Using the Devil with Courtesy: Shakespeare and the Language of (Im)Politeness 3034323158, 9783034323154

Citation preview

li253

Linguistic Insights

Studies in Language and Communication

Bianca Del Villano

Using the Devil with Courtesy

Peter Lang

Shakespeare and the Language of (Im)Politeness

Using the Devil with Courtesy

Linguistic Insights Studies in Language and Communication Edited by Maurizio Gotti, University of Bergamo Volume 253

ADVISORY BOARD Vijay Bhatia (Hong Kong) David Crystal (Bangor) Konrad Ehlich (Berlin / München) Jan Engberg (Aarhus) Norman Fairclough (Lancaster) John Flowerdew (Hong Kong) Ken Hyland (Hong Kong) Roger Lass (Cape Town) Françoise Salager-Meyer (Mérida, Venezuela) Srikant Sarangi (Cardiff) Susan Šarc�evic� (Rijeka) Lawrence Solan (New York)

PETER LANG Bern • Berlin • Bruxelles • New York • Oxford • Warszawa • Wien

Bianca Del Villano

Using the Devil with Courtesy

Shakespeare and the Language of (Im)Politeness

PETER LANG Bern • Berlin • Bruxelles • New York • Oxford • Warszawa • Wien

Bibliographic information published by die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche National-bibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available on the Internet at ‹http://dnb.d-nb.de›. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data: A catalogue record for this book is available from The British Library, Great Britain Library of Congress Control Number: 2018949510

Financial Support of the Department of Literary, Linguistic and Comparative Studies – University of Naples “L’Orientale” ISSN 1424-8689 hb. ISBN 978-3-0343-2315-4 hb. ISBN 978-3-0343-2317-8 Epub DOI 10.3726/b14509

ISSN 2235-6371 eBook ISBN 978-3-0343-2316-1 eBook ISBN 978-3-0343-2318-5 Mobi

© Peter Lang AG, International Academic Publishers, Bern 2018 Wabernstrasse 40, CH-3007 Bern, Switzerland [email protected], www.peterlang.com All rights reserved. All parts of this publication are protected by copyright. Any utilisation outside the strict limits of the copyright law, without the permission of the publisher, is forbidden and liable to prosecution. This applies in particular to reproductions, translations, microfilming, and storage and processing in electronic retrieval systems.

I am one of those gentle ones that will use the devil himself with courtesy. (W. Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, 4. 2. 32–33)

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations............................................................................11 Acknowledgements..............................................................................13 Introduction..........................................................................................15 0.1 Talk, text and subjectivity – a pragmatic approach...............15 0.2 Linguistic methodology........................................................18 0.3 Outline of the book ..............................................................19 Chapter One:  Introducing (im)politeness............................................21 1. Defining the concepts of politeness and impoliteness..........21 1.1 Politeness: early studies........................................................25 1.2 A face-based model: Brown and Levinson...........................29 1.2.1 Positive and negative face............................................30 1.2.2 B&L’s politeness strategies..........................................32 1.3 Discursive approaches to politeness......................................38 1.4 A theory of impoliteness.......................................................43 1.4.1 Contextual factors, (non)-inherent meaning and conventionalisation...............................................47 Chapter Two:  (Im)politeness and the Early Modern period................53 2.1 Contextualising historical pragmatics and Early Modern (im)politeness .........................................................53 2.1.1 Historical events and newhistoricist perspectives........57 2.1.2 Subjectivity and the Renaissance................................62 2.1.3 Language and semiosis................................................64 2.2 Diachronic definitions of politeness terms and strategies ....67

2.2.1 Politeness terms from a diachronic perspective...........67 2.2.2 Politeness and language strategies from the Anglo-Saxon period to the 18th century.......................68 2.3 Politeness as a sociocultural practice....................................73 2.4 Second-order politeness and Shakespeare............................80 2.5 Method .................................................................................82 2.5.1 Politeness markers.......................................................82 2.5.2 Discernment vs strategic politeness.............................85 2.5.3 Sociological variables..................................................85 2.5.4 General procedure ......................................................86 Chapter Three:  Speaking daggers: (Im)polite strategies in Hamlet.......91 3.1 Routine courtesy: the forms of discernment politeness........91 3.1.1 Barnardo and Francisco...............................................92 3.1.2 King Claudius: introducing variable RF (reflexivity).......94 3.1.3 Powerful characters and variable A..............................98 3.1.4 The Gravedigger: from discernment to strategic (im)politeness..............................................102 3.2 Courtesy as ambition...........................................................105 3.2.1 The deadly politeness of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern .......................................................109 3.2.2 Rosencrantz and Guildenstern at work......................112 3.2.3 Playing a pipe............................................................116 3.3 Off-record Hamlet...............................................................122 3.3.1 The fishmonger: splitting words................................127 3.3.2 Switching positions...................................................130 3.4 Summary.............................................................................134 Chapter Four: The gendering of (im)politeness: The Taming of the Shrew............................................137 4.1 The Induction: (im)politeness and identity construction......139 4.2 Sly, the Lord........................................................................148 4.3 Katherina and Bianca: impoliteness vs obedience..............151 4.4 Katherina and Petruccio: introducing mock politeness.......158

8

4.5 The Taming.........................................................................166 4.6 Summary.............................................................................170 Conclusions:  The sense of (im)politeness.........................................173 References..........................................................................................177 Index..................................................................................................195

9

List of Abbreviations

A Affect variable B&L Brown and Levinson BR Bald on Record BRS Bald on Record Strategy CA Conversation Analysis CC Conversational Contract CP Cooperation Principle D Distance variable DA Discourse Analysis DM Discourse Marker DP Discernment Politeness DT Derogatory Term FTA Face Threatening Act H Hearer IBR Impolite Bald on Record IP Irony Principle NA Nominal Address (titles, first and last names) NI Negative Impoliteness NI1 Frighten NI2 Condescend, scorn, ridicule NI3 Invade the other’s space NI4 Explicitly associate the other with a negative aspect NI5 Put the other’s indebtness on record NP Negative Politeness N1 Be conventionally indirect N2 Question, hedge N3 Be pessimistic N4 Minimise the imposition N5 Give deference N6 Apologize N7 Impersonalise S and H N8 State the FTA as a general rule (to soften the offence) N9 Nominalise N10 Go on record as incurring a debt

OFF-R Off Record ON-R On Record P Power variable PA Pronominal Address (you/thou) PI Positive Impoliteness MP Mock politeness PI1 Ignore, snub the other PI2 Exclude the other from activity PI3 Dissociate from the others PI4 Be disinterested, unconcerned, unsympathetic PI5 Use inappropriate identity marker PI6 Use obscure or secretive language PI7 Seek disagreement PI8 Make the other feel uncomfortable PI9 Use taboo words PI10 Call the other names PM Politeness Markers PP Positive Politeness P1 Notice, attend to H (his interests, wants, needs, goods) P2 Exaggerate (interest, approval, sympathy with H) P3 Intensify interest to H P4 Use in-group identity markers P5 Seek agreement P6 Avoid disagreement P7 Assert common ground P8 Joke P9 Assert or presuppose S’s knowledge of and concern for H’s wants P10 Offer, promise P11 Be optimistic P12 Include both S and H in the activity P13 Give (or asks) reasons P14 Assume or assert reciprocity P15 Give gifts to H (goods, sympathy, understanding, cooperation) R Rank of imposition (riskiness) RF Reflexive variable S Speaker

12

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank all the colleagues, friends and scholars who have made the publication of Using the Devil with Courtesy possible. My first thanks go to Hugo Bowles: I would have never been able to tackle and finish this work had it not been for his help and encouragement, his revisions and suggestions. Thanks to the linguists, pragmatists and literary critics from whom this study has benefitted considerably: Jonathan Culpeper, John Douthwaite, Keir Elam, Giuliana Garzone, Daniela Guardamagna and Gabriella Mazzon for reading chapters or the entire manuscript, inspiring me with their comments and feedback, and for advising me on how to work on the boundary between linguistics and literature. Thanks also to Simonetta de Filippis who many years ago introduced me to the study of Shakespeare, a path I have never abandoned since, and to Giuseppe Balirano and Oriana Palusci for their help in the final phases of the publication of this book. Finally, thanks to my friends and family, and especially to my daughter Federica, to whom this book is dedicated.

Introduction

When Hamlet is about to meet Gertrude in the ‘closet scene’ to tell her how much he disapproves of her, he says: “I will speak daggers to her but use none” (3. 2. 386). This remark relies on a distinction between deeds and words, expressing an intention to hurt his mother without actually killing her. At the same time, the metaphor establishes a link between what Hamlet is saying and what he is doing, since it has a considerable effect on the interlocutor; indeed, at the end of the exchange, Gertrude repeats the metaphor, deploying the very same expression used by her son: “O speak to me no more! / These words like daggers enter in my ears. / No more, sweet Hamlet” (3. 4. 92–94). The painful effect of Hamlet’s words on Gertrude is conveyed through a bodily image (the ears) that gives an impression of physical pain. Hence, words have actually performed actions as if they were weapons (daggers). What is the nature of this linguistic performativity? In what ways can it be related to verbal (im)politeness? What does it reveal about the subjectivity underlying it? These questions, which arise at the interface of talk, behaviour and subjectivity within Renaissance culture, are the main focus of study in this book.

0.1 Talk, text and subjectivity – a pragmatic approach In order to address the key question of how to analyse such a complex network of interconnecting problems, we need to start from some general considerations about our perception and analysis of talk and text. As regards spoken language, interactive communication is usually experienced by speakers as a ‘natural’ act, needed to convey ideas and emotions, and to structure interpersonal relationships of various kinds. If the mechanisms underlying speech are almost unconscious in their practical realisation, the awareness that conversation is a linguistic

practice embedded at different levels in every cultural, social and subjective process is the basis on which the various branches of linguistics have developed since the 1960s. Sociology has played a role in this respect, particularly Goffman’s theory of face (1967) – the image that each person has of him/herself. This image is variously affected by encounters with others and becomes a site of negotiation between subjects, their ego and the culture to which they belong. In the interconnection between these elements, language has become a privileged arena of investigation, especially since the evolution of Austin’s theory of speech acts, which developed in the 1960s. Austin demonstrated that language not only tells us about the world, but also creates it by virtue of a performative force that allows words to do things. Since then, language performativity has become central to research on spoken interaction, in fields such as conversation analysis (CA) and discourse analysis (DA), which became increasingly interested in verbal interaction as the main site of the formation of subjectivity rather than simply of its expression. At the level of the text, after the spread of the poststructuralist methodology and of critical trends (newhistoricism, cultural materialism, cultural studies) aimed at exploring the political and ideological demands converging in or emerging from texts, the study of subjectivity, of language and of cultural contexts has been informed by the idea that every communicative event is ‘textualisable’ and that textuality is marked not only by the creation/expression of meanings but also by their interpretation and reception. Texts, therefore, should not only be understood as the product (form plus content) of the communicative event but also as a space informing and interconnecting – more or less creatively – elements such as the speaker, the hearer, the language and the context. The critical methodologies studying the interconnection between subjects, cultures and languages have been applied to texts both from a synchronic and a diachronic perspective. Diachronically, a long-standing debate on the need to historicise subjectivity has led to a focus on the Renaissance as a historical period in which a new sense of the Self emerged: the early modern subject felt entangled within a network of cultural and social forces still looking back at the medieval past, whilst starting to imagine and express a kind of premodern individuality, located at the interface between the feudal condition of being subjected to a

16

Power coming from above and the urge to claim a status as an active subject, endowed with a certain degree of agency and power coming from below and from within. As Greenblatt notably suggested in his seminal Renaissance Self-Fashioning (1980), the Renaissance is the moment at which human subjects started feeling remarkably unfree, constrained into identity-positions determined by the social systems in force, whence – one could assume – sprang a quest for an autonomous Self, detached (in the Cartesian sense) from the world. Among the reasons for the emergence of this urge towards self-determination were the dissemination of new forms of knowledge – tied to Protestantism and to the birth of scientific discourses – and an unprecedented social mobility, fuelled by the economical transformations that would later lead to the definitive rise of the middle classes. Though under the surveillance of the Monarchy, the potential for ascending the social ladder led to the radicalization of specific behaviours connected to the culture of courtesy. Far from being merely an ideal of perfect courtly behaviour, courtesy was a practice that influenced the positioning and recognition of individuals in society, through ways of speaking, of properly addressing others and of efficaciously presenting one’s opinions at court as well as in other contexts. The research hypothesis adopted in this book is that subjectivity, language and culture in the Renaissance are interconnected through courtesy. Indeed, this study conjectures that practising courtesy is one of the factors that favoured the emergence of the premodern subjectivity discussed above, inasmuch as verbal courtesy soon became strategic language, implied not only in the construction of one’s social role – and, through this social role, of one’s identity – but also in the interpretation of others at a time of religious persecutions and cultural unrest. More importantly, the strategic language used to fashion the self as a public persona may have had a role in triggering an unparalleled exploration of the territories of inwardness, harbouring intentions and motivations that, for political reasons, often had to be different from the words used. The differential between what was thought and what was said, alongside the obsession with the social image of the self are considered in this study as the basis on which specific forms of facework (in the Goffmanian sense) emerged, detectable particularly in the patterns of politeness and impoliteness employed by speakers.

17

Hence, this book examines Renaissance verbal courtesy and/as strategic language through a pragmatic methodology drawing on the theory of (im)politeness: on the one hand recalling the semantic evolution in current English of the word “courtesy” (and its opposite), whilst on the other adopting the theorisations and set of tools used to examine linguistic phenomena aimed at protecting or attacking people’s social image. This methodology, developed in the wake of Goffman’s development of the notion of ‘face’ (1967), Grice’s identification of the Cooperative Principle (1967) and Lakoff’s introduction of a Politeness Principle (1973), was coherently expressed among others by Brown and Levinson (1987) and Culpeper (2011), who will be the main reference points in this study. Given the diachronic/historical dimension of this research topic, the object of analysis is written language, since we obviously have no recordings of the natural language of the time; among the available genres, drama – and in particular the Shakespearean corpus – has been considered particularly valuable for its conversational structure based on spoken face-to-face interaction. Specifically, Hamlet and The Taming of the Shrew were selected as they offer different insights into (im)politeness: Hamlet presents a variety of courtly behaviours and strategic exchanges among members of the aristocracy (with few exceptions) revolving around a male protagonist, a Prince, whose (im)polite interactions with others reveals traces of the huge existential revolution taking place in early modern times. The Shrew complements these elements by presenting the verbal behaviours of the lower social classes, proposing reflections on how language and (im)politeness concur to fashion a female subject.

0.2 Linguistic methodology Given the complexity of the object of this analysis (courtesy/(im)politeness and subjectivity), the historical period (the Renaissance) and the medium of analysis (the Shakespearean text; written speech), individual critical approaches such as literary or cultural studies, pragmatics or semiotics, sociology or newhistoricism are unlikely to be particular fruitful if used

18

in isolation. Besides, the linguistic analysis of literary texts requires an evaluation that takes into account their aesthetic quality as well as other factors of help in identifying pragmatic meanings. What is needed, then, is an interdisciplinary approach to the literary text, incorporating insights from linguistic analyses of text and talk: this book will seek to delineate and apply a methodology of this kind. The book follows a standard pragmatic procedure, using short textual sequences as qualitative data for analysing how and why characters use polite or impolite strategies. It then seeks to explain these sequences in a wider context by interpreting emerging patterns of politeness strategies in relation to the Renaissance sign-system and its cultural-historical specificity and significance. Using this overall framework, the book pursues three specific aims: 1) to analyse the language of politeness in two of Shakespeare’s plays; 2) to explore how this language connects to a specific Renaissance subjectivity; 3) to link language and subjectivity to extra-textual – historical and cultural – elements. From a methodological perspective, then, the book works in two ways: first it applies – and tests the applicability of – recent theories of (im)politeness to the Shakespearean text and second, it seeks to re-evaluate these (im)politeness findings in relation to their cultural-historical context.

0.3 Outline of the book The book is divided into four chapters. The first defines the pragmatic methodology to be used for the textual analysis and its application to the Renaissance, outlining the development of the theory of (im) politeness from the 1970s to 2010s. The first part of the chapter introduces the complex nature of politeness studies to show the importance of an interdisciplinary approach. It explores the connection between Goffman’s sociological identification of ‘face’ and its later deployment in linguistics, as well as aspects of politeness theory relating to Austin’s and Searle’s speech-act theory and to Lakoff’s and Leech’s Politeness Principles. The second part focuses in detail on the ‘discursive turn’

19

taken by politeness studies since the 1990s and on Culpeper’s more recent approach to (im)politeness. Chapter two introduces the Renaissance historically and culturally, outlining the conditions and reasons for the widespread interest in courtesy at the time. This cultural contextualization is followed by a discussion of recent suggestions from the area of historical pragmatics regarding (im)politeness and courtesy. Using Jucker (2010), in particular, the chapter proposes a link between Goffman’s concept of face and Renaissance subjectivity on the basis of a diachronic evaluation of formulaic medieval forms of courtesy. This forms the premise for the analysis of Shakespearean (im)politeness in the third and fourth chapters. Chapter three is centred on Hamlet, a tragedy whose action takes place at court. Its dialogues and soliloquies exhibit a high number of (im)polite strategies, providing a wide field of investigation. The chapter focuses in particular on Hamlet’s unusual and unpredictable verbal behaviour, technically defined as an “off-record strategy”. The chapter examines the reasons for Hamlet’s linguistic choices and the ways in which he deploys this indirect (im)polite tactic. Chapter four focuses on Katherina, the main female character in The Taming of the Shrew, and on the ways in which her characterisation relates to the discussion of Renaissance subjectivity. Katherina’s verbal choices, characterised by “mock politeness” in particular, are as extreme and strategic as those of Hamlet. The chapter outlines the variations in her impoliteness strategy and her apparently extra-polite attitude at the end of the play. The data analysed in Chapters three and four are discussed and compared in the Conclusions, which summarise the main linguistic points emerging from the textual analysis, demonstrating above all the importance of an interdisciplinary approach for analysing texts in relation to their historical and socio-cultural contexts.

20

Chapter One: Introducing (im)politeness

The field of pragmatics has become notably multidisciplinary, and (im)politeness in particular has come to be studied using a variety of different approaches; this chapter reviews studies of (im)politeness from the 1960s to the present day. In exploring a range of definitions of politeness and impoliteness, the chapter focuses primarily on the analytical models of Brown and Levinson (1987) and Culpeper (1996, 2005, 2010, 2011), on which this book principally draws. The aim of chapter one is thus to provide a theoretical context for (im)politeness that allows its applicability to literary texts to be assessed alongside other approaches – semiotics and newhistoricism – in chapter two. The chapter also introduces politeness terminology, for which abbreviations will be used in subsequent chapters.

1. Defining the concepts of politeness and impoliteness The search for a definition of the concepts ‘polite’ and ‘impolite’ might begin with the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), where we find the following entries: ֽ polite |pəlīt| adjective ( -liter , -litest ) having or showing behavior that is respectful and considerate of other people : they thought she was wrong but were too polite to say so. • [ attrib. ] of or relating to people who regard themselves as more cultured and refined than others : the picture outraged polite society. ֽ impolite |ֽimpəlīt| adjective not having or showing good manners; rude: it would have been impolite to refuse.

Some interesting questions emerge from an examination of these definitions. The word “polite” in contemporary usage refers either to a form of behaviour that shows consideration for others, or to possession of an attribute by people who consider themselves part of a “cultured and refined” social group. In its contemporary meaning, politeness thus appears to be concerned on the one hand with obtaining and showing respect and, on the other, with a form of distinctive in-group marking. Politeness thus involves both personal and social dimensions in which, as the first definition suggests, good manners may be a strategy (something that one shows) or, as the second definition suggests, a distinctive trait of one’s behaviour (something that one has). As Kizelbach puts it, “polite language can be understood as the language that shows respect and consideration, used when one tries to avoid being too direct in conversation, the language composed of formulaic polite expressions (“thank you”, “please”), and finally, the language expressing social distance, hypocrisy or dishonesty” (2014: 161). A full description of the phenomenon therefore includes variables that go beyond the semantics of verbal expressions to involve their pragmatics as well. The same issues arise with the definition of impoliteness; postulating impoliteness as the opposite of politeness and defining it by recourse to the negative (what impoliteness is not) locates it on an even more complicated plane. If politeness is a conscious, distinctive attribute of refined groups or a strategy to gain and show respect, should impoliteness be regarded as intentional, like politeness, or as unintentional, stemming from ignorance of good manners? Or, if politeness is the ‘ground zero’ of acceptable social behaviour, can impoliteness be considered a deliberate transgression of social norms? And if politeness is not vicarious to politeness, what might be its specificity? That (im)politeness has a strong social function is an idea common to all the main theoretical definitions that have appeared during the last forty years. For Lakoff, “politeness is developed by societies in order to reduce friction in personal interaction” (Lakoff 1975: 74). For Leech, it “can be measured in terms of the degree of effort put into the avoidance of a conflict situation” (Leech 1980: 19). Brown and Levinson (hereafter B&L) define it as “a complex system for softening face threats” (B&L 1987: 56–289, while Kasper’s view is that “communication is seen as a fundamentally dangerous and antagonistic 22

endeavour” (Kasper 1990: 194). According to Arndt and Janney (1985: 282), politeness is “interpersonal supportiveness”, whereas Hill et al see it as “one of the constraints on human interaction, whose purpose is to consider others’ feelings, establish levels of mutual comfort and promote rapport” (1986: 349). For Ide, politeness is “language associated with smooth communication” (Ide 1989: 22), and for Sifianou, it is “the set of social values which instructs interactants to consider each other by satisfying shared expectations” (Sifianou 1992: 86). The shared factor emerging from these citations is a view of politeness as a normative condition of social relations, namely the precautionary element of the potential conflict triggered in or by communication. Conversely, rudeness, or impoliteness1, “does not utilise politeness strategies where they would be expected, in such a way that the utterance can only almost plausibly be interpreted as intentionally and negatively confrontational” (Lakoff 1989: 103). For Beebe, it “violates a socially sanctioned norm of interaction of the social context in which it occurs” (Beebe 1995: 159). Bousfield defines it as the “communication of intentionally gratuitous and conflictive verbal face-threatening acts (FTAs) which are purposefully delivered: (1) unmitigated, in contexts where mitigation is required, and/or, (2) with deliberate aggression, that is, with the face threat exacerbated, ‘boosted’, or maximised in some way to heighten the face damage inflicted” (Bousfield 2008:72). Holmes et al take a similar line: “verbal impoliteness [is] linguistic behaviour assessed by the hearer as threatening her or his face or social identity, and infringing the norms of appropriate behaviour that prevail in a particular context and among particular interlocutors, whether intentionally or not” (Holmes, Marra, Schnurr 2008: 196). Impoliteness emerges from these studies as a violation, a subversive linguistic behaviour causing social threat and disharmony. Kienpointner (1997) offers a slightly different version of the prevailing view, stating that “rudeness is a kind of prototypically non-cooperative or competitive communicative behaviour which destabilises the personal relationships 1

Although linguists tend to differentiate the terms “impoliteness” and “rudeness” on the base of intentionality (Culpeper 2005, Terkourafi 2008), Culpeper (2011) suggests that there is an equivalence between them in terms of face threat. For this reason alone, in this introductory section the two terms will be employed as synonyms.

23

of the interacting individuals [...], creates or maintains an emotional atmosphere of mutual reverence and antipathy, which primarily serves egocentric interests” (Kienpointner 1997: 259). Here, the focus shifts towards the personal and psychological dimension of the interactants, foregrounding the element of intentionality. The most complete description of impoliteness is provided by Culpeper in his 2011 study: Impoliteness is a negative attitude towards specific behaviours occurring in specific contexts. It is sustained by expectations, desires and/or beliefs about social organisation, including, in particular, how one person’s or a group’s identities are mediated by others in interaction. Situated behaviours are viewed negatively – considered ‘impolite’ – when they conflict with how one expects them to be, how one wants them to be and/or how one thinks they ought to be. Such behaviours always have or are presumed to cause offence. Various factors can exacerbate how offensive an impolite behaviour is taken to be, including for example whether one understands a behaviour to be strongly intentional or not. (Culpeper 2011: 23)

Here Culpeper emphasises issues related to the Hearer’s (hereafter H) expectations and perceptions of what can be considered an offence, stressing that speakers in fact mediate their reception and production of utterances not only according to social norms but also according to their own interpretation of it. Culpeper’s position thus appears to take the aforementioned studies of (im)politeness a step further. Concepts such as “societies” (Lakoff 1975: 74), “conflict situations” (Leech 1980: 19), “human interaction” (Hill, Ide, Kawasaki, Ogino 1986: 349), “shared expectations” (Sifianou 1992: 86), “violat[ion]” of the “norm of interaction” (Beebe 1995: 159), “social identity”, “appropriate behaviour”, “particular context” and “particular interlocutors” (Holmes, Marra, Schnurr 2008: 196), all connect an essential social dimension of language to the notion of politeness. However, Culpeper also foregrounds the way in which language is produced and perceived by speakers and hearers, arguing not only that (im)politeness involves the Speaker’s (hereafter S) intentionality but also that the final evaluation of an utterance, in terms of (im)politeness, is entrusted to H’s perception of the supposed (im)­ polite utterance. Consequently, the question of whether a verbal expression is polite or impolite depends on a wide range of elements, which

24

have been progressively clarified by quantitative and qualitative pragmatic research on (im)politeness since the 1980s. The steps in this evolution are discussed below and form the basis of the model applied in the second part of this study.2

1.1 Politeness: early studies The first wave of literature on verbal politeness was directly or indirectly inspired by the work of Austin (1962), Searle (1969), Grice (1967), Goffman (1967), Lakoff (1973), and Leech (1983). Its most influential study has been, and still is, Brown and Levinson’s Universalism in Language Use: Politeness Phenomena (1978), later revised and enlarged as Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage (1987). The pragmatic assumptions on which the development of (im)­ politeness theory is based can be traced back to Austin’s How to do Things with Words (1962), in which the author emphasises the idea that stating is a kind of performative action that does something: “Once we realise that what we have to study is not the sentence but the issuing of an utterance in a speech situation, there can hardly be any longer a possibility of not seeing that stating is performing an act” (Austin 1962: 139). Each utterance can be analysed as a locutionary act – “uttering something meaningful” –, an illocutionary act – “performance of an act in saying something as opposed to performance of an act of saying something” – or a perlocutionary act – effects produced on the hearer “by saying it” (Austin 1962: 99;108) – but Austin was primarily concerned with the second dimension, that is, to establish the nature of the action performed by the speaker. His research was further systematised in the works of Searle (1969; 1976), who classified illocutionary acts as follows:

2

Though (im)politeness also includes non-verbal and non-linguistic behaviour, this study is limited to an investigation of the (im)polite aspects of spoken utterances as they appear in Renaissance drama. This is addressed further in the next chapter.

25

• Representatives [or Assertives], which commit the speaker to the truth of the

expressed proposition (paradigm cases: asserting, concluding etc.)  Directives, which are attempts by the speaker to get the addressee to do something (paradigm cases: requesting, questioning)  Commissives, which commit the speaker to some future course of action (paradigm cases: promising, threatening, offering)  Expressives, which express a psychological state (paradigm cases: thanking, apologising, welcoming, congratulating)  Declarations, which effect immediate changes in the institutional state of affairs and which tend to rely on elaborate extra-linguistic institutions (paradigm cases: excommunicating, declaring war, christening, firing from employment). (Searle 1976: 16–17; see also Levinson 1983: 240).

• • • •

Searle’s classification emphasises that every illocutionary act is intentional and that intention necessarily involves the interlocutor: the speaker (S) wants to obtain something or to produce an effect on the hearer (H). This emphasis on interaction is also central to the work of Grice, who focuses on how illocution and perlocution imply one another, especially in linguistic exchanges between A and B, in which there is an alternation of adjacency pairs (any utterance by A is a response/reaction to B and vice versa). Clearly the best territory for investigating this intersection is conversation. In “Logic and Conversation” (1967/1975), Grice suggests that verbal exchanges work on the basis of a Cooperative Principle (CP), which is tacitly and intuitively recognised by speakers. This principle guarantees the functioning of any dialogue and is organised on the basis of four maxims:

• Quantity: Make your contribution as informative as required (for the current

purpose of the exchange). Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. Quality: Do not say what you believe to be false. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. Relation: Be relevant. Manner: Avoid obscurity of expression. Avoid ambiguity. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity). Be orderly (Grice 1975: 69).

• • •

Transgressing these maxims can create what Grice defines implicatures, implicit messages that the hearer can reject or understand once s/he is

26

called upon to respond. Implicatures refer to a meaning that is ‘suggested’ and that must be inferred through (con)textual factors and an analysis of the transgression to the CP. On the one hand, Grice provides a scientific model that takes into account the role of context, while on the other context emerges only when the CP is transgressed. The additional meaning produced by implicatures remains mostly within semantic confines. In the wake of Gricean conversational analysis, Lakoff (1973) focuses on the principles governing conversation. Politeness makes its first appearance in Lakoff’s account as the second rule of pragmatic competence and she distinguishes it from the rule of clarity, which would include Grice’s conversational maxims. Her model postulates an idea of politeness as a reducer of social friction. If clarity conflicts with politeness, speakers prefer avoiding offence to being clear: “It is more important in a conversation to avoid offences than achieve clarity” (1973: 297). The three principles around which Lakoff’s model of politeness is organised are as follows: 1. Don’t Impose 2. Give options 3. Make your receiver feel good. (Lakoff 1973: 297)

Though much indebted to Grice’s CP, the introduction of a Politeness Rule revises Grice’s rationalist view of communication, inasmuch as it provides an effective framework for explaining non-clear and nondirect exchanges. Speakers in everyday situations may choose to flout the CP to avoid conflict. For example, in asymmetric power relationships between pupils and teachers, or employees and employers, pupils and employees generally try to avoid offence rather than to be clear. In Lakoff’s scheme, Politeness may thus be in opposition to Clarity, for if a speaker is voluntarily flouting the CP, s/he is probably trying to seem polite or, at least, to reduce possible conflicts: Politeness usually supersedes: it is considered more important in a conversation to avoid offense than to achieve clarity. This makes sense since in most informal conversations, actual communication of important ideas is secondary to merely reaffirming and strengthening relationships. (Lakoff 1973: 289)

27

Politeness is a system of interpersonal relations designed to facilitate interaction by minimizing the potential for conflict and confrontation inherent in all human interchange. […] If societies did not devise ways to smooth over moments of conflict and confrontation, social relationships would be difficult to establish and continue, and essential cohesion would erode. Politeness strategies are the means to preserve at least the semblance of harmony and cohesion. (Lakoff 1990: 34)

The politeness rule is further developed by Lakoff in later studies (1975, 1979, 1990) and discussed in relation to four determinants – 1) clarity; 2) distance; 3) deference; 4) camaraderie (1979) – that should accordingly be considered in any analysis of (im)polite speech acts. Leech (1983), exploring the Politeness Principle, developed a similar maxim-based approach, articulated around six principles: (I) TACT MAXIM (a) Minimise cost to other [(b) Maximise benefit to other] (II) GENEROSITY MAXIM (a) Minimise benefit to self [(b) Maximise cost to self] (III) APPROBATION MAXIM (a) Minimise dispraise of other [(b) Maximise praise of other] (IV) MODESTY MAXIM (a) Minimise praise of self [(b) Maximise dispraise of self] (V) AGREEMENT MAXIM (a) Minimise disagreement between self and other [(b) Maximise agreement between self and other] (VI) SYMPATHY MAXIM (a) Minimise antipathy between self and other [(b) Maximise sympathy between self and other]. (Leech 1983: 132)

Leech is particularly concerned with the interpersonal relations between S and H, since all his maxims aim at maximising politeness by minimising S’s position. Politeness can be achieved only through constructed inequality between S and H by making each maxim operational on a range of four parameters: 1) cost-benefit; 2) optionality; 3) indirectness; 4) authority and social distance. Though the model is thought to emphasise the position of H, the perlocutionary level of communication is still not fully developed: the model remains speakeroriented in that H’s function is basically passive – a mere target towards which S makes active efforts to maximise politeness (or minimise 28

conflict). As regards the perlocutionary level of communication, key to Leech’s system is the distinction between two kinds of politeness, namely an “absolute politeness”, pertaining to the domain of semantics, and a “relative politeness”, definable in terms of pragmatic (and therefore contextual) analysis. Absolute politeness prevails over relative politeness inasmuch as each speech act can be polite or impolite according to its illocutionary goal, which can be measured in terms of its social goal: (a) COMPETITIVE: The illocutionary goal competes with the social goal; e.g., ordering, asking, demanding, begging. (b) CONVIVIAL: The illocutionary goal coincides with the social goal; e.g., offering, inviting, greeting, thanking, congratulating. (c) COLLABORATIVE: The illocutionary goal is indifferent to the social goal; e.g., asserting, reporting, announcing, instructing. (d) CONFLICTIVE: The illocutionary goal conflicts with the social goal; e.g., threatening, accusing, cursing, reprimanding. (Leech 1983: 104)

a) and b) require politeness strategies aimed at mitigating potential conflict and competition or at emphasising conviviality through formulae of courtesy and good manners like thanking and welcoming, while c) and d) do not require such strategies. The maxim-based models of both Lakoff and Leech have been criticised (Fraser 1990; Brown and Levinson 1987) for being too abstract and for not offering sufficient analytical instruments to create a taxonomy of politeness components that could be successfully applied to case-studies different from their own. In this respect, Brown and Levinson took politeness theory in a new direction by developing a systematic analytics of politeness founded on the concept of face.

1.2 A face-based model: Brown and Levinson The notion of “face” was first theorised by Goffman (1967), who proposed the existence of a social, external image that any speaker aims to save by enacting different polite strategies. He defined face as “the 29

positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact. Face is an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes” (5). It is thus a mask or image sensitive to a surrounding audience and situational context. According to Goffman, any S has an idea of his/her Self that is inextricably expressed through face, while concomitantly having an equal concern for others’ face in accordance with a process of potential, mutual identification. 1.2.1 Positive and negative face Brown and Levinson’s classic 1978 theory of politeness was further systematised in 1987 in Politeness: Some universals in language usage, in which the concept of face is divided into positive and negative aspects: positive face corresponds to the desire to have one’s actions approved of by others, while negative face comes from the desire to act without impediment: (i) ‘face’, the public self-image that every member wants to claim for himself, consisting in two related aspects: (a) negative face: the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, rights to non-distraction — i.e., freedom of action and freedom from imposition; (b)  positive face: the positive consistent self-image or ‘personality’ (crucially including the desire that this self-image be appreciated and approved of) claimed by the interactants; (ii) certain rational capacities, in particular consistent modes of reasoning from ends to the means that will achieve those ends. (1987: 61)

Drawing on this notion, conversation emerges as a battleground in which face is constantly reinforced or threatened according to the rank of cooperation – in Gricean terms – that is driving the dialogue. Conversation aims at maintaining harmony in social groups (Grice’s cooperative principle), but there seems to be a permanent possibility of harmony being threatened (Goffman’s notion of face). To create a theoretical framework able to account for such a complex interactional system, Brown and Levinson postulate a series of FTAs, face-threatening acts, which are potential weapons in the mouths of speakers that can destabilise the 30

balance that should prevail in conversation. If there is a strong will or need to avoid conflict, face will be saved or reinforced, whereas a lack of interest in keeping the conversation ‘safe’ or neutral for the speakers will cause more evident face threats: Given [the] assumptions of universality of face and rationality, it is intuitively the case that certain kinds of acts intrinsically threaten face, namely those acts that by their nature run contrary to the face wants of the addressee and/or of the speaker. By act we have in mind what is intended to be done by a verbal or non-verbal communication, just as one or more ‘speech acts’ can be assigned to an utterance” (B&L 1987: 65).

B&L’s first step is to divide intrinsic FTAs into two groups: those threatening H’s positive and negative face and those threatening S’s positive and negative face. Let us consider the first group, in which B&L single  out three kinds of FTA for H’s negative face and two for H’s positive face. In particular, H’s negative face would be threatened by 1)

2)

3)

“Those acts that predicate some future acts A of H, and in so doing put some pressure on H to do (or refrain from doing) the act A”, such as orders and requests; suggestions and advice; remindings (of what H should do); threats, warnings and dares. “Those acts that predicate some positive future act of S toward H”, thus putting H in a possible situation of debt or forced gratitude, as in the case of offers and promises. “Those acts that predicate some desire of S toward H or H’s goods, giving H reason to think that he may have to take action to protect the object of S’s desire, or give it to S”, as in the case of “compliments, expressions of envy and admiration” or in the case of hatred, anger and lust (B&L 1987: 65–66).

In all these cases, H would feel limited in his/her freedom or obliged to re-pay S’s real or fake kindness in some way. An FTA to H’s positive face appears more direct “by indicating (potentially) that the speaker does not care about the addressee’s feelings, wants, etc. – that in some important respect he doesn’t want H’s wants”. Two possibilities are put forward in this respect:

31

1)

2)

Acts “that show that S has a negative evaluation of some aspect of H’s positive face” as in the case of “disapproval, criticism, contempt or ridicule, complaints and reprimands, accusations, insults” or “contradictions or disagreements, challenges”. Acts “that show that S doesn’t care about (or is indifferent to) H’s positive face”, as in case of “expressions of violent [...] emotions”, “irreverence, mention of taboo topics”, “bringing of bad news about H, or good news (boasting) about S”, “raising of dangerously emotional or divisive topics” (politics, religion, race, etc.), “blatant non-cooperation” (interrupting talk, making non-sequiturs, etc.), “use of address terms and other status-marked identifications in initial encounters” (B&L 1987: 65–66).

The series of FTAs threatening S’s face include: 1)

2)

Acts “that offend S’s negative face”, such as “expressing thanks”, “acceptance of H’s thanks or H’s apology”, “excuses”, “acceptance of offers” (i.e. accepting a debt), “responses to H’s faux pas”, “unwilling promises and offers”. Acts “that directly damage S’s positive face”, such as apologies, “acceptance of a compliment”, “breakdown of physical control over body”, “self-humiliation, shuffling or cowering, acting stupid, self-contradicting”, “confessions, admissions of guilt or responsibility”, “emotion leakage” (B&L 1987: 67–68).

1.2.2 B&L’s politeness strategies The second step in B&L’s theory is to outline a possible set of strategies aimed at minimising the threat deriving from FTAs, as “In the context of the mutual vulnerability of face, any rational agent will seek to avoid these face-threatening-acts, or will employ certain strategies to minimize the threat” (B&L 1987: 68). B&L’s strategies for the management of FTAs by speakers are shown in Figure 1.1 below:

32

Figure 1.1: B&L’s Strategies (1987: 69).

The figure (B&L 1987: 69) proposes a range of risks for loss of face, articulated around a series of binary choices: S can decide whether to perform an FTA – “do the FTA” vs. “don’t do the FTA” – and if the former is chosen, S can go intentionally “on record” or stay “off record”. In fact, “An actor goes on record in doing an act A if it is clear to participants what communicative intention led the actor to do A [...]. In contrast, if an actor goes off record in doing A, then there is more than one unambiguously attributable intention so that the actor cannot be held to have committed himself to one particular intent” (1987: 68–69). This point is particularly important for the argument of this study, when we explore B&L’s explanation of “off-record” strategies: “Linguistic realizations of off-record strategies include metaphor and irony, rhetorical questions, understatement, tautologies, all kinds of hints as to what a speaker wants or means to communicate, without doing so directly, so that the meaning is to some degree negotiable” (69, emphasis added). The importance of this claim will emerge from the discussion of Hamlet’s politeness strategy in chapter three. For now it is sufficient to underline that the off-record strategy seems to include particular rhetorical figures, highlighted above in italics, and can therefore be explored through pragmatic and stylistic analysis. As regards on-record strategies, the chart shows that the choice depends on whether redressive action is considered necessary on the part of the speaker. Bald on-record refers to speaking in the most direct and clear way possible, and is usually adopted when “S and H both tacitly agree that the relevance of face demands may be suspended in the interests of urgency or efficiency; where the danger to H’s face is 33

very small, as in offers, requests, suggestions [...]; where S is vastly superior in power to H, or can enlist audience support to destroy H’s face without losing his own” (69). A speaker’s alternative to a bald on-record strategy is to use some form of mitigation. Positive and negative politeness are two redressive strategies aimed at counteracting the face damage an FTA may produce by adding something or using words assuring that S recognises H’s face wants: positive politeness (hereafter PP) emphasises the desire not to interfere with the hearer’s freedom and negative politeness (hereafter NP) to make the hearer feel at ease. Unlike negative politeness, positive politeness is not necessarily redressive of the particular face want infringed by the FTA; that is, whereas in negative politeness the sphere of relevant redress is restricted to the imposition itself, in positive politeness the sphere of redress is widened to the appreciation of alter’s wants in general or to the expression of similarity between ego’s and alter’s wants. (B&L 1987: 101)

A better explanation of the difference between positive and negative politeness can be found in the tables used by B&L to illustrate the strategies. Figure 1.2 below shows the PP strategies:

Figure 1.2: B&L’s Chart of Positive Politeness Strategies.

34

According to B&L, the fifteen PP strategies are all an “exaggeration of normal everyday intimate language” (101). It is not important whether or not S sincerely feels approval for H, but that s/he wants to show approval and concern for H’s face. Again, what counts in polite exchanges is the mutual awareness of face as the public side of human interaction. The figure makes it clear that the factor shared by the three mechanisms driving the strategies (5.3.1 – 5.3.2 – 5.3.3) is the attempt to warrant a tangible cooperation on the part of S towards H. NP strategies appear rather more complicated, as Figure 1.3 shows:

Figure 1.3: B&L’s Chart of Negative Politeness Strategies.

In this case, NP has the function of showing respect rather than familiarity. While PP tends to shorten the distance between S and H, NP aims at maintaining that distance: When we think of politeness in Western cultures, it is negative-politeness behaviour that springs to mind. In our culture, negative politeness is the most elaborate and the most conventionalized set of linguistic strategies for FTA redress; it is the stuff that fills the etiquette books […]. The outputs are all forms useful in general for social ‘distancing’ (just as positive-politeness realizations are forms for minimizing social distance). (B&L 1987: 129–130)

35

Negative politeness is more problematic in that it combines conflicting demands deriving from S’s personal wishes and social norms that impose redressive activity. In fact, the two possible choices from which all 10 NP strategies spring – a) “on record” and b) “plus redress”, shown on the left of the diagram – pose a problem which B&L define as follows: “Negative politeness enjoins both on-record delivery and redress of an FTA. Now the simplest way to construct an on-record message is to convey it directly, as in bald-on-record usages. However, it turns out that this clashes with the need for redress attuned to H’s negative face, so in fact one does not issue negatively polite FTAs completely directly” (B&L 1987: 130). This clash between bald-on-record and the need for redress in relation to H’s negative face is marked “clash” by the highlighting in the top right corner of Figure 1.3. NP is thus characterised by a certain degree of indirectness and conventionality that is not only present in the first option of 5.4.2 – “be indirect” – but is more or less a feature of all the strategies resulting from the four redressive points (5.4.2 – 5.4.3 – 5.4.4 – 5.4.5). It also emerges that NP on-record strategies resembling the bald on-record approach may paradoxically be used in both unconventional and very formal situations with different functions. While on the one hand “there is an element in formal politeness that sometimes directs one to minimize the imposition by coming rapidly to the point, avoiding the further imposition of prolixity and obscurity” (B&L 1987: 131), on the other hand bald on-record utterances are made by speakers who are not afraid to seem impolite. This requires an analysis of the individual, specific implicatures produced in the exchange. Furthermore, the problem raised by the directness/indirectness clash may also recur, along with the presence of implicatures, when a speaker uses an off-record strategy. Returning to the illustration of off-record strategy as the most ambiguous FTA deprived of a redressive action on H, it seems clear that the indirectness that marks NP as maintaining conventionality (and thus an ostensible harmony between S and H), may be the source of non-polite strategies such as those tied to the off-record modality, inasmuch as they are multifariously interpretable and with an unpredictable meaning. The directness/impoliteness and indirectness/politeness correspondences are not definitive but subject to the deployment of strategies that may mix or invert these equivalences. 36

Figure 1.4 below illustrates fifteen off-record strategies with a high degree of figurativeness. This is directly relevant to the relationship of off-record and indirect strategies with rhetorical and literary language, which is one of the main areas explored in this study.

Figure 1.4: B&L’s Chart of Off-Record Strategies.

When confronted with one of these strategies, the hearer can remain silent or react by choosing to do an FTA in turn (thus producing an offensive-offensive pair), or reject the initial threat (producing an offensive-defensive pair). Though the distinction on the one hand between positive and negative politeness, and on the other between on-record and off-record speech, is clearly delineated by B&L, once strategies are singled out, the general schema of their functioning presents clashes and overlaps that further problematize the relation between clarity and politeness as well as the evaluation of polite language. Even the level of indirectness is not an indicator per se. As a consequence, a clear need for contextualisation emerges that in B&L’s model is partly met through the introduction of three variables: a) b)

Social distance (D) between S and H: the degree of familiarity and solidarity they share. Relative power (P) of S and H: the degree to which the speaker can impose their will on the hearer.

37

c)

Ranking of imposition (R) attached to the speech act in the culture: the degree of expenditure of goods and services by the hearer; the right of the speaker to perform the act; and the degree to which the hearer welcomes the imposition (1987:74).

