US-China Competition and the South China Sea Disputes [1 ed.] 0815380038, 9780815380030

Table of contents :
Contents
List of tables
Acknowledgments
List of contributors
Abbreviations
1 Battlefield or playground?: The rising tensions between the US and China in the South China Sea • Huiyun Feng and Kai He
2 The bargaining dilemma between the United States and China in the South China Sea • Huiyun Feng and Kai He
3 The geography of conflict: South China Sea and US–China Rivalry • Andrew Scobell
4 Chinese thinking on the South China Sea and the future of regional security • Feng Zhang
5 India’s responses to US–China rivalry in the South China Sea • Ian Hall
6 Japan and the South China Sea disputes: Emerging power politics and “fake liberalism” • Christopher W. Hughes
7 The South China Sea as symptom of Asia’s dynamic security order • Nick Bisley
8 When giants vie: China–US competition, institutional balancing, and East Asian multilateralism • See Seng Tan
9 East Asia’s institutional inadequacies and great power rivalry in the South China Sea • Mark Beeson
10 Security regionalism: a new form of strategic competition or cooperation between the United States and China in the South China Sea? • Baogang He
11 Looking to the future: Hypotheses on China’s maritime disputes and US–China relations • Steve Chan
Index

Citation preview

US–China Competition and the South China Sea Disputes

Traditionally, the South China Sea (SCS) issue was not on the negotiation table between the United States and China. However, the tensions between the United States and China over the SCS have gradually simmered up to a strategic level. Why and how did the SCS become a flashpoint between the United States and China? Will the United States and China really go to war over the SCS? Why did China adopt an “assertive” policy towards the South China Sea in the 2000s? What will regional actors do in the face of this “new normal” of competition between China and the United States? Will multilateral institutions in the Asia Pacific alleviate the potential conflicts over the SCS disputes? How will US–Chinese competition in the SCS shape the dynamics of Asian security? This edited book addresses these questions systematically and theoretically, with contributions from leading scholars in the field of US–China relations and Asian security from the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Singapore. It elevates the analysis of the SCS disputes from maritime and legal issues to the strategic level between the United States and China. Huiyun Feng is Senior Lecturer in the School of Government and International Relations at Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia. Kai He is Professor of International Relations in Griffith Asia Institute and Centre for Governance and Public Policy at Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia.

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US–China Competition and the South China Sea Disputes

Edited by Huiyun Feng and Kai He

First published 2018 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2018 selection and editorial matter, Huiyun Feng and Kai He; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Huiyun Feng and Kai He to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Names: Feng, Huiyun, 1971- editor. | He, Kai, 1973- editor. Title: US-China competition and the South China Sea disputes / edited by Huiyun Feng and Kai He. Other titles: United States-China competition and the South China Sea disputes Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2018. | Series: Politics in Asia series | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2017053500| ISBN 9780815380030 (hardback) | ISBN 9781351214308 (e-book) Subjects: LCSH: South China Sea–International status. | Territorial waters–South China Sea Region. | United States–Foreign relations–China. | China–Foreign relations–United States. Classification: LCC KZA1692 .U8 2018 | DDC 355/.033016472–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017053500 ISBN: 9780815380030 (hbk) ISBN: 9781351214308 (ebk) Typeset in Galliard by Taylor & Francis Books

Contents

List of tables Acknowledgments List of contributors Abbreviations 1 Battlefield or playground?: The rising tensions between the US and China in the South China Sea

vii viii x xiv

1

HUIYUN FENG AND KAI HE

2 The bargaining dilemma between the United States and China in the South China Sea

14

HUIYUN FENG AND KAI HE

3 The geography of conflict: South China Sea and US–China Rivalry

29

ANDREW SCOBELL

4 Chinese thinking on the South China Sea and the future of regional security

48

FENG ZHANG

5 India’s responses to US–China rivalry in the South China Sea

65

IAN HALL

6 Japan and the South China Sea disputes: Emerging power politics and “fake liberalism”

82

CHRISTOPHER W. HUGHES

7 The South China Sea as symptom of Asia’s dynamic security order NICK BISLEY

98

vi Contents 8 When giants vie: China–US competition, institutional balancing, and East Asian multilateralism

116

SEE SENG TAN

9 East Asia’s institutional inadequacies and great power rivalry in the South China Sea

134

MARK BEESON

10 Security regionalism: a new form of strategic competition or cooperation between the United States and China in the South China Sea?

151

BAOGANG HE

11 Looking to the future: Hypotheses on China’s maritime disputes and US–China relations

170

STEVE CHAN

Index

186

Tables

3.1 Maritime components of selected historical rivalries 3.2 Contemporary Asia-Pacific rivalries and the South China Sea (SCS) 4.1 Major Fault Lines in Chinese Debates on the South China Sea

34 35 61

Acknowledgments

We started this project with curiosities and surprises. The South China Sea issue – the longtime maritime and territorial disputes among Asian countries, especially between China and its neighbors – suddenly became a flash point between the United States and China in recent years. While the United States blamed China for its assertiveness in the South China Sea after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), China argued that its so-called assertiveness was a reaction to the US “Pivot to Asia” – a containment policy toward China in the eyes of Chinese leaders. The South China Sea issue, therefore, has become a testing ground for the two great powers to showcase their resolve and commitment, as well as to compete for power and influence in the Asia Pacific. There are numerous studies of US–China Relations on the one hand, and of the South China Sea disputes on the other. However, few links these two topics together. It is why we have initiated this project, in order to shed some light on the relationships between these two important topics in this book. We hope that this book can not only help readers obtain a better understanding of US–China relations in the context of the South China Sea disputes, but also make good sense of the future of the South China Sea disputes within the broad background of US–China competition in the 21st century. We would like to thank Griffith University’s research funds from the Areas of Strategic Investment (ASI), Griffith Asia Institute (GAI), and Center for Government and Public Policy (CGPP) for their generous support of this project. We appreciate the institutional support from GAI as well as the efforts of its skillful staff for successfully organizing a two-day conference in Brisbane on October 17– 18, 2016. Personally, we would like to thank Jason Sharman, our former colleague at Griffith (now at Cambridge) for his encouragement and help with this project. We are grateful to the contributors in this volume as well as all of the participants in the conference for their innovative contributions, sharp comments, and constructive suggestions on the project. We would also like to thank Professor Stephen Walker, our mentor and friend, for his suggestions and advice as always. At the publication stage, we are very grateful for the support and encouragement from Simon Bates, our editor from Routledge. Last but not least, we are indebted to the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Australian Research Council (ARC). We were fortunate to

Acknowledgments

ix

transfer our MacArthur grant (16–1512–150509-IPS) to Griffith University in 2016 so that we could buy out some teaching time in order to focus on research projects like this one. Kai He received an ARC Future Fellowship (Project ID: FT160100355) in 2016, which also provided him precious time to work on this project in 2017. Huiyun Feng and Kai He Brisbane, Australia

Contributors

Mark Beeson is Professor of International Politics University of Western Australia. Before rejoining UWA at the beginning of 2015, he taught at Murdoch, Griffith, Queensland, York (UK) and Birmingham, where he was also head of department. His work is centered on the politics, economics, and security of the broadly conceived Asia-Pacific region. He is the author of more than 150 journal articles and book chapters, co-editor of Contemporary Politics, and the founding editor of Critical Studies of the Asia Pacific (Palgrave). Recent books include: Institutions of the Asia-Pacific: ASEAN, APEC and Beyond, (Routledge, 2009), Securing Southeast Asia: The Politics of Security Sector Reform, (with Alex Bellamy, Routledge, 2008), Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia: Politics, Security and Economic Development, 2nd ed. (Palgrave, 2014), China’s Regional Relations: Evolving Foreign Policy Dynamics, (with Fujian Li Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2014), and edited collections Issues in 21st Century World Politics (with Nick Bisley, Palgrave, 2013), and The Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism, Routledge (with Richard Stubbs, Routledge, 2012). Nick Bisley is Head of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences and Professor of International Relations at La Trobe University. His research and teaching expertise is in Asia’s international relations, globalization and the diplomacy of great powers. Nick is currently the Editor-in-Chief of the Australian Journal of International Affairs, the country’s oldest scholarly journal in the field of International Relations. Nick is a director of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, a member of the Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific and has been a Senior Research Associate of the International Institute of Strategic Studies and a Visiting Fellow at the EastWest Center in Washington DC. Nick is the author of many works on international relations, including Issues in 21st Century World Politics, 3rd ed. (Palgrave, 2017), Great Powers in the Changing International Order (Lynne Rienner, 2012), and Building Asia’s Security (IISS/Routledge, 2009, Adelphi No. 408). He regularly contributes to and is quoted in national and international media including The Guardian, The Economist, and South China Morning Post. Nick also regularly hosts “Asia Rising”, the podcast of La Trobe Asia which examines the news and events of Asia’s states and societies.

List of contributors xi Steve Chan is a College Professor of Distinction of Political Science and Director of the Farrand Residence Academic Program at the University of Colorado, Boulder. He was the recipient of the Karl W. Deutsch award of the International Studies Association, Boulder Faculty Assembly Award for Excellence in Research, and CU Parents Association’s Marinus Smith Award for excellence in teaching. His other awards in recent years include a fellowship from the East Asian Institute (Seoul), the A&S College Scholar Award at the University of Colorado, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation Award of Japan sponsored by the East-West Center, and the Distinguished Scholar Award given by the Foreign Policy Analysis section of the International Studies Association. His work has appeared in journals such as the American Political Science Review, Comparative Political Studies, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, Security Studies, and World Politics. His most recent books are Trust and Distrust in Sino-American Relations (Cambria Press, 2017); China’s Troubled Waters: Maritime Disputes in Theoretical Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2016); Enduring Rivalries in the Asia Pacific (Cambridge University Press, 2013); and Looking for Balance: China, the U.S., and Power Balancing in East Asia (Stanford University Press, 2012). Huiyun Feng is Senior Lecturer in the School of Government and International Relations at Griffith University in Brisbane, Australia. She is a former Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar at United States Institute of Peace. Her publications have appeared in the European Journal of International Relations, Security Studies, The Pacific Review, International Politics, Chinese Journal of International Politics, and Asian Perspective. She is the author of Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Confucianism, Leadership and War (Routledge, 2007) and the co-author of Prospect Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis in the Asia Pacific: Rational Leaders and Risky Behavior (Routledge, 2013). Ian Hall is Professor of International Relations and a member of Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia. He is also an Academic Fellow of the Australia India Institute at the University of Melbourne. His recent publications include Dilemmas of Decline: British Intellectuals and World Politics, 1945–1975 (2012) and, as editor, The Engagement of India: Strategies and Responses (2014). His research interests include the history of international thought, diplomacy, and Indian foreign policy. Baogang He is Professor and Chair of International Relations at Deakin University. He has published 6 single-authored books, 63 international refereed journal articles including papers for British Journal of Political Science, Journal of Peace Research, Political Theory, and Perspectives on Politics. In addition, he published 3 books, 15 book chapters and 63 journal papers in Chinese. With an impressive track record of attracting 20 grants amounting to a total amount of S$2 million in research funding, Baogang has actively collaborated in several key international research projects. He has also held several honorary appointments and research fellowships at renowned universities including Stanford

xii List of contributors University, University of Cambridge, Columbia University, Leiden, and Sussex University. Kai He is Professor of International Relations in Griffith Asia Institute and Centre for Governance and Public Policy at Griffith University in Brisbane, Australia. He is currently an Australian Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow (2017– 2020). He was a postdoctoral fellow in the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program (2009–2010). He is the author of Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacific: Economic Interdependence and China’s Rise (Routledge, 2009), the co-author of Prospect Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis in the Asia Pacific: Rational Leaders and Risky Behavior (Routledge, 2013), and the author of China’s Crisis Behavior: Political Survival and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, 2016). Christopher Hughes is Professor of International Politics and Japanese Studies and the former Head of the Department of Politics and International Studies, Warwick University. Previously he was Research Associate at the Institute for Peace Science, Hiroshima University (IPSHU). From 2000 to 2001 he was Visiting Associate Professor, and in 2006 he held the Asahi Shimbun Visiting Chair of Mass Media and Politics, both at the Faculty of Law, University of Tokyo. He is an honorary Research Associate at IPSHU, and has been a Research Associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and Visiting Scholar at the East Asia Institute, the Free University of Berlin. In 2009–2010 he was the Edwin O. Reischauer Visiting Professor of Japanese Studies at the Department of Government, Harvard University, and is currently an Associate in Research at Harvard’s Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies. Research scholarships have been received from the Japanese Ministry of Education, the Japan Foundation Endowment Committee, the European Union, the British Council, and the British Academy. Andrew Scobell is Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation. Prior to joining the RAND corporation, he was an associate professor of international affairs at the George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service and director of the China certificate program at Texas A&M University in College Station, Texas. From 1999 until 2007, he was associate research professor in the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College and adjunct professor of political science at Dickinson College, both located in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Andrew is author of China’s Search for Security (Columbia University Press, 2012) with Andrew J. Nathan, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (Cambridge University Press, 2003), more than a dozen monographs and reports, as well as several dozen journal articles and book chapters. He has also edited or co-edited 12 volumes on various aspects of security in the Asia-Pacific region, including PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking (Stanford University Press, 2015) with Phillip C. Saunders.

List of contributors

xiii

See Seng Tan is Professor of International Relations and Deputy Director of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, RSIS, Nanyang Technological University. A student of Asian security, he is the author/editor of 15 books and monographs, and has published over 70 scholarly articles and book chapters. His latest (single authored) books include Multilateral Asian Security Architecture: Non-ASEAN Stakeholders (Routledge, 2015) and The Making of the Asia Pacific: Knowledge Brokers and the Politics of Representation (Amsterdam UP, 2013). He is a regular consultant for international organizations and national governments including that of Singapore, and has held visiting appointments and fellowships at various universities and research institutes. He was Head of the RSIS Centre for Multilateralism Studies until April 2015. Before entering academia, he worked at a faith-based, non-profit organization. He has BA Honours (First) and MA degrees from the University of Manitoba and his PhD is from Arizona State University. Feng Zhang is a Fellow in Department of International Relations, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs at Australian National University. He is also an adjunct professor at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies in China. He has received visiting research fellowships from the East Asian Institute of the National University of Singapore and the Guangdong Institute of International Strategy in China. His research focuses on Chinese foreign policy and strategy, Asia-Pacific maritime security, and international relations theory. He is the author of Chinese Hegemony: Grand Strategy and International Institutions in East Asian History (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015). His articles have appeared in leading international relations journals including the Chinese Journal of International Politics, European Journal of International Relations, Review of International Studies, and Survival. He writes a column on China’s international relations for The Paper (Shanghai), and also contributes to Foreign Policy (US), ChinaFile (US), The Strategist (aspistrategist.org.au), and International Public Policy Review (Singapore).

Abbreviations

A2/AD ADB ADIZ ADMM ADMM-Plus AFC AIIB AMF AMM APEC APT ARF ASEAN ASW BIMSTEC BRI CECA CICA CMI COC CSCAP CSIS DFAT DOC DOD DPJ EAMA EAMF EAS

anti-access/area denial Asian Development Bank Air Defense Identification Zone ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus Asian Financial Crisis Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (China) ASEAN Maritime Forum ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ASEAN plus Three ASEAN Regional Forum Association of Southeast Asian Nations Anti-Submarine Warfare Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation Belt and Road Initiative Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia Chiang Mai Initiative Code of Conduct Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic and International Studies Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia Declaration of Conduct Department of Defense Democratic Party of Japan East Asia multilateral architecture Expanded AMF East Asia Summit

Abbreviations EEZ EU FON FONOPS GDP ICJ IISS IMF IONS IORA ISR JCG JMOD LDP MDA MEA MOD MOFA MOU MSDF MTDP NDPG NISCS NSG NSS OBOR ODA PCA PECC PLA PLAN PRC ROC SAARC SAR SCO SCS SEATO SLIC SLOCs TAC TCOG

Exclusive Economic Zone European Union Freedom of Navigation Freedom of Navigation Operations Gross Domestic Product International Court of Justice International Institute for Strategic Studies International Monetary Fund Indian Ocean Naval Symposium Indian Ocean Regional Association intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance Japan Coast Guard Japanese Ministry of Defense Liberal Democratic Party (Japan) Maritime Domain Awareness Ministry of External Affairs Ministry of Defence Ministry of Foreign Affairs Memorandum of Understanding Maritime Self-Defence Force Mid-Term Defense Program National Defence Program Guidelines National Institute for SCS Studies Nuclear Suppliers Group National Security Strategy One Belt One Road Official Development Assistance Permanent Court of Arbitration (The Hague) Pacific Economic Cooperation Council People’s Liberation Army People’s Liberation Army Navy People’s Republic of China Republic of China South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation search and rescue Shanghai Cooperation Organization South China Sea Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Slow Intensity Conflict Sea Lines of Communication Treaty of Amity and Cooperation Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group

xv

xvi Abbreviations TPP TSD TTIP UNCLOS

Trans-Pacific Partnership Trilateral Strategic Dialogue Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

1

Battlefield or playground? The rising tensions between the US and China in the South China Sea Huiyun Feng and Kai He

Traditionally, the South China Sea (SCS) issue has not been on the negotiation table between the United States and China. However, the tensions between the United States and China over the SCS have gradually warmed up to a strategic level in recent years. The United States Navy started its first Freedom of Navigation (FON) operation by entering the waters within 12 nautical miles of the Subi and Mischief reefs where China conducted land reclamation in the disputed Spratly islands on October 27, 2015. In 2016, the US conducted more FON operations in the Paracels and Spratly Islands. As The New York Times put it, the major purpose of US FON operations was to “challenge Beijing’s ambitions in the South China Sea”, because China’s land reclamation projects in the South China Sea “hamper efforts to manage and resolve territorial and maritime disputes peacefully” (New York Times 2015; US Department of Defense 2015: 14). China issued diplomatic protests against US FON operations in the South China Sea by saying the US actions threatened China’s sovereignty and security interests. In addition, it was reported that China deployed missiles on Woody or Yongxing Island in the Paracels. On May 19, 2016 two Chinese fighter jets intercepted a US military reconnaissance aircraft over the South China Sea. While the US described the Chinese fighters’ actions as “unsafe”, China’s Foreign Ministry demanded that the United States immediately cease this type of close surveillance near China (Ali and Rajagopalan 2016). In January, 2017 the new Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson compared China’s island building in the SCS to “Russia’s taking of Crimea” and claimed during his confirmation hearing with the Senate that the US would deny China access to its artificial islands in the SCS.1 Although the Trump–Xi Mar-a-Lago Summit in April 2017 seemed to change the hostile attitude of the Trump administration toward China, the US Navy conducted a new FON operation within 12 nautical miles of Chinese-occupied Mischief Reef in the South China Sea in May, 2017 (De Luce and Johnson 2017). It is the first FON operation under the Trump administration. If the South China Sea issue re-ignites the strategic competition between the two nations, the Trump–Xi “honeymoon” would seem to be over. The routinized FON operations by the US Navy signify a new phase of the SCS issue, which has been transformed from enduring disputes over sovereignty and maritime rights amongst claimant states to strategic competition between the

2 Huiyun Feng and Kai He United States and China. The US government has made it clear that its Navy will continue its FON operations routinely in the South China Sea in the future. Although China stopped its land reclamation in the South China Sea, it has continued the infrastructure building, including port facilities and airstrips, on the man-made islands. Facing US FON operations, China has not only protested through diplomatic channels, but also responded militarily. For example, in the US FON operation in May, 2016 the Chinese Defense Ministry claimed that its Navy dispatched three aircraft and three warships to “expel” the American vessel from China’s waters (Lendon and Sciutto 2016). Although the two nations have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters in November, 2014 as the “rules of the road” at sea, further escalation of simmering tensions associated with the US FON operations might drag the United States and China into an unexpected military conflict over the South China Sea. So why have the United States and China engaged in this dangerous competition over the South China Sea in recent years? How will US–Chinese competition in the SCS shape the dynamics of Asian security in the future? Will the SCS become a battlefield between the US and China to fight militarily? Or it will be just a playground for the two nations to compete for influence and prestige without a substantial danger of real conflicts? What will regional actors do in the face of this “new normal” of competition between China and the United States? Will multilateral institutions in the Asia Pacific alleviate the potential conflicts over the SCS disputes? How will US–Chinese competition in the SCS shape the dynamics of Asian security? We do not expect that there will be consensus or a common understanding regarding the reasons and implications of the US–China competition in the SCS. Instead, we propose these questions for debate and discussion in this edited volume. This book is the product of a two-day conference in Brisbane, Australia, “US–China Relations and the SCS”, in October, 2016. The contributors are leading scholars in the field of US–China relations and Asian security from the United States, China, Australia, and Singapore. The unique feature of this edited volume is to elevate the analysis of the SCS disputes from maritime and legalistic issues to a strategic level between the United States and China. Differing from the normal focus of a US–China relations book, this edited volume identifies the SCS as a new focal point of strategic competition between the two nations. Compared to numerous other volumes on the SCS disputes, this book goes beyond the maritime disputes amongst claimants and places the SCS within a broader context of potential power transition between the United States and China. This introductory chapter offers some background information on US–China competition in the SCS in recent years. First, we critically examine two conventional views, “Chinese assertiveness” and “US fault”, regarding the rising tensions in the SCS between the two nations in recent years. We argue that both conventional views are problematic in explaining Sino-US dynamics in the SCS. Second, we briefly introduce the structure of this edited volume and the major arguments from each chapter. In conclusion, we discuss some key findings of this project.

Battlefield or playground?

3

The rising tensions in the SCS: whom to blame? The SCS disputes traditionally involve six parties. China and Taiwan have the same sovereign and maritime claims in the SCS based on the historical evidence, especially the controversial nine-dash line drawn on the map by the Republic of China in 1947, which covers about 62% of the SCS.2 Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei also claim part of the South China Sea, based either on history or the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), or both. After World War II, the SCS disputes between China and other claimants started to flare up and reached a peak in the 1970s when the United States and a number of UN survey agencies reported in the late 1960s that there might be rich oil and gas reserves on the continental shelves of the SCS. The signing of the 1982 UNCLOS provided some legal basis for other claimants to assert the 200 nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which overlaps with China’s nine-dash line. In 1974 and 1988, China engaged in brief military clashes with Vietnam in the Paracels and the Spratlys. After the Cold War the tensions in the South China Sea were well-controlled although there were occasional disputes over fishing and oil exploration rights amongst claimant states. The United States is not part of the SCS disputes. The SCS issue was not on the agenda of US–China bilateral relations before 2010. The United States traditionally adopted a “keep-a-distance” policy toward the SCS. On the one hand, the US government clarified that it does not take sides on the sovereignty issue in the SCS. On the other, it urged the peaceful resolution of the disputes by all claimants. However, the US started to modify its policy toward the SCS after the continuous escalation of tensions amongst claimants in 2010.3 One defining event is Secretary Clinton’s statement at the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that the United States has a “national interest in the freedom of navigation” and opposes “the use of force by any claimant” in the SCS.4 Although Clinton did not criticize China by name, it is clear that Clinton’s statement targeted China, which had engaged in several disputes and incidents with Vietnam and the Philippines as well as with the US naval surveillance ship Impeccable in the South China Sea in 2009. Since 2011, the SCS disputes between China and other claimants have been escalating. Some notable incidents or crises include the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff between China and the Philippines and the 2014 oil rig crisis between China and Vietnam. In late 2013, China started its rapid, large-scale, land reclamation projects in the SCS, which deepened regional concerns over China’s ambition in the Asia Pacific. The US involvement further intensified the simmering situation. In late 2014, a dangerous intercept between Chinese fighters and US P-8 surveillance planes took place over the SCS, which refreshed the bitter memory of the 2001 EP-3 incident between the two nations. As mentioned before, the United States started its FON operations in October 2015 in order to challenge and deny China’s sovereign and maritime rights over the man-made islands in the SCS. Why has the SCS issue become one of the key issues for bilateral relations between the United States and China since 2010? In particular, why did the

4 Huiyun Feng and Kai He United States drag itself into the SCS disputes that it had previously avoided for more than three decades? Why did China intensify the SCS tensions and alienate its relationships with its neighbors, whom it had successfully won over through the decade-long, charm offensive in Southeast Asia? There are two prevailing arguments regarding the recent tensions in the SCS. One is to blame China’s assertiveness and the other targets the US pivot or rebalance policy. China’s assertiveness Many scholars suggest that China’s assertiveness should be held responsible for the rising tensions in the SCS. China’s assertive behaviors in the SCS can be traced back to 2009. Numerous examples include the Impeccable Incident between China and the United States as well as China’s arrests of Vietnamese fishermen around the Paracel islands in 2009. In 2011, it was reported that China cut the towed sonar cable on a Vietnamese survey vessel operating in the disputed SCS. In the 2012 Scarborough Shoal crisis China conducted a heavy-handed policy toward the Philippines and eventually controlled the Scarborough Shoal with its fishery administrative and Coast Guard forces.5 As mentioned above, in late 2013 China started its massive land reclamation projects, which became new evidence of China’s assertiveness in the SCS. Scholars, however, disagree on why China shifted its successful “charm offensive” to self-destructive “assertiveness” toward the Southeast Asia countries.6 For example, Bonnie Glaser (2015a) argues that China’s assertive policy in the SCS is a deliberate and well-coordinated national strategy aiming to control the SCS. In particular, “China is engaged in ‘salami-slicing’ – using small, incremental actions, none of which by itself is a casus belli” (Glaser 2015b).7 The outcome is that China has gradually expanded its power and control in the SCS. According to this argument, China’s massive land reclamation since 2013 is an important strategic move for preparing the announcement of its air defense zone in the SCS in the near future (Vuving 2014). Moreover, China’s behavior in the SCS can also be seen as a strategic challenge to US primacy in the region. As Hugh White (2014) points out, if the United States fails to cope with China’s challenge in the SCS, its security commitment and longtime reputation will be damaged in the Asia Pacific. In other words, China is using the SCS as a battlefield to push the United States out of Asia. Contrary to this top-down approach to China’s decision making in the SCS, Linda Jakobson (2014: 1) suggests a bureaucratic argument to explain China’s SCS policy. Based on intensive interviews in China, Jakobson suggests, “there is no evidence that China’s recent actions in the maritime domain are part of a grand strategy Xi is pursuing to coerce China’s neighbors in a tailored way towards a pre-defined goal.” Instead, China’s SCS policy is driven by bureaucratic infighting among different “myriad maritime security actors” to “push their own agendas” in China’s increasingly pluralistic decision-making process. These actors include the military, local governments, resource companies, and state-owned resource companies.

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In addition, the nationalistic public also plays a constraining role in influencing China’s decision making in the SCS. One example is the 2014 oil rig crisis between China and Vietnam, in which the state-owned oil company and the local government played a decisive role in triggering the crisis. After the crisis erupted, China’s Foreign Ministry as well as Xi’s Central Government had no choice but to back up this patriotic action due to the nationalistic political atmosphere in society. In other words, the lack of coordination as well as the power struggle amongst different maritime security actors in China’s foreign policy decision-making body can well explain the contradictions of Chinese behavior in the SCS. While both the “national strategy” and “bureaucratic infighting” arguments reveal some elements of truth, there are two unaddressed questions. The first is about the timing of China’s assertiveness in the SCS. Although the 2008 global financial crisis seemingly changed the power distribution in the world, the economic and military power gaps between the United States and China are still massive. Therefore, it is not rational in a strategic sense for China to challenge the United States. As Johnston points out, the so-called China’s assertiveness meme “overestimates the amount of change in China’s diplomacy in 2010 and after” (Johnston 2013: 7). Second, the bureaucratic argument indeed touches on the complex nature of China’s foreign policy decision making process. However, it seems weak in explaining the consistent pattern of China’s behavior in the SCS. It is true that China’s actions sometimes show a lack of coordination and even some degree of conflict of interests amongst different bureaucracies and actors. However, it would be an exaggeration to suggest that local authorities and state-owned companies can hijack the central government and “wag the dog” in China’s SCS decision making. For example, without top-down support from the central government, it would be impossible to accomplish the massive land reclamation projects in the SCS. In addition, one undeniable reality is that China has gradually strengthened and expanded its maritime control in the SCS despite the inconsistencies of its SCS foreign policy. “US fault” Rather than attributing the flare-ups in the SCS to China, some scholars suggest that it is the US who is at fault for the escalation of the SCS disputes. There are two major variants in this school of thought. First, many Chinese scholars draw a causal link between the US pivot policy in Asia and the increasing tensions in the SCS. For example, Fu Ying and Wu Shicun, two well-known members of the foreign policy elite in Beijing, suggest that the United States is responsible for the deteriorated situation in the SCS, especially between the United States and China. Through reviewing the current history of the SCS disputes, they argue that, “it is the US’s Asia Pacific rebalance strategy, its taking sides on disputes in the SCS, and its direct intervention that have escalated the tensions and made the issue more complicated” (Fu and Wu 2016). In a similar vein, some Chinese scholars also suggest that one of the strategic goals of the US pivot or rebalancing strategy

6 Huiyun Feng and Kai He is to utilize the SCS disputes as a diplomatic tool to alienate China’s relations with Southeast Asian countries and eventually form a containment coalition against China’s rise.8 Differing from this strategic view of US behavior, some scholars argue that the bureaucratic politics between the Pentagon and the White House is a major reason behind US actions in the SCS. For example, Greg Austin suggests that the Pentagon intentionally conflated the Spratlys and Paracels in order to accuse China of breaching its commitment “not to militarize” the South China Sea in early 2016. In addition, in order to justify its FON operations, the Pentagon also exaggerated China’s threats to trade and commercial shipping in the SCS (Austin 2016a).9 According to Austin, it is “a big lie, an unadulterated fib, perpetrated by the Pentagon” (Austin 2016b). One US expert also admitted, “when the United States speaks to China on ‘freedom of navigation’, it is not referring to any Chinese hindrances to legitimate maritime trade; China rightly points out that it has no interest in obstructing maritime commerce and has never done so. The real issue for Washington is that China objects to US surveillance activities in its EEZ” (McDevitt 2015: 25). It is reported that the White House, especially President Obama, had some reservations on conducting the FON operations in the SCS in the first place (Larter 2016a). However, it seems that the Pentagon successfully used the SCS tensions to legitimize its naval budget increase in the bureaucratic infighting with the White House and the State Department (Larter 2016b). Although these two “US bashing” arguments make some sense in varying degrees, there are two analytical weaknesses. First, it is the State Department, for example Secretary Clinton, who fanned the flames with China in the SCS at the 2010 ARF meeting, not the Department of Defense (DOD). The rhetorical war between the United States and China is also a fight between the State Department and China’s foreign ministry. In 2011, China’s vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai warned the Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell that “some individual countries are playing with fire and I hope the fire will not be drawn to the United States.”10 It is true that the DOD, especially Admiral Harrison, utilized the FON operations and China’s threat in the SCS to justify its naval budget. However, it would be an exaggeration to suggest that the DOD drives US policy in the SCS. All in all, the FON operations are part of the US pivot or rebalancing strategy toward Asia, not the other way around. Second, it is equally unfair to blame the US pivot or rebalance policy for the diplomatic and even military standoffs in the SCS between the United States and China. It might be true that the “US pivot” indeed encouraged some countries to challenge China’s sovereign and maritime claims in the SCS after 2010. However, China’s excessive reactions also contributed to the continuous escalation of the SCS disputes. For example, China conducted a hardline policy toward the Philippines in the 2012 Scarborough Shoal crisis. Although the Philippines publicly called for help from the United States – its official ally, the US did not respond positively. Instead, the United States tried to mediate the Scarborough shoal crisis between China and the Philippines. It is reported that through diplomatic

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channels Obama persuaded both China and the Philippines to withdraw from the disputed area simultaneously. However, China returned and eventually controlled the Scarborough shoal with its advantageous maritime capabilities. The Economist suggests that China’s victory in the Scarborough shoal was built on US failure in the SCS and “China may have been encouraged by America’s failure to respond to China’s virtual annexation” in the SCS.11 Moreover, relying on its political influence over Cambodia – the host country of the 2012 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Phnom Penh – China successfully blocked the ASEAN from issuing a joint communiqué because the Philippines and Vietnam insisted on mentioning the SCS disputes in the statement. It is the first time the AMM failed to issue a joint communiqué in ASEAN’s 45 years of history, thereby being seen as the biggest setback in ASEAN’s internal unity and coherence. In the eyes of other ASEAN countries, China’s behavior is nothing but bullying its neighbors with its economic and military might. As one prominent scholar publicly complains, “China’s rise had made some of them [Chinese officials] arrogant.”12 It might be fair to suggest that the United States indeed utilized the SCS disputes to form an anti-China coalition, especially with the Philippines and Vietnam. However, without China’s “cooperation” it seems impossible for the United States to lure these countries over. No ASEAN countries are willing to damage their relations with China voluntarily, which is still their largest trading partner in the world. In the context of a tense security competition between China and the United States in the Asia Pacific, Singaporean President Lee pointed out that if there is a “secret poll” in Asia, “every nation would vote for broader American engagement no matter what they might say in public” (McGurn 2016). The implication is that China’s assertiveness in the SCS has pushed Southeast Asian countries to the US side. In a word, the existing arguments regarding “China’s assertiveness” and the “US fault” reveal some aspects of the truth in the SCS disputes. However, both arguments contain a “static bias” in that they point the finger at the other party without considering the interactions between China and the United States in the SCS. The SCS dispute between China and the United States is not about maritime rights, nor is it about legal principles. Instead, the SCS tension between China and the United States is a bargaining game of power politics between a rising power and an existing hegemon. The tit-for-tat behavior in the SCS actually reflects a process of “hard bargaining” between the two nations.

Structure of the book The conflicts in the South China Sea raise some key questions. Will the SCS become a battlefield or a playground for the United States and China? How will regional actors and institutions react to this “new normal” between the two states? Will the SCS competition between the United States and China transform the regional order? The contributors to this volume attempt to shed some light on

8 Huiyun Feng and Kai He these questions. Different scholars have different views from various theoretical perspectives in the ten chapters following this introduction. We adopt a theoretical approach of “analytical eclecticism” in structuring this book (see Sil and Katzenstein 2010). Analytical eclecticism means that we do not stick to one research paradigm, such as realism or constructivism, in explaining the dynamics of US–China competition in the SCS. Instead, we encourage our contributors to employ different approaches in examining their respective research questions and puzzles. Collectively, this book borrows explanatory variables and causal logic from distinct research traditions or paradigms in analyzing the dynamic interaction between the United States and China in the SCS as well as its implications for regional security. For example, Huiyun Feng and Kai He use bargaining theory – a rationalist approach – to explain diplomatic flare-ups of the SCS issue in US–China relations. When discussing China’s policies in the SCS disputes, Feng Zhang adopts a constructivist approach to examining different ideas and competing thoughts on the SCS inside China. In evaluating the role of multilateral institutions in the SCS, Mark Beeson employs a historical approach to criticize the inadequacies of multilateral institutions in meditating US–China rivalry. Baogang He’s regional and geopolitical approach is relatively optimistic regarding the emerging security regionalism in the SCS. These examples of analytical eclecticism in this book present different views as well as competing arguments on some key questions about US–China relations in the SCS. It is our hope that the theoretical richness and diversity of these arguments can not only help readers obtain a better understanding of US–China relations in the context of the South China Sea disputes, but also make good sense of the future of the South China Sea disputes within the broad background of US–China competition in the 21st century. We contend that the application of diverse approaches to the problem of strategic rivalry between the US and China in the SCS expands our comprehension of the complexity involved in solving this problem, which involves both military and economic issues and the role of regional institutions in addressing them. The contributors in this volume highlight different aspects of regional security, prosperity, and governance in the Asia Pacific raised by the SCS disputes. We summarize below the analytical approach and contents reported by the author of each chapter. In Chapter 2, Huiyun Feng and Kai He continue to explore the reasons for the rising tensions between the United States and China in the SCS in recent years. They offer a “bargaining dilemma” argument to explain the dynamic interactions between the two nations over the SCS. They argue that the US–China competition in the SCS reflects an unsettled bargaining game between a rising power and the existing hegemon for power, influence, and prestige in the region. The bargaining strategies of the two states in addressing information and commitment problems will shape the success or the failure of the negotiations between the United States and China in the SCS. The future of the SCS will largely depend on the wisdom of policy makers in both countries in finding a balance between skillful compromise and hard bargaining. The real danger lies in the failure of bargaining

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between the two nations, which will transform the SCS from a “playground” to a real “battlefield”. In Chapter 3, Andrew Scobell offers a geopolitical answer to the question of why the SCS has emerged as perhaps the most contentious issue in US–China relations. He suggests that tensions in this body of water have long simmered, but during the second decade of the 21st century the SCS has risen to a slow boil. He argues that the heightened geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China offers the most satisfactory answer. China has adopted a geostrategic approach to Southeast Asia and the South China Sea, and the United States has also chosen a geostrategic approach as can be seen from the Obama administration’s “pivot” or “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific. While it is unclear what policy the Trump administration will adopt, Washington will be obliged to respond to geopolitical realities and likely pursue a hard line vis-à-vis China in the South China Sea. In Chapter 4, Feng Zhang explores China’s policy toward the South China Sea from the perspective of internal Chinese debates. Zhang suggests that three major camps – the pragmatists, hardliners, and moderates – are now dominating these debates. The raging debates suggest that China has not developed a distinct or coherent strategy toward the South China Sea. Instead, diverse actors and interest groups are trying to impose their particular understanding of China’s positions and roles in the South China Sea. The future of Chinese policy will depend on the intellectual and policy competition amongst the three camps in domestic debates. That competition, in turn, will depend on the relational dynamics of the strategic interactions between China and other countries in the South China Sea. In Chapter 5, Ian Hall examines India’s reactions to the US–China competition in the South China Sea. He suggests that India has deliberately involved itself in the strategic dynamics of the South China Sea for reasons that go beyond economic interests. Instead, India’s policy is rooted in a mixture of insecurity arising from deep concern about China’s growing capabilities and intentions in the wider Indo-Pacific region and partly from a countervailing confidence arising from its deepening strategic partnership with the United States. In Chapter 6, Christopher Hughes critically examines Japan’s foreign policy toward the SCS. Japanese administrations, especially Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s, maintain that the Japanese SCS policy is manifested in essentially liberal policies of respect for the rule of international law, promotion of universal liberal values, and support for multilateralism. This chapter analyses Japan’s policy relating to the SCS and systematically demonstrates that it has been predicated on typically realist interests, often flouted the rule of international law, ignored liberal values, used multilateralism as an extension of power politics, and practiced classic balance of power “soft” and “hard balancing”. Hence, Hughes concludes that Japan’s approach toward the SCS is typically realist in nature and represents “fake liberalism”. In Chapter 7, Nick Bisley takes a regional order perspective to examine the reason for the spike in tensions between the United States and China in the SCS. He suggests that the rising tensions serve as a function of the transformation of East Asia’s regional order. In particular, he argues that the SCS disputes amongst

10 Huiyun Feng and Kai He claimants were masked by the constraining effects of a security setting dominated by US primacy whose terms were accepted by all. The surfacing of competing claims between China and other claimants as well as the rising tensions between the United States and China in the SCS reflect the breakdown of that old order, dominated by the United States. In Chapter 8, See Seng Tan examines how the rising tensions between China and the US over the SCS disputes have threatened to turn various parts of East Asia’s multilateral architecture, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), into arenas of bigpower sparring. Moreover, he argues that those major powers have used their power and influence to shape the behaviors of the smaller and weaker ASEAN countries along with a special case of China’s behavior toward the ASEAN states. He suggests that whether ASEAN can play a more active and effective role in mediating the strategic competition between the United States and China will be of key importance to the future security of the East Asian region. In Chapter 9, Mark Beeson also explores the role of multilateral institutions in managing the great power rivalry, especially the US–China competition, in the SCS. He argues that East Asia’s institutions are incapable of alleviating the rising contestations between the United States and China at a time of mounting tension in the SCS. Through tracing the historical development of East Asia’s institutional architecture, Beeson argues that regional organizations, especially ASEAN-oriented ones, have been designed to have minimum impact on member states for the sake of protecting the “sovereignty” and “non-interference” principles. Therefore, Beeson calls for a radical “institutional overhaul” if regional actors intend to utilize institutions to mediate the US-China competition in the SCS. In Chapter 10, Baogang He continues the debate over the role of multilateral institutions in the US–China competition in the SCS. He takes a distinctively regional approach to the strategic contestation between China and the United States. He examines both the geographical and domestic politics of strategic thinking on security regionalism and discusses the role and limits of security regionalism in intensifying or mitigating the tensions, or preventing potential wars in the SCS. In Chapter 11, Steve Chan adopts a more expansive theoretical perspective to explore different pathways of China’s maritime policies in the SCS. Based on several research traditions – such as collective action, extended deterrence, enduring rivalries, two-level games, and alliance dynamics, Chan introduces 13 hypotheses or propositions to explain the dynamics of the SCS disputes and competition between China and other states, including the United States. As Chan points out, these hypotheses will need to be tested with empirical verification in the study of US–China relations in the SCS.

Conclusion As in many other edited volumes, there is no single consensual argument amongst contributors. Instead, the contributors represent diverse IR theoretical approaches, different methodologies, and competing conclusions. However, two key findings

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are worth noting from this book. First, there are some optimistic views of the US– China competition in the SCS. In other words, the SCS is more likely to become a “playground” rather than a “battlefield” between the United States and China. However, the danger of the transformation from a “playground” to a “battlefield” is also real and looming large if the United States and China cannot reach a bargaining deal to settle their strategic rivalries during the potential power transition in the regional system. More importantly, the SCS competition has signified a regional transformation from an order of “consensus” led by the US to a “contested” Asian era. The future of regional security largely depends on the strategic interactions and negotiations amongst states as well as between states and non-state actors, especially multilateral institutions. Second, the SCS is not doomed to be a flashpoint between the United States and China, because the strategic interactions in the SCS are shaped by many domestic, international, geographical, as well as institutional factors. The roles of multilateral institutions, such as ASEAN, ARF, and APT, are limited in resolving the SCS disputes, but they might still be significant in alleviating potential tensions between the United States and China as well as amongst the SCS claimants. Policy makers in the Asia Pacific should seriously consider what Mark Beeson suggests are some “radical institutional overhauls”, in order to establish binding and effective multilateral institutions to address various security challenges, including the rising rivalry and competition between the United States and China in the SCS.

Notes 1 See Phillips (2017). 2 Media reports normally suggest that China’s claims cover 80–90% of the SCS. However, as the US State Department points out, China’s nine-dash line includes 62% of the area in the SCS. See Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (2014). 3 See Fravel (2014). 4 It is worth noting that “freedom of navigation” is a long-standing policy of the United States. The State Department issued a policy statement in 1995 that stated: “maintaining freedom of navigation is a fundamental interest of the United States” in the SCS. Due to China’s limited presence in the SCS at the time, the US position did not cause diplomatic tensions between the two states in the 1990s. Although the United States did not change its FON position, its FON operations intensified the US-China competition in the SCS after 2010. See Fravel (2014: 4). 5 For China’s use of Coast Guard and civilian forces in the SCS see Erickson and Kennedy (2016). 6 See Ba (2011). 7 See also Haddick (2012). 8 It is a prevailing view among Chinese academics. For example, see Ge (2012: 16–21); Zhou (2016: 23–44). 9 See also Bateman (2016). 10 See Wong (2011). 11 See The Economist (2013). 12 See Kishore Mahbubani (2016).

12 Huiyun Feng and Kai He

References Ali, I. and M. Rajagopalan. 2016. China Demands End to U.S. Surveillance after Aircraft Intercept. Reuters, May 19. Retrieved at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-south chinasea-china-usa-idUSKCN0YA0QX Austin, G. 2016a. China’s Threat to Commercial Shipping in the South China Sea. The Diplomat, March 7. Retrieved at: http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/chinas-threa t-to-commercial-shipping-in-the-south-china-sea/. Austin, G. 2016b. “Mountains out of Molehills”: The Pentagon’s Big Lie about the South China Sea: Blurring the Red Lines in the South China Sea. The Diplomat, February 24. Retrieved at: http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/mountains-out-of-molehills-the-penta gons-big-lie-about-the-south-china-sea/. Ba, A. 2011. Staking Claims and Making Waves in the South China Sea: How Troubled Are the Waters? Contemporary Southeast Asia, 33(3): 269–291. Bateman, S. 2016. Australia’s Flawed Position on the South China Sea. East Asian Forum, March 10. Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (US). 2014. Limits in the Seas: No. 143, China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea. United States Department of State, December 5. De Luce, D. and K. Johnson. 2017. In the South China Sea, the U.S. is Struggling to Halt Beijing’s Advance. Foreign Policy, May 25. Erickson, A.S. and C.M. Kennedy. 2016. China’s Maritime Militia. CNA Corporation, March 7. Fravel, M.T. 2014. U.S. Policy Towards the Disputes in the South China Sea Since 1995. Policy Report. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, March. Retrieved at: https://myweb.rollins.edu/tlairson/china/uspolicyscs.pdf. Fu, Y. and S. Wu. 2016. South China Sea: How We Got to This Stage. The National Interest, May 9. Retrieved at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/south-china-sea -how-we-got-stage-16118. Ge, H. 2012. Lingzhan hou Meiguo Nahai Zhengce ji qi dui Zhongmei Guanxi de Yingxiang [America’s South China Sea Policy in the Post-Cold War and its Influences on US–China Relations]. Dongnanya Wenti Yanjiu [Studies of Southeast Asia], 2: 16–21. Glaser, B. 2015a. Conflict in the South China Sea. Council on Foreign Relations. Contingency Planning Memorandum, April 7. Retrieved at: http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pa cific/conflict-south-china-sea/p36377. Glaser, B. 2015b. Testimony before the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission. Hearing on China’s Relations with Southeast Asia. Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 13. Retrieved at: http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/ Glaser_Written%20Testimony_5.13.2015%20Hearing.pdf. Haddick, R. 2012. Salami Slicing in the South China Sea: China’s Slow, Patient Approach to Dominating Asia. Foreign Policy, August 3. Retrieved at: http://foreignpolicy.com/ 2012/08/03/salami-slicing-in-the-south-china-sea/. Jakobson, L. 2014. China’s Unpredictable Maritime Security Actors. Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, December. Johnston, A.I. 2013. How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness? International Security, 37(4): 7–48. Kishore Mahbubani. 2016. Beijing in the South China Sea – Belligerent or Assertive? Financial Times, March 15. Retrieved at: http://blogs.ft.com/the-exchange/2016/ 03/15/beijing-on-the-south-china-sea-belligerent-or-assertive/.

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Larter, D.B. 2016a. 4-Star Admiral Wants to Confront China. White House Says not So Fast. Navy Times, September 26. Retrieved at: http://www.navytimes.com/news/ your-navy/2016/09/26/4-star-admiral-wants-to-confront-china-the-white-house-saysnot-so-fast/. Larter, D.B. 2016b. Pacific Command Chief Urges New Capabilities as Tensions Mount with China. Navy Times, February 23. Retrieved at: http://www.navytimes.com/ story/military/2016/02/23/pacom-harry-harris-china-militarizing-south-china-sea/80 796756/. Lendon, B. and J. Sciutto. 2016. U.S. Destroyer Sails Near Disputed Chinese Island. CNN McDevitt, M. 2015. The South China Sea: Assessing US Policy. American Foreign Policy Interests, 37(1): 23–30. McGurn, W. 2016. Lee Hsien Loong’s American Exceptionalism. The Wall Street Journal, March 31. Retrieved at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/lee-hsien-loongs-american-excep tionalism-1459464855 New York Times. 2015. America Challenges Beijing’s Ambitions in the South China Sea. Editorial, October 30. Retrieved at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/30/opinio n/america-challenges-beijings-ambitions-in-the-south-china-sea.html?_r=0. Phillips, T. 2017. China Hits Back at US over South China Sea “Takeover” Claims. The Guardian, January 24. Retrieved at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/ 24/trump-white-house-beijing-takeover-south-china-sea. Sil, Rufra and Katzenstein, Peter. 2010. Beyond Paradigms: Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave. The Economist. 2013. Flaws in the Diamond. The Economist, September 21. Retrieved at: http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21586539-different-disputes-east-china-sea-andsouth-china-sea-chinas-aims-are-same-flaws. US Department of Defense. 2015. Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy. Report. Washington DC. Retrieved at: https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/ NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_SecuritY_Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF Vuving, A. 2014. China’s Grand-Strategy Challenge: Creating its Own Islands in the South China Sea. The National Interest, December 8. Retrieved at: http://nationalinterest. org/feature/chinas-grand-strategy-challenge-creating-its-own-islands-the-11807 White, H. 2014. Explaining China’s Behaviour in the East and South China Seas. The Interpreter, May 22. Retrieved at: http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/05/ 22/Explaining-Chinas-behaviour-in-the-East-and-South-China-Seas.aspx. Wong, E. 2011. Beijing Warns U.S. About South China Sea Disputes. The New York Times, June 22. Retrieved at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/world/asia/ 23china.html?_r=0. Zhou, Q. 2016. Lingzhan hou Meiguo Nanhai Zhengce de Yanbian ji qi Genyuan [The Source and Evolution of America’s Policy toward the South China Sea after the Cold War]. Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World Economy and Politics], 4: 23–44.

2

The bargaining dilemma between the United States and China in the South China Sea Huiyun Feng and Kai He

This chapter examines the dynamics of the strategic competition between the United States and China over the South China Sea (SCS) in recent years. As we suggest in Chapter 1, the two conventional and static perspectives blame either the United States or China for the increasing tensions and are not successful in adequately capturing the strategic interactions between the two nations. In this chapter, we suggest a “bargaining dilemma” argument to offer a new explanation that will shed some light on the US–China competition in the SCS. We argue that the simmering tension between the US and China in the SCS reflects an unsettled bargaining game between a rising power and the existing hegemon for power and dominance in the region. The bargaining strategies of the two states in addressing their information and commitment problems will shape the success or the failure of the negotiations between the United States and China in the SCS. While multilateral institutions might be helpful, the future of the SCS will largely depend on the wisdom of policy makers in both countries in finding a balance between skillful compromise and hard bargaining. The chapter will proceed as follows. First, we introduce our “bargaining dilemma” argument to explain how the United States and China have engaged in the bargaining game in the SCS. In particular, we discuss two key issues that will influence the bargaining result: the information and commitment problems. Second, we discuss how the United States and China have adopted different “costly signaling” strategies to reduce uncertainty and increase credibility regarding their resolve in the SCS. Third, we examine the difficulties and a possible institutional lock-in solution for the United States and China to address the commitment problem in their bargaining game over the SCS. In conclusion, we argue that in order to reach a new bargaining equilibrium, both the United States and China need to compromise strategically. While China will need to consider signing a “code of conduct” with ASEAN to constrain its ambitions and behaviors, the United States will need to limit its FON operations in the SCS as well as reduce surveillance activities near China. The future of the SCS disputes between China and the United States is not that optimistic, because the situation might turn worse before getting better. Two caveats are worth noting. First, this paper is not about the SCS disputes, which are more complicated than US–China relations.1 Instead, we place the SCS

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disputes in the context of US–China relations. By focusing on the US–China bargaining dynamics in the SCS, we intend to shed some light on future US– China relations during a potential power transition period. Second, our bargaining argument is just one perspective that we utilize to explain the rising tensions between the US and China in the SCS. This rationalist approach shares some similar assumptions and arguments with other schools of thought, especially realism. For example, we argue that the goal of the bargaining game between the United States and China in the SCS is the attainment of power and influence. This goal is exactly what most realists, especially power transition realists and offensive realists, have suggested regarding the rise of China for a long time. However, we argue that our bargaining argument can offer some nuanced explanations on how China and the United States have competed and interacted with one another in the SCS. More importantly, our argument can reveal some key problems that impede a successful negotiation deal between the two nations.

The bargaining dilemma in the SCS Borrowing insights from the bargaining theory of international conflicts, we suggest that the SCS dispute between China and the United States is a bargaining game for power and influence between the two nations. A successful bargaining game will lead to a peaceful transformation of the international system. A failed bargaining game will cause conflicts and even war. Based on formal work on the causes and conduct of war, the bargaining theory of conflict suggests that war is a result of bargaining failure and an inefficient outcome for states. Since fighting is costly and destroys resources, states should prefer a Pareto-superior agreement through bargaining to fighting (Fearon 1995). As a rising power, it is rational for China to bargain for a new position, such as more power and higher status in the Asia Pacific. However, China faces a policy dilemma on how to convince the United States to accept China’s new demands without conflicts. The United States, as an existing hegemon, has a rational incentive to say “no” to China’s demands. However, merely denying or ignoring China’s bargaining efforts might lead to costly conflicts and war that will be damaging even more to US interests. The strategic dilemma for the United States is to make a decision on what it can and what it cannot give in to China in the bargaining process. According to the rational bargaining theory of conflicts, there are two problems that need to be addressed for a successful bargaining deal (Fearon 1995; Schelling 1960). The first is the information problem. Information problems arise from the asymmetric information between two parties in the bargaining. Two mechanisms will cause the asymmetric information problem. First, both parties have incentives to hide their private information, such as their real military capabilities and their bottom-line bargaining position because keeping their information “private” will give them advantages in the bargaining game. Second, states are also encouraged to misrepresent their private information, such as exaggerating their military capabilities and resolve, with a hope of cutting a better deal in the bargaining (Fearon 1995; Powell 2006; He and Feng 2012).

16 Huiyun Feng and Kai He Commitment becomes a problem because states have the incentives to renege on a promise or commitment when their interests or capabilities change. As James Morrow points out, “actors often want to make promises that others doubt the actors will be willing to carry out later” just because “actors’ incentives change over time” (Morrow 1999: 91–2). Indeed, commitment problems are rooted in the anarchic nature of the international system where there is no overarching authority to enforce agreements and punish cheating behavior (Fearon 1995; Powell 2006). States in this anarchic international system do not easily believe the promises of others. Nor, in return, are they trusted by others. The central theme of both information and commitment problems is credibility. While information problems focus on the credibility of words one state offers to the other during a negotiation, commitment problems are determined by the credibility of one country’s behavior after reaching a deal with the other. If both states have a high level of credibility in both words and behavior, it is likely that the two countries can reach an agreement to avoid war. However, in the anarchic international system, states face too many incentives to cheat on agreements and hide private information. This is why wars recur even though conflicts are by no means the best outcomes for states. In the SCS, the bargaining process between the United States and China started in 2010, when China began to expand its influence and control in the region. Although the United States is not a part of the sovereignty and maritime disputes in the SCS, it treats itself as the hegemon or a protector of the regional order. China’s assertiveness in the SCS reflects the changing power distribution in the system in which a rising China has started to renegotiate its power position in the system. We share here the power transition argument advocated by some realists, which suggests an inevitable power competition between a rising power and the hegemon in the power-transition era (Organski 1958; Mearsheimer 2001). However, we argue that this inevitable competition may not lead to war if the two parties can reach a bargaining deal. It will not be an easy process because of the information and the commitment problems discussed above. To a certain extent, the escalation of SCS tension is an unavoidable part of the process, as both the United States and China have to address and solve the information and commitment problems. The information problem in the SCS focuses on the resolve or bottom-line position of the two states involved in the dispute. Before the rising tensions in the SCS after 2010, China had kept a low-profile policy, i.e., shelving differences and seeking joint development for decades in the SCS. Therefore, it is not clear how strong and credible the resolve of the Chinese government will be in the SCS disputes. In other words, it is difficult for US policy makers to discern whether China’s assertiveness in the SCS is only a tactic of bluffing or a real strategic maneuver. In the eyes of Chinese leaders the United States resolve is also questionable. The United States is not traditionally part of SCS disputes. It had adopted a “keep-a-distance” policy toward the disputes for a long time. Although the United States started to be involved in the disputes in 2010, the degree of US

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determination in the SCS is still unclear to Chinese policy makers. For example, will the United States be willing to fight China if the Philippines, its official ally, engages in a military conflict with China over the SCS? The commitment problem is even more complicated. China has not clarified what it really wants in the SCS, because its historical claims based on the nine-dash line are vague and ambiguous in nature. The intentions of the United States in the SCS are also not clear, at least in the eyes of Chinese leaders. Due to its unrivaled military power, the United States can conduct its FON operations anywhere in the world, including the SCS. Although China can send fighter jets and naval ships to intercept US surveillance activities near its border, it has no capability to stop US FON operations in the SCS. The puzzle is what the United States really wants from its FON operations in the SCS – besides showing off its military might? Without knowing the real intentions of the United States and China, it is impossible for the two states to reach any agreement over the SCS. Scholars propose two major resolutions to alleviate the information and commitment problems. For the information problem a state can choose a “costly signaling” strategy to deliver its private information, such as its resolve and capability (Fearon 1997). For the commitment problem a state can choose an institutional, “lock-in” strategy to insure its commitment.2 We suggest that the escalation in the SCS dispute between the United States and China reflects the bargaining efforts of both nations in exchanging their “private information” through costly signaling strategies. However, the commitment problem still exists and becomes the key hindrance to any bargaining success between the United States and China in the SCS.

