned in 2011 to create a new, portable device.9 This new neutron detector is shown on Figure B.2.2 along with a thermal neutron image of multiple neutron sources. Without further measurements, a thermal neutron imaging detection system might be spoofed by spontaneous fission neutron sources (such as 252 Cf) or (α,n) isotopic neutron sources. Use of this imaging method could provide an important means to verify large numbers of items and subsequently use a complementary verification method in a sampling plan to increase the assurance obtained on the population of items put forward for verification.

 191

Annex B.2 191

Figure B.2.2  The Brookhaven National Laboratory thermal neutron imaging system showing five simulated nuclear warheads mounted on a MIRV (Multiple Independently targeted Re-​entry Vehicle) bus (such as shown in Figure 2.1). Such a system might be used to provide a gross defect verification of warheads, and plutonium warhead components.

Systems based on fast neutron imaging are also under consideration, but still rely on electronic processors to image a warhead.10

B.2.4  A zero-​knowledge proof protocol using active neutron interrogation11 This method could—​in principle—​be used verify that nuclear warheads or warhead components are the same as reference templates of given models of such items. All verification techniques developed in the 1990s for nuclear warheads and associated components used information barriers to protect the release of sensitive information during inspection measurements.12 Information barriers are complex hardware and software systems, however. They require that both the host and inspector parties be convinced that they have no trapdoors hidden from the inspectors, which could be used to pass spoof warheads as authentic (the authentication problem), nor side

192

192  Technical Annexes channels unknown to the host, which could leak classified information to curious inspectors (the certification problem). This raises the issue of detecting hardware exploits and malware in the equipment by a malicious party during the design or manufacturing stages. While the US has certified an information barrier for use on a classified item in the presence of Russian visitors, the authentication of any information barrier has yet to be demonstrated.13 To circumvent this problem, Glaser, Barak, and Goldston proposed a radically different approach to warhead verification that does not require an information barrier.14 They suggested the use of zero-​knowledge proofs to perform comparisons or computations on confidential physical data without measuring the data itself. Zero-​knowledge proofs are mathematical cryptographic methods that can be used to demonstrate the validity of a claim while providing no further information beyond the validity of the claim itself.15 While these methods are well established for computational problems,16 they had only limited physical implementation at the time. As a practical example, Glaser, Barak, and Goldston described a template-​ matching protocol in which two treaty-​accountable items are shown to have identical neutron transmission radiographs and induced emission signatures, while revealing no information about their geometry and material composition. To avoid issues with the authentication of hardware sensor and data acquisition systems, they suggested the use of non-​electronic neutron detectors to perform such measurements. Philippe et  al. eventually demonstrated this approach experimentally using superheated emulsion “bubble” neutron detectors comparing the fast neutron radiographic profiles of different simple objects.17 As shown in Figure B.2.3, the method consists in pre-​irradiating sets of detectors with the complementary radiograph of a reference item. In this case, the “complement” implemented by the State is defined as the preload that will result in the total fluence recorded in each detector being the same as if no item had been present when the inspected item is the same as the reference item. Such a radiograph with a flat profile and Poisson noise theoretically conveys zero sensitive information. Inspectors would randomly choose which complements are assigned to an inspected object, such that the inspector cannot prepare different complements matching spoof items in advance. Experimental results confirmed that the method did not reveal information about the interrogated items when they are identical. This property is no longer guaranteed, however, when the host attempts to cheat, opening the possibility for information leakage as a potential deterrent, but also creating a risk in the event of an honest mistake. Further research, involving higher statistics, with different neutron energies,18 and with special nuclear materials,19 is underway to assess the capabilities of this approach for the full range of relevant inspection scenarios.

 193

Figure B.2.3 A Zero-​ knowledge object-​ comparison system:  (a) Concept of zero-​ knowledge differential neutron radiography using superheated droplet detectors. Items are exposed to a neutron beam and their 2D transmission radiographs are recorded on detectors preloaded with the complement radiograph (including Poisson noise) of a reference item. If the item is valid (identical to the reference), the final radiograph is identical to the expected exposure if no object had been present (in the ideal implementation the root mean square deviation from the expected bubble count is solely because of Poisson noise. If the item is a spoof with an experimentally significantly different radiograph, some characteristic features appear in the final radiograph (the results are no longer zero-​knowledge) and the inspector rejects the proof. Each pixel represents the bubble count from a single superheated droplet (bubble) detector. (b)  Picture of a non-​electronic superheated droplet (bubble) detector. Some metastable droplets vaporized and expanded into macroscopic bubbles after a neutron interaction. The bubble count reflects the total fluence delivered to the detector. (c)  One-​ dimensional experimental realization with superheated droplet detector array, reference item (black box hood not shown) on staging area and aperture of a 14 MeV collimated neutron beam. (d) Composition and pattern of the reference item with detector positions (AL, aluminum; SS, stainless steel).

194

194  Technical Annexes

B.2.5  Physical cryptographic verification using nuclear resonance fluorescence20 This method could—​in principle—​be used verify that nuclear warheads or warhead components are the same as reference templates of given models of such items. An alternative to zero-​knowledge verification is physical cryptographic verification. Kemp, Danagoulian, MacDonald, and Vavrek developed what amounts to purely physical information barriers without the complexities of electronic systems.21,22 The system proposed provides for a provably “sound” and “complete” information-​secure method based on physics and a set of logical axioms. By the virtue of being in the public domain, various aspects of the system can be freely studied and scrutinized by any participant in the arms reduction process.

2 x HPGe Pb

DU / A1 encryption foil

Radiator

}

Proxy warhead

}

φ0(E )

NRFγ

LaBr3

φt(E )

e– Collimator Au

Cu

Plastic DU, A1

Optional encryption plates

Pb

NRFγ 1 x HPGe (top view, not to scale)

Figure B.2.4 Experimental layout for the physical cryptographic verification method using nuclear resonance fluorescence.

Soundness is the property that assures that no hoax object can be passed through the system. In the Glaser-​Barak-​Goldston zero-​knowledge system (see Section B.2.4, above), the soundness was limited to ensuring two objects had the same radiograph. In physical cryptography, soundness is extended to include the full three-​dimensional design of the warhead and all of its composite materials with isotopic specificity. Physical cryptography is able to check that the material composition of the warhead is entirely correct by exploiting a process in nuclear physics that is unique for every isotope of nature. Conventional neutron radiography and other such radiographic methods are unable to ensure this level of soundness.