These variables, according to B&L, “subsume most of the culturally specific social determinants of FTA expression, but […] there may be a residue of other factors which are not captured within P, D, and R dimensions” (1987: 16). D accounts for the interpersonal intimacy between S and H, P for the possible power asymmetry between S and H that might affect their choice of FTA or redressive strategy, and R for the degree of external social imposition on S/H. Thus, though they provide a very detailed description of the strategies, B&L only partially hint at S and H’s situational context in accounting for the social aspects of language connected with face: the interpretation of FTAs remains stuck on elements that pertain to something semantically intrinsic to the utterance and not dependent on broader pragmatic backdrops. After the publication of Brown and Levinson’s study, their politeness theory was subjected to a great deal of criticism, especially in relation to its grounding in “universals” (the assumption that politeness shares identical features in any speech community) and to its reduction of speakers to a Model Person (MP) endowed with and driven by absolute rationality, “defined as a mode of reasoning from the ends to the means that will satisfy those ends” (Kizelbach 2014: 155). Their universalist approach was called into question as a consequence of a discursive turn inspired by a post-structuralist view of language.

1.3 Discursive approaches to politeness The spread of poststructuralism during the 1960s (Dews 1987; Easthope 1988; Harland 1987) opened the door to a relativisation of the concept of meaning. Instead of being communicated transparently through language, meaning was viewed as something that could never be definitively grasped. It was ‘disturbed’ somehow by the passage of time and 38

changing historical, cultural and social conditions. In other words, if culture could not pre-exist language, language could not pre-exist culture, since it was itself influenced by culture, both cognitively in an individual dimension and performatively by contextual factors. Thus, the idea of a cultural structure expressing itself through language was replaced by the notion that culture itself was imbued with language mechanisms. However, although this relativisation of meaning constituted an attack on the idea of language universality, language was still assumed to affect the human vision of the world and was therefore still regarded as playing a strong role in shaping both identity and cognition. From this complex web of mutual influences between culture and language a new notion of discourse(s) emerged, whose theoretical matrix can be traced back to Foucault (1978) and was defined by Hall (1997) as follows: Normally, the term ‘discourse’ is used as a linguistic concept. It simply means passages of connected writing or speech. Michel Foucault, however, gave it a different meaning. What interested him were the rules and practices that produced meaningful statements and regulated discourse in different historical periods […]. Discourse is about the production of knowledge through language […]. It is important to note that the concept of discourse in this usage is not purely a ‘linguistic’ concept. It is about language and practice. It attempts to overcome the traditional distinction between what one says (language) and what one does (practice). (Hall 1997: 72)

Foucault’s notion of discourse implies that verbal language is expressed through agency and social practices whose extent must be historicised and contextualised. From the individual perspective of the speaker, this performativity works in opposite directions: from outside to inside (culture to subject) and from inside to outside (subject to culture). Speakers thus find themselves as sites of negotiation between the macropower of discourse and the micropower of their subjugation or resistance. They are inhabited and ‘spoken’ by discourse but are also agents, producing ever-different responses to it. The discourse/agency relation has become increasingly central to pragmatics in its socio-anthropological perspective: Linguistic anthropologists consider language, whether spoken or written, to be inextricably embedded in networks of sociocultural relations. When scholars

39

treat language, culture, and society as mutually constituted, one of their main responsibilities then becomes to study how discourse both shapes and is shaped by sociocultural factors and power dynamics. (Ahearn 2001: 110–111)

This socio-anthropological perspective influenced the politeness theories of Fraser (1990) and Fraser and Nolan (1981), and more recently of Watts (2003, 2005a), and Locher and Watts (2005), as well as Culpeper’s theory of impoliteness (1996, 2005, 2011). These will now be considered in turn. Fraser framed politeness in a structure called Conversational Contract (CC) (Fraser 1990), whose specific terms are defined by the context in which the speech act is uttered: [E]ntering into a given conversation, each party brings an understanding of some initial set of rights and obligations that will determine, at least for the preliminary stages, what the participants can expect from the other(s). During the course of time, or because of a change in the context, there is always the possibility for a renegotiation of the conversational contract (CC): two parties may read just what rights and obligations they hold towards each other. (1990: 22)

Fraser’s CC works according to pre-established “rules” which speakers intuitively know – they are responsible, for example, for the correct functioning of the turn-taking mechanism in conversation – and which are dependent on the sociocultural norms that structure spoken interaction. At the same time, however, the contract is subject to continual shifts and negotiations, partly depending on the participants’ intentions, which may vary as the conversation proceeds, and partly on variables such as status and power that may differ cross-culturally. Although, according to Fraser, fulfilment of the CC corresponds to polite behaviour, this does not “involve making the hearer ‘feel good’, à la Lakoff or Leech, nor with making the hearer ‘feel bad’, à la Brown and Levinson. It simply involves getting on with the task at hand in light of the terms and conditions of the CC” (1990: 223). Though not presenting an analytical model comparable to that of B&L, Fraser’s view of politeness contributed to a more contextual analysis of speech acts, avoiding the influence of visions of politeness that were sensitive to its ‘value’. To some extent, Fraser reconceptualised Grice’s CP, arguing that politeness was an important component of a contract that contributed to the success of communicative goals 40

determined by any number of contextual and cultural specifics rather than by the “good” or “bad” feelings of hearers. In 2001 and 2003 respectively, Eelen and Watts took a step further towards delineating an objective and neutral method for framing politeness, asserting the need to remove any value judgement that might affect scientific analysis. In particular, they singled out two levels of politeness – the lay notion of (im)politeness [(im)politeness1] and the theoretical notion of (im)politeness [(im)politeness2)]. Whereas (im)politeness1 is a concept used by the members of a community to indicate polite/impolite verbal usage and may therefore contain value judgements, (im)politeness2 is a theoretical notion used by linguists: the former looks at language from within (an emic perspective), the latter looks at language from outside (an etic perspective). While this dual-level approach dismantles the universalist assumptions of previous theories – “there can be no idealised, universal scientific concept of (im)politeness (i.e. (im)politeness2) which can be applied to instances of social interaction across cultures, subcultures and languages” (Watts 2003: 23) – it has also been criticised for being ‘essentialist’ in that it “establish[es] sharp demarcations between the ordinary social member and the expert or scientist” (Xie, He, Lin 2005: 455). In relation to politeness1 Watts makes a further distinction between “politic speech” and “polite speech”, referring to polite conventions and polite strategies respectively. The former may be described as verbal behaviours aiming at maintaining a social balance within a community. Politic speech is, in other words, a construction that “may have been made prior to entering the interaction, but is always negotiable during the interaction, despite the expectations that participants might bring to it” (2003: 20). Thus, politic speech can be assimilated to Fraser’s CC; conversely, ‘proper’ polite behaviour comes to be constituted as a strategy that is more than politic, like a second-degree language, leading to “an enhancement of the ego’s standing with respect to alter” (Watts 2005a: 51). In Watts’s words, “linguistic behaviour which is perceived to be appropriate to the social constraints of the on-going interaction, i.e. as non-salient, should be called politic behaviour. [...] Linguistic behaviour which is perceived to be beyond what is expectable, i.e. salient behaviour, should be called polite or impolite depending on whether the behaviour itself tends towards the negative or positive end of the spectrum of politeness” (Watts 2003: 19). 41

Thus, according to Watts (2003, 2005a, 2012), verbal behaviour is structured within a net of schemata existing before the speaker and creating precise expectations with respect to what is accepted as polite or impolite in a given society. S finds him/herself speaking as an individual agent but also ‘to be spoken’ by and through the community s/ he lives in, in the sense of replicating some mental/cognitive structures encoded through/by language. Politeness, in this view, cannot be fully explained by B&L’s rationalist model, nor by their treatment of Goffmanian face. For Watts, the key to analysing politeness is to adopt a broader version of facework, namely “relational work” (Locher 2006; Locher and Watts 2005; Watts 2005) that is rooted in social interaction: The term “facework”, therefore, should also span the entire breadth of interpersonal meaning. This, however, is rarely the case in the literature which is oriented to the norms established in previous interactions, a great deal of the relational work carried out will be of an unmarked nature and will go largely unnoticed. Marked behaviour, conversely, can be noticed in three ways. It will be perceived as negative if it is judged as impolite/non-politic/inappropriate or as over-polite/non-politic/inappropriate. (Locher and Watts 2005: 11)

Figure 1.5 below illustrates the dynamics of relation work. It shows how impolite and over-polite speech acts are both negatively marked, as both correspond to non-politic behaviour inappropriate in relation to the speakers’ expectations. Conversely, non-polite behaviour, which corresponds to the expected “politic” level of discourse, is unmarked, while the proper polite strategy is positively marked. The theories of Fraser and Watts are important for (im)politeness research because they produced a shift towards a non-inherent, negotiable conception of meaning and therefore of what could be defined as polite or impolite. In so doing, they inverted the logico-semantic trend of Lakoff, Leech and B&L in favour of an alternative discursive approach. The importance of this trend in politeness research for the present study is that it provides a perspective from which to revise B&L’s model and adapt it to the specific characteristics of a more discursive approach.

42

Figure 1.5: Watts 2005b: xliii; Locher 2006: 257.

1.4 A theory of impoliteness A significant turning point in politeness research was Jonathan Culpeper’s elaboration of a theory of impoliteness, which resulted in a partial revision of Brown and Levinson’s model.3 In “Towards an Anatomy of 3

Theories of impoliteness prior to Culpeper included Lachenicht (1980), who was the first linguist to focus on the way speakers might rationally wish to hurt one another verbally by consciously breaking the harmony of social interaction. Lachenicht postulated what he defined as “aggravating language”, which was expressed by four ‘aggravation’ superstrategies (Lachenicht 1980 cit. in Culpeper et al. 2003: 244). Lachenicht’s model was further developed in 1990 by P. Austin (1990), whose model of face attack is more oriented to H and how (and if) s/he perceives some speech acts as offensive. Her framework,

43

Impoliteness” (1996), Culpeper argued against the assumption that conversation always works on the basis of the cooperative principle. In his view, impoliteness can be a deliberate choice and an alternative strategy: [S]ome areas of politeness are not well represented in Brown and Levinson’s politeness model; otherwise those deficiencies could be carried over into an impoliteness framework. Their model is primarily geared to handling matters relating to linguistic form. A result of this, as they admit, is that impolite implicatures can slip through their framework. (Culpeper 1996: 358)

In order to remedy the supposed deficiency of the B&L model, Culpeper draws on Leech’s model and reverses it to produce his own framework for impoliteness: “Leech’s politeness model is primarily concerned with linguistic content, and may be used to complement Brown and Levinson’s model. Thus, reversing Leech’s Politeness Principle […], one general way of being impolite is to minimize the expression of polite beliefs and maximize the expression of impolite beliefs” (358). What emerges from Culpeper’s 1996 account is a set of five categories of impoliteness usage which are the mirror-image of B&L’s from a structural perspective: Bald on record impoliteness – the FTA is performed in a direct, clear, unambiguous and concise way in circumstances where face is not irrelevant or minimized. […] Positive impoliteness – the use of strategies designed to damage the addressee’s positive face wants. Negative impoliteness – the use of strategies designed to damage the addressee’s negative face wants. Sarcasm or mock politeness – the FTA is performed with the use of politeness strategies that are obviously insincere, and thus remain surface realisations. […] Withhold politeness – the absence of politeness work where it would be expected. (Culpeper 1996: 356–357)

For negative and positive impoliteness, Culpeper provides a set of individual strategies exemplifying how the category is applied in talk. These are as follows: which distinguishes six superstrategies, aims at singling out what renders utterances impolite in particular contexts (or as she writes “on the dark side”: 287). Austin’s original contribution to Impoliteness Theory lies in the addition of two on-record strategies with inappropriate redress, which place the emphasis on the context and H’s evaluation when perceiving impoliteness.

44

Positive impoliteness output strategies [heareafter called PI]: 1. Ignore, snub the other – fail to acknowledge the other’s presence. 2. Exclude the other from activity 3. Dissociate from the other – for example, deny association or common ground with the other; avoid sitting together. 4. Be disinterested, unconcerned, unsympathetic 5. Use inappropriate identity markers – for example, use title and surname when a close relationship pertains, or a nickname when a distant relationship pertains. 6. Use obscure or secretive language – for example, mystify the other with jargon, or use a code known to others in the group, but not the target. 7. Seek disagreement – select a sensitive topic. 8. Make the other feel uncomfortable – for example, do not avoid silence, joke, or use small talk. 9. Use taboo words – swear, or use abusive or profane language. 10. Call the other names – use derogatory nominations. […] (Culpeper 1996: 357–358)

Whereas Positive Impolite strategies require S to put H on a lower, inferior level (without a direct offence or threat), Negative Impolite strategies involve more direct approaches by S towards H: Negative Impoliteness output strategies [hereafter called NI]: 1. Frighten – instill a belief that action detrimental to the other will occur. 2. Condescend, scorn, ridicule – emphasize your relative power. Be contemptuous. Do not treat the other seriously. Belittle the other (use diminutives). 3. Invade the other’s space – literally (e. g. position yourself closer to the other than the relationship permits) or metaphorically (e. g. ask for or speak about information which is too intimate given the relationship). 4. Explicitly associate the other with a negative aspect – personalize, use the pronouns ‘I’ and ‘You’. 5. Put the other’s indebtness on record. […] (Culpeper 1996: 358)

Among the impoliteness strategies illustrated above, “Mock politeness” or “Sarcasm” – the fourth strategy – appears to be particularly relevant to developing a model for the pragmatic analysis of Shakespearean plays, in

45

which wit and irony – both relatable to sarcasm – are often key ingredients in the interaction between characters. In “Towards an Anatomy of Impoliteness”, “mock politeness/sarcasm” emerges as the opposite of “banter” (mock impoliteness) defined by Leech as follows: “In order to show solidarity with h, say something which is (i) obviously untrue, and (ii) obviously impolite to h [in such a way that] what s says is impolite to h and is clearly untrue. Therefore what s really means is polite to h and true” (Leech 1983: 145). For Leech there must be no doubt that the impolite utterance is totally untrue in order for the effect to be that of reaching solidarity and reinforcing cooperation between S and H. So, “banter” guarantees social harmony provided that S’s words and intentions are correctly deciphered. “Mock politeness”, in Culpeper’s analysis, reverses this schema and proves dysfunctional to cooperation by appearing indisputably insincere. In this first model, the relevance of Culpeper’s recourse to Leech is not exhausted here; read retrospectively, it could even be considered the start of subsequent developments and expansions of his theory. In particular, the parallelism he traces between Leech’s Irony Principle (IP), B&L’s “Off record politeness” and his own notion of “mock politeness” (1996: 356–357) raises a series of issues still discussed in his most recent models (2005, 2011). The chain linking the three phenomena is as follows: Leech’s Irony Principle apparently shares with B&L’s offrecordness an indirect way of conveying the message: “If you must cause offence, at least do so in a way which doesn’t overtly conflict with the PP [Politeness Principle], but allows the hearer to arrive at the offensive point of your remark indirectly, by way of an implicature” (Leech 1983: 82). At the same time, however, the specific use of irony with the consequent transgression of Grice’s CP through recourse to implicational language, as Leech understands it, does not virtually save face and proves dysfunctional to social relations: “[T]he IP, by enabling to bypass politeness, promotes the ‘antisocial’ use of language. We are ironic at someone’s expense, scoring off others by politeness that is obviously insincere, as a substitute for impoliteness” (Leech 1983: 142). Culpeper reworks this as an impoliteness strategy antithetical to banter: “Sarcasm (mock politeness for social disharmony) is clearly the opposite of banter (mock impoliteness for social harmony)” (1996: 357). The choice of the term “sarcasm” for mock politeness definitively clarifies the positioning of 46

the strategy within the politeness/impoliteness spectrum, but may also result in a wider categorization of irony. Recognising that irony can be used also for “enjoyment and comedy” (1996: 357), Culpeper indirectly gives it back a more neutral connotation and a general indeterminacy that makes it associable to either impoliteness (Leech) or politeness (B&L) in a non-automatic way. In this study – combining B&L’s, Leech’s and Culpeper’s positions – irony is considered as a flouting of Grice’s Quality Maxim, which may take the form of banter (mock impoliteness) or sarcasm (mock politeness) when it is perfectly clear that S is expressing the opposite of what s/he thinks to be true; otherwise, when the intentions of the speaker are not unmistakably detectable, his/her ironic speech is classifiable as off-record. Taking a step further, I argue the following: given that both mock (im)politeness and off-recordness maximise the implicational game, the former operates an inversion of the logical relation between utterance and meaning, an inversion that stays on record so that H can correctly interpret it; the latter, characterised by the highest implicational rate, produces a rift in the logical relation between utterance and meaning, whereby H’s interpretation may remain suspended, not immediate and not even definitively accurate. Nonetheless, off-recordness can be evaluated in its perlocutionary effect: indeed, Culpeper’s updated model presents off-recordness – considered the most indirect politeness strategy in B&L’s model – as an impoliteness strategy as well, if “the FTA is performed by means of an implicature but in such a way that one attributable intention clearly outweighs the others” (Culpeper 2005: 44). Off-recordness and mock (im)politeness – as I understand them – will be extensively analysed in relation to Shakespeare’s dialogues in chapters four and five; here it is important to continue the discussion of relevant issues and criticalities raised by Culpeper as well as other linguists belonging to the discursive turn. 1.4.1 Contextual factors, (non)-inherent meaning and conventionalisation In his seminal 1996 article, as partly shown by the discussion of his model, Culpeper sheds light on the effective role played by contextual factors and by the intentions and perceptions preceding and following 47

utterances. The way in which politeness and impoliteness can intermingle, in some cases proving difficult to interpret, implies that prescribed strategies can be modified and adapted by speakers according to circumstances and purposes. This conviction, governing all recent (discursive) analysis of (im)politeness, was originally addressed by Culpeper in connection with Leech’s and Fraser and Nolan’s different perspectives on “Relative Politeness” and “Absolute Politeness”. While Leech stated that “some illocutions (e.g. orders) are inherently impolite, and others (e.g. offers) are inherently polite” (Leech 1983: 83), Fraser and Nolan affirmed that “no sentence is inherently polite or impolite” and that “we often take certain expressions to be impolite, but it is not the expressions themselves but the conditions under which they are used that determine the judgement of politeness” (Fraser and Nolan 1981: 96). Examples of how the analysis of (im)politeness should be more inclusive of context-oriented indications are offered by Culpeper through the partial revision of Leech’s idea that sarcasm fosters social intimacy only between pairs,4 or through the recognition that the social

4

48

Culpeper focuses in particular on the effect achieved by the strategies: “If lack of politeness is associated with intimacy (an idea which is reflected in Brown and Levinson’s model), surface impoliteness is, paradoxically, even more likely to be interpreted as banter in non-intimate contexts, where it is more clearly at odds with expectations” (1996: 352). When there is no social distance between S and H, banter “reflects” intimacy (i.e. intimacy is a starting point) (Culpeper 1996: 352), whereas in formal contexts it aims to create intimacy by bypassing formality (intimacy is fictionally made up by the speech act). Importantly, in the second case, we see an inversion of the expected outcome of a conversation, due to a different function of the D, P and R variables. An interesting effect of banter in formal contexts may be that of S persuading H to do what s/he wants. Significantly, referring to Slugoski and Turnbull’s study (1988) on ironic compliments or insults, Culpeper senses the importance of the variable of “affect” (understood as like or dislike) in establishing whether a speech act can be interpreted as banter or mock impoliteness: “The more people like each other, the more concern they are likely to have for each other’s face. Thus insults are more likely to be interpreted as banter when directed at targets liked by the speaker” (Culpeper 1996: 353). Ultimately, the only way to clearly establish whether the impolite utterance is untrue is through contextual factors.

variables employed to evaluate (im)politeness should also include intimacy and affect, as in his later theorizations (2005, 2010, 2011 ).5 While adhering to the discursive turn, by shifting the focus of linguistic interpretation to a fully pragmatic (non-semantic) level of definition of an (im)polite speech act, Culpeper (2007) also expresses doubts about possible imprecisions and approximations in describing politeness in discourse: [P]ost-modern politeness work [has] drawn attention to the fact that (im)politeness is not inherent in particular forms of language, and argued that it is a matter of the participants’ evaluations of particular forms as (im)polite in context […]. However, there are problems here too. Despite criticising earlier studies for labelling certain behaviours as polite without particular regard for what the lay person might do, the post-modern scholars do not offer an authoritative account of the lay person’s use of politeness terms (2007: 42).

In trying to allay these doubts, Culpeper examines the question of semantic meaning in relation to the use and perception of impolite expressions. In his essay “Conventionalised impoliteness formulae” (2010), he offers a significant change in perspective, when he writes: My own position is dual in the sense that I see semantic (im)politeness and pragmatic (im)politeness as inter-dependent opposites on a scale. (Im)politeness can be more inherent in a linguistic expression or can be more determined by context, but neither the expression nor the context guarantee an interpretation of (im)politeness. What is different about semantic (im)politeness from, say, the semantics of the noun “table” is that it is the relationship between the expression and its interpersonal contextual effects that must be the central 5

In his 2011 work Impoliteness: Using Language to Cause Offence, the social variables are expanded to include emotions, and the possible ‘functions’ of impolite speech acts are explored. The latter are classified by Culpeper as follows: 1) “affective impoliteness” has the function of projecting one’s aggression onto another; 2) “coercive impoliteness” expresses emotions connected to power and to the desire to exert power over others; 3) “entertaining impoliteness” has the function of joking at the expense of another; 4) “institutional impoliteness” is linked to ‘public’ functions, in virtue of which impoliteness is allowed, as may happen, for example, in the army or in court trials (2011: 221–246). These functions are important for the classification of FTAs and for understanding their meaning, the intentions behind spoken words and the feelings determining their reception.

49

semanticised component for it to exist. […] Expressions can be semanticised for impoliteness effects to varying degrees. (2010: 3236–3237)

Inspired by Terkourafi’s frame-based approach (2005, 2008), he works through the notion of conventionalised (im)politeness formulae, resulting from a process whereby what were initially implicatures (particularised reinterpretations/transgressions of a norm) turn into conventions (generalised practices expected by a community of speakers) through the frequency of occurrence linking given utterances to given situations. This means that “a particular expression may be conventionalised in a particular context for virtually all speakers of a particular language, thereby appearing to be a convention of the language” (Terkourafi 2005d: 213). Nonetheless, “potential for variation keeps conventionalised inferences apart from conventional ones” (Terkourafi 2005c: 298), thus making it possible to imagine the socio-linguistic fabric of a community as an arena in which, against the backdrop of normative generalised practices, particular stratifications of language in use have the potential to counteract and undermine the norm. This aspect leads to the conceptualization of the relation between conventions (belonging to the language of all the speakers of a community), conventionalised expressions (spoken by groups of people within a community) and implicational, non-conventionalised language (spoken by individuals) as scalar and oppositional. Culpeper (2010) re-reads this relation in terms of an interdependency between the semantic and pragmatic components of (im)politeness. The degree of conventionalisation matches a corresponding level of ‘semanticization’ that occurs when pragmatic verbal behaviour is provided with a meaning fixed by and through frequency of occurrence but not coinciding with the conventional meaning attributable semantically to the same utterance. This may be the consequence but also the cause of speakers’ innovative uses of formulae, which “can be creatively exploited, either by breaking the formula itself or by deploying a formula so that there is a mismatch between the context it projects and the communicative situation in which it is contextualised” (Culpeper 2010: 3244). Contextualising (im)politeness, then, implies accounting for its degrees of ‘semanticisation’ and conventionalisation, as well as for the micro- and macro-dimensions involved in its organisation as a social 50

practice. In Culpeper 2011, the individual choices of speakers and hearers are framed in terms of “attitude schemata” that socio-cognitively explain and describe the modality according to which the micro- and macro-dimensions intersect, a position comparable to that of Watts (2003, 2012). Hence, it can be said that the cultural schemata (macro-dimension of discourse) interiorised and introjected by individuals orient their choices; nonetheless, speakers (micro-dimension of discourse) individually or as members of distinctive groups can show creativity in deciding – more or less consciously – to contravene and contest, adjust or radically change the norms. The analysis of conventionalised formulaic (im)polite speech and of implicational language, on the other hand, leads us to definitively consider S and H intentions as contextual criteria for framing and interpreting (im)politeness. In fact, just as meaning emerges as something that can be both inherent and non-inherent, so a verbal offence can be intentional as well as unintentional, since it “comes about when: 1) the speaker communicates face attack intentionally, or 2) the hearer perceives and/or constructs behaviour as intentionally face-attacking” (Culpeper 2011: 8). Intention involves not only what drives S to speak but also what affects H’s understanding of S’s utterance. Culpeper clarifies what he means by intentionality with an example: “A common context in which behaviour is known not to be intentional but is still taken as impoliteness causing offence concerns interactions between socially close individuals, typically partners. In such contexts, the person who produces impoliteness is held responsible for not foreseeing its offensive consequences” (2013: 5). The other contextual criterion regards the role of the hearer, who is gradually but markedly ascribed more and more agency in the construction of (im)polite meaning (Culpeper 2005, 2010, 2011). Whereas previously H had merely reacted to S’s speech acts, here s/he becomes directly involved in the creation of (im)­ politeness, considered to be the result of an interactional verbal process. It might be said that context does not simply pre-exist the speech act, thereby making it polite or impolite, but actually creates the conditions for its interpretation, which include the role of a speaker and an addressee. i.e. the intelligibility of S’s intentions and H’s perception and capacity for interpretation.

51

Overall, then, the question of whether (im)politeness is inherent in or contextual to language requires an evaluation that includes the micro- and macro-dimensions of language, from the sequence in which the utterance is spoken to the extra-textual elements providing information for determining whether the specific situation shows signs of a ‘pragmatic differential’ from semantics, or to put it differently, an implicational response where conventions would be expected. The question that must now be addressed is whether the relativized semantics and unpredictable implicature of (im)politeness can be applied to a historical era such as the early modern period, in which codes of politeness may have been differently expressed. This is the subject of the next chapter.

52

Chapter Two: (Im)politeness and the Early Modern period

Having outlined the salient stages in the development of a pragmatic theory of (im)politeness, we now turn to an investigation of (im)politeness as it emerges in the early modern period. Section 2.1 introduces Historical (Im)politeness and contextualises early modern politeness from a historical point of view, looking at historical events in relation to newhistoricist perspectives, the role of subjectivity and the semiotic analysis of cultural change. Section 2.2 examines historical definitions of politeness, looking at politeness terms and strategies from a diachronic perspective, while section 2.3 discusses politeness as a sociocultural practice.

2.1 Contextualising historical pragmatics and Early Modern (im)politeness This study aims to investigate early modern (im)politeness through two Shakespearean plays. The reason for this focus is the transitional nature of early modernity, marked by a residual feudal structure coexisting with proto-modern cultural unrest and social mobility. It is of great interest to investigate how forms of (im)politeness of medieval origin become modified, disappear or survive at the dawn of Modernity. Shakespeare, given the repository of situations, dialogues and characters of diverse social backgrounds he offers in his theatrical corpus, provides a remarkable representation of the verbal customs of his time, as well as being in himself an object of linguistic interest. This kind of analysis, studying the diachronic variations of linguistic phenomena identified through pragmatic methods and interpretative paradigms, is material for a specific field of research known as

‘Historical Pragmatics’, born in the wake of Jucker’s (1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2006) and Taavitsainen’s seminal work (1997, 2001, 2016). It focuses on three main areas of investigation – “the language use in earlier periods, the development of language use and the principles of such developments” (Jucker and Taavitsainen 2010: 6). In the 2010s a subarea – Historical (Im)politeness – devoted to the variation of politeness and impoliteness across time has flourished, inaugurated by the publication of Historical (Im)politeness (Culpeper and Kádár 2010) and of Understanding Historical (Im)politeness (Bax and Kádár 2012). As it falls into this field, therefore, the present study can only benefit from a discussion of the foundations on which these disciplines are built, clearly outlining the discursive perimeter that determines their specificities and thus also governs part of what follows. In their early days, both fields had to come to terms with the complications arising from the lack of knowledge of the natural language of periods before the advent of recording technologies and from doubts over the usage of written texts (the only available evidence in diachronic studies). The latter were seen as illegitimate sources of data (a position compounded when the texts under scrutiny were literary works, the most artificial on a virtual scale of ‘linguistic naturalness’).6 In the specific case of Historical (Im)politeness, then, objections also regarded the uncertainty over the effective applicability of models designed on and for contemporary speech to pre-modern language. Diachronic studies have mainly taken two paths: the refinement of a pragmatics of the written text and an expanded analysis of historical contexts, reconstructed and interpreted with the help of socio-cognitive and socio-anthropological approaches. With respect to the first point, Jacobs and Jucker (1995) and Jucker (1995, 2006), established the fundamental criteria for validating and legitimating written materials by observing that texts based on verbal events could be considered closer to orality than other types of texts. Though ‘oral’ and ‘natural’ are not 6

54

Jucker and Kopaczyk describe the suspicion of the written text as follows: “In the early days of historical pragmatics the legitimacy and validity of such data for pragmatic analysis was often questioned because it clearly does not tell us very much about the oral language use at the time. Researchers spent a considerable amount of time and effort in justifying their use of plays as data for pragmatic analysis” (435–436).

synonymous and belong to different linguistic and verbal dimensions, the existence of genres designed to be spoken (sermons, epistles, fictitious theatrical dialogues) or drawn up as reports of speech acts (fictitious pedagogical and narrative dialogues and trial proceedings) has made it possible to apply paradigms and models such as those emerging from the Theory of (Im)politeness even across time: [O]n the one hand, these historical records of spoken language may give us an approximation of the real spoken language in different historical and socio-cultural contexts; on the other, these instances warrant a pragmatic analysis in their own right. Thus, we may analyse the use of discourse markers in a play by Shakespeare, not because we believe that this is a particularly good approximation to how discourse markers were used in spoken conversations of Shakespeare’s time, but because we are directly interested in how Shakespeare used discourse markers in his plays. (Jucker 2006: 329)

Along this line, Culpeper and Kytö (2010), working out a suggestion on the language medium proposed by Koch and Oesterreicher (1985), have classified texts on a scale opposing communicative immediacy with communicative distance (rather than oral with written), thus identifying intermediate positions in what they term speech-related genres: • Speech-like, e.g. Personal correspondence • Speech-based, e.g. Trial proceedings • Speech-purposed, e.g. Plays. (Culpeper and Kytö 2010: 17)

Different in perspective, but analogously seminal for the refinement of a pragmatics of written texts, were Taavitsainen’s studies on genre (1997, 2001, 2016 to mention but a few) as well as her elucidation of the methodologies applicable to the field. In particular, in Fitzmaurice and Taavitsainen (2007), historical pragmatic methodologies are described and discussed also in relation to their grouping into quantitative – mostly computational and corpus-based – and qualitative – partly inheriting some traits of literary criticism, partly expanding the interdisciplinary investigation of socio-cultural contexts. The inclusion of socio-cognitive and socio-anthropological perspectives in pragmatic analyses of the context – and this is the second of the two points announced earlier – has made it possible to sharpen 55

the level of historicisation of phenomena such as (im)politeness, decisively contributing to limiting the risks deriving from anachronistic and blind applications of contemporary theories. Bax and Kádár (2012) have proposed a socio-pragmatic approach to (historical) (im)politeness that includes Geertzian paradigms for the examination of culture, seen as a network of meanings/signs rather than of laws, as a text in which any interpretation is superimposed and cannot invalidate other interpretations. Borrowing Geertz’s notion of “thick” description of culture, they have developed an analytical scheme aiming to “illuminate the continual reciprocity, and the inevitable interplay, between social practices and underlying sociocultural norms” so as to “single out the micro-macro links that allow for taking social (verbal) interaction as cultural practice” (5). Aligning the studies on conventionalisation (Terkourafi 2005, 2008; Culpeper 2010) and the socio-cognitive notion of “attitude schemata” (Culpeper 2011, Watts 2012) discussed in chapter one with Bax and Kádár’s (2012) concern with the practices/norms interface, a complex methodological tissue emerges whereby the “micro-macro links” appear central in themselves and as instruments to breach the wall of first-order diachronic (im) politeness: “[T]hick descriptions throw light on first-order understandings; that is, the meaning of interactional practices as construed by the participants themselves” (Bax and Kádár 2012: 5). In other words, thick descriptions allow us to acknowledge and account for the relational origin of language variation, for the social forces at stake in a given historical moment and for the role distinctive groups (classes) of speakers play in the practice/norm dialectics. In this perspective, the awareness of the genre specificities of written sources is of the utmost importance alongside the recognition of the points of view those sources express: “Whose politeness does the text represent?” (Kádár and Haugh 2013: 163) is the fundamental question for historical pragmatists, for written texts are always constructed and mediated representations. It might be said that, paradoxically, their subsisting as partial interpretations of a given culture (in a Geertzian sense), invest them with a status beyond their mere documentary value: like active speakers, written texts have concurred in the process of creating and interpreting meanings, in construing a cultural, social and linguistic perspective. It is on the basis of these suggestions that, in the following sections, Renaissance first-order (im)politeness is contextualized 56

and historicised, re-elaborating and extending the question “Whose politeness does the text represent?” to issues related to the interplay subsisting between Renaissance subjectivity, face-based language and culture. The reading of historical events is inspired by a newhistoricist perspective, while the socio-pragmatic approach leans towards semiotics and is completed by recourse to some lexical studies. Second-order politeness along with the integrated method employed in this study are presented in the final section of this chapter. 2.1.1 Historical events and newhistoricist perspectives The Renaissance was an age of great transformation and change, “a new world in which man was facing new responsibilities and the necessity to build a totally new system of values to replace the old values and rules of the feudal world that were irretrievably fading away” (de Filippis 2008: 119). Although the Tudors strove to consolidate the monarchy after the political instability of the War of the Roses (1455–1485), the maintenance of the status quo without significant variations ran up against a considerable number of destabilising events throughout the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth century.7 Columbus’s ‘discovery’ of the American continent, for example, brought about an expansion of navigation and trade, offering England the chance to widen its economic interests in the search for prosperity and independence, and enabling Henry VIII to pursue autonomy from foreign designs and influences – this was also to be on Elizabeth I’s agenda.8 The 1534 Anglican Reformation, a declaration of independence from the Pope, 7

8

Interesting discussions of historical and cultural conditions in England during the Renaissance are contained in the following studies: Baker et al. (1981); Barker (1984); Emmison (1970); Hattaway (2005); Greenblatt (1988); Hobsbawm (1965). Studies devoted to a more extensive analysis of the period from a European perspective are Burke (1989), or Kristeller (1990); Raimondi (1994) is also useful. Some useful terminology relating to early modern studies and the most relevant critical trends in relation to the Renaissance up to the 1990s have been taken from Marcus (1992). On this topic see Neale (1957). An original analysis of the difficult conditions of English absolute monarchy in the sixteenth century is offered by Moretti (1987), especially pages 50–60.

57

proved a turning point in this respect, causing the collapse of Monastic material and spiritual power and the beginning of a long process of Anglicisation of the liturgy and Scripture. This process of radical cultural revision was fostered by two factors: Luther’s nailing up of the famous 95 Theses, which started the spread of Protestantism, and the new ‘scientific’ thought that originated in the aftermath of Copernicus’s publication of De Revolutionibus Orbium (1543).9 The Tudors’ attempts to reinforce national identity were thus counterbalanced by events that ultimately undermined that identity from within. The replacement of the Ptolemaic world-order with the Heliocentric solar system significantly affected Elizabethan culture, causing the truths on which theology was based to be discarded and calling into question the “Great Chain of Being”10 – the gigantic world view according to which the Elizabethan world was discursively constructed. The Great Chain of Being was a legacy of medieval culture. The system it depicted was hierarchical and rigid in its positioning of people and things on an immovable ladder (Pagnini 1976: 125–126) and this hierarchical organization served to justify the social order. Tillyard, in his monumental analysis of the functioning of the Elizabethan world view, suggests that the conception of and need for ‘order’ was simply implied in any kind of conceptualization of the world at the time: “[T]he conception of order is so taken for granted, so much part of the collective mind of the people, that it is hardly mentioned except in explicitly didactic passages” (Tillyard 1943: 17). He goes on to claim that the idea of order was rooted in religion and was a harbinger of a particular mode of knowledge: “The conception of the world order was for the Elizabethans a principal matter; the other set of ideas that ranked with it was the theological scheme of sin and salvation” (Tillyard 1943: 26). Indeed, to disturb the cosmic order that assigned a place to everyone was seen 9

10

58

The first translation of Copernicus’s De Revolutionibus appeared in 1576; this was the first translation into a European language and ran through seven editions. On this topic, see Johnson (1937). Important discussions of the influence of Copernican thought and its intersection with the philosophical ideas of Giordano Bruno and other philosophers are contained in Sacerdoti (2009). Analysis of the Great Chain of Being as the constitutive framework of the Elizabethan world picture was the main focus of Tillyard’s well-known The Elizabethan World Picture (1943). The topic had already been analysed in Lovejoy (1936).

as ‘sinful’. Among potential attacks on the established divine order, the worst was regicide or any act against the monarchy or the authorities. This is why the Great Chain of Being was the last Tudor bulwark against the instability and centrifugal counter-discourses, particularly religious and social dissidence, that threatened its political authority. From a cultural-materialist perspective, Dollimore comments on Tillyard as follows: “Tillyard was not mistaken in identifying a metaphysics of order in the period […]. The error […] is falsely to unify history and social processes in the name of ‘the collective mind of people’ (1993: 5)”. The discrepancy between history and social processes alluded to by Dollimore concerns the emergence in society of new cultural forms, “[n]on-dominant elements interact[ing] with the dominant forms, sometimes coexisting with, or being absorbed or even destroyed by them, but also challenging, modifying or even displacing them” (Dollimore 1993: 6). These new energies, which Dollimore argues to be dangerous for the maintenance of the political stability represented by the Great Chain of Being, were “enclosures and the oppression of the rural poor; […] resistance to [State power]; reassessments of what actually were the dominant ideologies of the period […]; witchcraft; the challenge and containment of the carnivalesque; a feminist recovery of the actual conditions of women […]; conflict between class fractions within the State […]” (Dollimore 1993: 3). This was a conflict which pitted the ‘old’ residual system of the Great Chain of Being against the ‘new’ cultural forms emerging as a consequence of dissent and discontent. Belsey provides another reading of the causes of the emergence of alternative ways of thinking. She considers them to be both the products of collective social phenomena, like those listed by Dollimore above, and early symptoms of a more ‘proactive’ attitude towards the world, arguing that traditional Christian theology had previously attributed a passive role to the subject: To know God was not to master an object of knowledge, but to apprehend a meaning which was also truth. […] and fully to know God was not to differentiate oneself from the objects of knowledge but, on the contrary, to become absorbed in total presence, to be transformed and ultimately dissolved […]. Knowledge was also practice, uniting meaning and being in submission to the discourse and the discipline of salvation. It was thus absorption into the institution of the church and the body of the faithful. (Belsey 1985: 56)

59

Thus a series of active counter-discourses emerged in the sixteenth century in opposition to the passive reception of knowledge. Protestant Reform and the debates over Biblical exegesis gave rise to new relativist ways of interpreting the world. New approaches to Scripture based on individual interpretations paved the way for the refinement of alternative visions of the universe, which drew on other fields of knowledge such as cartography, anatomy and philosophy: “[T]he ideological and institutional uncertainties which immediately followed the breakdown of control by the Catholic church offered a space in which the empirical knowledge, not apparently in conflict with either Catholic or Protestant orthodoxy, was developed and modified to the point where experience was finally to supplant discourse as the source of truth” (Belsey 1985: 65). Anglican Reform and Luther’s Protestantism discarded the theological centres of power and doctrines that had hitherto gone undisputed, and carved out a space for individual response to faith, so that passive and unquestioning reception of knowledge became active re-elaboration and conceptualization of reality. Newhistoricist and cultural-materialist critics such as Dollimore and Belsey have rewritten the oppositions between ‘old’ (monarchical and religious discourse/Power) and ‘new’ (alternative counter-discourses) in terms of ‘containment’ by the old or ‘subversion’ by the new11. However, more recent positions tend to problematize this old vs. new dialectic in relation to the Renaissance by pluralizing not only the nature of the counter-discourses but also the configuration of Power itself. These new positions are inspired by a rereading of Foucault: Power’s condition of possibility […] must not be sought in the primary existence of a central point, in a unique source of sovereignty from which secondary and descendent forms would emanate; it is the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable. (Foucault 1978: 93)12 11

12

60

This approach is also discussed in Drakakis (1985). A fundamental study of Newhistoricism is Montrose (1992). I am indebted to this essay for the reconstruction and discussion of the different positions within this trend as well as for the delineation of the theoretical premises on which they operate. Another key study is Montrose (1989). Montrose illustrates this point further: “Within the context of the containment-subversion debate, my own position has been that a closed and static,

From this perspective, if counter-discourses are plural and come from various segments of society (Dollimore 1985: 3), the dominant ideology is also pluralized and vulnerable. The result is that, alongside a form of macro-power identifiable with the Monarchy and other institutions, there existed a form of micro-power whose agency lay in the potential or actual friction it could produce: cells of micro-power were minority groups of racial and religious ‘others’ which undermined the cohesion of society by introducing difference, or women, such as scolds and witches, who threatened the dominant role of male authority. Micro- and macro-power were asymmetrical since, in Paul Smith’s words, “[t]he symbolic realm, the place where we are in language and in social formations [that] constructs the ideological” indirectly determines the space where resistance can emerge. According to Smith it does this in such a way that “[resistance] takes place only within a social context which has already construed subject-positions for the human agent. The place of that resistance has, then, to be glimpsed somewhere in the interstices of the subject-positions which are offered in any social formation” (Smith 1988: 25).13

13

monolithic and homogeneous notion of ideology must be replaced by one that is heterogeneous and unstable, permeable and processual. […] In its emphasis on a dynamic, agonistic, and temporal model of culture and ideology – a ceaseless contest among dominant and subordinate positions, a ceaseless interplay of continuity and change, of identity and difference – such a perspective opens cultural poetics to history” (Montrose 1992: 404–405). Montrose offers another pertinent definition of the relations governing cultures and subjects: “the processes of subjectification and structuration are both interdependent and ineluctably historical; that the apparent systematicity of society is produced, adjusted, and transformed by means of the interactive social practices of individuals and groups; and that there is no necessary relationship between the intentions of actors and the outcomes of their actions – in other words, that their effectivity is conjunctural or situational and, to varying degrees, contingent. The possibilities for action are always socially and historically situated, always limited and limiting. Nevertheless, collective structures may enable as well as constrain individual agency; and they may be potentially enabling precisely when they are experienced by the subject as multiple, heterogeneous, and even contradictory in their imperatives. […] Thus my invocation of the term subject is meant to suggest an equivocal process of subjectification: on the one hand, it shapes individuals as loci of consciousness and initiators of action, endowing them with subjectivity and with the capacity for agency; and, on the other hand, it positions, motivates, and constrains them within – it

61

Here Smith introduces a key-concept – the subject. As illustrated in chapter one, an understanding of the role of the speaker is one aspect of the speaker-culture-language triangle needed for a full pragmatic account of (im)politeness. To understand the ideology vs. resistance dichotomy and its relation to (im)polite language, we must now explore the notion of the subject, and of subjectivity, from a historical perspective. 2.1.2 Subjectivity and the Renaissance The question of subjectivity has been one of the most controversial in Renaissance studies. Traditional ‘essentialist humanist’ views, such as those of Burckardt (1961) and Bradley (1904), based on an ahistorical concept of the ‘subject’ endowed with self-consciousness and self-determination in relation to the surrounding world, have been supplanted by newhistoricist or cultural-materialist positions, for which the early modern subject was less an individual and more a product of cultural factors. While the first generation of newhistoricists (Barker, Belsey, Greenblatt) considered the Renaissance subject to be totally lacking in interior identity, later critics such as Eisaman Maus (1995) and, from a psychoanalytic perspective, Pye (1990) have reinstated this as a key aspect of the early modern subject. In the 1980s, Greenblatt summarised the denial of autonomy and selfconsciousness to the Renaissance individual as follows: It seemed to me the very hallmark of the Renaissance that middle-class and aristocratic males began to feel that they possessed such shaping power over their lives, and I saw this power and the freedom it implied as an important element in my own sense of the self. But as my work progressed, I perceived that fashioning oneself and being fashioned by cultural institutions – family, religion, state – were inseparably intertwined. In all my texts and documents, there were, so far as I could tell, no moments of pure, unfettered subjectivity; indeed, the human subject itself began to seem remarkably unfree, the ideological product of the relations of power in a particular society. (Greenblatt 1980: 256)

subjects them to – social networks and cultural codes, forces of necessity and contingency, that ultimately exceed their comprehension or control” (Montrose 1992: 414–415).