Costly signaling strategies in the SCS Bargaining theory suggests that all states have incentives to hide their bottom-line positions and even misrepresent (normally exaggerate) relevant information in order to get a better payoff in a bargaining game. How to convince the other party about its resolve and capability becomes the first task for any state in the bargaining process. Costly signaling becomes a necessary method for a state to deliver its private information more credibly. There are two types of costly signaling: tying hands and sinking costs.3 Tying hands is to limit one’s own choices and increase the ex post cost for breaching what was previously said. Since leaders face accountability pressures from their domestic audience in both democracies and autocracies, they can signal their intention and resolve in public and let their adversaries know that they will face tremendous political costs, for instance, an electoral defeat in democracies or domestic punishment through a power struggle in autocracies, if they do not deliver what they promise and follow through on their commitments.4 The higher the audience costs, the higher the credibility of their words. Sinking costs means to invest tremendous resources before a negotiation takes place. If a state cannot keep what it invests, it will face ex ante cost or retrospective costs. For example, one state might invest heavily in building up its weaponry system to show its resolve in defending a disputed territory. This investment or cost becomes sunk costs since no matter what happens in the negotiation, the costs

18 Huiyun Feng and Kai He have occurred and cannot be recovered. Therefore, the credibility of this country’s resolve is closely associated with the sunk costs it invests. The higher the sunk costs, the more credible the words and intentions will be. In the SCS dispute, both the United States and China have adopted different costly signaling strategies to reveal their “private information,” although the policy emphasis and effectiveness of their strategies vary. While the United States has mainly employed a “tying hands” strategy to increase domestic and international audience costs, China has relied on a “sinking costs” strategy through land reclamation projects to strengthen the credibility of its resolve in the SCS. The US “tying hands” strategy in the SCS has two components. First, the United States focuses on the international audience. In the 2010 ARF meeting, Secretary Clinton made her well-known statement regarding US “vital interests” in the SCS.5 As mentioned above, there is nothing new about US FON claims in the SCS. However, given the simmering tension between China and its neighbors in the SCS, Clinton’s statement further fueled the flame against China in the SCS. It is reported that Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi was shocked and furious about Clinton’s statement (The Economist 2010). In the eyes of Yang and other Asian nations, Secretary Clinton made a public “threat” to China in the SCS. Therefore, the United States has no choice, but to back up this “threat” in future SCS disputes. Otherwise, it will lose the credibility to the international audience. In the similar vein, Obama’s “pivot toward Asia” – later renamed “rebalance toward Asia” – can also serve as part of its tying hands efforts through which the United States has tried to deliver a clear message or credible private information to China regarding its resolve in the SCS. In December 2014, the US State Department published a white paper entitled “Limits in the Seas: China Maritime Claims in the South China Sea” in which the United States for the first time challenged China’s sovereign and maritime claims associated with the “nine-dash” line in the SCS. Through both legalistic and historical perspectives, the report examines several possible interpretations of the “nine dash” line in the SCS. In conclusion, the report points out: unless China clarifies that the dashed-line claim reflects only a claim to islands within that line and any maritime zones that are generated from those island features in accordance with the international law of the sea, as reflected in the LOS convention, its dashed line claim does not accord with the international law of the sea.6 From a bargaining perspective, this report also serves as part of a tying hands strategy in that it increases the ex post cost for the US government in the international arena if it fails to keep its challenges and “threats” to China in the SCS. On May 20, 2015, about five months before the US conducted its first FON operation in the SCS, the CNN network broadcasted video footage taken by the P8-A Poseidon over China’s man-made islands. It showed that the Chinese navy repeatedly warned a US surveillance plane to leave the airspace over the artificial islands. It was the first time the Pentagon had declassified video of China’s

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building activity and audio of challenges to a US aircraft. As one commentator points out, “by inviting a CNN reporter aboard the P8-A, the Pentagon clearly wanted the world to get the message that China is starting to assert its claims to these disputed territories” (Panda 2015; Brunnstrom 2015). Still, the CNN footage is part of a US “tying hands” strategy targeting domestic and international audiences. For a domestic audience the CNN video has shown China’s “excessive claims” over the man-made islands. US officials can then presumably convince their Chinese counterparts that the US has no choice but to challenge China’s position in the SCS, because the CNN video has increased the political costs for US leaders to bear. For an international audience it is even clearer that if the US backed down from challenging China’s position in the SCS, it will lose its credibility and longtime reputation as the hegemon that protects regional order in the Asia Pacific. Eventually, the United States conducted three FON operations in the SCS in October 2015, January 2016, and May 2016. The FON operations serve as a “sinking costs” strategy to send a costly signal to China about the US bottom-line position as well as demonstrating credible resolve in the SCS, because each FON operation will bear economic costs that cannot be recovered afterward. The effectiveness of this “sinking cost” strategy might not be as high as its “tying hands” strategy for two reasons. First, the United States started the FON operations in the 1970s; therefore, its FON operations in the SCS could be seen as a routine maneuver that does not target only China. Second, the FON operations have more symbolic meaning than practical value. In the eyes of Chinese policy makers, the FON operations impose only limited political costs to US policy makers. It is reported that the White House had postponed the request for FON operations in the SCS from the Pentagon in 2015 out of consideration of US– China bilateral relations. It seems that the real political costs of the FON operations in the SCS are not unbearable for US leaders.7 In contrast, China has adopted a more expensive “sinking costs” strategy through land reclamation projects in the SCS that began at the end of 2013, on seven rocks and low-tide elevations, transforming them into artificial islands. In June, 2015 China announced that it had finished the island building projects in the SCS. As the 2016 regional security assessment report published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) indicates, in about 18 months Chinese vessels dredged and pumped sand from the seabed and coral was ripped out of nearby reefs. The total man-made landscape reached 3,000 acres (12 square kilometers). It is worth noting that China is not the first and only country that has conducted land reclamations in the SCS. However, because of its advanced technology, abundant funds, and building capabilities, the pace and scope of China’s land reclamation in the SCS far exceeds what other claimants have done. For example, the combined land area of island rebuilding efforts by all other claimants, including Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam, is only 100 acres (0.4 square kilometers) over 45 years (IISS 2016: 55). It is not clear how much money China has spent on the land reclamation projects over the seven man-made islands. One Chinese media source estimates that

20 Huiyun Feng and Kai He the mere island construction expenses might be billions of US dollars (Song 2014). China claims that the major purpose of these island building projects is for improving the living and working condition of personnel stationed there, better safeguarding territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, as well as better performing China’s international responsibility and obligation in maritime search and rescue, disaster prevention and mitigation, marine science and research, meteorological observation, environmental protection, navigation safety, fishery projection service and other areas.8 From a bargaining perspective China’s land reclamation is a “sinking cost” strategy, mainly to signal its credible resolve in the SCS. First, the land reclamation costs are massive and, more importantly, they cannot be recovered after the project. It is still unclear how China will utilize these man-made islands to protect its sovereign and maritime interests. Given the geographic nature of the SCS, no country (including the United States) has the capability to really control the SCS. The seven man-made islands might give China some short-term advantages in coping with challenges from littoral states, such as the Philippines and Vietnam. However, they will not increase any military and strategic value for China when facing US challenges. As one US military scholar points out, these man-made islands will become easy targets during a war and have limited strategic value for China.9 The huge economic costs with limited value represent a typical “sunk costs” outcome in the economic sense. However, for China this “sunk cost” situation contains a clear message to the United States and other nations that China will take its sovereign and maritime claims seriously. Since this type of ex ante cost is difficult for any nation to easily forego, it is the Chinese leaders’ hope that the credibility of China’s resolve in the SCS can be strengthened. It is difficult to compare which costly signaling strategy, the US “tying hands” or the Chinese “sinking costs” strategy, is more effective in delivering private information in the bargaining process in the SCS. Although some research suggests that the “tying hands” strategy is more credible than the “sinking costs” one in sending costly signals, others argue that the “sinking cost” strategy should not be underestimated.10 In the South China Sea both the United States and China have delivered their private information regarding their resolve and capabilities by sending costly signals to each other. As mentioned before, the escalation of the SCS tension between the two nations, to a certain extent, is a necessary process for both countries to exchange their private information. Although the information problem is alleviated, the two countries still face difficulties to reach a bargaining deal due to the unsolved commitment problem.

The unsolved commitment problem The commitment problem is rooted in the anarchic nature of the international system, because a state’s intentions can change over time and no overarching

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authority is responsible for enforcing any commitment or agreement between two states. In the SCS case the commitment problem is even more serious between the United States and China. First, it is still not clear what both countries really want in the SCS. Although China has enhanced its presence and control through land reclamation and frequent patrolling activities, it is still ambiguous about the real meaning of the nine-dash line in the SCS. There is no doubt that the status quo of the SCS has been changed by China’s assertive activities. However, no one knows how far China will go in the SCS. What the United States really wants in the SCS is also not clear to China. The United States has changed its long-time indifferent attitude to a more proactive policy toward the SCS disputes. The US has not only publicly criticized China’s assertive behavior, but also taken sides with other claimants. Moreover, the US government has strengthened its military ties with the Philippines, Vietnam as well as with other littoral states around China. In the eyes of Chinese leaders, the US pivot or rebalance policy is nothing but a containment effort against China. However, what the United States can really do in the SCS is still ambiguous. The FON operations by the US are definitely disturbing and annoying from a Chinese perspective. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, however, has confidently pointed out, “History will prove who is a mere guest and who is a real host [in the SCS]” (Forsythe and Perlez 2016). The implication is that the United States will not be able to stay physically in the SCS merely through the FON operations. In the 2016 Shangri-La Dialogue, US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter suggested that the United States advocate a “principled security network” in AsiaPacific (Carter 2016). However, what the “principled security network” really means is not clear. Although the United States emphasizes that all claimants need to resolve their SCS disputes according to the law of the sea, it has not ratified the UNCLOS itself. This has become China’s major criticism of US involvement in the SCS (Fu and Wu 2016). Just because of the deep-seated suspicion toward each other’s intentions, the United States and China might have missed some opportunities to reach a bargaining deal in the SCS. For example, China officially announced in June 2015 that its 18-month island building projects have been completed. Although it is not clear why China made this decision, the implication of this announcement is that China will not build new islands in the SCS. As mentioned above, the CNN video report on China’s land reclamations was released one month before this announcement. Given China’s past record of assertiveness, this high-profile announcement can be seen as a compromise that China made in the context of international pressure.11 However, China’s compromise seems unappreciated by the United States. In October, the United States still conducted its first FON operation near China’s newly built islands in the SCS. The commitment problem is the major reason for this failed bargaining process between China and the United States. The United States is not sure whether China will keep its “promise” to stop its land reclamation in the SCS. Since China still continued the infrastructure building on the man-made islands after the announcement, it was easily interpreted by the US side

22 Huiyun Feng and Kai He as reneging behavior regarding the earlier commitment. However, China has promised to stop the land reclamation, not the infrastructure building on the existing islands. Although it seems to be a misunderstanding, it does reflect the lack of mutual trust between the two nations. It is rational for the United States to question whether China will keep its commitment, because no one can monitor or enforce China’s commitment. Consequently, the United States had to use the FON operations to strengthen its resolve by saying “no” to China’s man-made islands in the SCS. Another example is the militarization issue in the SCS. During Xi’s visit to Washington DC in September 2015, it is reported that Xi made a public commitment for the first time not to “militarize” artificial islands in the disputed Spratly islands (Page, Lee and Lubold 2015). However, as mentioned above, the United States still conducted its first FON operation in the SCS less than one month after Xi’s commitment. In the context of Chinese culture the US FON operation was like a “slap in the face” for Xi.12 Moreover, the United States conducted its second FON operation in the Paracel islands in January 2016. It is reported that China deployed missiles on Woody Island (Yong Xing in Chinese) in the Paracels. China’s deployment of missiles is for the United States a violation of Xi’s previous non-militarization commitment. Then there were huge public outcries from US officials over China’s “militarization” of the SCS (Brunnstrom and Mohammed 2016; Shalal 2016). As mentioned before, Xi’s non-militarization commitment was limited to the Spratlys, not the Paracels, which China does not recognize as a “disputed area” at all. However, US officials still publicly accused China of cheating or breaking its previous promises. Therefore, it seems a misunderstanding or miscommunication problem exists. Its essence, however, is the lack of trust associated with the commitment problem in bargaining theory. In the eyes of Chinese policy makers the real reason for the United States to intentionally confuse Xi’s non-militarization commitment is that it is a tactic to impose more pressure on China in the bargaining game. It is the hope of the US that China will compromise more to remove the missiles on Woody Island in the Paracels. However, it becomes an unacceptable bargaining request for Chinese policy makers who believe that they had already made a “compromise,” i.e., the non-militarization commitment in the Spratlys. Moreover, the United States has not offered anything in return. Therefore, it is not rational for China to compromise again without reciprocity from the United States.

The locking-in strategy? Some scholars suggest that international institutions can help alleviate the commitment problems since institutions can increase transparency, enforce agreement, and foster cooperation (Keohane 1984; Keohane and Martin 1995). One major obstacle for a state to make a credible commitment is its concern for future bargaining power with the adversary, as the current agreement may change the power relationship between the two states, and the once weak state may become stronger and renege on the agreement later (Powell 2006: 170). We suggest that states can

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use institutions to “lock-in” themselves in the existing agreements and strengthen their commitments to the adversary. States can depend on the two mechanisms of issue linkages and the shadow of the future to lock-in themselves through institutions. Because institutions provide extensive linkages of different issues between states, the cheating or reneging behavior of a state on one issue will influence this state’s credibility on other issues. Therefore, states are more cautious in breaking their previous commitments within institutions (Haas 1980; Haggard and Simmons 1987). In addition, institutions can stretch the shadow of the future for interactions between states. Because of the existence of institutions, states know that they will encounter each other again in the future. The shadow of the future encourages states to retain a good reputation for their commitments and promote reciprocal cooperation between states (Axelrod 1984; Keohane 1986). In the SCS, however, there is no institution that China and the United States can use to alleviate the commitment problem. The ARF is a major regional security institution led by ASEAN. But China refuses to discuss the SCS issue in this multilateral forum because China will become an easy target of other nations, including the United States. It is worth noting that both countries are fully aware of the dangers of potential escalation in the SCS. In November 2014 the US and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding rules of behavior for safety of air and maritime encounters. The purpose of this MOU is to provide the “rules of the road” and avoid incidents associated with unplanned encounters between the two militaries in the SCS. However, this MOU did not address the commitment problem between the two nations in the SCS. The US FON operations starting in late 2015 as well as its continuous surveillance activities encouraged China’s military to react assertively. It is reported that China’s naval warships had unpleasant encounters with the US naval ships in the FON missions and Chinese fighter jets also conducted risky mid-air intercepts against US surveillance planes over the SCS after the MOU. Both the US and Chinese actions in the SCS could be seen as their bargaining moves in the negotiation. However, if the commitment problem cannot be addressed, these bargaining moves harbor a high risk of military conflicts if some encounters run out of control. In order to reach a commitment agreement, the two nations need to know what the other party wants first. For China, its demand in the SCS is relatively simple. Strategically, it wants more influence and control of the SCS although it fully understands that it has no capability to change the SCS to become a Chinese lake. Practically, it has successfully strengthened its physical presence in the SCS through land reclamation on the seven man-made islands. Although it is not clear how it will utilize these islands to protect its sovereign and maritime claims, China has gained some unprecedented advantages in the SCS. When and how to advance these advantages is another question, but the first thing in the Chinese leaders’ mind is to keep these existing gains. As for the United States, it is also fully aware that it cannot physically control the SCS either, no matter how often it patrols the area. In addition, it also knows

24 Huiyun Feng and Kai He that China’s gains in the SCS do not necessarily mean US losses, because it is unlikely for China to block the commercial routes in the SCS. In addition, the United States can still conduct its FON operations any time in any place in the SCS, because what China can do is just watch and follow. As for China’s newly built islands, they provide a very limited strategic advantage from a military perspective. However, as (ret.) Adm. Jonathan Greenert points out, “it’s a fait accompli; they are there. It is unfortunate” (De Luce and Johnson 2016). No matter how much the United States dislikes them and how the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague rules, it is unlikely for China to give up these man-made islands.13 Therefore, for better or for worse, the United States has to accept this hard fact. What the United States can do is seal a deal with China to stop any new land reclamation project in the SCS. However, the United States needs to consider some concessions to China in return as well. One tangible goal in the Chinese leaders’ mind is to reduce close-border surveillance activities by the US Navy. After clarifying what both countries really want, the next step to alleviate the commitment problem is to make the deal or agreement credible through institutions. For China, it will need to consider signing the long overdue Code of Conduct (COC) with ASEAN states. Although China signed the Declaration of Conduct (DOC) in the SCS with the ASEAN states in 2002, the rising tensions in the SCS after 2010 have made the DOC meaningless in alleviating the SCS disputes. It will be wise for the Chinese government to sign the COC, a more legally binding agreement with ASEAN in the SCS, because signing the COC will vindicate China’s peaceful intentions as well as strengthen its non-militarization commitment to the outside world. It is also a rational way to protect what it has gained in the SCS in past years. The huge power gap between the United States and China discourages the former from considering any deal that might constrain its actions in the SCS. This is why the United States has not ratified the UNCLOS yet, although it uses the law to criticize China’s behavior all the time. One pragmatic solution is to reach an unwritten agreement with China to reduce its surveillance activities in the SCS. However, there is no available mechanism to enforce the agreement if the United States decides to renege. Institutions seem weak when encountering hegemony and power politics in the SCS.

Conclusion – any deal at all? Based on a bargaining theory of international conflict, we have examined the dynamics of the US–China competition in the SCS. We suggest that the increasing tension in the SCS between China and the United States is a necessary, but risky, bargaining process between a rising power and the existing hegemon. Both the United States and China have adopted costly signaling strategies to reveal their private information – their resolve and capabilities – to each other in the SCS. While the United States has increased the audience costs in both domestic and international arenas to publicly challenge China’s assertiveness in the SCS, China has employed a sinking costs strategy to pour billions of dollars into the land

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reclamation projects. In addition, the US FON operations have strengthened US credibility as an unrivaled hegemon in the region. China’s risky intercepts against US surveillance planes near the Chinese borders aim to showcase its bargaining position against US behavior. Through intense interactions over the SCS, the information problem in the SCS bargain has been addressed. Both the United States and China understand the other party’s resolve and bottom line. China is fully aware that the United States will not allow China to control the SCS with coercive power. The United States understands that China’s demand of expanding influence in the SCS is backed by both military and economic means. The key to a successful bargaining deal between the United States and China depends on how to alleviate and resolve the commitment problem in the bargaining process. There are two obstacles for these two nations in addressing the commitment problem. Neither of them wants to reveal their real intentions in the SCS. There is also no mechanism to ensure the enforcement of any agreement between the two nations. Both countries might not really settle their strategic goals in the SCS. It is clear that China wants more, but the United States wants to give less in the SCS. How to reach equilibrium on the potential gains versus losses is the first step of a successful negotiation between the two nations. Regarding the enforcement issue, China will need to consider constraining its behavior and strengthening its commitment to peace by signing the COC with the ASEAN states. As the weaker party in the negotiation, it is wise for China to offer a credible concession first. It will provide an incentive for the stronger party to consider reciprocity in the negotiation. However, the huge military power advantage might discourage the US from making any compromise with China in the SCS. The future of the SCS does not look optimistic in the short run, because both the United States and China intend to strengthen their bargaining positions through various costly signaling strategies. The potential risk of costly signaling is associated with the danger of military escalation and even outright military conflict. The situation might become worse before it gets better. It is time for the policy makers in both countries to put themselves in the other’s shoes. The future relationship between the United States and China largely depends on the wisdom of policy makers in finding a balance between bargaining and compromising.

Notes 1 For China’s complicated maritime disputes, including the SCS, see Chan (2016). 2 We borrow the “lock-in” term from Ikenberry’s argument that the hegemon can use institutions to lock other states into the system. See Ikenberry (2001). 3 See Fearon (1997). Some scholars suggest that cheap talk also sometimes matters for bargaining. See Morrow (1994); Trager (2010). 4 For audience costs in autocracies, see Weeks (2008). For critiques of audience costs theory, see Snyder and Borghard (2011); and Trachtenberg (2012). 5 See Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 2012. On Ratification of the Law of the Sea. Testimony of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, 112 Congress, 2nd Session, May 23.

26 Huiyun Feng and Kai He 6 Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. 2014. Limits in the Seas: No. 143, China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea. United States Department of State, December 5, p. 24. 7 Personal interview in Beijing, December 2015. 8 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs (China) (2015). 9 See Goldstein (2015a). For different views, see Vuving (2015); Goldstein (2015b); Holmes (2015). 10 See Fearon (1997). For different views on the effectiveness of the “tying hands” versus “sinking costs” strategies see Slantchev (2005); Wolford, Reiter and Carrubba (2011); Moon and Souva (2016). 11 Personal interview in Beijing, December 2015. 12 Personal interview in Beijing, December 2015. 13 On July 12, 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague ruled in favor of the Philippines against China over territorial disputes in the South China Sea. China rejected the tribunal’s ruling, and reasserted its “indisputable sovereignty” over the South China Sea. The Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that the tribunal’s ruling is invalid and China does not “accept or recognize it”. See Blanchard and Petty (2016).

References Axelrod, R. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books. Blanchard, B. and M. Petty. 2016. China Vows to Protect South China Sea Sovereignty, Manila Upbeat. Reuters, July 12. Retrieved at: http://www.reuters.com/article/ us-southchinasea-ruling-stakes-idUSKCN0ZS02U. Brunnstrom, D. 2015. U.S. Vows to Continue Patrols after China Warns Spy Plane. Reuters, May 21. Retrieved at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-usa-china -idUSKBN0O60AY20150521. Brunnstrom, D. and Mohammed, A. 2016. China Is “Clearly Militarizing” the South China Sea. The Huffington Post, February 23. Retrieved at: http://www.huffingtonpost. com/entry/south-china-sea-fighter-jets_us_56cce072e4b0928f5a6d9e31. Carter, A. 2016. Remarks on “Asia-Pacific’s Principled Security Network” at 2016 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Secretary of Defense. Singapore, June 4, 2016. Retrieved at: http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/791213/remarks-onasia-pacifics-principled-security-network-at-2016-iiss-shangri-la-di. Chan, S. 2016. China’s Troubled Waters: Maritime Disputes in Theoretical Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. De Luce, D. and K. Johnson. A Court You’ve Never Heard of Is About to Raise the Stakes in the South China Sea. Foreign Policy, June 2. Retrieved at: http://foreignpolicy.com/ 2016/06/02/a-court-youve-never-heard-of-is-about-to-raise-the-stakes-in-the-south-china -sea/ Fearon, J. 1995. Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization, 49(3): 379–414. Fearon, J. 1997. Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Cost. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41(1): 68–90. Forsythe, M. and J. Perlez. 2016. South China Sea Buildup Brings Beijing Closer to Realizing Control. The New York Times, March 8. Retrieved at: http://www.nytimes.com/ 2016/03/09/world/asia/south-china-sea-militarization.html. Fu, Y. and S. Wu. 2016. South China Sea: How We Got to This Stage. The National Interest, May 9. Retrieved at: http://www.andrewleunginternationalconsultants.com/ files/south-china-sea_-how-we-got-to-this-stage-_-the-national-interest.pdf

Bargaining dilemma between the US and China

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Goldstein, L.J. 2015a. The South China Sea Showdown: 5 Dangerous Myths. The National Interest, September 29. Retrieved at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/thesouth-china-sea-showdown-5-dangerous-myths-13970. Goldstein, L.J. 2015b. The Main Problem with America’s Abundant South China Sea Hawks. The National Interest, October 28. Retrieved at: http://nationalinterest.org/fea ture/the-main-problem-america%E2%80%99s-abundant-south-china-sea-hawks-14186? page=show. Haas, E. 1980. Why Collaborate: Issue-Linkage and International Regimes. World Politics, 32(3): 357–405. Haggard, S. and B.A. Simmons. 1987. Theories of International Regimes. International Organization, 41(3): 491–517. He, Kai and Huiyun Feng. 2012. Debating China’s Assertiveness: Taking China’s Power and Interests Seriously. International Politics, 49(5): 633–644. Holmes, J. 2015. Face Off: How America Can REALLY Stop China’s Navy. The National Interest, October 5. Retrieved at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/face-how-america -can-really-stop-chinas-navy-14014. Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. IISS (International Institute for Strategic Studies). 2016. Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2016. London. Keohane, R. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press. Keohane, R. 1986. Reciprocity in International Relations. International Organization, 40(1): 1–27. Keohane, R. and L. Martin. 1995. The Promise of Institutionalist Theory. International Security, 20(1): 39–51. Mearsheimer, J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (China). 2015. China’s Reclamation Efforts on Part of its Nansha Islands are Legitimate and Legal. Xinhuanet.com, April 9. Moon, C. and M. Souva. 2016. Audience Costs, Information, and Credible Commitment Problems. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 60(3): 434–458. Morrow, J. 1994. Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution versus Information. International Organization, 48(2): 387–423. Morrow, J. 1999. The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics. In David Lake and Robert Powell, eds. Strategic Choice and International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 91–92. Organski, A.F.K. 1958. World Politics. New York: Knopf. Page, J., C.E. Lee and G. Lubold. 2015. China’s President Pledges No Militarization in Disputed Islands. The Wall Street Journal, September 25. Retrieved at: http://www.wsj. com/articles/china-completes-runway-on-artificial-island-in-south-china-sea-1443184818. Panda, A. 2015. China Issues 8 Warnings to US Surveillance Plane in South China Sea. The Diplomat, May 21. Retrieved at: http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/china-issues-8-wa rnings-to-us-surveillance-plane-in-south-china-sea/. Powell, R. 2006. War as a Commitment Problem. International Organization, 60(4): 169–203. Schelling, T. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Shalal, A. 2016. U.S. Warns China on Militarization of South China Sea. Reuters, March 2. Retrieved at: http://www.reuters.com/article/southchinasea-usa-carter-idUSKCN0W404R.

28 Huiyun Feng and Kai He Slantchev, B.L. 2005. Military Coercion in Interstate Crises. The American Political Science Review, 99(4): 533–547. Snyder, J. and E. Borghard. 2011. The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound. American Political Science Review, 105(3): 437–456. Song, X. 2014. China Spent Billions on Land Reclamation in the South China Sea. November 23. Retrieved at: http://bbs.tianya.cn/post-333-583442-1.shtml. The Economist. 2010. Strategic Jousting between China and America: Testing the Waters. July 29. Retrieved at: http://www.economist.com/node/16706997. Trachtenberg, M. 2012. Audience Costs: An Historical Analysis. Security Studies, 21(3): 3–42. Trager, R. 2010. Diplomatic Calculus in Anarchy: How Communication Matters. American Political Science Review, 104(2): 347–368. Vuving, A. 2015. Think Again: Myths and Myopia about the South China Sea. The National Interest, October 16. Retrieved at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/think-a gain-myths-myopia-about-the-south-china-sea-14096; Weeks, J. 2008. Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve. International Organization 62(4): 35–64. Wolford, S., D. Reiter and C. Carrubba. 2011. Information, Commitment, and War. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 55(4): 556–579.

3

The geography of conflict South China Sea and US–China Rivalry Andrew Scobell

Is the South China Sea a key flashpoint for US–China rivalry or a tempest in a teacup? This chapter examines the body of water from a geopolitical perspective and concludes that it is a significant flashpoint in US–China rivalry. By rivalry, I mean an antagonistic relationship between two states embroiled in “long-term hostility” and competition manifested in “multiple disputes, continuing [policy] disagreements and the threat of the use of force” (Thompson 2001: 574). By flashpoint, I mean a “longstanding political dispute” that is “proximate to … adversaries” and “threaten[s] to involve more powerful actors [thereby] raising the possibility of … a broader war” (Hoyt 2003: 119). While at least one scholar has argued that “the South China Sea is not a flashpoint” (Taylor 2014), this chapter contends that in the second decade of the 21st century this body of water does indeed meet the criteria. Although it may be a different kind of flashpoint from the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait, or Vale of Kashmir, the South China Sea is a key hotspot nonetheless. First, this chapter considers which international relations paradigm has the greatest explanatory value. While realism and constructivism each offer important insights, the more useful perspective is provided by geopolitical analysis. Second, this chapter examines the geopolitics of great power rivalries and highlights the tendency for these rivalries to have significant maritime dimensions. Third, this chapter examines the geostrategies of China and the United States. Finally, the chapter explores the implications of this analysis for US–China rivalry and the future of the South China Sea.

Theoretical approaches Why has the South China Sea become such a contentious issue in US–China relations? A realist perspective would highlight China’s growing set of interests in the body of water and China’s increasing economic clout and military might. These greater hard power resources provide Beijing with the ability to advance its claims to the region from a position of far greater strength vis-à-vis the United States and other states. Hence China has become considerably more assertive in the South China Sea and elsewhere in recent years.1 While realism explains the logic of US–China rivalry – either the defensive or offensive variants – it does not

30 Andrew Scobell explain WHY the South China Sea is a key flashpoint of this rivalry. Realism would suggest that this body of water does not merit the status of a major flashpoint in a rivalry between these two great powers.2 Although offensive realism anticipates that great powers will seek regional hegemony, the most prominent proponent of this school of international relations did not anticipate that the South China Sea would become such a focal point for US–China rivalry.3 On the face of it, the South China Sea should not be as important to China as the Taiwan Strait or Korean Peninsula. Moreover, even if the South China Sea did constitute anything like a vital interest, realism alone does not explain the level of intensity and hyperbole displayed by the two main rivals on this issue. A constructivist perspective would emphasize the socialization process China has undergone in its approach to the South China Sea. Beijing has adopted a gradualist approach, engaging with Southeast Asian states to “test the waters” – so to speak – in order to learn how best to advance its territorial claims in the South China Sea. From China’s perspective, dialogue alone has not been successful so it adopted a strategy of pursuing “gray zone” activities thereby seeking to change the facts on the ground – or, more accurately, the facts in the water – by building facilities such as docks and runways and constructing artificial islands. At the same time, China has stepped up its harassment and intimidation of the fishing boats and the maritime enforcement vessels of other states. However, while constructivism helps explain China’s approach to the South China Sea – learning by doing and adapting to changing conditions – it does not explain WHY China has invested so much time, energy, resources, and prestige into this body of water. Moreover, it does not explain WHY the United States has persisted in a tough unwavering approach to the South China Sea even as it appears ineffective in altering Chinese behavior.4 While realism and constructivism each can provide some useful insights into China’s strategy in the South China Sea, neither is able to provide a comprehensive explanation. A geopolitical analysis – which considers the influence of geography on international politics – offers a more thorough interpretation. In calculating balances of power and assessing national interests, the geographical proximity of adversaries and allies as well as the locations of topographical and maritime features of critical strategic importance should not be ignored. Meanwhile, constructivism suggests that disputants would also explore non-military ways to manage and, perhaps even resolve through negotiation, disputes over small, remote, and uninhabited rocks and shoals. By contrast, geopolitics highlights the tremendous geostrategic importance of littoral areas – what Nicholas Spykman (1944) called the globe’s “rimland” regions. The centrality of these maritime areas is underscored by the critical importance of seaborne international trade: 90% of the world’s commerce is transported by ship and approximately half of this trade either terminates on the rim of, or traverses, the South China Sea.5 Accordingly, one analysis describes the body of water as “both the fulcrum of world trade and the crucible of conflict” (Hayton 2014: xvi). This puts into sharper focus why the United States and China have come to view the South China Sea as center stage for their geopolitical maritime rivalry.

The geography of conflict 31

US–China geopolitical rivalry The United States and China have not faced each other on the field of battle since 1953, and since 1972 have enjoyed generally cordial and cooperative relations along with a dramatic expansion of economic and diplomatic contact as well as military-tomilitary exchanges and people-to-people interactions. Nevertheless, multiple contentious disputes have emerged along with significant policy disagreements, especially since the end of the Cold War. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a series of US–China political-military crises have occurred each raising the specter of escalation to the use of military force. Yet, the United States and China continue to cooperate on many issues and typically have maintained a cordial working relationship. However, mutual distrust and animosity pervade bilateral ties, and Washington and Beijing perceive each other as competitors or rivals (Lieberthal and Wang 2012). Rivalry between the United States and China in the Asia-Pacific region is framed by geography. This trite observation, of course, demands clarification. Robert Ross (1999) has argued that China is predominantly a continental power and the United States is mainly a maritime one. As a consequence, their rivalry is more stable than the extended US–Soviet geopolitical contest which encompassed significant continental and maritime components and hence Ross emphasized the “geography of the peace” was likely to prevail. According to Ross, “The post-Cold War bipolar regional structure is characterized by Chinese dominance of mainland East Asia and U.S. dominance of maritime East Asia” (Ross 1999: 84). At the turn of the century, Ross explained: “China dominates mainland Southeast Asia”, while “the U.S. Navy dominates maritime Southeast Asia” (Ross 1999: 84, 86). During the first two decades of the 21st century, however, competition between the United States and China has heightened in the Western Pacific with the South China Sea emerging as a central flashpoint. There is an emerging geography of conflict because China is becoming a major maritime power. Indeed, Ross observed that “… China can only destabilize [the ‘bipolar structure’] by challenging U.S. maritime supremacy” (Ross 1999: 99). Under PRC President Xi Jinping, in particular, Beijing has focused more resources on expanding China’s maritime capabilities (Erickson 2017). The rivalry has intensified because US global hegemony in the post-Cold War era is being challenged by China. Specifically, China is contesting America’s “command of the commons” and this is playing out in a very high profile manner in the South China Sea (Posen 2003). So, why did the South China Sea flashpoint catch many by surprise, including adherents of geostrategy? First, there tends to be an inherent bias toward continental thinking which emerges out of the writings of Sir Halford Mackinder. Thus, scholars such as Zbigniew Brzezinski emphasize the Eurasian landmass and focus on the geostrategic importance of Central Asia and the Caucasus – building on the foundation of Mackinder’s “heartland” thesis (Brzezinski 1997). Of course, the Cold War had a maritime dimension but it was global in scope and geographically dispersed. The most visible concentration of opposing forces was on the central European plain. Moreover, in prior “hot wars” – including World

32 Andrew Scobell War I and World War II – the hostilities played out most brutally in continental battles and ground campaigns in Europe. The shackles of Cold War era thinking have proved hard for Washington to break and the Pentagon has been struggling for decades to understand the new map of the world in the absence of a Soviet Union and without the specter of a major land war on the European continent.6 Of course the United States has engaged in sustained land power operations in the post-Cold War era, but these have not been in Europe. The extended employments of military force in places like Afghanistan and Iraq have in hindsight proved unsatisfactory, costly in blood and treasure, and lacking an orderly exit strategy. Meanwhile, China has focused on modernizing its military and paramilitary forces with particular attention to naval and maritime forces. Certainly, the United States has not ignored its own naval forces, but the swiftness with which the capabilities of all the services of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have begun to approach those of the US military has been dramatic. The introduction into the Pentagon lexicon of “Anti-Access/Area Denial” (A2/AD) is testament to Washington’s recognition of a new strategic reality in the Western Pacific. A2/AD refers to the increasing ability of China’s military to hold at risk US military assets that enter and operate in the Western Pacific. Moreover, more recently the Pentagon has been speaking of the need to pursue a “Third Offset Strategy” to deal with the daunting challenges posed to the United Stated by a variety of increasingly capable potential adversaries.7 Similar to the earlier iterations of “offsets”, the emphasis of the Third Offset is on leveraging US technological advantages to counter the increasing potent conventional military capabilities being developed and deployed by countries, notably China. However, unlike the offsets on the 1950s and 1970s, there is no single adversary and the solution does not involve greater attention to nuclear weapons. While Beijing is certainly a major US concern, it is not the only challenge that Washington faces. What the Third Offset strategy does emphasize is technological advancements in the domains of sea and air with a focus on countering stand-off precision guided weaponry. One strategic thinker has drawn sustained attention to the maritime realm with a series of books on geopolitics, the Indian Ocean, and most recently the South China Sea. Robert Kaplan (2011, 2012, 2014) appears to be a disciple of Nicholas Spykman who, in contrast to Mackinder, stressed the importance of “rimland” and world’s oceanic system in geopolitics.8 While globalization is not a new phenomenon, the pace and scope of this far-reaching process have accelerated. Moreover, although the oceans of the world have long played a key role in this process – including the explorations of pioneering mariners such as Christopher Columbus and Vasco da Gama – the significance of the oceans has only increased due to the expanded volume of shipping tonnage that now traverses the sea lanes of the world. This underscores the importance of the South China Sea which is crisscrossed by some of the busiest shipping lanes anywhere on the planet. A second reason that the South China Sea as a flashpoint has been such a surprise is that the body of water seems geographically well removed from the great powers. In short, the sea appears peripheral to recognized geopolitical centers of

The geography of conflict 33 gravity. Often overlooked is that technological advances in weaponry have dramatically shrunk distances – ballistic and cruise missiles have greatly improved in both range and accuracy.9 Furthermore, the South China Sea does not appear to involve significant territorial claims. A glance at the location of major powers and the disposition of heavily armed potential adversaries would suggest the serious flashpoints of the Asia-Pacific can be found in Northeast Asia. The Korean Peninsula remains very tense with two heavily armed adversaries facing each other across the so-called Demilitarized Zone. Moreover, North Korea has an expanding nuclear arsenal with enhanced delivery systems. Add to this the involvement of the United States – as South Korea’s ally – with sizeable military assets both on the peninsula and more that can be brought into theater and China – as North Korea’s ally – with much at stake in what transpires on the peninsula. The result is a volatile flashpoint. In addition, there are considerable simmering tensions between China and Japan, notably over the disposition of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Another flashpoint is the Taiwan Strait, which like the Korean Peninsula, is the location of an unresolved civil war albeit far less tense in recent years than its continental counterpart. A third reason for surprise over the emergence of the South China Sea flashpoint is that this body of water did not seem to be a high stakes issue in the US– China rivalry. Indeed, the escalation of tensions in the South China Sea seemed to come out of nowhere. According to Brzezinski, this body of water merely poses the risk of conflict between China and Southeast Asian claimants: he sees no danger of a US–China showdown over the South China Sea (Brzezinski 1997: 154). Indeed, Ross, writing in 1999, considered the body of water, the “least significant” flashpoint when compared to the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait.10 The late 2000s appear to be a tipping point in the status of the body of water because of a confluence of events. The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 hit the United States hard while leaving China relatively unscathed. The newly elected administration of Barack Obama, which took office in January 2009, seemed initially consumed with addressing the economic fallout, somewhat less committed to Asia, and more prepared to accommodate Chinese interests (Garver 2016: 661–3). In March, when Beijing probed US intentions by harassing the USNS Impeccable in the South China Sea, Washington did not seem to push back hard; in May, China submitted documents supporting its extensive claims to that body of water to the United Nations; then, in November, during the US–China summit, the Obama administration agreed to a joint declaration with language stating that each country should respect the other’s “core interests”. The following month, at a high level global climate change summit held in Copenhagen, Denmark, China appeared intent on sabotaging US initiatives and embarrassing President Obama (Garver 2016: 663–4). By mid-2010, Washington had concluded that Beijing’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea and elsewhere required a firmer US response. China interpreted the Obama administration’s tougher actions as a complete U-turn and reacted angrily. A diplomatic faceoff occurred at the ASEAN Regional Forum Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Hanoi, Vietnam, in July when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton articulated US policy toward the South China

34 Andrew Scobell Sea and implicitly criticized Chinese actions. PRC Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi responded heatedly seeking to intimidate the smaller states of Southeast Asia (Pomfret 2010).

Why the South China Sea matters The United States and China are geopolitical rivals. While there are elements of cooperation as well as elements of competition – which commonly characterize many interstate relationships – the two countries are at risk of being captured in a Thucydides Trap.11 When scholars revisit the epic conflicts between the great powers in different historical eras, the most easily recalled portions are the land campaigns and battles between opposing armies. The ground game is what appears to matter most. The most storied battle of the Napoleonic Wars is undoubtedly Waterloo (1815). The most epic struggle of World War I is likely the Somme (1916) although other patches of blood soaked earth also come to mind. The most significant and brutal battle of World War II may have been Stalingrad (1942–1943). Yet each of these major conflicts included a key maritime component with a corresponding epic sea battle. Indeed, for the Napoleonic Wars it was almost certainly the Battle of Trafalgar (1805), although the naval clashes on the Nile (1798) and at Copenhagen (1801) are also candidates. The cockpit of this maritime rivalry was the Mediterranean Sea (Table 3.1). For World War I there was the Battle of Jutland (1916) and World War II featured an extended Battle for the Atlantic (1939–1945), as well as the more concentrated Battle of Midway (1942) in the Pacific Ocean. Many of the epic rivalries in world history have included significant maritime dimensions. Particularly famous was the Anglo-German rivalry, chronicled by scholars such as Paul Kennedy (1980), which eventually escalated into World War I. Moreover, it is significant that for each of these rivalries and wars a specific body of water invariably served as a focal point or cradle of conflict. The above discussion suggests that great power rivalries play out geopolitically and the maritime Table 3.1 Maritime components of selected historical rivalries Rivalry

Cradle of conflict

Era of Rivalry

Athens–Sparta

Aegean Sea

Peloponnesian Wars

Korea–Japan

East Sea/Sea of Japan

Imjin War

England–Spain

North Atlantic/English Channel

Eighty Years War

England–France

Mediterranean/North Sea

Napoleonic Wars

England–Germany

North Sea/Atlantic

World War I & World War II

US–Japan

Western Pacific

World War II

US–USSR

Global oceans

Cold War

The geography of conflict 35 domain is a critical if not central arena of conflict. In the next section I examine contemporary Asian rivalries and where the South China Sea fits in each of them.

21st-century maritime rivalries and the South China Sea During the 2010s, the South China Sea has emerged as a focal point for confrontation between the United States and China. Yet, there are other overlapping rivalries that further raise the importance of the body of water: China is now also involved in rivalries with India and Japan in addition to a number of Southeast Asian claimant states (see Table 3.2). For India, the South China Sea seems to be very relevant although secondary to the Indian Ocean and a trigger for increased tensions between Beijing and New Delhi (Holmes and Yoshihara 2013). For Japan, the South China Sea has far greater salience but is still less central to its rivalry with China than the East China Sea (Smith 2017). The cumulative effect of these rivalries suggests that the South China Sea is probably “the most contested maritime space in the world” (Morton 2016: 911). China’s geostrategic goals So why has the South China Sea become the prime locus of US–China conflict? To state the obvious: because China cares about the South China Sea. Why does China care so much? While Beijing has significant land border disputes, many of which have been resolved through peaceful negotiation, maritime disputes, notably the South China Sea, have only increased in importance over time.12 Moreover, Washington has also attached greater importance to the South China Sea in recent years. Most conspicuously, China has become a major maritime power primarily in the Asia-Pacific (although Beijing does have global aspirations) and the United States has been forced to take note. As China embraced foreign investment and expanded international trade in the reform era since 1979, Beijing began to attach much greater weight to maritime matters. China adopted grand strategic naval vision – widely attributed to the late Admiral Liu Huaqing (1916–2011) – first set out in the early 1980s in which the PLA Navy would gradually extend its reach outward into the Pacific Ocean in Table 3.2 Contemporary Asia-Pacific rivalries and the South China Sea (SCS) Rivalry

SCS

Geostrategic linkage/ meaning

US–China

Southeast Asia

Within First Island Chain

China–Japan

Secondary

East China Sea primary focus

China–India

Secondary

Subset of ‘Indo-Pacific’ (Indian Ocean is primary)

Southeast Asia

Primary

Asia’s Mediterranean

36 Andrew Scobell a phased expansion of Chinese sea power (Cole 2010: 174–6). In the first phase, by 2000, the PLA Navy was to extend its area of operations in the Near Seas (South China Sea, East China Sea, and Yellow Sea) out as far as the so-called First Island Chain – the Kuril Islands, Japan, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines, Borneo, and Natuna Besar. The PLA Navy extended its responsibilities beyond China’s coastal waters to include “near shore” or littoral (jinan) and “near seas” (jinhai) (Tang and Han 2009: 13–14). In the second phase, by 2020, the PLA Navy aims to project its operational reach out to the so-called Second Island Chain – the Bonins, the Marianas, and the Carolines. In the third phase, by 2050, China would become a global sea power and hence on a par with the US Navy. Indeed, the PLAN’s activities and power project efforts have so far kept pace with this timeline. Furthermore, many PLA strategists have embraced the writings of US naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan (Holmes and Yoshihara 2007). Mahan emphasizes the central importance of sea power to a nation, notably the link between a state’s naval expansion, economic development, and the growth of maritime commerce as Chinese naval thinkers have observed.13 Hainan Island has become a maritime hub for China. The PLA constructed a modern naval base on the south side of the island at Yulin which permits submarines to enter without surfacing in plain sight and hence be visible to satellites. These subsurface platforms likely include ballistic missile carrying submarines (SSBNs) which will become increasingly important as China complements its land-based nuclear missiles with sea-launchable ones. The PLA may view the South China Sea as an “SSBN bastion” – a body of relatively secure water from where it can safely deploy ballistic missiles in peacetime and launch in time of war (Twomey 2013: 243). But why did the South China Sea emerge as the key maritime flashpoint for Beijing and what happened to flashpoint Taiwan? Three trends are most relevant. The first is that China has evolved from being a purely continental power in the mid-20th century to a maritime one by the turn of the 21st century. The second trend is that China’s economic center of gravity has shifted southward from northeast China – “Dongbei” or Manchuria – to a swath of eastern coastal China stretching from Tianjin to Shanghai to Fuzhou and further south to Hong Kong, Guangzhou, Haikou, and the beaches of Sanya. Third, the waters in the Taiwan Strait became calmer with the election of the Nationalist Party presidential candidate, Ma Ying-jeou in 2008 – widely considered pro-unification. With Ma as Taiwan’s head of state between 2008 and 2016 relations between Beijing and Taipei improved substantially. During the first four decades of the PRC’s existence, prime flashpoints were squarely continental. In the early 1950s, China’s primary flashpoint was the Korean Peninsula (with the Taiwan Strait being a secondary hotspot). In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s China’s foremost flashpoint was its vast land border with the Soviet Union with a secondary flashpoint being its southern land border with Vietnam. By the mid-1990s, however, China’s most prominent flashpoints had become maritime ones: the Taiwan Strait was of primary concern with the East China Sea as a secondary hotspot. This switch occurred as Beijing resolved most of its land border disputes with neighboring capitals with the notable exception of

The geography of conflict 37 New Delhi (Zhang 2012: 139). The height of post-Cold War tensions occurred in the Taiwan Strait, notably during a crisis in 1995–1996.14 Korea and Taiwan continued to be focal points of tension into the first decade of the 21st century. Nevertheless, by 2010, the South China Sea appeared to have replaced the Taiwan Strait as China’s most serious maritime flashpoint. This change appears to coincide with the southward drift of China’s economic center of gravity. A significant element of this is China’s greater seaborne trade with maritime Southeast Asia and beyond to Europe and the Middle East, but one should not overlook China’s growing economic interaction with continental Southeast Asia with the Yunnan Province and its capital Kunming as a major road, rail, and air terminus. Furthermore, US–China tensions over Taiwan dissipated and were supplanted by the South China Sea. This body of water became a focal point for mutual suspicion and US–China rivalry because it came to crystallize for the two powers both concrete regional disputes and broader abstract principles within the larger context of geopolitical rivalry. The Korean flashpoint has both continental and maritime dimensions. Continued instability on the peninsula is not just alarming to China because of a shared land border with North Korea, but also because of considerable maritime trade with South Korea and Japan. Tensions in Korea have escalated especially since 2010 as North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs have made dramatic progress. Consequently Beijing–Pyongyang relations have soured noticeably. Hence the South China Sea is not China’s only tense Asia-Pacific flashpoint in the 2010s. But while China has been distinctly subdued in its rhetoric and restrained in it actions vis-à-vis North Korea, where the South China Sea is concerned Beijing has been increasingly hardline and assertive.15 Chinese leaders have adopted a geostrategic outlook from their vantage point in Beijing. When members of the Politburo nervously look out from their leadership compound of Zhongnanhai they perceive their environment in terms of four concentric circles (Nathan and Scobell 2012). The first ring they see begins in the street outside their office window – China’s domestic security situation which includes all the territory within the borders of the PRC that Beijing controls or claims. The second ring of security comprises the PRC’s immediate periphery – a zone which includes fourteen neighbors – five of which China has fought wars with in the last 75 years. The third ring encircles the entire Asia-Pacific neighborhood, while the fourth and outermost ring extends to the world beyond. In this geostrategic conception the South China Sea looms large because it is considered to be part of rings one, two, and three as well as constituting an important stepping stone into the fourth ring. Not only is the lion’s share of this body of water claimed as Chinese territory, territorial waters, or Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), but it is also a critical element of China’s periphery, a crucial subsystem in China’s neighborhood and an important conduit to the world beyond. Thus, according to one prominent Chinese scholar, the South China Sea dispute “involves significant political, security, and economic interests” (Zhang 2012: 138). Uncertainty has swirled around whether China has defined the South China Sea as a “core interest”. In recent years, Beijing has begun to use the term to refer to a

38 Andrew Scobell set of high priority national security issues, notably sensitive territorial matters such as Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Some assert that the PRC has designated the South China Sea as a “core interest”. While Chinese officials have reportedly used the term in closed door discussions with US counterparts, the phrase has yet to appear in a public statement or PRC document (Bader 2012: 104–6). Why? Although there is no doubt that the South China Sea is one of Beijing’s most important issues, Chinese leaders appear to have concluded they have nothing to gain from making this designation official. Doing so would likely further escalate tensions with other claimants and the United States because it would only serve to reinforce China’s position on its claims in the South China Sea as non-negotiable and “maximalist” (Yoshihara and Holmes 2011).16 Moreover, it would almost certainly raise stakes of the body of water in the eyes of the Chinese people hence only increase the pressure on PRC leaders.

China’s great leap outward The importance of the South China Sea has only been underscored by recent policy initiatives. In 2013 President Xi Jinping publicly launched with considerable fanfare the “One Belt, One Road” program.17 He announced the initiative in two high profile speeches – one in Central Asia and the other in Southeast Asia. There are two major components to the initiative – a continental one and an oceanic one. Xi proposed the development of an overland “belt” of roads, rails, and pipelines from China into Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia stretching onward to Europe and the Middle East. Xi also proposed the development of a “maritime silk road” from China through the South China Sea and into the India Ocean and beyond. The plans emphasized the importance of two regions – maritime Southeast Asia and the Middle East. The former is a key waterway while the latter emerges as a nexus of the overland belt and the maritime road. This bold initiative appears to have its roots in the great western development plan of the 2000s to build up China’s infrastructure in its far western interior that spurred economic growth in the underdeveloped landlocked regions of China which had lagged behind the more prosperous and dynamic coastal provinces. Moreover, the intellectual predecessor of “One Belt, One Road” was the “March West” concept articulated in 2012 by Beijing University academic Wang Jisi (2012). Wang argued that China needed a geostrategic “rebalance” and this required putting greater efforts into developing relationships and linkages with its western neighbors. Nevertheless, it was not a call to turn away from China’s eastern coastal provinces; rather, it was a call for a more balanced approach to China’s domestic and foreign development strategies. When Beijing looks east it finds itself hemmed in by US military bases on the first and second island chains, a powerful US Navy contesting the Near Seas, and its robust allies, notably Tokyo and Seoul. By contrast, looking west reveals a more open geostrategic landscape. While there was a US military presence in Central Asia during the first and second decades of the 21st century, the balance of power in this location is much less skewed in America’s favor. Beijing had developed good relations with Central Asian capitals

The geography of conflict 39 and increasingly the region was coming within China’s economic orbit.18 Moreover, the United States has embarked on a drawdown of its military forces in Afghanistan and China’s influence in that country is on the rise (Zhao 2012).

China’s strategy toward the South China Sea Beijing’s policy stand on the South China Sea has been consistent across many decades. The PRC has long claimed sovereignty over virtually all the islands, reefs, and atolls in this body of war on the basis of historical presence and activity in the maritime area. The PRC’s claims are consistent with the territorial claims of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. Indeed, the PRC inherited its famous “nine-dashed line” map from the ROC. While Beijing has sought to use legal means to strengthen its territorial claims on this body of water, the primary rationale for its claim is historical and indeed one prominent PRC scholar, Professor Zhu Feng, Director of Nanjing University’s Center for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea, has characterized Beijing’s approach as grounded in “historical fundamentalism”. Zhu contrasts this Chinese approach to a US approach that he dubs “legal fundamentalism”.19 China’s strategy toward the South China Sea for many decades has been variously described as one of “delay”, “creeping assertiveness”, or “Slow Intensity Conflict” (“SLIC”).20 In this strategy China adopted a gradualist long-term approach to improve its claims on the features in as low-key manner as possible. Since at least the 1970s, China has opportunistically occupied islands and reefs sometimes by force (for example, the Paracel Islands in 1974 and the Spratly Islands in 1988) and other times unopposed (for example, Mischief Reef in 1995) as well as by stealthily strengthening its hold on formations it already occupies through the construction of fortifications, docks, and runways. In the 1970s and 1980s, for portions of the 1990s, and during much of the 2000s China was very successful in implementing this SLIC strategy in such a way as to avoid much attention, controversy or resistance. By 2010, however, China’s activities in the South China were increasingly less ‘SLIC’ in the sense that Chinese actions were more high profile and assertive so Southeast Asian claimants were increasingly alarmed and prepared to react. But claimants, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, were wary of confronting China directly either individually or collectively because of a significant imbalance of power. Instead, they preferred to press the United States to challenge Beijing publicly on the matter. As a result, the South China Sea issue became a contentious issue in US–China relations.21 Beijing perceives Washington’s high minded rhetoric about upholding the principle of freedom of navigation as an excuse to interfere in the South China Sea. According to one Chinese scholar, “maritime disputes have become a growing source of insecurity in East Asia.” The causes are varied and, “are further complicated by the involvement of third parties” (Zhang 2012: 139). Notable from a Chinese perspective, is the “high profile intervention of the United States…” (Zhang 2012: 127).

