U.S. Public Diplomacy Towards China: Exercising Discretion in Educational and Exchange Programs (Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy) 3030956431, 9783030956431

Table of contents :
Preface
Acknowledgments
Praise for U.S. Public Diplomacy Towards China
Contents
About the Author
Abbreviations
List of Figures
List of Tables
Chapter 1: Implementation Discretion in Public Diplomacy: An Introduction
A Focus on US-China Relations
Asia-Pacific Rebalancing Strategy
Why Implementation?
Methodological Issues
A Roadmap for the Rest of the Book
References
Chapter 2: Programs at the Departments of State and Defense
Public Diplomacy in DoS
Public Diplomacy Structure in DoS
The Public Diplomacy Objectives of the DoS
Budgets
Strategic Frameworks
The State-USAID Joint Strategic Goal Framework
Public Diplomacy in DoD
Does the Military Do Public Diplomacy?
Public Diplomacy Programs in DoD
The Reasoning Behind DoD Public Diplomacy Programs
The Public Diplomacy Objectives of the DoD
General Objectives
Objectives of Public Diplomacy Towards China
The Programs and Their Goals
The DoS
EducationUSA
The IVLP
The DoD
Exchanges and Visits
Education Delegation Visits
MPEP
The Game Plan
Foreign Military Education and Training
IMET
The HA/DR Exchange
Inter-regional Web and Magazine Initiatives
The TRWI
The TRMI
Public Diplomacy Strategy-Making Towards China
Generalization to a Broader Level
Conclusion
References
Chapter 3: Implementation and Public Diplomacy
The Dual Role of Implementation
The Implementation Process of Public Diplomacy
Implementation Discretion
Why Implementation Can Give Meaning to Policy?
Meanings of Public Diplomacy in Theory
The Purposes of Public Diplomacy
Communication in Public Diplomacy
Public Diplomacy Actors
Public Diplomacy and Related Concepts
Public Diplomacy Versus Propaganda
Public Diplomacy Versus Soft Power
Public Diplomacy Versus Cultural Diplomacy
Public Diplomacy Versus Public Relations
Ideal Public Diplomacy Without Discretion
Ideal Public Diplomacy in DoS
Ideal Public Diplomacy in DoD
What Is Not Public Diplomacy?
Conclusion
References
Chapter 4: The Mixed Impacts of Organizational Culture
The Effects of Organizational Culture
Conceptualizing Organizational Culture
Mechanisms of Influence
“Defense is from Mars and State is from Venus”
The Organizational Culture of DoS
A Process-Oriented Culture
A Culture of Elitism
The Organizational Culture of DoD
A Result-Oriented Culture
Hierarchy and Following Chains of Command
Process-Oriented and Elitist Tendencies in DoS
The DoS’s Organizational Culture and EducationUSA
A Foreign Student Recruitment Program
From Elitism to Inclusiveness
The DoS’s Organizational Culture and IVLP
Identifying Foreign Future Leaders
Elitist Participant Selection and Non-elitist Exchange Content
Result-Oriented and Hierarchical Tendencies in DoD
The DoD’s Organizational Culture and Public Diplomacy Strategies and Goals
Intelligence, Not Relationship Building
“Flying the Plane While Building It”
The DoD’s Organizational Culture and Public Diplomacy Programs
Public Diplomacy as Indicators of Bilateral Relationships
A Process-Driven Program
The Canceled Game Plan
Conclusion
References
Chapter 5: Public Diplomacy Becomes Measurable Outcomes
Displacing Ambiguous Goals with Measurables
Conceptualizing Goal Ambiguity
Goal Ambiguity and Implementation Discretion
Measurable Goals Became Goals
Perverse Effects
The Ambiguous Goals and Evaluation of Public Diplomacy
The Ambiguous Public Diplomacy Goals of the DoS and the DoD
“Unmeasurable” Public Diplomacy
The Preference for Measurable Factors in DoS
Increasing Student Numbers
Focusing on the Number of Students and Economic Benefits
Data from Open Doors
Economic Gains from Tuition
EducationUSA’s Goal Became Increasing International Students
Identifying Future Leaders and Increasing Diversity
Quantifiable Measurements
Identify Future Leaders
The Feature of Diversity
Leadership Exchange’s Goal Is Not Public Diplomacy
Measurable Goals in DoD
MPEP and IMET
Relationship Building and Tactical Training
Goals Turned into What Is Measured
The TRWI
Quantifiable Standards
Changing the Ambiguous Goal
Conclusion
References
Chapter 6: Public Diplomacy Constrained by Limited Resources
The Effect of Inadequate Resources on Implementation
Policy Resources and Implementation Discretion
Types of Policy Resources
Coping Mechanisms as Implementation Bias
Negative Consequences
Public–Private Partnerships in DoS
The Claim of Resource Deficiency
Reduced Budgets
Stable Resource in Recent Years
PPP to Leverage Resources
The Partnership with IIE
Sharing Resources
The Non-resource Factor
Implementation Discretion Induced Through PPP
The Partnership with Global Ties US
Partnership to Leverage Private Resources
Implementation Biases from Private Organizations
The Various Resource Constraints on DoD
Resource Constraints on DoD Public Diplomacy
Funding Deficiencies
Legislative Constraints
Executive Restrictions
Resource Restrictions Imposed on IMET
Constraint from Collaboration
Restrictions in Legislation
Implementation Discretion
Insufficient Support to TRWI
Limited Time Allowed
Jurisdiction Constraints
Conclusion
References
Chapter 7: Conclusion: Public Diplomacy in the Eye of the Beholder
Exercising Discretion in Public Diplomacy
Public Diplomacy and Implementation
Implementation Discretion in DoS
EducationUSA
The IVLP
Implementation Discretion in DoD
Public Diplomacy Strategy-Making
Public Diplomacy Got Canceled
Recurring Public Diplomacy
Public Diplomacy Excludes China
Why Does the DoD Not Claim Public Diplomacy?
Some Exceptions and Alternative Explanations
Connecting to the Literature
Looking into the Future
References
Index

Citation preview

U.S. Public Diplomacy Towards China Exercising Discretion in Educational and Exchange Programs Di Wu

Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy Series Editors Kathy Fitzpatrick University of South Florida Tampa, FL, USA Caitlin Byrne Griffith Asia Institute Griffith University Brisbane, QLD, Australia

At no time in history has public diplomacy played a more significant role in world affairs and international relations. As a result, global interest in public diplomacy has escalated, creating a substantial academic and professional audience for new works in the field. The Global Public Diplomacy Series examines theory and practice in public diplomacy from a global perspective, looking closely at public diplomacy concepts, policies, and practices in various regions of the world. The purpose is to enhance understanding of the importance of public diplomacy, to advance public diplomacy thinking, and to contribute to improved public diplomacy practices. This series is indexed in Scopus. More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/14680

Di Wu

U.S. Public Diplomacy Towards China Exercising Discretion in Educational and Exchange Programs

Di Wu School of Political Science & International Relations Tongji University Shangai, China

ISSN 2731-3883     ISSN 2731-3891 (electronic) Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy ISBN 978-3-030-95643-1    ISBN 978-3-030-95644-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95644-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the ­publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and ­institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © WENHAI TANG/Alamy Stock Photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

This book is an examination of US public diplomacy towards China. It looks at the practice of public diplomacy as policy implementation in order to explain whether and how implementation affected the meaning of “public diplomacy.” It identifies the gaps between what public diplomacy should be as defined by policy goals and what it is when practiced on the ground. The gaps between these suggest implementation discretion that strays from the original objective, which eventually changes not only public diplomacy practice but also its purposes. As a result, public diplomacy can become something else during its implementation. I started this project with a vague idea. Knowing that the field of public diplomacy was full of research relying on theoretical traditions of communication, I wanted to examine public diplomacy from a different angle. One area that I really wanted to pursue was the practice of public diplomacy. Scholars have focused on public diplomacy’s national strategies and prescriptive recommendations of what public diplomacy should be in order to achieve its ideal impact. After all, public diplomacy has been considered a practical field. However, less attention has been paid to the meaning of public diplomacy and the impact of its practice. With the help of my committee members, especially my dissertation chair, I explored the implementation theory in public policy. Scholars and practitioners of public diplomacy have been calling on the policy approach to analyze public diplomacy, but this has not been the subject of much focus in the literature. Recognizing this value, I placed public diplomacy against the backdrop of foreign policy. Public diplomacy is primarily a tool of foreign policy. Its official goal also points to the priorities of foreign v

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policies, though the latter is difficult to depict with an absolute language. I chose to focus on Barack Obama’s Pivot to Asia policy and his presidency as the timeframe for the research in this book. However, connecting the policy with public diplomacy practice was a difficult task. I ended up starting from the endpoint and tracing backward. Another big challenge was the scope of public diplomacy. In order to examine implementation factors, especially organizational culture and interests that affected public diplomacy, I needed to include multiple actors. Those who are familiar with public diplomacy will know that the concept of public diplomacy is fluid. Public diplomacy actors expanded from government agencies to non-state actors to individuals. In the US government, there is no doubt that the Department of State is a primary public diplomacy actor. Other agencies, such as the Department of Defense and the Department of Education, also practice public diplomacy, but they are seldom recognized as public diplomacy actors. The Department of Defense even refuses to admit its active role in public diplomacy. I argue in this book that the Department of Defense practices public diplomacy because its communicative programs are consonant with the public diplomacy definition of the US government. Its refusal to be called a public diplomacy actor is something that this book tries to explain. Activities that can be considered public diplomacy are also fuzzy due to the development of new communication tools such as the internet. It seems that all information can be accessed cross-border, even those not addressed to a foreign audience. The line between traditional diplomacy and public diplomacy is blurred, and diplomacy is becoming more open to the general public. Bruce Gregory used the term “public aspect of diplomacy” in The Paradox of US Public Diplomacy: Its Rise and “Demise” to describe this transformation, indicating that diplomacy and public diplomacy may merge into one. Acknowledging the new developments in the field of public diplomacy, I decided not to engage in this conversation directly. Instead, I followed the official definitions of public diplomacy in the US government and analyzed programs that fit this definition. The cases analyzed in this book were mostly US public diplomacy towards China. This is for three reasons. First, China is seen as a US competitor, so the analysis of US public diplomacy towards China can shed light on the conduct of public diplomacy in adversary relationships. Second, the US–China relationship has been regarded as one of the most important bilateral relations in global politics. Third, while most public diplomacy after 9/11 focused on the Middle East and the problem of

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terrorism, less attention was given to other parts of the world. China was chosen as an example of US routine public diplomacy that was part of the US global practice. However, I encountered challenges when examining public diplomacy cases in the Department of Defense. The organization tends to exclude China from many of its key public diplomacy programs, such as International Military Education and Training. My solution was to include these important programs despite their exclusion of China and explore why they did so. The underlying rationale was that China should be included as a participant and the prohibition was implementation discretion exemplified through American public diplomacy practices. It took me almost four years to finish this research project. During my prospectus defense, my committee members warned me that data collection could be challenging as it might be difficult to make contact with public diplomacy practitioners in these organizations. While I carried out a few interviews with those who worked at the Department of State, it was almost impossible to talk to anyone in the military. Obtaining the general information was easy, but the details of on-the-ground implementation required much more clearance. In the end, I used secondary data for my analysis, such as official reports, press articles, and public speeches. With the information from these sources, I was able to sketch a general picture of how public diplomacy was practiced in the Department of Defense, although more work is still needed. I plan to develop my data analysis by including more first-hand data for future works. In this book, the reader will see an effort to employ implementation theory to explain public diplomacy. It will not be a traditional public diplomacy study that focuses on communicative effects such as persuasion or relationship building. It is about what public diplomacy was practiced on the ground and why it was conducted this way. The book emphasizes the goal of public diplomacy, which has been overlooked by current public diplomacy literature. It also pays considerable attention to the agency of practitioners, including managers and frontline operators, as well as other factors such as organizational culture, the measurability of goals, and resources. There are many dynamics in the practice of public diplomacy, and this book aims to unveil its implementation process, which ultimately gives meaning to public diplomacy. Di Wu

Acknowledgments

My special thanks go to Sharon Weiner, my dissertation chair, from whom I have learned so much about implementation and developed my skills in analytical thinking. She was extremely supportive and set a higher bar to stimulate critical analysis. She held my hand from developing this research topic to finishing the project. Without her, this book would never have been possible. My dissertation committee members Carole Gallagher and Philip Seib gave me steadfast encouragement and insightful advice to move forward. I am immensely grateful for their guidance. I am also grateful to those who helped me throughout this process. First of all, I would like to thank my interviewees for their generosity in speaking with me about their work. I hope my research will be useful to their work. My mentor R. S. Zaharna was very enthusiastic about my research topic and urged me to pursue the practical aspect of public diplomacy. When I was lost during research, she encouraged me to finish it. I greatly appreciate her support in both my academic and personal life. Craig Hayden helped me to develop my idea to a research topic. We had numerous conversations about the field of public diplomacy and how my research could help me to find a place in this field. Robert Kelley offered me advice about the practice of public diplomacy. I happened to be connected to an interviewee through him. I spoke to Bruce Gregory during the very early stages of my research when I was puzzled by the scope of public diplomacy. His words and the term “public aspect of diplomacy” enlightened me. Katherine Brown gave me very helpful recommendations about public diplomacy research. Jay Wang, a ix

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very good friend and professor of mine, also provided helpful suggestions to my research project. Ni Shixiong, a retired professor of Fudan University and also the founding father of Western international relations theory in China, was very generous in helping me to reach out to some of my interviewees in China. I also wish to thank other professors who inspired me and set models for my academic career: Amitav Acharya, Christine Chin, Aimei Yang, David Kang, Boaz Atzili, and Wu Xinbo. I am grateful to have the privilege of working with them. They were the reasons that I determined to be a scholar in international relations. Special thanks to Professor Wu Xinbo, who has been my mentor since my master’s program at Shanghai International Studies University. He was the person who encouraged me to pursue a PhD degree and take an academic path. I’m glad I took his advice and found my passion in life.

Praise for U.S. Public Diplomacy Towards China “The US-China relationship is the critical driving force of contemporary world order, and public diplomacy is a vital tool for creating better understanding and reducing tensions between the two powers. Based on original research, this book is not only an important contribution to the academic literature on public diplomacy, but also an invaluable guide for analysts and policymakers in explaining why US cultural and education programs have had limited success, and how to improve them.” —Amitav Acharya, Distinguished Professor, American University, USA “In this path-breaking book, Di Wu pulls back the curtain of public diplomacy-astheory to reveal how public diplomacy-as-practice is actually implemented on the ground. Her extensive documentation and innovative analysis of the two major public diplomacy players in the US pivot to Asia—the US State Department and US Defense Department—vividly demonstrate how different organizational cultures, measurable goals, and resource constraints shape the practice and, ultimately, the meaning of public diplomacy.” —R. S. Zaharna, Professor, American University, USA, and author, Boundary Spanners of Humanity “Exploring public diplomacy strategy and impact from an implementation standpoint, this book offers a fresh perspective on one of the most endemic challenges facing the field.” —Jay Wang, Associate Professor and Director, Center on Public Diplomacy, University of Southern California, USA “This book is a comprehensive and compelling study of American engagement with the PRC. Detailed in research and insightful in commentary, this book offers a unique approach to one of the most critical relationships of the modern age. A fascinating, important, and timely contribution to public diplomacy scholarship.” —Gary Rawnsley, Professor, University of Nottingham Ningbo China

Contents

1 I mplementation Discretion in Public Diplomacy: An Introduction  1 2 Programs at the Departments of State and Defense 15 3 Implementation and Public Diplomacy 53 4 The Mixed Impacts of Organizational Culture 77 5 Public Diplomacy Becomes Measurable Outcomes115 6 Public Diplomacy Constrained by Limited Resources147 7 Conclusion: Public Diplomacy in the Eye of the Beholder179

Index

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About the Author

Di Wu  is an assistant professor at Tongji University. She holds a PhD in International Relations from American University in Washington, DC.  Her research sits at the intersection of foreign policy and strategic communication, with a geographic interest in China, East Asia, and US–China relations. She has published on soft power, public diplomacy, media, and US–China relations. Her publications include “China’s Public Diplomatic Networks on the Ebola Issue in West Africa: Issues Management in a Network Society” and “Assessing Resource Transactions in Partnership Networks: US 100,000 Strong Network of Public Diplomacy,” in Public Relations Review. She has also contributed book chapters “Chinese Political Leadership Transition: An Overview and Assessment,” in East Asian Studies in the Perspective of Regional Integration (2018), “Power Relations in Development Communication and Public Diplomacy: U.S. and Chinese Practices in Afghanistan,” in Communicating National Image Through Development and Diplomacy: The Politics of Foreign Aid (Palgrave 2018), and “Country Image in Public Diplomacy” (with Jay Wang), in Bridging Disciplinary Perspectives on the Formation and Effects of Country Image, Reputation, Brand, and Identity (2018).

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Abbreviations

BBG Broadcasting Board of Governors COIN Counterinsurgency CSO Civil Service Officer DIY Do It Yourself DoD Department of Defense DoS Department of State ECA Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs ECE Educational and Cultural Exchange EU European Union FM 3-16 Counterguerrilla Operations FM 31-16 FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Field Manual in 2006 FM 3-24 FSO Foreign Service Officer Game Plan Game Plan for 1999 US–Sino Defense Exchanges GAO General Accountability Office or General Accounting Office HA/DR Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief IIE Institute of International Education IIP Bureau of International Information Programs IMET International Military Education and Training IVLP International Visitor Leadership Program MISOs Military Information Support Operations MPEP Military Personnel Exchange Program NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCIV National Council for International Visitors NDAA National Defense Authorization Act NDU National Defense University NGO Non-governmental organization PEP Personnel Exchange Program xvii

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ABBREVIATIONS

PLA PPP PRC REAC RIMPAC TRMI TRWI UN USAID USIA USSOCOM

People’s Liberation Army Public–Private Partnership People’s Republic of China Regional Educational Advising Coordinator Exercise Rim of the Pacific Trans-regional Magazine Initiative Trans-regional Web Initiative United Nations US Agency for International Development US Information Agency US Special Operations Command

List of Figures

Fig. 3.1 Fig. 6.1 Fig. 6.2 Fig. 6.3 Fig. 6.4 Fig. 6.5 Fig. 6.6

The public diplomacy implementation process Annual funding rates for the DoS, public diplomacy, and political affairs. (Source: DoS Congressional Budget Justifications, FY 2010–2021) Annual funding percentage of the DoS’s public diplomacy and political affairs compared to its overall funding. (Source: DoS Congressional Budget Justifications, FY 2010–2021) Annual numbers of DoS direct hire positions: Positions in the public diplomacy and public affairs sectors. (Source: DoS Congressional Budget Justifications, FY 2010–2021) The proportion of positions in the public diplomacy and public affairs sectors in DoS direct hire positions. (Source: DoS Congressional Budget Justifications, FY 2010–2021) Rates of increase of annual actual funds for the DoD, IMET, and HA/DR exchange program. (Source: DoS and DoD Congressional Budget Justifications from FY 2010–2021) Annual funding of IMET and HA/DR as a percentage of the DoD’s overall funding. (Source: DoS Congressional Budget Justifications from FY 2010–2021)

54 153 154 155 156 163 164

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List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 2.3 Table 2.4 Table 5.1 Table 5.2 Table 7.1

The DoS definition of “public diplomacy” The public diplomacy strategic framework of the DoS Strategic imperatives for public diplomacy Goals of military contact with China The participant selection criteria of the IVLP The stated goals of MPEP Master table of research findings

19 20 21 30 130 134 180

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CHAPTER 1

Implementation Discretion in Public Diplomacy: An Introduction

The US government has been outsourcing foreign policy to the private sector at least since the Cold War. Contractors not only implement government-­sponsored programs and activities on the ground, but they also become “a permanent feature of what used to be called governance, both at home and abroad.”1 This is also true of public diplomacy. For instance, the US Department of State (DoS) partners with the Institute of International Education (IIE) at the global level in more than 180 countries for its educational exchange programs, including EducationUSA, which aims to promote US higher education to foreign markets.2 The majority of these programs are sponsored by the DoS and administered by IIE. There is a special case in this respect: China. American educational exchange programs in China started a long time ago and have been the emphasis of US public diplomacy in China. In the beginning, EducationUSA’s activities in China were managed by IIE.  In around 2009, the DoS stopped its partnership with IIE in China and took over the program. EducationUSA has been operated by the US embassies and  [30].   IIE, “Fulbright U.S.  Student Program,” IIE, https://www.iie.org/Programs/ Fulbright-­US-­Student-Program; EducationUSA, “The EducationUSA Network,” US Department of State, https://educationusa.state.gov/us-higher-education-professionals/ educationusa-network. 1 2

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. Wu, U.S. Public Diplomacy Towards China, Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95644-8_1

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consulates since then. The reason for this adjustment was because IIE delegated the EducationUSA brand as well as the endorsement of the US government to 40–50 study abroad agencies in China. This was considered to be unacceptable, as endorsing any corporations in China damages the government’s reputation and image. This change of management seems a minor incident in American public diplomacy practice in China, but it reveals one important yet widely neglected impact of outsourcing foreign policy, which is the discretion bias induced by implementation. Contractors have organizational interests and cultures that are different from those of the DoS, so they adopt different strategies and prioritize different tasks. In the case of EducationUSA China, IIE was more interested in increasing the number of Chinese students studying in the US, while representing the US as a country was not its duty. In addition, IIE’s education network relies on the participation of study abroad agencies, so maintaining a good relationship with these organizations forms part of IIE’s priorities. It is not only contractors but also government agencies that implement programs by themselves which tend to be affected by various forces that induce biases. Therefore, public diplomacy is at risk of creating biases by implementation that lead the program in a different direction. As a result, public diplomacy may stray from its original objectives and become something else. The issue of public diplomacy implementation has not been the subject of much investigation by the current literature. Public diplomacy is generally defined as an instrument used by states to communicate with foreign publics, build and manage relationships with them, and influence their perspectives to advance national interests and values, and especially to achieve foreign policy objectives.3 Public diplomacy scholarship has traditionally focused on two broad areas: national public diplomacy strategies and public diplomacy programs. The former area includes discussions on how public diplomacy goals are decided, while the latter contains analyses of the target audience and the impact of public diplomacy. However, few efforts have been made to examine the process of translating a public diplomacy policy goal—the specific order given to a governmental institution so as to achieve the general foreign policy goal—into public diplomacy practice and results, impacts, and organizational practice change.4 This middle stage of implementation is important for two reasons. First, it puts public diplomacy back into the political realm. After all, it is primarily 3 4

 [14, 34].  The specifications of each concept will be discussed in the following sections.

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a tool of foreign policy. Second, it challenges the assumption that public diplomacy is carried out the same as it is in foreign policy orders. In reality, the implementation of public diplomacy induces discretion that changes its meaning. This book aims to find out whether, in what ways, and to what extent implementation affected the meaning of public diplomacy as it is practiced. In other words, it discovers the meanings applied to public diplomacy through implementation. According to theories of implementation, discretion between the policy goal and practice exists in all forms of policy implementation. This is also true of public diplomacy. The gap between public diplomacy’s policy objectives and the programs implemented on the ground indicates that implementation can influence and apply meaning to public diplomacy. As a result, public diplomacy results in different practices following the discretion exercised in its implementation. This book presents the result of my research that utilizes US public diplomacy towards China as a case study to understand public diplomacy implementation, and I focus on two US government agencies: the DoS and the Department of Defense (DoD). Few studies have focused on US public diplomacy towards China. Needless to say, the US–China relationship is perhaps the most important bilateral relationship between great powers. American policy-makers have been viewing China as a strategic competitor. Although the term strategic competitor was officially used by former US President Donald Trump, this rivalrous relationship was formed during China’s rise to the status of a world power. The bilateral relationship is neither a new Cold War nor purely cooperative; it is complex yet unique. Therefore, there is value in understanding how the US has been engaging with China—its competitor—through public diplomacy. Interestingly, while the US–China relationship is unique, US public diplomacy towards China is a part of its global network. Many US public diplomacy programs in China are similar to those in place in other countries. Therefore, US public diplomacy towards China is both regular and unique: it not only reveals the interactions between world powers, but also applies to other countries and regions. In this book, I argue that implementation largely explains the existence of discretion exercised in public diplomacy by the DoS and the DoD, though there are a few exceptions. Factors such as organizational culture, measurable goals, and resource constraints have largely shaped public diplomacy as practiced by the DoS and the DoD. Ultimately, the meaning of public diplomacy was changed by these implementation biases. Public diplomacy became something that signified the status of the US–China

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relationship rather than a means to amend or improve it. Public diplomacy also tends to focus on short-term and measurable returns, as opposed to long-term impacts, which may be difficult to assess. It was also hijacked by conflicting interests, such as the agendas of private organizations, domestic considerations, and legislative restrictions to exclude certain countries and certain public diplomacy activities. The absence of proper evaluation mechanisms also indicates that public diplomacy became an unimportant and underused tool by the DoS and the DoD.  In general, I find that efforts to leverage cooperation in order to foster more positive views of the US are more likely to be found in the DoD—an agency that goes to great lengths to claim it does not perform public diplomacy.

A Focus on US-China Relations This book chooses to focus on US public diplomacy towards China and is based on two major considerations: the competitive relationship between the US and China, and the routine nature of US public diplomacy programs that aim to influence the Chinese. China’s rapid economic growth has raised concerns in the US, as it is seen as a challenger to US hegemony and the American liberal order.5 Some even say that no relationship will be as important in the twenty-first century as the one between the US, the world’s pre-eminent power, and China, the world’s fastest-rising power.6 In addition, the different cultures and political systems of the US and China have also generated a lack of trust between the two nations.7 Due to the strategic importance of China in US foreign relations and the distrust between the two countries, effective ways to build trust and understanding between the two nations seem imperative. US public diplomacy towards China not only recognizes China’s strategic position in American foreign policy, but is also considered one of the official approaches to improve and sustain long-term confidence in this bilateral relationship. This study addresses something specific about China: the role of public diplomacy in adversarial relationships. This volume also chooses to focus on the US–China relationship because of the routine nature of US public diplomacy towards China. It makes US public diplomacy towards China a good source to gain a better  [1].  [17]. 7  [21]. 5 6

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understanding of American public diplomacy on a global scale. In the literature on public diplomacy, much attention has been paid to US practices in the Middle East or towards Arab populations, especially the efforts to combat terrorism. This assumed a new urgency after 9/11, which identified the new priorities of US foreign policy.8 Those public diplomacy programs presently operating in many other countries have been the subject of fewer studies. These programs and activities constitute the routine and standard practice of American public diplomacy globally. While it is valuable to understand public diplomacy in the Middle East to address the strategic concern of terrorism, depicting a general picture of US public diplomacy requires a broader vision. The cases of US public diplomacy in China are part of a network of American global engagement, which operates not only in China but also in many other countries. Therefore, studying such cases in China can shed light on US public diplomacy in other regions. It is worth noting that the relationship between the US and China has been unstable, and its competitive nature has resulted in restrictions on public diplomacy programs, especially in the DoD. While theoretically the lack of trust between the two countries makes public diplomacy a vital means of reducing misunderstanding and improving the relationship, in practice US public diplomacy towards China is usually restricted or forbidden in order to avoid undermining US national security, as claimed by members of US Congress. As a result, many public diplomacy programs in the DoD excluded China as a participant. For instance, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program has omitted China due to the restriction contained in the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, which prohibits US foreign aid from promoting or assisting the projects or activities of any communist country.9 In order to provide a better understanding of the impact of implementation on public diplomacy, this book also includes major public diplomacy programs that exclude China, especially in the DoD, and examines exclusion as an example of implementation discretion.

8 9

 [13].  [18].

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Asia-Pacific Rebalancing Strategy Another reason for studying US public diplomacy towards China is the shift of focus from Europe and the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific in the foreign policy of the Obama administration, and more recently the Indo-­ Pacific strategy. The US Rebalance Policy or the Pivot to Asia policy towards China refers to a set of US engaging and containing policies from 2011 to 2016, which reflects the timeline of this study. The Rebalancing Policy has three pillars: security, which deals with China’s rise and other security issues in the regions; economy, which concerns the US–China bilateral trade and economic relationship as well as regional economic institutions; and diplomacy, which includes the promotion of US values such as human rights and democracy in China, as well as other issues, including education, climate change, the environment, health, and energy. Being one of the most powerful countries in the region and having contrasting ideological foundations to those in the West, China is one of the targets if not the most important target of the US Rebalance Policy.10 The overarching principle is that the US administration pursues cooperation when interests converge, and counters or deters China when interests diverge.11 On the one hand, the containment argument is prominent in both the media and scholarship. Some scholars believed that the Rebalance Policy is chiefly a response to China’s rise as a threat to US power. On the other hand, and equally important, is the idea of integrating China into the regional and global systems. Scholars such as Joseph Nye believed that the Rebalance Policy could not be considered the same as Cold War containment; instead, it was a continuation of the American policy of integrating China “into the international system through trade and exchange programs.”12 Unlike the containment perspective in realism, this liberal win-win integration strategy includes encouraging China’s participation in the regional trade institutions, increasing military-to-military exchanges, and continuing the annual US–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue.13 According to the “democratic peace” argument, a non-democratic China is considered to be an “impetus to [US–China] rivalry.”14 This standpoint

 [4].  [15]. 12  [24]. 13  [20, 31]. 14  [11]. 10 11

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requires the US to take diplomatic measures to further “export American ideological values” to China.15

Why Implementation? Implementation matters because it suggests an implementing actor’s agency to define and operationalize public diplomacy, which often gives meaning to public diplomacy in the long term. Public diplomacy has been described by governments around the world as an instrument to advance national interests and values. It usually involves communication with foreign publics, building and managing relationships with them, and influencing their perspectives.16 This volume utilizes implementation as a focal point to understand public diplomacy. It investigates how public diplomacy implementation implies meaning to public diplomacy practices in the short term and how, over time, the practice of public diplomacy comes to change the meaning of public diplomacy through evaluation and policy learning. The objective is to find out whether, in what ways, and to what extent implementation affected public diplomacy as it was practiced. Public diplomacy implementation may not only have led to public diplomacy practices that are significantly different from the original goal, but it may also affect the degree to which those activities can be successful. Over time, the practice of public diplomacy may come to shape the meaning of public diplomacy through the process of adaptation and learning.17 As Steve Smith and Michael Clarke stated, how decisions are carried out is valuable as it “forces us to consider the extent to which behavior [policy results] was the intended consequence of decisions [policy goals], or was the unintended consequence of the implementation process.”18 In the public policy literature, scholars define implementation as “what happens between policy expectations and (perceived) policy results.”19 They believe implementation may be subject to slippage, meaning that implementation may skew the meaning of policy goals.20 It does not matter if this slippage is intentional or unintentional; implementers have discretion  [9, 4, 19].  [6, 14, 27]. 17  [22]. 18  [29]. 19  [10]. 20  [16, 25]. 15 16

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and they use this to change policy. As a result, implementation affects policy practice and impact, which in turn shapes policy goals. Like public policies, public diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy also goes through an implementation stage. Implementing actors interpret and translate public diplomacy goals into concrete practices. In some circumstances, the implementation of public diplomacy may change the meaning of the public diplomacy objective and produce unintended results that diverge from the original purpose. The implementation of public diplomacy deserves scrutiny because public diplomacy is, almost by definition, ambiguous in some respects and thus implementers have more scope to apply meanings. The study of implementation is valuable to public diplomacy literature. The current public diplomacy literature has focused on two broad areas: national public diplomacy strategies and ground-level communication activities. The former includes discussions on broad directions and the impact of public diplomacy efforts, while the latter tends to focus on the best practices to engage foreign publics. Historical studies have reviewed the processes of states’ propaganda and public diplomacy at the national level, emphasizing the national strategies and the role of leaders.21 Some studies have paid attention to public diplomacy implementation at the embassy level, but do not analyze the role of implementation in the public diplomacy policy process.22 More recent studies have argued that contextual factors, such as globalization and technology, have been transformative and have created a “new public diplomacy” that is qualitatively different. The prominent features of this new practice are multiple actors other than states and two-way or even collaborative approaches to communication. In sum, little attention has been paid to public diplomacy implementation regarding its policy objective, which investigates the process of translating a public diplomacy goal—the specific order given to a governmental institution (usually foreign policy objectives)—into public diplomacy practices, and what public diplomacy has become through implementation. This book addresses this neglected area in public diplomacy literature by focusing on the agency of practitioners. It seeks to explain how choices are made about public diplomacy practice and how public diplomacy comes to acquire and change meaning on the ground.  [7, 23, 32, 35].  [26, 28, 33].

21 22

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Methodological Issues Implementation theories define the premise that discretion happens during the practice of programs. The first step in this volume is to review the meaning of “public diplomacy” in the literature and the ideal public diplomacy defined by scholars, as well as policy goals given to the implementing organizations in question (the DoS and the DoD). The policy goal is utilized as a yardstick to assess public diplomacy implementation. The second step is to identify how public diplomacy actors define public diplomacy and the public diplomacy objectives of programs. This is a part of implementation process as the definitions and goals are the results of DoS and DoD interpreting policy goals and formulating strategies and tactics. The third step is to examine selected public diplomacy programs in the DoS and the DoD during the Obama administration and discover whether and how implementation induces biases during practice. More specifically, I identify the gap between definitions and practice, explore three factors through which implementation discretion is exercised, and then apply the process-tracing method to delineate the causal relationships. In other words, in the case studies, I look at whether public diplomacy practice strays from the policy goal, whether implementation plays a role in it, and what caused any biases that occurred. This study uses both primary and secondary sources. I conducted a number of interviews with frontline public policy practitioners as well as with managers who supervise its implementation. The names of these interviewees are not given in order to protect their identity. This is also a consideration of ethical research. The interviews collected data on their perceived goals, their daily tasks, and evaluations. While relying on anonymous interviews may reduce the possibility to verify the findings I reached, I also use secondary data to support my arguments. The secondary sources include Congressional documents, departmental budgets, press releases, public speeches, newspapers, memoirs, and other studies on public diplomacy practice. Data collected from these sources were mainly utilized as evidence to support or refute the role of implementation in public diplomacy practice in terms of producing a result that diverged from the original aim. I utilize process tracing to analyze selected case. I chose to study major public diplomacy programs of the DoS and the DoD and utilized implementation theories to understand their practices. In general, these cases were selected because they are designed as long-term forms of public

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diplomacy and have existed for some time. Only through examining such cases can we understand how the meaning of public diplomacy is affected. Besides, the DoS and the DoD are the main US government agencies that carry out public diplomacy programs. The analyses belong to the type of disciplined configurative case studies, which use established theories to explain the case.23 I utilize the theories in policy implementation to explain public diplomacy practice. In the case studies, the independent variables are organizational culture, measurable goals, and resources; these come from the literature on policy implementation. The independent variable is discretion exercised during the implementation of public diplomacy. The method of process tracing was applied to process data and identify the intervening causal process—the causal chain and causal mechanism— between implementation and the meaning of public diplomacy.24 More specifically, I first deconstructed the public diplomacy implementation processes over time and described the observed change in order. Then I gathered and assessed the observations, before confirming causal evidence embedded in the observed processes. This included four steps: evidence collection, content evaluation, assessment of accuracy, and probability of evidence.25 Finally, I conducted four causal inference tests built on the comparative logic of elimination, such as Evera’s four kinds of empirical tests—the straw in the wind test, the hoop test, the smoking gun test, and the double decisive test—to evaluate the evidence.26 Two distinct causal relationships were examined using the process-tracing method. The first of these was the role of implementation in creating discretion in public diplomacy practice. The analysis of process tracing starts from the comparison between the program’s stated public diplomacy goal and its actual aim revealed in practice. The second process scrutinizes the public diplomacy practice in the longer term and observes whether the meaning of public diplomacy was changed by implementation. By combining these two processes, this book treats implementation as one of the contributors to policy evolution, investigating both the mechanism of implementation within each event and across a series of events.

 [12].  [12]. 25  [2]. 26  [3, 5, 8]. 23 24

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A Roadmap for the Rest of the Book The coverage of this book proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 presents an overview of US public diplomacy in the DoS and the DoD, especially programs towards China. It also offers a description and justification of the public diplomacy programs and activities that are analyzed in the book. Chapter 3 reviews the definitions of “public diplomacy” and “implementation” in the literature. It explains why the definition of “public diplomacy” has been largely led by theory, not practice, and it is important to understand the meaning of public diplomacy from its implementation. In Chap. 4, the implementation theory of organizational culture is utilized to explain the practice of public diplomacy. Chapter 5 explores whether public diplomacy implementation is biased towards measurable goals and ignores objectives that are difficult to measure. Chapter 6 uses the implementation theory of resource constraints to explain the cases and see whether public diplomacy implementation discretion is induced by resource deficiency. Chapter 7 concludes by including a summary of the research and a final discussion on how much discretion in public diplomacy is explained by implementation theory. It discusses the programs’ evaluation mechanisms and feedback to further demonstrate why public diplomacy remained to be something else. This chapter also discusses the contribution that this volume makes to the literature on this subject and identifies avenues for future research.

References 1. Acharya, Amitav. 2014. The End of American World Order. Malden, MA: Polity Press. 2. Beach, Derek, and Rasmus Brun Pedersen. 2013. Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 3. Bennett, Andrew. 2004. Process Tracing and Causal Inference. In Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, ed. Henry E. Brady and David Collier, 207–220. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 4. Chen, Dean. 2014. An Indispensable Pillar of Obama’s ‘Pivot’ to Asia: Continuing Strategic Ambiguity across the Taiwan Strait. In The US Strategic Pivot to Asia and Cross-Strait Relations: Economic and Security Dynamics, ed. Peter C.Y. Chow, 31–54. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 5. Collier, David. 2011. Understanding Process Tracing. PS: Political Science & Politics 44 (4): 823–830.

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6. Cull, Nicholas J. 2008. Public diplomacy: Taxonomies and histories. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616 (1): 31–54. 7. ———. 2009. The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 8. Evera, Stephen van. 1997. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 9. Fang, Guangshun, and Qiang Ma. 2014. Strategy of Rebalance to the Asia-­ Pacific in Obama's New Term and US Ideological Export. China International Studies 48 (5): 93–111. 10. Ferman, Barbara. 1990. When Failure is Success: Implementation and Madisonian Government. In Implementation and the Policy Process: Opening up the Black Box, ed. Dennis James Palumbo and Donald J. Calista, 39–50. New York: Greenwood Press. 11. Friedberg, Aaron L. 2011. A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 12. George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 13. Gregory, Bruce. 2008. Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616 (1): 274–290. 14. ———. 2014. The Paradox of US Public Diplomacy: Its Rise and ‘Demise’. Washington, DC: George Washington University. 15. Hart, Melanie. 2015. Assessing American Foreign Policy toward China. Washington, DC: Center for American Progress. 16. Hill, Michael James, and Peter L. Hupe. 2009. Implementing Public Policy: An Introduction to the Study of Operational Governance. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. 17. Hills, Carla A., Dennis C.  Blair, and Frank Sampson Jannuzi. 2007. U.S.– China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda, a Responsible Course. New  York: Council on Foreign Relations. 18. Kan, Shirley A. 2011. U.S.–China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 19. Kelly, Robert E. 2014. The ‘Pivot’ and its Problems: American Foreign Policy in Northeast Asia. Pacific Review 27 (3): 479–503. 20. Kissinger, Henry. 2011. On China. New York: Penguin. 21. Lieberthal, Kenneth, and Wang Jisi. 2012. Addressing US–China Strategic Distrust. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 22. Majone, Giandomenico, and Aaron Bernard Wildavsky. 1978. Implementation as Evolution. In Implementation, ed. Jeffrey L.  Pressman and Aaron B. Wildavsky, 163–180. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

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23. Malone, Gifford D. 1988. Political Advocacy and Cultural Communication: Organizing the Nation’s Public Diplomacy. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. 24. Nye, Joseph S. 2011. Obama’s Pacific Pivot. Project Syndicate. https://www. project-­syndicate.org/commentary/obama-­s-­pacific-­pivot-­2011-­12. 25. Palumbo, Dennis James, and Donald J. Calista. 1990. Implementation and the Policy Process: Opening up the Black Box. New York: Greenwood Press. 26. Pamment, James. 2012. New Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century: A Comparative Study of Policy and Practice. New York: Routledge. 27. Ross, Christopher. 2002. Public Diplomacy Comes of Age. Washington Quarterly 25 (2): 73–83. 28. Rugh, William A. 2014. Front Line Public Diplomacy: How US Embassies Communicate with Foreign Publics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 29. Smith, Steve, and Michael Clarke. 1985. Foreign Policy Implementation. London: G. Allen & Unwin. 30. Stanger, Allison. 2009. One Nation under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 31. Sutter, Robert G., Michael E.  Brown, Timothy J.  A. Adamson, Mike M. Mochizuki, and Deepa Ollapally. 2013. Balancing Acts: The US Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Stability. Rising Powers Initiative. https://www2.gwu. edu/~sigur/assets/docs/BalancingActs_Compiled1.pdf. 32. Taylor, Philip M. 1999. British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 33. Tuch, Hans N. 1990. Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 34. Wallin, Matthew. 2015. Military Public Diplomacy: How the Military Influences Foreign Audiences. Washington, DC: American Security Project. 35. Wolper, Gregg. 1993. Wilsonian Public Diplomacy: The Committee on Public Information in Spain. Diplomatic History 17 (1): 17–34.

CHAPTER 2

Programs at the Departments of State and Defense

In the US, many governmental agencies involve public diplomacy-like activities, even though some do not explicitly call these programs public diplomacy. To justify them as public diplomacy actors, a closer look at the objectives of programs is necessary. This chapter provides an overview of public diplomacy programs in the DoS and the DoD, as well as the stated goals of the programs. Specifically, it deals with three things: first, how is public diplomacy defined in practice by the DoS and the DoD? Second, why should these programs be studied and why can the DoD’s programs be considered public diplomacy? Third, what are the stated purposes of these programs? Against the backdrop of the Rebalance Policy, several public diplomacy efforts carried out by the DoS and the DoD are examined in this book. The DoS and the DoD are chosen because they are the main government institutions that practice public diplomacy and have prominent public diplomacy programs and activities targeting China. In addition, selecting these two very different organizations allows the researcher to use the implementation theory of organizational interests and culture to explain public diplomacy. In both agencies, public diplomacy programs can be roughly divided into two categories: international information programs, and educational and cultural exchange programs (ECE). This volume primarily focuses on the latter.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. Wu, U.S. Public Diplomacy Towards China, Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95644-8_2

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Public Diplomacy in DoS The DoS defines public diplomacy as a method to understand, inform, engage, influence, and build relationships, partnerships, and coalitions with foreign publics to support US foreign policy, advance national interests, and enhance national security.1 It also aims to inform US policy-­ making and requires intra- and interagency coordination.2 Specifically, public diplomacy should protect US core interests by advancing democracy and human rights and strengthening civil society. In relation to cultural diplomatic programs and people-to-people exchanges, public diplomacy targets the goal of mutual understanding and cooperation. This definition is summarized from various versions of public diplomacy definitions that appeared in many official documents such as budgets, Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Reviews, and public diplomats’ public speeches. Public Diplomacy Structure in DoS The DoS as the major agency for American foreign affairs is considered to be the leading actor in US public diplomacy. Public diplomacy is usually seen as the purview of the DoS by other government agencies. Many bureaus and offices in the DoS involve public diplomacy activities. By law, the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy has the primary responsibility for assisting “the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary in the formation and implementation of United States public diplomacy policies and activities, including international educational and cultural exchange programs, information, and international broadcasting.”3 The Undersecretary directly oversees the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), the Bureau of Public Affairs, and the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP), as well as the Global Engagement Center and an Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources. The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) is a separate media service that includes two federal networks: the Voice of America and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting. The BBG’s objective is to expand freedom of information and expression and communicate America’s democratic  [1].  [2]. 3  22 US Code § 2651a. 1 2

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experience. The function bureaus of the DoS that serve as the thematic lead on global issues such as human rights, counterterrorism, and participation in international organizations also have offices of public diplomacy to ensure the advocacy of the DoS on these issues. The regional bureaus of the DoS also play an important role in public diplomacy. They have the primary responsibility for bilateral relations with countries in their regions, so they are also responsible for public diplomacy activities in specific countries.4 The ECA and the IIP conduct the most prominent public diplomacy programs and activities directly by Washington. The ECA is in charge of managing cultural exchange programs, especially educational exchange programs. As was described in the 2012 DoS budget, the ECA manages “exchanges to build foundations of trust and prepare the next generation of leaders to work together on the shared challenges of the 21st century.”5 The mission of the IIP is to “provide the State Department’s worldwide public diplomacy platform and to partner with policy experts and missions abroad to design and develop products and programs that engage international audiences to advance U.S. foreign policy.”6 It informs and influences foreign opinions in order to further US foreign policy goals.7 Specifically, it produces multimedia content in English and multiple foreign languages that promotes US foreign policy priorities, supports American Spaces abroad that provide physical platforms for direct foreign audience engagement, recruits American experts to speak on US foreign policy issues to overseas audiences, and manages the websites of US embassies and consulates.8 The ECA administers people-to-people exchanges such as educational, professional, and cultural programs and activities. The mission is to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the United States and other countries by fostering mutual understanding through international educational and cultural exchange and training programs. The bureau strengthens the ties that unite the United States with other nations by promoting personal, professional, and institutional contacts between private citizens and organizations in the United States and  [3].  [4]. 6  [5]. 7  [4]. 8  [3]. 4 5

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abroad, as well as by presenting U.S. history, society, art, and culture in all of its diversity to audiences abroad.9

The ECA’s website summarized its objective as being to “increase mutual understanding between the peoples of the United States and other countries by means of educational and cultural exchanges that assist in the development of peaceful relations.”10 The Fulbright Program is the ECA’s flagship program. Later the Fulbright model was expanded to a new branded public diplomacy program, EducationUSA. This was created to promote US higher education around the world and encourage more international students to study in the US. Another flagship program, the International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP), is professionally oriented. It invites future foreign leaders to visit the US and attend various exchange programs in different parts of the country. Besides these two flagship programs, the ECA also oversees other exchange programs such as the Hubert H.  Humphrey Fellowship Program, the Visual and Performing Arts Program, the US Ambassador Fund for Cultural Preservation, the English Language Programs, and the Alliance of Museums. These programs focus on professional exchanges via short-term visits and cross-cultural exchanges through conducting performances, preserving cultural heritage, and facilitating museum projects. The Public Diplomacy Objectives of the DoS Budgets One source that can be used to understand the general objective of US public diplomacy is the Congressional Budget Justification of the DoS (see Table 2.1). According to the Budgets, the objective of the DoS of public diplomacy includes three elements: foreign policy, national interest, and national security. These three terms are inter-connected and focus on different aspects. “National interest” is a broad concept that includes national security (as well as other aspects such as development), while foreign policy is an approach to advance national interests. While the purpose of including all three terms may come down to the need for comprehensiveness, the relationship among foreign policy, national security, and

9

 [6].  [7].

