Using Europe: territorial party strategies in a multi-level system 9781847793089

Table of contents :
Front matter
Contents
List of figures
List of tables
Preface and acknowledgements
List of abbreviations
Introduction: regional party strategies in Europe
Territorial strategies: autonomy and capacity
Scottish party responses to Europe and devolution
Bavarian defence of the Heimat in Europe
Sardinian autonomy in the Mediterranean
Conclusion: the cyclical nature of territorial strategies in Europe
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

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Using Europe: territorial party strategies in a multi-level system

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DEVOLUTION series series editor Charlie Jeffery Devolution has established new political institutions in Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, London and the other English regions since 1997. These devolution reforms have farreaching implications for the politics, policy and society of the UK. Radical institutional change, combined with a fuller capacity to express the UK’s distinctive territorial identities, is reshaping the way the UK is governed and opening up new directions of public policy. These are the biggest changes to UK politics for at least 150 years. The Devolution series brings together the best research in the UK on devolution and its implications. It draws together the best analysis from the Economic and Social Research Council’s research programme on Devolution and Constitutional Change. The series has three central themes, all of which are vital components in understanding the changes devolution has set in train. 1 Delivering public policy after devolution: diverging from Westminster: Does devolution result in the provision of different standards of public service in health or education, or in widening economic disparities from one part of the UK to another? If so, does it matter? 2 The political institutions of devolution: How well do the new devolved institutions work? How effectively are devolved and UK-level matters coordinated? How have political organisations which have traditionally operated UK-wide – political parties, interest groups – responded to multi-level politics?

already published Devolution and constitutional change in Northern Ireland Paul Carmichael, Colin Knox and Bob Osborne (eds) Beyond devolution and decentralisation Alistair Cole Between two Unions Europeanisation and Scottish devolution Paolo Dardanelli Territorial politics and health policy UK health policy in comparative perspective Scott L. Greer The English Question Robert Hazell Devolution and electoral politics Dan Hough and Charlie Jeffery (eds) The Northern Veto Mark Sandford (ed.) Towards a regional political class? Professional politicians and regional institutions in Catalonia and Scotland Klaus Stolz Debating nationhood and government in Britain, 1885–1939 Perspectives from the ‘four nations’ Duncan Tanner, Chris Williams, Wil Griffith and Andrew Edwards (eds)

3 Public attitudes, devolution and national identity: How do people in different parts of the UK assess the performance of the new devolved Devolution and power institutions? Do people identify themselves

differently as a result of devolution? Does a common sense of Britishness still unite people from different parts of the UK?

in the United Kingdom Alan Trench

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Using Europe: territorial party strategies in a multi-level system Eve Hepburn

Manchester University Press Manchester and New York distributed in the United States exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan

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Copyright © Eve Hepburn 2010 The right of Eve Hepburn to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Published by Manchester University Press Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9NR, UK and Room 400, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, USA www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk Distributed in the United States exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, USA Distributed in Canada exclusively by UBC Press, University of British Columbia, 2029 West Mall, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z2 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data applied for

ISBN

978 0 7190 8138 5 hardback

First published 2010 The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Typeset by Action Publishing Technology Ltd, Gloucester Printed in Great Britain by MPG Books Group, UK

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Contents

List of figures List of tables Preface and acknowledgements List of abbreviations

page vii viii ix xiii

1

Introduction: regional party strategies in Europe

2

Territorial strategies: autonomy and capacity

27

3

Scottish party responses to Europe and devolution

53

4

Bavarian defence of the Heimat in Europe

99

5

Sardinian autonomy in the Mediterranean

143

6

Conclusion: the cyclical nature of territorial strategies in Europe 188 Bibliography Index

1

228 263

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List of figures

2.1 Territorial strategies of substate political actors page 49 2.2 Benefits of access to the centre 51 3.1 SNP performance in UK, Scottish Parliament and European elections, 1974–2009 59 4.1 CSU performance in federal, Bavarian and European elections, 1946–2009 102 5.1 Psd’Az performance in national, regional and provincial elections, 1921–2009 147 6.1 Regional party domestic and European constitutional demands, 1979–87 202 6.2 Regional party domestic and European constitutional demands, 1988–94 203 6.3 Regional party domestic and European constitutional demands, 1995–2009 204

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List of tables

1.1 1.2 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 6.1

Regional parties by ‘party family’ page 19 Regional overview of Scotland, Bavaria and Sardinia 23 UK general election results in Scotland, October 1974–2005 58 Overall results of Scottish devolution referendums 60 Scottish Parliament election results, 1999–2007 62 European election results in Scotland, 1979–2009 75 Public attitudes towards Scotland’s constitutional status 79 Public attitudes towards more powers for the Scottish Parliament 82 Public attitudes towards Bavarian autonomy and independence, 2003 104 Bavarian state election (Landtag) results, 1978–2008 107 European election results in Bavaria, 1979–2009 119 Regional electoral performance of Sardinian parties, 1949–89 (% of votes) 148 Regional electoral performance of Sardinian parties, 1994–2009 (% of votes) 151 Self-identity in Sardinia 153 European election results in Sardinia, 1984–2009 164 Perceptions of Europe across time and space 199

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Preface and acknowledgements

This book was motivated by the belief that something had fundamentally changed in the conduct of territorial mobilisation in Europe. After having studied ethno-symbolist theories of nationalism at the London School of Economics, and cost–benefit calculations of secession in Quebec at McGill University, it seemed to me that the realities of substate party mobilisation in Europe had moved beyond the literature. Nationalist parties were no longer seeking independence, framing their demands in an ethnic manner, or competing exclusively for the hearts and votes of substate electorates. Instead, regional parties of all political creeds had begun talking about exercising self-determination in a modern European construct. It appeared that state sovereignty had lost its meaning, as territorial demands bypassed the state to strike a chord in Brussels, and the notion of ‘independence’ began to be questioned in an era of interdependence and globalisation. This book is a first attempt to explore how substate political parties responded to the new complexities of multi-level politics by using Europe to advance their territorial projects. It is the product of several years of research and multiple sojourns to some of the most fascinating yet understudied stateless nations and regions of Western Europe. Yet it would never have been written without the support and encouragement of a large number of individuals. My greatest thanks go to Michael Keating, my doctoral supervisor, who provided a continuous source of advice and inspiration throughout this research project. My interest in, and grasp of, these issues owes much to Michael’s ground-breaking works on comparative territorial politics, and his coaching that one should always try to think across several fields, subjects and disciplines when tackling complex phenomena in order to give them the considered analysis they deserve. Charlie Jeffery, as Editor of the Devolution Series as well as my postdoctoral mentor at Edinburgh University, has offered me unflinching guidance, support and countless insightful comments on this book. Also, my thanks go to Jenny Howard and Tony Mason at Manchester

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

University Press for helping me get this manuscript ready for publication, as well two anonymous referees who provided valuable comments on previous drafts. I am greatly indebted to my colleagues at the European University Institute and the Territorial Politics team at the University of Edinburgh. As the risk of missing someone out, I would like to mention here Gavin Anderson, Luigi Bettelli, Ross Bond, Falk Daviter, Anwen Elias, Chiara de Franco, Frida Louise Göransson, Paul Harvey, Ailsa Henderson, Jennifer Hendry, Simon Jennings, Peter Mair, Nicola McEwen, Olivia Orozco de la Torre, Richard Parry, Tam Roberts, Michael Rosie, Ursula Schroeder, Orla Sheehy, Irene Sobrino Guijarro, Wilfried Swenden, Stephen Tierney, Daniela Vicherat, Neil Walker and Liz Webb. I have benefited enormously from their advice, feedback and moral support over glasses of Tuscan Chianti and pints of Edinburgh Deuchars. Further inspiration and feedback was gained at workshops, seminars and conferences organised by the European University Institute European Forum, the Institute of Governance, European Union Studies Association, Political Studies Association Territorial Politics Group, European Consortium of Political Research, University Association for Contemporary European Studies and Canadian Political Science Association. This research was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (Grant No: PTA-026–27–1484) entitled ‘The Challenges and Opportunities for Substate Territories in Europe. A Comparative Analysis of Party Strategies for Autonomy, Power and Capacity’. The compilation of the book was also undertaken with support from the Leverhulme Trust (ref: 7/SRF/2007/0208), whilst the European University Institute (EUI) provided travel funding to Edinburgh, Munich and Cagliari. Over 50 party representatives and government officials were interviewed for this project, and I thank them for their time, patience and insights into party politics. In my travels to Scotland, Sardinia and Bavaria, I also received help and direction from a number of people. I am especially indebted to Ilenia Ruggiu, who welcomed me into Sard culture, helped me contact renegade political parties and provided valuable comments about my research. Michael Münter and Claire Sutherland imparted a great deal of useful information on the Green Party and CSU in Bavaria, as well as feedback on my research strategy. In Edinburgh, David McCrone and Richard Kiely at the Institute of Governance gave me access to their archives and a place to work, for which I am thankful. Furthermore, staff at the Staatsbibliothek and the Hanns-Seidel Stiftung in Munich, the Biblioteca Regionale in Cagliari, and the National Library of Scotland provided valuable assistance. I am also grateful to have been awarded visiting fellowships at the Universitá di Cagliari, Humboldt Universität in Berlin, the University of

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British Columbia in Vancouver and McGill University in Montreal, where various parts of this book were completed in 2008–9. Though my husband Chad Damro and I lived only a stone’s throw away from each other in the streets of the Oltrarno in Florence when I first started the research for this book, we never met until I came home to Edinburgh to finish it up. I have no idea how I managed the first part without him by my side, but his unrelenting good humour, kindness and enthusiasm ensured that the final steps were completed during a period of profound happiness. Thanks also go to David Milne, Kerry Spark, Kent Pickles and Doreen Cheriton for all their support and encouragement. But my deepest gratitude lies with Margo Milne, whose unrelenting belief in the value of learning, in and of itself, led me to pursue a life in academia, and to disregard any glass ceilings on my way. Finally, I would like to dedicate this book to the memory of two extraordinary people: my friend and comrade, Dev Cropper, and my grandmother Anne Milne. Each of them opened a vista in my mind to the infinite possibilities of human understanding, ingenuity and compassion. Eve Hepburn Edinburgh

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List of abbreviations

AER AN BNG BP CAP CFP CiU CoR CDU CSA CSCE CSU DC DDR DS EA EACL ECSC EEC EFA EGP EP EPP ERC EU FDP FI

Assembly of European Regions Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance, Italy) Bloque Nacionalista Galego (Galician Nationalist Bloc) Bayernpartei (Bavarian Party) Common Agricultural Policy Common Fisheries Policy Convergència i Unió (Convergence and Union Party, Catalonia) Committee of the Regions Christlich Demokratischen Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union of Germany) Campaign for a Scottish Assembly Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union, Bavaria) Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrats, Italy) Democratic Republic of Germany Democratici di Sinistra (Democrats of the Left, Italy) Eusko Alkartasuna (Basque Solidarity) European Anti-Capitalist Left European Coal and Steel Community European Economic Community European Free Alliance European Green Party European Parliament European People’s Party Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Republican Left of Catalonia) European Union Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party, Germany) Forza Italia

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xiv FIS FLNC FRG IRS LN MdB MdL MEP MLG MP MSI MSP NATO OECD PC PCI PD PdL PES PP PPdeG PQ PR PS Psd’Az PSI PSOE PSC PSdeG QLP RC RegLeg SCUP SDP SGP SLD SLP SN SNP

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Forza Italia Sardegna, Sardinia Front de Libération Nationale de la Corse (Corsican National Liberation Front) Federal Republic of Germany Indipendèntzia Repùbrica de Sardigna (Independent Republic of Sardinia) Lega Nord (Northern League, Italy) Mitglied des Bundestags (Member of the Federal Parliament) Mitglied des Landtages (Member of the Regional Parliament) Member of the European Parliament Multi-level governance Member of the Parliament (UK) Movimento Sociale Italiano (Italian Social Movement) Member of the Scottish Parliament North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Plaid Cymru (Party of Wales) Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party) Partito Democratico (Democratic Party, Italy) Popolo della Libertà (People of Freedom, Italy) Party of European Socialists Partido Popular (Popular Party, Spain) Partido Popular de Galicia (Galician Popular Party) Parti Québécois (Quebec Party) Proportional representation Progetto Sardegna (Sardinian Project) Partito Sardo d’Azione (Sardinian Party of Action) Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party) Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Party) Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (Catalan Socialist Party) Partido Socialista de Galicia (Galician Socialist Party) Quebec Liberal Party Rifondazione Comunista (Refounded Communist Party, Italy) Regions with Legislative Powers Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party (Tories) Social Democratic Party, UK Scottish Green Party Scottish Liberal Democrats Scottish Labour Party Sardigna Natzione (Sardinia Nation) Scottish National Party

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS SPD SSP SVP UDB UDC Udeur UPC UV

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Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany) Scottish Socialist Party Südtiroler Volkspartei (South Tyrol People’s Party) Union Démocratique Bretonne (Democratic Union of Brittany) Unione Democrazia Cristiana (Union of Christian Democrats, Italy) Unione Democratici per l’Europa (Union of Democrats for Europe, Italy) Unione di u Popule Corsu (Union of the Corsican People) Union Valdôtaine (Valdotaine Union)

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1 Introduction: regional party strategies in Europe

The last two decades have witnessed tremendous changes to the structure, competences, legislative framework, economy and political systems of EU member states. The twin processes of European integration and decentralisation have resulted in a far-reaching process of spatial rescaling, the full effects of which social scientists are only just beginning to understand. Some scholars have likened the new political structures to a system of ‘multi-level governance’ (Marks and Hooghe 2001) whereby non-state actors influence decision-making across several interacting layers of political authority. This brings us some way towards understanding the complexity of the new structures of governance, whereby states are no longer the only actors involved in policy-making. Yet theories of multi-level governance (MLG) tend to underestimate, or perhaps neglect, the role of agency in the new Europe. Substate regions are often perceived as the passive recipients of policy concessions and access to decision-making, whilst studies of the effects of Europeanisation on political actors are in their infancy and still lack a regional dimension (Mair 2006). This book aims to address some of these gaps in research on territorial politics by examining regional party responses to European integration, decentralisation and multi-level governance in three West European states. In particular, it explores how parties have used Europe to advance their territorial projects during a period of rapid spatial rescaling. Regional actors have been presented with new challenges and opportunities in multi-level political systems. Such systems are characterised by clusters of political institutions that exist at multiple levels, each with its own policy domain and representational focus. In this analysis, the main foci of the multi-level political system lie at the regional, state and European levels, which each enjoy significant degrees of autonomy but are at the same time interconnected through governmental, policy and party machinery. Whilst party approaches to multi-level systems have so far concentrated on

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state–EU relations (Hix and Lord 1997; Mair 2006; Pennings 2006), and regional–state relations (Hough and Jeffery 2006; Detterbeck and Hepburn 2010), this book aims to complete the circle by exploring the dynamics of regional–EU party politics. It is argued that changing state and European structures have led regional political parties to alter their demands to include the European dimension, and correlatively, to decrease their focus on the state. But what types of strategies are being pursued in which places? How has European integration altered the nature of territorial politics and party competition at the regional level? And what are the limitations of Europe for regional party projects? These questions have become all the more pertinent in light of the de-centring of the nation-state, the rise of territorially based nationalist parties, and the growth and consolidation of regional political institutions in Western Europe (Marks et al. 2008). For a number of decades political scientists have been primarily interested in only one territorial unit: the modern nation-state (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). Most party and electoral research since the 1950s has been based on the assumption that the state is a historically and geographically determined entity, and that state-building has entailed the diffusion and standardisation of politics across the territory and the ironing-out of any regional variations. As a reflection of this, party scholars focused primarily on the behaviour, organisation, ideology and electoral strategies of statewide parties (Sartori 1976; Panebianco 1988; Mair 1997). Yet a number of studies have emerged in the field of regional and federal studies that have sought to nuance these approaches. Scholars have argued that we must look at the emergence of regions as important arenas for electoral competition (Hough and Jeffery 2006), and substate mobilisation based on claims of nationhood (Keating 1996a; De Winter and Türsan 1998) to see how political authority is dispersed. These are important contributions to our understanding of the way in which territory mediates politics at levels beneath, across and beyond the state. But there is still a lot of ground to cover. In particular, there have been few analyses that have pulled together the regional, state and European dimensions of party politics to examine how parties compete in multi-level political systems, and how they articulate their territorial projects at different levels. Whilst there is a steadily growing literature on minority nationalist party responses to European integration, there is a dearth of analyses examining the implications of European integration for the regional political context as a whole. This book aims to fill this gap by developing a comparative analysis of how political parties in three diverse regions have used Europe to advance their political projects during a

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period of deepening integration over the last 30 years. This actor-based approach fills an important gap in the literature on multi-level governance, which tends to emphasise institutions at the expense of political agency. It will explore the diverse motivations for substate mobilisation and the various types of territorial strategies pursued by regional parties in multi-level political systems. Instead of looking at just one actor in each case – for instance the dominant nationalist party in a given region – this approach moreover takes a broader view of how Europe has influenced territorial party politics in general. Autonomist claims have never been the exclusive domain of self-styled nationalist parties. Statewide parties have also incorporated territorial demands and have pursued strategies to rival the dominant nationalist vision. The main focus of this book is on the variety of ways in which regional parties have responded to and used European integration in their pursuit of territorial interests. There are a number of issues that are considered in this analysis, such as regional party ‘adaptation’ to European integration and identification with the EU; the salience of the European dimension in party programmes, discourse and strategies; and party utilisation of Europe-wide networks to strengthen their interests. The book also examines the extent to which integration has altered the nature of territorial politics and party competition, and whether Europeanisation has contributed to a more pronounced emphasis on territorial identities and interests. Finally, the book will explore the limitations of Europe for territorial projects. Why have some parties used opportunities to advance their interests in Europe, whilst others have not? A key question here is whether regional actors can bypass the state in the pursuit of their territorial projects in multi-level systems (Keating and Hooghe 2001), or if they must continue to rely on state support, representation and resources to meet their needs in an intergovernmental Europe with power lying in the Council of Ministers.

Decentralising the state

When the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was created in 1951, it was comprised of only six members. Since then, there have been several institutional transformations leading to the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958, the European Community (EC) in 1993, and the present-day European Union (EU). This has been accompanied by a significant expansion of competences and five member state enlargements, increasing the EU to 27 members as of 2004. Member states

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receive a range of benefits from joining the EU, but in return they must also accept that European integration will affect their domestic structures, laws and policies. One of the domestic ‘impacts’ of integration has resulted from the common endorsement of the principle of subsidiarity, a concept that implies taking decisions at the lowest appropriate level. For many states, this has entailed the decentralisation of authority and political functions to lower territorial levels, including administrative and legislative responsibilities for health, education, housing, infrastructure, planning, crime, the environment and economic development. The process of regionalisation in European member states has created new plurinational, devolved and non-symmetrical federal-type states, in which regions have gained a new political role. Within the 27 member states of the EU, there are now over two hundred regions, each of which constitutes a ‘small world’ as a container of social attitudes, policy preferences and political behaviour (Elkins and Simeon 1980; Assembly of European Regions 1996; Henderson 2010). The characteristics of EU regions range from those with significant legislative powers, a robust economy and a population bigger than some member states (like Bavaria) to smaller regions that have only an administrative capacity (like the English regions). Although there has been no uniform pattern of decentralisation, this process has led to the creation of new regional executives and parliaments with legislative competences over a wide range of areas, the emergence of regional policy communities, and the creation of distinct electoral arenas at the regional level, whose voting systems and party competitive dynamics are distinct from those of the state. Parties, too, have begun to decentralise in order to compete more effectively at the regional level (Detterbeck and Hepburn 2010). This enables regional units to develop their own policy and electoral programmes in order to reflect the values of the electorate. The concept of a ‘regional interest’ that is distinctive from the interests of the nation-state has also emerged. In order to develop a more accurate picture of the degree of spatial rescaling in advanced democracies, scholars have conducted quantitative analyses of the institutionalisation of regions in OECD countries. One ‘regional authority index’ accounts for the characteristics and growing powers of regional authorities between 1950 and 2006 (Marks et al. 2008). Using the measurements of self-rule and shared-rule, this analysis provides a full assessment of the growing regionalisation of states in the post-war period. Of the 42 countries examined, half had created regional tiers during the period and no country had become more centralised. This trend is particularly marked in Europe, where regionalisation has even become a condition for EU membership (Keating 2003; Hughes et al. 2004). For instance, Poland and

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other Central and Eastern European countries were required to create regional administrations to distribute structural funding as part of EU candidacy requirements prior to the 2004 enlargement round. Regionalisation is certainly not the only or direct consequence of European integration. There are also important local, statewide and global pressures at play. In particular, the existence of a centre–periphery cleavage that has been (re)politicised by a minority nationalist party seeking self-determination has forced states to territorially manage the region by granting it degrees of autonomy (Keating 1998). To take the case of the UK, which has recently experienced the most radical constitutional change in a century, devolution has been neither a homogenous process nor a symmetrical one. The different constitutional settlements for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in 1998 clearly reflected the desire of the central government to satisfy the minimum demand for autonomy by nationalist movements in each of the separate parts (Adams and Robinson 2002). This ‘asymmetrical’ pattern may be found in other decentralising European states such as Italy, Spain and Poland (Jeffery 1997; Le Galès 1998). In Spain, the greatest devolved powers were assigned to the autonomous communities of Catalonia and the Basque Country, each of which has a strong cultural and historical claim to nationhood and a formidable nationalist movement (Moreno 2005). In Italy, special status was granted to five regions that had either strong autonomist movements or a politicised ethno-linguistic heritage, in order to appease territorial demands (Cento Bull 1997). This fragmented approach reflects the state’s interpretation of, and response to, the specific territorial configuration, interests and demands of the regions. In many of the EU member states, there have been no attempts to impose a uniform regionalisation arrangement across the state, but rather an asymmetrical one reflecting the political demands for greater regional autonomy. This has resulted in tensions between various parts of the state over the allocation of resources and political representation within the state, and increased party competition on the constitutional question. It has also caused tensions within statewide parties themselves, as the creation of regional electoral arenas means that they must now cater to, and also sometimes defend, regional interests from those of the state.

The territorialisation of political parties

The reconfiguration of political authority across different territorial levels has necessitated an adjustment to how parties organise and compete. The

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trend towards decentralisation and federalism within European member states has strengthened the importance of the regional electoral arena as a focal point for territorial interests (Jeffery 1997; Loughlin 1997). At this level, statewide parties must operate in a peculiarly regional context, position themselves on regional issues, and incorporate territorial interests and identities into their programmes, rhetoric and goals. The minority nationalist party is therefore not the only one constructing the substate nation or region, claiming to protect territorial interests, or demanding concessions or autonomy from the state. In response to decentralisation, regional branches of statewide parties have become more autonomous and territorially focused. This means that regionalist parties are no longer the only actors seeking to represent territorial interests. Minority nationalist parties – otherwise known as ethno-territorial, regionalist, substate autonomist and so on – have received a considerable amount of scholarly attention in the last decade (for an overview, see Hepburn 2009b). Though ideologically diverse, the defining characteristic of these parties is the demand for self-determination and a radical restructuring of the state. A number of studies have considered the organisation, resources, policy goals, ideological position and electoral performance of these parties (Hooghe 1995; Lynch 1996; De Winter and Türsan 1998; De Winter 2001; Muller-Rommel 1998; De Winter et al. 2006; Elias 2008b), and these have been useful for focusing attention on the substate dimension of politics. But although scholars have produced a formidable collection of single or comparative case studies on stateless nationalist parties, few have considered how these parties interact with statewide parties, or how the latter themselves have increasingly adopted a ‘territorial’ mantle at the regional level. One would imagine that, having fought for decades to put the territorial question at the heart of political discussions in their homeland, nationalist parties would be the beneficiaries of the heightened salience of territorial issues resulting from decentralisation and supranational integration. This is not always the case. Despite reducing the barriers to self-determination by supporting less disruptive forms of autonomy in Europe, nationalist parties are not necessarily performing better in their respective party systems (Deschouwer 2009). The only way to account for this is to examine the party political context of the region. There are a number of actors which are involved in issues of autonomy, and which have pursued strategies to rival the dominant nationalist vision. In particular, regional branches of statewide parties have departed from the central organisation on a number of issues in order to pursue territorial strategies that aim to defuse the threat of secession (Detterbeck and Hepburn 2010).

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The pro-autonomy platforms of statewide parties, by accommodating territorial demands other than independence, may even elicit more support than those of nationalist parties. Statewide political parties have generally been considered to be the major instruments of national integration across states, through their representative functions and coordinated policy-making (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). However, the challenges of spatial rescaling have forced statewide parties to adapt both programmatically and organisationally to the new political realities of multi-level political systems. Shifts in the territorial distribution of power to regions have led to the ‘denationalisation’ of party systems, so that parties must respond to substate challenges. This has led to intra-party conflict as different parts of parties (operating at different levels) diverge in the areas of elite recruitment, party programmes and campaigning, and their activities in public office (Deschouwer 2003; Hopkin 2003; Hough and Jeffery 2006; Fabre 2008; Thorlakson 2006; Detterbeck and Hepburn 2010). As a result of the creation of multi-layered political arenas, parties can no longer pursue one strategy for office in a single statewide political arena. Instead their priorities are split between several arenas: they must adapt and respond to several loci of decision-making at different territorial levels, which may or may not have diverse electoral and party systems. At the substate level, statewide parties must refocus their strategies for different regional contexts and address regional policies and issues. The ‘territorialisation’ of statewide parties has a number of dimensions. These include the adoption of stronger territorial party identities and rhetoric, calls for greater organisational and programmatic differentiation from the centre, and the development of alternative constitutional goals. In territorialising party organisations, power and authority no longer rest in one single place, but rather different organisational units within parties possess different powers and autonomous functions. In this sense, parties are developing new stratarchical organisational structures, replacing the hierarchical structures of old (Carty 2004). First, regional branches of statewide parties have taken on a stronger territorial identity and rhetoric, in some cases declaring themselves to constitute the party representing the nation/region in opposition to nationalist parties. Second, the fact that regional branches often need to differentiate their policies from the centre to ‘fit’ the local setting has resulted in disparities between the regional and central parties. Regional branches have adopted differentiated party programmes, discourse and campaign strategies, and have sought greater organisational autonomy and policy independence. This transition has not always met with the blessing of the central party. In many cases, the central

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party’s reluctance to grant concessions to the regional branch has led to intra-party tensions, with regional units threatening to secede. Third, regional branches of statewide parties may develop constitutional alternatives to independence to defuse support for nationalist parties. This is facilitated by the exploitation and repackaging of party traditions with regard to their positions on regional autonomy. All of the main party families have both centralising and decentralising traditions. For instance, whilst Liberal (Democratic) parties have at times supported the creation of a federal state, in which the identities and traditions of a territory are recognised, at other times they have opposed ‘particularism’ in any form. Left-wing parties have shifted back and forth between centralism and regionalism, the latter especially when they entered alliances with autonomist movements. And Christian Democrat parties have advocated bringing powers to local communities in line with the principle of subsidiarity. In competing with nationalist parties, regional branches of statewide parties must emphasise the historical commitment of the party to decentralisation, and the benefits of this over secession. The territorialisation of statewide parties has been driven by a number of local, statewide and European factors. Within the regional party arena, the existence and electoral salience of nationalist parties forces regional branches of state parties to take territorial issues on board, and to offer alternative policies and demands to those of secession (Hepburn 2009b). The territorialisation of statewide parties also results from the decentralisation or federalisation of political structures and electoral arenas, whereby regional branches must position themselves on regional issues, compete in regional electoral arenas, and represent or channel the interests of the territory to higher-level political structures and vice versa (Chhibber and Kollmann 2004; Hough and Jeffery 2006). Finally, the territorialisation of parties is also influenced by European factors. European integration has had a direct impact on regional policy capacity, regarding for instance the environment, economy, laws and social rights, and regional parties must respond to these challenges to protect territorial interests (Hepburn 2004, 2009c). The regionalisation debates in Europe have encouraged branches of statewide parties to articulate how they want their nation or region to exercise autonomy in an integrating Europe.

Regions in an integrating Europe

European integration has upset a number of assumptions regarding the distribution of power, functions and authority across and within states. A

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legion of scholars have either bewailed or rejoiced in the apparent ‘emptying’ of the state – the erosion of its competences by supranational integration and decentralisation – leading to its eventual demise or, more realistically, the rescaling of functional systems and political authority (Wallace 1994; Loughlin 1997; Linklater 1998; Keating 2001, 2005). This challenge to normative ‘state-centric’ understandings of politics has been accompanied by a renewed emphasis on the role of regional territorial actors. Europe has been presented to voters in substate territories as constituting an alternative framework for developing the territorial project. Importantly, the transformation of political authority in Europe, resulting from integration and decentralisation, has opened up functional and political spaces in which substate actors may operate. Regions are seeking more representation and participation in European institutions and networks in order to give voice to their territorial interests. Broadly speaking, European integration may refer to a process of institution-building, policy-making and agenda formation that allows for the formulation of interests and representation at different territorial levels. Scholars have separated a number of dimensions of integration, such as economic, social, cultural and political integration, which have developed at varying speeds in reflection of the commitment to furthering each process (Farrell et al. 2002; Threlfall 2002; Banús 2002). However, this book explores only aspects of European integration that are most relevant to regional mobilisation and party competition. In particular, it explores whether parties have challenged the monopoly of member states in EU institutions by demanding greater regional representation in state delegations and input into EU policy making, the extent to which parties compete on European issues, and whether parties have ‘Europeanised’ their territorial projects by advocating EU themes. Links between regions and EU institutions were instituted in the mid-1970s when the European Community instigated a range of regional policies aimed at rectifying spatial inequalities resulting from market integration. In 1988 the reform of European regional policy created a more cohesive regional development programme, which was formulated to improve the competitive potential of deprived regions. The upshot of the reforms was to double the amount allocated to structural funds, making it the second largest item on the EU budget. Furthermore, the principles of additionality (EC resources are additional to member state regional policy expenditures), subsidiarity (exercising responsibilities at the lowest possible level) and partnership (involving EU, state and regional authorities in coordinating policies) became the bedrock of the new programmes. So whilst states began transferring responsibility for regional policy to regional

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authorities, regions began to forge direct links with Europe. The decentralisation and Europeanisation of regional policy opened up direct links to EU decision-making processes and encouraged the articulation of political demands in regional terms (Hooghe and Keating 1994: 370; Weyand 1997). During the period of regionalisation in Europe, regions soon began to project their interests into the European arena. Regions articulated distinct socioeconomic programmes that valorised local traditions and cultures as a resource to be exploited, seeking to ‘connect global trends with local traditions’ – a process known as ‘glocalisation’ (Hospers and Benneworth 2005). Regional governments’ responsibility for planning and programming allowed them to adapt local business to the demands of European knowledge economy, and regional lobbies pressed for the defence of their sectoral interests in state and European structures. Regions have also forged shared interests at the European level in the Committee of the Regions, within various transregional associations, through state lobbying channels and the practice of bilateral paradiplomacy. The latter concept refers to the activities of substate elites in seeking to foster external relations (Aldecoa and Keating 1999). Some scholars have argued that European integration has opened up new possibilities to pursue territorial interests that were once ‘closed’ by the expansion of the nation-state (Bartolini 2005). Regions now operate within a post-sovereign or ‘post-Westphalian’ order in which authority is dispersed (Linklater 1998; Keating 2001). Regional actors are now able, and obligated, to frame their interests and demands at levels of authority beneath and beyond the state. To account for the new role of these ‘intermediate’ regional institutions and their engagement with Europe, the notion of a ‘third level’ has been introduced in studies of regionalism (Bullman 1994; Hooghe 1995; Jeffery 1997). Aspects of a new regional role are indicated by the proliferation of European-wide regional organisations. Furthermore, the creation of the Committee of the Regions (CoR) in 1994 by the Maastricht Treaty provides a political arena for voicing regional demands. The CoR, which remains largely an advisory body, nevertheless created the first formal recognition of sub-national governments in the EU. In addition to the CoR, over 250 regional information offices have been established in Brussels (as of 2007) to lobby European institutions, monitor EC regulations and support regional proposals in European political processes (Moore 2008). Finally, European institutions, networks and lobbying organisations present certain opportunities for territorial mobilisation (Hooghe 1995: Keating and Hooghe 2001; De Winter 2001; Tatham 2008).

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To some scholars, it appears that the state has lost its capacity as the only important unit of political decision-making, being eroded by decentralisation from below and European integration from above (Wallace 1994). This has made ‘statehood’ not only an ineffective, but an unattractive option for territorial actors. With some exceptions, like the independence platform of the Scottish National Party, most minority nationalists have pursued less ‘radical’ forms of constitutional change (Hepburn 2008a). Parties have begun a new search for forms of autonomy within Europe that amount to something less than secession, that include a special place in a Europe of the Regions or Peoples. This indicates that European integration, and the subsequent creation of multi-level political systems, has radically altered the goals of regionalism. Territorial mobilisation is no longer solely about challenging the state, but also bypassing the state to pursue autonomy in an integrating Europe.

The Europeanisation of political parties

As well as adapting to the creation of decentralised state systems, parties operating in the EU member states must also adapt to European norms, structures and processes. Some scholars have argued that political parties have undergone a process of Europeanisation that has affected their programmes, strategies, behaviour and coalitions, especially at the European level (Hix and Lord 1997; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Bartolini 2005; Mair 2006). The concept of Europeanisation has been generally referred to as a process of change affecting political actors and institutional spheres that is linked to European integration. In other words, there is a strong tendency to conceive this as a ‘top-down’ process in which European integration is seen to influence domestic policies, institutions and identities (Cowles, Caporaso and Risse 2001; De Winter and Gómez-Reino 2002). Yet this interpretation is far from adequate. For one may also identify ‘bottom-up’ aspects of Europeanisation, whereby political actors seek to shape the direction of European integration (Bomberg 2002; Dardanelli 2006; Elias 2006). Ladrech (2002: 391) offers a broader account of Europeanisation as ‘the dual process of the emergence of a distinctive European polity as well as the adaptation of national and sub-national political EU systems’. Europeanisation must therefore be understood as a two-way process, though as Olsen (2002: 942) points out, its effects are difficult to identify and disentangle. Another characteristic of the ‘Europeanisation’ literature is the tendency to focus on how Europe affects parties and party systems at the

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state level, thereby overlooking the regional substate level, which may have quite different effects. Importantly, this literature does not account for how Europeanisation is perceived and debated by different parts of the same party, and how it affects party competition at different territorial levels. There remains a notable lack of any systematic, bottom-up accounts of how European integration has affected political debates at the substate level. The possibility that European integration may have an additional and diverse impact on the regional level has been generally overlooked in the Europeanisation literature. This is surprising, given that European integration has been perceived as creating a set of opportunity structures for political actors at the substate level (Hooghe 1995; Jeffery 2000; Keating and McGarry 2001). Some scholars working on minority nationalist parties have conducted empirical research on the ways in which Europe has influenced the goals and strategies of these parties (Lynch 1996; De Winter and Gómez-Reino 2002; Elias 2006). However these studies are unable to provide an overall view of the effects of Europe on the substate political arena and party competition in general. How have other parties at the regional level adapted to Europeanisation? Has Europe become an important point of competition between substate parties – be they nationalist, socialist, conservative, liberal or green? This book aims to fill this gap by exploring both the impact of European integration on substate parties and party systems, and the way in which substate parties seek to use Europe in the pursuit of their territorial objectives. Europeanisation is understood to consist of two related dimensions. On the one hand, Europeanisation may have a shaping effect on political parties. Europe has become a salient issue in party competition, requiring parties to take positions on European policies, issues and developments, and has even become a divisive issue between different party sections or levels. The second dimension of Europeanisation is strategic. Political parties may seek to influence the processes of European integration in order to achieve their own aims and to manipulate a given issue, and therefore employ Europeanisation as a political strategy (Dardanelli 2006: 17). In this sense, it is important to emphasise that integration is not only a top-down process affecting passive political actors – it also provides a number of opportunities, incentives and constraints for regional (and state) political agency. Europe constitutes a new arena in which parties pursue their goals, and Europeanisation is an additional dimension of party competition that parties may exploit to affect the salience of a given political issue.

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Multi-level governance

There are a number of ways in which scholars have sought to explain the emergence of a new political order in Europe, and to conceptualise the structures, processes, institutional behaviour and changing role of non-state actors resulting from integration. The main problems encountered in such endeavours result from the fact that European integration is a fluid and open-ended process, and the dimensions of political, economic and jurisdictional change are inherently different from those obtaining at state level. In response to this dilemma, political scientists have sought to create new terms to account for this complexity (Keating 2008). Of particular note is the concept of multi-level governance. MLG was first introduced by Marks (1992) in an analysis of how the reform of the EU structural funds in 1988 created opportunities for regions to engage in EU policy-making and implementation. The initial treatment of the concept was to explain how regional tiers of government have been brought into the ambit of European decision-making. MLG was defined as ‘a policy-creating process in which authority and policy-making influence are shared across multiple levels of government – subnational, national and supranational’ (Hooghe and Marks 2001: 2). Thus, the core idea of the MLG thesis is that decision-making is diffused across multiple territorial levels and public spheres and is thus characterised by the interdependence of relations between formal and informal institutions, though the notion of ‘multi-level’ also suggests a hierarchical structure of power relations. Substate interest formation in the EU, argues Hooghe (1995) is an important indicator of the nature of the Euro-polity, be it state-centric, supranational or multi-layered. This perception is part of Hooghe’s broader argument that ‘multi-level governance is the only model where regions would be a governmental level of importance next to the national, European and local arenas. This Europe cannot be one of the national states, nor of the regions, but only a Europe with the Regions’ (Hooghe 1995: 9). Given that Hooghe and Marks attribute primary importance to taking regional authority into consideration in EU decision-making, it is unusual that they do not consider intra-state pressures for regionalisation. Jeffery argues that MLG ‘overplays the significance of central state–EU interactions in catalysing sub-national mobilisation’ (Jeffery 2000: 3). The MLG approach leaves unanswered the question of how regional actors pursue their demands for access to EU decision-making. In short, whilst the MLG approach is important for highlighting the institutional complexity and fluidity of the emerging multi-tiered European

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polity in which a number of actors are involved, it does not explain how regional actors have responded to developments in Europe, how they pursue access to European decision-making, and envisage the form that a European polity might take. Conceptions of MLG suggest that regions will have more room to manoeuvre in Europe, but they will be sharing these spaces with other actors in a hierarchical fashion (Bache and Flinders 2004). In fact, Jeffery (2000: 8) argues that sub-national authorities ‘are typically portrayed [in MLG] as essentially inconsequential and passive players until either an incidental by-product of central state–EU interplay provides an opportunity for mobilization, or a central government decision is taken which passes decision-making powers down to SNAs (sub-national authorities)’. Multi-level governance approaches have not made any pretence to individually recognise regional territories, as authority is shared between different actors and not separated between self-determined actors. Regions are cast as inert objects of decision-making, which are unable to change their position in the hierarchical structure. There is no account of how regions themselves seek to change the dynamics that facilitate European policy and structural change. As with much of the literature, MLG scholars consider Europeanisation to be a top-down process, projecting downwards from the Europe-to-state level, thus neglecting the effects of Europe on regional and substate party competition. As Deschouwer (2003: 213) states, multi-level governance is ‘very much a party-free zone’, and his own research attempts to fill this gap by examining general patterns of party activity in different multi-layered systems. Within these systems, the regional and European electoral arenas have increased in importance, and have warranted new strategies and responses from political parties that had previously concentrated on state electoral competition. Parties now operate in complex systems in which their regional, national and European components influence each other in ‘three-way interactions’ of a horizontal or vertical nature. Yet the inability of MLG to recognise individual territorial units means that it cannot account for the motivations for regional mobilisation or the peculiarity of regional demands. Territorial claims to autonomy are linked to the kind of projects that regional actors wish to pursue, the resources they are able to mobilise and the intra-state circumstances in which they operate. The diversity in strategies and goals that these factors produce cannot be explained by current MLG approaches. For instance, whilst actors may concentrate on issues of autonomy, others may focus on defending their competences from Europe. Rather than positing arguments of path dependence, a multi-level politics approach must allow room for the strategic behaviour of the actors

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involved, the capacity of political actors to make choices in the face of different opportunities and constraints, and scope for regional actors to rethink and pursue new forms of autonomy and influence. Though MLG approaches have stimulated debate on the role of regional actors in the EU, the neglect of ‘bottom-up’ regional mobilisation renders the analysis incomplete. Territorial mobilisation within European states is extremely differential, leading to variation in the capacity for regional actors to access decision-making and advance different types of autonomy claims.

Multi-dimensional party competition

The issues of territorial autonomy and European integration have become important dimensions of party competition in multi-level states. As a result of changes in state and European structures, parties at the regional level must respond to territorial interests and develop strategies to combat nationalist parties. At the same time, owing to processes of European integration, parties have been forced to take a position on how they want their territory to fit into the newly emerging European order. These two dimensions, of territory and Europe, are connected in a number of ways. Primarily, they are concerned with the heightened importance of identity, centre–periphery relations and constitutional issues in regional electoral arenas. But there is no general pattern of how they overlap with the traditional left–right dimension of party competition. Both left-wing and right-wing parties have moved back and forth on supporting both greater regional autonomy and deeper European integration, whilst regionalist parties have adopted a variety of ideological creeds. There is therefore a need to unpack how parties compete in multi-dimensional policy spaces. Most approaches to party competition continue to emphasise ideology and interests as the critical axis upon which parties compete, and maintain that regional political behaviour and competition tends to replicate that of the state (Sartori 1976; Panebianco 1988; Maor 1997). Political parties are commonly classified and differentiated from one another by their location on a left-to-right spectrum, conventionally ranging from Marxism at the extreme left, with Fascism at the extreme right, with the addition of a ‘centre’ position committed to gradual socioeconomic change. Downs (1957) maintained that parties compete by taking diverging ideological positions along a set of issue dimensions, whilst Sartori (1976) understood political parties as strategic actors who seek to translate ideological cleavages into electoral support. Party competition arises from the extent to which parties differ on ideological grounds, or in Sartori’s words, the

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existence of ‘left–right polarisation’. This means that party systems, which are understood as ‘the system of interactions resulting from inter-party competition’ (1976: 44), can be categorised by the number of ideological poles upon which parties pivot, and the distance between parties on a left–right continuum. Sartori was aware of the bias inherent in the left–right imagery, and he later also considered religious, ethnic and linguistic dimensions in determining party competition (Sani and Sartori 1983). But these cleavages were believed to be secondary to ideology, and limited to isolated segments of the electoral market. As Daalder (1984: 99) notes, Sartori throughout his work has generally sought to reduce the multi-dimensionality of modern politics to a uni-dimensional left–right interpretation, an approach with which many others have concurred (Maor 1997). A growing body of literature has, however, challenged the Downsian/Sartorian view of party competition, for its dependence on a fixed perspective of ideological profiles, and for the inbuilt bias towards statewide parties and elections (Inglehart 1990; Deschouwer 2003). First, there is very little consensus on how to categorise a left–right continuum. For some, fascism and communism may be seen as occupying opposite ends of the spectrum, with liberal democrats somewhere in the centre. But from a ‘centre’ point of view, constitutional individualism may occupy one extreme whilst totalitarian collectivism occupies the other, regardless of whether they fit into neat left or right categories. The confusion surrounding the shifting nature of ideological poles in contemporary European politics has led scholars to argue that other dimensions are more important than the left–right distinction, such as the libertarian– authoritarian divide (Christie and Meltzer 1970; Inglehart 1977). An alternative source of criticism of the Downsian/Sartorian model derives from the view that the ideological dimension of party competition can take on different forms in different parts of a given state. Dunleavy (2005) demonstrated how, in the UK, parties tended to compete more on the right of the ideological spectrum in England, and more on the left in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. He furthermore found that regional units of the same parties altered their ideological profile to fit the regional setting, for instance, with Labour moving to the left of the Liberal Democrats in UK elections, and to the right of the LibDems in Scottish elections. These arguments have undermined the classical assumption that parties compete on the ideological dimension in a unified way across a given statewide territory. A third criticism of the Downsian/Sartorian model is that there are some issues that are not associated with a particular ideology. Europe is one

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such issue, which has won support among, and also divided, as many centre-left parties as it has centre-right parties, and cannot be affiliated with a particular ideology. Territory is another issue, whereby constitutional change or the defence of territorial interests may be pursued by any or all of the main ‘class-based’ parties, as well as regionalist and green parties. It has long been argued that territory provides an important framework for systems of political interaction (Rokkan and Urwin 1983). Political activity in substate political systems often pivots around issues of culture, language, regional–state relations and self-determination (Elkins and Simeon 1980; Jones and Keating 1995; Lynch 1996; De Winter and Türsan 1998). The emergence of regionalist movements seeking to overhaul state structures, and the development of territorial strategies and alternative forms of autonomy by statewide parties, demonstrates that the centre–periphery cleavage has not weakened. It may even be more polarising than the left–right dimension. Competition over the representation of regional interests has become a central cleavage in regions that have a strongly contested constitutional status. There are multiple lines of competition upon which parties compete and multiple arenas in which party politics takes place. The left–right dimension, which is central to classical analyses of party systems, cannot provide a complete theory, and is itself an unreliable measure due to the malleability of ideological positions. Some scholars have highlighted the importance of territory, for some defined as centre–periphery cleavages, in determining arenas of political interaction. Others have pointed to the growing importance of Europe as constituting a new battle line between mainstream and populist parties, and as a contributing factor to party divisions in a number of states (Taggart 1998; Ray 1999; Ladrech 2002; Hooghe et al. 2002; Sitter 2002; Conti 2006). The next challenge is to pull both of these strands together to understand how state and European structural change have affected party goals and behaviour, and to explore what types of territorial strategies parties choose to pursue in different places and at different times. Decentralisation and European integration have together created complex multi-level and multi-dimensional political arenas in which parties must adapt to a host of new challenges.

A framework of analysis

Contestation lies at the heart of territorial politics, as it is indeed a function of politics at any level. Yet, in spite of this, there have been few attempts to examine the complexity of political motives, actors, bargains and rivalry

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involved in framing and pursuing the territorial question. Too often, the focus is overwhelmingly placed on one political party as the bearer of the project of autonomy. This often neglects the party political context in which there may be a multiplicity of actors who raise the profile of territorial issues and push to find different status for the territory in question. Terms such as nationhood, autonomy and self-determination are used interchangeably by a number of parties for different ends, which could mean greater political authority or more specific demands such as educational rights. Parties will debate, negotiate, contend and sometimes cooperate on different strategies for pursuing autonomy, as well as their representation of territorial interests. Parties themselves are coalitions of interests and subject to internal contestation over demands, sometimes leading to splits, and parties may take up the autonomist mantle in certain time periods, whilst downplaying autonomy at other times. This book explores how political parties have pursued their territorial strategies within multi-level political systems. In particular, it considers the extent to which European integration has influenced the ways in which parties have pursued their demands of autonomy. The impact and uses of European integration by substate parties are systematically compared across three case studies – Scotland, Bavaria and Sardinia – during the period of deepening European integration from 1979–2009. Parties are loosely grouped into five categories: centre-left parties (including Social Democrats, socialist and communist parties); centre-right parties (including Conservatives, Christian Democrats and populist parties); liberal (democratic) parties; green parties; and regionalist and nationalist parties (see Table 1.1). The analysis will examine the effects of European integration on these parties, indicated through programmatic change, rhetoric, coalitions and involvement in European bodies. The aim is to explore the uneven effects of European integration in different places, and to gauge how regional parties have responded differently to the challenges and opportunities presented by the creation of multi-level political systems. The competition between regionally based political parties on the territorial and European dimensions has increased the number of means by which to pursue territorial interests in multi-level political systems. Party positioning on these issues is influenced by a number of factors, including the relevance of the territorial issues at hand in the public domain, pressures from strong parties seeking constitutional change (thus increasing the salience of an issue, and forcing other parties to adopt diverging positions to rival that party’s ‘ownership’ of the issue), and opportunities for expanding a party’s support base. Arguably, party positioning on the unitarism–independence continuum is as important as that on the left–right spectrum.

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Regional parties by ‘party family’

Scotland Nationalist and Scottish National regionalist Party (SNP)

Bavaria

Sardinia

Bavarian Party (Bayernpartei – BP)

Sardinian Party of Action (Psd’Az), Sardinia Nation (SN) and Independent Republic of Sardinia (IRS)

Centre-left

Scottish Labour Party (SLP), Scottish Socialist Party (SSP)

Bavarian Social Democratic Party (Bayern SPD)

Socialist Party (PSI), Communist Party (PCI), Democrats of the Left (DS) and Sardinian Refounded Communist Party (RC)

Centre-right

Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party (Tories)

Christian Social Union (CSU)

Union of Christian Democrats (UDC), Italian Social Movement (MSI), National Alliance (AN) and Forza Italia Sardegna (FIS)

Liberal (Democrat)

Scottish Liberal Democrats (LibDems/SLD)

Bavarian Free Democratic Party (FDP Bayern)

n/aa

Green

Scottish Green Party (SGP)

Bavarian Greens (Die Grünen in Bayern)

n/aa

a

Although liberal democrats (Riformatori Sardi) and greens competed in Sardinian elections during part of this period, because they are such minor parties they have been excluded from this analysis.

Following Sartori, the constitutional preferences of parties, as well as their positions on Europe, provide alternative ‘pivots’ upon which parties compete. These may include support for unionism, devolution, federalism and separatism on the territorial dimension, and support ranging from proto anti-European positions on the European dimension. These types of

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demands are not static, but rather parties are able to move from one goal to another. In some cases parties may articulate more than one preference at the same time in response to changing opportunities. This is especially true with regard to the European dimension, as parties may support some aspects of integration (such as the single market) whilst opposing others (such as the development of an EU foreign policy). As was previously stressed, both issues of ‘territory’ and ‘Europe’ are not affiliated with a particular ideology; rather they cut across the left–right dimension of party competition. This allows parties from the left, right or centre to advance their own interpretation of territorial interests in Europe. Yet in order to put forward a cohesive territorial project, parties must show how their constitutional preferences and attitudes towards integration are aligned with their policy demands, which may lead to inconsistencies in strategy. To that end, the book explores three arguments regarding the impact of integration on territorial strategies. First, it is argued that political parties have redefined their goals of autonomy, and altered their strategies for obtaining these, as a result of the opportunities presented by European integration. These ‘opportunities’ include access to European institutions such as the Committee of the Regions and the European Parliament, involvement in inter-regional bodies, European political parties and lobbying organisations, and special rights and minority protections under European law. This involves a two-way process of Europeanisation, whereby political parties have used European integration in order to advance their territorial projects at the European level whilst, correspondingly, changes and developments in Europe, such as the regionalisation debates and creation of regional institutions, have had an impact on the territorial strategies of substate parties. More specifically, the process of European integration has caused traditionally centralist and pro-federalist branches of statewide parties to become involved in debates on the future of their region in Europe, and to develop stronger demands for autonomy, which are framed within the context of a ‘Europe of the Regions’. Furthermore, instead of lessening the risks of independence for nationalist parties, European integration has lessened the need for independence, so that nationalist parties have moderated their demands, and have instead participated in the debates on the regionalisation of Europe as a progressive territorial strategy. Secondly, it is argued that as parties develop stronger territorial claims, they will seek greater autonomy from statewide parties. This will allow them to pursue more vigorous territorial strategies in the regional party system and to engage more fully in party competition on the territorial axis. Furthermore, non-nationalist parties will seek to influence other members

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of their party family to adopt more regional-friendly policies at the European level. On the other hand, regionalist and nationalist parties, whose autonomy claims are influenced by the regionalisation debates in Europe, will be more comfortable in making alliances with pro-autonomy statewide parties both within the local party system and at the European level, and will entertain a wider range of autonomy demands for short-term coalition purposes. Finally, this book explores the argument that political parties at the regional level have ‘Europeanised’ their rhetoric and have adopted civic and inclusive criteria for territorial membership. In emphasising their pro-European credentials, and in order to be perceived as credible, parties will therefore abandon tendencies towards ethnic exclusiveness or racism. Moreover, concepts and issues at the European level will be used and interpreted by parties according to their goals of autonomy. As such, parties will adapt their rhetorical devices to become more Euro-friendly if the opportunities for pursuing their territorial projects in Europe are seen to be ‘open’. For example, core concepts such as a ‘Europe of the Regions’ and subsidiarity will be used in party rhetoric if they can be interpreted to suit the autonomy claims of parties. However, parties may also use these terms to obscure complex problems. Demands for subsidiarity, federalism and a Europe of the Regions are useful to parties if they are vague and open to interpretation, and can be used as a substitute for substantial policy programmes when parties are forced to deal with real issues.

Case studies

In order to make the empirical base as varied as possible, the project examines three European states that are currently undergoing different types of constitutional reform. The cases have a good mix of ‘most similar’ and ‘most different’ research design. Scotland, Bavaria and Sardinia are all institutionalised regions embedded in the larger structures of multi-level states. Each regional government has primary legislative powers over a range of policy areas including education, culture, infrastructure and planning, and regional electoral arenas have become important spaces for party competition. These regions have also been characterised as stateless nations, owing to the existence of a strong territorial identity supported by regional civic institutions, a distinct political culture and the successful political mobilisation of territorial interests by regional parties. The main factor guiding this case selection is the emergence of political parties in Scotland, Bavaria and Sardinia that place the interests and identity of the

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territory at the heart of their political discourse. Second, there is more than one political party vying for the representation of territorial interests, leading to contestation. Third, in each case the constitutional issue is open, and is a source of party competition. Fourth, the constitutional issue has been correlated to European integration, which in Scotland was linked to devolution, in Bavaria the defence of the German Länder and reform of federalism, and in Sardinia to Italian decentralisation. Fifth, territorial parties have not only responded to European integration, but have developed visions of a future European polity, and what form regional autonomy may take within this setting. There are also differences between the cases, however, resulting from the structure of the states in which the regions are embedded, the capacity of the region to legislate, relations with the state, the dominance of political ideologies and the salience of different territorial issues and interests. These factors, amongst others, permit us to tease out differences and to account for sources of cross-national variation. For instance, Sardinia is an underdeveloped island in the Mediterranean and a ‘special region’ in Italy, where demands for autonomy are linked to demands for modernisation. Bavaria is a wealthy region in the centre of Europe, and the protection of its economic and political might from external threats is one of the central goals of the autonomist Christian Social Union. Scotland also lies on the periphery of Europe, and the protection of its traditional industries are central to the demands of substate parties. European integration has affected these cases in different ways, eliciting different responses and demands from political parties. Each region operates within different state structures, of a devolved state, a federal state and a decentralising state, and political parties have to respond to the constraints and opportunities this presents. Within each case, regional parties draw on different economic, political and cultural resources to mobilise territorial interests. Furthermore, the regions have different capacities to legislate, to access European institutions and to influence the state. Due to all of these factors and more, political parties in all three cases have interpreted, used and responded to European integration processes differently. An overview of the political and economic structures of the three territories is provided in Table 1.2. To select cases for comparison does not only involve justification of why certain cases have been included, but equally important, why other cases have been excluded. Since the 1960s (and in some cases prior to this) a plethora of territorial political movements have arisen in various parts of Western Europe. Why look at the cases cited and not, say, Catalonia, Flanders or South Tyrol? Bavaria is a well-known case, but in practice it is

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Regional overview of Scotland, Bavaria and Sardinia Scotland

Bavaria

Sardinia

Constitutional status

Devolved nation within the United Kingdom union state

Federal ‘Free State’ within the Federal Republic of Germany

Special Region within the decentralising state of Italy

Constitutional text

Scotland Act 1998 (of UK Parliament)

Bavarian Constitution

Sardinian Special Statute

Legislative competences

Scottish Parliament has primary legislative powers in matters not reserved to Westminster (including health, education, social services, local government, housing, economic development, planning, agriculture and environment)

Bavarian Landtag (State Parliament) has residual primary legislative powers guaranteed by the German constitution (including culture, education, universities, broadcasting/ television, local government, agriculture and the police)

Sardinian Consiglio Regionale (Regional Council) has exclusive legislative powers over a range of domestic policy areas (including health care, agriculture, training, planning, economic development, transport and the environment)

Fiscal/taxation powers

Tax-varying power of +/–3% on the standard rate of income tax

Responsible for setting property tax, inheritance tax, motor vehicle tax, beer tax, and tax on gambling

Responsible for setting value-added tax, vehicle tax, an annual surtax, a special tax on diesel cars, and health taxes

Electoral system

Additional Member System (AMS)

Mixed Member Proportional (MMP)

Proportional Representation (PR) (post-2005)/ AMS (pre-2005)

Government type

Majority coalition or minority singleparty government

Majority single party or majority coalition government

Majority coalition government

Populationa

5.1m

12.4m

1.6m

GDP per capita (% of EU average)a

112%

137.9%

79.5%

GDP (real prices, base 2000)a

136,665

389,093

32,659

Per capita incomea

26,999

30,863

20,007

a

Economic and Population data taken from OECD Regional Survey 2005 and EuroStat Data 2005. Prices shown are in euros.

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little-researched despite the strongly autonomist goals of the ruling Christian Social Union. Sardinia has barely figured in academic research despite nationalist parties together obtaining approximately 15 per cent of the vote in the 2005 provincial elections. Finally, Scotland has been well researched in selected areas, particularly the demands of the Scottish National Party, but neglected in others – such as the autonomist strategies of other regional and statewide parties. Although the theoretical arguments of the book draw on a small number of countries, this is compensated for by the detailed analysis of all of the parties in each case over a thirty-year period, and extensive field research. The book employs qualitative methods – including over 50 interviews conducted during 2003–9 with party officials in Edinburgh, Munich, Berlin and Cagliari based on a set of pre-prepared questions; analysis of party campaign literature (including programmes, manifestos, conference speeches, minutes, leaflets and press releases), government and EU documents and an archival analysis of local and national newspapers in three languages (English, Italian and German) – to map change in the territorial strategies of over twenty small parties from 1979–2009. Moreover, the theoretical framework of the research is considered to be highly applicable to other cases of territorial mobilisation in Europe – such as in Catalonia, Flanders, Northern Italy, Wales and the Basque Country – which is elaborated on in Chapter 6.

The structure of the book

This book is structured in the following way. The next chapter explores in depth the types of territorial strategies available to regional parties in Europe. Territorial strategies are conceptualised on two separate but interrelated dimensions: ‘autonomy’ strategies, which lie on a continuum ranging from unitarism to independence; and ‘capacity’ strategies that are pursued to obtain political, socioeconomic or cultural policy benefits for the region. Thus, a distinction is made between the pursuit of (constitutional) autonomy from the state, and the capacity to act and control resources. These concepts are used to develop a framework for analysing territorial mobilisation in Europe, and party competition at the regional level. As building capacity may require more access to the state, the discussion theorises on trade-offs between autonomy and capacity. The following three chapters are dedicated to the case analyses. Chapter 3 begins with an overview of the main political traditions in Scotland, examining how party autonomy goals have been shaped by

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different ideological discourses. This is followed by an examination of how parties conceptualise the ‘nation’ and Scotland’s position within Britain and Europe. The European dimension is then introduced, with consideration of party responses to European integration since 1979. It is argued that Scottish parties have continuously re-positioned themselves on Europe. In the early 1980s, Labour and the SNP opposed European integration as a Conservative free-market project that would undermine Scottish values. This changed in the late 1980s with a new emphasis on the social and political dimensions of integration. Labour and the Liberal Democrats began to view subsidiarity as intrinsic to Scottish devolution, whilst the SNP re-conceptualised the EU as an alternative arena to the UK for security and trading opportunities. Yet from the late 1990s there was evidence of Euro-criticism within the discourse of Scottish parties, as demands for the recognition of stateless nations went unheeded. The chapter concludes with a summary of different party understandings of Europe as an alternative to the ‘state’. Chapter 4, on the Bavarian defence of the Heimat in Europe, follows the same format as the Scottish case study. It demonstrates that, whilst all parties are unquestionably pro-European, this masks a growth of scepticism about what Europe can do for Bavarians, and where its limits should be drawn. Demands for a ‘Europe of the Regions’ were motivated by the fear that European integration was encroaching on Länder competences. In response, the Christian Social Union proposed that regional rights must be protected in Europe, and used this argument to lobby for a Committee of the Regions. However, the weakness of this body, and the expansion of European competences into ever-wider areas, forced the CSU to adopt a different strategy: to protect the ‘hard shell’ of the member state, which also meant protecting the Länder. Meanwhile, opposition parties – the Greens, SPD and Free Democrats – sought to counter the CSU’s strategy by arguing that a regionalised Europe should mean strengthening the local level against Bavarian state centralisation, and promoting multiculturalism within Bavaria – a policy the CSU vigorously opposed. The CSU construction of the nation (or Heimat – a term associated with the land, culture and people) was based on history, traditions and folklore and did not include foreigners or newcomers to the Land. Yet because the CSU does not describe Bavaria as a ‘nation’, or demand independence, it has escaped the attention of scholars of nationalism – an oversight this chapter seeks to rectify. Chapter 5 explores why European integration was linked to hopes for economic modernisation in Sardinia, but failed to have any resonance as a political opportunity structure for pursuing self-determination. Although

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autonomist parties began linking a renewed autonomy for the island in a ‘Europe of the Peoples’, this failed to influence the popular, and elite, perception of Europe as primarily a cash cow, giving Sardinia money and resources where they were needed. Moreover, as there was no direct representation of Sardinia in the European Parliament, European elections were low-profile affairs. Demands for self-determination were thus only loosely linked to processes of integration and regionalisation in Europe. Instead, the primary concern was breaking Sardinia’s dependence on Roman patronage, becoming economically self-sufficient, and seeking to exercise Sardinian autonomy in a Mediterranean political framework, where Sardinia could act as a ‘bridge’ between Europe and Northern Africa. This option was much more attractive than trying to increase Sardinia’s influence in the distant political and economic centres of Europe. Chapter 6 reviews the cyclical nature of territorial strategies in the three cases. It explains variation in responses to Europe, exploring why some parties perceived Europe as a means of advancing autonomy, whilst others viewed it as a threat. It also summarises the different interpretations of building ‘capacity’ in Europe – which has meant influence over central policy-making in Scotland, protection of competences in Bavaria, and increased resources in Sardinia. A typology of regional autonomist demands in Europe is included, demonstrating how parties shifted position on Europe and autonomy in three phases (1979–87; 1988–94; 1995–2009). Sources of cross-regional variation in party responses to Europe are identified, including local party competition, constitutional constraints, economic resources, and access to European institutions. This discussion also explores parties’ changing attitudes to European integration over time. In particular, it considers why parties became more Eurosceptical at the end of the 1990s. The concluding section makes more generalisable statements about territorial mobilisation in Europe by extending the model developed herein to other cases of regional mobilisation in Catalonia, Galicia, Flanders, Wales, South Tyrol and elsewhere. It also considers the implications of further supranational integration for the pursuit of territorial demands in Europe.