40 Andrew Scobell China’s response under President Xi Jinping has been to ramp up its activities in the South China Sea. Since December 2013, Beijing has embarked upon a massive program of land reclamation – a total of more than 2,900 acres have been added to seven of China’s eight occupied formations in the Spratly Islands archipelago.22 Moreover, PRC naval and maritime law enforcement ships have vigorously advanced Chinese claims by a concerted series of demonstrations of force, including harassing, expelling, and ramming fishing boats and other vessels from claimant states. The most remarkable demonstration of concerted PRC power occurred in May 2014 when dozens of fishing boats, coastguard vessels, and seven PLA Navy warships formed concentric rings of protection around oil rig HD-981 120 miles off the coast of Vietnam (Thayer 2014). The exploration was announced ahead of time with specific start and end dates. This highly coordinated maneuver was well executed although the exercise ended about a month early – but not before some 30 Vietnamese ships confronted the flotilla. The episode was a clear show of overwhelming force by Beijing. US geostrategic goals Why does the South China Sea matter to the United States? As the global hegemon, the United States defines its national interests on a global scale.23 Militarily the paramount US interest is the defense of the homeland and American allies; politically, the United States seeks to promote democracy and strengthen human rights around the world; economically, the United States looks to protect the global trading and financial systems. Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the world’s dominant naval power. Until quite recently US aircraft and naval vessels have been able to operate in air and waters almost anywhere in the world without fear of serious challenge. Consequently, Washington is both concerned with every corner of the world as well as being accustomed to having a remarkable degree of freedom of action in international waters and air space. Not surprisingly, many in the US Navy are Mahanians. They believe firmly in the primacy of sea power and the emphasis on “command of the sea” reflects the enduring influence of Mahan on US naval strategists.24 The maritime realm in the Asia-Pacific has been especially important and in 2015 the Department of Defense issued an Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy and major portions of the report focused on the South China Sea.25 For decades the United States has conducted more trade with Asia than it has with Europe. Today a multitude of trade routes reach across the Pacific Ocean and the United States has built a network of free trade agreements. Following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and rise of new democracies greater political attention shifted to Asia. The battleground for waging the war of ideas moved to Asia as countries including North Korea and Myanmar become the focus of concern for widespread human rights violations. Moreover, democracy appeared on the march in the 1990s with significant steps toward democracy in Thailand and Indonesia. More recently Myanmar has made considerable strides in democratization, while Thailand has suffered a setback. In the defense realm, the United States has sought to

The geography of conflict 41 strengthen its ties with allies, expand security ties with other democracies, notably India, across the region, and shift more resources to the Asia-Pacific. The much hyped “rebalance” or “pivot” to the region announced by the administration of Barak Obama is a clear signal that the United States Government was intent to catch up on the reality that more concerted attention to the AsiaPacific was necessary. The clearest and most detailed articulation of the “rebalance” comes in the form of a recent book by a key architect and implementer (Campbell 2016). However, the administration of Donald J. Trump seems likely to rethink US policy toward the region and adopt new Asia-Pacific initiatives. Certainly, Donald Trump, as president-elect publicly criticized Chinese actions in the South China Sea in a December 2016 tweet.26 Moreover, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, indicated he favored a harsh US response to China in the South China Sea during confirmation hearings in January 2017 (Forsythe 2017). Senior Department of Defense officials have also spoken in hardline terms about responding to Chinese actions in the South China Sea. Future Secretary of Defense James Mattis wrote in early 2016 that one of the top “priority challenges” for the United States was to “confront” Chinese trampling over the “rights of its neighbors in the South China Sea” (Sands 2016). Of course at the time he was a private citizen, but there is every reason to believe that these words continue to represent his views. During 2016 public testimony before the US Congress, Admiral Harry Harris, Commander of Pacific Command, was remarkably blunt, characterizing Chinese actions in the South China Sea as “provocative and expansionist”. He insisted the goal was to “build a great wall of sand” in an audacious effort to establish control over disputed waters (Perlez 2016). Seas, not SLOCs High profile attention to “choke points” and “Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs)” only serve to obscure the reality that bodies of water matter as much if not more than narrow straits and straight-line shipping lanes. Michael Wesley has underscored the importance of bays and drawn attention to three in the IndoPacific: the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea (Wesley 2014: 26–36). Much hype surrounds Beijing’s purported “Malacca dilemma” and Washington’s alleged obsession with “SLOC protection”.27 While there is an element of truth to these claims, in broader geostrategic terms, what matters more is command of the seas; specifically efforts to control bodies of water by one state or at least efforts to deny or limit access to other states. Much has been made of Chinese strategists’ focus on two island chains but these are merely boundary markers – they are not military objectives in and of themselves to be seized, occupied, and fortified. Beijing’s goal is to deny the waters inside these island chains to the air and naval platforms of an outside power. Thus, these islands are not walls to be defended but geographic features marking the outer reaches of China’s desired maritime domain. In short, China seeks to hold at increased risk US surface ships, submarines, and aircraft operating on, in, and above what Beijing dubs the “Near Seas”.

42 Andrew Scobell Similarly, the United States is more concerned about the ability to operate freely in the Western Pacific than it is about occupying particular islands or controlling specific straits. A foremost publicly articulated Department of Defense objective in the Asia-Pacific is “to safeguard the freedom of the seas”, including “uses of the sea and airspace … for military ships and aircraft….”28 Therefore the Pentagon is more focused on how to counter the improved “anti-access and area (A2/AD)” capabilities of the PLA inside the Near Seas than it is about particular archipelagic positions or littoral chokepoints.

US strategy in the South China Sea Washington’s approach to the South China Sea can be characterized as standing firm in principle and somewhat flexible in practice. Of course, this characterization is frequently applied to Beijing’s policies on various issues. In this case it is the United States that is adamant on the matter of the inviolability of the principle of freedom of navigation protection of the global commons. The United States has also consistently sought to take neutral stands on the competing claims of rival states in the South China Sea. But Washington does insist on abiding by international law. The oft-noted irony is that the United States has yet to ratify the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Still from Beijing’s perspective, Washington appears to be biased against China and interfering in a maritime region far removed from US geostrategic core interests. Moreover, the high profile freedom of navigation operations (aka “FONOPS”) conducted by the US Navy in the South China Sea from a Chinese perspective appear to be aimed at publicly humiliating China. The US interpretation of UNCLOS is that military vessels can operate unhindered in international waters, meaning anywhere outside of the 12 nautical mile limit of a country’s territorial waters.29 In contrast, China insists that a country has additional rights within its EEZ to deny access to the military vessels of another state unless permission has been granted (Tangredi 2012: 79). The United States is also engaged in other less prominent initiatives where the South China Sea is concerned. Amongst these is an effort to coordinate with other countries – claimants and non-claimants – to build on the sweeping decision of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).30 The outcome of this initiative remains to be seen. It is unclear whether the July 2016 PCA ruling will prove to be a landmark ruling and a turning point in the South China Sea dispute, or is on its way to becoming an extremely fascinating but largely irrelevant footnote in international law journal articles.

Conclusion The South China Sea has become a central flashpoint in the rivalry between the United States and China. Where the South China Sea is concerned China has long applied a shrewd realpolitik calculus and embarked on an extended constructivist learning curve. However, geopolitics is what best explains why the South China

The geography of conflict 43 Sea has only grown in importance to Beijing to become in the early 21st century “a principal node of global power politics” (Kaplan 2014: 49). China has adopted a geostrategic approach to Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. Geopolitics also underscores why the Asia-Pacific region is considered extremely important to the United States. The United States has adopted a geostrategic approach in its early 21st century grand strategy: this is why the Obama administration initiated the “pivot” or “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific. While it is unclear what policy the Trump administration will adopt, Washington will be obliged to respond to geopolitical realities and likely pursue a hardline vis-à-vis China in the South China Sea. The United States and China are geopolitical competitors and, like a good number of great power rivals before them, Beijing and Washington are playing this rivalry out in the maritime domain. China desires a “blue water” navy and to expand gradually its sea power out from its littoral waters to the so-called first island chain to the second island chain and beyond. Washington appears determined to sustain its worldwide oceanic preeminence and status as chief protector of the global commons, and seems to view the South China Sea as a central arena for this struggle. Beijing aspires to these ambitions partly because it views this maritime region as China’s rightful sphere of influence but the intensity and determination is driven by the logic of a geostrategic rivalry with the United States.

Notes 1 For the clearest outline of offensive realism, see John Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2014). 2 While offensive realism does predict that China will seek to dominate adjacent seas it does not anticipate the South China Sea as the cradle of US–China rivalry (Mearsheimer 2014). 3 In his The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2014), Mearsheimer instead focuses on Northeast Asia as the most likely fulcrum of US–China confrontation. See chapter 10. 4 For the classic constructionist manifesto, see Wendt (1999). 5 George (2013) and Energy Information Agency (last updated 2013). 6 See, for example, Barnett (2005). 7 For discussion of the “Third Offset” and its predecessors, see the speech by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work. 2015. The Third U.S. Offset Strategy and its Implications for Partners and Allies. Delivered at the Willard Hotel in Washington DC, January 28. Retrieved at: http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/ Article/606641/the-third-us-offset-strategy-and-its-implications-for-partners-and-allies. 8 But Kaplan observes that despite different emphases, Mackinder and Spykman each see a state’s control of both “heartland” and “rimland” as important for national security. See Kaplan’s The Revenge of Geography (2012: 96–7). 9 Thus Paul Bracken writes of “disruptive technologies” resulting in the “death of distance”. See Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age (1999). 10 Ross (1999: 111). Moreover, Ross opined that the disputed Spratly Islands were “too small to possess strategic value”, ibid. 11 A mix of cooperation and competition can also characterize rivalries. See Thompson (2001: 559).

44 Andrew Scobell 12 For an excellent overview of Chinese territorial disputes, see M. Taylor Fravel’s Strong Nation, Secure Borders: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes (2008). 13 See the discussion in Erickson and Goldstein (2009: 49–50). 14 See, for example, Scobell (2000a). 15 This is reinforced by a careful reading of a white paper issued by Beijing in early 2017. See State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (2017). 16 The question of whether China should explicitly define the South China Sea as a “core interest” has been hotly debated by Chinese analysts and scholars. See Swaine (2011: 10–11). 17 For a concise summary and analysis, see Rolland (2015). For the most comprehensive and authoritative PRC document on the topic to date, see Vision and Actions: On Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (2015), issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China with State Council authorization. 18 See, for example, Cooley (2012). 19 Presentation by Professor Zhu Feng at the International Conference on the South China Sea, Danang, Vietnam, October 2014. 20 On delay, see Fravel (2011); on creeping assertiveness, see Storey (1999); on SLIC, see Scobell (2000b). 21 For insights into the emergence of the South China Sea as a central issue in US–China relations see Scobell and Harold (2013). 22 Department of Defense (US) (2015: 16). 23 White House (2015). 24 While “command of the sea” is not a term that Mahan himself used, it has been widely employed by US Navy strategists. See Rubel (2012). 25 Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, see Department of Defense (US) (2015). 26 CNBC (2016). 27 For excellent discussion of the hyperbole surrounding China’s Malacca Dilemma see Tunsjo (2013: 119–24). 28 Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, see Department of Defense (US) (2015), pp. 1, 2. 29 Ibid., p. 2. 30 Permanent Court of Arbitration. 2016. The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China). Press Release. The Hague, The Netherlands, July 12.

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The geography of conflict 47 Thompson, W.R. 2001. Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics. International Studies Quarterly, 45(4): 557–586. Tunsjo, O. 2013. Security and Profit in China’s Energy Security: Hedging Against Risk. New York: Columbia University Press. Twomey, C. 2013. The Military–Security Relationship. In David Shambaugh, ed. Tangled Titans: The United States and China. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 235–262. Wang, J. 2012. “Xijin”: Zhongguo diyuan zhanlue dezai pingheng [Marching West: China’s Geostrategic Rebalance]. Huaqiu Shibao [Global Times], October 17. Wendt, A. 1999. The Social Theory of International Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Wesley, W. 2014. Restless Giants: Asia’s new Geopolitics. In Uttam Kumar Sinha, ed. Emerging Strategic Trends in Asia. New Delhi, India: Pentagon Press, 26–36. White House. 2015. National Security Strategy 2015. Washington DC, February. Retrieved at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_stra tegy.pdf. Yoshihara, T. and J.R. Holmes. 2011. Can China Defend a “Core Interest” in the South China Sea? The Washington Quarterly, Spring, 34(2): 45–59. Zhang, T. 2012. Disputes over Territories and Maritime Rights and Interests: Their Political Economic Implications. In Avery Goldstein and Edward D. Mansfield, eds. The Nexus of Economics, Security, and International Relations in East Asia. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 120–143. Zhao, H. 2012. China and Afghanistan: Chinese Interests, Stances, and Perspectives. Report of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington DC, March. Retrieved at http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline. com/web/120322_Zhao_ChinaAfghan_web.pdf.

4 Chinese thinking on the South China Sea and the future of regional security1 Feng Zhang

China’s strategy toward the South China Sea, if there is one, is hard to read. On the one hand, Beijing insists on a diplomatic approach of negotiation to the resolution of disputes over sovereignty and maritime rights with other claimant states. On the other hand, in the most recent round of tensions since 2009, Beijing has taken a notably power-centered approach to establishing de facto control over maritime features, raising regional suspicion and even fear of Chinese domination. China’s new assertiveness, as reflected in the Scarborough Shoal incident with the Philippines in 2012, in the oil rig incident with Vietnam in 2014, and in industrial scale land reclamation since 2014, has been at the centre of regional tensions. What exactly is China trying to achieve in the South China Sea? Is it only concerned with protecting its perceived rights from challenges from Southeast Asian claimant states? Or does it have a larger strategic plan for a hegemonic leadership contest with the United States? Indeed, does it have a coherent strategy toward the South China Sea? This chapter explores these questions from the perspective of China’s domestic debates about the South China Sea during the latest round of tensions since 2009. These debates reflect major Chinese thinking behind actual policy, and can thus be a useful guide to understanding the nuances of Chinese policy that are not always apparent from behavioral indicators. Previous studies have surveyed Chinese debates in limited areas.2 This chapter attempts to offer a comprehensive analysis of Chinese debates about the South China Sea across all the most important domains. Three schools of thought currently dominate Chinese debates. The pragmatists want to protect reasonable Chinese sovereignty and maritime rights in the region with limited disruption of regional stability. The hardliners want to maximize these rights and establish Chinese control over the area. The moderates, recognizing the need for rights protection, emphasize the importance of securing support from Southeast Asian countries for the overall national task of China’s rise. This chapter compares the key differences amongst the three camps in terms of their understandings of China’s strategic goals in the South China Sea, strategic approaches, risk propensity, and policy influence. The findings are based on a wide range of Chinese open sources (academic writings, policy reports, and media commentaries) and elite interviews with leading scholars, analysts, and policy makers. These sources do not include the views of senior leaders in the central

Chinese thinking on the South China Sea 49 leadership, as they are inaccessible to most researchers. But the elite views from experts and working level officials examined here are indicative and valuable enough of the range of Chinese perspectives. I offer the typology of pragmatists, hardliners, and moderates as a notional exercise, as it may need further examination via more documentary sources and elite interviews. Studying Chinese debates is necessary because only by grasping Chinese thinking will the outside world be able to appreciate the logic – sometimes counterintuitive and even unique – behind Chinese policy, and only by appreciating this logic will relevant countries be able to formulate targeted and effective responses. The debates suggest that China has not developed a distinct or coherent strategy toward the South China Sea. Instead, diverse actors and interest groups as represented by the three camps are trying to impose their particular understanding of China’s positions and roles in the South China Sea. China’s claims have not completely hardened and its strategy has not yet been coherently formulated because various political actors are still trying to develop China’s national interests and strategic approaches in the region. The future of Chinese policy will depend on the outcome of the debates amongst these actors. These debates, in turn, will be affected by the strategic interactions between China and other countries involved in the South China Sea.

The pragmatists Strategic goals Fu Ying, a high profile former vice foreign minister in charge of Asia policy from 2009 to 2013, argues that China still “highly values the maintenance of a stable and peaceful external environment”. Yet she also affirms that “China is determined to protect its own interests and would respond firmly to provocations, encroachments on its territorial sovereignty, or threats to its rights and interests” (Fu 2016: 103). Her views capture China’s two competing goals in the South China Sea: maintaining regional stability and protecting China’s sovereignty and maritime rights, especially rights to exploit hydrocarbon and fisheries resources. This relationship is more elegantly expressed as one between weiwen (maintaining stability) and weiquan (protecting rights). While these two foreign policy goals are not necessarily contradictory or incompatible, they have great potential to conflict. When Chinese assertiveness raises regional tensions and damages relations with neighboring states, the goal of protecting Chinese rights is achieved at the expense of regional stability. Conversely, when China exercises too much selfrestraint or makes gratuitous concessions in negotiations over territorial disputes for the sake of maintaining good relationships with its neighbors, the goal of preserving regional stability may come at the cost of sacrificing its rights. The debate about the tension between weiwen and weiquan rose significantly after 2009, when tensions in the South China Sea flared up. A major consensus amongst many analysts is that China’s maritime policy needs to shift from a “stability first” approach to a “rights first” approach. For the pragmatists, however, a “rights first”

50 Feng Zhang approach does not mean a complete disregard of the importance of achieving regional stability. They assign priority to protecting rights, but recognize that stability should also be maintained to the extent possible within an overall policy framework of rights protection. But regional stability is no longer regarded as the top foreign policy interest, and certainly not one that should be achieved at the expense of legitimate rights. On the contrary, the pragmatists are prepared to sacrifice a degree of regional stability for the sake of safeguarding maritime rights (Zhou 2016: 875). For the pragmatists, then, China’s major policy goal in the South China Sea is to protect and enhance its sovereignty and maritime rights without excessively jeopardizing regional stability. China should not try to realize its claimed rights in full, if doing so would cause conflict with Southeast Asian claimant states and possibly also the United States, thus reducing regional stability to a perilous degree that China would be unable to manage. Nor should the maximization of power be the goal. Rather, power should be seen as a means to achieve rights protection, not as an end in itself. Strategic means Because the pragmatists assign priority to rights protection over stability maintenance, they recommend an approach of deterrence-based assertiveness. For them, assertiveness is just a means to achieving the policy goal of rights protection. It is particularly useful for achieving the deterrent aim of preventing Southeast Asian claimant states like Vietnam and the Philippines from further encroaching on Chinese rights in the South China Sea. As the preceding section shows, Chinese analysts believe that China’s past selfrestraint produced the deleterious consequence of enticing these states to increase their demands on China and to strengthen physical control of the relevant maritime features. Such self-restraint was useful for improving China’s regional relations and maintaining regional stability, but it reduced China’s strategic resolve and sacrificed its rights. A new approach of deterrence-based assertiveness, the pragmatists argue, is essential to demonstrate Chinese resolve in maritime disputes. It is particularly important for achieving the psychological impact of changing regional states’ expectations of Chinese policy. As Zhou Fangyin, an influential thinker of the pragmatist camp, puts it: China has attempted to establish necessary and reliable deterrence of a kind likely to have only a very limited negative impact on regional stability. What is important for China is not to provoke any physical confrontation with the claimants in question, but to change the expectations of those claimants about how China will behave in a given situation, making sure that they fully understand China’s firmness of purpose and resolve to defend its fundamental rights and interests. This can be achieved through adopting an approach that is consistent and reasonable and at the same time firm and assertive. (Zhou 2016: 877)

Chinese thinking on the South China Sea 51 Policy influence and assessments The pragmatists have had significant policy influence since 2009. This was most clearly demonstrated through China’s notable new approach to the standoff with the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal in April–June 2012. The Scarborough Shoal, known as Huangyan Dao in China and Panatag Shoal in the Philippines, is a coral reef roughly 116 nautical miles from the archipelagic baseline of the Philippine Island of Luzon but is considered by China as part of the Macclesfield Bank, one of its four island groups in the South China Sea. On April 10, 2012, sailors from a Philippines naval frigate boarded several Chinese fishing vessels anchored in the lagoon at the shoal to investigate possible illegal fishing. Two nearby Chinese Maritime Surveillance ships soon arrived after receiving distress signals from the fishermen. A standoff ensued that, at its peak, involved dozens of vessels. It was finally resolved when Chinese ships took control of the area after the Philippines vessels withdrew (International Crisis Group 2015). The Chinese approach to this incident was not one of self-restraint. It was a clear example of remarkable new assertiveness for safeguarding Chinese rights in the South China Sea. The determination to confront the Philippines at sea and the decision to eventually take control of the shoal demonstrated sufficient Chinese resolve, backed up by impressive new maritime capabilities, to establish credible deterrence against Manila’s attempts to challenge Chinese interests. Chinese policy makers may well have thought that, recognizing such resolve from a newly assertive China, regional states may balk at challenging China directly and return to the negotiation table on terms favorable to China. In fact, the pragmatists have now hailed Beijing for establishing a “Scarborough Shoal” model in addressing maritime disputes. It is a strategy of deterrence based on China’s growing material power, but acquires a non-military character as Beijing prefers to use law enforcement and paramilitary units rather than regular military forces to enforce its claims. Such deterrence without the actual use of military force is useful for keeping tensions and confrontations within limits and preventing them from spiralling out of control (Zhang J. 2013; Zeng 2014). The Scarborough Shoal incident appears to be a vindication of the pragmatists’ deterrence-centered approach to managing South China Sea tensions. But their influence on China’s two other major policies – the oil rig incident with Vietnam and island building in the Spratlys – was less clear. In fact, their attitudes toward these decisions ranged from critical to ambivalent. In May 2014, Beijing deployed Haiyang Shiyou 981 – China’s first indigenous deep-water drilling rig developed by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation – in waters around the Paracel Islands of the South China Sea. Vietnam considered the area to be within its EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone). The deployment thus triggered intense and at times violent confrontations and collisions between dozens of Chinese and Vietnamese law enforcement vessels. The confrontation at sea fuelled large-scale, anti-Chinese protests across Vietnam, escalating into deadly riots in mid-May. The two-month long crisis finally abated when China removed the rig in July one month ahead of its announced schedule (International Crisis Group 2015).

52 Feng Zhang Many pragmatists regard Beijing’s deployment of the oil rig as a mistake. In contrast to the Scarborough Shoal incident where China managed to seize control over the shoal, Beijing did not seem to have made any practical gains from the oil rig deployment. Two wells were dug during the operation, but they were not large enough to produce a stable oil supply, and there is no indication when, if ever, the rig will return to the area to resume operations.3 But the diplomatic costs to China were considerable, including a broken relationship with Vietnam, increasing strategic distrust from ASEAN, criticisms from the US government and Congress, and a damaged international image. The pragmatists’ views about China’s industrial-scale land reclamation and island building activities in the Spratly Islands are more cautious. In late 2013, Beijing decided to pursue unprecedented building projects on seven Spratly reefs under its control. According to Admiral Harry Harris, commander of the US Pacific Command, China reclaimed 3,000 acres of former reefs in 18 months (Grady 2016). By 2016, all seven reefs had been turned into islets. In particular, Beijing has expanded Mischief Reef, Subi Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef to 5.6 km2, 4 km2, and 2.6 km2 respectively, making them the largest islands in the South China Sea. Moreover, each of these three islands are equipped with airstrips over 3 km in length, capable of handling both civilian and military aircrafts (US Department of Defense 2016: 13–20). The pragmatists acknowledge that the speed and scale of China’s island building are producing suspicion and even fear among regional countries. But they are generally supportive of the project for several reasons. First, before the Philippines v. China arbitration ruling in July 2016 which clarified the status of several of the reefs being built as within the Philippines’ EEZ,4 international law did not prohibit China from building over maritime features under its control. Second, a common Chinese view is that China is simply following the reclamation and building activities that Southeast Asian claimant states such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia have been undertaking since the 1970s. Third, island building of this magnitude is interpreted as a demonstration of China’s resolve, and is therefore similar to and a continuation of its rights protection activities following the Scarborough Shoal incident. Fourth, and more interestingly, the pragmatists argue that building over features already under its control may mean that China has no intention, at least for now, of seeking control of additional features currently occupied by other countries through coercion. In this sense, it is actually a demonstration of the limited nature of China’s strategic aim in the South China Sea.5 Through its massive reclamation and building activities, China has significantly strengthened its physical presence and control over the Spratly portion of the South China Sea. The pragmatists welcome this outcome. At a minimum, such an enhanced presence will greatly facilitate China’s attempts to better protect its perceived interests in the region. But they are cautious about what China might do with the islands in the future. As ever, the pragmatists are sensitive to the balance between the primary goal of protecting rights on the one hand and the secondary goal of maintaining a degree of regional stability on the other hand. If China pushes for significant militarization of the islands in an attempt to use them

Chinese thinking on the South China Sea 53 as new bases for maximizing its control and even establishing military dominance over the South China Sea, they fear, the balance between protecting rights and maintaining stability may be destroyed and regional tensions may spiral out of control, to the detriment of China as well as every other country in the region. That is a situation that they do not want to see. Thus, Wu Shicun argues that if the United States can restrain its military operations (including intelligence collection) near Chinese controlled islands, China should respect freedom of navigation in accordance with international law, avoid excessive militarization of the islands, and temporarily refrain from announcing an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) for the South China Sea (Wu 2016).

The hardliners Strategic goals The hardliners are not greatly concerned with the consequences of regional instability. They are instead obsessed with expanding Chinese rights to whatever extent possible, even at the cost of roiling regional tensions. China’s South China Sea policy, therefore, is much simpler for them: to defend, enhance, and enforce China’s rights, while at the same time expanding China’s power and influence in the region. In fact, they have made the South China Sea into a “core interest”.6 Admiral Wu Shengli, commander of the Chinese Navy, reportedly told the US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral John W. Richardson, that the South China Sea was a “core interest” that centred on the “foundation of the party’s governance, the country’s security and stability, and the Chinese nation’s basic interests” (Perlez 2016). The hardliners’ conception of Chinese interests also has a strong military dimension. Indeed, the most vocal hardliners reside within China’s military and law enforcement establishments. From a military perspective, securing and enhancing China’s rights in the South China Sea requires establishing a solid foothold in the region in order to carry out military and law enforcement activities. Such a foothold would also be very useful for protecting the South China Sea as a strategic sea line of communication vital for supporting China’s economic development and safeguarding its expanding overseas interests (Luo 2015: 8).7 The immediate practical objective that the hardliners seek is to establish as much control over Chinese-held islands and their surrounding environment as possible. For them, the South China Sea holds special economic and strategic significance both as a vast reserve of natural resources and as a strategic waterway for international commerce. Thus, People’s Liberation Amy (PLA) Major General Luo Yuan argues that controlling the South China Sea islands will enable China to effectively control this vital maritime region and international shipping routes. China must strive to gain control over every inch of the land and water of the South China Sea (Luo 2015: 13–15). Senior Colonel Dai Xu, another outspoken hawk in the PLA, asserts that not giving up an inch in sovereignty disputes is not meant to start war, but to avoid war and seek peace. China has experienced

54 Feng Zhang constant wars in modern history not because it was too strong and tough but because it was too weak and soft (Dai 2010: 285). Thus, “peace through strength” appears to be the hardliners’ vision of China’s international strategy.8 Whether the hardliners also seek to dominate the South China Sea militarily and thus push the United States out of the region by maximizing Chinese power is less clear. Military planners now prefer a naval strategy of “near-sea defense and far-sea rights protection”. They may well think that, as yet, China lacks the capability to achieve military dominance and deny the United States access to the South China Sea. They thus have a more limited goal of expanding China’s security perimeter and strategic frontier (Luo 2015: 133). Meanwhile, they aim to achieve the operational objective of holding American power projection capabilities at risk by developing what has been described by the US Department of Defense as A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) capabilities.9 The South China Sea may also be useful in providing a more secure operational theater for China’s emerging nuclear powered, ballistic missile carrying submarine (SSBN) force than the current Hainan Island base. A secure space for the SSBN force would be important for ensuring the reliability and effectiveness of China’s nuclear retaliatory capability. Strategic means The hardliners hope to realize the full range of Chinese rights in the South China Sea by establishing greater control over the region. But they are not so rash as to advocate a strategy of military aggression to occupy those islands and reefs currently under the control of other countries. They may think that China will be able to prevail in such wars and restore regional stability under the shadow of Chinese primacy. But the costs will be horrendous, and it will completely destroy the image of China as a “peace-loving” country which has been strongly promoted by the government throughout the reform period (1978–present) (Zhang F. 2013). Partly because of the moral constraint of Chinese pacifism, the hardliners favor a strategy of opportunistic assertiveness rather than outright assertiveness or aggression. Not wanting China to be seen as the aggressor, they prefer to wait for regional claimant states to make “mistakes” that China can then exploit with a forceful response, including occupying features under other countries’ control.10 As Luo warned the Philippines at the height of tension around 2012: “We are waiting for you to make mistakes. If you make mistakes, we will definitely take the opportunity and act resolutely” (Luo 2015: 134). Dai asserts that gradually releasing the energy of war through small-scale disputes and conflicts is the most effective way to avoid greater tragedy. The courage and ability to confront conflicts, according to him, is the basic mindset and criterion of a mature great power (Dai 2010: 290). It is important to appreciate the difference between the pragmatists’ strategy of deterrence-based assertiveness and the hardliners’ strategy of opportunistic assertiveness. The pragmatists’ strategy of deterrence-based assertiveness is defensive in orientation, even though it may be coercive in conduct. By creating credible

Chinese thinking on the South China Sea 55 deterrence against Southeast Asian claimant states, it is meant to prevent the further loss of Chinese interests. Because it is defensive and geared toward loss prevention, the strategy is unlikely to lead to military conflict as long as all sides can exercise a degree of self-restraint. In contrast, the hardliners’ strategy of opportunistic assertiveness is offensive in orientation, aimed at gaining greater control over the islands and waters of the South China Sea. They make no firm commitment to self-restraint. And if other claimant states are restrained, this is only going to delay, rather than remove, the hardliners’ attempts to realize the full range of Chinese rights in the South China Sea. Risk propensity The hardliners recognize that the costs associated with their strategy are potentially enormous. China’s military occupation of the Vietnam or Philippines-held islands in the Spratly chain may very well trigger a regional coalition led by the United States in opposition to China, if not a regional war at the outset. It may also destroy progress in political confidence building and economic cooperation that the East Asian region has made over the past several decades. But the hardliners believe that these costs will be transitory and bearable. They aver that even the very costly and negative international reactions to the Tiananmen Square crackdown of June 4, 1989 failed to bring China any long-term harm. China should be prepared to accept certain costs to make its rise a true success, they believe, and regional states will have to accept China’s rise as a geopolitical fact and eventually come to terms with a powerful China.11 The hardliners thus have a low sensitivity to costs and a high tolerance for instability. They also have a very low regard of and receptivity toward other countries’ views and concerns. Entirely self-centered, they wish only to maximize China’s self-interest, regardless of any anxieties and fears of the outside world. Their strategy of opportunistic assertiveness has a palpable military dimension, and in peacetime, they will not refrain from using coercive diplomacy to force other countries’ compliance with Chinese demands. Their ultimate aim is to compel regional states to accept Chinese claims in the South China Sea and the regional order that will emerge from the realization of these claims. Policy influence and assessments The greatest policy influence the hardliners have had is over China’s island building in the Spratlys. Like the pragmatists, the hardliners also give kudos to China’s forceful approach in the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident. But they do not think it nearly enough for establishing a foothold in the South China Sea. Although Beijing has taken de facto control of the shoal, that control comes in the form of maritime patrol by coast guard vessels rather than the stationing of Chinese personnel and facilities on the shoal. Not surprisingly, military leaders proposed land reclamation as a means by which China could establish a permanent foothold in

56 Feng Zhang the South China Sea. Delighted by President Xi Jinping’s approval, they executed the reclamation and building project with exceptional scale and speed.12 By 2009 at the latest, senior Navy officers began to intensify their calls for building airports and seaports in the Spratlys to demonstrate Chinese sovereignty and enforce control (Buszynski 2012: 146). Civilian analysts have joined their military colleagues to make the case for land reclamation and island building since the mid-2000s.13 Rejected by the cautious Hu Jintao, they have found a sympathetic ear in President Xi, who assumed power in late 2012. Although Xi pledged not to militarize the Spratly islands during his visit to Washington in September 2015 (White House 2015), the hardliners cannot but see militarization as a key raison d’être of the building activities. For them, it is only a matter of time before China develops these islands into fully fledged bases ready for military action. Thus, Dai argues that building large-scale bases, deploying combat platforms, and using the vast maritime frontier as a training field will not only protect the economic development of the South China Sea, but also substantially facilitate the modernization of the PLA (Dai 2010: 291). At the same time, Chinese planners recognize the limits and vulnerability of the islands as military bases. Yin Zhuo, another well-known PLA Major General who often appears on popular media, reveals that integrating its Air Force, Navy, and Rocket Force units, China is building a joint combat system in the South China Sea to protect those islands. Once protected, the islands will then be able to enhance Chinese security in the region by hosting combat aircraft and surface-to-air and anti-ship cruise missiles (Yin 2017).

The moderates Strategic goals The moderates do not dispute protecting rights as an essential goal of China’s South China Sea policy. But they disagree with the pragmatists and the hardliners about the importance of that goal in China’s overall foreign policy. Is the South China Sea a core national interest? Can the goal of rights protection now override other goals such as regional stability and the overall relationship with ASEAN member countries? Is achieving certain rights in the South China Sea worth a military showdown with the United States at this point in history? While the moderates wonder whether a “rights first, stability second” approach is the correct policy for China in the South China Sea, they would not want to return to the old approach of “stability first”. Indeed, they consider it somewhat misleading to frame China’s competing goals as those between rights and stability. Whatever interests – rights, stability, or else – China may have in the South China Sea must be subordinate to the top national interest of ensuring China’s rise in a non-disruptive and cost-efficient way. Viewed within the overall strategic framework of China’s rise, China’s priority foreign policy interest must be to maintain good relationships with key regional countries in order to secure their support for China’s rise. For the moderates, the South China Sea is not a core national interest

Chinese thinking on the South China Sea 57 that should be defended at all costs (Xue and Xu 2016),14 and is certainly not one that should be allowed to rock the boat of China’s rise. China’s priority foreign policy goal is to obtain sufficient international political support for its rise, in the South China Sea as elsewhere. Realists turned moderates Interestingly, two of the most prominent moderates are once famous realists. Yan Xuetong, formerly a realist international relations (IR) scholar at Tsinghua University and frequently seen as a hawkish voice in policy debates, is no longer identifying himself with realism of the American variety. In recent years, Yan (2011, 2015) has been trying to develop a theory of “moral realism” in the Chinese context.15 Armed with this theory, he argues that the primary objective of a rising power’s security strategy is to reduce international opposition to its rise and at the same time gain as much international support for its rise as possible. China has three types of strategic interests in the South China Sea: economic interests and maritime rights including fisheries and natural resources, sovereignty rights over the islands, and strategic relationships with regional countries. Yan argues that economic resources in the South China Sea are not decisive factors in China’s rise. Nor is island sovereignty, since China will not be able to change the status quo of other countries’ de facto control of the various islands and reefs except through wars of conquest. But ASEAN countries’ strategic choices in a looming China–US competition are indeed a major strategic variable that can affect the prospect of China’s rise. Yan thus argues that China should adjust its strategy to improve relations with ASEAN and change the balance of power in the South China Sea. If China can secure more ASEAN countries’ support for its position on the South China Sea, this would significantly improve the strategic environment of China’s rise. From the perspective of the strategic interests of China’s rise, this kind of strategic support from ASEAN is more important than economic resources and island control in the South China Sea (Yan 2016: 18). The second prominent advocate of a moderate Chinese position on the South China Sea is Shi Yinhong of Renmin University in Beijing, a distinguished historian and strategist and a one-time consultant of the State Council, China’s cabinet. Like Yan, Shi (2016) also grounds the South China Sea under the broader strategic framework of China’s rise. Although important in itself, the South China Sea is but one of China’s many strategic challenges and thus must be dealt with from the perspective of the overall strategic landscape. Shi points out that neither China’s regional relations nor Sino-US relations have been satisfactory over the past few years. And the two domains are connected: instability in China–US relations arose in large part from disturbances in regional problems such as the South China Sea. Shi argues that China must follow the overall principle of achieving a balance in protecting rights and maintaining stability in the South China Sea. Having focused so much on protecting rights since 2009, China must now catch up with maintaining stability. In particular, China must prevent the deterioration of strategic

58 Feng Zhang competition and confrontation with the United States, while making improving relations with Southeast Asian countries a very important part of the overall foreign policy. Shi supports consolidating China’s sovereign presence in the South China Sea, but considers it highly disadvantageous if such consolidation triggers a conflict with the United States or damages relations with maritime Southeast Asian countries (Shi 2016: 37). Yan and Shi are IR theorists and strategists, not South China Sea specialists per se. But their argument that China’s South China Sea policy needs to be conducted from the perspective of its overall international strategy is also echoed by prominent South China Sea experts. Ju Hailong, a leading specialist on South China Sea disputes, argues that for China, winning over Southeast Asia is much more valuable than occupying all the islands and reefs in the South China Sea. China’s loss will outweigh its gains if it damages relations with Southeast Asian countries in the course of disputes and tensions. Ju (2013) suggests that China needs to incorporate its strategy toward individual ASEAN countries such as the Philippines into its overall geopolitical strategy toward the greater periphery region. While being vigilant in protecting rights, it must avoid the trap of narrow, self-interested calculation of maritime rights. Ultimately, China must steer clear of the strategic mistake of “gaining sovereignty in the South China Sea but losing the whole Southeast Asia” (Ju 2013: 79, 82). Strategic means The moderates are not, in principle, opposed to necessary assertiveness for safeguarding reasonable rights. Indeed, Yan argues that assertiveness – or indeed war itself – is not a criterion against which to judge the wisdom of a rising power’s strategy. The key criterion is whether a particular approach can be morally justified and brings international support (Yan 2016: 12). Establishing credible deterrence based on measured assertiveness, as the pragmatists argue, can be useful if a proper balance can be achieved between deterrence against regional challengers and amity with key states whose support is important for China’s rise. The moderates favor a strategy of judiciously balancing the goals of protecting rights and improving relations with key regional states. While gradually enhancing its physical presence in the South China Sea, China must work hard to devise institutional means to manage disputes and stabilize relations. Institutions receive scant attention from the hardliners and the pragmatists, as their strategies of assertiveness are power-based, albeit to different degrees. But institutions are central to the moderates’ diplomatic strategy for improving China’s relations with ASEAN. They argue that China must take more seriously the negotiation of a Code of Conduct (COC) on the South China Sea in order to repair relations and build trust with ASEAN members (Yan 2017). Among the three camps, the moderates are the most sensitive to diplomatic costs (measured in terms of the loss of foreign support for China’s rise) and the least tolerant towards the deterioration of the regional security environment. They are also the most sensitive to other countries’ concerns and anxieties about

Chinese thinking on the South China Sea 59 China’s rise. China should not try to recklessly maximize its self-interest, but should rather aim at reasonable and legitimate interests – or “enlightened selfinterest”. Because of these sensitivities, the moderates attach great importance to the role of effective diplomacy in achieving equitable compromises between China and other claimant states. Chinese diplomacy since 2009 falls short, however, because it has failed to provide a compelling strategic narrative and promote effective communication with the outside world. Policy influence and assessments Between the late 1990s and 2008, China adopted a largely institutionalist approach to the South China Sea disputes reflective of the moderates’ thinking. As described in the first section of this chapter, China’s diplomatic efforts focused on negotiating and implementing the DOC as well as improving relations with ASEAN countries, especially in the economic domain. But because of the widespread perception that this approach failed to protect Chinese interests, the moderates lost their influence and were in fact silenced for several years after 2009. It was only after 2014 when the diplomatic costs incurred by Chinese assertiveness became apparent that the moderates have regained their voice. Although the moderates have not had such dramatic policy impact as that of the pragmatists on the Scarborough Shoal incident or that of the hardliners on island building, they have been regaining influence in new diplomacy promoted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In August 2014, Foreign Minister Wang Yi proposed a “dual-track thinking” for dealing with South China Sea disputes. That is, territorial disputes should be peacefully resolved through friendly negotiations between the claimant countries, while peace and stability of the South China Sea region should be maintained by both China and ASEAN countries. The significance of this proposal is its acceptance of, for the first time, a multilateral approach to the South China Sea problem (Zhang 2016: 104). Somewhat ironically, Beijing is still insisting on the DOC as the fundamental institution for managing tensions and is committed to expediting the process of negotiating a COC. During a series of ASEAN-centered foreign ministers’ meetings in Vientiane in late July 2016, Beijing succeeded in getting ASEAN to issue a new joint statement on the full and effective implementation of the DOC.16 In August 2016, China and ASEAN agreed to reach a framework for the COC by mid-2017 (Blanchard 2016). During the China-ASEAN Summit at the East Asian Summit in September 2016, the two sides also agreed to apply the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea to the navies of China and ASEAN countries operating in the South China Sea and approved guidelines for a China-ASEAN hotline for use during maritime emergencies. The Foreign Ministry clearly wants to put South China Sea diplomacy back on track, and it is returning to a revamped version of the institutionalist approach practiced in the 2000s. Because they always have the larger picture of China’s rise in mind, the moderates criticize island building in the Spratlys as a strategic mistake. If China’s goal is to militarily control the South China Sea, building these islands will not

60 Feng Zhang necessarily give China such control; nor will such control necessarily require the building of these islands. The key reason for their opposition, however, is that island building is turning most regional states against China in security matters and is driving them to embrace a stronger US presence as the only viable means to check China’s rising power.17 China is thus losing crucial political support for its rise, and the contradictions between its South China Sea policy and other key foreign policy initiatives such as the so-called “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) are becoming increasingly obvious. Believing that island building has already done enough damage, the moderates would not support reclaiming the Scarborough Shoal or establishing a South China Sea ADIZ as part of an offensive strategy to expand Chinese control over the region. Xue Li, an expert at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and an influential moderate voice, argues that China is unlikely to pursue aggressive militarization or turning the U-shaped line into a national boundary line because doing so would be detrimental to its long-term interests. For Xue, the BRI and China’s regional diplomacy command higher priorities in Chinese foreign policy than the South China Sea, and China must preserve its relations with Southeast Asian countries because those relations are an integral part of China’s regional policy and will be key to the success of the maritime leg of BRI (Xue and Xu 2016).

Conclusion The three camps of the pragmatists, hardliners, and moderates do not exhaust the diversity of Chinese views on the South China Sea (see Table 4.1 for a summary of the key differences). But they are broadly representative of the debates – sometimes in public, more often in private – taking place inside China about the country’s South China Sea policy. Broadly speaking, the pragmatists have had the upper hand in driving top-level decision making since the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident.18 The influence of the hardliners and moderates has been more modest, but certainly not absent. The hardliners were instrumental in the decision to build islands in the Spratlys, and the moderates have been promoting an institutionalist diplomacy centered on the DOC and the COC. Establishing the exact causes of China’s South China Sea policy will require solid empirical research that is beyond the scope of this chapter. I argue, however, that the three schools of thought capture a good deal of the actual strategic thinking currently informing Chinese policy. Indeed, actual policy has reflected the influence of these different approaches at different times. This makes one wonder whether China has developed a coherent South China Sea strategy at all (Zhang 2016: 100–109), especially given that the various protagonists – and political leaders by implication – are unable to reach a national consensus about a clear rank ordering of China’s national interests in the region. This research has important implications for understanding the nature of China’s South China Sea policy and its possible future evolutions. Internal debates show that diverse actors and interest groups inside China are trying to impose their particular understanding of China’s positions and roles in the South China

Chinese thinking on the South China Sea 61 Table 4.1 Major Fault Lines in Chinese Debates on the South China Sea Points of Contention

Schools of Thought Pragmatists

Hardliners

Moderates

Strategic goals

Protecting sovereignty and maritime rights with limited disruption to regional stability

Maximizing Chinese rights and establishing Chinese control

Obtaining support from Southeast Asian countries for China’s rise while reasonably protecting its rights in the South China Sea

U-shaped line

Historic rights line

National boundary line

Islands attribution line

Strategic means

Deterrent assertiveness

Opportunistic assertiveness

Strategic balance

Risk propensity

Medium

High

Low

Intellectual foundations

Rationalism

Active defense doctrine and assertive nationalism

Liberalism and traditional Chinese thought

Policy influence

Strong

Modest

Modest

Sea. At the heart of the debate, even if the protagonists do not fully appreciate it, is the fundamental question of China’s identity as a rising power. All of the protagonists are nationalists to varying degrees, in the sense that they all want to protect China’s national interests in the South China Sea. But they cannot agree on whether China’s fundamental interests lie in sovereignty and maritime rights, regional stability and strategic support from regional countries, material power capabilities, or political influence and authority. The hardliners are the most selfinterested, and their strategy of opportunistic assertiveness will turn China into an aggressive and isolationist great power with little regard for the outside world. The pragmatists want China to be on good terms with the outside world. Rationalist in their cost-benefit calculation, however, they are ready to sacrifice a good degree of regional goodwill for the achievement of perceived rights in the South China Sea. The moderates, in contrast, want to present China as a responsible rising power in order to gain foreign trust and support, and are consequently prepared to accept reasonable compromises in maritime disputes in order to ensure the success of the overall national task of China’s rise. The debate is likely to rage for a long time to come, creating policy uncertainties along the way. But the outside world need not despair because they also have a role to play in shaping its trajectory. It will be important, for example, for the policies of other countries, ASEAN members and the United States in particular, to help raise the importance of the moderates in Chinese decision making, turning

62 Feng Zhang them from a minority view to a majority consensus. In this process of the mutual constitution of identities and interests, they can create favorable conditions for shaping China’s policy toward a more conciliatory and cooperative direction. The future of China’s policy toward the South China Sea will depend on the intellectual and policy competition amongst the pragmatists, hardliners, and moderates. The dynamics of that competition, in turn, will be affected by the relational strategic interactions between China, the United States, and other countries in the South China Sea. Regional security and cooperation are possible, as are confrontation and conflict. The situation is inherently fluid because fluidity, change, and unintended consequences speak to the nature of international politics in the South China Sea, as elsewhere.

Notes 1 This chapter is a revised version of a journal article “Chinese Thinking on the South China Sea and the Future of Regional Security” published in Political Science Quarterly, Volume 132, Issue 3 (2017), 435–66. 2 See, for example, Goldstein (2011: 320–47). This chapter surveys China’s naval literature. 3 Author interview with a senior policy maker in Beijing, November 2015. 4 For the ruling, see Judge Thomas A. Mensah et al. 2016. The South China Sea Arbitration Award. PCA Case No 2013–19. The Hague, July 12. Retrieved at: https://pca -cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf. 5 Author interview with a leading scholar in Guangzhou, May 2015. 6 On the Chinese idea of “core interests”, see Swaine (2011). 7 Major General Luo is a well-known hawkish voice from the People’s Liberation Army. 8 The similarity with American hardliners in the Republican Party is striking. See Gray and Navarro (2016). 9 According to the Pentagon, anti-access refers to “those actions and capabilities, usually long-range, designed to prevent an opposing force from entering an operational area”. Area denial refers to “those actions and capabilities, usually of shorter range, designed not to keep an opposing force out, but to limit its freedom of action within the operational area”. Department of Defense (US) (2012: i). 10 Author interview with an influential hardliner, Beijing, September 2016. 11 Author interview with an influential hardliner, Beijing, September 2016. 12 Author interview with a scholar privy to the policy making process, Beijing, September 2016. See also Perlez (2016). 13 Author interview with a leading scholar, Beijing, September 2016. 14 Xue and Xu are experts at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China’s largest think tank. 15 Yan (2011, 2015). For a review that labels Yan’s theory “moral realism”, see Zhang (2012). 16 Foreign Ministers of ASEAN Member States and the People’s Republic of China. 2016. Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN Member States and China on the Full and Effective Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. July 25. Retrieved at: http://asean.org/storage/2016/07/Joint-Sta tement-on-the-full-and-effective-implementation-of-the-DOC-FINAL.pdf. 17 Author interview with a leading scholar in Beijing, September 2016. 18 This is a claim made in Zhou (2016).

Chinese thinking on the South China Sea 63

References Blanchard, B. 2016. China, ASEAN Aim to Complete Framework of South China Sea Rules Next Year. Reuters, August 17. Retrieved at: http://www.reuters.com/article/ us-southchinasea-china-idUSKCN10S0DQ. Buszynski, L. 2012. The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and US–China Strategic Rivalry. The Washington Quarterly, 35(2): 139–156. Dai, X. 2010. C xing baoweiquan – nei you wai huan xia de zhongguo tuwei [The C-shaped Encirclement: China’s Breakthrough of Internal Trouble and External Threats]. Shanghai: Wenhui chubanshe. Department of Defense (US)2012. Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC). Washington DC: Department of Defense. Fu, Y. 2016. How China Sees Russia. Foreign Affairs, January/February, 95(1): 96–105. Goldstein, L. 2011. Chinese Naval Strategy in the South China Sea: An Abundance of Noise and Smoke, but Little Fire. Contemporary Southeast Asia, December, 33(3): 320–347. Grady, J. 2016. PACOM CO Harris: More U.S. South China Sea Freedom of Navigation Missions Are Coming. USNI News, January 27. Retrieved at: https://news.usni.org/ 2016/01/27/pacom-co-harris-more-u-s-south-china-sea-freedom-of-navigation-missio ns-are-coming. Gray, A. and P. Navarro. 2016. Donald Trump’s Peace Through Strength Vision for the Asia-Pacific. Foreign Policy, November 7. Retrieved at: http://foreignpolicy.com/ 2016/11/07/donald-trumps-peace-through-strength-vision-for-the-asia-pacific/. International Crisis Group. 2015. Stirring up the South China Sea (III): A Fleeting Opportunity for Calm. International Crisis Group, Brussels. Ju, H. 2013. Zhongfei haishang guanxi de tubian jiqi yuanyin yu yingxiang [The Sudden Change in China–Philippines Maritime Security Relations and its Causes and Influences]. Guoji anquan yanjiu [Journal of International Security Studies], 6: 70–82. Luo, Y. 2015. Yingdan gehun: Luo Yan jiangjun lun guofang [Eagle’s Courage and Dove’s Spirit: Genenal Luo Yuan on National Defense]. Beijing: Zhongguo youyi chuban gongsi. Perlez, J. 2016. Prospect of Philippine Thaw Slows China’s Plans in the South China Sea. New York Times, September 24. Retrieved at: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/ 25/world/asia/philippines-south-china-sea.html?_r=0. Shi, Y. 2016. Guanyu zhongguo de yazhou xitaipingyang zhanlüe he nanhai wenti [On China’s Asia-Western Pacific Strategy and the South China Sea Issue]. Dongnanya yanjiu [Southeast Asian Studies], 5: 33–38. Swaine, M.D. 2011. China’s Assertive Behavior, Part One: On “Core Interests”. China Leadership Monitor, Winter, 34(22): 1–25. United States Department of Defense. 2016. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense. White House (Office of the Press Secretary). 2015. Remarks by President Obama and President Xi of the People’s Republic of China in Joint Press Conference. September 25. Retrieved at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/remarks-p resident-obama-and-president-xi-peoples-republic-china-joint. Wu, S. 2016. Rang nanhai wenti zaodian huigui benwei [Let the South China Sea Issue Return to its Origins Sooner Rather than Later]. Global Times, November 23. Retrieved at: http://opinion.huanqiu.com/1152/2016-11/9717126.html.

64 Feng Zhang Xue, L. and Y. Xu. 2016. How the US Misjudged the South China Sea, Part II. The Diplomat, August 5. Retrieved at: http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/how-the-us-misjud ged-the-south-china-sea-part-ii/. Yan, X. 2011. Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power. Daniel Bell and Sun Zhe, eds. Edmund Ryden, trans. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Yan, X. 2015. Shijie quanli de zhuanyi: zhengzhi lingdao yu zhanlue jingzheng [The Transition of World Power: Political Leadership and Strategic Competition]. Beijing: Peking University Press. Yan, X. 2016. Zhengzhi lingdao yu daoguo jueqi anquan [Moral Realism and the Security Strategy for Rising China]. Guoji anquan yanjiu [Journal of International Security Studies], 34(4): 3–19. Yan, Y. 2017. Jiasu nanhai xingwei zhunze cuoshang keburonghuan [Expediting Negotiation on a South China Sea Code of Conduct]. January 21. Retrieved at: http://www.na nhai.org.cn/index.php/Index/Research/review_c/id/191.html. Yin, Z. 2017. Wo haijun zuozhan liliang zengqiang, yu haiyang liyi xuqiu reng you chaju [Our Sea-Based Combat Capabilities Strengthened, Gaps with Needs of Maritime Interests Remain]. Yangguang junshi [China National Radio Military Channel], March 3. Retrieved at: http://health.cnr.cn/jkgdxw/20170303/t20170303_523634569_1. shtml. Zeng, Y. 2014. Cong “huangyandao moshi” kan zhongguo nanhai zhengce zouxiang [China’s South China Sea Policy Evolution from the Perspective of the “Scarborough Shoal Model”]. Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi luntan [Forum of World Economics & Politics], September, no. 5, 127–144. ZhangJ., “Huangyan dao moshi yu zhongguo haiyang weiquan zhengce de zhuanxiang” [The Scarborough Shoal model and the transition of China’s policy of maritime rights protection], Dongnanya yanjiu [Southeast Asian Studies], no. 4 (2013): 25–31 Zhang, F. 2012. The Tsinghua Approach and the Inception of Chinese Theories of International Relations. Chinese Journal of International Politics, Spring, 5(1): 73–102. Zhang, F. 2013. The Rise of Chinese Exceptionalism in International Relations. European Journal of International Relations, June, 19(2): 305–328. Zhang, F. 2016. Assessing China’s South China Sea Policy, 2009‒2015. East Asian Policy, July/September, 8(3): 100–109. Zhou, F. 2016. Between Assertiveness and Self-Restraint: Understanding China’s South China Sea Policy. International Affairs, July, 92(4): 869–890.

5 India’s responses to US–China rivalry in the South China Sea Ian Hall

In response to the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal on the maritime dispute between China and the Philippines on July 12, 2016, India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) issued a straightforward statement. It affirmed India’s support for “freedom of navigation and over flight, and unimpeded commerce, based on the principles of international law, as reflected notably in the UNCLOS”. Urging all parties to resolve disputes peacefully and exercise restraint, respecting UNCLOS, the MEA statement noted that the sea lanes of communication through the South China Sea are “critical for peace, stability, prosperity and development” (MEA 2016a). India’s statement differed slightly from those of other significant extra-regional states with interests in the South China Sea – including Australia, Japan, and the United States – in omitting to declare, as all of those other states did, that the decision is “final and legally binding on both China and the Philippines” (DFAT 2016; MOFA 2016; US Department of State 2016). This led some to suggest that India’s position was softer – or at least more ambivalent – than those taken by other democratic states. Seeking to reinforce this impression, some Chinese officials and commentators even suggested that India actually supported Beijing’s stance on the Tribunal’s proceedings and decision. China’s Chargé d’Affairs in New Delhi, Liu Jinsong, told The Hindu newspaper that India’s position was “quite similar” to China’s (Haidar and Joseph 2016). Liu argued that the Russia– India–China Summit joint ministerial statement issued in Moscow in mid-April 2016 committed the three states not just to “maintaining a legal order for the seas and oceans based on the principles of international law” in “full respect of all provisions of UNCLOS”, but also to the principle that “[a]ll related disputes should be addressed through negotiations and agreements between the parties concerned” (MEA 2016b). Liu believed this confirmed his assertion that India agreed with China that the territorial disputes should be settled bilaterally and without the involvement of third parties.1 Liu’s argument was promptly rejected by the MEA’s spokesperson, Vikas Swarup. India would not take sides when it came to the ruling, Swarup reaffirmed, and encouraged all parties to show “utmost respect” to the Law of the Sea, the Tribunal, and its ruling. Sticking closely to the MEA script, Swarup did not insist that the ruling was binding, and when pressed to make such a commitment and to spell out India’s stance in greater detail, he simply replied: “Diplomacy is the art of

66 Ian Hall reading between the lines. We have conveyed our position effectively” (Haidar and Joseph 2016).2 But just to make sure the message was clear, India restated it two days later, in identical language included in the joint statement resulting from the annual India–Japan Defense Ministers’ meeting on July 14.3 Why did India – a South Asian state with little concern, at least until recently, for East Asian affairs – make such a clear statement on the Arbitral Tribunal ruling, make it so quickly, make it in terms that aligned closely with similar statements from Australia, Japan, and the United States, and make it in a way that clearly irritated at least some Chinese officials and observers? To answer these questions, this chapter examines how India has, over the past 25 years, become increasingly engaged and entangled in East Asia – especially Southeast Asia. It argues that this has occurred partly as a result of India’s economic reforms, which have entailed significant efforts to attract inward investment from the region and to open up markets for its goods. It also observes that India has deliberately involved itself in the strategic dynamics of Southeast Asia, including that of the South China Sea, for reasons that go beyond economic interests. India has responded to US–China rivalry in the South China Sea in the ways that it has, this chapter argues, out of a mixture of insecurity arising from deep concern about China’s growing capabilities and intentions in the wider Indo-Pacific region and a partly countervailing confidence arising from its deepening strategic partnership with the United States. The chapter makes this case in four parts. The first and second survey the transformation of India’s ties with Southeast Asia since the end of the Cold War and lay out the interests India now has in that region’s prosperity and security, especially concerning the South China Sea. The third examines India’s management of the Sino-Indian security dilemma. The concluding part analyzes Indian behavior with regard to US–China rivalry in the South China Sea. It argues that while India has long adhered to “strategic restraint” with regard to regional security challenges, a combination of growing insecurity about China and growing confidence born of the American engagement of New Delhi, together with increased receptiveness to Indian involvement from other major players in the region, is bringing about a gradual change of approach, at least in the context of the South China Sea.4 It also argues, however, that as India takes a more positive stance, it faces significant challenges in ensuring its interests are protected in a highly dynamic strategic arena.