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Annex B.2 195 Physical cryptography confirms that the complete three-​ dimensional geometry is correct by using a single-​ pixel tomographic transform that provides a unique measure of the warhead’s internal geometry. As with the zero-​knowledge approach, information is protected by the intrinsic physics of the system rather than relying on difficult-​to-​certify electronic circuits or software. Both zero knowledge and physical encryption are template approaches and proceed as follows: (a) A template warhead is established by a joint exercise between the host (the country offering candidate warheads for verification) and the inspector. (b) The host submits additional candidate warheads to be tested into joint custody. (c) The host installs either a pre-​load (zero-​knowledge radiography) or an encrypting foil key (physical encryption) into the measurement apparatus. These physical objects protect the information being measured. (d) The inspector supervises the measurements of the template and candidate according to randomized parameters of the inspector’s choosing. Inspector’s choice renders cheating impractical for the host. In the zero-​knowledge approach, it is the act of measurement that protects information. When carried out in a particular way, all sensitive information will be safe. However, if a mistake occurs in the execution of the measurement, the process can leak sensitive information. In the physical cryptographic approach, the information is protected prior to measurement, so that if an error in the measurement process occurs, no sensitive information will leak. Unlike the zero-​knowledge approach, physical encryption requires some electronics to operate. However these electronics do not need to be certified by the host because they are never permitted in areas where sensitive information might be available to measure. Simulations for a bremsstrahlung-​based physical cryptographic system using available technologies and the simulated geometries suggest that two measurements, each a minute long, should be able to reject a canonical set of hoaxes with greater than 99.9% probability, while falsely alarming on an authentic warhead about once in every 10,000 warheads. Realistic foil and warhead geometries will almost certainly require somewhat longer measurements than those simulated. Recent work has validated the physical cryptographic measurement in an experimental setting.23 Proxy “genuine” warheads were constructed from plates of depleted uranium (DU) and plastic, and their nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) signatures were compared against those of proxy “hoax” warheads in which the DU was replaced by an equal areal density of Pb. Differences in the 238U NRF lines, as observed by high-​purity germanium detectors, indicate that the measurement is capable of distinguishing between genuine and hoax objects with > 5σ confidence in realistic measurement times.

196

196  Technical Annexes If a bremsstrahlung beam is used, several information security questions remain open, namely the information content of the continuum underneath the NRF signal is at present poorly understood, although studies are underway. This problem can be avoided entirely by using tunable monochromatic photon sources or time-​encoded calorimetric measurement. In general, a further layer of information security may be had by adding samples of weapon materials between the bremsstrahlung source and warhead. If sensitive information is somehow transmitted, the addition of the extra material allows the inference of only a large upper bound on the warhead areal density, rather than a reconstruction of the warhead’s true mass.

B.2.6  Cosmogenic muon verification with physical encryption24 This method could—​in principle—​be used verify that nuclear warheads or warhead components are the same as reference templates of given models of such items. This concept comes from elementary particle physics. Cosmic ray muons arrive at sea level at a rate of about one per minute per square centimeter and a small fraction of these muons will stop inside an object under test (such as a nuclear warhead). This method combines the analysis of muonic x-​rays emitted as a muon loses energy, to determine the elemental and isotopic composition of the object under test, and muon tomography to constrain the geometry of the object under test. In a high-​Z material, like plutonium, most of these muons will be captured into atomic orbitals before they decay and then displace atomic electrons. Eventually they cascade down to the atomic ground state, emitting characteristic muonic x-​ rays with energies in the 2–​ 20 MeV range. These x-​rays are emitted nearly instantaneously after the muon has stopped.25 Measuring the energy spectrum of these muonic x-​rays makes it possible determine the content of heavy elements, by making use of the known characteristic muonic x-​ray spectrum for each element. Moreover, isotope shifts in muonic x-​ray spectra are also large (due to the very small radii of the atomic orbits occupied by the muon), and hence nuclear structure effects are pronounced.26 In turn, this makes it possible to infer the elemental makeup of the object under test, and also—​within limits—​its isotopic composition. For muon tomography the fact that muons move in straight lines is exploited and by carefully measuring the muon angle and position when it enters the apparatus and the point where it stops inside the object under test, the geometric distribution of heavy elements can be imaged. In Figure B.2.5, two muon detectors A  and B form what is called a muon telescope and each detector records the x-​and y-​position of each muon  detected. These four measurements make it possible to determine the muon trajectory. They also provide a trigger signal for the spectrometer

 197

Annex B.2 197 muon muon detector A

muon detector B

Spectrometer

Spectrometer

X-ray

Warhead

Figure B.2.5 Conceptual arrangement for the muon verification method.

to open a data collection window for about 10 ns27 and only events registered in this tight coincidence window will be used for the analysis. This small time window removes all backgrounds not related to muonic x-​rays. The spectrometer determines the energy of the muonic x-​rays. There are two physical information barriers for the system. For the tomographic data, muon detectors A  and B are constructed as coded aperture masks with a filling factor of about 50% and with a random pattern of squares of fixed and known size. Thus, detection of some of the muon trajectories will no longer be possible, thereby encrypting the physical details of the shape and composition of the object being verified. Knowing the locations of holes in both detectors could allow the full signals to be reconstructed, but this is

198

198  Technical Annexes prevented by detector A being provided by the host country and detector B by INDA. Each party will provide a library of detectors and random sampling from these two libraries by the other party following a zero-​knowledge proof protocol will ensure reliability without disclosing any specific information about the two detectors actually used to verify the object under test. For the spectrometer, the number of muonic x-​rays detected limits the fidelity with which total element and isotopic contents can be determined, which is in turn fixed by the cosmic muon rate and the time an object under test spends in the apparatus. By limiting the time of the object under test inside the apparatus, firm limits on the sensitivity can be placed. It would be possible to ensure that the 239Pu purity could only be measured within fixed ranges, for example, 239Pu > 90%, between 80–​90%, etc. Initial simulations indicate that about 70% of muonic x-​rays produced in a warhead proxy would escape the object under test and distinguishing e.g., thorium and uranium would very easy even with a realistic spectrometer resolution. No artificial radiation sources are used and commercially available muon detectors are not expensive; thus the overall system would be relatively inexpensive and mobile versions are possible.

Notes 1 Note that in the Trilateral Initiative, Russia and the United States identified the attributes and concluded that there were no unclassified fissile material verification methods that could be used, thereby justifying the use of information barriers. When asked why, they often said that the reason was itself classified. Nuclear-​ armed States might declare such a conclusion for legitimate reasons, however, the possibility also exists that they might insist on unnecessary classification as a means to complicate the verification process to inhibit progress. 2 Shea and Rockwood, Nuclear Disarmament: The Legacy of the Trilateral Initiative. 3 S. Razinkov, A.  Livke, S.  Kondratov, J.  Thron, M.  Bulatov, M.  Leplyavkina, D.  Sivachev, S.  Tsybryaev, and A.  V’yushin RFNC-​ VNIIEF, Sarov, Russian Federation, and D.W. MacArthur, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM, USA (2010), The Design and Implementation of the AVNG, Proceedings of the 51st Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management, Baltimore, MD, Abstract #302. 4 When fission occurs, a heavy nucleus splits into two or three fission fragments and several neutrons (sometimes one, more often two, sometimes three, and rarely four or more), are released, sometimes immediately, sometimes after a short delay. With a high efficiency detector, it is possible to detect all of the neutrons from a single fission event, and from the results, to determine if the fission occurred spontaneously, or from a neutron striking the nucleus that fissioned. Using the combination of plutonium isotopes determined by measuring the gamma ray spectrum, it is possible to infer the total amount present, often with accuracies of better than 1%. 5 Originally the neutron multiplicity detector was to be equipped with over 100 helium-​ 3 (3He) neutron detector tubes, but a global shortage of 3He required that an alternative be used (plastic scintillator detectors doped with neutron capture material). After

