U.S.-European-Japanese Workshop on Space Cooperation : Summary Report [1 ed.] 9780309575638

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U.S.-EUROPEAN-JAPANESE WORKSHOP ON SPACE COOPERATION SUMMARY REPORT

Space Research Committee, Science Council of Japan European Space Science Committee, European Science Foundation and Committee on International Space Programs Space Studies Board Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Applications National Research Council

National Academy Press Washington, D.C.

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NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of the committees responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard for appropriate balance. Support for this project was provided by Contract NASW 96013 between the National Academy of Sciences and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the sponsor. Copies of this report are available free of charge from: Space Studies Board National Research Council 2101 Constitution Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20418 Copyright 1999 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America

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The National Academy of Sciences is a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the Congress in 1863, the Acade my has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal government on scientific and technical matters. Dr. Bruce M. Alberts is president of the National Academy of Sciences. The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964, under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences, as a parallel organization of outstanding engineers. It is autonomous in its administration and in the selection of its members, sharing with the National Academy of Sciences the responsibility for advising the federal government. The National Academy of Engineering also sponsors engineering programs aimed at meeting national needs, encourages education and research, and recognizes the superior achievements of engineers. Dr. William. A. Wulf is president of the National Academy of Engineering. The Institute of Medicine was established in 1970 by the National Academy of Sciences to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health of the public. The Institute acts under the responsibility given to the National Academy of Sciences by its congressional charter to be an adviser to the federal government and, upon its own initiative, to identify issues of medical care, research, and education. Dr. Kenneth I. Shine is president of the Institute of Medicine. The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy’s purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine. Dr. Bruce M. Alberts and Dr. William. A. Wulf are chairman and vice chairman, respectively, of the National Research Council. www.national-academies.org

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SPACE RESEARCH COMMITTEE A. NISHIDA, Institute of Space and Astronautical Science,Chair H. HIRABAYASHI, Institute of Space and Astronautical Science S. IKEUCHI, Nagoya University M. KATO, Institute of Space and Astronautical Science Y. KAWASAKI, Mitsubishi Kasei Institute of Life Sciences Y. KONDO, Solar Terrestrial Environment Laboratory, Nagoya University T. KOSUGI, Institute of Space and Astronautical Science K. MAKISHIMA, University of Tokyo Y. MATOGAWA, Institute of Space and Astronautical Science S. MIURA, National Space Development Agency A. MORIOKA, Tohoku University H. MURAKAMI, Institute of Space and Astronautical Science F. NAGASE, Institute of Space and Astronautical Science E. SAGAWA, Communications Research Laboratory NASUO SATO, National Institute of Polar Research NOBUO SATO, Japan Meteorological Agency S. TANAKA, Remote Sensing Technology Center T. TSUDA, Kyoto University K. TSURUDA, Institute of Space and Astronautical Science S. WATANABE, Daido Industrial College T. YAMAMOTO, Nagoya University K. YAMISHITA, Nagoya University

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EUROPEAN SPACE SCIENCE COMMITTEE JOHN LEONARD CULHANE, Mullard Space Science Laboratory, London, United Kingdom,Chair European Earth Observation Panel ROBERT J. GURNEY, University of Reading, Reading, United Kingdom,Chair WERNER ALPERS, Institut für Meereskunde, Universität Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany ANNY CAZENAVE, Laboratoire en Géophysique et Océanographie Spatiale (LEGOS), Toulouse, France MARIE-LISE CHANIN, Stratospheric Processes and Their Role in Climate (SPARC) Office, Verrières, France HANS SÜNKEL, Technische Universität Graz, Graz, Austria European Space Physical Science Panel JOHAN A.M. BLEEKER, Institute for Space Research, Space Research Organization Netherlands-Utrecht, The Netherlands, Chair JOHN LEONARD CULHANE, Mullard Space Science Laboratory, London, United Kingdom ALVARO GIMÉNEZ, L.A.E.F.F., Madrid, Spain GERHARD HAERENDEL, Max-Planck-Institut für extraterrestrische Physik, Garching, Germany NIELS LUND, Danish Space Research Institute, Copenhagen, Denmark PHILIPPE MASSON, Université de Paris Sud, Orsay, France MARTIN J.L. TURNER, University of Leicester, Leicester, United Kingdom STEFANO VITALE, Università di Trento, Trento, Italy JOHN C. ZARNECKI, University of Kent, Canterbury, United Kingdom ANDRZEJ ZDZIARSKI, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland European Microgravity Panel JEAN-CLAUDE LEGROS, Microgravity Research Center, ULB, Bruxelles, Belgium, Chair AUGUSTO COGOLI, ETH Technopark, Zurik, Switzerland JEAN-JACQUES FAVIER, Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique, Grenoble, France GERDA HORNECK, DLR, Institut für Luft und Raumfahrtmedizin, Köln, Germany JEAN-CLAUDE WORMS, ESSC Executive Secretary, ENSPS, Strasbourg, France HANS U. KAROW, ESF Scientific Secretary, Strasbourg, France

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COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SPACE PROGRAMS EUGENE B. SKOLNIKOFF, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Chair FRAN BAGENAL, University of Colorado LENNARD A. FISK, University of Michigan MARTIN A. GLICKSMAN, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute BILL GREEN, former member, U.S. House of Representatives JOHN P. HUGHES, Rutgers University ADRIAN LEBLANC, Baylor College of Medicine THOMAS R. LOVELAND, USGS EROS Data Center NORMAN P. NEUREITER, Texas Instruments (retired) LOUIS J. LANZEROTTI, Lucent Technologies (ex officio) Staff PAMELA WHITNEY, Study Director CARMELA CHAMBERLAIN, Senior Program Assistant

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SPACE STUDIES BOARD CLAUDE R. CANIZARES, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Chair MARK R. ABBOTT, regon State University FRAN BAGENAL, University of Colorado DANIEL N. BAKER, University of Colorado ROBERT E. CLELAND, University of Washington MARILYN L. FOGEL, Carnegie Institution of Washington BILL GREEN, former member, U.S. House of Representatives JOHN H. HOPPS, JR., Morehouse College CHRISTIAN J. JOHANNSEN, Purdue University RICHARD G. KRON, University of Chicago JONATHAN I. LUNINE, University of Arizona ROBERTA BALSTAD MILLER, Columbia University GARY J. OLSEN, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign MARY JANE OSBORN, University of Connecticut Health Center GEORGE A. PAULIKAS, The Aerospace Corporation JOYCE E. PENNER, University of Michigan THOMAS A. PRINCE, California Institute of Technology PEDRO L. RUSTAN, JR., Ellipso Inc. GEORGE L. SISCOE, Boston University EUGENE B. SKOLNIKOFF, Massachusetts Institute of Technology MITCHELL SOGIN, Marine Biological Laboratory NORMAN E. THAGARD, Florida State University ALAN M. TITLE, Lockheed Martin Advanced Technology Center RAYMOND VISKANTA, Purdue University PETER W. VOORHEES, Northwestern University JOHN A. WOOD, Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics JOSEPH K. ALEXANDER, Director

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COMMISSION ON PHYSICAL SCIENCES, MATHEMATICS, AND APPLICATIONS PETER M. BANKS, Veridian ERIM International, Inc., Co-Chair W. CARL LINEBERGER, University of Colorado, Co-Chair WILLIAM F. BALLHAUS, JR., Lockheed Martin Corp. SHIRLEY CHIANG, University of California, Davis MARSHALL H. COHEN, California Institute of Technology RONALD G. DOUGLAS, Texas A&M University SAMUEL H. FULLER, Analog Devices, Inc. JERRY P. GOLLUB, Haverford College MICHAEL F. GOODCHILD, University of California, Santa Barbara MARTHA P. HAYNES, Cornell University WESLEY T. HUNTRESS, JR., Carnegie Institution CAROL M. JANTZEN, Westinghouse Savannah River Company PAUL G. KAMINSKI, Technovation, Inc. KENNETH H. KELLER, University of Minnesota JOHN R. KREICK, Sanders, a Lockheed Martin Company (retired) MARSHA I. LESTER, University of Pennsylvania DUSA M. McDUFF, State University of New York at Stony Brook JANET L. NORWOOD, U.S. Commissioner of Labor Statistics (retired) M. ELISABETH PATÉ-CORNELL, Stanford University NICHOLAS P. SAMIOS, Brookhaven National Laboratory ROBERT J. SPINRAD, Xerox PARC (retired) NORMAN METZGER, Executive Director (through July 1999) MYRON F. UMAN, Acting Executive Director

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF REVIEWERS

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Acknowledgment of Reviewers

This report has been reviewed by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise, in accordance with procedures approved by the National Research Council's (NRC's) Report Review Committee. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the authors and the NRC in making the published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional standards for objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The contents of the review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We wish to thank the following individuals for their participation in the review of this report: Roger R. Anderson, University of Iowa, Peter M. Banks, Veridian ERIM International, Inc., Hugh S. Hudson, University of California, San Diego, and Solar Physics Research Corporation, Chris J. Johannsen, Purdue University, and Peter W. Voorhees, Northwestern University. Although the individuals listed above have provided many constructive comments and suggestions, responsibility for the final content of this report rests solely with the authoring task group and the NRC.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF REVIEWERS x

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CONTENTS

A B C D

E

F

G

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Contents

SUMMARY REPORT Preamble Introduction Lessons Learned Future Issues Some Questions for Consideration Closing Thoughts

APPENDIXES Notes from the Consultation Meeting on Space Cooperation, Workshop Agenda and Participants Guiding Questions for Workshop Speakers Perspectives on Geotail, A. Nishida, M.H. Acuna Perspectives on Yohkoh, T. Kosugi, J.L. Culhane, H.S. Hudson Perspectives on ASCA, K. Makishima, J. Hughes Acronyms and Abbreviations 1 1 1 2 7 8 9

11 13 16 19 21 33 51

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CONTENTS xii

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SUMMARY REPORT

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Summary Report

PREAMBLE A trilateral workshop on space cooperation hosted by the Space Research Committee (SRC) of the Science Council of Japan—and including representatives of the Committee on International Space Programs (CISP) of the Space Studies Board (SSB), National Research Council (NRC), and the European Space Science Committee (ESSC) of the European Science Foundation (ESF)—was held in Tokyo at the Science Council of Japan on May 19-21, 1999. The purpose of the workshop was to: 1.

Assist independent space science advisory bodies in Europe and the United States to establish a relationship with like bodies in Japan; 2. Begin this relationship by examining the nature of trilateral, cooperative space missions conducted during the last decade; 3. Understand better the primary factors that led to successful collaboration, explore the benefits and costs of cooperation, and identify major problems; and 4. Review the status of several embryonic projects and consider broader issues such as the possibility of coordinated, international strategic planning for space science and other policy issues likely to be significant in the future. INTRODUCTION The trilateral workshop originated, in part, from a joint SSB/CISP-ESSC study, U.S.-European Collaboration in Space Science, which recognized the need to consider interactions with other spacefaring partners such as Russia and Japan.1 Following publication of the joint study in 1998, both the ESSC and the SSB/CISP began to pursue relations with space science entities in Japan and agreed to initiate communications together. The SSB and ESSC identified the SRC under the Science Council of Japan as a similar entity with which to establish relations. Initial discussions among representatives of the SRC, SSB, and ESSC were held at the 32nd Scientific Assembly of the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) on July 16, 1998, in Nagoya, Japan, and led to an agreement to hold a tripartite workshop on space cooperation. The general scope of the workshop, which was to include surveys of three cooperative missions, analysis of the lessons learned from such missions, and discussion on how to improve future cooperative missions, was agreed upon in Nagoya (see Appendix A). Specifically, the workshop would include U.S., European, and Japanese perspectives on each of the missions to be surveyed. In addition, the workshop would focus on space science (astronomy and astrophysics, planetary sciences, and space and solar physics), recognizing that other disciplines and areas of cooperation might be studied later. The workshop agenda and a list of participants are included in Appendix B. Professor A. Nishida, chair of the SRC and director general of the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS), selected Geotail, Yohkoh (previously Solar-A), and the Advanced Satellite for Cosmology and Astrophysics (ASCA; previously Astro-D) as the three cooperative missions to be examined.2 Planning for the workshop entailed identifying individuals from the

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See National Research Council and European Science Foundation, U.S.-European Collaboration in Space Science, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1998, p. 11. 2 Geotail, launched in July 1992, is exploring the geomagnetic tail of Earth. Yohkoh was launched on August 31, 1991, as an observatory to study X-rays and gamma rays from the Sun. ASCA, launched on February 20, 1993, is Japan's fourth cosmic X-ray astronomy mission; it is conducting X-ray spectroscopy of astrophysical plasmas and features such as emission lines and absorption edges.

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SUMMARY REPORT

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United States, Europe, and Japan who had worked on these missions and would share their insights on the cooperative experience. Speakers were asked to focus on the lessons learned from the missions and on aspects of mission success and to elaborate on any problems within the collaboration, as well as on other concerns and issues that might affect future cooperative activities. Speakers were provided with a template of questions to guide them in preparing their remarks (see Appendix C). The speakers at the workshop rated collaborations on all three missions as successes, although there were also lessons learned. LESSONS LEARNED Framework Lessons extracted from the mission surveys were sorted into five general categories: 1. Personal issues such as trust, openness, language, leadership, cultural differences, sharing of credit within a joint project, and the equality of the relationship; 2. Legal, political, and institutional issues such as negotiation of memoranda of understanding (MOUs) and cross-waivers of liability, the role of umbrella science and technology agreements,3 export controls, data management agreements, continuity of resources, up-front planning funds, and differing policy processes; 3. Organizational patterns including relations among scientists, engineers, and operational personnel; project initiation and development; data access and publication norms; initiation of the cooperative activity; and the process for conceiving and developing new collaborative projects; 4. Scientific interest and technical issues including community interest in the subject; equality or complementarity of capabilities among partners; the eight criteria for successful cooperative missions identified in the U.S.-European report;4 and the payoffs of cooperation (e.g., exposure to different approaches and expanded opportunities); and 5. Other issues such as privatization; the impact of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) “faster, better, cheaper” philosophy on international cooperation; the effect of differing patterns of in-house versus contract development and NASA centers versus universities; the validity of cost savings from cooperation; and relationships to military activities.

Highlights of the Lessons Learned from Geotail, Yohkoh, and ASCA Personal Issues Language and cultural barriers among mission scientists were cited frequently as a challenge in cooperating on the Geotail, Yohkoh, and ASCA missions (see Appendix E, Culhane, Section 2.1). Some workshop participants noted that communication, at times, was more difficult when involving scientists and engineers together. However, the challenge of maintaining clear communication between scientists and engineers is not unique to international

3

The Department of State negotiates bilateral framework or umbrella agreements on science and technology with foreign governments. These agreements are formulated to be consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives. (See U.S. General Accounting Office, Information on International Science and Technology Agreements, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., April 1999.) 4

U.S.-European Collaboration in Space Science, pp. 102-104.

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SUMMARY REPORT

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collaborations.5 In the cases of Geotail, Yohkoh, and ASCA any language and cultural obstacles were largely overcome with the help of strong interpersonal relations, leadership, and constructive personalities. People, either individually in leadership roles or collectively in science working groups, or at a grassroots level in the community, are critical to the success of cooperative space activities. Strong leadership in the Japanese program was cited as a particularly important element in the effective working relations established among the partners. In addition, several workshop participants remarked on grassroots cooperation and scientist-to-scientist relations as a fundamental building block in conceiving collaborative activities and in bringing them to fruition. This history of working relationships among scientists, often cultivated through international scientific meetings, also served to engender the shared views and excitement about science goals so essential to overcoming the obstacles present in joint projects. Although people were felt to be the drivers behind good cooperation, there were, in some cases, consequences related to staffing limitations. For example, workshop participants commented that limited budgets at ISAS require staff and, in some cases, visiting scientists to fill many roles, such as alternating shifts on spacecraft operations. Although the operations are often delegated to students and younger science team members, some of the non-Japanese participants believed that these activities diverted talent and human resources from scientific analysis of the mission data. They therefore believe that the extra time and responsibilities such as handling spacecraft operations entitle their mission scientists to a longer “blackout” period in which to prepare for publication. However, the Japanese participants also emphasized that these operational activities encourage mission scientists to design their missions for easy operability and result in careful attention by mission scientists in operating “their” missions. Differing agency situations have required patience and flexibility from partnering scientists. Legal Issues The legal problem most often encountered in international space cooperation is the U.S. government approval process for MOUs required for each cooperative project. Until now, the primary stumbling block has been agreement over granting of immunity from liability required by NASA (see Appendix D, Nishida, Section 5.0; Acuna, 4.0, 5.0). For constitutional and structural reasons, most other countries, and notably Japan, cannot easily meet the U.S. requirement. MOU approval within the U.S. government requires what is called the Circular 175 process, managed by the State Department and requiring sign-off by all government departments or agencies that have responsibility for issues that arise on the project.6 The time needed tends to be substantial, in part because of the issues involved, in part simply because the process is inherently a bureaucratic one on issues not at the top of the agenda for most agencies. In fact, this process, although it has not yet scuttled any project, results in nerve-wracking hassles, last-minute approvals, and even program delays. Workshop participants questioned whether the procedures could be deterring the initiation of new projects or inhibiting the realization of some targets of opportunity.

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See U.S.-European Collaboration in Space Science, p. 107, “Because of the observed intellectual distance among scientists, engineers, and managers, good communication among these team members is an important ingredient of successful and smooth international cooperation. These interface problems are more critical in international cooperation, because of the added barriers of culture, language, and agency procedures that can further impede effective communication.” 6 U.S. General Accounting Office, Information on International Science and Technology Agreements, April 1999, p. 2.