Looking and acting East In the past 25 years India’s relations with the states, institutions, economies, and societies of East Asia have been transformed (Brewster 2011a). This transformation has occurred largely as a result of three initiatives: the partial liberalization of the economy that started in 1991 and the “Look East” policy put in place in 1993–1994, both undertaken by the Congress-led government of Narasimha Rao, and the nuclear tests in 1998 conducted by the BJP-led government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee.5 The first initiative opened up India to East Asian trade and investment, while the second and third allowed India into key regional institutions, especially the ASEAN Regional Forum and East Asia Summit (EAS), and then to build

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closer bilateral diplomatic, economic, and security partnerships with important East Asian states, as well as the United States (Hall 2016: 273). Today, trade and investment relationships with East Asian states – especially with China and with ASEAN member states – are significant drivers of Indian economic growth, thanks partly to New Delhi’s economic reforms and the ASEAN-India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA), agreed in 2003 and implemented in 2009. In 1991–1992, India’s merchandise trade with China was valued at only about US$265m and with ASEAN at US $2.3bn (Singh 2005; Asher and Palit 2009: 4). By 2015–2016, those figures had grown to US$70.7bn and US$65bn, respectively (Economic Times 2016; Rathi 2016).6 While the US remains India’s biggest export market for goods and services, Hong Kong and China are ranked 3rd and 4th, with Singapore 6th. China is the biggest source of Indian imports, with Indonesia 6th and South Korea 7th.7 At the same time, foreign direct investment to and from East Asia has also grown. The Indian government reports that almost US$50bn in foreign direct investment flowed from ASEAN between 2000 and 2016, while around US$40bn flowed in the other direction between 2007 and 2015 (MEA 2016c). India is also now embedded in East Asian regional institutions in a way that was difficult to conceive at the end of the Cold War. It became an ASEAN dialogue partner in 1992, attended the inaugural ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in 1996, and joined the EAS in 2005. It has negotiated important sub-regional initiatives, like the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), with Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. It has played a central role, along with Australia and Indonesia, in reviving the Indian Ocean Region Association for Regional Cooperation, now named the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), and creating the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS). Latterly, it has also joined the Chinese and Russian-led Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) (Sajjanhar 2016). At the same time, India has forged a series of bilateral strategic partnership agreements, as well as defense cooperation deals, with significant players in East Asia. Above all there is the partnership with the US, born of the extraordinary rapprochement that occurred after the 1998 nuclear tests, especially during the Presidency of George W. Bush (Twining 2014). Two deals made in 2005 laid the groundwork: the US–India Nuclear Deal, finalized in 2008, and the ten-year Defence Framework Agreement, renewed for another decade when Barack Obama attended the Republic Day celebrations in New Delhi in January 2015. Despite some ups and downs in the relationship, the US is now a major supplier of arms to India, with which it holds regular high-level strategic dialogues and military exercises, as well as collaborating on intelligence sharing and other issues (Burgess 2015).8 India has also negotiated strategic partnership agreements of varying types and intensities with Japan (2000), China (2005), Indonesia (2005), Vietnam (2007), Australia (2009), Malaysia (2010), and ASEAN (2012), as well as concluding defense cooperation agreements with Vietnam (1994), Indonesia (2001), Singapore (2004), and the Philippines (2006) (Scott 2013: 60). Of these, aside from

68 Ian Hall the arrangement with China, discussed in more detail below, the most important are arguably those with Japan, Singapore, and Vietnam. Despite their estrangement during the Cold War, when New Delhi’s foreign policy elite was suspicious of Japan’s alliance with the US and its embrace of market capitalism, despite Tokyo’s fleeting anger about India’s nuclear tests in 1998, and despite an economic relationship that has so far struggled to gain momentum, India and Japan have forged ever closer political and security ties since the mid-2000s, as Japan diverted significant resources into development assistance and infrastructure investment in India (Envall 2014). Now deemed a “Special Strategic and Global Partnership”, it encompasses regular high-level dialogues, economic initiatives, investment promises, public and cultural diplomacy, and commitments to shared principles and causes, from UN reform to upholding the rule of law in trade or maritime security (Envall and Hall 2016: 99). Singapore, for its part, has long been one of India’s biggest champions in Southeast Asia. In the 1960s, Lee Kuan Yew tried to persuade New Delhi to play a bigger role in the emerging security architecture of the region, including membership of ASEAN, and to maintain an Indian naval presence in Singapore (Brewster 2009a: 600). While India did not respond to these entreaties, during the 1990s their bilateral economic relationship began to pick up momentum, as India encouraged investment from (or via) Singapore, and trade with ASEAN grew. From 1993 onwards, they also began to forge strong ties in security and defense, first with the so-called SINBEX joint naval exercises, and then, from 2004, with India’s provision of extensive training facilities for Singapore’s army and air force (Brewster 2009a: 606–7). India and Vietnam have a long-standing relationship, stretching back to New Delhi’s opposition to American involvement in the Vietnam War and its rhetorical support for Hanoi’s intervention in Cambodia in 1978–1979 and Vietnam’s fight against China in 1979. In 2000, India began to court Vietnam with the aim of building a more robust relationship, especially in defense and security, with the then Indian Defence Minister floating the possibility, during a visit of Vietnamese Prime Minister Phan Van Khai to New Delhi, of the Indian navy making use of the port facilities at Cam Ranh Bay (Brewster 2009b: 30). While that arrangement was not made, the two governments did sign a defense cooperation agreement involving a range of activities, from jungle warfare training for the Indian army to Indian support for the servicing of Vietnam’s MiG aircraft. Soon afterwards, India began a training program for Vietnam’s submariners, who, in common with the Indian navy, operate Russian-made Kilo-class boats (Brewster 2009b: 30). Since then, India has also discussed selling Prithvi short-range missiles and the BrahMos cruise missile to Vietnam, and has extended lines of credit – one of US$100m in 2013 and another of US$500m in 2016 – for other military equipment, including Indian made offshore patrol boats (Dikshit 2013; Reuters 2016).

India and the South China Sea A major consequence of India’s growing economic and security ties to East Asia is the emergence of a new set of interests in the South China Sea and a new set of

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commitments to other states concerned with the territorial disputes in that region. Most obviously, India has now a specific and significant interest in the South China Sea’s sea lanes of communication (SLOCs). Some 55% of India’s total trade transits the Strait of Malacca and travels to East Asian ports, to Australia or New Zealand, or into the Pacific, and disruption to this sea-borne trade would directly affect its prosperity (Scott 2013: 55). Ensuring freedom of navigation in this region is thus no longer an abstract issue for India; it is now a core economic interest. It is for this reason, above all, that New Delhi is now keen to assert that India considers the South China Sea the “property of the world”, as then Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna put it after a meeting with his Chinese counterpart, Yang Jiechi (The Hindu 2012). Less salient, but still important, is India’s new stake in oil and gas exploration in the South China Sea. India has a growing appetite for both oil and gas – indeed, in 2015 it became the world’s third biggest oil importer, importing almost 200 million tonnes, compared to about 340 million tonnes each for the US and China, and Indian gas imports now far exceed exports (EnerData 2016). And while the bulk of India’s oil and gas presently comes from the Middle East, the international arm of its state-owned oil firm ONGC, OVL, has been engaged for over a decade in exploration in blocks in the Vietnamese-claimed areas of the South China Sea (Scott 2013: 56). Alongside these economic interests, India has acquired a new set of security concerns about the region arising from the possibility that China may be aspiring to dominate Southeast Asia and turn the South China Sea into a Chinese lake. In the 1990s, some in India’s strategic elite began to express the view that Chinese hegemony over the region could “undercut” India’s security, especially if the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) were to acquire capabilities or forward bases that would allow Beijing to project power into the Indian Ocean, South Asia, or even the Middle East (Tellis 2004: 163).9 In particular, they worried about China’s construction of a submarine base on Hainan Island, which might allow its boats to roam beyond the Malacca Strait (Grare 2017: 77). These concerns exacerbated wider worries about China’s growing and multifaceted capacity to limit India’s “strategic autonomy” in its own region and further afield, and generated the belief that New Delhi ought to concern itself directly in the region, both to gain a different perspective on China’s approach to territorial disputes and potentially to provide New Delhi with another front on which to needle China should disputes arise and tie down Chinese resources that might otherwise be deployed closer to India.10 In parallel with the emergence of these new security concerns, over the past few years India has made a series of commitments to a range of East Asian states to uphold certain principles and practices, as well as the more prosaic ones to build trade and investment and people-to-people links, and sustain and augment defense and security ties and capabilities. Especially relevant in this context are India’s commitments to uphold the so-called “rules-based order”. During President Barack Obama’s visit to India in late January 2015, the US and India issued a “Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region” which

70 Ian Hall declared their common belief in “the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea”. The two also made a number of (unspecific) commitments to strengthen the EAS “to promote regional dialogue on key political and security issues” and to “deepen regional integration, strengthen regional forums, explore additional multilateral opportunities for engagement” (White House 2015). India has made similar undertakings in joint statements with Japan. Noting the “broad convergence of their long-term political, economic and strategic goals” during Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to New Delhi in late 2015, the two “reaffirmed their unwavering commitment to realise a peaceful, open, equitable, stable and rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond”. They agreed to: … uphold the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity; peaceful settlement of disputes; democracy, human rights and the rule of law; open global trade regime; and freedom of navigation and overflight. They pledged to work for peace, security and development of the Indo-Pacific region toward 2025 underpinned by these principles. (MEA 2015) Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar reaffirmed these commitments once more in his speech to the 2016 Shangri-La Dialogue and similar (though more softly worded) statements concerning freedom of navigation and maritime security in the South China Sea can be found in the Chairman’s Statements following the regular ASEAN–India Summits (Parrikar 2016).11 In sum, India has growing interests in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea region that it did not have, either in fact or intensity, prior to 1991. Some have arisen out of deliberate choices, as part of the India’s partial economic liberalization and Look East policy, for example, which aimed to build better trade and investment links into East Asia. Others have arisen as a consequence of actions taken by other regional states, especially the US, Japan, and ASEAN members, to draw India into the security architecture and security governance of the region, and to make specific commitments to upholding its security and stability. Together, these have emerged as Indian concerns about the rise of China, its fast developing capabilities, and its – to some in New Delhi, at least – unclear intentions, as well as the implications all of this may have for India’s future economic prosperity and national security, have grown in New Delhi.

Managing the Sino-Indian security dilemma China now overshadows India’s foreign and security policies like no other challenge (Hall 2012).12 With Gross Domestic Product (GDP) four or maybe five times larger than its southern neighbor, depending on how it is calculated, and a military that is significantly more capable, China has the capacity potentially to impinge upon and influence India’s diplomatic, security, and economic ties with

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all of its immediate neighbors, placing possible limits on its foreign and security policy ambitions for South Asia. The unresolved dispute over the China–India border, in both the Western sector, adjacent to the troubled state of Jammu and Kashmir, and the Eastern sector, where Beijing claims all of the State of Arunachal Pradesh as “South Tibet”, continues to worry New Delhi, as do the memories of the humiliation inflicted upon India in the 1962 war. The “All-Weather Friendship” China has cultivated with Pakistan threatens India and prevents it from leveraging what diplomatic and military advantages it has over its smaller neighbor (Pant 2012). The growing activism of China’s diplomats, the People’s Liberation Army, and state-owned and private businesses throughout South Asia bother the Indians too, giving rise to the sometimes exaggerated fear that the Chinese are seeking to ring India with a “String of Pearls” designed to limit its influence and capacity to project power in the region (Brewster 2014). Finally, parts of New Delhi’s policy making elite are concerned with the possibility that China wants to lock India, as well as other states, out of emerging energy and other commodity markets in Africa and Asia.13 Concerned about the gap between Chinese and Indian capabilities and unsure of Beijing’s intentions, New Delhi’s political and strategic elite remains divided over how best to handle the complex and shifting challenges posed by China, with some counselling policies of accommodation or even alignment, others pushing harder lines, and still others favoring a pragmatic approach.14 But despite this ongoing debate, India has had a generally consistent approach toward China since the mid-1990s, an approach which aims to manage their bilateral relationship in such a way as to minimize the risk of Beijing taking punitive measures against it – economic or military – while seeking the means to forestall or prevent China from establishing hegemony over East Asia or even the wider Indo-Pacific (Grare 2017: 3). Over time, as Ashley Tellis noted over a decade ago, India’s strategy for achieving those aims has four distinct components. First, India tries to avoid “rhetorical, political, and military fights with China to the maximum degree possible”, even in contentious areas like the border dispute, the treatment of Tibet, and China’s “All Weather Friendship” with Pakistan (Tellis 2004: 141). While India’s vibrant media might make noise about these (and other) contentious issues, India’s politicians and diplomats generally confine what arguments they have with China to private meetings, if they raise them at all. Take, for example, the recent controversy over India’s failed application to join the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG), widely seen as blocked by Beijing at the plenary meeting at which the application was discussed, in Seoul in late June 2016. Despite considerable anger in the Indian media and amongst analysts outside government directed at China, the MEA released a detailed statement that expressed disappointment but – crucially – did not name or blame any state, and which argued that the only remaining obstacle to Indian membership was not a substantive issue of principle, but rather one of “process”.15 “It is self-evident”, the statement read, “that process issues would not arise if these countries were actually opposed to our participation. This is corroborated by our own bilateral engagement with each of these countries” (MEA 2016d).

72 Ian Hall The NSG episode demonstrates the extent to which India’s elite – even under the leadership of a robust Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, whose core foreign policy team is generally skeptical about China’s intentions towards India and concerned about its recent behavior (Boon 2016) – is willing to play down disagreement and avoid overt argument, even in the face of extensive Indian public anger towards Beijing. This tendency reflects the broader perception, shared across the political elite, that India is in no position – economically or militarily – openly to confront China at the present moment or in the short to medium term, as China is seen to have the capacity and the willingness to impose sanctions on New Delhi should it wish to do so (Mohan 2015: 90–112). Indeed, some in India’s elite believe that, as one recent high profile report put it, as China’s “economic and military capabilities expand, its power differential with India is likely to widen”, not diminish, in the “foreseeable future” (Khilnani et al. 2012: 13). The second component in India’s strategy for managing China is cautious engagement to build better bilateral ties with China in areas where it can and where there is clear potential for mutual benefit. The focus here is especially on economic engagement – on boosting bilateral trade and investment – but India has in the recent past also sought to cooperate in areas where interests converge, such as they did at the Copenhagen Climate Summit in 2009, when the two worked together to block a US-sponsored deal (Hurrell and Sengupta 2012). A similar logic – along with long-standing ties to Russia – has arguably also driven India’s application for membership of the SCO, despite Chinese doubts, as New Delhi views the organization as a means of engaging China on political and security issues in a multilateral setting in which India has other partners, especially Russia, that can balance Beijing’s influence (Sajjanhar 2016). In part, this approach reflects a grudging acceptance on the part of India’s policy making elite that China’s economic power must, for the moment at least, be reckoned with rather than resisted in South Asia as elsewhere. China is now a leading trading partner of every SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) member state; it also contributes significant funds in terms of development assistance and infrastructure investment. Moreover, China also presents major opportunities for India in terms of export opportunities, imports, inward investment and know-how – opportunities which the current government, in particular, has recognized and sought to realize, albeit carefully and selectively (Mohan 2015: 106–8). Suspicious of China’s motives, as well as the centrality of Pakistan to the initiative, Modi’s government has however held off Indian involvement in Beijing’s “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) scheme, despite declared commitments to “connectivity”, fearing that it is not in the national interest (Madan 2016).16 At the same time, it is has signed up to other Chinese initiatives, notably the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), reflecting India’s serious need for capital to fund new roads, rail links, ports, and other infrastructure, as well as the belief that the pragmatic engagement of China in the economic space may lead to progress in other areas (Mehra 2016). The third component in India’s strategy consists of building a nuclear deterrent capable of targeting China, while also developing conventional capabilities that

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might allow it to better defend itself against a potential Chinese military assault across the disputed border, but doing so in a relatively measured and restrained way (Tellis 2004: 142). There are of course questions about the credibility of India’s nuclear deterrent, given the few tests of nuclear weapons that have been conducted and the very slow pace of India’s delivery system programs (Hall 2014a). But it is nonetheless clear that it is designed to provide a weapon of last resort in the event of Chinese military aggression against India – notwithstanding New Delhi’s commitment to “No First Use” – and to try to attain a measure of bilateral strategic stability while modernization of the conventional military was undertaken.17 This latter task has progressed since 1998, but sluggishly, as India acquires advanced systems in some areas (for example, its Boeing P-8 Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft) and struggles to build capacity in others (for example, in replacing near-obsolete artillery).18 In the past decade and a half, in particular, significant Indian effort has gone into building capabilities that could be used in Southeast Asia, including in the South China Sea, in conjunction with local militaries or independently. Despite its internal security problems and potential threats from China and Pakistan across its land borders, New Delhi has invested heavily in platforms for so-called “power projection” – transport aircraft like C-17s, air-to-air refuelling planes, aircraft carriers like the refitted Admiral Gorshkov and the new ones under construction, a amphibious dock ship, landing craft, and so on (Joshi 2015: 2–3).19 Moreover, it has positioned some of these assets closer to the region. In 2001 India established its first tri-service integrated command in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, in the Bay of Bengal close to the Malacca Strait. Although some doubt whether the Command has so far worked as well as it might have done, it was a signal of intent, and it has been given lead responsibility for managing cooperation with Southeast Asian navies (Mukherjee 2015). The Indian navy now stations about 20 ships there and has expressed the desire to station an attack submarine and an amphibious dock too, while the air force now has a squadron of its Sukhoi Su30MKIs in the Andamans (Pandit 2015). With air refuelling, these aircraft have sufficient range to project Indian power into the South China Sea (Ladwig III 2009: 95). Last but not least, India’s development of a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) is also highly relevant in this context. India aspires to a full nuclear triad of ground, air, and sea-based deterrents, including five or six SSBNs (Joshi and O’Donnell 2014).20 If configured as reported, India’s Arihant-class SSBNs could provide a second-strike capability to a Pakistani attack, but could not strike most of China from the Indian Ocean.21 It might be able, however, to provide a credible second-strike capability against China if stationed, ideally on year-round patrols, in the South China or the East China Seas. For this reason, freedom of navigation in the South China Sea may soon loom even larger as an Indian national interest, despite the tensions that the presence of its SSBNs might cause in bilateral relations with some ASEAN states and the challenge that they would pose to ASEAN’s desire to keep the region a nuclear weapons-free zone (Holmes and Yoshihara 2013: 202).22

74 Ian Hall The last component of India’s approach to China is its concerted effort at the diplomatic engagement of key players in East Asia, involving, in part, the forging of the strategic partnership and defense agreements already discussed (Tellis 2004: 143). These engagement efforts are designed not so much to contain or “countercontain” China, as some suggest, but rather signal a concerted attempt by India to better understand the policy preferences and capacities of these partners, as well as to collaborate in building stronger economic, security, and defense ties that it might be able to leverage, if needed, if China’s assertiveness starts to impinge on New Delhi’s interests.23 Here the evolving US–India strategic partnership looms largest, mirroring India’s earlier alignment with the Soviet Union in the early 1970s, which was also designed, again in part, to address possible future threats from China.24 But the burgeoning relationships with Japan, Singapore, and Vietnam are also significant, together with improved ties to Australia and Indonesia (Hall 2014b; Brewster 2011b). In sum, India has sought to manage China with a combination of cautious engagement, involving some cooperation on matters of mutual interest in global governance and some development of their economic ties, with “internal” and “external”, “ hard” and “soft” balancing.25 India has sought – sometimes ineffectively and in a relatively restrained way – to build appropriate military capabilities to deter China and even to project power into areas closer to China, like the South China Sea, while also forging closer defense relationships with the US, Japan, and Southeast Asian states and pushing back against Chinese diplomatic agendas that New Delhi believes run counter to its interests. These latter moves include India’s robust and straightforward response to the Arbitral Tribunal in July 2016, timed and worded as it was to align with the comments of the US, Japan and Australia.

Conclusion: confidence, capabilities, and credible commitments India has become involved in the South China Sea dispute as it has become increasingly engaged in Southeast Asia as a whole, partly because that region offered its means to boost economic growth and partly because New Delhi has sought out stronger partnerships to help it manage the multifaceted challenge it faces in a resurgent China. But it should also be noted that New Delhi’s push for greater engagement in the region has also occurred – and succeeded to the extent that it has – because the behavior of other states involved in the region has created a benign context for Indian involvement. Evolving US–China strategic rivalry, combined with Southeast Asian anxiety about Beijing’s growing influence, are major enablers for India, allowing it to have a voice in an extra-regional dispute that it might not have wanted or been allowed to have at other times, as the interests of key players have aligned with New Delhi’s. Amongst these changes the most important is clearly the shift in US attitudes to India, partly driven by growing American concerns about China’s intentions for East Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific, as well as by interest in the potential economic benefits that might be derived from access to India’s markets, and the role

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that New Delhi could play in addressing them. As Frédéric Grare puts it – in frank language – the United States assessed that it did “not really need India in its relations with China, but if New Delhi’s diplomacy could complicate Beijing’s foreign policy in the region, it was a welcome addition” (Grare 2017: 6). As a result, the US set itself – not always completely enthusiastically, it should be admitted, especially under Barack Obama – the task of facilitating India’s rise, bringing it in from the cold after the 1998 nuclear tests and aiding the process of modernizing its armed forces.26 This has in turn given New Delhi some confidence to balance China, in terms of boosting its military power (internal balancing) and forging closer defense relationships with states in East Asia (external balancing), and in terms of openly assuming positions on issues like the South China Sea in which it might not in the past have involved itself (Mistry 2016: 8–9). Changes in Southeast Asian states’ perceptions of India, combined with changes in their perceptions of Chinese intentions and growing concern about Beijing’s assertiveness, have also been critical in allowing India the room to engage in the region and take a more confident approach. In the 1980s, India’s interventionism in Sri Lanka and the Maldives and its naval modernization program, which included plans to build a major naval base in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, north-west of the Malacca Strait, as well as the leasing of a Soviet nuclear-powered submarine, disturbed Southeast Asian states (Grare 2017: 73). Today, however, despite India’s acquisition of new assets that permit a modicum of power projection, and indeed the advent of its SSBNs, it is seen as relatively non-threatening, in comparison to China, and thus a more attractive partner. “Paradoxically”, as Grare puts it, “India’s strategic influence … emerged as a result of its diminished capabilities” rather than in spite of them (Grare 2017: 12). Three issues arise, however, from this analysis of India’s response to US–China rivalry in the South China Sea. The first concerns the nature and reliability of America’s commitments to its relationship with India and to maintaining the “rules-based order” in the South China Sea. The second concerns the ability and willingness of New Delhi to act to uphold its diplomatic commitments if they were tested by Beijing. And the third concerns India’s changing military capabilities and the ways in which they may change Southeast Asian views of its involvement in that region. As we have seen, the US has not merely assisted India’s economic, diplomatic, and military rise, it has also been an enabler for greater Indian involvement in the South China Sea. It has encouraged India to further its strategic partnerships with key East Asian states, for example, including Japan; it has also encouraged it to make rhetorical commitments to uphold the “rules-based order”. Yet it has to be observed that many Indian policy makers remain skeptical about US intentions in general, and its intentions towards India in particular, fear being dragged into a zero-sum competition for influence between the US and China, and express uncertainty about the circumstances under which Washington would use force against Chinese aggression across the Indo-Pacific, including in the South China Sea.27 The election of an unpredictable, even volatile, Trump Administration has done nothing to assuage those concerns.

76 Ian Hall India’s own commitments generate worries of their own. It now plays a much greater role in East Asia than it did, as it is integrated into regional institutions, as well as into deeper bilateral relationships. But its will and capacity to back up rhetorical commitments – and therefore its credibility – may be questioned, if only because they have not yet been tested. The “yawning gap between promise and performance” in various areas of India’s engagement with ASEAN has already affected relations with Southeast Asian states (Karl 2016: 15). The general assessment of India’s capacity to project military power beyond the Indian Ocean (and even within it) is similarly mixed – most informed analysts point to a significant gap between ambition and capabilities.28 Moreover, Indian policy continues, underpinned by strong nationalist sentiment, to be shaped by the twin objectives of maximizing “strategic autonomy” and building national economic strength, limiting its willingness to fully engage in regional multi-, mini- and plurilateral projects, economic or institutional (Lee 2015). The extent to which India would and could practically intervene to uphold the rules-based order in the South China Sea, even in collaboration with partner militaries, remains therefore in some doubt, which would lead to questions about its credibility in the minds of even deeply committed strategic partners, like Japan or Vietnam. Finally, India’s military modernization program – sluggish and uneven though it is – may well soon begin to generate new tensions in Southeast Asia. Although few if any states in the region perceive that India is a threat to their national security, it is possible that, as New Delhi acquires further assets that allow it to project power into South China Sea, tensions may emerge, even with strategic partners. In this regard, India’s SSBN program would be the most likely to cause concern, given capabilities that mean it might need to operate in the South or East China Seas, challenging ASEAN’s long-standing commitment to keeping nuclear weapons from the region and no doubt stimulating some anxiety in public opinion that will require careful management. As India’s responses to the South China Sea disputes become more robust, in other words, they may well bring new challenges with them.

Acknowledgments I am grateful to Kai He and Huiyun Feng for inviting me to write this chapter and all the participants in their workshop. Particular thanks are due to Jason Sharman for his comments on an earlier draft.

Notes 1 For China’s official position, see the State Council White Paper. 2016. China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea. July 13. Retrieved at: http://english.gov. cn/state_council/ministries/2016/07/13/content_281475392503075.htm. 2 This statement did not prevent one Chinese academic commentator from asserting that India was “neutral” on the Tribunal ruling. See Zhao (2016).

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3 Ministry of Defence (Government of India). 2016. Joint Statement after the Meeting Between Raksha Mantri and Japanese Defense Minister in New Delhi. Press Information Bureau, July 14. Retrieved at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid= 147097. This statement “expressed concern” over recent developments and “noted the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal on the South China Sea under the UNCLOS on 12 July 2016, and urged all parties to show utmost respect for the UNCLOS”. 4 On India’s strategic restraint, see Cohen and Dasgupta (2010). 5 For positive assessments of Rao’s reforms, see Sitapati (2016) and Baru (2016). For a cautious view, see Karl (2016: 21–4). On India’s nuclear program and rationale for testing in 1998, see Kennedy (2011). 6 It should be noted that India–ASEAN trade in 2015–2016 was down from the level of about $75bn seen between 2011–2012 and 2014–2015. 7 Indian Trade Portal, retrieved at: http://www.indiantradeportal.in/index.jsp. 8 See also Pant and Joshi (2015). 9 See also Mohan (2012: 184–5). 10 For a blunt discussion of those worries and perceived opportunities, see Karnad (2016: 104, 128–139). See also Mohan (2012: 185). 11 See also: Chairman’s Statement of the 14th ASEAN–India Summit. September 8, 2016. Retrieved at: https://asean2016.gov.la/kcfinder/upload/files/Chairman%27s% 20Statement%20of%20the%2014th%20ASEAN-India%20Summit.pdf. 12 See also Garver (2002a) and Holslag (2009). 13 It should be noted that some analysts argue that Beijing is far less concerned with India and its access to markets than some in New Delhi think. See especially Garver (2002b). 14 For an excellent summary of the debate in New Delhi, see Madan (2014). 15 See, for example, Joshi (2016). 16 See also Palit (2017). 17 See especially Ganguly (1999). 18 See, generally, Cohen and Dasgupta (2010). 19 See also Abhijit Singh’s (2016) cautious assessment of Indian naval capabilities. 20 On possible SSBN numbers see Wueger (2016: 77). 21 If configured with twelve Sagarika missiles of a range of a maximum 750km, it would be impossible to strike any Chinese target, even from the Bay of Bengal; if configured with four K-4 / K-X missiles and similarly situated, it could potentially strike some targets in southern China, but none of the major eastern sea-board cities. On the missile ranges, see O’Donnell and Joshi (2014: 470). 22 On ASEAN sensitivities, see Thayer (2011). 23 Iskander Rehman (2009) suggests that India is trying, with these means and others, to contain China. 24 This parallel is well drawn by Boon (2016: 800–1). 25 On internal and external balancing, see Waltz (1979: 118). On hard and soft balancing, see Pape (2005). 26 This approach was laid out by Robert D. Blackwill (2005), US Ambassador to India from 2001 to 2003. See also Mistry (2016: 4–5). 27 This point is well made by Grare (2017: 48, 58). See also Mistry (2016). 28 See, for example, Rajagopalan (2016: 30–2).

References Asher, M.G. and A. Palit. 2009. Trading Across the Bay of Bengal. Pragati: The Indian National Interest Review, March, 24: 4–6. Retrieved at: http://pragati.nationalinterest. in/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/pragati-issue24-mar2009-communityed.pdf. Baru, S. 2016. 1991: How P. V. Narasimha Rao made History. New Delhi: Aleph.

78 Ian Hall Blackwill, R.D. 2005. The India Imperative: A Conversation with Robert D. Blackwill. The National Interest, 80: 9–17. Boon, H.T. 2016. The Hedging Prong in India’s Evolving China Strategy. Journal of Contemporary China, 25(101): 792–804. Brewster, D.A. 2009a. India’s Security Partnership with Singapore. The Pacific Review, 22(5): 597–618. Brewster, D.A. 2009b. India’s Strategic Partnership with Vietnam: The Search for a Diamond on the South China Sea? Asian Security, 5(1): 24–44. Brewster, D.A. 2011a. India as an Asia-Pacific Power. London: Routledge. Brewster, D.A. 2011b. The Relationship between India and Indonesia. Asian Survey, 51 (2): 221–244. Brewster, D.A. 2014. Beyond the “String of Pearls”: Is There Really a Sino-Indian Security Dilemma in the Indian Ocean? Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 10(2): 133–149. Burgess, S. 2015. The US Pivot to Asia and Renewal of the US–India Strategic Partnership. Comparative Strategy, 34(4): 367–379. Cohen, S.P. and S. Dasgupta. 2010. Arming without Aiming: India’s Military Modernization. Washington DC: Brookings. DFAT (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia). 2016. Australia Supports Peaceful Dispute Resolution in the South China Sea. July 12. Media release. Retrieved at: http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2016/jb_mr_160712a.aspx. Dikshit, S. 2013. India Offers $100-m. Credit Line to Vietnam. The Hindu, July 28. Retrieved at: http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/india-offers-100m-credit-lineto-vietnam/article4962278.ece. Economic Times. 2016. India’s Trade Deficit with China Jumps to $53 Billion in 2015– 2016. August 1. Retrieved at: http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/ 53492853.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst EnerData. 2016. Global Energy Statistical Yearbook 2016. Retrieved at: https://yearbook. enerdata.net/#crude-oil-balance-trade.html. Envall, H.D.P. 2014. Japan’s India Engagement: From Different Worlds to Strategic Partners. In I. Hall, ed. The Engagement of India. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 39–59. Envall, H.D.P. and I. Hall. 2016. Asian Strategic Partnerships: New Practices and Regional Security Governance. Asian Politics and Policy, 8(1): 87–105. Ganguly, S. 1999. India’s Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi’s Nuclear Weapons Program. International Security, 23(4): 148–177. Garver, J. 2002a. The Security Dilemma in Sino-Indian Relations. India Review, 1(4): 1–38. Garver, J. 2002b. Asymmetrical Indian and Chinese Threat Perceptions. Journal of Strategic Studies, 25(4): 109–134. Grare, F. 2017. India Turns East: International Engagement and US–China Rivalry. London: Hurst. Haidar, S. and J. Joseph. 2016. India with Us on Verdict, Says China. The Hindu, July 15. Retrieved at: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-with-us-on-verdict-sa ys-china/article8850469.ece. Hall, I. 2012. China Crisis? Indian Strategy, Political Realism and the Chinese Challenge. Asian Security, 8(1): 84–92. Hall, I. 2014a. The Requirements of Nuclear Stability in South Asia. The Nonproliferation Review, 21(3–4): 355–371.

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Hall, I. 2014b. Australia’s Fitful Engagements of India. In I. Hall, ed. The Engagement of India: Strategies and Responses. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 129–146. Hall, I. 2016. Multialignment and Indian Foreign Policy under Narendra Modi. The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, 105(3): 271–286. Holmes, J.R. and T. Yoshihara. 2013. Redlines for Sino-Indian Naval Rivalry. In J. Garofano and A.J. Dew, eds. Deep Currents and Rising Tides: The Indian Ocean and International Security. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 185–212. Holslag, J. 2009. The Persistent Military Security Dilemma between China and India. Journal of Strategic Studies, 32(6): 811–840. Hurrell, A. and S. Sengupta. 2012. Emerging Powers, North–South Relations and Global Climate Politics. International Affairs, 88(3): 463–484. Joshi, M. 2016. India’s Abortive NSG Bid and the Kautilyan Lessons it Needs to Learn. The Wire, June 26. Retrieved at: http://thewire.in/46014/indias-abortive-nsg-bid-a nd-the-kautilyan-lessons-it-needs-to-learn/. Joshi, S. 2015. Indian Power Projection: Ambition, Arms and Influence. Whitehall Paper 85. London: Royal United Services Institute. Joshi, Y. and F. O’Donnell. 2014. India’s Submarine Deterrent and Asian Nuclear Proliferation. Survival, 56(4): 157–174. Karl, D.J. 2016. India and the East: Connectivity Begins at Home. In K.S. Farrell and S. Ganguly, eds. Heading East: Security Trade, and Environment between India and Southeast Asia. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 21–24. Karnad, B. 2016Why India is Not a Great Power (Yet). New Delhi: Oxford University Press. Kennedy, A.B. 2011. India’s Nuclear Odyssey: Implicit Umbrellas, Diplomatic Disappointments, and the Bomb. International Security, 36(2): 120–153. Khilnani, S., R. Kumar, P. Bhanu Mehta, P. Menon, N. Nilekani, S. Raghavan, S. Saran and S. Varadarajan. 2012. Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the 21st Century. New Delhi: Center for Policy Research. Ladwig III, W.C. 2009. Delhi’s Pacific Ambitions: Naval Power, “Look East”, and India’s Emerging Influence in the Asia-Pacific. Asian Security, 5(2): 87–113. Lee, L. 2015. India as a Nation of Consequence in Asia: The Potential and Limitations of India’s “Act East” Policy. Journal of East Asian Studies, 29(2): 67–105. Madan, T. 2014. China, in Three Avatars. In K. Bajpai, S. Basit and V. Krishnappa, eds. India’s Grand Strategy: History, Theory, Cases. New Delhi: Routledge, 308–359. Madan, T. 2016. What India Thinks about China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative (But Doesn’t Explicitly Say). Brookings, March 14. Retrieved at: https://www.brookings. edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/03/14/what-india-thinks-about-chinas-one-belt-oneroad-initiative-but-doesnt-explicitly-say/. MEA (Ministry of External Affairs, India). 2015. Joint Statement on India and Japan Vision 2025: Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World. December 12. Retrieved at: http:// www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/26176/Joint_Statement_on_India_and_ Japan_Vision_2025_Special_Strategic_and_Global_Partnership_Working_Together_for_ Peace_and_Prosperity_of_the_IndoPacific_R. MEA (Ministry of External Affairs, India). 2016a. Statement on Award of Arbitral Tribunal on South China Sea Under Annexure VII of UNCLOS. July 12. Retrieved at: http://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/27019/statement+on+award+of+arbitral +tribunal+on+south+china+sea+under+annexure+vii+of+unclos.

80 Ian Hall MEA (Ministry of External Affairs, India). 2016b. Joint Communiqué of the 14th Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Russian Federation, the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China. April 18. Retrieved at: http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm? dtl/26628/Joint_Communiqu_of_the_14th_Meeting_of_the_Foreign_Ministers_of_ the_Russian_Federation_the_Republic_of_India_and_the_Peoples_Republic_of_China. MEA (Ministry of External Affairs, India). 2016c. ASEAN-India Relations. November. Retrieved at: http://www.mea.gov.in/aseanindia/20-years.htm. MEA (Ministry of External Affairs, India). 2016d. Spokesperson’s Comments on NSG Plenary Meeting in Seoul. June 24. Retrieved at: http://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm? dtl/26949/Spokespersons+comments+on+NSG+Plenary+meeting+in+Seoul. Mehra, S. 2016. What Does India Get Out of its Membership in AIIB. South Asia Program, Hudson Institute, February 5. Retrieved at: http://www.southasiaathudson.org/ blog/2016/2/5/what-does-india-get-out-of-its-membership-in-aiib. Mistry, D. 2016. Aligning Unevenly: India and the United States, East West Center Policy Studies, 74. Honolulu: East West Center, 4–5. MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan). 2016. Arbitration between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China Regarding the South China Sea (Final Award by the Arbitral Tribunal). July 12. Retrieved at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/ release/press4e_001204.html; Mohan, C.R. 2012. Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mohan, C.R. 2015. Modi’s World: Expanding India’s Sphere of Influence. New Delhi: HarperCollins India. Mukherjee, A. 2015. India’s Joint Andaman and Nicobar Command is a Failed Experiment. Asia-Pacific Bulletin, 289, November 17. Retrieved at: http://scholarspace.ma noa.hawaii.edu/bitstream/10125/34251/1/apb%20no.289.pdf. O’Donnell, F. and Y. Joshi. 2014. Lost at Sea: The Arihant in India’s Quest for a Grand Strategy. Comparative Strategy, 33(5): 466–481. Palit, A. 2017. India’s Economic and Strategic Perceptions of China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative. Geopolitics, 22(2): 292–309. Pandit, R. 2015. India to Slowly but Steadily Boost Military Presence in Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Times of India, May 7. Retrieved at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes. com/india/India-to-slowly-but-steadily-boost-military-presence-in-Andaman-and-NicobarIslands/articleshow/47182151.cms. Pant, H.V. 2012. The Pakistan Thorn in China–India–U.S. Relations. The Washington Quarterly, 31(1): 83–95. Pant, H.V. and Y. Joshi. 2015. The US Pivot and Indian Foreign Policy: Asia’s Evolving Balance of Power. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Pape, R.A. 2005. Soft Balancing Against the United States. International Security, 30(1): 7–45. Parrikar, M. 2016. Managing Military Competition in Asia. Speech to the Shangri-La Dialogue, June 4. Retrieved at: https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dia logue/archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2016-4a4b/plenary2-e480/parrikar-5b41. Rajagopalan, R.P. 2016. India’s Maritime Strategy. In A. Mukherjee and C.R. Mohan, eds. India’s Naval Strategy and Asian Security. London: Routledge, 13–36. Rathi, P. 2016. India’s Free Trade Pact with ASEAN Questionable: Assocham. IBTimes, September 8. Retrieved at: http://www.ibtimes.co.in/indias-free-trade-pact-asean-ques tionable-assocham-693014.

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Rehman, I. 2009. Keeping the Dragon at Bay: India’s Counter-Containment of China in Asia. Asian Security, 5(2): 114–143. Reuters. 2016. India Offers $500 Million Defense Credit as Vietnam Seeks Arms Boost. September 3. Retrieved at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-india -idUSKCN11905U. Sajjanhar, A. 2016. India and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The Diplomat, June 19. Retrieved at: http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/india-and-the-shanghai-coopera tion-organization/. Scott, D. 2013. India’s Role in the South China Sea: Geopolitics and Geoeconomics in Play. India Review, 12(2): 51–69. Singh, A. 2016. In the Far Seas: Projecting India’s Naval Power. In A. Mukherjee and C.R. Mohan, eds. India’s Naval Strategy and Asian Security. London and New York: Routledge, 65–85. Singh, S. 2005. China–India Bilateral Trade: Strong Fundamentals, Bright Future. China Perspectives, 62: 1–13. Retrieved at: https://chinaperspectives.revues.org/2853. Sitapati, V. 2016. Half-Lion: How P.V. Narasimha Rao Transformed India. New Delhi: Penguin Random House. Tellis, A. 2004. China and India in Asia. In F.R. Frankel and H. Harding, eds. The India– China Relationship: What the United States Needs to Know. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center and Columbia University Press, 134–177. Thayer, C. 2011. The Rise of China and India: Challenging or Reinforcing Southeast Asia’s Autonomy. In A.J. Tellis, T. Tanner and J. Keough, eds. Strategic Asia 2011–12: Asia Responds to its Rising Powers. Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 313–343. The Hindu. 2012. South China Sea Region Property of the World, Says Krishna. April 6. Retrieved at: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/south-china-sea-region-prop erty-of-world-says-krishna/article3287504.ece. Twining, D. 2014. The US Engagement of India after 1991: Transformation. In I. Hall, ed. The Engagement of India: Strategies and Responses. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 19–38. US Department of State. 2016. Decision in the Philippines–China Arbitration. July 12. Retrieved at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/07/259587.htm. Waltz, K.N. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill. White House (Office of the Press Secretary). 2015. U.S. –India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region. January 25. Retrieved at: https://www. whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/25/us-india-joint-strategic-vision-asia-pacificand-indian-ocean-region. Wueger, D. 2016. India’s Nuclear-Armed Submarines: Deterrence or Danger? The Washington Quarterly, 39(3): 77–90. Zhao, G. 2016. Sino-Indian Relationship Should Focus on Big Picture, not Individual Issues. Global Times, August 16. Retrieved at: http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/ 1000842.shtml.

6

Japan and the South China Sea disputes Emerging power politics and “fake liberalism” Christopher W. Hughes

Japan, over the last two decades, – and especially intensifying under the current administration of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo- (2012–present day) – has devoted considerable attention to, and even increasing preparedness for indirect and direct involvement in, the emergent South China Sea (SCS) disputes. Abe has built on the approach of previous governments of both Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) hues, but been particularly vocal in advocating a position in regard to the SCS that forms part of his agenda of a “proactive contribution to peace” (sekkyoku-teki heiwashugi), which in turn is underpinned by the pursuit of self-proclaimed liberal values. Abe – upon his return to power for his second stint in office – argued that Japan should function in the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific as a “rules promoter” for trade, investment, intellectual property, labour, and the environment; a “guardian of the global commons”, including the “maritime commons”; and work with the other like-minded democracies to promote these values. In statements related to the SCS, Abe in one of his earliest pronouncements on the point of returning to office, articulated the concept of an “Asian Democratic Security Diamond”, consisting of Japan, Australia, India, and the US that would seek to safeguard the “maritime commons” from the Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific, and counter China’s ambitions to convert the South China Sea into “Lake Beijing” and to alter the territorial status quo in the region by coercion (Abe 2013a). Abe emphasized that this concept was underpinned crucially by the universal values of democracy, the rule of law, and human rights (Abe 2012). Abe again emphasized in a speech in Jakarta in January 2013, Japan’s interest in keeping “Asia’s seas unequivocally free, open and peaceful” through the principles of governing the maritime global commons by “rules and laws, not might” (Abe 2013b). In May 2014, Abe further stated in a keynote address at the IISS ShangriLa Dialogue Asia Security Summit – obliquely and without doubt referring to the SCS and concerns over China’s activities – that Asian security should be determined by the principles of freedom, democracy and the rule of law, and that maritime issues should be addressed through clarification of claims based on international law, through non-coercion, and peaceful means (Abe 2014). Abe further proposed, directly referring to the SCS, that all concerned parties should avoid unilateral action and return to the spirit and provisions of the Association of

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Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) –China 2002 “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea”. Taken at face value, therefore, Abe and Japan’s stance on the SCS as a part of a broader security strategy of a “proactive contribution to peace” appears to engender a rejection of power politics and realpolitik, and instead an embrace of a fundamentally liberal approach expressed in working with other liberal-minded and democratic nations, upholding the rule of international law, and reliance on multilateral associations and frameworks. However, this chapter argues that Japan’s position towards the SCS disputes has many more dimensions and is often far from running in line with, and indeed increasingly diverging from, the liberal principles espoused by Abe in particular. For just as Abe’s larger security program has been subject to critique in regard to its ambitions to expand Japan’s military capabilities and external commitments often driven by a new engagement in balance of power politics vis-à-vis China and historical revisionist and nationalist sentiment, so Japan’s SCS policy can be revealed as a subset of this arguably highly realist approach to international relations (Hughes 2015). Japan for the last decade or so – and becoming markedly more prominent during Abe’s tenure in power – appears to be not only avoiding following with any great energy the components of its own professed liberal line in SCS issues, but in many cases to be moving actually in direct contravention as it practices its own brand of the very power politics that it has supposedly rejected itself and condemned others for utilizing, and especially (in veiled terms) China. Japan’s motivations for increasing involvement in the SCS revolve around classic realist issues of the balance of power and its own territorial and economic material concerns. Moreover, Japan’s means for addressing the SCS appear increasingly realist in tone in prioritizing common cause with regimes that are evidently not democracies and lack strong regard for human rights; in failing to maintain a stance on territorial issues and the maritime commons that is consistent with issues of international law; and in taking an approach to multilateral cooperation that is nominal, opportunistic, selective, and ultimately an extension of power politics. Furthermore, in pursuing its interests in the SCS, Japan is utilizing not just old patterns of diplomacy with the ASEAN states and China, but is now actively engaging in new forms of “soft” and increasingly “hard” balancing as it seeks to form diplomatic coalitions and military partnerships to contain Chinese influence and to enhance its potential ability to deploy, individually or collectively, military force in the SCS. Overall, therefore, Japan’s opting for expediency and realism in the SCS makes it more and more indistinguishable from other actors in the region, and exposes its rhetoric of principled values as a form of “fake liberalism”.

Japan’s typically realist interests in the SCS disputes Japan in the post-war period, although not always seeking direct engagement due to the impact of its colonial past in Southeast Asia and accompanying constraints on its diplomatic and military power, has long maintained a strong set of interests in the SCS. In particular, Japan’s reliance on the Straits of Malacca SCS for the

84 Christopher W. Hughes passage of around one third of its global trade and close to 90% of its oil supplies has been a constant interest (Midford 2015: 525; Storey 2013a: 139). The fact that Japan maintains such material interests as open access to markets and resources, and concerns over the security of the sea lines of communication (SLOC), can certainly be portrayed as congruent with a liberal world view and has clearly been cast as such by Abe and other Japanese policy makers. Nevertheless, in recent years, Japan’s approach to the SCS can be revealed as far more congruent with and placed within Abe’s evolving and broader security vision that correlates strongly to typically realist notions of the regional balance of power, territorial integrity, balancing behavior, and essential concerns over relative rather than absolute gains as manifested in the SCS. Japan’s predominant approach to regional order and security during most of the post-war period has been that of a status quo power. Japanese grand strategy as formulated in the so-called “Yoshida Doctrine”, originally formulated by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and then refined by his mainstream LDP successors, has essentially sought to preserve the status quo of a US-centered international order and strong US security and economic engagement, or even hegemony, in East Asia, so as to benefit Japan’s own reengagement with Northeast and Southeast Asia, economic development, and a circumscribed military commitment.1 Japan’s approach towards China within this grand strategy for most of the post-war period has been attempts to foster its internal domestic reform, and integration into the regional political economy and cooperation frameworks. Japanese policy makers have thus had confidence, for much of the Cold War period and into the early 2000s, that China’s behavior in the region could be influenced in a benign direction and within the evolving international liberal order sponsored by the US and supported by Japan. In this sense, Japan’s policy can be seen to be corresponding to promoting a form of liberal international order (Ikenberry 2012: 333–60). Nonetheless, since the early 2000s, Japanese policy makers have become conscious of the deterioration of the existing international and regional orders, and the transition from the relatively comfortable status quo of the US-led hegemonic order to a shifting balance of power and new era of uncertainty. The US-led international order is seen to be under stress from the US’s own economic vulnerabilities and military overstretch and accompanying risks of isolationism or practice of a more predatory form of hegemony to secure its own interests and neglect those of other allies and partners. At the same time, the US’s relative hegemonic decline and the shifting balance of power is seen to be compounded by China’s rise. China is viewed as only partially integrated into the regional order, and indeed increasingly anti-status quo in orientation as it seeks to check or gradually push out US influence from the East Asia region by building its military power and starting to forge new frameworks for economic cooperation revolving around China. The scale of China’s regional ambitions and intent to overturn the status quo are also thought to be manifested in the attempt to use bilateral economic and security ties to pull individual ASEAN states into its orbit, and to again pursue territorial claims in Northeast and Southeast Asia, often driven by a growing sense of irredentist nationalism within China (Hughes 2016).

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In turn, Japanese policy makers are aware that this transforming regional order has potentially deep implications for Japan itself. Japanese policy makers are increasingly apprehensive that the Chinese leadership has a desire to marginalize Japanese political and economic influence in the East Asia region; to increasingly dominate the regional security order and so jeopardize Japan’s core security interests reliant on the maintenance of the US–Japan alliance, maritime security, and SLOCs; and that the renewal of Chinese nationalism, often engendered in anti-Japanese sentiment from the colonial period, will express itself in renewed tensions over territorial and resource disputes in the East China Sea. Japanese policy makers and the general public were most alerted to these types of risk in the aftermath of the 2010 incident involving a Chinese trawler and the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) around the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islets which resulted in a diplomatic standoff, a supposed Chinese economic embargo on rare earth resources, and thereafter prolonged tensions between the coast guards and militaries of both sides around the islets. For many Japanese the incident revealed that China was clearly no longer just perhaps posturing over the territorial dispute but was intent on asserting its territorial claims, would not accept the status quo, and was seemingly prepared to use economic levers and even military force to pursue its claims (Smith 2015: 100–45, 110–96).2 Japan’s policy makers have reacted to these scenarios connected with China’s rise with considerable constraint and retain some confidence that China can be engaged – and that the deep economic interdependency built up over the last three decades can mitigate tensions over bilateral issues and the shape of the larger regional order. Indeed, the DPJ in its brief period in power from 2009 to 2012 sought initially to redouble engagement efforts with China (Hughes 2012: 129– 30). Nonetheless, Japan’s dominant policy makers in the LDP and central bureaucracy increasingly share a consensus that China’s influence in the region can no longer be easily steered in a benign direction, and that the absolute gains of economic cooperation that might be thought to approximate to a liberal mode of interaction are giving way to concerns of relative gains over access to economic resources and markets, maritime security concerns, and territorial disputes that more reflect realist imperatives (Hughes 2016: 125–128). As a consequence, Abe and other policy makers have shifted their policy to a more explicitly realist stance toward China’s rise. Abe has argued that, whilst Japan clearly wants to avert tensions with China and prefers engagement, it is important to recognize that China is a state which works on a fundamental logic of only respecting power and thus Japan has responded with a more robust diplomatic, economic, and military stance (Yomiuri Shimbun 2015). For Abe this means restoring Japan’s position as “tier-one” or even great power in the international community, reviving its own economic fortunes through “Abenomics”, deepening and strengthening the US–Japan alliance and US presence in the region, and working with a coalition of potential allies such as Australia and India, and partners in Southeast Asia and on China’s periphery as a counterweight to its influence. Hence, Abe has spent much of the early years of his second administration bolstering the US–Japan alliance through the 2015 revision of the US–Japan

86 Christopher W. Hughes Guidelines for Defense Cooperation and the passing of legislation to enable Japan’s exercise of collective self-defense in support of the US. Abe has also demonstrated great energy in visiting states in ASEAN, Northeast Asia, Central Asia, South Asia and the Middle East, and pledging political cooperation in a barely veiled attempt to “encircle” China’s influence (Hughes 2015: 64–89). Japan’s move towards viewing the regional order and China’s rise within a more overtly realist framework has thus meant that it increasingly views its interests in the SCS issue in similar terms, so making its claims of a liberal stance as rather thin. Japan’s first National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2013 makes evident this realist outlook on the SCS. At the same time as discussing Japan’s desire for open seas and respect for the global commons, the NSS clearly views the SCS disputes within the realist context of the balance of power. As the section on “Security Environment and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region” argues: The shift in the global power balance has elevated the importance of the AsiaPacific region in the international community. While this shift provides opportunities for security cooperation, it has also given rise to regional issues and tensions … In this context, in addition to the issues and tensions arising from the shift in the balance of power, the Asia-Pacific region has become more prone to socalled “gray-zone” situations, situations that are neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territorial sovereignty and interests … China has taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the status quo by coercion based on their own assertions, which are incompatible with the existing order of international law, in the maritime and aerial domains, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea. (Cabinet Office of Japan 2013: 11–12) Japan has clearly ramped up its interest in the SCS as part of its vigilance against and desire to counter China’s deleterious effect on the balance of power in Southeast Asia as well as the wider East Asia region, and as will be seen in later sections, has practiced diplomacy and “soft” and “hard” balancing in action-reaction fashion to China’s expanding influence. In addition, as noted from the NSS statement above, it is clear that Japan’s engagement in the SCS has been driven deeper not just by concern for the ramifications of the disputes in Southeast Asia, but because of the potential close linkages with its own national interests over maritime and territorial issues with China (Pugliese and Insisa 2017: 43–54). Japanese policy makers anticipate that China’s expansionism in the SCS creates a pattern for imposing its will on Japan over the Senkakus dispute (de Castro 2013: 160). China’s stratagem is viewed as looking to first of all drive out US influence from the region and separate Japan from the US so as to expose Japan alone to dealing with China on the territorial dispute (Bo-eisho-hen 2011: 76). At the same time, and in the same way as the SCS, China is seeking – through maintaining a constant presence of its civilian maritime agencies and “over the horizon” the People’s Liberation Army Navy

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(PLAN) – to intimidate Japan and erode its will to resist (Satake 2017: 239–44; Storey 2013b: 2). All of this is reinforced by China’s precedent of overriding the rule of international law in the SCS and its potential transfer to the context of the East China Sea.

Japan as a consistent upholder of the rule of international law in SCS? Japan’s policy makers, with Abe at the forefront, have sought to argue that they take a principled and internationalist stance on the SCS in line with international law and norms, and in apparent contradistinction to China’s approach based on power politics and narrow national interest. However, Japan’s rhetoric does not entirely stand up to scrutiny and appears contradiction-ridden. As Midford points out, Japan’s supposed liberal logic is flawed. Most importantly, in its treatment of the controversy over its own Okinotorishima territory Japan appears to be acting in contravention of the United National Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which it claims all states should adhere to in the SCS.3 Japan’s Okinotorishima is a small reef in the Western Pacific that is used to claim a 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf beyond. Japan has persisted in its claims despite the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf ruling in April 2012 that Okinotorishima was not entitled to a shelf status given it was deemed an uninhabitable geographical feature, and so indicating also that Japan was in contravention of UNCLOS with its claimed EEZ. Nevertheless, Japan has continued land reclamation at Okinotorishima and maintains its EEZ under its own interpretation of UNCLOS as permitting this for “islands” such as Okinotorishima but not for other geographical features that are “rocks” (Yabuki 2016: 97–106). Japan’s contravention of UNCLOS in the case of Okinotorishima has been made even starker following the July 2016 ruling of the Tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at the Hague regarding the maritime dispute between China and the Philippines. The Tribunal ruled in favor of the Philippines and interpreted Article 121 of UNCLOS in such a way that insignificant “features” should not be entitled to generate large maritime zones. The Tribunal rejected any distinction between “rocks” and “islands” and produced a definition of a feature that indicated the necessity of sustaining a stable human community and non-reliance on outside resources or purely extractive economic activity, and so rejected in turn China’s claim that it could use its reclamation activities as the basis for territorial claims. Japan, though, has not appeared to take heed of the ruling for its own territorial claims, still arguing for the distinction between rocks and islands, and that Okinotorishima constitutes the latter, and arbitrarily claiming that the ruling does not apply to the Western Pacific. Japan, in this instance, appears to be acting in contravention of UNCLOS that applies globally and to be contradicting its own stance on the application of UNCLOS in the SCS. The Japanese government expressed strong support for the July 2016 Tribunal outcome and the stance of

88 Christopher W. Hughes the Philippines. As Foreign Minister Kishia Fumio stated on the announcement of the Tribunal’s decision: The Government of Japan supports the Philippines’ use of procedures under the UNCLOS aiming at peaceful settlement of disputes on the basis of international law, as such an action contributes to the maintenance and enhancement of the international order in the region based on the rule of law. (MOFA 2016a) The fact that Japan supports the UNCLOS in the SCS and critiques China for not abiding by its rulings but chooses to ignore it in the case of Okinotorishima clearly casts doubt on Japan’s rhetoric of liberalism. Moreover, in other instances, Japan has been observed as critiquing China for overriding UNCLOS while itself selectively applying its provisions or even practicing the same behavior as China. Japan has, for instance, opposed foreign intelligence gathering and surveys in its EEZ, even though the US has taken the line that this is permitted under UNCLOS, and so Japan has actually has moved closer to China’s position and the type of activities that China has been accused of taking heavy handed action on in the South China Sea.

