Urbanizing China in War and Peace: The Case of Wuxi County 082484100X, 9780824841003

Table of contents :
Contents
Acknowledgments
Weights and Measures
Introduction
Chapter One. The “Little Shanghai”: Urbanization of Wuxi City
Chapter Two. Wuxi Elites and Infrastructure: Urbanization of the Countryside
Chapter Three. Local Elites and the State: Managing Wuxi during the Warlord Era
Chapter Four. Abolish the County to Establish the City (Fei xian wei shi)
Chapter Five. The Nationalist State and Rural Infrastructure
Chapter Six. A Connected City: Native Place Societies, Migration, and Disaster Relief
Chapter Seven. Threads of Silk: Economic Recovery in Occupied Wuxi
Chapter Eight. The Utility of Rubble: Rebuilding the City and the Countryside
Chapter Nine. A Militarized Environment: Japanese Impact on Daily Life
Conclusion
Character List
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Urbanizing China in War and Peace

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Urbanizing China in War and Peace The Case of Wuxi County

Toby Lincoln

University of Hawai`i Press Honolulu

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© 2015 University of Hawai`i Press All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America 20 19 18 17 16 15     6 5 4 3 2 1 Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-­P ublication Data Lincoln, Toby, author.
 Urbanizing China in war and peace : the case of Wuxi County / Toby Lincoln.
 pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index.
 ISBN 978-0-8248-4100-3 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1.  Urbanization—­China—­Wuxi (Jiangsu Sheng)  2.  Wuxi (Jiangsu Sheng, China)—­ History—20th century.  I.  Title. HT384.C62L56 2015 307.760951'136— ­dc23 2014040353

Publication of this volume has been assisted by a grant from the Association for Asian Studies.

University of Hawai`i Press books are printed on acid-­f ree paper and meet the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Council on Library Resources. Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc.

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Contents

ac­k no w ­l e d g­m e n t s vii w e ig h t s a n d m e a ­s u r e s ix Introduction 1 ch a pt e r o n e

The “Little Shanghai”: Urbanization of Wuxi City 17 ch a pt e r tw o

Wuxi Elites and Infrastructure: Urbanization of the Countryside 38 ch a pt e r th r e e

Local Elites and the State: Managing Wuxi during the Warlord Era 55 ch a pt e r f o u r

Abolish the County to Establish the City (Fei xian wei shi) 72

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Contents

ch a pt e r f i v e

The Nationalist State and Rural Infrastructure 89 ch a pt e r s i x

A Connected City: Native Place Societies, Migration, and Disaster Relief 108 ch a pt e r s e v e n

Threads of Silk: Economic Recovery in Occupied Wuxi 127 ch a pt e r e i g ht

The Utility of Rubble: Rebuilding the City and the Countryside 146 ch a pt e r n i n e

A Militarized Environment: Japa­nese Impact on Daily Life 163 Conclusion 180

ch a r a c te r L ist 187 n ote s 193 b i b l i og rap hy 237 i nd e x 261

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Ac­know­ledg­ments

Over the ten years that it has taken for me to complete the research for this book, I have built up many debts that I will never be able to repay. I particularly thank Rana Mitter, for his constant and continued support. I was fortunate to be surrounded by many excellent scholars while at Oxford, but discussions with Timothy Brook, Lily Chang, and Robert Cliver proved to be particularly helpful in developing some of the ideas that inform this work. Before that, Gary Tiedemann was influential during my time as a master’s student at SOAS. A postdoctoral year at Yale widened my intellectual horizons, and Fabian Drixler and Peter Perdue ­were im­mensely supportive. My colleagues, past and present, at the Center for Urban History at the University of Leicester have been very welcoming. If, as I hope, this book speaks to urban historians of countries other than China, it is in part because of their influence. The university has been very generous with its study leave, and I am grateful that I have been allowed time to let my ideas mature. Researching and writing this book has taken me to archives, libraries, and conferences around the world, and I have been fortunate to gain many friends along the way. Some have even read parts of the manuscript at various stages of incomprehensibility. I particularly thank Felix Boecking, ­Peter Carroll, Karl Gerth, Christian Hess, Denise Ho, Huang Xuelei, Isabella Jackson, David Luesink, Teh Yun Ma, Leon Rocha, Andres Rodriguez, and Malcolm Thompson. Colleagues in China and Taiwan have been kind enough to put up with my broken Chinese, and I have learned much from them. Ma Xueqiang, Wang Min, Chang Ning, and Xu Tao have provided many comments on my work. In Wuxi, Tang Keke was generous with his time and or­ga­nized meetings with local historians, who provided a fresh perspective.

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Ac­ k n o w­ l e d g­m e n t s

I  am also grateful to Lynda Bell and one anonymous reviewer for their careful reading of the manuscript. Any mistakes that remain are mine and mine alone. Writing is often a lonely endeavor, and many friends have provided diversions and introduced me to much of the music that has been my ever-­ present companion. I especially thank Daniel Evans, James Guppy, and Andy Stone for my playlist, but a host of others have given me something to dance to and sofas to crash on. You know who you are! This book draws on sources in numerous archives and libraries. Staff at the following institutions have been generous with their time: the Bod­ leian Library at Oxford, the British Library, the Institute of Modern History at the Academia Sinica, the Jiangsu Provincial Archives, the Library of Congress, the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, the Shanghai Library, the Shanghai Municipal Archives, the Wuxi Library, the Wuxi Municipal Archives, and Yale University Library. My editors at the University of Hawai`i Press, Stephanie Chun and Patricia Crosby, have guided me smoothly through the various stages of review and publication. I am grateful to Yung Tai Hsu, whose generous scholarship supported my D.Phil. Financial support also came from the Association for Asian Studies, the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Urban History Group, St. John’s College at Oxford, and the Universities’ China Committee in London. Finally, it only remains for me to thank my family, particularly my parents, Christine and Mike. Over many years, they have given me more than they will ever know, and it is to them that this book is dedicated.

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Weights and Mea­sures

dan: A mea­sure of weight equal to between 100 and 150 jin, with local variations. It can also be pronounced shi, as indicated in the character list, and this is always used to refer to grain. In Wuxi, shi was used to denote a weight of approximately 150 jin. The second pronunciation of dan is used for mea­sur­ing the weight of other items, such as cocoons and rice. In Wuxi, 1 dan of rice (before milling) weighed between 135 and 150 jin. dou: mea­sure word for grain equal to one-­tenth of a shi. jin (catty): A mea­sure of weight equal to between 1.1 and 1.3 pounds, with local variations. li: A mea­sure of distance equal to approximately 0.33 mile or 0.2 kilometer. mao: 1 mao equals .10 of a yuan. Mao is also referred to as jiao. mu: A mea­sure of area equal to approximately 0.67 acre, with local variations. tael: The Chinese ounce, a mea­sure of weight equal to one-­sixteenth of a jin. It is also a unit of account for uncoined silver with differing values. wen: The smallest unit of currency in late imperial and Republican China. Made of copper, it is normally referred to as copper cash in En­glish. 1,000 copper cash was equal to one tael, although there ­were local variations. yuan: The Chinese dollar, referring to silver coinage used from the late nineteenth century and to money issued by the Republic of China after the demonetization of silver in 1935. Sources: Lynda S. Bell, One Industry, Two Chinas: Silk Filatures and Peasant-­Family Production in Wuxi County, 1865–1937 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Thomas G. Rawski and Lillian M. Li, eds., Chinese History in Economic Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), xiii.

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Introduction

In 1912, the Chinese industrialist Rong Desheng wrote The Future of Wuxi (Wuxi zhi jianglai), a pamphlet about his home city. He described how local entrepreneurial families had used profits made in Shanghai and other neighboring cities to construct new factories. The simultaneous arrival of electric lights and the telephone ­were a boon to commerce, and a new road ran from Chongan Temple in the city center, out through the new north gate up to the railway station, and was now a vibrant thoroughfare. A library, parks, and hospitals had been constructed, and shops crowding the narrow streets boasted modern facades. Encouraged by this development, Rong had grand plans for the next fifteen years, including the de­mo­li­tion of the city wall, building two ring roads, conversion of steam-­powered factories to electricity, construction of a power station, and a commercial district just outside the west gate. He also foresaw pleasant residential zones around the peaks of the neighboring hills of Huishan and Xishan and plush villas along the banks of Lake Tai (Tai hu) to the south, away from the noise and pollution of factory chimneys.1 Interviewed thirty-­four years later, Rong reflected on his earlier work and said, “I feel that what is in the book was a dream. Even after ten years, what I said had not become reality, although in fact some of it had been surpassed. So what I say now, although it is similarly a dream, is also an inevitable trend.”2 He then outlined his new dream, while also explaining how Wuxi’s location was vital to its prosperity. Wuxi is between Nanjing and Shanghai and is accessible from all directions by land and water. It also benefits from being a county along the route between Nanjing and Shanghai. If Wuxi is to be prosperous, the connections

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between Nanjing and Shanghai must also prosper. This is the hinterland of Jiangsu, and Jiangsu is the most densely populated province in China. For this reason, Wuxi’s prosperity both directly and indirectly depends on the ­whole country. Turning to Wuxi’s topography, Suzhou is to the east and Changzhou to the west. A result of continuous development is that Suzhou, Wuxi, and Changzhou could be merged. So, the distant future of a greater Wuxi is to merge with Suzhou and Changzhou to create a large city of several million people, and this must rest upon the connections between Nanjing and Shanghai.3

This book is about the urbanization of Wuxi County. In the first half of the twentieth century, the city expanded in both area and population to become the largest manufacturing center in China outside treaty ports. Meanwhile, the urbanization of the countryside meant that the city and surrounding towns and villages became increasingly similar. As Rong pointed out, urbanization in Wuxi was part of a wider regional trend, and it was in fact driven by two pro­cesses. First, the expansion of industrial capitalism into China transformed Wuxi City as local elites established factories and then built urban infrastructure. They did not stop at the expanding city limits but constructed roads, parks, factories, libraries, and schools throughout the countryside. Then, as the century proceeded, particularly after the establishment of the Nationalist (Guomindang) Government in 1927, the developmental state increasingly had the power to drive urbanization. Local officials, often with provincial supervision, took over many of the responsibilities of building and managing Wuxi City and surrounding towns and villages and ­were able to project the new discourses of the state onto the physical spaces in which people went about their daily lives. Although differences between the city and the countryside certainly remained, the rural-­ urban continuum, which for centuries had privileged rural values, was remade, as society became firmly oriented around the city. This spatial shift proved extremely resilient in the face of warlords, floods, and the Japa­nese invasion in 1937. This means that urbanization in Wuxi, the wider region, and indeed China as a ­whole can be understood only in the context of both war and peace. Rong Desheng did not use the word “urbanization” to describe either the changes in Wuxi between 1912 and 1946 or his dreams for future development. However, because urbanization is an explicitly spatial as well as a temporal pro­cess, it allows us to arrive at a textured understanding of the rapid changes China underwent during this tumultuous period. Throughout the

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rest of this introduction, I explain what I mean by urbanization and how studying the relationship among cities, towns, and villages in the Republican period in this manner adds to our understanding of Chinese history.