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SUMMARY REPORT

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Looking ahead, some workshop participants also expressed concern that new or intensified export controls on technology and differing approaches to intellectual property rights will make the MOU approval process even more difficult. Geotail scientists from the United States, for example, encountered serious problems in attempting to get needed instruments and technology both out of the United States and into Japan for the project. Some workshop participants and contributors who worked on Geotail questioned whether the mission would have been possible under current export control stipulations (see Appendix D, Acuna, 4.0)7. Organizational Patterns Agreements for handling the software for data analysis on cooperative missions can have lasting effects on access to and use of the data long after the primary mission ends. Both the Yohkoh and ASCA missions made significant contributions to software for data analysis in their respective disciplines. The ASCA mission led to the development of a software system for analyzing X-ray astronomy data based on a multi-mission concept (i.e., these were generic software tools applicable to different missions). Further, the team went on to establish standard data formats that have been adopted worldwide for several X-ray astronomy missions (see Appendix F, Hughes, 2.0). On Yohkoh there were at the start of the project notable differences among the participating parties in their approaches to software development. However, planning and dialogue led to agreement on constructing a unified software structure (known as SolarSoft) that complements ongoing data analysis and instrument calibration (see Appendix E, Culhane, 3.0, and Hudson, 3.4). The SolarSoft system was one of the exceptionally valuable outcomes of Yohkoh; however, its development had to evolve significantly during the mission. For example, Japanese researchers had written several large programs in FORTRAN, and their adaptation to achieve compatibility with SolarSoft required significant time and effort (see Appendix E, Hudson, 3.2). Problems of this kind have been encountered in other missions such as the Solar and Heliospheric Observatory. Will changing intellectual property and technology transfer policies make benefiting from these shared, cooperative software developments more difficult? Issues pertaining to data rights and access to the data were tricky and raised concerns within the scientific community at large. Workshop participants described a situation in which the lack of a guest investigator program on Yohkoh at first created a perception within the United States that Japan was attempting to protect the data (see Appendix E, Hudson, 3.3) when in fact NASA funds had not been approved to establish such a program. In accordance with Japanese practice, the requirement for all Yohkoh team scientists to participate in satellite operations significantly reduced the time available for team members to analyze the data. The problem was addressed by establishing a 1-year reserved data policy with data rights restricted to the Yohkoh team. This in turn raised the question in the United States of whether Japan was holding the data too closely (see Appendix E, Culhane, 2.3; Hudson, 3.3, 3.4). This question was not as significant for the United Kingdom, where the Japanese method of operating the mission could be explained more easily to the smaller U.K. community. These issues, which stemmed from differences in mission operation philosophy between Japan and the United States and Europe, pointed to a potential for misunderstandings but were not seen as major obstacles in the cooperative efforts. An overall lesson that emerges on organizational patterns from the Yohkoh experience is the importance of making clear agreements on the data rights of the collaborating parties in the early stages of mission development. Other concerns on the organizational aspects of Geotail, Yohkoh, and ASCA identified during the workshop point to issues that can arise in the selection of instrumentation. Should the

7 See U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Defense Trade Controls, The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (22 CFR 120-130), April 12, 1999.

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SUMMARY REPORT

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choice be made on the basis of the “best science” or to advance national capability in instrument technology? Participants commented that on ASCA, and now on Astro-E, hardware contributions were awarded to Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Goddard Space Flight Center through unsolicited proposals to NASA on the basis of procuring the best instruments available. Although scientists at the workshop believed that the excellence of the ASCA instruments is well accepted, the lack of competitive peer review raised concerns about future missions such as Astro-G (see Appendix F, Hughes, 3.0)8. The approach for Geotail was a mix: to select instruments for technological capability while flying similar Japanese instruments with less flight experience or “heritage” to develop Japanese technology. This issue of “best science” versus building national capability was not resolved within the workshop and reflected a deep although understandable tension. Scientific and Technical Interests Beyond the underlying impetus to seek answers to intriguing questions in space science, workshop participants noted several scientific and technical payoffs for cooperation. In particular, the opportunity for international cooperative missions to fill gaps in various national programs is a little recognized but important contribution. ASCA, for instance, filled a gap between the Einstein Observatory (1978-1981) and the recently launched Chandra (previously AXAF) X-ray astronomy observatory. Similarly, ASCA's contributions to provide “proof of concept” for Chandra technologies and on-orbit instrument operations cannot be overestimated (see Appendix F, Hughes, 2.0). Scientists who have participated in trilateral collaborative missions note the potential value of involving both scientists and engineers in meetings on cooperative missions. Of more consequence, some workshop participants mentioned that scientists working on Geotail and Yohkoh were involved in the instrument design and construction, particularly on those instruments built in Japan. They considered this scientist-engineer approach to instrument development a successful practice: Engineers were better able to design instruments that reflected the scientific intent and approach for the instrument, and scientists acquired more in-depth understanding of the instruments and hence a better, more accurate approach to calibrating and validating the instrument data. The decision to include Japanese collaborators in non-Japanese instrument fabrication also eliminated a “black box” style of management (see Appendix F, Makishima, 1.0) and thereby helped foster the openness and exchange of information critical to collaboration. Scientists involved in the Geotail, Yohkoh, and ASCA missions noted that disseminating project results at a wide range of levels ranging from peer-reviewed journals at one end to informal newsletters at the other has been quite valuable. For example, the soft X-ray instrument science team on Yohkoh created a weekly Web journal including “science nuggets” to encourage much broader scientific interest and further analysis of the data. The ASCA team issues a newsletter as well. Workshop participants stressed the importance of highlighting the collaborative nature of a mission within these outreach efforts, in press releases, Web sites, and public interest materials (see Appendix F, Hughes, 3.0).

8

The Space Studies Board has, in fact, noted in its reports the need for competitive procurement and peer review on technology developments. See Space Studies Board, National Research Council, Assessment of Technology Development in NASA's Office of Space Science, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1998, pp. 21-22. See also Space Studies Board, National Research Council, Managing the Space Sciences, National Academy Press, 1995, p. 68.

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SUMMARY REPORT

6

BOX 1 KEY ELEMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL INTERNATIONAL SPACE COOPERATION AS RECOMMENDED IN THE 1998 NRC-ESF REPORT Recommendation 1 The joint committee recommends that eight key elements be used to test whether an international mission is likely to be successful. This test is particularly important in the area of anticipated and upcoming large missions. Specifically, the joint committee recommends that international cooperative missions involve the following: • Scientific support through peer review that affirms the scientific integrity, value, requirements, and benefits of a cooperative mission; • An historical foundation built on an existing international community, partnership, and shared scientific experiences; • Shared objectives that incorporate the interests of scientists, engineers, and managers in common and communicated goals; • Clearly defined responsibilities and roles for cooperative partners, including scientists, engineers, and mission managers; • An agreed-upon process for data calibration, validation, access, and distribution; • A sense of partnership recognizing the unique contributions of each participant; • Beneficial characteristics of cooperation; and • Recognition of the importance of reviews for cooperative activities in the conceptual, developmental, active, or extended mission phases—particularly for foreseen and upcoming large missions.

SOURCE: Excerpted from National Research Council and European Science Foundation, U.S.-European Collaboration in Space Science, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1998, p. 4. Comparison with NRC-ESF Report The workshop participants endorsed seven of the eight criteria stated in the first recommendation of the 1998 report U.S.-European Collaboration in Space Science, published by the NRC and ESF (see Box 1). For example, the participants agreed that peer review, shared objectives, and clearly defined responsibilities were important to conducting successful international collaborations. In addition, the “historical foundation” of international scientific relationships was viewed as an important component of successful cooperative activities. As mentioned under “Personal Issues” above, the workshop attendees also agreed that “the history of working relationships among scientists, often cultivated through international scientific meetings, also served to engender . . . shared views and excitement about science goals . . . .” There was little support for periodic international mission reviews noted in the last criterion, which participants felt could be intrusive and burdensome. Cost-benefit enhancement, frequently cited as a motivation for cooperation, was also discussed with some contention. Some participants stressed that the enhancement of mission capability should be the economic driver of cooperation, rather than immediate cost savings. Often, cost savings over multiple missions can far outweigh initial project costs. For example, the contribution of U.S. charge-coupled devices (CCDs) on the ASCA mission amounted to $4.6 million. Yet the benefits, in terms of the proof of concept for the technology, improved estimates of CCD shielding requirements, and the need for extensive preflight calibration, among other benefits, amounted to experience worth much more than the $4.6 million financial contribution in the design of the CCD instrument on the U.S. Chandra mission (see Appendix F, Hughes, 2.0).

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SUMMARY REPORT

7

Scientists involved in Geotail, Yohkoh, and ASCA remarked positively about an “international payload line,” a small, flexible budget line in the Explorer program that once existed but does no longer (Appendix F, Hughes 1.1; Appendix E, Culhane, 1.3). They commented on the value that a small fund in NASA would have for “up-front” support for project initiation and planning prior to peer review. A budget line of this sort, the bilateral programs line, has been introduced recently in the United Kingdom (Appendix E, Culhane, 2.0). The absence of such funds in the United States presents a considerable barrier to initiating cooperative projects that would otherwise be desirable and similarly affects the ability to capitalize on targets of opportunity. The U.S.-European report echoes this sentiment and recommends the importance of having a small budget for peer-reviewed, international cooperative space science activities.9 As budgets for space agencies become increasingly tight, there may be a growing number of programs that could not be undertaken without a major technical and financial contribution from one or more international partners. FUTURE ISSUES Strategic Planning and Long-term, International Coordination Another issue that emerged in the workshop has to do with shared, or informed, strategic planning for space science among leading space nations. This can be a vexing subject, as spacefaring powers make plans more or less independently of the plans of others. NASA may have provided such a vehicle by inviting foreign participation in its Space Science Advisory Committee meeting on July 28-30, 1999. Other partnering agencies agree on the desirability of coordinating strategic planning among their advisory bodies and are also inviting international participation in strategic planning meetings. One question that arose during the workshop was whether there ought to be some kind of international discussion forum for space science strategic planning, perhaps as a single workshop or as a continuing scientific group. There was no resolution, although the idea of a permanent group was not received with any enthusiasm. The ESSC hopes to mount a workshop on methodologies for international cooperation that will consider this subject; representatives of the SSB and SRC will be invited to participate. Closer interaction among nations in their strategic space planning will be increasingly important in the future, especially for large-scale space missions. Increased interaction among partnering agencies and the international scientific community might address specific aspects of the planning process by attempting to better arrange alignments of announcements of opportunity (AOs) for the NASA Explorer program with the planning schedules of cooperative partners. In addition, workshop participants noted that establishing guest observer and guest investigator programs for the international community might increase the community's involvement in the missions. Further, they discussed the possibility that proposal mechanisms other than Explorer AOs may be required for important collaborative projects that do not address Explorer-type missions.

9

See U.S.-European Collaboration in Space Science, p. 108, “In light of the continuing scarcity of future resources, the volatility of the U.S. budget process, and the importance of trustworthy international agreements supporting cooperative efforts in space, the joint committee recommends that international budget lines be added to the three science offices within NASA to support important, peer-reviewed, moderate-scale international activities.”

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SUMMARY REPORT

8

Other Issues The workshop also addressed additional future operations and issues. One is the effect on international cooperation of NASA's “faster, better, cheaper” approach to conducting missions. That policy raises the prospect that international cooperation may be “frozen out” simply as a result of time and budget constraints. The SSB is beginning an examination of this NASA approach. If the SSB cannot consider this aspect of the policy in depth, the CISP believes a separate effort should be undertaken. The ESSC is planning a similar study from a European perspective. Another subject seen as requiring further attention was the impact of new national and international policies toward intellectual property rights. The full scope of the changes under way is not clear, yet the effect on space cooperation, in fact even on the national conduct of space science, could be severe. In the missions addressed during the workshop, the principal intellectual property question was how much lead time mission scientists should have with the instrument data before they are distributed to the public. Questions involving intellectual property rights will certainly be more difficult when considering other collaborative space activities in view of the intense commercial interest in communications, Earth observations, and propulsion systems. A third “future” issue identified is the need to consider coordinating international policies about forward and back contamination and the documenting, archiving, and preservation of planetary samples. There is much attention to this issue in the United States.10 Is there adequate attention to harmonizing the policies among other spacefaring nations? SOME QUESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION Lessons learned from past experience are useful only when they can guide or improve future cooperative activities. Some workshop participants remarked that upcoming international cooperative missions, which involve more complex instruments and spacecraft than the missions conducted in previous years, may require new approaches to international collaboration that build on lessons learned (see Appendix E, Culhane, 4.0; Appendix F, Hughes, 3.0). The workshop discussion pointed to a series of practices that may be considered to improve the overall cooperative experience involving the United States, Europe, and Japan across the space science disciplines and identified questions for possible exploration: • The benefits of language and cultural training for corporate managers and executives involved in international relations have been well documented.11 Similarly, workshop participants recognized the importance of helping scientists and engineers who will engage in international cooperation to be aware of the culture and political processes of their prospective partners.

10

See the following Space Studies Board reports: Evaluating the Biological Potential in Samples Returned from Planetary Satellites and Small Solar System Bodies, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1998; Mars Sample Return: Issues and Recommendations, National Academy Press, 1997; and Biological Contamination of Mars: Issues and Recommendations, National Academy Press, 1992. 11 See National Research Council, Office of International Affairs, Maximizing U.S. Interests in Science and Technology Relations with Japan, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1997, and Robert E. Scott, Expatriate Adjustment and Performance: A Research Report, Integrated Resources Group, Abilene, Texas, 1997. See also National Research Council, Engineering Tasks for the New Century: Japanese and U.S. Perspectives, National Academy Press, 1999, pp. 71-78, which discusses the importance of language and cultural skills for enabling engineers to work effectively in international settings.

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SUMMARY REPORT

9

• In international as well as national programs, multimedia and multilevel approaches to disseminating mission results are desirable for promoting use of the mission results by a broad range of the scientific community and the public. The workshop emphasized that establishing a variety of means for dissemination of results, including peer-reviewed publications, newsletters, and information posted on the World Wide Web, has been effective. • Participants noted that the cooperative programs analyzed in the workshop showed that cooperative space missions can provide an opportunity to learn different cultural approaches to technology and data analysis as well as maximize scientific output. Although it is difficult to quantify such advantages, other than anecdotally, the experience in the three programs was indicative of the benefits that can be realized (see Appendix F, Makishima, 4.0). • Several questions were raised in the workshop that deserve further consideration. For example, can the difficulties engendered by nationally based peer review be mitigated so as to more easily accommodate international research collaboration? Are there practical ways of developing more informed and collaborative strategic planning so as to help identify opportunities for space collaborations? CLOSING THOUGHTS The Workshop on Space Cooperation proved a useful forum for highlighting lessons on the cooperative experiences among the United States, Europe, and Japan gleaned from a decade of efforts on the Geotail, Yohkoh, and ASCA missions. The speakers and participants were well prepared and the discussions pertinent and focused. The workshop was considered a success in all respects and certainly forged new relationships between and among the ESSC, SSB, and SRC that are expected to grow over the coming years. In a workshop on lessons learned, the issues not mentioned or not noted with concern can be as valuable as the successes and problems illuminated. For example, little if anything was said about the effect of differences among partners in political structures (except for clearance of MOUs, waivers of liability, and export licenses), space agency procedures, and mission budgets on the international cooperative experience.12 Furthermore, issues did not arise with respect to national trends toward privatization of certain space operations; patterns of in-house versus out-of-house contract development; or partnerships among government, federal laboratories, and industries. Again, interactions among government, industrial, and academic entities will likely differ when collaboration is explored in such areas as Earth sciences, and life sciences and microgravity research. Perhaps one of the lasting effects of international cooperation is the indelible impression the experience makes on the individuals participating. Scientists at the workshop called attention not only to the technical and scientific gains of working together but also to the underlying dynamics of intercultural exchange within the cooperative space research arena. These aspects of international collaboration are integral to the success of the project and to the enrichment it provides personally and professionally to those involved. It is clear that aside from the sometimes fickle attitude that governments and space agencies may have toward international cooperation, the individuals who participate in the missions convey appreciation for the scientific opportunities and achievements gained, the experience acquired, the enthusiasm shared, and the broadened perspective that comes from an international approach to space activities.

12

Professor Nishida provided a comprehensive explanation of the ISAS procedures for planning and selecting missions. Professors Culhane and Bagenal explained the ESA and NASA processes, respectively.

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SUMMARY REPORT 10

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11

APPENDIXES

The appendixes to the summary report of the U.S.-European-Japanese Workshop on Space Cooperation include the following: a list of the attendees of and notes on the planning meeting held in advance of the workshop (Appendix A), the workshop agenda and a list of participants (Appendix B), a set of guiding questions for the workshop speakers (Appendix C), the working documents produced for the workshop (Appendix D Appendix E Appendix F), and a list of acronyms and abbreviations used (Appendix G). Some of the speakers chose to write formal papers that documented the history of the mission in which they were involved and the collaborative experience. Others prepared “talking points” or other presentation materials and imparted most of their perspectives on the collaborative experience orally at the workshop. Therefore, the level of detail in the working documents describing U.S., European, and Japanese perspectives on the Geotail, Yohkoh, and ASCA missions (Appendix D Appendix E and Appendix F) varies and is intended to reflect the spirit and intent of the workshop setting.

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12

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APPENDIX A

13

Appendix A Notes from the Consultation Meeting on Space Cooperation

PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS Space Research Committee (SRC) Science Council of Japan (JSC) European Space Science Committee (ESSC) Committee on International Space Programs (CISP) Space Studies Board (SSB) ATTENDEES Len Culhane, ESSC Chair, University College London Atsuhiro Nishida, SRC Chair, Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS) Eugene Skolnikoff, CISP Chair, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Gerhard Haerendel, ESSC, Max Planck Institute Gerda Horneck, ESSC, DLR, Institut für Luft und Raumfahrtmedizin, Köln, Germany Manabu Kato, SRC, ISAS Louis Lanzerotti, CISP, Lucent Technologies Kazuo Makishima, SRC, University of Tokyo Phillipe Masson, ESSC, Université de Paris Sud Carlé Pieters, Brown University Saturo Watanabe, SRC, Fujita Health University Pamela Whitney, CISP staff Jean-Claude Worms, ESSC staff AGENDA Introductions Participants introduced themselves and identified their organizational affiliations. Discussion of Purpose and Objectives G. Skolnikoff, CISP chair, outlined the approach for the meeting, which was to begin discussions on cooperation between Japan, Europe, and the United States in space-oriented activities. The objective was to develop new opportunities for cooperation and to illuminate success factors, problem areas, and other issues concerning past cooperation between the United States, Japan, and Europe in space.