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2 Territorial strategies: autonomy and capacity

Introduction

Territory is a fundamental determinant of politics. It provides the basis for political action, representation and policy-making (Smiley 1980; Keating 1998: 3), and it also provides a homeland, a sense of belonging and a unique identity (Smith 1991; Anderson 1991). Territorial borders determine the limits of political authority, and territory underpins functional systems and economic production (Agnew 1987; Bagnasco and Triglia 1993; Cooke and Morgan 1998). Yet territory is rarely conceptualised as a political strategy. In particular, very little has been written about the territorial dimension of party competition, or how parties articulate territorial interests and pursue territorial goals in multi-level political systems. This lacuna in the literature is due to the tendency in political science to overlook territory’s shaping effect on politics, or to label any form of territorial politics as an oddity (Smiley 1980; Liebfried and Zürn 2005; Jeffery 2008; Keating 2008). The dominant paradigm in political science has been the modernist one, in which functional diffusion across nation-states leads to the ironing-out of differences across territory, or indeed the ‘end of territory’ as one scholar argued (Badie 1995). Politics is seen to be determined by social-class interests that operate in a standardised fashion across states (Deutsch 1966), whilst territorial cleavages have been treated as throw-backs to the past or ‘revolts against modernity’ (Lipset 1985). In short, territorial distinctiveness has been characterised as a problem for the modern state, whose main purpose is national integration and assimilation (Finer 1974; Poggi 1978; Keating 1988; Caramani 2004). This perception of politics, as state-centred and socially determined, has shaped the work of party scholars. Most analyses of party competition are dominated by the view that ideological division is the fundamental axis upon which parties compete in a statewide fashion across the state political arena (Sartori 1976; Maor 1997). Regional political behaviour and

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competition is seen to merely replicate state political behaviour and competition (Butler and Stokes 1969; Roberts 2000; Caramani 2004). However, recent approaches to territorial politics have questioned these state-centred accounts. The ‘nationalisation’ or ‘standardisation’ of politics has run into problems, namely, the existence of distinctive territorial identities based on history, language, or institutional traditions (Keating 1988). Substate territorial units have provided an alternative setting for defining the political community, or the ‘small world’ nested within the state (Elkins and Simeon 1980). As individual containers of social attitudes and behaviour, regional units have distinctive party systems reflecting the efforts of regional parties to represent the values of the electorate (Deschouwer 2003; Pallarés and Keating 2003; Hough and Jeffery 2006; Hepburn 2010). One could argue that the persistence of territory marks a failure of processes of nation(state)-building. Instead, alternative projects of region-building have been pursued within states, characterised by competition amongst territorial actors for resources, recognition, representation and powers. This demonstrates that territory is much more than a geographical area to be governed or controlled; it is also used as an instrument to obtain broader goals such as economic resources or the recognition of minority identities. Substate actors have adopted a range of territorial strategies to advance their political projects. The most obvious example has been the demand for autonomy, which has led to the creation of autonomous regions and minority nations nestled within devolved and federal multi-level systems. In the 1970s, a wave of political parties in Europe and Canada began to challenge the very foundations of the state by demanding selfdetermination. In the UK, a clutch of independence-seeking Scottish Nationalist MPs were elected in 1974, leading to the development of proposals for devolution by the incumbent Labour government (Brand 1978; Mitchell 1996; Lynch 2003). In Italy, there were demands for the proper implementation of regional powers, especially from northern territories, leading to the creation of a ‘regional state’ in 1980 (Cento Bull 1997; Levy 1996; Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001). In France revived regionalist movements in Brittany and Corsica put to bed the myth of the unitary Jacobin state (Nicolas 2006; Elias 2006; Loughlin 2007). In Spain, in the aftermath of the centralising Franco regime, nationalist parties were resurgent in the autonomous communities of Catalonia and the Basque Country, demanding greater regional autonomy (Conversi 1997; Moreno 2005; Pallarés and Keating 2003; Guibernau 2006). In Belgium, regionalist parties in Flanders, Walloon and Brussels pushed for the federalisation of the state to accommodate a complex system of community

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and regional politics (De Winter et al. 2006; Van Haute and Pilet 2006; Deschouwer 2009). And in Canada, in the wake of Quebec’s quiet revolution, a modern social democratic nationalist movement emerged demanding full recognition of the Québécois nation (Coleman 1984; Meadwell 1993; Gagnon 2003). These territorial movements challenged the very existence of the states in which they were embedded, by articulating territorial interests and demanding various forms of autonomy ranging from devolution to independence. In many cases, their aims were partially or fully successful, being accommodated during several decades of state structural reform. For instance, in Belgium, regionalist parties were ultimately successful in pushing for the creation of a federal state in 1993; Scotland and Wales were given devolved institutions within the UK state in 1997–8; in Italy reforms implemented by the centre-left government in 2001 gave ‘ordinary regions’ legislative as well as administrative powers, to take the wind out of the Lega Nord’s sails; and Catalonia was granted more legislative powers in a revised Statute of Autonomy in 2006. However, with the attainment of constitutional powers at the regional level, territorial strategies have taken on a different meaning. Rather than seeking greater autonomy, territorial actors have switched their focus to achieving certain functional and policy goals for the territory. These include the ability to devise and implement social policies that reflect the needs of the regional electorate, assume greater control over taxation and economic policy to underpin economic development, and obtain political representation abroad in order to build trade and cultural links. Such policy-oriented territorial strategies have been evident in Quebec, which successfully demanded control over its immigration policy (Hepburn 2009a), Flemish and Francophone community control over mass media and education in Belgium (Erk 2003), the Catalan government’s implementation of bilingualism to protect the Catalan language (Keating 1996a), the Basque Country’s demands to maintain its historical fueros (charter) system of finance (Conversi 1997), and Flanders’ official representation in international bodies such as UNESCO and the OECD. These territorial strategies have less to do with obtaining autonomy, and more to do with exercising it. The goals are not constitutional rights and recognition, but rather increasing policy capacity, engaging in paradiplomacy and obtaining resources. The following discussion re-conceptualises territorial strategies in the context of multi-level political systems. It explores how substate actors pursue territorial strategies at multiple territorial levels. In the European context, the institutions of the EU provide an additional arena in which to pursue territorial projects. Territorial strategies now include constitutional

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demands for a Europe of the Peoples, Regions or Small States, or a Federal Europe, and capacity demands for cohesion funds, engagement in regional networks and EU sectoral policy benefits. As such, territorial strategies are conceptualised in two ways: autonomy, which implies a form of constitutional recognition, and capacity, which implies the ability to devise and implement policies and projects for the territory, which may be of a socioeconomic, political or cultural nature. In some cases parties are forced to make a trade-off between autonomy and capacity, by pursuing increased access, protection or resources from the centre. In multi-level systems, parties also have the option of playing the territorial levels off against each other, or of focusing on the new ‘centre’ in Brussels.

Traditional approaches to territorial strategies

Territorial strategies are largely associated with nationalism in the social science literature. A growing body of work has examined how minority nationalist and regionalist parties have pursued goals for self-determination (such as independence) in confrontation with the state (Rokkan and Urwin 1983; Breuilly 1993; Keating 1996a; De Winter and Türsan 1998; De Winter et al. 2006). By this understanding, territorial strategies are narrowly defined: the actors pursuing a territorial strategy are minority nationalist or regionalist parties; the object of the territorial strategy is the state; and the aim is constitutional self-determination. However, the complex dynamics of territorial politics in multi-level systems in Europe reveal the limitations of equating a territorial strategy with independenceseeking nationalism. As the following discussion demonstrates, minority nationalist and regionalist parties are not the only actors seeking to advance territorial strategies; territorial interests may be as much about economic and policy resources as constitutional rights; and in the context of deepening European integration and decentralisation, the state no longer represents the only object of territorial strategies. Rather, parties of all political creeds are pursuing differentiated territorial strategies in multiple spheres of authority. Actors

Political scientists have overwhelmingly associated territorial strategies with minority nationalist and regionalist parties (for an overview, see De Winter and Türsan 1998; Hepburn 2009b). These have been defined as ‘geographically concentrated peripheral minorities which challenge the

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working order and sometimes the democratic order of a nation-state by demanding recognition of their cultural identity’ (Muller-Rommel 1998). Aguilera de Prat (2002) argues that the main characteristics of substate nationalist parties are that they are organised within a given (substate) territory and that they seek to represent a population which shares a common identity. Türsan (1998: 5) concurs, arguing that unlike other party families, ‘ethnoregionalist’ parties stand for empowering the (ethno)regional groups they claim to represent. Such parties are seen to endorse a nationalism based on ethnic distinctiveness and territorial claims within states. However, minority nationalist and regionalist parties are not, and never have been, the only political actors in substate arenas claiming to be the bearer of the territorial project. Regional branches of statewide parties have also adopted territorial strategies in order to represent the interests of regional electorates and, in some cases, to compete with nationalist parties. The involvement of non-nationalist parties in the pursuit of territorial demands has led to competing projects for self-determination, which has sometimes crowded out the demands of the main nationalist party and resulted in the fragmentation of the territorial vote. The territorialisation of statewide parties means that regional branches of parties have sought greater organisational and programmatic autonomy in order to represent territorial interests (Hepburn 2006). For instance, Keating (1984) and McEwen (2004) have explored the territorial strategies employed by the Scottish Labour Party which, despite existing as a regional branch of the British Labour statewide party, has developed its own policy programme to reflect Scottish interests within the Union. It is not alone in this respect. Regional branches of statewide parties have also adopted territorial strategies to compete with minority nationalists in Spain, Canada, Italy, Belgium and other multi-level states. For instance, Sorens (2008) refers to the Quebec Liberal Party as an autonomy-seeking party; Orte (2006) has explored the territorial demands of the Catalan Socialist Party (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya – PSC) which is affiliated with the Spanish Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español – PSOE); Verleden (2008) examines the federalisation of statewide parties in Belgium; Detterbeck and Jeffery (2008) have explored the territorialisation of German statewide parties; and Detterbeck and Hepburn (2010) have developed a theoretical model of the strategies that statewide parties have adopted in response to the creation of multi-level political systems across several West European states, which are grouped into traditionalist, modernist and autonomist strategies. These analyses demonstrate that minority nationalist and regionalist parties are not the only political actors seeking to represent the needs and interests of substate regions.

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Scholars have mainly focused on the pursuit of territorial strategies within the state. Most notably, Breuilly (1993) argues that nationalism is a political opposition movement with a set of arguments for justifying the creation of an alternative political community that can replace the state. However, scholars have shown that independence is the goal of only a handful of territorial actors; most territorial parties have long pursued less ‘radical’ forms of constitutional change (Hepburn 2004). But still, these demands are usually framed in terms of concessions and autonomy from the state, or ‘nations against the state’ as Keating (1996a) argued in the case of Scotland, Catalonia and Quebec. In response to these developments, states are required to respond to pressures emanating from substate nations and regions. Rokkan and Urwin (1983: 166) argue that the state centre has two territorial objectives: ‘to preserve the integrity of the territory, and to ensure legitimacy within these boundaries through popular support for and acquiescence to its political authority’. The state does not willingly give concessions to territorial demands, particularly if they involve radical constitutional reforms, as these might challenge the unity of the state. For this reason, the state must find a way to accommodate peripheral demands. Keating calls this ‘territorial management’ which is defined as ‘the efforts of central elites to cope with the territorial dimension of policy problems and to contain territorially based challenges to the central power structure’ (Keating 1988: 18). States may pursue regionalism as an instrument of ‘economic intervention, to improve administrative efficiency and reduce overload at the centre, to coordinate their own activities and those of other agencies as well as to satisfy autonomist demands from the periphery’ (ibid.: 22). In particular, states may offer autonomy arrangements that range from devolution to federalism. Their goal is to offer concessions of autonomy to the territory to isolate separatists, whilst nationalist parties may be able to ‘negotiate for autonomy with the centre rather than having it presented to them by sovereign power’ (ibid.: 237). However, with the deepening of European integration, it is evident that territorial actors no longer confine their demands to the state. Instead, territorial strategies may be aimed towards a wider transnational setting that provides greater scope of recognition of their demands. The opportunity structures created by European integration have altered the nature and scope of territorial autonomy and Europe now provides new systems of action for territorial movements seeking recognition, self-determination and a ‘voice’ in European affairs. Many nationalist and

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regionalist parties have developed a ‘post-sovereign’ stance, developing new meanings of self-determination outwith the rigid boundaries of the state construct (Keating 2001; Elias 2006). Territorial actors now articulate different strategies at the regional and European levels (Lynch 1996; De Winter and Gómez-Reino 2002). This demonstrates that the state is no longer seen as the only sphere in which to pursue territorial projects. However, the ‘self-determination’ classifications that have been developed by scholars of territorial politics (Rokkan and Urwin 1983; De Winter and Türsan 1998) are unable to account for the supranational – or in this case European – dimension of territorial strategies (see below). There is need for a new classification of territorial strategies that can be applied to a multi-level system. Aims

Finally, territorial strategies have been associated with self-determination (i.e. constitutional autonomy) goals. Many scholars have concurred that the defining characteristic of minority nationalist and regionalist parties is the demand for self-government. Rokkan and Urwin (1983) and De Winter and Türsan (1998) have developed the most comprehensive classification systems for these demands. To begin with the former, Rokkan and Urwin (1983) construct a typology of autonomy objectives of peripheral (nationalist) parties, which they arrange on a continuum extending downwards from full independence, confederalism, federalism, regional autonomy and peripheral protest to a concern for peripheral identity-building. De Winter and Türsan (1998) build upon this work to classify regionalist parties into several categories: protectionist, autonomist, national-federalist and independentist political groups. These analyses show that nationalist movements do not necessarily equate the political expression of nationhood with independent statehood, as some scholars assume (Breuilly 1993). Instead, territorial actors are interpreting the principle of national self-determination to mean different degrees of autonomy. This can be seen as a pragmatic response to changes in state and supranational structures. However, territorial strategies are not solely concerned with the goal of self-determination or ‘autonomy’. They also have to do with building policy capacity, obtaining resources and developing a social project that meets the needs of the regional electorate. A handful of scholars have realised the importance of taking policy-related issues into account when exploring the mobilisation and demands of nationalist parties. For instance, McEwen (2002) examines ‘state welfare nationalism’ in Scotland, whereby

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nationalists linked a defence of the welfare state with an articulation of Scottish national identity in their demands for devolution. Scottish parties were therefore concerned with controlling social policy priorities in opposition to the neoliberal agenda of the UK Thatcher administration in the 1980s and 1990s. Béland and Lecours (2006) similarly examine the social policy programmes of Quebec nationalist parties. They argue that social policy underpins solidarity amongst the substate community, and point to the importance of the Quebec nationalist movement’s introduction of social policies that were ‘more progressive and egalitarian than the rest of Canada’ (Béland and Lecours 2006: 78). The movement’s focus was on the socioeconomic advancement of Francophones through state intervention, rather than merely seeking constitutional recognition within the Canadian federation. In a similar vein, Erk (2003) examines public policies advanced by regionalist parties in Belgium, with case studies on mass media and education. He argues that the ‘politics of interest is replacing the politics of identity’ (Erk 2003: 205) and that the main battle-lines between Flemish parties have been drawn around public policy and administration rather than the issue of self-rule. These analyses indicate that autonomy is not the only issue of concern to territorial actors: they must also devise policy projects to represent the interests of the regional community.

Autonomy and capacity

As we have seen, traditional conceptions of territorial strategies are concerned with obtaining autonomy from the state. However, a number of scholars have sought to emphasise the dual nature of (autonomous) power relations, which was most notably captured by Isaiah Berlin’s (1969) conception of positive and negative liberty. Negative liberty refers to the non-interference by others on the life of the individual or community, whereas positive liberty refers to the ability to fulfil one’s own potential. Thus, negative liberty is the absence of external constraints, whilst positive liberty is the presence of internal control. This distinction is useful for conceptualising the two principal types of territorial strategies: constitutional autonomy (which accords with Berlin’s notion of negative freedom) and territorial capacity (which represents the idea of positive freedom). These strategies may be understood as two sides of the same coin: territorial units are self-determining when they are free from certain constraints to do certain things. Robert Dahl (1956) has characterised these dual relations in terms of ‘power over’ and ‘power to’. For Dahl, an

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entity is relatively autonomous if it undertakes actions that no other entity can prevent. In other words, it is in the agent’s power to conduct its own affairs, against the wishes of others. This fits with Berlin’s notion of negative liberty. Yet others, such as Kjellberg (1995: 43) argue that autonomy, ‘from originally being negatively defined . . . [has] become an instrument for the realization of communal interests, as well as a means to implement other values’, thus endorsing a positive notion of autonomy. Sharpe (1987) captures this idea when he argues that substate units are autonomous when they have the freedom from interference by central officials, as well as the freedom to act to solve the problems of the regional community. So as well as identifying that a certain territory is in possession of devolved legislative powers, there is also a need to understand how that territory uses these powers, or other channels at its disposal, to shape and control policy. In other words, it is necessary to understand not only the institutional fact of autonomy, but also the means by which to exercise it. Negative liberty: autonomy from the state

For a term that is so ubiquitous in the contexts of international law, political science, philosophy, and constitutional law, it may seem surprising that no attempt has been made to construct a general theory of autonomy. But the explanation for this is quite simple: autonomy is a relative term that can only be understood within a larger context of complex authority relations. Autonomy does not signify the minimum level of independence of a particular entity that can be accorded the status of autonomy, but rather the extent of dependence or independence of a political, cultural or economic entity vis-à-vis the state, market or civil society, thereby rendering any universal theorising impossible. Some authors have argued that the concept is so ambiguous as to confound any explanatory value. But this is in fact the major strength of the term: it may be invoked on an ad hoc basis in any situation that requires it (Wiberg 1998; Suksi 1998). This is not to say that there have been no efforts to develop criteria or conditions for the establishment of autonomy regimes (see for example Lapidoth 1997; Hannum 1990) or to establish a principle of, or more ambitiously, a right to autonomy (see Hannum 1998; Brunner and Küpper 2002). However, what is lacking from these approaches is an examination of how autonomy can be understood in a theoretical framework, and not just as an institutional fact. At first glance one may attribute this self-restraint on the part of scholars to the difficulties in distilling the core traits of autonomy when it has been employed in such a bewildering amount of contexts. Autonomy

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has for instance been used to describe the status of the Åland Islands within Finland, the Basque Country in Spain, Aboriginal peoples within Australia and Puerto Rico in the USA. However, it appears that there may be a more obvious explanation for theoretical reticence – the propensity of legal and social science scholars towards terminological confusion. Autonomy is often used interchangeably with other related concepts such as self-determination, self-government, devolution and associated statehood (Lapidoth 1997; Rothchild and Hartzell 2000; Safran and Maiz 2000). Moreover, autonomy is often defined by what it is not – and here it is usually understood that autonomy does not mean secession, but rather a means of avoiding the break-up of states (Heintze 1998). As legal scholars like to emphasise, there are no general conditions, procedures or criteria for establishing autonomous units. Rather, autonony is invoked on an ad hoc basis and may comprise a wide range of constitutional arrangements. In domestic law, autonomy indicates the self-government of public institutions that are delegated authority from the state to regulate their affairs. The decision to create autonomy arrangements is often based on the notion that national cultures are largely incongruent with sovereign states, and that some territorial or cultural communities should have the right to limited control over their own affairs (Ghai 2000). In international law, autonomy implies sovereign state independence or the constitutional recognition of autonomy within an existing state. In this understanding, autonomy either belongs to a state and is attributed to the capacity of a state to exert power, or autonomy is negotiated within a state, arising from the decision of a state to allocate a degree of self-government to one or more of its constituent parts (Heintze 2000: 7; Motyl 2001). This means that the main frame of reference for autonomy remains the state. Some scholars have drawn upon empirical data of autonomous arrangements to distinguish between two types of autonomy: territorial and non-territorial. Territorial autonomy refers to state delegation of administrative and/or legislative powers to institutions representing a population inhabiting a certain territory within a state. Criteria for the possession of ‘full autonomy’ may include the following: a locally elected body with independent legislative powers; a locally chosen chief executive; and an independent local judiciary (Hannum and Lillich 1980: 858). In order for these autonomy arrangements to be successful, the group must reside within a geographically well-defined area and constitute a majority there. There have also been recommendations that territorial autonomy should take the particular historical circumstances of a group into consideration, such as those outlined in the CSCE Copenhagen Document

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(Heintze 2000: 18). Because the subject of autonomy is always a group, the recognition of minority groups and response to collective demands within a state is an important issue in the deliberation of autonomy arrangements. In contrast, non-territorial forms of autonomy are generally invoked when group members are not concentrated in a single geographical area and thus where territorial solutions are not feasible. The rights or entitlements protected under such autonomy arrangements may include the preservation and promotion of the religious, linguistic or cultural character of the minority through the creation of institutions representative of the minority. Certain competences may be delegated to these institutions, such as education, media and religion, insofar as they are essential to the group’s identity. However, as this discussion is primarily interested in territorial interests and representation, it will concentrate on territorial forms of autonomy. To summarise, territorial autonomy may be defined as the constitutional recognition of a distinctive group by the state through the delegation of administrative and legislative functions to territorial institutions representing the group. Yet we must be aware that in most accounts of autonomy arrangements, there is what some scholars call a ‘descriptive fallacy’: the notion that autonomy should correspond to, and be measurable against, an independent and objective reality (Walker 2003). Autonomy is ordinarily seen as a fixed and ascertainable state of affairs, or an ‘institutional fact’ (Werner and De Wilde 2001). However, as political geographers have argued, institutions and state boundaries are not static (Paasi 2001), meaning that autonomy is constantly negotiated – it is a process of negotiation derived from recognition and claims. This requires us to consider how territory is socially constructed, and to look at how territorial elites use devolved institutions to pursue political, economic and cultural projects in order to be self-determining not only in an ‘institutional’ sense, but also in a real-power sense. Positive liberty: capacity to act

Whilst autonomy may be associated with the constitutional arrangements of substate territories, it is also necessary to account for a substate territory’s capacity to achieve certain ends, such as the ability to control economic development, to innovate in social policy, or to protect minority languages. We must therefore distinguish between autonomy and the ability to realise it. Political scientists working in the field of urban politics have drawn our attention to what they call governing capability or capacity (Stone

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1989; Keating 1991). Stone defines an urban regime as a governing coalition, a ‘set of arrangements or relationships (informal as well as formal) by which a community is governed’ (Stone 2006: 28). They are neither fixed over time, nor possess clearly demarcated boundaries. The regime is less dependent on power over, a form of domination or conflict in the Weberian sense, than power to, a form of empowerment that entails building the capacity of the political community to act together to pursue common aims and to solve problems. This type of cooperative politics is crucial to the organisation of sustainable urban regimes, which comprise myriad actors with changing preferences, but which must agree upon technical solutions to problems. Gualini (2005) advances a similar interpretation of the collective mobilisation and facilitation aspects of governing capacity. He understands capacity as the ‘enabling dimension of institutions related to their ability to sustain social cohesion and to generate collective action’ (Gualini 2005: 295). This includes the capacity to exert influence on policy directions, and to mobilise resources for the local community. The notion of empowerment and the ‘capacity’ of a political community to act together to achieve certain ends is also evident in Keating’s (1991) earlier work on urban politics. Drawing on Stone’s distinction between problem-solving politics and conflict-based politics, he examines the form and factors determining the ‘governing capacity’ of local political arrangements, which implies ‘the ability of elected councils to manage social and economic change’ (Keating 1991). In order to effect and manage such change, governing coalitions must be able to formulate policies and to mobilise resources behind their implementation. This is determined by a number of structural and political constraints, such as the formal structure and powers of local government, control of the instruments of public services, and the constraints of the external economic environment (ibid.: 6–10). Whilst some scholars such as Gurr and King (1987) have emphasised the importance of a local government’s autonomy from higher levels of government to pursue local social and economic interests, Keating argues that the capacity to realise policy aims does not always require legislative autonomy. In fact it may flourish under conditions of state centralisation. It is possible for both local and higher-level governments to increase their capacity simultaneously, not only at the expense of the other. Centralisation does not necessarily entail the reduction in local government capacity, but state and local governments may enjoy ‘relative degrees of autonomy or dependence on each other’ (Keating 1991: 6). In his later work, Keating expands this framework to tackle the question of regional power: ‘regional autonomy means

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something more than having formal powers and competences devolved from the central state. It requires the ability to mount a distinct development project and to insert the region into the new networks of policy making spanning the public-private boundaries and crossing state borders’ (Keating et al. 2003: 33). Therefore, territorial capacity may be understood as the ability of a territorial entity to mount territorial projects, to control resources and to pursue informal channels of influence through networking and brokerage. It is clear, then, that territorial actors not only seek autonomy in the formal sense, but also the capacity to make decisions, to devise and implement policies, and to act in different political spheres. Increasing territorial capacity does not imply the declaration of a monopoly over political authority, but the ability to exert authority within a variety of different spheres. These spheres are not necessarily restricted to the boundaries of the territory – such as the safeguarding of language rights. Instead, increasing the capacity of the region also involves acting outwith the boundaries of the territory by engaging in transnational networks and projecting the region into international markets. In particular, European integration processes have created new challenges and opportunities for realising territorial interests, as well as altering the relations of dependence and autonomy between regional, state and supranational levels.

Territorial strategies in a multi-level system

As we have seen so far, legal and political science scholars predominantly frame autonomy and capacity demands in the context of state sovereignty. Autonomy is negotiated within a state, arising from the decision of a state to allocate a degree of self-government to one or more of its constituent parts, whilst increasing capacity involves the pursuit of territorial projects that may diverge from the state. This state-centric approach becomes inadequate, however, in explaining how autonomy may exist within a transnational or supranational framework. As the nature of the state changes due to pressures arising from supranational integration and decentralisation, the importance of state boundaries is simultaneously de-emphasised. This means that autonomy can stretch across one or more states (such as the Basque Country) or transcend them (calls for autonomy by the Roma, for instance, that ignore state boundaries). Moreover, regional parties have indicated that they wish to pursue autonomy within Europe, raising a host of complexities for understanding constitutional rights within a supranational framework. Who ‘grants’ the

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autonomy or offers brokerage deals, and how may these powers be exercised? In the first instance, autonomy may be attributed to the suprastate political system itself. The transformation of political authority in Europe, resulting from integration and decentralisation, means that the territorial claims of substate actors are no longer confined to the state. Substate territorial actors are now searching for forms of autonomy that are less clear-cut than independent statehood. The European level constitutes a new focus of demands for autonomy, which have included a Europe of the Regions or the Peoples, or a Federal Europe. However, how might suprastate political institutions grant formal (institutional) autonomy to substate territorial groups? Bullain (1998: 346) argues that at this point ‘we depart from a concept of autonomy the sphere of influence of which is framed by the state’. In broadening the legal definitions to include the European dimension, autonomy would imply the actual delegation of regulatory powers from central authorities – here perhaps the institutions of the European Union – to the institutions of the autonomous region. This may lead to a dead end, however, as there has been reluctance by the EU to recognise formal ‘rights’ to territorial autonomy. Despite the EU’s encouragement of greater regional participation in European institutions, this does not amount to the constitutional recognition that some substate actors so desire. But this is where our understanding of the capacity-enhancing strategy may prove more useful. It may be argued that the EU provides a new context for substate units to act and pursue their territorial projects. European integration has opened up functional and political spaces in which substate actors may operate. This means that authority may be re-constructed on a basis that does not necessarily correspond to the state. Europe also provides new systems of action for territorial actors, enabling them to pursue capacity-building strategies such as increasing resources, controlling regional policy and enhancing representation. As Bullain (1998: 355) states, ‘the conception of political autonomy within the states needs to be adapted to the new political supra-state frame. This implies a need to connect the autonomous units to the European institutions . . . that increasingly adopt normative decisions over sectors of autonomous competence’. This requires re-thinking the nature of territorial politics, whereby state sovereignty or even constitutional rights are no longer the main issue. This is evident in two ways. Firstly, the state no longer provides the main point of reference for territorial demands and most (nationalist and regionalist) parties indicate that they do not seek statehood. Second, territorial actors are seeking representation, influence and resources from

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supranational institutions, which entails the capacity to act rather than claims to constitutional rights. It has been argued that the EU opens up new possibilities for informal (or ‘soft’) power arrangements (Keating 2005). The fluid and open-ended nature of the EU system enables a wide range of actors to play an influential role in decision-making. Moreover, the EU offers a number of subsidies and protection to substate territorial actors seeking to expand their economic capacity. It may be considered more lucrative for substate actors to lobby EU institutions to access these resources, rather than seeking only funds and protection from the state. Moreover, substate actors may seek to establish coalitions, become involved in networks, set up trade missions or make more specific demands such as the protection of minority languages with recourse to the European Court of Justice. In order to achieve these goals, regions are seeking greater participation in European institutions and networks in order to give voice to their territorial interests. This means that the capacity for territorial political actors to act in systems of multi-level governance may in some cases be considered more important than obtaining constitutional rights. At the same time, it would be wrong to assume that regions seek only to increase their participation in European arenas, or to posit that all regions view the processes of European integration in a positive light. As Jeffery (2004) has shown, whilst some regions have argued for Europe to ‘let them in’, others have demanded that Europe ‘leave them alone’. Some regions feel themselves to be disempowered by European integration because of the way that competences are demarcated between the member states and Europe. To that end, their ‘capacity’ strategies may involve erecting barriers to Europe to prevent their competences from being transferred upwards.

Classification of territorial strategies

The previous discussion advanced the argument that territorial strategies may involve demands for constitutional recognition, as well as the capacity to mount territorial projects. In the next section, drawing on the ‘peripheral aims’ model of Rokkan and Urwin (1983) and the ‘self-government demands’ classification of De Winter and Türsan (1998), a classification of autonomist strategies is constructed. Autonomy strategies are arranged on a continuum from unitarism to independence. Following this, consideration is given to the capacity strategies of parties, which are of a socioeconomic, political or cultural nature. The aims of capacity strategies are to shape policy, control resources and secure representation. These

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policy demands inform and cut across the main constitutional demands in several ways. Autonomy strategies

An autonomy strategy seeks to institutionalise a new jurisdictional division of authority between territorial units in order to meet demands for recognition and powers by territorial actors. The categories of unitarism, unionism, devolution, federalism and independence are employed to account for the constitutional autonomy demands of political parties. These classes may be considered in succession based on their ‘radicalism’, using a scalar procedure, i.e. unitarism–separatism. It is important to bear in mind that these categories are ideal types in the classic Weberian sense, and that political parties may move from one position to another in response to changing circumstances. Unlike, say, the left–right cleavage in politics (though this is also coming under question), parties do not always have fixed, permanent positions on territorial issues. They may switch from one demand to another at different times, and different sections of parties may even endorse more than one autonomy aim. Unitarism

The creation or maintenance of a unitarist state, based on the Jacobin model, lies at one end of the territorial spectrum. Rokkan and Urwin (1983: 141) categorise this as the ‘full integration’ of a territory within a state, where there is no recognition of cultural, political or economic distinctiveness. Although none of the substate parties examined in the case studies advocate a unitarist solution as a territorial strategy, there have been attempts by state actors, such as the Italian Communist and Socialist Parties in the late 1940s and 1950s, to create a centralised unitarist model. In the case analyses, we shall examine how the regional branches of statewide parties and other substate parties have responded to these centralising efforts. Unionism

For those seeking to maintain the unity of the state, however, unionism is the proffered option. This is usually associated with a monopoly of power at the centre and, concomitantly, resistance to constitutionally recognising the identities of minority nations or regional communities, as this may constitute a threat to the integrity of the state. Yet despite overriding support for the centralisation of political institutions, unionists may in fact give recognition to a region through non-constitutional means, such as

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creating substate administrative institutions or preserving distinct educational systems, which do not challenge state sovereignty or lead to the ‘slippery slope’ of independence. Parties supporting unionism may therefore oppose granting constitutional rights to regions but be in favour of acknowledging regional interests and identities in a more culturally or economically oriented way, which allows them to engage in the pursuit of territorial policy goals. Advocates of unionism may also argue that regions are better represented through the state, and that access to the centre is more important than legislative autonomy. Devolution

This form of autonomy implies the decentralisation of administrative or legislative powers to a specific substate territorial unit. Devolution may entail the creation of elected regional parliaments and regional governments with executive, legislative and/or fiscal powers (which may be exclusive or shared with the central government). What distinguishes devolution from federalism is the fact that the substate territory in question is treated differently from the rest of the state. Therefore, parties that pursue devolution strategies ‘are not federalist in the sense that they demand greater autonomy purely for their own region’ (De Winter and Türsan 1998: 205). Another important aspect of devolution is that the making of demands may be a continuous process of negotiation with the central government for more and more powers in order to serve territorial policy interests and to maximise influence, rather than an end in itself. (Though the same might also be said for federalism, which some scholars argue should not be seen as a static system characterised by a fixed division of powers, but as a process of federalising – a continual negotiation of authority that is marked by both cooperation and competition (Friedrich 1968: 7).) In any case, regional government arrangements ordinarily involve the transfer of certain domestic competences to the region (often done in an asymmetrical fashion if other territorial units within the state are also furnished with devolved powers), such as health, education, economic development, planning and transport, whilst the central state has control over foreign relations, defence and monetary policy. Federalism

The goal of federalism, which involves transforming a unitary or devolved state into a federal state, requires not only giving a degree of self-government to the territory in question, but to all regions in the state. As Riker understands it, federalism is ‘a political organization in which the activities of government are divided between regional governments and a

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central government in such a way that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes the final decision’ (Riker 1975: 101). Importantly, authority is divided in such a way that neither government level may ‘trespass upon, override or remove the competence of the other’ (Walker 2000: 390). In this sense, federalism is institutionally a more radical demand than regionalism, as it alters the organisation of the entire structure of the state (De Winter 1998: 205). Yet it could also be argued that federalism is a politically weaker demand than regionalism, as it does not give recognition to the specifics of regional identities and cultures, but rather subsumes them within a larger programme of decentralisation where each region is made equal. Federalism in this understanding implies a mode of political organisation that unites separate polities within the overarching political framework of the state, rather than recognising or valorising the distinctiveness of one region’s specifics over another. Many federalists, for instance, abhor what they consider to be narrow-minded nationalism or regionalism, which they believe makes a claim to special treatment. Others believe that federalism may accommodate different types of cultures within a plurinational state, and that regionalism can be open, tolerant and progressive. An important aspect of federalism is the concept of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity has been interpreted in a number of ways, but generally implies that decision-making should be taken at the lowest, most appropriate level possible. However, there is often disagreement between advocates of federalism regarding what the ‘appropriate’ level should be: the state, region, province or commune. Moreover, there is disagreement as to how far regions may be able to diverge in policy. For that reason, I have introduced two ideal types of federalism in the following case analysis: centralising federalism, which emphasises the concentration of powers at the centre (and the standardisation of policies across regions); and decentralising federalism, which lays stress on bringing decisionmaking powers down to the lowest possible level and allowing for divergence between different territorial units – be they states (in a European context), regions, provinces or communes. The latter also accentuates the need to define and limit the autonomy and policy reach of the centre. Independence

Independence involves the full separation of the region from the rest of the country, and its establishment as an independent sovereign state with full powers over its internal and external affairs. In this sense, it is a much clearer option that devolution, which may cover a variety of different

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institutional forms with varying degrees of dependence. It is also possible for parties to adopt an end-strategy of independence, whilst pursuing in the meantime a gradualist approach that increases the powers of the territory. However, it could also be argued that goals for independence are less straightforward than they initially seem. Claims to absolute independence over one’s own affairs have come into doubt given that states – old as well as newly established – are undergoing a rescaling of their authority due to globalisation and supranational integration. Scholars have questioned why substate actors continue to demand independence when the very concept of state sovereignty is losing its meaning (Tierney 2005: 161). For instance, if we define sovereignty as consisting of ‘a plausible claim to ultimate authority made on behalf of a particular polity’ (Walker 2002: 345; emphasis added), how much sovereignty can a state in the European Union now claim to exercise, when many of its competences have been shifted upwards? Keating (2005) and Tierney (2005) argue that in response to these developments, some parties seeking independence have developed more nuanced goals, which include seeking a larger political or economic ‘external framework’ for the newly formed independent state, such as the European Union or the North American Free Trade Agreement, or seeking complex constitutional arrangements within and beyond the state. This is especially important if the territory possesses a small population and few resources, and its chances of survival, or being able to maintain pre-independence standards of living, have been questioned. Capacity strategies

Having examined the ideal types of constitutional goals available to substate political parties, it is now necessary to consider the second type of territorial strategy, which is the capacity to realise territorial interests. In the face of globalising and Europeanising trends, capacity goals may include a greater say over the type of socioeconomic development being pursued, to control and shape cultural policy, and to exert authority within a variety of different spheres. This discussion therefore distinguishes between three dimensions of capacity goals: political representation in higher levels of decision-making, cultural policy, and socioeconomic policy and resources. Let us examine these themes in greater detail. Political capacity

The first dimension of capacity strategies involves seeking political representation. Whilst this is usually perceived as an aspect of autonomy (e.g. the Åland Islands have formal representation in the Nordic Council as

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a result of their autonomous status within Finland), this is not always the case. For instance, increasing representation within state institutions may come at the expense of autonomy. Keating (1998) argues that territorial actors may seek privileged access to the centre, to influence state decision-making with respect to territorial concerns. Furthermore, in foreign policy matters, substate actors may wish to strengthen their representation within state delegations to supranational and international institutions. This involves seeking more access, and integrating into, state institutions rather than bypassing the state to achieve maximum political representation and influence in decision-making. Political capacity strategies involve practices associated with the term ‘paradiplomacy’. This refers to the activities of substate elites in seeking to foster external relations, either in cooperation or confrontation with state policies. In the latter case, this involves bypassing state boundaries and challenging the traditional monopoly of states over foreign relations (Aldecoa and Keating 1999). Paradiplomatic activities include seeking diplomatic representation in other states and official representation in international and supranational institutions such as UNESCO and the Council of Europe, setting up regional offices in Brussels, engaging in transnational lobbying associations such as Regions with Legislative Powers (RegLeg) and undertaking trade and cooperation agreements and partnerships with other regions and states. As Loughlin (2000) argues, such activities can either be seen as impinging upon the prerogatives of state governments in international affairs, leading to tensions between the two levels, or state governments can encourage paradiplomacy as it may bring economic benefits to the region and thus to the state as a whole. Constitutional autonomy is not a prerequisite for engaging in paradiplomatic activities in order to enhance a region’s capacity to act in international affairs. This is evident in the (non-legislative) English regions’ participation in the EU Committee of the Regions. Cultural capacity

Capacity strategies may be employed to achieve cultural aims. For instance, territorial strategies may be motivated by concerns for linguistic protection, cultural reproduction, distinctiveness of regional education systems and the control of mass media (Gellner 1983; Williams 1997; Erk 2003; Laponce 2003). In seeking linguistic protection, strategies could include demands for unilingualism, which was supported by the Parti Québécois, or effective language legislation, a policy of Plaid Cymru. Here, it is important to note that linguistic and cultural issues are closely linked to economic resources. A major concern for Welsh and Québécois parties has been to secure the

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survival of their language in a sea of English-speakers (McRoberts 1988; Levine 1990; Williams 1997). Minority-language speakers may find it difficult to find adequate employment, or even may be institutionally discriminated against (for instance in Quebec until the 1960s), requiring language legislation that would re-enforce the minority language in the public and private sectors. With respect to cultural reproduction, territorial actors may demand the creation of barriers to halt the inflow of immigrants into national communities, which are perceived as the source of ‘dilution’ of traditional cultures. This has famously been the case with the Lega Nord, which enacted a series of legislative measures designed to reduce immigration to (Northern) Italy in order to protect the Celtic and Christian identity of ‘Padania’ (Zaslove 2004; Hepburn 2009a). Contrarily, territorial actors may perceive the integration of immigrants as a method of reinforcing cultural reproduction, in order to grow the population of the region and strengthen territorial claims, which was an argument used by the Catalan Convergence and Union Party (Convergència i Unió – CiU) (Hepburn 2009a). Territorial actors may also seek to control education and media policy to strengthen cultural capacity (Erk 2003). These policy areas are central to maintaining a distinct identity, by enabling the teaching of regional history in schools, developing curricula that follow local traditions or meet the needs of the local workforce through vocational training, and shaping policy on print media and radio and TV broadcasting to focus on local interests and develop a sense of ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1991). Again, these cultural capacity aims do not necessarily require constitutional autonomy. Scotland famously maintained a distinct educational system following the Treaty of Union with England in 1707 (Paterson 1994) and the Welsh language was actively promoted in schools and given the status of equality with English through a number of Welsh Language Acts from 1967–93, prior to devolution (Keating et al. 2009). The protection of local cultures and languages may be understood as part of a broader social project that is underpinned by the desire to sustain the territory as a unit of identity. Socioeconomic capacity

Capacity strategies may involve seeking to develop a socioeconomic project for the territory. For those regions whose economic status is superior to the rest of the country, such aims may be to reduce their financial contributions to the centre, culminating in a ‘revolt of the rich’. In contrast, regions whose socioeconomic status is below the state average may seek

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protectionism and increased resources from the centre to improve economic performance and public services. Territorial capacity strategies may therefore be designed to alleviate the economic deprivation created by uneven development and to address regional economic inequalities (Nairn 1977; Hechter and Levi 1979). This may require seeking economic policy concessions or resources from the state, in order to ‘catch up’ or converge with the rest of the state (Rokkan and Urwin 1983). However, economic goals are not only a matter of the territorial distribution of wealth in states. They also have to do with having a greater say over the type of socioeconomic development pursued. Regional actors may articulate distinct socio-economic programmes that valorise local traditions and cultures, and which are in line with local norms of development. This may involve developing more progressive and egalitarian social policies in line with regional perceptions of the common good (McEwen 2002; Béland and Lecours 2006). Finally, economic goals may seek to raise their competitive advantage vis-à-vis the state and other regions in Europe or internationally, with the creation of the concomitant institutional structures, fiscal and tax powers to do so. Capacity strategies are therefore characterised by a mix of political, cultural and economic markers (see Figure 2.1). These may be highlighted at different times in order to pursue the most pressing goals of the day, such as securing control over cultural policy, increasing economic resources or enhancing political representation. Territorial actors may also use brokerage tactics, by negotiating their ability to control resources and influence decision-making with state or supranational actors, which are often pursued simultaneously with autonomy strategies, and sometimes instead of them. The latter tactic would involve a trade-off between autonomy and capacity.

Trading off autonomy for capacity

Whilst some scholars conflate the concepts of autonomy and capacity (Christopolous 2006), or argue that building capacity is dependent upon having autonomy (Loughlin 2000), the previous discussion has shown that this is not always the case. It is possible to increase the political, cultural and socioeconomic capacity of a substate territory without exercising constitutional rights. For example, to take the case of pre-devolution UK, this was evident in Welsh language protection, the representation of English regions in the European Committee of the Regions, and the maintenance of a distinct Scottish educational system – which were

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Figure 2.1

Territorial strategies of substate political actors

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achieved without constitutional autonomy. However, as well as separating these two types of strategies analytically, it is also necessary to analyse the relationship between them. In particular, it may be the case that substate territorial actors are forced to choose between the two strategies, which requires making a trade-off between constitutional autonomy and policy capacity. Building territorial capacity may require increased access to the state rather than more autonomy from it, in order to secure representation in state institutions, economic and policy concessions, and other forms of state protection. This requires substate territorial actors to develop and manipulate linkages and interdependencies with the state in order to gain influence and control resources. In this case, increased access to the centre and more control over regional–state linkages may seem more important to substate territorial elites than semi-independence, particularly in periods of economic decline (Keating 1988: 129). Substate actors may be keen to obtain ‘real’ control over policy areas such as the economy, planning, and social policy, in exchange for constitutional recognition. This type of brokerage politics is also preferable for states, as offering specific policy benefits is less of a threat to territorial integrity than constitutional rights. In delegating powers to the periphery, and extending its sphere of influence, the state still has the last word in deciding how far the territory may act independently or diverge in policy, whereas formal autonomous arrangements may remove the state’s control in a number of legislative areas. Therefore, territorial mobilisation is not only about seeking autonomy from the state, but also the capacity to act, which might require working through the state in order to obtain policy benefits. This involves trading off autonomy from the state for access to the centre in order to increase capacity. ‘Access’ may be pursued for three separate aims: influence, resources and protection from the centre. First, territorial capacity may be enhanced if substate actors can exercise greater influence within state institutions to secure political representation within state delegations and protect territorial interests in the fields of, for instance, cultural or economic policy. This indicates a trade-off between autonomy and influence at the centre. Regions may also seek the receipt of transfer payments, subsidies and policy concessions from the state to enhance their economic capacity, indicating a trade-off between autonomy and resources from the centre. Finally, substate actors may find that it is not more autonomy from the state that they need when confronting European and global pressures, but rather protection from the market and a shield from unwanted external encroachments in the area of common sectoral policies

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or immigration. This implies a trade-off between autonomy and protection by the centre. The different aims of trading off autonomy for access to the centre are captured in Figure 2.2. The following chapters will explore the way in which parties pursue different territorial strategies, and how these strategies are influenced by changing political processes at different levels. For some territorial actors, this may involve using Europe to bypass the state (to receive economic resources, representation or even recognition), but for others, playing the multi-level political game requires using the state in order to protect the region from processes of European integration. In both cases, it is necessary to explore the pursuit of territorial strategies at all three levels in a multi-level system, and the ways in which substate actors reconcile their autonomy and capacity goals in order to advance territorial interests.

Conclusions

As this chapter has shown, territorial strategies may include demands for more constitutional autonomy, as well as increased policy capacity to control resources. The creation of multi-level political systems in Europe has created more nuanced patterns of territorial politics, in which parties are seeking the accommodation of their autonomy and identity within the shifting state and transnational order. European integration has influenced the constitutional and policy goals of parties, and has been used in support of territorial political projects. It is no longer the case that all politicised

Figure 2.2

Benefits of access to the centre

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territories seek their own states (or autonomy within an existing one), as has been assumed in much of the literature. Instead, different types of strategy range from political self-determination to increased economic concessions. The way in which regional parties integrate their constitutional and policy goals will now be explored in the case analyses. The following chapters begin by examining how parties compete in a multi-dimensional policy space, how they construct territorial interests, and what kind of trade-off between capacity and autonomy was negotiated with the state. The case study discussions then consider how regional parties have developed territorial strategies in response to European integration. Demands for constitutional autonomy are separated from demands for increased policy capacity. In the first instance, the ideal types of constitutional categories identified above will be used as a basis for examining how parties have altered their goals for autonomy, and repositioned themselves along the ‘territorial spectrum’ in the face of deepening European integration. Following this, consideration is given to how Europe has affected the capacity dimension of territorial strategies. The main focus is on the socioeconomic programmes of substate parties in Europe, though cultural and political capacity goals are also considered. The aim is to explore how European policies are perceived to give advantage to, or disadvantage territorial interests, and how substate parties use Europe to get what they want. Furthermore, the extent to which the EU has become a new centre of decision-making and source of funding alongside that of the state will also be considered.

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3 Scottish party responses to Europe and devolution

Introduction

In the last 30 years, European integration has presented a new set of political challenges and opportunities for the exercise of Scottish self-determination. Yet the issue of constitutional change has been a constant fixture in Scottish politics since the turn of the twentieth century. The involvement of Scotland’s parties in issues of autonomy and the defence of Scottish interests has reflected an important territorial dimension to Scottish politics. Contrary to many assumptions, the independence-seeking Scottish National Party (SNP) was not the only political actor in Scotland to realise the electoral potential of nationalism. Rather, the SNP’s monopoly over national identity politics in the 1960s and 1970s gave way to a complexity of political actors involved in articulating competing constructs of the ‘national question’ (Mitchell 1996). Each of Scotland’s major political parties – the Scottish Labour Party (SLP), the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party (SCUP), the Scottish Liberal Democrats (SLD), and the smaller Scottish Socialist Party (SSP) – has at one time or another claimed to constitute the party of Scotland and has pursued a number of strategies to advance Scotland’s interests in an effort to substantiate that claim. One explanation for this trend towards national identity politics is the realisation of a degree of autonomy in the form of a Scottish Parliament. As a result, Scottish branches of ‘unionist’ parties have, since 1999, been operating in a peculiarly Scottish political context. Devolution of UK political structures has engendered calls for greater policy and organisational autonomy of Scottish branches of statewide parties (Detterbeck and Hepburn 2010). However, this adaptation to multi-level politics was not a sudden phenomenon. A number of factors, including the SNP’s slow rise from peripheral obscurity to forming the government of

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Scotland, compelled other parties to enter the nationalist debate. As a result, parties have become involved in a range of territorial strategies to advance Scottish interests in changing state structures. Crucially, parties were forced to take a position on the hugely contested issue of European integration, which played a central role in Scottish constitutional debates following the enactment of the Single European Act in 1988. State and European structural change presented parties with a complex, multidimensional policy context in which they were required to compete not only on the class dimension, but also on the issues of autonomy and Europe. This chapter explores how Scottish parties have re-positioned themselves in response to domestic constitutional change and supranational integration. It is shown that European integration has greatly influenced Scottish parties’ pursuit of constitutional autonomy and enhanced policy capacity. However, this adaptation has been neither a linear nor a homogenous process. Despite the main issues of European integration remaining constant, Scottish parties have continuously vacillated on the question of deepening economic, political and social integration, and Scotland’s role in shaping these processes.

Political traditions and ideologies in Scotland

Scotland is widely accepted as having distinct political traditions and ideologies within the Union (Fry 1987; Paterson 1994; Bennie et al. 1997; Brown et al. 1996). Whilst party competition in Scotland has been influenced by the historical impact of a two-party system, the Scottish electorate has tended to vote for the party that appeared to best represent Scottish interests in the Union. This has meant that Scottish branches of statewide parties were often perceived, and also acted, differently from their UK counterparts. This has been the cause, as well as consequence, of the need for parties north of the border to cater to Scottish interests within the Union (Brown et al. 1998: 124). Parties are successful when they are seen to maximise Scottish influence and interests in the UK. Throughout the nineteenth century, the main ideological force in Scotland was Liberalism. This effectively brought together two strands of unionist paternalism and interventionist socialism (Fry 1987: 147). The first element drew from the Scottish Presbyterian tradition of church government, the emphasis on ‘common sense’ and the equality of men, as well as a commitment to Scotland’s fruitful place in the Union. The second element was based on social reform, and included the destruction of privilege, the extension of civil liberty and an emphasis on popular

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education. The Liberal Party was able to maintain a hegemonic position in Scotland due to its ability to capture a variety of social platforms whilst catering to Scottish distinctiveness. But it was the division over interpretations of its ‘unionist’ basis that led to its decline. At the end of the nineteenth century the party split on the issue of home rule for Ireland, with the right wing taking over the smaller Conservative Party in Scotland in 1912. The Liberal Party (renamed Liberal Democrats following a merger with the Social Democrats in 1987) was then relegated to third or fourth place in Scottish politics behind the Conservatives, Labour, and later, the Scottish National Party. At the end of the twentieth century, the party’s involvement in the Constitutional Convention and campaigns for a Scottish Parliament helped raise its profile, which secured it the place of Labour’s junior coalition partner in Scotland’s first devolved executive in 1999. At the beginning of the twentieth century the ideology of unionism, best encapsulated by the Scottish Unionist Party, was ascendant in Scotland. Being an independent Scottish party between 1912 and 1965, the Scottish Unionists eschewed the use of the word ‘conservative’, which was regarded as an English phenomenon. Instead, the party drew its electoral appeal from a distinctive Scottish persona, ideology and policies. Furthermore, the Liberals’ influence on the Scottish Unionists meant that the party’s right-wing ideology was supplemented by a belief in state intervention and civic responsibility, endearing the party to the recently enfranchised Protestant working class. Yet the essence of this ideology rested on a belief in the union between Scotland and the rest of the UK, and the need to cater to Scottish distinctiveness. ‘On the one hand, Scotland had to be in the Union to realise its true potential as a nation: thus to be a true nationalist it was necessary to be a unionist. On the other hand, to be a true unionist it was necessary to be a nationalist because, in the absence of a Scottish nationalist assertion, the Union would degenerate into an English takeover of Scotland’ (Brown et al. 1998: 11). Being nationalist as well as unionist did not imply that the Scottish Unionist Party supported Scottish, Welsh or Irish home rule. On the contrary, the party feared that home rule would lead to the break-up of the British Empire, and later the UK. However, the Unionists also understood the UK as constituting a number of distinct national communities. The party’s recognition of the multinational nature of the UK and its policies for Scotland were important in competing with the UK Labour Party, which lacked distinctively Scottish appeal due to its principle of centralising power. However, the party’s increasing dependence on its English counterpart, due to electoral decline in the 1960s and 1970s, caused it to

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partially merge with England and reinsert the word ‘Conservative’ into its title. The Conservatives’ decline in Scotland owed as much to the party’s response to territorial issues as to its socioeconomic policies. As religion lost its power in Scottish politics and the welfare state grew in importance, the Tories’ basis of support – the Protestant working class – transferred their allegiances to Labour. This loss of support was compounded by the newly christened Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party’s (SCUP) inability to articulate a Scottish brand of Conservatism. Whilst the Scottish Tories were once able to combine unionism and territorial particularism as two sides of the same coin, this strategy came to an abrupt end upon the election of Margaret Thatcher as leader of the UK party in 1975. The Scottish Tories were handicapped by Thatcher’s desire to free the party from the ‘painful hook’ of recognising national identities within the UK (Thatcher 1995: 322), which undermined the distinct Scottish unionist ideology. Instead, Thatcher espoused the vision of a unitary state whereby assimilation became the key requirement for free-market liberalisation, an economic project that lay in opposition to the Scottish commitment to the post-war welfare settlement (McEwen 2002). Thatcher repeatedly declared her opposition to devolution, and her disdain of concessions to regional (Scottish) needs and interests (Kellas 1990: 428; Bennie et al. 1997: 68). It was a combination of the popular hostility to Thatcher’s unitarist project, in addition to a widespread rejection of her neoliberal policies, which catalysed a surge in nationalism, advanced calls for constitutional reform, and unified social-democratic parties in support of devolution. When Thatcher came to power in the 1970s, the predominant ideology in Scotland since the decline of the Unionist Party was socialism – or more specifically Labourism (in the form of Labour Party values). The success of this ideology may be interpreted as a continuation of the socially progressive ideas pursued by the radical Liberal Party in Scotland and later accommodated by the Scottish Unionists through their emphasis on common sense, which ‘fused economic individualism with a collectivist intent’ (Brown et al. 1998: 133). These long historical strands of social democracy in Scotland were in the 1950s best captured by Labour, which became the largest party in Scotland and so remained until May 2007, when it was overtaken by the SNP in the Scottish Parliament election (see Table 3.1). However, Labour took a long time to win this social-democratic vote, partly because of the strength of the Liberals. In fact, the first Scottish Labour Party was established in 1888 by Keir Hardie, a former Liberal who was dissatisfied with the party’s inability to turn itself into a left-wing workers’ party. Following the ‘Red Clydeside’ agitation in

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the early 1920s, which involved widespread strikes over housing, wages and conscription, Labour became the most attractive political vehicle for pursuing the demands of the radicalised Scottish working class. Labour was arguably continuing the Scottish traditions of corporatism and intervention that were practised by the radical Liberals and Unionists before them. During the time of Labour ascendance, what marked a break from previous eras in Scottish politics was the emergence of a specifically nationalist party, the SNP, whose denunciation of all things ‘unionist’ moved the main battle lines of party competition from left vs. right politics (where both sides could accommodate nationalism) to left vs. nationalist politics (which was a cause and consequence of the decline of the Tories, which represented the right). This was not a straightforward development, especially as the SNP began to adopt a left-wing mantle, whilst Labour itself harboured nationalist tendencies. Labour had a long history of supporting home rule. Indeed, Keir Hardie, founder of the Scottish Labour Party, was an enthusiast of Scottish self-determination. However, home rule was also seen to undermine Labour’s support of centralised planning and nationalisation. The party had its base in working-class interests, and it believed that the economic allocation of resources should be decided on the grounds of need rather than on regional pressures. This led to the policy of home rule being dropped in the 1920s, 1940s and late 1950s, and it has since exhibited a cyclical quality (Keating and Bleiman 1979). Turmoil in the 1970s, caused by the resurgence of political nationalism in Scotland, forced the Labour Party to reconsider its centralist ideology. A breakaway party was formed that sought to fuse socialism with nationalism (which called itself the Scottish Labour Party, not to be confused with the then Scottish Council of the Labour Party), and other factions within the party were vociferous in their calls for greater Scottish autonomy. In response, Labour found it necessary to devise strategies to accommodate its regional branches’ distinctive identities, which would enable them to compete more effectively with nationalist parties (McEwen 2004). In 1979 a referendum on devolution, hurriedly introduced by the Labour government to defuse the threat of secession, was defeated. Thereafter, Scottish Labour moved towards a clearer commitment to home rule and some of its members became active in the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly (CSA) in the 1980s. Initially, the party gave the CSA’s proposals for a Constitutional Convention a ‘guarded welcome’ but in time this developed into full-fledged support (Newell 1998: 110). In 1989, Labour MPs signed a declaration that directly challenged the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty: ‘We, gathered as the Scottish Constitutional

16

3

0

8.3

0

Other

Cons

24.7

11

LibDem

41

30.4

SNP

Seats

Labour 36.3

% vote

0

9.0

31.4

17.3

41.5

% vote

0

3

22

2

44

Seats

1979

0

24.5

28.4

11.8

35.1

% vote

1983

0

8

21

2

41

Seats

0

19.2

24.0

14.0

42.4

% vote

0

9

10

3

50

Seats

1987

1

13.1

25.7

21.5

39.0

% vote

0

9

11

3

49

Seats

1992

1.9

13.0

17.5

22.1

45.6

% vote

0

10

0

6

56

Seats

1997

4.8

15.6

16.3

20.1

43.3

% vote

1

10

1

5

55

Seats

2001

5.0

22.6

15.8

17.7

38.9

% vote

1

11

1

6

40

Seats

2005

12:12

Oct. 1974

UK general election results in Scotland, October 1974–2005

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Table 3.1

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Convention, do hereby acknowledge the sovereign right of the Scottish people to determine the form of government best suited to their needs.’ Through its involvement in the broad church of the CSA, Labour was able to re-assert its position as the party of Scotland, and carry forth the ‘mandate’ conferred on it by the Scottish people (The Herald, 13 June 1987). This claim, however, was vigorously challenged by Scotland’s main nationalist party. Although nationalism was a constant force in Scottish politics from the late 1800s, finding a vehicle in the Scottish Home Rule Association and the Scottish Covenant Association, political nationalism did not make a breakthrough in Scottish politics until the 1970s. In October 1974, the Scottish National Party polled 30 per cent of the general election vote in Scotland, exploiting the discovery of oil in the North Sea adjacent to Scotland the previous year (see Figure 3.1). The oil campaign made the option of Scottish independence appear economically feasible for voters, as national self-determination was assured by non-UK subsidised wealth (Miller 1981: 60). The SNP’s electoral success forced British parties to take the Scottish dimension more seriously, yet the party itself was divided on how to achieve the goal of self-determination. One group within the SNP, known as ‘gradualists’, sought to augment decentralising measures to advance Scottish independence, whilst fundamentalists demanded ‘independence nothing less’ and argued that devolution limited the aspirations of those who sought to establish a Scottish state.

Figure 3.1

SNP performance in UK, Scottish Parliament and European elections, 1974–2009

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The rivalry between the gradualist and fundamentalist wings of the party to a large extent determined the SNP’s responses to the devolution referendums of 1979 and 1997. In the first referendum, the party provided only tentative support for a ‘yes’ vote, viewing the referendum as a Labour strategy to undermine demands for independence. The separate campaigns and outright hostility between pro-devolution parties sent a confusing message to voters. Whilst a majority of Scots did vote in favour of constitutional change, their number did not meet the required 40 per cent and proposals for an Assembly failed (see Table 3.2). During the second referendum in 1997, introduced by the new Labour government, the SNP supported the consensual scheme, which was seen as a useful progression from the status quo. The SNP put its full political weight and resources behind a ‘yes-yes’ campaign organised by Scotland FORward, which was being spearheaded by Labour and the Liberal Democrats. Thus the group was able to create a unified campaign for a successful double-yes vote, which won the support of 74.3 per cent of the electorate in favour of establishing a Scottish Parliament, with 63.5 per cent in favour of tax-varying powers (see Table 3.2). The Scotland FORward alliance also highlighted some interesting parallels between the SNP and Scottish Labour positions, with both parties advocating a devolutionist, broadly centre-left and post-Thatcherite agenda.