62

Over the past thirty years, the critical debate surrounding subjectivity has been reluctant to speak in terms of ‘identity’. Greenblatt claims to have found no evidence of ‘pure subjectivity’ independent of society and culture. Likewise, Barker (1984) states that an authentic Renaissance inner reality, such as that attributed to Hamlet by previous critics, is a mystery simply because there is nothing to it: “interiority remains, in Hamlet, gestural […]. At the centre of Hamlet, in the interior of his mystery, there is, in short, nothing” (Barker 1984: 36–37). However, there have also been alternative views. Eisaman Maus, for instance, has argued as follows: The new-historicist critique insists, correctly in my view, that the ‘self’ is not independent of or prior to its social context. Yet that critique often seems to assume that once this dependence is pointed out, inwardness simply vaporizes […]. It may well be true that Renaissance notions of interior truth turn out to be philosophically defective: they are rarely elaborated or rigorously argued for. But lack of rigor neither limits the extent of, nor determines the nature of, the power such ideas can exert. Murkiness and illogicality may, in fact, enhance rather than limit their potency. (Eisaman Maus 1995: 28)14

A rhetoric of “inwardness” is undeniably a trait of Renaissance culture and the fact that it is often expressed by difference or as having negative connotations – i.e. it can be defined in terms of what one is not rather than what one is – does not mean that the subject does not possess agency or assertiveness. The micro-power of individual subjects may be located in the interstices created by conflicting social forces, fashioning the self – as Greenblatt writes – on a definite feeling of being unfree. The specificity of this micro-power resides in the way it develops a sense of inwardness, which is the space produced by the friction between what society imposes and what subjects really want. Surface adherence to institutional authority does not correspond to the inner desires of people (individuals or groups). 14

From a psycho-analytical perspective, Pye criticises both ‘humanist’ critics and critics of the first generation of newhistoricism: “While one can read in Jakob Burckhardt’s full subject the projected image of nineteenth-century positivist historiography […] one might equally ask from what transcendental posture outside his or her own cultural and subjective universe the contemporary cultural analyst claims descriptive access to a purely different being, a nonsubject or a presubject” (Pye 1990: 1).

63

Taking this newhistoricist perspective on the cultural and historical dynamics of the Renaissance, we now explore semiotic approaches to the use of language within the culture/subject dyad in order to expand the pragmatic scope of the study in the direction of a broader contextualization of (im)politeness and of an understanding of its place and configuration in the sign-system of the time.15 2.1.3 Language and semiosis What newhistoricism has conceptualised as the ideology/resistance dialectic can be rewritten in semiotic terms as an opposition between ‘centre’ and ‘margins’. The subversive forces singled out by Dollimore are interpreted by Bigliazzi (2005) as “margins” not yet endowed with a recognizable symbolic value, whereby the centre corresponds to the dominant model already in possession of codified significance and related cultural value (2005: 9). This binary configuration can be better understood by recalling the way in which culture creates systems of signs with recognizable significance through semiosis: Talking about cultural models, it should be remembered that from a semiotic point of view […] we interpret the formalization of the world according to a network of signs that transforms nature from an indistinct and chaotic continuum into a structure, a bearer of ‘meanings’. Once natural chaos has been modelled into a second-degree system, it gets entangled in structures and acquires a meaning that is then translated into codes and texts. In this perspective, the indistinct takes form and is evaluated within an axiological (epistemic, ethics, etc.) framework. […] [The] cultural codes do not limit themselves to describing what is simply there but endow it with value […]. That is why the words of the code are never neutral […] because in their use they are channelled into pre-ordered paths of meaning, endowed with social and ideological value. (Bigliazzi 2005: 6, my translation)

15

64

Keir Elam provides a clear definition of Semiotics: “Semiotics can best be defined as a science dedicated to the study of the production of meaning in society. As such it is equally concerned with processes of signification and with those of communication, i. e. the means whereby meanings are both generated and exchanged. Its objects are thus at once the different sign-systems and codes at work in society and the actual messages and texts produced thereby” (1980: 1).

This semiotic process is particularly problematic for the Renaissance because its counter-systems emerged from within the dominant system to challenge it. Lotman and Uspenskij (1975) explain how cultures generally cope with varieties of models in their fabric, by suggesting that “the need for structural variety is connected to […] the fact that every culture, apart from its extra-cultural background symbolically located underneath its level, distinguishes particular spheres that are differently organised; from an axiological viewpoint, these spheres are highly relevant, although they are situated outside the general organising system” (Lotman and Uspenskij 1975: 64–65, my translation). Different axiologies are located outside the main system, which perceives them, Bigliazzi argues, as entropic forces or as erroneous models in relation to the correct model. What is unusual in the case of the Renaissance is that these “destructuring margins” surface at the centre of the model, enabling entropy to erupt from within the dominant code (Bigliazzi 2005: 9). To put it differently, the dynamics between centre and margins in the Renaissance are anomalous – a movement that locates cultural diversity as a disruptive element at the centre of the dominant semiosis, creating entropic variations of signs and their underlying axiologies. Serpieri provides another description of the heterogeneous sign-system of early modern England: [T]he terms of the great structural and epistemological crisis that occurred between the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries […] can be summarized as the conflict between a symbolic model of the world (a classical-medievalRenaissance heritage) and a syntagmatic model of the world, inaugurating the relativism of the modern age. […] The two models reflect […] two distinct visions of language itself as the primary modelling system of a culture: motivated language versus arbitrary language. As a consequence, the word will be, in the first model, a linguistic interpretation, reserved mainly for the leader, of the general Sense of the world; whereas in the second model, arising out of a conflict with the first, the word will present itself as a deconstruction of this symbolic hermeneutics, in the name of a social project involving, if not ‘the people’ itself as the subject of history (democracy), at least the many who are able and willing to lead human affairs. (Serpieri 1985: 125–126)

The symbolic model finds concrete expression in the motivated language of official institutions, which coalesces around salient words 65

with meanings that relate to social codes and behaviour, whereas the syntagmatic model is represented by the arbitrary language of alternative axiologies, which introduces relativistic ways of interpreting and shaping reality. The signs relating to the latter can be regarded as still awaiting full formalization, as in Bigliazzi’s process of model-formation. As a consequence, it is hard to provide extra-contextual examples without inferential interpretation from the dominant code. Serpieri uses the Shakespearean word ceremony as a good example of symbolic language. It has “categorematic” value because it “serves as a paradigmatic vehicle for the very sense of the symbolic world-order, and of the idea of royalty which represents that world-order” (Serpieri 1985: 120). His analysis of the occurrences and use of “ceremony”16 shows how symbolic language can be corroded by a semantic shift in its codified meaning: [C]eremony should be understood as the epiphany of the symbolic cosmos, be it classical or medieval. Other meanings are all corollaries to this dominant meaning […]. The same word can be applied to the rank, sign and ritual of the State and the body politic […]. But the ceremony is also fictitious, the spectacle of a crisis, rather than its ritual and solemn confirmation, when it is presented as a façade that covers corruption and deception. (Serpieri 1986: 131, my translation)

The word ceremony implies symbolic meanings and values that start to lose their known connotations together with their institutional meaning. My hypothesis in relation to politeness, then, is that courtesy, a word related to the practice of politeness at the time, works as a categorematic term, bearing symbolic values that are undergoing a process of syntagmatic transformation.

16

66

In “Reading the Signs: towards a semiotics of Shakespearean drama” (1985), Serpieri uses examples from Henry V and Julius Caesar and in Retorica e Immagi­nario (1986), he extends his analysis of the function of the word ‘ceremony’ to Richard II and other history plays.

2.2 Diachronic definitions of politeness terms and strategies This section provides a quantitative and qualitative overview of politeness terminology, and in particular of the way in which the word “courtesy” and related terms have evolved over time. The terminology of politeness needs to be discussed within an accurate diachronic framework for two reasons: firstly because words such as “courtesy” and “courtly” designate the very practices and meanings to be subjected to theoretical scrutiny, and secondly because they may incorporate “pieces” of culture that are associated with the symbolic dominant code hypothesised by Serpieri or that may be moving towards new uses and meanings. 2.2.1 Politeness terms from a diachronic perspective Looking first at politeness terms, the word “courtesy” emerges as the most relevant from a diachronic perspective. It was introduced into Middle English as a loanword from the Old French ‘curteisie’. According to Kjellmer, “its meaning was ‘courteous behaviour, courtly elegance and politeness of manners; graceful politeness and considerateness in intercourse with others’ (OED, courtesy 1.a) or, as a quality, ‘courteous disposition; courteousness; also nobleness, generosity, benevolence, goodness’ (obs.) (OED, courtesy 2.a)” (Kjellmer 2006: 291). The Latin etymology – cohors meaning “court”, “enclosure” – which is also the origin of “court” in the sense of “princely residence”, adds something to this description, suggesting political connotations (see also section 2.2.3). Terkourafi (2008) has shown that the word “polite”, meaning “smoothed, polished”, already existed in English in 1398 but did not acquire a meaning close to “courteous” (the adjective correlating to “courtesy” as “polite” correlates to “politeness”) until 1751. The corresponding noun – “politeness” – only appears in 1627 with a figurative meaning – “intellectual refinement, elegance, taste” – thereafter

67

overlapping with “courtesy” (2008: 61). This historical semantic survey serves to explain why the investigation of Renaissance (im)politeness should be entrusted to the terms actually in use at the time and not retrospectively applied. This would be the case if we concentrated exclusively on words linked with “polite, politeness”. Schulze (1985) explicitly connects the practice of politeness in Western civilisations to two verbal and non-verbal ‘behaviours’, coalescing around the terms (1) “courtesy” and (2) “deference”, accompanied by a group of similar words, such as “conduct”, “deference”, “courtesy”, “civility”, and “politeness”, but with slight differences in their occurrences. “Courtesy” and “civility”, according to Schulze, pertain to the court and emerging town life in the late Middle Ages and the early modern period, while “conduct”, “deference” and “politeness” were more frequently used at the end of the fifteenth century in the modern sense of politeness (Schulze 1985: 21–22). Schulze’s argument fits well with Terkourafi’s data and further justifies the use of the term “courtesy” as a marker of what politeness was in the Renaissance. Schulze’s distinctions between the relative importance of specific words at specific times also suggest semantic shifts that may signal changes in the social mores relating to those words. From a semiotic and specifically pragmatic perspective, these changes underlie precise configurations of the sign-system that signal simultaneous transformations in the conceptualization of polite manners and in the way these manners provide a site of intersection between individuals and institutions. Pragmatic analysis will uncover the relation between these signs and early modern speakers. 2.2.2 Politeness and language strategies from the Anglo-Saxon period to the 18th century Having discussed the development of politeness terminology, this section examines the diachronic developments of the politeness principles, strategies and facework discussed in chapter one. An early trace of the kinds of social practices tied to politeness in past eras can be found in Jucker’s 2010 study of (im)politeness in

68

relation to Old English, Anglo-Saxon society and Middle English, analysing Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales and epistolary material from the sixteenth century. The premise of his argument is as follows: [T]here is growing evidence that for the Anglo-Saxon society face-based politeness did not play a significant role. Communication and interaction were governed by different principles. These principles were more concerned with the position of an individual within a hierarchical society and within the larger context of a world governed by a Christian God. In this context, the face wants of the individual played only a marginal role. (Jucker 2010: 179)

According to Jucker, the emergence of facework began after the AngloSaxon period and under the influence of the Normans following the 1066 Conquest; use of the French language and the adoption of new habits and manners brought with them a new view of social relationships that required a different way of showing deference. The concept of curteisie played a fundamental role in this transition through the introduction of conventionalised politeness formulae which Jucker classifies as “discernment politeness”:17 I want to distinguish between strategic or face-based politeness and discernment politeness. Strategic politeness comprises forms of politeness that are used in order to save, maintain and enhance face in the sense of Brown and Levinson […]. [D]iscernment politeness describes the choice of socially adequate forms of behaviour, forms that are not primarily concerned with face maintenance but with conforming to social conventions and maintaining social relationships. I do not see the two types of politeness as mutually exclusive, I prefer to think of them as two different aspects of verbal interaction that may differ in their importance in different societies, and their importance may differ in different periods of the development of one language. (Jucker 2010: 176–177)

17

Discernment Politeness was theorised and discussed in Hill et al. (1986); Ide (1989); Matsumoto (1989); Mazzon (2003). Mazzon, in particular, makes a distinction between discernment and volition (strategic) politeness, which she explains as follows: “[A] polarity drawn from pragmatics could be useful […]: discernment vs. volition; the former is the observation of rules of social behaviour as they are enforced in a particular community at any particular time – the latter is a conscious choice of verbal forms with special communicative and/ or pragmatic aims in mind” (2003: 228).

69

“Discernment politeness” (or DP) emerges as an antecedent form of NP, characterised not by a rank of imposition (the social variable P) induced by a vertical distance between S and H, but by “linguistic forms chosen in response to the social context, and not as a strategy to avert a face threat” (Jucker 2010: 196, emphasis added). Implying that deference is the fifth of B&L’s Negative Polite strategies, Jucker concludes that “the deference type of negative politeness can be seen as having its origin in forms of Middle English discernment politeness” (Jucker 2010: 196) and that its evolution is visible in the strategic facework characterising “courtesy” in the Renaissance: “[b]y the end of the fifteenth century […] there is already a considerable amount of evidence for a politeness culture based on face-work” (Jucker 2010: 179). In other words, Jucker traces a link between Medieval ‘curteisie’ and early modern ‘courtesy’, but he also makes a distinction between the two. He argues that a change occurs in the Renaissance and that this change is tied to the emergence of facework. This adds a variant to the deferential pattern by introducing face-saving strategies. The emergence of fully codifiable face work (according to B&L’s categories) is confirmed by Kopytko (1995), who, in his extensive examination of Shakespeare’s plays, reaches the following conclusion: I tentatively assume that the high rate of occurrence of positive politeness strategies in Shakespeare’s plays characterises the interactional style or ‘ethos’ of Elizabethan society. It should be stressed, however, that this assumption is valid for in-group politeness only. There is no reason to believe that Shakespeare created an ‘artificial’ society in his plays rather than reflected the one he belonged to. This is surprising, especially in view of the popular claims about the interactional style of modern British society which is associated instead with high social distance (D), i.e. negative politeness culture. If both claims, i.e. about the Elizabethan society and modern British society, are at least to some degree true, it may be tentatively proposed that the interactional style or ‘ethos’ of British society has evolved from the dominating positive politeness culture in the 16th century towards the modern negative politeness culture. (Kopytko 1995: 531–532)

Overall, it may be said that the key implications for politeness strategies in the Renaissance are that: 1) Shakespeare’s texts contain a great deal of PP, though NP is also present; 2) PP functions as an in-group device; 3) The PP characterising the Renaissance contrasts with the modern tendency towards a predominance of NP. With regard to NP, in the Renaissance the honorifics and formulaic deferential expressions that marked Middle 70

English politeness may have turned into ‘strategic’ negative politeness, characterised by forms of non-imposition over H, i.e. forms of conventional indirectness that would not disturb or damage H’s negative face. Although these Renaissance forms would eventually come to predominate in later modern English, in the eighteenth century there was a change of course: The aim of politeness was to reach an accommodation with the complexities of modern life and to replace political zeal and religious bigotry with mutual tolerance and understanding. The means of achieving this was a manner of conversing and dealing with people which by teaching one to regulate one’s passions and cultivate good taste, would allow one to realize what was in the public interests and for the general good. It involves both learning a technique of self-discipline and adopting the values of a refined, moderate sociability. (Brewer 1997: 102)

Kopytko’s comment on the negative nature of modern politeness is evident in Brewer’s quotation, in which self-discipline and moderation are qualities required for the fulfilment of social, civic ideals. Fitzmaurice (2010), analysing the changes of politeness in the eighteenth century, slightly revises Brewer, revealing a subtext that adds something to the ideal and ideological claims of modern politeness: As the century progresses […] the focus of polite behaviour on facilitating easy and informal interaction gives way to resorting to the practice of good manners to deceive one’s interlocutors. Politeness as a value becomes attached to certain symbols, forms and rituals that merely echo earlier notions of ease, familiarity and sociability, and thus devalue it so that it signifies little more than the etiquette regulating personal interactions. Accordingly, politeness is associated less with the manner of interaction, the reciprocity of accommodative conversation and consideration of the other, and more with the superficial forms of polite discourse as exemplified in forms of address, ritual greetings and salutations, and a stock lexicon. (2010: 88)

Fitzmaurice argues here that politeness in the eighteenth century also has a dark side, since it is either used to deceive or is simply an empty form of etiquette. This deceptive aspect of politeness may be a derivative form of Renaissance PP since Shakespeare’s corpus is full of episodes of subtle deception achieved through flattery – Richard conquering Lady Anna’s heart in Richard III (1. 2. 175–455) or Iago persuading Othello (3. 3. 30–300). 71

Overall, the studies by Jucker, Kopytko, Brown and Gilman, Brewer and Fitzmaurice argue for a four-stage development process for politeness from Old English to the eighteenth century: 1) 2) 3)

4)

a non-face-based kind of politeness in Old English; a form of discernment politeness in Middle English that was tied to the French term curteisie and its cognitive and social correlates; largely face-based politeness in Early Modern English, in which discernment politeness evolved into Negative Politeness but Positive Politeness strategies predominate; a rebalancing of NP and PP in the eighteenth century with a prevalence of NP.

In this diachronic reconstruction of the evolution of politeness, it is sufficient to note that discernment, negative and positive politeness coexist in the Renaissance in a rich, heterogeneous pattern, which was soon to change direction. In their important study on politeness in Shakespeare’s tragedies Brown and Gilman (1989), as well as Jucker (2010), insist a great deal on deference and NP. Their foregrounding of a shift from discernment politeness (DP) to NP raises the following questions: Could discernment politeness represent the symbolic language (the code of the old cosmos in decline) and could the appearance of NP be a symptom of the emergence of a syntagmatic form of expression testifying to the creation of symbolic space inhabited by an individual I? Could PP play the role of a vector, enhancing the importance of individuality? Starting from the premise that the patterns of variation emerging from the above diachronic examination of politeness have highlighted the heterogeneity of the phenomenon and its discursive nature – i.e. politeness has been shown to be a historicisable, context-governed practice – this study tentatively assumes that courtesy as a practice and as an object of debate triggered a process culminating in the formation of a new kind of subjectivity. This new subjectivity was affected by facework, evident from the emergence during the period of both PP and NP. It was distant from the “I” of the Middle Ages and closer but not equal to the modern notion of identity. Courtesy in the sixteenth century did not follow the emergence of face and was not a consequence of it. On the contrary, the questioning of who and what was courteous – through discernment 72

politeness, debates over courtesy and social rituals of mutual recognition – was intrinsic to the development of the idea that face was involved in the perception of both an exterior and an inner self. These perceptions are the subject of the next section.

2.3 Politeness as a sociocultural practice Courtesy in the Renaissance was not simply an attitude and it was not simply etiquette. It was a performative social practice that formed part of the fabric of the English monarchy and State in the aftermath of the War of the Roses, when the early Tudors were attempting to emulate other European courts by promoting culture and inquiring into the proper manners and values of the ruling class. Their goal was to achieve political stability by creating a sense of cohesion through a unified culture in order to combat the internal conflicts that had arisen as a consequence of the precarious state of the aristocracy and the economic growth of the middle classes: “Throughout the sixteenth century, a dynamic social process in England can be observed in which an established sector [aristocracy] felt the need to create and redefine its constitutive identity, while the rising non-aristocratic classes attempted to refashion their status” (Steppat 1994: 28). The discovery of the New Worlds and the rise of mercantilism had replaced the old social and economic order with a more dynamic vision of trade and commerce. A new sense of openness towards exploration and enterprise had engendered both curiosity and anxiety, which triggered a quest for social advancement. The social structure of the time, framed by the Great-Chain-ofBeing conception of the world discussed above, was famously described by William Harrison in The Description of England (1577) as follows: We, in England, divide our people commonly into four sorts, as gentlemen, citizens or burgesses, yeomen, and artificers or labourers. Of gentlemen the first and chief (next the king) be the prince, dukes, marquesses, earls, viscounts, and barons; and these are called gentlemen of the greater sort, or (as our common usage of speech is) lords and noblemen: and next unto them be knights, esquires, and, last of all, they that are simply called gentlemen. […] The fourth and last

73

sort of people in England are day-labourers, poor husbandmen, and some retailers (which have no free land), copyholders, and all artificers, as tailors, shoemakers, carpenters, brickmakers, masons, etc. (67)

This portrait suggests a comprehensive division of society into social groups that had to be made recognizable. Politeness played a pivotal role in this process of recognition, since it was able to identify people’s degree of nobility and hence their place in society. Manners defined social rank and were both a way of expressing oneself and a way for the upper echelons of society to be shown the proper forms of respect and deference: “Public acknowledgement of a man’s status by use of appropriate salutations was as automatic and essential then as an enlisted man’s salute to his officer is today” (Replogle 1973: 176). Thus, courtesy did not spring from affability as an interpersonal feeling, but as a means of establishing one’s position in the discursive structure – a structure that obviously reflected class hierarchy: “Ascribed status was still the basis of social structure and there were elaborate politeness rituals for each gradation of hereditary aristocracy. In addition, however, the period from 1540 to 1640 was a period of increasing social mobility” (Brown and Gilman 1989: 171). This was unprecedented and was perceived by those at the top of the hierarchy as a threat, while for the socially ambitious the difficulty in climbing the social ladder was frustrating. The general atmosphere in this respect was one of widespread discontent, a feeling of self-division that has been described as “psychically disturbed” (White 1974: 26; Mucci 2001:7), and a discordia concors-world (Colie 1966: 304). In this context, there was a surge of interest in courtesy as a social practice: “There was a great scramble to achieve position in a noble court and great uneasiness among the nobility at this pressure from below” (Brown and Gilman 1989:171). Nobles faced a decline in chivalric values and the shift towards civil obligations obliged them to review their status: [T]he dividing line between gentlemen or the lower nobility and the yeoman or freeholder class was punctured. This development, opening courtly awards to those who through education cultivated the suave skills of the literate administrator, was supported to some degree by the Reformation with its emphasis on the identity and conscience of the individual person. With the decline of chivalry, the aristocracy’s nominal power remained, but its substantial base was becoming questionable. (Steppat 1994: 29)

74

Courtesy, indispensable for inclusion among the elites, was accessible only to a few and was difficult to fully master for most. As a result, interest in courtesy grew, fuelling an intense literary and cultural debate: “Ambition and insecurity created a heightened concern for the signs of true gentility, verbal and non-verbal politeness. And a special genre of literature came into being; courtesy books, which were guides to advancement for the lowly and assurances of superiority for the lordly” (Brown and Gilman 1989: 171). Courtesy books, while aiming to teach the qualities that made the aristocracy, also constructed those qualities by providing the arguments on which social differences could be defined: “The main interest of most of these writings was to show how the male individual who seeks to define his social status by membership in a gentlemanly class is a race of his own, needing to maintain an essential difference of social verticality” (Steppat 1994: 28). Theories spread about the ideal courtier as a sum of humanist values, and the proper education for royalty was debated: Thomas Elyot’s The Book named the Governour (1531), Thomas Hoby’s The Book of the Courtier (1561) – a translation of Castiglione’s Il libro del cortegiano (1528) – and Roger Ascham’s The schoolmaster (1563) are among the best examples of this humanist debate on courtly manners and values, which also involved important translations to the English cultural context, such as Giovanni della Casa’s Il Galateo (1558)18 and Stefano Guazzo’s La Civil Conversazione (1574)19. The consequence of this debate,20 and of the corpus of didactic writing on the proper manners and customs of the courtier, was that courtesy soon came to serve a dual purpose: on the one hand, it was construed as an inner quality inherently characterising the aristocrat whilst, on the other, it concerned exterior behaviour and was seen as something that could be acquired along with the use of proper manners, such as polite formulae for greetings or a courtly bearing. This dual nature of courtesy as something inherently possessed by the subject and something that could be learned gave rise to a series of strategies for self-preservation by the elite against the assaults of the lower classes who aspired to a better position. Brown and Gilman insist on the extreme intricacy and complexity of this code: 18 19 20

Translated into English by Robert Peterson in 1576. Translated into English by George Pettie in 1581. An interesting discussion of the heterogeneous nature of humanist interventions in the debate over courtesy is offered by Richards (2003), especially chapter three.

75

In Elizabethan England, there were many young men attempting to enter the ruling elite, and there was a distinctive genre of books telling them how to go about it. Concern for the feelings of others was evidently not enough to generate the fastidious details of dress, of sitting, walking, and bowing, of elegant locution, graceful posture, deference, and self-deprecation […]. The code was so intricate that […] its first purpose, for the aristocracy, was to repress mobility, and certainly it was a filter that excluded many. (Brown and Gilman 1989: 201)21

Steppat goes further and identifies a more subtle strategy of self-preservation based on the strategic use of rhetoric: For the privileged elite, those who are used to lording, there is thus considerable need of a defensive weapon able to ensure collective survival. […] Instruction in persuasive strategies can thus serve the needs of containment, but likewise also the self-ascriptive needs of climbers […]. If defensive ability rests on rhetorical power, not necessarily on substantial superiority, submission on the part of […] ‘underlinges’ conversely depends on the inability to recognize that power is inscribed in rhetorical function […]; what counts is not substance but wit, not the deed but the word. (Steppat 1994: 30–31)

It is important to clarify that rhetorical power is only partially identifiable with appropriateness of speech, or with the codified and conventionalised language that appeared in the courtesy-books of the time.22 Rhetorical power was strategic and aimed at persuading, and to some extent secretly manipulating, one’s interlocutors. On the one hand, it involved a codified form of polite conversation able to express and reflect vertical, hierarchical relationships through expected formulae of homage and social recognition; on the other, there was a horizontal axis of confrontation between 21 22

76

Whigham (1984) was the first to suggest this hypothesis. Other studies on this topic are Stone (1966) and Wildeblood (1965). In the wake of the translation of Castiglione and Il libro del cortegiano (1528) by Thomas Hoby, many books on polite conversation flourished in England, defining and disseminating the rules of good conversation and codifying its various forms: for example, conversing with the monarch had totally different rules from conversing with one’s equal, as Kopytko makes clear: “Conversation with the monarchs should consist mainly of information, flattery or respectful silence – witticisms are allowed only in conversation with equals. Since the rules of conversation have always aimed for the protection of mutual respect, conversational theory consequently tends to demand not only social but also intellectual equality in those who converse with each other” (1993: 55).

speakers where what counted was the individual ability to use words to obtain goals contravening what was prescribed by social roles or what was allowed by the rules of social mobility. Conversation thus became a new battlefield where words were used in place of swords. The power of rhetoric to manipulate is a well-known trait of Renaissance culture. The importance attributed to the study of rhetoric is illustrated by John Case’s Sphaera Civitatis (1588), which presents the effigy of Queen Elizabeth embracing a globe made up of concentric circles including the following civil virtues: Iustitia Immobilis, Prudentia, Fortitudo, Religio, Clementia, Facundia and Ubertas Rerum.

Figure 2.1: John Case’s Sphaera Civitatis.

Facundia, which means “powerful language, eloquence” is located in the third circle from the centre outside Iustitia (Justice) and Ubertas Rerum (Abundance). This shows its pre-eminence among the virtues. The importance attributed to eloquence by the Elizabethans is also attested by the number of rhetorical manuals available and by the introduction of grammar and rhetoric to the universities and “grammar schools” of the time. In particular, as Corti suggests: 77

[T]hrough incessant practice, and mixing poetics and rhetoric without category preconceptions, Elizabethan authors aimed to use language as the proper way to achieve persuasion and proximity to the Truth. They borrowed the forms of oratory and legal debate, combining them with rhetorical figures, to involve the reader and guide his/her reaction; thus, the classical methaxis, i.e. the complicity of the audience with the textual axiology, became fundamental to literary expression. (Corti 1994: 376, my translation)

Corti, like Steppat, stresses that manipulation was the main goal of rhetorical skill, especially with reference to writing. Rhetoric was certainly a weapon in the hands of the Tudors and later the Stuarts, preoccupied with maintaining order and stability and containing anxiety and unrest through recourse to propaganda and discursive practices of every kind. The fact that courtesy and polite conversation both involved a combination of formulaic deferential language and strategic rhetoric is highly relevant to the emergence of subjectivity characterised by face, and connects well with the newhistoricist and semiotic perspectives discussed above. Politeness in its pragmatic sense may have functioned as a site of interaction, fostering the development of a sense of proper social behaviour – a distinctive way of affirming one’s value and status, or a way of proving oneself worthy of social advancement – but also a strategy for containing the advancement of others and counteracting submission to institutional discourse. In this perspective, politeness should be regarded as both a normative device for assigning hierarchical position and categorising groups, and as an instrument for the realization of indirect forms of reaction to this assignation. The need for the upper echelons of society to regulate discourse through politeness, which has been shown to be characteristic of the Renaissance period, suggests that the monarchy (and power in general) perceived that the hierarchical structure it dominated was under threat from below. We have already hinted at the new syntagmatic prelude to modernity coalescing around a series of counter-discourses. In the specific case of politeness, this study argues that the ramifications of face-functions and the emergence of strategic politeness have much to do with the need to orient opposition to the prevailing discourse without making this opposition apparent. The constrictions and restrictions created by power through its rituals and codified forms of behaviour required, from a certain point on, the establishment of counter-codes, 78

subtle forms of reaction constructed via the diffusion and refinement of rhetoric – the same rhetoric exploited by Power. But while Power’s linguistic forms were governed by a vertical variable (what B&L call the P variable) and can be identified with macro-power, the forms enacted in reaction to it necessarily had to be assigned to a horizontal axis (the D variable), which corresponds to micro-power. The abundance of complex stylistic figures and implicatures shown to characterise Renaissance textuality, and especially the Shakespearean corpus, arguably give voice to a subterranean struggle against official power. This voice avails itself of indirect speech acts and of NP and PP with their different forms of mitigation of FTAs. Use of these forms may be related to the gap between inwardness and outwardness, which Eisaman Maus connects to the stratification of the Renaissance subject: [I]n late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century England the sense of discrepancy between “inward disposition” and “outward appearance” seems unusually urgent and consequential for a very large number of people, who occupy virtually every position on the ideological spectrum. (Eisaman Maus 1995: 13)

The climate of religious persecution and Catholic dissidence, and the survival strategies adopted by other individuals and minority groups against macropower arguably reflect this discrepancy and the new rhetorical counter-code that emerged as a consequence of it: Attempts to enforce religious conformity can become lessons in the advisability of keeping one’s opinions – or the fact that one has no opinion – to oneself. This experience, too, while less sensational than the experience of the declared heretic, calls attention to the strategic difference between thought and utterance, secret conviction and external manifestation. (Eisaman Maus 1995: 19)

The widespread adoption of this counter-code was not just a consequence of a need for secrecy but of the fact that the number of interactants with whom an individual could come into contact was increasing: The rapid urbanization of English literate culture must have powerfully exacerbated many of the tensions just described. […] the city-dweller had to interact with a dramatically larger number and variety of people. The changes were qualitative as well as quantitative. The new urbanite needed to learn to manage a wider spectrum of familiarities: from almost anonymous interactions with

79

unknown persons, to casual attachments with acquaintances, to the intimate relationships among family members and close friends. If, as apparently often happened, a “vertical” change in class status accompanied “horizontal” or geographical displacement, the resulting disorientation must have been even more acute. (Eisaman Maus 1995: 24)

Interacting with so many people, sometimes under conditions of insecurity or personal danger, made the ability to speak and interpret speech an urgent issue, especially in the absence of any referential hermeneutic paradigm. Through the secure pattern of conventional and expected communicative codes, words could be used as a means of corroding the surface of these codes. The need to persuade, manipulate, deceive, attack or defend oneself by mitigating the appearance of the threat by making it run ‘underneath’ the utterance, seems a plausible explanation for the transition from Medieval “curteisie” to early modern face-based “courtesy”. In conclusion, the impossibility of speaking one’s mind under the impositions of the monarchy and the church in the Renaissance period, alongside the insurgence of dissent and ambition, may have brought with it a counter-code of politeness, involving expressions of courtesy that were not just greetings or deferential formulae. What Eisamann Maus calls the “strategic difference between thought and utterance” is what politeness as a strategy accounts for. It is therefore argued that B&L’s theory of politeness, with some modifications, can be usefully applied to the early modern period in order to understand the workings of this counter-code. The remaining problem is to define a method for analysing politeness in the Shakespearean text as a historical document, a literary work and a representation of dialogue.

2.4 Second-order politeness and Shakespeare Shakespeare’s plays have been seen as a huge source of variations and as a differentiated linguistic reservoir, with examples of tones, registers, formulas of all types. As such, the application of pragmatic methodologies to his corpus is not new. There have been numerous pragma-philological 80

studies, attentive to discourse analysis and socio-cultural contextualisation (Bax 2003; Brinton 2001; Collins 2001; Jacobs and Jucker 1995; Fitzmaurice 2010; Fritz 1995; Jucker 1995; Sell 2000). An equally productive trend has focused on the historical development of pragmatic elements, such as discourse markers and speech acts (Jucker and Taavitsainen 2000; Rudanko 1993; Traugott and Dasher 2002). Busse (2002) and Mazzon (2003), for instance, have examined the use of the second person pronoun and the you/thou variation respectively, while Nakayasu (2009) has studied the modality system in some Shakespearean texts. Some of the Shakespearean discourse markers analysed in these studies will be examined here and directly connected to (im)politeness. With regard to (im)politeness, the two most extensive analyses are Brown and Gilman’s Politeness Theory and Shakespeare’s Four Major Tragedies (1989) and Kopytko’s Polite Discourse in Shakespeare’s English (1993). Brown and Gilman worked on four Shakespearean tragedies (Hamlet, King Lear, Macbeth, Othello), providing a convincing test of the model according to which Shakespeare’s dialogues present instances of face-based work. They identified some discrepancies with B&L’s theory, especially in relation to sociological variables: A (affect) is more important than social distance in the plays. Kopytko (1993) extended the analysis to four comedies (The Taming of the Shrew, A Midsummer’s Night’s Dream, The Merchant of Venice and Twelfth Night). He added a positive strategy to B&L’s list – P16 (satisfy H’s informational deficit by offering information or an explanation of a state of affairs) – and ascertained the prevalence of bold on-record strategies within the lower classes and of PP strategies as markers of in-group solidarity. Both studies mainly focused on PP and NP strategies, and off-recordness remained marginal. Later studies have introduced a more discursive approach to Shakespearean (im)politeness: Culpeper (1996) represents – in his examination of Macbeth’s impoliteness – a qualitative example of analysis, also highlighting how impoliteness affects plot and characterisation. Magnusson (1999), Rudanko (2006) and Kizelbach (2014) have respectively explored aspects related to (im)politeness in Henry VIII, Timon of Athens and the Histories. The present study continues the work of the aforementioned scholars by applying B&L’s traditional model, with slight modifications, but also borrowing from the discursive turn: the aim is to establish continuity 81

with the first trend of (im)politeness theory applied to Shakespeare which paved the way for subsequent studies, while combining it with new methods and perspectives, indebted to current and up-to-date studies on diachronic (Im)politeness. The reason lies in the conviction that a combined method can on the one hand ensure control over and precision in the identification of (im)polite strategies and markers using well-tested tools to measure the linguistic expressions found in the texts; on the other, the discursive approach can open up the interpretation of data to more markedly interdisciplinary dimensions. Moreover, recourse to a combined model is also required by the hybrid status of the literary character, standing for but not coinciding with a real speaker/hearer. In fact, as a fictitious representation of human subjectivity mediated and filtered by an author, it may paradoxically appear closer to B&L’s Model Person than to a real human, given its essential purposedness. Its actions are always intentional, if not fully at an intra-textual/intra-diegetic level, then certainly in a systemic view of literature that sees characters as textual functions.

2.5 Method This section outlines the areas and procedure for analysing politeness in the Shakespearean text in the light of the discussion in chapters one and two. The three key areas for analysis have been identified as politeness markers, described in subsection 2.5.1, discernment and strategic politeness, described in subsection 2.5.2, and sociological variables, described in subsection 2.5.3. The final part of the section (2.5.4) draws the three areas together and sets out the method adopted for the analysis of politeness in Hamlet and Taming of the Shrew in the last two chapters. 2.5.1 Politeness markers Politeness markers are key indicators of (im)politeness in the Shakespearean text and have been studied principally by Brown and Gilman (1989), Culpeper (2001), Busse (2002), Mazzon (2003) and Jucker (2010). The 82

most important of these markers are honorific titles and nominal address, which are needed to establish the status of characters and their relative power over one another, and address pronouns, which reveal the type of distance between characters and whether or not their linguistic tone/register is confidential. According to Brown and Gilman, “upper-class speakers said you to one another; lower-class speaker said thou to one another; the between-class rule was you to the upper and thou to the lower” (Brown and Gilman 1989: 177). However, Brown and Gilman also add the following: Thou and you are not very important in scoring speech for politeness. This is partly because there are quite a few shifts that we cannot confidently account for and it is partly because, in many of the clear cases that follow the status rule, the pronoun of address, an obligatory aspect of speech, is automatic and ever-present and so does not function to redress an FTA. What we are left with is a small number of unusual uses and shifts that can be confidently interpreted. (Brown and Gilman 1989: 179)

There are contrasting linguistic views on the you/thou (Y/T) variation in early modern English. Quirk (1971) and Replogle (1973), for example, tend to consider you the unmarked form and thou a contrastive form used by speakers to mark speech.23 Mulholland (1967), on the other hand, claims that lower-class people use thou more frequently, while Barber (1987) states that you (unlike thou) is common among the middle classes. Mazzon (2003) unites the two positions: Shakespeare’s works yield interesting evidence concerning the stage at which, allegedly, Y-forms are used to signal social distance or respect, while T-forms are employed for the extremes of the social relationship scale, i.e either to address distant superiors […] or distant inferiors […]. At the same time, the choice between pronouns also conveys emotional distance or proximity […], and again T covers both extremes of a scale, signalling love or hate, affection or anger. (Mazzon 2003: 225)

So despite the wide range of interpretations regarding the possible uses and significances of Y/T variation, the use of thou and you helps both 23

Quirk states that: “You is usually the stylistically unmarked form: it is not so much ‘polite’ as ‘not impolite’; it is not so much ‘formal’ as ‘not informal’. It is for this reason that thou can operate in such a wide variety of contrasts with you” (1971:7).

83

to distinguish between discernment politeness and strategic deferential politeness (see below) and to understand the relationship between characters in terms of power and social distance.24 It should also be noted that metrical pattern is a possible form of deviation from the natural language norm in force at the time. As a result, variation of you or thou in early modern literary texts may be the consequence of authors’ stylistic choices, such as the use of verse and prose in drama or the use of blank verse. Other important indicators are discourse markers, which are defined by Jucker (1997) as follows: The term ‘discourse marker’ is used to describe a class of seemingly meaningless or empty elements that occur predominantly in spoken language. Discourse analysts and pragmatists, however, have found them to be a very rewarding research area both in English and in many other languages. These elements may have little semantic or truth-conditional meaning but their use is governed by pragmatic principles, and their study therefore requires a very careful pragmatic analysis. (1997: 91)

Though not strictly related to the attribution of a social value, like honorifics or other address terms, discourse markers (DMs) can nonetheless orient the interpretation of utterances by suggesting possible adversative meanings and values of words. Overall, Y/T variables, titles, address pronouns and discourse markers are all involved in the analysis of (im)politeness and in the distinction between discernment politeness, understood as formulaic conventional courtesy, and strategic politeness, understood as a means of persuading others, causing offence and minimising possible imposition by and on others.

24

84

Mazzon, in this respect, writes: “The use of personal pronouns and nominal address is of course directly relevant to the encoding of both “vertical” and “horizontal” new social relationships, such as those arising when the community’s social structure is in a state of flux, as in Elizabethan England. […] It is possible that the use of pronouns is not central to the performing of a specific speech act, but pronouns certainly contribute, at least on the same level as nominal address and perhaps even more powerfully, to the “face-dynamics” of several exchanges […]” (2003: 224, 228).

2.5.2 Discernment vs strategic politeness As the discussion in this chapter has shown, the question of discernment and strategic politeness is a key area of pragmatic analysis. On the one hand, politeness as a non-strategic choice used in conversation is what Watts considers the political aspect of speech and is connected to Ide’s discernment politeness – a term widely used by Jucker and other linguists such as Mazzon in their diachronic analysis of Middle English texts. On the other hand, B&L’s notions of positive and negative politeness (PP and NP) are strategic. Whereas politic speech and discernment politeness are forms of cooperation following the simplest norms of Grice’s CP or of Fraser’s CC (conversational contract), PP and NP are salient verbal behaviours. They are what Watts defines as polite speech, expressing an “enhancement of the ego’s standing with respect to alter” (Watts 2003: 51). This strategic nature of PP and NP makes them speech acts at the interface between Fraser’s CC/Grice’s CP and Lakoff’s Politeness Principle. Their aims and effects are intentional, ranging from reducing the risks of rule-breaking (by redressing FTAs) to indirectly causing offence (i.e. making an indirect, rather than overt and clear, FTA). In short, DP provides the general framework of conventional and conventionalised verbal behaviours imposed by social rules, against which PP and NP become operational when intentionally chosen by speakers for special pragmatic purposes. NP and PP, then, are recognised and classified in the analysis according to B&L’s model, which provides a very specific and detailed range of possible redressive strategies. This model is combined with a discussion of impoliteness as it emerges from interactions. 2.5.3 Sociological variables The distinction between DP, PP and NP is also explored in the two plays by examining the three sociological variables identified by B&L: P, which stands for the degree of imposition as a consequence of social status; D, which stands for the ‘horizontal’ distance between S and H; and R, which stands for the riskiness of the FTA. These three variables provide a framework for interpreting (im)polite strategies and 85

discernment politeness in relation to the social context (P), mutual relations between speaker and hearer (D) and the purpose and contents of the message (R), i.e. the extent to which it is offensive. In general terms, B&L’s theory prescribes that: 1) the person with less power is more polite; 2) in the case of high-D between S and H, speech tends to be more polite, while in the case of low-D, speech tends to be less polite; 3) extreme FTAs are more politely expressed. Brown and Gilman consider the variable of Affect (A) responsible for a specific Shakespearean trait, i.e. “the more the speaker likes the hearer, the greater the concern with the hearer’s face and so the more polite the speech; the less the liking, the less the concern and also the politeness” (B&L 1989: 193). Kopytko notes that in the Shakespearean tragedies, the variable A, understood as the kind of ‘liking’ between people who like each other and who therefore express this liking through positive politeness, is in fact very frequent (1993: 53–54).25 2.5.4 General procedure The general pragmatic procedure adopted for the analysis of politeness in Hamlet and The Taming of the Shrew in chapters three and four involves the qualitative analysis of particular scenes taking into account the three key areas described above. The procedure comprises the following 3 stages: 1.

Selection of scenes and exchanges to be analysed Scenes were selected for analysis based on the frequency and saliency of (im)polite utterances. The data were later interpreted qualitatively, trying to single out what type of (im)polite speech acts/strategies emerge and how they contribute to creating dramatic action and characterisation.

2.

Microanalysis of exchanges The exchanges were analysed using B&L’s and Culpeper’s models for the identification of (im)polite superstrategies

25

Variable A was also discussed and used by Culpeper in his first model of analysis of impoliteness (1996; see section 1. 4).

86

alongside pragmatic markers that are considered relevant for the interpretation of (im)polite speech acts; these include address forms such as the pronominal you/thou system, other nominal addresses such as names and honorific titles and discourse markers but only if they help infer an (im)polite meaning. Specifically, Y/T variations within the same exchange between two characters may signal a possible strategic change on the part of S towards H, probably due to facework; cases such as these were considered salient and analysed in terms of whether the variation was NP or PP.26 3.

Interpretation of exchanges The approach to interpretation was based on a framework combining B&L and Culpeper’s theories of (im)politeness, as indicated in chapter one. This framework uses a relational concept of Goffman’s notion of face recently reformulated in discursive pragmatics. The interpretation also took into account Watts’s distinction between political and polite speech, a distinction that historical pragmatics has already appropriated and reworked using Ide’s, Jucker’s and Mazzon’s notions of discernment and strategic (or volition) politeness. Using this framework, (im)politeness in verbal exchanges was interpreted in two ways: as a conventional expected element of conversation and as a strategic weapon to obtain a goal. Textual analysis of the nature of (im)polite exchanges also shows how strategies of impoliteness in a micro-exchange at a local level relate at a macro-level to the Renaissance courtesy culture described in this chapter.

26

The variation between you and thou, on the other hand, does have a pragmatic function that may be due precisely to facework, insofar as it cannot be casual as Mazzon underlines: “The alleged “neutrality” of pronoun choice must be rejected, since it is highly improbable that any speech community could tolerate “casual” alternation of forms in such a delicate pragma-linguistic area as address, particularly a speech community in which social codes were undergoing revolutionary changes” (2003: 228).

87

4. Abbreviations The abbreviations used in chapters three and four are listed below, while a general list of all the abbreviations mentioned in this study can be found in the List of Abbreviations. They are divided into a) (im)politeness types/superstrategies and strategies, b) politeness markers and c) sociological variables.