What Is Urbanization? Simply put, urbanization is the pro­cess by which societies are transformed from those in which the majority of people live in the countryside to ones in which they live in cities. This pro­cess has been particularly rapid since the advent of global industrial capitalism but is not reducible to the growth in the number and size of cities. Discussing urbanization in China in the reform era after 1978, John Friedman proposes five elements to what he calls a multidimensional construction of the urban. Administrative urbanization refers to whether a settlement is defined as a city, town, or village and depends on a set of arbitrary criteria, normally decided by the state. Economic urbanization describes a structural change towards urban-­style work, which is often industrial in nature, although it also includes ser­v ices. Physical urbanization concerns the changing built environment, which gradually acquires more of an urban look as new buildings, streets, schools, recreational facilities, and other infrastructure are constructed. Sociocultural urbanization is the transformation of everyday life, including changing working practices, social relations, and attitudes. Finally, po­liti­cal urbanization describes the methods by which the government manages changes in the city and the countryside.4 This book does not address each of Friedman’s categories of urbanization specifically, although elements of them are all mentioned. Instead, I concentrate on how the built environment in the city and countryside was constructed, managed, and experienced, in part because this is easier to trace throughout the tumultuous period covered in this book. Archival documents, government reports, surveys, newspapers, guidebooks, and journal articles, which make up the majority of the evidence used in this study, describe physical spaces in great detail. Because it is my purpose to explain how urbanization affected everyone living in the city and the countryside, I describe not only the part that local elites and the state played in construction and management but also how the rapidly changing physical landscape formed the spaces that constituted the horizons of daily lived experience for farmers and workers. Friedman’s categories also demonstrate how urbanization is a pro­cess that links spatial change to wider economic, po­liti­cal, and social forces.

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Cities are not islands. Rather, they are connected to the world at large through a dizzying array of networks and emerge and grow as a result of complex pro­cesses that both embed them in their hinterlands and open them up to the influence of global forces. This means that urbanization extends beyond the city limits and acts on the ­whole of society. In an urbanizing country, while differences along the rural-­urban continuum certainly remain, space in all its forms takes on similar aspects, meanings, and uses. Increasingly, cities provide the template for the entire society as the built environment, social relationships, po­liti­cal structures, and cultural trends are shaped by the fact that a greater number of people live in them. An urbanizing society is, in short, one that is becoming largely or completely oriented around a network of cities, which stretch across the country and beyond.5

Urbanization in Chinese History Many excellent histories of individual cities in China are available, but urbanization on a societal scale in the first half of the twentieth century remains understudied. This is partly because of the legacy of Max Weber’s view of Oriental cities as static compared to their dynamic Eu­ro­pean counterparts. Such a view is so prevalent that the long-­established notion of a rural-­urban continuum in late imperial China, the cultural norms of which ­were rooted firmly in the countryside and maintained through a combination of religious practice and a centralized state, is only now being reassessed, despite nearly half a century of research on the emergence of economic and po­liti­cal hierarchies of cities that existed within a gradually commercializing urban system and more recently studies of urban culture and society, particularly in Jiangnan, which is more commonly known as the Lower Yangtze Delta.6 This late imperial continuum formed the context for the emergence of the rural-­urban gap thesis, which has dominated the study of cities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indeed, it has become so widely accepted that it might be seen as a paradigm in Chinese history.7 This discourse emerged for two reasons. First, as cities grew rapidly in the late nineteenth century, acquiring new industries, infrastructures, institutions, and technologies, contemporaries saw them as either vanguards of modernity or dirty and debauched as opposed to villages, which ­were either traditional and backward or somehow pure and unsullied. In this, China is no different from other cultures the world over, as Raymond Williams has

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pointed out.8 Positive and negative views of cities have existed for centuries, but rapid urbanization exacerbated this dichotomy, and opinion is still often polarized. In En­gland, the world’s first urbanized society, the idea of the rural played an important part in shaping notions of national identity throughout the twentieth century. In China, the latest urbanized society, notions of a rural-­urban gap still affect the lives of hundreds of millions of migrant workers and farmers, whose village residency denies them access to benefits enjoyed by their urban counterparts.9 The second reason for the emergence of the rural-­urban gap thesis in China is the country’s semi­ colonial past. Because urbanization after the mid-­nineteenth century occurred first in treaty ports, the otherness of the city was conflated with foreign influence. This only added to the polarization of the rural and urban, as those who welcomed China’s increased openness found much to praise in its new cities, while others saw them as foreign tainted moral vacuums in contrast to the somehow authentically Chinese countryside.10 Working within this dichotomy, and faced with the need to transform China to counter the threat of Western imperialism, Chinese intellectuals fell into one of three camps. Many embraced urban life, some resisted it in the belief that a simple rural life offered a better alternative, and others saw China’s salvation in the development of the countryside.11 Historians, often unconsciously, have reiterated these views, and ideas on the dichotomy between the city and the countryside form much of the context for studies of urban modernity. There is much to be said for the use of this as an analytical category in Chinese history, but in positioning the modern city in contradistinction to the traditional countryside, or more recently focusing on rural modernity, scholars have failed to appreciate how urbanization acted on both spaces and how studying the rural-­urban relationship within this context adds to our understanding of change in cities, towns, and villages. Modernity certainly captures much of the complexity of urban life in Republican China, and Shanghai looms large in such discussions. As David Strand argues, there is some truth to “the image of an urban China paced and shaped by messages, goods, models, and technologies from Shanghai.”12 Similarly, Joseph Esherick identifies five different types of cities across China, including capitals, border cities, and railway cities as well as treaty ports but notes that Shanghai was still the standard by which other cities ­were judged.13 Because it is Shanghai where the conflation of the urban with the modern and the foreign has been most marked, modernity and not urbanization has become the major analytical framework for urban historians,

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even when they argue for a model that diverged somewhat from the ­metropolis or on those occasions when their analyses go beyond the city limits.14 This begs the question of what is specifically modern about Shanghai, which is particularly problematic when scholars turn their attention to the majority of the urban population, who ­were too poor to shop in new department stores along Nanjing Road or attend dances at the Paramount Ballroom. Addressing this, Lu Hanchao argues that those who lived somewhere other than Nanjing Road ­were “not modern” and describes the alleyways and slums of Shanghai as “an urban village with a small-­town type of life.”15 Despite this, he sees them as Shanghainese and, from the perspective of many people living outside the city, urbanized. What bound the millions in the metropolis together was commercial astuteness.16 Commercialism, like modernity, was an important element of being Shanghainese, but Lu’s analysis stops at the city limits. Where he explicitly compares a small town with his urban village, he picks one that had its heyday in the late Qing Dynasty and says nothing about subsequent changes, while his assumption that because the two spaces had similar shops they therefore may have produced similar attitudes in their residents largely ignores the wider influences of the city.17 Other scholars also often conflate Shanghai identity with a par­ tic­u­lar type of lifestyle, or fail to adequately consider how the city’s poorest inhabitants ­were also part and parcel of urban life.18 Rarely do they go beyond the urban boundary and explore differences and similarities between the city and the countryside and how the same historical pro­cesses ­were affecting both spaces. Seeing the city as modern reinforces the dichotomy between it and the countryside. This problem is not solved by considering the other two Chinese responses to rapid urbanization. Of those who saw the city as de­cadent like old Mr. Wu in the novel Midnight (Ziye), many ­were late imperial gentry with a quiet nostalgia for rural life. Such views reinforce the rural-­urban gap thesis, without telling us much about the changing relationship among cities, towns, and villages.19 More interesting is the third intellectual response, which argued for the revitalization of the rural economy to save China from the perceived threat of imperialist expansion. However, the description of this movement as rural modernity retains the dichotomy between the countryside and the city. Scholars of the rural reconstruction movement recognize the existence of this tension, but their somewhat uncritical ac­cep­tance that the countryside was poor and unchanging, and that the peasantry could be made modern only by reformers who

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directed their policies at problems specific to the countryside, does not consider how urbanization was already beginning to shape these spaces in ways that emulated some of the transformations occurring in cities.20 This is not to say that the concept of rural modernity, like its urban counterpart, is wholly without merit, but it, too, should be studied in the context of urbanization. Assigning a specific site to modernity, regardless of whether it is in the city or the countryside, confuses not just the understanding of the relationship between the rural and the urban but also how modernity and its constituent parts have been manifested spatially over time. Ultimately, cities are not closed and bounded or easily defined. Instead, they are multiply constructed, open, connected, and polyvalent entities. In the same way, the countryside is not an unchanging, static space but dynamic, incorporated, and developing. The key to removing this tension among the rural, the urban, and the modern is to investigate urbanization. By understanding how attributes that we normally consider emblematic of a specifically urban modernity ­were also appearing in the countryside, we can take the first step towards describing precisely what was metropolitan about the city. This emerged not in opposition to the countryside but, rather, as part of a pro­ cess of urbanization that was orienting Chinese society towards the city.