Table 3.2

Overall results of Scottish devolution referendums 1979

YES NO Turnout

1997

Scottish Parliament?

Scottish Parliament?

With tax-varying powers?

% vote

% electorate

% vote

% electorate

% vote

% electorate

51.6 48.4 64%

32.9 30.8

74.3 25.7 60%

45.7 15.8

63.5 36.5

38.9 22.4

The SNP and Labour’s positions on the territorial and left/right dimensions have not always been so similar. As Labour swung back and forth on the home rule debate throughout the twentieth century, so the SNP moved from left to right on the ideological spectrum in an effort to maximise its support amongst the Scottish electorate (Lynch 2009). These ideological tensions have their roots in the merger between the right-wing Scottish Party and the left-wing National Party of Scotland, which formed the SNP in 1934. At first these were resolved by taking no clear ideological stance, and instead

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emphasising the SNP’s inclusive nature as a ‘broad church’. However, by the 1960s, the party began adopting clearer policy positions, and the election of Billy Wolf as party leader saw the party move to a more explicitly left-of-centre standing. The motivation behind this strategy was to challenge the dominant political position of Labour. Although there was resistance within the party to defining the SNP as ‘leftist’, the SNP continued to articulate a socialdemocratic position throughout the 1980s. This was demonstrated by the party’s anti-poll tax stance and its exploitation of anti-Tory sentiments in Scotland. These two strands formed part of a larger strategy to fight Labour on the grounds that Scotland was a ‘working-class’ area. Furthermore, the election of the ‘self-confessed socialist’ Alex Salmond as party leader in 1990 moved the party firmly to the left. SNP policies under Salmond included a commitment to nuclear disarmament and progressive personal taxation to redistribute wealth from rich to poor. However, from the late 1990s there were indications of the party moving to centre-right politics. This was evident in the SNP’s move to support business tax cuts in 2003, its strong emphasis on law and order issues, economic growth and business development, and new emphasis on ‘small government’ in its 2003 and 2007 election manifestos, and its efforts to court industry during the 2007 Scottish Parliament election campaign. The SNP’s new ideological flexibility appeared to appeal to voters, who elected 47 SNP MEPs in the 2007 Scottish Parliament elections, enabling the party to form a minority government (see Table 3.3) – the first in the history of the UK with the explicit aim of breaking up the United Kingdom state (Hepburn 2008c). In an analysis of survey data taken from the 1997 Scottish Election and Referendum Surveys, Brown (1998: 18) concluded that the success of the SNP and Labour in Scotland could be partially explained by the dominance of a political discourse that linked Scottish nationalism with left-wing attitudes. This made party contestation over the meaning and merits of devolution versus independence, and the parties’ ability to link these constitutional aims to their ideological discourse, more pertinent to their election battles. However, there are signs that this dynamic is changing, as both parties have seemingly moved to the centre(-right) of the ideological spectrum (Paterson 2002; Lynch 2009), opening up space for other parties to claim the mantle of socialism in Scotland. The Scottish Socialist Party (SSP) was created in 1999, though its roots lie in the Trotskyist Scottish Militant wing within Labour, and the Socialist Workers’ Party. Scotland has a strong tradition of radical leftism, dating back to the Highland Land League in the 1880s, the heyday of Red Clydeside in the 1920s, and the disproportionate strength of the Communist Party of Great Britain north of the border in the 1950s. The

33.6 27.3 15.4 12.4 3.6 2.0 7.0

3 28 18 5 1 1 0

List seats 56 35 18 17 1 1 1

Total seats 34.6 23.8 16.6 15.4 0 6.2 1.5

Con vote % 46 9 3 13 0 0 2

Con seats 29.3 20.9 15.5 11.8 6.9 6.7 2.9

List vote % 4 18 15 4 7 6 2

List seats 50 27 18 17 7 6 4

Total seats 32.2 32.9 16.6 16.2 0.1 0.0 0.1

Con vote % 37 21 4 11 0 0 0

Con seats

29.2 31.0 13.9 11.3 4.0 0.6 4.3

List vote %

9 26 13 5 2 0 1

List seats

46 47 17 16 2 0 1

Total seats

Note: Scottish elections are determined by an Additional Member System (AMS), whereby people may vote for a constituency MSP and also an additional list member, which is designed to make the overall result more proportional. Out of Scotland’s 129 MSPs, 73 are constituency MSPs and 56 are additional members drawn from regional party lists.

53 7 0 12 0 0 1

38.8 28.7 15.6 14.2 0 1.0 1.7

List vote %

2007

12:12

Labour SNP Cons LibDem Greens SSP Other

Con seats

Con vote %

2003

Scottish Parliament election results, 1999–2007

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1999

Table 3.3

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Scottish Socialists, as well as arguing for the rights of the working man and woman, proclaim themselves to be the party of the Scottish people. The party seeks to create an independent Scotland based on socialist values, thus fusing the dominant post-war political traditions of socialism and nationalism in Scotland through its arguments for ‘a socialism that is based on decentralisation, diversity and voluntary co-operation between nations’ (SSP 2004: 3). The SSP claims to be the representative of traditional socialism in Scotland, supporting nationalisation, increased workers’ rights, and the replacement of the council tax with a Scottish Service Tax. Its position took some of the wind from both the SNP and Scottish Labour’s sails – winning the vote of SNP supporters disillusioned with the party’s move to the centre-right, and Labour supporters who believed that New Labour was a mask for the New Right. It emerged with seven seats in the 2003 Scottish Parliament election, winning considerable support amongst the disaffected working class. However, following the party’s split into two camps following leader Tommy Sheridan’s libel case, and the creation of a new party called ‘Solidarity’ in 2006, the Socialists lost all of their seats in the 2007 Scottish Parliament election and the movement seemed once again relegated to the political wilderness. In summary, the success of parties in Scotland from the nineteenth century to the present has been largely determined by their ability to articulate a distinct Scottish party identity whilst catering to Scottish needs and interests within the Union. Furthermore, parties in Scotland have been successful when they were seen to best represent Scottish social preferences. One can trace support for civic responsibility, interventionism, and egalitarianism in each of the four political traditions. These social preferences have underpinned Scotland’s support for the principles of the welfare state, a project that has been linked not only to the rise of socialism, but also to the resurgence of nationalism and the maintenance of unionism in the second half of the twentieth century. There is a strong link between Scottish identity and state welfarism (McEwen 2002; Béland and Lecours 2008), which requires parties to incorporate Scottish social values into their socioeconomic and constitutional proposals. When parties in Scotland did not fully represent, or make concessions to the particularities of Scottish economic, social or cultural life, this resulted in electoral deviations on either side of the border. Since 1959, Scottish voting preferences have diverged from the rest of the UK, heralding the decline of Scottish Unionism, Labour’s consolidation of being Scotland’s most popular party, and the rise of the SNP. From this time onwards, authors have held that the party system in Scotland differed from the rest of the UK (Paterson 1994; Brown et al. 1998; Bogdanor 2001).

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USING EUROPE Party constructions of the Scottish nation

Parties’ rhetorical constructions of the Scottish ‘nation’ are an important aspect of their territorial strategies. But although parties make varying efforts to capture feelings of politicised national identity, none of them vividly depicts the Scottish nation as an ‘imagined community’ with strong emotional and symbolic content as Benedict Anderson (1991) famously described. Rather, the emphasis is on how to obtain status and resources for the territorial collectivity. For the SNP, the Scottish nation is considered a political community that requires sovereign statehood in order to make it a ‘normal nation’. So long as Scotland is considered a ‘region’ of the UK, as it accuses other parties of doing, it will not be in control of its destiny (SNP 1991b). Nationalists rally against the view that Scotland is dependent on England; instead, the SNP envisages Scotland as a rich country with abundant natural resources and a skilled population that could easily overturn its sluggish economic growth and low self-confidence by choosing independence (Salmond 2003). Moreover, the SNP has brought a social-democratic discourse into its nationalist narrative, arguing that independence is the only means of establishing distinct social policies in accordance with Scottish values: ‘the ability to implement policies to make a real difference . . . requires full control of the economy, taxation, social security and employment policy’ (SNP 2003). The SNP argues that it is crucial for Scotland to be viewed in political and economic terms as separate from the UK, and not just a cultural entity within it as some statewide parties maintain. A great deal of attention has been paid to the overtly ‘civic’ character of the SNP. For instance, Hamilton (1999) argues that Scottish political nationalism is a model of associative identity-politics in Europe, whilst Nairn (2000) believes that the SNP has succeeded in recapturing the democratic voice of Scotland. The nation is characterised territorially, and thus anyone can consider themselves able to form that nation by living in it and sharing in its institutions and society. This inclusiveness means that the ‘tariff ’ for being a nationalist is low, and allows the SNP to appeal to the widest possible voting electorate. Non-native-born or blood-descent Scots are included in the Scottish nation, which is demonstrated by the SNP’s affiliated organisations Asian Scots for Independence and New Scots for Independence. The SNP’s definition of national belonging as voluntary participation in a multicultural society also deflects criticism that the party is exclusionary. The party is fearful that any emphasis on birth, tradition or Scottish culture will arouse accusations of narrow ‘ethnic’ nationalism and, to that end, the SNP has refused to imbue Scottish nationhood with

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cultural meaning. This may at first glance be seen as problematic, as political representations of the nation rarely command such profound emotional legitimacy as ascribed cultural meanings. For instance, McCrone (1992: 31) argued that the party’s main problem in its early years was its inability to transform the cultural idea of Scotland into a politically charged one. Yet this has not prevented the SNP from constructing a less contentious and more all-encompassing narrative of Scotland as a territorial, socioeconomic and political entity. And while the SNP continues to articulate its understanding of the Scottish nation as a civic community, other parties have drawn on the cultural appeal of nationalism in order to win electoral support. The Scottish Tories, by contrast, tend to view Scotland as a cultural nation, but not a political community with a strong claim to sovereignty. Whilst the party recognises Scottish nationhood, as being derived from its history, culture and traditions (SCUP 2004), this is firmly placed within the wider political construction of the UK state. Thus former leader David McLetchie (2003) argued that ‘we are a one nation party because we believe in the union – in a Scotland that plays the fullest part in British, European and world affairs’. This fits with the Tories’ constitutional goals, which have moved from opposing a Scottish Parliament (seen as a threat to the Union), to improving the workings of devolution in order to ‘save the Union’. The discourse of ‘one-nationhood’ is also linked to their economic and social policies for Scotland. The Scottish Conservatives argue that the post-war welfare state was a product of one-nation principles, and a means of forging a common loyalty across classes to the British nation. However, the Tories’ approach to public policy in Scotland underwent a major change with the advent of Margaret Thatcher as leader. She maintained that her neoliberal agenda, which broke with the one-nation approach by promoting a flexible, free-market economy with minimal government intervention, actually reinforced rather than undermined Scottish values. Instead of loyalty to state welfarism, she posited that Scots were naturally inclined to individual entrepreneurialism, and she offered a revisionist account of the philosophy of Scottish Enlightenment thinkers such as Adam Smith to support this argument. Thatcher thus attempted to correlate Conservative values with Scottish national identity: ‘Tory values are in tune with everything that is finest in the Scottish character . . . hard work, self-reliance, thrift, enterprise . . . Scottish values are Tory values’.1 Amongst the Scottish public, these arguments fell largely on deaf ears. The mass unemployment in Scotland caused by the closure of local industries, in addition to cutbacks in social security services that many Scots relied upon, led to the Tories being viewed as an English party out of touch with

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Scottish needs. The Scottish Tories, as an administrative branch, were in an awkward position. Although many members of the Scottish branch disagreed with the Thatcherite agenda, they were incapable of forging divergent policies that drew upon the state welfarism of one-nation Conservativism, and therefore suffered a steep decline in electoral support. Post-1999, the Scottish Tories – having gained more autonomy from the UK party – returned to their social-liberal roots, emphasising the Scottish Unionist position of ‘service to others and to the community’, whilst advocating fiscal autonomy to enable the devolved institutions to steer the Scottish economy. The Tories have also utilised Scottish cultural and historical imagery to invoke their claims to best represent Scotland. The Scottish Conservative Party depicted its members signing a ‘Declaration of Arbroath’ at the historic site in its 2004 European election manifesto. In this document, the Tories drew on history and traditions to justify Scotland’s claim to difference: ‘The history of Scotland has been the history of a small country merging with larger entities yet preserving its nationhood . . . The construction of a new European Union will be fatally compromised if it is conceived to be something hostile to and destructive of the national traditions that large and small countries cherish alike’ (SCUP 2004). However, the Conservatives also faced formidable challenges in expressing their political project to the Scottish electorate, due to their perception as an ‘English’ party hostile to any form of Scottish political selfdetermination. Following their electoral wipe-out in 1997, the Scottish Tories ran an internal inquiry to recreate a sense of ‘Scottishness’ and to develop a new ‘tartan distinctiveness to policy making’ (Seawright 2004: 7). This included the party’s acceptance of the principle of devolution, a commitment to ‘win back the trust of the Scottish people’, and a desire to address specifically Scottish aspirations (SCUP 1998, 2003). The Scottish Conservatives were not the only ‘unionist’ party in Scotland to draw upon the language of British nationhood and identity in their rhetoric. Whilst the Conservatives had historically linked unionism with Empire, the Labour Party spoke of Scotland leading the democratic renewal of ‘new Britain’ which was a ‘multicultural, multiethnic and multinational country’ (Brown and Alexander 1999: 4). Within this overarching construct, Scotland was considered one of the three ‘historic nations’ with multiple identities – as Scottish, British and European. Nationhood did not require political independence, which would result in ‘isolation, chaos and uncertainty’ (SLP 1994). Rather, Labour believed Scottish interests were best served in the UK, and for that reason advocated devolution. This position did not preclude Scottish Labour from

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supporting a form of ‘practical’ nationalism or engaging in a discourse of popular sovereignty and self-determination (McEwen 2004). Scottish Labour sought to appeal to a distinctly Scottish identity through its advocacy of Scotland as an historic nation and through its use of certain cultural imagery. For instance, in promoting ‘Tartan Day’ in North America former First Minister Jack McConnell posed in a kilt in New York, yet it would be difficult to argue that such activities are designed to appeal to cultural nationalism per se. Rather, the promotion of Scotland’s culture abroad is motivated by economic concerns – to boost tourism and increase external trade. Labour does not provide a cultural marker for its idea of the Scottish ‘nation’. Instead, it emphasises themes that undergird a collective identity, such as a particular Scottish commitment to social democracy, social inclusion and solidarity (Keating et al. 2003). Labour’s emphasis on a national identity based on shared values rather than political objectives may be considered as an effort to de-politicise national identity, and to ‘disassociate expressions of national identity from debates over Scotland’s constitutional and political future’ (McEwen 2004: 169). Since devolution, Scottish Labour has moved away from an explicitly pro-Scottish stance and has instead endorsed London’s commitment to a renewed sense of Britishness. Labour has sought to forge Scots’ loyalty to the British state and reconcile British and Scottish identity, a dualism that is the accepted norm for many Scots (Bond and Rosie 2002). Labour has furthermore argued that the Scottish values of egalitarianism are best served in the UK, based on the principles of the welfare state. But ‘New’ Labour’s centre-political agenda, especially its privatisation of public services, is seen as descending from Thatcherism and thus, for many Scots, is considered to be an English phenomenon. This may have prompted a move in Scottish Labour’s strategy away from emphasising Britishness. Former First Minister Jack McConnell, in response to Gordon Brown’s bid for all Brits to ‘honour and embrace’ the Union Jack, asserted that ‘I think of myself as a Scot, first and foremost’ (Observer, 29 January 2006). The Liberal Party advocated ‘home-rule-all-around’ from the 1880s onwards and can justifiably claim to have a longer pedigree than Labour in seeking to advance Scottish self-determination. The Liberals have advocated parliaments at Edinburgh and Cardiff at every general election since 1950, even if distinctly ‘Scottish’ and ‘Welsh’ priorities were submerged within the general commitment to a federal UK structure. The PR electoral system in Scotland has also opened up space for new parties, such as the Socialists and Greens, both of whom support independence. Although the Greens have avoided using the language of nationalism, they

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have argued that decentralisation, subsidiarity and bringing power closer to the people strengthens democracy, and for that reason have lent their support to self-determination (SGP 2003b: 2). In contrast, the Socialists assert that Scotland is a naturally socialist nation with a long history of radical politics, but which has been suppressed and exploited by successive governments in Westminster. They also accused the Labour-led Executive in Scotland of running down public services and living standards in their pursuit of free-market policies. In their 1999 campaign brochure, the SSP stated their desire to build a Scotland ‘based on the principles of equality, democracy, liberty, generosity and solidarity’ (SSP 2004: 2), a position aligned to the state-welfare values of the Scottish electorate. Constructions of Scottish nationhood have therefore been vigorously contested. The SNP’s claim to be the only ‘Scottish’ party has been challenged by regional branches of statewide parties as well as other local competitors, which have advanced alternative visions of Scottish self-determination. Yet none of the parties has explicitly sought to describe the Scottish nation as an imagined community with a concomitant sense of belonging and loyalty. Rather, they have tended to emphasise the socioeconomic and political values and traditions in Scotland to underpin notions of nationhood. Each party has also argued that their proposals for constitutional reform were the best way to safeguard these values. Thus for the SNP, Scotland had to acquire independence in order to be a ‘normal’ nation (though one that offers voluntary membership to any Scottish resident) with full control over social policy; for Labour the main objective was to enhance Scotland’s status abroad in order to obtain material benefits, but without breaking away from the UK which provides common welfare institutions; for the Conservatives, the Scottish nation was culturally defined but politically and economically part of the British Union; and for the Scottish Socialists, the nation had to be free from the UK and Europe to be self-determining, with the aim of creating a sense of socialist internationalism amongst Scots. It is the differing conceptions of Scottish nationhood that form the basis for competing territorial, and socioeconomic, demands.

Territorial strategies: autonomy versus capacity

Political parties in Scotland have advanced several projects to best secure Scottish power and influence, whilst continuing to underline Scotland’s system of shared sovereignty within a larger political construct. However, the way in which ‘power and influence’ is best obtained for Scotland has

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itself been the source of heated contestation. The various territorial strategies adopted by parties have both constitutional and policy dimensions. Whilst these two sets of territorial demands may sometimes sit easily together, as in the case that constitutional rights are seen as a pre-requisite for building policy capacity, at other times parties are forced to make a trade-off between the two. Throughout the twentieth century, Scotland’s lack of constitutional autonomy was the quid pro quo of privileged access to the centre (Midwinter et al. 1991: 74). Although the administrative functions of the Scottish Office, established in 1885, were gradually expanded to include welfare state services during the post-war period, it lacked legislative powers and thereby the ability to develop distinctive policies for Scotland. In exchange for weak ‘formal’ autonomy, the Scottish Office was given disproportionate access to the centre, which meant a strong lobbying role in the Cabinet and Whitehall departments in order to secure maximum funds for Scotland (Keating and Jones 1985). Particularly in times of economic crisis, it was believed that access to the centre was more important than achieving a quasi-independent status for Scotland (Keating 1988; McEwen 2002: 66). Questions of socioeconomic development were therefore divorced from those of constitutional reform, and the two main parties in Scotland often pursued a strategy of trading off Scottish home rule for greater influence in London. The Conservative strategy throughout the twentieth century was to give Scotland just enough administrative devolution to give a distinct Scottish style to state policies, and enough influence within Whitehall to pursue Scotland’s interests whilst withholding legislative autonomy. This strategy was part of the Tory vision of decentralised administration in the UK and resulted in the expansion of Scottish Office powers in the 1920s and 1960s. In particular, functions relating to transport, social policy, housing and planning were transferred to the Scottish Office in the 1950s, which gave Scotland a limited ability to develop economic planning programmes. Yet the Scottish Office was unable to make political decisions about the distribution of social benefits or to pursue a particular economic policy line (Mitchell 1996: 46). The Scottish Office remained an agent of local administration in a highly centralised British state. When Edward Heath, Conservative party leader in the late 1960s, tried to take this one step further through proposals for a Scottish Assembly, he failed to mobilise support within his party for legislative autonomy. Since that time, the Tories have taken a more or less consistent line against granting further self-government to the nations and regions of the United Kingdom. Yet arguments for economic centralisation were well supported by the

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existence, role and purpose of the British welfare state. Labour’s introduction of the national insurance, assistance and health service acts in the late 1940s, which formed the backbone of the post-war welfare state, were an important device in creating a sense of Britishness amongst Scots to replace the unifying appeal lost by the decline of Empire (Brown et al. 1998: 15). Furthermore, the welfare state could be effectively deployed in arguments against independence, by underlining the economic and social security of the welfare state in contrast to the insecurity of autonomy or secession (McEwen 2002: 69). The Tories also supported the welfare state as an important aspect of British identity and a bulwark against separatism. British governments therefore continued to accommodate Scotland’s territorial interests through administrative devolution and access to Whitehall. This consensus held until the 1970s when Labour was forced to revise its strategy. The rise of the SNP – based on promises of Scottish wealth through oil reserves – prompted Scots to question whether the British state was in fact the best guarantor of socioeconomic security. The SNP’s arguments for an economically successful and independent Scotland challenged the perception that Scots got a better deal in the Union through state subsidies from the UK (Mitchell 1996: 56). This economic case for the Union was also weakened by the advent of Thatcherism. The neoliberal agenda promoted by Thatcher, which undermined welfare institutions such as the National Health Service, also undermined the sense of loyalty amongst Scots to Britain (Mitchell 1996: 53). These policies threatened the social and economic security of Scots in the Union by rolling back the welfare state, and upsetting the trade-off that Scots had traditionally accepted between economic security and autonomy. Thatcher’s policies made autonomy a more attractive option. They also led many in Scottish Labour to believe that an assembly would have been able to resist the neoliberal agenda. Thatcherism was thus an important factor in Labour’s switch to a policy of home rule in the 1980s. At this point, demands for a Scottish Parliament replaced access to the centre as the primary goal of parties seeking constitutional and socioeconomic reform (McEwen 2002). The Scottish electorate had welfare expectations of a Scottish Parliament, and no longer trusted Westminster to act in Scotland’s interests on matters of socioeconomic reform. With devolution, the Scottish Parliament was given legislative control over social and economic policy, such as health, education, housing and regional planning. These policy areas were once only the administrative remit of the Scottish Office. But with the decentralisation of much of the welfare state to the substate level, the Scottish government is able to pursue a distinctive policy style in line with Scottish values. This was most evident

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in the introduction of free care for the elderly and the abolition of up-front student tuition fees, which put pressure on Westminster to offer similar benefits in England. Holyrood thus has considerable institutional autonomy to diverge in policy-making. However, this autonomy is not free from constraints. As stipulated in the 1998 Scotland Act, the UK government retains exclusive responsibility over important areas relating to the welfare state, economy and foreign relations, including social security, employment policy and control over taxation. These reserved powers impinge on the Scottish government’s ability to pursue a distinctive economic development programme for Scotland, as it must work within the macroeconomic boundaries set by Westminster. This requires a coordinated response to policy goals and priorities. Scotland’s autonomy is also constrained by limited financial powers. Scotland receives a block grant from the Treasury, and although it has discretion over how it spends this money, it has no control over how the money is raised. Debates about the autonomy and capacity of Scottish institutions have changed yet again with the deepening of European integration, as Brussels has provided a new ‘centre’ for regions to access, and EU legislation impinges on many of Scotland’s devolved competences. Scottish parties began to view Europe as a new context for pursuing constitutional change, which was partially catalysed by the need to counter the SNP’s appeal of independence in Europe. Europe was also considered by some parties to constitute a new arena for pursuing the social-democratic project that Thatcher seemingly tried to bring to an end. These two separate, but interconnected, goals played out in party programmes in a number of different ways.

Europeanisation and Scotland’s parties

British entry to the European Community (EC) in 1973 caused as much political discord in Scotland as it did in the rest of the UK. However, the discussion of costs and benefits of EC membership took a somewhat different tone north of the border. It was noted by Bennie et al. (1997) that Scots were decidedly critical of the EC before and after joining, despite voting positively during the referendum on continued UK membership of the EC in 1975 (but less so than England and Wales by about 10 per cent). What made the issue distinctive north of the border in the 1970s was the fear that Scotland would be further removed from the new economic and political centres and that Scotland’s fisheries, agriculture and traditional industries would be threatened by the Common Market. The Tory

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government’s principal argument in favour of EC membership – that the UK would recover its prosperity through increased trade – had less resonance in Scotland than elsewhere. The Scottish electorate’s cautious approach to Europe was better captured by left-wing parties. During the 1970s, the Scottish Council of the Labour Party argued that the EC threatened its programmes for nationalisation and the welfare state. Labour had vehemently rejected the neoliberal free-market Europe that the Tories had characterised. In the 1975 referendum on EC membership, the Labour Party was divided. Although members of the party in Scotland voted against continued EC membership at their 1975 party conference, the UK Labour Party had overcome its divisions by supporting the Callaghan government’s pro-Europe campaign (Butler and Kitzinger 1996). However, divisions between the pro- and anti-European camps of the UK party led to a conference decision to withdraw from the EC in 1980. In the 1983 general election, the party suffered a massive electoral defeat. Ashford (1992: 128) attributes this to the party’s anti-European position, which did not resonate with Britain’s voters. The public’s generally pro-European attitude, in addition to the conversion of trade unions to a pro-European position, led to a change in policy in the 1980s. Labour began to link constitutional change in Scotland to regionalisation in Europe, arguing for the need to take a more proactive role to avoid the creation of a ‘Fortress Europe’ and to ensure Scotland’s maximum representation in Brussels. The party’s ‘about-turn’ on Europe would become intricately linked to its re-commitment to constitutional change in the UK. During the post-war era the SNP was highly suspicious of European integration. The EC was viewed as centralist and elitist, and it was unclear to the party how Scottish interests would be represented if the EC operated on an inter-governmental basis – with the UK government taking important decisions over Scottish affairs. In the 1975 referendum, the SNP campaigned on the theme ‘No voice, no entry’, hoping that Scotland would distinguish itself from the rest of the UK by voting against the EC. However, the party misjudged the mood of public opinion (which at the beginning of the year had favoured the SNP’s position) and when 61.7 per cent of Scots turned out to vote ‘Yes’ by 58.4 per cent, the SNP had to re-think its position. The change in attitude was assisted by the election of Winifred Ewing to the European Parliament in 1979, who obtained publicity for the SNP’s defence of Scottish interests in Europe. Another influential proponent of Europe was Jim Sillars, a former Labour politician who in 1975 had formed a short-lived socialist-nationalist breakaway group. Sillars advocated the benefits of independent Scottish membership

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of the EC and upon joining the SNP became instrumental in developing its ‘independence in Europe’ platform. As for Scotland’s other main parties, the Liberal Democrats were enthusiastic advocates of European integration. They had supported applications for membership of the ECSC in 1951, the EEC and Euratom in 1957 and the attempts of both Labour and Conservative governments to join the EC in the 1960s and 70s. During the 1975 referendum, the Liberals campaigned for a ‘Yes’ vote, but were careful to distinguish themselves from the Conservative line: ‘Although Liberals have all along supported European economic integration, they have always laid the greatest stress on the need for a political union’ (Liberal Party 1975). In contrast, the Tories were openly hostile to closer political integration, and sought only the benefits that a deregulated economic Europe would bring. As Thatcher later recounted, ‘I had one overriding positive goal. This was to create a single Common Market . . . British businesses would be among those most likely to benefit from the opening-up of other countries’ markets’ (Thatcher 1995: 553). It was solely upon this basis that the Tories supported the 1975 referendum. However, with Thatcher’s election as leader of the Party in 1975, and Prime Minister in 1979, the Tories pursued a more pugnacious approach to Europe. In the period between the two devolution referendums of 1979 and 1997, the relevance of Europe to the constitutional debate in Scotland increased considerably (Dardanelli 2006). This was due to a number of factors. First, the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, and the election of Winnie Ewing for the Highlands and Islands constituency, created a direct institutional link between the Nationalist project and Europe (see Table 3.4). Lynch (1996: 37) argues that Ewing’s political activities ‘imported a more positive European dimension into the party’ and enabled institutional learning about the workings of the EU. The SNP’s adoption of ‘independence-in-Europe’ also encouraged other parties to reconsider their positions on integration. Second, at a time when Thatcher’s Britain held little attraction for Scottish political elites, Europe was beginning to look like a more agreeable system of shared sovereignty. Scottish Labour and LibDem MEPs had been active in debates about carving out a role for regions in the changing European construct, and linked this to the need for a Scottish Parliament (Hepburn 2006). The Constitutional Convention (1995) also attached ‘great importance . . . to Scotland’s dynamic and developing relationships with the institutions of the European Union’. Third, the social policies of the EC, such as those relating to childcare equality and workers’ rights, were looked upon favourably by the left (Brown et al. 1998). The provision of

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regional development funding, and the Highlands and Islands’ qualification for Objective 1 in 1994, also cast European integration in a more positive light. (‘Objective 1’ funding is priority EU funding for the development and structural adjustment of regions where per capita GDP is less than or close to 75 per cent of the EU average.) The Scottish Labour Party and SNP sought to construct a popular perception that Scotland was a more left-leaning country, and criticised the Tories’ refusal to sign the Maastricht Treaty’s Social Chapter in 1992. The Conservatives themselves continued to extol the economic rationality of Scots and the perceived benefits of market integration, whilst condemning political integration as a threat to British sovereignty. However, this particular message did not have the same impact in Scotland as in England, since Scottish sovereignty was already held to be shared with the UK. Once the SNP and Labour both switched to a pro-European stance in the late 1980s, joining the solidly Europhile Liberal Democrats, Scottish parties enjoyed parodying the little-Englander mentality of the Tories’ Europhobia. Not only did they argue that Scotland was a more social-democratic country, they also played on the commonly held perception that Scotland was a more pro-European nation. But despite the general perception that Europe heralded possibilities for constitutional reform, there was a great deal of contestation as to the nature of such reform and whether it was for the purpose of federalising, decentralising or separating the constituent parts of the UK.

Constitutional autonomy in Europe

The deepening of European integration from the late 1980s pushed the constitutional issue to the forefront of Scottish politics. Political parties developed a variety of responses to integration processes, ranging from demands for more recognition of Scotland’s interests and identity, to protest against what were perceived to be threats to Scotland’s competences. Parties competed on several constitutional goals, including independence, federalism, regionalism (devolution) and unionism, which were re-framed and re-contextualised to take account of the emerging European political sphere. Independence

Independence was the goal of three parties in Scotland – the Scottish National Party (SNP), the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP) and the Scottish

2 1 5 –

40.7 25.8 17.9 15.6

5 2 1 –

Seats 41.9 25.6 20.9 4.3

% vote

1989

7 1 – –

Seats 42.5 32.6 14.5 7.2

% vote

1994

6 2 – –

Seats 28.7 27.2 19.8 9.8

% vote

1999

3 2 2 1

Seats 26.4 19.7 17.8 13.1

% vote

2004

2 2 2 1

Seats

20.8 29.1 16.8 11.4

% vote

2009

2 2 1 1

Seats

12:12

Labour 33.0 SNP 19.4 Cons 33.7 LibDems 3.9

% vote

% vote

Seats

1984

1979

European election results in Scotland, 1979–2009

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Green Party (SGP). Yet the motivations for pursuing this goal, and interpretations of how independence might be achieved, have varied markedly. In 1988 the SNP adopted a policy of independence in Europe as a response to accusations from statewide parties that it was seeking to divorce Scotland from the rest of the UK. The European context would reassure voters of ‘going it alone’ and provide an external framework for shared Scottish sovereignty, replacing that of the UK. Upon coming to government in Scotland in 2007, the SNP published a government white paper on Scotland’s constitutional future and began a popular ‘National Conversation’ exercise on the issue, with the aim of holding a referendum on independence by 2010. However, the idea that Scottish independence would be best served within a European framework has latterly been challenged by two other parties. The Scottish Socialists and Greens are against EU membership, and demand independence outside Europe. The aim of independence has also been vigorously contested by the statewide parties, which have sought to preserve the UK Union through other decentralising or federalising measures. The SNP advocated that Scotland should play a full role in the EU, as a ‘normal’ nation and an independent member state. The party eschewed any attempt to classify Scotland as a ‘region’, which was seen as carrying much less political weight than nationhood. The SNP compared Scotland’s plight to that of other countries in Europe, especially in the East: ‘Nations throughout Europe are moving towards independent statehood, with the ultimate goal of EC membership. Yet . . . Labour and the LibDems are firmly committed to old, discredited state structures. Both would relegate Scotland to a region of Europe, with no power to shape our future’ (SNP 1991a: 2). From Labour’s perspective, the opposite held true. Scottish Labour argued that if Scotland were to secede, it would lose influence at the core of British decision-making, the Cabinet, and the advantages of being part of one of the biggest EU member-states in European negotiations. To counter the demand for independence, Labour endorsed the idea of a devolved assembly with legislative powers, arguing that a regionalised Europe better reflected the realities of interdependence and integration. For the SNP, however, the nation should be congruent with the state, and as a nation, Scotland should be entitled to statehood. Yet there has been significant contestation within the party about how this goal should be achieved, and what kind of Europe the SNP wants. When the policy was adopted in the late 1980s, there was ambiguity as to whether the party supported centralisation or decentralisation, or federalism versus confederalism in the EU. Supranationalists advocated closer European unification, in which the EU would have control over foreign policy,

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defence and a single currency; whilst intergovernmentalists maintained the primacy of states, whereby powers would only be transferred to the EU if members states so decided. Alan Macartney MEP (1990) sought to clarify the SNP’s position by arguing that independence in Europe required the creation of a European confederation; an association of member states which pool sovereignty in certain areas but do not surrender total control to an authoritative body. This would allow Scotland to exert equal influence over decision-making as other small member states. Yet the SNP is also not averse to having regional representation in the Council of Ministers. It has argued that Scottish Ministers in the devolved Parliament should be given the right to participate in the Council of Ministers’ meetings, and to lead the UK delegation when EU Council meetings dealt with specific Scottish interests. This ambiguous position raises the question of whether independence is truly necessary, provided Scottish Ministers are able to attend Council of Ministers meetings in a regional capacity. The dual strategy of demanding full independence but supporting further devolution results from a compromise forged between fundamentalists and gradualists. The former perceived independence as a zero-sum gain, whilst gradualists anticipated that sovereign statehood would arrive in stages, and have sought to use devolution as a ‘stepping stone’ to independence. In party literature, the SNP has tended to refuse acknowledgement of this intermediate strategy and focus solely on independence. The party believed that it would have ‘better prospects of success due to the decline in credibility of devolution . . . It is likely that the UK parties will promote a more UK-Unionist agenda’ (SNP 1992d: 2). The SNP was primarily referring to Labour, within which there is a strong section opposed to independence. Scottish Labour leaders have consistently warned voters of the ill-effects of ‘divorce’ from the UK. But this position was not always shared by all party members, in particular those sympathetic to home rule. A similar situation is evident within the other ‘unionist parties’. Although the Tories are staunchly opposed to independence, there are some members who believe it might produce a clearer and more cooperative relationship with England than asymmetrical devolution, which has not yet resolved the ‘West Lothian Question’.2 Likewise, the Scottish Liberal Democrats acknowledge that ‘independence is a perfectly legitimate aspiration. But: we reject claims that independence is risk free and a passport to instant success’ (SLD 1996: 1). The party wants to create a federal UK structure, an option that offers Scotland the autonomy it needs without the ‘unsettling effect’ of negotiating independence. The LibDems are also opposed to unitary statehood as it counters their policies of decentralisation.

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Contrarily, the break-up of the UK is a central aim of the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP), and of its breakaway party, Solidarity. These parties’ singular goal is to establish an independent socialist Scottish republic operating on the principles of public ownership. This new polity would not, however, seek to find a place within the free market EU. The SNP’s goal of independence in Europe is contested by the Socialists on two grounds. First, because the goal is seen as contradictory, entailing the transferral of rule from Westminster to Brussels as opposed to ‘genuine’ Scottish self-rule. Second, the EU represents a ‘semi-despotic and undemocratic’ set of institutions that operates behind closed doors to impose unjust, neoliberal policies on citizens (SSP 2003; EACL 2003). Of particular concern to the SSP is the lack of European provisions for social rights and laws on working conditions to off-set the social disequilibrium created by free-market economics. This contrasts with the SNP’s support of the single market, and its emphasis on the economic benefits to be obtained by bolstering business investment in Scotland through lower corporation taxes. The Scottish Green Party also supports the long-term goal of independence, but has refused to subscribe to ‘independence in Europe’. It argues that the unelected and unaccountable European Commission has ‘lost the trust of ordinary people’ (SGP 1999a). The party is also critical of the EU’s failure to meet pressing environmental problems, for instance the Common Agricultural Policy, which is a policy that ‘promotes intensive agriculture that destroys jobs and pollutes soil and water’ (ibid.). The Greens also consider the Schengen agreement to constitute a serious threat to civil liberties, by discriminating against ethnic minorities perceived as ‘non-European’. Therefore the party advocates an independent Scotland with open borders but is opposed to membership of the EU, without radical reform of its structures. On this count, the Socialists and Greens have similar platforms. But unlike the SSP, the Greens are predominantly gradualists and support the expansion of the Parliament’s powers in domestic and foreign (especially European) affairs. In 2004, attempts were made to capitalise on the existence of three independence-seeking parties in the Scottish Parliament, in order to bolster public support for independence, which had consistently gained approximately 25–30 per cent of popular support since the 1970s (for recent public attitude results on Scotland’s constitutional options, see Table 3.5). The SSP proposed the creation of an Independence Convention, which would exist as an umbrella grouping for the sovereigntist parties. Although this idea received support from the fundamentalist wing of the SNP, the SNP leadership and Greens refused to join. As an alternative, SNP leader John

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Public attitudes towards Scotland’s constitutional status

Scotland’s constitutional status Scotland should become independent, separate from the UK and the European Union Scotland should become independent, separate from the UK but part of the European Union Scotland should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has some taxation powers Scotland should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has no taxation powers Scotland should remain part of the UK without an elected parliament Don’t know

% of survey respondents

10.7

19.3

46.0

7.4 9.7 6.6

Source: Scottish Social Attitudes Survey, 2007 (www.data-archive.ac.uk/findingData/ssasTitles.asp)

Swinney promoted an ‘open dialogue’ with supporters of independence, holding talks with the Greens in particular. The issue of EU membership was not raised in these discussions, though cross-party cooperation on ‘the dream that is shared by Mr Sheridan and by the Green Party and by every member of the SNP, of an independent, free Scotland’,3 would certainly require some consensus on Europe. There were signs, however, that a more critical independence-alliance on Europe would not be so difficult to achieve. The Scottish National Party’s intention to oppose the European Constitution in a referendum (had fishing not been removed from EU competences) hinted at an increasingly Eurocritical attitude. To justify the party’s change in attitude towards Europe, former SNP leader John Swinney maintained that in the early stages of integration, the SNP were naive of the workings of Europe and would accept EU policies and directives unconditionally, but now one ‘shouldn’t always say yes to everything in Europe. There are some lines that we won’t cross’.4 In the European sphere, the SNP has been involved in the European Free Alliance (EFA) and Rainbow Group, despite calls from the anti-European camp to limit support for the EC. In its early days, EFA was a relatively loose organisation that allowed members to opt out of some policies (Lynch 1996: 143). This was important for the SNP, who remained (and remain) somewhat out of the orbit of the EFA because of its aim for independent statehood, rather than just regional autonomy. The

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Scottish Greens have also been active in developing links with others through the European Federation of Green Parties, which was succeeded by a European Green Party (EGP) in 2004. The EGP fashions itself as ‘the political voice of green issues in Europe’, and is committed to ‘shared development, open borders, diverse cultures and the eradication of racism’ (SGP 1999b). Finally, the Scottish Socialist Party has also joined several European organisations. In 2001 it became a founding member of the European Anti-Capitalist Left (EACL) which, together with like-minded parties from Denmark, Portugal, the Basque Country and Catalonia, sought to lobby the EC on the draft constitution. It also became active in the European Social Forum, which staged demonstrations against global capitalism in Florence (2002) and Paris (2003). During the Florence demonstration, the SSP co-sponsored a workshop with the Basque socialist and pacifist group Zutik, entitled ‘Globalisation and the right to National Self-determination’. The SSP has thus echoed the SNP’s tactics by forging alliances with like-minded parties in Europe sympathetic to the goals of socialism and independence. Federalism

Within the Scottish political arena, only one party – the Scottish Liberal Democrat Party – has officially endorsed the principle of federalism. The LibDems favour a federal solution to the UK’s constitutional debate, whereby Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and the regions of England would have control over certain domestic matters and the federal (UK) Parliament would retain other competences, ‘such as foreign affairs, defence and macro-economic policy, which are best dealt with at a collective level’ (SLD 1992: 1). A federal solution, the LibDems argued, would solve the problem of parliamentary representation for an area with legislative devolution as posed in the ‘West Lothian Question’. As a result of this commitment, the LibDems claim the longest history of supporting decentralisation of the UK to its various parts. However, there have also been recent developments within the Scottish Conservative Party that point to its acceptance of federalism as a potential solution to the unstable constitutional settlement created by devolution in 1998. Although this is not an official party aim, some Scottish Tories argue that a federal UK is preferable to the present distribution of powers, and have argued that fiscal autonomy is a step on the way to achieving this goal. These moves were, until the 2007 election, opposed by Labour, which was intent on defending existing relations between Edinburgh and Westminster. The Liberal (Democratic) Party was an early advocate of a federal

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Europe. This fitted with the party’s belief that peace and security were only achievable through international cooperation, free trade and the dispersal of state power upwards to international institutions and down to the regions. The party argued that a decentralised federal Europe should be based on the principle of subsidiarity, which ensures that EU policy-making is focused only on areas where EU action is indispensable. This principle should be enshrined in a Constitution that defines and circumscribes the centre’s powers. Since the 1990s, the LibDems have linked decentralisation in the UK to the development of multi-level governance in Europe and to that end supported the creation of a ‘Europe of the Regions’. This policy was consistent with the Liberals’ support for dispersing authority above and below the level of the state. However, the issue of federalism, despite being on the back burner, was always a core priority for the LibDems who queried ‘If Europe was to be a true federation, should the primary federal union for Scotland be Europe itself rather than the United Kingdom?’ (SLD 1992: 2; emphasis added). The LibDems’ initial goal is to convert the UK into a federal system that ‘recognises Scotland’s position and status as a founding partner in the United Kingdom’ (Steel Commission 2006: 60). But in the long term, the LibDems expect that within a federal Europe, Scotland will not need the external structure of the UK as the territory would be directly represented in Europe. Whilst the Labour Party has avoided articulating a clear position on the federal question in Scotland, it has been forced to confront this issue in its relations with the Party of European Socialists. The PES calls for the creation of a Federation of States and Peoples, based on decentralisation to regions, territories and organisations in civil society (PES 2001: 4). This position on a ‘new federalism’ is close to that of the Federation of European Liberals and Democrats (ELD), to which the Scottish Liberal Democrats are strongly tied. But despite individual members from the UK Labour Parliamentary Group having signed this document, the party officially rejected this constitutional objective. In contrast, the Scottish Conservatives have shown some sympathy for the goals of federalism, which they believe may be used as a method of strengthening the British Union to overcome problems associated with the asymmetrical system of devolution. Murdo Fraser argued that ‘we have a hotch-potch of systems and above it Westminster is essentially unreformed . . . So I think we need to have a federal or quasi-federal system that seeks to iron out the difficulties between the different parts of the UK’.5 This proposal, of federalising the UK to provide long-term stability for the Union, is a new development within the party, resulting from an internal review with the objective of making the party more palatable to Scottish voters and

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improving the devolution settlement. The party has proposed that the UK should be arranged along German or American lines, so that the House of Lords is converted into a second chamber that has direct representation of each of the nations and regions of the UK (SCUP 1998; Seawright 2004). However, Conservative support for federalism within the UK does not necessarily translate into supporting federalism at the European level. In the eyes of the Tories, the creation of a federal UK is designed to strengthen the UK Union, whilst federalism at the EU level is perceived as an erosion of UK sovereignty. Devolution

The Scottish Labour Party (SLP) has been a firm supporter of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ since the late 1980s, whereby the party has been able to link domestic arguments in favour of devolution in Scotland with the dialogue relating to subsidiarity as laid out in the Maastricht Treaty. The devolution settlement differs from federalism in that devolved powers are temporary and ultimately reside with central government. However, there have been demands, notably from the LibDems and the Conservatives, that regional assemblies should be guaranteed in the constitution so that they cannot be repealed by central government. These parties, as well as the SNP, Socialists and Greens also want to expand the range of powers of the Parliament. Such attempts were vigorously resisted by the Labour Party in Scotland, which has argued that ‘we have to wait and see.’6 This position has gone against public attitudes in Scotland, which have overwhelmingly favoured more powers for the Scottish Parliament (see Table 3.6). Table 3.6

Public attitudes towards more powers for the Scottish Parliament Agree

Neither

Disagree

‘The Scottish Parliament should be given more powers’

66

16

17

‘Now that Scotland has its own Parliament, it should pay for its services out of taxes collected in Scotland’

57

15

24

Source: British Social Attitudes Survey, 2008 Note: The survey results are based on percentages, which have been rounded up or down to the nearest decimal point.

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The Labour Party’s re-commitment to home rule became intricately linked to its position on Europe. David Martin MEP (former leader of the UK Labour Group in the European Parliament) argued that a Europe of the Regions would connect ‘devolved economic and democratic structures at national and regional level [to] a more democratic European Community’ (Martin 1988b: 83). The late UK Labour leader John Smith continued this line of argument by stating that regional government was increasing in power and influence in Europe, and Scotland – like the German Länder – should have its share of it (The Herald, 24 October 1992). Labour understood a Europe of the Regions as the extension of substate authorities’ participation in European decision-making. For example, David Martin (1988b) argued that Scotland should have maximum representation in the EU on the same level as the German Länder, representation in UK delegations, and the enshrinement of the notion of subsidiarity. In its 1997 campaign manifesto, Labour promised that Scotland would have ‘direct power’ in Europe if elected, including direct access to the Council of Ministers, a high proportion of Scottish representatives in the Committee of the Regions, the creation of offices in Brussels, and a Scottish Minister of European Affairs. During 1999–2007, the main goal of the Scottish Labour government was to position Scotland as one of the leading legislative regions in the EU (Scottish Executive 2004a). But, crucially, distinctive Scottish representation in Europe was combined with ‘the clout of being part of one of the main players in Europe’ (McConnell 1995). The primary motivation behind these proposals for a Europe of the Regions was to defuse support for the SNP policy of independence in Europe, and to demonstrate how influential Scotland could be without having to go the separatist route. In contrast, during the early 1990s, the SNP were openly disparaging of the regional dimension of the EU, arguing that ‘there are no plans to give regions political power. A “Europe of the Regions” is not on the Community agenda . . . European integration is diminishing the regions’ power and influence’ (SNP 1991a). Yet despite these tough words on regionalisation, the SNP moved in favour of the creation of the Committee of the Regions (CoR), an issue which split the party when SNP leaders made a secret ‘deal’ with the Conservative government to win more seats on the Committee for Scotland (The Scotsman, 9 April 1993). The SNP was also supportive of the establishment of a regional office in Brussels (Scotland House), the creation of a Minister for European and External Affairs, and the development of stronger links between the Parliament and other substate governments in Europe – policies that the SNP carried through, ten years later, to its government programme for Scotland in 2007.

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In Europe, the Labour Party was able to obtain support for creating a Scottish Parliament from the Socialist Group in the European Parliament (PES). The PES was strongly supportive of a Europe of the Regions and recognised the right to self-determination of substate entities. This commitment put the PES on a par with the European Free Alliance (EFA), of which the SNP is a member. The PES was instrumental in the creation of the CoR, which was considered as part of a broader project to reinforce social and economic cohesion in Europe, and in particular to support poorer regions that benefited from the structural funds. Furthermore, the PES called for greater regional involvement in the Convention on the Future of Europe and a regional right to representation in the European Court of Justice. These two demands also formed part of the European Free Alliance’s programme. Indeed, the majority of EFA members have supported the creation of a Europe of the Regions, which forced the SNP to revise its policy on subsidiarity and regionalism. Thus the party moved from a position that belittled the aspirations of regionalism (in Scotland) in the late 1980s to one that respected them as ‘perfectly legitimate’ (elsewhere) in the 1990s. According to the late SNP MEP Neil MacCormick, ‘I think it is important that everyone moves at their own pace, as there is more than one type of autonomy project. You also have to reflect the real state of affairs’.7 This statement indicates that some SNP members have adopted a more moderate position on regionalism in Europe. The Liberal Democrats meanwhile advanced a different interpretation of a Europe of the Regions, by arguing that it was simply an alternative way of developing the EU along federal lines. Since the 1990s, the LibDems associated decentralisation of the UK with European subsidiarity. But because the notion of a federal Europe received little sympathy in Scottish or British politics, the party preferred to use the language of regionalism. Some sections of the Scottish Conservative Party also argued for stronger links to Brussels and Scottish Ministerial representation in Europe on policy areas important to the territory. The party’s post-devolution approach to Europe was a decentralising one, with support for subsidiarity tempered by strident calls for maintaining the primacy of the state. Although the Tories declared no intentions of disbanding the Scottish Parliament and distributing its powers among the local authorities and central government, they remain hostile to regionalisation processes in Europe, which are held to be a threat to the UK’s territorial integrity (McLetchie 2003).

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Unionism

Unionists may be defined as those who support the union between Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom, created by the Acts of Union in 1707. Unionism has never been a homogeneous movement. Rather, it represents a pro-UK consensus held by all the statewide parties. Although the SNP labels any party that does not want independence for Scotland as ‘unionist’, thereby playing on the term’s associations with Conservativism and rule by Westminster, unionism is a flexible enough concept to cover an array of constitutional options, including the decentralisation of power and/or concentration of administrative responsibility from London to Scotland. The Scottish Tories, previously called Unionists, have always been fierce defenders of the UK Union. In the devolution debates of the 1970s and 1990s, they argued that a Scottish Parliament with law-making and tax-raising powers would undermine the Union and lead to the break-up of the state. Former Prime Minister John Major declared that devolution was ‘one of the most dangerous propositions ever put to the Scottish people’ in that it would split the UK apart and set ‘one people against another’ (The Scotsman, 3 May 1995; The Herald, 2 December 1993). Furthermore, the Tories argued that if Scotland were to gain more political and economic autonomy, it would lose influence within the core of the UK decision-making system in addition to the benefits of being part of one of the largest EU member states. According to Ian Lang, former Secretary of State for Scotland, Scotland was best represented in UK delegations to the Council of Ministers, where it would enjoy a regular place at the top table in Europe. To that end, the Tories declared in 1997 that a Scottish Parliament set up by the Labour Party would be abolished by a future Conservative government. After losing the ‘No-No’ campaign in the devolution referendum, the Tories finally accepted the ‘will’ of the Scottish people and the permanence of the devolved parliament. The party underwent a minor transformation after entering the Scottish Parliament. For example, it began advocating greater powers for Scotland in Europe, such as the right to lead UK delegations to the European Council of Ministers, especially in the areas of fishing and agriculture (SCUP 2001). Yet whilst the Conservatives supported measures to increase the Scottish Parliament’s powers, Labour swung back to its unionist roots by drawing tight boundaries around how far the devolution settlement should extend. Having been the chief architect of devolution in 1998, Labour in post-devolution Scottish politics was keen on maintaining the status quo of the existing settlement,

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especially with regard to Europe. One Labour representative, Christine May MSP, said that Scotland should not seek greater access to decision-making in Europe, which contrasted sharply with the party’s 1997 proposals and rhetoric.8 On the issue of the European Constitution, Scottish Labour did not formulate a separate response, but contributed to, and endorsed, the position of the Blair government. The aim was to show a ‘united’ British front by harmonising policies with Westminster. This forms part of a Labour strategy to engender a sense of Britishness and ‘coming together’ to underpin British sovereignty (Brown and Alexander 1999). This view was contested by Scotland’s other unionist party – the LibDems – which pledged to ‘set aside national sovereignty when necessary [and] work with other countries towards an equitable and peaceful international order’.9 The LibDems have refuted being labelled as a pro-sovereignty party, instead perceiving the replacement of sovereign states within a European political union as a natural and necessary development for the achievement of world peace. Unlike the LibDems, Labour and the SNP, the British Conservatives did not have any natural allies in Europe. When the UK joined the European Community in 1973, the Conservative Party decided to form its own political group in the European Parliament – the European Democrat Group. When the party came out of isolation to join the European People’s Party (EPP) in 1992, internal divisions failed to endear the Conservatives to their European counterparts. The ‘Bruges Group’ of Thatcherites, which opposed the social dimension of integration and sought to undermine the power of the trade unions, alienated those Christian Democrats who stressed consensual politics at all levels of authority. Importantly, the EPP has supported a federal vision of Europe, which was anathema to the official party line. Whereas the EPP openly favoured a United States of Europe in which the principle of subsidiarity was key, the Conservatives maintained an intergovernmental vision of the EU, and interpreted subsidiarity as ceasing at the state level. The Tories have since distanced themselves from the EPP owing to its federalist orientation, and finally separated from the Europarty amidst considerable controversy in June 2009. Their alternative was to set up a centre-right, anti-federalist and Eurosceptical grouping called the European Conservatives and Reformists (The Telegraph, 22 June 2009). This historical detachment demonstrates that many of the alliances made by Scottish and UK parties at the European level are often fragile and fraught with difficulties. Within Scotland, as within the UK generally, the Conservatives have refused to contemplate entering coalition arrangements. However, the system of proportional representation in Scotland ushered in a new set of political dynamics which

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restrained one party from winning an outright majority. This has forced the Conservatives to consider potential government alliances in Scotland, and ironically, one of their most feasible ‘partners’ north of the border is also their most reviled enemy south of the border. Murdo Fraser MSP admitted that: ‘if we look at the policy platforms of the other major parties . . . I think you will probably find that the party whose platform we were closest to of those three would be Labour’.10 Clearly, PR has radically altered the nature of Scottish politics and, for some parties, the prospect of coalition government. Yet one issue upon which the Tories and Labour are unlikely to agree is Europe. The Scottish Conservatives have opposed not only a regionalised Europe, but also a federalist Europe. Since the Treaty of Maastricht was signed in 1992, the Tories have been determined to veto further transfers of power from Westminster to Brussels. Yet their opposition to the draft European Constitution in 2004, which they feared would lead to a European superstate, was actually made on the basis that it would undermine Scottish self-determination. As Phil Gallie MSP stated, ‘The draft constitution for Europe would undermine totally the long-held aspirations of people in the chamber who fought for the creation of a Scottish Parliament. It represents a major step away from the devolutionary ideals on which the Scottish Parliament is founded . . . A considerable loss of sovereignty in a range of areas would follow . . .’11 Talk of ‘devolutionary ideals’ signalled the Conservatives’ radically changed attitude to Scottish autonomy since 1999. In the early 2000s the Tories added their voice to widespread cross-party demands for more Scottish parliamentary powers. Yet in the context of closer European integration since the late 1980s, in which many important legislative decisions were made at the European level, constitutional rights have been coupled with, and even superseded by, the need to defend Scotland’s policy interests in Europe.

Territorial capacity in Europe

A fundamental aspect of territorial policy capacity is the control of socioeconomic development. The campaigns for a Scottish Parliament in the 1990s were motivated by the belief that political autonomy would improve the quality of life of Scots, increase the country’s economic well-being, and give Scots the levers to pursue a distinctive economic agenda based on values of social democracy and egalitarianism (Surridge et al. 1998; McEwen 2002). These aims are important to consider when examining how parties compete in seeking to enhance Scotland’s policy

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potential. How do parties propose to increase Scotland’s capacity to mount economic projects in Europe? And how do these economic projects accord with their constitutional goals? Autonomy versus influence at the centre

The Scottish Labour Party, which was the senior coalition partner in the Scottish executive from 1999–2007, acknowledged that much of Scotland’s potential economic success rests on its ability to gain EU funding and resources, attract foreign capital investment, and to compete successfully with other regions in the European single market (SLP 1994: 5). To that end, the party supported reform of the Common Agricultural and Fisheries Policies to ensure a sustainable future for the Scottish farming and fishing industries, and welcomed the European structural funds as a means of improving Scotland’s transport, communications and infrastructure (SLP 1994: 4–5; SLP 2003: Section 5). The party argued that it was entirely capable of implementing effective socioeconomic policies for Scotland with devolved powers. It cited the introduction of some key policy initiatives to substantiate this claim: free personal care for the elderly, the abolition of up-front university tuition fees, land reform, new railways and transport infrastructure and a bill banning smoking in public places. These policies, it was argued, met the specific needs of Scottish society and the economy. Labour’s argument was that the Scottish Parliament could implement whatever policy it so chose given that the block grant system did not ring-fence spending areas. Labour furthermore argued that the constraints posed by reserved policy in the areas of macroeconomics, defence and foreign affairs did not prevent Scotland from carving out a niche for itself in European affairs. Scottish Labour in government 1999–2007 became active in the practice of substate ‘paradiplomacy’. The first years of devolution saw the establishment of Scotland House, cooperation agreements with Catalonia, Tuscany and Bavaria, the creation of a Nordic–Scottish Action Plan, and active participation in the Council of Local and Regional Authorities in Europe (CLRAE) and the European Group of Regions with Legislative Powers (RegLeg), of which former First Minister Jack McConnell was President in 2004. Yet the Labour Party was also intent on defending the Union and Scotland’s advantageous position within it. The party argued that Scotland should have a close working relationship with UK Ministers to ensure that ‘Scotland’s distinctive voice is heard’ and an increased role in scrutinising European legislation (SLP 2003: Section 27). Labour’s position was to encourage the Scottish Executive’s active participation in

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European institutions and networks, but as a ‘loyal member of the UK team’ (Keating 2005: 5) by using state channels to pursue Scotland’s interests in Europe. However, the institutional procedures for representation within the UK team were never entirely clear. There was a commitment to championing Scotland’s interests in ‘appropriate Council meetings of the EU and inside the UK’ (SLP 2003: Section 27). But this was an informal intergovernmental mechanism that would inevitably become strained when there were competing parties operating at different parliamentary levels in Scotland and the UK. The Scottish LibDems anticipated this eventuality by proposing a new federal settlement for the UK that included a system of fiscal federalism. This would give Holyrood greater powers over taxation and business regulation, thus improving its policy control in key areas. The LibDems argued that fiscal control would allow the Scottish Parliament to ‘influence the direction of the Scottish economy [and take a] different path to the rest of the UK’ (Steel Commission 2006: 103). Unlike Scottish Labour, the LibDems believed that fiscal control was necessary to shape, control and diverge in policy. This required reforming the block grant on a ‘needs’ basis to meet Scotland’s specific economic requirements as well as ensuring an equitable distribution of resources across the UK. The LibDems also argued that Holyrood should have greater powers and a formalised role in policy areas reserved to Westminster that affected the Scottish economy, for instance in energy and marine policy, asylum and immigration, employment law and strategic planning of welfare services. On European affairs, Scotland and other UK regions were ‘expected to have a proportionate and focused involvement in EU funding’ (Steel Commission 2006: 97). However this did not mean that they would be able to act independently of the UK. Their involvement in EU funding would be as part of a UK position in order to uphold the principles of solidarity and progressive distribution across poorer parts of the country, and across the continent. On this point, the Liberal Democrats endorsed Labour’s insistence on presenting a united UK front in Europe on economic matters. Moving onto the LibDems’ ground, individual Scottish Tories also sought to increase the Parliament’s fiscal powers and to develop a federal arrangement in the UK. As Murdo Fraser MSP, Deputy Leader of the Scottish Conservatives, stated ‘we don’t have a fully-rounded political debate in Scotland because all we talk about is how we’re going to spend money, how we’re going to cut up the cake we’re given by the Treasury in London. There is no debate about economic growth, about generating tax revenues, about supply-side arguments about how you generate more wealth in the country by growing the economy. These arguments simply

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don’t appear in the Scottish political debate at all, which we think is unfortunate’.12 The Tories believed Scottish fiscal autonomy would curb the nationalist challenge, as the SNP would be unable to argue that extra tax revenues were being returned to London. But more fiscal powers for the Parliament did not mean that Scotland should be able to pursue distinctive economic policies in Europe. The Tories, like the other two unionist parties, maintained that economic matters should be decided by the UK team in Europe, though with some Scottish input. The SNP’s electoral success and entry into the Scottish government in 2007 encouraged the unionist parties to cooperate on their common goal of keeping Scotland firmly within the Union. In April 2008, Labour, the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives launched a Scottish Constitutional Commission to examine proposals for more policy and fiscal powers for Scotland. The ‘Calman Commission’ encouraged the Scottish Labour Party to moderate its opposition to expanding the Scottish Parliament’s powers. However, on the issue of Scottish engagement in Europe, the Commission only recommended that Scottish MSPs and MEPs should develop more effective relations (Calman Commission 2008). Otherwise, the Commission supports developing Scotland’s voice in Europe through the machinery of a UK-wide team. This position was vigorously contested by the independence-seeking parties in Scotland. The Scottish National Party has claimed that independence alone would allow Scotland to wrest control of the levers of economic development from Westminster, and enable it to prosper in an integrating Europe. Scottish membership of the EU would lessen the transition costs of independence vis-à-vis access to the common market, structural funds for underperforming areas, and a ready-made institutional system in which small states have a disproportionate voice. Scotland itself was a country rich in natural (especially oil and gas) resources, renewable energy potential, and an educated and skilled workforce: the problem, according to the SNP, was that Scotland did not fully control these resources; Westminster did. The party argued that it was due to Westminster control that Scotland’s economic performance consistently lagged behind the rest of the UK, its population continued to decline, and the economy continued to underperform in post-devolution Scotland. With independence, Scotland would become a more competitive place to do business, as the Nationalists planed to cut corporation taxes and their control of additional North Sea oil revenues would increase Scotland’s overall wealth by meeting the public deficit.13 The SNP’s central contention was that the Union was counterproductive to Scottish economic development as it deprived Scotland of its natural wealth.