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Annex B.2 199 the Trilateral Initiative was concluded, American and Russian experts continued work on the AVNG system under a bilateral cooperative program and eventually succeeded in building a prototype system that was tested by Russian security officials. 6 Dr. Istvan Dioszegi of BNL contributed this Section. 7 Primaries may be made using only plutonium, or a mixture of plutonium and HEU, or HEU only. 8 P. Vanier and L.  Forman (2002), Forming Images with Thermal Neutrons, International Conference on Optical Science and Technology, Seattle, 2002. 9 I. Dioszegi et  al. (2014), “Coded Aperture Thermal Neutron Camera With ASIC-​ Based Pad Readout.” Applications of Nuclear Techniques (CRETE13) International Journal of Modern Physics, Conference Series Vol. 27:  1460139. www.worldscientific.com/​doi/​pdf/​10.1142/​S2010194514601392, accessed 11 January 2018. 10 Sandia Labs News Releases (2017), Overcoming the trust barrier in nuclear weapons verification measurements, https://​share-​ng.sandia.gov/​news/​resources/​ news_​releases/​warhead_​verificiation/​#.WqLz7ZPwa-​V, accessed 09 March 2018. 11 This Section was provided by Sébastien Philippe, PhD candidate, Nuclear Futures Laboratory, Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, Princeton University. 12 J. Yan and A. Glaser (2015), “Nuclear warhead verification: a review of attribute and template systems.” Science & Global Security 23, no. 3: pp. 157–​170. 13 J. Fuller (2010), “Going to Zero:  Verifying Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement.” In Corey Hinderstein (ed.), Cultivating Confidence: Verification, Monitoring, and Enforcement for a World Free of Nuclear Weapons (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2010), p. 151. 14 A. Glaser, B.  Boaz and R.  Goldston (2014), “A zero-​knowledge protocol for nuclear warhead verification.” Nature 510, no. 7506: pp. 497–​502. 15 S. Goldwasser, M. Silvio, and C. Rackoff (1989), “The knowledge complexity of interactive proof systems.” SIAM Journal on Computing 18, no. 1: pp. 186–​208. 16 B. Chazelle (2007), “Computing: The security of knowing nothing,” Nature 446, no. 7139: pp. 992–​993. 17 S. Philippe, R.  Goldston, A.  Glaser, and F.  d’Errico (2016), “A physical zero-​ knowledge object-​comparison system for nuclear warhead verification.” Nature Communications 7: 12890. 18 R. Goldston, F.  d’Errico, A.  di Fulvio, A.  Glaser, S.  Philippe, and M.  Walker (2014), “Zero-​ Knowledge Warhead Verification:  System Requirements and Detector Technology,” Proceedings of the 55th Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting, 20–​24 July 2014, Atlanta, Georgia. 19 S. Philippe, R.  Goldston, A.  Glaser ,and F.  d’Errico (2016), “Zero-​Knowledge Differential Isotopic Comparison of Special Nuclear Materials,” Proceedings of the 57th Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting, 24–​28 July 2016, Atlanta, Georgia. 20 This section was provided by R.  Scott Kemp, Associate Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering at MIT, and director of the MIT Laboratory for Nuclear Security and Policy. 21 R. S.  Kemp, A.  Danagouliana, R.  Macdonald, and J.  Vavreka (2016), Physical cryptographic verification of nuclear warheads, Proceedings of the United States National Academy of Sciences, 113 (31):  8618–​8623, available at www.pnas.org/​ content/​113/​31/​8618.abstract.

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200  Technical Annexes 22 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Science, Applications of Nuclear Science Archives, Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence at MIT, https://​science.energy.gov/​ np/​benefits-​of-​np/​applications-​of-​nuclear-​science/​archives/​nuclear-​resonance-​ fluorescence-​at-​mit/​, accessed 26 October 2017. 23 J. Vavrek, B. Henderson, and A. Danagoulian (2017), Experimental demonstration of an isotope-​sensitive warhead verification technique using nuclear resonance fluorescence, Cornell University Library, https://​arxiv.org/​abs/​1712.02904, accessed 16 December 2017. 24 This section was provided by Dr.  rer. nat. Patrick Huber, Professor, Center for Neutrino Physics, Physics Department, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA 24061-​0435, USA. 25 D. F.  Measday (2001), “The nuclear physics of muon capture.” Physics Reports 354: 243–​409, Published by Elsevier Science B.V., PII: S 0370-​1573(01)00012-​6. 26 D. A. Close, J. J. Malanify, and J. P. Davidson (1978), “Nuclear charge distributions deduced from the muonic atoms of 232Th, 235U, 238U and 239Pu.” Phys. Rev. C17, pp. 1433–​1455. 27 10 ns = 10 nanoseconds, =10x10-​9 seconds.

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Annex B.3  Inspection procedures for classified forms of fissile material

B.3.1  Level 4 inspections Level 4 inspections are to be carried out as defined in Table B.3.1. Table B.3.1  Level 4 Inspections Disarmament Activity

Inspection Activities

1. Demounting of nuclear warheads from specified nuclear weapon delivery systems

a. Review the state declaration and the relevant AIP; b. Examine the first (or the next) warhead from the declaration and confirm the serial number, model, etc., as stated on the declaration; c. Maintain that warhead under continuous inspector observation; d. Photograph that mounted warhead in situ; e.  Witness that warhead being demounted from its delivery system; f.  Photograph that demounted warhead, including any unique markings, especially across any openings; g. Apply unique INDA identification seals to that warhead in such a manner as to prevent opening the warhead without destroying two or more seals;1 h. Verify that warhead in situ using a Warhead Verification System for Level 4 (WVS/​L4) approved by the state and INDA for this application; i.  Witness the loading of that warhead into a protective container; j.  Record the protective container model and serial identification information; k. Apply unique INDA identification seals to each warhead container; l.  Photograph each container showing INDA seals and serial number markings; m. Commence chain of custody; n. Complete the inspection record for that warhead including the WVS/​L4 verification findings, the record of seals installed, and the film storage packet for that warhead; (continued)

202

202  Technical Annexes Table B.3.1  (Cont.) Disarmament Activity

Inspection Activities

o. Select the next warhead on the declaration and repeat steps a–​o until all warheads included on the declaration have been processed; and p. Exit the inspection area and complete the inspection, removing from the site all documents and supportive material as specified in the relevant AIP. 2. Temporary storage of a. Review the state declaration and the relevant AIP; nuclear warheads under b. Remove and verify any installed INDA seals military control following on Ingress/​egress access routes into the storage verified demounting under chamber; activity 1 above, pending c. Examine the internal storage chamber and compare shipment to a Level 3 with facility information documents maintained Facility at the facility or provided by the state during the inspection to determine that previously verified facility information remains valid; d. Count and identify the warhead protective containers in the storage facility and compare the number, identity, and storage position of the stored containers with the state declaration and the previous inspection record; e. For each warhead container coming directly to the storage facility from verified demounting and remaining under continuous inspector observation, witness the placement of the warhead container and apply INDA seals in situ, as per the relevant AIP, update the inspection record, and proceed to the next warhead container until all new warheads entering the storage chamber have been processed; f. If the inspection orders so specify, reverify the standing stored inventory according to a random sampling plan using an authorized WVS/​L4 warhead verification system; g. Upon completion of all emplacement and reverification activities, service all installed film surveillance cameras, placing the retrieved films in special containers for removal and processing in an authorized location and confirm that the film cameras are operating; h. Upon exiting the storage chamber at the completion of each inspection, install INDA seals on all ingress/​ egress access routes into the storage chamber to protect the chain of custody; and i. Exit the inspection area and complete the inspection, removing from the site all documents and supportive material as specified in the relevant AIP.