Urbanization and the Rural-­Urban Continuum To understand the impact of urbanization on China in the twentieth century, it is important to appreciate that, although it may have been oriented towards the countryside, late imperial China did not lack cities with a distinct urban identity. Fei Si-­yen argues that a common culture existing across the rural-­urban continuum does not preclude their emergence, because “instead of creating a separate urban cultural tradition, urbanites appropriated the shared cultural language to express their spatial experiences.”21 The same logic applies to changes in the Republican period, although the source of the shared cultural tradition was now the city rather than the countryside. This was particularly true of the Lower Yangtze Delta. By the 1920s and 1930s, the economic, po­liti­cal, and social transformation of this region went far beyond the city and gave farmers opportunities to express themselves spatially in an environment similar to that of their urban counterparts. Lu Hanchao recognizes that although a rural-­ urban gap exists in contemporary China, society is now firmly oriented towards the city, and the development of rural society simply lags behind

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that of urban society.22 Far from being a product of the reform era, this shift actually occurred in the first half of the twentieth century. To explain this, it is necessary to consider how urbanization is driven by and, in turn, shapes the spatial manifestation of wider historical forces. It has long been understood that urbanization does not occur in a vacuum. Nearly fifty years ago, one of the found­ers of the discipline, H. J. Dyos, noted that urbanization may be both a dependent and in­de­pen­dent variable and asked how the historical study of the city should be related to other major trends, such as industrialization and population growth.23 In a similar vein, Charles Tilly argued that urban historians should address large questions, such as the impact of the development of capitalism, the rise of nation-­ states, and technological change on the lives of individuals, and, in doing so, challenged them to stop thinking of cities as either merely undifferentiated sites within wider pro­cesses or to only explore them as bounded entities, untouched by the world outside.24 Urbanization is a dependent and in­ de­pen­dent variable, a cause and consequence of wider historical pro­cesses. Henri Lefebvre offers a solution to this apparent contradiction. In discussing the specificity of the city, he writes: “The city always had relations with society as a w ­ hole, with its constituting elements (countryside and agriculture, offensive and defensive force, po­liti­cal power, States, ­etc.), and with its history. It changes when society as a ­whole changes. Yet, the city’s transformations are not the passive outcomes of changes in the social ­whole. The city also depends as essentially on relations of immediacy, of direct relations between persons and groups which make up society (families, or­ga­ nized bodies, crafts and guilds, e­ tc.).”25 Lefebvre distinguishes between far order relations, those with society as a ­whole, and near order relations, those with individuals or communities, and argues that both should be considered to truly understand urban pro­cesses. However, this only gets us into the city and does not explain the changing rural-­urban relationship. To understand how urbanization is a mediating force that affects different spaces, it is important to realize that experiences that may not appear to have any actual connection are often caused by the same far order historical forces acting on a different scale. Near order pro­cesses that create space on the small scale are embedded in far order larger-­scale causal mechanisms but do not simply reproduce the effects of these mechanisms. Instead, the way in which macro-­forces are reworked on different scales privileges the par­tic­u­lar causal factors that operate at these micro-­levels. It is thus that the farmer’s subjective experience of the impact of industrial capitalism as mediated by, for example, the construction

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of a new road, shows how effects of macro-­processes ­were manifested in specific ways as they ­were actualized within individual sites on the micro-­scale. Historians of China have long been comfortable with thinking spatially on different scales. In constructing his hierarchy of central places, William G. Skinner recognized that changes in relationships between settlements of different size ­were driven by several factors, although he privileged economic causes.26 More recently, Carolyn Cartier has argued that what is missing from Skinner’s rather static model is the “human pro­cesses and their variation that underlie urbanization and regional formation, especially social and cultural practices, long-­distance trade, and associated economic activities.”27 She uses this interscalar analysis to explore how the Pearl River Delta has been reformulated as a distinct region in different historical epochs and how its successive iterations have combined to place it very much at the forefront of contemporary China’s path of modernization and international integration.28 Taking a slightly different tack, although still operating at a regional scale of analysis, is Kenneth Pomeranz’s study of how the Huang-­Yun core of the north China macroregion in western Shandong Province and what is now Hebei Province became a periphery in the late imperial and Republican periods because the rise of coastal cities changed the economic geography of the region.29 While not concentrating specifically on urbanization, Cartier and Pomeranz highlight how dynamic regional geographies in China change over time but also retain their identities. Moreover, they emphasize the interaction between global and local, or, in the language of Lefebvre, far order and near order, pro­cesses in producing change on the ground in different spaces. Similarly, I argue that urbanization in Wuxi was embedded in wider historical pro­cesses, even as it mediated their spatial manifestation on different scales.

The Economy and Urbanization Industrial capitalism and the growth of cities are closely linked, although the debate over which one has explanatory primacy can be traced back to Marx.30 Urbanization in China has a long history, especially in the Lower Yangtze Delta, which was the country’s most commercialized region. Between the latter half of the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) and the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864), economic development underlay the emergence of distinct urban identities in cities such as Hangzhou and Suzhou, which ­were embedded in a dense network of smaller towns and villages that, by the

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mid-­Qing, gave rise to an urban system that rivaled the one in Western Eu­rope and, indeed, was connected to it through early modern trading networks.31 Despite the destruction of the Taiping Rebellion, this highly commercialized regional economy adapted to the rapid changes caused by the expansion of global industrial capitalism into China. This remaking of the region for the twentieth century drove urbanization in Wuxi, which then in turn mediated how economic development was manifested on the different scales of the city, the town, and the village. Much of the literature on the Chinese economy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has focused on the peasant immiseration debate, but all contributors recognize the impact that industrialization had on long-­established marketing networks and farming practices.32 As Lynda Bell and Kathy le Mons Walker both point out, in the case of silk in Wuxi and cotton in Nantong, a continuum emerged between agricultural production, the development of the textile industry, and global markets, which built on but also transformed commercial links between villages, towns, and cities.33 It is primarily with these two studies that the social history of business partnerships and migration and the po­liti­cal history of state interaction add human agency to the numbers that have been the source of so much contention for so long. However, neither author seeks to explain the relationship between this economic continuum and regional urbanization. Although Skinner recognized the importance of late nineteenth-­century connections to the global economy and new innovations such as transport in causing urbanization, urban historians have focused on commercialism and industrialization in the city itself. They have concentrated on local commercial and industrial elites who constructed new factories, proto–­shopping malls, movie theaters, parks, gardens, and a host of other amenities in cities as far afield as Beijing, Chengdu, Shanghai, and Suzhou.34 Elsewhere, studies of other effects of economic development, such as the spread of material culture across the country or specific sites of rural industrialization because of proximity to raw materials, also largely fail to consider urbanization as a mediating factor.35 An exception is research on Nantong, where the construction of the Dasheng Cotton Mill transformed the town of Tangzha, a few miles north of the city. Meanwhile, Zhang Jian invested in ports, roads, and other urban infrastructure to link the new industrial suburb ever closer to a city that was itself being transformed. Inside the cotton mill, the young women workers walked home to their villages at the end of a long day but ­were exposed to the same rhythms of the workplace as those in the factories of Shanghai. Focusing on how Zhang Jian and other

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elites constructed the new urban landscape certainly brings human agency to the fore, but although the Dasheng Mill is described in great detail, we only have a brief glimpse of the impact industrialization had on urbanization across the county as a ­whole.36 Nantong lived and died with Zhang Jian and was surpassed by Wuxi in the 1920s as the largest regional economic center after Shanghai. Wuxi’s development also depended on a continuum between agricultural production and global markets, although silk was not as dominant as cotton was in Nantong. Just as in Nantong however, local families ­were primarily responsible for the construction of an industrial city. They wrote about their accomplishments and future plans, not to distinguish Wuxi from Shanghai as their counterparts did in Nantong and Suzhou but to emphasize how the city emulated the treaty port. Indeed, Wuxi was often described as Xiao Shanghai (Little Shanghai).37 The continuum between agricultural production, industrial pro­cessing, and global markets that drove the expansion of the city also caused the urbanization of the countryside. Many of the same families that invested in the city poured money into factories, roads, and other infrastructure across the county. At the same time, some of the changes in material culture that defined the horizons of everyday life for those in factories and dormitories began to appear in fields and farm­houses, even as more people than ever before migrated to the city in search of work. All this occurred within a rural-­urban continuum that was now not only oriented towards the city but, through its myriad connections, to the world of global industrial capitalism.

The State and Urbanization The first half of the twentieth century in China was a period of state expansion. At the end of the Qing Dynasty, local po­liti­cal elites, many of whom ­were also responsible for commercial and industrial development, took on the responsibilities of societal management. They often invoked the idea of self-­government (zizhi), which gave rise to hopes of municipal autonomy and fostered reform around the country.38 After 1911, self-­government was replaced with official rule (guanzhi), as first the Beiyang government in Beijing and then after 1927 the Nationalist government in Nanjing created institutions, passed laws, and established guidelines. This marked the emergence of what William Kirby has called the developmental state, which after 1927 sought to implement policies based very much on the ideas of Sun Yatsen as set down in his Industrial Plan (Shiye jihua).39 State institutions

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­were often inefficient, with local officials and other elites who ­were obscurantist or just plain corrupt. Meanwhile, the vicissitudes of warlordism, famine, flood, and, finally, the outbreak of war with Japan meant that the environment was often hostile. Moreover, as the Republican state established itself as the primary locus of power, a ­whole host of actors engaged with it in different ways. Some opposed it, and others accepted it; some manipulated it for their own ends, and others made its ends their own. Despite all this, as the century wore on, the state increasingly gained the ability to shape Chinese society in its own image. The developmental state was also an urbanizing state, and this has been the subject of some scrutiny. After all, as David Strand has pointed out, municipal governments ­were large enough to deal with very real issues such as social order and local transport but small enough to avoid responsibility for military security, and “if one is searching for the origins of an interventionist, administrative Chinese state, the city is a good place to look.” 40 Urban historians have, therefore, investigated how the state shaped the cityscape, intervened in public health, entertainment, poverty alleviation, the family, and other areas of daily life, and although circumstances differed across the country, they are united in admitting that it was an important factor in urban development.41 State-­making in the countryside is normally studied within the context of nation-­building. For example, the Shanghai-­ Hangzhou Motor Road opened on 10 October 1932 and was a typical “modern” road, which met international standards and used new building methods and materials. It epitomized the Nationalists’ attempt to put into practice Sun’s vision of nation-­building through infrastructure development.42 However, it also linked two major cities ever more closely in an expanding urban system and brought pro­cesses and materials shaping the physical urban environment out into the countryside while exposing rural dwellers to a developmental discourse that underlay the road’s construction. As scholars study economic development, tax collection, management of religion, and educational initiatives in the countryside, not to mention rural reconstruction, they have seen how the Republican state, particularly after 1927, had real power to mold society in its own image. However, this work has not yet placed these developments within the context of a pro­cess of urbanization that mediated the impact of the developmental state on both the city and the countryside.43 The state drove urbanization through the construction of a legal and bureaucratic apparatus. As Peter Carroll points out, concentrating on institution building and administrative arrangements may grant the state

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too much power and not always capture the full complexity of developments on the ground. However, officials at all levels used the new administrative apparatus to pursue the state’s agenda and, in so doing, shaped the urbanization of the city and the countryside. In the early Republican period, the state’s ability to do this was hampered by its own weaknesses and the fighting of warlords, and so in Wuxi, as in Nantong and elsewhere, commercial and industrial elites ­were often those with official positions. However, after the establishment of the Nationalist Government in 1927, new laws defining the administrative status of settlements of different sizes set out the responsibilities of officials at all levels and brought the locality firmly under the control of the provincial government.44 In Wuxi, local officials, motivated by Sun’s vision for national development, used these central guidelines to construct and manage the built environment in the city and the countryside. Just as economic development drove urbanization across the Lower Yangtze Delta, which, in turn, shaped its manifestation on different scales, so the same dynamics worked in the interrelationship between the developmental state and urbanization. This meant that, throughout the first half of the twentieth century, economics and politics worked hand in hand as far order factors driving a complete spatial reordering of the rural-­urban continuum that oriented the region firmly towards cities.