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According to the SNP, Scotland’s poor economic situation hardly improved with devolution. Scotland’s parliament was still politically and financially subordinate to Westminster. The party was disparaging of the limited fiscal powers of the Scottish Parliament, arguing that it was really a ‘sub-committee of Westminster, spending a pocket-money budget’ (SNP 1996). Westminster retained significant powers over taxation, revenueraising and social security, and the Scottish Parliament was financed by a block grant determined by the Barnett Formula, which had originally been put in place for the Scottish Office in 1978. The SNP argued that Scotland was unable to steer its own economic development, as it had no control over Scottish revenues and was unable to restructure taxation. An independent parliament would hasten economic growth and aid population growth through SNP policies such as lowering corporation tax, investing in oil, gas and renewable energy sources, improving infrastructure, and initiating a pro-active immigration policy that welcomed ‘new Scots’ and ex-pats from abroad (SNP 2005). Europe was central to the SNP’s plans for an economically successful Scotland. It claimed that small states in Europe were more economically successful than big ones, and that the EU guaranteed them ‘access to a wider marketplace’ (Hudghton 2004). Although the party refrained from explaining the finer details of why small states performed ‘better’ than big states, it did make the argument that there was ‘a direct connection between the clout in Europe that statehood gives Ireland, and that country’s phenomenal economic success’ (ibid.). According to the SNP, Scotland needs to take advantage of the economic opportunities in Europe by creating strong political institutions, taking control over economic policy and exerting a direct voice in Europe. The SNP argued prior to the 2007 election that it would use these levers of economic growth to lower business rates and take a strong Scottish stand on the Common Agricultural Policy and European fisheries policy (or even opt out of these policies altogether). There has been some evidence of this tough stance on Europe since the SNP entered government in 2007. For instance, in the December 2007 EU Fisheries Council, the Scottish Government strongly argued for an increase in the cod total allowable catch to help Scottish fishermen increase their stocks. But it was unclear how a move to protectionism through enhanced fiscal autonomy, whereby ‘each state retains its own residual sovereignty in respect of constitutional and fiscal matters’ (SNP 2001: 1), corresponded with SNP support for further integrationist measures, or how Scotland would be able to exert full control over fiscal matters if it joined the single currency, operated within the single market, and adhered to EU regulations. In other words, it was unclear to

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what extent independence in Europe would furnish Scotland with the ability to manage processes of social and economic change, given that economic and social policy in EU regions as well as member states is now largely impinged upon by EU regulations. In response to these contradictions, the SNP began to develop a more protectionist stance towards Europe and the perceived threat that European regulations posed to Scotland’s economic interests. In their 2001 manifesto, it was stated: ‘The SNP is in favour of joining the common currency . . . This view is, however, compatible with a rigorously critical view of excessive Euro-enthusiasm, and creeping integrationism. We have a robust view of the need to set clear limits to what can properly be done at the all-Europe level’ (2001: 1–2). By 2009, the SNP had abandoned its unconditional commitment to the Euro, by seeking to put this to a referendum (The Times, 16 October 2009). Furthermore, the SNP argued that the Common Fisheries Policy had ‘failed Scotland and our fishing communities. We believe that power over Scotland’s fisheries should be returned to Scotland’ (SNP 2009: 12). The party even made this a condition for supporting the draft European Constitution. In order to exercise a greater say over the CAP and CFP, the SNP advocated the expansion of the Scottish Parliament’s powers on European matters, as well granting the Scottish government a representative role in European institutions on a par with the German Länder or Belgian regions. In 2008, First Minister Alex Salmond pressed for Scotland to take the UK chair in EU negotiations where Scotland had an overwhelming interest (Salmond 2008). This indicated that the SNP has been forced to adapt to the new realities of being in regional government by moderating its autonomy and capacity goals. But the problem for the SNP was that their support for a stronger Scottish Parliament with a greater range of powers over economic and social policy, and more representation in state delegations, also weakened the need for an independent Scottish member state in an intergovernmental Europe. Whilst the SNP moved to oppose the encroachment of European regulations on devolved Scottish competences, other independenceseeking parties wanted to leave the EU altogether. The Socialists argued that ‘there is nothing intrinsically internationalist or progressive about a united Europe, any more than there is anything intrinsically progressive or internationalist about the United Kingdom’ (SSP 2004: 3). The SSP advocated fiscal independence outside the European Single Market, and rejected the European currency, which was viewed as a ‘one-size-fits-all right-wing monetary regime’ that held states as ‘economic prisoners’ to the European Central Bank (SSP 2004: 10–11). The SSP also argued that the

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Growth and Stability Pact, which imposed penalties on EU member states whose budget deficits amounted to 3 per cent of GDP, undermined spending on public services and thus the welfare state itself. The SSP advocated the creation of a Scottish Socialist state that would ‘stand up to the economic power of the multinationals and political power of Washington, London and Brussels’ (SSP 2003). However, the party refrained from providing any details of how Scotland would operate outside the single market, and how feasible ‘economic independence’ was in practice. The SSP, like the SNP, avoided spelling out the details of social and economic policy in an independent Scotland, be it inside or outside the EU. In the SSP’s 2003 manifesto, the only mention of the economics of independence was: ‘[once elected to office] the SSP will set a date for an independence referendum, asking the people of Scotland to give us a further mandate to break free of the United Kingdom and take control of our own finances and resources’ (SSP 2003). Precisely what ‘taking control’ meant to the SSP was left unanswered. Whilst the Greens’ long-term goal was also a financially independent Scotland, they were more sceptical of the context of European economic and monetary integration in which independence was sought. The Greens, for instance, challenged SNP support of the single currency. Monetary integration was criticised for speeding up ‘the damaging process of globalisation’ and ‘would make the transformation to a sustainable Scotland impossible’.14 The Greens sought to avoid locking Scotland into an inequitable common monetary policy that put ‘low rates of inflation before protecting jobs and public services’ (SGP 2003b: 5). They also argued that the unelected European Central Bank increased regional disparities across Europe, which undermined efforts to strengthen local economies and to secure social and environmental development (SGP 2004: 4). To that end, the Greens proposed making the EU a fair-trade zone, improving EU funding targets to support small-scale rural economies, and using economic investment to create environmentally and socially sustainable jobs (SGP 2004: 4). Yet whilst the party did ‘favour independence for Scotland which is free from the bureaucracy and interference of the emerging European Community superstate . . . we do however wish to see close cooperation will all the countries of Europe in a loose confederal structure where economic independence is guaranteed within a framework of environmental protection and social rights and justice’ (SGP 1992: 3). These policies, the party believed, could be achieved by granting Holyrood more fiscal powers. In sharp contrast to the Scottish Socialists, the Green argument was that ‘devolution of power is a process. The next stage is for the Scottish Parliament to have greater

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control over its finances and increased powers in areas such as energy, transport, health and consumer affairs’ (SGP 2003b: 4). Contrasting autonomy and policy goals

The trade-off between autonomy and having access to the centre is clearly evident in the economic positions of the unionist parties. Despite the fact that the EU legislates in many areas affecting regional economies, Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives tend to channel their demands through the state, whilst the independence-seeking parties argue that Scotland can only have full control over its economy through being a member state of the EU, or upon exiting the EU. However, there are some flaws in the parties’ arguments. The SNP argues that independence is an economic ‘end goal’, but fails to explain how an independent Scottish economy might work in an integrating Europe. Whilst European integration may reduce the economic costs of independence by providing an external support system through the single European market and the structural funds, one could also argue that it renders independence unnecessary, as regulations on subsidies, monetary policy and socioeconomic policies apply equally to states and substate governments. Moreover, as the latter have increased their functional abilities, allowing them to concentrate on socioeconomic conditions, institution-building and developing a regional economic model that allows them to compete in global markets, substate nation-building can actually proceed without formal independence (Keating 2001: 38). In contrast, unionist parties have sought to underline the economic benefits of the Union, but have failed to develop new ideas about how Scotland should pursue a distinctive socioeconomic project in Europe. Whilst Labour promised that Scotland would have ‘voice and influence’ at the British and European levels (SLP 1994), these aspirations were inconsistent with Labour’s opposition to expanding Holyrood’s European relations and its belief that Scotland was better served through UK delegations. In short, it appears that Scottish parties have failed to reconcile their constitutional aims with their social and economic policies. Whilst Europe undeniably provides Scottish parties with opportunities for networking and political representation, when it comes to safeguarding Scotland’s economy parties clearly prefer to use state channels. This may be because the main benefits of remaining in the Union are seen to be economic, and these traditions of looking to the state to provide economic security are difficult to break. It may also be because parties in Scotland are more concerned with the extent to which European integration constrains

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Scotland’s ability to pursue distinctive socioeconomic policies. Whilst parties were more enthused about the possibilities of receiving resources from the EU after the 1988 reform of structural funds, since the late 1990s Scottish parties have become more aware of the threats posed to regional cultures and economies by the homogenising tendencies of the single market programme and restrictive EU regulations on sectoral policies (Keating et al. 2003: 40). Indeed, there was growing scepticism about European integration amongst parties at the turn of the century. Europe was viewed as threatening Scotland’s fishing and agriculture industries and Scottish parties proposed various methods of solving this problem. Whilst Labour and the Conservatives defended post-devolution intergovernmental mechanisms, arguing that Scottish interests were best defended through Scottish participation in UK delegations to Europe, other parties were less sanguine. In particular, the SNP argued that Scotland should opt out of the Common Fisheries Policy once independent, whilst the Greens and Socialists maintained that an independent Scotland should leave the EU altogether. Many of these proposals required a reform of the Scottish Parliament’s financial powers, but surprisingly, debates on expanding Scotland’s powers did not have a strong European dimension.

European alternatives to the state

In 1990 James Kellas enquired ‘as the constitutional debate has been continuing in Scotland for over one hundred years, it might be asked what’s new? In one sense, very little . . .’ (Kellas 1990: 437). Kellas went on to examine five constitutional options for Scotland in light of proposals put forward by the Scottish Constitutional Convention, which comprised: integration of Scotland and England, the status quo, devolution, federalism and independence. This chapter has considered a number of these constitutional options from a different perspective. The opportunities for regional actors resulting from the deepening of European integration have become an important addition to the constitutional debate in Scotland. From the early 1990s, parties in Scotland began to endorse demands for a Europe of the Regions. This strategy was influenced by Europeanwide developments for enhancing the regional level in Europe through institutions such as the CoR, greater regional participation in structural funds, and the new social dimension to European policy. Social-democratic parties began to view Europe as a socially progressive political arena in which regions and small states could play a full role, whilst the SNP sought to enhance the devolution settlement to augment Scotland’s powers in

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Europe as a step towards independence. Even the Scottish Conservatives, Greens and Socialists argued that there were some issues in which Scotland should have direct access to decision-making in Europe, despite being sceptical of the perceived ideologies that were ‘driving’ European integration. At earlier times during the European integration process, many Scottish parties viewed Europe more as a hindrance rather than an opportunity. Scotland, it was thought, could have become further peripheralised from the central areas of decision-making, thereby making Scottish administrators and representatives doubly distant from Brussels and London. However, this view changed during the late 1980s, and Europe came to be seen as protecting peripheries and regional interests. In particular, the opportunities for regional action and a Europe of the Regions during the early 1990s encouraged parties to take a stronger position on how they wanted Scotland to fit into the newly emerging European polity. And with the creation of a Scottish Parliament responsible for implementing European legislation, parties became more informed about European developments and how to protect Scotland’s interests in Europe. Yet the Scottish Parliament’s detailed scrutiny of European regulations has also uncovered deeper challenges for Scotland in Europe, namely, how to protect its territorial interests in a Europe that seems increasingly insensitive to regional specificities, demands and needs. The belief in Europe as an opportunity structure for stateless nations gave way in the late 1990s to greater scepticism about what regions could achieve in Europe. This was spurred by the failure of the CoR to constitute anything more than a ‘talking-shop’, the homogenising tendencies of the Single Market that undermined regional competitiveness, and the continuing centralisation of powers at the state level in the Council of Ministers. Following the failure of Scotland to obtain guarantees for a stronger regional role in the draft European Constitution, some parties began to criticise the lack of transparency in European institutions, the lack of public engagement, and specifically the threat that an unreformed Common Agriculture and Fisheries Policy would pose to Scotland’s economy. This necessitated a focus on the ‘substantive’ aspects of self-determination, that is, the ability of Scotland to enhance or protect its policy capacity. Civic and political support for a Scottish Parliament was largely motivated by a desire to articulate a separate socioeconomic project from the rest of the UK. Parties (with the exception of the Conservatives) supported a left-of-centre socioeconomic agenda for Scotland, emphasising high-quality public services. Yet whilst Europe at one time appeared to offer an arena for pursuing this project, there was a growing perception

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that these commitments were left by the wayside in Brussels and Strasbourg in the pursuit of economic growth and competitiveness. Scottish parties reacted in turn, with unionist parties demanding more Scottish influence within intra-state coordinating mechanisms to influence British policy on Europe, and nationalist parties demanding either independence with veto powers or withdrawal from the EU until its structures were radically reformed. Finally, Scotland’s parties have faced legitimacy problems in that the pro-European political consensus has not transferred as easily into public attitudes toward European integration. Although the British Social Attitudes Surveys (Park et al. 2001) and Scottish Election Surveys (McCrone et al. 1999) have indicated that since 1992 Scottish attitudes to the EU have been slightly more positive than those of the rest of Britain, it is also true that all parts of Britain – including Scotland – have become more hostile to the EU since the Maastricht Treaty was signed. Scottish public opinion still remains less Europhile than that of its political elites, particularly in outlying rural regions where Scots are greatly in favour of reducing the EU’s powers (McCrone et al. 1999). So far, Scottish public opinion has decided that the Scottish Parliament and the EU should be the bodies tackling social reform (Brown et al. 1998), and this supports some of the territorial and pro-European strategies of political parties. But until the public begins making the same connections as political elites between European integration and constitutional reform, the European orientation of Scottish politicians seems unlikely to translate into strong electoral support.

Notes 1 Margaret Thatcher’s speech to the Conservative Party Conference 1988, reproduced in Harris (1997: 295). 2 In the run-up to the first devolution referendum in 1979, Tam Dalyell, MP for West Lothian, posed the question of why, after legislative devolution, Scottish MPs should be able to vote on English domestic affairs. 3 Alex Neil, MSP (SNP), quoted in The Scotsman, 27 September 2003. 4 Interview with John Swinney, SNP MSP, 21 February 2005. 5 Interview with Murdo Fraser, MSP and Vice-President of the Scottish Conservative Party, 6 January 2004. 6 Interview with Christine May, Scottish Labour Party MSP, 15 January 2004. 7 Interview with Neil MacCormick, SNP MEP, 28 October 2003. 8 Interview with Christine May, Scottish Labour Party MSP, 15 January 2004. 9 Constitution of the Scottish Liberal Democrats, Preamble, as amended in April 2002.

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10 Interview with Murdo Fraser, MSP and Vice-President of the Scottish Conservative Party, 6 January 2004. 11 Scottish Parliament debate on the European Constitution, 25 September 2003. 12 Interview with Murdo Fraser, MSP and Vice-President of the Scottish Conservative Party, 6 January 2004. 13 Despite the SNP’s claims, there have been no academic studies supporting the SNP’s fiscal surplus position. See Midwinter (2004). 14 Charles Booth, International Spokesman for the Scottish Green Party, quoted in The Herald, 25 June 2002.

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4 Bavarian defence of the Heimat in Europe

Introduction

The Freistaat Bayern (Free State of Bavaria) has long confounded attempts of categorisation. Depending on which field of social enquiry one is starting from, Bavaria could be referred to as merely one of the sixteen Länder in the Federal Republic of Germany; a formidable voice and heavyweight region in the EU; the greater part of an economic region that stretches across the Alps; a thousand-year-old cultural and historical entity with its own language, traditions and folklore; or a modern nation whose territorial integrity spans some two hundred years. Although these definitions are not mutually exclusive, it would be rare to find a social scientist who accepts all of them. This is because Bavaria is ordinarily examined in the context of (German) federal politics, and does not translate as readily as ‘stateless nations’ such as Catalonia and Scotland into the field of nationalism. Rather than seeking to mobilise the population around claims to independence, Bavarian parties aim to secure an autonomous Bavarian Heimat1 within Germany and Europe. The Bavarian-based Christian Social Union (CSU), which has governed the Land since the end of the Second World War, believes that Bavaria’s interests are best served within the German federation. Yet this faith in federalism has not prevented the CSU from pursuing an aggressive approach towards Bonn/Berlin in defence of Bavaria’s special identity and interests, or proclaiming itself to be a Bavarian party first and foremost. The CSU may indeed be understood as a nationalist party that seeks maximum sovereignty for Bavaria: ‘The CSU rhetorically expresses love for the Bavarian Heimat and the need to preserve and defend it in much the same way as nationalists prioritise the nation . . . the ideology of the CSU is nothing other than a nationalist one’ (Sutherland 2001a: 12). At the same time, the CSU’s federalist orientation is central to its success. The party has

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been able to provide a bridge to German politics through its electoral partnership with the Christian Democratic Union, which allows the CSU to contest federal elections and form governing coalitions, and to translate Bavarian interests to Germany and vice versa. The regionalist and federalist stance of Bavaria’s ‘party of state’ has had a significant impact on party competition in Bavaria. In its quest to defend Bavarian interests, the CSU – like the Scottish National Party – has forced other parties in Bavaria to enter the territorial debate. Regional branches of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Free Democrats (FDP) and Greens have all acknowledged the need to take a more pro-Bavarian stance in order to succeed electorally, and have adopted more distinctly territorial identities and policies. The CSU shares another commonality with the SNP: both parties have pushed a European agenda in which greater autonomy is sought. In response, statewide parties have had to compete with the CSU’s demands for a ‘Europe of the Regions’. While the CSU’s pursuit of a regionalisation agenda in Europe has been broadly welcomed, if we look more closely we find that other parties’ interpretations of a Europe of the Regions differ greatly, often meaning the decentralisation of decision-making structures to regions below the Bavarian level. Furthermore, whilst the CSU has become more critical of EU integration, other parties have pursued a more open and participative approach towards Europe. Bavaria therefore has much to tell us about how European structural change has altered the scope for substate territories to pursue autonomy and greater capacity, and how integrationist measures have forced substate parties to alter their strategies. Together with the classic ‘nationalist’ case of Scotland and the little-known ‘regionalist’ case of Sardinia, an examination of Bavarian territorial politics offers greater insights into the diverse effects of European integration on substate territorial demands.

Political traditions and ideologies in Bavaria

According to Peter James (1995: 1), ‘the Free State of Bavaria has operated almost as a system within a system’. Although the traditional cleavages of German politics apply in Bavaria – such as the left/right dimension and religion – there is an important territorial dimension to party competition in Bavaria that cuts across the other issues. Bavaria’s political system, which is dominated by the CSU – the only ‘regional’ party that was not culled in the ‘house-cleaning’ reforms of the 1950s – has been able to maintain its distinct traditions and political culture that mark it out from the rest of

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Germany (Mintzel 1993). The main political traditions of Bavaria prior to the creation of the Federal Republic have had a significant impact on its post-war party system development, which according to Padgett and Burkett (1986: 114) were ‘Catholicism and separatism (“nationalism” might not be too strong a description)’. However, it is also necessary to unpack how the dominant ideology throughout Bavarian history, Christian (Catholic)-Conservativism, was able to accommodate two competing strands: that of an explicitly Bavarian nationalism, and a more Germanoriented federalism. We must also consider how this ideology was able to triumph over socialism and liberalism in the immediate post-war years, when the Bavarian political system underwent the transformation from being a multi-party system to a one-party system. Christian-Conservatism has been the dominant political tradition in Bavaria since the mid-nineteenth century. Its main characteristics are strongly conservative social and cultural values, economic liberalism tempered by a belief in the responsibility of the state to care for its citizens, an emphasis on individual responsibility, and (until the mid-twentieth century) religious loyalty to the Roman Catholic Church. In Bavaria, Christian-Conservativism has been seen as the best vehicle for protecting Bavarian distinctiveness, underpinning the philosophy of the Bavarian Patriotic Party (BPP) in the 1860s, the Bavarian Centre Party in the 1890s, and the Bavarian People’s Party (BVP), which constituted the largest party in Bavaria until the fall of the Weimar Republic. However, the Christian-Conservative political tradition in Bavaria has suffered from splits between two competing forces: a Bavarian nationalist wing and a more Reich-oriented federalist wing. For instance, the BVP found more explicitly nationalist competitors in the Bavarian Farming League, which represented the agrarian, petit-bourgeois values of ‘Old Bavaria’. After the collapse of the Third Reich, this fault line re-emerged in the battles between the radical-separatist Bavarian Party and the federal-oriented Christian Social Union. As we shall see, there was not enough room in the Bavarian political landscape for both parties representing Christian-Conservatism to exist. The CSU was founded in October 1945 and licensed by the US Military Government in early 1946.2 The first proposed name for the party was the Bavarian Christian Social Union, but the prefix was dropped due to the Americans’ unease about sanctioning political regionalism in the new Germany. Yet this did not prevent the CSU from developing an explicitly nationalist profile in line with its Christian-Conservative ancestors. The CSU supported a strong type of federalism, based on maximum decentralisation of authority to the Länder and a more powerful Bundesrat (the federal council of Germany representing the sixteen Länder).

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Throughout the post-war period, it positioned itself as the only party capable of effectively representing Bavarian interests in Germany, and has been able to convince voters of this ability. With the exception of a break in 1954–7, the CSU has continuously governed Bavaria since the first Landtag election in 1946, and without coalition partners from 1966 to 2008, at which point it entered an alliance with the Bavarian FDP. The party has regularly received between 50 and 60 per cent of the vote in Bavarian, federal and European elections (see Figure 4.1). As James marvels, ‘No party in the FRG has exerted as much political power and influence and regularly recorded such spectacular election results as has been the case with the CSU in Bavaria’ (James 1995: 93). The CSU’s ability to maintain its powerful position in Bavarian politics was due to a number of factors. First, it sought to advance a vision of a single Bavarian culture, to which it tied its party identity. The Bavarian party system in the immediate post-war period had been fragmented and heterogeneous, reflecting the distinct political cultures of Swabia, Franconia and Old Bavaria. On coming to power, the CSU set about promoting Bavarian solidarity by bridging the socio-cultural divide between the Catholic south and Protestant north, and integrating the diverse regional traditions. Another essential ingredient in the success of the CSU was its ability to adapt the traditional Bavarian identity to a modern industrial setting. Until the 1950s, Bavaria’s economy was predominantly agricultural, yet within less than twenty years it underwent a complete volte-face, with new technological centres sweeping across the Land. The rapid industrialisation brought enormous socioeconomic changes, which the CSU government was able to steer without major

Figure 4.1

CSU performance in federal, Bavarian and European elections, 1946–2009

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disruptions to Bavarian society. The CSU sought to satisfy the demands of farmers and property-owners, whilst remaining attractive to the new middle classes. These diverse groups would provide the electoral basis of the CSU’s success. Yet the CSU also sought to extend itself into the Liberal and Social Democratic strongholds in the north-west in its bid to become a ‘catch-all’ party. The CSU’s transformation from being a party representative of Catholic-Conservative agrarian communities to being a modern, inter-confessional mass party did not, however, entail a desertion of its strongly honed regional identity. Instead, the CSU was able to shape a strong, conservative and patriotic Bavarian political culture through the use of the media, control of the state bureaucracy, and its numerous and powerful local organisations (Sutherland 2001b). Finally, an important part of the success of the CSU was that it did not restrict its activities and demands to the Bavarian political arena. Instead, it negotiated an agreement with the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in the years 1947–9, so that the CSU was able to participate in federal politics as part of the Christian Democratic parliamentary group and fill Cabinet posts in CDU-CSU governments. This did not threaten its independence – which was manifested through separate party programmes and congresses, organisational and membership structures, and the existence of a CSU Landesgruppe in the Bundestag (the federal parliament of Germany). Both parties agreed not to contest elections outside of their territories and the CSU became known as the CDU’s Schwesterpartei (sister-party). As a result of this agreement, the CSU developed what Mintzel (1990b: 92) describes as an institutional and political Doppelrolle (dual role) as an autonomous Land party with special federal characteristics. This means that it can contest federal elections and be involved in federal politics even if its agreement with the CDU means that it can only field candidates in Bavaria. The CSU’s relationship with the CDU furnishes it with a political significance in Bonn that extends far beyond Bavaria. Had the CSU not made a pact with the CDU in the immediate post-war period, Mintzel (1978: 222) argues that it might simply have become another local party pursuing a ‘radical separatist patriotism’. One could argue that this is exactly what happened to the CSU’s main opponent in the 1950s. The Bavarian Party also stood for the Catholic, conservative and agrarian traditions of the rural communities of Old Bavaria. The BP was less open to seeking a rapprochement between the Catholic south and Lutheran Protestant north in Bavaria, and sought far-reaching constitutional reform, moving to support for outright separatism. This was to avoid being dominated by the ‘Prussians’ whose ‘dream wish’ would be to create a centralised state that favoured the

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north’s development.3 The BP’s programme garnered considerable support amongst the Bavarian populace, winning 17.9 per cent of the vote in the 1950 Landtag election. This made a large dent in CSU support, which dropped from 52.3 per cent in 1946 to just 27.4 per cent in 1952. When some of the CSU’s most popular figures jumped ship to the BP, the parties embarked on a ‘fraternal war’ (Bruderkrieg). The BP joined forces with the SPD, FDP and the All-German Block/Party of Refugees and Expellees to form a ‘Coalition of Four’ in the Bavarian Landtag in 1954–57. Despite its awkward position as the only Catholic-Conservative force in the coalition, the alliance was worth it for inflicting the ‘ultimate humiliation’ on the CSU (Carl-Sime 1979: 99). In response to being ousted from office, the CSU initiated a far-reaching programme of internal reform, creating a broad organisational sub-structure by setting up municipal offices, centralising the party machine, and establishing a weekly party newspaper. The CSU’s expansion into other districts enabled it to throw off its reputation as an Old Bavarian party, and to climb back up to its 50 per cent mark in elections.4 The BP, on the other hand, ‘never recovered from the resounding defeat the CSU inflicted on it’ (James 1995: 3). It was unable, and unwilling, to expand its voter base, and still seeks to represent only the Catholic rural population. As a result, since the late 1960s the Bavarian Party became a ‘micro-party’ unable to capture more than 5 per cent of the vote.5 Interestingly, the BP is unable to gain the support of a substantial minority of the Bavarian population that actually supports independent statehood. In a survey conducted by the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, in which Bavarians were asked whether they wanted Bavaria to have more autonomy in Germany, 17 per cent supported outright independence (see Table 4.1).6 This is not an insignificant number – in Wales, for instance, only 13.9 per cent of people support independence (as of 2003). However, Bavarian voters are much more stolidly in favour of expanding Bavaria’s powers within Germany, with this proposition winning 57 per cent of popular support. Table 4.1

Public attitudes towards Bavarian autonomy and independence, 2003 Yes

Partly

No

More autonomy for Bavaria

24%

33%

38%

Bavaria as an independent state

17%

21%

56%

Source: Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung (2003)

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The CSU’s brand of Christian-Conservatism not only defeated the radical separatism of the BP, but also the competing ideologies of socialism and liberalism in Bavaria, both of which predominated in the industrialised towns and urban areas, and the Franconian-Protestant ‘corridor’. The Bavarian Social Democratic Party is the oldest party in Bavaria (est. 1892) and the only surviving pre-Second World War party in the Landtag. The Bavarian SPD has exhibited a separate identity from the rest of its counterparts in Germany, owing to its long-standing sympathy with the need to preserve Bavaria’s unique identity in the Federal Republic (Unger 1979; Ostermann 1994; James 1995). The Bavarian SPD proudly recalls the role of party leader Wilhelm Hoegner in drafting the Bavarian constitution in 1946, which made reference to Bavaria’s uniqueness, traditions of statehood and sense of identity, and which gave Bavaria the opportunity to ‘anchor its autonomy (Eigenstaatlichkeit) as firmly as possible, in anticipation of a new German state’ (James 1995: 69). Hoegner is now remembered as a Bavarian patriot and ‘father’ of the Bavarian constitution. The Bavarian SPD’s sense of patriotism has often led to tensions with the Bundespartei. According to Bauer (2006: 32), the German SPD ‘has a long tradition of federal state-centric preferences to which a regional right of appeal does not really fit’. At the same time the Bavarian SPD is faced with the task of ‘showing that the SPD does more for Bavaria than the CSU’ (Bayern Vorwärts March 2006). During the debates surrounding the German constitution in the 1940s, the Bavarian SPD pushed for a ‘strong’ type of federalism that gave equal weight to the Bundestag and Bundesrat and that decentralised the community and economic structures of the state (Ostermann 1994: 129). This became known as ‘der bajuwarische Impetus’ (the Bavarian impetus) in social-democratic circles. This stance led the Bavarian SPD, along with other Bavarian parties, to reject the ‘Basic Law’ in 1949, which clouded the relationship between the federal and Bavarian Social Democrats. Recognition of Bavaria’s distinctiveness went against the internationalist principles of the federal SPD, and the SPD’s state-centrism later led to demands for the Bavarian party to become independent.7 The Bavarian SPD differed from its German counterparts in other ways. For instance, when the German SPD adopted the Godesberg Programme of 1956, in which the party dropped its Marxist roots and began its evolution into becoming a ‘catch-all’ party, the Bavarian SPD had already pre-empted this move the decade before by becoming ‘more Volkspartei than a class party’ (Unger 1979: 59) in response to the strongly conservative political landscape of Bavaria. Since then, the party has moved to the left of the political spectrum, seeking radical reform of childcare, family policy, employment rights, and reform of secondary and higher education.8

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Because the Bavarian SPD has always been in opposition in Bavaria, this has enabled the party to maintain a more radical left agenda than the rest of the BundesSPD. Furthermore, because the Bavarian SPD was allowed to constitute itself as a Landesverband (regional association) and not, like the other Länder, as a branch directed by the centre, this allowed for a degree of policy divergence. In the post-war years, the BayernSPD sought, unsuccessfully, to steal the CSU’s thunder as the true Bavarian party. In the 1970s, this led to the articulation of a campaign that highlighted ‘the other Bavaria’, which emphasised the social-democratic traditions of Franconia and urban centres, in opposition to the CSU’s rural and Old Bavarian conception of the Land. However, this strategy failed to win over the Bavarian populace, and the Bavarian SPD lost significant electoral support in the 1978 elections (dropping to 31 per cent from 36.2 per cent in the 1974 elections). This encouraged party members to discuss breaking away from the federal party altogether to compete with the CSU as an independent Bavarian social democratic party. In the end, however, the proposal was defeated and the Bavarian SPD sought another strategy – of trying to win influence within the federal party to represent Bavarian interests.9 Some authors argue that the political climate of Bavaria is not amenable to social-democratic thinking because of the historical predominance of the Christian-Conservative ideology linked to Bavarian patriotism (Oberreuter 1987: 59). Others have argued that the Bavarian SPD’s weak position is due to its inability to create a Bavarian socialdemocratic counter-culture. ‘The SPD allowed its initial progress towards attaining a distinctive Bavarian character and Social Democratic identity to wither away, and it neglected to develop a specific Social Democratic regional orientation among the political-cultural developments in Bavaria’ (Mintzel 1993: 110). Attempts to reform the party in 1990 by achieving Land party status and calling itself ‘BayernSPD’ instead of ‘die bayerische SPD’ were too little too late. In the following elections, it failed to overturn its electoral decline or surpass its best election result, which was in 1966, when it took 35.8 per cent of the vote in the Landtag elections. Indeed, in the 2003 and 2008 Landtag elections, it received approximately 19–20 per cent of the vote (see Table 4.2). Similar problems exist for the development of Liberalism in Bavaria. The FDP has been equally hampered by its perception as a Bavarian ‘affiliate’ of Bonn/Berlin and by the federal party’s staunch opposition to regional patriotism. Yet there are also problems peculiar to the FDP, both within Bavaria and elsewhere. First, because of its post-war affiliation with the Christian Democrats at the federal level, the FDP has been more

CSU SPD Green FDP

% vote

Seats

129 65 – 10

% vote

59 31 – 6.2

58 32 4.6 3.5

1982

133 71 – –

Seats 56 28 7.5 3.8

% vote

1986

128 61 15 8

Seats 55 26 6.4 5.2

% vote

1990

127 58 12 7

Seats 53 30 6.1 2.8

% vote

1994

120 70 14 –

Seats 53 29 5.7 1.7

% vote

1998

123 67 14 –

Seats

61 20 7.7 2.6

% vote

2003

124 41 15 –

Seats

43 19 9.4 8.0

% vote

2008

92 39 19 10

Seats

12:12

1978

16/4/10

Table 4.2 Bavarian state election (Landtag) results, 1978–2008

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reluctant to criticise the CSU at the Land level for fear of jeopordasing a possible coalition government (a coalition which came about in September 2008 following the CSU’s loss of majority electoral support in the Bavarian Land election). The FDP’s desire to act as a ‘kingmaker’ in a coalition with the CSU has made it an ineffective opposition force in Land politics. Moreover, in Bavaria specifically, the FDP has suffered because of its unwillingness to develop a strong ‘Bavarian’ profile for the party. For them, regional pride is associated with particularism and exclusivity. In the aftermath of the National Socialist regime, the Bavarian Liberals were committed to fighting ‘against separatism and particularism in every form, every popularistic sense of superiority’.10 To that end, the FDP has always maintained a firmly pro-federal stance in which power is decentralised and as ‘close’ as possible to the citizens. The party’s official position is that Bavaria should be treated no differently in Germany, but should enjoy strong rights along with other Länder. At the same time, the party has acknowledged the fact that it has to become more Bavarian to win more votes.11 Thus the party now insists that ‘we in Bavaria love our freedom, our independence and our traditions’ (FDP Bayern 2003). Yet if we look closer, instead of strengthening of the regional level, the FDP believes that the Bavarian sub-regions should be given more autonomy to offset the centralisation of power at the Bavarian level (FDP Bayern 1982: 10). But pleas for a reduction in the Bavarian state’s powers have won little support: in 1994 the FDP was ousted from parliament, and failed to win more than 5 per cent of the vote until 2008, when it won 8 per cent and entered a coalition government with the CSU. There is an indication, however, that a new political tradition is emerging in Bavaria that does not simply say ‘Please – we’re also from Bavaria!’ like the SPD and FDP (Mintzel 1999: 120). The Green Party has politicised the issue of environmentalism and framed it within a Bavarian context. Die Grünen won their first seats in the Bavarian Landtag in 1986, with 7.5 per cent of the vote, some years after the German Green Party was created out of citizen-initiative groups to contest the 1979 European elections. Like other German Green parties, the Bavarian Greens consider themselves to be an anti-system party. Yet in the specific Bavarian context, the ‘system’ was dominated by Christian-Conservatism, and the archetypal party that the Greens opposed was the ‘mass and professional machine’ of the CSU. Some scholars argue that the Greens should be considered less an ecological movement and more of a protest movement against the ‘unholy trinity’ of the Bavarian state, the CSU and the Catholic Church (Mintzel 1990a: 172; James 1995). However, the party has been slow in committing itself to a specifically Bavarian agenda, as there is a strong section of the

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party opposed to developing a Bavarian identity, which is associated with their main political rival – the CSU. It was not until the Bavarian party realised that the success of the Baden-Württemberg Greens was due to their becoming more Land-focused, that they too decided to regionalise their party identity.12 This involved the creation of policies that would appeal to the strongly patriotic and conservative Bavarian electorate. These debates on the ‘Bavarianisation’ of the Green Party in Bavaria took place during the late 1990s, after which time the Greens increased their share of the vote from 5.7 per cent in the 1998 Landtag election to 9.4 per cent in 2008 – their best ever result. In order to break their weakness in Bavaria and catalyse political change, the Greens needed to appeal to the progressive conservative stratum. This goal was to be achieved through the development of a stronger Bavarian identity to sit alongside the Greens’ ecological convictions. The environment was already a central concern amongst Bavarian farmers, and the Greens were able to harness part of this vote – something that the SPD or FDP were unable to do. This territorial strategy played off well: in the countryside the Greens won support from the pro-Bavarian conservatives who were interested in environmental matters (from the CSU), and in the main towns and cities they appealed to the left-wing anti-old Bavarian (and anti-CSU) vote. The Greens thus made political enemies of both the CSU in the countryside, and the SPD in urban areas, becoming the third force in Bavarian politics.

Party constructions of the Bavarian Heimat

The CSU has continuously asserted the existence of Bavaria as an ‘imagined community’ and has sought to mobilise the population around a certain construction of the Bavarian Heimat. The CSU’s experience in government and control over state communication channels has made it difficult for other parties to articulate an alternative vision of Bavaria, and scholars have noted the repeated failure of opposition parties to create a ‘counter-culture’ to the CSU. The CSU’s notion of the Bavarian nation is derived from an historical myth of statehood, territorial continuity and shared culture and traditions that sits with, but ultimately supersedes, the identity and traditions of Bavaria’s diverse regions. The CSU is adept at mobilising certain elements in Bavaria’s history that glorify the Land and its independent spirit, whilst ignoring other less palatable incidents, such as the establishment of the first Socialist Republic in Munich in 1919. The CSU creates a ‘reusable past’,

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and a crucial aspect of Bavarian nationhood is its long history of legislative and administrative autonomy. Minister President Max Streibl once said that ‘Bavarian sovereignty is the political protector of the Bavarian way of life. Bavaria, the oldest German state and one of the oldest states in Europe, should never be allowed to sink to the level of a mere administrative province.’13 Yet the CSU’s construction of Bavaria is also based upon the post-war modernisation of the Land, with the CSU at the helm. This vision of ‘modern’ Bavaria brimming with high-tech industries is complemented by safeguarding traditional economic communities, such as craftsmen and farmers, which are associated with Bavaria’s history and culture. To underline Bavaria’s territorial integrity, the CSU has sought to develop a singular political culture in which the ‘sub-cultural’ regional traditions of Swabia, Franconia and Old Bavaria are integrated into an overall vision of the Bavarian nation. This has proved difficult in some areas. For instance, people in the northern district of Franconia often consider themselves to be Franconians rather than Bavarians – the latter still considered an alien, imposed identity associated with Old Bavaria. To combat the prevalence of local identities over the Land identity, and to ensure a sense of common purpose and belonging, the CSU has been instrumental in developing cultural and education policies that assert Bavaria’s unique identity, such as holding annual traditional festivals and cultural events, and teaching Bavarian history, literature and traditions in schools. Another, unofficial, aspect of CSU policy is cultural homogeneity. The CSU insists that foreigners must integrate fully into Bavarian society, but even then, the party opposes the idea of multiculturalism. CSU Leader Edmund Stoiber once said that ‘talk of a multicultural society tears up the very roots of our national and cultural identity, developed over centuries’.14 The party has sought to ensure that Bavarian society would not be ‘diluted’ by foreigners arriving from across Europe and beyond, and its advocacy of a reduction in the number of asylum seekers that Germany accepts has prompted critics to label the CSU xenophobic. This under-researched strand of CSU policy regarding the composition of the Bavarian Heimat raises interesting questions for scholars of nationalism. Having never been described as a nation or an ‘ethnic’ group, Bavaria’s party of government has pursued a policy that sought to protect the unique Bavarian Heimat from unwanted ethnic and religious diversity. So, whilst most European nationalist parties have abandoned the ethnic criterion for national membership (Keating 2006), and have internationalised their goals and rhetoric to conform to ‘civic’ values and play the European ‘ideological game’ (Lynch 1996), the CSU, a self-described Christian-Conservative party that has gone unnoticed by nationalism scholars, exhibits an attitude

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that has been associated with ethnic nationalism (Hepburn 2009a). The CSU has been successful in tying its party identity to the Bavarian political culture that it was instrumental in creating. For instance, during the 1982 elections the CSU’s slogan was ‘We in Bavaria’, in 1986 the party declared ‘Three names, one power: Bavaria, the CSU and Strauss’, whilst more recently the CSU adopted the straight-to-the-point slogan of ‘Vote for Bavaria’. The CSU also employs the two national symbols of Bavaria – the lion and the blue diamond – as party symbols, which are usually located on the backdrop of the white-and-blue national flag of Bavaria. As Mintzel notes, ‘it is not even necessary to add the CSU’s name. In fact nearly everyone knows which party is meant’ (Mintzel 1990a: 176). This has created enormous difficulties for other parties to break the CSU monopoly (one could say copyright!) over Bavarian nationhood. The Bavarian SPD has been unable to create a social-democratic ‘counter-culture’ in opposition to the political hegemony of the CSU state (Mintzel 1993: 110). One electoral placard in 1978 declared: ‘The powerful CSU needs to be checked by a strong Bavarian SPD. Therefore please give us your vote’ (Ostermann 1994: 160). But as Ostermann notes, if the SPD wants to appeal to sections of the electorate, it cannot just exist as the ‘bereaved’ party in a competitive system. Slogans such as ‘the other Bavaria’ according to Sutherland (2001a) have made no attempt to subvert or even challenge the CSU’s ideological interpretation of Bavaria as Heimat. Yet if we look more closely at the SPD’s construction of the Bavarian nation, we will find that it does differ from the CSU’s version. The Bavarian SPD argues that ‘we will allow nobody, and especially not the CSU, to outstrip our love for this land’ (Rothemund 1986). Unlike the CSU, however, the party understands the Bavarian nation as ‘our cosmopolitan Bavarian Heimat . . . a multicultural society’ (BayernSPD 1994: 35). The party has sought to counter the CSU’s version of a homogenous political culture centred on Old Bavarian traditions, by emphasising the sub-Bavarian regional traditions of Swabia and Franconia. This may be considered an electoral strategy as much as an ideological discourse on the Bavarian Heimat. The SPD performs better in communal elections, especially in the cities of Munich and Nuremberg and the industrial north-east. Support for a heterogeneous Bavaria is a way of countering the centralism of the CSU at the Land level. At the same time, the Bavarian SPD support a policy of multiculturalism as a way of opening Bavaria up to outside influences, thereby challenging closed and anti-immigrant tendencies in the Land. The party insists that Bavaria itself is an amalgamation of different cultures and has historically been able to accommodate cultural differences. The FDP has made fewer efforts to develop an alternative construction of the Bavarian Heimat, and indeed, it prefers to focus on individuals rather than

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regional communities. One of the central themes in German Liberal discourse is the belief in an open, pluralistic society, where the rights of the individual are protected regardless of race, religion, gender or country of origin. For the FDP, the CSU’s abuse of the state government to promote party aims that include protecting Bavaria’s population from an influx of foreigners and creating a separate political culture, goes against the grain of democratic liberal thinking. Julian Gyger, former Chair of the Bavarian FDP, once stated: ‘I will not declare the Liberal party uniform to be Lederhose and Gamsbart15 – we should first of all get rid of all superficial and hackneyed clichéd ideas about our Bavarian Heimat that we have internalised [and convince people] that there is actually an acceptable alternative for every citizen in the face of the superior strength of the CSU’ (FDP Bayern 1983: 34). But what kind of alternative Bavaria does the FDP visualise? The party has sought to undermine the CSU’s singular vision of Bavaria by stressing the notion of individual citizenship rights. The FDP objects to the emphasis on the Old Bavarian traditions and culture – which excludes the rest of the Land and insinuates homogeneity in Bavarian culture that, for the Liberals, does not exist. Gyger says, ‘when I speak of paying more attention to the Bavarian art of living and Bavarian lease of life, I am not referring to only that of Old Bavaria, but also to the Franconians, Swabians and the Sudetendeutschen’ (FDP Bayern 1983: 34).16 The Liberals do not interpret Heimat as a single political culture, but as a hybrid of diverse and juxtaposing cultures. This fits in with the Bavarian Liberals’ vision of an open and pluralistic society in Bavaria, which contrasts with the CSU vision of a primarily homogenous society in which foreigners not welcome. The Liberals refuse to play any Bavarian card, but partly as a result of this, the party has been sidelined in Bavarian society whilst the CSU continues to set the political agenda. The Greens have been more successful than the Social Democrats or Liberals in their construction of an alternative Bavarian Heimat. They have sought to replace the homogenous Christian-Conservative, Old Bavarian-centred culture of the CSU with images of an open, multicultural, pluralistic and tolerant society free from discrimination and particularism. They have done so by appropriating some of the main symbols of Bavarian nationhood, whilst giving them a Green twist. To illustrate, in Green party elections posters for the Landtag election in 2003, the co-Chair of the party, Sepp Daxenburger, was wearing lederhose and drinking a maß (a tankard of beer) in a beer garden. Other posters showed a group of Bavarian youths – of different ages, colours and backgrounds – enjoying a drink in the traditional beer garden. Although this message was directed for the benefit of urban voters (likely to vote for the SPD or FDP), the Greens

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were clearly moving onto CSU territory – using traditional Bavarian images to appeal to voters in the countryside. By the late 1990s, the Green Party was holding its party meetings in beer gardens – a strategy that had been monopolised by the CSU. The success of the Green vision of an open, modern and progressive Bavaria that simultaneously respects its history, regional diversity, traditions and (environmental) values, has led some authors to argue that the party is the only political force identifiable with a ‘counter-culture to the political hegemony of the CSU’ (James 1995: 103). But even though the Green Party has begun to challenge the CSU’s construction of Bavaria, it is reluctant to mobilise the nation for political ends, or to argue in defence of special Bavarian interests within the Federal Republic. This makes it difficult to convince voters that the CSU’s goals and identity are not intrinsically Bavaria’s goals and identity. Finally, in contrast to the CSU’s efforts to promote a singular political culture, and the opposition parties’ interpretation of a multicultural Bavaria, there is one party in Bavaria that has moved towards a closed vision of Old Bavarian society. The Bavarian Party (BP) believes that an independent Bavaria, free from the shackles of Bonn and Berlin, should be governed according to Bavaria’s traditional conservative and Christian values instead of ‘foreign ideologies’ (Bayernpartei 1993: 5). The BP wants to maintain a homogenous Bavarian society that can stand up to the threat of being ‘overcome’ by foreigners. In an independent Bavaria ‘our social system would no longer stand on the brink of collapse from more immigrants’ (Bayernpartei 1996). The party also argues that foreigners should not have a right to vote in elections, despite professing to support a ‘weltoffener Heimat liebe’ (a cosmopolitan love of Heimat). Indeed, the party strongly opposes multiculturalism and post-independence, the party maintains that the number of foreigners living in Bavaria would be reduced (Bayernpartei 1993: 45). Cosmopolitanism for the BP should only imply diversity of regional traditions and Stämme (tribes) of Bavaria.

Territorial strategies: autonomy versus capacity?

When the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was created, Bavaria constituted the only large historical political entity among the ten German Länder, and one of the few Länder whose boundaries had survived the territorial restructuring following the Second World War (the others were the city-states of Bremen and Hamburg). In order to protect its special interests and identity in the FRG, the southern Land time and again provided an independent, and oftentimes dissident, voice in German affairs

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(Dorondo 1992). The patriotism of Bavarian parties was evident in the drawing up of the Bayerische Verfassung (Bavarian constitution) in 1946, which recognises Bavaria’s uniqueness, traditions of statehood and sense of identity, and in the Bavarian Assembly’s rejection of the federal constitution in 1949. Since then, the Bavarian government has consistently pursued its own policy line in the Federal Republic. For example, the Bavarian government took a hard line on Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik – which was viewed as a threat to security and political reunification – culminating in the Bavarian government’s successful challenge to the constitutionality of the federal government’s Basic Treaty with the German Democratic Republic (DDR) in 1972. In contrast to parties in Scotland, Bavarian political actors do not seek unique political recognition of their territory within the state. This is because Bavaria was already constitutionally recognised in the Grundgesetz (Basic Law). Yet despite Bavaria’s entrenched place in the FRG, the CSU has explicitly stated that its aims are to achieve more influence and autonomy for Bavaria – both formally through the decentralisation of powers to the Länder within Germany, and informally through Bavaria’s paradiplomatic dealings with other regions and states in Europe. Former Bavarian Minister for European and Federal Affairs, Eberhard Sinner, argued that Bavaria should be considered like other stateless nations in Europe such as Scotland and Catalonia – as an historical political entity with a desire to obtain more autonomy.17 Yet instead of choosing independence as its preferred constitutional goal, it seeks to make its presence felt within federal German and European structures. The CSU’s core aim is ‘to protect the Bavarian Heimat, and to build a secure and prosperous future for the unified German Vaterland’ (CSU 1990a: 41). The CSU vehemently defends the powers of the Länder vis-à-vis the federal government and any hint of centralisation is met with strident condemnation by CSU officials. In particular, the question of fiscal equalisation between centre and periphery and between Länder, which requires Bavaria to pay more due to its wealthy status, has provoked deep resistance within the CSU. Bavaria’s position as an influential political actor in Germany and Europe has been bolstered by the ‘economic miracle’ it experienced. Yet it is important to bear in mind that in the immediate post-war period, Bavaria was far from being economically self-sufficient – it had a predominantly agricultural economy, with no raw materials or heavy industry to compete with the rich Ruhr area or the thriving ports of Hamburg or Bremen. With the erection of the Iron Curtain, Bavaria was severed from its traditional trading markets in the east and south, and became largely dependent on the federal government for subsidies. Yet this dependency did not endure.

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During the process of industrialisation in the 1950s, Bavaria’s economy became 75 per cent more productive than its pre-war capacity (Treml 1989: 427), and this figure continued to soar as more people moved from the agricultural sector to manufacturing and services. The CSU developed economic policies that consisted of providing subsidies to support agricultural sector workers and small and medium-sized businesses, whilst investing in important growth industries such as aeronautics, nuclear energy, electrical engineering, automobile manufacturing, petro-chemicals and the tertiary sector. To assist these dual aims, the CSU sought subsidies from the federal government to support Bavarian farmers, craftsmen and small businesses, whilst winning tax concessions to develop a large industrial base. This was largely achieved through the CSU Landesgruppe in Bonn, which acted as a powerful lobby for Bavarian economic interests during the years of rapid industrialisation (Carl-Sime 1979: 100). In order to reduce the possibility of social dislocation during Bavaria’s industrialisation (and to dampen any stirrings of an industrial proletariat with leftist-secular sympathies), the CSU also promoted social and cultural policies that ‘created a specific variant of industrial society’ (Mintzel 1993: 106). The CSU has a strong notion of social solidarity, which places the emphasis on individualism and the family as the basic unit of an organic society. Its social and cultural policies derive from these beliefs, which have included opposition to abortion, divorce legislation, and maintaining Catholic iconography in schools, which are seen to reinforce social bonds. The CSU developed a mixed economic policy based on the concept of the ‘social market’, which combines market liberalism with an active policy of state economic intervention to prevent social hardship. This policy, often referred to as Laptop und Lederhose by CSU officials, also endeavours to preserve Bavaria’s cultural heritage by supporting the traditionally important Bavarian farmers, craftsmen and small businessmen and maintaining the values of these communities, whilst encouraging the location of multinational corporations in Bavaria in order to attract investment and grow the economy. This is presented as ‘the Bavarian Way – a combination of tradition and progress’ (Stoiber 1999). These policies have been highly successful, and Bavaria has experienced the fastest economic growth out of all the Länder. It is the largest food producer in the Federal Republic (James 1995: 133), produces the greatest amount of genetic technological research, and has the biggest aerospace industry in Germany (Stoiber 1999). Bavaria’s buoyant economy has made it difficult for opposition parties to criticise government economic policy. However, the CSU’s economic strategy has changed considerably over the years, in particular promoting ‘less state, more freedom’ since the 1980s. The

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Bavarian government has moved away from its traditional policy of state interventionism by undertaking a large-scale privatisation of the public sector and decreasing employment protection legislation. Moreover, the CSU-led Bavarian government no longer seeks concessions from the federal government, nor does it support the kind of equalisation measures, subsidies and tax concessions that enabled Bavaria to modernise. Rather, the CSU wishes to reduce its fiscal contributions to other Länder, and to gain more regional autonomy in areas such as health, energy and unemployment. These debates about increasing Bavaria’s autonomy over its own political and socioeconomic development have inevitably been affected by European developments. Once considered to lie on the periphery of the EEC, Bavaria is now at the ‘centre’ of the EU 27, being in an advantageous trade position between the east and west. In the two decades preceding the ‘acceleration’ of European integration in the late 1980s, there was a strong consensus amongst political parties that ‘ever closer union’ was a guiding value for German politics. The future of Bavaria, as well as the development of federalism in Germany, was linked to the European project by political parties, and the economic benefits that a single market portended was enthusiastically anticipated by Bavaria’s party of state. Thus, whilst in Scotland concerns were expressed in the 1970s and 1980s about the peripheralisation of Scotland from centres of decision-making, in Bavaria parties looked forward to increased trade for an economically powerful Bavaria at the heart of Europe.

Europeanisation and Bavaria’s parties

In contrast to the United Kingdom, the process of European integration has been unequivocally welcomed by all of the mainstream parties in Germany. Germany’s future has been tied to that of Europe’s and as such, political parties have argued that Germany should be the driving force towards further integration. Roberts (2000: 176) calls this a ‘symbiotic relationship’ whereby Europe and Germany both need, and have benefited from, each other. At the substate level, Bavarian parties have displayed a consistently positive attitude towards Europe. Franz Joseph Strauss, who was CSU leader from 1961 to 1988 and Bavarian Minister-President from 1978 to 1988, saw European integration as a way of uniting the ‘two Germanies’ and he subsequently emphasised the importance of Europe for the future of Bavaria and Germany (Strauss 1968, 1976). When direct elections to the European Parliament were introduced in 1979, the CSU

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saw its role as creating a ‘Christian Democratic Europe’ as an alternative to the ‘Communist Europe’ to the east (CSU 1979b). The CSU had material as well as ideological interests in supporting European integration. For instance, the Single European Act of 1987 was seen as providing new markets for the robust business community in Bavaria. The importance of Europe to CSU rhetoric is captured in the party slogan ‘Bavaria is my Heimat, Germany is my Vaterland and Europe is my future’. However, the debates surrounding the deepening of European integration since the late 1980s have taken on a much less positive tone in Bavaria. A feeling began to emerge that the federal government – which was in charge of European (considered as ‘foreign’) policy – was ‘europablind’ (Jeffery 2003). During the late 1980s, the Länder governments united in lobbying for the implementation of laws to prevent their competences being transferred to Europe. For the CSU, a potential solution to maintaining Länder autonomy was encapsulated in the idea of a ‘Europe of the Regions’. Yet this should not be confused with the Scottish Labour Party’s understanding of the concept. Whilst a regionalised Europe was seen as offering the promise of more autonomy for Scotland to act outside the state, in Bavaria this concept was developed to limit Europe’s encroachment on regional competences. The CSU insisted that the deepening of integration must not interfere with the rights and responsibilities of the German Länder. Even by 1979, the party felt it necessary to implement the principle of subsidiarity to prevent the creation of a centralised European state (CSU 1979c). To avoid this scenario, during the years between the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty, the Länder sought to halt, and even push back, some of the perceived European encroachments on their own competences. Bavaria was instrumental in passing laws that strengthened Länder rights of participation vis-à-vis the Bundesrat in European matters, such as the amendment to Article 23 of the German Basic Law. This lays out the constitutional basis for German membership of the EU, in which the Federal Republic was forbidden to cede Länder competences to the EU without the approval of the Bundesrat. European integration was recognised as a domestic policy, and the Länder were guaranteed a delegate, selected by the Bundesrat, to represent Germany in Europe where the policy responsibilities of the Länder were concerned. A Committee of Länder Ministers for European Affairs was also established in 1992 to coordinate strategies (Roberts 2000: 174). And of utmost importance, the CSU organised a series of conferences entitled ‘Europe of the Regions’ from 1987–1991, which the party argued led to the entrenchment of the principle of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty, the creation of the European Committee of the Regions (CoR) in 1994, and

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provided the catalyst for a mushrooming set of regional networks and exchanges across Europe. Bavaria, and the CSU, were therefore at the forefront of demands to entrench Länder rights and competences (Jeffery 2003; Bauer 2006). The CSU strongly believed that European integration must go hand-in-hand with the safeguarding of regional rights: ‘to strengthen the Länder and regions – i.e. federalisation – is our answer to centralisation and internationalisation’ (CSU 1998a: 18). In short, the CSU was willing to support the project of European integration as long as it did not diminish Bavaria’s autonomy. As a result, the party moved from a position of enthusiastic promotion to ‘realistic but critical acceptance’ of European integration by the end of the 1980s (Sutherland 2001b: 220), especially on policies it considered to compromise Bavarian interests. However, the CSU also believed that Bavaria lacked representation in Brussels, and that ‘Germany is not standing up for the regions; we have to build up our own representation and influence it our own way. Brussels is nearer to Bavaria than Berlin.’18 In the 1990s the CSU-led government sought to develop a range of informal and formal mechanisms to make its demands known. Rather than going the separatist way, the CSU sought to become an influential player in the European sphere. It perceived a regionalised Europe as an attractive construct for the CSU, as it could act as the uncontested political representative of a territorial unit bigger than Denmark or Belgium (Wagemann 2005: 183). This European strategy won the support of a significant portion of the Bavarian electorate, gaining the CSU 64 per cent of the vote in the 1999 European election (see Table 4.3). The Bavarian Left, which in contrast has received a maximum of 29 per cent of the vote in European elections (in 1979, which has steadily declined since then), has historically displayed a more critical attitude towards Europe than Christian Democratic parties. The SPD opposed Germany’s membership of early European organisations such as the European Coal and Steel Community. In the mid-1990s, the SPD briefly toyed with the idea of opposing the single currency project and rejected the blueprint for a European constitution in 1994. However, the SPD has always viewed itself as a European party, pointing to its goal of creating a United States of Europe in 1925. It was the ‘kind’ of Europe that was being developed that they did not support. In particular, they criticised economic integration for creating greater disequilibrium amongst rich and poor. However, in the late 1980s, the SPD lauded the benefits that a ‘social’ Europe could bring by regulating the impact of economic integration (SPD 1989). By the late 1990s, the rhetoric was this: ‘The Bavarian SPD is a European party. We will help to make sure that the interests of broad strata

5

5

–

1

63

29

SPD

Greens 2.9

4.7

CSU

FDP

% vote

Seats

% vote

4.0

6.8

28

–

–

5

7

Seats

4.0

7.8

24

45

% vote

1989

1

1

4

7

Seats

3.3

8.7

24

49

% vote

1994

–

1

4

8

Seats

1.9

6.1

22

64

% vote

1999

–

1

3

10

Seats

4.2

12

15

58

% vote

2004

–

–

2

9

Seats

9.0

11.5

12.9

48.1

% vote

2009

1

1

3

8

Seats

12:12

57

1984

1979

16/4/10

Table 4.3 European election results in Bavaria, 1979–2009

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of the population in Europe are moved back into focus. For this to happen, economic policy must be brought together with social policy in Europe’ (BayernSPD 1998: 58). The SPD believes that the power of Europe must be harnessed for the right social and environmental causes, in order to make European integration a bulwark against globalisation. However, this idea of a social Europe has won little support amongst the Bavarian electorate. In the 2004 European Parliament election, the Bavarian SPD’s vote dropped to 15 per cent (see Table 4.3). The Free Democratic Party of Germany, like its liberal-democratic sibling in Scotland, is unswervingly pro-European. The FDP substantiates its support for European integration by referring to the interests of Germany, to peace between historically divided neighbours, and to the opportunities it presents to the citizens of Europe. On the latter point, the FDP believes that an open, competitive market economy in Europe will guarantee more jobs for European citizens, which along with the development of European social policies, will save them from poverty and destitution. These commitments mean that the FDP is ‘the most enthusiastic of all parties on European matters’ (Roberts 2000: 174). The Bavarian FDP, in line with the federal party, supports the creation of a ‘proper’ European political union based on subsidiarity, and stresses the benefits of further economic and monetary integration to Bavaria. Finally, the Greens, who first came together to contest the 1979 European elections, have offered conditional support for European integration. The Green Party, like its siblings across Europe, has raised concerns about the centralisation of competencies in Brussels that removes power even further from the people, and the lack of transparency to keep these powers in check. There are fears of an increasing democratic deficit in the EU, and that environmental concerns are being pushed aside in favour of economic growth. On individual policies, the Greens have been vocal in opposing the single market and nuclear arms, and they have a strong anti-NATO policy in keeping with their commitment to the principle of non-violence. However, the stance of the Bavarian Greens cannot be likened to the anti-European position sometimes evident within the Scottish Green Party, which is fundamentally in agreement with the principles of European integration.19 Yet this has not prevented the German Greens from ‘taking a more critical view of progress towards European integration’ (Roberts 2000: 175). This Euro-critical attitude was more visible in the early years of the party, when their self-understanding as an ‘anti-system’ party was much stronger, and when left-wing parties were generally less than enthusiastic about Europe.