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APPENDIX A

14

Organizations L. Culhane, ESSC chair, presented an overview of the ESSC organizational structure and activities. He explained the ESSC's terms of reference as a European Space Foundation (ESF) associated committee, its structure and external linkages, the process of selecting members, and the ESSC's activities and their outcomes, particularly concerning the need to achieve greater coherence among space programs in Europe. He explained that several ESSC members serve ex officio in various advisory committees of the European Space Agency (ESA), the European Union, and so on. ESSC will have an observer status in ESA's council, which will be decided on a case-by-case basis for each council meeting. L. Lanzerotti, CISP member and former SSB chair, presented an overview of the SSB. He noted that the SSB was chartered in 1958 as a body independent of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The chartered organization is the National Research Council (NRC), which is the operating arm of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering. The NRC conducts studies at the request of government agencies but acts independently from the government. Therefore, its advice can be ignored; however, the NRC has earned respect throughout its history and its advice is often acted upon. NASA and Congress make requests of the SSB to prepare studies, with these requests sometimes occurring through congressional legislation. The SSB membership includes 20 to 25 researchers (primarily) and policy specialists that serve for 3-year terms. As a rule, the SSB requests that no member serve on any NASA advisory committees so as to preserve its independence from the agency. The SSB has developed linkages with other NRC boards, including the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board and the Board on Physics and Astronomy. The organizational structure includes standing discipline committees, the chairs of which serve as members of the board. Other task groups are formed on an ad hoc basis. The SSB is also the adhering U.S. body to the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR). A. Nishida, chair of the SRC of Japan and director general of ISAS, presented an overview of Japanese space entities and the SRC. He called attention to three organizations that are involved in space activities—ISAS, the National Aeronautics and Space Development Agency (NASDA), and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which is eager to get involved in space as a way to promote industry. The Space Activities Commission is the prime minister's coordinating body for space activities, although it takes no action on science. The SRC falls under the auspices of the JSC, which was established after World War II. The members of the JSC represent all science disciplines and number about 200. The SRC is composed of about 30 members; it has a NASDA member for Earth sciences and microgravity sciences, but most of the membership (approximately twothirds) is from universities. The JSC also has committees on astrophysics, geomagnetism, and solar-terrestrial science. The function of the JSC and its subcommittees is advisory and conceptual; so far, its impact on policy making has been weak. The Ministry of Education, Science, Sports, and Culture (Monbusho) has advisory committees on academic matters, on space science, and on high-energy physics. The subcommittee on space science is the most important in terms of decision making and will play a key role in the planned merger between Monbusho and the Science and Technology Agency of the Japanese government. Its functions concern the program operations. ISAS, NASDA, and the National Aeronautics Space Lab are among the member institutions of the space science subcommittee. The SRC, unlike the subcommittee on space science, is removed from program operations and is therefore the appropriate body for reviewing cooperation and establishing international links. U.S.-European Collaboration in Space Science Report J.C. Worms, ESSC staff, presented the approach and rationale for the U.S.-European study. He also described an overview of the types of cooperative arrangements explored, including NASA-ESA and

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APPENDIX A

15

NASA-European space agencies, the case missions studied, and the types of issues explored within the report. Discussion on How to Proceed G. Skolnikoff opened the discussion by noting that the U.S.-European report is probably too elaborate to accomplish as a joint U.S.-European-Japanese activity. Instead, he said the groups might work toward a workshop or conference. A. Nishida presented a chart of ISAS collaborations, calling attention to the fact that most ISAS collaborations are grassroots, scientist-to-scientist activities because these seem to work best. He noted that it is a good time to look back at cooperation in Japanese missions. He also stated that one of the difficulties in cooperative space missions with NASA concerns the memoranda of understanding (MOUs). For example, he signed the MOU for the Japanese Planet-B mission on the eve of the launch. The governments and space agencies on both sides are not well prepared for international cooperation and sometimes try to impose barriers. The issues are political and deep rooted; moreover, the procedures on each side are different. All sides agreed that a retrospective on Japanese cooperation in space was a good idea. The SRC is to identify a subset of missions for analysis, and all three sides are to identify a subset of people involved in the missions to write about the collaboration according to a template of questions. (The drafting and iterative process could be done largely by e-mail.) G. Haerendel, president of COSPAR, observed that one never learns from history alone, because the context and experience is never the same as a previous one. He urged the group to look forward, to explore exciting new areas for the future, and to address important aspects of cooperative projects that are about to go wrong and make people aware of potential problems. He noted, for example, that the ESA and NASA cometary programs are disconnected. More important, he urged that the space powers plan together for a major scientific objective of long duration such as a multidecade exploration of the solar system. In addition to small missions, there is a need for science that can be done only on big missions. These issues should be planned in a coordinated program. All sides agreed that a workshop or symposium should look at the past collaborations with Japan as well as issues for current and future cooperative endeavors. Various participants mentioned key issues affecting the space research environment of the current and future era, including why government should support big missions, and an increasing trend toward commercial investments in space and space applications. Next Steps A. Nishida, G. Skolnikoff, and L. Culhane outlined a series of next steps: 1 2 3 4

Select a subset of Japanese collaborative missions. Develop a template of questions to analyze the missions. Request papers on themes for future space cooperation. Identify who should participate in the workshop or conference—get industry and government to present perspectives. 5 Consider having two to three meetings for this activity.

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APPENDIX B

16

Appendix B Workshop Agenda and Participants

AGENDA Wednesday, May 19, 1999 Morning—Welcome and Openings (E. Skolnikoff, Chair) 10:00

Opening address—A. Nishida

10:10

Welcome address—S. Ikeuchi (a JSC member)

10:30

Workshop objectives (or expected outcome)—E. Skolnikoff

10:45

Project selection and implementation procedures in Japan—A. Nishida

11:15

ASCA perspective—K. Makishima, J. Hughes, M. Turner

12:30

Break

Afternoon—Overviews and Mission Surveys (A. Nishida, Chair) 14:00

Introduction to SSB—E. Skolnikoff

14:15

Introduction to ESSC—L. Culhane

14:30

Review of U.S.-European collaboration study—E. Skolnikoff, L. Culhane, J.C. Worms

15:00

Break

15:15

Geotail perspective—A. Nishida, R. Anderson

16:30

Yohkoh perspective—T. Kosugi, H. Hudson, L. Culhane

17:45

Adjourn

Thursday, May 20, 1999 Morning—Lessons Learned and Ongoing Missions (L. Culhane, Chair) 10:00

Lessons learned, Discussion I

11:15

Break

11:30

Practices on ongoing and upcoming collaborative missions, Part I HALCA—H. Hirabayashi Nozomi—K. Tsuruda LUNAR-A—H. Mizutani SELENE—K. Tsuruda SOLAR-B—T. Kosugi

12:30

Break

Afternoon—Visit to ISAS (Sagamihara) 14:00

Departure for ISAS

18:00

Reception at ISAS

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APPENDIX B

17

Friday, May 21, 1999 Morning—Discussion of Practices on Ongoing and Upcoming Collaborative Missions (E.Skolnikoff, Chair) 10:00

Legal issues—I. Nakatani

10:30

Practices on ongoing and upcoming collaborative missions, Part II ASTRO-E—K. Mitsuda MUSES-C—T. Yamamoto ASTRO-F—H. Murakami

11:30

Lessons learned, Discussion II

12:30

Break

Afternoon—Future Themes, Issues, and Workshop Results (to be co-chaired) 14:00

General discussion Strategic planning on an international scale Future themes and issues Follow-on activities Workshop summary

16:00

Adjourn

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS U.S. Space Studies Board, Committee on International Space Programs R.R. Anderson

University of Iowa (invited speaker)

F. Baganel

University of Colorado

Bill Green

U.S. House of Representatives (former member)

H.S. Hudson

UCSD/SPRC (invited speaker)

J. Hughes

Rutgers University

N.P. Neureiter

Texas Instruments (retired)

E.B. Skolnikoff

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

P. Whitney

Space Studies Board

European Space Science Committee J.L. Culhane

Mullard Space Science Laboratory (University College London)

P. Masson

Laboratoire de Geologie Dynamique de la Terre et des Planetes / Université de Paris Sud

M. Turner

University of Leicester

J.C. Worms

European Space Science Committee

JSC Space Research Committee and Related Committees H. Hirabayashi

Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS)

R. Ikeuchi

Nagoya University

M. Kato

ISAS

T. Kosugi

ISAS

K. Makishima

University of Tokyo

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APPENDIX B

18

A. Morioka

Tohoku University

H. Murakami

ISAS

F. Nagase

ISAS

A. Nishida

ISAS

E. Sagawa

Communications Research Laboratory

N. Sato

Japan Meteorological Agency

T. Tsuda

Kyoto University

K. Tsuruda

ISAS

S. Watanabe

Fujita Health College

K. Yamashita

Nagoya University

T. Yamamoto

Nagoya University

H. Matsumoto

Kyoto University (SCOSTEP Special Committee)

K. Mitsuda

ISAS (on behalf of H. Inoue, Astronomy Committee)

T. Mukai

ISAS (SCOSTEP Special Committee)

I. Nakatani

ISAS, Director of the Office of External Relations

Observers G. Kirkham

NASA Japan representative

A. Saegusa

Nature Tokyo correspondent

T. Takuma

U.S./Japan Foundation (invited)

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APPENDIX C

19

Appendix C Guiding Questions for Workshop Speakers

The Space Studies Board's Committee on International Space Programs is exploring, along with the European Space Science Committee (ESSC) of the European Science Foundation (ESF) and the Space Research Committee (SRC) of the Japan Science Council (JSC), the history of space cooperation among the three entities to understand better what are the elements that improve cooperation and what are the impediments that have been encountered in the past. Three missions have been chosen (Geotail, Yohkoh, and ASCA), with rough histories being prepared on each from the perspective of each of the participants. We will hold a workshop on May 19-21, 1999, to compare our views and to consider changes in policy that may improve the environment for future cooperation. Below is a set of questions that may assist you in extracting insights on U.S. participation and collaboration in the case missions. They are intended to serve as a guide, rather than implying systematic analysis. You may wish to call attention to other aspects of the U.S. participation in these missions that illuminate important lessons for future cooperative activities with Europe and Japan. It would be most helpful to get a written version of your perspectives, even an informal one, to facilitate their integration into a workshop summary. Should you choose to draw on sources in your informal writeup, please provide references for your work. This is not intended to be a formal exercise, so feel free to present your views as a story. 1. Basic mission profile • Who was involved with the project, what were the scientific objectives, and what is the present status? 2. Historical background • • • • • •

How was the project initiated? Were agreements necessary and, if so, how long did it take to work them out? Who were the central actors? Was initial planning realistic or unrealistic, and why? Is there any other relevant historical information? Were internal funding restrictions (e.g., for meetings) a problem? What was the motivation for initial consideration of cooperation (e.g., funding limitations, access to equipment, likely scientific contributions of collaborators, etc.)? 3. Cooperation Consider issues such as:

• • • • • • • • • •

What were the mechanisms for collaboration? Was there a division of responsibility between scientists and managers, and with what effect? Did funding prove to be a problem, and/or were there cost-savings? What were the perceived net benefits of the collaboration? Were the parent agencies supportive? Was the scientific community supportive, and was the mission science considered a high priority? How did personalities, people, and management approaches affect the collaboration? Were there problems in communication among agencies, scientists, engineers, etc.? What were the specific issues or requirements that impeded collaboration, if any? Were there other aspects that appeared to be key elements leading either to success or difficulties?

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APPENDIX C

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• Were there U.S. government policies (e.g., annual budgets or transfer of technology restrictions) that impeded collaboration? • Were there policies of other countries that impeded collaboration or that specifically furthered collaboration? 4. Lessons learned • What conclusions can be drawn that would help in the planning of future bilateral or multilateral collaboration with Europe and Japan? • Were cost savings an important element? • Was the collaboration worthwhile scientifically? • Did the collaboration lead to larger effects or new projects? • Were there institutions that proved to be important or essential (e.g., Committee on Space Research)? • Were there technological aspects that influenced the result (e.g., access to new information technology, formal data exchanges, etc.)? • To what extent did the political and/or policy environment in the countries involved, or in their relations, affect cooperation? 5. Additional comments or conclusions

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APPENDIX D 21

Appendix D

Perspectives on Geotail

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APPENDIX D 22

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APPENDIX D

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INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE GEOTAIL PROGRAM A. Nishida Institute of Space and Astronautical Science 1.0 Introduction To investigate the geomagnetic tail region of the magnetosphere, the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) undertook a joint project to develop, launch, and operate a scientific satellite designated Geotail satellite. The Geotail mission was to measure energy flow and transformation in the magnetotail to increase understanding of fundamental magnetospheric processes, including the physics of the magnetopause, the plasma sheet, and reconnection and neutral line formation. To conduct these measurements, Geotail took two orbit phases: a nightside double lunar swingby orbit to distances of 220 Re and a low inclination orbit at geocentric distances of about 10 to 50 Re and then to 30 Re. The Geotail satellite was designed and developed by ISAS and was launched by NASA by a Delta II in July 1992. In the mission planning phase, the ISAS team was led by A. Nishida and the NASA team by J.K. Alexander and S.D. Shawhan. Valuable advice and guidance were offered by T. Obayashi, M. Oda, H. Oya, and F.L. Scarf. In the spacecraft development phase the executive members of the team were A. Nishida, K.T. Uesugi, T. Mukai, I. Nakatani, and I. Kimura at ISAS and S.D. Shawhan, K. Sizemore, R. Tatum, M. Grant, and M. Acuna at NASA. 2.0 Historical Background In the late 1970s, a working group was formed to draw a plan of a space program to study the near-Earth plasma environment comprehensively. The report of this working group, published in April 1979, defined the goals of this program, named OPEN (Origin of Plasmas in the Earth's Neighborhood), so as to (1) assess the mass, momentum, and energy flows through the geospace, (2) improve our understanding of the plasma processes, and (3) assess the importance to the terrestrial environment of variations in energy input to the atmosphere. The membership of 19 included 2 from Europe (Geiss and Haerendel) and 1 from Japan (Nishida) but was overwhelmingly American. The OPEN program was to consist of a fleet of four spacecraft, IPL (Interplanetary Physics Laboratory), GTL (Geomagnetic Tail Laboratory), PPL (Polar Plasma Laboratory), and EML (Equatorial Magnetosphere Laboratory). However, even four spacecraft are not sufficient to conduct comprehensive monitoring of the key regions of the geospace. For example, the near-Earth region of the magnetotail was known to be the site of the near-Earth reconnection, which drives magnetospheric substorm, but none of these spacecraft could cover the magnetotail in the distance range of 12 to 80 Re. (One might suspect that this omission was not accidental but reflected the critical views against the near-Earth reconnection model, which was held by some influential scientists around that time.) Hence Nishida decided to propose a complementary mission, OPEN-J, as a Japanese national program. OPEN-J was to focus on the studies of the dynamics of the near-Earth tail region, and the orbit elements were tailored for this objective: Apogee and inclination were to be 20 Re and 0, respectively. The launch was to be made by an M-type launcher of ISAS with enhanced upper-stage capability. OPEN and OPEN-J teams kept close contact, and representatives of the OPEN-J team attended meetings of the OPEN science working group (founded in January 1982) regularly. The OPEN program, however, was not supported inside NASA. The principal difficulty was the large size of the budget (for the FY-1985 new start, $730 million in real dollars or $400 million in FY-1981 dollars), and the U.S. team was strongly advised by the NASA Office of Space Science and Applications management (headed by B.I. Edelson) to seek international cooperation and reduce the cost. This led the project manager (K. Sizemore) and project scientist (J.K. Alexander) of OPEN to visit ISAS

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APPENDIX D

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in May 1983 and propose a merger of the two programs. The essence of the collaboration was to (1) replace one of the OPEN spacecraft with OPEN-J, (2) install U.S. instruments on OPEN-J in addition to Japanese instruments, (3) launch OPEN-J with the Space Transportation System (STS) (as the space shuttle was then called), and (4) provide in principle the obtained data to the OPEN science community. After a few months of negotiations a mutually agreeable plan was reached, and a draft memorandum of agreement between NASA/OPEN and ISAS/OPEN-J science team representatives was signed on September 6, 1983. According to this plan OPEN-J and GTL were to be combined and the orbit was to consist of a sequence of two phases: GTL-type distant tail orbit and OPEN-J-type near-Earth tail orbit. Points (1) through (4) above were also included. This agreement defined the Geotail program as it stands now, the only change having been the replacement of the launch vehicle from the STS to an Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV), which was officially chosen to be Delta II) following the Challenger accident in January 1986. This change could be made with minimal impact because the development of Geotail was to start from FY-1986 (starting from April 1986), whereas the conceptual design was performed in FY-1985. In the international arena involving the European Space Agency (ESA), a joint ESA/ISAS/NASA solarterrestrial science meeting was held in Washington in late September 1983. As a result the OPEN program was reorganized in 1984 into the International Solar-Terrestrial Physics (ISTP) program, which consisted of Wind (formerly IPL), Polar (formerly PPL), Geotail, SOHO, and Cluster. Equator (formerly EML) was sacrificed until it was revived as Equator-S in 1997 with German leadership. Interball satellites of the Russian Space Agency have also joined the fleet in the framework of the Inter-Agency Consultative Group for space science (IACG). The overall program comprising all these missions was called IASTP by IACG. Geotail was launched on July 24, 1992, as the first of the ISTP fleet of satellites and has lived up to expectations. Six years after the launch the spacecraft is sound and still providing valuable information in such key regions of the magnetosphere as the magnetotail and the magnetopause. Collaborations with other ISTP and IACG missions have also been conducted and are expected to develop further. In fact at the outset of the collaboration, ISAS management was afraid that NASA would demand use of its own normal requirements in the implementation of the Geotail program. For example, NASA relied on heavy documentation and used redundancy in key subsystems, but these requirements were beyond the capability of ISAS in terms of budget and work force. It was fortunate, however, that NASA middle management recognized the reliability of the ISAS system as reflected in the past records and agreed to adopt the ISAS procedures. Still, the Geotail program had to produce more documents than any other ISAS programs. We noticed that ISAS's request to minimize the documentation was hailed by NASA scientists and U.S. scientific colleagues. We often found that these documents were written and filed but not read. 3.0 Cooperation In the Geotail program, a clear division of responsibilities existed between ISAS and NASA. ISAS was responsible for development and operation of the spacecraft, whereas NASA provided the launch vehicle. Responsibilities were shared in science instruments, telemetry data acquisition, and data processing and archiving. Integration and test of the spacecraft were performed at ISAS. No funds were exchanged between the two agencies. To be more specific, according to the words in the memorandum of understanding (MOU): ISAS will use its best efforts to (a) design, fabricate, integrate and test the Geotail spacecraft and deliver it to the NASA JFK Space Center, (b) including the onboard propulsion system, (c) as well as the ground support equipment, (d) adhere to the Geotail/ELV interface requirements and safety requirements and prepare the associated documentation and procedures, (e) provide Japanese scientific instruments . . . , (h) assure compatibility of the spacecraft with the

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APPENDIX D

25

NASA DSN, (i) conduct Geotail spacecraft mission operations, and (j) establish data bases and provide access to these data by the NASA Data Handling Facility. NASA will use its best efforts to (a) provide a suitable upper stage with appropriate deployment/support software . . . and launch the spacecraft into the agreed orbit, (b) represent ISAS to the ELV, (c) provide necessary ELV ground facilities, (d) provide and deliver to Japan U.S. scientific instruments . . . , (g) provide for data acquisition during the launch phase and mission operations phase, (h) provide an appropriate communication link between NASA and ISAS, and (i) provide for the acquisition, processing and archiving of tape recorded data.