 203

Annex B.3 203 Table B.3.1  (Cont.) Disarmament Activity

Inspection Activities

3. Preparation for shipment to a Level 3 Facility

a. Review the state declaration and the relevant AIP; b. Remove and verify any installed INDA seals on ingress/​egress access routes into the storage chamber; c. Examine the internal storage chamber and compare with facility information documents maintained at the facility or provided by the state during the inspection to determine that previously verified facility information remains valid; d. Count and identify the warhead protective containers in the storage facility and compare the number, identity, and storage position of the stored containers with the state declaration and the previous inspection record; e. If the inspection orders so specify, reverify the standing stored inventory according to a random sampling plan using an authorized WVS/​L4 warhead verification system; f. Identify each warhead container to be transported, witness the placement of the warhead container into the transporter and apply INDA seals in situ, as per the relevant AIP, update the inspection record, and proceed to the next warhead container until all warhead containers identified on the shipment manifest have been processed; g. Upon removal of all warhead containers to be shipped, service all installed film surveillance cameras, placing the retrieved films in special containers for removal and processing in an authorized location and confirm that the film cameras are operating; h. Upon exiting the storage chamber at the completion of each inspection, install INDA seals on all ingress/​ egress access routes into the storage chamber to protect the chain of custody; and i. Exit the inspection area and complete the inspection, removing from the site all documents and supportive material as specified in the relevant AIP.

204

204  Technical Annexes

B.3.2  Level 3 inspections Level 3 inspections are to be carried out as defined in Table B.3.2. Table B.3.2  Level 3 Inspections Disarmament Activity

Inspection Activities

1. Receipt and storage of warheads slated for disarmament

a. Review the state declaration and the relevant AIP; b. Remove and verify any installed INDA seals on ingress/​egress access routes into the storage chamber; c. Examine the internal storage chamber and compare with facility information documents maintained at the facility to determine that previously verified facility information remains valid; d. Count and identify warheads or warhead containers in the storage chamber that have not been previously verified and compare the number, identity, and storage position of the warheads or stored containers with the state declaration, examine each warhead or warhead storage container and apply INDA seals in accordance with the AIP, verify the population of those warheads or warhead protective containers according to a random sampling plan using an authorized WVS/​L3, and update the corresponding inspection record; e. Count and identify previously verified warheads or warhead containers in the storage chamber and compare the number, identity, and storage position of the stored containers with the state declaration and the previous inspection record; f. If the inspection orders so specify, reverify the standing stored inventory of previously verified warheads or warhead containers according to a random sampling plan using an authorized WVS/​L3; g. Upon completion of all emplacement and reverification activities, service all installed film surveillance cameras, placing the retrieved films in special containers for removal and processing in an authorized location and confirm that the film cameras are operating; h. Upon exiting the storage chamber at the completion of each inspection, install INDA seals on all ingress/​ egress access routes into the storage chamber to protect the chain of custody; and i. Exit the inspection area and complete the inspection, removing from the site all documents and supportive material as specified in the relevant AIP.

 205

Annex B.3 205 Table B.3.2  (Cont.) Disarmament Activity

Inspection Activities

2. Transfer one or more a. Review the state declaration and the relevant AIP; nuclear warheads to the b. Remove and verify any installed INDA seals on dismantlement facility ingress/​egress access routes into the storage chamber; c. Examine the internal storage chamber and compare with facility information documents maintained at the facility or provided by the state during the inspection to determine that previously verified facility information remains valid; d. Count and identify the warhead protective containers in the storage facility and compare the number, identity, and storage position of the stored containers with the state declaration and the previous inspection record; e. Identify each warhead container to be transported, witness the placement of the warhead container on the transporter and maintain the warhead or warhead container under continuous inspector observation as the warhead or warhead container is moved from the storage chamber to the dismantlement facility, apply INDA seals in situ as per the relevant AIP, update the inspection record, and proceed to the next warhead container until all warhead containers on the shipment manifest have been processed; f. If the inspection orders so specify, reverify the standing stored inventory according to a random sampling plan using an authorized WVS/​L3; g. Upon removal of all warhead containers to be shipped, service all installed film surveillance cameras, placing the retrieved films in special containers for removal and processing in an authorized location and confirm that the film cameras are operating; h. Upon exiting the storage chamber at the completion of each inspection, install INDA seals on all ingress/​ egress access routes into the storage chamber to protect the chain of custody; and i. Exit the inspection area and complete the inspection, removing from the site all documents and supportive material as specified in the relevant AIP. 3. Dismantle a nuclear a. Review the state declaration and the relevant AIP; warhead (verification on b. For a nuclear-​armed state having a bilateral inspection the basis of a perimeter process on the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, control arrangement allow inspectors from the bilateral partner of the tailored to each nuclear-​armed state to witness and collect information dismantlement facility) for the purposes of meeting the bilateral inspections, according to the relevant AIP; (continued)

206

206  Technical Annexes Table B.3.2  (Cont.) Disarmament Activity

Inspection Activities c. Identify the warhead container and compare with the state declaration, inspect all INDA seals applied on the warhead container, and remove and retain the seals removed for INDA forensic analysis; d. Witness the opening of the warhead container and visually examine the warhead, identify its model number and serial number, and compare the warhead with photos taken upon demounting the warhead if the warhead was presented for Level 4 verification; e. Inspect all installed INDA seals on the warhead, and remove and retain the seals removed for INDA forensic analysis; f. Verify each warhead using an authorized WVS/​L3 maintaining the warhead under continuous inspector observation; g. Verify the dismantlement chamber prior to moving the warhead into the chamber, and establish and maintain a perimeter inspection system on the dismantlement chamber during the dismantlement of the warhead to be dismantled, using inspector observation, film camera surveillance and INDA seals, as specified in the relevant AIP;2 h. For each warhead passing the WVS/​L3 verification, update the inspection records and transfer the warhead to the dismantlement chamber; for any warhead failing the WVS/​L3 verification, repeat the verification and/​or use any complementary verification capability authorized in the relevant AIP; i. For any warhead continuing to fail the verification according to the relevant AIP, declare that the warhead does not meet acceptance requirements and request the state to remove it from the dismantling facility; j. For a nuclear-​armed state having a bilateral inspection process on the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, formally transfer verification and monitoring responsibility to the bilateral inspection team, and skip to step m below; k. Following the completion of dismantlement of the warhead, verify that no fissile material is in the container(s) for the recyclable components and materials removed from the warhead, and observe the removal of those components or materials from the dismantlement chamber; l. Witness the shredding or other destruction of all components that are not recyclable, inspecting the nose cone or similar objects marked by inspectors prior to this operation;

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Annex B.3 207 Table B.3.2  (Cont.) Disarmament Activity