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Table 2.1  The DoS definition of “public diplomacy” Year

Definition

2011

“Understanding, informing, engaging, and ultimately influencing foreign publics on behalf of US foreign policy.” 2012 “Supports the achievement of US foreign policy goals and objectives, advances national interests, and enhances national security by informing and influencing foreign publics and expanding and strengthening the relationship between the people and government of the United States and citizens of the rest of the world.” 2013–2016 “Supports US foreign policy goals and objectives by expanding and strengthening the relationship between the people and government of the United States and citizens of the rest of the world.” 2017 “Advances US foreign policy goals, promotes national interests, and enhances national security by engaging with foreign audiences in the public domain.” 2018 “Advances US foreign policy goals, promotes national interests, and enhances national security by engaging foreign audiences around the globe to forge international partnerships, build coalitions, and galvanize foreign public opinion in support of US policy priorities.”

Source: [1]

national interest, as well as their connections with public diplomacy, is not clear in the definition. The definitions of “public diplomacy” were altered between 2011 and 2018. In 2011, public diplomacy was about understanding, informing, engaging, and influencing foreign publics. A year later, a new approach, “expanding and strengthening relationship” with foreign publics, was added. The term “relationship” has been in the definition from then on. Later in 2018, the idea of cooperation was emphasized in the definition. Public diplomacy was then designed to forge partnerships and build coalitions. This change suggests that public diplomacy in the DoS has been gradually moving from one-way to two-way communication. The 2018 definition requires more mutual understanding and trust. According to the literature, partnership and coalition require a higher level of cooperation and collaboration than building relationships.11

 [8].

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Strategic Frameworks The DoS’s 2010–2016 strategic frameworks of public diplomacy offer more detailed planning (see Table 2.2). A document by the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs specified the meaning of public diplomacy’s strategic imperatives (see Table 2.3). The goals “shape the narrative,” “expand and strengthen people-to-­people relationships,” and “combat violent extremism” addressed the target audience, while the last two, “better inform policy-making” and “deploy resources in line with current priorities,” referred to the ability of public diplomacy to inform the overall foreign policy-making. This suggests that public diplomacy is not just about influencing foreign publics, but also about collecting information and intelligence to help the DoS do its job better. Since 2015, the strategic goals have shifted to focus on implementation, which includes resource management, coordination, evaluation, and so on. The 2018 Strategic Plan was a more succinct version of the previous implementation goals. It emphasized “listening” and connecting public diplomacy to US policies, as well as management and evaluation. Also worth pointing out is that in 2015, the DoS put forward two indicators to

Table 2.2  The public diplomacy strategic framework of the DoS Year 2012–2015

2016–2017

2018

Source: [1]

Shape the narrative Expand and strengthen people-to-people relationships Combat violent extremism Better inform policy-making Deploy resources in line with current priorities Align resources with regional and thematic priorities Coordinate intra- and interagency collaboration Clearly define and measure the effectiveness of programs Inform policy-making Develop new tools and approaches Audience research Strategy development: application of public diplomacy to US policy areas Effective management Evaluation

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Table 2.3  Strategic imperatives for public diplomacy Strategic imperatives Contents

Explanations

Shape the narrative

We have been misrepresented— or not represented at all—in too many global conversations A foundation of trust, opens ears and minds

Expand and strengthen people-to-people relationships Combat violent extremism

Better inform policy-making

Deploy resources in line with current priorities

Develop proactive outreach strategies to inform, inspire, and persuade Build mutual trust and respect through expanded public diplomacy programs and platforms Counter violent extremist voices, discredit and delegitimize al Qaeda, and empower credible local voices Ensure the foreign policy is informed upfront by an understanding of attitudes and opinions of foreign publics Strengthen structures and processes to ensure coordinated and effective public diplomacy

The voices of violent extremists must not go unchallenged

If we fly blind, expect to crash

We can do this better … and we have to

Source: [2]

measure the effectiveness of public diplomacy programs: (1) increasing foreign understanding of the US and (2) improving US favorability.12  he State-USAID Joint Strategic Goal Framework T The DoS also works with the US Agency for International Development (USAID) on public diplomacy. A few governmental documents specifying the interagency objectives, which also further explain US national interests and foreign policy. For example, Strategic Goals of Joint State and USAID identified institutional priorities including public diplomacy objectives. For Fiscal Year (FY) 2007–2012, one of the six strategic goals was “promoting international understanding,” which contained three sub-­ objectives: offering positive vision, marginalizing extremism, and nurturing common interests and values.13 In FY 2014–2017, the language of the strategic goal that involved public diplomacy was changed to “advance US interests and universal values through public diplomacy and programs that  [9].  [10].

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connect the United States to the world.”14 This goal was modified to become more specific in the 2014 document. State-USAID Joint Strategic Goal Framework spelled out US interests and national security priorities, which consisted of economic and political impact, climate change, the ideologies of human rights and democracy, and development. Public diplomacy was to “promote and protect human rights through constructive bilateral and multilateral engagement and targeted assistance.”15 These changes in public diplomacy goals from generalization to specification indicate an effort to make public diplomacy meaningful in order to advance foreign policy objectives, aligning with the public diplomacy purposes in congressional budget justifications. Public Diplomacy in DoD Unlike the DoS, which uses the term “public diplomacy” extensively, DoD avoids using that term in the names of its programs. Officially it claims that public diplomacy is within the purview of the DoS. However, judging from the objectives and practices of some DoD programs, they are in fact public diplomacy. Besides, many scholars have also suggested that the DoD employs public diplomacy.16 Therefore, this study includes the DoD as a public diplomacy actor, even though it rarely invokes the term.  oes the Military Do Public Diplomacy? D The question of whether the DoD does public diplomacy is debatable among both scholars and practitioners. Generally speaking, the term “public diplomacy” has been officially denied by the DoD as, by law, it is under the purview of the DoS.17 The DoD seldom uses the term “public diplomacy” to describe its informational and engagement programs, though these programs are public diplomacy by definition. The DoD described its role in public diplomacy as supportive, which was outlined by the Interagency Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication.18 This framework refers to the interagency collaboration  [11].  [12]. 16  [13, 14]. 17  [13]. 18  [15]. 14 15

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to engage key audiences for achieving a government’s interests, policies, and objectives.19 The DoD embraced the term “strategic communication” and used it in many of its official documents. It became an alternative term for public diplomacy among some scholars and practitioners. In theory, strategic communication and public diplomacy have similarities, but focus on distinct aspects. Compared with the definitions of public diplomacy summarized in the previous section, strategic communication shares the following features with public diplomacy. First, it is a tool used by the government to understand and engage with domestic and foreign key audiences. Second, like the relational approach of public diplomacy, it requires active listening and sustained engagement with relevant stakeholders, using not only information transmission but also physical communication through actions conveying meanings.20 Third, the objective of strategic communication is to create and strengthen a favorable environment for its policies, interests, and objectives.21 However, the difference between strategic communication and public diplomacy is also quite obvious. Strategic communication emphasizes the alignment of multiple communicative efforts towards the internal and external audiences on an interagency basis. According to an official document, strategic communication is “the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with and leveraging the actions of all instruments of national power.”22 In the US government, strategic communication refers to interagency collaboration led by the Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs of the DoS.23 So, public diplomacy programs at the DoD have to be in line with other public diplomacy programs. For example, one reason why the websites of the Trans-Regional Web Initiative (TRWI) were taken offline was that they were not well coordinated with other public diplomacy activities. This issue will be covered in the case analyses in Chap. 6.  ublic Diplomacy Programs in DoD P The fact that the DoD does public diplomacy is determined not only by terminologies but also by its practices. Generally speaking, like the public  [16].  [17]. 21  [16]. 22  [16]. 23  [18]. 19 20

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diplomacy programs of the DoS, public diplomacy at the DoD can also be categorized into two forms: information and exchange. However, unlike the DoS, which has a bureaucratic division according to these two types of programs, the DoD does not separate them, and the functions of these programs sometimes overlap with each other. This is exemplified by four types of major public diplomacy programs at the DoD: information operations, public affairs, civil affairs, and military information support operations. Information operations refer to the capabilities of using integrated information to “influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.”24 This is part of the function of public diplomacy, especially during wartime.25 Public affairs emphasize the process of information management. Their mission is “to plan, coordinate, and synchronize US military public information activities and resources to support the commander’s intent and concept of operations.”26 This looks like the listening element of public diplomacy that creates a feedback loop from the public’s perceptions in order to inform policy-making. Civil affairs stand for populace and resources control, foreign humanitarian assistance, civil information management, nation assistance, and civil administration support. Their purpose is to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society.27 They involve foreign assistance, which also has public diplomacy elements.28 Military Information Support Operations (MISOs) refer to planned operations to convey selected information to foreign audiences in order to influence their “emotions, motives, objective reasoning,” and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments and other actors in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives.29  he Reasoning Behind DoD Public Diplomacy Programs T This book focuses on five categories of public diplomacy programs in the DoD: military-to-military exchanges and visits, foreign military education and training, the US–China Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Exchange Program, the Trans-Regional Magazine Initiative and the Trans-Regional Web Initiative, and public diplomacy strategy-making.  [19].  Originally, people use the term “propaganda” to describe this kind of activity. 26  [20]. 27  [21]. 28  [22]. 29  [23]. 24 25

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Military-to-military exchanges and visits are public diplomacy for the following reasons. First, military personnel are part of the general public. Although they work directly for national security, take orders to perform in a highly organized and sensitive environment, and engage with sensitive security matters and the use of force, personal bonding and relationships established through public diplomacy programs can be sustained and carried on when they retire from the military. Second, since they are in the broader political and security circle, military staff have special access to resources that can potentially influence their home country’s policy-­ making, which echoes the opinion-leader model utilized in many public diplomacy programs at the DoS.30 Third, military personnel are supposed to develop skills and learn American values.31 Many military operations, such as counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, have “winning hearts and minds” as their goal. This is in line with the definitions of “public diplomacy” in the literature, especially the soft power approach. This section further justifies the case selection of these programs as public diplomacy. Military-to-military exchanges and visits are believed to increase mutual understanding and build personal relationships between participants from the US military and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in China. They are public diplomacy because they are consonant with the features of public diplomacy. This classic format of military exchange includes meetings and conversations, which ideally suggests two-way communication between participants. Meetings and conversations are a form of back-and-­ forth communication, not simply one-way information projection through mass media such as international broadcasting. This kind of military engagement was argued to have the impact of “pursuing wider foreign and security policy goals” through engaging Chinese military personnel as part of the foreign public.32 It is also hoped that the personal relationships established through the exchange can be extended in the future. The informal conversations between participants were said to facilitate this process. For instance, the conversations between participants on personal stories and their gift exchanges were seen as an effort to build interpersonal as well as organizational relationships. 30  According to Giles Scott-Smith, the opinion-leader model adopted by many cultural exchange designers assumes a “two-step flow of communication” model, which argued that opinions broadcast via the mass media had their widest impact when passed through persons of influence recognized as opinion leaders within their own society. 31  [24]. 32  [25].

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Programs of foreign military education and training were designed not only to support foreign military reform and development, but also to promote American values such as liberal democracy and human rights.33 These programs were considered “an investment in ideas and people”34 and should be considered a form of public diplomacy. First, their mission to foster bilateral and multilateral cooperation and partnership resonates with the definition of “public diplomacy” in the literature.35 The relational approach of public diplomacy emphasized building and managing relationships with the foreign public. Second, the programs intend to promote values of democracy, human rights, and good governance. This echoes the idea of increasing American soft power and winning the hearts and minds of the foreign public so that they will change their perceptions and behaviors in favor of US interests. Third, the Regional Center Program and the IMET program are based on the opinion-leader model, which resembles a few public diplomacy programs of the DoS.  Similar to the DoS’s EducationUSA and IVLP, IMET targets future military leaders and hopes that they will pass on what they have observed and learned to those in their professional network when they return home, thus influencing not only their future decision-making but also their social networks. When they reach important positions, these leaders are also anticipated to make policy decisions favorable to US interests. It has been suggested that the exchange on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) will boost US military image and promote US soft power in foreign nations.36 The US–China HA/DR Exchange Program is public diplomacy. First, the HA/DR exchange between the two countries is public diplomacy to build relationships, reduce misunderstandings, and promote trust. As a US official put it, a combined US– Chinese HA/DR effort would heighten understanding between the two militaries and promote stable military-to-military relations.37 Second, HA/DR can also be considered collaborative public diplomacy in which two sides work together for the same objective to engage a wider community. According to Fisher, collaborative public diplomacy is a co-­ decision-­making process of the public diplomacy sponsor and recipient  [26, 27].  [28]. 35  [29]. 36  [14, 30]. 37  [31]. 33 34

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engaging in an equal participating relationship with shared common interests to reach a wider audience while building relationships.38 It places neither participant at the center of the relationship and is less likely to create an “us versus them” confrontation. In the US–China HA/DR exchange, the US military and the PLA are both participants in this program and engage in a collaborative relationship with a common objective. Informational programs such as the TRWI and the  Trans-Regional Magazine Initiative (TRMI) provide original content tailored to specific regions and audiences in order to present the US and its military operations in a positive light.39 These programs fit the description of public diplomacy inasmuch as they (1) build cooperative relationships with foreign publics, including the military; (2) promote democratic civilian control of the armed forces as part of wider efforts to support liberal democracy and good governance, so that their foreign policies may be favorable to American interests; and (3) engage the audience in key countries and regions to counter extremist messaging.40 Compared to other public diplomacy programs at the DoD, the TRMI and the TRWI are short-term public diplomacy programs that rely upon information communication such as news stories, pictures, and videos to communicate with the target audience. Another characteristic of short-term or informational public diplomacy is that it usually has the objective of explaining and promoting government policies. The TRMI is designed to support US policies and the TRWI is designed to counter terrorism. These two programs both serve the public diplomacy purpose of advocating US policies.  he Public Diplomacy Objectives of the DoD T The DoD’s public diplomacy objectives in general and its goals in its engagement with China are different. In general, the DoD’s public diplomacy aims to forge favorable opinions among and build relationships with foreign publics. In public diplomacy programs towards China, the objective becomes reducing misunderstandings and persuading China to become a responsible regional actor. This difference implies implementation discretion in terms of formulating public diplomacy towards China as the result of interpretation and choice from the general objective of public diplomacy in the DoD.  [8].  [32]. 40  [25]. 38 39

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General Objectives The DoD has many public diplomacy programs that do not bear that name. These programs share a common objective: “shaping operational environment and fostering common views on security challenges.”41 This goal corresponds to the definitions of “public diplomacy” in the literature. The internationalist perspective suggests that one of the purposes of public diplomacy is to build a secure global environment.42 Others focus on public diplomacy as a government tool to explain and advocate foreign policies to foreign publics. It is defined as a process of creating a favorable public opinion environment for foreign policies. With this overarching goal, each particular capability of public diplomacy at the DoD has a slightly different emphasis. For example, informational activities take a confrontational approach and were defined as an instrument to “improve U.S. credibility and legitimacy, weaken an adversary’s credibility and legitimacy, convince selected audiences to take specific actions that support U.S. or international objectives, [and] cause a competitor or adversary to take (or refrain from taking) specific actions.”43 Military engagements such as military-to-military contacts and exchange programs pursue comparatively long-term objectives, such as building relationships with other nations and maintaining US influence in the world. The military exercises aim to “develop local and regional situational awareness, build networks and relationships with partners, shape the OE [operational environment], keep day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict, and maintain US global influence.”44 To summarize, public diplomacy at the DoD tends to be a tool to shape foreign opinions and build relationships with foreign publics, which ultimately forges a favorable operative environment. Objectives of Public Diplomacy Towards China The objective of the DoD’s public diplomacy towards China is different from the general goal explained above. Their aim to engage the Chinese became reducing misunderstanding and persuading China to be a proactive member contributing to regional stability. In reports to Congress, senior officers defined principal objectives of programs that engage with  [33].  [34]. 43  [17]. 44  [18]. 41 42

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the PLA, and these goals have been persistent over the years. In 1998, US Secretary of Defense William Cohen said that US–China dialogue not only could reduce misperceptions, increase understanding of Chinese security concerns, and build confidence between two defense establishments to avoid military accidents and miscalculations, but could also be “critical to ensure that both countries have a clear appreciation of one another’s regional security interests.”45 Ten years later in 2008, the objectives and strategies of the DoD to engage China and the Chinese military still follow this same approach. For instance, US Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England defined several principal US objectives in the 2018 annual report to Congress on contacts with the PLA: to support the overall US policy goals regarding China and promote stable bilateral relations; to prevent conflict and lower the risk of miscommunication; to maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and encourage China to play a responsible, constructive, and peaceful role in the region; to increase understanding of China’s military capabilities and intentions; to encourage Chinese military to adopt openness and transparency; and to increase mutual understanding between US and PLA officers.46 According to China Military Power Reports from 2012 to 2017, the objective to engage China was shifted from building relationships with China to reducing risk and maintaining the US competitive advance in the US–China military-to-military exchange and contact (see Table 2.4). In 2012 and 2013, the objectives were building cooperative capacity for maintaining military dialogues and cooperation in areas of mutual interest between the US and China. During a press briefing in 2013, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia David Helvey stated that the US military would “continue to use military engagement with China as one of several means to expand areas where we can cooperate, discuss, frankly, our differences, and demonstrate the United States’ commitment to the security of the Asia Pacific region.”47 This was in line with the cooperative approach that the DoD took in 2012 and 2013. Then in 2014, the goal of US–China military-to-military engagement changed to “reducing risk, expanding common ground, and maintaining US military

 [35].  These objectives appear in a CRS report, but they are not found in any Congress reports. See [36]. 47  [37]. 45 46

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Table 2.4  Goals of military contact with China Year 2012

Building cooperative capacity Fostering understanding of each other’s military institutions in ways that dispel misconceptions and encourage common ground for dialogue Allowing senior leaders to address the global security environment and relevant challenges 2013 Building cooperative capacity in areas of mutual interest Fostering greater institutional understanding Promoting common views of the regional security environment and related security challenges 2014–2016 Building sustained and substantive dialogue through policy and senior leader engagements Building concrete, practical cooperation in areas of mutual interest Enhancing risk management efforts that diminish the potential for misunderstandings or miscalculations Source: Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2012–2016

superiority.”48 In 2016, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia Abraham M. Denmark said in a press briefing that the DoD’s approach to China was focused on “reducing risk, expanding common ground, and maintaining our military superiority.”49 Similarly, the DoD’s budget proposals to Congress and the hearings to justify the appropriations presented a similar trend in US–China military engagement, which developed from cooperation to competition. The budgetary documents started to mention China’s rising regional and global capabilities in FY 2011. The FY 2011 budget stated that the US must sustain its leading actor’s place in a world shaped by the rise of China.50 The request for FY 2014 described China as a critical actor in the Asia Rebalance Policy, which posed a significant challenge to the position of the US in the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, the US should seek to expand US–China military-to-military ties, advocate for increased transparency in China’s military development, and seek China’s cooperation in relation to regional and global security challenges.51  [36, 38, 39].  [40]. 50  [41]. 51  [42]. 48 49

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Different levels of DoD officials also expressed their stances and views on US–China military-to-military exchanges. Their overall perspective was constructive and collaborative. From 2009 to 2013, they described the bilateral relationship and military exchange as cooperative yet uncertain. In a hearing on the appropriation for FY 2010, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael G. Mullen described US–China military relations as involving both mutual concerns and confrontations. He also recognized China’s growing role as a regional and global partner.52 In 2011, he further suggested that continuous military-to-military dialogues between the US and China were to reconcile uncertainties and generate confidence in areas of common interests such as counterpiracy, counter-proliferation, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.53 Similarly, former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel said during a hearing of appropriation for FY 2014 that the US military would “continue to work toward a healthy, stable, reliable and continuous military to military relationship with China.”54 Specifically, the strategy of the military-to-military relationship with China had three features: first, it worked to improve cooperative capacity in areas of mutual interest, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief missions, and counterpiracy operations; second, it fostered greater institutional understanding through contacts between the armed forces at all levels; and, third, it built common views of the regional security environment and related security challenges, which occurred primarily through institutional exchanges. In 2014, the higher-level officials at the DoD started to talk about the issue of the transparency of the PLA and bringing China into the existing security system. Samuel J.  Locklear III, Navy Commander of the US Pacific Command, said in a hearing before the US House of Representatives: “Although U.S-China military-to-military ties are improving, we will need ever more transparency and understanding of Chinese military intentions and capabilities if we are to minimize friction and avoid conflict in the future.”55 Similarly, in an appropriation hearing for FY 2016, Locklear emphasized the objective of helping China integrate into the existing security architecture.56 The US National Security Strategy of the Obama  [43].  [44]. 54  [45]. 55  [46]. 56  [47]. 52 53

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administration also experienced a similar change. The 2010 Strategy described the relationship with China as “positive, constructive, and comprehensive,” and the US pursued the policy of improving communication between the two militaries to reduce mistrust.57 In 2015, the strategy added that the US–China relationship would be competitive and the US insisted that China should uphold international rules and norms.58 This transition summarized the tendency described above, which was from cooperation on issues of mutual interest to competition management. It suggests a tendency to focus on results rather than processes, an issue which is further analyzed in Chap. 4.

The Programs and Their Goals This book focuses on the most prominent programs in main government agencies that implement public diplomacy. In the DoS, I chose two programs at the ECA: EducationUSA and the IVLP. EducationUSA is a program of educational exchange and the IVLP is a professional exchange program. In the DoD, HA/DR exchange, visits, and foreign military education and training, as well as the TRMI and the TRWI, are examined. These programs are studied not only because they are the most prominent ones in the DoS and the DoD, but also because they are also recurring programs with a relatively long history in China. Three major public diplomacy cases excluding China are IMET, the Military Personnel Exchange Program (MPEP), and the Game Plan for 1999 US–Sino Defense Exchanges (hereinafter “Game Plan”); these are analyzed to demonstrate the meaning applied to public diplomacy through implementation. The DoS EducationUSA EducationUSA is a program offering educational advice and information. As one of the ECA’s long-established public diplomacy programs, it is officially described as a “network of over 425 international student advising centers in 178 countries.”59 It is administered by the ECA’s Educational Information and Resources Branch of the Office of Global Educational  [48].  [49]. 59  [50]. 57 58

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Programs in Washington.60 In China, it is overseen by the Public Affairs Section in the US Embassy in Beijing. There were six advising centers in China as of 2017, including the Wuhan center.61 At the frontline, EducationUSA’s education advisors are considered to be “an integral part of the Mission’s public diplomacy efforts.”62 They usually have expertise and knowledge of the US higher education system and admission processes. EducationUSA is officially defined as an educational advising network. It has a dual mission of informing foreign students to apply for American colleges and providing marketing support to American educational institutions to achieve their recruiting goals. On the one hand, EducationUSA is the “network [that] promotes U.S. higher education to students around the world by offering accurate, comprehensive, and current information about opportunities to study at accredited postsecondary institutions in the United States.”63 On the other hand, it “also provides services to the U.S. higher education community to help institutional leaders meet their recruitment and campus internationalization goals.”64 It is a broker between American universities and foreign students. It helps US educational institutions recruit foreign students and provides information for foreign students so that it is easy for them to apply. In order to offer application information to Chinese prospective students and their parents, EducationUSA China organizes six types of activities: mini-fairs, training, webinars, school visits, information sessions, and outreach. These events are usually held at EducationUSA China centers, high schools, universities, libraries, and other public venues. EducationUSA China has a mantra called “Do it yourself (DIY).” This means that Chinese students are encouraged to apply to US higher educational institutions by themselves without the involvement of private agents. To operationalize this mantra, EducationUSA developed the “Your 5 Steps to US Study” plan: research your options, finance your studies, complete your application, apply for your student visa, and prepare for your departure. A series of workshops and lectures organized by EducationUSA follow the themes  [51].  These centers are in the Beijing Embassy and the Consulates General in Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenyang, and Chengdu. EducationUSA in Wuhan is covered by Beijing advisors. 62  [52]. 63  [53]. 64  [53]. 60 61

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of these five steps, and they are held according to the timeline of each year’s application process. For example, during the summer, before the fall semester starts, EducationUSA usually hosts events on “preparing for your departure” and “things to do upon arrival.” Reaching out to prospective students and their parents is one aspect of EducationUSA China’s mission; the other is to help American educational institutions to understand the interests and special needs of Chinese students.65 EducationUSA China provides US universities and colleges with information on the Chinese educational market, the Chinese education system, and possible opportunities to engage with Chinese students and parents. On a flyer to US universities and colleges, EducationUSA was said to offer webinars, information sessions, and outreach events, as well as content on social media, websites, and videos. The EducationUSA Forum hosted in the US is another important activity, which meets the needs of American universities and colleges. The Forum is for professionals at accredited US colleges and universities seeking to recruit, enroll, and support international students. The focus of the Forum is on recruitment and education marketing. It is said to offer participants “practical skills and explore strategies for utilizing EducationUSA resources to better engage international students and ensure their success on campus.”66 Participants of the Forum include EducationUSA staff and advisors around the world, as well as government officials. During the event, professionals and experts exchange information such as regional mobility trends, recruitment tips, and models of good practice in campus internationalization. The IVLP Besides educational programs like EducationUSA, the ECA also administers professional exchange programs. The most prominent of these is the IVLP. The program deserves analysis because it represents the model of US exchange programs and it has been operating in China for many years. It is another flagship professional exchange program of the ECA. It was launched in 1940 and has experienced multiple reforms since then. The central idea of this program is to select and bring future leaders to visit the US and exchange with their American counterparts. The program is invitation-based and only includes current and future foreign leaders. The  [54].  [55].

65 66

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participants in the IVLP are usually mid-level professionals who have had limited previous exposure to American culture and society. The objective of the IVLP has three elements. Its primary purpose is to identify and bring current and emerging foreign leaders to the US. The second aspect is to advance mutual understanding. One of the IVLP’s flyers mentioned that the goal of the program was to “enable the participants to understand better the people and culture of the United States. While the visitor may arrive in America as strangers, we hope they will leave as friends.”67 The IVLP also maintains an alumni network after the visitors return to their home countries, which is seen as a way to sustain the established relationships. The third element is professional exchange, which “provides opportunities for foreign opinion-makers to meet and confer with their American counterparts and gain firsthand knowledge about U.S. society, culture, and politics.”68 The IVLP programs include visits to three to four American cities in addition to a stop in the capital to meet with their professional counterparts. In Washington, DC, the activities include a two-hour tour and a federalism briefing at which a professor or government expert explains the American system of government. In other cities, visitors attend meetings with professionals working in the field, exchange on the topic of their interests with their counterparts, get to know American society, culture, and history, and stay with American families.69 The IVLP’s visitors are expected to “share their culture and offer insight on best practices and perspectives with their American hosts.”70 The IVLP office at the DoS does not directly run the program. The IVLP relies on a network of programing agencies now named Global Ties US to implement its programs. At the national level, national program agencies receive orders with policy themes from IVLP Program Officers at the DoS and design programs accordingly. At the community level, local organizations propose and manage activities taking place in their areas. While the IVLP headquarters in Washington, DC, has the overall responsibility of the program and ensures the relevance of the programs to foreign policy themes, the actual formats of the program are designed by national agencies and community-based organizations in the Global Ties  [56].  [57]. 69  [56]. 70  [58]. 67 68

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US network, including public sector organizations, corporates, non-profit organizations, and advocacy partners.71 The DoD For public diplomacy at the DoD, five types of cases are studied here. These are exchanges and visits, foreign military education and training, the US–China HA/DR exchange, the TRMI and the TRWI, and strategy-­ making. Unlike the case studies of the DoS that examine the details of their implementation, the analysis of the DoD focuses on the nature and design of these programs. This is mainly due to two reasons. First, through analyzing these five types of public diplomacy programs and their relations with China, meanings applied to public diplomacy may be revealed. The practice of these public diplomacy programs addresses whether and how implementation affects the meaning of public diplomacy. In the case of China, why some DoD public diplomacy programs include or exclude China also implies the meaning of public diplomacy applied through implementation. Second, unlike the DoS’s public diplomacy programs, which are well developed, the DoD’s public diplomacy efforts are not so systematic, and there is less information available about their particular implementation. Therefore, the analysis broadens the inquiry and examines five broad types of public diplomacy at the DoD. This approach also allows an in-case comparison of whether the meaning of public diplomacy is derived from China specifically or elsewhere. Exchanges and Visits Exchanges and visits belong to the most common type of military-to-­ military exchanges between the US and China. They usually involve visits to military bases and conversations among military personnel. Unlike exchange programs such as the IVLP that last for weeks or months, military visits usually last one day or even a few hours. This kind of visit usually includes touring training squadrons and attending education and training briefs.72 In the DoD, the US military and the PLA engage in exchanges and visits, including delegation visits, port visits, military band exchanges, MPEP, and the Game Plan. These programs are all military-to-military contacts and dialogues with a general objective to find common ground,  [56].  [59].

71 72

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build trust, and manage differences. Military exercises such as the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) are opportunities to share knowledge and develop a better understanding between militaries. They all share the “to know us is to love us” rationale and are designed based on the assumption that the increased contact of military personnel will lead to mutual understanding and advanced relationships. Education Delegation Visits Education delegation visits refer to the two militaries sending delegations of military academy students to visit each other reciprocally. On the Chinese side, the PLA National Defense University (PLA NDU) sends students of the “Tigers” course (that trains mid-level officers) and the “Dragons” course (that trains senior officers) on a tour of US military establishments. Reciprocally, the US National Defense University’s (US NDU) capstone fellows travel to China and conduct exchanges with their counterparts.73 The Capstone course provides executive education for newly appointed flag officers and senior civilian national security leaders.74 The objective of this exchange is to increase understanding of China and build trust between the two militaries.75 It facilitates dialogues to learn about shared values and cultural differences, as well as build cooperation.76 However, although US War Colleges (Airforce, Army, and Marine) sent delegations to China from 2014 to 2016, and PLA colleges visited the US from 2012 to 2016, these visits did not take place every year.77 An academic delegation visit usually includes a base tour, a roundtable discussion, and other informal interactions. For instance, in 2012, PLA officers observed a Marine Corps capability demonstration during their tour at the Marine Corps Base in Hawaii. During this visit, US Marines conducted multiple demonstrations to familiarize senior Chinese military officers with the mission and capabilities of the Marine Corps.78 In 2014, a student delegation from the PLA NDU visited the US NDU at Fort McNair,79 and in 2015, a 13-person Capstone delegation from a National War College of the  [60].  [61]. 75  [42]. 76  [59]. 77  See “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” 2012–2016. 78  [62]. 79  [63]. 73 74

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US NDU visited a regiment under the PLA Shenyang Military Area Command. They attended various activities including roundtable discussions, briefings, tours, and lunches.80 In 2015, PLA officers had an exchange with Army War College students. The interaction was described as follows: Sitting at a 30-person roundtable, the group traded questions and comments in friendly discussions both formal and informal. Topics ranged from US/China economic interests, civ-mil relations, US alliances and partners, officer professional development, cyberwar, and more. The conversation unfolded after the dean of the School of Strategic Landpower introduced the Army War College’s role, since its inception in 1901, to educate and develop leaders—and its current parallel mission to advance knowledge of the global application of Landpower … The delegation’s senior colonel drew parallels between President Obama’s trip to China and the mid-level military-to-military exchanges that are very important to peace and stability in the region and the world. He opened a 90-min discussion with an invitation to the US students to comment on and assess the U.S. rebalance to the Pacific: the “return to Asia,” as he called it.81

Besides the formal exchange, participants also engaged in informal conversations. PLA officers and US Army War College (USAWC) students were looking for common ground through one-on-one conversations on topics as diverse as hometowns or provinces, Swiss Army knives, and military uniforms. MPEP MPEP has a long-standing history that began in 1947. The first and ongoing exchange has been between the US Military Academy at West Point, New York, and Heroico Colegio Militar, the military academy in Mexico. Over the years, the program has been expanded to 17 countries and includes long-standing exchange agreements with the UK, Canada, and Australia, and more recent exchange agreements with France.82 MPEP was designed to let selected US military personnel make temporary one-­ for-­one exchanges with personnel from foreign services and vice versa. The participants of MPEP are expected to integrate fully into the host organizations as if they belonged to the service to which they have been

 [64].  [65]. 82  [66]. 80 81

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assigned.83 The exchange usually lasts about 24 months, so during this period, exchange personnel should be embedded as members of the host military. MPEP has two specific missions: sharing expertise and building military-to-military relations.84 The program excludes the PLA because it requires a high level of security trust and is usually conducted between allies. The reason for including MPEP here is that the analysis on implementation discretion requires a recurring program that has been fully implemented for a long time. MPEP has many participants, and it could be reasonably used as a reference for public diplomacy towards China. The Game Plan Although not a fully implemented program, the Game Plan (and its cancellation) is also considered a case study in this book. Unlike other exchange programs with substantial exchange activities, the Game Plan is investigated due to the Congressional scrutiny it received, which resulted in its cancellation. The Game Plan called for 80 military-to-military activities in 1999, including “12 high-level visits by Pentagon and PLA officials, 40 functional exchanges of working-level military officials, 16 confidence-­ building measures and 13 international security meetings.”85 Also included were PLA observation of training maneuvers by the Third Army, paratroop operations by the 82nd Airborne Division, briefings on logistics, and a trip to Sandia National Laboratory.86 The content of the Game Plan raised concerns from Congress officials. In a letter to Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Representative Dana Rohrabacher wrote that “after reviewing the ‘Game Plan,’ it appears evident that a number of events involving PLA logistics, acquisitions, quartermaster and chemical corps representatives may benefit PLA modernization to the detriment of our allies in the Pacific region and, ultimately, the lives of own service members.”87 Later in 2001, Senator Bob Smith and Representative Rohrabacher wrote to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, expressing concerns about renewed military contacts with China. Their concerns and discontent led to the revision of the FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to prohibit the  [67].  [68]. 85  [69]. 86  [70]. 87  [71]. 83 84

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Secretary of Defense from authorizing any military-to-military contact with the PLA if that contact would “create a national security risk due to an inappropriate exposure” of the PLA to key operational areas.88 Defense Secretaries were also required to submit reports that explained whether any military contact with China in that year was a “violation” of the restrictions. In general, the cancellation of the Game Plan demonstrated stricter Congressional restrictions on US–China military-to-military exchange.  oreign Military Education and Training F The DoD offers a variety of training programs to foreign militaries, including the Global Peace Operations Initiative, IMET, Regional Centers for Security Studies, the Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, and the Foreign Academy Exchange Program. This study focuses on IMET, which excludes China because the program is the most prominent practice of military education and training to foreign military personnel in the DoD. It is based on the rationale that aims to assist the development of foreign military while promoting democratic values. IMET IMET is a security assistance program of granted aid, which provides training to military students from allied and friendly nations.89 Authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 with annual appropriations requested by the President and approved by Congress, IMET is administered by the DoS and implemented by the DoD’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency.90 The DoS offers coordination as well as guidance and determines participating countries, while the DoD manages and executes the program.91 Together with Foreign Military Sales, the Professional Military Exchange Program, and Unit Exchange, IMET belongs to the 88  These areas include force projection operations, nuclear operations, advanced combinedarms and joint combat operations, advanced logistical operations, chemical and biological defense and other capabilities relating to weapons of mass destruction, surveillance and reconnaissance operations, joint warfighting experiments and other activities related to transformations in warfare, military space operations, other advanced capabilities of the Armed Forces, arms sales or military-related technology transfers, release of classified or restricted information, and access to a DoD laboratory. 89  IMET, along with Foreign Military Sales, the Professional Military Exchange (PME) program, and Unit Exchange, comprise the US Security Assistance Training Program (SATP). 90  [72]. 91  [73].

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US Security Assistance Training Program.92 The objective of IMET is summarized as supporting democracy, good governance, and human rights, and enabling foreign militaries’ capacities for joint operations.93 To achieve this objective, IMET offers courses relating to these values and helps to target countries in order to operationalize them in combat and non-combat situations. According to many official documents, the recipient countries of IMET are selected based on two criteria: first, they should be either allies or friendly nations, and second, they should be financially incapable or low-­ income countries. Students of these countries take courses at 150 US military schools.94 Courses made available to IMET grant recipients can be divided into two main categories: professional military education and technical training. Professional military education is designed to prepare recipients for leadership positions, while technical training courses equip students with the skills required to operate specific weapons systems or fulfill the demands of a specific military occupational specialty.95 E-IMET, authorized by the amended Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 in 1991, is an extended form of IMET, which broadens the training to relevant civilian members of foreign governments in particular courses, as well as the types of training provided.96 It focuses on teaching professional-level management skills, improving the efficacy of the military and judicial systems, and strengthening military codes of conduct.97 According to the DoD and DoS Joint Reports to Congress on Foreign Military Training, students from many countries in the world took part in IMET, except high-income countries and “less-friendly” nations such as China, Russia, Venezuela, Iran, Belarus, Palestine, and Myanmar.98 Military personnel from these “less-friendly” countries were included in less-systematic educational training programs at Regional Centers for Security Studies, but they were excluded from IMET. No official ­document explicitly explained why China has been excluded from IMET, but according to existing data, the reason could be that China is a US competitor, not a friend. Official documents such as the China Military Power Report  [74].  [75]. 94  [76]. 95  [77]. 96  [78, 79]. 97  [79]. 98  [29]. 92 93

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and political rhetoric have all treated China as a US competitor or even an enemy.  he HA/DR Exchange T The US–China HA/DR exchange is a special program that has endured for years. It is perhaps the DoD’s most institutionalized exchange with the PLA.  According to the DoD’s joint publication on humanitarian assistance, HA/DR mainly relieves or reduces endemic conditions such as human suffering, disease, hunger, and privation for universal human values.99 The HA/DR exchange program was designed to reduce conflicts, increase practical deconfliction between the two countries, and enable a better understanding of each other’s procedures in the event of a real-­ world disaster.100 It also aimed at making China a proactive member of the Asia-Pacific region. The US–China HA/DR exchange started in 2005 and has been held at multiple locations in both countries following the reciprocity principle. Even when there were frictions between the two countries, the exchange has never been canceled like other exchange programs. The HA/DR program focuses on practical and field interactions as well as personal interactions. According to US officials, the HA/DR program has developed and matured from basic visits and briefings into a substantive exchange that uses tabletop and practical field exchanges to focus and facilitate interaction and enhances the capacity to “deconflict” HA/DR operations between the US Army and the PLA.101 Previous records show that the program format varies year on year, depending on the host organization. It is a non-linear process—in some years, the HA/DR exchanges were more in-depth, while in others, the format was less fixed, depending on the bilateral relations and available resources. For example, the 2017 US–China HA/DR exchange was on a flooding scenario in which both armies provided humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.102 In 2015 the 10th exchange only included visits and briefings in Hawaii and did not include a practical field exchange. Similarly, the 12th exchange that took place in 2016 in Yunnan, China, only included visits to different Chinese agencies involved with disaster management.  [80].  [81]. 101  [81]. 102  [81]. 99

100

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Three years before in 2013, the program included a Practical Field Exchange along with Expert Academic Discussions.103 In 2012, the exchange was hosted by China and its highlight was a tabletop exercise based on an international HA/DR earthquake scenario.104 This was the first of its kind during the US–China HA/DR exchanges. I nter-regional Web and Magazine Initiatives The TRWI and the TRMI are usually grouped together as they are both programs of MISOs by US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). They were part of the information operation efforts that consisted of a collection of specific programs, including military information support teams, web-based initiatives, and collaboration with private industry throughout the area of responsibility.105 The TRWI The TRWI’s core aim was to build a series of news and information websites in support of the “geographic combatant command’s countering violent extremism objectives.”106 These websites were designed to counter misinformation and inaccurate information provided by extremist websites. More broadly, as Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England stated, developing these websites was “an essential part of (their) responsibility … to shape the security environment in their respective areas.”107 Specifically, these websites aimed to shape the global media landscape through internet technologies, such as slideshows, video content syndication or podcasts, blogs, streaming video/audio, and advanced search.108 TRWI websites are run much in the same way as any normal web-media portal. According to a hearing by USSOCOM, the ten websites across six geographic regions published factual content six days a week, 24 hours a day, in 23 languages.109 The content for these websites was produced by local journalists hired to cover stories that fit the Pentagon’s goals for the initiative, such as promoting democracy, security, good government, and

 [82].  [83]. 105  [84]. 106  [32, 85]. 107  [86]. 108  [87]. 109  [88]. 103 104

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the rule of law.110 Specifically, they published content by native/Indigenous contributors with backgrounds in politics, academics, security, culture, and entertainment, which appealed to identified foreign target audiences.111 The target regions of the TRWI were the Balkans, Trans-Sahara or North Africa, Iraq, the Middle East, Central Asia/Pakistan, and Latin America.112 The TRWI was ordered to close down in 2014 following criticism of its ineffectiveness and lack of coordination with other public diplomacy efforts. The TRMI The TRMI refers to quarterly magazines published for six geographic Combatant Commands.113 It was established and maintained by USSOCOM and Unified Combatant Command. The magazines develop, synchronize, and coordinate military-to-military information and message for overseas contingency operations or Special Operations activities in support of US government objectives.114 In other words, the program’s aim is to offer information to support military operations. The content of the magazines varies by Combatant Command. Each issue usually contains 60–80 pages.115 According to official data, the magazines have reached more than 90,000 senior military leaders and defense officials in 12 languages across 171 countries worldwide.116 The magazine that targets the Chinese military audience is the Indo-­ Pacific Defense Forum. It is Indo-Pacific Command’s publication in the form of a website that provides “an international forum” for military personnel of the Indo-Pacific areas.117 The articles are available in English, Chinese, Indonesian, Thai, Korean, and Japanese, which cover not only the Indo-Pacific region but also other parts of the world.118 The production of the magazines was contracted out to a private consulting company,  [86].  [89]. 112  [32]. 113  They include Southern Command’s Diálogo Americas, PACOM’s Indo-Pacific Defense Forum, European Command’s Per Concordiam, African Command’s African Defense Forum, Northern Command’s Agora, and Central Command’s Unipath. 114  [88]. 115  [90]. 116  [88]. 117  [91]. 118  See Indo-Pacific Defense Forum’s website in Chinese: http://apdf-magazine.com/ zh-hans/. 110 111

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Booz Allen Hamilton, which in turn hired journalists to work on the stories.119 These journalists deliver content such as original features, news, sports, entertainment, economics, politics, cultural reports, business, and similar items of interest to targeted readers.120  ublic Diplomacy Strategy-Making Towards China P Strategy-making is an important step in the process of public diplomacy implementation. It interprets abstract goals and turns them into operationalized plans. Theoretically, strategy-making is subject to discretion and can apply meaning to public diplomacy. In this book, I include the DoD’s strategy-making of public diplomacy towards China as well as its reaction to Obama’s Strategic Communication Framework because it suggests implementation bias. The overall public diplomacy goal in the DoD is to build relationships and forge a secure operative environment. The objective to engage China was stated as reducing miscalculations and urging China to become a responsible regional actor. The gap between these two purposes may indicate implementation discretion, which could be explained by theories. Therefore, by including this case, this study looks at not only the practices of public diplomacy programs but also the process of strategy-making. Generalization to a Broader Level On the level of looking to apply general conclusions from US–China relations to other regions, the cases have broader implications because they are not specifically designed for China—they are part of the US global public diplomacy network. For instance, EducationUSA is officially defined as a network of international student-advising in 178 countries. The practice of EducationUSA in China is one part of this massive network. Therefore, studying the implementation of EducationUSA may shed light on its implementation in other parts of the world. Similarly, the model of visits and exchanges between the US and Chinese militaries are routine practices of military-to-military contact between the US and other countries. The results of analyzing these military programs with China can be applied to similar practices with other countries.