The actual orbit of Geotail has been as follows: (1) For about 2 years from the launch to October 1994 the orbit was controlled by the double lunar swingby maneuvers and the highest apogee was 220 Re while the perigee was about 10 Re, and (2) since that time the apogee has been lowered, first to 50 Re for about 5 months and then to 30 Re, with the perigee first at 10 Re and since June 1997 at 9 to 9.5 Re. The inclination during the latter, nearEarth orbit phase has been –8 Re, so that the spacecraft is continually sunlit at the apogee in the near-Earth plasma sheet around the December solstice. The perigee is chosen so that the spacecraft can skim along the dayside magnetopause, and it was adjusted in 1997 to enhance the passage on the earthward side of the magnetopause during the low sunspot activity. Geotail carried seven sets of scientific instruments on board of which five were provided by the Japanese principal investigator (PI) teams and two by the U.S. PI teams. These two U.S. instruments were those that were originally selected for the GTL mission. Three other PIs of the GTL mission became co-investigators by combining part of their instruments with the instrumentation of the Japanese experiments in the same area or providing expert advice in instrument design. Some European scientists also joined the mission through personal invitation from Japanese PIs. The electric field experiment (PI: K. Tsuruda, ISAS) uses (1) spherical probes and wire antennas and (2) the electron boomerang method. Probes were deployed by 100 m tip-to-tip antennas. The U.S. co-investigator (F.S. Mozer, University of California, Berkeley) provided expertise from his past experience on the double probe experiment. An ion emitter for the spacecraft potential control was provided by a European co-investigator (R. Schmidt, ESA). The magnetic field experiment (PI: S. Kokubun, University of Tokyo) uses fluxgate and search coil magnetometers for dc and ac measurements, respectively. Two sets of the fluxgate magnetometers were deployed at distances of 4 and 6 m along the 6-m mast. The outboard and inboard magnetometers were provided by Japanese and U.S. teams (led by R.L. Lepping and D.H. Fairfield; and M. Acuna), respectively. Observations of plasma are conducted by two independent sets of instruments. One is the low-energy plasma (LEP) analyzer (PI: T. Mukai, ISAS), and the other is the comprehensive plasma instrumentation (PI: L.A. Frank, University of Iowa). Energetic particles were also observed by two independent teams. One is the high-energy particle (HEP) experiment (PI: T. Doke, Waseda University), and the other is the energetic particle and ion composition (EPIC) experiment (PI: D.J. Williams). The HEP experiment has three sensors covering different energy ranges and one of them, the LD sensor, was provided by a German co-investigator (B. Wilken, Max Planck Institute for Aeronomy). Plasma wave investigation (PI: H. Matsumoto) had two frequency analyzers and the wave form capture equipment. One of the frequency analyzers was provided by the U.S. co-investigator (R.R. Anderson, University of Iowa). ISAS has conducted all the spacecraft operations in cooperation with NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) and Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), including the orbit maneuvers, orbit determination, attitude determination, and instrument operations. Such key information as orbital state vectors, predicative and definitive orbital data, predicative and definitive attitude data, and time tag correlation data, are transferred electronically (via Internet) from ISAS to NASA GSFC and JPL. The JPL determines time intervals available at the Deep Space Network (DSN) for dumping the data from the on-board tape recorders. With this intimate cooperation, more than 95 percent of recorded data has been

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APPENDIX D

26

successfully recovered by the DSN. Two tape recorders are used every 7.5 hours in turn to cover observations on a 24-hour continuous basis. ISAS uses its 64-m antenna at Usuda in central Japan to send commands to the spacecraft as well as to receive real-time telemetry. The housekeeping data for each instrument are routinely monitored in Sagamihara Spacecraft Operation Center (SSOC) in ISAS. All the PIs, that is, both U.S. and Japanese PIs, can monitor the status of their instruments while the spacecraft is in sight from Usuda, for designing the operation. In addition, when anomalies are found at SSOC, the PIs are notified immediately by telephone. When the command requests from the PIs are received electronically at ISAS, the commands are compiled and sent from SSOC to the spacecraft, while the telemetry data are monitored in real time at the PIs' home institutions. Multitudes of security measures are incorporated in this procedure; for example, the compiled command code first is sent to the PI by telefax and then is verified word by word over the telephone when the code is transmitted to the spacecraft. The data obtained have been made available to the international science community. The summary data, called key parameters, have been produced at the CDHF at NASA GSFC using the algorithms provided by PIs and have been available on line. More detailed data are provided on a collaborative basis at first, but at a certain time after acquisition the data are also made available on line. The cost of the program up to the launch year (1992) was ¥9,500 million at ISAS and was estimated to be about $130 million at NASA. Thus both parties spent only about half of what they would have had to if they had conducted the program alone. The ISAS Geotail team was instructed to keep the budget within the range of the total cost of the other ISAS programs, including the cost of its own M-3SII launch vehicle. Throughout the program the collaboration proceeded smoothly and no serious conflict arose. During the satellite development phase the Japanese project manager (K.T. Uesugi) took the overall command, and the project scientists (T. Mukai, I. Kimura, and M. Acuna) supervised development of science instruments. Numerous joint working group meetings were held at ISAS, NASA GSFC, and NASA Kennedy Space Center. The most difficult decision that had to be made was the turning off of the spacecraft main power. This was needed to revive the LEP instrument, which had been made inoperative after the electric arcing that occurred during the test run in August 1992. Although no other instruments were affected by the arcing, there was a strong desire to revive LEP because it is one of the key instruments and is indispensable for the mission success. However, risk of losing the satellite was not entirely absent even if extensive studies had shown that the satellite could survive a temporary power cutoff. The issue was brought to the Geotail joint working group meeting in early 1993, and by the majority vote of the PIs it was decided to conduct the operation. The orbit was modified in June 1993 to bring the satellite to the nightside of the moon, and the battery was separated at midnight (JST) on September 1, 1993, while the satellite was in the lunar shadow. After 10 minutes of extreme tension the satellite emerged to the sunlight and was alive. The worth of this operation has been testified to by the fact that in the 5 years since then more than 100 scientific papers have been published based on the observations made by the LEP experiment. During this crucial phase of the mission the upper managements of both agencies were fully informed, but they left the decisions entirely to the project team. In spite of the problems that could be foreseen if the operation failed, there was moral support not only at ISAS where the PI of the LEP belonged but also at NASA. The desire to maximize the mission outcome was shared by all the parties, and the project was highly encouraged by this moral support. 4.0 Lessons Learned The collaboration in the Geotail program has been, and is continuing to be, a pleasant and profitable experience. The mission has been highly productive in terms of scientific outcome, and the

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APPENDIX D

27

monograph “New Perspectives on the Earth's Magnetotail,”1 which is based largely on the results of the Geotail mission, was recognized by the Association of American Publishers as the best professional and scholarly book of 1998 in physics and astronomy. One could count many reasons as the causes of this success, but most important is that the U.S. and Japanese scientists shared common objectives. All of them were strongly motivated to explore the magnetotail more thoroughly than in any previous missions and find answers to many basic questions that had arisen during their preceding research efforts. They also knew that these objectives could be accomplished only through this collaborative program and were willing to make best efforts toward its success. Often each party went out of its way to accommodate the other party; for example, ISAS scientists helped U.S. PI teams in their hardware integration and test procedures and operations, and NASA team members helped to convince the NASA reviewers of the ISAS standards for the procedures. Because the resources from two parties were combined the cost was not as much of a limiting factor as in most other missions. 5.0 Legal Issues Although the collaboration was implemented quite satisfactorily both scientifically and technically, it was challenged by NASA lawyers. When the MOU of the Geotail program was negotiated they took a strong position that a cross-waiver of liability be explicitly declared in the MOU using language that is standard to the U.S. law. Although it is common sense that parties should not sue each other in collaborative programs, to write such in an official document is inconsistent with Japanese domestic law, which does not permit unconditional waiving of liabilities because it contradicts established social norms. The negotiation was at deadlock, but it was saved accidentally in September 1989 when then U.S. Vice President Quayle visited Japan, and the governments chose the signing of the Geotail MOU for the ceremonial occasion. The issue was left fundamentally unresolved, however, and it still casts a shadow on the future of the collaboration.

1

Nishida, A., D.N. Baker, and S.W.H. Cowley, eds. New Perspectives on the Earth's Magnetotail, Geophysical Monograph Series, Volume 105, AGU Code GM105-088-7, American Geophysical Union, Washington, D.C., 1998.

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APPENDIX D

28

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WITH JAPAN IN THE INTERNATIONAL SOLARTERRESTRIAL PHYSICS / GGS PROGRAM M.H. Acuna NASA Goddard Space Flight Center 1.0 Introduction The origin of the Geotail Program and the collaboration with Japan traces back to the Origin of Plasmas in the Earth's Neighborhood (OPEN) Program, a fleet of four spacecraft studied at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) in the early 1980s to conduct multipoint, coordinated measurements in the Earth's magnetosphere and the interplanetary medium. The OPEN program was the natural evolution of the early discovery missions, which although finding many new regions and plasmaphysical phenomena in the magnetosphere had problems separating cause-and effect relationships and resolving space-time ambiguities. The primary scientific objective was the coordinated study of the flow of energy, mass, and momentum from the Sun through the interplanetary medium and its eventual deposition in the Earth's atmosphere. This objective was to be achieved in a quantitative manner and to that extent theory, models, and ground-based observations were incorporated for the first time as an integral part of the project baseline. An ambitious ground system, capable of processing and visualizing the vast amounts of data generated by these spacecraft, was also conceived and incorporated in the OPEN concept. 2.0 Historical Background The elements of the OPEN program were derived primarily from the experience (positive and negative) gained from many exploratory space physics missions such as the early Explorer series, Dynamics Explorer, the International Sun Earth Explorers, and others. It is useful to note that these early missions involved important programmatic and scientific collaborations with Europe, and the role played by Japanese scientists was primarily concerned with data interpretation and not with hardware contributions. In particular A. Nishida of the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS) played a leading scientific role in studying phenomena taking place in the geomagnetic tail related to energization and transport of plasma and energetic particles. The development of the OPEN program proved to be a major challenge—the cost and risk elements associated with the simultaneous construction and operation of 4 spacecraft and more than 30 scientific instruments were just too high for the anticipated level of funding and the achievement of the scientific objectives. Based on previous experience, international cooperation was actively sought to reduce NASA's costs and to widen the scientific participation in the program. The ISAS in Japan had conducted definition studies for a mission to the near geomagnetic tail (OPEN-J) at less than 20 Re based primarily on science priorities in Japan and the capabilities of the ISAS launch vehicles. The definition teams of OPEN and OPEN-J shared much information and attended joint planning meetings to coordinate science goals, instrumentation, and operation of spacecraft. The sequence of events leading to the NASA-ISAS memorandum of understanding (MOU) has been documented in more detail by H. Nishida.1 It was clear that to keep costs down and make OPEN a reality rather than a paper exercise, a programmatic collaboration between ISAS and NASA was highly advantageous to both parties. Japan agreed to integrate the objectives and requirements of the OPEN Geomagnetic Tail Laboratory into their program in exchange for a launch aboard a much more capable U.S. vehicle, the Delta II rocket, and Geotail was born. To further reduce OPEN costs the NASA study team held many bilateral and

1

Nishida, A., “International Cooperation in the Geotail Program,” Appendix D of this report, p. 23.

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APPENDIX D

29

multilateral discussions with Europe and the Soviet Union, and as a result the OPEN program evolved into the International Solar-Terrestrial Physics (ISTP) program with important contributions from the Horizons 2000 program of the European Space Agency (ESA) such as the Solar and Heliospheric Observatory, and Cluster and the multiagency coordination elements developed under the Inter-Agency Consultative Group umbrella for the 1986 Halley apparition involving NASA, ESA, ISAS, and the Soviet Union (IKI). The first ISTP agreement to be executed was the NASA-ISAS bilateral agreement for the Geotail program, and as such Geotail was the first ISTP spacecraft launched in July of 1992. This date is an important datum, which marks the beginning of what is now in full operation, the ISTP program. The U.S. flagship contribution to ISTP, which by then had been renamed the “Global Geospace Science” program, ran into serious development difficulties with resulting delays in the anticipated spacecraft launches, seriously impacting the planned coordination and simultaneity of observations. In particular the delays in the Wind spacecraft (named IPL under OPEN) and later of Polar (PPL under OPEN) impacted the timing of the different phases of the Geotail mission to an extent that probably tested to the limit the U.S.-Japanese collaboration (see later). 3.0 Geotail Spacecraft and Instrument Development Phase One of the prime management documents executed at the start of a NASA mission is usually the Executive Project Plan. This document, which has for the most part a predefined format, takes the terms of the MOU and translates them into management organizations, structures, reporting tools, responsibilities, interfaces, and so on. The entire structure of the Project Plan reflects U.S. management philosophy, and it became immediately clear that the plan was not entirely compatible with Japanese assumptions and expectations. The heavy reliance by the NASA management team on formal documents for everything (including many trivial matters) was a challenge to the ISAS normal way of doing business. This created many minor conflicts which eventually had to be “translated” into mutually acceptable language. My impression is that the Japanese, following their pragmatic tradition, eventually generated many “documents” just to please NASA and keep things going but either had an incomplete knowledge of the contents and expectations or just ignored them until they became critical or finally realized what was implied. In the early days of Geotail several Japanese scientists confessed to me that American behavior and expectations were a “mystery” to them. Many things were learned the “hard” way by NASA, such as the dangers of pushing an issue (e.g., the early DECNET, and SPAN networks for data exchange and communications) too vigorously without knowledge of the sensitivities of the Japanese system. This early phase was aided greatly by the residence of Dr. Icihiro Nakatani for several years at GSFC who could observe and experience the NASA system at close range and was able to translate and reinterpret many complex issues in the context of ISAS culture and its language and protocols. These activities were also aided significantly by periodic joint working group and science working group meetings where issues were openly discussed and resolved. The U.S. and Japanese science teams, having much more experience than the management team in international endeavors, were critical to the success of the collaboration. The U.S. investigators, through their engineering teams, also contributed greatly to the solution of technological challenges. It was clear at the onset that the hardware development philosophies of NASA and ISAS and the relations with supporting contractors were very different. NASA management insisted on a “watchdog” philosophy (especially after Challenger) supported by tons of legalistic paper and “watchers.” ISAS on the other hand was perfectly happy with delegating the bulk of hardware development matters to their main support contractor (NEC) because they had done good work in the past and there was no reason to expect that they would not do it in the future. Another point of subtle friction was the high stature, visibility, and strong personalities of the U.S. principal investigators aboard Geotail versus their Japanese counterparts who, with few notable exceptions, had yet to prove themselves in an international science arena. The introduction of theoretical investigators by NASA into the U.S. activities of Geotail also created some professional friction. The incredible capacity for work and sacrifice by the Japanese team gained them tremendous respect. During integration and test

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APPENDIX D

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of the Geotail spacecraft, things were accomplished in a few hours that would have taken months in the United States. Several science instruments had important hardware contributions from the United States and required interaction with other industrial support contractors to ISAS, such as the MEISEI Electric Company, which had the bulk of the responsibility for the Japanese instruments. Included in these activities were the import/export regulations controlling the flow of space hardware between Japan and the United States. The performance characteristics of several of the Japanese science instruments appeared to have been based on highly successful, equivalent counterparts developed by very experienced U.S. groups for earlier missions, and MEISEI had the task to make these goals a reality although it was not clear whether or not the experience base existed at MEISEI. To their credit, the performance of Japanese instruments on Geotail, with almost no exceptions, has been outstanding. The importation of U.S. instruments into Japan required some interesting procedures and support documents, like color photographs of their component parts, schematics, and so on. It must be said that compared to the situation today, the export/import control problems experienced by Geotail were minimal. Current export control laws and procedures in the United States and at NASA would make a repeat of the Geotail successful collaboration an impossibility. The operational aspects of the Geotail spacecraft also generated some interesting challenges. The command system was incompatible with U.S. standards as defined by the Deep Space Network (DSN), and ISAS and NEC did not have the resources or flexibility to modify the baseline design to make it compatible with DSN standards. Hence a compromise was reached where the United States would just receive tape recorder playbacks commanded from Japan on a time delayed basis. Not all the instrument data were included in this data stream—the high rate, high resolution data were transmitted directly to the Usuda station in Japan through a separate link. The Wind and Polar delays created a serious situation for NASA's support of the Geotail objectives. The energetics of the twophase Geotail mission required that the spacecraft first be launched into the deep-tail orbit, not a Japanese prime goal. With Wind and Polar absent, many of the ISTP objectives of multipoint simultaneous observations would have to be postponed or in some cases abandoned, and the prime Japanese mission would have to wait for 2 additional years. Japanese protocol required that Geotail be launched on time, such as it was, within a week or so of the intended date planned several years before. NASA responded by increasing support for the operation of the venerable Interplanetary Monitoring Platform (IMP-8) spacecraft, to obtain simultaneous interplanetary and nearEarth data while waiting for the Wind and Polar development problems to be solved. This sacrifice by ISAS was greatly appreciated and respected in the United States and was a significant factor in later considerations of risktaking trade-offs. An important technical point that emerged from the initial discussions was the system design philosophy to avoid propagation of failures from one system to another aboard the spacecraft. The initial design reflected the “closed” environment in which ISAS had developed spacecraft in the past. However, the U.S. project and investigators were concerned about a single failure dragging several instruments and subsystems down. Several compromise fixes were implemented, but because of the heritage design not all potential problems could be addressed. This particular issue came to light dramatically when the low-energy plasma analyzer (LEP) instrument (T. Mukai, PI) “latched-up” and ceased to respond to spacecraft commands. Because of the system design, the only way to recover from latch-up was to power the spacecraft OFF, an impossible feat unless the solar array could be turned off. ISAS proposed to do this by flying behind the Moon, during which time all power would be disconnected for several minutes allowing the LEP instrument to recover from the latch-up condition. The NASA project office reviewed the work carried out by ISAS to support this action and was deeply divided about the potential risks of the spacecraft occultation strategy. The U.S. PIs were also strongly opposed to what they considered a high-risk solution that could impact the future of their investigations. On the other hand the LEP was one of the most innovative experiments on board and had already demonstrated the capability to produce outstanding data. Several meetings were held to discuss this option and I personally reviewed the work done by ISAS for the recovery maneuver judging it excellent. However, many arguments were made regarding the size of “U.S. investment” in Geotail and why risk it? Earlier NASA had let ISEE-3 spend 20 minutes behind the Moon with no power source at all in order to visit a comet and was willing to invest close to $80 million in Cluster scheduled to fly on the

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APPENDIX D

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very first flight of an unproven rocket, Ariane 5. So spending 10 minutes behind the Moon with Geotail to recover a major ISAS instrument did not seem to be such a bad risk after all. At a Project Science working group meeting the decision was made to proceed with the maneuver, which was executed with total success (see footnote 1), another example of the critical role played by the scientists in the success of Geotail. 4.0 Networks, Data, and Other The OPEN program had already considered the important role that networks and computing were starting to play in the visualization and analysis of space data. These elements were further enhanced in ISTP with the explosion of these technologies in the United States and Europe. But Japan and ISAS were another story. There was no strong tradition of high-level computing with workstations and networking, and this was a source of some concern to U.S. investigators. Good intention efforts were made by the National Space Science Data Center to assist in the establishment of computers and networks in Japan, but the proper protocol was not observed and some difficulties developed although these were later solved successfully. The highly personal Japanese approach was being challenged by the centralized, large-scale ISTP approach to data processing, distribution, and analysis. It was my impression at the time that ISAS and other Japanese investigators were not totally happy with the tremendous U.S. pressure being applied to them, nor with the “standards,” paperwork, and other apparently bureaucratic processes being requested by NASA. In fact this was also the case among investigators in the United States who were balking at these new impositions that had no useful purpose (in their opinion). However, the significant success of this approach is unanimously recognized today as one of the major accomplishments of ISTP and is being emulated in other NASA and ESA projects. Later on, with NASA's desire to make data available as quickly as possible to the science community at large and with no strings attached, more external pressures were imposed on the Japanese investigators. Their response has been excellent, and Geotail data of all kinds are widely available worldwide. Sadly, current export control regulations in the United States raise troubling questions regarding the distribution and access to scientific databases for future international collaborative programs. 5.0 Lessons Learned The Geotail program has been and continues to be an outstanding success. In addition to the significant scientific accomplishments by the U.S. and Japanese Geotail investigators, many other goals have been achieved such as one expressed to me by a leading Japanese scientist at the start of the program: “I want to see Japanese scientists compete on the same level as and match the productivity of U.S. scientists.” In spite of the delays in the development of the Wind and Polar spacecraft, all major science goals have been accomplished with important scientific discoveries to Geotail's credit. The international team approach to the science goals was the central catalytic force driving scientists to work together, sharing data, knowledge, and tools in ways never imagined before ISTP. During ISTP development the technology of space physics instruments made a giant leap forward with the introduction of imaging detectors, microprocessors, and “intelligent” instruments, and the open sharing of information made possible state-of-the-art instruments that are returning invaluable data today. The important balance between science goals and resource management, so critical to the success of space missions, was achieved in both the United States and Japan thanks to the personal dedication and open-minded approach of all involved, sharing knowledge, facilities, and resources and overcoming cultural and language obstacles. Interpersonal relationships developed through close and continuous interactions throughout the program at the working level and also played an important role in “translating the untranslatable” whenever things got complicated. Finally, the development of a mutual trust relationship between the partners was perhaps the most critical element of all for success. U.S. project

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managers were (eventually) willing to trust the ISAS approach and methodology (although at times this was a hotly debated issue) and ISAS was patient enough to (eventually) understand and accept mysterious and inefficient U.S. documentation requirements. It is unfortunate that the highly legalistic approach by the United States to liability and export matters created what seemed insurmountable issues at times. I am extremely pleased by the success of Geotail and the privilege that I was afforded to meet and work with world-class U.S. and Japanese scientists in space research. Perhaps in the near future we will find ways to overcome political and unscientific issues, which only detract from the common goals of science, and realize the full benefits of international collaboration in space missions.

