Venetian Shipping: From the Days of Glory to Decline, 1453-1571 9004398163, 9789004398160, 9789004398177

Table of contents :
Acknowledgements
Figures and Tables
Introduction
1. Structure
2. Caution
3. Editorial Matters
4. Currencies
Part 1. The Legal, Executive, and Judicial Framework
Chapter 1. Venice’s Privilege-Based Merchant Marine
1. Ship Registries and the San Marco Flag
2. Ships with Privileges and Those Without
Chapter 2. The Corridors of Power: Venice’s Maritime Authorities
1. The Major State Authorities
2. Executive Authorities Involved in Commercial Shipping
3. The Enforcement of Sea Laws Overseas
Chapter 3. The Protagonists: The Division of Ships into Classes and Groups
1. Ship Classes and Privileged-Based Ship Groups
2. The Carrack-Type Round Ship
3. Other Types of Vessels
Chapter 4. Volume, Size, and Loading Lines
1. The botte and Other Units of Capacity
2. Overall and Partial Capacities of Vessels
3. Techniques to Calculate a Ship’s Capacity
4. The Relative Capacity of the Hold
5. Calculating the Carrying Capacity by Using Stowage Factors
6. The stimadori and the Administration
Chapter 5. ‘Safety First’: Rules for the Safety and Security at Sea
1. Regulations against Overloading and Overcrowding
2. The Military Potential
3. The Quota of Professional Mariners and Crew on Board
4. The Quota of Professional Soldiers
5. Arms and Artillery Requirements
6. Convoys of Merchant Ships (conserva)
7. Mandatory Pilotage Services
8. Venetian Safety Standards for Hawsers, Cordage, and Anchors
Chapter 6. Navigating Fiscal Chaos
1. The Vicissitudes of the Imposts on Ships
2. Duties on Ships in the Port of Venice
3. Negotiating Fiscal Privileges and Tax Concessions
4. The Tax Burden and the Incentive Structure It Gave Rise To
Part 2. Shipping Enterprise and the World of Round Ships
Chapter 7. From Forming to Dissolving a Shipping Company
1. The Organizational Structure of the Shipping Enterprise
2. Insuring Ship and Freightage
3. Settling the Accounts
4. The Unloading Procedure in Venice’s Port
Chapter 8. Ship Biographies
1. The nave grossa Marcella, 1496–1503
2. Riding Out the Storm: The Biography of the Ship Dolfina, 1525–29
3. The Short History of the Priula, 1545–47
Chapter 9. The Lifespan and Life-Cycle of Mediterranean Ships
1. Shipworms and the Maintenance of Wooden Vessels
2. Life-Expectancy Estimates
3. The Economic Viability of Round Ships
4. Costs of Construction, and the Depreciation of Value of Wooden Vessels
Chapter 10. Can We Assess Profitability?
1. The Services Provided by the Shipping Industry
2. Sustaining a Liner Service against the Backdrop of Cargo Imbalance
3. The Role of the State in Providing Freights for Its Round Ships
4. Profits from Freightage and the ufficiali all’estraordinario
5. Was Shipping a Long-Term Profitable Business?
Part 3. ‘Venetian Shipping during the Commercial Revolution’ Reconsidered
Chapter 11. Fortunes Begin to Ebb, 1453–89
1. The Golden Age of Shipping, c. 1423–32
2. The Shipping Markets Following the Fall of Constantinople
3. The War That Triggered the Downturn, 1463–79
4. Shipping Fails to Rally in Response to Emerging New Realities, 1480–89
5. The Eclipse of Venice’s Oceanic Sea Lanes
Chapter 12. The Roaring Nineties and the War with the Turks, 1490–1502
1. A Positive Trend in Shipping during the Last Decade of the 15th Century
2. The Merchant Marine c. July–August 1499: The War Effort
3. The Detrimental Effects of the War with the Turks on Shipping, 1499–1502
Chapter 13. Venetian Shipping in Crisis, 1503–26
1. Venice’s Levant Trade in the First Quarter of the 16th Century
2. Dwindling Traffic in Port and the Loss of Hegemony over the Adriatic Sea
3. The Liberalization of Maritime Transport in the Western Mediterranean
4. ‘Venice Is Drying Up’
Chapter 14. A Period of Stagnation, 1527–40
1. The Effects of a Rise in Natural Disasters on Shipping, 1527–33
2. The Shipping Reform Act of 1534/5
Chapter 15. The Emergence of New Players in Maritime Transport, 1541–71
1. Regaining Momentum: Shipping and Trade Undergoing Liberalization
2. A New Golden Age or an Indian Summer?
3. The New Protagonists in Shipping and Trade
4. Digest of Tables and Graphs
Conclusions
1. The Aggregation of Vessels Hoisting the San Marco Flag
2. Resiliency or Decline?
3. Deforestation Was Not a Major Factor
4. The Agency of Environmental Factors in Venice’s Decline
5. Could the Senators Have Steered towards a Different Ending?
Appendix A. Snapshots of Venice’s Merchant Marine, 1480–1558
Appendix B. Estimates of the Size of Four Colonial Fleets, c. 1499
Appendix C. The Itinerary and Life Expectancy of Selected Round Ships
Appendix D. The Cost of Construction and the Value of Wooden Vessels
Appendix E. Net Incomes from Freights Transferred by the Cashier of the Estraordinario
Appendix F. Gross Incomes from Freights
Sources and Bibliography
Index of Subjects
Index of Names

Citation preview

Venetian Shipping

Brill’s Studies in Maritime History Series Editor Gelina Harlaftis, Institute for Mediterranean Studies/Foundation of Research and Technology – Hellas (FORTH) and University of Crete Editorial Board Maria Fusaro, University of Exeter, U.K. Michael Miller, University of Florida, U.S.A. Sarah Palmer, University of Greenwich, U.K. Amélia Polónia, University of Porto, Portugal David Starkey, University of Hull, U.K. Malcolm Tull, Murdoch University, Australia Richard W. Unger, University of British Columbia, Canada

volume 10

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/bsmh

Venetian Shipping From the Days of Glory to Decline, 1453–1571 By

Renard Gluzman

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Cover illustration: An illustration of two commercial ships from the fresco La traslazione del corpo di San Marco da Alessandria a Venezia, Scuola dei Calegheri, San Tomà, Venice. Illustration by the author. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Gluzman, Renard, author. Title: Venetian shipping from the days of glory to decline, 1453-1571 / by  Renard Gluzman. Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, 2021. | Series: Brill’s studies in  maritime history, 2405-4917 ; volume 10 | Includes bibliographical  references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2021018110 (print) | LCCN 2021018111 (ebook) |  ISBN 9789004398160 (hardback) | ISBN 9789004398177 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Shipping—Italy—Venice—History—To 1500. |  Shipping—Italy—Venice—History—16th century. |  Shipbuilding—Italy—Venice—History—To 1500. |  Shipbuilding—Italy—Venice—History—16th century. |  Navigation—History—To 1500. | Navigation—History—16th century. Classification: LCC HE839 .G58 2021 (print) | LCC HE839 (ebook) |  DDC 387.50945/31109024—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021018110 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021018111

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. ISSN 2405-4917 ISBN 978-90-04-39816-0 (hardback) ISBN 978-90-04-39817-7 (e-book) Copyright 2021 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Hotei, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau Verlag and V&R Unipress. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Requests for re-use and/or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill NV via brill.com or copyright.com. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents Acknowledgements ix List of Figures and Tables x Introduction 1 1 Structure 3 2 Caution 5 3 Editorial Matters 5 4 Currencies 6

part 1 The Legal, Executive, and Judicial Framework 1

Venice’s Privilege-Based Merchant Marine 9 1 Ship Registries and the San Marco Flag 9 2 Ships with Privileges and Those Without 14

2

The Corridors of Power: Venice’s Maritime Authorities 18 1 The Major State Authorities 19 2 Executive Authorities Involved in Commercial Shipping 22 3 The Enforcement of Sea Laws Overseas 44

3

The Protagonists: The Division of Ships into Classes and Groups 47 1 Ship Classes and Privileged-Based Ship Groups 49 2 The Carrack-Type Round Ship 53 3 Other Types of Vessels 60

4

Volume, Size, and Loading Lines 73 1 The botte and Other Units of Capacity 73 2 Overall and Partial Capacities of Vessels 74 3 Techniques to Calculate a Ship’s Capacity 77 4 The Relative Capacity of the Hold 81 5 Calculating the Carrying Capacity by Using Stowage Factors 82 6 The stimadori and the Administration 84

vi

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5

‘Safety First’: Rules for the Safety and Security at Sea 86 1 Regulations against Overloading and Overcrowding 86 2 The Military Potential 91 3 The Quota of Professional Mariners and Crew on Board 93 4 The Quota of Professional Soldiers 95 5 Arms and Artillery Requirements 97 6 Convoys of Merchant Ships (conserva) 102 7 Mandatory Pilotage Services 105 8 Venetian Safety Standards for Hawsers, Cordage, and Anchors 108

6

Navigating Fiscal Chaos 113 1 The Vicissitudes of the Imposts on Ships 113 2 Duties on Ships in the Port of Venice 119 3 Negotiating Fiscal Privileges and Tax Concessions 129 4 The Tax Burden and the Incentive Structure It Gave Rise To 134

part 2 Shipping Enterprise and the World of Round Ships 7

From Forming to Dissolving a Shipping Company 139 1 The Organizational Structure of the Shipping Enterprise 139 2 Insuring Ship and Freightage 163 3 Settling the Accounts 170 4 The Unloading Procedure in Venice’s Port 179

8

Ship Biographies 186 1 The nave grossa Marcella, 1496–1503 186 2 Riding Out the Storm: The Biography of the Ship Dolfina, 1525–29 191 3 The Short History of the Priula, 1545–47 195

9

The Lifespan and Life-Cycle of Mediterranean Ships 198 1 Shipworms and the Maintenance of Wooden Vessels 198 2 Life-Expectancy Estimates 203 3 The Economic Viability of Round Ships 206 4 Costs of Construction, and the Depreciation of Value of Wooden Vessels 208

Contents

10

vii

Can We Assess Profitability? 212 1 The Services Provided by the Shipping Industry 212 2 Sustaining a Liner Service against the Backdrop of Cargo Imbalance 220 3 The Role of the State in Providing Freights for Its Round Ships 223 4 Profits from Freightage and the ufficiali all’estraordinario 225 5 Was Shipping a Long-Term Profitable Business? 228

part 3 ‘Venetian Shipping during the Commercial Revolution’ Reconsidered 11

Fortunes Begin to Ebb, 1453–89 233 1 The Golden Age of Shipping, c. 1423–32 233 2 The Shipping Markets Following the Fall of Constantinople 235 3 The War That Triggered the Downturn, 1463–79 236 4 Shipping Fails to Rally in Response to Emerging New Realities, 1480–89 248 5 The Eclipse of Venice’s Oceanic Sea Lanes 254

12

The Roaring Nineties and the War with the Turks, 1490–1502 261 1 A Positive Trend in Shipping during the Last Decade of the 15th Century 261 2 The Merchant Marine c. July–August 1499: The War Effort 272 3 The Detrimental Effects of the War with the Turks on Shipping, 1499–1502 274

13

Venetian Shipping in Crisis, 1503–26 282 1 Venice’s Levant Trade in the First Quarter of the 16th Century 284 2 Dwindling Traffic in Port and the Loss of Hegemony over the Adriatic Sea 297 3 The Liberalization of Maritime Transport in the Western Mediterranean 302 4 ‘Venice Is Drying Up’ 304

viii

Contents

14

A Period of Stagnation, 1527–40 315 1 The Effects of a Rise in Natural Disasters on Shipping, 1527–33 315 2 The Shipping Reform Act of 1534/5 324

15

The Emergence of New Players in Maritime Transport, 1541–71 331 1 Regaining Momentum: Shipping and Trade Undergoing Liberalization 331 2 A New Golden Age or an Indian Summer? 338 3 The New Protagonists in Shipping and Trade 346 4 Digest of Tables and Graphs 353

Conclusions 355 1 The Aggregation of Vessels Hoisting the San Marco Flag 355 2 Resiliency or Decline? 356 3 Deforestation Was Not a Major Factor 358 4 The Agency of Environmental Factors in Venice’s Decline 359 5 Could the Senators Have Steered towards a Different Ending? 360 Appendix A: Snapshots of Venice’s Merchant Marine, 1480–1558 363 Appendix B: Estimates of the Size of Four Colonial Fleets, c. 1499 477 Appendix C: The Itinerary and Life Expectancy of Selected Round Ships 479 Appendix D: The Cost of Construction and the Value of Wooden Vessels 485 Appendix E: Net Incomes from Freights Transferred by the Cashier of the Estraordinario 490 Appendix F: Gross Incomes from Freights 497 Sources and Bibliography 510 Index of Subjects 537 Index of Names 541

Acknowledgements This book is the product of eight years of concerted research on Venice’s maritime history in the framework of a Ph.D. dissertation at the School of Historical Studies at Tel-Aviv University, under the supervision of Benjamin Arbel. It took over 10,000 emails and countless phone calls and meetings for Arbel to train this reckless amateur skipper of sailboats to peruse Venetian sources with due thoroughness. My thanks therefore go primarily to Benjamin for his Sisyphean patience and caring, which enabled me to guide this ‘vessel’ safely into port. In 2019 that dissertation was awarded the ‘Ugo Tucci Prize’ for original unpublished work on the theme ‘The Mediterranean between Medieval and Modern Times’ by the Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti in Venice. My special thanks go to the steering committee and especially to the Institute’s president Gherardo Ortalli. Two additional years of research on the subject were made possible due to the generous support of the Haifa Center for Mediterranean History (HCMH), Israel. My thanks go to the heads of the centre Gil Gambash and Zur Shalev for their feedback and financial support in the process of rendering this dissertation into a book. I am immensely grateful to all those who helped me negotiate the swell of bureaucratic and administrative business that inevitably arises when conducting such long-term research in historical archives on distant shores. Finally, I am proud that the greater part of this book was actually composed on board my sailboat Bellatrix while navigating various stretches of the Mediterranean itself, thus adding a brackish vitality to the enterprise: paper, pen, and sea spray. Renard Gluzman, 2021

Figures and Tables Figures 1 A sixteenth-century carrack-typed ship of c. 600 tons 57 2 Rear view of a large-tonnage carrack-type ship 58 3 Carracks of c. 240 tons wintering in front of San Marco basin 59 4 A lateen-rigged vessel of small capacity (possibly a burchio) 68 5 A small vessel underway (possibly a grippo) 72 6 A composite sectional cutaway of a carrack 75 7 The division of the captaincy on large-tonnage ships between those with noble origins and other social groups, 1480–1558 153 8 The composition of the merchant marine in all categories above 240 tons, c. 1499 274 9 A reconstruction of the channel at the ports of Sant’Erasmo and San Nicolò in 1350 313 10 The channel at the ports of Sant’Erasmo and San Nicolò in 1410 after the construction of the palificata Garzina 313 11 The deviation of the channel ( fuosa) from east to south-southeast at the entrance of San Nicolò, based on a design from 1526 314 12 The composition of the merchant marine in all categories above 240 tons, c. 1549 337 13 A division of the ownership on big-tonnage ships between those associated with the aristocracy and the lower classes 348 14 The socio-economic change in the composition of the city’s shipping milieu 348 15 Fluctuation in the number of ships and galleys of more than 240 tons between 1480 and 1558 in intervals of around ten years 353 16 The total carrying capacity of the merchant fleet in all categories above 240 tons between 1480 and 1558 in intervals of circa ten years 354 17 The total carrying capacity of the merchant fleet by categories 354

Tables 1 2 3

The official rating of several ships, 1545–1554 79 Relative capacity of the hold 81 The rates for piloting vessels into the port of Venice in 1512 107

Figures and Tables 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

xi

Annual income from cordage tax based on auction price results (1525–71) 111 The port duties that were charged from the pilgrim galley (1408) 116 Venice’s port taxes tariff, 25 August 1529 123 Annual income from port duties based on auction price results (1525–71) 124 Port duties calculated for twelve foreign ships that arrived in Venice in 1552 125 Reimbursement of the share of the investments made by the crew of the intercepted Cornera, 1539 160 Snapshot of the merchant marine c. July–December 1480 248 Snapshot of the merchant marine in August 1490 261 Snapshot of the merchant marine c. July–August 1499, including medium-sized vessels of over 72 tons 273 The merchant marine c. October–December 1509 284 The merchant marine c. July–August 1520 294 The merchant marine c. July–August 1530 321 The merchant marine c. May–June 1540 330 The merchant marine in July 1549 337 The merchant marine c. October–December 1558 338

Introduction Recently, Jan Lucassen and Richard W. Unger have suggested that shipping throughout Europe experienced rapid growth between 1350 and 1850. They do not attribute this trend with any ‘national’ fleet in particular, but attributed to the concept of a ‘global’ fleet of Europe as a whole. Pace Lucassen and Unger, the reasons for this growth is technological development (i.e., more efficient ways to utilize wind energy).1 This affirmation cannot be applied in the case of Venice, however, where the vicissitudes of the ‘national’ trading fleet do not show a long-term positive trend. The aim of this book, therefore, is to verify the interplay between trading volumes, fleet nationality, and the evolution of shipping networks with respect to a maritime power that experienced multiple hardships during a period of rapid growth in shipping on a ‘global’ level. In the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century the merchant marine of the Maritime Republic had sunk from its role as a leading provider of shipping services at an international level. While numerous scholars have outlined a general trend of decline,2 the countless factors that run parallel seriously hamper any attempt at analyzing the available data, meaning that many details are inevitably left out. Add to this the fact that most studies related to maritime commerce have continued to focus on the state-owned merchant galleys, omitting the broader picture,3 despite the fairly widespread knowledge of the crucial role played by round ships in the history of Venice.4 Likewise, 1 Lucassen & Unger, ‘Shipping, Productivity And Economic Growth’, pp. 4–6. 2 Selected studies on the decline in Venetian shipping: Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, pp. 229–39; idem, Venice, A Maritime Republic, pp. 132–34; Luzzatto, ‘La decadenza di Venezia’, pp. 162–81; idem, ‘Le vicende del porto di Venezia’, pp. 14–16; idem, ‘Navigazione di linea e navigazione libera’, pp. 53–58; Hocquet, ‘L’armamento privato’, pp. 397–400 cit. 3 and the bibliography therein. 3 Rawlinson, ‘The Flanders Galleys’, pp. 145–68; Sottas, Les messageries maritimes; Tenenti and Vivanti, ‘Le film’, pp. 83–86/ maps; Guilmartin, Gunpowder and Galleys; idem, Galleons and Galleys; Beeching, Galley at Lepanto; Gardiner and Morrison, Age of the Galley; Doumerc, ‘Le galere da mercato’, pp. 357–93; Stöckly, Le Système de l’incanto; Judde de Larivière, Naviguer, commercer, gouverner. 4 Frederic C. Lane’s path-breaking Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders of the Renaissance (1936), updated in the French edition of 1965; the second volume of Jean-Claude Hocquet’s Le Sel et la fortune de Venise (1978/9), which deals with the contribution of maritime transport of bulky materials to Venice’s economy; the collective volume edited by Ugo Tucci and Alberto Tenenti dedicated to the sea (XII: Il Mare) in the series Storia di Venezia of the Enciclopedia Treccani, published in 1991, is the most comprehensive work to encompass current knowledge on Venetian shipping, with greater emphasis on private ships; the monograph dedicated to fifteenth-century marine insurance in Venice by Karin Nehlsen-von Stryk is also

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004398177_002

2

Introduction

the colonial component of the merchant marine, which has been studied only recently, is still entirely missing from the estimates of the gross tonnage.5 Thus, the yearly fluctuations in the volume and value of trade moving by sea are assessed only on the basis of the auctioning of the galleys. Information on the movement of dozens of other round ships and hundreds of smaller vessels of various provenance is so fragmented that, as yet, no scholar has put forward a comprehensive analysis of the changing fortunes of Venice’s marine traffic over time. For this reason, although significant and on the whole correct, the picture so far gathered is too general to establish a comprehensive causeeffect relationship. To fill that gap therefore, there was no other way but to ply the harder course and access numerous and very diverse sources so as to compile an intricate chart of the itineraries and life-cycles of the hundreds of round ships cited in the various archives, each one with its own peculiar logic. Thus, I have managed to assemble nine ship lists, each presenting a snapshot of this sector of the merchant marine in approximately ten-year intervals spanning 1480 to 1558. No systematic record of this kind exists for the early years. However, based on the reconstructed ‘biographies’ of these vessels, and a great variety of hitherto unpublished archival material, this project endeavours to provide a more accurate and comprehensive picture of shipping from the Fall of Constantinople to the Battle of Lepanto. The timeframe chosen coincides with the major geographical discoveries of the period, the struggle for political and economic hegemony in Europe, and the rise of the Ottoman Empire as a leading power in the Mediterranean. It has been argued that wars are a very effective way to periodize Venetian historical development and to analyse the fluctuation of its economic fortunes.6 Likewise, it has been rightly observed that Venice began the sixteenth century demoted to a second-grade sea power. In the long run, the Ottoman Turks were Venice’s most exhausting foe, commented Frederic C. Lane.7 The present study concurs with these views. It regards the advance of the Turks as the principal of great importance to our topic. On round ships in general, see Pryor, ‘The Mediterranean Round Ships’, 59–76 and the bibliography therein. 5 On the present state of research on Greek shipping: Pagratis, ‘Sources for the Maritime History of Greece’, pp. 125–146. His own pioneering work on the Corfiot fleet: idem, ‘Ships and Shipbuilding in Corfu’; idem, ‘Trade and Shipping Corfu 1496–1538’; idem, ‘Venice, Her Subjects and Ships’. On the shipping activity in Dalmatia: Raukar, ‘Jadranski gospodarski sustavi: Split 1475–1500. godine’; idem, ‘La Dalmatia e Venezia nel basso medioevo’; Tadić, ‘Venezia e la costa orientale’; Schmidt, ‘La mer’; Fabijanec, Le développement commercial de Split et Zadar. 6 Fusaro, Political Economies, p. 12. 7 Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, pp. 198, 242, 245.

Introduction

3

(though certainly not the only) factor responsible for the decline of Venice’s fabled maritime puissance. This was not only an issue of naval hegemony, of maritime and/or territorial expansion, but also of freights, and fiscal and economic policies that ultimately did not favour the Venetians. Several comments on this analysis are in order. First, the study regards all vessels whose base of operation was within the Republic’s territories as a single, uniform merchant marine; second, while a division between ‘public’ and ‘private’ navigation is to some degree justified – and was effectively at the core of the economic system – merchant galleys and private vessels comprised two complementary sectors of Venice’s shipping industry.8 They were dealt with by the same maritime authorities, and in many cases they were run by the same shipping tycoons and their relatives. From an economic standpoint as well, both sectors faced similar hardships in the beginning of the sixteenth century; it was only from the 1540s that their histories diverged significantly. 1 Structure This study is divided into three major sections. The first, entitled ‘The Legal, Executive and Judicial Framework’, comprises six chapters that provide an in-depth introduction to Venice’s sea laws and the maritime authorities that enforced them. Scholars have largely avoided the complexities of the legal status of private vessels. Consequently, it was essential to reconstruct the basic legal framework in which these ships operated. The application of sea laws in Venice’s overseas territories and the complicated question of a given ship’s belonging are at the centre of attention: Did ships fly flags? Was a ship that was operated from one of the colonies perceived as part of the same merchant marine? And if so, did it inherit the same legal status of the ones that were built in Venice? How was a colonial ship treated by port authorities across the borders? Did certain ships have special privileges – and if so, why were these prerogatives denied to others? Did the identity of the shipowner influence the legal status of his ship? In this way the first six chapters interact with recent scholarly works to draw attention to the mechanics of ‘brokering’ empire against a backdrop of a complex geographical, cultural, and traditional substructure.9 Forming the second section of this book, entitled ‘The Shipping Enterprise and the World of Round Ships’, Chapters Seven to Ten examine this industry 8 Judde de Larivière, Naviguer, commercer, gouverner, p. 44. 9 Christ et al., Cultures of Empire; O’Connell, Men of Empire; Rothman, Brokering Empire.

4

Introduction

from different perspectives. We first focus on the milieu of shipowners and the practices of their trade, by following a shipping enterprise through its various stages. The focus then shifts to the ‘biographies’ of selected round ships and their itineraries. In this way, we investigate the impact of human and nonhuman factors on this vital sector of Venetian life. Shipworms, ‘citizens’ of the Mediterranean since ancient times, are the focus of attention in Chapter Nine. Given their importance in determining the lifespan and life-cycle of vessels with the obvious impact on shipping economy, I start by taking a microscopic look on their life and natural habitat. Zooming out, the discussion shifts to the characteristics of infested wood, and of the ever-infested fleet itself. It then deals with the practice of hauling out and careening a ship, and different types of worm repellents and their varied success. I then address the costs of construction, the depreciation of the vessel’s value, and the scrapping and/or recycling of its timber and equipment. The following chapter is an attempt to verify whether shipowning could be remunerative in itself, or if it was only a tool for wider commercial activity. In the third section entitled ‘“Venetian Shipping During the Commercial Revolution” Reconsidered’, we move from the single cases to the broader scene by quantifying and detailing the fluctuating fortunes of the merchant marine between 1453 and 1571. As implied by its title, this section is to a great extent a critical dialogue with Frederic C. Lane’s well-known and highly influential article (first published in 1933 and reprinted in 1968), dealing with the vicissitudes of Venetian shipbuilding, trade and shipping during the long sixteenth century. Chapters Eleven through Fifteen also strive to contribute to a discussion of the long-term effects of Venetian rule on the economic development in its overseas territories, and entangled empires.10 The book includes six appendices: Appendix A presents nine ship lists that provide a series of snapshots of the merchant marine at intervals of around ten years. These are the core novelty and original work of this study; Appendix B contains estimates of the size of four colonial fleets, c. 1499; Appendix C presents the itineraries and life expectancy of twenty-one round ships that were active during this period; Appendix D includes assorted indications on the cost of construction and the value of wooden vessels; Appendix E contains net

10 On the many forms of citizenship and belonging: Thomas, ‘Cittadinanza veneta accordata ai forestieri’; Ell, Citizenship and Immigration in Venice; Ashtor, ‘Ebrei cittadini di Venezia?’; Jacoby, ‘Citoyens, Sujets et Protégés’; idem, ‘Venice and Venetian Jews’; Mueller, Immigrazione e cittadinanza; Rothman, Brokering Empire; Christ, ‘Transients on a Stepping Stone’; Fusaro, Political Economies; and the bibliography therein.

Introduction

5

profits from freights paid through the ufficiali all’estraordinario in 1528/9; and Appendix F aggregates assorted indications on the gross incomes from freights. 2 Caution For this study a concerted effort was made to track down all vessels of over 240 tons that were in regular operative condition in Venice and its colonies. This somewhat ambitious quest was thwarted by the incomplete nature of the surviving data in the sources, and therefore our knowledge of the ships afloat and their relation to the ideal whole is perforce incomplete. For instance, it is feasible that what might seem to be a slump in shipping is actually the result of a scarcity of sources, the cause of which is simply unknown. Secondly, we should bear in mind that wooden ships are moveable objects, and that periods with low or zero activity leave little or no trail of documentation. In the same manner, vessels that for whatever reasons were not employed along the stricken routes and did not choose Venice as their base of operation are invariably harder to track down. Such is the case, for example, of vessels operating in tramping in the western Mediterranean, making few or no stops in their home port throughout their activity. To this, we should also add a margin of error caused by the intricacies of international shipping, a business that sometimes imposes a degree of ambivalence regarding the identity of the ship and its owners. States historically have been unable to prevent their merchant navies from temporarily ‘flagging-out’ and using other forms of subterfuge to adapt the service offered to the particularities of their operating zones. It seems only logical that some vessels kept off the radar of the maritime authorities, as it were, operating by or on behalf of foreign partners in the enterprise. Finally, dealing with patchy data requires a degree of guesswork to connect the dots, which risks leading to erroneous conclusions. Some allowance for any human slip-ups is therefore essential. 3

Editorial Matters

I chose an abbreviated form for indicating published sources and studies, e.g., Sanuto, I diarii, II, 802 (4 February 1504). All the dates are adapted to the new style. For the complete bibliographical information, see the ‘Sources and Bibliography’ section. The shortcuts for unpublished (archival) sources are indicated in the same section as well. Names are noted q. (quondam, ‘son of the late’) whenever evidence was found, otherwise left as di (son of). All names

6

Introduction

remain faithful to the Venetian dialect, though some standardization of the names of people and places was inevitable. The Index aggregates all these indications. Importantly, two distinct terms are used to identify the city’s fleet: the first is ‘Venetian-built ships’ (navi veneziane), the second is ‘Venice’s ships’ (navi venete). The former describes those vessels that were built in Venice and its duchy (dogado), whereas the second represents the aggregation of all commercial vessels, including those built in Venice’s colonies or purchased and then ‘naturalized’ under the San Marco flag. Another important factor in this analysis is the distinction between shipbuilding proper, the shipping industry, and Venice’s trade carried by sea. While their histories often overlap, they had different and sometimes conflicting interests. Of the three, in times of crisis the shipbuilding industry proved more vulnerable. 4 Currencies Unless specified otherwise, the ducat referred to was the Venetian ducat of account (D). Similarly, the lire (pl. of lira) (L) mentioned in most of the texts are ‘of account’ and are based on the silver currency. The lira di piccoli was divided into 20 soldi, and each soldo into 12 denari piccoli. The gold ducat was equivalent to 6 lire and 4 soldi dei piccoli (s), i.e., to 124 soldi. Occasionally, one encounters the lira di grossi: one such lira contained 240 grossi (sometimes called denari grossi). There was another type of lira, called lira di grossi a oro, linked to the ducat by valuing the ducat at 2 soldi di grossi (a oro). Thus, there were 24 grossi a oro (gr) to a gold ducat (1 soldo = 12 grossi), and each grosso a oro was divided into 32 piccoli a oro (p). Such a lira di grossi a oro (containing 20 soldi) was equivalent to 10 ducats.11 Weights and volumes are addressed in Chapter Four and in the introduction to Appendix A. 11

Lane and Mueller, Money and Banking, p. 489.

part 1 The Legal, Executive, and Judicial Framework

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Venice’s Privilege-Based Merchant Marine 1

Ship Registries and the San Marco Flag

Venice’s maritime authorities never attempted to compile into a single registry the multitude of ships and smaller vessels built or operating from its territories. Instead, to meet requirements such records were prepared ad hoc by the local administration, and lost their relevance once the immediate purpose was achieved. There are, however, several remarkable examples of state agencies that were able to retrieve historical information on vessel movements in the port of Venice years and decades after.1 Perhaps the nearest thing to a complete ship registry in the fifteenth century was that of the consoli dei mercanti, which included the rating of all ships built in Venice or naturalized.2 Such a record, however, did not exist in the overseas colonies before 1495. Already in the 1460s, several decrees ratified the obligation of governors and chancellors to prosecute in cases of fraud in the building or selling of ships in the territories under their authority. The enforcement was however mostly passive: the administration acted upon information that they received directly. In 1490 the Senate instructed governors as well as state representatives in foreign lands to investigate ships’ identity for any infringement of the right to hoist the San Marco flag.3 A directive to keep a permanent register of all ships originating in the colonies was introduced in 1495 for the first time. The governors in Venetian-Greek and Dalmatian territories were instructed to make a proclamation calling shipowners of any vessel, including those under construction, to register their craft in the chancellor’s office within fifteen days of the announcement. Henceforth, those planning to build ships were required to declare so in writing, failing which they risked having the vessel demolished or impounded once ready. Venice’s subjects and residents were authorized to sell their vessels to citizens, citizen-subjects or fideles of Venice (and not to foreigners) only after they obtained an attestation from the governor of the place of the transaction. To increase enforcement against the alienation or selling of 1 Gluzman, ‘What Made A Ship Venetian?’, pp. 321–23. 2 Most probably, these records did not include ships that never cast their anchors in Venice. It is also doubtful that the consoli maintained accurate information on shipping in the colonies. Still, in 1502 the consoli were able to retrieve some statistics on the number of ships and their ratings between 1420 and 1450: ASVe, SM, reg. 15, ff. 156v–57r (21 October 1502). 3 Ibid., reg. 13, ff. 3r–4v (1 March 1490).

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004398177_003

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vessels to foreigners, the governors were required to proclaim this decree once a year (in January or February). Likewise, shipowners were required to make a new attestation whether the ship was still in their possession or sold according to law.4 Further steps were taken a couple of months later, in 1496. The new measures intended to track down the voyages of all colonial ships. Shipowners that chartered their vessels were required to declare the names of the charterers (or operators), the type of merchandise, and the ports of call, and to do so before loading began. The scope of this decree is also impressive, as it was supposed to be proclaimed in the following colonies: Corfu and the vicinities, Modon, Coron, Napoli di Romania, Nauplion, Candia, Retimno, Chania, Zara, Cattaro, Sibinico, Trau, Spalato, Lesina, Curzola, Veglia, Antivari, Dulcigno, and Durazzo.5 Judging by the letter of the law, the new measures taken in the colonies to register ships and monitor their movements were more firm and restrictive than those used in Venice in this period. The question remains, for how long and to what extent were these measures practised? A significant step toward the standardization of the registration of ships was made in 1516, when the rating of private ships was delegated to the Arsenal and its armiraglio as sole authority.6 Consequently, a large-scale attempt was made to survey all ships in Venice, including foreign and colonial ships. Still, the Arsenal records were updated only when unregistered vessels stopped in the port; those that never cast anchor in the lagoon were not registered.7 The lack of a unified ship registry did not mean that ships were able to escape regulatory control. Although largely varied in many respects, all ships based in territories ruled by the Republic (navili di sudditi) were considered part of a large aggregate of commercial vessels, subject to Venetian rule. The terms terrièri and nostri were used in this context and referred to Venetian-built ships (navi veneziane) as well as those originating from Venice’s colonies. The term navi venete or navili veneti meant basically that, but was less common in fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century legal language. Venetian merchant vessels hoisted the San Marco flag (bandiera, vessillo, or insegne) and other banners and signs that represented the owner or the captain’s coat of arms. Occasionally, they communicated also the identity of important passengers on board. In the sixteenth century, the flag was entrusted 4 Ibid., reg. 14, ff. 83v–84r (3 November 1495). 5 Ibid., f. 103r (26 August 1496). This enactment was followed by another one. The doge and his counsellors instructed the administrations in the overseas possessions to provide information on the number of vessels and their capacity: Sanuto, I diarii, I, 283 (28 August 1496). 6 Lane, Navires et constructeurs, p. 145. 7 ASVe, SM, reg. 18, f. 151v (6 November 1516); Sanuto, I diarii, XXII, 520 (3 September 1516).

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to the captains at the office of the cinque savi alla mercanzia.8 The right to hoist the flag was closely linked to the place where a ship was built. The letter of the law stated that a ship was Venetian (veneziana) if it was built in a shipyard within Venice and its duchy (dogado), including Murano, Torcello, Mazorbo, Burano, Malamocco, Chioggia, and other less-populated parts of the lagoon.9 In other words, the place of construction not only gave a ship the right to hoist the San Marco flag, but such a ship remained Venetian for the rest of its existence. Similarly, in Venice’s possessions overseas, merchant vessels of Venetian citizens, citizen-subjects, and fideles flew the San Marco flag, as is attested by disparate textual and iconographic contemporary sources.10 Their connection to a certain city or port was most probably represented in some way as well. From a legal standpoint, all Venetian citizens (de intus, de intus et extra, originarii, and noblemen) as well as all subjects who had permanent residency in the Republic’s territorial possessions were entitled to own ships or hold shares in ships and boats built anywhere throughout the stato da mar. This practically allowed shipping entrepreneurs to order the building of a privileged ship in one of the territories that benefited from special privileges, or alternatively to buy a second-hand vessel or have shares in a ship that inherited tax concessions or lucrative shipping permits. The selling of a vessel of San Marco to a non-Venetian citizen or subject was strictly forbidden throughout the period addressed in this study, unless at least ten years had elapsed since its construction; and even then, only under certain conditions.11 Other restrictions on the registry prohibited Venetian citizens and subjects who resided outside Venetian possessions from owning or having shares in San Marco’s ships unless they returned to live somewhere within the boundaries of the Republic. Foreigners were traditionally prohibited from ordering the building of vessels, owning, or having shares in Venice’s commercial vessels. This policy was anchored in the maritime statutes dating back to the thirteenth and fourteenth 8 9

Pedani, ‘Veneta auctoritate notarius’, pp. 48–49. Luzzatto, ‘Per la storia delle costruzioni navali’, p. 38. The confirmation of former laws in 1487: ASVe, SM, reg. 12, ff. 127r–v (10 November 1487). Round ships were also built in less populated areas of the lagoon: e.g., the islands of Poveglia and La Motta (di San Lorenzo). 10 Further evidence that colonial vessels flew the San Marco flag: a brigantine-type oared vessel belonging to Martin da Zara and hoisting the San Marco flag made a stopover in Venice on its way to Trieste: Sanuto, I diarii, VII, 443 (7 May 1508); Gluzman, ‘What Made a Ship Venetian?’, pp. 284–85. 11 After ten years, a Venetian vessel could be sold to foreigners without its rigging and equipment, sine suis coredis: ASVe, PC, reg. 1, f. 12v (1325); ASVe, PSD, bus. 1, reg. 1, f. 133v (4 December 1328). The alienation of ships and vessels and the involvement of foreigners in shipping in Venetian territories are discussed below.

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century, which presumably were based on earlier customary practices.12 The barring of foreigners from the registry was complemented by the exclusion of foreign-built ships. Venetian citizens, citizen-subjects, and fideles were prohibited from building, buying, or having shares in foreign-built ships. Likewise, their chartering was prohibited with only few, albeit temporary, reservations.13 The commission orders to the governors and other functionaries in the administrations overseas explicitly emphasized their responsibility for keeping control of the transactions of commercial vessels of 100 milliaria (50 tons), and above all preventing them from falling into the hands of foreigners. Acts of sale were to be submitted for the governor’s approval and registered by his officials. Foreign intervention in shipping and attempts to disguise the vessel’s identity were chronic problems that were aggravated considerably whenever Venice was at war, or during an economical crisis or embargo. The government retaliated by increasing its enforcement to reduce the foreign component in the ‘registry’. Another common ploy the Senate was keen to stamp out was partnership between foreigners and Venetians. Such partnerships enabled the foreigners to enjoy the loans offered by the State for shipbuilding and the subsequent fiscal privileges once the ship was operative. Legally, these incentives were granted only to resident-citizens and subjects of Venice and its territories.14 Without dwelling too much on the many instances in which Venice attempted to enforce its policies in this regard, it will suffice to note that these prohibitions remained in force until the very last decade of the sixteenth century. They were finally repealed when the shipbuilding industry failed to show signs of recovery.15 Until 1590, the only legal way to naturalize a foreignbuilt ship was by petitioning for a gratia spetial. Not surprisingly, these constraints on the ship registry caused many complications, which were dealt with via response to petitions. Such petitions were presented to the Senate and other magistracies by individuals under special circumstances that might justify a digression from the law. Venice did not encourage the naturalization of foreign-built ships, but at the same time left 12 The articulation of the early laws suggests this had also been the practice previously: ASVe, PC, reg. 1, ff. 12r (1325), 20v (1 August 1359); ASVe, PSD, bus. 1, reg. 1, f. 133v (4 December 1328). 13 An enactment 4 August 1488 prohibited Venetian citizens and subjects from going into partnership in foreign ships. In 1489, Venice reinforced these measures by forbidding Venetians from indirectly investing in shipbuilding in colonies, in which such privileges were denied. Foreign-built ships owned by Venetian citizens and subjects were scrapped: ASVe, SM, reg. 12, ff. 150r (4 August 1488), 187r (23 October 1489). 14 Tucci, ‘Venetian Ship-Owners’, p. 291; ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 24, ff. 132r–v, 133r (18, 26 July 1550). 15 Lane, ‘Venetian shipping’, p. 41.

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the door open for special cases.16 Another channel through which ships were naturalized was by the seizure of vessels in military operations or confiscation following illegal activity, such as contraband and piracy. Ships were then put up for auction at the Rialto or in other places across the Venetian territories.17 Unless otherwise specified, Venice’s sea laws applied also to vessels that were built in its possessions overseas. All carriers, for example, were bound to respect certain safety requirements concerning the quota of their crew, their artillery, and the type of rigging they were using. In addition, they were occasionally inspected by officials in the ports of call against overloading and overcrowding. These safety measures gave merchants the right to insure their merchandise on such vessels for any damage inflicted during the voyage. In other words, wares could be insured under the same rates and conditions as if they were being transported on Venetian-built ships. The regulations strictly prohibited any form of insurance on board foreign vessels, arguing that the same safety requirements could not be guaranteed.18 In return, rules regarding cabotage operations  – the movement of goods between ports under the rule of Venice – opened these shipments to domestic shipping companies only. Colonial vessels as well as those originating from territories that enjoyed the protectorate of the Republic (e.g., the Duchy of Naxos) benefited from the commercial pacts signed with foreign powers. These agreements guaranteed, for example, free and secure passage in strategic waterways such as Gibraltar or the Bosporus straits; the safe conduct to merchant ships and protection against corsairs and war vessels; free passage for sailors 16 Ibid., pp. 39–40; Hocquet, Voiliers et commerce, pp. 573–74, 593 cit. 22. 17 E.g., in 1464, the commander of the Venetian galley convoy to Alexandria sequestrated a barza of 700 botti, belonging to a certain corsair, after the latter presented false safe conducts from Venice. Consequently, the barza was sent to Candia, where it was repaired with the intention of sending it to the fleet: Malipiero, Annali veneti, pp. 617–18 (12 November 1464). In 1484, the galley, captained by Malipiero, captured two vessels from Ragusa loaded with grain, and forced them to change their course and sail to Venice. The act was approved by the Senate, and they were naturalized and put to auction at the Rialto. A vessel captured by the galley of Marco Gabriel was naturalized under similar circumstances: ASVe, SM, reg. 12, ff. 10r–v (4, 11 June 1484). In 1507 the Senate debated whether to return the ship of a certain Sicilian citizen, subject of the King of Aragon and Naples. Allegedly, this vessel caused some damage to Venice’s ships and was auctioned by the ufficiali al cattaver. It purchased by the Coresi family: Sanuto, I diarii, VII, 59 (29 April 1507). In 1548, an abandoned ship from Ragusa was found at sea and towed by a boat from Cephalonia to Zante, where it was put up for auction by the Venetian governor: ASVe, SM, fil. 5, ff. 410r–v (2 August 1548). In 1551 a caravella of a certain corsair was put up for auction by the provveditori del’armata, purchased by Thomasso Venier and then naturalized: ibid., reg, 31, ff. 87v–88r (24 January 1551). 18 Tucci, ‘Gli investimenti assicurativi’, p. 159.

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and merchandise saved from wrecked ships in foreign territories; the protection of sailors from impressment; an official arbiter in legal disputes between Venetians and others.19 Another significant benefit for all of Venice’s ‘registered’ ships was that merchants and agents in the Levant and elsewhere were expected to prioritize these carriers over foreign-flagged ships for the transport of their goods.20 However, the subjection to Venice could also become a handicap. In times of war, the navigation of colonial ships was restricted, sometimes with disastrous effects on the local economy. As we shall see presently, on many occasions the disadvantages of this scheme overshadowed its potential benefits. 2

Ships with Privileges and Those Without

The workings of early modern societies were based on privileges granted to individuals or communities. In the Venetian context, fourteenth- and fifteenthcentury demographic policies were closely related to trade privileges and significant tax concessions.21 While the populace was divided into legally defined status groups by awarding privileges to some and burdens to others, the parts constituted a social whole.22 Similarly, commercial vessels were distinct legal entities, and their legal status in subject territories was determined by the various privileges granted separately to port towns and islands as well as to individuals.23 Thus, the colonial factor in Venice’s (virtual) merchant marine included many different components that must be addressed separately.24 In 19 Sanuto, Le vite dei Dogi (1474–94), I: p. 140 (25 January 1479); idem, I diarii, V, 42–47 (29 May 1503). These customary pacts are found in medieval sea laws as well: Khalilieh, Admirality and Maritime Laws, pp. 218–20; Arbel, ‘Venice’s Maritime Empire’, p. 145. 20 Gluzman, ‘What Made a Ship Venetian?’, p. 307 cit. 44. 21 Mueller, Immigrazione e cittadinanza, pp. 17–59; Jacoby, ‘Venetian Citizenship and Venetian Identity’, pp. 132–54. 22 Romano, Patricians and Popolani, pp. 12–38; Bellavitis, ‘Per Cittadini Metterete  …’, pp. 359–83. 23 Ships were customarily classified under a legal category of movable objects ‘rerum mobilium’ and obtained several distinct characteristics of immoveable objects: Zeno, Storia del diritto marittimo, pp. 240, 257–59. 24 Pagratis, ‘Sources for the Maritime History of Greece’, pp. 125–46; idem: ‘Ships and Shipbuilding in Corfu’, pp. 237–46; idem, ‘Trade and Shipping in Corfu’, pp. 169–220; Raukar, ‘Jadranski gospodarski sustavi: Split 1475–1500. godine’, pp. 49–125; idem, ‘La Dalmatia e Venezia nel basso medioevo’, pp. 63–87; Tadić, ‘Venezia e la costa orientale dell’Adriatico’, pp. 687–704; Schmidt, ‘La mer’.

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this context we can identify at least two types of privileges: shipments and fiscal. The first concerns permission to engage in certain shipping activities; the second established reduced port and custom duties for privileged vessels and merchandise that was carried on board. 2.1 Privileged Shipments The shipments of particular cargoes along certain routes were more closely observed and restricted when State interests were involved. The implications of such bans on shipping were then negotiated between the representatives of collective bodies of subject territories, wherever they existed, and the Venetian governing bodies. The results were formulated, as part of a wider range of rights, in statutes (statuti) after the takeover or occupation of a certain territory, and subsequently, by additional capitoli when new demands necessitated additions or changes to the statutes.25 To give one example, one of the most coveted privileged shipments was permission to sail to the ports serving the fairs held in Abruzzo, Le Marche, and Apulia. Since Venice strived to defend its role as a main entrepôt in the Adriatic Sea, it prevented shipments from arriving to destinations sottovento (the eastern Italian coast). Allowing certain sudditto to do just that was therefore considered a privilege.26 All ships originating from Dalmatian cities under the rule of Venice received permission to transport part of their local products to destinations along the western coast of the Adriatic in 1422. This privilege was respected with only brief interruptions.27 On the other hand, on several occasions Venetian-built ships, and vessels originating from the Greek colonies, were denied the same privilege.28 Other types of transport services were approved for merchant vessels of a certain capacity or subject to some other criterion without regard for their place of origin. It is well known that the coveted shipment of spices was traditionally reserved for the merchant galleys. In fact, this same logic applied also with regards to other types of cargo. To name one example, in 1469 and again in 25 26 27

Arbel, ‘Venice’s Maritime Empire’, pp. 182–88. Raukar, ‘La Dalmatia e Venezia nel basso medioevo’, pp. 73–78. A Senate prohibition on trade with destinations sottovento applied to all ships in the registry. It was later adjusted to allow several Dalmatian cities to do just that. E.g., the Senate’s decision in the case of Curzola: ASVe, SM, reg. 18, ff. 44r–v (18 May 1514); Sanuto, I diarii, XVIII, 388 (24 July 1514); Hanĕl, ‘Statuta et leges civitatis et insulae Curzulae’, pp. 241–42. 28 On the refusal of the Venetian Senate in 1514: Pagratis, ‘Trade and Shipping in Corfu’, pp. 175–76; idem, ‘Ships and Shipbuilding in Corfu’, p. 245. In 1524, the Corfiots requested to allow them to conduct one voyage per year to the fairs in Recanati. The Dalmatians cities were mentioned as a precedent: Sanuto, I diarii, XXXVI, 514 (5 August 1524); Sathas, Documents inédits, V, p. 261 cap. 7.

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1490, the shipment of salt from Cyprus and Ibiza was permitted only on board round ships equipped with a crow’s nest and square sails (nave da ballador, et che vadino ala qua(d)ra). Lateen-rigged vessels, che vada ala latina, and in particular marani, were explicitly excluded. This time, protectionism was applied to defend the interests of round ships, in view of their elevated operating costs and stiff competition.29 Still, individual concessions complicated the entire question, and it was capacity rather than structural features that became the decisive criterion. 2.2 Fiscal Privileges The Venetian fiscal system distinguished between commercial vessels that were taxed ‘as Venetians’ (privileged) and those that were taxed ‘as foreigners’ (unprivileged). Thus, formally there were only two fiscal categories. Vessels belonging to the former were exempted from the alboraggio (Lat. arboraticum), a port duty imposed on the freightage (i.e., the shipowners’ income). On the other hand, unprivileged ships were charged 3% of their freightage after the deduction of 10% of its rate, with rare exceptions. Privileged ships were also exempted from a duty collected by the ufficiali del Levante,30 and enjoyed reduced ancoraggio rates for using the port facilities. The rate was indexed to the capacity of the ship in botti, and in the case of smaller vessels, in stara of wheat. The ancoraggio was collected per voyage; that is, when the ship entered port, regardless of the time spent at moorage. In addition, a rating fee (stima) was charged the first time a ship arrived in port.31 Similarly, merchandise carried on privileged vessels enjoyed significantly lower rates in custom duties on imports, exports, and the transhipment. The terms ‘as Venetian’ and ‘as foreigners’, which are often used in this context, can be somewhat misleading. In their basic form, such tax concessions were only granted to ships that were built in Venice or the dogado. In time, vessels originating from selected possessions overseas, and even ships hoisting foreign flags, were granted fiscal privileges. On the other hand, ships from other territories under Venetian rule, including Cyprus (Venice’s biggest overseas colony) or Lesina (Hvar), were not included in this category unless by special, individual concession (de gratia). We may, therefore, assume that they 29 ASVe, SM, reg. 9, f. 19v (28 September 1469); ibid., reg. 13, f. 4v (1 March 1490). 30 Gluzman, ‘What Made a Ship Venetian?’, pp. 311 cit. 61–62. 31 After 1516, the magistracy in charge of the latter impost was the Arsenal, and the right to collect ancoraggio was soon auctioned to tax farmer: ASVe, SM, reg. 18, f. 151v (6 November 1516); ibid., reg. 20, f. 206r (10 January 1526).

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were charged ‘as foreigners’. Yet, the fact that some fleets of Venice’s subjects (navili di sudditi) were denied fiscal privileges in the port of Venice does not mean that these ships were excluded from the aggregate body of vessels flying the San Marco banner. The term ‘as foreigners’ in the fiscal context should be better understood as being subject to extra duties, while in the same context the term ‘as Venetians’ means being charged the customary imposts only.

chapter 2

The Corridors of Power: Venice’s Maritime Authorities In many respects, the starting point of any critical analysis of Venice’s sea laws and its institutional framework in later centuries are the city’s thirteenthcentury maritime statutes. These include Doge Pietro Ziani’s Ordinamenta super saornatione caricatione et stivatione navium (12 March 1227), two enactments associated with Doge Jacomo (1 June 1229, with additions dated 1233), and the Statuta navium (1255) attributed to Doge Reniero Zeno.1 The latter exclusively applied to unarmed sailing ships in use in the mid-thirteenth century, and more specifically to two-decked dual-masted lateeners with a carrying capacity of 200 to 1,000 milliaria (100–500 tons).2 Many other sea laws were introduced in the following decades, some were included in compilations of 1302, 1328, and 1343, ascribed to Doge Andrea Dandolo.3 The constant challenge to satisfactorily enforce legislation motivated the introduction of new schemes and agencies aimed at the prevention of law infringement. Thus, several organs dominant in Zeno’s time became relatively inactive in maritime affairs in the following centuries, while other institutions gained power.4 The shift of onus underlines the importance of commercial shipping to Venetian

1 Preceded by maritime customs and sea laws, which are repeatedly referred to in the abovementioned statutes, as well as, in early commercial treaties between Venice and other rulers, principally Byzantine: Zeno, Storia del diritto marittimo, pp. 82–86, 157–60; Cassandro, ‘La formazione del diritto marittimo’, pp. 185–87. 2 Types of vessels that fall into this category were the banzono, buzonave, and tarrete. The miniature found in a copy of Zeno’s Code at the Querini Stampalia Library in Venice represents such a ship: BQS, Ms. Classe IV, H3 (147). 3 On 19 January 1303 the Grand Council provided for the implementation of Zeno’s Code in the Ducal courts and ordered its proclamation at the Rialto and San Marco on the day of the Patron Saint each year: Predelli & Sacerdoti, ‘Gli statuti marittimi’, p. 336; Cassandro, ‘La formazione del diritto marittimo’, pp. 188, 215. 4 Frederic C. Lane attributed the fall into disuse of the Statuta navium to technological development in ship design that occurred in the fourteenth century, mainly the introduction of the cog (cocca). This view, however, has been contested. Notwithstanding the importance of the technological innovations referred to by Lane, his argument failed to consider that lateen-rigged ships continued to be built and employed in later centuries, cf. Lane, ‘Maritime Law and Administration’, pp. 227–28, 251–52; Lane, ‘Venetian Seamen’, p. 419; Zeno, Storia del diritto marittimo, pp. 164–65; Cassandro, ‘La formazione del diritto marittimo’, p. 215.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004398177_004

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life, and the sheer complexity of a sector that necessitated the involvement of so many separate bodies to govern all the different aspects of maritime activity. 1

The Major State Authorities

The Grand Council of Venice left the control over maritime trade to the more agile and faster assembly of the Senate.5 The latter organ was the highest authority on economic matters in Venice and overseas, including setting fiscal policies; protecting the safety of navigation; and safeguarding the interests of the shipbuilders.6 On a far smaller scale, it granted special permits to individuals.7 The component entrusted with the management of maritime affairs was the savi agli ordini. This body was elected for the first time in 1321, and became permanent and aggregated to the Senate in 1442.8 Its scope expanded to include the commissioning and decommissioning of communal vessels, shipping, and broadly all matters that concerned the stato da mar. The savi agli ordini drafted proposed legislation, occasionally in collaboration with other magistracies, and the preparation work was then put up for a vote in the Senate. The Senate was headed by the Ducal Council (serenissima signoria) composed of the doge and his six counsellors, joined by the three heads of the quarantia (the supreme court of appeal). This supreme executive body acted as the government, the Senate’s steering committee. With respect to maritime affairs, the signoria carried out official correspondence with ambassadors and representatives of foreign nations concerning the infringement of commercial treaties, e.g., the requisition or confiscation of ships, and acts of violence at sea. It gave clearance or detained ships, approved safe conducts for foreign ships, 5 Despite the above, the latter retained its jurisdiction concerning several fields in maritime law that had social implications, for example, the obligation to carry a certain quota of noblemen on board ships and galleys, as well as, the material conditions of crews on ships. Other policies that were strictly under the jurisdiction of the Grand Council were those that were considered taboo already in earlier centuries, such as, the prohibitions to carry infidels and their merchandise on board Venetian galleys and ships, the transport of merchandise prohibited by the Church, the chartering of ships to infidels and the limitations on navigation along the western coast of the Adriatic Sea (sottovento): Lane, ‘Maritime Law and Administration’, p. 236. 6 An enactment 11 May 1467 empowered the Senate as the highest-level authority on economic and financial matters: Gullino, ‘L’evoluzione costituzionale’, p. 350. 7 Lane, ‘Venetian Merchant Galleys’, p. 194. 8 In two enactments, on 25 January 1442 and 2 October 1422: Maranini, La costituzione di Venezia, II, p. 161.

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issued sea letters (sing. patente), granted fiscal concessions and privileges to engage in trade, and gave permissions to assist ships in distress or to borrow equipment from the state-controlled shipyards.9 Adjoined by a council of ministers, the six savi grandi, five savi agli ordini, and five savi de teraferma and the four heads of the quarantia the Ducal Council formed the pien Collegio. The Collegio prepared the agenda of the Senate and translated its decrees into operative directions to the various magistracies, colonial officials, and naval commanders.10 It devoted considerable attention to ship movements within Venice, and kept daily communication with the port admiral and the heads of the public shipyards. It also commissioned merchant vessels for the navy, and approved payment orders for such services. Another competence was setting the conditions of the cotton mude (the regular convoy of ships that sailed to Syria) and electing convoy commanders. The Collegio supervised certain procedures related to the financial backing that was offered to shipowners for building round ships, such as the approval of the required securities; the election of counsellors to survey the ships; and the orders of payment (under the competence of the Council of Ten after 1514). From about 1480, the Council of Ten, a supreme body of policing and disciplining, assumed a growing influence on the administration in Venice and the stato da mar.11 In conjunction with the Grain Commissioners, they regulated the supplies and the prices of cereals in periods of famine, contracted ships, approved deals with importers, and confirmed the payment of freightage for grain consignments. The Ten also took measures to direct grain-carrying vessels to the capital through a policy of bounties and other incentives, as well as military action. Around the same time, the supervision over the Salt Office was delegated to the Council of Ten as well. Joined by the Salt Commissioners, the Ten officiated over the salt markets and took means to preserve the monopolies of this trade. Under their competence as well, was the shipping of irregular cargo, such as falcons, or the property of deceased officials who had perished overseas. They also approved petitions for the naturalization of foreign ships (strictly under the competence of the Senate after 1527, unless a near-to-unanimous consent was achieved). Finally, with the introduction of state loans for shipbuilding in 1534, the Ten oversaw the disbursement of these loans, which were provided by the Salt Office. 9

Lane, ‘Maritime Law and Administration’, pp. 236–37; idem, Venice, A Maritime Republic, pp. 95–97, 254–55; Rossi, ‘Le magistrature’, pp. 688–90, 695–96. 10 An enactment from 1420 delegated the Collegio to put into effect the Senate’s decrees: Maranini, La costituzione di Venezia, II, pp. 333; Gullino, ‘L’evoluzione costituzionale’, p. 349. 11 Cozzi, ‘Authority and the Law’, pp. 293–345; Arbel, ‘Venice’s Maritime Empire’, p. 154.

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Finally, the state attorneys (avogadori di Comun) had an important role in prosecuting any infringements of sea laws. They conducted investigations, interrogated the witnesses, and presented the case at the hearing, or took legal action in the supreme court of the quarantia.12 So was, for example, the prosecution against contraband in the broad sense;13 the violation of policies regulating the intervention of foreigners in the Levant trade;14 restrictions on foreign ownership of Venice’s ships or of building vessels in foreign territories;15 frauds in the survey;16 flying false flags;17 fiscal frauds;18 the presence of infidels and their merchandise on board;19 disregard of regulations on the part of the captains;20 disputes with the port authorities;21 manifestations of violence against port officials, between crew and officers, or cases of death while at sea when no claims were made;22 violation of contracts without summoning the Council of Twelve;23 defaults or debtors of state subsidies for shipbuilding;24

12

13 14 15

16 17 18 19

20 21 22 23 24

Setti, ‘La terza parte a Venezia’, pp. 130–38; Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 100; Dudan, ‘Il processo d’intromissione’, p. 21. Several examples related to shipping: the prosecution of Antonio Grimani Capitano general da mar and other fleet commanders, following the defeat in the battle of Zonchio: Dolfin, Annalium Venetorum, pp. 58–59 (12 June 1500), 92 (8 July 1500). In the following cases colonial officials were accused of giving licence to ship captains to engage in illegal trade: ASVe, SM, reg. 12, ff. 127r–v (10 November 1487); ibid., reg. 18, f. 44r (18 May 1514). E.g., ASVe, CL, bus. 152, 507–8 (24 August 1479), 511–14 (14 November 1481); ASVe, MC, reg. 25, ff. 79v–81r (26 September 1512). ASVe, CN, reg. 13, f. 164v (26 March 1488); ASVe, SM, reg. 12, ff. 158r–59r (18 November 1488); ibid., reg. 20, f. 113v (19 April 1524). The avogadori oversaw the enforcement against Venetians who formed partnerships with foreigners for building ships with state subsidies. In 1550, the Senate ordered all shipowners to name their shareholders in the office of the avogaria: ASVe, SM, fil. 6, f. 359r (26 July 1550). Ibid., reg. 16, f. 41r (29 January 1504). Ibid., ff. 131v–32r (20 October 1506). Ibid., reg. 12, f. 22v (21 September 1484). E.g., the role of the avogadori in the enforcement and prosecution in the following enactments: ASVe, MC, reg. 23 ff. 14v–15r (6 February 1458); ibid., reg. 24, ff. 15r–v (5 November 1480); ASVe, SM, reg. 11, f. 120v (7 July 1481); ibid., reg. 16, f. 81r (29 May 1505); ibid., reg. 20, f. 113v (19 April 1524). ASVe, SM, reg. 15, f. 31v (12 June 1500). Sanuto, I diarii, XLVI, 105 (25 September 1527). Based on an enactment from 1546: ASVe, ACLR, bus. 3521, fasc. 1 [15 November 1583]. Following the shipwreck of the Morosina, the captain was prosecuted by the avogadori for violating his contract without consulting first the Council of Twelve: ASVe, SM, reg. 21, f. 182r (16 November 1529). ASVe, CXDC, fil. 29, fasc. 100 (16 May 1541).

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and violence at sea against vessels of Venice’s citizens and subjects.25 The avogadori also advocated the interests of pilgrims in court to redeem the securities given by captains to reimburse them for damages.26 2

Executive Authorities Involved in Commercial Shipping

2.1 Consoli dei mercanti Established in 1233, the consoli dei mercanti held an administrative and juridical competence on trade and navigation. Their importance to shipping is evident throughout the statutes of this office’s capitolare (1244, terminus ad quem).27 In Zeno’s time, the consoli prevented ships from taking on too much weight, checking that their markers were not submerged to an illegal extent; they performed full inspections on round ships prior to departure, and made sure that the official calendar of sailing seasons was respected.28 During the thirteenth century, the consoli oversaw the enrolment of the ship clerks (scrivani) on board private vessels. This practice was later abolished, and captains enrolled their own men for the job.29 The consoli retained jurisdiction in prosecution against captains who disregarded safety regulations (i.e., disembarked before their ship entered port; replaced their crew without permission from the majority of the merchants on board, etc.) and they prosecuted merchants and passengers who refused to be part of the Council of Twelve after being elected.30 In the course of the fourteenth century these functions were delegated to other magistracies. In many respects, the ufficio di Levante became the authority in charge of the inspections over the bulk part of the safety regulations of navigation, including overloading and stowage. Concurrently, the jurisdiction in maritime law was passed on to the curie di palazzo, principally 25

E.g., the accusation of piracy acts against Zuane Solert: ASVe, ACMCP., bus. 4234, fasc. 16 (14 August 1496); ibid., bus. 4590, fasc. 3 [28 February 1497]. 26 ASVe, SM, reg. 14, f. 112v (14 January 1497). 27 The capitolare (1244 or before) contains 13 chapters related to ships, which are an extension and in some way modification to Zeno’s statutes. One of the three surviving copies of the capitolare, held in the library of the family Giusti del Giardino di Padova-Lanfranchi, was published in a critical edition by Marco Michelon: Capitolare dei consoli, pp. 19–20. Similar organs were established also in other maritime centres in the Mediterranean: Zeno, Storia del diritto marittimo, p. 88. 28 Lane, ‘Maritime Law and Administration’, pp. 230, 237–40; Michelon, Capitolare dei consoli, p. 17. 29 Lane, ‘Venetian Seamen’, p. 409. 30 The Council of Twelve was created outside Venetian territories, whenever an alternation from the original plan was considered: Tucci, ‘Le conseil des douze’, pp. 119–25.

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the giudici del forestier. Cases that involved the violations of sea law were under the competence of the state attorneys and the Ducal Council itself.31 Notwithstanding their reduced importance, the consoli in the fifteenth century still retained areas of jurisdiction in disputes that concerned salvage, general average, and insurance claims.32 One of the consoli’s prominent functions regarding merchant shipping was the survey, intended to determine the official rating of all ships of over 200 milliaria (c. 166 botti).33 This function remained in force until 1516, when it was delegated to the Port Admiral and the provveditori e patroni all’Arsenal.34 The official rating was then recorded by the consoli in a special register that was regularly updated.35 In the early sixteenth century, they were still considered the authority in supplying reliable information on the rating of a single ship or statistics on the merchant marine as a whole. In 1502, for example, the consoli were able to provide data on the number of ships and their ratings between 1420 and 1450. An enactment in 1505 ratified the obligation of shipowners to notify the consoli dei mercanti on any transaction concerning their vessels or part of the shares, with the exception of those purchased for scrapping.36 Clearly, there were many inaccuracies in the registry: not all shareholders were keen to expose their identity, and the estimates must have been subject to fraud.37 Despite inaccuracies and the absence of registration numbers, the 31 Lane, ‘Maritime Law and Administration’, pp. 240–41, 243–44, 246, 251. 32 An enactment of the Grand Council, dated 25 July 1468, delegated the jurisdiction over insurance contracts and general average disputes from the Ducal tribunals to the consoli dei mercanti. An equivalent development in maritime insurance was already practised in Genoa in the early fifteenth century: ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 17, 198–99 (25 July 1468); Borgherini-Scarabellin, Il magistrato dei cinque savi, p. 14; Nehlsenvon Stryk, L’assicuratione marittima, p. 32. On 7 April 1423, the consoli dei mercanti passed from three to four, but were later reduced again to three: Gullino, ‘L’evoluzione costituzionale’, p. 349. 33 Lane, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 246–47. 34 Lane, ‘Maritime Law and Administration’, pp. 237–38, 251; Michelon, Capitolare dei consoli, p. 11. 35 The entries in their registry were probably similar to an attestation issued by the consoli for a ship captained by Hieronimo Malipiero (1458): ASVe, PSM, Misti, bus. 116, fasc. VIII ‘Conto della caratada di la nave patron Jeronimo Malipiero’. 36 ASVe, SM, reg. 15, ff. 156v–57r (21 October 1502). In 1505, the consoli were instructed to keep a separate journal containing the acts of sale of all ships or shares in a ship to enable the messetteria agency to better enforce the sell tax: ASVe, PSD, bus.1, f. 24r (20 February 1505). 37 E.g., in 1481 the collegio dei dodici savi – a provisory body entrusted with legislative power by the Senate – attempted to increase enforcement by instructing the consoli to register all the transfers of ownership or shares in a ship, a measure taken to facilitate the detection of tax evaders: ASVe, UM, reg. 1, f. 110r (12 February 1481).

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records of the consoli dei mercanti must have been similar in many respects to a modern ship registry. The rating served different purposes, primarily to determine the quota of crew and equipment. Other magistracies used it for their own needs: the tre savi in Rialto used the information to set the quota of nobili da poppa on board ships; the estraordinario used the ratings to collect port duties; the ufficiali alla messetteria taxed the transfer of carats in a ship based on a list of shareholders; and the ufficio di Levante copied and transmitted the data to the colonies to be used for enforcement of regulations against overloading and stowage overseas.38 The delegation of the survey of ships to the Port Admiral and the provveditori e patroni all’Arsenal in 1516 formally divested the consoli of their former position as the official source of information on ships. The establishment of the cinque savi alla mercanzia in 1507 and their transformation into a permanent magistracy in 1517 further reduced the competence of the consoli in economy and trade. 2.2 Ufficiali sopra le mercanzie del Levante (ufficio di Levante) It is erroneously assumed that this magistracy was only active during the thirteenth and fourteenth century.39 In fact, the ufficio di Levante retained some of its functions concerning shipping at least until the mid-sixteenth century. From its establishment, this magistracy supervised Levant trade, enforced trading privilege policies, and controlled the import of lucrative merchandise from the Near East. Since 1279 they had overseen the inspection of safety regulations (i.e., the quota of crew required in law and the presence of arms on board ships). In 1285, their office was merged with that of the domini de contrabannis, as they retained similar functions, though they were separated again shortly after. In 1291 the ufficio di Levante is mentioned again as responsible, alongside the cattaver, for inspecting round ships before departure, not only those sailing to Syria, but all Venice’s unarmed ships. In 1339 the inspection was extended to include vessels originating from Dalmatia and Greece, which were known to sail without carrying proper arms. But their principal concern was round ships, specifically the safety measurements taken for ballasting, balancing, and stowing cotton in the Levant. In 1375 the magistracy was appointed to oversee enforcement against overloading based on the ratings that were supplied by the consoli dei mercanti.40 38 Michelon, Capitolare dei consoli, pp. 11, 15–18. 39 Tiepolo, ‘Archivio di Stato di Venezia’, p. 937. 40 Lane, ‘Maritime Law and Administration’, pp. 240, 243–44, 251.

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After the fourteenth century, Venice’s sea laws focused more on limiting the quantities of merchandise that were stored above decks. Former regulations concerning the stowing of cotton and overloading largely disappeared from legislation, and thus was mistakenly assumed to be obsolete. On the contrary, these aspects were meticulously inspected by the ufficio di Levante as well as the provveditori di Comun throughout this period. Giorgio Dolfin, who wrote his chronicle in the late fifteenth century, commented: The Levant Office consists of two officers, who conduct the inspections of the ships that want to leave Venice. They oversee that the crews have their proper arms and other things necessary. And they also have the right to conduct search for contrabands.41 A Senate enactment on 2 September 1460 further extended the range of inspections the ufficio di Levante conducted on board, with one of the articles explicitly indicating the submergence of the load lines (segnali).42 Diarists Marino Sanuto and Domenico Malipiero provide further confirmation that the ufficio di Levante continued to be the authority in such matters. In their description of the tragic shipwreck of an inexperienced young captain on 18 January 1494, both chroniclers mention the recent death of Francesco Savina, an experienced seaman who had been employed at the ufficio di Levante. The latter had a reputation for being an expert in ballasting and balancing a ship. After his death, Sanuto writes, no other person was appointed to replace him, and this was the reason for such accidents: I should mention that a certain old and experienced mariner named Francesco Savina that was working in the ufficio di Levanti for 60 years, and no ship dared to leave port without his permission, as his job was to inspect ships and say whether ‘this ship is overloaded’, or ‘strained’ and must not leave before repairs, or require more ballast. This person recently passed away, and they didn’t appoint any expert in his place, and no wonder that such shipwrecks occur.43

41

‘L’offitio de’Levanti son do. Questi vanno a far far le zerche delle navi quando le vuol partir di Venexia, et veder se le ha tutti i suo homini con le sue arme et di tutte altre cosse necessarie, et hano libertà di far zerchar i contrabandi’: Dolfin, Cronicha dela nobil cità, p. 132. 42 The portada of the seamen was the only type of merchandise permitted to be stored on deck, 2 September 1460: ASVe, CDM, reg. 128, ff. 4r–v; ASVe, SM, reg. 6, f. 198r. 43 Sanuto, Le vite dei Dogi (1474–94), II, p. 709 (18 January 1494); Malipiero: Annali veneti, p. 627. For the stranded ship: Appendix A: 1490, n. 57.

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Clearly, ships continued to be inspected after the death of this expert, but the role of the ufficio di Levante in this respect is unclear. We can, however, consider 12 July 1527 as the terminus ante quem for delegating this competence to other magistracies.44 While the loss of one of their fundamental functions likely reduced the ufficiali del Levante’s importance to shipping, they retained some competence on shipped merchandise. Thus, in 1541 a Ragusan ship captain is said to have attempted to avoid the duty disbursed to the ufficiali del Levante on his merchandise by unloading them at Parenzo in Istria and sending them to Venice by smaller boats.45 In 1552 Ottoman grain-carrying ships were exempted from a duty to this magistracy, which otherwise would have amounted to 13% of their profits for each 100 stara of wheat that was consigned.46 The tariff of port duties published by Moresini (c. 1546–63) established the impost rates to be paid to the ufficiali del Levante. This impost, as well as their function regarding merchandise, has yet to be further clarified; however, there is little doubt that the magistracy remained an integral part of the clearance procedure throughout the fifteenth century and a great part of the sixteenth.47 2.3 Ufficiali all’estraordinario Established in 1302, the ufficiali all’estraordinario held responsibility over the collection of freightage for merchandise carried on galleys.48 In the course of time, their competence extended to private ships as well. The estraordinario was able to sustain the extension of payment over longer periods; hence it functioned as a buffer between shipowners and merchants. This, in turn, improved cash flows and enhanced the overall business circulation for the advantage of both.49 The arrival procedure for merchant galleys was meticulously described in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century enactments. A similar practice likely applied in the case of round ships, whose principal business model was also freightage. 44 45 46 47

ASVe, SM, reg. 21, f. 72v (12 July 1527). ASVe, PPA, reg. 135, f. 54r (13 July 1541). ASVe, SM, fil. 8, 210–15 (23 December 1551). In late fifteenth century, the ufficio di Levante was still an obligatory stop in the clearance procedure for all ships: ASVe, SM, reg. 12, f. 75r (13 April 1486); ASVe, CN, reg. 14, f. 17r (13 April 1490). See also: Hanĕl, ‘Statuta et leges civitatis et insulae Curzulae’, p. 214 LXI (15 November 1493). 48 Their competence regarding the maintenance of waterways, administrating the dredging of the canals and the control over the depths at the port entrances was retained by the savi alle acque in early sixteenth century: Lane, ‘Maritime Law and Administration’, pp. 249–50. 49 Lane, ‘Venetian Seamen’, p. 408 cit. 2.

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As soon as a vessel entered the port, the estraordinario or the custom officials went on board, inventoried the cargo, and sealed the hatches and other exits to ensure the shipment’s integrity. The cargo was subsequently unloaded from the vessel and consigned to the maritime customs. There, it was stored until the merchants settled their accounts. The vessel’s clerk was required to consign the cargo books to the estraordinario within eight days from the moment the ship or galley started unloading. The books were then used as references and for issuing attestations, or bill of lading.50 The scribes of the estraordinario registered the bills, which were sent to the ufficiali sopra i dieci uffici for an annual inspection.51 The same procedure was applied during departure.52 Merchants came to the office at the Rialto to attest for the content of their goods, disburse freightage, and receive a bolleta.53 The cargo was charged with freight rates, a proportional share in the general average, and any additional duties or tithes imposed on merchandise. Depending on the destination, the freightages on galleys were assigned fixed rates, determined by the Senate or the subordinate magistracies. Captains of private ships and merchants were generally left to discuss the rates between themselves.54 In various circumstances, lucrative merchandise that were traditionally reserved for the galleys (i.e., spices and silk) were carried on private ships instead. Merchants disbursed the full freightage to the ship captains (i.e., the rates that were established for the galleys) and were charged an additional duty by the estraordinario amounting half the freightage (mezzo noli) and sometimes full freightage, which was accredited to the Arsenal or the auctioneers of the galleys. The freightage was transferred to the auctioneers of the galleys or the shareholders of the ships, for which purpose the estraordinario kept a record of the division of the shares of all Venetian vessels. The taxes on freightage (i.e., the 2, 3 and 4% taxes due to the State) and the proportional share in the general average were deducted first. The net freightage was divided between the shareholders according to their carats in the enterprise – and as long as they did not have previous debts to the government.55 50 A competence that was shared with the ufficio di Levante: ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 23, reg. 22ter, cc. 5b (22 August 1307), 7b (4 January 1330), 23a–b (31 August 1345), 78b (c. 1515). 51 This measure was taken after some disorders were discovered in 1521: ibid., cc. 77a–b (29 July 1523). 52 Ibid., cc. 6a–b (5 July 1320), 9b–10a (c. 1345). 53 The procedure was revised in various instances: ibid., reg. 22bis, ff. 14r–v (3 April 1322); ASVe, SMist., reg. 52, f. 48r (27 September 1417). 54 In 1502 the Senate intervened to establish price-setting mechanisms: Lane, ‘Venetian shipping’, p. 31. 55 The mezzo noli impost was divided between the patroni of the returning galley muda, based on the conditions that were set in the auctioning of the galleys. In years where no

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To facilitate the procedure and avoid the depreciation of freightage to the detriment of shipowners – allegedly one of the causes for the shipping crisis – the 1502 enactment established a reform in the payment procedure. The collection of freightage was divided between the captains and the magistracy in the following way: before departure, the merchants disbursed the full freightage in cash in the office of the estraordinario in return for a bolleta. After the return of the ship to Venice, the merchants disbursed in cash the return freightage directly to the captains in the customs up to a maximum of 25 ducats. If they failed to do so, the estraordinario pursued the payment of debts by acting as a debt collector and charging both parties extra fees. If the freightage was greater than 25 ducats, merchants were permitted to disburse them at the office within one year and without incurring penalties. After expiration, the handling of the debt was delegated to the ufficiali sopra i dieci uffici.56 From its establishment, the estraordinario was the authority on matters concerning the general average. The ship’s scrivano was expected to note down chronologically various expenses or losses incurred during the voyage that he wished to include as general average. The list was then delivered with the freight registers to the scribes of the estraordinario who were authorized to decide what expenses would be considered as general average and make the necessary calculations (butar avaria).57 The result was frequently disputed, and such cases were resolved in arbitration in the office at the Rialto or by the court of auditori vecchi delle sentenze – three civil judges with jurisdiction to deliver final judgement in small claims or intermediate assessment before delegating the case to the higher instance of the quarantia civil vechia. The estraordinario acted as arbiters also in other disputes between captains and merchants within their field of competence. Difficult cases were delegated to the ufficiali sopra i dieci uffici.58

galleys were auctioned the said duty was accredited to the Arsenal. Disputes between the Arsenal and the patroni were solved in arbitration in the office of the estraordinario: ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 23, reg. 22ter, cc. 63b (15 November 1428), 76b (23 September 1515), 77–78a (SD); Ashtor, Levant Trade, pp. 426–27. 56 The novelty in 1502 was securing prompt payment to shipowners and the introduction of penalties for delays: cf. ASVe, SM, reg. 9, f. 120v (12 December 1471); ibid., reg. 15, ff. 156v– 57r (21 October 1502). 57 ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 23, reg. 22ter, cc. 57a–b (27 September 1417). Re-enacted: ibid., c. 53a (29 March 1429). 58 Ibid., cc. 21b–22a (3 November 1342), 66a (9 December 1434).

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2.4 Ufficiali al cattaver This body advised the Senate in matters regarding the economy, and was involved in the enforcement effort against contraband, conducted within the stretch of sea from the Po Delta to the Gulf of the Quarner.59 Their functions with relevance to shipping were to deal with treasures found at sea, unclaimed merchandise, and goods confiscated during military action or policing against contraband. Such items (including entire vessels) were put out for auction at the Rialto.60 A function this office shared with the provveditori di Comun was the confirmation and registration of bills of sale of ships. The cattaveri had jurisdiction to naturalize foreign ships, although the legitimacy of such procedures was contested in the late fifteenth century.61 Salvaged merchandise and cash recuperated from shipwrecks remained in custody of this office until the rightful owner was found and the finder duly rewarded.62 Another competence with relevancy to shipping concerned the control over the port pilots and their fraternity (established in 1449). The cattaveri regulated the tariff of services offered by the pedoti and set the minimum capacity required by law to use their services. Joined by the savi agli ordini, they articulated laws concerning pilotage that were put to vote in the Senate. The cattaveri maintained the privileges and obligations of the guild of pilots, based on their statutes, and kept a record of all the registered pedoti that were allowed to practice this profession. Joined by the head of the guild (gastaldo), they conducted the initiation test to become a certified pilot; appointed, approved, and promoted pilots from the lower to the higher class; and elected veteran pilots to the role of guards at the castelli at San Nicolò (one of the entrances to the Lagoon). They were arbiters in related disputes and prosecuted pilots for practising without a licence, overcharging, or infringing on other regulations.63 Part of the logistical considerations were to secure the availability of pilot services 59 Legal proceedings against contraband that were opened in the colonies were then delegated to the cattaveri for prosecution: ASVe, UC, reg. 2, ff. 45r–v (30 June 1280); ASVe, UT, reg. 1, ff. 13v–14r (4 February 1475). 60 E.g.: Sanuto, I diarii, VII, 60 (29 April 1507). 61 ASVe, SM, reg. 13, ff. 3r–4v (1 March 1490). 62 ASVe, UC, reg. 2, ff. 67r–v (2 May 1353), 67v–68r (24 August 1488), 68v–69r (30 January 1515), 90r–v (25 August 1403), 92v–93r (16 February 1417), 105r–6r (6 June 1546); Sanuto, I diarii, XIX, 408 (31 January 1515). The Collegio entrusted to an official from the cattever the handling of the recuperated goods from the shipwrecked Corresa: ASVe, CSC, reg. 4, ff. 10r–v (19 September 1513). 63 ASVe, UC, reg. 3.5, ff. 4v–5v (27 June 1450), 9v–11v (26 May 1458), 13r–v (1 September 1487), 14r (15 September 1491), 19r–v (3 June 1504), 20v–21r (15 February 1507), 21v–24v (4 September 1512), 28v–29v (27 September 1513), 34r–v (4 September 1521), 42v–43v (4 August 1529); ASVe, CL, bus. 19, 67 (2 May 1497).

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in all authorized ports in Venice and Istria and to coordinate their activity with the Port Admiral. For instance, the pedoti were obligated to conduct sounding measurements at Malamocco and Chioggia (the two other points of entry into the lagoon) at least twice a year, and report their results to the armiraglio, whereas the latter had exclusive right to conduct soundings in the port of San Nicolò. Disciplining the pilots to respect the privileges of the Admiral required considerable attention as well. Meanwhile, the fees charged by the latter for piloting a ship were supervised by the cattaveri.64 One of the earliest functions of this magistracy (since 1292) was looking after the welfare of pilgrims arriving in Venice in search of passage to the Holy Land. The licence to carry pilgrims on board private ships, for example, was conditioned by safety requirements determined in an enactment from 1392. Vessels of a capacity below 400 botti were unauthorized to carry pilgrims. The periodical inspections in this regard were outsourced to three experts accompanied by one of the officials. Captains who carried pilgrims were required to attest in writing that their ship met the safety requirements. This office also determined the dates of the voyage to Jaffa, and saw to it that no pilgrim embarked under a false name as a merchant or as a passenger. Another measure obliged pilgrims to register in the office of the cattaver upon their arrival in Venice. In 1497 ship captains were required to present sureties that would be defrayed in case of infringement of the contract to compensate for any possible damage incurred to the pilgrims.65 The cattaveri mediated in disputes between the parties on issues such as late arrivals, sanitary conditions, deviation from the designated route, and excessive merchandise on board. Captains who had committed serious offences were prosecuted by the cattaveri in the higher judicial magistracies. 2.5 Provveditori di Comun Established around 1256,66 one of their earliest concerns was maintaining the legal privilege to engage in the Levant trade, originally granted to Venetian citizens and denied to others.67 Sea-related jurisdictions revolved around a similar bundle of protectionist policies. Thus, the commissioners were in charge of prosecuting those involved in transporting infidels and their merchandise on 64 ASVe, UC, reg. 3.5, ff. 28v–29v (27 September 1513), 33r–v (27 September 1520), 37r–v (23 May 1525), 38v–40v (19 February 1527), 40v–42r (27 June 1527). 65 Ibid., reg. 2, ff. 85r–88r (4 June 1392); ASVe, SM, reg. 14, f. 112v (14 January 1497). 66 ASVe, PC, reg. 1, f. 1r (before 1300). 67 Within this framework they granted trade privileges to non-Venetian citizens, long-term residence and work permits, as well as different forms of citizenship by privilege: ibid., reg. 1, ff. 30v (1377), 34r (16 June 1385); ASVe, UM, reg. 1, ff. 22v–24r (12 February 1376).

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Venetian vessels to and from the Levant, or in carrying merchandise prohibited by the Church;68 they prosecuted foreigners engaged in illegal commercial activity, either directly or indirectly through cooperating with Venetian citizens or financing such activities;69 they enforced the prohibition on foreigners’ purchasing, building, or having shares in ships.70 For these reasons, the passage of ownership or carats was subject to confirmation of the provveditori di Comun and the acts of sale were registered in their books. Enforcement against the alienation of ships or having foreigners as partners in Venetian ships required the attention of the magistracy at any period. A decree of 1325 suggests that the commissioners granted illegal permits for selling Venetian ships to foreigners.71 The alienation of ships became an acute problem in the second half of the fifteenth century. In 1471, the provveditori were instructed to maintain their own registry of all the ships and vessels in Venice and the estimate of their capacity. They were required to be present at the surveys of ships capacity as well72  – a requirement that was ratified in 1487.73 In 1495 the Senate went further to instruct the commissioners to actively enforce these policies by prosecuting citizens and residents of Venice who had shares in ships and vessels that were built outside the dogado or were partly-owned by foreigners.74 They worked together with the local authorities to regulate shipping in the stato da mar. Legal actions taken in the colonies were delegated to higher magistracies for ruling. Thus, the provveditori di Comun handled civil cases, alternately acting as prosecutors in cases that were directed to other courts.75 Other sea-related policies under their jurisdiction included the limitation on the building of vessels of over 100 botti in foreign territories within the Adriatic Sea;76 the chartering of foreign ships;77 unlawful transport of lucrative goods, and the transit of merchandise to other ports along the western coast of the

68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77

In 1419, they were instructed to proclaim the prohibitions before the departure of ships to the Levant: ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 13, ff. 14v–15r (12 March 1419). ASVe, PC, reg. 1, f. 11r (27 September 1324). Ibid., f. 20v (1 August 1359). Ibid., ff. 12v–13r (1325). ASVe, SM, reg. 9, ff. 120v–21r (12 December 1471). Ibid., reg. 12, ff. 127r–v (10 November 1487). Ibid., reg. 14, ff. 103v–4v (26 August 1496). ASVe, PC, reg. 1, f. 23r (22 November 1363). They retained this function: ASVe, SM, reg. 20, f. 113v (19 April 1524). On law enforcement overseas: Arbel, ‘Venice’s Maritime Empire’, pp. 156–64. ASVe, PC, reg. 1, ff. 27v (1374), 64v (26 November 1435), 92r (24 January 1477). Ibid., f. 60v (12 February 1434).

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Adriatic Sea;78 and contraband in the broad sense. The prosecution of governors and other colonial officials who issued permits for such unlawful trade was carried out in collaboration with the state attorneys.79 From the late fourteenth century until the third decade of the sixteenth, the provveditori di Comun enforced regulations against overloading and overcrowding of ships.80 Ship captains had to leave a copy of their libretto di carico in the superintendent’s office within fifteen days after the completion of loading or unloading.81 The chronicler Giorgio Dolfin goes further to suggest that the commissioners also inspected the seaworthiness of the older vessels.82 Other sea-related functions were, for example, granting permissions to export rigs, cables, and the types of ropes and cords exclusively produced in the Tana (the rope factory in Venice’s state-controlled shipyards);83 handling merchandise salvaged from shipwrecks or recuperated from corsairs;84 regulating fluvial transportation; overseeing the traghetti services; providing against illegal import of foreign-built river boats and burchi; maintaining the waterways in the city; overseeing shipping regulations concerning woollens, silk, and other fabrics; and enforcing the prohibition of hiring non-citizen scrivani on Venetian galleys and ships.85 2.6 Savi sopra la revision dei conti (tre savi in Rialto) Established in the Senate on 16 May 1474 to audit the account books of the governatori delle entrate, the tre savi’s function as an official financial inspector was gradually expanded to include examining the accounts of other state organs. This included the magistrato all’armamento (responsible for the arming of galleys and ships), the Arsenal, its artillery branch, fortifications, and ammunition and supplies allotted to the colonies overseas. Although the magistracy had marginal relevance to maritime affairs, it possessed one important point of contact: the tre savi supervised the procedure of recruiting nobili da poppa (noblemen who were required to serve on merchant vessels). The quota was determined according to the ships’ capacity. For this reason, the tre savi kept a record of all ships and made inquiries to verify that the ratings were correct. Ship captains had to appear in person before departure and again within 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85

Ibid., ff. 17r (24 June 1348), 42r (30 June 1402). ASVe, SM, reg. 18, f. 44r (18 May 1514). ASVe, PC, reg. 1, ff. 34v–35v (11 January 1386), 82r (20 October 1455). Ibid., f. 24r (1 September 1366). Dolfin, Cronicha de la nobil cità, p. 131. ASVe, PC, reg. 1, f. 24v (10 June 1368). E.g, ASVe, SM, reg. 19, ff. 23v–24r (26 May 1517); ASVe, CN, reg. 24, f. 214r (8 October 1542). ASVe, PC, reg. 1, f. 68v (18 September 1442).

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three days after arrival at the office of the tre savi in Rialto to guarantee that the quota was respected.86 Starting in 1510, the magistracy was instructed to keep record of all departures and the names of those noblemen who embarked on the ships. Following changes in the quota of nobles on board 31 January 1520 and 25 June 1545, their presence at the surveys was re-enforced.87 The copy of the register with information on the ratings of all ships and the names of the officials who attended the stima passed to the Collegio for periodical inspection. The 1545 enactment prohibited ships from leaving port without a bolleta issued by the tre savi to attest that the necessary arrangements were made.88 This office acted as arbitrators in disputes in their field of competence with similar jurisdiction to that of the state attorneys. 2.7 Cinque savi alla mercanzia The office of cinque savi was created to ‘rationalize’ all matters commercial in an attempt to solve the crisis of the Venetian entrepôt following the discovery of the Portuguese route to India. Established by the Senate on 15 January 1507 for a limited period of three years, they became a permanent body ten years later (1517). The cinque savi, members of the Senate, took over the responsibilities of the consulta dei savi del Collegio in matters concerning navigation and trade and the remaining executive functions of the largely dissolved consoli dei mercanti. They functioned as an economic development agency that the Senate would appoint to study certain sectors of the economy and suggest reforms; these were presented to the Collegio, revised, and put to the vote in the Senate. Over the course of the sixteenth century, the cinque savi reviewed sea-related policies in fiscal matters, clearance procedures, customs, protective tariffs, contraband, maritime insurance, etc. On a more occasional basis, it regulated the prices in the markets, the ceiling on freight charges, and fiscal charges. The cinque savi were less involved on the operative level, which was largely administrated by the Arsenal and the Port Admiral.89 2.8 The State-Controlled Shipyard (Arsenal) The principal function of the Arsenal was invariably to build, maintain and equip the military fleet of war vessels and commercial galleys.90 But as of 1516, 86 87 88 89

ASVe, SM, reg. 14, ff. 6r–v (31 March 1493). Ibid., reg. 19, f. 131r (31 January 1520). Ibid., reg. 28, f. 39r (25 June 1545, confirmed three days after). Borgherini-Scarabellin, Il magistrato dei cinque savi, pp. 16–19; Ferro, Dizionario del diritto comune, II, pp. 259–61; Sanuto, I diarii, VI, 532 (15 January 1507). 90 On the expansion of the Arsenal on the backdrop of the Ottoman conquests: Davis, Costruttori di navi, pp. 81–83; Bellavitis, L’Arsenale di Venezia, pp. 18–127; Concina,

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the Arsenal together with the cinque savi alla merchanzia retained all major responsibilities on private shipping that were formally under the jurisdiction of the consoli dei mercanti. This includes the collection of port duties, and consequently the rating of ships and the maintenance of a registry. The initiative was introduced by the provveditori e patroni all’Arsenal after the discovery of multiple frauds and inaccuracies in the rates provided by other magistracies. Since the income from anchorage tax depended on these ratings, the Arsenal proposed to perform a thorough re-estimation of all the ships in port. Starting on 6 November 1516, the provveditori e patroni, together with the Port Admiral, obtained full authority to set an official rating for all ships of over 250 stara, including foreign and colonial vessels. The estimate was carried out when a ship arrived to Venice for the first time, and the results were recorded by the scribes of the Arsenal in a designated register.91 The departure from port was conditioned to obtaining a bolletino issued by the scribe.92 Hence, the year 1516 marks a significant stepping stone in the State’s attempt to better administer private shipping: in literal terms, the control over shipping that was previously under the competence of various commercial boards was given to one important body that was not exclusively bureaucratic but had all the technical and professional know-how at its disposal.93 The implementation required time and further adaptations; an enactment from January 1520 suggests that there was still disorder in the ratings of ships built in Venice,94 and on 11 January 1526 it was deemed necessary to perform a wholesale reevaluation of all ships and smaller vessels by the admiral and the Arsenal.95 On a more regular basis, the assistance that could be obtained from the Arsenal was one of the advantages of building a ship in Venice, rather than L’Arsenale della Repubblica di Venezia, pp. 25–97, 127–41; Lane, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 125–39. On the various functions of the provveditori e patroni: ibid., pp. 141–64; Rossi, ‘Le magistrature’, pp. 723–45; Davis, Shipbuilders of the Venetian Arsenal, pp. 47–82. 91 Smaller vessels continued to be surveyed by other magistracies: ASVe, SM, reg. 18, f. 151v (6 November 1516); Sanuto, I diarii, XXII, 520 (3 September 1516); Lane, Navires et constructeurs, p. 145. 92 ASVe, PPA, reg. 7, f. 15r (15 January 1518). 93 To be sure, private ships built with state subsidies were under the supervision of the provveditori e patroni all’Arsenal already in the fifteenth century. Ships belonging to the State (navi di Comun) were also marked with a sign for identification purposes: ASVe, PC, reg. 1, f. 92r (24 January 1477). 94 ASVe, SM, reg. 19, ff. 131r–v (31 January 1519). 95 A new survey was performed to all marciliane and other vessels of small and medium size, since many were registered below their actual rating to be tax exempted. The Port Admiral was instructed to inform in writing to the patroni on expected arrivals. Another procedure was established in Malamocco: ASVe, SM, reg. 20, ff. 206r–v (11 January 1526), a copy of the same: ASVe, PPA, reg. 7, ff. 93r–v; Sanuto, I diarii, XL, 640–41.

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in other places, where the construction costs might be lower. Thus it was customary to purchase from the public shipyards raw materials that were difficult to obtain elsewhere.96 The growing shortage in oak and larch timber in the first decades of the sixteenth century drove shipowners to request permission to obtain timber from the public forests, which, in principle, were supposed to serve only for building galleys.97 The launching of large round ships could not have been accomplished without heavy-duty equipment, which was not available at the private shipyards.98 Shipowners filed requests to borrow missing items such as barrels, old masts, capstans and winches, all necessary to careen a ship.99 Conducting seasonal repairs required similar equipment,100 as did masting and dismasting.101 Other assistance from the Arsenal included the hire of work boats,102 while ships charted to load grain for the State were required to install a capstan or winches on board,103 and since masts, yards, and spars of merchant galleys could be fitted – with minor adjustments – to a round ship, they were occasionally purchased from the Arsenal, subject to 96 The savi agli ordini put such requests to vote in the Collegio, e.g.: ASVe, CN, reg. 22, f. 31v (9 April 1532); ASVe, SM, reg. 23, f. 194r (11 December 1536); ibid., reg. 24, f. 147r (27 May 1538); ibid., fil. 5, 317 (4 January 1549); Sanuto, I diarii, XXXV, 131 (22 October 1523); ibid., XLVIII, 148 (22 June 1528). 97 The requests were directed to the patroni through the chanceries of local governors: ASVe, SM, reg. 19, f. 133r (8 February 1520); Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, p. 43 cit. 1. 98 ASVe, CN, reg. 25, f. 24r (26 March 1543); ASVe, SM, reg. 21, ff. 44v (13 October 1526), 51v (22 December 1526); ibid., reg. 22, ff. 42v (18 August 1530), 75v (21 April 1531), 97v (31 October 1531); ibid., reg. 23, ff. 71r (9 December 1534), 143r (19 February 1536), 155v (5 June 1536); ibid., reg. 24, ff. 51r (14 June 1537), 54r (23 June 1537), 55v (29 June 1537), 59r (9 July 1537); ibid., reg. 25, ff. 67r (23 June 1539), 155r (8 June 1540), 185r (18 November 1540); ibid., reg. 31, ff. 42v (21 June 1550), 51r (31 July 1550); ASVe, PPA, reg. 9, f. 50r (5 May 1544); Sanuto, I diarii, XL, 418 (4 December 1525), 515 (28 December 1525); ibid., XLI, 140 (4 April 1526); ibid., LV, 95 (31 October 1531); ibid., LVI, 380 (21 April 1531). 99 ASVe, CN, reg. 25, f. 34r (19 May 1543); ASVe, SM, reg. 21, f. 115v (9 July 1528); ibid., reg. 22, ff. 76r (21 April 1531), 88r (24 September 1531), 96r (13 October 1531), 197r (16 June 1533); Sanuto, I diarii, II, 225 (18 December 1498), 284 (31 December 1498); ibid., XLI, 361 (16 May 1526); ibid., XLIV, 137 (22 February 1527); ibid., XLVIII, 232 (9 July 1528), 417 (10 July 1533); ibid., LIV, 193 (23 December 1530), 380 (21 April 1531); ibid., LV, 55 (12 October 1531); ibid., LVII, 642 (21 March 1533); ibid., LVIII, 323 (16 June 1533). 100 ASVe, CN, reg. 23, f. 64v (22 March 1536); ibid., reg. 24, ff. 96v (10 October 1540), 172v (1 March 1542); ASVe, SM, reg. 20, f. 180v (11 August 1525); ibid., reg. 21, f. 89v (14 December 1527); ibid., reg. 23, f. 142r (14 February 1536); ibid., reg. 27, f. 117r (26 June 1544); Sanuto, I diarii, XL, 128 (24 October 1525); ibid., LVII, 617 (12 March 1533). 101 ASVe, SM, reg. 25, f. 68r (28 June 1539); Sanuto, I diarii, L, 272 (3 May 1529). 102 ASVe, PPA, reg. 531, fasc. 5, n. 19 [12 August 1546], [4 April 1549]. 103 ASVe, CN, reg. 19, f. 125r (31 August 1523); ASVe, ST, reg. 24, f. 118v (24 July 1526); ASVe, SM, reg. 21, f. 39r (1 August 1526); Sanuto, I diarii, LII, 288 (1 August 1526).

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the consent of the high magistracies.104 Pieces of artillery passed frequently between magazines and decks to secure the necessary quota of arms and artillery on board private vessels.105 Also, any salvage boat (barca di Comun) assisting ships in distress outside the port of Venice was commissioned by the Arsenal. Shipowners who expected the arrival of a ship would file an advance request to the savi agli ordini,106 but due to the potential risk, the provveditori e patroni had full authority to use their judgement and borrow such equipment without need for approval.107 In addition, the Arsenal was indirectly involved in salvage operations by lending repair paraphernalia to salvage teams; this was, however, a paid service and subject to a vote in the Senate.108 The salvage of round ships required heavyduty equipment; only a large merchant galley, for example, was capable of lifting a wrecked ship of 800 botti (c. 480 tons). On a more regular basis, rafts and old decommissioned vessels were rented. In exceptional circumstances the patroni all’Arsenal personally intervened.109 104 In several instances ships were constrained to remain in port until supplies arrived from Venice: ASVe, SM, reg. 18, f. 57v (2 September 1514); ibid., reg. 21, f. 29r (18 May 1526); ibid., reg. 24, f. 118v (24 July 1526); ibid., reg. 31, f. 90 (7 February 1551); ASVe, PPA, reg. 8, ff. 27r (12 March 1533), 31r (4 January 1533), 57v (22 March 1536); Sanuto, I diarii, XLII, 209 (23 July 1526); ibid., LVII, 394 (4 January 1533); ibid., XLVI, 641 (27 February 1528); ibid., XLIX, 299 (29 December 1528). 105 ASVe, SM, reg. 20, f. 174r (7 July 1525); ASVe, CXDC, fil. 26, 296 (26 February 1540); ibid., fil. 31, fascc. 31, 154 (22 March, 26 June 1542); Sanuto, I diarii, XXII, 394 (2 August 1516); ibid., XXXIX, 181 (6 July 1525). 106 ASVe, SM, reg. 21, f. 84r (24 October 1527); ibid., reg. 22, f. 87r (12 September 1531); ibid., reg. 23, f. 90v (24 February 1535); ibid., reg. 24, ff. 83r (19 October 1537), 88v (2 November 1537); ibid., reg. 25, ff. 121r (24 October 1539), 127v (11 March 1540), 202r (17 February 1541); ibid., reg. 26, f. 168v (19 December 1542); Sanuto, I diarii, XLVI, 423 (30 December 1527), 482 (14 January 1528). 107 ASVe, PPA, reg. 531, fasc. 5, n. 19 (6 September 1516). 108 Some consideration was shown in the case of the Malipiera in July 1521: ASVe, SM, reg. 19, f. 180r; Sanuto, XXXI, 40. In another salvage case, the owner of the wrecked ship asked to reconsider the bill of expenses presented to him: ASVe, CN, reg. 20, f. 218r (2 January 1529); Lane, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 144–45. 109 E.g., the tragic shipwreck of the Coresa on the island of Brioni. This ship set sail to Crete carrying colonial officials and important personnel. The salvage was financed by the Coresi and administered by Arsenal officials, in response to the family’s appeal for assistance. The celebrated proto Matteo Bressan arrived at the wreck site, but the salvage was eventually delegated to Nicolò Sbisao, an independent engineer, in return for a share of the salvaged goods: ASVe, CN, reg. 17, f. 55v (16 June 1513); ASVe, SM, reg. 17, ff. 181v (12 and 26 July 1512), 183v (19 August 1512), 190r (2, 6 October 1512); Sanuto, I diarii, XIV, 517–18 (26 July 1512). In 1511 the Bernarda was stranded in port. The Admiral and several proti advised the salvage teams, but did not intervene directly in the operation: ASVe, SM, reg. 17, f. 142v (16 June 1511). In 1499 the marano of Nadal Nadal was stranded

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In view of the intensive use of the Arsenal’s resources by the private sector, it is no wonder that stealing was chronic. Shipowners would send their crews with the service boat into the shipyards complex, where it was hauled out and repaired at public expense. Others managed to replace their outworn rigging with new pieces and leave the Arsenal unobserved. Helping oneself to timber, nails, rigging parts, and assorted hardware was common practice and rarely paid for.110 Several attempts were made to restrict the appropriation of equipment, and to charge reimbursement for wear and tear on equipment borrowed and returned.111 The free rein given to the Arsenal’s officials to sell off unused vessels and equipment opened the door for fraud as well.112 Although the private ships are conventionally classified as a separate sector in shipping from that of the so-called ‘public navigations’, there is no viable justification for dismissing the interdependence of these two sectors, which in fact had many facets. To give several examples: when the heads of the Arsenal had to come up with an idea for a certain type of ship that could remain at sea whatever the conditions, they collected information from all those who owned ships of over 800 botti. To do this, esteemed seamen and shipowners were invited to attend formal ceremonies, such as that of 1526, when shipowners were among those requested to accompany the doge on his tour of the Arsenal to view the latest innovations. One year later, four renowned shipowners accompanied the doge, members of the Collegio, and the heads of the Ten to inspect the building progress of the public warships. Similarly, in 1530 ten esteemed shipowners formed a consultant team to advise on a launching strategy for the new ships of the Comun.113 On a regular basis at the in the port’s vicinity; a request for salvage teams was denied, and supplies were granted instead: Sanuto, I diarii, II, 404 (4 February 1499). Similarly: ASVe, SM, reg. 22, f. 57v (31 December 1530); ibid., reg. 23, f. 82v (5 February 1535); ibid., reg. 24, f. 51r (14 June 1537); Sanuto, I diarii, XLVII, 20 (3 March 1528). 110 ASVe, PPA, reg. 6, ff. 28r–v (25 September 1488). 111 Carats were used to measure the extent of damage and wear to equipment (24 carati = 100%): ASVe, PPA, reg. 134, ff. 26–27 (18 April 1502). On wear and tear to artillery, see ibid., reg. 531, fasc. 5, n. 19 [31 March 1520]; ASVe, SM, reg. 16, f. 123r (18 July 1506). On keeping a record on the artillery, see ASVe, CXDC, fil. 20, fasc. 75 (18 May 1536). 112 Lane, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 149–50. On stealing: ASVe, PPA, reg. 531, fasc. 5, n. 19 [27 April 1372], [12 February 1443], [24 July 1458], [5 June 1479], [23 February 1487], [1490], [8 June 1525], [3 March 1528], [22 July 1531], [22 January 1532], [29 September 1544], [23 December 1544]. Concerning reimbursement for wear and tear, see ibid., reg. 133, f. 21 (29 July 1504). The borrowing of equipment was kept under a closer watch during the War of the League of Cambrai: Sanuto, I diarii, XVIII, 355 (13 July 1514). On borrowed rigging: ibid., XXXIX, 99 (22 January 1525); ibid., XL, 259 (9 November 1525). 113 Sanuto, I diarii, XL, 630 (8 January 1526); ibid., XLII, 745 (27 September 1526); ibid., XLVI, 379 (16 December 1527); ibid., LII, 484 (13 January 1530).

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professional level, the Republic obliged itself to employ master-shipwrights and master-caulkers in the Arsenal whenever there was not enough demand for their work in the private shipyards that built Venetian merchantmen.114 Furthermore, ship carpenters and caulkers were also part of the crew on every Venetian ship of a certain size.115 Thus, they constituted another strong link between the sector of private shipping and that of the large industrial compound of the state-controlled shipyard. For all these reasons, Arsenal officials were traditionally forbidden from owning or having shares in private ships, so as to forestall conflict of interests.116 2.9 The Admiral of the Port The port administration was practically a wing in the Arsenal complex and was headed by the harbourmaster of the port of San Nicolò (also known as the ‘Admiral of the Arsenal’). The highest non-noble official in the Arsenal’s chain of command, the armiraglio was elected for life based on his former experience as an officer in the fleet.117 Directly under his command was a company of skilled rowers that manned two boats and a clerk. The guards at the two forts at the San Nicolò entry into the Lagoon, and the pedoti followed his orders as well (the latter being subordinate to the cattaveri).118 The Admiral was the only person authorized for measuring the depth of the water at the San Nicolò entrance. By the late fifteenth century, this information was ‘broadcasted’ to ships in the vicinity through a device installed on the rooftop of one of the forts on the Lido.119 The Admiral advised the Collegio whenever there was doubt regarding the ability of a fully loaded round ship to 114 Luzzatto, ‘Per la storia delle costruzioni navali’, pp. 37–51; Lane, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 165–78. 115 Hocquet, ‘La gente di mare’, p. 492. 116 The re-enactment of a decree from 1370: ASVe, SM, reg. 27, f. 52r (16 July 1543). 117 Eligible candidates were those who served as patron zurado, comito, homo di consiglio, and armiraglio on the galleys, as well as captains of ships of over 300 botti: ASVe, CXDM, fil. 32, fasc. 266 (3 February 1514); ASVe, CL, bus. 19, 83 (1 June 1521). A previous experience on the galleys was obligatory in the fifteenth century: ASVe, CL, bus. 238, 54 (29 May 1409), 56 (3 June 1443). It was generally considered a life position, but after the fire incident in the Arsenal in 1534, Admiral Andrea di Vivian was replaced, being already too ‘senile and old’. In 1556, shipowners petitioned to replace the armiraglio for similar reasons: ASVe, CXDC, fil. 17, fasc. 217 (18 February 1534); ASVe, PPA, reg. 531, fasc. 1 (29 September 1556); Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 362. 118 ASVe, CL, bus. 19, 91 (19 February 1527). 119 E.g., the accusations against Alvise Mocenigo, after twelve ships were shipwrecked outside the port since he was appointed armiraglio: Sanuto, I diarii, LVII, 642 (21 March 1533). The level of water at the entrance during high tides was marked by a black leather ball attached to a rod: Mueller, ‘A Device for Signalling’, pp. 261–79.

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safely enter port.120 At times he would also pilot vessels of important personnel, and had primacy in choosing the vessel he wished to escort outside or within the port.121 Once inside the Lagoon, his company embarked and would seal all the hatches and the openings to prevent contraband.122 Before departure, his crews would inspect the bills issued by the different magistracies to make sure all the imposts and duties were disbursed.123 The Admiral was authorized to detain ships at his discretion,124 he brought news coming from the sea, reported on new arrivals, and delivered letters directed to the doge and his counsellors.125 A significant enactment dated 12 July 1527 delegated the enforcement of safety regulations to the Port Admiral. Upon arrival, the ship’s scrivano had to take an oath at the office of the patroni all’Arsenal that no merchandise was stored on deck between the mast and the prow and in the castles at the stern and prow (except for the portada of the sailors). Similarly, before a ship’s departure, the Admiral and his company had to make sure the regulations against overcrowding were respected, and that the load line was visible above the water level.126 2.10 The Grain Office and the Grain Commissioners Established in 1365 by the Grand Council, the provveditori alle biave regulated the import, conservation, and distribution of grain and other types of cereals and legumes with all power derived thereof, including the supply to subjected 120 ASVe, SM, fil. 3, 148–49 (18 January 1547). 121 ASVe, UC, reg. 3.5, ff. 28v–29v (27 September 1513), 37r (23 May 1525), 40v–42r (27 June 1527). 122 ASVe, UT, reg. 1, f. 7v (12 May 1449). 123 Ships had to present an attestation from the Arsenal to prove that duties were paid. This obligation was confirmed again in 1515 and 1525: ASVe, PPA, reg. 7, f. 67v (13 November 1525); ibid., reg. 133, ff. 48r–v (13 August 1515); ibid., reg. 531, fasc. 1 [13 November 1525]. The clearance procedure for foreign ships was administered by the Cinque savi alla mercanzia: ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 1, cap. 1, f. 85 (29 September 1543). 124 This was the case, for example, during the famine of 1533. Ships of over 120 tons were not permitted to leave port without clearance from the Armiraglio: ASVe, CL, reg. 19, 101 (4 July 1533). In 1543, the Collegio instructed the Armiraglio in Malamocco to detain the ships departing to the Levant: ASVe, CN, reg. 24, f. 226v (8 February 1543). In 1550, the Senate overruled the Armiraglio’s decision to detain the ship Dolfina: ASVe, SM, fil. 6, 67 (8 February 1550). 125 ASVe, SEA, reg. 65 (18 December 1526); Sanuto, I diarii, XXXV, 326 (10 January 1524). 126 ‘Se i haverano passato il signal dove e deputato al cargar’: ASVe, SM, reg. 21, ff. 72v–73v (12 July 1527); ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 1, 178 (12 July 1527) and confirmed in 1569 and 1575: ibid., reg. 18, 652 (8 July 1569), 654 (22 January 1575); Pardessus, Collection de lois maritimes, V, p. 67; Zeno, Storia del diritto marittimo, p. 216; Lane, Navires et constructeurs, p. 145; Rossi, ‘Le magistrature’, p. 735.

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territories in the terraferma and the overseas colonies. The office under their supervision was one of the richest in Venice, encompassing the banking functions that helped finance various other needs of the Republic. Round ships were the principal carriers of cereals for the city; consequently, the commissioners were one of their major clients. The office either chartered ships directly on their own account, or indirectly by signing deals with merchants, suppliers, and importers that were responsible for chartering ships themselves. It was also quite common for ship captains to load grain without any previous obligation, and offer it for sale to the commissioners once the ship arrived in Venice. Bounties and fiscal concessions to grain-carrying ships were introduced in times of famine and war. In the period under study, the supervision over this magistracy passed from the Senate to the Council of Ten, which intervened directly in the import of wheat and barley, and regulated the supplies to Venice and the colonies.127 2.11 The Salt Office and the Salt Commissioners Salt was a state monopoly, and one of the most important products imported to Venice. Ships were encouraged – and occasionally obligated – to carry salt in their holds as ballast (saorna, It. zavorra) on their return voyage. Salt exported from the colonies generally incurred no costs except those of transport. For salt imported from Ibiza, Alexandria, or Cyprus (before it was annexed to Venice), the Salt Office accredited the captains for the price of the commodity in addition to the freightage.128 Now and then, loans and bounties were introduced to encourage the supply of this essential commodity. The loans allowed ship captains to receive an advance based on the quantity they guaranteed to transport, whereas the bounties were rated higher than the customary freight charges. These special cargo-bids were offered to selected ships and denied from the rest  – a charter privilege that was modified according to supply and demand. The Rialto office of this agency was in charge of ensuring adequate supplies of salt, distribution, and tax collection, as well as administering the officials, who worked in the depository at the Punta della dogana and the eastern point

127 Ferro, Dizionario del diritto comune, I, pp. 272–75; Faugeron, Capitolare degli ufficiali al formento; idem, Nourir la ville, pp. 56–58, 66–67, 79–80, 105–56. Additional two sopraprovveditori were appointed starting 12 December 1526, together with the commissioners they constituted the magistrato alle biave: ibid., p. 354 cit. 183. 128 During periods of salt scarcity, subsidies were granted to encourage the carriage of this essential commodity from Ibiza and Cyprus, e.g.: ASVe, SM, reg. 13, ff. 27r–28r (27 August 1490); ASVe, CXDM, reg. 25, f. 99r (30 December 1491).

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of the Giudecca.129 The latter kept journals, recording all salt consignments according to the order of arrival; these books were occasionally consulted for analysis or to issue attestations.130 The order of disbursement was determined by the time of unloading the salt from the ship to smaller carriers – a custom established by the Grand Council in the thirteenth century.131 The ufficio del sal and the commissioners as heads of the administration (since 1428) were subordinated to changing institutional organs: in the thirteenth and fourteenth century the Grand Council determined the policies executed by the office, and the prices were regulated by a special board (collegio del sal);132 between 1350 and 1480 the competence was transferred to the Senate. Starting in 1420, the elected savi could intervene in salt policies, according to their fields of responsibility. The savi del consiglio (savi grandi) were the only ones authorized to pass judgement on the price of salt. After 1480 the supervision over the Salt Office was given to the Council of Ten, which could intervene directly in the salt trade and navigation without the Senate’s approval.133 The amount of salt consigned in Venice did not always correspond to the amount claimed to have been transported. The temperature and humidity under decks were largely responsible for changing the physical properties of salt and ruining at least part of it. The missing or ruined salt was considered lost (claimed naufraggio) and captains were fined accordingly. This opened the door to fraud, in which captains claimed part of the quantity lost, paid out the fine, and sold their cargo to merchants at considerable profit. In 1493, for example, the governor of Cyprus sent a detailed report on all ships that loaded salt in the island between 1477 and 1490, pointing to considerable difference between the loading quantities and the quantities eventually consigned.134 A more thorough coordination between the colonial administration and the office at the Rialto was necessary to tackle the issue.135

129 Hocquet, Voiliers et commerce, pp. 196–97; Gullino, ‘L’evoluzione costituzionale’, p. 349. 130 The critical edition of one such register: Hocquet, ‘il libro “creditorum”’, pp. 50–52. 131 Idem, Voiliers et commerce, p. 198. 132 A related administrative organ, comprising six savi grandi (the senior members of the Collegio), six doge’s counsellors, the three heads of the quarantia, and four officials of the ufficio del sal. 133 Gullino, ‘L’evoluzione costituzionale’, p. 349, on 4 August 1510 their number was reduced from six to four, p. 352. Hocquet, Voiliers et commerce, pp. 189–97. 134 ASVe, CXDM, reg. 25, ff. 31v–32r (16 March 1493). On the loss from gifts to officials: ASVe, Psal, bus. 1, f. 63r (30 December 1491). 135 On the annual reports of the governors of Cyprus: ASVe, CXDM, reg. 26, f. 202v (31 July 1495).