 [92].  [85].

119 120

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Analyzing these programs has general implications for the broader literature on public diplomacy and international relations. The selected cases demonstrate the routine practice of US public diplomacy and the liberal mentality to integrate China into the global order. They are components of the American global public diplomacy network. Therefore, analyzing US public diplomacy towards China sheds light on its practice in other countries and regions. Also, examination of the Asia-Pacific Rebalance Policy as a background to these public diplomacy efforts helps to situate this study within the international relations literature. As discussed earlier, the objective of integrating China into the global system as a pillar of the Rebalance Policy represents two streams of liberalism: interdependence theory and democratic peace theory. Examining public diplomacy as an instrument of the foreign policy of the Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific is an attempt to elaborate on the liberal foundation of public diplomacy and to determine whether this liberal objective can be achieved through public diplomacy.

Conclusion This chapter is a summary of the public diplomacy programs under scrutiny in this volume. It introduces how DoS and DoD define public diplomacy and outlines US public diplomacy towards China by these two institutions, including the reason to choose them for the analysis of public diplomacy implementation as well as their objectives. These programs are either prominent or include/exclude China as the target audience. The next chapter deals with the theoretical foundation of public diplomacy and implementation that guides the analyses in the following chapters. The purpose is to answer the questions of why and how implementation theories can be applied to explain public diplomacy and why that is important for the field of public diplomacy.

References 1. US Department of State. 2012–2018. Department of State Operations Congressional Budget Justification. Washington, DC: US Department of State. 2. ———. 2010. Public Diplomacy: Strengthening U.S.  Engagement with the World: A Strategic Approach for the 21st Century. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

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3. Walker, Vivian S., Shawn Baxter, and Kristina Zamary. 2015. Comprehensive Annual Report on Public Diplomacy and International Broadcasting. Washington, DC: US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. 4. US Department of State. 2012. Executive Budget Summary: Function 150 and Other International Programs. Washington, DC: US Department of State. 5. ———. 2019. Foreign Affairs Manual: 1 FAM 350 Bureau of International Information Programs. Washington, DC: US Department of State. 6. ———. 2018. Foreign Affairs Manual: 1 FAM 340 Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. Washington, DC: US Department of State. 7. US Department of State Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. About ECA. https://eca.state.gov/about-­bureau. Accessed February 4, 2022. 8. Fisher, Ali. 2013. Collaborative Public Diplomacy: How Transnational Networks Influenced American Studies in Europe. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 9. Secretary of State. 2015. Congressional Budget Justification Volume 1: Department of State Operations Fiscal Year 2015. Washington, DC: US Department of State. 10. US Department of State and US Agency for International Development. 2007. Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2007–2012. Washington, DC: US Department of State and US Agency for International Development. 11. US Department of State Bureau of the Comptroller and Global Financial Services. 2013. Joint State-USAID Strategic Goals. Washington, DC: US Department of State and US Agency for International Development. 12. US Department of State and US Agency for International Development. 2013. Strategic Plan FY 2014–2017. Washington, DC: US Department of State and US Agency for International Development. 13. Wallin, Matthew. 2015. Military Public Diplomacy: How the Military Influences Foreign Audiences. Washington, DC: American Security Project. 14. Williams, Abiodun. 2009. The U.S. Military and Public Diplomacy. In Toward a New Public Diplomacy: Redirecting U.S.  Foreign Policy, ed. Philip Seib, 217–237. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 15. Obama, Barack. 2009. Interagency Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication. Washington, DC: The White House. 16. Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2011. Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Operational Planning. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense. 17. Gates, Robert. 2009. Department of Defense Report on Strategic Communication. Washington, DC: Department of Defense. 18. Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2017. Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense. 19. ———. 2012. Joint Publication 3-13: Information Operations. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense. 20. ———. 2010. Joint Publication 3-61: Public Affairs. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense.

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21. Department of the Army. 2011. FM 3-57: Civil Affairs Operations. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense. 22. Pamment, James, and Karin Gwinn Wilkins. 2018. Communicating National Image Through Development and Diplomacy: The Politics of Foreign Aid. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. 23. Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2010. Joint Publication 3-13.2: Military Information Support Operations. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense. 24. Hanauer, Larry, Stuart Johnson, Christopher Springer, Chaoling Feng, Michael J. McNerney, Stephanie Pezard, and Shira Efron. 2014. Evaluating the Impact of the Department of Defense Regional Centers for Security Studies. Washington, DC: RAND Corporation. 25. Cottey, Andrew, and Anthony Forster. 2004. Introduction-Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance. The Adelphi Papers 44 (365): 5–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/714027950. 26. Foreign Assistance Act. §§ 2151 et seq., 1961. U.S. Code 22. 27. Taw, Jennifer M. 1993. The Effectiveness of Training International Military Students in Internal Defense and Development. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 28. Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2017. Joint Publication 3-20: Security Cooperation. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense. 29. Department of Defense, and Department of State. 2014. Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest: Joint Report to Congress 2013–2014. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense and US Department of State. 30. Cruz, Marissa. 2015. How the U.S. Military Engages in Public Diplomacy. Los Angeles: USC Center on Public Diplomacy. 31. Grower, Jason P. 2013. Joint Responders. Proceedings 139 (4): 28–32. 32. Rumbaugh, Russell, and Matthew Leatherman. 2012. The Pentagon as Pitchman: Perception and Reality of Public Diplomacy. Washington, DC: Stimson. 33. US Department of Defense. 2017. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense. 34. USC Center on Public Diplomacy. What is Public Diplomacy? http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/page/what-­pd. Accessed February 4, 2022. 35. Cohen, William. 1998. The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-­ Pacific Region. Washington, DC: Department of Defense. 36. Kan, Shirley A. 2014. U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 37. Helvey, David. 2013. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (East Asia) David Helvey Holds a Defense Department News Briefing on Military and Security

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Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China. Political Transcript Wire. 38. US Department of Defense. 2014. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense. 39. ———. 2016. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense. 40. Denmark, Abraham M. 2016. Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asia Abraham M. Denmark Holds a Press Briefing in the Pentagon Briefing Room. https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/759664/ deputy-­assistant-­secretary-­for-­east-­asia-­abraham-­m-­denmark-­holds-­a-­press-­ briefi/. Assessed February 17, 2022. 41. US Department of Defense. 2010. United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense. 42. ———. 2013. United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Request. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense. 43. Committee on Appropriations, US Senate. 2009. Department of Defense Appropriations for FY 2010. Washington, DC: US Senate. 44. Committee on Appropriations, US House of Representatives. 2010. Department of Defense Appropriations for FY 2011. Washington, DC: US House of Representatives. 45. Committee on Appropriations, US Senate. 2013. Department of Defense Appropriations for FY 2014: Senate Hearings Before the Committee on Appropriations. Washington, DC: US Senate. 46. Committee on Appropriations, US House of Representatives. 2014. Department of Defense Appropriations for FY 2015: House Hearings Before the Committee on Appropriations. Washington, DC: US House of Representatives. 47. ———. 2015. Department of Defense Appropriations for FY 2016: House Hearings Before the Committee on Appropriations. Washington, DC: US House of Representatives. 48. Obama, Barack. 2010. National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington, DC: The White House. 49. ———. 2015. National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington, DC: The White House. 50. Pamment, James. 2012. New Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century: A Comparative Study of Policy and Practice. New York: Routledge. 51. US Department of State. 2018. Foreign Affairs Manual: 10 FAM 220 Academic Programs. Washington, DC: Department of State. 52. ———. 2018. Foreign Affairs Manual: 10 FAH-1 H-000 Public Diplomacy. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

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53. ———. n.d. EducationUSA. https://educationusa.state.gov/. Accessed February 4, 2022. 54. China Daily. 2011. Interview with Senior Officials at EducationUSA China. March 28. 55. US Department of State. 2017. 2017 EducationUSA Forum. https://educationusa.state.gov/events/2017-­educationusa-­forum (webpage removed). Accessed July 4, 2017. 56. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs US Department of State. 2017. IVLP Fact Sheet 2017. https://www.globaltiesus.org/storage/documents/ IVLP_Fact_Sheet_2017.pdf. Accessed February 4, 2022. 57. Secretary of State. 2012. Congressional Budget Justification Volume 1: Department of State Operations Fiscal Year 2012. Washington, DC: US Department of State. 58. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs US State Department. n.d. International Visitor Leadership Program. https://eca.state.gov/ivlp. Accessed February 4, 2022. 59. Goetz, Robert. 2015. Chinese Officers Visit 12th FTW Squadrons, AETC Headquarters. http://www.jbsa.mil/News/News/Article/598570/chinese-­ officers-­visit-­12th-­ftw-­squadrons-­aetc-­headquarters/. Accessed February 4, 2022. 60. US Department of Defense. 2013. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense. 61. National Defense University. 2014. Annual Report for Academic Year 2013–2014. Washington, DC: National Defense University. 62. Marine Corps Base Hawaii. 2012. National Defense University-PLA Tour. https://www.dvidshub.net/image/613073/national-­defense-­university-­pla-­ tour. Accessed February 4, 2022. 63. National Defense University. 2014. PLA NDU Delegation Visits US Counterpart at Fort McNair. https://www.ndu.edu/News/Article-­View/ Article/572645/pla-­ndu-­delegation-­visits-­us-­counterpart-­at-­fort-­mcnair/. Accessed February 4, 2022. 64. China Military Online. 2015. U.S. Military Capstone Delegation Visits PLA Shenyang MAC. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseNews/2015-­03/27/content_4577209.htm. Accessed February 4, 2022. 65. Kerr, Carol. 2014. PLA Officers Engage Army War College Students. https:// www.army.mil/article/138906/pla_officers_engage_army_war_college_students. Accessed February 4, 2022. 66. Suits, Devon L. 2019. Building Relationships, Interoperability through Exchange Program. https://www.army.mil/article/224669/building_relationships_interoperability_through_exchange_program. Accessed February 4, 2022.

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67. Perez, Andrea. 2013. Personnel Exchange Program Can Take You Places. https://www.militarynews.com/norfolk-­navy-­flagship/news/top_stories/ personnel-­exchange-­program-­can-­take-­you-­places/article_a0efb0bb-­4418-­57 6e-­807f-­925261a44ea3.html. Accessed February 17, 2022. 68. Department of the Army. 2011. Army Military Personnel Exchange Program with Military Services of Other Nations. Washington, DC: Department of the Army. 69. Washington Times. 1999. Military Exchange with Beijing Raises Security Concerns. February 19. 70. Pollpeter, Kevin. 2004. U.S.–China Security Management: Assessing the Military-to-Military Relationship. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 71. Kan, Shirley A. 2009. U.S.–China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 72. Larson, Charles R. 1993. IMET: A Cornerstone of Cooperative Engagement. DISAM Journal 15 (4): 96–102. 73. Defense Security Cooperation Agency. n.d. International Military Education and Training. http://www.dsca.mil/programs/international-­military-­ education-­training-­imet. Accessed February 4, 2022. 74. Departments of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. 2011. Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training. Washington, DC: Departments of the Army the Navy and the Air Force. 75. Cottey, Andrew, and Anthony Forster. 2004. Conclusion-Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Cooperation and Assistance. The Adelphi Papers 44 (365): 69–78. https://doi.org/10.1080/05679320412331340247 . 76. Secretary of State. 1998. Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations Fiscal Year 1999. Washington, DC: US Department of State. 77. Federation of American Scientists. International Military Education and Training. https://fas.org/asmp/campaigns/training/IMET2.html#_ftn5 (now removed). Accessed May 26, 2019. 78. McCoy, William H., Jr. 1994. Senegal and Liberia: Case Studies in US IMET Training and Its Role in Internal Defense and Development. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 79. US Government Accounting Office. 1992. Observation on Post-Cold War Program Changes. Washington, DC: US Government Accounting Office. 80. Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2019. Joint Publication 3-29: Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense. 81. Barbour, Nathan H. 2017. U.S., Chinese Troops Attend Disaster Management Exchange. https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1380334/us-­ chinese-­troops-­attend-­disaster-­management-­exchange/. Accessed February 4, 2022.

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82. USARPAC Public Affairs US Department of Defense. 2013. US, China Conduct Disaster Management Exchange. https://www.army.mil/article/115267/us_china_conduct_disaster_management_exchange. Accessed February 4, 2022. 83. Dodson, Russell. 2012. US and China Focus on Disaster Management. https://www.army.mil/article/92736/us_and_china_focus_on_disaster_ management. Accessed August 14, 2018. 84. Wald, Charles. 2006. New Thinking at EUCOM: The Phase 0 Campaign. Joint Forces Quarterly 43 (4): 72–75. 85. Senate Armed Services Committee. 2011. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. Washington, DC: Senate Armed Services Committee. 86. USA Today. 2008. Pentagon Launches Foreign News Websites. April 30. 87. Washington Post. 2008. Pentagon Sustains Focus on Information Operations in War on Terrorism. December 1. 88. US Central Command Special Operations Command and Transportation Command. 2013. Hearing on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on Armed Services. Washington, DC: House of Representatives. 89. US Special Operations Command of Department of Defense. 2008. USSOCOM Trans Regional Web Initiative Solicitation. https://www.fbo.gov /?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=bc9c5ebfffe728b044553ddbf6092983&t ab=core&_cview=0 (webpage removed). Accessed May 4, 2020. 90. Rugh, William A. 2014. Front Line Public Diplomacy: How US Embassies Communicate with Foreign Publics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 91. Indo-Pacific Defense Forum. About Us. https://apdf-­magazine.com/about­us/. Accessed August 27, 2019. 92. Washington Post. 2013. Plenty of Magazines to Go Around. May 8.

CHAPTER 3

Implementation and Public Diplomacy

The Dual Role of Implementation Implementation is utilized both as a practical process and as a methodology in this book. It refers to the process of translating a public diplomacy policy goal—the specific order given to a governmental institution in order to achieve the general foreign policy goal—into public diplomacy practices and impact. In addition, it refers to a research method focusing on implementation and accepting the prerequisite of discretion from implementation theory. The Implementation Process of Public Diplomacy Implementation is a process that translates a policy order into practice on the ground. Public diplomacy implementation can be considered as a process of turning the public diplomacy policy goal into an impact (see Fig. 3.1). This process contains two steps. The first step is transforming the public diplomacy goal into public diplomacy strategies and tactics. A public diplomacy policy goal order is given to the government institutions to support an ordinarily general foreign policy objective. I treat public diplomacy goals of the DoS and the DoD as given, and I am not concerned with why and how they were selected and decided. Identifying the public diplomacy policy goals is important because it helps to understand © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. Wu, U.S. Public Diplomacy Towards China, Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95644-8_3

53

Practice

Evaluation

Feedback/Policy Learning

Strategy & Tactics

Fig. 3.1  The public diplomacy implementation process

PD Policy Goal

PD Implementation

Foreign Publics & Foreign Policy

PD Impact

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what the implementing institutions were instructed to do. It also defines a clear starting point for this study. The second step is public diplomacy practice, including strategy-­making and program practice. Implementing institutions interpret the public diplomacy goal and formulate strategies and tactics to put that goal into practice. From the given public diplomacy goal to the public diplomacy strategies and then tactics, implementing actors make decisions about how to implement the public diplomacy goal. Then public diplomacy programs are designed and carried out accordingly. First, implementers may decide which public diplomacy program or activity best suits the objective. They may choose educational and cultural exchanges, or they may use mass media to engage with foreign publics. Second, implementers also make multiple choices when they carry out public diplomacy programs and activities. For example, they may alter the program according to organizational culture or they may induce discretion when facing resource constraints. Through implementation, public diplomacy makes an impact as the consequences of practices. It impacts foreign publics and foreign policy. Implementers understand the impacts of public diplomacy through evaluation. They measure the impact of public diplomacy programs and activities. The results of this evaluation can inform future policy-making or goal-making in public diplomacy through feedback. Theoretically, implementers learn from evaluation and then use it to redefine public diplomacy. This process is considered as policy evolution or policy learning.1 In policy evolution, implementation reshapes its policy goal into a new one based on feedback.2 Ultimately, public diplomacy implementation not only shapes results but also affects public diplomacy goals over time. Implementation Discretion As a link in the larger policy circle, implementation refers not only to the process that produces policy results which is distinct from policy formation but also to a research method that directly examines this conduct of execution where actors exercise discretion.3 In fact, the phenomenon of slippage is the central implication of implementation as a research method. The existence of discretion is the foundational block of implementation research. The overriding debate in the literature on policy implementation  [40].  [37]. 3  [52]. 1 2

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concentrates on whether the behavior of practitioners should be precisely prescribed by policy decisions, or whether they need to use their discretion to interpret and modify the policy objective.4 The former approach is top-­ down and the latter is bottom-up. The top-down model assumes that policy implementation starts with a decision made by the central government and is constrained by those who make policy choices. Implementation research thus deals with the task of understanding how the policy was first characterized and analyzing the difficulties in achieving these objectives.5 For example, Jeffrey L.  Pressman and Aaron B.  Wildavsky considered implementation as an “interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieve them.”6 In other words, the key to this group of implementation studies is to understand whether or not implementation remained true to the characterization of policy. While the top-down model focuses on policy decisions, the bottom-up approach values the actions of street-level bureaucrats and argues that these actions shape policy output. Rather than considering the policy goal as the only input that directs implementation practices, the bottom-up perspective acknowledges that people at the local level do have the agency to “exercise discretion under intolerable pressures” and that this discretion is not only inevitable but also has a positive impact. On the one hand, as argued by bottom-up believers, it is unrealistic to expect policy designers to be able to control the actions of street-level practitioners.7 On the other hand, the discretion of implementers is a beneficial factor because frontline workers were seen to be much closer to the real problems than central policy-makers.8 Why Implementation Can Give Meaning to Policy? The field of public policy implementation emerged in the 1970s with the recognition of the independent effect of implementation on policy outcomes.9 Mazmanian and Sabatier provided a widely agreed definition of implementation:  [27].  [52]. 6  [51]. 7  [39]. 8  [28, 52]. 9  [1]. 4 5

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Implementation is the carrying out of a basic policy decision, usually incorporated in a statute but which can also take the form of important executive orders or court decisions. Ideally, that decision identifies the problems to be addressed, stipulates the objectives to be pursued, and in a variety of ways, “structure” the implementation process.10

This definition separates policy implementation from policy formation. Some scholars of policy implementation posit the process implementation as a missing link in a larger policy cycle.11 The policy cycle includes stages or phrases from policy formation to implementation and to evaluation.12 Policy formation is also considered as policy input, and evaluation refers to policy outcome. Policy implementation is the process that results in certain policy output.13 Hill and Hupe identified the problems of confusing policy output with outcome and suggested that output may be affected by non-policy-related factors, and the policy outcome should be a judgment to policy-making, not implementation.14 According to Palumbo and Calista, policy implementers are crucial to the policy networks that shape policy.15 Early studies in public policy assumed that implementers simply carry out policies without any agency.16 Later studies separated off policy implementation as a subfield and argued that implementers shape policy in many different ways.17 Hargrove, as well as Pressman and Wildavsky, complained that there was no literature on policy implementation.18 Those who study policy implementation are also divided into two camps. Early implementation studies assumed that policy implementation was separated from other parts of the policy cycle.19 The underlying supposition is that they consider the policy cycle as a linear process from policy-making to policy implementation and evaluation. In the late 1980s, scholars started to argue that implementers play a significant role at all stages of the policy-making process.20  [41].  [25, 29]. 12  [13, 32]. 13  [16]. 14  [27]. 15  [4]. 16  [28]. 17  [4]. 18  [25, 51]. 19  [51]. 20  [4, 12, 20, 58]. 10 11

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Theories of policy implementation are trying to answer the following basic question: what during the process of implementation affects the policy output?21 Scholars of public policy have offered multiple explanations as to why this happens, which include organizational culture and interests, the measurability of goals, and resources. Organizational culture or interests exert influence through implementation. It refers not only to what organizations do and how they do it, but also to available resources.22 Measurability of goals signifies goals that are easy to measure. Organizations tend to “give most of their attention to the more easily measured outcomes at the expense of those less easily observed or counted.”23 Therefore, these measurable outcomes induce implementation discretion that focuses on a few specific indicators and targets, usually the most achievable or saleable, at the expense of the overall objectives. Resources refer to the availability of means to implement policies. When the resource is limited, implementers are likely to set priorities and reallocate resources according to their own judgment based on where the richest opportunities for risk reduction lie and to minimize activities in other program areas.24

Meanings of Public Diplomacy in Theory Public diplomacy is a term with contested meanings. Its various connotations for different actors under different contexts relate to the rapid changes and challenges brought about by globalization, as well as the theoretical developments of multiple academic disciplines. A review of public diplomacy definitions in the literature sets the boundary for this research, and also clarifies and differentiates the relationship between public diplomacy and other related concepts, as well as situating the study in the relevant literature. The term “public diplomacy” was coined in 1965 by Edmund Gullion, a retired Foreign Service Officer who was the Dean of the Fletcher School at Tufts University.25 Since then, the meaning of public diplomacy has been developed and expanded in theory and practice. Every public diplomacy author has their own distinct definition of what the term means. In  [27, 28, 48].  [3, 19, 31]. 23  [66]. 24  [62]. 25  [56]. 21 22

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general, scholars agreed that public diplomacy should target the general public in other countries, which sets it apart from traditional diplomacy. Traditional diplomacy usually refers to closed-door negotiations and communications between representatives of governments, whereas public diplomacy influences the general public in foreign societies.26 From the perspective of the target audience, public diplomacy is also different from public affairs, which usually aims at domestic audiences and internal socialization.27 Although not always explicitly explained by scholars, the way in which public diplomacy influences or engages foreign publics involves two mechanisms. Definitions of “public diplomacy” assume a two-step process where public opinion in the target country is first persuaded and then the public pressures its government to alter attitudes and policies that are hostile towards the other country.28 This approach of public diplomacy was subsequently replaced by a dialogical, relational, and collaborative paradigm, which relied on the rationale of showing others what is desirable in the expectation that it will be emulated, rather than “telling others what to do.”29 Moreover, public diplomacy activities target trust enhancement between the two countries, which may lead to cooperation or favorable policy. This process of demonstration and learning is usually achieved through engagement activities such as media campaigns, exchanges, and educational programs. The Purposes of Public Diplomacy Generally speaking, the majority of public diplomacy scholars settle on the notion that public diplomacy pursues the interests of the sponsor actor. Part of the literature implicitly or explicitly holds the view that public diplomacy empowers the sponsor organization. Some authors do not specify the nature of influence and merely suggest that public diplomacy is a process of influencing the public of foreign societies. For example, Robin Brown states that public diplomacy is an activity that is “intended to have an influence on external publics.”30 Nevertheless, the power relationship is  [55].  Melissen’s new public diplomacy challenged this traditional view of public diplomacy and suggests that it should not be separated from domestic socialization. See [43]. 28  [21]. 29  [65]. 30  [2]. 26 27

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embedded in their arguments and public diplomacy is believed to be an actor exerting an impact on foreign publics. Some scholars are more specific by stating that persuasion, influencing the attitudes and opinions of, and forging a favorable image among foreign publics is the purpose of public diplomacy. For instance, Joseph S. Nye states that public diplomacy is to “communicate with and attract the public of other countries.”31 Edward Comor and Hamilton Bean describe public diplomacy as an effort to “win support and favorable image among the general public of other countries.”32 Some authors directly connect public diplomacy with foreign policy goals. One approach expresses the view that public diplomacy was to directly “accomplish the goals of their [international actors’] foreign policy.”33 The other indirect perspective emphasizes that the aim of public diplomacy is to increase understanding of and support for a country’s specific foreign policies.34 The recent literature leans towards mutuality in public diplomacy. These studies believe that public diplomacy should be a mechanism to build relationships and foster mutual understanding as well as trust.35Cultural diplomacy and people-to-people contacts such as educational exchanges usually adopt this rationale.36 Instead of emphasizing the benefits resulting from the involvement of the sponsor actor, this relational approach argued that the desired outcome for public diplomacy was to reach common interests, mutual understanding, and benefits rather than to obtain the power to persuade.37 Some early studies call this approach the “tender-minded” school in public diplomacy, which maintains that public diplomacy should bypass short-term foreign policy objectives and focus on long-term national goals, such as creating a climate of mutual understanding.38 Others referred to this as a policy network model, which consisted of a set of non-hierarchical and interdependent relationships linking a variety of actors, who shared common interests about a policy.39 This network approach sees public diplomacy as a process of  [45].  [6]. 33  [10]. 34  [15, 63]. 35  [64]. 36  [7]. 37  [18]. 38  [60]. 39  [33]. 31 32

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actors exchanging resources to pursue shared interests and achieve common goals through cooperation. A few new approaches to public diplomacy have broadened its scope in terms of what it can do. These authors believed that public diplomacy could pursue a wide variety of objectives. For example, Jan Melissen claimed that (new) public diplomacy (as opposed to traditional public diplomacy, which is usually state-centric and one-way) could achieve both “soft power” and “hard power” goals, such as the establishment of links with civil society groups beyond the opinion gatekeepers in the fields of political dialogue, trade, and foreign investment, as well as alliance management, conflict prevention, and military intervention.40 The USC Center on Public Diplomacy emphasizes the role of public diplomacy in building “a secure global environment” through advancing mutual trust and productive relationships.41 R. S. Zaharna defines public diplomacy as an exchange of ideas to “bridge policy perspectives” from nations and political entities communicating in the global arena.42 More broadly, Manuel Castells proposes that public diplomacy should be the diplomacy of the public (not the government), and its objective is for social collectives and their cultures to share meaning and understanding in the international arena.43 Communication in Public Diplomacy Public diplomacy is essentially a process of communication. Definitions of “public diplomacy” have experienced a major evolution in terms of the mode of communication. Originally, public diplomacy mainly referred to informational activities during the Cold War. Public diplomacy was one-­ directional, from one government to foreign publics, and it aimed to influence foreign governments’ policies to become favorable to the foreign policy of the public diplomacy sponsor.44 This one-way approach usually takes advantage of the media’s information-dissemination function, which requires actors to acquire media relations skills, promotional, and persuasive strategies and techniques.45 Robert M. Entman, a media scholar, used  [42].  [64]. 42  [69]. 43  [5]. 44  [49]. 45  [33]. 40 41

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the term “mediated public diplomacy” to emphasize the media’s role in public diplomacy. Mediated public diplomacy specially refers to activities “using mass communication (including the Internet) to increase support of a country’s specific foreign policies among audiences beyond that country’s borders.”46 Nicholas J.  Cull called this “policy advocacy,” which means managing the international environment through active international communication for policy or interest promotion in the minds of a foreign public.47 It includes embassy media/press relations and informational work that involves daily communication through traditional and new media. Along with this mode of information projection, an implied two-step influence process was prevalent in early studies of public diplomacy.48 The first step refers to direct communication with foreign publics in order to affect their thinking, attitudes, and opinions. The second step is for the public to influence and pressure their own government for a friendlier policy towards the country that employs public diplomacy. For example, Gifford D.  Malone defined public diplomacy as “direct communication with foreign peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking and, ultimately, that of their governments.”49 Robert F.  Delaney suggested that public diplomacy actors “influence directly or indirectly those public attitudes and opinions which bear directly on another government’s foreign policy decisions.”50 However, this two-step model is downplayed in the current public diplomacy literature because of the ethical problem of using the public as an instrument to get to foreign governments and the changing landscape of global information. Some scholars of public diplomacy started to include models of two-way and symmetrical communication between the sponsor and the foreign public.51 Cull stresses the “listening” element in public diplomacy, which asks practitioners to understand the target audience and “manage the international environment by collecting and collating data about public and their opinions overseas and using that data to redirect its policy or its wider public diplomacy approach accordingly.”52  [15].  [10]. 48  [21]. 49  [38]. 50  [11]. 51  [35]. 52  [10]. 46 47

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Melissen’s definition of new public diplomacy moves away from the information-­dissemination model of one-way or two-way communication or coordination of relations with the press. Instead, according to him, public diplomacy should be “intellectual engagement, as well as political and social engagement.”53 Some scholars define public diplomacy against the backdrop of the internet era. Philip Seib points out that public diplomacy is challenged by “real-time diplomacy,” which is a result of the rapid spread of information facilitated by social media. Governments have to respond quickly to certain events or crises. Although public diplomacy should not be considered within arguments of technological determinism,54 new media such as the internet and smartphones allows more of the population to be reached and empowered.55 From this perspective, members of the target audience are no longer conduits to their government’s policy change; they are credible interpreters and receivers.56 Because of the influence from public relations as public diplomacy’s sister field, there was a relational return in the field of public diplomacy.57 As a result, many scholars define “public diplomacy” as a process of relationship building and management.58 The idea is to move beyond the traditional information projection model to a relational-based communication mode that facilitates mutuality and cooperation. The relational approach to public diplomacy situates actors in a non-hierarchical and networked society where public diplomacy practice is influenced by the networks of other actors. Public diplomacy may even be a collaboration of two or more actors working together to influence a wider public.59 Geoffrey Cowan and Amelia Arsenault developed a framework of multidirectional engagement in public diplomacy. They suggest that public diplomacy should be looked at from three perspectives: monologue, dialogue, and collaboration. Monologue refers to a one-way information projection. Dialogue is two-way communication with listening and feedback. Collaboration stands for a deeper relationship in which all parties engage in a partnership.60 According to Ali Fisher, collaborative public diplomacy  [43].  [53]. 55  [59]. 56  [44]. 57  [67, 70]. 58  [23]. 59  [17]. 60  [8]. 53 54

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should not be providing services; it should be based on co-decision-­ making at all levels. Foreign publics are conceptualized as participants rather than only recipients of information, and public diplomacy is no longer about “self-interests” but “dual interests” or shared common interests.61 This transition of communication mode also indicates the division of short- and long-term public diplomacy. Scholars such as Mark Leonard and Joseph Nye divide public diplomacy into three groups.62 The first and shortest dimension is daily communications and news management. It involves the explanation and advocacy of domestic and foreign policies. These public diplomacy activities usually last hours or days. The second dimension refers to strategic communication such as political and advertising campaigns. These usually occur over weeks, months, or even years. The third dimension includes relationship building and management, such as “scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars, conferences, and access to media channels.” It usually takes many years to establish stable relationships with key figures through these public diplomacy channels.63 As mentioned earlier, some public diplomacy authors argue that public diplomacy (cultural diplomacy) should focus on long-term goals rather than short-term foreign policy objectives. Public Diplomacy Actors In terms of public diplomacy actors, there has been a transition from a statist view to a multi-actor approach. Studies in the 1980s did not specify who controlled the information or who was the sponsor in public diplomacy.64 It was widely assumed that only governments utilized public diplomacy. These definitions of “public diplomacy” focus on its processes and purposes rather than the actors involved. For example, the classic definition of “public diplomacy” cited by most scholars is the Fletcher definition, which defines it as an activity that “deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies.”65 Similarly, Paul Sharp considers public diplomacy as “the process by which direct  [17, 33].  [34, 46]. 63  [46]. 64  [21]. 65  [14]. 61 62

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relations with people in a country are pursued to advance the interests and extend the values of those being represented.”66 Later definitions of public diplomacy, especially new public diplomacy, adjusted the concept according to the condition of globalization and information technology development.67 Many scholars assert that public diplomacy should include both state and non-state actors, such as international governmental organizations and institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multinational corporations, and individuals.68 There are different explanations among scholars about why non-state actors conduct public diplomacy. Some argue that non-state actors, especially corporations, practice public diplomacy because the images of their home countries affect their interests and businesses.69 This perspective considers non-state organizations as unofficial partners of states. Others believe that non-state actors such as NGOs mobilize foreign public opinion for their own public diplomacy policies and goals.70 Here, non-state groups also engage in governance separately from governments, not just as partners to governments.71 Nevertheless, these two standpoints both accept the influence of state and non-state actors on foreign publics. Another relative niche approach defined public diplomacy as a process of empowering the public rather than powerful organizations. It represents a “participatory turn” in public diplomacy literature that recognizes the projection of the values and ideas of the public in the international arena.72 This view is closely associated with the concept of the global public sphere, where the public mainly refers to social organizations that transcend the private. The private sphere is the domain of self-defined interests and values, whereas the public sphere was the domain of the shared interests and values.73 Public diplomacy is no longer about any powerful actors, whether state or non-state actors; it is about people’s voices and voicing in this global public sphere. In this sphere, people utilize public diplomacy to communicate and share. The needs of the citizens of civil society are

 [26].   21]. 68  [33, 42]. 69  [54]. 70  [42]. 71  [22]. 72  [5]. 73  [5]. 66

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placed before governance.74 In general, this expansion of public diplomacy actors takes into account the transformation of the informational environment where public diplomacy is at work. It is a response to globalization and the diffusion of power. Public Diplomacy and Related Concepts  ublic Diplomacy Versus Propaganda P Public diplomacy is often contrasted and compared with a few related concepts. Among these ideas, the most puzzling is the difference between public diplomacy and propaganda. Both propaganda and public diplomacy involve the process of persuasion, but propaganda is largely considered to have negative connotations. It is widely believed that the term implies information warfare with hostile or hidden intent, though some scholars have argued that propaganda was a neutral instrument.75 In the US, propaganda usually refers to activities of the US Information Agency (USIA), a stand-alone government body mainly to counter the influence of the Soviet Union during the Cold War.76 Public diplomacy was created to liberate informational practice from the “taint” of this dominant term. Some suggested that the main difference between public diplomacy and propaganda is that the former emphasized the “listening” aspect of communication (collecting data about the foreign publics and using that data to redirect public diplomacy and policy) while the latter comprised an asymmetrical exchange of information that always favors the sponsor.77 Others believe that public diplomacy puts human interactions in far less manipulative positions than propaganda.78 Nevertheless, public diplomacy carries the legacy of propaganda, and in many cases, it is the continuation of propaganda with updated means and ends. It is believed to be actors using interactive methods to communicate genuine content with foreign publics to achieve win-win results.79

 [50].   23]. 76  [57]. 77  [9]. 78  [61]. 79  [68]. 74

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 ublic Diplomacy Versus Soft Power P Another important concept usually associated with public diplomacy is soft power. While some scholars directly attribute the goal of public diplomacy to advancing foreign policies and national interests, other studies and political rhetoric attribute its purpose to the advancement of soft power. Essentially, both the approaches of policy and soft power accept the paradigm that people are targets of foreign policy, and the sponsoring actor is the one that is empowered in the process.80 Soft power is defined as the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment, whereas public diplomacy is an instrument that governments use to mobilize these resources to communicate with and attract the public of other countries.81 In other words, there are many ways to promote soft power,82 and public diplomacy is one of the tools that is used to do so.83 The concept of soft power not only captures actors’ capability of attraction, but also justifies public diplomacy programs by describing how attractiveness derived from an actor’s soft power assets such as culture, policies, or actions can be leveraged to achieve foreign policy ends.84  ublic Diplomacy Versus Cultural Diplomacy P Cultural diplomacy is sometimes used as an alternative term for public diplomacy. However, the literature characterizes cultural diplomacy as a special form of public diplomacy.85 Cull defined it as “an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment by making its cultural resources and achievements known overseas and/or facilitating cultural transmission abroad.”86 As one subset of public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy is often contrasted with short-term informational programs such as news management.87 Unlike public diplomacy programs such as international broadcasting that attend to short-term effects, cultural diplomacy mainly refers  [30].  [45]. 82  Nye suggests that other instruments of public diplomacy include national intelligence services, information agencies, diplomacy, public diplomacy, exchange programs, assistance programs, and training programs. See [47]. 83  [49]. 84  [26]. 85  [10]. 86  [10]. 87  [10]. 80 81

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to long-term campaigns to win the “hearts and minds” of the foreign public through the exchange of persons and overseas arts tours and exhibitions.88 The literature is also divided into two sections based on their attitudes about the relationship between cultural diplomacy and foreign policy. Philip H. Coombs proposed that educational and cultural relations should be the fourth dimension of US foreign policy. He argued that people-to-­ people contacts outside formal diplomatic channels could promote mutual understanding, which benefited the advancement of foreign policies.89 Other scholars and practitioners of cultural diplomacy are reluctant to associate cultural diplomacy with policy. They believe that public diplomacy overly emphasizing diplomatic objectives would “taint” cultural diplomacy. First of all, a cultural program “branded with a government’s logo” is usually seen as propaganda and less credible. Second, the relatively short-term nature of foreign policy conflicts with the long-term nature of cultural diplomacy programs. As Melissen argued, “it [cultural diplomacy] runs the risk of becoming counterproductive and indeed a failure when the foreign policy itself is perceived to be a failure.”90  ublic Diplomacy Versus Public Relations P The field of public diplomacy has also been connected with the field of public relations. The two fields seek similar objectives and use similar tools to reach the target audience.91 “Public relations” is defined as the management of communication between an organization and its publics.92 Some argued that it mainly dealt with the managing of the relationship between an organization (usually a business) or individual and the public.93 Public diplomacy aims at opinion and behavior change of the target audience in favor of the sponsor. It is usually described as a tool of public persuasion in a diplomatic context, and the roots of public diplomacy are in the persuasion industries of public relations, marketing, and advertising.94 Public relations research also fueled public diplomacy with practical strategies and best practices about how to practice effectively. For example, Kathy  [33].  [7]. 90  [42]. 91  [60]. 92  [24]. 93  [18]. 94  [36]. 88 89

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Fitzpatrick proposed both the theoretical and practical significances of applying the public relations theory of relationship management to public diplomacy, which challenged the fundamental power-based approach to public diplomacy. This relational model aims to achieve a win-win result rather than benefiting the public diplomacy sponsor. According to this perspective, public diplomacy should be more about managing relationships among state and non-state actors and less about communicating.95 However, there are criticisms about applying public relations and marketing skills to public diplomacy. It is argued that associating public diplomacy with public relations and marketing practices reduces public diplomacy to a tactic, while it should “provide appropriate context to foreign policy decisions and cope with social and political impetus not easily understood abroad.”96

Ideal Public Diplomacy Without Discretion What should public diplomacy look like in an ideal situation where no implementation discretion is exercised? This is a critical issue for this study of public diplomacy implementation because it lays the foundations for identifying the gap that exists in public diplomacy practice between what public diplomacy should be and what it is when it is implemented on the ground. It also implies that the meaning of public diplomacy is subject to change by implementation. Ideal Public Diplomacy in DoS According to the DoS, public diplomacy should serve two purposes: advancing mutual understanding between the US and foreign publics, and supporting US foreign policy, national interests, and national security. To achieve these objectives, DoS public diplomacy programs are supposed to understand, inform, engage, influence, and build relationships, partnerships, and coalitions with foreign publics. Therefore, the ideal public diplomacy of the DoS should directly engage with foreign publics in order to understand them, build relationships with them, and finally influence them for foreign policy purposes or simply advance mutual understanding. However, mutual understanding is a means to an end, which should  [18].  [21].

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ultimately serve a political impact. It could be advancing American values such as democracy and human rights; it could also be specific foreign policy purposes. An ideal public diplomacy program at the DoS should follow the above guidelines. EducationUSA China as an education-advising program should build relationships with Chinese prospective students in order to promote either mutual understanding between the US and Chinese students studying in the US or American values and/or foreign policy. The IVLP invites future leaders of foreign countries (in this case China) to visit the US and attend various exchange programs in different parts of the country. It should engage and build relationships with these emerging leaders. More importantly, the IVLP needs to make efforts to ensure that these leaders’ experiences in the US will lead to their future decisions being beneficial to US foreign policy and national interests. Ideal Public Diplomacy in DoD DoD public diplomacy programs tend to focus on military-to-military engagement. The general objective of their public diplomacy is to forge a secure operative environment and advance common views on security challenges between the US and foreign publics or militaries. This public diplomacy goal has two elements. The first element is similar to the DoS’s objective of mutual understanding. However, unlike the DoS’s mutual understanding as a means to an end, the DoD’s pursuit of common views on security issues directly points to the tactical idea of advancing interoperability and reducing miscalculation for national security purposes. The second element of the objective is to form a favorable global environment for US military operations. It could include strengthening US alliances, promoting American values, and maintaining US global influence. When it comes to China, the DoD has developed a more detailed goal for its public diplomacy. The objective of the DoD’s public diplomacy towards China includes reducing misunderstandings and persuading China to become a responsible regional actor, which is slightly different from the general public diplomacy goal of the DoD.  Specifically, four types of DoD public diplomacy programs towards China should follow these objectives to implement on the ground. US–China military exchanges and visits should primarily work towards the goal of reducing misunderstandings and miscalculations between the two militaries. For programs targeting other countries such as MPEP, they should have some

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tactical elements to improve interoperability so that a more secure environment can be established. Foreign military education and training aim to advance mutual understanding between the US and foreign militaries. This is also similar to the IVLP, in that the aim is to influence future foreign military leaders. Thus, ideally, it should ensure that education and training achieve such purposes. The US–China HA/DR Exchange Program mainly targets China as a responsible actor regionally, so it should ensure that China is contributing to regional security and stability. At the same time, two countries are cooperating in the field of HA/DR, so exchanging experiences and establishing common views are also important in this program. The TRWI and the TRMI mainly focus on the objective of increasing mutual understanding, but they have more specific security missions to perform as a result of communication such as counterterrorism. Ideally, these two programs should ensure that the security objectives are achieved. What Is Not Public Diplomacy? To better illustrate the scope of public diplomacy, it is also important to explain what public diplomacy is not. First, public diplomacy is not traditional state-to-state diplomacy. The definitions of “public diplomacy” have agreed that the target audience of public diplomacy is the foreign general public. Traditional diplomacy is usually practiced by professional diplomats and the process involves behind-the-scenes negotiations. Public diplomacy is relatively open and relies on communication methods such as international mass media and people-to-people engagement. Second, public diplomacy is not public relations. Although it borrows public relations theories and techniques in order to engage with foreign publics, its political nature or governance-related agenda set it apart from other public relations activities in fields such as international business. Third, public diplomacy is not public policy. Although the public policy actor is also the government and the target audience is the public, public policy usually involves affairs in the domestic arena.

Conclusion This chapter lays down the theoretical foundations and sets the scope for this study, which includes both implementation and public diplomacy. Implementation is not only a process stage that takes place between

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policy-making and policy outcome, but also a methodology that emphasizes the exercising of discretion. Implementation matters to public diplomacy because the practice induces biases that shape the programs’ outcomes as well as their meanings. Laying out this foundation is not only necessary to situate this study in the public diplomacy literature, but also critical for the implementation analysis in later chapters. The second half of the chapter explains the theoretical meaning of public diplomacy. It outlines how scholars have defined the meaning of public diplomacy and what public diplomacy looks like when there is no implementation discretion, as well as what public diplomacy is not.