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Constitutional autonomy in Europe

Bavarian parties have advanced competing visions of their ‘ideal’ European construct and Bavaria’s place within it. These constitutional demands can be divided into three ideal-type categories: independence, decentralised federalism and centralised federalism. Unlike Scotland, support for independence in Europe is significantly weaker in Bavaria; instead, most party demands focus on a federal model for Europe. However, understandings of ‘federalism’ vary widely, ranging from support for more or less centralisation of powers at the European level, with different emphasis on the role that states, regions and communes should play. For this reason, ‘federalism’ is divided into two categories: centralising and decentralising. Although both types of federalism have overlapping features, they may be distinguished by the fact that the former emphasises the gradual accretion of powers to the European level and the standardisation of some policies across regions and member states, whilst the latter decentralises powers to the lowest level to allow regions to pursue their own agendas. Independence

Whilst in Scottish political life debates over the merits or pitfalls of independence have been a constant theme since the 1970s, in Bavaria support for statehood rapidly declined following the CSU’s defeat of the Bavarian Party in the 1950s. Currently, the BP constitutes an electorally insignificant ‘micro-party’ in Bavarian politics. However, the aim of independence is considered here to ascertain how the BP accommodates European integration in its constitutional programme; to explain why independence is only a minority preference in Bavaria, and to compare the BP’s ‘independence in Europe’ platform to that of the SNP. Since its incarnation in 1946, the Bavarian Party has identified a place for an independent Bavaria within a European political framework. The Bavarian Party’s ‘Ur-Programme’ from 1947, written in English for the benefit of the American military government’s licensing requirements, included the demand for ‘the creation of a “United States of Europe” on the basis of self-determination and the equality of rights for all European States and Länder’ (Bayernpartei 1947). In 1949, the party’s manifesto for the Bundestag election made the claim for an independent Bavarian state within a ‘Pan-European Economic and Security Union’ (cited in Bayernpartei 1996). That year the party won 20.9 per cent of the vote, making it the third most powerful political force in Bavaria. The BP claims

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to have been the first party after the war to recognise the importance of European political integration and to accommodate this in its party goals (Bayernpartei 1993: 9). However, the Bayernpartei has not always been an unconditional or enthusiastic supporter of European integration. From the late 1980s, the party adopted a pronounced Eurosceptical stance and opposed what were seen as attempts to create a centralised European state: ‘The central bureaucracy that grows out of Brussels removes all parliamentary control. We reject this centralisation and the Maastricht Treaties’ (Bayernpartei 1993: 9). Instead, the BP sought to create an independent Bavarian state within a European confederation based on intergovernmental lines (ibid.: 4). This programme very much echoes that of the SNP. The party makes two general justifications for wanting an independent Bavaria in Europe: the first is that Bavaria constitutes one of the oldest, largest and richest states in Europe and is thus a priori entitled to state sovereignty; the second maintains that there are principles developed in European law that safeguard the rights of peoples to be self-determining, to enjoy linguistic and cultural rights and have their identity recognised, and Bavaria ought to benefit from these developing legal provisions (Bayernpartei 1993: 7–8). The first, older ‘argument’ for Bavarian sovereignty is undoubtedly the more powerful: ‘a Land of 12 million people must have more say and the ability to decide its own cultural and economic projects’.20 On the party’s website, there is a list of all of the EU member states that are smaller or poorer than Bavaria (evoking similarities to the SNP’s website). The party also makes comparisons with Ireland, emphasising its strong rural traditions. The party seems to have determinedly ignored Edmund Stoiber’s ‘High-Tech Offensive’ and the modernisation of the economy in its quest to re-construct the old Bavarian ways of life. The BP also has a closed vision of society, by seeking to protect its homogenous culture and ethnic group from the threat of ‘foreign’ influences. This reveals the BP’s instrumental understanding of European integration, which is useful insofar as it guarantees Bavarian sovereignty. But within Europe, Bavaria must not become ‘Europeanised’ – the party argues vehemently against a multicultural society. The BP also briefly supported the idea of a Europe of the Regions. In 1990, the party issued a manifesto that argued for a greater role for the regions in European decision-making. The BP’s ‘Europe of the Regions’ programme entailed four parts: (1) EU laws guaranteeing the rights of Länder in their spheres of sovereignty; (2) the establishment of a second European ‘Regional Chamber’ like that of the German Bundesrat; (3) the creation of a ‘Regional Commissioner’ post in the European Commission and; (4) the

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creation of a Bavarian ‘representation’ in the EC, which specifically promotes Bavarian interests (Bayernpartei 1990: 11). Clearly, these goals imply that the party is prepared to accept something other than full independence for Bavaria. However, BP General Secretary Hubert Dorn later clarified that support for the creation of a Europe of the Regions is only a short-term goal, whilst the central long-term aim of the party is full independence (interview, 2005). The BP has thus advocated a ‘stepping-stone’ approach, seeking to gradually enhance Bavaria’s powers to the point that independence is the natural next step. However, like the SNP, the party quickly saw the limitations – indeed, contradictions – of supporting a regionalised Europe rather than a Europe of small states, and the imagery of a Europe of the Regions soon disappeared from party literature in the mid-1990s. The Bavarian Party’s main goals for the establishment of a ‘sovereign Bavarian state’ in a European Staatenverbund (confederation) are similar to the SNP’s plans for Scottish independence within a European confederation of states, and the BP has used some of the same tactics as the SNP to strive for this goal. However, this is where the similarity between the parties ends. Unlike the ‘civic, not ethnic’ nationalism of the SNP, the Bayernpartei envisions a closed, homogenous society based on the ethnic roots and socioeconomic traditions of Old Bavaria, which should be protected from dilution by foreigners. Furthermore, the BP moved to an anti-European position in the late 1980s when many other nationalist and regionalist parties turned towards Europe for providing opportunities of regional action. The BP remains closed to the possibility of entering Bavarian or Euro coalitions. It resisted pressures to conform to the European ‘ideology’ of promoting cultural diversity, free trade, and territorial criteria for membership. It has never sought to obtain membership of the European Free Alliance (EFA). Instead it prefers to ‘work independently’, through creating bilateral links with nationalist parties in South Tyrol and Austria, where common concerns are shared regarding the preservation of a distinct ‘Alpine’ culture. In its constitutional programme, the BP sees Europe as a backdrop to its goal of independence, which endows the party with a more ‘internationalist’ persona. But in reality, the party is opposed to the direction of European integration and its principles of social justice, the free market and multiculturalism. The BP has isolated itself in Germany and Europe through its fixed ideology, putting forward ‘Bavarian statehood against the Federation as much as against a European central bureaucracy’ (Bayernpartei 1993: 47). Due to its weak electoral support, the BP’s demands have had little impact on the strategies of other Bavarian parties, which have all endorsed federalism within Germany and Europe.

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The Christian Social Union is Germany’s staunchest advocate of securing greater regional autonomy in Europe through a process of decentralising federalism. This would allow individual regions and states to set their own agendas and have exclusive control over a range of policy issues, rather than trying to impose a centralist solution from Brussels. The CSU is not the only party in Bavaria to argue that powers should be decentralised downwards – the Greens also support a Europe that is closer to the people (burgernähe). But whilst the CSU think competences should be devolved to Bavaria, the Greens think this should go further, arguing that towns and communes should also be given the appropriate decision-making powers in order to combat centralisation at the Bavarian level. To start with the CSU, a decentralised federal Europe means that regions would constitute a third level (dritte Ebene) alongside the member states and the EU, and Brussels should only take decisions in the event that the issue cannot be dealt with at a lower level. It should be noted here that this type of Föderalismus implies that the powers lie with the parts of the federation, which decide which powers the centre may enjoy, and not the gradual accretion of powers to the federal axis, which will be discussed in the next section. In this way, decentralised federalism is much more akin to the concept of confederalism, which is evident in the CSU goal of creating a European Staatenverbund (confederation) rather than a Bundesstaat (federal state), so that the EU is structured on intergovernmental lines. The way in which the CSU is able to reconcile its support for an intergovernmental Europe in which member states are stronger than the central European authority, and a decentralised Europe in which regions become key political actors, is through a careful elaboration of the concept of subsidiarity. This means that ‘decisions are to be taken where one can judge them best. There are also no policies to be directed from above downwards, instead it is reversed from below upwards’ (CSU 1994b). For the CSU (1991), federalism and the principle of subsidiarity are both geared towards empowering the lowest level of decision-making, which for the CSU means the region (Bavaria). This interpretation of subsidiarity allows the CSU to support the integrity of the member states of the EU, whilst also believing that European states must give up some of their powers, especially in the areas of foreign and security policy (CSU 1993a: 121–2). This does not mean that member states should relinquish their sovereignty altogether – rather, the EU, states and regions should not interfere in one another’s responsibilities. To that end, the continuing sovereignty of Germany and the increasing autonomy of Bavaria in Europe

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are seen as entirely compatible: ‘We need a Europe of shared sovereignty, in which the regions and nations, thus Bavaria and Germany, have their own rightful place’ (Friedrich 1991: 33). The CSU is aware of the dynamics of interdependence arising from the European project, and the spaces that this creates for regions. This contrasts with a party like the SNP whose pursuit of Scottish autonomy in Europe is deemed incompatible with Scotland residing within the UK state. In order to further its goal of securing Bavarian autonomy within a decentralised Europe, the CSU has actively promoted the idea of a Europe of the Regions. In line with its stance on a federal Europe, this policy envisions the creation of a decentralised confederation whereby regions constitute a third level of authority, alongside states and European institutions. The Länder ‘must be given rights of initiative and participation in the European decision-making process where their rights and interests are concerned’ as well as an independent legal right before the European Court of Justice (CSU 1993a: 91). However, a Europe of the Regions for the CSU is strictly taken to mean the regionalisation of the EU, as opposed to the Europeanisation of the regions. This reflects the central motivation behind the CSU’s European policy in the late 1980s, which was ‘to protect, as much as possible, the autonomy of the Free State [of Bavaria] in a Europe that is growing together’ (Hübler 2002: 250). Subsidiarity would provide the most effective guarantee of Länder rights by empowering the regional level in Europe and limiting the ability of the Commission to encroach on regional competencies by imposing a clear separation of powers between different levels (CSU 2009: 3). Or put another way, it would prevent Brussels from interfering with decisions made by the Bavarian government. The CSU has developed three different strategies to protect Bavaria’s sovereignty in Europe. Its first tactic was to bypass the German state and go directly to Europe to secure regional participation, which accords with Jeffery’s (1999) ‘let us in’ model of regional responses to Europe. This was evident in the lead-up to the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. At first this involved presenting a united front with other German Länder, which did not draw attention to Bavaria’s peculiarity or special claims. This resulted in the Länder representatives issuing a joint declaration that federalism and subsidiarity should be the building blocks of future European integration. As the CSU boasts, ‘it is to Bavaria’s credit that the German federal states have spoken with one voice against [the expansion of EC activities] and have made their position clear’ (CSU 1989a: 3). Yet this position of presenting Bavaria as just another one of Germany’s sixteen Länder was soon abandoned in favour of working more closely with like-minded

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Länder, such as Baden-Württemberg, and establishing a more independent voice and bilateral links in Europe. The CSU utilised a number of institutional mechanisms and networks to increase Bavaria’s visibility and influence in Europe. As party of regional government, the CSU was able to lobby the European Commission through its ‘mini-embassy’ in Brussels, through its active involvement in the organisation Regions with Legislative Powers (RegLeg), through the Committee of the Regions (CoR), and perhaps most importantly, via the constitutionalised coordination structures for European policy-making in Germany and its right to represent Germany in Council of Ministers meetings that concern Bavarian competences. Bavaria’s access to European decision-making is considered the best amongst the German Länder (Jeffery and Collins 1998). The Bavarian government’s relative strength in Europe enables the CSU to mount powerful European election campaigns, and the party has found a niche by being the European affairs expert who provides information, and a lead response, for other Länder.21 The CSU government also participated in regional lobbying organisations, and increasing trade and other cultural links through paradiplomatic activities. Finally, as a party, the CSU was well represented in the European Parliament22 and the European People’s Party. The EPP opens up an especially productive route as CSU ministers are able to meet and build links with prime ministers of EU member states that sit on the EPP board. However, since the failure of the CoR to become more than a weak advisory body, and the halt to further regional recognition in the EU, the CSU began to pursue a second strategy in Europe. Rather than seeking to bypass the state to make its voice heard in Europe, the CSU reverted to lobbying for Bavarian interests and the protection of its competences within the German federal state. The CSU felt that European integration was disempowering Bavaria because of the way in which competences were demarcated between the member states and the EU. For that reason, the CSU from the late 1990s focused on increasing its powers within Germany through a reform of the federal structures of the state. Its central guiding philosophy has been: if you protect the ‘hard shell’ of the state, you also protect the Länder (Jeffery 2004). Therefore, the CSU sought to bolster the structure of the German state to protect Bavarian competences from unwanted European influences, which accords with Jeffery’s (1999) ‘leave us alone’ model of regional engagement in Europe. In the years 2000–2, Bavaria opposed several proposals during the negotiations about the constitutional treaty that were considered to be a threat to its sovereignty (Bauer 2006). Furthermore, the Bavarian government clearly prioritised increasing its autonomy in Europe rather than increasing participation

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rights in EU affairs, which broke from the common position of the German Länder (ibid.). More recently, however, there has been evidence that the party has not relinquished its activities in the European sphere altogether. This involves a ‘third way’, of seeking to combine and maximise the earlier ‘participation’ and ‘protectionism’ strategies of the 1980s and 1990s. The CSU has sought to increase its participation in the EU, but from behind the protective shell of the state. Bavaria’s Minister for European Affairs, Eberhard Sinner, took over the Presidency of RegLeg in 2005, at which point he reiterated his commitment to a Europe of the Regions and the Bavarian government’s attempts to increase Bavaria’s autonomy in both Germany and Europe.23 The CSU-led government has also been active in creating alliances with other European regions and states such as Scotland and the Czech Republic, setting up international missions, creating mini-embassies in Mexico, South Africa, China, Russia, India, Canada and elsewhere, and signing international agreements such as the 2001 Flanders Declaration and 2004 Edinburgh Declaration, which sought to create a united regional lobbying front in Europe. These activities indicate that the CSU realises that in order to exert maximum influence, it cannot afford to cut itself off from lobbying or participation at either the German or European level. The Green Party in Bavaria is also a strong proponent of the decentralisation of political structures in Europe. Like the CSU, the Greens oppose the idea of creating a European state, and to that end, both parties found agreement in their criticisms of the Maastricht Treaty for concentrating too many competences at the European level (Süddeutscher Zeitung, 13 October 1993). Instead, ‘endeavours towards centralisation must emphatically be replaced by a Europe of the Regions’ (Die Grünen 1979). Since 1979, the Greens have given prime importance to developing a strong regional voice in Europe, in order to bring decisions closer to the people. A regionalised Europe was envisioned to provide an alternative to the existing structure of the European Community that was dominated by states. However, the party’s interpretation of a Europe of the Regions, its definition of ‘region’, and its motivations for decentralising political structures, differed greatly from the CSU’s. Whilst the latter seeks to strengthen Bavaria’s voice and influence in an intergovernmental Europe, the Greens seek to strengthen decision-making apparatus at levels beneath the regions – i.e. the communes. The Greens staunchly oppose any strengthening of ‘egoistic’ regional or state interests. In particular, the Greens do not believe that Bavaria has any right to be treated as a special case amongst the German Länder or

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Europe generally (Die Grünen 1994). When the party supported a ‘Europe of the Regions’ in the 1979 European election, it was seen as a way of accommodating the claims of minority nationalists, whereby the rights of minorities were considered to belong to the category of basic rights, which must be entrenched in Europe (Die Grünen 1979: 11). This included ‘the right to self-fulfilment of . . . the Bretons, Basques, Corsicans, and South Tyroleans’ (Die Grünen 1979: 11). Bavaria was noticably absent from this list. For the Greens, Bavaria was not meant to benefit from a Europe of the Regions, as it was not considered to constitute a ‘nation’ and its individuality was in any case protected by the Grundgesetz (the ‘Basic Law’ or constitution of Germany). However, the Greens’ interpretation of a Europe of the Regions changed over the years. Far from seeking to help national minorities whose claims were not accommodated within the state, their dominant understanding of a Europe of the Regions in the 1990s was of strengthening the communal level, citizen democracy and cultural diversity (Die Grünen 1989, 1999). And in their 2004 manifesto, there was no mention of the regions at all. So whilst the CSU’s support of a Europe of the Regions was motivated by a desire to increase Bavaria’s autonomy in Europe, for the Greens it meant the opposite: recasting the political structures of Europe to avoid any future likelihood of centralisation at the state or regional level. Centralising federalism

Whilst the Christian Social Union and the Bavarian Green Party oppose the creation of a European centralised state, the Free Democrats and the Social Democrats both argue in favour of a European Bundesstaat. This should not necessarily entail the complete centralisation of powers, as both parties are committed to subsidiarity and burgernaehe (citizen-focused) policies, but they do believe that the EU should take the form of a political union. However, their interpretation of ‘centralising federalism’ on the European level differs in two important respects. For the FDP, individual and communal rights supersede regional identities, and they are thus opposed to Bavarian ‘provincialism’, whilst the Bavarian SPD argues for a stronger Bavaria in Europe and acknowledge its claims to special recognition. The BayernSPD is officially committed to creating a United States of Europe (Vereinigten Staaten von Europa), a stance which was adopted in the German SPD’s Heidelberg Programme of 1925. The SPD justifies its commitment to this goal by arguing that ‘the democratic states must bundle their powers together, in order to assert, and also to work towards, a European peaceful order’ (SPD 1998: 16). States, then, are to be the

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central actors determining European integration, though the party also seeks to protect the cultural identity of minority groups. Yet the Bavarian SPD’s emphasis on the ‘integrity and sovereignty of all states in Europe’ waned in the 1980s. In response to the popular Europe of the Regions debate, the BayernSPD argued for an increased role for Bavaria and the regions in EU decision-making. In a press conference entitled ‘The Heart of Europe beats in Bavaria’, the Chair of the SPD parliamentary party in Bavaria stated: ‘the age of the nation-states is coming to an end; the economic and political integration of the Community marches on. Bavaria will, with the Eastern enlargement of the EU, become the heartland of the European Union. Old cultural ties – for example with the Czechs, Slovaks or Hungarians – will be picked up and newly revived’ (Maget and Kohler 2000). The Bavarian SPD’s programmatic goals, which heralded the decline of the state and the emergence of the regions, differed sharply with those of the federal SPD, which sought to maintain the centrality of the nation-state. This distinction is best explained by considering that the BayernSPD sees itself, like the CSU, as a Bavarian party. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Bavarian SPD supported the goal of creating a Europe of the Regions, in which Bavaria would be able to enhance its voice and influence. The party argued that without politically strong regions, Europe would become weaker (BayernSPD 1994: 42). In fact, the party went as far as criticising the CSU for not defending Bavarian interests strongly enough. The Bavarian SPD accused the CSU of wanting to strengthen Bonn against Brussels, whereas the SPD declared themselves as protectors of the Bavarian identity, seeking to ‘strengthen Bavaria against Brussels and staunchly defend Bavarian interests in Europe’ (BayernSPD 1994: 42). One of the party’s aims was to convert the European Committee of the Regions into a ‘real regional chamber with legal guarantees of involvement’ – a task they accused the CSU government of failing to accomplish. But this strategy of trying to out-Bavarianise the CSU was gradually abandoned. By the late 1990s, instead of advocating the opportunities for Bavaria in a Europe, the SPD went a step further – or perhaps lower – in arguing that the regions within Bavaria should be strengthened. The Bavarian SPD began drawing attention to the fact that the municipalities ‘have been denied an independent role in the process of European integration’ and that their role within Bavaria must be strengthened (BayernSPD 1992b; BayernSPD 1998: 51). The BayernSPD argued that if the CSU-led Bavarian government won more powers in Europe, these would be used only to increase their ‘weight and influence as a regional party in Germany and in an increasingly

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integrated Europe’ rather than further Bavarian interests per se (BayernSPD 1997). The Bavarian SPD became disparaging of the CSU’s efforts to ‘go its own way’ in Europe, and its habit of using ‘Bavarian interests’ as a stick with which to beat down any European development it disagreed with. Instead, for the Bavarian SPD, a Europe of the Regions should not entail strengthening the regional level against others, but supporting the communes and citizen involvement, much in the same way as the Bavarian Greens and FDP. The centrepiece of Free Democratic Party demands is a Europe of the Citizens (Europa der Bürger), which means that ‘politics must be organised from below upwards: first the citizens, then the municipalities, then the regional level (Land), then the member state (Bund), then Europe’ (FDP 2004). Although the FDP argues in favour of decentralised power-sharing, it seeks to create a united federal state (Bundesstaat) based on supranationalism, rather than a confederal Europe (Staatenverbund) that is drawn along intergovernmentalist lines. A Bundesstaat would entail ‘an Executive that is appointed by the Parliament, the Council as a European Senate, and the Court of Justice for the direct application of the Community laws through the national courts’ (FDP 1989). The way in which the Liberals would assure the creation of a European Bundesstaat, and avoid any possibility of this turning into a Superstaat, is through a firm application of the principle of subsidiarity, which means that ‘Europe shall only be responsible for political questions that cannot be properly decided by the individual states, regions or local authorities’ (FDP Bayern 1998: 47). However, the type of subsidiarity that the FDP sought to incorporate into the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 differed from that envisioned by the CSU. For the Liberals, subsidiarity does not stop at the level of the regions, or even at the level of the communes, but at the level of the individual. For the Liberals, bringing decisions as close to the people as possible requires a clear separation of competences between the regional, national and European levels. In the debates on the draft European Constitution, the party called for ‘the strict observance of the principle of subsidiarity (higher levels may only assume the tasks that lower levels are not in a position to do) and for the introduction of the principle of connectivity (whoever arranges for a measure to be taken must provide the finances for it)’ (FDP Bayern 2003: 49). The resulting draft constitution was seen as an acceptable compromise that would further the development of a transparent Union that is close to the citizens (FDP 2004: 13). The FDP have also acknowledged the importance of involving regional parliaments in the European decision-making process (FDP 1994a: 127). However, the FDP are opposed to regionalism as a political movement, or to any other

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type of particularism that goes against individual rights or the universalising project of European integration. Regionalism is seen as a threat that could undermine the European project and ‘shatter the national state into a multitude of egotistical communal and regional interests’ (FDP 1988). Both the BayernSPD and the FDP Bayern have been active in creating bilateral links with other Social Democrats and Liberals in Austria and the Czech Republic (BayernSPD 1994: 10). They are also represented through the federal parties in the European Socialist Party and the European Liberal Party, respectively. However, there appear to be fewer direct links between the Land parties and the Europarties – and it also appears that the former are quite content to be represented by the federal parties in Europe. At the Bavarian level, the FDP was historically unable to play the role of ‘kingmaker’, as it has done in federal politics, due to the CSU’s electoral might. However, this changed in 2008 when the CSU’s vote dropped to 43 per cent in the Bavarian elections, and it was forced into a coalition with the Liberals. The SPD has also considered working in coalition with the Greens. Both parties are in favour of strengthening the power and role of the Landtag in determining Bavarian European policy, and they agree on a number of social and environmental policy issues. However, even if they did join forces, their combined votes (totalling 27 per cent in the 2008 election) is still not nearly enough to oust the CSU from power.

Territorial capacity in Europe

Constitutional recognition is not the only territorial strategy parties may pursue. Just as important is the ability to advance social and economic projects in line with distinctive territorial preferences. How have parties responded to the challenges that European integration has posed to Bavaria’s policy-making capacity? Unlike the Scottish case, influence at the centre is less a motive for Bavarian political actors, due to the constitutionally enshrined rights of the Länder. However, the ‘centre’ is important to Bavaria in other ways, namely to provide a bulwark against encroaching European competences or to ensure the implementation of common social standards. In the latter sense, this means that Bavarian parties can make ‘trade-offs between sub-unit autonomy and redistributive claims among sub-units’ (Follesdal 2001). The main debate about Länder control over social and economic policy matters centres on the juxtaposition of competitive versus cooperative federalism. The cooperative model, which was institutionalised in Germany following reforms in the 1960s, explicitly requires the equalisation of living

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conditions among the sub-units (sozialer Ausgleich), which was to be achieved through joint decision-making mechanisms and ‘interlocking politics’ (Art. 72.2 of the Basic Law). An important aspect of cooperative federalism is thus the responsibility of the federal government to redistribute finances across Germany from richer to poorer states. Competitive federalism, on the other hand, entails the distributive conflict between the Länder (Wettbewerbschaft), requiring greater autonomy over economic and social policy to pursue differentiated responses to globalisation. This model is associated with a clearer division of competences between different levels, or ‘disentanglement’ (Entflechtung), in order to limit creeping European powers. The trade-offs for supporters of the cooperative model are therefore between autonomy and common standards; and for competitive federalism advocates, the trade-off is between autonomy and protection from the centre. Bavarian parties have divided along ideological lines on the issue of capacity in Europe. Whilst the centre-right (CSU and FDP) believe regions should have the capacity to compete for resources and investment, the centre-left (SPD and Greens) wish to create minimum standards in socioeconomic policies to guarantee equality of opportunities for regions. Autonomy versus protection from the centre

In the early years of European economic integration, EEC policies were perceived to be highly beneficial to the Bavarian economy. The EEC supported the development of arts and crafts, which was a vital component of Bavaria’s economy, for symbolic if not only economic reasons (James 1995: 136). Bavaria promoted the feasibility of small and medium-sized businesses as the ‘driving force of the social market economy’ with the help of European structural funds (James 1995: 137). Furthermore, despite the proliferation of large-scale industry, the agricultural sector, which has been supported by EC subsidies, remains important to Bavaria’s economy, (Padgett and Burkett 1986: 119). The creation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was initially advantageous to the Bavarian economy as it meant that the costs of supporting this sector were borne by Brussels, freeing up the state government to focus on the development of local industry (Paterson and Southern 1991: 195). The maintenance of the CAP in its early years was a key CSU policy. With the introduction of the Single Market in 1993, Bavaria was ideally placed to take advantage of expanding trade links between the east and west, and win back old markets that it had lost with the creation of the Iron Curtain (James 1995: 146). However, deepening European integration has seen a change in

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Bavaria’s attitudes towards Europe, especially as its ability to control the economy has been weakened by the transferral of competences to Brussels. Of the utmost importance to Bavaria’s territorial interests, the CSU government’s signature policy of active state intervention in the economy to support small and medium-sized businesses was challenged by EU competition policy. The Bavarian government has sought to change EU competition rules so that they do not undermine the Bavarian state’s ability to subsidise public services (Daseinsvorsorge). Furthermore, the CAP, with its bias towards large farms, was increasingly perceived as detrimental to the interests of Bavarian farmers. The CSU-led Bavarian government vocally lobbied for an overhaul of the system so that small farms did not continue to lose out to large-scale farms with strict quotas on, for instance, dairy products. As an alternative, the CSU argued that regions must take more responsibility for supplementary income subsidies, co-financed by member states. Thus, the CSU wished to remove these powers from Brussels and renationalise (meaning reregionalise) them by giving greater responsibilities to the member states. In all of these economic and social policy areas, the CSU has been concerned that ‘the EU keeps grabbing new powers’ and has a ‘tendency to want comprehensive jurisdiction’ (Stoiber 2002: 4). The only way to prevent European centralisation and the creation of a europäischen Superstaat, in the CSU’s eyes, is to retain maximum functional responsibilities at the state (which also means the Länder) level (CSU 2009: 3). Gaining more powers and protections at the state level would enable Bavaria to continue to diverge in policy, free from European encroachment. The CSU also wishes to reform the EU Regional Development Policy, so that the current system of redistribution via the cohesion fund is replaced by direct transfer payments to weaker states through a Solidarity Fund. This would reduce the scope for Brussels to ‘control regional development centrally’ (Stoiber 2002: 3), give regions and states more autonomy over regional policy, and make sure that poorer regions become more the responsibility of the member state rather than the EU. In tandem with direct transfer payments, the CSU proposes that stronger states should be given greater scope for national subsidies for regions not covered by EU funding, thus again increasing the responsibility of the state for ensuring financial solidarity. This is clearly a strategy of strengthening the ‘hard shell’ of the state to foster socioeconomic development, and ties in with the CSU’s realisation that Bavaria is in a stronger position to influence German European policy than the Commission itself. The CSU is against implementing common socioeconomic standards across Europe, as this is seen to stifle innovation and over-tax the EU’s

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(wealthier) citizens. It also believes European Commission proposals for increased coordination of economic policy ‘will lead to a centralised European economic government’ (Stoiber 2002: 6). Instead, the CSU maintains that economic policy coordination must be the responsibility of the regions and states, so that the decentralisation of legislative powers would allow a more precise targeting of economic regulations to the needs of local industries. The CSU believes that states and regions must engage in ‘healthy competition’ in economic, tax and social policy, that reflects individual territorial preferences based on political culture and social identity, and which is arguably in the interests of the tax-paying citizens of Europe. The CSU also cites reasons for political, as well as economic, competition: to enable regions to search for better solutions to common problems. Attempts by the EU to impose uniform requirements with regard to employment, schools or pensions, for instance, are considered by the CSU to be counter-productive as they ‘restrict fruitful competition between different policy approaches’ (Stoiber 2002: 6). For the CSU itself, competitive federalism is a strategy to protect Land control over socioeconomic policy from European competition policy and other common sectoral policies. Yet as Jeffery (2003: 105) notes, this should not be taken for pure economic protectionism on the part of the Bavarian government. Rather, it is linked to a wider agenda about decentralisation in Europe that allows the development of territorially based responses to globalisation. This type of federalism, as Jeffery (2003: 102) points out, has yet found no institutional form in Germany (or Europe), but informally the practice of competitive federalism – in which Länder compete for inward trade and investment – is flourishing within these ‘cooperative’ structures. The CSU-led government aims to institutionalise this development by increasing the fiscal independence and budgetary autonomy of Länder (i.e. revenue-raising and tax powers). This will ensure that richer states like Bavaria do not have to ‘pay billions from their own budgets to poorer states’ and that poorer states themselves break out of a ‘subsidy-minded mentality’ (Beierl 2001: 6, 7). The CSU has extended this vision of competitive federalism to the European level: ‘we believe that the principles of competition, a subsidiary character [sic], and diversity should also become the role model for the architectural structure of Europe’s nations’ (Beierl 2001: 9). The CSU has pushed for greater competition between regions in order to protect its own economic interests and ensure that its contributions to equalisation subsidies were reeled back. Thus, competitive federalism is partly about reducing Bavaria’s financial contributions to recipient Länder and poorer regions in Europe through

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German net contributions to the EU budget – of which Bavaria contributes a significant share. Again, this requires strengthening the hard shell of the state to protect Bavaria from having to give up its hard-earned cash. The model of competitive federalism has also been supported by the Free Democrats in Germany, who are enthusiastic supporters of a market economy. For example, the Bavarian Liberals seek to dismantle European-wide subsidies, strengthen disadvantaged regions by means of infrastructural reform, and obtain maximum assistance from Europe to increase Bavarian farmers’ powers to innovate (FDP Bayern 2003: 49). The party argues that regional policy should be decentralised and that regions should be granted maximum powers to compete autonomously in the European single market. The Bavarian FDP also refer to enhancing Bavaria’s position ‘in the middle of Europe’, and the benefits to be had for Bavaria from further integration and enlargement, for instance through re-building trade links between Bavaria and the Czech Republic (FDP Bayern 2003). The Liberals agree with many of the free-market policies that the CSU has instigated.24 However, the FDP does not seek to strengthen the regional tier against European centralisation, but rather the communal tier against Bavarian centralisation. One of their proposals favours the dismantling of the Bavarian (not German or European!) bureaucracy to promote free competition with neighbouring regions (FDP Bayern 2003). The CSU’s attempts to cut back its contributions (through Germany) to the EU budget and its emphasis on competition rather than social solidarity have been criticised by the political left, which sees competitive federalism as a ‘derogatory label for the neo-liberal, or perhaps merely self-serving, rejection of the solidaristic commitments engrained in the post-war political culture’ (Scharpf 2005: 9). Instead, the SPD and Greens in Bavaria believe in creating a ‘social Europe’ that guarantees minimum socioeconomic standards, a European employment pact and sustainable development policies. This requires the transfer of a certain amount of powers to the European level, and coordination amongst different tiers of government – European, state, regional, communal – in jointly deciding and implementing policy. Both the SPD and the Greens have advocated the creation of a ‘social Europe’ that promotes social solidarity and prevents ‘social dumping’ through common European-wide standards in employment, real wages and social benefits. The political left in Bavaria strongly defend the fiscal equalisation programme in Germany, seeking to prioritise social and economic cohesion and environmental coordination above regional or state autonomy. This indicates that the political left in Bavaria are willing to trade off regional autonomy for loyalty and (socioeconomic) obligations to the centre.

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It is important to bear in mind that the political left in Germany once opposed what it considered to be a neoliberal agenda in Europe, where the centralisation of economic and monetary policy presented a threat to social solidarity. Yet since the early 1990s, the SPD has adopted a more pragmatic approach to Europe (Sloam 2002). This was characterised by greater ‘ideological flexibility’ that supported a mixed policy programme of creating a social Europe within the context of economic globalisation. The SPD pushed for the creation of a European Employment Pact to flank the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact in order to create a linkage between the Economic and Monetary Union and a commitment to an ‘active’ employment policy (Dyson and Goetz 2003: 209). This amounted to a Neue Mitte (third way) ‘forward for European social democracy’, characterised by labour market reform combined with cutbacks in state spending (Schroeder and Blair 1999). This rhetoric has influenced the Bavarian SPD, which now speaks of creating a ‘balance between competition and workers’ rights’ (Bayern Vorwärts March 2005). The Bavarian SPD take the Scandinavian model as a blueprint for economic growth mixed with social solidarity (Bayern Vorwärts June 2006), and contrast this with the CSU’s disregard for the social dimension of integration (BayernSPD 1997). Instead, the Bavarian SPD endorses a model of cooperative federalism in Europe, based on that of Germany, which would guarantee workers’ rights through common European standards in social and economic policy, and entrench the principle of social solidarity amongst regions (Bayern Vorwärts June 2006). Despite arguing for some measures that protect Bavarian interests – such as reforming the CAP ‘for our farmers’ so that agriculture is returned to being a state responsibility (Kreissl-Doerfler 2004) – the BayernSPD submerge Bavarian interests within a common German agenda, which means continuing Bavarian contributions to federal coffers in the interest of social cohesion and solidarity. Their argument to the Bavarian electorate is that they will achieve more together with the rest of Germany (rather than apart with the CSU), and they seek to demonstrate how cooperative federalism and working together for common standards is superior to competition between autonomous regions that have the capacity to diverge. The Greens in Bavaria have also sounded calls for a ‘social Europe’ that is based on cooperation and joint decision-making between states and regions to develop common European standards in areas of public policy. Their economic model is based on ‘fair competition inside a social and ecological framework’, environmental sustainability and a progressive labour market (Schopper and Daxenberger 2006: 14). In some areas, the party proposes more radical reforms to social policy than the SPD. It

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demands a reform of EU structural policy based on the principles of ‘solidarity and sustainability’, which means concentrating funds on poorer regions and minority groups (Die Grünen in Bayern 2003b). The Greens also voice concerns for the environment due to the EU’s emphasis on economic growth, and argue for the creation of a common energy tax at the European level. In the debates surrounding the Convention on the Future of Europe, the Bavarian Greens were broadly in favour of the proposed constitutional treaty as long as key aspects included ‘environmental protection, equality of rights between women and men and social justice’ (Die Grünen in Bayern 2003b). So far, so cooperative federalism. But the Greens also argue that ‘not everything should be decided at the European level’ (Die Grünen in Bayern 2004). For instance, the Greens argue that Europe should not decide questions of essential public services (Daseinsvorsorge). They demand further decentralisation, especially to towns and communes, which should be given stronger financial powers. The Greens also want a stricter demarcation and disentanglement of competences between the EU and member states. In order to create ‘solidarity and sustainability’, for instance, they think EU structural policy should be renationalised (Die Grünen in Bayern 2003b). And for those policies that are harmonised at the European level, the Greens argue that the European Parliament should have a stronger role in decision-making, so that their decisions are democratically accountable. The Greens therefore have an ambiguous position on what type of federalism they want: decentralised but cooperative. Some policies, such as energy, consumer protection, environmental sustainability, immigration and transport, should be harmonised at the European level, along with foreign and security policy (Die Grünen in Bayern 2004). Others, such as the renationalisation of structural funds, should be decided at the national or regional level. But the decentralisation of legislative powers to regions should not result in a Dumpingwettlauf (dumping race) and falling, differentiated social standards (Runge 2006), which they fear is the objective of the CSU in its bid for more regional competition. There must be limits on the ability of the Länder to diverge, in order to guarantee social protections and common living standards. Contrasting autonomy and policy goals

As Scharpf (2005: 8) maintains, the affirmation of the virtues of competitive over cooperative federalism ‘can be seen as a response to the challenges of European economic integration which had the effect of

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opening national markets to competitors from all member states’. What is important to substate parties is not just the attainment of symbolic constitutional goals, but the need to protect, or expand, the capacity of the region to control social and economic policy, to advance territorial interests, to diverge from the centre to reflect political traditions and to become more competitive in European and global markets. The trade-off for the CSU is not between autonomy and ‘influence at the centre’ (which Bavaria has in the Bundesrat) but is considered in terms of autonomy versus protection by the centre. In other words, the CSU needs to strengthen the German state, and its influence over European policy within it, in order to protect the Länder competences. But this empowerment of the German state should not come at the sacrifice of the region’s ability to exercise control over, and diverge in, policies. Herein lies the CSU’s dilemma. Alternatively, the FDP and SPD are less concerned with Europe taking responsibility for a larger area of policies from the state, due to their commitment to a European Bundesstaat. But whilst the Social Democrats wish to see the creation of a cooperative federal Europe, the Liberals endorse the model of competitive, decentralised federalism. Thus, for the political left, the trade-off involves deciding between enhanced regional autonomy versus loyalty to the centre to provide fiscal redistribution, whilst for the Liberals the question is how far regions should be able to diverge without undermining the basis of European political integration. The Bavarian case has shown that support for cooperative and competitive federalism cuts across constitutional demands to create a federal or confederal Europe. This counters the assumption in much of the literature that competitive federalism correlates with decentralisation of legislative competences, and cooperative federalism with centralisation. As we have seen, the Greens and the FDP in particular have had difficulties in combining their ideological or capacity-related aims with their constitutional demands. The Greens take the position of favouring decentralisation of political structures and legislative competences in Europe, like the CSU, but insist that there should be limits to this to protect social cohesion and equal opportunities, and to avoid a ‘race to the bottom’, like the Social Democrats. In contrast, the FDP supports the creation of a European Bundesstaat, but endorses the model of competitive federalism that sets regions against each other and allows for policy divergence. The party most consistent in its constitutional and capacity goals is the CSU, which demands more legislative autonomy for Bavaria in a competitive federal European context. The SPD also (more-or-less) consistently argues in favour of joint decision-making and the harmonisation of economic and social policy, in order to guarantee minimum social standards and avoid widening the economic gap between East and

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West. It believes that Bavaria should share the burden of economic inequalities across Germany and Europe in order to create equal living conditions, which means continuing its contributions to the tax-sharing regime and fiscal equalisation transfers. For Bavarian political parties, Europe provides a new ‘centre’ from which to extract concessions and within which to seek influence. Yet it also means, especially for the CSU, a threat to Bavarian autonomy through the transferral of Land competences to the European level (CSU 2009). As greater areas of federal legislation have come to be determined by EU directives, the CSU-led Bavarian government has sought to slow down the integration process (Stoiber 1993), and failing that, has demanded that selected policies be renationalised (meaning re-regionalised). The CSU’s main strategy has thus changed from seeking to influence European institutions through the lobbying activities of its grandiose mini-embassy in Brussels in the early 1990s, to strengthening the collective role of the Bundesrat in European affairs and with it the hard shell of the German state from the end of that decade. Opposition parties, when criticising integration processes, have done so from a multilateral perspective (for instance, citing the democratic deficit, the need for a stronger European Parliament and the reform of structural funds to favour disadvantaged regions) rather than arguing in the defence of Bavarian territorial interests per se. As the CSU proclaims, it is indeed the only party in Bavaria to fight for purely Bavarian interests in Europe, in both a socioeconomic and a constitutional sense.

Conclusions: Europe and the defence of the Länder

Whilst some scholars have argued that European integration would lead to a reduction in power of the Länder governments (Scharpf 1992), others maintain that there could be a revival of regional autonomy ‘because the Länder governments could gain power by directly contacting European institutions and bypassing the federal government’ (Clement 1993: 117; cited in Benz 1998). The reality is that both have occurred at different periods of time. After the Maastricht Treaty, the role of the Länder in the EU was strengthened, leading to expectations that this would lead to a Europe of the Regions to sit alongside, or even replace, a Europe of the States. However, this notion lost its impact by the end of the 1990s due to disillusionment with the CoR, the transfer of more and more Länder competences to the European level, and the difficulties created for state structural policy by EU competition policy. This resulted in a realisation on

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the part of the CSU that it needed to defend Bavarian interests, as decisions over Länder competences were being made in Brussels without their direct input. In Bavaria, a ‘Europe of the Regions’ was also linked to debates on the reform of federalism in Germany. The CSU-led government was mainly concerned with increasing centralisation in Brussels and reduced Länder say over European decision-making. Whilst in the late 1980s and early 1990s, its response to perceived European centralisation was to obtain more direct representation of regions in European fora, its disappointment with regional opportunities in Europe forced it to resort to using state channels to protect Länder interests. Since the 2000s, one could argue that Bavaria pursues both these strategies, though with varying emphasis, through its involvement in Regions with Legislative Powers as well as in demanding more influence within intra-state decision-making mechanisms to shape European policy. But whilst for Scotland the constitutional and symbolic aspects of autonomy are perceived to be of the utmost importance in Europe – captured in the former First Minister of Scotland’s words regarding putting Scotland on the world map but without needing to obtain independence to do so – Bavaria was more concerned with protecting its policy capacity. Certainly, Bavarian leaders such as Eberhard Sinner have argued that Bavaria is as much a nation with a right to self-determination as Scotland. But talk of nationhood is more likely to be aired in the corridors of Brussels rather than in the Bundestag in Berlin. It is also an interesting development for scholars of nationalism – Bavaria, in allying itself with the other minority nations of Europe through regional networks, has begun to adopt some of their rhetoric. However, stronger constitutional demands in Bavarian parties’ rhetoric is noticeably absent. Bavarian leaders place the emphasis on protecting the division of powers between Länder, states and Europe that presently exists rather than advocating a more constitutionally formidable Bavaria in Germany or Europe. Independence, in other words, is off the cards and remains a minority taste to supporters of the ultra-Conservative Bayernpartei. This is not to say, however, that Bavaria would not like to wield its powers in a more informal manner in Europe. Just because Bavaria exists in a symmetrical federation does not preclude it from wanting more than what the other Länder have. Indeed, Bavaria prides itself in having a special identity in the German state. But it is crucial to note that politicians – the CSU and others – realise that Bavaria wields greater strength by being a powerful Land in the German federal state than by being an independent member state of Europe. Moreover, the CSU has realised that its territorial strategy of seeking to strengthen its position within Germany with a view

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to influencing European policy is more effective than trying to ‘bypass’ the state as a regional player in Europe. Successive Bavarian CSU-led governments have relished their ‘dual role’ in the German and Bavarian political arenas – and are keen to add an additional role in Europe to their repertoire through the manipulation of linkages between the different political arenas. Such an achievement is the envy of many of their regional counterparts in Europe.

Notes 1 Heimat is a notoriously difficult word to define, but most Bavarian politicians, when asked to elaborate on the term during interviews, mentioned attachment to the land, identity, people, culture and traditions – in other words, it can be made equivalent to nationhood (Sutherland 2001a, b; Hepburn 2008b). 2 This was two years before the Bavarian Party was authorised to compete in Land elections. The occupation forces were sceptical of regionalist parties, which could thwart German unity. 3 Joseph Baumgartner, Chair of the Bayernpartei, in a speech to the Bavarian Landtag, 15 August 1948. 4 The CSU won 45.6 per cent in 1958, 48.1 per cent in 1966 and 56.4 per cent in 1970 (see Table 4.2). 5 The BP won 8.1 per cent of the vote in the 1958 Landtag election, dropping to 0.4 per cent in 1978, and winning less than 1 per cent since 1989. In the European elections, the BP increased its vote from 0.6 per cent in 1984 to 1.6 per cent in 1994. 6 Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung (2003), Generationenstudie 2003. Heimat und Heimatgefühl in Bayern (Munich: Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung), p. 49. 7 Interview with Harald Schneider, Press Spokesperson, BayernSPD, 2 February 2005. 8 Interview with Larissa Schulz-Triglaff, Press Spokesperson, Bavarian Landesgruppe in the SPD Bundesfraktion, 20 April 2009. 9 Interview with Walter Kolbow, Member of the Federal Parliament (MdB) for the SPD in Bavaria, 21 April 2009. 10 Programm der Liberal-Demokratischen Partei München, 28 March 1946, reproduced in Meuschel (1992: 11). 11 Interview with Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenburger, Member of the Regional Parliament (MdL) and Chair of the Bavarian FDP, 13 January 2005. 12 Interview with Bavarian Green Party official, 20 January 2005. 13 Speech in Munich on 6 July 1990 (Sutherland 2001a: 33, 39). 14 Stoiber’s statement was printed in Die Welt on 25 February 1989 and quoted in Sutherland (2001b: 208). 15 A Gamsbart is the tuft of hair from a mountain antelope that is traditionally worn as a hat decoration in Bavaria. 16 The Sudetendeutschen were the German population expelled from Czechoslovakia.

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17 Interview with Eberhard Sinner, Bavarian Minister of European and Federal Affairs, 14 January 2005. 18 Interview with civil servant, Department of European and Federal Affairs in the Bavarian State Chancellery, 14 January 2005. 19 Interview with Alex Burger, Press Spokesperson, Bavarian Green Party, 19 January 2005. 20 Interview with Hubert Dorn, General Secretary, Bayernpartei, 20 January 2005. 21 This was confirmed in an interview with a civil servant in the Bavarian Ministry for Europe. He stated that ‘other Länder rely on Bavaria to do something about Europe’. 22 Out of the 11 seats allocated for Bavaria in the European Parliament, the CSU elected 8 members in 1994, 10 in 1999 and 9 in 2004 (see Table 4.3). The CSU also forms a group with the CDU in the EP, known as the CDU-CSU Europagruppe. 23 Interview with Eberhard Sinner, Bavarian Minister of European and Federal Affairs, 14 January 2005. 24 Interview with Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenburger, Chair of the Bavarian FDP, 13 January 2005, in which she voiced her support for CSU economic policies, and vowed to continue with these fiscal measures if the FDP took power.

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5 Sardinian autonomy in the Mediterranean

Introduction

Sardinia has been largely ignored by scholars of nationalism and regionalism. This is not because territorial claims have omitted independence, or have shunned ‘nationalist’ parlance (as in Bavaria), but because Sardinian nationalism has failed to pose a major threat to the territorial integrity of the Italian state or to catalyse any constitutional reforms, in contrast to the Lega Nord. In fact, many scholars might argue that Sardinian nationalism has already had its day. In the period immediately following the First World War, Sardinia’s nationalist party – Partito Sardo d’Azione (Psd’Az – Sardinian Party of Action) – won 36 per cent of the vote in regional elections, thereby unifying a largely disparate and divided island under the banner of Sardinian autonomy. However, the ‘special statute’ granted to Sardinia in the 1948 Italian Constitution served to subdue nationalist claims. As a result, the Psd’Az was relegated to being a minor party in the following decades, and efforts to modify nationalist goals to appeal to voters only resulted in party splits. Today there are half a dozen nationalist micro-parties in Sardinia, and their limited impact is largely due to the success of regional branches of statewide parties in playing the Sardinian card. Each party in Sardinia has declared itself to be autonomist, and nationalist parties have had to struggle to make their voice heard. To combat their relative impotence on the Sardinian political stage, nationalist parties looked to Europe in the late 1980s to provide opportunities for regional mobilisation. The Psd’Az was an early enthusiast of a ‘Europe of the Regions’, envisioning the exercise of Sardinian autonomy within a federal European framework. The election of the Psd’Az party leader, Mario Melis, to the European Parliament in the 1980s and 1990s brought a new European dimension to regional politics. Other

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parties were forced to respond to this, developing proposals for Sardinia’s place within a federal Europe, or a Europe of the States. However, demands for the renewal of Sardinian autonomy were only very loosely linked to processes of integration and regionalisation in Europe. This was because Sardinia’s interest in Europe was primarily economic – i.e. as a source of regional structural funds – and party approaches to political integration remained reactive and uncritical. Constitutional questions were submerged under the more pressing need for economic modernisation, and the costs and benefits that Europe offered in this regard. This chapter will explore how Sardinian parties have developed their territorial strategies in response to Europe, beginning with an examination of the political traditions and constructions of the nation in Sardinia, and how these inform parties’ constitutional and socioeconomic demands. In particular, it will examine the trade-off that successive governing parties in Sardinia have made between exercising a ‘real’ autonomy and obtaining resources and patronage from Rome, and how Europe has altered this context by providing a new ‘centre’ for territorial demands.

Political traditions and ideologies in Sardinia

From the outset it appears that Sardinia has followed Italian political traditions and voting patterns, whereby the Christian Democrats were dominant in the post-war period, and the left formed a permanent – though divided – opposition. But on closer inspection there are particular nuances in the Sardinian party system that differentiate it from other regions and Italian politics in general. These include: the presence of the oldest nationalist party in Italy, the Psd’Az, whose ideological flexibility enabled it to act as coalition partner to both the Christian Democrats and the left; the autonomist positions of Sardinian branches of statewide parties; and the advent of anti-globalisation independence-seeking parties. The strength of the territorial dimension in Sardinian politics has meant that ‘autonomy’, and less class and religion, is the ‘central axis’ upon which Sardinian parties compete (Tidore 1993: 29). According to Paolo Pisu, ‘in Sardinia we’re all federalists, autonomists or separatists’.1 There is no such thing as an ideology of ‘unionism’ that exists in Scotland, or opposition to regionalism as in Bavaria. This necessitates an examination of how the political traditions of Christian Democracy, communism, and socialism have addressed the territorial question, and how political nationalism itself emerged in Sardinia. The Partito Sardo d’Azione (Psd’Az) was formed by ex-soldiers from

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the famous Brigata Sassari (Sassari Brigade) – a Sardinian section of the Italian armed forces that fought in the First World War. Headed by the charismatic Emilio Lussu, the Psd’Az benefited from a surge of mass popular nationalism in Sardinia in the 1920s. The war provided the first collective experience for the Sardinian people, who had been isolated from each other in closed communities spread across the island. Their involvement in the war ensured that ‘for the first time ever [the Sards] engaged in contact with the reality of the national vision’ (Melis 1982: 23). In return for the sacrifices of the ‘intrepid Sardinians’, the Psd’Az demanded self-determination in order to protect the Sardinian identity, language and culture. These goals won the support of large strata of the population, especially soldiers, peasants and miners. The first party congress was held in April 1921, making the Psd’Az ‘the first and most important autonomist movement’ in Italy (Vallauri 1994: 199).2 In the elections that year, the party won 36 per cent of the vote, establishing itself as a mass movement for the autonomy of Sardinia in a Federazione mediterranea (Mattone 1982: 74; Cubeddu 1995: 270). However, its ideological position was less clear. Attempts to pull the party in the direction of socialism in order to represent the struggle of the workers were met with opposition. And when the Italian Fascist Party began making headway in 1923, many of the party’s conservative leaders broke with Lussu’s radical socialists to merge with the Fascists (Addis Saba 1982: 132). This was motivated by Mussolini’s promise of ‘autonomy’ for the island, which meant the sum of one billion lire to be spent on public works and land reclamation. Meanwhile, the project of granting Sardinia special recognition was abandoned in the lead up to the war, when centralisation and territorial expansion to Africa were the key orders of the day. Meanwhile, the rump of the Psd’Az, under the direction of Lussu, vigorously opposed Mussolini’s project and re-emerged following the fall of Fascism in Italy in 1943 after years in exile. By this time, the autonomist movement had become associated with anti-fascism, anti-war sentiments, and the struggle of the peasants and miners (Melis 1982). However, it was unable to galvanise the pre-war levels of support, as the reputation of the party had been tarnished by its association with Fascism and it could not depend on the automatic assistance of the ex-servicemen’s associations. Despite this, the party was still considerably large and put forward its programme for a federal Italian state in 1946: ‘the Psd’Az is firmly convinced that only a restructuring of the state along republican-federal lines will save and reinforce national unity, guarantee and intensify the exercise of individual, communal and regional rights, and allow for the realisation of a substantive social justice’ (cited in Melis 1982: 30). That

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year, the Psd’Az also put forward proposals for a Special Statute for Sardinia, seeking exclusive legislative competences across a wide range of areas including policing, work and pensions, health, finance, public works, industry, agriculture and education (Mattone 1982: 30). It failed to obtain many of these powers. Months of internal bickering among Sard parties about the content of the Statuto led the Italian government to take charge and draw up the document based on Sicily’s text, which was then approved by the Italian Parliament. In short, Sardinia was handed a watered-down constitution decreed by Rome with no popular backing. The Psd’Az suffered another set-back in 1948. Emilio Lussu decided to abandon the conservative elements in the party and establish his own Partito Sardo d’Azione Socialista (Psdas) in order to revive the socialist sardism of the early 1920s. During the elections that year, the Psd’Az obtained 10.5 per cent of the vote with seven seats in the Assembly, and the Psdas took 6.6 per cent and three seats. The split served to benefit neither party: ‘one lost its radical wing and found itself weakened in the face of moderate Christian democracy, the other, viewed with suspicion as a potential rival by the communist party, was never able to find its own niche’ (Addis Saba 1982: 135). Lussu’s Psdas finally merged with the Italian Socialists in 1949 whilst the Psd’Az veered to the right. It began a long collaboration with the Christian Democrats, allowing it to enter a number of regional governments. But due to the failure of the government’s economic development plans and its inability to break Sardinia’s dependence on the central state for favours and patronage, the Psd’Az also suffered from this collaboration. The Psd’Az entered a period of crisis in the 1960s, unable to win more than 5 per cent of the vote (Tidore 1993). The precarious position of the Psd’Az was reversed in the 1970s when it began to capitalise on the burgeoning success of a new cultural nationalist movement, known as neo-sardismo. This movement, based on linguistic and cultural demands, was headed by a number of cultural groups and intellectuals. But it soon acquired political overtones, namely a demand for independence that was framed in the language of anti-colonialism. Its new political protagonists included Il Fronte Indipendentista Sardo, Sardinnya e Libertat and Su Populu Sardo. The latter organisation, established in 1973, temporarily merged with the Psd’Az in 1981. As a result of the party’s adoption of neo-sardist goals, it enjoyed a boom in electoral support, gaining 15 per cent of the vote in the 1980 regional elections (see Figure 5.1). Involvement in the neo-sardism movement had other effects on the party. In 1979 the Psd’Az officially changed its main goal from federalism to supporting independence (Petrosino 1988). This led many neo-sardisti to join the party, thus

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Figure 5.1

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Psd’Az performance in national, regional and provincial elections, 1921–2009

expanding and diversifying its membership, and moving the party again to the left. However, the goal of ‘independence’ was unclear: it did not actually detract from support for the federal reform of the Italian state. This ambivalence frustrated its new members, leading to internal divisions and a significant drop in electoral support. The party’s reluctance to press for independence, in addition to its association with the Christian Democrat government’s failed economic plans, damaged its reputation: it was seen as having failed to secure a ‘real’ autonomy for the island. The Christian Democrats (DC – Democrazia Cristiana) were the main party of government in Sardinia from 1948 to 1991 (with a short break in the 1980s when a left coalition came to power – see Table 5.1 for electoral results). This meant that the DC Sarda was also the party of autonomy. During the drafting of the Italian Constitution in 1946–48, the DC Sarda enthusiastically supported the creation of autonomous institutions for Sardinia. This was in keeping with the state party’s stance, which favoured a decentralised Italian state in line with its commitment to ‘local participation’ and the Catholic notion of subsidiarity (Partridge 1998: 54). Thus, the Sardinian DC’s regionalist orientation and nationalist coalition partners did not create a problem for the statewide party. During the 1950s, the most urgent task of the DC Sarda government was to re-build Sardinia’s predominantly rural economy, which was one of the poorest in Europe. A group of ‘Young Turks’ within the party advocated a modern autonomy for Sardinia that was linked to economic development based on industrialisation. This commenced in 1962 when the Italian Parliament allocated one hundred billion lire to Sardinia’s piani di rinascita (‘plans of rebirth’). Based on the concept of growth poles, the aim of the first plans was to create high-technology industries such as petrochemical plants, steelworks and oil refineries on the island. The state-run Cassa per il

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Mezzogiorno administered the projects, but the imposition of an alien form of industrialisation on an island with poor infrastructure, and with little consultation from Sardinian authorities, spelt disaster. As the industrial plants failed to provide many jobs and the traditional agro-pastoral economy was ignored,3 the Sardinian people turned against the ‘cathedrals in the desert’. Table 5.1

DC PCI PSI/PSDI Psd’Az MSI/PNM

Regional electoral performance of Sardinian parties, 1949–89 (% of votes) 1949

1953

1957

1961

1965

1969

1974

1979

1984 1989

33.0 19.4 8.9 17.0 18.5

41.1 22.3 10.6 7.0 16.3

43.0 17.5 12.2 6.0 11.6

46.3 20.5 12.8 7.2 11.0

43.4 20.5 16.1 6.3 7.5

44.5 19.7 16.3 4.5 6.7

38.3 26.8 17.3 3.1 7.8

37.7 26.3 15.8 3.3 5.3

32.1 28.7 14.4 13.8 3.9

35.0 23.1 18.6 12.9 3.5

Source: Regional Council of Sardinia and Istituto Cattaneo Note: DC – Democrazia Cristiana; PCI – Partito Comunista Italiano; PSI – Partito Socialista Italiano; PSDI – Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano; Psd’Az – Partito Sardo d’Azione; MSI – Movimento Sociale Italiano; PNM – Partito Nazionale Monarchico.