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During the fifteenth century, the Senate on occasion offered support in the form of loans or bounties for the building of ships of over 1,000 botti.136 In 1471 the Commissioners for Public Revenues (governatori delle entrate) supplied the necessary funding; in 1488, the revenues from tithes collected by the ufficio di dieci savi was used for that purpose; in 1515 a bounty in the form of a credit in the Bankruptcy office (ufficio alle cazude) was offered; in 1486 and 1490, the revenues from the sale of salt largely financed the city’s shipbuilding activities. The bounty was received directly from the Salt Office, after the commissioners confirmed that all the binding conditions had been observed.137 The bounty offered between 1502 and 1507 was under the supervision of the Collegio.138 As from 16 July 1534, the ufficio del sal was closely involved in financing shipbuilding by offering loans that were subsequently reimbursed in the form of salt consignments. In this instance, the Senate appointed the Council of Ten to supervise the procedure.139 The Council of Ten tried to assure a maximum of revenues from the office, while the latter strove to preserve its traditional function. One of the biggest controversies concerned the payment of freightage. The following procedure was set in 18 March 1519, re-enacted in 1533, and occasionally referred to: once the salt was consigned to the magazine, the office’s clerk issued an attestation specifying the freightage accredited to the captain; this document was signed by the Salt Commissioners and directed to the heads of the Council of Ten. The document included the name of the previous ship to arrive, so as to ensure the correct order of disbursal. Based on the attestation, the capi issued an order of payment directed to the treasury of the Council of Ten. The latter updated their books and instructed the cashiers to transfer the sum to the beneficiaries. The amount received was then divided between the shareholders, based on the quotas of ownership (in carats, provided by the captain). In other words, starting in 1534, the Salt Office was no longer in charge of the payment procedure. Another controversial issue concerned the collection of penalties from debtors who did not honour their obligations. In 1549 shipowners were required to reimburse their loans in hard cash to the cashier of the Council of Ten, otherwise their debt would be deducted from their freightage payments. However, in 1559 the ufficio del sal managed the collection of penalties for loan defaults, which were accredited to this magistracy’s account. Problematic cases were

136 E.g., ASVe, SM, reg. 9, ff. 37v, 99r, 105r, 120v–21r (17 March 1470–12 December 1471). 137 ASVe, CXDM, reg. 27, ff. 205r–v (16 May 1498). 138 Ibid., reg. 29, ff. 177v–78r (15 October 1502); ASVe, SM, reg. 15, f. 156v–57r (21 October 1502). 139 ASVe, SM, reg. 23, f. 45v (16 July 1534).

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delegated to the ufficio di tre savi sopra il regno di Cipro,140 the island being the principal source of the city’s salt. 2.12 The Magistrate for Health This office controlled and policed all matters related to public health, hygiene, and the spread of infectious diseases originating from both sea and land.141 Ship captains were required to contact the representatives of the sanità at the castelli as soon as their ship arrived in port for a clearance certificate. The pedoti were strictly prohibited from piloting, and the Port Admiralty, customs, the ternaria (an office responsible for the customs administration and food supply) were instructed not to approach the ship or accept cargo until such clearance was obtained. The officials of the sanità at the castelli investigated the vessel’s itinerary and the origin of its cargo. In suspicious cases, they embarked and instructed the ship to drop anchor at the vicinity of the entrance; they remained on board to ensure that nobody left the ship and that no other vessel approached. The Health commissioners retained full power to instruct captains how to proceed; some ships were even sent back to Istria, where they remained under the custody of the local governor.142 To prevent the spread of epidemics via mare, the office commissioned a boat that patrolled the three entrances to the lagoon, controlled passing ships, and conducted investigations.143 It imposed prohibition from halting in infested areas, and lifted restrictions only when the risk was deemed over. Such bans were proclaimed in Venice and applied in the colonies in collaboration with the local administration.144 Ships were required to stop in one of the ports in the colonies before arriving in Venice to obtain from the local governor an attestation related to 140 Hocquet, ‘il libro “creditorum”’, pp. 45–52. 141 The provveditori alla sanità received in 1486 supreme authority from the Senate to defend the city from the plague; they became permanent 9 January 1490. An additional body of sopravveditori was created in 1556 with greater jurisdictional power. Other sea-related fields of responsibility were the administration of the lazaretti (the quarantine areas). In 1529, the Magistrate for Health was instructed to pick up young orphans and vagabonds and enrol them as mozzi, the lowest rank in the crew, on board round ships. A quota of one or two was set according to the ship’s capacity: Besta, ‘Il Senato veneziano’, p. 63; Vanzan Marchini, I mali e i rimedi, pp. 25–37, 65, 75; idem, Venezia, la salute e la fede, pp. 77–78; idem, Le leggi di sanità, III, p. 18 (3 April 1529); Hocquet, ‘La gente di mare’, p. 498 cit. 39. 142 ASVe, PS, reg. 725, f. 28v (23 December 1493). See other instances and especially enactment 22 March 1550 ‘Metodo da osservarsi circa bastimenti sospetti’: Vanzan Marchini, Le leggi di sanità, I, pp. 282–87. 143 Ibid., p. 260; ASVe, PS, reg. 725, f. 31r (6 October 1497). 144 ASVe, PS, reg. 727, f. 275v (30 August 1533).

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the health conditions on board. The Health Commissioners had jurisdiction to prosecute captains who put into ports that had been vetoed, or carried merchandise and/or passengers from infected areas. The procedure was generally short and drastic, the array of penalties included fines, the confiscation of all merchandise, the incineration of both ship and cargo, and the sentencing of the captains to prison.145 3

The Enforcement of Sea Laws Overseas

3.1 Colonial Officials and Consulates A considerable part of Venice’s sea laws would have been practically ineffective without the presence of Venetian officials outside the borders of the lagoon. The great diversity in titles, functionality, and local institutions makes any generalization difficult.146 However, as far as maritime trade and navigation were concerned, the colonial administration, ambassadors, and naval commanders had merely an executive function, that is, to enforce a long list of sea laws dictated from the central organs of government, principally the heads of the Council of Ten and the Senate.147 Some examples include the detection of and prosecution against illegal traffic, the loading of goods prohibited by the Church, ‘light merchandise’ reserved for the merchant galleys, and the selling or chartering of ships to foreigners. In addition, major ports were administered by a local Port Admiralty, who monitored ship movements, maintained the port’s infrastructures, and commissioned guard vessels for police and patrol missions. He was also in charge of collecting port duties that were principally used to cover his salary.148 In foreign territories, consuls sent their clerks to the docks to supervise the loading and unloading of Venice’s ships. They made sure that all merchandise was taxed according to the conditions set in commercial treaties between Venice and other nations. As part of the enforcement, the 145 Ibid., reg. 725, f. 15v (13 November 1495); ibid., reg. 726, ff. 27v (30 March 1520), 48v (24 November 1522), 52v (17 March 1523), 78r (9 December 1523); ibid., reg. 727, ff. 69v–70r (28 September 1530), 260v–61r (28 August 1533); Vanzan Marchini, Le leggi di sanità, III, p. 157. On the procedures in the following century: idem, I mali e i rimedi, pp. 84–88. 146 Arbel, ‘Venice’s Maritime Empire’, pp. 146–47, 150. 147 Ibid., p. 154. Failing to perform their duty could have led to prosecution by the provveditori di Comun, the avogadori di Comun or the sindici in levanter: ASVe, SM, reg. 18, f. 44r (18 May 1514). 148 ASVe, SM, reg. 20, f. 99v (1523); ASVe, CXDC, fil. 13, fasc. 78 (22 April 1531); Aristidou, Ανέκδοτα έγγραφα, 2, p. 323 (1516); Thiriet, La Romanie vénitienne au Moyen Age, pp. 250–51; Arbel, ‘Port Dredging in the Venetian Stato da Mar’, p. 134.

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overseas agencies retained jurisdiction to prosecute delinquents. The proceedings were then delegated to the state attorneys.149 3.2 The Council of Twelve The Council of Twelve was a provisory consultative and deliberative body that formed outside Venice to preside over specific decisions that carried legal consequences. As such, it represented the interests of all the parties involved in the enterprise in their absence, and acted as a judicial authority. Participation in the Council’s sessions was obligatory, under risk of prosecution, and the Council could be summoned at any time by the captain or the ship’s clerk.150 Despite its name, the actual number of participants could vary. As to its members, a preference to elect Venetian noblemen was written into law. When decisions concerned commercial operations, the merchants or their representatives were called in. An appointed scrivano meanwhile noted down the decision of the majority, which usually went by the name of mandato consilio duodecim. The Council of Twelve maintained its position as legal instance for centuries, and captains were obliged by law to summon it at opportune moments, such as a case of shipwreck; imminent risk from piracy or enemy fleets; when approaching plague-infested land; decisions of whether to hire extra crew; any variation from the original course; overloading and overcrowding; the jettison of merchandise; weighing unforeseen expenses as general average; appointing a replacement for the captain or the ship’s clerk; or any deviation from the conventions set by law.151 Several examples are in order: on the night of 1 March 1499 an error in navigation led to the stranding of the ship Veniera on the coast of Cyprus; a Council of Twelve was duly appointed to administer the salvage operation and the handling of the retrieved merchandise; the expenses were claimed as general average, and set against the salvaged merchandise and cash. In this specific case the Council included fifteen participants, the chief governor of the island, his two counsellors and two treasurers, and a commander of the order of San Giovanni, whereas other members participated in the commercial enterprise in one way or another. With the exception of two, all members were Venetian noblemen. Captain Pasqual Vidal himself was not part of the Council, although 149 ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 13, ff. 14v (12 March 1419), 15r (6 February 1458). 150 Tucci, ‘Le conseil des douze’, pp. 119–25; Lane, ‘Venetian Seamen’, pp. 406–10; idem, Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 348. 151 The Council of Twelve could have potentially included all members on the crew. Ugo Tucci mentions a case where the 28 crewmen of the Maurizio formed a Council of Twelve in 1577: ‘Le conseil des douze’, pp. 119–24.

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he was the one who insisted to delegate the decision concerning the freights to a Council of Twelve, because of the insurance.152 On 10 May 1521, the ship of Zuane di Stefani encountered four fuste commanded by a corsair named Synan Turco. The crew managed to defend their ship, but an accidental explosion killed both the captain and a passenger, injuring nineteen others, among them the ship’s helmsman (nochiero). The Turkish governor (cadi) of Coron commissioned armed boats to hasten to their rescue, and consequently the ship altered course and entered the port of Coron, where it was held over. A Council of Twelve was summoned to appoint the ship’s clerk as vicepatron to govern the ship as far as Constantinople, where the shareholders would provide a new captain.153 Following the shipwreck of the Morosina on the island of Silba (Croatia) in 1529, the avogadori di Comun prosecuted the captain who deviated from his contract without consulting first with the Council of Twelve.154 In all these cases the provisory body of Twelve was put together to decide on the way to deal with exceptional situations. It was up to the captain to decide whether to appoint such a Council or not, and in his absence, as in the case of the explosion off Coron, by the senior members of the crew. 152 Arbel, ‘Attraverso il Mediterraneo’, pp. 103–15. 153 Sanuto, I diarii, XXX, 367, 381–82 (10 May 1521). 154 ASVe, SM, reg. 21, f. 182r (16 November 1529).

chapter 3

The Protagonists: The Division of Ships into Classes and Groups Historic vessels are generally divided into two categories based on their structural features – those propelled by a combination of oars and sails, and those propelled by sails alone. The use of oars for propulsion necessarily determined a long, narrow hull with a shallow draught. Vessels in the second category were usually wider and taller, and allowed greater leeway in the depth and proportions of their hulls. Notably, the two categories had very little in common in terms of their crew composition, the services they provided, and how they were perceived by Mediterranean societies.1 Thirteenth-century sea laws offer a parallel criterion for analysis: those in the first category – principally galleys – were armed vessels with sizeable crews that provided both rowing and fighting power; vessels belonging to the second category were unarmed, manned by small crews with limited ability to protect themselves or to pursue others. In the centuries that followed, security remained an important factor in vessel classification, although the formal requirements changed considerably.2 In his treatise on navigation (1464/5), the Ragusan merchant and shipowner Benedetto Cotrugli proposed a sub-classification of the second category, whereby unarmed sailing vessels could be subdivided on the basis of the shape of their hull: that is, navili tagliati, curved ships usually with a narrow, gently tapering hull; in contrast with navili rotondi, or round ships having hulls shaped in a ‘deformed’ ellipse.3 While the latter were superior in size and capacity, this came to the detriment of speed, manoeuvrability, stability, safety, and even popularity. Other influential factors created sub-types within these two categories. Venice, for example, was compelled to build flat-bottomed vessels with shallow draughts to suit the water depth at the entrances to the lagoon and further inside.4 Another factor affecting ship design was the service 1 Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, p. 27. 2 Lane, ‘Maritime Law and Administration’, pp. 234–35. As a result of a shortage in small and large tonnage in Venice in the second quarter of the fourteenth century, the legal status of a vessel was not determined by size, but by whether it was armed with a sufficient quota of men: Hocquet, Venise et le monopole, I, pp. 550–53, 558. 3 Cotrugli, ‘Il trattato “De Navigatione”’, pp. 131–34. 4 Ibid., p. 131.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004398177_005

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for which they were built: if they aimed for speed, their hull was narrow at the expense of cargo capacity; conversely, carriers of bulky cargo had a wider hull at the cost of speed and manoeuvrability. Every choice entailed a compromise, even within the same broad framework.5 State agencies, whose interests were purely fiscal, did not necessarily classify vessels according to the same logic. In fact, there was no general ranking as such, and categories varied according to circumstances. For instance, in 1503 the Senate established a new impost on all ships that rode on anchor outside the port of Corfu, and the tax brackets were set in the following manner: (A) all ships with a forecastle (balador) and a crow’s nest (cheba, It. gabbia); (B) caravels; (C) schierazi (sing. schierazo) and fuste (sing. fusta) with a top or a platform; and (D) commercial grippi (sing. grippo).6 A second example is a tariff established in 1528 by the Magistrate for Health, one of the obligatory stages in the port clearance procedure, with the following tax brackets: (A) all ships with a crow’s nest, comprising their crew; (B) larger vessels devoid of a crow’s nest, comprising their crew; (C)  boats and burchi (sing. burchio) comprising the persons on board.7 By contrast, an earlier tariff of 1512 charged private ships the customary pilot services based on capacity: (A) ships of any type with a capacity of 100 to 200 botti; (B) those of 300 to 400 botti; (C) 400 to 500 botti; (D) 800 to 1,000 botti; (E) 1,000 to 1,500 botti; (F) 1,500 to 2,000 botti; (G) grippi, marciliane (sing. marciliana) and any other vessel of less than 100 botti.8 The botte was also used to determine the anchorage tax in Venice in the 1530s, but with a different set of grades: (A) vessels of over 100 botti were charged a fixed sum per every 100 botti; (B) all vessels between 70 to 99 botti; (C) those between 50 to 69 botti; (D)  those between 25 to 49 botti; and (E)  vessels of less than 25 botti were tax exempted.9 This demonstrates that the division of ships into groups for administrative use was not uniform, but subject to the issue at hand. Despite terminological ambiguity and the often-subjective nature of classification into types, this chapter presents a basic strategy for identifying our floating protagonists.

5 Rahn Phillips, ‘The Galleon’, pp. 100–1. 6 ASVe, SM, reg. 16, f. 31r (8 September 1503); Sanuto, I diarii, V, 82. 7 ASVe, PS, reg. 726, f. 133v (31 March 1528). 8 Smaller vessels were not required to use a pedoto: ASVe, UC, reg. 3.5, cc. 22r–22t (4 September 1512). 9 ASVe, PPA, reg. 133, f. 105r (25 August 1529); the same categories were established every two years.

Division of Ships into Classes and Groups

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Ship Classes and Privileged-Based Ship Groups

The classification of ships according to their structural features and capacity was strongly encouraged by the Venetian government. The maritime code of 7 January 1229 established the minimum proportions of a lateen-rigged merchant ship (nave).10 Subsequently, the statutes of Doges Tiepolo and Zeno set the minimum capacity of a nave to 200 milliaria (c. 100 tons, equal to 166 2/3 botti).11 Thus, the generic term nave (in Latin navis, pl. naves), was necessarily used in the correct form to describe a sea-going commercial ship of a considerable size and capacity.12 Correspondingly, the term navilio and in Latin navigium can be regarded as any sea-going commercial vessel less spacious than a nave, but bigger than a boat (barca); it could be either curved or round-shaped, to adopt Cotrugli’s dual typology. Whereas a boat could refer to a fluvial, lagoon-type, inshore and offshore carriers of small capacity (i.e., barca, barchetta, burchio, piate, xylo, legno, panfiles, etc.).13 On the basis of Venetian sea laws, Frederic C. Lane distinguished four classes of ships with distinct functions, based on their type and capacity: (A)  large cogs, large carracks, barze, galioni, and exceptionally large ocean-going merchantmen of over 1,000 botti; (B) the bulk part of the cogs, carracks, and other carriers in inter-regional trade (here I will use the international or sea-going terms instead) of over 400 botti and less than 1,000 botti; (C) mostly lateeners employed in the Adriatic Sea and cabotage trade rated between 167 and 400 botti; (D) canal and river boats of less than 167 botti.14 Lane’s system reveals the predominance of the round-ship typed cogs or carracks with respect to capacity. The functional distinction between the groups is however not entirely effective. In fact, the two lesser categories included the bulk of sailing vessels that were employed in international trade. Such a division might also lead to the erroneous impression that ships of less than 1,000 botti were not employed in the Atlantic Ocean, or that those of over 1,000 botti were not designed to sail to the Levant – which clearly is far from the truth. To be able to offer better groupings, it is imperative to examine the contexts in which these figures appear in the sources as minimum requirements. The exact figure of 400 botti is supported in several decrees that concerned shipping, primarily the preamble to the Senate’s decree 21 October 1502, 10 11 12 13 14

Predelli & Sacerdoti, ‘Gli statuti marittimi’, p. 51; Martin, The Art and Archaeology, p. 175. Lane, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 246–47. Hocquet, Venise et le monopole, I, pp. 290–92. Ibid., pp. 295–96; Cotrugli, ‘Il trattato “De Navigatione”’, p. 109. Lane, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 94–95; idem, ‘Venetian Shipping’, pp. 25–26 cit. 2.

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declaring that: ‘[a]t present there are hardly sixteen ships with a capacity superior to 400 botti that are fit for navigation. These ships are the only ones allowed to carry salt according to law.’15 Another important decree of 16 July 1534 that renewed/revived state subsidies for shipbuilding set the minimum requirement to 400 botti.16 The conditions were revised on 4 June 1535 to introduce a new criterion based on the effective volume of the hold. But since the overall capacity is a derivative of the size of the hold, we can still regard 400 botti as a valid criterion for obtaining a loan in 1535.17 Indeed, in the absence of any better criterion, 400 botti seems reasonable enough, albeit with some reservations, noted below. Ships of over 400 botti had never enjoyed any financial support from the State before 1502; on the contrary, during the fifteenth century the State directly supported the building of ships of not less than 1,000 botti. The beginning of the heavy tonnage race is marked in 1408 by an official invitation to operators to purchase foreign-built ships of over 1,000 botti.18 The dependency of Venice’s ocean shipping on such large vessels was the primary reason for offering support.19 After the Ottoman – Venetian war of 1499–1502, the desperate attempt to recapture Cretan wine shipments from foreign competitors was abandoned. The 1502 enactment gave priority to the building of much smaller ships of 400 botti. In fact, larger ships of 1,000 botti had already ceased to be significant as a category after 1490, when the Senate offered the same subsidies to all vessels sailing to the West. Thus, for example, in 1493 and again in 1495, Hieronimo Zorzi q. Domenico & bros. sent their 700-botti ship to England and Flanders in return for subsidies for a wine shipment to England and a salt consignment from Ibiza.20 Despite the fact that several large ships of over 1,000 botti existed in Venice in the sixteenth century, they disappeared from view in Venetian legislation after 1490. Another reservation concerning salt transportation is that, according to the 1502 and 1534/5 enactments, ships below 400 botti were denied the privilege of carrying salt from Cyprus and Ibiza. Since this privilege is regarded as one of the principal criteria in the division of ships into groups, it deserves further 15 16 17 18

ASVe, SM, reg. 15, ff. 156v–57v (21 October 1502). Ibid., reg. 23, f. 45v (16 July 1534). Ibid., f. 108r (4 June 1535). Hocquet, Venise et le monopole, I, p. 553. Around 1400 the largest fleets have employed ships of over 1,000 botti: Melis, ‘La situazione della marina mercantile’, pp. 112–13. 19 Lowder, ‘Candie Wine’, pp. 97–102; Tucci, ‘Il commercio del vino’, pp. 187, 203; idem, ‘Le commerce venitien du vin’, pp. 199–211; Jacoby, ‘Creta e Venezia’, p. 94. 20 ASVe, CXDM, fil. 7, fascc. 68 (8 June 1493), 146 (18 September 1493); ASVe, SM, reg. 14, f. 103r (9 August 1496).

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attention. Down through history, salt has invariably been a state monopoly, and due to its importance to public incomes, this transport was more closely controlled. One way to regulate the supply and demand of salt in Venice was to exclude or include certain types of ships from transporting this privileged shipload. In 1487, shortly before the formal annexation of Cyprus, which had already been under informal Venetian control since 1474, salt transports from the island were reserved to ships with a crow’s nest and square sails (nave da ballador, et che vadino ala qua(d)ra). A Senate’s enactment of 1 March 1490 explicitly excluded marani and other lateen-rigged (ala latina) vessels from this trade. The same ordinance ratified the confinement of such vessels to the Adriatic Sea.21 But the attempt to exclude vessels from carrying this cargo on the basis of their structural features was short-lived. Individual permissions were already granted to lateen-rigged vessels by the following summer: a large vessel fitted with a stern rudder owned by Nadal Nadal q. Zuane was permitted to continue carrying salt from Cyprus, as it had done for the previous three years; similarly, three navili ala latina – rated 300 to 400 botti and sailing regularly outside the Adriatic Sea – obtained permission to carry salt from Cyprus under the same conditions as ships with square sails.22 The multitude of marani and other lateen-rigged vessels of 300 to 500 botti (and sometimes even of 700 botti) moved the state authorities to change the criterion of ship classification from structural features to effective capacity. Already on 30 December 1491 the Council of Ten allowed the transport of salt from Cyprus on any ship with a carrying capacity of at least 200 mozza of salt (c. 250 botti); smaller vessels that were newly built required a special permission to engage in this activity.23 The same minimum requirement (i.e., 200 mozza of salt) was established for salt coming from Ibiza, a cargo that was previously open for all vessels, while those returning from Flanders were granted bounties.24 This shift of the rating system from structural features to capacity allowed the Salt Office and the Council of Ten to better regulate the quantities of salt consignments in Venice. In this manner, over the ensuing years the minimum requirement was occasionally modified: on 3 December 1494 the standard was reduced to 160 mozza of salt (c. 200 botti);25 in 1500, during a period of famine in the Venetian overseas possession Cyprus, all ships without restraints on capacity that carried wheat to the island were permitted to return 21 22 23 24

ASVe, SM, reg. 13, f. 5r (1 March 1490). Ibid., ff. 15v (9 July 1490), 24r (23 August 1490). Aristidou, Ανέκδοτα έγγραφα, 1, p. 226 (30 December 1491). ASVe, SM, reg. 9, f. 121r (12 December 1471); ibid., reg. 12, ff. 89r (21 September 1486), 158v (18 November 1488). 25 Aristidou, Ανέκδοτα έγγραφα, 1, p. 233 (3 December 1494).

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with an equal quantity of salt;26 and in 1502 the limit was set to 220 mozza of salt, intending ships of over 400 botti. During the following decades, the minimum requirement oscillated between 150 to 220 mozza of salt, and on several occasions the limitations were lifted outright. After the loss of Cyprus, Venice practically invited foreign ships to transport salt from Ibiza and Trapani by offering them with favourable fiscal concessions.27 The inevitable conclusion is that the minimal capacity of 400 botti cannot be regarded as an inflexible criterion in this respect, or in any other for that matter – except for state subsidies for shipbuilding after 1502.28 In the same manner, Zeno’s Code established 200 anfore (equated to 166 botti) as the minimum requirement for vessels to participate in the mude to the Levant. Still, in the days of Doge Mocenigo (1423), 200 anfore was set as the volume of the smallest vessel classed as a ship (nave).29 Although these medium-sized vessels were occasionally excluded from the lucrative freight of salt – which was reserved to ships of more ample girth – their movements were not particularly restricted. It is after all highly unlikely that caravels were confined by the Venetians to cabotage in the Adriatic Sea, while they crossed seas and oceans under the flags of other nations.30 Although vessels with a capacity below 166 botti might have been excluded from the mude to Syria, they, as well, were free to transport other freights to and from other places. It would therefore be a mistake to insist on any division of ships into definitive groups with a distinct function that confines them to a navigational zone. As they appear in Venetian sea laws, ships were ranked in relation to a specific type of privileged shipment. 26 Ibid., p. 248 (24 October 1500). 27 ASVe, CL, 19, 600 (28 January 1575). 28 The fact that smaller vessels took part in the mude to the Levant is attested in several other instances in law: on 17 February 1540, the Senate authorized all ships of 300 botti to load spices and silk in Syria under certain limitations. The quota of nobili da poppa based on ship’s capacity was occasionally modified. In 1510 and 1520 the minimum requirement was set as low as 250 botti, in 1541 and 1545 it raised to 300 botti. Such ships regularly sailed to the Levant, according to the letter of the law: ASVe, SM, reg. 17, f. 124v (28 September 1510); ibid., reg. 19, ff. 88v–89r (15 November 1518), 131r–v (31 January 1520); ibid., reg. 25, f. 201v (17 February 1541); ibid., reg. 28, f. 39r (25 June 1545). Several other instances where 300 botti was set as minimum requirement: ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 25, ff. 19r (21 June 1554), 33r (14 January 1559). 29 Lane, Navires et constructures, pp. 246–47. 30 The Corfiot and Cretan fleets engaged in international trade: Pagratis, ‘Ships and Shipbuilding in Corfu’, p. 239; Arbel, ‘Riflessioni sul ruolo’, pp. 252–56. Even within the borders of the Adriatic Sea, local maritime activity was not particularly restrained or interrupted: Rauker, ‘La Dalmazia e Venezia nel basso medioevo’, pp. 79–80; ASVe, SM, reg. 15, ff. 31v (12 June 1500), 73r (29 March 1501).

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In conclusion, it is possible to say that an early modern society founded on special concessions created a privileged-based merchant marine. As such, the figure of 400 botti represents nothing but the preference of the State regarding the minimum capacity of a carrack-type ship. Evidently, there were smaller carracks, and other types of vessels equally large. 2 The Carrack-Type Round Ship By the mid-fifteenth century, the Mediterranean round ships called cocca was already replaced by the carrack, the largest bulk carrier known to contemporaries.31 The term carrack, originating from Arabic qarāqīr, was used by Atlantic seafarers to describe large carriers of bulky cargo that entailed a fusion of north European and Mediterranean seafaring technologies.32 Strangely enough, indications of carracks in Venetian maritime vocabulary are marginal.33 Round vessels were rather called nave and infrequently nave di convento, a Genoese maritime term that entered the vocabulary of the Venetians.34 The term nave da cheba literally translates to a ship with a crow’s nest; nave quara (quadra), a ship that carries a square sail, were common 31 The gradual transition between the Nordic cog and its Mediterranean version with a hybrid-sail plan is summarised by Frederic Lane in his Venice, A Maritime Republic, pp. 122–23. Sergio Bellabarba believes that the Mediterranean cocca adopted features of the Nordic kogge on a two-masted Mediterranean round ship, i.e., the building technique remained faithful to the traditional one, reserving also the peculiarities of the typical rigging of the lateen sails when possible: Bellabarba, ‘Note sull’origine’, pp. 81–88. 32 Bellabarba, ‘Note sull’origine’, p. 86; Friel, ‘The Carrack’, p. 77, 79. 33 One possible explanation is that this term was already taken by a smaller type of lateenrigged vessel called carraca or carachia, ‘between a cocha and a marciliana’: Cotrugli, ‘Il trattato “De Navigatione”’, p. 238; this type of vessel was widely diffused in southern Italy and throughout the Ionian and Peloponnesian regions, e.g,: Fabijanec, Le developpement commercial, I, p. 217; a report including one carachia from Budua: Sanuto, I diarii, XXVII, 508 (21 July 1519); Antonio da Lesina owned a carachie with a carrying capacity of circa 1,000 stara of wheat: ASVe, SEA, reg. 606, pt. 5, f. 25v (13 August 1523); a consignment of wheat in Piran was accredited to the patron of a carachia Michiel Frachaso da Lesina; a carachia patron Andrea da Vegia transported wheat to Umago; the carachia patron Antonio di Marin da Curzola carried wheat as well: ASVe, CapCX, Lettere dei rettori, Parenzo, reg. 266, ff. 8r–v (5, 14 November 1528). 34 E.g., Cotrugli, ‘Il trattato “De Navigatione”’, p. 237; Morosini, Tariffa del pagamento, p. 83, see Appendix, D. The term carraca in Venetian sources was rather used to denote large foreign carracks, ships sailing under the hospice of Spain, Genoa and France: Sanuto, I diarii, III, 1480 (1 March 1501); ibid., XXXIII, 386 (ref. to 26 June 1522); ibid., XXXIV, 70 (31 March 1523); ibid., LVI, 728 (14 July 1532). Insurance rate on a ship typed carracone, captained by Pietro di Angelo da Venezia, on a voyage from Nice to Cadiz. According to

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as well.35 Notwithstanding this awkward preference, the iconographic sources allow us to describe as carracks (according to modern scholarship) the type of large ships that were in use in Venice, whatever contemporaries called them. Based on the few extant Venetian treatises on naval construction, we are nonetheless able to establish a series of general geometrical and proportional relationships applied in the construction of round ships during the period in question. Vessels suitable for carrying cargo in bulk had circa a 2.9:1 to 3.6:1 length-to-beam ratio. The length was measured along each of the two decks, and the beam or width was measured at the maximum curvature amidships (bocca). Such ships were also wider relative to their keel length and their keel-to-beam ratio was circa 2.5:1.36 Other salient features of the hull were a straight keel, a high curved stem with a marked rake characterized both ends in the fore and aft. The bottom was quite flat and wide amidships compared to other types of vessels of large tonnage. The tumblehome in the hull form was quite pronounced as well. The vessels in Jacopo de’ Barbari’s veduta of Venice (c. 1500) display pronounced girding beams (wales) running along their flanks, acting as the main horizontal supports of the hull.37 The castle structure at the prow, called the baladór or balaor (from the Latin bellatorium), was used as a fighting platform. The structure at the stern, called cassero or cassera (from Arabic kasr), descended to a cassarètto that extended one-quarter of the ship’s length, including the captain’s and the scrivano’s quarter, the living quarters, the kitchen, and storage area for arms and foodstuff. Both castles at the prow and stern were integrated into the hull design.38 The jutting forecastle was positioned atop an up-curving stem and was significantly higher than the aftcastle. According to the ‘Timbotta’ manuscript (c. 1445), the forecastle of a large carrack of 1,000 botti would have stood over 15 metres above the keel. The difference in the height between the stempost and sternpost was

35 36

37 38

my records, the ship was probably not Venetian. The same vessel was later indicated as galione: Melis, Origini e sviluppi, p. 295 (26, 29 April 1524) appendix II. E.g.: ASVe, PSM, Misti, bus. 41, fasc. IX [1 June 1475]; Sanuto, I diarii, XXVI, 295–96 (17 November 1518). Martin, The Art and Archaeology, pp. 146, 171; Bonino, Archeologia e tradizione, p. 62; idem, ‘Lateen-rigged medieval ships’, p. 15; Anderson, ‘Jal’s Memoire no. 5’, pp. 160–67; idem, ‘Italian Naval Architecture’, pp. 135–63; Bellabarba, ‘The square-rigged ship’, 116; Freil, ‘The Carrack’, p. 82; Lane, ‘Naval Architecture’, pp. 182–88; idem, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 219 (Table A), 224–25 (Table D); Tucci, ‘Un problema di metrologia’, pp. 232–41, in particular the table, p. 239; Hocquet, Voiliers et commerce, pp. 116–19; idem, Venise et le monopole, I, pp. 310–11. Basch, Les navires et bateaux, p. 17. Martin, The Art and Archaeology, p. 187. After mid-sixteenth century an additional level called sopracassaretto was added at the stern: Pinon, Relation du voyage en Orient, p. 315.

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very marked – about 3.7 metres on the 1,000-botti ship and just over 5.2 metres on the 700-botti carrack. Such an arrangement would have produced the towering forecastle so typical of carracks in late medieval and sixteenth-century images. The overall length over posts of such a ship of 1,000 botti is estimated at 42.7 metres and that of a 700-botti ship at 36.9 metres.39 It had one rudder, thick and long, positioned at the centre of the stern, extending from the structure and reinforced with ironwork.40 The freeboard was considerably high owing to the tall and round-shaped hull. Contemporary iconographers tend to draw hulls higher above the waterline than they were under sail. A fully loaded round ships of 500 botti extended 11 pie’ (c. 3.74 m) below the waterline, and the drafts of 1,000 and 1,500-botti ships were 19 and 24 pie’, correspondingly. Likewise, a fully loaded merchant galley (galea grossa) extended 20 pie’ below the waterline, while the drafts of armed fusta and galea sotil (of three banks) were 2.5 and 4 pie’.41 In actual fact, the draft was also adjusted to better fit with the sailing conditions. In June 1560, the 900-botti Croce kept 18 pie’ draft at the stern and 14 3/4 pie’ at the prow to beat better to windward on the return voyage from the Levant.42 The cargo holds did not comprise a single void but were divided into tolde or decks (sing. tolda). Two decks were the norm up until the mid-sixteenth century. The merchandise was stored between the decks, while equipment, artillery, and the crew’s portada were stored on the exposed deck or in the castles; this was at least the requirement of the law. The interest of the shipowners to increase the storage space of their ships pushed master shipbuilders to close greater parts of the superstructure and the castles, which were previously exposed. Thus, the three-decked carrack was born. The extra weight and height of the third deck was balanced by an increase of the ballast by one third. In his later days, master shipwright Francesco da Curzola presented himself as the inventor of this new design.43 Several other features conspicuous from afar were a large winch or capstan placed abaft the main mast and near the hatches, and the service boats. The first was fastened by cables to the stern, and the second carried alongside on the port side of the ship in a position called the barcarizo. During long-distance voyages and rough weather, both boats were raised above the waterline with 39 40

Freil, ‘The Carrack’, pp. 81–83; Martin, The Art and Archaeology, p. 177. A stern rudder worked better on flatter and rounder hulls: Lane, Navires et constructeurs, p. 38. 41 ASVe, APGVP, bus. 2, 18 [Misure di vascelli etc.]. 42 Magno, Voyages (1557–1565), p. 633. 43 ASVe, SM, fil. 43 [21 December 1569].

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the help of cranes (paranchi). While in port, the cranes were used for loading and unloading.44 Iconographic sources support the appearance of a three-masted round ship with a hybrid sail plan in Venice around the 1450s, and to a greater extent after 1480.45 In his treatise on navigation (1464/5), Benedetto Cotrugli described a combined square-lateen sail plan on a typical round ship with three to five masts: the main central mast (maestro) was the tallest and thickest, and had two square sails, one above the other, and a crow’s nest at the summit. A system of bonnets (bonnette) allowed the fastening and loosening of extra sail area according to the conditions of the wind and sea. The sections of sail were greater in length than width and could easily be fastened on both sides of the mainsail. Notably, carracks were equipped with a second mast and sail called the mezzana placed behind the main one. This mizzen, lateen-rigged mast was relatively shorter and obliquely set on forward. The triangular sail hung on a long yard made up of two or more sections tightly bound together, the upper part called penna and the lower carra or carres. The yard could be pitched and adjusted to the wind direction, and each yardarm (the outer extremity of a ship’s yard) provided the leading edge of the sail. The yard was raised on its mast with a halyard called manti (amantus).46 Invariably, carracks also had a foremast with a square foresail called a trinchetto, situated on the castle at the prow. The principal function of the foresail was to assist tacking the ship by pointing to the wind. Another important function of this sail was to allow the ship to be propelled slowly, such as when leaving port. The foremast could also be equipped with a square foresail known as lo trinchetto alla cheba, which was added to increase the overall surface of the sails, so the ship would advance more quickly in favourable winds. Similarly, on particularly large ships another mizzen sail and mast were added on the castle at the stern, to which Cotrugli did not assign a name.47 The additional mast at the rear was most probably a bonaventure mizzen, which was introduced around Cotrugli’s times on larger ships to improve the windward sailing performance of the vessel. The following decades experienced further division and diversion of the sails on the same masts: the fore, mizzen, and bonaventure topsails along with fore and main topgallant sails (a square-rigged sail immediately above the topsail). Similarly, topsails became commonplace on many other types of vessels

44 45 46 47

Pinon, Relation du voyage en Orient, p. 314. Lane, Navires et constructeurs, p. 33. Martin, The Art and Archaeology, pp. 141–45; Kreutz, ‘Ships, Shipping’, p. 82. Cotrugli, ‘Il trattato “De Navigatione”’, p. 235.

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figure 1 A sixteenth-century carrack-typed ship of c. 600 tons. Jacopo de’ Barbari, Veduta di Venezia, 1500. Woodcut from six blocks, 135 × 280 cm, Museo Civico Correr, Venice

in the second half of the fifteenth century.48 The division of the sail improved manoeuvrability and eased tacking or wearing ship (jibing). Another major advantage was reefing: the topsails were taken in first and the main rig was reefed more simply by fastening part of the sail space to the yard with the help of reef points. Once again, Jacopo de’ Barbari’s famous veduta of Venice can be used to verify which technological changes were already in use at the turn of the century. The view contains a considerable number of ships that are wintering at the anchorage in front of the San Marco basin. The four-masted carracks are clearly distinguishable from the rest. They have two foremasts with square sails, while the rear ones are lateen. A topsail is visible on their main mast, as are the V-shape supports for the shades over the castles. A strongly inclined bowsprit extends as far as possible to support the foremast. An additional square-sail, called a spritsail (cividiera), was installed on the lower part of the bowsprit, reaching as low as the waterline. It seems that the large carracks were the only 48

Freil, ‘The Carrack’, pp. 80–81.

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Rear view of a large-tonnage carrack-type ship. Jacopo de’ Barbari, op. cit.

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figure 3

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Carracks of c. 240 tons wintering in front of San Marco basin. Jacopo de’ Barbari, op. cit.

vessels with a spritsail, while smaller vessels had only shrouds connecting the bowsprit to the main mast. The large carrack at the front of the woodcut is the only one with external chainwales to support the shrouds and a botalo outrigger at the rear, employed to sustain the bonaventura sail.49 By 1546, all round ships of large capacity had four masts according to the manuscript entitled Misure di vascelli et cetera attributed to a proto of the Arsenal: the main and mizzenmasts, the foremast and the bowsprit (bompresso da prova). Additional topsails – the moschetto di cheba (It. gabbia) and the trinchetto di cheba – were hoisted above the main and foresail correspondingly.50 Similarly, the diaries of the travels of Alessandro Magno (1557–65), the log-book of the ship Giustiniana on a voyage to Cyprus (1567), and the detailed description by Carlier de Pinon of the ship on which he sailed in 1579 all attest that topsails (le velle di cheba) were already an integral part of a sail plan on a typical round ship: that is, one (trinchetto di cheba) installed on the foremast and another one (moschetto) on the main mast. The ship described by 49 Basch, Les navires et bateaux, pp. 12, 17. 50 Tucci, ‘Archittettura navale’, pp. 283, 292–93.

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Alessandro Magno had a cividiera sail as well (a square sail found at the bow below the bowsprit). In strong winds the topsails and the bonnette of the main sail were frequently blown down.51 Several years later (1594/5), the Girarda had three square sails on the main mast, three square sails on the mizzenmast, two square sails on the foremast at the forecastle, and a lateen sail on each of the two mizzenmasts.52 Compared to other vessels, the carracks sailed better when running before the wind or with broad reach, but encountered serious difficulties pointing to the wind and sailing closed-hauled. This was particularly the case for those built in Venice, since their draught was shallower to allow access to the lagoon.53 3

Other Types of Vessels

3.1 ‘Clinker Built’ Vessels in Venice: The belingier and the barza The belingieri were a type of a whaler-shaped vessel originating from the Bay of Biscay that could use 50 to 60 rowing oars under deck for propulsion, what was very helpful and especially when departing from port. Around 1499 there were at least two belingieri in Venice: the first of 400 botti owned by Nicolò da ca’ da Pesaro q. Piero da Londra & bros., and the second belingier was owned by the government.54 Other vessels that were primarily designed for oceanic voyages but were occasionally seen in the Mediterranean Sea were the hourque (it. urca), berton, and the barze (sing. barza). The latter was used by the Biscayans and the Spaniards for both commercial and military purposes: ‘they are in great quantity nowadays’, noted Cotrugli in 1464/5.55 The barza was ‘clinker built’, a technique that significantly differed from the carvel (or skeletonfirst) method used in the Mediterranean, whereby the frames were laid one over the other, based on the Nordic shell-first tradition. The hull was curved in a manner like that of the galione. Instead of the rounded bow typical of the merchant ship, the barza also had a lower and more pronounced bow, narrow and tapered, similar to the Spanish caravelle.56 The curved profile improved 51 MCC, Cic, bus. 3596, fasc. 29 ‘Viaggio della nave Giustiniana’; Magno, Viaggi, pp. 602, 604–5, 607–8, 610, 613. See also Cortelazzo, Dizionario veneziano, p. 855; Guglielmotti, Vocabolario marino militare, p. 221. 52 Hocquet, Venise et le monopole, I, p. 306. 53 Cotrugli, ‘Il trattato “De Navigatione”’, pp. 131, 237; Lane, Navires et constructeurs, p. 38. 54 Appendix A: 1499, nos. 32, 55. 55 Cotrugli, ‘Il trattato “De Navigatione”’, pp. 133, 238. 56 Malipiero, Annali veneti, p. 645 (January 1498).

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the boat’s faculty to sail close-hauled, at the expense of a smaller carrying capacity. Moreover, its displacement was relatively small; it was considered stable and fast and could stay its course with minimal effort. Venice’s shipping circles attempted to followed fashion. In April 1486, for example, merchants from Crete reported that the local branch of the Coresi clan built a barza (later termed nave) of 1,000 botti in Rethimno, designated for the Cretan wine trade with England.57 The barza was the first battleship designed in Venice. In August 1490 (ratified on 7 January 1491) the Senate authorized Leonardo Bressan, a celebrated master-shipwright, to build a barza (barcia, bagia) of 1,000 botti that would be employed in the guerre de course, based on his own suggestion. Concurrently, a captured corsair’s barza arrived in Venice and was commissioned around May 1491.58 In 1499 Venice’s fleet already included three barze di Comun: vessels built and owned by the government, vaunting 2,000 and 2,500 botti and designed as war ships. Two additional barze – each of over 1,000 botti and likewise owned by the government – were under construction at private shipyards in Venice. Besides these truly huge vessels, Venice’s merchant marine included four other barze or barzotti rated 200 to 400 botti. Around 1499 the Coresi family owned a 400-botti barza (or barzotto), which was greatly admired by Ottomans and Venetians alike.59 In 1508 two barzotti – each of 400 to 450 botti – were under construction in the Arsenal, with the intention to commission them the same year, though it is doubtful whether this was achieved; one of these vessels was later sold to private operators. In the first three decades of the sixteenth century several barze and barzotti were part of the Venetian merchant marine. The largest privately-owned barzotto that I was able to uncover was a vessel of 600 botti, owned by Andrea Contarini q. Ambrosio and relatives.60 After a lengthy debate in January 1526, the Senate authorized the building of three vessels, two barze and one galione, to secure navigation against piracy. Once again, Leonardo Bressan was appointed to build the first barza, intended as a 800 botti vessel but ending up as 1,200 botti, while Francesco di Todaro was commissioned to build the second vessel of 800 botti. The building of the galione was administrated by Matteo Bressan. The three warships were launched between 1530 and 1531.61 By then, the usage of the barza for commercial use in Venice had waned. It is likely that there was only one private 57 58 59 60 61

Appendix A: 1490, n. 58. Ibid., nos. 1–2. Ibid., 1499, nos. 1–2, 4, 31, 35, 52, 132, 137–38. Ibid., 1509, nos. 13, 34, 37. Ibid., 1530, nos. 1, 36.

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barza in Venice’s merchant marine in 1530 and in 1540, but none by 1549. The two barze di Comun of 800 and 1,200 botti were decommissioned in 1548, and eventually scrapped in 1550.62 These were the last barze built and owned by the government.63 Despite an impressive service of seventeen and eighteen years, the average lifespan of this type of vessel was considered shorter than average. Benedetto Cotrugli reported that water regularly infiltrated between the frames, and hence required constant pumping, which eventually accelerated the decay of the beams.64 The Venetian experience was no different in this respect; between July and August 1500 the Captain of The Armed Ships Marco Orio reported that he had two pumps constantly operating in the bilge of his barza, which reportedly churned out 92 buckets per day. During a summer storm, he measured 1.7 metres (pie’ 5) of water inside the haul of his ship. The other barza Mora was practically half-submerged, as the water level inside the hull reached 2.38 metres (pie’ 7).65 3.2 Venetian-Built War galione Three different types of vessels were called galleons (sing. galione, pl. galioni) by the Venetians. The first was a fifteenth-century fluvial war vessel, which was a hybrid between round and long craft and was propelled by oars. The word galleon was however more commonly used to describe sea-going war vessels (some were built in the Arsenal), or medium-sized sea-going commercial vessel originating from Crete and its surroundings.66 Unlike the barze, war galleons were built using the method of skeletal construction and carvel planking pioneered in the Mediterranean. The hull had more ribs and bracing than ships designed solely to carry cargo. The strongly braced hull enabled it to withstand hard and continual use on the open seas, as well as the weight of artillery and the kickback when firing; the displacement was relatively greater, however. The length-to-beam proportions were generally no more than 3.6:1, the length being measured along the lower of the two planked decks. Another salient feature was the beak below the bowsprit, inherited from the medieval war galley that had used this prominent feature for piercing the hulls of enemy vessels. The war galleon had two fully planked decks that carried artillery, plus a halt-deck, a quarterdeck, and a poop deck aft of the main mast. The high structures enhanced the galleon’s defensibility. The forecastle was 62 63 64 65 66

Ibid., 1549, nos. 53–54. Lane, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 47–48; Hocquet, Venise et le monopole, I, p. 308. Cotrugli, ‘Il trattato “De Navigatione”’, p. 238. Sanuto, I diarii, III, 561, 672, 727 (July–August 1500). Lane, ‘Naval Architecture’, pp. 178–79; idem, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 47–48.

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lower than the structure aft, giving it a distinctive low-slung crescent profile, similar to the caravelle and markedly different from other round ships. Classic galleons carried three masts and a bowsprit, some, however, had an additional bonaventura mizzen aft of the mizzenmast. The main and foremast carried large trapezoidal ‘square’ mainsails and topsails. The mizzen and the bonaventure mizzen carried large lateen sails, sometimes with a trapezoidal topsail. The bowsprit carried a trapezoidal spritsail, and later developments included a spritsail topsail and a spritsail topgallant.67 In the sixteenth century several European fleets employed galleons as war vessels, most notably the Spanish and the Portuguese ones. The Venetians delegated Matteo Bressan to build one on 27 January 1526. The galleon was launched on 11 August 1530, but the commissioning was not completed before mid-1531. The galione distinguished itself in the battle of Prevesa in 1538, using its gunnery to fight off surrounding Turkish galleys. However, it proved unstable at sea with a heavy load of artillery and its considerable height.68 Bressan’s galione was eventually decommissioned and disassembled in 1546 after fifteen years in service, and its parts were returned to the public shipyards. In 1547 Vettor Fausto started building a second galione.69 The text entitled ‘Misure di vascelli et cetera di [?] proto nell’Arsenale di Venetia’, written by an unknown proto of the Arsenal, contains the measurements of a galione grosso of 1,500 botti.70 The terminus ad quem of this manuscript is 1 April 1546, hence it is tempting to think that the measurements represented the galione built by Bressan (which was apparently documented for future shipmakers). The instructions of Teodoro di Nicolò (1550) include the measurements of a galione grosse as well.71 In fact, in 1544 one Padre Teodoro presented himself to the Council of Ten as an expert in the construction of modern war galleons (legni et galioni moderni per pugna naval), and had several scale models to show them as well. His petition won him, on 23 June 1544, an allocated part of the Arsenal to build his prototype,72 a sure indication of the extent to which Venice was fascinated by war galleons around that period.

67 Rahn Phillips, ‘The Galleon’, pp. 98–103. 68 Ibid., pp. 98–104; Lane, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 47–48; Hocquet, Venise et le monopole, I, pp. 308–9. 69 Appendix A: 1549, n. 56. 70 Tucci, ‘Architettura navale’, pp. 278, 282, 291–93. 71 Lane, ‘Naval Architecture’, pp. 181–84; idem, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 224–25 Tableau D. 72 ASVe, CXDC, fil. 35, fascc. 165, 168 (7–23 June 1544).

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3.3 Specialized Medium-Sized ‘Round’ Vessels: The marano and the marciliana Many specialized ships were built for bulk cargoes demanding a significantly different stowage factor.73 For example, the Venetian peate (Lat. plati) or piate were barges especially designed to carry marble from Istria, or iron ore or wood along coastal and fluvial waterways. The relatively low position of the stowage required considerable structural strength, and capacious cargo holds. Clearly, the piate were better suited for this type of freight, besides involving lower operating costs.74 They did not compete with the carrack-type ship for the same share of the market, however, because they were not employed as carriers along international sea routes. However, there were other types of ‘round’ vessels that contended with the carracks for the same freights. One such example is the marano, a flatbottomed vessel with relatively little displacement when fully loaded. It was devoid of castles and steered by two side rudders. A typical sail plan included two masts with two nearly identical lateen sails, and an additional mizzenmast. The marano had a significant disadvantage when sailing closed-hauled, and it was practically impossible for the vessel to come about by turning to windward; a change in direction was possible only by jibing. With winds from the stern, the marani had to run dead before the wind with sails spread to both sides, a manoeuvre that was considered dangerous. Nevertheless, the shape of their hull being wide and flat made them very stable and reduced leeward drift. This feature also allowed it to carry more cargo and further into the shallow waters of the Venetian lagoon.75 In the early fifteenth century the marani were employed as carriers of Istrian stones, firewood, and bulky cargo. Although Cotrugli acknowledged the advantages of the marani and their diffusion in Venice and Istria, he did not regard them as candidates to replace carracks. However, it was around that time, between 1463 and 1467, that the marani became more popular among Venetian shipowners. The number of medium-sized vessels of 300 to 350 botti that were classified as marani increased dramatically. The larger mutations were believed to be the cause of reducing the number of round ships to a new ebb. Never before, it was stated, were there so few round ships being built in Venice. One of the reasons for the marano’s alleged success was the reduced operational costs. These vessels were practically exempted from levies, port 73 Stowage factor is the volume occupied by one unit of mass (weight) when stowed in a cargo space. 74 Levi, Navi Venete, appendix ‘epoca terza’; Hocquet, Venise et le monopole, I, p. 295. 75 Cotrugli, ‘Il trattato “De Navigatione”’, p. 238.

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procedures and safety requirements that applied on the round ships, despite the fact that they sailed the same routes and competed for the same freights.76 Between 1467 and 1469, the disastrous effect of the marani on the maritime economy in Venice eventually led to a great outcry against their competition with Istria as the centre of attention. By then, the number of navili grossi, navette, or navilioti (terms used to distinguish these vessels from their smaller archetypes) had become so great that the Senate took the drastic measure of forbidding the construction of any ship of over 100 botti northward to the Gulf of Quarner, excluding Venice and the dogado.77 It is interesting to consider to what extent the regulatory reaction of Venice affected the composition of the fleet in the following decades. Several marani of 300 and 400 botti were owned by Venetian nobles and citizens in the 1480s and ’90s. During the war between Venice and the Ottomans (1499–1502), the State used marani as fleet auxiliaries. Part of the ammunition and supplies to the armada were carried on board marani of medium-size capacity. In the summer of 1499 the Venice’s merchant marine included at least four marani of 400 botti, an additional marano with a crow’s nest and possibly a capacity of over 300 botti, belonging to the Donà family, and at least two others of more humble dimensions.78 All of these demonstrate that the marano was already rooted in Venice’s economy, being a worthy and reliable vessel. After 1502, Venice loosened many of its former restrictions on ship movements and the marani experienced a new heyday. In fact, Venice practically leased them as carriers of salt, grain, and bulky merchandise from the Levant, and Sicily. Within several years, they traded in spices and valuable merchandise carried from Alexandria and Syrian ports. Renowned Venetian shipowners and captains owned marani in this period.79 76 ASVe, SM, reg. 8, f. 144r (3 November 1467). 77 Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, p. 28; idem, Navires et constructeurs, p. 255; Hocquet, Venise et le monopole, I, pp. 553–55. 78 Appendix A: 1499, nos. 35, 37, 39, 43; ASVe, SM, reg. 16, f. 130r (13 October 1506); ibid., reg. 17, f. 17v (23 March 1508); Sanuto, I diarii, II, 1081 (14 August 1499), 1293 (13 September 1499), 1129 (24 August 1499); ibid., III, 1394 (6 February 1501), 1527 (9 March 1501); Dolfin, Annalium Venetorum, p. 28 (18 April 1500). 79 ASVe, CXDM, fil. 39, fascc. 274–75 (8 August 1517); Sanuto, I diarii, IV, 652 (20 January 1503); ibid., VI, 553 (24 February 1507). Contarini Minoto owned a fleet of marani vessels: one returned from Alexandria with 30,000 ducats worth merchandise in 1518: ibid., XXV, 505 (19 June 1518). In 1522 the medium-sized marano of Matteo di Priuli q. Francesco was licensed by forty pilgrims for a voyage to the Holy Land. The meagre number of travellers – owing to the fact that Rhodes was then under siege by the Ottomans – did not justify the lease of a large carrack. In 1524, the marano of Piruli returned from Alexandria with 100 colli of spices and 500 cantar of cotton: ibid., XXXIII, 311, 373 (July 1522); ibid., XXXVI, 159, 172, 213 (April 1524).

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To judge by their meagre presence in the ship lists in following years, it seems that the marani became less attractive as an offshore commercial vessel after the introduction of state loans for shipbuilding in 1535 and, to even a further extent, after the Ottoman-Venetian war of 1537–40. Another round-shaped flat-bottomed vessel with a shallow draught and no rising line was the marciliana. Its notable width allowed it to carry an impressive cargo in shallow lagoon or fluvial waters. One of this ship’s advantages was that it could easily beach on plain shore and be hauled to land, making the unloading and loading procedure easier and quicker. This was the custom, for example, along the eastern shores of Italy in Le Marche at the coastal towns of Fermo, and Recanati. This type of ship came in many sizes and shapes: a fairly large marciliana might have a capacity of 300–400 botti,80 though the majority were smaller.81 Venetian sea laws regarded the marciliana as a smallor medium-tonnage vessel, since it lacked a crow’s nest and had no castles at either aft or fore. Conversely, the bow of the marciliana was fairly tall and curved (like the Atlantic lugger), with a spacious platform but no castle. The stern was square, giving it a rigid, geometric appearance, again with no castle. Other features included a platform protruding above the cutwater at the bow, a quarterdeck for the captain at the stern protruding up to the gangway, and two beams to support the deck from the mast towards the bow. The marciliana was principally a lateen-rigged ship, a typical sail plan would have included: a mizzenmast equipped with a lateen rig used to improve manoeuvrability and ease pressure on the helm; a main mast with a square or a lateen mainsail, to which was added one or two smaller top square rigs after the fifteenth century; a foremast, which raked forward, similar to a long bowsprit, with a square rig to help stabilize the ship while tacking.82 Being considerably wide, the marciliana had 80 Cotrugli, ‘Il trattato “De Navigatione”’, pp. 237–38; Lane, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 50 cit. 1, 239; Marzari, ‘La marciliana’, p. 27 cit. 59. The shipowner of a marciliana of 300 botti used both terms, navilio grosso and marciliana granda: ASVe, SM, fil. 1, ff. 133r, 155r (1540/1), the masts are indicated in f. 156v. 81 An inventory of a marciliana of 300 stara (approx. 25 tons) that was sold in Zadar for 34 ducats in 1440 attests it had two masts with two sails, a lateen vela de antimonies on the main mast with its yard and rigging and another lateen sail for the mizzenmast. It had three rudders (likely a stern and two side rudders), and came with five oars or sweepers. Similar transactions are found in notarial records in Zara and Spalato starting the 1360s, in which marciliane of small capacity were sold for modest prices varying from several dozens of ducats to a maximum of 160 ducats: DAZd, Johannes de Calzina, B. I, F. I, f° 88’, 13.XII.1440: cited by Fabijanec, Le developpement commercial, I, pp. 221–22. 82 Marzari, ‘La Marciliana’, pp. 11 cit. 13, 25–29, 31–32. For categories: Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, pp. 25–26; idem, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 37–38, 41, 239. See a contract for the building of a marciliana (1525): Gluzman, ‘Resurrection of a Sunken Ship’, p. 75.

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to utilize side rudders in strong winds to complement the stern rudder, according to Benedetto Cotruli: They have three rudders, one at the stern and two laterals. These are lowered only when bad weather put some pressure on the sails. And these vessels being flat are unnavigable without side rudders, and all these vessels have a mizzenmast to point better to the wind.83 With regard to its sailing qualities, Cristoforo da Canal (1510–62), the naval expert and commander of galleys and author of Della milizia marittima, did not think much of the marciliana. He considered it rather unsafe when confronting the short, high waves typical of the Mediterranean.84 It seems that he was in a minority of one in his opinion, since the lowest insurance rates for an Adriatic voyage were recorded for the marciliana: around 2%, with some anomalies due to extraordinary circumstances. The significantly lower premiums, compared to other types of vessels for similar voyages, suggest that the marciliana was considered relatively safe.85 The marciliana was also economical to operate: it required a small crew of five to ten men, compared to the forty or fifty on a carrack,86 and the construction and maintenance costs were lower as well. We encounter the marciliana frequently in Venetian sources after 1500. It became dominant in the Adriatic Sea, Apulia, and Sicily, and as far as Candia and the Levant, with cargo normally consisting of different types of victuals, firewood, timber, grain, hides, soap, and salt. Its importance increased towards the end of the sixteenth century, and diminished one hundred years later, before disappearing completely after the fall of the Republic.87

83 84 85 86

Cotrugli, ‘Il trattato “De Navigatione”’, pp. 237–38. Da Canal, Della milizia marittima, II, pp. 61–62. Tenenti, ‘I tassi assicurativi’, pp. 24–27. According to formal requirements, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries a large merchantman hired one sailor per 6 tons (10 botti): Hocquet, ‘La gente di mare’, p. 495; Lane, Navires et constructeurs, p. 37; for the marciliana crew, see Marzari, ‘La Marciliana’, pp. 11, 23 cit. 45 (referring to Z. Herkov’s estimate of 8 to 12 mariners). 87 Aymard, Venise, Raguse et le commerce du blé, pp. 56–57; Hocquet, Venise et le monopole, I, pp. 296–98, 556–58; Tucci, ‘Venetian Shipowners’, p. 292; Marzari, ‘La marciliana’, pp. 10, 20, 31.

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figure 4 A lateen-rigged vessel of small capacity (possibly a burchio). Jacopo de’ Barbari, op. cit.

Small to Medium-Sized Lateeners: galeoni, schierazi, grippi, and Caravels Despite the disadvantages, the predominance of the lateen rig in the Mediterranean continued after the introduction of the square sail. Starting the first decade of the sixteenth century, a medium-sized offshore merchant vessel also accorded the common name galeone became ever-more frequent in Venetian sources. The largest commercial galione owned by Venetians seems to have been of 450 botti. It had originally been a foreign vessel that was naturalized in 1528 at the request of its owners.88 However, the galleons owned by Venetians normally varied between 150 to 350 botti. Since the sources often confuse this vessel with a schierazo, it is possible that they had similar structural features. Alternatively, the schierazo was a local version of a Catalan or Spanish galleon, built by Greek master-shipwrights. 3.4

88

Appendix A: 1530, n. 23.

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The vessel most closely identified with Venice’s Greek subjects was the grippo. The success of this vessel is attributed to the specialization of the local shipyards in Corfu, although it was spread all over the Ionian Sea and Albania. It was a favourite of operators from Perasto (Perast), Cattaro (Kotor), Castelnuovo (Herceg Novi), Valona (Vlora), Durazzo (Durrës) and some ports in Apulia. The grippo’s capacity varied from several dozen to a maximum of 200 botti. It was manned by thirteen to eighteen seafarers, which increased to fifty when converted for warfare. The smaller version of ten metres boasted a single mast and one deck and was propelled by both oars and sails. The larger version had a square-rigged foremast and a lateen-rigged mizzen and was both swifter and more efficient at manoeuvring than any other commercial vessel used by the Venetians in this period. A grippo (and its bigger sister the gripperia) could complete a voyage from Crete to Venice in just sixteen days, a feat fairly common for such fast vessels.89 The grippo was used with considerable flexibility of purpose, from fishing to long-distance voyages along the routes to the Barbary Coast, the Levant, and Constantinople. However, its deficiency with respect to size and capacity limited its ability to threaten the dominance of the carracks in this market segment. Largely of the same category of small and swift ‘curved’ vessels was the caravel that rapidly propagated throughout the Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea in the 1440s. The caravella was slimmer and sat lower in the water, distinguishing it from other vessels. The prow was low, extending forward as a beacon in some models and inclining upwards in others. This design allowed more space on deck, it had no forecastle, and the low aftcastle sometimes ran almost to the foot of the main mast and a little forward. The stern was relatively long to support the stays of the lateen-rigged masts. It mounted an angular tall and narrow sternpost rudder, parallel to the captain’s quarters. Some models were designed to be propelled with the aid of oars or sweeps. Medium-sized caravels had multiple masts, not less than three and four in the

89 ASVe, MCart, bus. 29, 54 (23 January 1483). Urgent letters and news were hastened by grippi: Sanuto, I diarii, I, 743 (1 September 1497); ibid., V, 34 (16 April 1503); this grippo departed from Corfu on 13 January 1503 and arrived to Venice after seven days: ibid., IV, 636; it took this grippo 10 days to complete a voyage from Crete to Venice laden with wine: ibid., XIX, 9 (2 September 1514); this grippo completed a voyage from Alexandria to Modon in five days and from Modon to Lepanto in three: ibid., XXXVI, 148 (2 April 1524); this grippo arrived in Venice from Crete laden with wine in less than 20 days: ibid., 586 (8 September 1524). See also Lane, Navires et constructeurs, p. 50.

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fifteenth century. The mast at the aft had two square sails and the other twothree masts were equipped with lateen-rigged sails, with the larger one at the centre. The triangular sails diminished in size toward aft. Small caravels had no bowsprit, but the medium-sized caravelle had a steep bowsprit that served to reinforce the masts. Clearly, many other changes to the rigging and structure were introduced to adjust the caravels for specific use. Notwithstanding diversity, the caravelle were good sailing vessels with considerable advantage in speed and manoeuvrability. They pointed better to the wind – as close as 45 or 50 degrees  – while their low sides reduced windage. This made them ideal for inshore work and better able to sail northwards from West Africa or the Levant against the contrary prevailing winds.90 The Venetians were very attentive to new developments in ship design, and tended to follow the changes in this field. The role played by the design of the Portuguese caravel in the various oceanic discoveries created much hype around this type of vessel. In July 1499 the doge proposed to commission caravels to the fleet since there were so many of them around. The result was that the Venetian war fleet that year included around one hundred medium-sized vessels, out of which forty-five were caravels.91 Ranking second in number was the grippo, which shared traits similar to the former. The caravels were also the preferred vessel in Venetian possession in Dalmatia. Those of 200 botti took a notable part in the commerce in the Adriatic Sea, between Zara, Lesina, Curzola, and southern Italy, and along the Greek coast to Constantinople.92 90

The great discoverers re-rigged their caravels with square sails before the oceanic crossing and replaced them with lateen rigs as they arrived at the Indian Ocean. Columbus re-rigged his Niña with square sails for the outbound voyage of 1492. Those of Vasco de Gama sailed in 1502 east under square rig, reverting to lateen sails in the Indian Ocean: Elbl, ‘The Caravel’, pp. 91–92, 96; Cicliot, ‘Note sulle caravellae’, p. 71; Cotrugli, ‘Il trattato “De Navigatione”’, p. 237; Lane, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 44, 49; Hocquet, Venise et le monopole, I, p. 309. 91 Lane, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 254–55; ASVe, SM, reg. 14, ff. 193r (13 July 1499), 208v (22 February 1500); Sanuto, I diarii, II, 887, 917 (July 1499), rated by Domenico Malipiero 200 to 400 botti: Malipiero, Annali veneti, pp. 170 (1499), 630 (1496). 92 Lane, Navires et constructeurs, p. 49, the caravelle that were employed in Adriatic Sea trade were small vessel of 100 to 400 botti: Hocquet, Venise et le monopole, I, p. 309. The traffic in the port of Zara and Spalato based on counter letters during the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries shows low traffic in caravelle. The cargo consisted of local products from Dalmatian to destinations in Apulia or Venice: Fabijanec, le développement commercial, I, pp. 236–37. Additional evidence to their diffusion in Dalmatia: ASVe, SM, reg. 16, f. 44r

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Further south in the Greek colonies, they were abundant in Crete and Cyprus.93 Corfiots, however, remained loyal to their local shipbuilding tradition, and continued to employ grippi.94 During its heyday, the caravella was constructed all over the Mediterranean. Despite the rigid law that prohibited the purchase of foreign-built vessels, the Venetian nobility found a way to purchase foreign-built caravelle of considerable size: in 1499, a caravella with a capacity of 2,500 to 3,000 stara of grain (c. 300 botti), captained by Pasqual di Zuane, was wrecked in the vicinity of Rosetta in Egypt; in 1503 the cavalier Polo Trivisan owned a caravella of at least 2,000 stara of grain that sailed to Cyprus; and a caravella Malipiera was also active around that time; in 1511, several citizens were ordered to auction off their caravella of 2,000 stara, which was built in Apulia and employed in Venetian possessions; Zuan-Battista Merlini, who operated a trading network in Syria, used mainly caravelle to swiftly correspond with his relatives. His brother purchased a caravella of 250 botti directly from its captain in Tripoli after the latter faced financial difficulties. In 1531 the noblemen Zuane Corner q. Donado and Marco Bollani q. Alvise purchased a caravella built in Fiume of 160 botti from the giudici del forestier (presumably confiscated and put up for auction), and applied to the Senate to naturalize it. Tommaso Venier filed a similar request to naturalize the caravella he had purchased at an auction – one previously owned by a corsair and captured by the captain of the Venetian fleet.95 The caravel’s predominance waned in the following decades, as evinced by the 1509 ship list, which reveals a greater diversity in the lower categories:

(1504); Sanuto, I diarii, I, 811 (1497); ibid., II, 1070 (1499); ibid., IV, 391 (1502), 772 (1503); ibid., V, 902 (1504); ibid., XIX, 232 (1514). 93 E.g., two notarial documents, the first from Candia concerns the chartering of a Ragusan caravella for a voyage to Venice in 1517, the second concerns the formation of a convoy of two caravelle and one schierazo on their voyage to Valonia and Venice: ASVe, NC, bus. 177, ‘Manualetto A’, f. 116v (14 September 1517); ibid., ‘Primo Quaderno’, f. 129v (‘XVI’). 94 Pagratis, ‘Ships and Shipbuilding in Corfu’, pp. 239–41. 95 See correspondingly: ASVe, SM, reg. 22, f. 97r (21 October 1531); ibid., reg. 31, ff. 87v–88r (24 January 1551); ASVe, MG, bus. 12a, fascc. ‘1509’, n. 147 (15 September 1510); ibid., ‘SD’ [1510]; Sanuto, I diarii, II, 229, 249, 756, 770 (March 1499); ibid., IV, 449 (15 November 1502); ibid., V, 942 (4 March 1504); ibid., LV, 95 (October 1531); ASVe, ACR, reg. 3661, 186r (188 old) (4 April 1511).

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A small vessel underway (possibly a grippo), based on Breydenbach’s panoramic view of the port of Corfu (c. 1483)

caravels, schierazi, grippi, galleons, marciliane, and barzotti. By the 1530s the caravel was almost a rarity. Eventually, the Venetians came to their senses, and the fad for caravels abated. After all, a metropolis such as Venice, with an urbanized terraferma at its back, could not rely on the caravelle to supply enough cereals, salt, and other bulky cargo necessary for its industries.

chapter 4

Volume, Size, and Loading Lines 1 The botte and Other Units of Capacity In the second half of the fourteenth century, the former customary mode of measuring the capacity of Venice’s round ships by units of weight in milliario (or in Latin milliarium) of libre grosse (a measure of 1,000 Venetian pounds, equivalent to 477 kg), was replaced with that of units of volume, namely the botte (pl. botti). Interestingly, the botte originally represented the volume of one barrel of Cretan wine, measured in smaller units of capacity known as masteli (or mistati). Due to the popularity of this wine in Venice and its importance to the economy, the botte became the popular unit of measurement of the capacity below decks (sottocoperta). Basically, a ship’s cubic capacity was measured in terms of the quantity of Cretan wine that it could carry, even when the cargo was not wine. The usage of the botte as a standard measure is similar in this respect to the modern ‘freight ton’ – a unit of volume used for establishing freighting equivalents.1 The conversion to ‘standard merchandise’ allowed shipowners to accept light goods and liquids according to volume, and assorted heavy products by weight. This was necessary in order to balance between lightweight wares that might occupy the larger part of the hold’s space, and heavy ones deployed as zavorra (ballast) to lower the vessel’s centre of gravity and thereby ensure greater stability at sea.2 There is some debate among historians on the conversion rate of the botte (unit of volume) to the modern deadweight tonnage (dwt – unit of weight). Frederic C. Lane equated 1 botte to 0.6 metric ton of cargo that a ship could carry, which is practically the equivalent to deadweight tonnage.3 I follow his example, as it seems more adequate a measure for the fifteenth and early sixteenth century. Finally, the botte is repeatedly equated with 10 stara, unit of volume of grain (1 staio equals 83.3 litres). For convenience, throughout the 1 Lane, ‘Tonnages, Medieval and Modern’, pp. 349–50; Hocquet, Venise et le monopole, I, pp. 290–91. 2 Hocquet, ‘Tonnages ancien et moderne’, pp. 349–60; idem, Venise et le monopole, I, pp. 290–92. 3 Based on seventeenth-century figures, however, Ugo Tucci concluded that the conversion rate should be 0.8 dwt. The disagreement between the experts was summarized by Lane in his Venice, A Maritime Republic. Lane regarded the sixteenth century as a borderland, in which such figures represented subjective evaluations used for different purposes: pp. 479–80.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004398177_006

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present study, the estimates are reported in botti or stara, and their conversion into modern deadweight tonnage follows this equation: 1 botte = 10 stara = 0.6 dwt. That said, the cubic capacity was also measured in units of other products carried in bulk or in sacks in the ship’s hold: for example, a carra of wood or a mozzo or moggio (pl. mozza or moggia) of salt or grain. Since at the time there were no standard universal units, the mozzo used to measure salt, for example, was different from the one for measuring grain; moreover, it was different in each Venetian territory. This is because the variation in weight in relation to volume between the different types of salt requires separate conversion rates. Moreover, the weight of the salt changed after it was taken out of a depository.4 For this study, I will therefore consider the capacity of coarse salt (sale grosso) that was loaded in Ibiza or Cyprus as my yardstick for all further evaluations and estimates of shiploads. Hence, the equivalent of 100 botti is 80 Venetian mozza of salt, where 1 Venetian mozzo equates to 13 stara, a capacity equivalent to approximately one litre. This equation is verified in the proclamation of the Council of Ten of 10 February 1556, which established the quota of salt that ships built with the subvention of state loans were required to carry on their return voyage.5 2

Overall and Partial Capacities of Vessels

In modern English terminology, the uppermost complete deck exposed to weather and sea is called the first deck; however, Venetians started counting from the hold (sotto la prima coperta, da basso). Round ships and other large merchantmen had a second deck, which was the exposed deck. Around midsixteenth century, shipbuilders pitched the two decks to squeeze in an additional mid-storey, which was developed further into the uppermost third deck. Notwithstanding this modification, official rating in botti remained loyal to the two decks design, namely representing the overall capacity below the second complete deck. The space allocated for merchandise at the aft and forecastles, and anywhere else above the exposed deck (sopra coperta) were not included in this estimation (fig. 6).6 4 Hocquet, ‘Métrologie du sel’, p. 400; idem, Voiliers et commerce, p. 89 cit. 18, 21; idem, Production et monopole, pp. 78–79; idem, Venise et la monopole, I, p. 291. 5 Per ogni cento botte di stima se intenda esser la portada ottanta moza di sali: ASVe, Psal, bus. 1, reg. 4, f. 137v. 6 Tucci, ‘Un problema di metrologia’, p. 245; Hocquet, Voiliers et commerce, p. 88 cit. 8; ASVe, SM, fil. 43 [25 June 1569].

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figure 6

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A composite sectional cutaway of a carrack, based on the manuscript Instructione sul modo di fabricare galee of Pre’ Teodoro de Nicolò (c. 1550). Figures are in piedi veneziani: Lane, Navirest et constructeurs, p. 3

It is imperative to distinguish between measurements representing the overall capacity of a ship and those referring to a carrying capacity of a specific type of bulky cargo (portada), such as salt or cereals. On open-deck or one-deck carriers this estimate would not be radically different from the total carrying capacity. However, round ships were different in this respect – bulky cargo was carried in the hold, while the space between decks was allocated for other merchandise. When the entire capacity of a two-deck ship was leased for carrying in bulk, it was explicitly stated in the contract.7 Venetian maritime authorities clearly distinguished between the overall capacity and the portada of a certain type of merchandise. For example, a Senate’s decree 21 October 1502 granted bounties for building ships with a minimum carrying capacity of 220 mozza of salt: Henceforth, all ships that would be made and built in our city with a carrying capacity of 220 to 450 mozza of salt will be granted one ducat per botte, intending 220 mozza for a 400 botti [ship]. And those of 450 mozza and above will be granted double, namely, two ducats per botte.8 7 One such example is the leasing of three ships by the Grain Office Commissioners in January 1527. It was explicitly stated in the contract that the entire capacity of the ship, sotto la prima et seconda coverta, would be used for grain transport, reserving only the space allocated for the crew’s portada: ASVe, CXDC, fil. 4, fasc. 144 (12 January 1527). 8 …  tute le nave che di cetero se principiarano et farano in questa nostra cità, quelle, videlicet, serano di portada da moza 220 fino moza 450 di sal, haver debino ducato uno per bota, intendandose moza 220 per botte 400. Et da moza 450 in suso, haver debino el dopio, videlicet,

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The letter of the law established the quantity of salt a ship was expected to carry; for this reason, the criterion was set in mozza and not in botti. The Senate assumed that a ship with an overall capacity of 400 botti would have a carrying capacity of 220 mozza of salt. As noted, 100 botti were equated with 80 mozza of salt – so theoretically a ship of 400 botti would be able to carry 320 mozza of salt. However, two-deck ships carried other merchandise between decks, and the 220 mozza requirement intended to represent only the space of the hold.9 This hypothesis is confirmed by the enactment of 4 June 1535 that granted loans for ship construction. In this instance, the Senate explicitly required that the capacity under the lower deck (the hold) would be greater than 250 botti. A certain proportion between the heights of the lower deck (above the keel) and the height between the two decks was established to leave no room for artful interpretation: [T]o make ships of 250 botti and more under the lower deck, designed with their right proportions between the height of the exposed deck and that between decks. In this way, to prevent frauds that would attempt to increase the capacity of the lower part on the expense of that between decks, what would be hazardous.10 The capacity between the two decks was a derivative of the capacity of the hold, hence a rough estimate of the latter at an early stage in the construction sufficed to disburse the first instalment. The ship was then re-estimated at an advanced stage after planking. The second instalment already brought into account any adjustment to the previous rating.11 The customary form of reimbursement of the loans was by salt consignment in instalments (per rata). It is therefore no wonder that the Senate took great interest in the capacity of the hold. Besides, this part was largely exploited by the State for carrying other bulky cargo, such as cereals, ironware, timber, biscuits and ash. ducati do per botte: ASVe, SM, reg. 15, ff. 156v–57r (21 October 1502); Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, p. 31. 9 Hocquet, Voiliers et commerce, p. 89 cit. 19. 10 ASVe, SM, reg. 23, ff. 108r–9r (4 June 1535). 11 E.g., the first instalment of a loan paid out for Hieronimo Bragadin was for building a ship of 680 botti. The second instalment already considered the new rating of 720 botti and remuneration for the additional 40 botti. Similarly, the ship of the Vidoa was rated 320 botti for the first instalment. The second instalment for a ship of 396 botti, included additional remuneration to cover the difference between both ratings: ASVe, CapCX, Mandati, reg. 1, ff. 169v (2 June 1539), 175v (20 August 1540), 181r (10 December 1541), 185r (11 August 1542).

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Techniques to Calculate a Ship’s Capacity

One method for measuring the cubic capacity of a vessel with accuracy was to load it with cargo whose weight and volume were known until the gunwale touched the water level. This was the practice used by a master-shipwright and his assistant, who were hired by the magistracy of the savi alle acque to estimate the capacity of several burchielle boats: [T]hey loaded each one of these burchielle as much as was required to submerge it to the level of water. And so, to know the real carrying capacity of each one of the burchielle when they would be loaded with cargo.12 This method is, however, impractical with big ships. Other techniques based on taking measurements and mathematic calculus were applied. The fifteenthcentury manuscript Fabrica di galere mentions one such formula: the length of the beam (lunghezza in colòmba) measured in passa was multiplied by the width of the ship at its widest point (bocca) measured in piedi; multiplied by the height of the interior at its maximum point (pontàl) measured in piedi; the result was then divided by six. When reducing all measures to piedi (1 passo = 5 piedi) it reads: Keel × Beam × Draught / 30 = capacity in botte13 This, however, is considered to have been an unofficial, crude formula, allowing a large margin of error. The consoli dei mercanti, the magistracy in charge of conducting ship surveys until 1516, likely used a different technique. To take the length of the ship, the surveyor used a measuring rope on which the passa were marked off. This, however, was not the usual five-piedi Venetian passo, but one equal to three and 1/4 piedi. A second tool was the hoop of a barrel with which the surveyor determined the number of barrels that could be stored beside and on top of each other. The calculation was carried out in three places: the centre, an eighth of the way aft from the prow, and an eighth of the way toward the bow from the stern. The number of hoops at the centre was multiplied by half the length of the ship in passa. The number of hoops at the positions in the stern and prow were added together and multiplied by

12 ASVe, SEA, bus. 176, reg. 4, pt. 4, f. 22v (15 September 1525). 13 Lane, ‘Tonnages, Medieval and Modern’, p. 361; idem, Navires et constructeurs, p. 239; Tucci, ‘Un problema di metrologia’, pp. 240–41.

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one quarter of the length. The results added together gave the size and holding capacity of the ship in botti.14 Both methods reflect a simple proportional technique pioneered in the Mediterranean and passed down orally for generations. A design system of partixon (literally, a division) dictated each vessel’s principal dimension, from the length of the keel and the extensions fore and aft, up to the stem and sternpost, the overall length of the ship, the maximum breadth (or beam), the draught, the measurements of the hold, and the length of the mast. In this manner, the master-builder and the master-carpenter would already have in mind the proportions for the finished ship before the keel was laid.15 In the same manner, the maritime administration was able to rate the ship with reasonable accuracy in an early stage of the construction. By way of example, on 3 July 1507 the Senate authorized the proto Leonardo Bressan to survey six ships, which were in different phases of construction in different Venetian shipyards. The report was filed after two days, and all numbers were round. Clearly, Bressan did not conduct a fully accurate survey in such a short time; he rather based his estimates on taking measurements of the hold and consulting the master-shipwrights at the site of construction. In one such instance, his impression was significantly different from that of the master-shipwright, and two ratings were indicated.16 The rounded figures sufficed for the needs of the savi agli ordini (the members of the Collegio in charge of maritime affairs). A more accurate survey was supposedly conducted at a later stage.17 In 1535 the Collegio instructed the Arsenal officials to survey the newly built ship of Nicolò Mustachini below and above deck in the customary way (sicome si fanno le stime di le altre nave).18 One can only wonder what this customary way really was. Still, ships with two decks had to be measured in two places, under the lower deck, and between the two decks. The botti were calculated separately and added together to establish the overall capacity. The measurements of several ships leave little doubt that the official rating intended to represent the size and the capacity with accuracy: 14

The statutes of the consoli dei mercanti contain two texts describing the same technique, the first in Venetian dialect and the second in Latin, assumingly from the fourteenth and first half of the fifteenth century, respectively: Lane, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 239–40. 15 Rahn Phillips, ‘The Galleon’, pp. 100–1; Bellabarba, ‘The Ancient methods of Designing Hulls’, p. 274; Martin, The Art and Archaeology, pp. 146–47. 16 ASVe, CN, reg. 16, f. 8v (6 July 1507); Lane, Navires et constructeurs, p. 116 cit. 6. 17 Until the seventeenth century figures in round numbers – which are apparently the commonly known sizes  – largely corresponded to official ratings: Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, pp. 479–80. 18 ASVe, CN, reg. 23, f. 34v (28 June 1535); Appendix A: 1540, n. 2.

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The official rating of several ships, 1545–1554

Beam (bocca) in piede

Height (pontal) in piede

Capacity in botti

A Standard ship (1515) Under the first deck 14 –

24 –

Landa (1545) Under the first deck

8 5¼ Total

– – 500 botti

20

6 1/4 and 2 dedi (1/8 pie’) Total

220 botti

Length (lunghezza) in passa

12

–

Alberta (1545) Under the first deck

11, pie’ 3

17 ¼

Boza (1545) Under the first deck Between decks

7 1/2 Total

– 239 botti

13, pie’ 3 –

21 1/2 –

Vincenzo Capello’s ship (1545) Under the first deck 11 Between decks 22, pie’ 2

7 1/2 less 1 dedo – Total

182 botti 91 botti 273 botti

16 ¼ 18 3/4

Corcumela built in Crete (1549) Under the first deck 13 Between decks 14 1/2

5¼ 3 Total

– – 180 botti

20 3/4 24 1/3

A wrecked ship in Malamocco (1552) Under the first deck 19 1/2 Between decks –

7¼ 4 1/2 Total

143 96 239 botti

29 1/2 –

Caluzza built in La Canèe (1553) Under the first deck Between decks

8 1/2 – Total

500 botti 334 botti 834 botti

29 1/3 29 1/2

7 5 1/3 Total

300 200 500 botti

14, pie’ 4 15, pie’ 4

80 table 1

chapter 4 The official rating of several ships, 1545–1554 (cont.)

Beam (bocca) in piede

Height (pontal) in piede

Capacity in botti

Priula built in the Black Sea (1554) Under the first deck 17, pie’ 4 Between decks 18, pie’ 3

26 1/2 30 1/2

Alessandro di Franceschi’s ship (1554) Under the first deck 10, pie’ 4 Between decks 9, pie’ 4

7 5/6 5 Total

437 290 727 botti

17 1/4 19

Of Stefano di Colori built in Dulcigno (1554) Under the first deck (1)2, pie’ 1 Between decks 12, pie’ 3/4

6 1/2 3 1/4 Total

99 76 175 botti

16 3/4 18 3/8

5 1/4 4 1/2 Total

108 72 180 botti

Length (lunghezza) in passa

An enactment of 1515 established a length/width ratio of 2.91:1 for a 500-botti ship. The following measurements were required: length under the keel passa 14; width pie’ 24, height of the hold pie’ 8, height between decks, pie’ 5 1/4: ASVe, SM, reg. 18, ff. 85v–86r (29 June 1515); ASVe, CN, reg. 25, ff. 180v (18 August 1545), 181r (4 September 1545), 194r (9 December 1545), 204r (18 December 1545); ibid., reg. 29, ff. 82v–83v (1553/4). The wrecked ship in Malamocco was built using the structure of a former ship owned by Barbaro and Bon: ASVe, CamCX, Notatorio, reg. 3, f. 24r (31 October 1552); Hocquet, Venise et le monopole, I, p. 311.

Lastly, the capacity varied with the kind of voyage, the age of the ship, the portion devoted to equipment, quarters, and arms, as well as, the interest of those involved to increase or decrease the rating of the ship. By way of example, the measuring of the ship Madonna s. Maria Mazor e santo Isepo produced different results. They were first indicated in a contract signed in 1558 between the first owners and the shipyard at San Raffaele in Venice. At an advanced stage of construction later that year a more accurate result was produced by two different surveyors elected. It was further re-estimated in 1562 on the passage of ownership. Another survey, carried out the same year by the armiraglio

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dell’Arsenal, confirmed the rating established in 1558. Still, different measurements were then taken by the owner, to exploit the space under decks.19 4

The Relative Capacity of the Hold

The relationship between the hold and the overall capacity for round ships of over 400 botti fluctuated around 60% (table 2). This figure corresponds with the required carrying capacity of salt for a typical ship of 400 botti – 220 mozza (c. 275 botti). The question arises whether this parameter represents a standard around 1500, or whether it was simply wishful thinking on the part of the Senate. The enactment of 4 June 1535 corresponds better to the proportion of the ships that were built in the following decade. According to this enactment, a minimum of 250 botti at the hold was necessary to be entitled for a state loan. For a ship of 400 botti, this space would consist of 62.5% of the total. table 2

Relative capacity of the hold

No. Ship’s name

In the Between Total % of the Hold decks capacity Hold

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

437 380 437 182 143 300 99 437 500 270

Alessandro Contarini q. Andrea (1535) Zuane Michiel q. Francesco (1535) Francesco Maffeo a Luna (1536) Boza (1545) Corcumela (1549) Caluzza (1553) Alessandro di Franceschi (1554) Priula (1554) Wrecked in Malamocco (1552) Madonna s. Maria Mazor e santo Isepo (1558)

291 250 293 91 96 200 76 290 335 270

728 630 730 273 239 500 175 727 834 540

60.03 60.31 59.86 66.67 59.84 60 56.51 60.11 59.84 50

ASVe, CapCX, Mandati, reg. 1, ff. 146v, 147v, 148v, 153v, 154r, 155v; Hocquet, Venise et le monopole, I, p. 311, 362–63; ibid., II, p. 567; Tucci, ‘Una nave Veneziana’, p. 711.

19

Tucci, ‘Una nave veneziana’, pp. 711–14.

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Calculating the Carrying Capacity by Using Stowage Factors

A survey of the entire ship was not always feasible, and a ‘stowage factor’ was applied to determine the cubic capacity.20 The stowage factor is the volume required to stow a given weight of cargo on board a ship under normal conditions. These are always estimates, since many aspects of the goods can lead to variations, for instance, the degree to which they were processed. The decisive parameters related to wheat were its water and oil content, and grain size. Salt varied in weight and lump form, as well as in the extent of humidity absorption. Dried hides would be rated differently from wet-salted hides. As a ship’s hold was never a dry storage place, the heat and humidity in the compartments under decks must have changed the volume and weight of different bulky merchandise during a voyage. Packaging was another consideration – liquid cargo, such as wine or oil, was carried in barrels, casks, and other containers, with unavoidable gaps between parts of the cargo. The stowage of dry cargoes such as cereals, ash or salt, was affected by sack-filling levels. Similarly, hemp, yarns, woollens and cotton were usually transported compressed to a degree that varied and was regulated in Venetian laws. The structural features of the storage compartment also caused unavoidable stowage losses. In view of all these variables, the ability of contemporaries to calculate the stowage capacity with accuracy is questionable.21 Yet, by the early sixteenth century the freighting equivalent system provided an equitable measuring method for calculating the carrying capacity of a vessel, when more conventional ways were not practicable. In 1517 the overall capacity (below the exposed deck) of the ship Bernarda grossa was determined based on its cargo from the maiden voyage that took place in 1508. According to the records of the Salt Office, the amount of Cypriot salt that was consigned in Venice was 561 mozza (equivalent to 1,021 botti). Meanwhile, the ufficiali all’extraordinario supplied information on the rest of the cargo on the return voyage: 205 sacks of cotton; 59 cases (casse) of sugar; 8 sacks of yarns; 19 barrels 20 Lane, ‘Tonnages, Medieval and Modern’, p. 349. 21 A simplistic technique of freighting equivalents was already in use in the first years of the thirteenth century: Dotson, ‘A Problem of Cotton’, pp. 56–58. The minimum freight rates established by the Senate on 21 October 1502 to restrict the bargaining over rates suggest a freighting equivalent system with twenty-two basic categories: ASVe, SM, reg. 15, ff. 156v–57r (21 October 1502); Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, p. 31. Often mentioned in this respect is the tariff from 1681 established by the cinque savi alla mercanzia, introducing fifty-seven rough equivalents in botti for various types of merchandise: Tucci, ‘Un problema di metrologia’, pp. 223–31; Hocquet, ‘Tonnages ancien et moderne’, pp. 349–50; Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, pp. 479–80.

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(botti) of capers; 30 tablets (tauole) of samite; 10 boards of camlet; 4 boards of carpets; 18 bales of cordovan leather; 26 sacks of cumin; and 2 sacks of styrax.22 The volume and weight of the cargo was then calculated at 133 botti by one Ettor Ottobon, a clerk of the Salt Office. Both figures were then added together to establish an overall capacity of 1,154 botti. The capacity was then multiplied by 2 ducats per botte to determine a bounty of 2,308 ducats accredited to the owners for shipbuilding based on the 21 October 1502 enactment.23 In fact, the Bernarda grossa was stranded around 16 June 1511 outside the Lido of Venice. A major restoration project carried out in 1516 considerably reduced the size of its draught – the hull was shaped in the form of a galione. Even though the ship was still afloat (although away from Venice) in September 1517, the hold was different from the original one. Hence, the re-evaluation of this ship’s capacity was performed by calculating the weight and volume of its cargo on the return voyage in 1508.24 Similarly, eyewitness testimonies were used to establish the carrying capacity in consideration of the vessel’s condition. In 1523, for example, the savi alle acque confirmed the portada of a vessel owned by Antonio da Lesina based on the testimonies of two merchants who had leased it previously.25 The same magistracy determined the capacity of the marciliana of Alvise Zenero to be 600 stara, based on a merchant’s testimony and the records of the Grain Office Commissioners in respect to former consignments.26 In 1524 all vessels with a portada of over 180 mozza of salt were offered a bounty of 3 ducats per mozza for the consignment of Cypriot salt. The unfortunate Captain Matteo di Donato was unable to enjoy such privilege, since the amount of salt imported on his vessel was determined to contain only 177 1/2 mozza. The captain asked to re-consider his ship’s capacity based on the testimonies of his crew. The 22 23 24

25

26

Styrax a resin produced from a plant called liquidambar orientalis, commonly known as the oriental sweetgum: Sopracasa, Venezia e l’Egitto, p. 711. ASVe, CN, reg. 18, f. 73r (27 September 1517). As a matter of fact, the ship was already surveyed before, however shipowner Filippo Bernardo q. Dandolo was unhappy with the result and asked that their ship be surveyed again. On 5 August 1510 the Salt Office Commissioners were instructed to send a surveyor. This most probably did not occur before the stranding of the ship: ASVe, SM, reg. 17, f. 142v (16 June 1517); ASVe, Psal, bus. 60, reg. 2, f. 142r (5 August 1510). On the Bernarda grossa, Appendix A: 1509 n. 2; 1520, n. 2. Based on his personal records, a merchant who leased the ship to carry grain declared that it had a capacity of 900 stara. Another merchant gauged the total capacity at circa 1,000 stara. His estimate was based on the 940 stara of grain that this vessel carried on his own account, the portada of the crew and several barrels of wine: ASVe, SEA, bus. 606, reg. 1, pt. 2, f. 25v (13 August 1523). Ibid., f. 26r (9 September 1523).

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ship’s company confirmed they could have safely sailed with a quantity of 180 and even 200 mozza of salt.27 Captain Antonio Zacharin was granted the same privilege, based on the testimonies of the ship’s clerk and other eyewitnesses regarding his ship’s capacity of carrying salt.28 6 The stimadori and the Administration No licence or privilege was required to conduct ship measurements; the reputation of the surveyors (stimadori) was, however, important. Executive agencies occasionally outsourced this service to professionals, master-shipwrights, but on a more regular basis the daily routine work of keeping records, issuing certifications and occasional checks were left in the hands of clerks and functionaries, whose knowledge in such matters was very limited. Examining the suitability of round ships for state subsidies was an exception – the sole authority to conduct a survey in such cases rested with a team that included Arsenal officials, experienced proti, and representatives of the higher magistracies. This was believed necessary to prevent fraud. A Senate enactment of 12 December 1471 required three senior magistrates – a capo di quarantia, savio di terraferma, and savio agli ordini – to supervise the procedure and the registration of the results in the books of the Ducal Chancery, the provveditori di Comun, and other magistracies.29 The enactment passed on 1 September 1490 changed the composition of such a commission, which had to include four elected members of the pien Collegio – one of the doge’s counsellors (consigliere ducale), savio del conselio, savio di terraferma, and savio agli ordini.30 Indeed, the ship Giustiniana, built following this enactment, was surveyed in the presence of these supervisors.31 Similarly, on 29 January 1504 the Senate required four members of the Collegio to be present in the survey of the new ships, whose owners applied for state loans. A capo di quarantia and representatives of the office of the tre savi in Rialto (in charge of enrolling young impoverished noblemen for apprenticeship in command on board galleys and

27 28 29 30 31

ASVe, PSal, bus. 64, reg. 10, ff. 106v–7r (12 January 1526). Ibid., ff. 120r, 129r (27 and 5 May 1526). ASVe, SM, reg. 9, ff. 120v–21r (12 December 1471). Ibid., reg. 13, f. 29r (1 September 1490). ASVe, PSal, bus. 8, reg. 7bis, f. 82r (21 March 1491).

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ships) were required to attend as well.32 The composition of the surveying team was subject to only small changes throughout this period.33 As already noted, vessels that did not receive state subsidies for shipbuilding were surveyed by other magistracies. The reform in survey procedures 6 November 1516 recognized the Arsenal as the sole authority to assign official ratings to all ships with a carrying capacity greater than 250 stara. Vessels under this category were required to arrive at the public shipyards after working hours and be surveyed by the Admiral of the port and the patroni all’Arsenal. The procedure was conducted once in return for a fee that was previously collected by other agencies. The ‘registered ton’ was primarily used for fiscal reasons, that is, to determine the anchorage tax.34 The right to collect anchorage tax was then auctioned to private tax farmers. The latter were granted permission to survey ships for the interest of their income. However, modifications required the Arsenal’s approval.35 32 ASVe, SM, reg. 14, ff. 6r–7v (31 March 1493); ibid., reg. 16, f. 41r (29 January 1504). 33 In 1545 the team was composed of the armiraglio, two proti (a master-shipwright and a caulker), and other shipwrights. The supervisory committee was composed of the capo di quarantia, savio agli ordini, patrono all’Arsenal and the savi sopra I conti (also known as the tre savi in Rialto): ibid., reg. 28, f. 39r (25 June 1545); ASVe, CN, reg. 25, ff. 180v (18 August 1545), 181r (4 September 1545), 194r (9 December 1545), 204r (18 December 1545). 34 ASVe, ST, reg. 19, ff. 136r–37v (6 November 1516). Re-enacted in 1526: ASVe, SM, reg. 20, ff. 206r–v (10 January 1526). 35 E.g., ASVe, PPA, reg. 134, ff. 308–11 (25 August 1529).

chapter 5

‘Safety First’: Rules for the Safety and Security at Sea 1

Regulations against Overloading and Overcrowding

For any number of reasons, merchant ships were invariably overloaded and overcrowded. Venice’s early sea laws restrained ship captains from loading excessive quantities of cargo. The consoli dei mercanti and the colonial administrations conducted safety inspections against overloading in Doge Zeno’s days (c. 1260s). A cross was marked on the ship’s side at the level of the lower deck to determine how far below the water level the ship might be submerged; the exact positioning considered the age and shape of the vessel, its cargo and destination. A problem facing Venetian lawmakers in the early fourteenth century was the practice of ‘cotton screwing’, that is, various methods that enabled tighter packing of cotton into the hull, but with the consequent danger of the ship lying too low in the water, or of weakening its structure. Limitations to such practices introduced in 1332 set a minimum weight of 500 Venetian ‘light’ pounds (equivalent to 330 English lbs) for sacks of cotton packed by hand and a maximum of 700 pounds (462 English lbs) for those compressed by a mechanical device.1 But a new system of marking became necessary so as to simplify the otherwise multiple readings of the cross, and thus ensure the enforcement of restrictions. In an enactment from 1375, the cross on round ships was replaced with a ‘sign’ (signal) to mark the correct load line.2 A Senate’s enactment of 11 January 1386 delegated the enforcement of the load lines to all agencies that dealt with contraband, and to the administration in the Republic’s possessions overseas. Thereafter, inspection against overloading ceased to be the concern of a certified milieu of the consoli dei mercanti and those appointed by them. Governors and their officials were to ensure that ships entering their ports were not loaded ultra signa ordinata. In such cases, they were to instruct the 1 Frederic C. Lane suggested that the shift of attention in fourteenth-century regulations between overloading and overcrowding and vice versa resulted from a temporary problem of cargo imbalance on the return voyage from the Levant and the introduction of the cog. The evidence to support this claim is however inconclusive: ‘Cotton Cargoes and Regulations’, pp. 253–62; idem, ‘Maritime Law and administration’, pp. 237–38. 2 ASVe, Smist, reg. 34, ff. 165r–v (27 February 1375).

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004398177_007

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captain to offload excessive cargo. Captains were prohibited from leaving the port if the signal disappeared below the waterline. Similarly, a fully loaded ship docking into port was barred from re-loading quantities of goods in excess of the gross weight of the merchandise that it had unloaded. Ship masters who failed to observe the regulation were threatened with penalties and the retention of one-third of their freightage upon the return of their ship. The provveditori di Comun was placed in charge of prosecution, and it was their duty to ensure these regulations were proclaimed every six months and duly noted down in directions handed to new colonial officers to be observed in their respective territories.3 By 1412 the concern over excessive cotton screwing seems to have abated, and prohibitions on the use of various types of boom, capstans, and windlasses for loading soon lapsed.4 Thereafter, Venetian sea laws tried to limit the quantities of merchandise stored on the exposed deck. Ship captains were prohibited from crowding the decks with goods or equipment that might interfere with manoeuvring or with the ship’s performance in battle. Former restraints on overloading and overcrowding were now grouped under the somewhat vague term stracargar. Despite this apparent relaxing of regulations, several fifteenth-century statutes indicate that the provveditori di Comun and the ufficiali del Levante continued to inspect ships before departure to control overloading. Around mid-century, the provveditori di Comun were outsourcing such inspections to three professional ship carpenters and caulkers, whose responsibility it was to ensure that the waterline marks of ships stationed in port were plainly visible.5 While a Senate enactment of 2 September 1460 concerning inspections conducted by the ufficiali del Levante did indicate the load mark, greater attention was however given to merchandise stored above the exposed deck.6 Following the death of a veteran officer in the said agency in 1494, the chroniclers Marino Sanuto and Domenico Malipiero acknowledged the man’s long experience of conducting overloading and overcrowding inspections for all departing ships.7 There is evidence to show that similar enforcement was applied in the Venetian possessions overseas. Chapter 84 in the statutes of Spalato (Split) refers to an enactment of 29 November 1383, entitled ordo super navigijs onerandis, concerning the election of several noblemen whose duty was to control 3 ASVe, PC, reg. 1, f. 34v; ASVe, APGC, reg. 22, c. 14t (11 January 1386). 4 Lane, ‘Cotton Cargoes and Regulations’, p. 261; idem, ‘Maritime Law and Administration’, p. 250; idem, ‘Tonnages, Medieval and Modern’, p. 355. 5 ASVe, PC, reg. 1, f. 82r (20 October 1455). 6 ASVe, CDM, reg. 128, ff. 4r–v (2 September 1460). 7 18 January 1494: Sanuto, Le vite dei Dogi (1474–94), II, p. 709; Malipiero, Annali veneti, p. 627.

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that the chains (presumably at the prow) were at least half a piede (17.39 cm) above the waterline. These officials were allowed certain leeway to apply further measures, at their discretion.8 Similar evidence concerns the Greek transhipment centres in the Peloponnesus. Francesco Bragadin, the elected governor of Modon (Methoni) in 1485, was ordered to make inquiries and thoroughly ascertain that no merchandise was stored on the exposed deck, from the mast to the prow, above and under the castles at both ends, on the shades and the topmasts. It was equally prohibited to place merchandise under the bartizan (bertesca), below the wax canvas that covered cargo in open-deck vessels (vanum, It. vano), in the living quarters at the stern (paradisum), in the magazines/lockers under the exposed decks reserved for equipment (coredores, It. corridoi), and under the ramp at the stern (tabernam). Captains who accepted merchandise with intention to store them above deck were liable to fines amounting to double their estimated freightage.9 Following rumours that the Veniera was taking water, the captain Jacomo Solta was detained in Cyprus. One of the shareholders who was present on board secretly instructed the crew to raise anchors and escape the island, leaving the astonished Solta behind.10 The pressure on the part of shippers and the prospects of increasing profits prompted captains to load their ships to the maximum, a practice that invariably cluttered the decks and created hazards. In 1482 Captain Manuel Bon refused to accept more than 100 stara of grain from a shipper in Modon, as his ship was already overloaded.11 Similarly, in 1498 Captain Alvise Trivisan loaded 2,200 botti of wine in Candia, leaving 500 in port, lest the ship be overloaded and risk rupturing the beams of the decks.12 On November 1517 the ship captained by Polo Bianco arrived at Saline in Cyprus from Laiazzo (Ayas) in the gulf of Alexandretta, loaded to breaking point. The colonial administration ordered the captain not to take on any more cargo as the navigation was scheduled for wintertime. However, it was assumed that the ship would accept a small quantity of merchandise to be stored above deck, since merchants lacked carriers directed to Venice and did not spare their complaints.13 To be

8 Hanĕl, ‘Statuta et leges civitatis Spalati’, p. 288 (29 November 1383). 9 Sathas, Documents inédits, I, n. 198, p. 297 (10 May 1485). 10 ASVe, Collegio, Risposte di fuori, reg. 317, n. 129 (24 June 1567). Other instances in which captains were fined or detained for similar reasons are found in the correspondence between the colonial administration and the high authorities in Venice. 11 ASVe, PSM, Misti, bus. 3, fasc. XVI [8 January 1482]. 12 Malipiero, Annali veneti, p. 646 (1498). 13 ASVe, CapCX, Lettere dei rettori, Cipro, reg. 288, f. 305v (27 November 1517).

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sure, merchant galleys were likewise victim to the same pressure and to problems of overloading and overcrowding.14 The increasing influence of the Arsenal in merchant shipping after 1516 triggered another reform in safety inspections. On 12 July 1527 the most extensive and important law to date concerning ballasting of private ships was enacted. What sparked the new ordinance was the shipwreck of the Cornera, captained by Luca Gobo. The preamble of the Senate’s decree declared that for some time ships carried such a quantity of commodities above deck that they might be said to have not two but three decks. This practice proved to be dangerous, as it increased the number of cases in which merchandise was damaged and put ships at risk of capsizing (trabaltarse). What aggravated the problem was the fact that merchandise was loaded in parts of the structure that did not exist before: the top (garide d’alto)15 and the aftcastle (cassero). It was therefore decided to prohibit the loading of cotton and other merchandise in the aftcastle and on the section of deck from the main mast to the prow, including the top platform, apart from the customary portada of the seamen. Moreover, the new ruling deemed that the captains and ships’ clerks could be implicated for collusion in the misdeed and liable to prosecution as well. Clerks were therefore required to pledge that cotton and other commodities would not be stored on deck. Subsequently, Arsenal officials would go in person to ensure compliance, and the port admiral was personally responsible for the inspection during loading or before departure to verify the waterline mark was not submerged.16 Cases in which a ship capsized or sank as a result of incompetent ballasting were delegated to the avogadori di Comun.17 The 1527 enactment was re-issued several times during the second half of the sixteenth century, with only small changes. Later decrees concerned the enforcement on overloading and overcrowding in destinations in the Levant, as well as revising laws to close certain loopholes. For instance, it was reported that ship captains relocated equipment and foodstuff on deck (or on the 14 E.g., a Senate’s attempt to tackle excessive loading of the holds on galleys 27 July 1492: ASVe, SM, reg. 13, f. 92r; a Senate’s bid to impose a ceiling on the weight of parcels loaded on galleys 10 July 1498: ibid., reg. 14, f. 161v; see also: Judde de Larivière, Naviguer, commercer, gouverner, pp. 207–10. 15 A platform with railing at about 1/4 to 1/3 of the way up the mast, not to be confused with the crow’s nest (cheba): Gulielmotti, Vocabolario marino e militare, p. 390. 16 12 July 1527: ASVe, SM, reg. 21, f. 72v; Sanuto, I diarii, XLV, 475; Pardessus, Collection de lois, V, p. 67. 17 One such case involved the ship Luna, which capsized shortly after leaving port in 1544. As it were, the captain had continued to receive merchandise in open sea with the assistance of some barges from Ferrara, he was indicted with breaking the law by overloading the vessel and not balancing the goods accordingly: ASVe, CN, reg. 25, f. 95r (24 April 1544).

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gangway) to provide additional space for merchandise. The storing of goods in the captain’s room or other parts in the aftcastle was likewise prohibited.18 Many instances attest to the fact that ships were duly marked with a sign called a brocca that was subject to inspection. In June 1560 the Croce of 900 botti left the Island of Cyprus with the brocca half-submerged in the water.19 In 1569 shipowners appealed to the Senate to adjust the brocca so as to better represent the actual loading line of the new three-decked design. Likewise, the French traveller Jean Carlier de Pinon’s description of the loading procedure on round ships around 1579 attests that the brocca was subject to inspection.20 Judging by Carlier’s descriptions, the mode of loading in the Levant followed a fairly standard procedure. First the hull was loaded with salt or ash to provide initial ballast; then the space between the two decks (tra le do coperte), was stacked with bales of cotton, all properly stowed and secured. The packages of spices, silk bales, and assorted valuable merchandise were also stored on this deck. Meanwhile, several spaces on board were left free of any merchandise, and these included a room at the prow used for storing the ship’s equipment; the living quarters of the crew; and a place used to store the water supplies. In case of an overload, part of the cotton and small packs were stored in the aftcastle, the forecastle, and the lower platform (cassaretto), and along the port and starboard beams. As the foregoing shows, the tricky, shifting balance between profitability and safety at sea demanded continual adjustments on all sides. Accordingly, in the fifteenth and sixteenth century ships continued to be inspected and duly marked with waterline signs. The fact that the principal magistracy in charge of enforcement changed at least four times in the course of as many centuries 18 In 1569 a ban was imposed on loading goods onto additional parts of the superstructure. Other special regulations included a period called the ‘heart of winter’, starting 15 November and ending on 20 January, during which departure for a voyage was prohibited. This did not mean that ships in the Levant were obliged to remain inactive during the winter, but that they were expected to plan their itinerary to comply with this requirement: ASVe, CL, bus. 294, 190 (8 June 1569). The role of the armiraglio in conducting overloading inspections was re-enacted on 22 January 1575: ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 1, f. 178v. Overloading on board marciliane was addressed on 4 November 1589: ibid., bus. 12, ff. 25r–28r. Further measures to restrict overloading above deck and store water barrels on the gangway were taken on 18 June 1598: ASVe, CL, bus. 63, 92. Former laws were reenacted on 3 October 1602: ASVe, CSAM, NS, bus. 97, pt. b, f. 20r. 19 Magno, Voyages (1557–1565), p. 633. 20 Pinon, Relation du voyage, pp. 320–21. According to Alberto Gugliemotti, the masculine form brocco signifies the sign that was legally used to mark the load line on the hull: Vocabolario marino e militare, p. 272. The feminine form was however in use in late sixteenth-century documents.

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suggests that the State was intent on tightening its control, rather than relaxing it. A key motive for delegating these duties must have been that certain agencies were better able to enforce laws at the docks. One can assume that the practice worked sufficiently in periods in which no significant change in the policies was introduced. 2

The Military Potential

Between 1400 and the mid-sixteenth century, the exceptionally large type of carrack entered the ranks of prestigious warships owned by various European kingdoms.21 These vessels, however, should not be confused with the majority of the carrack-type ships that were initially designed as merchantmen. There were several intrinsic features of a typical bulk carrier that limited their military potential. First and foremost, their hull was not reinforced with iron and double planking, and was therefore more vulnerable to ramming and cannon fire. Secondly, the interior of a warship sacrificed part of its storage space for the ship’s ordnance and relative mountings: equipment that clearly did not exist on typical merchantmen. For these reasons, it was practically impossible to convert a merchantman into a war vessel simply by manning and arming it. Round ships were better employed as auxiliary vessels in naval conflicts, but did not engage directly in battle unless they came under attack. But so long as medieval naval battles resembled land battles taken to sea, and the individual ship-to-ship combats were essentially a question of boarding the enemy ship, the extra height provided our protagonists with a certain advantage against the faster yet smaller war vessels.22 The crow’s nest (cheba) was used as a fighting platform, a topcastle. Ammunition was hoisted using a small winch, and the crew rained spears, darts, bombs and grenades onto the deck of the enemy vessel.23 During one episode in the War with the Turks (1463–79), Antonio Michiel, a Venetian merchant residing in Constantinople and active as the holder of a lease of the alum mines, expressed his confidence in the superiority of Venice’s fleet to the Republic’s Captain General Vettor Capello. His advice was to commission round ships with men armed with iron spears, darts, small mortars, smoke grenades, stones (and not least boiling oil). Such an assault 21 Freil, ‘The Carrack’, pp. 86–88. 22 Lane, Navires et constructeurs, p. 46. The role of the Nordic cog in naval battles: Runyan, ‘The Cog as War Ship’, pp. 50, 55–56. The adaptability of the cog is perhaps overappreciated: ibid., p. 58. 23 Hocquet, Venise et le monopole, I, pp. 550–51.

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would give the Venetians strategic and psychological advantage, as the Turks lacked such technology and feared it.24 More often than not merchantmen sailed with a reduced quota of men and insufficient protection to reduce operating costs, thus, powerful corsairs and enemy fleets were not particularly impressed by the height of the freeboard: in 1426, at the sight of the approach of around thirty Turkish fuste (rowing vessels designed for warfare), the crew of the cog Balba abandoned ship and fled to shore.25 Similarly, in 1475 it took no more than four men to hijack the new ship of 300 botti owned by Francesco Dolfin q. Zorzi & bros. da San Canzian: as soon as the ship reached Cape Maleas in the southern Peloponnesus, four passengers boarded the vessel, murdered the helmsmen, and changed course to Tripoli in the Barbary Coast.26 On 9 May 1493, the 600-botti ship captained by Zuane Boza was heading to Alexandria with a cargo of copper, soap, paper, and 500 barrels of oil. The vessel was idling in waters twenty Venetian miles off the island of Cerigo in the southern Peloponnesus when a ship of 350 botti tagged by three fuste led by the fearsome corsair Kemal Reis loomed into view. On board the Boza were Alvise Malipiero q. Stefano, the newly appointed Vice Consul in Alexandria, Captain Daniel Copo q. Hieronimo, who was sent to Alexandria as the agent of Michele Foscari, along with thirty other passengers and crew members, of whom eight were suffering from acute seasickness. The ship carried assorted bombards, but insufficient stones or gun-powder. It was soon discovered that nobody knew how to operate the bombards and the company decided to change course and enter the port of Kapsali on the southern tip of the island to seek assistance. A light breeze enabled them to steer to the port, and as soon as they cast anchor, Malipiero and Copo disembarked and ran up the hill to the castle (chora Kythera) requesting assistance from the Venetian Castellan Francesco Querini q. Biasio. Since it was harvest-time, the locals were busy in the fields, and the Venetian noblemen managed to round up no more than twenty-five men. Meanwhile, the rest of the crew abandoned ship and fled for shelter wherever they could. Soon afterward, the armed corsairs arrived in port, embarked, and led the vessel away without resistance.27 This episode demonstrates the limited effectiveness of the prescribed safety requirements, which are discussed below, along with the habit of shipowners

24 25 26 27

Malipiero, Annali veneti, pp. 39–40 (14 December 1466). Sanuto, Le vite dei dogi (1423–74), I, p. 59 (23 June 1426). Idem, Le vite dei dogi (1474–94), I, p. 22 (14 December 1475). 1493: ASVe, PSM, Misti, bus. 41, fasc. IX [15 January]; ibid., bus. 43, fasc. XXIII [16 May], [15 June].