88

a)

(Im)Politeness types/ superstrategies and strategies BR = Bald on Record DP = Discernment Politeness IBR = Impolite Bald on Record NP = Negative Politeness N1 = Be conventionally indirect N2 = Question, hedge N4 = Minimise the imposition N5 = Give deference N7 = Impersonalise S and H N8 = State the FTA as a general rule (to soften the offence) N9 = Nominalise N10 = Go on record as incurring a debt NI = Negative Impoliteness PI = Positive Impoliteness DT = Derogatory term FTA = Face-Threating Act MP = Mock Politeness PI9 = Use taboo words PI4 = Be disinterested, unconcerned, unsympathetic PP = Positive Politeness P1 = Notice, attend to H (his/her interests, wants, needs, goods) P2 = Exaggerate (interest, approval, sympathy with H) P4 = Use in-group identity markers P5 = Seek agreement P6 = Avoid disagreement



P7 = Assert common ground P10 = Offer, promise P11 = Be optimistic P12 = Include both S and H in the activity P13 = Give (or asks) reasons P14 = Assume or assert reciprocity P15 = Give gifts to H (goods, sympathy, understanding, cooperation) OFF-R = Off Record ON-R = On Record

b)

Politeness Markers DM = Discourse Marker NA = Nominal Address (titles, first and last names) PA = Pronominal Address (you/thou)



c)

Sociological Variables D = Distance P = Power R = Rank of imposition (riskiness)

The abbreviations are listed here for the reader’s ease of reference, since a great many are marked in the Shakespearean text in the next two chapters.

89

Chapter Three: Speaking daggers: (Im)polite strategies in Hamlet

The tragedy of Hamlet (1601) offers a rich social fabric of characters of different classes and status, of help for investigating the functions which “courtesy” might have had in Renaissance society. This chapter explores the representation of impoliteness in Hamlet in terms of three areas of courtesy: 1) Routine courtesy, involving the use of formal courtesy conventions (DP); 2) Strategic politeness, emerging as a form of ambitious courtesy, which concerns the way courtiers use politeness to fulfil their social and individual ambitions; 3) Strategic (im)politeness as off-recordness, which characterises Hamlet’s speeches in particular. A section of the chapter is devoted to each area. Textual analysis of the nature of (im)polite exchanges in these terms will attempt to show how strategies of impoliteness in a micro-exchange at a local level relate to the Renaissance courtesy culture at a macro-level. The analysis employs the methodology outlined at the end of chapter two. (Im)polite superstrategies and markers of polite or impolite effects and of potentially (im)polite speech acts are abbreviated (see 2.5.4) and shown in brackets next to the selected quotations on the right-hand side of the page.

3.1 Routine courtesy: the forms of discernment politeness In Hamlet there are four social levels. The highest levels are represented by the royal family – Claudius, Gertrude and Hamlet – with other members of the Court, such as the State Councillor Polonius, his son Laertes and his daughter Ophelia, and Hamlet’s friend Horatio at a lower, secondary level. Characters such as the courtiers Rosencrantz and Guilderstern, the ambassadors Voltemand and Cornelius, and the foppish

courtier Orsic are even lower in status and are at the third level; they are all ‘people of the court’ but do not have a strong emotional connection with the royal circles. At the lowest social level are the guards Marcellus, Barnardo and Francisco, Reynaldo a servant of Polonius, and the two Gravediggers. Overall, the interactions in Hamlet present a wide range of discernment and strategic politeness, alongside a very heterogeneous pattern of variable combinations, insofar as characters have a wide variety of relationships, ranging from political relations to love affairs. These are illustrated in detail below, using dialogue between characters of different ranks and social distance. 3.1.1 Barnardo and Francisco There are a large number of exchanges in Hamlet that provide the general ‘discernment’ background against which strategic politeness arises; these primarily concern relationships regulated by power (P) or those regarding ‘professional routine’. For instance, at the very beginning of the play two BRs are uttered as a ritual by the sentinels: Barnardo Who’s there? Francisco Nay, answer me: stand, and unfold yourself. (1.1.1–2)27

[BR – Professional Routine]

[BR]

The abrupt first question is the performance of Barnardo’s professional task as a guard. Francisco answers with a similar directive. Although this adjacency pair is a typical performative on which the changing of the guard officially depends, the two soldiers do not follow the expected 27

92

W. Shakespeare, Hamlet. Revised Edition, ed. by Ann Thompson and Neil Taylor, London, Bloomsbury, 2016. Subsequent quotations of this play are taken from this edition, which contains the Q2 version of the Shakespearean play, the longest and most authoritative of the three ‘received Hamlets’ – Q1 (1603), Q2 (1604/05), F (1623) – according to the most recent Shakespearean philology. I will also consider – when relevant – the 1623 F version, published in W. Shakespeare, Hamlet. The Texts of 1603 and 1623, ed. by Ann Thompson and Neil Taylor, London, Bloomsbury, 2006.

procedure; in fact, Barnardo who is reporting for duty asks the question of Francisco, who is already on duty, while the correct procedure is the reverse. This unusual form of turn-taking by the two guards at the start of the play immediately raises the question of the subversion of roles – a constant theme in Hamlet, particularly in relation to social position, family role and verbal convention. After the mutual recognition of the sentinels, Horatio is introduced and informed of a ghostly apparition: Marcellus Holla! Barnardo! Barnardo Say, what, is Horatio there? [DM] Horatio A piece of him. (1. 1. 17–18, emphasis added) […] Barnardo Sit down awhile; [P12] And let us once again assail your ears That are so fortified against our story What we have two nights seen. Horatio Well, sit we down, [P12] And let us hear Barnardo speak of this. (1. 1. 29–33)

The use of names without titles suggests a certain degree of confidence between the three. This is unexpected, given that Horatio is a courtier and friend of the Prince, while Francisco and Barnardo are ordinary sentinels. The closeness can be explained by the two P12 strategies chosen by Barnardo and Horatio to create interactive intimacy – a form “to include both speakers and hearer in the activity” (B&L 102). By not using “my lord”, “sir” or some other expected form of discernment politeness, Barnardo attempts to involve Horatio in the conversation since he and Marcellus want Horatio to speak to the ghost. It is worth noting that Barnardo uses DMs such as “say” and “what” in lines 34–35, creating a sense of positive surprise at Horatio’s arrival. Horatio too makes use of a DM – “Well” – in line 32 which, along with the conjunction “And” (line 33), echoes Barnardo’s speech and serves to establish an atmosphere of camaraderie. After that, Marcellus takes his turn:

93

Marcellus Thou art a scholar – speak to it, Horatio. […] Marcellus Speak to it, Horatio. Horatio […] By heaven, I charge thee speak! Marcellus It is offended. Barnardo See, it stalks away. Horatio Stay, speak, speak, I charge thee speak (1.1.45, 48, 52–54)

[BR]

[BR] [BR]

[BR]

The address pronoun “thou” endorses Barnardo’s confidential tone, by virtue of which the imperative “speak to it” is not an imposition but is justified by the riskiness of the situation itself and not by Marcellus’s FTA. A ghost has appeared and Marcellus and Barnardo, who do not know how to handle it, need Horatio’s help to understand it. Ironically, Horatio’s directive addressed to the ghost – “by heaven, I charge thee speak!” – is perceived by the ghost as an FTA. As it leaves, Marcellus describes it as “offended”. In conclusion, the very first scene is marked by an inversion of the expected turn-taking sequence between Barnardo and Francisco, reflecting an inversion of courtesy expectations (there is no deference at all) and an inversion of the natural order of things (a ghost has returned from the afterlife). 3.1.2 King Claudius: introducing variable RF (reflexivity) At the start of the second scene, which takes place at Claudius’s court, the King, a moderate and cautious politician, asks his counsellors, ambassadors and relatives for information about what is going on in his kingdom. After an introductory speech ‘reconciling’ mourning for his brother’s death with the joy of his own wedding to Gertrude, Claudius addresses Voltemand and Cornelius, the ambassadors:

94

Claudius […] The lists and full proportions are all made Out of his subject; and we here dispatch [BR] You, good Cornelius, and you, Voltimand, [P1] For bearers of this greeting to old Norway, Giving to you no further personal power To business with the king more than the scope Of these delated articles allow. Farewell, and let your haste commend your duty. Voltemand In that and all things will we show our duty. [P6] Claudius We doubt it nothing. Heartily farewell. (1. 2. 32–42, emphasis added)

The use of a name with an honorific adjective – “good Cornelius” – in relation to Cornelius can be scored as positive politeness (P1) on the part of the King, who wants to show his generosity and good temper, while the short and neutral reply – “In that and all things will we show our duty” – can be classified as P6, “avoid possible disagreement”. When the King takes his leave of them, he uses the adverb “heartily”, which can again be scored as a positively polite addition to his previous speech. However, this imbalance between the King and the ambassadors’ politeness contradicts B&L’s predictions for P – lower-rank person is more polite – and is not even fully explained by Brown and Gilman: “Politeness in Shakespeare’s tragedies increases with the power of the speaker over the hearer and it increases with the extremity of the face threat. Politeness decreases with the withdrawal of affection and increases with an increase of affection” (1989: 199). Whilst it is clear why politeness increases with an increase of affection – this is what variable A accounts for – it is not apparent why politeness should increase when S has power over H. This frequently occurs in both Claudius’ and Hamlet’s speeches as S (speakers) and, as Kopytko has demonstrated in his extensive study, in all Shakespeare’s great tragedies.28

28

In his analysis of the four Great Tragedies – Hamlet, Macbeth, Othello, and King Lear –, Kopytko writes that: “(P1) is offered preponderantly by (S)-high(P) to (H)-lower(P)” (1993:67). Kopytko explains the datum by recourse to the variable A (affect) that accounts for all the cases in which S and H like each other

95

How can we explain this exception to the general theory? If the reason for the King’s positive politeness is not affection, as he has no interpersonal relationship of any kind with the two ambassadors, it should be sought elsewhere. My suggestion is that, in the Renaissance, people of high rank used positive politeness as a form of reflexive courtesy: the more polite a lord, the more powerful he appeared to those around him and this was all the more true for a king. The literature and treatises of the time often exploited the metaphor of the sun irradiating light all around to describe sovereign power. Courtesy, like the sun’s rays, radiates outwards, showing the greatness of the high-ranking person who is producing it for an audience who can thus testify to his/ her greatness. This specific Renaissance variable could be labelled RF (reflexivity), as it will be hereafter in this study. RF also governs Hamlet’s verbal behaviour. For example, when welcoming the actors, he shows more PP than necessary towards people of lower rank: You are welcome, masters, welcome all. I am glad to see thee well. Welcome, good friends. (2. 2. 359–360)

[P15]

The appellative “masters” underlines the professionalism of the actors, conferring a specific social status on them, while “good friends” serves to shorten the distance: Hamlet ’Tis well. I’ll have thee speak out the rest of this soon. [to Polonius] Good my lord, will you see the players well bestowed? Do you hear, let them be well used, for they are the abstract and brief chronicles of the time: after your death you were better have a bad epitaph than their ill report while you live. Polonius My lord, I will use them according to their desert. (2. 2. 459–466)

[N2]

or are bound by family/friendship relationships, but not for cases such as that of Claudius and Cornelius.

96

Hamlet then asks Polonius to act as host to the actors and to look after them well; when Polonius replies conventionally that they will be treated as they deserve, the dialogue continues as follows: Hamlet God’s bodykin, man, much better! Use every man after his desert and who shall scape whipping? Use them after your own honour and dignity – the less they deserve the more merit is in your bounty. Take them in. Polonius Come, sirs. (2. 2. 467–471, emphasis added)

This exchange theorises the premises on which RF rests: the way a Lord treats people of low rank is an indicator of how courteous he is – “Use them after your own honour and dignity” – even though they do not deserve it: “the less they deserve the more merit is in your bounty” (emphasis added). In other words, Hamlet is saying that the more polite you are, the more admirable you show yourself to be. The use of “sirs” (line 471) on the part of Polonius confirms a high distance (D) between the actors and the courtiers. Polonius treats them as strangers who have arrived at Elsinore, whereas Hamlet uses a clearly defined positive politeness strategy dictated by his higher rank and governed by RF. On a different level, we find another example of RF in Polonius’s conversation with his servant Reynaldo: Polonius Give him this money and these notes, Reynaldo. [Directive] Reynaldo I will, my lord. [DP] Polonius You shall do marvellous wisely, good Reynaldo, [Directive] Before you visit him to make inquire Of his behaviour. Reynaldo My lord, I did intend it. [DP] (2.1.1–5, emphasis added)

97

In this passage Polonius asks Reynaldo to keep an eye on Laertes once he has left for France and to check if he is behaving as a gentleman should. Polonius addresses him by name with an honorific adjective as a positive polite strategy – “good Reynaldo” (line 3) – , while giving a directive to his servant – “Give him this money and these notes” – with the addition of another request (lines 3–4), softened by the expression “marvellous wisely” (line 3). Polonius in this case is not being strategic, since Reynaldo is supposed to obey orders. Reynaldo is indeed deferential to his master (lines 2 and 5). Polonius’ positive politeness is once again due to what we have called the reflexive politeness variable, a function of courtesy that serves to exalt the superiority of higher-ranking people in public. The more elevated the rank, the more polite the speech. 3.1.3 Powerful characters and variable A High-ranking people using politeness under the effect of A differ from situations governed by RF. Claudius talking to Laertes is a good example: Claudius […] And now, Laertes, what’s the news with you? You told us of some suit – what is’t, Laertes? You cannot speak of reason to the Dane And lose your voice. What wouldst thou beg, Laertes, That shall not be my offer, not thy asking? The head is not more native to the heart, The hand more instrumental to the mouth, Than is the throne of Denmark to thy father. What wouldst thou have, Laertes? Laertes My dread lord, Your leave and favour to return to France, From whence though willingly I came to Denmark To show my duty in your coronation, Yet now I must confess, that duty done, My thoughts and wishes bend again toward France And bow them to your gracious leave and pardon. Claudius Have you your father’s leave? What says Polonius? Polonius He hath, my lord, wrung from me my slow leave

98

[P15] [PP – PA – NA]

[PP] [DP] [N5]

[N5]

[NA]

By laboursome petition, and at last Upon his will I sealed my hard consent. I do beseech you give him leave to go. [N1] Claudius Take thy fair hour, Laertes, time be thine [P15] And thy best graces spend it at thy will. (1. 2. 42–63, emphasis added)

Laertes is called by name, which Brown and Gilman do not score for positive politeness, and the pronouns used to address him are mixed: both “you” and “thou” are used by the King for Laertes, while the opposite would clearly be impossible because of P and D. Nevertheless, “thou” and “you” are not used indifferently in the first part of the exchange; instead there is a shift from the formal “you” to the confidential “thou”, as the general tone is increasingly marked by positive politeness. At the beginning of his speech, Claudius addresses Laertes as “you”, which is nonetheless accompanied by a marked form of PP in showing empathy and understanding for the young man – “You cannot speak of reason to the Dane, / And loose your voice” – which is classified as a P15 strategy (B&L 1987: 102). Immediately after these lines, the King starts using the informal “thou” as if to demonstrate involvement and familiarity with Laertes – “what wouldst thou beg, Laertes, / That shall not be my offer, not thy asking?”. This line can be scored as a PP strategy, since it claims to offer in advance what Laertes is about to ask for. In other words, in lines 44–45 Claudius reassures Laertes that he will fulfil his request; later, the use of the conditional in line 52 – “What wouldst thou have, Laertes?” – can also be scored as a PP strategy in that it indirectly and politely – and not baldly on record – enquires about H’s needs. Lines 47–49 – “The head is not more native to the heart, / The hand more instrumental to the mouth, / Than is the throne of Denmark to thy father” – clarifies the reason for Claudius’s affection, i.e. the fact that Polonius is his most loyal collaborator. Laertes’s reply (lines 52–58), which uses the address form “my dread Lord”, is very useful for fixing parameters for the correct use of titles. Indeed, the adjective “dread” is employed only for Kings and Queens in Shakespearean tragedies (Brown and Gilman 1989: 176). The rest of Laertes’s speech is characterised by deference, with the presentation of a request mitigated by the appellative “gracious” and by 99

a respectful request for permission to leave. Polonius, called upon by Claudius, replies in a similar deferential tone, as when he addresses the King as “my lord” and an indirect conventional request (N1): “I do beseech you, give him leave to go”. In the last two lines, Claudius uses only the informal “thy” and “thine”, as if to express affection after granting the favour Laertes asked him for. There is no contradiction of the theory here, since Claudius is bound to Polonius’s family by ties of affection and trust: A is the variable that shortens the distance between the King and the courtiers, and motivates the use of PP by Claudius. Further evidence of politeness strategies is provided in a sequence concerning Hamlet and Horatio’s friendship. The sequence starts with affectionate greetings between the two friends: Horatio Hail to your lordship. Hamlet I am glad to see you well – Horatio, or I do forget myself. Horatio The same, my lord, and your poor servant ever. Hamlet Sir, my good friend; I’ll change that name with you. And what make you from Wittenberg, Horatio? Marcellus? Marcellus My good lord. (1. 2. 160–165)

[DP – PP] [P15]

[P4]

In this sequence Horatio is deferential to Hamlet – “your lordship” – and Hamlet reciprocates affectionately by nominally addressing Horatio and declaring to be “glad” (line 160) to see his friend, which can be scored as genuine and non-strategic positive politeness aimed at camouflaging an FTA. A P4 strategy in line 163 allows Hamlet to use an in-group marker – “my good friend” – but the adjacency pair (lines 161–163) nevertheless reveals the difference in status between the two: Horatio’s “My lord” denotes deference to Hamlet, while Hamlet’s “good friend” is a more familiar salutation formula; Marcellus too is deferential towards Hamlet, repeating Horatio’s salutation, so the exchange confirms that Hamlet is the highest in rank. On the other hand, this exchange may also suggest that forms of conventional politeness between friends with low distance and high affect are not necessarily aimed at mitigating an FTA 100

but at paying homage to the positive face of the other out of genuine feelings. In other words, despite the disparity in rank between Hamlet and Horatio, variable A allows us to interpret the passage as indicating friendship. The same happens in the rest of the sequence: Hamlet […] But what is your affair in Elsinore? We’ll teach you to drink deep ere you depart. Horatio My lord, I came to see your father’s funeral. Hamlet I pray thee do not mock me, fellow-student, I think it was to see my mother’s wedding. Horatio Indeed, my lord, it followed hard upon. Hamlet Thrift, thrift, Horatio, the funeral baked meats Did coldly furnish forth the marriage tables. Would I had met my dearest foe in heaven Or ever I had seen that day, Horatio. My father, methinks I see my father. Horatio Where, my lord? Hamlet In my mind’s eye, Horatio. (1. 2. 174–184)

[P10] [P12]

[N1 – P4]

Hamlet shows interest in and consideration for Horatio – “But what is your affair in Elsinore?” – offering hospitality as a comrade in the form of an inclusive activity that concerns both of them: “We’ll teach you to drink deep ere you depart”. In the subsequent exchange (lines 176–178), Hamlet ironises about the fact that the wedding between his uncle and his mother immediately followed the funeral of his father. His indirect request (N1), introduced by “I pray thee”, is reinforced by the use of “fellow-student” (P4), an in-group identity marker. It is in line 180 that the irony is most evident: Hamlet attributes the motive for the hasty wedding to “thrift”. Significantly, his true discontent emerges just after that in his use of a direct and unfiltered expressive (lines 181–183), confirming Hamlet’s trust in Horatio: the prince can confide his pain to his true friend. 101

In conclusion, the analysis of the above sequences illustrates the conventional uses of Discernment Politeness, with occasional use of Positive Politeness and Negative Politeness. It has also explored social and affective variables, adding RF (reflexivity) – exhibited as a mark of generosity reflecting the ‘superior’ courtesy of upper class people – as a possible factor affecting the choice of polite strategies. 3.1.4 The Gravedigger: from discernment to strategic (im)politeness The following sequence, involving the exchange between Hamlet and the Gravedigger, is not covered by any of the politeness patterns discussed so far; on the contrary, it could be considered an episode that virtually links discernment politeness with the strategic language that dominates Hamlet’s speech, as will be explained later. The confrontation is apparently governed by P and D: Hamlet is an aristocrat and the Gravedigger is a common worker so there is a class difference, which means that P is high; in addition, they are strangers to each other, so D is also high. Deference should be at work, orienting the interaction between the two. However, the Hamlet/Gravedigger exchange turns into a verbal game, full of FTAs and ironic adjacency pairs that sometimes invert the power positions between the speakers, since the Gravedigger turns out to be wittier and discursively more powerful than the Prince. The passage begins with Hamlet returning from England and happening to see the Gravedigger preparing Ophelia’s grave, of which the prince knows nothing. The conversation is opened by Hamlet, who asks the Gravedigger whose grave he is digging: Hamlet […] Whose Grave’s this, sirrah? Gravedigger Mine, sir, […]. (5. 1. 110–112)

[NA]

The gravedigger’s use of “sir” following Hamlet’s direct question and use of “sirrah”, normally used at the time to address people of lower social rank (Markus 2015), confirms that Hamlet has been recognised 102

as a noble; the address pronouns conform to the norm of using the confidential “thou” downwards and the respectful “you” upwards. In this polite framework, the Gravedigger establishes an unusual expressive register based on irony, which invariably goes against Hamlet’s expectations and offers humorous, poignant and totally off-record answers. In saying “mine”, the Gravedigger deliberately shifts the meaning of the question by stating the obvious: he is the gravedigger and the grave is his. This overtly violates the maxim of quality, insofar as he does not give Hamlet the information he wants. Commenting on this exchange, Brown and Gilman suggest that “there is no indication that Clown has a face-threatening act in mind, no hint at any risky meaning. He is pretending that Hamlet has been the first to violate the maxim of quality. It is a challenge game of off record speech” (Brown and Gilman 1989: 200).29 In pretending to be properly replying to a question that has been improperly asked, the Gravedigger scores a point in his favour and puts down his upper-class interlocutor without being impolite. The game goes on: Hamlet I think it be thine, indeed, for thou liest in’t. Gravedigger You lie out on’t, sir, and therefore ’tis not Yours. For my part I do not lie in’t, and yet it is mine. Hamlet Thou dost lie in’t, to be in’t and say it is thine. ’Tis for the dead, not for the quick. Therefore thou liest. Gravedigger ’Tis a quick lie, sir, ’twill away again from me to you. (5.2. 114–121)

Hamlet accepts the challenge and provokes the Gravedigger with a pun on the double meaning of “lie”. Starting from the meaning of “occupy”, 29

The Gravedigger is named Clown in many editions of the play and evidently is called so also in Brown and Gilman’s essay. The reason is that Shakespearean comedic characters entrusted with the task of introducing hilarity both in comedy and in tragedy are usually assimilated to the figure of the traditional Clown. Besides, the Clown is opposed to the Fool who, by contrast, represents a more ironic and bitter form of comedy.

103

which the Gravedigger has claimed as the reason for his ownership of the grave, Hamlet accuses him of lying, in the sense of being mendacious, when he says that the grave is his, because the grave is actually meant for the “quick”, i.e. living people. The Gravedigger replies with a second pun on “quick”, used this time in the sense of “fast”. The conclusion of the exchange alludes to the second point won by the Gravedigger: “’twill away again from me to you”. Hamlet then tries a more direct question: Hamlet What man dost thou dig it for? Gravedigger For no man, sir. Hamlet What woman, then? Gravedigger For none, neither. Hamlet Who is to be buried in’t? Gravedigger One that was a woman, sir, but, rest her soul she’s dead. (5. 2. 122–128)

Again, the Gravedigger pretends to misunderstand the true meaning of Hamlet’s questions by taking them literally: the grave is neither of a man or a woman but of someone who was a woman before dying. Hamlet is defeated: Hamlet How absolute the knave is! we must speak by the card or equivocation will undo us. (5.2. 129–130)

The Gravedigger’s ironic speech shows the power of language that allows a low-ranking worker to make fun of a high-ranking noble. This is all the more relevant because Hamlet is the character most associated with discursive domination over other characters, while here an ordinary but witty man has been able to subdue him. This is not due to social mobility but to a sense of individuality; the Gravedigger is not a social climber, but merely wants to outdo someone of a higher rank in a 104

confrontation in which wit, not rank, determines the outcome. Hamlet’s closing lines are eloquent in this respect: “By the Lord, Horatio, this three years I have took note of it, the age is grown so picked that the toe of the peasant comes so near the heel of the courtier he galls his kibe” (5.1. 130–133). Hamlet is complaining about the shortening of the distance between “peasant” and “courtier”, directly referring to the social mobility that characterised Shakespeare’s time. Indeed, the exchange between Hamlet and the Gravedigger offers an example of how individual verbal skills can shorten the distance between lower and upper classes, bypassing P and D.

3.2 Courtesy as ambition As chapter two illustrated, the deployment of courtesy in the sixteenth century was part of a widespread process of social mobility. Those who aspired to social progress had to assume aristocratic courtesy as a model. Courtesy-books explained etiquette and taught people how to behave at court. Hamlet portrays and plays on this phenomenon by presenting a caricature of the ambitious courtier – Osric – who tries to gain a higher position by exhibiting qualities that are in fact exterior and fake. In the following passage, Osric reports a message from the King to Hamlet: Osric Your lordship is right welcome back to Denmark. [P2] Hamlet I humbly thank you, sir. [aside to Horatio] Dost know this water-fly? [DT] Horatio No, my good lord. Hamlet Thy state is the more gracious, for ’tis a vice to know him. He hath much land, and fertile. Let a beast be lord of beasts and his crib shall stand at the king’s mess. ’Tis a chough but, as I say, spacious in the possession of dirt. (5. 2. 67–75, emphasis added)

105

According to Hamlet, Osric is a man in search of titles. The derogatory appellative “water-fly” used by Hamlet to ridicule Osric resembles King Lear’s “gilded butterflies” – “We two alone will sing like birds i’ the cage […] so we’ll live, And pray, and sing, and tell old tales, and laugh At gilded butterflies, and hear poor rogues Talk of court news […]” (5.3.11–13)30 – an expression associated with deceptive and futile courtly habits. Remarkably, Hamlet does not address his comment to Orsic but to Horatio and its effect is to ridicule the clumsy courtier. If Osric’s initial greeting of Hamlet in line 65 was exaggerated (P2), his subsequent speech is marked by affectation: Osric Sweet lord, if your lordship were at leisure I should impart a thing to you from his majesty. Hamlet I will receive it, sir, with all diligence of spirit. Your bonnet to his right use; ’tis for the head. (5. 2. 76–79)

[N2] [MP] [Directive]

Osric uses a N2 strategy – “do not assume willingness to comply” – to announce the task with which the King has entrusted him (lines 76–77). Hamlet replies with a mock politeness strategy aimed at ridiculing Orsic’s affectation. He not only parodies Orsic’s excessive solemnity of speech using mock-politeness but also his attire, concluding with a straight directive telling the courtier to put his bonnet back on. This directive is a mock-polite speech act, imitating Osric’s excessively obsequious style. As the conversation continues, Hamlet produces a sequence of FTAs against Osric: Osric I thank your lordship, it is very hot. Hamlet No, believe me, ’tis very cold; the wind is northerly. [FTA] Osric It is indifferent cold, my lord, indeed.

30

106

W. Shakespeare, King Lear, ed. by R. A. Foakes, London, Bloomsbury, 2003.

Hamlet But yet methinks it is very sultry and hot, or my complexion – Osric Exceedingly, my lord, it is very sultry, as ‘twere, – I cannot tell how. (5. 2. 80–87)

[FTA]

Orsic is now in a quandary. He cannot put the bonnet on because it would be contrary to etiquette, but at the same time he cannot contradict the Prince’s statements about the weather, so he ends up agreeing with him (“exceedingly, my lord, it is very sultry”). He then makes an apparently purposeless speech about Laertes: Osric Sir, here is newly come to court Laertes – believe me, an absolute gentleman, full of most excellent differences, of very soft society and great showing. Indeed, to speak seelingly of him, he is the card or calendar of gentry, for you shall find in him the continent of what part a gentleman would see. (5. 2. 91–97, emphasis added)

Brown and Gilman suggest that this speech is a form of self-praise: “What is said of Laertes is exactly what Osric fatuously believes to be true of himself. […] The courtesy books enjoin the courtier to be modest and warn that self-praise is only tolerable when very skilfully done” (1989: 203). On this interpretation Orsic is trying to get himself noticed by Hamlet by describing Laertes’s qualities: The word continent is used in the sense of “sum and substance” not the familiar sense “land mass”. […] Probably then continent as “sum and substance” is to be taken in the play as the courtier’s invention. What would the point of it have been? Card could mean “map” or “chart” and that suggests an intention to evoke the “land mass” sense and make a kind of geography trope, but it is a trope without purpose and calendar really will not fit in at all. (Brown and Gilman 1989: 203)

The effect of Orsic’s elocution is parodied by Hamlet through the use of two obsolete words – “definement” and “perdition” – as follows: 107

Hamlet Sir, his definement suffers no perdition in you, though I know to divide him inventorially would dazzle th’arithmetic of memory, and yet but yaw neither, in respect of his quick sail, but in the verity of extolment I take him to be a soul of great article, and his infusion of such dearth and rareness as, to make true diction of him, his semblable is his mirror, and who else would trace him, his umbrage, nothing more. Osric Your lordship speaks most infallibly of him. (5. 2. 98–105, emphasis added)

Orsic does not understand that his interlocutor is mocking him and falls prey to Hamlet’s cruel game. He has been induced to think that his description has been appreciated and that Hamlet has a similar opinion of him. The trick is revealed later: Hamlet What imports the nomination of this gentleman? Osric Of Laertes. Horatio His purse is empty already – all’s golden words are spent. Hamlet Of him, sir. Osric I know you are not ignorant – Hamlet I would you did, sir. Yet, in faith, if you did, it would not much approve me. Well, sir? Osric You are not ignorant of what excellence Laertes is. Hamlet I dare not confess that, lest I should compare with him in excellence. But, to know a man well were to know himself. (5. 2. 112–124)

[Question] [N2]

In the concluding lines, Hamlet claims that he does not dare to compare Laertes’s excellence with his own. This is a way of professing a modesty 108

that Osric cannot perform without affectation and is what the courtesy books of the time defined as sprezzatura – being brilliant without apparent effort (Brown and Gilman 1989: 204). The juxtaposition of Osric, an ambitious courtier who lacks wit and rhetorical skills, with Hamlet, the perfectly educated Prince who is a master of language and conventions, seems to suggest that courtesy books are not enough to make someone courteous. 3.2.1 The deadly politeness of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern While Osric represents the ambitious but dull courtier, two other characters – Rosencrantz and Guildenstern – harbour social aspirations. They are Hamlet’s university friends whom Claudius has summoned to Elsinore to find out what is behind his nephew’s madness. Their exchanges with the King are examples of how, through strategic politeness, S’s intentions can be inferred by H even though they are not directly expressed by words. Rosencrantz and Guildenstern’s arrival at court is a typical example of this: Claudius Welcome, dear Rosencrantz and Guildenstern! Moreover that we much did long to see you The need we have to use you did provoke Our hasty sending. Something have you heard Of Hamlet’s transformation – so call it Sith nor th’exterior nor the inward man Resembles that it was. What it should be More than his father’s death, that thus hath put him So much from th’understanding of himself I cannot dream of. I entreat you both That, being of so young days brought up with him And sith so neighboured to his youth and havior, That you vouchsafe your rest here in our Court Some little time, so by your companies To draw him on to pleasures and to gather So much as from occasion you may glean, Whether aught to us unknown afflicts him thus That opened lies within our remedy. (2. 2. 1–18, emphasis added)

[P13] [P13]

[P7]

[N4]

109

The King initiates the sequence with a warm welcome reinforced by “dear”, followed by a P13 strategy, through which he explains why he has summoned them to court – “the need we have to use you” (2. 2. 3). Lines 4–7 specify (another P13) that the help they can give the King concerns Hamlet’s madness. The longer Claudius speaks, the more polite his speech becomes. In lines 11–13 he creates common ground (P7), using verbs such as “entreat” and “vouchsafe”, which sound unequivocally deferential. The subsequent “some little time” minimises the imposition and introduces what he wants Rosencrantz and Guildenstern to do – spend time with Hamlet and help find the cause of his disease. Polite strategies here are highly relevant to the subtext of Claudius’s speech, which is that he wants them to spy on Hamlet. The King uses deferential verbs and resorts to speech acts that minimise the FTA (the request). To what extent is this successful? Rosencrantz and Guildenstern occupy a lower level on the social scale and so are distant in terms of intimacy and affect, and this ought to produce a situation governed by a high rate of imposition on the part of the King over the two courtiers. However, the King is too polite. The situation is not even affected by the variable RF (reflexivity) because Claudius is not offering anything and is not asking too politely for something that is already due to him, which would require a show of magnanimity. What he is asking for is something that goes beyond the bounds of normal duty for Rosencrantz and Guildenstern: They are to find out what it is that so afflicts Hamlet and report it to the king and queen. They are to play informers to the court on their schoolfriend. This request is more extreme than the surface invitation to draw Hamlet on to pleasures because it requires them to violate the confidences of friendship and become creatures of the king. How do Rosencrantz and Guildenstern know that they are asked to do something so extreme? They are asked too politely. (Brown and Gilman 1989: 199)

In short, this excessive politeness, out of place in the mouth of a King in this kind of circumstance, is due to an awareness of the extreme riskiness of the FTA and is therefore governed by the variable R (rank of imposition). This confirms the theory that extreme threats are more politely expressed.

110

The scene continues with the Queen intervening in the exchange. She too is very polite, starting with a P7 and repeating the King’s attempt to create common ground by including Rosencrantz and Guildenstern in the group of people affectively close to Hamlet and so to the royal couple. She balances positive politeness with some NP strategies so as not to give the impression of imposing: N10 serves not to assume willingness to comply, while N2 serves to ask for the favour as something which incurs a debt of gratitude. Gertrude Good gentlemen, he hath much talked of you [P7] And sure I am two men there are not living To whom he more adheres. If it will please you To show us so much gentry and good will [N2] As to expend your time with us awhile For the supply and profit of our hope, Your visitation shall receive such thanks [N10] As fits a king’s remembrance. (2. 2. 19–26, emphasis added)

The N10 strategy goes to the heart of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern’s ambition: in agreeing to betray their friend, they are contemplating the possibility of receiving favours from the King in return. Indeed, they do not hesitate to accept the King’s offer: Rosencrantz Both your majesties [P15] Might by the sovereign power you have of us Put your dread pleasures more into command Than to entreaty. Guildenstern But we both obey [P15] And here give up ourselves in the full bent To lay our service freely at your feet To be commanded. (2. 2. 27–32, emphasis added)

Just as the King is too polite in his request for help, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are more deferential than necessary: “majesty”, “might” and “dread” are words used exclusively to address the King and they are accompanied 111

by a direct reference to sovereignty, the power of the King, which they both recognise as a source of command and not of “entreaty”. Both their replies show P15 – they give the King and Queen what they want. 3.2.2 Rosencrantz and Guildenstern at work In the following passage we witness Guildenstern and Rosencrantz approaching Hamlet and trying to get the information Claudius wants. Guildenstern My honoured lord. Rosencrantz My most dear lord. Hamlet My excellent good friends. How dost thou, Guildenstern? Ah, Rosencrantz! Good lads, how do you both? Rosencrantz As the indifferent children of the earth. (2. 2. 217–222)

[DP – N5] [DP – N5] [P1] [P4] [N2 – N4]

To Rosencrantz and Guildenstern’s strategic courtesy the Prince responds first with a genuine welcome and later with a much more sophisticated verbal strategy connected to his “crafty madness”. The first lines of the exchange present conventional greetings on the part of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern: their discernment politeness, which is also strategic (N5) given their secret task, contrasts with Hamlet’s warm greeting. To their deferential “lord”, he responds “excellent good friends” and subsequently “good lads” both used as P1 and P4 – forms of exaggerated friendship but also in-group markers. Hamlet’s words here are governed by the A variable: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are friends and he is trying to make them feel comfortable. Although this early exchange between the trio appears to be one of friendly banter, Rosencrantz’s reply to Hamlet when he asks them how they are (line 222) is ambiguous. By hinting at their being common people – “as indifferent children of the earth” – Rosencrantz may be aiming to minimise the extent of their disloyal investigation (N4), while at the same time using a hedging strategy (N2). In claiming to be 112

“indifferent” Rosencrantz constructs an image of himself and Guildenstern that does not correspond to what they are in fact doing. He is using a mask of vagueness to minimise Hamlet’s possible suspicions. This is a different way of performing negative politeness – the aim is to give the interlocutor the illusion that he is not under threat. However, their attempt to keep Hamlet at a distance arouses his suspicions: Guildenstern Happy, in that we are not ever happy. On Fortune’s cap we are not the very button. Hamlet Nor the soles of her shoe. Rosencrantz Neither, my lord. Hamlet Then you live about her waist, or in the middle of her favours. Guildenstern Faith, her privates we. Hamlet In the secret parts of Fortune? O, most true – she is a strumpet. What news? (2. 2. 223–231)

[N2]

The joke about Fortune in this extract does not distract Hamlet from wanting to know why his friends happen to be at Elsinore. Whilst his first question was general (“how do you both?”), the next is direct and unmediated (“What news?”). In his reply, Rosencrantz deviates by impersonalising his speech: Rosencrantz None, my lord, but that the world’s grown honest. [N7] Hamlet Then is doomsday near – but your news is not true. But, in the beaten way of friendship, what make you At Elsinore? (2. 2. 234–236)

Rosencrantz’s use of a negative strategy suggests that he perceives Hamlet’s question as an FTA and that he wants to protect the secrecy of his own information-gathering, which might be perceived as a threat 113

if it were discovered. However, Hamlet brings the conversation straight back to his own agenda by asking more clearly what has brought the two friends to court. He uses a P7 strategy by evoking their past friendship – “in the beaten way of friendship” – aimed at creating a common ground ruled by the A variable. Interestingly, the version of the play published in the Folio presents an interesting variation on Hamlet’s part: Hamlet Then is doomsday near – but your news is not true. Let me question more in particular: what have you, my good friends, deserved at the hands of fortune, that she sends you to prison hither? (2. 2. 237–241)

[P4]

His recourse to another P4 – “good friends” – serves to reassure Rosencrantz and Guildenstern that he is their friend and that they can be as sincere with him as he has been with them by directly asking about their arrival. Paradoxically, then, Hamlet in both the Q2 and F texts openly plays the detective with those who have themselves been sent to spy on him. In the Folio, the conversation continues with an exchange constructed around a metaphor associating Denmark with a prison and with Rosencrantz’s argument about “ambition”. Although Rosencrantz tries to find out whether Hamlet’s discontent is due to political aspirations, the projection of his own desire for social escalation is clear, especially because it is aggravated by the use of the DM “Why then” (line 250 below), which has an adversative meaning31: Guildenstern Prison, my lord? Hamlet Denmark’s a prison. […] Rosencrantz Why, then your ambition makes it one; ’tis too narrow for your mind. 31

114

[DM]

Lutzky singles out a very specific function for why then: “[T]wo functions which have been exclusively identified for the discourse marker why are its contrastive function, with why challenging something an interlocutor has said or done, as well as its conclusive function, which it shows primarily in the collocation why then” (2012: 179–180).

Hamlet O God, I could be bounded in a nutshell and count myself a king of infinite space – were it not that I have bad dreams. Guildenstern Which dreams, indeed, are ambition; for the very substance of the ambitious is merely the shadow of a dream. Hamlet A dream itself is but a shadow. Rosencrantz Truly, and I hold ambition of so airy and light a quality that it is but a shadow’s shadow. (2. 2. 241- 242, 250–260, emphasis added)

Rosencrantz’s attempt to discover the reason for Hamlet’s madness is an evident failure but the Prince’s investigation continues and culminates in Rosencrantz and Guildenstern’s surrender. With this cue, the analysis returns to the Q2 version as the main text: Hamlet Beggar that I am, I am even poor in thanks, but I thank you, and sure, dear friends, my thanks are too dear a halfpenny. Were you not sent for? Is it your own inclining? Is it a free visitation? Come, come, deal justly with me: come, come; nay, speak. Guildenstern What should we say, my lord? Hamlet Anything but to th’purpose – You were sent for, and there is a kind of confession in your looks, which your modesties have not craft enough to colour. I know the good King and Queen have sent for you. Rosencrantz To what end, my lord? Hamlet That you must teach me. But let me conjure you, by the rights of our fellowship, by the consonancy of our youth, by the obligation of our ever-preserved love, and by what more dear a better proposer could charge you withal, be even and direct with me, whether you were sent for or no.

[N10] [Question] [Question] [Exhortation] [N2]

[N2] [N7] [P4]

115

Rosencrantz What say you? Hamlet Nay then, I have an eye of you. If you love me, hold not off. Guildenstern My lord, we were sent for. (2. 2. 272–292)

This time Hamlet’s politeness strategy is tempered by spontaneous questioning. He starts in line 270 by using a N10 strategy through which he goes on record by declaring his debt of “thanks”. This, however, is followed by a series of questions and the exhortation to ‘confess’. Guildenstern replies in line 277 by hedging (N2). Hamlet continues with a declarative, implying that he knows their intentions – “I know the good king and queen have sent for you” – in which “good” is evidently strategic, as Hamlet’s true feelings for his uncle are unmistakably ones of hatred and disgust. Rosencrantz replies in line 282 by hedging (N2). The Prince’s parting shot (lines 283–288) is an appeal to friendship and is the equivalent of using an in-group marker. Their confession eventually arrives – “my lord, we were sent for”. 3.2.3 Playing a pipe After the play within the play, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are sent by the Queen to summon Hamlet. The King has been upset by the play and Hamlet is now sure that what the ghost said – that Claudius murdered his father – is true. Rosencrantz and Guildernstern try to talk to Hamlet: Guildenstern Good my lord, vouchsafe me a word with you. Hamlet Sir, a whole history. Guildenstern The king, sir – (3. 2. 288–291)

116

[N5 – N4] [NA – MP]

Guildenstern’s opening is too polite: indeed, “Good my lord” adds an honorific adjective to the title, giving the impression that he wants to appear reassuring, not as threatening Hamlet’s negative face. The choice of “vouchsafe”, then, is significant, as it is the same deferential verb used by Claudius when persuading them to betray their friend. In this scene, as in the exchange between Claudius and the two courtiers, excessive negative politeness is symptomatic of FTA risk. Guildenstern, again, is betraying his friend by trying to extort his secret on behalf of the King. Hamlet’s reply mimics Guildenstern’s over-polite strategy, turning it into mock-politeness. However, when Guildenstern mentions the King, the prince interrupts him: Hamlet Ay, sir, what of him? Guildenstern – is in his retirement marvellous distempered. Hamlet With drink, sir? (3. 2. 292–295)

Hamlet’s interruption allows him to shift the focus of the discourse. Guildenstern is talking about the king’s reaction after the spectacle, but Hamlet pretends to misunderstand him, alluding to Claudius’s supposed drinking habit, since “distempered” can also mean “drunk”. This is an implicit insult to Claudius – an absent target – and is a strategic part of Hamlet’s successful attempt to control the conversation through questioning. Guildenstern would like to interrogate Hamlet but Hamlet disrupts the investigation with irritating queries of his own. Guildenstern is thus forced into a situation in which it is difficult to answer without causing offence, either to the King or to Hamlet himself. Hamlet exploits his power of vertical imposition – P – to control the dialogue and intensifies it further through the nominal address form “sir” (lines 292 and 295), which highlights D – the horizontal distance between himself and Guildenstern. He knows Guildenstern cannot answer back because he is lower in rank and distant in affect and intimacy, and so tries to provoke a reaction in his interlocutor. Hamlet, who is well aware of the P imposition, wants to invite disagreement and provoke Guildenstern’s 117

impolite responses, for he knows that disagreement has to be justified by someone of inferior rank. Guildenstern does give some reasons, but it becomes increasingly difficult for him to sustain the conversation: Guildenstern No, my lord, with choler. Hamlet Your wisdom should show itself more richer to signify this to his doctor, for for me to put him to his purgation would perhaps plunge him into far more choler. Guildenstern Good my lord, put your discourse into some frame and start not so wildly from my affair. (3. 2. 296–301)

[OFF-R]

[BR]

Guildenstern refers to “choler” in the sense of ‘anger’, but Hamlet pretends not to understand: “choler” in the Prince’s answer refers to one of the four bodily humours – bile – which medieval, Galenic medicine associated with irascibility. He calls for a “doctor” (line 298) and suggests a possible cure by medical “purgation” (line 299). “Purgation” is used equivocally, through reference to its multiple meanings – “remedy”, “spiritual cleansing” and “clearing oneself of an accusation”. Hamlet uses “purgation” to be irreverent towards the King but actually alludes to the purification of Claudius’s sin because he has his father’s murder in mind. Guildenstern cannot hide his impatience and frustration in line 300, explaining that he is unable to understand the subtext of Hamlet’s words. He perceives that the Prince is now off record and invites him to go back on record – “put your discourse on frame” (line 300). In this he is unsuccessful, as the next section will show. It is important to note the dramatic effect of Hamlet’s discourse at this point. The play is organised in such a way as to replicate the ironic mechanism underlying Hamlet’s off-recordness on a dramatic plane. Verbal irony relies on a gap between what the speaker says and what he means, and Hamlet’s off-record strategy depends on a separation between signified and signifiers – between the literal meaning of his statements and their true significance. The exploitation of this gap between what is said and what is meant links Hamlet’s off-recordness to a kind of dramatic irony: in fact, the true sense of Hamlet’s previous comments (lines 118

297–299) can be fully understood only by the audience. The spectators have sufficient information – from soliloquies and from having witnessed the action in its entirety – to infer Hamlet’s intentions and motives from his cryptic language. In the following passage, Hamlet continues to shift the focus of his discourse: Hamlet I am tame, sir, pronounce. Guildenstern The Queen your mother in most great affliction of spirit hath sent me to you. Hamlet You are welcome. (3. 2. 302–305)

[OFF-R]

In line 300 immediately preceding this exchange – “put your discourse into some frame” – Guildenstern has tried to put Hamlet on record by using a BRS to introduce Gertrude’s request (lines 303–304). As usual, Guildenstern is not being sincere but acting as a mediator for the King and Queen. Hamlet reacts by going off record in line 305 and displaying politeness with a mock-welcome. In the following extract, Hamlet’s mockery is perceived by Guildenstern as odd and out of place: Guildenstern Nay, good my lord, this courtesy is not of the right [N2] breed. If it shall please you to make me a [FTA] wholesome answer, I will do your mother’s commandment. If not, your pardon and my return shall be the end of business. Hamlet Sir, I cannot. Guildenstern What, my lord? Hamlet Make you a wholesome answer. My wit’s diseased. […] [ON-R] (3. 2. 306–313, emphasis added)

Guildenstern appears exasperated by what he perceives as misplaced courtesy: he understands that there is a form of provocation underlying 119

Hamlet’s words, particularly in the expressions “I am tame” and “you are welcome” (lines 302, 305), yet he cannot escape the trap that Hamlet has been laying throughout the conversation. In fact, Hamlet is still aiming to provoke dispreferred responses from Guildenstern but this time he is using a different strategy, which involves a deliberate form of misplaced and unconvincing courtesy. Guildenstern reacts with a non-redressed FTA (lines 307–310), whose subtext is “if you do not stop making fun of me, I will go away”. Far from being a real threat, this statement marks Hamlet’s triumph. His next answer – “Sir, I cannot” – achieves a peak of irony by performing an on-record reply that formally satisfies Guildenstern’s request. The prince goes back on record but only to declare that he is mad and that he cannot go on record. Rosencrantz’s intervention, using friendship as a means of breaking into Hamlet’s mindset, is counteracted by the prince’s reference to ambition. Here Hamlet reverts to and exploits the arguments put forward by his friends during their first encounter in Act Two. He deceives them by saying what he knows is on their minds: Rosencrantz My lord, you once did love me. Hamlet And do still, by these pickers and stealers. Rosencrantz Good my lord, what is your cause of distemper? You do surely bar the door upon your own liberty if you deny your griefs to your friend. Hamlet Sir, I lack advancement. Rosencrantz How can that be, when you have the voice of the King himself for your succession in Denmark? Hamlet Ay, sir, but while the grass grows – the proverb is something musty. (3. 2. 326–335)

[N4] [OFF-R] [N4]

[OFF-R]

[OFF-R]

“I lack advancement” (line 331) is an interesting claim, which provides an apparently reasonable reply to Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. In fact, it is also an off-record statement since it has a double meaning that only the audience can catch. Its hidden meaning – hidden to Rosencrantz and 120

Guildenstern but not to the audience – concerns Hamlet’s self-reproach at his delay in avenging his father. This piece of information has been given to the spectators on more than one occasion and, in particular, in the third soliloquy, when he says: Hamlet ’Swounds, I should take it. For it cannot be But I am pigeon-livered and lack gall To make oppression bitter, or ere this I should ha’ fatted all the region kites With this slave’s offal – bloody, bawdy villain, Remorseless, treacherous, lecherous, kindless villain. Why, what an ass am I! (2. 2. 511–517)

Since Hamlet has already informed the audience of his feelings of self-reproach, the dramatic irony of “I lack advancement” is a good example of how Shakespearean dialogue can permit on-record speech to be used in an off-record way. Returning to the exchange between Guildenstern and Hamlet, the sequence closes with an on-record FTA organised around a metaphor associating the prince with a pipe: Hamlet Why, look you now how unworthy a thing you make of me: you would play upon me! You would seem to know my stops, you would pluck out the heart of my mystery, you would sound me from my lowest note to my compass. And there is much music, excellent voice, in this little organ. Yet cannot you make it speak. ’Sblood, do you think I am easier to be played on than a pipe? Call me what instrument you will, though you can fret me you cannot play upon me. (3.2. 345–363)

[ON-R]

Hamlet begins his speech by complaining about Guildenstern and Rosencrantz’s disloyal behaviour towards him (lines 345–351). In line 351, however, the imprecation “sblood” introduces an FTA that serves to tell Rosencrantz and Guildenstern that he knows all about their 121

strategies while they will never know anything about his; indeed Hamlet will take his revenge on them in Act Four and have them both killed by the King of England. In conclusion, sections 3.2, 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 have offered an overview of some strategic uses of (im)politeness, which suggest that the dramatic action develops exclusively around its linguistic construction. Although Orsic, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern have shown themselves to be ambitious courtiers, the passages in which they speak to Claudius or Hamlet have mainly shown the persuasive power of the King’s speech acts and Hamlet’s ability to exploit off-recordness strategically to offend others or defend himself.