Japan’s selective multilateralism Japan’s clear preference has been for a diplomatic approach to achieve a resolution to the SCS issues or at least maintain the status quo. Consequently, it has sought in the past to support and initiate itself a range of multilateral frameworks to address the SCS disputes. Japan was in part one of the originators of the concept of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) established in 1994 and worked with its membership to persuade China to discuss aspects of the SCS multilaterally. Similarly, Japan supported efforts through the 2010 ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) Plus forum to encourage China to work with the ASEAN states to conclude a binding Code of Conduct relating to the SCS. Japan went further in November 2011 and proposed at the East Asian Summit (EAS) that the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) should be expanded into a wider regional forum incorporating the ASEAN states and eight dialogue partners. Japan’s proposal, after considerable discussion, was subsequently given shape with the creation in 2012 of the Expanded AMF (EAMF) comprising the EAS membership. All of this activity would seem to support the Japanese government line that it has been a model proponent of multilateral norms and approaches in the SCS. That Japan has been active multilaterally and a supporter of key initiatives cannot be denied. Nevertheless, it is also arguable that Japan has become increasingly skeptical of the efficacy of multilateral initiatives over time and attempted to shape frameworks, some competitive in nature, to enable it to pursue its own national relative gains within a cover of multilateralism. Japan’s continuing disenchantment with the ARF as a forum capable of moving from dialogue to actual conflict resolution has been well documented (Yuzawa

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2005). Japanese policy makers have also been alarmed at ASEAN’s seeming inability to effectively address the SCS issue, despite its being the most mature multilateral diplomatic community in the region. China’s ability to drive a wedge within ASEAN over the SCS was illustrated for Japan at the July 2012 ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting which failed to agree to a final statement because of Cambodia’s refusal to include mention of the SCS for its concern at alienating China (Storey 2013a: 152–3). In 2012, ASEAN did restore its unity and begin discussions with China on a binding Code of Conduct for the SCS, but Japan’s concerns over the weakness of ASEAN to achieve a multilateral approach to the SCS still remains. Japan has thus switched increasingly to a track of not abandoning multilateral frameworks as a means to address the SCS but of tailoring them to suit its own political interests (Limaye and Kikuchi 2016: 11). Hence, Japan’s proposal for the EAMF was undoubtedly precipitated by the intensification of the Sino-Japanese dispute over the ECS in 2010 and the increasing perceived linkage, already pointed out in early sections, with the SCS. Japan was seeking through the EAMF proposal to further multilateralize the SCS, but do it in such a way that drew into the grouping dialogue partners that were clearly favorable to its maritime cause, including the US, Australia, and India, and thus the EAMF was a form of extension of Japanese balancing of China in the ECS and SCS seen in earlier and later sections. It was therefore no surprise that China initially opposed Japan’s proposal for fear of this multilateral framework being used to isolate it diplomatically.

Japan’s bilateral dealings and ebbing liberalism Japan’s frustrations with the limitations of multilateralism to deal with the SCS disputes has encouraged its policy makers to increasingly switch energies to developing bilateral tracks (Ordaniel 2015: 112). This has involved working with Southeast Asian partner states that essentially share Japan’s own views on the SCS, suspicions of China, and strategic alignment with the US. Significantly, Japan appears to have been willing to work with these states with declining reference to or even with disregard to any suggestion of their status as supposedly “likeminded” liberal powers, so indicating that Japan places its realist political interests far above considerations of principle. The prime target for Japan’s efforts to build a bilateral, interest-based approach to the SCS has been the Philippines. Japan’s policy makers have clearly identified the Philippines as key given that it is a prime disputant with China over the SCS, is aligned with the US, and is a functioning democracy. Prime Minister Taro- Asoand President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo had already sought to foster a “strategic partnership” in 2009, although it largely did not touch upon security issues, referred only to maritime security in relation to the Straits of Malacca and piracy, and made no mention of the SCS (MOFA 2009). In 2011, however, in the wake of Japan’s growing concerns over China’s territorial ambitions after the SinoJapanese trawler incident, and as the SCS disputes heated up, Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko and President Benigno S. Aquino concluded a full “Strategic

90 Christopher W. Hughes Partnership”, which stated that based on shared values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law they should expand cooperation beyond economics into maritime security, including exchanges and coordination with the Japan Coast Guard and Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), and now mentioning for the first time diplomatic support in the SCS (MOFA 2011). As explained in more detail in the next section, Japan under Noda pressed ahead with substantive bilateral maritime security cooperation with the Philippines, and Abe has largely continued this approach of enhancing diplomatic and security coordination over the SCS, including the transfer of maritime patrol vessels. The Abe administration has expressed support for the Philippines taking the territorial disputes to the PCA, and in turn Aquino backed Abe’s revision of the constitutional prohibition on the exercise of collective self defense and thus a potentially more active security role in the Asia-Pacific region (MOFA 2015a). Most notably, though, the Abe administration has not shifted its position in any way on Japan–Philippines cooperation even with the transition to the new regime of President Rodrigo Duterte. After assuming power Duterte has indicated the intention to pursue an “independent foreign policy” of distancing the Philippines from the US and rapprochement with China, even comprising the acceptance of military assistance (Parameswaran 2017). Duterte has also pursued a domestic set of policies around the “drug war” which has raised questions of a new authoritarianism and international condemnation of breaches of human rights. The Abe government has, however, remained silent on these domestic issues, preferring to maintain its same policy line towards the Philippines to avoid its moving further toward China. All this indicates that Japan is far more focused on pursuing power politics around the SCS disputes than concerning itself with the illiberalism of the Duterte government and its contraventions of the foundations of the Japan–Philippines strategic partnership supposedly based on common principles. Japan’s preparedness to prioritize its strategic interests in the SCS disputes in aligning with Southeast Asian states whilst sidelining its liberal principles is further demonstrated in its pursuit of closer bilateral ties with Vietnam. Japan and Vietnam concluded their own “strategic partnership” in October 2010, which was gradually expanded in scope to commenting on the SCS and maritime security cooperation (MOFA 2010). Vietnam also expressed support for Japan’s intention to revise the ban on the exercise of collective self-defense, and Japan, as with the Philippines, also looked to transfer maritime patrol vessels (MOFA 2015b). Japan and Vietnam have repeatedly justified this interaction in terms of common values of the rule of law. However, Japan has consistently overlooked the fact that it is aligning with a highly illiberal state in the shape of Vietnam which has been argued to have a human rights record that is little better than that of China.4

Japan’s “soft” and “hard” balancing in the SCS Japan’s failing liberalism in approaching the SCS has meant that it has resorted to methods of engagement in the issue that approximates increasingly to a realist doctrine. Of course, the Japanese preferred approach, as noted in previous

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sections, is diplomacy and a form of “soft” balancing of China’s ambitions in Southeast Asia. Japan has pursued this “soft” balancing through its key bilateral ties outlined in the previous sections. Its extension of power interests in multilateral fora to constrain China’s influence has also been noted. More generally, Japan has sought, through working with ASEAN and other states concerned with the SCS and China’s rise, to influence the diplomatic balance of power to complicate China’s freedom of action. Abe’s diplomacy in Southeast Asia has been highly vigorous. Shortly after assuming power in December 2012, the new prime minister paid visits to Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia in January 2013, Myanmar in May, and Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines in July, Brunei in October, and Cambodia and Laos in November. Abe had thus visited all the ASEAN states by the end of his first year in office. Abe has reinforced diplomacy with economic assistance: Japan pledged close to US$20 billion in official development assistance (ODA) to ASEAN states at the Japan–ASEAN Commemorative Summit in Tokyo in December 2013. Overall, therefore, Japan and Abe in these interactions with the ASEAN states has attempted to lead the creation of a regional system characterized by a series of shared values that are set up in implicit opposition to China’s rising presence. Starting before Abe, but consolidating under his administration, the most significant development in Japan’s behavior relating to the SCS has been a move toward a form of “hard” balancing. This stratagem has taken various interlocking forms of enhancing the maritime capacity of individual ASEAN states, supporting the presence of the US in the region, and an increasingly direct projection of JCG and MSDF presence in the sub-region. Japan has been attempting since the early 2000s to boost the maritime security capacity of ASEAN states, particularly to respond to the threat of piracy in the Straits of Malacca, but more generally to enhance the ability of Southeast Asian partners to exert presence in the region in the face of China’s rise and to prevent any easy destabilization by the latter of the territorial status quo. Japan stepped up these efforts under the Noda and Abe administration in line with the rising consciousness of China’s intent to purse its territorial claims. Japan, in seeking to further develop “strategic partnerships” with the Philippines and Vietnam, agreed in July 2013 to export ten patrol boats to the former through a yen loan and thus as part of the ODA provision, and in January 2013 to investigate providing similar maritime security support to Vietnam (MOFA 2013a, 2013b, Midford 2015). Japan and the Philippines signed a defense ministry-level “Memorandum on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges” in January 2015, including pledging collaboration on defense equipment and technology (MOD 2015a). Japan and the Philippines further produced in June 2015 an “Action Plan for Strengthening of the Strategic Partnership”, again making reference to defense equipment cooperation (MOD 2015b). In September 2015, Abe and President Duterte agreed on the transfer to the Philippines of MSDF TC-90 training aircraft (MOFA 2016b). The Japan Ministry of Defense (JMOD) was also reported in December 2016 as

92 Christopher W. Hughes attempting to sell MELCO’s FSP-3 radar to Thailand in order to counter China’s increasing influence in arms sales to the country (The Japan Times 2016a). Japan’s second main effort has involved improving potential support for the US’s ability to maintain the status quo in the SCS as the dominant military player and the only power capable of facing down China’s use of force. The 2015 revised US–Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation contain a number of statements about the need for enhanced bilateral cooperation in maritime security in the AsiaPacific region (MOFA 2015c). Japan’s reinterpretation of constitutional prohibitions and passing of new legislation between 2014 and 2015 to enable the exercise of the right of collective self-defense has further made feasible US–Japan military cooperation in the SCS (Hughes 2017). Japan’s support for the US is likely to be its traditional “shield” role to support the “sword” of US power projection, taking the form of the provision of bases in Japan for US Navy and Air Force missions into the SCS and the likely extension of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities through its maritime patrol aircraft and increasing spacebased maritime domain awareness (MDA) capabilities. Japan might also be called upon to provide logistic support for the US military in the event of conflict. Least likely would be Japan’s joining the US or other Southeast Asian states in collective self-defense combat operations, but Japan is certainly now equipped constitutionally for such a role for the first time. In addition to constitutional empowerment, Japan is perhaps equipped for the first time for a direct military role in the SCS due to the experience and capabilities it has built up over the past two decades. The JMOD’s National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) was revised in 2010 to note that the JSDF would enhance security cooperation with the ASEAN states (MOD 2010: 9). The further revision of the NDPG in 2013 stressed the importance of maritime security cooperation with ASEAN countries (MOD 2013: 11). Japan has thus expanded military-tomilitary non-combat cooperation with ASEAN states. For instance, two MSDF destroyers and a submarine made a much publicized port visit to the Philippines’ Subic Bay in April 2016, and then the destroyers continued on to Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay the same month (The Japan Times 2016b). President Benigno Aquino, on visiting Japan in June 2015, also claimed his government would initiate talks with Japan on a Visiting Forces Agreement to allow the JSDF to use bases in the Philippines (Asahi Shimbun 2015a). Japan’s potential for much greater naval deployments in the SCS has been demonstrated in other instances. The JMOD dispatched over 1,000 JSDF personnel and three MSDF vessels for relief operations around the Leyte Gulf following the Haiyan cyclone disaster in the Philippines in 2013. In November 2015, during the US–Japan Summit at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum in the Philippines, Abe expressed support for US Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations and even mused that as the South China Sea, “influenced Japan’s own security continued attention would be devoted to it and investigation of JSDF activities”, so hinting that Japan could join FON in line with interpretations of collective self-defense (Asahi Shimbun 2015b: 3). In June 2017, the MSDF dispatched its largest vessel, the 27,000-ton Izumo, classed as a destroyer

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but essentially a light helicopter carrier, for the first ever US–Japan joint naval exercise in the SCS. Although the exercise was not defined as FON, the fact that it came the same week as FON exercises by the USN was an indication of Japan’s potential to take on such role (Osborn 2017). Moreover, Japan is clearly building the military capacity for meaningful deployments in the SCS if necessary. The 2013 NDPG provides for two Izumoclass helicopter carriers embarking up to 14 helicopters, providing a very strong ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare) capability and versatile naval asset for potentially supporting US missions in the SCS. MSDF submarine capabilities have increased, with the revised NDPG and accompanying Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) continuing the 2010 NDPG’s build-up of the fleet from sixteen to twenty-two boats. The MSDF’s air fleet is strengthened through the procurement of the P-1 aircraft with an 8,000-kilometer range capable of patrolling and ASW operations deep into the SCS. All this adds to the sense that Japan can attempt to balance China not just via the ASEAN states and the US, but it can now directly intervene in the SCS disputes if the situation was sufficiently threatening to require it.

Conclusion: Japan’s traditional realism camouflaged as liberalism Japan’s contention that it is pursuing in the SCS a policy characterized by the rejection of power politics and adoption instead of an approach based on essentially liberal values looks like a leaky proposition when held up to full scrutiny. Japan appears to be driven by the same considerations of the shifting balance of power, territory, and material gain that has influenced other interested actors, including the largest protagonist in the disputes in the shape of China. Japan’s concerns over the SCS, indeed, reflect the larger pattern of the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations and the triumph of relative over absolute gains, so compounding the realist outlook. Japan also appears also to be an inconsistent upholder of international law – the most important claimed distinction between itself and China – in regard to its own parallel territorial claims in the Western Pacific and flouting of UNCLOS provisions. Japan’s record in multilateral cooperation is a strong one, but it appears to be simply extending its realist concerns into these frameworks rather than allowing the frameworks themselves to be the decisively shapers of approaches to the disputes. Japanese policy makers have further demonstrated an increasing propensity to work bilaterally with regimes that are far from like-minded democracies, and are increasingly illiberal, if not outright authoritarian. Japan’s preferred policy response is diplomatic in nature, but its current approach has clear “soft” balancing characteristics, and more and more Japanese policy makers are enhancing “hard” balancing options through the buildup of ASEAN states’ maritime security capacity, the JSDF’s own capabilities and experience of operation in the SCS region, and most crucially, cooperation with the US and other partners. In sum, therefore, Japan’s policy towards the SCS look like a plain case of realist calculations and responses. The liberal trope is perhaps a useful means of internationalizing the SCS disputes, painting Japan as an honest broker, and

94 Christopher W. Hughes camouflaging its real interests and behavior. Japan’s desire to conceal its approach is understandable given its desire to reassure East Asian neighbors of its security intentions, but just how much traction and effectiveness the approach has and will yield is questionable. Certainly, ASEAN states are in general less sympathetic to the playing of the liberal arguments. In terms of the future implications of Japan’s “fake liberalism” in the SCS, even if the camouflage is stripped away, the essential core approach is unlikely to remain unchanged. Japan will continue to seek to check Chinese influence in the subregion through diplomacy and a quiet expansion of military presence. As noted above, Japan will seek to avoid direct confrontations with China in the SCS to avoid the image of attempting to exert any form of dominance or interference, and the main thrust of its policy is to complicate Chinese influence that could change the status quo by force or fait accompli. Nevertheless, if the situation in the SCS continues to deteriorate in China’s favor, and the ECS situation fails to improve, then Japan’s interests in the both and the linkage of the two might precipitate a more direct approach such as logistical or defensive support for US military action in the SCS.

Notes 1 2 3 4

For classic formulations of the “Yoshida Doctrine” see Pyle (2007) and Samuels (2003). For a critical appraisal of the perceived “embargo” see Hagström (2012: 282–3). Midford (2018, forthcoming). Ibid.

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7

The South China Sea as symptom of Asia’s dynamic security order Nick Bisley

The origins of the South China Sea disputes lie in the way pre-modern Asia’s political practices were disrupted by the exercise of imperialism, the conflicts that it spawned and the ways in which competing interests were reconciled hastily in the post-war settlement in 1945 (Hayton 2014).1 They have long been a source of tension in the region. But the attention focused on the dispute since around 2010 is unprecedented in the post-war period. The dispute is now influenced by the dynamics of nascent Sino-American rivalry. Some even believe that it may spark region-wide conflict and has the same standing as the long run regional hotspots of the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan (for example, Coughlin 2016). This chapter’s goal is to assess why the South China Sea dispute has become so contentious over the past half-decade and how this relates to the dynamic forces at play in the region’s changing security order. Previously, the dispute was contained by a security order centered around US primacy whose terms were accepted by all. But in both the fact of and the manner in which these claims are being made and defended we see the evidence of the breakdown of that old order. The chapter’s first part explains what I mean by regional security order and provides an account of the order that prevailed from 1979 to around 2012. Here I argue that the key to its success at providing peace and stability was the wide-ranging consensus about the form and function of regional security order. The second part then explains the changes that have taken place which have meant that consensus is being replaced by contestation as the region’s defining feature. The final part shows how the South China Sea disputes are a symptom of the changes in train. The conclusion explains why even though contested Asia will be more unstable there exist a number of moderating forces that are likely to reduce the prospects of systemic conflict.

Asia’s long peace A security order is an important component of a broader international order.2 This overarching concept refers to the rules, principles, institutions, and values which create stable relations among discrete members of an international system and also shape their behavior. Orders can be produced in many different ways, by institutions, hegemons, or alliances. But the central feature is that there is a discernible

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pattern of relations among states whose form is determined by a particular distribution of power, ideas, and institutions.3 A regional security order refers to the set of ideas, policies, and practices that provides a reasonably coherent and predictable pattern of security relations among a geographically circumscribed group of states. Although the larger context of world politics matters, in security terms, the most important forces shaping how states behave relate to their region (Buzan and Waever 2003). To understand how states behave and their security policy choices, one must focus most heavily on their regional security setting. Security here refers to the challenges and threats to the state and its core interests. This has traditionally been understood to be the military threat posed by other states. However, security threats have come to be understood in a broader manner in which concerns relating to terrorism, infectious disease, and population movement are perceived to threaten interests in an acute manner. Security is thus increasingly recognized as an open concept in that it conveys the focus on threats to core interests but does not necessarily prefigure the nature or character of those threats (Smith 2005). Indeed – as the South China Sea dispute illustrates – security challenges in Asia regularly entail conventional state-based threats interwoven with complex non-traditional elements such as fishing rights and hydrocarbon reserves. From 1949 until 1979 Asia’s regional security environment was characterized by violent conflict, ideological contestation, and regular interference by Asian powers in each other’s affairs. While the Cold War was clearly an important influence in these conflicts, that larger contest did not define or determine how states behaved. Indeed, it was the interaction between the local sources of conflict with the larger geopolitical and ideological considerations of the Cold War which made the region so very violent. This period ended in 1979; the year in which the US and China exchanged ambassadors and the final year in which Asia had a high number of battlefield deaths (Human Security Centre 2005: 44). It was also the beginning of Asia’s long peace. Indeed, the region where more people were killed in conflict than any other during the Cold War (in excess of six million, not including those many millions more killed in internal upheavals in China, Cambodia, and elsewhere) had become almost entirely war-less. What had become of Asia’s war-prone security order?4 In contrast to approaches which emphasize the role of hierarchical relations and hegemonic leadership provided by the US,5 I argue that the peace and stability in the post 1979 period in the region was due to the “consensual” qualities of Asia’s security order. I use this term because of the region-wide consent toward US dominance and the consensus that existed about key aspects of regional security order. This period of stable geopolitics and predictable security relations rested on the four foundations: great power amity; the clarity of US commitments to the region; broad ranging acceptance of the form and function of the regional security order; and the prioritization of domestic state and nation-building aims over international policy ambition. The nature of great power relations is crucial to any regional security setting. Once Beijing and Washington were able to establish a workable diplomatic relationship the region’s security order shifted from one dominated by ideological and

100 Nick Bisley geopolitical contestation to one centered on US military primacy and its acceptance by all the key powers in the region.6 This change occurred because the White House wanted to extricate itself from Vietnam and pressurize the USSR. China also sought Cold War strategic advantage in relation to its former partner and wanted to adopt a less confrontational approach to the outside world. In return for Washington’s recognition of its legitimacy, the PRC accepted US military dominance in East Asia and would not seek to change either the borders or the politics of countries of the region. By the time the terms of the deal set up by Nixon were formalized in 1979, China had launched the economic reform program that would fundamentally transform the country and with it Asia’s international politics. The violence of the 1945 to 1970s period was driven by revolutionary powers contesting Asia’s post-war arrangements both geopolitically and ideologically. This period came to an end in 1979 and the amity of Sino-American relations underpinned the prosperity of the following decades. But Asia’s stable and peaceful order was not only a product of a shift in great power politics. It was created also by the clarity and credibility of US commitments. This derived from what came to be known as the Guam doctrine.7 Here, the US signalled that while it would honor its alliance commitments to provide protection for its junior partners, those partners would have to be responsible for the majority of their defense and security needs. There would be no more openended commitments of the kind that had dragged it into Vietnam. This limited liability approach enhanced US credibility because it made clear what the country would and would not do. While it did not want another major war the US did not want to vacate the region nor leave it vulnerable to destabilizing acts. By underlining alliance commitments and ruling out open-ended proxy warfighting the US encouraged prudence on its junior partners and established parameters of acceptable security conduct. The third pillar on which Asia’s security order rested was the acceptance of both the form and function of that order. By the late 1970s, virtually every country in the region had come to terms with an international security order underpinned by American military predominance.8 American power would keep Japan in check, stabilize the Taiwan Straits and the Korean Peninsula, and keep the sea lanes of communication on which trade depended open. Asian states and societies would not have to pay much to receive American security public goods. But acceptance was not only about the fact of the security order but the interests it served. Although the US paid a high price and took risks to play a dominant role in regional security, it benefited considerably by ensuring that the rules, norms, and principles of Asia’s security order reflected its interests and values. And it is the fact that virtually all states were willing to live with this which was crucial to the order’s success. This political acceptance was underpinned by the alignment of the region’s economic interests with those of the US through the part played by US markets in Asia. The US was essentially open for export while the country was the most important source of inward investment. Unlike much of the literature on Asia’s security order, which tends to focus almost exclusively on the international policy behavior of the major powers,9 this

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account emphasizes the way in which great power politics interact with the choices of the region’s lesser powers and the alignment of economic and political interest. It was not just US dominance and its acceptance by the region that made Asia stable, but also the choices of Asian states. They prioritized the business of state and nation-building at home over the demands of ambitious or risky options abroad. Whether contesting borders, undermining neighbors, or trying to spread revolution, after 1945 many post-colonial Asian states emphasized international policies that were destabilizing strategically and economically. The post1979 environment was notable for the consensus that existed across the region about prioritizing domestic economic and social concerns over international matters. For many this involved following the model established by Japan of exportoriented state-led development. While not all went down that path, consensual Asia saw a profound shift in policy preferences away from risky international initiatives. These pillars – great power amity, clarity of US commitments, consent for the structure and purpose of regional order, and the priority of domestic state and nation-building programs over foreign policy imperatives – created Asia’s long peace. War was avoided, battle deaths virtually disappeared and economic welfare improved dramatically in many parts of the region. And of course it provided an extremely supportive environment for managing the region’s many disputes. How did this order keep the South China Sea dispute from flaring up? At a basic level, disputing claims in the Sea at that time came with high costs and uncertain benefits. This fact meant that in an environment where most were focused on domestic concerns, claimant states lacked the drive to make good on their ambitions. Protean ideas like national honor and prestige were not sufficient to propel the disputes up the priority list. Equally, the disputants were not in a particularly strong material position to make good on their ambitions. China’s strategic aims in its maritime domain have not varied much during the lifetime of the PRC. Rather, it has been the material and political circumstances that have changed (Friedberg 2015: 143). US maritime predominance was unchallenged during this period and efforts to press claims or alter the status quo in some way would have required not only considerable courage in the face of this dominant naval power, but also a willingness to question the underlying facts of the international settlement. The dispute was tailor-made to benefit from consensual Asia. Great power concord, the priority of the domestic, the credibility of US power, and the acceptance of both the form and function of Asia’s security order kept this complex historical dispute from becoming a significant issue. Indeed the one period in which the dispute flared during this period, in the mid-1990s, was the only time when aspects of the post-war period settlement were being questioned as America appeared to flirt with neo-isolationism. Once those questions were resolved by the Asia strategy delineated by the Nye reports of 1996 and 1998, the dispute once again quickly retreated from view.10 Differences amongst the claimants remained – but they were not an irritant to the order management of the region’s international politics.

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The return of contestation Asia’s long peace continues in the sense that the region remains free of interstate conflict and battlefield deaths are non-existent. Yet the region’s security order has changed considerably over the past half-decade. And although the region is not on the brink of a major conflict, it is now much more uncertain and less stable than it has been since the late 1970s.11 The instability has been driven by changes to the four pillars of the security order. These changes are ushering in a period in which contestation is becoming the hallmark of Asia’s security relations, in contrast to the consensus of the 1979 to 2012 period. This refers both to specific contests over territorial disputes, institutional influence, and WMD proliferation as well as the larger contest over the form and function of Asia’s regional security order. This is being driven by shifts in the domestic politics of key countries, changing configuration of economic interests and the revival of nationalism as powerful force in the region’s international politics. The deterioration of the relations between the US and China alongside the lingering mutual suspicion and mistrust that has characterized Sino-Japanese relations represents the first important shift. Where in the past the US and China could accept one another’s place in the regional security order, today their relations are characterized by mistrust about both ends and means of security policy. China is no longer willing to accept a subordinate role to the US. Perhaps more importantly, both countries have fundamentally different and incompatible views about the kind of regional order they want. US strategy in Asia continues to center around the perpetuation of military dominance so as to maintain a favorable balance of power and deter states from acting in destabilizing ways. This means that the US has to retain not only an advantageous disposition of force but also the capacity and will to exercise that force. In contrast, while China does not and will not be able to challenge the US directly, it is already challenging the capacity of the US to act in the way that it has in the past. China is already the world’s second largest economy and it will not countenance ongoing vulnerability to predation by the US Navy’s 7th fleet. To ensure this China wants to secure its maritime approaches and defend its broader interests in the region. As has already become apparent, this is incompatible with the manner in which the US has pursued its regional interests. Great power amity is coming to an end. This mistrust exists in spite of the fact that the US and China go to great lengths to manage their relationship. There are around 1,000 meetings per year ranging from the very pinnacle of political leadership down to operational links which are intended to provide a liberally-inspired informational ballast to the relationship.12 In spite of this, mistrust persists. The consensus that had existed about their respective roles in the region has broken down and in its place is growing rivalry. So far this remains contained and is not yet a Cold War style systemic geostrategic competition. Rivalry and contestation is visible in the South China Sea but can also be seen in the East China Sea, the Korean Peninsula and even in parts of Southeast Asia.

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US commitments to partners and allies now experience doubts in ways that were unimaginable ten years ago.13 There has not yet been a complete collapse in confidence in the US altogether, nor has American military power been functionally weakened in some fundamental sense. But this questioning of credibility entails two changes of a decidedly political nature. Since the public mood in the US turned against the lingering conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the sense in the region is that the appetite for military risk-taking by Washington has declined. The Obama administration was particularly cautious about the use of force and sent unclear signals about its intentions, most famously in relation to the “red line” decision in Syria. The reluctance of the Obama years has been underlined by a blustering Trump administration whose combination of nativism and fecklessness leave few reassured (Lake 2016). Equally, it has become a catechism for senior American officials to declare publicly and repeatedly that America means what it says about its regional security commitments.14 That the region’s preeminent military power feels the need to say such things is illustrative of the underlying doubts and shifting mood in the region. The other question about credibility relates to the regional impact of the US continuing to pursue its interests in the region in much the same way as it did in the past. During the 1979–2012 period, the US role in the region was broadly accepted to have had a beneficial impact on the region’s security setting.15 From this perspective, US military power prevented the PRC from attempting to use force to resolve Taiwan’s status, stopped the North invading South Korea, and also kept Japan from acting militarily in ways which its neighbors would have found disruptive. The US presence, organized through alliances, was perceived to have kept Asia stable and peaceful. The deeper question that is only now beginning to be asked is whether the logic of US primacy producing regional stability will hold in the future. Many point out that the US is likely to remain the dominant military force, as conventionally understood, in the region for decades to come.16 But it is far from certain whether American military capacity, when yoked to its pursuit of primacy, will continue to produce stability in the future. Central to this will be China’s response to the US efforts to exercise primacy. Under Xi Jinping, the country has already become much more assertive in the pursuit of its interests (Bisley 2011). It continues to see the US presence as an effort to contain China’s influence and constrain its growth. Moreover, its development of aircraft carriers, fifth generation fighter aircraft, and the modernization of its strategic nuclear force indicate that military steps are already being taken to reduce American influence. As China continues to grow it is likely to contest America’s policy of primacy. The consequence of this will be a much more unstable region. Lesser powers in Asia are also likely to respond to this environment in ways that further fuel uncertainty and instability. Where US primacy was a source of comfort in the past, it is becoming a motive force for contestation and instability. The unsettled regional security environment illustrates that there is growing discontent about the basic security order, as well as the means used to achieve that order and the ends to which it is put. China is one force driving this. In an opaque political system such as that led by the Chinese Communist Party policy priorities

104 Nick Bisley are always difficult to discern, but it is clear that the leadership perceives the present international security environment as one which at best does not serve its interests and at worst is positively rigged against it, serving instead the interests of the US and its allies. Japan is also seeking to play a larger security role in the region.17 While encouraged to take these steps by the US and other allies, those urging Japan on do not appear to realize that this move, even moderate and occurring within the framework of the US alliance, has unsettling consequences. Elsewhere in the region, the larger second-tier states are also taking new steps. Vietnam is developing a strategic partnership with the US and also reaching out to other US allies like Australia and Japan, while the Philippines, under the leadership of the mercurial Rodrigo Duterte, appears to be moving away from its links to Washington. There is no longer a region-wide consensus about the purpose of the region’s security order. East Asian states are also beginning to change the balance of priorities between domestic and international policy. States are devoting more resources to defense expenditure, in particular to force projection and war fighting capabilities, than in the past. The region is now the biggest regional defense spender as most seek to modernize their militaries, adopt high technology equipment, and focus more directly on external security challenges (IISS 2016: 215). This is only the most obvious material way in which international policy concerns are increasing their capacity to call on state resources. The sense of plasticity in the regional security environment is also encouraging countries to act on territorial disputes and competing claims. The disputes in the South China Sea illustrate this most clearly. Many of the lesser claimants believe that over time China’s position will grow ever stronger and that they have a limited opportunity to make good on their ambitions. It is this factor that motivated the Philippines’ legal case which was concluded in its favor in July 2016 and was a key motivation behind Vietnam’s efforts to internationalize the dispute.18 It is not only that this gambit is likely to strengthen their relative position in relation to China, it also is an attempt to position China’s claims as being at odds with the international community. This is illustrative of the way in which the changing security environment is creating an incentive structure that is prompting more internationally risky and destabilizing activities than in the past. An important element for this account of Asia’s security order is the emphasis on the interaction of domestic and international forces. A crucial development in recent years has been the revival in key countries of a nationalism which, when linked to growing economic capacity, has reinforced a move away from the dominance of domestic over international policies. Nationalism is destabilizing for a number of reasons. First, it shifts the political calculus about security policy decision making in ways that can exacerbate uncertainty and in extremis prompt conflict. The role of the South China Sea disputes in the domestic nationalist mythology in China and Vietnam is a significant hindrance to the long-run resolution of the dispute as well as to managing the recent increase in tensions. Second, it can narrow the choices available to decision makers when confronted with crises. Given the intersection of nationalism and interests at play in the South China Sea dispute, this is likely to become a more significant problem over time.

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Sources of change Contested Asia is being propelled by the breakdown in great power amity and growing rivalry, uncertainty about the US and its commitments, shifting attitudes toward the character and nature of the regional security order, and the growth in importance of international matters versus domestic priorities for many countries in the region. The erosion of the pillars that made Asia peaceful has been caused by a number of developments in key regional countries. The most important of these come from China and relate not just to the increase in material capability that has come from that country’s economic transformation. China now has the capacity to be a significant actor in regional security in ways which previously it was unable to do. But it is not only that China now has more military power to advance its interests, it is also that its leadership has changed its approach to advancing those interests and toward the regional security order more broadly. As Ren Xiao has shown, a key reason for the success of Asia’s long peace was the way in which the attitudes of Chinese elites toward the regional security order changed to become more accepting of the external environment (Xiao 2016). Since coming to power in 2012, President Xi has brought about a cognitive shift in China’s approach to the world. China’s underlying security interests and its ambitions have not changed significantly over the 67 years of the People’s Republic. What has changed is both the capacity of the country to make good on these ambitions as well as the means it uses to advance these ends (Friedberg 2015). Plainly China has not reverted to a neo-Maoist revolutionary foreign policy, but equally it has moved away from the approach that prevailed in the 1990s and early 2000s. Now it takes the view that it must more confidently and actively defend its interests. In part this is shaped by a more expansive view of its interest. For example, China’s prosperity is now much more dependent on external trade, such as the energy and commodity inputs on which its growth depends, than it was in the past. Consequently, its maritime security interests are more important now than they were previously. Thus China needs to develop an approach to regional security order that better reflects the changing perception of its interests. Relatedly, China has also begun to frame aspects of the old security order as part of an international environment that is preventing the full realization of its potential. Thus American and other efforts to resolve the South China Sea disputes in line with prevailing international law is a challenge to the CCP’s programmatic nationalism. The South China Sea is presented on maps and in school textbooks as an inherent part of China, akin to Xinjiang and Taiwan, thus efforts to defend its claims there are an effort to defend the particular understanding of China that justifies the Party’s rule. Although the transformation of China and the more assertive policies of Xi Jinping’s government are the most visible changes in the region, strategic behavior is inherently interactive. China’s choices are shaped by its perception of its environment and the actions and intentions of others. Here no one looms larger in the mind than the United States. And there are two important developments in the US that have been crucial to the shift toward a more contested Asia. The policy

106 Nick Bisley choices made by the United States and in particular the signature foreign policy initiative of the Obama administration, its “rebalance” to Asia,19 has been vitally important to the Beijing’s perception that the US is seeking to keep China’s power and influence in check. With the rebalance Washington’s intention was to remove the distortions in US strategy caused by its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and to underpin the long-term viability of US predominance in Asia in the face of a changing regional setting. In essence it was about making the necessary adjustments to US policy to ensure that primacy, the policy that has prevailed since the late 1970s, is sustainable over the longer run (Bisley 2017). From China’s perspective the rebalance is about maintaining a regional security order which privileges the United States and its allies and which contains Chinese power and influence. Even though US elites believe that their preferred regional order is compatible with a maximally successful Chinese economic development story, the sense in Beijing is quite the opposite. Under conditions of US primacy, Xi Jinping’s government believes China cannot protect its core security interests. By focusing on Asia and doing so in such a publicly emphasized manner, the US has not stabilized the region. Rather, in fuelling a sense of Chinese encirclement it has inadvertently contributed to a more unstable region.20 In seeking to maintain the strategic status quo through the “rebalance” the US has created an action-reaction dynamic that is unsettling the region. Second, elites in Asian states perceive the US to be suffering significant longterm political and economic malaise. The past decade has been difficult for the preeminent global power. It has endured the worst economic downturn since the 1930s, one that has been of longer duration than any other and whose recovery has not only been slow but lacked sustained job creation until very recently. More importantly, US productivity growth is at its lowest in decades. In the face of a dynamic Asia the US has looked positively sclerotic. Compounding the basic facts of weak economic performance has been the dysfunction of the US political system. The partisanship within the US Congress has turned what had been a once-in-a-generation problem – the failure to pass a budget – into an annual game of chicken. This is a problem for Asia’s security context because it feeds into the sense of a weakened US which is not up to the task of regional leadership. Hovering over US defense commitments is the threat of automatic cuts of around US$100 billion if the sequestration arrangements of 2011 were to return (Department of Defense 2013). If this were to occur then it would result in a significant constraint on the ability of the US to play the kind of strategic role that it has in the past. And of course the election of Donald Trump and his chaotic first eighteen months in office appears to confirm the diagnosis of political dysfunction. The fourth driver of change relates to the way in which states are responding to regional uncertainty. In this sense it is part of what might be described as a feedback mechanism in which uncertainty and a sense of strategic fluidity is pushing international matters up the priority list for many in the region. Whether this involves spending more on defense, asserting territorial claims or developing new strategic partnerships, the shifting regional setting is creating an environment that

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encourages further disruption of the old order as smaller states now act in different ways than they had in the past. The forces shifting Asia’s security order to a more uncertain setting relate to growing Chinese wealth and capacity, US policy choices having a different impact than anticipated, shifting attitudes to the US and its ability to play the kind of role that it has in the past, and then a feedback cycle in which a dynamic of uncertainty prompts action that fuels instability across the region.

A symptom of contested Asia For those who argue that the US military presence has been the most important glue maintaining the regional security order, events of the past few years should be sobering. Critics have long chided the US for being a hegemonic power in Asia but that characterization has never been quite right. As Mastanduno (2003) has pointed out, US dependence on allies as well as its inability to shepherd events entirely to its preferred outcome has meant at best an incomplete hegemonic presence. But even with this more limited sense of the kind of American leadership, US primacy did restrain regional powers from risky international behavior. However, the activities of the claimant states in the South China Sea illustrate that US primacy does not have quite the calming influence it has had in the past. There could be no more clear illustration of the reduced credibility of US power and influence than the fact that China has created 3,000 acres of terrain which can be used not just to advance territorial claims but to project force across vital sea lanes – sea lanes in which the US navy has not only acted with complete impunity since the mid-1940s but on which its regional strategy has been premised. To be clear, the islands do not fundamentally change the strategic balance – US power is still considerably advantageous and Washington could destroy the features easily – rather the islands’ existence undermines US credibility and strengthens the perception of China’s influence. And since China has completed its first round of island building the flexing of US military muscles has been both confused and lacking in impact (Bosco 2016). Beyond the basic sense that US dominance had kept the disputants in check, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia are of the view that their relative capacity to advance their claims in relation to China will diminish as each year goes by. The consequence of internationalizing the disputes in a closing “window of opportunity” has not only increased the stakes but also broadened those stakes out to the point where the dispute appears to pit great powers’ conceptions of security order against one another. But beyond the questions of primacy and its efficacy, the disputes reflect the contested nature of Asia’s security order in two other ways. First, the disputes are a contest over whose claims to the islands and features prevail and what follows from those claims, most obviously relating to maritime boundaries and questions of jurisdiction within EEZs (Exclusive Economic Zones). The geopolitical settlement in Asia has changed once since the 1970s, with the independence of East

108 Nick Bisley Timor in 2002. China appears to have been successful in fact if not in theory, to have affected some alteration to that settlement, even if it has not achieved all of what it wants. Indeed, one of the great puzzles of the dispute relates to the precise nature of what it is that China claims.21 The dashed line map that has been at the centre of the PRC’s approach is vague in terms of delineation as well as function. China has not yet clarified precisely what the dashes actually mean. For some the dispute is a technical one testing the limits of UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) processes in a complex enclosed sea in which there appears little will to forge a consensus. Others see a contest between an expansive Chinese claim for the South China Sea to become effectively a Chinese domain with the dashed lines acting as maritime boundaries. However conceived this multilayered dispute, while among the region’s more complex, is by no means the only difference in territorial opinion in the region. Asia is home to many dozens of territorial disputes. Some of these are quiet affairs of no great diplomatic issue among the disputants, while others are of great significance. Whether the big disputes such as Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh involving huge tracts of land or smaller matters of great symbolic importance such as the Dokdo or Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, the resurgence of the South China Sea disputes illustrates the loosening of the old security order’s capacity to corral these differences. Both in the sense of providing a less constraining international environment and then in the way in which the disputes play out, that is if one or other strategy is perceived to be effective, then it may also have the effect of encouraging others. There is a strong chance that the forces which have brought the South China Sea dispute to the surface are likely to prompt the reheating of other disputes thus furthering the sense of contestation evident in Asia. But the contest also operates at a higher level. The disputes also reflect a contest between differing conceptions of how it is that territorial disputes should be managed or resolved. The US and its allies have sought to reduce the risks of the disputes spiralling into a military contest and have opted to align their responses and frame them in terms of their conception of international law. It is no coincidence that the centerpiece of Washington’s response has been to position its approach to the dispute in legal terms. It has not openly portrayed China as the aggressive or assertive force, although that implication is reasonably clear from official statements (Kirby 2016); instead it has persistently advocated for the resolution of the dispute in accordance with international law. With the July 12 finding of the arbitral tribunal Washington, Japan, and others have called on China to adhere to the findings, even though Beijing was not party to them and there is no legal obligation on the country to do so.22 The broader context in which the US and its allies and partners have begun to position the dispute is as part of a “global rules-based order”. At the centerpiece of this is the implication that China is out of step with that order and that Washington and its friends act in accordance with its dictates. In so doing they turn the complex disputes about rocks, shoals, reefs, and technical questions relating to EEZs and jurisdictional rights into a much larger contest about the nature of Asia’s regional order. On the one side is the US

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and its vision of a politically neutral legal conception of order and on the other, as framed by this move, is a China subverting that order through the exercise of power and coercion. And one of the great problems faced by the US and other more status quo oriented countries is what they will do if China does not shift its approach. The point here is not to decide whether the US and its allies have made an astute judgement which will strengthen their hands while managing escalation risks but rather to show the way in which the dispute now has a further dimension in which it is seen as a test of differing ways of managing competing claims to questions of national interest. The outcome of which will be of considerable consequence for the emerging Asian security order. The South China Sea has become a contest about the underlying ends and means of Asia’s security environment. A third way in which they are symptomatic of the changing security order is the way in which they reflect competing conceptions of Asia’s strategic map. A central component of Asia’s old order was the acceptance of the form and function of international security arrangements. Embedded within that was a shared view about the kind of strategic environment that the order oversaw. This related less to the physical geography of the region and more to the way in which the states shared a sense of Asia’s strategic cartography. They had a common view of where the key flash points were, where the countries’ respective redlines were, of what they were comprised, and what consequences would have to be paid by those who stepped across them. In the past, the region’s states shared a sense of just what the status quo entailed, and what price states deviating from that might pay for such action. The South China Sea disputes are, in part, a function of the breakdown of that consensus about the strategic status quo. China perceives that its actions are purely reactive to an encircling coalition of powers and to which it must respond.23 In contrast, Washington and its allies perceive China to be the one breaking with the old ways of doing things.24 One of the most dispiriting aspects of the dispute is the way in which each side sees the other’s actions and statements as disingenuous. Washington sees Chinese claims of reaction as a smokescreen to justify assertive behavior while China sees the US positioning itself as an independent arbiter of a neutral international law as only so much window dressing of efforts to constrain Beijing’s growth. This reflects the breakdown of a shared sense of the region’s strategic topography which in turn makes both the management and resolution of the dispute so very difficult. The final point relates to the way in which the disputes reflect differing understandings of the role and rights of great powers in Asia’s international system. The conventional understanding of the role played by great powers for much of modern international history centers on their central managerial function. In return for underwriting order and providing public goods, great powers receive special dispensation from the normal rules, particularly those relating to the restraints on the use of force (Bisley 2012). One of the great challenges in times of shifting power is affording recognition of the newly powerful and managing the political and strategic problems which that creates. In 2011, at an ASEAN summit where the dispute was subject of considerable debate, then Chinese foreign minister, and now state councillor, Yang Jiechi declared that “China is a big country

110 Nick Bisley and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact” (Kurlantzick 2011). China’s approach to the dispute has, at times, appeared to be informed by traditional assertions of great power prerogatives. It sees its interests in the Sea as superior to others because of its standing as a great power. Here it is at odds not only with other claimants who cannot make such a claim, but with the only other state of that stature, the US. For so long as the contemporary global order, centered around the UN, has been in place, the US has had a complex relationship with the tensions between power and law that the UN system embodies. On the one hand there is an aristocratic vision of order in which the great powers have special rights and obligations. On the other is an egalitarian conception in which all states, regardless of stature or function, have an equal position in the system and have the same opportunities and constraints. The US has followed what can be described as an à la carte approach to the ideas and principles in the UN system. At times it adheres to the prerogatives of a great power, while at others it takes a more narrowly circumscribed understanding as to what it is that states can and cannot do. Viewed from the perspective of a great power taking steps to claim what it perceives to be its due, not only in the narrow sense that it has particular claims in the Sea, but also in the broader sense that it has rights as a great power, the dispute illustrates two deep tensions in the contemporary international order. First, there is not a clear consensus about the balance between the aristocratic and egalitarian notions that coexist in the current order (Zala 2017). Should all states be treated as equal or do some states have rights and privileges that others do not? Second, even if such a consensus were to exist how does one manage the necessary adjustments to the order to reflect the emergence of a new great power? Do they have to demonstrate not only the exercising of rights but the carrying out of order providing obligations? China plainly sees the South China Sea through the prism of an aristocratic great power. Its claims are superior not only because of their rather nebulous historical foundations but because of the country’s special standing in international society, they trump those of lesser significance. In the past this may have worked as middle class states knew their place and, crucially, other great powers recognized the importance of giving peers their due. Today, such deference no longer exists from the lesser powers nor does the US appear willing to extend such peer privilege to China. This cognitive disconnect in the South China Sea reflects the uncertain normative status of great powers in the current order as well as the competing views about the kind of order extant in Asia. This further contributes to the contested quality of that order and contributes to the underlying instability in the region that is increasingly becoming the norm. As East Asia’s peaceful security order decays states are taking less prudent policy positions and prompting regional instability. This has caused the South China Sea disputes to bubble up as a point of contestation. But the manner of their resurfacing as an issue, with growing militarization, increasing diplomatic pressure, and the prevalence of zero sum thinking mixed with nationalism is particularly dispiriting. One would struggle to find a better illustration of contested Asia and its crosscutting cleavages than the South China Sea dispute.

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How does the idea of an increasingly contested security order sit with the idea that the international system continues to enjoy a broadly liberal international order? One of the most influential scholars of that order, John Ikenberry, has famously argued that the liberal system is easy to join and hard to overturn (Ikenberry 2008). A rising China can find comfort within the system and will find it extremely difficult to replace it with something different. Ikenberry and other liberals seem to miss the fact that even while China benefits from the order, it is perceived to be made in Washington to serve American interests. And even though that perception is wrong – the prevailing order is a multinational product – China’s perception is powerful and resonates strongly with the underlying nationalist legitimation strategy of the party-state. Equally, at the regional level the institutional foundations of the liberal international order are weak and only liberal in a very basic sense. It allows easy subversion of prevailing norms and practices by capable countries, again something plainly on display in the South China Sea. More recently, Ikenberry has argued that where in the past East Asia enjoyed a US centred hierarchical order it now has a dual hierarchical structure. The US remains at the head of a security order while China is atop an economic order potentially pulling states in different directions (Ikenberry 2016). These dual hierarchies, Ikenberry argues, are likely to remain stable due to the convergence of interests that will induce the two great powers to avoid contestation and which will keep the basic balance of lesser state preferences in place. The argument presented here contests this sanguine view. Rather, it sees the breakdown in the alignment between economic and security interests that was at the heart of consensual order as an important factor driving the emergence of contested Asia. Because China is motivated not only by instrumentally rational interests but also by nationalist ideology as well as its willingness to yoke economic relations to political and strategic goals, the disconnect between the economic and the strategic that has been caused by the shifting trade and investment patterns prompted by China’s rise, means that Asia is likely to have a more contested order and become less stable than in the past.

Conclusion: contested Asia This chapter has argued that the pillars that sustained East Asia’s security order during its remarkable four-decade run of peace and stability are weakening. Recent years have marked a new phase of East Asia’s evolution with contestation replacing consent as the era’s defining feature. The resurfacing of tensions in the South China Sea and in particular the manner in which these tensions have reappeared is a function of this process. The dispute had been constrained by the great power amity established in the late 1970s, acceptance of the US vision of regional order, both the overarching purpose of that order and the mechanisms for its management, and the overwhelming priority regional powers put on domestic questions over international ones. As great power amity has broken down and as questions are being asked about both the US role and the overarching regional security order, the constraints over the South China dispute have loosened and brought

112 Nick Bisley about the current crisis. The weakness of the security order and the institutional setting allowed the issue to flare up once again. The South China Sea dispute is a leading edge indicator of the kind of contestation that will become more common in the region. Contestation will be about both immediate issues, like border disputes and sovereignty claims as well as larger questions about the underlying structures shaping regional security relations. But just because Asia will be the subject of great power rivalry it does not mean that war is inevitable or, indeed, even likely at present. This is due to the fact that even though contestation has replaced consensus at the centre of East Asia’s international politics there remain three important forces that will moderate the risks that contestation and rivalry will boil over into war. First, East Asia’s states have become bound up in webs of complex economic interdependence. This is especially the case amongst the region’s major powers. The Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations are the most important and potentially combustible security relationships. These bilateral relationships have networks of shared economic interest. And it is not just that states are likely to moderate their behavior because of their trade and investment ties, actors within each economy who have a stake in the trade and investment relationships – the large corporations, banks, and other firms – are also prompted to put pressure on political leaders. Economic interdependence will help moderate relations amongst the major states. A second factor is Asia’s nuclear balance. Asia’s key powers are nuclear weapon states which have effective second strike capabilities. This second buttress will act as a powerful constraint on dangerous state choices. Finally, East Asia’s security order is a subset of a global system in which there is widespread acceptance of the proscription of the use of force. Since the formation of the UN system wars have declined dramatically and a key reason for this has been the constitutional setting it provides in which force is prohibited as a policy choice except under very specific circumstances. And even though East Asian states have been spending more on war fighting capabilities, they have all shown a widespread acceptance of this normative framework. While it does not rule out war altogether – the region remains a part of the world in which systemic conflict remains a distinct possibility, most obviously on the Korean Peninsula and over Taiwan – the likelihood of the many flash points and areas of friction in contested Asia turning into large-scale war are restrained by economic interdependence, nuclear weapons, and the normative setting of the prevailing international order. This should not be a counsel of complacency but it does provide some comfort as Asia’s international politics enter a new and more dangerous phase.

Notes 1 See chapters 1 to 3 on the history of the sea and disputes up to 1995. 2 There is no academic consensus as to Asia’s prevailing security order. For an assessment of the differing approaches to the issue see Bisley (2014). 3 On international order more generally see Bull (1995) and Hurrell (2007). 4 A number of studies have begun to explore these questions in detail, see Kivimaki (2014) and Weissmann (2012).

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5 See Goh (2013); Kang (2003); Ikenberry (2004). 6 On which see Kirby, Ross and Li (2006). 7 For an interesting reflection on the emergence and misunderstanding of the doctrine see Kimball (2006). 8 An influential variation on this argument is Goh (2008). 9 See, for example, Ayson (2015); Shearman (2014). 10 There were two “Nye Reports” named after Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph S. Nye. The first was published in 1995 and the second and definitive edition was published in 1998. See Department of Defense (1998). 11 For an illustrative analysis see IISS (2015: 331–410). 12 For an analysis of these and their shortcomings see Tanner and Dong (2016). 13 For example, Chen (2014); Dyer (2016). 14 For examples see speeches by various secretaries of Defense at the Shangri-La Dialogue among many others. Text can be retrieved at: https://www.iiss.org/en/events/sha ngri-s-la-s-dialogue. 15 For example of this thinking see Dibb (2006). 16 For example, sentiments express by Australian PM Turnbull reported in Osborne (2016). 17 See Hughes (2015). 18 See Busynzski and Roberts (2014). 19 For a thorough overview of the administration’s perspective of the “rebalance” see Campbell (2016). 20 On the view that the Bush administration emphasized Asia but opted to do so in a deliberately low key manner to reduce this impact see Silove (2016). 21 See Webster (2015). 22 See statements from Australia retrieved at: http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pa ges/2016/jb_mr_160712a.aspx and Japan http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/p ress4e_001204.html. 23 For a typically over the top illustration of this view see Global Times (2016). 24 For example, Glaser (2015).

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114 Nick Bisley Buzan, B. and O. Waever. 2003. Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Campbell, K. 2016. The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia. New York: Hachette. Chen, Dingding. 2014. Four Reasons Why Japan (Still) Doubts US Security Assurances. The Diplomat, April 29. Retrieved at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/4-reasonswhy-japan-still-doubts-us-security-assurances/. Coughlin, C. 2016. Why the South China Sea Could Be the Next Global Flashpoint. The Telegraph (UK), April 8. Retrieved at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/ 08/why-the-south-china-sea-could-be-the-next-global-flashpoint/. Department of Defence (US). 1998. The United States Security Strategy for the East AsiaPacific Region: East Asia Strategy Report. Office of International Security Affairs. Retrieved at: http://www.dod.gov/pubs/easr98/easr98.pdf. Department of Defense (US). 2013. Sequestion: Across the Board Cuts Could Threaten National Security. Washington DC. Retrieved at: http://www.defense.gov/News/Sp ecial-Reports/Sequestration. Dibb, P. 2006. America and the Asia-Pacific Region. In R. Ayson and D. Ball, eds. Strategy and Security in the Asia-Pacific. Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 173–190. Dyer, G. 2016. Obama Flies into Doubts over US Place in Asia. Financial Times, September 2. Retrieved at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a3a36128-7121-11e6-9a c1-1055824ca907.html?siteedition=intl#axzz4LJOSNtSs. Friedberg, A.L. 2015. The Sources of Chinese Conduct: Explaining Beijing’s Assertiveness. The Washington Quarterly, 37(4): 133–150. Glaser, B. 2015. Conflict in the South China Sea. CSIS Contingency Planning Memorandum Update. April 7. Retrieved at: http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/con flict-south-china-sea/p36377. Global Times. 2016. Blustering US a Paper Tiger in S. China Sea. July 13. Retrieved at: http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/994129.shtml. Goh, E. 2008. Hierarchy and the Role of the United States in the East Asian Security Order. International Relations of the Asia Pacific, 8(3): 353–377. Goh, E. 2013. The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy, and Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hayton, B. 2014. The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Hughes, C.W. 2015. Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy Under the “Abe Doctrine”. London: Palgrave. Human Security Centre. 2005. Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century. New York: Oxford University Press. Hurrell, A. 2007. On Global Order: Power, Values and the Constitution of International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. IISS (The International Institute for Strategic Studies). 2015. Strategic Survey 2015. London: Routledge for IISS. IISS (The International Institute for Strategic Studies). 2016. The Military Balance, 2016. London: Routledge for IISS. Ikenberry, G.J. 2004. American Hegemony and East Asia Order. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 58(3): 353–367. Ikenberry, G.J. 2008. The Rise of China and the Future of the West. Foreign Affairs, January/February, 87(1): 23–37.