War and Urbanization The first half of the twentieth century was a time of extreme turmoil across China. Individual case studies of different cities often touch on violent episodes in their history, although this is not the case with work on Nantong and Suzhou, but for the most part they do not go beyond the outbreak of the Anti-­Japanese War of Re­sis­tance in 1937.45 Recent scholarship on the Japa­nese invasion and occupation has often used cities as sites for exploring other themes, such as collaboration, war­time culture, refugee movements, and the economy.46 Meanwhile, work on the countryside overwhelmingly concentrates on guerrilla warfare, although more recently the effect of the conflict on the natural environment has come under scrutiny.47 Exploring the impact of the war on Chinese society assesses its interaction with other historical forces, such as state development or revolution, and my analysis of the relationship between urbanization and the Japa­nese invasion and occupation of the Lower Yangtze Delta draws on and adds to this rich vein of scholarship.48

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War posed numerous challenges for Wuxi. It damaged the regional economy, destroyed the built environment, presented local officials and societal elites with myriad problems, and traumatized thousands. The economic and po­liti­cal changes that shaped urbanization ­were not derailed by either the Jiangsu-­Zhejiang War in 1924–1925 or the Japa­nese invasion and occupation. However, during moments of extreme crisis, such as the siege of Wuxi in January 1925 or the months of fighting in the autumn of 1937, the region was often close to complete societal breakdown, the newly established institutions of the state could not manage the crises effectively, and social elites and their networks stepped in to help. During periods of recovery, the state re-­emerged to take control, and this was particularly the case during the Japa­nese occupation. Despite a scale of destruction not seen in the region since the Taiping Rebellion, the economic and po­liti­cal pro­cesses that had driven urbanization proved remarkably resilient. The rapid recovery of the silk industry in 1938 limited Japa­nese ability to monopolize the economy, while local officials took responsibility for rebuilding the city and the surrounding countryside and ­were often able to implement prewar plans for urban expansion. Of course, the Japa­nese had the ability to assert their control, and this was most evident during the “clean the countryside” (qing­ xiang) campaigns when they moved against the Communist-­led New Fourth Army and other guerrilla and bandit groups in Jiangnan. However, for the most part it was Chinese officials working in a similar bureaucratic and regulatory environment to the prewar era and in the context of a recovering regional economy who ­were responsible for managing continued urbanization. Explaining how war, particularly the Japa­nese invasion and occupation, intersects with urbanization is important in understanding its transformative impact on all of Chinese society throughout the twentieth century. In this book, I argue that urbanization is a total societal orientation toward the city and that in China this pro­cess began in the Republican era. This means that despite the vicissitudes of war and revolution, continuities must be sought, and, indeed, work that looks across the 1949 divide is now beginning.49 Moreover, arguing that urbanization is a continuous historical pro­ cess means that it deserves to be given as much attention as nationalism, state development, war, revolution, and, of course, modernity in how it has shaped China. In focusing specifically on urbanization as my primary analytic, I do not seek to deny the value of other approaches. Ultimately, however, urbanization’s ability to unite spatial and temporal pro­cesses and to connect far order and near order explanatory variables helps us to under-

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stand how, in a little over a century, China has gone from being the world’s largest and longest existing agricultural empire to its newest urban society.

Chapter Outline Chapter 1 describes how Wuxi became the largest industrial city in China outside treaty ports. It concentrates on how leading local industrialists built factories and urban infrastructure, tracks the migration of workers into the city, and describes their daily lives. Chapter 2 turns to how these same industrial families invested in commerce and industry that drove urbanization in the countryside. Descriptions of Wuxi in guidebooks and travel magazines show how writers recognized the extent of the county’s transformation, and I conclude with an account of how changes in the daily lives of farmers mirrored those of urban workers. Chapter 3 discusses the role of the state in the early 1920s. It describes how industrialists who built the city used their po­liti­cal position to secure for Wuxi a mea­sure of municipal autonomy in the belief that this would attract Chinese and foreign investment and ensure continued prosperity. It then explores how social elites managed the crisis of the Jiangsu-­Zhejiang War, during which a weak state at the whim of a warlord proved largely unable to deal with its effects on the city. Chapter 4 takes the story into the Nanjing De­cade and explains how new administrative laws gave officials in Wuxi the chance to establish municipal autonomy, which contributed to the continued expansion of the city, while giving local and provincial officials more control over construction and management. Changes to the law brought an end to administrative in­ de­pen­dence, and Wuxi came under the jurisdiction of the county once more. However, as chapter 5 shows, this gave the state power to drive rural urbanization as the built environment of towns and villages was imbued with its developmental discourse. Chapter 6 explores Wuxi’s connections to the regional urban system through a description of native place societies (tongxianghui) in Nanjing, Shanghai, and Suzhou. These confirmed the city’s new regional importance and ­were a source of po­liti­cal capital to help Wuxi and its wider migrant population weather crises, such as floods and the impact of the Japa­nese attacks on Shanghai in 1932 and 1937. Chapter 7 takes the narrative into the period of the Japa­nese occupation and explains the revival of the silk industry between 1938 and 1941. It charts how Wuxi’s recovery was built on a re-­establishment of the link to international markets via Shanghai that had been the basis of its prosperity for so

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long. War­time circumstances pushed silk reeling out into the countryside, and this new industry drove continuing urbanization while limiting Japa­ nese attempts to monopolize economic production. Chapter 8 turns to the reconstruction of Wuxi County. The Japa­nese mostly left the often mundane activities of road repair or rehousing to Chinese officials, who in some areas used the destruction as an opportunity to carry out prewar plans for urban development. In many areas of their daily lives, Chinese ­were not directly affected by the occupation, but the enemy had the ability to make its presence felt. This is the subject of chapter 9, which describes periods of Japa­nese lockdown after the assassination of the county magistrate in 1940 and during the qingxiang campaigns the following year. Barbed wire, watchtowers, and identity cards ­were part of a military infrastructure that shaped the built environment in the city and the countryside. In doing so, they drove war­time urbanization in Wuxi County and the region as a ­whole, just as economic and po­liti­cal pro­cesses had done during peacetime.

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The “Little Shanghai” Urbanization of Wuxi City

This chapter explores how the expansion of industrial capitalism into China transformed what during the Qing Dynasty had been a small but significant trading center into the largest manufacturing city in China outside the treaty ports. Wuxi’s emergence as “Little Shanghai” was the result of investment by several local Chinese families, who took advantage of new international markets for agricultural products to establish extensive multisector business empires. The key to Wuxi’s prosperity was the number of families involved and the diversity of their investments. Chinese family businesses tend to die out after one generation, and this partly explains Nantong’s decline. Although Wuxi’s industrial development only really took off after the outbreak of World War I, it was multisectoral, unlike Nantong, which was very much the creation of Zhang Jian, and Suzhou, where commercial development was limited to one street, and only three cotton factories w ­ ere built.1 Excellent studies have been written on some of the Wuxi family enterprises, most notably the cotton and flour mills of the Rong family, but scholars have not yet thoroughly explored how they ­were responsible for the expansion of the city in the Republican era. This tradition of investment was particularly prevalent in Jiangnan, which benefitted from the expansion of global industrial capitalism into China.2 Investigating how local industrial families founded factories, constructed roads, and built dormitories connects the wider regional and global economic changes to the specificity of urbanization in Wuxi City. Urbanization involves an increase in a city’s population as well as its size, and the new factories in Wuxi attracted migrants from across the county and beyond. Just as in Chengdu or Shanghai, urban life for the laborer or rickshaw puller had its own par­tic­u­lar flavor. To truly understand how

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urbanization affected everyone in the city, it is important to reconstruct the minutiae of daily life as much as possible. In doing this, I focus on factory dormitories, although, where the sources allow, describe aspects of life on the city’s streets. I am following a well-­trodden path that investigates the impact of industrial working practices on urban space and the lives of laborers.3 However, setting this history firmly within the context of urbanization connects these specific local changes to regional and global pro­cesses and permits the exploration of similarities and differences in fields, factories, and workshops along the rural-­urban continuum. Before that, though, it is important to describe Wuxi’s place in the late imperial regional economy, because the development of the city in the twentieth century did not occur in a vacuum.

Wuxi in Late Imperial China The origins of Wuxi date back to the Han Dynasty (206 BC–AD 220), when tin was discovered in the neighboring hills of Huishan and Xishan. The stream running down from Xishan emptied into Lake Tai, and a settlement grew up to transport the tin from the lakeside to the canals that carried it around the region and beyond. After the tin was exhausted, the city acquired its name Wuxi (literally, “no tin”).4 Later, transport connections brought prosperity, and it became an important trading center for rice. Throughout the Qing Dynasty, shipments arrived from as far afield as Anhui and Jiangxi, and on the eve of the Taiping Rebellion, over 140 businesses managed the transshipment of 1.3 million shi of rice annually.5 A similar trade was conducted in cotton and silk, which ­were also bought and sold across the empire. Although Wuxi did not produce significant amounts of cotton, as in many other parts of China, farming ­house­holds there developed sidelines in weaving that connected them and the city to the wider economy, with brokers selling to customers in Anhui, Shandong, Zhejiang, and even Taiwan. Meanwhile, the end of the Ming Dynasty monopoly on silk weaving formed the context in which multiple links between farming ­house­holds and merchants developed, presaging the rise of silk filatures and cocoon brokers that ­were to transform the industry several centuries later.6 These connections to late imperial trading networks ­were not the only sources of Wuxi’s prosperity. The largest home-­grown industry was brick and tile making. During the eigh­teenth century, 108 enterprises sprang up outside the south gate of the city, employing approximately ten thousand

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workers, and on the eve of the Taiping Rebellion, products ­were already reaching Shanghai, Nanjing, and Zhenjiang. Other important sectors included iron smelting, ship building (of which there ­were some 170 manufacturers by the end of the Qing), and clay statue making, a traditional handicraft produced in Huishan, a town to the west of the city.7 All this vibrant activity left its legacy on Wuxi’s morphology. Other than the factories outside the south gate, expansion beyond the city walls was concentrated to the north, where the confluence of rivers made this a natural port, while a rice market brought buyers and sellers together.8 The city’s trade, like that of many others, suffered during the Taiping Rebellion, but as the region recovered, centuries of urban development left its mark as Wuxi was remade for a new age.