3.3 Off-record Hamlet In B&L, off-record strategy is defined as follows: “[I]f an actor goes off record in doing A, then there is more than one unambiguously attributable intention so that the actor cannot be held to have committed himself to one particular intent” (1987: 69). Though B&L consider this a politeness strategy, Culpeper in an updated model stresses that it can also be used to cause offense: “Off-record impoliteness” occurs where “the FTA is performed by means of an implicature but in such a way that one attributable intention clearly outweighs any others” (2005: 44). The oscillation between the necessity to hide his vengeful intentions before he is sure of his father’s murder – polite off-recordness – and the desire to produce FTAs attacking his enemies’ face in order to get to the truth about King Hamlet’s death, is characteristic of Hamlet’s speech. His hatred of Claudius is mixed with his disgust for Gertrude, visible even before the spectre’s apparition: Claudius […] But now, my cousin Hamlet, and my son,-- [NA] Hamlet A little more than kin, and less than kind. [OFF-R] Claudius How is it that the clouds still hang on you? [P15]

122

Hamlet Not so much, my lord; I am too much in the ‘son’. (1. 2. 64–67, emphasis added)

[OFF-R]

The King addresses Hamlet by name, adding “cousin” and “son” – family names which classify this as a form of PP. Hamlet’s off-record phrase “a little more than kin and less than kind” has multiple interpretations. In this case, both Claudius and the audience are unaware of what Hamlet actually means. In fact, this is the scene in which Hamlet first appears on stage: he is disgusted by the improper behaviour of his mother as a widow – she has remarried only two months after her first husband’s death – and he is still mourning his father. However, he does not yet know about King Hamlet’s murder. Thanks to this offrecord cue, the audience begins to conjecture about what is “rotten in the State of Denmark”. Returning to this exchange, as Elam highlights (2006: 138), Hamlet makes reference to the English proverb “the nearer in kin the less in kindness”. This allusion, hinting that Hamlet is more than a relative but not a proper son, expresses the prince’s disapproval of the marriage between his mother and his uncle. In addition, “less than kind”, playing on the double meaning of “kind” as “relative” and “gentle”, discloses the aggression he will later show towards other characters – an aggression triggered at the end of this Act by the Ghost’s request for revenge. Hamlet’s cue thus splits the plane of signification in two ways – the play on words shows the arbitrary correspondence between referents and words, while there is also a gap between the utterance itself and the intentions underlying it. The King’s next line shows his interest in Hamlet’s sadness (P15); Claudius expresses concern for his nephew and Hamlet replies by going off-record again, though without forgetting the deferential expression “my lord”, which is clearly a discernment politeness formula due to P. This time, the wordplay is not semantic but involves the homophony between “sun” and “son”, alluding to the pain of being the present King’s son. The perfect framework of DP courtesy displayed by both parties in this scene suggests that Hamlet wants to appear formally correct, which is certainly a natural trait of his courtly education but also confirms the weight of the variable P; though distasteful, Claudius as King is an institutional figure considered untouchable and unquestionable 123

in the Renaissance. In other words, Hamlet is affected by a burden of imposition that prevents him from overtly expressing his true aversion and disapproval. His attitude to Gertrude is also affected by a burden of imposition, but in this case it is due to affect (A): Gertrude Good Hamlet, cast thy nighted colour off And let thine eye look like a friend on Denmark. Do not for ever with thy vailed lids Seek for thy noble father in the dust. Thou knowst ‘tis common all that lives must die, Passing through nature to eternity. Hamlet Ay, madam, it is common. Claudius If it be, Why seems it so particular with thee? (1. 2. 68–75)

[NA] [N1]

[N8]

[P15 Question]

Gertrude intervenes with a N8 – “an instance of a general rule to soften the offence” – in lines 71–72, telling Hamlet to forget his father and carry on with his life. This sentence, which might be regarded as sensible advice for a mourner, is perceived as an FTA by Hamlet. His reply confirms this. Indeed, when Gertrude alludes to King Hamlet’s death as if it were a natural event, something that sooner or later happens to everyone, Hamlet agrees with her – “Ay, madam, it is common” – but only in terms of it being part of a normal birth/death cycle. When they get to the “particular” case of their family (line 75), the Prince says something different – something that strangely connects the discourse of the naturalness of the birth/death cycle with the dichotomy between being and seeming, as if to trace a parallelism between the artificiality of external behaviour and the unnaturalness of his father’s premature departure. When Gertrude asks for explanations of Hamlet’s mood, demonstrating a genuine positive polite interest, Hamlet answers as follows: Hamlet ‘Seems’, madam nay it is, I know not ‘seems.’ ’Tis not alone my inky cloak, cold mother, Nor customary suits of solemn black, Nor windy suspiration of forced breath, No, nor the fruitful river in the eye,

124

[DP] [N5] [Declarative]

Nor the dejected havior of the visage, Together with all forms, moods, shapes of grief, That can denote me truly. These indeed ‘seem’, For they are actions that a man might play, But I have that within which passes show, These but the trappings and the suits of woe. (1. 2. 76–86)

Hamlet declares that he hates any forms of exteriority and empty “showing” (line 76), but his speech also establishes his main character trait. He feels an excess inside – “But I have that within which passes show” – which he cannot express properly and which may have been induced by a sense of imposition. This emerges from the soliloquy that ends this scene: Hamlet […] That it should come thus: But two months dead nay, not so much, not two – So excellent a king, that was to this Hyperion to a satyr, […] And yet within a month (Let me not think on’t – Frailty, thy name is Woman), A little month, or e’er those shoes were old With which she followed my poor father’s body, Like Niobe, all tears. Why she – O God, a beast that wants discourse of reason Would have mourned longer – married with my uncle, My father’s brother (but no more like my father Than I to Hercules). Within a month, […] O most wicked speed! To post With such dexterity to incestuous sheets, It is not, nor it cannot come to good; But break, my heart, for I must hold my tongue. (1. 2. 137–140, 145–153,156–159)

[Soliloquy]

In relation to (im)politeness, a soliloquy has the important function of opening a rift in the interactional construction of the dramatic action, by enabling information about the states of mind, motives and intentions behind the characters’ speech to be conveyed to the audience. The soliloquy cannot be scored for (im)politeness in itself, since it is outside the realm of interaction; however, it provides precious information which allows genuine talk to be distinguished from strategic utterance. By comparing monologues and dialogues by the same character, both 125

the audience and the researcher can infer the implicatures implied in conversation as well as the (im)polite strategies enacted in interaction. A number of points can be made in relation to this particular soliloquy. Hamlet is disgusted by his mother’s behaviour: the interrupted lines (lines 138, 145–146, 149–151), exclamations (line 142) and suspended sentences (line 138) all suggest that he experiences her marriage to Claudius as a traumatic event. This may partly account for the sense of imposition that forces Hamlet to speak off record: we infer that he is not able to speak because the pain caused by his mother’s behaviour is too great. However, the expression “I must hold my tongue” (emphasis added) also hints at censorship brought about by the impossibility of openly denouncing the immorality of the King and Queen. P and A are responsible for this self-censorship. The monologue thus connects the line “I have that within which passes show” with the fact that Hamlet feels something that cannot be conveyed in words and whose untellability is a consequence of an internal or external sense of being imposed upon. The sense of powerlessness that derives from his inability to speak returns in Act Two when, in another monologue, he chastises himself for not being able to follow up on the ghost’s request to avenge his murder. In the following passage he refers to revenge against Claudius as his “cause”: Yet I, A dull and muddy-mettled rascal, peak, Like John-a-dreams, unpregnant of my cause, And can say nothing. (2. 2. 501–504, emphasis added)

Line 504 “And can say nothing” asserts Hamlet’s inability to speak; this, along with the need to verify the ghost’s words, leads him to the idea of the play within the play: Hum, I have heard That guilty creatures sitting at a play Have by the very cunning of the scene Been struck so to the soul that presently They have proclaimed their malefactions. For murder, though it have no tongue, will speak With most miraculous organ. (2. 2. 523–529, emphasis added)

126

Hamlet, who cannot openly accuse the King of murder without evidence, and who is incapable of translating his tormented thoughts into action, decides to make theatre speak for him and arranges for a play to stage the murder. The staged play is the semiotic equivalent of a verbal FTA – an act aimed not only at verifying the ghost’s words, but also at threatening Claudius by reminding him of his sin and eliciting a reaction. At the same time, he amplifies the off-recordness of his previous confrontation with Claudius and Gertrude by making it the foundational strategy of his feigned madness. Both strategies – madness and the play within the play – are alternative ways of expressing what cannot be said clearly and directly. 3.3.1 The fishmonger: splitting words The first scene showing mad behaviour by Hamlet takes place at Court in the presence of Polonius. The counsellor’s greeting is conventionally deferential because he wants to test the extent of Hamlet’s madness. He clumsily offers sympathy to his interlocutor and tries to verify his mental condition: Polonius How does my good Lord Hamlet? Hamlet Well, God-a-mercy. Polonius Do you know me, my lord? Hamlet Excellent well, you are a fishmonger. Polonius Not I, my lord. Hamlet Then I would you were so honest a man. Polonius Honest, my lord? Hamlet Ay, sir, to be honest as this world goes is to be one man picked out of ten thousand. (2. 2. 168–176)

[P15] [OFF-R]

127

In this passage Hamlet’s supposed madness functions as a specific mode of discourse aimed at breaking up Polonius’s logic by disregarding the expectations generated by questions. The Prince’s paradoxical statement – “you are a fishmonger” – plays on the double meaning of the word “fishmonger”, which at the time meant a ‘fish-seller’ but also a ‘pander’ or pimp. The subtext of “You are a fishmonger” followed by Polonius’s denial can be rephrased as: you are a fishseller – no – then I wish you were at least as honest as a pimp. So Hamlet’s intention in using the word “fishmonger” here is to offend Polonius and to tell him things that he would not be able to say if he were speaking on record. The subtlety of the strategy is also shown in the use of the adverb “then”, which establishes a logical connection between the two statements that reverses the social hierarchy and mixes social and moral categories. In fact, Hamlet combines a low-ranking person (the fishseller) and an immoral one (the pander) to suggest that Polonius is unworthy of being either. The general effect is to lower the status of the King’s counsellor both morally and socially. The passage continues with an allusion to a daughter, which connects the concept of “prostitute” with that of “death”: Polonius That’s very true, my lord. Hamlet For if the sun breed maggots in a dead dog being a god kissing carrion – Have you a daughter? Polonius I have, my lord. Hamlet Let her not walk i’ th’ sun: conception is a blessing but not as your daughter may conceive, friend look to ’t. Polonius [Aside] How say you by that? Still harping on my daughter. Yet he knew me not at first, ’a said I was a fishmonger! ’A is far gone; and truly in my youth I suffered much extremity for love very near this. I’ll speak to him again – What do you read, my lord? (2. 2. 177–188)

128

The prostitute/death association might be due to Hamlet’s disgust for his mother, which he extends to all women. Gertrude is judged by the Prince to be an inconsiderate woman who has yielded to lust – a point explained in the “closet scene” (Act 3, Scene 4) – and this disapproval becomes metonymical for a misogynistic feeling that produces an association ending with a reference to Ophelia. Hamlet’s words – “for if the sun breed maggots” (line 178) – allude to a process of putrefaction, which is confirmed by the choice of the word “carrion” (line 179), which stands for “corpse” but is also a slang word for “prostitute”. Thus, although Hamlet is producing ‘mad discourse’ to confuse Polonius, the associative chain connecting putrefaction to the feminine emerges as a motif in this conversation. The choice to go off record to express this motif is also due to the fact that Hamlet is not ready at this stage to formulate a clear and overt accusation against his mother. His first soliloquy, analysed above (1. 2. 137–159), testifies to his inability to even think about his mother’s hasty marriage to Claudius and establishes his reproach for Gertrude as the matrix of his melancholy and disease; indeed, the soliloquy precedes the revelation of the murder. It is only after the play within the play that Hamlet becomes able to speak his mind to Gertrude in the closet scene. The carrion reference, then, encapsulates his dark feelings towards his mother and these inevitably contaminate his relationship with Ophelia too. In this respect, it is worth highlighting that Polonius understands the reference to his daughter but not the hidden meaning of Hamlet’s speech, which is off record for Polonius but on record for the audience (again a case of dramatic irony), which is aware of Hamlet’s disgust at Gertrude’s marriage to Claudius. Besides, although he recognises that “Though this be madness, yet there is method”, Polonius is not able to fully grasp the power of Hamlet’s “words, words, words”, which deconstruct conventional meanings and follow more dangerous semantic paths. Off-record strategies thus prove to have a performative illocutionary force that becomes the core of the dramatic action. Hamlet’s utterances relativize the effectiveness of communication by violating Gricean maxims. The mismatch between different planes of enunciation and the association of more than one meaning with the same referent reveals the arbitrariness of language and, by extension, the arbitrariness that actually governs the world.

129

3.3.2 Switching positions Condensing or deferring meaning in language is linked to another trait of Hamlet’s off-recordness. He often talks to interlocutors while actually addressing other people he has in mind. He thus interrupts the correspondence between the enunciation and its addressee, not only by opening signifiers to more than one signified but also by overlapping different addressees. This strategy is applied to family roles and begins with the kin/kind game (1. 2. 65) described above. In the ‘closet scene’, for example, he plays sarcastically on his mother’s use of the word “father”: Hamlet Now, mother, what’s the matter? Gertrude Hamlet, thou hast thy father much offended. Hamlet Mother, you have my father much offended. Gertrude Come, come, you answer with an idle tongue. Hamlet Go, go, you question with a wicked tongue. Gertrude Why, how now, Hamlet! (3. 4. 7–12)

[Question] [FTA] [OFF-R] [FTA] [OFF-R]

While Gertrude uses “father” to refer to Claudius, Hamlet uses it to refer to his own father. While Gertrude makes unredressed FTAs, accusing Hamlet of offending the King and of being “idle” with her, Hamlet comments on the offence that Gertrude has caused his dead father using off-record utterances which once again violate conversational maxims and blur the underlying mechanism of enunciation. Gertrude thinks Hamlet is playing with her. Her choice of the word “idle” and her shift from the confidential “thou” (line 8) to the formal “you” (line 10) suggest that the Queen is treating Hamlet as an unruly son. Her attitude resembles that of a mother scolding a child: “thou has thy father much offended”. Hamlet goes off record and turns the accusation back on her by repeating her exact words but changing the meaning of “father”. Gertrude is not sure of the real meaning of the Prince’s words and in fact replies as if she were unable to take him seriously. But Hamlet is 130

very serious in alluding to her “wicked tongue”. This exchange is at the interface between off-recordness and on-recordness since Hamlet is referring to Gertrude’s deception (off record) but also defending himself against her FTAs (on record). On the one hand, Hamlet’s speech is off record because it is ambiguous about its real meaning, while on the other it is perceived as an impolite speech act. Indeed, the Queen again reacts with a motherly rebuke (line 12). The DM why (line 13) intensified by another DM how now (line 12), expresses surprise and contempt on the part of the Queen, who cannot believe her ears. A further example of Hamlet’s strategy of changing his addressee and/or referent can be found in a passage in which he makes fun of Claudius when he is about to be sent to England: Hamlet But, come, for England Farewell, dear mother. Claudius Thy loving father, Hamlet. Hamlet My mother. Father and mother is man and wife. Man and wife is one flesh. So, my mother. Come, for England! (4. 3. 47–51)

In bidding goodbye to Claudius, Hamlet addresses his uncle as his “dear mother”. Replacing father with mother is very effective; husband and wife, father and mother are interchangeable and therefore no longer correspond to fixed referents. With the “incestuous” marriage by which an uncle has become a father and a brother-in-law has become a husband, and the killing of the King which has deprived Elsinore of its monarch, any kind of disruption of social positions and family roles is possible, even for Claudius to become Hamlet’s mother. The decisive moment in relation to this switching of addressee between family members takes place in the play within the play: Hamlet This is one Lucianus, nephew to the King! […] ’A poisons him i’ th’ garden for his estate. His name’s Gonzago. The story is extant and written

131

in very choice Italian. You shall see anon how the murderer gets the love of Gonzago’s wife. Ophelia The King rises! (3. 2. 237; 254–257)

Hamlet is commenting on the dramatic action that the courtiers are watching and explaining that the King’s assassin is his nephew. In the play, Hamlet replaces the uncle (Claudius) with the nephew (Hamlet himself), thus connecting the past with the future, and what happened in the past with the vengeance that he will eventually take when he kills the King. The uncle/nephew utterance thus functions as an FTA within the wider FTA of the spectacle. Claudius is in fact so threatened by it that he leaves the performance. Although any number of intentions can be attributed to off-recordness in ordinary conversation, in Hamlet it can often be construed as impolite. This is particularly evident in the ‘nunnery scene’: Hamlet Nymph, in thy orisons Be all my sins remembered. Ophelia Good my lord, How does your honour for this many a day? Hamlet I humbly thank you, well. Ophelia My lord, I have remembrances of yours That I have longed long to redeliver; I pray you, now receive them. Hamlet No, not I. I never gave you aught. Ophelia My honoured lord, you know right well you did. And with them words of so sweet breath composed As made these things more rich. Their perfume lost, Take these again for to the noble mind Rich gifts wax poor when givers prove unkind. There, my lord. (3.1.87–101)

132

[P15]

[DP] [Expressive] [N5] [PI4] [FTA]

The dialogue starts in a formal tone marked by the use of formulaic courtesy, followed by Ophelia’s attempt to return Hamlet’s gifts. After a DP, Hamlet denies having given her anything (line 95), which corresponds to a precise positive impolite strategy – “Be disinterested, unconcerned, unsympathetic” (Culpeper 1996: 357–358). When she reacts (lines 96–101) with an FTA accusing him of being unkind and less ‘noble’ than she is, he explodes with a sequence of FTAs that offend Ophelia: Hamlet Ha! are you honest? Ophelia My lord? Hamlet Are you fair? Ophelia What means your lordship? (3. 1. 102–105)

Hamlet’s questions preceded by the exclamation “ha!” (line 102), which signals a change in his tone, later give rise to the following set of impolite imperatives: Hamlet […] Get thee to a nunnery. Farewell. Or, if thou wilt needs marry, marry a fool for wise men know well enough what monsters you make of them. To a nunnery go, and quickly too. Farewell. Ophelia Heavenly powers restore him. Hamlet I have heard of your paintings well enough God hath given you one face and you make yourselves another. You jig and amble and you lisp, you nick-name God’s creatures and make your wantonness ignorance. Go to, I’ll no more on’t. It hath made me mad. I say we will have no more marriages. Those that are married already – all but one – shall Live. The rest shall keep as they are. To a nunnery, go! (3. 1. 136–148)

133

This speech may not be directly connected to Ophelia but again to Gertrude because of her inappropriate behaviour as a widow, according to a metonymical process of Hamlet’s mind, expressed through off-recordness. His off-record modality thus disturbs the correspondence between utterance, addressee and referent, but it also proves to be a device of dramatic irony that allows him to be simultaneously offensive – for the audience is able to evaluate the strength of his hidden FTAs and to understand that his true target is Gertrude – and defensive – for Ophelia (line 140) and the other characters can only perceive his aggression but not decipher the offence he cannot overtly express.

3.4 Summary This chapter has discussed different aspects of (im)politeness in Hamlet by focusing on DP, PP and NP, and the extent to which they are governed by P, D, A, R and RF, a new variable which is a distinctive component of Renaissance courtesy. (Im)politeness in Hamlet emerges from this analysis as a stratified phenomenon with different functions in social interactions. The analytical process – covering a selection of scenes divided into sub-sequences – has shown the following: 1.

2.

3.

134

The opening scene shows transgression by the guards of expected roles and formulae, producing an atmosphere of confusion that will return in later scenes; An analysis of the exchanges involving the courtiers illustrates different patterns of discernment politeness being deployed, with the introduction of a new variable (RF), which suggests that high-ranking people may wish to show more courtesy than would be expected from P and D; The analysis has shown how characters such as Rosencrantz, Guildenstern and Orsic employ strategic (im)politeness in order to realise their social ambitions; at the same time, the Gravedigger’s ironic game with Hamlet provides an example of a non-sociallyambitious (im)polite strategy being used by a social inferior, aimed

4.

at proving his linguistic mastery and resulting in a diminishing of the imposition of P and D in the exchange; The final section shows that the main trait of Hamlet’s speech is off-recordness – a strategy played out at the very limits of irony at both a verbal and a dramatic level. Hamlet’s off-record strategies are shown to be constructed around the systematic deferral and condensation of meaning and around the disruption of the correspondence between utterance, addressee and referent.

135

Chapter Four: The gendering of (im)politeness: The Taming of the Shrew

The Taming of the Shrew, written around 1594, is one of Shakespeare’s first comedies. The central action, which covers five acts, is technically a play-within-the play since it is embedded in the Induction – a framing story in which Sly, a tinker, is induced to believe he is a nobleman who has forgotten his original life. To celebrate Sly’s return to his noble life, a show is put on about the taming of a ‘shrew’, a stereotypically unruly and impolite woman despised by society. As Culpeper (2001) stresses, it is in the Renaissance that the shrew comes to overlap with the notion of a ‘scold’ and to be identified exclusively with a woman who does harm to her community, especially to her husband (266), through her aggressive and disobedient attitude. In fact, the etymology of the word ‘shrew’ reveals that it originally referred only to an animal of the genus sorex – a mouse with a long snout – and later began to be used metaphorically to mean someone (man or woman) who was wicked and malicious (Culpeper 2001: 265). By the end of the sixteenth century, the word exclusively denoted talkative, disobedient women who dominated their husbands and were thus associated with devilish creatures. Such women were considered dangerous to the patriarchal establishment, which was preoccupied with keeping social order: “To be ruled by a woman […] meant loss of freedom, and this may well have been the reason why a shrew […] was depicted as a devilish figure, the worst evil on earth” (De Bruyn 1979: 138).32 The construction and condemnation of the shrew is based on stories of “women [who] were likely to vent frustration against the nearest symbols of authority” (Underdown 1985: 120) and who committed crimes – verbal or physical mistreatment of neighbours and husbands, refusal to go into service – that were tried in local courtrooms. These stories contributed to the raising of a “woman question” that 32

See Culpeper (2001) on this topic.

soon became a central issue among intellectuals and moralists of the time33. This is why, in attempting to maintain social stability by exorcising the unease brought about by the possible inversion and subversion of gender roles, Renaissance culture started proposing the shrew as “a stock figure for laughter and amusement” (De Bruyn 1979: 138). The shrew was a character who “function[ed] to subdue a male character (normally a husband), and thereby to amuse the audience” (Culpeper 2001: 266) and was inspired by the spectacles of scold ‘carting’ and ‘ducking’ performed in Carnivalesque rituals (Mucci 2001: 67). The most effective reaction to the menace of uncontrolled women was to marginalise them through social and legal condemnation, and to neutralise their subversive potential by representing them as comic figures. In other words, fear of role inversion was counteracted by another inversion, in which the threat was mocked and derided and so turned into its opposite – something amusing and ridiculous. Shakespeare’s The Taming of the Shrew is an interesting experiment, which problematizes what Culpeper has labelled the Renaissance ‘shrew-schema’ (2001: 265) by constructing a female protagonist, Katherina, who goes through a non-naturalistic transformation that leads her to abandon her initial scold-like behaviour and become the perfect example of an obedient wife as a consequence of violent taming by her husband Petruccio. Whilst this plot seems to be in line with coeval plays on the subject (Boose 1991, Mucci 2001), Katherina’s characterization, particularly her non-naturalistic transformation, still puzzles critics. There have been three main lines of interpretation of the characterisation of Katherina: in the first half of the twentieth century critics tended to view her as a woman whose self-will is finally suppressed by Petruccio (Charlton 1938); later feminist critics claim that Katherina remains unbroken (Kahn 1977,

33

138

Concern with “the woman question” was obviously connected with the more general turmoil of the period (see chapter two) and the anxiety engendered by the changes involved in moving on from a feudal cultural heritage; if the Renaissance is an age based on a dichotomy between old and new, it can also be classified in terms of binary oppositions – order vs disorder, master vs servant, English vs stranger, husband vs wife. The male-female antithesis encompasses all the others (Mucci 2001: 64).

Dash 1981, de Filippis 2003); a third interpretation sees Katherina accept Petruccio’s taming as a game which she eventually joins in with through her ‘obedience speech’ (Morris 1981). However, there has been very little critical discussion of Katherina’s (im)polite language. This chapter addresses the question of impoliteness in Taming of the Shrew by looking first at the two parts of the Induction (4.1, 4.2) and working through the role played by language in the subtle mechanisms of identity-formation. This prior analysis is needed for an understanding of Katherina’s characterisation and of her relationship with her father and sister, discussed in 4.3. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 provide an analysis of Katherina’s speech acts as resistance – in the form of verbal flyting – to Petruccio’s taming. Speechact theory features strongly in this chapter as a methodological tool for investigating (im)politeness.

4.1 The Induction: (im)politeness and identity construction The play opens with a conversation between a Hostess and Sly, a tinker. The politeness labels for each character’s speech acts are shown to the right of the text: Enter Christopher SLY and Hostess Sly I’ll feeze you, in faith. Hostess A pair of stocks, you rogue! Sly You are a baggage: the Slys are no rogues. Look in the Chronicles; we came in with Richard Conqueror: therefore paucas pallabris, let the world slide. Sessa! Hostess You will not pay for the glasses you have burst? Sly No, not a denier. Go by, Saint Jeronimy, go to thy cold bed and warm thee.

[IBR FTA – Commissive] [Expressive – DT] [DT] [Two assertives] [IBR FTA – Directive]

[Request – Directive]

[IBR Directive]

139

Hostess I know my remedy; I must go fetch the headborough. [FTA – Commissive] Exit Sly Third, or fourth, or fifth borough, I’ll answer him [Assertive] by law. I’ll not budge an inch, boy. Let him come, and kindly. [Optative Imperative] Falls asleep (Ind. 1. 1–14)34

The play opens with a clear FTA on the part of Sly to the Hostess (Ind. 1. 1), a threat to which she replies by expressing her ‘desire’ to see Sly put in the stocks (Ind. 1. 2). The exchange continues with a series of assertives, directives and commissives, interspersed with impolite taboo words (“rogue”, “baggage”). The overall impression is of low-level, popular language, as might be expected from a hostess and a poor ‘customer’ like Sly who does not want to pay his bills. But there is more. In mentioning “paucas pallabris” and “Jeronimy”, Sly is alluding to the Spanish Tragedy (c. 1592) by Thomas Kyd, a play in vogue at the time and used as a model by Shakespeare in Titus Andronicus (1593). “Paucas pallabris” is a mocking reference to pocas palabras, as Perosa notes in his comments on The Taming of the Shrew (2009: 203), while “Jeronimy” refers to the protagonist of The Spanish Tragedy, Ieronimo. Thus, the reference not only provides comic mockery of a rival play – this was not unusual at the time among competitive dramatists – but also, and more subtly, establishes a form of parallelism between the violence of a play considered the epitome of staged brutality in the revenge tragedies of the time and the comic verbal violence of Taming of the Shrew. Overall, the FTAs in this episode introduce verbal aggression while also raising a laugh. A further reference to politeness occurs in Sly’s statement that his family descends from the Normans, whose arrival in England after their defeat of the Anglo-Saxons in 1066 led to the rise of the culture of courtesy described in chapter two. Sly’s claim that his Norman ascendency automatically exonerates him from the charge of being a rogue signals a certain degree of awareness on his part in associating ‘courtesy’ with the Normans. Here Shakespeare’s exploitation of the Normans/courtesy 34

140

W. Shakespeare, The Taming of the Shrew, ed. by Barbara Hodgdon, London, Bloomsbury, 2010. Subsequent quotations of this play are taken from this edition.

association through Sly’s comic use of the name “Richard Conqueror” instead of William the Conqueror plays on ideas that had already formed in the collective imagination. The exchange closes with Sly pronouncing an optative imperative (“let him come”), which is a form of direct imperative, modified by the adverb “kindly”. This links to the next sequence, shown below, involving the entrance of a real Lord and his attendants. This new episode is marked by a different tone and provides examples of conversation between people of different social ranks. Whereas in the exchange between Sly and the Hostess the P variable did not affect the interaction even though their impolite expressions and FTAs produced a high degree of riskiness (R), in this second episode the P variable has a marked effect on the language and tone of the exchange: Wind horns. Enter Lord from hunting [, two Huntsmen and others]. Lord Huntsman, I charge thee, tender well my hounds: [NA – N1 – BR Directives] Breathe Merriman – the poor cur is embossed – And couple Clowder with the deep-mouthed brach. Sawst thou not, boy, how Silver made it good At the hedge corner, in the coldest fault? [Question – Vocative] I would not lose the dog for twenty pound. First Huntsman Why, Belman is as good as he, my lord: [DM – NA – N5] He cried upon it at the merest loss, And twice to-day picked out the dullest scent. Trust me, I take him for the better dog. [P13] Lord Thou art a fool. If Echo were as fleet [PI9 – DT – PA] I would esteem him worth a dozen such. But sup them well, and look unto them all: [BR Directive] Tomorrow I intend to hunt again. [Commissive] First Huntsman I will, my lord. [N5] (Ind. 1. 15–29, emphasis added)

This exchange between the Lord and the first Huntsman presents conventional speech: the Lord begins by calling the huntsman by his ‘title’, which Brown and Gilman (1989: 175) label as neutral polite verbal behaviour, and making a bald on-record directive (Kopytko 1993: 156), introduced

141

by the expression “I charge thee”, which Brown and Gilman list among the phrases used to introduce indirect requests classifiable as N1 (1989: 181). Thus, the BR directive seems to be mitigated by recourse to a negative polite strategy characterised by indirectness. In his reply, since the Huntsman (low rank) does not agree with the Lord (high rank), he is required by convention to soften his disagreement. So he first marks his disagreement with the DM “why” (line 21), which according to Lutzky (2012)35 is an adversative, and then uses the expected deferential honorific “my lord”, followed by a P13, a positive polite strategy used by S to justify to H what he/she wants to do. The Lord reacts with a positive impolite epithet – “Thou are a fool” (line 25) – followed by directives giving orders – “sup them well and look unto them all” (line 27) – and a commissive expressing intentions – “To-morrow I intend to hunt again” (line 28). The closing line is again deferential (N5) – “I will, my lord” (line 29). Unlike the exchange between Sly and the Hostess, which is marked by rudeness, here we see the principles of politeness in action, based on a difference in rank (P). At this point the Lord notices Sly and thinks up the joke he wants to play on him. Lord O monstrous beast, how like a swine he lies! [PI10 – DT] Grim death, how foul and loathsome is thine image. Sirs, I will practise on this drunken man. [Assertive] What think you, if he were conveyed to bed, Wrapped in sweet clothes, rings put upon his fingers, A most delicious banquet by his bed And brave attendants near him when he wakes Would not the beggar then forget himself? (Ind. 1. 33–40, emphasis added) 35

142

In her investigation of the pragmatic functions of what and why in early modern texts, Lutzky (2012) writes that, in using the two DMs, “The speaker wonders why something needs to be discussed or explained as it is self-evident, as well as other attitudes such as dismay, anger, contempt or disgust at their interlocutor’s (verbal) behaviour. […] Additionally, both what and why are used with an intensifying function to attract the attention of a person, e. g. in summons, when they may convey a degree of impatience on the part of the speaker” (179–180). The huntsman of The Taming of the Shrew is thus using a DM that may prove risky if directed at someone socially superior, a fact which requires the use of mitigations expressed as N5 and P13, as suggested in the analysis.

In this sequence the Lord first utters some impolite words (“monstrous beast!” and “swine”) to refer to Sly, and then provides a long series of directives describing how the “jest” should be organised. These directives offer a full description of how a noble lord should be treated. They have been divided below into three sub-sequences based on their different functions. The first sequence helps the audience visualise how Sly will be carried into a chamber and prepared to unwittingly play the part of the nobleman: Lord Even as a flattering dream or worthless fancy. Then take him up, and manage well the jest: Carry him gently to my fairest chamber, And hang it round with all my wanton pictures; Balm his foul head in warm distilled waters And burn sweet wood to make the lodging sweet; Procure me music ready when he wakes To make a dulcet and a heavenly sound; (Ind. 1. 43–50)

[Directive]

This is a long directive describing how Sly will be treated. As well as providing insight into the life of an aristocrat, it also establishes the difference between the aristocracy and people of lower rank. The next sequence is a set of instructions for addressing Sly in a courteous linguistic register. As the initial Hostess/Sly dialogue has shown, this is a register that Sly would not be accustomed to: And if he chance to speak, be ready straight And with a low submissive reverence Say ‘What is it your honour will command?’ Let one attend him with a silver basin Full of rose-water and bestrewed with flowers; Another bear the ewer, the third a diaper, And say ‘Will’t please your lordship cool your hands?’ (Ind. 1. 51–57)

[Directive]

Here the directive is focused on the kind of verbal behaviour that the servants need to show Sly, introducing the importance of language in the process of character-making and consequently in the construction of discursive identity. The kind of language they must use is formal and 143

deferential – “with a low submissive reverence” (Ind. 1. 51) – and adorned by the use of titles such as “honour” and “lordship” (Ind. 1. 52, 56). In the final sequence, the Lord’s instructions involve the kind of contextual information that Sly needs to be given when he wakes up: Some one be ready with a costly suit [Directive] And ask him what apparel he will wear; Another tell him of his hounds and horse And that his lady mourns at his disease. Persuade him that he hath been lunatic, And when he says he is, say that he dreams, For he is nothing but a mighty lord. This do, and do it kindly, gentle sirs, It will be pastime passing excellent, If it be husbanded with modesty. (Ind. 1. 58–67, emphasis added)

In explaining how to turn Sly into a Lord, though only ostensibly, these three directive sequences expose the artificiality of the entire procedure as well as, indirectly, the constructive and non-essentialist nature of the master-servant relationship. It thus provides a template for interpreting what will be staged in the play within the play about the taming of the shrew. Indeed, the use of “husbanded” as a verb (Ind. 1. 66) signals the wife/husband plot that will be staged between Katherina and Petruccio, characterised by a similar inversion of social roles. The master/servant reversal being described by the Lord is echoed by the later woman/man reversal in the play within the play, so that the reference to the former’s artificiality is inevitably extended to the latter. These allusions to the construction of social roles are intensified by a reference to metatheatre, which emerges in a subsequent exchange between the Huntsman and the Lord: First Huntsman My lord, I warrant you we will play our part, [DP – Assertive] As he shall think by our true diligence [P10 – Assertive] He is no less than what we say he is. Lord Take him up gently and to bed with him, [BR – Imperative] And each one to his office when he wakes. [Directive] (Ind. 1. 68–72, emphasis added)

144

Standard linguistic politeness is used in this exchange. The dialogue is governed by the variable P determined by the difference in social status between the Lord and the Huntsman, and thus confirms the B&L norm that the person with less power is more polite. P can be inferred from the Huntsmen’s DP towards the Lord, particularly his use of the title “my lord” and the address pronoun “you” (line 68). In addition, whereas the Lord uses a directive with a BR imperative to issue orders, the Huntsman uses a P10 strategy to guarantee that the Lord’s commands will be executed. The huntsman’s first line – “we will play our part” – also hints at a metatheatrical dimension in which the Lord performs the director role and the huntsmen and servants figure as the actors. Interestingly, Sly’s identity depends on this fiction, created exclusively by the power of words. The expression “He is no less than what we say he is” clearly suggests a process of subjectivity formation in which the speech of others proves paramount. The huntsman’s metatheatrical discourse is reinforced by the announcement that a group of players has arrived: Lord […] Now, fellows, you are welcome. Players We thank your honour. […] Lord – Well, you are come to me in a happy time, The rather for I have some sport in hand Wherein your cunning can assist me much. There is a lord will hear you play to-night; But I am doubtful of your modesties Lest, over-eyeing of his odd behaviour – For yet his honour never heard a play – You break into some merry passion And so offend him; for I tell you, sirs, If you should smile, he grows impatient. A Player Fear not, my lord, we can contain ourselves, Were he the veriest antic in the world. (Ind. 1. 78–79, 89–100)

[P2] [N5 – DP]

[P13]

[NA – DP]

145

This dialogue between the Lord and the players contains a number of interesting politeness elements. When he welcomes the actors, offering them hospitality and asking for their services, the Lord uses a positive polite strategy (P2), showing friendliness. The deployment of a P13 strategy giving reasons for his request is, on the one hand, justified by his arrangement of the joke but, on the other, seems to be governed by the reflexive variable (RF). This variable may be introduced as a typical feature of Renaissance courtesy, aimed at exhibiting a distinctive sign of superiority for the upper classes in early modern England: the Lord is offering something very politely to the actors (certainly lower in rank and also distant from him), and this makes him appear generous and worthy of his higher rank. The player replies using DP, as the use of the honorific “my lord” seems to suggest, but this reply could just as well be labelled as a strategic N5 (“give deference”), given his implicit but obvious desire to be employed by the Lord. The Lord does not reveal that Sly is not a nobleman – a fact which complicates the metatheatrical game. On stage, in fact, we have two groups of actors – the Lord’s servants and the professional players. The servants are playing for sport, trying to cheat Sly who is the unwitting object of the joke and part of the ‘representation’. At the same time, Sly is the spectator of a play being performed by the professional actors; he knows they are acting but they do not know that they are part of a bigger spectacle. The arrangement continues with the Lord instructing his own page Bartholomew to play the part of Sly’s wife: Lord Sirrah, go you to Barthol’mew my page And see him dress’d in all suits like a lady. That done, conduct him to the drunkard’s chamber, And call him ‘Madam’, do him obeisance. Tell him from me, as he will win my love, He bear himself with honourable action Such as he hath observed in noble ladies Unto their lords by them accomplished. Such duty to the drunkard let him do, With soft low tongue and lowly courtesy, And say, ’What is’t your honour will command, Wherein your lady and your humble wife

146

[PI – Directives] [Series of Imperatives]

May show her duty and make known her love?’ And then with kind embracements, tempting kisses And with declining head into his bosom, Bid him shed tears, as being overjoyed To see her noble lord restored to health, Who for this seven years hath esteemed him No better than a poor and loathsome beggar. (Ind. 1. 104–122, emphasis added)

In this speech the Lord changes his register, addressing his interlocutor as “sirrah”, a depreciative epithet when used towards an adult by a person of higher rank. Brown and Gilman score it (-1), which means it is a non-polite way of interfacing with H (1989: 176). P (power) rather than RF (reflexivity) governs this impolite choice: the Lord does not feel the need to appear particularly courteous towards his own servant. The rest of the episode is a series of directives using imperative forms – “go you”, “see him”, ”call him”, “tell him” (lines 104, 105, 107, 108). Overall, the speech offers a description of the proper behaviour of wives, characterised by humility, courtesy and “low tongue” (line 113). The last part of the speech exposes the artificiality of the feminine construction, showing what the Page must do to look like a woman – “And then with kind embracements, tempting kisses, / And with declining head into his bosom, / Bid him shed tears” (lines 117–119) – which is comparable to the master/servant artificiality discussed above. The theatrical nature of the passage allows Shakespeare to refer to extra-textual elements that simultaneously relativise the play – by showing what happens ‘backstage’ – and to problematize subjectivity itself, which is presented as being fashioned from outside. This point is clear from the next extract, which concludes the Lord’s speech by offering a final but clear reference to metatheatre and its ultimate purpose: I know the boy will well usurp the grace, Voice, gait and action of a gentlewoman. I long to hear him call the drunkard ‘husband’, And how my men will stay themselves from laughter When they do homage to this simple peasant. I’ll in to counsel them: haply my presence May well abate the over-merry spleen Which otherwise would grow into extremes. (Ind. 1. 130–137)

147

This extract brings the first part of the Induction to a close with a dual level of representation. “The boy” refers to the role of the page, played by the boy-actor who was traditionally used for female roles on the Renaissance stage. Metatheatrical discourse is thus rendered using mechanisms of representation such as disguise, which is a device that extra- and intra-textually reveals identity to be a social and gendered artefact. The transformation of the Page into a woman parallels the transformation of the boy-actor into a female character, thus foregrounding the artificiality of femininity on stage. In general, The Taming of the Shrew stages the construction of femininity and nobility in such a way as to arouse a sense of hilarity. However, it remains to be seen whether the ultimate aim is that of problematizing this construction or exposing it in order to exorcise its potential dangerousness. Within this overall construction, the language of (im)politeness in the first part of the Induction scene is an essential component of identityformation. Courtesy is the distinctive ingredient in the construction of nobility, and is treated as something which is applied from outside. In the sequences examined so far, Sly, who cannot speak and who is not accustomed to finery, is surrounded by servants who address him with ennobling epithets. As suggested by the Huntsman “he is no less than what we say he is”, meaning that his identity is determined by the words that describe his status. As regards the construction of femininity, the future wife (the Page) is ‘dressed’ by the Lord’s words, which describe femininity and the limits of possible female behaviour.