Inspection Activities m. Examine all classified fissile material containers (CFMCs) holding pits and/​or secondaries, or other fissile material subcomponents (as may apply) removed from the warhead, at the exit point from the dismantlement chamber; record the CFMCs serial numbers, photograph the CFMCs, and apply INDA seals to each CFMC; n. Verify each CFMC using an authorized classified fissile material verification system (CFMVS) as specifically authorized in the relevant AIP; o. As appropriate, witness the loading of each CFMC into its protective container (CFMC/​ PC) as appropriate, record the CFMC/​PC serial identification, photograph the CFMC/​PC and apply INDA seals as authorized in the relevant AIP; p. Enter relevant information into the inspection record, provide copies to the state and to the bilateral state inspection team, as appropriate, and terminate joint operations with the bilateral state inspection team, as authorized in the relevant AIP; q. Examine the dismantlement facility after completion of dismantlement operations and confirm that no fissile material remains; r. Transport sealed CMFCs or CFMC/​PCs to their designated storage facility; s. When all designated warheads have been dismantled and all classified fissile material has been presented for verification in designated CFMCs, discontinue the chain of custody perimeter on the dismantlement chamber; t. Exit the inspection area and complete the inspection, removing from the site all documents and supportive material as specified in the relevant AIP.

4. Storage of CFMCs or a. Review the state declaration and the relevant AIP; CFMC/​PCs at a Level 3 b. Remove and verify any installed INDA seals on facility pending shipment ingress/​egress access routes into the storage chamber; to a Level 2 Facility c. Examine the internal storage chamber and compare with facility information documents maintained at the facility to determine that previously verified facility information remains valid; d. As appropriate, count and identify CMFCs and/​or CFMC/​PCs alrerady in the storage chamber that have not been previously verified and compare the number, identity, and storage positions of the CMFCs or CFMC/​PCs with the state declaration, examine each CMFC or CFMC/​PC, apply INDA seals in accordance with the AIP, verify the population of those CMFCs or CFMC/​PCs according to a random sampling plan using an authorized CFMVS, and update the corresponding inspection record; (continued)

208

208  Technical Annexes Table B.3.2  (Cont.) Disarmament Activity

Inspection Activities e. Count and identify previously verified CMFCs or CFMC/​PCs in the storage chamber and compare their model numbers, serial identification numbers, and storage positions with the state declaration and the previous inspection record; f. If the inspection orders so specify, reverify the standing stored inventory of previously verified CMFCs or CFMC/​PCs according to a random sampling plan using an authorized CFMVS; g. Verify the placement of the newly arrived CMFCs or CFMC/​PCs in the storage chamber as specified in the state declaration; h. Upon completion of all emplacement and reverification activities, service all installed film surveillance cameras, placing the retrieved films in special containers for removal and processing in an authorized location and confirm that the film cameras are operating; i. Upon exiting the storage chamber at the completion of each inspection, install INDA seals on all ingress/​ egress access routes into the storage chamber to protect the chain of custody; and j. Exit the inspection area and complete the inspection, removing from the site all documents and supportive material as specified in the relevant AIP.

5. Shipment of CMFCs or CFMC/​PCs to a Level 2 Facility

j.  Review the state declaration and the relevant AIP; k. Remove and verify any installed INDA seals on ingress/​egress access routes into the storage chamber; l. Examine the internal storage chamber and compare with facility information documents maintained at the facility or provided by the state during the inspection to determine that previously verified facility information remains valid; u. Identify each CFMC/​PC to be transported, examine all INDA seals installed on the CFMC/​PC, As appropriate, witness the loading of each CFMC into its protective container (CFMC/​PC) as appropriate, record the protective container serial identification, photograph the container and apply INDA seals as authorized in the relevant AIP; m. witness the placement of the CFMC/​PC into the transporter and apply INDA seals in situ, as per the relevant AIP, update the inspection record, and proceed to the next CFMC/​PC until all CFMC/​ PCs identified on the shipment manifest have been processed;

 209

Annex B.3 209 Table B.3.2  (Cont.) Disarmament Activity

Inspection Activities n. Count and identify the remaining CFMC/​PCs in the storage chamber and compare the number, identity, and storage position of the stored CFMC/​PCs with the state declaration and the previous inspection record; o. If the inspection orders so specify, reverify the standing stored CFMC/​PC inventory according to a random sampling plan using an authorized CFMVS; p. Upon removal of all CFMC/​PCs to be shipped, service all installed film surveillance cameras, placing the retrieved films in special containers for removal and processing in an authorized location and confirm that new films have been installed and confirm that the film cameras are operating; q. Upon exiting the storage chamber at the completion of each inspection, install INDA seals on all ingress/​ egress access routes into the storage chamber to protect the chain of custody; and r. Exit the inspection area and complete the inspection, removing from the site all documents and supportive material as specified in the relevant AIP.

210

210  Technical Annexes

B.3.3  Level 2 inspections Level 2 inspections are to be carried out as defined in Table B.3.3. Table B.3.3  Level 2 Inspections Disarmament Activity

Inspection Activities

1. Receipt and storage of a. Review the state declaration and the relevant AIP; classified fissile material b. Identify all CFMC/​PCs in accordance with the in an L2 storage facility shipment manifest and compare with reports submitted to INDA; c. Remove and verify any installed INDA seals on ingress/​egress access routes into the L2 storage chamber; d. Examine the internal storage chamber and compare with facility information documents maintained at the L2 facility to confirm that previously verified facility information remains valid; e. Count and identify all CFMCs and/​or CFMC/​PCs in the L2 storage chamber that have not been previously verified and compare the number, identity, and storage position of the unverified CFMCs or CFMC/​PCs with the state declaration, examine each unverified CFMC or CFMC/​PC and apply INDA seals; f. Verify all unverified CFMCs or CFMC/​PCs using an authorized CFMVS, and witness the placement of each CFMC into the L2 storage chamber in its designated location; g. Update storage inventory to reflect verification of all stored CFMCs or CFMC/​PCs; h. Count and identify previously verified CFMCs or CFMC/​PCs in the storage chamber and compare the number, identity, and storage position of the stored containers with the state declaration and the previous inspection record; i. If the inspection orders so specify, reverify the standing stored inventory of previously verified CFMCs or CFMC/​PCs according to a random sampling plan using an authorized CFMVS; j. For storage of incoming CFMCs without their protective containers, examine each CFMC/​PC and all INDA seals installed on each CFMC/​PC, witness the unloading of each CFMC/​PC, identify each CFMC as it is removed from its CFMC/​PC, inspect all INDA seals on the CFMC, verify each CFMC using an authorized CFMVS, and witness the placement of each CFMC into the L2 storage chamber in its designated location;

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Annex B.3 211 Table B.3.3  (Cont.) Disarmament Activity

Inspection Activities k. For storage of CFMCs within their protective containers, examine each CFMC/​PC and all INDA seals installed on each CFMC/​PC, verify each CFMC/​PC using an authorized CFMVS, and witness the placement of each CFMC/​PC into the L2 storage chamber in its designated location; l. Upon completion of all emplacement and reverification activities, service all installed film surveillance cameras, placing the retrieved films in special containers for removal and processing in an authorized location and confirm that the film cameras are operating; m. Upon exiting the storage chamber at the completion of each inspection, install INDA seals on all ingress/​ egress access routes into the storage chamber to protect the chain of custody; and n. Exit the inspection area and complete the inspection, removing from the site all documents and supportive material as specified in the relevant AIP.