Wuxi’s Emergence as an Industrial City After the Taiping Rebellion ended, the economy of Jiangnan was transformed. Shanghai’s position at the edges or crossroads of empires meant that it now stood at the intersection of domestic and foreign markets.9 Even before the establishment of the treaty port in 1843, the city had long been an important economic center, but the foreign presence was the catalyst for the development of a symbiotic relationship between local industry, which was reliant on the produce of the hinterland, and foreign trade.10 The metropolis’s rise was not entirely due to exogenous factors, as the destruction of the late imperial urban centers of Hangzhou and Suzhou shifted the ­locus of development. Coming after several de­cades of decline in water transport along the Grand Canal caused by poor maintenance and increased coastal shipping, the rebellion was the final nail in the coffin of a network of economic and cultural centers reaching from Hangzhou up through Jiangsu to Beijing. This meant that beginning in the mid-1850s Shanghai became the focal point for commerce, finance, industrial development and the destination of choice for migrants from its hinterland. By the turn of the twentieth century, there was no industry in the Lower Yangtze Delta that remained unaffected by links to international markets through Shanghai, and no city that did not, to at least some extent, depend on the treaty port for its prosperity.11 Of all the cities in Jiangnan, Wuxi underwent perhaps the most comprehensive transformation, albeit a de­cade or so later than Nantong. Underlying this was the expanding international market for silk, which transformed agricultural production, while mechanization of spinning and weaving led

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to the growth of industry and the expansion of the city. Although silk dominated, Wuxi’s new elite made their fortunes in a variety of sectors.

Silk Strong global demand in the late nineteenth century caused the total value of raw silk and silk fabric exports from China to rise from between 230,000 taels in the 1890s to nearly 1 million taels during World War I. The value nearly doubled in the 1920s before collapsing as a result of the Great Depression.12 This demand caused the growth of silk filatures in Shanghai, and as the sector grew after the 1880s, the need for raw materials led to a new marketing system as compradors established cocoon brokers (hang), small purchasing agents across Wuxi County, their number increasing from 140 in 1910 to 373 in the early 1930s. Wuxi City’s position as a transport hub and the construction of the railway station in 1906 meant that cocoons could be gathered in towns and villages, shipped to the city, and then sent on by boat or rail to Shanghai.13 By the turn of the twentieth century, this resulted in “a silk-­industry ‘continuum,’ ” which transformed farming in the countryside as nearly every family switched from cotton as a supplementary industry to growing mulberry bushes and raising silkworms.14 After 1900, Wuxi City emerged as a center of silk-­filature operation, as Chinese investors moved their activities inland, believing that it offered benefits over Shanghai in terms of decreased transport costs and labor savings. Because cocoons ­were no longer shipped to Shanghai, factory own­ers also saved on transit tax, and land was cheaper in Wuxi. The strong international demand until 1930 provided rich pickings for those willing to invest, and on the eve of the Great Depression thirty-­nine filatures operated in the city, although their number dropped dramatically soon after.15 Meanwhile, the expansion of cocoon brokers to the countryside began to transform the rural landscape. For the most part, they ­were set up by landlords or petty businessmen, who ­were highly competitive in securing the lowest price for the silk filatures to which they sold.16 Some ­were located in Wuxi City itself, but many ­were scattered in towns and villages, and this drove urbanization across the county, as by the 1930s, “a commercial network characterized by a large town every 5 li and a small town every 3 li had already emerged.”17 Filature own­ers ­were a diverse assortment of landlords, cocoon merchants, cotton merchants, native bankers, and Shanghai industrialists. Two of the most important w ­ ere Zhou Shunqing and Xue Nanming.18 Zhou was born to a small, land-­owning family in Dongze in southeast Wuxi County

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and studied as an apprentice ironmonger before becoming manager of the British-­backed Shengchang Ironworks, before later founding his own company with branches in Changzhou, Suzhou, Wuxi, and Zhenjiang. He then used money made in Shanghai to set up companies throughout its hinterland and poured funds into seventeen cocoon brokers and a pawnshop back in his hometown. In 1904, he followed this with the Yuchang Silk Filature, the first to be built in the county. It is illustrative of the extent to which urbanization was not confined to the city that the first silk filature in Wuxi was actually built in a small town. Having achieved success in business, Zhou then began to take part in local politics, and, having previously bought official rank, he became a founding member of the Xijin Chamber of Commerce, the forerunner to the Wuxi Chamber of Commerce.19 Xue Nanming’s career took the opposite route. With gentry origins, he held office in Tianjin under Li Hongzhang, the viceroy of Zhili. After returning to Wuxi, he used profits from the rent on his family’s 6,000 mu of land to set up cocoon brokers and invested in the Yongtai Silk Filature in Shanghai with, among others, Zhou Shunqing, as well as the Qingfeng and Yukang cotton mills, both in Wuxi City.20 His first foray into silk filatures in Wuxi came in 1910, when he set up the Jinji Silk Filature outside the west gate of the city. He followed this with three more filatures over the next de­cade, all at Tingziqiao, just east of the city walls, and also acquired fourteen cocoon brokers around the county. One of these was located just outside the south gate, and in 1925, when the lease was up on Xue’s factory in Shanghai, he moved the Yongtai Silk Filature to a neighboring patch of land. Within a year, construction was complete on the 20-­mu plot, and the filature employed a thousand workers.21 He passed management of his company to his son, Xue Shouxuan, who, after his father’s death in 1929, succeeded in establishing a monopoly over silk production in Wuxi. Control of egg breederies in the early 1930s was followed by the founding of the Xingye Silk Company in 1936, which allowed Xue to use his growing links to the Nationalist Government to set the price of silkworms, inspiring protests from farming ­house­holds.22 The growth of the silk industry underlay the urbanization of Wuxi County, as local families took advantage of the spread of global industrial capitalism to establish their businesses.

Grain Silk was not the only industry to prosper in Wuxi. Grain production in China also benefitted from increased global demand during World War I, and

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exports ­rose fifty-­fold between 1914 and 1920. This fostered the growth of flour mills in Wuxi. Prior to 1913, the city had only three mills, with total production of 8,900 sacks of flour per year. Although only one more was added before the Great Depression, new technology increased production to 321,000 sacks a year.23 Purchasing practices depended on local dealers, and in fact many rice brokers also bought wheat, although the number of specialist grain brokers ­rose from 117 at the end of World War I to 142  in the 1920s. Like silk filatures, large mills in Shanghai had their own agents. For example, the Fufeng and Fuxin Mills both had representatives in Wuxi City as well as counties across Jiangsu, while some businesses also sent out representatives to villages to estimate the yield of grain and set prices.24 Construction of flour mills in Wuxi mirrors that of silk filatures, and there is no better example of how the city was part of the regional economy than the Rong family business empire. The history of this empire dates back to Shanghai’s earliest days as a treaty port, when Rong Yaoliang and Rong Yaoguang opened the Ruiyu Ironworks. The Taiping Rebellion forced them to flee to Shanghai, where they founded the Rongguang Cotton Shop in the old city.25 As the Rong cotton and flour mills ­were to do two generations later, these first businesses attracted relatives from Rongxiang, the family’s hometown in Kaiyuan Ward. By the turn of the twentieth century, they owned business concerns in Rongxiang, Wuxi City, and Shanghai. Rong Zongjing and Rong Desheng used this network to expand their business and eventually founded the Shenxin Company, which relied heavily for personnel on family members and people from Wuxi. By 1900, the Rong brothers owned a cocoon broker in Rongxiang and an old-­ style Chinese bank, called a qianzhuang, in Shanghai. The profit from this was used to set up the Baoxing Flour Mill in Wuxi, which was later renamed the Maoxin Flour Mill, and was followed in 1906 by the Zhenxin Cotton Factory.26 Sherman Cochran claims that after this initial period of siphoning money from Shanghai back to Wuxi, Rong Zongjing broke with long-­established patterns of business development in China and concentrated his attentions on his industrial concerns in Shanghai as well as securing finance from outside the circle of personal shareholders.27 However, the Rong brothers maintained their close relationship with Wuxi City and Rongxiang. Together with forty-­one other shareholders, many already investors in the Rong empire, the brothers founded the Shenxin Number Three Cotton Mill in Wuxi in 1921.28 This demonstrates that although Rong Zongjing may have alienated many members of his family and others in Wuxi with his reliance on non-

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personal forms of capital and investment in businesses that ­were not owned by people from his native place, he also provided opportunities for them.29 I shall return to the Shenxin Number Three Cotton Mill in a more detailed examination of the industrial urban landscape below. For now, it suffices to note that, like the Xue and other industrial families in Wuxi, the Rong brothers took advantage of new opportunities to invest in the city of their birth and contributed to its development as Jiangnan’s preeminent industrial center.

Rice Rice remained important to Wuxi and the wider economy, while mechanization of the milling pro­cess led to the construction of new factories in Wuxi City and caused the spread of technology to the countryside. The crop was an important staple for farmers well into the twentieth century, since even at its height mulberry bush cultivation accounted for only about 30 percent of land use.30 The influx from local farms was far surpassed by external trade, which recovered quickly after the Taiping Rebellion. At the end of the Qing, rice shipped through the city amounted to between 6 million and 7.5 million shi annually, compared with just 1.3 million shi in 1888, while the number of rice brokers grew from 80 to 143 over the same period.31 Despite increasing competition from Eu­rope and Japan and government attempts to limit exports from Jiangsu for a brief period before the Great Depression, the rice trade continued to grow, although the number of brokers dropped from 200 at their height to 130 in 1935.32 Meanwhile, Shanghai was integrated into a global rice market that extended to Southeast Asia and India.33 This meant that it became an increasingly important destination for rice from Wuxi, although since only 1.5 million shi was transported to the city in 1935, Zhejiang was the larger market, where at least some of the rice was used to make Shaoxing wine.34 Back in Wuxi City, rice brokers ­were an important feature of the urban landscape. Because 70 percent of the rice arrived in Wuxi by steamer, they sprang up along the canals and, in a continuation of earlier patterns of development, ­were concentrated to the north of the city walls. There, the new industrial zones of Beizhakou, Beitang, and Huangniqiao boasted fifteen, twenty-­nine, and thirty-­t wo brokers, respectively, while outside the south gate there w ­ ere thirty-­six and to the west only nine.35 Different brokers managed rice from within the county and further afield, and some ­were established by merchants from Anhui or northern Jiangsu. Most ­were