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46. ———. 2010. The New Public Diplomacy. https://www.project-­syndicate. org/commentary/the-­new-­public-­diplomacy?barrier=accesspaylog. Accessed February 8, 2022. 47. ———. 2011. The Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs. 48. O’Toole, Laurence J., and Robert S.  Montjoy. 1984. Interorganizational Policy Implementation: A Theoretical Perspective. Public Administration Review 44 (6): 491–503. 49. Pamment, James. 2014. Articulating Influence: Toward a Research Agenda for Interpreting the Evaluation of Soft Power, Public Diplomacy and Nation Brands. Public Relations Review 40 (1): 50–59. 50. Pamment, James, and K.G. Wilkins. 2018. Introduction: New Dimensions in the Politics of Image and Aid. In Communicating National Image through Development and Diplomacy: The Politics of Foreign Aid, ed. James Pamment and K.G. Wilkins, 1–22. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. 51. Pressman, Jeffrey L., and Aaron B. Wildavsky. 1984. Implementation. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 52. Pülzl, Helga, and Oliver Treib. 2006. Implementing Public Policy. In Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods, ed. Frank Fischer, Gerald J.  Miller, and Mara S.  Sidney, 89–107. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. 53. Rawnsley, Gary D. 2021. Communications Technologies and Public Diplomacy: A History of the Tools of Statecraft. In The Frontiers of Public Diplomacy, 25–41. New York: Routledge. 54. Reinhard, Keith. 2009. American Business and its Role in Public Diplomacy. In Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy, ed. Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor, 195–200. New York: Routledge. 55. Ross, Christopher. 2002. Public Diplomacy Comes of Age. Washington Quarterly 25 (2): 73–83. 56. Rugh, William A. 2014. Front Line Public Diplomacy: How US Embassies Communicate with Foreign Publics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 57. Schindler, Caitlin E. 2018. The Origins of Public Diplomacy in US Statecraft: Uncovering a Forgotten Tradition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 58. Schwarz, John E. 1985. America’s Hidden Success: A Reassessment of Twenty Years of Public Policy. New York: W. W. Norton. 59. Seib, Philip. 2012. Real-Time Diplomacy: Politics and Power in the Social Media Era. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 60. Signitzer, Benno H., and Timothy Coombs. 1992. Public Relations and Public Diplomacy: Conceptual Convergences. Public Relations Review 18 (2): 137–147.

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61. Snow, Nancy. 2012. Public Diplomacy and Propaganda: Rethinking Diplomacy in the Age of Persuasion. E-International Relations. https:// www.e-­ir.info/2012/12/04/public-­diplomacy-­and-­propaganda-­rethinking-­ diplomacy-­in-­the-­age-­of-­persuasion/. 62. Sparrow, Malcolm K. 2011. The Regulatory Craft: Controlling Risks, Solving Problems, and Managing Compliance. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. 63. Tuch, Hans N. 1990. Communicating with the World: U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 64. USC Center on Public Diplomacy. What is Public Diplomacy? http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/page/what-­pd. Accessed February 8, 2022. 65. Van Ham, Peter. 2013. Social Power in Public Diplomacy. In Relational, Networking and Collaborative Approaches to Public Diplomacy: The Connective Mindshift, ed. R.S.  Zaharna, A.  Fisher, and A.  Arsenault, 1–27. New  York: Routledge. 66. Wilson, James Q. 1989. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. New York: Basic Books. 67. Yang, Aimei, Anna Klyueva, and Maureen Taylor. 2012. Beyond a Dyadic Approach to Public Diplomacy: Understanding Relationships in Multipolar World. Public Relations Review 38 (5): 652–664. 68. Zaharna, R.S. 2004. From Propaganda to Public Diplomacy in the Information Age. In War, Media and Propaganda: A Global Perspective, ed. Yahya R.  Kamalipour and Nancy Snow, 219–226. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 69. ———. 2018. Global Engagement: Culture and Communication Insights from Public Diplomacy. In The Handbook of Communication Engagement, ed. Kim A.  Johnston and Maureen Taylor, 313–330. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell. 70. Zaharna, R.S., Ali Fisher, and Amelia Arsenault. 2013. Relational, Networking and Collaborative Approaches to Public Diplomacy: The Connective Mindshift. New York: Routledge.

CHAPTER 4

The Mixed Impacts of Organizational Culture

The Effects of Organizational Culture Organizational culture is believed to have a deep impact on organizational processes, employees, and performance. Theories of implementation suggest that programs tend to be consonant with the organizational culture; those that do not fit with the organizational culture will be altered, neglected, or resisted in their implementation. This section mainly looks at the theoretical foundation of organizational culture and its effects on implementation. Specifically, it presents several mechanisms identified by the literature through which organizational culture induces implementation biases. Conceptualizing Organizational Culture Organizational culture is a core concept in many academic disciplines. As James Q. Wilson stated: “Every organization has a culture, that is, a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships within an organization.”1 It is defined and analyzed in the literature on public administration, business management, health management, education, and international relations. It has also been 1

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considered a major factor that explains organizational behaviors. In general, “organizational culture” is defined as a system of beliefs, values, norms, and practices that determine an organization’s behavior as it adapts to its external environment and manages its internal affairs.2 These meanings are expressed, affirmed, and communicated to the members of an organization through social processes such as modeling, reinforcement, and sanctions.3 It is believed that organizational culture may arise as a result of experience, critical practices, common educational training of employees, or the vision of organizational leaders.4 It has important consequences for the way in which employees, bureaucrats, and leaders of that organization make sense of the world and implement their tasks.5 In other words, organizational culture is pervasive and has a strong influence on organizational behavior.6 Organizational culture is not singular. An organization can have multiple cultures that coexist. It may consist of multiple groups that often oppose one another and have ambiguous cultural identities.7 An organizational culture may also have different levels. According to Edgar H. Schein, levels of organizational culture include artifacts, espoused beliefs and values, and underlying assumptions.8 Artifacts referred to visible organizational structure and processes. Espoused beliefs and values could be seen as an organization’s strategies, goals, and philosophies. They were usually justifications for organizational behaviors. Underlying assumptions were unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings. They were hard to detect, but were shared by members of the organization. Many studies of organizational culture adopted typologies and models to guide their research. For instance, Kim S. Cameron and Robert E.  Quinn classified four types of organizational culture: the hierarchy (control) culture, the market (compete) culture, the clan (collaborate) culture, and the adhocracy (create) culture.9 Geert Hofstede developed a model of four dimensions of organizational culture: means-oriented versus goal-oriented, internally driven versus externally driven, easygoing work  [2, 3].  [4, 5]. 4  [1, 6, 7]. 5  [8]. 6  [6]. 7  [9]. 8  [10]. 9  [11]. 2 3

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discipline versus strict work discipline, and local versus professional.10 These models are helpful to categorize different types of organizations at a macro level. Mechanisms of Influence The research agenda of organizational culture mainly includes organizational performance and effectiveness, organizational transformation and innovation, and its relationship with the external climate. The inquiry into the impact of organizational culture on implementation falls within the broad framework of organizational performance and effectiveness. It investigates how organizational culture could be a factor in skewing the meaning of policy during implementation, which will affect the program’s effectiveness. On the one hand, organizational culture shapes programs so that their design and implementation will be consistent with the organizational culture and interests. On the other hand, organizations neglect different programs and tasks that are not part of their culture or get rid of programs that do not provide a good fit with this. The implementation literature suggests that organizational culture influenced the ability and willingness of an organization to adopt a new program or policy.11 Policies that run counter to organizational norms are difficult to implement without discretion.12 Specifically, workers are more likely to implement policy orders in a manner that is congruent with policy intent when the aims and assumptions of the policy are consistent with their core tasks and organizational culture.13 On the contrary, when policy features clash with the organizational culture, workers are able to use their discretion to skew or resist implementation. As Wilson generalizes, the effect of organizational culture has three aspects: first, organizations tend to give special attention to programs that fit their culture and ignore those that did not fit; second, organizations with more than one culture competing for supremacy will experience conflict; third, organizations will resist taking on new tasks that are incompatible with their culture; and, fourth, organizational culture exerts its impact on implementation by altering the task to match the dominant organizational culture so that the program may receive organizational support and survive. In other words,  [12].  [1, 13]. 12  [14]. 13  [15]. 10 11

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new tasks and programs that do not fit the organizational culture will be ignored, discarded, or remolded to suit the culture.14 Organizational culture affects implementation because the latter is embedded in “a broad meaning system” reflected by the organizational culture, which consists of “interests, identities, values, and assumptions.”15 In this environment, workers are exposed to institutional logic through their membership of the organization and participation in its daily work. Besides, organizational culture provides organizational members with a sense of common purpose and unity that helps explain their connections and guides their interactions.16 As a result, implementers tend to behave according to the organizational culture, and programs are becoming consonant with the culture. In the end, the program’s original objective may be ignored in practice. For instance, Sharon K. Weiner argued that organizational culture and interest shaped US programs to fight nuclear proliferation by providing income to former Soviet nuclear weapons workers through implementation discretion. As a result, these programs failed to meet their goals of finding new jobs for weapon experts.17 Public diplomacy implementation can also be affected by organizational culture. Public diplomacy implementers are also likely to resist taking on tasks that are not central to their organizational culture, or such tasks will not receive the same amount of attention,18 or programs that do not fit in with the existing organizational culture will be revised. As Schein claimed, people stuck to culture even if it meant “distorting, denying, projecting, or in other ways falsifying” and led them to act unreasonably, irrationally, and ineffectively.19 As a result, over time, public diplomacy programs will come to be consistent with organizational culture and will add to existing tasks without changing the core mission or altering the organizational culture. Specifically, the DoS’s public diplomacy programs will be branded with their organizational culture, which is distinct from that of other organizations such as the DoD. The public diplomacy programs of the DoS and the DoD are implemented differently because they have different organizational interests and cultures. Over time, public diplomacy programs in the DoS and the DOD may look different, or they  [1].  [15]. 16  [16]. 17  [17]. 18  [1]. 19  [10]. 14 15

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will seek to rid themselves of public diplomacy programs that do not fit in with the existing organizational culture.

“Defense is from Mars and State is from Venus” Perhaps one of the most well-known pieces of research that compares the organizational cultures of the DoS and the DoD is “Defense is from Mars and State is from Venus” by US Army Lieutenant Colonel Rickey Rife and Foreign Service Officer Rosemary Hanson.20 Although the paper was published in 1998, many of their findings still apply today.21 Rife and Hanson used the following words to describe the characters of the US military: they value competence, efficiency, achievement, uniformity, and teamwork. They are professional, conservative, goal-oriented, time-conscious, and detail-driven. They believe in rehearsals and are task-oriented. The structure of the military is hierarchical, and it operates “in a landscape of crisis, interservice rivalry, and sensitivity training that is approaching critical mass.”22 In addition, the organization is goal-oriented as the decision-­ making process of the DoD often ends with a “definable, achievable” ultimate goal. The path to reach the final objective is often set by rules. In terms of communication, the military is more direct and prefers short and succinct papers and PowerPoint slides.23 Those who work at the DoS value individual achievement rather than collective success.24 Compared to the military, the DoS is event-driven, and procedures to reach the goals are usually fluid. The organization is hierarchical on paper, but flat in reality. Unlike the DoD’s problem-­solving style, which is episodic, the DoS’s decision-making process is continuous and usually not conclusive. Generally speaking, the DoS encourages brainstorming rather than the step-by-step problem-solving method. The culture also accepts negotiations and trade-offs. Finally, the culture values good writing skills, and foreign service officers often write lengthy and detailed reports.

 [18].  [19]. 22  [18]. 23  [19]. 24  [18, 19]. 20 21

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The Organizational Culture of DoS  Process-Oriented Culture A Hofstede’s model of four dimensions of organizational culture includes a dimension that categorized organizations into means-oriented or goal-­ oriented. In a means-oriented culture, the key feature is how work has to be carried out. In a goal-oriented culture, staff are out to achieve specific internal goals or results.25 The literature agrees that one key element of the DoS organizational culture focuses on means and not ends. In fact, the argument that the DoS is a process-oriented organization is not random, but rather one of the main features of the DoS.  Newt Gingrich once wrote: “The media and intellectual elites, the State Department (as an institution), and the Foreign Service (as a culture) clearly favor the process, politeness, and accommodation position.”26 The DoS’s tendency towards process comes from its basic functions, which are as follows: reporting on the actions of foreign governments that are important to the US, general representation of American interests abroad, and negotiation of specific issues when directed by the government.27 The roots of these institutional traits can be traced back to the origins of the DoS in 1789 and the ratification of the US Constitution. At that time, the new agency adopted the European model of diplomacy, with an emphasis on “representation, negotiation, and intelligence.”28 This element of culture is deeply rooted, so we can expect it to affect public diplomacy implementation. The tendency of the DoS to focus on process is directly connected to the function of reporting. The DoS has a culture that promotes and rewards effective reporting and maintaining relationships.29 As the international environment is often featured by a high degree of complexity, uncertainty, threat, and dispersion, the DoS was given the mission of extensive data-gathering and reporting to and from field posts.30 Therefore, the DoS has traditionally had a tendency to attach greater value to analytical reporting skills over action or management.31 This is in line with  [12].  [20]. 27  [21–23]. 28  [24]. 29  [1]. 30  [24]. 31  [25]. 25 26

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Wilson’s point that the DoS organizational culture values communication skills which are process-oriented, rather than operational tasks that are often result-driven.32 Foreign service officers (FSOs) maintained relationships through the careful exchange of written memoranda with each other and the representatives of foreign powers.33 As Donald P.  Warwick observed, the most direct expression of the DoS’s policy was a written report, which took on enormous importance in the life of the DoS.34 This function of information-gathering also led the DoS to leave foreign policy decisions outside of the organization. As a result, the DoS is reduced to the status of a think tank preparing options for the State Secretary to submit to the President.35 It has no power over the results and decisions; its actions concentrate on the process of gathering information or advising decision-making rather than making or executing policy.36  Culture of Elitism A Another key component of the DoS’s organizational culture is the emphasis on elitism. It is also widely seen as the most persistent and deeply rooted element of DoS culture. The DoS is largely a foreign service organization, which “places great emphasis on the history of the diplomatic profession and on the intellectual and social superiority of its members.”37 Elitism first implies that it is difficult to become an FSO: “FSOs consider them to be the crème de la crème of the government in foreign policy expertise.”38 The demand to join the foreign service is extraordinarily high and job openings are few. The Foreign Service Exam is also extremely demanding.39 The elitism culture derived from the foreign service is distinct from the civil service. FSOs go through a rigorous selection process, entering at the bottom rather than at the lateral level as civil service officers (CSOs). An FSO is chosen for a lifetime career rather than for a first job, whereas CSO recruitment is for a position. FSOs, like members of the military, have a personal rank that determines their salary and involuntary retirement, and a CSO is paid according to their position, and they face no  [1, 26].  [1]. 34  [24]. 35  [24]. 36  [26]. 37  [24]. 38  [27]. 39  [27]. 32 33

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retirement requirements that apply to FSOs. FSOs are said to be available to be stationed worldwide, while CSOs serve in domestic positions, and overseas assignments are voluntary and exceptional.40 The elitist mentality of FSOs is also reinforced by their privileged lifestyle abroad and constant interaction with foreign elites. Elitism also refers to the tendency of the FSO membership that is biased in favor of “white Anglo-Saxon Protestants from wealthy, urbane families who often attended Ivy League schools.”41 The key to entering the foreign service circle is an individual’s “pedigree,” which includes family, background, education, and connections.42 In the 1970s, criticisms condemned the DoS’s attitudes, which valued the affluent, residents of the Northeastern US, Protestants, and graduates from a small number of prestigious Eastern colleges and universities, along with the virtual exclusion of women and non-whites from the foreign service.43 While some of these features or problems may not be applicable today due to improvements on discrimination, the culture that favored elites still holds, meaning that racial and gender equality has a long way to go. Now the DoS organizational culture of elitism generally emphasizes “the history of the diplomatic profession and on the intellectual and social superiority of its members.”44 According to a series of interviews reported by John Ensor Harr, there has been a consensus of elitism in the DoS that certain qualifications and sophistication such as proficiency in foreign languages, representation, and negotiation are given much more weight than other regular skills in diplomacy.45 While the interviews were conducted 50 years ago, the data and claims still remain true today. The tendency of elitism is believed to be the political liability for the DoS and stifles individual initiative and creativity.46

 [24, 28].  [27]. 42  [27]. 43  [29]. 44  [24]. 45  [30]. 46  [31, 32]. 40 41

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The Organizational Culture of DoD  Result-Oriented Culture A The DoD’s organizational culture is mission-driven and result-oriented.47 According to Hofstede, organizations with a goal-oriented culture require employees to achieve specific goals or results, and people in the organization identify with the “what,” not the “how.”48 It is widely agreed among scholars that goal orientation is the central feature of the DoD’s organizational culture. For instance, according to the official press release, the DoD’s Defense Performance and Management Appraisal Program was designed to foster a result-oriented performance culture that links individual performance to organizational goals.49 In the DoD Civilian Personnel Management System, the objective of performance expectation is “results-oriented and aligned with the organization’s mission.”50 A report regarding how the DoD could establish a lasting culture that rewarded and promoted innovation and continuous improvement also recommends a purpose-driven and result-aligned culture.51 The DoD’s result-oriented culture leads to the commitment of winning wars. According to Karen Dunivin, the military’s core activity, which defined its very existence and meaning, is combat.52 Military structures and forces are designed around activities of combat, such as divisions of ground fighting, fighter air wings, battle groups of naval aircraft carriers, and weapon procurement. It is featured by “aggression against other societies, protecting the society against aggression by others, and providing the means for maintaining domestic order and control.”53 The tendency to focus on results such as winning wars was also illustrated by the publication of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual in 2006 FM 3-24 (FM 3-24). The FM 3-24 doctrine stresses the centrality of the civilian, greater military assumption of risk, and the importance of non-­ military efforts and actors.54 This innovative shift challenges the DoD’s traditional desire to win combats, but the DoD’s culture resisted the full  [33].  [12]. 49  [34]. 50  [35]. 51  [36]. 52  [37]. 53  [38]. 54  [39]. 47 48

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adoption of the doctrine. As Rebecca Patterson noted: “Although nonconventional warfare represents the majority of missions executed in the last sixty years, the US Army still primarily plans, organizes, and trains to fight conventional high-intensity ground wars.”55 Counterinsurgency (COIN) was not new to US military operations. The US Army and Marine Corps had been involved in COIN before, most notably in Vietnam. An older version of the COIN Manual entitled Counterguerrilla Operations FM 31-16 (FM 31-16) was published in 1963 in the Vietnam War era.56 Like FM 3-24, the FM 31-16 also stressed the importance of civilian support as “civil affairs plays a much more dominant role in counterguerrilla operations than is normal in conventional operations … The conduct of civil affairs functions may become a primary mission of the military force.” 57 David Fitzgerald pointed out that after the Vietnam War, most US military strategists took the view that the problem lay with the 1963 COIN doctrine, not their implementation of it, so they returned to their comfort zone of preparing for large-scale wars.58 The new 2006 COIN doctrine is strikingly similar to that developed during the Vietnam War.59 Both the 1963 and 2006 COIN doctrines define the key elements of COIN in similar ways, which is to shift the operational focus to civilians.60 This means that the military strategists did not think of picking up the 1963 doctrine and were unprepared for the Iraq War in 2003. The tendency to ignore non-conventional warfare such as COIN is shaped by the US military organizational culture. James Dobbins, who was a special envoy to Afghanistan under George W. Bush, said, “Every time they do a post-war occupation, they do it like it’s the first time, and they also do it like it’s the last time they’ll ever have to do it.”61 The 1963 and 2006 COIN doctrines challenge the DoD’s result-­ oriented culture. First, the manuals underscore the importance of civilian affairs and support, which take time and may expose soldiers and marines to great risk. The doctrines’ tolerance for lethal conflict and risk contradicts the military organizational value of fighting and winning wars. Second, the goal of securing civilians also disagrees with the DoD’s  [40].  [41]. 57  [42]. 58  [43]. 59  [44]. 60  [44]. 61  [45]. 55 56

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culture that favors the result of killing the enemy and combat effectiveness. Third, a successful COIN operation requires intelligence about the terrain, the enemy, and the entire population. This also increases the risk of military operations. As a result, the doctrines for COIN in Vietnam as well as Iraq and Afghanistan were ignored by the DoD after the conflict.  ierarchy and Following Chains of Command H The DoD and its largest component, the Military Service, have a famously hierarchical and mechanistic structure and culture.62 Specifically, DoD is highly controlling and embraces strict rank hierarchies.63 Because the DoD operates in a rigidly legal manner, there exists a strong chain of command, vertical communication, clear roles, and responsibilities, definitive division of labor, detailed job descriptions, and hierarchical rules.64 Communication channels in the military are also hierarchical, and vertical paths of communication are enforced.65 Based on the amount of internal structuring, control, and discipline, these organizations are defined as those with a strict and mechanistic structure.66 In these organizations, coordination and problem resolution occur at high levels in the hierarchy. Lower-level employees are unlikely to recognize problems or correct them without management approval.67 The hierarchical structure of the US military induces its operational mode to follow the chain of command. The chain of command is the hierarchical structure of seniors and subordinates.68 It postulates a downward flow of directives.69 Specifically, it works, as the “higher up the chain of command officers move the more they become privy to. The farther down the chain of command soldiers sit, the less they need to know, presumably because they have no choice but to do what they are told.”70 In other words, military cultures are more coercive than the cultures of businesses.71 There is no need for the higher command to worry about what the  [46].  [47]. 64  [48, 49]. 65  [46]. 66  [12, 50]. 67  [51]. 68  [48]. 69  [52]. 70  [53]. 71  [52]. 62 63

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teams think; teams obey orders. Therefore, hierarchy in the military determines who is in charge.72 From the perspective of a soldier, they communicate in channels following the chain of command. They should see their captain first when there is a program and then their major.73 This is why the execution of orders in the military features discipline and control.74

Process-Oriented and Elitist Tendencies in DoS The DoS’s organizational culture shapes the implementation of EducationUSA and the IVLP. It causes public diplomacy implementation to stray from its original course and changes the meaning of public diplomacy. China is one of the target countries for the global network of EducationUSA and the IVLP.  The designs of EducationUSA and the IVLP in China are similar to the set-up of other targeting countries. Thus, a generalized approach is applied to the analyses of these two public diplomacy programs. The DoS’s Organizational Culture and EducationUSA  Foreign Student Recruitment Program A The process-oriented culture of the DoS induces implementation discretion in both EducationUSA and the IVLP. For EducationUSA, the program’s implementation leans heavily towards attracting foreign students to study in the US.  The public diplomacy objective to increase mutual understanding or support US foreign policy has been neglected. For instance, the program changed its mission from promoting and managing international exchange to offering consultations on college applications to foreign students, as well as helping US higher educational institutions to enroll more students. Its current mission is as follows: The network promotes U.S. higher education to students around the world by offering accurate, comprehensive, and current information about opportunities to study at accredited postsecondary institutions in the United States. EducationUSA also provides services to the U.S. higher education

 [48].  [53]. 74  [52]. 72 73

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community to help institutional leaders meet their recruitment and campus internationalization goals.75

This demonstrates that EducationUSA shifted its program goal to increasing foreign student numbers rather than focusing on the quality of their stay in the US, which should be the concern of public diplomacy. Therefore, EducationUSA focuses on the process of bringing more students to the US rather than the result of making sure they understand the US better or have a positive opinion about the US. In addition, EducationUSA’s practice has been to focus on college applications. Its activities—mini-fairs, training, webinars, school visits, information sessions, and outreach programs—all have the same objective: to help prospective students to successfully apply to American universities. For example, information sessions in China usually include lectures for students on the US education system, as well as pre-departure orientations and experience sharing from students who have studied in the US, and American students who have studied in China. At the mini-fairs, EducationUSA invites college recruitment officers to talk with students and parents about college applications.76 EducationUSA also offers training to education professionals in China. For example, it hosts Guidance Counselor Workshops to connect more students and parents with these counselors’ networks (Chinese college admission counselors help high school students to navigate the college application process). EducationUSA China advisors also travel to Chinese high schools and universities to give presentations. Besides face-to-face interactions, EducationUSA China holds webinars so that experts can communicate with Chinese students and parents without actually going to China. It also reaches out to a larger audience (students and parents) through its official website (educationusachina.com), social media platforms (Sina Blog, Weibo, and WeChat), and a cellphone app. In addition, EducationUSA China helps American educational institutions to recruit more Chinese students.77 EducationUSA also hosts EducationUSA Forums in the US to build and maintain professional networks for various stakeholders in the field. In this manner, EducationUSA becomes a program that attends to the process of college

 [54].  [55]. 77  [56]. 75 76

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applications rather than the result of ensuring that Chinese students will learn more about the US. Another example of EducationUSA’s process orientation is its “DIY” mantra, which urges Chinese prospective students not to use an agent when they apply to American universities. In its programs in China, EducationUSA has been sending a strong message to Chinese students that they should adopt a DIY approach to their college applications. As mentioned in Chap. 2, EducationUSA developed “Your 5 Steps to US Study” to guide the students’ application processes. The steps are ways to help practitioners simplify how they talk about US higher education and make the process manageable, according to one EducationUSA officer.78 Series of workshops and lectures organized by EducationUSA follow the design of “five steps,” which also demonstrates their process-driven mentality. Directors of EducationUSA promoted the “DIY” slogan on many occasions. According to EducationUSA officials, the reason for this is twofold: first, students will have a sense of achievement once they receive admission letters, and second, during the application process, students can learn more about the US and the city they want to go to. This will make the adaptation process easier.79 Another EducationUSA advisor said in an interview that admission officers could distinguish between essays written by students themselves and those prepared by agencies. It is better to present a true self to admission officers.80 In other words, EducationUSA hopes that prospective Chinese students will follow the American rules and values when they apply, which not only will benefit American universities but will also ensure a level playing field in relation to other applicants, both internationally and domestically. In the same vein, EducationUSA opposed the involvement of private recruiting agents during students’ college application. The decision-­ makers believe that private recruiting agents do not serve the program’s interests, and do not select and send appropriate students to American universities. The official documents specify that education advisors of EducationUSA should not be using commercial agents as they “do not represent the breadth of the U.S. higher education system, nor can they represent U.S. universities equitably.”81 Again, these principles show that  [57].  [58]. 80  [59]. 81  [60]. 78 79

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EducationUSA pays more attention to the process of how students are being recruited while ignoring the result of Chinese students’ stay in the US. To summarize, EducationUSA’s mission and practice in China demonstrate the program’s bias towards student recruitment. It is shaped by the DoS’s organizational culture, which favors process over results. Increasing the number of foreign students is a midway goal to reaching the ultimate purpose of public diplomacy, which is to promote mutual understanding and support US foreign policy. However, EducationUSA only focuses on the process and considers student recruitment as its ultimate objective. This preference for process has led the program to stray from its original path of public diplomacy. As a result, EducationUSA becomes a program to promote US higher education by increasing the number of international students. The public diplomacy goal, which should be the result of the program, has thus been overlooked.  rom Elitism to Inclusiveness F The organizational culture of DoS that focuses on elitism affected the early practice of cultural and educational programs such as the Fulbright Program, but recent programs such as EducationUSA do not share this elitist mindset. The Fulbright Program and EducationUSA are key educational public diplomacy in the ECA. The Fulbright Program is the ECA’s flagship program based on the legacy of Senator J. William Fulbright that enables scholars to study and research in each other’s countries. EducationUSA expands the Fulbright spirit to the area of education advising. These two programs have very close connections. First, both EducationUSA and the Fulbright Program are based on the Fulbright-­ Hays Act, which lays out the mission for educational and cultural activities: increasing mutual understanding between the people of the US and the people of other countries. The Fulbright-Hays Act is the foundation for the establishment of the ECA.82 Second, the implementation of these two programs is usually tied together. In a few countries, EducationUSA is implemented by the same personnel as the Fulbright Program. For instance, EducationUSA is hosted by Fulbright Commissions in some countries, and they often organize events together.83 They are seen as one organization in these nations, which include Turkey, Greece, Finland, and  [61].  [62].

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Canada.84 Third, the Fulbright Program has a longer history than EducationUSA. It was founded in 1946 before the establishment of the ECA. To some extent, EducationUSA expands the scope of the Fulbright Program from scholar exchange to foreign students’ recruitment. The transition of the target audience from Fulbright’s scholars to EducationUSA’s prospective students is not consonant with the DoS’s elitist organizational culture. It is believed that foreign service should be only practiced by FSOs, who are predominantly white men and elite graduates. FSOs tend to have a privileged lifestyle abroad, and they usually socialize with foreign elites. Therefore, it is assumed that the implementation of public diplomacy should exhibit the traits of elitism. In fact, only the implementation of the Fulbright Program demonstrates elitism. In China, for example, the Fulbright Program invites selected scholars to the US for research purposes. This arrangement was inherited from the practice of the Boxer Indemnity Program, which was funded by Boxer Rebellion indemnity money paid to the US that provided for Chinese intellectual elites to study as students in the US. Scholars argued that it was one of the most successful US international educational exchange programs before World War II.85 In the Republic of China at the time, the most influential figures in intellectual and political circles were the beneficiaries of the program. As a result, they became a pro-American force in Chinese society.86 The US realized that if its cultural programs in China could sustain and approach these elites and create a positive impression of the US, this would certainly help the US to participate in the post-war reconstruction in China. Therefore, the DoS emphasized the establishment of relationships with official leaders and educators in education, science, and technology, as they were believed to be key to the success of cultural projects. These suggestions of these elites were seen as valuable to the US. However, the implementation of EducationUSA tells a different story, as it did not adopt the same elitist approach. In contrast, the program enlarges the target audience to include general Chinese prospective students who wish to study in the US. It also allows the US higher education institutions to promote their international recruitments. In China, EducationUSA’s events such as information sessions are open to the  [63].  [64]. 86  [65]. 84 85

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general public, and training for college guidance counselors has taken place in different Chinese regions. The advisory materials are available online to help Chinese prospective students deal with the process of college application. EducationUSA also assists all accredited US higher education institutions by organizing school visits and college fairs, sharing information about foreign educational systems and scholarship programs, and connecting the US and foreign educational institutions.87 In this manner, the DoS organizational culture of elitism did not affect the implementation of EducationUSA.  The program challenges the notion of exclusiveness in foreign service and expands the scope of the target audience. Actually, this inclusive approach is the essence of public diplomacy, which aims to engage with the foreign general public and build relationships with them. EducationUSA is more affected by the public diplomacy spirit than the DoS elitist culture. The DoS’s Organizational Culture and IVLP I dentifying Foreign Future Leaders The implementation of the IVLP was shaped by the process-driven culture of the DoS. The IVLP is a program that brings future foreign leaders to the US and arranges professional exchange programs in multiple US cities between these leaders and their US counterparts. The stated purpose of the program is to help “strengthen U.S. engagement with countries around the world and cultivate lasting relationships by connecting current and emerging foreign leaders with their American counterparts through short-term visits to the United States.”88 Although the program should be working towards cultivating and strengthening long-term relationships with foreign countries, the actual implementation of the IVLP has focused on identifying future leaders and ensuring that the programs are relevant to policy themes. On many occasions, including public speeches, congress hearings, and interviews, officials and frontline operators downplayed the IVLP’s goal of building sustained foreign relationships and emphasized the process of identifying current and future leaders.89 For instance, many leaders of the partner organizations at the Global Ties US network used the number of  [66].  [67]. 89  [68, 69]. 87 88

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important leaders in the IVLP’s alumni pool to demonstrate the program’s success. One of them stated: “When assessing the impressive results of the International Visitor Program or any exchange, for that matter, we tend to focus on the visitors themselves—the positions of prominence they attain, their accomplishments.”90 Moreover, the task of selecting future leaders is restricted to certain personnel in DoS. Participants of the IVLP can only be nominated by officers at US embassies overseas and approved by IVLP staff in Washington, DC.91 This procedure is the result of DoS organizational culture, which values means over ends. The IVLP cares more about the process of bringing qualified foreign participants to the US than about ensuring the results that their experiences in the US are positive and can influence their future decision-making when they reach important positions later on. Moreover, frontline implementers stress the importance of policy themes. This tendency is also shaped by the DoS’s organizational culture because the program assumes that it supports US foreign policy by inviting participants to meetings and exchanges that are policy-focused. One DoS employee in charge of the IVLP in Washington, DC, said during an interview that the design of the programs was based on the most important issues of the bilateral relations, which was determined by both IVLP managers in Washington, DC, and the Beijing Embassy.92 Programming organizations that served as subcontractors of the IVLP (award recipients) also need to design programs and draft proposals based on the policy themes given to them. Adherence to policy theme is the most important criterion for the proposals to be selected.93 For instance, a funding opportunity document that provides guidelines to IVLP subcontractors suggests that the subcontractors need to develop the full range of projects based on substantive themes. “Project themes and foreign policy objectives will be pre-determined by the DOS prior to assignment of the project to the award recipient and all award recipients are expected to have the capacity to develop applicable projects on all themes.”94 Ensuring that participants are attending policy-theme-based programs seems to be the purpose of

 [69].  [70]. 92  Interview 5. 93  Interview 4. 94  [70]. 90 91

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the IVLP, while the actual result of these leaders understand or like US foreign policy is less underscored. The IVLP focuses on the process by which it selects people and topics. Policy-makers seem to assume that if they follow the process in place, attitude change will happen. While meeting these two objectives may contribute to the attainment of its final goal of attitude and policy change, the implementation of the IVLP did not proceed to impacts. Many official documents and news articles describe a big leader alumni pool as the IVLP’s major accomplishment, but the program’s actual impact on these leaders is not clear. An analysis of former French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s IVLP experience shows no concrete evidence that being an alumnus of the program influenced his decision-making as President.95 Moreover, ensuring that programs adhere to policy themes may be an instrument for quality control, but in implementation, it becomes the final objective. There is no explanation of how organizing meetings around policy themes can further US foreign policy goals. Consequently, the implementation discretion induced by the DoS’s organizational culture to focus on the process has led the IVLP to become a program to identify foreign future leaders and host professional exchanges on certain policy themes.  litist Participant Selection and Non-elitist Exchange Content E On the subject of elitism, the implementation of the IVLP presents a more complex picture. On the one hand, the traits of elitism could be found in its implementation. Not only are participants of the IVLP current or potential leaders in government, politics, the media, education, science, non-government organizations, the arts, and other disciplines, but their nomination process is controlled by a small group of people, including officers at US embassies overseas and ECA staff in Washington, DC.96 In other words, you cannot simply apply to take part in the IVLP; you need to be invited to join the program. The final decision-making processes are not open to public scrutiny. This procedure indicates the elitist mentality that public diplomacy should engage elites, not the general public. Moreover, the fact that the visitors are “invitation-only” and highly selective also reflects the elitist culture of the DoS.

 [71].  [70].

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On the other hand, the IVLP’s programming shows a non-elitist approach through its emphasis on presenting the diversity of the US. First, the program partners with various programming organizations and local community organizations to implement the program on the ground. Besides, diverse kinds of community partners, including public sector organizations, corporates, non-profit organizations, and advocacy partners, have taken part in IVLP exchanges with foreign visitors.97 The breadth of the organizations involved can be read as a sign to be inclusive, which is the opposite of elitist exclusiveness. Second, the IVLP also pays attention to the diversity of US participants. The program arranges for foreign visitors to meet with their US counterparts of various backgrounds. A 2017 IVLP Fact Sheet states that participants “meet with professional counterparts in both the public and private sectors; explore American society, history, and culture; engage in home hospitality with American families.” This arrangement also implies a non-elitist approach. Third, the implementation of the IVLP also highlights its diverse content. Practitioners claim to offer a wide range of local and global exchanges on a large number of topics and themes. For instance, programs on China spotlight entrepreneurship, government, the media, education, economics, the environment, labor, and the rule of law.98 The aim is for foreign visitors “to better understand the diversity that exists in the United States.”99 This demonstrates that the IVLP takes a non-elitist approach and tries to include all possible parties and themes in the exchanges. Summarizing the above two cases, the theory of organizational culture does not explain all public diplomacy implementation in the DoS. EducationUSA expanded the scope of the target audience from elite scholars to general high school students, and the IVLP’s programming includes diverse organizations, US participants, and exchange themes. In this regard, EducationUSA and the IVLP are affected more by the public diplomacy principles than the elitist organizational culture of the DoS. After all, public diplomacy by definition targets the foreign general public and is more open than traditional diplomacy.

97  The organization named Global Ties US sustains a network of organizations that host exchange meetings in different communities. 98  Interview 5. 99  [72].

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Result-Oriented and Hierarchical Tendencies in DoD In theory, organizational culture determines how the military views the world and adjusts to address current and future challenges, and it shapes programs by giving selective attention to some and resisting others.100 However, the actual practice in public diplomacy is more complex, as public diplomacy implementation on some occasions is not consonant with the DoD’s organizational culture. This section examines the goals of US public diplomacy towards China and the adoption of strategic communication in the DoD, as well as specific public diplomacy cases: US–China military exchanges and visits, the US–China HA/DR Exchange Program, and the abandonment of the Game Plan. The DoD’s Organizational Culture and Public Diplomacy Strategies and Goals I ntelligence, Not Relationship Building The DoD’s result-oriented culture affects its strategy-making of public diplomacy towards China. Its overall public diplomacy objective is to shape foreign opinions to foster a secure global environment and build relationships with foreign publics. Although not specifically included in every official document, in general, the public diplomacy objectives of the DoD are said to be based on the foundation of mutual understanding by military officials in their public speeches. First, convincing and influencing the foreign public through informational programs requires listening to and understanding the target populace as well as their society. Second, building long-term relationships also requires interactions that focus on mutuality. In general, the DoD’s overall public diplomacy goal corresponds with the theoretical definition of public diplomacy, which stresses means such as mutual understanding and relationship building. These objectives tend to be long-term and process-driven in nature. But when it comes to China, the objectives of public diplomacy become something that emphasizes the result. The stated goal of the DoD’s public diplomacy towards China is reducing miscalculation as well as persuading China to become a proactive and responsible actor contributing to regional  [73].

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stability.101 The DoD’s annual report to the Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving China states that the objective of its contacts and exchanges with China is to “manage and reduce risk, including by encouraging China to be more transparent about its military and security affairs.”102 The purpose is not to strengthen mutual understanding but to increase Chinese transparency so that the US military can make accurate decisions. Compared to the overall public diplomacy objectives that pay more attention to the processes of engagement and socialization, these two specific purposes to interact with China and the Chinese military emphasize the ends of public diplomacy without specifying the means to reach them. There is no explanation about how to urge the Chinese military to become more transparent. This approach to encouraging transparency in the Chinese military echoes the US military’s practice of intelligence because military intelligence aims to gather various information on foreign military forces, as well as information about foreign countries and events in foreign countries required to plan for and carry out military operations.103 Urging transparency of the Chinese military basically means that the Chinese military should share more information about its operations and technological developments. The US Deputy Assistant Secretary David Samuel Sedney stated that a continued lack of transparency about China’s intentions in its defense modernization strategy compelled the US to hedge in its foreign relations and its military development against potential hostility in the future.104 This indicates that the result of understanding China’s intention is key to US–China engagement and public diplomacy, while the process of maintaining a long-term relationship is less important. While to some extent intelligence could be seen as the listening aspect of military public diplomacy, this shift from two-way mutual understanding to one-way transparency is still discretion exercised in the implementation process shaped by the DoD’s result-oriented culture.105 Intelligence 101  See Annual Reports to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China from 2008 to 2016. 102  [74]. 103  [75]. 104  [76]. 105  I argue that the intelligence-like objective is still a public diplomacy goal because it resembles the listening aspect of public diplomacy, which focuses on collecting and collating data about public and their opinions overseas and using that data to redirect its policy or its wider public diplomacy approach accordingly. The difference is that intelligence covers a

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is result-driven and has a clear purpose of facilitating military operations to win wars, whereas public diplomacy focuses on the long-term effect of relationship building. In other words, the DoD’s public diplomacy programs are expected to know more about China and reduce miscalculations rather than foster lasting relationships. Therefore, the DoD’s organizational culture, which values results, affects its public diplomacy strategy-­ making. In this manner, the DoD’s public diplomacy towards China pays more attention to the result than the process of engagement. “ Flying the Plane While Building It” In 2007, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates gave a speech at the Kansas State University, in which he lamented the inability of the US to communicate to the rest of the world what America is about as a society and a culture, its values such as freedom and democracy, and the policies.106 He then called for the US government to provide more money and efforts to civilian instruments of national security or soft power tools, including strategic communication, diplomacy, and economic assistance.107 Although strategic communication is not new to the US military, its recent systematic revival began under the Obama administration. The Obama White House in 2009 issued an Interagency Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication which attempted at coordinating strategic communication efforts across the interagency community. The DoD’s Quadrennial Defense Reviews in 2006 and 2010 also emphasize the importance of strategic communication. These official documents suggest that strategic communication becomes a policy to be enforced in military organizations. The strategic communication framework emphasizes the coordinated planning of government agencies. According to the Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept: Strategic communication is focused on US Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans,

broader conceptual area which includes not only public opinions but also various information about the target country. 106  [77]. 107  [78].

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themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.108

The DoD mainly engages public diplomacy efforts through the mechanism of strategic communication. In the DoD, strategic communication involves activities such as public affairs, psychological operations, and defense support to public diplomacy. The DoD’s public diplomacy programs are within its strategic communication framework. The decision to strengthen strategic communication from the upper level of the command chain is followed at the lower level. The DoD’s organizational culture in relation to hierarchy affects how strategic communication is received and implemented at the frontline. As hierarchy leads to coerciveness and obedience in chains of command, strategic communication is accepted even though there is no specific guidance or doctrine on how to implement it. In 2007, at the first annual Worldwide Strategic Communication Seminar at the National War College, senior government officials depicted the process of implementing strategic communication as follows: “we will be flying the plane while we’re building it.”109 It was admitted that no one understood how to carry out strategic communication or even understood what it is. Moreover, military scholars point out that there is a conceptual confusion about strategic communication and other existing military operations such as information operations and the support given to public diplomacy.110 Strategic communication in the DoD’s official documents is described as activities relating to information operations and public affairs, with an emphasis on information communication. Strategic communication also includes information operations, defense support to public diplomacy, public affairs, and civil affairs.111 It refers not only to the process of communicating with foreign publics, but also to the integration of “foreign audience perceptions into policymaking, planning, and operations at every level.”112 These definitions and clarifications are vague, and no specific instructions are provided for its implementation or its integration into existing operations.  [79].  [80]. 110  [81]. 111  [82]. 112  [83]. 108 109

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Nevertheless, leaving the definition and the process of strategic communication hanging, the US military obeyed the order. The DoD even refuses to admit that it does public diplomacy while acknowledging its “supportive role” in strategic communication. Many programs and activities of the DoD are public diplomacy by nature. The DoD accepted the order without asking questions. It did not carefully streamline the relationship between strategic communication and public diplomacy. In this manner, the US military obeying strategic communication was affected by the DoD’s organizational culture of hierarchy. On the one hand, DoD accepted the order without understanding what it means. On the other hand, it took the policy at face value and refused to admit its proactive role in practicing public diplomacy. The DoD’s Organizational Culture and Public Diplomacy Programs  ublic Diplomacy as Indicators of Bilateral Relationships P The DoD’s organizational culture, which focuses on results, has greatly shaped its implementation of exchanges and visits with the PLA.  These public diplomacy activities become indicators of the bilateral relationship status rather than a means to improve the relationship. This is especially illustrated by the cancellations of several US–China visits and exchanges by the DoD. In 2001, two navy fighters collided over the South China Sea. After that incident, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld limited military-to-military contacts with the PLA.  The military relationship between the two countries did not fully resume until 2005 when Rumsfeld visited China. In 2018, after the US placed sanctions on China for buying Russian weapons, the US and China canceled military talks.113 Because of the South China Sea issue, the Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) invited China in 2014 and 2016, but excluded it in 2018. Former Defense Secretary James N.  Mattis said in the 2018 annual Shangri-La security dialogue in Singapore that “China’s policy in the South China Sea stands in stark contrast of the openness of our [US] strategy. Chinese militarization of the islands was considered as a form of intimidation and coercion.”114 Exchanges with other countries have also been affected by bilateral  [84].  [85].