2. Transfer one or more a. Review the state declaration and the relevant AIP; CFMCs or CFMC/​PCs b. Remove and verify any installed INDA seals on to processing facility ingress/​egress access routes into the storage chamber; for removing all fissile c. Examine the internal storage chamber and compare material classified with facility information documents maintained properties at the facility or provided by the state during the inspection to determine that previously verified facility information remains valid; d. Count and identify the CFMCs or CFMC/​PCs in the storage facility and compare the number, identity, and storage positions with the state declaration and the previous inspection record; e. Identify each CFMC or CFMC/​PC to be transported, witness its placement on the transporter and maintain the CFMC or CFMC/​PC under continuous inspector observation as the CFMC or CFMC/​PC is moved from the storage chamber to the processing facility, apply INDA seals in situ as per the relevant AIP, update the inspection record, and proceed to the next CFMC or CFMC/​PC until all CFMCs or CFMC/​ PCs on the transfer manifest have been processed; f. If the inspection orders so specify, reverify the standing stored inventory according to a random sampling plan using an authorized CFMVS/​L2; g. Upon removal of all CFMCs or CFMC/​PCs to be transferred to the processing facility, service all installed film surveillance cameras, placing the retrieved films in special containers for removal and processing in an authorized location and confirm that the film cameras are operating; (continued)

212

212  Technical Annexes Table B.3.3  (Cont.) Disarmament Activity

Inspection Activities h. Upon exiting the storage chamber at the completion of each inspection, install INDA seals on all ingress/​ egress access routes into the storage chamber to protect the chain of custody; and i. Exit the inspection area and complete the inspection, removing from the site all documents and supportive material as specified in the relevant AIP.

3. Processing classified a. Review the state declaration and the relevant AIP; fissile material to remove b. For a nuclear-​armed state having a bilateral classified properties inspection process on the removal of classified properties, allow inspectors from the bilateral inspection team to witness and collect information for the purposes of meeting the bilateral inspections, according to the relevant AIP; c. Identify each CFMC or CFMC/​PC to be processed together as a single batch and compare with the state declaration, inspect all INDA seals applied on each CFMC or CFMC/​PC, and remove and retain the seals removed for INDA forensic analysis; d. Witness the opening of the each CFMC/​PC and visually examine the CFMC and identify its model and serial number, and inspect all installed INDA seals on the CFMC, and remove and retain the seals removed for INDA forensic analysis; e. Verify each CFMC using an authorized CFMVS/​L2 maintaining the warhead under continuous inspector observation;3 f. When all CFMCs in the batch have been processed, as may be provided in the relevant AIP, verify any fissile material blend stock to be introduced into the processing facility to remove the classified properties for the batch using the CFMVS/​L2 to confirm relevant properties; g. Re-​establish the perimeter control system around the processing area as provided in the relevant AIP; j. Verify the processing facility prior to moving any of the CFMCs or blend stock into the facility, to confirm that facility information documents maintained at the facility or provided by the state during the inspection to determine that previously verified facility information remains valid; h. Inspect and replace, as appropriate, installed INDA seals on internal transfer fixtures as may be used to introduce or remove fissile material from the processing area, as specified in the relevant AIP;4

 213

Annex B.3 213 Table B.3.3  (Cont.) Disarmament Activity

Inspection Activities i. Verify the processing facility to detect the presence of any appreciable amounts of fissile material using a portable CFMVS as provided in the relevant AIP; j. Remove all INDA seals on each CFMC in the batch and transfer the CFMC through the controlled perimeter into the processing area, retain the removed INDA seals for forensic analysis and update the inspection records; k. Maintain the perimeter until the batch has been completed; l.     Verify the removal of each empty CFMC by serial number and visual examination to determine that it empty, and by use of a CFMVS as provided in the relevant AIP; m. Verify the removal of any remaining blend stock using the CFMVS as provided in the AIP; n.   Count, identify, and seal all containers of unclassified fissile material; o.    Verify each batch of containers holding unclassified fissile material (UFMCs) according to a random sampling plan and an authorized unclassified fissile material verification system (UFMCVS) as provided in the relevant AIP; p.    Witness the loading of UFMCs into storage/​ shipment containers, seal such containers; and approve their shipment to a Level 1 storage facility or to a disposition facility, as provided in the AIP; q.   When all processed fissile material and any remaining feedstock have been removed from the processing facility, verify the processing facility to detect the presence of any appreciable amounts of fissile material using a portable CFMVS as provided in the relevant AIP; r.     Discontinue the chain of custody perimeter on the processing area; s.     Enter relevant information into the inspection record, provide copies to the state and to the bilateral state inspection team, and, as appropriate, terminate joint operations with the bilateral state inspection team, as authorized in the relevant AIP; t.  Exit the inspection area and complete the inspection, removing from the site all documents and supportive material as specified in the relevant AIP.

214

214  Technical Annexes

B.3.4  Level 1 inspections Level 1 inspections are to be carried out as defined in Table B.3.4. Table B.3.4  Level 1 Inspections Disarmament Activity

Inspection Activities

1. Receipt and storage of fissile material with no classified properties within the nuclear weapons complex where sensitive activities are carried out, and periodic reverification of stored UFMCs

a. Review the state declaration and the relevant AIP; b. For each batch of incoming containers holding unclassified fissile material (UFMCs) that have been previously verified and maintained under chain of custody arrangements as provided in the relevant AIP, count, and identify all containers, inspect INDA seals, identify containers for re-​verification according to a random sampling plan with an authorized UFMCVS, place the containers in locations designated by the state and apply authorized monitoring systems to maintain the chain of custody; c. Count and identify all UFMCs or UFMC/​ PCs in the storage chamber that have not or have been previously verified and compare the number, identity, and storage position of the unverified UFMCs or UFMC/​PCs with the state declaration, examine each unverified UFMCs or UFMC/​PCs and apply INDA seals; d. Verify all unverified UFMCs or UFMC/​ PCs using an authorized UFMCVS, and witness the placement of each UFMCs or UFMC/​PCs into the Level 1 storage chamber in its designated location; e. Update storage inventory to reflect verification of all stored UFMCs or UFMC/​PCs; f.   Upon completion of all emplacement and reverification activities, service all approved monitoring systems; g. Upon exiting the storage chamber at the completion of each inspection, install INDA seals on all ingress/​egress access routes into the storage chamber to protect the chain of custody; and h. Exit the inspection area and complete the inspection, removing from the site all documents and supportive material as specified in the relevant AIP.

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Annex B.3 215 Table B.3.4  (Cont.) Disarmament Activity

Inspection Activities

2. Transfer UFMCs to disposition

a. Review the state declaration and the relevant AIP; b. For UFMCs that have been previously verified and maintained under chain of custody arrangements as provided in the relevant AIP, count and identify all UFMCs on the transfer order, inspect INDA seals, identify containers for re-​verification according to a random sampling plan with an authorized UFMCVS, place the containers into shipment containers, witness the loading of the containers into a declared transporter and apply seals to the transporter if useful for maintaining the chain of custody; c. Update storage inventory to reflect the removal of the designated UFMCs; d. Upon completion of all removals, verify the number and locations of all remaining stored UFMCs and service all approved monitoring systems; e. Upon exiting the storage chamber at the completion of each inspection, install INDA seals on all ingress/​egress access routes into the storage chamber to protect the chain of custody; and a. Exit the inspection area and complete the inspection, removing from the site all documents and supportive material as specified in the relevant AIP.