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Ikenberry, G.J. 2016. Between the Eagle and the Dragon: America, China and Middle State Strategies. Political Science Quarterly, 131(1): 9–43. Kang, D. 2003. Hierarchy and Stability in Asian International Relations. In G.J. Ikenberry and M. Mastanduno, eds. International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific. New York: Columbia University Press, 163–190. Kimball, J. 2006. The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of Misunderstanding. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 36(1): 59–74. Kirby, J. 2016. Decision in the Philippines–China Arbitration Official Statement. Department of State, Washington DC, July 12, Retrieved at: https://2009-2017.state.gov/ r/pa/prs/ps/2016/07/259587.htm. Kirby, W.C., R.S. Ross and G. Li, eds. 2006. The Normalization of US-China Relations: An International History. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Kivimaki, T. 2014. The Long Peace of East Asia. Farnham: Ashgate. Kurlantzick, J. 2011. The Belligerents. The New Republic, January 27. Retrieved at: http s://newrepublic.com/article/82211/china-foreign-policy. Lake, E. 2016. Obama’s Pivot to Asia Fails to Deter China. Bloomberg, September 7. Retrieved at: https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-09-07/obama-s-pivotto-asia-fails-to-deter-china. Mastanduno, M. 2003. Incomplete Hegemony: The United States and Security Order in Asia. In M. Alagappa, ed. Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 141–170. Osborne, P. 2016. US Remains Asian Force For Decades: PM. News.com.au. September 4. Retrieved at: http://www.news.com.au/world/breaking-news/us-remains-asian-for ce-for-decades-pm/news-story/c24bbe4c4781e467c0d305a52d640024 . Shearman, P. ed. 2014. Power Transition and International Order in Asia. London: Routledge. Silove, N. 2016. The Pivot before the Pivot: US Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance in Asia. International Security, 40(4): 45–88. Smith, S. 2005. The Contested Concept of Security. In K. Booth, ed. Critical Security Studies and World Politics. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, pp. 27–62. Tanner, T. and W. Dong. eds. 2016. US China Relations in Strategic Domains. Report. National Bureau of Asian Research, Washington DC, April. Retrieved at: http://www. nbr.org/publications/specialreport/pdf/Free/06192016/SR57_US-China_April2016. pdf. Webster, G. 2015. How China Maintains Strategic Ambiguity in the South China Sea. The Diplomat, October 29. Retrieved at: http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/how-china-ma intains-strategic-ambiguity-in-the-south-china-sea/. Weissmann, M. 2012. The East Asian Peace: Conflict Prevention and Informal Peacebuilding. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Xiao, R. 2016. Idea Change Matters: China’s Practices and the East Asian Peace. Asian Perspective, 40(2): 329–356. Zala, B. 2017. Great Power Management and Ambiguous Order in Nineteenth-Century International Society. Review of International Studies, 43(2): 338–367.

8

When giants vie China–US competition, institutional balancing, and East Asian multilateralism See Seng Tan

Of late East Asia’s regional security architecture has come under strain in the light of growing competition between the region’s big powers over the South China Sea (SCS). Increasingly, the actions of major powers in multilateral offshoots of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have threatened to turn those mechanisms into battlegrounds where participants spar over their respective national interests. In particular, differences between China and the US over the SCS disputes have threatened to turn various parts of East Asia’s multilateral architecture (hereafter EAMA), such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), into arenas of bigpower sparring. Moreover, in advancing their own interests, those major powers have apparently sought to use their size and sway to shape the behaviors of the smaller and weaker ASEAN countries; more than any other great power, China has been singled out in this regard. By way of the concepts of “institutional”, “adversarial”, and “associational” balancing, this chapter assesses the evolution of balancing dynamics between the great and regional powers, particularly between China and the US, within the EAMA (Emmers 2003; He 2008a; Little 1989). I argue that for the first two decades of post-Cold War East Asia, interstate balancing within the EAMA was predominantly “associational” in quality, with China, the US, and other powers balancing each other in ways that threatened neither the centrality of ASEAN in East Asian multilateralism and the grand compact that rendered that possible, nor the fundamental integrity of the EAMA. That began to change as institutional balancing assumed “adversarial” characteristics with China’s growing assertiveness in the SCS and its apparent attempts to divide ASEAN against the backdrop of the Obama administration’s rebalance to Asia. Whether this potentially harmful shift can be arrested and reversed – and the prospective role of ASEAN to that effect – will be of key importance to the future stability and security of the East Asian region.

Institutional balancing within the EAMA The notion that countries balance one another within particular institutional settings is well established (He 2008a, 2008b). Others have drawn the distinction

When giants vie 117 between countries balancing each other between or across institutions (“interbalancing”) and countries balancing each other within the same institution (“intra-balancing”) (Lee 2012). In the post-Cold War history of East Asian multilateralism, both types of balancing have been present at various times, although it is fair to say intra-balancing was more prominent during the 1990s when the ARF was the only region-wide institution available, and inter-balancing taking place since the 2000s with the proliferation of institutions in East Asia (Tan 2009, 2015a). By and large, proponents of institutional balancing accept that countries balance one another under specific conditions and pursue cooperation with one another under other conditions (He 2008a). Balancing can therefore take place amongst countries that are linked together through economic and other forms of collaboration. In short, economic interdependence does not preclude balancing (Khong 2004). This has certainly been so where the EAMA is concerned, despite the economically interdependent ties amongst East Asian states, many of whom are also participating economies in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) trade forum or are enmeshed in bilateral economic relations with one another (Follett 2014; Wyne 2015). Other than a few exceptions, the early scholarly literature said little about institutional balancing in the terms understood above. When the ARF, the first of the ASEAN-based offshoots, was formed in 1994, some regional leaders welcomed its establishment as an opportunity afforded the region to transcend its traditional reliance on the balance of power (Badawi 1995: 5). In the same vein, scholars like Yuen Foong Khong viewed the ARF not as simply an adjunct to the workings of the balance of power – as the late Michael Leifer had argued (Leifer 1996) – but as a mechanism for defusing the negative by-products of power balancing practices (Khong 1997). For Leifer, the security of East Asia – and, by extension, the successful functioning of its regional arrangements – necessarily depends on the prior existence of a stable balance (Leifer 1996: 58). The difference between the perspectives of Khong and Leifer seems to be that the very elements of interest to the former are, for the latter, to be found within rather than without the balance of power system (Tan 2012: 324). Others elsewhere have also questioned whether the balance of power is the cause of international stability or its consequence. For them, it is the mutual exercise of strategic restraint and self-moderation by states, supported partly by the opportunities for dialogue and confidence building, and habits of cooperation with one another that together have served as the foundation of a successful balance of power system (Claude 1989: 80). These aforementioned views appear to share the implicit assumption that multilateral institutions like the ARF, whether as an adjunct to the power balance, a conflict-mitigation mechanism or a common socializing space for mutual restraint, are distinct from the balance of power. As noted, there have been exceptions, such as a number of early works focused explicitly on intra-balancing dynamics within the ARF (Emmers 2003; Tan and Cossa 2001). According to Lee Seungjoo, although states cooperate to create an institution to provide a public good, once created, they continue to be cooperative, but at the same time seek to balance against each other within that institution

118 See Seng Tan through bargaining, struggle, and confrontation – albeit without intending to undermine that institution (Lee 2012: 6). Richard Little in particular has contended that power balances are not only adversarial or coercive in kind but could have an associational or cooperative dimension to them, where countries participating in an institutional arrangement, whether substantially or loosely conceived, recognize that “they have a collective responsibility to maintain order in the international society and that as a consequence they are required to establish and maintain the balance of power” (Little 2007: 12). Applying this notion to intrabalancing situations, those early research efforts implied that big and regional powers within the ARF have sought to counterbalance one another and ASEAN broadly in a fashion – including, it should be said, in ways that some have termed “soft” or non-military balancing (Paul 2005) – that served their respective interests without undermining the institutional integrity and legitimacy of the ARF. In the context of the wider international system, Little’s concept of associational balancing also presumably explains why, during the post-Cold War unipolar moment, the US’ predominance as the world’s sole global power remained fundamentally unchallenged despite relatively minor acts of resistance from weaker states (Walt 2005) – including, say, France’s deep disagreement with the US over George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003 – which in themselves do not properly constitute adversarial balancing (Little 2007: 282–3). It also implies, if indeed unipolarity – a benign one, arguably – supports the exercise of associational balancing, that one could reasonably expect the increased likelihood of adversarial balancing when the unipolar power is in decline or perceived to be so (Yang 2013). While Little’s understanding of balancing during unipolarity has been taken to task for failing to take into account the likely existence of soft balancing (Zhang 2011: 649), it is interesting to note that analyses that have sought to apply associational balancing to intra-balancing dynamics within the ARF do not see associational balancing and soft balancing as antithetical (Tan 2012: 319–24). East Asian countries have also sought to engage in inter-balancing or balancing actions across institutions, as Japan and other regional countries sought to accomplish against China through the establishment of the EAS out of concern over China’s apparent dominance of the ASEAN plus Three (APT) (Liow, Emmers and Tan 2011). Needless to say, this understanding does not preclude the possibility of “hard” or military balancing in interstate relations outside the institutional context of the EAMA, as we saw earlier with Leifer, and as leaders like Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore readily assumed about the East Asian region (Acharya and Tan 2006: 37–8). Crucially, if the collective purpose of states is to establish a stable balance of power that contributes to the region’s security and facilitates its pursuit of peace and prosperity, then the associative/cooperative form of balancing aimed at maintaining rather than revising – violently, that is – the regional status quo takes on added significance relative to adversarial/conflictual balancing. In like fashion, engagement by India in the East Asian region is welcomed by ASEAN for the “soft balancer” role India can purportedly play against China, but not in such a way as to contain China’s rise and potentially destabilize the region (Goh 2013). Put differently, the stability of any balance of power

When giants vie 119 system presumably rests on the ability of the participating states to mutually manage tensions arising from the interplay of associational and adversarial dynamics between and amongst themselves. Finally, the role of ASEAN as a balancing force between the great powers has been suggested by some analysts (Sarith 2013; Viet Nam News 2016). This idea is partly supported by the view held by some that ASEAN, despite its status as a regional organization with a membership of ten sovereign nations, can (potentially) be regarded as a “middle power” given the combined economic and political weight of its ten members (Gilley and O’Neil 2014; Ryu 2013; Tan 2013a) – assuming all ten are able to unite together in shared purpose and collective action. Furthermore, ASEAN’s ability to play a balancer role between the major powers is viewed by some as the foundation of its centrality in East Asian multilateralism (Huang 2014: 10). More plausibly, rather than the questionable proposition of ASEAN as a collective regional actor balancing against the great powers, ASEAN has sought to cultivate a complex balance of influence between China and the US in East Asia – partly through a process of institutional enmeshment via the EAMA – with the aim of preserving a hierarchical regional order led by the US (Goh 2007/2008). Crucially, the aforementioned possibilities are predicated on the relative weakness of ASEAN, which enhances its legitimacy as a regional leader for the reason that it threatens no one (Bara 2014; Stubbs 2014). Moreover, since ASEAN cannot be considered a military actor let alone a military power, the balancing in which it engages is thereby of the associational not adversarial variety.

Associational balancing in the EAMA Arguably, during the first two decades after the Cold War, balancing actions undertaken between and amongst stakeholders of the emerging EAMA were predominantly of the associational variety. Balancing was less about hard balancing – to date, the US remains the world’s foremost military power, notwithstanding the rise of peer challengers and domestic sequestration (Kazianis 2015) – as much as the quest for relative gains in economic and political influence over the region. While Little is undoubtedly correct about associational balancing being the consequence of unipolarity, it is safe to say the EAMA contributed its fair share in facilitating associational balancing through furnishing institutional settings that permitted its participants ample opportunities to interact regularly with each other – not unlike what the Concert of Europe did for its members in postNapoleonic Europe (Jervis 1982; Little 1989). Notwithstanding concerns regarding its increasingly troubled trusteeship of the regional security architecture it helped to establish, the vital contribution of ASEAN to regional order was its success in persuading the great powers to commit to multilateral confidence building at a time of strategic uncertainty following the end of the Cold War. Understandably, middle powers welcomed the move for the opportunities it would supposedly afford them to shape the region in ways they would otherwise not have been able to do on their own; for example, Australia and Japan led in the establishment of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (Beeson and

120 See Seng Tan Higgott 2014; Soeya 2013). On the other hand, great powers are arguably less likely to support and participate in multilateral arrangements not of their own making, not least because of the institutional constraints placed on their ability to act unilaterally – in theory at least (Mearsheimer 1994/1995). It bears reminding that both China and the US, for different reasons, viewed post-Cold War proposals to build the architecture for multilateral security dialogue in East Asia with great suspicion (Yuan 2000; Mastanduno 2008). Yet ASEAN, working alongside other regional advocates, succeeded in persuading both the Chinese and the Americans to invest in the region’s emerging multilateral venture. China has evolved from a wary neophyte at multilateral diplomacy to a selfassured connoisseur and convener of the practice (Shambaugh 2004/2005; Wang and French 2013; Wu 2008). Its involvement in East Asian multilateralism – including “Track 2” platforms such as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) and the like (Tan 2013b: 70–5) – has not only provided it with a platform from which to promote if not protect its economic and security interests, but also, or so hoped, to assuage regional concerns and reassure neighbors concerning the “peaceful” nature of its rising power and influence and focus on building regional community (Chen 2011; Chung 2010; Zhang 2006). This was well served by the fact that other stakeholders of the EAMA, including the ASEAN states, envisioned the APEC and ARF as regional platforms to deeply engage post-revolutionary China and help socialize its evolution toward becoming a “normal” and “responsible” power (Acharya 1996; Wanandi 1996). However, China has equally sought to influence and shape the institutional process (Ba 2006). In the early days of the ARF, this was most evident in the case of Chinese unease with the third and final phase of a proposed three-stage roadmap for security cooperation in the ARF. In particular, conflict resolution, conceived in the ARF Concept Paper as the culmination of confidence building and preventive diplomacy, was viewed by the Chinese as problematic for the implications it held of the possibility for intrusion and intervention by other countries in China’s domestic affairs. At the second ARF Senior Officials Meeting in Bandar Seri Begawan in August 1995, the Chinese succeeded in getting the offending stage replaced with “elaboration of approaches to conflict” (Leifer 1996: 166). Arguably, China’s effort constituted a successful attempt at intra-balancing against activist powers within the ARF, such as Australia, Canada, Japan, and the US, seeking more ambitious security cooperation and deeper institutionalization of regional architecture (Emmers and Tan 2011). That China got its way reflected not only the consensus principle at work and the putative goodwill of other ARF members toward China, but the successful functioning of a non-adversarial form of balancing that ensured the integrity of the ARF. Following the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 1997, China’s regional reputation benefited indirectly from the perceived high-handedness of the US and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which not only imposed upon ailing East Asian economies bitter structural readjustments but effectively killed Japan’s proposal for an “Asian Monetary Fund” (Lipsey 2003). Together with Japanese and South

When giants vie 121 Korean support, Chinese backing was significant to ASEAN’s formation of APT in 1997 and the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), a currency swap arrangement, in 2000. Through the 2000s or at least the period referred to as China’s so-called “charm offensive” (Kurlantzick 2008) – in 2002, China and ASEAN signed a free trade agreement as well as the Declaration on the Conduct by Parties in the South China Sea (DOC); in 2003, China became the first major power to sign ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and it inked a strategic partnership with ASEAN – many regional countries regarded China for the most part as “a good neighbour, a constructive partner, a careful listener, and a non-threatening regional power” (Shambaugh, 2004/2005: 64). At the same time, it has been argued that China’s plans to turn the APT into a comprehensive institution for both economic and security affairs – including forming a so-called “East Asia Summit” (EAS) for high-level discussions – and its similar designs for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) had to do with its aim for institutional balancing against the unipolar power of the US (He 2008a: 44). Ultimately, Chinese aspirations for the EAS were dashed when the idea was “hijacked” by regional countries worried over Chinese dominance in the APT, which led them to seek ways to balance against Beijing’s regional influence through enlarging the EAS beyond 13 countries twice – first by including Australia, India, and New Zealand when the EAS was inaugurated in 2005, and subsequently Russia and the US in 2011. In recent times, China appears to have undergone a fundamental change in predisposition and policy. The ascendency of Xi Jinping as the president of China in 2013 and the subsequent confirmation of his status as “core leader” in 2016 heralded a shift from the long-standing adherence to dictums established by Deng Xiaoping, such as “keep a low profile” and “bide one’s time”, to a decidedly more assertive and confident display of Chinese ambition, power, and influence, even as Beijing continues to reassure the world of its commitment to “peaceful development”. Institutionally, China has placed emphasis on multilateral ventures like the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), which President Xi Jinping used in 2014 to promote his exclusivist idea that Asia’s security should be the sole prerogative of Asians alone – Xi’s so-called “Asian security concept” – and in 2016 to propose “a new regional security cooperation structure that would ‘suit Asia’s unique traits’ and also a new crisis-control mechanism to prevent regional issues from flaring up” (Kor 2016). Furthermore, at the APEC summit in Manila in 2015 and presumably as a counterproposal to the Obamabacked Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Xi called for Asia-Pacific leaders to align their development plans and establish the so-called “Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific” (Levin 2015). Together with other Chinese initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the “Belt-and-Road” strategy, the string of new multilateral ventures advanced by China have understandably worried ASEAN advocates, who view them as evidence of increasing Chinese impatience with ASEAN and the ASEAN-based EAMA as well as a Chinese exercise in “unilateral multilateralism” apart from ASEAN (Mahbubani 2016; Ekman 2016). Moreover, China’s recent participation in the EAS suggests a possible Chinese effort to neutralize attempts by the Japanese and the Americans to introduce

122 See Seng Tan security issues – cyber security in particular – into the EAS agenda.1 In the context of institutional balancing, these efforts could be understood as efforts in interbalancing aimed at enhancing China’s influence in a US-led international order, but one increasingly open to revision even as China continues to press for greater global acknowledgement of its newfound economic and political power and influence (Kassim 2015) – as Xi sought to accomplish with his call for a “new type of major power relations” at his first summit with Obama at Sunnylands in California in 2013 (Chen 2014). As the unipolar power for nearly two decades after the Cold War, the US presumably did not engage in balancing. When it attempted to do so – as some have suggested regarding Obama’s rebalance to Asia strategy (Zhao 2013) – its version of balancing, at least according to Henry Kissinger, was purportedly a self-absorbed one where the realization of international order meant the world coming to its senses and thinking like America (Kissinger 2014; Micklethwait 2014). If it were true that great powers as a rule do not make good multilateral actors (Holloway 2000), then the US approach to East Asian multilateralism has proved in parts surprising and frustrating. The US consistently rejected proposals and discouraged initiatives for multilateral institution building in Cold War Asia. Washington rejected Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s proposal in the 1980s for an Asian version of the Conference for Security Cooperation in Europe out of concern that Gorbachev was reviving Leonid Brezhnev’s “collective security for Asia” proposal (Buszynski 1992/1993). As the “hub” of the post-WWII San Francisco system of bilateral alliances, the US worried over whether advocacy for security multilateralism meant the concomitant rejection of its alliances in the region. However, its initial reluctance to participate in the EAMA did not connote an absolute rejection of multilateralism as a whole. It was President Bill Clinton who initiated the upgrading of APEC from a gathering of economic ministers to a summit by inviting heads of government to the APEC meeting in Seattle in 1993 (Langdon and Job 1997: 3). However, it was also during the Clinton presidency that combined IMF-US pressure on East Asia following the 1997 AFC, which indirectly weakened the region’s commitment to APEC and, fairly or otherwise, encouraged regional perceptions of APEC as a “tool of US domination” (Nesadurai 2006). As noted earlier, in contrast to regional unhappiness with the Americans, these developments presented the Chinese with an opportunity to enhance Beijing’s influence in the region (Pang 1999). George W. Bush became the US president in 2001 promising to treat China as a “strategic competitor”, as opposed to his predecessor’s view of China as a strategic partner (Carpenter 2000). But while China might have sought to institutionally balance against America via the EAMA, the 9/11 terrorist attacks focused US attention on Afghanistan and Iraq and caused America to effectively recuse itself from any direct power balancing vis-à-vis China for much of Bush’s presidency. As the US increasingly relied on China’s support in the war on terrorism, the Bush administration paid less attention to China issues and to irritants in its relations with China (deLisle 2011). What also should not be missed is US engagement with ASEAN during his second term. At the ASEAN “plus one”

When giants vie 123 level, Bush was instrumental in laying the groundwork for ASEAN–US relations. Together with his Southeast Asian counterparts, Bush established the ASEAN–US Enhanced Partnership (2006–2011) and the ASEAN–US Leaders’ Meeting. It was also under Bush that the US became the first dialogue partner of ASEAN to appoint an ambassador to ASEAN. And while much has been made of his Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice’s absences at the 2005 and 2007 ARF meetings, it bears noting that two Democrat presidents also missed meetings – Clinton vis-àvis APEC in 1995 and Barack Obama vis-à-vis APEC and EAS in 2013 – as a result of federal shutdowns in the US. With his avowed advocacy of multilateralism and his rebalance to Asia, Obama built upon the foundation laid by his predecessor and robustly engaged the region through America’s accession to the TAC in 2009 and its subsequent entry into the EAS in 2011 (Capie and Acharya 2011). The ASEAN–US leaders’ meeting was upgraded to a summit-level gathering and an ASEAN–US strategic partnership was established in 2015. These developments underscored the Obama administration’s regard for ASEAN as a “fulcrum for the region’s emerging regional architecture” (Sirila 2010). While this might have partially assuaged regional angst over whether Washington would continue its support of ASEAN centrality in East Asian regionalism (Tan 2017), it also raised expectations regarding the effectiveness of the EAMA to “produce results”, as Hillary Clinton emphasized during her tenure as US Secretary of State.

Balancing after the rebalance: from associational to adversarial? While China, the US, and other non-ASEAN stakeholders might have increasing cause to question ASEAN’s stewardship of the EAMA, it is the SCS disputes and ASEAN’s evident inability to influence them in any positive way that has underscored for many the increasing irrelevance of both ASEAN – notwithstanding the association’s standard disclaimers about its neutrality and that it is neither an adjudicating body nor a conflict resolution mechanism – and the EAMA to regional security. Realist analysts have long predicted the rise of strategic competition amongst the great powers in post-Cold War East Asia and the likelihood of the region becoming a “cockpit” of big power rivalry (Friedberg 1993/1994; Mearsheimer 2010). Needless to say, there have been important dissenting opinions (Bitzinger and Desker 2008), although some of those analysts have themselves begun to doubt the region’s ability to keep the peace in the light of growing tensions in the SCS (Bitzinger 2016). Big power tensions have also crept into their interactions at the ARF and more recently the ADMM-Plus. Remarkably, their 2016 editions were relatively free of acrimony and discord, or at least nothing that was serious enough to debilitate the meetings as had previously happened. “ASEAN and China worked hard to avoid a showdown, which would have left all parties red-faced if a fallout were to occur during the Commemorative Summit to mark the silver jubilee of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations”, as one observer explained. “ASEAN was also eager not to allow the South China Sea issue clout and dominate bilateral ties” (Tang 2016). But this was certainly not the case at earlier gatherings.

124 See Seng Tan For many Chinese analysts and practitioners, the rise in tensions are mostly if not entirely due to the Obama administration’s decision to implement its pivot or rebalancing strategy towards Asia, which Beijing believes – and Washington denies – was directed at China in order to curb its continued rise (Chang 2016; Ivanov 2016; Liu 2013). Nor did it help that while the Americans persistently explained the rebalance as a post-Afghanistan strategy to comprehensively engage with the Asia-Pacific region – economically through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); multilaterally through membership in the EAS; and militarily through a shifting of US Navy assets from the Atlantic to the Pacific, strengthening of its Asian alliances, and the formation of bilateral partnerships with other Asian countries – it was the military dimension that ended up gaining the most attention as a consequence of the US decision to undertake freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) in response to China’s aggressive reclamation and military build-up of the disputed islands – and China’s reported reliance on anti-access/area denial (A2/AD), a strategy designed to restrict the enemy’s access to a certain strategic location – in the SCS (Cordesman and Kendall 2016; Lieberthal 2011; Newsham 2017). Arguably, this inadvertent militarization of the US approach to the SCS has taken a turn for the worse with Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw the US from the TPP – his first executive order as president – whilst adopting his “peace through strength” strategy, which reportedly takes a page right out of former US president Ronald Reagan’s playbook by stressing that peace and security for America and the world can only be achieved through amassing US economic and military strength (Navarro 2016). For the Chinese, Obama’s purported strategic motive for the rebalance was revealed at the 2010 ARF at Hanoi. Remembered for the vehemence with which then Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi reacted to comments made by his US counterpart Hillary Clinton, the Hanoi meeting marked the first public instance where the US (through Clinton) identified the peaceful resolution of competing sovereignty claims to the SCS as a US “national interest”. According to Yang, the US stance amounted to “an attack on China” as the SCS constituted a “core interest” for the Chinese (cited in He 2016: 102). It was instructive to learn from Clinton, as revealed in her memoir, that her incendiary comment had apparently been made in response to the felt anxieties of some of the regional countries toward China’s growing assertiveness (Clinton 2014: 79). If anything, consecutive allegations by the ASEAN states about Chinese bullying apparently reinforced her own sense, garnered from her involvement at the US–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Beijing in May 2010, that the Chinese might have overreached with their “SCS as a core interest” declaration and their inflexible insistence that (in Clinton’s words) “China would not tolerate outside interference” in the SCS as such (cited in Dyer and Mitchell 2016). One view has it that the Chinese felt they had been unfairly waylaid by the Americans – with help from ASEAN – at the 2010 ARF, which was in a sense understandable since, before Clinton’s comments, the Obama administration had largely eschewed confrontation with the Chinese (Chang 2016). At the same Hanoi meeting, Yang also infamously reminded the ASEAN countries of the indubitable “fact” that China is a “big country” and that they

When giants vie 125 were “small countries” (Pomfret 2010). Furthermore, the Chinese apparently vented their fury against ASEAN states – Singapore in particular – deemed to be aligned closely with the United States.2 Chinese efforts at strengthening its ties with a number of ASEAN member states – and arguably deepening their dependence on China – contributed – deliberately, in the view of some – to a divided ASEAN (Sim 2016; Thim 2016). The 2014 ARF held in Naypyidaw was equally notable for the starkly different positions adopted by Beijing and Washington. In the light of China’s controversial decision to station an oil rig in Vietnamese waters in May 2014 – which provoked anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam – then US Secretary of State John Kerry proposed a moratorium on “provocative acts” in the SCS. Kerry’s proposal was roundly rejected by his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi (Mooney and Wroughton 2014). The Secretary General of ASEAN, Le Luong Minh, claimed that the ASEAN leaders did not discuss the US proposal, which in his view was not the critical issue. Rather, it was up to the ASEAN “to encourage China to achieve a serious and effective implementation” of the 2002 DOC, which committed signatories to “self-restraint” on actions such as land reclamation and building on disputed islands and reefs (The Straits Times 2014). When the ADMM-Plus met for only its third time in Kuala Lumpur in November 2015, it was forced to scrap a planned joint statement on the SCS. Unlike ASEAN meetings, however, joint declarations are not mandatory for the ADMM-Plus. The initial plan to issue one was abandoned following disagreements among the non-ASEAN countries over whether to include mention of the South China Sea disputes in the statement. It had been widely (and wrongly) reported by the international press that the failure of the ADMM-Plus to issue a joint statement was reminiscent of ASEAN’s disunity in Phnom Penh in July 2012 (Tan 2015b). Moreover, the failure to agree on a statement fosters the impression that the ADMM-Plus, for all the encouraging progress it has hitherto achieved in defense diplomacy – achievements that are more functional than strategic in nature, it should be said (Baldino and Carr 2016) – may go the way of the ARF. However, the key difference at the ADMM-Plus meeting in Kuala Lumpur was that all ten ASEAN member countries – including the four SCS claimants – stood firmly against the inclusion of the SCS in the proposed joint declaration, while ensuring its mention in the chairman’s statement issued by Malaysia in its role as ASEAN chair for 2015 (Tan 2016a: 73). Reportedly, the collective position adopted by the ASEAN countries was in anticipation of the likely inability of the ADMM-Plus members to achieve the consensus needed for a joint declaration owing to their differences over the SCS. If, as noted at the top of this section, the 2016 gatherings of the ARF, ADMMPlus, and EAS were relatively free of acrimony and discord, it could prove but a brief respite from the emerging pattern of adversarial balancing that has animated the EAMA since at least 2010. At his US Senate confirmation hearing in January 2017, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson hinted that the Trump administration could adopt a tougher stance on China in the SCS and on North Korea (Rich 2017). However, contrary to Trump’s bluster over alleged freeriding by Japan and South Korea, his defence chief James Mattis reaffirmed US commitment to the security

126 See Seng Tan alliances America has with those two countries during his visit to the region in early February 2017. Likewise, despite Trump’s own prediction (via Twitter) that his April 2017 summit with Xi would be a “very difficult one”, the event reportedly ended instead in warm declarations of goodwill and mutual respect without little to show for by way of substance (Chandler 2017). The future of the US rebalance – unfulfilled during Obama’s tenure, for many observers (Green 2016) – remains uncertain in the light of doubts over Trump’s proposed military build-up and the lack of clarity over his Asia policy (Boot 2016; Eaglen 2017; Liow 2017).

Conclusion: whither ASEAN and EAMA? The contention of this chapter has been that balancing dynamics between China and the US within the institutional context of the EAMA have taken different forms, namely, associational balancing during the first two decades of the postCold War period, followed by adversarial balancing as evidenced by growing rivalry between China and the US since the onset of the US rebalance to Asia. While associational balancing did not fundamentally destabilize the EAMA, the same cannot be said of adversarial balancing, however. This is not to imply that prior to the rise in Sino-US tensions over the SCS, East Asian multilateralism was essentially free from the impact of big power rivalry and intervention. Great and regional powers have long competed to exert their power and influence in and over East Asia; alternatively, they have sought to shape the regional strategic environment in ways advantageous to their own security and wellbeing. But the manner in which they did so did not adversely affect the embryonic East Asian multilateralism that emerged in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. If anything, the big and regional powers played their parts to establish the EAMA and actively defined and moulded the substance and style of regionalism therein (Tan 2015a). Yet they did so through a grand compact that endorsed the “centrality” of ASEAN within the EAMA and by adopting ASEAN’s institutional model and diplomatic-security convention (Acharya 1997; Katsumata 2009; Leifer 1996). However, the compact has been fraying with the surge in big power tensions and the ensuing accentuation of existing cleavages within ASEAN, and creation of new ones (Goh 2014; Kausikan 2016; Sarith 2013). In a sense, regional arrangements like the ARF and ADMM-Plus are being used as they were meant for, namely, as places of debate where states can argue and presumably work out their disagreements. However, their perceived ineffectiveness has led many to dismiss those arrangements – and, by implication, ASEAN, given its ostensible centrality in the regional architecture (Tan 2017) – as increasingly irrelevant to the security and stability of East Asia. Granted, unhappiness with ASEAN and its leadership of the regional architecture has been around well before the present SCS-related tensions – as happened when Australia (under Prime Minister Kevin Rudd) and Japan (under Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama) separately advanced their respective visions for regional community and architecture (Fukukawa 2009; Thayer 2009). In their respective ways, Chinese and American actions have contributed to the weakening of ASEAN, directly or otherwise. On

When giants vie 127 the one hand, China’s divide-and-rule tactics have weakened ASEAN’s ability to adopt a firm corporate position on the SCS – an ultimately self-defeating strategy in the long run in the view of some, since ASEAN’s success has in fact facilitated China’s peaceful rise (Mahbubani 2016). On the other hand, although ASEAN states have generally supported the US rebalance (Lieberthal 2011), that support has also complicated their ties with China and indirectly affected ASEAN’s effectiveness as a regional organization (Tan 2016b: 20). From an institutional balancing perspective, the future of East Asian multilateralism may well depend on whether ASEAN can help facilitate a return by China and the US to associational balancing. If, as suggested above, East Asian powers balanced each other in ways that undermined neither the EAMA nor ASEAN centrality during the first two decades of the post-Cold War period because of US unipolarity, then the prospect for associational balancing in a time of growing power parity between China and the US – at least where the balance of influence between them in East Asia is concerned – might seem dim. That said, strategic thinkers who hold the view that the US cannot not share power with China (and others like India and Japan) in a time of power transitions clearly assume that collaboration between rival great powers is not only possible but essential to ensuring a stable balance of power in East Asia (White 2013). Exactly what sort of modus vivendi China and the US would eventually strike and when and how they and other big powers would achieve that remain unclear. If ASEAN seeks to stay relevant in the regional affairs of East Asia, it needs to ensure it is a part of that conversation, where its net worth could well be measured in terms of whether it can help steer Sino-US relations back to an even keel.

Notes 1 At the CICIR Forum in Beijing in October 2016, the leading Chinese academic and public intellectual Wang Jisi speculated in his presentation that Premier Li Keqiang’s involvement – in place of President Xi Jinping – at the 2016 EAS Vientiane in September 2016 was designed to fend off efforts by the others to “securitize” the EAS. Wang’s rationale was that by sending its premier as its representative, whose remit is essentially economics, in place of its president, China was effectively “delegitimizing” the EAS as a security forum – ironically, the very thing China was seeking to do when it assumed back in 2005 that the proposed EAS would constitute the final form, and comprise only the 13 members of the APT (He 2008b: 44). 2 One observer has described of the abundant pyrotechnics at the 2010 ARF: “Yang [Jiechi] stared down the foreign minister of Singapore, a country known in the region as one of America’s staunchest friends. The Singaporean foreign minister, a normally placid man named George Yeo, stared right back” (cited in Kurlantzick 2011).

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130 See Seng Tan Katsumata, H. 2009. ASEAN’s Cooperative Security Enterprise: Norms and Interests in the ASEAN Regional Forum. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Kausikan, B. 2016. Consensus, Centrality and Relevance: Asean and the South China Sea. The Straits Times, August 6. Retrieved at: http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/con sensus-centrality-and-relevance-asean-and-the-south-china-sea. Kazianis, H.J. 2015. Is America Still a Military Superpower? The National Interest, March 12. Retrieved at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-still-military-superp ower-12405. Khong, Y.F. 1997. Review Article: Making Bricks without Straw in the Asia-Pacific? The Pacific Review, 10(2): 289–300. Khong, Y.F. 2004. Coping with Strategic Uncertainty: The Role of Institutions and Soft Balancing in Southeast Asia’s Post-Cold War Strategy. In J.J. Suh, P.J. Katzenstein and A. Carlson, eds. Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 172–208. Kissinger, H. 2014. World Order. New York: Penguin. Kor, K.B. 2016. Xi Jinping Calls for Security Structure that “Suits Asia”. The Straits Times, April 29. Retrieved at: http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/xi-jinping-calls-forsecurity-structure-that-suits-asia. Kurlantzick, J. 2008. Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World. New York: New Republic Books. Kurlantzick, J. 2011. The Belligerents. New Republic, January 27. Retrieved at: https:// newrepublic.com/article/82211/china-foreign-policy Langdon, F. and B.L. Job. 1997. APEC Beyond Economics: The Politics of APEC. Working Paper 243. The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Notre Dame. Lee, S. 2012. The Evolutionary Dynamics of Institutional Balancing in East Asia. EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper. East Asia Institute, Seoul, February. Leifer, M. 1996. The ASEAN Regional Forum. Adelphi Paper 302. Oxford University Press for International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. Levin, N. 2015. China’s Xi Urges New Free-Trade Pact at APEC. The Wall Street Journal, November 18. Retrieved at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-leader-urges-newfree-trade-pact-at-apec-1447827988. Lieberthal, K. 2011. The American Pivot to Asia. Foreign Policy, December 21. Retrieved at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/12/21/the-american-pivot-to-asia/. Liow, J.C. 2017. Trump’s Asia Policy, 2 Months On. The Straits Times, March 2. Retrieved at: http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/trumps-asia-policy-2-months-on. Liow, J.C., R. Emmers and S.S. Tan. 2011. The East Asia Summit and the Regional Security Architecture. Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, 3–2010(202). University of Maryland School of Law, Baltimore. Lipsey, P.Y. 2003. Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund Proposal. Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs, 3(1): 93–104. Little, R. 1989. Deconstructing the Balance of Power: Two Traditions of Thought. Review of International Studies, 15(2): 87–100. Little, R. 2007. The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and Models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Liu, A. 2013. China Weighty Factor in US Pivot Policy. Global Times, March 4. Retrieved at: http://www.globaltimes.cn/con tent/765683.shtml. Mahbubani, K. 2016. ASEAN Still the Critical Catalyst for China’s Future. East Asia Forum, November 29. Retrieved at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/11/29/asea n-still-the-critical-catalyst-for-chinas-future/.

When giants vie 131 Mastanduno, M. 2008. After Bush: A Return to Multilateralism in U. S. Foreign Policy? Nanzan Review of American Studies, 30: 33–46. Mearsheimer, J.J. 1994/1995. The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security, 19(3): 5–49. Mearsheimer, J.J. 2010. The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia. Chinese Journal of International Politics, 3(4): 381–396. Micklethwait, J. 2014. As the World Turns: Henry Kissinger’s “World Order”. The New York Times, September 11. Retrieved at: https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/ books/review/henry-kissingers-world-order.html. Mooney, P. and L. Wroughton. 2014. U.S. Call for South China Sea “Freeze” Gets Cool Response from China. Reuters, August 9. Retrieved at: http://www.reuters.com/a rticle/us-asean-southchinasea-idUSKBN0G904O20140809. Navarro, P. 2016. The Trump Doctrine: Peace Through Strength. The National Interest, March 31. Retrieved at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-trump-doctrine-pea ce-through-strength-15631. Nesadurai, H. 2006. APEC: A Tool for US Regional Domination? The Pacific Review, 9(1): 31–57. Newsham, G. 2017. America Just Sent its Most Powerful Weapon to the South China Sea (and it Might Be Pointless). The National Interest, March 2. Retrieved at: http://na tionalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/america-just-sent-its-most-powerful-weapon-the-southchina-19642. Pang, Z. 1999. Globalization and China: China’s Response to the Asian Financial Crisis. Asian Perspective, 23(1): 111–131. Paul, T.V. 2005. Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy. International Security, 30(1): 46–71. Pomfret, J. 2010. U.S. Takes a Tougher Tone with China. The Washington Post, July 30. Retrieved at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/ 29/AR2010072906416.html. Rich, M. 2017. Rex Tillerson, in Japan, Says U.S. Needs “Different Approach” to North Korea. The New York Times, March 16. Retrieved at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/ 03/16/world/asia/rex-tillerson-asia-trump-us-japan.html?_r=0. Ryu, Y. 2013. ASEAN’s Middle Power Diplomacy toward China. EAI Issue Briefing MPDI2013-2. East Asia Institute, Seoul, October 10. Sarith, H. 2013. ASEAN: Between China and America. East Asia Forum, July 17. Retrieved at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/07/12/asean-between-china -and-america/. Shambaugh, D. 2004/2005. China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order. International Security, 29(3): 64–99. Sim, W. 2016. China Sought to Divide Asean with its Own 10-Point Consensus at Foreign Minister Meet: Source. The Straits Times, June 15. Retrieved at: http://www.straitstim es.com/asia/east-asia/china-sought-to-divide-asean-with-its-own-10-point-consensus-atforeign-minister-meet. Sirila, A. 2010. Clinton: “Renewed American Leadership in Asia”. Asia Matters for America, November 4. Retrieved at: http://asiamattersforamerica.org/asia/clinton-renewedamerican-leadership-in-asia. Soeya, Y. 2013. Prospects for Japan as a Middle Power. East Asia Forum, July 29. Retrieved at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/07/29/prospects-for-japan-as-a -middle-power/.

132 See Seng Tan Stubbs, R. 2014. ASEAN’s Leadership in East Asian Region-Building: Strength in Weakness. The Pacific Review, 27(4): 523–541. Tan, S.S. ed. 2009. Regionalism in Asia, Vol. III: Regional Order and Architecture in Asia. Abingdon: Routledge. Tan, S.S. 2012. Spectres of Leifer: Insights on Regional Order and Security for Southeast Asia Today. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 34(3): 309–337. Tan, S.S. 2013a. Facilitating China-U.S. Relations in the Age of Rebalancing: ASEAN’s “Middle Power” Diplomacy. EAI MPD Working Paper 1. East Asia Institute, Seoul, October. Tan, S.S. 2013b. The Making of the Asia Pacific: Knowledge Brokers and the Politics of Representation. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Tan, S.S. 2015a. Multilateral Asian Security Architecture: Non-ASEAN Stakeholders. Abingdon: Routledge. Tan, S.S. 2015b. Claims of Asean Disunity at Summit Unfounded. The Straits Times, November 22. Retrieved at: http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/claims-of-asean-dis unity-at-summit-unfounded. Tan, S.S. 2016a. The ADMM-Plus: Regionalism That Works? Asia Policy, 22(1): 70–75. Tan, S.S. 2016b. Facilitating the US Rebalance: Challenges and Prospects for Singapore as America’s Security Partner. Security Challenges, 12(3): 20–33. Tan, S.S. 2017. Rethinking “ASEAN Centrality” in the Regional Governance of East Asia. Singapore Economic Review, June, 62(3): 721–740. Tan, S.S. and R.A. Cossa. 2001. Rescuing Realism from the Realists: A Theoretical Note on East Asian Security. In S.W. Simon, ed. The Many Faces of Asian Security. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 15–34. Tang, S.M. 2016. Six Takeaways from Asean Summits. The Straits Times, September 15. Retrieved at: http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/six-takeaways-from-asean-summits. Thayer, C.A. 2009. Kevin Rudd’s Multi-Layered Asia Pacific Community Initiative. East Asia Forum, June 22. Retrieved at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/06/22/ kevin-rudds-multi-layered-asia-pacific-community-initiative/. The Straits Times. 2014. Southeast Asia Ministers Didn’t Discuss US Plan on Sea Claims, Diplomat Says. August 9. Retrieved at: http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/ southeast-asia-ministers-didnt-discuss-us-plan-on-sea-claims-diplomat-says. Thim, M. 2016. China’s “Divide and Rule” Attitude in Southeast Asia is Good for no One, Including Itself. South China Morning Post, August 8. Retrieved at: http://www.scmp.com/ comment/insight-opinion/article/2000792/chinas-divide-and-rule-attitude-southeast-asiagood-no-one. Viet Nam News. 2016. ASEAN Key to Balance China–US Rivalry. March 11. Retrieved at: http://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/293558/asean-key-to-balance-china-us-rivalry. html#fldjSwQ5aCOSpm2K.97. Walt, S.M. 2005. Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy. New York: W.W. Norton. Wanandi, J. 1996. ASEAN’s China Strategy: Towards Deeper Engagement. Survival, 38(2): 17–128. Wang, H. and E. French. 2013. China’s Participation in Global Governance from a Comparative Perspective. Asia Policy, 15(1): 89–114. White, H. 2013. The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wu, G. 2008. Multiple Levels of Multilateralism: The Rising China in the Turbulent World. In G. Wu and H. Landsdowne, eds. China Turns to Multilateralism: Foreign Policy and Regional Security. Abingdon: Routledge, 267–289.

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9

East Asia’s institutional inadequacies and great power rivalry in the South China Sea Mark Beeson

East Asia is famous for many things. The longevity of Chinese civilization, for example, is unsurpassed. Likewise, the region’s economic development in the period since World War II is unparalleled in its speed and extent. More ominously, the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam were also unmatched in their intensity and impact during the same period. What has attracted less attention, by comparison, has been the role of the region’s distinctive institutions. With the possible exception of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), East Asia’s institutions have had relatively little real impact, either amongst the scholarly and policy making communities or – more importantly – on the actions of their member states (Beeson 2009a). To be sure, there has been a good deal of color and movement as one institutional initiative or another has taken flight, but there has been a notable difference between rhetoric and reality when it comes to actually making a tangible impact on regional political and even economic outcomes. The modest impact of the region’s institutional architecture is even more striking in the context of what is currently East Asia’s most pressing regional concern: trying to ensure strategic stability. Whatever the discursive and ontological status of the much discussed “rise of China” may be (Zhang 2010), there is no doubt that China’s remarkable economic transformation and its increasingly assertive foreign policy profile have had a profound impact on the region, its stability, and some of the optimistic – not to say complacent – assumptions regional policy makers made about its consequences (Walt 2013). Such expectations were encouraged by China’s so-called “charm offensive” that seemed to herald a new era of regional politics in which China would play an entirely positive role (Kurlantzick 2007). Now, however, things look rather different, and the dominant discourse, especially in the US, is characterized by uncertainty, insecurity and worries about the very real possibility of outright conflict (Blackwill and Tellis 2015). What might be described as the region’s changing ideational temperament is of interest for two, deeply interconnected, reasons. First, much attention has been given to the purported ability of regional institutions generally – and to ASEAN in particular – to influence to behavior of states by promoting norms and ideas that not only encourage cooperative behavior, but which also help to cement ASEAN’s place as a source of regional leadership (Acharya 2009; Stubbs 2014). Second, such claims are currently being put to a searching examination as China seeks to

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assert itself and – equally significantly – the United States seeks to respond to this very real challenge to its hitherto dominant, not to say, “hegemonic” position (Beeson 2009b). The election of Donald Trump as the 45th President of the United States has made the outcome of this contest much less certain, but the key question remains whether East Asia’s institutions are capable of managing great power contestation at a time of mounting tension. As the title of this chapter implies, in my view the answer to this question is no. To understand why we need to initially trace the development of East Asia’s institutional architecture before considering how this may have had a debilitating effect on its capacity to influence the behavior of great powers from within and outside the region.

The evolution of East Asia’s institutional architecture Regional institutional architecture has become a familiar and seemingly functionally necessary part of regional politics (van Langenhove 2010); or it did until the European Union (EU) was swamped by a series of economic, political, and social crises, at least. Even now though, the EU in its heyday represents something of a benchmark against which to measure other regional architectures and trajectories (Manners 2002). At the outset, however, we need to be conscious of the fact that, just as the EU represented a model to emulate for at least some regional elites when it was associated with economic prosperity and strategic stability, there is every chance that it will come to be seen as a model to avoid when it is associated with crisis and dysfunction (Beeson and Stone 2013). Indeed, for policy makers and commentators who never wished to replicate the EU experience and its sovereignty-pooling logic, the problems the EU is currently experiencing are not altogether unwelcome (Mahbubani 2012). Schadenfreude is one European export that has been enthusiastically embraced in some parts of Asia. The logic underpinning the European project – that effective cooperation and the provision of collective goods requires hitherto unprecedented levels of political cooperation and integration – has been stoutly resisted in Asia (Jones and Smith 2007). On the contrary, if there is one defining feature of Asia’s myriad forms of domestic political governance, it is that sovereignty is sacrosanct. Any infringement on national sovereignty is fiercely resisted and even resented, as the regional response to the “Asian economic crisis” of the late 1990s reminds us (Higgott 1998). If we want to understand why East Asia in particular is so suspicious of EU-style cooperation, though, we need to look at the region’s history generally and at the formation and operation of ASEAN in particular. ASEAN: the geopolitics of consensus In 1967 when ASEAN was inaugurated, the Vietnam War was in full swing and there were genuine, albeit exaggerated, fears that communist expansion would sweep all before it (Narine 2002). It was against this threatening geopolitical backdrop of superpower confrontation and escalating strategic tension that ASEAN emerged. From the outset it was predicated upon necessary compromises

136 Mark Beeson between members with relatively little in common, some of whom – like Indonesia and Malaysia – had actually been engaged in outright conflict before ASEAN was established. Forbidding as the external strategic environment undoubtedly was, it is also important to remember that Southeast Asia’s well-known and undiminished preoccupation with internal security was an equally important incentive for regional cooperation. After all, the states of the region were (with the exception of Thailand) relatively newly independent and political stabilization and economic development were the primary concerns of the region’s neophyte rulers. The establishment of ASEAN promised to help resolve intra-regional tensions while giving the insecure states of Southeast Asia a higher profile and presence in a wider region of which it was a hitherto subordinate part (Beeson 2009a). Perhaps the most significant innovation to come out of ASEAN was its distinctive diplomatic modus operandi. The “ASEAN Way” of consensus, voluntarism, and consultation has, for better or worse, become the default form of interaction at the intergovernmental level in ASEAN itself and the other regional initiatives that eventually followed in its wake (Haacke 2003). Indeed, the price of gaining ASEAN’s participation in other regional initiatives was an explicit recognition of the sort of “cultural sensitivities” that made ASEAN’s leaders allergic to the sort of legalism preferred by Western states such as the US and Australia (Kahler 2000). Such acquiescence would, as we shall see, undermine the effectiveness of other organizations as it had with ASEAN itself, and helps to account for the notorious ineffectiveness and impact of regional bodies in the Asia-Pacific. There is an important but inconclusive debate between those scholars that believe that ASEAN has exerted a surprisingly powerful normative and ideational influence (Acharya 2004; Stubbs 2014), and those who regard it – whether by accident or design – as ineffective (Jones and Smith 2007; Ravenhill 2009). What we can say is that ASEAN was both a product and a beneficiary of specific geopolitical conditions: its members were initially galvanized by a struggle for survival in unpropitious circumstances. Once established, however, the organization has been able to exploit differences and tensions between more powerful states that we might otherwise have expected to play a more dominant role. Even now, when relations between Japan and China are characterized by growing acrimony and a contest for regional influence, ASEAN has the potential to play a leadership role because of the absence of alternatives (Stubbs 2014). Whether it will be able to take advantage of being “in the driving seat” as its admirers claim, is quite another question. Nevertheless, its history and influence have implications for other regional organizations. The principal contemporary significance of ASEAN and its distinctive style of diplomacy has been its impact on subsequent regional institutional developments. Potentially important initiatives such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) grouping and the East Asia Summit (EAS) have failed to fulfill the hopes of their creators because of the perceived need to adhere to the ASEAN Way. APEC has also suffered from a lack of coherence, capacity, and mandate (Bisley 2012), while the APT has been undermined by regional rivalries, despite – or because of, perhaps – the enthusiastic

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support of China. Rivalries and tensions between China and Japan in particular are making the possibility of a coherent East Asian region increasingly remote (Park 2013). The impact of such on the APT has been even more pronounced as it has become increasingly marginalized as regional states “hedge” against the possibility of Chinese dominance (Medeiros 2005). In short, geopolitical constraints and tensions have once again worked to thwart the development of a particular regional identity and institution. In the case of the EAS, this looked like an initiative that was actually being driven by and benefiting from the sort of underlying geopolitical tensions that seemed to have fatally undermined the APT. A number of events – all of which are essentially geopolitical, rather than functional – have given the EAS a prominence that is both unexpected and unjustified, to judge by its actual impact, at least. The key development in this context, as in so many other areas of recent intra and inter-regional relations, has been the “rise of China”. Not only has China become the lynchpin of East Asia’s increasingly integrated production networks (Henderson and Nadvi 2011), but it has also become a much more significant strategic player and concomitant source of unease among its neighbors, as we have seen. More significantly, China’s rise is also a growing source of concern for the US and it is this that has suddenly raised the profile of the EAS (Kim 2010). The EAS was unquestionably in the right place at the right time and offered a ready-made form of institutional engagement for the US as it “rebalanced” to the region (Beeson 2016). But even before the election of Donald Trump, there were major doubts about the impact of the EAS. The expansion of the grouping – a process with which China seems entirely comfortable – looks set to undermine the EAS in precisely the same way that APEC’s continued growth did. At least APEC initially had a more or less coherent agenda, even if it was one many of its members had little interest in. The EAS, by contrast, would seem to have little real purpose or rationale other than providing a vehicle for states such as the US, India, and Australia to engage with East Asia and potentially “contain” China’s rise. Given that the EAS does little other than meet, this looks like a triumph of hope over experience. Indeed, it is precisely the lack of impact of existing regional institutions that has underpinned the development of yet more initiatives and proposals about how “the region” might be conceived and the purposes to which such conceptions could be put. The ARF and the absence of ASEAN leadership The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is emblematic of all that is wrong with East Asian institutions. Established in 1994, the ARF would seem to be an organization that is unambiguously in the right place, at the right time, with the right membership. The ARF contains all of East Asia’s most significant strategic actors such as China, Japan, and both Koreas. Equally importantly, the more expansive sense of region embodied by the ARF also includes extra-regional great powers such as the US, Russia, India, and even the EU. The only noteworthy absence is Taiwan, omitted in deference to the PRC’s sensitivities about its unresolved status and the

138 Mark Beeson fact that mainland China’s leaders regard it as a domestic problem. Nevertheless, in theory the ARF looks well placed to address many of the problems that threaten to destabilize regional security. In reality, however, the ARF suffers from many of the same sorts of problems that have plagued ASEAN itself (Emmers and Tan 2011). Not only are there the usual sensitivities about possible infringements of sovereignty to contend with, but the influence of the ASEAN Way means that there is little appetite to deal with complex problems such as the territorial disputes that threaten to plunge some parts of the East Asian region into outright conflict. To ensure that as many regional powers as possible participate it is necessary to resort to the default ASEAN option: setting the bar of expectations and obligations low enough so that no member feels discomfited when trying to get over it. Without such compromises it is entirely possible that a state such as China might not cooperate or even participate. The widespread idea that China’s policy elites will be “socialized” into more cooperative patterns of behavior consequently looks questionable at best (Johnston 2003). On the contrary, the empirical record seems to suggest that the PRC’s diplomats are entirely comfortable with ASEAN style diplomacy and the limited obligations it entails (Beeson and Li 2014). The different attitudes held by many Asian elites about the value, role, and content of institutionalized forms of multilateral cooperation means that there is a potentially insurmountable division between the ARF’s Asian and Western members (Kahler 2000). For countries such as the US with a strong preference for legally binding agreements – when it suits them to do so, at least – this undermines the value of organizations such as the ARF that seem incapable of addressing, much less resolving, long-standing regional flashpoints. More importantly in the longer term, perhaps, the inability to cajole Asian states into behaving in ways it would like highlights the possible limits to American influence and the general decline of its hegemonic position (Schweller and Pu 2011). This is what makes China’s increasingly assertive foreign policies so important when trying to understand the way that multilateral processes might evolve in East Asia, and why it is difficult to have confidence about their impact. China’s actions would be consequential under any circumstances, but in the absence of a coherent position on the part of ASEAN they will be even more influential. China’s actions have already demonstrated the threadbare nature of claims about ASEAN solidarity, let alone leadership. ASEAN is not entirely to blame for this rather predictable outcome, however. On the contrary, China has employed an especially effective divide-and-rule strategy, which has entirely undermined ASEAN’s ability to act in unison. By pouring aid and investment into mainland Southeast Asian states such as Laos and especially Cambodia (Kynge, Haddou and Peel 2016), China has ensured that friendly voices are heard within ASEAN’s internal debates. China’s potential influence has been enhanced more recently by the rise of Southeast Asian leaders who are either unpredictably authoritarian, such as Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines, or personally compromised, like Malaysia’s Najib Razak. Both Duterte and Najib have recently paid their respects to Xi Jinping, effectively reinforcing China’s influence and

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significantly reducing criticism of its policies toward the South China Sea disputes (Browne 2016a; Chin 2016). Such developments are a manifestation of how rapidly the diplomatic and geopolitical landscapes of East Asia were changing – even before the largely unexpected election of Donald Trump. Trump’s pledge to tear up key parts of America’s painfully negotiated diplomatic and economic presence in the region, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), as well as his threat to overturn the basis of the region’s bilateral security architecture, presents profound challenges for even the most reliable and uncritical alliance partners, such as Australia (Sanger and Yardley 2016). The reality is that a Trump presidency throws into doubt many of the most cherished beliefs about the regional balance of power and the possible role of organizations such as ASEAN and the ARF. In this highly fluid and unpredictable context, it becomes even more important to examine the options open to some of the region’s smaller states and the possible strategies that may be pursued by them as individual or collective actors.

East Asia’s institutions in practice – and theory East Asia’s institutional architecture may be comparatively thin and rather ineffective, but this has not stopped its admirers and members from making major claims about its potential efficacy and impact (Mahbubani 2008; Jetschke 2009). One of the most important arguments in this context is that institutions are capable of producing a process of “socialization” amongst participants: simply by taking part in regional institutions the thinking and behavior of participating elites will be changed as a consequence. This is major claim and – if true – a rather optimisminducing one; or it is if the norms, values, and rules of “international society” are judged to be appropriate and likely to induce cooperative regional relations, at least (Hurrell 2007). The ascendancy of Donald Trump ensures that such notions are about to be put to a searching examination. Indeed, it is unclear whether the new Trump administration, let alone China, will be socialized into the ways of Western diplomacy. There are, however, a number of comparative theoretical and policy-oriented points that can be made about such claims at the outset. First, many scholars of a constructivist bent interested in the role of ideas and norms tend to assume that where normative diffusion actually occurs this is likely to be a positive, not to say “progressive” development (Finnemore 1996; Legro 2005). The possibility that illiberal ideas and reactionary norms might be promoted is only rarely considered (Zarakol 2010). Yet this is an especially important potential failing given East Asia’s continuing historical association with authoritarian forms of government (Gilley 2014), and a general resurgence of nationalist powers internationally (The Economist 2016). Indeed, the rise of non-democratic, authoritarian China ought to have given pause to some of the more sweeping claims about the positive impact of normative change – even without the very energetic and broadly based campaign to control dissent and criticism that is currently underway in China (Phillips and Pilkington 2016).