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f­rictions. For instance, the DoD stopped the IMET programs with countries such as Guatemala and Indonesia when they were found to have resulted in human rights violations. As a result, countries that violate human rights values or place security threats to the US are seen as enemies and thus are not worth engaging with. The above practices highlight the DoD’s result-oriented culture, which exhibits less patience for changing the target countries’ conditions. Relationship building that faced obstacles was met with little tolerance. Exchanges and visits that encounter difficulties during the process are considered to be failures. The problems that happened in the process of public diplomacy implementation are attributed to the program itself, though some of these issues may have been caused by uncontrollable factors, such as the target country’s domestic situation. Also, as the DoD pays more attention to results than processes, the general means to achieve the goal is not specified or stressed. The exchange program thus becomes an indicator that reflected the conditions of the bilateral relationship rather than an engagement method to recover the damaged relationship. The US–China military-to-military exchanges and visits are designed to increase mutual understanding and enhance trust. This is aligned with the DoD’s overall public diplomacy objective to engage China, which is designed to reduce misunderstandings and miscalculations. The purpose of the exchanges and visits should focus on the process of communication, interaction, and relationship building. However, the non-recurring nature of the exchanges and visits ignores these goals and focuses on the immediate results of the bilateral relationship. When an issue arises in the bilateral relationship, the DoD’s first reaction is not public diplomacy. For example, the DoD did not continue to engage with countries with human rights problems in order to restore the desired conditions. Instead, the IMET programs were canceled, as human rights problems were considered to be the result of ineffective public diplomacy. The attention was focused on the result, not the process. Therefore, the DoD’s result-­ oriented organizational culture affected and biased public diplomacy implementation.  Process-Driven Program A While US–China military exchanges and visits focus on results, the DoD’s HA/DR Exchange Program with China paid more attention to the process. The US Army Pacific and the PLA have been conducting exchanges in the field of HA/DR since 2005. The two militaries have hosted annual

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exchange programs in multiple locations in both countries.115 The objective of the program, according to the DoD, is to address challenges and collectively better prepare for the next major disaster in the Asia-Pacific region.116 On the one hand, the exchange with the PLA aims to share lessons learned in order to increase the capacity to respond to future natural disasters in the Asia-Pacific region. Both sides can gain more knowledge of each other’s capabilities in civil affairs and disaster relief. On the other hand, it facilitates collaboration in addressing non-traditional security threats such as natural disasters to help a third country. Officials from the two countries directly involved in this program also emphasized the objective of mutual understanding and trust building.117 The US–China HA/DR Exchange Program attends more to the process than the result because it concentrates on knowledge and experience sharing as well as relationship building. First, the program has taken place in both countries every year since 2005. Unlike the on-and-off exchanges and visits or the IMET program, which restricted China’s participation, the HA/DR Exchange Program has not been confined by bilateral relationship or legislative restrictions. This exception enables the program to take a long-term approach that emphasizes the process of trust development. Second, the aim of the program is to gain more knowledge about how China operates HA/DR programs. The annual exchange program allowed the US to continuously engage with China and gain more knowledge about Chinese practices in the field of HA/DR. This is also a long-­ term process. Third, the HA/DR practices in the region involved multilateral efforts, which are based on trust as well as mechanisms of collaboration. Maintaining a long-term relationship with the Chinese military through the program is a way to develop trust and maintain a cooperative channel for HA/DR practice. This is also a piece of evidence that the program focuses on the process. Specifically, personnel involved in the US–China HA/DR Exchange Program embrace the process-orientated form of conduct. An Army Commander commented on a US–China HA/DR exchange as follows: “They [disaster management exchanges] allow us to truly recognize the importance of collaboration in addressing non-traditional security threats

 [86].  [87]. 117  [88]. 115 116

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such as natural disasters.”118 A Navy Commander believed that cooperating with the PLA and supporting its humanitarian capability would be “a powerful force-multiplier” for HA/DR in the Asia-Pacific region.119 For instance, in 2017, the HA/DR Exchange Program focused on a flooding scenario where two armies were requested to provide HA/DR to a third affected state.120 Thus, the beneficiary of US–China cooperation in HA/ DR was the entire Asia-Pacific region including many American allies. Moreover, helping the countries in the region which experience disasters requires long-term planning, and the result of a “decisive” win may not happen in the foreseeable future. In this manner, the collaborative approach of the HA/DR exchange is not consonant with the organizational culture of the DoD that values results. In fact, the collaborative relationship may take years to establish. The outcome of the cooperation between the US and China may not be achieved in a discernible future. It seems that this format of programming of HA/DR exchange was more greatly influenced by public diplomacy that emphasized process than the result-oriented organizational culture. The DoD’s organizational culture affected US–China exchanges and visits, but did not have an impact on the US–China HA/DR Exchange Program. The theory of organizational culture thus could only explain parts of the DoD’s public diplomacy implementation. The strategy-­ making of public diplomacy and the non-recurring nature of military exchanges and visits demonstrate the impact of the DoD’s result-oriented culture. The objective of public diplomacy towards China focuses on the intelligence-like results, gaining more information about the Chinese military. The exchange programs are subject to being dropped when they are considered not to reach the ideal outcomes in the short term, or the bilateral relationship encounters frictions. The exchanges and visits then become an indicator to reflect rather than a means to improve the bilateral relationship. The US–China HA/DR Exchange Program pays more attention to the process of sharing experiences and building relationships. Its collaborative approach to public diplomacy is based on mutual trust, and it prepares for future humanitarian and disastrous crises in a third country in the region. In this regard, it is not affected by the result-driven

 [86].  [89]. 120  [86]. 118 119

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culture of the DoD; instead, it is shaped by the public diplomacy rationale that leans towards processes.  he Canceled Game Plan T The DoD’s organizational culture of hierarchy has also affected its public diplomacy program towards China. In 1999, the Pentagon planned to expand military ties with the PLA and produced an internal document entitled “Game Plan for 1999 US-Sino Defense Exchanges” (hereinafter “Game Plan”). The Game Plan outlined more than 80 activities of military-­to-military visits, meetings, and exchanges between the two militaries at different levels. Specifically, these included “12 high-level visits by Pentagon and PLA officials, 40 functional exchanges of working-level military officials, 16 confidence-building measures and 13 international security meetings.”121 In fact, an exchange program between the US and China had been underway for years. The DoD’s history of engaging China and the Chinese military implies that it is in the DoD’s interests to conduct military-to-military exchanges with China. For instance, the DoD’s East Asia strategy report issued in November 1998 identified “comprehensive engagement with China to build the foundation for a long-term relationship based on cooperation and mutual interest” as the third important element among the nine components of US strategy.122 It wrote that dialogues between the US and China were critical to ensuring understanding of each other’s regional security interests, reducing misperceptions, increasing understanding of People’s Republic of China (PRC) security concerns, and building confidence to “avoid military accidents and miscalculations.”123 In 2001, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz wrote that military exchanges with China in 2000 sought to foster an environment that would be conducive to frank, open discussion, would complement the broader effort to engage the PRC, and would reduce the likelihood of miscalculations regarding cross-strait issues.124 Despite the above strategic interests, the Game Plan encountered many skeptical concerns that these activities would strengthen Chinese military capabilities and undermine US national security. A few US congressional  [90].  [91]. 123  [91]. 124  [92]. 121 122

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officials expressed concerns about renewed military contacts with the Chinese military.125 They argued that military exchanges with the PLA failed to reduce tensions, lacked reciprocity, and provided militarily useful information. The Congressional scrutiny resulted in provisions in the 2000 NDAA that forbad almost all substantial military-to-military exchange or contact with China. The Secretaries of Defense were also expected to submit an annual written report by December 31 of each year as to whether any military communication with China approved by the Secretary of Defense in that year is a “violation” of the restrictions.126 The NDAA’s order to ban US–China military-to-military contact was accepted by the DoD, even though the decision contradicted its strategy and interests. Not only was the Game Plan terminated, but Secretaries of Defense from Donald Rumsfeld to Gordon England also submitted reports on military exchanges with China, though they did not follow the December deadline specified in the NDAA.127 In addition, the idea not to help the PLA to attain the goal of military modernization was quickly accepted. In 2002 Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz told reporters that: We believe that the contact between American military personnel and Chinese military personnel can reduce misunderstandings on both sides and can help build a better basis for cooperation when opportunities arise. So we’d like to enhance those opportunities for interaction but we believe that to be successful we have to have principles of transparency and reciprocity. It’s very important that there’s mutual benefit to both sides … The more each country knows about what the other one is doing, the less danger is there, I believe, of misunderstanding and confrontation.128

This quote best demonstrates the stance of the DoD on engaging China. On the one hand, it needs to be cautious and ensure Chinese transparency, so that the US could also learn about the PLA’s operations and technologies. On the other hand, the DoD believed that there was value to engaging the PLA because it would reduce miscalculations and risks.

 [92].  [92]. 127  [92]. 128   Department of Defense, “Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz’s Interview with Phoenix Television,” May 31, 2002. 125 126

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The above cases of the 1999 Game Plan and the DoD following legislative restrictions to engage the PLA highlighted the impact of the DoD’s organizational culture of hierarchy. The order from the NDAA that asked the DoD to stop engaging the Chinese military was obeyed without any negotiation. Even though the DoD believed that maintaining contact with the PLA was of strategic importance to US national security in the region, the NDAA order was still followed. The Secretaries of Defense also adhered to the NDAA and submitted reports to Congress to explain military exchanges with China. In this manner, canceling US–China military contacts and exchanges is the result of the DoD’s organizational culture of hierarchy and obedience. The cases of obeying the order on strategic communication and US– China military exchange given above show that the DoD’s organizational culture, which focuses on hierarchy, affects its public diplomacy implementation. While these two cases did not involve specific program practice, the processes of strategy-making still represent the early stage of implementation. First, strategic communication was ordered to streamline the DoD’s communication efforts and advance interagency collaboration. Without knowing what it meant, how to implement it, and how to differentiate it from existing public diplomacy practices, the military followed the command. Second, the DoD’s engagement with China and the Chinese military was challenged by officials in Congress on the ground that the contacts undermined US security and interests. While maintaining the relationship and exchanging with the PLA is important to US strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, the DoD followed the command of the NDAA to limit or cancel its engagements with China. In this regard, the DoD’s culture of hierarchy affected and biased its public diplomacy implementation.

Conclusion This chapter has focused on the effects of organizational culture and interest in public diplomacy implementation. The findings suggest that while some public diplomacy programs in the DoS and the DoD are biased to fit the culture, a few public diplomacy practices have been affected by their organizational cultures. In the DoS, EducationUSA and the IVLP focus on processes rather than the result of public diplomacy. However, these two programs show little connection to the DoS’s elitist culture. In the DoD, the public diplomacy goal to engage China has been shaped by the

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organizational culture, which stressed results and hierarchy. The DoD’s culture of hierarchy has led to its adoption of strategic communication and the abolition of US–China military exchanges. The on-and-off US–China military exchanges and visits emphasize ends rather than means to build relationships. Yet, the US–China HA/DR Exchange Program leans towards the process of trust building, which contradicts the goal-oriented culture. The mixed impact of organizational culture on the implementation of public diplomacy has several implications. First, some organizational cultures have more in-depth impacts on public diplomacy practice. The tendency of the DoS to process was quickly picked up, but the culture of elitism is not as influential there. The DoD’s result-oriented and hierarchical culture has a similar influence on its public diplomacy programs, but there is an exception: the US-China HA/DR Exchange Program. Second, public diplomacy programs in the DoS that focus on processes are different from the programs of the DoD that value results. EducationUSA and the IVLP tend to stress processes and ignore the results of public diplomacy. The DoD’s contacts with China are driven by the result of understanding more about the Chinese military. Third, implementation discretion induced by organizational culture changes the meaning of public diplomacy. EducationUSA has become a program to help recruit foreign students, and the IVLP’s main task has become to identify future foreign leaders. The DoD’s public diplomacy task to engage China and the Chinese military pays more attention to understanding China for intelligence purpose and avoids helping Chinese military modernization. US–China exchanges and visits turn out to be indicators of rather than a tool to amend and further the bilateral relationship.

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5. Kier, Elizabeth. 1995. Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars. International Security 19 (4): 65–93. 6. Builder, Carl H. 1989. The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. 7. Heimann, C.F., and Larry. 1997. Acceptable Risks: Politics, Policy, and Risky Technologies. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 8. Barnett, Michael N., and Martha Finnemore. 1999. The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. International Organization 53 (4): 699–732. 9. Martin, Joanne. 2001. Organizational Culture: Mapping the Terrain. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. 10. Schein, Edgar H. 2004. Organizational Culture and Leadership. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 11. Cameron, Kim S., and Robert E.  Quinn. 2011. Diagnosing and Changing Organizational Culture: Based on the Competing Values Framework. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 12. Hofstede, Geert H. Organizational Culture. Hofstede Insights. https:// www.hofstede-­insights.com/models/organisational-­culture/. Accessed March 1, 2020. 13. Sandfort, Jodi, and Stephanie Moulton. 2015. Effective Implementation in Practice: Integrating Public Policy and Management. Somerset, MD: John Wiley & Sons. 14. Brehm, John, and Scott Gates. 1997. Working, Shirking, and Sabotage Bureaucratic Response to a Democratic Public. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 15. Garrow, Eve E., and Oscar Grusky. 2012. Institutional Logic and Street-Level Discretion: The Case of HIV Test Counseling. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 23 (1): 103–131. 16. DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W.  Powell. 1991. The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. In The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, ed. Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, 63–82. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 17. Weiner, Sharon K. 2011. Our Own Worst Enemy? Institutional Interests and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Expertise. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 18. Rife, Rickey L., and Rosemary Hansen. 1998. Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus; Improving Communications and Promoting National Security. Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College. 19. Karas, Mark. 2020. Reconciling Defense and State Department Cultures at Embassies: A FAO Survival Guide to Working on a U.S. Country Team. FAOA Journal of International Affairs. https://faoajournal.substack.com/p/ reconciling-­defense-­and-­state-­department. Accessed July 27, 2021. 20. Gingrich, Newt. 2003. Rogue State Department. Foreign Policy 137: 42–48.

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21. Harr, John Ensor. 2015. The Professional Diplomat. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 22. Scott, Andrew M. 1969. The Department of State: Formal Organization and Informal Culture. International Studies Quarterly 13 (1): 1–18. 23. Simpson, Smith. 1967. Anatomy of the State Department. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin. 24. Warwick, Donald P., Marvin Meade, and Theodore Reed. 1975. A Theory of Public Bureaucracy: Politics, Personality, and Organization in the State Department. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 25. Miles, Renanah. 2011. The State Department, USAID, and the Flawed Mandate for Stabilization and Reconstruction. Prism 3 (1): 37–46. 26. Irwin, Lewis G. 2012. A Clash of Organizational Cultures and Resources. In Disjointed Ways, Disunified Means: Learning from America’s Struggle to Build an Afghan Nation, ed. Lewis G.  Irwin, 173–214. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. 27. Scott, James M., and Jerel A. Rosati. 2011. The Politics of United States Foreign Policy. 5th ed. Boston, MA: Wadsworth. 28. Kopp, Harry W., and John K. Naland. 2017. Career Diplomacy: Life and Work in the US Foreign Service. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 29. Garnham, David. 1975. Foreign Service Elitism and U.  S. Foreign Affairs. Public Administration Review 35 (1): 44–51. 30. Harr, John Ensor. 1969. Change and the Profession. In The Professional Diplomat, ed. John Ensor Harr, 235–289. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 31. Clarke, Duncan L. 1987. Why State Can’t Lead. Foreign Policy 66: 128–142. 32. Hook, Steven W. 2003. Domestic Obstacles to International Affairs: The State Department Under Fire at Home. PS. Political Science & Politics 36 (1): 23–29. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096503001641. 33. Tinoco, Janet K., and Anke Arnaud. 2013. The Transfer of Military Culture to Private Sector Organizations: A Sense of Duty Emerges. Journal of Organizational Culture, Communications and Conflict 17 (2): 37–61. 34. Department of Defense Announces Changes to Procedures and Policy for Reduction in Force in the Civilian Workforce. 2017. US Department of Defense. https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/ Release/Article/1060585/department-­of-­defense-­announces-­changes-­to-­ procedures-­and-­policy-­for-­reduction/. Accessed March 30, 2020. 35. US Department of Defense. 2014. DoD Civilian Personnel Management System: Nonappropriated Fund (NAF) Performance Management Program. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense. 36. Defense Business Board. 2006. Innovation and Cultural Change Task Group Report Washington. DC: US Department of Defense.

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37. Dunivin, Karen O. 1994. Military Culture: Change and Continuity. Armed Forces & Society 20 (4): 531–547. https://doi.org/10.117 7/0095327x9402000403. 38. Coates, Charles Hunter, and Roland J. Pellegrin. 1965. Military Sociology: A Study of American Military Institutions and Military Life. University Park, MD: Social Science Press. 39. The U.S.  Army/Marine Corps. 2007. The U.S.  Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 40. Patterson, Rebecca. 2014. The Challenge of Nation-Building: Implementing Effective Innovation in the U.S.  Army from World War II to the Iraq War. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 41. Birtle, Andrew J. 2007. U.S.  Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine: 1942–1976. Washington, DC: U.S.  Army Center of Military History. 42. US Department of the Army. 1963. Department of the Army Field Manual 31-16: Counterguerrilla Operations. Washington, DC: US Department of the Army. 43. Fitzgerald, David. 2013. Learning to Forget: US Army Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Practice from Vietnam to Iraq. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 44. Long, Austin. 2016. The Soul of Armies: Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Military Culture in the US and UK. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 45. Wunische, Adam. 2018. America’s Military is Losing its Counterinsurgency Operations Capabilities. The National Interest. https://nationalinterest.org/ feature/americas-­m ilitar y-­l osing-­i ts-­c ounterinsurgency-­o perations-­ capabilities-­32462. Accessed April 21, 2020. 46. Whittinghill, Craig. 2011. An Evaluation of the Perceived Organizational Culture and Innovative Climate of a Department of Defense Community of Organizations. Huntsville, AL: University of Alabama in Huntsville. 47. Collins, Joseph J. 1998. The Complex Context of American Military Culture: A Practitioner’s View. Washington Quarterly 21 (4): 213–228. 48. Remond, Sarah A., Sherrie L. Wilcox, Shawna Campbell, Alice Kim, Kimberly Finney, Kaytlin Barr, and Anthony M. Hassan. 2015. A Brief Introduction to the Military Workplace Culture. Work 50: 9–20. https://doi.org/10.3233/ WOR-­141987. 49. Williams, Thomas M. 2009. Understanding Innovation. Military Review 89 (4): 59–67. 50. Zammuto, Raymond F., and Jack Y.  Krakower. 1991. Quantitative and Qualitative Studies of Organizational Culture. Research in Organization Change and Development 5: 83–114.

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51. Tata, Jasmine, and Sameer Prasad. 1998. Cultural and Structural Constraints on Total Quality Management Implementation. Total Quality Management 9 (8): 703–710. https://doi.org/10.1080/0954412988172. 52. Soeters, Joseph L., Donna J.  Winslow, and Alise Weibull. 2006. Military Culture. In Handbook of the Sociology of the Military, ed. Giuseppe Caforio, 237–254. New York: Springer. 53. Simons, Anna. 1998. How Ambiguity Results in Excellence: The Role of Hierarchy and Reputation in U.S. Army Special Forces. Human Organization 57 (1): 117–123. 54. US Department of State. EducationUSA. US Department of State. https:// educationusa.state.gov/. Accessed March 1, 2019. 55. Lan, Yang. 2015, January 12. Mulling Over Internationalized Education. The Global Times. http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/901385.shtml (now removed). 56. Yu, Chenkang, and Xuyan Cui. 2011, March 28. Interview with Senior Officials at EducationUSA China. China Daily. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/ exchange/2011-­03/28/content_13103841.htm. 57. EducationUSA. nafsa.org. https://www.nafsa.org/professional-­resources/ browse-­by-­interest/educationusa-­resources. Accessed July 4, 2017. 58. Sohu Study Abroad. 2016. American Embassy’s EducationUSA Director advises on How to Choose American Schools. Sohu. https://www.sohu. com/a/73763820_119368. Accessed July 4, 2017. 59. Huanqiu. 2014, September 11. Apply EducationUSA Abroad DIY, Chinese No Longer Rely on Study Abroad Agencies. Phoenix New Media. http://sd.ifeng. com/education/jiaoyuzixun/detail_2015_03/05/3617482_0.shtml. Accessed February 23, 2022. 60. EducationUSA. Policy Guidance for EducationUSA Centers on Commercial Recruitment Agents. Washington, DC: EducationUSA. 61. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. History and Mission of ECA. US Department of State. https://eca.state.gov/about-­bureau/history-­and-­ mission-­eca. Accessed May 14, 2020. 62. US Department of State. 2010. EducationUSA. Library of Congress Web Archives. https://www.loc.gov/item/lcwaN0027030/. Accessed February 23, 2022. 63. EducationUSA. Find an Advising Center. US Department of State. https:// educationusa.state.gov/find-­advising-­center. Accessed May 14, 2020. 64. Hsu, Madeline Y. 2012. Chinese and American Collaborations through Educational Exchange during the Era of Exclusion, 1872–1955. Pacific Historical Review 83 (2): 314–332. 65. Iriye, Akira. 1967. Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.

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66. EducationUSA. About EducationUSA. US Department of State. https://educationusa.state.gov/about-­educationusa. Accessed February 7, 2020. 67. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. About IVLP. US State Department. https://eca.state.gov/ivlp/about-­ivlp. Accessed March 24, 2020. 68. Kelly, Jon. 2011, March 29. How Do You Spot a Future World Leader? BBC News Magazine. http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-­12880901. Accessed May 27, 2018. 69. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 2000. Exchange Programs and the National Interest. Washington, DC: US Senate. 70. US Department of State. 2017. Project Objectives, Goals, and Implementation (POGI): FY 2018 International Visitor Leadership Program. Office of International Visitors Educational and Cultural Affairs. https://eca.state. gov/files/bureau/fy18_ivlp_pogi.pdf. Accessed February 23, 2022. 71. Scott-Smith, Giles. 2011. Mutual Interests? US Public Diplomacy in the 1980s and Nicolas Sarkozy’s First Trip to the United States. Journal of Transatlantic Studies 9 (4): 326–341. https://doi.org/10.1080/1479401 2.2011.622931. 72. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. 2017. IVLP Fact Sheet 2017. US Department of State. https://www.globaltiesus.org/storage/documents/ IVLP_Fact_Sheet_2017.pdf (now removed). Accessed March 18, 2018. 73. Siegl, Michael B. 2008. Military Culture and Transformation. Joint Forces Quarterly 49 (2): 103–106. 74. US Department of Defense. 2017. Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense. 75. Military Intelligence. 1996. Federation of American Scientists. https://fas. org/irp/offdocs/int014.html. Accessed April 21, 2020. 76. US-China Economic And Security Review Commission. 2008. China’s Expanding Global Influence: Foreign Policy Goals, Practices, and Tools-Hearing Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Washington, DC: US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. 77. Gates, Robert. 2007. Landon Lecture at the Kansas State University. Kansas State University. https://www.k-­state.edu/landon/speakers/robert-­gates/ transcript.html. Accessed May 16, 2020. 78. Shanker, Thom. 2007, November 27. Defense Secretary Urges More Spending for U.S.  Diplomacy. The New  York Times. https://www.nytimes. com/2007/11/27/washington/27gates.html. 79. Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2009. The Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept Washington. DC: US Department of Defense. 80. Murphy, Dennis M. 2008. The Trouble with Strategic Communication(s). Carlisle, PA: Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College.

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81. Harmon, Matthew F. 2009. Defense Support to Public Diplomacy: Options for the Operational Commander. Newport, RI: Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College. 82. Obama, Barack. 2009. Interagency Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication. Washington, DC: The White House. 83. Courts, Michael, and John Pendleton. 2012. DOD Strategic Communication: Integrating Foreign Audience Perceptions into Policy Making, Plans, and Operations. Washington, DC: US Government Accountability Office. 84. Stanway, David, and Lesley Wroughton. 2018. China Cancels Military Talks with U.S. in Protest at Sanctions over Russia Military Equipment. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-­china-­usa-­sanctions/china-­cancels-­ militar y-­t alks-­w ith-­u -­s -­i n-­p rotest-­a t-­s anctions-­o ver-­r ussia-­m ilitar y-­ equipment-­idUSKCN1M20DQ. 85. Mattis, James N. 2018. Remarks by Secretary Mattis at Plenary Session of the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue. US Department of Defense. https://www.defense. gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1538599/remarks-­b y-­ secretar y-­m attis-­a t-­p lenar y-­s ession-­o f-­t he-­2 018-­s hangri-­l a-­d ialogue/. Accessed April 26, 2020. 86. Barbour, Nathan H. 2017. U.S., Chinese Troops Attend Disaster Management Exchange. US Department of Defense. https://www.defense.gov/News/ Article/Article/1380334/us-­chinese-­troops-­attend-­disaster-­management-­ exchange/. Accessed August 13, 2018. 87. Behlin, Michael. 2016. U.S., China participate in Disaster Management Exchange. US Army. https://www.army.mil/article/178714/us_china_participate_in_disaster_management_exchange. Accessed August 13, 2018. 88. Dodson, Russell. 2012. US and China Focus on Disaster Management. US Department of Defense. https://www.army.mil/article/92736/us_and_ china_focus_on_disaster_management. Accessed August 14, 2018. 89. Grower, Jason P. 2013. Joint Responders. Proceedings 139 (4): 28–32. 90. Gertz, Bill. 1999. Military Exchange with Beijing Raises Security Concerns. The Washington Times. February 19. https://infoweb.newsbank.com/apps/ news/document-­view?p=AWNB&docref=news/0EB0F379297B0349. 91. Secretary of Defense. 1998. The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense. 92. Kan, Shirley A. 2009. U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.

CHAPTER 5

Public Diplomacy Becomes Measurable Outcomes

Displacing Ambiguous Goals with Measurables In the literature on organizational performance, one goal displacement phenomenon referred to replacing vague program objectives with measurable outcomes. Scholars contend that “behavior in organizations tends to drift toward compatibility with the ways the organization is evaluated.”1 Compared to private business programs, public programs usually have greater vagueness in relation to their goals and greater difficulty in assessing the achievement of those goals.2 Thus, the program goals of public organizations tend to give leeway for implementation to focus on measurable outcomes, and government agencies can redefine policy goals according to how programs are measured or can be measured. Specifically, they develop surrogate measures of performance on which performance is evaluated, such as caseloads, arrest rates, home visits and worker/client ratios. These surrogate measures then come to replace the program’s original goals.3

 [1, 2].  [2, 3]. 3  [1]. 1 2

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Conceptualizing Goal Ambiguity While implementation bias that favored measurable goals may be due to various reasons, many scholars attribute it to goal ambiguity. Implementation bias is defined as the extent to which an organizational goal or a set of goals allows leeway for interpretation when that goal represents the desired future state of the organization.4 Some scholars even claim that all organizations have multiple and conflicting goals that are often difficult to specify or measure.5 For instance, Aaron Wildavsky suggested that “objectives invariably may be distinguished by three outstanding qualities: they are multiple, conflicting, and vague.”6 Similarly, as William Richard Scott admitted, “the concept of organizational goals is among the most slippery and treacherous of all those employed by organizational analysts.”7 It was also argued that compared to private organizations, public institutions tend to have broader and vaguer program objectives because public organizations lack the economic indicators of efficiency and effectiveness that helped direct and clarify goals.8 For instance, Sanjay K. Pandey and Bradley E. Wright found that goal ambiguity is one of the five salient factors affecting program performance in the US federal government.9 James Q. Wilson also outlined the goals of government agencies in the US Government Manual and commented that all of them are unclear.10 Goal ambiguity is closely connected to program performance. Laurence J. O’Toole Jr. identifies it as one of the critical factors of successful public programs and policies, through a literature review covering more than 100 program implementation research studies.11 Specifically, ambiguous goals allowing leeway for interpretation have negative consequences for the performance of agencies. First, inappropriate goal specification towards measurables causes performance dysfunction in organizations.12 Richard E.  Matland wrote that “goal ambiguity is seen as leading to misunderstanding and uncertainty and therefore often is culpable in  [4].  [5]. 6  [6]. 7  [7]. 8  [8]. 9  [9]. 10  [2]. 11  [10]. 12  [5]. 4 5

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implementation failure.”13 Second, ambiguous goals make it difficult to develop clear and measurable performance indicators and expectations.14 Employees may not be certain about how to achieve goals or even which goals to achieve.15 More importantly, organizations can use vagueness, ambiguity, and discretion to implement a policy that is more closely aligned to their own preferences.16 Goal Ambiguity and Implementation Discretion Measurable Goals Became Goals Given the ambiguous goals, program implementers seize on some aspects of program implementation and ignore others.17 The focus of practice then shifted towards that which could be measured and easily audited.18 Which goals are measurable and observable, and which are unmeasured? Scholars offered some explanations. For example, Christopher Pollitt identified that the task of issuing driving licenses was standardizable, predictable, and measurable, while mental health counseling was not.19 In education, measurable outcomes may be faculty-to-student ratios, retention and graduation rates, employment prospects for students, or faculty publications.20 Outcomes such as research innovation and authentic student learning are not directly measurable. The preference for measurables may lead to insufficient attention being paid to less observable aspects, allowing significant scope for discretion.21 As Wilson puts it, organizations “give most of their attention to the more easily measured outcomes at the expense of those less easily observed or counted.”22 Other scholars contend that in order to increase the likelihood of political and budgetary support, organizations tend to concentrate on activities that allow them to increase their overall accomplishments

 [11].  [12, 13]. 15  [14]. 16  [4, 15]. 17  [1]. 18  [16]. 19  [17]. 20  [18]. 21  [19–21]. 22  [2]. 13 14

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and, by extension, on less costly or easier-to-measure activities.23 For instance, by analyzing the Federal Aviation Administration’s safety oversight system, Mark Hansen and Carolyn McAndrews found that focusing on the measurable outcomes “has become an important factor in the ability of programs to obtain budgetary inputs.”24 In turn, these measurements replace the program goal and induce implementation discretion that focuses on a few specific indicators and targets—usually the most achievable or saleable—at the expense of the overall objectives, especially when time and resources are limited.25 As a result, the program goal becomes what could be measured. An empirical study by Peter Blau found that employment counselors of an employment agency shifted the focus of their work to the more easily employed at the expense of those that were more difficult to place after they began to be evaluated in terms of their placement rate.26 Similarly, in relation to the Forest Service, Eric Biber discovered that organizations would overproduce on goals that were complements, were easier to measure, or had higher incentives. For example, protection of water quality, scenic and aesthetic values, and wildlife habitat quality were all difficult to measure. Those activities were likely to be under-emphasized as opposed to something more tangible for budgetary purposes.27 Other empirical studies also suggest that the reliance on contracts leads to a checklist mentality in which implementers deliver only those things that are specified in the formal performance system or place emphasis on results that are easy to measure and auditable.28 Perverse Effects Implementation bias in favor of measurable outcomes has at least four perverse effects. First, it creates problems for accountability and compliance. On the one hand, workers will focus on outcomes that are measured or easy to measure and will ignore the unmeasured ones, even though the measured tasks do not fully represent the stated program objective. As a result, implementers skew the meaning of policy orders and only follow how they are evaluated. For instance, a museum aims to increase the  [22–24].  [25]. 25  [19, 26]. 26  [27]. 27  [22]. 28  [28, 29]. 23 24

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number of visitors that may be less interested in other principles such as the quality of its collection, the protection of the cultural heritage, the educational purpose of the museum, or the degree to which it promotes scientific research.29 On the other hand, given the incentive in numbers, implementers may try to fudge the numbers. As Wilson suggested, this could be out of a desire to shrink, which referred to minimizing efforts or subverting, as well as producing easier outcomes other than the measured one.30 Second, focusing on measurable tasks prevents program implementation from being more efficient. In order to measure efficiency, it is first necessary to measure goal attainment. When the program goal is vague and implementation is reoriented towards easily measurable items, the stated program objective is abandoned. Thus, the assessment of the program only responds to the displaced goals or the measurable goals, not the original ones for which the program was designed. As a result, whether the program meets the stated original objective is unknown.31 Third, focusing on measurable outcomes blocks innovation. As revealed by Hans de Bruijn, there may be a strong incentive for thinking in terms of “cash cows,” which preferred products that could be made simply and quickly, allowing as much money as possible to be generated.32 For example, a university that keeps reproducing existing knowledge will score a high output, but will no longer be innovative. Lastly, this tendency towards measurables may finally become part of the organizational culture that dictates future practices. Wilson considered “quantitative metrics” as one of the factors central to shaping bureaucratic culture.33 The implementation of Occupational Safety and Health focused on safety rather than health concerns, because safety was far easier to address through regulations, while health concerns were more complex and difficult to address through regulations.34 Organizations of projects containing observable outputs and/or outcomes appear to have management structures that use these quantifiable metrics to facilitate conformity.

 [30].  [2]. 31  [2]. 32  [30]. 33  [2, 31]. 34  [2]. 29 30

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Statistics can thus be a central driving force in the development and maintenance of institutional culture.35 It is argued that organizations tend to give more attention to the easily measured outcomes and neglect the less observed and quantifiable outcomes. Ambiguous goals of organizations, especially public organizations, were more likely to grant leeway to implementers in terms of exercising discretion over implementation that focused on measurables. In the long run, this shaped organizational performance, program efficiency, and organizational culture. In order to better understand public diplomacy, I use this theory to explain public diplomacy implementation and find out whether the same goal displacement process is found in this field and whether implementation changes the program goals.

The Ambiguous Goals and Evaluation of Public Diplomacy The Ambiguous Public Diplomacy Goals of the DoS and the DoD Like many other bureaus and departments of government agencies, the public diplomacy sector operates under unclear and broad goals. As Wilson pointed out, the stated objectives in the US Government Manual use terms such as “well-being,” “potential,” “security,” “viable,” “decent,” “suitable,” “welfare,” “orderly,” and “development.” The meanings of these words are vague, and they could mean different things to different people. Even when the meaning of a goal is fixed, it is also likely that people may disagree over the means to achieve it. 36 The mission of the DoS is to lead America’s foreign policy through diplomacy, advocacy, and assistance by advancing the interests of the American people, their safety, and economic prosperity. The words “lead,” “advance,” “interests,” “safety,” and “economic prosperity” can have different meanings. In the DoD, military forces need to deter war and ensure the nation’s security. Interpretations differ as to the meanings of words like “deter,” “ensure,” and “security.” The public diplomacy objectives of the DoS and the DoD allow multiple interpretations, which allows leeway for implementation discretion. Specifically, the public diplomacy activities of the DoS are designed to  [31].  [2].

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work towards two objectives: representing and promoting US interests abroad. But foreign policy and national interest are vague terms with unclear meanings. As Wilson stated: “The State Department has goals, but they are so general that no executive can derive from them a clear definition of the department’s tasks.”37 People disagree about US interests, which could potentially change in unpredictable ways, and they are unsure about the required course of action to achieve national interests. Accordingly, the public diplomacy objectives of the DoS are vague and broad. As was noted in Chap. 2, the keywords of public diplomacy goals at the DoS included “foreign policy,” “national interests,” “national security,” “understand,” “engage,” “influence,” “strengthen,” “expand,” and “relationship.” These words neither have a definite meaning in the implementation process nor indicate clear means and methods to achieve the objectives. The public diplomacy goal of the DoD is also unclear and broad. In general, the DoD’s public diplomacy is aimed at shaping the operational environment and fostering common views on security challenges. The terms “shape,” “foster,” “operational environment,” and “challenge” could have various interpretations. Regarding China, the DoD’s public diplomacy aim is to reduce misunderstandings and persuade/encourage China to become a responsible regional actor that contributed to regional stability. It also contains unclear terms such as “reduce,” “persuade,” “encourage,” “misunderstanding/miscalculation,” and “stability.” These words have different meanings and there is no clear guidance on how to achieve this objective. “Unmeasurable” Public Diplomacy The evaluation of public diplomacy has also been considered a difficult task among scholars. In a report on public diplomacy evaluation, Robert Banks identified “intangible concepts that may not be measurable” as one of the key challenges in terms of measuring public diplomacy. It is difficult to directly verify changes in awareness, perceptions, and attitudes caused by public diplomacy.38 In other words, the foreign public’s perception change attributed to public diplomacy is believed to be unobservable and unmeasurable. The “unmeasurable” public diplomacy may lead to a  [2].  [32].

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reluctance by Congress to fund public diplomacy because it is difficult to determine to what extent public diplomacy can influence the foreign public to support US foreign policy. As Pierre C. Pahlavi noted, “without a valid evaluation tool, PD will remain condemned to play a secondary role within states’ foreign policy systems.”39 Therefore, in order to secure resources and support for public diplomacy, practitioners tend to use surrogate measurements to prove the effectiveness of their programs.

The Preference for Measurable Factors in DoS In the DoS, the implementations of EducationUSA and the IVLP demonstrate their tendency to focus only on measurable outcomes while ignoring the unmeasurables. In the end, these measurable indicators become the goal of these programs. First, higher-level officials and frontline operators explain the achievements of the programs to Congress and the public based on how these programs can be quantifiably assessed. For instance, the DoS budget justifications use the number of US and foreign exchange participants that the ECA involved annually as a measurement to demonstrate the achievement of public diplomacy’s long-term engagement. As was noted in Chap. 2, the general public diplomacy goal of the DoS is to advance mutual understanding and support foreign policy. EducationUSA redefined this objective and turned its goal into promoting US higher education, emphasizing the efforts to increase foreign college students studying in the US. The IVLP retains the vague goal of relationship building and mutual understanding, but in its implementation, its purpose has shifted towards identifying future foreign leaders. Increasing Student Numbers The implementation of EducationUSA focuses on the increase of foreign students studying in the US. In the case of China, its implementation pays more attention to Chinese students studying in the US, which is measured by the quantifiable numbers of incoming students, as well as the economic gains from their tuition and other expenses. Other outcomes such as the quality of the students’ stay in the US and relationships established there have been ignored during the implementation process. Consequently, the goal of EducationUSA has become one of enlarging the number of  [33].

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international students in the US, which not only differs from its original intent, but also ultimately becomes its goal. Focusing on the Number of Students and Economic Benefits Data from Open Doors EducationUSA relies on two quantitative performance indicators to measure its success: the number of foreign students studying in the US and the economic benefits that result from them doing so. Data from a report titled Open Doors were commonly used to prove the achievements of EducationUSA. Open Doors is an annual report published by the IIE with the support of a grant from the ECA.  It contains statistics that mainly explain the situations of foreign students in the US as well as the trend of student mobility.40 It provides quantifiable data about educational exchanges, trade in educational services, and study abroad activities. Specifically, it gathers statistics “on places of origin, sources of financial support, fields of study, host institutions, academic level, and rates of growth of the international student population in the United States, as well as on the economic impact of international students to the state where they study and the nation as a whole.”41 The data in Open Doors are claimed to justify the effectiveness of US educational programs, including EducationUSA. EducationUSA officials mentioned this report on many occasions and used the data to prove the success of US educational exchanges. For example, EducationUSA hosts a press conference every November to release the Open Doors report. At the press release conference, US government officials along with alumni form a panel to present the up-to-date data on international students hosted by US colleges and universities. EducationUSA’s press releases implicitly expressed that the increase of international students in the US is evidence to demonstrate the significance of EducationUSA.42 On other occasions, officials explicitly stated that the report presents the success of US higher education promotion. For example, Judith A. McHale, former US Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, stated at an

 [34].  [35]. 42  [36, 37]. 40 41

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EducationUSA Forum that the annual Open Doors report was supported by the DoS to measure the progress of education promotion.43 However, the measurable data presented in Open Doors reports only shows that more international students chose the US as their education destination. The less measurable outcomes, such as increased “mutual understanding” and international students’ positive perceptions about the US, are not reflected by the statistics. The increased number of incoming international students does not say much about the quality of their stay. We still do not know from Open Doors whether they develop an understanding and a favorable impression toward the US after their study. Instead, EducationUSA could use other measurements such as observations, opinion polls, and surveys to monitor and assess foreign students’ experience in the US.  More international students studying in the US does not necessarily mean that they understand the country better. This indicator is used by EducationUSA because it is measurable, and the data are relatively easy to gather. This results in something different being measured than was the original intent of the program, which was to increase mutual understanding between the US and the foreign public. Economic Gains from Tuition DoS officials also attribute the economic benefits resulting from student tuition paid by international students to the work of EducationUSA. It is believed that the quantifiable measurement can be used to prove the success of EducationUSA. Former Under Secretary Judith A. McHale said in a remark at one EducationUSA forum: “From an economic perspective, bringing foreign students to study in our country is just plain good business. The economic benefits to the U.S. economy from tuition, housing, and other expenses total nearly $20 billion each year and we can’t afford to lose out on that opportunity.”44 Marie Royce, former assistant secretary of state for Educational and Cultural Affairs, highlighted the contribution of Chinese students studying in the US to the US economy at the EducationUSA forum in 2019: Chinese students contributed 15  billion dollars to the U.S. economy in 2018 alone, making international education one of our country’s top exports. From a foreign relations standpoint, the friendships that are formed,  [38].  [38].

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the values shared, and the networks created, are even more important than the economic contributions of these Chinese students. I know everyone in this room is committed to this goal.45

This statement shows that the tuition and other expenses of these students are believed to benefit the US economy. Officials use this quantifiable economic impact as an indicator of the success of EducationUSA. Again, economic gain refers to the measurement of the financial worth of foreign students studying in the US, not the quality of their stay. These students came to the US and contributed to the US economy by paying their tuition, traveling to and within the US, as well as living expenses. The statistics only prove that EducationUSA is a program that could improve the US economy. However, the public diplomacy objective of advancing mutual understanding and forging long-term relationships had nothing to do with the economic gain from foreign students; they may come to the US, spend a great deal of money, and leave with negative impressions. Therefore, the measurement of EducationUSA that focuses on financial profits from foreign students is different from the program’s original public diplomacy objective.  ducationUSA’s Goal Became Increasing International Students E The implementation of EducationUSA focuses on measurable outcomes, such as the number of incoming foreign students and the economic benefits gained from their study in the US. Whether they developed positive perceptions about the US has not been on the radar of these evaluation indicators. In addition to these two indicators, the current objective of EducationUSA also suggests that the program redefined and shifted the public diplomacy goal of the DoS towards a more measurable and operational one. Its current stated goal is “offering accurate, comprehensive, and current information about opportunities to study at accredited postsecondary institutions in the US and providing services to the US higher education community to help institutional leaders meet their recruitment and campus internationalization goals.”46 This demonstrates a shift from vague goals to measurable goals. The goal includes instructions on how to encourage Chinese students to apply to American universities, offering information and helping higher education institutional leaders. The  [39].  [40].

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objective of helping US higher education institutions to meet their recruitment and campus internationalization goals is more operational and measurable than building relationship and supporting foreign policy. It assumes that Chinese students’ positive experience in the US could be supported by universities meeting recruitment and internationalization goals. The redefined goal to promote US higher education leaves out other important unmeasurable outcomes. The indicated measurements are surrogates and do not reflect the public diplomacy objective. For instance, offering accurate and comprehensive information for Chinese students who are applying to American universities only addresses the application process; it ignores whether these students will have a sufficiently good experience in the US so that a sustained positive relationship can be established. Moreover, advancing the interests of US educational institutions is far from a public diplomacy goal. It could be argued that meeting the internationalization goals of these organizations will enhance the experience of international students in the US.  While this may be true, this objective leaves out unmeasurable aspects, such as their off-campus experience and the difference between expectation and reality. These factors also influence students’ opinions of the US. In other words, helping US higher educational institutions to meet their goals does not necessarily fulfill the purpose of public diplomacy, such as advancing mutual understanding or supporting US foreign policy. As a result, EducationUSA has become a tool to promote US higher education or simply to increase the number of incoming foreign students rather than a program of public diplomacy to foster long-term relationships. The current objective of EducationUSA, as stated on its official website, is “promoting the diversity of U.S. higher education to help international students find their ‘best fit.’ ”47 The measurable outcome of attracting more Chinese students to the US is turned into the objective of EducationUSA. The original goal of advancing mutual understanding and building long-term relationships in order to support foreign policy has become overlooked and displaced by this more tangible goal. Thus, the goals of EducationUSA have become those that have been measured.

 [40].

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Identifying Future Leaders and Increasing Diversity Similarly, the implementation of the IVLP also exemplifies the discretion shown in focusing more on measurable tasks than those that are difficult to observe or assess. Implementers use two indicators to demonstrate the significance of the IVLP: the number of important foreign leaders in the program’s alumni network and its emphasis on diversity. The data of these two measurements can be directly obtained and observed. Other critical values that are important to public diplomacy, such as the relationships created by the program and visitors’ opinion change as a result of their trip, are neglected, as are long-term policy effects. In the end, the objective of the IVLP has become these two indicators that can be measured. Quantifiable Measurements Identify Future Leaders In practice, IVLP practitioners redefine the program’s objective and justify its significance by using the number of important leaders in IVLP’s alumni poll. Congress officials, managers, and frontline operators of the IVLP all consider the foreign leaders who are also IVLP alumni as evidence of the program’s success. They believe that these leaders’ short trips to the US will have an impact on their decisions in the future when they hold important positions. In other words, these future leaders are expected to have positive experiences in the US, which will then subsequently result in them enacting favorable policies towards the US. Officials stated in front of a Congress Hearing that the leaders brought to the US under the IVLP later assumed prominent positions, including heads of state.48 In 1989, Bruce F. Gelb, former Director of the USIA, said the following in a hearing to the Senate to demonstrate the significance of the IVLP: USIA’s International Visitor program, as well as others, brings foreign leaders to this country for intensive professional and cultural orientation. Many of the participants have later assumed prominent roles in journalism, academia, the arts, and government, including 99 current or former heads of state.49

 [41].  [41].