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partnerships, and all ­were small enterprises employing three to five staff, with the largest having capital of 20,000 yuan. All business was transacted in a tea­house near Sanliqiao, directly north of the city walls. It was a bustling place, as throughout the day representatives of buyers from cities across the region met with sellers and bargained over prices, before walking up to the docks to view the merchandise. Nor did the growth of rice brokers stop at the city limits, since many set up branches or links with brokers in the countryside, which catered to farmers or landlords wishing to sell directly on the open market. In 1935 there ­were fifty-­six brokers dotted around the county, and some towns, such as Tangkou, which had nine, ­were local trading centers. Despite differences in topology, they ­were distributed fairly evenly throughout the county, springing up in Nanfangquan in the far south as well as Luoshe and Bashiqiao to the north.36 All this rice had to be stored, and much of it milled, and these two industries developed in tandem. By 1907, thirty mills ­were in operation, employing ninety-­nine oxen, located mostly along the Grand Canal. That year, the first diesel-­powered mill was built, and mechanization spread quickly.37 The fortunes of rice mills, like other industries, reflected the international climate, and their number reached twenty-­one before falling back to thirteen in 1935. The largest had an investment of 10,000 yuan and employed thirty workers, although most ­were smaller. Over time, they ceased to be in­de­pen­dently run operations; of the mills that existed in 1935, two ­were controlled by rice brokers, and four ­were part of ware­house operations.38 Ware­houses, which stored silkworm cocoons and other produce, became a particularly important link in agricultural supply chains that stretched out from Wuxi. This was partly a result of the increasing amount of trade flowing through the city but also reflected the level of debt underlying these industries, over 50 percent of which was advanced on collateral consisting of agricultural products such as raw cotton, cocoons, and wheat.39 Of the twenty-­six ware­houses in Wuxi, eight ­were owned by banks, including two of the largest, which ­were the property of the Bank of China and the Bank of Jiangsu.40 As with silk filatures, others ­were the result of partnerships between Wuxi businessmen, many of whom had significant interests in other sectors. For example, Rong Desheng and Qian Jingsheng invested 10,000 yuan in the Baoxing Rice Mill in 1909.41 Ware­houses, silk filatures, cotton, and flour and rice mills comprised the new industrial landscape that transformed the morphology and skyline of Wuxi City. For the most part, they ­were built by groups of investors from a few industrial families, whose backgrounds reflect the diverse origins of

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Republican-­era local elites. As well as building factories, these men ­were also responsible for constructing the new infrastructure that transformed the rapidly expanding city.

Building Urban Infrastructure Much of the growth in Wuxi City was to the north, where a lively new commercial and industrial center emerged. Its development was very much due to one man, Yang Hanxi, who, as we shall see in later chapters, was to play a vital part in municipal government. Born in 1877, Yang spent the first de­ cade of the twentieth century working in the local railway and tele­gram offices and a short time at a military academy in Japan. After 1911, he set up the Wuxi Telephone Company and was appointed head of the city’s branch of the Bank of China in 1914. The following year, he bought land in the northern suburbs and, in partnership with several entrepreneurs, including Xue Nanming, he founded the Guangqin Cotton Mill and constructed Guangqin Road to connect this rapidly developing urban area directly to the railway station. On its completion, Yang built worker housing along some of the road’s 2-­li length and set up three police stations.42 The prime location of the site, which was close to rail and river transport, attracted other industrialists, leading the Qingfeng and Yukang cotton mills as well as several silk filatures to be erected in 1920 and 1921. Yang invested in greenery along the roadside to improve the environment for the increasing number of workers who lived there, and it was said that “each spring the peach trees bloomed red and the willows green.” 43 Meanwhile, Yang Hanxi built a primary school next to the cotton mill. In 1921, after the establishment of the Guangqin Soap Factory, he invested money in a park behind his school, which boasted a stage for educational plays and a sports field. Soon afterward, he built a branch of the Puren Hospital in the area. After a brief hiatus during the Jiangsu-­Zhejiang War, Yang founded the Guangqin Silk Filature and Flour Mill, the former replacing the soap factory, which had become unprofitable. After 1927, the Nationalist Government took increasingly close interest in urban affairs in Wuxi, but this did not stop Yang from contributing to flood relief in 1931 and investing in the provision of clean water and improved fire ser­v ices. Nor did his involvement with the city stop when the Japa­nese invaded in 1937, and he played a major part in recovery from the damage resulting from that invasion in the early months of 1938.44 Yang Hanxi epitomizes Republican entrepreneurs. Their wealth was derived from rapidly growing industries, but they also

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invested in the development of their native place. Yang was just one of several families that poured money into Wuxi City, building factories, worker housing, roads, schools, and hospitals. This transformed the city’s morphology.

Wuxi’s New Urban Morphology As Wuxi developed into an important regional industrial center, the city expanded in all directions. Additionally, it acquired new shops, hotels, movie theaters, and other amenities that existed in other rapidly growing cities across the country. The maps in Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution of factories and the layout of the major roads to the north of the city walls. The first map does not distinguish between factories and small workshops, although we can surmise that there was no large-­scale manufacturing within the old city walls. Instead, manufacturing was concentrated around the gates of the city and along the canals, the railway station ensuring that the north remained the locus of development. Businesses to the northwest of the city ­were clay pits concentrated around the town of Hui­ shan. Surveys give an idea of the extent of industrialization. In 1929, the county government published information based on a survey conducted by Xue Mingjian, the manager of the Shenxin Number Three Cotton Mill, which it admitted was incomplete. It listed 138 enterprises, including 49 knitting factories, 35 machinist factories, and 18 dyeing factories, as well as numerous silk filatures. A later survey from 1935 added weaving, oil pressing, and brick making to the list and put the total number of factories in the city at 203, a surprising increase considering the impact of the Great Depression.45 This survey also provided dates when factories ­were founded, and this confirms Wuxi’s rapid rise to prominence in the second and third de­cades of the twentieth century, just as Nantong was declining. Only ten factories ­were established in Wuxi before 1911: five silk filatures, two rice mills, two cotton-­weaving factories, and a flour mill. After the demise of the empire in 1911, industrialization really took off. Seventy-­t wo factories w ­ ere set up in the first ten years of the Republic, with knitting the most vibrant sector, followed by machinery and silk filatures. Over the next twelve years, one hundred more factories ­were founded, the majority of them silk filatures, although rice mills and dyeing factories also increased significantly during this de­cade.46 Some factories ­were very large, employing hundreds if not thousands of workers, but many ­were small firms. This was certainly the case for machinist shops, of which there ­were sixty-­six in 1929, although

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Figure 1 ​Wuxi City with major factories and shops marked, 1933. Source: Gu, Wuxi zhi gongye.

they ­were subdivided into hardware, molding, copper plating, and other types. Most ­were simple setups, and few had capital of over 20,000 yuan or used electricity. The industry as a ­whole employed just over a thousand people, although it had its own ­union.47 Factories ­were far from the only source of employment in Wuxi. In a survey of workers conducted in 1934, Xue Mingjian estimated that there ­were between six thousand and seven thousand people in the tailoring business, two thousand hairdressers, thirty cobblers providing work for five hundred people, three hundred painting and decorating companies, and some ten thousand carpenters across the ­whole county.48 Beyond this, Wuxi boasted a thriving retail sector. There ­were the usual establishments selling food of all kinds, textile shops dealing in silk, cotton, and ramie cloth, and those

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Figure 2 ​Northern part of Wuxi City with some major roads and bridges marked. Sources: Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha, Chōsabu, Mushaku kōgyō jittai chōsa hōkokusho; Wuxishi diming weiyuanhui bangongshi, Wuxishi biaozhun diming shouce.

that provided other daily necessities, such as coal and all manner of iron utensils. Additionally, there ­were thirteen bookstores, eigh­teen photography studios, and fourteen perfume shops.49 Although there ­were no department stores like those in Shanghai, customers had access to many of the latest products from abroad, as evidenced by the photography and electrical shops. As with industry, much of the expansion occurred north of the city walls, and Beidajie was transformed into Wuxi’s Nanjing Road. By 1930, the street boasted sixty shops, including ten selling silk, six medicine shops, two restaurants, and one tea­house. At night, shoppers walked under green and red lanterns and ­were assailed by the sounds of radios used to drum up business, while smells from food carts lining the street added to the temptations.50 The city’s population also needed entertainment. Wuxi was home to twenty-­seven hotels and twenty-­five public theaters and tea­houses.

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­ iversions on offer ranged from taking in a film at the Zhongsheng Movie D Theater, which could seat a thousand, to listening to a storyteller at one of the tea­houses, where a worker could be part of an audience numbering between 50 and 150.51 Wuxi even had its own Great World (Da shijie) entertainment center, where locals watched plays or opera, ate ice cream, viewed curiosities such as armadillos from the United States, and watched fireworks displays.52 Beyond this, the city emulated Shanghai in other respects. For example, for just a few wen, movie-­goers could see the film Three Modern Women (Sange modeng nüxing). At the end of January 1933, only a month after its premier in Shanghai, it was showing four times a day.53 Entertainment was not limited to home-­grown productions, and in 1931 All Quiet on the Western Front appeared only one year after it was released in the United States.54 Clearly, for those who could afford it, Wuxi offered many of the same leisure pursuits as its coastal neighbor, and when we consider the extent of industrial development, the city certainly deserved to be called “Little Shanghai.”

Migration and Urbanization The industrialization of Wuxi attracted migrants to the city, and its population grew rapidly. Statistics from the early years of the century are unreliable, but the population of the city was estimated at a hundred thousand people in 1907. A later county government survey put the number of people at just over 170,000 in 1929, and this was quoted by Wang Yiya in his article on the geography of the city five years later.55 This means that the city’s population nearly doubled in two de­cades, a trend that matches the region as a ­whole. Skinner estimated that the urban population of Jiangnan between 1843 and 1893 increased from 7.4 percent to 10.6 percent. This growth accelerated in the twentieth century, although one estimate of a regional urban population at 30 percent in 1950 may have been a little high. Shanghai stood out, with an increase in the city’s population from 1 million in 1900 to over 5 million fifty years later.56 These statistics may be subject to a degree of error, but the general trend cannot be denied. As the Academia Sinica sociologist Chen Hansheng, who conducted three major surveys of Wuxi between 1929 and the early 1950s, noted, rural-­to-­urban migration was an important part of urbanization in this period.57 Many migrants to Wuxi City came from the surrounding countryside. One survey estimated that in the 1920s, 8.7 percent of villagers left their homes.58 Chen Hansheng gave figures of 9.53 percent in 1929, 10.77 percent