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to pare down their operating costs by sailing with reduced crews and insufficient ordnance. 3

The Quota of Professional Mariners and Crew on Board

Round ships were obligated to enrol one mariner (marinaio) per 20 botti. The term mariner signified an ‘able-bodied seaman’ of a certain adult age – twenty or above  – and sometimes they were also expected to have fighting skills.28 The law determined the number of skilled seamen only. Formally, round ships enrolled one crewman for every 10 botti (that is including the captain, the officials, craftsmen, professional soldiers etc.).29 For instance, the seven coche grandi that took part in the muda to Syria in 1425 were required to enrol ten crewmen for every 100 botti.30 But the ratio was not always honoured and when the matter was left to operators to decide, they invariably sent their ships out with a reduced crew. An educated guess would put a quota of about twenty crewmen on the ship Boza of 600 botti (the eight persons that suffered from seasickness were probably passengers; the aforementioned Copo and Malipiero were not included among the sick). The ratio, therefore, would be one crewman for every 30 botti (and not 10 botti). Besides the marinai, the crew comprised young apprentices in early stages of their maritime careers, who assisted the company with the chores, served meals, and mopped up after. They were appointed to the role of fanti (at around the age of eighteen) with duties that required more physical strength than expertise. Their prowess was then put to the test in a rite of passage, 28 Hocquet, Venise et le monopole, I, pp. 302–5; idem, Voiliers et commerce, p. 125 cit. 114; Friel, ‘The Carrack’, p. 83. 29 Predelli & Sacerdoti, ‘Gli statuti marittimi’, p. 19. Thirteenth-century lateen-rigged ships enrolled double the quota in both categories, i.e. the number of skilled mariners, and the total crew. Sea laws from the first half of the thirteenth century required one crewman for every 10 milliaria (a little less than 5 tons). With the introduction of the cog, the legal requirement was one adult mariner for each 10 botti. This figure appears in an enactment of the Grand Council (1362), as well as in several documents of the consoli dei mercanti. According to Frederic C. Lane, a quota of five skilled mariners and two boys (apprentices) were required for every 100 botti on ships of at least 400 botti. Hence, the obligatory quota of mariners on board was one per 10 tons: Lane, ‘Venetian Seamen’, p. 413 cit. 2; idem, Navires et constructeurs, p. 37; idem, Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 382; Hocquet, Voilers et commerce, p. 108; idem, ‘La gente di mare’, pp. 494–95; idem, ‘Gens de mer à Venise’, pp. 131–32; Melis, ‘La situazione della marina mercantile’, p. 113. Captains pledged to comply with the requirements. The minimum age to be counted as a mariner was eighteen: Lane, ‘Venetian Seamen’, p. 409 cit. 1. 30 Sanuto, Le vite dei dogi (1423–74), I, p. 44 (10 January 1425).

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in which they proved knowledge of time reckoning, course plotting with a chart, and other skills considered part of good seamanship. They were then appointed mariners.31 Several crew lists from the second half of the sixteenth century suggest that the law did not differentiate between the fanti and marinai and both were applicable. According to Alessandro Magno’s journal, in 1557 the crew of the ship Bona on which he sailed comprised twenty-one fanti and only four mariners. The crew of the ship Vianella e Panegagia, which set sail on a commercial voyage to Alexandria in 1561, did not include marinai but rather twenty-two fanti who were paid differently, according to their expertise and equipment.32 In 1579, Carlier the Pinon embarked on a 600-botti ship that was manned by sixty crewmen, of whom one-third were fanti.33 The crew of the 600-botti Girarda (1594) consisted of three mariners and sixteen fanti.34 Clearly, the interpretation of the law did not regard the rite of passage as a criterion in this respect. Some crewmen had more than one function and were able to repair a fault or stitch the sails; specialization was not as rigid as it must have been on board the military fleets. The quota of crew members on board merchant ships, particularly those of medium and small capacity, was more freely interpreted.35 The lowest rank in the hierarchy on board was that of the mozzo, who lacked any maritime skills and came from a quite different social background. His competence was principally sanitation, but he likely assisted in other chores as well. During the acute famine of 1529, the provveditori alla sanità was instructed to pick up young orphans, vagabonds, and homeless adolescents, and assign them to private ships as mozzi. Captains were required to enrol one or two, depending on their ship’s capacity. In the eighteenth century the quota gradually increased to six. The enrolment of youth with no interest in life at sea was not without difficulties. Captains feared the slackening of discipline on board their ships, and in cases of desertion of their charges, would absolve themselves from responsibility.36

31

On the rite of passage and the two distinct stages: Cotrugli, ‘Il trattato “De navigatione”’, pp. 124–25. 32 Magno, Voyages (1557–1565), pp. 527, 633–34; Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 382. 33 Hocquet, Venise et le monopole, I, p. 307; idem, ‘La gente di mare’, p. 500. 34 Pellegrini, ‘Salariato’ della nave Girarda, p. 20. 35 At the end of the seventeenth century the criterion was changed from botti to the overall length measured in piedi veneziani: Hocquet, ‘La gente di mare’, pp. 493–95; idem, ‘Gens de mer à Venise’, p. 132; Tucci, ‘La marina mercantile’, pp. 157, 176. 36 Hocquet, ‘La gente di mare’, pp. 498, 500 cit. 46; Tucci, ‘Marinai e galeotti’, p. 691.

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Another member of the sanitation team was the ship’s cat. Venetian ships could not leave port without having a cat on board, whose job was to keep the ship free of rats. Such a requirement is attested by the testimonies of several passengers who sailed on board Venetian ships.37 A long list of officers and craftsmen were enrolled to command the lower ranks. General security and safety rules did not impose any requirements in this field; instead it was practice and experience that determined the composition of the better-paid members of the crew. The hierarchy, proficiency, and social and material conditions have been the subject of several prominent studies,38 but my concern here is with formal requirements. Within this framework, another professional group that received considerable attention in legislation was that of the soldiers. 4

The Quota of Professional Soldiers

Until the introduction of the superior muskets and cannons of the sixteenth century, military competence was entrusted to specialized crossbowmen (balestrieri). This elite group of soldiers monitored the crew and occasionally instructed them how to load and shoot. However, in the second half of the fifteenth century, the crossbow waned in importance, and the balestrieri were replaced by artillerymen (artiglieri) or musketeers (archibugi). In 1461 the galleys were equipped with mortars, and six out of thirty-two archers were replaced with artillerymen. In 1486 the number was increased to eight. In 1518 the Council of Ten engaged twenty musketeers on board the galleys, and thirtysix in 1528, being more suitable for naval warfare.39 Similar changes took place on board the round ships.

37 Arbel, ‘Daily Life on Board’, p. 202. 38 On the composition of the crews and the deterioration in their material conditions: Tenenti, Cristoforo da Canal, pp. 77, 101–2; Lane, ‘Diet and Wages’, pp. 15–43; idem, ‘Venetian Seamen’, pp. 403–29; idem, ‘Wages and Recruitment’, pp. 21–26; Balard, ‘Biscotto, vino e topi’, pp. 243–54; Tucci, ‘Marinai e galeotti’, pp. 677–92; idem, ‘L’alimentazione a bordo’, pp. 601–6; idem, ‘I Greci nella vita marittima’, pp. 243–55; idem, ‘Una nave veneziana’, pp. 721–22; Hocquet, ‘Gens de mer à Venise’, pp. 103–68; idem, ‘La gente di mare’, pp. 481–526; idem, Venise et le monopole, I, p. 307; Jackson, ‘From Profit – Sailing to Wage – Sailing’, pp. 605–28; Zille, ‘I balestrieri della pope’, pp. 5–38; Pellegrini, ‘Salariato’ della nave Girarda, p. 20. On board smaller vessels: Gluzman, ‘Resurrection of a Sunken Ship’, pp. 44–47. 39 Hocquet, ‘La gente di mare’, pp. 507–8, 511–12; Lane, ‘Venetian Seamen’, pp. 408, 415–16.

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The requirement of skilled soldiers facilitated the enrolment of young noblemen, who were willing to acquire military and marine skills and gain expertise in shipping and trade. These nobili or balestrieri da poppa were initially hired solely for the galleys. But in the early fifteenth century, the Senate attempted to secure 150 places for young impoverished noblemen. Unlike before, they did not have the same military function, but were enrolled as apprentices for command, to gain business skills or learn how to master a ship and the use of weaponry. Thus, in times of economic depression, this role served as a governmental assistance programme for less-fortunate patricians. In 1430 a quota of two noblemen was established for every armed ship of the Comun, not without a strong opposition.40 In 1433 each one of the six round ships that departed for Syria was required to enrol two noblemen as balestrieri da poppa. Around midcentury ships of over 400 botti were required to carry two such noblemen.41 After 1451 this requirement was expanded to include also ships of a smaller capacity, of 200 to 400 botti.42 In the second half of the century, the quota on bigger ships was increased successively to four, six, and eight in 1483, with a monthly salary of four ducats, and the prospects for additional profits from trade during the voyage.43 It should be noted, however, that the nobili were initially enrolled on board round ships of over 1,000 botti that were licensed by the State or took part in important convoys to Flanders and England. The majority of the vessels were exempted from this requirement. The fall in the number of big ships and galleys and the increase in the number of applicants moved the Grand Council to apply the same requirement to smaller vessels. In the first two decades of the sixteenth century, ships of over 250 botti were required to enrol one nobile, and two for those of over 500 botti. In 1545 the quota was altered slightly to one nobile on ships with a total capacity greater than 300 botti, and two for those larger than 500 botti. This requirement applied on all Venice’s round ships that set sail from Venice, including those owned by colonial subjects.44 The programme looks good on paper, but new developments in weaponry gradually diverted younger patricians from acquiring practice in such 40 41 42 43

It was first declined on 5 February 1530: Sanuto, Le vite dei dogi (1423–74), I, p. 82 (1430). Dolfin, Cronicha dela nobil cità, p. 135. 16 January 1451: ASVe, SM, reg. 4, f. 28v; Sanuto, Le vite dei dogi (1423–74), I, p. 458. The potential profit for a noblemen who enrolled as balestriero da poppa for a commercial voyage was about 100–200 ducats. It constituted a steppingstone in the careers of many: Hocquet, ‘La gente di mare’, p. 510. 44 ASVe, SM, reg. 11, f. 199v (13 February 1484); ibid., reg. 14, ff. 6r–7v (31 March 1493); ibid., reg. 16 (22 April 1506); ibid., reg. 17, f. 124v (28 September 1510); ibid., reg. 19, f. 131r (31 January 1520); ibid., reg. 28, f. 39r (25 June 1545).

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professions. On top of that, noblemen who were not at all keen on joining the fleet would send someone to act on their behalf, in return for part of their profit. Disenchanted from the multitude of frauds, the Senate attempted to limit those eligible to stand in for patricians either to the nobleman’s relatives, or to someone suitable for this role. In truth, the arrangement met with little enthusiasm on the part of the operators as well, for whom it spelled nothing but trouble: the noblemen were no substitute for professional soldiers. The preamble to the 21 October 1502 enactment draws attention to the superfluous expenses incurred from enrolling nobili da poppa. In fact, these were seen as one of the causes for the attrition of the private sector of merchant shipping. To lessen the burden, it was decided to include their salaries and the daily expenses as general average;45 but the space allocated for their portada remained an indirect loss to the operators. Nevertheless, the complaints were silenced, at least officially. The general dislike of the nobili da poppa arose from the fact that they were elected by various institutions and not directly by the operators. They also hailed from very different social backgrounds and mostly had no experience at sea. Captains had little patience for this excessive weight on their command bridge.46 More importantly, their loyalty was in doubt, and therefore they jeopardized the commercial prospects of the voyage. Indeed, they were so much disliked that the operators were willing to award a full salary and additional bonuses to those elected, should they not embark. The administration often complained about the various ruses the operators employed to leave their nobili behind, and captains were required to present a bolleta issued by the responsible authority to obtain their clearance.47 5

Arms and Artillery Requirements

Several chapters in thirteenth-century maritime statutes determined the armament on board commercial ships based on their relative size.48 One would therefore expect to find equivalent enactments in the following two centuries. However, the records of the major state authorities fail to mention 45 Ibid., reg. 15, f. 156v (21 October 1502). 46 In the introduction to his first voyage to Cyprus, Alessandro Magno commented that noblemen did not have any role on board. He enrolled as one on his second voyage: Magno, Voyages (1557–1565), pp. 526, 633. 47 ASVe, SM, reg. 14, ff. 6r–7v. (31 March 1493); ibid., reg. 19, f. 131r (31 January 1520). On the re-estimate of the ships’ capacity to better determined the quota of nobili on board: ibid., reg. 28, ff. 39r (25 June 1545), 60r (29 June 1545); ibid., fil. 5, f. 273r (29 September 1548). 48 Predelli & Sacerdoti, ‘Gli statuti marittimi’, II, pp. 181–83.

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such specifications. Weaponry requirements, if they existed, were probably established by authorities of lower rank in the administrative hierarchy. Nevertheless, improvements in naval warfare led to significant changes in the ordnance on board. The War of Chioggia was the first in which cannons were used on ships; Venetian cogs had some pieces of artillery from the 1370s onward.49 Bombards were noted as the first item in a list of armaments supplied by Benedetto Cotrugli in 1464–65. Other items include more conventional weaponry, such as the crossbow and multiple projectiles: Bombards, light shield (targhe), spears (lance), iron darts (dardi), crossbows (ballestre), armour (coraze), headgear (celate), a bomb or a grenade (carcasi, carcassa), big darts for a crossbow (verrectoni), black powder (polvere di bombarda), cutting tool from metal (tagliole), type of dagger (cinti).50 This list contains mostly anti-personnel projectiles of various sorts. The bombards referred to were probably small pieces which, around 1460–70, began to be mounted on the decks of ships, in the waist, firing on the broadside either over the bulwarks or through small ports cut in them. Similarly, small calibres fired through compact openings in the castles fore and aft. The best ordnance afloat was quite capable of putting a stone or a cast-iron ball of moderate weight (12 lb and above) through the hull of a ship at perhaps 180–270 metres.51 The last decades of the fifteenth century saw rapid improvement in the implementation of artillery on board. Mediterranean navies began to mount a single heavy gun on a fixed mounting, right forward. Initially these guns were long, wrought-iron breech-loaders of the type known as basilisks. Such a piece is visible at the bow of a pilgrims’ galley in one of the woodcuts found in Bernhard von Breydenbach’s Peregrination in Terram Sanctam dated 1486. Another woodcut of the battle of Zonchio (1499) shows pieces of this sort on the bows of Ottoman galleys. The construction of the carracks with their lofty forestages made it difficult to develop a powerful ahead-firing armament that could beat the galley at her own game. Another early piece of artillery, known in Venice as passavolante, was a long and medium-calibre gun brought into use at the last possible moment, when ships came alongside each other. However, such new weaponry did not change the tactics of naval warfare, as the fate 49 Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, pp. 195, 356–60; Ashtor, ‘Aspetti dell’espansione italiana’, p. 23. 50 Cotrugli, ‘Il trattato “De Navigatione”’, pp. 129, 236. 51 Rodger, ‘The Development of Broadside Gunnery’, pp. 304–5.

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of a battle continued to be basically determined by ship-to-ship combat and boarding. In fact, many of these pieces were put out of use by the balestrieri and the archibugieri in the early stages of a fight.52 Another significant change introduced around the turn of the century (c. 1500) was the gradual replacement of wrought-iron ordnance with pieces of cast bronze, muzzle-loading cannon, and culverins, as Europe’s premier heavy gun-powder ordnance. High-quality bronze pieces could potentially remain in service for 150 years.53 Around the same time ships of war began to mount a pair of large long-guns (a type of basilisk) right aft on the lowest deck that soon became known as the gunroom, firing through ports cut in the stern on either side of the sternpost.54 A letter written on 22 August 1497 by Andrea Loredan, commander of the armed ships, to his brother Antonio refers to two pieces of large bombards (possibly heavy guns firing forward) that were retrieved from the wrecked ship Contarina in the vicinity of Tripoli on the Barbary Coast; these were subsequently mounted on a Venetian galley. The same letter raised the issue of the technological race to successfully mount heavy guns on board sailing vessels that could effectively strike the enemy on or near the waterline. When a certain Genoese ship refused to haul down its sails, Loredan reacted by shooting small pieces of artillery to signal them to stop, but when the Genoese did not alter their course, the Venetian commander fired one shot from the large bombards, and even though the shot came from leeward, the projectile managed to destroy part of the rigging of the enemy vessel, compelling it to stop. Loredan expressed his personal satisfaction in the efficiency of the canons and minions fixed with their fork at the beam, as well as the large bombards.55 But it took several more decades for broadside artillery fired through watertight gun ports in the hull to revolutionize naval warfare.56 Owing to the high cost of ordnance, most common ships invariably suffered a chronic deficiency. In fact, the Arsenal’s own manufactured artillery was reserved for the galleys and ships of the Comun. Since a great many ships sent to the fleet during the Ottoman-Venetian war (1499–1502) armed with 52 Ibid., pp. 301–2; Guilmartin, ‘Guns and Gunnary’, pp. 139, 144–45; Morin, ‘Morphology and Constructive’, pp. 2–3. 53 Cast-iron guns were considerably heavier than bronze pieces of the same calibre but cost a third to a fourth as much: Guilmartin, ‘Guns and Gunnery’, p. 146. 54 Ibid., p. 303. 55 The reference is to the 700-botti ship of Piero Contarini, which was captured earlier by the corsair Zuane Perez in the waters of Tunis and probably shipwrecked afterwards: Sanuto, I diarii, I, 772, 768–69 (22 August 1497). Loredan’s large bombards were iron-cast: ibid., I, 774. 56 Guilmartin, ‘Guns and Gunnery’, p. 143.

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additional artillery failed to return the weapons after the war, in 1502 the Arsenal appointed an official in charge of ordnance loans to commercial ships. In a bid to further tighten control, in 1506 the Senate introduced penalties for late returns of borrowed items. Despite this, the haemorrhage of artillery from the public armoury became chronic, and eventually required the intervention of the Council of Ten. In 1520 the borrowing of bronze artillery for merchantmen was stipulated by the consent of that Council. Further measures were taken in 1531 to record the names of all creditors and debtors and identify the pieces by marking each one with an ‘X’ and a unique registry number. These measures were ratified by the Ten in 1536 and again in 1537 during another conflict with the Turks. Meanwhile, an accountant was appointed to keep track of the cannons, sulphur, and other items stored in the armoury.57 Special requests were approved on a case-by-case basis;58 in 1525, for example, the Senate authorized Zuane Capello to purchase two pieces of bronzecast artillery, the supports, and thirty bullets of 16 lb for his ship; in 1532, the ship Rimonda, captained by Bortolo da Lesina, was leased to carry wheat from Thessaloniki. However, since a considerable part of its artillery had been jettisoned in its previous voyage to Flanders, two pieces of bronze-cast artillery of 25 lb and above were granted for the new voyage. In 1540 Angelo Correr appealed to the Council of Ten, asking permission to purchase two bronze-cast canoni da sedici for his ship that was about to set sail to the Levant in February of that year, before the treaty to end the war with the Turks was signed. In 1542 one of the bronze pieces on the ship of Filippo Lion q. Tomà broke prior to the vessel’s departure to Flanders. Lion requested to borrow one artillery da sedici, offering raw bronze as security. He was also willing to give the Arsenal the first right to barter it for the borrowed piece upon the return of his ship. In the same year, Antonio Alberto leased his ship to the State to transport rusks from Barletta to Corfu. Since the Adriatic Sea was infested with pirate fuste, he borrowed six bronze muskets that shot ten-ounce bullets, offering security in gold or silver of equivalent value.59 As one would expect, warships were more fit for battle and carried a greater number of weapons. The complete ordnance of bronze artillery that was required to arm the barze and the galione of the Comun is found in the records 57 See correspondingly: ASVe, PPA, reg. 134, ff. 26–27 (18 April 1502); ibid., reg. 531, fasc. 5 [31 March 1520]; ASVe, SM, reg. 16, f. 123r (18 July 1506); ASVe, CXDC, fil. 18, fasc. 181 (4 August 1506); ibid., fil. 20, fasc. 75 (18 May 1536); ibid., fil. 21, fasc. 49 (7 June 1537). 58 Morin, ‘Artiglieria navali’, p. 26. 59 ASVe, SM, reg. 20, f. 174r (7 July 1525); ASVe, CXDC, fil. 15, fasc. 265 (20 September 1532); ibid., fil. 26, fasc. 296 (26 February 1540); ibid., fil. 31, fascc. 31 (22 March 1542), 154 (26 June 1542).

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of the Council of Ten. In 1534 the barza captained by Jacomo d’Armer was equipped with a total of 115 pieces of artillery. The galione captained by Bertuci Contarini (1535) was armed with 130 pieces of artillery. In 1544 the barza captained by Stefano Taraboto was commissioned for a relatively peaceful voyage to Cyprus and fitted-out with 67 pieces of artillery.60 A manuscript entitled Misure di vascelli et cetera, attributed to an Arsenal’s proto (terminus ad quem 1546), contains the ordnance of a war galleon with 128 pieces of artillery.61 The inventories include culverins, cannons, and swivel guns of equivalent calibres. The pieces are customarily divided into muzzle-loaders and breechloaders. The first category includes the more important, more powerful, and larger pieces. The distinction of the calibre is based on the weight of the lead balls, measured in Venetian libbra sotile (1 lb = 301.2 g.), though in practice iron balls with equal diameter were used. The colubrine-type guns (culverin) were adapted to standard sizes; so did the cannons that were roughly one-third shorter and lighter in comparison with the corresponding calibre in the culverins. Other types of muzzle-loaders were the saker (sacro); aspide; the falcon ( falcone); falconet ( falconetto); the musket ‘da zuogo’; and the standard robinet (maschetto). The breech-loaders included the Venetian swivel guns (petriere da mascolo), literally a ‘stone-thrower’, a short-barrelled breech-loading piece used as a railing piece delivering stone projectiles; the petriere da braga and the moschetto da braga, both with a stout iron-plate breech (the braga).62 It is doubtful whether merchantmen maintained such quantities of firearms on board.63 Even the barza di Comun carried fewer arms when commissioned for a commercial voyage. Moreover, while the calibre of Venetian military artillery produced in the Arsenal’s foundries was carefully respected (the weight and length could differ), that of private artillery varied according to the specifications supplied by the buyer. Hence, the ordnance of merchant ships was a mixture of ‘state’ artillery, privately manufactured custom-made pieces, and old cannons inherited or purchased from decommissioned ships.

60 ASVe, CXDC, fil. 18, fasc. 32 (27 June 1534); ibid., fil. 19, fascc. 94 (14 June 1535), 96 (16 June 1535); ibid., fil. 35, fasc. 180 (4 July 1544). 61 Tucci, ‘Misura di vascelli’, p. 292. 62 For the great diversity of available arms and their technical specifications: Morin, ‘Artiglieria navali’, pp. 19–21; idem, ‘Morphology and Constructive’, pp. 4–6; Scordato, ‘Two Venetian Swivel Guns’, p. 28. 63 Compare with the relatively humble number of cannons used for arming a 400-tons merchantman built in Liguria in 1546/7: Massa Piergiovanni, ‘Aspetti finanziari ed economici’, p. 110.

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Archaeological finds attest that most of the artillery on board merchant vessels was manufactured by private master-founders and was of inferior quality.64 We can match up this information with several indications found in the written records of ships’ ordnances. A document dated 26 March 1504 found among the inheritance papers of Angelo Malipiero q. Tomà reports twentyeight pieces of artillery that were transferred from a decommissioned vessel to his new ship (later captured by pirates). It includes bombards and Spingarde cannons of different calibres and their respective value in ducats.65 On 14 May 1532 a certain Denis Possot embarked on the Santa Maria captained by Polo Bianco on a voyage to Cyprus; the ship had seven large cannons, many smaller pieces, along with three full-armour coats (brigandines) for protection.66 A vessel of 130 botti owned and captained by Manoli Servo that was confiscated in 1561 included schiavine and other muskets worth 95 cechini, 36 pieces of iron artillery, and black powder.67 The inventory of the Madonna S. Maria Mazor e Santo Iseppo of 420 botti (official rating), which was prepared in 1562 on the moment of sale, contained 22 pieces of artillery that were on board, including seven bronze cannons of different calibre (3 to 16 lb), eleven smerigli (long cannons), and three swivel guns (petriere) cast from iron or bronze, plus black powder and ammunition.68 In 1549 the inspection of the cattaveri of 700– 800-botti ships, which offered transport services to the Levant for pilgrims, shows that the Alberta possessed 14 gross pieces of bronze artillery, and 17 muskets or other light projectiles, and 4 pieces of iron artillery; the Vianuola had 16 pieces of bronze artillery and 18 light projectiles; and the Liona carried 6 pieces of bronze artillery 6 of iron.69 6

Convoys of Merchant Ships (conserva)

The decision to sail in a convoy was taken voluntarily if the financial drawbacks were relatively small compared to the advantage of having additional protection. In such cases the captains were required to raise anchors at a certain date, proceed in a formation within eye distance of each other, and obey 64 Two such examples are the Venetian cannons found on Megadim beach in Israel, and the non-homogenous ordnance recouped from the Gnaliç Wreck in Croatia: Morin, ‘Artiglieria navali’, pp. 20, 26; idem, ‘Morphology and Constructive’, p. 8. 65 ASVe, PSM, Misti, bus. 6A, fasc. IV [26 March 1504]. 66 Possot, Le voyage de la Terre Sainte, p. 108. 67 ASVe, ACMCP, bus. 3857, c. 110r (10 February 1562). 68 Tucci, ‘Una nave veneziana’, p. 716. 69 ASVe, UC, bus. 315, f. 3r (4 June 1549).

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the elected capitanio; the convoy dissolved when the vessels reached their agreed coordinates. A commercial fleet had the potential to include many ships of diverse nationalities sailing to different destinations. Similarly, small vessels tended to join big convoys for a leg of their journey.70 Despite restrictions on free movement, vessels continued as separate business units and did not share any components of their business management. One such example, is a convoy established in the office of a public notary in Candia in 1503. The captains of two caravels and a schierazo, who had licensed their ships for a voyage to Venice via Valonia in Albania, established the conditions of a conserva as far as the island of Meleda (Mljet, Croatia). The captain of the larger vessel Michele Coresi q. Piero was expected to take command from the moment they departed from Crete.71 Venice obligated its ships (and not only galleys) to sail in a convoy when its possible loss would have a disastrous effect on the economy. These constraints were extreme measures that increased the financial burden; ships competed in keeping down the expenses, being the first to put into ports and hence clinch better deals with agents and shippers. Maintaining the convoy meant dead time in ports and speed restrictions at sea, all delays that affected their business and incurred extended salaries and greater supply costs. In theory, a ship that caused delay would reimburse the other vessels accordingly, but in practice compensations were not always easy to determine. Advised by the savi agli ordini, on 24 April 1519 the Collegio ordered two richly accoutred ships that were preparing to set sail to Constantinople to form a convoy and divide the captainship between them on a weekly basis. It soon became clear that while the ship of Polo di Priuli q. Domenico was ready for departure, the other was not. Despite repeated appeals from Priuli, the Collegio was unwilling to rescind the ruling. Undeterred, the captain sought assistance from the public prosecutor, who successfully persuaded the doge and his counsellors to revoke their commitment. This demonstrates the effort operators were willing to make to neutralize such constraints on their ships: in this case at the personal price of confronting the doge himself.72 In cases where the commercial convoy was escorted by an armed war ship of the Comun, the naval commander was automatically appointed capitanio.73 70 The following convoy consisted of two muda ships and three other vessels: ASVe, SM, reg. 12, f. 71r (10 March 1486). Hans Tucher’s pilgrim galley (1479) formed a convoy with merchant galleys, a large Venetian ship, and a smaller Genoese vessel in Modon: Die ‘Reise ins gelobte Land’, pp. 359–60 (9 July 1479). 71 ASVe, NC, bus. 177, ‘Primo quaderno’, f. 129v ‘XVI’ (1503). 72 Sanuto, I diarii, XXVII, 205 (24 April 1519). 73 The cotton muda of autumn 1483 for example: ASVe, SM, reg. 11, f. 174r (27 July 1483).

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In other cases, the role was delegated to any high-ranking state officials among the passengers: governors and consuls were directly eligible;74 and when there were no such officials on board, the Collegio appointed one of the noble merchants; alternatively, as we have seen, one of the ships’ captains – with precedence to those of noble birth; and if there were none, the role was allotted according to age or reputation and the size of the ship.75 When no other provisions were made, the captains took turns. The primary function of the capitanio was to maintain the formation during navigation. He set the speed, the course, and the itinerary, altering the route and determining stopovers as he deemed fit. Formally, he was also responsible for inspecting the vessel against overloading and overcrowding  – a duty that was rather sparingly exercised. Any breach of convoy rules entailed a personal fine and the loss of captainship for several years.76 Before departure, all the captains received written instructions on the codes that would be used for communication at sea. One such an example is a copy found among the legacy of Captain Stefano Pastrovichio of a document written in Constantinople on 22 November 1533. The document established a system of signs for communication between the ship captained by the said Pastrovichio and another owned by Vincenzo di Achudi. The reason for forming a convoy was not indicated; however, several months earlier, on 29 April 1533 Pastrovichio set sail to Constantinople in a convoy that had been instated by the Senate owing to his ship’s cargo of valuable merchandise. Possibly, a similar arrangement was required in this instance as well. The identity of the writer or the capitanio is likewise unclear: was it one of the captains, or a passenger on board? This copy, however, was addressed to Pastrovichio 74 The 1482 September muda sailed in a convoy commanded by Francesco Marcello, the consul of Damascus: ASVe, SM, reg. 11, f. 146r (18 July 1482). 75 E.g., Captain Biasio di Alboregno, the older in a convoy of 4 cocche on a voyage to Syria on 26 March 1429 was elected capitanio: Sanuto, Le vite dei dogi (1423–74), I, p. 78. In another instance a convoy to Constantinople in 1483 was commanded by Captain Nicolò Bon the only nobleman among the captains: ASVe, SM, reg. 11, f. 177v (28 August 1483). 76 E.g., the forming of a convoy for the return voyage of four ships found at the Saline in Cyprus as far as Corfu. The conditions were underwritten in Nicosia on 28 July 1517 by a provisory Council of Twelve. The elected capitanio Hieronimo di Francesco Bernardo was instructed to proceed promptly to Le Saline, embark on the ship captained by Piero di Bortolo and provide that all ships would be properly crewed. Bernardo was authorized to punish negligent captains with a fine of 300 ducats. A copy of the commission was presented in 1521 before the counsellors, members of the Collegio, before reelecting Bernardo as capitanio of the departing ships to Syria: ASVe, CN, reg. 19, ff. 16r, 18r (9, 20 March 1521).

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himself, suggesting that the writer received the orders from someone else. The system of signals made use of lamps ( ferali) and the flag in the following way: (a) to change course: light two lamps and keep them clear and strong until the convoy ship responds; (b) to riff the sails (libar velle): light one lamp and keep it firm and visible until receiving a response from the convoy ship; (c) to strike down a sail (metter a secho): light one lamp, lift it three times, and then cover it and repeat the sequence until it is seen by the convoy ship; (d) to remain on bare poles: light three lamps and hold them steady until they are spotted by the convoy ship; (e) to hoist the sail: light one lamp ( far dirichao uno feral) and hold it steady until a response arrives from the convoy ship, presumably with its own lamps and flags; (f) to hoist other sails: light three lamps firm until getting a response from the convoy ship; (g) should you lose sight of the convoy ship: hoist the San Marco flag on the crow’s nest from the up-wind side, alzar la bandiera in cheba ala volta dela vella; (h)  to request consultation: hoist a flag on the stern or in mid-ship so that both ships can get closer to form a council at sea.77 7

Mandatory Pilotage Services

The safe conduct of offshore navigation was largely dependent on charts, compasses, dead-reckoning, and regular sounding of the waters,78 but when a ship approached ports the piloting shifted to professionals, who could be hired in commercial ports along the principal routes. According to Venetian law, ships and galleys that sailed to England or Flanders were required to enrol a pedoto in Cadiz or Lisbon; another was hired for the return voyage.79 Ships sailing to the Levant were required to pull into the port of Modon (until 1499, and later Zante or Corfu) and hire a local pilot. The same custom was practised by other commercial fleets.80 The qualified pilots were hired on a short-term basis, as was required by their profession. They were familiar with the coastline, 77 The written instructions also included the following orders: in case of danger on the horizon, draw close to the other ship for consulting; the convoy would be dissolved after passing Cape Maleas in the Southern Peloponnesus; any approach to land or port is not permitted before making contact with the other ship. My thanks to Mauro Bondioli for drawing my attention to this document: ASVe, SAC, bus. 42 [23 November 1533]. 78 Lane, ‘The Economic Meaning’, pp. 606–7. 79 The galleys bound for Flanders hired a pilot in Lisbon after fifty vessels were shipwrecked in the previous months: Sanuto, I diarii, II, 457 (19 January 1499). 80 Cotrugli, ‘Il trattato “De navigatione”’, pp. 126–27, 234.

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sounding, and the weather patterns in their region, thus ensuring safe and efficient passage. In his treatise on navigation, Benedetto Cotrugli recounts an event he witnessed close to the city of Segna (Senj) in Dalmatia, when the local pilot spotted small clouds gathering and instructed the captain to take immediate shelter in the port and secure his ship. Within less than an hour fierce winds bore down upon the area, without mercy.81 Many similar accounts stress the importance of making use of local experience and know-how whenever a ship approached the shores. In Venice, all vessels of over 100 botti (or an equivalent of 1,000 stara of grain) required an expert local pedoto grande to be on board while the vessel entered or left the lagoon. It was not wise to attempt the tricky entrance without accurate and up-to-date information on the current state of the perilous fuosa (the channel that extended several miles offshore and was constantly shifting). Smaller vessels were formally exempted yet encouraged to hire the services of a pedoto pizolo to facilitate the manoeuvre. Some ships tried to avoid the requirement by declaring a smaller capacity.82 Tugging the ship Malipiera of 1,090 botti outside the port in 1509 required eleven pilot boats that were hired for 6 lire per boat, totalling 66 lire; an additional three rowing boats (barche di nave), two with 8 rowers and one with 13, for 1 lira per rower, totalling 29 lire; plus 46 additional rowers for a total of 53 lire 5 soldi; the fee to the armiraglio Zerchollaqua for piloting the ship through the passage over the fuosa came to a total of 31 lire. To tug the ship as far as the lighthouses, the owners disbursed an additional sum of 14 lire 10 soldi for 16 rowers. Hence, the total expenditure was over 31 ducats.83 A tariff dated 4 September 1512 established the rates (in ducats) for piloting a vessel into the port proper, or up to the anchorage places situated outside the port (sopra porto), where part of the merchandise might be unloaded before the vessel continued its schedule: 81 82

83

Probably an intensification of the bora in the gulf of Quarner: ibid., pp. 62–64, 126–27, 234. On the exclusion and re-inclusion of the pilot fees in the general average: ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 23, reg. 22ter, c. 53b (29 March 1429). The pedoti pizoli were not permitted to work on ships of over 1,000 stara or smaller vessels owned by the State, a privilege reserved to the pedoti grandi: ASVe, UC, reg. 3.5, cc. 4t–5t (27 June 1450), ratified in 1512: ibid., cc. 21t– 24t (4 September 1512). The name of the ship is not indicated, but it is reckoned to be the Malipiera of 1,090 botti: ASVe, PSM, Misti, bus. 161, fasc. VI [1509]. It is unclear whether two additional items that are indicated in the same document concern the entrance procedure: ‘Nicolò di Lesina for 2 days and one night lira 1 soldi 5, and for 2 additional men lire 1 soldi 15’. Similarly, the 500-botti Croce that carried Carlier de Pinon to the Levant in 1579 was tugged out of port by ten boats, headed by the armiraglio: Carlier de Pinon, Voyage en Orient, pp. 32–3.

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The rates for piloting vessels into the port of Venice in 1512

Type and capacity

Sopra porto

In porto

Grippi, marciliane and other vessels bellow 100 botti Ships and vessels of 100–200 botti Ships of 300–400 botti Ships of 400–500 botti Ships of 800–1,000 botti Ships of 1,000–1,500 botti Ships of 1,500–2,000 botti

– – 5 ducats 6 ducats 8 ducats 10 ducats 15 ducats

3 ducats 5 ducats 7 ducats 8 ducats 13 ducats 17 ducats 20 ducats

The gaps between the different brackets (the ‘missing’ botti) were probably necessary for pairing ships to a category with ease. The inexact rating measurements established by various magistracies must have been a source of dispute. Merchant galleys enjoyed a reduced tariff of 10 ducats for the passage from Istria to Venice, and 4 ducats on the opposite direction: ASVe, CL, bus. 19, 87 (4 September 1512). In 1521, marciliane and other vessels of whatever type, with a capacity of over 700 stara were required to hire pilots as well: ASVe, UC, reg. 3.5, cc. 34r–t (4 September 1521).

The pilots thus commissioned were picked up in one of the ports along the Istrian peninsula and were expected to disembark after casting anchor. Then they returned to Istria on a vessel that set sail in that direction.84 The State intervened to ensure the availability of a sufficient number of pedoti grandi and took means to centralize this service in the Istrian ports of Parenzo and Rovigno. There, the pilot boats approached nearby ships and offered their services. This practice was, however, abolished in 1512; captains were required to send one of their officers with the service boat to Parenzo to negotiate with the pilots that were expected to wait on the docks. After coming to terms, the pedoti embarked on the ship that rode on anchor outside port.85 Meanwhile, there were also hoaxers to contend with, and records show that the magistracy of the cattaver prosecuted impostors who had posed as official pilots.86

84 ASVe, CL, bus. 19, fasc. 21, 7 (21 January 1468). 85 ASVe, UC, bus. 3.5, cc. 1r (27 July 1440), 12r–t (2 February 1480), 21t–24t (4 September 1512). 86 Ibid., cc. 13r–t (1 September 1487), 20t–21r (15 February 1507), 29t–31r (2 September 1515), 34t–35r (31 October 1523).

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Venetian Safety Standards for Hawsers, Cordage, and Anchors

The ship’s cordage (sartiame) was divided into two distinguished groups. The first was the sartie d’acqua, thick intertwined hawsers for mooring, towing, and anchoring that were designed for salty waters. The second was the sartie d’arboro, all standing and running rigging arrangements, including shrouds, forestay, backstay, and various other lines for hoisting, trimming, and handling lateen and square-rigs. Their characteristics and length varied considerably according to their use. The checking of all ship’s cordage along the entire length for signs of fraying, loose strands, and breaks was an indispensable part of good seamanship. Operators would find themselves liable for any damage to goods incurred as a result of deficient cordage, a liability that became standard for leasing contracts. In quite a few incidents, ships remained at the mercy of their last anchor line.87 For this very reason the Venetian authorities intervened in the cultivation of hemp, but also in the entire chain of manufacturing and its importation, to ensure the right quality standards for marine use.88 By the thirteenth century Zeno’s Code established the quota of the new and used intertwined hawsers, and their respective anchors, in proportion to the ship’s capacity. The provveditori di Comun issued penalties to captains who set sail with defective cordage or sold their equipment. Additionally, three supervisors inspected the manufacturers themselves, and the twisting of the crucial heavy hawsers was conducted only in the presence of the said delegates.89 In the meantime, a new wing of the Arsenal (the Tana) was assigned for stocking hemp and cordage. After 1328 all the hackling of hemp plants and the sorting and grading of fibres was done at the Tana, and the finest grades were set aside for marine cordage.90 The government’s concern for the excellence of the ropes and riggings on Venetian ships eventually forced hemp spinners to aggregate into a guild and work within the Arsenal complex itself, whereby it functioned as a communal central workshop, in which the craftsmen did not own the material on which they worked. Gradually, more efforts were made to standardize the products; whitelabelled hawsers and mooring lines (gomene), made of the finest Bolognese hemp, were considered premium quality. Second to these was black-labelled cordage made of second-grade Bolognese hemp. Then came the green-labelled 87 88 89 90

E.g., Sanuto, I diarii, XXXII, 420 (27 January 1522); ibid., LVII, 289, 300–3, 306, 326–27, 377 (29 November–28 December 1532). Lane, ‘The Rope Factory’, pp. 269–84; Celetti, La canapa nella Repubblica Veneta, pp. 211–53. Predelli & Sacerdoti, ‘Gli statuti marittimi’, pp. 316–17, 336; Lane, ‘Venetian Seamen’, p. 409 cit. 1; idem, ‘Maritime Law and Administration’, p. 227. Lane, ‘The Rope Factory’, pp. 271–72 cit. 10–11, 274.

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ropes made from first-grade non-Bolognese hemp, and yellow-labelled ropes made of second grade non-Bolognese ropes.91 In addition to the domestic monopoly, the Tana enjoyed protection from outside competitors – foreignmanufactured ropes were considered inferior and imputed as the principle cause for accidents and shipwrecks. Ships hoisting the San Marco flag and treated ‘as Venetians’ were required to purchase their hawsers and rigging directly from the Tana. If these items were purchased elsewhere, they had to be inspected and approved by the proti della Tana, or else considered contraband and therefore unworthy.92 The Fabrica di galere manuscript (1410) includes a short section with details on the sartie d’acqua and the cordage requirements for merchant vessels. The types of ropes were of three or four strands (nomboli). According to a rule described as general, two anchor cables (sing. tortiza) were required for every 100 botti or 100 milliaria. All these cables were to weigh 10 Venetian pounds (libbra grossa of 477 g) per passo, which corresponds to 2.75 kg per metre, and measured 20.32 cm in circumference and 6.5 cm in diameter. The normal length of an anchor cable was 80 paces (139.2 m), but in other passages cables of 85–90 and 100 paces are mentioned. A ship of circa 700 botti measuring 13 paces in the keel is described to be equipped with twelve anchor cables and mooring lines: four prodesi of 80 paces, two prexe weighing 3 lb per passa, three prexoline of 2 lb, three gripie, and so forth. The very same ship had ten anchors: two 1,000 lb and the others of 850 lb. It was customary to compare the weight of the anchor to that of the cable and not vice versa. Hence, the anchor was supposed to weigh 10% (and even a quarter) more than its hawser.93 A document that found its way into a dossier of bills of lading (polizze di carico) 1481–1506 in the inheritance records of Michele Foscari q. Filippo contains an inventory of an unidentified round ship reported as possessing the following cordage: five new hawsers (gomene); three old hawsers; one cable for the boat (cavo da barca, possibly for tugging or for hauling the boat); one cable for careening; general cordage (sartia menuda cioè menali, used for the tackles 91 Ibid., pp. 269–70, 276, 281; idem, Venice, A Maritime Republic, pp. 162–63, 318. On the production of marine cordage and tariff in the sixteenth century: Sanuto, I diarii, XXXIX, 387 (4 September 1525), as well as the stamped edition of Gio-Piero Pinelli: ASVe, PPA, reg. 621 [18 May 1615, a separate booklet]. 92 ASVe, PC, reg. 1, f. 24v (10 June 1368). The same policy in 18 November 1530 enactment: ASVe, SM, reg. 22, f. 53r; Sanuto, I diarii, LIV, 118. 93 Bellabarba, ‘The Square-Rigged Ship’, pp. 118, 129 cit. 11; the thickest hawser mentioned in the Fabrica di galere is of 28 lb per passo (about 11 cm in diameter). Such ropes (and smaller ones) were used on ships of 900 to 1,500 botti furnished with eight to ten corresponding anchors of 1,500 to 3,000 lb.

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to careen a ship); a line used to maintain the antenna or the sails (manto da stiva); trip lines for the anchors (gripie); a plumb line (scandajo); and four anchors.94 The same list contains an impressive number of sails (mostly new), however, the standing and running rigging are missing. It is possible that the inventory in question refers to items stored below deck, including the anchor and mooring lines and reserve cables, as well as the cordage that was used for careening the ship and reserve sails. An inventory, dated 7 June 1517, of a threemasted lateen-rigged navilio owned by Marco Gradenigo q. Giusto included a detailed description of the following items, including their measurements: two anchors, a new mooring line, a new intertwine cable of three strands (cao da terzo) at an identical length, along with another used hawser at an identical length, a smaller old hawser (gomenetta vechia), two old flat cables (cai piani), a half-used cable (prexolina), an old cable for the boat another type of rope (lanzana), and two plumb lines (scandagi).95 The critical dearth of supplies in the Arsenal in 1509 at the outbreak of the war of the Holy League prompted the Council of Ten to grant a temporary permit to citizens and subjects to purchase marine cordage from suppliers outside the Tana, be they in Venice or elsewhere. The Ten even encouraged ships to sail to Ragusa and other ports where cordage was available and supply them to the Arsenal.96 In 1524 Corfiot subjects applied to the Senate to purchase foreign-made cordage. According to the same source, a similar privilege had been granted to Dalmatian vessels earlier.97 These instances suggests that the rigid rules were generally respected concerning all vessels that hoisted the San Marco flag, unless exempted by some form of privilege. Starting in 1525, the safety inspection on board ships was conducted by the armiraglio del porto; among his duties was to attend the assembly of all the rigging. But it soon became necessary to employ specialists to conduct a more thorough inspection, for which the Tana employed two surveillance boats commanded by the capitanio sopra i canevi. According to one of these officials’ own testimony, he focused on the foreign-manufactured cordage since they were not of the same quality (carata et fineza) as those of Venetian make, and

94 ASVe, PSM, Misti, bus. 41, fasc. X [SD]. 95 ASVe, MG, bus. 12bis – I [7 June 1517]. 96 In the sixteenth century, the high-quality ropes were made of two types of canvas, refudi and mocadi: ASVe, CXDM, reg. 32, f. 211r (15 November 1509). A temporary shortage in refudi in 1533 was confronted with the manufacture of hawsers from mocadi only: ASVe, SM, reg. 22, f. 179v (24 March 1533). 97 Sathas, Documents inédits, V, p. 264 (5 August 1524).

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faulty rigging was the cause of many shipwrecks.98 Vessels navigating outside the Adriatic Sea that required cordage were permitted to purchase them elsewhere, but with an attestation of quality and quantity from the local governor or authority in the place they were manufactured. Within ten days following the arrival, the attestation had to be approved by the provveditori e patroni all’Arsenal, which in turn instructed the proti della Tana to seal both ends of the rope, so that they would be identified during the inspection, and the ship could therefore sail without delay. For this service, the operators paid 2 ducats per milliaria to the Tana and additional 10 soldi for the seal.99 The right to collect cordage taxes was auctioned off for the first time in 1525 to private tax farmers in return for a yearly fixed sum of 2,200 ducats; this was more than double the sum that the Arsenal expected to gain from auctioning the anchorage tax.100 The sum offered increased significantly in years with adverse weather, between 1527 and 1531. It was auctioned off quite regularly every two consecutive years and sold for the following prices: table 4

Annual income from cordage tax based on auction price results (1525–71)

Date of auctioning

Sold for

Per month

20 November 1525 24 September 1527 28 September 1529 28 September 1531 25 September 1533 August 1535 23 September 1537 5 July 1541 9 February 1543

2,200 ducats 3,061 ducats 3,080 ducats 2,800 ducats 2,062 ducats ? 1,200 ducats 1,251 ducats 1,563 ducats

183 1/3 255 256 2/3 233 1/3 171 4/5 50  69 1/2  65 1/8

ASVe, PPA, reg. 134, ff. 267–71 (24 September 1527), 311–15 (28 September 1529), 387–92 (28 September 1531), 407–8 (25 September 1533).

98 ASVe, PPA, reg. 134, ff. 368–70 (1 December 1531); ASVe, CXDC, fil. 14, fasc. 156 (12 December 1531). 99 ASVe, PPA, reg. 531, no. 15 [18 November 1530], [re-enacted 20 November 1535]. 100 Based on a Senate’s enactment 4 September 1525: ibid., reg. 134, ff. 239–45 (13 November 1525).

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The 1525 tariff established a rate of 16 ducats per milliaria for taking out any cordage (sartie) from the Arsenal. A fee of 15 lire per milliaria was disbursed for the compression of the yarns of the hawsers (tortize), by twisting the threads around their axis in a process called commettadura (commettitura). Fees of 5 and 4 lire per milliaria were disbursed for compressing the yarns of the flat cords of four and three strands, correspondingly. Foreign-manufactured cordage paid an impost of 10 ducats per milliaria, and any purchased henceforth would entail 12 ducats per milliaria. According to the Moresini Tariffa (midsixteenth century), ship captains disbursed 49 lire and 13 soldi per milliaria on the tortize cables that were manufactured in the Tana. The rate of the flat cords (cai piani) was 10 lire less than that of the tortize. No extra fees were charged for the commettadura. Foreign cordage purchased abroad with the requisite attestation was charged 2 ducats per milliaria for the inspection, or alternatively 13 ducats per milliaria as penalty for failing to present the said attestation.101 An example of sanctions imposed for violation is offered by the galione of Stefano di Patti in 1589: a routine inspection revealed two hawsers that had been purchased in London but not declared. For his omission Patti received a fine of 62 ducats, plus additional fees to disburse among various functionaries, the total amounting 75 ducats and 16 grossi.102 101 Moresini, Tariffa del pagamento, p. 84. 102 ASVe, MG, reg. 44, fasc. ‘Conti di riparazioni di navi, e noleggi (sec XVI)’ [21 August 1589].

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Navigating Fiscal Chaos 1

The Vicissitudes of the Imposts on Ships

Whatever port they entered, ships were charged with an anchorage tax (dazio dell’ancoraggio, spelled with slight variations). This consisted of several distinct levies based on local customs and subject to regional circumstances. In Alexandria, for example, the Mamluk fiscal system charged vessels according to their structural features: square-rigged round ships were charged higher rates than lateen-rigged vessels, and galleys were also rated differently. The anchorage duties in the Egyptian port included fees for translators, the guards at the entrance to the port, and those at the customs; for aerial messaging using pigeons; for the local rais; and for middlemen, the armiraglio, and other functionaries.1 Similarly, round ships that loaded salt in Bichieri (modern Abū Qīr in Egypt) were charged double that of lateen-rigged vessels.2 Such a classification, however, did not exist in the Syrian ports of Beirut, Tripoli, and Acre. For instance, while the standard port duties for ancoraggio in Beirut were relatively low (52 deremi – dirham, local silver coins and a unit of account), an extra fee (260 deremi) was charged by local authorities for loading cotton or ash; in addition, all Venice’s ships had to pay tribute for the maintenance of the church of San Salvador in Beirut. Meanwhile in Tripoli, the ancoraggio was rated considerably higher (312 deremi) regardless of the type of cargo loaded. For loading cotton in Acre, ships paid merely 150 deremi, but an additional fee (104 deremi) was charged by the local governor; equivalents in malvasia wine or chestnuts were generally accepted.3 On top of that, in all major ports in the Levant, where Venetian consuls were sitting, additional impost was disbursed to cover, by obligatory contributions, the losses of the Venetian Consul caused by extortions or derived from the commercial treaties (cottimo), as well as the maintenance of the consular services (bailazzo). Imported and exported merchandise were charged with such duties, according to the rate varied in percentage – ad valorem – depending 1 Sopracasa, Venezia e l’Egitto, pp. 262–65, 452, 593–94, 597, 640, 642. On the clearance procedure in the port of Alexandria: pp. 262–65. 2 Ibid., p. 608. 3 Ibid., pp. 469–70, compare with those in Venice: MCC, PD, bus. 597 C/IV, cc. 147t–49r. Naturally, such charges were also subject to modification, and the sums mentioned in the tariffs reflect a situation that was relevant to the year in which they were composed.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004398177_008

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on the value of the merchandise.4 The imposts were paid before departure in return for an attestation (bolleta di partenza) that was later presented in Venice, as proof of the provenance of the ship. Vessels were not charged with cottimo or bailazzo; other services offered by the local Venetian administration were charged with petty fees.5 One such example from Constantinople is found in a tariff dated 10 April 1479, which established the customary duties that were collected by the secretary of the Venetian bailo: all vessels were charged 10 aspri for issuing a bolletino required for departure; ships with a crow’s nest were taxed double rates.6 With the increased dependency of Venetian shipping on Ottoman subjects and ports in the 1540s, the network of consuls was expanded to include Volos, and towns in Thrace and the Sea of Marmara (e.g., Kavala, Silvirea, Panormos). The appointed representatives had a directive to collect ancoraggio from Venetian vessels, those of Venice’s subject, and those treated ‘as Venetian’.7 Port and customs duties were also subject to regional economies. Marginal ports battled to direct more traffic their way by offering tax concessions – this was the case, for example, with Famagusta, following the annexation of the island to Venice: the city’s representatives hoped to boost the commercial activity in port, and especially the load of cotton, by demanding the Senate not to charge port duties for the first two days the vessel stayed in port. Noteworthy in this respect is the violent action taken in 1564 by the custom administrator in Tripoli against Cypriot vessels heading for other ports in Syria to force them to use Tripoli as their port of call.8 4 Ashtor, Levant Trade, pp. 401–3; idem, ‘Profits from Trade’, p. 265; Christ, Trading Conflicts, pp. 77, 86; Sopracasa, ‘Les marchands vénitiens’, pp. 176–82; idem, Venezia e l’Egitto, pp. 297– 99, 642; Besta, Bilanci generali, CIII. 5 Sopracasa, ‘Les marchands vénitiens’, pp. 179–80, 217; Moresini, Tariffa del pagamento, p. 84. 6 ASVe, CN, reg. 22, ff. 183v–84r (10 April 1479). 7 The merchandise was taxed ad valorem and in some places also burdened with cottimo and bailazzo: ASVe, BC, reg. 263, [primus], ff. 49v–50r (7 July 1546); ibid., [secondus], ff. 2r–v (21 July 1546). 8 The port of Famagusta was a detour from the sea lanes to the Levant. Most ships sailing between Venice and the eastern Mediterranean coasts used anchorages along the southern shores of the island: Arbel, ‘Port Dredging’, pp. 118–19. Representatives of the community of Famagusta went further to suggest that all ships would be obligated to load and unload their merchandise in town, otherwise they would be prevented from loading salt at the southern parts of the island: ASVe, SM, reg. 13, f. 54v cap. 18 (17 May 1491), published in Mas Latrie, Histoire de l’île de Chypre, III, pp. 489–92, with this specific request on page 491. See also Arbel, ‘Traffici marittimi e sviluppo urbano a Cipro’, pp. 89–94; idem, ‘Maritime Trade in Famagusta’, pp. 96–97, 101. In his visit to Saline in 1561, Pantaleão de Aveiro commented that this was the place where all Venetian and foreign ships had to load their cargo: Itinerario, p. 62.

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Venetian fiscal policies overseas interrelated with local customs that generally favoured the local fleets and their traditional commercial alleys. In Zara, for example, Zariot vessels were exempted from the alboraggio (a tax imposed on the ship’s freightage) levied on foreigners. When Zara was retaken by Venice in 1409, this arrangement was continued secundum consuetudinem. In 1424, after a period in which the levy was largely ignored, Venice found it necessary to repeat the obligation to exact alboraggio from foreign ships. Nevertheless, privileges continued for vessels originating from towns in Apulia (Otranto, Galipoli, Taranto, Brindisi, Polignano, and Rodium), all traditionally excluded from taxes in Zara.9 Local fishermen in Schiato (Skiathos), under Venetian rule since 1453, continued to pay the local governor in fish ‘according to custom’, charging a rate of three fish for every sailing voyage. Vessels that carried other victuals were taxed in a similar way.10 Attempts to superimpose new fiscal policies in the colonies often resulted in a dispute between the local administration and the colonial subjects. This was the case following the introduction of a new toll on local boats and merchandise in Lepanto applied by the new governor Francesco Boldu. In 1449 the community of Lepanto filed a complaint after many inhabitants sold their boats and abandoned the town in protest.11 Similarly, in 1553 the Governor of Zante, Domenico da Ponte, attempted to levy a new impost on local vessels and boats as part of a reform that was introduced by the cinque savi alla mercanzia. The new tariff charged 5 aspri per voyage from local barchette carrying wheat, beef, and victuals to Castle Tornese or Chiarenza in Morea, a distance of about 20 Venetian miles (c. 15 nautical miles); only navili stopping at Patras and Lepanto were charged in advance. Consequently, the Governor encountered strong opposition, and the Senate revoked the new duty of 5 aspri. Boats that carried victuals were exempted, according to the previous custom; nevertheless they were charged 2 aspri per voyage if silk, dyestuff, hides, wax, and similar goods were loaded in Morea, or bales of wool were shipped to Morea.12 In 1485 Thodorino da Modon, the armiraglio of Lepanto, attempted to reintroduce an alboraggio tax on local vessels and boats, navili, and barchette carrying timber. The community appealed to the Senate, which instructed the governor in Lepanto to abolish the new impost since it was ‘against the custom and all 9 10 11 12

Kolanović, Križman, Statuta Iadertina, pp. 608–10 (1424). Sathas, Documents inédits, V, p. 47; Arbel, ‘Venice’s Maritime Empire’, p. 137. Sathas, Documents inédits, V, pp. 2–3 (23 January 1449). As a compromise, a duty of 2 aspri per voyage was charged from vessels that carried valuable goods on the outward or homebound voyage: ibid., pp. 110–11 (31 October, 20 November 1553).

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reason’.13 The admiral of the port of Famagusta was probably not a popular figure among captains and shipowners, who complained that the only responsibility he possessed was to his pocket.14 To be sure, the fiscal policies in territories under Venetian rule did not entirely exempt Venetian vessels from port duties. The logbook of the galeazza captained by Andrea Arian for the second voyage to Cyprus (1408), found in the inheritance records of Bertuci Pisani q. Nicolò, confirms that even a Venetian pilgrim galley was charged port duties in Venice’s ports overseas. The galley departed from Venice 3 July 1408, stopping at Rovigno, Durazzo, Modon, Crete, Rhodes, and Jaffa, where it arrived in August. The following port duties (in units of account) were included in the expenses: table 5

The port duties that were charged from the pilgrim galley (1408)

Port

Taxes charged from the galley

Sum

Rovigno Durazzo Modon Candia

no port duties were indicated ancoraggio & alboraggio ancoraggio & alboraggio ancoraggio & alboraggio for clearance for the Port Admiral ancoraggio & alboraggio for the inspection and clearance Alboraggio for the Consul in Ramla

– soldi 3, grossi 2, piccoli 8 grossi 6, piccoli 24 soldi 3, grossi 6, piccoli 21 grossi 6, piccoli 24 grossi 6, piccoli 24 soldi 2, grossi 11, piccoli 20 soldi 2, grossi 9, piccoli 24 soldi 5, grossi 2 grossi 10

Rhodes Jaffa

Other expenses in Mamluk Jaffa were gifts for the Port Admiral, the guards, functionaries, translators, transportation and other services for the pilgrims amounting: lire 11, soldi 16, grossi 8: ASVe, PSM, De ultra, bus. 218, ‘Quaderno della galeazza’, f. 16r (1408); see also Arbel, ‘Les listes de chargement’, p. 31–50.

Despite the regional particularities, navi terrière benefited from significant advantages in the fiscal system of the colonies overseas. In the early fifteenth century, for example, spices and other merchandise unloaded in Modon or Coron and not in transit to Venice were charged 1.5% if carried on Venetian 13 Ibid., pp. 11–12 (23, 31 July 1485). 14 The testimonies of several eyewitnesses on the daily routine of the Port Admiral of Famagusta: ASVe, CXDC, fil. 13, fasc. 78 (22 April 1531).

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vessels and 3% if carried on foreign vessels. Silk, dyestuffs, wax, and other merchandise originating from Morea were charged according to the same logic when exported from Coron and Modon to any destination but Venice. As part of a wider policy, the Senate annulled customs on merchandise in transit that was supposed to be shipped to Venice by Venetians and their subjects on vessels with fiscal privileges. Merchandise in transit to other destinations was, however, charged 3% if exported on foreign ships and 1.5% if exported on Venetian ones.15 One interesting case worth mentioning concerns the fiscal system in the port of Corfu. Until 1503, only foreign vessels were charged alboraggio, amounting to 1 ducat for vessels of 30 botti and above, and 3 soldi for those of smaller capacity. However, the shoreline around the city of Corfu supplies plenty of safe anchorage space that likely reduced the importance of the port as a shelter. Foreign vessels attempted to evade this duty by sending their service boats to shore, while the ship rode on anchor outside port. A reform introduced around mid-fifteenth century charged half the sum, mezo alboraggio, from all foreign ships that cast anchor at the vicinity.16 On 8 September 1503, the fiscal tariff in Corfu’s port was revised to supply the necessary funds for the repair of the breakwater and the dredging of the port. The new limitation imposed a port duty on local ships as well, probably for the first time under Venetian rule. The rates were determined according to ship categories and paid per voyage. The tariff read that all ships with a forecastle and a crow’s nest that rode on anchor outside the breakwater were charged 1 ducat; caravelle paid 18 grossi of gold (units of account: 24 grossi per ducat); schierazi and fuste with half a crow’s nest (a platform called top) paid 12 grossi; merchant grippi paid 8 grossi; fuste and other vessel that entered port for convenience or to conduct repairs paid a fee according to the custom in other ports subjected to Venice (i.e., 1% of their volume in ducats of account); the unit of capacity was not noted but assumed to be botti.17 A certain ambiguity concerning the new duty provoked a dispute, delegated to the Senate in 1505. Consequently, it was decided to adopt the system used in Crete, and a tariff was set that served for the auction of the right to collect port duties.18 Ten years later, in 1516, the università of Corfu presented a complaint to the Senate claiming that the new gravezza burdened local shipping to a great extent, as their grippi had always been exempted from 15 Sathas, Documents inédits, IV, pp. 44–46 (1390–1415); Besta, Bilanci generali, I, CLXXI. 16 The same tariff was applied in Modon on 9 March 1453. The enactment contains the copy of the tariff that was in use in Corfu: Sathas, Documents inédits, IV, p. 33. 17 ASVe, SM, reg. 16, f. 31r (8 September 1503). 18 Sathas, Documents inédits, V, p. 241 (12 September 1505).

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any tax. In addition, foreign ships that previously frequented Corfu stopped doing so, to the great detriment of the inhabitants.19 Consequently, in 1517 the Senate lifted the recent impost and reinstated the customs that had been previously observed, that is, the ancoraggio collected by the port admiral and the fees paid to the capitanio del borgo.20 Corfu’s port remained partly in ruin at least until 1524, when representatives of the community of Corfu filed a complaint that nothing was done with the sums that had been earmarked for the dredging of the port and the repair of the breakwater; unless it was provided soon, no galley or vessel would be able to enter. The Senate then instructed the colonial administration to carry out the maintenance work and repairs.21 The tariff in the port of Corfu around 1530s read that foreign vessels of above 30 botti casting anchor in Corfu or at the near salt pans were charged 1 ducat as alboraggio. Smaller vessels originating from Apulia, Ottoman territories, and any other place paid half a ducat per voyage. Venice’s vessels (i.e., all vessels originating from Venice and the subjected territories) paid 1 mocenigo or 8 aspri for alboraggio. Corfiot vessels were exempted. In addition, the capitanio del borgo charged regalia of 100 aspri per miera of salt (a different report indicated 140 aspri per miera, equal to c. 2 ducats). Salt that was loaded for Venice and other destinations in Dalmatia under Venetian rule was charged a reduced fee of 75 aspri per miera (70 aspri according to a different report). A new impost that was introduced around that period included an additional fee of 25 aspri per miera for renting sacks of salt required in the loading procedure.22 As regards Venetian rule in the overseas colonies, it is generally accepted that the precise ways in which it articulated itself depended very much on specific local circumstances and periods, reflecting local bargaining power as well as the modalities by which a given polity had come into being.23 In this sense, the application of Venice’s fiscal policies on ships and merchandise provide us with multitude of case studies, as ports were essentially dissimilar in their roles, assets, functions and institutional organization. While Venice did not 19 Ibid., p. 253 ‘Capitula comunitatis Corphoy’, cap. 12 (5 October 1516), see also Pagratis: ‘Ships and Shipbuilding in Corfu’, pp. 241–42 (but the date is 1516, and not 1506). As we have seen, the duty was collected from various types of vessels. In this instance however the local grippi were exempted. 20 Proclaimed in Corfu, Zante, Cefalonia, Napoli di Romania and Monevasia: Sathas, Documents inédits, V, p. 257 (20 June 1517). 21 To the request of the Corfiots, the Senate banned the practice of burning the exterior of the hull inside port since it had caused silting: ibid., p. 266 cap. 20 (5 August 1524). 22 ASVe, CXDC, fil. 20, fasc. 123 (23 June 1536). 23 Arbel, ‘Venice’s Maritime Empire’, p. 144; Sander-Faes, Urban Elites of Zadar, p. 32.

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dismiss traditional customs that favoured local shipping and their commercial allies, it superimposed a package of privileges that were aimed to support various components in Venice’s (virtual) ship registry and discourage others. In this way, vessels’ structural features and capacity, cargo specifics, and destination were accountable criteria for tax differentiations. Treaties with foreign rulers could potentially grant similar privileges to vessels hoisting other flags. Lastly, individuals and communities negotiated the fiscal status of their ships by filing a petition. 2

Duties on Ships in the Port of Venice

Venice’s long-standing rivalry with the ports of Ancona, Ragusa, and Livorno in the long sixteenth century underlines the genuine efforts to attract greater share of foreign commerce. While the particularities of the fiscal concessions granted to groups of Levantine merchants are well known;24 here, the interest lies with the identity of the ships for which these concessions were offered, that is: in what ways and to what extent Venice’s fiscal policies supported its own merchant marine? 2.1 The Package of Anchorage Imposts In Venice, the anchorage tax was called dazio de’ castelli, in reference to the towers at the entrance to the lagoon (the so-called porto di San Nicolò).25 The port duties consisted of two principal duties and several additional fees. The first was the actual anchorage tax – as it is known today – paid by ships for using the port facilities. The ancoraggio was calculated according to the capacity of the ship. It was measured in botti and occasionally in stara of grain in the case of smaller vessels. The ancoraggio was collected per voyage, namely once the ship called in port, regardless of the time it spent at anchor. A decree from 1426 established the following tax brackets per voyage:26 Vessels of 50–100 botti Vessels of 100–200 botti Vessels of over 200 botti were charged per each 100 botti

ducats 1/2 ducats 1 ducats 1

24 Anselmi, Venezia, Ragusa, Ancona; Ravid, ‘The Legal Status’; idem, ‘A Tale of Three Cities’. 25 E.g., Besta, Bilanci generali, I, pp. 631–32 ‘Regolazione del dazio dell’ancoraggio, 10 May 1581’. 26 ASVe, SMist, reg. 56, ff. 63v–64r (19 November 1426); ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 23, reg. 22ter, c. 62a (19 November 1426).

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Based on these rates, a ship of 400 botti was charged 4 ducats as ancoraggio for every single voyage. The 1426 enactment does not indicate whether foreign ships were charged differently. Captains of ships in the last tax category were permitted to include this duty in the general average collected proportionally from all those involved in the commercial enterprise, i.e., the merchants and the shareholders in the ship. A second impost, known as alboraggio, was imposed on the ship’s freightage, i.e., the shipowner’s revenues. In Venice, the alboraggio was better known as the 3% tax – ad valorem – since this was the rate that was charged to foreign ships on goods that were loaded or unloaded in port. Venetian ships and those enjoying the same fiscal privileges ‘as Venetians’ were exempted from the alboraggio.27 The magistracy in charge of collecting port duties in the fifteenth century was the estraordinario. Ship captains had to present the bills of lading to the Admiral of the Port before departure. At the end of each month, the Admiral returned the bills to the office of the estraordinario to cross-check for possible acts of fraud.28 The collection of the anchorage tax was delegated to the Arsenal in 1516, and eventually auctioned to private tax farmers.29 Other imposts that were included in the dazio dell’ancoraggio in this period were the fee paid for the Arsenal’s clerk to issue a bill of lading (bolleta or a bolletino) that was required for clearance,30 and a single fee paid for establishing the ship’s tax rating. This stima was carried out by the port’s admiral either after launching or when ships built in Venice were in an advanced stage of construction. Other vessels, including foreign ships, were surveyed once they arrived in Venice for the first time. Although the authorities were anxious not to increase the fiscal burden for the already troubled private sector of Venice’s merchant marine, every now and then new levies were introduced as ad-hoc measures to secure new sources of cash inflow. In 1463, for example, in view of the surge in public expenditure due to the outbreak of war with the Ottomans, the Senate imposed a tithe on the renting of houses and other possessions by Venetian citizens, including the

27 ASVe, PPA, reg. 134, ff. 308–11 (25 August 1529); Morosini, Tariffa del pagamento, pp. 81–82. 28 ASVe, SM, reg. 4, f. 198r (25 June 1453). An enactment 26 March 1488 delegated the estraordinario to charge all ships with the same compulsory taxes that were imposed on vessels originating from the dogado: ASVe, CN, reg. 13, f. 164v; ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 23, reg. 22ter, c. 38a. 29 ASVe, SM, reg. 18, ff. 151v–52r (6 November 1516); ibid., reg. 20, ff. 206r–v (10 January 1526). 30 The exact rates were indicated in a tariff from 1581. Venetian and foreign vessels were charged 2 and 4 soldi respectively: Besta, Bilanci generali, I, p. 631.

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dogado (the area included in and around the Venetian lagoon, except Venice itself), as well as 1% duty on freights and merchandise.31 In February 1486, a massive dredging operation of the Grand Canal as far as San Marco required funding. A new impost on all ships and boats was necessary to cover one-third of the expenses; the provveditori di Comun that ran the operation collected up to 10 ducats from round ships that stopped in port.32 In fact, the city duty was just the tip of the iceberg. The clearance procedure passed through a long list of magistracies, in part chosen according to the type of merchandise concerned. The result was that ships departing from Venice on a sea-going voyage were compelled to disburse considerable sums to obtain all the necessary bills that were inspected at the castelli. In view of a further slowdown in shipping, the Senate attempted to simplify the clearance procedure.33 But the reform did little to ease the tax burden on shipowners. Ships originating from the dogado were still subject to compulsory duties and tithes that did not apply to other vessels, therefore hampering their ability to compete with the latter on freights. Acting on the advice of the estraordinario, the Collegio revised the 1486 enactment two years later to apply to Venetian ships only, while other vessels had to pass through a complex clearance procedure.34 Notwithstanding the reforms, one of the principal reasons for the crisis in shipping was the barrage of compulsory levies and additional expenses that previously did not exist. In 1502 the Senate affirmed that because Biscayan, Spanish, and Portuguese ships, as well as other foreign vessels, were not burdened with such duties in their home ports, they thus obtained significant advantage. In response, all the compulsory taxes were lifted, except for a share in the expenses incurred for the commissioning of the rescue boats by the Arsenal. In addition, no extra collective charge would be imposed on the freightage, except for the salary to the nobili da poppa.35 The pressing need to find new sources of income during the war of the league of Cambrai resulted in levying new tanse, decime, and extraordinary 31 Ibid., CXLVIII–CXLIX, pp. 135–37. 32 Emilio, Edizione commentata della cronaca di Venezia di Giovanni Tiepolo, p. 634. 33 According to the revised tariff ships and marani departing from Venice would be taxed in the customs no more than 2 ducats per milliaria of capacity either empty or full; 1 ducat to the scrivani of the customs; 1 ducat to the porters; and 1 ducat to the appraisers. The recently imposed compulsory tax was lifted on that occasion. Thereafter, the operators would obtain their various bills from the provveditori di Comun, ufficio di Levante, and the extraordinario. The duty of 1 ducat per 100 botti of cargo that had hitherto been disbursed at the office of the rason vechie remained in force: ASVe, SM, reg. 12, f. 75r (13 April 1486). 34 ASVe, CN, reg. 13, f. 164r (26 March 1488), eventually interpreted differently by the estraordinario: ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 23, reg. 22ter, c. 38a. 35 ASVe, SM, reg. 15, ff. 156v–57v (21 October 1502).

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gravezze. In one instance, on 11 October 1509, the Senate imposed an angaria general on all ships, marani, and sundry other vessels – including fluvial and lagoon-based barges and boats. Merchant ships of over 100 botti were charged a single fee amounting to 2% of their estimated value, including the structure and rigging; a reduced rate of 1.5% was applied to smaller merchant vessels. Meanwhile, barges, carriers, specialized vessels, and private boats owned by noblemen and citizens were subjected to a different tax regime handled by the provveditori al sal, which were also responsible for appraising the vessels and their rigging. The freightage was likewise taxed, with 1% duty for a predetermined period of one year. Owners of ships and vessels that were underway had to vouch that the said duty would be disbursed once the ship returned to port. Attempts to shift the costs onto the merchants by increasing freightage were threatened with penalty.36 Arguably, one significant step in the attempt to simplify clearance procedures and increase the State’s revenues from anchorage tax was the delegation of responsibility to the Arsenal in the second and third decades of the sixteenth century. The auctioning of this package of imposts to private tax farmers provides insights into the rates levied upon ships that entered the lagoon during this period. The tax was regularly auctioned for a term of two years, in return for a pre-established annual sum. The winning bidder was then required to share (caratare) this right among his partners; the result had to be presented to the Arsenal within ten days, lest he forfeit the auction. Each partner was then liable for his respective share in the investment should the profits turn out to be smaller than the sum paid for the lease. The tax farmer received full liberty to conduct his own estimates of the ship’s capacity if it would prove to be beneficial to his business. Disputes were delegated to arbitration by the provveditori e patroni all’Arsenal. The tax farmer transferred the entirety of the revenues to the cashiers of the Arsenal. After the pre-established sum was deducted, the cassieri returned the net revenue to the tax farmer and his partners. On 25 August 1529 the ancoraggio tax was thus auctioned for the first time for 750 ducats per year to Vincenzo di Zuane. The tariff gives us an idea of what were the various impositions on ships in the different categories:

36 11 October 1509: ASVe, ST, reg. 16, ff. 153r–v, 156v; ASVe, PSal, bus. 6, reg. 3, f. 199v; ibid., bus. 63, reg. 7, f. 118v; a list of angarie imposed between 1500 and 1515: Sanuto, I diarii, XX, 7–15. Owing to the poor response, further measures were taken between 19 October and 9 November to increase enforcement: ASVe, ST, reg. 16, f. 156v; ASVe, PSal, bus. 6, reg. 3, f. 202v. See the introduction to Appendix A: 1509.

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Venice’s port taxes tariff, 25 August 1529

Anchorage fee Vessels of over 100 botti, per each 100 botti D 1 1/2 Vessels with a capacity of 70–99 botti D1 Vessels with a capacity of 50–69 botti D 1/2 Vessels with a capacity of 25–49 botti gr 20 One-time survey fee Vessels of less than 25 botti for being ‘sealed’ gr 20 Vessels of 25–49 botti, per every 100 stara of grain s 10 Vessels of 50–100 botti for being surveyed D1 gr 2 Vessels of over 100 botti for being surveyed, per each 100 botti D1 Per voyage Venice’s vessels [terrièri] of over 50 botti, per voyage s 14 Foreign vessels of over 25 botti, for each 100 stara s 13 Alboraggio Foreign ships of over 50 botti, 3% on freightage after a 10% discount, in ducats For the full text: ASVe, PPA, reg. 134, ff. 308–11 (25 August 1529).

The alboraggio applied to the freightage received from merchandise loaded or unloaded in Venice itself, and not elsewhere. The reason for the 10% discount before the deduction of the 3% duty is not entirely clear.37 In the course of the first two years, small vessels (e.g., burchi, barche, etc.) which transported raw and bulky materials were exempted from this tax bundle.38 On 30 August 1531 the right to collect ancoraggio was auctioned to Nicoletto Mustachin, again for the same sum of 750 ducats per year. The latter won the auction once more on 23 August 1533, for a yearly sum of 950 ducats, under similar conditions. Henceforth, it was auctioned consistently every two years, with few interruptions:

37 Moresini, Tariffa del pagamento, pp. 81–82. 38 ASVe, PPA, reg. 134, ff. 329–30 (4 January 1531). Similarly, burchi that transported salt and supplies to the Arsenal were tax exempted starting from the following auction: ibid., ff. 353–56 (30 August 1531). In 1532 burchi that carried stones and construction materials were tax exempted as well: ibid., ff. 376–77 (8 January 1532). In 1538 boats and burchi that carried grain to the mills requested exemption from anchorage tax: ibid., reg. 135, f. 28v (11 April 1538).

124 table 7

chapter 6 Annual income from port duties based on auction price results (1525–71)

Date of auctioning 25 August 1529 1 September 1531 23 August 1533 2 September 1535 2 September 1537 (It was auctioned again after the war) 29 March 1541 2 January 1543 16 December 1544 … c. January 1551 5 March 1555

Sold for*

Period

750 750 950 930 950

Sept. 1529–Aug. 1531 Sept. 1531–Aug. 1533 Sept. 1533–Aug. 1535 Sept. 1535–Aug. 1537 Sept. 1537–Aug. 1539

704 595 896 … 1,250 1,130

Jan. 1541–Dec. 1542 Jan. 1543–Dec. 1544 Jan. 1545–Dec. 1546 … 1551–52 Jan. 1555–Dec. 1556

* Rates are indicated in ducats per year ASVe, PPA, reg. 134, ff. 353–58 (1 September 1531), 400–5 (23 August 1533); ibid., reg. 135, ff. 11v–12v (2 September 1535), 34r–35r (2 September 1537), 50r–51v (29 March 1541), 67v–68v (2 January 1543), 78r–79r (16 December 1544); ibid., reg. 136, ff. 1r–3v (5 March 1555).

The bidding gives us a general idea of the extent of traffic in port. The sum however represented the profit to the Arsenal alone, the total expected revenues must have been higher to include the revenues of the dazieri. Besides, the period 1529–33 saw a general lull in turnover for Venetian shipping; most vessels were employed as grain-carriers and were tax-exempt. In 1550, however, the bid price was 1,250 ducats, implying that the dazieri must have predicted a brisk increase in the traffic in port. But it turned out that the attempts to win the auction with higher bids backfired: reality failed to meet expectations, and Michele Sandelli, Nicolò Civran, and Alvise da Albori  – who had auctioned the right to collect the dazio dell’ancoraggio between 1550 and 1552 – became debtors of the Arsenal for a sum of 500 ducats. The reason given was a decree issued by the Council of Ten on 7 August 1551, which exempted foreign ships that loaded wheat in Constantinople from the anchorage tax; it was estimated that twenty-four such ships eventually arrived in Venice.39 We can get a clearer idea on the rates imposed on foreign ships from a petition filed in 1560 by the heirs of Sandelli and Civran. The petition includes 39 ASVe, SM, fil. 23 [2 December 1560].

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an account prepared by Jacomo Canal, a scrivano in the Arsenal, giving the integral port duties calculated for twelve foreign ships that arrived in Venice in 1552 full of cargo, and were exempted from tax – to the obvious detriment of the dazieri. The information is presented succinctly below (table 8). The stima and don are single payments charged once a vessel arrived in port for the first time. Several ships had probably already frequented Venice and therefore were exempt from the single fees. Alternatively, either the information was lost or the armiraglio did not bother to estimate the ship’s capacity, as it was anyhow not liable. The next column refers to the fee to the Arsenal, that is, the ancoraggio, followed by an additional duty that foreign ships disbursed to the ufficiali sopra le mercanzie del Levante. There follows the net freightage (i.e., the profits for the consignment of wheat) followed by the 3% duty (i.e., the tax imposed on the net freightage after a 10% discount from the total). The next column on the right, entitled ‘soldi 3 per lira’, stands for an additional impost called limitation that was introduced in 1544, and was superimposed on any other tax that was collected in Venice and the terraferma.40 The last column contains the expected revenues from all port duties in ducats and grossi veneti. table 8

Port duties calculated for twelve foreign ships that arrived in Venice in 1552

Ship

Botti Stima

Don Arsenal Levante Net freightage 3%

Nave of Pasha del Cai[r]o

252

L 6 s 14 L 15 s 10

L 23 s 8

Nave of Raston Pasha

500

–

L 46 s 10 L 32 s 10 D 5142

–

L 16 s 7

D 1878

s 3 per L In ducats

L 349 s 5 L 61 s 13

D 78 gr 6

L 956 s 7 L 155 s 5 D 192 gr –

Nave of Capiagha di Gianizari, cpt. Manuel Rais

D 1042

L 123 s 4 L 29 s 1

D 35 gr 22

Nave of Sinopi, cpt. Mamut Rais

D 1185

L 220 s 7 L 33 s 1

D 40 gr 21

Nave of Tesoria, cpt. Mamut Rais

D 1018

D 30 L 32

D 35 gr 1

D 743

L 137 s 19 L 26 s 6

Nave of Zorzi Salvaresi, cpt. Nicolissino da Scio

140

L 6 s 14 L 8 s 10

L 12 s 18 L 9 s 2

40 Besta, Bilanci generali, I, pp. 583–84 ‘163bis’ (20 December 1544).

D4L3 s2

D 32 gr 12

126 table 8

chapter 6 Port duties calculated for twelve foreign ships that arrived in Venice in 1552 (cont.)

Ship

Botti Stima

Nave, cpt. Chachi Rais

112

L 6 s 14 L 7 s4

L 11 s 2

L 9 s 12

D 587

L 109

L 21 s 5

D 26 gr 6

Schierazo, cpt. Morat Rais

120

L 6 s 14 L 7 s4

L 11 s 2

L 7 s 16

D 1347

L 250 s 9 L 42 s 9

D 52 gr 14

Nave, cpt. Domenico di Bossi

437

L 6 s 14 L 27 L 40 s 11 L 28 s 8 s2

D 2730

L 451 s 16 L 53 s 4

D 102 gr 20

Nave of Matteo Jubriani, cpt. Dimitri da Lepanto

circ. D 600

L 111 s 12 L 16 s 3

D 20 gr 16

Nave of Lorenzo di Antonio, cpt. Zillio di Antonio, a voyage 27 August 1552

circ. D 600

–

D20 gr 16

D 600, for 3,000 stara

L 111 s 12 L 21 s 6

Nave cpt. Costantin Sambro, a voyage 23 June 1552

–

Don Arsenal Levante Net freightage 3%

–

L 17 s 16 L 12 s 9

s 3 per L In ducats

–

Total

D 26 gr 7

D 661 gr 21

ASVe, SM, fil. 23 [2 December 1560].

The basic concepts and tax categories did not change significantly in respect to the one appended to the package of imposts that were auctioned in 1529. But starting in the mid-1570s an increasing number of foreign vessels were granted the same privilege. 2.2 The messetteria Tax The messetteria was a sale tax imposed on the export of commodities and goods on ships and galleys, and on the purchase of real estate, homes, ships, and boats in Venice and the dogado. The rate was set to 5% from the value of the transaction.41 In 1385 the impost was extended to apply to property that was put up for auction by the various magistracies. Ships (or shares in a ship) were liable to the messetteria when sold; fishermen vessels or work boats were 41 18 January 1339: ibid., p. 59; ASVe, SMist, reg. 17, f. 120r; ASVe, UM, reg. 1, f. 11r.

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exempted, however.42 Notably, to keep track of the transactions of ships posed a considerable challenge.43 The ufficiali alla messetteria periodically examined the protocols of public notaries in Venice, requested attestations from those working on the terraferma, and controlled the transactions registered in the journal of the savi alle decime and other magistracies that sold property at auctions. In 1505 enforcement was still on the agenda, as it emerged that ships were repeatedly being sold without any trace of the transactions in the office’s records. The consoli dei mercanti were instructed to keep a separate register in which all the shareholders of ships put up for sale should be duly noted.44 Around the mid-sixteenth century, the impost for selling a ship or shares in a ship was 2 ducats 3 lire and 8 soldi for every 100 ducats (around 2.23%), divided equally between the buyer and seller unless otherwise specified. The notaries were warned not to confirm the contract before the parties presented the bolletino della messetteria to attest that the tax was paid.45 After 29 September 1579, the rate was changed to 3% of the value in ducats.46 2.3 The ‘Public Boat’ and the Maintenance of Port Infrastructures Infrequently from 1489, but regularly since 1515, an extra levy (angaria) was collected by the Arsenal to cover the expenses of the ‘public boat’ (barca di Comun).47 This boat supplied extra anchors and ropes for the safety of round ships outside the Lido of Venice; it also came to the aid of crews on ships in distress.48 The service was offered year round, and even in periods of great shortage in equipment.49 Besides damage from wear and tear, the duty was aimed to cover the pays to the captain, helmsman, 3 mariners at the stern, and

42 ASVe, UM, reg. 1, f. 30v (13 April 1385). In context of other consumables: Faugeron, Nourrir la ville, p. 103. 43 E.g., ASVe, UM, reg. 1, ff. 48v–49r (1 August 1406), 103r (12 January 1474). Further measures to facilitate the detection of tax evaders were necessary in 1481: ibid., f. 110r (12 February 1481). 44 ASVe, PSD, bus. 1, ff. 23r–24r (2 February 1505). 45 Moresini, Tariffa del pagamento, pp. 64–65. 46 Besta, Bilanci generali, I, XLIII–XLIV, CXXXIII, on property LXVII. 47 ASVe, SM, reg. 12, f. 187r (15 October 1489). 48 In one such instance, the barca di Comun was launched to assist the ship Semitecola: Sanuto, I diarii, III, 1146 (8 December 1500). 49 Judde de Larivière, Naviguer, commercer, gouverner, p. 283. The policy remained unchanged during the war of Cambrai, under extreme shortage in supplies: ASVe, SM, reg. 18, f. 50r (27 June 1514).

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23 oarsmen; in 1520 the monthly salaries totalled 295 lire.50 The duty was collected from all ships before their departure.51 In various ports in the Mediterranean it was customary to charge local and foreign vessels for the maintenance of the public infrastructures they made use of. The income thus generated was directed towards the repair of the breakwater, for instance, along with dredging operations, and reimbursement for wear and tear. Venice was arguably a special case, since to keep the entrance to the lagoon navigable required a steady flow of considerable funds and constant labour. Already in the fifteenth century, all ships (Venetian and foreign) were charged a fee per voyage called limitation that was collected by the ufficiali al cattaver, the magistracy in charge of such works. The tariff reads that vessels of 50–200 botti were charged one-quarter ducat; vessels of over 200 botti were charged a half ducat.52 Despite the delegation of supervision to the savi alle acque, in the sixteenth century the cattaveri continued to collect the limitation on the basis of these categories. The tariff published by Moresini established the following rates: vessels of 500 to 2,000 stara disbursed 1 lira and 15 soldi per voyage to the cattaveri, while those above 2,000 stara were charged 3 lire and 6 soldi. Notably, vessels that carried such staples as salt and firewood were exempted from the limitation. 2.4 The luminaria dei castelli da mar The luminaria fee is usually associated with social and religious activity, such as keeping candles lit at a chosen altar or financing the guilds.53 In this case, the peculiar fiscal categories – as well as the use of the terms ‘luminare dohane maris’, ‘incantum luminare littoris’, and ‘la luminaria del lido’ – suggest that this tax was intended to cover also the expenses incurred for the upkeep and illumination of lighthouses, beacons, and other devices aiding navigation at the port’s entrance.54 The categories and rates of the luminaria remained the same from the early fourteenth century (1318) until the mid-sixteenth century.55 The rate was determined by the type of craft and the previous port of call. In this manner, all vessels that sailed along the western shores of the Adriatic from Cape Otranto northward paid 1 lira and 1 soldo, whereas marciliane and vessels departing from ports situated north to Monte d’Ancona were excused from such levies. The same rate was charged for all ships and smaller craft (including 50 51 52 53 54 55

ASVe, PPA, reg. 7, f. 36r (6 November 1520). ASVe, SM, reg. 18, f. 90r (7 August 1515); Lane, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 144–45. ASVe, UC, bus. 2, XLVIIv–XLVIII (26 March 1415, ref. to 16 October 1408). Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 165. ASVe, PSM, De supra, Atti, bus. 35, ff. 16r (28 September 1525), 22r (23 September 1531). Ibid., f. 3r (1318); Moresini, Tariffa del pagamento, p. 84.

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marciliane) that sailed along the eastern Adriatic shores from Durazzo as far as the Gulf of Quarner. Any vessel departing from a port situated to the north of the Quarner was excluded from the luminaria, although, de facto, small and medium-sized vessels that arrived from Pago, Arbe, Vegia, Cherso, Ossero, or other places in the Quarner as far as the southern tip of Istria were charged 32 soldi by the dazieri – contrary to law.56 In addition, the luminaria included a per-capita fee, whereby Venetian and foreign round ships (nave da convento) departing from ports outside the Adriatic Sea were charged 4 piccoli per person – mariners and passengers included. Merchant galleys disbursed 1 lira and 12 soldi for the entire galley, while war vessels were not liable.57 The right to collect the luminaria was auctioned for a period of five years by the procuratori di San Marco (de supra ecclesiam Sancti Marci). To judge from the bidding of the auctioneers, the revenues from this impost can be estimated at 100–200 ducats per year: in 1525 collection was auctioned to Zuane di Stefani (draperio) for 124 ducats per year. Vincenzo Zuane Manalissa won the five-year lease for the same sum in 1530 and again in 1535, in return for 126 ducats. Cesaro (di) Zuan-Antonio (proto della tana) auctioned the right for 210 ducats in 1540.58 3

Negotiating Fiscal Privileges and Tax Concessions

A ship’s fiscal privileges were attested by sea letters (sing. patente)59 issued in Venice by the Signory (the supreme body of government made up of the doge, his six counsellors, and the three heads of the quarantia criminal) and probably also by the provveditori di Comun.60 The sea letter used a customary form, addressed ‘To Whom it May Concern’ and requesting that the captain be treated as a Venetian citizen or a subject and his ship ‘as Venetian’. The description distinguished between the status of the captain and that of the ship. If the captain was not a Venetian citizen or a citizen of one of the subject towns, the letter referred to the status of the vessel and the merchandise owned by 56 ASVe, PSM, De supra, Atti, bus. 35, ff. 16r–19v (6–11 July 1526). 57 See the tariffs dated 1318 and 1 March 1420: ibid., ff. 3r (1318), 4r (1 March 1420). 58 Ibid, ff. 1r–1v (13 September 1525), 1v–2v (17 September 1530), 3r–v (7 September 1535), 45r–47r (11 September 1540). 59 Boerio, Dizionario del dialetto veneziano, p. 481. 60 ASVe, PC, reg. 1, f. 1r (before 1300), on the prosecution in the colonies: ibid., ff. 27v (1374), 64v (26 November 1435), 92r (24 January 1477). For privileges concerning the Levant trade and navigation: ibid., ff. 30v (1377), 34r (16 June 1385); ASVe, UM, reg. 1, ff. 22v– 24r (12 February 1376). On keeping the registry of ships: ASVe, SM, reg. 9, ff. 120v–21r (12 December 1471).

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Venetians. All colonial officials were then required to treat the ship and the captain as such. Likewise, vessels that carried to Venice salt, supplies for the Arsenal, firewood, stones, pebbles and sleeves (for construction) were exempted from these duties. This measure was also common during a food crisis, or a shortage in supplies resulting from war or embargo. Without going through all the instances in which such concessions were granted, suffice to give two: the shortage in French-style woollens for the local drappieri in Venice prompted the Senate in 1485 to temporarily suspend the 14 March 1478 decree, and permit the transportation of this cargo by sea or land from England, Flanders, and the Barbary Coast, by any person (including foreigners) on any vessel (including foreign ships), without having to disburse additional freightage to the Flanders galleys, and by insuring the cargo as if it were loaded on Venetian vessels.61 Likewise, during the war with the Turks, in 1538, the Senate practically invited French and RaguSan ships to transport spices and pepper from Alexandria to Venice’s colonies by absolving them from taxes, suspecting they would otherwise be transported to Livorno.62 Interestingly, Moresini’s tariffa also attests that around the mid-sixteenth century, Portuguese ships were charged a fixed duty of lire 18 soldi 12 per voyage and were exempted from other port levies, whereas vessels sailing under the auspices of the Holy Roman Empire were treated ‘as Venetians’.63 Portuguese ships were welcomed in Venice since their much-remembered assistance in the wars against Genoa. When and in what circumstances vessels flying the colours of the Holy Roman Emperor were granted such privileges is less clear. Interestingly, Spanish ships enjoyed fiscal concessions in Venice already in the fifteenth century. On 13 April 1490, the ambassador of the Kingdom of Naples under the rule of King Ferdinand II of Aragon appealed to the Collegio, expressing dissatisfaction over the fact that, while Venetian ships were released from the 3% freightage duty in ports of the kingdom for several years, ships of that same kingdom putting into port in Venice were unfairly being charged those levies. With the advice of the estraordinario, it was decided to abolish the 3% duty, along with any additional fees to the ufficio di Levante levied on vessels originating from Naples and Sicily.64 In 1531, the same prerogative was

61 62 63 64

ASVe, SM, reg. 12, f. 63v (26 November 1485). Ibid., reg. 24, f. 170r (21 October 1538). Moresini, Tariffa del pagamento, p. 82. ASVe, CN, reg. 14, f. 17r (13 April 1490).

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extended to other territories under Spanish rule.65 Previously, on 31 March 1519 the Duke of Ferrara had suggested to the Collegio that his vessels might hoist the ensign of San Marco and therefore enjoy similar fiscal privileges – most probably this was a ploy to enable subjects of Ferrara to engage in trade in Ottoman lands under more favourable conditions. Small wonder that the duke’s request was declined, as the Collegio feared that such concessions would trigger serious upheavals in the fiscal system.66 Arguably, a special case concerns the Ottoman subjects. By 1524, Venice had de facto granted to Ottoman subjects trade privileges that permitted them to transport merchandise originating from Ottoman-Greek territories (Romania alta e bassa) on Venice’s ships under favourable conditions. Tolerating some form of trade conducted by Ottoman subjects between Venice and the Levant constituted a fundamental change. Still, the authorized vessels for such transports were strictly Venetian or those that were treated ‘as Venetian’ by the standards of Venice’s fiscal system. For that matter, Turkish vessels were still taxed ‘as foreigners’. Likewise, in the attempts to remedy commerce that was seriously disrupted during the Ottoman-Venetian war (1537–40), the Senate took decisive steps to increase the traffic in port and convey Levantine traders, mainly Jews, to use Venice as their centre of operation.67 None of the measures taken included a sweeping fiscal concession to foreign ships. A profound and long-term change in this policy came only after the economic outcomes of the War of Lepanto and the loss of Cyprus came into full effect. By the mid-1570s Venetian shipping still failed to show signs of recovery. This new reality had many consequences, one of which was practically opening the port of Venice to foreign shipping companies. A shortage in gross salt moved the Senate on 28 January 1575, to exempt all foreign ships that stopped in Venice with their holds filled with salt from Ibiza and Trapani from the ancoraggio and alboraggio on other merchandise imported or exported from Venice. In 1581 the rates of the ancoraggio and alboraggio for all ships that were treated ‘as foreigners’ was reduced significantly. On 13 September 1586 French ships were exempted from the 3% duty altogether, and were basically granted fiscal privileges identical to those obtained by the Spaniards and to those ranked ‘as Venetians’, even. On 29 September 1595 vessels originating in Flanders were exonerated from ancoraggio and alboraggio, given that they

65 ASVe, SM, reg. 22, f. 59r (13 January 1531). To judge by Moresini’s tariffa, these concessions were no longer applicable in mid-sixteenth century. 66 Sanuto, I diarii, XXVII, 86, 118–19 (22–31 March 1519). 67 ASVe, SM, reg. 20, ff. 113v–14v (19 April 1524); Ravid, ‘A Tale of Three Cities’, pp. 140–43.

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arrived in Venice fully laden with much-needed grain.68 More fleets and shipments were included in the package of privileges in the course of the seventeenth century, as the latter gradually lost their importance. However, by the end of the fifteenth century the same fiscal privileges still conferred significant benefits in investments and trade within the limits of the city of Venice and the stato da mar. Indeed, the evident advantages of having one’s vessel treated ‘as Venetian’ induced many shipowners who had built their ships elsewhere to appeal to the Dominante for a personal gratia. In 1497, for example, the Venetian noblemen Luca Donado q. Andrea – and his partner Zuane da Cherso on behalf of his brother Martin – commissioned their ship for a commercial voyage and requested a waiver on the 3% tax in light of Donado’s position as shareholder (though he presented no proof for this claim). Their appeal was overruled, however, since the records of the estraordinario attested that on previous occasions Da Cherso had paid the 3% tax, and that this particular vessel was built on the (Venetian) island of Cherso (Cres) in Dalmatia, whose subjects and their ships did not enjoy such privileges.69 In this context it is worth mentioning the inhabitants of the island of Curzola that were granted Venetian citizenship ‘de intus’ on 19 March 1485; the bundle of privileges included fiscal concessions in Venice for their ships. Two cases from 1494, which were copied to the capitoli of the estraordinario, most probably to be used as reference, shed light on this matter. The first case concerns Captain Zuane di Martin, an ex-Ragusan and a Curzolan citizen, who continued to be treated as a foreigner in Venice and consequently charged the 3% tax on his freightage. Di Martin appealed to the estraordinario, presenting an attestation of the privilege of citizenship that was granted to him personally on 5 January 1481 by Nicolò da Mula, then the governor of Curzola. The documentation contained the subsequent ratification of the same privilege by Vettor Soranzo, capitano generale da mar, as well as an attestation prescribed in Venice on 25 October 1484, in which it was expressively stated that he, his vessel, merchandise, and property should be considered ‘as Curzolan’ and enjoy the privileges derived from this status. Captain Di Martin appended several other testimonies of Curzolan citizens attesting to the fact that he actually lived on the island, where he had bought a house and other possessions. He was then recognized by the estraordinario as a citizen ‘de intus’ and was absolved from the 3% tax.

68 ASVe, CL, bus. 19, 600 (28 January 1575), 601–2 (10 May 1581), 603 (13 September 1586), 605 (29 September 1595). 69 ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 23, reg. 22ter, c. 72v (21 January 1497).

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The second case concerns Francesco di Michiel, who was a Curzolan citizen and resident before citizenship ‘de intus’ was granted to the islanders. In this case, the testimonies of three curzolani that the same Di Michiel possessed a house and property on the island were sufficient proof for the estraordinario to acknowledge him ‘as Venetian’ in fiscal terms, insieme con li suo navili, merchanzie et beni, and exempt him from the 3% duty.70 In 1540 the RaguSan captain Vincenzo Di Polo returned from Volos in company with three other RaguSan ships. Owing to severe famine afflicting the Serenissima, he was ordered to remain at sea by Nicolò Bondimier, the capitanio del golfo, in the vicinity of Ragusa, and then instructed to change course and consign his cargo to Venice instead. Di Polo was compelled to obey, and later even banned from his hometown of Ragusa. In reaction, he emigrated to Curzola with all his family, invested his capital in property, and also started to build his own ship. However, since at the time Di Polo was only a resident and not yet a citizen, he was obliged to obtain the Senate’s consent to pursue his enterprises. To this end, in 1546 Zuane Balbi, the Venetian governor of Curzola, filed a petition to the Senate on behalf of Captain Di Polo – supported by Curzolan noblemen and citizens  – literally pleading that the captain be allowed to build a ship on Curzola, and to acknowledge the vessel ‘as Venetian’. Since it was furthermore indicated that the captain possessed security capital amounting to 10,000 ducats to buy land and property on the island, the petition was duly approved.71 In several borderline cases, the application of the law reached the phase of arbitration. As mentioned, after 1526 the provveditori all’Arsenal ruled in disputes that involved the port duties. In one such case, Zuane Morello, the owner of a marciliana of 300 botti – built by Venetian shipwrights on the banks of the River Po near Mantua – demanded that his vessel be accorded the same fiscal rights enjoyed by Venetian ships. However, the dazier Polidoro Campana begged to differ, and the case was delegated to arbitration on 26 August 1545. The provveditori all’Arsenal sentenced the owner of the marciliana to pay his dues as per a ‘foreign’ ship. Morello did not give up, however, and having filed a petition to the Senate asking for his vessel to be naturalized, he received the latter’s full consent on 16 October 1545.72 Previously, the dazier Campana had likewise denied a marciliana built in Monte Sant’Angelo the privileges granted on 13 January 1531 to all ships sailing under the Spanish colours. This consent would mean recognizing the vessel’s right to receive the same tax benefits as 70 Ibid., reg. 22bis, f. 5r (8 January–4 February 1494). 71 ASVe, SM, fil. 2, ff. 109r–16v (30 July 1546). 72 Ibid., reg. 28, f. 108v (16 October 1545); ASVe, PPA, reg. 135, ff. 86v–87r (26 August 1545).

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Venetian ships, principally the exemption from the 3% freightage levy.73 In another case, on the basis of a Senate decree of 25 February 1542, the dazier Polidoro Campana refused to recognize ‘as Venetian’ a ship purchased in Constantinople by Antonio Priuli q. Michele on behalf of his brothers. After the vessel’s arrival in Venice, the case was brought to arbitration in the office of the provveditori all’Arsenal, which validated the Priuli brothers’ claim.74 4

The Tax Burden and the Incentive Structure It Gave Rise To

The calculation of port duties, which were eventually spared from the twelve grain ships that arrived in Venice in 1552 (table 8), implies a heavy fiscal burden on foreign ships. The 3% tax on the freightage is the most prominent item as it comprises circa 75% of the overall sum in nearly all cases. For example, the dazieri estimated that the 500 botti ship of Raston Pasha would produce an income of 192 ducats. Notably, a sum of lire 956 soldi 7 (c. 154 1/2 ducats) was expected from the alboraggio, which was weighted in the overhead duty of the limitation as well. The estimate included elevated rates in other duties as well, and more than 5 ducats (lire 32 soldi 10) to the ufficio di Levante. Similarly, the 437 botti ship captained by Domenico di Bossi was expected by the dazieri to yield an income of lire 451 soldi 16 (c. 73 ducats) on the freightage and 4 1/2 ducats (lire 28 soldi 8) for the Levante. Applying the same logic for an ‘unprivileged’ merchantman of 600 botti that discharged or loaded its full cargo in Venice, the income from tax could have easily reached 240 ducats and more. Evidently, the fiscal system imposed a serious obstacle for providers of shipping services, whose ships were treated ‘as foreign’. In case this was not enough to discourage unwanted competition, the same privilege extended lower custom duties on merchandise in all major ports under Venetian control. Arguably, one of the most confusing concepts of the Venetian fiscal system was the direct link between the ship’s fiscal privileges and the rates charged on merchandise. Customs duties were rated according to the type of merchandise and collected in percentage from the total quantity in the format of ducato per cento (ad valorem). In Venice, the magistracies in charge of the collection of the customs duties were the estraordinario and the officials in the dogana da mar, regarding most of the merchandise throughout the period in question. The imposts on such essentials as wine, oil, grain, grass, 73 ASVe, PPA, reg. 135, ff. 59r–v (18 January 1542). 74 Ibid., f. 61v (8 August 1542); ASVe, SM, reg. 26, f. 90r (25 February 1542).

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iron, hemp, timber, and firewood were collected by other magistracies.75 The tax rates on import, export, and the transit of merchandise carried on Venetian vessels (or those treated ‘as Venetian’) were lower by up to 50%. This significant advantage tended to sway merchants to load their merchandise onto ships enjoying this privilege, and thus pay fewer imposts. As a result, ships originating from the dogado and others treated ‘as Venetians’ enjoyed a far wider gamut of charters and freight opportunities along the routes to and from Venice. Most likely this was a major consideration in favour of building a ship either in the dogado or in the several other shipyards that qualified for such privileges. In this way, tax concessions practically increased competitiveness in the Levant trade between ships that were treated ‘as Venetians’ and Venetian-built vessels. In addition, shipowners were able to reduce construction costs by building equally privileged ships outside the dogado, to the detriment of Venetian shipbuilders. Clearly, such concessions had many other implications. For all these reasons, it seems that the claim made by the heirs of Sandelli and Civran was exaggerated (i.e., that a potential income of 661 ducats and 21 grossi was denied to them). Grain-carrying ships were traditionally absolved from ancoraggio.76 Most probably, ‘foreign’ ships would never have accepted a charter that obliged them to pay as much tax without securing fiscal concessions in advance; or otherwise signing an agreement with the shippers to split these costs or charge higher freight rates. The annual income to the Arsenal from port duties based on auction price results (table 7) corroborate with this supposition. Between 1529 and 1571, the bids fluctuated between 596 and 1,250 ducats subject to various circumstances. The auctioneers must have considered the expected incomes from all the traffic in port (i.e., vessels of all size terrièri or forestieri, including state galleys). Even if we allow for the tax collectors’ additional income, the totals are relatively humble. The port duties in Venice were a relatively unimportant source of income to the State, certainly when compared to profits from the selling of salt, renting, levies, etc.77 Their primary importance was to channel the influx from shipping and commerce; to pose a deterrent for foreign intervention and to protect the local shipping milieu from unwanted competition. Ships that were deprived of 75 Besta, Bilanci generali, I, XXXIX. See also: ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 23, reg. 22ter, cc. 47a (26 February 1389), 47b (16 February 1392), 48b (7 November 1392), 49a (13 July 1400). 76 As was asserted by the provveditori e patroni all’Arsenal: ASVe, PPA, reg. 135, f. 28v (11 April 1538). 77 In the year 1469, the Republic’s income from taxing galleys and ships was 1,000 ducats from a total of 133,800 from tithes alone: Sanuto, Le Vite dei Dogi (1457–74), II, pp. 123–24.

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fiscal privileges had no commercial incentive to stop in Venice. For their part, while Venetian shipowners benefited from this policy, they were also confined by it, and were encouraged to direct trade to the capital, whereby they enjoyed favourable conditions and charters aplenty. Venice’s fiscal policies worked to a certain extent up until mid-1570s, when it experienced an irreversible break, and was compelled to open its port to foreign shipping companies.

part 2 Shipping Enterprise and the World of Round Ships

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From Forming to Dissolving a Shipping Company 1

The Organizational Structure of the Shipping Enterprise

1.1 The Division into Carats By convention, at least from the eleventh century onward, the Venetian legal system divided the ownership of a vessel into twenty-four shares or carats (carati).1 While many small-sized vessels were owned by a single person, it was very common to split the ownership of sea-going commercial vessels into fractions. In this way, the principal shareholders, called parcenevoli, could jointly share the liabilities and risks, and divide the profits between them.2 Unlike modern shipping companies, the associated partners had no economic dependence on each other, and there was no shared capital for the financial management of the enterprise. The partners instead acted autonomously but were required to finance the expenditures. The carats were transferable, and thus the system facilitated an intricate network of partnerships. A sharp-witted parcenevole could potentially chop his carats into halves and one-thirds to attract new money seeking investment, and further reduce his own risk. Similarly, shipowners were willing to parcel out shares in the ship to the highranking officers among the regular crews, craftsmen, potential commercial partners, and thereby secure their vested interests in the enterprise. The division into smaller units did not necessarily hinder innovation, since only a limited number of shareholders actually took an active role in the management of the enterprise.3 Similarly, the system proved beneficial for less wary investors seeking channels to invest in maritime ventures without being personally involved.

1 Similar methods to divide the ownership were used also elsewhere: Çizakça, Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships, pp. 123–25; Zeno, Storia del diritto marittimo, p. 122 cit. 1; Pagratis, ‘Organization and Management’, p. 630. 2 Tucci, ‘Venetian Ship-Owners’, p. 279; Lane, Navires et constructeurs, p. 113; Zeno, Storia del diritto marittimo, pp. 251–57. On early forms of organization of maritime joint-ventures: ibid., pp. 333–38. 3 For the division to fragments of carats: Hocquet, ‘Squeri e unità mercantili’, p. 346. Ugo Tucci reflects whether the Venetian form of organisation did not hinder the shipping sector from re-emerging: ‘Venetian Ship-Owners’, pp. 278, 280–82.

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Two examples are in order: the first concerns a lawsuit found in the legacy documentations (commissaria) of Biagio di Cesani q. Francesco. The ship owned and captained by his brother Alvise was chartered in Venice in early 1469 for a tramping voyage to Naples, Alexandria and Cyprus. Acting on behalf of his brother, Biagio accused Marin Venier q. Alvise – the owner of four carats in the ship – of not paying his share of the expenses. The initial sum paid out covered the first six months, but the voyage itself lasted over sixteen and Venier’s share was necessary to provide for salaries and food supplies. In his defence, the latter argued that the freight dues from the previous two voyages to Syria were never received. He also accused the captain of paying the crew ahead of time, and without notifying him first. Clearly, in this case the shareholder had little to do with the operational or commercial aspects of the enterprise, which were managed directly by the captain.4 The second example is a contract of 20 December 1550 in which for the sum of 1,900 ducats Nicolò Rotha q. Zuan-Maria from Bergamo sold to Triffo Malipiero q. Angelo eight out of his sixteen carats in the newly built ship of 500 botti. The contract denied the latter from taking an active role in the management of the ship, but authorized him to receive regular updates. His eight carats were consigned with Nicolò Rotha, who guaranteed to insure them before every voyage and present Malipiero with the policies. The seller undertook to keep the shares free of debt or possible claims on the private property of the buyer. Malipiero reserved the right to rent or sell his eight carats as he pleased, or use them as securities for any purpose – without requiring any prior permission. In this case as well, the buyer did not expect to enter the joint venture as an active parcenevole, but rather as a shadowy figure masked by the identity of his partners, and with the intention of reducing his risks to a minimum.5 The division to twenty-four equal carats continued to be the most common system of property sharing in Venice, until the fall of the Republic and beyond. In fact, even today in Italy the ownership of commercial vessels and leisure boats still follows this system. Moreover, the same division applied to the ship’s equipment. The ownership of the anchors, cordage, masts, spars and sails, arms and artillery, and even the stocks and supplies, was potentially divisible into quotas. Thus, when the ship captained by Nicolò di Civitan da Lesina capsized in Apulia, the surviving equipment was sold and the gains shared out between 4 ASVe, PSM, De citra, bus. 147, fasc. ‘Carte e conti in vita’ [20, 26 June, 4 July 1470, etc.]. Another lawsuit was filed against the charterers after they allegedly refused to pay the first instalment in the freights: ibid. [26 May 1470]. 5 ASVe, NA, bus. 10646, f. 770r (20 December 1550).

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the partners: Domenico and Alvise Parata q. Marco (eight carats); Hieronimo and Marco Marin q. Zuane (six carats each); and the captain (four carats).6 1.2 The Contractual Arrangements between the Shareholders The first move towards a shipping enterprise proper came with the idea of establishing more permanent association of parcenevoli, formed specifically to finance and direct the construction and commission of new vessels. The partnership thus created subsequently contracted the services of a mastershipwright and a shipyard, and organized the supply of timber and other raw materials necessary for the vessel’s construction. One of the parcenevoli was appointed to supervise the works and deal with the technical aspects, keeping a detailed record of expenses for the eventual balance sheet.7 The next stage in the procedure began after the ship was launched; the verb armare indicated the process of commissioning the ship for the voyage. In case of a new ship, this entailed the services of professional craftsmen to install the masts, spars, and all the rigging. Next came choosing the crew and equipping the ship with the right quota of supplies specific to the voyage.8 These duties were usually delegated to one of the parcenevoli or directly to the captain, if he was already contracted. The other partners shopped around for the most viable freights for the maiden voyage. One such contract for the founding of a joint venture for building a new ship of 500 botti under decks is preserved in the Cicogna collection at the Museo Civico Correr, Venice.9 According to this document, on 5 November 1519, four Venetian noblemen  – Michele Foscarini q. Zaccaria, Hieronimo di Angelo Badoer, Nicolò di Benedetto Semitecolo, and Zuan-Francesco Zustinian q. Nicolò – divided the property carats into quarters, and each participant was committed to an equal share of the risks and benefits entailed by all the stages described above. The company elected Nicolò Semitecolo to superintend the construction on behalf of the party, and to present them with the accounts; the expenses entailed by the enterprise would be discussed first among the partners. The construction itself was scheduled to begin before Christmas and continue without delay until completion. The experienced seaman ZuanFrancesco Zustinian was appointed captain, and would in time also replace 6 See a dispute between the heirs of the shareholders and Alvise Gritti, who administrated the sale of the surviving equipment in Apulia: ASVe, GP, Sentenze a giustizia, reg. 202, ff. 112r–13v (11 May 1501). 7 Tucci, ‘Venetian Ship-Owners’, pp. 277–78. 8 On the considerations in arming a ship: Massa Piergiovanni, ‘Aspetti finanziari ed economici’, pp. 111–12. 9 MCC, Cic, bus. 3431, n.10 (5 November 1519); Lane, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 113–14.