Popular resistance to the modernisation plans in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which degenerated into criminal activities such as banditry and kidnapping in the pastoral and mountain areas of Sardinia,4 precipitated a crisis within the DC Sarda. After years of having been complicit with the Italian government’s dubious economic experiments in Sardinia, the Young Turks in the DC Sarda embarked on ‘a politics of open confrontation with Rome and the same political class in Sardinia that, with a considerable influence in all of the parties and a presence in the national parliament [. . .] was accused of not doing enough possible for the interests of the island and, on the contrary, of favouring government projects and programmes that undermined the autonomy and self-determination of the Sards’ (Brigaglia et al. 2002: 76). The DC Sarda sought to defuse the radical neo-sardism movement by developing a new plan of rebirth in 1974 that tried to compliment Sardinia’s traditional economy (ibid.: 81). The plan offered grants for reforestation and cheese-making cooperatives and allowed shepherds to buy land. But when it became apparent that the DC’s economic programme still centred on the ‘regional distribution of patronage’ (Clark 1996: 90), the autonomist movement became associated with the left. The left in Sardinia has not always been supportive of demands for autonomy. During the 1940s, both the Socialist Party (PSI) and

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Communist Party (PCI) were stolidly against giving autonomy to the regions in case it promoted ‘reactionary political tendencies at the periphery’ (Cento Bull 1997: 2). The PCI was most hostile to decentralising power to the regions, which was viewed as a threat to their main goal of creating a centralised system along Soviet lines in which the revolution would occur. However, there also existed a ‘tepid autonomist position’ in the Sardinian branch (Sotgiu 1996: 31) that acknowledged the specificity of Sardinian identity, history and traditions. One section of the party even broke away to form the Partito Comunista Sardo to create ‘a Federal Socialist Republic in which Sardinia will be inserted as an Autonomous Sardinian Republic’ (cited in Mattone 1982: 29). Its position helped force the hand of the PCI, which moved towards supporting a more ‘moderate regionalism’ (Melis 1982: 34). But the ambiguity in its territorial goals remained. Its main challenge was to integrate those Sards who were sympathetic to the ideals of communism but who also wanted to give autonomy a class-based interpretation. But it could not make ‘autonomism’ synonymous with communism, as many right-wing Sards supported autonomy and moreover, demands for special recognition were antithetical to the Marxist interpretation of class struggle. For this reason, the PCI had to officially oppose ‘particularism’, and any measures that could potentially unite Sardinians against the Italian state. In the immediate post-war period, the Socialist Party seemed equally hostile to Sardinian autonomy. The Cagliari branch of the PSI was convinced that socialism would answer the problems of ethnic difference by levelling them (Pintore 1996: 9), which would thwart the domino effect of regional demands leading to independence, and prevent the demise of Italy. Yet the party was soon forced to reconsider this position when Lussu’s breakaway party, the Socialist Sardinian Party of Action, joined the Italian Socialists in 1949. It sought to change the PSI’s views on the regional question, and to some extent succeeded: ‘the entrance of the socialist sardisti accelerated the process, already begun, of the conversion of the party to the idea of autonomy’ (Contu 1992: 29). Furthermore, following the rise of the neo-sardism movement in the late 1960s, the PCI and PSI in Sardinia were both forced to re-evaluate their positions on the regional question (Ortu 1998: 87). This was in part motivated by a concern that their resistance to reforms safeguarding Sardinia’s cultural and linguistic heritage would lose them electoral support. It was also motivated by statewide factors: in the 1970s, regional governments had been established elsewhere in Italy by the PSI/DC/PCI government (Clark 1984: ch. 18). The PCI became the main beneficiary of increased representation in decentralised institutions in the central belt,

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making it more open-minded to claims for autonomy. But this was ‘autonomy’ of a particular kind: the PCI instead insisted that regional authorities must be empowered to draw up and execute a new set of economic development programmes so that Sardinia could ‘catch up’ with the rest of Italy (Ortu 1998: 80; Accardo 1998: 130). The PSI took a similar stance, arguing for more effective exercise of current regional powers, rather than more powers (Accardo 1998: 133). The Left argued that the previous plans of rebirth had failed because of the DC regional elite’s misuse of authority5 and argued that they would far better use the resources available to increase the welfare of the Sardinian people. They got their chance when a coalition of the Psd’Az, PCI and PSI was elected to government in 1981–2 and 1984–9. But even the left were unable to overturn Sardinia’s ailing economy or to break their dependence on the state, and the failure of their socioeconomic reforms incited voters to call the DC back into government in 1989. The political climate of frustration with the local political classes and their clientelistic networks soon hit crisis point, though for extra-Sardinian reasons. In the early 1990s, the Italian political system underwent a meltdown. A group of judges in Milan uncovered widespread corruption amongst the highest-ranking members of government in the DC and Socialist Parties, a phenomenon called Tangentopoli (‘bribesville’). The Christian Democrats and Socialist Party were dissolved, followed by the break-up of the Communist Party after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and were succeeded by a handful of smaller parties divided along complex ideological lines. With the collapse of the old political system, and the introduction of a more bipolar politics following a referendum in 1993 that introduced a majoritarian electoral system in Italy, most Sardinian autonomists joined forces with the left. In 1996, the Psd’Az entered the L’Ulivo (later renamed L’Unione) alliance, hoping to pressure the centre-left alliance from within in favour of regional autonomy. But in 2001, the party congress voted against renewing its pact as Romano Prodi’s coalition ‘did not have any arguments in the interests of Sardinia’ (La Nuova Sardegna, 1 May 2001). The Union’s rhetoric about strengthening Sardinian identity and autonomy was criticised as an empty gesture to ensure the support of the Psd’Az, whose partnership it needed to form a government. But the alternative electoral strategy of the Psd’Az, which was to stand alone in regional elections, met with little success. As its share of the vote declined, that of its nationalist competitors increased (see Table 5.2). Yet the election of a broad centre-left alliance in 2004 called Il Progetto Sardegna (the Sardinia Project), headed by the media-communications baron Renato Soru, marked an important change in Sardinian politics.6

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Regional electoral performance of Sardinian parties, 1994–2009 (% of votes)

a

Centre-right Centre-leftb Psd’Az Other regionalistsc

1994

1999

2004

2009

32.2 18.1 5.1 3.4

29.6 14.2 4.5 1.77

22.3 31.8 3.8 1.13

30.2 24.8 4.3 4.9

Source: Istituto Cattaneo and Roux (2006) Notes: a Centre-right: Forza Italia/Msi-Dn/AN/People of Freedom b Centre-left: Pds/DS/Margherita/Progetto Sardegna/Democratic Party c Other regionalists: Sardignia Natzione/ Lega Nord/Lega Sarda/ IRS/Movement for Autonomy

The group’s programme sought to link ‘innovation with the preservation of the environment and identity, claiming an ethnic revival of regional politics and increasingly restive with national decisions over the regional territory’ (Casula 2005a: 15). After joining Soru’s coalition, the Democrats of the Left (DS) more openly favoured the creation of a cooperative federal state in Italy whilst the Sardinian Refounded Communists (RC) became enthusiastic supporters of increased autonomy for the island. On the other side of Italy’s political divide, within the Pole of Liberty (renamed House of Liberty in 1996),7 both Forza Italia Sardegna and Alleanza Nazionale claimed to be pro-federalist and acknowledged the specificity of Sardinian language, culture and identity. Both statewide alliances endorsed federalism and increased powers for the regions as long as this did not threaten the state. As Pintore (1996: 56) jokes, ‘federalism is a bit like autonomism a while ago: a large enough pot for all soups’. Meanwhile, the goal of independence has been spearheaded by other nationalist parties in Sardinia. Sardigna Nazione (SN) is a successor of the neo-sardist group Su Populu Sardo. The SN has maintained the rhetoric of the earlier cultural movement, which uses the language of anti-colonialism to wage its battle against the Italian state. In an effort to distinguish itself from the Psd’Az and to expand its potential pool of voters, SN proclaims to be beyond any ‘ideological’ group.8 But despite its criticisms of its ‘soft’ position on autonomy, the SN entered a temporary strategic relationship with the Partito Sardo in the 2001 regional elections. The alliance opposed the ‘false federalism’ being pushed by the Lega Nord, and demanded that Sardinia be made independent immediately, with the possibility of entering a European federation (Indipendentzia 2001: 1). Other smaller right-wing and left-wing nationalist groups have split from both the Psd’Az and the SN. Sardistas was established by former Psd’Az candidate for President,

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Efisio Serrenti in 1999, due to a clash following his election with the support of Forza Italia and Alleanza Nazionale, which was opposed by left-wing Psd’Az members. It joins the micro-nationalist parties Fortza Paris and Unione dei Sardi (UDS) on the right, the latter of which is headed by ex-DC President of Sardinia, Mario Floris. On the left, Indipendentzia Repubrica de Sardigna (IRS) broke away from the SN in 2001 and strives for an independent republic of Sardinia. More recently, a leftist group called Rosso Mori (based on the Sardinian national flag, called Quattro Mori), split from the Psd’Az in 2009 to align itself with the centre-left in regional elections, whilst the rump of the Psd’Az entered a pre-electoral alliance, and then regional office, with the right-wing Forza Italia Sarda and Alleanza Nazionale. Clearly, the different ideological strands of sardism that were prevalent in the early days of the movement still exist today.

Party constructions of the Sardinian nation

Sardinia is commonly referred to as an ‘aborted nation’ by its intellectuals and politicians, an idea that was famously introduced by Camillo Bellieni – one of the founders of the Partito Sardo d’Azione – during the 1920s (Clark 1989: 397). This term conveys a sense that throughout its history (as a singular territorial entity), Sardinia never quite managed to achieve the cultural, political and economic self-determination that so many of its inhabitants desired. The expression that ‘los sardos son pocos, locos y mal unidos’ (Sardinians are few, crazy and disunited) reflects this sense of national inadequacy. Sardinia’s culture was considered to be deformed and archaic, its economy primitive, and most importantly for Bellieni, its political status and system after seventy years of ‘fusion’ with Piemonte and then Italy was entirely ‘italianized’ (Accardo 1998: 181; Ortu 1998: 54). For Bellieni, in order for Sardinia to be a proper nation, Sardinians had to think in Sardinian terms, and that transformation in national selfconsciousness required autonomy from the Italian state. This sentiment fuelled much of the idealism of the territorial movement during the early interwar years, when it seemed possible – perhaps even imminent – that Sardinia might finally constitute the nation it should have been. Twenty years later, after the fall of Mussolini’s fascist dictatorship and the creation of a Special Statute for Sardinia, the realisation of this dream for Lussu’s Sardisti was still distant. The Statute was ultimately decided and dispensed by Rome due to prolonged disagreements between Sardinia’s political parties as to what it should contain.

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However, the Psd’Az itself appeared unsure of how to approach the question of Sardinian nationhood. Until the advent of the neo-sardismo movement of the 1970s, the party made few references to Sardinian culture, language and heritage, instead focusing on political and economic demands for the island. The party’s discussions centred on how to make Sardinia an autonomous political nation with the powers to steer economic modernisation, and break its dependence on the state. Neo-sardismo, on the contrary, was a response to the failure of one model of autonomy – focused on state-driven economic integration, material benefits and standardisation – and the demands for another, cultural and linguistic-based autonomy that sought to break with the state altogether. Proponents of neo-sardism argued that once independent, Sardinia would have full control over its own legislation, and could thus pass laws on bilingualism, preserve Sardinia’s customs and traditions and encourage the teaching of Sard history in schools. The movement’s focus on culture and language, as opposed to economics, was not lost on the Psd’Az, and it made adjustments to its policies in order to woo the movement’s supporters into its own political wings. For instance, the party sought to make the Sard language official in public institutions and have it taught in schools, whereas previously it had rarely mentioned language in its policies (Clark 1989: 452). Furthermore, one of the party’s most prominent intellectuals, Antonio Simon Mossa, sought to instil a strand of cultural nationalism in the party by arguing that Sardinia must be recognised as an ethno-linguistic minority. However, any references to Sardinia constituting an ‘ethnie’ (a human collectivity possessing a shared heritage, language, religion or culture) have, in line with the party’s distaste for cultural or ethnic nationalism, been abandoned. Table 5.3

Self-identity in Sardinia

Do you have a . . .

Yes

No

Local identity Sardinian identity Italian identity European identity

75% 94% 88% 69%

25% 6% 12% 31%

Source: Euromosaic (1995): www.uoc.es/euromosaic/web/document/sard/an/e1/e1.html

Unlike some nationalist movements in Italy, the Psd’Az prides itself in articulating a pro-European forward- and outward-looking ‘civic’ brand of nationalism (Melis 1994), denouncing the Lega Nord as ‘Northern racists’. Although the party acknowledges the unique culture, identity and history

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of the Sard people, in similarity to the Scottish National Party, it does not attempt to mobilise the sense of belonging or strong emotional attachments that Sards have to their island (see Table 5.3). Instead, the focus of the party is to obtain resources and a semi-sovereign status for the territory. The party advocates a number of policies such as creating a zona franca, promoting local business, improving transport links and creating a Sard energy programme, but there is a lack of an over-arching vision for the future of Sardinia behind these policies. This is perhaps due to the party’s reluctance to position itself in left–right ideological terms, preferring to focus on the ‘idea’ of self-determination. Despite assertions like ‘regions don’t exist for us. We are a stateless nation’,9 the main hurdle that the Psd’Az must overcome is to convince Sards that electing the Psd’Az to government would not result in a directionless nation. Unlike the Psd’Az, the Christian Democrats have no reservations in viewing Sardinia in cultural terms. According to one of the leaders of the Sardinian DC, Antonio Segni, Sardinia constitutes ‘a distinctive entity with a pronounced personality’ (quoted in Mattone 1982: 29) – which appears to attribute a lot more to Sardinia than the basic ‘unit of administrative decentralization’ that the Italian DC envisioned for the regions (Pintore 1996: 8). One can identify a strong strand of nationalism in the rhetoric of the UDC (the centre-right successors of the DC). As Vice RegionalSecretary of the UDC, and former MEP Felice Contu, says: ‘We are a nation because we are not Italians, we are Sardinians, like the position of the Scots who make up part of Great Britain . . . I am an Italian citizen, but in rational terms, I am not Italian.’10 Such sentiments could easily have come from any member of the Psd’Az. But they are also unsurprising, given the DC’s institutional role as the party of an autonomous Sardinian government, their long-standing coalition with the Psd’Az and their support for subsidiarity. In the post-Tangentopoli period, the UDC joined forces with the centralist Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale and the separatist Lega Nord in the Pole/House of Liberty. Ironically, the UDC – which favours devolving powers to the lowest level as part of its commitment to subsidiarity – did not give its full support to Umberto Bossi’s ‘devolution’ plans, which were put forward by Silvio Berlusconi’s government in 2005. This was because it perceived them to be a sop to the Lega Nord, and disagreed with the legislative reforms linked to the devolution plans, in particular those that would vastly increase the powers of the Premier. In contrast, the left in Sardinia has been forced to articulate a stronger idea of the Sardinian nation, in part because of the success of the neo-sardismo movement, and in part because of its sporadic alliances with

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the Psd’Az. At the party conference of the Communist Party in 1980, entitled ‘The Autonomist and Struggle and the Politics of Revival’, the Sardinian PCI came out in favour of strengthening the region in the face of threats from international capitalism, by supporting the creation of a zona franca. It also presented an (unsuccessful) bill in parliament in favour of bilingualism in 1989. Likewise, the Sardinian PSI presented a motion for the acknowledgement of special ‘ethnic’ regions at their national conference in 1990 (Contu 1992: 32). This demonstrates an astonishing turnaround for a party that once reviled regional identities, let alone ‘ethnic’ ones. As for the PCI’s successors, the Democrats of the Left became more attuned to appeals to national identity, advocating bilingualism and safeguarding Sardinia’s unique culture (Contu 1992: 32), whilst the smaller Sardinian Communist Party adopted a more traditional Marxist approach to the question of regional identities. It does not consider Sardinia to constitute a nation, but rather a part of the Italian nation: ‘we are incredibly proud of being Italians’.11 Meanwhile the Rifondazione Comunista have taken an unambiguous stance on the national question. For the Sardinian RC, there does not exist an Italian ‘people’ or an Italian nation: ‘In Sardinia, “national” means Sardinian. In Sardinia the sardist and nationalist sentiment is strongly radicalised, also in the expressions that we use. We do not say that we are an Italian people, we say that we are a Sardinian people, within the Italian state.’12 The Sardinian RC’s press spokesperson, Roberto Cherchi, argues that Sardinia has its own territory, people, history, language, culture and traditions that make up the basis of the ‘nation’. In a globalising world, the Sardinian RC want to preserve Sardinia’s national characteristics, and support the protection of distinct identities elsewhere, to avoid creating a generic, homogenous global society. However, the party’s nationalist position has caused deep consternation within the state party. The statewide party is not as keen on recognising minority nations and regions, indeed, Levy (2002: 3) argues that the Italian RC was the only party to oppose regionalisation in the 1990s as a neo-liberal ploy of Bossi’s Lega Nord. Nor do Fausto Bertinottti’s Communists support federalism, which the Sardinian branch vigorously advocates. In response, the Sardinian RC sought to obtain more autonomy from the national party in order to develop its own policy programme. These efforts have so far been unsuccessful as it was unable to obtain enough votes in successive congresses of the national party to achieve this objective.13 In Sardinia, the parties of the centre-left, formerly united under the umbrella of the Sardinian Project (Progetto Sardegna – PS) led by Renato Soru, were associated with a new programme that called for the ‘valorisation’

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of the Sardinian nation, and the strengthening of its identity, language and culture to underpin the modernisation of the island economy. This contrasted with previous state-run development projects that ignored Sardinia’s local traditions and skills. Indeed, Hospers and Benneworth (2005: 343) believe that one of the aims of the Italian government’s southern development policy was ‘to “italianise” the obstinate Sards and their centuries-old local culture’. In contrast, the Sardinian Project sought to break Sardinia’s dependence on the state and to revive the sense of Sardinia being a self-determining nation with control over its economic and cultural resources. The PS wanted ‘a strong Sardinia, that walks on its own feet, that ensures that autonomism and identity are no longer a false imagining, but a reality that guides us towards the future’ (Sardegna Insieme 2004: 11). The PS also sought, unlike the other parties, to construct a sense of nationhood that was integrated into their socioeconomic and political programmes. The Project’s policies included plans to ‘save the coasts’ (Salvacosta) to increase the potential of tourism, to ‘export not emigrate’, to protect the environment, to cut down on regional government bureaucracy, and underlying all of this, to bolster the Sardinian identity through bilingualism and other cultural initiatives that would ‘stimulate communications with the outside world’ (PS 2005). These proposals won the support of a large section of the population, as well as other parties such as Sardigna Natzione, which had long battled to protect the island’s language. Indeed, when the Sardinian Project was in government from 2004–9, there was a revival of cultural nationalism in Sardinia. This was largely related to a legislative proposal for making the Sardinian language official, called ‘sa limba sarda comune’ (a communal Sardinian language) in 2006. In justifying the law, President Soru argued that ‘we are the largest linguistic minority in Italy, however we are the only one that has still not decided to make its language official’ (Il Manifesto, 26 April 2006). The recognition of Sardinia’s most powerful cultural characteristic – its language – has encouraged a renaissance in traditional Sardinian dancing, singing and cultural festivals, not only amongst the older generations of Sards, but spearheaded by its youth. The renewed pride in Sardità (the Sard identity) indicates that the neo-sardismo movement of the 1960s, though it waned over the years, never entirely disappeared. This has forced regional branches of statewide parties to alter their position on nationality-related issues accordingly. Even Forza Italia Sardegna, which came to power in Sardinia as part of a new centre-right ‘People of Freedom’ party (Popolo della Libertà) in February 2009, now perceives Sardinia as a cultural nation. The party has argued that Sardinia’s distinct cultural identity should be recognised in the re-writing of the Sardinian

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Special Statute, in which it wants: ‘a restatement of the instruments that strengthen the Sardinian culture, which is an ancient culture, with some particularities especially in its language, and that could be used as a resource, not only on the social level but also on the economic level’.14

Territorial strategies: autonomy versus capacity?

The question of increasing the autonomy of Sardinia, at the risk of undermining state funding and patronage, has been a key issue since the Second World War. The Special Statute, which was drawn up by the Constituent Assembly in Rome, ensured that Sardinia’s legislative powers could be superseded by national law, and many important matters were ‘concurrent’ with Rome (Mattone 1982: 31). Yet rather than demanding more self-government from the Italian state per se, Sardinian party leaders were more concerned with maintaining personal ties with Rome and developing Sardinia’s economy to ensure parity with the rest of Italy. The focus on economic modernisation was reflected in a unique reference in the Statute that did not exist in any other regional constitution in Italy, which committed the state to ‘the economic and social rebirth of the island’ (Art. 13, Constitutional Act 1948).15 As Clark (1989) argues, autonomy in Sardinia did not signify self-determination, but the ‘request for material concessions and modernisation’. Sardinian politicians thus made an early trade-off between autonomy and obtaining funds from the state. However, the failure of Sardinia’s autonomous institutions to set a realisable path of economic development, imbued the term ‘autonomy’ with the opposite meaning of that which it once had. It came to be seen as a façade, masking a very real and continuing dependence on the Italian state that, crucially, was not in the interests of the indigenous political elite to break. The ruling Christian Democrats discovered that ‘autonomy’ served to reinforce their position, through clientelism and corruption. This new settlement arguably advantaged the regional elite much more than if Sardinia had been merely an ‘ordinary’ administrative region. This is because the introduction of an illusory form of ‘autonomy’ rendered obsolete the calls for independence coming from the Psd’Az and allowed the DC to bring the nationalists into coalition with them. Arguably, Sardinia’s situation was even worse than many of those substate territories – including Scotland – that were not granted a degree of political autonomy until recently. For the autonomy granted to Sardinia in the 1948 constitution failed so miserably to advance Sardinians’ way of life that it dampened the desire for more.

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Thus it came about that the demands of the once formidable nationalist movement won less and less support in the two decades following the war, as the ‘individuality’ of Sardinia was accommodated by the Italian state. Moreover, it was felt that the regional institutions did not represent the people, but were in fact controlled or superseded by Rome (Melis 1982: 1). This was evident when the Italian government decided to impose its own ‘braccio di ferro romano’ (iron fist of Rome) through the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno without consulting the regional council. (The Cassa, or ‘Fund for the South’, provided funding for development and infrastructure projects in the less developed southern Italian regions.) This type of top-down action came to signify the general state of relations between the ‘autonomous’ region and its benefactors in Rome. The island’s reliance on hand-outs from the state’s regional development funds led to a structural and political dependence on the Italian state, and stymied efforts by the regional government of pursuing local projects itself. Sardinia was not entirely alone in this respect. This weak capacity of local political leaders to pursue and sustain projects of economic development was prevalent in many of the Southern Italian regions (Piattoni 2002). But in another sense, regional governments were institutionally disabled from setting their own path of economic development until regional policy was devolved to the regions. When the Cassa was created, and the first of plans of rebirth put into place, Sardinian authorities were excluded from the design and administration of the economic programmes and the ‘Sardinian question’ was incorporated into la questione meridionale by the Italian state. Sardinia’s weak autonomous institutions seemed to be all but ignored. But despite this, regional elites eagerly accepted the programmes, and the funds coming their way. This highlights problems deriving from regional factors as well as state constraints in Sardinia’s relationship to Rome. Sardinia never had its own indigenous autonomous elite, in the sense that the majority of regional politicians did not try to pursue an independent line, but followed the instructions of Rome (Levy 1996). Furthermore, as is widely practised in the south of Italy, parties in Sardinia undertook clientelistic policies for their own personal or party gain. Whilst clientelism may be used as a device for building up cooperation, trust and exchange amongst regional elites (Piattoni 1998), in Sardinia this created a negative business climate, undermined local development initiatives and had serious effects on the popular and political desire for more autonomy. According to Casula (2005a: 9), ‘regional politicians used the autonomist argument as a means to bargain with the central government over the quantity, not the quality of development plans for the region’. The practice of clientelismo e

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sottogoverno meant that politicians siphoned off the regional funds to strengthen their own party bases (Melis 1982: 2). Thus, the autonomous institutions of Sardinia were run by the entrenched regional political class that was strongly linked to, and highly dependent on, Rome. As a result, the regional government has been unable to advance Sardinia’s economic capacity, as the development schemes – soon known as ‘cathedrals in the desert’ – were run by state agencies without local consultation. Nor were the Sardinian authorities able to advance Sardinia’s cultural policy, because laws relating to the implementation of bilingualism or teaching Sard in schools were subject to the approval of the Italian Parliament. Yet in recent years some Sardinian parties have become disillusioned with the state’s influence over economic development, cultural policy and the environment. Since the 1990s in particular, ‘Sardinians, of all parties, are disillusioned with mainland “development” schemes that have gone wrong’ (Clark 1996: 100) and have united behind demands to give the region greater powers over cultural matters and industrial development. Sardinian autonomy has come to mean the ‘demand for resources to be placed in Sardinian hands’ (Clark 1996: 86). Also, with the reform of Italy’s centralist regional policy in 1992, the Sardinian government has been in a stronger position to independently address the island’s problems (Hospers and Benneworth 2005: 342). The reform of Title V of the Constitution in 2001, in which the left coalition in Rome approved a radical reform of Italian regionalism, also affected parties’ perceptions of autonomy. The reform increased the autonomous powers of the 15 ‘ordinary’ regions, and also precipitated something of a crisis of identity in the five ‘special regions’, which were stripped of their specialità. In response, all parties in Sardinia began advocating Sardinian ‘sovereignty’. Yet despite being made more or less equal to the other Italian regions, the constitutional amendments did give Sardinia greater control over its finances and more legislative powers regarding town planning, tourism and hotels, roads and public works, agriculture, forestry, fishing and arts and crafts (Fabbrini and Brunazzo 2003: 101). Since 2001, the Sardinian government has promoted tourism and its related activities as the mainstay of the economy, and it has also promoted the export of Sardinian food products and arts and crafts, and the creation of biotechnology research centres. There has also been widespread denouncement of the clientelistic policies of the old regional political class. According to its members, the Sardinian Project was established to provide an alternative to, and more ambitiously, an end to the classi dirigenti (political classes) that were considered to be motivated by narrow egoismi localistici (Sardegna Insieme 2004: 1).

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One of the central questions for Sardinian political parties in recent elections has been how to overturn Sardinia’s economic ‘backwardness’ by wresting control of Sardinian resources, facilitating bottom-up development projects and severing dependence on the Italian state. One way of doing this has been to seek economic and political support and finanacial investment from elsewhere. This is how Europe first came to the mind of many Sardinian parties. From 1988 to 2006, Sardinia was designated an ‘Objective 1’ area in the EU cohesion programme, and has obtained significant funds to improve its economy. But in seeking only funds from Europe, some parties argue that this is merely another form of economic dependence. The Sardinian Project set out detailed plans for hastening economic self-sufficiency to make the Sardinian economy more competitive in European and global markets instead of continuing its dependence on European and state hand-outs. These included increasing exports and improving infrastructure and transport links, encouraging start-up companies and expanding access to education. These policies became all the more urgent as Sardinia exited the Objective 1 category in 2006 to avoid returning to, or even increasing, Sardinia’s dependence on Italian state funds.

Europeanisation and Sardinia’s parties

From the creation of the first European institutions in the 1950s, many Sardinians were sceptical about the supranational project, which was viewed as another form of distant authority that was dominated by the interests of the large financial and industrial capitals (Cardia 1982: 188). This was compounded by the fact that Sardinia’s first experience of economic integration was of ‘a cruel and cutting form’ (ibid.). Sardinia was not alone in Italy, nor in Europe, in its fears of the exacerbation of economic inequalities, further peripheralisation and isolation from the main centres of economic trade. Southern Italian regions were ‘sceptical of the potential side effects that integration, and the necessary austerity measures that go along with it, would have on relatively poorer regions’ (Gold 2003: 96), in contrast to richer northern regions. So whilst some authors have argued that ‘European unity is not a political issue in the country’ because all of the main parties in Italy have been consistently in favour of closer integration (Cento Bull 1997), Sardinia diverged from this norm. Many Sardinian parties vigorously opposed the island’s insertion into the European political and economic arena, which was thought as too centralising, too distant, and too unrelenting on peripheral economies.

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More specifically, European integration began the process of transforming the local economy from the pastoral traditions of old to large-scale farming methods. Owing to the requirements of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), traditional pastoral areas were supplanted by modern ‘agro-zootecnica’ producing meat and dairy products. Furthermore, Sardinia was required to close its carbon mines, placing even more importance on the island’s agricultural, then tourist, economies (Brigaglia et al. 2002). These developments were resented by the local population, who had little understanding of the reasons for change. The principal political debates during the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979 therefore revolved around how to reverse Sardinia’s economic problems and how to make modernisation less destructive of the traditional ways of life in Sardinia (Cardia 1982: 189). Yet aside from material concerns, since the 1960s there has been a strong tradition among Sardinian intellectuals of looking to Europe as a wider context for their claims to autonomy. Important figures such as Antonio Mossa, Michelangelo Pira and Giovanni Lilliu long argued that Sardinia must be part of a Europe of the Ethnies, Peoples or Regions, and sought to convince their respective political parties of the need to recognise this. Mario Melis – a former President of the Region as well as MEP for the Partito Sardo d’Azione during 1984–9 and 1989–94 – was also aware of the importance of European political integration and moves towards building a federal construct. He was among the first to use the concept of a Europe of the Regions in his proposals in Brussels (Melis 1994). However, even Melis was highly critical of the undemocratic structures of the EU, in which the interests of the rich North overtook the needs of the South. In 1987, he described Europe as ‘the aggregation of the interests that gathered together in the triangle between Milan, Paris and Bonn . . . with the devastating penalisation of all of southern Europe’ (quoted in Lepori 1991: 125). As a solution to these problems, he argued that a Europe of the States must be replaced with a decentralised Europe of the Regions. Yet for most of Sardinia’s parties, a regionalised Europe of the Peoples remained a far-off dream, and their focus remained on the short-term rehabilitation of the island through economic means. In the late 1980s, negative perceptions of European integration changed when the EU began to institute a series of reforms to help the lagging regions of Europe that had been adversely affected by its economic standardisation and harmonisation policies. The European Regional Development Funds were reformed in 1988, and sought to increase the competitive potential of deprived regions, in particular regions in industrial decline and disadvantaged rural regions. The fact that Sardinia was one of

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the poorest regions in Europe (before the 2004 enlargement), meant that it qualified for ‘Objective 1’ status in the Cohesion policy.16 Yet as O’Neill (2005: 120) has shown, Sardinian authorities were slow in recognising the salience of the Cohesion Policy ‘simply because other more readily accessible sources of funding existed’. The regional government continued to look to funding from the central state. However, when the convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty forced Italy to reform its top-down regional policy and dissolve the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, the European Commission increased its direct negotiations with the regions, which were given powers to design their own development policies. As the only new source of funding available, the EU Cohesion Policy finally attracted the full attention of the regional government, becoming ‘a replacement paradigm for southern policy’ (ibid.: 164). And for most of Sardinia’s political parties, any interest in European affairs was strictly to do with opportunities for funding and resources. There were few parties who saw the non-economic ramifications of European integration, and those that did were relegated to the political sidelines. Despite being a small ‘non-ideological’ party, the Psd’Az sought to push the issue of European political integration to the forefront of Sardinian political debate. The Psd’Az articulated Sardinian autonomy within a wider Europe of the Peoples and Mario Melis MEP played a significant role in drawing up the laws establishing the Committee of the Regions. These efforts did have some impact on statewide parties in Sardinia, which uncritically adopted calls for a Europe of the Regions or a federal Europe. However, the consensus that developed also created problems: it dampened the tendency towards contestation and stifled debate of the real issues at hand. To illustrate, no party in Sardinia put forward proposals for the draft European Constitution, preferring instead to leave these matters in the hands of the ‘national’ parties. Very little research was actually done by parties into European developments, and they generally avoided taking positions on specific laws or projects. Although parties in Sardinia dutifully mounted campaigns during European elections, European issues themselves were not of great magnitude for the parties and for party competition in general. This indifference may be explained by the unlikelihood that any of the parties in Sardinia will elect a representative in Strasbourg. Sardinia has no direct representation in the European Parliament. Instead, it shares an electoral constituency for the European elections with Sicily.17 There are 6 million inhabitants in Sicily, and only 1.6 million in Sardinia – meaning that Sicily almost always elects all of the candidates for the ‘Islands Constituency’, without accounting for the fact that the two islands tend to vote quite

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differently (generally speaking, the former votes centre-right, whilst the latter alternates between centre-left and centre-right poles). Since 1994, Sardinia has had no representatives in the European Parliament (see Table 5.4). A large barrier to Sardinian political engagement with Europe has therefore been its lack of direct representation in Europe. The unbalanced distribution of the electoral colleges has been called into question, uniting all parties in Sardinia to lobby the Italian government in 2008 to change the electoral law so that Sardinia would be ensured its own representation. However, this proposal failed to have any resonance by the time of the 2009 European elections, at which point Sardinia’s main nationalist parties – Partito Sardo d’Azione, Sardigna Natzione and Indipendentzia Repubrica de Sardigna – determined to take action. The SN staged a protest outside the European Parliament in Brussels to draw attention to Sardinia’s lack of representation, whilst all three parties boycotted the European election and called on Sardinian voters to do the same (L’Unione Sarda, 15 May 2009). Their campaign to dissuade Sards from voting may have had some effect: voter turnout, at 40.9 per cent, was the lowest in Italy and showed the highest decrease of any region (Cattaneo 2009).

Constitutional autonomy in Europe

In the late 1980s there was a growing perception amongst nationalist parties that Europe could provide an alternative constitutional framework for pursuing self-determination that would allow Sardinia to wean itself off its dependency on the state, both financially and politically. Statewide parties in Sardinia joined nationalist parties in supporting the creation of a Europe of the Peoples. As in the cases of Scotland and Bavaria, the imagery of a Europe of the Regions masked a variety of constitutional goals, including regionalism, federalism and independence. This marked a significant change in the territorial strategy of Sardinian parties, which had previously focused on their relations with Rome. However, given the prominence of economic concerns in Sardinia, parties have been more concerned with the ways in which Europe might improve standards of living rather than achieving symbolic recognition. Independence

Sardigna Natzione (SN – Sardinia Nation) and Indipendentzia Repubrica de Sardigna (IRS – Independent Republic of Sardinia) are independence-seeking parties. They differ from the Partito Sardo d’Azione

35.9 27.8 12.0 3.7 – – 10.6

– – 1

% vote

– – – –

Seats

– – 1

– – – –

Seats

25.6 40.2 0.7

– – – –

% vote

1994

– – –

– – – –

Seats

23.0 42.2 2.6

– – – –

% vote

– – –

– – – –

Seats

1999

37.6 41.0 1.5

– – – –

% vote

– – –

– – – –

Seats

2004

35.6 36.6 –

– – – –

% vote

– – –

– – – –

Seats

2009

12:12

1st Republic DC 31.2 PCI 32.5 PSI 8.1 MSI 5.1 2nd Republic Centre-Left – Centre-Right – Psd’Az 12.7

% vote

1989

European election results in Sardinia, 1984–2009

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1984

Table 5.4

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in that, despite its flirtation with independence in 1979 and 2001, the latter has historically pursued a stronger form of autonomy for the island within a federal structure and the recognition of its claim to nationhood.18 In truth, the Psd’Az deems that sovereign statehood is incompatible with the processes of European integration. This has exasperated the other nationalist parties, which believe that the national project would be strengthened if all three parties united in demanding independence, but which nevertheless refuse to accommodate the Psd’Az’s more moderate constitutional goals. Since the late 1970s, the Partito Sardo d’Azione has struggled with the dilemma of whether or not to support complete independence for Sardinia, or to seek accommodation of Sardinia’s nationhood through more devolved powers. The confusion as to the constitutional goals of the party is reflected in the way that party members use the terminology of self-determination. For some party members, Sardinian ‘sovereignty’ actually means that the Italian state has control over finance, foreign affairs and justice, whilst Sardinia is responsible for all other competences.19 The term ‘independence’ is often used in the same way. For instance, the Gallura Thesis declares the party’s primary objective to be ‘the affirmation of the sovereignty of the Sardinian people on the territory [. . .] and to lead Sardinia to independence’ (Psd’Az 2002), but independence actually means putting an end to Sardinia’s dependence on Rome through ‘economic emancipation’. It thus means autonomy from the Italian state, not breaking from it altogether. This fits with the party’s strong federalist orientation. As Mario Melis, stated: ‘Our independentism is functional, established on an essential base that we cannot renounce, of federalism.’20 In contrast, Sardigna Natzione – which is the second largest nationalist party – believes that the Psd’Az’s goal of creating a federal Italy within a federal Europe cannot guarantee Sardinian self-determination. It argues that the only way for Sardinia to break free from its position as a colony of the Italian state is to achieve independence alongside other nations and small states in a European construct. However, this does not mean that the party supports the structures and processes of European integration: ‘the real battlefield is not Italy, but Europe, and in this arena, if we do not wish to be the first victims of liberalism, there is need to combat the signs of liberalism’.21 Sardigna Nazione wants to rid the European Union of its perceived neoliberal bias and the influence of multinational companies in its quest for Sardinian independence. The party therefore combines anti-EU rhetoric with the goal of independence and a ‘seat at the top table’. However, the SN has failed to provide any proposals of how to reform the EU, apart from ‘removing’ the influence of big business in

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European governance. Party spokespeople have admitted to caring little about whether the ideal European structure for Sardinian independence is of a federal or confederal nature.22 Party programmes indicate the latter: Sardinia must be able to exercise its powers as a sovereign state with a seat at the Council of Ministers, alongside other island-states such as Malta and Cyprus. In other words, the island cannot achieve its full potential in a Europe of the Regions. In order to achieve the goal of independence, the SN stipulates that a referendum must be held in Sardinia on its continued membership of the Italian state, which would offer three options: (1) for Sardinia to continue being a region of Italy; (2) for Sardinia to become part of a federated state within Italy; (3) for Sardinia to become an independent state in a federal or confederal European structure with other European nations (SN 1996). However, the SN fails to provide a coherent programme for Sardinia post-independence, such as creating central financial institutions, restructuring taxation, establishing diplomatic relations, or creating armed forces. Furthermore, it fails to consider how an independent Sardinia’s macroeconomic, security and foreign policy would be pursued in an integrating Europe. Indipendentzia Repubrica de Sardigna is the newest nationalist party in Sardinia, created by ex-SN official Gavino Sale in 2001. The party’s main objective is ‘carrying the Sardinian Nation and its People towards independence and consequently to its construction as an independent Republic’ (IRS 2004: charter 5). It is unclear, however, how the IRS substantially differs in its policies and constitutional aims from the SN. It is likely that the creation of the IRS resulted from internal (personal) disagreements within the SN, rather than an acknowledged need to put forward an alternative programme for increasing Sardinia’s autonomy that differed from that of the SN. The IRS has taken its cue from the SN (and before it, the Psd’Az) to include the European dimension into its demands for independence. The party’s goal is for ‘Sardinia in Europe as an independent Republic with its own representatives and its own social and economic rights, like many small nations that are entering the EU with dignity and decision-making powers’ (IRS 2004). The only difference from the SN’s constitutional goals appears to be the addition of the word ‘republic’. Aside from that, there are very few substantive references to how an independent Sardinia will function in Europe. There is no specification of whether the party prefers a confederal or federal Europe, whether it welcomes recent developments such as enlargement or the creation of a European constitution, or whether it agrees or disagrees with any of the EU’s policies. The IRS’s understanding of how independence in Europe

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might work is not much clearer than the constitutional preferences of the SN. Given the relatively similar goals of the main nationalist parties in Sardinia, there have been efforts to create a third nationalist ‘pole’ to compete with the centre-left and centre-right alliances. As well as splintering the nationalist vote between them, the nationalist parties had felt increasingly marginalised within the bipolar political system. This has forced them either to join one of the two statewide coalitions (as the Psd’Az did by joining Prodi’s Olive coalition in 1996, and Berlusconi’s People of Liberty party in an electoral alliance in 2009), or to compete against them with little hope of success. In response, Sardigna Natzione joined forces with the Psd’Az in an electoral alliance called the Indipendenzia List in 2001. The parties compromised on a number of issues, such as endorsing the idea of creating a Europe of the Peoples but as a stepping stone to independence within a European federal or confederal construct (Indipendenzia 2001). They also reinforced their commitment to working within the Conference of Nations without States and the European Free Alliance to lobby the draft European constitution to include recognition of ‘the right to independence by stateless nations’ (Indipendenzia 2001: 1). In the run-up to the election, Giacomo Sanno, Secretary of the Psd’Az, said that the Independence List ‘is an historic moment that united two spirits, one that is young and another that is old. They gather the desire of the nationalist force through being together in a course that wishes to carry the nation to independence. Autonomy, as it has developed so far, no longer has any sense’ (L’Unione Sarda, 22 April 2001). This optimistic language soon changed in the aftermath of the election. The List obtained only 3.4 per cent of the vote, in contrast to previous elections when the Psd’Az won 6 per cent in 1995 and 5 per cent in 1999. Antonio Delitalia, Vice-Secretary of the Psd’Az, admitted that it had been ‘an error not joining the Olive coalition’ (La Nuova Sardegna, 17 May 2001). After this disastrous result, the Psd’Az did join the Union alliance, but for only a short period. Indeed, the party abandoned any leftist pretence by allying with Forza Italia in the 2009 elections, and entered a coalition government with them that year (L’Unione Sarda, 9 January 2009). This caused serious reverberations throughout the party, with one group of leftist members forming a splinter group Rosso mori. Ideological incoherence has always been the Achilles heel of the Psd’Az (Hepburn 2009d). Meanwhile, Sardigna Natzione turned its back on domestic political alliances in favour of building relationships with nationalist parties abroad. Here, the SN has sought to create links with independence-seeking parties

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that are sympathetic to the SN’s strong anti-globalisation rhetoric. These have not always involved wise choices. For instance, Sardigna Natzione was involved in an alliance with Herri Batasuna – a radical Europhobic party with a terrorist wing fighting for the national independence of the Basque Country. Herri Batasuna agreed to ‘represent’ the SN in the European Parliament in 1999–2004 when Sardinia did not have a representative. This relationship indicates certain naivity on the part of the pacifist SN, which sees the EU as an imperfectly formed but potentially beneficial structure for Sardinian territorial claims. The SN has also developed bilateral contacts with other nationalist parties in the Mediterranean, and its relations with Corsica Natzione are extremely close – such that, when the SN added the word ‘Indipendenzia’ to its party name in 2001, so did its Corsican sibling. The socialist-minded IRS, meanwhile, has developed bilateral links with other nationalist and socialist parties such as the Catalan ERC, Herri Batasuna, Corsica Natzione and the Scottish Socialist Party. Like the SN since the defeat of the Indipendenzia List, the IRS eschews membership of the EFA, which is perceived as a coalition of autonomist rather than independence-seeking parties. Federalism

Federalism has become the catchword in Sardinian politics in recent years. Long put forward by the Psd’Az as a solution to Italy’s highly fragmented regional cultures, this concept has recently been endorsed by all of the statewide parties in Sardinia. With the deepening of European integration, parties in Sardinia have also promoted the creation of a European federal structure. However, this constitutional goal covers a multitude of meanings. For instance, whilst the Partito Sardo d’Azione and Rifondazione Comunista della Sardegna (RC Sardegna) believe a European federal structure should be based on the recognition of minority nations, the Sardinian Project and the UDC both have a more functional interpretation of federalism. The Psd’Az has always been pro-European, and through its experience in the European Parliament and the European Free Alliance, it has welcomed the regionalisation debates in Europe. One author has argued that Psd’Az intellectuals such as Antonio Simon Mosso had invented the idea of a Europe of the Peoples and the Ethnies, arguing that Sardinia should be assured a place within a European federation that was not based on the states but rather the ‘ethnies’ of Europe (Contu 1992: 30; Vallauri 1994: 199). Currently, the Sardinian party’s preferred goal is to see the creation of a ‘European Federation of the Peoples’, in which Sardinia is a

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full independent member (Psd’Az 2003). The party argues for the recognition of stateless nations and peoples in a European federation, whereby ‘Sardinia will be able to constitute, with other regions, a subject of Europe that has its own institutional importance in the ambit of the EU organisation’ (Psd’Az 2000a). This is similar to demands from regional parties elsewhere for a Europe of the Regions. Yet unlike the Scottish Labour Party, say, the Psd’Az wants to construct a federal Italy as part of a federalised Europe, in which Sardinia can exercise maximum autonomy. Although the party uses phrases such as ‘independence’ and ‘sovereignty’, it does not actually propose separating from the Italian state. The project of the Psd’Az is in fact more subtle: to create an Italian federal state in which the centre has competences over currency, justice and defence, with the regions being responsible for everything else – with, sooner or later, these powers being transferred to the European level in a federalising structure, so the Italian state is rendered obsolete. Sardinia would be freed of its ties to the Italian state without formally separating from it. The party has therefore fully integrated the notion of shared sovereignty into its objectives. In order to achieve this goal, the party put forward a set of proposals for reforming Europe along regional lines during the debates on the Future of Europe. A European constitution, argued the party, should include the direct participation of the ‘peoples’ of Europe (Psd’Az 2003). To aid this process, the Committee of the Regions should be transformed into a Chamber of the Regions. Furthermore, a treaty with the EU must contain a definition of the special relationship with Sardinia, and provide for the direct representation of Sardinia within EU institutions. Finally, the Psd’Az insists that Sardinia should be given direct representation in the European Parliament, in order to gain recognition of Sardinian nationhood alongside other stateless nations such as the Basque Country, Catalonia and Scotland, which all have seats in Brussels (Psd’Az 2009). However, Europe is not the only proposed context in which to exercise Sardinian self-determination. The Psd’Az argues that Sardinia should be given the right to instigate direct relations with the national community of states with which the EU has a treaty of association, in particular, with the countries in the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Middle East. The party would welcome either a federal or confederal European or Mediterranean structure in which its autonomy was guaranteed. Here, Sardinia could also assume a key role in acting as a ‘bridge’ between Europe and Northern Africa (ibid.). The Psd’Az strategy of using Europe to advance Sardinian claims to autonomy has influenced the positions of other parties. The RC Sardegna

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supports Sardinian autonomy within a federal Europe. This goal amounts to ‘social federalism in a Europe of rights and peoples’ (RC Sardegna 2002: 6). The party has become very pro-European, which contrasts with the left’s general scepticism of Europe until the late 1980s, so much so that the party symbol includes the words ‘Sinistra Europa’ along with the title of the party and the sickle and hammer iconography. Furthermore, the party is committed to full political decentralisation of powers, and believes that Sardinia, with its unique culture, language and identity, should be protected in a Europe of the Peoples (RC Sardegna 2005: 1). The RC also proposed re-writing the Statuto to include the full legal guarantee of Article 13 (relations with the Italian state and EU); the re-structuring of autonomous institutions to guarantee increased popular participation; and a social-environmental project of development. The RC’s motivations for re-writing the Sardinian statute are linked to the reform of Italian state and European structures, which have changed the state’s role and given more powers to the regions. ‘The process of European economic and political integration, the laws on administrative decentralisation, the re-writing of Title V of the Constitution, requires the construction of a new Region . . . that is no longer a bureaucratic entity of supplying services but a legislative entity that shapes programmes’ (RC Sardegna 2002). The RC also seeks to distinguish itself from other nationalist and pro-federalist parties by demanding a strengthened role for the communes, by devolving much of the administrative and bureaucratic structure of the regional apparatus downwards (RC Sardegna 2005: 1–2). This is a part of their plan for ‘social self-determination’ and popular participation, a strategy that seeks to galvanise the nationalist as well as the communist vote. This plan very much resembles the subsidiarity objectives of the SPD and Greens in Bavaria. The Psd’Az and RC are not the only parties to occupy the ‘federal’ ground in Sardinian politics. They have both met competition from Christian Democrats (DC) and the Sardinian Project. The DC, like the Psd’Az, has a strong European dimension to its claims for federalism. The intellectual, Giovanni Lilliu, began talking about a Europe of the Regions in Sardinia in 1975 and spent the next decade trying to convince the DC of its merits. In a speech to the party congress in 1975, Lilliu argued that: ‘The peoples of Europe . . . call for re-establishing Europe along new lines according to another model, and with a structure of relations different from the Eurocentric and ethnocentric type[;] a Europe of the Regions or Peoples . . . that takes account of place and regional factors, especially those territories with autonomy’ (Lilliu 1975: 131, 133). Lilliu’s persistent efforts to Europeanise, as well as territorialise, the party eventually bore the

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fruits of success. The principal successor of Democrazia Cristiana,23 the Union of Christian Democrats (UDC), is a fervent supporter of a Europe of the Regions. This should be formed along federal lines, in similarity to the USA, to create a balance among the small states and large states, and small states and large regions. The UDC in Sardinia believes that Europe should not be controlled by the states, as they are considered too large and concerned with protecting their own interests. The party’s MEP during 1989–94, Felice Contu, later Vice-Chair of the party, was convinced that a Europe of the States would never produce a proper European ‘Union’ as they were too arrogant to give up their powers. At the same time, the UDC does not labour under false hopes as to the difficulties of actualising this construct: ‘A Europe of the States slowly transforming itself into a Europe of the Regions is a dream.’24 Failing that, the party supports a steady increase in the powers of the regions, especially on European matters. The UDC’s proposals for a regional Europe bear a striking resemblance to those put forward by the Sardinian Project (Progetto Sardegna). But whilst the UDC represents to many Sards a continuation of clientelistic politics, the PS fashioned itself as representing the ‘new politics’ on the island. The Project was suspicious of the constitutional claims of ‘traditional’ parties, and for this reason did not support demands for Europe of the Regions or Peoples. Instead, it couched its constitutional goals in functional, un-emotive language, seeking to develop Sardinia as a ‘European Region within an Integrated System of Autonomy’ (Sardegna Insieme 2004: 101). According to Prof. Gianmario Demuro,25 this goal means increasing the relations between regions, making them more powerful and competitive, and pursuing cultural, educational and economic links between regions. Demuro makes it clear that this does not imply a Europe of the Regions, a concept that he believes is impossible to formalise because of the sheer diversity of regions of Europe. However, an ‘integrated system of autonomy’ is actually rather similar to the territorial projects of Scottish Labour and the CSU in Bavaria, which want regions to become political and economic actors in their own rights. The main difference is that whilst the CSU and Scottish Labour look to increase their influence over decision-making in Europe, the PS believes that Sardinia must work on becoming a ‘normal’ European region, whereby ‘the concept of normality today does not mean closedness, but of opening (the region up)’ to trade links with other countries and improving the foreign language abilities of Sards (as well as basic levels of literacy).26 In order to create room for Italian regions to operate in a European system of integrated autonomy, it is necessary to reform the Italian constitution. The Sardinian Project approved the constitutional

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amendments under Prodi’s government in 2001, but it believed it should go further so that regions were fully empowered to pursue their territorial objectives abroad, such as building trade links and bilateral agreements with other countries, and improving their representation within state and European institutions. The PS felt that Italian constitutional reform should promote the integration of Sardinia into Italy and Europe in conditions of equal opportunity, especially in its transport links and infrastructure, as well as giving it access to the ‘corridors of communication’ on the European continent (Sardegna Insieme 2004: 101). And for that, it is necessary to have a regional constitution that reflects Sardinia’s insertion into the European and Mediterranean contexts. A new Special Statute should ‘redefine the specialness of Sardinia, articulating and affirming a precise political and institutional form of the Sardinian community, mediated by the recognition of its identity, the language and culture, and helping to construct a new system that is based on solidarity and participation, with the European Union as well as with the Italian state’ (Sardegna Insieme 2004: 102). Yet the prerogatives of Sardinia in an ‘integrated system of autonomy’ should be more focused on the Mediterranean and North Africa than on the heartland of continental Europe.27 Sardinia cannot compete with Bavaria, argues Demuro, but it can compete with Algeria, Morocco, the Balearic Islands and other countries in the Mediterranean. Thus, the context for integrated autonomy is more Mediterranean-based, where Sardinia competes with countries that share a more or less similar economic status. Sardinia’s pro-federalist parties make for unlikely bedfellows. Whilst the Partito Sardo d’Azione has been involved in minority nationalist party networks in Europe, the UDC’s state coalition partners have included neo-fascists. In particular, the Psd’Az was a founding member of EFA and has been active in building up bilateral links with nationalist parties in Italy and Europe, for instance the South Tyrol People’s Party, the Sicilian Action Party, Union Valdôtaine (Aosta Valley), Liga Veneta (Veneto), and further afield in Corsica, the Basque Country and Catalonia. Meanwhile, the Sardinian RC has been able to create bilateral links with other communist parties in Europe, especially with those in Corsica and Greece, which share similar problems relating to insularity, under-development and the agriculture-dominated and tourism-dependent industries. RC Sardegna has also been involved in the European Social Forum, which it believes is a critical way of constructing an alternative Europe in which peoples such as the Sards may participate. Within the Sardinian Project coalition, members are divided as to how much power and influence to give the regions in their relations with Rome

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and Brussels. Some parties, such as RC, Italia dei Valori and Udeur in Sardegna, have come out strongly in favour of re-writing the regional statute to grant Sardinia more autonomy. Other PS members have been less enthusiastic about increasing Sardinian autonomy. The Partito dei Comunisti Italiani firmly believes in the primacy of the Italian state, and relegates Sardinia to regional status without the need for further rights or recognition. Furthermore, the Democrats of the Left (DS) have downplayed their commitment to constitutional reform in the absence of external pressures. For instance, during the run-up to the 1994 elections, the DS shelved any references to federalism. This was the year in which the Psd’Az stood outside Prodi’s Olive coalition and the pressure on the DS to acknowledge Sardinian territorial interests was removed. When the centre-left government introduced a constitutional law to devolve powers to the regions in 2001, this was also due to external pressures: to win the support of the more federalist regions in northern Italy (Fabbrini and Brunazzi 2003). Since then, the DS has taken a position in opposition to ‘federalism’, especially as the term is popularly associated with the centre-right’s devolution proposals. The DS and La Margherita appear to be less than committed to Soru’s grand hopes for Sardinian autonomy, backtracking on constitutional issues when the pressure is off. Finally, the UDC has diverse coalition partners at both the Italian and European levels, which has often produced tensions between parties. At the European level, the UDC is a member of the European People’s Party, and the Sardinian branch uses the common EPP programmes in European elections. At the statewide level, the UDC has been part of the House of Liberty, which included a mix of centre-right parties such as Alleanza Nazionale (heirs to the neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano), the populist Forza Italia, and the separatist Lega Nord. The UDC strongly criticised Bossi’s ‘devolution’ plans, and is more pro-European than its statewide allies. Yet at the Sardinian level, the UDC finds common ground with other members of the centre-right pole: ‘perhaps [AN and FI] do not want a Europe of the Regions, but also they are autonomists. In Sardinia they are all autonomists.’28 This indicates that all regional branches are more in favour of autonomy than their parent parties. ‘Devolution’

In response to the autonomist sentiment of the Sardinian electorate, and its accommodation within the programmes of the centre-left and Christian Democrat parties, the regional branches of FI (Forza Italia) and AN (National Alliance) have shown sympathy for the goal of decentralisation. In

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the past, these voices have been weak within the statewide parties. Yet since the House of Liberty’s conversion to the merits of ‘devolution’, Forza Italia Sardegna (FIS) has grabbed this opportunity to frame the Lega Nord’s proposals within the context of the struggle for Sardinian autonomy. Let us for a moment consider the content of the devolution proposals. In 2005, Umberto Bossi submitted a constitutional law that called for the transfer of authority over health, education and law and order from the state to the regions. Furthermore, he called for the transformation of the Senate into a regional chamber, and the reform of the Constitutional Court so that regional interests were represented. On the European front, Bossi called for regions to be constitutionally guaranteed direct involvement in the transformation of EU directives into national law. Yet there were also (largely disconnected) centralising aspects of the constitutional proposals that were proposed not by Bossi, but by the Alleanza Nazionale. The proposed amendments included strengthening the powers of the Premier so that s/he would be able to dissolve parliament, appoint and fire cabinet ministers and be able to call elections. These are currently powers exercised by the largely ceremonial President of the Republic. Proponents of the constitutional reform argued that devolution would increase the accountability of regions and entrench the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ in the constitution, whilst at the same time creating more stability in the Italian political system through increasing the powers of the executive. In Sardinia, these proposals were welcomed by Forza Italia Sardegna and the Sardinian branch of Alleanza Nazionale. To take advantage of the centre-left parties’ indecision on the regional question, the centre-right parties argued strongly in favour of recognising Sardinia’s unique cultural identity within European institutions. The FIS sought ‘maximum autonomy’ for Sardinia, and its referendum campaign programme was entitled ‘Yes for the freedom of Sardinia’ (Forza Italia Sardegna 2006) – thus making a stake in the traditional turf of the nationalist parties by using the word freedom, however loosely defined. In this programme, the FIS underlined the importance of the constitutional reform proposed by the Berlusconi government for the provisions in the new Sardinian Special Statute. It was presented as a chance for Sardinians to seize the real autonomy that they should have been granted in the 1948 Italian constitution, which should have created a federal Italian state.29 The party commended the devolution proposals for ‘guaranteeing more autonomy and more powers for our land’. Indeed, the FIS makes the case that the proposals should be seen as a continuation of the struggle for autonomy in Sardinia, and that devolution is in ‘the best autonomist traditions’.

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The European dimension of the devolution proposals was also praised by the FIS, for ‘also allow[ing] our region to create a new autonomy with regard to financial resources and powers in relation to Europe’. Whilst FI at the state level has long supported an intergovernmental Europe in which states are the key actors, the FIS supports the construction of Europe based on una forma federativa. Vice-Chair of the FIS, Giorgio La Spisa, posited that his party sees ‘European integration as an important resource for all of the states and also all of the peoples of Europe’. He argues that Sardinia should have more powers, especially in its relations with other countries in the Mediterranean. The reform of the constitution, by enshrining the notion of subsidiarity and giving regions more control over European directives, is the next step towards achieving this: ‘The reform of the Italian state, which has always been heading in the direction of the reinforcement of the regional powers, gives us something that we once called autonomism, now we call federal.’30 Alleanza Nazionale in Sardegna has also significantly revised its aspirations for a centralised unitary Italian state, and has developed what Pintore calls ‘a kind of right-wing Sardism’ (Pintore 1996: 35). The party moved to a pro-federalist position, and supported the constitutional reforms proposed by Bossi. Its motivations for doing so appeared to be primarily economic: it campaigned for a ‘Yes’ vote in Sardinia on the basis that it would ‘contribute to the introduction of fiscal federalism’ (AN Sassari 2006). However, this did not imply support for self-determination or secession. The Sardinian AN, whilst advocating a form of federalism, also called for the preservation of the inviolability of the nation-state. In its campaign literature for the devolution referendum, the AN in Sardinia emphasised the centralising aspects of the proposals, arguing that it would reinforce national unity through strengthening the powers of the premier and the state. The AN clearly refuses to join the FI and some centre-left parties in becoming more regionalist: instead it competes with other parties by emphasising its commitment to state integration. In June 2006, Italian voters overwhelmingly rejected the proposals put forward by the Berlusconi government. Not only were the devolution proposals criticised by some 200 constitutional experts in Italy (Rossi and Pozzoli 2006), each of the parties that made up the Union coalition, and the nationalist Psd’Az; they were also lambasted by the UDC – one of Berlusconi’s coalition partners. The UDC places great emphasis on preserving the unity of the Italian state through its demands for federalism, and is hostile to the separatism of the Lega Nord. For different motivations, the Psd’Az argued that whilst it would welcome the type of devolution that took place in the UK 1997–9, Bossi’s plan bears no resemblance to this. In

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fact, it centralises the powers of the state in the hands of the Prime Minister and endows the state with the authority to override regional laws and interests (Psd’Az 2006). This would lead to a reduction in the powers of Italy’s special autonomous regions. The Psd’Az also opposed the neoliberal thrust of the proposals that pits regions against each other, arguing that federalism should ‘unite states, not divide them’.31 Finally, the party criticised the proposals for not taking into consideration the European dimension, maintaining that a federal Italy must place itself squarely in a federalising Europe.