140 Mark Beeson Second, the extent, impact, and direction of the socialization process is far less clear than some claim. While there plainly have been major changes in Chinese foreign policy and the behavior of its diplomats over the last 30 years or so, it is much less clear what impact this may have had within China or even over the content of foreign policy making. A number of recent studies have illustrated the complex nature of China’s foreign policy making process and the relatively uninfluential role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs within policy debates (ICG 2012; Jakobson and Knox 2010). In other words, even if China’s professional diplomats are convinced about the need to behave appropriately, it is not obvious that they can translate such a transformed sensibility into actual policy practice. On the contrary, a rising tide of nationalism – fuelled in part by the increasingly powerful figure of Xi Jinping – reminds us both of the limited impact of the socialization process and the possibility that domestic forces and considerations may outweigh external ones (Browne 2016b). The third point to consider, therefore, is whether the socialization process is not unidirectional but may, in fact, be encouraging the adoption of non-liberal and/or non-“Western” norms and ideas. There are ample grounds for considering this as a real possibility, too, especially in the context of a rising China. Many observers and regional policy makers are conscious of the impact of ideas about economic development and political order emerging from China. This general pattern has been captured in the debate about the so-called “Beijing consensus” and the unhappiness with an extant institutional architecture seen to be dominated by the US in particular and the West more generally. Indeed, for many analysts China’s possible policy influence is an entirely welcome and appropriate development as its ideas about the role of the state and political representation become more prominent (Halper 2010; Bell 2015). Crucially, China has the economic firepower and leverage to give institutional expression to an alternative set of ideas about economic and political governance (Blackwill and Harris 2016; Norris 2016). The creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), for example, has attracted so much attention because it offers an important practical and ideational alternative to the established international financial institutions over which China exerts much less influence (Beeson and Li 2016). Institutional balancing A number of important and innovative ways of thinking about the theoretical and policy implications of China’s rise and the persistence of geopolitical competition have emerged of late. Many scholars have drawn attention to the growing incidence of strategic “hedging”, as the relatively weak Southeast Asian states seek to position themselves favorably in the aftermath of wrenching economic crisis and an enduring strategic stand-off between the US and China (Rüland 2011). The key point for observers such as Kuik (2016: 502) is that a hedging strategy “exhibits elements of both power-acceptance (manifest in some forms of selective partnership, collaboration and even deference vis-à-vis a power) and power-rejection (some signs of selective resistance and defiance vis-à-vis the same power)”.

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However, it is, as we have seen, far from clear whether ASEAN states in particular have the freedom of maneuver individually or collectively that these sorts of analyses often imply. Before considering recent empirical evidence, however, it is useful to consider a variant of the conventional hedging literature that speaks directly to the role of institutions in the East Asian region. One of the more important contributions to this debate has been provided by Kai He (2008: 495), who argues that institutional balancing is driven by the inter-play between the distribution of power in the system and [that] the economic interdependence among states determines state behavior, either hard power balancing or soft institutional balancing. The core causal mechanism in the model is a rationality criterion in the form of cost–benefit calculations as well as expectations of states in making policy decisions. The stronger the decision-makers’ perceptions of interdependence, the more risky and costly for states to pursue military balancing, thus the more likely states will engage in institutional balancing. Like those observers who suggest that the idea of strategic hedging best describes the behavior of weaker states, He assumes that states – in particular the ASEAN states – have the capacity and the will to coolly calculate their respective “national interests” and make optimal policy decisions as a consequence. In this context, the extant institutional architecture provides an important potential mechanism within which individual and even collective interests can be pursued. It is precisely this possibility that leads He (2008: 504–505) to claim that the major achievement of the ARF lies in its inclusive balancing strategy towards China in terms of constraining China’s assertiveness over the South China Sea. Contrary to military balancing, ASEAN engaged China with a multilateral security dialogue and used institutional norms and rules to constrain China’s behavior … China has changed its strong attitude on the South China Sea to a benign and cooperative policy since it joined the ARF. Again, we have to acknowledge that China’s foreign policies generally and its activities in the South China Sea in particular have changed rather dramatically of late, but these sorts of analyses looked rather panglossian even at the height of the so-called “charm offensive”. In reality, it is difficult to find examples of great power behavior being significantly changed when it did not suit them to be so, or when what were perceived as viral national interests and/or autonomy were at stake. China’s recent behavior demonstrates this possibility with vivid clarity. The prospects for achieving this sort of normative or institutional leverage look even more remote in the aftermath of Trump’s election victory. Trump’s policies and his apparent unwillingness to provide assurances about American policy mean that China is likely to play an even more prominent role. Indeed, China’s promise to champion free trade and climate change mitigation signals a potentially remarkable shift in the roles played by the great powers in the region and may even mark the

142 Mark Beeson start of a genuine “hegemonic transition” (Lyons, Magnier and Maudlin 2016; Beeson 2009b) Making sense of a changing China The remarkable changes that have occurred in China’s foreign policy of late are not surprising or disconcerting for all observers. On the contrary, realists have long argued that China ought to be asserting itself and seeking to challenge the hitherto, dominant, if not “unipolar” position of the US, because that is what rising powers have always done (Mearsheimer 2010). According to some of the most influential readings of great power behavior, material transformations in the structure, and associated redistributions of power in the international system inevitably cause instability as revisionist powers seek to assert themselves (Gilpin 1981). For realists, the only surprise has been that it has taken so long for things to return to “normal”; China’s “charm offensive” and self-restraint was the historical aberration, not its recent self-assertion. The current debate about the so-called “Thucydides trap” is but the latest iteration of a timeless struggle for survival in an anarchical, self-help system, according to realists (see Allison 2015). It is not necessary to accept every claim made by realists about the inevitability of war, or even about the nature of the contemporary international system to recognize that they have a point. Plainly, China is fulfilling many of the expectations that realists have about great powers and the sorts of foreign policy goals they develop as a consequence of their material position and “struggle for status” (Deng 2008). It is striking that both the US and China believe that they are “exceptional” and have a unique historical destiny and significance as a consequence (Zhang 2013). No doubt many countries labor under such illusions: the reason we give China’s and the US’ claims more attention is simply because their material power and standing makes them matter more to the international system than any other state. In this context there are some well-known aspects of China’s history that help to explain current policy shifts and which may make them especially resistant to the influence of external powers and institutions. The so-called “one hundred years of humiliation”, during which China was transformed and dismembered by the predations of the European and – most gallingly – Japanese imperialism remains the defining event in recent Chinese history (Callahan 2010). Restoring what many Chinese policy makers and the wider population see as its rightful place at the centre of regional, if not global affairs, remains a key goal. Significantly, it is an objective that receives active support on China’s increasingly pervasive and influential social media (Stockmann and Gallagher 2011; Lewis 2013). The point to emphasize here is that we cannot assume that social media or even civil society in China will play the sort of progressive, politically emancipatory role that they may have done in the West’s development of capitalism and liberal democracy. The other point to emphasize about China’s reversion to geopolitical business as usual is that it makes a difference who is in charge of China. Even though most realists are notorious for ignoring or downplaying the significance of domestic

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factors like politics, culture, and leadership, in the case of very recent Chinese history it has clearly made a difference. Not only is Xi Jinping very different from the bland technocrats of the Jiang–Hu periods, but the country over which he has assumed an increasing influence is much more powerful, too (Economy 2014; Lampton 2014). In other words, China is currently an unambiguously great power led by someone that is keen to restore it to its former position at the centre of regional affairs. Even though the territorial disputes that are at the centre of regional tensions predate Xi’s ascent to power, it is no surprise that they have assumed such prominence on his watch: they are a measure of his effectiveness as a leader and a potential source of legitimacy and validation for a political system and Party that lacks any other (Zhu 2011). Restraining China The East Asian region is currently preoccupied by growing regional tensions that appear to be getting worse and potentially undermining many of the claims about the so-called “long peace of Asia” (Kivimäki 2014). Even if we put to one side the question of whether there actually is anything remarkable or sui generis about Asia’s stability – interstate war has been in remarkable and precipitate decline everywhere, after all (Pinker 2012) – current events are putting the thesis about the pacifying effect of Asian institutions and norms to an especially searching examination. Indeed, at the level of interstate (rather than intrastate) conflict, East Asia looks more prone to an outbreak of old fashioned interstate conflict than just about anywhere else on the planet at the moment (Wong and Lubold 2016). There are two principal arenas in which conflict has become increasingly possible and both of them involve China. China has a continuing dispute with its arch rival and sometime foe Japan over the Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands, which shows no sign of easy resolution and which is the site of increasingly dangerous interactions by the military forces of both sides (Clover 2016). Whatever the relative merits of both protagonists’ claims to the islands may be, it is important to note that the most recent escalation of tensions had Japanese origins when the Japanese government took formal control over islands that had formerly been in private Japanese hands. In other words, inflammatory nationalist sentiment is not something that is confined to China (Hayashi 2014). On the contrary, there are powerful pro-nationalist movements in both countries that make it very difficult to negotiate a settlement to this dispute between old adversaries that are very concerned about the possibility of losing face in the eyes of increasingly vocal nationalist forces. Given the noteworthy paucity of institutional architecture in Northeast Asia it is perhaps not a good case study for the purposes of this discussion (Rozman 2004). After all, if institutions are generally conspicuous by their absence we would intuitively expect that it would be difficult to control intra-regional tensions. Southeast Asia, by contrast, presents a very different scenario. Not only is Southeast Asia famously the home of the region’s most enduring and supposedly influential institution, but as we have seen, ASEAN has spawned a series of related

144 Mark Beeson institutions some of which, such as the ARF and ADMM-Plus, are specifically designed to deal with regional security issues. If institutions are really capable of making a difference and influencing the behavior of the members in significant ways then we ought expect to see unambiguous evidence of this happening where the region’s institutional architecture is at its “thickest” and where some scholars claim that ASEAN’s influence is most tangible. Neither the historical nor, more importantly, the recent empirical record gives little cause for optimism about the capacity of ASEAN-inspired institutions to make a decisive difference to great power behavior, however. The most celebrated example of ASEAN being in the proverbial driving seat – the resolution of the Cambodian crisis during the 1980s – came about largely because ASEAN’s interests and goals happened to coincide with those of the major external actors involved in that conflict too: the United States and China (Beeson 2009a). Indeed, there are noteworthy parallels with the contemporary situation in which relations between a now risen China and the world’s only remaining superpower continue to demarcate the limits of ASEAN’s influence. What makes the contemporary situation even more challenging for ASEAN, and by implication, illustrative of its limited institutional influence, is China’s skillful exploitation of ASEAN’s own lack of solidarity and common cause. Not only is China now an even more consequential regional actor than it was during the Cambodian crisis, but it has shown little sign of subscribing to the ASEAN vision of regional cooperation. In part this can be attributed to the rather bland and imprecise nature of ASEAN’s “vision” for the region, which like most ASEAN documents tends to be long on lofty rhetoric and short on specific policies that would make a decisive difference to its own members, let alone the actions of a great power such as China (Jones 2008). The main reason ASEAN has proved such an ineffective and inconsequential brake on China’s actions, though, has been because of underlying, structurally embedded differences of interest and position between some of ASEAN’s members themselves. The real test of influence and capacity, of course, is at times of tension. In this regard, China is effectively presenting ASEAN diplomacy with an unwanted stress test that it appears to be conspicuously failing. Underlying potential differences that can be glossed over or ignored during times of relative economic, political, and strategic stability, are thrown into sharp relief at times of crisis. The gulf between ASEAN’s mainland and maritime states that always lurked in the background, has been thrown into sharp relief by recent events. China’s massively increased economic presence in the region has not only made it vastly more important to the ASEAN economies, but as we have seen, China also has the wherewithal to buy influence amongst the ASEAN states themselves (Beeson 2015). At the most recent meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers hosted by China, the initial concluding statement had to be hastily withdrawn as some members were loath to irritate their hosts (Thayer 2016). It is not hard to see why. Cambodia and Laos in particular have succumbed to the second iteration of China’s carefully calibrated charm offensive. ASEAN’s famed solidarity and unity has become increasingly fractured as a consequence (Kundu 2016).

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However, it is not simply China’s rather effective, time-honored policy of divide and rule that presents such a fundamental challenge to ASEAN and the idea that smaller powers can influence or socialize great powers into patterns of behavior that they might not adopt otherwise. On the contrary, China’s recent, long foreshadowed decision to reject the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on its territorial claims in the South China Sea is an unambiguous rejection of both the importance of the international rule of law and of the possibility that its policy makers have been socialized into entirely new modes of behavior and thinking (Phillips and Pilkington 2016). The rules-based international order that is given such rhetorical prominence in ASEAN’s declaratory statements is given little weight or significance by China – unless it suits its national interests to do so, of course. Even more ominously, perhaps, there are few signs that the Trump administration is likely to pursue anything other than a very narrowly conceived, entirely instrumental notion of the national interest that may not even pay lip service to international law, let alone unenforceable norms (Parry 2016). It is important to recognize, therefore, that China is far from unique. On the contrary, great powers have traditionally chosen when and/or if they will follow international rules or norms. The United States remains the quintessential exemplar of a powerful state that has only subscribed to international rules when they are of its own making, or when they align with its perceived national interests. The US’ long-standing unwillingness to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and – even more significantly for the purposes of this discussion – its refusal to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), are telling examples of a great power rejecting the norms of international society (Page 2016). Despite the claims made by prominent American liberal scholars (Ikenberry 1998), the US has refused to be bound by institutions – even those of its own creation – when it considers this to be against its national interests. Put differently, great powers refuse to be constrained when it suits them not to be, simply because they can. Consequently, they have an entirely different view of, and approach to, international institutions, and one that is potentially at odds with the interests and ideas of smaller states. As China’s former foreign minister, Yang Jiechi rather undiplomatically put it, “China is a big country and other countries are little countries, and that’s just a fact” (quoted in Yu 2016).

Conclusion Conflict between great powers in Asia is once again a real possibility. While neither the US nor China wants such an outcome, the chance that they may blunder into a catastrophic clash is far from unthinkable. The damage to the principal protagonists, not to mention the global economy and the smaller states of Southeast Asia would be potentially incalculable. The capacity of regional institutions to maintain stability and mitigate against such a possibility is clearly a question of the upmost importance. Unfortunately the historical record of East Asian and/or Asia-Pacific institutions does not inspire confidence. Whether it is primarily economic institutions like APEC, or security organizations such as the ARF, regional

146 Mark Beeson entities have had only a limited capacity to influence the behavior of their members. It is important to recognize that this outcome has not necessarily been unwelcome. On the contrary, from the inception of ASEAN onwards, regional organizations have been designed so that they would not have too much impact on their members or risk violating national sovereignty. While concerns about national autonomy may be understandable given the troubled history of the region, enduring rivalries and resentments, and a predilection toward authoritarianism that makes many states especially sensitive about external criticism and “interference” in domestic affairs, the long-term impact of such concerns is clear: East Asia lacks, and looks unlikely to develop, institutions that are actually capable of addressing regional crises, be they economic or – even more problematically – strategic. The idea that the increasingly fractured ASEAN grouping can make states such as China or the US behave in ways that they might not otherwise, looks implausible at best and like delusional wishful thinking at worst. China’s recent foreign policy generally and its response to the UN-backed ruling on its territorial claims in the South China Sea in particular vividly demonstrate the limits of its willingness to be socialized and influenced by international rules, much less norms. It is unlikely to come under great moral or normative pressure from the Trump administration to change its ways. Does this mean that the development of institutions in East Asia is a futile waste of time and that realist perspectives on regional relations have been vindicated? Not necessarily. What it may mean, however, is that if such institutions are to actually amount to anything other than political window dressing they may need a radical overhaul. One problem is that there are – paradoxically enough – far too many of them. Consequently, there is a good deal of competition for authority, duplication of roles, and general confusion about which body is responsible for any given issue. In part, this is an unfortunate accident, but it is also apparent that China is not unhappy about the expansion of the EAS, for example, as this makes it even less likely to have any impact. Fewer bodies with a clearer focus and an ability to make binding decisions that actually influence the behavior of members would be a significant step forward. It is one that is unlikely to be taken, however. There is still little enthusiasm for such an outcome in the region, and little pressure from the US to reform. Indeed, at a time when the EU is convulsed with seemingly insoluble problems, any appetite that there may have been for change and the development of powerful institutions in the region has likely evaporated. Realists may find such an outcome unsurprising and predictable. We must hope they are wrong about their other predictions about the inevitability of conflict. Unfortunately, a region without effective institutions makes such a possibility all the more likely.

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10 Security regionalism: a new form of strategic competition or cooperation between the United States and China in the South China Sea? Baogang He The recent increasing tensions in the South China Sea (SCS) run the risk of escalating into war and call for a new form of regional security governance or security regionalism as proposed by Bob Hawke, the former Prime Minister of Australia in 2016. While scholars have developed knowledge on why and how the United States and China are competing in the SCS, and how regional countries have responded to this strategic competition between the United States and China in the SCS (see all other chapters in this volume), we have limited understanding of the role and function of regional institutions in the dynamics of US–China competition in the SCS. The chapter contends that there are two competing views of the functions of regional institutions in the dynamics of US–China competition in the SCS. One is to offer conflict resolution, and the other is to intensify competition, thus furthering the conflict. Currently, the former is in the advocacy stage or at best in the early exploratory stage, while the latter predominates. This chapter examines the imperative, driving forces, and limits of Asian security regionalism, and in particular the complex relationship between the US-led alliance and regionalism as well as the conflictive relationship between the Chinese national approach and security regionalism. It also examines the contestations of security regionalism in Asia, presenting both the arguments for and/or against security regionalism. This chapter starts with an examination of various arguments for why Asia needs security regionalism in the SCS, but ends with a discussion on the obstacles facing the emergence of security regionalism. Throughout the chapter, critical realism grounds the discussion in real geopolitics with a critical eye. It raises an important question of security regionalism cooperation as a part of great power management between China and the United States and it offers a normative critique of the assumptions held by both Beijing and Washington. The structure of the chapter is as follows. The first section discusses the various arguments on how security regionalism can manage conflicts in the SCS and maintain peace in Asia. The second and third sections examine China’s regional approach to the SCS and its discontents followed by a discussion of the US alliance approach and its discontents in turn. The fourth section discusses the contestation between the United States and China in developing and engaging in a variety of regional security instruments, measures and institutions. The fifth section explains why security regionalism is only offering limited solutions to the SCS issue.

152 Baogang He

Proposals for security regionalism The idea of security regionalism refers to the establishment and development of a security community with its enforcement procedures and mechanisms. In the context of the SCS, the idea of security regionalism would include a security organization that is capable of managing conflicts in the SCS, or at least capping the military expenditure of each country to avoid an arms race in Asia. However, the idea of security regionalism is very much a preliminary one; it has not been developed or articulated in detail. Moreover, the idea of security regionalism itself is constantly contested. We therefore need to understand the diverse range of Asian approaches to security regionalism, their advantages and disadvantages, and their main characteristics and limits. Using mechanisms of security regionalism or regional security governance to manage conflicts between the United States and China in general, and to address the SCS dispute in particular, has been promoted in recent years. Specifically, in 2008 Kevin Rudd proposed the idea of an Asia-Pacific Community. This regional institution, according to Rudd, is able to “engage in the full spectrum of dialogue, cooperation and action on economic and political matters and future challenges related to security” (Rudd 2008). In particular, the APC proposal included the idea of a security community. Rudd argued that “Australia would welcome the evolution of the Six Party Talks into a wider regional body to discuss confidence and security building measures in North East Asia and beyond” (Rudd 2008).1 In comparative terms, while APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) is an economic cooperation organization, Rudd’s APC proposal involved a community with a strategic regional vision and a comprehensive organization covering all areas, including security cooperation. In 2011 Henry Kissinger proposed the development of a Pacific Community to manage and contain potential conflict between the United States and China. More precisely, Kissinger proposed a regional security arrangement in which the United States would need less from its allies so as to address the problem of a security dilemma (Kissinger 2011). In 2016, Amitav Acharya has argued strongly that it is critical to “go[ing] beyond its [the United States] traditional alliance or likeminded groups such as the G-7, the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) and TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership). Supporting and working through inclusive regional institutions, such as ASEAN and the African Union, will be critical to managing regional issues” (Acharya 2016). Guochong Xu and Baogang He detail the success of a multilateral institution in handling the Danube conflict and its implications for the management of the SCS dispute (Xu and He 2016: 123–8). Historically, the Danube River was a source of war. There was, on average, one war every 19 years between the 17th and 19th centuries, including ten major wars in Europe in the name of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Now it is a river of cooperation and prosperity. One decisive move, amongst many joint efforts from the UK, France, and many other European countries, was the “intervention” of the United States who proposed at the 1884 Berlin conference, and then at the 1945 Potsdam conference, that the

Security regionalism in the South China Sea 153 freedom of navigation in the Danube be guaranteed and an international organization be established to develop and impose rules and regulations on the use of the Danube river. In the wake of World War II, the presidents, senators, and statesmen of the United States all made very strong statements on the freedom of navigation, and in particular the American right to navigate in the Danube river (US Department of State 1947: 34, 68). The tone of these statements was as strong as, and at times much stronger than what Washington says today with regard to the SCS. While the Soviet Union strongly protested against the American “intervention”, under the leadership of the Soviet Union, multilateral regional governance on the Danube was eventually established, thus paving the way for the cooperative and prosperous Danube zone, and laying down a solid foundation for the development of the EU. The keys to the success of the Danube’s multilateral governance are the principles of shelving disputes and seeking common development, multinational participation and co-governance (Xu and He 2016). Given that five claimant states have different but overlapping maritime claims it is difficult to determine maritime boundaries in the SCS. Consequently, one option is to accept and facilitate the development of the idea of shared and overlapping maritime boundaries and a multilateral regional organization that is capable of developing and imposing the regional rules and regulations. Perhaps China together with ASEAN countries, could set up a supranational SCS Affairs Management Board. Bob Hawke proposed a Chinese-led regional multilateral organization to ease and manage the SCS dispute on October 11, 2016 at the 7th annual Xiangshan Forum. According to Hawke, the membership should include “other interested parties attending as well” (implying the United States), with the task to “explore options for developing a new multilateral maritime regime for the South China Sea”. One of the principles should be respect for freedom of navigation, and the result “could become a model for the kind of co-operative, constructive leadership that all hope that China will show in Asia” (Callick 2016: 6). Rather than proposing new regional institutions, other concrete steps toward the development of security regionalism include making the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) a binding agreement, and using ASEAN’s Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism (1996) to deal with several fishery and oil development disputes in the SCS. The idea of security regionalism is also connected to the idea of great power management. The 19th century witnessed a concert of Europe and great power management without security regionalism. The 20th century, however, is the first time that human societies have developed regionalism initiatives such as the EU, ASEAN and the African Union, and great power management has to include the management of regionalism. In the 21st century, it is likely that regionalism will continue to grow despite the temporary setback caused by Brexit and the conflict over the SCS. Historically, it was the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War period that provided an opportunity to develop the EU and ASEAN. It is a great paradox that the rivalry between great powers offers a great opportunity for small and middle powers to exercise their influence

154 Baogang He through regional institutions and regional integration. While the current contestation between the United States and China has pulled the ASEAN countries in different directions, in that Singapore and Vietnam are closer to the United States, and Cambodia and Laos are closer to China, the contestation also offers a unique opportunity for Australia and the ASEAN countries to play a critical role in furthering the development of security regionalism in the Asia-Pacific region. There are several challenging questions related to the idea that security regionalism can reduce conflicts in the SCS. Can regionalism reduce conflicts? How can two great powers accept the idea of mediating and managing their conflicts through a regional arrangement? And whose model or version of regionalism has the best chance of reducing conflict? The US-led model of Asia-Pacific regionalism clashes with China’s model of so-called harmonious Asian regional cooperation. Moreover, is it possible for a regionalism alternative to go beyond the US alliance? And can alliances and regionalism be compatible? The above questions have not been fully examined yet in the existing literature. In the following four sections I will examine these questions and demonstrate why the idea of security regionalism has met with such hostile opposition. Using the idea of security regionalism as a benchmark, I will also examine to what extent China and the United States have engaged regional institutions. I will also discuss how the approaches adopted by China and the United States have deviated from the idea of security regionalism with a normative critique of both..

China’s regional approach to the SCS and its discontents China-led regional security organizations First let us look briefly at two China-sponsored regional security organizations. One of these is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which was formed and co-sponsored by China and Russia in 1996 and includes four Central Asian countries. The SCO is not alliance, nor is it a security community. It is a cooperative multistate organization, one that amalgamates some of the common traits of alliance and security community (Wilkins 2010: 165). While there is some skepticism and criticism surrounding this organization, the SCO has succeeded in managing border conflicts and containing terrorism within its member states. It was ranked the third most effective regional institution behind ASEAN and ASEAN+3 by respondents to the Asia Pacific Security Survey Report 2008 (Wilkins 2010). In June 2016, the SCO has decided to include India and Pakistan as members. They became full members in 2017. Another organization is a large one – the Conference on Interaction and ConfidenceBuilding Measures in Asia (CICA), established in 1999 with 26 member states and 7 observer states. The CICA is an intergovernmental forum for enhancing cooperation and multilateral discussion on promoting and maintaining peace, security, and stability in Asia. It has adopted the consensus decision-making rule, that is, decisions are based on the absence of formal objection from any member state. Its secretariat was established on June 17, 2006 and it is located in Almaty,

Security regionalism in the South China Sea 155 in the Republic of Kazakhstan. The chairmanship has passed from Kazakhstan (2002–2010) to Turkey (2010–2014), rested with China (2014–2016), and the tenure of China’s Chairmanship has been extended until 2018. Unlike the annual rotation system of ASEAN, the chairmanship involves an application and approval process. This institutional incorporation of a chairman enables the chair to play a more active leadership role for a number of years. Both the SCO and CICA have not addressed the SCS dispute issue yet. As far as the SCS issue is concerned, Chinese-led regional security institutions are inadequate and incomplete. One critical question is whether China can extend the SCO to manage the SCS dispute. An obvious objection is that it is difficult for a regional organization to settle maritime disputes involving five claimant states in the SCS; in contrast, the SCO’s task is to maintain the existing borders as they have already been settled. Another reservation is that the SCO has been developed through the co-leadership of China and Russia. It will, however, be difficult for China to develop co-leadership with the United States to manage the SCS issue, as China views the United States as an external country and its “interference” as unproductive. Of course, both objections can be rebutted. One may argue that a genuine regional approach favors the suspension of sovereignty, the co-management of overlapping territories and resources, and co-development. Such a regional approach can reduce military tensions in the SCS. Moreover, given the United States’ domination in Asia and American interests in the region, it is impossible to exclude the United States from the regional security architecture and some ASEAN member states continue to prefer the United States as a guarantor and arbitrator. China’s regional approach toward the SCS? In the 1950s and 1960s, Mao Zedong was first preoccupied with economic reconstruction, and then with the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, coming from a rural background, Mao perceived the sea as alien, and thus the SCS did not feature in his strategic thinking (Kim 1994). In the 1970s and 1980s, China became aware of the SCS (Kim 1994). Internally, the end of Maoist ideology and Deng Xiaoping’s vision of four modernizations impacted foreign policy. Externally, China faced direct challenges from other claimant states such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia, and discovered oil and gas resources for China’s industrialization. The control of the SCS, therefore, is economically and strategically important. China needs to control the SCS to ensure economic supplies and trade, to prevent the enemy from using the base to launch an attack on China’s southern flank, and to enhance China’s power and prestige in the region. In 1988 Wang Yingfan, the former Chinese ambassador to Manila, suggested that Beijing had decided to temporarily shelve the question of sovereignty over the Nansha (Spratly) Islands, but this does not mean China has given up its sovereignty over these Islands. Chinese scholars object to the Antarctic model being applied to the SCS.

156 Baogang He In the 1990s and 2000s, Beijing preferred to take a bilateral approach toward maritime territorial claims; but at the same time it has increasingly accepted a multilateral approach toward ASEAN (Kuik 2005). China acceded to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 and became an official ASEAN dialogue partner in 1996. In the Hu Jintao era, China sped up regional cooperation with the ASEAN. China has developed a friendly relationship with the ASEAN countries by signing a Free Trade Agreement in November 2001, and adopting the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea on November 4, 2002 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, and signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN countries in Bali in October 2003. However, China and Malaysia eschewed a legalistic approach, and consequently the final document of DOC became a non-binding political statement (Storey 2013). DOC as a non-binding declaration has not played an obvious role in reducing tensions, and it remains aspirational if it is highly inspirational. In 2004 China and ASEAN established a senior official meeting mechanism to implement the DOC but disagreed about procedure without any substantive progress. Until July 2011 China and ASEAN adopted the Guidelines to implement the DOC. In 2013 China announced its willingness to negotiate with ASEAN members to implement the DOC on a consensus basis. However, despite attending the ARF meetings, Beijing has rejected attempts to multilateralize the SCS issue. China blocked the mention of the SCS disputes in the joint communiqué through Cambodia’s ASEAN Chair in 2012. It initially objected to ASEAN as a group to deal with the SCS. Between 2013 and 2015, China has shown flexibility and agreed to start formal negotiations on the DOC in July 2013 (Kuik 2005). China and ASEAN has reached an agreement to set up a Search and Rescue (SAR) hotline in Suzhou, China, on September 14–5, 2013 (Storey 2013: 31). In 2014, President Xi Jinping referred to a “China-ASEAN Community of Common Destiny” (Xi 2014: 323). The idea of a “community of destiny” was originally adopted by Hu Jintao’s government in 2007 which was initially used to describe the relationship between mainland China and Taiwan. This phrase has since been used by China’s leaders to describe and ferment its relations with other countries. Xi Jinping expanded on this notion in a speech at the Boao Forum in 2015 explaining that this community comprises a range of countries which are equal members of the international community with the right to voice their opinion, and that China as a large state has a responsibility to maintain regional peace and development.2 In 2014, Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang, at the 9th ASEAN Summit, announced China’s new “dual-track approach (双轨思路)” to the SCS dispute. The “dual-track approach” states that (1) disputes should be resolved through negotiations and consultations by countries directly concerned; and (2) the peace and stability of the SCS should be maintained by China and ASEAN together. This approach modifies the Chinese government’s earlier insistence on a bilateral approach. China has abandoned its opposition to ASEAN’s right to conduct prior consultations together before meeting China (Acharya 2015). In 2015, Wang Yi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, pledged China’s “Five Commitments” (a

Security regionalism in the South China Sea 157 commitment to the peace and stability of the SCS, a peaceful solution based on negotiation and consultation, proper management of disputes by rules and mechanisms, freedom of navigation and over-flight in the SCS, and win-win outcomes through cooperation) (MOFA 2015). In 2015 the National Institute for SCS Studies (NISCS) in Haikou and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta co-organized a Track II workshop focusing on SCS disputes (National Institute for South China Sea Studies 2016).3 In 2016 they formed the China-ASEAN Research Centre on the SCS. China’s new regional approach has been driven by a combination of internal and external factors. Internally, the top leadership has re-evaluated its counterproductive policy toward the SCS (Thayer 2013). They do not want the SCS to damage China’s New Silk Road plan (Xue and Liu 2015) and undermine China’s other ambitious plans (Desker 2015). Externally, a more unified and determined ASEAN amongst its core members has also forced China to recognize its power (Thayer 2013). In the past, ASEAN had difficulties in forming a unitary policy toward China’s actions in the SCS. This was a natural phenomenon, given that claimant states such as Vietnam and the Philippines and non-claimant states such as Cambodia and Laos have diverse interests with regard to the SCS. In July 2012, ASEAN failed to announce a customary joint communiqué (Thayer 2013). After this failure, Natalegawa, the Indonesian Foreign Minister at the time, travelled to Vietnam, the Philippines, and Cambodia within 72 hours to encourage the ASEAN countries to endorse the “six-point principles” (Saragih 2012) in an Indonesian attempt to promote ASEAN unity. China’s recognition of ASEAN as a group in dealing with the SCS dispute has reinforced the power and logic of ASEAN-led regionalism. However, the impact of this compromise remains to be seen. Historically, China’s recognition of multilateralism is largely symbolic; and, according to Jones and Smith (2015), China plays its game to its own advantage. Moreover, this recognition refers to ChinaASEAN bilateral relations. It does not mean that China and ASEAN will establish regional security governance. China and ASEAN have not developed into an effective form of regional security governance to deal with the SCS dispute. The failure of the DOC is one such example. Beijing often uses the language of regional cooperation, not regional integration. This demonstrates that China is following an intergovernmental approach toward regional security governance rather than a supranational approach toward regional integration. China’s regional policy is part of the so-called neighborhood diplomacy of China. On October 24 a special seminar attended by all politburo members was devoted to neighborhood diplomacy. The language of China’s neighborhood diplomacy has diluted its regional initiatives and policies. Regionalism is presented as a form of diplomacy rather than a complete new way of thinking on regional security governance. Beijing has used regionalism to counter the influence of the US-led alliance, whilst some have asserted that China’s regional strategy is not merely focused on balancing powers (Breslin 2008; Pan 2014). It has not yet developed a concrete regional security proposal. China’s regional strategy is “still taking shape” (Cheng

158 Baogang He 2013: 53). A blind spot is how to deal with the US alliance system in Asia. To use regionalism as a check against the United States is unproductive. It is also impossible to exclude the United States from regional security governance. Xi Jinping’s idea of Asian security is a modern version of Asianist security governance as it excludes the role of the United States. So far, Beijing has not made up its mind as to how it will utilize regionalism extensively. Policy makers in Beijing are more interested in developing, or seeing internal brief reports on a variety of strategic partnerships, even developing strategic partnership with Australia, than in committing to security regionalism.4 In 2016 Chinese think tanks explored security regionalism further. Wang Jishi, the Director of the Institute of International Strategy at Beijing University, has formed a study group on a regional security framework and mechanism and his team has consulted with several relevant parties. Wang also organized an international forum on Asia-Pacific security architecture sponsored by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October 2015, and Kevin Rudd was also invited to offer his idea of an APC (Sohu News 2016).5 Wang Jishi (2016) quoted Chinese Prime Minster Li Keqiang’s statement that “given the multiple overlapping Asia-Pacific economic cooperation organizations, it is inevitable to establish an Asia-Pacific security architecture which needs to be suitable to Asian reality and meets the demand of all relevant parties” (Wang 2016: 4). Wang also points out that currently no other country can make any proposal of Asia-Pacific security regionalism and that it is too early for China to make a proposal. However, Wang suggests that China needs to take the leadership role in developing key concepts and in setting up an agenda (Wang 2016: 4–5). It seems that China may revive and revise Rudd’s idea of an APC. Some scholar-officials in one think tank at Beijing propose that Beijing should utilize the East Asia Summit (EAS) fully to develop multiple security networks and/or a regional architecture.6 In summary, China’s regional approach to the SCS issue is symbolic or, at best, at a stage of early infancy. Its dominant approach is nationalist, which appeals to its historical argument that the SCS has belonged to China for centuries and its legitimate claim is based on the nine-dashed line drawn by the KMT government. Beijing often opposes discussions on the SCS dispute in regional forums and rejects the authority of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with regard to the dispute. This is because China believes that Chinese history has already decided the maritime boundary; and to accept the ICJ means internationalizing the issue, which undermines China’s power and pride. China’s approach to the SCS still falls into the politics of might. China reminded some ASEAN countries of their small power status in 2010. On several occasions Beijing boycotted discussions on the issue of the SCS in international and regional forums such as the EAS. In the last decade, the ASEAN countries expected that China would be socialized through regional engagement. Now the direction goes in the opposite way. China is now demanding that ASEAN adjust its position and be socialized into the Chinese way. China has created land in the Spratly Islands, turned a reef into an island in 2015–2016, and rejected the ruling of the International Tribunal in the Hague in July 2016.

Security regionalism in the South China Sea 159 Clearly, if the SCS issue cannot be mentioned and discussed in regional and global forums, there is no way that China and ASEAN can develop a successful regional security governance structure toward the SCS. China’s refusal to deepen regional Asian security cooperation leads to a strengthening of the American alliance in Asia as a few Asian countries welcome US forces back. These states, among others, are willing to allow and welcome the United States to increase its military influence in the region in exchange for their security. One may argue that the source of the problem, perhaps, is China’s nationalist approach. Jones and Smith (2015) assert that “China intends to salami slice its way to control the South China Seas, taking it in small increments by making the economic costs of resistance too high”. This policy has caused a vicious cycle in the sense that Chinese behavior has driven several small Asian states into the USled alliance for their security, while the deepening of the US-led alliance has further strengthened China’s nationalist approach, thus increasing tensions in the region. To break this vicious cycle, a genuinely fresh regional approach is called for.

The US alliance approach to the SCS and its discontents Although it has traditionally taken a bilateral approach, the United States has acknowledged the inevitability of multilateralism in Asia (Gates 2011). The United States has actively participated in regional forums such as the ARF, APEC, and the EAS (East Asian Summit). It signed the protocol of accession to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2009. The United States has attempted to raise the SCS issue in the EAS and pressed China to solve disputes in the SCS in accordance with international law (Thayer 2013). The Unites States emphasizes international law, the freedom of navigation, peaceful resolution, and a no-taking side policy with regard to the SCS. However, the SCS issue has transformed from an issue of sovereignty and maritime jurisdictions amongst the five claimant states to a strategic area of great power contestation between the United States and China. In this context, Washington’s dominant approach toward the SCS dispute is the strengthening of the US-led alliance system. Defenders of the US-led alliance, however, also use regional forums but they do not take security regionalism seriously as security is interpreted as relying heavily on the balance of power to achieve peace. A regional approach is at best marginal and secondary in American foreign policy. This is a blind spot in US global strategy. Washington lacks an innovative approach to security regionalism in Asia. Such an approach clashes with the genuine regional approach. I will discuss these points in turn.

Arguments for the US-led alliance The domination of the US-led alliance is deeply rooted in its history, the current situation of geopolitics in Asia, and its advantages. The US alliance plays a key role

160 Baogang He in stabilizing the regional security order, but at the same time it poses a threat in the eyes of China and North Korea. Since World War II, the United States has established and consolidated its alliance system in Asia. Currently, China’s rising power and its assertive position are in contrast to the weakness of ASEAN; this has driven several small and middle-power countries toward the orbit of the US-led alliance. Moreover, an alliance system provides public goods such as ensuring external security and creating predictability. In contrast, Asian security regionalism is not able to provide predictability yet; nor can it guarantee peace and security. Australia, Japan and South Korea have all strengthened their military relations with the United States. All are reluctant to renege on their security treaties as this involves substantive costs. Complete abandonment of the alliance system is difficult if not impossible, but a small “deflection” is possible. Lee Kuan Yew made a persuasive argument for the United States in Asia. He pointed out that Australia and Singapore both share the view that US military presence is “vital for maintaining the balance of power in the Asia Pacific region and good for security and stability, without which the rapid economic growth of the region would not have taken place” (Lee 2000: 387). Japan also endorses the role of the United States in Asia. Japan has transformed its policy from stressing region building to supporting the alliance system. Historically, Japan was the first dialogue partner of ASEAN, an initiator of APEC and the ARF, a driving force and donor of the ADB (Asian Development Bank), and a facilitator and leader of the APT (ASEAN plus Three) and the China–Japan–South Korea trilateral summit (CKJ). However, given the rise of China’s power, Japan, together with Singapore, invited the United States to participate in the EAS. In particular, China’s assertive policy has prompted Japan to shift its strategic focus to the alliance system. In 2016, the US-Japan Commission released a report entitled the US-Japan Alliance to 2030: Power and Principle to deepen, broaden and sustain the alliance. The US bilateral alliance system remains predominant in Asian security governance despite the fact that multilateral organizations and institutions are slowly developing in order to tackle issues such as trade, the environment, and terrorism in Asia. The former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, made it clear that the United States saw itself as the most important power in the region which had “a network of strong alliances in the region, no territorial ambitions, and a long record of providing for the common good” (Clinton 2011). In describing Washington’s plan for the future she made it clear that the United States wanted to continue with the traditional San Francisco System by “strengthening bilateral security alliances and deepening our working relationships with emerging powers, including China” (Clinton 2011). However, she also emphasized the importance of multilateral cooperation and mentioned the importance of regional order and stability which requires “a set of institutions capable of mustering collective action” (Clinton 2011). While the US-led alliance system is a critical part of the regional security structure, it does not develop a common security framework. It is not a regional institution per se. It also cannot guarantee long-term peace for the region. A peaceful Asia must be found in security regionalism. The main question is, therefore,

Security regionalism in the South China Sea 161 whether the US-led alliance can be transformed into a multilateral regional institution. If so, it must include China and work with the existing regional security institutions. The US-led alliance must also be allowed to play a moderate and stabilizing role in the EAS. This raises the question of whether integration between the alliance approach and regional security governance is possible. South Korea sees “a combination of alliance and ASEAN-led multilateralism as the best way to assure regional stability” (Koga 2010: 20, also see Baogang He 2017, 140). The contestation between regionalism and the US-led alliance Promoters of security regionalism contend that the establishment of a regional security community is ultimately the primary goal as it ensures a state of perpetual peace. The alliance system, meanwhile, is viewed as a means to achieve temporary protection and stability, and it is often contingent on a number of factors. Today, security regionalism offers a concrete mechanism to realize Kant’s doctrine of perpetual peace. Unfortunately, the domination of the US-led alliance prevents the search for perpetual peace through the establishment of a regional security community. Now let us look at the arguments for Asian security regionalism. An alliance system is more likely to strengthen security dilemmas and lead to conflict or war. The more each country spends money on defense, the more others feel insecure. However, in Europe, regionalism has successfully overcome the security dilemma problem. Evincing a no-threat mentality, Germany decided to abolish conscription and France and Britain are planning to share the use of nuclear submarines by alternating month by month. A historical lesson is that, as Beeson points out, “Europe’s complex system of alliance not only failed to deter war it actually helped make it difficult to avoid” (2014: 102). Thus, for Beeson, “alliances offer no comfort” (2014: 103). Beeson argues further that “an alliance structure that seems bent on trying to contain China’s rise looks unsustainable and counterproductive in the long run. Finding ways to accommodate China’s rise and encourage it to play a constructive leadership rule in the region look like part of the answer” (2015: 317). A regional security community should include China, a non-US ally state, in regional dialogue and a regional order, and this is likely to provide long-term stability. While some small and middle-power countries have already strengthened their military relationship with the United States, there are a number of arguments that favor regional institution building and the consolidation of ASEAN. Asian regionalism can provide a third road or space for small and middle-power states to work with both the United States and China in a hybrid regionalism framework. ASEAN as a regional organization tries to set a regional security policy and pursues an independent path, which does not fall under traditional alliance politics. ASEAN wants to be a friend to all, and invites the United States, China, and India to be strategic dialogue partners.7 It has developed a complex policy towards China and the United States, including issue-based cooperation and competition with either China or the United States. Rather than fixing its position within the

162 Baogang He American alliance system, ASEAN has constantly rebalanced its approach toward the United States and China and tries hard to prevent either one from dominating Asian regionalism. In ancient times, the people on the island of Milos were dragged into the conflict between Athens and Sparta against their will. During the Cold War, many small or middle powers were unfortunately forced to make a choice against their will between the Soviet Union and the United States. However, the non-alliance strategy and policy pursued by Asian countries in the Bandung conference in 1955 and the formation of the ASEAN led to the failure of the US-led SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization). Today, despite the fact that clashes between China and the United States have the potential to divide Asia, even polarize Asia into pro-China or pro-US camps on certain issues, ASEAN, as a club of small and middle powers, has developed its own collective power to balance against the power of outsiders. ASEAN has refused to make a choice imposed by great powers. ASEAN regionalism as a whole is able to modify great power politics by stressing that weak and middle powers take the lead in developing cooperative security. The above arguments are from a very broad ASEAN perspective. Now let us take the concrete example of Vietnam to see how it advocates a regional approach. Vietnam has pursued a regional approach to the SCS issue by encouraging the four claimant states (Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei) to reach consensus on the issue first, and then seek support from the other six member countries of ASEAN.8 Vietnam aims to push ASEAN to adopt a unified policy toward the SCS issue, and make ASEAN central in handling disputes. Beijing, on the other hand, dislikes such a regional approach. A number of Vietnamese leaders have advocated a regional or multilateral approach. Dr. Tran Cong Truc, former chairman of Vietnam’s government committee for boundaries, argues that Vietnam should Count on the roles of regional and international organizations such as the UN, ASEAN, ASEAN+1, ASEAN+2 … These organizations should have clear and transparent operating rules, certain responsibilities and rights decided by related parties, regional and international organizations. (Truc 2015) Xuan Linh, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, warns against serious East Sea disputes. He argues that Vietnam has made good use of bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and simultaneously maintained ASEAN union and a friendly relationship with China (Linh 2016). According to General Phung Quang Thanh, the SCS dispute involves many countries and includes many issues. Some of the issues, such as the Gulf of Tonkin and the Paracel islands issues (in the northern gulf of Vietnam) should be solved by bilateral cooperation only, whereas other issues such as the Spratly Islands issue should be solved through multilateral cooperation (Thanh 2015).

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Competition between the United States and China in regional organizations In contrast to the various proposals which argue that security regionalism offers a solution to the SCS dispute, here I would like to examine the fact that regionalism has become a new battleground in the US-Sino rivalry. While China uses regionalism to counteract US influence, the United States uses it to contest and contain China’s power. Regionalism becomes an instrument to increase one’s power at the expense of the other. Under this kind of rivalry, regionalism cannot perform its function as a conflict resolution mechanism. A concrete example is that China protested against any reference to the SCS in a draft Joint Declaration of the 3rd ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus in Kuala Lumpur on November 4, 2016. As a response, the United States refused to endorse the Joint Declaration. Below I briefly discuss three areas of contestation regarding regional organizations. First, there has been competition between China and the United States in the area of regionalism. For example, the United States under the Obama Administration actively promoted the TPP, a large and ambitious framework to liberalize economic transactions in the Asia Pacific without the participation of China. Similarly, China has set up the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) without the participation of the United States. While China has accepted ASEAN as a group that can play a proper role, China is firmly opposed to intervention from external powers, and especially the United States (Xinhuanet 2014).9 Historically the Sino-Japan rivalry sped up economic regionalism with ASEAN, but today’s rivalry between the United States and China has not produced such an effect. In the last few years, we have witnessed the United States and Japan develop the TPP, and China has pushed its own One Belt One Road (OBOR) to connect Asia and Europe. Both efforts have marginalized the centrality of ASEAN and stopped the momentum of Asian regionalism. Second, both the United States and China have tried to woo ASEAN. The recognition of the importance of ASEAN itself, however, becomes a strategic battleground. The United States sees ASEAN as a “cornerstone” of its Pacific Asia policy, and China as “connecting” with or a “supporter” of its grand strategy. Both the United States and China are attempting to win over ASEAN rather than intimidate it. China tries hard to endear itself to ASEAN as a group. It has supported ASEAN’s regional cooperation and integration in the form of the ASEAN– China free trade agreement and the APT. The first summit between the United States and ASEAN was held on American soil in Sunnylands, California in 2016. It called for restraint and the observance of international law to resolve the SCS dispute peacefully. Third, if both the United States and China accept the idea of security regionalism, there would be a severe contestation of the scope, membership, form, and procedures of security regionalism. There has been a competition between panAsianism and Asia-Pacific regionalism. If Kissinger’s idea of Pacific regionalism is interpreted as excluding a leadership role for China, it would unlikely be able to

164 Baogang He perform the function of containing conflicts. Asian states would be put in an awkward position if they had to make a choice between an Asian version of regionalism that favors China but disadvantages the United States, or a Pacific version of regionalism that favors the United States but disadvantages China. If two major powers compete to promote different visions of a regional order then this kind of regionalism cannot manage conflicts as Kissinger (2011) imagined. Indeed, the real problem is that United States' proposals are seen as efforts to contain China and Chinese proposals are seen as efforts to exclude the United States (Cha 2011). Back in 2003–2005, China was determined to speed up the regional integration of the APT that excluded the United States in the context of backlash against the Bush administration’s unilateralism and obsession with the war against terror. On May 21, 2014 at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed an Asian concept of Asian security, namely, that Asian affairs should be managed by Asians, Asian problems solved by Asians, and Asian security maintained by Asians. It seems that Beijing has returned to some old idea of pan-Asianism. This idea of Asian security can be interpreted as an exclusive version of Asian security regionalism in the sense that the United States would be excluded. If Beijing promotes an exclusive idea of regionalism, regionalism itself becomes a site of contestation. Currently, the Trump administration weakened Asian regionalism by abandoning the TPP. Former Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, warned that China’s access to “those islands also is not going to be allowed”. New Secretary of Defense General James Mattis called for strengthening America’s alliances and boosting America’s military readiness. At the same time, China’s state media expressed clearly that to stop China from accessing its sovereign territory means a war between the United States and China. China is preparing for the worst case of engaging in war to defend its maritime territories. The idea of security regionalism currently seems to be a remote possibility.

Questions of compatibility and conditionality In the previous sections I have discussed a number of obstacles to security regionalism including Chinese nationalism, the predominance of the alliance approach, and the politics of great powers. Here I focus on the issue of compatibility. Amongst other conditions, one necessary condition under which security regionalism can mediate and dilute strategic conflicts between the United States and China in the SCS is to ensure the compatibility of the American alliance with Asian regionalism. ASEAN alone cannot provide regional security and maintain peace. Equally, the United States alone cannot establish East Asian regional security architecture. ASEAN-led regionalism needs to be backed by the United States’ alliance system. A workable regional idea and practice is one that has US alliance backing. In the case of the EU, it has benefited from the American alliance in Europe. It was NATO, the American led-alliance that maintained regional peace and thus

Security regionalism in the South China Sea 165 provided a foundation for the EU to develop. When Japan promoted Asian regionalism in the 1990s, Washington became suspicious that Japan was moving away from the alliance. Thus, Washington rejected Japanese regional initiatives. A US alliance system can be part of the Asian regional security architecture. As Victor Cha contends, the United States and China can coexist in the regional architecture that is emerging in Asia. Cha considers Asia to have a distinctly different form of regionalism which is compatible with existing US alliances. Regionalism is looked upon favorably by the United States because of its existing alliances in the region which Cha describes as “not mutually exclusive but rather mutually reinforcing” (Cha 2011: 41). Examples of this are represented by the many multilateral groupings in Asia which are based on existing bilateral alliances such as the US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG), the US-Japan-India Strategic Dialogue, and the US-Japan-Australia TSD (Trilateral Strategic Dialogue). While many scholars are quick to label Asian regional security as a failure, Cha explains that security cooperation in Asia is thriving “albeit in non-traditional structures” with the “U.S. bilateral alliances … helping to create new linkages and maintain the salience of many emerging groups” (Cha 2011: 48–9). Dealing with the compatibility issue requires new thinking and a new policy. It requires the United States to honor the principle and procedure of multilateralism. It is also necessary for China to be treated as a US ally, as it was during World War II. Of course, it will take a long time for China to become a part of the USalliance system, but at least the proposal to establish an Asia-Pacific peace treaty or agreement should include China; in this way, China can be interpreted as a part of the US-led alliance.10 These new ideas and policies may help to build a hybrid order in which the US-led alliance, China, and regional security governance can coexist. The “compatibility” of the American alliance with Asian regionalism is controversial and subject to scrutiny. In the eyes of Beijing, the logic of strengthening the American alliance is likely to weaken Beijing-led security regionalism in Asia; and the alliance policy is likely to slow down the development of Asian regionalism. This is evidenced by the fact that Australia and Japan, who have strengthened the alliance option, moved away from Rudd’s regional initiative and Hatoyama’s proposal of an East Asia Community in Australia and Japan respectively. Vietnam has been prompting ASEAN to play a role in settling the SCS dispute. If pushed hard by China, it will consider establishing an alliance with Washington.11 Equally, in the eyes of Washington, China’s AIIB caused disunity among the United States’ allies, thus weakening the US alliance. In short, managing and reducing the inner tension between the US alliance system and Asian security regionalism is a challenge for both the Chinese and American leaderships. Beijing is one key player. Currently, Beijing deems the USled alliance system as incompatible with Asian security regionalism. Its version of security regionalism attempts to undermine the US alliance system. If Beijing perceives the US alliance system and Asian security regionalism as compatible, this will be a big step toward Asian security regionalism.

166 Baogang He

Conclusion Beyond the nationalist approach and alliance politics, this chapter adopts a distinctively regional approach to the SCS conflict. It details various proposals of security regionalism which offer conflict resolution mechanisms and platforms. Indeed, it is common sense that open deliberation in regional forums on the SCS issue is much better than the physical movement of navy ships and fighting jets. Both the Chinese nationalist approach and the US-alliance approach have encountered serious discontents. Nevertheless, unfortunately, rather than security regionalism’s solution to the SCS dispute, regionalism itself has become an area of contestation between the United States and China. The perceived incompatibility between security regionalism and the alliance system adds a further obstacle to security regionalism. The function of conflict resolution suggested by the idea of security regionalism is in mere advocacy. The other function of regionalism is playing out in real politics, that is, it has intensified the contestation between China and the United States. This pessimistic conclusion, however, leads us to critical realism that questions the fundamental assumptions held by both China and the United States. Washington tends to focus on alliances and balance of power and therefore does not consider security regionalism as a vital option for regional security. However, there are a variety of compelling arguments for the necessity of security regionalism. Security regionalism can achieve perpetual peace. The US-led alliance can only maintain short-term security. East Asian politicians and intellectuals have been influenced by American military and intellectual power, and many of them are comfortable with the US-led alliance. However, it must be recognized that the United States lacks the creative idea of security regionalism. Australia, Japan, and other ASEAN countries have already developed their own idea of security regionalism. The success of developing ideational power in Asia is a critical condition for Asians to construct a new regional order through a multilateral and transnational approach. China seems to hold the key to initiating and establishing security regionalism. This, however, requires China to undo much of its nationalist thinking and embrace genuine security regionalism. While nationalism can be easily mobilized as a political force for China’s legitimacy and survival, regionalism does not have a political function of mobilization. Nevertheless, the regional peace effect is greater than all of the small gains achieved through nationalist mobilization. Genuine regional security governance is in China’s best and long-term interest in maintaining regional stability and peace and the idea of security regionalism should be a critical part of greater power management in the 21st century. At the same time, the United States should also adopt fresh thinking and a new strategy. As Amitav Acharya (2016) suggests, “the United States needs to decenter, prioritize and regionalize its grand strategy, encouraging middle powers, regional powers and regional organizations, many of which share America’s strategic goals if not its means” (Acharya 2016). The weakness of the United States’s “Asian Pivot” policy is its lack of regionalism strategy and policy, and in particular the absence of a regionalism management policy.

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Notes 1 For a critique of Rudd’s idea, see He (2011). 2 Xinhuanet. 2014, March 29. Retrieved at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/ china/2014-11/13/c_133787079.htm. 3 NISCS (National Institute for South China Sea Studies). 2016, January 18. Retrieved at: http://www.nanhai.org.cn/index.php/Index/Dynamic/content/cid/35/id/ 2293.html#div_content. 4 This was mentioned in an interview conducted by the author with a think tank scholar in Beijing on July 14, 2014. 5 Sohu News. 16 October 2015. Retrieved at http://news.sohu.com/20151016/ n423376075.shtml. 6 This point was mentioned in an interview conducted by the author on August 6, 2015 in Beijing. 7 This point was mentioned in an interview conducted by the author with Rodolfo C. Severino, a former Secretary General of ASEAN, 2011. 8 This point was mentioned in an interview conducted by the author in Hanoi in April 2015. 9 Xinhuanet. 2014, March 29. Retrieved at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/ china/2014-11/13/c_133787079.htm. 10 This was mentioned in an interview conducted by the author on August 5, 2015 at China’s Foreign Affairs University. 11 This point was mentioned in an interview conducted by the author in Hanoi in April 2015.