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Semitecolo as the person in charge of the commission process (armatura), personally choosing the crew members, keeping the accounts, and monitoring whatever else cropped up. Beside his personal share in the profits, the captain was awarded a salary of seventy ducats per year – whether the ship was employed or not – and the option to renew the contract for an additional year. His salary would commence from the day the other members of the company instructed him to launch the ship. In addition, Zustinian was entitled to a portada of eight miera (i.e., tax-free merchandise to a maximum weight of 8 milliaria), and was moreover obliged to use his personal quarters on board for the storage of designated merchandise (and up to four passengers, along with their belongings), purely for the benefit of the company, with an explicit warning not to use this space for personal profit. He was, however, at liberty to invite ship personnel to dine at his table if he deemed it for the benefit of the ship and the general harmony aboard, though any such expense was not to exceed one ducat per head (which would be covered by the company). Moreover, the captaincy would only be forfeited in the instance that he committed a manifest violation of the said agreement. For his part, Zustinian was entitled to resign from the captainship at whatsoever moment he might choose. As arbiter, the company appointed Angelo Badoer q. Renier, father of one of the shareholders, and invested him with the outright authority to rule whithersoever a violation of said obligations or contention among members of the company should arise. The contract explicitly declared that such disputes would be resolved through mediation (among associates), and not be delegated to court. Since the four wished to build their ship outside Venice, they agreed to engage the services of a master-shipwright that would offer to take on the job for less. The expenses for the transport of raw materials and assorted equipment to the place of construction would be borne jointly by all members of the company. The somewhat generic nature of this contract suggests it was drafted at an early stage of planning. As it were, shipping enterprises rarely started from a tabula rasa but were fashioned directly on the circumstances. In the present case the outcome was counter to all expectation: ultimately, no ship was built. On 14 March 1520 Marino Sanuto noted in his diary that the barzotto di Comun was purchased in an auction by none other than the Foscarini-Badoe r-Semitecolo-Zustinian partnership: The selling of the [recently] launched barzotto of the Signoria that was held yesterday at the Rialto by the patroni all’Arsenal was confirmed in voting [in the Senate]. The barzotto was sold for 860 ducats, to be paid within four years. It was purchased by Michele Foscarini q. Zaccaria, Nicolò Semitecolo q. Benedetto, Hieronimo di Angelo Badoer, and Piero

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Zustinian q. Ferigo. Each one was regarded responsible for his part and the whole. Their intention is to commission it for a voyage.10 Arguably, the construction of the new ship did not start before Christmas, as planned, and the company either folded or sought to buy an existing ship instead of building one from scratch. A certain Piero Zustinian q. Ferigo replaced the fourth member of the company, Zuan-Francesco Zustinian q. Nicolò.11 This goes to show that the contractual arrangements between the members of the joint venture did not so much announce as confirm a shipping enterprise that was already under way. 1.3 The Anatomy of the Private Shipyards in Venice While Venice’s long shipbuilding tradition gave rise to entire dynasties of celebrated foremen shipwrights, the profession was by no means a closed group, and any able ship carpenter could offer his services and prove his worth to a group of merchants commissioning a ship, and this way perhaps rise to the position of foreman, at least temporarily. Operators of small boatyards were generally handicraft retailers contracted to build a gondola, barge, boat or suchlike for a fixed price and within a predefined period; they were responsible for supplying the materials, hiring the necessary workforce, and paying the weekly wages, while the clients were presented with the final product. Clearly, the building of round ships required an entirely different form of organization. The larger the ship, the more difficult it was to secure the necessary oak and larch wood, much of which had to be brought from afar at great expense. For the construction itself, it was necessary to occupy one of the largest shipyards (squeri) in the city, or make similar arrangements elsewhere, and to hire scores of craftsmen. It may come as a surprise, but the shipyards in Venice were somewhat basic and incapable of managing such complicated and expensive initiatives. They had an artiSan system whereby the rules of their trade were anchored in the statutes (mariegole) of the guild of master-shipwrights and caulkers. To be sure, some attempt had been made to extend their operations to the construction of large ships, but this had been stymied in 1425 by a ban on contracting vessels of over 167 botti, a limitation that left little leeway for the emergence of owner-managers with 10 Sanuto, I diarii, XXVIII, 340 (14 March 1520); Levi, Navi Venete, pp. 272–73. 11 It seems that the two members of the clan Zustinian were not close relatives: ASVe, Genealogie Barbaro, VII.35, pp. 459, 476. Four years later, in 1524 this ship was stranded in Portugal on the return voyage from England after a fateful encounter with a French corsair: Sanuto, I diarii, XXXVI, 401 (14 June 1524).

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combined technical know-how, capital, and entrepreneurial ability.12 In the second half of the fifteenth century, the statutory organization of the Venetian workforce prevented the city’s private shipyards from competing with the emerging shipyards further south in the Adriatic Sea. As a result, craftsmen deserted en masse to foreign yards, weakening the State’s shipbuilding facilities and triggering new state provisions barring Venetian shipowners from constructing vessels elsewhere.13 Thus, from a financial standpoint, shipowners and shipbuilders were the same persons. The owners held full economic control over the enterprise, kept all the accounts, and bore the financial burden. They supplied the raw materials, rented the shipyard, contracted the necessary workforce, and paid the salaries.14 While shipowners were well informed on the technical specifics of ship construction, it was the responsibility of the foreman to ensure that their preferences were translated into exact measurements, supervising the craftsmanship during every phase of construction. A document dated 1509, containing the working stages on the parts called opere vive below the waterline: broadly speaking, the first phase of construction involved installing the long keel beam along with all its branching supports: ‘una [nave] cavo da prova cum le columbre solamente’; after this came the principal beams of the skeleton (imboscata); the secondary beams were followed (imboscata in fili), after which the planking or plating stage began (serada), whereby the caulkers riveted the lateral planks to the skeleton. Their job was to drill and hammer ( forar e fichar), then they stuffed hemp between the joints (chalchar) and coated the planks with pitch (impegolar). The next stage, again broadly speaking, included the work on the opere morte, that is the parts above waterline: the building of the ramps, castles, and the supports for the masts. The making of these parts along with the rudder, capstans, blocks, pulleys, and rigging were assigned to professionals that worked freelance, and not in the employ of the shipyards. Part of this complex completion work – particularly the masting – was completed after the ship was launched.15 The legacy documentations of Michele Foscari q. Filippo comprise a contract with the maestro Leonardo da Albori for crafting the main mast at a length of nearly 34.5 metres,16 on the basis of a scale model that was presented 12 Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 385. 13 Idem, ‘Venetian Shipping’, p. 27. 14 Idem, Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 164; idem, Navires et constructuerus, pp. 110–13; Luzzatto, ‘Per la storia delle costruzioni navali’, pp. 386–88, 391–92. 15 Hocquet, ‘Squeri e unità mercantili’, p. 343. 16 The verb imbottare means to craft the pieces of timber and reinforce them with iron hoops to assemble large masts: Guglielmotti, Vocabulario marino e militare, pp. 861–62.

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beforehand for approval. Other items included in the contract were the trinchetto; mizzen and contra mizzen masts; the upper part of the main mast at the top of the crow’s nest; and the cividiera (spelled zivadora). All these components were furnished with their respective rigging, booms, spars, and spare parts. Similarly, the mast of the service boat and that of the schiffo, each with its respective spars, were indicated as well. Foscari ensured the supply of all the timber and other raw materials.17 Now, to haul or launch a round ship required a suitable slipway, or at least a slope that would convey the craft down to a depth of at least four metres below the waterline. Private shipyards with facilities of this kind could be found at the waterfront between the Ducal Palace and the Arsenal, extending as far as Sant’Antonio; similarly, along the Giudecca Canal at Zattere and San Basegio, and on the northern section of Cannaregio. In the fourteenth century these areas were not yet blocked in with stone embankments, but were basically swamps or pools or muddy shores, where boats and smaller vessels regularly ran aground. Gradual development in urban planning pushed the private shipyards further to the periphery. In the fifteenth and sixteenth century, the largest complex of private shipyards moved from Castello further eastward towards San Pietro di Castello. In time, shipyards moved away from the seafront of the more urbanized parts of the city, primarily the Grand Canal and the area between San Marco and the Arsenal. The list of ships built in 1507 from state loans details each one’s place of construction. At the time, most ships were built at Spirito Santo, a complex of shipyards situated along the Giudecca Canal  – the ‘de Saloni’ shipyard stood behind the customs house; other key shipyards in the vicinity were those of master-shipwrights Jacomo Brocheta, Polo da Locha, and Bartolomeo Navaro. Other ships were built in the vicinity of the Arsenal, in Ca’ Navagero, and in the shipyards of a certain maestro Matteo in Quintavalle.18 Out of the twenty-three nave di Comun that were built between 1422 and 1554, five were built at the Arsenal, the others in private shipyards at Sant’Antonio, Quintavalle, Santa Trinità, on the island of Poveglia, and the rest at Spirito Santo as far as the squero of ‘I Saloni’.19 The state of the waterfront in Zattere and Spirito Santo around 1500 – with its slipways, docks, piles, and wooden jetties protruding into the canal  – is clearly visible in the vast woodcut by Jacopo de’ Barbari, with its detailed view 17 ASVe, PSM, Misti, bus. 41, fasc. IX [21 February 1485]; ibid., bus. 44, fasc. X [5, 13 June, 10 July 1484 etc.]. 18 ASVe, CN, reg. 16, ff. 8v–9r (5 July 1507); Hocquet, ‘Squeri e unità mercantili’, p. 344; Crouzet-Pavan, ‘Sopra le aque salse’, I, pp. 307–32. 19 Lane, Navires et constructuers, pp. 116 cit. 6, 265–66 appendix VII.

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of the city from above, from which it is also apparent that most of the waterborne traffic at the time was concentrated along the San Marco basin, bordering with the eastern part of Castello and the Arsenal. The view shows how the ships being careened or repaired are moored in front of the shipyards by means of floating pontoons fastened to the hull on both sides. Other vessels at different stages of construction stand or lean on their keel in the dry. The large complex of private shipyards includes the zone of Quintavalle, San Pietro di Castello and the estuary of the canal of San Domenico in the background. The shipyards in Sant’Antonio are visible in the waterfront facing San Marco, just after the canal of the Arsenal, and as far as the granaries of San Biasio. Some fifty years later, in mid-sixteenth century, most of the yards for the construction of round ships in Venice were concentrated in Sant’Antonio. Spirito Santo had been one of the most active centres for shipbuilding in Venice until 8 February 1520, when the Senate voiced the serious silt problem caused by the extension of the private shipyards towards the seafront. This, in turn, altered the current through the Giudecca Canal, creating an area of stagnant water between the customs warehouse and the island. The preoccupation with the silting of the lagoon and the growing risk of disease moved the Senate to order the demolition of the private shipyards in Spirito Santo, from Santa Marta and as far as the salt warehouses, that is along the entire waterfront facing Giudecca. Instead, the so-called fondamenta was constructed to confine the canal.20 The squero run by the Sabina (Savina) family of master-shipwrights at Sant’Antonio had a tradition of over one hundred years. The earliest indication I found is dated 1463, where a cocca owned by Maffeo and Ambruxo Contarini captained by Zuane Zimalarca was repaired in the squero of Simon di Sabina before setting sail to Syria.21 In 1525 Leonardo Sabina requested permission to construct an underwater slipway in front of his shipyard that would start from a depth below the waterline of about eight pie’ (2.78 metres) to allow him to haul out or launch ships of large capacity.22 After 1535 the Sabina shipyard is occasionally indicated in the orders of payment of loans by the treasury of the Council of Ten for new ships under construction. Another squero in Sant’Antonio was run by Francesco di Daniele Mezavolta & bros.

20 Hocquet, Voiliers et commerce, p. 576; idem, ‘Squeri e unità mercantili’, p. 347; Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, pp. 14–16. 21 ASVe, GP, Terminazioni, reg. 44, ff. 7v–10r, 18r–18v (ref. to 1463–64). 22 ASVe, SEA, bus. 368, pt. Terzo, ff. 3r–3v (11 September 1525).

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The man’s expertise in salvage operations was renowned throughout the Mediterranean.23 Notwithstanding the importance of the Sant’Antonio complex, many ships were built elsewhere, as there was no law to stipulate where such ships were built, as long as construction was carried out within the dogado. The shallow waters and muddy terrain facilitated ship-building in the lagoon’s outskirts, such as Murano, Poveglia, Livenza, Meduno, La Motta, Lio, and even at the entrance to the port of San Nicolò or on the outskirts of the dogado and as far as the mouth of the River Po. In 1565 the brothers Hieronimo and Stefano Querini built their ship on their private land in Mazorno, in the vicinity of Canale di Loreo south of Chioggia.24 Sea-going commercial vessels built at a distance from Venice required a different form of organization. The division of responsibilities between the future owners of the ship and the master-shipwright present on the construction site were established by contract. One such accord was signed in Venice on 23 October 1525 between the shareholders Marin Spici and Pasqualin q. Zorzi and the master-shipwright Piero di Nicolò, who ran a shipyard in Caorle,25 whereby the craftsman was obligated to build a marciliana within a period of six months. A similar contract on 12 March 1566 was signed in Venice between Antonio di Ambruxio Gratuol and Francesco di Vicenzo da Curzola, for the building of a vessel on the island of Curzola within three months.26 In both these examples, the contract established the measurements of the ship, the building schedule, and the agreed price. The necessary hardware and metals were brought from Venice by the future shipowners, at their expense. However, since Caorle and Curzola were close to timber resources, most of the oak was supplied by the master-shipwrights – a convenience that was probably one of the principal reasons for contracting these shipyards in the first place. Indeed, the two most expensive items on the budget were timber supplies, followed by the salaries to the foreman and his team.27 Building a ship in Venice was considerably more expensive in terms of both categories. In 1483 Marco Bembo, a shipowner and merchant residing in Venice, wished to build his new vessels on the island of Crete, as it was way cheaper but with no loss of quality. He employed his old ship to transport the necessary hardware from Venice to the port of Candia, including cordage, metal parts, and hemp.28 In one of his 23 24 25 26 27 28

ASVe, CXDCrim, reg. 8 [3 March 1537]. Hocquet, Voiliers et commerce, p. 576; idem, ‘Squeri e unità mercantili’, p. 344. Gluzman, ‘Resurrection of a Sunken Ship’, p. 75. ASVe, CDM, reg. 128 [12 March 1566]. Massa Piergiovanni, ‘Aspetti finanziari ed economici’, p. 110. ASVe, MCart., bus. 29, 55 (31 January 1483), 83 (3 June 1483).

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letters addressed to Zuane Malipiero, residing in Crete, he expressed his wish to build a 400-botti ship near the timber resources in the southern part of the island:29 I have decided to sell our ship that gives little profit and too much expenses being of small capacity [probably of 270 botti]. My idea is to make a big ship [nave grossa] there [in Crete]. But I would not proceed any further due to the present occurring [the Ferrara war], as I hope that the Signoria will provide bounties for those who wish to build big ships. Bear in mind though that instead of the one we have, a 400-botti ship will be able to sail around the world [anderà per ell mondo] with the same costs of a 270 [botti]. I do not want to burden you with the construction though. I [also] do not want to built it in Candia [intending the city of Candia], since the available larch timber is too soft [chorbame] and not hard enough [durada], like the timber in La Canea. But also there, as far as I heard, it is difficult to built ships, as the timber had to be carried from afar. If you will find a way to build the ship on the southern part of the island and give the job to a master-shipwright, the hull would be built with little expenses and the only other costs would be on hardware. Think about it, make some inquiries and let me know. It should be made according to the Venetian style [alla gixa veneziana] that is rounded and flat [bastaxiera] and not curved [taiada], functional and not pompous. 1.4 Providing Timber The logistical considerations that were involved in obtaining the necessary quantity of timber are manifested in the following example. On 3 February 1534 the heads of the Council of Ten, with the consent of the patroni all’Arsenal, instructed the Count of Prata (in Friuli) to permit and offer assistance to Marco Malipiero q. Perazzo in harvesting four hundred oak trees at the forest resources in the vicinity for the purpose of building a ship of 400 botti. The permit was valid for two months, one month for harvesting the timber, and the second for transporting it, presumably to Murano, where his ship was eventually built.30 Before use, the oak timbers had to be seasoned underwater for about eighteen months, until the green timber hardened sufficiently, at which 29 Ibid., 115 (20 November 1483). 30 ASVe, CapCX, Notatorio, reg. 10, f. 95r (3 February 1534). In 1536 Marco Malipiero launched a ship that was built on the island of Murano. According to his petition to the Council of Ten, the capacity under the lower deck was estimated 350 botti, hence the overall capacity must have been around 525 botti. It is unclear whether any additional quantity of timber was necessary to complete the ship: Appendix A: 1540, n. 20.

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point the craftsmen sawed it into lengths of board. Therefore, for those who wished to obtain green timber directly from the forests rather than purchase it from suppliers in Venice, it was essential to acquire the supply of oak well in advance of when they would be employed in naval construction. Another key factor was to ensure sufficient river levels for the timber rafts, which meant transporting the material during the spring snowmelt, and again during the September rains; consequently, the timeframe for acquiring the building material was relatively tight.31 Clearly, physical characteristics, chiefly specific density and strength of certain types of wood used in ship-building were important considerations. In Venice, the skeleton of ships and galleys was built from stortami oak. Larch was the preferred specie for items on board, masts, cranes, capstans, etc. The main timber species for hull planking seem to have been fir, pine, and cedar, also popular coastal pine and cypress, larch and plane.32 Cedar’s famous resistance to rot and terrestrial insects is well known,33 and indeed in times of shortage of oak supplies, galleys were completed from cedar. Having good access to timber resources potentially reduced the price of construction and was probably one of the primary concerns in the early stages of the enterprise. Scattered evidence shows that the Venetian shipping milieu was well informed on the quality and availability of timber in their surroundings and in the overseas territories they had access to.34 Actually, shipowners often travelled in person to ensure the timber was of the right quality. In a letter from Venice dated 18 May 1544, the shipowner Zuane Vidoa q. Gasparo informed his captain that Zuane Dolfin q. Lorenzo had left Venice for Vicenza to procure a great quantity of oak to build his ship.35 It seems that Venice also offered a good market place for scrapped materials, the timber parts above the waterline (opera morta, pl. mòrti) – which had a longer life expectancy – were primarily used for building new ships.36 31 Appuhn, A Forest on the Sea, pp. 97–98, 122–23; Lazzarini, ‘Boschi, legnami, costruzioni navali’, I, pp. 115–16. 32 For the galleys: Lazzarini, ‘Boschi, legnami, costruzioni navali’, I, pp. 139–60, 174. 33 Steinmayer & Macintosh Turfa, ‘Effects of Shipworm’, p. 110. 34 Planning to build a ship on the Island of Crete in 1483, Marco Bembo instructed his partners not to use the Candiot timber for the skeleton since it was too soft and not hard enough, those in the vicinity of Chania and particularly in the south part of the Island were more adequate for that purpose: ASVe, MCart, bus. 29, 115 (20 November 1483). On the particularities of different species of oak in North Italy and Istria in Drachio’s writings (late 16th century): Lazzarini, ‘Boschi, legnami, costruzioni navali’, I, pp. 117–19. 35 ASVe, MG, bus. 12bis-II, [18 May 1544]. 36 Gluzman, ‘Notes on Venice’s Ship-Breaking Industry’, pp. 88, 90–92.

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But the dwindling of the forest resources further complicated the logistics, and inevitably pushed up the overall costs of construction. Toward the end of the fifteenth century the Council of Ten decided to oversee the Arsenal manager’s administration of the new public forests, and in the following decades it took care to re-enact and extend these policies to include new territories. During the period in question, although the legislation governing forestry specifically allowed for the harvesting of oak trees in Venetian reserve forests for the building of ships and boats, any request to harvest a certain type of timber from the state reserves required the official approval of the Ten.37 The records of this magistracy provide a useful chronicle of formal requests for a wide range of projects, including many cases of ship construction or repair. In 1505, for example, Michele di Jacomo Malipiero was granted permission to cut fresh oak wood on the islands of Veglia and Cherso for boat construction38 – probably designated for his new Malipiera of 800 botti that was built at the squero of Jacomo Brocheta two years later, in July 1507.39 And in 1516 Piero Diedo received a similar permission to harvest oaks on the island of Lesina, for his new ship.40 In the years that followed the War of the League of Cambrai, and until 1524, when the Venetians finally recaptured virtually all their lost territories in the terraferma,41 shipowners found themselves facing a dearth of timber for construction and repairs. During this period, the merchant galleys were completed from cedar timbers, but even this reservoir was depleting fast.42 The harvest of oak trees in Venice’s dominions in northern Italy and as far as the Quarner was practically prohibited for any other purpose than naval construction, public and private.43 The examples of pleas to the Council for using the Arsenal’s reserve as an alternative are many: Francesco and Filippo Bernardo ran out of timber while repairing the hull of their ship and requested permission to harvest thirty beech and larch trees in the Arsenal reserves in Montello, in the province of Treviso;44 in order to complete the repairs for his ship Galeazzo Semitecolo received a licence to harvest eight oak trees in the Montello, ‘as they

37 Appuhn, A Forest on the Sea, pp. 94–97, 109–15; Lazzarini, ‘Boschi, legnami, costruzioni navali’, II, p. 89. 38 ASVe, CXDM, fil. 17, fasc. 209 (28 September 1505). 39 ASVe, CN, reg. 16, f. 8v (5 July 1507). 40 ASVe, CapCX, Lettere dei rettori, Lesina, reg. 278, 66 (26 February 1517). 41 Appuhn, A Forest on the Sea, pp. 125–35. 42 ASVe, CN, reg. 18, f. 127v (16 July 1519). 43 ASVe, PPA, reg. 7, ff. 32r–32v (8 February 1520). 44 ASVe, CXDM, fil. 46, fasc. 81 (24 October 1520).

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could not be found elsewhere’;45 the appeal of Jacomo Michele q. Hieronimo and Zuan-Andrea Badoer q. Hieronimo to obtain forty trees from the Arsenal to complete their ship was debated in the Senate, despite the fact that the party guaranteed to replace the stock within two months.46 Marco Malipiero q. Perazzo petitioned the Council of Ten three times for permission to harvest oaks trees in Montello to build a ship: the first time was in January 1522, ‘since such timber could not be found elsewhere, as is very well known’;47 one year later, he presented a similar request for an additional supply;48 and just about when the ship was ready for launching, in August 1523 Malipiero lacked the necessary timber for the masts and the supports.49 Given the situation, the masts and spars were cut from fir, beech, and larch timber, which would normally be purchased from suppliers in the Cadore region, near the headwaters of the River Piave.50 Securing enough stocks of timber, and shipping the wood to its destination, was a constant concern for shipowners throughout the following decades. In 1536 the Ten declined to grant Zuane Michele and Zuan-Battista Donado permission to harvest trees in the Arsenal’s reserve, and consequently the two men sought the intervention of the Senate.51 Against the backdrop of renewed conflicts with the Turks, in 1537 the procedures for obtaining a permit to cut fresh oak-wood for ship construction were made even tighter, and now required the signature of at least three of the provveditori e patroni all’Arsenal. Oak resources on plains and hills were more closely regulated, whereas the same restraints did not necessarily apply to others. After 1559 candidates applying for government loans for ship construction had to provide proof that the oak had been cut in foreign territories and not from the State’s own reserves.52 The contractual agreements between shipowners and timber suppliers reveal a host of other details about how materials were traded during this period: on 16 March 1542 a certain Thoma Duodo q. Hieronimo, acting on behalf of the other shareholders of the ship Cornera, signed a contract with Bernardin Segato from villa di Nogaro to supply him one hundred and thirty 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52

Ibid., fil. 48 fascc. 187, 218 (8, 27 January 1522). Sanuto, I diarii, XXXV, 131–34 (22 October 1523). ASVe, CXDM, fil. 48, fasc. 219 (27 January 1522). Ibid., fil. 50, fasc. 176 (29 January 1523). Ibid., reg. 46, f. 110v (12 August 1523). Appuhn, A Forest on the Sea, p. 98. ASVe, SM, reg. 23, f. 182r (29 September 1536). ASVe, CXDC, fil. 22, fasc. 185 (27 February 1537); ibid., fil. 49, fasc. 19 (13 September 1549); ASVe, PPA, reg. 531, fasc. 15 [14 January 1559]. The restriction on the harvest of oak was limited to the Arsenal reservoirs. Other areas were less regulated: Lazzarini, ‘Boschi, legnami, costruzioni navali’, II, pp. 92–94, 96.

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oak trunks from the district of Treviso; the agreement specifies the type, features, and dimensions of the timber required, as well as the price per piece, including the transportation costs. Segato was expected to deliver the timber directly to the canal of San Giovanni e Paolo in Venice within a period of two and a half months, failing which the buyers reserved the right to purchase the same quantity elsewhere, at the expense of the seller.53 In another notarial contract dated 7 January 1549, the same Thoma Duodo offered 400 ducats to Alvise Rizzi q. Andrea and Andrea Barbarigo q. Zorzi for three hundred and fifty carri (a Venetian measurements for wood)54 of cerris oak that would be harvested on the island of Veglia, and carried to Venice with the burchio of the said Rizzi; the price per carro was fixed at 26 soldi for the first two-hundred, and 28 soldi for the remaining one hundred and fifty, comprising the cost of delivery. Similarly, Duodo reserved his right to purchase the same quantity at the expense of the supplier, if the latter should fail to provide as per agreement.55 1.5 Contracting the Captain Captains of round ships were a somewhat tight-knit cabal of unusually skilled men, and very much in demand, given that much of the success or failure of a shipping enterprise depended on their expertise and performance. Their reputation, moreover, reflected on that of the shareholders, and vice versa. To judge from the snapshots of Venice’s merchant marine (Appendix A), the captaincy on the large-tonnage vessels was divided more or less equally between the captains of noble origins and socially inferior groups, at least until the third decade of the sixteenth century. Thereafter, the cittadini or sudditi take the lead (fig. 7). In 1558, out of 58 abled captains of big merchantmen in Venice, only three names are associated with the upper class.56 Those with noble blood that were appointed for the role came from impoverished houses or branches, or were possibly the illegitimate sons of patricians. It was also customary for the younger son to govern the family’s new ships in the first few voyages. The majority of the captains were, however, of Greek origin, Dalmatian or Albanian.57 If we trace the career of some of these men, we can see that the same captains skipped from ship to ship among a relatively small number of vessels, 53 ASVe, NA, bus. 10636, ff. 278v–79r (16 March 1542). An additional stock of timber necessary for the building of the new Cornera, was most probably recycled from the decommissioned ship. 54 Boerio, Dizionario del dialetto veneziano, p. 140. 55 ASVe, NA, bus. 10644, f. 10r (7 January 1549). 56 MMC, DDR, bus. 217 MS. ‘Navi grosse di Venetia loro viaggi e loro patroni’, c. 30r. 57 Judde de Larivière, Naviguer, commercer, gouverner, p. 290.

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The division of the captaincy on large-tonnage ships between those with noble origins and other social groups, 1480–1558

evidently in search of whatever commission proved most profitable. Captain Polo di Domenico Bianco, for example, was in command of two ships belonging to Benedetto di Priuli from 1500 until he shipwrecked his new vessel in January 1511. Barely a year later, in 1512 he was appointed captain of the Morosina of Piero Morosini; between 1514 and 1515 he was in command of the ship of the Bernardo brothers; and in the following three years he took the helm of the Semitecola. Fast-forward a few years and we find him, from 1525 to 1527, in command of the ship of Alvise Di Polo Loredan & co., and subsequently appointed armiraglio of a galley fleet for two years. Between 1530 and 1532 the reputed captain governed the 1,200-botti Dolfina, proud property of Alvise Dolfin q. Hieronimo and Fantino Corner q. Hieronimo dalla Episcopia. In a later episode in his long career he is mentioned at the helm of the ship Cornera on a voyage to Cyprus.58 The following case clarifies to what extent the captain’s careers, their vices and virtues, were common knowledge for all those involved in shipping. In late 1557 the position of captain on the ship of the Donada e Cornera partnership was up for grabs. In a letter written to Zuan-Battista Donà, governor of Cyprus, his son Andrea named some options:

58

Appendix A: 1499, n. 32; 1509, n. 3; 1520, nos. 9, 10; 1530, n. 41. On Bianco’s career as armiraglio: Sanuto, I diarii, XLV, 483 (14 July 1527); ibid., XLIX, 297 (29 December 1528).

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Since Hieronimo [Andrea’s brother] decided not to return with the ship [to Cyprus] we lack a captain. Nicolò Corner [shareholder] said he trust us with this matter and will accept any person we decide. We regard as first Francesco da Curzola, if he will be available [at that time he was still contracted to the decaying Tarabota], and as second Francesco di Nicolò da Lustiza. He was the scribe of the Liona for a long time, and recently became the patron of the ship, which is expected [to arrive] presently. I have a good impression of him, but there are many rumours that he never leaves the ship when in land, he sees absolutely nobody, nobody, nobody. Those noted are presently contracted. [Stefano] Taraboto offered me [to contract] his son Iseppo that did not return from Smirne yet. But I don’t think you think much of him, and Nicolò Corner is under the same opinion.59 It was customary to grant captains shares in the ship to secure their commitment to the enterprise. Besides, the captain was paid an annual salary regardless of the time the ship was employed – the exact term translates ‘at sea and on land’. The salary varied between 50 and 100 ducats per year, depending on the size of the ship and the captain’s reputation.60 In addition, he was entitled to carry a quota of freightage-free merchandise on board (portada), the size of which was an important element of the contract. Several examples are in order: in 1492 Nicolò Arimondo q. Ferigo was contracted to command the newly built Malipiera of 500 botti for an annual salary of 70 ducats (commencing from the day of its launch), the perk as captain being a portada of 6 botti; whereas Benedetto Ragazoni who captained the 800-botti ship of Hieronimo Bragadin q. Vettor and Jacomo Negron between 1521 and 1524 received merely 60 ducats per year;61 in 1539 the regular salary of the captain of a marciliana of 300 botti was 50 ducats per year.62 Now, shipowners keen to secure the involvement of the top-drawer captains were invariably willing to provide bonuses on the side. Hence, while Stefano di Nicolò Taraboto captained the Cornera of 650 botti from 1538 to 1542, in addition to his salary of 80 ducats per year, he was offered a portada of 20 sacks, equivalent to 20 miera or 200 stara of wheat, depending on the cargo. Taraboto was evidently quite a catch, since he was subsequently chosen to command the barza di Comun, making him the 59 MCC, DDR, reg. 411, fasc. VI, 66 (10 November 1557). Their hopes were eventually fulfilled, and Francesco da Curzola was contracted for the job: Hocquet, ‘il libro “creditorum”’, p. 66. 60 Magno, Voyages (1557–1565), pp. 526–27; Tucci, ‘Una nave veneziana’, pp. 721–22; Pellegrini,‘Salariato’ della nave Girarda, pp. 52–91. 61 ASVe, CXDM, fil. 51, fasc. 177 (8 July 1523). 62 Gluzman, ‘Resurrection of a Sunken Ship’, p. 46.

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very first non-nobleman to be thus honoured. Alarmed at the idea of losing him, the Cornera shareholders offered to raise his annual salary to 100 ducats and the portada to 25 with up to 30 sacks, in the hope he would decline the barza captaincy.63 In 1544 the shipping tycoon Andrea di Anastasio Corcumeli was particularly eager to hire the services of one Jani Fuschi to helm his new ship, built in Crete in 1544. Fuschi was expected to depart from Venice at once, reach the island, take over the command, and wait for further notice on the destination of the voyage. The captain’s annual salary was fixed at 70 ducats, starting from the day of signature, along with a portada of 8 miera. Such was his impatience to engage the captain that Corcumeli volunteered to settle the man’s former debts in Venice and deduct it from his future salary, and to advance all the expenses for supplying and crewing the ship.64 The ploy evidently worked, as Jani Fuschi remained in command of the Corcumela at least until 1548. Another item in the standard contract regulated the use of the captain’s quarters: in 1485 the agreement signed by Captain Polo Foscari q. Urban included a prohibition to use his private space for storing anything but his portada of 40 butts of wine ‘of the customary size’.65 Elsewhere we read that in 1492 Captain Nicolò Arimondo was entitled to accommodate passengers and colonial officials in his quarters, presumably at the poop castle, and benefit from this additional income. Should this space be made available to carry the passengers’ goods as well, the captain was entitled to one-third of the freightage on the total, while two-thirds were on the account of the ship that was divided between the shareholders. It was however expected from Arimondo to use this space sensibly, and not compromise the stability of the ship. Despite the frequent perks, captains devised ways to further increase their personal profits. In 1496, for example, the same Arimondo had an overhang built out from his cabin, in which (for a fee) he stored wheat on behalf of the ship’s scrivano and nochiero. His ruse was discovered, however, and he was later sued by the charterer Andrea Loredan for loading wheat in a quantity that exceeded his portada. In his defence, the captain argued that the extension was necessary to ballast the ship (!).66 The job contract also took into account the captain’s liability for enrolling the crew and guaranteeing their sustenance, along with a regular disbursement 63 As attested by Zuan Michiel q. Francesco, a shareholder: ASVe, CXDC, fil. 38, fasc. 39 (7 August 1545). 64 ASVe, NA, bus. 10639, fasc. 2, ff. 8v–9r (15 May 1544). 65 ASVe, PSM, Misti, bus. 41, fasc. XIII [30 September 1485]. 66 ASVe, ACMCP, bus. 4095, fasc. 8 (8 February 1497).

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of their salaries in the course of the voyage. Besides the captain, the ship’s scribe (scrivano) was the only person authorized to distribute allowances from the ship’s cash deposit. The captain received a sum in advance that was used to disburse part of the salaries to the crew in the course of the voyage. The refusura, which was the final pay, was disbursed after the return of the ship. In this case, Captain Arimondo was entrusted with one ducat per month per person for that purpose, and an additional sum – about 300 ducats in cash – was assigned to cover various other expenses that would be incurred during the voyage. The captain was expected to present how these 300 ducats were spent, but was entitled to keep any surplus. He was also empowered to enrol one of his acquaintances as a mariner ( fante) to replace an existing crewmen. Similar arrangements are found in other contracts as well. Such contractual arrangements were influenced by the changing circumstances and their clauses varied accordingly. In this context it is worth mentioning the tendency of the Greek shipping magnate Andrea Corcumeli to turn his captains into equal partners in the enterprise by sharing the profits with them, and showing considerable flexibility when settling their expenses. In this sense, the method adopted was similar to a joint venture (the Venetian colleganza or the Corfiot syntrophia for that matter),67 in which the sedentary merchant invested his capital, while the person accompanying the merchandise provided his labour and expertise  – in this case the captain, who was not only expected to command the ship but to do good business as well. On 14 March 1547, for example, Corcumeli sold one quarter of the carats of his galione, including its rigging and artillery, to the newly appointed captain Zorzi di Simon Postichi, for the price of 200 ducats. The terms of payment were quite flexible: half of the sum was paid in cash upon signing, and the rest upon the safe return of the galione to Venice. In cases where the voyage did not prove profitable, the disbursement of the second half was postponed to the return from the ensuing trip.68 At any rate, this sort of arrangement was made possible on smaller vessels. The large amounts of capital involved in financing large round ships inevitably reduced the chances of the captain becoming a partner-investor on an equal footing, and turned him into a contracted employee receiving certain benefits.

67

Business institutions of this kind activated a large part of the idle local capital, which was then invested systematically in the apparatus of commercial development: cf. Pagratis, ‘Organization and management’, pp. 632, 637–38, 640. 68 ASVe, NA, bus. 10642, ff. 55r–v (14 March 1547).

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1.6 The Memorandum Letter Unless the agreement had undergone significant changes – that is, in the conditions of employment, a change of vessel and so forth  – the contract with the captain remained in force as long as the captain was in command. Given his state of almost complete autonomy, it was standard practice to apprise the captain of the various commercial prospects of the forthcoming voyage. Known as the aricordo (memorandum), this document was a written summary of a spoken agreement, and was addressed to the captain, and written in the second person as a set of conditions he was expected to comply with. This memorandum was legally binding, and constituted important evidence in possible disputes between the parties.69 The following example clarifies the impact the captain’s conduct had in the success of the enterprise. In 1482, wishing to benefit from the elevated price of cereals in Venice and the bounty that was offered by the State, the shipowner Marco Bembo reckoned it would be better to send his ship on his own account, rather than charter it to other merchants. Bembo elaborates the primary responsibilities of his captain Andrea Malluxà in the memorandum letter: first and foremost to make sure the ship returned to Venice before March so as to receive the state bounties for wheat consignments; secondly, to keep a tight control over expenses; thirdly, to find profitable freights: ‘Since you are the captain of this ship,’ it reads, ‘I grant you liberty to do whatever you think would be profitable and useful for this ship; being myself far away, you will know the facts as they are, and are in a better position to decide. Therefore,’ Bembo continues, ‘I will go no further, as with prudent men there’s no need for too many explanations, and I am well familiar with your work.’ Finally, the owner instructed his captain to provide for the merchant Hieronimo Copo in person, who was about to embark the ship with his merchandise on this voyage to Constantinople.70 A second example concerns the shipment of olive oil from Le Marche to Alexandria on board the ship Foscara in 1489. That year Venice had taken full control of Cyprus, a move that greatly strained the already uneven relations with the Mamluk Sultan Qaitbay. The Venetian ambassador Piero Diedo had meanwhile been sent to Egypt to settle the question of the tribute to be paid, 69

70

One such an example is a memorandum of 23 May 1483, issued by shipowners Hieronimo Tiepolo and Zuane dal Cortivo to their captain Michali di Zuane before his departure to Apulia and Alexandria. Despite safe conduct, the ship was captured (Venice was then at war) and the letter was used at court as evidence in a dispute between the shipowners and charterers Nicolò and Benedetto Pesaro: ASVe, GP, Sentenze a giustizia, reg. 195, ff. 1r–5r (11 March 1495, ref. to 23 May 1483). Ibid., 47 (22 November 1482).

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and to deal with the reestablishment of the pepper monopoly. By the time the Foscara departed from Venice, there were no longer any sureties for the entire enterprise, and Michele Foscari feared that his ship would be detained and its cargo seized by the Mamluks. For this reason, Captain Nicolò Vidal was instructed to send his service boat to the port of Alexandria before the arrival of the ship proper, and contact Foscari’s agent, Daniel Copo. Were he nowhere to be found, and the political conditions proved too volatile, Vidal was ordered to proceed to Bichieri (Abu Qir), ride on anchor, and wait for further developments. From Alexandria he was expected to make his way back directly to Venice, and in case of insufficient return freights he would proceed to Cyprus to complete his cargo with salt.71 Another example of 29 July 1540 is a written summary of a consultation that took place in Venice between the principal shareholders of the ship Cornera and the ship’s captain, Stefano di Nicolò Taraboto. What makes this case particularly interesting is the particularly sensitive political juncture in which it took place, that is, while a truce with the Turks was agreed, but before a full treaty had been signed. Amid this hush of uncertainty Taraboto was instructed to meet the governor of Cyprus, Zuan-Battista Donà, and follow his advice whether to proceed to Syria. If the voyage to Syria proved impossible, Taraboto had instructions to load the entire ship with wheat. Hedging their bets, the partners had previously obtained a permit from the Council of Ten to load 5,000 stara of grain in Cyprus. Wheat was preferred, however, so long as a sufficient quantity could be obtained. Failing that, Taraboto would invest in barley to a maximum of 2,000 stara, or in spices or silk, leaving it for him to decide. Should he fail to make a good deal, his instructions were to return with the cash, or invest it in cotton, which would likely be available at convenient prices.72 Finally, it is worth relaying the words contained in a memorandum letter of 1562 addressed to the captain of the Contarina Nicolò di Zorzi: ‘Remember well that the best utility that ship-captains can give to their shareholders is the fast expedition from ports, and to make voyages short, this I oblige you always to do.’73

71 ASVe, PSM, Misti, bus. 41, fasc. IX [30 July 1489], [18 August 1489]. On the political turmoil following the acquisition of Cyprus in 1489: Ashtor, Levant Trade, p. 459. Piero Diedo’s mission: Rossi, Ambasciata straordinaria al sultano d’Egitto. 72 MCC, DDR, bus. 412, fasc. ‘45 lettere’, 8 (29 July 1540); Arbel, ‘Operating Trading Networks’, pp. 23–33. 73 ASVe, PSM, Misti, bus. 115-A, fasc. ‘Contratti di noleggio (1558–1573)’ [28 September 1562].

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1.7 The Remuneration System for the Crew The crew’s remuneration traditionally described as ad partes, meaning that the crew took part in the profits or losses from the voyage; and ad soldos, whereby a fixed salary and a portada were established in advance. While both systems co-existed in Ragusa and other maritime centres, in Venice itself the payment ad partes was actually prohibited, and the social rights of the crewmen and primarily the portada were anchored in law.74 So, while simple crewmen on board round ships could never officially become partners in the enterprise, the portada system opened the door to enter joint-ventures on a smaller scale. Those further down the ladder such as senior officers were contracted by the captain himself, or directly by one of the shipowners, who was responsible for the commissioning. Several of the senior officers were engaged for an indefinite period, and received an annual salary, similar in sum to the captain. Once the top brass were chosen, the tars in the lower ranks were recruited by the ship’s clerk or his assistant, the scrivanello. All crewmen were required to indicate a person ready to pledge for their good conduct; this guarantor was thereafter liable to indemnify the ship’s owners in case of the crewman’s desertion or infringement of the contract.75 An example of this kind of arrangement can be seen in a contract of 14 May 1550 between Jacomo Samariari (one of the principal shareholders) and the scrivanello of the ship, Thodaro di Zorzi Lopesi, who was scheduled to embark on the Samariara, captained by Nicolò dalla Canea. Lopesi’s father pledged the necessary guarantees in case part of the merchandise would be damaged, missing, or stolen by members of the crew, and in exchange the son received 22 1/2 lire di pizoli as an advance on his monthly pay of 9 lire di pizoli.76 While the said salaries formed the basics of the remuneration system, the crew logically expected to increase their income through trade. The varied documentation on the drastic loss of the ship Cornera (rechristened La Trinità) enables us to assess the kind of profit that the crew expected to gain from a seagoing commercial voyage. In 1539 the ship captained by Stefano Pastrovichio was attacked by corsairs on the return voyage from England. Soon enough the crew abandoned ship and it was intercepted and conveyed to France, where it was sold. The owners Jacomo Corner q. Zorzi and Thoma Duodo q. Hieronimo delegated the scrivano, Marc-Antonio Ottobon, to claim their losses. Part of the investment was eventually recouped from the French authorities, and consequently the shareholders faced repeated demands for remuneration from 74 ASVe, SP, bus. 497, f. 1r (11 November 1403, 12 May 1414). 75 Tucci, ‘Una nave veneziana’, p. 721–22. 76 ASVe, NA, bus. 10645, ff. 366v–67r (14 May 1550).

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the crew. They decided to settle their accounts in the following way: Corner and Duodo were willing to reimburse 25 ducats for each 40 ducats, either in cash or in the equivalent merchandise lost at sea. This reimbursement clearly excluded any previous advances received, or any personal property the crew had carried with them: table 9

Reimbursement of the share of the investments made by the crew of the intercepted Cornera, 1539

Crew

Loss

Reimbursed

Zaneto di Mayna detto Mustachi, helmsman (timoniere) Zuane di Bortolomeo, cook (scalco) Marco di Michiel, gunner (bombardier) Zuane di Nicolò, gunner Marin, penese (cf. the chief mate on English commercial ships) Andrea di Damian, mariner ( fante) Constantin di Alvise, master-shipwright (marangon) Sebastian dal Cortivo, assistant to the ship’s scribe The representative and attorney of Nicolò di Piero di Antivari, fante Hieronimo di Arbe, gunner Zuane di Nicolò dal Zante, detto Zancharuol, timoniere Nicolò da Ragusi, ship-master (masser) Zuan-Maria, caulker (calafato) The representative of Rado da Montenegro Andrea Manolesso di Marc-Antonio, nobile da poppa

D 50 D 56 D 154 D 130 D 40

D 31 1/2 D 35 D 92 D 56 D 25

D 13 D 13 D 18 D 16

D8 D8 D 12 D 10

D 44 1/2 D 35 D 17 D 13 D 16 D 105

D 27 gr 8 D 22 D 11 D8 D 10 D 65

ASVe, NA, bus. 10636, ff. 217r–19v (27 August–1 September 1539).

To get a clearer picture of what the compensations involved, we can confront the above figures with the basic salaries documented for the round ships – the Bona (1557), the S. Maria Mazor e Santo Iseppo (1561), the Girarda (1594/5), and the pay on board state-owned war ships (1530). The rates of the lower-rank officials, the penese, paron, marangon, and calafato, were between 17 to 24 lire per month; that of the masser was slightly less; a skilled marinaio earned about 12 lire per month; and the fanti between 6 to 14 per month.77 77 Magno, Voyages (1557–1565), pp. 526–27; Tucci, ‘Una nave veneziana’, pp. 721–22; Pellegrini,‘Salariato’ della nave Girarda, pp. 52–91; Sanuto, I diarii, LII, 451(4 January 1530).

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Clearly, these salaries are considerably lower than the declared losses of the Cornera’s crew. And this prompts the question of how the crew of the Cornera could end up with cash or merchandise worth up to ten times more than their average salaries? One plausible answer is that they had invested their personal capital (or that of their relatives and acquaintances) in the enterprise – quite an achievement, since we can safely assume that the socioeconomic background of the crew was relatively poor: to judge by their surnames, the bulk of the workforce came from the Venetian stato da mar itself.78 The other possible explanation is that they set up joint-ventures with sedentary merchants or investors, similar in this respect to the ad partes remuneration system (the seamen merchants), which was still widespread practice in the Mediterranean.79 A notarial contract dated 12 September 1542 confirms that Vielmo di Antonio, nochiero, and Zuane di Simone da Zara, paron of the ship Cornera (different from the one captured) received 25 ducats each from Francesco da Atene and Zuane Carvuri. The two crewmen pledged to invest this capital in merchandise in Cyprus or Syria for the benefit of the partnership, to keep detailed accounts of their expenses, and to return the allowance upon the ship’s safe re-entry to port. The expenses would be then deducted from the profits, and the credit divided equally between the four, excluding the portada of the crewmen, which was not divisible; for his part, Captain Stefano Taraboto supplied the necessary guarantees for his officers.80 Another indicative example is the contract, signed in 1546 between Bortolo di Lesina and Tommaso di Francesco di Arbe, the timonier of the ship of Andrea da Canal, captained by Francesco Nicolò. Di Lesina borrowed 100 ducats to invest in merchandise, which was purchased in Venice and later sold (or bartered) in Smirne for the benefit of both parties, under similar conditions.81 Given the income it promised, the tax-free portada attracted sedentary merchants and investors aplenty, such as Canachi Cuurli q. Andronichi, originally from Napoli di Romania, who formed numerous lucrative joint-ventures with crews of merchant ships. It appears that Cuurli was quite content to award allowances of dozens and hundreds of ducats to ship officials, at times even on the same voyage. For instance, on 19 December 1542 Cuurli gave 10 ducats to Manusso di Nicolò da Malvasia to invest in merchandise for their mutual benefit: Malvasia was due to embark on a voyage to Alexandria with the ship Dolfina, captained by Simone di Zuane, 78 Tucci, ‘L’alimentazione a bordo’, pp. 601–4; Pellegrini, ‘Salariato’ della nave Girarda, p. 16. 79 Several crew members on the ship Panigaia on its return voyage from Messina in 1565 obtained a relatively impressive portada: Tucci, ‘Una nave veneziana’, pp. 722–23. 80 ASVe, NA, bus. 10637, ff. 65r–v (12 September 1542). 81 Ibid., bus. 10641, fasc. 1, f. 1r (17 February 1546).

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and Cuurli expected to have the loan repaid with an account of the expenses after the return of the ship, at which the costs would be deducted from the profits and divided into half; merchandise carried by Manusso as his personal portada would not be charged with freightage. Ten days later, Cuurli signed a similar contract with Manoli di Zuane Galara da Lombardi, the pedoto of the same Dolfina, who received 20 ducats to invest in merchandise in Venice that would be either sold or bartered in Alexandria for the benefit of both.82 The records of the public notary Agostino Pellestrina contain many such contracts signed by Cuurli. Clearly, not all crewmen managed to make use of their portada successfully; the fanti usually carried humble quantities of legumes or salt. Nevertheless, this system of remuneration allowed the operators to keep the salaries relatively low, and thereby reduce the overall costs of the voyage. At the same time, it effectively provided crewmen with the opportunity to become potential investors in the enterprise they were already part of. It is likewise possible that the seamen merchants disbursed freightage to the ship they were embarked on. Finally, it goes without saying that by engaging the crew in the voyage the operators were securing a communal interest. It should also be noted that the remuneration system was based on incentive: captains were entitled, for example, to reward an individual crewman for good service. Hence, it was not unusual for shipowners, charterers, or captains to formulate a set of incentives beforehand. Hence, we find that in 1539 a group of merchants who chartered the ship of Maffeo Bernardo considered offering a bonus for the captain and crew to guarantee their timely arrival, and thus their own eligibility to win the bounties for wheat transport:83 And so that the captain and his officials would have a reason to do their job and hurry up on both, the outward and the return voyage, everyone will be granted a bonus if they manage to return to Venice within the month of April. The bonus would be divided according to ranks in such a manner that the patron of the larger ship would receive 50 ducats and so forth, provided the total would cost about 300 to 400 ducats. I am inclined to reconsider the general belief that the material conditions of seamen deteriorated in the late Middle Ages due to significant technological improvements, and the further evolution in shipping during the fifteenth and sixteenth century. We may wonder whether the terms of employment on 82 Ibid., bus. 10637, ff. 106v–7r, 109r–v (19, 29 December 1542). 83 Saito, ‘Il noleggio delle navi’, p. 242.

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board Venetian round ships and coastal vessels in this period were less advantageous than those of other maritime centres, such as Ragusa, or Genoa and the Ligurian coast.84 2

Insuring Ship and Freightage

2.1 Taking Out Insurance on Ship and Freightage Insurance policies covered shipowners for damage or loss to the ship (corpo), comprising the hull and structure, along with other items considered integral parts of the vessel. The various stocks and supplies necessary for the voyage could be insured as well, under a separate clause; these were termed spazado (or spaccio, spazzo) and included the stocks of hemp, timber, pitch, nails, tools, shovels, sacks, containers, packaging equipment, food supplies, and the cash to pay the salaries and the expenses. The policy covered the contractor from assorted risks, including natural or human causes, fire and other mishaps, through until the vessel’s safe arrival at the destination. The very general formula was then subject to interpretations based on precedents, yet jettison and general average were normally not covered.85 Occasionally, the cordage (corriedi) is indicated separately from the corpo, suggesting a distinct insurance item. Given the vulnerability of ropes and rigging and the depreciation of their value, it is doubtful whether wear and tear were included in the standard

84 On the deterioration in the material conditions on Venetian vessels: Tenenti, Cristoforo da Canal, pp. 77, 101–2; Lane, ‘Diet and Wages of Seamen’, pp. 15–43; idem, ‘Wages and Recruitment’, pp. 21–26; Tucci, ‘Marinai e galeotti nel Cinquecento’, pp. 677–92; idem, ‘Costi e ricavi di una galera’, pp. 135–36; idem, ‘L’alimentazione a bordo’, pp. 601–2; Hocquet, ‘La gente di mare’, p. 500; Massa Piergiovanni, ‘Aspetti finanziari ed economici’, pp. 115–16. 85 The singular importance of Venice as one of the leading insurance markets in fifteenthcentury Italy has been reassessed in a scrupulous study conducted by the legal historian Karin Nehlsen-von Stryk, who analyses the details of insurance contracts and their legal interpretation based on several surviving collections of related policies and judicial records. Although dealing with the second half of the sixteenth century, it is imperative to mention the works of Alberto and Branislava Tenenti related to maritime insurance in Venice and Ragusa. Here, the discussion is limited to the specific practices used by shipowners to insure their ships and freightage: Nehlsen-von Stryk, L’assicurazione marittima a Venezia nel XV secolo; A. Tenenti, Naufrages, corsairs et assurances maritimes; B. Tenenti, ‘Ragusa e Venezia nell’Adriatico della seconda metà del cinquecento’, pp. 99–127; A. & B. Tenenti, Il prezzo del rischio. See also Giuseppe Stefani’s L’assicurazione a Venezia dale origini alla fine della Serenissima; Melis, Origini e sviluppi delle assicurazioni in Italia.

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policy, as it would inevitably affect the premium rates.86 Another distinct insurance product concerned the freightage (nolo), and aimed to safeguard the profits of the shipowners in the instance that the merchandise arrived safely but for some reason freightage was not disbursed. The insurance did not cover the freightage on cargo that did not reach its destination: the custom in maritime transports was such that when merchandise failed to reach the addressee and the captain was not to blame, the shippers were exempted from paying freightage, though bore the losses to their merchandise. The insurance agreement was usually articulated in the following way: ‘noli prinzipiadi o non prinzipiadi a guadagnare, guadagnadi o non guadagnadi’, intending freightage for merchandise that was already on board or secured through contracts. Most likely the insurers were also liable to cover freightage which were converted into cash and carried on board, but not freight charges collected or earned before the mishap had taken place (and were not on board). At any event, the policy did not claim to represent the many variants and judicial implications deriving from it. The brokers at the Rialto were responsible for making such stipulations in compliance with customs and agreed values that speeded up the execution of the contract and pre-empted complications.87 Once a claim was made, the insurers were accountable to pay the underwritten sum or the relative share of the damage in monthly instalments (usually twelve), starting from the moment the news reached Rialto.88 It was customary for one of the shareholders to insure the rest of the company, according to their respective share in the enterprise.89 The contractors 86 One example may offer some clues: the policy taken out by Domenico Sanuto on 7 February 1498 insured his carats in the corpo, spazado, choriedi, and noli of the ship captained by Urban Orso, but specifically excluded the wear and tear of the cordage: Stefani, L’assicurazione a Venezia, I, p. 236 n. 19. See in this context: A. Tenenti, ‘L’assicurazione marittima’, pp. 665–69. Karin Nehlsen von-Stryk avers that the insurance normally applied to the equipment as well: L’assicurazione marittima, pp. 120–25. 87 Nehlsen-von Stryk, L’assicurazione marittima, pp. 127–32; Some provisions were however required in late sixteenth century after many shipowners tended to over-estimate the value of their carats to make bigger claims in case of shipwreck. This practice was officially acknowledged in a decree of 31 August 1602, and a maximum rate of two-thirds of the worth of the vessel after survey was established. It is doubtful however that this ruse became serious before 1600. At any rate, once a shipowner obtained the policy, he was legally insured for the sum nominated: A. Tenenti, ‘L’assicurazione marittima’, pp. 664, 669–70. 88 Nehlsen-von Stryk, L’assicurazione marittima, pp. 534–35. 89 In the following case Zuan Sfachioti the captain and shareholder in a galione formed a joint-venture with Andrea di Anastasio Corcumeli, and Matteo Antonici. Corcumeli was responsible for insuring the merchandise on board for the sum of 600 ducats. Sfachioti disbursed his share in the premium in advance, as well as his share in another insurance

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tended to postpone the payment of the premium, although the insurance was valid only once the premium had been paid to the broker. The period of cover commenced from the moment the ship departed from San Nicolò di Lido, and terminated 24 hours after the vessel berthed at the same port upon re-entry. An alternative was to determine the covered period in days or months. The policy thus gave the captain a degree of leeway to manage the affairs of the ship. During the period of cover, the vessel was free to stop in any place, port or shore on the outbound and inbound voyage along the scheduled route and beyond, acting by order of Venetian officials or on the judgement of the captain in consultation with others. Basically, the ship could stay, leave, load or unload without limitations.90 2.2 Sailing with No Insurance The factors of unpredictability and risk were deeply entrenched in the economic system in the pre-modern world. The longer trade routes in which Europeans engaged involved a variety of inevitable risks that frequently intensified, risks that were more political rather than directly economic in nature.91 Nevertheless – and as strange as it may seem – many shipowners chose not to insure their ships and freightage, and to suffer the consequences.92 In 1489, for example, Jacomo and Nicolò Manolesso q. Pietro were reduced to poverty when their ship of 700 botti was shipwrecked without being insured;93 in 1495 Hieronimo and Carlo Contarini q. Battista lost their ship of 800 botti on the return voyage from Flanders in the vicinity of Sardinia: ‘e no se hanno assegura’.94 In 1497 the ship of 800 botti of Vido di Priamo Contarini was chartered to Moors in Alexandria and was shipwrecked on the rocky shoals of Tripoli, with no insurance;95 in 1510 the 1,000-botti ship of Benedetto Priuli q. Francesco captained by Polo Bianco returned from its third voyage to Syria loaded with his merchandise and was stranded outside the port of Venice. Being the sole owner, Priuli claimed a loss of 15,000 ducats, ‘since nothing was insured’;96 in 1515 Bernardo Moro q. Leonardo claimed losses of over

90 91 92 93 94 95 96

that Corcumeli guaranteed to take out for a different joint-venture, in which the former was involved. In case of mishap, Corcumeli was liable to indemnify Sfachioti for his share in the insured sums: ASVe, NA, bus. 10643, ff. 219v–20r (23 August 1548). A. Tenenti, ‘L’assicurazione marittima’, pp. 674–75. Musgrave, ‘The Economics of Uncertainty’, pp. 10–12. Tucci, ‘Costi e ricavi di una galera’, p. 211. ASVe, SM, reg. 12, f. 160v (29 January 1489). Malipiero, Annali veneti, p. 629 (December 1495). Ibid., p. 635 (1497). ASVe, CXDC, fil. 13, fasc. 57 (26 April 1531, ref. to 1511).

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6,000 ducats after his ship was ran aground in Ragusa Vecchia: ‘as his ship and cargo were without any insurance’;97 in 1518 Ferigo Morosini q. Cyprian lost 3,000 ducats in similar circumstances: ‘for not being insured for anything as is well known to all’.98 Such grave losses would seem to indict Renaissance shipowners with carelessness or lack of common sense, but the fact remains that most voyages of this kind were not insured.99 Since policies could practically be underwritten at any stage of the voyage, merchants and shipowners delayed taking out insurance to the very last minute, a practice epitomized by the following case: loaded with iron and soap bound for Crete and Syria, on 22 January 1522 the ship of Alvise Dolfin q. Hieronimo was riding on anchor outside the Lido when the wind changed to the southeast direction (scirocco) and grew stronger. Soon afterward the thirteen crewmen on board were forced to cut the mainmast to prevent the ship from being stranded. At nightfall the crew fired several warning shots to alert the rescue service, but the high seas prevented the barca di Comun from coming to their aid until the next morning. Meanwhile the abandoned ship continued to ride on one anchor, which prevented it from running aground. At that time Captain Luca Gobo and the owner Dolfin were on the shores of the Lido, but could do very little until that evening when the storm finally abated. ‘The ship was miraculously saved by a single worn-out rope,’ commented Marino Sanuto, ‘those who had merchandise on board rushed to insure them at a rate of 30 per 100 ducats, and so many insurers managed to make high profits that day.’100 Similarly, when rumours on the capture of the Vianuola by the Ottoman armada reached Rialto in 1533, merchants hurried to insure their merchandise at a rate of 25%. Little did they know that the ship arrived safely at Zante.101 Clearly, merchants that waited too long risked not finding anyone willing to underwrite a policy. And so it was for the banker and shipowner Bernardo Maffeo, whose marano carrying 90 colli of spices on his account had left Alexandria and then disappeared. When several months passed with no further sign of the vessel it was considered lost. By that time Bernardo could find 97 Ibid., fil. 36, fasc. 150 (24 December 1515). 98 Ibid., fil. 42, f. 195 (5 January 1518). 99 Branislava Tenenti suggests an increase in the number of insurance policies taken out for small and medium-sized vessels for voyages in the Adriatic Sea from the third decade of the sixteenth century. Still, most vessels were not insured: B. Tenenti, ‘Note sui tassi Adriatici d’assicurazione’, pp. 194, 201. It was also common to insure at a value lower than the actual one: A. & B. Tenenti, Il prezzo del rischio, pp. 132–66. 100 Sanuto, I diarii, XXXII, 420–21 (27 January 1522). 101 Ibid., LVIII, 259 (7 June 1533).

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nobody in Venice willing to underwrite insurance at less than 15%, and was compelled to send his agents to Florence to try their luck there.102 Clearly, ship insurance was taken out selectively, and the reasons why varied. For once, it was argued that the high profits in years of plenty were the only effective insurance against the high risks involved in Levant trade.103 But piracy or enemies aside, we cannot rule out the possibility that round ships were considered relatively safe, very much like the galleys which, along with the merchandise carried on board, were rarely insured. In periods of peace, the voyage along the otherwise more notorious routes to the Levant in convoys was also deemed relatively free of danger. Similarly, ships that were chartered by state agencies secured some degree of protection against force majeur and other dangers; in some cases Venice vouched to reimburse the owners whose ship were captured by enemy fleets.104 It is therefore doubtful whether shipowners burdened themselves with the cost of insurance when their ship sailed in convoy or was in the service of the Comun. Secondly, winning an insurance claim must have been a lengthy and litigious affair, in which the interpretation of the contract was entrusted to the brokers. In case of shipwreck, the insurance did not exempt shipowners from being directly involved in the salvage operation.105 Of utmost importance was the convention of a general average that supplied reasonable protection in case merchandise had to be jettisoned or voluntarily sacrificed, as a result of events beyond the control of the captain which imperilled the entire ship. Lastly, we should also remember that in the age of ‘ventures’, merchant practices learned ways of reducing risk, such as gathering information in advance on the conditions of the ship and the proficiency of the captain, though the reputation of the shipowners was probably an important factor as well. A letter written in 1539 during wartime by the governor in Nicosia, Zuan-Francesco Badoer, to his brother Zuan-Alvise in Venice, provides insights into how shippers evaluated the situation ahead: the governor instructed his brother in Venice to insure their cotton on the nave Luna for the value of 150 ducats, in case he received news of the approaching Ottoman armada or other perils at sea. The warranty was advisable also considering the previous poor management of the Luna. Similarly, Zuan-Francesco proposed to insure their goods on the Dolfina for the value of 100 ducats, since the rates would probably be 102 Ibid., XXXVI, 149 (2 April 1524). 103 Musgrave, ‘The Economics of Uncertainty’, pp. 16–17. 104 Gluzman, ‘Resurrection of a Sunken Ship’, pp. 53–54. 105 To deal with salvage, the cinque savi alla mercanzia formed a consortium between insurers, merchants and operators, who divided the expenses between them: A. Tenenti, ‘L’assicurazione marittima’, p. 676.

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as low as one half a per cent.106 This particular Dolfina was a new ship built in 1537 and belonged to their colleague, Zuan Dolfin q. Lorenzo. It was chartered by the State to carry wheat on the return voyage from Cyprus.107 One cannot ignore the role played by merchant practices and instruments for risk management, when dealing with the economic considerations of entrepreneurs related to investment in the shipping industry. If indeed maritime insurance and general average were able to reduce risks by offering compensation in case of partial or total loss, this could explain the readiness of Venetian investors to continue their engagement in the shipping industry despite the loss of ships even shortly after being launched. Of course, such practices were effective up to a certain degree of risk, and as long as the freightage gains remained attractive. 2.3 What Affected Insurance Rates? It was in the interests of the insurers to keep the premiums relatively low (and fixed) along the stricken routes to the Levant, so they developed a scale of premiums that worked (for both sides) at an economic level. Although inherently speculative, the rates varied according to predefined categories, meaning that they could be applied along fairly standard lines: the time of year, for example, had no effect on the premiums, and while the condition of the vessel or its type might prompt merchants to take out insurance, this also seems not to have had a significant effect on the premium rates. In short, the most important factors in determining the rates were the ship’s destination and the duration of the voyage. In general, the navigation to Beirut (or Cyprus) was regarded safer and shorter than that to Alexandria,108 and the rates for all the routes to the East were considerably lower than those bound for the West, as can be learned from the examples below. The collections of insurance policies found among the inheritance papers of Alvise Basegio q. Francesco and the ones of Michele Foscari q. Filippo provide information on the tariffs in late fifteenth-century Venice: during periods of peace the premiums for a voyage to the Levant were about 1 to 1.5%, and between 2 and 2.5% for the return voyage (which took longer and was more risky as far as elements of nature were concerned). The rates showed elasticity inasmuch as they tended to rise in times of war or in the presence of other substantial perils in the relevant stretch of sea. Usually, once peace was declared, the premiums shrank back to their normal levels within a few months. In 106 ASVe, MG, bus. 12bis-II, [20 December 1539]. 107 MCC, DDR, bus. 412, fasc. ‘45 lettere’, 1–2 (6, 10 February 1540). 108 ASVe, SM, reg. 36, f. 166v (13 June 1564).

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the second half of the fifteenth century the average rate for an outbound or inbound voyage in the Adriatic Sea was 1.5% on navi, navili, and caravelle; the average premium for a ship sailing from Venice to Crete was 1%, and for the return voyage 2%. At the turn of the century the rates jumped to 4 and 5% for the outbound and inbound voyage to Crete, respectively, and 3% for the return voyage alone, but notably, after the cessation of hostilities in 1502 the tariffs dropped to 2.5%. Similarly, in the second half of the fifteenth century the voyages from Venice to Apulia and Alexandria were rated 2 to 3%, and 4 to 6% during times of war. The premium for a voyage from Acre via Syria and Cyprus to Venice was 1.5%, but that of Constantinople stood on average around 4%.109 An account contained among the inheritance records of Hieronimo Contarini q. Bertuci da Londra corroborates the premium upsurge during the 1499–1502 war. On 13 April 1500 the broker Beneto Fugazon mediated an insurance policy for merchandise worth 1,100 ducats on the ship of Vettor Sarasin for a voyage from Crete to Cyprus, and then to Venice, at a rate of 5%, equalling 55 ducats; and again on 26 August, for merchandise worth 900 ducats on the ship of Francesco Tarlato for a voyage from Cyprus to Venice at a rate of 4%, totalling 36 ducats. The same account includes another entry for insurance taken out on 12 September 1500 by Alvise TriviSan for the value of 400 ducats on the ship captained by Marc-Antonio Novello for the inbound voyage from Cyprus to Venice at a rate of 4%, equalling 16 ducats.110 As can be expected, following the outbreak of the war of the league of Cambrai, the fees surged, so Priuli reports, from 2.5 to 5% on ships returning from Syria, and wares loaded on the galleys to Flanders that were usually charged 4%, could not be had even for 15%.111 As noted, charges for routes originating from or bound to the western basin of the Mediterranean and beyond the Pillars of Hercules were higher, 6% for a ship on a voyage from Syracuse to Venice in 1454; and 4% for a belingier in a voyage from Venice to Syracuse in 1477. Similar rates were recorded for other ports in Sicily and the premiums tended to oscillate for destinations still further westward: for example, a voyage from Barcelona to Venice was rated 6 to 8%, and not less than 10% (in 1441) and 8% (in 1459 and 1462) for the trip in opposite direction. The insurance charges for Venetian ships along the coastal 109 The first batch contains 38 policies, starting March 1470 through until 1483, and the second batch comprises 55 insurance policies, dated from 1482 to 1 August 1506: Nehlsen-von Stryk, L’assicurazione marittima, pp. 36, 500–24; A. Tenenti, ‘L’assicurazione marittima’, pp. 681–82. 110 ASVe, PSM, Misti, bus. 104, fasc. ‘Note di conto 1483–1529’ [1499–1502]. 111 Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 382.

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routes connecting the Iberian ports were considerably high as well.112 In 1545 the shareholders of the ships Ragazona and Bragadina, which were chartered to carry wheat from Sicily to Spain, complained of the higher expenses and premiums along this route compared with those for Cyprus.113 Six insurance policies for merchandise loaded onto Venetian ships in Ancona attest to elevated premiums too. The policies were underwritten in Florence through mediation with a broker named Raggio Raggi, between 1524 and 1526. The strict prohibition to Venetian captains from stopping in this port (under papal control) might explain this anomaly.114And finally, the records show that at the end of the sixteenth century, the insurance rates for a voyage between Venice and Alexandria or Syria could reach a maximum of 3.5 or 4%.115 3

Settling the Accounts

3.1 Book-Keeping During the voyage, both the captain and the ship’s clerk (scrivano) each kept a journal in which they documented any event that might have economic or judicial significance. These records were stored for possible later use as evidence in disputes. The ship’s progress was documented by the captain in his logbook. The daily entries included the time of day, a description of the sea and weather conditions, the course they were taking, and each adjustment to the setting of the sails. The mileage covered was indicated at least once a day. Conspicuous landmarks and passing ships on the horizon were also annotated. A notable example of this type of written record is the logbook of the ship Giustiniana, documenting its voyage to Cyprus in 1567. Captain Zuane della Vrana left an accurate description of his navigations, using a set of conventional terms to describe the varying conditions of the sea.116 Alessandro Magno’s description of his Voyages to Cyprus and Alexandria between 1557 and 1565 was probably based on the captains’ logbooks.117 For his part, the scrivano (with the assistance of the scrivanello) kept track of the daily expenses and revenues. This data was recorded in the sariato (or salariato), a double-entry accounts book with the debits (die dar) on the left page, the credits (die haver) on the right, 112 Nehlsen-von Stryk, L’assicurazione marittima, pp. 500–24; A. Tenenti, ‘L’assicurazione marittima’, pp. 681–82. 113 ASVe, CXDC, fil. 37, fasc. 203 (17 June 1545). 114 Melis, Origini e sviluppi, pp. 294–307. 115 Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 382. 116 MCC, Cic, bus. 3596, fasc. 29 (8 August 1567). 117 Magno, Voyages (1557–1565).

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and the cash balance of the accounts (saldo di cassa). This method allowed accounts to be separated and recombined and adapted to the particularities of each enterprise. The accounts were divided by subject matter; some listed down the salaries of the crew (partide) and were recorded for each crewman separately, in order of the ship’s hierarchy. The partida began with the original advance at the time of the crew member’s enrolment, followed by allowances distributed during the voyage, and finally the closing refusura paid out upon the ship’s return, balancing the account. There follow the expenses incurred during the voyage, port duties, the commissions to harbour officials, and a long list of expenditures on victuals and supplies purchased during the voyage, including unforeseen expenses for specialist craftsmen and assorted repairs. As the voyage progressed, the scrivano would open a new account tabled in each local currency. Such a sariato could include or omit certain details on the cargo and freight rates, which served to balance the accounts, but at any event the record was not intended to represent the full cargo or all the payments for freightage, since the full cargo of the ship was noted down in a separate register, called the libretto di carico, in which the entries were sorted according to the ports where goods were loaded, and carried information on the type and quantity of merchandise, and their intended ports of destination. When the ship arrived in port, copies of the originals were delivered to the owners of the ship, and extracts thereof to state magistracies, according to their duties.118 118 The pioneering work of Ugo Tucci on the sariato of the galley of Francesco Contarini on a voyage to Flanders in 1504 (‘Costi e ricavi di una galera’, pp. 161–230) was recently complemented with other scholarly works worth noting here. A critical edition of the salariato of the ship Girarda of 600 botti on a voyage to Sardinia 1594/5 was published by Giovanni Pellegrini: Pellegrini, ‘Salariato’ della nave Girarda, 179 pp. Stefania Montemezzo published a critical edition of two sariati belonging to Giovanni Foscari, the captain of the Flanders galley in 1463/4 and 1467/8: Foscari, Viaggi di Fiandria, pp. 75–79. Ugo Tucci draws attention to the near-complete sariato of the ship Panigaia on a voyage to Alexandria in 1561. The first twenty pages include the pay of the 42 crewmen, the consequent twelve pages are the expenses and principally on hemp, pitch, animal fat, iron nails, sundry gifts, etc. The last pages include the merchandise loaded in Venice and Alexandria. The cash balance is missing, however: Tucci, ‘Una nave veneziana’, pp. 717–18. An extract of a sariato of a Venetian marciliana on a voyage to Cattaro and Corfu contains the extra expenses incurred after the vessel was scuttled in Cattaro in 1539: Gluzman, ‘Resurrection of a Sunken Ship’, pp. 29–78. Earlier examples show similarities in the organization of the separate accounts: Arbel, ‘Les listes de chargement’, pp. 31–50. An unpublished copy of a sariato dated 2 August 1543 concerns the galione di Comun captained by Francesco Contarini q. Alvise: the booklet contains 33 pages (the last two are blank) in which the pay for the crews and the expenses on food and victual were drawn up. Several pages concern the costs of various services, repairs, and the payments for craftsmen and guards: ASVe, PSM, De ultra, bus. 100, no. 3, ‘Copia del contto del gallion capitano el magnifico messer Francesco Conttarini fo di messer Alvise’ (1543). In this context: ASVe, SM, reg. 27, f. 55r

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3.2 The Balance Sheet Following the return of the ship, the operators and their investors would draw up a balance sheet for the journey, and divide between them the various expenditures and revenues incurred. The balance provided the basis for a notarized declaration aimed at settling the accounts between the parties and winding up the venture. However, in practice, each maritime operation invariably followed on the heels of the former one, and thus the notarized document occasionally served to draw a line between two ventures or voyages. The registers of the public notary Agostino Pellestrina contain numerous contracts of this kind. One interesting case is a partnership between Andrea Corcumeli q. Anastasio and Captain Manoli Comita q. Leone, both based in Crete. In the space of eighteen months they managed to shipwreck a first ship, enter as partners in another, shipwreck that one as well, and then enter as partners in a third. For this reason they needed to balance their account several times. A reasonable starting point would be the early months of 1542, when the ship of Andrea Corcumeli, Captain Comita and a third shareholder Manoli Sclavo, was shipwrecked in Curzola. The scant remains salvaged from the vessel were shipped to Venice to be sold. Several months later, Corcumeli and Captain Comita purchased a ship from the Florentine merchants Pandolfo Atananti & co. The two partners settled their accounts on 13 July 1542 by signing a lengthy document that included their previous profits from freightage, the selling of merchandise and equipment from the wrecked ship, and all their expenditures up to that day, including the sale tax (messetteria) on the new ship. The result indicated a debt of 204 ducats 1 lira and 2 soldi that Captain Comita still owed his partner: ‘per conto saldo et integra solution’. The calculation comprised his share of 12 carats for the purchase of the ship. Corcumeli undertook to settle the debt on behalf of the captain, who was about to set sail with their new purchase. In addition, Comita confirmed he was indebted to Corcumeli for 30 ducats on the supplies purchased for the upcoming voyage. All other expenses, including the pay of the crew, would be disbursed by Comita and taken into account after the return of the ship. The contract also spelled out a new maritime venture. Corcumeli entrusted the captain with merchandise worth 384 ducats, specifically 2,000 planks, 8 milliaria of iron, 8 barrels of rivets or nails, and 8 cases of soap. These items would be sold or bartered by Manoli for the benefit of the company. Corcumeli instructed the captain to invest the sums collected as freightage in merchandise for the return voyage. After the return of the ship, they would deduct Corcumeli’s expenditures on the merchandise and divide (2 August 1543). See the transcription of an extract from the libretto di carico of the sunken Veniera in 1499: Arbel, ‘Attraverso il Mediterraneo nel 1499’, pp. 112–15.

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the profits equally. Meanwhile, Corcumeli undertook to insure the voyage on behalf of both.119 As it turned out, the ship was wrecked in a place called Le Leurose in the vicinity of Zara (modern Zadar). This time a considerable part of the merchandise and equipment were salvaged,120 and on 4 March 1543 the partners sat down to settle their accounts once again. Manoli remained in debt to his partner to the tune of 68 ducats, though this did not include the value of his shares in the cordage of the wrecked ship. The ship had been insured for the sum of 500 ducats. Corcumeli negotiated with the insurers, and managed to squeeze out 300 ducats, to be shared equally between them. They also co-owned a shipment of barley that was left on hold in Lesina (Hvar). Comita was prepared to forfeit his share in the barley to a certain Dimitrio Caticora, to help offset the 68 ducats he still owed Corcumeli. In addition, the captain reserved the option to enter as partner for one-third of the shares on another of Corcumeli’s ships he was about to command. The estimated worth of this vessel was 1,200 ducats, including the cordage. The 400 ducats necessary to cover Comita’s share in the ship would be taken from his expected quota in the above-mention insurance indemnity, namely 150 ducats, and the future sale of the cordage of the wrecked ship, after they were transported to Venice. In case the 400 ducats were not fully ceded, Manoli would be allowed to pay the remainder after his return from the future commercial voyage. Corcumeli was also a creditor for 29 ducats and 16 grossi he had given Comita (no reason specified).121 In the following months the salvaged items were shipped to Venice and sold off.122 Prior to departure on 11 August 1543 both partners balanced their accounts again, confirming the transfer of 8 carats (one-third of the new ship’s price), inclusive of the equipment and artillery. In addition to selling off the salvaged accoutrements, Comita would pay for whatever expenses on the crew and victuals were necessary, to be put on the account of his 8 carats. Declaring that Corcumeli would disburse 40 ducats to the Salt Office on behalf of Comita, however, he reserved the right to demand this sum after the return of the ship.123 In this example, the occasional balancing of the accounts offered the basis for the formation of a new joint-venture, which was soon replaced by another. This procedure could have repeated itself for years, and in fact the partnership

119 ASVe, NA, bus. 10637, ff. 32r–33r (13 July 1542). 120 Ibid., f. 95r (28 November 1542). 121 Ibid., bus. 10638, ff. 57r–58r (4 March 1543). 122 Ibid., f. 158v (14 June 1543). 123 Ibid., ff. 199v–200r (11 August 1543).

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between Corcumeli and Comita continued on an apparently even keel at least until 1547. 3.3 Arbitration Not all maritime ventures ended with such serene transitions. The contracts for the formation of a joint-venture, the agreements with the captain and crew, generally saw to it that disputes would not be settled in court but instead solved through mediation by arbiters chosen by agreement. Doubtless this was done to keep procedures as simple and painless as possible. The chosen arbiters were usually part of the same shipping milieu, people in the know – reputed captains, shipowners, or master-shipwrights – keeping it all in the family, so to speak. Delegating the case to court was the last resort, and was reserved for cases in which ‘outsider’ parties were involved, such as insurers or shippers. The following case of the ship Samariara was resolved through mediation: the ship rode through a severe storm on the return voyage from Messina and Alexandria in February 1550, during which some of the goods were jettisoned and the masts had to be cut down. The litigation revolved around general averages: the operators demanded that their damages were shared with the merchants, based on the assessment of the Admiral of the Port, Nicolò dalla Canea, who was also the third arbiter. For their part, the merchants expected that the losses from their jettisoned goods would be shared out with the operators.124 Concurrently, the shipowners indicted Captain Dimitri da Lepanto with a list of extra expenses, and the latter responded by presenting a counter-list of claims. Consequently, the case was appointed to mediation. Meanwhile, Jacomo Smariari q. Michele, on behalf of his relatives, settled the accounts with the only non-Samariari partner in the ship, Nicolò di Zorzi, called Magniatti, or rather the procurator chosen by his heirs (since both parties had in the past settled their accounts on a regular basis, the final balance was relatively simple).125After the heirs of Magniatti bowed out of the situation, Samariari presented the mediators with a list of alleged superfluous expenses that were incurred by the captain – such as the purchase of almonds, hiring the services of a pilot and additional daily workers in Messina, more expenses in Zante, along with several errors and inaccuracies detected in the sariato. Samariari also demanded that an advance of 12 grossi a head per month, which went to cover food-related expenses on the crew, should be returned to him. The list continues, as Samariari was determined to sue his captain for his every last 124 A lengthy dispute with several Jewish merchants: ibid., bus. 384, ff. 30r–32r (18 April 1550), 37v–40v (27 March 1550), and testimonies, ff. 42r–47v (28 March 1550). 125 Ibid., bus. 10645, ff. 75r–76v (8 February 1550).

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soldo (he even imputed him for the wear and tear to the cordage!). Dimitri da Lepanto countered this with his own list of allegations  – he demanded, for example, that the Samariari should share the losses from the exchange rates on three lettere di cambio, the expenses on pilot and tugboats on the outward and the return voyage, including the dinner on board offered to Ottoman officials and other functionaries in Alexandria. The compromise eventually reached absolved the captain from most of the claims. However, the case was re-opened to further mediation after it was discovered that the captain had jettisoned barrels of distilled spirits, mistaking them for wine.126 3.4 General Average Among the legal principles of maritime law is the system known as general average (avaria), according to which all parties involved in a given sea venture proportionally share any losses resulting from the voluntary sacrifice of part of the cargo – or of the ship itself – to forestall disaster and save ship and crew in an emergency. Dramatic situations such as cutting down the masts to prevent the ship from capsizing, or the loss of the anchors or the rudder, were customarily classified as general average.127 In the Venetian context, this avaria stood for many collective charges and duties incurred in the course of the voyage. Here are a few examples: fearing a threat by a French fleet in 1497, a provisory Council of Twelve on board the galleys of Barbaria decided to charter the ship Soranza captained by Francesco Tarlato for 500 ducats to escort them for defence purposes – these extra expenses were listed under general average: ‘andera a avaria della mercantia’;128 during the war with the Turks in 1499, the Senate required all ships participating in the muda convoy to Syria to enrol additional twenty-five men per ship, and these added costs were deemed part of this general average;129 in 1525 the ufficiali all’estraordinario incorporated into the general average all the idle days that the ship Cornera was retained by the governor of Zante.130 In 1530 the Council of Ten instructed the captains returning from plague-infested Istanbul to discharge all their merchandise in the quarantine areas (lazaretti): the extra expenses incurred from carrying the merchandise to the lazaretti and then to the customs, as well as the operational costs of the light galley that was sent to meet the ships in Istria, were seen as 126 Ibid., ff. 366v–67r, 382r–82v (14, 19 May 1550); ibid., bus. 10646, ff. 449r–51r (20 June 1550), 464r (27 June 1550). Notwithstanding litigations, the Samariara was ready for departure under the command of the new captain Nicolò dalla Canea in May. 127 Zeno, Storia del diritto marittimo, p. 364 (pp. 363–74). 128 Malipiero, Annali veneti, p. 635 (1497). 129 ASVe, CN, reg. 14, f. 172v (25 February 1499). 130 Ibid., reg. 20, f. 38v (16 March 1525).

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avarie.131 The expenses of enrolling the nobili da poppa on round ships and galleys were regular items in this calculation.132 Other expenses customarily regarded as avaria were the obligatory pilot services from Istria to Venice, or Cadis to England; tugboats under the command of the armiraglio of the port; unloading goods to smaller boats (libamento), and so forth. Initially designed as a mutualistic form of redistribution of costs incurred from the risks involved in maritime trade, general average was occasionally exploited. Operators were tempted to include other expenses in the avaria so as to share out the costs, such as gifts to port officials, or wear and tear to equipment; to curb fraud, each application of this kind was deliberated by the ufficiali all’estraordinario.133 In 1428 the Senate checked this habit by limiting general average to two specific cases – jettison of merchandise stored under deck, or expenses denoted as avaria by law. Understandably, the new decree met with strong opposition from the shipping milieu. The pedoti operating from Istria were not happy either, and sent representatives to appeal to the Senate, expressing concern they would be left without work. Trying to reduce their costs, some ship captains apparently saved themselves the burden of hiring one. Barely a year later, in 1429 the Senate was obliged to rescind their earlier decree under a wave of protests.134 In 1502 the system was eventually abolished as part of more widespread reforms of the shipping sector. But in 1548 disgruntled shipowners and captains began to include various recently imposed duties into the general average.135 The ship’s clerk had the task of noting down the expenses to be included in this calculation, and the list was then appended to the libretti di cargo and delivered to the ufficiali all’estraordinario, who ruled in such matters and conducted the necessary calculations (butar avaria).136 The general average was 131 ASVe, PS, reg. 727, ff. 82r–84v, 98r–98v (11, 31 October 1530), 99r–100v (2 November 1530). 132 Shipowners were permitted to include the daily expenses on food and supplies for the nobili da poppa as well as the estimate loss incurred their portada. In 1502, any collective charges on the freights imposed by the State – with the exception of the nobili da poppa – were annulled: ASVe, SM, reg. 15, ff. 156v–57r (21 October 1502); ibid., reg. 28, f. 39r (25 June 1545); ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 24, f. 117v (29 September 1548). 133 In 1341 the gifts to port officials were excluded from the general average. The scrivano of the ufficiali all’estraordinario was the person authorized to calculate avaria on private ships sailing in convoys, including the mude convoy ships: ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 23, reg. 22-ter, cc. 21b (11 December 1341), 21b–23a (3 November 1342), 23b–24a (15 May 1347), 11b (12 May 1358). 134 Ibid., c. 53a (29 March 1429); ASVe, SMist, reg. 57, f. 8r (9 June 1428). 135 29 September 1548: ASVe, SM, fil. 5, f. 273r; ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 24, f. 117v. 136 ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 23, reg. 22-ter, cc. 57a–b (27 September 1417); ibid., c. 53a (29 March 1429).

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then divided into instalments (rate) and duly deducted from the ‘cargo’ (merces receptes); the ‘ship’ (corpo); ‘freightage’ (nobulis) and the portada, shared out between the shippers, shipowners, the beneficiaries from the freightage, and the crewmen’s own portada.137 Given the burden, it is small wonder, then, that general averages were often contested, and such disputes were arbitrated by the extraordinario or by the auditori vecchi. The legal proceedings themselves were under the jurisdiction of the consoli dei mercanti, whereas appeals were raised in the court of auditori vecchi delle sentenze. 3.5 Jettison as Part of the General Average The voluntary disposal of cargo to lighten a ship’s load in times of distress was quite common in the Age of Sail. However, early fifteenth-century Venetian sea laws excluded from the general average any merchandise stored above deck that was jettisoned this way. Legally, such items were the first to be cast overboard, although it was not always the case. The adding of features to the superstructure, the cladding of the bow, vessels with an open deck or single deck, created a multitude of borderline cases in the claims for compensation. Moreover, voluminous but relatively light merchandise such as cotton, woollens, or yarns were partly stored above board to avoid straining the beams below, because of the method used of compressing the cotton by use of jack screws.138 It is therefore no wonder that the various magistracies in Venice interpreted the law each in its own way. In 1445, for example, the weavers Zuane and Jacomo Bon shipped by means of their agent in Patras three butts of wine on a vessel captained by Andrea di Bertuci da Lesina. The vessel reached Venice with one cask only, the other two having been jettisoned during a storm in the Gulf of Ludrin (the stretch of sea to the north of Albania). The weavers demanded 24 gold ducats as remuneration for the missing butts, comprising the cost of the containers. However, the captain refused, claiming the jettisoned wine butts were stored above deck. The case was brought before the giudici del forestier. For their part, the weavers argued that the two butts were stored below deck – just like the surviving third one – and that the captain should have first jettisoned his own merchandise stored on deck. The captain protested that if the judges approved the contention of the Bon brothers, the rest of the shippers who had their merchandise above deck might decide 137 E.g., a loss of 582 ducats on goods that were jettisoned off Saseno in 1543. The general average was divided between the owners of the salvaged merchandise (260 ducats), the shipowners (120 ducats), the freights (190 ducats), and the portada of the crew (12 ducats): ASVe, CDM, reg. 128, ff. 3r–4r (16 May 1543). 138 Lane, ‘Cotton Cargoes and Regulations’, p. 257.

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to prosecute him as well, which would ruin him. After hearing both sides and examining the evidence, the judges ruled in favour of the captain and acquitted him from the charges.139 In another case from 1510 the Venetian merchant Gasparo di Piero Contarini (not to be confused with the famous diplomat and cardinal), lodged a claim before the curia del forestier to include in the general average five butts of wine that were stored on deck of a grippo and jettisoned during a storm. Since a grippo was a single-deck vessel, argued Contarini, it was authorized by law to carry merchandises on deck. He presented the court with comparable earlier cases, in particular one ruled by the auditori vecchi in 1501. On behalf of the defendant Constantino Argiro – one of the merchants involved in the shipping enterprise – the curia lawyer Zuane Bembo begged to differ, arguing that if the butts had been stored below-decks they would be considered avaria, but since they were loaded above deck they did not qualify as general average. The lawyer then presented the curia with a copy of the relevant law, and summoned the captain as witness for the defence. After examining the evidence, the judges of the forestier ruled according to the law (secundum legem) in favour of Argiro and charged Gasparo Contarini with the expenses of the court. Later in the month the auditori vecchi confirmed the ruling of the giudici del forestier.140 As part of the significant reform in shipping that was introduced in 1534/5, the Senate attempted to avert this type of ambiguity by declaring that jettison or damage to merchandise of any sort stored above deck would not be considered general average – on any type of ship. The law regarded the castle at the stern to be integral parts of the sopra coperta, recording that the law in this matter dated from a period in which ships were built without any castle structure. Therefore, any damage to goods that were stored sotto cassero or in cassero – with the exception of woollens, cotton and yarns – could not be treated as general average. Moreover, shippers who loaded their merchandise with intention to store them in the aforementioned places would suffer the consequences. However, if the captain and the scrivano did not clarify this fact in advance, they would be regarded responsible and be duly penalized in case of jettison. This decree also aimed to establish a single coherent policy for the various magistracies ruling in such cases.141 By any standard, the act of jettison was clearly an extreme measure, and a captain had to protect himself against lawsuits filed by shippers and insurers. 139 ASVe, CDM, reg. 128, ff. 1v–3r (24 November 1445). 140 Ibid., ff. 5r–6r (2 October 1510). 141 ASVe, SM, reg. 23, ff. 45v (16 July 1534), 108r–9r (4 June 1535); re-enacted in 1574: ASVe, CL, reg. 63, 87 (16 June 1574).

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The ship’s scrivano was required by law to draw up a separate list of all the items (merchandise and equipment) that had been jettisoned, indicating the exact place where they were originally stored. This document was used as evidence in future claims. In cases of distress, as the storm abated, a ship was required to change course and head for the closest port to issue an official report (prova di fortuna). Ships flying the San Marco ensign were expected to appear before the Venetian authorities, the colonial administration or, in the case of foreign territories, consuls. In the absence of any state official, claimants could make recourse to a local notary instead. At any event, the captain’s statement had to be certified and signed by eye-witnesses to the incident, which meant either members of the crew or passengers. In Venice itself the magistracy in charge of claims of this nature was the consoli dei mercanti. It seems that this authority kept a regular record of the sea conditions for the upper part of the Adriatic Sea, which was primarily used to check whether captains overstated the poor conditions of the sea so as to dodge various obligations, such as stopping in Istria to pick up a pilot. It goes without saying that this record was also very useful in settling sea claims. Hence, the records of the consoli might be included as evidence in court for disputes over damages – as happened on 8 July 1522, for example, when a representative of the captain Francesco Zenaro from Chioggia asked the giudici del forestier to consider as avaria certain goods that were jettisoned during a storm, since one of the merchants Piero di Cordes had refused to share the costs. Zenaro produced a sea protest issued by the consoli dei mercanti to certify the captain’s claims. The judges ruled that the general average would be put into effect, and that Cordes would bear the expenses of the trial.142 4

The Unloading Procedure in Venice’s Port

4.1 The Practice of Libamento In the early decades of the sixteenth century access to Venice via water was becoming increasingly troublesome due to the silting of the channels and basins. Despite consistent efforts to keep the waterway ( fuosa) at the entrance of the port of San Nicolò open to vessels with large draught, the shallow waters imposed serious obstacles, and even peril in foul weather. Fully loaded round 142 The claim was previously approved by the auditori vecchi (a magistracy that handled appeals in civil cases, including those originating from the stato da mar), and was appealed against in the court of the giudici di forestier: ASVe, CDM, reg. 128, ff. 7v–8r (8 July 1522); Arbel, ‘Venice’s Maritime Empire’, p. 161.

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ships and even medium-sized vessels were obliged to unload part of their merchandise to reduce their draught before approaching the channel leading to the do castelli, the city’s watery gateway. Often carried out at open sea, this procedure was known as libamento (from the verb libare), meaning to lighten a ship by unloading part of its cargo, in this case onto smaller carriers – raft-type boats called lembo or libo (the thirteenth-century term), and flat-bottomed burchi, piati, zattere, tugs and pilot boats in early modern Venice.143 The fees for the libamento boats were calculated per day or per voyage, and customarily divided between shipowners and shippers. The captains of these carriers disbursed the payments for their crews.144 To get an idea of the manhours and logistics involved, note that the unloading procedure of a standard round ship could take between five to seven days, during which the scrivani alli castelli, an official of the salt depository (salinari), and the governatori delle entrate would arrive on site. They compiled a careful record of each step of the procedure, including the name of the round ship, details of the libamenti boats, the quantities shifted, the registration number of the warehouse, and the exact dates the libamento commenced and ended.145 The following transcription of a document of 1 February 1504 itemizes the libamento procedures for Cypriot salt transferred from a ship captained by Zuane Boza:146 143 Hocquet, Voiliers et commerce, p. 95; Levy, Navi Venete, appendixes ‘epoca quarta’, ‘epoca quinta’; a libamento was required also when technical problems were encountered, and the access for a certain part of the ship was blocked. In 1517, for example, a major leak was discovered in one of the merchant galleys to Alexandria. Part of the cargo was transferred to a smaller ship and carried to Crete, where the galley’s captain hoped to repair the fault and resume his voyage: Sanuto, I diarii, XXV, 8, 36 (1 October 1517). In 1545, the barza di Comun returned to Istria and could not complete the parenzana without the help of a marano that was chartered to lighten part of the salt and artillery: ASVe, CN, reg. 25, f. 192r (22 November 1545). 144 A rough estimate of the rates: in 1487 the marano captained by Lazaro Ongaro was reimbursed 20 ducats as freightage for the twenty-three days that he had been held up in Parenzo, where the vessel was expected to lighten part of the cargo of the Tiepola: ASVe, PSal, bus. 59, ff. 137r (1 July 1486), 153v (8 March 1487). In another case in 1502, the owners of a marano captained by Domenego Negro, Luca Donado August bros., were accredited 25 ducats for the libamento of the Marcella: ibid., bus. 62, reg. 6, f. 75r (23 May 1502). The expenditure on libamento sora porto of the Dolfina (690 botti) was 199 ducats and 8 grossi: ASVe, SM, fil. 19 [March 1558]. 145 Based on the records of libamenti for three ships that returned from Cyprus with salt between June and July 1541: ASVe, Psal, bus. 67, reg. 15, ff. 100v, 101v, 102r (13 June–16 July 1541). Attempt to prevent fraud in the libamento of the ship Contarina: ASVe, GPE, bus. 146, reg. 38, f. 87v (21 November 1547). The prosecution against boat captains that lightened the infested ship Dolfina: ASVe, PS, bus. 726, ff. 62r–v (17 July 1523). 146 An account consisting salt deposits from Cyprus for the month of February 1503 ‘Conto di salli vegnudi di Zipro del 1503, zoè del 1503 a dì primo frever’: ASVe, Psal, Miscelanea, reg. 1, f. 1r (1 February 1503).

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1503, a dì primo frever Nave patrono sier Zuane Boza vene di Zipro die aver per sali che l’á conduto con la sua nave, prima per saler numero X, dalla ponta xoso la Judecha a nave dita dischargado di suo libamento, e prima – Libamento patrono Antonio Chiapino mozza 12 0 0 Libamento patrono Antonio di Bortolamio mozza 8 0 0  7 Libamento patrono Griguol da Pavia mozza 23 0 2 19 Da nave propia in questo dì mozza 13 0 0 22 Da nave propia in questo dì mozza 107 0 0 23 Per resto dela ditta mozza 11 7 2

Summa mozza 174

8 2

The ship captained by Polo Bianco returned from Cyprus on 6 February 1503 and followed the libamento unloading procedure outside the port:147 A dì 6 ditto, Nave patrono sier Polo Bianco vene di Zipro die aver per sali che l’á conduto con la sua nave, e prima per soler numero 2 dalla Trinità da nave dita per sal ditto discharga’ di suo libamento, e prima – Libamento patrono Bernardo di Zuane, sabioner fo mozza 20 4 2 7 Libamento patrono Andrea dal’aqua mozza 90 9 0 Libamento patrono Domenego Ferarexe per resto dela ditta lebo di fuora per non voler vegnir dentro, fo mozza 46 11 2

Summa mozza 158 1 0

In the first case, Captain Boza lightened part of his cargo via libamento boats, enabling his ship to approach the wharves of the salt depositories fronting the Giudecca canal and deliver the remainder. In the second case, the cautious Captain Bianco chose to tether his ship outside the port and unload the entire cargo of salt by means of libamento boats.148 In another case, in 1486 a burchio captained by Piero Circhier was chartered by the Salt Commissioners to unload salt from the nave di Comun, captained by Zorzi Dragan. Circhier made five libamenti, one of which was to sopra porto and another to nearby Chioggia,

147 Ibid., f. 2r (6 February 1503). 148 The calculation of salt deposits was in mozza. Each Venetian mozzo of salt contained 12 stara that were equated 24 mozzetti. In the example above, the stara was divided into 4: Hocquet, ‘Métrologie du sel’, p. 402.

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as the ship changed its position.149 In 1497 the ship Malipiera, captained by Todaro da Corfu, arrived from Cyprus fully loaded with barley transported on account of the State; given its size, the ship could not enter the port without first discharging part of its cargo.150 Predictably, the shifting of merchandise from the large ship to smaller carriers (and further to the customs) left the door open for all kinds of fraud and theft, as some of the merchandise was secretly directed to private warehouses or by fluvial waterways to the terraferma.151 The libamento in open sea was certainly not encouraged by the State, as it offered less direct control over the process, not to mention the risks involved. Most accidents involving either the loss or damage to merchandise occurred right here: the merchandise would fall into the water or get soaked by rain, and parcels would just disintegrate while being lowered into smaller carriers. In addition, the burchi and other rivergoing boats were not accustomed to open-sea conditions, and were prone to capsizing when fully loaded or poorly balanced. Any prolonged stay outside the port exposed the vessels to a considerable risk. Because the liabilities incurred were so often disputed, libamento boats were insured against damages for this kind of activity. In 1512 Marino Sanuto noted that the four galleys returning from Alexandria and the pilgrim galley from Jaffa crossed to Venice from Istria, but did not have enough time to unburden themselves of part of their cargo before they were caught in a storm that forced them to remain outside port, with the peril of getting stranded on the shoals.152 Similarly, in 1516 several galleys returning from Beirut managed to discharge part of their merchandise outside port, but stormy conditions prevented them from entering to berth.153 In another case, the cargo ship of the Donà family waited sopra porto for six full days as strong easterlies prevented the arrival of the libamento boats.154 Clearly, such situations were a regular threat, and dreaded by all concerned. Given the frequent disasters, the libamento in open sea was eventually outlawed on 12 July 1527, as part of a more comprehensive Senate legislation aiming at enforcing regulations for safety at sea. Shipowners were threatened with a fine of 100 ducats for every libamento procedure sopra porto, and were liable to lawsuits by merchants and shippers for any damage incurred to merchandise 149 ASVe, PSal, reg. 59, f. 137r (1 July 1486). 150 ASVe, CN, reg. 14, f. 172r (8 February 1497). 151 The successive decrees issued to address these problems: ibid., reg. 26, ff. 150v–51r (3 September 1548). 152 Ten more ships and vessels laden with wheat waited for an opportunity to lighten their cargo and enter port: Sanuto, I diarii, XIV, 38 (18 March 1512). 153 Ibid., XXII, 65 (25 March 1516). 154 MCC, DDR, bus. 411, fasc. VI, 66 (10 November 1557).

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that had been unloaded in this way. The unloading at the sorzador had its advantages, however, and continued to be practiced openly despite recurring accidents and prohibition.155 4.2 Alternative Sites for Loading or Unloading The drastic silting up of the port of San Nicolò in the early sixteenth century made it necessary to find an alternative area of anchorage. Lying about five nautical miles further south of Venice itself, the port of Malamocco seemed a good enough alternative. Round ships entering the lagoon could ride on anchor in the vicinity of the island of Poveglia, and from there the smaller libamento carriers would use the internal canals of the lagoon to transport the goods to the customs house in Venice.156 The coastal cities in Venetian Istria were also used as centres of libamento for round ships before the last leg to the port of Venice proper, known locally as the parenzana (lit. short stretch). To be sure, stopping in Istria to lighten the ship’s load was time-consuming and an extra financial burden. Nevertheless, the Istrian ports were relatively convenient for libamento, and lay at a distance of about one day of sailing. To curb the misappropriation of cargo, the local customs officers kept a record of all the libamenti and sent reports to the central administration in Venice. One such record has survived due to the unusual circumstances: during a period of famine and plague in Venice in the winter of 1528, a certain Zuan-Francesco Molino, one of the Grain Office commissioners, was instructed to make his way to Istria and quantify all the cargoes of wheat bound for Venice and make sure they would reach their destination intact. His neatly drafted, painstaking ship-by-ship inspection comprised a total of 42,145 stara of cereals – of which 4,910 stara were duly transferred via libamenti carriers to Venice. He then produced a mandato or a comandamento for every ship, attesting to the quantity that was unloaded onto smaller carriers. These certificates were accordingly presented to the Grain Office upon the subsequent arrival of the round ships to Venice. Molino’s full report contains the date and place of each libamento; the names of the captains; the capacity

155 ASVe, SM, reg. 21, f. 72v (12 July 1527). Reoccurring accidents: ASVe, GPE, bus. 146, reg. 39 [3–4 February 1553]; ASVe, SM, reg. 34, ff. 54r–v (25 July 1558). Additional provisions to protect the cargo; e.g., the discharge of ash and salt on the same leg were prohibited in 1561: ASVe, PSal, reg. 1, f. 148v (31 March 1561). 156 In 1549 the silting of the canal connecting Malamocco with Venice via Santo Spirito prevented the libamenti from passage unless in high tides: ASVe, SEA, bus. 607, f. 256v (7 March 1549).

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of each boat in stara of wheat; the respective quantity and type; and the securities presented by the captains of the libamenti.157 4.3 The Order of Arrival and the Consignment of Salt Since the thirteenth century, the order in which ships reached port had determined the order of payments disbursed by the ufficiali al sal to the creditors from salt deposits.158 The rule was rigorously observed by captains and officials alike. In 1520 the recompense for salt deposits was assigned to the Council of Ten, and the heads of this council instructed their treasury to respect the ships’ order of arrival and the time they commenced the libamento, based on the information supplied by the provveditori al sal.159 In 1521 the Collegio advised the provveditori al sal to give preference to ships that used burchi di libamento, a craft that was explicitly designed for such work, rather than other vessels less reliable for this job.160 The following dispute between the owners of two round ships, Andrea di Priuli and Piero Duodo on the one hand and Thoma Duodo on the other, sheds further light on this practice. In July 1506 both ships returned from Cyprus loaded with salt and cotton, and cast anchor at the sorzador open sea area. Francesco Tarlado, the captain of the Priula, proceeded towards the lighthouses that marked the entrance to the waterway ( fuosa); there, he bided his time for the right moment to gain access. Meanwhile the Duoda lingered a few miles behind and began to lighten the ship with the services of a burchio di legno, captained by Bortolo Pavia and crewed by three mariners. Now packed with salt, the burchio began to make its way back to port. However, as it passed the Priula near the lighthouses, the vessel ran aground on a sandbar at a place called Cao di farin. This was not so grave since a flat-bottomed boat like a burchio could fairly easily drag itself out of the sandbar in normal weather conditions. Indeed, the crew successfully freed the boat by dropping the anchor at some distance – probably with the aid of a smaller boat – and then gradually heaved the boat off the shoals toward deeper water. Around midday, however, 157 One such mandato was issued for the galione of Constante di Sinopio, which carried a total of 3,000 stara of wheat, of which 630 stara were lighten in Istria. This cargo was then transported to Venice on four different pilot boats with a respective carrying capacity of 150, 160 and 280 stara of wheat (in this instance the fourth boat carried only 40 stara, therefore its actual capacity was not indicated). It is assumed that Captain Sinopio continued to Venice with the rest of the cargo, and the reduced draught allowed him to enter the port of San Nicolò: ASVe, CapCX, Lettere dei rettori, Parenzo, bus. 266, ff. 6r–11r (9–15 November 1528). 158 Hocquet, Voiliers et commerce, p. 198. 159 ASVe, PSal, bus. 60, f. 234v (29 March 1520). 160 ASVe, CN, reg. 19, f. 29r (31 July 1521).

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as the crew was still struggling to pull the vessel off the sandbank, the Priula took advantage of the rising tides, raised its anchors, and headed for the castelli port entrance, passing at some distance from the burchio. Shortly afterward the burchio returned to the dredged channel aft of the Priula, but, being a lighter and more agile vessel, it had no difficulty in catching up. As the Priula reached the castelli of San Nicolò and Sant’Andrea, the ‘finishing line’ of this little improvised boat-race, the burchio passed the larger ship and steered in the direction of San Marco, holding the lead probably as far as the docks of the salt depository. In an almost comical epilogue, both the Duoda and the Priula claimed primacy for payment, so they were summoned to a joint hearing in the Salt Office. A few days later, the shipowner Andrea di Priuli and two of his colleagues, Martin da Cherso and Francesco dal Cortivo, joined by Bartolo Navaro, the owner of the burchio that performed the libamento for the Duoda, met with Bortolo Pavia, the captain of the said burchio, in Piazza San Marco ‘outside the bakery’. In this forum Priuli asked the captain – ‘Who entered the castelli first? You with the libamento or my ship?’ Pavia responded that the Priula arrived first and the libamento followed behind, and repeated it several times before Priuli told him he might be required to testify before the provveditori al sal. The fact that the owner of the burchio was standing beside Priuli during this exchange suggests that this was not a clear-cut case, and apparently some pressure was applied on Pavia to ‘adjust’ his version to expectations. Then, Andrea di Priuli appeared before the provveditori al sal and demanded his priority in credits from salt deposits, as dictated by the rule-book. His witnesses included the same Bortolo Pavia, two out of the three mariners who were present on board the burchio (the third one was no longer in Venice), and Francesco dal Cortivo, who was present in the Piazza on the Sunday when Pavia made his confession. Since our sources do not report the eventual ruling of the Provveditori, we can only speculate the outcome of this somewhat burlesque event, but I believe it safe to assume that Priuli’s version was accepted.161 161 ASVe, PSal, bus. 63, reg. 7, ff. 17v–20v (13–18 July 1506).

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Ship Biographies 1 The nave grossa Marcella, 1496–1503 Described by contemporaries as a bellissimo vassello, the Marcella was assessed by surveyors on separate occasions. The first appraisal was conducted in the building yard in 1496, while the ship was still under construction. It was said to have a capacity of 1,085 botti beneath the exposed deck. Another official evaluation was made before May 1500, which turned up a slightly higher capacity of 1,170 botti. During its ‘life’ the vessel’s capacity was quoted variously at 1,400 and 1,500 botti. The Marcella was built in Venice by Sebastian Marcello q. Antonio, as sole owner, initially without the backing of the State. Earlier, however, in 1494 the State had offered bounties for the construction of two ships of at least 1,200 botti (beneath the exposed deck), but the preconditions had excluded the Marcella as a candidate for the hand-out. Nonetheless, Sebastian Marcello’s plan for his newly built ship was to take on wine transport to the Atlantic, and he hoped to benefit from the promised 2 ducats per butt on wine exported to England, and the 8 ducats per mozzo of salt purchased in Ibiza.1 However, several months later the investor ran into financial straits and filed a request for a loan of 2,500 ducats to tide him over. In February 1497 the loan was granted, on condition that if the ship was requisitioned by the State, the credit from freightage would be set against his debt. In this way, the readying of the ship was guaranteed, and work duly completed.2 Captained by its owner, the Marcella set sail on the maiden voyage and reached Messina in September 1497. Not long afterward the State required the services of this new ship for a transport of grain from Sicily to Pisa, which was then engaged in war against Florence and needed Venice’s assistance.3 In the following months the Marcella was employed in cabotage across the Tyrrhenian Sea. In November 1498 the ship pulled into Naples for repairs, intent on loading a freight of salt designated for nearby Salerno. But in light of yet another 1 In accordance with a Senate’s decree enacted on 27 August 1490, confirmed on 13 June 1496, and applied to all ships that would subsequently sail westwards: ASVe, SM, reg. 14, f. 100r (13 June 1496). 2 On 8 February 1497, his brothers, Hieronimo, Donado, Piero, and Andrea duly supplied the Collegio with the necessary collateral to ensure timely reimbursements of the loan within the stipulated ten years: ibid., reg. 14, f. 114v; Sanuto, I diarii, I, 503. 3 Sanuto, I diarii, I, 781, 869, 880, 884, 921 (February 1498).

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004398177_010

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outbreak of conflict with the Ottomans, the Senate dispatched orders to officials in Naples to reroute the Marcella to Corfu, where it would join the armada in return for half of the debt owed by Sebastian Marcello to the State.4 The Marcella set sail in the opposite direction, however, and arrived in Palermo on 4 February 1499, from where it hastily continued to Spain so as to take further advantage of the newly liberalized short-haul sea markets.5 Most probably, the investor was aware of the intention to send his ship to war, and so he wisely weighed anchor and sailed in the opposite direction, to continue trafficking until the ‘official’ word caught up with him. On 1 June Marcello steered his ship from Ibiza to Naples, following orders he had received to return to base. After various setbacks and a violent encounter with the corsair Piero Navara, the Marcella eventually put into Corfu harbour on 23 June, and was duly conscripted into the armada.6 After the defeat of the Venetian fleet at Zonchio (Pylos) and other minor advances in the battles that followed, on 18 November 1499 the Senate decommissioned the Marcella, which not only lacked men and equipment but also required repairs.7 Sebastian Marcello hastened to Venice to present his report on the failed naval battle at Zonchio to the Collegio,8 leaving the Marcella to winter in Pola in Istria under the custody of a handful of men. The protected waters of the Venetian lagoon were probably too shallow for ships with a draught that size, but anyway, Marcello felt no urge to bring his ship to Venice, even were it technically possible. Bad tidings concerning the ship’s fate arrived on 1 September 1500, however, in the form of a letter to the Senate from Marco Navaier, the Conte di Pola: First thing, the ship of Sebastian Marcello is in port and faces immediate risk of being shipwrecked; it is not well equipped and lacks sufficient crew. A few days ago, during a fearsome sirocco storm, the cables were torn down and the anchors remained under water, the mooring cables were torn as well. The ship dragged anchors for more than 100 passa and touched bottom. By my orders, the locals gave the ship the 4 Ibid., II, 131 (17 November 1498), 312, 344, 413, 531 (January–March 1499). 5 Ibid., 491 (ref. to 4 February 1499). 6 The buccaneer possessed a letter of marque from the king of Naples. He strategically attacked Venetian ships as well, based on a tip received from some French barze. Although Marcello claimed that he had successfully thwarted the assault of Navara’s barza, another ship that sailed in a convoy with him under the Catalan flag was set ablaze: ibid., II, 487, 518 (1, 14 March 1499), 813–14, 922–24, 1011, 1124, 1245 (May–July 1499). 7 18 November 1499: ASVe, SM, reg. 14, f. 201r; Sanuto, I diarii, III, 54. 8 Sanuto, I diarii, III, 60, 70–71 (28 November, 19 December 1499).

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necessary equipment now … but things will go bad. I wish to give warning in advance.9 Eager to relocate, Marcello was too busy figuring out his next move to bother with the decaying wooden carcass of the former bellissimo vassello. Earlier, in May 1500 the provveditori sopra la revision dei conti (a special body formed to deal the credits for service in the armada) accredited him for seven months of service at war, a tidy sum amounting to 1,689 ducats and 6 grossi (after the deduction of the original loan and sundry other debts that he owed to the State).10 Despite its state of disrepair, the Senate expressed an interest in buying the ship. It was five years of age at that point, notes Marino Sanuto, and by his reckoning could continue navigation for a further five years. In truth, the vessel was just over four years old, and according to the last estimate, its value was 3,040 ducats. Surveyors were sent again to re-evaluate its worth and assess the degree of work necessary to make it seaworthy once more.11 The conditions were then set for its purchase. Marcello would thereby be credited for 3,163 ducats – including the rigging and equipment – in two equal instalments.12 On 17 October 1500, the Marcella became a nave di Comun to all effects, and the Senate elected Andrea Contarini q. Pandolfo as captain, who was immediately dispatched to Pola to attend to the refitting and careening of the ship.13 Seven months later, in July 1501, under its new title Contarina (after the name of its new patron), the imposing vessel was finally ready for departure. Since the summer campaign was nearly over, the ship was sent loaded with artillery and ammunition to different outposts in the Levant, and then continued on to Cyprus to take on cargoes of salt, cotton, yarns, wheat and barley on account of the Signory, and also carry merchandise in return for freightage. The Contarina was expected to return to Venice in a convoy, together with the merchant galleys deployed in Beirut. Consequently, the crew was fixed at 80, and later increased to 150 men.14 After several delays, Captain Contarini set forth in his 9 10 11 12 13

14

Ibid., 764 (13 September 1500). The credit was not paid promptly, it was nevertheless secured: ASVe, SM, reg. 15, ff. 130r–v (ref. to 4 May 1500, revised and confirmed in 3 May 1502). Sanuto, I diarii, III, 780 (14 September 1500). ASVe, SM, reg. 15, f. 43v (17 September 1500); Sanuto, I diarii, III, 793–94, 829 (17, 25 September 1500). The payment was eventually issued on 12 March 1505: ASVe, CapCX, Mandati, reg. 1, ff. 25v, 89v; ASVe, CXDM, fil. 17, fasc. 4. 17 October 1500: ASVe, SM, reg. 15, f. 49r; Sanuto, I diarii, III, 926; The ship was careened in Pola on 28 January 1501: ASVe, PPA, reg. 133, f. 1r. Incidentally, around that time Sebastian Marcello failed in his bid to be elected as captain of the barza piccola di Comun: Sanuto, I diarii, III, 1210 (21 December 1500), 1298 (15 January 1501). ASVe, SM, reg. 15, ff. 89v, 90v (24, 30 July 1501).

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ship on 21 August.15 Some four months later, the Contarina made its return to Venice bearing salt from Cyprus. En route the convoy attacked and boarded a caravel bearing the papal banner, and seized merchandise belonging to several Milanese citizens, among others.16 In the spring of 1502 the Contarina was commissioned again to join the city’s armada. The departure was however delayed owing to news on the approach of Admiral Camali to Cephalonia. Subsequently, the crew was increased to 500.17 Plans changed again, however, and the Contarina set sail on 31 June with supplies for Corfu by way of Syracuse, where it expected further orders concerning a cargo of wheat that awaited transhipment to Corfu for replenishing the war fleet.18 From Corfu the Contarina proceeded to Cyprus. On 23 November it ran into a storm in the Gulf of Satalia (the stretch of sea delimited by Rhodes and Cyprus), but nevertheless managed to reach Saline, where it began loading salt and merchandise on account of the State. However, a serious leak in the hull was discovered only after the ship came under load, and consequently the listing vessel barely made it to Famagusta, with two pumps running full-time to keep it afloat. Luckily, local divers were found and managed to seal the cracks as best as they could, while part of the artillery was discharged to improve stability. But Famagusta had neither the facilities nor the place to careen such a big ship. The return westward fully loaded during winter seemed too risky a venture, hence, the cargo was unloaded and the ship waited for the following spring. Finally, on 16 April 1503 the Contarina fu Marcella reached Venice with no cargo, and was left in Poveglia under the custody of several men, whose job was to keep the pumps running. On 3 October proti from the Arsenal concluded that the repairs would incur expenses far above the vessel’s worth. By then the nave fu Marcella was considered old (seven years of age) and no longer fit for navigation. Since it was impossible to find any potential clients for such a big ship with so little commercial value, the Collegio was left with no other solution but to dismantle it.19 For about six years after its launch in 1497, the Marcella conducted eight commercial voyages, some longer than others. During its relatively short 15 16 17 18 19

ASVe, CSC, reg. 4, ff. 14r–v (21 August 1501). ASVe, SM, reg. 15, ff. 110r–v (11 December 1501); ASVe, PSal, bus. 62, reg. 6, f. 75r (23 May 1502). ASVe, SM, reg. 15, f. 127v (14 April 1502); Sanuto, I diarii, IV, 252, 261, 279 (March–June 1502). ASVe, CSC, reg. 4, f. 23v (31 June 1502). Arbel, ‘Port Dredging in the Venetian Stato da mar’, p. 123; Sanuto, I diarii, IV, 703, 718–20 (15 December 1502, 24 January 1503); ibid., V, 17 (16 April 1503), 122 (3 October 1503). A report dated 22 February 1504 documenting the condition of all public vessels still mentioned the nave fu Marcella in Poveglia, along with two other barze di Comun, being constantly pumped: ibid., 926.