Territorial capacity in Europe

Europe has created a new context in which to deal with Sardinia’s problems of underdevelopment and isolation. Whereas previously, Sardinian parties stolidly opposed the negative economic effects of European integration, there have been two new developments in Sardinian attitudes towards European integration since the early 1990s: first, a sense that the Italian government was not effectively representing Sardinia’s economic interests in Europe; and second, the perception of the EU as an important source of funding. These economic arguments dominated parties’ perceptions of Europe as constituting a new opportunity structure for Sardinia. Autonomy versus resources from the centre

The Sardinian Project, which led the regional government from 2004–9, has argued for the need to break Sardinia’s dependence on state and European funding, and to increase the island’s economic potential in European and global markets. This means becoming a ‘normal region’ in Europe by being more competitive through increasing international trade, developing the right infrastructure, exploiting human capital and controlling the tourist economy. However, developing economic capacity does not necessarily mean increasing Sardinia’s fiscal autonomy, or diverging in social and economic policy from the mainland. In opposition to the centre-right’s devolution proposals, the PS favoured a cooperative type of federalism, based on the maintenance of common standards in public services and welfare, and ‘social solidarity’ amongst regions. The PS sought to more effectively utilise the regional competences that the Giunta already exercises to develop a renewed sense of confidence amongst the population and business communities. This required harnessing the potential of Sardinia’s strong sense of identity and local traditions, and

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opening Sardinia up to European influences (Sardegna Insieme 2004: 10). Despite the loss of European transfer payments resulting from the region’s exit from Objective 1, the PS insisted that Sardinia must enter a ‘new phase of competitiveness’ (PS 2006). The Project’s plans for economic self-sufficiency included exporting Sardinia’s products to international markets, ‘saving the coasts’ (which was institutionalised in the Salvacosta regional law in 2006) to increase the potential of tourism and protect the environment, cutting down on regional government bureaucracy, and bolstering the Sardinian identity through plans for bilingualism and other cultural initiatives in order to ‘stimulate communications with the outside world’ (PS 2005). The PS also sought to increase access to education, and build links between Sardinian and other European universities. This was intended to combat the fact that Sardinia has one of the lowest education attainment rates in Europe, which is a significant obstacle to development. The PS proposed, like the Scottish Labour Party, to focus on the supply-side of the economy to increase growth, rather than demanding more legislative powers or regional competences. But unlike Labour, which sought to diverge in policy from Westminster over key policy areas such as education and healthcare, the PS sought to maintain common statewide standards in the provision of public services. It opposed the centre-right’s proposals to decentralise more powers to the regions on the grounds that it would undermine the collective provision of welfare. Instead of seeking to free the regions to pursue divergent policies from the state, the PS sought to integrate Sardinia into the Italian economy in conditions of equal opportunity. On a different level, the PS-led Sardinian government looked to exercise a new ‘informal’ type of autonomy through its involvement in European networks, especially with Corsica and the Balearic Islands, through the Iles de la Méditerranée occidentale (IMEDOC) scheme, which is designed to enhance linkages between the islands of the Mediterranean. Former Sardinian President Renato Soru was also keen to develop international trade links, and signed an agreement with the Italian and Algerian governments for creating a gas pipeline between Algeria and Sardinia (with funds from Europe). PS official and Sardinia’s CoR representative, Linetta Serri, argued that Sardinia’s insularity, which has been its main handicap, could in fact be a resource. Sardinia should exploit its central position within the Mediterranean, by acting as an ambassador towards the EU, in linking Europe with North Africa. This is also where many Sards believe their economic future lies – in trade and cultural agreements with Tunisia, Algeria and Libya.32 Finally, an important part of the Project’s plan was to increase the

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regional government’s powers over Sardinia’s physical territory, in particular with regard to the nuclear power stations and military bases in Sardinia. Soru entered a fight with the Italian government about the American military installations on the island, where bombing and other nuclear and chemical tests are carried out to the destruction of the tourist and fishing industries. Soru rejected the funds offered by the Italian government to cover moneys lost by the fishing industry, and demanded an end to America’s continued military presence. These demands were successful, and the Italian government agreed to move out the American military bases from the Santa Stefano area. Another recent episode involved President Soru demanding that Berlusconi’s finance minister hand back some of the money that Sardinia overpaid in Italian taxes, amounting to some 4.5 million euros (La Repubblica, 28 October 2005). After Soru refused to go through the usual institutional channels such as the State-Regions Conference to make his claim, the two parties were able to reach a compromise and Rome agreed to return some of the money. The Project’s focus was therefore on ‘putting its house in order’ and lobbying for more control over Sardinian territorial interests and influence within the Italian state, before taking its demands directly to Europe. It also argued for more consultation in Italian delegations to Europe where Sardinian interests were concerned, especially regarding the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Perhaps influencing this state-centred strategy was the fact that Sardinia has only weak access to European institutions. As well as lacking a dedicated Member of the European Parliament, Sardinia’s only other means of access is through the Committee of the Regions, for which it has two representatives. The Sardinian Project also failed to play an active role in some of the transregional lobbying organisations, such as the Regions with Legislative Powers (RegLeg), which has been driven by the interests of the stronger regional governments in calling for a greater role for regions in shaping European common policies and directives. In order to influence the European agenda, Sardinian elites have preferred to focus on using the channels within the Italian state, such as the State-Regions Conference, and have limited their demands for more consultation on, rather than control over, European policy-making. The Partito Sardo d’Azione acknowledges that European economic integration has presented major challenges for Sardinia: the island, like other isolated regions, is hampered by the free movement of goods, capital and peoples because of its lack of transport and communications links (Psd’Az 2004c: 6). But the party blames Sardinia’s failure to respond positively to these developments less on European institutions and

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directives than on the actions of the regional elite. The party agrees with the Sardinian Project that previous regional governments had no innovative ideas about how to develop Sardinia’s economy. EU cohesion policies in the post-1992 period were badly implemented and money was wasted due to the corruption of the regional political class. But more than that, the Psd’Az argues that the main problem was that ‘the Sards do not have any idea of what to be and what they want in Europe’ (Psd’Az 2004c: 6). There was a lack of vision of what Europe could offer. Despite the ineptitude and corruption of regional politicians, the party believes that Europe has been beneficial to the Sardinian economy. For example, ‘the question of territorial continuity was resolved thanks to Europe, and certainly not thanks to the Italian state’.33 The Psd’Az understands ‘territorial continuity’ as the reduction of obstacles to efficient communication, such as transportation to and from the island, to put it on a level playing field with mainland regions. The EU financed the airport infrastructure in Alghero, which is now the island’s centre for low-cost flights. But at the same time, the Psd’Az does not want ‘European assistance without a process of construction and growth’. In order to tackle Sardinia’s problems of underdevelopment, the party proposed concentrating on three sectors: energy, credit and transport. On the first issue, Sardinians have to pay over 40 per cent more than other Italians in their energy costs, due to the island’s isolation. The party called, in the short term, for the Italian state to eliminate the disparity in energy costs, and in the long term, for the development of alternative energy sources such as solar energy. It also supported Renato Soru’s moves to ensure greater access to gas and oil through the construction of a pipeline between the island and Algeria. Second, Sardinia has no credit institutions – they are all subsidiaries of mainland Italian banks, which creates problems of access for Sardinian businesses. In order to reduce the costs of credit and make greater savings, the party proposed establishing a number of state-run banks and credit cooperatives on the island. Third, the Psd’Az supported stronger transport infrastructure and cheaper transport costs between Sardinia and mainland Italy, in order to integrate the island into Italian and European markets. The party also called for the creation of a Mediterranean zone of free exchange, and more intervention into the economy in favour of family-oriented policies in order to reduce emigration. Complementing these policies was the need to strengthen the Sardinian culture, through official bilingualism and the teaching of Sard history in schools to create a feeling of national community to tackle communal problems (Psd’Az 2004a, b). In order to achieve these policy objectives, the Psd’Az wants Sardinia

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to become a ‘federated nation’ with autonomous powers and representation in European and international institutions. It believes that efforts at constitutional reform by both the centre-left and centre-right fail on this demand. The party criticised the centre-left government’s constitutional reform in 2001 for creating too many concurrent powers between regions and the state, leading to conflicts of competence. And though agreeing that the devolution proposals simplify the complex demarcation of powers of the 2001 reform, Psd’Az official Antonio Moro called Bossi’s version a federalismo egoistico. He asserted that the Psd’Az supported a solidaristic federalism based on cooperation between regions. The party also believed the proposals for fiscal federalism to be ‘too vague and indefinite’ (Psd’Az 2006). Bossi’s plans would benefit the northern regions to the detriment of the poor through its reform of the fiscal equalisation programme. Yet in a longer-term perspective, the Psd’Az believes that internal debates about Italy’s fiscal structure would be transformed as the EU gradually accrues more powers from the Italian state in macroeconomic policy. Going beyond the Psd’Az’s proposals, the SN has put forward the notion of ‘fiscal self-determination’ (autogoverno fiscale) for Sardinia to raise revenues and control the tax base. This means introducing protectionist measures to stop the ‘pillage’ of Sardinia’s natural resources by the Italian state and foreign companies. To that end, it proposes levying an exportation tax on all natural resources. But fiscal self-determination also has another dimension: creating a financial base in Sardinia for business communities and a zona franca ‘to create equal opportunities for Sardinian businessmen’. There have also been proposals to reduce taxes for artisans and small businesses, and create an ‘entrance tax’ (tasso d’ingresso) for non-residents, raising moneys that will be invested in tourism, safeguarding the environment and the agro-pastoral economy (SN 1999). However, questions about the way in which such a fiscal system might accord with European directives, policies and constraints, such as the Growth and Stability Pact, are left untouched by the party. In contrast, the IRS argues that Sardinia needs to break free from the shackles of Rome to develop its economic base. It believes ‘autonomy’ has resulted in economic deprivation; the destruction of Sardinia’s forests and agricultural economy; the pillaging of its mineral resources; cultural stigmatisation and the ‘shame’ of being Sardinian; obstacles to the flourishing of the Sardinian language; increased insularity through Sardinia’s lack of transport connections to the mainland; pollution through dumping nuclear waste on the island; and the political alienation of the Sardinian people from the regional clientelist class (IRS 2005). What are

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the party’s alternative policy proposals? The IRS has proposed a ‘radical transformation of the welfare model’ that includes maximising intergenerational solidarity, strengthening the third sector, and defending rights to healthcare and education. It also proposed creating provisions for supporting the tourist economy, teaching Sardinian history in schools, winning emigrants back to the island and halting their departure, and the institutionalisation of bilingualism. On the economic front, the IRS has sought to make the Sardinian economy more competitive in international markets by exporting more products with a ‘Made in Sardinia’ logo, improving the traditional agro-pastoral economy, investing in technological and scientific research and improving communications with other countries through more internet access. Nationalist parties have advanced similar socioeconomic goals to the Sardinian Project for a self-determining and prosperous Sardinia. However, there is still an entrenched political class in Sardinia that does not want to give up its power and is happy for Sardinia to continue being dependent on external funding. In the 2004 regional elections, Forza Italia Sardegna’s slogan was ‘We won’t let them change our Objective 1 status’. Its motivations are for Sardinia to stay the same in order that they can continue to receive money from Europe. Forza Italia Sardegna also favours ‘fiscal autonomy’, which would compensate for its geographical disadvantages by giving Sardinia the possibility of having more commercial and trade links with other parts of Europe, in particular North Africa and the southern Mediterranean. Yet such economic empowerment can only come with the help of external subsidies. FIS Vice-President La Spisa believes that Europe in particular holds a possibility of aiding reform of Sardinia’s agricultural and industrial base, and strengthening its financial services, through direct intervention to combat the structural problems of Sardinian enterprise. Like the Alleanza Nazionale, he highlighted Sardinia’s reliance on EU funding: ‘on the basis of economic and social cohesion [the EU] has brought more resources through the structural funds to Sardinia’. Thus fiscal federalism for FIS does not imply that Sardinia would have to become economically self-sufficient. For La Spisa, ‘maximum autonomy for us means the possibility of Sardinia obtaining much more resources than it currently gets’.34 The Alleanza Nazionale in Sardinia agrees with this interpretation. In their campaign literature for the referendum on constitutional reform, they framed ‘fiscal federalism’ as actually guaranteeing more resources for Sardinia from the state. Provincial Commissioner, Nanni Moro, argued that fiscal federalism would improve the workings of central institutions to ensure that equalisation funds for territories with ‘weak fiscal capacity’

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would be increased, it would guarantee additional resources for territories with ‘objective conditions of disadvantage’ and as a result, Sardinia would be eligible for much more money (AN Sassari 2006). Fiscal federalism would thus serve to increase Sardinia’s dependence on state resources, rather than equipping it with the institutions and infrastructure to become more economically independent. In contrast, the Sardinian UDC has taken the position that European economic integration has damaged Sardinia’s economy, in particular the Common Agricultural Policy. Vice-President of the party Felice Contu argues that there should be special attention given to the island-regions of Europe, which have their own particular interests and problems. For instance, Sardinia’s greatest handicap is one of physical isolation: transportation and communications with the rest of Europe are highly difficult and costly. The UDC argues that these difficulties of transportation also underline the fact that the European market is biased in favour of the northern regions, and that territorial continuity will be difficult to achieve because ‘the real interests of Northern Europe do not coincide with the interests of the South’. In order to tackle these problems of institutionalised discrimination in the single market, the UDC argues that the EU must be structurally overhauled in order to give the smaller regions more say over their own affairs: ‘we think that the island-regions should have particular help from Europe, because they are islands. But until now, Europe has closed its eyes to us, and it has not had the desire to hear our problems.’35 However, this ‘particular help’ from Europe has not solved and will not solve all of Sardinia’s problems. In soliciting funds from the EU without having full control over regional development programmes or creating an ‘entrepreneurial spirit’, it could be argued that Sardinia has simply switched its economic dependency from Rome to Brussels. And the clientelism and corruption still persists, as European funds are siphoned off to the politicians or businessmen who were handed the responsibility of implementing local development programmes (O’Neill 2005). However, as European funds declined when Sardinian exited Objective 1, there has been a renewed focus on the potential for receiving additional state funds (PS 2006). But that also means that hopes for economic self-sufficiency remain just that, whilst the prospect of reviving Roman patronage looms large. Contrasting autonomy and policy goals

European economic integration, unlike political integration, has brought Sardinian territorial interests to the forefront of political debate. More

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specifically, because the convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty forced the Italian state to reform its regional development policy, this allowed Italian regions to communicate directly with Brussels in implementing cohesion policies, which strengthened their position vis-à-vis the state. After decades of Sardinia’s political elites making the trade off between autonomy for patronage and resources from Rome, the decentralisation of regional policy in the early 1990s gave them the option of changing this strategy. However, the fact that European structural funding became the only source of funding available to Italian regions after 1992 meant for many poor regions that their dependence simply switched from Rome to Brussels, so that the new question was trading off autonomy and funding from Europe. In Sardinia, as one former President of the Regional Council stated, the improvements to Sardinia’s economy, society and quality of life have been ‘largely financed by the European Community, through the intervention programmes, through finance from the regional funds, through the policies that the Community has elaborated and proposed for improving the living conditions of the “less favoured regions”’ (Serrenti 2003). However, rather than having to trade off autonomy for these hugely important resources, it appears that most Sardinian parties want to have their cake and eat it. They would prefer to see a continuation of funds to Sardinia from the EU, but they want to become more independent and competitive through building up trade links. Furthermore, parties want more influence within the Italian state, whilst at the same time having more direct representation and participation in European institutions. Yet this is not the case for every party. We have seen that whilst the AN and Forza Italia Sardegna advocated fiscal autonomy, which actually means strengthening the state’s fiscal redistribution apparatus, the nationalist parties wanted to put an end to this dependency by pursuing bottom-up plans of socio-economic development that take advantage of Sardinia’s cultural resources and products to place Sardinia within international markets. The Sardinian Project, like the nationalists, also argued that Sardinia must ‘walk on its own two feet’ and become more competitive. For Linetta Serri, Sardinia must increase its capacity to be autonomous. But whilst acknowledging the need for more direct regional representation and autonomy in Europe, the centre-left coalition preferred to focus on altering its relations with the state – by obtaining more influence in intra-state bodies as well as regional transfers to cover those lost in Europe. For all parties, with the exception of the nationalists, autonomy still comes second to building up Sardinia’s economic capacity, which may require seeking more access to, and resources from, the centre.

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USING EUROPE Conclusions: Europe and Italian decentralisation

In Sardinia, few linkages were made between European integration and the process of decentralisation in Italy, when Bavaria was an enthusiastic advocate-turned protectionist critic of the project, and Scotland demanded direct participation. Sardinian political actors watched from afar, and current debates on constitutional reform reflect their lack of involvement in the previous stages of regionalisation. Although there are demands for a regional right to direct participation in European institutions, Sardinian parties – with the exception of the nationalists – preferred to be more passively represented through Italian state channels. Furthermore, Europe has not been an important element of political competition among Sardinian parties. This is with the exception of the nationalist parties who, despite their best efforts to highlight the possibilities of exercising Sardinian autonomy in Europe, are too small and electorally insignificant to shape the political agenda. The Partito Sardo d’Azione’s main contribution to the European dimension of party competition in Sardinia has been to encourage regional branches of statewide parties to adopt the slogan of a ‘Europe of the Peoples’ – but without forcing them to elaborate what this might signify for Sardinia in any meaningful way. To be more specific, whilst political integration – which relates to issues of representation and self-determination in European structures – is not a point of party competition, economic integration has received disproportionate attention. The weakness of the first aspect of integration in Sardinian party competition is inextricably linked to the heightened salience of the second. Because Europe has come to be seen as a source of funds by Sardinian parties, ‘this has created a deficit in political goals – for having more influence, a stronger voice and lobby [in Europe]. The focus on money has meant that parties have lost their vision of other [political] opportunities in Europe’36 and they are inattentive to the formulation of common sectoral policies. The political questions relating to how Europe works, and what direction it is heading in, receive little political or public attention. Instead, opportunities presented by European integration have almost exclusively been interpreted in terms of building Sardinia’s economic capacity. In particular, the Sardinian Project has suggested various modernisation plans to make the Sardinian economy more competitive in European and global markets. But it has also acknowledged that regional economic ‘self-sufficiency’ still requires a helping hand from the state. The Project’s European strategy was to lobby for more representation within Italian delegations to Europe on issues important to the territory, such as agriculture, fishing and tourism.

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In this sense, the centre-left Sardinian government, unlike those of Bavaria and Scotland, did not try to create direct channels of communication with European institutions or to ‘bypass’ the state to better represent the territorial interests of the island at the European table. Nor were the demands for the renewal of Sardinian autonomy strongly linked to the processes of regionalisation in Europe. Little was mentioned about European integration in the proposed draft of the Sardinian Special Statute, aside from having more Sardinian representation in Italian state delegations. Instead, the focus was placed on a renewal of relations with the state. But what might cause Sardinia to diverge substantially from the territorial strategies being pursued by regional governments elsewhere are the strong calls from all parties to develop Sardinia’s relations with the countries of Northern Africa and the Middle East. Sardinian parties have maintained that the island is uniquely placed to act as a bridge between Southern and Northern European cultures, and to compete in Mediterranean markets. The Sardinian Project-led government harboured hopes that the island would be able to create a new role for itself in Italy, Europe and the world by forging closer relations between the diverse regions of the Mediterranean basin and by taking advantage of its position as a cultural and economic ‘trading post’, a desire that is supported by the centre-right and nationalist parties in Sardinia. This could lead to the development of a ‘Mediterranean of the Regions’ that operates alongside, or even in competition with, the North-Centre-focused Europe of the Regions. And opportunities to act in the Mediterranean appear far more tangible to regional elites than trying to increase Sardinia’s voice in the distant centres of European decision-making or edging its way into economic spaces already monopolised by the wealthier regions of northern Europe.

Notes 1 President of Commission V in the Sardinian Regional Council and member of Rifondazione Comunista in an interview with the author on 20 May 2005. 2 Other autonomist movements were not established until after 1945, in Valle d’Aosta, Piedmont, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Venetia and Trentino-Alto Adige. 3 Whilst 53,000 jobs were lost in agriculture, only 5,000 were created in industry during 1963–75 (O’Neill 2005: 97). 4 Between 1966 and 1968 there were 33 known kidnappings. 5 Ballero, B. Se la Regione sfrutasse tutti I poteri che ha, cited in L’Unione Sarda, 8 February 1985. 6 The PS began not as a ‘party’ but as a coalition, and the parliamentary group includes representatives from outside politics – predominantly from academia,

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USING EUROPE industry and civil society – as well as centre-left parties. Its party members include Sinistra Federalista Sarda (DS), La Margherita, Udeur, Italia dei Valori, Socialisti Democratici Italiani, Partito della Rifondazione Comunista (RC), Comunisti Italiani (PCI) and i Verdi (Greens). The Sardinian Party of Action (Psd’Az) was not an official member of the coalition, but stood as part of the PS list in the regional elections in 2004. The Sardinian Project later merged into the Democratic Party (Partito Democratico) in 2007. The House of Liberty was an alliance of right-wing political parties, including Forza Italia, National Alliance, Lega Nord and the Union of Christian and Centre Democrats, which was founded in 2000 to fight the 2001 national elections. The previous incarnation of this grouping was called the Pole of Liberty, which won the 1994 elections. In 2008, two of the consistent parties of the House of Liberty – Forza Italia and the National Alliance – formed a new political party called ‘People of Freedom’. It is neither left-wing nor right-wing, according to National Coordinator Bustiano Cumpostu in an interview with the author. Interview with Antonio Moro, Secretary of the Federation, Psd’Az, 18 May 2005. Interview with Felice Contu, former MEP and Vice-President of UDC Sardinia, 26 May 2005. Interview with Annarella Casu, member of the Party of Italian Communists, 25 May 2005. Interview with Roberto Cherchi, Press Spokesperson, Sardinian RC, 19 May 2005. Interview with Roberto Cherchi, Press Spokesperson, Sardinian RC, 19 May 2005. Interview with Giorgio La Spisa, Vice-President of Forza Italia Sarda, 23 May 2005. Sardinia, in addition to Sicily and the three border-regions in Northern Italy, was given ‘special status’ in the Italian constitution and a larger degree of autonomy than was ascribed to the 15 other regions in Italy – primarily because of the existence of a strong minority nationalist or irredentist sentiment in these respective territories. To be eligible for this status, the GDP per capita of the region must be under 75 per cent of the European average. See Law 24 of the Italian Constitution: January 1979, n. 18. Elezione dei membri del Parlamento europeo spettanti all’Italia. The nationalist parties on the right, Unione dei Sardi (UDS), Fortza Paris and Sardistas also eschew complete separation from the Italian state, vouching instead for increased autonomy and cultural and linguistic rights for the Sardinian population. However, as the parties are so insignificant in Sardinian politics, often failing to field candidates in elections and obtaining less than 1 per cent of the vote, their goals will not be explored in depth here. Interview with Antonio Moro, Secretary of the Federation, Psd’Az, 18 May 2005. Melis is quoted on the IRS website at: www.repubricadesardigna.net (accessed 21 June 2005). Article entitled ‘Referendum, Ha vinto La Democrazie e L’antiliberalismo’, 28

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May 2000, found at http://web.tiscali.it/sardignanatzione/novas1.htm (accessed 21 June 2005). Bustiano Cumpostu, in an interview with the author, said: ‘In the end, it’s only a question of words, because whether one builds a confederation or a federation it is important that it is a contract among equals.’ The DC’s two other heirs are Alleanza Populare Udeur and La Margherita, both of which – reflecting the long-standing division in the old party between progressives and conservatives – are centre-left political parties, which were involved in Prodi’s Union at the state level, and Soru’s Sardinian Project at the regional level. Interview with Felice Contu, former MEP and Vice-President of UDC Sardinia, 26 May 2005. Consultant to the Sardinian Project and one of the authors of their 2004 political programme. Interview with Gianmario Demuro, member of the Executive, Progetto Sardegna, 18 May 2005. Concetta Amato, Secretary to President of Sardinia Renato Soru, stated in an interview with the author on 27 May 2005 that Sardinia was focusing on creating alliances with other nations in Northern Africa, particularly Morocco, and was working with the Italian government on this ‘Mediterranean strategy’. Interview with Felice Contu, former MEP and Vice-President of UDC Sardinia, 26 May 2005. See www.forza-italia.sardegna.it/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file =article&sid=374 (accessed 24 June 2006). Interview with Giorgio La Spisa, Vice-President of Forza Italia Sarda, 23 May 2005. Interview with Antonio Moro, Secretary of the Federation, Psd’Az, 18 May 2005. Interview with Linetta Serri, member of the Democratici di Sinsitra and Sardinian Local Authority member of the European Committee of the Regions, 20 May 2005. Interview with Antonio Moro, Secretary of the Federation, Psd’Az, 18 May 2005. Interview with Giorgio La Spisa, Vice-President of Forza Italia Sarda, 23 May 2005. Interview with Felice Contu, former MEP and Vice-President of UDC Sardinia, 26 May 2005. Interview with Linetta Serri, member of the Democratici di Sinsitra and Sardinian Local Authority member of the European Committee of the Regions, 20 May 2005.

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6 Conclusion: the cyclical nature of territorial strategies in Europe

Introduction

As we have seen in the cases of Scotland, Bavaria and Sardinia, territorial strategies for pursuing autonomy and capacity in Europe are extremely differential. Unlike some multi-level governance approaches that assume that regional participation in the EU has led to a real shift of decision-making to the regions, this analysis has highlighted the variation in the intensity and effects of regional mobilisation. European integration has not had a uniform effect across territories. Rather, it is interpreted differently, often inversely, in different contexts and at different times – either as a set of opportunity structures or constraints for realising territorial interests. In particular, Europe has been used and perceived in three different ways. In Scotland, it was seen as a new arena for exercising Scotland’s newly won legislative autonomy. In Bavaria, European integration was seen as a threat to its autonomy, which sought to halt the encroachment of European directives on Länder competences. For Sardinia, the EU was primarily used as a source of funds, while political autonomy was instead pursued in a Mediterranean construct. These three models may also capture other cases of territorial mobilisation in Europe. The Scottish, Bavarian and Sardinian approaches to European integration can be used as exemplars beyond the scope of this study to explain why some actors have focused on the economic challenges or benefits of European integration while others have focused on political opportunities; why some actors seek more participation in EU decision-making while others prefer using the old channels of lobbying inside the state to increase their influence; and why some actors have developed robust policy platforms on Europe while others have shown a general disinterest. The variety of regional party responses to Europe identified in this analysis is broad enough to encompass party territorial

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strategies in the Basque Country, Brittany, Catalonia, Corsica, Flanders, Galicia, Northern Italy and Wales. In these cases, and others, parties have pursued constitutional autonomy goals in Europe (including demands for a Europe of the Regions, a Federal Europe and a Europe of the Small States), and also capacity-enhancing goals such as pursuing EU funding, participation in European transnational networks and lobbying organisations, and policy aims relating to industry, agriculture and fisheries policy, immigration and minority languages. Moreover, parties in these territories have followed the common trend identified in this book of moving from an anti-European position to supporting calls for a Europe of the Regions in the late 1980s, to becoming more critical of European integration in the late 1990s. But before exploring the wider applicability of the case study findings, it is first necessary to assess the similarities and differences between Scottish, Bavarian and Sardinian strategies in a comparative context, and to account for sources of variation. This will allow us to identify common patterns in territorial responses to Europe, which we can use to develop more comparative and generalisable data that is applicable to a wider range of cases. The analysis begins with a presentation of some general observations about the effects of Europe on substate territorial politics and party competition. However, these broad developments mask sharp differences in regional party responses to Europe, and this requires unpacking these ‘trends’ across cases. It also requires an examination of how territorial strategies have changed over time in response to perceived opportunities in Europe. A typology is constructed that plots the domestic constitutional goals of substate parties against their preferred European construct. This is replicated for three phases in the 30–year period under study: from 1979–87, 1988–94 and 1995–2009, which indicates the cyclical nature of territorial strategies in Europe. This analysis allows us to identify sources of variation in substate demands in Europe, and to explore how the trade-off between autonomy and capacity – in relation to both the state and Europe as ‘centres’ of decision-making – has taken on different forms in different places.

The impact of Europe on substate territorial politics

Although this research has sought to examine variation in substate party responses to European integration, this does not prevent us from drawing some general conclusions about the way in which Europe has altered the context of territorial debates in substate political arenas. European

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integration has led to the re-territorialisation of politics at the substate level by reinforcing territorial interests, providing a new context for autonomy claims, and creating a new European discourse for minority nations and regions. At the same time, these general trends have played out differently in each of the cases. This underlines the fact that common issues, arising from changes at the transnational level and diffused through European networks, are invariably interpreted differently in different contexts. The reinforcement of territorial interests

European integration has reinforced territorial interests. Some 60–80 per cent of legislation passed by regional governments now originates in the EU (Moore 2008). As European integration has a direct impact on regional competences, such as those relating to the economy, social policy and the environment, this has forced regional actors to articulate and often defend territorial interests in the face of European challenges. In particular, the creation of a single market opened up regions to greater economic competition and forced regions to adapt and modernise their industries or lose investment. In order to make their demands heard, some regional actors demanded more participation in European decision-making, became involved in transregional lobbying and established regional offices in Brussels. However, many of these demands were led by a core group of ‘strong’ regions, whose interests were not necessarily representative of all regions in Europe, especially poorer regions. Indeed, parties responded quite differently to common issues at the transnational level. Scottish and Sardinian parties were initially hostile to the supranational project, which was viewed as another distant, bureaucratic and elitist structure on a par with London and Rome. Parties in both regions feared the exacerbation of economic inequalities and their further peripheralisation from the new economic and political centres. For example, Sardinian farmers and shepherds were adversely affected by the requirements of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and many traditional pastoral areas in Sardinia were supplanted by modern technologies, causing resentment amongst the local population. In Scotland, there were fears that its fisheries and its whisky, agricultural and traditional industries would be threatened by the common market. Many Sardinian and Scottish parties sought to fight the CAP and European fisheries policies in order to protect traditional ways of life and local economies. They were also critical of the central government’s failure to represent their territorial interests in European institutions, demanding more influence in state delegations to the Council of Ministers. Yet these positions changed in the late 1980s when the

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European structural funds were reformed. Jacques Delors’ vision of a social Europe won the support of the left, and provisions for the protection of minority languages and cultures were enthusiastically endorsed by nationalist parties. However, the U-turn in party attitudes towards Europe was spurred by different motivations in each territory. Whilst in Scotland parties sympathetic to constitutional reform looked on Europe as providing an arena in which to continue the social-democratic project, Sardinian parties focused on taking advantage of structural funds for the island (Casula 2005a, b). And whilst Scottish parties sought greater regional representation in European decision-making structures, Sardinian parties largely left political questions about Europe to be dealt with by Italian political actors. In contrast, due to the robust state of Bavaria’s economy, Bavarian parties were enthused about the possibilities of increasing trade with the single market. Bavarian parties were also more positive about the principle of European integration, whereby the future of Bavaria, as well as the development of federalism in Germany, was linked to the European project. However, the debates surrounding the deepening of European integration from the late 1980s acquired a different tone. Länder governments began to view European integration as a threat to regional competences and united to lobby for the implementation of laws to protect their rights in the German federation. The CSU-led Bavarian government was at the forefront of such efforts, and linked the need to protect and maintain Länder autonomy to the possibility of creating a Europe of the Regions. But unlike in Scotland, where this concept was viewed as a method for achieving greater autonomy for regions, for the CSU it was designed to safeguard the already considerable autonomy of the Länder. The expansion of European competences over ever-wider areas posed a threat to Bavarian control over its own affairs. In response, the Bavarian government established a mini-embassy in Brussels, actively engaged in transregional lobbies and demanded the creation of a Committee of the Regions. As in Scotland and Sardinia, then, European integration forced Bavarian parties to take a stronger stance to protect, as well as advance, territorial interests, albeit for differing motives. Whilst some parties believed that European directives undermined their legislative competences, others saw the advantages of common European policies. Territorial interests were positively or negatively reinforced by European integration based on the region’s economic and cultural resources. For parties operating in poorer countries such as Sardinia and Scotland, European economic integration was largely seen to pose a threat to their economies, and Europe was regarded negatively until structural funds were

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reformed. Parties in wealthier territories, such as Bavaria, were more enthusiastic about the creation of the single market. On the question of cultural interests, each of the territories again responded in different ways. Sardinian parties, especially the nationalists, welcomed provisions for the protection of European minority cultures and languages whilst Scottish parties also embraced calls for multiculturalism. Meanwhile, the more pressing concern for the CSU in Bavaria was the need to protect its culture from unwanted immigration and the resulting cultural and religious diversity, which it believed was being hastened by European integration. Contrarily, opposition parties such as the Greens and Social Democrats welcomed the Europeanisation and diversification of the region to counter the CSU’s vision of a homogenous Bavarian Heimat. A new context for autonomy claims

Changes in the political structure of state and European institutions, together resulting in a ‘third’ regional level of decision-making, widened the scope for territorial demands and new forms of autonomy. In each of the case studies, the European level constituted a new focus of demands for autonomy and capacity during the initial period of deepening integration. These were defined in different ways by substate parties and included a Europe of the Regions, a Europe of the Peoples, a Europe of the Citizens, and a Federal Europe. More specifically, nationalist parties in all three regions moderated their constitutional goals in the face of new possibilities for autonomy in Europe, whilst regional branches of statewide parties adopted stronger territorial demands. However, the problem for nationalist parties adopting ‘lesser’ constitutional demands was that they were forced onto the same ground as statewide parties, and support for a Europe of the Regions (re)introduced divisions within parties about how to achieve their constitutional goals, and what these goals should be. For the SNP, Europe highlighted the divide between ‘fundamentalists’ and ‘gradualists’, the former arguing for statehood and nothing less, with gradualists supporting regionalisation measures as a step towards independence. The Bayernpartei was unperturbed by the fact that its support for a Europe of the Regions contradicted its end goal of being an independent member of a confederal Europe based on states, rather than a regional member of a (supranational) federal Europe. In Sardinia, both Sardigna Natzione and the IRS demanded independence in Europe, but gave little thought to whether that was in a federal or confederal European construct. At times they also argued for independence outside Europe until the structures of the EU

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were reformed. The Psd’Az was the only nationalist party to give consideration to the realities of shared sovereignty in Europe. Instead of demanding independence, it understood that within an integrating Europe, states would be forced to transfer macroeconomic, foreign and defence policy upwards and socioeconomic policy downwards. This meant that the regions and Europe would be empowered simultaneously, with the state being left impotent. As for the strategies of regional branches of statewide parties, there was a ‘meeting of minds’ on certain policies for the territory. In Scotland and Sardinia, parties across the political spectrum supported stronger regional representation in state delegations to Europe, more access to European decision-making, and greater control over territorial issues affected by EU directives. However, this is not to say that regional branches of statewide parties responded in a homogenous fashion to the regionalisation debates. Their demands for greater regional representation were based on differing motives, and ultimately shaped by their preferred European construct. For example, many parties in Sardinia and Scotland recognised their territory as constituting a nation and argued for more recognition of this uniqueness in Europe. But in Bavaria a very different dynamic was identified. Few parties agreed with the CSU’s edict that Bavaria was a ‘nation’ alongside Scotland and Catalonia. Indeed many were hostile to any form of ‘particularism’ and believed the Land should have no special recognition in Germany or Europe. After temporarily supporting the empowerment of regions in Europe, the SPD, Greens and FDP all moved to a position that prioritised the strengthening of the communes. Furthermore, party support for decentralisation did not amount to endorsing a separate regional presence in Europe. In many cases, party support for regional autonomy was tempered by regional parties’ desire to maintain a common statewide front in Europe, whilst in other cases Europe was used as a wedge to differentiate the regional party from their statewide parent. This analysis shows that there was a convergence of territorial demands for autonomy in response to the opportunities presented for regional action in Europe, with independence-seeking parties moderating their claims, and regional branches of statewide parties adopting stronger demands for autonomy. Independence-seeking parties in Scotland, Bavaria and Sardinia modified their demands to include a ‘Europe of the Regions’ to sit alongside long-term goals. However, in some cases this was only a temporary measure, whilst for others it was merely a slogan that gave little thought to how a regionalised Europe might contradict their goal of a confederal state-centred Europe. Thus, the SNP quickly deserted its support for a regionalised Europe in 1994, almost immediately after it had

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adopted the slogan. The Bavarian Party also incorporated the concept into its literature, but this was secondary to its main goal of independence. The Psd’Az was the only party to move from a pro-independence position to a post-sovereignty, pro-Europe of the Regions position and stay there. In the meantime, regional branches of statewide parties in all cases adopted stronger positions on the territory’s role and interests in Europe, and espoused the language of a regionalised Europe. This was evident in the rhetoric of Scottish Labour and LibDems, as much as the Sardinian UDC and the Sardinian RC. However, it is important to note that there was also significant variation between regional branches in how they interpreted and used the imagery of a regionalised Europe (which, for example, meant strengthening the communes against nationalism for the Bavarian Greens, compared to strengthening the nation for the Scottish Labour Party). Therefore, these strategies were tempered by party-specific considerations. In any case, one could argue that these parties have taken over the ‘centre ground’ on the territorial dimension, and are unwilling to relinquish this territory. This has put pressure on nationalist parties that formerly tried to pursue more moderate goals, but which have been relegated to the extremes of the continuum, seeking independence in or outside Europe. So whilst there was a convergence of demands on a regionalised Europe, this did not last longer than a few years in the early 1990s. A new dimension of party competition

Whilst Europe has become a new arena for party politics since direct elections to the European Parliament were introduced in 1979, European integration has also affected party competition at lower levels in various ways. With the transformation of (hitherto centralised) state structures into multi-level systems, Europe has become an arena for pursuing political projects, alongside the state party system and the newly strengthened regional party system. In response to the development of new forms of multi-level governance, political parties have been forced to differentiate their strategies at different levels, and to begin making linkages between them; not only between Europe and state policies, but also Europe and the regions. This book has examined the dynamics between the European and regional political arenas, exploring how European integration has become an important dimension of party competition at the regional level. This analysis fills a gap in the literature, which predominantly focuses on state–regional dynamics within multi-level systems, and excludes the European dimension (Hough and Jeffery 2006). Moreover, theories of

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multi-level governance have tended to focus on top-down institutional changes in EU structures rather than bottom-up regional mobilisation in Europe, and the literature on Europeanisation has largely overlooked the effects of Europe on political parties and the party system at the substate level (Hix and Lord 1997; Mair 2000; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Bartolini 2005). These studies have been unable to account for how Europe is perceived by different parts of the same party, and how it affects party competition at different territorial levels. This research has demonstrated that regional parties (be they independent or branches of statewide parties) have increased their engagement in European activities, formulated positions on EU policies and participated in European-wide networks, party organisations, and lobbying groups. Regional parties now perceive Europe as an additional arena in which to pursue their political projects and forge alliances. In particular, demands for a ‘Europe of the Regions’ won support across the regional party spectrum during the 1990s. This idea was put forward by social democrats (the Scottish Labour Party, the Sardinian Democrats of the Left, the Bavarian SPD), Christian democrats (the Sardinian Union of Christian Democrats, the Bavarian Christian Social Union) liberal democrats (the Free Democratic Party in Bavaria, the Scottish Liberal Party) and green parties (Alliance ’90/The Greens in Bavaria). However, it is important to emphasise that a ‘Europe of the Regions’ also meant different things to different party families. For instance, it was seen by regional Christian democratic parties as protecting the local level through its provisions for subsidiarity; for the regional left Europe was viewed as an arena for advancing a social democratic project with some provisions for regions; and for the regional right Europe was viewed as a project for strengthening the free market. Of those making the biggest change in their strategies on Europe, the left has moved from an anti-European and sometimes anti-autonomy position to supporting a Europe of the Regions or Peoples, and has to varying extents embraced territorial politics, identities and interests. This is evident in the left-wing parties in Italy, the Scottish Labour Party and Bavarian SPD. Of those making the least change in territorial strategies, Liberals in all three cases have been supportive of a Federal Europe, though with the difference that in Scotland and Sardinia liberals have been supportive of the recognition of national identities, whilst the Bavarian FDP is opposed to particularism. Yet as we have seen in the case studies, even within these broad party families, individual branches of statewide parties have adopted differing positions on a regionalised Europe. The responses of regional parties to Europe has been affected by a host of factors including their autonomy within the

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statewide party, their position in the party system (in particular, being in government at the regional level), the constitutional rights of the region within the state and European institutions, and internal issues such as factional disputes and leadership issues. Moreover, their European strategies have been largely shaped by the position of the dominant nationalist party within the regional party system. This did not result in regional branches following the nationalist parties in a uniform way, but rather regional parties adjusted their understanding of a Europe of the Regions to suit their own party needs and to address the specificities of the regional political context. Therefore, branches of statewide parties with few previous claims to autonomy began to support a regionalised Europe, which weakened support for nationalist parties and offered an alternative to secession for those seeking territorial reform and recognition. Europe was presented to voters as constituting an alternative framework for developing the territorial project. Importantly, the concept of a Europe of the Regions gained particular support amongst regional government leaders, who had actively participated in European debates and institutions, and were in touch with the new concepts and rhetoric in Brussels. Europe was seen by regional government leaders as an opportunity structure to gain new political and economic resources for the region, to market the region to foreign investors, to engage in trade and cultural exchanges, to lobby central institutions for more influence, and occasionally as a tool to pressure the state to grant the region certain privileges. The active engagement of regional government actors in Brussels, and their endorsement of a Europe of the Regions, was not, however, accompanied by a total abandonment of state channels. Instead, regional governments viewed Europe as an additional instrument to accrue powers and resources for the region alongside intrastate channels. Regional parties also formulated positions and attitudes towards European policies that were distinct from those of statewide parties. For instance, the Scottish Green Party adopted a far less Eurosceptical position than green parties in the rest of the UK; the Bavarian FDP broke ranks with the federal party by supporting Turkish membership of the EU; the Sardinian Refounded Communists demanded recognition of Sardinia in a Europe of the Peoples, and almost broke away from the Italian statewide party to do so; the Scottish Conservatives positioned themselves as more pro-European than the party in England (which is easier to do as the Scottish Tories do not face the same competition on their right flank from the anti-EU UKIP); and the Bavarian CSU has quarrelled with the German CDU over a number of European issues, including the introduction of the

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European single currency, and asylum and immigration laws. Therefore, Europe has become a salient issue within statewide parties, sometimes leading to divisions between different levels of the party. The case studies also revealed that regional parties have been active in forging alliances at the European level. The SNP and Psd’Az were both founding members of the European Free Alliance (EFA); Sardigna Natzione has developed bilateral links with Corsica Nazione and Herri Batasuna; the Bavarian CSU is an active member in the European People’s Party; the Sardinian Refounded Communists have been involved in the European Social Forum; the Scottish Socialist Party has developed links with the Sardinian IRS and the Basque Socialist group Zutik; and the Scottish Green Party has been active in the European Federation of Green Parties. Regional parties have engaged in bilateral relations with like-minded parties elsewhere without going through the state (or the statewide party), sharing best practices and building long-term alliances. Whilst scholarship in this area has tended to only explore the relationships between British and Europarties, for instance highlighting the tensions between the UK Labour Party and the Party of European Socialists (PES), regional parties appear more eager to integrate into European party networks and alliances. Clearly, European issues and opportunities appeal to regional parties, and play across regional party systems, in ways that are distinct from state party dynamics. A new European discourse

Some scholars have argued that one effect of European integration on nationalist parties is their adoption of civic and inclusive criteria for territorial membership, and the need to emphasise their progressive pro-European credentials (Lynch 1996; De Winter and Türsan 1998; Keating 2003). It has become important for minority nationalists to ‘play’ the European ideological ‘game’, which has been shaped by greater participation in European affairs and networks and political dialogue at the EU level. This was evident in the discourse of the SNP and Psd’Az, both members of the European Free Alliance. These parties have advocated principles and themes common to those of the EU – such as support for free trade, diversity and multiculturalism – and a pro-European ideology is important for them to be perceived as credible. However, it is certainly not the case for all parties. We have examined how Indipendentzia Repubrica de Sardigna, Sardigna Natzione and the Scottish Socialist Party (not strictly a minority nationalist party, but seeking independence) have used the language of anti-colonialism to frame their claims for independence,

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and have strongly objected to the perceived neoliberal policies of the EU. In a different vein, the Bayernpartei has shunned all attempts to ‘internationalise’ its language, indeed, its vision of the Bavarian Heimat is closed, homogenous and xenophobic. Finally, the CSU, which is not considered to form part of the ‘minority nationalist’ family, but which nevertheless has articulated a nationalist vision of society and maximum autonomy for the nation, has escaped pressures to advance a civic nationalist discourse. For the CSU, membership of the Bavarian Heimat is based on ethnic, cultural or ascriptive criteria, which excludes immigrants and foreigners. This demonstrates that there is a great deal of heterogeneity in party attitudes to Europe, and varying degrees of ‘Europeanisation’ of party discourse. However, it is also clear that core European concepts will be used in party rhetoric if they can be adapted to fit autonomy claims. For example, the term ‘subsidiarity’ was linked to increased autonomy in Europe for most Scottish and Sardinian parties, whilst in Bavaria it meant halting perceived centralising tendencies in Europe that threatened its autonomy. The adoption of many of these ‘European’ terms often appeared to be tactical, as did attitudes towards European integration more generally. The adoption of a ‘pro-European’ position was often influenced by the desire to receive resources, increase influence and to be accepted into European party families, rather than demonstrating long-term attitudinal change. Tellingly, some parties moved from being pro-European to outright criticism if they failed to win their desired aims.

The rise and fall of a ‘Europe of the Regions’

Even though the contours of European integration have not changed, the previous discussion has shown that the positions of parties have changed quite radically since 1979. The next section analyses our cases from a comparative temporal perspective, to explain why the potency of a Europe of the Regions rose and fell during the 1990s. Three stages in the evolution of substate party goals in Europe are identified: 1979–87, a period characterised by nationalist and left-wing animosity to the European project; 1988–94 when the idea of a regionalised Europe led to a convergence of party demands for autonomy in Europe; and 1995–2009, when the perceived failure of a regionalised Europe caused parties to revert back to state-focused strategies (see Table 6.1 for a summary of regional perceptions of Europe during these phases).

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Table 6.1

Perceptions of Europe across time and space Perceptions of Europe

1979–87 Scotland Considered EEC a threat, against economic integration, equally distant from state and EEC

1988–94

1995–2009

Strong alternative to Considered EU a state, for gaining secondary forum for influence and advancing Scottish interests, social and regional work through state, project protection of local industries

Bavaria

Supported principles of Europe, and welcomed economic integration

Strong alternative to state, for gaining power and advancing economic and regional project

Sardinia

Considered EEC a Strong alternative to threat, against state, for gaining economic integration, resources equally distant from state and EEC

Considered EU a threat, against aspects of sectoral policy, against Europeanisation of Bavaria Considered EU a supplementary source of funds, focus instead on state channels

The first period of party ‘positioning’ on Europe lasted from 1979 to 1987. The year 1979 marked the introduction of the first elections to the European Parliament, at which point parties became more involved in European institutions and were forced to compete on European themes and issues. During this period, the constitutional goals of parties were not yet tied to the project of European integration. This was because (1) regions were still viewed implicitly as ‘recipients’ of EC funds rather than active participants in the decision-making process; (2) peripheral regions were disadvantaged by the new European market and many regional parties did not see European integration in a wholly positive light; and (3) because of the weak political and constitutional evolution of Europe. Instead, Europe was viewed as a distant structure by regional parties and territorial demands were channelled to the state. Regional elites were involved in striking bargains with the centre to achieve more influence over state and regional policy-making. The focus was on trading off autonomy for more access to, and resources from, the state. However, this state-centred focus was about to change with the deepening of European integration and the rising popularity of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ in the late 1980s. The second period lasts from 1988 to 1994, with the year 1988 signifying Jacques Delors’ commitment to a social Europe and the reform

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of the European structural funds, and 1994 marking the creation of the Committee of the Regions under the Treaty of Maastricht. During this period, the regionalisation debates encouraged statewide parties to articulate the place of their region within the evolving structures of Europe, and to develop demands for autonomy framed within the context of a ‘Europe of the Regions’. The opportunities presented by Europe seemed to offer a third way between independence and centralism to regional branches of statewide parties, though such debates were necessarily refracted through the prism of domestic politics in each case. Simultaneously, the idea of a Europe of the Regions persuaded many nationalist parties to moderate their demands and participate in the regionalisation debates. But although this period was characterised by a convergence of demands around the imagery of a ‘Europe of the Regions’, which was flexible enough to mean different things to different political actors, territorial strategies were also focused on gaining policy benefits from Europe. Parties began to view Europe not only as a new context for exercising autonomy (away from the state), but also a centre from which to secure resources, and an arena for advancing their socioeconomic programmes. Parties sought more autonomy to act in Europe without state constraints – for instance, through the CoR, interregional organisations, and regional offices in Brussels. As well as seeking direct participation in European affairs that bypassed the state, regions also saw Brussels as a new centre of resources to access, in particular the structural funds. Europe, to a great extent, replaced the state in substate territorial strategies as an arena for exercising autonomy, as a centre to access, and also as a source of funds. The overriding philosophy at this point was ‘let us in’. But this reasoning, and the strategies that accompanied it, was unsustainable. During the last period, from 1995 to 2009, parties began to question whether their territorial strategies could be met in Europe. This was spurred by the failure of the Committee of the Regions to constitute anything more than a ‘talking-shop’, the continuing centralisation of powers at the state level in the Council of Ministers, and the failure of regions to obtain guarantees for a stronger regional role in the draft European Constitution. Furthermore, although the themes around which the territorial strategies of the parties converged – notably the idea of a Europe of the Regions – were easy to incorporate into the rhetoric of both nationalists and regional branches of statewide parties, they were difficult to integrate into parties’ long-term goals (i.e. seeking separation or state unity), leading to inconsistencies in strategies. A number of hitherto ‘pro-European’ nationalist parties (such as the SNP) even opposed, or threatened to oppose, the draft European Constitution in national

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referendums. The apparent ‘closing’ of opportunities for regions to act in Europe put an end to cross-party consensus on pursuing regional autonomy in Europe. As opportunities appeared to dwindle, some parties began to fall back on state channels, whilst others, such as the SNP, CSU and the new wave of Sardinian nationalist parties, adopted more Eurosceptical positions. Parties began to revert to previous state-centred positions: seeking more access to, resources from, or protection by the state in order to ward off disagreeable European influences. Europe was seen to pose a threat to their autonomy or regional competences, and through their desire to strengthen the state, and equally the position of the territory within it, parties such as the CSU adopted the philosophy of ‘leave us alone’. This radical change in strategy indicates that substate party support for European integration is often tactical, whilst territorial strategies are strongly motivated by the perception of policy benefits to be obtained.

Shifting party positions on Europe

Having identified variation in substate territorial strategies across space and time, the next step is to begin charting this change in strategies. It is now possible to construct a typology that plots the autonomy strategies of substate parties in relation to domestic constitutional change against their attitudes towards European integration. On the first dimension (Y), the ideal types of domestic constitutional categories that were defined at the beginning of this book will be re-introduced: independence, federalism (which is separated into ‘decentralising’ and ‘centralising’ federalism), devolution and unionism (also broadened to include the integration of the territory within the state). Substate parties’ desired European constructs are identified on the second dimension (X). This comprises four categories: a supranational (federal) Europe, a regionalised Europe (‘Europe of the Regions’), an intergovernmental Europe based on states, and the final option of opposing European integration (which includes dismantling the EU or opting out of its structures). This typology is replicated for three phases in the period under study: from 1979–87 (Figure 6.1), 1988–94 (Figure 6.2), and 1995–2009 (Figure 6.3), which indicates the ‘movement’ of substate parties along the territorial continuum in response to European integration. During the period 1979–87, nationalist parties in Scotland and Bavaria both adopted anti-EU positions, seeking independence outside Europe. The Psd’Az is the exception: in 1979 it was both pro-independence and pro-European. Both centre-left and centre-right

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Independence

Psd’Az

Federalism (decentralised)

SLD, DC CSU

Federalism (centralised)

FDP

SNP, BP

Bav Greens

SPD

SPD

Devolution

Unionism state integration

Scottish Cons, MSI

Supranational Europe

Regionalised Europe

SPD PCI/PSI

IntergovernNo/anti-EU mental Europe

Desired European Construct

Figure 6.1

Regional party domestic and European constitutional demands, 1979–87

parties in Scotland and Sardinia were unsympathetic to demands for either regionalisation or federalism during this time. Where they differ is that whilst the left (the PCI, PSI and SLP) was sceptical of all aspects of European integration, the right (the Scottish Conservatives and Movimento Sociale Italiano – predecessor of the AN) tended to be pro-economic integration. The Bavarian Greens were the only supporters of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ in 1979, based on the grounds of stateless nations’ rights to self-determination, though they were the exception to the rule amongst party families. Meanwhile, liberal (democrat) and Christian democrat parties (including the Scottish LibDems, the Sardinian UDC, and the Bavarian CSU and FDP) supported federalism or decentralisation within Europe.

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SNP, BP

Autonomy Strategies

Independence

Federalism (decentralised)

CSU, (U)DC Psp’Az, FDP

Federalism (centralised)

Bav Greens, SPD, PCI– DS/RC

Devolution

SLP, SLD

Unionism state integration

FI/AN, Scottish Cons

Supranational Europe

Regionalised Europe

IntergovernNo/anti-EU mental Europe

Desired European Construct

Figure 6.2

Regional party domestic and European constitutional demands, 1988–94

The most striking issue in the period 1988–94 was the clustering of demands for a Europe of the Regions, which was put forward by centre-left, Christian democrat, green and liberal (democrat) parties. Indeed, many on the left (Scottish Labour, Sardinian DS/RC and Bavarian SPD) adopted a pro-autonomy and pro-European position simultaneously. At the same time, support for a Europe of the Regions was most strongly associated with parties in regional government – the Sardinian Christian Democrats, the Bavarian CSU and Scottish Labour from 1999, which sought to use regional institutions in Europe to increase their influence. Nationalist and regionalist parties also utilised the term, but whilst commitment to this goal achieved longevity within the Psd’Az, the SNP and BP only briefly flirted with the idea of a

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USING EUROPE SN, IRS, SSP, Scot Greens

Autonomy Strategies

Independence

Federalism (decentralised)

FDP, SLD Bav Greens

Psp’Az

CSU, (U)DC

Federalism (centralised)

SPD

RC

Sardinian Project, DC

Devolution

SLP, FI/AN Scottish Cons

Unionism state integration

AN

Supranational Europe

Regionalised Europe

IntergovernNo/anti-EU mental Europe

Desired European Construct

Figure 6.3

Regional party domestic and European constitutional demands, 1995–2009

regionalised Europe. Instead, the latter two’s positions were more strongly characterised by their repositioning as more pro-European parties and their adoption of the policy of independence in Europe. The Bavarian Greens at this point began to abandon their commitment to a Europe of the Regions, in response to the CSU’s monopolisation of the term, and advocated decentralisation to the municipalities of Europe. Meanwhile, the regional right remained outside the ‘convergence’ pattern due to parties’ commitment to state integration of the territory in an intergovernmental Europe. In this final period from 1995–2009, party families splintered unevenly across a range of dimensions. The regional left lost its

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cohesiveness as a party family, with parties taking up a range of stances from independence outside Europe, to more fiscal autonomy in a federal or regional Europe. For instance, the Italian left abandoned its commitment to unitarism, and split into groups supporting either a centralised federal Italy within a regionalised or intergovernmental Europe. In particular, both the Sardinian Project and the DS favoured cooperative federalism in Italy based on grounds of social solidarity, whilst the RC sought a regionalised Europe (a ‘Europe of the Peoples’) that recognised the Sard identity. Likewise, the regional right adopted a variety of positions, endorsing confederalism, federalism and devolution (though for the Sardinian AN and FI the latter goal actually meant continuing regional structural dependence on state finances). Also of note, the Scottish Conservatives moved to a pro-devolution position. The green family has also adopted a variety of positions, ranging from opposition to ‘regional egocentism’ to supporting independence for minority nations. For instance, whilst the Greens in Bavaria moved from support to a Europe of the Regions that recognised the rights of minority nations to opposing regional centralisation, the Scottish Greens contrarily support the long-term goal of independence for Scotland, to be exercised outside Europe until EU structures are reformed. The liberal (democrat) parties have been most consistent in demands for a federal Europe, although to qualify this, there are differences between parties on the type of federalism sought, and the recognition of regions within these structures. Finally, within the nationalist and regionalist party family we can identify growing scepticism of European integration from the late 1990s. The SNP, CSU and the new wave of Sardinian nationalist and Scottish independenceseeking parties became more forceful in their opposition to the continued intergovernmental nature of European decision-making that ignored regional interests. In particular, to protect its competences, the CSU argued for a strengthening of the states in Europe, rather than strengthening the regions in Europe (thus it moved to supporting an intergovernmental Europe, though this also means strengthening the regions within the state). One can also identify a clustering of old and new socialist, green and nationalist independence-seeking parties against Europe during the last period, which is mainly due to their frustration with the limitations for regional action in Europe.

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206 Explaining variation in strategies

It is clear from the above discussion that political parties in the substate regions and nations of Europe have developed a variety of responses to integration processes, ranging from demands for greater recognition of territorial distinctiveness, to protest against a perceived threat to their competences – despite the main issues of European integration being constant across cases. Based on the case analyses, we can identify a number of factors that have affected parties’ territorial strategies in Europe. These are (1) access to European institutions and organisations; (2) local party competition; (3) economic resources; and (4) constraints of state structures. Access to European institutions

Political parties operate within distinct opportunity structures determined by the incentives and constraints of state territorial management. This means that parties have different levels of access to European institutions and organisations within and across cases, and across time (with recently decentralised regions gradually gaining enhanced rights of participation in Europe). As we have seen in all of the cases, parties in regional government have taken a more active stance on European issues in order to advance the economic, cultural and political interests of their region in the European context. Parties in government at the regional level benefit from greater experience in European institutions than parties who are only represented in the European Parliament, or in European political parties, or neither, as their party representatives are directly involved in policy-making, and will be in a stronger position to affect the development of issues and agendas at the European level. Whilst Scotland and Bavaria have relatively strong representation in Europe (by regional standards) – including a large number of MEPs, past leadership of RegLeg, strong intergovernmental mechanisms for representing regional interests in state delegations, and access to the Council of Ministers (albeit in representing the state as a whole), Sardinia is unable to elect its own MEP owing to the way in which European constituencies are carved up in Italy. The ability or inability of parties to access European institutions directly affects their ability to influence the development of agendas at the European level. This was acknowledged by Sardinian nationalist parties in 2009, when they staged a protest during the European elections to highlight the need for Sardinia to have its own direct representation in Brussels. There may be an interesting causal effect of increased party

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involvement in Europe over time. The case analyses indicate that parties’ increased engagement in European institutions correlates with a greater sense of disillusionment with the limits of regional empowerment in the European project – evident in the ways in which Bavarian and then Scottish parties became increasingly sceptical about what they could achieve in Europe. Therefore, it appears that – counterintuitively – the more ‘institutional learning’ parties undergo in Europe, the more likely they are to be disillusioned with the apparent possibilities presented by European integration. Political parties with first-hand involvement in European institutions and networks realise more quickly where the constraints of the regional agenda in Europe lie. Once they are wiser to the limitations of Europe for territorial projects, the more likely they are to retreat to traditional channels of lobbying through the state for the protection of competences in state delegations. In contrast, parties with relatively limited experience in, and access to, European channels may be more naively enthusiastic about the possibilities for regions in Europe. This was evident in Sardinia, where most parties were almost uniformly and unquestioningly pro-European. Economic resources

The economic status and resources of substate territories affect parties’ territorial strategies in Europe. Each territorial party draws on different economic and cultural resources upon which to base their strategies. Parties operating in rich regions can mobilise the population around programmes that increase the region’s autonomy to act in European and global markets without fear of losing economic protection from the state. Indeed, as was seen in the case of Bavaria, parties operating in wealthy regions may want to reduce what amounts to their protection of other regions in the state through fiscal equalisation programmes. In particular, for parties seeking independence in Europe, it is important that they make their projects economically viable. This is a problem for substate parties operating in poorer regions, where the territory’s dependence on transfer payments and state protection may undermine demands for independence. For instance, the SNP only began its electoral rise in Scotland after it was able to mount an economic case for independence, based on oil revenues following the discovery of North Sea oil in the 1970s. Lacking such resources, the Psd’Az was unable to mount such a strong economic case for autonomy in Sardinia. Despite this, the SN and IRS have argued that independence, in and of itself, will generate more wealth for Sardinia as it would put an end to clientelistic practices that saw regional elites siphoning

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off funds for their own personal gain, and halt the state’s exploitation of the island’s natural resources. At the same time, the EU has provided a new centre of resources and funding for substate actors to access. All of the territories examined have in some way or another benefited from EU structural funding, but their reliance on such funds has differed widely, and this has also changed across time in relation to regional economic growth. The European Commission was criticised for granting Bavaria Objective 2 structural funds to improve rural areas and infrastructure in 2001, given its status as one of the richest regions in Europe. The Highlands and Islands in Scotland received Objective 1 funding from 1994–8, which assisted the development of this poorer, depopulated part of the country. However since devolution all EU regional funding is incorporated into the block grant determined by the Treasury, and as such Scotland receives no additional funding. Sardinia, the region most dependent on the funds, exited Objective 1 in 2006, causing concern for parties across the spectrum. Centre-right parties in Sardinia sought to maintain structural funding for the island, if not from the EU then from the state. Their goal of wanting to increase transfer payments to Sardinia was criticised by the left and the nationalists, who argued that it would dampen the need to develop policies maximising sustainable economic growth. The Sardinian Project instead sought wider markets to access, in particular creating trade links with countries in North Africa, rather than focusing solely on the Italian market. Equally important to some substate parties may be the protection of some traditional sectors of the economy from European competition, as well as from European quotas. Bavaria has sought to protect its farming and crafts communities, Scotland its coastal fishing communities, and Sardinia its shepherds and farming communities. There is evidence of a tendency towards economic protectionism in each of the regions, based on safeguarding regional industries and promoting exports in the face of competition. For instance, the SNP threatened to oppose the draft European Constitution in a statewide referendum if the EU did not devolve fishing competences, the CSU criticised the European competition policy for undermining its ability to subsidise public services, and the Sardinian Project sought to promote exports labelled ‘made in Sardinia’ rather than ‘made in Italy’ in wider European and Mediterranean markets. Substate parties have used protectionism as an entrustment of region-building – by developing indigenous industries, and by emphasising the importance of traditional industries to the culture and well-being of the region.

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Local party competition

Local party competition is an important factor in determining the responses of political parties to European integration. European integration has increased contestation between political parties regarding the constitutional future of substate territories in Europe, whereby territorial autonomy may be only one strategy amongst several. Electorally and politically significant parties have been able to set the territorial agenda in the region, and other parties must respond to this. This has been the case for the CSU and the SNP, which both adopted strong European platforms. These parties have been able to define the territorial cleavage and competition on the territorial dimension, which has encouraged regional branches of statewide parties to adopt more ‘regional’ profiles and policies. However, whilst regional branches of statewide parties may succumb to the pressure to become more regionalised, they do not do so in any uniform way. Whilst some statewide parties have opted for a wholesale decentralisation of the party in a confederal structure (such as the Scottish Conservatives within the British party), others allow the regional branch only a degree of autonomy to respond to local needs (such as Forza Italia Sardegna) (Detterbeck and Hepburn 2010). Furthermore, whilst the strength of a nationalist party within a given region may necessitate the development of alternative constitutional demands by their political opponents, these demands may also vary from party to party, ranging from support for devolution to federalism. Contrarily, if there is no strong nationalist party in the territory, the territorial dimension of party competition is determined elsewhere – by parties in government, or parties with a goal of federalism – and the territorial project may be submerged under other socioeconomic issues. This has been the case in Sardinia, where nationalism has been accommodated by statewide parties, thereby weakening the Psd’Az’s ability to make European integration – an issue linked to the party’s autonomy goals – an important dimension of party competition. The Psd’Az was not strong enough to either make its demands for autonomy in Europe heard, or to pose a threat to the integrity of the Italian state, unlike the SNP and CSU. Demands for independence were weak, and there was greater emphasis on achieving socioeconomic progress within a federal Italy that recognised Sardinia’s special needs and interests. Solutions to Sardinia’s socioeconomic problems were not effectively addressed by nationalist parties, which instead focused on constitutional change.

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210 Constraints of state structures

The development and pursuit of territorial strategies in Europe is affected by state constraints, which again vary across regions and across time in relation to decentralisation and territorial restructuring. Each region operates within different state structures, of a devolved state, a federal state and a decentralising state, and political parties have to respond to the constraints and opportunities this presents accordingly in order to access Europe and legislate on European matters. For instance, the Bavarian government has access to Germany’s European policy-making through the Bundesrat; the devolved Scottish Executive/Government since 1999 contributes to the UK negotiating line in Europe through intergovernmental channels and the Joint Ministerial Council, and the Sardinian Giunta has been pressing for greater regional representation in Italian intra-state institutions. But whilst Germany and the UK have allowed Scotland and Bavaria considerable room to manoeuvre, Sardinian parties have had few channels to Europe through the state, thereby weakening their influence over, and interest in, political developments in Europe. In addition to differential access to Europe through statewide institutions, the relative political importance of parties within the state also affects their European and territorial projects. For instance, in Italy, the main demands for constitutional reform were coming from the Lega Nord in the North, not from the Psd’Az in the South. This is in contrast to the SNP in Scotland and the CSU Bavaria, which led the demands for devolution and the reform of federalism in the UK and Germany respectively. The weakness of Sardinian nationalist parties in many ways contributed to Sardinia’s limited ability to control the Italian constitutional agenda, and its failure to demand greater powers in the 2001 constitutional settlement. The reform of the Italian constitution to decentralise more powers to the regions had, in essence, been a strategy of the left in Italy to pull the rug from beneath the Lega Nord’s feet. And whilst the northern regions of Italy were in favour of devolution, southern regions were unprepared and at times unsupportive of the powers being foisted upon them by the North and by the left.