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APPENDIX E 33

Appendix E

Perspectives on Yohkoh

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APPENDIX E 34

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APPENDIX E

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INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE YOHKOH PROGRAM T. Kosugi Institute of Space and Astronautical Science 1.0 Introduction The Yohkoh satellite, formerly named Solar-A before launch, is the second X-ray solar-physics satellite of the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS), and was launched by an M-3S-II launch vehicle on August 30, 1991. It is fully operational even after 7 years have elapsed and is expected to be so during the coming solar maximum in 2000-2001. The Yohkoh mission aims at unveiling energy-release and particle-acceleration processes in solar flares, as well as at deeply understanding structures and dynamics seen in the solar corona. To achieve these goals, it carries four scientific instruments: (1) a hard X-ray telescope (HXT), (2) a soft X-ray telescope (SXT), (3) a set of wideband spectrometers, and (4) a set of Bragg crystal spectrometers (BCSs). Each of the four instruments has its own advantages over its predecessors, but more important is that these four instruments were so designed as to principally observe a single object, that is, a solar flare. The intention was to obtain a coordinated set of complementary observations taken simultaneously. This goal has been fully achieved, resulting in fruitful scientific return not only in number (467 papers in refereed journals, 597 proceedings papers, 34 Ph.D. theses, and 39 master's theses as of August 1998) but also in quality. From the beginning, Yohkoh was planned by ISAS as an international collaborative mission with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA—United States) and Science and Engineering Research Council (SERC; at present the Particle Physics and Astronomy Research Council—United Kingdom) as international partners. Inside Japan, the Yohkoh collaboration includes the National Astronomical Observatory of Japan (NAOJ), major universities, and others. Participating institutions are listed in Table E.1. 2.0 Historical Background Prior to the Yohkoh mission planning, solar physicists in Japan had much experience working with U.S. and U.K. scientists but more on an individual basis than as a result of large-scale organized programs. Many leading Japanese solar physicists had been regular visitors to the United States and had developed collaborative research, frequently exchanging data as well as ideas. The collaboration drastically expanded when ISAS and NASA simultaneously and independently planned the Solar Maximum Mission (SMM) and Hinotori satellites, respectively, for the previous solar maximum around 1980. Although these two missions differed much in size and as a result Hinotori covered a smaller field in science than SMM, the two missions aimed at essentially the same scientific objective: understanding solar flares, with similar instrumentation, that is, hard X-ray imaging based on collimator technique and Bragg crystal spectroscopy. Under such circumstances, a cooperative relationship naturally developed between the two missions, ranging from exchanging observation schedules to exchanging data and participating in joint data analysis projects. Because U.K. scientists participated in the SMM program, JapanU.K. collaboration also developed during this period. This positive experience led to discussions for a collaboration on a future satellite mission, first among Japanese, U.S., and U.K. scientists in 1982 and 1983, and subsequently among ISAS, NASA, and SERC. The result of these discussions was an informal decision to proceed with a joint mission to be led by ISAS. In 1985 letters were exchanged between ISAS and NASA, in which ISAS offered, and NASA accepted, the opportunity for direct involvement of U.S. scientists in the Solar-A (Yohkoh) mission. It was decided at this stage that the U.S. involvement was to participate in the SXT experiment by providing its hardware; this would complement the HXT experiment built in Japan. Subsequently, SERC offered,

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APPENDIX E

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TABLE E.1 Institutions Participating in the Yohkoh Program .

Type of Participation

Institution

Country

ISAS

Japan

University of Tokyo

Japan

NAOJ

Japan

ISAS

Japan

NAOJ

Japan

University of Tokyo

Japan

Lockheed Palo Alto Research Laboratory

United States

NASA/MSFC

United States

ISAS

Japan

Rikkyo University

Japan

NAOJ

Japan

ISAS

Japan

NAOJ

Japan

Mullard Space Science Laboratory

United Kingdom

Rutherford Appleton Laboratory

United Kingdom

National Institute of Standards and Technology

United States

E.O. Hulburt Center for Space Research, Naval Research Laboratory

United States

NAOJ

Japan

Kyoto University

Japan

Nagoya University

Japan

On-board Instruments HXT

SXT

WBS

BCS

Ground-Based Observations, Etc.

Communications Research Laboratory

Japan Stanford University

United States

University of California at Berkeley

United States

University of Hawaii

United States

Others

and ISAS accepted, U.K. participation in Solar-A (Yohkoh) via the BCS experiment, in collaboration with U.S. groups. While the above discussions were in progress for establishing the international collaboration framework, Japanese scientists worked hard inside and outside ISAS to find a good solution for the conceptual design of a satellite suitable for deploying the two telescopes (HXT and SXT). The biggest challenge was a total revision of the HXT instrument. The initial design, which had been based on a rotating modulation collimator similar to that on board Hinotori, had to be abandoned and a completely novel design of a multielement, Fourier-synthesis telescope adopted instead. This revision made a three-axis stabilized satellite possible, which enabled SXT to operate at full sensitivity and flexibility via long exposure of its charge-integrating CCD sensor. Such efforts for optimizing the instruments, based on a desire to have a set of fully developed, coordinated instruments on board a single satellite, have been and still are indispensable for realizing such a successful mission as Yohkoh.

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APPENDIX E

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3.0 Cooperation The international Solar-A (Yohkoh) team was organized in 1986 just after NASA's announcement of opportunity (AO) process for selecting a U.S. SXT team was completed. It is noteworthy here that NASA's AO clearly stated, in accordance with the agreement with ISAS, that U.S. scientists selected through this AO process would be designated as co-investigators on Yohkoh by ISAS and would join the overall Yohkoh mission science team headed by a Japanese project manager and project scientist and that some of the U.S. scientists would be expected to spend substantial time in Japan to participate in the Yohkoh mission development, science operations, and data analysis activities. Consequently the selected U.S. SXT team included not only instrument builders but also some providing ground-based observations and some mainly interested in observations with the other instruments on board Yohkoh and in theoretical work. The international Yohkoh team was organized on this principle, the essence of which is fully reflected in the basic team organization as shown in Table E.2. The actual cooperation in the subsequent stages has been developed on the basis of this basic principle as discussed in the following sections. TABLE E.2 Yohkoh Team Organization Position

Name

Affiliationa

Project manager

Y. Ogawara

ISAS

Secretaries to manager

T. Kosugi

University of Tokyo

S. Tsuneta

University of Tokyo

T. Watanabe

NAOJ

Y. Uchida

University of Tokyo

K. Kai

NAOJ

K. Makishima

University of Tokyo

T. Hirayama

NAOJ

L.W. Acton

LPARL; PI to NASA

WBS

J. Nishimura

ISAS

BCS

E. Hiei

NAOJ

J.L. Culhane

Mullard Space Science Laboratory, PI to SERC

Project scientist Principal investigators (PIs) HXT

SXT

aAffiliations

given here are those in the team formation stage in 1988.

3.1 Design, Fabrication, Integration, and Testing In the Yohkoh program, ISAS took the responsibility for the satellite system integration. Under the guidance of the ISAS project manager, each instrument subteam conducted the design, fabrication, integration, and testing for the instrument for which the subteam was responsible. To be noted here is the fact that the instrument building itself was a joint effort among the participating institutions and scientists regardless of whether it was domestic or international. This was especially so in the design phase. For an international instrument, SXT or BCS, a large number of international meetings were held. These meetings not only helped to define clear interfaces between the Japanese and foreign hardware, but also to find the best instrument designs as a whole. In addition there were meetings for defining the on-board central data processor and some other bus module instruments that would have crucial impacts on the mission science.

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APPENDIX E

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Once the decision was made on the design including task sharing, there was a clear division of responsibilities among the participating institutions. For example in the case of SXT, our U.S. partner provided the telescope optics including the CCD camera and its front-end controller, while the Japanese side was responsible for observation control and on-board data processing software for optimizing the data volume within the limited capacity of the on-board data recorder. 3.2 Mission Operations In the sense that Yohkoh is a Sun-pointing satellite and that all the instruments on board cover the full Sun without any satellite attitude maneuvers, the Yohkoh mission operations are simple in comparison with those of other X-ray astronomy satellites of ISAS. However, Yohkoh needs to operate semiautonomously in responding to flare occurrence; flares are predictable neither in time nor location. In addition, once a flare occurs, high-cadence observations with proper exposures are of vital importance to accommodate the highly variable phenomenon. Although Yohkoh was designed in such a way that flare observations can be conducted mostly in an automated way by the on-board central data processor, the parameters of its observing programs must be specified from the ground in advance based on solar activity prediction. The use of ground-based observation networks in collaboration with Yohkoh has been one of the key elements for fully achieving the mission objectives. Mission operations of Yohkoh have been conducted to match these conditions in the framework of the international Yohkoh team. A weekly operation meeting is held at ISAS every Monday to discuss weekly operations planning. Also discussed in this meeting are operation problems, if any, and their troubleshooting, and the latest science topics mainly from the previous week's operations. These meetings are attended by most of the Yohkoh team members who work in and near ISAS, including U.S. and U.K. colleagues either resident or visiting. Collaborative observations with other satellites, such as the Compton Gamma Ray Observatory, Ulysses, the Solar and Heliospheric Observatory (SOHO), and the Transition Region and Coronal Explorer, and groundbased observatories, have been pursued so far as “campaigns observations” based on the decisions made at the weekly meetings. Daily operations are planned primarily at the Sagamihara Spacecraft Operation Center (SSOC) in ISAS by two duty scientists (SSOC “Tohban”), assigned on a weekly basis, with the assistance of an SXT chief observer. The operation plan prepared by them is forwarded to the Kagoshima Space Center (KSC) of ISAS, where two duty scientists (KSC “Tohban”) who are assigned on a 2-week basis are responsible for making final checks of the operation plan and conducting real-time operations. The KSC Tohban duties include uploading commands, receiving downlink telemetry, and providing routine monitoring of the satellite housekeeping, as well as the scientific data. When anomalies are found, an immediate notification is sent to SSOC, as well as to other relevant personnel. The KSC Tohban duties include the worldwide circulation, via e-mail, of the current Yohkoh observation status. This facilitates the simultaneous observation of specific active regions on which Yohkoh (usually autonomously) concentrates its observations. These Tohban duties, as a whole, are shared by all participating scientists—irrespective of nationality. Another important aspect of the Yohkoh operations is the participation of NASA's Deep Space Network stations, and the Wallops and Santiago stations, as stored data downlink stations. Because the on-board data recorder becomes full in only 40 minutes at the highest data recording rate, downlinks at these stations are of crucial importance for continuous data coverage. Data downlinked at these stations arrive at ISAS in 1 or a few days via network (NASCOM line). A limited number of Yohkoh SXT full-Sun images are delivered on a daily basis to the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and other sites for space weather prediction purposes. This distribution is managed in Japan by the Central Communications Laboratory.

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APPENDIX E

39

3.3 Data Analysis The downlinked data are reformatted and made accessible online immediately after the original data arrive at ISAS. Exabyte tapes containing reformatted data are distributed to major home institutes of the Yohkoh team with no delay longer than about a month. One year after the data acquisition the same reformatted data are sent to NASA's Space Science Data Center (NSSDC) for the use of the international science community, outside the Yohkoh team. In addition to NSSDC, the Solar Data Analysis Center at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (NASA/GSFC) has played an important role for making the Yohkoh data easily accessible by those who are not familiar with Yohkoh. The full Yohkoh analysis software package is also made available together with its users' guidebook; this software package is now installed in many sites worldwide and has been a model for software developments in subsequent missions. The 1-year period is reserved for Yohkoh team members for their preferential data analysis. Because the Yohkoh operation is based not on a science proposal and refereeing process but on team discussion, no specific observations can be analyzed exclusively by one person. Instead, cooperative data analysis has been encouraged in the Yohkoh team among various groups, say, between different instrument subteams, or between Japanese and U.S./U.K. members. To moderate possible collisions or conflicts in data analysis, the Yohkoh team organized a “Team Bulletin Board” and a system of data use coordinators (DUCs). The former is a World-Wide-Web-based team circular and has been used to distribute individuals' data analysis activities to team members. DUCs are assigned for the individual instruments to monitor data analysis activities, help individual data users who are not familiar with the instruments, and advise individual data users to initiate a joint data analysis program if there are any other analyses in progress on the same or similar topics. Thanks probably to the large amount of newly found topics that Yohkoh has provided almost continuously, no serious collisions or conflicts have been reported. We have heard some arguments against the 1-year data reservation by the Yohkoh team from team outsiders, claiming that the data should be opened without any reservation period. Most of the arguments are based on a misunderstanding of the situation. The Yohkoh operations have been maintained as a result of sacrificing contributions by young scientists, especially graduate students, from universities in Japan. Even senior scientists suffer from a heavy burden of operational duties. In such a circumstance, completely opening newly acquired data to those who do not share operation duties might not be fair. Hence, the Yohkoh team has been flexibly interpreted as including those who contribute to the operations, with “contribute” here interpreted in its widest meaning. Ground-based observers may be treated as team members if they make observations cooperatively with Yohkoh. Furthermore, those conducting even theoretical work together with a Yohkoh team member have been allowed to analyze newly obtained Yohkoh data. Thus, the 1-year reservation rule has been applied as a minimal request from the team to outsiders. With regard to data analysis, two more points are worth mentioning: (1) In 1993 and 1994, a guest investigator program was made available by funding from NASA. To our regret, Japan had no corresponding system to support interested scientists outside the Yohkoh team. It was only a few years ago that the Japanese government started a new program that expanded the number of postdoctoral research fellows. The Yohkoh team has begun to use this new program as a tool for providing opportunities to young scientists to participate in Yohkoh data analysis. (2) Since 1997 a series of small coordinated data analysis workshops (CDAWs), each of which is devoted to a specific data analysis topic, have been held as Yohkoh-SOHO joint meetings twice every year. CDAWs emphasize actual data manipulation, notably the coalignment of images from a wide variety of instruments, and they contribute to developing a cooperative atmosphere not only within the Yohkoh team but also between team members and team outsiders.

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APPENDIX E

40

4.0 Lessons Learned When we, Japanese solar physicists, started the Solar-A program more than a decade ago, we did not understand what constitutes international collaboration. Even now we may have learned only a little about it. In spite of this, most of those involved in the Yohkoh program agree that the Japan-U.S.-U.K. collaboration has been fruitful on all sides. First, we are now confident that, even though our systems for performing activities may differ, Japanese, U.S., and U.K. scientists can pursue the same scientific objectives by sharing our duties and responsibilities as equal partners in a unified team. Differences, large and small, have been overcome by mutual understanding. Scientists who share a common exploration of remarkable discoveries can be unified into a team even in competitive circumstances. Second, the Yohkoh experience has taught us that international cooperation provides an excellent opportunity to learn new methods. Each system may have its own unique advantages. Learning from our international partners has proven quite useful, and I hope that they have also learned from us. To be more specific, for example, a mature analysis software methodology that was first developed for SMM observations has been extended and introduced as a standard in the Yohkoh team. This methodology has been contributing in a major way to enhancing our level of activity. Third, a new generation of scientists who are experienced in international cooperation has emerged from the Yohkoh program. I hope that, under the leadership of these young scientists, the next ISAS solar-physics mission, Solar-B, will provide another example of success in the near future. 5.0 Concluding Remarks The Yohkoh program, the first Japanese international satellite program in the field of solar physics, has provided us with many lessons. The program has been a great success, I believe, thanks to great efforts by our colleagues on the team. The Japanese solar physicists have learned from ISAS as well as from our foreign colleagues how to organize an international cooperation in the satellite mission. Especially important was the principle upon which the international Yohkoh team was organized. The essence was given in the agreement between ISAS and NASA, which has been a good guide for making decisions in a cooperative manner. Preparation of the satellite, mission operations, and cooperative data analysis have been conducted on the same principle: a single, unified team working on a task-sharing basis with everyone's burdens as equal as possible. In the Yohkoh program, team members have equal rights to have access to data taken with any instrument. This has promoted collaborative data analysis between those who have become involved in the team from different starting points. Also the data have been opened to others as far as possible, within the minor constraint of reservation of newly obtained data by the Yohkoh team for 1 year. I believe this open-data policy has been effective in expanding the number of Yohkoh data users beyond the Yohkoh team. This brief paper is not intended to describe fully all aspects of the Yohkoh program. Instead it is almost a private memo on what the author has been involved in as one of the secretaries of the program under the guidance of the project manager, Professor Y. Ogawara. Each topic is touched on briefly, without detailed information on the individuals who have mainly contributed to the program.