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He implied that the IVLP was successful because it identified so many leaders who later assumed important positions in their countries. In 1991, Edwin J. Feulner Jr., the former Chairman of the US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, delineated this process by stating: Under the International Visitors program, USIA officers in Paris or London will find a member of the European Parliament and send him over to the United States. Four or five years later that member might end up being a senior official in the European Parliament or a home parliament. Those kinds of educational exchanges matter.50

This quote reveals that the IVLP was believed by higher-level officials to be a program to establish connections in foreign governments. More recently, Philip Breeden, the press counselor at the US embassy in London, insisted that the IVLP was people-to-people diplomacy, focusing on the relationships built by future leaders and Americans: “What we’re looking for is people who are contributing to their community, who we think will advance in their chosen career path, who will serve as a good link between our two countries.”51 Mid-level managers also shared this perspective. For example, Jennifer Clinton, the former president of Global Ties, an executing partner of the IVLP at the local level, wrote in an article: “IVLP touts its very prominent alumni base of more than 330 heads of government or state—an impressive achievement.”52 Similarly, the World Affairs Council, a frontline organization that invites foreign service nationals from the embassies of 13 countries to the US in a special IVLP program, explained that the “job of these Information Specialists [IVLP participants] is to interpret events in their home countries to US ambassadors and embassy staff and to promote and explain US policy to local officials and media. These people serve as the eyes and ears of US foreign service personnel.”53 These quotes from managers meant that identifying and inviting key personnel or

 [42].  [43]. 52  These visitors include former British Prime Ministers Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, Margaret Thatcher, and Edward Heath, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy, former Afghan President Hamid Karzai, former Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard, and former Zimbabwean Premier Morgan Tsvangirai. [44]. 53  [45]. 50 51

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emerging leaders of foreign countries was the perceived main aim of the IVLP. Many articles and interviews also use the names of these famous political leaders to either introduce the IVLP or defend its success. A leader of one local partner organization of the IVLP believes that its impressive statistics on current heads of state and ministers that were participants in the program in their younger days throughout the world is evidence that the US is planting seeds today to harvest tomorrow.54 This rhetoric is seen in many texts and speeches about the IVLP, a fact which indicates that identifying emerging foreign leaders becomes the program measurement and even the de facto goal. Focusing on the number of future leaders identified and invited by the IVLP can be seen as a coping mechanism to deal with the ambiguous goal of the program. Not only is it presentable and measurable, but it also reflects an important component of the implementation of the IVLP. As Wilson pointed out, “when goals are vague, circumstances become important.”55 Circumstances mean the situations or tasks that operations need to cope with on a daily basis. In the IVLP, the key circumstance is to pinpoint the right people that the program would benefit the most from bringing them to the US. The decision of who to invite is usually made by program officers and higher-level officers at the embassy. The criteria for participant selection are given in Table  5.1, which delineates how the IVLP selects future leaders as visitors. This task of the IVLP is so critical that it becomes a part of the program measurement that determines program effectiveness. The Feature of Diversity Another measurable goal adopted by the implementation of the IVLP is the level of diversity. As was discussed in Chap. 4, the IVLP aims to present US diversity to foreign visitors. Highlighting diversity is also a coping mechanism to deal with the vague goal of the program, which focuses not only on the number of places for foreign participants to visit, but also on the number of leaders in diverse fields. These surrogate indicators lead the program to concentrate on measurable outcomes. For instance, printed material provided by the Shanghai Consulate noted that the IVLP brings more than 100 Chinese participants to the US each year. This pool includes  [46].  [2].

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Table 5.1  The participant selection criteria of the IVLP Criteria

Explanation

Personal factors

Candidates should be established or potential leaders in their fields. They must be physically and mentally able to fulfill the conditions of a program, with extensive travel and a typically busy schedule. Candidates should be persons who will gain from their US programs and will continue to be valuable mission contacts. Citizenship Candidates must, as a rule, be citizens of the country from which they are nominated. Personal Candidates must be personally known to the nominating officer. knowledge While missions sometimes use the IVLP strategically to seek out new contacts in key sectors, acquaintance with candidates needs to precede the nomination. Visa eligibility Candidates must be eligible for a US exchange visitor visa (J-1). Previous US Candidates who have visited the US on a grant or other funding government grant awarded by any US government agency within the past five years or funding normally should not be nominated. Previous visits to The mission should give preference to persons who have not the US previously visited the US. Military personnel The IVLP is civilian in nature and therefore is not generally intended and ministerial-­ for foreign military personnel and current members of government at level officials cabinet and sub-cabinet levels.

See [47]

Chinese journalists, activists, government officers, educators and academic directors, finance officials, research leaders, business leaders, and museum representatives.56 They participate in exchanges with the themes on government, media, education, economics, environment, labor, and rule of law in many American communities.57 However, presenting the diversity of the US was not the original goal of the program. The number and expertise of visitors, as well as the diverse themes, are utilized to demonstrate the IVLP’s effectiveness, whereas, in fact, the program should be focusing on building relationships and forging favorable policies.

56  In November 2018, nine delegates from China visited Detroit and met with leaders to learn about cutting-edge technology around transportation and infrastructure in southeast Michigan, according to Global Ties Detroit. 57  [48, 49].

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 eadership Exchange’s Goal Is Not Public Diplomacy L The stated goal of the IVLP is to strengthen US engagement with countries around the world and to cultivate lasting relationships by connecting current and emerging foreign leaders with their American counterparts through short-term visits to the US.58 This goal has several ambiguous keywords: “strengthen,” “engagement,” “cultivate,” “connect,” and “relationships.” These words have multiple meanings that have created leeway for implementers to exercise discretion. For example, engagement could refer to different kinds and levels of contacts and exchanges, such as shaking hands and meetings, but it could also involve in-depth interactions such as cooperation and partnership. In other words, the stated goal of the IVLP is a typical instance of unclear statement that is identified by Wilson. However, in practice, the goal of the IVLP becomes what has been measured. Practitioners have explicitly and implicitly expressed that the actual objective of the IVLP is to identify emerging leaders, as if the program only predicts future leaders. After all, identifying future leaders is more observable and measurable than promoting mutual understanding. It becomes what the IVLP is all about. The actual exchange that follows may not mean too much except benefits to local communities. Moreover, a Congressional document explicitly states that experiencing cultural diversity is one of the purposes of the IVLP.59 Presenting the diverse US is measured by the number of places that foreign visitors visit, the broad range of topics and themes on which the events are organized, and the various backgrounds of the visitors. In turn, the IVLP as public diplomacy becomes a program to identify future leaders and promote diversity.

Measurable Goals in DoD MPEP and IMET The implementation of the DoD’s MPEP and IMET public diplomacy programs demonstrates their focus on measurable outcomes. The implementation of MPEP gives more attention to relationship building. Practitioners and participants place the idea of establishing long-term relationships with foreign militaries at the forefront. The objective to share  [50].  [51].

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knowledge and advance foreign service for interoperability is neglected during the implementation process. IMET, which brings foreign military students to the US for education purposes, focuses on courses involving tactical operations rather than those promoting human rights. The important purpose of IMET—to advance American values—is neglected during its implementation. Subsequently, the goals of these programs become these measurements.  elationship Building and Tactical Training R Although MPEP and IMET have different purposes and emphasize different aspects of the exchange process, their preferences demonstrate the same discretion mechanism, which is the displacement of goals to concentrate on more measurable outcomes. Both MPEP and IMET tend to focus on practices that result in measurable outcomes and ignore unmeasurable tasks. MPEP places more attention on building relationships between the participants and their host organizations. Officials use the number of officers and the number of foreign countries that participated in the program to show the relationships being built. For instance, in a hearing in front of Congress, Joseph M.  McDade Jr., an Air Force director in charge of MPEP, used the quantifiable data to demonstrate the effectiveness of the program: We are nearly tripling the number of Military Personnel Exchange Program (MPEP) billets in non-English countries to 140 by FYI2 with a focus of program expansion to countries where US military presence has been limited or non-existent. Additionally, in FY09 we have 18 officers attending foreign developmental education in 11 countries, 29 Olmsted Scholars obtaining Master’s degrees at foreign universities, and 16 National Defense Fellowships focused on International Affairs.60

Conversely, the objective of advancing interoperability based on mutual learning and sharing is ignored during the implementation process. This is because of four reasons. First, with a limited number of military personnel participating in the program, the impact of the program on interoperability is less observable. Second, the outcome requires the cooperation of foreign militaries, which is less controllable. Third, learning each other’s capabilities and tactics is a process, not a goal, and it is unclear to what  [52].

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extent participants should seek to understand each other. Fourth, it is difficult to measure the knowledge shared by the exchange. When there is no concrete standard about mutual learning, the measurement to demonstrate the program’s effectiveness becomes futile. Therefore, although not impossible to measure, it seems that these difficulties prevented IMET from implementing its original goal. In IMET, practitioners appear to be more interested in providing tactical courses that the recipient countries need the most than courses on human rights. The impact of tactical training could be measured by the number of students, the number of courses provided, and the skills learned by foreign countries that they then used to improve their capabilities in various areas. For instance, IMET was considered to have strengthened the US–Egypt relationship since 9/11 by training a large number of military students at different levels: The IMET program has strengthened USCENTCOM’s relationships in its AOR with many regional partners beyond Egypt. Since 9/11, 169 senior military graduates have trained in U.S. senior Service schools. Additionally, 234 intermediate military graduates in our AOR have trained in U.S. command and staff colleges, 752 military graduates trained in U.S. advanced equivalent officer courses, and 746 military graduates trained in U.S. basic officer courses.61

It is more challenging to evaluate the impact of IMET on human rights. As one GAO report pointed out, US officials believed it would be difficult to measure the impact of IMET on human rights conditions in specific countries, and they did not have a system for monitoring the effect that human rights awareness training had on international students.62 Besides, many other factors could influence the human rights condition of a certain country, even though IMET carries out sufficient work on human rights training. It is difficult to control other factors that could lead to human rights issues in the target countries. Some recipients such as Guatemala and Indonesia have been accused of committing massive human rights violations. Therefore, the results from measuring IMET’s human rights education are not in favor of the implementers. They may even become counterevidence for the program’s effectiveness. In other words,  [53].  [54].

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selectively ignoring the objective of human rights promotions is a choice made by implementers to better demonstrate the success of IMET.  oals Turned into What Is Measured G Like the public diplomacy programs of the DoS, MPEP and IMET also have vague program goals that have allowed multiple interpretations, leading to implementation discretion that focuses on measurable outcomes. MPEP is a military personnel exchange program that lets participants become fully integrated into foreign military services. The program objective is twofold: learning each other’s capabilities and tactics for interoperability, and building military-to-military relations. However, the language used by the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy stresses different elements (see Table 5.2). While the officials of the Army and Navy recognize that MPEP works towards relationship building and defense cooperation, the Air Force emphasizes only promoting mutual understanding and trust.63 Moreover, the MPEP’s objectives contain many ambiguous terms, such as “build/expand/enhance relationships” and “bolster interoperability.” It is unclear through which path the relationship and interoperability can be boosted and expanded. IMET is a military assistance program that provides military education and training to students of selected foreign countries. Its stated goal has several elements: train future leaders; create a better understanding of the US; establish a rapport between the US military and the country’s military to build alliances Table 5.2  The stated goals of MPEP Army Air Force Navy

The US Army MPEP was created to build relationships with allies and partners while bolstering interoperability The exchange program is a special-duty assignment that allows airmen to integrate into military units of foreign allies with the aim of building, sustaining, and expanding international relationships The Personnel Exchange Program (PEP) enhances international and interservice relationships by providing exchange opportunities for US Navy officers and enlisted personnel, both foreign and domestic

[55–57]

 [56, 58–60].

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for the future; enhance interoperability and capabilities for joint operation; focus on professional military education; allow countries to use their national funds to receive a reduced cost for other DoD education and training; provide English Language Training assistance.64

To summarize, IMET’s objective contains three aspects. The first is training future leaders so they understand the US better. The second is promoting and advancing the values of democracy, good governance, and human rights in target countries. The third is enabling the capacities of foreign militaries for interoperability. Although its objective is relatively clear compared to the public diplomacy goals of the DoS because it delineates how the goals should be achieved, such as through professional military education and language training, it is still vague and broad. For instance, terms such as “create a better understanding of the US,” “build a rapport,” and “enhance interoperability” are all very ambiguous and could point to different directions in implementation. The ambiguity of program goals not only allows the implementation of MPEP and IMET to skew the meaning of public diplomacy and focus on the measurable aspects, but also makes their goals become what was measured. In this case, the objective of MPEP becomes building relationships and the purpose of IMET is turned into offering tactical training to foreign military students. In the DoD budget document for FY 2008, Michael Moseley, the Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, stated that MPEP aimed to build, sustain, and expand “international relationships that are critical enablers for our Expeditionary Air and Space Force.”65 He went on to explain that the long-term success of the global war on terrorism required broad international cooperation and integration, so it was critical to expand the exchange program to other parts of the world and establish lasting partnerships with US allies. For IMET, although a new program E-IMET was established to emphasize human rights and other non-­ combat-­related areas for promoting democratic values, the original IMET program stays away from these topics, which are difficult to measure. IMET ends up abandoning the task of promoting human rights and leaving it to an extended program. As a result, the program goals of MPEP and IMET become what is measured.

 [61].  [62].

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The TRWI The TRWI was a USSOCOM program of news and information websites. Its implementation also focused on measurable outcomes, such as the number of sites in various languages, the number of readers, the number of submissions and requests, and the results of surveys and polls. The actual impact of the program on countering extremist propaganda and supporting US operations was not confirmed through these evaluation methods. These less tangible goals were ignored during the implementation process. Ultimately, the ambiguous objective of the TRWI became these measurables. Quantifiable Standards Officials used measurable indicators to prove the effectiveness of the TRWI. First, it was believed that the number of sites that covered multiple regions and the amount of information it offered each day were legitimate methods of assessment in terms of its influence. A Commander of USSOCOM once said the following to Congress to demonstrate the significance of the program: TRWI currently operates 10 Web sites across 6 geographic regions, providing a global network of influence Web sites. These Web sites publish factual content 6 days/week, 24  hours per day, in 23 languages. Such content undermines and indirectly counters the Al Qaeda narrative that the U.S. is at war with Islam while maintaining a focus on the pragmatic aspects of regional and local economic and social improvements. TRWI Web sites also leverage various social media outlets, greatly expanding the reach and influence of the messaging.66

As this quote indicates, numbers associated with the program’s set-up were used to demonstrate its efforts and achievements. However, the causal relationship between news articles and counterterrorism could not be established by these numbers. Second, the DoD used the websites’ measurable data, such as article reads and unique site visitors, along with reader comments, online surveys, and polls, to measure performance and behavioral data on a daily, monthly, and quarterly basis, and to determine messaging effectiveness.67 The connection between this general  [63].  [63].

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information and the goal of countering violent extremism is not clear, especially when the program is given limited time to develop before it was closed down. Furthermore, few studies suggest that the mass media could even play a contributory role in amplifying negative impact.68 The TRWI’s measurements focused on showing the breadth of and the general impact on the contents of the websites, which was different from what it was designed for.  hanging the Ambiguous Goal C The TRWI was designed to support the geographic combatant command’s objectives for countering violent extremism.69 Specifically, it offered and disseminated an alternative narrative and a different source of news in regions where violent extremist threats were identified.70 Its stated purpose was countering “violent extremist ideology and propaganda, amplifies moderate voices within the region, and degrades adversary dominance of the information domain.”71 It was regarded by former Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England as “an essential part of [the] responsibility … to shape the security environment in their respective areas.”72 Although the stated objective of the TRWI specified the use of news websites in terms of disseminating information to key regions, it contained many ambiguous elements. Specifically, it was unclear which one was more important than the others. The goal contained specified methods that implementers could use to achieve the final purpose, but it was not well defined whether and how disseminating information through websites and publishing articles in foreign languages for senior military leaders could eventually meet the objective of countering violent extremist propaganda and advancing security. Second, countering al Qaeda propaganda, promoting stability and security, and supporting US activities were three different goals. The implementers had to decide which one would be prioritized during implementation, which created leeway for discretion. Given the ambiguous goal and the preference for measurable outcomes, the implementation of the TRWI led the program goal to become what was measured. This was illustrated by how the website content was  [64].  [65]. 70  [66]. 71  [63]. 72  [67]. 68 69

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created. To implement the TRWI, local journalists were hired to write stories that fit the objectives of the Pentagon, such as promoting democracy, security, good governance, and the rule of law. Military personnel or contractors monitored the stories to ensure they were consistent with those goals. Reporters were paid only for work that was posted to the sites; in other words, these writers may have been induced by this payment arrangement to only write things that would be approved. Such information production may look good on the numbers in terms of how many articles on human rights were published per day, but the program may receive negative feedback due to this propagandistic approach. As a researcher pointed not, promoting the DoD’s agenda by disseminating information through what appeared to be independent outlets raised some concerns and criticisms because it was seen as US propaganda that undermined independent news and the credibility of the information.73 The objective of DoD public diplomacy to build relationships and foster a secure environment was not only ignored but also damaged by the TRWI’s concentration on producing quantifiable stories to counter violent extremist narratives. As a result, the TRWI became a program to produce information favorable to the US military agenda or propaganda. The news websites were ordered to be closed in Section 344 of the fiscal 2014 defense authorization act and were gradually shut down in 2014 and 2015. The above implementation discretion, which paid more attention to measurable outcomes, is one of the reasons why the program was shut down. Congress believed it was ineffective and a waste of money. The Senate Armed Services Committee pointed out that the TRWI’s problem was the limited approach of targeting those regions where internet access was readily available.74 One joint explanatory statement stated that the House and Senate Armed Services committees believed “available resources may better be used to support tactical and operational military information support activities.”75 This was primarily based on a GAO report, which found that, first, the websites were not well coordinated with other programs or interagency efforts that were operating in the countries covered by the websites and, second, the DoD did not evaluate TRWI programs against strategic goals.76 Some critics suggest that TRWI  [67].  [68]. 75  [69]. 76  [70]. 73 74

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may be better managed by other agencies outside of the military, indicating that the DoS or the BBG should be responsible for such activities.77 Others pointed out that a program branded as a DoD operation may not be well received by countries that are traditionally sensitive to a foreign military presence.78

Conclusion This chapter shows that public diplomacy implementation emphasizes measurable outcomes and ignores those that are less measurable or not directly measurable. Consequently, the program goals become what gets measured. In the DoS, EducationUSA in China measures the number of Chinese students studying in the US and the economic gains that result from them doing so. The less tangible goals, such as building long-term relationships, are left out. The IVLP is assessed through its ability to identify future foreign leaders as well as the value of diversity it represents. The objective of mutual understanding, which is seen as not directly measurable, gets ignored. In the DoD, MPEP focuses on personal relationship building between the exchange participants and their host military organizations, which is easier to measure than the vague and intangible objective of learning from each other for interoperability. IMET ignores the human rights agenda because it requires many resources to ensure and measure the impact in the target countries. Instead, it places more emphasis on tactical military training, which is easier to observe and measure. For the TRWI, implementers were inclined to encourage an increase in the number of stories that met their standards at the expense of news independence. As a result, the program was considered to diverge from its original purpose and was closed down. The vagueness of public diplomacy objectives allows leeway for implementation bias to occur. Performance in social services is too complex to reduce to quantifiable measures, and the program practiced by performance measurement becomes virtually ubiquitous. This implementation bias is usually deployed in policies ranging from education, health, and welfare to child protection and policing.79 In the practice of public diplomacy, not only does it have vague and broad goals, such as promoting  [71].  [72]. 79  [19]. 77 78

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mutual understanding and supporting foreign policy, but both scholars and practitioners also argue that it is difficult to measure, given its long-­ term orientation and the nature of perception change. So, implementation discretion happens when practitioners develop proxy evaluation indicators to prove the significance of the program. These evaluation methods focus on things that can be easily measured and attained. Other valuable outcomes that are difficult to measure tend to be left behind. More importantly, practitioners and scholars note that the evaluation of public diplomacy, especially long-term-oriented programs, faces many challenges. To deal with this, practitioners look for surrogate measurements, favoring those that are easy to observe and present. Because of ambiguous goals, the goals of public diplomacy programs tend to become things that can be measured as measurable outcomes, which are likely to lead to more success in arguing for future resources. These programs officially and unofficially steer away from their original intent and move towards the practice of targeting measurable outcomes. EducationUSA adds the objectives of diversity promotion, while the IVLP has become a program to identify future leaders. MPEP neglects the actual substance of exchange, and IMET evades human rights courses. The TRWI valued the number of articles that fit its strategic narratives but neglected the actual impact of this strategy on countering violent extremism. In the end, the goals of these programs have become what got measured.

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Wildavsky, Aaron B. 1989. Speaking Truth to Power. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Scott, William Richard, and Gerald F.  Davis. 2015. Organizations and Organizing: Rational, Natural and Open Systems Perspectives. New  York: Routledge. Pandey, Sanjay K., and Bradley E.  Wright. 2006. Connecting the Dots in Public Management: Political Environment, Organizational Goal Ambiguity, and the Public Manager’s Role Ambiguity. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 16 (4): 511–532. https://doi.org/10.1093/ jopart/muj006. Ripley, Randall B., and Grace A.  Franklin. 1982. Bureaucracy and Policy Implementation. Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press. O’Toole, Laurence J. 1986. Policy Recommendations for Multi-Actor Implementation: An Assessment of the Field. Journal of Public Policy 6 (2): 181–210. Matland, Richard E. 1995. Synthesizing the Implementation Literature: The Ambiguity-Conflict Model of Policy Implementation. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 5 (2): 145–174. Barton, Allen H. 1980. A Diagnosis of Bureaucratic Maladies. In Making Bureaucracies Work, ed. Carol H. Weiss and Allen H. Barton, 27–36. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. Warwick, Donald P., Marvin Meade, and Theodore Reed. 1975. A Theory of Public Bureaucracy: Politics, Personality, and Organization in the State Department. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wright, Bradley E. 2001. Public-Sector Work Motivation: A Review of the Current Literature and a Revised Conceptual Model. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 11 (4): 559–586. https://doi. org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a003515. Mazmanian, Daniel A., and Paul A. Sabatier. 1983. Implementation and Public Policy. New York: University Press of America. Norman, Richard. 2007. Managing Outcomes while Accounting for Outputs: Redefining “Public Value” in New Zealand’s Performance Management System. Public Performance & Management Review 30 (4): 536–549. Pollitt, Christopher. 2005. Performance Management in Practice: A Comparative Study of Executive Agencies. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 16 (1): 25–44. https://doi.org/10.1093/ jopart/mui045. Alexander, Jennifer. 2000. Adaptive Strategies of Nonprofit Human Service Organizations in an Era of Devolution and New Public Management. Nonprofit Management and Leadership 10 (3): 287–303. https://doi. org/10.1002/nml.10305.

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Brodkin, Evelyn Z. 2012. Reflections on Street-Level Bureaucracy: Past, Present, and Future. Public Administration Review 72 (6): 940–949. https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-­6210.2012.02657.x. McDermott, Kathryn A. 2011. Lessons for Performance Measurement Research and Practice. In High-Stakes Reform: The Politics of Educational Accountability, ed. Kathryn A.  McDermott, 180–188. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Rizzo, John R., Robert J. House, and Sidney I. Lirtzman. 1970. Role Conflict and Ambiguity in Complex Organizations. Administrative science quarterly 15 (2): 150–163. https://doi.org/10.2307/2391486. Biber, Eric. 2009. Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies. Harvard Environmental Law Review 33: 1–63. Boyne, George A., Kenneth J.  Meier, Laurence J.  O’Toole, and Jr., and Richard M. Walker. 2005. Where Next? Research Directions on Performance in Public Organizations. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 15 (4): 633–639. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mui037. Schultz, Courtney A., Cassandra Moseley, and Katherine Mattor. 2015. Striking the Balance between Budgetary Discretion and Performance Accountability: The Case of the US Forest Service’s Approach to Integrated Restoration. Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research 7 (2-3): 109–123. https://doi.org/10.1080/19390459.2015.1027533. Hansen, Mark, and Carolyn McAndrews. 2005. Challenges of Measuring Performance for FAA’s Safety Oversight System. Transportation Research Record 1937 (1): 31–36. Curristine, Teresa. 2005. Government Performance: Lessons and Challenges. OECD Journal on Budgeting 5 (1): 127–151. Blau, Peter. 1963. The Dynamics of Bureaucracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Norman, Richard. 2001. Letting and Making Managers Manage: The Effect of Control Systems on Management Action in New Zealand’s Central Government. International Public Management Journal 4 (1): 65–89. Schick, Allen. 1996. The Spirit of Reform: Managing the New Zealand State Sector in a Time of Change. Wellington: State Services Commission and the Treasury. Bruijn, De, and Hans. 2003. Output Steering in Public Organizations: About the Use of a Product Approach and a Process Approach. Managerial Auditing Journal 18 (4): 303–312. https://doi.org/10.1108/02686900310474325. Rabin, Nina. 2014. Victims or Criminals: Discretion, Sorting, and Bureaucratic Culture in the U.S. Immigration System. Southern California Review of Law and Social Justice 12 (2): 195–247. Banks, Robert. 2011. A Resource Guide to Public Diplomacy Evaluation. Los Angeles, CA: USC Center on Public Diplomacy.

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Pahlavi, Pierre C. 2007. Evaluating Public Diplomacy Programmes. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 2 (3): 255–281. Institute of International Education. Open Doors. Institute of International Education. https://www.iie.org/opendoors. Accessed February 26, 2022. 35. EducationUSA. Open Doors Report. US Department of State. https://educationusa.state.gov/us-­higher-­education-­professionals/recruitment-­resources/ open-­doors-­report. Accessed March 24, 2020. US Embassy in Canberra. 2017. Open Doors Report 2017 Published. US Embassy and Consulate in Australia. https://de.usembassy.gov/open-­doors-­ report-­2017-­published/. Accessed February 26, 2022. US-UK Fulbright Commission. 2016. USA Sees Largest Year-on-Year Increase in British Students for Over 30 Years. US-UK Fulbright Commission http:// www.fulbright.org.uk/news/usa-­sees-­largest-­year-­on-­year-­increase-­in-­british-­ students-­for-­over-­30-­years. Accessed March 24, 2020. McHale, Judith A. 2011. Remarks At The EducationUSA Forum. US Department of State. https://2009-­2017.state.gov/r/remarks/2011/ 166730.htm. Accessed February 26, 2022. Royce, Marie. 2019. The United States Welcomes Chinese Students. State Department Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. https://eca.state. gov/highlight/assistant-­secretary-­royce-­remarks-­edusa-­forum. Accessed March 17, 2020. US Department of State. EducationUSA. US Department of State. https:// educationusa.state.gov/. Accessed March 1, 2019. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 1989. US Information Agency Authorization for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991. Washington, DC: US Senate. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 1991. US Public Diplomacy in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Washington, DC: US House of Representatives. Kelly, Jon. 2011, March 29. How Do You Spot a Future World Leader? BBC News Magazine. http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-­12880901. Accessed May 27, 2018. Clinton, Jennifer, and Jelena Putre. December 2015. Looking to the Future. The Foreign Service Journal. http://www.afsa.org/sites/default/files/december2015fsj.pdf. Accessed February 26, 2022. 45. WAC Hosts World’s Info Experts: To Learn about American Society, Culture. June 1, 1998. Asian Reporter. https://www.proquest.com/docview/ 368088564?accountid=8285. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 1990. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives. Washington, DC: House of Representatives. US Department of State. 2018. Foreign Affairs Manual: 10 FAH-1 H-000 Public Diplomacy. Washington, DC: US Department of State.

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48. CDI Welcomed These Distinguished Guests in 2014. 2014. Citizen Diplomacy International. https://www.cdiphila.org/2014_delegations. Accessed March 7, 2019. Szeliga, Ann. 2015. Advancing Women in STEM. WorldChicago. http:// www.worldchicago.org/advancing-­women-­in-­stem/ (now removed). Accessed March 5, 2019. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. About IVLP. US State Department. https://eca.state.gov/ivlp/about-­ivlp. Accessed March 24, 2020. US Senate. 2000. A Resolution Commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the International Visitors Program, S.Res.87, 106th Cong. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. House Committee on Armed Services. 2008. Transforming the U.S. Military’s Foreign Language, Cultural Awareness, and Regional Expertise Capabilities. Washington, DC: US House of Representatives. McKenzie, Kenneth F., Jr., and Elizabeth C.  Packard. 2011. Enduring Interests and Partnerships: Military-to-Military Relationships in the Arab Spring. Prism: a Journal of the Center for Complex Operations 3 (1): 99–106. Congress, U.S. 1992. Security Assistance: Observations on Post-Cold War Program Changes. Washington, DC: US General Accounting Office. Mullinax, Jeanette. 2019. US Air Force Exchange Officer Soars with Partners Down Under. US Air Force. https://www.af.mil/News/Article-­Display/ Article/1998944/us-­air-­force-­exchange-­officer-­soars-­with-­partners-­down-­ under/. Accessed March 18, 2020. My Navy, H.R. Personnel Exchange Program. US Navy Personnel Command. https://www.mynavyhr.navy.mil/Career-­Management/Language-­Culture/ PEP/. Accessed February 26, 2022. Suits, Devon L. 2019. Building Relationships, Interoperability Through Exchange Program. Army News Service. https://www.army.mil/article/224669/building_relationships_interoperability_through_exchange_program. Accessed February 22, 2020. Department of the Army. 2011. Army Military Personnel Exchange Program with Military Services of Other Nations. Washington, DC: Department of the Army. Salazar, Andrea. 2017. Foreign Pilots Fly High in Exchange Program at Joint Base Charleston. Joint Base Charleston Public Affairs. https://www.jbcharleston.jb.mil/News/Article/1232357/foreign-­pilots-­fly-­high-­in-­exchange-­ program-­at-­jb-­charleston/. Accessed February 22, 2020. Torres, Juan. 2018. Yokota Hosts Military Personnel Exchange Program Conference. US Indo-Pacific Command. https://www.pacom.mil/Media/ News/News-­A rticle-­V iew/Article/1576136/yokota-­h osts-­m ilitar y-­ personnel-­exchange-­program-­conference/. Accessed January 11, 2020.

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US Defense Security Cooperation Agency. International Military Education and Training. US Department of Defense. http://www.dsca.mil/programs/ international-­military-­education-­training-­imet. Accessed September 4, 2018. House Committee on Armed Services. 2007. Department of Defense Fiscal 2008 Budget. Washington, DC: House of Representatives. US House Central Command Special Operations Command and Transportation Command. 2013. Hearing on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs before the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives. Washington, DC: House of Representatives. White, Jessica. 2020. Terrorism and the Mass Media. London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. US Defense Security Cooperation Agency. 2011. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 Report. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. Richardson, Roslyn. 2013. Fighting Fire with Fire: Target Audience Responses to Online Anti-violence Campaigns. Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Eisler, Peter. 2008, April 30. Pentagon Launches Foreign News Websites. USA Today. https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/military/2008-­04-­30-­ sites_N.htm. Senate Armed Services Committee. 2011. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. Washington, DC: Senate Armed Services Committee. House Committee on Armed Services. 2013. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014: Legislative Text and Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany H.R. 3304 Public Law 113–66. Washington, DC: House of Representatives. US Congress. 2013. Military Information Support Operations: Improved Coordination, Evaluations, and Training and Equipping are Needed. Washington, DC: US Government Accountability Office. Mazmanian, Adam. 2015. DOD Shutters Two ‘Influence’ Websites Covering Africa. Federal Computer Week. https://fcw.com/articles/2015/02/13/ african-­web-­sites.aspx. Accessed July 15, 2019. Locker, Ray. 2014. Military Propaganda Websites on Verge of Extinction. USA Today. https://www.usatoday.com/story/nation/2014/01/02/trans-­ regional-­web-­initiative-­defense-­bill/4291467/. Accessed July 15, 2019.

CHAPTER 6

Public Diplomacy Constrained by Limited Resources

The Effect of Inadequate Resources on Implementation Policy Resources and Implementation Discretion In the literature on public policy and management, resource allocation is considered to be a factor that determines organizational performance and effectiveness.1 Scholars believe that resource inadequacy induces workers to exercise discretion in their daily tasks.2 Specifically, when bureaucracies lack the resources to implement policies, discretion will be exercised to “fit” the policy into the resources available.3 If the resource deficiency refers to limited financial incentives, it will lead organizations to adopt a low-cost form of implementation that ignores the policy values which does not carry a direct monetary benefit.4 Or implementers will set priorities and reallocate resources according to their own judgment about where the richest opportunities for risk reduction lie and will minimize activities in other program areas.5 Resources also effect “who gets what”  [1–3].  [2]. 3  [4]. 4  [5]. 5  [6]. 1 2

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. Wu, U.S. Public Diplomacy Towards China, Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95644-8_6

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in implementation, which leads to the problem of injustice and inequality. With shrinking resources, bureaucrats may attempt to match clients with available resources, so the needs of some clients are ignored.6 Types of Policy Resources While policy resources traditionally refer to law, money, and personnel, recent research also considers the following as resources employed by policy actors: information, organization, public infrastructure, time, consensus, and political support or power.7Law is a unique resource because it is mainly (but not exclusively) at the disposal of public actors. It constitutes the source of legitimization for all public actions. In most cases, legislative decisions mainly delineate the distribution of money and rights. Through allocating these two resources, the legislature decides—at least in part— on the endowment of other resources.8 Money or financial resources provide the foundation for program implementation. This is the most obvious and important political measure through which the legislator can engage in program implementation on a regular and very concrete basis. Personnel resources not only signify the number of people involved, but also any professional training that is necessary for the program implementation. A related factor to personnel—organization—is a resource relating to the quality of the organization of the administrative or societal structures; a suitable organization may improve the implementation. Information or knowledge relates to “technical, social, economic and political data concerning the collective problem to be resolved.”9 It offers an essential basis for decision-making. Consensus is generally built between actors during policy implementation. A minimum level of consensus is required for an administration to be able to implement its policies reasonably and efficiently. While not usually considered a resource in itself, the time allocated to accomplish a task is also critical to its success. Time commonly appears in policy implementers’ budgets for implementation. Some programs may need more time than others to reveal their ideal effects. Public infrastructure “includes all of the tangible goods or property at the disposal of the different actors.”10 Lastly, political support represents the potential  [7].  [8]. 8  [8]. 9  [8]. 10  [8]. 6 7

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acceptability of the policy in question by a parliamentary or popular majority.11 These types of resources are all important to policy implementation. When analyzing the impact of resources on policy implementation, it is crucial to consider not only money and personnel, but also other factors. Coping Mechanisms as Implementation Bias In policy implementation, many coping mechanisms have been utilized by implementers to deal with inadequate resources. Not only do they prioritize or neglect certain tasks, but they also employ resources through various methods. First, implementers overtly or covertly redefine the program’s objectives, so it is easier to accomplish the goal with limited resources. Second, implementers only acknowledge certain tasks, by written notice or public speeches, but never actually act on them. For instance, Lipsky noted that Boston housing inspectors gave the complainants a copy of the inspection report, leaving them with the impression that the inspector’s visit was fruitful, but in fact, the inspector never followed through on initiating legal action regarding the violations.12 Third, program practitioners act as gatekeepers and screen who they supply services to. When resources are limited, some clients will not have access to the service. For instance, implementers choose to deal with simple cases instead of tough ones—essentially refusing to help those who need it most.13 Fourth, inadequate resources also lead to implementers relying on other organizations in implementation, including adopting the judgments of others and delegating services to other organizations. Fifth, practitioners also send clients to other places and pass on their tasks to other people as a way to minimize costs.14 Negative Consequences The above-mentioned implementation discretions to deal with insufficient resources cause negative impacts on program performance. In general, implementers exercise discretion at the expense of clients who are denied  [9].  [2]. 13  [7]. 14  [2]. 11 12

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benefits to which they were legally entitled.15 First, the displacement of goals caused by limited resources leads the program to stray from its original intent. As a result, the program is implemented towards something else rather than the purpose it was designed for. Thus, the policy efficacy of the program is compromised. Second, recognizing the task without acting on it also contributes to the problem of ineffectiveness; it essentially means that the task is pushed aside. Third, through screening, the needs of some clients are ignored, resulting in the unequal treatment of some clients—those with the greatest need for service may be denied. Fourth, delegating the work to others can save resources, but at the expense of accepting different agendas from these organizations. It is also called shrinking, which means simply accepting others’ decisions. Moreover, the organization loses control and power over implementation. Lastly, referring clients to other places is essentially turning them away. The problem may never be resolved as they get pushed around between organizations.

Public–Private Partnerships in DoS Among many coping mechanisms to manage the problem of limited resources, public–private partnerships (PPPs) are perhaps the most prominent ones adopted by public diplomacy programs, especially ECEs. The DoS has been leveraging private resources such as funds, expertise, and human capital to better implement public diplomacy programs for a long time.16 In fact, taking advantage of private resources is perhaps the most important reason why government agencies choose to work with the private sector. While the literature and government documents suggest that PPP could help governments to leverage the resources or expertise of a private entity, it is not clear whether the deficiency of government resources—including money, personnel, and time—can explain the existence of all PPPs in public diplomacy. The discussion here examines PPPs in the DoS’s public diplomacy programs with the aim to understanding whether inadequate resources can explain public diplomacy implementation.

 [7].  [10].

15 16

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The Claim of Resource Deficiency Reduced Budgets In the past, public diplomacy has been confronted with major budget cuts. Over the years, practitioners of public diplomacy have been complaining about the lack of resources allocated to public diplomacy. In fact, the USIA wrestled with budget cuts in the 1990s.17 The agency was forced to eliminate its print publications and close the central office of its book translation program in the Middle East.18 In an article published in 1994, Walter Laqueur suggests that the decline in public diplomacy efforts had taken place over a long time. The number of USIA staff had dropped from 12,600 in 1967 to 8500 in 1994. The number of foreign service officers stationed abroad for public diplomacy had also decreased. The budget was less than it was in 1970.19 As Joseph Nye stated: From 1963 to 1993, the federal budget grew fifteen-fold, but the United States Information Agency (USIA) budget grew only six and a half times larger. The USIA had more than 12,000 employees at its peak in the mid-­1960s but only 9,000 in 1994 and 6,715 on the eve of its takeover by the U.S. State Department. Soft power seemed expendable. Between 1989 and 1999, the budget of the USIA, adjusted for inflation, decreased 10 percent.20

A Report by the Public Diplomacy Council stated that public diplomacy was buffeted by a decade of budget cuts and hampered by bureaucratic structures that marginalized it.21 Another report by the American Academy of Diplomacy argued that reduced budgets and personnel devoted to improving foreign publics’ understanding of the US after the end of the Cold War led in many parts of the world to a decrease in understanding of the US.22 In addition, a Congressional hearing in 2000 showed that public diplomacy practitioners at different levels had to plead for more resources in front of the Senate. To sustain funding for programming, ECA officers  [11].  [12]. 19  [13]. 20  [14]. 21  [15]. 22  [16]. 17 18

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and leaders of partner organizations, including Global Ties US, justified the importance of ECEs to national interests.23 The Congressional hearing in 2000 and the justifications indicate that the programs were on the brink of another budget reduction. Although after September 2001 Americans began to rediscover the importance of investing in public diplomacy, resources for public diplomacy were still believed to be limited. Practitioners claimed that public Diplomacy in the DoS was understaffed and underfunded as the total public diplomacy budget of 2008 was $859  million with a staff of 1332, 24% less than the comparable 1986 total of 1742.24 A report submitted from the Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs to the House in 2009 hinted at public diplomacy’s employment shortfalls and workload increases, and recommended funding and staffing expansion.25 S table Resource in Recent Years While the budget for public diplomacy is not comparable to its peak years during the Cold War and the DoS needs to fight harder in Congress for its overall budget than the DoD does, its funding and personnel have been relatively stable from 2008 to 2019. This judgment is based on the data analysis of the budgetary documents of the DoS from FY 2010–2021. Statistics on actual spending in these years show that in general, the increase or decrease rate of funding for public diplomacy is similar to that of the overall funding for DoS (see Fig. 6.1). The increase rate for political affairs is different because of the sudden increase in expenditure on Near Eastern affairs and South and Central Asian affairs in 2011. In other words, the expenses of public diplomacy, including ECE and public diplomacy at regional bureaus, are consonant with the overall DoS budget. Another way to examine the resources for public diplomacy is by looking at the proportion it comprises compared to the DoS overall funding. Figure 6.2 shows the percentage of public diplomacy funding in the overall funding of the DoS from 2008 to 2019. The data suggest that funding for public diplomacy accounted for approximately 4% of the DoS overall funding during these years; the comparable figures for ECE and public diplomacy at regional bureaus were approximately 2% and 1.2%, respectively. The funding percentage for political affairs, while considerably  [17].  [16]. 25  [18]. 23 24

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1.2 1 0.8

%

0.6 0.4 0.2 0 -0.2

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

-0.4 -0.6

Year DoS

Public Diplomacy Total

Regional Bureaus

Political Affairs Total

ECE

Fig. 6.1  Annual funding rates for the DoS, public diplomacy, and political affairs. (Source: DoS Congressional Budget Justifications, FY 2010–2021)

greater than that for public diplomacy, was not stable because of its special operations in the two regions mentioned above. The data show that the status of public diplomacy in the DoS was the same during this period. There was neither a significant budget increase nor a decrease in public diplomacy activities. In terms of personnel, the trend for total positions of public diplomacy was stable over the 2009–2019 period at around 1500, while the number of political affairs positions declined from more than 7000 to less than 6000 (see Fig. 6.3). The overall DoS direct hire positions saw an increase from around 16,000 in 2008 to more than 24,000 in 2019. Figure 6.4 shows the percentages of positions in the public diplomacy and political affairs sectors in the DoS. Both sectors saw a decrease in proportion over the years. This means that there was not a drastic change in personnel numbers for public diplomacy and political affairs from 2008 to 2019. In fact, with the increase in overall positions, the positions for both sectors declined over the years. This means that according to the number of personnel, both the public diplomacy and public affairs sectors were given less attention and there was not much difference between the two in this respect.

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0.16 0.14 0.12

%

0.1 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Year Public Diplomacy Percentage

ECE Percentage

Regional Bureaus Percentage

Political Affairs Total Percentage

Fig. 6.2  Annual funding percentage of the DoS’s public diplomacy and political affairs compared to its overall funding. (Source: DoS Congressional Budget Justifications, FY 2010–2021)

The above data on funding and personnel show that there was not an evident lack of attention given to public diplomacy from 2008 to 2019. The trend of public diplomacy funding corresponds with the trend of overall DoS funding. While we cannot infer that there were sufficient resources for public diplomacy, this at least suggests that the DoS gave public diplomacy the same level of attention during this period. There was no major budget cut for public diplomacy; when the overall budget went up, the budget for public diplomacy went up accordingly and vice versa. In terms of personnel, public diplomacy positions were also stable during this period. The data also show that when the number of staff increased, both sectors saw a decrease in personnel, while the change of public diplomacy positions was not radical. All in all, the data indicate that public diplomacy was not treated unfairly during this period and there was no major resource reduction.

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30,000 25,000

Position

20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 0

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Year DoS Direct Hire Positions

Public Diplomacy Total

Political Affairs Total

Fig. 6.3  Annual numbers of DoS direct hire positions: Positions in the public diplomacy and public affairs sectors. (Source: DoS Congressional Budget Justifications, FY 2010–2021)

PPP to Leverage Resources Government institutions partnered with private organizations for various reasons, one of which was to take advantage of private resources for implementation. The Foreign Affairs Manual of the DoS specifies that a “‘public-­ private partnership’ (PPP) is a collaborative working relationship with nongovernmental partners in which the goals, structure, and governance, as well as roles and responsibilities, are mutually determined.”26 It also explains that the primary reason for PPPs is to “enhance impact through resource sharing.”27 The DoS partners with two NGOs, the IIE and Global Ties US, to share resources in order to implement EducationUSA and the IVLP.  This section focuses on whether these partnerships were due to a lack of resources and whether there was implementation discretion induced by the partnerships.

 [19].  [19].