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lifetime the vessel remained inactive for months in Istria and Cyprus. Its original owner, Sebastian Marcello, used the ship also as a political tool to leverage his position in Venice in the early stages of his career. In the long run, the project never proved profitable; so, because the Marcella had little commercial potential, it was left to the mercy of the State that had its own reasons for keeping such bulky ships afloat and active. At that time Venice made a consistent effort through various legislative devices to encourage operators to build navi grosse by offering preferential access to lucrative cargos (wine or salt), along with economic incentives (generous tax rates, or subsidies for construction), and mandates specifying that such ships might be leased by the State. Despite the goodwill and endeavours of the senators, owing to a variety of contingent and circumstantial factors, the navi grosse failed to be remunerative, and the State was ultimately compelled to intervene directly in order to keep them in service. The tangled connections between the State and private entrepreneurs regarding both the ownership and the operation of these exceptionally big round ships is illustrated by other cases as well. For example, Nicolò Pixani, together with Francesco di Dandolo Bernardo and brothers, appealed to the Council of Ten on 5 April 1503 for loans to complete construction on their nave grossa. Failing would obliged them to ask the Senate to buy their ship, as indeed happened with the Marcella.20 A further example is offered by the Pandora, another oft-cited nave grossa, built in the Arsenal and later sold to entrepreneurs for the ridiculously low price of 1,000 ducats. The new owners promised to repair the ship for navigation and make it available for public service in case of necessity. It was eventually consumed by fire in the battle of Zonchio. The see-sawing of responsibility between State and private shipowners regarding the construction and operation of big round ships did not follow any predefined system – unlike the merchant galleys – but instead adjusted to the evolving circumstances. Given that shipping is always subject to fluctuations in demand, and that Venetian operators preferred to invest their capital in smaller vessels, it seems that the economic conditions in Venice and its colonies were not solid enough to justify the existence of these navi grosse. And yet the demand among other European nations for goods and shipping boomed to such an extent that such freight runs were immensely remunerative outside Venice.

20 ASVe, CXDM, reg. 29, f. 224r (5 April 1504).

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191

Riding Out the Storm: The Biography of the Ship Dolfina, 1525–29

Between 1527 and 1533 the intensification of bad weather events was largely responsible for the tragic end of many vessels and for a downturn in shipping in general. Nevertheless, despite the frequent shipwrecks, several shipowners managed to keep their business afloat with impressive resiliency. One such example is the patrician Zuane di Lorenzo Dolfin, who became an expert in the field of grain trade. Our point of departure would be the launching of his 800-botti ship in December 1525. It was then licensed by pilgrims for a voyage to Jaffa.21 In view of grain shortage, the Senate instructed the governor of Cyprus to give priority to the loading of cereal on the returning ships. Dolfin reached an agreement with the Signory to carry half the quantity on his own account. In this way he hoped to reap greater profits (not solely from freightage).22 The return voyage took longer than expected, however. The Dolfina encountered a threatening storm while rounding Cape Maleas and was forced to change course to Crete after running out of drinking water.23 The ship was reported in the Istrian port of Parenzo on 20 December, nearly six months after its departure from Venice.24 The heavy demand for grain minimized idle time in port. On 3 January 1527 the provveditori alle biave licensed the Dolfina and two other ships.25 In 21 On 26 October 1525, Dolfin appealed to the Council of Ten for a licence to harvest two oak trees in the forest of Montello in Treviso to build the supports of the mast: ASVe, CXDC, fil. 2, fasc. 94. He asked for launching equipment on 28 December 1525: ASVe, SM, reg. 20, f. 204v. On 22 June 1526, one of the passenger boats that carried five pilgrims to the anchorage place outside the Lido was capsized in bad weather. Despite the tragedy the ship set sail several days later. Marc-Antonio Memo q. Lorenzo was indicated as the patron on 22 June. However, the reputed captain Zuane Vassalo was eventually hired for the maiden voyage: Sanuto, I diarii, XLI, 663, 722 (22, 26 June 1526). 22 The conditions were further negotiated on 21 and 23 July with no results: ibid., XLII, 186 (10 July 1526). 23 ASVe, PSM, De ultra, bus. 19 [11 September 1527]; ASVe, MG, bus. 2, fasc. 1526 [27 November 1526]. 24 Sanuto, I diarii, XLIII, 473 (20 December 1526). 25 A usual contract established the following conditions: the ship would enjoy priority in loading. It was expected to set sail not later than 15 January, and spend 20 days loading in two grain outlets in southern Cyprus, not including the day of arrival, departure and moving between ports, after which it was supposed to return directly to Venice. The entire capacity of the ship was chartered, reserving only the space allocated for the crew’s portada. A quantity of 400 stara would be loaded on the account of Dolfin and the rest on that of the State in return for freightage: 18 ducats per 100 stara of wheat and 16 for barely. The rates would be reduced to 16 and 14 ducats in case of unjustified delays. The company

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May the ship unloaded part of its wheat in Corfu, before receiving a permission to proceed to Venice.26 In view of the attractive bounties for the transportation of wheat that were introduced in June 1527, Zuane Dolfin formed partnerships with other merchants. In July his smaller vessel, captained by Piero Bon, found itself surrounded by enemy fuste in Apulia, and required assistance from Corfu.27 Meanwhile, the larger Dolfina, captained by Zuane Storto, headed to the Aegean Sea. It loaded wheat belonging to different merchants and returned to Venice, probably in January 1528, despite a difficult winter.28 Shortly afterwards it was chartered again by pilgrims on a voyage to Jaffa, and returned with cereals on 18 July after a narrow escape from Moorish corsairs about forty miles south of Zante.29 The bounties that were reinstated in 4 July 1528 prompted Dolfin to take a bigger risk and send both his ships to Syria to load 10,000 stara of wheat on his own account. The smaller Dolfina arrived in Jaffa with pilgrims in the autumn of 1528, and loaded 3,500 stara of wheat along with other valuable merchandise. The vessel then turned back to Venice, but was unfortunately stranded, resulting in the total loss of the ship and merchandise. Meanwhile, in December the larger Dolfina was just about to complete the loading of 6,500 stara of wheat, when the agent in Jaffa and two crewmen were imprisoned and sent to the Ottoman governor in Damascus. Suspecting that the situation would deteriorate, Captain Zuane Storto raised anchors and continued to Cyprus, where he expected to complete his cargo with cotton. This however led to further complications: infested by a plague of locusts, Cyprus was experiencing dire famine with no sureties concerning the success of the following crop. Upon his arrival, Storto was ordered to unload the entire quantity of wheat of 14,780 Cypriot mozza. When he refused to comply with this order, the ship was impounded and its sails and rudder were confiscated. The Venetian governor priced the wheat considerably lower than the sum the company expected to gain in Venice: 5 bisanti per mozzo instead of 7. Storto was determined to obtain the full price for his cargo, arguing that even his crew got better prices in Limassol by selling their share. He went further to accuse the was however entitled to 7 ducats per day for involuntary delays caused by the agents: ASVe, CXDC, fil. 4, fasc. 144 (12 January 1527). 26 Ibid., fil. 5, fasc. 185 (ref. to 5, 7 May 1527). 27 Ibid., fil. 6, fasc. 210 (28 December 1527); ibid., fil. 7, fasc. 12 (14 March 1528); Sanuto, I diarii, XLV, 656 (23 August 1527). 28 ASVe, CXDC, fil. 6, fasc. 210 all. 3 (ref. to January 1528); ibid., fil. 7, fascc. 12 and all. 3 (ref. to 31 August 1527, January 1528), 33 and all. 6 (26 March 1528, ref. to 31. August 1527, January 1528). 29 Sanuto, I diarii, XLVIII, 268 (18 July 1528).

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governor of defying the orders of the Ten that strictly forbade the detention of ships carrying wheat to Venice. The governor lost his temper and ordered to unload the ship by force. One-third was disbursed in cash and the rest in goods, as money was scarce. Being short of cash, Storto was unable to return to Syria or Alexandria to reload wheat, and was thus compelled to load cotton and salt instead. The Dolfina departed from Cyprus on 15 May 1529 and arrived in Venice on 13 July, eight months after it set sail. In view of the complications, Zuane Dolfin appealed to the Council of Ten, asking a higher rate for his wheat consignment. The petition draws attention to the losses incurred following the misadventures: Dolfin expected to reap profits for the delivery of 10,000 stara of wheat at a rate of 25 lire per 100 stara, a figure established on 4 July. Instead, one ship was lost and the other returned with a loss of 1,100 ducats, a sum that represented the difference between his expectations and the actual disbursement. Another consideration was the idle time that the ship spent in Cyprus, including the time detained in port and for the unloading and loading procedures. ‘It was like making two voyages for the profit of one,’ commented Dolfin. In addition, the deterioration of the structure and rigging, being under load longer than expected, demanded a thorough overhaul. Even if this claim was somewhat overblown, there is little doubt that the late return prevented the Dolfina from setting sail again in spring. On the other hand, it was argued that the sale of salt and cotton yielded an additional income of 1,000 ducats. Nevertheless, in view of the setbacks encountered, the Council of Ten ruled that the selling rate would be raised to 6.5 bisanti.30 The Dolfina set sail again to the Levant the following autumn and loaded ash, cotton, salt, and black pepper in Cyprus. But on 18 November 1529, during the return voyage, it was caught up in a storm and sought shelter in the island of Merlera (Ereikoussa) to the northwest of Corfu. This proved fatal and the ship was stranded on a sandy beach with barely 2.5 metres (2 passa) between the merchandise and the waterline.31 Misfortune followed misfortune, and just four months later another vessel owned by Zuane Dolfin, a medium-sized marciliana, was attacked by corsairs from Marseilles on its return voyage from

30 ASVe, CXDC, fil. 9, fascc. 129, 175 (22, 26 June 1529); Sanuto, I diarii, L, 348 (22 June 1529), 373 (26 June 1529); ibid., LI, 64 (13 July 1529). Another indication makes reference to a contract that was signed with Dolfin on 15 January 1529 to supply wheat to Zante from Alexandria in return for attractive freights. This contract was probably annulled following the delay in Cyprus: ASVe, CapCX, Notatorio, reg. 8, f. 64v (ref. to 15 January 1529). On the locust problem in Cyprus: Arbel, ‘Sauterelles et mentalités’, pp. 1057–74. 31 Sanuto, I diarii, LII, 347 (ref. to 18 November 1529).

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Alexandria. It then was sold off in Rhodes, along with the cargo belonging to Dolfin and other Venetian noblemen.32 In view of the frequent losses and reversals, one might expect Zuane Dolfin to have declared bankruptcy. But this was not the case. Instead, the undaunted entrepreneur took advantage of his connections with suppliers, and was appointed on 9 October 1530 as an agent for the acquisition of grain on behalf of the Signory, with authority to sign contracts with suppliers and charter ships. Two months later, Marino Sanuto reported that twenty-four boats carrying wheat acquired for the State by Zuane Dolfin in Vasto, in the province of Chieti, were shipwrecked outside the Lido. Concurrently, Dolfin was personally involved in the shipment of wheat from Syria on different vessels that were chartered for that purpose in return for bounties.33 In one such case the vessel was late to arrive, and Dolfin was fined and lost his bounties. On 21 April 1531 a new ship called Dolfina was launched. In the summer of 1532 it carried wheat from the Levant, and was back in Istria on 12 September and in Venice on 30 October 1532. Besides, in 1533 Dolfin owned a marciliana captained by Bare di Sebenico. In view of another grain shortage, he was sent to Milan to buy cereals.34 In January 1534 he was involved in the charter of different vessels for carrying cereals from Alexandria.35 In November of the same year the new Dolfina was chartered to carry wheat from Volos in north-eastern Greece to Cyprus, which suffered another locust invasion.36 The ship was expected to arrive in Cyprus in February 1535.37 Taking advantage of the loans for shipbuilding that were introduced in 1535, Zuane Dolfin built a new vessel of 432 botti at the Venetian shipyard of Sant’Antonio between October 1536 and May 1537 and launched it on 23 June 1537. Upon the outbreak of war with the Ottomans in 1537, Dolfin owned two round ships. The larger of the two joined the armada, whereas the newer one engaged in trade. The man’s shipping activity continued throughout the 1540s. In 1545 his son Lorenzo was mentioned in relation to the shipping business of his father, and that same year the two men obtained loans for the building of yet another Dolfina, this time of 690 botti.38 Lorenzo’s 32 ASVe, SDS, fil. 10 (1533) rrr. [26 August 1530]; Sanuto, I diarii, LIII, 190 (ref. to March 1530). 33 ASVe, CXDC, fil. 12, fascc. 49 (9 October 1530), 145 (12 January 1531); ibid., fil. 13, fasc. 253 (18 August 1531); Sanuto, I diarii, LIV, 154 (4 December 1530), 479 (18 June 1531). 34 ASVe, SM, reg. 22, f. 75v (21 April 1531), 156v (30 October 1532); Sanuto, I diarii, LVI, 909, 937 (12–15 September 1532); ibid., LVIII, 309, 392 (13 June, 3 July 1533). 35 ASVe, MG, bus. 12bis-I, [2 January 1534]. 36 Arbel, ‘Sauterelles et mentalités’, p. 1071 cit. 92. 37 ASVe, CXDC, fil. 18, fasc. 273 (14 November 1534). 38 ASVe, SM, reg. 24, f. 54r (23 June 1537); ASVe, CN, reg. 23, f. 121v (19 September 1537); ASVe, CapCX, Mandati, reg. 1, ff. 153v (9 October 1536), 158r (4 May 1537), 199, 201 (23 March, 13 October 1545).

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brothers were involved in the business as well, but it seems that the former was mostly identified with shipping during the 1550s and 1560s.39 Adverse weather was one of many factors, both human and non-human, that shaped the biography of the ship Dolfina. In view of the critically steep construction costs (probably not less than 16,000 ducats), the relatively short lifespan (47 months) and the average duration of a voyage (7.8 to 8 months), it may well be that, taken as a whole the enterprise was rarely remunerative.40 Despite this, the resilience of those who managed to steer their business through all the adversities cannot be underestimated. 3

The Short History of the Priula, 1545–47

On 22 April 1544 a group of Venetian noblemen – Marc-Antonio and Zuane Priuli q. Andrea, Hieronimo, Andrea Malipiero q. Sebastian, Andrea di Hieronimo Marcello, procuratore di San Marco, and Captain Agustin Pelizier q. Dimitri – signed a contract at the office of the public notary Bonadio Marin for the division of carats on their newly built ship. A few days later, a disagreement broke out and the company abruptly folded. On 2 May, Andrea Marcello and Andrea Malipiero – representing his brother Hieronimo and in accordance with Captain Pelizier, who was also in charge on the building process – issued a statement in the office of the public notary Giova-Maria Cavanis, offering the Priuli brothers to either renounce their share in the ship and pass it to Marcello and the Malipiero brothers, or to become the full owners of the ship. With the first option, Marcello and the Malipiero would oblige themselves to continue the construction and refund the Priuli for their expenses. In the second option – which they eventually chose – Marcello and the Malipiero brothers would cede their shares to the Priuli, once their own expenses had been settled. In addition, the Priuli promised to respect the salary and conditions of Pelizier, honour the debts previously incurred, and provide assurance that expenses would be fully covered within a period of eight months, while the old guarantors would be relieved from their previous obligation. Shortly afterward, the entire matter was resolved and the Priuli brothers acquired the shares of the other patricians, at which point the Santa Maria di Loreto e Sant’Antonio da Padova became known as the Priula.41 39 ASVe, SM, reg. 34, f. 53v (25 July 1558); ibid., fil. 38 [January 1568]; Hocquet, ‘il libro “creditorum”’, pp. 58, 62, 64, 66 (1550–58); Aymard, Venise, Raguse et le commerce du blé, p. 142. 40 Lane, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 259–60, 262; Hocquet, Voiliers et commerce, pp. 582–83. 41 ASVe, NA, bus. 3249, ff. 150r–v (2 May 1544).

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The Priula was built in Venice in the yards of the Bocca del rio di San Domenego, and had a capacity of 794 botti under the exposed deck. It was one of many ships built with the help of state loans for ship construction in the mid-1540s. The loans were granted in two instalments: the first on 25 September 1544, once the preliminary stages of construction had been made and the securities confirmed in the Collegio; the second instalment was disbursed on 18 December 1544, while the construction was well under way, the principal beams laid, and the planks nailed in place. The previous August the company had run short of oak, and asked the Senate to intervene. Altogether, construction took fourteen months, but finally, on 18 June 1545 the launching equipment was borrowed from the Arsenal, and the Priula glided out the yards to begin its maiden voyage to Cyprus.42 The ship reached the island around 15 October, and subsequently returned to Venice that winter.43 On 15 March 1546 the ship set sail for Syria, and appears to have returned to Venice in June.44 At this point, Pelizier either resigned or was dismissed, and it is unclear whether he retained his shares in the ship.45 Despite this change of captain, preparations were swift, and in October the Priula was once again ready for departure, this time to Syria under the command of Nicoletto da Lesina. The vessel stopped in Cyprus to complete its cargo, and eventually put into Venice before March 1547. Under the command of Da Lesina, in June the company decided to change course, and the Priula set off for Constantinople, and was reported reaching it on 26 July.46 On 31 August the ship was still in port awaiting the extra cargo sufficient for the return voyage. Francesco Bono, the sopracargo, who embarked to control the cargo on behalf of the charterer, filed a complaint to Alessandro Contarini, the Venetian bailo in Constantinople. The former demanded to enforce the law of the Republic that granted precedence to Venice’s ships over foreign ones in loading merchandise belonging to citizens and subjects of Venice. To judge from 42 ASVe, CapCX, Mandati, reg. 1, ff. 197r, 198r (25 September, 18 December 1544); ASVe, SM, reg. 23, f. 108r (4 June 1535); ibid., reg. 27, f. 134r (29 August 1544); ibid., reg. 28, f. 38r (18 June 1545). 43 Since the State loans were reimbursed in the form of salt consignment, part of the cargo on the return voyage was probably salt: ASVe, CapCX, Lettere dei rettori, Cipro, bus. 289, 269 (15 October 1545). 44 ASVe, NA, bus. 10641, fasc. 1, f. 20v (15 March 1546). 45 On November 1546, Pelizier captained the Bernarda ship on a voyage to Spain. In 1548, he was appointed as the captain of the Alberta ship at least until 1554: ASVe, CXDC, fil. 42, fasc. 8 (10 November 1546); Hocquet, ‘il libro “creditorum”’, pp. 58, 60, 62 (1550–54). 46 ASVe, NA, bus. 10641, fasc. 5, ff. 19r, 29r (2, 21 October 1546); ibid., bus. 10642, ff. 102v, 138r, 140r (May–June 1547); ASVe, MG, bus. 12bis-II [29 March 1547].

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records of the imposts of cottimo and bailazzo paid on merchandise exported on the Priula, the departure was postponed at least until mid-September.47 On 9 November 1547 disaster struck, when the Priula was wrecked in the vicinity of Zante on its way back from Constantinople loaded with merchandise and passengers. In May 1548 the governatori delle entrate conducted investigations into the remaining merchandise salvaged from the wrecked ship.48 In its short life of two years and four months, the Priula was exploited to the maximum and completed four voyages at an average of seven months per voyage, including idle time in ports. Despite the premature shipwreck of their ship, Marc-Antonio and Zuane Priuli showed outstanding determination and were already planning the construction of their Priula nuova of 800 botti. The first instalment of the state loan for the new ship was paid out 7 April 1548, and the second on 27 June, while the hire of the launch gantry was approved on 20 July. This implies that the new Priula was completed in less than eight months, or that construction had started before the former vessel was shipwrecked. Moreover, the resourceful Priuli brothers did not wait for another disaster, and less than one year later began the construction of a third ship, in the summer of 1549. The Priula novissima was built in the Sant’Antonio shipyard run by the Sabina family, one of the most prestigious private yards in Venice.49 These seemingly extraordinary measures were vital to ensure the shipping magnates the continuity of their business, and to pre-empt the setbacks of possible shipwreck. 47 ASVe, BC, bus. 263, reg. ‘Sententiarum tertius’, f. 20v (31 August 1547); ibid., reg. ‘Fede de baylazzi et cottimi’, ff. 26r–26v (mid-September 1547). 48 According to one testimony, the captain on the return voyage was Mina di Cerigo and not the said Nicoletto da Lesina: ASVe, GPE, bus. 465, fascc. 31–32 (25 May 1548); ibid., bus. 466, fasc. 38 (27 June 1548). 49 ASVe, SM, reg. 29, f. 209r (20 July 1548); ibid., fil. 6, ff. 94–97 (15 January 1550); ASVe, CapCX, Mandati, reg. 2, ff. 1r (7 April 1548), 3v (27 June 1548), 7v–8r (31 July 1549).

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The Lifespan and Life-Cycle of Mediterranean Ships 1

Shipworms and the Maintenance of Wooden Vessels

1.1 The Teredo Whether the species nowadays identified with the Teredino navalis was a regular inhabitant of the Mediterranean or was introduced only after the discovery of the New World is still being debated.1 Nonetheless, an epidemic of marine wood-boring organisms is recorded in the Middle Sea already in the Classical Period, and even in Pharaonic Egypt.2 In early modern Italy, two terms were used to describe such parasitic borers – bissa (pl. bisse) and bruma (pl. brume). The shipworm is a form of mollusc that enters submerged timbers while still very small, but grows rapidly inside the wood. Shipworms are restricted to intertidal zones above the sediment line, and thrive particularly in warm water and in ports, where the seabed is particularly convenient for marine life. The larvae are resistant to water temperatures as high as 30°C, although growth may cease above 25°C. Minimum reproductive temperature is reported as approximately 11–15°C, but they have been found in temperatures as low as 0.7°C. Its tolerance to decreased salinity allows the mollusc to thrive in brackish water, and to survive periodic exposures to low salinities, including freshwater. The worm’s lifespan is generally around ten weeks, but some studies document lifespans of up to two years. 1.2 Characteristics of Infested Wood The Teredinidae mollusc live completely embedded in wood as they feed themselves, and hence can destroy the interior of a timber pile with scarcely any manifestation of surface damage. As the action of the waves in the intertidal zone gradually peels away the wood’s surface, the animals burrow deeper, systematically reducing its diameter over time. Only a few species of wood have 1 Columbus mentioned the shipworms for the first time after his arrival to Rio de Gracia in January of 1493. His diaries might have inadvertently fuelled the conviction among modern scholarship that when he set sail for the New World, much of the traditional knowledge about borers had vanished: Nelson, Shipworms, pp. 31–32. 2 Castagna, Shipworms, p. 7; Steinmayer & MacIntosh Turfa, ‘Effects of shipworm’, pp. 105–7.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004398177_011

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shown resistance to the borer’s appetite, one being cedar, but other considerations are involved, such as diversity of the same species of wood depending on the soil it grew in, which affect both composition and resistance. Although the common oak is not immune to borers, it presents a strong and durable material that is less prone to rotting from the alternating exposure of wet and dry.3 Basically, ships offered a floating ecosystem of sorts, for species of all kinds, each one a Noah’s Ark of mammals carrying an untold quantity of busy microbes, barnacles and assorted molluscs busy siphoning, and not least plankton. Small wonder then, that the abundance of such myriad creatures critically shortened the life expectancy of wooden vessels. Inevitably, a ship with a potential career on the high seas of several years was already crippled after one or two years, their hulls riddled with bore-holes full of water that drastically altered the vessel’s mass and seaworthiness. This unwanted increment in water absorbed by the wood seriously hampered the vessel’s ability to point to the wind, maintain speed, and determined the quota of cargo it could have safely carried. Coupled with the progressive structural damage caused by shipworm, the extra weight caused the ship to ride lower in the water, increasing the area of wood exposed to the seawater, and the rate of leakage into the bilges as well.4 The pilgrim Felix Fabri nicely illustrated the extent of leakage in his description of the vessel’s hull during rough weather:5 Although the ship was everywhere dressed with pitch and the other things that are used to prevent leakage and to keep out the water, during this storm the water came in through unsuspected leaks everywhere, so that there was nothing in the whole ship which was not wet: our beds and all our things were sopping, our bread and biscuit all spoiled by the sea water. 1.3 Characteristics of the Infested Fleet Shipworms directly impacted the day-to-day operation of shipping companies to such an extent that anyone involved in this business needed to be constantly mindful of the parasite’s life-cycle and habitat. When it was time to overhaul a ship, all the shareholders were consulted and were expected to agree to portion out the repair expenses between them. Failure to disburse one’s quota likely resulted in losing the carats to the other owners who instead fulfilled 3 Hochman, ‘Degradation and Protection’, pp. 248–49. 4 Steinmayer & MacIntosh Turfa, ‘Effects of shipworm’, pp. 113–14. 5 Fabri, Evagatorium in Terrae sanctae, 1, p. 52.

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their obligations.6 What seems to have played a decisive role in the decision whether to keep a vessel afloat or dismantle it was the immediate commercial prospects. In a letter of mid-November 1557, Andrea Donà informed his father Zuan-Battista the Governor of Cyprus that the owners of the Tarabota had a hard time reaching a consensus on whether to scrap their vessel, or risk accepting another charter by having it first careened to re-plank the entire hull. He also updated his father on the condition of their own vessel, which by then also required careening. Actually, the hull did not take in too much water yet, so the company hoped to complete the works before Christmas and speed the return of the ship to Cyprus.7 Besides the more obvious need for a regular supply of fresh water and victuals, crews of infested ships renewed their stocks of hemp, tar and pitch in way-stations along the vessel’s scheduled route. In one such case in 1534, the captain of the Cornera Stefano Pastrovichio waged a chemical war with his stealthy shipworm adversaries on his voyage to Thessaloniki. He purchased 50 planks in Corfu and replenish his supplies of stope and pegole almost in every stop along the way.8 The administration in the colonies had the authority (or rather the obligation) to detain a ship underway if it was suspected of failing to complete the voyage. In 1510 the governor of Paphos, one Niccolò Valaresso, reported to Nicosia that the ship of Matteo Conda arrived in his port half-submerged; in response, a provisional Council of Twelve was convened to decide whether to allow Conda to leave Paphos and continue its journey.9 Some ports, such as Curzola, Corfu, Candia, and Famagusta offered a range of repair facilities, and even a hauling-out service.10 Other bases with more humble resources could at least provide extra hands to assist with the lightening of the ship, or professional scuba-divers as first aid to repair the worst of the leaks below the waterline. Ad-hoc solutions such as this allowed struggling vessels to resume their voyage. There was, however, no other way to repair the accrued damage of several months of worm-borings in the hull’s planks without hauling the vessel out of the water and/or thoroughly careening it. 6 Lane, Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders, pp. 116 cit. 15, 123. 7 MCC, DDR, reg. 411, fasc. VI, 66 (10 November 1557). Other instances support the supposition that the expenditures of careening a ship did not exceed several dozen ducats: ASVe, SAC, bus. 42 [conto 1 April 1534]; Gluzman, ‘Resurrection of a Sunken Ship’, pp. 48–49. 8 ASVe, SAC, bus. 42 [conto 1534]. 9 Sanuto, I diari, XI, 202 (5 July 1510). 10 Venice’s eastern-most port of Famagusta had the facilities to haul out and careen a light galley and other medium-sized vessels: ibid., XXX, 110 (3 April 1521). Round ships, however, had to proceed to Candia: ibid., IV, 718–19 (15 December 1502); Arbel, ‘Port Dredging’, pp. 123–24.

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1.4 The Practice of Hauling Out and Careening Smaller vessels fared better against shipworms, since they could run into almost any beach or port and be dragged out of the water to ‘suffocate’ the parasite with tar or pine resin. Most Renaissance seamen were fully capable of hauling out vessels of up to 200 tons. Conversely, for the larger vessels, heavyduty equipment was only available in major maritime centres such as Venice. Visiting the public shipyards in 1494, the pilgrim Pietro Casola observed ‘a most beautiful’ contrivance for raising large galleys from the water, positioned within the walls of the Arsenal at the banks of the main channel entrance.11 Although round ships were much larger than the galleys, they too were hauled out in the private shipyards using an array of slips, capstans, and winches in order to conduct thorough repairs or to modify the shape of the hull.12 The most common way however to gain access to the vessel’s base was to keel it over, or careen it by means of sturdy tackles attached to its masts. The practice of careening became common practice when certain ships became too bulky to be hauled ashore. In fact, until the beginning of the twentieth century, careening was the system most widely used and, in many cases, the only method by which a vessel’s base could be made accessible for maintenance. This kind of maintenance could often be effected as a ship lay aground during ebb tide, for instance. The base on which it rested needed to be smooth, so that the timber hull would not be damaged by sharp stones or other projections, a hazard that increased with the vessel’s size and displacement. To this end, Venice’s tidal lagoon was ideal for this heavy yet also delicate operation.13 Careening was regularly conducted at San Biasio and Sant’Antonio, opposite the Arsenal complex, and the choice of that particular spot for maintenance was widely considered one of the major causes of the silting of the Grand Canal in 1518.14 With the increasing usage of the less-silted gateway of Malamocco, 11 Newett, Canon Pietro Casola’s Pilgrimage, p. 140. 12 E.g., ASVe, PSal, bus. 8, reg 7bis, 108 (13 April 1492); ASVe, SM, reg. 25, f. 155r (8 June 1540); ibid., fil. 3, 234 (5 November 1546); ibid., fil. 6, 491–92 (16 July 1549); Sanuto, I diarii, V, 757 (24 January 1504); ibid., X, 776 (13 July 1510). Lunardo Sabina petitioned to build an underwater slip in front of his shipyard that would enable him to haul out ships: ASVe, SEA, bus. 368 [Terzo terminaziones] (11 September 1525). The practice of hauling out ships was prohibited in the parish of San Moisè: ibid., bus. 176 [quinto], f. 47v (March 1528). A failed attempt to haul out a 600-botti Sicilian barza at the squero of Francesco Mezavolta: ASVe, CXDCrim, reg. 8 [3 March 1537]. 13 The panoramic view of Venice by Jacopo de’ Barbari (c. 1500) contains several vessels that are being careened inside the Arsenal and along the waterfront facing the private shipyards at Sant’Antonio. Also visible are the workers standing on floating pontoons that smoke and bream the surface of the inclined ships. 14 ASVe, CN, reg. 18, f. 108v (16 November 1518).

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in the sixteenth century the lagoon island of Poveglia became a favoured site for careening. After a vessel was discharged, it would remain with its ballast only,15 and all the sails and relative gear were removed. It was then keeled over and propped up with barrels and planks in the lagoon’s shallow waters. No less than fifty men were required to haul out or careen a large merchant vessel. To be sure, both operations were complicated and potentially dangerous for all involved. But there was also room for innovation in the methods adopted, and anyone who found easier and safer methods to careen a ship could obtain a ‘copyright’ for their ideas.16 Once tilted on its side, the parts close to the waterline vulnerable to the borers were exposed ready for a thorough examination.17 Mediterranean caulkers applied a generous coating of tar or pine resin used as antifouling on both the exterior and interior of the hull below the waterline; a process known as pegolare. Tars and pitches are black sticky substances obtained by the destructive distillation either of wood, bark, or tapped resin from soft and hardwood trees such as pine, spruce and birch. The treatment was applied after the old tar was scraped off and the surface was breamed (imbrunar) or smoked (spalmare, adj. spalmato). Heating up the beams helped to harden the surface, along with cleaning a hull’s bottom by burning barnacles, grass and other foul materials preparatory to recoating it with tar sulphur. This treatment had to be done with care, as there was always a danger of burning the entire ship, as indeed was the case with one Turkish galeazza in 1500.18

15

Shipowners delayed the consignment of salt from Cyprus and kept it as ballast until the operation was well advanced: ASVe, PSal, reg. 1, f. 148v (31 March 1561). 16 The privilege granted to Francesco Mezavolta for his invention of a new way to careen a ship got him into trouble with the guild of caulkers: ASVe, CN, reg. 22, f. 172r (22 December 1534). Zulian di Reliogi da Padoa invented a device to haul out or careen a ship using four men only: ASVe, CXDC, fil. 34, fasc. 200 (21 June 1543). 17 The verb abissàr in Venetian dialect or in its reflective form bissata described a ship that was already corroded by shipworms. In this context, the verb impalmar (i.e., spalmare) meant to apply an anti-shipworm treatment. For example, ‘La nave Zustignana, la qual era abissa di aqua’: Sanuto, I diarii, III, 921 (1501); ‘Non ha seo per impalmare le galee’: ibid., X, 218 (1510); ‘La qual galea era nova, ma era un poco bissata nel porto di Alexandria et feva aqua’: ibid., XL, 31 (1525); ‘Essa nave getava l’aqua cum 4 trombe … ma non e dato compida carena, solum fin do aque’: Dolfin, Annalium Venetorum, p. 52 (1500); ‘Intramo entro lo Mandrachio per conzar le galee e impalmar’: Grassetto, Viaggio di Francesco Grassetto, p. 48 (1512); ‘Circha hore VI se siguro la nostra galea qual fu conza zeneral, et era molto abisata, et do impalmata di libre 1,800 di sevo [i.e., sego] in tuto’: ibid., p. 50. 18 Sanuto, I diarii, p. 183 (10 March 1500).

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Life-Expectancy Estimates

The question of the lifespan of Mediterranean ships occupied scholars dealing with medieval and early modern shipping in different countries. Significantly in many cases, figures suggested in this respect seem to be based on a general impression, substantiated by a number of examples, rather than on any accurate and valid calculation.19 In the case of Venice, the average lifespan of round ships was estimated at about ten years, and could reach up to thirteen in times of peace.20 Considering several external factors that shortened ships’ lifespans, the average dropped to less than six years.21 Elsewhere a range of five to ten years was suggested.22 2.1 Tragic Endings Irrespective of difficult years in terms of weather or violence at sea, throughout this period shipwrecks and marauding were chronic problems, and one or two losses per year were to be expected. A case in point is that of the Venetian nobleman Tommaso Donado q. Nicolò, who lost five of his sons at sea on various ships and galleys.23 Such losses were compounded by the silting of the channels leading into Venice’s harbours, which affected the round ships in 19

The typical life of a warship in the Classical Period was estimated 20 years: Casson, Ships and Seamanship, p. 90; Morrison et al., Greek Oared Ships, p. 280. This figure seems too high, even if we consider that warships spent much time out of the water while not in commission. Federico Melis describes the itinerary of a 750-ton Genoese ship that operated between 1394 and 1407 before it ran aground in Bruges. During a period of thirteen years it completed fifteen commercial voyages to Bruges, occasionally via Southampton. A ship from Savona remained afloat along the same lines seventeen years with twelve commercial voyages: ‘La situazione della marina mercantile’, p. 114. Jorjo Tadić established a far longer lifespan for RaguSan ships, sometimes marking up twenty-six or twenty-eight years: ‘Le port de Raguse’, p. 102; idem, Ragusa e il suo porto, p. 246. Stjepan Vekari has suggested an average life expectancy of eight years for RaguSan ships built at the end of the sixteenth century: Dubrovačka trgovačka flota 1599 godine, pp. 427–31. An average lifespan of ten years was estimated elsewhere: Nistri-Lischi, Livorno and Pisa, p. 190. 20 For maintaining a fleet of thirty-seven to forty-two round ships, Venice had to build between 3.7 and 4.2 ships a year: Romano, ‘La marine marchande vénitienne’, p. 41. Frederic C. Lane argues that frequent shipwrecks forced the government to reach a rate of construction that oscillated between 2.5 and 3.4 ships a year, one less than the former estimation. Merchant galleys had a little longer lifespan of around thirteen years: Navires et constructeurs, p. 259, appendix V. The contemporary master-shipwright Baldassarre Drachio estimated a lifespan of eight or nine operable years for the galleys: Lazzarini, ‘Boschi, legnami, costruzioni navali’, I, p. 117. 21 Hocquet, Voiliers et commerce, pp. 582–83; idem, Denaro, navi e mercanti a Venezia, p. 142. 22 Luzzatto, ‘Per la storia delle costruzioni navali’, p. 37. 23 ASVe, ST, reg. 18, f. 186r (22 October 1514).

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particular. Despite tremendous efforts invested in ensuring safe navigation in and around the port, Venice’s perilous access ultimately proved to be the biggest threat to its own round ships. The islands in Dalmatia, the coast of Apulia and the port of Alexandria were also decorated with the wrecks of San Marco. The southwestern coastline of Cyprus is littered with the wrecks of vessels returning from the Levant. The wretched crews attempted to round this cape to continue north-westward, but were pushed back by the prevailing NW winds, accompanied by rough seas. Indeed, this stretch of sea merits the name coined by contemporary seafarers as the ‘true breakwater of the eastern Mediterranean’.24 These were the impressions of Leonardo da Vinci, who visited Cyprus in the late fifteenth century:25 Alas! How many ships have foundered there! How many vessels have been broken upon these rocks! Here might be seen an innumerable host of ships: some broken in pieces and half-buried in sand; here is visible the poop of one, and there a prow; here a keel and there a rib; and it seems like a day of judgement when there shall be a resurrection of dead ships, so great is the mass that covers the whole northern shore. There the northern winds resounding make strange and fearful noises. A considerable number of ships wrecked in an early stage of their ‘life’, between one and four years. Examples include the new 2,000-botti ship of Angelo di Alvise that ran aground sopraporto in January 1494;26 the Tiepola (Foscara) of 2,500 botti that sank on its maiden voyage in the Bay of Biscay in early 1497;27 the Priula of more than 1,000 botti that was marooned on the sandbanks outside Venice’s port on January 1511, returning from a third voyage fully loaded;28 the 500 botti ship of Agostino Gritti q. Zuane & co. built in Curzola and sank in Istria on the way back from its maiden voyage in January 1519;29 the new ship of Gasparo Malipiero that was similarly stranded off do castelli in 1521;30 the 900-botti ship of Contarini-Dandolo that was built in Curzola and captured by the Ottomans on its maiden voyage in 1537;31 the Negrona di Cipro of 800 botti 24 25 26 27 28

Manzano Martin, Íñigo de Loyola, p. 245. Da Vinci, The Notebooks of Leonardo da Vinci, p. 371. Malipiero, Annali veneti, p. 627 (18 January 1493). Sanuto, I diarii, I, 668–69, 684, 722, 786–87 (June–August 1497). ASVe, CXDC, fil. 13, fasc. 57 (January 1511); MCC, PD, bus. 668/15 (13 July 1508); Sanuto, I diarii, XI, 716 (January 1511). 29 Sanuto, I diarii, XXVI, 403 (31 January 1519). 30 Ibid., XXX, 471 (3 July 1521). 31 ASVe, CXDC, fil. 31, fasc. 50 (31 March 1542, ref. to 1537).

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was operative for three and a half years before it was burnt out in 1524;32 the Veniera e Corsa shipwrecked after four years in 1542.33 Similarly, the brothers Lion lost two of their ships in a brief span of time: the first was destroyed by the Turks off Cyprus on the return from its fifth voyage in 1545, and the second on its third voyage in the Atlantic Ocean in 1547.34 Other fleets were not immune to the effects of adverse weather. In 1495, 350 local ships were lost along the coasts of Brittany. In this year two of the Flanders galleys shipwrecked in the Bay of Biscay; the crew of the third galley jettisoned part of the cargo and eventually completed the voyage. Three Venetian round ships sank in 1496, concurrently the fleet of Genoa lost four big ships, the armed Salvega of 3,000–4,000 botti off Livorno, the Cattanea of 2,500 botti in Genoa, a third near Valencia, and the fourth off Sluys, Holland. Returning from its campaign in Italy, the French fleet was likewise severely hit by adverse weather.35 The risk of shipwreck was invariably weighed up in the insurance rates, however, and such mishaps permeated every aspect of the organization of the shipping enterprise. One might ask then, what was the ‘normal’ life expectancy of vessels that did not encounter such adversity? 2.2 Honourable Lifespans Out of a total of 21 ships whose itinerary has been reconstructed (Appendix C), only 11 survived longer than ten years. For instance, the Nicolosa, operated for about 13 years; the Cornera grossa was launched in 1531 and sailed the seas for over 11 and a half years until 1542, carrying out between 11 and 14 commercial voyages; the Cornera e Duoda grossa was active in the same period for about 11 years conducted between 14 and 16 commercial voyages; another Cornera (also called La Trinità) was active for 12 and a half years and completed between 15 and 21 commercial voyages; the Gritta, built in late 1527 and active for 12 and a half years until 1540 completed between 12 and 15 commercial voyages; the Vianuola was active between 1531 and 1542 with a lifespan of at least 11 years and between 11 and 17 commercial voyages; the Maurocena e Ragazona was launched in 1526 and sailed for nearly 13 years (until 1538), completing between 14 and 21 commercial voyages; the Canala built in 1530 spent 14 years in the high seas and was probably decommissioned in 1544 after concluding between 17 and 21 commercial voyages.

32 33 34 35

Sanuto, I diarii, XXXVI, 553, 555 (28–29 August 1524). Appendix C., n.16. ASVe, CXDC, fil. 45, fasc. 65 (28 April 1548). Sanuto, I diarii, I, 336, 382; Priuli, I diarii, I, p. 60; Malipiero, Annali veneti, p. 633.

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The second category though includes ships with a life expectancy of 7 to 8 years. Examples include the Nana, which was active at least from 1528 and until February 1535, with a lifespan of about 7 years and three months and nine to 13 voyages; similarly, the Luna active between 1536 and 1544 with approximately the same lifespan of 7 years and three months and 8 to 13 commercial voyages; the Malipiera that sailed between 1536 and 1545 with a lifespan of 9 years and three months. It went through major repairs at least twice and completed between 12 and 15 commercial voyages. The Marcella was active for about seven years. Despite such documentation, it is impossible to reach a valid figure representing an average lifespan of commercial fleets during the period under consideration. Any evaluation of the sort must be based on an arithmetic calculation rather than general impression. This is however unfeasible, as the number of vessels for which both the launch date and the date of ‘death’ is provided is too limited to be used as a base for such an assessment. Likewise, we lack any consistent information on other specifications, primarily the sources of timber that were used. Moreover, dealing with the question of an average lifespan does not add very much to a better acquaintance of the milieu of maritime trade. A more useful evaluation would be to consider the following four categories of lifespan in economic terms. Thus, by sixteenth-century observers 11 to 13 years were presumably considered to be a ripe old age for a seafaring vessel. Most round ships were decommissioned or destroyed in tragic circumstances before they reached the age of ten. Therefore, it seems that 8 to 10 years was considered a respectable lifespan; 6 to 7 years was short, but not uncommon; while any ship that failed to make it to the age of 5 was a waste. This balance must have been very clear to anyone in the treacherous business of shipping. Operators had to assume that their ship was unlikely to last longer than 7 years, even if it was eventually fortunate enough to stay afloat for longer. 3

The Economic Viability of Round Ships

3.1 Life-Cycles The prospects of enjoying revenues from the investment in shipbuilding and the operation of a ship did not simply depend on a ship’s lifespan, but also on the number of voyages it was able to carry out successfully in economic terms. Let us therefore consider the number of voyages a ship undertook before it was dismantled and cannibalized for whatever could be salvaged for further use, which presumably meant many of the elements above the waterline.

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The reconstructed itinerary of several dozen Venetian ships confirms that although technically, one year was enough for the ships to complete two voyages to the Levant, for numerous reasons they did not manage to maintain such a rhythm. The multiple setbacks included unexpected delays in ports, cargo logistics, the frequent detainment by port officials, and not least the necessary seasonal repairs and maintenance. The voyage westwards out of the Mediterranean was obviously longer, and the round trip was rarely if ever completed in less than one year. The variables that affected the duration of the voyage did not change much throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth century.36 The relatively short life-expectancy of ships and the extended duration of their voyages meant that, for them to be remunerative, the investment in shipbuilding and refitting had to yield positive results within a relatively short term. This hypothesis is corroborated by the terms for reimbursement of state loans for shipbuilding in the form of salt transports around mid-sixteenth century. There seems to have been a strong correlation between the period of reimbursement and the itinerary of these ships. In 1535 the Senate appears to have calculated that loans could safely be repaid in their entirety after eight commercial voyages to Cyprus, assuming ships returned with a full cargo of salt (in the hold).37 Their idea seems to have been that these eight voyages would be carried out in a span of four years, whereas in practice it took five to six years. When the ‘booster’ loans were reinstated in 1549, one of the Senate’s principal concerns was the period of reimbursement. As can be imagined, shipowners did not hurry to pay their debts in time. However, the problem of non-payment was compounded by the fact that, in practice, ships did not always sail to Cyprus – nor did they always carry salt in their hold on the return voyage. Consequently, the Senate altered the terms of repayment and included other destinations. So, instead of counting the viaggi as such, the period for reimbursement was set to seven years. The sum was paid in equal instalments every eight months, either by deduction from the freightage for salt or in cash, regardless of the duration of the voyage and even irrespective of the condition of the vessel concerned.38

36

It took a ship seven to eight months on average to complete a standard round trip to the Levant, given different sorts of setbacks. This assertion is however based on a sequence of voyages and not on the full itinerary of a ship: Hocquet, Production et monopole, pp. 160– 68; idem, Venise et le monopole du sel, I, pp. 334–39. 37 ASVe, SM, reg. 23, f. 108r (4 June 1535). 38 Ibid., reg. 30, f. 65r (4 April 1549).

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3.2 When Breaking Ships Started to Make Sense Small as it was, the worm imposed a serious impediment to the natural development of seafaring economies and naval powers. Besides the borer, the challenge lay in reducing the fallout from the many natural and manmade perils, so as to ensure a ship’s continuous activity for seven to eight years. Since many ships failed to do so, governments had to regularly offer loans to galvanize the construction of new vessels. But the Venetian authorities were apparently more preoccupied with encouraging the private sector to build new ships than with finding solutions to prolong the lifespan of the existing ones. How to explain this preference? It is fair to say that the construction of new ships and the scrapping of existing ones created jobs for a wide range of artisans, meaning that Venice encouraged ship demolition to bring the balance needed between supply and demand. This in order to keep its economy running, and to safeguard the livelihood of artisans, who moreover had a strategic role to play in times of war.39 In a way, the idea behind the industrial stimulation plan introduced in 1534/5 was to create a sort of ‘production line’ of short-lived, functional (and certainly unpretentious) merchantmen with an average capacity of 500–600 botti that would be predominantly employed in commerce with the Near East. The new type of carrier was not designed to venture beyond the Pillars of Hercules (Straits of Gibraltar), nor to last more than seven or eight years before being sent to the breakers. The downside of this investment was that the strictly functional structure of such vessels significantly reduced their usefulness in battle situations. Although it only really gathered momentum after 1544, the finance scheme proved remarkably successful, however, since it suited the actual circumstances. In the years that followed, the loans guaranteed the continuity and the increase of the gross tonnage of Venice’s merchant marine, a development that was only interrupted by the loss of Cyprus in 1571. 4

Costs of Construction, and the Depreciation of Value of Wooden Vessels

Given a vessel’s short lifespan, there was not much point investing more than the minimum required to keep it operating along the customary routes to the Levant. The preference of functional low-cost carriers is already apparent in 1460s, which also accounts for the phenomenal success of the marani. But by 1550 most of the vessels built with government loans were of this kind. None of 39 Ibid., pp. 37–51; Lane, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 165–78.

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the industrial incentive-based programmes specify what quota of the overall expenditure they were intended to cover. It has nonetheless been suggested that in the sixteenth century the loans aimed to cover around 15% of the total expenditure, the purpose being to give Venice’s shipyards a competitive edge over other shipbuilding centres around the Mediterranean. How much did it cost to build a ship in Venice, then? A tentative answer can be found in Appendix D, which includes incidental comments on the costs of construction and the value of ships collected from various contemporary sources. Given the considerable gaps in the available data, the assessment that follows involves a generous amount of guesswork. The attempt to estimate the annual depreciation of value is even less transparent, since any calculation is subject to the age of the ship and a host of other factors, such as marine insurance, immediate need for repairs and replacements, and so forth.40 However, in the absence of any better evidence, these figures give a general idea of the expenditures. By way of example, the legal documents of a dispute between Marco Zustinian and Andrea Gritti (the future doge) contains a price list of a new 400-botti ship purchased in 1498 from Zuane dal Cortivo, citizen of Venice. The overall expenditure of 3,245 ducats was divided accordingly: 1,575 ducats for the vessel being already built, tarred and launched; 500 ducats for used rigging taken from one of Cortivo’s earlier vessels; 920 ducats for assorted ropes and mooring lines; and 250 ducats to complete and supply the ship. The costs of commissioning the ship for the voyage (spazado) were extra. Around the same time, the cost of building and arming a war barza of 800 and 900 botti was estimated at 16,000 ducats. Still in the same year, the ship Marcella of about 1,300 botti, aged four and in need of thorough repairs, was valued at 3,163 ducats. In 1506 the bailo of Constantinople requisitioned the 500-botti round ship Malipiera to appease the Ottoman Bostanji-bashi (the chief of the imperial guards). The owners were reimbursed 2,300 ducats for their ship and claimed additional loss of 650 ducats for the spazado. According to his own testimony, the 700-botti ship of Gasparo Malipiero cost him 6,000 ducats to build in 1521. In 1534 the new Michiela of 650 to 700 botti built in Crete was valued at 5,000 ducats. In 1541 the new ship of 900 botti owned by the Contarini-Dandolo cost them about 12,000 ducats to build and send to Cyprus, a figure supported by the sariati of the ship’s clerk. The applicants petitioned for a suspension on their repayments of the government loan of 1,748 ducats. In 1550, the overall expenditure for building in Venice and contracting the 500-botti Santa Maria 40

A figure between 8 to 15% per year has been suggested: Hocquet, Denaro, navi e mercanti, p. 147.

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di Gracia was around 5,700 ducats. The figure comprises the price of the artillery (bronze and iron) and supplies for the maiden voyage to Constantinople (e.g., anchors, sails, ropes and rigging, boats, provisions, and the salaries to the crews up to that point). Between 1553 and 1555, the cost of building a 1,100-botti ship by Domenico BresSan at a shipyard in San Domenico was estimated 12,000 ducats, which were partly covered by the government loan of 1,800 ducats. Lastly, an itemized list of the costs of building and commissioning an armed 1,200-botti galleon in 1560 totalled 32,822 ducats, or rather 15,616 ducats after the deduction of expenditures on arms and artillery. The latter represents the costs of construction of a man-o-war or a high-grade merchantman. 4.1 The Rising Costs of Construction This data suggests that the total outlay in Venice for building and fitting a standard merchantman of 240-ton (400 botti) was about 3,000 ducats, a value that depreciated by several hundreds with age. A significant augmentation in the price (in about one-third) can be observed around the mid-sixteenth century. Smaller carriers of 150–300 botti fared better in this respect. The expenditures fluctuated between 600 and 900 ducats, subject to the equipment on the ship. As the ship’s size increased, the rise in price was more pronounced. Up until the mid-1530s it was still possible to build in Venice a round ship of 700 botti for about 6,000 ducats, and for 5,000 in the colonies. In the 1550s this sum barely sufficed to build a 500-botti ship. At that time, building and accoutring a ship of 900 to 1,000 botti was estimated at 12,000 ducats. Still, in the 1560s some 16,000 ducats were required to build and equip ships of this category.41 What seems to aggravate the problem was the fact that their voluminous carcass could not be easily repaired, and thus the vessel’s value dropped sharply with age. A petition tendered by Piero Solto for a loan to build a ship of 800 botti dated 28 December 1586 includes an itemized list of the expenditures. It shows that in the space of a few decades the costs of construction more than doubled, from 15–16,000 (presumably in the 1560s) to 35–36,000 ducats.42 Frederic C. Lane attributes the decline in shipping to the depletion of the sources of timber for shipbuilding on the terraferma and in Istria.43 To be sure, matters were complicated when in 1559 the dwindling public forests were suddenly closed 41 The estimated costs of building and arming a light galley was 6,000 ducats in 1571 and between 8,000 to 10,000 ducats at the end of the century. Timber and workforce made up for nearly half of the outlays: Lazzarini, ‘Boschi, legnami, costruzioni navali’, I, p. 161. 42 Hocquet, Voiliers et commerce, p. 574; idem, Venise et le monopole, I, pp. 605–6; Lane, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 262–63; Romano, ‘La marine marchande vénitienne’, pp. 61–68. 43 Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, pp. 40–44.

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to shipbuilding, and oak-related expenses further augmented. Still, the depletion of oak concerned a specific type that proved more suitable for the curved frames of the skeleton. Restrictions on the harvest of this type of oak applied mainly in plains and some hilly areas, while the cutting of other types of oak was less regulated.44 Besides, investors and owners were offered ever-larger bounties for ship construction, and the policies concerning the naturalization of foreign ships were not slacken before 1590, after the offer of bounties had failed to revive Venetian shipbuilding to its former level. In fact, the years 1545– 71 are considered a period of relative revival for Venice’s shipping sector. Before the ban went into effect some 25,000 to 30,000 oaks were harvested per year for naval construction alone. Moreover, an opinion that has been put forward to the Senate in 1547 attests that the significant increase in the costs of construction was out of proportion to timber-related outlays.45 Arguably, the general inflation that the Venetian economy experienced in those years was more responsible for this upsurge. Lane’s thesis does not tally also with the fact that the shipping economy experienced a collapse in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Cyprus in 1571; the significance of this historical event to the crisis in shipping has little to do with the gradual depletion of oaks and larch trees. The following chapters suggest a different guiding principle that sees the slump in Levantine freights as the major cause for the crisis in shipping that followed. 44 Lazzarini, ‘Boschi, legnami, costruzioni navali’, I, p. 119; ibid., II, pp. 92–94. 45 ASVe, SM, fil. 3, 165 (14 January 1547).

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Can We Assess Profitability? 1

The Services Provided by the Shipping Industry

Traditionally, the shipping industry is divided into two main sectors (markets): the bulk shipping sector, engaged mainly in the transportation of raw materials such as iron ore, marble, timber, ash, salt, cereals, and liquids; and the liner shipping sector, involved in the transportation of final and semi-final products such as textiles, spices, dyestuff, bullion, and a miscellany of ready manufactured products. From a market structure point of view, the two sectors are as different as they could be. Bulk shipping uses large and less sophisticated ships to transport goods in bulk on a contract basis, which expired upon the completion of the voyage. Conversely, liner shipping is geared to the provision of regular services between specified ports, at regular intervals, according to timetables and prices advertised well in advance. The service is in principle open to everyone with cargo to shift between the listed ports, and ready for transit by their sailing date. In Venice, the provision of such a service (known by the term mude or mudae) was usually identified with the merchant galleys. Round ships were dry-bulk carriers by default, but were occasionally employed in liner shipping, albeit under stringent conditions, at least from the thirteenth century onward.1 The regulated voyages, which employed galleys and round ships, required larger and more complex infrastructures in terms of recruitment, security, equipment, cargo handling, and not least agencies ashore. Understandably, the government transport policies (e.g., securing convoys, establishing routes and schedules, etc.) played a vital role in the regulation of the mude voyages.2 1.1 The Charter Contract One of the arrangements offered by a transport enterprise was to charter the vessel for the whole voyage or one leg, in return for freights. The contract ended once the ship reached its destination and the cargo was unloaded. 1 Specialized liner services reserved to the round ships were known as the mude of cotton or chestnuts. Another service was known as nave a rata, in which a ship was chartered for a fixed price to join the convoy of galleys: Sacerdoti, ‘Note sulle galere’, p. 102. 2 Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, pp. 23–27; idem, ‘Fleets and Fairs’, pp. 128–41; idem, ‘Venetian Merchant Galleys’, pp. 194–200; Masson, ‘Observations sur la navigation libre’, pp. 413, 416; Judde De Larivière, Naviguer, commercer, gouverner, pp. 13–52.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004398177_012

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Before departure, the operators guaranteed that the ship complied with the safety requirements and provided enough crew, and that it would follow the itinerary specified by the charterer in a timely manner. The contract established the stalia, namely, the agreed time for the loading and unloading, as well as the liability of the charterer to remunerate the charting party for the soprastalia, meaning any extra time or delays incurred. The customary rates varied between 1 to 2 ducats per day for every 100 botti. Other articles in the contract protected both sides against unforeseen complications with the cargo, or its availability. It was customary for example to charge extra for instances in which ships were required to make several stops. In some cases the charterer received exclusive rights on the type of cargo he was shipping. The charter contracts were devised to leave the operators with considerable freedom concerning the mode of loading, but nevertheless considered the captain answerable if the storage place proved insufficient to house the entire cargo he was contracted to carry.3 Other articles entrusted the loading to a certified deputy, homo di consilio or a sopracargo, who was appointed by and at the expense of the leasing party. Although not always explicitly stated, the custom was that the port duties were disbursed by the chartering party, and the charterers were liable for any duty or fees imposed on their merchandise. Finally, the ratios were customarily expressed as freighting equivalents, and accepted as stable.4 Other particularities concerning the charter contract are discussed in the context of the following examples: on 26 August 1550 Zaneto da Lustiza, captain of a marciliana of 1,200 stara, chartered the vessel to a merchant for a voyage to Valona. The captain and a crew of five were required to depart from port on a predetermined date and sail directly to Valona. The charterer was supposed to be present already in Valona before arrival and have provided for the availability of the wheat. The rate was set at 14 ducats per 100 stara, and the stalia at a maximum of twenty-five working days. In case the charterer failed to provide the wheat within this timeframe, the captain was free to return to Venice and still receive the same freightage for every 100 stara that was lacking. The captain reserved the option to remain in port over twenty-five days at the request of the charterer, in return for 2 ducats per day.5 We can therefore estimate that the potential profit from freightage amounted to 168 ducats for the inbound voyage − 14 ducats × 1,200 stara/100. Although the ship most likely carried merchandise on the outbound voyage from Venice, this information is not specified in the contract. 3 ASVe, NA, bus. 10639, fasc. 3, ff. 27r–v (16 July 1544). 4 Dotson, ‘A Problem of Cotton and Lead’, pp. 59–60. 5 ASVe, NA, bus. 10646, ff. 557v–58r (26 August 1550).

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In another contract of 8 March 1547, Antonio di Andrea da Lepanto chartered the marciliana of Vielmo da San Rocho. The vessel crewed by seven able men was expected to depart from Venice five months later and sail directly to Lepanto. The chartering party supplied the barrels and guaranteed for their quality. Antonio or his agents would load 35 anfore (a local measurement equal to 43 mistati) of wine type ‘di Romania’ for 17 lire per anfora; the vessel was supposed to return directly to Venice. The stalia at Lepanto was set at twenty days, starting from the day of arrival, and that in Venice at twenty additional days commencing after the wine was assessed by the authorities; additional delays would be charged 2 ducats (soprastalia);6 in this case the freightage totalled 595 lire, about 96 ducats. A similar contract 16 July 1544 established a rate of 18 lire per anfora for a total of 60 anfore of wine that would be shipped from Lepanto. The captain had to guarantee delivery of the cargo before 25 September, or be charged 1 1/2 ducats for each additional day. Moreover, he was liable for any damages incurred to the wine during the voyage, and for any cargo left in Lepanto. To prevent unnecessary competition, the captain and crew were prohibited from loading wine or any other merchandise on board until the entire cargo was loaded. The stalia in Venice was set at fifteen days, commencing after the wine had been assessed by the officials. Any delay would be charged with a soprastalia of 1 ducat per day. The ship would transport 1 anfora of wine and 1 barilla free of freightage.7 The estimated freightage revenues for the return voyage were therefore 1,080 lire, amounting to around 174 ducats. The mutual distrust that came with such arrangements is manifested in the following examples: in July 1482, the Venetian merchant Marco Bembo chartered the entire ship of Francesco Bon for 150 ducats that were paid in advance. He then instructed his agent in Crete that as soon as the ship arrived to port he should send one of his men on board to make sure that the captain respected the contract and did not load merchandise on behalf of others.8 In the following case a detour from the well-established routes was considered with caution by the chartering party: in June 1544 a Cypriot ship of 300 botti owned by Alvise Filaretto was chartered by two merchants; the intention was to set sail from Venice directly to Durazzo to load cargo and ship it to Candia in return for 80 ducats (the sum was indicated in Cretan unit of account). Durazzo was perhaps not a habitual port of call for the Cypriot ship, and fearing delays the chartering party set the soprastalia penalty at 5 ducats per day, and the 6 ASVe, NA, bus. 10642, ff. 47v–48r (8 March 1547). 7 Ibid., bus. 10639, fasc. 3, ff. 27r–v (16 July 1544). 8 ASVe, MCart, bus. 29, 6 (16 July 1482).

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condition to leave port after 5 days, and be entitled to the integral freightage. Apart from the alboraggio tax, whatever duties and expenses were incurred in Durazzo would be on the head of the charterer.9 1.2 The Dependency of Shipping on Freights It is often argued that Venetian legislation and practice made no clear legal or institutional distinction between the ownership of a vessel and participation in maritime joint-ventures. Owners took a direct interest in the commercial venture of their ship and acted both as parcenevoli and merchants.10 While not dismissing this view entirely, I contend that the operators of round ships used only part of the vessel’s storage space for their own merchandise, and the rest served for reaping freightage. In truth, it was very unusual for a private enterprise in Venice to muster enough capital and cargo to charter a big round ship in toto, unless there was some direct backing from the State in the form of loans or bounties. Private merchants or joint-ventures normally shipped their goods on board the round ships, which provided a fairly regular liner service plying wellestablished routes. In such a case, the freightage was paid in cash and the goods were loaded in return for a bill of lading (polizza di carico), without hiring any space in a ship. A good example is the ship Veniera captained by Pasqual Vidal, wrecked off Saline in Cyprus in 1499; all its cargo, as reflected in the surviving cargo lists, was of this kind.11 Another option for merchants was to charter smaller vessels, by which they could guarantee full control over the itinerary. Other contractual arrangements included joint-ventures whereby merchants leased a compartment in a round ship, or chartered it for a particular leg or part of its scheduled itinerary, as illustrated by the following case: on 22 November 1482 Marco Bembo dispatched an urgent message to his agent in Candia asking to help him find freights for his ship on the outbound voyage to Constantinople: At present I send my ship to Constantinople. I want it to load wheat on the return voyage to this place [Venice] … This ship will need freights for Constantinople, so I ask you to do anything within your power to charter it to others. Should you not manage to do so, start by loading 50 to 9 ASVe, NA, bus. 10639, fasc. 2, ff. 43v–44r (18 June 1544). For a similar arrangement: ibid., fasc. 3, ff. 15r–v (4 July 1544). 10 Tucci, ‘Venetian Ship-Owners’, p. 278; idem, ‘Una nave veneziana’, pp. 724–25; and in other works: Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, pp. 138–40; Pagratis, ‘Organization and management’, pp. 631–32, 642, 648. 11 Arbel, ‘Attraverso il Mediterraneo nel 1499’, pp. 103–15.

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60 butts of wine on our behalf to get things underway, so that others would see reason to load their own.12 Indeed, the Bemba lacked freights on the outward voyage to Constantinople and so, suspecting it would be difficult to find a client disposed to charter the entire hold, Bembo was willing to charter only a part to other merchants, and use his own stocks to fill the rest for a total of 50 to 60 barrels. The articulation of the charter contract distinguished between booking the entire ship, or merely a part of it – noliza la nave vs. noliza sopra (in su) la nave. In the former case, the contract stated explicitly that the entire storage space both above and below decks was reserved and excluded only the personal portada of the captain and crew. In the latter case, the shippers chartered only part of the ship, which left them less control over the vessel’s itinerary. Still, the nature of such a deal required a contract, and could not suffice with an ordinary bill of lading. In another contract dated 4 July 1486, Andrea and Francesco Bragadin chartered a quota of storage space for 350 botti of olive oil – or other merchandise with an equivalent freight value – on the ship Foscara for a voyage to Apulia and Alexandria, from which the chartering party expected a potential revenue of 437 1/2 ducats. This figure represents neither the entire cargo of the ship, nor the total income from freightage.13 An agreement dated 1 August 1482, sheds more light on this modus operandi. In this instance Salvador Ulises loaded merchandise worth 1,500 ducats on Alvise Basegio’s ship for a voyage to Valencia in Spain. The said merchant did not charter the entire ship, yet the scale of his deal required a proper contract to certify the value of the received goods and other particularities regarding the vessel’s loading.14 What emerges is that the business model of a round ship was clearly multifaceted. In its basic form, these ships were deployed as freight carriers, and revenues derived from freightage. But occasionally and concurrently they were chartered, in part or in full, to individual merchants and joint-ventures in which the owners also played their share. The likelihood that a ship would 12 ASVe, MCart, bus. 29, 25 (22 November 1482). 13 The contract set the freight equivalent of 1 botte of oil to 1,200 libre grosso in case other merchandise would be loaded instead: ASVe, PSM, Misti, bus. 41, fasc. IX [4 July 1486]. Around the same time, the ship’s owner Michele Foscari q. Felippo signed a deal for the purchase of 300 miera of oil that awaited transhipment to the Marche region, suggesting that the Foscara may well have carried other merchandise in the unchartered space between decks: ibid., [18 June 1486]. The total capacity of the Foscara was of over 400 botti and possibly 600: Malipiero, Annali veneti, pp. 142–43 (3 June 1493), 623 (21 June 1488). 14 ASVe, PSM, Misti, bus. 116, fasc. X [1 August 1482].

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remain idle for days awaiting possible freights was one of the shipowners’ worst nightmares. The high operating costs and the longer loading procedures for such large vessels required careful planning in advance; one of the main responsibilities of the commercial agents located in the ports visited by Venice’s ships was to guarantee that a fair quota of goods were ready for shipment upon the vessel’s arrival. Unless they had some assurance that the markets would prove sturdy, shipowners hesitated to send their ship without first securing a charter for the return voyage. In times of political upheaval and unstable markets, such reassurance was even more important. The chartering of the hold or parts of the hold to the State for transporting bulky commodities to some extent ensured the economic viability of the return voyage. After such shipments were settled, shipowners were more willing to form joint-ventures with their commercial partners and accept freights for the outbound voyage, then, when the deals were signed and the cargo loaded, the ship was finally ready to set sail. 1.3 Venice’s Liner Services: The mude of Galleys and Ships The most lucrative service provided by the Venetian shipping enterprise was the mude of galleys and ships, a term that was used to describe the time and duration of loading in the Levant, but was equally applicable to the carriers themselves. This type of service employed the largest sea-going commercial vessels to be found at the time, namely round ships with multiple decks and large holds, or state-built merchant galleys.15 These carriers were engaged along well-established routes largely determined by the State. The ports of call at either end were limited to relatively few hub ports or load centres, from where this pooled merchandise was forwarded by means of smaller vessels to regional and local ports.16 The standard cargo on board the mude carriers was transported in various types of container, such as pallets, boxes, barrels, and crates, or stowed in small pre-packaged consignments (parcels), and organized in batches according to their destination. A typical cargo probably represented the stakes of up to a hundred investors who had placed varying sums in the hands of the operators, or indeed in the hands of the seamen merchants and

15 16

Lane, ‘Fleets and Fairs’, pp. 650–63; idem, ‘Venetian Merchant Galleys’, p. 181. In 1522, for example, there were no more than forty pilgrims that searched for a passage to Jaffa. Hence, no shipowner was ready to take them further than Cyprus, Beirut, or Tripoli. The reason was that the leg to Jaffa was not remunerative enough. As a result, the pilgrims chartered a smaller vessel, the marano of Matteo di Priuli, and set sail without adequate security: Sanuto, I diarii, XXXIII, 311, 373 (18, 20 June 1522).

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dozens of other travelling merchants, colonial officials, and passengers that embarked on these ships.17 The mude were an attempt to regulate and rationalize sailing schedules and ports of call, and by that to reduce the overall transport costs. Back in those days the loading procedure was a very labour-intensive process, and in many cases ships spent most of their time in port, waiting to load or discharge their cargoes. Subject to many variables, these lengthy delays in ports made trade movements erratic and unpredictable, and ultimately obliged all the manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers involved to keep large stocks of whatever cargo they needed shifting. Consequently, the mounting costs for warehousing and carrying (capital) were added to the outlay for transport, making final goods more expensive, and consequently jeopardizing international trade and economic development. In order to honour its announced time schedule, a muda carrier had to leave port at a pre-established date irrespective of whether it was fully loaded or not. The operating costs therefore no longer depended on the amount of cargo carried, and predictably, some vessels were forced to leave port before reaching their full capacity. The operators would often linger in the hope of some last-minute customer with extra cargo at an attractive price, but this practice risked compromising the voyage altogether, pushing their cargo prices down so low they barely covered their outlay costs. This is why any loading activity after the muda had weighed anchor was considered a serious offence, and the State rewarded anyone who delivered information on offending captains and officers. A Senate enactment of 1492 promised any informant in this respect various types of promotion: nochieri would be raised to the status of comiti on galleys for two years without need of election; paroni would serve on the merchant galleys for four years; and simple mariners would be appointed balestrieri for five years; the informants were also entitled to a share in the prize, proportional to the value of the cargo.18 The recourse to some sort of protectionism was nigh inevitable to keep such a highly expensive liner service up and running; add the daily risks of navigation, rampant piracy, and the political instability that plagued all trade with the Levant.19 The records of the Collegio and the Senate confirm that these regular mude of round ships attracted plenty of attention, second only to that of the galleys. At the early stage certain mude were more exactingly organized 17 Lane, ‘Cotton, Cargoes, and Regulations’, pp. 253–62; Dotson, ‘A Problem of Cotton and Lead’, pp. 52–62. 18 ASVe, SM, reg. 13, ff. 79r (6 February 1492), 91v (27 July 1492). 19 Musgrave, ‘The Economics of Uncertainty’, pp. 13–14.

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than others, what was termed ‘licence voyages’,20 but in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century the tendency was to reduce state intervention in the mude organization to the minimum. For example, the conditions set by the Senate for the muda of September 1479 determined only the date of departure and the duration of loading in Syria and Cyprus. News of a flotilla of Catalan corsairs menacing traffic in the Aegean Sea prompted the Senate to require the captains to enrol some extra balestrieri and sail in a convoy as far as Modon, where the local governor would instruct them how to proceed. Meanwhile, the armed fleets in Albania and Corfu were expected to ensure the safe passage of Venice’s ships in the Near East.21 Occasionally the State intervened also by setting minimum freight rates to limit price competition. Fearing another crisis in freightage, the city’s shipowners petitioned the Senate to curb competition and establish price-setting mechanism. As a result, the decree of 21 October 1502 introduced a freighting equivalent system with 22 standard categories representing the minimum freight rates on merchandise that were specifically relevant to the operators of the muda liner service to the Levant.22 The minimum rates for merchandise loaded on the outward voyage were set in the following way: Gold and silver for the value of 100 ducats Corals, amber, worked leather products, for a value of 100 ducat Cloth per balla, i.e., alti PZ 10, bassi PZ 20 Dried sardines, per balla Hemp cloth, per balla Tin, per miera Processed copper, per miera Copper ore, in coffe

20

21 22

D2 D2 D1 D1

gr 12 gr 18

gr 16

gr 12

Lane, ‘Venetian Merchant Galleys’, p. 184. One such example is the conditions set for the September muda of cogs to Syria in 1405: the convoy was limited to six ships. Candidates had to apply in advance, and those elected to present securities to be forfeited if they eventually would not sail. The cogs had to comply with stricter safety and security requirements that were specified in law. Participation was subject to an inspection performed by the consoli dei mercanti. The freight rates on cotton, cotton yarns, ash, alum, and other merchandise on the return voyage were anchored in law. The muda ships sailed in convoy and followed a relatively predetermined route: ASVe, SMist, reg. 47, ff. 7r–v (13 June 1405). E.g., ASVe, SM, reg. 11, ff. 40v–41r (11 August 1479); ibid., reg. 12, ff. 56r–57r (8 August 1485). It translates: ‘To enhance the building of new ships and encourage those currently afloat there is a need to regulate freightage and set the minimum rates for the benefit of the ships. The Senate hereby declares the minimum freight rates for the export and import of the following’: ibid., reg. 15, ff. 156v–57r (21 October 1502); Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, p. 31.

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Cinnabar, per miera Silver ore, per miera Lead, per miera Paper, per balla Soap, per miera Oil, per botte shipped to Alexandria

D1

gr 18 gr 18 gr 12 gr 6 gr 12 gr 12

There follow the lowest rates for cargoes loaded on the return voyage: Cotton from Syria and Cyprus, per miera Cotton threads, 1 ducat more per miera, as per custom Ash, per miera Camlet, woven fabrics and other textiles packed in colli minuti, per collo Sugar and other powders from Cyprus, in standard containers Woollens from Constantinople, Thessaloniki, heavy cloth blankets, per miera Acorns per mozzo, from territories between Santa Maura and Venice Acorns, from territories between Naples and Santa Maura

D4 D5 D1 D1

D5

gr 12

gr 18

gr 12 gr 18

It can be imagined that applying such mechanisms so blatantly to protect the interests of a shipping milieu or select coterie of interest groups provoked the ire of many shippers (cargo owners), who saw this kind of price-setting as an obstruction of free trade, to the detriment of the consumer. Protest they might, the efforts to cope with the dwindling earnings and poor financial returns in shipping to sustain the liner services in the last decades of their existence involved protectionism as well. 2

Sustaining a Liner Service against the Backdrop of Cargo Imbalance

In the age of ‘ventures’, the entire system of international trade was based on risk, on speculation and acquisition. The prevalence of unpredictability made for wide fluctuations in freight rates. There was rarely a ‘normal’ or ‘average’ year. For this reason, the charges for carrying a cargo were rarely known for a point-to-point trip only. Ship operators may well have used one highly

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profitable leg to subsidize a less profitable one.23 This system functioned as long as operators found cargoes to fill holds on return trips, even if those were of lesser value. But in the beginning of the sixteenth century, the shortage in freights on the return leg from the Mamluk Levant developed into a full-blown crisis that contributed to a significant imbalance between supply and demand in the shipping industry; this, in turn, necessitated state intervention to shore up the losses in a failed attempt to sustain liner services. In his life-long study of Levant trade, Elyahu Ashtor continued to defend his conviction of the ascendancy of Venice and the decline of oriental industries in the Levant in the early fifteenth century. In several detailed articles Ashtor describes the collapse in the textile, sugar, paper, and soap industries. Concurrently, Europe took the lead in industrial development in the late Middle Ages, which led to a considerable increase in the importation of industrial products into Moslem Levant.24 The dependency of the eastern market on Venetian imports in the last two decades of the Mamluk Sultanate (1495–1515) is borne out by various cargo lists of ships and galleys on their outbound voyage. They attest to well-established patterns of consumption of a wide selection of goods originating from Venice and the West.25 The challenge was finding enough heavy freights with which to balance the load on the return voyage to Europe. Apparently, there were less bulky cargoes trafficking in the westbound direction, and shipowners faced a risk that their ships would return with low utilization rate of its storages; a problem that is called cargo imbalance in shipping economy. Round ships therefore had 23 Lucassen & Unger, ‘Shipping, Productivity And Economic Growth’, pp. 7–8. 24 Ashtor argues that the increase in imports, and particularly of western textiles, at least partly address the problem of unfavourable trade balance with the Muslim Orient: Ashtor, ‘L’exportation de textiles occidentaux’, pp. 303–77; idem, ‘The Venetian Supremacy’, pp. 5–53; idem, ‘Levantine Sugar Industry’, pp. 91–132; idem, Levant Trade, pp. 200–16. An article written some fifty years ago by Roberto Sabatino Lopez is still regarded as the point of reference: ‘Il problema dei bilanci dei pagamenti’, pp. 431–51. Several estimates of the monetary imbalance: Luzzatto, Storia economica di Venezia, pp. 45–47; Ashtor, ‘Les métaux précieux’, pp. 41–42, 46, 50, 96; idem, Levant Trade, p. 477; Cahen, ‘Quelques mots sur le déclin commercial’, pp. 31–36; Tucci, ‘Le emissioni monetarie di Venezia’, pp. 275– 316; Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, pp. 287, 297–99; Setton, A History of the Crusades, V, pp. 446–51. On the shortage of liquidity in Italy during the fifteenth century: Heers, Gênes aux XVe siècle, pp. 73–96; Salvestrini, L’Italia alla fine del medioevo, I, p. 371. On the balance of payments in the last decades of the Mamluk sultanate: Romano et al., ‘Venise et la route du cap’, pp. 109–39. 25 Arbel, ‘The Last Decades’, pp. 43–65.

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reasons to offer low freightage tariffs to heavy cargoes to ensure balance. Alkali (ash), an essential raw product for the glass industry, was one of the major exports in bulk carried by the muda ships on the return voyage from Syria. Similarly, alum from Egypt, cereals and salt from outlets in the Near East were very much sought after. Another means of solving the quest of heavy cargoes that could also serve as ballast on the Syria-Venice leg was to apply price discrimination, namely to transport a simple product such as salt in return for elevated freight rates so as to keep the other freightage relatively low.26 Price discrimination policy regarding salt transport was further exploited after Cyprus became Venetian territory de facto in 1473, followed by the delegation of the supervision over the deposits of salt to the Council of Ten in 1480. In view of the great geopolitical commercial and military upheavals that characterized the last decades of the Mamluk Sultanate, the quantities of merchandise reaching the outlets in Syria and Alexandria became somewhat less regular. Cypriot salt and other bulk commodities (cotton, yarns, wheat and barley, and around mid-sixteenth century, sugar) were exploited to sustain the shipping lines to the Levant. Price discrimination in liner shipping could have been effectively exercised owing to the potential ability of the State to maintain a certain degree of monopoly power on the distribution of salt in northern Italy,27 and its capacity to exploit the abundant agricultural and mineral resources of the Island. Indeed, the troubled Levant in the wake of the Portuguese activities in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea have been one of the reasons that moved the Venetian government to further exploit Cypriot natural resources, especially salt, wheat, barley, and cotton.28 Investment in the development of plantations largely directed at exports can be seen also in Zante and Cephalonia around that period.29 This scheme managed to sustain shipping for a great part of the sixteenth century and have been partly responsible for its revival between 1544 and 1571. In these years, an increasing number of round ships that sailed between Venice and the Levant began to terminate their eastwardly voyage in Cyprus, ceding to smaller regional carriers the exchange of wares between the island and the gateways in Syria.30 This strongly suggests that at times the 26

Several freight crises that triggered a tonnage slowdown: Hocquet, Venise et le monopole, I, pp. 543, 551–52, 563–64, 576. A decree 2 March 1391 to subsidize the export of ash from Syria; one of the reasons for doing so was to provide ships with freights on the inbound voyage: ASVe, SMist, bus. 41, f. 130v (2 March 1391); Ashtor, Levant Trade, p. 209. 27 Hocquet, Voiliers et commerce, pp. 189–97. 28 Arbel, ‘The Economy of Cyprus’, pp. 185–92. 29 Fusaro, Political Economies of Empire, pp. 43–45. 30 Arbel, ‘Maritime Trade in Famagusta’, p. 100 cit. 38.

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volume of trade with Syria was small enough to dispense with using the larger round ships for the last leg. After the fall of Cyprus, Venice could no longer provide her ships with attractive freights for bulky cargoes originating in the East, what necessarily reduced the profitability of this line. 3

The Role of the State in Providing Freights for Its Round Ships

Government intervention in shipping is often portrayed as an attempt to restrict ‘free voyaging’ and redirect trade into channels that were more beneficial for the Republic.31 However, shipowners would have thwarted such efforts unless they received substantial benefits in return. Salt freight, for example, offered a handy means for reimbursing state loans for ship construction. The relatively high freight rates on salt transports helped shipowners to recoup a fair chunk of their operating costs. This form of price discrimination not only sustained shipping but promoted trade by making possible the exportation from the Levant of low-value, price-sensitive commodities. Since a cargo imbalance favoured the outbound leg, ships were sailing from Venice with a mixture of heavy and light cargo that was charged relatively lower freight rates: the same ships returned to Venice laden partly with bulk merchandise on behalf of the State, and this cargo was charged at higher freight rates than its market worth. In a different direction, the State supported the shipments of Cretan wine, raisins, and cereals by offering remunerative rates to sustain other lines of shipping as well.32 In this way the Republic’s interest in furnishing the city with essential bulk products was fulfilled, and the shipowners significantly reduced the risk that their ship would return with a negative balance. The case of Hieronimo Tiepolo q. Andrea further clarifies this point. In 1504 he presented the Council of Ten with his newly built ship of over 600 botti with a carrying capacity of at least 5,000 stara of cereals, petitioning for gratia special to transport 3,000 stara of wheat from Cyprus on behalf of the State, which the Council authorized the local governor to provide.33 Basically, this freight was created to ensure the economic viability of the new ship’s maiden voyage. Clearly, wheat was necessary at the same time to nourish the city of 31 Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, pp. 25–26; Hocquet, Voiliers et commerce, pp. 378, 539–41. 32 Hocquet, Voilliers et commerce, p. 541–47; idem, Venise et le monopole, I, pp. 577–83. 33 ASVe, CXDM, fil. 16, fasc. 187 (30 August 1504). The administration in Cyprus confirmed that the Tiepola took on 8,500 mozza of wheat on behalf of the State, two thirds of the freightage had been disbursed in the Island: ASVe, CapCX, Lettere dei rettori, Cipro, bus. 288, 35 (19 November 1504). The ship returned to Venice on 30 January 1505: Sanuto, I diarii, VI, 129.

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Venice.34 Furthermore, having the government as a major client gave the ship instant status. The viability of the return voyage was also a major concern for the owners of the ship Manolessa, which was licensed by the Collegio in 1500 to transport general supplies, military equipment, and soldiers to Crete for the defence effort. The ship’s owners were reluctant to sail before finding a suitable freight to offset the costs of the return voyage. Eventually, the State was compelled to set up a joint-venture, and instructed the governor of Cyprus to load the ship with barley and whatever other merchandise he could muster in the various ports of call along the southern and eastern parts of the island. Presumably, the owners were willing to send their ship from Crete to Cyprus with a relatively low utilization rate to win the freightage that would be disbursed by the Signory for the return leg.35 Similarly, when in 1545 the shipowners Donado and Bernardo Corner q. Alvise launched their new galione of 200 botti built in Cyprus, they found themselves short of freights that would enable them to sail to Venice, and so appealed to the Council of Ten, which granted them a onetime permission to carry salt (a privileged shipment reserved for the round ships).36 The Venetian government supported round ships directly by chartering them or commissioning freightage, and indirectly by introducing incentives to encourage others to participate. In the late fifteenth century, one such scheme was the transport of Cretan wine to England.37 Similarly, nourishing the city with much-needed cereals during the lean years of food shortage required both direct and indirect intervention.38 The records of the Ten include numerous contracts underwritten by the Grain Office. In one such a case of 22 December 1526, the Ten confirmed the chartering of the ship captained by Nicoletto da Lesina. His instructions were to proceed directly to Saline in Cyprus and contact the governor of Famagusta. Da Lesina pledged to load not less than 4,500 stara, stacking as much as possible in the hold and between the two decks, while leaving free only his personal portada and that of the crew. The owners of the ship were permitted to load an additional 400 stara on their own account. The freight rates were 17 and 19 ducats per 100 stara of barley and wheat. In the case of the ship being instructed to proceed to Famagusta 34 35 36 37 38

Arbel, ‘Cypriot Population under Venetian Rule’, p. 214, n. 193. ASVe, CSC, reg. 4, f. 3v (25 May 1500). ASVe, CXDC, fil. 39, fasc. 78 (2 June 1545). Luzzatto, ‘Per la storia delle costruzioni navali’, p. 393; Tucci, ‘Il commercio del vino’, pp. 187, 203; Lane, Navires et constructeurs, p. 44; idem, Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 380. Arbel, ‘Cypriot population’, p. 214, n. 193; Pullan, ‘The Famine in Venice’, pp. 141–201.

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for loading, the rates would be increased to 18 and 20 ducats, respectively.39 The total income from freightage on the return voyage was therefore around 900 to 1,000 ducats. The extra 400 stara that may have been transported on behalf of the shipowners would likely have yielded additional profits. The government supported cereal shipments indirectly by offering advance bounties to anyone willing to guarantee to their supply, albeit within a rigorous timeframe. The correspondence between members of the Florentine merchant family Somaia shows that in 1539 one of their agents residing in Venice was negotiating to charter a Venetian ship to load wheat in the area of Volos and Thessaloniki. The letters reveal how uncertain the economic viability of such an enterprise was during the war with the Ottomans: the owner Maffeo Bernardo refused to charter his ship for less than 50 ducats per 100 stara of wheat, a highly inflated sum. He intended to secure the same freight rates for whatever cargo went missing, and demanded a share of 5 ducats in the bounties for the stock that would eventually be sold.40 4

Profits from Freightage and the ufficiali all’estraordinario

Previous attempts to gauge profitability from freights have based their estimates on a small sample of freightages listed in the double-entry account books (sariati) kept by the ship’s clerk. Such readings would inevitably yield revenues from freightage so low that one is bound to question the profit of the entire voyage.41 In fact, it is simply impossible to evaluate the business potential of a shipping enterprise based on a handful of entries recorded in the sariati. The main purpose of these ledgers was to keep an orderly listing of the expenses. These accounts were then balanced with assorted freightages collected during the voyage. Actually, the bulk of the freightage was paid before the voyage 39 40 41

The contract fixed the idle time in port at twenty days, excluding the days of arrival and departure. An extra charge of 7 ducats per day was set for delays: ASVe, CXDC, fil. 4, fasc. 121 (22 December 1526). Saito, ‘Il noleggio delle navi’, pp. 229–50. Ugo Tucci faced this quandary with the galley Contarina on its voyage to Flanders, observing that revenues from freightage were suspiciously low: Tucci, ‘Costi e ricavi di una galera’, pp. 182–85, 217–18; likewise, the data on freightage recorded in the sariati of the ship Panigaia seem partial. Allegedly, the voyage to Taranto ended in a modest gain; whereas the two voyages in 1566 finished in the red. The sariati do not include indirect expenses, so the total expenditure for the voyage must have been higher than that indicated. Tucci concludes that the ship was not remunerative, but rather an unusual case in which shipowning was for some reason separate from the mercantile activity, or in any case [from?] the principal activity: ‘Una nave veneziana’, pp. 719–25.

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commenced or after the return of the ship to Venice, and went directly to the captain and the scrivano or indirectly to the officials of the estraordinario, usually within the span of a year. The cargo itself was detailed in another ledger called the libretto di carico. A copy of this book was used by the estraordinario for the collection of freight dues from the shippers. Other merchandise in bulk, such as sacks of salt and grain or butts of oil and wine, were probably excluded from the libretto or noted down separately, since they had no connection with this magistracy. Before a departure from Venice, the merchants disbursed the full freightage in cash in the office of the estraordinario at the Rialto in return for a bolleta that served as proof of payment. Upon the return of the vessel, the shippers, who had merchandise on board, disbursed in cash the freight dues (in case they had not been already paid) that did not exceed 25 ducats directly to the captains in the customs house, and in case of failure to do so the debt was delegated to the magistracy, which charged a fine from the shippers and captains alike. In cases where the freight dues were higher than 25 ducats, they were disbursed in the office of the estraordinario within a period of one year, without penalty. Thereafter, the handling of the debt was delegated to the ufficiali sopra i dieci uffici. There are no surviving records from the archival series ufficiali all’estraordinario.42 Consequently, the procedures involved in the collection and distribution of freightage remain somewhat nebulous. However, one revealing document regarding the payment of freight dues to the shipowners is found in the collection of commercial letters and documents miscellanea Gregolin, and consists of a booklet of 24 pages (of which 2 are blank). The name ‘Garzoni’ is inscribed on the cover, and the dates ‘1527–13 January 1528’ in more veneto were marked by an archivist. The first entry in the booklet is dated 4 January 1528 and the last 17 February 1529, and a folded insert between two pages dated 14 April 1529. The booklet belonged to Filippo di Garzoni, a cashier in the office of the estraordinario, and contains entries in different handwriting of individuals who attested they had received cash from Garzoni. This is probably the only surviving evidence of a register that includes disbursements of income by this magistracy dating to this period. The following is one such example:43 42

Tiepolo, ‘Archivio di Stato di Venezia’, p. 937. Two registers containing the compilation of early laws (‘capitulare’) are found in the archival series of the cinque savi alla mercanzia. 43 The fact that the entries are written in different handwriting suggests that this was the original book, and not an extract or a copy: ASVe, MG, bus. 40, fasc. ‘Documenti relativi ad una causa fra la famiglia Garzoni ed il reverendo Benedetto de Martini cavaliere dell’ordine Gerosolimitano, 1495–1549.’

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† Jesus, 1528, in Venice Received, Agostino Gritti q. Zuane on 10 March from Felippo di Garzoni for part of the freights of our galione, 45 ducats, 19 grossi idem, received from the same on the account of the general average, 9 lire 10 soldi On 22 April, received, Agostino Gritti from the same on the account of the freights of our galione, 20 ducats, namely – On 29 April, received, Agostino Gritti from the same on the account of the freights, 7 ducats, 18 grossi, that is – On 19 November 1528, received, Agostino Gritti from the same on the account of the freights and the general average aforementioned. … [18r] † 1528, 23 October Received, Agostino Gritti q. Zuane from Felippo di Garzoni for part of the freights and general average of our galione, captained by Nadalin da Cattaro, returning from Candia 11 September recently passed, 5 ducats, 12 grossi, namely –

D1

gr 19 gr 12

D 20 D7

gr – gr 18

D2

gr 13

D5

gr 12

In this entry, Agostino Gritti q. Zuane attested, on separate occasions, that he received income from freightage and general averages for a voyage to Crete of a galione captained by Nadalin da Cattaro, in which he had shares. The last entry implies that no more income was expected from this voyage. Gritti received a net income of 83 ducats and 14 grossi in cash after tax deduction, and possibly other fees or previous debts. This was probably not the only money Gritti received from this voyage. We have no information regarding freightage collected directly via the scrivano. These incomes were taxable as well, and the dues were probably deducted from what was eventually transferred to Gritti. It is also possible that part of the merchandise on board belonged to Gritti, and hence was not charged with freightage, or passed thorough other magistracies – oil, wine, grain, salt, and so forth. One last consideration, the attestation implies that Gritti was not the sole owner in the galione, therefore the net income probably corresponded to his carats, on which we have no information. The sums disbursed by Garzoni to the shipowners are noted briefly in Appendix E. Although this booklet contains an impressive list of shipowners, the information is probably incomplete – it is highly unlikely that these were the only freight dues collected by the Office in 1528, even though many ships were engaged in grain transports that year (and therefore received the freight

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dues from the Grain Office). Garzoni was possibly not the only cashier in the office, and it is also probable that he kept more than one booklet for this purpose. In this case too, we are unable to estimate how this income relates to the total revenue from freightage. 5

Was Shipping a Long-Term Profitable Business?

Round ships and even smaller vessels carried tens of thousands of ducatsworth of merchandise. To get an idea of the sums involved, in 1491 the cargo of the captured ship of Marco Zustinian q. Giacomo was estimated at 30,000 ducats;44 in 1493 a grippo was captured on its way to Constantinople, bearing merchandise worth 15,000 ducats;45 in 1497 the ship of 600 botti of Alvise Contarini q. Ferigo was shipwrecked off the southern Peloponnesus with a total loss of 20,000 ducats;46 in 1523 the cargo of the 800-botti Negrona on the outboard voyage to Cyprus and Syria was valued at 50,000 ducats;47 when in 1530 a ship captained by Matteo di Donato was captured by a Sicilian corsair, the total loss was estimated at 30,000 ducats;48 in 1544 news came that the ship Luna was wrecked in the vicinity of Melleda (Mijet in Croatia) with 200,000 ducats-worth of merchandise.49 Numerous notorious maritime disasters confirm losses on a similar scale. Although it is logical to assume that freight rates were derived from the cargo’s worth, it is nevertheless impossible to gauge the profitability from sea transports based on this information. Fortunately, various sources contain occasional mentions of profits from round ships employed as bulk carriers or engaged in freightage. A selection of such examples is given in Appendix F. Quite often such figures represent the expected income, while some allowance must inevitably be made for depreciation resulting from any defective cargo, long delays for reimbursement, and numerous other factors. It goes without saying that such statements concern gross incomes, while an estimate of the net income requires deducting the costs of packaging or stowing, loading and unloading, and for that matter the overall operating costs. Yet these figures suggest that sea transports yielded much higher incomes than those recorded in the sariati of ships and galleys, or in the ledgers of the cashiers of the estraordinario. 44 45 46 47 48 49

Malipiero, Annali veneti, p. 625 (1491). Ibid., p. 626 (1493). Sanuto, I diarii, I, 514 (16 February 1497). ASVe, CXDM, reg. 46, f. 101v (8 July 1523). Sanuto, I diarii, LIII, 78 (27 March 1530). ASVe, MG, bus. 12bis-II [24 May 1544].

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Interesting in this respect is that the requisition of ships to the fleet was done on a time basis, whereby a fixed sum per month was established in advance. A Senate’s decree of 5 December 1475, offering incentives for the construction of ships of over 1,000 botti, set the maximum monthly rate for requisitioning the same ships at 30 ducats per 100 botti. The decree failed to win the majority vote, but it is likely that a monthly income of 300 ducats for a ship of 1,000 botti left the owners with a modest net income. By the same logic, ships and caravels that were requisitioned to the armada in the late fifteenth century were accredited 40 and 30 ducats respectively for each 100 botti per month in service. In such cases the State obtained full control of the ship but was also liable for any additional costs incurred from recruiting extra men or arming the vessel. Indeed, when the 400-botti ship captained by Daniel Copo was contracted for a period of three months on a voyage to the Barbary Coast in 1482, the monthly rate was set at 160 gold ducats; i.e., 40 ducats for each 100 botti. In view of an inevitable clash with the Ottoman armada in 1499, shipowners were presented with a better option, whereby they would charter their vessels to the State in return for higher monthly rates and pay out the extra operating costs themselves. Refusing meant that the State was entitled to requisition the vessel in return for the lower ‘standard’ rate. The charter option established monthly rates that fluctuated around 100 ducats per 100 botti. It left shipowners with more control over their property, and the likelihood of increasing their income by keeping the operating costs as low as possible. Some seventy years later, Venice was again at war with the Ottomans, and large-tonnage ships were requisitioned for rates varying from 90 to 133 ducats per 100 botti, depending on their quota of crew. Naval operations aside, the outward voyage was less worrying in terms of profit. In Venice, abundant light and heavy cargoes awaited shipment to all destinations. If owners faced difficulty in finding enough freights in the Capital, they would likely find what they were looking for further south in the Adriatic Sea. The ship that carried Arnold von Harff to the Levant stopped in the island of Brioni in Istria to fill its ballast with stones that were used for construction as well as cannon balls. This natural resource alone yielded an income of 12,000 ducats per year to the government.50 Other bulky freights included pieces of artillery, timber, ironware, as well as casks of oil and wine. In terms of profit, the more risky leg was the return voyage, and it was here that the legislative effort was largely concentrated. As we have seen, the fact that the government provided owners with freights – or even chartered the entire hold of the ship for the return voyage – offered some sort of a safety net. 50

Von Harff, The Pilgrimage of Arnold von Harff, p. 72.

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Reliance on such instances, whereby round ships were licensed by the government to load cereals or salt on their return voyage from Cyprus, is confirmed by the data in Appendix F, which suggests that the expected gross income from freights on the carriage in bulk for a typical 600-botti ship employed on a round-voyage to the Levant was roughly between 2,500 to 3,000 ducats. Given a period of 7.5 to 10 months (including the idle time in ports, and until the ship was ready to set sail on a new commercial voyage), the monthly income fluctuated between 42 and 67 ducats per 100 botti. There was however an evident risk of netting smaller sums if voyages extended further than that. From the very few examples concerning westbound voyages, we can gauge that the expected freight dues from a trip to England were more than double that figure. Medium-size carriers expected smaller profits: in 1510 it was estimated that a 250-botti caravel could yield a yearly income of 600 ducats; that is 20 ducats per month per 100 botti. Yet, in 1513 a caravel of 220 botti was chartered in Cattaro (Kotor) to carry wheat from Albania to Venice in two voyages. The gross income of 198 ducats yielded a monthly gain of 45 ducats per 100 botti, given it took the vessel two months to complete the voyages. These somewhat rough estimates could be further refined with future analysis of the few surviving records that do offer a relatively coherent picture on the expenses and gains from one shipping enterprise. A good example is the analysis of the costs and profits of a 400-tons Genoese ship that was employed in trumping in the western side of the Italian Peninsula between the years 1546 to 1560 – The almost complete accounting books of the first two voyages to Sicily and Spain as well as fragmented evidence from other voyages suggest a healthy gap between gains and expenditures.51 For all these reasons, Ugo Tucci’s conviction that voyages in Venice and elsewhere frequently ended at a loss due to the high operating costs is somewhat anachronistic.52 Up until the first decades of the sixteenth century shipping was viewed by contemporaries as both an instrument for commercial activity, and a safe and rewarding form of investment. However, as the century progressed, the rising costs of construction necessarily narrowed the gap. But for the time being, these difficulties were overcome by state backing and governmental investment in the development of colonial agricultural products with export potential. 51 Massa Piergiovanni, ‘Aspetti finanziari ed economici’, pp. 122–25. 52 Tucci, ‘Venetian Ship-Owners’, pp. 281–85. Both more recent analyses of the account books of the Flanders galley captained by Giovanni Foscari (1463–64, 1467–68) and that of the ship Girarda (1594–95) support this idea: Foscari, Viaggi di Fiandra, pp. 63–64, 75–79; Pellegrini, ‘Salariato’ della nave Girarda, pp. 21–22.

part 3 ‘Venetian Shipping during the Commercial Revolution’ Reconsidered

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Fortunes Begin to Ebb, 1453–89 1

The Golden Age of Shipping, c. 1423–32

In 1381 the protracted conflict between Venice and Genoa ended with a hardearned and costly victory for Venice, which established its naval pre-eminence in the eastern Mediterranean, and a near monopoly over Levantine trade. The flourishing Venetian shipping in the early decades of the fifteenth century was complemented both by the opening of new markets for Venetian goods in the Italian terraferma properties inland, and by new expansion further into the Aegean Sea and the Peloponnesus. Of prime importance was the restoration of Venice’s rule over Dalmatia from the 1420s onward, which also meant a significant increase in the workforce that had fuelled Venice’s merchant marine for centuries.1 The Venetians strove hard to become the main supplier for eastern goods to central Europe and large swathes of eastern Europe. They encountered stronger competition providing the same services in the more distant West. For once Venice was lagging: it was the last of the Italian states to establish direct commercial links with the trading powerhouse of Britain, for example. From the 1390s the galleys of Flanders had been stopping regularly in Southampton on their way back to Bruges. In the following decades Venice, Florence, and Genoa competed between them but also joined forces against rivals to increase their market share as providers of shipping services for Levantine goods to western Europe.2 From about 1420 onward Venice probably enjoyed the full advantages of its dominance in Levantine trade through special privileges, one that went virtually unchallenged.3 The unusually 1 During this time of relative peace Venice expanded the stato da mar through the acquisition of former Byzantine territories: Durazzo (Durrës) and Scutari (Shkodër) in Albania, Lepanto, Patras, Argos, Nauplia (Nafplio) in the Morea, Athens, as well as extending the hinterland around Negroponte and assorted islands in the Aegean, and not least it acquired Corfu after 1402. Meanwhile in the terraferma, new acquisitions included Vicenza, Verona, and also Padua after the crushing defeat of the Carrara family (1406–08): Luzzatto, ‘Per la storia delle costruzioni navali’, pp. 42–43; idem, ‘Il debito pubblico’, pp. 211–24; idem, Storia economica di Venezia, pp. 133–38; Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, pp. 189, 191, 196–97, 227; Hocquet, Venise et le monopole du sel, I, pp. 543, 551–52, 563–64, 576; Cozzi and Knapton, La Repubblica di Venezia nell’età moderna, I, pp. 3–11. 2 Stöckly, Le système de l’Incanto, pp. 157–58; Fusaro, Political Economies, p. 28; Melis, ‘Sulla “nazionalità” del commercio marittimo’, pp. 84–85; Mallett, The Florentine Galleys, p. 133. 3 Meanwhile, trade routes plied by the Republic’s galleys functioned regularly, and on average, in every quinquennium some twenty-eight to thirty-four galleys put into the ports of © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004398177_013

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rich fount of statistics on shipping contained in the ‘Deathbed Oration’ of Doge Tommaso Mocenigo offers some significant bearings on the size of the merchant marine around 1423.4 Likewise, according to the contemporary chronicler Gaspare Zancaruolo, in 1432 Venice claimed to possess 50 navi of 400 to 1,200 botti, and 60 navi of 100 to 400 botti.5 In light of the estimates proposed by scholars, it seems that Venetian shipping experienced a golden age and never again achieved the size and volume in could boast around 1423. Admittedly, the four military campaigns in Lombardy would have had a negative effect on shipping; and the years 1432 to 1450 were probably less glorious for the Republic’s economy and its shipping industry.6 That said, Venice’s gross tonnage in these decades must have been robust still, with around thirty-five round ships in 1449/50,7 and twenty-eight merchant galleys in 1449 (reduced to twenty in the following year).8 the Muslim Levant: Ashtor, ‘Venetian Supremacy’, pp. 48–50; idem, Levant Trade, pp. 227–28, 245–47, 250–53; Fusaro, Political Economies, p. 28. 4 According to this source, there were 300 navi (with no indication of size or type) manned by 8,000 crewmen; and 3,000 smaller navili of 10 to 200 anfore (120 tons, c. 166 botti) employing a crew of 17,000 (an average of five to six per vessel); 3,000 shipwrights, and a comparable number of caulkers. The document’s authenticity has been debated for over a century. All things considered, it is fairly likely that the text was manipulated by unknown hands several years after the election of the new Doge Francesco Foscari: Luzzatto, Storia economica di Venezia, pp. 149–50; Stahl, ‘The Deathbed Oration of Doge Mocenigo’, pp. 284–88; Hocquet, Venise et le monopole du sel, I, p. 565. Nevertheless, the general acceptance of the text suggests that the numbers were not entirely false. Hence, a reasonable guess is that the figure of 300 navi stands for all vessels of over 166 botti (100 tons): Lane, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 245–47. All attempts to figure out how many of these 300 were ships of over 400 botti entail speculation, and highlight the issue of drawing conclusions without a systematic reconstruction of the fleet. At any rate, Gino Luzzatto suggests that 30 out of 300 vessels were of large capacity: ‘Per la storia delle costruzioni navali’, p. 37; idem, Storia economica di Venezia, pp. 149–50. To this we can add another comment made by Marino Sanuto, according to whom the city boasted thirty-one navi or coche around December 1429: Le vite dei dogi (1423–74), I, p. 81. 5 Hocquet, Venise et le monopole du sel, I, p. 553. 6 The four campaigns in Lombardy between Venice and the Duchy of Milan started in 1423 and ended with the Peace of Lodi in 1454. This period of distress and turmoil has weakened Venice’s economy: ibid., pp. 202–3, 565–66, 576; Fusaro, Political Economies, p. 65. On the new imperial age under the dogeship of Francesco Foscari: Romano, The Likeness of Venice, p. 8. 7 The edicts issued almost daily by the Collegio throughout the first half of the fifteenth century include information on the various types of round ship that took part in the organized convoys (mude) to the Levant. On the basis of this source, Frederic C. Lane proposes that around 1449/50 the fleet consisted of thirty-five ships, with a gross tonnage of 25,322 botti: Navires et constructeurs, p. 246. The estimate was updated to ‘at least thirty’ in his monograph: Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 378. 8 Operating merchant galleys in 1449/50: Stöckly, Le système de l’Incanto, pp. 118 (Romania, 3/3), 130 (Cyprus, 0/1), 142 (Alexandria, 7/5), 151 (Beirut, 7/5), 163 (Flanders, 7/6), 173 (Barbaria, 4/0).

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Concurrently, the various European navies were embarking on a race to build large ships for their expansion across the oceans. The new technological advances in navigation and shipbuilding challenged Venice’s market share beyond the Pillars of Hercules, and the lagoon’s shallow waters curtailed the domestic industry’s aspirations to follow this emerging trend in ship design. The fact that in this same period ships of over 1,000 botti were built in the private shipyards in Venice (in defiance of common logic) bears witness to the technological race under way. Large ships were extremely expensive to build and even more costly to run; as a business proposition, they were too risky, since it required so much time to piece together enough freights to ensure the economic viability of each voyage. Thus, it soon became clear that projects on this scale would not likely be undertaken without government hand-outs.9 2

The Shipping Markets Following the Fall of Constantinople

The conquest of Constantinople on 28 May 1453 had far-reaching effects on the geo-political map of the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean. Venice, being the Italian state most exposed to Turkish aggression, was sorely affected. There were few illusions about which direction events were heading: the Ottoman advance inevitably posed an imminent threat to Venice’s holdings in southern Greece, and after the Ottoman conquest of Bosnia in 1463, that meant the Adriatic coast as well. By the end of 1462 Venice was on the brink of open conflict, but procrastinated until 28 July of the following year, when the Senate narrowly voted for declaring war on the Porte.10 9 Hocquet, Venise et le monopole du sel, I, pp. 560, 565, 583–87. 10 The following is the general outline of the Ottoman expansion that eventually led to the outbreak of war with Venice: In 1455 the Ottomans took Phocaea, along with the island of Samothrake. In 1458 Athens came under Ottoman control, while the Venetian-controlled Duchy of Naxos and the Genoese colonies of Lesbos and Chios became tributary under the Sultan in 1458. Chios was directly annexed to the caliphate a mere four years later. Serbia was overrun in 1459, and the last Byzantine remnants – the Despotate of Morea and the Empire of Trebizond  – were taken over in 1460/61. In 1462 four Candiot ships were confiscated by the Ottomans and requisitioned to their fleet. Considering this act as a breach of the treaty (1454), the Senate resolved to impose an embargo on the Sublime Porte: Lopez, ‘Il principio della guerra’, pp. 46–63; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, II, pp. 241, 243, 249; Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, pp. 235–36; Ashtor, Levant Trade, pp. 445–47; Stantchev, ‘Devodo: The Venetian Response’, pp. 53–55; see also: ASVe, SM, reg. 7, f. 90v (4 December 1462); Malipiero, Annali veneti, p. 11; on the threat to the prospects of shipping in the Levant: Emilio, Edizione commentata della cronaca di Venezia di Giovanni Tiepolo, p. 569. Already in 1442, as a direct consequence of the new direction taken by events in the eastern Mediterranean, the Grand Council delegated the

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Nevertheless, between the conquest of Constantinople and the outbreak of hostilities with the Ottoman Empire, Venetian shipping continued to flourish. In 1450 there were six large merchantmen of 1,000 botti or above that hoisted the Venetian banner.11 Such large ships continued to be built throughout the 1450s, and various new directions in which the State supported their presence were explored.12 Private initiatives in this sector were not rare, and suggest that the climate for shipbuilding of this size was still favourable: in 1458, the cocca captained by Hieronimo Malipiero was estimated at 1,351 botti;13 the ship of 3,000 botti owned by Bortolamio Zorzi q. Luca, captained by Zuane Soligo and launched on 1 January 1461, was probably the largest ship ever built in Venice.14 The size of the military fleet in the first few years of the war against the Ottomans suggests that pre-war shipping in all categories was brisk – in the summer of 1462, following the conquest of Argos and before the declaration of war, the fleet consisted 28 navi, 5 galeazze, and 8 marani (according to Sanuto there were 23 navi in all).15 Four years later, on 14 December 1466, Antonio Michiel – who was active in Constantinople as the holder of a lease of the alum mines – wrote to the Fleet Commander Vettor Capello that Venice ‘had no reason to fear, since it had 40 galee sotile, 10 galee grosse, and 20 navi grosse of 500 to 600 botti with one-hundred men per ship’.16 Clearly, not all ships were commissioned for the fleet once the war broke out, and therefore it is reasonable to assume that the pre-war merchant marine managed to maintain a quota of 35 round ships of over 400 botti. 3

The War That Triggered the Downturn, 1463–79

The direct consequences on shipping of entering war with the Ottomans were known well in advance; as predicted, Venice’s trade perforce soon deviated to other ports, the Republic’s freight opportunities shrank, and its ships were conscripted or detained for security reasons, lying idle at harbour. The chronicler Marino Sanuto noted that the Florentine galleys seized their chance

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competence on all things maritime to a single more agile organ, the Senate: Rossi, ‘Le magistrature’, p. 732–33. Lane, Navires et constructeurs, p. 44. Hocquet, Venise et le monopole du sel, I, pp. 567, 587–88. ASVe, PSM, Misti, bus. 116, fasc. VIII [13 July 1463]. Sanuto, Le vite dei dogi (1423–74), II, p. 25 (1 January 1461). Lopez, ‘Il principio della guerra’, p. 64; Malipiero, Annali veneti, p. 13 (1462); Sanuto, Le vite dei dogi (1423–74), II, p. 39. Malipiero, Annali veneti, p. 39 (1466).

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and began trafficking to Constantinople, and taking advantage of the plight of the Venetians, primarily stealing their freightage.17 Scrambling to save the situation, Venice’s shipowners began to sell shares in their ships to foreign bidders, at which on 13 January 1464 the Senate forcefully reminded operators that selling their ships (or parts thereof) to outsiders was strictly prohibited. In addition, all vessels of over 150 botti were thereafter banned from sailing to Ottoman territories, including those owned by Cretans and other subjects in the overseas dominions.18 Stiffer policies imposed on transhipment in the western Mediterranean were no less harmful, as evidenced by the petition that shipowners presented to the Senate some forty years later.19 Other detrimental factors were the new obligation thrust upon all Venice’s ships – including those originating from the colonies – to make a routine stopover in Modon, which must have complicated the navigation of many vessels that were not heading to this port;20 and the decisive revision of the fiscal system that was enacted on the eve of war (15 June 1463) and involved a tax of 1% on the value of all vessels of over 100 botti, as well as a generic 1% applicable to all freightage and merchandise.21 With this, the new measures could no longer claim to be ‘exceptional’, but were by now a standard provision, which the Senate would modify from time to time. In 1469 the income from direct tithes on freightage of galleys and ships was estimated around 1,000 ducats; the tithe on the merchandise itself netted an additional 14,000 ducats.22 In such conditions one would expect an increase in the shippers’ freight charges so as to cover the extra expenses they now incurred, however the opposite happened, and these decades saw an abrupt drop in freight rates on certain routes, triggering a downward spiral that plunged the shipping sector into a recession. Freight charges on many of the bulk cargoes  – such as cotton, potash, and salt – fell by at least a quarter during the second half of the century. Wine shipments from Crete to England – which previously netted 7 or 8 ducats per butt, fell as low as 3 or 4 in the 1470s. In fact, the drop in 17 Sanuto, Le vite dei dogi (1423–74), II, p. 60. On the downturn in shipping, see the Senate’s enactment 14, 19 October 1463 and the reflections of Roberto Lorez: ‘Il principio della guerra’, pp. 102, 125–26. 18 The embargo against the Ottoman Empire passed on 4 December 1462 and became a key tool against the Ottomans by the summer of 1464: ASVe, SM, reg. 7, f. 90v (4 December 1462); ASVe, PSD, bus. 1, c. 134r (13 January 1464); Stantchev, ‘Devodo: The Venetian Response’, p. 44. 19 ASVe, SM, reg. 15, ff. 156v–57v (21 October 1502). 20 Sanuto, Le vite dei dogi (1423–74), II, p. 59 (1464); the same reiterated 21 September 1474: ibid., p. 216. 21 Ibid., pp. 39 (c. November 1462), 55–56 (15 June 1463). 22 Ibid., pp. 33.

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rates resulted from foreign competition and the chiefly Spanish, English, and Genoese fleets that were active along this route after the Turks squeezed them out of the Black Sea.23 Indeed, the recession Venice had experienced by adverse political and economic conditions, was in contrast of the emerging international shipping market and economic recovery in most countries across Europe. A general positive trend can be detected in France, England and Spain, and more modestly in some Italian city-states. The increase in production and consumption in Europe stimulated the Levant trade.24 Benedetto Cotrugli’s De navigatione (1463) listed the principal actors plying the international maritime routes: the first mentioned were the Biscayans, with their characteristic baloneri (belingier) of up to 4,000 botti, and barze (also called urche), which were widely employed in oceanic commercial voyages by the Spaniards; then came the Genoese, with their round ships of large draught dubbed nave dal convento; the galeazze of 1,300 botti built in Naples (and likewise in France); and the caravels of the Portuguese, used for the oceanic exploration. Nearer home, Venice’s 23 Frederic C. Lane suggests that Cretan wine was used as ballast to balance their load, which may explain their offering such low freight rates on wine from Crete to the English Channel: Venice, A Maritime Republic, pp. 379–80; Hocquet, Venise et le monopole du sel, I, p. 548. 24 Eliyahu Ashtor was convinced that despite the wearying negotiations between the Venetian emissaries and the Mamluk sultan, trade with the Levant was seldom obstructed: Levant Trade, pp. 450–79. A closer examination suggests that the sources used to establish this claim – that is, a flourishing Venetian trade in the Levant in the second half of the fifteenth century – are dated either to the 1450s or to the last decades of the century (before 1499), periods of relative peace at the eastern front, during which maritime trade largely ran on an even keel. Thus, for example, in his monograph Ashtor writes that at the end of the century no less than forty Venetian firms had an agent in Aleppo (p. 462); his enlightening information on the increase in the volume of spice trade is, however, dated to the year 1480, and then in selected years during the 1490s (p. 477); similarly, the information drawn from chroniclers on the volume of Levantine trade dates to the last two decades of the century (p. 478); notably, the downward trend in the price of pepper in Egypt and of ginger in Damascus (if this was indeed the case) does not necessarily correspond to an increase in the volume of Venetian trade. At any event, the fluctuations are too inconclusive, as Ashtor himself admits (pp. 469–70). Belying this trend is an apparent increase in the total number of galley convoys on the routes to Alexandria and Beirut in the second half of the century – between 1451 and 1498 there were 340 galleys, against 313 in the first half of the century. Ashtor’s Table LII (p. 474) entitled ‘Decennial totals of Venetian Levant galleys’ suggests continuity during the war years, rather than disruption. His analysis of the fluctuations in the auction prices of merchant galleys tells us little about why such oscillations occurred (pp. 472–76), and regrettably comparable information about the trade with the cotton cogs during this period is too patchy to reach any conclusions (p. 472).