4.2 Sly, the Lord The second part of the Induction sees Sly being treated as a Lord: Enter aloft [SLY] the drunkard with three Servants – with apparel, basin and ewer, and other appurtenances – and Lord. Sly For God’s sake, a pot of small ale. First Servant Will’t please your lordship drink a cup of sack? [P10]

148

Second Servant Will’t please your honour taste of these conserves? Third Servant What raiment will your honour wear to-day? (Ind. 2. 1–4)

[P10] [P10]

This exchange between Sly and the Servants is imbued with a strong contrast between the spontaneity of the tinker and the extreme politeness of the servants. Sly says that he is used to drinking only common beverages (line 1) and the three servants in turn offer him drink, food and clothes (P10 strategy). Sly replies as follows: Sly I am Christophero Sly; call not me ‘honour’ nor [Directive] ‘lordship:’ I ne’er drank sack in my life, and if you give [P13] me any conserves, give me conserves of beef. Ne’er ask me what raiment I’ll wear; for I have no more doublets than backs, no more stockings than legs, nor no more shoes than feet – nay, sometimes more feet than shoes, or such shoes as my toes look through the over-leather. Lord Heaven cease this idle humour in your honour! [Optative Imperative] O, that a mighty man of such descent, [N9] Of such possessions and so high esteem, Should be infused with so foul a spirit. (Ind. 2. 5–15, emphasis added)

In this extract Sly vehemently tries to claim an identity that obviously has nothing to do with the use of honorifics. He asks not to be treated deferentially with DP titles such as “honour” and “lordship”. He explains his negative directive using a P13 strategy, giving reasons for his denial: honorifics are not a good match for poor clothing and bad habits – an assertion that confirms the social aspect of DP and of courtesy in general. The lord is more deferential than Sly for humorous purposes. He does not directly address Sly but uses an optative imperative – “Heaven cease this idle humour in your honour!” (line 12) – and a N9 strategy (lines 13–15), using general and impersonal terms to describe Lord Sly’s predicament. Later, the page enters, disguised as a lady, to complete the charade:

149

Page How fares my noble Lord? [NA] Sly Marry, I fare well, for here is cheer enough. Where is my wife? Page Here, noble lord! What is thy will with her? [DP] Sly Are you my wife, and will not call me ‘husband’? My men should call me ‘lord’; I am your goodman. Page My husband and my lord, my lord and husband; [N5] I am your wife in all obedience. Sly I know it well – What must I call her? Lord Madam. Sly ‘Al’ce madam’, or ‘Joan madam’? Lord ‘Madam’, and nothing else. So lords call ladies. (Ind. 2. 97–108, emphasis added)

The Page provides some examples of how a noble wife was supposed to treat her husband at the time: s/he is deferential by calling her husband “noble lord” (line 100) and professing obedience (line 104). However, the expression “my husband and my lord, my lord and husband” (line 103) sounds rather mocking in its repetition of the two terms in a chiastic sentence. This inverted parallelism between the words ‘lord’ and ‘husband’ reproduces the conceptual hierarchical structure underlying Renaissance society, in which the husband is the Lord of his house. This truth is comically followed by a brief exchange in which the Lord is taught how to address his wife (see lines 105–108). However, this passage can also be read at another level. If we consider the Page’s words to be aimed at cheating Sly, the titles and other formulaic expressions used as DP become a form of strategic politeness aimed at performing the joke, thus foregrounding the performative nature of the whole play we are watching or reading, in which everything is strategically shaped by the author. What emerges in this sub-section, then, is a heterogeneous pattern of (im)polite speech acts, in which we regularly find deferential polite 150

expressions and strategies as well as positive and negative polite strategies. Impoliteness, on the other hand, is expressed through taboo words and BR directives without redressive action.

4.3 Katherina and Bianca: impoliteness vs obedience Katherina Minola’s first appearance on stage occurs as she is walking down the streets of Padua, the setting of the play-within-the play, accompanied by her father Baptista and her sister Bianca. They meet Hortensio and Gremio, Bianca’s suitors: Baptista Gentlemen, importune me no farther, For how I firmly am resolved you know: That is, not bestow my youngest daughter Before I have a husband for the elder. If either of you both love Katherina, Because I know you well and love you well, Leave shall you have to court her at your pleasure. (1.1.48–54)

[NA – Directive] [P13]

[P15]

Baptista opens the sequence with a bald on-record directive addressed to the suitors, asking them not to bother him with further requests. He presents himself authoritatively but subsequently uses two polite strategies to mitigate his previous directive: P13, through which he gives reasons for his behaviour, and P15, which serves to express his empathy with the suitors. As with the Lord during the Induction, Baptista’s use of PP redressive strategies seems to contradict B&L’s theory, which states that greater politeness should be used by people of lower rank when talking to people of higher rank. In the cases of both the Lord and Baptista, PP may serve not only to protect H’s face but also to generate a reflexive degree of courtesy. A person of high status may be expected to behave politely in case his/her unmitigated words require subsequent adjustment. Another reason may be the theatrical need to explain and clarify situations for the audience: thus, for instance, the strategy of “giving reasons” (P13) may 151

be one of the devices used by Shakespeare to reveal motivations behind previous events and the character’s intentions. Returning to Baptista, the last line of his speech “leave shall you have to court her at your pleasure” (1. 1. 54), in which “court” is used with its conventional meaning of “woo”, leads Gremio to produce an interesting pun: Gremio To cart her rather: she’s too rough for me. There, there, Hortensio, will you any wife? (1.1.55–56)

[Pun]

Gremio’s pun, playing on the assonance between “cart” and “court” might be classified as a bald on-record strategy of impoliteness. In Brown and Gilman’s scheme, jokes are classified as polite strategies. Here, the effect is impolite rather than polite, insofar as it aims to mock Katherina. Thus, it might be regarded as a mocking impolite expression – different from banter –, a category that we do not find in any classification in B&L or in Culpeper. However, Culpeper notes that in Gremio’s pun “the phonological parallelism reinforces the semantic contrast – from romantic courtship to the punishment of bawds or whores by carting them through the streets” (Culpeper 2001: 269). In his analysis of the passage, Culpeper underlines how the pun manages to create a connection between opposite meanings through recourse to assonance between the sounds of the two verbs. He also notes that “court” and “cart” refer to contrasting spheres, that of gentleness and romantic love and that of whores and bawds. However, it is argued here that it also refers to the sphere of scolds and shrews. As shown in the first section, Mucci has described the mocking practices of the carting and ducking to which shrews were subjected. Gremio’s pun thus seems to introduce the issue of Katherina’s shrewish reputation. Katherina’s reply does not immediately characterise her as a shrew, however: Katherina I pray you, sir, is it your will [N5 – Directive] To make a stale of me amongst these mates? [DT] (1. 1. 57–58, emphasis added)

152

Katherina’s directive, particularly her request to her father, is softened by a mixed strategy, starting with a positive polite expression (“I pray you”) and then turning into a negative polite attempt to save her own face. Kopytko and Brown and Levinson classify expressions such as “I pray you” as deferential, but in this case it is clearly defensive, emerging from a context in which Katherina feels attacked. Her defensive strategy is coloured by politeness when addressing her father and by impoliteness when talking to her suitors. “Sir”, denoting respect for Baptista, is strikingly different from “mates”, a generic and slightly derogative word for Gremio and Hortensio. The deferential tone she uses is a highly strategic choice. If we consider her words as provocative, questioning Baptista’s role as father and master of the household, the deference she shows serves to introduce the fact that she, as a daughter, is demanding explanations of her father with less risk. On the other hand, Katherina may also be exploiting the protection that derives from affiliation to her father, marked by her deferential “I pray you”, in order to insult the suitors. Her deference in this case would be designed to provoke the suitors. Katherina’s directive is read negatively by Hortensio: Hortensio ‘Mates’, maid! How mean you that? no mates for you Unless you were of gentler, milder mould. (1.1.59–60)

[IBR]

Katherina’s complaint to her father actually produces a defensiveoffensive sequence, ending with Hortensio’s impolite bald on-record cue referring to her bad temper. This causes her to explode with rage: Katherina I’faith, sir, you shall never need to fear. [NA] I wis it is not half way to her heart: [FTA] But if it were, doubt not her care should be [FTA] To comb your noddle with a three-legged stool And paint your face and use you like a fool. [DT] (1.1.61–65, emphasis added)

Katherina starts with a conventional expression – “In faith” – which intensifies the impolite bald on-record sequence, revealing the scope of her ‘shrewness’. Thus, the first line (“I’faith, sir, you shall never need 153

to fear”) sounds sarcastic and she clearly uses mock politeness towards Hortensio as an introductory strategy to better intensify her subsequent unredressed FTAs. In fact, the honorific “Sir”, which was used deferentially with Baptista, is derogatory here. She mirrors Hortensio’s strategy of employing a hypothesis (“unless you were of gentler milder mould”) with an if-clause (“if it were …”). This can perhaps be labelled as an unredressed FTA, culminating in the derogatory term “fool”. The use of the impersonal third person to address herself (“to her heart”) is particularly noteworthy. On the one hand, she uses the third person to distance herself from her interlocutors, who evidently cause her offence and embarrassment. On the other hand, the impersonal strategy, whether consciously or otherwise, causes a split, since Katherina is both the speaking subject (“I wis”) and the object of her own speech (“her heart”). Why does she do this? Of the three B&L variables – power, distance and riskiness – only distance can be applied to these passages, which all take place among peers. Katherina strategically increases this distance and makes it a sign of her discomfort by mimicking her own objectification. By appropriating it in this way she is able to produce a formidable FTA, and indeed Hortensio reacts as if he had been slapped in the face: Hortensio From all such devils, good Lord deliver us! Gremio And me too, good Lord! (1.1.66–7)

Hortensio and Gremio’s exclamations reveal their surprise and indignation at Katherina’s rudeness. Indeed the extent of male disdain for improper female behaviour is also evident from comments by Tranio and Lucentio, valet and master respectively, who have witnessed the entire scene at a distance: Tranio Husht, master, here’s some good pastime toward; That wench is stark mad or wonderful froward. Lucentio But in the other’s silence do I see Maid’s mild behavior and sobriety. Peace, Tranio. (1.1.68–72)

154

According to Lucentio, the perfect behaviour for a maid is to be silent, so presumably Katherina is being criticised not only for what she says but also because she dares to speak. In this respect, Culpeper’s recourse to the shrew-schema to explain the protagonist’s behaviour in this passage seems correct. Shakespeare exploits cultural schemata that are known by the audience of his time in order to create precise expectations about what a shrew can do. At the same time, however, the schemata are complicated by the addition of personal motivations to the construction of characters. These relativise the schemata and make the dramatic action more unpredictable: “So far, the configuration of information about Katherina neatly fits the SHREW schema, though there are some discounting factors: Baptista has granted permission to two fools to court her, and so it may not seem entirely unreasonable that she should question his will” (Culpeper 2001: 270). Later in Act 3, just before marrying Petruccio, Katherina expresses her view better: “I see a woman may be made a fool, / If she had not a spirit to resist” (3. 2. 220–221). Her “spirit” is what the society she lives in defines as shrewness: The beginning of an understanding of gender and sexuality during Shakespeare’s life is the patriarchal household. Patriarchy in the late sixteenth century referred to the power of the father over all members of his household […]. Early modern culture was resolutely hierarchical, with women, no matter what their wealth or rank, theoretically under the rule of men. […] Yet, the existence of the notion of a shrew or scold – as embodied in rebellious characters like Katharine – suggests that not all women obeyed or kept silent” (Traub 2001: 130).

Deviation from the patriarchal norm, however, does not produce effective agency but results in open condemnation. Though Katharina’s directness is disruptive of the patriarchal order, the effect is to highlight the ‘other’ model of woman, embodied by Bianca. In other words, Katherina’s impolite speech cannot be considered a deviation that genuinely threatens the patriarchal structure, but a ‘functional deviation’ that is tolerated by it. Katherina’s sister Bianca is the other side of the coin. While Katherina is first given her shrew identity by Bianca’s suitors, Bianca is given her first identity schema by Lucentio: “But in the other’s silence do I see / Maid’s mild behaviour and sobriety”. Her only speech in Act One confirms this: 155

Bianca Sister, content you in my discontent. – Sir, to your pleasure humbly I subscribe: My books and instruments shall be my company, On them to took and practise by myself. (1. 1. 80–83)

[N1]

Bianca presents herself humbly and modestly, and she is deferential to her father. However, as Culpeper notes, “Not only does she comply, but she also emphasises her deference to her father. This is achieved through the adverb humbly, which is syntactically foregrounded through its unusual positioning before the subject of the sentence” (Culpeper 2001: 270–271). Thus, Bianca too is unhappy with her father’s treatment but “she invites the […] inference that she is a ‘good’ daughter, respectful and obedient even in the face of hardship” (Culpeper 2001: 271). The effect generated by the juxtaposition of the two sisters is that of enclosing Katherina and Bianca in fixed roles, both recognizable to an Elizabethan audience. Act Two opens with a highly relevant exchange between the sisters. Katherina has tied Bianca’s hands together and is tormenting her to get information about her suitors. The competition between the two sisters is clear from the passage below: Bianca Good sister, wrong me not, nor wrong yourself To make a bondmaid and a slave of me – That I disdain; but for these other goods, Unbind my hands, I’ll pull them off myself, Yea, all my raiment to my petticoat Or what you will command me will I do, So well I know my duty to my elders. Katherina Of all thy suitors here I charge thee tell Whom thou lov’st best. See thou dissemble not. Bianca Believe me, sister, of all the men alive I never yet beheld that special face Which I could fancy more than any other. Katherina Minion, thou liest. Is’t not Hortensio?

156

[P4]

[P2]

[Imperative] [BR – FTA] [P4]

[PI10 – DT]

Bianca If you affect him, sister, here I swear I’ll plead for you myself but you shall have him. Katherina O then, belike you fancy riches more: You will have Gremio to keep you fair. Bianca Is it for him you do envy me so? Nay then, you jest, and now I well perceive You have but jested with me all this while. I prithee, sister Kate, untie my hands. Katherina If that be jest, then all the rest was so. Strikes her (2. 1. 1–22)

[P4] [P10]

[P5] [N1 – P4] [BR – FTA]

This sequence shows strikingly different behaviour by the two sisters. Bianca is positively polite, using in-group markers (P4) – the appellative “sister” in lines 1, 10, 14 and 21, accompanied by the adjective “good” (lines 1, 21); she also exaggerates her submission to Katherina (P2) (line 7), agrees to do whatever she commands (lines 6–7) and makes promises, even offering a suitor to her sister (P10) (lines 14–15). At the end of the passage (lines 19–20), she tries to come to an agreement (P5) in order to avoid Katherina’s threatening behaviour, epitomised by her markedly impolite imperatives, derogatory terms and direct FTAs – “here I charge thee, tell” (line 8); “see thou dissemble not” (line 9); “Minion, thou liest” (line 12). However, whereas Katherina uses performative commands (line 8), Bianca gives the impression of paying lip-service to Katherina, which gives Katherina licence to exert power over her (line 10–12). Katherina insists that Bianca is a liar and a “minion”, and ends the sequence by striking her sister. Katherina is not being linguistically strategic here, since she utters non-redressed FTA against Bianca. Bianca, on the other hand, tries to use politeness strategies to appease her sister. She shows deference by using family names and making indirect requests such as that in line 21 introduced by the informal “prithee”, and accedes to Katharina’s violent requests. However, these attempts to mollify her sister are unsuccessful. This is perhaps a sign that Katherina recognises the strategies of others and is able to resist them by her mastery of language, as in the suitors scene, or by physical and verbal aggression, as occurs with Bianca. 157

However, if Bianca is the opposite of Katherina, Petruccio, the young Veronese protagonist of the play, turns out to be her mirror-image.

4.4 Katherina and Petruccio: introducing mock politeness As soon as he arrives in Padua, Petruccio is informed of Katherina’s wealth and Baptista’s desire to marry her off before her sister. He is interested in a profitable marriage, so he asks Baptista for permission to woo the young woman: Petruccio Signor Baptista, my business asketh haste, And every day I cannot come to woo. You knew my father well, and in him me, Left solely heir to all his lands and goods, Which I have bettered rather than decreased. Then tell me, if I get your daughter’s love, What dowry shall I have with her to wife? (2.1.113–119)

[BR] [BR] [P13]

[BR]

Petruccio’s words as he tries to make his position and desire clear (lines 115–117) have been classified by Kopytko as P13. His speech, however, is characterised by a widespread use of bald on-record statements in lines 113–114 and 118. He addresses Baptista quite deferentially, using just his first name “Baptista” and the Italian formula “signor”, but then not particularly politely claims that he cannot waste time wooing Katherina every day – “And every day I cannot come to woo” – which seems a very bald utterance to use with a prospective father-in-law. In line 118 he demands a reply with the imperative “tell me”, which is intensified by “then”, as if to insist on an answer from his interlocutor. Petruccio, like Katherina, is a direct and bald speaker, but in his case these qualities do not provoke comment because he is a man. When he is alone, he reveals the strategy he will employ to tame Katherina:

158

Petruccio I will attend her here, And woo her with some spirit when she comes. Say that she rail, why then I’ll tell her plain She sings as sweetly as a nightingale; Say that she frown, I’ll say she looks as clear As morning roses newly wash’d with dew; Say she be mute and will not speak a word, Then I’ll commend her volubility And say she uttereth piercing eloquence. If she do bid me pack, I’ll give her thanks As though she bid me stay by her a week; If she deny to wed, I’ll crave the day When I shall ask the banns and when be married. Enter Katherina. But here she comes, and now, Petruccio, speak. (2.1.167–180)

Interestingly, Petruccio uses the word “spirit” as Katherina does in Act 3. For Katherina, “spirit” is the power of speech, the power of expressing her own opinion and making herself visible by emerging from silence. This is connected to the shrew schema because, as Traub notes, “‘Shrew’ links female insubordination to unruly female speech, and speech was one of women’s most powerful weapons” (Traub 2001: 130). For Petruccio, however, “spirit” is a deliberate tactic to get what he wants and this strategy is expressed through mock politeness, i.e. the systematic misunderstanding of Katherina’s speech and hence the annulment of her potential disruptiveness. What Petruccio aims for is to turn Katherina “mute”, silencing her speech through politeness, which here becomes the mirror image of and antidote to Katherina’s impoliteness. However, whereas Katherina’s impoliteness stems from the restraints and constrictions of a household in which she is constantly reminded of her female inadequacy by others, Petruccio’s mock politeness is purposeful and looms over her as yet another constraint. As soon as they meet, Petruccio’s first move is to rename Katherina Kate – perhaps a forewarning of his desire to force her into another identity:

159

Petruccio Good morrow, Kate, for that’s your name, I hear. Katherina Well have you heard, but something hard of hearing: They call me Katherine that do talk of me. (2.1.181–183)

[PI – NI] [PI]

Petruccio begins by using a positive impolite strategy, deploying the name “Kate” rather than “Katherina” as “an inappropriate identity marker” (Culpeper 1996: 357). To make matters worse, he refers to rumours about what other people are saying about Katherina: he thus implicitly hints at the shrew schemata of which he had been informed by Hortensio. Obviously Katherina, who is aware of her reputation, reacts with a bold on-record sentence that can be labelled as impolite, insofar as it aims to threaten Petruccio with the reference to something “hard of hearing” (line 182) followed by the rejection of her nickname. In his reply, quoted below, Petruccio exploits a different strategy to force Katherina to look at herself differently. It relies on the reversal of the shrew schemata and the presentation of the shrew as the paragon of Renaissance femininity. This strategy is mock politeness, a strategy designed to give offence in a polite way: Petruccio You lie, in faith, for you are call’d plain Kate, And bonny Kate, and sometimes ‘Kate the Curst’; But Kate, the prettiest Kate in Christendom, Kate of Kate Hall, my super-dainty Kate – For dainties are all cates, and therefore ‘Kate’ – Take this of me, Kate of my consolation: Hearing thy mildness praised in every town, Thy virtues spoke of and thy beauty sounded – Yet not so deeply as to thee belongs – Myself am moved to woo thee for my wife. (2.1.184–193)

[P2] [P2] [P2] [P2] [P10] [P13] [P11] [P11] [P10 – P11]

Brown and Gilman’s first positive polite strategy is “Noticing admirable qualities”. They claim that in comedy this strategy is typically used by men towards women and, indeed, Petruccio attributes these qualities to Katherina. He is also playing with other forms of politeness: he uses P2 to exaggerate his compliments to Katherina (lines 184–187), then 160

P10, normally used for offers and promises, to propose to her (lines 189–193), P13 to describe her reputation (line 190) and finally P11 to show his optimism about their proposed marriage (lines 191–193). Overall, he employs a wide range of positive politeness forms within a general framework of strategic mockery. His parting shot is a reference to marriage (“Myself am moved to woo thee for my wife”). This does not intimidate Katherina: Katherina ‘Moved’. In good time, let him that moved you hither Re-move you hence. I knew you at the first You were a moveable. (2. 1. 194–196)

[PI 7] [PI 7]

Katherina responds in the same mock polite register as Petruccio. Specifically, she uses a play on the word “moved” which becomes the motif of this speech, intensified by the effect of repeating the root form “move” with a variety of morphological changes – “moves”, “removed”, “moveable”. Overall, the effect is one of positive impoliteness urging Petruccio to leave her presence. While Petruccio employs mock politeness to break into Katherina’s aggressiveness, Katherina is affected by the shrew-schemata and perceives Petruccio’s words to be excessive and inappropriate. Counting on her verbal dexterity, she decides to mimic Petruccio with the same mock-polite strategy but with the different aim of producing an FTA that is comically offensive. A long set of sequiturs follows in which Petruccio and Katherina seem to be involved in flyting36, a ritualised and competitive form of banter:

36

Flyting is a competitive ritual which can be traced back to Scandinavian settlement in England and whose aim was to reinforce in-group solidarity or operate as “a societal safety-valve”, by creating a place where you could “be impolite with impunity” (Culpeper 1996: 353). In Hughes’s Encyclopaedia of Swearing (2006), we find the following definition: “This unfamiliar term denotes a swearing match or competition in insult, a form with a long tradition, being found in Old Norse and Anglo-Saxon literature, where the participants are both legendary and historical” (173). The language mechanisms of flyting are well explained in William Labov (1972). See also Leslie Anouk (1999).

161

Petruccio Come, come, you wasp i’ faith, you are too angry. Katherina If I be waspish, best beware my sting. Petruccio My remedy is then to pluck it out. Katherina Ay, if the fool could find it where it lies. Petruccio Who knows not where a wasp does wear his sting? In his tail. Katherina In his tongue. Petruccio Whose tongue? Katherina Yours, if you talk of tails, and so farewell. Petruccio What, with my tongue in your tail? Nay, come again, good Kate, I am a gentleman – Katherina That I’ll try. She strikes him (2.1.210–221)

[PI] [PI] [FTA] [PI 9 – DT]

[PP – PI]

Petruccio starts with a positive impolite strategy, provoking Katherina by calling her a “wasp”. Katherina replies with a witty response marked by alliteration on the consonants ‘w’ and ‘b’: “If I be waspish, best beware my sting” line 211). Petruccio in line 212 replies with an FTA (“my remedy is then, to pluck it out”), a metaphor for what he really wants to achieve, namely the neutralisation of Katherina’s aggressiveness. She answers in line 212 with a taboo word (“fool”), daring Petruccio to find the sting (line 212). A sexual subtext becomes clearer as the exchange unfolds, with Petruccio using sexually explicit metaphors playing on the word “tail” (line 215), while Katherina prefers to keep the dialogue on the safer plane of a purely linguistic battle. Indeed in line 216 she proposes a wordgame playing on the alliterative “t” connecting “tail” and “tongue”. The recourse to rhythmic and witty language can be interpreted in two ways: on the one hand, the battle of words between Katherina and Petruccio can be seen simply as part of the creation of a conflict that will subsequently be played out and resolved over the course of the play. On the other hand, 162

on an extra-textual level, the scene can be viewed as having the function of traditional flyting by creating a space which neutralises gender conflict. The rhythmic pattern of the characters’ answers is humorous for the audience and therefore socially safe. This sense of safety is further emphasised by the fact that the quarrel between Katherina and Petruccio is presented as a representation, a mere spectacle watched by both Sly and the theatre audience. Thus, the gender issue is problematized through recourse to polite strategies in a very sophisticated way: patriarchy and the cultural background of the household, each with its own set of schemata and expectations, are turned into a show for the entertainment of two sets of audiences through language strategies. In this perspective, verbal and gender saliency resides in the skill and wit that Katherina and Petruccio are able to exhibit. When Baptista re-enters, Petruccio gives a completely false description of his earlier interaction with Katherina: Baptista Now, Signor Petruccio, how speed you with my daughter? Petruccio How but well, sir? How but well? It were impossible I should speed amiss. (2.1.283–286)

Here Baptista uses the deferential form “Signior” and asks a bald onrecord polite question, which Petruccio answers with rhetorical questions that denote an off-record strategy. Baptista then questions his daughter, who on this occasion offers a bald on-record impolite answer: Baptista Why, how now, daughter Katherina! in your dumps? Katherina Call you me daughter? now, I promise you [NI] You have show’d a tender fatherly regard, To wish me wed to one half lunatic; [PI 10 – DT] A mad-cup ruffian and a swearing Jack, [PI 10 – DT] That thinks with oaths to face the matter out. (2.1.287–292, emphasis added)

163

Katherina is at her best when she is being rude. She is no longer deferential towards Baptista and is openly impolite towards Petruccio, whom she refers to with the offensive terms “lunatic”, “mad-cup ruffian” and “swearing Jack”. Her impoliteness is negative when addressed to Baptista, in that she is trying to offend his negative face constructed around his public role as a father (lines 288–289), whereas when addressing Petruccio, her impoliteness attacks his positive face since her derogatory comments are aimed at his self-esteem (lines 290–291). Nonetheless, she mitigates any offence by not addressing Petruccio directly but only referring to him, albeit impolitely, in the third person as “one half lunatic”. This lack of directness may be a sign of Katherina’s vulnerability when faced with a potential marriage proposal, but interestingly one of her insulting terms – “swearing Jack” – hints at Petruccio’s skill in attacking her. Swearing in its double meaning of making a solemn promise and cursing references both Petruccio’s vow to marry her and his ability in insulting her. In reaction to the FTA offending his public face, Petruccio intervenes with a fictitious reframing of Katherina’s words: Petruccio Father, ’tis thus: yourself and all the world [N5 – P5] That talked of her have talked amiss of her. If she be curst, it is for policy, For she’s not froward but modest as the dove; She is not hot, but temperate as the morn; For patience she will prove a second Grissel, And Roman Lucrece for her chastity: And to conclude, we have ’greed so well together That upon Sunday is the wedding-day. (2.1.293–301, emphasis added)

On this occasion Petruccio uses the deferential and affectionate term “Father” to address Baptista, for he is trying to gain Baptista’s trust and is seeking agreement with a P5 strategy. To succeed in his attempt at being accepted as a son-in-law, he describes Katherina in terms that are completely different from the shrew stereotype, and in so doing mirrors Katherina’s strategy of referring to her addressee in the third person. In fact, he turns her third person insult into a third person narrative description i.e. more polite but just as entertaining for the listeners. In

164

fact, he tells a different and better story than she does. The audience knows that the story is not true and this “knowingly untrue” storytelling creates a strong affinity between Petruccio and the audience. He juxtaposes definitions from the shrew schema with his own description of her attitudes and manners. The contrasting adjectives (froward vs modest; hot vs temperate), accompanied by similes (“as a dove”; “as the morn”) entertain the overhearing audience by helping them to visualise something which they probably regard as impossible. Katherina responds with an unequivocal, impolite, bald onrecord assertive: Katherina I’ll see thee hanged on Sunday first. Gremio Hark, Petruccio; she says she’ll see thee hanged first. Tranio Is this your speeding? Nay, then, goodnight our part. Petruccio Be patient, gentlemen. I choose her for myself: If she and I be pleased, what’s that to you? ’Tis bargained ‘twixt us twain, being alone, That she shall still be curst in company. I tell you, ’tis incredible to believe How much she loves me. (2.1.302–311)

[IBR]

[P6] [P13]

After Katherina’s self-evident FTA, Petruccio tries to avoid disagreement by explaining their respective positions. The declarative “I tell you” makes him appear self-confident. In his linguistic choices in this passage, as in the previous exchange with Baptista, he moves from a deferential attitude towards his wife-to-be’s father, to whom he uses positive politeness, to a less obsequious tone when he speaks to the whole company. While claiming that Katherina’s impoliteness is a pose (“This a bargain’s ‘twixt us twain, being alone, / That she shall still be curst in company”), he produces a P13 (“Be patient gentlemen; I choose her for myself; / If she and I be pleased, what’s that to you?”) to account for the offense he has just received from his beloved.

165

The sequence closes with Petruccio’s farewell: Petruccio Father, and wife, and gentlemen, adieu. I will to Venice. Sunday comes apace. We will have rings, and things, and fine array, And kiss me, Kate, ‘We will be married o‘Sunday’. Exeunt Petruccio and Katherina (2.1.325–328)

This is one of the most controversial points in the play. Petruccio invites Katherina to kiss him. Although the previous lines were quite clear about her discomfort, it is impossible to infer what she desires or expects, especially after the kiss, as she subsequently says nothing about it or the wedding announcement. Reading this extract through the prism of (im)polite strategies, we might say that her silence can be interpreted as being both a polite and an impolite strategy. On the one hand, her silence matches the B&L option “Don’t do the FTA”, while on the other it could be classified as one of Culpeper’s withhold politeness strategies, i.e. “the absence of politeness work where it would be expected” (357). As in section 4.3, Katherina’s linguistic behaviour denotes her mastery of (im)polite strategies, which she uses to offend the characters by whom she feels threatened, such as Bianca’s suitors (section 4.3), Bianca (section 4.3) and Petruccio (section 4.4). In particular, the exchange with Petruccio, which we have compared to flyting, shows that the unique feature of her interactional style is her ability to appropriate and mimic the strategies of others, for example by turning Petruccio’s mock politeness into highly effective FTAs.

4.5 The Taming Having subjected Katherina to every sort of abuse by starving her and denying her clothing, Petruccio’s endgame strategy focuses on the linguistic power of a husband over his wife. Language use is thus the means by which Katherina’s definitive entry into her new role as wife is to be 166

decided. In the following episode, Petruccio and Katherina are heading to Baptista’s house after spending a few days at Petruccio’s mansion in Verona. The conversation takes place on a public road during the day: Petruccio Come on, i’ God’s name, once more toward our father’s. Good Lord, how bright and goodly shines the moon! [Performative – NI] Katherina The moon? the sun, it is not moonlight now. [Constative – PI] Petruccio I say it is the moon that shines so bright. [Performative – NI] Katherina I know it is the sun that shines so bright. [Performative – PI] Petruccio Now by my mother’s son – and that’s myself – It shall be moon, or star, or what I list [performative – PI] Or e’re I journey to your father’s house. [to Grumio] Go on and fetch our horses back again. – Evermore crossed and crossed; nothing but crossed! (4.5.1–10)

Petruccio begins his speech by showing the self-referential nature of his language use and thus his power over Katherina; he commands Katherina to believe in what he says despite the evidence (line 2). The directive is also an FTA, a negative impolite strategy that imposes on Katherina’s negative face – her desire to feel free to believe in what she wants. Katherina comments on his exclamation with a positive impolite response: “It is not moonlight now” (line 3). This positive impolite strategy undermines Petruccio’s self-esteem since she overtly refuses to do as he says. Petruccio retorts using a declarative – “I say” – again imposing his view of the factual evidence, which again has the effect of an FTA threatening Katherina’s negative face. This time she is more incisive in her reply that “she knows it is the sun that shines so bright” (emphasis added). Katherina asserts the autonomy of her thoughts; she knows what reality is and that Petruccio is transforming it through language. At this point, Petruccio, exasperated by his wife’s resistance, makes matters worse by bursting into an FTA that imposes agreement through blackmail, saying that if it is not “what I list”, then he will not continue the journey to Padua. He concludes with an exclamation – “nothing but cross’d!” – which may be

167

understood both as an FTA to Katherina and as an admission of his powerlessness over her, which in this case would be self-defeating. The extent of Petruccio’s strategy becomes clearer if it is analysed using Austin’s division of speech acts into performatives and constatives. The difference between the two types of speech act lies in their relation to referents: constatives describe reality and can be true or false, whereas performatives create reality and do not rely on referentiality. According to a later systematization, constatives become a sub-category of performatives, since their performative nature is dependent on the pragmatic use that speakers put them to. The above passage offers a perfect example of how the two categories work. Petruccio starts the sequence with a false constative, claiming that the sun is the moon (line 2), which turns out to be a performative insofar as it is strategically aimed at subduing Katherina. Katherina asserts what is evidently the truth: the sun is the sun (constative). Petruccio attacks her with another false statement introduced by the assertive “I say”, revealing the performative quality of a constative used with the pragmatic scope of self-assertion and imposition over H. The wife’s reply shifts the focus to her own assertiveness. Her constative is performative inasmuch as it is grounded in something Petruccio cannot control. This makes him desperate. It is at this point that Katherina changes register, accepting Petruccio’s vagaries, as we will see in the next exchange. Does she recognise Petruccio’s power or does she consider it to be a whim and decide to go along with it anyway? In the following sequence she reverses Petruccio’s strategy and operates on a deeper performative level; indeed, from now on, Katherina plays on the separation between what she knows – that the sun is shining – and what she says, i.e. what she tells Petruccio to be true – that he is right in affirming that it is the moon that is shining: Hortensio Say as he says, or we shall never go. Katherina Forward, I pray, since we have come so far, And be it moon or sun or what you please, And if you please to call it a rush-candle, Henceforth I vow it shall be so for me. Petruccio I say it is the moon.

168

[N1]

[Performative]

Katherina I know it is the moon. (4.5.11–17)

[Performative]

In line 2 she uses the deferential “I pray”, aimed at shortening the affective distance between her and Petruccio. For the first time in her interaction with others she introduces politeness – the strategic use of a conventional indirect request. Petruccio tests her by repeating the declarative “I say”, which verbalises his power. Katherina replies as expected, supporting him while at the same time introducing her sentence with “I know”, which can be interpreted both as a real and a false surrender. However, if we align her recourse to politeness N1 with the subsequent strategy, the pattern of continuity between the two linguistic choices suggests that Katherina is being mock-polite and mocking her own performance of consent: Petruccio Nay, then you lie; it is the blessed sun. Katherina Then God be blest, it is the blessed sun, But sun it is not, when you say it is not, [PP] And the moon changes even as your mind. What you will have it named, even that it is, [PP] And so it shall be so for Katherine. [N7] Hortensio Petruccio, go thy ways, the field is won. Petruccio Well, forward, forward, thus the bowl should run, And not unluckily against the bias. [Enter Vincentio] But, soft, company is coming here? (4.5.18–27, emphasis added)

In this exchange Katherina is being excessively polite. Lines 19–20 repeat the words “blessed” and “it is not”, which give rhythm to the verse. She confirms her acceptance of Petruccio’s false constatives, remarking on his power and flattering his positive face. She insists on using the pronoun “you” in lines 20–22, as if to sanction her husband as the source of power. In fact, up to this point the exchange resembles flyting in reverse, with rhythmic courtesies being used instead of rhythmic insults. 169

In line 23 at the end of the dialogue Katherina impersonalises herself, describing herself in the third person and not with “I” (“so it shall be so for Katherina”). This choice replicates the self-distancing strategy she employed at the very beginning of the play in relation to Baptista and Bianca’s suitors. Again, she becomes both the subject and object of the speech, but this time a change has taken place which involves (im)politeness. Whereas her first appearance was marked by impoliteness, here she is almost too polite, mockingly polite. The parallelism between the two scenes and the two strategies suggests that the initial impoliteness and the final politeness are mirror-strategies. And if impoliteness clearly produces FTAs, an excess of politeness, which according to B&L’s theory is due to an excess of risk in producing the FTA (B&L 1987: 134), aims to cause offense with fewer risks. We can therefore read the ‘obedience speech’ in which Katherina appears to be totally ‘tamed’ (5. 2. 136–179) through the lens of this kind of mock politeness. Politeness has emerged as a ‘dress’ that Petruccio forces on her but which she eventually appropriates by performing it as a selfdefensive-strategy. In the end, she plays the obedient wife. This hypothesis is corroborated by the gender construction presented in the Induction – that of the Page turning into a lady – and proposed as a supplement of another identity construction based on courtesy – that of Sly turning into a Lord. Politeness in both cases plays an important role as a linguistic strategy informing the two formations of subjectivity. If the Induction and the play-within-the play stage how language shapes people, the metatheatrical exposition of the artificiality of such an operation provides a counterconstruction that relativises the entire comedy by performing performance.

4.6 Summary The aim of this chapter was to outline a general framework to explain the different uses and purposes of (im)politeness in Taming of the Shrew. The analytical process – covering six selected scenes and divided into sub-sequences – has shown the following:

170

1.

2.

3.

4.

A pattern of discernment and deferential politeness has emerged, as prescribed by politeness theory and responding to the variables P and D; Strategic (im)politeness has proved to be more unpredictable; it is mainly used in the exchanges between the protagonist Katherina and her husband Petruccio. The most significant strategies employed by the characters are: (a) mock politeness – used by Petruccio against Katherina and ultimately appropriated by Katherina herself – and (b) bald on-record impoliteness, which marks Katherina’s speech at the beginning of the play; Katherina uses a subtle verbal strategy that mimics mock politeness in order to render the FTA not immediately recognisable.

Most of the meanings inferred from the exchanges between characters in the play derive their pragmatic significance, i.e. their scope, extent and purpose, from the exposition of the dramatic mechanisms implicit in the utterances of the speech acts in the Induction. In the same way, the initial cultural contextualisation of the play served to explore the gender dynamics at its heart.

171

Conclusions: The sense of (im)politeness

This study has analysed the linguistic phenomenon of (im)politeness in Shakespeare’s Hamlet and The Taming of the Shrew drawing on the classical model by B&L (1987), combined with Culpeper’s theory of impoliteness (1996, 2011) for textual analysis. This pragmatic investigation of exchanges in which (im)polite speech acts were salient for textual interpretation has also been combined with socio-cultural contextualisation inferred from newhistoricist and semiotic theory. Within specific early modern cultural parameters, (im)polite language has been discussed as an important component of Renaissance subjectivity, resulting from the emergence of cognition affected by facework. In the exploration of general theories in chapter one, politeness is described as a conversational principle aimed at maintaining social harmony in situations where conflict can disrupt what Grice called the Cooperation Principle (CP). If, on the one hand, the Politeness Principle (Lakoff 1973) potentially maintains harmony, on the other it is also the result of inner motivation that converges in the development of “face”. The concept of face has emerged from sociological studies (Goffman 1967) as a tool governing both the inward and outward expression of subjects, i.e. the desires connected with how subjects would like to appear and be considered by others. Face is also reflexive, as it makes the subject aware that others may have similar desires to be both appreciated and not constrained. The identity component implicit in the concept of face complicates the notion of PP as a regulator of the CP, since politeness based on facework becomes a strategy aimed not only at preserving the conversational cooperative pact between speakers when they try to offend, cause embarrassment or say something that would transgress Gricean maxims, but also at achieving selfish desires and needs such as persuading and manipulating others or escaping cultural impositions. In this respect, as Culpeper has shown, the dynamics of facework can result in the deployment of impolite strategies; polite and impolite speech acts

can be mixed so that speakers may decide to use politeness to offend (sarcasm, irony, mock politeness) and impoliteness to harmonise conversation (banter). If creativity in choosing and using (im)politeness depends on speakers’ individual choices, the range of usable strategies depends on the historical period in which interactants find themselves speaking. The semantic and pragmatic value and meaning of words evolve over time and space since they are strongly affected by socio-cultural variables. For the same reason face must also be historicised, since it operates in specific cultural contexts. Chapter two contextualised (im)politeness in the Renaissance, considering it to be the period when face started to emerge. In this study, the emergence of face is argued to be an aspect of the long-standing debate surrounding Renaissance subjectivity. More importantly, face is considered to be an expression of Renaissance semiosis. The early modern period witnessed a transition from an old, analogical sign-system based on a fixed correspondence between things and words – what might be called a symbolic, motivated language – to an arbitrary, syntagmatic language, which is the expression of a world characterised by mobility and instability. The phenomenon of (im)politeness is argued to be crucial to both language and subjectivity. It emerged in the Renaissance as a twofold activity, partly connected to the use of conventional speech (DP), derived from a medieval typology of social confrontation that was not based on facework, and partly connected to a form of subjectivity that began to use (im)politeness strategically (PP and NP), according to individual face needs. In chapters three and four, the deployment of DP and PP/NP strategies was analysed in Hamlet and The Taming of the Shrew using a qualitative approach, aimed at discussing (im)politeness from a historical pragmatic perspective attentive to the socio-cultural context. Overall, the analysis shows very heterogeneous strategic patterns involving a fixed stratum of expected formulaic polite language (DP) and a more variable range of PP and NP used for strategic purposes. It is argued that both DP and PP/NP are connected to the importance attributed to courtesy in the Renaissance period, which was closely tied to social mobility and social ambition. Courtesy, as an intrinsic quality of the aristocrat or as a feature that could be learned, testifies to the political

174

and institutional importance attributed to appearance and self-reinvention and was thus an aspect of the process of self-fashioning (Greenblatt 1980), which can be defined as the construction of subjectivity from the outside. At the same time, the emergence of strategic courtesy in the Renaissance suggests the existence of a sense of inwardness. On this hypothesis, (im)politeness is an instrument with which subjection to social hierarchies and the desire to modify, exploit and flout that subjection can be strategically negotiated by an individual. Analysis of the two Shakespeare plays has shown that (im)politeness is present in a stratified way and that a description of this stratification can shed light on cultural aspects of the dynamics of intersubjective communication. Hamlet is a character who uses a linguistic strategy that can be defined in B&L terms as off-recordness. Off-recordness is based on the mechanism of irony, i.e. a deliberate breaking of the enunciation/utterance plane, in which words do not correspond to their referents. In the case of Hamlet, the off-record strategy goes beyond irony, playing on the arbitrariness of the signified/signifier link. For instance, in his interactions with Polonius or with Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, Hamlet’s words allude to meanings that differ from those his interlocutors are able to infer. The effectiveness of this strategy is intensified by the fact that the verbal irony subtending off-recordness is also achieved at a dramatic level. Hamlet’s speeches are off record for the characters but on record for the audience, since the spectators are aware of the protagonist’s inner feelings, expressed through his soliloquies. Hamlet’s off-recordness, then, may be described as a (dramatically ironic and metonymical) torsion of language that breaks the analogical link between words and things. It is argued here to represent the way the symbolic order inherent in the Great Chain of Being is under attack from a changing sign-system characterised by arbitrariness. The constant trait of Hamlet’s off-recordness is the interchangeability of its significances, referents and addressees. Hamlet stages a world in which political and family hierarchies are questioned by the insurgence of a self that is no longer totally communal (subjected to society) but starts being performative (an active subject) through verbal action. In The Taming of the Shrew, analysed in chapter four, the subjectivity/language nexus returns as a central issue, but from a comedic

175

viewpoint related to gender issues as the protagonist is a woman, Katherina. The treatment of female subjectivity exposed to the impositions of the household, in which the father or the husband is at the top of the hierarchy, intersects with questions relating to the language of impoliteness. Katherina, like Hamlet, reacts to a sense of imposition by using speech strategically. Her verbal choices, however, are different; her speech is marked by aggression in the early scenes and by mock politeness in the final ones. Whilst Hamlet reveals the arbitrariness of Elsinore and the complexity of an identity divided between being and seeming, old and new, The Shrew problematises identity by making it appear to be a linguistic construction, in which (im)politeness is not only an expressive instrument at characters’ disposal, but also the object of metatheatrical representation in itself, especially in the flyting that involves Katherina and Petruccio. Whilst Hamlet enacts a torsion of language, The Taming of the Shrew enacts a different conceptual operation involving subject, language and culture. It could be compared to an inversion, a typical Carnivalesque motif, in which the order of constatives and performatives, of what is ‘real’ life and what is theatre, are reversed. In conclusion, the study of (im)politeness in these two Shakespeare plays has served to identify and interpret the protagonists’ verbal behaviour and strategies, while at the same time linking these results to historical and cultural aspects of politeness. The importance of this kind of interdisciplinary analysis of politeness in the Shakespearean text is that its results are mutually reinforcing. It is able not only to shed light on the Shakespearean text and its interpretation, but also on the pragmatic method itself, since the analytical process has served to better understand and study a linguistic phenomenon – (im)politeness – that was central to English culture in the early modern age as it is still today.