Notes 1 Recall that the warhead has been slated for disarmament and all structural components will be destroyed during the dismantlement process. 2 The architecture of each dismantlement facility will offer different challenges that will affect the ability of INDA to assure that the dismantlement operations are as declared, without any undeclared introduction, substitution, or removal of any fissile material. 3 In the event that a CFMC fails the verification test, given that each CFMC had previously passed verification, that CFMC should be set aside for special investigation pending INDA Nuclear Disarmament Council consideration. 4 The architecture of each processing facility will offer different challenges that will affect the ability of INDA to assure that the processing operations are as declared, without any undeclared introduction, substitution or removal of any fissile material.

216

Index

Note: Page numbers in italic denote figures and in bold indicate tables, end of chapter notes are denoted by a letter n between page number and note number. active neutron interrogation 191–​192, 193 agreements: safeguards 10, 13, 67, 68, 69–​70, 81–​82, 87–​88, 89, 91, 155–​177; verification and monitoring 13, 52, 122–​154 AIPs see authorized inspection protocols (AIPs) alternative nuclear materials 18n17, 66, 88–​89; see also weapon-​usable nuclear materials americium, detecting diversion of 88–​89 antineutrino detectors 103–​104 arms reduction treaties, bilateral 100–​101 attribute verification 47–​48, 187–​189, 188 Attribute Verification by Neutron and Gamma ray assay (AVNG) 188–​189, 188 authorized inspection protocols (AIPs) 53, 54–​55 bilateral arms reduction treaties 100–​101 Brookhaven National Laboratory 189–​190, 191 bubble chamber detectors 43–​44 Budget and Finance Committee 27 “can-​in-​canister” immobilization concept 79–​80, 80 Center for Nuclear Disarmament Verification Research and Development 30–​32, 49; initial tasks 183–​185; physical installations 181–​182

chain of custody monitoring 48, 51n23 China 7, 8, 8, 78, 85, 99 clandestine production of weapon-​usable nuclear material 90–​91, 103–​104 classification 12; see also verification methods for classified fissile material Classification Committee 26 classified fissile material containers (CFMCs) 207–​209, 210–​213 classified fissile material protective containers (CFMC/​PCs) 207–​209, 210–​212 communications, inspection findings 61 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization 23, 24, 29 Conference of States Parties 6, 7, 22 confidence building measures 14–​15, 16, 99–​104; antineutrino detectors 103–​104; bilateral arms reduction treaties 100–​101; controls on fusion materials 102; controls on refurbishment of warheads 102; engagement exercises 101; export/​ import controls 102; extraterritorial facilities 103; standardized facility architecture 102–​103; subsidizing disarmament 104; temporary monitoring 101 cosmogenic muon verification 196–​198, 197 costs of disarmament 6–​7 Council see Nuclear Disarmament Council Council of Elders (COE) 29–​30 Councilors 24–​25

 217

Index 217 cryptography, physical 192–​195, 194 CTBTO see Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization

France 7, 8, 8, 78, 79, 85 fusion 37–​38, 79; controls on materials 102

Data Protection Committee 26 deuterium 38, 102 direct-​use nuclear material 18n17; see also weapon-​usable nuclear materials diversion of weapon-​usable nuclear material 84–​89 down blending of highly enriched uranium 75–​77, 76, 82

Germany 78

Elimination or Conversion of Weapon Complex Facilities Committee 26 engagement exercises 101 enrichment plants, conversion of 83–​84 equipment see verification and monitoring equipment export/​import controls  102 extraterritorial facilities 103 facilities: elimination or conversion of nuclear weapon facilities 14, 57–​59, 58, 82–​84; extraterritorial facilities 103; standardized facility architecture 102–​103 Facility Information Questionnaires (FIQ) 14, 53 financing disarmament 6–​7, 104 fissile material 3–​4, 34–​39, 56–​57; defining 16n2, 36–​37; detecting clandestine production of 90–​91, 103–​104; detecting diversion of 84–​88; disposition of 15, 75–​82, 76, 80; estimating historical production and imports/​exports, 92–​93; in nuclear weapons 37–​39, 37; removing classified properties 41, 50n12, 56, 212–​213; verification levels 13, 35, 38–​39, 47, 52, 54, 55–​56; see also fissile material-​related inspection activities; highly enriched uranium (HEU); plutonium; verification methods for classified fissile material; weapon-​ usable nuclear materials fissile material-​related inspection activities 56–​57, 201–​215; Level 1 activities 56, 57, 214–​215; Level 2 activities 210–​213; Level 3 activities 204–​209; Level 4 activities 201–​203 fission 36

highly enriched uranium (HEU) 16n2; ban on use of 15, 36–​37; detecting diversion of 86–​88; disposition of 15, 75–​77, 76, 82; enrichment plants 83–​84; naval reactors 59; see also fissile material IAEA see International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) INDA see International Nuclear Disarmament Agency (INDA) India 7, 8, 8, 78, 85 information barriers 47, 187–​189, 188, 191–​192 information security 41–​44 inspections 52–​61; authorized inspection protocols (AIPs) 53, 54–​55; conduct of 60–​61; elimination or conversion of nuclear weapon facilities 57–​59, 58; findings 61; fissile material-​related activities 56–​57, 201–​215; Level 1 inspection activities 56, 57, 214–​215; Level 2 inspection activities 210–​213; Level 3 inspection activities 204–​209; Level 4 inspection activities 201–​203; logistics 60–​61; verification equipment 53, 56–​57, 60 inspectors 24, 28 Institute of Nuclear Disarmament 23, 25, 28–​30, 57–​58 institutional verification arrangements 9–​12 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 4, 6, 10–​12, 23, 24, 29, 65–​73, 75–​93; chain of custody monitoring 48, 51n23; conversion of nuclear weapon facilities 14, 82–​84; detecting clandestine production 90–​91, 103–​104; detecting diversion of nuclear material 84–​89; detecting unconventional acquisition 92; estimating historical production and imports/​exports, 92–​93; fissile material disposition 75–​82, 76, 80; information security 42; non-​proliferation safeguards system 43, 70–​73, 71, 72, 84; reasons for not assigning

218

218 Index disarmament to 11–​12; safeguards agreements 10, 13, 67, 68, 69–​70, 81–​82, 87–​88, 89, 91, 155–​177; safeguards implementation metrics 71; tasks assigned to 67–​70; use of equipment 47, 60; see also Trilateral Initiative International Nuclear Disarmament Agency (INDA) 4, 21–​32; Center for Nuclear Disarmament Verification Research and Development 30–​32, 49, 181–​182, 183–​185; Council of Elders (COE) 29–​30; Director General 22, 23, 24, 28; elimination or conversion of nuclear weapon facilities 14, 57–​59, 58; inspectors 24, 28; Institute of Nuclear Disarmament 23, 25, 28–​30, 57–​58; missions 9–​10, 21; organization 22; Preparatory Commission 22, 27; Secretariat 23, 26, 27–​28; standing committees 22, 25–​27; Statute 22, 23; verification and monitoring agreements 13, 52, 122–​154; see also inspections; Nuclear Disarmament Council International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) 51n20 International Workshop on Applied Antineutrino Physics 104 Iran 70 Iraq 70 Israel 7, 8, 8, 85