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168 Baogang He He, B. 2011. The Awkwardness of Australian Engagement with Asia: The Dilemmas of Australian Idea of Regionalism. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 12(2): 267–285. He, B. 2017. Contested Ideas of Regionalism in Asia, London: Routledge. Jones, D.M. and M.L.R. Smith. 2015. Can ASEAN Ever Solve the South China Sea Dispute through Multilateral Dialogue? The Telegraph (UK), November 24. Kim, S.P. 1994. China’s Changing Policies towards the South China Sea. American Review, Winter, 12: 61–81. Kissinger, H. 2011. On China. London: Penguin Press. Koga, K. 2010. Competing Institutions in East Asian Regionalism: ASEAN and the Regional Powers. Issues and Insights, 10(23): 1–28, Pacific Forum CSIS, Honolulu, October. Kuik, C-C. 2005. Multilateralism in China’s ASEAN Policy: Its Evolution, Characteristics, and Aspiration. Contemporary Southeast Asia, April, 27(1): 102–122. Lee, K.Y. 2000. From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965–2000. New York: HarperCollins. Linh, X. 2016. Phó thủ tướng cảnh báo tranh chấp biển đông gay gắt. Vietnamnet Online, January 23. Retrieved at: http://vietnamnet.vn/vn/chinh-tri/286137/pho-thutuong-canh-bao-tranh-chap-bien-dong-gay-gat.html. MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China). 2015. Wang Yi: The Chinese Side Adheres to Five Commitments on the South China Sea Issue. August 4. Retrieved at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1286125.shtml. Pan, C. 2014. The “Indo-Pacific” and Geopolitical Anxieties about China’s Rise in the Asian Regional Order. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 68(4): 453–469. Rudd, K. 2008. It’s Time to Build an Asia Pacific Community. Speech to the Asia Society Australasia Centre, June 4. Retrieved at: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/politics/ full-text-of-kevin-rudds-speech/story-e6frgczf-1111116541962. Saragih, B.B.T. 2012. RI Finds Common ASEAN Ground in Sea Dispute. The Jakarta Post, July 23. Retrieved at: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/07/23/ ri-finds-common-asean-ground-sea-dispute.html. Storey, I. 2013. South China Sea: Glacial Progress amid On-Going Tensions. In R. Huisken, ed. CSCAP Regional Security Outlook 2014. Kuala Lumpur: CSCAP, 30–33. Thanh (General), P.Q. 2015. Bộ trưởng Phùng Quang Thanh: “Quan hệ tốt với Mỹ, Trung sẽ giữ được thế cân bằng” [Good Relationships with China and the US Will Be Balanced]. VnExpress Online, October 22. Retrieved at: http://vnexpress.net/tin-tuc/ thoi-su/bo-truong-phung-quang-thanh-quan-he-tot-voi-my-trung-se-giu-duoc-the-canbang-3300211.html. Thayer, C. 2013. New Commitment to a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea? The National Bureau of Asian Research, October 9. Retrieved at: http://nbr.org/research/a ctivity.aspx?id=360#footnote8. Truc, T.C. 2015. Solutions to Maintain Peace, Stability and to Strengthen Cooperation in South China Sea. Paper presented at the 7th South China Sea International Conference, Cooperation for Regional Security and Development, November 23–24, Vung Tau City, Vietnam. US Department of State. 1947. Making the Peace Treaties: 1941–1947. Washington DC. US–Japan Commission. 2016. US-Japan Alliance to 2030: Power and Principle. Report of the Commission on the Future of the Alliance, February 29. Retrieved at: https://www. spf.org/topics/finalreportfinal.pdf. Wang, J. 2016. Building an Asian Pacific Regional Security Architecture: Objectives, Conditions and Visions. Journal of International Security Studies, 1: 4–12.

Security regionalism in the South China Sea 169 Wilkins, T. 2010. Building Regional Security Architecture: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: From an Organisational Theories Perspective. In M.P. Amineh, ed. State, Society and International Relations in Asia. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 163–178. Xi, J. 2014. The Governance of China. Beijing: Foreign Language Press. Xu, G. and B. He. 2016. An Empirical Investigation of the History of Multilateral Governance on the Danube River. Foreign Theoretical Trends, 12: 123–128. Xue, L. and M. Liu. 2015. Explaining China’s New “Commitments” on the South China Sea. The Diplomat, September 11. Retrieved at http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/exp laining-chinas-new-commitments-on-the-south-china-sea/.

11 Looking to the future Hypotheses on China’s maritime disputes and US–China relations Steve Chan

How can social science research be informative about China’s maritime disputes in the South China Sea? One way is to seek from this research falsifiable propositions about the future evolution of these disputes. I draw on several research traditions – such as collective action, extended deterrence, enduring rivalries, two-level games, and alliance dynamics – to deduce these propositions. These traditions appear especially pertinent to China’s maritime disputes because they all involve highly asymmetric contests pitting the smaller Southeast Asian claimant states against China – and this asymmetry seems likely to grow in the coming years. This being the case, we encounter the central puzzle about these maritime disputes. Why have the weaker claimant states apparently decided to hold out – that is, to eschew a settlement with China for the time being – even though their respective bargaining power relative to China is likely to decline further in the future? One plausible explanation is that they believe they can internationalize their respective bilateral disputes with China, thereby offsetting their relative weakness when matched individually with Beijing. Internationalization can take the form of collective action with the rest of Southeast Asia, or it can involve US intervention to balance against current or future Chinese capabilities. This attempt at internationalization can be moreover exemplified by Manila’s appeal to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in its maritime dispute with Beijing – even though Beijing had explicitly opted out of this provision when signing the United Nations Convention of the Law of Sea. A decision in favor of stalemate may therefore reflect a confidence in ASEAN unity, US willingness to defend their cause, or one’s ability to rally international support in other ways to stop China from playing its stronger hand. This decision can also reflect a sense of domestic vulnerability – a concern that any compromise settlement reached with Beijing may be too costly for an incumbent leader’s domestic political standing. Yet another possible reason to eschew settlement for the time being (from the perspective of bargaining theory) can be a lack of confidence in Beijing’s future commitment to honor the terms of an agreement. If one accepts this characterization, one can infer the following policy questions confronting Chinese leaders. How can Beijing most effectively defeat an effort to build a united front amongst the other claimant states against it, and how can Beijing most effectively reduce the probability and the level of US intervention

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(thereby reducing the danger of a direct Sino-American confrontation)? Which of the Southeast Asian claimant states is likely to be most susceptible to Beijing’s enticement or coercion to break ranks with the others? And how can Beijing’s settlement of its dispute with this particular counterpart be deployed to build its reputation “to play nicely (or ruthlessly)” or “to honor its commitments” in subsequent negotiations with the other claimant states? From the perspective of US leaders, how can Washington increase the credibility of its extended deterrence against Beijing without, however, running the risk of becoming entrapped by its protégés in an unwanted confrontation with China? The more Washington is seen to be committed to support the other claimant states, the more it faces the moral hazard of actually encouraging these countries to escalate their conflict with China. So how can the US finesse this dilemma?

Hypotheses on dispute persistence, escalation and resolution Contrary to the typical characterization of China’s sovereignty disputes in the East and South China Seas, the above stylized depiction claims that the contesting elites are actually in fundamental agreement albeit for perhaps different reasons. They agree to disagree for the time being – all of them would rather see their disputes continue than settled. From Beijing’s perspective, accepting a protracted conflict – or put alternatively, to let time take its course and wait till later to resolve this conflict – is tantamount to a decision that the costs of settling are higher today than later. It is also possibly a vote of confidence in how ongoing and unfolding trends will improve China’s bargaining hand in the future. Finally, a decision to postpone settlement implies that there are more pressing issues with higher stakes that demand attention today. Deng Xiaoping reflected this logic to table bilateral differences and wait for a more favorable time in the future when he remarked in 1978 about the Sino-Japanese sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyu/ Senkaku islands, stating that: It is true that the two sides maintain different views on this question [competing sovereignty claims over the disputed islands] …. It does not matter if this question is shelved for some time, say, ten years. Our generation is not wise enough to find common language on this question. Our next generation will certainly be wiser. They will certainly find a solution acceptable to all. (Peking Review, 1978, November 3: 16; quoted by Lo 1989: 171–2) A decision to postpone settlement can reflect optimism about the shifting balance of power in favor of China, or changes in Washington’s outlook inclining the US to limit its support for China’s opponents, or simply a matter of making a virtue out of necessity. Obviously and as already mentioned, similar reasoning (albeit featuring different expectations such as with respect to the US incentive to intervene or future bilateral power shifts) characterizes the other claimant states, inclining them also to postpone settlement rather than to terminate the dispute

172 Steve Chan now. Regarding the suggestion of making a virtue out of necessity, it takes a strong – that is, domestically secure leader – to offer concessions to foreigners, thereby making a dispute settlement possible (Huth and Allee 2002). In contrast, a weak leader who fears domestic criticisms for being soft on an adversary is more likely to engage in diversionary tactics – that is, to manipulate foreign disputes and mobilize nationalist sentiments in order to boost his/her popularity with domestic constituents. Ceteris paribus, we deduce the following hypothesis on the timing of a dispute settlement, if any. Proposition 1: Dispute settlement is more likely when China has a strong paramount leader. This hypothesis implies that China’s dispute counterparts should hope that Xi Jinping has secured his leadership position and that the Chinese leaders are united rather than divided. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is similar to Robert Putnam’s (1988) analysis of the so-called two-level games, when he argues that a negotiator (such as an authoritarian leader who faces few domestic challengers) is more easily and likely to be “pushed around” in international bargaining because he or she has more domestic political space to make concessions. In contrast, democratic leaders or leaders facing domestic dissent will be in a stronger bargaining position because they face domestic constraints to making concessions to their foreign counterparts. Thus, unsurprisingly, US officials from the executive branch repeatedly point to congressional skepticism or opposition in order to gain concessions from China in bilateral negotiations. The need to seek domestic “ratification” – that is, to acquire the consent or at least the acquiescence of important domestic constituents – gives this bargaining leverage to politically constrained leaders. Thus those negotiators whose “hands are tied” are paradoxically in a better position to make bargaining gains and conversely, those leaders whose domestic political position is secure can be expected to be more forthcoming in making concessions. Because it takes at least two sides to settle a dispute which requires mutual accommodation, the domestic window for dispute settlement must be open on both sides (Nincic 2011). In the past, Arab–Israeli and US–Cuba talks have failed repeatedly in part because the two contesting sides’ political clocks are not synchronized. For instance, when a US president faces a strong challenger in a reelection bid, he is less likely to be receptive to overtures from Havana. Often, breakthroughs in political impasses come when a political incumbent faces a term limit or has just won a landslide reelection. This discussion leads us to offer another hypothesis about which disputants are more likely to settle a dispute rather than to accept its protraction. It takes only one side to cause a dispute to become protracted (which is therefore the more likely outcome) but it takes two sides to come to a settlement. Proposition 2: Dispute settlement is more likely between two countries whose leaders happen to be domestically secure at the same time.

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By definition, democracy means shared power among various domestic veto players and also a larger “selectorate” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) whose approval or at least acquiescence will be required to “ratify” a foreign deal (Putnam 1988). Because they (or their successors) will have to submit themselves to electoral approval by the voters, democratic leaders are also generally more constrained by public opinion in making concessions whereas authoritarian leaders are less sensitive to a possible popular backlash. Simply put, there are a larger number of veto players in a democracy who can block a settlement or at least limit the bargaining space of their country’s negotiators to reach an accord with foreign counterparts. Accordingly, we reach the following hypothesis. Proposition 3: As public opinion gains more influence in China’s foreign policy decision processes and as its leaders’ political stature is diminished compared to their predecessors such as Mao Tse-tung or Deng Xiaoping, that is, as China’s politics becomes more pluralistic and its decision processes become more decentralized, Beijing will be more constrained in making concessions that may be perceived as a sellout by its nationalist audience. According to this proposition, we should not expect to see any repetition of episodes such as when Mao Tse-tung reportedly decided unilaterally to turn over the island of Bailungwei to Hanoi’s control in the 1950s or for that matter, when North Vietnam’s leaders recognized Chinese sovereignty over the Paracels as they did in the 1960s. Proposition 3 is a corollary and further specification of Proposition 1 and when combined with Proposition 2, we reach yet another inference about the regional implication of a general trend toward greater democratization. Contrary to the popular idea of democratic peace (for example, Russett and Oneal 2001), this process can actually diminish the prospects of dispute settlement and incline leaders to engage in (foreign) diversionary attempts to boost their domestic standing during this period of political transition (Mansfield and Snyder 2005). This tendency is likely to be more acute when leaders find themselves in domestic distress which can be due to a variety of reasons. Proposition 4: A general process of democratization among the disputing countries is likely to reduce rather than enhance prospects for settlement and conversely, these prospects for a settlement are the highest amongst the more authoritarian pairs – such as China and Vietnam. As another implication of the reasoning presented thus far, we may hypothesize that the prospects for dispute settlement are most doubtful when leaders are approaching elections (or their functional equivalent in authoritarian countries, when new members for the Politburo, for example, are to be selected) and when such occasions are characterized by close contests and intense competition. Conversely, these prospects are the brightest when leaders face term limitations to their office or mandatory retirement, or when they have just been elected by a landslide election. A new leader is also less likely to feel bound by his/her

174 Steve Chan predecessors’ policies and is therefore in a better position to initiate a new policy of reconciliation. Proposition 5: Prospects for dispute settlement tend to be the highest shortly after a new leader comes to office or shortly before an old leader retires from office. It has been suggested that economic interdependence tends to foster peace. Interdependence implies reciprocal vulnerability. When trade relations are highly asymmetric, this situation creates the opportunity for using the resulting economic dependency of one party on the other for political exploitation or coercion by the latter (for example, Hirschman 1945). Naturally, this opportunity can be overcome by the intervention of third parties. For example, Taiwan is highly reliant on exports to China and is consequently vulnerable to a decision by Beijing to impose an economic embargo. Beijing’s leverage in this respect, however, can be offset if Tokyo or Washington were to step in to fill the shortfall created by Beijing’s actions (in the parlance of economic sanctions literature, to intervene as a “spoiler” or a “white knight” depending on one’s perspective). Expectations of how much one will gain or suffer in the future should economic ties be disrupted, suspended, or continued (Copeland 1996) – and not the current commercial state of affairs – will drive officials’ calculations which are forward-looking (that is, these officials try to anticipate the future). Officials also compare the prospective gains and costs of future economic ties in comparison to their relative valuation of political objectives (Benson and Niou 2007). Do they prefer political sovereignty or national territorial integrity (as they perceive these values) more than economic exchanges and commercial gains, or vice versa? We reach the following hypothesis (again, of course, assuming everything else being equal). Proposition 6: Considering both the asymmetry of commercial relations and the probability of third-party intervention, Beijing will have greater bargaining leverage over some dispute counterparts than others (e.g., those that value economic wellbeing more intensely compared to others who put a higher priority on political objectives such as contested territory or national sovereignty), and disputes are more likely to be settled with the former type than the latter type. This hypothesis implies that Sino-Malaysian and perhaps Sino-Vietnamese maritime disputes are more likely to be resolved than other pairs of disputes. This implication corresponds with that of Proposition 4. It is more difficult to speculate about how the discussion thus far applies to the Philippines. It seems to be a country that is economically needy (such as being dependent on tourism from China and banana exports to China) but also politically volatile (its presidential elections appear to be highly dependent on personalities rather than the candidates’ professed policies). This country has also a special historical relationship with the US and like Tokyo, a defense treaty with Washington. Naturally, vibrant economic ties should in themselves encourage leaders to settle territorial disputes and this settlement should become more attractive if it

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also promises additional political values, such as neutralizing a US ally. From this perspective, China’s maritime dispute with South Korea appears to be an especially likely candidate for Beijing to settle. Such a settlement with South Korea is easier because it is less likely to arouse nationalist sentiments inside China compared to a deal with Japan; moreover, this agreement has a potential effect of peeling Seoul from a potential coalition with Japan and the US in joint opposition to China. Thus the absence of historical animosity and the weight of additional economic and political considerations make a prospective deal with Seoul most likely for Beijing. Conversely and as to be discussed, distance – physical, cultural, psychological, and historical – also makes reaching a deal with Brunei easier for Beijing to undertake. China has, of course, settled almost all of its land borders (Fravel 2008), except for India. The history of Beijing’s negotiations with these neighbors points to a general pattern which suggests that it tends to be more conciliatory and even generous when dealing with smaller, weaker counterparts and conversely, more resistant to the demands of larger and more powerful counterparts. China has settled its land disputes with countries such as Nepal, Burma, and North Korea on terms generally favorable to them, whereas it has been more unyielding in protracted negotiations with the former USSR and of course, India. The latter tendency shows Beijing’s desire to demonstrate a reputation that it cannot be intimidated or “pushed around” by a stronger or even just a peer adversary. This pattern suggests another hypothesis. Proposition 7: The greater the power asymmetry between China and its dispute counterpart in China’s favor, the more likely Beijing is to settle its dispute with this counterpart. This proposition directly contradicts offensive realism, which argues that a powerful country will push as hard as it can in driving a bargain with a foreign counterpart (Mearsheimer 2001). It also has a straightforward implication. Of all of China’s maritime disputes, the one with Japan in the East China Sea is the most intractable and thus the least likely to be settled for the time being – even when disregarding the strong nationalist sentiments that the Chinese people have about Japan as a consequence of this latter country’s previous aggressions against their country. Beijing is most likely to put its dispute with Tokyo on the back burner and let time take its course rather than push for a precipitous showdown or a definitive resolution of the dispute. Conversely, Beijing will find it easiest to settle with Brunei amongst its various sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea. The logic presented in the above paragraph is reinforced by other considerations. When faced with collective opposition from various other countries contesting China’s sovereignty claims, Beijing is most likely to try to break this united front by focusing on its weakest (or from Beijing’s perspective, most promising) link. Conversely, it is most likely to avoid trying to seek settlement with the hardest case which would be a country that is most likely to arouse the strongest domestic feelings and also most likely to trigger US intervention – namely, Japan.

176 Steve Chan It also so happens that the closer a dispute counterpart is located to China, the greater the defense security implications that any prospective settlement will have for Beijing – and of course also for this counterpart because of the proximity of the disputed territory to it too. Put simply, closer physical distance means a dispute will be more pregnant with defense security implications and will therefore be more controversial for this reason alone. Accordingly, we reach the next hypothesis. Proposition 8: The geographic location of a sovereignty dispute matters, so that the farther away is a dispute’s location the less salient it is for domestic political and defense security reasons and this kind of dispute is more amenable to concession by Beijing (whereas looking from the other disputing country’s perspective, it should feel more strongly motivated to insist on its position because this dispute is located closer to its home base and should thus matter more to it). Again, this hypothesis should have an obvious implication. China is more likely to reach a settlement with Brunei and to a somewhat lesser extent with Malaysia than, say, with Japan. Concessions to the former countries are less likely to be perceived by Chinese nationalists as a betrayal of the national cause than the latter country. It stands to reason that political rather than economic reasons are more likely to stand in the way of dispute resolution. Economic dividends are divisible (Fearon 1997), whereas claims about intangible values such as national sovereignty involve goods that are inherently indivisible. Conflicts over divisible goods such as undersea minerals can be more easily settled because one can more easily negotiate over their division and monitor and enforce agreements concerning this division than transcendental and intangible goals such as national honor and sovereignty that defy compromise. This claim argues that if one can frame or even convert sovereignty disputes into conflicts over resources, they will become more amenable to settlement. This observation in turn implies a possible negotiation strategy. Proposition 9: When states are poised to negotiate seriously over their disputes, they are likely to side-step sovereignty issues and focus on the division of resources, and this strategy is more likely to be adopted by the smaller and/or more authoritarian countries than the larger and more democratic countries (such as Vietnam and the Philippines compared to Japan in their disputes with China; indeed the former two countries had at one time entered into an agreement with China for joint oil exploration in the disputed area). As alluded to earlier, the Southeast Asian contesting countries – and even Japan – would obviously like to engage in collective action (Olson 1965), and they would try to avoid being pitted against China in a one-on-one contest. All, including Japan, would like to recruit the US to their side in order to offset any Chinese advantage in a bilateral contest. Conversely, China would obviously like to avoid this united front against it and seek to pursue separate negotiations with

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each of the other disputants. One way for Beijing to break up or forestall an ongoing or prospective coalition against it is to entice one of its members to leave it – the proverbial weakest link in this coalition. It will focus on that country where it is easiest and cheapest for its inducements to succeed. The logic of the discussion thus far points to Brunei or Malaysia as the most likely candidates for this overture. Others like Laos, Cambodia, and Myamar (countries that are not directly involved in maritime disputes with China but are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) can also be expected to be lobbied and recruited by Beijing to prevent any appearance of a unified Southeast Asian opposition to China’s sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. Naturally, to break the weakest link can also involve coercion and intimidation in an effort to demonstrate that there is a serious cost to any country that decides to antagonize China. At least economically speaking, this coercion may be more effective against the Philippines than others. The more general point here is that Beijing is likely to pursue a dual track of “harder on the hard track, and softer on the soft track” in order to show to its dispute counterparts and even third parties that an accommodative and cooperative posture toward China promises large rewards whereas a confrontational posture entails severe costs. Beijing’s punitive responses can involve economic and diplomatic boycott such as those that it has directed against Manila. From the perspective of a target country of China’s overtures to settle a bilateral maritime dispute, it is likely to receive the most attractive offer from Beijing if it can position itself as the first one to break ranks with its other counterparts – this situation promises the greatest benefit to China for the obvious advertisement value showing Beijing as a reasonable and accommodating negotiation partner and demonstrating its ability to lure away a member from an opposing coalition. As the first mover, this target of Beijing’s overture can also more reasonably expect that Beijing will not renege on its terms of offer (what Fearon 1995 has called the commitment problem) for the obvious reason that Beijing will have to pay a higher reputation cost if it were to do so and consequently, by this action diminish its chances to settle subsequently with its other dispute counterparts (who would then demand a higher level of confidence in China’s commitment to a deal if they are to settle their respective disputes with Beijing). Proposition 10: A smaller, weaker and more distant dispute counterpart is more likely to settle with China and this country is likely to receive the most advantageous offer to settle from Beijing. If the above hypothesis is correct about the first country to settle with Beijing will receive the most favorable terms, then there is an incentive for all to be that country. One would not want to be the last one to settle because by then one will be left with no allies and because all the territories being contested could have already been determined by the other contesting countries. This last remark of course reflects the fact that those who are contesting jurisdictions in the South China Sea are not only making claims against Beijing but are also advancing claims

178 Steve Chan against each other. The last holdout can consequently face the risk of being completely shut out. This situation in turn suggests another proposition. Proposition 11: Maritime disputes in the South China Sea can remain in a situation of stalemate for a long time but when/if China reaches a settlement with one of the other contestants, this settlement is likely to be followed in rapid succession by others. The discussion thus far has not given enough attention to the proverbial elephant in the room. Although the US is not a direct disputant in contested sovereignty in the South and East China Seas, its policies will have a determinative effect on the evolution of these disputes. As already mentioned, the decision by China’s dispute counterparts to hold out rather than settle their disputes with Beijing is at least in part based on their expectation that US involvement will offset Beijing’s advantages in any bilateral contest. Their decision to postpone settlement is at least in part a vote of confidence in the US coming to their support. Washington, however, is in a delicate situation. It wants to protect its formal or informal allies from Chinese pressure without, however, encouraging them to use Washington’s support to antagonize Beijing or even to deliberately provoke the latter in a deliberate attempt to engulf the US in an unwanted confrontation with China for sake of these allies’ own agenda and benefits. As Snyder (1997) has mentioned some time ago, alliances create the institutions to aggregate several countries’ capabilities when facing a common adversary, but from the perspective of the alliance leader they also create the danger of entrapment by its junior partners. It is also true that the latter situation can be reversed so that South Korea and Japan’s alliances with the US can embroil them in a conflict with China, say, over Taiwan that they would rather prefer to stay out of. If, as suggested earlier, those countries facing a competing Chinese sovereignty claim actually do not confront the same degree of pressure from Beijing and the same level of danger of a military escalation and if they have good reason to expect differential treatment by Beijing in negotiating a settlement, they will also have different valuation of potential political or military support from the US. For example, Brunei and Malaysia will see less of a threat from Beijing and hence have a diminished demand for US military protection than, say, the Philippines (the supply of this US protection will of course come with a price tag). Conversely, the US will see less of a compelling reason to extend support to Brunei and Malaysia to the extent that its real objective is less to help these countries in their bilateral quarrels with China and has more to do with leveraging such quarrels in advancing its more fundamental objective to contain China’s rise. If the latter explanation is correct, then Washington’s support is likely to have the effect of stiffening the resolve of some countries – most likely the Philippines, Vietnam, and Japan – to resist Beijing’s demands, whereas this effect is likely to be absent or at least greatly attenuated for other countries that find themselves in a less intense dispute with China. Naturally, countries that find themselves in a maritime dispute can be expected to play the

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“US card” in order to gain more advantageous settlement terms from Beijing, something that Chinese negotiators are clearly aware of. Proposition 12: The stronger a country’s alliance ties with the US, the less likely it is to settle its dispute with China. Paradoxically, this stronger alliance will also encourage and enable Washington to urge greater restraint on its partner in order to avoid a military escalation with Beijing. This hypothesis, along with others suggested earlier, leads to the expectation that China’s maritime disputes with Japan and to a lesser extent the Philippines are most likely to linger in an unresolved state for a long time. Beijing is most likely to put its dispute with Tokyo on a back burner and let the situation take its natural course to mature into an indefinite future. Finally, any assurance of US support in a possible military clash with China is tantamount to an attempt by Washington to provide extended deterrence (Morgan 1977). An extended deterrence involves a threat by a country to take military action to protect an ally. Compared to a threat to fight if one’s homeland is attacked, this promise to fight for the sake of an ally is inherently not credible (Schelling 1966). This promise has to be made credible by the deterring country’s deeds rather than just its words. It can try to increase its credibility to intervene by “sinking costs” or “tying its hands” (Fearon 1997). For example, it can build military bases on an ally’s territory, form joint military command with it, sell advanced weapons to it, enter into a defense treaty with it, and announce publicly and repeatedly that its treaty commitment to this ally will apply to a possible military situation involving China. In all these respects, Washington’s support for Tokyo is much more credible than, say, for Hanoi. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that the US will want to involve itself again in a military fight in Indochina. Proposition 13: Depending on the robustness or fragility of prospective US support for those countries contesting China’s territorial claims, some are more likely to settle their disputes with Beijing (those with only weak expectation of US support) than others. This hypothesis suggests again that China’s disputes with Japan and the Philippines are more intractable than its disputes with Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam. This inference also reflects the expectation that Beijing is least willing to pick a fight that may end up involving US intervention. Thus far the various propositions have referred mostly to dispute persistence or resolution. How about dispute escalation? What circumstances are likely to incline Beijing to resort to arms? The previous discussion has already hinted at some domestic factors encouraging this inclination, specifically when Chinese leaders find themselves facing internal disarray or a setback (such as the Great Leap Forward campaign and the Tibetan insurgency preceding the Sino-Indian border war in 1962). As well, Chinese leaders are more likely to act militarily when they sense that their foreign opponents are initiating encroaching policies out of a belief that

180 Steve Chan Beijing is weakened and besieged by internal problems or external isolation (again, as exemplified by New Delhi’s so-called forward policy in 1962) so that it is incapacitated by these difficulties. Beijing is especially likely to resort to arms when it sees itself facing a window of vulnerability and when it believes that this vulnerability will only increase in the face of passivity. Its past use of force in the “near abroad” does not stem from a confidence that it will necessarily prevail on the battlefield or that its use of force will resolve a difficult problem once and for all. Rather, this use of force is intended to send a political signal that it will hit back if challenged – even when it is facing a much stronger foe such as the US in Korea in 1951 and the USSR over the Ussuri in 1969. This posture has been described as “reactive assertiveness”.1 Another episode characterized by some of the elements just described occurred in 1979 when Vietnam aligned itself with the USSR and invaded Cambodia which was a Chinese ally. In this case, China initiated a border war with Vietnam in order to “teach Hanoi a lesson”. Beijing’s use of force in this and the other cases suggests an attempt to halt a deteriorating political or security situation (either at home or abroad) from getting even worse (Christensen 2006), and it has accordingly been motivated more by a defensive than offensive desire. Chinese moves in these cases can be described as deterrence efforts to forestall enemy initiatives (an attempt that obviously failed in Korea when US forces crossed the 38th parallel, although arguably it had subsequently succeeded in preventing Douglas MacArthur from carrying out his threat to “roll back” communism and assist the Kuomintang to retake the Chinese mainland). These remarks do not deny that Beijing is also quite capable of going on the offensive when an opportunity presents itself, such as when it seized the Crescent group in the Paracels in 1974 when the crumpling Saigon government and the US forces departing the Vietnam War were not expected to put up an effective resistance. A possible declaration of formal independence by Taiwan can fit a situation whereby Chinese leaders can perceive themselves, to use the parlance of prospect theory (He 2016; Kahneman and Tversky 1979), as being placed in a domain of loss both domestically and internationally (in terms of the reputation costs they will suffer if they were to remain inactive). Amongst China’s various maritime disputes, such a situation is most likely to be precipitated by a challenge from a Vietnam that has become a formal or tacit US ally, thus presaging a fundamental change in Beijing’s relationship with this neighbor. Proposition 14: Tightening US security relations with an immediate neighbor of China engaging in a territorial dispute with Beijing coupled with a more vigorous challenge from this neighbor is most likely to become the catalyst for Beijing’s decision to escalate a dispute, especially when Beijing perceives itself being caught in a vulnerable domestic and/or international situation. As mentioned above, Vietnam’s increasingly close strategic relationship with the US (especially in view of Barack Obama’s visit to Hanoi in May 2016 and his announcement to lift the US ban on arms sales to Vietnam) can augur this possibility. At this point, China is in complete control of the Paracels for which Vietnam

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has also advanced a claim. Chinese and Vietnamese vessels have clashed in these waters. Vietnam, like China, has also staked out claims and asserted physical control over some islands in the Spratlys. Given Beijing’s prior behavior, however, largescale military clashes (though not necessarily minor naval skirmishes) are less likely to occur in both of these areas. If an escalation were to occur, China is more likely to exert its military leverage on land where it also shares a border with Vietnam. If the expectations sketched out in the last hypothesis are generally correct, they suggest that the US need to be cautious in its actions so that they will have a calming effect rather than causing the opposite result of actually exacerbating China’s concerns and encouraging a conflict to escalate. Parenthetically, this discussion does not contradict the previous claim that China would rather not pick a fight when there is a risk of the US getting involved. Having to confront the US directly in a military situation will be Beijing’s last resort rather than its first choice. But as just discussed and as history has shown, Beijing will not shrink from this prospect if it senses that its even larger interests are in jeopardy. One may be reminded of past US conduct as a historical parallel. How did the US behave during its period of rapid rise to claim regional hegemony? It was much more assertive and expansionist in its “near abroad” than China is today – with respect to its border disputes with Canada, its interventions in Central and South America and, of course, its “muscular” policies in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean. As a result of the Spanish-American war, it invaded Cuba, annexed Puerto Rico and Guam, and waged a military campaign to colonize the Philippines. It also supported Mexican insurgents and Panamanian rebels – in the latter case to secede from Colombia so that the US could build and control the Panama Canal. Its expansion also reached the Hawaiian archipelago which was subsequently annexed. This expansion far exceeded China’s current ambitions as represented by “the cow tongue” or “the nine-dotted line” demarcating Beijing’s territorial claim in the South China Sea. As Graham Allison (2017) has remarked in his recent book, one would only wish that the Chinese will not follow the US model and imitate the imperialist policies of Teddy Roosevelt. This history may also incline one to ask whether the US would follow the footsteps of the British, who decided to accommodate US demands and concede the Western Hemisphere to this rising power in order to better focus its attention and resources to confront another rising power (Germany) that is located closer to its home base. The likely answer to this question is “no”. The election of Donald Trump to the US presidency, however, has raised additional questions about the continuity of preexisting US patterns of behavior or the durability of Washington’s traditional policy orientations. His administration has evidently turned away from multilateral institutions and collective action with longtime allies. It has adopted more nationalist, unilateralist, and isolationist policies in matters concerning trade, defense, immigration, and the environment. It is of course too early to tell whether the Trump administration’s predilections represent only a temporary aberration from prior US policies or presage a more permanent and fundamental break from them. Nevertheless, to the extent that these policies have the effect of shaking the confidence of those countries engaging in ongoing maritime disputes in US

182 Steve Chan commitments to and support for them in possible confrontations with China, they are less likely to pick fights with Beijing. The Trump administration’s policies may thus precipitate or accelerate policy reorientations on the part of traditional US allies in the Asia Pacific such as in the case of the Philippines (even though Rodrigo Duterte’s rapprochement with Beijing occurred during the Obama administration and thus predated Trump). Proposition 15: The policies of the Trump administration are likely to incline the other claimant states to hedge their policies and to avoid dispute escalation with Beijing. These policies are therefore likely to have a calming effect on the maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas, causing the claimant states to become more favorably disposed to accept détente measures. As just implied by the above hypothesis, Washington’s policies loom large in other countries’ dispositions and calculations, whether they are its longtime allies or nominal neutrals. The reverse, however, is not necessarily true. That is, the maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas are more likely to be matters of secondary interest and concern to Washington, taking a backseat to its overall strategic relations with Beijing. This is to argue that these disputes have derivative rather than intrinsic importance to the US, derivative in the sense that they tend to be largely seen in the context of US–China bilateral relations and subordinated to these ties. If this is true and if Donald Trump’s style for reaching agreements and making deals is “transactional” (rather than “principled”), as it has been described in the popular media, then Asia’s maritime disputes can become more closely linked to other issues – ones that are of greater concern to and receive higher priority in Washington. This being the case, mutual accommodation or exchange of assistance and concessions between the US and China can become more feasible – such as Washington reciprocating Beijing’s support in the matter of North Korea’s nuclear program by curtailing its arms sales to Taiwan or Vietnam, or by equivocating on whether its treaty obligations to Japan and the Philippines would apply to the latter countries’ maritime disputes (at one time, Washington did prevaricate on this question until in Japan’s case, the Obama administration came out with more explicit and strident declarations in support of Tokyo). Although at the time of writing the Trump administration is still in its early days and it seems to be mired in domestic political turmoil, its policies may have an unintended effect in reducing the danger (for Washington) of entrapment and in inclining the disputing parties to avoid confrontation and perhaps even to seek settlement or to at least pursue temporary accommodation.

Conclusion The propositions advanced in this chapter are derived from existing international relations theories and some prior work on Chinese foreign policy. Some of these propositions reflect prevailing views – whereas others contradict conventional wisdom such as that suggested by the literature on democratic peace and offensive

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realism. The propositions reflect my understanding of the pertinent studies and my interpretation of the available evidence. Other people may very well disagree with me, but the whole point of presenting hypotheses is to articulate one’s claims explicitly and to submit them to empirical verification even if such examination were to disprove these claims. I have stated my propositions as bivariate hypotheses for ease of presentation although they can in principle be tested in a multivariate format. However, in actual practice, there are only a small number of maritime disputes involving China and we therefore encounter a problem caused by the number of independent variables exceeding the number of cases. This limitation can be relaxed if we expand the number of cases being studied to include instances of China’s border disputes on the land. Moreover, the logic behind the various propositions about Beijing’s strategic outlook should be reasonably clear and by examining how the various disputes evolve over time, we can at least catch a glimpse of how the conflict dynamics have been affected (or not) by those factors mentioned in this essay and gain a general sense of their relative influence (if not in a strictly statistical sense). Even when we cannot use multivariate statistical analysis to take on the hypotheses presented here, there are still other possible methodologies to lend some rigor to our analysis. Boolean logic, for example, presents one such approach to study whether the presence or absence of various putative causal factors is regularly associated with particular event outcomes (for example, Chan 2003; Ragin 1985). Finally, some of the propositions presented in this chapter point to convergent expectations. For instance, unpleasant historical memory, potential domestic political repercussions, geographic proximity, and Japan’s security ties with the US all tend to suggest that this country’s maritime dispute with China is much more likely to be shelved than resolved compared to Beijing’s other such disputes. Similarly, due to its physical distance (from China) and size (much smaller and weaker than China), Brunei is more likely to be accommodated by China than the other contesting countries. For various reasons such as its strategic position in Northeast Asia, its burgeoning economic relationship with China, and its historical and cultural proximity to China, South Korea also appears to be such a candidate in contrast to, say, Japan whose dispute with China promises to be the most difficult to resolve. Such cases of convergent expectations based on different reasons perhaps warrant a greater degree of confidence. The variables may interact in such a way that each of them does not necessarily offer a straightforward prediction. That is, the same variable may produce different expectations in the presence or absence of other pertinent variables. Thus, for example, physical and historical proximity may play out differently in the case of Vietnam compared to South Korea. If Hanoi is seen by Beijing to be concluding a strategic relationship with Washington, its border conflict with China presages the greatest danger for military escalation for reasons already given earlier. It is also pertinent to note that some of the factors hypothesized earlier to influence dispute resolution, persistence, or escalation point to different expectations. For instance, Vietnam’s authoritarian political system should make negotiation to settle this country’s dispute with China easier, but its physical proximity to China should also

184 Steve Chan make its leaders more wary of growing Chinese influence. The future evolution of the dispute between these countries can therefore give us a hint about which of these variables producing divergent expectations turns out to be a more powerful predictor. To the extent that some of the suggested variables are roughly similar for some of China’s dispute counterparts – such as large economic stake in and close geographic proximity to China, and also deep and extensive security ties with the US in the cases of Japan and South Korea, we may also want to undertake comparative analysis to investigate what other factors may account for any differences in Beijing’s approach to dealing with these counterparts.

Note 1 International Crisis Group (ICG). 2013. Retrieved at: http://www.crisis.group.org/ ~/media/Files/asia/north-east-asia/245-dangerous-waters-China-japan-relations-on-therocks.pdf.

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Mansfield, E.D. and J. Snyder. 2005. Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Mearsheimer, J.J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton. Morgan, P.M. 1977. Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Nincic, M. 2011. The Logic of Positive Engagement. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Olson, M. Jr. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Putnam, R.D. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization, 42(3): 427–460. Ragin, Charles. 1985. The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Quantitative and Qualitative Strategies. Berkeley: University of California Press. Russett, B.M. and J.R. Oneal. 2001. Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organizations. New York: Norton. Schelling, T.C. 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Snyder, G.H. 1997. Alliance Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Index

Note: page numbers in bold denote references to Tables. Abe, Shinzo 70, 82, 86, 91 Acharya, Amitav 152, 166 ADMM-Plus (ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus) 125 adversarial balancing diplomacy 116, 118, 126 Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) 53 Allison, Graham 181 analytical eclecticism 8 anarchic international systems: commitment problems 16; credibility 16; information problems in 15–16 Anglo-German rivalry 34 anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities 32, 54 Aquino, Benigno S. 89–90, 92 Arbitral Tribunal ruling 65–6 ASEAN. See Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) 88 ASEAN Plus Three (APT) 136–7, 164 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 117, 120, 124–5, 137–9; Japan and 88 ASEAN-US relations 122–3 Asian Democratic Security Diamond 82 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) 120 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 72, 140, 163 Asia-Pacific Community, as regional institution 152 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 117, 119–20, 122, 136, 152 Asia’s long peace 98–101 Aso, Taro 89

assertive policy 54 See also deterrence-based assertiveness; opportunistic assertiveness associational balancing diplomacy 116, 118, 119–23, 126, 127 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): as balancing force 119; China influencing solidarity of 138–9; diplomacy style 136–7; geopolitics of consensus 135–7; inauguration of 135; as ineffective and inconsequential 144; leadership absence 137–9; Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism 153; as regional organization 161–2; resolving intra-regional tensions 136; US relations with 122–3; weakening of 126–7. See also ADMM-Plus (ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus); ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Austin, Greg 6 Australia 160 ballistic missile carrying submarines (SSBNs) 36 Baogang He 152 bargaining game: failed 15; information problems in 15–16; missed opportunities in 21–2; successful 15 Battle for the Atlantic 34 Battle of Jutland 34 Battle of Midway 34 Battle of Trafalgar 34 Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) 67 Beeson, M. 161 Beijing consensus 140 belt and road initiative (BRI) 60

Index 187 border disputes 175 Brunei 178 Brzezinski, Z. 33 Bush, George W. 67, 122 Cambodia 144, 154, 157 Campbell, Kurt 6 Carter, Ashton 21 Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 157 Cha, Victor 165 charm offensive 142 charm offensive, China 121, 134, 141 Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) 120–1 China: Asian security concept 121; assertive policy 4–5; charm offensive 121, 134, 141, 142; as continental power 31; deteriorating relations with United States 102; divide and rule policy 145; economic center of gravity 36–7; enlightened self-interest of 59; evolving from continental to maritime power 36; expanding maritime capabilities 31; external trade 105; geostrategic goals 35–8; great leap forward 38–9; historical fundamentalism approach to South China Sea 39; India and 70–4; influencing ASEAN solidarity 138–9; international strategy 54; as key to security regionalism 166; land reclamation 1–2; low-profile policy 16; maintaining regional stability 49–50; multilateral diplomacy 120; nationalism 104; national strategy 5; naval strategy 54; neighborhood diplomacy of 157; oil rig deployment 51–2; one hundred years of humiliation 142; policy dilemma 15; power position 16; protecting rights 49–50; reactive assertiveness 180; regional approach toward South China Sea 155–9; reversion to geopolitical business 142–3; Scarborough Shoal crisis 6–7; self-restraint 50; South China Sea as core interest 37–8, 53; South China Sea strategy 39–42; unilateral multilateralism of 121–2; use of force 180; vulnerability of 180. See also strategic goals, China; strategic means, China; Xi Jinping China-ASEAN bilateral relations 157 China-ASEAN Research Centre 157 China National Offshore Oil Corporation 51 Chinese assertiveness 49–50

Clinton, Bill 122 Clinton, Hillary 3, 6, 33–4, 123, 160 Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea 59 Code of Conduct (COC) 24, 25, 58, 59, 88 Cold War 31–2, 99 commitment problems 16, 17, 20–2 community of destiny 156–7 competition intensification 151 Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) 121, 154–5, 164 conflict resolution 151 constructivism perspective 30 contestation 102–4, 107–11, 112 Copenhagen Climate Summit 72 costly signaling method 17–20 credibility 17–18, 25, 102–3; in anarchic international systems 16 Cui Tiankai 6 Dai Xu 53, 54, 56 Danube conflict 152–3 dash line map. See nine-dash line Declaration of Conduct (DOC) 24, 59, 153, 156 Defence Framework Agreement 67 democracy, definition of 173 democratization 40–1 Deng Xiaoping 121, 171 deterrence-based assertiveness 50–1, 54–5, 58 See also assertive policy dispute escalation 179–81 dispute settlement: boosting domestic standing 173; domestically secure leaders 172–3; economic interdependence 174; geographic location and 175–8; last holdouts 177–8; mutual accommodation and 172; postponing 171–2, 178; punitive responses 177; two-level games 172; when leaders approach elections 173 divide and rule policy, Chinese 126–7, 138, 144–5 Duterte, Rodrigo 90, 91, 138 East Asia’s multilateral architecture (EAMA) 116; associational balancing diplomacy 119–23; institutional balancing with 116–19 East Asia Summit (EAS) 121, 146 economic interdependence fostering peace 174 European Union 135

188 Index exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 3, 37, 51, 87, 107 Expanded AMF (EAMF) 88–9 extended deterrence 179 fake liberalism 83 First Island Chain 36 flashpoint: definition of 29; South China Sea as 30–4 freedom of navigation 6 Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations 1–2, 6, 17, 19, 25, 92–3 Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific 121 Fu Ying 5 geopolitical analysis 30 geopolitical rivalry 31–4, 43 geopolitics of consensus 135–7 Glaser, Bonnie 4 Global Financial Crisis of 2008 33 global rules-based order. See rules-based order Gorbachev, Mikhail 122 Grare, Frédéric 75 great power relations 99–100, 109–10, 111–12, 153 Greenert, Jonathan 24 Guam doctrine 100 Guochong Xu 152 Hainan Island 36 hard balancing diplomacy 118 hardliners: on China’s strategic goals 53–4; on China’s strategic means 54–5; in Chinese debates 61, 61; description of 48; on policy influence and assessments 55; on risk propensity 55 Harris, Harry 41, 52 Hawke, Bob 151, 153 He, Kai 141 hedging strategy 140–1 historical fundamentalism 39 Hu Jintao 56 Ikenberry, John 111 Impeccable Incident 4, 33 India 35; border disputes 175; China strategy for 71–4; Japan and 68; Look East policy 66–7; Maldives and 75; on maritime dispute between China and Philippines 65–6; nuclear deterrent 72–3; nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) 73, 76; oil and gas

exploration 69; response to US-China rivalry 75; rules-based order 69–70; Singapore and 68; and South China Sea 68–70; Southeast Asian state’s perceptions of 75; Sri Lanka and 75; strategic partnership agreements 67–8; trade with East Asian states 67; tri-service integrated command 73; Vietnam and 68 Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) 67 Indian Ocean Regional Association (IORA) 67 information problems 15–16, 25 institutional architecture: evolution of 135–9; modest impact of 134; socialization process 139–40. See also regional institutions institutional balancing diplomacy 116–19, 140–2 intellectual foundations, major fault lines in Chinese debates 61 International Court of Justice 145, 158 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 19 international institutions, alleviating commitment problems 22–3 internationalization 170 international law: China’s actions incompatible with 86–7, 105; China’s island building and 52–3; Japan upholding 87–8, 93; maritime disputes settled by 82–3, 108–9; UNCLOS and 65; United States emphasizing 42, 159, 163 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 120 international order. See liberal international order interstate balancing diplomacy 116 intra-balancing diplomacy 117–18 island building. See land reclamation/island building Jakobson, Linda 4 Japan 35; approach to regional order 84; bilateral dealings 89–90; bilateral ties with Vietnam 90; endorsing US-led alliance 160; failing liberalism 90–1; fake liberalism 83; hard balancing diplomacy 91; interest in Asia’s seas 82, 86; Ministry of Defense 91–2; multilateral cooperation 93; National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) 92, 93;

Index 189 National Security Strategy (NSS) 86; Philippines strategic partnership 89–91; promoting liberal international order 84; realism camouflaged as liberalism 93–4; realist interests in South China Sea disputes 83–7; reliance on Straits of Malacca 83–4; as rules promoter for trade 82; selective multilateralism 88–9; soft balancing diplomacy 90–1; United States alliance with 85–6; United States support for 179; upholding international law 87–8; Yoshida Doctrine 84 Johnston, A.I. 5 Jones, D.M. 157, 159 Ju Hailong 58 Kaplan, Robert 32 Kerry, John 125 Kishia Fumio 88 Kissinger, Henry 152, 163–4 Korean flashpoint 37 Korean Peninsula 33 Kuik, C-C. 140 land campaigns 34 land reclamation/island building 1–2, 4; embarking on 40; hardliners’ views on 55–6; moderates’ views on 60; pragmatists’ views on 52–3; purpose of 20; as sinking costs strategy 20; stopping 21–2; US military and 107 Laos 144, 154, 157 legal fundamentalism 39 Leifer, Michael 117 Le Luong Minh 125 liberal international order 84, 110–11 Li Keqiang 156 Little, Richard 118 Liu Huaqing 35–6 Liu Jinsong 65 locking-in strategy 17, 22–4 Luo Yuan 53, 54 Macapagal-Arnoyo, Gloria 89 Mahan, Alfred Thayer 36 Malaysia 178 Maldives 75 Manila 170 Mao Zedong 155, 173 March West concept 38–9 maritime commerce, obstructing 6 maritime disputes: between China and Philippines 65; China vs. South Korea

175; dual-track approach 156–7; extended deterrence 179; lingering in unresolved state 179; playing the US card 178–9; Scarborough Shoal model 51; as secondary interest to United States 182; Sino-Malaysian 174; Sino-Vietnamese 174 maritime domain awareness (MDA) 92 maritime rivalries: components of 34; contemporary Asia-Pacific rivalries 35–8, 35; historical 34 maritime security 5, 68, 69–70, 89–93, 105 See also regional security maritime silk road 38 maritime territorial claims, bilateral approach 156 Mastanduno, M. 107 Mattis, James 41, 125–6, 164 Ma Ying-jeou 36 Midford, P. 87 military balancing 118, 141 moderates: on China’s strategic goals 56–7; on China’s strategic means 58–9; in Chinese debates 61, 61; description of 48; policy influence and assessments 59–60 Modi, Narendra 72 moral realism theory 57–8 Morrow, James 16 multilateral institutions 152–3 multilateralism 88–9, 117–23, 126, 157, 159, 165 See also unilateral multilateralism mutual accommodation 172 Myanmar, democratization of 40 Napoleonic Wars 34 national autonomy 146 National Institute for SCS Studies (NISCS) 157 nationalism, Chinese 84–5, 102, 104, 110, 140, 164 national sovereignty 135 neighborhood diplomacy 157 neo-isolationism 101 nine-dash line 3, 17, 18, 108, 181 Noda Yoshihiko 89–90 non-military balancing diplomacy 118 North Korea 33, 37, 160 Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) 71–2 nuclear weapon capabilities 112 Nye reports 101

190 Index Obama, Barack 41, 67, 123 Obama administration 9, 33, 43, 103, 106, 116, 123–4, 163, 182 offensive realism 175 oil rig incident 51–2 Okinotorishima territory 87 One Belt, One Road program 38–9, 72 opportunistic assertiveness 54–5 See also assertive policy Pacific regionalism 163–4 Paracels 1, 3, 6, 22, 173, 180–1 Parrikar, Manohar 70 peace through strength 54 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 32 Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) 42, 87, 170 perpetual peace doctrine 161, 166 Philippines: China’s policy toward 6–7; as claimant state 157; Japan’s bilateral dealings with 89–90; Japan’s support for 87–8; maritime dispute with China 65; Scarborough Shoal crisis 6–7; Visiting Forces Agreement 92 Phung Quang Thanh 162 pivot policy in Asia. See rebalance policy PLA Navy 36 policy influence and assessments: hardliners’ views on 55–6; major fault lines in Chinese debates 61; moderates’ views on 59–60; pragmatists’ views on 51–3 pragmatists: in Chinese debates 61, 61; description of 48; deterrence-based assertiveness and 50–1; policy influence and assessments 51–3; on strategic goals 49–50 principled security network 21 private information 15, 16, 17, 24 Putnam, Robert 172 rational bargaining theory 15 rationalists 8, 15, 61 Razak, Najib 138 reactive assertiveness 180 realism perspective 29–30, 57–8, 142 rebalance policy. See United States regional institutions: functions of 151; influencing behavior of states 134; maintaining stability 145. See also institutional architecture regionalism. See security regionalism regional security: China-led 154–5; China’s interests in 105; definition of 99; governance 157; great power relations

and 99–100; plasticity in 104; US dominant role in 100; US military presence and 107. See also maritime security regional uncertainty, states responding to 106–7 Ren Xiao 105 Rice, Condoleeza 123 Richardson, John W. 53 rights first, stability second policy 56 rimland regions 30, 32 risk propensity: hardliners’ views on 55; major fault lines in Chinese debates 61 rivalry, definition of 29 Ross, Robert 31, 33 Rudd, Kevin 152, 158 rules-based order 69–70, 75, 108–9 Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters Memorandum of Understanding 2, 23 SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) 72 Scarborough Shoal incident 6–7, 48, 51, 55 sea lines of communication (SLOCs) 41–2, 69, 84, 100 security, definition of 99 security order: aristocratic vision of 110; Asia’s strategic map 109; contested nature of 107–11; definition of 98–9; economic vs. 111; egalitarian concept of 110; forces shifting 105–7; instability of 102; purpose of 104 security regionalism: achieving perpetual peace 166; ASEAN-led 164–5; as battleground in US-Sino rivalry 163–4; as check against United States 157–8; China as key to 166; compatibility of American alliance 164–5; contestation 166; definition of 152; functions of 166; great power management and 153; mutually reinforcing 165; proposals for 152–4; reducing conflicts 154; US alliance approach 159–62. See also regionalism security threats 99 Senkaku/Diaoyu islets 85, 143 Seungjoo, Lee 117–18 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) 67, 154 Shi Yinhong 57–8 Singapore 68, 154, 160

Index 191 sinking costs strategy 17–18, 19, 24–5, 179 Sino-American relations 112 Sino-Indian security dilemma 70–4 Sino-Japanese relations 102, 112, 163 Sino-Malaysian maritime disputes 174 Slow Intensity Conflict (SLIC) 39 Smith, M.L.R. 157, 159 Snyder, G.H. 178 soft balancing diplomacy 118 South Korea 161 Spratly islands 1–2, 6, 22, 40, 52, 55–6, 59–60, 158–9, 162, 181 Spykman, Nicholas 30 Sri Lanka 75 Stalingrad 34 Straits of Malacca 83–4, 91 strategic goals, China: hardliners’ views on 53–4; major fault lines in Chinese debates 61; moderates’ views on 56–7; pragmatists’ views on 49–50 strategic hedging 140–1 strategic means, China: hardliners’ views on 54–5; major fault lines in Chinese debates 61; moderates’ views on 58–9; pragmatists’ views on 50 Swarup, Vikas 65–6 Synder, G.H. 178 Taiwan, US-China tensions over 37 Taiwan Strait 33 Tellis, Ashley 71 territorial disputes: encouraging leader to settle 174–5; India and 65, 69; Japan and 85–6; managing 108; Philippines and 90; plasticity and 104; pragmatists approach to 49, 59; Xi and 143 Thailand, democratization of 40–1 Third Offset Strategy 32 Thucydides Trap 34, 142 Tillerson, Rex W. 1, 41, 125, 164 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 139 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) 121 Truc, Tran Cong 162 Trump, Donald 41, 135, 139, 181 Trump administration: abandoning TPP 164; hostile attitude of 1; India and 75; international society and 139, 145, 146; prior US policies and 181–2; on regional security commitments 103; responding to geopolitical realities 43 Trump-Xi Mar-a-Lago Summit 1 trying hands 17 tying hands strategy 19, 179

UNCLOS (UN Convention of the Law of the Sea) 3 unilateral multilateralism 121–2 See also multilateralism unipolarity, balancing during 118 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 42, 87–8, 108 United States: approach to multilateralism 122; assertiveness/expansionist in near abroad 181; bureaucratic politics between Pentagon and White House 6; credibility 25; Defence Framework Agreement 67; defining its national interests 40; deteriorating relations with China 102; dominant role in regional security 100; exercising primacy 103; geostrategic goals 40–1; India and 69–70, 74–5; keep-a-distance policy 16–17; legal fundamentalism approach to South China Sea 39; on maritime claims in South China Sea 18; as maritime power 31; obsession with sea lines of communication 41; policy toward China 33–4; rebalance policy 5–6, 21, 43, 106, 123–6; reduced credibility of 107; South China Sea strategy 42; supporting Brunei 178; supporting Malaysia 178; weakened regional leadership 106. See also Obama administration; Trump administration United States Navy 1–2 US-China rivalry 75, 163–4 US Department of Defense 40 U-shaped line 61 US-India Nuclear Deal 67 US-India strategic partnership 74 US-Japan alliance 85–6 US-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation 92 US-led alliance system 159–62 USNS Impeccable. See Impeccable Incident US State Department 18 Vietnam: anti-Chinese riots in 125; as claimant state 157; India and 68; Japan’s strategic partnership with 90; oil rig incident 51–2; Paracels 180–1; pursuing regional approach to SCS 162; security regionalism 154 Wang Jisi 38, 158 Wang Yi 21, 59, 125, 155, 156–7 Waterloo 34 weiwen vs. weiquan 49–50

192 Index Wesley, Michael 41 White, Hugh 4 World War II 34 Wu Shengli 53 Wu Shicun 5, 53 Xi Jinping 22, 31, 38, 103, 105, 121, 156, 164 See also China Xuan Linh 162 Xue Li 60

Yang Jiechi 34, 109–10, 124–5, 145 Yan Xuetong 57, 58 Yew, Lee Kuan 68, 160 Yin Zhuo 56 Yoshida Doctrine 84 Yoshida Shigeru 84 Yuen Fong Khong 117 Zhou Fangyin 50 Zhu Feng 39