Comparing trade-offs in Scotland, Bavaria and Sardinia

In Chapter 2, the dichotomy of seeking autonomy from the state versus seeking more access to the centre was identified. In the case studies, this general trade-off has been unpacked to account for three diverse strategies

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pursued by parties in regional government to reinforce regional power at the centre. In Scotland the regional government’s focus was on trading off autonomy for influence at the centre; in Bavaria there was a need to obtain greater protection by the centre; whilst in Sardinia the main question was whether or not to sacrifice autonomy in order to obtain more resources from the centre. Let us examine each of these in more detail. In Scotland, there was a tradition in the pre-devolution years of forgoing political autonomy in exchange for more access to Whitehall. After devolution, this trade-off was only slightly modified, especially under the ‘unionist’ Lib-Lab coalition. The Labour-dominated Scottish Executive underlined the importance of intra-state representation, in order to influence policy formulation within the domestic arena, as well as for ideological reasons: to present a ‘common’ British front with the Labour Party in Westminster. This did not, however, prevent the Scottish Executive from striking out on its own in some areas. The Executive was active in the practice of paradiplomacy and sought to enhance Scotland’s position in European and global networks and markets. The Executive also sought to build up its policy capacity without requiring more formal powers, such as fiscal autonomy. Regarding interest representation, Labour argued that Scottish interests were best represented through a strong UK state delegation. Scotland is said to exercise more influence within European policy-making as part of a large state than it would as a small independent state. This position was supported by the Liberal Democrats and the Scottish Conservatives. However, it was contested by the independence-seeking parties, which argued that Scotland should have a stronger, direct voice in European affairs. According to the SNP, Scotland, as a ‘constitutional region’ in Europe, still has a minimal direct role in EU institutions that have real decision-making power, and its ability to influence the UK negotiating line has not greatly improved. As a result, the SNP argues that independence alone will be able to secure Scotland’s best interests in Europe – which would also mean ending the trade-off made by unionist parties altogether. The SNP is not the only party to have argued that substate interests are not a primary concern of state delegations in Brussels. This is also a burning issue in Bavarian politics. With strong constitutional powers and considerable political influence within the Bundesrat, the trade-off for the CSU-led Bavarian government is not between autonomy and influence or resources from the centre (being a large contributor to the German equalisation programme) but rather protection by the centre to secure its control over the economy and public services. The CSU has been faced with the choice of seeking to strengthen the German state (and to re-regionalise European competences) to protect

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Länder autonomy, or seeking to increase that autonomy by arguing for a model of competitive, decentralised federalism. But unlike the Labour-dominated Scottish Executive, the CSU government did not want to present a ‘common front’ as it did not believe that Berlin fully represented Bavarian interests in Europe. The Bavarian CSU moved from a position of seeking direct participation in Europe, to working through the state in order to effectively engage with Europe. It did so by seeking to influence the German EU negotiating line through constitutionalised coordination structures for policy-making. But the CSU did not abandon its European lobbying activities altogether. It remained active in RegLeg and other external activities that raised Bavaria’s international profile, such as fostering trade and cultural agreements with regions and states across the world. With regard to policy capacity, although the Bavarian government has been able to successfully implement its ‘social market’ programme in Bavaria, the CSU sought more control over fiscal policy in order to manage the economy, and to protect these competences from European encroachments. The CSU has been particularly concerned that the growing centralisation of powers within the German federal state may be replicated at the European level, and for that reason has encouraged ‘healthy competition’ between regions. This position is opposed by centre-left parties, who argued for the continuation of cooperative federalism in Germany that guarantees fiscal equalisation and social solidarity across the Länder (and regions in Europe more generally). The trade-off for centre-left opposition parties can thus be viewed as having to choose between autonomy versus loyalty to the centre. In their eyes, Bavaria is constitutionally obligated to foster greater social solidarity across Germany in line with the Grundgesetz, which requires continuing its fiscal equalisation transfers. In contrast, the question for parties in Sardinia was whether or not the region needed more autonomy before it could become economically successful, or whether it needed more economic capacity before it could become autonomous. Neither autonomy nor capacity had been truly obtained in Sardinia, as the Special Statute of Autonomy ultimately sealed Sardinia’s dependence on state funding, administered by state institutions with the cooperation of corrupt regional elites. For the centre-left regional government, as well as the nationalist parties, fiscal autonomy meant breaking Sardinia’s dependency and becoming self-sufficient. But, as right-wing parties have pointed out, this would mean forgoing the generous funding from Europe and Rome. The main trade-off for Sardinian parties is therefore best seen in the light of autonomy versus access to the centre to secure resources. Yet, since Sardinia’s exit from

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Objective 1, it appears that the trade-off may have has lost its meaning. Most parties would prefer to see a continuation of funds to Sardinia from the EU, but they also want to have more influence within Italian and European structures. In particular, there has been a renewed focus on increasing Sardinia’s access to intra-state policy-making structures during the debates on Italian federal reform. This was more important to the Soru-led regional government than gaining more competences, as was evident in its rejection of Umberto Bossi’s devolution proposals on the grounds that regional policy diversity would undermine social solidarity. The trade-off made by the centre-left regional government was somewhat similar to that chosen by the Scottish Labour Party, in seeking greater input into, and influence over, intra-state policy-making structures rather than demanding more formal constitutional autonomy. So, whilst much of the rhetoric of centre-left parties has been about becoming more independent from Rome and more competitive in European markets, they also realise the need to be able to influence policy at the centre. The Sardinian Project, like the CSU, realised that it is in the intra-state domestic arena that the region’s greatest influence lies in shaping and responding to European policy. We can now build a more general theory of regional trade-offs. Prior to decentralisation in many European states, regional elites were able to trade off constitutional autonomy with opportunities to influence policy-making at the centre – as happened in both Scotland and Sardinia. With decentralisation of constitutional powers, the focus moves to certain policy goals for the territory, such as control over economic policy and regional planning. Increasing territorial capacity presents a number of dichotomies to substate actors that include, but are not restricted to, questions of policy divergence versus standardisation, fiscal equalisation versus fiscal autonomy and the representation of territorial interests through state structures rather than forging direct links with extra-state actors. This does not mean, however, that the constitutional goals of parties are relegated to rhetorical devices once legislative powers have been decentralised. For if policy goals are not considered to be attainable within current structures, this may require further constitutional reform. Based on this analysis, we can isolate three ‘capacity’ aims of seeking to trade off autonomy with more access to the centre: (1) influence in state structures; (2) resources from the centre; and (3) protection by the centre. It is possible to extrapolate under what conditions regional elites may seek to trade off autonomy with access to the centre. In the first scenario, territorial elites may trade off formal autonomy for having more influence in the affairs of the state, and its delegations abroad. This strategy is likely

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to be pursued by substate actors in regions that lack strong constitutional powers to shape regional policy, or by actors who seek to become a strong player on the state (as well as regional) stage. In both cases, it stems from an acknowledgement that although states may no longer have a monopoly on policy-making in regionalised or federal states, they still have extensive control over a wide range of policy areas that directly or indirectly impact on regional competences, particularly through their control of macroeconomic and foreign policy. To that end, it is necessary for the region to develop and manipulate linkages and interdependencies with the state in order to gain power and to have influence over these centres of policy-making. Obtaining representation in intra-state institutions and state delegations may be considered more important than bypassing the state. In the second scenario, regional actors may trade off autonomy for access to the centre in order to obtain state resources and subsidies. This is an option chosen mainly by poorer regions, which may seek protection and additional funding from the centre to improve their economic performance. This type of trade-off most strongly suggests the regions’ continuing dependence on the state, despite their legislative autonomy. It may also come with strings attached, so that regions may have to concentrate on certain sectors of the economy to gain funding. This allows the state to exert a degree of control over the type of economic development being pursued in the region, which was most evident in the case of Sardinia and the top-down ‘plans of rebirth’. This type of trade-off also carries ideological baggage. Regions in receipt of state transfer payments may be accused of being ‘subsidy junkies’, unable to mobilise their resources and compete on markets effectively. These criticisms tend to ignore structural determinants of economic growth. Meanwhile, the economic aims of wealthy regions, which contribute more to state revenues than they receive in public expenditure, are to reduce their contributions to the centre and increase their control over economic policy. This strategy may thus include demands for fiscal autonomy, so that regions have more control over taxation and expenditures. One could argue that this is the flip-side of the trade-off between autonomy and resources from the centre; instead it becomes autonomy to diverge in these policy areas versus integration with the state (based on social solidarity grounds), which appears to be the preference of centre-left parties at the regional level. In the third scenario, regions may trade off autonomy for protection by the centre from extra-state influences, resulting from globalisation and European integration. This may involve, on the one hand, state protectionist policies designed to cushion local industries from the vagaries

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of the international market, or on the other it may entail the protection of the region from supranational political influences. The strategy of seeking state protection was evident in cases where regional elites felt that European integration was disempowering them, or more specifically, was undermining their ability to control regional policy. Regions with the most extensive competences will be most affected by the expansion of EU competences. Constitutionally strong regions are thus more likely to pursue this strategy than regions with weaker internal competences. Not being in a position to effectively lobby the European Commission to amend its policies, or to push for a strict demarcation of competences by treaty so as to restrict its ability to influence policy areas at the regional area, regions must turn to the help of the state. Although this does not entail a reduction of regional autonomy in the constitutional sense, it does imply a degree of dependence on the state to act on behalf of the region. Relying on the state to hold back European legislation also indicates a degree of political impotency of the region in the European sphere. As we have seen, substate actors may make three types of trade-off between autonomy and access to the centre – to obtain influence within state networks, state resources, and protection by the state from unwanted external pressures. However, the trade-off must be modified when we add the EU as a new ‘centre’ to access. Regional actors have pursued two types of strategy to access European decision-making: (1) influence (through regional representation and participation) and (2) resources (i.e. structural funds). As for seeking the ‘protection’ of the EU from external influences, there have been cases where regions have sought to protect unique ‘local’ products such as Parmesan cheese and Scotch whisky from economic globalisation, but the main focus has been on obtaining influence and resources within Europe. These capacity strategies have altered over time in accordance with the three phases identified above. From 1979–87 parties continued to focus on the state as the ‘giver’ of autonomy and a centre to access; from 1988–94, when the idea of a Europe of the Regions emerged, parties sought autonomy from the state to act in Europe (to gain influence and resources); and from 1995–2009, parties reverted back to state-focused strategies, seeking protection by the state from European influences.

Patterns of territorial mobilisation in Europe

This book has compared how the twin issues of territory and European integration have played out across three regional party systems. It has

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explored the ‘Europe of the Regions’ debate through an analysis of the territorial strategies of parties in Scotland, Bavaria and Sardinia over a period of thirty years. Yet many of the theoretical statements made about regional responses to, and uses of, European integration are not only applicable in these three cases. Indeed, these three cases may also serve as models for territorial mobilisation elsewhere. The following discussion examines the territorial strategies pursued by regional parties in other parts of Europe, to determine whether they fit into the wider patterns of territorial mobilisation – both across space and across time – that have been identified in this book. First, this analysis identified a broad temporal pattern of regional party responses to European integration. There is a growing, but fragmented, literature that has dealt with other cases of territorial mobilisation in Europe. Most of this work comprises case studies on nationalist and regionalist party responses to European integration. We can draw on this body of literature to compare how the patterns identified here conform to other case findings. The overwhelming evidence is that nationalist and regionalist parties championed the idea of a Europe of the Regions in the late 1980s and early 1990s as an alternative to the state (Elias 2008b; Lynch and De Winter 2008). Many of these parties had previously held more critical positions on European integration, perceiving economic integration and competition as a threat to local industries, and seeing the EU as a distant and undemocratic form of political authority. To take some examples, the Südtiroler Volkspartei (SVP) was sceptical of economic integration and its effects on the culture, economy and linguistic rights of the German-speaking community in this Italian region (Holzer and Schwegler 1998). In Galicia, the Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG) was highly critical of the negative impact of economic and political integration on the Galician economy and society, but moved to formally supporting the idea of a Europe of the Peoples from the mid-1990s (Llamazares, Gómez-Reino and Ramiro, 2008; Elias 2008b). The Front de Libération Nationale de la Corse (FLNC) in Corsica rejected European integration as a process that was driven by capitalist and imperial interests that exacerbated the island’s economic problems (Elias and Hepburn 2008). In Sicily, where the economy is heavily dependent on traditional agricultural methods, the Sicilian National Front was highly critical of the introduction of the single market (Keating 1988). In Spain, the Partido Andalucista also feared the negative effects of European economic integration on the traditional agricultural sector of the region (Montabes et al. 2006). And in Northern Ireland Sinn Féin adopted a position of outright hostility to the EEC, which included a refusal to even take part in European elections. The

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party viewed Europe as a threat to the sovereignty of the Irish Republic due to its ‘dictatorial’ nature (Frampton 2005: 238). However, with the reform of the structural funds and the promise of a regional chamber in Europe in the late 1980s, parties across Europe began to change their tune. Regionalist and nationalist parties began a new search for forms of autonomy within Europe that amounted to something less than secession. The SVP moved to adopting the goal of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ in the late 1980s, even though it decided not to join the European Free Alliance in the European Parliament. The BNG in Galicia adopted the goal of securing Galician autonomy within a Europe of the Peoples (Elias 2009). The Volksunie in Belgium began to link constitutional reform and federalism in Belgium to demands for a regionalised Europe (Lynch 1996). In Wales, Plaid Cymru called for ‘full national status’ in a Europe of the Regions (Elias 2006). And in the early 1990s, the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) also adopted the call to replace a ‘Europe of the nation-states’ with a ‘Europe of the Regions’ and then later a ‘Europe of the Peoples’ to accommodate Catalonia’s specificity in Europe (Giordano and Roller 2002). In Brittany, Europe was seen to provide an alternative context for regional recognition in the eyes of the Union Démocratique Bretonne (UDB), which joined the European Free Alliance in 1994. Sinn Féin even moved to a position of ‘critical but instructive engagement’ with Europe owing to the tide of structural funds coming to Northern Ireland (Frampton 2005). Indeed, a Europe of the Regions ended up being supported by parties as diverse as the Lega Nord (LN) in Northern Italy, Union Valdôtaine (UV) in Valle d’Aosta, Spirit in Flanders, the Unione di u Popule Corsu (UPC) in Corsica and Eusko Alkartasuna (EA) in the Basque Country (Lynch 1996; De Winter and Türsan 1998: 207; Elias 2008a, b). De Winter and Türsan (1998: 191) argued that regionalist and nationalist parties moved to support for European integration for three main reasons: (1) that it was seen to assist economic and political decentralisation; (2) that it encouraged political and cultural pluralism and respect for minority languages; and (3) that European institutions were seen as either chipping away the powers of the states from above, or constituting a viable external support system for autonomy. They concluded that ‘most ethnoregionalist actors believe that the framework of a politically and economically united Europe will permit their region to achieve greater autonomy or even full independence’. Marks et al. (2002) agreed, classifying regionalist parties as Europhile due to the fact that European integration was eroding the sovereignty of the state. The authors did not account for the perception amongst some regionalist actors that

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European integration, by eroding state sovereignty, was also eroding regional autonomy. Despite this, Jolly speaks of ‘regionalist Europhilia’ although this remark is largely based on a single case study of the SNP, which downplays the party’s anti-EU stance in the 1970s and its opposition to the draft European Constitution and European fisheries policy in the late 1990s and 2000s. From this perspective, Jolly’s case study did not entirely support his conclusion that regionalist parties were ‘consistently pro-EU’ (Jolly 2007: 124). In particular, many analyses fail to account for the nationalist and regionalist party turn against Europe in the late 1990s and 2000s. It soon became clear that nationalist and regionalist party support in principle for a Europe of the Regions was not always accompanied by support for the concrete policy and institutional realities of actually-existing Europe. With the continuing weakness of regional institutions in Europe, and failure to confer specific institutional and legal rights on Europe’s nations and regions, nationalist parties that were once ardent supporters of a regional Europe became increasingly sceptical of European integration. As Lynch and De Winter (2008) have argued, party members of the European Free Alliance have suffered from a closing of supranational opportunity structures and adopted more critical attitudes towards Europe. The authors argue that this is due to the continuing weakness of the CoR, the failure of nationalist parties to obtain guarantees for institutional recognition in the European constitution, and the negative effects of the 2004 enlargement for West European regions, as funds for regional policies have been funnelled to the new member states. As a result, there has been a new wave of scepticism amongst the nationalist and regionalist party family, which was disappointed with the state-centric bias of the European Constitutional Treaty and the loss of regional representation and regional funds in the European Parliament following enlargement in 2004. In Spain and France, many regionalist parties campaigned to reject the Constitution when referenda were held to ratify the document. In Corsica, the majority of radical nationalist groups like the FLNC voted to reject the text due to its failure to make progress towards a Europe of Nations without States (Elias and Hepburn 2008). The UDB in Brittany was divided on the issue of the Constitution, with several prominent party members urging people to vote ‘No’, in opposition to the official position of the party which was in favour of the constitution. The BNG in Galicia adopted an unequivocal ‘No’ position on the draft European Constitution (Gómez-Reino 2006). And in Catalonia, the ERC also threatened to oppose the draft Constitution, as they became convinced that European integration was only benefiting the states and not the

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regions, nations or peoples of Europe. Elsewhere, Plaid Cymru in Wales, like the SNP, also voiced disagreement with several aspects of the constitutional treaty (Massetti 2007). As Giordano and Roller (2002: 110) have argued, there was a sense of disillusionment with what Europe could offer Europe’s regions and stateless nations. Parties began to believe that European integration was not working towards the interests of substate regions. Even regionalist and nationalist parties that had taken a more consistently positive attitude towards European integration – such as the CiU, Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party) and Plaid Cymru – began voicing disappointment and frustration with the EU’s failure to guarantee regional interests and recognition in Europe. Jordi Pujol, former CiU leader and Catalan Prime Minister, who was one of the most enthusiastic advocates of European integration, even acknowledged the perceived EU rebuff to regional demands and grievances in the constitutional treaty when he stated that ‘the EU is no longer encouraging regionalism’ (The Economist, 13 November 2003). So far, this analysis corroborates the three phases of nationalist and regionalist mobilisation in Europe identified in the cases of Scotland, Bavaria and Sardinia. But what of the territorial strategies of regional branches of statewide parties on European issues? Here it is more difficult to confirm these broad trends as there are very few studies that have examined the impact of European integration on the regional party system as a whole. The positions of regional branches of statewide parties in Europe remain to be explored. There are, however, two exceptions: Giordano and Roller’s (2002) analysis of the impact of Europe on Catalan parties across the political spectrum is one, and Elias (2008a, 2009) has also considered nationalist parties’ competition with regional branches of statewide parties in Wales and Galicia. Their findings generally confirm the patterns identified in this book. In Catalonia, the Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC), which is allied with the PSOE at the Spanish level, adopted a position that favoured greater decentralisation in Europe in the 1990s. Yet, in similarity to the Bavarian SPD, this amounted to supporting the empowerment of levels beneath the region. Whilst the Bavarian SPD interpreted a Europe of the Regions to mean strengthening the communes in competition with the CSU’s desire to centralise powers at the Bavarian level, the Catalan PSC proposed the ‘construction of a Catalan project with great respect towards Europe and the cities’, which countered the CiU’s view of a Europe of the Regions (Giordano and Roller 2002: 107). At the same time, in similarity to the Bavarian SPD and Scottish Labour, the Catalan PSC also favoured strengthening the

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Committee of the Regions and transforming it into a second chamber in Europe. Meanwhile, the Catalan Partido Popular emulated the position of the statewide party by supporting a Europe of the States, much like the Scottish Conservative Party before devolution. However, the Catalan PP is not entirely against regional participation in Europe; indeed, it supported the establishment of the CoR. Elias (2008c, 2009) has given consideration to how the European dimension has played out in regional party systems in Wales and Galicia. Very much in response to Plaid Cymru’s platform for an autonomous Wales within a Europe of the Regions, all of the regional branches of statewide parties in Wales have begun to champion Welsh interests within the European Union (Elias 2008c: 573). The Welsh Labour Party has also given itself a more ‘territorial’ slant by proclaiming itself to be the ‘true party of Wales’ (Elias 2009). In Galicia, regional branches of statewide parties have also been forced to adopt more territorial, and European, platforms. In competition with the BNG, Galician statewide parties like the Partido Popular de Galicia (PPdeG) and the Partido Socialista de Galicia (PSOE-PSdeG) began to articulate Galician interest representation within the EU. As a result, the BNG’s European position ‘is no longer as clearly distinguishable from the regionalist inclinations of other statewide parties in Galicia’ (Elias 2008c: 573–4). It is clear from these additional cases that regional branches of statewide parties across Europe have strengthened their positions on seeking regional autonomy within the European Union. As a result of taking over the ‘centre ground’ on the issue of regional engagement in Europe, statewide parties have caused considerable problems for nationalist parties, which have been forced to distinguish themselves from statewide parties on the territorial and European dimensions by adopting more extreme positions. A case in point is the decision of Plaid Cymru to replace demands for a Europe of SelfGoverning Regions with those for Independence in Europe in 2004 (though almost immediately qualifying this as a post-sovereign position). European integration has clearly contributed to the regionalisation of statewide parties throughout Europe. A further issue that could be fruitfully explored in other cases of regional mobilisation has to do with territorial capacity strategies in Europe. Have regional parties in government in other parts of Europe also sought to trade off autonomy for access to the centre when the situation warranted it? And have regional political actors brokered deals with the state in order to obtain more influence, resources, and protection? These patterns are more difficult to quantify due to the lack of empirical data. However, it is possible to identify conditions under which regional actors

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may focus on the state, or Europe, or play off the two, in order to advance territorial projects. As previously discussed, regional actors may trade off autonomy for influence at the centre if they are constitutionally weak; they may prefer to access resources if they are economically weak; and they may prefer the protection of the state if they wish to halt encroachments on their policy and economic portfolios. These hypotheses deserve further investigation by territorial politics scholars. It is perhaps easier to identify a temporal trend in autonomy and capacity strategies, whereby territorial actors changed their focus from gaining powers from the state (in 1979–87), to seeking autonomy in Europe (in 1988–94), to a refocus on the state as protector of regional competences (in 1995–2009), as was evident in Scotland, Sardinia and Bavaria. Beyond these cases, scholars have shown that regional governments and parties in Wales and Galicia switched their strategies from engagement in Europe to secure regional recognition in the early 1990s, to focusing on the state in order to increase their autonomy and policy capacity in the 2000s. For example, the salience of Europe has declined in Plaid Cymru’s party programmes, which has instead focused on replacing the secondary law-making powers of the National Assembly of Wales with full legislative powers (Elias 2008c: 576). In Galicia, European issues have also received less attention during the period of negotiations on the new Statute of Autonomy for Galicia, in conjunction with a refocus on the state as ‘giver’ of autonomy. As Elias argues, ‘the bilateral distribution of political power between the Spanish state and Galician political institutions became the predominant frame of reference for the party’s arguments in favour of greater political autonomy’ (Elias 2008c: 276; emphasis added). Therefore, regional actors have realised that the most important avenue for gaining powers and resources, and for influencing Europe, has been through the state. This is part of the shift towards more critical regional party attitudes, as they become more aware of European ‘encroachments’ on regional competences, and the limits of Europe for pursuing autonomy goals. This brief analysis of territorial mobilisation elsewhere in Europe confirms many of the general arguments made in this book. First, it demonstrates that regional parties have ultimately used Europe to get what they want. Importantly, the ‘uses’ of Europe were not only concerned with constitutional or symbolic recognition; they also had to do with gaining policy concessions, resources and other benefits from acting in European political arenas. The imagery of a regionalised Europe was used by parties to support a variety of territorial projects, including not only constitutional goals (being linked to federalism, devolution and independence), but also

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socioeconomic goals (such as access to European structural funding) and protectionism (by pushing back European competences). In cases where parties adopted more critical attitudes to Europe when they failed to get what they wanted, this revealed the instrumental nature of substate party support for integration. The adoption of European terms by substate parties was often tactical, as was the adoption of a ‘pro-European’ attitude more generally – for some parties it was clearly motivated by the desire to receive resources, increase influence and be accepted into European party families, rather than demonstrating long-term attitudinal change. To that end, Europeanisation can be understood as a strategy by parties to manipulate the dimensions of a given political issue – be it autonomy, economic resources or protectionism – at the regional, state or European levels. Secondly, whilst much of the literature portrays the regionalist party family as unswervingly pro-European (Hix and Lord 1997; De Winter and Türsan 1998; Marks et al. 2002; Jolly 2007), this analysis has shown that this is inaccurate. Regionalist and nationalist parties have frequently changed their positions on Europe over time, in particular becoming more Eurosceptical when they believed their demands were not being met. By the early 2000s, regional and nationalist parties across Europe had moderated their previously enthusiastic positions towards a Europe of the Regions, and adopted a much more critical stance towards European integration. This hardening of attitudes towards Europe was due to a number of factors. These included disappointment with the weak Committee of the Regions (CoR), the failure to obtain institutional and legal guarantees in the draft European Constitution and later the Lisbon Treaty, the effects of European enlargement on structural funding in many West European regions, and the dawning realisation that European integration was not only encroaching on the powers of the state – it was also infringing on areas of regional competence. Finally, regionalist and nationalist parties, when adopting more critical attitudes to Europe, can also be seen as responding to the increasingly negative attitudes of the public towards the European project. As a result, many parties have reverted to their more Eurosceptical pre-1988 positions, of doubting the ability of European institutions to recognise regions of Europe, of criticising the perceived centralising tendencies in Brussels, and of opposing the negative impact of European common sectoral policies on regions. In relation to the shifting positions of regionalist and nationalist parties in Europe, we have also seen a repositioning of regional branches of statewide parties on the issues of regional engagement and autonomy in

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Europe. The case studies, and this broader comparative analysis, have revealed that regional demands in Europe have not only been spearheaded by regionalist and nationalist parties. Regional branches of statewide parties also enthusiastically adopted demands for a Europe of the Regions although, importantly, they have interpreted this concept to mean different things in line with party ideology and the regional political context. In some cases, support for a regionalised Europe has led to tensions with central branches of statewide parties, which have not adopted such positive views on the regionalisation of Europe. In any case, Europe has been an important factor in the regionalisation of statewide parties. Finally, this analysis has demonstrated that whilst regional parties and scholars alike became enthused with the possibilities of bypassing the state in a Europe of the Regions in the 1990s, at the end of the day the state was and continues to be the most important channel for influencing Europe, and constitutes an essential source of resources, representation, and protection for regions. In the early 1990s, regional actors sought to take advantage of opportunities in Europe for establishing regional offices in Brussels, participating in a European Committee of the Regions, electing representatives to the European Parliament, forging alliances in Europarties and transnational lobbying groups, gaining access to Council of Ministers meetings, and engaging in deliberations over EU regional policy. However, as the hype associated with a ‘Europe of the Regions’ faded in the mid-1990s, there was a realisation that regions were far from being genuine partners in the European project, even in the field of regional policy. Instead, it was the states that were still firmly in control.

Conclusion

In the early 1990s, a rather subversive idea emerged in European circles that appeared to sound the death knell for the state. This was not the panic-inducing idea of a centralised European state operating behind closed doors in Brussels; rather, it was the concept of a regionalised Europe based on grass-roots political engagement that would slowly deprive the state of its competences, authority and legitimacy. A ‘Europe of the Regions’ has meant many things to many people. Some have foreseen the replacement of states with regions in Europe, in a return to the model of ‘small worlds’ evocative of the Holy Roman Empire. Others have perceived the creation of a third tier of regional political authority in Europe, which sits alongside the state and European levels. Whatever the basis of their interpretation, however, it is clear that political parties operating at the

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regional level across Europe – a disparate group ranging from minority nationalists to Communists and Christian Democrats – aspired to the creation of a regionalised Europe that acknowledged the interests and identities of the substate regions, stateless nations and peoples of Europe. European integration therefore promised opportunities for regional actors seeking to assert themselves in an increasingly fragmented and globalising world. In the early 2000s, however, this picture could hardly have been more different. In the debates leading up to the draft European Constitution, regional parties struggled to have their voices heard amidst the clatter of the pro- and anti-European statewide camps. Regional interests appeared to have been all but forgotten in the decisions leading to the strengthening of European institutions and decision-making structures, despite regional demands for a proper application of the subsidiarity principle as promised in the Maastricht Treaty. Regional parties themselves began to turn against the new European project, threatening to oppose the legislation in statewide referendums. The regions, it seemed, had been left behind in the onward march of supranational integration. No longer buoyed by the promise of ‘bypassing the state’ on the road to Europe, regions were left to fend for themselves by negotiating a better position within the state to secure their interests in, and from, Europe. This book has explored how the opportunities and challenges for regional actors have changed in the decades of ‘deepening’ European integration, and how regional parties themselves have approached and responded to these developments. It examined how parties used Europe to advance their territorial projects at a time when supranational mobilisation appeared to offer more benefits than mobilisation within or against the state. Regional parties sought new ways in which to exercise their autonomy during a period in which the once-protective boundaries of statehood were becoming ‘fuzzy’ (Batt 2003). However, these boundaries were not quite as fuzzy as regional actors had hoped. Failure to endow the Committee of the Regions with more powers, the lack of reform of European institutions in a more regional-friendly direction, and the refusal to include regional demands in the Constitution, brought a convergence of territorial party demands for a Europe of the Regions to an end. This led to a further repositioning of parties on the territorial and European dimensions, with a renewed focus on the state either as a centre to access (in order to influence European policy-making) or as a territorial aim in itself (by seeking a seat on the Council of Ministers). Furthermore, whilst in the late 1980s many substate parties changed their attitudes from an anti- to a pro-European position, since the late 1990s there has been

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evidence of increasing Euroscepticism – raising the question of how ‘Europeanised’ regional parties were in the first place. One pivotal question raised by these research findings is why political parties seem to have lost their way on Europe. The repositioning of parties from support for Europe to scepticism of certain policies indicates that parties have perhaps not fully understood European integration. To put this another way, parties have often accepted one aspect of European integration – such as the social or economic dimension – whilst rejecting other aspects, without ever putting the whole package together. For instance, the left in Italy is anti-economic integration but pro-social integration, the CSU is pro-political integration but anti-cultural integration, and the UK Conservatives are pro-economic integration but anti-social integration. The resulting difficulties in integrating these aspects of Europe into party platforms led to inconsistencies in party strategies. For instance, the CSU’s support for ‘unity in diversity’ in Europe was undermined by its opposition to immigration, whilst the SNP’s support for economic integration was questioned after it threatened to oppose the draft Constitution if Scotland was not given full control of its fishing policy. Another explanation for the inconsistency in party positions is that parties are able to ‘play’ the European ideological game without actually becoming socialised into the ideological package. Or, in other words, support for European integration was often for tactical reasons. This was evident when parties took on more Eurosceptical positions when they believed their interests were not being represented nor their demands met. Regional parties initially sought to use Europe to pursue territorial demands in the 1980s and 1990s and, when these demands looked set to fail due to the closing of opportunity structures, parties turned against the European project. This was evident, for example, when the Bavarian CSU complained that EU competition law threatened its ability to support local industries, the Sardinian government became concerned about its ability to compete in an enlarged Europe without the benefit of Objective 1 funding, and the SNP demanded control over marine policy. These are individual case-by-case grievances. However, there are also general grievances across the regions Europe, which began with the disappointment with the limited powers of the Committee of the Regions in 1995, escalated with enlargement and the entry of small nation-states such as Malta and the Baltic States to the top EU tables in 2004 whilst bigger, richer regions had to be represented through their states, and climaxed when regions failed to secure a greater role for themselves in the draft European Constitution and following Lisbon Treaty in 2005–7. The resulting sense of Euroscepticism following these (draft) treaties

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indicates that parties have loosened the ties between autonomy claims and the evolving European project. Yet this raises an interesting question. Did the regions and minority nations of Europe truly believe that states would relinquish their powers to create a regional ‘third’ level of decision-making in Europe? And concurrently, why did states allow, and even encourage, regions to pursue greater autonomy within Europe? Whilst one aspect is certainly the desire to dampen aspirations for secession, there are other motivations at play. Although not directed at the European dimension, Keating (1988: 22) argues that states have a number of reasons to pursue regionalism, such as improving administrative efficiency, reducing overload at the centre, and to better coordinate their own activities. This strategy makes sense in the state arena, which is, to a greater or lesser extent, calling the shots. But what are their motivations for advocating regional autonomy in the EU, especially when the increased power of regions, along with deepening European integration and globalisation, appeared to be reducing the nation-state’s own role and competences? The reality is that far from allowing the European Union to remove state power over the regions, states were able to consolidate their powers through European integration; in Milward’s (1994) words, Europe has in many ways rescued the nation-state. This was achieved not only through their ‘guardian’ role in allowing regions to be involved in Council of Ministers decisions when they so decided, but also because the expanding range of EU competences over devolved legislation meant that state governments were able to ‘reoccupy’ devolved areas of competences (Keating 2008: 632). Moreover, being more aware of the limitations of supranational integration, the state foresaw that when the regions became disenchanted, they would fall back yet again on state channels. This indicates that many of these European ‘opportunities’ were unsustainable in the first place. Although the idea of a Europe of the Regions appeared to take the lid off the state and allow the regions to become independent actors in the European project, the regions found they were unable to realise their ambitions as the states were also the gatekeepers to the European centre. It was the states themselves which made the Committee of the Regions a weak body, refused to grant the regions concessions in the draft Constitution, and continued to concentrate power in the Council of Ministers. A Europe of the Regions never seriously posed a threat to a Europe of the States, as the states were ultimately orchestrating the direction of the European construct and the role for regions within this. This demonstrates that, whilst regional actors sought to use Europe to advance their territorial projects, state actors were using Europe to consolidate their powers.

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Taking the lid off the state may have, however, unwittingly opened a Pandora’s box, releasing a multitude of unresolved issues and tensions within the regions of Europe. The pressures of a European-wide movement for a regionalised Europe has encouraged branches of statewide parties to adopt more territorial mantles, strengthened substate party systems and demands for increased regional access to, and influence within, intra-state policy-making structures, and reinforced territorial interests and policy demands at the substate level. Furthermore, European integration has radically transformed the meaning and nature of independence, and with it the aims of parties seeking self-determination in a post-sovereign order. These unintended consequences will undoubtedly have major ramifications for state territorial management and shape the terms of the European regional debate for years to come.

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Index

agriculture in Bavaria 102, 114–15, 132, 136 in Sardinia 146, 159, 161, 172, 180–1, 184–5, 190 in Scotland 71, 78, 85, 92, 96, 190 see also farming; pastoral economy Alleanza Nazionale (AN) 151–2, 173 passim, 181 alliances, of political parties 8, 21 Bavarian, 102, 104, 123, 127 European 167, 197, 223 Italian elections 151, 167, 186 Sardinian nationalist parties 150–2, 154–5, 167–8 Scottish 60, 79–80, 86 see also European Free Alliance Alpine culture 123 anti-globalisation 144, 167–8 Austria 123, 131 autonomous communities 5, 28 Baden–Württemberg 109, 126 Barnett Formula 91 Basic Law (Grundgesetz) 105, 114, 117, 128, 132, 212 Basque Country attitude towards Europe 217, 219 fueros 29 nationalism 5, 28, 168, 217 party alliances 80, 168, 172, 197 regional powers 5, 39 see also PNV Bavaria constitutional autonomy 23, 110, 131 culture 102, 109–10, 115, 192, 198 economy 102–3, 110, 114–16, 122, 132–9, 191, 207 elections 102, 104, 106–9, 116–17, 119, 131 federalism 99–101

identity 109–11 Landtag 104–5, 108, 114, 131 nationalism 25, 99, 101, 103–4, 110, 123, 140, 143, 193 paradiplomacy 88, 114, 126–7, 139, 191, 212 party system 100–9 regional diversity 110–12 relationship with CDU 103, 196–7 representation in Europe 117–18, 122–3, 125–6, 129, 139–40, 191, 206 representation in Germany 115, 126, 138, 140–1, 210–11 support for independence 104, 140 see also Heimat; CSU; Basic Law (Grundgesetz) Bavarian Green Party 19, 108 anti–system orientation 108 ‘Bavarianisation’ 100, 108–9, 112–13 construction of Heimat 112–13, 198 electoral results 62, 107, 108, 119 Eurocritical attitude 120, 137 interpretation of ‘Europe of the Regions’ 124, 127–8, 202, 204 position on decentralisation 127–8, 130, 193–4 position on nationalism/regionalism 127–8 Bavarian Patriotic Party 101 Bavarian People’s Party 101 Bayernpartei (BP) 19, 103 alliances and coalitions 123 competition with CSU 104–5 construction of Heimat 113 electoral support 104, 121, 121, 141 independence in Europe 121–3, 140 interpretation of ‘Europe of the Regions’ 122–3, 192, 204 in government 104

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264 see also Dorn, H. Bayern SPD 19 alliances 131 ‘Bavarianisation’ of 105–6, 129–30 construction of Heimat 111 electoral support 106, 120 interpretation of ‘Europe of the Regions’ 129–30, 219 position on fiscal equalisation 136 position on decentralisation 129, 219 relations with federal SPD 105–6 reform of party 106 see also Social Democratic Party, of Germany Belgium federalisation 28 regional competences 29 regionalist parties 28, 29, 34, 217 statewide parties 31 see also Flanders; Volksunie Bellieni, C. 152 Berlusconi, Silvio 154, 167, 174–5, 178 Bertinotti, Fausto 155 Blair, Tony 86, 136 block grants 71, 88–9, 91, 208 Bloque Nacionalista Galego 216–18, 220 Bossi, Umberto 154–5, 173 passim, 180, 213 Brandt, Willy 114 Brittany 28, 189, 217, 218 British Empire 55, 66, 70 British identity 65–7, 70, 86 Brown, Gordon 67, 86 Brussels perceived centralisation, 120 passim, 133, 140, 222 regional offices 10, 46, 83, 118, 126, 190, 223 regionalist parties 28 bypassing the state 11, 46, 51, 125–6, 139, 141, 185, 200, 214, 223–4 Calman Commission 90 Campaign for a Scottish Assembly/Parliament 55, 57 Canada 28, 29, 31, 34, 127 see also Quebec CAP see Common Agricultural Policy Cassa per il Mezzogiorno 147–8, 158, 162 Catalonia alliances 80, 88, 172 attitude towards Europe 217–19 nationalism 5, 28, 32, 217–19 regional powers 5, 29 see also CiU; ERC catch–all party 103, 105

INDEX cathedrals in the desert 148, 159 Catholicism 101 passim, 108, 115, 147 Christian Conservatism 101, 103, 104, 110, 112 Christian democracy 8, 86, 106, 117–18, 144, 146–7, 150, 195, 202, 224 Christian Democratic Union (CDU) 100, 103, 106, 142, 196–7 Christian Democratic Party (Sardinia) see DC Sarda Christian Social Union (CSU) 19, 100–1 alliances 126–7 coalition with FDP 108 competition with Bayernpartei 104 construction of Heimat 109–11, 198 dominance in Bavaria 102, 105 electoral support 102–3, 104, 108 Eurocriticism/scepticism 100, 118, 126, 133, 201, 225 federalist orientation 99–101 interpretation of ‘Europe of the Regions’ 117, 124–6, 140, 191 lobby for EU Committee of the Regions 25, 117 nationalist/regionalist orientation 99–100, 140, 198 party modernisation 103–4 position on fiscal equalisation 114, 116, 212 position on decentralisation 114, 124, 134–5 relationship with CDU 100, 103, 196–7 social market policy 115–16, 212 see also Christian Democratic Union CiU see Convergència i Unió civil society 35, 81, 186 class middle class 103 party competition 54, 144 working class 55 passim, 61, 63 and political parties 17 and territory 149 see also cleavages cleavages, electoral centre–periphery 5, 16–17 class 15–16, 27, 42, 100 ethno-linguistic 16 territorial 16, 27, 42, 209 clientelism 157, 158–9, 182 Committee of the Regions (EU) creation of 10, 25, 191, 200 demands for reform 129, 169, 220 disappointment with 222–6 opportunities presented by 20 and Bavarian parties 117, 126, 129

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INDEX and English regions 46, 48 and Sardinian parties 162, 169, 178 and Scottish parties 83 see also European Union; Treaty on European Integration Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Bavaria 132, and Sardinia, 161, 178, 182, 190 and Scotland 78, 91 Common Fisheries Policy and Scotland 92, 95 Communist Party of Italy see Partito Comunista Italiano conservatism 55, 56, 101 see also Conservative Party; Christian–Conservatism Conservative Party (British) attitude to Europe 25, 73–4, 86, 225 and Scottish values, 65 see also Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party Contu, Felice 154, 171, 182, 186–7 Convention on the Future of Europe 84, 137 see also European Constitution Convergència i Unió 47, 219 Corsica 28, 172, 177, 189 nationalist parties 168, 172, 197, 216–18 Council of Europe 46 Council of Ministers see European Union CSCE 36–7 culture 10, 17, 21, 36, 44, 47–8, 191–2, 208, 216 in Bavaria 25, 102–3, 106, 109–13, 123, 141 in Sardinia 145, 151–3, 155–7, 168, 170, 172, 179 in Scotland 64–5, 67, 95 see also multiculturalism; Heimat Cumpostu, Bustiano 186 Czech Republic 127, 129, 131, 135, 141 Dalyell, Tam 97 DC Sarda 147–8, 150, 154, 157, 164, 170–1, 187 see also UDC Delors, Jacques 191, 199–200 democracy 68, 128 see also social democracy; Christian democracy Democrats of the Left (Italy) 19, 151, 155, 173, 195 Demuro, G. 171–2, 187 devolution asymmetry of 5, 43, 77, 81

265 British 53, 56–9, 60, 70–1, 82–5, 91, 93–4, 97, 211 administrative devolution 69–70 general competences 43 Italian 154, 173–6, 180, 213 see also referendums; Calman Commission Die Grünen in Bayern see Bavarian Green Party Dorn, H. 123, 142 Downs, A. 15–16 Economic and Monetary Union 93, 120, 136 economic policy 28, 48, 50, 213–14 Bavarian 115, 120, 131, 134 macroeconomic 80, 180 Sardinian 176, 193 Scottish 69, 70, 91, 93 see also taxation ECSC 3, 73 education nation–building 29, 34, 37 policy competences 4, 21, 23 substate party demands 18 territorial strategies 43 and culture 46–7 in Bavaria 105, 110 in Sardinia 146, 160, 171, 177, 181 in Scotland 47, 48, 54–5, 70 EFA see European Free Alliance electoral systems 23, 67, 150 England 16, 47, 55–6, 64, 71, 74, 77, 80, 97, 196 English regions 4, 46, 48 enlargement 3, 5, 129, 135, 162, 166, 218, 222, 225 environment European policy 78, 93, 120, 137 policy issue 131, 135, 136, 156, 177 political movement 93, 108, 109, 113 regional competences 4, 8, 23, 159 and nationalism 151, 180 see also Green parties Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) 168, 217, 218–19 ethnicity 21, 149, 153 ethnic minorities 78, 155 and identity 66, 151 and party competition 16 and nationalism 31, 64–5, 110–11, 122–3, 153, 198 see also culture; multiculturalism ethnie 153, 161, 168 Euro see single currency European Anti–Capitalist Left (EACL)

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266 78, 80 European Community 3, 10, 72, 83, 89, 123, 127, 183, 199 regional policy 9–10, 132, 199 UK membership of 71–4, 86 see also European Union European Constitution 79, 86, 87, 92, 96, 118, 130, 162, 167, 169, 200–1, 208, 218, 222, 224–5 see also referendums; Lisbon Treaty European Court of Justice 41, 84, 125, 130 European Free Alliance (EFA) 79, 84, 123, 167, 168, 197, 217–18 European Green Party (EGP) 80, 197 European integration dimensions of 9 impact on regions 4, 8, 12, 22, 41, 139, 190 impact on states 8–9, 10–11, 226 impact on demands for independence 94, 227 opportunities for regions 20, 32, 40, 184, 194 public attitudes to 97 and globalisation 120, 215 and reunification of Germany 116–17, 191 Europeanisation 3, 12, 14, 192 of political parties 1, 11–12, 20, 71–4, 116–20, 160–3, 195, 222 of regional policy 10, 125 European Parliament 20, 206 Bavarian parties 128–9, 137, 139 elections 26, 73, 75, 118–20, 142, 163–4, 199 party groupings 84, 86, 126, 217 Sardinian parties 143, 161–3, 168–9, 178 Scottish parties 72–3, 83 see also European Free Alliance; European People’s Party; Party of European Socialists European People’s Party (EPP) 86, 126, 173, 197 European Union agriculture and fisheries 78, 91–2, 190, 218 Commission 78, 122, 125–6, 133–4, 162, 208, 215 common (single) market 78, 88, 90–1, 95, 116, 120, 182, 190–2, 216 competition policy 133–4, 139, 208 Council of Ministers 3, 77, 83, 85, 96, 126, 166, 190, 200, 206, 224, 226

INDEX regional policy 9–10, 133, 135, 158–9, 162, 183, 223 social dimension 86, 95, 120, 136, 225 see also Committee of the Regions; Common Agricultural Policy; European Community; European Parliament; structural funding; single currency (Euro) Europe of the Peoples 26, 30, 161 passim, 167–8, 170, 184, 196, 205, 216–17 Europe of the Regions 11, 20–1, 25, 40, 198–201, 222–4, 226 convergence of party positioning 189, 195, 216 nationalist parties 191–4, 216–18, 222 regional governments 196–7 and Bavarian parties 100, 117, 122–3, 125, 127–30, 139–40 and Sardinian parties 143, 161–3, 166, 170–1, 185 and Scottish parties 81–4, 95–6 Europe of the States 139, 144, 161, 171, 220, 226 Euroscepticism 26, 86, 122, 196, 201, 222, 224–6 Euskadi see Basque Country Eusko Alkartasuna 217 Ewing, Winnie 72–3 factionalism 57, 149, 196 farming 88, 101, 161, 208 see also pastoral economy; agriculture fascism 15, 16, 145 FDP Bayern 19 alliances 104, 131 ‘Bavarianisation’ 108 construction of Heimat 111–12 electoral support 108, 119 Europeanism 120 interpretation of ‘Europe of the Citizens’ 128, 130–1 position on fiscal equalisation 135 position on decentralisation 130–1, 135, 193 position on nationalism/regionalism 106, 108, 130–1, 195 relationship with CSU 102, 106–8, 131 see also Free Democratic Party, of Germany federalism 43–4, 121 centralising federalism (Germany) 128–31 competitive federalism in Germany 131–2, 134–5, 138, 212

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INDEX cooperative federalism in Germany 131–2, 136–8 in Italy 205 decentralising federalism (Germany) 124–8 fiscal federalism 89, 175, 180–2 perceptions of, in UK 80–82 see also devolution; subsidiarity fiscal autonomy 66, 80, 90–1, 176, 181, 183, 205, 211–14 fiscal equalisation 114, 116, 131–2, 134–5, 139, 180–2, 207, 211–12 Flanders 28, 29, 189, 217 see also Belgium; Volksunie folklore 25, 99 Forza Italia (Italy) 154, 173, 186 see also Berlusconi, Silvio Forza Italia Sardegna (FIS) 19, 181 position on federalism/autonomy 151, 156, 173–4 position on fiscal autonomy 181, 183 relationship with Psd’Az 152, 167 see also La Spisa, G. France 28, 218 see also Brittany; Corsica Fraser, Murdo 81, 87, 89, 97–8 Free Democratic Party, of Germany 120, 128, 130–1 see also FDP Bayern free trade 45, 81, 123, 197 Front de Libération Nationale de la Corse (FLNC) 216 Galicia 26, 189, 216–21 see also Bloque Nacionalista Galego globalisation 45, 80, 93, 120, 132 passim, 214–15, 226 see also anti-globalisation green parties see Bavarian Green Party; Scottish Green Party; European Green Party growth poles 147–8 health policy 4, 23, 43, 70, 116, 146, 174, 177, 181 Heath, Edward 69 Heimat 25, 99, 109–13, 114, 117, 141, 198 Herri Batasuna (HB) 168, 197 Hoegner, Wilhelm 105 home rule 55, 57, 59, 60, 67, 69–70, 77, 83, see also devolution; federalism House/Pole of Freedom (Italy) 151, 154, 173–4, 186

267 identity Bavarian 99, 102–3, 105, 109–10, 113–14, 122, 129, 140, 141 British 66, 70 Sard 145, 149–51, 153, 155–6, 170, 172, 174, 176–7, 205 Scottish 34, 53, 63–5, 67 Padanian 47 relationship to territory 27 and autonomy 33, 37 and capacity 47 and regionalist/nationalist parties 31 see also ethnicity; ethnie; culture; Heimat Iles de la Méditerranée Occidentale (IMEDOC) 177 imagined community 47, 64 immigration 29, 47, 89, 91, 137, 189, 192, 225 independence 44–5, 192–4 attitudes to 79, 104 Convention (Scotland) 78–9 economics of 90–3, 94 Bavarian movement 99, 114, 121–3, 140 ‘independence in Europe’ 73, 74–80 regionalist and nationalist parties 11, 28–9 Sard movement 144, 146–7, 151–2, 163–8 Scottish movement 28, 59, 64, 67–8, 90, 92–3 and European integration 11, 20, 192–4 see also Bayernpartei, Scottish National Party, IRS, Sardigna Natzione; referendums Indipendèntzia Repùbrica de Sardigna (IRS) 19, 152 alliances 168, 197 electoral support 151 independence goal 163, 166–7, 180–1, 192–3, 208–9 industralisation 102–3, 115, 147–8, 159 intergovernmental (intra-state) relations 89, 95, 97, 140, 183, 206, 210–11, 213–14, 227 Ireland 5, 16, 55, 80, 91, 122, 216 IRS see Indipendentzia Repubrica de Sardigna Labourism 56–7 Labour Party, of Britain 16, 55, 57 anti-nationalism attitudes to devolution 57, 60, 66, 70 governments 28, 60

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268 position on Europe 72 relations with PES 81, 84, 197 welfare policies 69–70 see also Scottish Labour Party; New Labour language Catalan 29 Welsh 46–7, 48 Québécois 46–7 Sard 145, 153, 155–7, 170, 172 and capacity and European laws 41, 191–2, 217 and territorial politics 17, 28 La Spisa, G. 175, 181, 186 Lederhose 112, 115 Lega Nord 29, 47, 143, 151, 153–5, 173–4, 175, 186, 210, 217 Liberal (Democratic) Party, of Britain 55, 67, 73 see also Scottish Liberal Democrats Lilliu, Giovanni 161, 170–1 Lisbon Treaty 222, 225 local government (communes, municipalities) capacity 38 empowerment of 124, 127, 129–30, 137, 170, 193, 204, 219 subsidiarity 44, 130 Lussu, Emilio 145–6, 149, 152 Maastricht Treaty see Treaty on European Integration McConnell, Jack 67, 83, 88 MacCormick, Neil 84, 97 Major, John 85 media 29, 34, 37, 46–7, 103–4, 150 Mediterranean 26, 168, 169, 172, 175, 177, 179, 181, 185, 188, 208 Melis, Mario 143, 161–2, 165 modernisation 22, 110, 122, 144, 148, 153, 157, 161, 184 Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) 19, 148, 164 multiculturalism 25, 110–11, 113, 123, 192, 197 see also culture multi-level governance 1, 3, 13–15, 41, 81, 188, 194–5 Mussolini, Benito 145, 152 National Alliance see Alleanza Nazionale National Health Service 70 nation/region-building 28, 94, 208 nation-state 2, 10, 27, 129, 175, 217, 225, 226 NATO 120

INDEX neoliberalism 34, 56, 65, 70, 72, 136, 165, 176, 198 New Labour 60, 63, 67 see also Labour Party newspapers see media North Africa 169, 172, 177, 181, 208 Northern Ireland 5, 16, 80, 216–17 Northern League see Lega Nord oil revenues 59, 70, 90–1, 147, 179, 207 Olive Coalition 150, 167, 173 opportunity structure 12, 20, 32, 96, 176, 188, 196, 218, 225 Organisation for Cooperation and Economic Development (OECD) 4, 23, 29 Padania 47 paradiplomacy 10, 29, 46, 88, 114, 126, 211 Partido Popular (Spain) 220 Partido Popular de Galicia (PPdeG) 220 Partido Socialista Obrero Español see PSOE Parti Québécois (PQ) 46 Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya see PSC Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) 19, 148–50 Sardinian branch 149, 155 see also Democrats of the Left; RC Sardegna Partito Democratico (Italy) 151, 186 Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI) 19, 148–50 Sardinian branch 149–50, 155 see also Progetto Sardegna (PS) Party of European Socialists (PES) 81, 84, 197 pastoral economy 148, 161, 180–1, 190 patronage 26, 144, 146, 157, 182–3 Plaid Cymru 46–7, 217, 219–21 poll tax see taxation Popolo della Libertà 156 post-sovereignty 10, 33, 194, 220, 227 press see media privatisation 67, 116 Prodi, Romano 150, 167, 172, 173, 187 Progetto Sardegna (PS) 150–1 alliances 155, 172–3, 185–6 anti-clientelism platform 159, 171 interpretation of ‘Europe of the Regions’ 172 position on constitutional reform 171–2

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INDEX relations with Italian state 178, 183–4 nationalism of 151, 155–6 socioeconomic policies 156, 160, 171, 177–8, 184 support for cooperative federalism 176 see also Renato Soru proportional representation (PR) 23, 62, 86–7 protectionism 22, 41, 47–8, 91–2, 127, 134, 180, 208, 214–15, 222 Prussia 103–4 PSC 31, 219–20 Psdas 146 Psd’Az 19, 143–5 coalitions with statewide parties 144, 146, 150, 154–5, 157, 167, 173, 186 construction of nation 153–4 electoral support 143, 145–6, 148, 151, 164, 167 federalist orientation 145, 165, 168–9 ideological divisions 145, 146, 154, 167 interpretation of ‘Europe of the Regions’ 143, 162, 168–9, 193 links to neo-sardism 146–7 membership of EFA 168, 172, 197 position on ‘devolution’ 175–6, 180 position on independence 163–5 relations with nationalist competitors 151–2, 167 see also Mario Melis; IRS; Sardigna Natzione PSOE 31, 219, 220 public opinion 72, 78–9, 82, 97, 104, 184, 222 public ownership 78 public services 38, 48, 67–8, 93, 96, 133, 137, 176–7, 208, 211 Pujol, Jordi 219 Quebec 29, 31, 32, 34, 46–7 Quebec Liberal Party 31 Quiet revolution 29 RC Sardegna 19 alliances 151, 172 construction of nation 155 federalist orientation 151, 168, 169–70, 173 interpretation of ‘Europe of the Peoples’ 170, 205 nationalism of, 155 Red Clydeside 56–7, 61 referendums devolution (Italy) 174–5, 181

269 devolution (UK) 57, 60, 73, 85, 97 draft European Constitution 79, 200–1, 208, 224 EC Membership (UK) 71–3 electoral system (Italy) 150 independence proposal (Sardinia) 166 independence proposal (Scotland) 76, 93 regional development 9, 73–4, 133, 158, 161, 182–3 regionalisation 4–5, 10, 13, 72, 83–4, 100, 125, 144, 155, 168, 184, 192, 200 Regions with Legislative Powers (RegLeg) 46, 88, 126, 127, 178, 206, 212 religion 37, 56, 100, 112, 144, 153 see also Catholicism Sale, Gavino 166 Salmond, Alex 61, 64, 92 Sardigna Natzione (SN) alliances and coalitions 151, 167–8 electoral support 167 European Parliament protest 163 independence 163–7, 180 Indipendenzia List 167 links to neo-sardism movement 151, 197–8 Sardinia 24 banditry and kidnapping 148 constitutional autonomy 23, 153, 159 dependence on state 146, 157–8, 163, 183 economy 157, 160–1, 177, 179 language 145, 153, 155–7, 170, 172 nationalist movement 143–6, 151–2 neo-sardism movement 153, 155 party system 144–52 piani di rinascita 147–8, 150 representation in Europe 26, 162–3, 178 Statute of Autonomy 146, 147, 152 see also clientelism; identity; Mediterranean; Psd’Az; Progetto Sardegna Sardinian Action Party see Psd’Az Sartori, G. 2, 15–16, 19, 27 Sassari Brigade 144–5 Schroeder, Gerhard 136 Scotland culture 64–5, 67, 95 economy 64, 90–1, 94, 207–8 identity 34, 53, 63–5, 67 nationalist movement 59–61, 64–5 paradiplomacy 88–9

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270 party system 16, 54–63 representation in Europe 72, 83, 88–9, 94, 206 see also devolution; Scottish Executive/Government; Scottish Parliament Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party (SCUP) 19, 55 decline in Scotland 56 merger with English party 55–6 position on devolution 69, 85, 87, 95, 205 position on federalism 80, 82 relationship with SNP 83 and British identity 65 and Calman Commission 90 and Scottish identity 53, 66, 68 and Scottish Unionism 55 and Europe 84, 87, 196 Scottish Constitutional Convention 55, 57–9, 73, 95 Scottish Executive/Government 55, 68, 70–1, 88–92, 210–2 Scottish Green Party (SGP) 19 alliances 79–80, 197 anti-EU attitude 76, 78, 93, 120 support for devolution 82, 93–4 support for independence, 67–8, 74–6, 78–9, 93 Scottish Labour Party (SLP) 19, 56, 63 alliances and coalitions 55 electoral results 58, 62, 75 competition with SNP 61 construction of nation 66–7 interpretation of ‘Europe of the Regions’ 82–4, 117 position on devolution 25, 57–9, 60, 70, 82–6, 95 nationalism 57, 61, 67 territorialisation of 31, 53 in Scottish Executive 68, 88, 211–12 see also Labour Party, of Britain Scottish Liberal Democrats (SLD) 19, 54–5 alliances and coalitions 53, 81 electoral results 58, 62, 75 construction of nation 66–7 Europhilia 73, 74 federalist orientation 77, 80–1 fiscal federalism 89 interpretation of ‘Europe of the Regions’ 73, 80–1 position on devolution 25, 60, 67, 82, 84 territorialisation 53 in Scottish Executive 55

INDEX see also Liberal (Democratic) Party, of Britain Scottish National Party (SNP) 19 alliances and coalitions 78–9, 84, 197 electoral results 56, 58, 59, 62, 75 civic nationalism 64–5, 91 construction of nation 64–5 Eurocriticsm/skepticism 25, 72, 92, 95, 200–1, 205, 208, 225 gradualists and fundamentalists 59, 192 independence in Europe 71, 73, 74–8 ideological orientation 57, 60–1, 63, 64, 74 position on devolution 60, 77, 82, 83, 92, 95–6, 193–4 in minority government 61, 83, 90, 91 Scottish Office 69–70, 91 Scottish Parliament 23, 53 passim, 60, 65, 70 elections to 56, 58, 59, 61–3 enhancing powers of 82, 85, 91 passim, 95 opposition to 65, 85 welfare expectations 70–1, 87–8, 96 see also Campaigns for a Scottish Assembly/Parliament; Calman Commission; proportional representation Scottish Socialist Party (SSP) 19, 53 alliances and coalitions 78–9, 80 construction of nation 64–5 electoral support 63 Euroscepticism 78, 92–3 origins of 61–3 support for independence 74, 78, 93 see also Sheridan, Tommy Segni, Antonio 154 separatism see independence Serri, L. 177, 183, 187 Sheridan, Tommy 63, 79 Sicily 146, 162–3, 186, 216 Sillars, Jim 72–3 Simon Mossa, A. 153, 161 single currency (Euro) 77, 91–3, 118, 197 see also European Union Single European Act 54, 117 Sinner, Eberhard 114, 127, 140, 141–2 Sinn Féin 216, 217 see also Northern Ireland SNP see Scottish National Party social democracy 56, 67, 87, 136 Social Democratic Party, of Germany 100, 105–6, 118, 120, 128–9, 136 see also Bayern SPD

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INDEX social solidarity 115, 135–6, 176, 205, 212–14 see also fiscal equalisation; public services Socialist Party, of Italy see Partito Socialista Italiano 19, 148–50 Socialist Sardinian Party of Action see Psdas Soru, Renato 150–1, 155–6, 173, 177–9, 187, 213 South Tyrol 26, 123, 172 Spain 28, 31, 216, 218, 221 see also Basque Country; Catalonia; Galicia statute of autonomy 23, 29, 143, 146, 152, 157, 170, 172 passim, 185, 212, 221 Stoiber, Edmund 110, 115, 122, 133–4, 139, 141 Strauss, Franz Joseph 111, 116 Streibl, Max 110 structural funding 5, 74, 200, 208, 215 reforms 9–10, 13, 190–2 in Bavaria 132, 137, 139–40 in Sardinia 144, 181, 183 in Scotland 74, 84, 88, 90, 95 see also Cassa per il Mezzogiorno; European Union subsidiarity 4, 8–9, 25, 44, 81–4, 86, 117, 124–5, 128, 130, 147, 174–5, 195, 198, 224 Südtiroler Volkspartei 216 Swinney, John 78–9, 97 taxation 48, 89 passim, 133–4, 139, 166, 178, 214 business tax 61, 78–9, 90, 180 council tax 63 energy tax 137 entrance tax 180 poll tax 61 regional powers over 23, 29, 71, 79, 180 tax concessions 115–16 see also fiscal autonomy; fiscal equalisation tax-varying powers 60, 85 territorial management 5, 32, 206, 227 Thatcher, Margaret 34, 56, 60, 65–7, 70–1, 73, 86, 97

271 Third Reich 101 Tories see Conservative Party tourism 67, 156, 159, 161, 172, 176–8 passim trade unions 72, 86 Treaty of Union (Anglo–Scottish) 47 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht) 10, 82, 87, 97, 117, 125, 127, 139, 162, 183, 200, 224 Udeur 173, 186, 187 Ulivo see Olive Coalition unemployment 65, 116, 185 ‘unholy trinity’ 108 Union Démocratique Bretonne 217 Unione di u Popule Corsu (UPC) 217 unionism 42–3, 55–6, 63, 66, 85–7, 144 Union of Christian Democrats (UDC) 19, 182 alliances and coalitions 154, 172–3 interpretation of ‘Europe of the Regions’ 171 nationalism of 154 position on ‘devolution’ 175 support for federalism 168, 171, 202 see also Contu, Felice; Democrazia Cristiana Union Valdôtaine 172, 217 unitary state 28, 42, 56, 77, 175, 205 United States of America 36, 82, 171, 101, 121, 178 United States of Europe 86, 118, 121, 128 universities 23, 88, 177 Volksunie (Belgium) 217 voting behaviour 54, 63, 71–2, 102, 104, 112–13, 144, 150–1, 162–3, 175 Wales 46–7, 55, 67, 220 Weimar Republic 101 welfare state 34, 56, 63 passim, 69–72, 93 West Lothian Question 77, 80, 97 Westminster 23, 68, 70–1, 81, 85 passim, 90–1, 177 xenophobia 110, 198 see also immigration; ethnicity