Nuclear Disarmament Agency (INDA) 13, 52, 122–​154 muon verification 196–​198, 197

Level 1 fissile material verification 13, 35, 38, 47, 52, 54, 55; equipment 47, 60; inspection activities 56, 57, 214–​215 Level 2 fissile material verification 13, 35, 38, 47, 52, 54, 55; equipment 60; inspection activities 210–​213 Level 3 fissile material verification 13, 35, 39, 47, 52, 54, 55; equipment 60; inspection activities 204–​209 Level 4 fissile material verification 13, 35, 39, 47, 52, 54, 55–​56; equipment 60; inspection activities 201–​203 lithium deuteride (LiD) 38

naval reactors 59 neptunium, detecting diversion of  88–​89 non-​proliferation safeguards system 43, 70–​73, 71, 72, 84 North Korea 7, 8, 8, 70, 85, 99 NPT see Treaty on the Non-​Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Nuclear Disarmament Council 4, 6, 22, 23–​27, 29; Councilors 24–​25; inspection findings 61; inspections 55, 57–​58; responsibilities 23–​24; standing committees 22, 25–​27 Nuclear Disarmament Fund 27 Nuclear Disarmament Institute 23, 25, 28–​30, 57–​58 Nuclear Disarmament Journal 30 nuclear disarmament process 12–​13, 34–​36, 35, 38–​39; see also inspections Nuclear Disarmament Research and Development Committee 27 Nuclear Disarmament Verification and Monitoring Committee 25 nuclear energy, use of plutonium for 78, 85 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), United States 99 nuclear resonance fluorescence 192–​195, 194 Nuclear Suppliers Group 23, 24 nuclear warhead tax 7 nuclear warheads 37–​39, 37; controls on refurbishment of 102; demounting 201–​202; dismantling 205–​207; numbers of 8, 8; preparing for shipment 203; storing during disarmament 202, 204; thermal neutron imaging 189–​190, 191 nuclear weapon complex facilities, elimination or conversion of 14, 57–​59, 58, 82–​84 Nuclear Weapon Safety and Security Committee 26 nuclear weapon secrecy 12; see also verification methods for classified fissile material

model agreements: with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 10, 13, 70, 155–​177; with International

Pakistan 7, 8, 8, 85 Perry, William J. 5 physical cryptography 192–​195, 194

Japan 78, 85 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 70

 219

Index 219 plutonium 16n2, 36, 57; ban on use of 15, 78, 86; detecting clandestine production of 103–​104; detecting diversion of 85–​86; disposition of 15, 50n12, 77–​82, 80; thermal neutron imaging 189–​190, 191; use for nuclear energy 50n12, 78, 85; see also fissile material Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) 50n12, 93n12 plutonium production reactors, conversion of 83 Preparatory Commission 22, 27 R&D Center see Center for Nuclear Disarmament Verification Research and Development random sampling plans 44–​46, 54 rearmament prevention 10–​11, 65–​73, 75–​93; conversion of nuclear weapon facilities 14, 82–​84; detecting clandestine production 90–​91, 103–​104; detecting diversion of nuclear material 84–​89; detecting unconventional acquisition 92; estimating historical production and imports/​exports, 92–​93; fissile material disposition 75–​82, 76, 80; safeguards agreements 10, 13, 67, 68, 69–​70, 81–​82, 87–​88, 89, 91, 155–​177; tasks for International Atomic Energy Agency 67–​70 reprocessing plants, conversion of 83 Russia 7, 50n12, 78, 85, 99; numbers of nuclear weapons 8, 8; see also Trilateral Initiative safeguards agreements 10, 13, 67, 68, 69–​70, 81–​82, 87–​88, 89, 91, 155–​177 safeguards system, non-​proliferation 43, 70–​73, 71, 72, 84 secrecy 12; see also verification methods for classified fissile material Secretariat 23, 26, 27–​28 Secretariat Operations Committee 27 soundness 194 South Africa 70 standardized facility architecture 102–​103 standing committees 22, 25–​27 State of Disarmament Assessments 28–​29 State of Disarmament Reports 24 subsidizing disarmament 104

tax, nuclear warhead 7 template verification 47–​48; physical cryptography 192–​195, 194; zero-​knowledge proofs 48, 191–​192, 193, 194–​195 temporary monitoring 101 theater-​centric verification 7–​9, 8, 8 thermal neutron imaging 189–​190, 191 thermonuclear warheads 37–​38, 37 Threat Assessment Committee 57–​58 Threat Reduction Committee 25, 30 time-​bound disarmament  5–​6 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) 3–​4; Conference of States Parties 6, 7, 22; engagement exercises 101; financing disarmament 6–​7; tasks for International Atomic Energy Agency 67–​70; text of 111–​121; time-​bound disarmament 5–​6 Treaty on the Non-​Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 4, 10–​11, 70, 77 Trilateral Initiative 39–​41, 42, 43, 46, 49n6; attribute verification 47, 187–​189, 188 tritium 38, 102 unclassified fissile material containers (UFMCs) 213, 214–​215 United Kingdom 7, 8, 8, 78, 85 United Nations 22 United States 7, 50n12, 76, 77, 78, 85; Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 99; numbers of nuclear weapons 8, 8; see also Trilateral Initiative uranium 36–​37, 57; detecting diversion of 88–​89; see also highly enriched uranium (HEU) verification and monitoring agreements 13, 52, 122–​154 verification and monitoring equipment 12, 27; agreeing use of 53; chain of custody monitoring 48–​49; development of 31–​32, 49, 60; information security and 41–​43; inspections 53, 56–​57, 60; for Level 1 fissile material verification 47, 60; practicality and affordability 46 verification coverage 44–​46, 54 verification methods for classified fissile material 46–​48, 186–​198; attribute verification 47–​48, 187–​189,

220

220 Index 188; cosmogenic muon verification 196–​198, 197; degree of assurance 44–​46, 54; disarmament value 44, 45; factors affecting selection of 41–​46; information barriers 47, 187–​189, 188, 191–​192; information security 41–​44; physical cryptography 192–​195, 194; practicality and affordability 46; susceptibility to cheating 46; template verification 47–​48, 191–​195, 193, 194; thermal neutron imaging 189–​190, 191; zero-​knowledge proofs 48, 191–​192, 193, 194–​195 Vienna, Austria 23, 27

weapon complex facilities, elimination or conversion of 14, 57–​59, 58, 82–​84 weapon-​usable nuclear materials 3, 13, 15, 16n2, 18n17, 66; detecting clandestine production of 90–​91, 103–​104; detecting diversion of 84–​89; detecting unconventional acquisition 92; estimating historical production and imports/​exports, 92–​93; see also fissile material World Institute of Nuclear Security 23 zero-​knowledge proofs 48, 191–​192, 193, 194–​195