26 27

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0.7 0.6 0.5

%

0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Year Public Diplomacy Percentage

Political Affairs Percentage

Fig. 6.4  The proportion of positions in the public diplomacy and public affairs sectors in DoS direct hire positions. (Source: DoS Congressional Budget Justifications, FY 2010–2021)

 he Partnership with IIE T Both the US Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 and the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 confirm that PPP is a valid approach to leverage support from the private sector for US government-sponsored international exchange and training activities and should be encouraged.28 The ECA also states on its official website that the objective of PPP is to “combine networks, expertise, and resources to better serve citizens around the world.”29 As described in Chap. 4, the Fulbright Program has been partnering with IIE for a long time. Established in 1919, the IIE is a non-governmental organization that specializes in international education. Its mission is to strengthen “ties among individuals and nations.”30 A dozen years after its birth, the IIE developed into “the representative of nearly all the official agencies of foreign countries having to do with international cultural relations.”31 It was even  [20].  [21]. 30  [22]. 31  [23]. 28 29

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considered the “unofficial educational embassy.”32 This implies that the organization has a wide international network to support its operations in various countries in the world. This paved the way for its partnership with US government agencies. Through a cooperative agreement with the ECA, the IIE became EducationUSA’s partner in terms of administering and implementing the program on the ground, offering services such as educational outreach and advising. Sharing Resources The IIE not only offers resources to engage with foreign publics on education, but also provides guidance and training to EducationUSA’s advisers. The IIE’s Beijing office was opened in 2001, administering scholarship and fellowship programs, and serving as the home office of EducationUSA in China. The IIE’s Regional Educational Advising Coordinator (REAC) claimed that it led the EducationUSA network of advising centers in Greater China to foster international student mobility, guide and train EducationUSA advisers, and support the ECA’s public diplomacy efforts.33 The IIE also organized EducationUSA Leadership Institutes on behalf of the DoS and the ECA.34 The Leadership Institutes aimed to bring participants from selected countries and world regions to the US in order to improve their understanding of US higher education, establish the resources required to create capacity within their own countries, and interact efficiently and sustainably with the US higher education sector.35 Through PPP, the IIE shared several kinds of resources with the ECA through the implementation of EducationUSA. First, the IIE had knowledge and expertise in the US higher education and regional education fields. For instance, a job description posted by the REAC stated that the position should be an expert in international student mobility and higher education engagement between the US and the assigned region, and the job position involved providing advice and recommendations on student mobility issues and related programming to the ECA.36 Second, the IIE generated funding for the ECA’s educational programs. A budget document stated that the IIE generated $1 million in supplemental funding for  [24].  [25]. 34  [26]. 35  [27]. 36  [28]. 32 33

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the Fulbright Program from universities and the private sector in 1980.37 Third, private organizations like the IIE had more resources than government divisions. The positions directly funded by the DoS had many restrictions. For instance, Congress restricted federal funding for cultural programs and limited the number of staff in the DoS’s Cultural Office, so much of its work had to be contracted out to specialized private agencies like the IIE.38 FSOs and other well-trained staff at the DoS could be used for managerial work, while the groundwork could be allocated to private organizations. This was also the case for the IVLP, as its work on the ground was implemented by non-profit organizations in the Global Ties US network. Besides, sometimes the partnership was not due to a lack of financial resources per se, as most of the work done by the private organizations was funded by the government.39 PPPs were established for public diplomacy in order to overcome Congress restrictions. While government agencies were strictly bound by regulations and bureaucratic limitations, NGOs like the IIE were more flexible in terms of being able to carry out different kinds of activities. Private organizations can offer services that public organizations cannot. Therefore, the DoS’s PPP with the IIE was not only about leveraging financial resources. The Non-resource Factor Although the partnership with the IIE provided EducationUSA with valuable resources, there was also a non-resource-related motive behind the partnership. It was argued that the IIE was selected as an administrator of educational exchange programs because there was a debate on how close the relationship between educational exchanges and foreign policy should be.40 Some scholars and practitioners believed that ECEs needed to be independent of the government’s influence. However, educational exchange programs like the Fulbright Scholarship were initiated by the US government and for political purposes, so the PPP with the IIE was intentionally designed to separate the Fulbright Program and EducationUSA from foreign policy objectives. Therefore, the PPP was set up as a cover for public diplomacy activities.

 [29].  [24]. 39  [24]. 40  [30]. 37 38

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Implementation Discretion Induced Through PPP The PPP with the IIE induced implementation discretion. Delegating tasks to other NGOs tended to weaken the role of the DoS in terms of exercising its power over the program and controlling the implementation process. As was discussed in Chap. 4, in China, the DoS was not satisfied with the IIE’s implementation of EducationUSA.  The IIE had its own agenda for achieving the program objective of increasing Chinese students studying in the US. It was cooperating with private recruitment agents to reach this goal. Since the IIE is not a government agency, it does not have the same organizational culture as the DoS. The IIE’s cooperation with commission-based agents not only violated the DoS’s principles of ethical practice as well as its organizational culture, but also indicated that the DoS had lost control over the program. In the end, the US embassy in China took over the implementation of EducationUSA from the IIE. This showed that leveraging private resources may backfire, inducing implementation discretion that was not the intention of the policy order or betraying the government agency’s culture and standard procedure in terms of how things should be done. Resource limitations could partly explain why EducationUSA sought to partner with an NGO like the IIE. On the one hand, as stated by Richard T.  Arndt, when federal funding and staff positions were squeezed, the understaffed public diplomacy division had to contract out its work to private organizations like the IIE.41 On the other hand, EducationUSA partnered with the IIE because ECE was believed to be better implemented by non-governmental entities. This would avoid the negative impression of foreign government sponsorship from a foreign public, and it could also separate ECE from specific and changing foreign policy priorities, as the former was long-term-oriented. Nevertheless, through PPP, implementation discretion was exercised, and this led the DoS to lose control over its course of implementation. The IIE injected elements of its own agenda into the implementation of EducationUSA, which went against the organizational culture and the rules of conduct in the DoS. The DoS picked up on this and discontinued the IIE’s implementation role in China.

 [24].

41

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 he Partnership with Global Ties US T The DoS partnered with Global Ties US to implement the IVLP. This PPP was mainly due to resource constraints. Global Ties US (previously known as National Council for International Visitors (NCIV)) was founded in 1961 and its mission is to promote citizen diplomacy. It oversees a national association for a network of organizations and individuals involved in citizen diplomacy. Now its network has member organizations in all 50 states and more than 20 countries.42 According to the website of the ECA’s Office of International Visitors, which is responsible for the implementation of the IVLP, eight National Program Agencies, as well as 85 community-based non-profit organizations across the US within the Global Ties US network, help administer IVLP projects.43 Partnership to Leverage Private Resources The PPP between the ECA and Global Ties US is primarily based on resource sharing. First, Global Ties US provides resources such as personnel, information, and organization to the partnership. According to an ECA funding opportunity document, the mission of award recipients (partner organizations that receive contracts from the ECA) is to “develop professionally substantive and highly-customized projects that offer IVLP participants a well-balanced, well-paced, and varied experience in the United States.”44 Specifically, they should develop the full range of projects, including planning, organizing, administering, designing the itinerary, creating a social media plan, and actively monitoring internal information systems for projects. The outreach capacity of these organizations is also seen as a valuable asset by the DoS, which does not possess such resources. The program design of the IVLP requires on-the-ground event organization in different parts of the country. The community members in the Global Ties US network could offer resources, such as connecting local organizations and leaders as well as arranging meetings and events, and cultural immersion through “homestays,” where each visitor stays with an American family to learn about American pastimes and interests. Second, many organizations in the Global Ties US network are sustained by the labor of volunteers, so DoS can leverage their human capital  [31].  [32]. 44  [33]. 42 43

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through the PPP.45 Third, organizations in the Global Ties US network have expertise and knowledge in different areas. As Sherry L. Mueller, the former President of Global Ties US, noted: Many of the organizations, such as AMIDEAST, have a regional focus; others are global in orientation. Some focus on a particular field, such as the environment, education, entrepreneurship, management training, human rights, refugee affairs, population and family planning, or youth exchange.46

These organizations with various forms of expertise met the need of IVLP to offer programs in different policy areas. Implementation Biases from Private Organizations Through the PPP, Global Ties US exercised discretion when implementing the IVLP. Higher-level officials and leaders of the implementing organizations all expressed that the significance of the IVLP lay partly in the benefits it brought to the local communities. On the one hand, the programs initiated under the IVLP generated revenue for the local economy; on the other hand, the programs also had non-economic effects, such as introducing local leaders to the world.47 These domestic benefits were utilized as evidence to demonstrate the importance of the IVLP to US national interests before the Senate. However, boosting the local economy should not be considered a direct purpose of a public diplomacy program. By definition, public diplomacy should aim to advance mutual understanding and support foreign policy. It seems that the concerns of local communities were prioritized and emphasized through the PPP. In summary, the theory of inadequate resources partly explains the DoS’s public diplomacy implementation process. Both EducationUSA and the IVLP sought a PPP to deal with the issue of funding and expertise deficiency. While the IVLP’s PPP with Global Ties US was mainly for its resources, EducationUSA worked with the IIE for its expertise and personnel as well as its non-governmental background. Therefore, insufficient resources were not EducationUSA’s only motive for the partnership. Nevertheless, the PPPs resulted in the implementations of both programs straying from their original intentions. Through PPPs, EducationUSA  [34].  [34]. 47  [17]. 45 46

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became a program to increase the number of foreign students, disregarding the DoS organizational culture, while the IVLP was turned into a program that emphasized domestic impacts.

The Various Resource Constraints on DoD The practice of public diplomacy by the DoD showed that limited resources did induce implementation discretion. Unlike the resource constraints in the DoS, which mainly related to funds and personnel, major restrictions on resources in DoD public diplomacy came from the legislative and executive branches, as well as the amount of time allocated for program implementation. This is illustrated by two cases: IMET and the TRWI.  Both programs were influenced by resource constraints, which caused their implementation to deviate from their original public diplomacy purposes. Resource Constraints on DoD Public Diplomacy Funding Deficiencies Although IMET’s money comes from the DoS, it is still valuable to compare it with the DoD overall budget and the budget for the HA/DR Exchange Program. The purpose of this data analysis is to understand whether the DoD’s public diplomacy programs were given less attention from 2008 to 2019. Figures 6.5 and 6.6 present the trends of funding in this period. Figure 6.5 shows the change in funding increase or decrease rates. It is obvious from the data that the rates of increase in IMET’s funding corresponded to the rates of increase in the DoD’s overall funding. The funding of the HA/DR Exchange Program saw a more drastic change in this period, but in general, the rates of increase were above that of the DoD.  The level of funding for these two programs remained stable at around 0.0165% of the DoD’s overall funding (see Fig.  6.6). The data show that IMET and HA/DR were given consistent attention in these years and there were no major budget cuts. Therefore, there is not enough evidence from the budgetary data to conclude that public diplomacy was allocated insufficient funding from 2008 to 2019.

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0.4 0.3 0.2

%

0.1 0 -0.1

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

-0.2 -0.3

Year DoD Increase Rate

IMET Increase Rate

HA/DR Increase Rate

Fig. 6.5  Rates of increase of annual actual funds for the DoD, IMET, and HA/ DR exchange program. (Source: DoS and DoD Congressional Budget Justifications from FY 2010–2021)

Legislative Constraints The DoD was prevented by the US legislation from engaging in certain activities with some countries. For example, as was analyzed in Chap. 4, the DoD produced a Game Plan in 1999 which outlined more than 80 activities, including military-to-military visits, meetings, and exchanges between two militaries at different levels. This raised significant concerns in Congress. A few Congressional officials worried that these activities would strengthen Chinese military capabilities, which might harm US national security.48 This led the DoD to cancel the Game Plan. Another restriction came from the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, which prevented US foreign aid from promoting or assisting in foreign aid projects or activities of any communist country, including China and the PLA.49 Data from the USAID shows that no money has been given in the form of military aid to China compared to 100% economic aid since 2001.50 As the

 [35].  [36]. 50  [37]. 48 49

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0.00025 0.0002

%

0.00015 0.0001 0.00005 0

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Year IMET Percentage

HA/DR Percentage

Fig. 6.6  Annual funding of IMET and HA/DR as a percentage of the DoD’s overall funding. (Source: DoS Congressional Budget Justifications from FY 2010–2021)

following case study shows, legal restrictions prevented the DoD from engaging China, which went against the original intent of public diplomacy. Executive Restrictions The DoD was confined by the Obama administration to only playing a supportive role in public diplomacy. The Interagency Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, issued by the Obama administration in 2011, determined that the DoS officially led US communications overseas, while the DoD played a supportive role. It was stated that the DoD and the DoS should work together “in the deployment of Military Information Support Teams (MISTs), the use of online platforms and other communication capabilities, priority setting, and messaging alignment with policy.”51 In other words, the DoD’s public diplomacy needed to be in line with that of the DoS and be well coordinated with other public diplomatic activities by the DoS, such as the programs at local embassies. This was considered by the DoD to be an obstacle, because it had to obtain numerous clearances from the DoS before a proposed action  [38].

51

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was approved or disapproved. As a report to the Congress described, a combat commander may have to seek approval from several US ambassadors in the region in order to conduct an initiative in their region.52 This is particularly an obstacle for public diplomacy because many communicative activities are time-sensitive.53 Moreover, their public diplomacy activities had to be embedded in the strategic communication framework led by the DoS. This is part of the reason why the DoD claims that it does not carry out public diplomacy and does not use that terminology. Not only was the DoD required to support the DoS’s public diplomacy efforts, but the effectiveness of its public diplomatic activities also needed to be scrutinized within the framework of strategic communication. Its efforts had to be successful both in terms of achieving the objective and in coordination with the DoS. Resource Restrictions Imposed on IMET The implementation of IMET was restricted by both the executive and legislative powers. Specifically, it was shaped by the framework of strategic communication and law. On the one hand, IMET is a collaboration between the DoD and the DoS. It is a program funded by the DoS and managed by the DoD, so its implementation carries out the mission designed by the DoS. This collaboration was also defined by the framework of strategic communication from the Obama administration, which required the DoD to play a supportive role in public diplomacy. On the other hand, IMET was prevented by law from including China as a participant, as Congressional officers believed that providing military education and training to the PLA might impair US national security. Constraint from Collaboration The framework of strategic communication demands that the DoD plays a supportive role in public diplomacy, supplementing the public diplomacy programs and activities of the DoS. In other words, the DoD’s public diplomatic activities need to be in accordance with DoS’s public diplomacy. IMET was an example of DoD–DoS collaboration. Its funding came from DoS, but it was implemented by the DoD.54 The DoS offered  [18].  [39]. 54  [40]. 52 53

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coordination and guidance as well as determining the participating countries, while the DoD managed and executed the program.55 From the perspective of the DoD, the implementation of IMET was affected or even limited by the DoS: first, the program was designed according to the opinion-leader model as a premise, and, second, IMET’s objective was shared by other DoS public diplomacy programs. Although it was a military education and training program administered by DoD, IMET was established on the assumption that selected program participants would disseminate their positive opinions about the US to their social networks in their home country. This premise is described as an opinion-leader model that is widely shared by many DoS public diplomacy programs, especially ECEs. The “opinion-leader model” suggests that opinions have their greatest impact when passed through persons of influence recognized as opinion leaders within their society.56 The aim was to expand the influence of the program by engaging foreign opinion leaders. EducationUSA and the IVLP are all based on this notion. Many IMET officials expressed in speeches and official documents that the program’s aim was to target future foreign leaders, which was similar to the goal of the IVLP. For example, the official website of IMET outlines that one of the program’s goals is to “train future leaders.” A GAO report also notes: “The IMET Program was established to encourage relations between the United States and foreign countries by training potential military leaders.”57 A RAND report explains that IMET could reach the multiplier effect when students “return to their home countries, and act as instructors, replicating the courses they took in the United States using US training materials and doctrine.”58 It is also anticipated that after training in the US, these students who attained leadership positions were “more accessible to the United States and amenable to U.S. interests.”59 The objective of IMET is also similar to that of DoS public diplomacy. One of the original intents of IMET determined by Congress is to “encourage effective mutually beneficial relations and increased  [41].  According to Giles Scott-Smith, the opinion-leader model adopted by many cultural exchange designers assumes a “two-step flow of communication” model, which argued that opinions broadcast via the mass media had their widest impact when passed through persons of influence recognized as opinion leaders within their society. 57  [42]. 58  [43]. 59  [43]. 55 56

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understanding between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of the goals of international peace and security.”60 This objective corresponds to the public diplomacy objective of the DoS explained in Chap. 2. In the DoD, the purpose of public diplomacy focuses on building a secure environment for military operations. Although the DoD is required to collaborate with the DoS on public diplomacy, its public diplomatic efforts are on a different trajectory from the public diplomacy of the DoS.  This is why the DoD defined IMET’s goal as establishing military-­ to-military cooperation and enhancing competence for joint operations rather than advancing mutual understanding.61 The enforced collaboration generated confusion in relation to the program goals, which led to implementation discretion such as goal displacement. This also explains why the DoD refuses to admit it practices public diplomacy. Using the term means that the DoD has to obey the rules set by the DoS, which may go against the DoD’s organizational culture and interests. Restrictions in Legislation In addition to President Obama’s executive order, the implementation of IMET was also restricted by law. According to the DoD and DoS Joint Reports to Congress on Foreign Military Training, many countries in the world are recipients of IMET, except high-income countries and “less-­ friendly” nations such as China, Russia, Venezuela, Iran, Belarus, Palestine, and Myanmar.62 These countries may take part in less-systematic educational training programs offered by the DoD’s Regional Center, but they are excluded from IMET.  No official document explicitly explains why China is excluded from IMET, but according to a policy manager of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s program, IMET only provides professional military training and education to US allies.63 China was considered by the DoD to be a competitor rather than a friend of the US. Besides, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 prevented US foreign aid from being used to promote or assist the foreign aid projects or activities of any communist country, including China. The Act also applies to

 [44].  [41]. 62  [45]. 63  [46]. 60 61

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foreign aid projects to the PLA, including those by any entity owned or controlled by or an affiliate of the Chinese military.64 Another reason that led IMET to exclude China was the wish to prevent wrong signals from being sent that could impair US foreign policy. In 2011, the Senate Appropriations Committee raised concerns about the implementation of IMET and noted that many perceive IMET participation as bestowing a degree of legitimacy from the United States on the actions of the foreign militaries and governments. Therefore, when deciding to provide IMET, the committee believes that the administration should consider the effects that these signals will have on larger U.S. foreign policy goals and target this assistance accordingly.65

According to this advice, the legislative constraint also pointed to the impact of selecting participant countries. Congressional officials were afraid that picking one country over another might send out a signal that the US government endorsed the government or military’s actions. To avoid this risk, the Committee advised the implementers to carefully select the “right” participant. As a result, this regulatory constraint may create implementation discretion that replaces the ultimate program goal and leaves out countries that should be included in the program. Implementation Discretion Resource restrictions were an additional factor in China’s exclusion from IMET. First, the framework of strategic communication ordered by the Obama administration defined the DoD’s supportive role in public diplomacy, which means that the DoD is torn between meeting both the goals of the DoS and its own interests. As a result, the DoD refuses to admit that it conducts public diplomacy, even though many of its programs and activities are actually forms of public diplomacy. Second, concerns were expressed in Congress about military-to-military exchanges or foreign aid supplied to China. However, from the standpoint of public diplomacy, IMET should include China, as forging connections with less-friendly countries makes more sense than prioritizing friendly states. If the bilateral relationship between the two nations is already good, why give them priority if the goal is not only to advance their military capacity but also to  [36].  [47].

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promote American values? A more efficient way should be targeting countries that do not have such friendly relations with the US.  Third, the Senate officials worry that including China may send wrong signals to the world, but excluding China misses the opportunity to engage with PLA and fails to achieve DoD’s public diplomacy goal of reducing miscalculation and misunderstanding with China. These legislative factors shape the implementation of IMET. However, engaging China through public diplomacy programs can achieve the goal of building relationships and reducing misunderstandings. As a result, IMET became a program that only engaged with countries that already have positive relations with the US. Likewise, the executive order on strategic communication also shaped DoD public diplomacy practice in terms of following the DoS’s instructions and framework. In order to employ public diplomacy, the DoD has to go through many points of control and checks from the DoS to ensure that the program follows the right path. The DoD thus refuses to claim its responsibility for public diplomacy. Insufficient Support to TRWI In the TRWI, limited time and jurisdiction restrictions prevented the program from succeeding. The program was judged to be ineffective as it did not result in sufficient levels of change among the target audience and it was not well coordinated with other public diplomacy activities, violating the order on strategic communication from the Obama administration. The implementation of the TRWI was affected by these two resource constraints. On the one hand, without enough time, the impact of a public diplomacy program cannot be seen; on the other hand, the DoD was not allowed to practice public diplomacy freely, even though the program supported military operations. As a result, informational public diplomacy programs like the TRWI became a non-DOD program or something that the DoD should not do.  imited Time Allowed L Concrete change takes time. Many researchers argued that behavioral change often takes tremendous amounts of time and resources over decades of engagement, so they urged the practical world to pay attention to the long-term results of public diplomacy.66 However, policy-makers  [48, 49].

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have focused on whether public diplomacy has achieved the policy impact, which is a short-term result.67 In other words, public diplomacy was given insufficient time to accomplish its long-term objectives. The implementation of the TRWI illustrates this time constraint; it was shut down because of insufficient time. The TRWI was a network of websites that offered information to counter violent extremism. A US Africa Command spokesperson said that the websites were “information tools used to fight misinformation and inaccurate information provided by extremist websites.”68 In other words, the ultimate goal of the TRWI was to win the hearts and minds of the people in key regions through alternative online information. Unlike informational war, which may be short-term, using public diplomacy to combat terrorism and change the target audience’s opinions and behaviors requires a long-term strategy.69 Scholars have differentiated public diplomacy and propaganda against the background of the War on Terror. One difference, they suggest, is that public diplomacy promoted cultural understanding as well as the appreciation of US society—the American people and American values.70 This takes time to achieve. Seib also suggests that informational public diplomacy needs to be innovative and persistent, which implies that more time should be allowed for programs like the TRWI.71 However, without much patience, Congress ordered the closure of the TRWI in Section 344 of the Fiscal 2014 Defense Authorization Act. The joint statement by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees following the final bill acknowledged, “We remain skeptical of the effectiveness of the websites established under the TRWI and believe that available resources may better be used to support tactical and operational military information support activities.”72 The TRWI and its websites were not given enough time to fully develop. Some websites were online for little more than a year before they were closed down. For instance, the Sabahionline website, sponsored by the Africa Command and featuring news from across the Horn of Africa region, was launched in February 2012, a year before the Congressional decision. It was too early to see the effectiveness of the website in combating extremism by the time that the  [48].  [50]. 69  [51–53]. 70  [11]. 71  [54]. 72  [55]. 67 68

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websites were shut down. An article noted that Sabahionline had averaged 1400 daily visitors and 8000 articles read per day.73 To change the perceptions of the target audience, more time was needed. Jurisdiction Constraints The bill to close down the TRWI websites also assessed that the program might be better implemented by other organizations. The joint explanatory statement from the House and Senate Armed Services Committees accompanying the final bill notes that: We believe strategic information operations activities, like TRWI, may more appropriately be managed by other relevant U.S.  Government agencies, with the Department of Defense focused on contributing to an interagency approach that is responsive to military-specific operational requirements.74

This statement further indicates that public diplomacy programs like the TRWI may be more suitable for organizations such as the BBG (currently the US Agency for Global Media), the government agency that operates various state-run media outlets and is considered to be part of the US informational public diplomacy. Others pointed out that a program branded as a DoD operation may not be well received by countries that are traditionally sensitive to a foreign military presence.75 This Congressional ruling suggests that the DoD should only practice military-related activities or that its public diplomacy needs to be further integrated into the framework of the DoS. In the view of Congress, the TRWI did not directly contribute to military-specific operational purposes. Congress also believed that information public diplomacy that targeted foreign civil publics like the TRWI should be managed and implemented by the DoS and the BBG.  The DoD is not supposed to conduct public diplomacy independently. This restriction prevents it from actively engaging in public diplomatic activities and programs, even though the TRWI was designed to influence the perceptions, attitudes, and subsequent behavior of selected foreign audiences in support of US military objectives.76 Consequently, the TRWI was canceled, and the DoD lost a means of engaging with foreign publics.  [50].  [56]. 75  [57]. 76  [50]. 73 74

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Unlike other public diplomacy programs discussed in this chapter, the TRWI experienced resource constraints that directly led to its termination. In other words, it did not have a chance to alter its implementation according to time and jurisdiction constraints before it was closed down. The action to end the program itself is implementation bias induced by resource restriction, although the decision was not by the implementers, but by Congress. As a result, the DoD may become more cautious about public diplomacy that utilizes information (rather than people-to-people exchange) to engage with foreign publics. The DoD is likely to not employ information public diplomacy via the mass media to communicate with the foreign public. Resource constraints from executive and legislative orders confined the DoD to the implementation of public diplomacy. This is perhaps the reason why the DoD claims that it does not conduct public diplomacy. Furthermore, public diplomacy projects in the DoD, such as TRWI, were not given enough time to achieve their goals before being shut down. Time as an important resource that shaped public diplomacy outcomes was neglected by policy-makers. As a result, these public diplomacy programs at the DoD were either canceled or limited in terms of their scope. As a result, their impacts were narrowed.

Conclusion This chapter has shown that theory can partly explain implementation discretion, but that this is not the only factor involved. In the DoS, while public diplomacy experienced major budget cuts in the 1990s, and the levels of funding as well as personnel were not comparable to those seen in the 1960s, the resources allocated to public diplomacy were stable in the period from 2008 to 2019, though the inadequacy of resources for public diplomacy is something on which scholars in this field agree.77 In terms of practice, EducationUSA and the IVLP mainly utilize PPPs to deal with the resource issue. EducationUSA’s partnership with the IIE can be explained by the aim to leverage private resources such as funds, personnel, and expertise. However, it is not the only reason for this partnership. The IIE was chosen to be a cover for EducationUSA, as it is believed that an ECE program should not be directly linked to foreign policy or government institutions. The IVLP’s partnership with Global Ties US is designed to  [58, 59].

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leverage the latter’s network’s resources, especially its national and international capabilities to organize meetings and events in various communities. Based on the mechanisms through which resources shaped implementation, delegating tasks to other organizations could induce implementation biases that might undermine the interests of the program and the institution. EducationUSA’s partnership with the IIE overlooked the organizational culture of the DoS. The IVLP’s partnership with Global Ties US led the program to focus on domestic benefits rather than its original goal of promoting mutual understanding with foreign publics. In the DoD, resource constraints resulted from executive and legislative limitations as well as insufficient time. The DoD’s role in public diplomacy was restricted by the strategic communication framework, so some of its programs such as IMET had to follow the motives and objectives of the DoS. Legal issues also prevented the program from including certain countries such as China, even though it was meant to include countries that had less strategic trust with the US.  For the TRWI, the limited resource refers to insufficient time as well as the confinement to exclude the DoD from practicing certain public diplomacy. In the end, the TRWI websites were closed down because they were considered to be ineffective and not well coordinated. In terms of implementation bias, IMET’s resource constraints inhibited the program from engaging with countries that were valuable from a public diplomacy perspective. The insufficient time allowed for and the imposed “jurisdiction” on the TRWI led to its cancellation. Therefore, the theory of inadequate resources alone does not fully explain public diplomacy implementation. Some programs and practices in public diplomacy are too complex to be explained only by resource deficiency. Resource constraints make the public diplomacy programs analyzed in this chapter become something else. EducationUSA lost control over its implementation due to its partnership with the IIE.  Through working with Global Ties US, the IVLP focuses on domestic consequences. IMET’s resource constraints shape the program in terms of excluding countries like China, while military training could help to enhance trust between the two countries. The cancellation of the TRWI due to limited resources may also discourage the DoD from practicing similar public diplomacy programs again in the future. All in all, constraints from various resource channels induced implementation discretion and changed the meaning of public diplomacy in these cases.

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30. Wit, De, and Hans. 2002. Internationalization of Higher Education in the United States of America and Europe: A Historical, Comparative, and Conceptual Analysis. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 31. US Department of State Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. About IVLP. US State Department. https://eca.state.gov/ivlp/about-­ivlp. Accessed March 24, 2020. 32. ———. Office of International Visitors. US Department of State. https://eca. state.gov/about-­b ureau/organizational-­s tructure/office-­i nternational-­ visitors. Accessed April 11, 2020. 33. US Department of State. 2017. Project Objectives, Goals, and Implementation (POGI): FY 2018 International Visitor Leadership Program. Office of International Visitors Educational and Cultural Affairs. https://eca.state. gov/files/bureau/fy18_ivlp_pogi.pdf. Accessed February 23, 2022. 34. Foreign Policy Association. 2012. Opportunities in International Exchange and Education. New York: Foreign Policy Association. 35. Pollpeter, Kevin. 2004. U.S.-China Security Management: Assessing the Military-­to-­Military Relationship. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 36. Kan, Shirley A. 2011. U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 37. U.S. Foreign Aid by Country-China. US Agency for International Development. https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/CHN. Accessed May 1, 2020. 38. White House. 2012. Update to Congress on National Framework for Strategic Communication. Mountainrunner.us. https://mountainrunner.us/wp-­ content/uploads/2012/03/President-­response-­to-­NDAA-­1055-­of-­2009-­3. pdf. Accessed September 3, 2018. 39. Seib, Philip. 2012. Real-Time Diplomacy: Politics and Power in the Social Media Era. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 40. Davison, Michael S., Jr. 1998. Laying the Foundation for European Peace: The U.S.  Military Education and Training Program. DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management 20 (4): 99–101. 41. US Defense Security Cooperation Agency. International Military Education and Training. US Department of Defense. http://www.dsca.mil/programs/ international-­military-­education-­training-­imet. Accessed September 4, 2018. 42. US Government Accounting Office. 1992. Observation on Post-Cold War Program Changes. Washington, DC: US Government Accounting Office. 43. Taw, Jennifer M. 1994. Thailand and the Philippines: Case Studies in US IMET Training and Its Role in Internal Defense and Development. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 44. Foreign Assistance Act. §§ 2151 et seq., 1961. U.S. Code 22. 45. Department of Defense and the Department of State. 2014. Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest: Joint Report to Congress 2013–2014. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense and US Department of State.

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46. Miles, Donna. 2011. Education Program Promotes Relationships, Partnerships. American Forces Press Service. https://www.af.mil/News/Article-­Display/ Article/112890/education-­program-­promotes-­relationships-­partnerships/. Accessed January 27, 2020. 47. Gildea, Kerry. 2001. Foreign Operations Package Raises Concern on Middle East Missile Proliferation. Defense Daily 212 (4): 1. 48. Gonzalez, Carissa. 2015. The Evaluation Revolution in Public Diplomacy. American Ambassadors Review. https://www.americanambassadors.org/ publications/ambassadors-­review/fall-­2015/the-­evaluation-­revolution-­in-­ public-­diplomacy. Accessed February 26, 2022. 49. Matwiczak, Kenneth. 2010. Public Diplomacy: Model for the Assessment of Performance. Austin, TX: Lyndon B.  Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin. https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/ files/372557988.pdf. 50. Mazmanian, Adam. 2015. DOD Shutters Two ‘Influence’ Websites Covering Africa. Federal Computer Week. https://fcw.com/articles/2015/02/13/ african-­web-­sites.aspx. Accessed July 15, 2019. 51. Seib, Philip, and Dana M. Janbek. 2010. Global Terrorism and New Media: The Post-Al Qaeda Generation. New York: Routledge. 52. Mor, Ben D. 2007. The Rhetoric of Public Diplomacy and Propaganda Wars: A View from Self-Presentation Theory. European Journal of Political Research 46 (5): 661–683. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-­6765.2007.00707.x. 53. Kruckeberg, Dean, and Marina Vujnovic. 2005. Public Relations, Not Propaganda, for US Public Diplomacy in a Post-9/11 World: Challenges and Opportunities. Journal of Communication Management 9 (4): 296–304. 54. Seib, Philip. 2019. US Public Diplomacy and the Terrorism Challenge. The Hague Journal of Diplomacy 14: 154–168. 55. Congress, U.S. 2013. Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 113th Congress, 1st Sess. Washington, DC: US Congress. 56. House Committee on Armed Services. 2013. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014: Legislative Text and Joint Explanatory Statement to Accompany H.R. 3304 Public Law 113–66. Washington, DC: House of Representatives. 57. Locker, Ray. 2014. Military Propaganda Websites on Verge of Extinction. USA Today. https://www.usatoday.com/story/nation/2014/01/02/trans-­ regional-­web-­initiative-­defense-­bill/4291467/. Accessed July 15, 2019. 58. Fitzpatrick, Kathy. 2010. The Future of U.S.  Public Diplomacy. Boston, MA: Brill. 59. Sukma, Rizal. 2011. Soft Power and Public Diplomacy: The Case of Indonesia. In Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia, ed. Jan Melissen and Sook Jong Lee, 91–115. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion: Public Diplomacy in the Eye of the Beholder

Exercising Discretion in Public Diplomacy In this book, I use implementation theories to explain public diplomacy practice. Table 7.1 summarizes my cases, the theories used, and the results. My cases (which were described in more detail in Chap. 2) were the DoS’s EducationUSA and the IVLP, and the DoD’s US–China military exchanges and visits, as well as the DoD’s MPEP, IMET, the US–China HA/DR Exchange, the TRWI, the Game Plan, the Strategic Communication Framework, and public diplomacy strategy-making towards China. The theories I used, which are summarized in more detail in each case study, highlight implementation discretion as a function of changing policy meanings. The first theory used to explain public diplomacy was the implementation theory of organizational culture. Organizations have distinct systems of beliefs, values, norms, and practices that guide the behavior of their staff. Their cultures and interests then shape implementation so that program design and implementation are consistent with the culture, or they neglect programs and tasks that are not part of their culture or get rid of them altogether. The second theory states that organizations tend to focus on goals that are easy to measure because measurable outcomes lead to future allocated resources. Consequently, goals that were measured became the ultimate program objective. Resource constraints also induce implementation discretion, which is exercised to “fit” the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. Wu, U.S. Public Diplomacy Towards China, Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95644-8_7

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Table 7.1  Master table of research findings

DoS

Organizational culture

Measurable goals

Resource constraints

Process: Yes Elitism: No Process: Yes Elitism: Yes and no Result: Yes Hierarchy: n/a n/a Result: n/a Hierarchy: Yes n/a

Yes

PPP

Yes

PPP

n/a

n/a

Yes n/a

n/a Legislative constraints

Yes n/a

TRWI and TRMI

Result: No Hierarchy: n/a n/a

Collaboration with the DoS and the law n/a

Strategic communication Public diplomacy towards China

Result: n/a Hierarchy: Yes Result: Yes Hierarchy: n/a

n/a

TRWI: Time and jurisdiction Executive restrictions

n/a

n/a

EducationUSA IVLP

DoD Exchanges and visits MPEP Game plan IMET HA/DR exchange

TRWI: Yes

Note: “n/a” means that the implementation theory was not utilized to explain this case because either it was not relevant to the practice of the case or there were no available data for the analysis

policy into the resources available, or where implementers would look for other ways to compensate for the deficiency. The results of this study, as summarized in Table 7.1, demonstrate that most public diplomacy discretion can be explained by implementation. The organizational culture of the DoS explains the tendency of EducationUSA and the IVLP to focus on processes. Its culture of elitism also affects the IVLP’s participant selection process, though it does not account for the practice of EducationUSA. In the DoD, the result-­oriented organizational culture gives reasons for how and why US–China military exchanges and visits are not permanent but subject to disruption, and the objective of its public diplomacy towards China was to highlight China’s transparency and its role in the region. Its culture, which emphasized hierarchy, led to its obedience to higher-level commands, such as the cancellation of the Game Plan and its adherence to the Strategic Communication

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Framework. The argument about goals’ measurability is reflected in EducationUSA, the IVLP, MPEP, IMET, and the TRWI.  These public diplomacy programs all experienced displacements of goals. Their ultimate program objectives were replaced by those that were easy to measure and observe. Lastly, the public diplomacy programs of the DoS and the DoD are also restricted by limited resources. EducationUSA and the IVLP leverage private resources through PPPs; IMET is confined by its collaboration with the DoS and the Foreign Assistant Act, which prohibits aid being given to China. The TRWI was called off because of jurisdiction requirement that informational public diplomacy should be practiced by the DoS. Besides these positive results, there are also cases where implementation did not explain public diplomacy discretion. The US–China HA/DR Exchange Program has not been affected by the result-driven culture of the DoD.  Unlike military exchanges and visits as well as the strategy-­ making of public diplomacy towards China, the HA/DR Program aims to build a sustained relationship between the two militaries and better prepare for the next major disaster in the region. In other words, it focuses on the process of relationship building and knowledge sharing.

Public Diplomacy and Implementation Implementation Discretion in DoS The public diplomacy of the DoS should aim to advance US foreign policy goals and build relationships with foreign publics. In order to achieve these two objectives, public diplomacy of the DoS is supposed to understand, inform, engage, influence, and build relationships, partnerships, and coalitions with foreign publics. The two cases of the DoS analyzed in this research—EducationUSA and the IVLP—share this public diplomacy nature and goal. However, in practice, these two programs appear different in practice compared to what they were designed for. EducationUSA EducationUSA is a public diplomacy program managed by the ECA of the DoS, so by its nature it should aim to fulfill the purpose of public diplomacy, which includes supporting foreign policy and building relationships with foreign audiences. First, it should speak to foreign policy, no matter how vague or unstable the policy is. For instance, when the US foreign

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policy priority is advancing democracy and human rights, a public diplomacy program needs to directly target improving the democratic and human rights situations in the target country. The success of the program should be dependent on whether the conditions have been improved. Second, it needs to pay attention to the quality of the relationship, meaning that the program is supposed to forge the audience’s favorable opinions of the US.  For example, an exchange program that brings foreign visitors to the US should treat their lasting favorable opinions of the US as its final purpose. However, in practice, EducationUSA has become a program to promote US higher education. Specifically, its aim is now to increase the number of foreign college students studying in the US and assist US higher education institutions in recruiting more international students. To reach this skewed program goal, EducationUSA has focused on offering information on the US university admission process to prospective students. At the same time, it also provides information on foreign marketing to US universities and colleges so that they can recruit more students and better operate international programs. As a result, it has strayed from its original course of public diplomacy and has instead become a program to facilitate US higher education and to attract more international students. The quality of foreign students’ stays in the US, which directly affects their opinions of the US, and the relationships that were supposed to be built through EducationUSA have been neglected. In other words, public diplomacy goals have been ignored in the implementation of EducationUSA. There is a gap between what EducationUSA should be and what it was in practice. This difference could to a large extent be explained by the implementation process. According to the research findings summarized in Table  7.1, EducationUSA’s practice is shaped by the DoS process-­ oriented organizational culture; it focuses on measurable goals, and it leverages the resource of private organization, the IIE, to operationalize the program in China. In other words, EducationUSA’s practice was affected by the DoS’s organizational culture, which focuses on processes rather than results. It also works towards measurable goals (such as the number of foreign students studying in the US) rather than public diplomacy goals that are difficult to assess (such as supporting foreign policy and building relationships). It cooperates with the IIE to implement the program on the ground in China as a way to deal with limited resources, such as knowledge, expertise, personnel, funding, and legislation.