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most threatening contender was Ragusa, which managed to subtract freightage from the Venetian in all seas, including the Adriatic Sea.25 The Ottoman conquest of the colony of Negroponte in the Aegean Sea in August 1470 (the war had already been going on for seven years) was a major blow for the Venetians, who provisionally commissioned all available vessels to the fleet. Details supplied by Marino Sanuto suggest that the Venetian war fleet included twelve galee grosse (the four Flanders galleys, and a similar number of Beirut and Alexandria galleys); four galee sotile (it would seem that others were already in service); three large ships presumably of over 1,000 botti; ten ships and ten additional marani possibly of 300 to 350 botti and above, built in accordance with the Senate’s decree;26 this makes a total of twentythree sailing vessels, having an overall capacity roughly between 12,000 and 15,000 botti (7,200–9,000 tons). The size of the entire merchant marine in all categories over 240 tons, including the seventeen galleys that were auctioned between January and April 1570,27 must have been slightly greater than forty vessels with an overall carrying capacity of 11,000–13,000 tons. Earlier that year the Republic’s Cretan subjects were able to commission seven ships (Sanuto does not indicate their size) to augment the armada in Negroponte.28 One year later, on 23 December 1471 ten ships were registered for the voyage to Syria, while four were detained.29 On 3 October 1474, towards the final campaigns in Albania, the Senate decided to commission a hundred light war galleys and twenty-five private ships.30 More details are available for the year 1480, when Venice’s merchant marine included four ships of over 1,000 botti, twenty-five of over 400 botti, and eighteen merchant galleys; overall 47 vessels of over 240 tons with a combined capacity of 14,763 tons. This goes to show that shipping probably reached its lowest ebb around 1470, arguably the lowest in that century. In light of the slump in both shipping and shipbuilding activity in Venice during the long war with the Ottomans, it seems only reasonable to assume that the volume of trade in those years was affected as well. As can be expected, the period of war in the Levant signalled difficult times for trade, as testified by 25 Cotrugli, ‘Il trattato “De Navigatione”’, pp. 130–34. 26 Sanuto, Le vite dei dogi (1423–74), II, p. 129 (1470). There were eighteen round ships under the command of Nicolò da Canal in the battle of Negroponte: Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 358. 27 The auctioning of the galleys in 1470: ASVe, SDIncanti, reg. 1, ff. 1r–3r (Barbaria:3), 3v–4v (Aigues-Mortes:2), 5r–8v (Flanders:4 new), 9r–11v (Beirut:4), 11v–13v (Alexandria:4). 28 Sanuto, Le vite dei dogi (1423–74), II, p. 128. 29 Hocquet, Venise et le monopole du sel, I, p. 568. 30 Sanuto, Le vite dei dogi (1423–74), II, p. 216.

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the commercial letters of Francesco Bevilaqua, a Venetian merchant residing in Acre, whose correspondence of the year 1472 makes it clear that the war had weakened the status of Venetians throughout the Levant. Between 1464 and 1471, Venetian traders had carried on their activities in Egypt and Syria without major conflicts, but in 1471 relations with the Sultan were again seriously impaired when the Venetian consul in Damascus was beaten, imprisoned and sent to Cairo. Relations deteriorated further midway through 1473, in part due to the rise in hostilities at sea against Muslim merchants on the part of Venetian naval commanders, though they were not uniquely responsible. Several remarks by Bevilaqua are highly indicative of the grave difficulties afflicting the Venetian market itself. On one occasion, he refers to the slack demand for cotton in Venice. When complaining about some of his Venetian associates who did not materialize their cotton purchases in the Levant he comments, ‘Never before have I seen so many deals come to nought’.31 Girolamo Priuli, an insightful observer of the daily movement of business, noted that during the hostilities with the Ottomans, trade and business virtually came to a standstill, and there was very little money circulating.32 Against a backdrop of the prolonged war of attrition with the Ottomans, and the general expansion in other nations maritime activity, Venetian shipowners strove earnestly to reduce their shipbuilding and operating costs. One of their main problems was with the guilds of shipwrights and caulkers, and the ineradicable privileges written into the mariegole (statutes) of their trade. These entitlements were so water-tight that they jeopardized Venice’s competitive edge, given the rapid growth of shipyards in the Adriatic Sea and beyond.33 A petition filed on 6 March 1460 by the guild of the caulkers to the provveditori di Comun and to the ufficiali della giustizia vecchia bears evidence that shipowners bargained simultaneously with ten or twelve different caulkers, forcing the price down to the extent that their wages were an insult and barely enough to sustain their families. Since seeking work outside Venice was strictly prohibited, numerous caulkers had logically abandoned the lagoon to find employment elsewhere. A set of peak-season and off-season fares were established in a bid to curb competition. In theory, this is evidence of a dire imbalance of supply and demand – the available workforce must have vastly outmatched the demand for ships, or such ruthless haggling over prices would

31 Arbel, ‘Venetian Trade in Fifteenth-Century Acre’, pp. 235–36, 259. 32 Luzzatto, Storia economica di Venezia, p. 237. 33 Tucci, ‘Venetian Shipowners’, pp. 295–96.

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never have come about.34 We should be cautious, however, before presuming a slump in demand for new ships based only on these volatile negotiations within the shipbuilding sector. A Senate enactment 28 February 1467 goes to suggest that shipyards had been asking exorbitant prices for the use of their docks and facilities for ship careening and other maintenance work.35 3.1 The Success of the Modified marani In light of these complications, the phenomenal success of the modified marani during the 1460s should come as no surprise. The marani – unarmed carriers of bulky merchandise, principally marble and other stone cargo – existed for decades in their somewhat humble trafficking between Venice and Istria.36 It was not until Venetian shipowners became seriously frustrated by the adverse conditions they were facing – and now with stiff competition – that these vessels were considered a viable alternative to round ships. The growing demand for a type of vessel that would be both cheaper to build and more cost-effective to run gave rise to this shift in direction. The new large marani were not burdened with taxes, at least for some time. Similarly, conventions governing the rules of safety at sea on the round ships were not in force. Thus, the modified marani were not required to enrol nobles as balestrieri da poppa, they were poorly armed and employed smaller crews. Being without castles or crow’s nests invalidated their military potential, enough to ensure they would not be part of the attacking force in the armada.37 Shipowners exploited this legal loophole as far as possible. By 1467, the Senate admitted an increase in the number of such vessels, allegedly marani of 300 to 350 botti and above, and the unprecedented decrease in the number of round ships. Fuelled by Venetian investment, Istria rose in importance as a centre for naval construction, affording resilient operators a resourceful 34 Based on the codex of laws of the guild of ship-caulkers of 1437, with an addition of 6 March 1460: Luzzatto, ‘Per la storia delle costruzioni navali’, pp. 43–44. 35 ASVe, ST, reg. 5, f. 179r (28 February 1467); Lane, Navires et constructeurs, p. 117 cit. 6. On the political role of the guilds and the working class: Tucci, ‘Carriere popolane e dinastie di mestiere’, pp. 817–51. 36 In 1421 there were fifteen marani in Venice at hand for maintenance jobs, such as repairing breaches in the natural breakwaters encircling the lagoon. It was then decided to build sixteen more of 200 miera (95 tons). Records show that in 1424 sixteen marani brought a cargo of stones from Istria to shore up the Lido. Over a decade later, in 1438 the Senate promoted the construction of additional marani for that same purpose. In July 1439 there were no fewer than seventy marani regularly assigned to major maintenance works at the lidi. In 1442 forty marani were thus deployed, and an order for twenty more was signed by the city’s chief engineer: Hocquet, Venise et le monopole du sel, I, pp. 553–54. 37 Ibid., p. 593.

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solution whereby they managed to bypass the Venetian guilds and their mariegole, and hire cheaper workforce in the Istrian peninsula. Small wonder, then, that the 1467 decree, which aggravated the fiscal burden on the marani, failed to induce shipowners to build round ships in Venice itself.38 Two years later, on 28 September 1469 the Senate acknowledged the dearth of ships in the city and the stagnation of the shipyards – ‘not one person builds a ship in this city anymore’. Between 1460 and 1463 the number of shipwrights and caulkers (presumably those involved in the construction of merchantmen) had plummeted from 750 to 250. The number of mariners had likewise declined considerably.39 Meanwhile, the marani of 300 to 500 and 700 botti built outside Venice became ever more popular, and in turn began competing successfully on the same freight runs that were previously reserved to the round ships. In a bid to keep the industry at home, the Senate slapped a penalty of 500 ducats on the building of marani of over 100 botti outside Venice, and the navigation of this type of vessel was confined to the Adriatic Sea. However, once the vessels were surveyed and charged the same dues that applied on the round ships, the markets in Le Marche and Apulia became viable with reservation to authorized shipments. Alternatively, the marani were permitted to sail outside the Adriatic Sea under the service of the State, that is their freights were strictly limited to the carriage of troops, horses, and munitions on the outward voyage, with a return cargo of salt. Their customary function as stone and timber carriers was not burdened with new imposts. Furthermore, the officials in Cyprus were instructed not to permit the marani or any lateen-rigged vessel to load salt, which was still reserved for ships equipped with castles and square sails.40 Clearly, the new measures aimed to reduce the cost-effectiveness of the modified marani in the long run. Several concessions were made in the following years to allow those that were still navigable to accept freights, albeit under strict reservations to ensure that such initiatives would not recur.41 38

In the same decree, vessels of over 150 botti that ventured beyond the Adriatic were subject to the same clearance procedure, duties, and safety requirements: ASVe, SM, reg. 8, f. 144r (3 November 1467). 39 Ibid., reg. 9, f. 19v (28 September 1469). 40 Ibid., f. 21r (23 October 1469). The same was re-enacted: ibid., reg. 13, f. 4v (1 March 1490); Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, pp. 27–28; idem, Navires et constructeurs, p. 98; Hocquet, Venise et le monopole du sel, I, pp. 362, 554–55. 41 In 1471 the Senate set a period of one year, after which these vessels were prohibited from engaging in commerce. The time limit was extended by one more year on 13 June 1472 for the benefit of those vessels that were still in a navigable condition. Their movement was, however, confined to the zone between Crete and Sicily. A special privilege to sail further to the Levant was accorded to those that returned with cereals for the State: ASVe, SM, reg. 9, f. 136v (13 June 1472). Several other freights opened up to the modified marani

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3.2 The Shortage in Large Round Ships Another burning issue in the autumn of 1469 was the drop in the number of larger ships: the preamble to the Senate’s decree attests that ‘our city at this moment and over usual lacks large ships’.42 Hoping to encourage the construction of six ships of 1,200 botti, the senators granted loans of 2,000 ducats and above, to be reimbursed in the form of consignment of salt from Cyprus and Ibiza over a period of four years. The response was disappointing, which suggests that the seriousness of the situation was underestimated. The capture of the ship Coppa by the French corsair Coulon several days later prompted the Senate to repeat the offer. In one exemplary case, the senators granted a loan to Antonio Mauro, whose ship was already in an advanced stage of construction.43 The shortage in large round ships remained on the agenda in the early 1470s, the attention they received is out of proportion in relation to their relative part in the commercial fleet. Still, their importance to the war effort is borne out by the fact that the Ottomans were intimidated by round ships, since they had not mastered their construction yet.44 On 17 March 1470 the Senate reinstated the loans of 2,000 ducats for a reduced minimum capacity of 1,000 botti for a total of five applicants at the most. Meanwhile a parallel, proportional loan was introduced, whereby ships of 1,500 botti would be granted 3,000 ducats in credit (an increase of 50%).45 To the senator’s dismay, this appeal also seemed to fall on deaf ears. This notwithstanding, the urgent need to have at least four large round ships operational compelled the Senate on 3 June 1471 to issue a volley of bounties (doni) instead of loans, to the tune of 1,500 ducats for ships of 1,000 botti, and 2,000 for those of 1,200 botti and above. These ships would receive precedence when required for military action. The enactment goes further to suggest that the only two candidates to apply in answer to the previous decrees – namely Antonio Moro (whose ship was already under construction in 1469), as well as Francesco di Stefani – had not yet carried through their intentions. Again, they were granted the same bounty, on the condition that their ships be of a sufficient size.46 According to Marino Sanuto, construction work on two ships

42 43 44 45 46

in the following months: ibid., ff. 146v (14 October 1472), 157r (20 February 1472), 171v (10 May 1473). Attested in both enactments: ibid., ff. 19v (28 September 1469), 20v (12 October 1469). Ibid., f. 21r (23 October 1469). Malipiero, Annali veneti, p. 39 (14 December 1466); Hocquet, Venise et le monopole du sel, I, p. 589. ASVe, SM, reg. 9, f. 37v (17 March 1470); Hocquet, Venise et le monopole du sel, I, p. 594. ASVe, SM, reg. 9, f. 99r (3 June 1471).

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with an estimated capacity of 1,300 botti each began thereafter: the first by a popolano named Zorzi Dragan; the second by Gentil Contarini q. Andrea.47 Fearing this was not enough, the Senate made a further creditable effort on 9 August 1471, whereby it indirectly increased the income of these ships by creating a special category of privileged shipment: it offered a bounty of 8 ducats per mozzo for all ships of over 1,000 botti that would deposit salt from Ibiza. It also abolished the prohibition on the shipment of salt north of Gaeta to Pisa, Piombino, or any other port under the rule of Rome or King Ferdinand II of Aragon, in perfect keeping with the election of the new Pope Sixtus IV and the general concern of the Italian League for their common interests in the Levant.48 These measures can be regarded as an incentive to Venetian citizens – and subjects, primarily from Crete – to build large merchantmen in the stato da mar. Curiously, at this juncture, even the naturalization of such ships was seen in a favourable light. At any event, misgivings were still rife enough to prompt the Senate to issue a further decree on 12 December 1471, whereby the bounty was increased to 2,500 ducats for vessels of 1,000 botti, and 250 extra ducats per each additional 100 botti. The Senate also stipulated that payment would be in monthly instalments in the form of credit transfers in the ledgers of the state auditors (governatori delle entrate). The selling to foreigners of ships built with the aid of bounties was strictly prohibited, the (reasonable) suspicion being that foreign operators might take advantage of these bounties, as invisible partners. In this way, the bounties may well have lowered the costs of manufacture to a competitive level. However, since the economic liability of running these vessels was no less problematic than building them, the possible delays in the credit flow also needed addressing: merchants were therefore required to disburse (in cash) all freightage amounting to less than 25 ducats directly to the shipowners and their representatives, on the nail. Sums greater than 25 ducats could instead be paid within four months. A condition in the decree limiting this significant reform to ships of over 1,000 botti evidences the Senate’s prudent yet tardy reaction to a rapidly growing global shipping market.49 The day soon came, however, when the Senate acknowledged the need to secure the prompt payments of freightage for any ship, and not just those of over 1,000 botti. In conclusion, the senatorial efforts of 1469–71 in encouraging individuals to build large round ships had limited success, the lesson being that it was simply 47 Sanuto, Le vite dei dogi (1457–74), II, p. 163 (1471). 48 ASVe, SM, reg. 9, f. 105r (9 August 1471); Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, 2, pp. 310–14. 49 ASVe, SM, reg. 9, ff. 120v–21r (12 December 1471); Hocquet, Venise et le monopole du sel, I, pp. 595–96.

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not enough to champion the construction of ships per se, but equally important to buttress their operations by establishing a solid framework of privileged shipments. The shortage in large-tonnage ships was on the agenda again on 5 December 1475, as the senators acknowledged being outnumbered by the Turks in terms of galleys. They concluded that the only way to repel the Ottomans was to possess large ships, hence a proposal to grant bounties of 3,000 ducats for private initiative to build four ships of 1,000 botti – upped by 200 ducats for each additional 100 botti. According to this programme, these vessels would have been exempted from the decime (imposed in 1463) on their freightage and from other levies and duties, such as the customary fees to the castelli, a fee to cover the expenses of the salvage boats, and from the obligation to carry nobles as balestrieri da poppa. The proposal also suggested prompt payment for salt cargoes from Ibiza and Cyprus. The Senate also considered offering the same benefits – excluding the bounties for construction – to any ship of over 800 botti built in Venice, at any rate, this proposal was eventually declined.50 Instead the senators resolved to favour operations within the Comun, to ensure the construction of the much-needed large war ships. The Arsenal’s proti Bortolomio Gallo, Zuan Griego, Zuane Bressan and Vettor Rosso were elected to build four such ships of 1,000 to 1,200 botti.51 Five years later two nave di Comun of circa 1,200 botti were already up and running, while the other two were not launched before 1480. Similarly, there were two privately owned ships of over 1,000 botti afloat – the Dragana of Zorzi Dragan & co. and the Muazza of Daniel Muazzo (Appendix A: 1480, nos. 1–4). 3.3 Emergency Measures to Ward Off Recession While the Republic was busying itself with a handful of large ships, the merchant marine took advantage of the general weakening of the State’s mechanisms of control. The lack of law enforcement during such pressing times gave rise to a surge in contraband activity. The need to increase funding eventually compelled the government to elect a provisory body of twelve of the city’s ‘wise men’, called the collegio dei dodici savi sopra i mestieri, to act as a substitute constitutive organ to the Senate with similar authorities. It carried out the requisite reforms, starting with a thorough revision of the customs procedures, 50 5 December 1475: ASVe, ST, reg. 7, ff. 98r–99r; Sanuto, Le vite dei dogi (1474–94), I, p. 22. 51 According to a Senate’s decree of 4 August 1477, two ships were already completed and commissioned on 23 January 1478. The other two were under construction already in 1477, but their launching was postponed: ASVe, PPA, reg. 6, ff. 20r–v (4 August 1477); ASVe, MG, bus. 35, fasc. ‘Conti 1490–1500’ [23 January 1478]; Lane, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 44, 47; Hocquet, Venise et le monopole du sel, I, pp. 588–89.

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so as to curb the many irregularities that had become routine. Through a raft of decrees, the collegio dei dodici tackled the issues, including violations of customs procedures, loading and unloading, and particularly the circulation of the bollete before departure.52 Another enactment by the same constitutive body redirected all the traffic of victuals in the northern Adriatic towards the port of Venice, and delegated the enforcement to the local governors.53 Besides, the same wise men devised a new reform in the shipbuilding sector, which was approved on 18 June 1477. After reviewing all the decrees concerning shipwrights and caulkers since 1395 to that day, the twelve savi outlawed the construction of any type of water craft by Venetian citizens or residents anywhere else but in Venetian possessions. To ensure their will they imposed grievous penalties on whomsoever involved himself with such vessels. The long list of potential offenders included owners, operators, captains, mariners, merchants, agents, charterers, insurers, brokers, middlemen, and so forth. Thus, only vessels built within the dogado and in the possessions overseas (excluding places prohibited by law), were to be considered of Venetian stock, and therefore eligible for the same rights (in terms of freedom of navigation) as those accorded to ships manufactured in Venice itself.54 3.4 The Decline in Number and in Gross Tonnage Venice entered the second half of the fifteenth century with more than twenty operating merchant galleys and thirty-five round ships, of which at least six boasted a capacity of over 1,000 botti. Moreover, sea trade continued with few interruptions and with a steady turnover until the outbreak of hostilities with the Ottomans in 1463. The savage war of attrition that lasted sixteen years 52

It is only because these edicts do not appear in the registers of the Senate (terra and mar) – though were echoed in the capitoli of various executive organs – they have not been sufficiently addressed by scholars: ASVe, CL, bus. 152, 467 (29 April 1474), 471 (29 April 1475), 489 (2 June 1475), 493 (19 September 1475); ASVe, UT, bus. 1, c. 10r (19 February 1476); ASVe, PSD, reg. 1, c. 5r (19 October 1476); the penalties for infraction were upped on 24 August 1479: ASVe, CL, bus. 152, 507 (proclaimed 26 August). 53 ASVe, UT, bus. 1, cc. 13t–14r (4 February 1476). 54 Foreign vessels that were captured or confiscated in military or policing operations would be taken into custody by the provveditori di Comun, the patroni all’Arsenal, and other magistracies in charge of contraband. The new measures had to be proclaimed at the Rialto once a year: ASVe, PPA, reg. 6, ff. 18r–19v (18 June 1477). An amendment to the previous enactment dated 23 January 1478 prohibited citizens and residents of Venice from buying vessels that were built in Venetian possessions in the terraferma, e.g., Padua, Treviso, Vicenza, and Verona. Since many Venetians still possessed such boats, mainly burchi and burchielle, the Arsenal officials were ordered to mark them with a seal (bolla), similar to the one that was used to label the chests on the great galleys. Any vessel without a bolla was ordered to be dismantled: ibid., f. 20v; ASVe, PC, reg. 1, f. 92r.

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had put a heavy strain on the resources of Venice, incurring an expenditure amounting to around 1.2 million ducats a year. Unsurprisingly, the general downturn in the economy triggered a corresponding decline in seaborne trade. Around 1470, Venice was left with little more than twenty-three ships, of which ten were categorized as modified marani of over 300 botti, and seventeen operating galee grosse. The conflict ended when Venice admitted defeat, after hordes of Turkish cavalry poured into Dalmatia and Friuli. In the treaty signed on 25 January 1479 Venice renounced Negroponte, which had been the Republic’s major colony in the Aegean Sea. It similarly renounced various other Aegean islands and holdings in Albania (primarily Scutari), and agreed to pay 10,000 ducats a year for trading privileges in Ottoman territories. On the other hand, The Ottomans tacitly recognized Venice’s recent occupation of Cyprus. The war inevitably brought about the rapid expansion of the Ottoman navy, which became powerful enough to challenge the Venetians and the Knights Hospitaller for supremacy in the Aegean Sea. Among the new threats were the Turkish corsairs, creating major problems with the security of shipping in the Levant. Logically, Venice strove to ensure the preservation of its colonies and keep the lines of communication with the Levant open, while diligently avoiding any offence to the Ottoman sultan.55 At the end of the armed conflict, the merchant marine consisted of eighteen commissioned galleys with a combined tonnage of about 9,000 milliaria, and twenty-nine ships having a total capacity of some 17,950 botti (table 10). The shortage of large round ships was chronic, as the general preference for smaller vessels prevailed.56 This dearth is attested by the fact that in 1480 there were only four large round ships afloat: two were navi di Comun of 1,200 botti (authorized in 1475 and completed in 1476), and two were private – the Dragana of 1,500 botti and the Muazza of over 1,000 botti. The latter was shipwrecked outside the Lido of Venice in the winter of 1480, but was still technically afloat in July and therefore included in the counting. Most of the ships are listed in the lesser category, but still, the combined capacity of these four comprises around 20% of the carrying capacity of the entire fleet.

55 Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 235; Ashtor, Levant Trade, pp. 447–48. On the peace treaty: Sanuto, Le vite dei dogi (1474–94), I, p. 139 (25 January 1479). 56 Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, pp. 27–29; Hocquet, Voiliers et commerce, pp. 526–28.

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table 10

Snapshot of the merchant marine c. July–December 1480

Category

1,500 botti (900 tons) and above 1,000–1,500 botti (600–900 tons) 800–999 botti (480–599 tons) 600–799 botti (360–479 tons) 400–599 botti (240–359 tons) Merchant galleys (240 tons) Total

No. of vessels

in %

1

6

3

14

3

10

6

15

16

27

18

28

47

100

Capacity

1,500 botti (900 tons) 3,400 botti (2,040 tons) 2,400 botti (1,440 tons) 3,800 botti (2,280 tons) 6,850 botti (4,110 tons) 9,000 milliaria (4,293 tons) 15,063 tons

17,950 botti (10,770 tons)

See respectively, Appendix A: 1480.

4

Shipping Fails to Rally in Response to Emerging New Realities, 1480–89

As soon as the peace treaty with the Porte was confirmed, seaborne commerce with the Ottoman Empire resumed with full vigour. The public voyages of the merchant galleys to Constantinople were renewed after a hiatus lasting over a quarter of a century, though the galleys no longer ventured into the Black Sea. The main function of this traffic was carrying Venetian manufactures on the outward journey and return with the raw silk, dyes, and wax consignments that were stockpiled in stations along the way.57 Shipowner and merchant Marco Bembo, who transferred to Constantinople in those years, wrote to his elder brother in 1480: ‘My arrival to the Levant will be very useful for our

57

After 1453, the merchant galleys did not sail to Constantinople: Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, pp. 348–49; Ashtor, Levant Trade, pp. 426–27; Sottas, Les Messageries Maritimes, p. 117.

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company. With the help of God, it would yield thousands of ducats with no risk involved.’58 Meanwhile, Venetian merchants were doing excellent business in Syria and Egypt, as well. The Republic’s political romance with the Ottoman foe Uzun Hasan (1480) had been no more than an interlude, and Venice resumed her longstanding policy of keeping peace with the Mamluks. The loss of Negroponte was largely offset by the new Venetian protectorate over Cyprus, established in 1474, which gradually enabled Venice to exploit the abundant agricultural and mineral resources of the island, consisting mainly of sugar, salt, and cotton, without being hampered by an unpredictable Ottoman or Mamluk administration.59 Private shipping, on the other hand, was seriously challenged by competition, which drove many operators to find loopholes in the numerous restrictive policies, as they strove to keep their business afloat and survive the lasting adverse conditions. During the war, Venice was in no position to deal with the endemic lawlessness. With the war over, traders now had the necessary elbowroom to resume their affairs, and moreover the Ottoman markets now open to them proved prosperous. For one, Marco Bembo shipped wine of various sorts to Messina, Constantinople, Cyprus, and Northern Africa, and in the opposite direction to England and Flanders. In Constantinople, he chartered a Cretan ship, the Vergaza of 300 botti, to carry timber to Egypt, and expressed his intention to charter another Turkish gripparia for a voyage to the Black Sea.60 It is doubtful that such activities on the part of Venetian merchants were strictly in line with the Republic’s policies. The traffic between the Barbary Coast and Egypt also proved lively. The senators complained that captains of ships and galleys – and even pilgrim galleys (‘the ultimate symbol of Christianity!’ they declared) – were accepting freights from Turks and carried their merchandise from Turkish to Moorish lands, with complete disregard for the laws. More so, timber, iron and other goods banned by the Church were conveyed to the lands of the infidel with impunity. Merchant citizens and subjects were the first to blame, lamented the senators, as these individuals were using subterfuge of all kinds to bypass the law, in the name of profit. Much to the Senate’s chagrin, the Greek overseas colonies provided ready emporiums for goods, thus contributing to the alienation of trade from the capital.61 58 59 60 61

ASVe, MG, bus. 8 [25 April 1480]. Ashtor, Levant Trade, pp. 449, 458. ASVe, MG, bus. 8 [25 April 1480]. ASVe, MC, reg. 24, f. 14r (5 November 1480); Sopracasa, ‘Les merchands Vénitiens’, p. 119. During the war, Venetian galleys were chartered to Moors on a passage from Alexandria to Tunis: Sacerdoti, ‘Note sulle galere da mercato’, pp. 111–13.

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Ever with an eye on profit, shipowners shrewdly formed partnerships with foreign investors for the purpose of building and running shipping enterprises. During the war with the Ottomans, ships often removed their flags so as to continue their business with the Levant; this was a common practice, and the authorities turned a blind eye. But the sheer length of the war had made these provisional arrangements near-permanent, and the foreign component of Venetian shipping became so extensive that huge efforts were required to reverse the situation. Meanwhile, the work in the yards in Venice had all but drawn to a halt, as they were no longer competitive at any level. The said Marco Bembo planned to build his swift lateen-rigged saeta of 250 botti, along with a round ship of 500 botti on the southern part of the island or Crete, where better deals were to be had. He then loaded the anchors, the fittings of the rigging, the mast and its parts, as well as the raw canvas for the sails, and shipped them to Crete. As for the fustian necessary for the sail-work, he asked his agent to provide, since the prices were better at his end, and apparently commissioned the sewing of the sails as well.62 On top of this, the trade vacuum created by the ongoing hostilities attracted foreign ships, eager to take advantage of the turmoil to increase their share in the Levantine trade. By no means, one of the outcomes of the prolonged war with the Turks was the proliferation of Florentine-backed ships working from Ragusa.63 While the Ragusans were not as dominant as the Genoese, Catalans, or French at the international level, their central position in the Adriatic and their proximity to the lucrative market fairs in Le Marche was worrying. To the Venetians’ chagrin, Ragusan ships could compete against them on the same freights by offering lower rates; furthermore, they had easy access to supplies of timber, iron, and not least to coveted manpower from Dalmatia.64 In the Senate’s view, the shipyards and the emerging shipping industry of Ragusa

62

63 64

Since the departure of the Bemba was delayed, the mast was carried with a galley, which sailed to Cyprus to load salt, what seems to be an unusual cargo for a galley: ASVe, MCart, bus. 29, nos. 55 (31 January 1483), 91 (11 July 1483), 92 (30 July 1483), 95 (4 August 1483). In Bembo’s day the oak resources in the vicinity of Chania were already exploited. Hence, his intention to reach medium altitudes or the cypress woodlands at the high mountain ranges in Crete. On the timber resources in Crete: WWF, ‘Mediterranean Island of Crete’, in Terrestrial Ecoregions, Mediterranean forests, woodlands and scrubs, https://www .worldwildlife.org/ecoregions/pa1205 (accessed 18 December 2020). Melis, ‘Sulla “nazionalità” del commercio marittimo’, pp. 96–101. Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, p. 28; idem, Navires et constructeurs, p. 98; Hocquet, Venise et le monopole du sel, I, p. 555 cit. 44. In this context: ASVe, SM, reg. 9, ff. 19v (28 September 1469), 21r (23 October 1469), 136r (13 June 1472), 146v (14 October 1472), 157r (20 February 1473), 171v (10 May 1473).

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were one of the main causes of the ailing number of Venetian vessels, and the decline of the Republic’s own shipbuilding sector.65 In 1480 Venice shifted its priorities toward the revival of seaborne trade as the best means of boosting both public and private incomes to ensure the Republic’s prosperity as a whole. To this end, the ad hoc measures taken were aimed at redirecting trade to the capital. However, these intentions met with little success, simply because once again the State lacked the means of enforcement. In 1481 the Senate raised the alarm over the surge in contraband activity in the Adriatic Sea in the area of Badaleno (in modern Croatia) and the Promontore (the southernmost tip of Istria). The Senate also addressed the unauthorized transport of wine from Le Marche directly to Dalmatia and Albania in return for local products.66 Whatever the effectiveness of the measures taken, soon enough Venice found itself dragged into a new war – a costly one, to boot – that promptly scotched all chances of policing the merchant traffic in the north Adriatic Sea. The events that led to the War of Ferrara (1482–84) and its aftermath are well documented. To be sure, this was an expensive war, whose costs are estimated at two million ducats. The state income from direct taxes (decime) were siphoned off to pay the interest on the new issue of public bonds, called the monte nuovo, which could be bought by both Venetian and foreign investors.67 Venetian diarists noted that during this war there were thirty-seven instances in which the decime was demanded of the city’s denizens, and as a result, ready cash was scarce.68 Once again, Venetian shipping suffered the consequences. The sailings westward were interrupted, as verified in the preamble to a Senate decree of 30 August 1483; many goods belonging to citizens and subjects were sitting idle in the wharves awaiting transhipment, in Sicily and other foreign ports, where no ships of Venice were available. Consequently, the Senate granted merchants a temporary permit to transport wheat, victuals, animal fat and other essentials from western territories by chartering foreign ships, and to insure the cargo as if it was loaded on Venetian vessels.69 Another phenomenon to deal with was the growing number of young nobles now impoverished as a result of the war’s drain on family resources and the general demographic increase. The Senate’s solution was to obligate captains of ships of over 1,000 botti to increase the number of noblemen hired as balestrieri da 65 66 67 68

See the preamble to the Senate’s enactment: ASVe, SM, reg. 12, f. 22v (21 September 1484). ASVe, CL, bus. 152, 511–14 (14 November 1481). Luzzatto, Storia economica di Venezia, p. 237; Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, pp. 237–38. Mueller, The Venetian Money Market, p. 239. The shortage of cash is attested in the letters of Marco Bembo to Francesco Zustinian: ASVe, MA, bus. 29 [1482]. 69 ASVe, SM, reg. 11, f. 181r (30 August 1483).

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poppa from two to four.70 However, contraband activity flourished in all areas once more, exemplified by Marco Bembo, who urged his agent in Modon to take advantage of the confusion and stow textiles ‘in segreto’ on the returning galleys of trafego as well as on his own ship, the Bemba.71 The Treaty of Bagnolo, signed on 7 August 1484, put an end to the so-called Salt War with Ferrara, leaving Venice with considerable lands in the mouth of the Po River and the Polesine. With this victory, all told, Venice’s expansion over the Italian mainland had been a success. However, in the meantime Venetian shipping was experiencing an alarming slowdown. These years evidence repeated indications of a shortage in ships. In a letter sent by Alessandro Foscari from Crete to his brother Michele in Venice in December 1485, the former complained that the sluggish turnover and the general shortage in carriers had meant disbursing unusually high freight rates.72 With the Ferrara war over, the ensuing calm enabled Venice to sort out the legacy of problems that the conflict against the Turks had generated within its merchant marine. In 1484 the Senate resurrected a legal device that had obliged all trade exchanges within the northern Adriatic Sea to pass through Venice, and to use registered vessels only for that purpose. In addition, Venice was tense about the worrying extent of Ragusans activity in its Dalmatian territories. A letter written by one Alvise Malipiero, residing in Venice, suggests that his company was making use of a Ragusan ship to transport otherwise unidentified goods (the letter omits information on the cargo), and adds that a certain Piero Cadena (presumably a Venetian citizen representing the interest of this company) was present on the (foreign) ship.73 At one time, the areas of Dalmatia under Venetian rule were forbidden to build any vessels larger than 50 botti, but were later permitted to do so, provided they had no association with Ragusan or other foreign investors: the draconian taxes that Venice tactically imposed on all freights (except the carriage of grain) had effectively deterred Ragusan vessels from encroaching on Venetian territories.74 70 71 72 73 74

Ibid., f. 197v (13 February 1484). ASVe, MCart, bus. 29, n. 56 (31 January 1483), 75 (19 March 1483). ASVe, PSM, Misti, bus. 43, fasc. XXIII [31 December 1485]. ASVe, MCart, bus. 29, n. 46 (12 November 1482). ASVe, SM, reg. 12, f. 22v (21 September 1484); Malipiero, Annali veneti, p. 620 (1484). See, for example, the proclamation in Curzola: Hanĕl, ‘Statuta et leges civitatis et insulae Curzulae,’ p. 193 (21 September 1484). The ban remained in force until 1509. The great necessity moved the Senate to offer Ragusan and foreign ships fiscal privileges. The distrust in Ragusa was such that it required the reiteration of the same: ASVe, SM, reg. 17, f. 72r (18 May 1509); Luzzatto, Storia economica di Venezia, pp. 168–70; Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, pp. 379–80.

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Meanwhile, the Curzolani (from Korčula, an island off the Dalmatian coast) obtained the status of citizens de intus with the corresponding fiscal privileges to their ships in March 1485. This came as a reward for the successful defence of the island against Neapolitan naval incursions. It was no less urgent to prevent the Curzolani from alienating to the emerging shipping enterprises in Ragusa.75 Between 1487 and 1492 the Senate dusted off various old laws forbidding Venetians from forming commercial partnerships in foreign-built ships, having shares in them, or ordering their construction: new measures were necessary to address the machinations of the wily Ragusans. Thus, on 10 November 1487 a new edict renewed the limit on vessel construction in Dalmatia to 50 botti. Unsurprisingly, this sparked strong opposition from the Dalmatian subjects, who eventually managed to secure some amendments to this otherwise hostile provision.76 But the citizens and residents of Venice continued to build – and buy  – foreign-built ships, either through hidden loopholes or by fraud. The preamble to the Senate’s edict of 4 August 1488 admits that despite previous decrees, many citizens and subjects continued to lease or hold shares in foreign ships, to such an extent that the only ships actually being chartered were foreign. To stanch the haemorrhage, the Senate once again placed a ban on partnership in both shipping and trade with outsiders.77 Despite all previous attempts to remedy the situation, the shipyards were largely out of work and shipwrights and caulkers sought employment in the Arsenal, which was obliged to accept them. Consequently, the expenses of the public shipyards had increased, and in October 1489, the Senate applied further enforcements 75 76

77

Arguably, this privilege marks a turning point in Curzola’s shipping activity: soon enough it became an important shipbuilding centre for the Venetian stato da mar: ASVe, SM, reg. 12, ff. 37r–v (9 March 1485). In its final form the edict permitted the Dalmatians to build the ships required for their own voyages in the Adriatic. In addition, a vote was taken to sever all financial links between the Dalmatian shipping industry and Venetian capital, and to emphatically sunder any association with the Ragusans: Lane, ‘Venetian shipping’, p. 29. Translated from a decree of 10 November 1487: ‘Henceforth, it is strictly prohibited for citizens and residents of Venice, and Venetian subjects living in Venice to build or order others to build for them ships, marani, and any other vessel of a capacity that exceeds 50 botti in territories outside Venice, Murano, Torcello, Mazorbo, Burano (Burano di mar), Malamocco, and Chioggia.’ Excluded from this prohibition were Candia, Corfu, and places that had received permission in the past to build ships in their territories: ASVe, SM, reg. 12, ff. 127r–v, 128v (10, 28 November 1487); Hocquet, Venise et le monopole du sel, I, pp. 569–70. The letter of the law prohibited citizens and residents in Venice and subjects in the stato da mar from entering into partnerships with foreigners, or from leasing foreign ships (whether directly or indirectly) for any destination whatever: ASVe, SM, reg. 12, f. 150r (4 August 1488).

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against the purchase of foreign vessels to deter Venetians from indirectly investing in shipbuilding in foreign territories or unprivileged dominions. Formally, this decree condemned all foreign-built ships owned by Venetians to the scrapyard.78 Equally worrying for the Senate was the loss of Venice’s former hegemony over the trade in spices and silk; these products were being loaded in various Levantine ports, as well as in Constantinople and Romania by commercial agents and other non-citizens, and transported on all carriers to Candia or other possessions, from where they were shipped to yet other destinations.79 Similarly, it was admitted in July 1488 that many grippi (broadly speaking, any lateen-rigged vessel) owned by citizens or subjects of Venice transported their cargo regularly to foreign markets in the Adriatic Sea. In the absence of enough armed vessels, the Senate authorized captains of merchant vessels to police the seas against delinquents in return for a share in the booty.80 These provisions were of little avail, and as we shall see the same problems were occasionally addressed in the 1490s. 5

The Eclipse of Venice’s Oceanic Sea Lanes

The importance and the continuity of Venice’s shipping services in the North Sea probably reached its apogee in the first three decades of the fifteenth century, but proved less stable in the following decades due to political and commercial hostility. In the 1460s the lines were suspended at an ever-increasing rate.81 Thereafter, the struggle to maintain Venice’s market share in oceanic shipping turned from costly to irrational, and eventually futile. The situation 78 The letter of the law translated: ‘Without taking strict measures against such customs there is no reason to expect that more ships or navili would be built in Venice, to the great detriment of our Arsenal and the loss of our shipwrights’: ibid., f. 187r (23 October 1489). 79 This lack of control led to the provisions of 1487, which established that the recipient of goods for the Republic must perforce be a Venetian citizen, and the said merchandise had to be transported on the merchant galleys only: ibid., f. 128v (28 November 1487). 80 Ibid., f. 148v (24 July 1488). 81 Venice’s commercial exchange with England and Flanders was largely dependent on the availability of ‘national’ shipping services. This dependence rendered Venetian traders more vulnerable than Tuscan or Genoese, especially when Venetian shipping sputtered. However, between 1384 and 1453 four or five state galleys and other round ships sailed regularly to Flanders and England each year: Stöckly, Le système de l’Incanto, pp. 153, 157–58, 163; Fusaro, Political Economies, pp. 29–30, 33–36; Fryde, ‘Italian Maritime Trade’, p. 311; Foscari, Viaggi di Fiandra, p. 48; Montemezzo, ‘Galley Routes and Merchant Networks’, pp. 168–69.

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deteriorated significantly in 1464, when King Louis XI of French started to send his galleys to the Levant, and Venice retaliated with the removal of the Aigues-Mortes line in the following year. The commercial war that pitted both fleets against each other took a heavy toll, particularly in the Atlantic front, where the galleys of Flanders were repeatedly attacked by the French corsair Coulon and his crews. Concurrently, merchant convoys hoisting other flags were less affected by hostilities, which precipitated a sharp drop in the prices of the incanti of the Flanders galleys. At this juncture, for the operators, neither the outward nor the return voyages to England and Flanders were remunerative enough. In 1470 the Senate resolved to offering a generous bounty of 5,500 ducats to each one of the parties that auctioned the four galleys.82 Also in the following years, the west-bound voyages were sustained by government backing to encourage merchants and manufacturers to maintain their clientele in the those markets. But the French-Venetian commercial treaty of 1476 failed to put an end to the hostility.83 The illustrious attack of Coulon junior on the four galleys of Flanders in 1485 and the siege laid by Saint-Germain and his French fleet on the Venetian convoy in Southampton in 1488 were enough to persuade those still unconvinced that Venice was losing momentum in the North Sea. On top of this, irregularities in the influx of spices from the East, which characterized the last decades of Mamluk rule in the Levant led to shortage in freights. The galleys had to complete their cargos with bulky products (e.g., wine and cotton) that yielded lower returns.84 The Venetian round ships fared no better in the Atlantic: stiff competition had driven down the profits of freighting wine from Crete to Southampton by half. By this time, however, the demand for Mediterranean goods in England and Flanders was greater than the capacity of the available carriers. Flouting the rules, the Venetian merchants covertly conducted this trade on board foreign vessels. Similarly, the shortage in French-style woollens for the local drappieri in Venice prompted the Senate in 1485 to temporarily suspend the 14 March 1478 decree, and permit the transportation of this cargo by sea or land from England, Flanders, and the Barbary Coast, by any person (including foreigners) on any vessel (including foreign ships), without having to disburse additional freightage to the Flanders galleys, and by insuring the cargo as if it 82 Greco, Quaderno di bordo di Giovanni Manzini, p.169; Stöckly, Le système de l’Incanto, p. 158; Sacerdoti, ‘Note sulle galere da mercato’, pp. 97–98. 83 Sottas, Les Messageries Maritimes de Venise, pp. 125, 133–35. 84 Doumerc, ‘Il dominio del mare’, p. 159. Following the capture of the galleys of Flanders in 1485, ships sailing in this direction were authorized to load any merchandise, including those reserved to the galleys: Aleo, Edizione commentata della Cronaca di Venezia di Giovanni Tiepolo, p. 633 (December 1485).

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were loaded on Venetian vessels.85 But the transport of woollens on foreign barze was banned again in January 1488, in a bid to support the galleys on the return voyage.86 By that time, the interests of the Cretan wine producers conflicted with those of the groups associated with Venice’s larger merchant ships. The former aimed at opening the maritime export to competition, a move that attracted English and other foreign ships to the island; in response, Venice scrambled to recapture their business from the new competitors. This mutual reliance between grape cultivators and Venetian large-ship handlers had been established in a series of decrees earlier in the mid-fifteenth century. When in 1473 the Senate decreed a tax of 5 ducats per butt of wine to be imposed on foreign ships – so as to match the transport costs with those charged by Venetian ships and thereby reduce the competitive edge of the foreign freight – the English retaliated by levying a tax at their end on all Cretan wine imported by any vessel not under the Crown, and continued collecting this tax even after the Venetians lifted theirs.87 A decade or so later, the paltry number of large ships remaining in service persuaded the Senate in June 1486 to issue an open call for any citizen with an opinion to be heard.88 The result was the enactment of 13 September 1486, which reads: Our city is in great demand and such a shortage of large ships that not only that there are no ships available, as everybody knows, but also that those of the Comun would soon be unfit for navigation.89 Basically, this decree would grant 4 ducats per botti in three instalments to any applicant who would guarantee to build two ships of 1,000 botti. The concessionaires were therewith obligated to commission the ship for two continuous years, or to refund the said subsidy. To encourage the concessionaires and expedite the completion and the proper operation of their ships, the State declared that, in case of need, these ships would be the first to be armed and 85 ASVe, SM, reg. 12, f. 63v (26 November 1485). 86 Ibid., f. 139v (15 January 1488). 87 In the first decades of the fifteenth century wine travelled exclusively on Venetian ships, whilst from the 1440s there is evidence that English ships were becoming active on the Candia – England route: Tucci, ‘Il commercio del vino’, p. 187; Fusaro, Political Economies, 40–42; Two decrees in this context are 25 July 1441 and 1 March 1451, reiterated and reinforced: ASVe, SM, reg. 12, ff. 158r–59v (18 November 1488). 88 Sanuto, Le vite dei dogi (1474–94), II, p. 515 (June 1486). 89 Luzzatto, ‘Per la storia delle costruzioni navali’, pp. 44–46; Hocquet, Venise et le monopole du sel, I, p. 569.

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sent for the fleet. Otherwise, the ships would be leased for the transport of Cretan wine. In addition, the State offered a bounty of 2 ducats for each butt of Cretan wine shipped to the Channel, a kind of differential operating subsidy for an ‘essential’ route. In addition, every ship that would load salt in Ibiza would receive from the ufficio del sal 3 ducats per mozzo of salt loaded on the island, after consignment in Venice.90 When once again the results were disappointing, the State resolved to build its own round ships as naval auxiliaries.91 During those years the Florentines and Genoese more or less abandoned their shipping exploits to England and Flanders, and the activity of the Venetian merchants likewise waned noticeably.92 Those who were still active employed foreign vessels, shipping their goods to various destinations (Spain, the Barbary Coast, Majorca, and Sicily) and not necessarily to Venice. Consequently, the cottimo in England (the fees collected by the London-based Venetian consul) dropped dramatically.93 Given the Senate’s caveats, the hesitation of shipowners in venturing westwards is understandable, as manifested in a letter sent by Marco Bembo to his agent in Crete in July 1482. The company planned to charter foreign ships to carry large quantities of wine to their partners Hieronimo Tiepolo in London and Jacomo Vanchlei and Alberto Contarini in Bruges.94 The round ship Bemba owned by the family was employed along the route between Venice and Constantinople. Bembo never even imagined sending his own vessel to Flanders; the reopening of trade with the Sublime Porte, and the relative security that now prevailed along the routes to the Levant, made a plentiful supply of attractive freight trips available to his ship. Instead, Bembo used Crete to relay merchandise and local wine out to Flanders on board foreign ships.95 But this too was not as easy as it seemed, and soon he admitted difficulties finding a ship that went in the desired direction: ‘times are tough,’ he wrote to his colleagues in London. ‘If we could just find a ship to charter, you would have 600 botti of wine at your end.’ He then instructed his agent in Crete to load this quantity (or as much as the captain would accept) on an English ship that was expected to arrive to Crete from Chios. As it was, the English ship 90 ASVe, SM, reg. 12, ff. 88v–89r (21 September 1486); Malipiero, Annali veneti, p. 622 (13 September 1486). 91 By 1487, all four navi di Comun authorized in 1475 already sank or were decommissioned. The Senate ordered the Arsenal to build two new ships of 1,200 botti below-decks: ASVe, SM, reg. 12, f. 125r (8 October 1487); Appendix A: 1480, nos. 1–2; Luzzatto, ‘Per la storia delle costruzioni navali’, p. 44; Tucci, ‘Il commercio del vino’, pp. 187, 203; Lane, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 44, 47; idem, Venice, A Maritime Republic, pp. 379–80. 92 Fryde, ‘Italian Maritime Trade’, 332–33. 93 ASVe, SM, reg. 12, f. 124r (28 September 1487). 94 ASVe, MCart, bus. 29, n. 54 (23 January 1483). 95 Ibid., nos. 6 (16 July 1482), 13 (29 July), 25 (22 November), 52 (8 January 1483), 53 (13 January).

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could not accept any more freights, and consequently the Venetian merchant resolved to charter a foreign vessel in Genoa – of all places – where freightage was known to be less onerous. The ship itself would be British or Genoese. He ordered his agent in Crete to figure out a similar solution at his end, since at that time there was no ship in Venice heading westward, otherwise Bembo would have already chartered it. The only four Venetian large ships that were potentially fit for the voyage were commissioned to the armada, whereas two smaller ships – one of them the Landa of 800 botti – were at anchor in Venice all August. Unwilling to break his promise to his partner Hieronimo Tiepolo in London, he eventually resorted to chartering a Genoese ship in Genoa, whose business he considered was ‘suspect’. The ship set sail to Chios and Alexandria, and was scheduled to reach Crete in January 1484 to complete its cargo with 600 butts of wine, and then proceed to England.96 Similarly, Piero Contarini hesitated to send his ship to England, and instead opted to transport wine from Crete as far as Livorno or Pisa, where it would await transhipment on board foreign ships bearing woollens and cloth to these same Tuscan ports.97 The brothers Foscari fared no better in April 1486, hesitating whether to send their Foscara of 600 botti through the English Channel amidst the theatre of ongoing conflicts between Britain and France. In a letter written from Crete to his brother Michele Foscari in Venice, Alessandro surmised that their commercial rival Da Mosto in Corfu ‘was not so wealthy as to risk the ship and cargo in these times of conflict.’ However, possible competition for the deal came from Nicolò Coresi, based in Crete, who was readying a ship of over 800 botti in the port of Rettimo (Rethymno), and whose intention was to load this new ship with wine, and sail to the Channel in September. Eventually, he too changed his mind and the launch was postponed to a much later date.98 The Foscara meanwhile met a no better fate: on 4 December 1487, news reached Rialto that the vessel had been shipwrecked in English waters.99 As controls tightened, operators resorted to new subterfuges to hold on to their market share, with the result that by the end of 1488 there was not a single

96 Ibid., n. 71 (19 March 1483), 76 (9 April), 83 (3 June), 91 (11 July), 110 (November), 115 (20 November), 126 (21 February 1484), 133 (8 February). 97 Contarini’s plan was thwarted by the senators; instead, he was granted one ducat per butt if he would choose to carry the wine to England with his own ship: ASVe, SM, reg. 13, ff. 11r–v (26 May 1490); Schanz, Englische Handelspolitik, I, p. 138. 98 ASVe, PSM, Misti, bus. 43, fasc. XXIII [15 April 1486]; Appendix A: 1490, n. 57. 99 Sanuto, Le vite dei Dogi (1474–94), II, p. 580.

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ship in Venice of over 1,000 botti.100 This statement tallies with the ship list provided in table 11 below.101 Faced with such a dire situation, the Senate offered significant subsides to allow Venetian operators to outbid foreign ships in the malvasia wine ‘freight war’, which saw foreign companies poaching business by reducing rates as low as 4 ducats per butt of wine, whereas the operating costs prevented Venetian ships from charging less than 7 ducats per butt. In force from 1 March 1489, a protective tax of 4 ducats per butt (besides the standard imposts) was again applied for all westbound cargos of Cretan wine loaded on foreign ships and barze. This decree virtually prevented foreign vessels from loading wine in Crete, comparable therefore to the draconian imposts that had been foisted on the Ragusans at a previous juncture. New far-reaching methods were needed to embolden operators to invest in such voyages. Hence, the Senate decreed a subsidy of 3,000 ducats and above in instalments for investors who would build ships of over 1,000 botti; a bounty of 1 ducat in cash for every mozzo of salt loaded in Ibiza, in addition to 7 ducats in timed payments (i.e., 4 ducats in cash per mozzo after consignment, and the rest in instalments).102 Once again, the attempt was of little avail  – in 1480 Venice 100 ASVe, SM, reg. 12, f. 159r (18 November 1488, revoked); Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, p. 29 cit. 2–3. 101 In August 1490 there were two navi di Comun of over 1,000 botti afloat. The first of these ships, which I suspect to be the Pandora (of over 2,000 botti), was authorized for building in 1487 but not launched until 1489, and hence did not exist yet in 1488. The second nave di Comun, the Calafata of 1,800 botti, had been built as a private ship by Manoli Calafato dalla Cania in the 1470s: it was abandoned in Chioggia, at the southern end of the Venetian lagoon, in the early 1480s, subsequently purchased by the State, repaired, and re-commissioned in 1486 (Appendix A: 1480, n. 29), and hence was still afloat in the year in question, 1488. Similarly, the Tiepola of 1,200 botti (rated 900 and 1,000 botti in two other instances) was afloat in 1488. Most probably, the Senate’s aforementioned statement referred to new ships being built in Venice at that time. Indeed, no ship of over 1,000 botti was under construction in private shipyards in Venice before 1 September 1490, which is the date the Senate ratified a new recovery plan. I include a chronological list of large round ships that were built as a direct result of the latter enactment in Appendix A: 1490. 102 Schanz, Englische Handelspolitik, I, pp. 132–33; Hocquet, Venise et le monopole du sel, I, p. 581. In those years the only subsidies Venice offered to its shippers was on salt consignments. It was decreed on 11 May and 5 June 1479 to grant a bounty of 1 ducat per mozzo, in addition to the customary rates, for shipments of salt from Cyprus and Ibiza. This measure assured the flow of moderate supplies (a monthly sum of 200 ducats was assigned for paying freightage). The subsidy was extended in two years in 1481 and for five additional years in 1483: ASVe, SM, reg. 11, ff. 121v (9 August 1481), 175r (16 July 1483). On 23 February 1485 the Council of Ten suspended it until income deposits were secured.

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had a mere four round ships of over 1,000 botti, two of which were owned by the Comun. A decade later in 1490 that number had dropped to three, one of which was privately owned. With regard to percentages, large ships of over 1,000 botti accounted for over 21% of the total capacity of the merchant fleet in 1490; a similar proportion was recorded ten years earlier. Clearly, shipowners remained sceptical about the expediency of the entire package. As a result, no ship was willing to accept such freights. On 21 May 1485 the suspension was lifted and the ufficio del sal disbursed 1 ducat per mozzo of salt: ASVe, CXDM, reg. 22, ff. 143v (23 February 1485), 173r (21 May); Sanuto, Le vite dei Dogi (1474–94), II, pp. 607–8.

chapter 12

The Roaring Nineties and the War with the Turks, 1490–1502 1

A Positive Trend in Shipping during the Last Decade of the 15th Century

Mediterranean shipping in the late 1480s and early 1490s was a decidedly tense and competitive market, and a test of strength for many operators. Looking at the snapshot of Venice’s merchant marine in August 1490 (table 11), we see a tendency to build ships of the lowest category (1480:16; 1490:18) and a decline in the number of ships in all other categories, with the exception of the two owned by the Comun. table 11

Snapshot of the merchant marine in August 1490

Category

1,500 botti (900 tons) and above 1,000–1,500 botti (600–900 tons) 800–999 botti (480–599 tons) 600–799 botti (360–479 tons) 400–599 botti (240–359 tons) Merchant galleys (240 tons) Total

No. of vessels

in %

2

16

1

5

1

3

4

11

18

32

19

32

45

100

Capacity

3,800 botti (2,280 tons) 1,200 botti (720 tons) 800 botti (480 tons) 2,600 botti (1,560 tons) 7,600 botti (4,560 tons) 9,500 milliaria (4,560 tons) 14,160 tons

See respectively, Appendix A: 1490.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004398177_014

16,000 botti (9,600 tons)

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For all shippers involved in the race, new and tighter methods were brought into play to maximize their returns on investment. The ones who faced the greatest hurdles were those that clung to a conservative management structure, a system that to some extent might be said to represent the Venetian ideal of ‘correctness’ in the trading sector. This group of shipowners filed a joint complaint to the Senate citing the difficulties in outbidding freights, accusing other Venetian shipowners and merchants of not respecting the interests of the State. A decree of 1 March 1490 conceded that, despite the prohibition set in law, many Venetian citizens not only operated and chartered foreign ships, but had also financed their construction. To the dismay of the Ten, the ban against Ragusan ships was also being flagrantly breached through a loophole that involved renting property in the Venetian possessions in Dalmatia (without living or staying there on a permanent basis). Thus, they obtained the right to hoist the Venetian banner on their vessels, although the shareholders of these vessels were foreigners and their crews consisted solely of Ragusans (whereas the law required a Venetian majority). Under the auspices of the winged lion of St Mark, these individuals had committed countless frauds and violations of the Republic’s regulations. All this took place in the last decade of the fifteenth century, despite the concerted efforts of maritime legislators to tighten the screws on colonial shipping; governors, consuls and baili in foreign territories were expected to closely monitor all traffic at their end, irrespective of whether vessels were coowned by Ragusans and foreigners, or built in foreign lands. Individuals who settled in Venice’s overseas possessions and received citizenship after the year 1485 were required to prove that they were living in these territories  – with their wife and family – for at least three consecutive years; failing this, their application for citizenship would be rejected, and they would be considered foreigners, and ineligible to work as captains or to have shares in Venetian vessels.1 Although subjects of Venetian dominions in the Italian mainland and in a few Dalmatian towns – such as Zara, Sebenico, Spalato, and Dulcigno – had already enjoyed the standing of cittadini de intus in Venice from the first half of the fifteenth century,2 the 1490 ruling suggests that the lawmakers’ main concern was Curzola, where the islanders had obtained the same status on 19 March 1485. In the same decree the Senate dealt with another serious loophole by which Venetians could purchase or indirectly build ships in foreign

1 ASVe, SM, reg. 13, ff. 3r–4v (1 March 1490). 2 Mueller, Immigrazione e cittadinanza, pp. 169–72.

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territories, and then naturalize them (i.e., declare them Venetian).3 Lastly, it was decided to reaffirm the longstanding law that prohibited the construction of navili da cheba of over 50 botti (di vera portada) in the entire stretch of territory between Saseno (modern Sazan, in southern Albania) and Venice itself. On 9 August 1490 the senatorial body admitted that many shipowners could not honour the ultimatum that was set in law, and duly suffered sanctions and confiscations by state officials. The period was then extended by one month so that vessels would qualify to complete a contracted voyage, discharge cargo, and undergo repairs and other maintenance, before being put up for sale.4 1.1 The Reform Programme of 1490 This imposition of further restrictions presaged a far-reaching reform programme announced between 27 August and 1 September 1490, aimed at increasing Venice’s gross tonnage – in all categories. This would involve completely overhauling the city’s shipyards to bring an end to the drawn-out stagnation, and by applying the harshest controls over the Cretan wine cultivators, one of the colonial economy’s most vital sectors. Although the history books tend to favour the 21 October 1502 decree (the alleged ‘remedial law’), this reform package was by far the most bold and effective to date: at least nine round ships of 700 to 2,500 botti were completed and launched, seven of which were owned by Venetian noblemen.5 Unlike the previous unsuccessful attempts to reboot the shipyards, the 1490 bill contained the full range of government regulatory policies. Of utmost importance was the open call for all of Venice’s ships – including those built in the colonies (the term used is nave venete)  – to accept freights to Flanders and England in return for a subsidy of 2 ducats per butt of wine, in addition to the freight rates agreed with the merchants. Ships that sailed in that direction were encouraged to load salt in Ibiza on their homebound voyage, in return for a bounty of 8 ducats per mozzo 3 To naturalize their ships, the operators sold their ships to themselves for a small sum. Thereafter, similar acts of sale registered by the cattaveri or by any other magistracy or colonial administration would not be considered as a naturalization procedure. Such vessels were prohibited from hoisting the San Marco flag, and ordered to leave Venetian territories within a period of one month or be dismantled in the Arsenal. It was equally prohibited to let others operate such ships under all penalties set in law. The accusers would then receive the ship: ASVe, SM, reg. 13, ff. 3r–4v (1 March 1490). 4 The governors were expected to warn owners who built such ships to dismantle them within a period of one month, or to administer the operation themselves, and obtain the rights on the timber and the rest of the materials. The fact that the ultimatum was postponed suggests that these policies were enforced. The extension of the period was revoked in the Senate on 9 July and again 19 July and finally approved 9 August 1490: ibid., f. 15v. 5 Appendix A: 1490.

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of salt, half of which would be paid on the nail upon consignment in Venice, in addition to the price of the salt (i.e., 1 ducat and 16 grossi); the remaining sums would be credited to their tab in the ufficio del sal. It was the first time that such stimuli had been offered to any ship owned by citizens, residents or subjects of Venice (and not exclusively to Venetian-built ones). There was also no limitation on the ships’ tonnage (i.e., the 1,000-botti minimum requirement was annulled). Interestingly, this decree might even be regarded as an oblique invitation to investors to construct larger-tonnage ships overseas. No less radical was the fact that the senators were willing to offer two bounties of 500 ducats (in addition to the aforementioned benefits) for citizens or subjects who would resume the commercial exchange with England and Flanders on board two foreign barze of over 1,000 botti; namely, by buying or building such ships in foreign territories. The vessels could then pass through a process of naturalization (‘et intelligantur facte venete’), what would nullify the protective tax on malvasia wine, and instead open up a range of privileged shipments. As discussed elsewhere, the naturalization process also entailed lower rates for port and customs duties in all Venetian ports. Another privilege offered by the decree allowed tramp trade (a contract carrier) in the western Mediterranean, with the exclusion of salt shipments from Ibiza to these places. In case of need, the barze might be commissioned for service by the Comun, in return for a hefty reward. The barze would be manned by Venetian citizens and subjects, and would enrol nobili da poppa. Finally, a subsidy of 4,000 ducats was offered to anyone willing to finance the construction of any craft with a minimum capacity of 1,000 botti in a shipyard in Venice, to a maximum of four vessels.6 The response to the appeal is reported in the Collegio’s records, along with the approval of four such candidates.7 The first two ships authorized on that same day (2 September) was the Marcella of 1,085 botti built in Venice,8 and the Tiepola (also known as the Foscara), whose launch was postponed until March 1496. However, the latter vessel was shipwrecked on its maiden ocean voyage, an event widely considered to be one of the greatest naval disasters of the period. The third ship authorized that day was the Zustiniana, owned by Luca di Benedetto Gritti, and Benedetto Zustinian q. Pangrati; their vessel was launched half a year later, but Gritti himself died soon afterward, and when the gross tonnage fell to 700 botti, the company lost its eligibility for the 4,000-ducat 6 ASVe, SM, reg. 13, ff. 27r–28r (27 August 1490), 29r (1 September 1490). 7 Sanuto, Le vite dei dogi (1474–94), II, pp. 632–33 (27 August 1490). 8 Hocquet, Venise et le monopole du sel, I, pp. 582, 591. See also the reconstructed biography of this ship.

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bounty. The fourth ship of 1,200 botti below the lower deck – having an overall capacity of 2,000 botti – was built by a company of noble merchants. In the wake of a problematic launch operation, and delays to its departure for Crete, the vessel then capsized disastrously, in plain view of the port of San Nicolò.9 The incident prompted the Senate’s decree of 7 February 1494, which offered a bounty of 3,000 ducats for the construction of two ships with dual decks and forecastle, one of which with a minimum capacity of 1,200 botti below the lower deck. The owners of the wrecked ship were offered first grabs, but declined.10 No evidence has so far turned up to show that any ship of such size was built as a result of this decree. Hence, we can reasonably say that the 1490 and the 1494 enactments failed to trigger any significant revival in the construction of big ships in Venice. One of the reasons for the poor response may be the counter-duty of an extra 18 shillings per butt of malmsey (strong sweet wine) imported to England on foreign vessels, imposed in 1492 by an Act of Parliament.11 Not long thereafter, on 9 August 1496 the Senate re-enacted the subsidies previously offered to all ships that would carry wine to the Channel, despite the fact that the war between England and France seriously hampered traffic in those waters.12 This time, however, the number of round ships clocking between 600 and 799 botti noted in the registers for 1499 reveals a sharp rise relative to the figures that appear to represent the situation in the previous decades: from six such ships in 1480 and four in 1490, the total jumped to sixteen in 1499. Undisputedly, this leap was the direct outcome of the Republic’s readiness to offer industrial stimuli (ship-operating subsidies) to vessels built in the colonies. Indeed, in 1498 the Venetian senator and shipowner Benedetto Zustinian commented that the number of ships of over 500 botti owned by Venetians, ‘zoè de’ venitiani’, had dropped to twelve against some 350 under Doge Tommaso Mocenigo, owing to widespread capture and shipwreck.13 And yet just one year later, the total number of Venice’s ships in these categories – including those originating from the colonies – was around twenty-five.14 Allowing for navi di Comun and those 9 Appendix A: 1490, nos. 54–56, 62. 10 ASVe, SM, reg. 14, ff. 27v (7 February 1494) 48r–v (23 October 1494). To infallibly supply the subsidy of 3,000 ducats, the subsidies for salt deposits were suspended: ASVe, CXDM, reg. 26, f. 152r (6 November 1494). 11 Epstein, ‘The Early History of the Levant Company’, p. 1 and the bibliography therein. 12 ASVe, SM, reg. 14, f. 103r (9 August 1496). 13 It reads: ‘How right now in this territory, that is of the Venetians, there are only 12 ships of 500 botti and more, while in the times of our Doge Tomà Mocenigo there were 350 ships’: Sanuto, I diarii, II, 225 (12 December 1498). 14 Appendix A: 1499.

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whose owners were possibly not Venetians, we are left with thirteen to fifteen ships of 500 botti or above. Hence, the senator’s comment strongly suggests that the industrial stimulations that were offered in 1490 intended (and indeed managed) to attract a wider milieu of shipping entrepreneurs that were not Venetians (seemingly Venetian residents or colonial subjects) that built their ships not necessarily in Venice. 1.2 Piracy on the Rise Amidst all this serious business of legislation and statutes, a significant feature affecting shipping throughout the 1490s was the sudden rise in piracy, which became so intense it was tantamount to an outright war on merchant traffic in the western basin of the Mediterranean. In 1493, for example, three Venetian round ships were seized by corsairs and held captive in the Barbary Coast to sell their cargo. Shortly afterwards Piero Lando’s ship carrying salt from Ibiza to the Barbary Coast was also captured. The constant dangers of piracy were reported by Alessandro Foscari, then residing on Crete, in a letter to his brother Michele: ‘This is a bad thing that our ships cannot sail anymore, as the corsairs are everywhere.’15 The number of Venetian vessels of over 300 botti reported to have been captured by pirates or corsairs gives a clear picture of the situation: in 1491 five vessels were seized, in 1492 two, in 1493 seven (out of which three were later retrieved), in 1496 two, in 1497 another four, in 1498 yet again three ships, in 1499 the same number (excluding those destroyed in battle), in 1500 yet another three (see Appendix B). This surge of incursions contrasts with the previous decade, in which the number of ships captured fluctuated between zero to one per year (with the exception of two in 1483 and 1488, respectively). Notably, the number of smaller vessels that fell victim to sea plunder was considerably greater. Hostilities further intensified with the French invasion of Italy and the onset of the Italian War (1494–99), in which Venetians became actively involved in March 1495.16 A parallel war against Florence saw the Venetians in support of Pisa (1496–99), and this had a further detrimental effect.17 Threatened thus by the marauding French fleets on one side and harassed by corsairs on the other, Venetian seaborne trade in the western Mediterranean and beyond the Pillars of Hercules was seriously hampered. The notoriously disastrous galley voyage 15 ASVe, PSM, Misti, bus. 43, fasc. XXIII [26 February 1493]. 16 Gino Luzzatto regards Venice’s imperialistic aspirations responsible for unnecessary expenses in critical times: Luzzatto, Storia economica di Venezia, p. 219; Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, pp. 241–42. 17 Mueller, The Venetian Money Market, p. 239.

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to Flanders of the year 1495 – in which two galleys sank and the returning convoy was raided in the port of Southampton left Venice’s oceanic aspirations in shambles. Soon afterwards, thanks to the ongoing state of war with France, on 20 April 1496 the Senate deleted the voyage to Flanders from the itinerary.18 The lasting impact on the activity of the Venetian trading companies is amply attested by the petition that Andrea Loredan q. Nicolò, submitted to the Council of Ten in 1497. Loredan refers in his petition to the ‘universal’ scarcity of cereals that lasted two years, during which he undertook to supply a quantity of 40,000 stara of grain from Sicily and Negroponte. For this purpose, he had leased eight vessels, which he stocked with metals, gold, and spices to barter for cereals at his destinations. All eight craft were either captured or detained in various ports for months on end, being easy prey for the powerful corsair Piero Navaro. Unable to fulfil his various obligations, Loredan was forced to file for bankruptcy protection.19 1.3 Bank Failures The alarming rise in plunder and confiscation at sea and land was matched by the all-too-frequent recourse of the Senate to the decime (this tithe was applied no fewer than seventy times between 1482 and 1499).20 One might be puzzled by the apparent dynamism of shipping in the 1490s as described above, and the marked signs of economic straits. Sensing disaster in the air, the Rialto bankers Pietro and Vettor Soranzo wisely decided to quit banking while their business was still solvent. In 1499 two otherwise solid banks at the Rialto, the Garzoni and Lippomano, went bankrupt within three and a half months, and as the Pisani and Agostini also went under, other failures followed relentlessly. Pisani faced further ruin the following year, but was eventually bailed out by the intervention of numerous foreign citizens and merchants present at the Rialto.21 Both diarists, Marino Sanuto and Domenico Malipiero, attributed the dearth of ready money to the financial drain of the various war efforts, starting with the French invasion of Italy in 1494, if not before. The principal problem was that large sums of money were siphoned off from bank deposits into the loan fund of the Monte Nuovo, which yielded a meagre return of 5%, at most. 18 Sottas, Messageries Maritimes, pp. 132–33; Sanuto, La spedizione di Carlo VIII, p. 295 (5 April 1495); idem, I diarii, I, 329, 332 (22, 27 September 1496); Malipiero, Annali veneti, pp. 630–33 (16 August 1496); ASVe, ACMCP, bus. 4590, fasc. 3 (28 February 1497). 19 ASVe, CXDM, fil. 12, fasc. 11 (27 July 1497). On the famine: Luzzatto, Storia economica di Venezia, p. 171. 20 Mueller, The Venetian Money Market, p. 239. 21 Ibid., pp. 230, 241–43, 246–49.

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Consequently, the banks lost heavily on deposits that in normal circumstances bore high interests. To increase their liquidity, therefore, the banks competed madly to import silver. Amid this scenario, doubts were rife about the liquidity of the State itself, prompting creditors to offer their credits against the Treasury at a discount, for as low as 52%. By the end of 1498, the situation was such that Venice made overtures to Pisa to bring an end to its conflict with Florence, which was eventually resolved in early May 1499.22 Although it is unclear what started the massive withdrawals of liquidity in the first place, we can reasonably assume that some merchants – such as those with credit at the Garzoni bank – obtained inside information, or got a whiff of the impending disaster that the summer campaign of the Ottomans would catalyze.23 Whatever the true reasons were for the implosion, it can be imagined that the shipping business was at least momentarily paralyzed; i.e., shipments were cancelled, merchants suspended the disbursement of freightage, and orders for new ships came to naught. But the much-feared chain reaction did not materialize, and the government immediately took vigorous measures to force the bankers (and their families) to pay off all depositors, seizing the banker’s personal property, and even threatening expulsion from the nobility.24 1.4 The Attempts to Redirect Shipping and Trade Despite the signs of crisis and lack of ready money, the ship list of 1499 leaves little doubt that the 1490s were actually lively times for shipping activity and commercial exchange in general. One way to explain this apparent contrast is that trade with Constantinople and the Levant was left largely uninterrupted and managed to keep the merchant marine buoyant. Venetian spice trade in the Levant probably reached an apogee at the end of the fifteenth century, a heyday that lasted until the fatal year of 1496, when the death of the Mamluk sultan was followed by several years of violent power struggles over the throne.25 Still, on 1497 the Alexandria galley carried well over 12 metric tons of silver coinage, although some of it returned to Venice.26 Arguably, of equal importance was the decision to release the shipbuilding market from the tethers of the lagoon by offering ship operating subsidies to a wider range of ships, 22 Ibid., pp. 238–39, 241–43. 23 Venice was alarmed by the new Turkish armada already in early 1495. The threat became concrete in the winter of 1498/9: Sanuto, La spedizione di Carlo VIII, pp. 294–95, 351; Lane, ‘Naval action’, p. 148. 24 Luzzatto, Storia economica di Venezia, pp. 172–73, 224; Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 328; Mueller, The Venetian Money Market, p. 246. 25 Cf. Ashtor, ‘The Venetian Supremacy’, pp. 21–22; Arbel, ‘The Last Decades’, pp. 68–69. 26 Mueller, The Venetian Money Market, pp. 234–35.

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which is believed to attract non-Venetians to enter into this hazardous sector. Another possible explanation for the short-lived heyday in shipping is the securing of lucrative freights for Venetian ships by practically banning foreign ships from Crete since 1 March 1489. However, the detrimental repercussions to the Cretan economy were not late in coming: in 1499 on behalf of the island’s feudal society a special envoy, Renier Dandolo, presented the Senate with a request to revoke the protective tariff of 4 ducats per botte on foreign ships.27 The tax had forced the island’s cultivators to sell their produce at ruinous prices, and consequently many islanders had already abandoned Crete, and others kept on emigrating from the island. To be sure, the Venetians were well informed of the consequences, but the system gave precedence to the interests of a group of wealthy merchant-shipowners. By now it was clear that a head-on confrontation with the Ottomans was inevitable, and that Crete would be cut off from one of its most important clients, Constantinople. The motion to lift the protective tax was put to the vote on 25 February and 20 March 1499, but no decision was made. The senators asked the Collegio to express its opinion in this matter on 10 April. Eventually, the lifting of the protective tax was confirmed in the Senate one week later, and the news sent to the governor of Crete on the following day.28 We can reasonably assume that at this juncture foreign competitors swiftly took over, an event foreseen by the owner of the Pandora, Piero Pesaro, who was one of the chief contenders against the removal of the protective tax. Nevertheless, after his ship was destroyed by fire in battle, he filed a petition in 1500 asking to transport his wine on foreign ships in return for subsidies.29 The Senate’s bid to control the Cretan wine trade was only temporarily put on hold, and in 1504 the protective measures were reinstated so as to prevent this traffic from falling entirely into foreign hands.30 Faced with ever-stiffer competition, Venice’s challenge now was to attract more ships and cargos in its direction, to increase the city’s income through customs imposts. A thorough revision in the spice trade decreed on 27 July 1492 became a benchmark for many later adjustments. The decree mostly concerned the practices of merchants in Syria and Egypt, the shipments of spices to Ottoman territories, and also covered various aspects of the loading procedures in the Levant. It reminded merchants that for return voyages it was 27 Malipiero, Annali veneti, p. 649 (1499). 28 ASVe, SM, reg. 14, f. 181r (17 April 1499); Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, pp. 29–31. 29 Similar permissions were granted to others as well: Sanuto, I diarii, II, 476–77 (25 February 1499); ASVe, SM, reg. 15, ff. 24v, 25v (14, 22 May 1500). 30 1504: ASVe, SM, reg. 16, ff. 41v (19 January), 49v (21 March); and respectively: Sanuto, I diarii, V, 729, 1027.

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prohibited to take on spices and other goods belonging to infidels. It was also acknowledged that Venetian merchants frequently shipped their goods on foreign galeazze and other vessels, thereby depriving Venice’s own ships of freights. To address this contravention, captains of foreign vessels were allowed to retain and confiscate all the spices loaded by Venice’s merchants on their ships, without risk of prosecution.31 Similarly, the haemorrhage of fiscal revenues caused by the endemic contraband in the Adriatic Sea  – chiefly the traffic between the Gulf of Quarner and Le Marche – prompted the Senate on 3 August 1492 to resuscitate the obligation for all cargo ships to haul into port in Venice.32 The alienation of seaborne trade from the Greek overseas territories to foreign ports during this decade also received considerable attention from the Senate. Such commercial centres as Corfu, Modon, and Crete had become flourishing emporiums of shipping and trade, but the traffic was not necessarily directed to Venice.33 In the mid-1490s the Senate acknowledged that the grippi freely transported grain and other cargo to the Barbary Coast and elsewhere, a practice that seriously affected the Republic’s fiscal revenues.34 As shipping moved towards an international industry, the pressure grew on local operators to flag out. It was already admitted in 1488 that Venetian citizens and subjects held shares in foreign ships to the extent that only foreign ships were being chartered.35 The Senate’s decree of 3 November 1495 aimed to prevent the alienation of colonial vessels or their sale to foreigners, and to channel colonial seaborne trade back to conform with a system of rules and regulations beneficial to the State. In this light, from now on subjects in Venice’s overseas territories were obliged to declare the capacity and condition of each of their vessels, along with the names of their captains and shareholders. To this end, each local administration was instructed to keep records on all ships in their territories, and register any acts of sale, which were subject to an attestation by the governor. The prohibitions on the leasing of vessels to foreigners (be they Christians or Muslims)  – and on shipping certain goods to foreign destinations – were likewise subject to ratification. The list of Venetian territories in which the decree was proclaimed attests to its importance: Corfu and the vicinity; Modon; Coron; Napoli di Romania (Nafplion); Lepanto; Candia; 31 ASVe, SM, reg. 13, ff. 91v–92v (27 July 1492). 32 Ibid., ff. 93v–94r (3 August 1492). A decree of 24 August 1497 threatened with imprisonment and exile any captain or scrivano of merchant vessels found handling contraband: ASVe, ST, reg. 13, ff. 12v–13r. 33 Pagratis, ‘Ships and Shipbuilding in Corfu’, pp. 243–45. 34 Governors were asked to provide information on local vessels: Sanuto, I diarii, I, 283 (28 August 1496). 35 1488: ASVe, SM, reg. 12, ff. 148v (24 July), 150r (5 August).

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Rettimo; La Canea; Zara; Cattaro; Sebenico; Traù; Spalato; Lesina; Curzola; Veglia; Antivari; Dulcigno; and Durazzo. Based in Venice, the provveditori di Comun were the authority in charge.36 Again on 26 August 1496 it was acknowledged that Venetian subjects had continued to sell their grippi to foreigners and infidels through fraudulent means, causing a serious paucity of grain in Venice and other maritime territories, particularly in Corfu. Venetian fleet commanders had personally witnessed the grippi freely carrying cargo along the Barbary Coast and elsewhere. Consequently, from then on operators were obliged to report to the cancellieri or scrivani in the place of departure, and supply the following details of their freight: crew names; destination; the names of those who chartered the ship; the type of merchandise on board; and the scheduled ports of call. They were to do this even before the loading began.37 At least formally, this clamp-down on shipping practices made the short sea markets more controlled than they had ever been before. 1.5 The Exploitation of Cyprus’s Natural Resources Another reform aimed at reviving the shipping sector involved fixing new freight rates and modes of payment for Cypriot salt that were more in line with the formal annexation of the island (in 1489) and the increased exploitation of the salt production that followed.38 To stem theft, the Council of Ten established a procedure to match the quantities of salt reportedly loaded in Cyprus against those eventually consigned.39 Moreover, it was vital to ensure that the privileged salt shipments would be reserved for the round ships. The 36 Ibid., reg. 14, ff. 83v–84r (3 November 1495). The 1325, 1328 decrees permitted the selling of a vessel to Venetian citizens or subjects only, unless the vessel had been afloat ten years, and in this case, only the hull without rigging or equipment: ASVe, PC, reg. 1, f. 12v (1325); ASVe, PSD, bus. 1, f. 133v (4 December 1328). 37 Naval commanders were instructed to prevent grippi owned by Christians from loading goods belonging to infidels. However, if encountered at sea, such vessels could proceed: ASVe, SM, reg. 14, f. 103r (26 August 1496). 38 The freight rate was set at 6 ducats per net mozzo, to be disbursed upon consignment. The new mode replaced the older system by which owners received in advance the price of salt they intended to load in Cyprus, and deducted their debit from the credit of 1 ducat per mozzo upon delivery. According to the new system, the captains had to obtain an attestation concerning the quantity loaded: ibid., reg. 13, f. 5r (1 March 1490). 39 A decree dated 16 March 1493 acknowledged the fact that a considerable part of the salt that was loaded in Cyprus between 1477 and 1490 did not arrive to the depositories but ended up on the black market. This was mainly due to alleged declarations of naufraggio (i.e., damaged or lost cargo): ASVe, CXDM, reg. 26, ff. 31v–32r (16 March 1493), 66v– 68r (19 September 1493). On the annual report of the quantities loaded in Cyprus: ibid., reg. 26, f. 202v (31 July 1495). On salt declared lost: ibid., reg. 27, ff. 200v–1r (21 April 1498).

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shipping operators and Venetian administration in Cyprus were reminded that the marani were not allowed to sail beyond the Adriatic Sea, and if they did, it was strictly prohibited for them to load salt in Cyprus. Nevertheless, several operators were granted special transport rights on an individual basis. Less than two years later, on 30 December 1491 the annual expenses of the ufficio del sal on purchasing (in the case of Ibizan salt) and transporting salt from Cyprus and Ibiza had risen from 4,000 to 12,000 ducats per year. The stock of salt in the warehouses was so abundant, it ‘would suffice for twelve years’, a fact that prompted the Council of Ten to lift the bounties on salt importation and pay (in the case of Ibizan salt) by the market price, as had been the custom before. Nevertheless, the ships sailing to England and Flanders would still be entitled to their bounty of four ducats. In this instance, all ships with a carrying capacity of over 200 mozza were authorized to carry salt to Venice.40 However, in 1494 the dire shortage of carriers of grain from Cyprus (a symptom of the alienation of shipping) persuaded the Ten to condition all transport of salt from that island to shipping out an equal quantity of cereals.41 2

The Merchant Marine c. July–August 1499: The War Effort

In the summer of 1499 Venice mobilized a considerable part of its commercial fleet against the Turkish war machine, which by now surpassed that of the Venetians, even at sea.42 It is generally believed that for the war effort Venice exploited the entire commercial fleet in its possession. Often mentioned in this context is a comment made by the state attorney prosecuting Antonio Grimani (admiral of the fleet accused of misconduct during the Battle of Zonchio in 1499), that Venice very nearly cleared the seas of its vessels in anticipation of the coming confrontation. Such a statement can be interpreted as mere rhetoric, given that letters continued to pass from Venice to its armada, and that grain and supplies still made their way safely to Venice and the subjected colonies. Indeed, evidence suggests that the total capacity of Venice’s merchant marine in all categories of over 120 botti (72 tons) was bigger than that of the war fleet (table 12).

40 Ibid., reg. 25, f. 99r (30 December 1491). Two failed attempts to reduce the minimum capacity required by law to 160 and later 200 mozza: ibid., fil. 6, f. 48r (23 May 1492). 41 Aristidou, Ανέκδοτα έγγραφα, I, p. 233 (3 December 1494). 42 Hocquet, Venise et le monopole du sel, I, p. 572.

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Snapshot of the merchant marine c. July–August 1499, including medium-sized vessels of over 72 tons

Category

No. of in % vessels

in %

1,500 botti (900 tons) and above 1,000–1,500 botti (600–900 tons) 800–999 botti (480–599 tons)

5

27

16

1

3

2

2

4

3

600–799 botti (360–479 tons)

17

29

17

400–599 botti (240–359 tons)

15

18

11

Merchant galleys (240 tons)

17

19

11

Sub Total

57

100

c. 60

Smaller vessels (72–239 tons) 108 + the invisible 25% in this category

(36)

Total

201

c. 40

100

Capacity

10,000 botti (6,000 tons) 1,200 botti (720 tons) 1,600 botti (960 tons) 10,500 botti (6,300 tons) 6,565 botti (3,939 tons) 8,500 milliaria (4,055 tons)

29,865 botti (17,919 tons)

21,974 tons 11,226 tons (3,742 tons)

14,968 tons

36,942 tons

See respectively, Appendix A: 1499.

In 1499 the merchant marine of Venice consisted of seventeen galleys and forty round ships with a combined capacity of 21,974 tons. In addition, gauging the relative size of the colonial fleets around that year, there were approximately 144 commercial vessels of 72–239 tons comprising altogether at least 40% (14,968 tons) of the carrying capacity.43 Hence, the gross tonnage in all the categories examined must have reached the size of 36,942 tons.

43

The total gross tonnage in this category is calculated according to a capacity of 150 botti. As for the undocumented quota: Appendix A:1499, note on the sources; Appendix B.

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The composition of the merchant marine in all categories above 240 tons, c. 1499

Several other observations can be made here. In 1499 we find three navi di Comun with an overall capacity of 6,500 botti. The fourth ship, the Pandora of 2,000 botti, was built by the Arsenal but sold to private entrepreneurs. A striking fact is that a mere six out of the total of 219 vessels afloat in 1499 made up nearly 20% (6,720 tons) of the gross tonnage of the fleet. In comparison with earlier years, the most significant change is the dramatic increase in the number of ships in the category of 600–799 botti (360–479 tons) – which leaped from six and four in 1480 and 1490 respectively, to no fewer than seventeen in 1499. Vessels with a capacity smaller than 72 tons, which had no significant military role in the war with the Ottomans, remained unmentioned by Sanuto. Consequently, it is impossible to estimate their exact quota, though they likely far outnumbered the other categories in the merchant fleet. We must keep in mind that, despite the fact that these smaller vessels were generally excluded by law from salt imports and other lucrative charters, they still engaged in regional and inter-regional trade along the same routes as their larger counterparts. 3

The Detrimental Effects of the War with the Turks on Shipping, 1499–1502

The outbreak of another war with the Ottoman Empire brought shipping and seaborne trade to an abrupt standstill. In the year 1499 and again in 1501, the merchant galleys sailed out of port to join the war fleets, instead of setting off on their trading voyages. Owing to the shortage of crews, all operators of the lagoon’s traghetti under the age of forty and fifty were requested to serve on the galleys. The expenses of the war effort placed a further burden on Venice’s

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population, and the ensuing strictures affected all social classes. To tackle the rising military expenses, on 6 July 1499 the Senate raised the tax on imports and exports through all territories in the northern Adriatic Sea by one-third (excluding wine and cereals). Meanwhile, the tithe on all maritime commerce also saw an increase. The State’s military losses aggravated the economic situation further, and inevitably affected the banks both directly and indirectly.44 In the Levantine ports as well, goods were stockpiled in warehouses awaiting transhipment, often for months. The disruption of the once-lively voyages of the merchant galleys induced the Senate to authorize the transport of spices on other ships as far as Corfu, from where they were transferred to galleys and carried up to Venice.45 Owing to all this turmoil, the commercial exchange in the fondaco dei tedeschi dwindled to nought. Priuli commented: ‘Owing to these wars, everything was banned, and the cash flow all but dried up.’ No matter what measures were taken to meet each new challenge, the payoff was never enough to cover the outlay.46 3.1 Competition over the Levantine Shipping Routes In light of the Venetian recession, merchant fleets from rival economies were quick to offer lower rates and compete on the same freights. Diary entries for 1500 and 1501 by both Priuli and Sanuto confirm the activity of French and Genoese vessels transporting copper, woollens, and corals to Syria and Egypt, and exporting cotton and spices from the same areas.47 In August 1500 the Venetian consul in Alexandria related that a Genoese ship of over 2,000 botti (2,500 according to a different version) owned by the Zustinian family had berthed in Alexandria, stacked with some 150,000 ducats worth of merchandise (mainly woollens) and moreover 40,000 ducats in silver and gold. The same vessel was subsequently chartered in Alexandria by Turkish merchants to carry men and goods to Antalya, for the most agreeable sum of 3,000 ducats. Other ships documented in port at the time include a Genoese gallion; three French barza of 1,500 and two of 700 botti carrying woollens, oil, and soap, totalling 130,000 ducats worth of merchandise and 200,000 ducats in currency; two ships from Ragusa laden with oil from Apulia; a barzotto from Messina; and three caravels from Barcelona. The latter carried 2,000 colli of

44 45 46 47

Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, p. 33; Mueller, The Venetian Money Market, pp. 236–37, 246. Judde de Larivière, Naviguer, commercer, gouverner, p. 258. Luzzatto, Storia economica di Venezia, pp. 216–18; Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 348. Arbel, ‘The Last Decades’, p. 38. Jorjo Tadiç’s comment to: Romano et al., ‘Venise et la route du cap’, pp. 133–37; İnalcık, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, p. 343.

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spices which, noted the Venetian ambassador in Barcelona, had been practically ‘stripped’ from the Venetian galleys.48 Two months later, a report from the ambassador in Catalonia stated that another nave grossa returning from Alexandria had brought back 300 colli of spices, including 100 colli of pepper, along with sundry other goods; part of this cargo was handled by two Venetian agents who sailed with the ship and managed to sell part in Barcelona and send the rest on to Lyon. Meanwhile, two other ships of 700 and 1,200 botti were about to set sail to Alexandria;49 Indeed, the Catalans expected good prospects since the Venetians were excluded from the equation. About the same time, a merchant residing in Ragusa witnessed the return of two ships with spices (early 1501): ‘the Ragusans have taken the freights from us, with their ships and caravels. There is plenty of spices, pepper, and ginger in Alexandria.’ This alert merchant also observed a great quantity of contraband (mainly woollens) being shipped by Florentine dealers to various destinations in the Adriatic.50 On 27 February 1501 the consul in Alexandria, Alvise Arimondo, reported that foreigners of every nation – ‘over the usual number’ – were arriving to port as a result of the disruption in Venetian trade, and had already mustered over 900 colli of spices for shipment.51 Two months later, in April 1501 the news from Genoa was that three new ships, one of 3,000 another of 2,000 and a third of 1,000 botti, all laden with corals and assorted merchandise, set sail in the direction of Alexandria and Beirut. No less interesting is the fact that four German trading companies – among which was the powerful Fugger bank – opened branch offices in Genoa and had already purchased 500 miera of tin, with the intention of shipping it to the Levant. With evident displeasure, Marino Sanuto wrote: ‘since the outbreak of our war with the Turks, Genoa earned 300,000 ducats in two years because everyone goes there to buy spices.’52 The diarist also notes that in June of that year two (presumably different) Genoese ships of 2,000 botti and an additional smaller one were on their return voyage from Alexandria.53 The flux of foreign ships in Mamluk ports continued unabated in the years that followed.54 These personal testimonies leave us lit48 13–15 August 1500: Priuli, I diarii, II, 65; Sanuto, I diarii, III, 942, 1199, 1121–22 (20–25 October 1500). 49 Sanuto, I diarii, III, 1030 (20 October 1500). 50 Ibid., 1458 (1 February 1501), 1589 (5 March 1501). 51 The Moors preferred galleys to ships: ibid., IV, 10 (ref. to 27 February 1500). 52 Ibid., 28 (28 April 1501). 53 Ibid., 85 (14 June 1501). 54 On 27 September 1504, Captain Daniel Copo indicated the ship movements in the port of Alexandria: three French ships bound to Aigues-Mortes, two Ragusan ships (one already

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tle doubt of Venice’s powerful hold in the Levant, a supremacy that it strived to maintain in the last decades of the fifteenth century, but lost altogether during the war with the Ottomans.55 3.2 The Dismal Condition of the Fleet On top of this, in 1499 seven of the city’s round ships of over 300 botti had been destroyed as a direct outcome of the war; moreover, between 1499 and 1500 twelve other ships were either captured or shipwrecked in various circumstances. As far one can tell, there were no new private ships built in Venice while the hostilities lasted, whereas the private shipyards at Sant’Antonio in Venice were engaged in the construction of warships,56 and some degree of shipbuilding continued in Crete, despite everything.57 The exploitation of the trading vessels in the Republic’s armada seriously weakened their structure.58 Already by 21 September 1499 Michele Foscari’s agent Polonio Gualdrini complained about the dire state of several vessels that had arrived in Crete after being retained during the battle of Zonchio, and deemed them unseaworthy. His report was a litany of dilapidation: the navilio captained by Lorenzo di Zuane was taking in water, and although the leak was repaired, once the ship was fully loaded, it leaked badly once again. Moreover, the sails were in dismal shape, and Gualdrini doubted they would survive the voyage. While the equipment was sufficient ‘for what can be expected’, commented the agent, the crew itself was lacking. The other navilio, captained by Rado da Cattaro, was deemed too old and in a very sorry state of repair; it had reached Crete with its bilge pumps constantly working. No repairs or maintenance had been done on the ship for over a year, but the captain was in a hurry and did not want to lose more time, so he tracked the source of one leak and halved the amount of water entering the hull. ‘The sails and equipment are okay,’ the agent noted, ‘but certain crewmen are of the worst kind, and the patron himself is a beast.’ Indeed, the said captain started a fight with one of his crew, punching the man so hard he fell overboard – ‘I cannot see how these two ships will make it,’ concluded Gualdrini.59 Further evidence for the

55 56 57 58 59

departed), one Genoese ship, and the Venetian ship of Pizani: ASVe, PSM, Misti, bus. 43 [27 September 1504]. Weinstein, Ambassador from Venice, p. 87. Sanuto, I diarii, II, 1255 (8 September 1499); ibid., III, 122 (20 February 1500). ASVe, SM, reg. 15, f. 34v (10 July 1500); Sanuto, I diarii, III, 1572 (17 March 1501). ASVe, SM, reg. 15, f. 156v (21 October 1502); ASVe, CXDM, fil. 53, fasc. 136; Appendix A: 1499. ASVe, PSM, Misti, bus. 43 fasc. XXIII [21 September 1499].

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dire condition of the ships that survived the armada is found in the correspondence from naval commanders and colonial officers.60 After a truce with the Turks was declared in 1502, Venice was left with only sixteen round ships of over 240 tons, which were soon due to be dismembered.61 A similar deficiency affected the vessels in the lower category, that is the caravels ‘of Dalmatia’ and the marani. All evidence points to a drastic collapse of the city’s merchant marine. Alarmed by the lack of any new building initiatives among the citizenry, the Senate realized it was necessary to launch new incentives. The shipowners were invited to relate their troubles at length before the senators, and their testimony gave rise to the 21 October 1502 decree.62 3.3 The Recovery Programme of 1502 Two related factors were indicted for the loss of the voyage westward to foreign competitors. First and foremost was the crisis in freights (mancharli di partidi), by which the Venetians were outbid by foreign shipping companies that offered the same service for lower rates; moreover, the elevated operational costs – partly caused by the aggravation of the fiscal burden (the salaries to nobili da poppa, the bolletini of cargo, pays for guards, pesadori, scrivani) – prevented Venetian operators from agreeing to comparably lower freight rates. Secondly, for some time Venice’s ships were barred by law from trafficking (the exact term is trafego) in the Gulf of Lion, including freights on the transport of grain, salt, and other commodities to various places along the western coasts of the Italian peninsula and beyond. Ships belonging to other nations, such as the Basques, Spaniards, and Portuguese, which previously had not customarily entered the Mediterranean Sea, were now largely involved in the short-haul market routes within the western basin of the Mediterranean. Further to that, the lifting of the protective tariff on Cretan wine (1499) was practically an invitation to foreigners to use Crete as an emporium for other commodities, and as an outlet for their own goods.63 The 1502 decree lacked glamour: it was rather an admission of failure and recognition of the disastrous effects of war. Venice had lost its position as the middleman reaping profit from the supply of wine and eastern goods to England and the Flanders. It was equally acknowledged that a considerable part of colonial seaborne trade was now being transported on foreign ships. 60

E.g., on 25 September 1500, Bortolamio Dandolo in Modon described the dilapidated state of the war fleet, which included 19 galeazze, 28 light galleys, and 23 armed ships: Dolfin, Annalium Venetorum, p. 180. 61 See respectively, Appendix A: 1499. 62 ASVe, SM, reg. 15, ff. 156v–57v (21 October 1502). 63 Lowder, ‘Candie Wine’, pp. 97–102; Tucci, ‘Il commercio del vino’, pp. 187, 203; Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 305; Hocquet, Venise et le monopole du sel, I, p. 591.

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This sense of failure is corroborated by an abrupt drop in expectation; amid the gloom, the Senate voted to grant funds for the construction of 400-botti ships. The halcyon days of Doge Tommaso Mocenigo seemed long passed, and the senators’ preoccupation with the limited number of large round ships was finally over. The government officially renounced its arms race for ships of over 1,000 botti, and as a result forsook having any significant share in the routes westwards. The reform was also an acknowledgement that the global shipping market was no longer as remunerative for the Venetians as it used to be. Nevertheless, eastbound shipping remained strategically essential for ‘national’ development, and therefore demanded government-led financing solutions in an attempt to keep it remunerative amid the industry’s sharp downturn. In parallel, the state of the shipbuilding sector in Venice was far worse. Yards simply could not function without new orders, but for some time the market was filled with quality vessels that were built elsewhere at knock-down prices. Hence, it was necessary to allocate government funds to bolster the struggling shipowners as a temporary cushion for shipyards facing collapse; but this was no long-term solution either. That said, the standard cash injections that had worked in the past were not entirely abandoned, though progress on liberalizing the shipbuilding sector crawled along at snail’s pace. What the shipbuilding sector truly required now was a wholesale restructuring package, which would also involve reshuffling the very workforce and replacing the guild system. This drastic makeover was never carried through, however, as it would have meant dismantling an entire society. Instead, the Senate offered a bounty of 1 ducat per botte for every ship built in Venice with a carrying capacity of 220 to 450 mozza of salt, intending that the minimum overall capacity below the exposed deck would be 400 botti. Ships with a carrying capacity in excess of 450 mozza would be entitled to 2 ducats per botte. For the first time, the government offered subsidies for the building of such ships in Crete – a loan of 1 ducat per mozzo of salt was the deal, that is, specifically relative to the carrying capacity of salt, and not the ship’s gross tonnage. Shipbuilding in Dalmatia was limited to vessels with a carrying capacity of less than 2,000 stara of grain (it is unclear whether this number represents the total capacity). At any rate, it turned out that this decree was not proclaimed for the Dalmatian towns themselves, and therefore applied on Venetian citizens and residents only.64

64 The senators were surprised to discover in 1513 that eighteen vessels (some bigger than 200 botti) were under construction on the island of Curzola for Ragusan clients: ASVe, SDS, reg. 46, ff. 36r–v (14 November 1513).

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The 1502 decree maintained the full bundle of incentives offered on 27 August 1490, that is, the subsidies of 2 ducats per butt of Cretan wine transported to the West, and the bounties for the consignment of salt from Ibiza. The loans for shipbuilding were only partly responsible for the rise in the gross tonnage between 1502 and 1507. As a matter of fact, the disbursement to creditors was occasionally postponed, as documented in 1510.65 Of no less importance was the lifting of limitations on trafficking in the western Mediterranean. Ships were authorized to bid freights  – including shipments of salt, grain and other wares – to various destinations, including the ports in Tuscany, with the exception of goods forbidden by the Church, along with those reserved for the galleys and Moorish merchants and their wares. Notably, Venice’s monopolistic interests over the supply of salt to its possessions in the terraferma were secondary to the urgency of providing the merchant marine with attractive freights. The senators were surely aware of the fact that shipments of salt to Tuscany mean slashing part of the Republic’s income from this tax, thereby contributing to the growing importance of competing ports in northern Italy. The significant reform in the customs procedures and the reduction in imposts on freightage have already been addressed in previous chapters. Suffice it to say at this juncture, however, that their importance was twofold: for once, the fiscal burden was significantly lightened; secondly, the Senate took steps to ensure the prompt collection and disbursement of freightage. Establishing minimum freighting equivalents for various imported and exported wares was another protective measure that acknowledged the increasing role of the State in the preservation of its merchant marine.66 The peace treaty with the Turks of 23 May 1503 comprised the ceding of Modon and Coron in exchange for a basic guarantee that the now unimpeded navigation of the Adriatic would enable Venice to resume its traditional trajectories.67 It has been rightly observed that Venice entered the sixteenth century with its once all-powerful status demoted to a second-grade sea power.68 What characterized Venetian maritime policies in the ensuing decades was its reaction to other nations’ actions – a symptom of the Republic’s debilitated 65 ASVe, CN, reg. 16, f. 71v (13 September 1510). 66 Hocquet, Venise et le monopole du sel, I, p. 574. 67 Luzzatto, Storia economica di Venezia, pp. 216, 227. To compensate in part for the losses, during the same war, Venice took control of Cephalonia and Ithaca: Arbel, ‘Venice’s Maritime Empire’, pp. 134, 141–42. 68 Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, pp. 198, 242, 245.

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strength, which over time became ever more pronounced. As international seaborne trade shifted increasingly to the Atlantic, Venice failed to corner a significant market share in those seas. Consequently, the shipping activity was relegated to the eastern Mediterranean, where the Republic could still enjoy significant advantages and offer some protection for its ships.69 69 Ibid., p. 291.

chapter 13

Venetian Shipping in Crisis, 1503–26 After four gruelling years, a peace treaty with the Turks was finally signed in May 1503, and Venice’s shipping began to pick up from the dire situation of 1502, when the city could claim to have a mere sixteen ships of over 400 botti afloat. The resumption of seaborne trade with Constantinople  – bringing greater security along the Levant routes – and the liberalization of the shortsea market in the western Mediterranean, heralded a moderate increase in the city’s gross tonnage, a rise that was soon interrupted by the outbreak of the War of the League of Cambrai.1 The effect of the bounties offered by the Senate for ship construction was marginal. For once, ships were not surveyed before January 1504,2 and at any event, the bounties were suspended in 1507, and the credits had still not been disbursed by 1510.3 On top of that, 400 ducats for building a 400-botti ship merely sufficed to cover 10 or 15% of the costs, to say nothing of the operational costs or the repairs that were required to keep the vessel afloat. That said, the bounties helped ensure that the yards in the dogado were competitive. The suspension of these bounties arose in 1507 in order to reallocate funds to cover other unforeseen expenses. The law averred that a great number of craft had been built since 1502.4 At that time, six additional ships were at different stages of construction in private shipyards in Venice.5 All in all, the fleet’s gross tonnage did not reach its former size, and there was no significant revival in

1 To my mind, Frederic C. Lane’s conviction of the satisfactory result of the 1502 enactment – which he dubbed assuredly as the ‘turning of the tides’ – is misguided: ‘Venetian Shipping’, p. 31; idem, Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 380. His analysis has received widespread agreement from other scholars. Ugo Tucci, for one, believes that the quota of ships increased after 1502: ‘Venetian shipowners’, pp. 288–89. On the other hand, Jean-Claude Hocquet remains sceptical about the long-term success of the 1502 act: Voiliers et commerce, pp. 532–33; idem, Venise et le monopole, I, pp. 574–75. 2 ASVe, SM, reg. 16, f. 41r (29 January 1504). 3 Creditors of the State on account of bounties, freightage and the retention of ships were not reimbursed in the form of cash money. Rather, they received the right to claim property of debtors or in auction at the ufficio dele cazude. Creditors were equally invited to lend the State cash money: ASVe, CN, reg. 16, f. 71v (13 September 1510); ASVe, SM, reg. 17, ff. 109v (31 May 1510), 111v (3 June 1510). Cf. Sanuto, I diarii, X, 477, 500. 4 ASVe, SM, reg. 16, f. 164v (3 July 1507). 5 ASVe, CN, reg. 16, ff. 8v–9r (5 July 1507); Lane, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 116–17 cit. 6.

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the city’s shipping industry in the first decade of the sixteenth century.6 In fact, barely eighteen months later (12 February 1509) the Senate affirmed that there were then a mere twelve round ships in operable condition in Venice.7 The situation was such that by January 1511, due to numerous recent shipwrecks, there were no longer any large ships in the city.8 Perhaps seeing an opportunity in the glaring dearth of vessels in service, in August 1512 the Spanish ambassador asked that his ships and Sicilian barze be granted the privilege to transport salt to Venice, and be accredited in the ufficio del sal, no less.9 The condition of the fleet in 1509 (table 13) suggests a decline of 25% in the number of ships afloat compared to ten year earlier – thirty round ships of over 240 tons against the forty documented as afloat in July 1499. Overall, the gross tonnage shrank by more than 45% – from 21,974 tons in 1499 to 12,037 tons in 1509. This is largely because at the time there were no navi di Comun in service, as no such ships were built after the signing of the peace treaty with the sultan in 1503. In addition, the number of navi grosse dropped from six (6,720 tons) to four (2,771 tons) in 1509. Of further interest is the reduction in number and shrinkage in volume of round ships in the lower categories, in comparison with the 1499 list, while the number of round ships in the lowest category, that of 240–359 tons, remained the same: fifteen ships (3,939 tons) in 1499 and fifteen ships (3,900 tons) a decade later. On top of that the number of galleys dropped as well – in 1509 the galley line to Beirut was the only one still operating.10 This picture does not entirely discount the effects of the recovery programme of 1502, but it most certainly reduces its importance in the long run. One might argue that if the loans had continued after 1507, the gross tonnage would have increased further. At any rate, the law was discontinued, and the contrary happened. Indeed, despite the profound attempt to confront a prolonged crisis, the effects were short-lived and failed to achieve the desired recovery. The reform certainly did not mark a ‘turning of the tides’, but rather another state intervention in a series of enactments aimed to encourage shipbuilding (1463, 1479, 1490, etc.). It can even be argued that the 1 September 1490 enactment achieved similar, if not better, results than that of 1502. Furthermore, given the fact that shipping is a good indicator of a state’s economy at any given time,

6 ASVe, SM, reg. 16, f. 164v (3 July 1507). Cf. Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, pp. 30–31; Hocquet, Voiliers et commerce, p. 574. 7 The intention was to commission six ships for the armada but they were later left to proceed with their voyages: ASVe, SM, reg. 17, ff. 62v, 64r (12, 22 February 1509). 8 Sanuto, I diarii, XI, 716 (5 January 1511). 9 Ibid., XIV, 635 (29 August 1512). 10 Judde de Larivière, Naviguer, comercer, gouverner, p. 66.

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chapter 13 The merchant marine c. October–December 1509

Category

No. of in % vessels

1,500 botti (900 tons) and above 0 1,000–1,500 botti (600–900 tons) 4 800–999 botti (480–599 tons) 4 600–799 botti (360–479 tons) 7 400–599 botti (240–359 tons) 15 Merchant galleys (240 tons) 3 Total

33

24 17 22 31 6 100

Capacity

4,619 botti (2,771 tons) 18,869 botti 3,400 botti (2,040 tons) (11,321 tons) 4,350 botti (2,610 tons) 6,500 botti (3,900 tons) 1,500 milliaria (716 tons) 12,037 tons

See respectively, Appendix A: 1509.

the evidence confirms that the Republic had sunk into a severe recession, from which it did not recuperate for several decades. The present analysis starts with the dramatic events in the Levant following the Portuguese discoveries beyond the oceans; the second part reviews the progressive abandonment of the former busy routes in the western Mediterranean; there follows the loss of Venice’s political patronage over the Adriatic, and the triumph of colonial shipping. Finally, by adopting a longue durée approach, we will discuss the role of nature in Venice’s decline. All four lines of analysis confirm beyond doubt that the Republic’s shipping industry had virtually ran aground in the first quarter of the sixteenth century, second only to the collapse that would follow the War of Cyprus in 1571. 1

Venice’s Levant Trade in the First Quarter of the 16th Century

1.1 The Pressing Consequences of the Portuguese Discoveries Although the onset of Venice’s economic hardships predates the Portuguese discoveries, Portugal’s epoch-making achievements had immediately influenced the Republic’s economy across the board: ‘this is more important to the Venetian State,’ commented Girolamo Priuli in his chronicle, ‘than the war with the Turks or any other war that could take place.’11 A certain Tomè Pires, an apothecary who reached Malacca (Melaka) in the wake of the Portuguese 11

See translation: Finlay, ‘Crisis and Crusade’, pp. 57 cit. 36, 60.

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conquest of 1511, insightfully wrote, ‘Whoever is lord of Melaka has Venice by the throat.’12 The conditions were certainly worrying. By December 1502 the Signoria had hastily appointed a special committee (giunta, in Latin additio specierum) to devote itself exclusively to the problem.13 The Venetians were caught in a situation they could do very little about, and acknowledged it would not be possible to hinder the Portuguese from further exploiting this route. Furthermore, their diplomatic efforts on behalf of the sultan had merely worsened the political ties with the pontiff, as well as other European rulers, who accused Venice of being motivated by material interest. There was no question of waging war against Portugal, a country 4,000 Italian miles away from Venice, amounting to about twice the city’s distance from Alexandria in Egypt. It was equally apparent that the formal invitation by King Manuel I of Portugal for Venice’s ships to carry spices from Lisbon would leave the Republic at the mercy of the potent king of Spain. Instead, Venice pinned its hopes on a possible Muslim jihad against the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean, and equally hoped to strengthen its foothold in the Levant trade, which had basically been Venice’s own speciality ‘since the beginning of time’.14 The course of events took a completely different direction, however. The increasingly straitened circumstances of the Mamluk sultanate had caused its sultan, al-Ghawri, to stiffen his trade policies at seaport. This, in turn, created friction with the Venetians, who held the Egyptians responsible for provoking the calamity in the first place by raising the prices of spices. As a result, the spice trade in Egypt had begun to stagnate. In the four years 1502–05 the Venetians imported on average just under one million pounds of spices per year. The first large cargoes arrived in Portugal in 1503, and in the four years 1503–06 the Portuguese imported an average of about 2,300,000 pounds per year, of which 88% was pepper. The decrease in the number of galley voyages is more pronounced in the next decade; to judge from the records, there were no such voyages at all between 1509 and 12 Ibid., p. 48. 13 Weinstein, Ambassador from Venice, pp. 77–84. The commission letter to the ambassador of Venice in Portugal: ASVe, CXDM, fil. 16, 123 (3 July 1504). Vincenzo Querini’s report to: ‘Relazione delle Indie Orientali’, pp. 5–19. The mission of Leonardo da Ca’ Masser: Scopoli, ‘Relazione di Leonardo da Ca’ Masser’, pp. 9–48. 14 On 24 June 1504, the Council of Ten instructed the jewellery merchant Francesco Taldi to offer the sultan to sabotage the Portuguese enterprise by providing that large quantities of spices would be available at the outlets in Mamluk lands: ASVe, CXDM, reg. 30, f. 93r; Mas Latrie, Traités de paix et de commerce, II, pp. 259–63; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, v. 3, p. 19. The European states accused the Venetians in aiding the Egyptian sultan to fight the Portuguese in the Red Sea: Finlay, ‘Crisis and Crusade’, pp. 56, 66, 84; Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 290.

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1513, marking a huge contrast with the phenomenal success of the Portuguese during these same years. That fact was that pepper cost between three and four times less in Lisbon than it did in Venice; Portuguese pepper – reaching a capacity of 20–30,000 quintals – was on sale in the markets in Genoa and Lyon. German merchants logically abandoned Venice for Lisbon, threatening to supply all of France and Germany through the port of Antwerp in Belgium. Portuguese ships already delivered spices directly to Bruges and Southampton, and had driven the Venetian ones from western markets by cutting their supplies.15 The galley voyages to Flanders, Aigues-Mortes, and the Barbary Coast became sporadic, and at any rate operated at a loss for quite some time.16 These years saw a significant drop in the galley voyages in every direction; from seventy-three journeys in 1495–99 to fifty-two in 1500–4, forty in 1505–09, and only seventeen in 1510–14. Logically, during war-time the interruption of flow was particularly noticeable. Hence, no galleys were sent to Alexandria in the years 1503, 1506, 1508, 1509, 1510, 1513, 1514, and 1515, whereas galley traffic to Beirut ceased altogether in 1505 and 1510.17 Unsurprisingly, the unreliability of the galley lines had left many naval officers in Venice kicking their heels.18 The general decline in seaborne trade and shipping services is verified by contemporary writers. On 5 April 1507, for instance, the Venetian diarist and historian Marino Sanuto described the widespread gloom of his townsfolk and noted several bad omens before the Grand Council was convened. ‘There are three things in Venice at present,’ he wrote. ‘A big fontego with scant bales, many banks with little money, many ships with few freights.’19 In the third audience that Tommaso Zen was granted with the Sultan al-Ghawri (r. 1501– 16), the Mamluk ruler was blunt: ‘You are no longer of any use to my country,’ he began. ‘You used to send seven galleys to Alexandria and five to Damascus loaded with goods, and the warehouses were filled; now you bring nothing.’ At which Zen replied: ‘There were no spices … the Venetians used to export 6–7,000 bales [colli] of spices from Damascus, at present there were no more than 1,200 bales.’ The sultan fumed: ‘If there is nothing for sale in my country,

15 Romano et al., ‘Venise et la route’, pp. 111–12, cited with approval: İnalcık, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 341–42; Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, p. 33; idem, ‘Mediterranean Spice Trade’, pp. 47–58; idem, Venice, A Maritime Republic, pp. 291–92; Finlay, ‘Crisis and Crusade’, p. 58; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, v. 3, pp. 22–23. 16 Luzzatto, ‘La decadenza’, p. 232. 17 Judde de Larivière, ‘L’abandon de la navigation’, p. 122; idem, Naviguer, commercer, gouverner, p. 66. 18 ASVe, SM, reg. 16, f. 61r (11 August 1504). 19 Sanuto, I diarii, VII, 42 (5 April 1507); Finlay, ‘Crisis and Crusade’, p. 59.