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in 1936, and 16.42 percent in 1948, with the vast majority of these people recorded as working.59 In Lishe, a small town in the northeast of the county, of the 755 people who had migrated by 1931, 4.5 percent lived in another province, 75 percent in another county, and 20 percent in Wuxi City itself. Among those who left, 400 went to Shanghai, and some to Suzhou.60 Observers of laborers in the city also noticed the preponderance of migrants. Xue Ming­ jian estimated that although 20 percent of workers ­were from Wuxi City, the majority came from surrounding towns and villages, and a further 20 percent from outside the county.61 These figures are supported by a survey of 2,239 factory workers in 1929, which found that 86.9 percent came from Jiangsu, with 62.83 percent of them coming from Wuxi County.62 Unsurprisingly, given the expansion of Wuxi’s industrial base, many of the new migrants worked in factories. In 1929, 27 percent of the city’s population was characterized as workers, which gives a figure of just over 45,000, while two later estimates from the mid-1930s recorded 37,000 and 63,000.63 Attention should be paid to the number of women who made the move from village to city, because patterns of movement and employment ­were gendered. In Wuxi, women ­were heavily concentrated in the textile industry, and in 1934 35,124 female workers ­were employed in silk filatures and cotton factories out of a total of 38,664 women recorded as working in the city. Children ­were mostly found in silk filatures, with 7,472 out of 8,772 recorded as having this occupation. Men, by contrast, made up a smaller share of the total number of workers, numbering only 16,328, of which some 8,638 ­were making bricks.64 Although estimates of the number of workers in Wuxi differ, most ­were recent migrants, and it is important to understand why they came to the city, since, as Skinner recognized, industrialization expanded the horizons of farming ­house­holds, giving them more connections ever farther beyond their villages. Some families may have lost cohesion through outward migration, but many gained opportunities and links to the city that allowed them to survive and, in some cases, prosper in a rapidly changing environment.65 People left their villages for many reasons, including banditry, flooding, marriage, and war, as well as to look for employment. As Lynda Bell has argued, movement to the city may have predominantly benefitted richer farming ­house­holds in neighboring towns and villages, but it provided an increasingly important source of income for families across the county. Moreover, it may also have been true that the majority of migrants ­were men, but young unmarried women left to work in silk filatures and cotton mills in Wuxi City, Shanghai, and elsewhere while nonfarm work in shops and

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workshops was increasingly common for both men and women in towns across the county.66 Whether out of necessity or a wish to improve personal and family circumstances, rural-­to-­urban migration was increasingly common throughout the early de­cades of the twentieth century. People moved to Wuxi, rather than Shanghai or another city in Jiangnan, because of ease of transport, familiarity with the city, and friends or relatives who eased the transition to urban life.67 We have seen above how family connections ­were important for the development of business empires, and the dispersed nature of Jiangnan lineages suggests that these personal networks offered similar opportunities for farming ­house­holds by giving individuals multiple personal links to different places. While land holdings ­were important, they ­were not as central to lineage identity as in south China. Instead, lineages relied on marital ­unions and other intangible assets such as job introductions and information flows to gain and maintain social status, which meant that families ­were dispersed around the region.68 Where landholdings existed, they ­were sometimes managed in the form of a charity hall ( yizhuang). In 1881, the Wuxi gazetteer listed forty-­nine charity halls in the county, which occupied 8 percent of its total land area.69 As Jerry Dennerline has illustrated in his study of intermarriage between the Hua and Qian families in Tangkou, they developed to provide support for children and widows and so attracted high-­status women to the lineage. They provided the basis for a “community of affines . . . ​that was in effect, a large network of families generated in part by marriage strategies of earlier generations.”70 This was certainly the case with the Hua estate, which was the oldest in Tangkou, and by the end of the Republican period had grown to 3,598 mu, with donations from sixteen different branches of the family. In total, some 450 people relied on it for various types of financial support, which included school fees, and help for those entering the job market. Some of these ­were poor ­house­holds living as far away as Changzhou and Suzhou, for whom the charity hall was the main source of income.71 Evidence from Wuxi is supported by industrial workplaces in Shanghai and Tianjin, where personal connections helped to shape the environment on the shop floor. Moreover, subcontractors often hired from either their native counties or repeatedly went back to the same towns and villages, whereas in Nantong skilled workers hailed from Ningbo, while the unskilled ­were picked up in the immediate vicinity of the city. Gang connections complicated the pro­cess, and migration to the city was not always a pleasant experience, even in the Rong family enterprises.72 In Wuxi, there was a local clique (bang) in the tailoring business, while migrants from Zhenjiang

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and Hubei dominated the hairdressers, and there was a high concentration of people from Wuxi, Ningbo, and Zhenjiang in the brewing industry.73 Male and female workers also had family or even gang relationships with factory foremen or women, known as Number Ones, in the Shenxin Number Three Cotton Mill. Descriptions of this system do not describe hiring practices in detail, but there is no reason to suspect that they would have been any different from those in other factories across the region. Indeed, the system in Wuxi was as entrenched as that in Shanghai, as shown by the fact that an attempt at reform in 1925 was met with a strike or­ga­nized by Number Ones, and the local police had to be brought in to restore order.74 As Jiangnan urbanized, Shanghai remained the destination of choice for many migrants, and as we shall see in Chapter 6, people from Wuxi played a part in the life of the metropolis. Elsewhere across the region, cities grew in size, providing job opportunities for farmers, many of whom already had family members living there. While there is more work to be done on migration throughout the Lower Yangtze Delta as a ­whole, especially on its impact on villages, industrialization in Wuxi caused the expansion of the city in both size and population.

Factory Life in Wuxi City For many migrants to Wuxi, the horizons of urban life w ­ ere defined by the rhythms and regulations of the factory. In this, the city was much the same as others across China, where technology was transforming the workplace, while the industrial landscape, with its belching chimneys, formed the wider environment in which people went about their daily lives.75 In Wuxi, we know most about the Shenxin Number Three Cotton Mill, and I focus on this factory, while mentioning other working environments for which evidence is available. The Shenxin Mill was certainly unique in some respects. The factory’s general manager, Xue Mingjian, established the worker self-­government district (laodong zizhiqu).76 Despite the name, every aspect of life was supervised to improve production and create model workers. In dormitories, politics and discipline ­were under the management of one person, while another was assigned to look after education.77 Single men and women had separate dormitories divided into eight “villages,” each with between fourteen and twenty-­six rooms, housing as many as twelve people. Families also had separate accommodation. Conditions ­were better there than other compounds in Wuxi, which could have as many as twenty women to one room, although most, such as the Yongtai Silk Filature dormitories, provided

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basic amenities such as washing and toilet facilities, and hot water could be purchased from small shops set up specifically to provide it called tiger stoves (laohuzao).78 Back in the Shenxin compound, regulations governed the domestic environment, including allocation of beds and closets for each person, set times for waking and sleeping, no noise after lights out, daily cleaning by a designated person, and no chamber pots in the dormitories. Workers ­were also rewarded for diligence and success in studying and punished for skipping class and laziness in washing.79 Mealtimes ­were set. Breakfast was at 5:20 in the morning, lunch at 11:10 a.m., and then dinner at 6:25 p.m. There was one dining hall for men and two for women. Tickets ­were obtained from the head of each dormitory and exchanged for food at a counter. Rules forbade excessive talking and laughing, and throwing bones on the floor was forbidden.80 This was a far cry from homegrown food in the villages, and while it may be going too far to call them an early example of communal eating, which was to characterize work-­unit life in Maoist China, they ­were certainly part of the new industrial urban environment. The Shenxin workers’ compound provided a number of other ser­v ices. There was a hairdresser, a post office, a hospital, and a shop selling daily necessities that operated on a cooperative basis, which kept its prices lower than those at grocers outside the compound. The factory even made some provision for pop­u­lar religion, as there was a shrine for charitable and pious deeds. A great store was set on education. Other than schools for children, there was a night school and a reading room; in addition, debates and ­ ere or­ga­nized and films shown.81 All this activity was often porlectures w trayed as a model to be followed elsewhere, and the head of the Chinese branch of the International Labor Or­ga­ni­za­tion, government officials, and other businessmen all visited the factory. Nor was the Shenxin compound unique, as workers in dormitories in the Yongtai Silk Filature had access to a doctor practicing Western medicine, and the factory offered classes in accounting and literacy.82 Despite the restrictions, life in factories offered opportunities and some freedom. This may have been the case for women in par­tic­u­lar, as Xue Ming­ jian complained: “Fashionable women can win the love of factory employees, so women workers often hope to become their wives. However because of this, clothes, makeup, and accessories are a large part of women’s expenditure. In the eve­ning, after work the homes of fashionable female workers become an intoxicating paradise for the factory employees.”83 The slight tone of condescension suggests that women workers may not have been granted

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the agency and individuality that was reserved for professionals. Indeed, some commentators equated them to prostitutes, the only difference being that workers sold their labor, rather than sex.84 For all that, women certainly took advantage of new fashions and culture. In cotton mills in Shanghai, they wore uniforms to work but outside dressed in Chinese-­style dresses called qipao and woolen coats in winter, and their leisure hours ­were spent singing, playing ball, and reading.85 Given how much women in Wuxi apparently spent on clothes and makeup, and the number and variety of theaters and teashops in the city, it is likely that such behavior was also common ­here. Of course, not all experiences of the city ­were positive, and it is worth remembering that labor contractors often had great power over dormitories, and there ­were reports of sexual harassment and rape.86

Street Life in Wuxi City Many people in Wuxi did not live in dormitories or work in factories, and the cityscape itself formed part of the rich tapestry of urban life. Typical Jiangnan one-­story ­houses with white walls and black-­tiled roofs known as pingfang ­were common, but there ­were four main types of urban dwellings. Of 132 families questioned in one survey, eighty lived in housing described as “one story, one base” ( yilou yidi). The rest lived in pingfang and factory dormitories, and a few of the poorest in straw shacks.87 The yilou yidi ­houses ­were most common in the factory districts, and Xue Mingjian estimated that there ­were between twenty thousand and thirty thousand across the city. Perhaps the most important difference with the countryside, where each ­house­hold had its own plot of land, was that in both Wuxi and Shanghai, as many as twenty or thirty people from several families might be living in one ­house.88 This meant that although they may have been poorer in the countryside, individuals had less living space in the city, and it was such overcrowding that helped to create the bustling streetlife found across the country. Although there is less information on how people conducted their daily lives in Wuxi, complaints about disorderly housing and the widespread use of canopies when it was sunny certainly suggest that streets ­were similar hives of human activity.89 Outside dormitory compounds, access to basic amenities such as food and water involved daily contact with the urban environment. In Wuxi, despite extensive plans, municipal authorities did not develop advanced water-­supply and sanitation systems as in Shanghai, Tianjin, and other treaty ports. Instead, most people used water straight from the river, which is