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In general, the implementation theories of organizational culture and resource constraints shaped the practice of EducationUSA and are responsible for most of the gaps identified earlier. First, the DoS’s organizational culture pays more attention to processes than results, so this shaped the operation of EducationUSA to also focus on processes. Thus, instead of fostering mutual understanding or supporting foreign policy priorities, the program concentrates its efforts on student recruitment, an important part of the process to reach the final objective of public diplomacy, which implementers believe is the meaning of public diplomacy. Its tendency to reach measurable goals—the increase in the number of foreign students studying in US higher educational institutions—also pertains to this element of the DoS organizational culture. Second, the issue of limited resources led EducationUSA to work with a private organization, the IIE, to implement the program in China (and a few other countries). This is because public organizations such as the ECA are bound by many restrictions, and private organizations like the IIE have more resources and are more flexible. As a result, EducationUSA’s practice was hijacked by the IIE. Public diplomacy became sidelined in favor of increasing the number of foreign students through recruiting agencies, which violated the ethical rules of the DoS. The IVLP According to the summary in Table 7.1, the elements of the DoS organizational culture of process-orientation and elitism shape the implementation of the IVLP in practice, which tends to veer towards measurable goals such as the number of foreign leaders identified by the program. Limited resources (including in relation to outreach) have led the IVLP to work with programming and community organizations in the Global Ties US network to implement the program. Again, the objective of public diplomacy was lost in its implementation. Organizing exchange activities according to policy themes became a way to support foreign policy, though the actual impact of doing so has not been evaluated. Identifying future foreign leaders is considered an achievement of public diplomacy. Domestic interests, rather than the opinions of foreign audiences or long-term relationships, became the program’s goal. Like EducationUSA, the IVLP is also a public diplomacy program of the ECA that aims to support foreign policy priorities and establish long-­ term relationships with foreign publics. Ideally, the IVLP should accomplish both goals in practice, but in reality, it has become a program to

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identify future foreign leaders and pursue domestic interests. Specifically, the IVLP focuses on bringing the right people to visit the US and the emphasis has been on identifying foreign future leaders. It also underlines the significance of the economic and social benefits brought by the visitors to the local communities. As a result, the IVLP is no longer a program to carry out the public diplomacy mission of shaping the foreign public’s opinions of the US, but a program to enlarge the alumni pool of foreign leaders and serve the needs of local communities. The questions of how these leaders think of the US and whether such relationships can further US foreign policy are lost during the implementation process. In this way, the IVLP’s ideal public diplomacy raison d’être is biased and the program has become something else. This book not only identifies the gap between what the IVLP should look like and what it does look like in practice, but it also demonstrates how much of the gap can be explained by the implementation theories. It concludes that implementation matters to the IVLP and can explain many of the reasons for the existence of this gap. First, two components of the DoS organizational culture affect the IVLP’s implementation: on the one hand, the process-driven culture leads the program to pay more attention to identifying future foreign leaders, which is a means to achieve the program’s ultimate goal; on the other hand, the elitist culture shapes how the participants in the IVLP are selected. The program is not open for general application and the procedure of visitor selection is also not transparent. The visitors join the program by invitation only and they are hand-picked by officers at US embassies overseas and ECA staff in Washington, DC. However, the IVLP’s emphasis on diversity in its programming reveals a non-elitist value, which contradicts the DoS’s organizational culture. The program requires its programming agencies to design it according to the principle of diversity, meaning that the exchange should include diverse kinds of organizational and individual participants, as well as topics to reflect the diversity of the US. In this regard, IVLP’s practice cannot be fully explained by the implementation theory of organizational culture. Overall, the above two case analyses show that implementation theories explained the majority of reasons as to why the practice of public diplomacy in the DoS was conducted in such a way. In other words, the majority of implementation discretions exercised in EducationUSA and the IVLP are caused by indicators identified in the theories, including the organizational culture, the measurable goal, and resource constraints. In the end, implementation implies and changes the meaning of public

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diplomacy. Through the practice of EducationUSA, public diplomacy has become education promotion and foreign student recruitment. The implementation of the IVLP has changed the aim of public diplomacy to identifying foreign leaders and boosting local economies. Implementation Discretion in DoD Implementation theories also largely explain the gap in the DoD’s public diplomacy between what should be defined by policy objectives and what is practiced on the ground. The DoD’s public diplomacy objectives contain two levels. Level one is the general public diplomacy goal, which refers to shaping the operational environment and fostering common views on security challenges. Level two is the public diplomacy objective towards China. It requires the DoD’s public diplomacy programs towards China to reduce misunderstandings and miscalculations, as well as to persuade China to take a proactive role in ensuring regional stability. The process of moving from level one to level two is strategy-making in public diplomacy implementation, which refers to the translation from the policy order to specific implementation (see Chap. 1). This process was also analyzed as a case study in Chap. 4. Nevertheless, the DoD’s public diplomacy programs should follow its general objective, which is cultivating a secure operating environment and advancing mutual understanding. However, in practice, five forms of DoD’s public diplomacy—exchanges and visits, foreign military education and training, the US–China HA/DR Exchange Program, the TRWI and the TRMI, and strategy-making— became something else through implementation (see Table  7.1). Implementation applies meanings to and changes the DoD’s public diplomacy. The DoD’s public diplomacy then becomes something that represents the bilateral relationship condition, aims at short-term and measurable results, and is given a subordinate status. Exchanges and visits as well as the cancellation of the Game Plan were affected by the DoD’s organizational culture of focusing on results and hierarchy. Consequently, public diplomacy has been turned into something that reflects the state of bilateral relationships rather than a tool to improve them. The implementation of the TRWI is explained by the theories of measurable goals and resource restrictions. The program was measured by the number of sites and articles that reflected the mission of the DoD. It was also restricted by time and jurisdiction as relationship building needed time and jurisdiction prevented DoD from practicing informational public diplomacy. Through

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the practice of the TRWI, public diplomacy was changed into something else. Its objectives became quantifiable outcomes, and it tended to focus on short-term effects. Congress believed that such programs should be only practiced by the DoS. MPEP was likewise measured by the number rather than the quality of relations, so its practice suggests the change of meaning of public diplomacy towards quantifiable goals. Moreover, IMET, impacted by measurable goals and resources, also focuses on objectives that are easy to measure and fit its practice in relation to the DoS’s organizational interests, neglecting the human rights agenda. The DoD obeyed the order of Strategic Communication Framework from the Obama administration, though this framework was complicated and undermined its current public diplomacy practice. Public diplomacy thus became a secondary task of the DoD. The strategy-making towards China focuses on the short-term results of reducing miscalculations and changing China’s behavior, so public diplomacy is then driven by results rather than the process of relationship building. The US–China HA/DR Exchange Program is the only exception in which implementation does not have an impact on its practice. The program highlights relationship building and knowledge sharing so that both militaries can better deal with HA/DR in the region.  ublic Diplomacy Strategy-Making P Organizational culture shapes the DoD’s public diplomacy strategy-­ making (see Chap. 4). First, the DoD’s public diplomacy was ordered to operate within the Framework of Strategic Communication. Ideally, its public diplomacy should follow the objective of shaping the operative environment and fostering mutual understanding, but in practice, it was directed by the Strategic Communication Framework to play a secondary role. This gap between theory and practice is explained by the implementation process. Impacted by the DoD’s organizational culture, the DoD embraced and followed the Strategic Communication Framework without an understanding of what it meant and how to implement it in accordance with its existing public diplomacy programs. Strategic communication stresses interagency coordination in foreign communication and engagement, especially following the lead of the DoS. Acknowledging its “supportive role” in public diplomacy, the DoD needed to situate its communicative efforts within the Strategic Communication Framework, which should be compatible with the DoS’s public diplomacy activities. As a result, the DoD not only refused its proactive role in public diplomacy,

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but also denied that many of its programs were public diplomacy, though these programs were in fact public diplomacy. Second, the DoD’s strategy-making, which produced its public diplomacy objective towards China, is shaped by its result-oriented culture. As mentioned earlier, the DoD’s public diplomacy goal towards China is an interpretation of its purpose, which is to carry out public diplomacy purpose. The general public diplomacy objective cultivates a secure operative environment and fosters mutual understanding, while the strategy towards China focuses on risk and miscalculation reduction, as well as persuading China to become a responsible regional actor. Ideally, public diplomacy towards China should be consistent with the overall thrust of public diplomacy. However, in practice, the goal has been shifted from fostering mutual understanding to increasing Chinese transparency so that the US military could make accurate decisions, which is result-oriented. The overall public diplomacy goal adopted the assumption that public diplomacy takes time and the impact comes from the process of interaction, whereas the objective to engage China indicated that public diplomacy was based on short-term results. In this way, the end of understanding China was more important than the means of sustaining the relationship with China. Thus, the meaning of public diplomacy was changed to focus on quick behavior change rather than the continuation of engagement.  ublic Diplomacy Got Canceled P A few public diplomacy programs in the DoD, especially those that targeted China, were canceled permanently or temporarily. The TRWI and the Game Plan were called off, and US–China exchanges and visits were fitful. Ideally, these public diplomacy programs should be carried on to further the relationships with China and key regions of counter-extremism (for the TRWI). Public diplomacy is supposed to be a tool to sustain long-­ term relationships between the sponsoring country and foreign publics, and it may produce the best possible results if utilized when the bilateral relationship deteriorates. When the relationship worsens, public diplomacy can be a good method to amend and sustain the relationship. However, in practice, these public diplomacy programs were canceled due to a lack of trust. It seems that public diplomacy becomes an indicator that reflects the relationship status rather than a method to improve it. It signifies an already good relationship rather than a tool to make changes. This implies a gap between what these programs should be as public diplomacy

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and what they are in practice. In this way, the meaning of public diplomacy was changed by implementation. This gap is largely explained by implementation. First, the implementation of US–China exchanges and visits is affected by the DoD’s organizational culture, which focuses on results (see Chap. 4). When the US–China bilateral relationship runs into problems, these programs are among the first to be withdrawn. The disinvitation of China to the 2018 RIMPAC was the result of US discontent with China’s actions in the South China Sea. The process to improve bilateral connections gave way to the result of a weakened relationship. Thus, the exchanges and visits are not utilized as an engagement tool to recover the damaged relationship; instead, they become indicators of the bilateral relationship status. Second, the Game Plan was impacted by the DoD’s organizational culture of emphasizing hierarchy, which favored strict enforcement by chains of command (see Chap. 4). The Game Plan raised concerns in Congress that the DoD’s exchange programs with China might help the development of the Chinese military, which would undermine US national security. Therefore, the 2000 NDAA restricted US–China military exchanges and required US Secretaries of Defense to submit reports that explained military communication with China. While the Game Plan was in the DoD’s interests and aligned with its public diplomacy purposes, the hierarchical culture led the DoD to follow the order of the NDAA without question. As a result, the Game Plan was canceled. A channel to engage with the Chinese military was abandoned due to the DoD’s organizational culture of hierarchy. Third, the implementation of the TRWI was affected by resource restraints of time and jurisdiction (see Chap. 6). On the one hand, the program was not given enough time to fully develop and reach its desired objective of countering violent extremism. On the other hand, the TRWI was confined by Congress arguing that certain public diplomacy should be practiced by the DoS, not the DoD. The program was accused of being inefficient and lacking coordination with other public diplomacy activities, and it was believed that these would be better carried out by the DoS. Although the TRWI was in the DoD’s interests in terms of fostering a secure environment and advancing mutual understanding, resource restrictions led to the termination of the program. As a result, the meaning of public diplomacy was changed. First, public diplomacy’s long-term vision was overlooked. There was a general lack of patience in terms of waiting for its long-term impacts to become visible. Second, it was

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considered that informational public diplomacy like the TRWI that offers news to the target audience should only be practiced by the DoS; the DoD was believed to be an unsuitable vector for such a program. Moreover, the TRWI’s practice was also altered by measurable goals (see Chap. 5). Instead of focusing on the public diplomacy objectives, which might be difficult to gauge, the TRWI’s efforts aimed at outcomes that were easy to measure. On the one hand, officials used a number of sites and articles to demonstrate the accomplishments of the program. On the other hand, the content of the websites had to align with the Pentagon’s missions, such as promoting democracy, security, good governance, and the rule of law. These quantifiable objectives led the program to become propagandist, which undermined its credibility among the foreign public. In the end, the TRWI’s goal became what was measured. Its goal of countering extremism and building long-term relationships with the target audience was replaced by quantifiable indicators.  ecurring Public Diplomacy R Not all DoD public diplomacy towards China is irregular. One exception is the US–China HA/DR Exchange Program. The most prominent feature of this program is its recurring nature. Unlike regular exchanges and visits between the two militaries, it is not affected by the result-oriented culture of the DoD (see Chap. 4). There is no gap between the program’s design and its practice on the ground. Since 2005, the US and Chinese militaries have hosted many exchanges in both countries in order to better deal with HA/DR in the Asia-Pacific. The stated purpose is to address challenges and collectively better prepare for the next major disaster in the region. Contrary to the DoD’s organizational culture, the HA/DR Exchange Program puts considerable energy into building relationships and trust, so that the two militaries might better cooperate following a disaster in the region. The program also adopted a collaborative approach to target a third country in the region. In this regard, implementation theory does not align with the US–China HA/DR Exchange as the program is much in line with the original public diplomacy intention.  ublic Diplomacy Excludes China P In the DoD, public diplomacy programs that exclude China are also shaped by the implementation process. These programs are the main communicative programs that fulfill the definition of public diplomacy, even though the DOD claims they are not public diplomacy. Besides, their

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practices offer important insights into the effect of implementation. While MPEP requires a higher level of security checks because the exchange personnel need to become members of the target militaries, IMET as a program of military education and training is restricted by its collaboration with the DoS and the legislative order not to provide military-related assistance to China. Moreover, implementation discretion in both MPEP and IMET shows that implementers prefer measurable goals to those that are difficult to assess, though they are supposed to meet public diplomacy objectives. Therefore, the gap between what MPEP and IMET should be and what they are when practiced on the ground can be explained by implementation theories. As a result, public diplomacy has been turned into something easy to measure. Both MPEP and IMET prefer activities that are measurable to the tasks that are difficult to assess (see Chap. 5). In MPEP, more attention has been paid to building relationships between the participants and their host organizations than the knowledge learned. IMET is more interested in providing tactical training than courses on human rights. These implementation biases are led by the implementation tendency to favor goals that are easy to measure. For MPEP, the relationship being built by the program is easier to quantify than the knowledge shared. It is worth noting that here relationship building in this context does not refer to its quality. We do not know if the relationship is sustained and can be translated to policy results. For IMET, tactical training can be measured by quantifiable indicators, such as the number of students, the number of courses provided, and the skills foreign countries learned in order to improve their capabilities, while human rights improvement in the target country cannot be easily assessed. Therefore, the objectives of these two programs became what got measured. The meaning of public diplomacy was thus modified and became an indicator that was easy to quantify and measure. IMET is also affected by resource restrictions (see Chap. 6). Here, “resource” refers not only to money and personnel, but also to law, time, information, organization, public infrastructure, consensus, and political support or power. Ideally, the program should include China because it is a good tool to advance mutual understanding between the US and China. It should also help to build a secure operative environment of which China is a part. However, in practice, IMET has been forced by limited resources to ignore the human rights agenda and has excluded China. As a collaborative program between the DoS and the DoD, it has a dual mission. On

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the one hand, it is based on the DoS’s public diplomacy framework that involves the opinion-leader model and mutual understanding. On the other hand, the goal of IMET as set by the DoD is to establish military-­ to-­military cooperation and enhance the competence for joint operation. These two objectives from two different organizations are not compatible with each other. IMET’s implementation adopts its own agenda and ignores the objective of human rights. This tendency also relates to the implementation theory of organizational culture. As discussed in Chap. 4, IMET’s lack of patience for human rights improvement in the target country is shaped by the DoD’s result-oriented organizational culture. IMET is also affected by legislative restrictions. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 prevented substantial military assistance to China, which included public diplomacy programs like IMET. Similar to the motivation behind the Game Plan, offering educational training to Chinese military personnel corresponds with the DoD’s public diplomacy goal of reducing misunderstandings and persuading China to become a responsible regional actor. However, the Foreign Assistance Act prohibited such activities, resulting in IMET’s exclusion of China. In this way, the meaning of public diplomacy is changed and it becomes something that reflects the status of the bilateral relationship rather than a tool to improve it.  hy Does the DoD Not Claim Public Diplomacy? W Another important reason behind the DoD case studies examined here is to answer the following question: why does the DoD claim that it never practices public diplomacy? Based on the analyses, the answer lies in the effects of implementation. First, the Strategic Communication Framework prevents the DoD from leading or playing a proactive role in public diplomacy (see Chap. 4). The DoD’s organizational culture of emphasizing hierarchy affects its response to this policy order, which is to obey without question. Therefore, although the Framework contradicts with DoD’s current public diplomacy operations, the DoD still follows the rule and claims that it does not practice public diplomacy. Second, in relation to strategic communication, the different approaches to public diplomacy between the DoS and the DoD also inhibit the DoD from admitting its role in public diplomacy. The case of IMET shows that the program receives two different sets of policy orders. From the perspective of the DoS, IMET should be a program to advance mutual understanding. From the perspective of the DoD, IMET needs to meet the aim of advancing the target country’s military capacity for interoperability. In the end, the

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program is affected by the DoD’s operational role as well as the legislative order to exclude China as a participant. But in order to comply with the interagency arrangement, the DoD does not challenge the Strategic Communication Framework; instead, it refuses its role in public diplomacy so as to avoid contention and a clash of values between the DoS and the DoD. All in all, the denial of the DoD’s role in public diplomacy is induced by the DoS’s position in public diplomacy. In this way, the meaning of public diplomacy has been changed, and public diplomacy has become what was practiced by the DoS. In general, implementation explains most of the DoD’s public diplomacy discretion exercised in practice. Organizational culture affects US– China exchanges and visits, the Game Plan, the DoD’s adoption of the Strategic Communication Framework, and strategy-making towards China. The practices of MPEP, IMET, and the TRWI were working towards measurable goals. IMET and TRWI were subject to resource restrictions. The US–China HA/DR Exchange Program is the only exception because its practice has been consistent with the objective of public diplomacy, which focuses on processes rather than results. Consequently, the meaning of public diplomacy is changed by the practice of these programs. Public diplomacy becomes an indicator of the bilateral relationship through US–China exchanges and visits. It is turned into something favorable to measurable outcomes, and thus MPEP and IMET have excluded China. Through the termination of the TRWI, public diplomacy was changed so as to be short-term-oriented, quantifiable, and mostly practiced by the DoS. The cancellation of the Game Plan indicates that public diplomacy should only target “friendly” countries. The DoD’s adoption of the Strategic Communication Framework suggested that public diplomacy is secondary in DoD.  The strategy-making process towards China shows that public diplomacy leans towards intelligence and understanding of China rather than fostering mutual understanding.

Some Exceptions and Alternative Explanations Besides the above impacts of implementation, two overarching mechanisms indicated other sources of influence. First, not all components of organizational culture explain public diplomacy. The elitist culture of the DoS does not affect the implementation of EducationUSA and only can explain a part of the IVLP’s practice. EducationUSA expanded the target audience of the Fulbright Program from elites to regular prospective

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college students. The IVLP’s emphasis on diversity also suggests a non-­ elitist approach. In the DoD, the result-oriented organizational culture does not offer an explanation for the practice of the US–China HA/DR Exchange Program. As discussed earlier, this program focuses on processes of relationship building between the two militaries. It may be because the elements of organizational culture have different impacts on the implementation of public diplomacy. Second, my research also looked at whether there was policy learning from program evaluation. I found that public diplomacy programs tend to ignore evaluation or measure for program legitimation. Evaluation as a part of implementation has not been enforced, and it has many negative consequences. Program evaluation is an important part of implementation, as suggested in implementation theory. It sends feedback to policy-­ making and may change the meaning of a policy. However, in general, public diplomacy programs in the DoS and the DoD are not subject to systematic evaluation programs to measure public diplomacy outputs and outcomes. EducationUSA does not have an official evaluation method, but it has monitored the work of the IIE to ensure there was no violation of rules during the implementation process. Several evaluation programs were conducted for the IVLP’s special programs, but they did not initiate a feedback procedure for policy learning. The ECA conducted two formal evaluations for the IVLP. One evaluation was on the IVLP in Eurasia and the other was on Special Initiatives Projects.1 The findings of these two evaluations confirmed the success of IVLP in achieving its legislative goals. According to the evaluation reports, no critical suggestions were offered to give feedback on decision-making in terms of revising or improving the program. Therefore, learning did not take place as a result of these two evaluations. In addition, many officials used measurable goals to prove the effectiveness of the IVLP, which only signified goal displacement, not the program’s actual achievements. DoS officials, leaders of partner organizations, and ground-level implementers testified in front of Congress to demonstrate the significance of the IVLP (their arguments were discussed in detail in Chap. 5). The evidence they used only indicated the implementation discretion of the IVLP and the results of goal displacement.

1  The executive summary of the evaluation reports can be found on ECA’s evaluation website: see [12].

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Moreover, the output and anecdotal evidence were also not valid evaluation results. MPEP has a standard evaluation process, but it focused on personal skills and program procedures rather than the impact of the program. According to the evaluation forms of the Army and the Navy, MPEP is evaluated like other programs, as they share the same evaluation forms. For example, the indicators of the Army include Army values and leader attributes/skills/actions; therefore, it focuses on personal qualities. The Navy evaluation contains the following indicators: professional knowledge, quality of work, command or organizational climate/equal opportunities military bearing/character, personal job accomplishment/ initiative, teamwork, and leadership.2 These evaluations of MPEP do not consider the program’s objectives and are only interested in whether the program provides a good fit with the military culture and values. IMET does not have an internal evaluation method, but it was assessed twice by the GAO.  The 1992 GAO report assessed changes in IMET, including the expanded program and civic action training. It also measured the extent of human rights training and violations. The evaluation found that IMET did not provide specific human rights training according to the security assistance legislation. The report recommended revising the Security Assistance Management Manual to reflect human rights awareness training to international students, as written in the Foreign Assistance Act, and to make more specific human rights education available to international students.3 The 2011 GAO report found that IMET was still not paying enough attention to human rights training and that the evaluation of IMET was unsatisfactory. Comparing these two reports, it is obvious that IMET does not have a feedback mechanism that encourages learning from evaluations. The 1992 report identified the problem of the lack of a human rights agenda in education and training, and the same issue was pointed out nearly 20 years later in the 2011 report. It could be assumed that the recommendations from the 1992 report were never fed back to the decision-making level or the implementation level to improve the program’s performance. Part of the reason for this, as suggested by the 2011 report, was the lack of a proper evaluation plan to measure the program according to its goals and targets. 2  See the Army Officer Evaluation Report Support Form (DA Form 67–9) and the Navy Evaluation Report & Counseling Record (E1–E6). 3  [13].

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The TRWI did not have a formal evaluation plan, but its termination was due to an external evaluation. As analyzed in Chap. 6, a non-public report by the GAO criticized the program for being ineffectual and wasting money. The TRMI was evaluated to demonstrate its effectiveness in helping military operations. The USSOCOM, the administrative body of the program, used evaluation data to prove the credibility and effectiveness of the TRMI in promoting peacekeeping. It used the target audience’s feedback to assess the level of influence, and a quantitative and qualitative assessment study in 2011 to compare the effectiveness of one magazine’s impact on a control group across a two-year exposure period. It found positive results in terms of significant changes in attitude regarding reader support of their country’s cooperation with the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and UN Peacekeeping missions as a direct result of exposure to the articles published under the TRMI.4 However, this evaluation was mainly to prove the program’s success in promoting peacekeeping. Other objectives of the program, such as to “develop, synchronize, and coordinate senior military-to-military information and influence message in support of SOCOM [Special Operations Command] and GCC [Geographic Combatant Command] objectives” were ignored.5 These evaluations are public relations exercises that showcase the positive outcomes of the program. Taking all the above results into account, evaluation seemed to be an implementation phrase that was ignored in the practice of public diplomacy. It signifies that there was no route to either making sure the program reached its stated goal or changed the policy order based on its skewed implementation. It can be inferred that the reason for the lack of evaluation and/or feedback mechanisms in these programs was either limited resources or that implementers did not want to assess the program as they recognized the existence of the “gap.” This negligence has a few implications. First, it may indicate that public diplomacy is considered unimportant in the DoS and the DoD, so its evaluation is given fewer resources or less attention. People in other areas may think it is unnecessary to evaluate public diplomacy because it is worth the resources. Second, the lack of evaluation may leave the significance of public diplomacy unproven. Without a proper assessment, we do not know if public 4 5

 [14].  [14].

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diplomacy can achieve policy goals. In the end, public diplomacy could be blamed for its ineffectiveness by not having evidence to support its value. Public diplomacy may thus be marginalized. Third, the feedback from program evaluation to policy-making was not in place to prompt policy learning. Without appropriate evaluation that induces policy learning, public diplomacy cannot learn and improve from its implementation. This will only accentuate the sidelined position of public diplomacy in the DoS and the DoD. While this book focuses on whether and how implementation affects the practice of public diplomacy and induces discretion, it is also important to recognize competing theories that may offer alternative explanations. In fact, as the results of this research have suggested, implementation theories do not explain all public diplomacy practices. The US–China HA/DR Exchange Program has not been affected by the DoD’s organizational culture; instead, it is practiced as a standard public diplomacy program that values the process of relationship building. Areas of exchange may determine implementation discretion in the DoD. Other important factors, such as the general context of both home and target countries, may also affect the implementation of public diplomacy. These indicators are alternative explanations for the phenomena explored in this book.

Connecting to the Literature Through the lens of implementation, this volume makes a number of contributions to the existing literature on public diplomacy and international relations. First, the findings of this study suggest that implementation discretion changed the meaning of public diplomacy, and public diplomacy became something else. Specifically, DoD public diplomacy was turned into a tool that signified the status of the relationships (in this case the US–China relationship) rather than a method to improve them. But policy-­makers in the DoD still claim that it is the method to reduce miscalculations and enhance mutual understanding, which is public diplomacy.6 The analyses show that public diplomacy programs such as regular 6  Although DoD does not use the term “public diplomacy,” military policy-makers consider some of their programs as communicative and information efforts that engage foreign publics for the purpose of supporting regional operations. In this sense, they implicitly admit that these programs are public diplomacy even though in practice discretion has changed them into something else.

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exchanges and visits, IMET, and the Game Plan faced constraints when engaging with China. These programs’ non-recurring nature indicates that public diplomacy was not considered to be a method to build and sustain relationships; instead, it became a sign of damaged relations. Public diplomacy also tended to focus on quick returns and measurable objectives. This contradicted the definition of public diplomacy in the existing literature, which argued that public diplomacy should be long-term-­ oriented and focus on opinion change.7 Limited resources also led public diplomacy practice to be hijacked by other interests, such as the interests of private organizations, domestic benefits, and the exclusion of certain countries and certain public diplomacy activities. This refuted the arguments in the current literature on the virtues of developing PPPs to advance the US cultural presence abroad.8 Finally, the lack of proper evaluation mechanisms indicates that public diplomacy may be marginalized and considered to be unimportant. This corresponds with the studies in public diplomacy, which suggest a lack of proper evaluation mechanisms in public diplomacy.9 Second, this study not only underscores implementation and its impact on the meaning of public diplomacy, but also emphasizes public diplomacy as a tool to implement foreign policy. The gaps identified via case studies indicated that the stated objectives of public diplomacy tend to be different from public diplomacy as it is practiced on the ground. Therefore, the assumption that public diplomacy is true to what is described in public diplomacy theories and policy documents should be revisited. This belief is mainly found in the studies on national strategies of public diplomacy.10 This book unpacks the relationship between public diplomacy goals and practices by arguing that implementation discretion exists and can change the meaning of public diplomacy. It also challenges the public diplomacy studies that offer prescriptive suggestions on how public diplomacy should be.11 It demonstrates the value of studying how public diplomacy is carried out on the ground. Third, this research speaks to the international relations literature by suggesting public diplomacy’s decreasing connection to liberalism. Public  [4].  See [10]. His articles summarized the built-in advantages of PPP in public diplomacy. 9  [1]. 10  [3, 7, 9]. 11  This problem in public diplomacy is also addressed in [6]. 7 8

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diplomacy is based on the international relations liberal theory that more interaction leads to interdependence and a democratic China as part of the global order is beneficial for global peace.12 However, the findings from the DoD cases suggest that the meaning of public diplomacy was changed by implementation. It moved away from the liberal approach and became a tool that was used not to integrate China into the American liberal order, but to praise “friendly” nations and punish “unfriendly” ones. In the cases of the DoS, public diplomacy tends to focus on measurable processes, not the end goal of building relationships and supporting foreign policy. The ultimate program goal that featured the liberal approach was thus ignored. The PPPs entered into by the DoS also led public diplomacy to become a tool to meet the interests of private partners, which usually contradicts interests and rules of government agencies. Fourth, the process-oriented public diplomacy in the DoS also challenges the concept of soft power in international relations. Public diplomacy and soft power are often conflated.13 Public diplomacy is believed to be a tool to boost the impact of a country’s soft power, which is necessary to achieve foreign policy objectives.14 Whereas soft power focuses on the ability of attraction, public diplomacy, shifted by implementation discretion, favors processes and quantifiable outcomes. Some scholars have pointed out that the effectiveness of public diplomacy could not be neatly quantified because it was human activity, and soft power did not lend itself to measurement and evaluation, as there were no measures to connect it to foreign policy outcomes.15 This volume has found that public diplomacy was working towards measurable goals that were not public diplomacy, and the state’s actual ability to advance attraction to foreign public was neglected in practice. Consequently, public diplomacy and soft power are gradually separating from one another. Fifth, this study enriches the public diplomacy literature by including the DoD as a valid actor. Specifically, public diplomacy exercised by the DoD was compared and contrasted with the public diplomacy efforts of the DoS through the analysis of organizational culture and interests. As the findings revealed, the DoS and the DoD have distinct organizational cultures, and their public diplomacy programs tend to present different  [15].  [11]. 14  [6, 8]. 15  [2, 5]. 12 13

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mechanisms of implementation discretion. The DoS is process-oriented and values elitism, while the DoD focuses on results and chains of command. Analyses found that their organizational cultures affected public diplomacy practices and so different meanings were applied to public diplomacy. Moreover, this research also offers an answer to the question of why the DoD claims that it does not perform public diplomacy. The organizational culture of hierarchy led to the DoD’s obedience to the order of Strategic Communication, which required the organization to play a secondary and supportive role in public diplomacy. Besides, confined by the leadership of the DoS and the clash of interests between the two organizations, the DoD preferred not to claim public diplomacy so as to remain unaffected by external pressures. Finally, this study indicates that public diplomacy is in the eye of the beholder. There is much variation in terms of what public diplomacy means across programs and government institutions. Public diplomacy is recognized and clearly defined in theory and practice, but through implementation, it has become something else. According to the findings given in this chapter, public diplomacy was turned into many things by various programs. However, these programs were still considered public diplomacy in the DoS, while the DoD, by contrast, claimed not to carry out public diplomacy, but actually seemed to do so. In other words, public diplomacy can be many things in practice, and as an overarching term, it seems to have lost its meaning. In this regard, public diplomacy became an assertion, and overall this assertion is very different from the situation in practice.

Looking into the Future While this book offers the above contributions to public diplomacy literature, it has limitations that point to avenues for future research. First, it utilizes three implementation theories to explain public diplomacy. More theories such as professional norms, the cost of monitoring, and the likelihood of punishment could offer insights into public diplomacy practice. Second, competing theories such as policy-making and context could be included to extend the research on public diplomacy. These mechanisms may help us better understand how public diplomacy acquires meanings. Third, the focus on US public diplomacy towards China has broader implications, but it may lack comprehensiveness. Practices in other countries can offer additional insights into the effect of implementation

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discretion. Fourth, due to data availability, the analysis of the DoD is mostly based on program design and lateral evidence. Future studies could use more data from direct resources such as interviews and observations. Lastly, while the DoS and the DoD are the main US government agencies that practice public diplomacy, future studies may use implementation theories to explain the public diplomacy of other agencies and non-state actors. In this way, more mechanisms and factors through which implementation affects the meaning of public diplomacy can be identified.

References 1. Banks, Robert. 2011. A Resource Guide to Public Diplomacy Evaluation. Los Angeles: USC Center on Public Diplomacy. 2. Brown, John. 2002. The Purposes and Cross-Purposes of American Public Diplomacy. American Diplomacy. https://americandiplomacy.web.unc. edu/2002/08/the-purposes-and-cross-purposes-of-american-public-diplomacy/. Accessed February 26, 2022. 3. d’Hooghe, Ingrid. 2007. The Rise of China’s Public Diplomacy. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. 4. Gilboa, Eytan. 2008. Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616 (1): 55–77. 5. Goldsmith, Benjamin E., and Yusaku Horiuchi. 2012. In Search of Soft Power: Does Foreign Public Opinion Matter for US Foreign Policy? World Politics 64 (3): 555–585. 6. Hayden, Craig. 2017. Technology Platforms for Public Diplomacy: Affordances for Education. In International Education Exchanges and Intercultural Understanding, ed. Julie Mathews-Aydinli, 59–78. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. 7. Melissen, Jan, and Sook Jong Lee. 2011. Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 8. Nye, Joseph S. 2008. Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616 (1): 94–109. 9. Potter, Evan. 2002. Canada and the New Public Diplomacy. International Journal 58 (1): 43–64. 10. Ross, Christopher. 2002. Public Diplomacy Comes of Age. Washington Quarterly 25 (2): 73–83. 11. Snow, Nancy. 2012. Public Diplomacy and Propaganda: Rethinking Diplomacy in the Age of Persuasion. E-International Relations. https://www.e-­ir. info/2012/12/04/public-­d iplomacy-­a nd-­p ropaganda-­r ethinking-­ diplomacy-­in-­the-­age-­of-­persuasion/. Accessed February 26, 2022.

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12. US Department of State Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. Evaluation at Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. US Department of State. https://eca.state.gov/impact/eca-­evaluation-­division/evaluation. Accessed October 8, 2018. 13. US Government Accounting Office. 1992. Observation on Post-Cold War Program Changes. Washington, DC: US Government Accounting Office. 14. US House Central Command Special Operations Command and Transportation Command. 2013. Hearing on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs before the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives. Washington, DC: House of Representatives. 15. Yun, Seong-Hun, and Elizabeth L.  Toth. 2009. Future Sociological Public Diplomacy and the Role of Public Relations: Evolution of Public Diplomacy. American Behavioral Scientist 53 (4): 493–503.

Index

A Afghanistan, 87 American Academy of Diplomacy, 151 American value, 70 Asia-Pacific, 103 Asia Pacific Rebalance, see Asia Rebalance Policy Asia Rebalance Policy, 6, 30, 46 containment, 6 three pillars, 6 B BBG, see Broadcasting Board of Governors Boxer Indemnity Program, 92 Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), 16, 139, 171 Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), 32, 91 mission, 17 mutual understanding, 18 objective, 18 Office of International Visitors, 160

PPP objective, 156 professional exchange, 35 Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP), 16 C China Boxer Indemnity Program, 92 China Military Power Report, 29 Chinese college admission counselor, 89, 93 economy, 4 IMET, 41 intention, 98 IVLP, 96 PLA, 25 regional and global partner, 31 rise, 3, 6 South China Sea policy, 101 Chinese military transparency, 29–31, 98, 106, 180, 187 Civilian Personnel Management System, 85

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 D. Wu, U.S. Public Diplomacy Towards China, Palgrave Macmillan Series in Global Public Diplomacy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95644-8

203

204 

INDEX

COIN, see Counterinsurgency Collaborative relationship, 104 Community-based non-profit organizations, 160 Counterinsurgency, 86 Cultural diplomacy, 60, 67–68 D Diplomacy, 59, 71 DoD, see US Department of Defense DoD and DoS Joint Reports to Congress on Foreign Military Training, 167 DoS, see US Department of State E ECA, see Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs ECE, see Educational and Cultural Exchange Educational and Cultural Exchange (ECE), 15 EducationUSA, 1, 18, 32, 181 college application, 89 current mission, 88 DIY, 33, 90 economic gains, 124–125 education advising, 70, 91 education advising network, 45 education advisor, 33 EducationUSA Forum, 89 effectiveness, 123 evaluation, 193 5 Steps to US Study, 33, 90 goal displacement, 126 goal redefinition, 122 Guidance Counselor Workshop, 89 and IIE, 157 inclusiveness, 93

information sessions, 89 Leadership Institute, 157 measurable data, 124 measurable goals, 125 measurable outcomes, 122, 125 mini-fairs, 89 mutual understanding, 91, 124, 183 objective, 125, 126 private recruiting agents, 90 surrogate measures, 126 webinars, 89 Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), 37, 101, 188 F Fiscal 2014 Defense Authorization Act, Section 344, 138, 170 FM 31-16, 86 FM 3-24, 85 Foreign policy, 18 and cultural diplomacy, 68 decision, 83 and ECE, 159, 172 EducationUSA, 181 expertise, 83 fourth dimension of US, 68 and IMET, 168 influence, 62 and IVLP, 95, 183 Obama administration, 6 objective, 8 outcome, 198 outsourcing, 1 and public diplomacy, 8, 69, 122, 197 public diplomacy implementation, 2 short-term, 60, 68 and soft power, 67, 198 US, 5, 17, 21

 INDEX 

US and China, 4 vagueness, 121 Fulbright-Hays Act, 91 G Game Plan, 32, 39–40, 105, 163, 187, 188 activities, 105 NCAA’s ban, 106 objective, 105 skeptical concerns, 105 Gates, Robert, 99 Global environment, 70 secure, 28, 61, 97 Global Ties US, 35, 93, 160 community members, 160 and DoS, 155 and ECA, 160 human capital, 160 implementation discretion, 161 National Program Agencies, 160 private resources, 160–161 resource, 161 Goal ambiguity, 116, 120 DoD, 121 DoS, 121 IVLP, 129, 131 negative consequences, 116 public diplomacy, 120–121 TRWI, 137 Goal displacement, 115, 150, 167, 181 EducationUSA, 126 IMET, 132, 135 IVLP, 131 MPEP, 132, 135 in public organizations, 116 surrogate measures, 115, 122 TRWI, 137 Goal measurability, 58

205

H HA/DR, 42 Human right, 6, 16, 26, 70 countries violated, 102 courses, 133 and E-IMET, 135 and IMET, 41, 102, 133, 135, 139, 194 and public diplomacy, 22 and TRWI, 138 and US foreign policy, 182 I IIE, see Institute of International Education IIP, see Bureau of International Information Programs IMET, see International Military Education and Training Implementation, 7, 56, 58 bottom-up approach, 56 discretion, 55, 118, 192 methodology, 53 process, 53 slippage, 7, 55 steps, 53 top-down approach, 56 Implementers, 55, 57, 118 Indo-Pacific Defense Forum, 44 Information projection, 62 Institute of International Education (IIE), 1, 123, 156 and ECA, 157 and EducationUSA, 157 non-resource factor to partnership with EducationUSA, 158 objective, 159 Intelligence, 87, 98 Interagency collaboration, 22, 23

206 

INDEX

Interagency Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, 22, 99, 164 International Military Education and Training (IMET), 5, 40, 165, 190 constraint from collaboration, 165–167 courses, 41 DoD-DoS collaboration, 165 E-IMET, 41 evaluation, 194 exclude China, 41, 167 goal displacement, 132, 135 ignoring objective, 134 impact on human rights, 133 implementation discretion, 168–169 legislative restrictions, 191 measurable outcomes, 133 mutual understanding, 190 objective, 41, 132, 134, 166 professional military education, 41 recipients, 41 resource restrictions, 165–169, 190 technical training, 41 vague program goals, 134 International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP), 18, 34, 93, 183–185 alumni pool, 94, 95 diversity, 96, 129–130 effectiveness determinant, 129 evaluation, 193 fact sheet, 96 Global Ties US, 35, 160 goal ambiguity, 129, 131 goal displacement, 131 invitation-only, 95 local organizations, 35 measurable goal, 127–129 measurable outcomes, 122 mutual understanding, 35, 139, 173 nomination, 94 objective, 35, 71, 131

participants, 35, 95 participant selection, 130 policy themes, 35, 94 process-oriented, 95 professional exchange, 32, 35 programming organization, 94, 96 programs, 35 purpose, 93 subcontractor, 94 vague goal, 122 Iraq war, 86 IVLP, see International Visitor Leadership Program J Jurisdiction constraints, 171–172 L Liberalism, 46 M Measurable goal, 116–119 cash cow, 119 EducationUSA, 125 IMET, 190 MPEP, 190 TRWI, 189 Measurable outcomes, 115, 118, 179 EducationUSA, 122, 124 efficiency, 119 IMET, 133 IVLP, 122 MPEP, 132 TRWI, 136 Media relations, 62 Military academy, 37 Military and Security Developments Involving China, 98 Military education delegation visit, 37–38

 INDEX 

activities, 37 informal conversation, 38 objective, 37 Military Information Support Operation (MISO), 24, 43 Military Information Support Teams (MIST), 164 Military modernization, 106 Military Personnel Exchange Program (MPEP), 32, 38–39, 190 evaluation, 194 goal displacement, 132, 135 implementation discretion, 186 measurable outcomes, 132 missions, 39 mutual understanding, 134 objective, 70, 132, 134 participants, 38 vague program goals, 134 MISO, see Military Information Support Operation MIST, see Military Information Support Teams MPEP, see Military Personnel Exchange Program Multilateral effort, 103 Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, 156 Mutual understanding, 16, 19, 69, 103 DoD, 25, 29, 70, 97, 102, 185, 196 ECA, 18 EducationUSA, 91, 124, 183 IMET, 190 IVLP, 35, 139, 173 MPEP, 134 public diplomacy, 88, 140 N National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 39, 106 National interest, 18

207

and ECE, 152 and IVLP, 161 public diplomacy, 67, 69 US, 21, 121 vagueness, 121 National security, 18 US, 5 NDAA, see National Defense Authorization Act Networked society, 63 NGOs, see Non-governmental organizations 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, 5, 40, 163, 167, 191 Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 65 Non-state actor, 65 Non-traditional security threats, 103 O Obama, Barack administration, 6, 9, 31, 45, 99, 164, 165, 168, 169, 186 executive order, 167 White House, 99 Occupational Safety and Health, 119 Open Doors, 123 Operational environment, 28 Opinion gatekeeper, 61 Opinion-leader model, 26, 166 Organizational culture, 2, 77, 119, 179 dimensions, 78 DoD, 85–88 DoS, 82–84 effects, 79 exclusiveness, 93 hierarchy, 87–88, 100, 101, 105, 107, 108 and implementation, 80 multiple, 78 process-oriented, 82–83

208 

INDEX

Organizational culture (cont.) and public diplomacy implementation, 80 result-oriented, 85, 102 type, 78 Organizational goal, 116 Organizational performance, 79, 115 P Peacekeeping, 195 Pentagon, 105 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 25, 102, 168 Pivot to Asia policy, see Asia Rebalance Policy PLA, see People’s Liberation Army PLA National Defense University (PLA NDU), 37 PLA NDU, see PLA National Defense University Policy cycle, 57 Policy evaluation, 57, 118 Policy evolution, 55 Policy feedback, 193 Policy formation, 57 Policy goal, 2, 53 circumstance, 129 Policy learning, 55 Policy-making, 57 Policy outcome, 57 Policy output, 57 Policy resource, 58, 148 allocation, 147 consensus, 148 coping mechanism, 149 executive restrictions, 164–165 financial, 148 information or knowledge, 148 insufficient financial, 151–152, 162–163

law, 148 legislative constraints, 163–164, 167–168 negative consequences from implementation discretion, 149–150 organization, 148 personnel, 148 political support, 148 public infrastructure, 148 screening, 150 shrinking, 119, 150 time, 148, 169–171 Power relationship, 59 PPP, see Public-private partnership Private recruiting agents, 90 Private sphere, 65 Program objective, 179 stated, 119 vague, 115, 116 Program performance, 116 Propaganda, 66 Public diplomacy, 2, 58, 64 actors, 64–66 advocacy, 62 civil society, 61, 65 collaboration, 19, 26, 63 communication, 61–64 design, 55 dialogical, relational and collaborative paradigm, 59 dialogue, 63 dual interest, 64 evaluation, 20, 55, 121, 193 feedback, 24, 55, 195 foreign policy instrument, 46 and global public sphere, 65 ideal, 69–71 impact, 55 informing, 20 internationalist perspective, 28

 INDEX 

209

listening, 20, 62, 66 long-term, 60, 64, 68 mediated, 62 monologue, 63 multi-directional engagement, 63 mutuality, 60 mutual understanding, 140 network approach, 60 new, 8, 61, 63 objective, 187 one-way approach, 61 participatory turn, 65 persuasion, 60 policy goal (see Policy goal) practice, 2, 55 process of empowering, 65 and public policy, 71 and public relations, 68–69, 71 purpose, 59–61 relational, 63, 69 routine practice, 5, 46 shared common interests, 64 short-term, 64, 67 sponsor, 59 strategic framework, 20–22 strategic imperative, 20 strategies and tactics, 53 target audience, 59 tender-minded, 60 trust advancement, 59 two-step process, 59, 62 two-way communication, 19, 62 ultimate purpose, 91 unmeasurable, 121–122 Public-private partnership (PPP), 150, 155 implementation discretion, 159

R REAC, see Regional Educational Advising Coordinator Real-time diplomacy, 63 Regional Center, 26, 40, 41, 167 Regional Centers for Security Studies, see Regional Center Regional Educational Advising Coordinator (REAC), 157 Relationship building, 63, 64 Relationship management, 63, 64, 69 Resource constraints, 179 RIMPAC, see Exercise Rim of the Pacific

Q Quadrennial Defense Review, 99 Quantitative metrics, 119

T Technological determinism, 63 Traditional diplomacy, see Diplomacy

S Sabahionline, 170 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 95 Security Assistance Management Manual, 194 Senate Appropriations Committee, 168 Senate Armed Services Committee, 138 Social collectives, 61 Soft power, 61, 67 State-USAID Joint Strategic Goal Framework, 21–22 Strategic communication, 23, 64, 99 Strategic Communication Framework, 45, 186, 191 Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept, 99 Strategy-making, 45, 55, 97, 107, 185 Student recruitment, 91

210 

INDEX

Trans-regional Magazine Initiative (TRMI), 27, 44 evaluation, 195 Indo-Pacific Defense Forum, 44 objective, 27, 44, 71 production, 44 short-term public diplomacy, 27 Trans-regional Web Initiative (TRWI), 27, 43, 169, 187, 188 evaluation, 195 goal ambiguity, 137 goal displacement, 137 implementation discretion, 185 jurisdiction constraints, 171–172 limited time, 169–171 measurable goals, 189 measurable outcomes, 136 objective, 27, 43, 71, 137, 170 problems, 138 resource constraints, 169–172, 188 short-term public diplomacy, 27 shut down, 138 target regions, 44 TRMI, see Trans-regional Magazine Initiative Trump, Donald, 3 Trust-building, 103 Trust development, 103 TRWI, see Trans-regional Web Initiative 2018 Shangri-La security dialogue, 101 U US Agency for International Development (USAID), 21, 163 USAID, see US Agency for International Development US Army Pacific, 102 US Army War College (USAWC), 38 USAWC, see US Army War College US-China HA/DR Exchange Program, 26, 42–43, 71, 186, 189, 196

Expert Academic Discussions, 43 multilateral efforts, 103 objective, 103, 189 powerful force-multiplier, 104 Practical Field Exchange, 43 process orientation, 102, 104 tabletop exercise, 43 trust development, 103 US-China military-to-military exchange, 29, 36, 40 limitation, 101 military exercises, 37 US-China relations, 3 adversarial, 4 competitive, 4 distrust, 4, 5 military, 31 military-to-military strategy, 31 miscalculation, 97, 105 rivalry, 6 strategic competitor, 3 US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, 6 US Consulate in Shanghai, 129 US Department of Defense (DoD), 3 civil affair, 24 Defense Performance and Management Appraisal Program, 85 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 40 education delegation visits, 37–38 Foreign Military Education and Training, 40–42 hierarchical organizational culture, 87–88, 188 implementation discretion, 185–192 information operation, 24, 100 insufficient financial resource, 162–163 intelligence, 98 mutual trust, 102 mutual understanding, 25, 29, 97, 185, 196

 INDEX 

obedience, 100, 107, 180 organizational culture, 86 public affairs, 24, 100 public diplomacy, 23–24 public diplomacy objective, 27–32, 45, 70, 97, 102, 121, 185, 186 public diplomacy objective towards China, 27–32, 70, 97, 104 reasons for not practicing public diplomacy, 165, 191–192 recurring public diplomacy, 189 resource constraints, 162–165 result-oriented culture, 102, 187 strategy-making (see Strategy-making) US-China military exchanges and visits, 36, 70, 102 winning wars, 85 US Department of State (DoS), 1 budget cuts, 151 Congressional Budget Justification, 18 CSO, 83 ECA (see Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs) elitism, 83, 95 Foreign Affairs Manual, 155 FSO, 83, 92 Fulbright Commission, 91 Fulbright Program, 18, 91, 156 function bureau, 17 ideal public diplomacy, 69 insufficient financial resource, 151–152 IVLP (see International Visitor Leadership Program) mission, 120 organizational culture, 82, 83, 182, 184 process-oriented culture, 82 professional exchange, 18 public diplomacy definition, 16, 19

211

public diplomacy objective, 121, 181 public diplomacy structure, 16 regional bureau, 17, 152 relationship, 19 resource constraints, 151–154 stable budgets, 152 US Embassy, 94 in Beijing, 33, 159 Public Affairs Section, 33 US foreign policy, 181–182 US Government Manual, 116, 120 US higher education, 33 USIA, see US Information Agency US Information Agency (USIA), 66 US Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, 156 US National Defense University (US NDU), 37 US National Security Strategy, 31 US NDU, see US National Defense University US Rebalance Policy, see Asia Rebalance Policy US Security Assistance Training Program, 41 USSOCOM, see US Special Operations Command US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), 43, 195 US War College, 37 V Vietnam War, 86 W White House Obama, 99 Winning hearts and minds, 25, 26, 68 Worldwide Strategic Communication Seminar, 100