176

References

Primary Sources Ascham R. 1904. The Schoolmaster (1563). In A. W. Wright (ed.) English Works of Roger Ascham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Case J. 2011. Sphaera Civitatis (1588). London: Nabu Press. Castiglione B. 1965. Il libro del cortegiano (1528). Torino: Einaudi, 1965. Copernicus N. 1992. On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres (1534). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. della Casa G. 2006. Il Galateo (1558). Milano: Garzanti. Elyot T. 1975. The Book Named the Governour (1531). London: Dent. Harrison W. 1968. The Description of England (1577) Toronto: Courier Corporation. Hoby T. 1900. The Book of the Courtier (1561). London: David Nutt. Guazzo S. 2010. La Civil Conversazione (1574). Roma: Bulzoni. Shakespeare W. 2016. Hamlet. Revised Edition. Ed. by A. Thompson / N. Taylor. London: Bloomsbury. Shakespeare W. 2006. Hamlet. The Texts of 1603 and 1623. Ed. by A. Thompson / N. Taylor. London: Bloomsbury. Shakespeare W. 2003. King Lear. Ed. by R. A. Foakes. London: Bloomsbury. Shakespeare W. 2010. The Taming of the Shrew. Ed. by B. Hodgdon. London: Bloomsbury. Shakespeare W. 2006. The Oxford Shakespeare. The Complete Works. Ed. by S. Wells / G. Taylor. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Secondary Sources Ahearn L. 2001. Language and Agency. Annual Review of Anthropology. 30, 109–137.

Anouk L. 1999. Flyting and Sounding the Agonistic Insult. In L. Arnok (ed.) Diachronic Pragmatics. Seven Case Studies in English Illocutionary Development. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 15–40. Austin J. 1962. How to Do Things with Words. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Austin P. 1990. Politeness revisited-the dark side. In A. Bell and J. Holmes (eds) New Zealand Ways of Speaking English. Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters, 277–293. Arndt H. / R. Janney 1985. Politeness revisited: cross-modal supportive strategies. IRAL International Review of Applied Linguistics in Language Teaching. 23.4, 281–300. Arundale R. 2006. Face as relational and interactional: A communication framework for research on face, facework, and politeness. Journal of Politeness Research. 2, 193–216. Bayraktaroğ lu A. / Sifianou M. 2001. Introduction. In A. Bayraktaroğ lu / M. Sifianou (eds) Linguistic Politeness across Boundaries: the Case of Greek and Turkish. Amsterdam/New York: John Benjamins, 1–16. Baker F. et al. 1981. 1642: Literature and Power in the Seventeenth Century. Colchester: University of Essex. Barbe K. 1995. Irony in Context. New York: John Benjamins. Barber C. 1987. You and thou in Shakespeare’s Richard III. In V. Salmon / E. Burness (eds) Reader in the Language of Shakespearean Drama. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 163–181. Barker F. 1984. The Tremulous Private Body: Essays on Subjection. London: Methuen. Bax M. (ed.) 2003. Ritual Language Behaviour. Special Issue of Journal of Historical Pragmatics 4.2. Bax M. / Kádár D. (eds) 2012. Understanding Historical (Im)politeness. Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Beebe L. M. 1995. Polite fictions: Instrumental rudeness as pragmatic competence. In J. E. Alatis / C. A. Straehle / B. Gallenberger / M. Ronkin (eds) Linguistics and the Education of Language Teachers: Ethnolinguistic, Psycholinguistics and Sociolinguistic Aspects. Georgetown University Round Table on Languages and Linguistics. Georgetown: Georgetown University Press. 178

Belsey C. 1985. The Subject of Tragedy. Identity and Difference in Renaissance Drama. London/New York: Methuen. Bigliazzi S.  2005. Nel prisma del nulla. L’esperienza del non-essere nella drammaturgia shakespeariana. Napoli: Liguori. Boose L. 1991. Scolding Brides and Bridling Scolds: Taming the woman’s unruly Member. Shakespeare Quarterly. 42, 179–213. Boose L. 1994. ‘The Getting of a Lawful Race’. Racial Discourse in Early Modern England and the Unrepresentable Black Woman. In M. Hendricks / P. Parker (eds) Women, Race, and Writing in the Early Modern Period. London: Routledge, 35–54. Bowker L. / Pearson J. 2002. Working with specialized Language: a practical guide to using corpora. London: Routledge. Bourdieu P. 1977. The Logic of Practice. Cambridge: Polity Press. Bourdieu P. 1990. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Trans. by Richard Nice. New York: Cambridge University Press. Bousfield D. 2008. Impoliteness in Interaction. Philadelphia and Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Bradley A. C. 1904 (1991). Shakespearean Tragedy. London: Penguin. Brewer J. 1997. The Pleasure of the Imagination: English Culture in the Eighteenth Century. London: Harper-Collins. Brewer M. B. and Gardner W. 1996. Who is this ‘‘we’’? Levels of collective identity and self representations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 71/1, 83–93. Brinton L.J. 2001. Historical discourse analysis. In D. Schriffin, D. Tannen / H.E. Hamilton (eds) The Handbook of discourse analysis. Oxford: Blackwell, 138–160. Brislin W. R. 2000. Understanding Culture’s Influence on Behaviour. London: Wadsworth. Brown R. / Gilman A. 1989. Politeness Theory and Shakespeare’s Four Major Tragedies. Language in Society 18/2, 159–212. Brown P. / Levinson S. 1987. Politeness, Some Universals in Language Use. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brown P. / Levinson S. 1978. Universals in language usage: politeness phenomena. In E. Goody (ed.) Questions and Politeness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 56–289. Burckhardt J. 1961. The Civilisation of the Renaissance in Italy. New York: The Phaidon Press. 179

Burke P. 1989. The Renaissance. London: Macmillan. Busse U. 2002. Linguistic variation in the Shakespeare corpus. Morphosyntactic variability of second person pronouns. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Carnap R. 1942. Introduction to Semantics. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Cashman H. R. 2006. Impoliteness in children’s interactions in a Spanish/English bilingual community of practice. Journal of Politeness Research. 2, 217–246. Charlton H. 1938. Shakespearian comedy. London: Methuen. Chen R. 2001. Self-politeness: A proposal. Journal of Pragmatics. 33/1, 87–106. Colie R. 1966. Paradoxa Epidemica. The Renaissance Tradition of Paradox. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Collins D.E. 2001. Reanimated Voices. Speech reporting in a historicalpragmatic perspective. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Corti C. (ed.) 1994. Il Rinascimento. Bologna: Il Mulino. Corti C. 1994. Discorso e retorica. In C. Corti (ed.). Il Rinascimento. Bologna: Il Mulino. Culpeper J. 2013. Impoliteness: Questions and Answers. In D. Jamet and M. Jobert (eds) Aspects of Linguistic Impoliteness. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholar Publishing, 2–15. Culpeper J. 1996. Towards an anatomy of impoliteness. Journal of Pragmatics 25, 349–367. Culpeper J. 2010. Conventionalised Impoliteness Formulae. Journal of Pragmatics 42/12, 3232–3245. Culpeper J. 2005. Impoliteness and entertainment in the television quiz show: The Weakest Link. Journal of Politeness Research. 1/1, 35–72. Culpeper J. 2011. Impoliteness. Using Language to Cause Offence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Culpeper J. 2001. Language and Characterization: People in Plays and Other Texts. Harlow/New York: Longman. Culpeper J. 2007. Reflections on Impoliteness, Relational Work and Power. In D. Bousfield / M. Locher Impoliteness in Language. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 22–53.

180

Culpeper J. / Bousfield D. / Wichmann A. 2003. Impoliteness Revisited: With special Reference to Dynamic and Prosodic Aspects. Journal of Pragmatics. 35, 1545–1579. Culpeper J. / Kádár D. (eds) 2010. Historical (Im)politeness. Bern: Peter Lang. Culpeper J. / Kádár D. (eds) 2010. Historical (Im)politeness: An Introduction. In J. Culpeper / D. Kádár (eds) Historical (Im)politeness. Bern: Peter Lang, 9–36. Culpeper J. / Haugh M. / Kádár D. (eds) 2017. The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness. London: Palgrave. Culpeper J. / Kytö M. 2000. Data in Historical Pragmatics: Spoken Discourse (Re)cast as Writing. Journal of Historical Pragmatics. 1/2, 175–199. Culpeper J. / Kytö M. 2010. Early Modern English Dialogues. Spoken Interaction as Writing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Culpeper, J. / Kytö M. 2002. Lexical Bundles in Early Modern English Dialogues: A Window into the Speech-related Language of the Past. In T. Fanego / B. Méndez-Naya / E. Seoane (eds) Sounds, Words, Texts and Change. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 45–65. Culpeper J. / Schauer G. / Marti L. / Mei M. 2008. The Cross-cultural Variation of Impoliteness: A Study of Face-attack in Impoliteness Events Reported by Students in China, Britain, Germany and Turkey, Paper presented at 4th International Symposium on Politeness, 2–4 July. Budapest: Hungary. Dash I. G. 1981. Wooing, Wedding, and Power: Women in Shakespeare’s Plays. New York: Columbia University Press. de Bruyn L. 1979. Women and the Devil in Sixteenth-Century Literature. Tisbury Wiltshire: Compton Press. de Filippis S. 2003. La bisbetica italianata. Memoria di Shakespeare. 3, 49–67. de Filippis S. (ed.) 2008. The Literary Gaze. English culture and literature from the Middle Ages to the Restoration. Naples: Unipress. Dews P. 1987. Logics of Disintegration. Post-structuralist Thought and the Claims of Critical Theory. London/New York: Verso.

181

Dollimore J. 1993. Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology, and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare and his Contemporaries. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Dollimore J. (1985). Shakespeare, Cultural Materialism and the New Historicism. In J. Dollimore / A. Sinfield (eds), Political Shakespeare. Essays in Cultural Materialism. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press. Donahue T. J. 1992. Structures of Meaning: a Semiotic Approach to the Play Text. Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press. Drakakis J. 1985. Introduction. In Alternative Shakespeares. London/ New York: Methuen, 1–25. Drakakis J. (ed.) 1985. Alternative Shakespeares. London: Methuen. Drakakis J. (ed.) 1992. Shakespearean Tragedy. London: Longman. Easthope A. 1988. British Post-Structuralism since 1968. New York: Routledge. Eelen G. 2001. A Critique of Politeness Theories. Manchester/Northampton: St. Jerome Publishing. Eisaman Maus K. 1995. Inwardness and Theatre in the English Renaissance. Chicago/London: Chicago University Press. Elam K. (ed.) 2006. Amleto/Hamlet. Trans. by G. Baldini. Milan: BUR. Elam K. (ed.) 1986. La grande festa del linguaggio. Shakespeare e la lingua inglese. Bologna: Il Mulino. Elam K. 1980. The Semiotics of Theatre and Drama. London: Routledge. Emmison F. G. 1970. Elizabethan life: Disorder. Chelmsford: Essex County Council. Fitzmaurice S.  2010. Changes in the Meanings of politeness in Eighteenth-century England: Discourse Analysis and Historical Evidence. In J. Culpeper / D. Kádár (eds) Historical (Im)politeness. Bern: Peter Lang, 87–116. Fitzmaurice S. / Taavitsainen I. (eds) 2007. Methods in Historical Pragmatics. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Foucault M. 1969. L’Archéologie du savoir. Paris: Éditions Gallimard. Foucault M. 1978. The History of Sexuality. An Introduction. Vol. I. New York: Pantheon. Fraser B. 1990. “Perspectives on politeness”, Journal of Pragmatics 14.2: 219–36.

182

Fraser B. / Nolan W. 1981. “The association of deference with linguistic form”, in International Journal of the Sociology of Language 27: 93–109. Fritz G. 1995. Topics in the history of dialogue form. In Jucker A. (ed.) Historical Pragmatic developments in the history of English. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 469–498. Fukushima S. 2004. Evaluation of politeness: the case of attentiveness. Multilingua 23, 365–387. Gass S. M. / Neu J. (eds) 1996. Speech Acts Across Cultures: Challenges to Communication in a Second Language. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Geertz C. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. Gibbs R.W.jr. / Colston H.L. (eds) 2007. Irony in Language and Thought. A cognitive science reader. New York: Routledge. Goffman E. 1967. Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face to Face Behaviour. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Greenblatt S. 1980. Renaissance Self-Fashioning. From More to Shakespeare. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Greenblatt S. (ed.) 1988. Representing the English Renaissance. Berkeley: University of California Press. Grice H. P. 1967 (1975). Logic and conversation. In P. Cole and J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics III: Speech Acts. New York: Academic Press, 41–58. Gudykunst W. B. 1997. Cultural variability in communication. Communication Research. 24/4: 327–350. Gudykunst W. B. / Matsumoto Y. / Ting-Toomey S. /Nishida T. / Kim K. / S. Heyman (1996). The influence of cultural individualism– collectivism, self construals, and individual values on communication styles across cultures. Human Communication Research. 22, 510–543. Hall S. 1997. Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices. London: Sage. Harland R. 1987. Superstructuralism. London/New York: Methuen. Hattaway M. 2005. Renaissance & Reformations. Oxford: Blackwell. Haugh M. 2003. Anticipated versus inferred politeness. Multilingua 22/4, 397–413.

183

Haugh M. 2007. Emic conceptualisations of (im)politeness and face in Japanese: implications for the discursive negotiation of second language learner identities. Journal of Pragmatics 39/4, 657–680. Haugh M. 2004. Revisiting the conceptualisation of politeness in English and Japanese. Multilingua 23, 85–109. Held G. 1992. Politeness in Linguistic Research. In R.J. Watts / S. Ide / Y. / K. Ehlich (eds) Politeness in Language: Studies in its History, Theory, and Practice. New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 131–153. Hendry J. 1993. Wrapping culture: Politeness, presentation and power in Japan and other societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hickey L. / Stewart M. (eds) 2005. Politeness in Europe. Toronto: Multilingual Matters. Hill B. / Ide S. / Ikuta S. / Kawasaki A. / Ogino T. 1986. Universals of linguistic politeness: quantitative evidence from Japanese and American English. Journal of Pragmatics. 10/3, 347–371. Hobsbawm E. 1965. The crisis of the seventeenth century. In T. Aston (ed.) Crisis in Europe, 1560–1660. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Holmes J. / Marra M. / Schnurr S.  2008. Impoliteness and ethnicity: Māori and Pākehā discourse in New Zealand workplaces. Journal of Politeness Research: Language, Behaviour, Culture 4/2, 193–219. Hughes G. 2006. An Encyclopaedia of swearing. The social history of oaths, profanity, foul language, and ethnic slurs in the English speaking-world. New York: ME Sharpe. Ide S. 1989. Formal forms and discernment: two neglected aspects of linguistic politeness. Multilingua 8.2/3, 223–248. Jacobs A. / Jucker A. 1995. The Historical Perspective in Pragmatics. In A. Jucker (ed.) Historical Pragmatics. Pragmatic Developments in the History of English. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 3–33. Jamet D. / Jobert M. (eds) 2013. Aspects of Linguistic Impoliteness. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholar Publishing. Jary M. 1998. Relevance theory and the communication of politeness. Journal of Pragmatics. 30, 1–19. Jaworski A. / Coupland N. (eds) 1999. The Discourse Reader. London/ New York: Routledge. 184

Ji S. 2000. ‘Face’ and polite verbal behaviours in Chinese culture. Journal of Pragmatics. 32, 1059–1062. Johnson F. R. 1937. Astronomical Thought in Renaissance England. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press. Jucker A. 2002. Discourse Markers in Early Modern English. In R. Watts and P. Trudgill (eds) Alternative Histories of English. London/New York: Routledge, 210–230. Jucker A. 2000. English Historical Pragmatics: Problems of Data and Methodology. In G. Di Martino / M. Lima (eds) English Diachronic Pragmatics. Napoli: CUEN, 17–55. Jucker A. 1998. Historical Pragmatics: An Interdisciplinary approach. In R. Borgmeier / H. Grabes / A. Jucker (eds) Anglistentag 1997 Giessen. Proceedings. Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 3–7. Jucker A. 2010. In curtisie was set ful muchel hir lest. Politeness in Middle English. In J. Culpeper / D. Kádár (eds) Historical (Im) politeness. Bern: Peter Lang, 175–200. Jucker A. (ed.) 1995. Historical Pragmatics. Pragmatic Developments in the History of English. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Jucker A. 2006. Historical Pragmatics. In K. Brown (ed.) Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Oxford: Elsevier, 329–332. Jucker A. 1997. The discourse marker well in the history of English. English Language and Linguistics. 1/1, 91–110. Jucker A. / Kopaczyk J. 2017. Historical (Im)politeness. In J. Culpeper / M. Haugh / D. Kádár (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Linguistic (Im)politeness. London: Palgrave, 433–459. Jucker A. / Taavitsainen I. 2000. Diachronic speech act analysis. Insults from flyting to flaming. Journal of Historical Pragmatics. 1/1, 67–95. Jucker A. / Taavitsainen I. (eds) 2010. Historical Pragmatics. Berlin/ New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Kádár D. / Haugh M. 2013. Understanding Politeness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kadt E. de 1998. The concept of face and its applicability to the Zulu language. Journal of Pragmatics. 29, 173–191. Kahn C. 1981. Man’s Estate: Masculine Identity in Shakespeare. Berkeley/ Los Angeles: Routledge.

185

Kahn C. 1977. The Taming of the Shrew: Shakespeare’s Mirror of Marriage. In Diamond A. / Edwards L.R. (eds) The Authority of Experience: Essays in Feminist Criticism Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 84–100. Kasper G. 1990. Linguistic politeness: Current research issues. Journal of Pragmatics. 14, 193–218. Kienpointner M. 1997. Varieties of rudeness: types and functions of impolite utterances. Functions of Language. 4/2, 251–287. Kim M.S. 1994. Cross-cultural comparisons of the perceived importance of conversational constraints. Human Communication Research. 21, 128–151. Kim M.S. / Kim H-J. 1997. Communication goals: Individual differences between Korean and American speakers. Personality and Individual Differences. 23, 509–517. Kizelbach U. 2014. The Pragmatics of Early Modern Politics: Power and Kingship in Shakespeare’s History Plays. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Kjellmer G. 2006. Panchrony in Linguistic Change. The Case of Courtesy. In R. Facchinetti / M. Rissanen (eds) Corpus-based Studies of Diachronic English. Bern: Peter Lang, 289–300. Koch P. / Oesterreicher W. 1985. Sprache der Nähe – Sprache der Distanz. Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit im Spannungsfeld von Sprachtheorie und Sprachgeschichte. Romanistisches Jahrbuch. 36/85, 15–43. Kohnen T. 2000. Explicit performatives in Old English. A corpus-based study of directives. Journal of Historical Pragmatics. 1/2, 301–321. Kopytko R. 2000. Cartesianism versus Kantianism: A choice for pragmatics? Rask. 13, 57–78. Kopytko R. 2001. From Cartesian towards non-Cartesian pragmatics. Journal of Pragmatics. 33, 783–804. Kopytko R. 1995. Linguistic Politeness Strategies in Shakespeare’s Plays. In A. Jucker (ed.) Historical Pragmatics. Pragmatic Developments in the History of English. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 515–540. Kopytko R. 1993. Polite Discourse in Shakespeare’s English. Poznan: Adam Mickiewicz University Press. Kopytko R. 1998. Relational pragmatics: Towards a holistic view of pragmatic phenomena. Studia Anglica Posnaniensia. 33, 195–211. 186

Kristeller P. O. 1990. Renaissance Thought and the Arts. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Labov W. 1972. Rules for Ritual Insults. In Language in the Inner City. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 297–353. Lachenicht L. G. 1980. Aggravating language: a study of abusive and insulting language. International Journal of Human Communication. 13/4, 607–688. Lakoff R. 1975. Language and Women’s Place. New York: Harper and Row. Lakoff R. 1979. Stylistic strategies within a grammar of style. In J. Orasanu / M. Slater / L. Loeb Adler (eds) Language, Sex and Gender. New York: Annals of the New York Academy of Science, 53–78. Lakoff R. 1990. Talking Power: The Politics of Language in our Lives. Glasgow: Harper-Collins. Lakoff R. 1989. The Limits of Politeness: Therapeutic and Courtroom Discourse. Multilingua, 8/2–3. Lakoff R. 1973. The logic of politeness; Or, minding your p’s and q’s. In Papers from the Ninth Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society. Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society, 292–305. Leech G. 1980. Explorations in Semantics and Pragmatics. Amsterdam: Benjamins. Leech G. 1983. Principles of Pragmatics. London/New York: Longman. Leech G. 2007. Politeness: Is there an East-West divide? Journal of Politeness Research. 3, 167–206. Levinson S.  1983. Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lim T. S.  1994. Facework in Interpersonal Relationships. In S. TingToomey (ed.) The challenge of facework: Cross-cultural and interpersonal issues. Albany: SUNY Press, 209–230. Lizardo O. 2004. The Cognitive Origins of Bourdieu’s Habitus. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour. 34/4, 375–401. Locher M. A. 2006. Polite behaviour within relational work: The discursive approach to politeness. Multilingua. 25, 249–267. Locher M. A. / Watts R. 2005. Politeness theory and relational work. Journal of Politeness Research. 1/1, 9–33. Loomba A. 1989. Gender, Race, Renaissance Drama. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

187

Lotman J. M. / Uspenskij B. 1975. Tipologie della cultura. Milano: Bompiani. Lovejoy A. O. 1936. The Great Chain of Being. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lutzky U. 2012. Why and What in early modern English drama. In Markus M. / Iyeirie Y. / Chamson E. (eds) Middle and Modern English Corpus Linguistics. A Multi-dimensional Approach. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 177–190. Mao L. R. 1994. Beyond politeness theory: ‘face’ revisited and renewed. Journal of Pragmatics. 21, 451–467. Magnusson L. 1999. Shakespeare and Social Dialogue: Dramatic Language and Elizabethan Letters. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Marcus L. S. 1992. Renaissance/Early Modern Studies. In S. Greenblatt / G. Gunn (eds) Redrawing the Boundaries. New York: The Modern Language Association of America, 41–63. Markus M. 2015. “Sirrah, What’s Thy Name?”: The Genesis of Shakespeare’s Sirrah in Relation to Sir and Sire in Late Middle and Early Modern English. English Studies. 96/2, 101–203. Matsumoto Y. 1989. Politeness and conversational universals-observations from Japanese. Multilingua. 8, 207–221. Matsumoto Y. 1988. Re-examination of the universality of face: politeness phenomena in Japanese. Journal of Pragmatics. 12, 403–426. Mazzon G. 2003. Pronouns and nominal address in Shakespearean English: a socio-affective marking system in transition. In I. Taavitsainen / A. Jucker (eds) Diachronic Perspectives on Address Term Systems. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 223–250. McEnery T. / Wilson A. 1996. Corpus Linguistics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Meier A. J. 1995a. Defining politeness: universality in appropriateness. Language Sciences. 17/4, 345–356. Meier A. J. 1995b. Passages of politeness. Journal of Pragmatics. 24/4, 381–392. Meier A. J. 1997. Teaching the universals of politeness. ELT Journal. 51/1, 21–28. Meier A. J. 2004. Has ‘politeness’ outlived its usefulness? Vienna English Working Papers. 13/1, 5–22. 188

Mills S. 2003. Gender and Politeness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Milroy L. 1987. Language and social networks. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Montrose L. 1992. New Historicisms. In S. Greenblatt / G. Gunn (eds) Redrawing the Boundaries. New York: The Modern Language Association of America, 392–418. Montrose L. 1989. Professing the Renaissance: The Poetics and Politics of Culture. In J. Rivkin / M. Ryan (eds) The Literary Theory; an Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 584–591. Moretti F. 1987. La grande eclissi. Forma tragica e sconsacrazione della sovranità. In Segni e stili del moderno. Torino: Einaudi. Morris B. (ed.) 1981. The Taming of the Shrew. London: Methuen. Mucci C. 2001. Il teatro delle streghe. Il femminile come costruzione culturale al tempo di Shakespeare. Napoli: Liguori. Mulholland J. 1967 (1987). You/Thou in Shakespeare. In Salmon V. / Burness E. (eds) Reader in the Language of Shakespearean Drama. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 153–162. Nakayasu M. 2009. The Pragmatics of Modals in Shakespeare. Bern: Peter Lang. Neale J. E. 1957. Elizabeth I and her Parliament 1585–1601. London: Jonathan Cape. Nwoye O. G. 1992. Linguistic politeness and sociocultural variation of the notion of face. Journal of Pragmatics. 18, 309–328. O’Driscoll J. 1996. About face: A defense and elaboration of universal dualism. Journal of Pragmatics. 25, 1–32. O’Driscoll J. 2007. What’s in an FTA? Reflections on a chance meeting with Claudine. Journal of Politeness Research. 3, 243–268. Pagnini M. 1976. Shakespeare e il paradigma della specularità. Pisa: Pacini. Paternoster A. 2015. Cortesi e scortesi. Percorsi di pragmatica storica da Castiglione a Collodi. Rome: Carocci. Perosa S. (ed.) 2009. La bisbetica domata. Milano: Garzanti. Pizziconi B. 2007. The lexical mapping of politeness in British English and Japanese. Journal of Politeness Research. 3, 207–241. Pye C. 1990. The Regal Phantasm. Shakespeare and the Politics of Spectacle. London/New York: Routledge.

189

Pye C. 2000. The Vanishing: Shakespeare, the Subject and Early Modern Culture. Durham/London: Duke University Press. Quirk R. 1971. Shakespeare and the English language. In V. Salmon / E. Burness (eds) Reader in the Language of Shakespearean Drama. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1987, 3–22. Raimondi E. 1994. Rinascimento inquieto. Torino: Einaudi. Reiter R. M. 2000. Linguistic Politeness in Britain and Uruguay: A Contrastive Study of Requests and Apologies. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Replogle C. 1973. Shakespeare’s salutations: A Study in stylistic etiquette. Studies in Philology. 70/2 (April), 172–186. Richards J. 2003. Rhetoric and Courtliness in Early Modern England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rudanko J. 1993. Pragmatic Approaches to Shakespeare: Essays on Othello, Coriolanus and Timon of Athens. Lanham/New York/ London: University Press of America. Rudanko J. 2006. Aggravated Impoliteness and Two Types of Speaker Intention in an Episode in Shakespeare’s Timon of Athens. Journal of Pragmatics. 38/6 (June), 829–841. Sacerdoti G. 2009. Antony and Cleopatra and the Overflowing of the Roman Measure. In M. Del Sapio Garbero (ed.) Identity, Otherness and Empire in Shakespeare’s Rome. Farhnam/Burlington: Ashgate, 107–118. Schulze R. 1985. Höflichkeit im Englischen : zur linguistischen Beschreibung und Analyse von Alltagsgesprächen : mit einer Zusammenfassung in englischer Sprache. Tubingen: Gunter Narr. Searle J. 1969. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Searle J. 1976. A Classification of Illocutionary Acts. Language in Society. 5/1, 1–23. Searle J. 1979. Expression and Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sell R. D. 2000. Literature as Communication. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Serpieri A. 1985. Reading the signs: Towards a Semiotics of Shakespearean Drama. In J. Drakakis (ed.) Alternative Shakespeares. London/New York: Methuen, 119–143. 190

Serpieri A. 1986. Retorica e immaginario. Parma: Pratiche. Scollon R. / Scollon S. W. 1995. Intercultural Communication. Oxford: Blackwell. Sifianou M. 1997. Do we need to be silent to be extremely polite? Silence and FTAs. International Journal of Applied Linguistics. 5, 95–110. Sifianou M. 1992. Politeness Phenomena in England and Greece: A Cross- Cultural Perspective. London: Clarendon Press. Slattery M. 2003. Key Ideas in Sociology. London: Nelson Thornes. Smith P. 1988. Discerning the Subject. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Spencer-Oatey H. / Ruhi Ş. 2007. Identity, face and (im)politeness (Editorial). Journal of Pragmatics. 39/4, 635–638. Steppat M. 1994. Social Change and Gender decorum: Renaissance courtesy. In J. Carré (ed.) The Crisis of Courtesy. Studies in the Conduct-Book in Britain 1600–1900. The Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 27–41. Stone O. 1966. Social mobility in England, 1500–1700. Past and Present. 33, 17–55. Strecker I. 1993. Cultural variations in the concept of ‘face’. Multilingua. 12, 119–141. Taavitsainen I. 2001. Changing conventions of writing: The dynamics of genres, text types, and text traditions. European Journal of English Studies. Special Issue: Early Modern English Text Types. 5/2, 139–150. Taavitsainen I. 2016. Genre dynamics in the history of English. In M. Kytö / P. Pahta (eds) The Cambridge Handbook of English Historical Linguistics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 271–285. Taavitsainen I. 1997. Genres and text types in Medieval and Renaissance English. Poetica. 47, 49–62. Terkourafi M. 2005a. An argument for a frame-based approach to politeness: evidence from the use of the imperative in Cypriot Greek. In R. Lakoff / S. Ide (eds) Broadening the horizon of linguistic politeness. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 99–116. Terkourafi M. 2005b. Beyond the micro-level in politeness research. Journal of Politeness Research. 1/2, 237–262. 191

Terkourafi M. 2005c. Identity and Semantic Change: aspects of T/V usage in Cyprus. Journal of Historical Pragmatics. 6/2, 283–306. Terkourafi M. 2005d. Pragmatic correlates of frequency of use: the case for a notion of ‘minimal context’. In S. Marmaridou / K. Nikiforidou / E. Antonopoulou (eds) Reviewing Linguistic Thought: Converging Trends for the 21st Century. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 209–233. Terkourafi 2008. Toward a unified theory of politeness, impoliteness and rudeness. In D. Bousfield / M. Locher (eds) Impoliteness in Language: Studies on its Interplay with Power in Theory and Practice. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 45–74. Tillyard E. M. W. 1943. The Elizabethan World Picture. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Traub V. 2001. Gender and sexuality in Shakespeare. In M. de Grazia / S. Wells (eds.) The Cambridge Companion to Shakespeare. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 129–146. Traugott E. C. / Dasher R. B. 2002. Regularity in Semantic Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Underdown D. 1985. The Taming of the Scold: the Enforcement of Patriarcal Authority in Early Modern England. In A. Fletcher / J. Stevenson (eds) Order and Disorder in Early Modern England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 116–136. Wallis M. / Shepherd S.  2002. Studying Plays. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. Watts R. J. 2012. A Socio-cognitive Approach to Historical Politeness. In M. Bax / D. Kádár (eds) Understanding Historical (Im)politeness. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 103–130. Watts R. J. 2005a. Linguistic politeness and politic verbal behaviour: Reconsidering claims for universality. In R. Watts / S. Ide / K. Ehlich (eds) Politeness in Language: Studies in its History, Theory, and Practice. New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 43–70. Watts R. J. 2005b. Linguistic politeness research. Quo vadis? In R. Watts / S. Ide / K. Ehlich (eds) Politeness in Language: Studies in its History, Theory, and Practice. New York: Mouton de Gruyter, xi–xlvii. Watts R. J. 2003. Politeness. Key Topics in Sociolinguistics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

192

Watts R. / Ide S. / Ehlich K. 2005. Politeness in Language: Studies in Its History, Theory and Practice. New York: Mouton de Gruyter. Werkhofer K. T. 1992. Traditional and modern views: the social constitution and the power of politeness In R. Watts / S. Ide / K. Ehlich (eds) Politeness in Language: Studies in its History, Theory and Practice. New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 155–199. Whigham F. 1984. Ambition and privilege: The social tropes of Elizabethan courtesy theory. Berkeley: University of California Press. White L. Jr 1974. Death and the Devil. In R. S. Kinsman (ed.) The Darker Vision of the Renaissance. Beyond the Fields of Reason. Berkeley/ Los Angeles/London: The University of California Press, 25–46. Wierzbicka A. 1997. Understanding Cultures Through Their Key Words. English, Russian, Polish, German, and Japanese. New York/ Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wildeblood J. 1965. The polite world. A guide to English manners and deportment from the thirteenth to the nineteenth century. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Xie C. / He Z. / Lin D. (2005). Politeness: Myth and Truth. Studies in Language. 29/2, 431–461. Yule G. 1997. Pragmatics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

193

Index Ahearn L., 40, 177 Anouk L., 161, 178 Arndt H. and Janney R., 23, 178 Arundale R., 178 Ascham R., 75, 177 Austin J., 16, 19, 25, 43-44, 168, 178 Austin P., 16, 19, 25, 43-44, 168, 178 Barbe K., 178 Barber C., 83, 178 Barker F., 57, 62-63, 178 Bax M., 54, 56, 81, 178, 192 Beebe L. M., 23-24, 178 Belsey C., 59-60, 62, 179 Bigliazzi S., 64-66, 179 Boose L., 138, 179 Bourdieu P., 179, 187 Bousfield D., 23, 179-181, 192 Bradley A., 62, 179 Brewer J., 71-72, 179 Brinton L. J., 81, 179 Brislin, 179 Brown P. and Levinson S., 7, 11, 18, 21-22, 25-26, 29-30, 38, 40, 43-44, 48, 69, 153, 179, 187 "B&L", 7, 11, 18, 21-22, 25-26, 29-30, 38, 40, 43-44, 48, 69, 153, 179, 187 Brown R. and Gilman A., 72, 74-76, 81-83, 86, 95, 99, 103, 107, 109110, 141-142, 147, 152, 160, 179 Burckhardt J., 63, 179 Burke P., 57, 180 Busse U., 81-82, 180 Carnap R., 180 Case J., 31-32, 35, 42, 48, 54, 65, 68, 77-78, 86, 98, 123-124, 129, 151, 153, 158, 168, 175, 177-178, 183, 186, 192 Cashman H.R, 180 Castiglione B., 75-76, 177, 189 Charlton H., 138, 180

Chen R., 180 Colie R., 74, 180 Collins D. E., 81, 180 Copernicus N., 58, 177 Corti C., 77-78, 180 Culpeper J., 13, 18, 20-21, 23-24, 40, 43-51, 54-56, 81-82, 86-87, 122, 133, 137-138, 152, 155-156, 160161, 166, 173, 180-182, 185 Dasher, 81, 192 Dash I. G., 139, 181 de Bruyn L., 137-138, 181 de Filippis S., 13, 57, 139, 181 della Casa G., 75, 177 Dews P., 38, 159, 181 Dollimore J., 59-61, 64, 182 Donahue T. J., 182 Drakakis J., 60, 182, 190 Easthope A., 38, 182 Eelen G., 41, 182 Eisaman Maus K., 62-63, 79-80, 182 Elam K., 13, 64, 123, 182 Elyot T., 75, 177 Emmison F. G., 57, 182 Fitzmaurice S., 55, 71-72, 81, 182 Foucault M., 39, 60, 182 Fraser B., 29, 40-42, 48, 85, 182-183 Fritz G., 81, 183 Geertz C., 56, 183 Goffman E., 16, 18-20, 25, 29-30, 87, 173, 183 Greenblatt S., 17, 57, 62-63, 175, 183, 188-189 Grice P., 18, 25-27, 30, 40, 46-47, 85, 173, 183 Guazzo S., 75, 177 Hall S., 39, 160, 183 Harland R., 38, 183 Harrison W., 73, 177 Hattaway M., 57, 183 Haugh M., 56, 181, 183-185

Held G., 33, 51, 122, 184 Hendry J., 184 Hickey L., 184 Hill B., 23-24, 69, 184 Hobsbawm E., 57, 184 Hoby T., 75-76, 177 Holmes J., 23-24, 178, 184 Hughes G., 161, 184 Ide S., 23-24, 69, 85, 87, 184, 191-193 Jacobs A., 54, 81, 184 Jucker A., 20, 54-55, 68-70, 72, 81-82, 84-85, 87, 183-186, 188 Kádár D., 54, 56, 178, 181-182, 185, 192 Kahn C., 138, 185-186 Kasper G., 22-23, 186 Kienpointner M., 23-24, 186 Kizelbach U., 22, 38, 81, 186 Kjellmer G., 67, 186 Koch P., 55, 186 Kohnen T., 186 Kopytko R., 70-72, 76, 81, 86, 95, 141, 153, 158, 186 Kristeller P. O., 57, 187 Kytö M., 55, 181, 191 Labov W., 161, 187 Lachenicht L. G., 43, 187 Lakoff R., 18-19, 22-25, 27-29, 40, 42, 85, 173, 187, 191 Leech G., 19, 22, 24-25, 28-29, 40, 42, 44, 46-48, 187 Levinson S., 7, 11, 18, 21-22, 25-26, 29-30, 38, 40, 43-44, 48, 69, 153, 179, 187 Locher M., 40, 42-43, 180, 187, 192 Lotman J., 65, 188 Lovejoy A. O., 58, 188 Lutzky U., 114, 142, 188 Magnusson L., 81, 189 Marcus L. S., 57, 188 Markus M., 102, 188 Marra M., 23-24, 184 Matsumoto Y., 69, 183, 188 Mazzon G., 13, 69, 81-85, 87, 188 Montrose L., 60-62, 189 Moretti F., 57, 189

196

Mucci C., 74, 138, 152, 189 Mulholland J., 83, 189 Nakayasu M., 81, 189 Neale J. E., 57, 189 Nolan W., 40, 48, 183 O’Driscoll, 189 Oesterreicher W., 55, 186 Ogino, 24, 184 Perosa S., 140, 189 Pye C., 62-63, 189 Quirk R., 83, 190 Raimondi E., 57, 190 Replogle C., 74, 83, 190 Richards J., 66, 71, 75, 139, 141, 178179, 190 Rudanko, 81, 190 Sacerdoti G., 58, 190 Schnurr, 23-24, 184 Schulze R., 68, 190 Searle J., 19, 25-26, 190 Sell R. D., 81, 190 Serpieri A., 65-67, 190 Shakespeare W., 5, 8, 13, 19, 47, 53, 55, 70-72, 80-83, 92, 95, 105-106, 137-138, 140, 147, 152, 155, 173, 175-183, 185-186, 188-190, 192 Sifianou M., 23-24, 178, 191 Smith P., 61-62, 191 Steppat M., 73-76, 78, 191 Stone O., 76, 191 Taavitsainen I., 54-55, 81, 182, 185, 188, 191 Terkourafi M., 23, 50, 56, 67-68, 191-192 Tillyard E.M.W., 58-59, 192 Traub V., 155, 159, 192 Traugott E. C., 81, 192 Underdown D., 137, 192 Uspenskij B., 65, 188 Watts R., 40-43, 51, 56, 85, 87, 184-185, 187, 192-193 Whigham F., 76, 193 White L., 74, 193 Wildeblood J., 76, 193 Xie / He /Lin, 41, 192-193

Linguistic Insights Studies in Language and Communication

This series aims to promote specialist language studies in the fields of linguistic theory and applied linguistics, by publishing volumes that focus on specific aspects of language use in one or several languages and provide valuable insights into language and communication research. A cross-disciplinary approach is favoured and most European languages are accepted. The series includes two types of books: – Monographs – featuring in-depth studies on special aspects of language theory, language analysis or language teaching. – Collected papers – assembling papers from workshops, conferences or symposia. Each volume of the series is subjected to a double peer-reviewing process. Vol. 1

Maurizio Gotti & Marina Dossena (eds) Modality in Specialized Texts. Selected Papers of the 1st CERLIS Conference. 421 pages. 2001. ISBN 3-906767-10-8 · US-ISBN 0-8204-5340-4

Vol. 2

Giuseppina Cortese & Philip Riley (eds) Domain-specific English. Textual Practices across Communities and Classrooms. 420 pages. 2002. ISBN 3-906768-98-8 · US-ISBN 0-8204-5884-8

Vol. 3

Maurizio Gotti, Dorothee Heller & Marina Dossena (eds) Conflict and Negotiation in Specialized Texts. Selected Papers of the 2nd CERLIS Conference. 470 pages. 2002. ISBN 3-906769-12-7 · US-ISBN 0-8204-5887-2

Vol. 4

Maurizio Gotti, Marina Dossena, Richard Dury, Roberta Facchinetti & Maria Lima Variation in Central Modals. A Repertoire of Forms and Types of Usage in Middle English and Early Modern English. 364 pages. 2002. ISBN 3-906769-84-4 · US-ISBN 0-8204-5898-8

Editorial address: Prof. Maurizio Gotti

Università di Bergamo, Dipartimento di Lingue, Letterature Straniere e Comunicazione, Piazza Rosate 2, 24129 Bergamo, Italy Fax: +39 035 2052789, E-Mail: [email protected]

Vol. 5

Stefania Nuccorini (ed.) Phrases and Phraseology. Data and Descriptions. 187 pages. 2002. ISBN 3-906770-08-7 · US-ISBN 0-8204-5933-X

Vol. 6

Vijay Bhatia, Christopher N. Candlin & Maurizio Gotti (eds) Legal Discourse in Multilingual and Multicultural Contexts. Arbitration Texts in Europe. 385 pages. 2003. ISBN 3-906770-85-0 · US-ISBN 0-8204-6254-3

Vol. 7

Marina Dossena & Charles Jones (eds) Insights into Late Modern English. 2nd edition. 378 pages. 2003, 2007. ISBN 978-3-03911-257-9 · US-ISBN 978-0-8204-8927-8

Vol. 8

Maurizio Gotti Specialized Discourse. Linguistic Features and Changing Conventions. 351 pages. 2003, 2005. ISBN 3-03910-606-6 · US-ISBN 0-8204-7000-7

Vol. 9

Alan Partington, John Morley & Louann Haarman (eds) Corpora and Discourse. 420 pages. 2004. ISBN 3-03910-026-2 · US-ISBN 0-8204-6262-4

Vol. 10

Martina Möllering The Acquisition of German Modal Particles. A Corpus-Based Approach. 290 pages. 2004. ISBN 3-03910-043-2 · US-ISBN 0-8204-6273-X

Vol. 11

David Hart (ed.) English Modality in Context. Diachronic Perspectives. 261 pages. 2003. ISBN 3-03910-046-7 · US-ISBN 0-8204-6852-5

Vol. 12

Wendy Swanson Modes of Co-reference as an Indicator of Genre. 430 pages. 2003. ISBN 3-03910-052-1 · US-ISBN 0-8204-6855-X

Vol. 13 Gina Poncini Discursive Strategies in Multicultural Business Meetings. 2nd edition. 338 pages. 2004, 2007. ISBN 978-3-03911-296-8 · US-ISBN 978-0-8204-8937-7 Vol. 14 Christopher N. Candlin & Maurizio Gotti (eds) Intercultural Aspects of Specialized Communication. 2nd edition. 369 pages. 2004, 2007. ISBN 978-3-03911-258-6 · US-ISBN 978-0-8204-8926-1 Vol. 15

Gabriella Del Lungo Camiciotti & Elena Tognini Bonelli (eds) Academic Discourse. New Insights into Evaluation. 234 pages. 2004. ISBN 3-03910-353-9 · US-ISBN 0-8204-7016-3

Vol. 16

Marina Dossena & Roger Lass (eds) Methods and Data in English Historical Dialectology. 405 pages. 2004. ISBN 3-03910-362-8 · US-ISBN 0-8204-7018-X

Vol. 17

Judy Noguchi The Science Review Article. An Opportune Genre in the Construction of Science. 274 pages. 2006. ISBN 3-03910-426-8 · US-ISBN 0-8204-7034-1

Vol. 18

Giuseppina Cortese & Anna Duszak (eds) Identity, Community, Discourse. English in Intercultural Settings. 495 pages. 2005. ISBN 3-03910-632-5 · US-ISBN 0-8204-7163-1

Vol. 19

Anna Trosborg & Poul Erik Flyvholm Jørgensen (eds) Business Discourse. Texts and Contexts. 250 pages. 2005. ISBN 3-03910-606-6 · US-ISBN 0-8204-7000-7

Vol. 20 Christopher Williams Tradition and Change in Legal English. Verbal Constructions in Prescriptive Texts. 2nd revised edition. 216 pages. 2005, 2007. ISBN 978-3-03911-444-3. Vol. 21 Katarzyna Dziubalska-Kolaczyk & Joanna Przedlacka (eds) English Pronunciation Models: A Changing Scene. 2nd edition. 476 pages. 2005, 2008. ISBN 978-3-03911-682-9. Vol. 22

Christián Abello-Contesse, Rubén Chacón-Beltrán, M. Dolores López-Jiménez & M. Mar Torreblanca-López (eds) Age in L2 Acquisition and Teaching. 214 pages. 2006. ISBN 3-03910-668-6 · US-ISBN 0-8204-7174-7

Vol. 23

Vijay K. Bhatia, Maurizio Gotti, Jan Engberg & Dorothee Heller (eds) Vagueness in Normative Texts. 474 pages. 2005. ISBN 3-03910-653-8 · US-ISBN 0-8204-7169-0

Vol. 24

Paul Gillaerts & Maurizio Gotti (eds) Genre Variation in Business Letters. 2nd printing. 407 pages. 2008. ISBN 978-3-03911-681-2.