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APPENDIX E

41

YOHKOH—THE VIEW FROM EUROPE: AN ACCOUNT OF THE COLLABORATIVE PRODUCTION OF THE U.K./U.S./JAPANESE BRAGG CRYSTAL SPECTROMETER J.L. Culhane Mullard Space Science Laboratory 1.0 Historical Background 1.1 Origins and the Nature of Yohkoh and the Bragg Crystal Spectrometer • Japan, U.S., and U.K. research groups had flown three high-resolution Bragg Crystal X-ray spectrometers in the early 1980s. • The instruments—on the Hinotori (National Astronomical Observatory of Japan (NAOJ) / Institute for Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS), P78-1 (U.S. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) and Solar Maximum Mission (SMM) / (Lockheed/Mullard Space Science Laboratory (MSSL) / Rutherford Appleton Laboratory (RAL)) spacecraft—obtained several important results on solar flares and active regions. • The Bragg crystal spectrometer (BCS) was accepted for flight on Solar-A (Yohkoh) by ISAS in late 1986. • The U.K. Science and Engineering Research Council (SERC) support for MSSL and RAL, and U.S. NRL internal funding from its E.O. Hulburt Center for Space Research, were agreed on in January 1987. • Instrument heritage was derived from the U.K.-designed curved or bent crystal spectrometer, which was flown on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) SMM in February 1980. • This configuration was chosen because: — The Yohkoh mission plan emphasized solar flare observations with focus on time and spectral but not spatial resolution; — Flight heritage existed from the instrument; — An instrument with 10 times greater sensitivity than its predecessors could be accommodated on Yohkoh; and — A conventional scanning spectrometer would have been massive and complex. 1.2 Attitudes • Having pioneered the technique in the 1960s and following SMM, U.K. hardware groups retained substantial interest and expertise in high-resolution solar X-ray spectroscopy. • Because Japan's Solar-A looked set to become the world's next major solar physics mission, discussions about U.K. involvement (K. Tanaka/Culhane/Gabriel) began in the early 1980s. • The U.K. X-ray astronomy community had already engaged in a highly successful collaboration with ISAS in the Ginga mission. • In Japan, although there was interest in X-ray spectroscopy following the success of Hinotori, there was uncertainty about the capability of the curved crystal technique, particularly as to its sensitivity. • Given in addition the modest spacecraft resource available on Solar-A, the Japanese community took some time to reach a consensus for acceptance of the BCS.

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• In the United States, the NRL and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) groups possessed unrivaled skills and facilities for bending, mounting, and calibrating curved crystals. The NRL group in particular wished to follow up its very successful solar flare work undertaken with P78-1. • Although U.K. and U.S. groups were involved at the hardware phase of Yohkoh, the wide availability of the Yohkoh shared software has allowed European groups to participate significantly in the data analysis phase of the mission. • Groups from the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia have been involved in Yohkoh data analysis. Many European groups have used the Yohkoh Data Archive Centre at MSSL. 1.3 Politics • The main parties for implementation of the Yohkoh mission were ISAS and NASA. • In the United Kingdom the MSSL group, supported by RAL, proposed a bilateral involvement with Japan and secured U.K. funding subject to Japanese acceptance of the BCS for flight on Yohkoh. • The hardware groups proposed on behalf of the U.K. solar community, although this was comparatively small at the time. • With the limited U.K. resources available and the need to access the world-leading curved crystal skills at NIST, involvement of the United States was important. • Flexible and imaginative use of the NASA Explorer budget line had enabled major NASA participation in provision of the soft X-ray telescope (SXT). • Given the required level of U.S. funding for SXT, support for other instruments was not possible. • With the agreement of the superintendent of the NRL Space Science Division (Herb Gursky), internal funds were used to procure the mounted bent crystals and to fabricate the instrument structure. • Following acceptance of the BCS by ISAS, a Japanese principal investigator (Professor E. Hiei) and an instrument scientist (Dr. T. Watanabe) assumed responsibility for the BCS program in Japan. 2.0 Cooperation 2.1 General Implementation • Following the ISAS/U.K. collaboration for Ginga, a generic, or umbrella, agreement between SERC (later the Particle Physics and Astronomy Research Council (PPARC)) and the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports, and Culture (Monbusho) was already in place. • A specific subagreement between ISAS and MSSL enabled the Yohkoh collaboration for the BCS. • A separate agreement between MSSL and NRL enabled the U.S. participation. • Features of the collaboration, which were new for U.K. participants, included: — The existence of a Solar-A mission science team. Although informal and evolving, U.K. (and U.S.) participants became members and accepted rights, duties, and responsibilities. — A language barrier, which made the role of the Japanese instrument scientist mission critical. — By comparison with European Space Agency and NASA programs, a degree of flexibility in interface definition, which may have been related to the scale of the Solar-A program. — A very different software and mission operations philosophy, with operations conducted by the participating scientists. — A consequent Japanese sensitivity to “data rights” issues given that it was unreasonable to expect practicing solar scientists to be disadvantaged by the need to operate the mission.

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2.2 Software and Operations Implementation • •

•

• • •

• •

Prior to the launch of Yohkoh, the approaches to data analysis software differed significantly among Japanese, U.S., and U.K. participants. By virtue of the investment and effort particularly by the Lockheed group, the mission has developed a software structure (SolarSoft) that has been extended to subsequent missions (e.g., Solar and Heliospheric Observatory (SOHO), Transition Region and Coronal Explorer (TRACE)). Software is maintained at sites in the U.S. (Lockheed and NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center) and in the U.K. (MSSL), as well as at ISAS. Expertise in the use of the Yohkoh instruments is also available at these sites. The “mission science” approach to Yohkoh data exploitation has allowed the broadly based development of appropriate analysis software and its resulting wide availability. The Japanese approach to operations, which entails mission science team members sharing operational duties on a rotational basis, was at first unfamiliar to U.K. participants. Although language and cultural differences were initially a problem, these difficulties have been largely overcome with, as in the case of the approaches to software development, a willingness on the part of all participants to take a flexible and responsive approach. The PPARC continues to support mission operations in Japan. It is arguably the case that mission operations, when conducted by dedicated, competent, and committed people, are much less likely to lead to operational errors, or in worst case, loss of mission. Yohkoh experience in this regard compares favorably with that of other missions.

2.3 Rights and Benefits • The need for Yohkoh science team members and associates to devote substantial time to operations generates a requirement that these individuals should retain a meaningful opportunity to achieve and to participate in major scientific discoveries. • This in turn has led to the reservation of rights to current data for a period of 1 year for the Yohkoh science team members. • The smaller size of the U.K. community and the ability to explain the situation to them meant that the data rights issue posed less difficulty than in the United States. • The richness of the mission data has meant in practice that few priority disputes have occurred. Instead there have been sufficient outstanding results for all participants to feel amply rewarded. • The U.K. community in particular has benefited from: — Participation in a world-leading mission whose results have revolutionized solar physics; — Recognition of the achievements of U.K. participants, which is leading to significant growth in the strength and size of the U.K. community; — Strengthened ties with European solar physics groups through joint analysis of Yohkoh data; — Use of the data in space weather and other applied programs; and — Exploitation of Yohkoh in the area of public understanding of science, or public outreach. 3.0 Lessons Learned • Highly effective collaboration can be achieved among Japanese, U.S., and European scientists in executing major missions in solar physics.

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• All participants have learned the virtues (and difficulties) of each other's methods and approaches, in such areas as software methodology, operations, mission optimization, and selection procedures. • The benefits of the science team approach, previously applied by U.S. and U.K. groups to a single instrument on SMM, can be achieved for an entire mission. • The U.K. solar physics community has learned better to work coherently and has been significantly strengthened as a result. • A new software base (SolarSoft) has been developed that is being applied to a growing range of solar physics space missions and ground-based data sets. • Different schools of solar physics have been engaged with each other to mutual benefit. 4.0 Issues for the Future • Can the Yohkoh hardware, software, and operations methodologies be applied effectively to Solar-B? • Can we learn from the TRACE mission experience on operations in Sun-synchronous orbit? • Can the science team approach remain effective in the more complex Solar-B mission with its greater diversity of instruments?

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APPENDIX E

45

COMMENTS ON THE SOLAR-A (YOHKOH) MISSION H.S. Hudson University of California, San Diego and Solar Physics Research Corporation 1.0 Introduction / Mission Profile The Solar-A spacecraft, which became Yohkoh upon launch, was the second Sun-observing satellite of the Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS), following Hinotori (1981). The participants in Solar-A were ISAS and other Japanese institutions under the ISAS lead, plus various U.S. and U.K. institutions under the management of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and Science and Engineering Research Council (later the Particle Physics and Astronomy Research Council, PPARC). The fundamental objective of Solar-A was the study of solar flares at high energies—these were the Hinotori target as well—and the mission continues successfully at present, following an August 1991 launch. The author of these notes acted as a go-between during the original planning of the U.S. participation in Solar-A, aided NASA in the selection of its team, and since launch has acted as the senior resident U.S. representative for mission operations and science. Because the notes below are verbose, the key points are summarized as bullets first: • Solar-A was launched 8 years ago, became Yohkoh, and continues to provide widely used data. • Current research notes are maintained on a World-Wide Web periodical, found at . • From the U.S. point of view, Yohkoh has been a success, both scientifically and with regard to popular impact. • The major shortcoming on the U.S. side was probably the lack of a guest investigator program, from the point of view of both funding and perception. 1.1 Hardware and Software Yohkoh carries four instruments: (1) a hard X-ray telescope (HXT) (an imager based on shadow formation, a development of Minoru Oda's1 original “modulation collimator”); (2) a grazing-incidence soft X-ray telescope (SXT) in the heritage of many rocket observations and the Skylab Apollo Telescope Mount; (3) a Bragg crystal spectrometer (BCS) for high-resolution soft X-ray emission-line spectroscopy; and (4) an X-ray/gamma-ray counter instrument. All the instruments worked properly (and are still working). The data and an extensive shared software environment are broadly distributed; the software system, with heritage from the Solar Maximum Mission, has further evolved to become SolarSoft, a large IDL-based software environment widely used in other space missions. 1.2 Operations and Science The Yohkoh operations, based at ISAS, involve a multinational team, but with the principal burden falling on the Japanese community of solar scientists. NASA provides extensive downlink telemetry coverage via Wallops and Deep Space Network tracking stations, but uplink is solely through ISAS's Kagoshima Space Center in Kyushu. The Yohkoh data continue to be valuable, in spite of the

1

Oda was one of the pioneers of X-ray astronomy and returned from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to foster this new branch of astronomy in Japan. He later became a director general of ISAS.

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APPENDIX E

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new missions (Solar and Heliospheric Observatory (SOHO) and Transition Region and Coronal Explorer (TRACE)), because of the complementarity of the data sets. In the tradition that has developed in solar astronomy, the data are widely shared among research workers using these instruments (and ground-based observatories), now aided by an extensive network of Web resources. For those interested, a weekly Web journal written by the SXT2 observers routinely documents the science operations (for example, many of the weekly pages describe aspects of the coronal mass ejection-predicting sigmoid patterns discovered with Yohkoh observations). A chronological list of these pages is available online at . 2.0 Historical Background 2.1 Planning The initial impetus for Solar-A came from Japan, stimulated by the strength of the X-ray astronomy group at ISAS, as well as the success of Hinotori in 1981. Two communities of solar researchers in Japan wished to continue observations from space, essentially the community derived from the cosmic-ray side and with roots in classical solar astronomy. Much of the heritage of X-ray and gamma-ray astronomy rests on the cosmic-ray community (for example, the founding fathers of X-ray astronomy in the United States, including Minoru Oda and Bruno Rossi, came from schools of cosmic-ray research). In terms of spacecraft design, there was a clear distinction between these two communities. One group preferred the old technology of spin-stabilized spacecraft (all that ISAS had done prior to Yohkoh, including Hinotori), and the other preferred three-axis stabilization to permit long, steady telescope exposures. The astronomers won this debate, and Yohkoh was on its way, but a flare-oriented mission really required a state-of-the-art hard X-ray or gamma-ray imager. This instrument had to overcome the handicap of a nonrotating spacecraft, and a Japanese team led by Keizo Kai (National Astronomical Observatory of Japan (NAOJ)), and including T. Kosugi (NAOJ), K. Makishima (University of Tokyo), and T. Murakami (ISAS) accomplished this difficult task. A similar community existed in the United States, and it is interesting to note that the recent Small Explorer selection of the high-energy solar spectroscopic imager (HESSI) essentially changed to the other branch of flare research following Skylab and subsequent U.S. solar missions, all of which have had three-axis stabilization. HESSI, however, aims at high-resolution hard X-ray and gamma-ray imaging spectroscopy, using an inexpensive spin-stabilized satellite not so different conceptually from Hinotori. The United States was presented with the Japanese decision for a three-axis spacecraft and by an almost effortless consensus decided that an SXT based on grazing-incidence mirror technology and a charge-coupled device (CCD) detector would be an ideal U.S. contribution. The results from Skylab, the Orbiting Solar Observatory series of spacecraft, and many rocket flights strongly pointed in this direction. The U.S. research groups had thus for many years pursued this kind of observation, but with limited technology. On Skylab, for example, film was the image readout device. To do coronal imaging in its natural soft X-ray emission range with a CCD detector had great appeal. A CCD is linear and very sensitive, therefore, a satellite-borne SXT could basically add the time dimension to the two spatial dimensions shown off by the earlier observations. The major Japanese instrument on Yohkoh, therefore, became the hard X-ray imager, which operated without the advantage of spin stabilization. The HXT became successful as the third (following the Solar Maximum Mission and Hinotori) solar hard X-ray imager, greatly extending the energy range and sensitivity of the previous observations.

2

The hardware, camera software, and data analysis software for the soft X-ray telescope were prepared by Lockheed Palo Alto Research Laboratory, with Loren Acton (now at Montana State University) as the principal investigator.

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APPENDIX E

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2.2 Motivation Yohkoh was relatively easy to promote as a cooperative program. The X-ray astronomy group at ISAS, led originally by Minoru Oda and later by Yasuo Tanaka, had achieved independent success with Japanese satellites and instrumentation. However, it was clear that to do the best science required international cooperation. The Xray astronomy group, the ISAS patron of Yohkoh, therefore, had a strong interest in pursuing U.S. collaborations. From the U.S. point of view (here, C. Pellerin, at NASA headquarters, was a key player), the Japanese onceper-year launch schedule made them excellent partners for small missions of a type that NASA was drifting away from in favor of gigantism (the “Great Observatories” program was one example). New technology for observations could be developed and both partners could benefit from it, with the advantage of small missions on relatively short and fixed ISAS-type schedules. Furthermore, Yohkoh would be cheap and could be administered under the line-item Explorer program funding. Thus Yohkoh became a favorite at NASA as well as ISAS, and its success led to further successful collaborations on Asuka (Astro-D) and now Astro-E; this series of missions seems to have confirmed the wisdom of the program encouraged by Pellerin and Tanaka. More recent and nearfuture ISAS astronomy missions, notably Haruka (radio) and Astro-F (infrared), do not have non-Japanese hardware contributions. 2.3 Political Mechanisms The ISAS and NASA administrative systems differ radically in terms of the selection process. NASA required an announcement of opportunity (AO) competition for its contribution to Yohkoh. David Bohlin of NASA HQ developed the AO and oversaw the program development. In the case of Solar-A, the mismatch of national styles was really no problem; a science working group (convened by D. Bohlin and chaired by H. Hudson) discussed the science and rather easily concluded that a grazing-incidence SXT must happen. The AO therefore could more or less focus on this item, the Japanese preference anyway, as endorsed by the U.S. working group, and the AO could have a fairly sharp definition of the scientific investigation. In response to the narrowly defined AO for U.S. participation in Solar-A, there were three proposals; all were good but involved interestingly different technologies. The system had worked admirably! Better yet, the SXT was then built and is still working well. 2.4 The U.K. Involvement At an early stage in the Solar-A concept development, the inclusion of a Bragg crystal X-ray spectrometer looked possible, as long as it was minor from the point of view of spacecraft resources and did not tap NASA funding. This would fill a gap in the observations, because SXT could only coarsely characterize flare plasma conditions via its broadband filters. The inclusion of spectroscopy of X-ray emission lines would then parallel the spectroscopy of gamma-ray emission lines, already on board Solar-A in the form of BGO (bismuth germanate) scintillation counters. A consortium, led by L. Culhane of Mullard Space Science Laboratory (MSSL), that consisted of Naval Research Laboratory and National Institute of Standards and Technology programs in the United States and MSSL and Rutherford Appleton Laboratory in the United Kingdom, could build this experiment at no cost to NASA, so it was included. With this experiment, the Solar-A payload consisted of two spectrometers and two imagers.

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APPENDIX E

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3.0 Cooperation 3.1 Administration On the U.S. side, Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) (John Owens) provided low-key but technically effective management. As a result of this good experience, perhaps in spite of the general NASA desire to focus space science at other centers, MSFC has again been given the lead role for U.S. involvement in Solar-B. The partners in Solar-A brought different team structures to the experiment. For example, the acronym “PI” in ISAS jargon refers to “physical instrument,” that is, the flight hardware, rather than “principal investigator.” In addition, the ISAS “principal investigator” role differs strikingly from the NASA one anyway; each Solar-A instrument had a Japanese principal investigator, but these individuals did not necessarily do detailed scientific or technical work, and the more effective team management was at a lower level of seniority. On the U.S. side, a NASA experiment team has co-investigators with carefully defined rights and responsibilities; at ISAS no such legalistic organization exists, and in fact the entire community has a right to participate because of ISAS's unique status in Japanese space research. 3.2 Communication Problems: Shared Software In the Yohkoh program, as mentioned, a common data environment for all the instruments was agreed on at the outset. For the SXT and BCS3 (with heavy foreign involvement) this worked fine, but for the HXT and wideband spectrometer (WBS)4 it did not work so well. The Japanese groups tended to prefer to work with FORTRAN and mainframe computer implementations and were not able to contribute much directly to what became SolarSoft. For HXT this did not present much of a problem; the data were so interesting and important that foreign users provided the SolarSoft structure for data analysis, by adapting the key Japanese FORTRAN developments. This kind of problem of course is not unique either to Yohkoh or to Japan. SOHO did not initially adopt a shared software environment as a project, and at present—even though SolarSoft is an available standard —data from several of the instruments cannot be handled efficiently except with essentially proprietary software. 3.3 Communication Problems: Data Rights One of the knottiest communication problems had to do with data rights. The Japanese and American positions seemed to differ diametrically, especially at the agency level, and these differences resulted in a long negotiation. In the end, the policy embodied in the U.S. AO required the current year's worth of data to be reserved for Yohkoh team members and their collaborators and, following the 1-year proprietary interval, to be in the public domain. This policy has continued to the present. The free use of images for educational and technical purposes (e.g., forecasting) was discussed and eventually approved. A certain degree of community confusion became a by-product of the protracted (and probably overinterpreted) discussion of data rights. Some U.S. researchers developed the impression that Yohkoh data were to be closely held by the investigators, because of Japanese pressure (“gaiatsu” in reverse?). The lack of a guest investigator program probably exacerbated this feeling. In fact, the broad circulation of data analysis software and the wise decision to archive essentially raw data rather than “data products”

3

The BCS observes selected narrow spectral bands in the regions of strong soft X-ray emission lines of S XV, Ca XIX, Fe XXV, and Fe XXVI. L. Culhane of MSSL is the principal investigator. 4 The WBS is an array of proportional counters and scintillation counters for broadband X-ray and gamma ray spectroscopy. Masato Yoshimori of Rikkyo University is the principal investigator.