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why do you remain here?’20 Indeed, in 1504 once the Portuguese had cut off the spice supply to Egypt, the Venetian galleys to Alexandria and Syria were returning home half-empty.21 After a disagreement in early 1505 concerning the price of pepper, the galleys left port without Sultan Qaitbay’s clearance, and had taken on no cargo in its hold. The spat caused a rupture in relations that lasted for several years. Although the spice trade resumed in 1508, tensions reached a peak between 1510 and 1512 owing to hostilities on the part of the Knights Hospitallers. According to Sanuto, trade with Beirut continued more or less without interval, but business was slack. Despite conflicting interests, in 1512 both sides eventually decided to resume trade. Nevertheless, the war developing in its homelands left Venice in no position to organize galleys to Alexandria, a hiatus that lasted three years. Up until 1514 the spice import from Alexandria remained only a quarter of what it had been, and the once-prized commodity of pepper all but fell from the cargo lists. The shortage of pepper, which was required for the city’s industries, was the trigger for the notable 3 May 1514 decree. Whereby, the Senate revoked the galleys’ exclusive right of transporting pepper, and from then on allowed all vessels (including colonial) to carry black pepper freely from Alexandria and Beirut all year round. Moreover, ships that carried spices were exempted from the 3% duty on freightage, along with any additional dues paid by the merchant, tithes, and other compulsory levies – with the exception of the cottimo.22 Starting from this date, therefore, galley cargo lists no longer offer an accurate indication of the amount of spices effectively being shifted. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that the decree brought about any significant revival in this trade. Meanwhile, the Mamluk efforts to oust the Portuguese from the Indian Ocean ran aground, but worse was to come: in 1513 the Portuguese not only conquered Hormuz but penetrated the Red Sea, and in 1516 occupied the island of Kamaran, wreaking havoc on Muslim shipping in and around Jeddah. Small wonder that the spice supply was interrupted, pushing the price of pepper to 120–50 ducats per sporta. Thanks to this turmoil, when the consul in Alexandria, Nicolò Bragadin, essayed to balance the books towards the end of his administration in August 1517, he declared himself short of 70,000 ducats.23 20 Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, v. 3, p. 26 (3 March 1511). 21 Ibid., p. 19; Tucci, ‘Costi e ricavi di una galera’, 165–67. 22 Judde de Larivière, Naviguer, commercer, gouverner, p. 261. The 3  May 1514 enactment: ASVe, SM, reg. 18, f. 43r; Sanuto, I diarii, XVIII, 177–78. Further provisions: ibid., XX, 473 (7 August 1515). 23 Horii, ‘The Mamluk Sultan Qansuh al-Ghawri’, pp. 178–79, 184–85, 186–92; Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, pp. 33–35; idem, Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 290. On the shortage in pepper

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1.2 The Struggle to Maintain the Route to Alexandria Private ships maintained their navigations to the Levant during the open war with the Turks (1499–1502).24 According to various reports from the port of Alexandria, marine traffic was continuous until the year 1505.25 But after an incident in 1505 which some galleys had to flee under cannon fire, captains were largely reluctant to attempt putting into port.26 The correspondence of one merchant posted from Cairo suggests that, at that time, woollens and hazelnuts enjoyed excellent prices owing to a shortage of certain goods in the Egyptian markets resulting from the temporary absence of Venice’s ships.27 Venetian shipowners who wished to maintain their commercial activities in Alexandria hoisted other nations’ flags, while others were unlawfully using foreign ships to keep their business up and running. The extent of illegal traffic eventually induced the Venetian vice-consul in Alexandria, Fantin Contarini, to file an official complaint against Venetian subjects who regularly put in to Alexandria’s port either on foreign barze, or on colonial vessels that they had flagged out (‘si fano per forestieri’). By using false names, they redirected their goods to the Catalan Consul, thereby dodging the cottimo on the cargo and Venetian taxes in general. The preamble to the Senate’s decree of 20 October 1506 laments that the commerce of Venice in Alexandria is reduced to an extreme that requires urgent intervention. To ensure that vessels would fly the ensigns of San Marco and not those of foreigners, the consuls in Syria and Egypt were instructed to investigate and forward their findings to the avogadori di Comun.28 At this juncture a new committee was set up, known as the cinque savi alla mercanzia (initially entitled provveditori), whose duties were to keep a close watch on the vectors of international trade, and propose whatever measures

and the renunciation of the exclusivity obtained by the galleys: ASVe, SM, reg. 18, f. 43r (3 May 1514). 24 Luzzatto, ‘La decadenza’, p. 232. 25 ASVe, PSM, bus. 41, fasc. IX [15, 31 December 1502]; ibid., bus. 43 [7 March 1504], [9 August 1503], [24 July 1504]; ibid., bus. 44, fasc. X [13 January 1500], [23 June 1503]; ASVe, GP, bus. 205, ff. 180v–81v (8 January 1504, ref. 26 February 1502); Sanuto, I diarii, V, 34–35 (26 March 1503), 163 (ref. to 1 September 1503); ibid., VI, 206 (8 August 1505); Appendix A: 1509, nos. 12, 14. 26 Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, p. 34; Horii, ‘The Mamluk Sultan Qansuh al-Ghawri’, pp. 187–88. 27 Priuli, Annali veneti, II, 401 (1505). 28 The preamble to the 20 June 1506 enactment reads, ‘as was informed by various sources, colonial vessels fly other ensigns and pretend they are foreigners and get to terms with the Catalan consul’: ASVe, SM, reg. 16, ff. 131v–32r; Sanuto, I diarii, VI, 454.

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they deemed adequate to stanch the haemorrhaging of trade.29 The question of whether they should maintain regular galley convoys to Alexandria was also on the agenda, since the grim alternative was to act in a way similar to foreign operators, who occasionally showed up in order to export goods only on board round ships. However, marine traffic soon resumed after an agreement was reached with the sultan in May 1507,30 and by November the ship Contarina was reported to be on its way back from Alexandria with full cargo.31 In 1508 the galleys returning from Alexandria carried 1,100 colli of spices, and a surplus was loaded on an auxiliary ship.32 The tide changed once again, however, and after 1508 the number of San Marco vessels in Egypt began to wane. In 1510 the consul and several merchants were imprisoned when secret contacts between the Venetians and the Safavids and the Knights of Rhodes were discovered. Although the Alexandria route was not entirely abandoned during these years,33 Cyprus and Syria remained by far the most important ports of call for the round ships; close behind came Constantinople and assorted emporiums for cereal crops in the Aegean. This drop in number was discussed in the talks that preceded the commercial agreement between Sultan al-Ghawri and the Venetian ambassador Domenico Trivisan (July 1512). ‘Nowadays only a small number of ships come [to Alexandria],’ grumbled the sultan, ‘and the galleys now arrive once every two years.’34 To his mind, the cause was the War of the League of Cambrai (1509–16) rather than his own aggressive trade policies. Indeed, that war had been a crushing drain on the Republic’s finances,35 as testified by the decline 29 Pace Gino Luzzatto, the rapid advance of the Turks in the Balkan peninsula led to the creation of this magistracy: ‘La decadenza’, p. 166; idem, ‘Le vicende del porto di Venezia’, p. 14. Possibly, the disruption in trade with Egypt after 1505 provided another reason. 30 Sanuto, I diarii, VII, 203–24 (November 1506–May 1507). 31 Ibid., 179 (14 November 1507). 32 An additional quantity was loaded on the nave a rata that arrived in Venice 26 July 1508: ibid., VII, 589, 591, 597. 33 The following vessels stopped in Alexandria between 1510 and early 1512: the galleys of 1510 carried goods valued 300,000 ducats; the ship Marcona in the winter of 1510 and again in 1511; in August 1511, one of the Coresi ships from Crete was held by the sultan in Alexandria; a Venetian ship laden with chestnuts ‘del noxele’ cast anchors in port in February 1512. See the corresponding notes Appendix A: 1509; ASVe, PSM, Misti, bus. 52, fasc. 1 [3 February 1512]. On the imprisonment: Pedani, ‘Venetians in the Levant’, p. 104. 34 The capitoli were drawn following a political crisis, which was created by the military activity of the Knights Hospitallers: Pedani, ‘Le ultimi accordi’, p. 61; Reinaud, ‘Traités de commerce’, p. 28. 35 On the financial burden: Gilbert, ‘Venice in the Crisis of the League of Cambrai’, pp. 284– 85, 287–88 cit. 48, 53; Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, v. 3, pp. 54, 60–61, 70; Finlay,

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in the gold and silver shipments to the Levant in those years.36 While the sea lanes themselves remained open, seaborne trade focused on furnishing the city with wheat, victuals, and gun-powder. The fear that foreign ships would take over the spice trade was voiced repeatedly by senators and traders alike.37 1.3 A Tardy Response: Liberalizing the Shipments of Pepper A debate that was held in the Senate in 1509 confirms that the senators were still unwilling to liberalize the trade in luxury goods. The trigger was large quantity of spices and silk that awaited shipment in Beirut and the departure of the muda of five round ships to Syria. To many of the senators, delegating the transport of surplus quantities of spices and silk to private ships seemed an open invitation to fraud, which would be disastrous and surely destroy the economy. The muda of ships was eventually granted exclusive permission, but the conditions were discussed in the smallest detail. Earlier decrees that had excluded ships from such a trade were repeated, so as to curb future bootlegging.38 For many senators, this new ploy of accepting private vessels as spice carriers was tantamount to admitting failure. The scheme became law on 5 May 1514, when private ships were granted freight privileges and became equally legitimate carriers for pepper and other ‘fine goods’, which was loaded in the space between decks, alongside other less prestigious goods. Nevertheless, the bulk of the cargo remained more or less the same as it had been for centuries, consisting mainly of ash, salt, wheat or other cereals, and cotton.39 One of the direct outcomes of the innovation was the dramatic increase of attacks upon Venetian vessels in 1515. Potent corsairs such as the Ottoman pirate Cotruli patrolled the Ionian and Aegean Seas

‘Crisis and Crusade’, pp. 79–80; idem, ‘Fabius Maximus in Venice’, pp. 990–1006; on the uprising in the stato da mar following the battle of Agnadello: Ventura, Nobiltà e popolo, pp. 167–86; Pullan, ‘The Occupation and Investments’, pp. 387–88; Cessi, Storia della republica di Venezia, vol. 3, p. 504; Priuli, Annali veneti, II, pp. 270, 282. 36 Arbel, ‘The Last Decades of Venice’s Trade with the Mamluks’, pp. 69–70. 37 Based on the report of the capitanio of the galleys to Alexandria and two other letters: Sanuto, I diarii, XI, 56–58 (1 May 1510); ibid., XIV, 498–502 (26 April, 9 May 1512). 38 2 March 1509: ASVe, SM, reg. 17, f. 68r; Sanuto, I diarii, VIII, 9. 39 Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, p. 34; Judde de Larivière, Naviguer, commercer, gouverner, p. 261. E.g., ships arriving in Venice laden with spices: Sanuto, I diarii, XXIII, 247 (27 November 1516), 326 (15 December); ibid., XXV, 157–58 (28 December); ibid., XXVI, 145, 163 (25, 28 October 1518); ibid., XXVII, 211 (28 April 1519); ibid., XXXI, 463 (24 September 1521); ibid., XXXIII, 529 (2 December 1522); ibid., XXXV, 326 (10 January 1524); ibid., XXXVI, 159 (5 April), 590 (10 September); ibid., XXXVII, 28 (8 October), 441 (15 January 1525).

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in search of poorly protected spice-carriers.40 The unfortunate case of Piero Contarini q. Luca offers a kind of yardstick for the treacherous times for shipping in general. He lost two of his fleet in a brief interval of time: the first was shipwrecked in Paxos in 1513, and the second captured by corsairs returning from Egypt in 1515. These losses took their toll, and he died from ‘melancholia’ shortly after.41 The Senate reacted to the mounting perils by imposing a compulsory insurance policy at the rate of 5% on all merchandise loaded in Alexandria for the return voyage – this is about 100% more than the customary rate!42 The insurance policy was to be taken out at the office of the Venetian Consul in Alexandria, who was also authorized to enforce it. Doubtless, the primary reasons for enforcing the new insurance policy were the considerable hazards faced at sea, coupled with Venice’s inability to guarantee safe passage, yet one suspects that the additional expense was also a shrewd way to shore up the balance of the cottimo, which had fallen into the red. To this end, on 27 February 1515 the Consul in Alexandria Tommaso Venier, anxious not to end his administration with a debt to the cottimo (so far 500 ducats, but it grew in the years that followed), wrote to the provveditori sopra il cottimo di Alexandria, advising them strongly against employing merchant galleys: ‘we are in a new age, where the public voyages, which once consisted of three to four galleys that honoured our State, has fallen to zero. Ships rarely arrive, and hence prices in Venice are exorbitant.’ The ambassador added that the Sultan himself had expressed his alarm that recently no Venetian ship or galley had dropped anchor in his port.43 40 In December 1515 Marino Sanuto drew a shortlist of ships that were recently shipwrecked or captured by corsairs: the ship Pasqualiga of 900 botti sank in the vicinity of Durazzo on the return voyage from Syria with 730 sacks of ash, 400 sacks of cotton, pepper, cloves, fine spices (menude) and barley loaded in Cyprus on account of the state. The damages were estimated 30,000 ducats. Another ship of Francesco Foscari was captured by Cotrugli. Two marani of Francesco di Perazzo Malipiero and the Donado family were lost as well. A ship of Simon Fachinato laden with spices and other merchandise was lost on the return voyage from Alexandria: Sanuto, I diarii, XXI, 34 (22 December 1515). The fact that Venice’s fleet experienced a rise in shipwrecks and hostilities at sea in 1515 is also attested in the petition of Alvise Bembo, a shareholder in the dazio del vin: ASVe, CXDM, fil. 46, f. 159 (ref. to 1515). 41 Sanuto, I diarii, XVII, 270 (30 October 1513); ibid., XXI, 271 (4 November 1515). 42 Ibid., XX, 70 (22 March 1515), 137 (23 April 1515). Already in 1507, Venice filed a complaint to the Ottoman sultan that the island of Negroponte became a pirate haven, from where corsairs attacked vessels of Venice’s subjects: Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, v. 3, p. 51. 43 The drop in Venetian shipping activity in Egypt during the administration of Venier as consul is attested in his petition to the Council of Ten 22 January 1518. According to Venier, the former consuls benefited from two and three mude of galleys per year, and from ships

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Previously, in 1514 the sultan had been more than willing to take stringent measures to curb extortion among his officials, and to formalize customs procedures. To this end, in 1514, grippi and other vessels originating from Venice’s overseas territories were granted significant fiscal privileges in Egypt. In addition, the local authorities guaranteed that no one would be allowed to embark their vessels without explicit licence from the consul himself, with the exception of registered merchants.44 This emphasis on colonial grippi was not incidental: while Venice faced a costly war and public and private shipping was heavily burdened and often hindered, ships from Venice’s Greek territories were enjoying a bonanza. New provisions to fight tax evasion on shipments of Cretan wine to Egypt indicate that shipping activity on this island was lively.45 During the Ottoman conquest of Egypt, the Mamluks detained twenty-five of Venice’s ships anchored in port, the majority of which were vessels from Crete.46 In his final report to the doge and his counsellors, Tommaso Venier, the returning consul in Alexandria, counted thirty nave and navili of Venice’s subjects moored in the port of Alexandria shortly before his departure, about four months after the Ottoman conquest. His advice to the doge was to send round ships to load spices in Alexandria, and use galleys for the voyage to Beirut, considering the ‘delicate times’ afoot, and the risk that the galleys might be impounded.47 The Merchant Marine in the Aftermath of the Ottoman Conquest of Syria and Egypt The news on the Ottoman victory over the Mamluk army in Syria reached Venice on 23 October 1516 with the ship Semitecola, captained by Polo Bianco q. Domenico. This triumph opened the way to the Ottoman conquest of Egypt by the end of January 1517.48 Upon the conquest, Selim I assumed the task 1.4

44 45 46 47 48

that stopped in port all year round. During his term in office, there was only muda of galleys to Alexandria and it proved unsuccessful, ‘con pochissime fazende’. Consequently, his income from the cottimo was reduced and the sultan refused to disburse his share in the consul’s salary since there were no galleys: ASVe, CXDM, fil. 41, fasc. 219 (ref. to 10 March 1518). Sanuto, I diarii, XX, 168–69 (ref. to 27 February 1514). ASVe, SM, reg. 18, ff. 58v–59r (12 September 1514), 127r (14 June 1516). Sanuto, I diarii, XXIV, 599 (24 August 1517). In August 1518, all seaborne trade was directed to the port of Alexandria by orders of the sultan. Ship captains who stopped in Rosetta, Le Brulle, and Damietta were threatened with penalties: ibid., XXV, 124–25 (7–8 December 1517); ibid., XXVI, 164 (28 October 1518). On the flow of news of these dramatic events to Venice: Arbel, ‘La république de Venise’, pp. 113–42.

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of protecting Islam and its vital interests, for some time jeopardized by the Portuguese in Arabia and the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, the Turks failed to oust the Portuguese from their newly acquired domains in the East, and now the arrival of spices in the Mediterranean ports became irregular. The supplies fluctuated very much according to the attacks and counter-attacks between the Portuguese and the Ottoman forces, whose commercial policies in the Levantine outlets contrasted greatly with those of the Mamluk sultanate. Portuguese difficulties in protecting the long route to the Far East and assuring the quality of spices that were brought along these long voyages also had its impact on the availability and cost of the Portuguese spice trade. With Sultan Selim I, the system of forced purchase of pepper was scrapped, and a tax-farming system (iltizam) was introduced instead. This scheme enabled resident Jews to obtain the concession for managing the customs houses in Egypt, which paved the way for subsequent enmity between the Venetians and the local administration during the 1520s. Moreover, the Ottomans reinstated Venetian trading rights in 1513 and 1517 and, except during times of war, they did not close the door to Venetian commerce in the Mediterranean.49 On the other hand, similar privileges were granted also to traders of other nations. The degree of Venice’s success to win back its market share in the spice trade is therefore a question of shipping volumes, weights and measures.50 The list compiled for 1520 (table 14) suggests a further decline in the number and volume of round ships in the second decade of the sixteenth century. A total of twenty-one round ships were present in 1520, having a combined gross tonnage of 7,977 tons, in comparison with thirty ships and a total of 12,037 tons in the previous snapshot. Similarly, that same year there were no navi di Comun afloat. The number of navi grosse was reduced from four to two, and their volume had shrunk by nearly half. The numbers are lower in all other categories as well. Clearly, the private shipping sector showed no signs of resilience in the second decade of the sixteenth century, and instead experienced a new low.

49 50

Lybyer, ‘The Ottoman Turks and the Routes of Oriental Trade’, pp. 584, 588; Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 291–92; Weinstein, Ambassador from Venice, pp. 85, 87–88; Horii, ‘The Mamluk Sultan Qanush al-Ghawri’, pp. 178, 193; Finlay, ‘Crisis and Crusade’, p. 87. Finlay, ‘Crisis and Crusade’, p. 85; citing Wake, ‘The Changing Pattern’, pp. 361–403; Ashtor, ‘The Volume of the Medieval Spice Trade’, pp. 753–63.

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table 14

The merchant marine c. July–August 1520

Category

No. of in % vessels

1,500 botti (900 tons) and above 1,000–1,500 botti (600–900 tons) 800–999 botti (480–599 tons) 600–799 botti (360–479 tons) 400–599 botti (240–359 tons) Merchant galleys (240 tons) Total

0 2 3 7 9 4

17 16 31 25 11

25

100

Capacity

2,495 botti (1,497 tons) 13,295 botti 2,400 botti (1,440 tons) (7,977 tons) 4,650 botti (2,790 tons) 3,750 botti (2,250 tons) 2,000 milliaria (954 tons) 8,931 tons

See respectively, Appendix A: 1520.

Public navigations fared no better. The number of active galleys fell to seventeen in the period 1510–14, and increased slightly to twenty-four in 1515–19; to be sure, a plunge of over 50% with respect to the beginning of the century.51 After 1500 the number of investors in public navigation steadily dwindled, with a corresponding increase in the size of their investment. From the 1520s, companies were generally composed of no more than two investors. A transition had occurred: large companies made up of multiple investors were replaced by smaller ones with a limited number of backers sharing the available capital. Consequently, there were increasingly fewer patricians and a growing number of cittadini involved in the system.52 We can therefore establish a direct correlation between the disruption in the operation of the system of merchant galleys and the crisis in large tonnage at the beginning of the sixteenth century. The recession in shipping activity must have reached a new low around 1515. This conjecture is supported by several decrees from that period: on 29 June 1515, the Senate offered a bounty of 1 ducat per botte in the form of credit in the ufficio alle cazude for the building of four ships with a capacity of at least 500 botti. It imposed certain binding requirements regarding the structural features to ensure that the bounty would not be employed for building other types of ships, such as the marano, which had no strategic value as regards the State. The reason for the Senate’s measure was declared to be the 51 Judde de Larivière, ‘L’abandon de la navigation’, p. 122 ; idem, Naviguer, comercer, gouverner, pp. 65–66. 52 Idem, ‘The “Public” and the “Private”’, pp. 84–85.

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scant number of ships then afloat.53 Policy changes around 1520 included revising the quota of nobili da poppa on board round ships to include vessels of over 250 botti – this was an innovation, since craft of such a small tonnage had never been required to do so in the past.54 Although not primarily commercial, the construction and running of the pilgrim galleys was privatized in 1518,55 and operators now had to comply with rigorous safety requirements to compete on this lucrative freight, namely running a pilgrim service to the Holy Land.56 There was also a decisive change in policy concerning salt imports from Cyprus and Ibiza. This profitable charter was normally reserved for round ships, so to justify the profitability of the return voyage.57 The shortage of carriers of this size persuaded the Council of Ten in June 1518 to consider opening this charter to any ship with a carrying capacity of over 150 mozza of salt, with an annual limit of 4,000 mozza so as to prevent a surplus of salt supplies. Although this enactment was eventually revoked,58 a similar decree of 18 March 1519 offered bounties to all ships that would carry salt from Cyprus, stating no restraints on capacity, starting on 1 July.59 This statute was revised on 30 August 1520 to apply only to those with a carrying capacity of over 180 mozza of salt (or an overall capacity of 300 botti, according to Marino Sanuto).60 Furthermore, starting in 16 June 1524, ships in this category were obligated to load at least a quarter of their capacity with salt on the return voyage from Cyprus. Concurrently, the Council of Ten reinstated bounties for

53

It translates, ‘since, at present, there are very little and there will be soon less’: ASVe, SM, reg. 18, ff. 85v–86r (29 June 1515); Hocquet, Venise et le monopole du sel, I, pp. 574, 592. 54 The multitude of applicants for the role of nobili da poppa and the insufficient number of big vessels moved the Senate to reduce the minimum requirements: ASVe, SM, reg. 19, ff. 88v–89r (15 November 1518), 131r–v (31 January 1520); cf. Sanuto, I diarii, XXVIII, 219. The question of poor patricians became a crucial political issue in those years. The noble group had always contained a margin of poor patricians, but economic and political difficulties were exacerbating the problem: Pullan, Rich and Poor in Renaissance Venice, pp. 229–30; Cozzi, ‘Authority and the Law’, p. 208; Cowan, ‘Rich and poor among the patriciate’, pp. 147–60. 55 ASVe, SM, reg. 19, f. 74r (13 July 1518); Judde de Larivière, Naviguer, comercer, gouverner, p. 294; Sottas, Les Messageries Maritimes de Venise, p. 161. 56 See respectively, Appendix A: 1520. 57 E.g., ASVe, SM, reg. 15, ff. 156v–57v (21 October 1502). 58 This proposal was twice voted on and rejected: ASVe, CXDM, fil. 41, fascc. 252, 289 (12, 26 August 1518). 59 Ibid., fil. 43, fasc. 16 (18 March 1519). 60 30 August 1520: ibid., fil. 45, fasc. 277; Sanuto, I diarii, XXIX, 144.

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any vessel that would carry salt from Cyprus or Ibiza, imposing no restraints on capacity.61 Evidence passed on in 1528 by Ettor Otobon, one of the provveditori al sal, substantiates this supposition: the official’s personal records state that no salt from Cyprus was consigned in 1517 or 1518.62 According to the same source, between 15 September 1519 and 17 June 1528, 143 ships consigned Cypriot salt in the office’s depository, an average of approximately sixteen ships per year. This was at least in part the upshot of the new measures. 1.5 The Still-Debated Policy over the Shipments of Pepper A decisive step towards the liberalization of pepper transports was taken on 1 March 1519. The preamble to the Senate’s decree cites the permanent disruption to the supply of pepper, resulting from the Portuguese activities. It also acknowledges that the provisions taken in 1514 failed to achieve the desired result, because of the dwindling supplies of spices in the Levant. The small amount of pepper that did arrive to Venice came from the West and was deemed contraband, as this practice had been outlawed. It was therefore decreed to authorize the import pepper to the city by merchants from any nation, whether by land or sea using any carrier, including foreign ships. No other levies besides the 3% tax would be imposed on such cargo, whereas pepper arriving from Egypt or Syria on board ‘national’ vessels was tax-exempted.63 The majority of the Venetian aristocracy was far from happy with this abrupt change in spice-carriers. This was especially the case after the ship Cornera returned from Alexandria in January 1524 with all the spice cargos available in that port, leaving nothing for the galleys.64 The issue sparked a heated debate in advance of the yearly departure of the spring muda of galleys to be sent to Beirut and Alexandria. Some argued logically that the political and economic circumstances had shifted in favour of private round ships, due to costs, while others remained convinced that the proper answer was to reinstate the 61 ASVe, CXDM, reg. 47, f. 93v (16 June 1524). These enactments caught the attention of Jean-Claude Hocquet, but he was unable to determine to what extent these unusual measures were triggered by the shortage in gross tonnage: Hocquet, Voiliers et commerce, p. 533; idem, Venise et le monopole, I, p. 575. 62 It translates, ‘we attest, on behalf of the Salt Office, that we do not find in our office’s books any indication that salt was transferred from Cyprus in the year 1517 and the year 1518’: ASVe, GP, Terminazioni, reg. 39, f. 45r (17 June 1528). 63 The 1 March 1519 decree was drafted by the cinque savi alla mercanzia, subsequently voted in the Senate, and copied out by Marino Sanuto. Voted in favour 167, against 9, refrained from voting 0. Published at the Rialto and San Marco the next day: ASVe, ST, reg. 21, ff. 19v–20r; Sanuto, I diarii, XXVII, 10, 14. 64 Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, p. 14; Sanuto, I diarii, XXXV, 332, 337 (13, 16 January 1524).

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former restrictive policies, namely to ‘put the voyages back on the right path’.65 Antonio Priuli q. Francesco dal Banco, an expert in Syrian affairs, advocated a liberalized policy: ‘the days in which the Mamluk ruled these lands and the Germans were not buying their spices in Lisbon, as they do now, are over’;66 for his part, Priuli expressed his conviction that trade from the Ottoman Levant would be better off using private vessels. A resolution was passed not before June 1524, when the Senate authorized the carriage of light merchandise from Syria and Egypt on any type of vessel as far as Cyprus, Corfu, or Zante. From there, they would be shipped to Venice on board the merchant galleys. As part of a broad attempt to revive the trade with the Levant, the control over foreign investments in shipping enterprises was increased. Foreigners were no longer allowed to embark on Venetian vessels, and Venetian captains were prohibited from carrying the merchandise of foreigners in the direction of Egypt, Syria, Constantinople, or to other possessions of the sultan in Romania. Conversely, as a result of an article in the peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire, the subjects of the sultan were allowed to enter into commercial partnerships with their Venetian counterparts. In the months that followed, the cinque savi alla mercanzia and the Senate were busy revising the requirements for citizenship, so as to legally grant trading privileges to various merchant communities.67 Nevertheless, after two favourable voyages in 1526 and 1527, the situation had worsened and the convoys to Alexandria remained sporadic. Public navigation to Syria was still active and employed two or three galleys per year. However, following the outbreak of the war with the Ottomans in 1537, public voyaging in both routes was seriously disrupted.68 2

Dwindling Traffic in Port and the Loss of Hegemony over the Adriatic Sea

2.1 Contraband and the Reform in Customs Procedures Rampant contraband had become a major cause of economic haemorrhaging in 1502, as the need to resuscitate Venice’s trade was ever more urgent. The general laxness of the control procedures in the customs house spurred the Grand 65 Judde de Larivière, Naviguer, commercer, gouverner, p. 261. 66 Sanuto, I diarii, XXXVI, 79–80 (19 March 1524). 67 Arbel, ‘Jews in International Trade’, pp. 76–79; ASVe, SM, reg. 20, ff. 113v–14r (19 April 1524); ASVe, PPA, reg. 8, f. 2v (11 June); ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 12, 37–38 (18 June); ASVe, PC, reg. 1, ff. 262v–63r (16 January); Sanuto, I diarii, XXXVI, 79 (19 March), 382 (2 June). 68 Luzzatto, ‘La decadenza’, pp. 232–33; Judde de Larivière, Naviguer, commercer, gouverner, pp. 66–67.

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Council on 30 November 1502 to appoint a provisory body, entitled collegio del serenissimo Principe, which included also the doge and his counsellors. Its duty was to draft a thorough overhaul of the customs procedures to boost the State’s tax income. The result was the decree of 1–2 March 1503, bringing the reinstatement and revision of on-board inspections for all galleys, ships, and navili during both loading and unloading, to be carried out by the dazieri. One of the latest commotions concerned a cargo of caskets or containers especially rigged so that they could be opened without breaking the seal, meaning that they had already been empty by the time they reached the customs depot.69 The bid to liberalize the tramping sea markets through the 21 October 1502 decree had proved beneficial, as shown by records for 1505. However, soon enough it was necessary to introduce some restrictive measures to exclude trafego from the port of Ancona. Likewise reinstated was the prohibition on the transport of salt and other merchandise to ports up and down the Adriatic. Marine traffic in this stretch of sea returned frequently to the agenda.70 Equally disturbing for the dogado was the use of vessels flying San Marco’s flag to transport infidels and their merchandise, which was done by faking permits on goods in transit.71 Whatever the effectiveness of the provisions taken may have been, the War of the League of Cambrai abruptly scuppered such efforts. Given such contingencies, this was not the right time to attempt any significant institutional or constitutional reforms in the customs administration.72 Colonial shipowners deviously flagged out their craft by selling shares of the entire vessel to foreigners, so as to prevent any interruption to their business. By the summer of 1509 it had already been necessary to re-enforce the ‘grippi law’ (1495/6) prohibiting such underhand practices.73 Inspectors admitted in 1510 that many of the tax frauds and muddles in the customs house were partly caused by the negligence and incompetence of the scrivani of ships and galleys, but this income was crucial for the war effort.74 On 26 September 1512 the Grand Council declared

69 ASVe, UT, bus. 1, c. 30 (1–2 March 1503). According to this edict, ship captains had to present the attestation of their cargo to the customs officer upon their arrival. The latter had full authority to interrogate all those voyaging on the ship in search for contraband. The guards at the customs had to be present during unloading. 70 ASVe, SM, reg. 16, f. 71v (20 February 1505); confirmed again: ibid., reg. 18, f. 44r (18 May 1514). 71 29 May 1505: ASVe, SM, reg. 16, f. 81r; Sanuto, I diarii, VI, 170. 72 Gilbert, ‘Venice in the Crisis of the League of Cambrai’, p. 277. 73 ASVe, SM, reg. 17, f. 80r (6 August, 15 September 1509). 74 Ibid., f. 101r (12 March 1510); ASVe, ST, reg. 17, f. 18v (13 March 1512).

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an amnesty, and invited merchants guilty of tax evasion as of 1 March 1508 to come forward, in return for a moderate fine only.75 Venice’s inability to police the Adriatic during the War of the League of Cambrai triggered a surge in illegal traffic between Dalmatia and the various key trade fairs held in Le Marche, Abruzzo, and Recanati, along with other ports of the sottovento. Meanwhile, the general absence of law and order left a growing margin for popular uprisings against the local nobilities in certain Venetian possessions in Dalmatia.76 Clearly, Venice’s long-standing hegemony over seaborne trade in the Adriatic was seriously compromised, at least temporarily. Subsequently, during the 1510 peace talks between Pope Julius II and Doge Grimani, the Republic conceded to renounce its dominance over the Adriatic, which had been formally recognized by Pope Gregory X almost two and a half centuries previously. From then on, navigation to Le Marche and Abruzzo for vessels flying the ensigns of Ferrara and other territories in the Papal States was permitted, although Venice later tried to disentangle itself from this concession.77 2.2 Privileged Shipments of Local Products from Greek Territories For a long time Venice’s colonial ships had continued to operate in the highly competitive markets in collusion with Ottoman merchants. They sailed to Ancona and carried goods shipped for the fairs of Lanciano and Recanati, a custom that eventually sparked the 18 May 1514 decree. In this instance the authorities acknowledged that maritime traffic regularly deviated to other ports in the Adriatic, with disastrous effects to the economy. The 1514 provision granted temporary permission to all ships to carry to Venice a wide range of cargoes, including silk and various textiles, woollens and cloth, ash, dyestuff, wax, carpets, moss, and other sorts of spices originating from Ottoman-Greek lands, the Epirus coast, and the Ionian Islands; the provision moreover exempted merchants from tithes, charging only the fees that were customary on the galleys. Captains were required to submit a full declaration of their cargo in Corfu (or other colonial administration) to assure that their goods would not be shipped to Ancona or other ports sottovento. Unloading cargo and leasing the ship for tramping in the Adriatic was strictly prohibited, with the exception of 75 ASVe, MC, reg. 25, ff. 79v–81r (26 September 1512). The decree was copied in full by Marino Sanuto: Sanuto, I diarii, XV, 137–44 (26 September 1512). 76 On the unrest in Venetian Dalmatia: Ventura, Nobiltà e popolo, pp. 151–68; O’Connell, Men of Empire, pp. 142–49. 77 Sanuto, I diarii, IX, 492, 583 (23 January, 15 February 1510); Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, 3, pp. 70, 73–75; Cessi, La Repubblica di Venezia e il problema adriatico, pp. 175–95.

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olive oil, almonds, nuts, chestnuts, and similar freights carried from Apulia to Alexandria, Candia, Venice, Beirut, or other authorized places.78 The provision had two major consequences: the first was to open up attractive freights along one of the most remunerative routes, namely to Constantinople. The second was the redirection of shipping to Venice, which would increase the city’s tax revenues. In the same period the role of Corfu as a military and policing base for shipping was further exploited. The same provisions were re-enacted on 30 October (1514) and proclaimed in Corfu; Zante; Dulcino; Lesina; Zara; Curzola; Crete; Budva; Cattaro; and Napoli di Romania.79 About that time, the Curzolani were granted privilege to continue their navigations to Apulia and Le Marche, limited to bearing their own local products.80 This in turn aroused the envy of the Corfiots, who were clearly the ones mostly affected by the new policing measures. This severe blow to their economy was mentioned in the periodical capitoli of the islanders presented to the Senate on 5 October 1516. The first chapter outlined the disastrous consequences of the prohibition imposed on colonial vessels and merchants sending goods directly to the sottovento fairs. Previously, Ottoman vessels carrying goods to be sold in Lanciano and Recanati and numerous Corfiot vessels had been able to enjoy the multitude of charter opportunities available to them. Now these 1514 provisions basically reduced Corfiot operators to poverty, their vessels lacked freights and were left to decay in port. ‘Unless the enactment were reversed,’ they pleaded, ‘the islanders would soon be forced to abandon their homeland.’ The Senate’s response on 20 June 1517 was negative: the decree would not be reversed, but the Senate would instead grant the Corfiots special fiscal privileges in Venice for shipping most goods originating from Romania, the Epirus Coast, and the Ionian Islands. Foreigners were equally encouraged to use Corfiot carriers for such transport, provided they complied with some simplified customs procedures in Venice.81 78

Further to the above, the imposition of the dacio del transito in Corfu by Antonio Loredan following the war with the Ottomans was lifted and the customary duties that were in practice before the war were reinstated: ASVe, SM, reg. 18, f. 44r (18 May 1514). On the obligatory stop in Corfu or Zante on the return voyage: Judde de Larivière, Naviguer, commercer, gouverner, p. 260; Arbel, ‘The Ionian Islands’, pp. 147–60. 79 ASVe, SM, reg. 18, f. 62r (30 October 1514); Cessi, La Repubblica di Venezia e il problema adriatico, pp. 175–95; Aymard, ‘Le commerce dans la Mer Adriatique’, pp. 703–21; Tucci, ‘Venezia, Ancona e i problemi della navigazione adriatica’, pp. 147–70. 80 Hanĕl, ‘Statuta et leges civitatis et insulae Curzulae’, pp. 241–42 (24 July 1514); Sanuto, I diarii, XX, 185 (7 May 1515). 81 Shipowners attempted to include their ships among those entitled to the 20 June 1517 privilege: Sathas, Documents inédits, V, pp. 249–50, 253, 255, 257; ASVe, CXDM, fil. 39, fasc. 159; ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 836a, 6; ibid., bus. 1 [20 June 1517]; Sanuto, I diarii, XXIV,

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Overall, the reform carried through in 1514 proved beneficial, and in 1519 other colonial ships  – principally those from Napoli di Romania, Malvasia, Zante, and Cefalonia  – were granted the same privilege.82 Two years later, merchants (including foreigners) were invited to transport such goods from Romania under similar conditions, on ships of every nation as far as the Ionian Islands, from where they would proceed to Venice on board vessels flying the San Marco flag.83 Concurrently, by 1518 the role of Corfu and Zante had strengthened as mandatory ports of call and attractive transhipment centre for Ottomans and their subjects. In 1520 the ports in Istria were awarded a similar status. Further measures were taken to close the new legal loopholes each time they emerged.84 However, on 5 August 1524 the Corfiots appealed to the Senate again, asking permission to sail to the sottovento fairs once a year, on a par with the Dalmatians. Time and again the request was denied, and the tax concessions in Venice were extended.85

389; Pagratis, ‘Ships and Shipbuilding in Corfu’, p. 245. The following case stresses the effort to redirect trade to the capital: in 1518 a Ragusan ship chartered by subjects of the sultan was on its way to Ancona with dyestuffs, silk, wax, cotton, acorns, etc. In Corfu, the ship was boarded by some officials, who urged the captain to change course to Venice, where it would enjoy better fiscal conditions: ASVe, SM, reg. 19, f. 64r (11 May 1518). 82 8 August 1519: Sanuto, I diarii, XXVII, 547; ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 23, reg. 22, 1r. 83 ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 8 [29 September 1521]. 84 Arbel, ‘The Ionian Islands’, pp. 147–60; Pagratis, ‘Trade and Shipping’, pp. 172–74. Decrees of 29 September 1519, 28 November 1519, 3–4 January 1520 prohibited the transport of wine, cheese, fat products, sardines, and meat from Candia and the surrounding area to any destinations in the Adriatic Sea, with the exception of Venice; new provisions were introduced for the clearance procedure in the colonies. The double taxation on merchandise in transit inter-Crete was lifted. In addition, the governors in Dalmatia were expected to deliver their monthly reports to the ufficio del dacio del vin and the ufficio del uscida and to monitor the traffic of victuals in their ports. Shipping in Chioggia and Corfu were also placed under a closer watch. The imposition of taxes on merchandise in transit between ports on the island of Crete was annulled: ASVe, SM, reg. 19, ff. 126r, 127r–v; Sanuto, I diarii, XXVIII, 155; ASVe, PSD, bus. 4 [29 September 1519]. The ports in Istria were granted the same fiscal concessions on 20 July 1520. This privilege was prolonged every two years: 9 August 1516; 8 August 1519; 29 January 1521; 6 March 1522; and until 20 September 1526. Further adjustments concerning specific types of merchandise were introduced. E.g., in 1521 silk imported from Constantinople on ships was charged with half the freightage to the galleys: ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 17 [7 March 1521]. 85 5 August 1524: Sanuto, I diarii, XXXVI, 514; Sathas, Documents inédits, V, pp. 261–64. It was extended in two years: ASVe, SM, reg. 21, f. 41r (20 September 1526).

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The Liberalization of Maritime Transport in the Western Mediterranean

After 1500, Venice could no longer claim it provided significant shipping services in the western Mediterranean and beyond the Pillars of Hercules. The trafego galleys, which traditionally connected Venice with Tunis, Tripoli, Alexandria, and the Syrian ports, remained inactive for four consecutive years. One of its peculiarities was that it offered transportation services to Moorish merchants who sailed from the Barbary Coast to Egypt. In 1504 the Senate decided to open these markets to private ships of over 800 botti. Ships that set sail for this voyage were required to enrol at least ninety mariners (approximately one crewman per 10 botti).86 An equally important mission high on the Senate’s agenda was the recapture of the Cretan wine trade from foreigners. Shipments in this direction were temporarily suspended, and the Senate funds were allotted to cover the expenses of ambassadors, and later to sustain the payments for the interests on the monte nuovo bonds. Once the peace treaty with the Turks had been signed and sealed in 1503, the lucrative routes to Constantinople reopened. The senators estimated that the economy in Crete would be able to sustain the imposition of the protective tax on foreign ships exporting wine. To further bolster private shipping (which was finally picking up), it was proposed to reverse the decree of 17 April 1499 and reinstate the duty of 4 ducats per butt of wine carried on foreign barze. The decree was put to the vote in the Senate 19 January 1504, after excluding from the vote all those shipowners who received state subsidies, and their close relatives. The issue was raised again 26 February, and the protective tax was finally imposed on 21 March.87 In May the navigation to the West was all set to resume, and it was decreed to re-allot the monthly sum of 200 ducats to its original purpose established in 1490: that is a bounty of 2 ducats per butt of wine exported westward on Venice’s ships.88 It is doubtful whether the protective tax was actually brought into force in the following year. Whatever was the case, the high tariffs did not deter foreign ships from this trade; there is evidence of an increase in malmsey traffic by English ships between 1504 and 1509.89 On 4 December 1505, however, the Senate acknowledged the ‘infinite damage’ caused by foreign barze, which were 86 26 April 1504: ASVe, SM, reg. 16, f. 39r; Sanuto, I diarii, VI, 16; Judde de Larivière, Naviguer, commercer, gouverner, p. 259. 87 19, 21 March 1504: ASVe, SM, reg. 16, ff. 41v, 49v; Sanuto, I diarii, V, 729, 1027. 88 ASVe, CXDM, reg. 30, f. 91v (22 May 1504). On the gradual redemption of the monte nuovo after 1503: Pezzolo, Il fisco dei veneziani, p. 44. 89 Tucci, ‘Costi e ricavi di una galera’, p. 176.

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expanding their activities in Crete and throughout the Levant. Their ships carried woollens owned by foreigners and Venetians as far as Constantinople and other destinations in the East, and then returned westward with Cretan wine. The subject was debated once again and then postponed to March to allow the feudal nobility and community in Crete to send their ambassadors and express their wishes in this regard.90 Meanwhile, spices from Lisbon were arriving on the London markets, and this resulted in a depression of their price. The news from the West led to a hot debate in the Senate whether or not to auction the galleys that year. Clearly, the entire structure of the Eurasian spice trade experienced rapid changes in those years.91 As clouds were gathering with the formation of the League of Cambrai (November 1508), the Senate prohibited ships from sailing westward.92 After the defeat in the Battle of Agnadello (14 May 1509), Venice found itself in a phase of acute difficulty on both land and sea. Given the regular transit of war fleets in and out of the Strait of Gibraltar, it was nigh impossible to guarantee the safety of the merchant galleys on their way to the English Channel, a fact that seriously curtailed all trade on such routes.93 The sense of risk perceived is exemplified by the case of certain galleys from Flanders carrying 600,000 ducats worth of cargo, which failed to find insurers offering rates lower than 15% (the usual rate being 4%). All other western voyages came to a halt as well; the galleys of Aigues-Mortes never sailed again, and the efforts to reanimate the trading voyage along the North African coast and routes to the English Channel ran into various political difficulties.94 In the following years the oncethriving wine trade with England on board San Marco ships steadily petered out. Shipowners that demanded protection from the State proved incapable of conducting such voyages themselves. Cretan wine exports to England were regularly carried on foreign vessels. Soon enough a small English commercial settlement (and perhaps a consul) emerged in Candia.95 90 ASVe, SM, reg. 16, f. 100v (4 December 1505). 91 Tucci, ‘Costi e ricavi di una galera’, pp. 167–68; Fusaro, Political Economies, p. 67. 92 Instead, on 22 February 1509, ships were authorized to set sail to the Levant from where they could be easily called back: ASVe, SM, reg. 17, f. 64r. 93 From 1509 to 1517 no Venetian trading fleet visited England: Luzzatto, Storia economica di Venezia, pp. 221–24; Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, pp. 242–45, 324–25, 329, 350–51; Epstein, ‘The Early History of the Levant Company’, p. 4. 94 E.g., in the absence of Venetian ships in the direction of Valencia, it was authorized on 5 March 1510 to transport woollens on foreign ships: ASVe, SM, reg. 17, f. 100r; Sanuto, I diarii, X, 21. 95 Direct trade between England and other islands in the Ionian Sea was slowly developing: Epstein, ‘The Early History of the Levant Company’, pp. 2–3; Fusaro, Political Economies, p. 44; Maltezou, ‘The Historical and Social Context’, pp. 17–47, 29–32.

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Meanwhile, having established Constantinople as their base where many of their compatriots were living, Cretans had set up maritime entrepreneurial networks through which malmsey wine was exported. The capital of the Empire absorbed part of this valuable product, the rest was distributed to cities in northern Europe, Poland, and Moldova.96 The growing dilemma prompted another bid to lift the protective taxes on wine imports, at both ends.97 The cinque savi alla mercanzia supported by the majority of the senators was progressively moving towards the liberalization of maritime transport, primarily along the routes to the West. This was effected both gradually and prudently, by distinguishing between different types of merchandise. In 1519, for example, carriers of all nationalities were called to import ash from western destinations under favourable conditions to support the local soap and glass industries.98 Notwithstanding the lack of any single drastic statute to secure this process, the steps taken mark a decisive change in Venice’s guiding principles. As the economy began to show signs of recovery, on 21 March 1524 several councillors proposed to revive the public trade routes to Flanders, but instead of using galleys they offered a bonus of 4 ducats per butt of Cretan wine for anyone willing to build nave grosse of 1,000 botti (for a maximum of four ships). However, this plan was never realized either.99 4

‘Venice Is Drying Up’

Nature itself became an increasing obstacle to shipping at a time when Venice’s maritime might was steadily being eclipsed. In the last decades of the fifteenth century the ‘enemy’ in the eyes of many was the River Brenta, which emptied into the lagoon between Mestre and Marghera; the regular flooding was harmful to the neighbouring areas, and the circulation of fluvial water in the lagoon generated not only an unbearable stench but was believed to be the cause of sickness among the population, and not least the cause of silting.100 The 96 97 98 99 100

Pagratis, ‘Venice, her subjects’, p. 256. On the lively trade in malmsey with Constantinople on Cretan ships: Sanuto, I diarii, XXVI, 295–96 (24 December 1518), 417 (3 March 1519); ibid., XXVII, 399 (18 June), 474 (14 July), 634 (12 September). ASVe, SM, reg. 18, ff. 77v–78r (20 April 1515). Ibid., reg. 19, f. 113r (11 July 1519). Sanuto, I diarii, XXXVI, 86 (21 March 1524). Crouzet-Pavan, Sopra le acque salse, 1, pp. 315, 355–57. One of the precautions taken in 1462 was to authorize ship demolition on the Lido only. Infrastructures that were believed to be the cause of silting were removed: ibid., 1, pp. 310–11. To be sure, the problem of the embankments of the lidi (murazzi) became severed in the end of the century: In 1424, 6,000 ducats were spent each year on the littoral; in 1469, more than 11,000; similar sums

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evident dangers to the lagoon’s health was publicly acknowledged in 1488, and a decision was made to devise a way to divert the watercourse away from the lagoon,101 but experts disagreed on the line of action to take, and the scheme was put on hold; by 1490, however, it became clear that in few years’ time, even the doge’s Bucintoro would no longer be able to dock in front of Piazza San Marco, nor would ships unload at the customs house. The ‘drying up’ of the lagoon was aggravated further by the constant shifting and silting of the very access to the port along a channel that was regularly dredged to create a passage through the sandbanks near the forts of San Nicolò and Sant’Andrea (do castelli). In previous years, this waterway, known locally as the fuosa, was relatively short and directed eastwards, the north and easterly winds facilitating access to the lagoon (see fig. 9) owing to the customary wind hailing from beam or broad reach. However, the alternating outflow of the Brenta significantly altered the direction of the currents. This, in turn, affected the fuosa waterway. The sand that was carried by the Piave through the river mouth and spilled to the sea was no longer driven further by the strong currents of the Brenta. Previously these currents flowed from the port of San Nicolò, but now were coursing through the port of Malamocco instead. Consequently, the fuosa of San Nicolò gradually shifted towards southeast (fig. 10) and further south (fig. 11), and the entrance to the port with northerly and north-easterly winds became increasingly challenging, since the wind was invariably sottovento, that is contrary to the desired direction. Hence, tacking through the fuosa was always a dangerous undertaking, and simply not feasible for large ships with limited manoeuvrability.102 Vessels were compelled to wait at the anchorage area in open sea, sometimes for days or weeks before being able to attempt entry. Meanwhile the wait itself exposed them to the danger of being caught in a storm in offshore waters. A new device to mark the level of water at the entrance was installed on the fort of Sant’Andrea, probably in the early 1490s. In this way the high tides were communicated to the ships at anchor outside the Lido by means of a black leather ball fixed on a rod, indicating the fluctuating water-level.103 Previously subordinate to the northern outlets of the lagoon, by 1493 the port of Malamocco had become almost essential for the navi grosse, thanks were invested in the 1490s: ibid., pp. 347–48; idem, ‘An Ecological Understanding of the Myth’, pp. 49–51; idem, ‘Venice and its surroundings’, p. 39. 101 With a transcription of the 16 October 1488 decree: Zendrini, Memorie storiche, I, pp. 126–29. 102 Ibid., pp. 130–32 (ref. to 26 April 1490); Crouzet-Pavan, ‘Venice and its surroundings’, p. 41. 103 Mueller, ‘A Device for Signalling’, pp. 261–79.

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to the endless silting problems of the fuosa.104 Now round ships would cast anchor in the vicinity of Poveglia, from where merchandise was unloaded onto smaller carriers and thence conveyed to Venice. The additional expenses were included in the general average, and shared among the various parties involved. Dredging works began in Chioggia, together with the construction of a mole called the pallada di Lion. As a result of these efforts, by August 1500 the depth of the channel had increased from 3.82 metres (11 pie’) to 6.25 (18 pie’), which was sufficient to accommodate large round ships.105 4.1 The Entrances to the Lagoon at the Beginning of the 16th Century As of 1501 the Council of Ten intervened directly in all matters regarding the safety of the lagoon waters and access to the city; it also established a new magistracy entitled the savi alle acque. The new body assumed responsibilities that were previously under the aegis of the provveditori di Comun. Its legislative authority within the areas of responsibility was subject to the consent of one of the members of the Ten.106 Around this time, Pietro and Angelo Sambi da Chioggia were requested to prepare a report based on their personal memory of the changing elements in the lagoon over the previous fifty years. According to their report, the depth in the port of Malamocco used to be 4.86 metres (14 pie’) and was then barely one metre deep (3 pie’). The underwater shoal now extended for over a mile, and areas that were previously one or two metres underwater were now dry land. During high tides the sand that was coming from the River Brenta invaded the lagoon as far as the Santo Spirito and the Giudecca, and silted Venice as well.107 By 1510 the Chioggia entrance was silted up again, and the local council of citizens and mariners considered the installation of a signal device or beacon at the mouth of the waterway, and to cover the expenses by placing an entry tax on foreign vessels.108 Another wave of fierce winter storms tormented the lagoon during the last months of 1510 and early 1511, which in turn aggravated the silting of the fuosa. In one such instance, the convoy of ships returning from Beirut was caught off-guard outside the port, resulting in the shipwreck of several vessels, while others had managed to escape but suffered extensive damage.109 The highly risky departure of the merchant galleys of Alexandria in the following months 104 Crouzet-Pavan, Sopra le acque salse, 1, p. 357. 105 Sanuto, I diarii, II, 666 (24 August 1500). 106 Favaro, ‘Notizie storiche sul magistrato’, pp. 179–99; Zendrini, Memorie storiche, I, p. 135. 107 Zendrini, Memorie storiche, I, pp. 156–58; Crouzet-Pavan, ‘Venice and its surroundings’, p. 41. 108 Sanuto, I diarii, X, 359 (17 May 1510). 109 Ibid., 716–17 (5 January 1511).

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drove the cattaveri and the savi agli ordini to re-enact, on 4 September 1512, the obligation for all ships to hire the services of a pedoto for the crossing from Istria. It was also decreed that departures in difficult conditions be first subjected to a consultation with a committee of pilots with experience of the lagoon’s waters. Unsurprisingly, the rising demand for piloting services led to the pedoti overcharging for their services, which drove the Senate to draw up a tariff of maximum rates,110 and introduce further restraints in the ensuing years.111 As from August 1515 all ships at the anchorage area off the Lido were charged for arming the Arsenal’s service boats and for borrowing additional hawsers and anchors (to cover the depreciation of their value).112 Around that time, Zuane di Piero, the armiraglio of San Nicolò, warned the senators that in recent years the fuosa had significantly changed its path. Previously, the access to the waterway was with north-easterly winds, now however it was better to arrive with easterly winds. He also noted how the currents flowing out of the lagoon were significantly reduced: ‘Once a boat with four oars could barely advance against the current,’ he commented, ‘while at present it is easily done with a boat of two oars.’ To prevent the sand from piling up at the entrance it was suggested to extend the guardian, the principal breakwater protecting the port.113 The fact that the Bernardo brothers had to pare down both of their navi grosse to reduce the overall draught by over 1.74 metres confirms the magnitude of the problem. In the aftermath of the War of the Holy League, Venice was unable to allocate the necessary funds to conduct major dredging and construction operations to prevent its principal waterway from silting. Instead, Malamocco and Chioggia received priority and further provisions were taken to allow local administrations to deal efficiently with contrabands and corruption, arguably marking an expected increase in the traffic from these entrances to the lagoon at the expense of San Nicolò.114 4.2 The ‘Grand Plan’ A deposition of 23 May 1519 made by Zuane da Castello – an experienced pilot – confirms that in the second decade of the sixteenth century the situation at the 110 ASVe, UC, reg. 3.5, ff. 21v–22r (4 September 1512). 111 These years are marked by excessive legislation regarding piloting: ASVe, SM, reg. 18, f. 65r (29 December 1514); ASVe, CL, bus. 19, 77 (28 February 1515); ASVe, UC, bus. 3.5, ff. 29v–31r (2 September 1515), 32r–33r (24 December 1519). In Malamocco: ibid., ff. 35v–37r (13 November 1523), 38v–40v (19 February 1527). 112 ASVe, PPA, bus. 531, fasc. 15, c. 79v (7 August 1515), re-enacted (6 November 1516); ASVe, UC, bus. 3.5, ff. 31v–32r (15 April 1519); Sanuto, I diarii, XX, 473 (7 August 1515). 113 Zendrini, Memorie storiche, I, pp. 168–69. 114 11 June 1518: ASVe, SM, reg. 19, ff. 67r–v; Sanuto, I diarii, XXV, 455.

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entrances to the lagoon had deteriorated dramatically. Previously, the depths in the inner part of Malamocco were 4.86 metres (14 pie’) and 4.17 metres (12 pie’) at the entrance; 1.4 to 2 metres (4 to 6 pie’) were measured in the channel of Sant’Erasmo; and 2 metres were measured further north, at Treporti. The experienced pilot asserted that the conditions had changed critically after the construction works in Mestre and Marghera. By now, the depths at the port of San Nicolò dropped to 3.8 metres (11 pie’), the fuosa was half a mile longer than it used to be, and had shifted towards the south-west (garbino). It was becoming shallower and narrower by the day, being hedged in on the west side by the littoral. In the past, ships had pointed their bows towards the southwest, now the bow had to be pointed towards north-north-west. The prevailing north-easterly winds and their intensification (the bora) made that passage particularly difficult, with the contrary winds practically pushing the vessel to the lee shore. The depth in Malamocco had meanwhile increased from 4.86 to 5.91 metres (17 pie’).115 The experienced pilot backed by the savi alle acque proposed to reopen the artificial canal that diverted the Brenta from flowing into the lagoon, so as to increase the currents at San Nicolò. The matter was debated in the Collegio and delegated to the Senate.116 On 16 June 1519 the Senate adjourned to determine the line of action. Gasparo Malipiero, a shipowner and one of the savi alle acque in these dramatic years, opened the session by presenting the group of experts that stood at his side – these were celebrated pedoti, harbourmasters, and the Arsenal’s proti Andrea di Vivian, and Ludovico and Matteo Bressan. The specialists testified to the fact that the port was no longer navigable and the lagoon was equally silting. They were all in favour of reopening the artificial canal. The manifest danger of the closure in Marghera was already reported in 1503 and now brought to the senator’s attention by Malipiero. Strong opposition came from Luca Tron, one of the previous savi who had ordered the works in the first place.117 ‘The matter was of great importance,’ intoned Malipiero. ‘It could very well lead to the abandon of Venice.’ Tron instead argued that the ‘respectable forum’ was inexperienced in matters concerning the waters of the terraferma, noting that the diversion of the Brenta by Francesco I da Carrara, the lord of Padua, was one of the principal reasons they had waged war back in 1371. He reminded the senators that the closure of the Brenta saved Venice during one of the first 115 Zendrini, Memorie storiche, I, pp. 169–70. 116 Sanuto, I diarii, XXVII, 323 (26 May 1519). 117 Incidentally, Luca Tron was one of the critics against public navigation, and advocated the liberalization of shipping and trade: Judde de Larivière, Naviguer, comercer, gouverner, p. 300.

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episodes in the War of the League of Cambrai, and that the previous flooding, foul air, and sickness, had made Mestre and Marghera almost uninhabitable at the time. Therefore, the artificial canal which had already cost the tax payer 40,000 ducats, was to be developed and not abandoned. The senators withdrew to read from a book entitled Capella compiled by the city’s forefathers, containing the history of the lagoon; given the tardy hour, they postponed their decision to another session.118 In the following days the discussions revolved around the question of whether or not to create two openings in the Brenta in order to better regulate the currents in the lagoon. Others were of the opinion that the same scheme might be applied to the River Adige; thus, no agreement was reached, and all decisions were deferred.119 In the following winter, the fuosa deteriorated even further, and the needed dredging operation required raising special funds. In January 1520, boat owners and fishermen found themselves saddled with a new duty, in the form of an order that the marani and burchi were obliged to conduct one voyage per year for the magistracy.120 In July of the same year (1520) the savi enrolled a member of the Ten and several specialists to inspect all the infrastructures along the lidi. Their reports show that by now the fuosa measured 35 metres (20 passa) in width and 870 metres (500 passa) in length, with the water-level reduced to a mere 3.1 metres (9 pie’): as such, the channel presented an extremely perilous passage for virtually any commercial vessel. It was therefore decided to construct a mole of 52 metres in width (30 passa) along the Lido on the side facing the sea, repair the embankments as far as Malamocco (which risked being overwhelmed by sea surge), and replace the beacons and signals at the port of San Nicolò.121 The provveditori al sal – who were also in charge on the maintenance of the littorals – proved incapable of tackling a project of such a huge scale, and hence in August 1520 the savi alle acque assumed control of the operation,122 and shortly afterwards the task of dredging of the canals in the city itself was also delegated to the savi.123 Amidst all these debates and decisions, it was equally important to establish some kind of official rating for the water-level at the lagoon’s entrance, 118 16 June 1519: Sanuto, I diarii, XXVII, 379, 392–94. 119 Sanuto, I diarii, XXVII, 443, 448–50 (4–5 July 1519); diverting part of the stream in Marghera towards the Adige was confirmed on 28 January 1520: ibid., XXVIII, 213. 120 Ibid., 196, 198 (19, 21 January 1520); ibid., XXVIII, 333 (10 March 1520). 121 ASVe, SEA, bus. 67 [23 July 1520]; Sanuto, I diarii, XXIX, 52, 56 (16, 19 July 1520). 122 ASVe, CL, bus. 238, 64 (22 August 1520). 123 Previously administrated by the provveditori di Comun: ASVe, PC, reg. 1, f. 245v (3 November 1520).

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by which ships could gauge the hazards of entry. To avoid contradictory information, ship pilots were strictly prohibited from carrying out sounding measurements, and instructed instead to follow information provided by the armiraglio of San Nicolò, though the regulations for Malamocco and Chioggia were somewhat less emphatic.124 The opening of the artificial canal in Marghera to allegedly increase the water flowing outside the lagoon remained high on the agenda for some time, and the Senate soon established a special Council of Thirty to come up with a detailed plan,125 which resulted in an illustrated document, printed in twohundred and fifty copies at a cost of 11 ducats. It was distributed among the senators on 6 September 1520, so that all and sundry could study the proposed new canal, the fuosa Gradeniga. The proposal involved digging a new waterway to connect the artificial canal of the Brenta with the lagoon, and the plan and schedule were eventually approved, a scheme which would enable the arrival by boat as far as Mestre.126 In the ensuing session, discussions revolved around the need to raise 10,000 ducats for the excavation work, and an additional budget was required to resume the works on the littoral. Furthermore, it was imperative to dredge the public shipyards;127 the scheme to protect the littoral ballooned, and in the following winter further provisions were introduced to secure the lagoon’s future.128 The ambitious works on the lidi began in the spring of 1521. Thousands of oak trees were felled each year for this purpose, and soon enough prisoners were brought in to complete the huge workforce that the project required.129 In the meantime, the perilously shallow waters at the lagoon’s entrance is confirmed by a report that the marciliana and other vessels of only 700 stara had also needed chaperoning by tugboats in 1521 to ensure their safe passage into the city’s harbour.130

124 ASVe, UC, reg. 3.5, ff. 33r–v (27 September 1520). 125 Sanuto, I diarii, XXIX, 112 (13 August 1520). 126 Ibid., 163 (6 September 1520); Zendrini, Memorie storiche, I, pp. 170–71. 127 Sanuto, I diarii, XXIX, 266–67 (3 October 1520). 128 For instance, it was strictly prohibited to build constructions on pillars or pontoons without explicit licence from the magistracy; such edifices had to be dissembled so they would not impede the currents: ibid., XXIX, 560–61 (18 January 1521). Emptying bilge water along the San Marco Basin was prohibited: ASVe, SEA, bus. 176, pt. III, f. 39v (29 November 1524). 129 ASVe, SM, reg. 19, f. 243v (10 July 1521); Sanuto, I diarii, XXIX, 302 (18 October 1520); ibid., XXXII, 109 (7 November 1521). 130 ASVe, UC, reg. 3.5, ff. 34r–v (4 September 1521).

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4.3 The Stranding of the Malipiera In July of the same year (1521), the newly built Malipiera of 700 botti, owned by the same Gasparo Malipiero, found itself stranded in the vicinity of the do castelli at the port entrance. The ship had cost 6,000 ducats to build, had so far successfully completed one voyage to Cyprus, and was about to set sail again when the disaster occurred. All attempts to save the ship were in vain. The ballast comprised 50 miera of iron, but great quantities of sand had already penetrated through a fracture in the hull. It soon became clear that it would be impossible to extract the hulk without the aid of two large galleys. Desperate to save his vessel, Malipiero pleaded tearfully with the Collegio to lend him the two galee grosse that ran the Flanders route. Unfortunately for him, the vessels had been auctioned four days earlier, and there seem to be no way to reverse the sale. The Senate, however, acknowledged that Gasparo merited help,131 and so several galleys destined for the voyage to Beirut were borrowed for the salvage operation, for a period of five days. Despite all efforts, however, the ship’s hulking carcass proved irremovable. At one of the following sessions of the Senate, Malipiero changed his argument, observing that if the hulk were not removed it would soon block the entire fuosa, and that some 3,000 ducats would be required to reopen the channel.132 4.4 The Failure of the Newfangled fuosa Gradeniga The years 1523 and 1524 were evidently hazardous for navigation in general, given that no fewer than nine round ships were shipwrecked, most of them during the harsh winter months. This means that within barely two years, one quarter of the entire merchant fleet of large round ships were lost. Moreover, the severe winter storms had seriously impaired the embankments on the littoral in Malamocco and further south towards Chioggia, in Porto secco and the Caroman. Also partly ruined were the guardian pier protecting the port of San Nicolò, along with the other nearby breakwaters. Vast quantities of sand had been carried by the tides and piled up at the entrance and further inside at the waterway that passed between Sant’Elena and the Lido, and as far as San Marco itself. In November 1523 it was reported that the water level had fallen from 7 metres (20 pie’) to less than 2.78 (8 pie’); a new low, to be sure.133 In response, the Senate limited the approach to the embankments, the moles and

131 Sanuto, I diarii, XXX, 471 (3 July 1521). 132 Ibid., XXXI, 40 (14 July 1521). 133 ASVe, CXDM, fil. 52, fasc. 105 (18 November 1523).

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other infrastructures, and all fishing at the vicinity was prohibited, to prevent further silting.134 It is however doubtful whether the provisions taken were sufficient to stave off what was basically an ongoing natural disaster. Despite the inauguration of the fuosa Gradeniga around that time, in May 1524 travelling by boat to Mestre was still impossible, as the waterway had run dry. The foul air in Mestre made life nigh impossible, and by now the town was also exposed to the inevitable spring floods, which were not late in arriving,135 and in November that same year a great part of Mestre was covered with water. On 1 and 3 December the Senate committee raised the issue of reclosing of the new Gradeniga canal, but with no result.136 Unsurprisingly, Luca Tron did not spare his criticism, but he was only one of many convinced that the intervention had only worsened the conditions. In his final report to the Collegio 26 October 1524, Zuan-Antonio Dandolo, the exiting governor of Chioggia, warned of the immediate risk that the fuosa Gradeniga posed to vast stretches of cultivated land in the southern section of the lagoon. The outlets of the Adige and the Brenta nova had meanwhile silted up Porto di Brondolo, forming a large sandbank outside the port of Chioggia, such that whereas ‘large ships entered in the past, now even a marciliana could not enter.’137 A lengthy report from 1526 on the defence systems created to save the lagoon condemns the previous works as a series of fatal errors, conducted by officials with insufficient experience. The embankments along the littoral were never properly completed, and hence there was a risk they would soon be destroyed by the elements.138 Another report, filed by the armiraglio of San Nicolò Antonio Spiera together with a team of pilots and experts, affirmed that the length of the fuosa – about fifty-two metres (30 passa) thirty years earlier – had grown to at least 174 metres (100 passa). Over time, the direction of this growth had gradually shifted from the south-east to south, settling in the condition of south-west. The team was convinced that the northern outlets of the lagoon, Sant’Erasmo and Tre Porti, were responsible for diverting the fuosa of San Nicolò. The winter bora winds had shored up immense quantities of sand, particularly during a storm on the feast of Saint Simon (28 October). The mass of sand that spilled over the fuosa – so much that ‘one-hundred ships could not carry’ – silted it up irreparably. The team concluded that ‘unless further 134 ASVe, ST, reg. 22, f. 172r (23 February 1522). 135 Sanuto, I diarii, XXXVI, 353 (19 May 1524). 136 Ibid., XXXVII, 263, 277 (29 November 1524). 137 The internal canals that served burchi for carrying wine and merchandise turned impassable and tax incomes were consequently reduced: ibid., 97 (26 October 1524). 138 ASVe, CXDC, fil. 2, fasc. 207 (26 January 1526).

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figure 9

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A reconstruction of the channel at the ports of Sant’Erasmo and San Nicolò in 1350, based on B. Zendrini, Memorie storiche, t. I, tav. II

figure 10 The channel at the ports of Sant’Erasmo and San Nicolò in 1410 after the construction of the palificata Garzina, based on B. Zendrini, Memorie storiche, t. I, tav. III

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figure 11 The deviation of the channel ( fuosa) from east to south-southeast at the entrance of San Nicolò, based on a design from 1526: Progetto di Cristoforo Sabbadino per la creazione di canali navigabili intorno all’Arsenale e a Venezia nel 1557 (Archivio di stato di Venezia)

protection is provided, galleys would soon be unable to enter San Nicolò at all’.139 But, in fact, no specialist could have predicted the events that followed; soon enough, Italy and vast parts of Europe entered a period of severe weather conditions and a spike in natural disasters. Yet despite its seriousness, the silting up of San Nicolò did not deliver the expected death blow to Venice’s shipping prowess, since the southern inlets and the ports in Istria were wisely being developed to provide alternative means of access. Nevertheless, the ravages of nature added insult to injury, worsening a situation that already spelled a deep and lasting crisis in Venice’s shipping in the first four decades of the sixteenth century. 139 Sanuto, I diarii, XLIII, 462 (17 December 1526); Zendrini, Memorie storiche, I, pp. 172–73.

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A Period of Stagnation, 1527–40 1

The Effects of a Rise in Natural Disasters on Shipping, 1527–33

1.1 On the Brink of Disaster In January 1529, diarist Marino Sanuto compiled a list of Venetian large merchant vessels that were shipwrecked in the course of one year: Note of the ships that shipwrecked this year. The ship of sir Leonardo Arimondo of late Fantino, laden with wheat, shipwrecked in the vicinity of Vatika on the return voyage; the ship of the Tiepolo, captained by Hieronimo […], went to pick up wheat and capsized in Boca di Cataro; the ship of Zorzi da Napoli, with wheat, on the island of Negroponte; the ship of sir Jacomo Corner & co., captained by Zuane Fortin, went to load […] in the vicinity of [the island of] Milo; the ship of sir Zuane Pisani and sir Zuane Capello, captained by Matteo Verga was stranded on a rock in Apulia on the return voyage from Alexandria carrying broad beans, the cause of shipwreck was the storm on the Holy Innocent’s Day [28 December]; the ship of sir Maffeo Bernardo, captained by Tommasin Filacanevo, returning from Alexandria with broad beans; the ship owned and captained by Antonio Purese, previously of Battista Sereni and Bartolomeo di Belin [shipwrecked] in the vicinity of Monopoli on the outward voyage to Alexandria; the ship of Francesco di Rimondo and Bernardino di Cristofolo di le Segurtà [shipwrecked] in the vicinity of Pulignan on its outward voyage to Alexandria.1 Shortly after, the ship of Marc-Antonio Dandolo was stranded on the island of Skiathos in the Aegean Sea and Sanuto indicated that at least twenty-five ships and caravelle belonging to Venetian citizens and subjects were shipwrecked in a single year.2 These figures are remarkably high, particularly when counted against the number of round ships in those years. The fact that about one-third of the fleet of round ships and numerous smaller vessels were shipwrecked within such a short period demands an explanation.

1 Sanuto, I diarii, XLIX, 385–86 (26 January 1529). 2 Ibid., L, 132 (19 March 1529).

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004398177_016

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Between 1527 and 1530 and again in 1533 much of central and northern Italy experienced unusually cold weather. The rates of rainfall and snow in Venice and the surrounding mainland were said to be the highest in fifty years. Cloudbursts and merciless rain caused flooding in vast rural lands in the proximity of the rivers Po, Adige, Brenta, and Piave. Nearly the entire Mantuan and Polesine countryside was covered in water and villages were evacuated. Frogs were heard croaking in the flooded canals of Venice.3 The mud was knee-high in the surroundings of Ferrara, and villages at the foot of the Alps were practically abandoned.4 The stretch of frequent bad weather and flooding affected Sicily and southern Italy as well.5 On 3 November 1529, high tide in Venice (locally called acqua alta) reached a new peak and destroyed the embankments of the Brenta submerging the entire terrain of Liza Fusina (the western banks of the Lagoon). The Adige rose a foot higher than it had ever done in living memory. In November 1530 a climatic catastrophe was recorded in northern Europe, where the entire island of Zealand (in Denmark) and parts of Flanders and Holland were deluged. The water-level rose one foot higher than all previous recordings, and locals compared it to the biblical flood of Noah’s days.6 In October 1531, in upper Italy extensive flooding was recorded in Venice, the Brenta and the Piave, where the level of water rose as high as the axels of a carriage.7 The suffering that resulted from crop failures was not late in coming either, and the poor fled to the main cities of Italy in search of refuge and sustenance. In Venice itself the government built temporary shelters to deal with the multitude of the newly destitute within the city and provide them with food, in the hope that the next harvest would prove successful. The effects of these great climatic catastrophes on the Venetian terraferma and on the development of social care policies and practices are well

3 Ibid., XLV, 93, 162, 177, 225, 244, 274, 283, 292, 305 (8 May–13 June 1527). 4 Ibid., XLIV, 375 (March 1527); Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 332. 5 In January 1528, several eyewitnesses reported on a strange weather phenomenon in Sicily during a fierce south-easterly storm: ‘being in Messina, an east-south-eastern tempest accompanied by strong winds and heavy rain began and carried certain dust or fine red clay soil. When the winds abated [the soil] filled the streets up to a level of two deta [circa 4.34 cm]. When it started to rain again, the soil liquefied and washed the streets like blood. [He] reports that persons that returned from Calabria heard that the same had occurred also there. For this reason, the clergy and the people begged our God, suspecting it was a supernatural phenomenon and sign of a bad future’: Sanuto, I diarii, XLVI, 620 (27 January 1528). 6 Ibid., LIV, 137–38 (5–6 November 1530). 7 Ibid., LV, 87–89 (26–29 October 1531).

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documented.8 They had wide-ranging implications on shipping as well. The fact that storms occurred more frequently and ferociously in different stretches of sea is attested by contemporaries. In a series of wintry storms in December 1528, an exceptional number of merchant vessels were wrecked along the shores of southern Italy. The Venetian war fleet was seriously affected as well.9 The merchant marine of Chioggia lost no fewer than twelve vessels (mostly marciliane) in Apulia, while many other seamen and captains died from a plague that infested these areas.10 Later the same month, a round ship captained by Matteo Verga was shipwrecked in Apulia and another belonging to Lorenzo di Hieronimo Tiepolo capsized in Cattaro.11 The unfolding toll of disasters is probably what prompted Marino Sanuto to compile his list of shipwrecks around that time. Furthermore, in November 1529 the intensification of bad weather led to the shipwreck of the Morosina in Silva in Croatia as well as that of three other merchant ships outside the Lido in Venice.12 In 1530 another violent storm ignited across the shores of southern Italy during the night of 28 October (the feast of San Simone) and caused the loss of at least nine merchant ships (some owned or chartered by Venetians) and dispersed the convoy of the Flanders galleys. On 4 December twenty-four grain-carrying craft and several merchant vessels were stranded on the sandbanks outside Venice during a wintry storm.13 The petition of Ciprian and Jacomo Malipiero q. Hieronimo (prev. to 1531) refers to the misfortunes of the recent years and the heinous difficulties that the shipping business was facing: And among other [suffering], we lost on the barzotto of Bertuci Contarini, captured south to [the island of] Cerigo [Kythera], more than 2,500 ducats; on the ship Morosina captained by Piero Taiapiera that was shipwrecked north to Zara [Zadar] we lost more than 3,000 ducats; in addition, on the ship captained by Zuan Storto that was shipwrecked north to Corfu we lost more than 800 ducats; and then on various other vessels bad luck strangely followed us.14 8 On social care policies in this period: Pullan, ‘The Famine in Venice’, pp. 141–202; idem, Rich and poor in Renaissance Venice, pp. 239–47; Del Torre, Venezia e la Terraferma, pp. 199–216; Scarabello, ‘Strutture assistenziali a Venezia’, pp. 119–33. 9 Arsil, a sea-going landing craft propelled primarily by oars: Sanuto, I diarii, XLIX, 217, 226, 232, 269–71, 280–81, 284–86, 351–56 (December 1528). 10 ASVe, CXDM, fil. 9, fasc. 37 (28 February 1528); ibid., fil. 9, fasc. 77 (18 March 1529). 11 Sanuto, I diarii, XLIX, 351 (December 1528). 12 ASVe, SM, reg. 21, f. 182r (9 November 1529); ASVe, ACMCP, bus. 3666, cc. 59v, 76v (November 1529); Sanuto, I diarii, LII, 167 (3 November 1529). 13 Sanuto, I diarii, LII, 154, 161–62 (28 October–4 December 1530). 14 ASVe, CXDC, fil. 12, fasc. 213 (28 February 1531).

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One to three shipwrecks per year can be considered a standard rate for the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Hence the loss of twenty-one round ships between 1528 and 1530 due to weather conditions alone (in 1530 three others were captured by corsairs) dealt a dramatic blow to the city’s merchant marine. Moreover, we can safely assume that the toll on smaller vessels was considerably higher. The devastating effects to Venetian shipping are supported also by a drop in tax revenues. One such a case concerns the petition to the Council of Ten by Zuan-Antonio Botazzo, the contractor of the 3% tax on profits incurred from imports of merchandise and freightage in Venice between 1 March 1528 and 28 February 1530 (a period of two years). The petitioner claimed a loss of more than 20,000 ducats ascribed to irregularities in the expeditions of the galleys to Beirut and Alexandria. As far as private vessels were concerned, the fact that ships carried mostly wheat and were tax-exempted – along with the reduction in number due to shipwrecks – exacerbated this situation.15 The delays in the expedition of the merchant galleys in 1529 did not concern the weather, but rather uncertainly related to the intentions of the armada of Andrea Doria. Two years earlier, however, in 1527 the muda to Alexandria had been postponed after the mast of one of the galleys and the spar of another were broken while crossing the gulf of Quarner. In 1526 and 1528 the galley voyages to Alexandria were cancelled. In 1528 the procurement outlay for one of the merchant galleys that were auctioned dropped as low as 21 ducats, and to a mere 1 ducat in 1529. The prices showed no sign of returning to their former rates until 1536. However, since public navigation had already been in crisis for some time, it is unclear as to what extent the commercial prospects of the galleys were particularly affected by the abnormal meteorological phenomena.16 The correlation between a rise in natural disasters and a further slowdown in shipping is better manifested in a significant legislative effort to confront this situation. On 12 July 1527, the capsizing of the Dolfina  – thanks to an attempt to load extra smuggled cargo in the open sea – triggered a reform in safety regulations against overloading, and to provide the means to secure the approach to the port of Venice. In a rather lengthy decree the Senate delegated

15

Ibid., fil. 13, fasc. 68 (28 April 1531). Benedetto Priuli q. Francesco, the owner of two carats in the 3% tax, stressed the losses to shipping (primarily colonial) caused by bad weather: ibid., fasc. 57 (26 April 1531). A petition by Bernardo Arian that was persuaded to buy one carat in the enterprise: Chambers and Pullan, Venice: A Documentary History, p. 144. 16 Sanuto, I diarii, XLV, 654, 657 (22–23 August 1527); ibid., XLVI, 565 (7 February 1528); Judde de Larivière, Naviguer, commercer, gouverner, pp. 66, 70, 114; Gino Luzzatto, ‘La decadenza di Venezia’, p. 171.

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wider powers to the admiral of the port and the provveditori all’Arsenal.17 On 11 April 1529, following the disaster in Apulia in which many war vessels were shipwrecked or otherwise damaged, the Senate chose to employ fifteen to twenty coastal boats of 300 stara instead of the larger galee sottile. The reason was that the latter could not be guaranteed safe passage in these dangerous waters. The extent of the losses suffered by shipowners persuaded the State to grant them various concessions.18 Due to the drop in number of large ships, requests for the naturalization of foreign ships in return for the transportation of grains were seen in a favourable light. In one petition of this kind, Zuane di Tommaso Mocenigo (son of the Doge Leonardo), indicated the frequent shipwrecks as grounds for his request to naturalize an Ottoman vessel he had purchased.19 The naturalization of foreign vessels allowed Venetian shipowners to compensate, at least in part, for the recent losses. However, the resulting harmful effects on local shipbuilding moved the Senate on 30 December 1531 to abolish such practices altogether.20 At any rate, these measures were largely cosmetic and barely dented a crisis whose roots lay much deeper. Besides, the Venetian government was preoccupied with issues of a more burning nature. For one, widespread crop failures and dismal harvests had led to starvation conditions in all major cities up and down the peninsula. In Modena citizens swarmed the streets and the main square crying ‘pane! pane!’ Similar incidents of popular unrest were reported in Rome, Bologna, Milan, and Genoa.21 In spite of the relative ease with which Venice could import grain by sea from different locations in the Mediterranean, 17 These powers were previously under the competence of the consoli dei mercanti and the ufficio Levantis: ASVe, SM, reg. 21, ff. 72v–73v (12 July 1527); Sanuto, I diarii, XLV, 475 (12 July 1527). The coordination between the armiraglio and the pedoti was the subject of another enactment earlier that year: ASVe, UC, Atti, bus. 3.5, ff. 38v–40v (19 February 1527). 18 ASVe, CXDC, fil. 6, fasc. 80 (19 October 1527); ASVe, SM, reg. 21, ff. 92r (31 December 1527), 99v (3 March 1528), 155r (11 April 1529). 19 ASVe, SM, reg. 21, f. 185r (20 December 1529). The increase in the application for the naturalization of foreign ships conveyed the Council of Ten in 1527 to delegate the competence in such matters to the Senate, unless a near to unanimous consensus was obtained in the Ten, i.e., unless presented by the 3 heads and 6 counsellors, and voted in favour by five sixths of the members of the Ten including the zonta (It. aggiunta): ASVe, CXDC, fil. 5, fasc. 245 (27 August 1527). 20 ASVe, SM, reg. 22, f. 105r (30 December 1531); Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, p. 39; idem, Navires et constructeurs, p. 106. 21 In March, Venetian officials reported on famine and popular unrest in cities in northern and central Italy: Sanuto, I diarii, XLIV, 206–7, 217, 271, 336, 324, 329, 345, 348, 419 (March 1527). Genoa was blockaded by Venetian fleet to prevent any imports of wheat by sea: ibid., XLIV, 17–18 (19 January 1527). On the outbreak of plague and famine in 1527/8: Muratori, Annali d’Italia, X, 199, 205, 209–10, 212, 215–17, 219, 221, 226.

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it was difficult to sustain its growing population during the great famine of 1527. The diaries of Marino Sanuto leave no room for doubt that the government reserves ran dry, and the prices of fine wheat in the markets jumped from their usual 4 lire per staro to 16 lire and 4 soldi, and 11 lire per staro of brown wheat. The city’s two large grain stores at the Rialto and San Marco were besieged by a starving crowd.22 The Council of Ten played an important role in regulating the supply of grain to the city. It tackled the problem by forcing all grain-carrying ships to stop in Venice first, and meanwhile on its own initiative chartered round ships for that very purpose.23 Soon enough, bounties were introduced to reward those willing to commit themselves to import grain on any vessel whatever, regardless of its national identity.24 However, these ad hoc measures did not aim at solving a protracted crisis in shipping, but to yield immediate results to face the food crisis. 1.2 Overview of the Merchant Marine in 1530 Early in the fourth decade of the sixteenth century the Venetian private sector of shipping began to show signs of an upturn (table 15). However, any idea of building nave grosse in Venice’s private shipyards had long been scuppered. Indeed, the city had only two such ships at the time: the first was the barzotto di Comun Taiapiera, of about 1,200 botti, which was built in the Arsenal and launched on 31 March 1530; the second was the Dolfina e Cornera, a vessel of similar capacity that was probably built or purchased outside Venice.25 If we include the lesser category, we can count five private ships of over 800 botti with a combined tonnage of 3,420 tons, compared with an equal number of 22 The protests were solved by the intervention of the provveditori alle biave that took means to distribute the reserves equally: Sanuto, I diarii, XLV, 424, 598 (April 1527), 606 (9 August 1527); Sardella, Nouvelles et spéculations, p. 26; Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, 332. 23 After the city’s needs had been taken care of, the supplies were distributed to subject territories: ASVe, CXDC, fil. 5, fasc. 167 (4 July 1527); ibid., fil. 7, fasc. 157 (6 July 1528); ibid., fil. 10, fasc. 30 (18 September 1529); ibid., fil. 11, fasc. 168 (18 July 1530); ibid., fil. 16, fasc. 158 (8 July 1533). 24 Such bounties were introduced in June 1527, and consequently every several months: August, September (ratified in October), and December. They were reinstated in July 1528 and extended in October, December and February 1529, August 1530 and November 1531: ASVe, CXDC, fil. 5, fascc. 151–53 (17 June 1527); ibid., fil. 6, fascc. 21, 56, 62, 194 (19 September–28 December 1527); ibid., fil. 7, fasc. 148 (4 July 1528); ibid., fil. 8, fascc. 11, 75, 178 (8 February–19 October 1529); ibid., fil. 14, fasc. 121 (15 November 1531); ASVe, CN, reg. 21, f. 103r (12 August 1530). 25 Appendix A: 1530, nos. 1–2. Two other navi di Comun, a galione and a barza of 800 botti each, were launched in August 1530 and September 1531 respectively. Hence, they were excluded from the estimate.

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The merchant marine c. July–August 1530

Category

No. of in % vessels

1,500 botti (900 tons) and above 0 1,000–1,500 botti (600–900 tons) 2 800–999 botti (480–599 tons) 4 600–799 botti (360–479 tons) 13 400–599 botti (240–359 tons) 16 Merchant galleys (240 tons) 7 Total

42

10 14 36 29 11 100

Capacity

2,400 botti (1,440 tons) 21,240 botti 3,300 botti (1,980 tons) (12,744 tons) 8,660 botti (5,196 tons) 6,880 botti (4,128 tons) 3,500 milliaria (1,670 tons) 14,414 tons

See respectively, Appendix A: 1530.

ships and a total of 2,937 tons in 1520. Ergo, shipbuilding activity in this sector basically remained unchanged. Conversely, the two lower categories exhibit a significant increase – a trend that is even more striking in view of the many shipwrecks, compounded by the lack of any active government policies to boost ship construction. The year 1530 was also marked by an attempt to reinvigorate the Atlantic voyages to England by sending three galleys. However, the last galleys to set sail in this direction had been sequestered in Southampton at the king’s behest in 1522. Two galleys set sail to Beirut, and the same number to Alexandria, in total seven.26 1.3 Towards a Reform in Shipping On 30 November 1532, the returning convoy of the galleys of Flanders as well as thirteen other ships were caught in bad weather outside the Lido of Venice and rode on anchor for days without being able to enter the shielded waters of the Lagoon. The 400-botti ship of Tommaso di Leonardo Mocenigo (the same ship that was naturalized by the Senate in 1529), with 40,000 ducats worth of merchandise from Constantinople, attempted to enter the port of Malamocco but soon ran aground on a sandbank. On 3 December, still under stormy conditions, the crew of the 1,200 botti ship of Alvise Dolfin and Fantino Corner that returned from Cyprus with salt and cotton had to cut down its masts and castles to relieve the pressure on the vessel’s hull. Under these conditions and 26 ASVe, SDIncanti, reg. III, ff. 70r–78v; Judde de Larivière, Naviguer, comercer, gouverner, p. 66.

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without food supplies, for days the ship rode on anchor in front of Jesolo at the mercy of a single rope. On 5 December several other ships attempted the entrance in stormy conditions, and one schierazo laden with wine and cheese from Crete ran aground in the vicinity of Chioggia. On 7 December the crews of two other ships were forced to cut down their masts as well. Many others chose to abandon the ships and galleys and leave them at risk. Finally, on 13 December, a temporary improvement in the weather allowed the galleys to enter the port, ending a tedious voyage of twenty-eight months. The foul weather regained force the following days causing acqua alta in Venice. The three mastless round ships remained on anchor in the vicinity of Jesolo and Grado until 28 December, when they were eventually tugged into Malamocco in a calm sea, following nearly one month of offshore waiting.27 In the face of yet another year of crop failures and famine, it became clear that unless a more thorough reform in shipping were adopted, Venice would soon remain without the squadron of round ships vital for supplying the city with grain. On 5 March 1533, the Senate ordered the cinque savi alla mercanzia to come up with a plan that would offer subventions (doni) or other incentives to those who wanted to build round ships.28 On 22 July 1533 the Senate assigned the Collegio to draft a proposal that would be voted on in the presence of all senators within eight days.29 However, the means to secure the necessary funds for the subventions caused additional delays. Meanwhile, the Council of Ten took extreme measures and restricted the chartering of all vessels of 200 botti and above for any other purpose than the transportation of grain, unless by consent of the Grain Office.30 The preparations left some room for optimism; yet, this was summer. On 17 September the floods came and the matter of funding was raised again in the Collegio. The solution was initially sought among the public debt, but soon enough the Salt Office seemed the most reasonable financial source of funds, owing to its interests in the import of salt on round ships.31 27 Sanuto, I diarii, LVII, 289, 300–3, 306, 326–27, 377 (29 November–28 December 1532). The capitanio of the galley convoy argued that unusual weather and the imminent risk were responsible for the prolongation of the voyage: ibid., LVII, 456, 461–62 (23 January 1533). 28 The preamble to the Senate’s decree 5 March 1533 reads: ‘their number has dropped considerably due to shipwrecks and other accidents to an extent that now there are very few [ships] in respect to the great number that this city had known in the past’: ASVe, SM, reg. 22, f. 175r; Sanuto, I diarii, LVII, 583; ibid., LVIII, 479–80. 29 22 July 1533: ASVe, SM, reg. 22, f. 202r; Sanuto, I diarii, LVIII, 467, 480–81. 30 ASVe, CXDC, fil. 16, fasc. 142 (4 July 1533). 31 Sanuto, I diarii, LVIII, 692 (17 September 1533); Hocquet, Le sel et la fortune de Venise, 2, pp. 572–73.

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In the following days, heavy rain and the sirocco winds that blew vigorously caused another sea surge in Venice and flooding of the River Brenta, bringing grave damage to the surrounding areas. News reached Rialto that a ship laden with 5,000 stara of grain was shipwrecked off the coast of Croatia. Predictions of crop failures were not late to come, commented Sanuto, who hurried to secure reserves of grain for his kith and kin. On the very same day (24 September), when the rain poured hard through the windows of the Salt Office, the provveditori set down to confirm a plan to allocate the necessary funds.32 The initial budget totalled 18,000 ducats. A sum of 12,000 ducats came from tax revenue on salt (selling salt was a state monopoly) in Treviso, Vicenza, Verona and other towns in the terraferma. This sum was designated for disbursing freightage on salt shipments, it was then complemented by an additional 6,000 ducats per year. The basic principle was to grant subvention as an allowance for those who would build round ships that would, in turn, be reimbursed by transporting salt from Cyprus and Ibiza.33 Finally, on 16 July 1534, the Senate voted on the subvention plan that intended to end a prolonged crisis in shipping. The preamble to the Senate’s decree suggests that the rise in natural disasters was seen as one of the main reasons for the drop in the number of ships, and their importance to ensure grain supplies as a primary concern.34 It took nearly a year and a half for the initiative to materialize, counting from the day in which the Senate instructed the cinque savi alla mercanzia to come up with a plan. As a matter of fact, shipowners were not totally convinced of the economic viability of the scheme nor of the sincerity of the Senate’s intentions. Hence, on 4 June 1535, the conditions were modified and the programme was reinstated, in the hope of achieving a 32 18–24 September 1533: Sanuto, I diarii, LVIII, 693, 708, 711, 714, 728; ASVe, PS, bus. 9, ff. 25v– 26r; ASVe, CamCX, Notatorio, reg. 2, ff. 105r–6r. 33 On 29 September 1533, the plan was confirmed in the Council of Ten, which acted as a mediator in disbursing freightage on salt consignments: ASVe, CXDC, fil. 17, fasc. 48. A credit transfer from other magistracies was necessary for raising the sum in time: ibid., fil. 18, fascc. 62, 65 (22 April 1534). 34 It reads, ‘This [the crisis in shipping] was caused by the shortage in ships, whose number has dropped owing to the great misfortunes that occurs for some time now as well as the big expenses incurred for making such ships. In order not to defer any longer [it is required to] procure a fast and firm provision with all knowledge and diligence; seeking in this manner to encourage the building of as many ships as possible for the benefit of our taxes and merchandise, as well as, [securing] the shipping of wheat to nourish the population …’: ASVe, SM, reg. 23, f. 45v (16 July 1534); Luzzatto, ‘Per la storia delle costruzioni navali’, pp. 37–51; Romano, ‘La marine marchande vénitienne’, p. 37; Lane, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 104–8; idem, Venice, A Maritime Republic, pp. 380–81; Hocquet, Le sel et la fortune de Venise, 2, pp. 565–72.

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better result.35 Still, at this point in history, the rise in natural disasters acted as a catalyst of change that, in turn, was effective in recovering the Venetian merchant marine from a prolonged crisis. 2

The Shipping Reform Act of 1534/5

The decrees of 1534/5 were part of a broader strategy to reclaim a significant share in the spice trade, challenging the hegemony of the Portuguese that had taken hold in the first few decades of the century. In the new economic context, public navigation seemed neither well-adapted nor efficient. The costs of protection were too high in comparison with the profits, and the system was no longer financially attractive. As for the investors themselves, the incanto rules were too restrictive when held up against the few advantages that the system now offered. On the one hand, there were fewer patricians able to take advantage of the muda system, and on the other they could no longer fulfil their commitments: e.g., they did not want to serve in the armada; they tried to avoid paying duties; and did not satisfy merchants’ demands. In these conditions the time-honoured privileges in spice transport – which were traditionally reserved to the galleys – could no longer be justified.36 The severe crisis forced the Senate to effect significant structural changes in order to remain competitive. Moves included cancelling the import tax on pepper, edging towards the more liberalized market policies that became predominant all over Europe, and shifting powers to the cinque savi alla mercanzia and the Arsenal, while providing new stimulus to a wider shipping milieu to boost construction. The 1534/5 act involved advancing capital without applying any interest. It was virtually an open call to investors from the Venetian terraferma and the stato da mar to commission the construction of new vessels in Venice’s shipyards, in return for a loan of 6 ducats per botte, or to do so outside Venice for a smaller loan of 4 ducats per botte. Either way, it was intended to galvanize the yards and above all swell the fleet. These new ships enjoyed special fiscal perks, such as being considered ‘as Venetians’, regardless of the place of their construction; they also benefited from being awarded the lucrative shipments of salt from Cyprus and Ibiza. This was the first time that the Republic offered this kind of incentive for shipbuilding outside the Venetian dogado, with the exception of Crete, which had enjoyed this right following the 21 October 1502 decree (suspended in 1507). Soon enough the Senate got cold feet, and in 1538 35 ASVe, SM, reg. 23, f. 108r (4 June 1535). 36 Judde de Larivière, ‘The “Public” and the “Private”’, pp. 87–88.

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retracted this part in the decree, restricting the incentives to the dogado.37 Similarly, the renewal of the stimuli for the city’s shipping industry in 1540, 1545, 1549, and 1554 favoured construction within the Venetian lagoon only.38 Between 1535 and 1538 two round ships of 728 botti (437 botti in the hold, and 291 botti between two decks) were built in Curzola with the help of state loans.39 It is unclear why in 1538 the senators held back from introducing such incentives in the colonies. One possible reason is that priorities had changed following the outbreak of another war with the Ottomans the previous year. Effectively, there was steady pressure on the government to offer similar stimuli in the colonies, such as the request in 1548 from one Lorenzo Morosini, a Venetian subject based in Curzola, who filed a petition to the Senate, asking for a loan to build his ship of 1,000 botti on that island.40 The repeated appeals and the increasing difficulty in obtaining certain types of oak in northern Italy eventually moved the Senate to offer loans in 1556 for ship-building in Dalmatia, where the supply of wood was more plentiful; subsequently the initiative was extended to include the entire stato da mar in 1559. The same policy was applied in 1566 and 1573.41 In Crete, the construction stimuli were later channelled towards the building of a specific type of vessel, the galleon.42 Regardless of the option to receive loans also for building ships in selected colonies, the reform of 1534/5 was a formal invitation to investors from all social classes to build their ships in Venice under favourable conditions. Moreover, foreign investment in Venetian shipping was not prohibited, at least not explicitly, and the general impression is that a certain degree of foreign passive involvement was disregarded by the authorities. Ultimately, the growing number of foreigners acting as invisible partners eventually triggered

37 ASVe, SM, reg. 24, f. 166v (26 September 1538). 38 ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 24, f. 123r (4 April 1549); ibid., reg. 25, f. 19r (21 June 1554). 39 These were the ships of Alessandro Contarini (1535) and that of Venieri brothers (1538): ASVe, CapCX, Mandati, reg. 1, ff. 146v (25 October 1535), 164v (11 June 1538). 40 ASVe, SM, reg. 29, f. 189v (21 April 1548). 41 The shortage in oak that led to an increase in the costs of construction was already acknowledged in 1535. Still, shipbuilding received priority, as far as the harvesting of trees was concerned. On the other hand, the 21 June 1554 and 14 January 1558 decrees conditioned the loans to the import of timber from foreign territories: ASVe, CL, bus. 102, 65 (27 August 1535); ASVe, PSal, bus. 1, f. 134v (21 June 1554); ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 10, fasc. 3 (16 July 1556); ibid., reg. 25, ff. 33r (14 January 1559), 34v–35r (31 March 1559); ibid., NS, bus. 97, ff. 16r–v (31 March 1559), 17r (6 July 1566), 18r–v (1 June 1573). 42 Costantini, ‘I Galeoni di Candia’, p. 217.

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alarms, however, and from 1550 shipowners were under obligation to submit a comprehensive list of their shareholders to the avogaria di Comun;43 further provisions in this regard were taken in 1558.44 The reform act had significant sway in enticing new entrepreneurs to invest in round ships, but the change that the Senate hoped for did not materialize instantly. For once, the loans of 1535 were fixed for a definite period of one year; on 27 May 1536 this period was extended by another six months, while new measures were taken against cases of fraud, such as when older ships were hauled out for maintenance and then claimed as new.45 In addition, the overall response was lower than expected, and on 8 April 1536 the Council of Ten rerouted to other purposes the 6,500 ducats that had been set aside to pay future shippers for salt consignments.46 One of the reasons for the investors’ general reluctance was the rising cost of construction. In view of an increase in the price of timber, it was imperative to provide for safeguarding the forests and therefore guarantee adequate supply. In a bid to tighten control, in 1537 and 1538 the Senate appointed the Arsenal the sole authority to issue licences for harvesting oak, and adopted means to police the forests against illegal felling and theft.47 But there were more pressing issues than the shortage in timber: for one, famine was widespread in 1533 and again in early 1537, and the nourishment of the State’s growing population was the moral priority. The Ten allocated funds to offer bounties for merchants who would transport wheat and cereals on any type of vessel, since such provisions had proved beneficial in the past. In September 1537 the incoming supplies were sufficient to keep hunger at bay, but the grain shortage worsened once war broke out and the access was cut off to outlets in Romania and Cyprus, the State’s main grain supplier.48 As an emergency measure, the Senate decided to prevent the direct transport of grain to its overseas dominions by obliging all grain-carrying ships to put into Venice first, from where the cargo was distributed to its subject territories. In 1539 the grain shortage reached a breaking point, and the price of wheat rose from the normal level of 4 1/2 lire (di piccoli) to 15 1/2 per staro of grain. Various forms of 43 44 45 46

ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 10, fasc. 2 (18 July 1550); ASVe, SM, fil. 6, 359 (24–26 July 1550). ASVe, CSAM, NS, bus. 97, 14 (11 February 1559). ASVe, SM, reg. 23, f. 153v (27 May 1536). 8 April 1536: ASVe, CXDC, fil. 20, fasc. 33; ASVe, CamCX, Notatorio, bus. 2, f. 139r. Part of the budget was later allotted for sending the merchant galleys: ibid., f. 132r (10 May 1536). 47 27 September 1537: ASVe, CXDC, fil. 22, fasc. 29. The commissioning of an inspector in Istria: ibid., fasc. 30. Further provisions: ibid., fasc. 185 (27 February 1538). 48 Ibid., fil. 20, fascc. 314, 330 (15 January–3 February 1537); ibid., fil. 22, fasc. 11 (14 September 1537); Sardella, Nouvelles et spéculations, p. 29.

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subterfuge were employed for leasing ships to carry wheat from Ottoman territories.49 In early 1540 Venice made overtures for importing sizeable quantities of wheat from Ottoman territories. This investment was postponed, however, until the signing of a peace treaty in August.50 Another detrimental effect to shipping during the 1530s was the overbearing manner of the Jewish-Egyptian, Abraham Castro, at the customs house in Alexandria, who burdened Venetian merchants with elevated customs and port duties, and by frequently detaining ships in port. A similar situation arose in the Syrian outlets, with another officer coincidentally bearing the same name, whose heavy-handedness greatly soured relations between the Venetian and the Ottomans. Among his policies was a 10% duty on all the spices purchased at his end, a 5% impost on silk and other exports of goods, and a similar tariff on imported goods. The new levies were considered exorbitant, and threatened to halt Venetian trade with Syria altogether: soon enough, the yearly cotton muda to Syria shrank to a mere two ships, and the capital on board was also reduced.51 In early 1537 negotiations were held in Constantinople, but no significant agreement was reached. Given the fact that in 1535/6 French ships and merchants had meanwhile won admission to Ottoman ports,52 Castro’s tough stance with Venice must have been a bitter pill to swallow. 2.1 The War That Cut Off Levant Trade, 1537–40 When war broke out, Venetian commercial activity in and around the Levant was crippled. The steep drop in freight runs along the routes to the Levant was a death blow to Venice’s commercial shipping, and many vessels began to ply the route to Portugal instead. Another serious setback for shippers was the strict ban on exporting raw materials vital for the war effort, which included hemp, canvas, fibres, and so forth.53 At any event, commercial voyages to Syria 49

50 51 52 53

On the expedients used to import cereals from Ottoman lands during war: Saito, ‘Il noleggio delle navi’, pp. 229–50. On the famine of 1539: idem, ‘Venice after the Battle of Prevesa’, pp. 83–84, 86. On the provisions to direct all quantities of wheat from the terraferma to Venice: ASVe, CXDC, fil. 24, fasc. 245 (27 February 1538); ibid., fil. 25, fascc. 151, 194–95 (20 June–23 July 1539); ibid., fil. 26, fascc. 21 (19 September 1539), 149 (4 November 1539); ASVe, CapCX, Lettere, bus. 39, 198, 286 (4 July–29 August 1539). ASVe, CXDC, fil. 26, fascc. 259, 261 (12, 15 January 1540); ibid., fil. 27, fascc. 41 (1 April 1540), 247, 256, 288 (26 July–31 August 1540). Arbel, Trading Nations, pp. 45–47; ASVe, SM, reg. 23, ff. 206r–7r (10 February 1537). Sella, ‘Crisis and Transformation’, pp. 90–91; Pagratis, ‘Venice, her Subjects and Ships’, p. 258. ASVe, SM, reg. 24, ff. 103r–v (14 December 1537); ibid., reg. 25, f. 190v (20 December 1540).

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and Egypt were interrupted in 1536, and were not resumed until 1541.54 The trading firms of Augsburg attempted to get spices for the German market via Ragusa, where such shipments still arrived.55 Venice’s situation plummeted further with the papal bull of Paul III decreed shortly after his election in 1534, which granted all foreigners – including Turks, Jews and other infidels – both residency rights and trading permits in Ancona and other centres in the vicinity, within the Papal States. For Venice the timing could not have been worse, since during times of conflict the importance of Ancona in trade with the Ottoman Empire increased dramatically.56 What ensued has to be considered against the backdrop of this important event and its effects on commercial life throughout the Italian peninsula. In retaliation for the hostilities against its subjects and their property in Ottoman territories, in September 1537 Venice began to retain the merchandise of Ottoman subjects – be they Jew or Turk – in all Venetian overseas territories. The provveditori di Comun were instructed to make inventories of the merchandise belonging to infidels, and prevent their removal.57 Moreover, military commanders were authorized to impound Ragusan ships.58 Policing the shortrange markets in the Adriatic Sea against contraband required constant vigil; it was reported, for example, that subjects from Murano, Friuli, and Trieste were committing an ‘infinite’ number of illegalities by trading sottovento.59 The nave Coresa and other foreign vessels were known to have loaded hemp in Ancona and carried it to Constantinople, where it was used to refit the enemy’s armada, no less.60 Meanwhile, it was critical to monitor transhipments of Levantine goods from the Greek colonies to ensure that seaborne traffic was redirected

54 The public voyages to Beirut were resumed after the war and continued regularly until 1551 and occasionally afterward. Those to Alexandria remained discontinuous: Judde de Larivière, Naviguer, commercer, gouverner, p. 67. 55 İnalcık, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, p. 355. 56 Arbel, Trading Nations, pp. 4–6; Simonsohn, ‘Marranos in Ancona under Papal Protection’, pp. 235, 243; Ravid, ‘A Tale of Three Cities’, p. 141; idem, ‘Venice, Rome, and the Reversions’, pp. 154–55. 57 ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 17, 219 (10 February 1537); ASVe, SM, reg. 24, ff. 69r, 75r (15, 19 September 1537). 58 ASVe, SM, reg. 24, f. 87r (22 October 1537). Ragusan ships experienced a heyday during the war years: Romano, ‘La marine marchande vénitienne’, p. 52. 59 ASVe, SM, reg. 23, f. 59r (29 September 1534); ASVe, PSD, bus. 1, ff. 139v–40v (8 March 1535); ASVe, CL, bus. 152, f. 26v (19 March 1535; 5 January 1538). 60 ASVe, SM, reg. 24, f. 111v (5 February 1538).

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to the port of Venice, for cargo control.61 Venetian entrepreneurs, including senior magistrates, were using foreign ships and other workarounds to maintain their business, despite the threat of imprisonment.62 In Venice and elsewhere, noblemen, citizens, and subjects were using Ragusan and French ships to load spices in Alexandria and carry them to Livorno, Ancona, and other destinations. In fact, foreign ships were officially invited to transport spices to Venice under favourable fiscal conditions, and pepper cargo was exempted from tax.63 State loans for shipbuilding were reinstated in 1538, but this time they were slightly more restrictive. The extension of the same on 24 February 1540 confirms that the number of ships was reduced, owing to the recent ‘great misfortunes’ and the rising costs of construction. The 1540 decree was a muchneeded shot in the arm for the sector – the loans were significantly increased and expanded to include smaller vessels of 300 to 500 botti, while the privileged shipments of salt were generously rewarded.64 To be sure, this was the first time that Venice directly supported the building of 300-botti vessels. 2.2 The Merchant Marine c. May–June 1540 Despite the revitalization plan to encourage the construction of ships, the overall size and capacity of the fleet in all sectors shrank. In 1530 there were thirty-five vessels of 400 botti and above, making a total capacity of 12,744 tons. In 1540 that number had fallen to twenty-five, and the gross tonnage reduced to 9,755 tons. Meanwhile, only one private ship of over 1,000 botti remained in Venice: it was the Bernarda, belonging to Maffeo Bernardo q. Francesco dal Banco. The only other ship in this category was owned by the State, namely the barzotto di Comun. Besides these, the two other large-capacity vessels – a barza and a galione of 800 botti, both built by the Arsenal – were decommissioned in 1540. A comparable drop can be seen in the number and volume of round ships in the two lower categories (table 16). The war also shut down the prospects of the galleys to the Levant, and between 1537 and 1541 no galleys were auctioned.65

61 62 63 64 65

Ibid., reg. 23, ff. 211r–v (26 February 1537); ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 24, f. 56r (29 December 1535). Arbel, ‘Operating Trading Networks’, pp. 23–33. ASVe, SM, reg. 24, f. 170r (21 October 1538). Ibid., reg. 25, f. 122r (24 February 1540). Judde de Larivière, Naviguer, commercer, gouverner, p. 66.

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chapter 14 The merchant marine c. May–June 1540

Category

No. of in % vessels

1,500 botti (900 tons) and above 1,000–1,500 botti (600–900 tons) 800–999 botti (480–599 tons) 600–799 botti (360–479 tons) 400–599 botti (240–359 tons) Merchant galleys (240 tons)

0 2 2 14 7 0

14 10 56 20

Total

25

100

See respectively, Appendix A: 1540.

Capacity

2,300 botti (1,380 tons) 1,600 botti (960 tons) 9,183 botti (5,510 tons) 3,175 botti (1,905 tons)

9,755 tons

16,258 botti (9,755 tons)

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The Emergence of New Players in Maritime Transport, 1541–71 1

Regaining Momentum: Shipping and Trade Undergoing Liberalization

The grave consequences of the Ottoman-Venetian war (1537–40) had left the Republic with no choice but to follow the example of Ancona and open greater parts of shipping and trade to merchants of all nationalities and religions from the Levant, and allow them to settle in Venice with their families. The following three decades of sustained peace and stability with the Turks were booming years for Republic’s economy, certainly compared with the rest of the sixteenth century. The city had experienced a rapid demographic growth. There was an upsurge in the woollen, paper, and glassmaking industries, great part of which was exported to the Levant.1 The exploitation of Venice’s dominions in the terraferma and the stato da mar was enhanced as well. The policy of refortification of all Venetian-controlled overseas territories became more ambitious, and the investment in the navy also in times of peace increased immensely.2 However, Venice’s Indian summer in shipping and trade ended abruptly with the Battle of Lepanto and the loss of Cyprus in 1570/1, from which it never recovered. The events are well known and documented. Our concern here is with the steps taken to reanimate shipping and trade and to inquire on the nature of this revitalization. 1.1 Following the Example of Ancona, 1540–44 After the cessation of violence, it was crucial to re-discuss the heavy duties imposed in the Syrian ports by the aforementioned customs duties leaseholder Abraham Castro. Venice demanded the retraction of the 10% levy upon both capital and merchandise, commonly referred to as the angaria dell’osera. For the time being, until positive notice arrived from Constantinople that some progress had been made in the talks between the Republic’s ambassador Badoer and the sultan, Venice’s ships were basically prohibited from setting sail to the Levant. The ensuing peace treaty (signed in October 1540, with a 1 Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, pp. 309–12. 2 Arbel, ‘Venice’s Maritime Empire’, 206–13; Fusaro, Political Economies, pp. 68–69.

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final ratification in Venice in April 1541) virtually lifted the new impositions in the Syrian outlets, namely, the 10% imposts and other taxes that had been imposed on Venetian trade in Syria before the war.3 Conceding that their privileges had practically evaporated, the patricians scrambled to offer significant incentives to attract new actors to fill the dwindling ranks of the shipping milieu, and the merchant class as a whole. As early as December 1540 the shipping of hemp to Syria and other Turkish territories was reauthorized to anyone who was willing to engage in this trade; moreover, the invitation was open to foreigners of any ilk, even infidels.4 Shortly after, on 17 February 1541 the Senate granted permission and tax concessions on shipments of Syrian spices and silk to all Venice’s ships of over 180 tons (300 botti), without any further restrictions.5 The admission that the city’s international trade was barely treading water prompted the Senate to take further drastic measures on 2 June 1541. Compounding the problem was that the steep customs tariffs and various imposts in Venice had driven merchants to transfer their activities to rival trading centres, predominantly Ancona, where the tax burden was considerably lower. The measures taken were an outright abolition of customs duties on goods originating from Ottoman-Greek territories, that is the Balkans and the Aegean Sea (Romania alta e bassa), for a period of two years (that was extended thereafter) – namely the duty on the import of merchandise; the 2% and 3% duties; the decime (or any impost substituting the tithe); half of the freight charges, which merchants had to pay to the galley operators (the auctioneers) or to the Arsenal; and any other imposts excepting the routine fees to the customs officials.6 Since the complex custom procedure regarding the transports of nutgalls – an important material used in the leather industry – was one of the principal reasons for the diversion of seaborne traffic from the Ottoman-Greek territories to Ancona and other sottovento destinations, it was therefore decreed to treat this freight like any other. Likewise, the clearance procedure for all ships was simplified to prevent impediments, sequestrations, or judicial intervention by various government officials. 3 Arbel, Trading Nations, pp. 43–44, 48–49; ASVe, SM, reg. 25, ff. 160r–v (24 June 1540). 4 ASVe, SM, reg. 25, f. 190v (14 December 1540). 5 Ibid., f. 201v (17 February 1541). 6 The provisions were for two years and then extended. Animal fat, wine, wheat, essentials and merchandise in transit originating from Syria, Persia, Egypt and other destination were charged the customary duties: ASVe, SM, reg. 26, ff. 44v–46r (2 June 1541); the renewals: ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 16 [2 June 1541], [16 July 1543], [21 May 1545], [5 June 1547], [16 July 1549], [20 June 1551]; Arbel, Trading Nations, pp. 197–200.

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The 2  June 1541 decree envisaged a much broader change, extending tax concessions to a long array of merchandise: it was an official invitation to Ottoman subjects, no less, to settle in Venice, whereby Greeks, Turks, renegade Christians, Armenians, Ragusans, and Jews – aggregated under the term levantini – began from the mid-sixteenth century to find their slot in the markets of the Dominant City.7 Indeed the 1541 invitation can be regarded as a tardy response to the declaration of Ancona as a free port by Pope Paul III. At this moment Greek and Jewish merchants commanded the greater part of shipping and commerce between Italy and the Ottoman Levant. The following decades saw the emergence of a new class of Greek shipping magnates and Jewish traders, which is regarded as a new phenomenon in the early modern period.8 Meanwhile the Senate gradually liberalized other sectors of shipping and trade. For example, 1542 saw the reinstatement of the tax concessions to Ottoman merchants for goods in transit via Corfu and Zante.9 In 1543 the nolo duty on spices originating from Alexandria, which was disbursed to the Arsenal was cut in half, so as to enable Venice’s merchants to be competitive and deter such freights from reaching Ancona.10 Similar provisions were made for other routes, such as the extension of the liberalization of the shipments of textiles originating in England, Flanders, and the Barbary Coast, which had proved beneficial in the past.11 In one of their attempts to increase revenue, the

7 8

Pagratis, ‘Venice, Her Subjects and Ships’, p. 253. In 1544 the same pope granted a residence charter, apparently the first of its kind on Italian territory, to Levantine Jews: Simonsohn, ‘Marranos in Ancona under Papal Protection’, pp. 235, 243; Ravid, ‘A Tale of Three Cities’, p. 141; idem, ‘Venice, Rome, and the Reversions’, pp. 154–55; Arbel, ‘Shipping and Toleration’, p. 61 cit. 20; idem, Trading Nations, pp. 4–6, 176–80; Ravid, ‘A Tale of Three Cities’, pp. 138–62. 9 ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 19, 281 (4 March 1542; with reference to 9 August 1516 and 6 March 1522 decrees). The debate whether to relief the fiscal burden on Turkish, Syrian and Moorish merchants was delegated to the cinque savi alla mercanzia: ASVe, CN, reg. 24, f. 149r (13 September 1541). 10 A Senate’s decree 19 February 1543 still required merchants to disburse full freightage to the galleys on spices that would be carried on private ships from Alexandria. It was reduced by half in July as long as the galleys did not sail: ASVe, SM, reg. 27, f. 50v (14 July 1543, ref. to 19 February 1544). Further provisions: ASVe, CN, reg. 25, f. 52r (25 August 1543); ASVe, SM, fil. 3, 54 (19 February 1546). 11 ASVe, SM, reg. 23, f. 135v (18 December 1535); ibid., reg. 24, f. 25r (5 March 1537); the renewals: ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 11 [26 September 1539], [20 May 1542], [26 May 1543], [23 April 1545], [5 June 1547], [16 May 1549].