Vol. 25 Ana María Hornero, María José Luzón & Silvia Murillo (eds) Corpus Linguistics. Applications for the Study of English. 2nd printing. 526 pages. 2006, 2008. ISBN 978-3-03911-726-0 Vol. 26

J. Lachlan Mackenzie & María de los Ángeles Gómez-González (eds) Studies in Functional Discourse Grammar. 259 pages. 2005. ISBN 3-03910-696-1 · US-ISBN 0-8204-7558-0

Vol. 27 Debbie G. E. Ho Classroom Talk. Exploring the Sociocultural Structure of Formal ESL Learning. 2nd edition. 254 pages. 2006, 2007. ISBN 978-3-03911-434-4 Vol. 28

Javier Pérez-Guerra, Dolores González-Álvarez, Jorge L. Bueno-Alonso & Esperanza Rama-Martínez (eds) ‘Of Varying Language and Opposing Creed’. New Insights into Late Modern English. 455 pages. 2007. ISBN 978-3-03910-788-9

Vol. 29

Francesca Bargiela-Chiappini & Maurizio Gotti (eds) Asian Business Discourse(s). 350 pages. 2005. ISBN 3-03910-804-2 · US-ISBN 0-8204-7574-2

Vol. 30

Nicholas Brownlees (ed.) News Discourse in Early Modern Britain. Selected Papers of CHINED 2004. 300 pages. 2006. ISBN 3-03910-805-0 · US-ISBN 0-8204-8025-8

Vol. 31

Roberta Facchinetti & Matti Rissanen (eds) Corpus-based Studies of Diachronic English. 300 pages. 2006. ISBN 3-03910-851-4 · US-ISBN 0-8204-8040-1

Vol. 32

Marina Dossena & Susan M. Fitzmaurice (eds) Business and Official Correspondence. Historical Investigations. 209 pages. 2006. ISBN 3-03910-880-8 · US-ISBN 0-8204-8352-4

Vol. 33

Giuliana Garzone & Srikant Sarangi (eds) Discourse, Ideology and Specialized Communication. 494 pages. 2007. ISBN 978-3-03910-888-6

Vol. 34

Giuliana Garzone & Cornelia Ilie (eds) The Use of English in Institutional and Business Settings. An Intercultural Perspective. 372 pages. 2007. ISBN 978-3-03910-889-3

Vol. 35

Vijay K. Bhatia & Maurizio Gotti (eds) Explorations in Specialized Genres. 316 pages. 2006. ISBN 3-03910-995-2 · US-ISBN 0-8204-8372-9

Vol. 36

Heribert Picht (ed.) Modern Approaches to Terminological Theories and Applications. 432 pages. 2006. ISBN 3-03911-156-6 · US-ISBN 0-8204-8380-X

Vol. 37

Anne Wagner & Sophie Cacciaguidi-Fahy (eds) Legal Language and the Search for Clarity / Le langage juridique et la quête de clarté. Practice and Tools / Pratiques et instruments. 487 pages. 2006. ISBN 3-03911-169-8 · US-ISBN 0-8204-8388-5



Vol. 38 Juan Carlos Palmer-Silveira, Miguel F. Ruiz-Garrido & Inmaculada Fortanet-Gómez (eds) Intercultural and International Business Communication. Theory, Research and Teaching. 2nd edition. 343 pages. 2006, 2008. ISBN 978-3-03911-680-5 Vol. 39

Christiane Dalton-Puffer, Dieter Kastovsky, Nikolaus Ritt & Herbert Schendl (eds) Syntax, Style and Grammatical Norms. English from 1500–2000. 250 pages. 2006. ISBN 3-03911-181-7 · US-ISBN 0-8204-8394-X

Vol. 40

Marina Dossena & Irma Taavitsainen (eds) Diachronic Perspectives on Domain-Specific English. 280 pages. 2006. ISBN 3-03910-176-0 · US-ISBN 0-8204-8391-5

Vol. 41

John Flowerdew & Maurizio Gotti (eds) Studies in Specialized Discourse. 293 pages. 2006. ISBN 3-03911-178-7

Vol. 42

Ken Hyland & Marina Bondi (eds) Academic Discourse Across Disciplines. 320 pages. 2006. ISBN 3-03911-183-3 · US-ISBN 0-8204-8396-6

Vol. 43

Paul Gillaerts & Philip Shaw (eds) The Map and the Landscape. Norms and Practices in Genre. 256 pages. 2006. ISBN 3-03911-182-5 · US-ISBN 0-8204-8395-4

Vol. 44

Maurizio Gotti & Davide Giannoni (eds) New Trends in Specialized Discourse Analysis. 301 pages. 2006. ISBN 3-03911-184-1 · US-ISBN 0-8204-8381-8

Vol. 45

Maurizio Gotti & Françoise Salager-Meyer (eds) Advances in Medical Discourse Analysis. Oral and Written Contexts. 492 pages. 2006. ISBN 3-03911-185-X · US-ISBN 0-8204-8382-6

Vol. 46

Maurizio Gotti & Susan Šarcevi´c (eds) Insights into Specialized Translation. 396 pages. 2006. ISBN 3-03911-186-8 · US-ISBN 0-8204-8383-4

Vol. 47

Khurshid Ahmad & Margaret Rogers (eds) Evidence-based LSP. Translation, Text and Terminology. 584 pages. 2007. ISBN 978-3-03911-187-9

Vol. 48

Hao Sun & Dániel Z. Kádár (eds) It’s the Dragon’s Turn. Chinese Institutional Discourses. 262 pages. 2008. ISBN 978-3-03911-175-6

Vol. 49

Cristina Suárez-Gómez Relativization in Early English (950-1250). the Position of Relative Clauses. 149 pages. 2006. ISBN 3-03911-203-1 · US-ISBN 0-8204-8904-2

Vol. 50

Maria Vittoria Calvi & Luisa Chierichetti (eds) Nuevas tendencias en el discurso de especialidad. 319 pages. 2006. ISBN 978-3-03911-261-6

Vol. 51

Mari Carmen Campoy & María José Luzón (eds) Spoken Corpora in Applied Linguistics. 274 pages. 2008. ISBN 978-3-03911-275-3

Vol. 52

Konrad Ehlich & Dorothee Heller (Hrsg.) Die Wissenschaft und ihre Sprachen. 323 pages. 2006. ISBN 978-3-03911-272-2

Vol. 53

Jingyu Zhang The Semantic Salience Hierarchy Model. The L2 Acquisition of Psych Predicates 273 pages. 2007. ISBN 978-3-03911-300-2

Vol. 54

Norman Fairclough, Giuseppina Cortese & Patrizia Ardizzone (eds) Discourse and Contemporary Social Change. 555 pages. 2007. ISBN 978-3-03911-276-0

Vol. 55

Jan Engberg, Marianne Grove Ditlevsen, Peter Kastberg & Martin Stegu (eds) New Directions in LSP Teaching. 331 pages. 2007. ISBN 978-3-03911-433-7

Vol. 56

Dorothee Heller & Konrad Ehlich (Hrsg.) Studien zur Rechtskommunikation. 322 pages. 2007. ISBN 978-3-03911-436-8

Vol. 57

Teruhiro Ishiguro & Kang-kwong Luke (eds) Grammar in Cross-Linguistic Perspective. The Syntax, Semantics, and Pragmatics of Japanese and Chinese. 304 pages. 2012. ISBN 978-3-03911-445-0

Vol. 58

Carmen Frehner Email – SMS – MMS 294 pages. 2008. ISBN 978-3-03911-451-1

Vol. 59

Isabel Balteiro The Directionality of Conversion in English. A Dia-Synchronic Study. 276 pages. 2007. ISBN 978-3-03911-241-8

Vol. 60 Maria Milagros Del Saz Rubio English Discourse Markers of Reformulation. 237 pages. 2007. ISBN 978-3-03911-196-1

Vol. 61

Sally Burgess & Pedro Martín-Martín (eds) English as an Additional Language in Research Publication and Communication. 259 pages. 2008. ISBN 978-3-03911-462-7

Vol. 62

Sandrine Onillon Pratiques et représentations de l’écrit. 458 pages. 2008. ISBN 978-3-03911-464-1

Vol. 63 Hugo Bowles & Paul Seedhouse (eds) Conversation Analysis and Language for Specific Purposes. 2nd edition. 337 pages. 2007, 2009. ISBN 978-3-0343-0045-2 Vol. 64

Vijay K. Bhatia, Christopher N. Candlin & Paola Evangelisti Allori (eds) Language, Culture and the Law. The Formulation of Legal Concepts across Systems and Cultures. 342 pages. 2008. ISBN 978-3-03911-470-2

Vol. 65

Jonathan Culpeper & Dániel Z. Kádár (eds) Historical (Im)politeness. 300 pages. 2010. ISBN 978-3-03911-496-2

Vol. 66

Linda Lombardo (ed.) Using Corpora to Learn about Language and Discourse. 237 pages. 2009. ISBN 978-3-03911-522-8

Vol. 67

Natsumi Wakamoto Extroversion/Introversion in Foreign Language Learning. Interactions with Learner Strategy Use. 159 pages. 2009. ISBN 978-3-03911-596-9

Vol. 68

Eva Alcón-Soler (ed.) Learning How to Request in an Instructed Language Learning Context. 260 pages. 2008. ISBN 978-3-03911-601-0

Vol. 69

Domenico Pezzini The Translation of Religious Texts in the Middle Ages. 428 pages. 2008. ISBN 978-3-03911-600-3

Vol. 70

Tomoko Tode Effects of Frequency in Classroom Second Language Learning. Quasi-experiment and stimulated-recall analysis. 195 pages. 2008. ISBN 978-3-03911-602-7

Vol. 71

Egor Tsedryk Fusion symétrique et alternances ditransitives. 211 pages. 2009. ISBN 978-3-03911-609-6

Vol. 72

Cynthia J. Kellett Bidoli & Elana Ochse (eds) English in International Deaf Communication. 444 pages. 2008. ISBN 978-3-03911-610-2

Vol. 73

Joan C. Beal, Carmela Nocera & Massimo Sturiale (eds) Perspectives on Prescriptivism. 269 pages. 2008. ISBN 978-3-03911-632-4

Vol. 74

Carol Taylor Torsello, Katherine Ackerley & Erik Castello (eds) Corpora for University Language Teachers. 308 pages. 2008. ISBN 978-3-03911-639-3

Vol. 75

María Luisa Pérez Cañado (ed.) English Language Teaching in the European Credit Transfer System. Facing the Challenge. 251 pages. 2009. ISBN 978-3-03911-654-6

Vol. 76

Marina Dossena & Ingrid Tieken-Boon van Ostade (eds) Studies in Late Modern English Correspondence. Methodology and Data. 291 pages. 2008. ISBN 978-3-03911-658-4

Vol. 77

Ingrid Tieken-Boon van Ostade & Wim van der Wurff (eds) Current Issues in Late Modern English. 436 pages. 2009. ISBN 978-3-03911-660-7

Vol. 78

Marta Navarro Coy (ed.) Practical Approaches to Foreign Language Teaching and Learning. 297 pages. 2009. ISBN 978-3-03911-661-4

Vol. 79

Qing Ma Second Language Vocabulary Acquisition. 333 pages. 2009. ISBN 978-3-03911-666-9

Vol. 80

Martin Solly, Michelangelo Conoscenti & Sandra Campagna (eds) Verbal/Visual Narrative Texts in Higher Education. 384 pages. 2008. ISBN 978-3-03911-672-0

Vol. 81

Meiko Matsumoto From Simple Verbs to Periphrastic Expressions: The Historical Development of Composite Predicates, Phrasal Verbs, and Related Constructions in English. 235 pages. 2008. ISBN 978-3-03911-675-1

Vol. 82

Melinda Dooly Doing Diversity. Teachers’ Construction of Their Classroom Reality. 180 pages. 2009. ISBN 978-3-03911-687-4

Vol. 83

Victoria Guillén-Nieto, Carmen Marimón-Llorca & Chelo Vargas-Sierra (eds) Intercultural Business Communication and Simulation and Gaming Methodology. 392 pages. 2009. ISBN 978-3-03911-688-1

Vol. 84

Maria Grazia Guido English as a Lingua Franca in Cross-cultural Immigration Domains. 285 pages. 2008. ISBN 978-3-03911-689-8

Vol. 85

Erik Castello Text Complexity and Reading Comprehension Tests. 352 pages. 2008. ISBN 978-3-03911-717-8

Vol. 86

Maria-Lluisa Gea-Valor, Isabel García-Izquierdo & Maria-José Esteve (eds) Linguistic and Translation Studies in Scientific Communication. 317 pages. 2010. ISBN 978-3-0343-0069-8

Vol. 87

Carmen Navarro, Rosa Mª Rodríguez Abella, Francesca Dalle Pezze & Renzo Miotti (eds) La comunicación especializada. 355 pages. 2008. ISBN 978-3-03911-733-8

Vol. 88

Kiriko Sato The Development from Case-Forms to Prepositional Constructions in Old English Prose. 231 pages. 2009. ISBN 978-3-03911-763-5

Vol. 89

Dorothee Heller (Hrsg.) Formulierungsmuster in deutscher und italienischer Fachkommunikation. Intra- und interlinguale Perspektiven. 315 pages. 2008. ISBN 978-3-03911-778-9

Vol. 90

Henning Bergenholtz, Sandro Nielsen & Sven Tarp (eds) Lexicography at a Crossroads. Dictionaries and Encyclopedias Today, Lexicographical Tools Tomorrow. 372 pages. 2009. ISBN 978-3-03911-799-4

Vol. 91

Manouchehr Moshtagh Khorasani The Development of Controversies. From the Early Modern Period to Online Discussion Forums. 317 pages. 2009. ISBN 978-3-3911-711-6

Vol. 92

María Luisa Carrió-Pastor (ed.) Content and Language Integrated Learning. Cultural Diversity. 178 pages. 2009. ISBN 978-3-3911-818-2

Vol. 93

Roger Berry Terminology in English Language Teaching. Nature and Use. 262 pages. 2010. ISBN 978-3-0343-0013-1

Vol. 94

Roberto Cagliero & Jennifer Jenkins (eds) Discourses, Communities, and Global Englishes 240 pages. 2010. ISBN 978-3-0343-0012-4

Vol. 95

Facchinetti Roberta, Crystal David, Seidlhofer Barbara (eds) From International to Local English – And Back Again. 268 pages. 2010. ISBN 978-3-0343-0011-7

Vol. 96

Cesare Gagliardi & Alan Maley (eds) EIL, ELF, Global English. Teaching and Learning Issues 376 pages. 2010. ISBN 978-3-0343-0010-0

Vol. 97

Sylvie Hancil (ed.) The Role of Prosody in Affective Speech. 403 pages. 2009. ISBN 978-3-03911-696-6

Vol. 98

Marina Dossena & Roger Lass (eds) Studies in English and European Historical Dialectology. 257 pages. 2009. ISBN 978-3-0343-0024-7

Vol. 99

Christine Béal Les interactions quotidiennes en français et en anglais. De l’approche comparative à l’analyse des situations interculturelles. 424 pages. 2010. ISBN 978-3-0343-0027-8

Vol. 100

Maurizio Gotti (ed.) Commonality and Individuality in Academic Discourse. 398 pages. 2009. ISBN 978-3-0343-0023-0

Vol. 101

Javier E. Díaz Vera & Rosario Caballero (eds) Textual Healing. Studies in Medieval English Medical, Scientific and Technical Texts. 213 pages. 2009. ISBN 978-3-03911-822-9

Vol. 102

Nuria Edo Marzá The Specialised Lexicographical Approach. A Step further in Dictionary-making. 316 pages. 2009. ISBN 978-3-0343-0043-8

Vol. 103

Carlos Prado-Alonso, Lidia Gómez-García, Iria Pastor-Gómez & David Tizón-Couto (eds) New Trends and Methodologies in Applied English Language Research. Diachronic, Diatopic and Contrastive Studies. 348 pages. 2009. ISBN 978-3-0343-0046-9

Vol. 104

Françoise Salager-Meyer & Beverly A. Lewin Crossed Words. Criticism in Scholarly Writing? 371 pages. 2011. ISBN 978-3-0343-0049-0.

Vol. 105

Javier Ruano-García Early Modern Northern English Lexis. A Literary Corpus-Based Study. 611 pages. 2010. ISBN 978-3-0343-0058-2

Vol. 106

Rafael Monroy-Casas Systems for the Phonetic Transcription of English. Theory and Texts. 280 pages. 2011. ISBN 978-3-0343-0059-9

Vol. 107

Nicola T. Owtram The Pragmatics of Academic Writing. A Relevance Approach to the Analysis of Research Article Introductions. 311 pages. 2009. ISBN 978-3-0343-0060-5

Vol. 108

Yolanda Ruiz de Zarobe, Juan Manuel Sierra & Francisco Gallardo del Puerto (eds) Content and Foreign Language Integrated Learning. Contributions to Multilingualism in European Contexts 343 pages. 2011. ISBN 978-3-0343-0074-2

Vol. 109

Ángeles Linde López & Rosalía Crespo Jiménez (eds) Professional English in the European context. The EHEA challenge. 374 pages. 2010. ISBN 978-3-0343-0088-9

Vol. 110

Rosalía Rodríguez-Vázquez The Rhythm of Speech, Verse and Vocal Music. A New Theory. 394 pages. 2010. ISBN 978-3-0343-0309-5

Vol. 111

Anastasios Tsangalidis & Roberta Facchinetti (eds) Studies on English Modality. In Honour of Frank Palmer. 392 pages. 2009. ISBN 978-3-0343-0310-1

Vol. 112

Jing Huang Autonomy, Agency and Identity in Foreign Language Learning and Teaching. 400 pages. 2013. ISBN 978-3-0343-0370-5

Vol. 113

Mihhail Lotman & Maria-Kristiina Lotman (eds) Frontiers in Comparative Prosody. In memoriam: Mikhail Gasparov. 426 pages. 2011. ISBN 978-3-0343-0373-6

Vol. 114

Merja Kytö, John Scahill & Harumi Tanabe (eds) Language Change and Variation from Old English to Late Modern English. A Festschrift for Minoji Akimoto 422 pages. 2010. ISBN 978-3-0343-0372-9

Vol. 115

Giuliana Garzone & Paola Catenaccio (eds) Identities across Media and Modes. Discursive Perspectives. 379 pages. 2009. ISBN 978-3-0343-0386-6

Vol. 116

Elena Landone Los marcadores del discurso y cortesía verbal en español. 390 pages. 2010. ISBN 978-3-0343-0413-9

Vol. 117

Maurizio Gotti & Christopher Williams (eds) Legal Discourse across Languages and Cultures. 339 pages. 2010. ISBN 978-3-0343-0425-2

Vol. 118

David Hirsh Academic Vocabulary in Context. 217 pages. 2010. ISBN 978-3-0343-0426-9

Vol. 119

Yvonne Dröschel Lingua Franca English. The Role of Simplification and Transfer. 358 pages. 2011. ISBN 978-3-0343-0432-0

Vol. 120

Tengku Sepora Tengku Mahadi, Helia Vaezian & Mahmoud Akbari Corpora in Translation. A Practical Guide. 135 pages. 2010. ISBN 978-3-0343-0434-4

Vol. 121

Davide Simone Giannoni & Celina Frade (eds) Researching Language and the Law. Textual Features and Translation Issues. 278 pages. 2010. ISBN 978-3-0343-0443-6

Vol. 122

Daniel Madrid & Stephen Hughes (eds) Studies in Bilingual Education. 472 pages. 2011. ISBN 978-3-0343-0474-0

Vol. 123

Vijay K. Bhatia, Christopher N. Candlin & Maurizio Gotti (eds) The Discourses of Dispute Resolution. 290 pages. 2010. ISBN 978-3-0343-0476-4

Vol. 124

Davide Simone Giannoni Mapping Academic Values in the Disciplines. A Corpus-Based Approach. 288 pages. 2010. ISBN 978-3-0343-0488-7

Vol. 125

Giuliana Garzone & James Archibald (eds) Discourse, Identities and Roles in Specialized Communication. 419 pages. 2010. ISBN 978-3-0343-0494-8

Vol. 126

Iria Pastor-Gómez The Status and Development of N+N Sequences in Contemporary English Noun Phrases. 216 pages. 2011. ISBN 978-3-0343-0534-1

Vol. 127

Carlos Prado-Alonso Full-verb Inversion in Written and Spoken English. 261 pages. 2011. ISBN 978-3-0343-0535-8

Vol. 128

Tony Harris & María Moreno Jaén (eds) Corpus Linguistics in Language Teaching. 214 pages. 2010. ISBN 978-3-0343-0524-2

Vol. 129

Tetsuji Oda & Hiroyuki Eto (eds) Multiple Perspectives on English Philology and History of Linguistics. A Festschrift for Shoichi Watanabe on his 80th Birthday. 378 pages. 2010. ISBN 978-3-0343-0480-1

Vol. 130

Luisa Chierichetti & Giovanni Garofalo (eds) Lengua y Derecho. líneas de investigación interdisciplinaria. 283 pages. 2010. 978-3-0343-0463-4

Vol. 131

Paola Evangelisti Allori & Giuliana Garzone (eds) Discourse, Identities and Genres in Corporate Communication. Sponsorship, Advertising and Organizational Communication. 324 pages. 2011. 978-3-0343-0591-4

Vol. 132

Leyre Ruiz de Zarobe & Yolanda Ruiz de Zarobe (eds) Speech Acts and Politeness across Languages and Cultures. 402 pages. 2012. 978-3-0343-0611-9

Vol. 133

Thomas Christiansen Cohesion. A Discourse Perspective. 387 pages. 2011. 978-3-0343-0619-5

Vol. 134

Giuliana Garzone & Maurizio Gotti Discourse, Communication and the Enterprise. Genres and Trends. 451 pages. 2011. ISBN 978-3-0343-0620-1

Vol. 135

Zsuzsa Hoffmann Ways of the World’s Words. Language Contact in the Age of Globalization. 334 pages 2011. ISBN 978-3-0343-0673-7

Vol. 136

Cecilia Varcasia (ed.) Becoming Multilingual. Language Learning and Language Policy between Attitudes and Identities. 213 pages. 2011. ISBN 978-3-0343-0687-5

Vol. 137

Susy Macqueen The Emergence of Patterns in Second Language Writing. A Sociocognitive Exploration of Lexical Trails. 325 pages. 2012. ISBN 978-3-0343-1010-9

Vol. 138

Maria Vittoria Calvi & Giovanna Mapelli (eds) La lengua del turismo. Géneros discursivos y terminología. 365 pages. 2011. ISBN 978-3-0343-1011-6

Vol. 139

Ken Lau Learning to Become a Professional in a Textually-Mediated World. A Text-Oriented Study of Placement Practices. 261 pages. 2012. ISBN 978-3-0343-1016-1

Vol. 140

Sandra Campagna, Giuliana Garzone, Cornelia Ilie & Elizabeth Rowley-Jolivet (eds) Evolving Genres in Web-mediated Communication. 337 pages. 2012. ISBN 978-3-0343-1013-0

Vol. 141

Edith Esch & Martin Solly (eds) The Sociolinguistics of Language Education in International Contexts. 263 pages. 2012. ISBN 978-3-0343-1009-3

Vol. 142 Forthcoming. Vol. 143

David Tizón-Couto Left Dislocation in English. A Functional-Discoursal Approach. 416 pages. 2012. ISBN 978-3-0343-1037-6

Vol. 144

Margrethe Petersen & Jan Engberg (eds) Current Trends in LSP Research. Aims and Methods. 323 pages. 2011. ISBN 978-3-0343-1054-3

Vol. 145

David Tizón-Couto, Beatriz Tizón-Couto, Iria Pastor-Gómez & Paula Rodríguez-Puente (eds) New Trends and Methodologies in Applied English Language Research II. Studies in Language Variation, Meaning and Learning. 283 pages. 2012. ISBN 978-3-0343-1061-1

Vol. 146

Rita Salvi & Hiromasa Tanaka (eds) Intercultural Interactions in Business and Management. 306 pages. 2011. ISBN 978-3-0343-1039-0

Vol. 147

Francesco Straniero Sergio & Caterina Falbo (eds) Breaking Ground in Corpus-based Interpreting Studies. 254 pages. 2012. ISBN 978-3-0343-1071-0

Vol. 148 Forthcoming. Vol. 149 Vijay K. Bhatia & Paola Evangelisti Allori (eds) Discourse and Identity in the Professions. Legal, Corporate and Institutional Citizenship. 352 pages. 2011. ISBN 978-3-0343-1079-6 Vol. 150 Maurizio Gotti (ed.) Academic Identity Traits. A Corpus-Based Investigation. 363 pages. 2012. ISBN 978-3-0343-1141-0 Vol. 151

Priscilla Heynderickx, Sylvain Dieltjens, Geert Jacobs, Paul Gillaerts & Elizabeth de Groot (eds) The Language Factor in International Business. New Perspectives on Research, Teaching and Practice. 320 pages. 2012. ISBN 978-3-0343-1090-1

Vol. 152

Paul Gillaerts, Elizabeth de Groot, Sylvain Dieltjens, Priscilla Heynderickx & Geert Jacobs (eds) Researching Discourse in Business Genres. Cases and Corpora. 215 pages. 2012. ISBN 978-3-0343-1092-5

Vol. 153

Yongyan Zheng Dynamic Vocabulary Development in a Foreign Language. 262 pages. 2012. ISBN 978-3-0343-1106-9

Vol. 154

Carmen Argondizzo (ed.) Creativity and Innovation in Language Education. 357 pages. 2012. ISBN 978-3-0343-1080-2

Vol. 155

David Hirsh (ed.) Current Perspectives in Second Language Vocabulary Research. 180 pages. 2012. ISBN 978-3-0343-1108-3

Vol. 156

Seiji Shinkawa Unhistorical Gender Assignment in Lahamon’s Brut. A Case Study of a Late Stage in the Development of Grammatical Gender toward its Ultimate Loss. 186 pages. 2012. ISBN 978-3-0343-1124-3

Vol. 157

Yeonkwon Jung Basics of Organizational Writing: A Critical Reading Approach. 151 pages. 2014. ISBN 978-3-0343-1137-3.

Vol. 158

Bárbara Eizaga Rebollar (ed.) Studies in Linguistics and Cognition. 301 pages. 2012. ISBN 978-3-0343-1138-0

Vol. 159

Giuliana Garzone, Paola Catenaccio, Chiara Degano (eds) Genre Change in the Contemporary World. Short-term Diachronic Perspectives. 329 pages. 2012. ISBN 978-3-0343-1214-1

Vol. 160

Carol Berkenkotter, Vijay K. Bhatia & Maurizio Gotti (eds) Insights into Academic Genres. 468 pages. 2012. ISBN 978-3-0343-1211-0

Vol. 161

Beatriz Tizón-Couto Clausal Complements in Native and Learner Spoken English. A corpus-based study with Lindsei and Vicolse. 357 pages. 2013. ISBN 978-3-0343-1184-7

Vol. 162

Patrizia Anesa Jury Trials and the Popularization of Legal Language. A Discourse Analytical Approach. 247 pages. 2012. ISBN 978-3-0343-1231-8

Vol. 163

David Hirsh Endangered Languages, Knowledge Systems and Belief Systems. 153 pages. 2013. ISBN 978-3-0343-1232-5

Vol. 164

Eugenia Sainz (ed.) De la estructura de la frase al tejido del discurso. Estudios contrastivos español/italiano. 305 pages. 2014. ISBN 978-3-0343-1253-0

Vol. 165 Julia Bamford, Franca Poppi & Davide Mazzi (eds) Space, Place and the Discursive Construction of Identity. 367 pages. 2014. ISBN 978-3-0343-1249-3 Vol. 166 Rita Salvi & Janet Bowker (eds) Space, Time and the Construction of Identity. Discursive Indexicality in Cultural, Institutional and Professional Fields. 324 pages. 2013. ISBN 978-3-0343-1254-7 Vol. 167 Shunji Yamazaki & Robert Sigley (eds) Approaching Language Variation through Corpora. A Festschrift in Honour of Toshio Saito. 421 pages. 2013. ISBN 978-3-0343-1264-6 Vol. 168 Franca Poppi Global Interactions in English as a Lingua Franca. How written communication is changing under the influence of electronic media and new contexts of use. 249 pages. 2012. ISBN 978-3-0343-1276-9 Vol. 169

Miguel A. Aijón Oliva & María José Serrano Style in syntax. Investigating variation in Spanish pronoun subjects. 239 pages. 2013. ISBN 978-3-0343-1244-8

Vol. 170

Inés Olza, Óscar Loureda & Manuel Casado-Velarde (eds) Language Use in the Public Sphere. Methodological Perspectives and Empirical Applications 564 pages. 2014. ISBN 978-3-0343-1286-8

Vol. 171

Aleksandra Matulewska Legilinguistic Translatology. A Parametric Approach to Legal Translation. 279 pages. 2013. ISBN 978-3-0343-1287-5

Vol. 172

Maurizio Gotti & Carmen Sancho Guinda (eds) Narratives in Academic and Professional Genres. 513 pages. 2013. ISBN 978-3-0343-1371-1

Vol. 173

Madalina Chitez Learner corpus profiles. The case of Romanian Learner English. 244 pages. 2014. ISBN 978-3-0343-1410-7

Vol. 174 Chihiro Inoue Task Equivalence in Speaking Tests. 251 pages. 2013. ISBN 978-3-0343-1417-6 Vol. 175

Gabriel Quiroz & Pedro Patiño (eds.) LSP in Colombia: advances and challenges. 339 pages. 2014. ISBN 978-3-0343-1434-3

Vol. 176

Catherine Resche Economic Terms and Beyond: Capitalising on the Wealth of Notions. How Researchers in Specialised Varieties of English Can Benefit from Focusing on Terms. 332 pages. 2013. ISBN 978-3-0343-1435-0

Vol. 177 Forthcoming. Vol. 178

Cécile Desoutter & Caroline Mellet (dir.) Le discours rapporté: approches linguistiques et perspectives didactiques. 270 pages. 2013. ISBN 978-3-0343-1292-9

Vol. 179

Ana Díaz-Negrillo & Francisco Javier Díaz-Pérez (eds) Specialisation and Variation in Language Corpora. 341 pages. 2014. ISBN 978-3-0343-1316-2

Vol. 180

Pilar Alonso A Multi-dimensional Approach to Discourse Coherence. From Standardness to Creativity. 247 pages. 2014. ISBN 978-3-0343-1325-4

Vol. 181

Alejandro Alcaraz-Sintes & Salvador Valera-Hernández (eds) Diachrony and Synchrony in English Corpus Linguistics. 393 pages. 2014. ISBN 978-3-0343-1326-1

Vol. 182

Runhan Zhang Investigating Linguistic Knowledge of a Second Language. 207 pages. 2015. ISBN 978-3-0343-1330-8

Vol. 183

Hajar Abdul Rahim & Shakila Abdul Manan (eds.) English in Malaysia. Postcolonial and Beyond. 267 pages. 2014. ISBN 978-3-0343-1341-4

Vol. 184

Virginie Fasel Lauzon Comprendre et apprendre dans l’interaction. Les séquences d’explication en classe de français langue seconde. 292 pages. 2014. ISBN 978-3-0343-1451-0

Vol. 185 Forthcoming. Vol. 186

Wei Ren L2 Pragmatic Development in Study Abroad Contexts 256 pages. 2015. ISBN 978-3-0343-1358-2

Vol. 187

Marina Bondi & Rosa Lorés Sanz (eds) Abstracts in Academic Discourse. Variation and Change. 361 pages. 2014. ISBN 978-3-0343-1483-1

Vol. 188

Giuditta Caliendo Rethinking Community. Discourse, Identity and Citizenship in the European Union. 240 pages. 2017. ISBN 978-3-0343-1561-6

Vol. 189

Paola Evangelisti Allori (ed.) Identities in and across Cultures. 315 pages. 2014. ISBN 978-3-0343-1458-9

Vol. 190

Erik Castello, Katherine Ackerley & Francesca Coccetta (eds). Studies in Learner Corpus Linguistics. Research and Applications for Foreign Language Teaching and Assessment. 358 pages. 2015. ISBN 978-3-0343-1506-7

Vol. 191

Ruth Breeze, Maurizio Gotti & Carmen Sancho Guinda (eds) Interpersonality in Legal Genres. 389 pages. 2014. ISBN 978-3-0343-1524-1

Vol. 192

Paola Evangelisti Allori, John Bateman & Vijay K. Bhatia (eds) Evolution in Genre. Emergence, Variation, Multimodality. 364 pages. 2014. ISBN 978-3-0343-1533-3

Vol. 193

Jiyeon Kook Agency in Arzt-Patient-Gesprächen. Zur interaktionistischen Konzeptualisierung von Agency 271 pages. 2015. ISBN 978-3-0343-1666-8

Vol. 194

Susana Nicolás Román & Juan José Torres Núñez (eds) Drama and CLIL. A new challenge for the teaching approaches in bilingual education. 170 pages. 2015. ISBN 978-3-0343-1629-3

Vol. 195

Alessandra Molino & Serenella Zanotti (eds) Observing Norm, Observing Usage. Lexis in Dictionaries and in the Media. 430 pages. 2015. ISBN 978-3-0343-1584-5

Vol. 196

Begoña Soneira A Lexical Description of English for Architecture. A Corpus-based Approach. 267 pages. 2015. ISBN 978-3-0343-1602-6

Vol. 197

M Luisa Roca-Varela False Friends in Learner Corpora. A corpus-based study of English false friends in the written and spoken production of Spanish learners. 348 pages. 2015. ISBN 978-3-0343-1620-0

Vol. 198

Rahma Al-Mahrooqi & Christopher Denman Bridging the Gap between Education and Employment. English Language Instruction in EFL Contexts. 416 pages. 2015. ISBN 978-3-0343-1681-1

Vol. 199

Rita Salvi & Janet Bowker (eds) The Dissemination of Contemporary Knowledge in English. Genres, discourse strategies and professional practices. 171 pages. 2015. ISBN 978-3-0343-1679-8

Vol. 200

Maurizio Gotti & Davide S. Giannoni (eds) Corpus Analysis for Descriptive and Pedagogical Purposes. ESP Perspectives. 432 pages. 2014. ISBN 978-3-0343-1516-6

Vol. 201

Ida Ruffolo The Perception of Nature in Travel Promotion Texts. A Corpus-based Discourse Analysis. 148 pages. 2015. ISBN 978-3-0343-1521-0

Vol. 202 Ives Trevian English suffixes. Stress-assignment properties, productivity, selection and combinatorial processes. 471 pages. 2015. ISBN 978-3-0343-1576-0

Vol. 203

Maurizio Gotti, Stefania Maci & Michele Sala (eds) Insights into Medical Communication. 422 pages. 2015. ISBN 978-3-0343-1694-1

Vol. 204

Carmen Argondizzo (ed.) European Projects in University Language Centres. Creativity, Dynamics, Best Practice. 371 pages. 2015. ISBN 978-3-0343-1696-5

Vol. 205

Aura Luz Duffé Montalván (ed.) Estudios sobre el léxico. Puntos y contrapuntos. 502 pages. 2016. ISBN 978-3-0343-2011-5

Vol. 206

Maria Pavesi, Maicol Formentelli & Elisa Ghia (eds) The Languages of Dubbing. Mainstream Audiovisual Translation in Italy. 275 pages. 2014. ISBN 978-3-0343-1646-0

Vol. 207

Ruth Breeze & Inés Olza (eds) Evaluation in media discourse. European perspectives. 268 pages. 2017. ISBN 978-3-0343-2014-6

Vol. 208

Vijay K. Bhatia & Maurizio Gotti (eds) Arbitration Discourse in Asia. 331 pages. 2015. ISBN 978-3-0343-2032-0

Vol. 209

Sofía Bemposta-Rivas, Carla Bouzada-Jabois, Yolanda Fernández-Pena, Tamara Bouso, Yolanda J. Calvo-Benzies, Iván Tamaredo (eds) New trends and methodologies in applied English language research III. Synchronic and diachronic studies on discourse, lexis and grammar processing. 280 pages. 2017. ISBN 978-3-0343-2039-9

Vol. 210

Francisco Alonso Almeida, Laura Cruz García & Víctor González Ruiz (eds) Corpus-based studies on language varieties. 285 pages. 2016. ISBN 978-3-0343-2044-3

Vol. 211

Juan Pedro Rica Peromingo Aspectos lingüísticos y técnicos de la traducción audiovisual (TAV). 177 pages. 2016. ISBN 978-3-0343-2055-9

Vol. 212

Maria Vender Disentangling Dyslexia. VenderPhonological and Processing Deficit in Developmental Dyslexia. 338 pages. 2017. ISBN 978-3-0343-2064-1

Vol. 213

Zhilong Xie Bilingual Advantages. Contributions of Different Bilingual Experiences to Cognitive Control Differences Among Young-adult Bilinguals. 221 pages. 2016. ISBN 978-3-0343-2081-8

Vol. 214

Larissa D’Angelo Academic posters. A textual and visual metadiscourse analysis. 367 pages. 2016. ISBN 978-3-0343-2083-2

Vol. 215

Evelyne Berger Prendre la parole en L2. Regard sur la compétence d’interaction en classe de langue. 246 pages. 2016. ISBN 978-3-0343-2084-9

Vol. 216

David Lasagabaster and Aintzane Doiz (eds) CLIL experiences in secondary and tertiary education: In search of good practices. 262 pages. 2016. ISBN 978-3-0343-2104-4

Vol. 217

Elena Kkese Identifying Plosives in L2 English: The Case of L1 Cypriot Greek Speakers. 317 pages. 2016. ISBN 978-3-0343-2060-3

Vol. 218

Sandra Campagna, Elana Ochse, Virginia Pulcini & Martin Solly (eds) Languaging in and across Communities: New Voices, New Identities. Studies in Honour of Giuseppina Cortese. 507 pages. 2016. ISBN 978-3-0343-2073-3

Vol. 219 Adriana Orlandi & Laura Giacomini (ed.) Defining collocation for lexicographic purposes. From linguistic theory to lexicographic practice. 328 pages. 2016. ISBN 978-3-0343-2054-2 Vol. 220

Pietro Luigi Iaia Analysing English as a Lingua Franca in Video Games. Linguistic Features, Experiential and Functional Dimensions of Online and Scripted Interactions. 139 pages. 2016. ISBN 978-3-0343-2138-9

Vol. 221 Dimitrinka G. Níkleva (ed.) La formación de los docentes de español para inmigrantes en distintos contextos educativos. 390 pages. 2017. ISBN 978-3-0343-2135-8 Vol. 222

Katherine Ackerley, Marta Guarda & Francesca Helm (eds) Sharing Perspectives on English-Medium Instruction. 308 pages. 2017. ISBN 978-3-0343-2537-0

Vol. 223 Juana I. Marín-Arrese, Julia Lavid-López, Marta Carretero, Elena Domínguez Romero, Ma Victoria Martín de la Rosa & María Pérez Blanco (eds) Evidentiality and Modality in European Languages. Discourse-pragmatic perspectives. 427 pages. 2017. ISBN 978-3-0343-2437-3 Vol. 224

Gilles Col Construction du sens : un modèle instructionnel pour la sémantique. 292 pages. 2017. ISBN 978-3-0343-2572-1

Vol. 225

Ana Chiquito & Gabriel Quiroz (eds) Pobreza, Lenguaje y Medios en América Latina. 362 pages. 2017. ISBN 978-3-0343-2142-6

Vol. 226

Xu Zhang English Quasi-Numeral Classifiers. A Corpus-Based Cognitive-Typological Study. 360 pages. 2017. ISBN 978-3-0343-2818-0

Vol. 227

María Ángeles Orts, Ruth Breeze & Maurizio Gotti (eds) Power, Persuasion and Manipulation in Specialised Genres. Providing Keys to the Rhetoric of Professional Communities. 368 pages. 2017. ISBN 978-3-0343-3010-7

Vol. 228

Maurizio Gotti, Stefania Maci & Michele Sala (eds) Ways of Seeing, Ways of Being: Representing the Voices of Tourism. 453 pages. 2017. ISBN 978-3-0343-3031-2

Vol. 229

Dino Selvaggi Plurilingual Code-Switching between Standard and Local Varieties. A Socio-Psycholinguistic Approach 371 pages. 2018. ISBN 978-3-0343-2663-6

Vol. 230

Anca-Cristina Sterie Interprofessional interactions at the hospital. Nurses’ requests and reports of problems in calls with physicians. 371 pages. 2017. ISBN 978-3-0343-2734-3

Vol. 231

Xiaodong Zhang Understanding Chinese EFL Teachers’ Beliefs and Practices in the Textbook-Based Classroom. 189 pages. 2017. ISBN 978-3-0343-3053-4

Vol. 232

Manuela Caterina Moroni & Federica Ricci Garotti (Hrsg.) Brücken schlagen zwischen Sprachwissenschaft und DaF-Didaktik. 345 pages. 2017. ISBN 978-3-0343-2667-4

Vol. 233

Dimitrinka Georgieva Níkleva Necesidades y tendencias en la formación del profesorado de español como lengua extranjera 401 pages. 2017. ISBN 978-3-0343-2946-0

Vol. 234

Juan Santana-Lario & Salvador Valera (Hrsg.) Competing patterns in English affixation. 272 pages. 2017. ISBN 978-3-0343-2701-5

Vol. 235

Francisco Salgado-Robles Desarrollo de la competencia sociolingüística por aprendices de español en un contexto de inmersión en el extranjero 241 pages. 2018. ISBN 978-3-0343-2323-9

Vol. 236

Maria Chiara Janner Sguardi linguistici sulla marca. Analisi morfosintattica dei nomi commerciali in italiano 345 pages. 2017. ISBN 978-3-0343-2667-4

Vol. 237

Bárbara Herrero Muñoz-Cobo & Otman El Azami Zalachi La primavera del árabe marroquí. 192 pages. 2017. ISBN 978-3-0343-3104-3

Vol. 238

Consuelo Pascual Escagedo El papel del oyente en la construcción de la conversación espontánea de estudiantes italianos en su interlengua y en su lengua materna 295 pages. 2017. ISBN 978-3-0343-3186-9

Vol. 239

Stefania M. Maci The MS Digby 133 Mary Magdalene. Beyond scribal practices: language, discourse, values and attitudes. 336 pages. 2017. ISBN 978-3-0343-3256-9

Vol. 240

Eliecer Crespo-Fernández Taboo in Discourse. Studies on Attenuation and Offence in Communication. 326 pages. 2018. ISBN 978-3-0343-3018-3

Vol. 241

Jana Altmanova, Maria Centrella, Katherine E. Russo (eds) Terminology & Discourse / Terminologie et discours. 424 pages. 2018. ISBN 978-3-0343-2417-5

Vol. 242

Xavier Blanco et Inès Sfar (dir.) Lexicologie(s) : approches croisées en sémantique lexicale. 442 pages. 2018. ISBN 978-3-0343-3056-5

Vol. 243

Yunfeng Ge Resolution of Conflict of Interest in Chinese Civil Court Hearings. A Perspective of Discourse Information Theory. 302 pages. 2018. ISBN 978-3-0343-3313-9

Vol. 244

Carla Vergaro Illocutionary Shell Nouns in English 322 pages. 2018. ISBN 978-3-0343-3069-5

Vol. 245

Paolo Frassi L’adjectif en français et sa définition lexicographique. 270 pages. 2018. ISBN 978-3-0343-3394-8

Vol. 246

Suwilai Premsrirat and David Hirsh (eds) Language Revitalization. Insights from Thailand 328 pages. 2018. ISBN 978-3-0343-3497-6

Vol. 247

Wei Wang Researching Learning and Learners in Genre-based Academic Writing Instruction 282 pages. 2018. ISBN 978-3-0343-3297-2

Vol. 248

Isusi Alabarte, Alberto & Lahuerta Martínez, Ana Cristina (eds) La comprensión lectora de lengua extranjera Estudio de los factores de familiaridad, interés, género y métodos de evaluación 336 pages. 2018. ISBN 978-3-0343-3493-8

Vol. 249

Mercedes Eurrutia Cavero Approche didactique du langage techno-scientifique Terminologie et discours 374 pages. 2018. ISBN 978-3-0343-3512-6

Vol. 250

Aurora Ruiz Mezcua (ed.) Approaches to Telephone Interpretation Research, Innovation, Teaching and Transference 268 pages. 2018. ISBN 978-3-0343-3330-6

Vol. 251

Morini Massimiliano A Day in the News A Stylistic Analysis of Newsspeak 188 pages. 2018. ISBN 978-3-0343-3507-2

Vol. 252

Ignacio Guillén-Galve & Ignacio Vázquez-Orta (eds.) English as a Lingua Franca and Intercultural Communication Implications and Applications in the Field of English Language Teaching 414 pages. 2018. ISBN 978-3-0343-2763-3

Vol. 253

Bianca Del Villano Using the Devil with Courtesy Shakespeare and the Language of (Im)Politeness 216 pages. 2018. ISBN 978-3-0343-2315-4

li253

Renaissance England was marked by a pervasive culture of courtesy. The research hypothesis of this book is that verbal courtesy, for historical and social reasons involving social mobility and the crisis produced by the clash between different systems of thought (Humanism, Catholicism, Protestantism, new scientific discourses), soon became strategic language, characterised by specific forms of facework detectable through the patterns of politeness and impoliteness employed by speakers. Adopting a historical pragmatic perspective, Using the Devil with Courtesy semantically and conceptually connects courtesy and (im)politeness to analyse Renaissance forms of (im)politeness through Shakespeare. Drawing on a methodological line of research running from Goffman (1967) and Grice (1967), to Brown and Levinson (1987), Jucker (2010) and Culpeper (2011), the book focuses specifically on Hamlet (c. 1601) and The Taming of the Shrew (c. 1594) with three principal aims: 1) to survey the (im)polite strategies used by the characters; 2) to explore how this language connects to a specific Renaissance subjectivity; 3) to link language and subjectivity to extra-textual (historical and semiotic) factors. Bianca Del Villano is a Lecturer in English Linguistics at the University of Naples “L’Orientale”. She holds a PhD in English Literature from the University of Turin and a PhD in English Linguistics from the University of Rome Tor Vergata. Her research interests span pragmatics, stylistics, and literary linguistics in general. She is currently working on (im)politeness in early modern English drama and on contemporary English language fiction. Her publications include the monograph Lo specchio e l’ossimoro. La messinscena dell’interiorità nel teatro di Shakespeare (Pacini 2012).