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APPENDIX E

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resulted in a rather flexible access to the data. Moreover, the Sun cooperated by producing more than enough remarkable objectives for study, and little hard competition for results developed in practice. 3.4 Resolution of the Data-Rights Issue: Who Got What? Within the 1-year exclusion rule, the Yohkoh data have been broadly distributed from ISAS, from the Solar Data Analysis Center at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, and from the European center at MSSL (United Kingdom). The Yohkoh database-style raw data accompanied by full analysis software, which embodies the instrument calibrations, has worked well and provides a model for later missions. The software environment became SolarSoft and now also embraces various ground-based data sets. The result has been that Yohkoh data users in relatively obscure locations have been able to make substantial contributions. Between the main partners, Japan and the United States, which side has been obtaining most of the best scientific results? The answer seems to be that both sides are doing Yohkoh science quite well. The felicitous lack of competitive pressure and the friction that might have gone with it may reflect the different styles of the two communities. The major early phenomenological discoveries of Yohkoh—one could list the soft X-ray jets, the hot cusp sources, the nonmagnetostatic nature of active regions, the “loop-top” hard X-ray sources—were mainly announced by the Japanese side. That this transpired may have resulted partly from the 1-year exclusionary rule, but also partly from the fact that the distribution of databases and software tools, and ISAS Internet access, really did take some start-up time to become efficient. The Japanese have also led the way in applying Yohkoh data to the refinement of traditional solar problem areas, such as the magnetohydrodynamic modeling of magnetic reconnection in solar flares. Major non-Japanese science results, on the other hand, may have tended to be in areas not well known in Japan, such as the study of X-ray counterparts of meter-wave coronal phenomena and coronal mass ejections, various nonflare applications of the soft X-ray images, and theoretical interpretation of some of the discoveries. In summary, the Yohkoh experience clearly shows the value of prompt dissemination of data and software, rather than any policy of private access. 3.5 What the United States Did Wrong The extensive successes of the mission might suggest that very little went wrong. However: • During the hardware development for SXT there was a definite mismatch between the engineering styles of ISAS and NASA. To me this was most obvious in the area of CCD camera development, the responsibility of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. There were many agonizing difficulties, with communication problems, schedule and cost impacts, and hard feelings. Although the successful Lockheed proposal for SXT was based on the concept that flightworthy CCDs existed, in fact they did not, and NASA had to pay for a special production run at Texas Instruments (Japan) late in the program. • Quite near launch, a NASA administrative blunder almost caused the unspeakable horror of a launch slip. This was the result of an unnecessary “end-to-end” focus test (the Hubble focus problem had just been discovered) within months before launch. The test damaged the flight CCD and a backup had to be substituted at the last minute. • An important component of SXT, the aperture entrance filter, ruptured about 14 months into the mission (the exact reason for this event is not currently known). This problem made it impossible to derive adequate coalignment information for SXT images from SXT data. Luckily, sensors on the HXT could be used; these are now decaying but still work almost well enough.

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APPENDIX E

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• There was no independently funded guest investigator program for SXT. As mentioned elsewhere in these notes, this situation not only reduced the data analysis effort directly because of lack of funding, but also probably contributed to the wrong impression regarding data policy. 3.6 How the United States Has Benefited from Yohkoh and How Science Is Benefiting in General It is difficult now to attend a solar session of any major meeting, on any continent, and not see Yohkoh data being used. There are two aspects to this. First, the Yohkoh movie of the soft X-ray corona, some 50 images per day, nicely characterizes the solar origins of space weather. The movie essentially provides maps to the origins of the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES) soft X-ray photometry, provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, long used to characterize the time development of coronal magnetic activity. Second, the movie of routine images itself, but even more so the special data sets covering flares and other activity, form the basis for a great deal of unique Yohkoh research. In the sense that science is fundamentally international and no one nation's property, the solar community worldwide benefits a great deal from the existence of the Yohkoh data. However, national programs exist at least partly because of national interests, so it makes sense to inquire about narrow U.S. benefits. One main measure of the benefit of a “big science” program, of which Yohkoh represents a small example, might be the training of graduate students, especially in terms of their participation in the instrumentation. Because the lead U.S. institutions involved in Yohkoh are large commercial or public laboratories, students were not involved to a great extent in the instrumentation. However the SXT team made a special point to incorporate universities (specifically Stanford, Berkeley, and Hawaii, and now Montana State) directly into the project, so that observational Ph.D. theses based on Yohkoh data or related theory did happen. Probably as many Yohkoh-based Ph.D. theses have been written outside Japan as inside, including several in Europe from groups not connected in any formal way with the instrument groups. A separate plus on the U.S. ledger, of course, has to do with the successful development of high-technology instrumentation mainly from U.S. sources. This contributes to the development of optics, detectors, and software technology, for example. 4.0 What Lessons Were Learned, and How Can We Apply Them? The era of a simple U.S.-Japanese collaboration on a small space mission seems to have ended, because ISAS no longer schedules small missions. This is a flip-flop in comparison with the U.S. programs, which, starting about the time Yohkoh began development, saw a renewal of interest in flexible small flight opportunities. So the cultures of space science in the two countries seem to have traded places to a certain extent. This is also reflected in the speed of development of the programs, with the U.S. space programs now happening on astonishingly short development schedules (e.g., TRIANA, HESSI, or many other Small Explorers (SMEXs) and University Explorers (UNEXs)). For larger missions, such as Solar-B (in phase A following an AO and selection on the U.S. side), the Yohkoh experience may not play much of a role. In comparison the Solar-B payload is extremely complex, and the science that it addresses equally so. How do two quite different science communities plan such a mission together? The basic mechanism regulating the growth of science knowledge, the open literature, moves so ponderously and with such apparent confusion and misunderstanding, that it cannot serve as a good basis for decision making involving a broad community. Thus we have science working groups to define future missions. In the case of Solar-A the next step was pretty clear scientifically; for Solar-B or any other major mission, other forces come into play. Thus the main legacy of Yohkoh may simply be the goodwill of the groups participating in it and the enhanced communications resulting from working within the same program so closely.

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APPENDIX F 51

Appendix F

Perspectives on ASCA

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INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON THE ASCA PROGRAM K. Makishima University of Tokyo 1.0 Introduction ASCA, meaning “flying bird” in Japanese, and also the acronym for Advanced Satellite for Cosmology and Astrophysics, is the fourth Japanese cosmic X-ray satellite, launched in February 1993. This mission includes a significant contribution from the United States supported by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The scientific objective of ASCA is to perform high-sensitivity imaging spectroscopic studies of cosmic high-energy phenomena, covering a broad energy band of 0.5-10 keV. In particular, ASCA is the world's first satellite that can take X-ray images of celestial objects in energies above 4 keV. Furthermore, the ASCA instruments have much better spectral resolution than most of the previously flown cosmic X-ray instruments. The Japanese-U.S. collaboration on ASCA has been implemented in the following way. The X-ray instruments of ASCA have been developed in close collaboration with U.S. scientists based on the agreement between the Institute for Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS) and NASA. These instruments are designed, fabricated, tested, and calibrated as a joint effort of the Japanese and U.S. scientists involved. Also, the U.S side gives a major contribution in the software development and data archiving, and NASA provides partial support to the data acquisition utilizing the Deep Space Network (DSN). The cooperation has been based on three principles. The first is “no exchange of funds,” for obvious practical reasons. The second is to conduct the collaboration in a grassroots manner based on scientist-to-scientist contact, with the least amount of bureaucratic formality possible. Finally, there should be no “black box”; an instrument fabricated in either Japan or the United States should have collaborating groups in both countries, so that its performance is fully understood by both parties. The entire ASCA team has been led by the Project Manager Y. Tanaka (ISAS) and Deputy Project Manager H. Inoue (ISAS), while the U.S. participants are represented by S.S. Holt (Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC)). Japanese institutions participating in the ASCA mission include ISAS, University of Tokyo, Tokyo Metropolitan University, Nagoya University, Osaka University, Kyoto University, RIKEN (The Institute for Physical and Chemical Research), and several other smaller groups. U.S. participation involves NASA/GSFC, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and Pennsylvania State University. In addition, the ASCA team also included the international experiment advisors. 2.0 Historical Background The Japanese-U.S. collaboration in the ASCA mission, formerly called Astro-D, was initiated in the mid-1980s. NASA had the “Great Observatories” program but also maintained strong interest in international collaborations in the missions of other countries. Since the mid-1980s, Y. Tanaka (then director, Space Astrophysics Division, ISAS) and C. Pellerin (then director, Astronomy and Space Science, NASA) had maintained close contact and had actively discussed a possible NASA contribution in the ISAS missions. (U.S. participation in the Yohkoh mission was one of the outcomes.) Both sides agreed to pursue the collaboration in the Astro-D mission. From the NASA side, continuity of research with frequent launch opportunities provided by the ISAS M-3SII launcher was appreciated, and participation of the U.S. scientists in the ISAS missions was considered to contribute to excellent science in specific fields.

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From the Japanese side, international collaboration was considered important to maximize scientific return within the limited resources. It was believed that by joining the expertise and technology of both sides, the most advanced scientific capability could be realized. Also, the Challenger accident had caused a long hiatus in space research in the United States, with no U.S. X-ray astronomy missions since the Einstein Observatory launched in 1979. As a result, participation in the Astro-D mission received strong support from the U.S. X-ray astronomy community. 2.1 Previous Japanese Cosmic X-Ray Missions It may be helpful to briefly review the Japanese X-ray astronomy missions preceding ASCA. The first mission, Hakucho (called CORSA-b before launch), weighing only 96 kg, was launched in February 1979 by the M-3C-4 launcher as a purely Japanese project. It provided the community with valuable lessons as to the satellite project in general, although the observation was limited to galactic objects. The second mission, Tenma (called Astro-B before launch), which was about twice as heavy as Hakucho, was launched in February 1983 using the M-3S-3 launcher. It was also an entirely domestic project. Though rather short lived, Tenma produced a number of fine spectroscopic results, carrying an on-board gas scintillation proportional counter newly developed at ISAS. A number of galactic sources (X-ray binaries, supernova remnants, and so on), as well as a limited number of extragalactic objects (active galactic nuclei and clusters of galaxies), became the research targets. The third X-ray satellite project, Astro-C, was initiated in the early 1980s. It was expected to use the newly developed M-3SII launcher and to become a 400-kg-class spacecraft. The satellite was planned to use the increased capacity for a large-area proportional counter (LAC) array in order to obtain much higher photoncollection capability than before. Then, in 1981, a proposal came from the United Kingdom to collaborate in this mission. The Japanese community decided to collaborate with the U.K. groups in the preparation of the LAC instrument. In addition, a small gamma-ray burst detector was prepared jointly with a U.S. group. The cooperation evolved quite successfully, and Astro-C was launched by M-3SII-3 on February 5, 1987, and was renamed Ginga. The Ginga LAC achieved superior sensitivity, producing many important results on both galactic and extragalactic objects. 2.2 Planning Phase of Astro-D (ASCA) In 1984, when Astro-C (Ginga) was still under construction, a working group (WG) was formed in Japan to plan the fourth X-ray mission. Involving virtually the entire Japanese community working on cosmic X-ray research, the WG considered launching the fourth cosmic X-ray satellite using the next-generation M-V launcher, which was then in the planning phase. Meanwhile, however, it became apparent that M-V development would take longer than originally anticipated. Although M-V allows a much larger payload than M-3SII, the WG proposed launching the fourth X-ray satellite in the early 1990s using the operational M-3SII launcher so as not to break the research continuity. This mission was called Spectroscopic X-Ray Observatory (SXO) in the planning stage, was later renamed Astro-D, and was nicknamed ASCA after launch. The WG agreed that SXO should far exceed Astro-C in sensitivity and exceed Tenma in spectral resolution. To realize such ambitious requirements within payload capability that is essentially the same as Astro-C, SXO was to carry on-board X-ray focusing mirrors, together with imaging spectroscopic X-ray detectors. For the focusing optics, the spacecraft length is too short for an acceptable focal length. An extensible optical bench that is folded during launch and extended in orbit was proposed for a new development program at ISAS. As to the focal plane instruments to measure the position and energy of each incoming X-ray photon, the WG agreed to put on board several, perhaps two, types of instruments with somewhat different characteristics.

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2.3 Collaboration on the X-Ray Mirrors The mirrors on board SXO were to be of the thin-foil optics type, rather than high-precision polished X-ray optics such as were flown on board the Einstein Observatory and would be flown on the Roentgen Satellite (ROSAT; a German mission in collaboration with the United Kingdom and United States). This choice was almost unique for the mass of the satellite (400 kg) but was needed to achieve a high throughput over a sufficiently wide energy range, which is essential for X-ray spectroscopy. At that time there were at least two candidate technologies for such X-ray optics. One was the multinested conical X-ray reflectors using gold-coated thin aluminum foils, which had been developed at NASA GSFC by P. Serlemitsos. The mirrors with this technology provided a key element of the Broadband X-Ray Telescope (BBXRT) experiment, which was one of the Astro-1 payloads about to be flown on board the Space Shuttle in 1990. The other technology was similar conical thin-foil reflectors using plastic substrate, developed in Japan at Nagoya University by K. Yamashita, H. Kunieda, Y. Tawara, and their collaborators. The groups representing these two technologies had actually been collaborating for a few years, including participating in mutual exchanges of scientists. After a series of discussions, both within Japan and between Japan and the United States, it was agreed that the X-ray mirrors on board Astro-D should be a joint U.S.-Japanese project, with P. Serlemitsos (GSFC) being the principal investigator (PI) and H. Kunieda (Nagoya) the co-PI. This collaboration became the XRT (X-Ray Telescope) experiment. In March 1987, C. Pellerin, then director of the NASA Astronomy and Space Science Division, sent to M. Oda, then the ISAS director-general, a letter of intent expressing the willingness of NASA to collaborate with ISAS on SXO, through the production of X-ray mirrors and related activities. The precedent for this type of collaboration on the experiment level was the successful, ongoing ISAS/NASA cooperation on the Solar-A mission (launched in August 1991 and renamed Yohkoh). 2.4 Approval of the Astro-D Project The SXO project was proposed to the ISAS Space Science Committee in 1986 as the fourth X-ray astronomy mission including a significant contribution from NASA and was supported by the space scientist community. The mission was then renamed Astro-D and proposed to the Space Activities Commission (SAC) of Japan for the ISAS mission to be launched in early 1993. The proposal was officially approved in 1987 by SAC, and funding started in April 1988. By that time, Astro-C (Ginga) had already been launched into orbit and was producing numerous important results, including the X-ray detection of the supernova SN1987A. In order to implement the Astro-D mission, an international Astro-D science working group (SWG) was formed. It consisted of those scientists in Japan and the United States who were working directly on Astro-D, including hardware development, software development, spacecraft design/production, and mission operation. The SWG met roughly once per year either in Japan or the United States. The SWG activity lasted not only until Astro-D was launched, but also long after the launch to promote the observational activity. 2.5 Collaboration on the CCD Cameras As to the focal plane instruments on board Astro-D, two different types of detectors were selected. One is the gas scintillation proportional counter, which was developed in Japan and was used successfully in Tenma. This is the gas imaging spectrometer (GIS) instrument, some details of which are given in Section 3.2. The other is a solid-state device, which in general has much better energy resolution than the gas detectors but suffers from smaller collecting areas. When the funding started, there were two options: a

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silicon PIN-type device or X-ray charge-coupled device (CCD). The former was being studied at ISAS and was thought to be available in Japan, but the expected position resolution was rather inadequate. The latter, under development at Osaka University, was thought to have by far the better position resolution and a significantly better energy resolution than the PIN device then available, but high-quality X-ray-sensitive CCD chips were not expected to become available domestically in time. At that time the first space-borne X-ray CCD was chosen as the focal plane detector for the Soft X-Ray Telescope experiment, a joint U.S.-Japanese effort, on board Solar-A (Yohkoh). The Yohkoh CCD was chosen from the commercially produced types (specially fabricated by Texas Instruments, Japan), but these CCDs were operated in the ordinary flux integration mode like the optical CCDs. By then, none of the commercially available CCDs could be used for X-rays in the photon-counting mode (i.e., measuring the charge produced by a single Xray photon). Meanwhile, efforts to develop X-ray photon-counting CCDs were being carried out by several groups in the United States and Europe. Among them, the MIT group, led by G. Ricker, was making significant progress in the development of the AXAF focal plane detector. That group's advantage was that high-quality developmental CCDs were produced at the MIT Lincoln Laboratory. The MIT group was able to convince us that their device and related technology was ready for X-ray spectroscopy application in space. NASA also supported the MIT group's involvement. Accordingly, an agreement was established between NASA and ISAS that the solid-state focal plane instrument would be implemented with two sets of CCD cameras prepared by MIT, as a part of the U.S.-Japanese collaboration, with G. Ricker of MIT serving as the PI and H. Tsunemi of Osaka University as the co-PI. This instrument was called the solid-state imaging spectrometer (SIS). The entire SIS system was completed with frequent exchange of scientists and was thoroughly tested at ISAS by the SIS team. 3.0 Cooperation 3.1 Spacecraft The Astro-D spacecraft was designed, constructed, and tested in Japan under the strong leadership of Y. Tanaka and H. Inoue. The spacecraft was launched successfully into orbit by ISAS on February 20, 1993, using the M-3SII-7 rocket. The launch was entirely a Japanese task. In orbit, the spacecraft was renamed ASCA. 3.2 Scientific Instruments As mentioned in Sections 2.3 and 2.5, ASCA carries on board three scientific instruments: XRT, the SIS, and the GIS. The XRT provides the X-ray optics, while the SIS and the GIS serve as focal plane imaging spectrometers with complementary characteristics. The SIS and GIS observe the same target and acquire data simultaneously. An ASCA observer generally uses the GIS and SIS data together. The XRT consists of four identical multifoil X-ray mirrors and has been developed under U.S.-Japanese cooperation as already described. The four mirrors were fabricated one by one at GSFC under U.S. responsibility and then shipped to Japan, where prelaunch X-ray calibration and environmental tests were carried out under the responsibility of ISAS and Nagoya University. The XRT has quite complicated angular and spectral responses, so that extensive in-orbit calibrations have been conducted as a joint U.S.-Japanese program. The SIS, a joint U.S.-Japanese instrument, uses two X-ray CCD cameras, which occupy focal planes of two of the four XRTs. As mentioned in Section 2.5, the CCD chips were produced at the MIT Lincoln Laboratory. The CCD cameras and the analog electronics were integrated at MIT under U.S. responsibility. The Japanese collaborators at ISAS and Osaka University took responsibility for