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Venetian port and customs authorities taxed Portuguese ships arriving from Lisbon, even though they were normally exempted.12 It took several years for these steps to bear fruit, however. Meanwhile, Venice experienced a series of setbacks. Although the two notorious trouble-makers going by the same name of Abraham Castro  – one in Egypt and the one in Syria – were both out of the way, the angaria of 10% was still being applied in Syria. In a lengthy letter of September 1543 the Senate commissioned the bailo in Constantinople to do everything within his power to eliminate this duty.13 Further evidence of Venetian dissatisfaction with the prospects in shipping economy can be seen from an edict issued in August 1543, by which the Council of Ten rerouted part of the budget reserved for the loans in light of the scant number of ships being built.14 The shortage of carriers prompted the Senate to authorize the use of foreign ships and vessels to carry the Republic’s goods, given that two-thirds of the cargo would be unloaded in Venice (or its dominions), with the likelihood that these ships would not stop in any other port in the Adriatic Sea.15 This general downturn in the merchant traffic to the Levant and in the gross tonnage of the city’s fleet is corroborated by the acute shortage of salt. To address this dearth, a decree of 3 March 1544 obligated any ship that sailed to Cyprus or Syria to fill at least half of its hold with salt on the return voyage, with grave penalties for failure to comply.16 While salt was central to the economy, the supply of grain was an equally serious issue: between 1542 and 1543 at least five foreign round ships were naturalized, four of which carried wheat from the northern Aegean area, while the fifth was a Basque ship chartered by the State.17 The logic was simple: given the city’s growing population and the shortage in gross tonnage, the liberalization of the markets for bulky cargo was an obvious solution. In this way, in March 1544 the State attempted to address another wave of acute famine in northern Italy by offering special bounties for grain consignments – on whatever ship was available and willing.18 Thanks to this policy in August 1545 the 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

The fiscal privileges granted to the Portuguese were confirmed: ASVe, SM, reg. 27, f. 89v (9 February 1544). Ibid., f. 68v (20 September 1543). ASVe, CamCX, Notatorio, reg. 3, 2v–3r (8, 23 August 1543). Those who received loans and failed to start building their ships were required to return the sum: ASVe, CXDC, fil. 34, fasc. 46 (28 September 1543). Romano, ‘La marine marchande vénitienne’, pp. 49–50. ASVe, PSal, reg. 9, ff. 86v, 105v, 115v–16r (March–May 1544). Lane, ‘Ships and Shipping’, p. 39. ASVe, CXDC, fil. 35, fasc. 1 (3 March 1544).

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city had enough supplies, and by the arrival of winter 1549 these incentives were reiterated to address the shortfall.19 Around this time the three ufficiali sopra i dieci uffici filed a petition to the Ten in which they bore witness to the prolonged recession under way. Established in 1414/5, the agency’s principal function was to collect money from debtors who had failed to pay their dues to the tax-collecting magistracies. The petition reads: ‘When this magistracy was first set up, the city was a hub for of all types of merchandise originating from every part of the world. The previous officials earned great sums during that golden age,’ whereas the present standstill had drastically reduced commercial activity at every level: ‘so little business is being done right now,’ they opined, ‘we might say that nothing is happening at all.’ As a result of the stagnation, the galleys remained at anchor, and ‘as is well known’ the number of ships calling into port was negligible, a sorry predicament that left the agency in growing debt.20 While the scarcity of carriers was still troubling in 1544, work in the city’s shipyards had gathered momentum, such that in November 1544 numerous shipowners addressed the Council of Ten for their due compensation for the many ships they had recently built and launched.21 A Senate decree of 29 June 1545 testifies to this increase in the number of ships, and accordingly saw to the appointment of the prescribed balestrieri da poppa for each one.22 In November of the same year (1545) the state loans for shipbuilding were extended for another five years.23 Between 1544 and 1550 there were fifty-one applications for loans, making an average of over seven requests per year.24 This would indicate that around the second part of the year 1544 there must have been a significant breakthrough for the private shipping sector in terms of gross tonnage, owing to an ostensible increase in the number of ships under construction.

19 ASVe; ibid., fil. 38, fascc. 69, 77 (19, 25 August 1545); ibid., fil. 49, fasc. 109 (28 November 1549). 20 ASVe; ibid., fil. 35, fasc. 15 (8 March 1544). 21 Ibid., fil. 36, fasc. 150 (12 November 1544); ASVe, CamCX, Notatorio, reg. 2, f. 112v (19 November 1544). Means to disburse loans for recently built ships: ASVe, Psal, reg. 1, f. 117v (10 November 1544). 22 ASVe, SM, reg. 28, f. 60r (29 June 1545); ASVe, CXDC, fil. 38, fasc. 26 (24 July 1545). 23 ASVe, SM, reg. 28, f. 126r (3 November 1545); ibid., reg. 30, f. 65r (4 April 1549); ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 25, 33 (14 January 1559). 24 There were ten such requested between 1551 and 1556; thirty-three between 1557 and 1563 (4.4 per year); and nineteen requests between 1564 and 1570 (2.2 annual average): Hocquet, Voiliers et commerce, pp. 604–15.

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The generous bounties offered by the Senate for Cypriot salt consignments secured the chance of lucrative bulk freight for the return voyage of Venice’s merchant vessels. Time and again, salt served as a stabilizing factor that significantly reduced the risk of a voyage resulting in losses. The success of this policy was acknowledged already in a decree of 4 August 1546. The letter of the law recognized that one of the positive effects of the bounties of 3 and 4 ducats per mozzo of Cypriot salt carried on ships of over 300 and 500 botti respectively, was the hoped-for increase of the city’s gross tonnage. Indeed, salt consignments from Ibiza were remunerated with up to 6 1/2 ducats per mozzo, a bonus that encouraged more ships to venture in this direction as well. Emboldened by the outcome, the State aimed to revive trade with Alexandria by offering the same incentives applied for Cyprus, here again increasing the chances that this route would become remunerative.25 Similarly, loans were offered for the owners of marciliane, marani, and smaller vessels, which could be paid back with cargos of salt brought from Corfu, Zante, and Pag in Croatia.26 Thus, lucrative salt shipments were used to push the economy forwards, given also the need for stabilizing ballast due to a lack of bulk on the return voyage from the Levant. 1.2 Overview of the Merchant Marine in July 1549 Venice witnessed a sharp increase in the quantity of round ships and their gross tonnage in 1549: now there were forty, against the twenty-five of the previous decade (table 17). Effectively, this exceeds the number of ships afloat in 1499, and fully represents the boom in ship construction in the private sector. The gross tonnage rose from 9,755 tons in 1540 to 15,925 tons in 1549, including the four operating galleys. However, this was still far from the 21,974 tons that Venice’s merchant fleet in all categories of more than 240 tons could boast in 1499. The absence of operative navi di Comun and the scarcity of round ships of over 1,000 botti in 1549 is largely responsible for the big difference – only two ships in this category were afloat, compared with six (6,720 tons) in 1499. With respect to the public voyages, the line to Beirut maintained two galleys. Two other galleys were only recently built and auctioned to sail to Alexandria; this service was discontinued since 1545 and reinstated with difficulties.27 25 4 August 1546: ASVe, CN, reg. 26, f. 43r; ASVe, Psal, reg. 9, f. 104r. 26 ASVe, CN, reg. 25, f. 154v (24 April 1545). The governors in Corfu and Zante were instructed to charter ships for that purpose: ibid., f. 157v (5 May 1545). 27 ASVe, SDIncanti, reg. 5, ff. 166r–70r; Judde de Larivière, Naviguer, comercer, gouverner, p. 66.

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The merchant marine in July 1549

Category

No. of in % vessels

1,500 botti (900 tons) and above 0 1,000–1,500 botti (600–900 tons) 2 800–999 botti (480–599 tons) 7 600–799 botti (360–479 tons) 15 400–599 botti (240–359 tons) 16 Merchant galleys (240 tons) 4 Total

44

8 22 39 25 6 100

Capacity

2,100 botti (1,260 tons) 24,953 botti 5,824 botti (3,494 tons) (14,971 tons) 10,214 botti (6,128 tons) 6,815 botti (4,089 tons) 2,000 milliaria (954 tons) 15,925 tons

See respectively, Appendix A: 1549.

figure 12 The composition of the merchant marine in all categories above 240 tons, c. 1549

Comprising the operative galleys, the number and size of Venice’s merchant marine in 1549 falls dramatically behind that of 1499: 44 vessels with a combined tonnage of 15,925 tons against 56 with a gross tonnage of 21,614 tons half a century earlier. Nevertheless, the private sector of Venice’s merchant fleet showed encouraging signs of recovery during the fifth decade of the sixteenth century, although its composition differed in many ways (fig. 12).

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chapter 15 The merchant marine c. October–December 1558

1558

No. of in % vessels

1,500 botti (900 tons) and above 1,000–1,500 botti (600–900 tons) 800–999 botti (480–599 tons) 600–799 botti (360–479 tons) 400–599 botti (240–359 tons) Merchant galleys (240 tons)

0 1 10 16 16 0

5 30 40 25

Total

43

100

Capacity

1,300 botti (780 tons) 27,234 botti 8,134 botti (4,880 tons) (16,340 tons) 10,960 botti (6,576 tons) 6,840 botti (4,104 tons) – 16,340 tons

See respectively, Appendix A: 1558.

2

A New Golden Age or an Indian Summer?

2.1 Positive Trends in Shipping, the 1550s and ’60s The ensuing decades witnessed further growth in the merchant marine. Powered by the system of state loans, the economic conditions enhanced the replacement of older models with newer ones. We can observe a more pronounced gap between two classes of round ships – those of 800 botti and above (nave grosse), and those that barely reach the requirements set by law to apply for loans. Notably, there were no public voyages in 1558.28 Hence, the merchant marine in 1558 (Table 18) still did not reach the size and gross tonnage Venice vaunted at the turn of the century. Likewise, drafts to the Senate decrees 7 June 1590 contain a list of ships of over 700 botti that were active in Venice in 1567/8. Not counting any surviving merchant galleys – the merchant marine possessed forty-two ships of 400 botti and above, with a total capacity of 44,200 botti (26,520 tons) of which thirtyfive ships were of 1,000 botti and above. However, the lack of information on round ships of less than 700 botti is highly suspicious.29 All things considered, the supposedly elevated numbers compensate for other vessels that were possibly omitted from the list. I therefore tend to accept the supposition that 28 Judde de Larivière, Naviguer, comercer, gouverner, p. 66. 29 ‘Nota delle navi si attrovanno l’anno 1567–68’: ASVe, SM, fil. 108, f. 33r (7 June 1590); Romano, ‘La marine marchande vénitienne’, pp. 33–34; Hocquet, Voiliers et commerce, pp. 578–79; idem, Venise et le monopole, I, pp. 608–9.

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Venice’s shipping sector further increased and reached a peak around 1567/8. The question remains, what sort of revival was it? In the 1550s and ’60s shipbuilding in Venice was reinvigorated as a result of the system of loans. Shipbuilding in the stato da mar benefited from this flux as well. Starting 1559, it was formally supported by offering loans to building anywhere within Venice’s overseas territories.30 Yet the foreign element in Venice’s merchant marine was steadily increasing. Clearly, the 10 December 1531 decree that left little room for the naturalization of foreign-built ship was axed.31 But the presence of foreign ships in Venice’s ship registry is a symptom of the larger trend; that of the growing liberalization of shipping and trade. Merchants and shipowners expended their commercial networks, operating from different commercial centres around the Ottoman and Christian world. In 1561 it was admitted that many of Venice’s ships employed in tramp trade between Constantinople and foreign territories after obtaining a formal approval from Venetian baili or provisory consuls abroad.32 Another apparent trait in shipping in those decades was the revival of the voyages to Spain and England. Several ships were commissioned on a voyage of eight or nine months to the west. This was followed by a shorter route of three to four months to Sicily, Corfu and about to re-align the ship’s itinerary with the seasonal voyages to the Levant. Tramp voyaging and the apparent increase in the number of ships heading to the west is perfectly in line with the general economic growth experienced by the major maritime powers at that time, resulting from the discovery of the New World. The shipbuilding industry was adjusted to better exploit the system of loans, and older models were replaced with newer ones more cost-efficient. For once, ship demolition and scrapping became ever more important, as the upper structures of ships, and other parts that were less vulnerable to the ravages of the worm, were recycled and installed on new hulls. Thus, shipowners managed to reduce the construction costs, enhance the production line, and benefit from the loans that the State granted for the construction of new ships.33 In one such case Zuan-Nicolò Balbi was granted loans for building a ship out of the remains of the submerged Barbara e Bona.34 Such arrangement were

30 ASVe, SM, reg. 34, ff. 92v–93r (31 March 1559). 31 This fact is corroborated by the petition of the Querini brothers to naturalize a foreign ship. To strengthen their case, they provided a long list of ships that received such privilege in the past decade: ibid., fil. 29 [1559]. 32 Ibid., reg. 35, f. 141r (23 December 1561). 33 Gluzman, ‘Notes on Venice’s Ship-Breaking Industry’, p. 85. 34 ASVe, CapCX, Notatorio, reg. 3, f. 24 (31 October 1552).

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crucial to maintain a healthy gap between costs and returns, in view of the growing complications in finding raw materials. To ensure returns from freightage and comply with strict regulations against overloading and overcrowding, the traditional two-decked model was altered. The new design contained three decks equal in size and above the waterline. In this way merchandize was stored in sealed, protected compartments and the exposed platforms were left free of obstacles. The ship’s equipment, weaponry and artillery were likewise stored in sealed compartments. The third coverture added significant weight to the structure and altered stability. It was therefore necessary to increase the ballast by one third to prevent the ship from capsizing. The excessive weight of the extra deck and ballast meant that the ship sat lower in water and the load mark (brocca) was submerged. An appeal to raise the load sign to better fit it to the new design (i.e., to increase the quota of merchandise permitted by law) encountered strong opposition. Not sparing mutual insults and accusations, in 1569 Venice’s shipbuilding and shipping industries were torn between two opposing parties, based on whether one opposed or was in favour of raising the brocca.35 2.2 The Turn Inwards: Industrialization and Colonial Products Between 1550 and 1580, shipping in many parts of Europe experienced economic growth, riding on high demand from increasing American trade.36 In Venice, this growth arrived just when its role as trade emporium on an international level shrank. In the context of Venetian history these two apparently opposing factors become complementary, and ultimately provide the interpretative key for the Republic’s economy. In mid-sixteenth century Venice’s manufacturing was increasing its share of wealth-creation; the drapery sector of woollens and cloth, the products of goldsmiths, books and prints, and shipbuilding powered by government incentives, were the principal drivers of urban productivity. Another upward trend among the nobility was investments channelled to property areas closer to the lagoon (the regions of Padua, Treviso, and the south-western part of the Friuli), and further to the areas around Vicenza and south of Verona.37 The rapid population growth strained the dependency of the city in regular transport of staple goods by sea. The years 1554, 1556, and to some extent until the end 35 36

37

1569: ASVe, SM, reg. 39 ff. 69v–70v; ibid., fil. 43. On the expansion of Dutch overseas trade around mid-sixteenth century: van Tielhof & van Zanden, ‘Productivity Changes in Shipping’, pp. 48–49. Likewise, shipbuilding and shipping within the Iberian Peninsula experienced their apogee in the mid- to later sixteenth century: Grafe, ‘The Strange Tale of the Decline’, pp. 85, 98–99, 101–4, 106. Pezzolo, ‘The Venetian Economy’, pp. 257–58, 267 and bibliography quoted therein.

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of the decade, were periods of poor crop yields and famine in Italy. The Grain Office in Venice had to make provisions for the transport of a yearly quota of 65,692 stara of grain (c. 1,800 stara per day). The principle sources were Cyprus and Greek-Ottoman territories.38 To sustain liner shipping along these routes, plantation of agricultural products directed for export was further developed in the Ionian islands; these include the currant and raisin plantations in Zante and Cephalonia, as well as assorted livestock. Corfu and Zante (or alternatively Chiarenza) became obligatory ports of call for all ships heading to the Levant. An income of circa 1,000 ducats could be expected by loading local goods and freights in transit, mainly woollens and silk.39 Cyprus was further developed into a plantation colony. Of all products, salt played the most important part as ships were required to transport half of their carrying capacity with salt on the return voyage.40 The salt pans in Saline were extended. With the opening of the salina nuova in 1559, it was estimated that the annual yield would suffice to fill the hulls of twenty ships.41 The registries of the Salt Office in Venice attest to the exploit of this system. A 700-botti ship generated an income of 1,000 to 1,200 ducats from salt alone. Policies of discriminatory freights were further exploited to guarantee the remunerability of the return voyage. Starting 1561, all ships that stopped in Cyprus were obliged to return with a certain quota of wheat as well as salt. We can truly say that a fleet specialized in the transport of bulk goods was born.42 Salt and grain were not particularly attractive freights but minimized the risk of negative balance on the return leg. In times of increased uncertainties with the availability of spices in Syria, securing just that was crucial. A common subterfuge those days was for captains to fill their hulls to the maximum with salt in Saline, and unload part of the quantity after their departure in Limassol or Paphos if more profitable freights were available.43 38 39

40 41 42 43

On the demographic growth in Venice and the quantities of grain: ASVe, APGVP, bus. 2, fasc. 35 (1552–56); the chronicle of Stefano Magno: BNM, Ms. It. VII 518 (7884), p. 154. ASVe, SM, fil. 19 [1558]. Already in the fourteenth century a consistent share of Crete’s agricultural output was destined for export, and might have served as a model for other islands: Ashtor, ‘Levantine Sugar Industry’, pp. 91–132; Jacoby, ‘La production du sucre en Crète Vénitienne’, pp. 167–80; Tucci, ‘Le commerce vénitien du vin de Crète’, pp. 199–211. ASVe, CXDC, reg. 22, ff. 102v–3r (28 February 1554); ASVe, CN, reg. 30, ff. 37r–v (14 January 1556). ASVe, SDDR, Cipro, bus. 4, [22 September 1559]; ibid., bus. 5 [3 November 1559]. Braudel, La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen, I, p. 611; ASVe, CXDB, reg. 1, 63 (10 June 1561). ASVe, SDDR, Cipro, bus. 2 [18 September 1562].

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2.3 Venetian Shipping in Ottoman Waters Following the signature of the capitulations to end the war of 1537–1540, the Ottoman Empire sought to establish its sovereignty in Greek and easternMediterranean waters. On both sides, military fleets and corsairs were guilty of gross violations of the peace treaty. The protracted crisis was felt across the eastern Mediterranean, with the rise of the Uscocks (Croatian pirates) who preyed upon Adriatic shipping, the fearsome Dragut Rais and petty corsairs operating from bases in Malta, Albania, the bay of Epirus and Patras, as well as Rhodes and the maritime zone of Cyprus. The baili in Constantinople demanded from the Turks to try harder to guard the seas, as was agreed in the bilateral accords. The most to suffer were Greek-Venetian shipping, captains experienced continuous provocations, and were forced to pay exaggerated tributes.44 The round ships fared better in this respect, though they were not immune to hostilities. On 27 February 1560 the ship of the Briconi was captured by Turkish-flagged armed ships at the vicinity of Cape Matapan with 75 men on board; 30 managed to escape, the others were enslaved, injured or killed.45 In 1563 the ship Fabiana captained by Domenico di Rossi was attacked by Dragut Rais off the lighthouse of Messina: a cannon ball that hit the ammunition store set the ship on fire, and it later sank.46 Reports on the confiscation of goods, the equipment of vessels, mariners enslaved, or those who met with worse fates reached the colonial administration almost daily. From there the information was relayed to San Marco. The response was diplomatic and defensive. The evident fear from another armed conflict with the Ottomans prevented Venice from taking any decisive measure against the protracted provocations. What followed were large-scale projects of fortifications of the stato da mar and the mobilization of soldiers; these are all well known. Interesting in this respect is a speech carried by Vincenzo Moresini savio di terraferma in 1568. Aiming to convince his fellow senators to allocate considerable funds for the defence of the stato da mar, Moresini

44 E.g., reports of the governors of Corfu and Cyprus: ibid., [5 June 1560], [15 April 1562]; ibid., bus. 4 [1 October 1557], [30 November 1557]; ibid., fil. 5 [23 June 1558], [2 July 1558]; ibid., Corfu, bus. 1 [3 October 1555], [1 April 1556]; ibid., bus. 2 [1, 3 October 1559], [15 August 1560]; ibid., bus. 3 [8 October 1563]. The preamble to the following decrees: ASVe, SM, reg. 33, ff. 134r–v (26 March 1557), 136v–37r (3 October 1557). Letters by Antonio Bragadin capo della guardia di cipro: MCC, DDR, bus. 412, ‘2’ ‘3’ (27 July 1557). In the Lippomano Chronicle: BNM, Ms. It VII 213 (8836), ff. 110v, 175r–v (16, 28 November 1558), 252 (8 June 1568). 45 ASVe, SDDR, Corfu, bus. 2 (4–5 March 1560). 46 Ibid., bus. 3 [8 October 1563].

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pointed out that the loss of Cyprus would bring the end to the shipping industry in all directions, as well as the incomes from taxes in Venice.47 2.4 Navigating through Trends of Trade in Syria and Egypt In the first half of the sixteenth century the market of Damascus underwent a severe crisis, while Aleppo took advantage from this situation; it flourished, helped also by the sultan himself, who wintered with his troops in the city in 1548–49 and enjoyed its air greatly. As a result of the economic development, many European states had opened consulates in Aleppo. Still, the caravans of spices from Mecca to Syria, which was already interrupted during the Ottoman-Safavid War, did not resume its previous volume even after the signature of the Peace of Amasya. The muda of galleys to Syria in the autumn of 1556 found it devoid of spices and with only few merchants.48 The letters of the merchant Andrea Berengo give a systematic picture of nine complete months between 1555 and 1556 in the Syrian ports. Quantities arriving to these outlets were small; at times prices in the Levant were higher than those in Venice. The general uncertainty, the influx of goods from the West, the growing success of local cloth factories in Aleppo, created impossible conditions for the merchants to cope with. Ugo Tucci, who studied the Berengo letters, convincingly demonstrated the sensitiveness of the markets, where prices were constantly changing, faster than the flow of news. The old spice route saw some excellent years in the 1560s, but otherwise was less favourable. Nevertheless, it was maintained due to resistance offered by a kind of force of inertia. The shipping economy had to adopt a new commercial structure so as to ride through this crisis. In the last twenty years of Venetian rule in Cyprus most round ships terminated their voyages at the island, and the exchange of wares with the gateways in Syria was ceding to smaller regional carriers.49 In 1559 the emin of Aleppo in charge of the custom duties complained to the Porte that Venetian round ships or galleys no longer made their way to Syria once Cyprus was established as their final destination. He was also pushing his superiors to take measures against Cypriot vessels that stopped in Tripoli. It was decided, however, that tightening the limitation would only make the situation

47 BNM, Ms. It VII 213 (8836), ff. 260r–63r, (22 May–11 June 1568). 48 ASVe, PSM, Misti, bus. 115-A, fasc.  ‘lettere’ [17 July 1556]; ASVe, SDDR, Cipro, bus. 4 [28 October 1556]. 49 Tucci, Lettres d’un marchand vénitien, pp. x, 12–15; Arbel, ‘The Economy of Cyprus’, pp. 185–92; idem, ‘Maritime Trade in Famagusta’, p. 100, cit. 38; pace M.-L. von Wartburg, sugar production technology in Cyprus provided the blueprint for those in the New World: ‘Production du sucre de canne’, pp. 126–31.

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worse.50 The fact that smaller carriers replaced the round ships on the CyprusSyria leg strongly suggests that the volume of trade with the Levant had dropped significantly. The disaffection with the Levant is corroborated by other examples: in 1558 the owners of the Querina were reimbursed 500 ducats for refusing an attractive freight to Constantinople and instead carrying soldiers and equipment to Cyprus. Likewise, the owners of the Gradeniga were reimbursed for changing course from the Ottoman capital to Cyprus in 1567.51 In 1568 the ship Martinona reported losses for sailing to Cyprus instead of the original plan to sail to Alexandria.52 Regardless of the smaller prospects, Venice’s largest plantation colony helped sustain the voyage to the Levant and nourish the growing population in Venice. Once the stricken route was secured, shipowners could deviate every now and then into more lucrative yet risky directions. But after the fall of Cyprus in 1571, Venice could no longer secure attractive freights for bulky cargoes originating in the East, a fact that reduced the profitability of this line. The Egyptian markets fared better in this respect. Private commercial letters and consular reports attests to the overwhelming quantities of spices that arrived from Mecca to Egypt via the Red Sea routes in the 1550s. The leg from Cairo to Alexandria was mediated by Jewish merchants with an advantage of 20% to the detriment of the Venetians.53 In his final report, the consul in Alexandria (1550–53) Daniele Barbarigo points out to yet another difficulty; Venetian-flagged vessels were detained by the authorities two and three months in port. The risk of superfluous operating costs resulted from this confinement deterred many shipowners from sending their vessels to Alexandria. Not many ships stopped in this port in the days of the succeeding consul Lorenzo Tiepolo (1553–56). Those that did had difficulties in finding enough freights for the return voyage. The captains of the Corcumella and the navilio Pugnaleto were inclined to charter their vessels to foreigners and sailed to Messina instead.54 As the century progressed, Venetians had to confront stiffer competition from merchants coming to the Ottoman Empire from other kingdoms and ports, principally the Genoese, Ragusans, and French.55 When in 1569 the king 50 51 52 53

ASVe, SDAR, Constantinopoli, fil. 2-B, n. 77, ff. 188v (10 September 1559). ASVe, SM, reg. 38, ff. 80v–81r (9 November 1567). Ibid., f. 113v (10 April 1568). ASVe, PSM, Misti, bus. 115-A, fasc. ‘lettere’ [17 July 1556]; Tuchscherer & Pedani, Alexandrie ottomane 1, pp. 58–59; Tucci, Lettres d’un marchand vénitien, pp. x, 3–4, 15; Lane, ‘The Mediterranean Spice Trade’, pp. 581–90. 54 Tuchscherer & Pedani, Alexandrie ottomane 1, pp. 76–77, 93–94. 55 Magno, Voyages (1557–1565), p. 642.

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of France obtained capitulations from the sultan, soon enough other nations sported the French flag to carry out business in the Levant: merchants from Genoa, Messina, Lucca, Chios, as well as Catalans and Bretons. In response to the outbreak of war with Cyprus in 1570, the Collegio issued an authorization for all Christians to load whatever type of spices or merchandise on any ship bound for Venice.56 Meanwhile, the expansion of French activities in the Levant came at the Republic’s expense. After the loss of Cyprus, although the line from Venice to Syria was resumed, the role of San Marco ships was reduced.57 In 1580 England also obtained a berat (authorization) with commercial privileges. While Flemish and Dutch ships were present in the Levant even before the Low Countries received their capitulation in 1610.58 It is hardly surprising that the gross tonnage of Venice’s merchant marine was adversely affected by these developments. In 1576 it was reduced to 7,650  tons (12,750 botti), and shrank even further to 5,850 tons (9,750 botti) in 1590. These decreases impelled the Republic to repeal the prohibition on naturalizing foreign-built ships, and to encourage the building of larger-tonnage ships in the colonies. Despite the repeal, in 1602 only twelve good-sized Venetian craft existed, but by 1605 the merchant marine could boast twenty-six vessels of 600 botti, over half of which were naturalized.59 By then, the general economic growth experienced by other maritime centrer in Europe contrasted with the signs of evident decline in the shipbuilding and shipping industries in Venice.60

56 ASVe, CN, reg. 38, ff. 263v–64r (27 November 1570). 57 E.g., the final report of Andrea Navagero (1578): Berchet, Relazioni, p. 61. 58 Braudel, La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen, I, p. 563; Tuchscherer & Pedani, Alexandrie ottomane 1, pp. 58–59. 59 Tenenti, Naufrages, corsaires et assurances maritimes, p. 567; Romano, ‘La marine marchande vénitienne’, p. 34; Hocquet, Voiliers et commerce, pp. 579–82; Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, pp. 41–42; idem, Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 386. Fernand Braudel provides a bigger figure regarding the gross tonnage in 1605: The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World, I, p. 446. 60 In 1597, the Republic’s authorities confirmed. Trade on the other hand was still solid, and run by subjects of Venice, active in foreign countries: Tenenti, Piracy and the Decline of Venice, XVII; idem, Naufrages, corsaires et assurances maritimes, p. 19. The principle factors for the decline in shipping pace the cinque savi alla mercanzia were: the English establishing maritime bases in Venetian territories, the growing importance of Ancona, unfavourable fiscal policies in the West, the recent war with the Ottomans, the foreign component in Venice’s society: ASVe, CSAM, PS, bus. 141, 2r–4r (15 July 1602).

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The New Protagonists in Shipping and Trade

Up until the end of the fifteenth century, from his youth the typical Venetian patrician was engaged in the search for profit through commerce. Since many wealthy patricians were merchants and investors in shipping, they protected their interests from unwanted competition, whether foreign or domestic, by introducing a complex system of privileges.61 In the course of four decades, however, the growing pressure from the lower social class coupled with exogenous factors moved the nobility to parcel out an increasing quota of their former activity to third parties. The upshot was that by the 1540s Venice’s trading community in the Levant was operated almost exclusively by agents of nonnoble origin, mostly citizens and citizen-subjects.62 Likewise, the revival in the private shipping sector (after 1541) was partly the result of new funds siphoned in by entrepreneurs from social groups previously excluded from this area of business. This welcome influx meant that by 1550 the city’s fleet boasted more round ships – either owned or co-owned by non-noblemen – than ever before in Venetian history. Moreover, an attempt to restrain direct or indirect involvement of foreigners in Venetian shipping was thwarted.63 For the first time, the commoners were in the forefront of commercial shipping’s most lucrative sector aside the nobility. This new spirit of enterprise, powered by the general demographic and economic growth that Europe had experienced, was largely responsible for the commercial heyday that preceded the Battle of Lepanto. The Growing Ambivalence of the Ruling Class towards Shipping and Trade The decline in Venice’s supremacy at sea largely corresponds to the ruling class’s equivocal attitude about shipping and seaborne trade. The diarist Girolamo Priuli presented a convincing analysis of the causes and effects of the Portuguese discoveries at the turn of the century. In his view, the Cape route to India would reduce the Republic’s volume of trade, and consequently the Venetian nobility would reduce its investments in the seafaring and shipbuilding business, and reroute its capital to the terraferma. According to Priuli, the reason behind the Venetian invasion of the nearby Romagna region in northern Italy in 1503 was to gain more land in a bid to make up for the losses of income from trade at sea. This move inland precipitated the War of 3.1

61 Judde de Larivière, ‘The “Public” and the “Private”’, p. 78. 62 Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople, pp. 130–31; Tucci, ‘La psicologia del mercante veneziano’, p. 48. 63 ASVe, SM, reg. 31, ff. 49r–50v, 50v–51r (18, 26 July 1550).

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the League of Cambrai,64 which marked a turning point in Venice’s attitude toward mainland possessions.65 While scholars accept Priuli’s analysis in principle, the extent of the patriciate’s withdrawal from shipping and trade after the Portuguese discoveries is still under debate.66 Numerical data on the composition of investors in the public voyages confirms the general tendency: from 1495 to 1500 there were more than 250 patricians financially involved in the auctioneering of the galleys, but half a century later there were no more than thirty, and all of them were members of a handful of family-based networks. Thus, before the sector became obsolete in the 1550s, some of the most influential patricians monopolized the profits to be made from trade at sea. In this new configuration, public galleys lost their traditional collective dimension, and corporate governance was no longer a reality.67 In the big-tonnage sector, however, the picture that emerges is quite different. To judge from the snapshots of Venice’s merchant marine afforded us through the ship lists (Appendix A) – on the face of it – it seems that those associated with the aristocracy maintained control of about 70% to 75% of the most lucrative sector of private shipping until the fifth decade of the sixteenth century. The remaining were primarily owned by non-nobles, citizens and citizen-subjects and fideles of Venice (fig. 13). Despite this continued commitment by the patricians, and those associated with them, we must bear in mind that the volume of activity – that is the size and gross tonnage of Venice’s merchant marine – dropped significantly at the beginning of the sixteenth century, and remained relatively low in the four decades to come. Hence the gradual withdrawal of investment and participation of the city’s upper social class in private shipping tallies with the decline of the system of merchant galleys (fig. 14). Again, the ship lists reveal the shifts under way: we can notice a change in the names of the primary owners in the list drawn up for the years 1549 and 1558, indicating that the social composition of the shipping milieu had altered in the aftermath of the war with the Turks (1537–40): ships primarily owned by noblemen now amounted to barely 50%. Although the steady investment in the private ships in this decades – and the higher-ranking ships were still owned by the patriciate class – it was the wider citizenry and citizen-subjects who powered the revival that came about in 1549, bringing a new spirit of 64 Finlay, ‘Crisis and Crusade’, p. 83. 65 Woolf, ‘Venice and the Terraferma’, pp. 190–91. 66 Cf. Luzzatto, ‘La decadenza’, pp. 163–64; idem, ‘L’economia veneziana nei secoli ‘400 e ‘500’, p. 60; idem, Storia economica, pp. 229–32; Pullan, ‘The Occupation and Investments’, p. 386; Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, pp. 306–7. 67 Judde de Larivière, Naviguer, commercer, gouverner, pp. 84–85.

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figure 13 A division of the ownership on big-tonnage ships between those associated with the aristocracy and the lower classes

figure 14 The socio-economic change in the composition of the city’s shipping milieu, 1480–1558

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enterprise and injecting private capital into an otherwise listless shipping economy. 3.2 The Rise of the New Merchant Class After 1541 the entire shipping sector – and Venice’s merchant class as a whole – underwent a sweeping social transformation. Immigrants from the colonies seeking new opportunities in the capital were swelling the ranks of the cittadini class, thereby generating a formidable economic resource. Though a considerable number of patricians continued to attend to commercial affairs, the economic foundations of the city’s ruling class were truly transformed. One of the figures that represented the new spirit of the emerging shipping industry in the mid-sixteenth century was a captain of Corfiot origins, Matthaios Verghis (cited as Matteo Verga in Venetian sources). At least from 1509, Verghis made numerous voyages between Venice and the eastern Mediterranean as a captain of small and medium-sized vessels.68 From 1523 to 1528 he captained the round ship Cornera, owned jointly by the Corner brothers and Thoma Duodo. As second-generation businessmen, Matthaios took part frequently and concurrently in numerous joint-ventures (the so-called syntrophies) for the transportation of local products from Corfu to Ottoman harbours. The Verghis clan belonged to that group of Greek merchants who accepted the occasional offerings to import Ottoman wheat in return for the incentives issued by the Grain Commissioners. It seems that these activities commenced in 1524. In that year Matthaios began consigning cargoes of cereals in Venice, which were sent via Corfu by his brother Alexandros. The Verghis brothers established a leading role among the Greeks in this field in the following years, bringing them into competition (and even conflict) with other mercantile families who were active in the same line of business, such as the Kouvlis and the Samariaris. Following the war (1537–40) the said Matthaios and his brother Demetrios relocated to Venice, from where they kept an eye on their affairs, having access to more reliable intelligence and utilizing the services of a dense network of agents in key commercial points. From the capital, the family further exploited the government incentives, which were offered quite regularly, to those who were willing to import cereals and other essentials originating from Romania alta e bassa. Of crucial importance was the fact that the Verghises maintained agents in Ottoman ports and developed useful contacts amidst the Ottoman bureaucracy. Thus, they managed to influence the local authorities, ensuring the unhindered export of cereals and overcoming prohibitions imposed from 68 ASVe, Psal, bus. 63, reg. 7, f. 119r (24 October 1509).

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time to time by the Sublime Porte. The Verghis adopted established practices of amassing and investing capital (leasing of feudatories, tax farming, shipbuilding) and took loans to invest in joint-ventures. Thus, they were involved in dozens of mercantile transactions, the object of which was the supply of grain from Albania, Epirus, and Volos, of maize from Volos, of millet from Epirus, and of cotton and salt from Cyprus. From the 1540s the Verghises widened their collaboration with the Jewish element of Corfu, particularly with those newly arrived from Apulia, through members of the Vivante, Mazza, and other families. Thus, by ensuring the continuous flow of eastern goods into the Venetian market, they gained significant political privileges in return, including full Venetian citizenship. Matthaios’s collaborators in Venice were members of the Marcello clan, as well as the Venier and the Contarini. In 1560 the Verghis brothers invested 15,000 ducats to build their own vessel of 900 botti at the Pegolotto shipyard in bocca del Rio di San Domenego in Venice. The carats were divided equally between Matthaios and his nephew Ioannis, Demetrios’s son. Between 1560 and 1569 the ship made no fewer than nine commercial voyages from Venice to Cyprus, and one to Ibiza. Another instructive case is that of Marco(s) Samariari(s), son of a fivechildren family from Zante with numerous relatives in other parts of the Peloponnese. As a shipowner and grain merchant, Samariaris made effective use of his origin and of the geographical dispersion of his family in order to facilitate his business affairs. With the collaboration of his relatives, he was purchasing grain in the Peloponnese, which he then transported with his ships to Venice. His brother Jakovos – also a shipowner and merchant and probably his partner in business – was one of the richest members of the Greek fraternity in Venice, the owner of many houses, farms, and ships both in Zante and in Venice, where the family owned an entire block, the Corte Samariari.69 Similarly, a certain Stefano di Nicolò Taraboto, citadino veneziano, earned a reputation as captain on board the Morocena e Ragazona (1535–37) and the Cornera (1538–42). In 1544 this Taraboto was made captain of the barza di Comun, being the first non-nobleman to be appointed to this prestigious position. After four years in public service, he returned to the private sector and captained the ship Priula del banco from 1550. Concurrently, in 1544 Taraboto built his own round ship – named after him – in partnership with two Venetian noblemen, Zaccaria di Barbon Morosini, and Benedetto di Nicolò Venier.70 69

Pagratis, ‘The Greeks in the Maritime Trade of Venice’, p. 206; idem, ‘Venice, Her Subjects and Ships’, pp. 260, 265–66. 70 On the resolution of the Council of Ten to elect a citadino to command the barza di Comun: ASVe, CXDC, fil. 35, fasc. 30 (14 March 1544). According to my records, Morosini

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Yet another figure that successfully represents the new type of shipping entrepreneurs now operating in Venice was the Cretan shipman Andreas di Anastasio Corcumeli (Korkumelis). Although Andreas himself was not a captain, his brother Alexandros was. In the 1530s their centre of activity was still in Crete, but some time after 1541 Andreas moved to Venice and established his base in San Lio, from where he ran an impressive shipping network and collaborated with numerous captains, merchants, and investors.71 With their networks in the Ottoman world  – as well as their power and personal fortunes – the new protagonists earned a certain freedom from the constraints of the Venetian shipping economy. An indicative case is that of Constantinos Siguros, a citizen of Zante and a member of one of the families that gained their fortunes from trade between Venice and the Ionian islands. In 1555 he owned jointly with Ahmet Pasha a large ship captained by a Muslim, Mustafa Reis, which was employed in transporting grain to Venice. In the next decades, however, the Siguros clan was active in the burgeoning commerce with England, on behalf of themselves, and funding provided by Jews of Portuguese origin and Venetians merchants from the end of the sixteenth century onwards. In 1562, shortly before his death, Constantinos purchased a ship in Tripoli of Barbary from none other than the infamous Dragut Rais. The other shareholder and captain was a certain Michelin Sumeriti dal Zante.72 Dated to the second half of the sixteenth century, the records of commercial and maritime activities of the Friulan nobleman Zuan-Battista Panigai, constitute an important source for the study of the new actors that propelled the economic growth of the shipping sector in Venice in those years. The ship Mazzona (Santa Maria Mazor e Santo Iseppo) of around 540 botti was built in 1558 in Venice and decommissioned in 1567. Even though the ship changed hands several times, none of the registered shareholders was a Venetian nobleman. Enterprises such as those of the Verghis, Corcumellis, Sicuros, Samariaris, and the Kouvlis families were not only the driving force behind a revival in Venice’s shipping economy, but actually laid the groundwork for the ensuing alliance with the English. The strengthening of this relationship was a direct consequence of the fact that the economic interests of Venetian-Greek subjects

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and Venier did not have previous experience the operation of round ships. On this partnership: ibid., fil. 38 (15 July 1545); ASVe, CapCX, Mandati, reg. 1, ff. 195v (14 June 1544), 197 (1 October 1544). See Chapter Seven. Pagratis, ‘Venice, her Subjects and Ships’, pp. 264–65; ASVe, SM, fil. 29 [23 June, 9 July 1563].

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ended up being better taken care of by an alliance with other outsiders.73 In this context, it is indeed probable that the rebirth of Greek shipping and trade in modern times commenced in the years of the Ottoman conquest and the privileges that were granted in Italian port towns.74 Clearly, the new entrepreneurs did not just step out of the blue: for centuries coastal navigation and the ownership of small and medium-sized vessels had been dominated by the lower classes. Already in the second half of the fifteenth century, the captainship of Venice’s round ships of more than 240 tons was largely in the hands of the popolani (fig. 7). It was also the norm to award them with shares in the ships they governed.75 We have already seen that the industrial stimulations that were offered in 1490 intended (and indeed managed) to attract a wider milieu of shipping entrepreneurs that were not Venetians (seemingly Venetian residents or colonial subjects) and who built their ships not necessarily in Venice. After all, the Republic’s citizens and subjects in the terraferma and the stato da mar were the natural candidates – and anyway the most immediate – when this industry reduced its importance on an international level.76 What is more difficult to assess, however, is the readiness of the lower classes to enter into more ambitious maritime enterprises before they were officially invited. To be sure, there were several exceptions, and one of the most prominent examples is the ship of 1,800 botti, built and owned by Manoli Calafato dalla Cania in the 1470s. This ship was drafted into the war fleet, and after the owner’s death was abandoned at Suda in Crete.77 Yet the tendency of the nobility to dominate this hazardous sector of shipowning can be seen at large. The noble families continued to constitute the nucleus of the upper sector of commercial shipping in the first four decades of the sixteenth century; thereafter, their relative importance in terms of number and gross capital slowly but steadily decreased. 3.3 Epilogue While the mid-sixteenth century saw a more or less balanced division in the ownership of round ships between the nobility and other social groups, the 73 74 75 76 77

On the reversal of the balance: Fusaro, Political Economies, pp. 21, 33–39, 43–47 and the bibliography therein. Pagratis, ‘Venice, Her Subjects and Ships’, pp. 263–66; idem, ‘Organization and Management’, p. 637; idem, Merchants of Giannina. pp. 129–43. Given the conditions of virtual autonomy, the captains enjoyed wide powers during the voyage. Securing their interests in the ship was therefore logical. E.g., Appendix A: 1480, nos. 1–2, 9, 14, 20. Judde de Larivière, ‘The “Public” and the “Private”’, p. 89. Appendix A: 1480, nos. 29.

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growing dominance of the latter becomes more evident at the second half of the century.78 Out of eleven applications for state loans made between 1553 and 1559, seven (around 63%) were made by noblemen. Between 1588 and 1603, the total number of applications increased to forty, of which only seven (around 11%) were filed by noblemen, however.79 By 1622, among the representatives of the shipping industry who were negotiating the affairs of this sector with the cinque savi alla mercanzia, there was only a single nobleman. By 1677 not a single one of the forty-one parcenevoli taking part in the election of this body was of noble extraction.80 The overall trend is therefore quite clear. 4

Digest of Tables and Graphs

figure 15 Fluctuation in the number of ships and galleys of more than 240 tons between 1480 and 1558 in intervals of around ten years

78

Pullan, ‘The Occupation and Investments’, pp. 380, 386; Woolf, ‘Venice and the Terraferma’, pp. 198–99; Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, p. 41–42 and updated in his Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 386. 79 Romano, ‘La marine marchande vénitienne’, pp. 42–43; Tucci, ‘The Psychology of the Venetian Merchant’, p. 356. 80 Tucci, ‘Venetian Ship-Owners’, pp. 283–84; Luzzatto, ‘La decadenza di Venezia’, pp. 162–81; idem, ‘Le vicende del porto di Venezia’, pp. 17–20.

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figure 16 The total carrying capacity of the merchant fleet in all categories above 240 tons between 1480 and 1558 in intervals of circa ten years

figure 17 The total carrying capacity of the merchant fleet by categories

Conclusions As dry land finally heaves into view, and this inquiry drifts toward its bourn, the time has come to address some of the less obvious arguments developed in various parts of this work. 1

The Aggregation of Vessels Hoisting the San Marco Flag

It has been amply exposed that the complex scope of state intervention invites a more holistic analysis of shipping, one which acknowledges the overlap and interdependence of the various sectors involved in this industry. An example of this approach might be Jacopo de’ Barbari with his extraordinary woodcut of the city, completed c. 1500: we need to both zoom out for a bird’s-eye view of the whole, while providing microscopic detail of all things maritime. Admittedly, some distinction was made between ‘public navigation’ and ‘private navigation’, but this did not mean the two worked in opposition, and it would be a mistake to overestimate the division.1 We have seen that in various situations the rapport between private and public vessels was more a question of fluidity than of rigidity. Under the conditions of a muda, for example, private ships operated as freight carriers with rigid itineraries very much like the galleys. Instead of being chartered by a group of merchants, the muda ships carried the goods of many in return for freights that were anchored in law. It has also been argued that the ownership of several nave grosse was divided between private entrepreneurs and the public shipyards. From an institutional standpoint, the same maritime authorities governed both sectors of navigation, such that one might find the same clerk dealing with both types, round ships and merchant galleys. We have also seen how private ships were rigorously inspected for overloading and overcharging, and were required to comply with safety requirements throughout this period. This is particularly the case after 1516, when the Arsenal and the cinque savi alla mercanzia assumed control over private navigation as well. In her prosopographical study of the patrons and the auctioneers of the galleys, Claire Judde de Larivière observed many instances in which public and private navigation were operated by the same circle of shipowners and investors: a significant proportion of the patricians who auctioned and operated the merchant galleys also owned 1 On the concepts of ‘private’ and ‘public’ in Renaissance Venice rhetorical discourse: Judde de Larivière, Naviguer, commercer, gouverner, pp. 26–34, 40, 44.

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big-tonnage ships.2 Still, the conviction that private ships fared better than (and even replaced) the galleys in the sixteenth century prevented scholars from adopting a more decisive stance on the practical implications of this interdependence, beyond the very concept or idea. As for the colonial component of Venice’s merchant marine: up until recently, the multitude of mid-sized commercial vessels owned by Dalmatians and Greeks were entirely missing from the history books. Taking this gap in our knowledge on board, I first argue that the merchant vessels of all Venetian citizens, citizen-subjects, and mere fideles flew the San Marco flag (or some local variation of it), and that the rules for displaying the flag were more rigorously enforced in ports than on the open sea. Secondly, it is maintained that the term navi veneziane referred to ships built in Venice and its duchy (the surrounding lagoon), while the terms navi terrière and navi venete refer to the aggregate of commercial vessels under Venetian rule, including those originating in the colonies. Thirdly, it has been suggested that commercial vessels were distinct legal entities, some of which enjoyed privileges denied to others. Such privileges could relate to shipment to certain destinations and/or certain types of cargo, or include fiscal advantages. By the mid-sixteenth century, ships originating from Venice’s overseas territories of Candia, Zante, Corfu, Sebenico, Zara, Dulcigno, and Curzola enjoyed the same fiscal concessions to which Venetian-built ships were entitled automatically. The territories of Modon and Coron, and possibly Negroponte, had also enjoyed such privileges before the Ottoman conquest. Ships from other Venetian possessions, including Cyprus (Venice’s largest overseas colony) were not included in this category, and their owners were required to apply for individual privileges. Lastly, notwithstanding the range of vessels and their singular legal status, all ships built in Venetian territories – or naturalized – were subject to the same sea laws, and were treated as Venetian in foreign ports. The consequence of this affiliation to the San Marco flag can be seen at work in times of crises or wars, when the alienation of ships had become fulcral to the public debate. 2

Resiliency or Decline?

In their seminal works, the two great historians, Fernand Braudel and Frederic C. Lane, emphasized the resilience of Venice, reflected in its capacity to withstand the combined challenges of the new sea route to the Far East opened by the Portuguese, the wars with the Ottomans and those against 2 Ibid., pp. 289–310.

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Western powers in Italy, and the harsh competition over the Levant trade. They claimed that from the 1540s until the loss of Cyprus in 1571, Venetian shipping and maritime trade entered a period of economic growth.3 It is worth reminding ourselves first of the historiographical context within which the prediction of Venice’s resilience in the sixteenth century had emerged. Up until the early twentieth century, what scholars at the time considered to be the decline of Venice and its merchant marine was ascribed to three signal factors in particular: the great oceanic discoveries, the Ottoman consequent of the Levant, and the abandon of the system of merchant galleys.4 While Albert H. Lybyer (1915) may deserve pride of place in reassigning the decline of the Mediterranean spice trade to a much later period, it was the work of Frederic C. Lane – first published in 1933 – that provided substantial support for this thesis through his painstaking assessment of the Venetian merchant fleet and its changing capacity over the centuries.5 Lane stressed that the effects on Venetian trade of the Portuguese discoveries had frequently been misrepresented, thanks to the failure among scholars to distinguish between long ships (galleys) and round ships. Historians regularly confused the growth or decline in the size of galley convoys with that of Venetian shipping and spice trade as a whole. The decline of merchant galleys, Lane concluded, did not correlate with a reduction in Venetian commerce in the first half of the sixteenth century. Whereas Lane’s conviction that the merchant galleys had been eventually superseded by private merchantmen in liner shipping is substantially correct, the interdependence between both sectors is not sufficiently stressed in his aforementioned study. The snapshots of Venice’s merchant marine show that the gradual decline in the system of merchant galleys did indeed reflect a downturn in shipping across the board up until the 1540s. For all these reasons, the increase in the size and the gross tonnage – the first signs were reported in the summer of 1544 – has to be seen in relative terms.

3 Braudel, ‘La vita economica di Venezia’, p. 100; Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’; idem, ‘Recent Studies on the Economic History of Venice’, p. 330. See also Sella, ‘Crisis and Transformation’, pp. 92–96. 4 A prominent work is that of Wilhelm Heyd from 1886: idem, Histoire du commerce du Levant au Moyen Age, pp. 508–52. On the historiographical context: Pezzolo, ‘The Venetian Economy’, pp. 255–56. 5 Lybyer, ‘The Ottoman Turks’; Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’.

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Deforestation Was Not a Major Factor

Taking a reflective stance on the reasons that led to transformations in shipping, it has been argued here that the fluctuation of gross tonnage was brought on by the confluence of numerous factors working in parallel, and often interrelated. These factors include wars and a general rise in violence at sea; the level of effective competition from foreign fleets (especially during wartime); the silting of the port of Venice; an increase in dramatic weather events; the rise in the costs of ship construction; the fiscal burden; storage handling, customs clearance and transhipment policies; the direct effects of idle time in port on the operating costs; market regulations and several impediments to free competition. Clearly, some of these factors presented more serious and immediate impediments than others, yet, by my reckoning they were all secondary to the reliance of the shipping industry on regular freights. This somewhat obvious assumption provides a guiding compass for the present analysis of Venetian shipping. With this in mind, Frederic C. Lane’s famous thesis6 – which attributes the decline in shipping primarily to the depletion of the sources of timber for shipbuilding on the terraferma and in Istria – now seems somewhat off-beam. To be sure, matters were complicated when in 1559 the dwindling public forests were suddenly closed to shipbuilding, and oak-related expenses further augmented. Still, Karl Appuhn (and more recently Antonio Lazzarini) have shown that the depletion of oak concerned a specific type that proved more suitable for the curved frames of the boat’s skeleton. Restrictions on the harvesting of this type of oak were in force in the plains and some hilly areas, while the cutting of other types of oak was less regulated. On this issue, my stance diverges from Lane’s, since I reject deforestation as a major factor in the decline of Venice’s shipping industry. Shipbuilding and shipping involved a complex interplay. For one, already in the fifteenth century Venetian shipowners – with the help of their partners overseas – exploited alternative timber resources in Dalmatia, Albania, Epirus, and Crete for building their ships. Second, the closing of public forests to the shipping industry were backed up with ever-larger bounties for ship construction. Third, it was argued that throughout this period there were multiple instances in which the naturalization of ships was confirmed, albeit under strict conditions and on an individual basis. The policies concerning the naturalization of foreign ships were not formally slackened before 1590, which also suggests that there were still alternative timber resources. One more consideration is the fact that in the second half of the sixteenth century 6 Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, pp. 40–44.

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Spain experienced similar hardships in providing sufficient timber for its fleets. Although the costs of ship construction inflated, the demand remained high and the Spanish government ballasted the industry with a raft of subsidies.7 Compelling as it is, the scenario painted by Lane does not give enough weight to the fact that despite the apparent dearth in timber resources and the consequent rise in the costs of construction, this was nevertheless a period of relative growth for Venice’s shipping sector. By the same measure, Lane’s thesis does not tally with the fact that the shipping economy experienced a collapse in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Cyprus in 1571. The major significance of this historical event to the crisis in shipping has little to do with the gradual depletion of the State’s reserves of oaks and larch trees. I argue that instead that it was the shrinking number of attractive freights along the routes to the Levant after the loss of Cyprus that precipitated the sharp drop in the number of ships in service, and of the total volume of tonnage. By then, Venice was no longer able to offer its appealing big-tonnage freights on bulky cargo, namely to continue and exploit the island’s grain fields, sugar, cotton plantations, and natural resources (particularly salt). It is argued that colonial minerals and agricultural products were crucial not only for nourishing the growing populace in Venice and its subject territories, or providing raw materials to the textile manufacturing in northern Italy and beyond the Alps, but also for sustaining the merchant marine when spice supplies in Syria and Egypt dwindled. 4

The Agency of Environmental Factors in Venice’s Decline

Any discussion of Venice cannot overlook its unique ecosystem, one which necessarily affected every aspect of life in and around the lagoon. The role of sand and silting in the fluctuations of the merchant fleet adds a new facet to the already voluminous groundwork carried out by Élisabeth Crouzet-Pavan (Sopra le acque salse) and Salvatore Ciriacono (Building on Water).8 Chapter thirteen reconstructs the dramatic events that led to the silting of the very access to the ‘port’. It reviews the debate between the experts on the line of action to be taken, and the ambitious works on the lidi, which began in the 7 Grafe, ‘The Strange Tale of the Decline’, pp. 95, 99. 8 These studies conceptualize the longue durée of Venetian urban development and environmental change. Crouzet-Pavan, however, does not cover the eventful first two decades of the sixteenth century, years in which the silting of the lagoon worsened to such an extent that decisive action was required.

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spring of 1521. We have seen how this crisis was manifested in many forms: institutional changes, the revision of port administration (guards, pilots, harbourmaster), development of port infrastructures, the administration of the salvage boats, the practice of relieving cargos on the open sea, and the relocation of private shipyards that were believed to be the cause of silting. The next chapter (fourteen) discusses the effects on shipping of a surge in natural disasters between 1527 and 1533. This period is marked by several consequences resulting from the deterioration of Europe’s climate (the Spörer Minimum), according to some climatologists and historians. Sam White has drawn productive connections between natural disasters in the early modern period and what has been relatively recently identified as the Little Ice Age, a period of colder temperatures and unstable weather patterns that disrupted shipping, harvests, and indeed political regimes over wide swathes of the globe.9 In the Venetian context, Nelli-Elena Vanzan Marchini and Brian Pullan have drawn attention to the links between this surge in natural disasters and the development of social welfare and institutions, the Health Magistrate, and the control and quarantine during disease outbreaks.10 Yet, the impact of increased storminess on sixteenth-century Venetian shipping and the government responses to the increased number of shipwrecks in the late 1520s has not been dealt with before. Thus, this chapter complements a broader discussion of the agency of climatic events in early modern state formation. It also invites a comparison with Dagomar Degroot’s, The Frigid Golden Age, which makes a similar case for the resilience of shipping in the face of environmental crisis. 5

Could the Senators Have Steered towards a Different Ending?

For centuries, merchant shipping was an extension of the commercial life, power, and prestige of the Venetian Republic. In order to nurture and grow its merchant marine, the senators made recourse to protectionism through various forms of legislation. This was aimed at safeguarding privileges and commercial options and bolstering the Republic’s reputed hegemony of trade over a vast stretch of sea. Such interventions took the form of selectively awarding freight privileges, assorted fiscal perks, special benefits in port dues, subsidies for shipbuilding, subsidies for ship operation, and discrimination ‘in 9 White, The Climate of Rebellion; idem, A Cold Welcome. 10 Vanzan Marchini, I mali e i rimedi della Serenissima; idem, Le leggi di sanità; Pullan, Rich and Poor in Renaissance Venice.

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form or in fact’ against vessels of other trading nations. In addition, Venice institutionalized participation in shipping through select chartering arrangements aimed at benefiting both parties, operator and shipper. Arguments in favour of this type of intervention in shipping have emphasized the benefits of economic security and independence; the strategic and military importance of having large round ships; the safeguard of ‘public’ and ‘private’ interests; generating employment; preserving maritime know-how; and maintaining and developing all shipping-related maritime infrastructures. As much as these arguments helped to maintain Venice’s superiority for centuries, one can only wonder whether the adoption of drastic measures to liberalize shipping following a prolonged war of attrition (1463–79) – when the first signs of a long-term decline of shipping were apparent – would not have placed the merchant marine in a better position to face the tide of reversals that hit it some twenty years later. Instead, the senators’ response can be regarded tardy, indecisive, and overly cautious. As maintained throughout the present analysis, the procedure of liberalizing the shipbuilding and shipping sector crawled along at a snail’s pace. One cannot help wondering whether Venice’s belief in its own myth (i.e., the common perception of the immortal Republic) did not play a role in decision-making.11 Convinced of its self-worth, the patricians made a persistent anachronistic attempt to maintain the privileged-based social fabric of Venetian society. This, in turn, had cost them their primacy as providers of shipping services on an international level. In the first four decades of the sixteenth century the Republic no longer enjoyed lower costs in providing transportation by sea along several lucrative routes. Hence, its protectionist approach became a hindrance rather than an advantage. In this sense, there is no need to wait for the end of the sixteenth century to come across the full range of government regulatory philosophies: the advocates of liberalized policies in shipping carried significant weight in the arena of political decision-making, and by the 1520s several sectors in maritime shipping had already been liberalized in a bid to maintain Venice’s position as a leading port in the Adriatic, and to solve the more burning issues of food supply. It was not until 1534/5, however, that the foot-dragging senators were finally willing to open this industry to newcomers. Nevertheless, it took until 1541 before Venice successfully followed the example of other port towns, such as Ancona, Ragusa and Livorno, and invited its subjects and other merchant communities to transfer their activities to the City. Consequently, the shipping industry and 11

Finlay, ‘The Immortal Republic’, pp. 931–44.

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the merchant class were to a great measure supplanted by citizens and colonial subjects, mainly Greeks and Dalmatians.12 The new protagonists – who maintained important connections in the Ottoman Levant – centred their business activities along the routes that connected the capital with its territories, making occasional calls in ports under the rule of the sultan. This necessarily led to a drop in Venice’s role as a provider of shipping services on a ‘global’ scale. But the decline of shipping’s importance to the Venetian economy was offset by a shift towards industrial and agricultural development, new investments in the terraferma at its back and in the stato da mar of remote territories and colonies While in mid-sixteenth century Venice experienced an economic boom,13 scholars argue that this must be put in perspective, however. Firstly, shipping in many parts of Europe had experienced an upturn, between 1550 and 1580, riding on demographic growth and high demand from increasing trade with the New World. Secondly, Venetian shipping never returned to the size and gross tonnage it boasted in 1499. If this was indeed the case, one cannot argue for an exceptional ‘resiliency’ on the part of the once Dominant City. All things considered, apart from twenty-seven vibrant years (1544–71), sixteenth-century Venice was not so glorious a place for those Venetians who owned ships. 12 On the rise of the cittadini originari, their demand for political function and economic privileges, their collaboration with actors from different social classes: Judde de Larivière, Naviguer, commercer, gouverner, pp. 293–94; Bellavitis, ‘“Per Cittadini Metterete  …”’, pp. 359–83; Romano, Patricians and Popolani, pp. 12–38. In the general context: Epstein, Freedom and Growth. 13 Pezzolo, ‘The Venetian Economy’, pp. 264–65, 272–76, and the bibliography therein.

appendix a

Snapshots of Venice’s Merchant Marine, 1480–1558 In his monumental work The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (1966) Fernand Braudel writes, ‘[I]t must be accepted once and for all that we shall never have complete knowledge of tonnage in the sixteenth century, let alone the average tonnage that would enable us, where we know the number of ships entering or leaving a port, to calculate their total tonnage’ – a fact that did not deter the French historian from providing his own estimate.1 Given the nature of available sources, the total gross tonnage of Venice’s merchant fleet can only be calculated up to a certain point. The very few ship lists that have survived from this period contain partial, and often unreliable, information.2 Nevertheless, in the absence of any alternative sources, these lists, complemented by incidental comments made by contemporaries, comprise the factual basis of previous studies on fluctuations in the gross tonnage of the merchant fleet. One of the first historians to attempt analysis was Gino Luzzatto in an article published in 1925.3 Referring to several comments found in official records, primarily of the Senate, Luzzatto described the general ups and downs in the merchant marine: beginning with reports of a shortage in ships of large capacity in 1363, and concluding with the distinct decline in shipping and trade in the late sixteenth century. Frederic C. Lane drew a similar but arguably more detailed chronological analysis in an article published in 1933.4 In his study, Lane presents the number and capacity of ships of over 240 tons between 1558 and 1560, based on a document entitled ‘Navi grosse di Venetia, loro viaggi e loro patroni’, found in the private collection of the Donà dalle Rose family at the Museo Civico Correr in Venice. In the same publication, Lane also provides data on the number and capacity of ships clearing annually for selected voyages about 1448 and 1449, based on records of the Collegio and the Senate from this period. One year later in his monograph Ships and Shipbuilders in Renaissance Venice of 1934, Lane published the sources upon which he based his previous estimates and complemented his analysis with a chapter on the activity of private shipyards. The results were slightly updated in the French edition of the book in 1965.5 Of particular importance are the tables and appendices at the end of the book, which include estimates of the gross tonnage of the merchant marine in three different 1 Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World, I, p. 297. 2 Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 480. 3 Reprinted in 1954: Luzzatto, ‘Per la storia delle costruzioni navali’, pp. 37–51. 4 Reprinted in 1968: Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, pp. 22–46. 5 Lane, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 226–28 Tables E, F, G, 245–51 Appendix II, 253–56 Appendix III.

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periods: first, 1405–65 (Table D and Appendix 2), based on the registers of the daily enactments of the Collegio; second, 1499, based on the diaries of Marino Sanuto (Table E and Appendix III); and third, 1558–59 (Table F), based on the private collection of the Donà family. The same manuscript of the Donà family also supplied the source material for Alberto Tenenti’s assessment of the merchant marine in 1605, in his book on shipwrecks and maritime insurance, published in 1959.6 In light of a discovery in the Senate records of three ship lists for the years 1567, 1576, and 1590, Ruggiero Romano proposed an estimate of the merchant marine in the second half of the sixteenth century.7 Romano was also the first to attempt to follow the ships noted in 1567 by using other sources. His study, published in 1962, included a brief overview of the merchant marine between 1498 and the early seventeenth century. The most recent and significant contribution to the assessment of the gross tonnage in this period is the work of Jean-Claude Hocquet. The second volume of Hocquet’s monograph Le sel et la fortune de Venise (1978) contains three chapters relevant to this topic (11–13).8 Arguably, Hocquet’s greater contribution concerns the period after 1534/5, when state loans for ship construction were reinstated. In this place he presents a chronological review of the modifications introduced by the loan programme, continuing by drawing attention to the archival series entitled Capi del consiglio dei dieci, Mandati del camerlengo, which contains instuctions to the treasury of the Council of Ten to provide loans to private investors offering to build ships. This source enabled Hocquet to present a substantial analysis of the fluctuations in loan applications between 1535 and 1569, dividing this period into three phases with different rates of construction. This study – the most up-to-date analysis of the total gross tonnage of Venice’s merchant marine in the second half of the sixteenth century – has been reedited and republished in several new publications, most recently the first volume of Venise et le monopole du sel.9 To obtain a more accurate picture of sixteenth-century shipping, one would have to reconstruct the merchant marine in the category of vessels of over 240 tons (400 botti), including those built and operated in Venice’s overseas territories. Using extensive sources containing scattered and fragmented data, I have been able to assemble nine ship lists for the years 1480–1558 at about ten-year intervals, each presenting a snapshot of this sector of the merchant fleet. Clearly, these snapshots ignore the developments that took place in the intermediate years, therefore do not pretend to represent 6 Tenenti, Naufrages, corsaires et assurances maritimes, p. 567, based on: MCC, DDR, bus. 271, f. 46v (1605). 7 Romano, ‘La marine marchande’, pp. 33–68. 8 Hocquet, Voiliers et commerce, pp. 489–97; 520–35; 551–63; 565–72; 572–91. 9 Idem, Venise et le monopole, I, chapters 10–12.

appendix a

365

trends of an entire decade. For the present estimates, the categories used by Frederic C. Lane and Jean-Claude Hocquet were adopted; namely, navi grosse are regarded as ships of over 1,000 botti (600 tons), and the only round ships that were ‘counted’ are those of over 400 botti (240 tons). I have also estimated the gross tonnage of another category – that of medium-sized vessels of over 120 botti (72 tons) – but so far only for the year 1499. As noted, the information provided by Sanuto on vessel movements during the war with the Ottomans represents a unique opportunity to assess the merchant marine with this category included; such an attempt, however, is considerably more challenging for other periods. An assessment of the multitude of smaller-sized vessels – say, of less than 72 tons – active in Venice and its overseas colonies, is beyond the scope of this research.10 To give an accurate estimate of the number of galleys afloat, I used the registers of the Senato, Deliberazioni, Incanti di galere. The contracts refer to the actual vessels that were auctioned. Occasionally, the auctioneers replaced their galleys with better ones, and such replacements were noted at the end of the contract along with the date of arrival. Thus, this source gives a fairly accurate account of all the merchant galleys that were employed at any given time. The gap in the coverage, between 1497 and 1524 – the missing Register III – can be completed from other sources: First, the archival item ASVe, Avogaria di Comun, Prove di età per patroni di galere e altre cariche, reg. 179, which contain the lists of companies that auctioned the galleys between 1495 and 1529. A systematic record of the galley voyages between 1495 and 1569 using this, as well as other, sources is presented by Claire Judde de Larivière.11 Each one of the following nine ship lists is divided into several parts: the first is an attempt to include all round ships, merchant galleys, and other sailing vessels of over 240 tons that were operative at that specific point in time. The second includes vessels that were excluded from the first part for various reasons. For instance, when suspected to be smaller than 240 tons, or when their existence in that specific point in time is doubtful. This part, however, does not give a full list of all medium-sized vessels that were afloat in that instance – their number was considerably higher. 10 11

The sources tend to give much more attention to the big tonnage: Tucci, ‘La storiografia marittima’, p. 166. This includes, for example, the list of great galleys built in the Arsenal between 1496 and 1505, as well as the number of galleys in the Arsenal between 1504–91: Lane, Navires et constructeurs, p. 229 Table H: ‘Grandes galères construites à l’Arsenale par différents maîtres (1496–1505)’, p. 230 Table I: ‘Nombre de galères à l’Arsenal (1504–1591)’; Meanwhile, the gross tonnage of the merchant galleys: Romano, ‘Aspetti economici degli armamenti navali’, pp. 49–52. On the frequency and quantity of voyages per year: Vivanti and Tenenti, ‘Le film’, pp. 83–86. Claire Judde de Larivière presents a list of galleys that sailed in convoys between 1495 and 1569: Judde de Larivière, Naviguer, commercer, gouverner, pp. 63–64, 311–19 Appendix: Les convois de galères publiques (1495–1569).

366

appendix a

The identification of the ships has mainly been based according to their owners or captains. Regardless of the christening ceremony, Venetian ships were nicknamed after the name of their principle owner/s or that of the captain, whereas the definite article was changed to the feminine form. Nicknames for ships, such as the Foscara or Malipiera, were added when specifically stated. Round ships and medium-sized vessels were usually owned by several individuals. Unfortunately, a comprehensive list of shareholders and the division of carats are rarely indicated in the sources. The captains are mentioned as shareholders here if specifically stated. Nevertheless, the tendency throughout this period was to turn captains into commercial partners to secure their involvement in the enterprise. Although the following lists contain many noblemen (or so it is assumed) that captained merchant vessels, this function was often entrusted to non-noble citizens or subjects of Venice. The participation of commoners in the ownership of round ships and the auctioning of the galleys was also customary throughout this period, but their identity was overshadowed by their partners from the higher social class. The word nave stands for round ships of 400 botti and above. The word navilio is used here as a generic term to describe any type of vessel that is smaller. Other typologies, such as caravella, maran, galion are used if explicitly stated in the sources. Notwithstanding this classification, vessels varied in shape and style and were occasionally ranked differently. The rating represents an estimate of the overall capacity below decks in botti, as was indicated in the sources. The margin of error in all rounded figures could be considerably high. Still, the numbers offer a general impression of the size of a ship in comparison with others. When different estimates concerning capacity were indicated for the same ship, the one that seems more reliable has been adopted, and if not applicable, the smaller one; the logic behind this method is explained in the comments. Quite often, no rating was found and the capacity was estimated on the basis of other variables, such as the quantity of cargo, and if not available (or partial), by the characteristics of the ships, its contracts and destinations. The remuneration for the retention of a ship in port is also an important indicator, and so is the identity of the owners and captains; it is assumed, for example, that a captain of round ships continued to work on vessels of the same rank. The equivalent of one botte = 10 stara of wheat is used here.12 In certain cases the capacity was determined according to other types of cargo. These considerations are discussed on a case-by-case basis in the comments. The estimates are then converted to metric tons (or tonnes, the same as deadweight tonnage). I follow Lane’s estimation of the botte as equal to 0.6 ton, which seems to be more appropriate to the fifteenth and first half of the sixteenth century, rather than the 12 Stara was a unit of volume. The botte is repeatedly equated with 10 stara of grain (1 staio equals 83.3 litres): Lane, Navires et constructeurs, pp. 239–43.

367

appendix a

one proposed by Ugo Tucci (and adopted by Hocquet) of 0.8 ton, which would have given higher results.13 With respect to the merchant galleys, those employed along the great trading voyages were all of the one large design. Smaller models, such as the galleys to Romania, disappeared from the auctioning in late fifteenth century. In the years preceding 1481 the capacity of the galleys reached a climax of 500 to 600 milliaria. Thus, on 20 January of that year the Senate established a maximum of 450 milliaria (about 215 tons) below deck to restrain the shipbuilders.14 The galleys legally carried additional 20–40 tons of merchandise above deck and in other compartments.15 In 1520 it was necessary to restrain the galley size again, and the maximum length was set to 132.5 piedi allowing capacity of circa 450 milliaria.16 For the following estimates, I used an average of 240 tons (about 500 milliaria) per galley.

Editorial Marks:

& & bros. & co. prev. 600 > 600 c. 600 est. 600

co-owned / in partnership with e Fratelli e soci / e company Previously known by a different name / owned by a different person Rounded measurement of capacity as it appears in the sources Larger (or smaller) than, based on an indication that appears in the sources An average of several ratings, or a conversion from other measurements Based on my own estimate

1 1480 Note on the sources: this list presents a snapshot of the merchant marine between the months of July and December 1480 in all categories of over 240 tons. The findings are primarily based on the series Procuratori di San Marco:

13 Idem, Venice, A Maritime Republic, pp. 479–80. 14 ASVe, SM, reg. 8, f. 115v; Malipiero, Annali veneti, p. 619; Sanuto, Le vite dei Dogi (1474–94), I, p. 181. 15 Lane, Navires et Constructeurs, pp. 14, 222–23 (Table C). 16 ASVe, SM, reg. 19, f. 139r (30 March 1520); cf. Lane, Venice, A Maritime Republic, p. 338.

368

appendix a

– Misti, Commissaria di Girolamo q. Moise Venier, bus. 3, fascc. VIII: ‘7 lettere commerciali di Antonio Soranzo al Girolamo di Moise Venier da Modon’, XVI: ‘lettere di Antonio Soranzo da Modone a Girolamo Venier in Venezia, 1480, 3 gennaio– 1482, luglio’. – Misti, commissaria di Michele q. Filippo Foscari, bus. 41, fascc. IX: ‘contrati navali, 1472–1507’, XI: ‘contrati di assicurazione navale, 1481–1506’; ibid., bus. 43, fasc. XXIII: ‘lettere a Michele Foscari, 1472–1506’; ibid., bus. 44, fasc. XXXIII: ‘libretti di conto a Venetia e Alessandria 1472–1510’, ‘conto di messer Michele Foscari (1474–83)’, ‘libretto della segurtade (1479–1504)’. – Misti, commissaria di Alvise q. Francesco Baseggio, bus. 116, fascc. VII: ‘contratti di assicurazione (1470–83)’, VIII: ‘lettere di cambio, molte in Londra (1475–85)’, IX: ‘contratti commerciali (1445–81)’, X: ‘dichiarazioni di debito e di guadagna’, XIII: ‘fatture relativi a merci etc.’; ibid., bus. 117, fascc. XVI: ‘atti società con Polo Caroldo’, XVIII: ‘materiali varie’. – Misti, carte Piero q. Paolo Morosini, bus. 128, fasc. II: ‘5 lettere di Girolamo Contarini da Aleppo (1483)’. – Misti, carte Tommaso e Angelo Malipiero, bus. 161, fasc. VII: ‘note di conto varie (1472–1507)’. – Misti, carte Valiero Valier, bus. 170a, fasc. ‘Lettere a Valerio Valier a Costantinopoli, di Antonio Valier q. Ottaviano, Benetto Valier q. Antonio, Clara Valier’. – De Citra, carte Cesari (di), Biaggio q. Francesco q. Biaggio, bus. 147, fasc. ‘Lettere’. – De Citra, carte Marino q. Domenico Morosini, bus. 197, fascc: ‘conti varie polizze etc.’, ‘lettere da Aleppo (1482–91)’. Other sources: Serenissima Signoria, reg. 164; Collegio, subseries Notatorio, regg. 13, 14, Secreta, Commissioni, reg. 1; Senato, Deliberazioni, subseries Terra, reg. 7, Mar, regg. 11–14; ASVe, Consiglio di dieci, Misti, reg. 24; Provveditori e patroni all’Arsenal, reg. 6; Provveditori al sal, bus. 59. The judicial series Giudici di petizion, Sentenze a giustizia, regg. 172–73, 176, 178, 182, 187–88, 190, 195, 205; Avogaria di Comun, Miscellanea civile e penale, Raspe, regg. 3654–57. The collection of commercial letters in Miscellanea Gregolin, bus. 8 (the correspondence of Marco di Hieronimo Bembo in Pera); Miscellanea di carte non appartenenti ad alcun archivio, bus. 29 (the letters of the same Bembo after his return to Venice and until his death on 6 September 1484, and responses written by members of the trading company). Printed sources and studies: Marino Sanuto Le vite dei dogi (1474–94), 2 vols., Domenico Malipiero, Annali veneti (attributed to Piero Dolfin), Girolamo Priuli, I diarii. Appendix 2 in Nehlsen-von Stryk, L’assicurazione marittima, pp. 500–24, is a useful reference for the collection of insurance policies that are found in the abovementioned commisarie of Basegio and Foscari. The data on the galleys: ASVe, Senato, Deliberazioni, Incanti di galere. Register I. The data on the navi di comun, cf. Lane, ‘Venetian Shipping’, p. 29 cit. 2–3; idem, Navires et constructeurs, p. 265 Appendix VII. See also: Arbel, Venetian Letters, p. 118.

appendix a

1.1

369

1480(a): Ships Afloat c. July–December

No. Ships’ info

Botti

1 2 3

c. 1,200 c. 1,200 1,500

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

Nave di Comun: authorized in 1475 and completed in 1476. Nave di Comun: same as the above. Nave Dragana: of Zorzi Dragan & Melchior Trivisan q. Polo & co., captained by the former. Nave Muazza: of Daniel Muazzo q. Piero, captained by Nicolò di Matteo. Nave Malipiera: of Leonardo Malipiero q. Tommaso & co., captained by Matteo dalla Torre. Nave Landa: owned and captained by Piero Lando q. Zuane. Nave Trivisana: of Francesco and Angelo Trivisan, captained by Polonio Massa. Nave Bona: of Piero Bon q. Otto & co., captained by Nadal Dandolo. Nave Manolessa: of Jacomo, Marco, Zuane and Nicolò di Piero Manolesso, captained by Nicolò. Nave Cocca: of Marino Cocco q. Andrea, captained by Andrea Cheba. Nave Bemba: of Jacomo and Bernardo di Piero (son of Andrea dalle navi) Bembo, captained by Hieronimo di Vido. Nave: of Francesco Bonaver & Hieronimo di Jacomo Morosini & Alvise and Lorenzo Priuli, captained by the former. Nave: owned and captained by Francesco Bon. Nave Galimberta: of Domenico Galimberto & Roberto di Priuli, captained by the former. Nave Veniera di Candia: of a certain Venier & Jacomo Polani q. Alvise, captained by Nicolò Barbeta. Nave Marcela (e Trivisana?): of Sebastiano Marcello q. Antonio & co., captained by Luca di Pucheo. Nave: of Carlo di Battista Contarini, captained by Francesco Sandro. Nave Pesara: of Nicolò di Piero da ca’ Pesaro da Londra & bros., captained by Michele di Zupane. Nave: owned and captained by the brothers Alvise and Zuane di Pace. Nave: of Marino and Nicolò da Canal q. Bartolomeo, captained by Bartolomeo Cortellano. Maran Brocheta: of Zuane dal Cortivo q. Stefano, Hieronimo Abramo & Jacomo Brocheta, captained by the latter.

> 1,000 > 800 800 800 700 700 c. 600 est. 600 est. 600 est. 600 500 500 c. 500 c. 500 c. 450 > 400 > 400 400

370 1.1

appendix a

1480(a): Ships Afloat c. July–December (cont.)

No. Ships’ info

Botti

22

est. 400

23 24 25 26 27 28 29

Nave: of Donado di Bernardo & Marco di Hieronimo Bembo, captained by the former. Nave: of Nicolò di Piero da ca’ Pesaro da Londra & bros. & Hieronimo da Leze, captained by Lorenzo Cadena. Nave: owned and captained by Zuane di Nicolò. Nave (Foscara?): of Francesco and Michele di Filippo Foscari, captained by Daniel di Hieronimo Copo. Nave: of Hieronimo di Andrea Tiepolo and Zuane di Stefano dal Cortivo, captained by Michele di Zuane. Nave: captained by Hieronimo Caroldo. Nave: captained by Nicolò di Ferigo Arimondo. Nave: captained by Luca da Pozzo. Total Capacity

1.2

est. 400 est. 400 est. 400 est. 400 est. 400 est. 400 est. 400

17,950 botti (10,770 tons)

1480(b): Excluded

No. Ships’ info

Botti

30 31 32

1,800 500 est. 500

33 34 35

Nave Calafata: of Zuane Calafato q. Manoli dalla Canea. Nave: owned and captained by Marco dalle Aste. Nave Loredana: of Alvise Loredan q. Polo, captained by Domenico Cadena. Nave or navilio: of Marco Loredan q. Francesco, captained by Nicolò di Michiel. Nave Soranza: of Antonio and Alvise Soranzo q. Benedetto, captained by the latter. Nave Vergaza: from Candia, captained by Constantino Soreto (or Sorento).

c. 350 300 300

appendix a

1.2

1480(b): Excluded (cont.)

No. Ships’ info 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59

371

Nave or navilio: of Alessandro Priuli q. Lorenzo, captained by Zorzi di Piero Cimera. Nave or navilio: of Stefano and Alvise Pulese, captained by the former. Nave or navilio: owned and captained by Alvise Trivisan. Nave or navilio: captained (and owned?) by Hieronimo (di Zuane?) di Marin. Maran: captained by Jacomo di Stefani da Lesina. Nave or navilio: of Dardi (di Marino?) Zustinian. Nave or navilio: of Alvise di Priuli. Nave or navilio: captained by Francesco Tinto. Nave or navilio: captained by Todarin da Coron. Nave or navilio: owned and captained by Zorzi Paganino di Pagan. Nave or navilio: captained by Zuane di Dimitri Agustin. Nave or navilio: captained by Jacomo di Ricardo (Rizardo). Nave or navilio: captained by Nicolò di Liberal. Nave or navilio: captained by Piero (and Vido?) di Baldigaro. Maran: owned by Francesco Brocheta & Lenerando Trivisan, captained by Filippo di Francesco Brocheta. Nave or navilio: of Antonio Trivisan & Bernardo di Orsi & Zuane di Stefano dal Cortivo, captained by the former. Nave or navilio: captained by Zuane Cortese. Maran: owned and captained by Jacomo dalla Riva. Schierazo: owned and captained by Antonio Surian da Retimno. Nave or navilio: owned by Omobon di Triadan Gritti, captained by Piero di Costa. Nave or navilio: captained by Marco Gradelo dalla Canea. Maran: captained by Domenico Vivian. Nave or navilio: captained by Hieronimo Maurizio. Nave or navilio: captained by Antonio di Siviglia.

Botti c. 300 est. 300  150 > 150 > 150 > 150 > 150 > 150 > 150

appendix a

3.2

1499(b): Smaller Vessels Afloat c. July–August (cont.)

No.

Ships’ info

101 102 103

Caravella: of Francesco Barbeta, captained by Ruscho da Lesina. Caravella: of Alvise Gradenigo, captained by Lorenzo Zupana. Caravella: of Lodovico da Ponte, captained by Jacomo Racichy da Sibenico. Caravella: of Lodovico da Ponte, captained by Biasio di Pasqual da Cherso. Caravella or barzotto: of Luca Donà q. Andrea, captained by Gabriel da Monte. Schierazo: of Fantino di Francesco Malipiero, captained by Domenico di Vetor da Venezia. Caravella or schierazo: of Dardi Moro, captained by Antonio Barbo da Venezia. Caravella: of Sagredi. Caravella: of Marco di Jacomo Berengo, captained by Fiorio di Maria da Corzula. Caravella: captained by Stefano di Polo. Caravella: captained Rado da Cattaro. Caravella: captained by Martin di Antonio. Caravella: captained by Tommaso da Sibenico. Maran: captained by Sebastiano di Franceschi. Marciliana. Grippo: of Dimitri Zaleti da Corfu. Caravella: of Nicolò da Mulla & son Zuane. Marciliana: of Zaneto da Muran. Barzotto: of Memi. Brigantine: commissioned and captained by Andrea Lanza, the castellan of Parga. Caravella: of a certain messer Zustinian. Maran di marmi: captained by Isepo di Zuane. Naveta: of Corner dalla Episcopia in Cyprus, captained by Francesco Zane. Caravella: of Matteo Alberto, captained by his son Piero. Navilio: of Bernardino Jova, captained by Todaro Vassalo. Navilio: of Piero and Zuane Pachaluco, captained by Antonio Caretielli. Caravella: owned and captained by Jacomo da Mosto.

104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114* 115* 116* 117* 118* 119* 120* 121* 122* 123* 124* 125* 126* 127*

399

Botti > 150 > 150 > 150 > 150 > 150 > 150 > 150 > 150 > 150 > 150 > 150 > 150 > 150 > 150 > 150 > 150 > 150 > 150 > 150 > 150 > 150 > 150 > 150 > 150 > 150 > 150 > 150

400

appendix a

3.2

1499(b): Smaller Vessels Afloat c. July–August (cont.)

No.

Ships’ info

128 129 130

Nave: a second ship commissioned by Abriano Monovassi. 130 Grippo: of Hieronimo Malipiero, captained by Ambroxin Zenovese. > 120 19 Grippi and schierazi: originated from Corfu. They are calculated > 2,280 according to 120 botti per vessel.

Botti

Total capacity (150–400 botti)  18,710 botti (11,226 tons)

3.3

1499(c): Excluded

No.

Ships’ info

131* 132* 133* 134* 135*

Nave Premarina: captained by Luca Premarin. Nave di salumi. Nave or barzotto Veniera: of Domenico di Angelo Venier da Candia. Nave: of Alvise Moschatello & relatives. Schierazo: of Piero and Zorzi Coresi, captained by Nicolò da Negroponte. Caravella: of Matteo Vizamano. Several navili and a nave: originated from Cyprus. Barze di Comun: under construction. Barze di Comun: under construction.

136 137* 138* 139*

Botti 500 c. 400 c. 250 > 150 100 60 X > 1,000 > 1,000

Comments: (1)  barza di Comun Alvisa of 2,500 botti and above, commissioned by Cosma Pasqualigo q. Polo and captained by his son Vincenzo. This was the flagship used by Alvise Marcello, capitanio delle navi. (2)  Barza di Comun Armera ( fu Capitania) of 2,000 botti, captained by Alban d’Armer. It was burnt out in Zonchio. (3) Pandora (also known as Rosetta), authorized as a ship of 1,200 botti under decks, but rated 2,000 and 3,000 botti during the war. It was built by the Arsenal and launched probably in 1489 (1490, n.1). In 1497, it was decommissioned in Poveglia (Malamocco), and sold in an auction to private entrepreneurs for 1,000 ducats. The new owners, Piero di Nicolò da Ca’ Pesaro da Londra and Alvise Pisani q. Francesco dal Banco, conducted repairs and replaced the masts and riggings. The serviced Pandora rated 2,200– 2,300 botti, captained by Alvise Trivisan, departed to England via Crete in 1498. Being already aged and after three careenings, the ship dispensed with part of the cargo to

appendix a

401

prevent excessive pressure on the beams and overloading. The Pandora returned to Venice in May 1499 and was commissioned to the armada for four months under Stefano di Antonio Ottobon. The ship arrived in Corfu in early June, and eventually destroyed by fire in Zonchio in August 1499: cf. Lane, Navires et constructeurs, p. 265 Appendix VII . (4) Barza di Comun Mora ( fu Pasqualiga) of 2,000 botti, captained by Sebastiano di Damian Moro, and previously by Daniel di Vetor Pasqualigo. It was careened in Pola and commissioned in August 1499. Nine months later, the Mora was already in bad condition and practically sinking. It was eventually decommissioned in January 1501, returning to Venice in April. (5)  Nave Marcella owned by Sebastiano Marcello q. Antonio, joined the armada on 27 July. The new captain, Andrea Contarini q. Pandolfo was appointed in October 1500. It was decommissioned and already half-submerged in April 1503, aged eight. See this ship’s biography and itinerary. (6) Nave Ruziera owned by Piero Ruzier da Candia (1490, n.62). The rating of the ship in 1496 was 1,200 botti (based on a Senate’s decree). During wartime the ship was rated differently: Domenico Malipiero, 1,500 botti; Piero Dolfin, 1,200 botti; and Marino Sanuto, 1,000 botti. In 1499 the Ruziera was detained in La Canea. Piero’s son Francesco was indicated as captain and shareholder between 1500 and 1501. The ship was probably out of commission in 1503. (7)  Nave Bernarda of 800 botti owned by Filippo, Francesco and Zacaria Bernardo q. Dandolo dalle nave. The brothers lost their former Bernarda off Negroponte in 1496 (1490, n.22). Shortly after, on 10 March 1497 they were granted a loan to build a ship. The new Bernarda participated in the muda to Syria in March 1499. After some complications in Syria it arrived in Cyprus in May, and was accidentally detained the entire summer. On 16 September the Cypriot governor was instructed to allow the ships to proceed in a convoy. The Bernarda participated in the muda to Syria again in March 1500, arriving in Tripoli in early June and detained again in Cyprus shortly after. It was then decided to commission the ship to the armada. The convoy left for Crete, where they loaded supplies and extra men, and arrived in Zante to join the rest of the fleet on 15 July. The Bernarda is found in the lists of attacking ships on 18 and 27 August but did not take an active part in the Battle of Zonchio. After the war, the Bernarda continued to be employed in the mude to Syria. (8)  Nave Malipiera ( fu Mema) of 800 botti owned by Michele (di Alessandro?) Malipiero da San Samuel (Barbaro, Arbori, IV, p. 391). The Malipiera was commissioned to the armada in June 1499 and set sail in July under the command of Domenico Bianco. It was commissioned again in 1500, but the Collegio insisted that the captain be replaced. Newly appointed Francesco Felician set sail from Venice at the end of May and served until March 1501. (9) Nave Malipiera of 600 botti owned by Alvise and Piero Malipiero q. Stefano, Angelo and Nicolò Malipiero q. Tommaso and Tommaso Duodo (citizen). Built before June 1494, it set sail to England and Flanders in 1495, and twice to Le Marche and Alexandria in 1496, and probably was one of the two ships to sail to Syria in 1497 (Sanuto, I diarii, I, 739–40). The Malipiera was commissioned to the armada in

402

appendix a

April 1499 and again in the following year and until March 1501, being already halfsubmerged. It was then repaired and participated in the muda to Syria in September 1501, and probably again in 1502. In that instance, Tommaso Duodo was accused of contraband but was found not guilty. The ship was captained by Marco Bigarelli the following year. Returning from Syria it was shipwrecked in the Ionian Sea off Kythira. Backed with state loans, the company built a new ship in February 1504. (10)  Nave Zustiniana of 700 botti owned by Benedetto Zustinian q. Pangrati. Built in 1490 (1490, n.56). Benedetto Zustinian was once described as a fast builder, who was willing to pay his workers higher rates to enhance delivery. This ship was already surveyed in March 1491 and set sail on its maiden voyage to England in June. Captained by Alvise Trivisan, the ship was employed in western Mediterranean waters in the early 1490s. In 1496 it returned from Ibiza with a cargo of salt. In 1498 the Zustiniana was leased in Genoa to carry the Venetian ambassador Zuane Badoer to Spain. It was commissioned to the armada on 5 May 1499, captained by Zuane dalla Riva. In June 1500 the ship was commissioned again under the command of Simon di Alberto. Soon it was discovered that the hull was leaking badly, however. Being now barely fit for navigation, it was decommissioned and continued to Fraschia in Crete. The provisory Council of Twelve decided to discharge the ship and wait for further instructions from the owners. The Zustiniana was probably dismantled shortly after. During the last two years of its existence, the Zustiniana was rated as a ship of 700 botti several times. If this was the case, the Zustiniana did not comply with the preconditions for a bounty reinstated on 1 September 1490. (11) Nave Lesignana of 700 botti owned by Matteo da Lesina, his son Piero, and by Jacomo di Suino da Dulcigno. In February 1498, it returned from Barbaria loaded with wheat. It joined the armada in July 1499 and again in 1500. (12*) Nave of 600 to 700 botti owned by Francesco Malipiero q. Perazzo & bros. in partnership with Tommaso Contarini & co., captained by Antonio di Stefano (1499). The ship was captained by Francesco’s brothers Marco on other occasions. In May 1499, while being underway to Catalonia with timber, it was called back from Sicily. The ship was consumed by fire in the armada. (13) Nave of 600 botti of Matteo di Tommaso, captained by Tommaso di Matteo da Lesina. According to Marino Sanuto, the ship was detained in Modon on 8 June 1499. No other records of this ship were found. It has been suggested that the diarist erred by mentioning the ship of Piero and Matteo da Lesina twice (n.11). (14) Nave Cocca of 600 botti owned by Antonio Cocco q. Francesco, captained by Fantino di Ludovico Memo. After a technical fault was discovered, the Cocca was discharged to conduct some repairs in Modon. It eventually arrived in Venice but was shipwrecked outside the Lido in November 1499. (15) Nave Gradeniga (Brocheta) of 600 botti owned by Francesco Gradenigo q. Polo, Andrea Paradiso and Filippo Brocheta q. Francesco. The latter captained the ship as well. It was caught in the crossfire and sank in August 1499. At least one of the shareholders Andrea Paradiso was bankrupted. (16) Nave Grimana of 600 botti owned by Alvise and Hieronimo Grimani

appendix a

403

q. Bernardo, Domenico and Angelo Contarini, and Andrea di Vivian, who also captained the ship. Grimana was commissioned in May 1499, and again between 1500 and 1501. (17) Nave Soranza of 600 botti owned by Andrea and Alvise Soranzo q. Benedetto & bros., captained by Francesco Tarlado. Shipping was the family’s business at least since the 1480s. The Soranza was captured in August 1501 in the vicinity of Otranto. Supported with state loans, Alvise launched a new ship in 1504. Unfortunately, this one was consumed by flames in front of the Palazzo Ducal shortly afterward. This vessel was rated 400 botti: Malipiero, Annali veneti, p. 166, for or a less plausible figure of 700 botti: Dolfin, Annali veneti, IV, p. 130. (18) Nave di Donati of 600 botti owned by Luca Donà q. Andrea, (his uncle?) Bernardo Donà, and Martin da Cherso. The latter captained the ship. It participated in the armada between June and August 1499, and carried wheat from Sicily in 1501: Barbaro, Arbori, III, p. 313. (19) Nave Zustiniana of 600 botti owned by Marco Zustinian q. Jacomo, captained by Francesco Vassalo. In 1499 it was leased by pilgrims for a voyage to the Holy Land but was eventually requisitioned. The Zustiniana (not to be confused with that of Benedetto, n.10) was included in the list of attacking ships. It was commissioned again in June 1500, under the command of Jacomo Vesentin. After the war, the Zustiniana resumed its former business as a pilgrim ship. Returning from Cyprus laden with barley, it sank in the vicinity of Rhodes in July 1509: Sanuto, I diarii, VI, 11; ibid., VII, 188; ibid., IX, 234. (20)  Nave Malipiera of 600 botti (and according to another indication of 400 botti) owned by Francesco Malipiero q. Perazzo & bros., captained by Michele di Stefano (n.20). This ship was detained in Cyprus in April 1499. In 1500 it participated in the muda to Syria but was detained once again. (21) Nave Mosta of 550–600 botti owned by Bortolo and Andrea di Jacomo da Mosto, captained by Zuane di Piero (1499) and Marco Remer (1500). The Mosta was detained in Cyprus in 1499 but commissioned to the fleet in the following year. It participated in the battle on Cephalonia. (22) Nave Barbariga (previously known as the Pasqualiga of Cosma and Vetor) of 600 botti, owned by Gabriel (and Zuane?) di Antonio Barbarigo. It was shipwrecked in the Levant in 1503. (23*) Nave of 600 botti captained (and owned?) by Piero Pasin. The ship was decommissioned from the fleet in 1500, after being practically half-submerged. (24*) Nave Manolessa owned by Jacomo Manolesso q. Piero, captained by Piero Banba. In 1499 the Manolessa was employed in the western Mediterranean. It loaded salt in Ibiza and arrived in Naples. It was commissioned relatively late, on 14 August 1499. It was later leased to carry ammunition to Candia and continued to Cyprus. See a petition by Manolesso concerning the wreck of their previous ship: SM, reg. 12, f. 160v. (25*) Nave Malipiera: of Polo di Jacomo Malipiero & bros. was one of the muda ships to Syria, it returned to Venice in April 1500. In this instance, the captain Alvise di Zuane skipped Modon despite orders and was sentenced by the avogadori di Comun. I was unable to find any previous indications of this ship, nevertheless, it was probably afloat around late 1499. (26)  Nave of 500 botti owned by Sebastiano di Hieronimo Bernardo. (27)  Nave of

404

appendix a

500 botti owned by Tadio di Nicolò Contarini, detained in Cyprus. It was confined in Brindisi afterwards. (28) Nave Vendramina of 500 botti owned by Leonardo di Luca Vendramin. In 1499 the Senate considered commissioning the ship to the fleet, on condition that Leonardo Vendramin would settle his debt in the office of the rason nuove. Failing to do so, Leonardo attempted to sell his ship to Alvise Zorzi. The deal fell through, and the Vendramina was still in Venice on 14 August 1499. In this instance it was rated 4,000 stara with 28 pieces of artillery. Vendramin’s debt was voted on in the Grand Council in May 1501, and in the Senate in December. Shortly after, in 1502 Leonardo died: Barbaro, Arbori, VII, pp. 33, 199. (29) Nave of 500 botti of Piero Duodo q. Luca. The intention to commission the ship on 30 July was probably averted, as it was still in Venice on 14 August. In this instance it was rated 300 botti. It was requisitioned in 1500. (30*)  Nave owned by Hieronimo Zorzi cavalier and Cosma Pasqualigo q. Polo, with a carrying capacity of at least 4,652 stara of wheat. The earliest indication found is dated August 1500. (31) Nave of 450 botti (and according to a different rating 300 botti) owned by Manoli Xodactilo from Crete, captained by Zuane Valier. It was detained in Candia in 1499 and requisitioned for the armada in 1500. (32) Nave or barzotto Priula of circa 450 botti owned by Alvise and Benedetto di Francesco (il procurator) Priuli. Other brothers that were mentioned in the context of this ship are Matteo (1500), Marco (1500), and Zuan-Francesco (1500–3). It was requisitioned in 1499. The Priula sailed to Syria in early 1500 and skipped the obligatory stop of Modon on the return leg. Captain Atanasio di Priuli (and according to a different version Christoforo di Atanasio) was sentenced by the avogaria. The Priula was commissioned again, this time under the command of Polo Bianco. It participated in the battle of Cephalonia and was burnt by a corsair in Trapani (Sicily) in 1506. (33) Belingier Pesara of Nicolò da Ca’ Pesaro q. Piero da Londra & co., captained by Zuane da Pesaro (1490, n.25). During the war, it remained idle in Brindisi. The same Nicolò was against removing the protective tariff on the transports of Cretan wine on foreign vessels: Sanuto, I diarii, II, 476–77. For the division of carats and reimbursement for the service in the armada in 1500: SM, reg. 17, f. 116v. (34) Nave Liona of 400 botti. It is assumed that the ship was owned by Stefano Lion and his son Hieronimo. During the 1490s the Liona was deployed between Venice and Crete (1490, n.17). (35) Nave or maran of 400 botti, captained by Stefano Schiavo. The same man captained a ship of 600 botti owned by Alvise Contarini q. Ferigo Minoto, which was captured and set on fire in Sicily in January 1499. He managed to return to Venice, where he remained the entire summer as the captain of a 400-botti ship. He set sail on 1 September with supplies. One year later Schiavo is reported in Crete loaded with cotton. At this stage it is impossible to determine who the shareholders of this ship were. (36*) Barzotto of 400 botti owned by the Coresi. The shipping enterprise of the Coresi family comprised of ships and smaller vessel. In 1499 the brothers Piero and Zorzi Coresi owned a barza or barzotto of 400 botti that did not take part of the armada. On 3 September 1499, this barzotto

appendix a

405

arrived in Zante from Constantinople, wherefrom it departed some 40 days earlier. In 1500 the Senate suspected that the barzotto would be requisitioned by the sultan, and the movements of Piero Coresi’s ship were restricted. Eventually, the vessel joined the fleet in August, captained by Nicolò di Candia Zusto. Another schierazo of the Coresi of 100 botti was employed in the armada in 1500. The Coresi owned at least one large round ship that stopped in Syria in June 1500. This ship was not commissioned to the fleet (1490, n.58). (37*) Maran of 400 botti armed in Modon. Following the arrival of the Cocca in Modon (n.14), the artillery and arms were discharged and used to arm a maran. It appears that this was the same maran that was sold by Benedetto Zustininan to the port of Modon (1490, n.24). (38) Navilio or maran of Alvise Contarini q. Ferigo Minoto. This vessel probably returned to Venice loaded with wheat in March 1499. It was then requisitioned for the armada and reported in Corfu in 1500. Contarini’s larger ship co-owned by Andrea Loredan q. Nicolò was captured by the corsair Navaro in Sicily in January 1499. Minoto was one of those who opposed the removal of the protective tariff on Cretan wine loaded by foreign ships: Sanuto, I diarii, II, 476–77, 508. (39*) Maran of Zuane dal Cortivo a Venetian citizen, commissioned to carry supplies for the armada but were still in Venice on 1 September. A certain maran captained by Antonio dalla Riva provided biscotti and ammunition to the armada in 1500. (40) Nave Semitecola owned by Benedetto, Galeazzo, Angelo, Jacomo and Zorzi di Zuane Semitecolo. It was detained in Modon on 27 July. During the war, this ship was rated 350 botti by Marino Sanuto. It was however rated 400 botti in the instance of its shipwreck in Curzola on 9 December 1504. A less plausible figure of 500 botti was indicated by Dolfin, Annali, IV, p. 130. (41)  Nave of Stefano and Tadio Contarini q. Bernardo detained in Venice in the summer and shipwrecked in 1500 in San Cataldo (Lecce). (42)  Caravella of 3,000 stara owned by a member of the Donà clan, captained by Antonio da Cherso. It was detained in Venice in July and August. (43) Maran of 3,000 stara and a crow’s nest, owned by a member of the Donà clan and captained by Jacomo Taraboto. It was detained in Venice in the summer. (44) Nave of Nicolò (di Andrea?) Querini was detained in Crete. (45) Nave of Jacomo di Rizardo was detained in Cyprus. (46) Nave Zuiba owned by Bortolo di Marco (cavalier) Contarini. His brothers were indicated in another instance. See also the reimbursement for service: ACMCP, bus. 3947, fasc. 13. (47) Nave of Piero Barbo & sons was detained in Modon on 8 May, and later destroyed by fire. (48) Nave captained by Francesco Cecilian. Detained. (49) Nave of Piero di Zuane Contarini dalle Malvasie & Cristofolo Moro, captained by Francesco Gallo, was detained in Venice the entire summer. In the following year it was captained by Gabriel de Monte. (50) Nave of Francesco Foscari q. Filippo il procurator, captained by Zuane Boza, was leased for Crete but detained in Venice at least until 3 September. (51) Nave captained by Francesco da Monte was detained in Venice in July and August. It was then leased for a voyage to Bari, to pick up the merchandise of the Captain General Antonio Grimani, with orders to join the fleet afterwards. This contract was

406

appendix a

eventually cancelled. In 1500 the vessel was leased to carry ammunition. (52) Caravella of 2,500 stara detained in Venice in the summer. It was then leased by Michele Foscari q. Filippo to carry wine: PSM, Misti, bus. 44a, fasc. XXX Conto G. This vessel was later captured. (53*) Barzotto of 250 botti, captained by Hieronimo di Nicolò Morosini, was commissioned to the armada in May 1500 and probably afloat in 1499. (54) Nave captained by Zuane Zustinian was detained in Venice in July and August. (55) Belingier. Out of commission in 1499, and still reported in the canal of San Marco in February 1500. (56) Detained in Modon on 4 June. (57) Detained in Candia. Domenico Venier’s ship of 500 botti was destroyed in Venice in Easter 1498 (1490, n.48). (58) Detained in Candia. (59–63) Caravelle of 2,000 stara were detained in Venice in July and August. (64) Schierazo of 2,000 stara. This vessel is described as a barzotto the following year. It was detained in Venice in 1499. (65–67) Caravelle of 2,000 stara. Detained in Venice. (68) Caravella of 2,000 stara. Detained in Venice in July and August. In 1500 the same Fachin captained a naveta. (69) Nave that was detained in Crete. The name of Camilo dalla Canea was indicated in 1499. Twenty years later, in 1520, the sons of Antonio Dandolo dalla Canea attested for the services of their father’s ship: Sanuto, I diarii, XXVIII, 419. (70–71)  Navi. Detained in La Canea. (72)  Nave ready to be launched. Detained in La Canea. Captain Bartholo Bondimier was later accused of contraband: ASVe, ACMCP, Raspe, reg. 3658, f. 198r. (73) Caravella of 2,000 stara. In 1498 Marco Foscolo’s ship of 300 botti was captured in Sicily. In 1500 he was the owner of a saeta as well. This caravella was commissioned in Venice in mid-July and joined the armada in August. (74)  Caravella of 1,500 stara; detained in Venice the entire summer. (75)  Caravella and another smaller one of undefined capacity were detained in Candia. (76) Nave of 300 botti from Crete was detained in port in 1499 and joined the armada in 1500. (77–79)  Detained in Candia. (81–81)  Detained in La Canea. (82– 83) Detained in Modon on 25 April. (84) Nave of Bernardino Loredan was detained and later consumed by fire. (85) Nave captained by Alessandro di Zuane Semitecolo. (86–87) Requisitioned. (88) Zustiniana of Alvise di Marco Zustinian & bros. Detained in Cyprus in April 1499 in July and August; no records of this vessel after 1499 were found. (89–90) Requisitioned. (91) Nave di noxele of Zuane di Marino Bragadino da Candia & son. The ship arrived in Alexandria with a cargo of chestnuts in June and returned to Napoli di Romania circa 31 July 1499. It was later commissioned to the armada and went up in flames. (92–95) Caravelle were requisitioned for the armada: SM, reg. 17, f. 49r. (96–97) Two caravelle from Dalmatia and another from Sicily (foreign), were commissioned and retained in Modon in late July. It seems that these are the two included in Sanuto’s list. (98) Caravella retained in armada. (99–113) These vessels were commissioned in Venice between 15 and 18 July and joined the armada in August. Some other particularities: (99–100) Two caravelle were employed in 1500 as well. (105)  Caravella or barzotto of Luca Donà q. Andrea, captained by Gabriel da Monte. At least four of the vessels in this list were owned by the family Donà. This one

appendix a

407

was set on fire by orders of the Captain General. (107) Caravella (also typed a schierazo) owned by Dardi Moro. It departed from Curzola on 3 August 1499 and again on another mission in 1500. It was shipwrecked in Lesina later that year. (108) Caravella owned by Sagredi, commissioned to the armada. It arrived in Curzola on 3 August and proceeded in a convoy with three local vessels which were armed in the island. See the caravella of Francesco Sagredo. (114*–115*) Maran and a marciliana leased to carry supplies for the armada in January 1501. (116*)  Grippo retained in the armada in January 1501. (117*)  Caravella mistakenly attacked by Venetian galleys in June 1500. (118*–119*) Marciliana of Zaneto da Muran, and a barzotto of Memi. These two vessels joined the armada on 9 August, supposedly to continue to Candia. The armed barzotto of Memi carried soldiers. Possibly, the same marciliana was damaged in a storm outside the port of Venice circa December 1500. (120*) Brigantine, commissioned and captained by Andrea Lanza, the castellan of Parga (Lanza’s father was a priest in Corfu). (121*)  Caravella of a certain Zustinian, destroyed in Zonchio on 11 August 1499. (122*) Maran captained by Isepo di Zuane. Usually employed in the shipping of marble and stones. In 1499 it was leased to supply biscuits to the fleet and sailed to Corfu and Otranto. Described as nave: Sanuto, I diarii, III, 833. (123*)  Naveta owned by Corner dalla Episcopia in Cyprus and possibly Ferigo di Fantino Corner. The vessel was reported in Famagusta in 1499. The ship arrived in Alexandria on May 1500 and was captured. (124*) Caravella owned by Matteo Alberto, detained in Modon: SM, reg. 17, f. 25v. (125*–126*) Two navili, the first of Bernardino Jova and the second of Piero and Zuane Pachaluco, both commissioned in February 1500. These two vessels were not included in Sanuto’s lists (July and August). Still, they were commissioned to the armada on 22 February 1499 and were probably afloat before. Bernadino Jova or Giava, a Venetian citizen, collaborated with the same captain in the following years. (127*) Caravella owned and captained by Jacomo da Mosto, leased to carry 45 miera of wine from Crete on 12 July. (128)  Nave, a second vessel commissioned by Abriano Monovassi; detained in La Canea. (129) Grippo of 1,200 stara, detained in Venice the entire summer. (130) 19 Grippi of various sizes originating in Corfu, which were commissioned to the armada or other patrol missions; they were indicated briefly by Sanuto. (131*) Nave Premarina of Luca Premarin, captured and held by the Ottomans during the war. (132*)  Nave di salumi. This vessel might also be a generic term to describe any craft employed along the route from Constantinople to Venice with a main cargo of conserved beef. (133*) Nave or barzotto Veniera owned by Domenico di Angelo Venier da Candia. Impounded by the Ottomans for the entire duration of the war. According to another version, this was in fact a naveta of 250 botti owned by Tommaso Michiel. Venier built a new ship in Candia in 1500. In July it was already in advanced stages of construction. (134*) nave of Alvise Moschatello. Captured and held by the Ottomans during the war. It is unclear whether it was later retrieved. (135*) Schierazo of 100 botti owned by the brothers Piero and Zorzi Coresi, served in

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the armada. (136)  Caravella: the capacity indicated is less than 120 botti, hence its exclusion from the overall estimate. It was retained in La Canea. (137*) Several navili and a nave originating from Cyprus. They arrived in Crete with biscotti and were sent to the armada in late July or August 1499 and were probably excluded from the attacking fleet. (138*–139*) Two barze di Comun were under construction at a shipyard in Sant’Antonio on 8 September 1499. The first was near completion, the second was launched not before December 1500.

4 1509 Note on the sources: a Senate’s decree 11 October 1509 imposed a war duty on shipowners based on their vessel’s capacity in botti and the appraisal of their rigging: Senato, Deliberazioni, Terra (ST), reg. 16, f. 153r. The competence was delegated to the provveditori al sal (PSal). The harbourmaster and the guards at the castelli were instructed to detain ships without proof of payment: PSal, bus. 63, reg. 7, f. 118v. The period of assessment was extended to eight days on 9 November. The salt commissioners were required to complete the stime of the rigging within fifteenth days, and sent the results to the Collegio: ST, reg. 16, f. 156v. Further provisions were taken on 25 November, and again in January 1510. Marino Sanuto covered the events: Sanuto, I diarii, IX, 244, 301, 303, 341, 448. The registry of shipowners who disbursed a duty, as well as, the surveys that were presented to the Collegio were probably lost. However, representatives of the Salt Office made house calls to remind shipowners to pay their duty. Indications of these house calls are found in busta 63, register 7: the first two lists dated 24 October 1509 contain the names of 9 and additional 5 shipowners (f. 119r); each one of the following two lists dated 23–24 November 1509 contain the names of 8 shipowners (f. 122r); another list dated 12 December 1509 contains the names of 12 shipowners that still had to settle their debt (ff. 123r–23v). Another important source, which was used to compile the following list, is the commercial letters directed to Zuan-Battista Merlini in Syria in 1509 and 1510. These letters are found in busta 12a of the archival series Miscellanea Gregolin (MG). The correspondence between the governors in Cyprus and the heads of the Council of Ten contains valuable information on marine traffic between Venice, Cyprus and Syria: Capi del consiglio di dieci, Lettere rettori, busta 288 (Cipro: 1493–1529). Other sources: Collegio, subseries Notatorio, regg. 15–18, Mandati di pagamento 1507–8, reg. 1, Secrete Commissioni, reg. 4; Senato, Deliberazioni, Mar, regg. 15–18; Consiglio di dieci, Misti, fils. 16–19, 23–25, 29–30, 32–33, 35, 37, 43; the diaries of Marino Sanuto vols. V–XIV. The following list comprises all ships of over 400 botti that were employed between October and December 1509. Several smaller vessels (150– 400 botti) were indicated below, without suggesting any estimate concerning the total in this category.

appendix a

4.1

409

1509(a): Ships Afloat c. October–December

No. Ships’ info

Botti

1

1,275

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Nave Nicolosa of Ludovico Nicolosi & Francesco Nicolosi & Francesco Benedetto, captained in rotations by Martino da Cherso (or Corso) & Zuane Vassalo. Nave Bernarda grossa (1507): of Filippo Bernardo q. Dandolo, captained by Nicolò di Alvise. Nave Priula: of Benedetto Priuli q. Francesco, captained by Polo Bianco. Nave Malipiera: of Alvise di Stefano (il procurator) Malipiero & Angelo di Tommaso Malipiero & Tommaso Duodo. Captained by the latter. Nave Pasqualiga: of Zuan-Alvise Pasqualigo & bros. q. Cosma il grande Nave Tarlada: of Piero di Francesco Duodo & Andrea Priuli q. Marco, captained by Francesco Tarlado. Nave Bernarda (1503): of Filippo, Francesco and Zacaria Bernardo q. Dandolo, captained by Hieronimo di Matteo. Nave Morosina: of Piero di Nicolò Morosini & bros. da San Zuane Nuovo, captained by Damian di Mariani. Nave Tiepola: of Hieronimo Tiepolo q. Andrea il conseglier, captained by his son Vincenzo. Nave Contarina: of Piero Contarini q. Zuane dalle Malvasie, captained by Zuane di Jacomo di Stefani. Nave Molina: of Marco Molino il conseglier & Domenico and Fantin Malipiero, captained by Nicolò Bianco. Nave Marcona: of Antonio Marconi, captained by Matteo Verga. Barzotto or nave Contarina: of Andrea Contarini q. Pandolfo & sons, captained by his son Alessandro. Nave Coresa: of Piero and Zorzi Coresi. Nave: captained by Nicolò di Lorenzo. Nave: of Piero Duodo q. Luca, captained by Piero Brocheta. Nave Vendramina: of Luca di Alvise Vendramin dal Banco. Nave Zustiniana: of Alvise Zustinian q. Marco & bros., captained by Dimitri Pelizer. Nave Malipiera: of Gasparo and Piero di Michele Malipiero & bros. Nave Malipiera: of Francesco Malipiero q. Perazzo & bros. Nave: of Luca Donato q. Andrea. Nave Coresa: of Piero and Zorzi Coresi.

1,154 1,100 1,090 900 900 800 800 750 > 600 600 c. 600 c. 600 c. 600