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fabricating the digital data processing electronics, as well as the cryogenic system including radiation cooling and heat pipes. The prelaunch tests of the entire SIS system and in-orbit calibration have been conducted as a joint U.S.-Japanese effort. The remaining two XRTs are coupled to the GIS instrument, which is a Japanese experiment led by T. Ohashi of Tokyo Metropolitan University and K. Makishima of Tokyo University, with collaborators at ISAS and several other Japanese institutions. GIS is a position-sensitive gas scintillation proportional counter, newly developed as an extension of the technology previously developed for the Tenma satellite. All the GIS components have been designed, produced, tested, and calibrated in Japan. However, since the ASCA launch, U.S. involvement in the GIS in-orbit calibration has been extensive. 3.3 Spacecraft Operation The uplink to ASCA is available only from Kagoshima Space Center, southern Japan, where transmission of all the necessary commands is accomplished during five ground contacts every day. Usually two Japanese duty scientists are attending at Kagoshima and two more at Sagamihara, the ISAS headquarters for ASCA daily operations. About 40 staff scientists, about 10 postdoctorates, and about 80 graduate students make up the available human resources. In addition one or two U.S. scientists are stationed at ISAS to assist the general ASCA program. In principle there is no direct U.S. involvement in the daily spacecraft operation except the data receiving at NASA Deep Space Network (DSN) stations. The downlink from ASCA is available at Kagoshima, as well as at NASA DSN stations at Canberra, Madrid, Goldstone, and Wallops. The stored data are transmitted to the Kagoshima ground station by a real-time command, whereas data transmission to the DSN stations is automatically done by preloaded programmed commands. 3.4 Data Sharing in the Performance Verification Phase Following the first 2 months of spacecraft run-up and instrument check-out, the next 6 months were used as the performance verification (PV) phase of ASCA. The strategy during the PV phase features one of the most important aspects of the Japanese-U.S. cooperation on ASCA. For the purpose of joint observation, the ASCA team was defined as an assembly of about 100 Japanese, about 30 U.S. scientists, and 1 U.K. scientist, who contributed in hardware development, software development, spacecraft construction, observation planning, or spacecraft operation. Essentially, the ASCA team, which includes many graduate students, is an enlarged version of the Astro-D SWG. Then, the observation plan and the target list were created based in principle on discussions among the entire ASCA team. In practice the targets to be observed were divided into the following categories: (1) instrumental calibration targets, (2) stars and cataclysmic variables, (3) X-ray binaries, (4) supernova remnants and rotation-powered pulsars, (5) normal galaxies, (6) active galactic nuclei, (7) clusters of galaxies, and (8) diffuse X-ray background. For each category, one Japanese and one U.S. scientist were assigned as coordinators. After discussing with each other the possible PV-phase targets in their category, as well as gathering ideas and proposals from the entire team, the coordinators came up with a baseline plan for the relevant category. The final PV-phase observation plan was then generated by adjusting these baseline plans from all the categories. A still more important feature of the PV phase was that all the ASCA data acquired during this time period were made a common property of the ASCA team, that is, they were accessible to any team member. When the time came to analyze the data and write papers, any team member was allowed to sign up for any number of PVphase targets in which he or she was interested. The author list of a specific publication included practically all the team members who signed up for that particular object and contributed to the paper. Normally the category coordinators assigned one principal member for each object, who coordinated the publication but did not necessarily become the top author. This scheme,

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although it appeared somewhat awkward at first sight and forced one-to-one correspondence between targets and publications, in fact worked amazingly well. Further evaluation of this scheme is given in Section 4.0. 3.5 Data Sharing in the Guest Observation Phase When the PV phase ended, all the ASCA observing time became open to guest observations based on competitive proposals. The available observing time, after reserving about 5 percent for the spacecraft and hardware maintenance, was divided into three sectors: 60 percent for the Japanese investigations, 15 percent for the U.S. investigations, and 25 percent for joint Japanese-U.S. investigations. Of the 60 percent Japanese time, 10 percent was allocated for joint European-Japanese investigations. The announcement of opportunity for the ASCA guest observation has been issued semi-regularly every year, through NASA and ISAS simultaneously. Basically, proposals from Japanese scientists are sent to ISAS and are evaluated in Japan, while those from U.S. researchers go through the NASA channel and are evaluated in the United States. For European-Japanese proposals, the European Space Agency offers evaluation, and the result is sent to ISAS. The proposals successfully selected via these channels are then submitted to the merging committee consisting of several Japanese and U.S. representatives. The merging committee makes a necessary adjustment of the time share, taking into account the priority of the proposals. In some cases the committee makes recommendations for merging proposals on the same target or moving one into the 25 percent joint Japanese-U.S. time (except European-Japanese proposals). This joint time provides an implicit way of encouraging joint efforts between guest observations from the two countries, beyond the confines of the ASCA team. 3. 6 Data Archiving Data archiving, which is an important U.S. contribution in the ASCA program, is handled by the High-Energy Astrophysics Center (HEASARC) at NASA/GSFC. All the ASCA data become publicly available after a certain length of time (1 to 1.5 years depending on the condition), and any scientist from any country can have online access to these data by contacting HEASARC. A mirror site exists at ISAS, which is useful for Japanese investigators. HEASARC also provides various services for the convenience of the archival data users worldwide. The assistance of HEASARC is highly appreciated in Japan, because the resources available for these archiving tasks are extremely limited in Japan. 4.0 Lessons Learned The collaboration on ASCA has been highly successful; it enabled putting into orbit the most advanced cosmic X-ray instruments available at that time, despite severe limitations of the spacecraft resources. It has also enabled maximum use, on a worldwide scale, of this high-performance observatory. No major problems or fundamental difficulties have occurred in the course of the collaboration. The best way to illustrate the successful aspects of the ASCA collaboration is that it is now being used, with minor modifications of course, as an ideal template for a similar Japanese-U.S. collaboration on the fifth Japanese cosmic X-ray satellite, Astro-E, to be launched in February 2000. A significant portion of the Astro-E team, again composed of Japanese and U.S. scientists, collaborated on ASCA. The ASCA collaboration has greatly expanded the frontier of X-ray astronomy. As of September 1998, 450 scientific papers on ASCA results have been published in refereed journals. Of these, about 150 have Japanese primary authors, another 150 have non-Japanese primary authors but have Japanese co-authors, and the remaining 150 have no Japanese co-authors. The number of Ph.D. theses written on

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the ASCA data now exceeds 45, and of these about 30 are in Japan. A quantitative way of evaluating the scientific outcome of ASCA was provided by the U.S. Senior Review in 1996, which awarded ASCA the second ranking, after the newly launched ISO mission, among various astrophysics missions in which NASA was involved. One particular benefit brought about by the cooperation is mutual exchange of scientific cultures between Japan and the United States. Obviously, the high-energy astrophysics communities in the two countries have experienced a number of subtle differences in their experiences, methods, attitudes, and mentalities toward solving the same scientific issues. By analyzing the data together and writing a joint paper, people from the two countries became aware of these interesting differences. In particular, many U.S. scientists expressed that the style of the PV-phase investigation (Section 3.4), in which a good balance was achieved between competition and cooperation, was a completely new experience. There will be a similar PV phase for Astro-E, because its merit has been highly evaluated by the communities in the two countries. Finally, it would be unfair not to mention the very successful Japanese-U.K. collaboration on the preceding Ginga (Astro-C) mission. This collaboration greatly helped the Japanese X-ray community to become international, and the positive experience of this international collaboration encouraged the Japanese scientists to commence a still more extensive international cooperation on ASCA. The Ginga joint effort is also highly evaluated in the United Kingdom, where a strong interest is being expressed as to future U.K.-Japanese collaborations in this research field.

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PERSPECTIVES ON ASTRO-D/ASCA John Hughes Rutgers University 1.0 Historical Background 1.1 Timeline of Major U.S. Events on Astro-D • Fall 1987-Spring 1988— — Presentations made to various National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) advisory committees (e.g., the HEAMOWG) to generate support for U.S. involvement in the Astro-D mission — Committees generally supportive but wanted (1) U.S. costs limited to roughly $10 million, (2) a significant share (a minimum of 15 percent) of the observing time for U.S. astronomers, and (3) all data eventually made available for archival analysis — Astro-D project approved as a mission of opportunity, funded under the International Projects program • January 1989—Charge-coupled device (CCD) detector contract let to Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) • October 20, 1989—NASA agreement letter to Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (ISAS) suggesting the terms and conditions acceptable to the U.S. side • March 15, 1990—ISAS acceptance letter for U.S.-Japanese collaboration on Astro-D • February 1991—Astro-D NASA Technical Plan published • June 1991—U.S. Astro-D users group constituted to provide input and guidance to NASA to help ensure optimum scientific return from the Astro-D mission • February 1993—Astro-D launch, renamed Advanced Satellite for Cosmology and Astrophysics (ASCA) • Spring 1993—First NASA announcement of opportunity for ASCA general observers (GOs) • October 1993—Beginning of ASCA GO phase 1.2 Important Players in the ASCA Project on the U.S. Side Alan Bunner, Chief, High Energy Astrophysics Branch Steve Holt, U.S. Astro-D Project Scientist Nick White, Deputy Project Scientist Peter Serlemitsos, Principal Investigator (PI), foil mirrors (Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC)) George Ricker, PI, CCD detectors (MIT) U.S. members of the International Astro-D Science Advisory Committee: Claude Canizares David Helfand Dan McCammon Richard Mushotzky

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1.3 U.S. Contributions to Astro-D • Two single photon counting X-ray CCD cameras including analog electronics and thermoelectric coolers • Four multinested thin-foil conical X-ray mirror assemblies (Wolter-I type) • Use of NASA Deep Space Network tracking station in Australia for additional telemetry downlink contacts to increase overall mission efficiency • Development of data analysis and reduction software, maintenance of an ASCA archive, and dissemination of data to U.S. PIs 1.4 History of CCD Development at MIT (Ricker) • 1984-1987—NASA supporting research and technology (SR&T) funds ($120,000 per year) to evaluate commercial CCDs (mostly from TI) • 1985—Teamed with Penn State (PI) on successful Advanced X-Ray Astronomy Facility (AXAF) proposal for CCD imaging spectrometer. The proposed AXAF devices were fairly conservative but were greatly improved based on the Astro-D experience. AXAF funding was low during Astro-D development. • Late 1980s—Began working with Lincoln Labs • Summer 1987—Ricker convinced Tanaka that CCDs provided considerably better performance than the PIN diodes he was considering at the time for Astro-D. Furthermore, Ricker and his collaborators had built and tested X-ray CCDs, demonstrating both their technical superiority and flight readiness. 1.5 History of Thin-Foil Conical Mirror Development at GSFC (Serlemitsos) • Late 1970s—NASA SR&T funding led to the development of a lightweight X-ray mirror using thin plastic reflectors in the conical approximation. First test of this type of mirror done in 1978 at the X-ray calibration facility of Marshall Space Flight Center • Early 1980s—Successful proposal for a shuttle attached payload experiment called the Broadband X-ray Telescope (BBXRT) using thin metal (aluminum) mirrors with a cryogenic nonimaging solid-state detector at the focus • Early 1988—Rocket launch of a thin-foil mirror telescope to detect X-ray emission from SN1987A (not detected). Experiment performed well, demonstrating flight readiness • 1990—Ten-day shuttle flight of BBXRT. Many X-ray sources were detected and spectra from them were accumulated. This flight dramatically demonstrated the richness of X-ray spectroscopy and pointed toward an exciting future for Astro-D. 2.0 Cooperation: Net Benefits of Collaboration • Access to data for U.S. astronomical community—ASCA filled the gap between the Einstein observatory (1978-1981) and Chandra (formerly AXAF) (1999- ). The ASCA mission has resulted in many scientific publications. In addition, pioneering ASCA studies now allow well-focused follow-up observations with more powerful upcoming U.S./European missions. Finally, the development of new models and analyses led to identification of problems in the basic atomic physics of our spectral emission models.

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• Experience in software development —The only previous GO experience was with the Einstein observatory by the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory. In the late 1980s the same group was developing software for the Roentgen Satellite (ROSAT) emphasizing imaging analysis. Largely under the ASCA program, GSFC developed a software system for X-ray data analysis based on the multimission concept involving generic software tools that can be used by different missions. In addition, standards for data formats were established that are now in use virtually worldwide by X-ray astronomy missions. • In-flight experience—ASCA gave the United States the opportunity to incorporate new features and improvements in upcoming missions. The Chandra CCD project has greatly benefited from experience learned from the ASCA mission, which provided the proof of concept for reducing background (from cosmic rays) using charge distribution morphology and verified the model for proton-induced radiation damage on orbit, which allowed better determination of the amount of shielding required for Chandra. The ASCA experience also convincingly showed the need for full bias maps, an on-board gain calibrator, and extensive preflight CCD calibration. The bottom line is that the ASCA experience was worth considerably more than $4.6 million to the Chandra project. Thin-foil mirror technology also benefited from ASCA. Flight improvements growing out of ASCA resulted in significant reduction in surface micro-roughness and better overall optical figure, leading to a factor-of-two improvement in spatial resolution for Astro-E. 3.0 Lessons Learned, Concerns, and Issues for Future Collaborations • U.S. hardware contributions, guest observer facilities, software development, and mission scientist roles must be competed freely through scientific peer reviews. On ASCA and now Astro-E the hardware contributions were awarded to MIT and GSFC through unsolicited proposals to NASA. In these situations good cases could be made that the groups proposing had a unique capability to provide the required hardware. This will not necessarily be the case in the future. In particular, U.S. contributions to Astro-G should be handled through competitive scientific peer review. This will force groups to produce realistic cost estimates, schedule hardware delivery milestones, and strive to provide the best instruments for the allocated funding, which therefore will be in the best interests of NASA and the U.S. government. Moreover, support for the project among the U.S. X-ray astronomy community will be severely weakened if the hardware contributions are not competitively awarded. On ASCA the U.S. science advisors were chosen by Dr. Tanaka. Astro-E science advisors were selected though a competition in the United States and then approved by the Japanese. This policy, or a similar one, needs to be followed in future collaborations. • On the U.S. side, a mechanism needs to be worked out that allows these international missions of opportunity to be peer reviewed in the context of current U.S. missions in a similar price range. This mechanism needs to consider the potential loss of a U.S.-led mission, due simply to lack of funds (zero-sum game). Also, the United States may decline to participate in an international mission of opportunity if it risks a current or planned U.S. mission. • On the Japanese side, it might be helpful if U.S. involvement could be brought in at an earlier stage. As it appears now, planning for new missions on the Japanese side is done entirely in-house and the international community is presented with a rather advanced mission concept. It seems reasonable to suggest that early involvement might result in more and better collaborations. • Personalities and egos are involved so great care must be taken that proper recognition and credit are given for the important contributions made by both sides. ASCA would not have been the great success it was without both the U.S. and Japanese contributions. The organizations and individuals involved on both sides must strive to always highlight the collaborative nature of the mission in their press releases, Web sites, promotional materials, and so on.

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APPENDIX F

63

• ROSAT, AXAF/Chandra, and X-ray Multi-Mirror Mission have all devoted considerable effort and money to carry out extensive preflight ground calibration and end-to-end testing. As Japanese missions become more complex and powerful, it will be expected by the international community that they attain a similar level of calibration accuracy. This might require the development of more extensive ground calibration facilities. Acknowledgments I would like to acknowledge useful discussions with Pete Serlemitsos, George Ricker, Steve Kahn, and Pat Henry on various aspects of the ASCA mission.

Copyright © 1999. National Academies Press. All rights reserved.

About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution.

APPENDIX G

64

Appendix G Acronyms and Abbreviations

AO ASCA AXAF BBXRT BCS CCD CDAW CGRO CISP COSPAR DSN DUC ELV EML EPIC ESA ESF ESSC GIS GSFC GTL HEASARC HEP HESSI HXT IACG IPL ISAS ISTP JPL JSC KSC LAC LEP MIT MITI MOU MSFC MSSL NAOJ NASA NASCOM NASDA NIST NOAA NRC NRL

announcement of opportunity Advanced Satellite for Cosmology and Astrophysics Advanced X-ray Astronomy Facility (renamed Chandra X-ray Observatory) Broadband X-ray Telescope Bragg crystal spectrometer charge-coupled device coordinated data analysis workshop Compton Gamma Ray Observatory Committee on International Space Programs Committee on Space Research Deep Space Network data use coordinator Expendable Launch Vehicle Equatorial Magnetosphere Laboratory energetic particle and ion composition European Space Agency European Science Foundation European Space Science Committee gas imaging spectrometer Goddard Space Flight Center (United States) Geomagnetic Tail Laboratory Geomagnetic Tail Laboratory high-energy particle High-Energy Solar Spectroscopic Imager hard X-ray telescope Inter-Agency Consultative Group (for space science) Interplanetary Physics Laboratory Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (Japan) International Solar-Terrestrial Physics (program) Jet Propulsion Laboratory (NASA) Science Council of Japan Kagoshima Space Center (Japan) large-area proportional counter low-energy plasma analyzer Massachusetts Institute of Technology Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Japan) memorandum of understanding Marshall Space Flight Center Mullard Space Science Laboratory (United Kingdom) National Astronomical Observatory of Japan National Aeronautics and Space Administration (United States) NASA Communications National Aeronautics and Space Development Agency (Japan) National Institute of Standards and Technology (United States) National Institute of Standards and Technology (United States) National Research Council Naval Research Laboratory (United States)

Copyright © 1999. National Academies Press. All rights reserved.

About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the original typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be retained, and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution.

APPENDIX G

NSSDC OPEN PI PPARC PPL PV RAL ROSAT SAC SCOSTEP SERC SIS SMM SOHO SRC SSB SSOC STS SWG SXO SXT TRACE WBS WG XRT

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NASA's Space Science Data Center Origin of Plasmas in the Earth's Neighborhood principal investigator Particle Physics and Astronomy Research Council (United Kingdom) Polar Plasma Laboratory performance verification Rutherford Appleton Laboratory (United Kingdom) Roentgen Satellite Space Activities Commission (Japan) Scientific Committee on Solar-Terrestrial Physics Science and Engineering Research Council (United Kingdom) solid-state imaging spectrometer Solar Maximum Mission Solar and Heliospheric Observatory SR&T supporting research and technology Space Research Committee (Japan) Space Studies Board (United States) Sagamihara Spacecraft Operation Center (Japan) Space Transportation System science working group Spectroscopic X-Ray Observatory soft X-ray telescope Transition Region and Coronal Explorer wideband spectrometer working group X-ray telescope