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hardly surprising given how many canals and streams ran through the city. There ­were a few private wells and just three public wells. They ­were open between six in the morning and ten at night, and customers first had to stand in line and pay one wen for a ticket, which they then exchanged for a bucket of water.90 Hot water was available at tiger stoves, which in Shanghai also served as tea­houses, bath­houses, wine shops, and even recruitment agencies for migrants seeking domestic ser­v ice.91 In Wuxi tiger stoves ­were a common sight. Setting up in the hot water business required capital of only 400 yuan, which was not beyond the means of even some poor migrants from north Jiangsu. Like all other businesses, they ­were susceptible to market conditions, as a rise in the price of fuel brought more expensive hot water, although this did not halt their expansion throughout the city.92 The tiger stoves came to fulfill several functions for urban residents, but their origin lay in solving a problem caused by living in the city: the provision of hot water to those who had no kitchens. The growth of these enterprises and their place in urban society are an excellent example of how access to even the most basic amenities provided new possibilities for commerce and human interaction. After water, food was the most important resource, and food purchases took up a large percentage of the average earner’s wage packet. In Wuxi, workers spent over 60 percent of their income on food.93 Lack of data for the countryside makes it difficult to compare diets, although it is almost certain that a higher income meant more meat and a wider selection of produce, which was more readily available in the city. For example, one survey recorded working families in Shanghai eating 129 different types of food, ranging from the comparatively exotic bananas, sweets, and ice cream to the mundane rice and soybean curd. The picture is less detailed in Wuxi, but families spent money on meat, fish, and fruit, which speaks of a somewhat varied diet.94 While Wuxi residents walked the streets to and from work or in search of food and water, it was probably in the pursuit of leisure that they ventured farthest from their daily routine. I have already described Beidajie to the north of the city walls, and the women workers of whom Xue Mingjian disapproved most likely frequented theaters, teahouses, and the Great World. I conclude this chapter with the celebration of public festivals, since it was during these holidays that urban residents had the time to interact with the urban landscape in new ways. Of course, festivals had long been an urban spectacle and a commercial opportunity. In Wuxi, nowhere was livelier than the old city center around Chongan Temple, and during the Lunar New Year,

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a temple fair combined religious and worldly pursuits, as depicted in this early Republican-­era account. “When the New Year begins, children rush ­here. All the salesmen have puppet plays, small cups or plates of melted tin and chairs or tables of pig iron. There are dagger-­a xes of cut bamboo and masks made of pasted paper. Most of them cheat the small children out of their New Year’s money for things that are of no value. There is no real loss, and so where’s the harm? Now, Japa­nese toys are being imported and are particularly desirable, so the children buy them happily.”95 The festival also attracted people from across the county, some of whom came to settle accounts or trade. In 1930, so many people ­were traveling to the city that the municipal government sent police and the militia to patrol the river routes to Wuxi and Jiangyin.96 Festival celebrations also made a spectacle of the urban fabric. On the final day of the Lantern Festival (Yuanxiaojie), lights adorned every street and alleyway and made for a spectacular view, as “many visitors climb to the top of Xishan to gaze on the city, which looks like a fiery dragon.”97 During the first de­cades of the twentieth century, some of these traditions remained, but modes of celebration began to change as leisure pursuits multiplied. In 1932, a Wuxi journalist commented on the crowds at the city’s theaters, parks, and tea­houses.98 Movie theaters showed films that captured the spirit of the season. For example, the film Three Modern Women, mentioned above, was advertised as the Zhongnan Movie Theater’s “Great Contribution to the New Spring” and was a film that “the young could not help but see and the old could not help but love.”99 All this conspicuous consumption put pressure on urban resources. In 1928 a power cut occurred, and although shop­keep­ers turned to oil lamps and candles until the electricity was restored, its failure later in the eve­ning caused further loss of business. By the time the lights finally came back on at midnight, most people had already retired for the eve­ning.100 This account of the celebration of festivals in Wuxi completes the description of daily life in the city. By the 1930s, commercial, industrial, and infrastructure development had transformed the urban landscape. Wuxi’s dormitories, factories, movie theaters, and hastily constructed ­houses catered to a rapidly growing population, much of which was newly arrived from the countryside. Like city-­dwellers everywhere, they had daily lives whose complexity defies simple categorization. For some, urban life was full of possibility and plea­sure, but others ­were destined to eke out a living on the margins of the city, pulling rickshaws, begging, or putting in long hours stirring silkworm cocoons in cauldrons of boiling water. Nonetheless, these new

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migrants lived in a city that had overtaken Nantong to become the most prosperous in the Lower Yangtze Delta. Wuxi’s urbanization was the direct result of the orientation of the regional economy towards international markets via Shanghai, which gave local families opportunities to invest in factories and other commercial enterprises and then build urban infrastructure. This, in turn, constituted the changing environment in which locals and migrants alike lived. To understand how this transformation was part of a wider societal pro­cess of urbanization, it is necessary to explore changes in the countryside.

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Wuxi Elites and Infrastructure Urbanization of the Countryside

Urbanization was not confined to Wuxi City. In the early twentieth century, many of the families that built urban factories, roads, hospitals, and schools also invested in rural infrastructure. This altered the physical appearance of the countryside and brought new technology and material culture often seen as epitomizing urban life out to farms and fields. The urbanization of towns and villages was a vector carry­ing the effects of the spread of global industrial capitalism to China beyond the city while at the same time shaping its spatial manifestation. In this chapter, I argue that investment in factories, rural infrastructure, and tourism urbanized the countryside. I then turn to descriptions of the county in guidebooks and travel magazines, since these illustrate how locals and visitors alike recognized the extent to which Wuxi had been transformed. Finally, I take a walk in the fields to investigate the impact of urbanization on farmers. I tease out similarities and differences along the rural-­urban continuum, which was now firmly oriented towards the city.

Yanjiaqiao: The Urbanization of One Small Town There is no better example of how Wuxi entrepreneurs ­were responsible for the urbanization of the countryside than the town of Yanjiaqiao, which was located in the northeast of Wuxi County. It was the home of another important local industrial family, the Tang. Yanjiaqiao was equidistant from Wuxi City, Changshu, Jiangyin, and Suzhou. The main access to the town remained by boat until the completion of the highway from Shanghai to Nanjing on the eve of the outbreak of the Anti-­Japanese War of Re­sis­tance in 1937. Despite its location, Yanjiaqiao was a bustling place. A survey in 1947

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put the population at 281 ­house­holds, many of them made up of immigrants attracted by the town’s remoteness in times of disaster.1 It was for this reason that Tang Ziliang left his cloth shop in Wuxi during the Taiping Rebellion and re-­established his business in Yanjiaqiao, later adding a carpenters, pawnshop, and ware­house.2 At the beginning of the twentieth century, his son Tang Baoqian became a rice broker in Sanliqiao just to the north of Wuxi City and was then one of ten investors in the Jiufeng Flour Mill.3 It was a great success, and within ten years it was sourcing wheat from across Jiangsu, while sales offices ­were set up in Hangzhou and Shanghai. The latter reported daily on the latest international wheat prices, allowing Tang Baoqian to react quickly to the vicissitudes of international demand.4 He expanded his business empire with the Yiyuan Ware­house and Rice Mill and then in 1914, in partnership with Yang Hanxi, added the Runfeng Vegetable Oil Pro­cessing Factory, which was the first such enterprise to use diesel power. The final pieces of his business empire ­were the Qingfeng Cotton Mill and the Jinfeng Silk Filature, which used cocoons from the Tang family brokers in Yanjiaqiao.5 Even while pouring money into Wuxi, Tang Baoqian did not forget about his hometown. In 1920 he added a brick-­making factory to the businesses the family already owned, which used local clay as raw material.6 With a chimney towering over the neighboring countryside, it used technology imported from Germany, employed five hundred workers, and provided bricks for the construction of Tang’s Qingfeng Cotton Mill back in Wuxi.7 Other than the Tang, several other families invested in the town, among them the Cheng, which owned carpenters and rice mills. In 1935, they also introduced new technology, replacing the diesel-­run bailing machine used for irrigation with more efficient electrical equipment, updating the rice mill, and erecting street lighting.8 Commerce and industry transformed Yanjiaqiao. New roads of gravel and stone slabs ­were built through its center, and while most structures ­were the ubiquitous pingfang common to city and countryside alike, local builders began to adopt foreign styles.9 The town boasted 200 small shops that sold, among other things, rice, wheat, silk, groceries, and alcohol, and there ­were tea­houses, restaurants, and Chinese medicine shops.10 Worthy of note for providing goods from across China and abroad ­were the shops selling southern goods, of which there ­were forty-­five. They ranged in size from one to three rooms and, among other products, stocked oil, soap, matches, and cigarettes. The larger shops conducted business with ­wholesalers in Wuxi, Changshu, and Suzhou and let customers run up accounts.11

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Yanjiaqiao was a bustling town, with a commercial center that attracted shoppers into the night with street lights and music. Clearly, urbanization was not on the same scale as the metropolises of Shanghai or Wuxi, but the extent to which the town was transformed is evidenced by the fact that it was known as Xiao Wuxi (Little Wuxi).12

Urbanization across the County Yanjiaqiao was just one of many urbanizing towns and villages in Wuxi, some of which are shown on the map in Figure 3. Divided into seventeen wards, the county had an estimated population of nearly a million by the late 1920s. Outside the city, the main settlements ­were Tangkou and Zhangjingqiao, which both had more than 5,000 residents, while Anzhen, Bashiqiao, Luoshe, and Yanqiao boasted over 4,000, and Nanfangquan, Hudi, and Shitangwan over 3,000.13 Table 1 gives some indication of the

Figure 3 ​Map of Wuxi County with some towns and villages marked. Sources: Wuxishi ­difangzhi bian zuan weiyuanhui, Wuxishi zhi; Wuxishi diming weiyuanhui bangongshi, Wuxishi biaozhun diming shouce, 144.

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171, 240 70,327 47,445 36,510 55,448 50,884 57,583 42,438 24,103 27,552 42,621 54,404 38,429 44,158 64,501 69,083 43,965

Wuxi shi 1 Jingyun 2 Yangming 3 Kaiyuan 4 Tianshang 5 Tianxia 6 Huaishang 7 Huaixia 8 Beishang 9 Beixia 10 Nanyan 11 Taibo 12 Xinan 13 Kaihua 14 Qingcheng 15 Wanan 16 Fu‘an 17

Wuxi City Jiangbeiqiao Zhouxin zhen Qianqiaotou Yanqiao Bashiqiao Zhangjingqiao Anzhen Houqiao Dongting Tangkou Daqiangmenkou Huda fanzhuang Nanfangquan Fengfudun Luoshezhen Zhangshe

Main center of government multiple 1 3 16 5 4 4 3 3 several –­ 2 –­ several several multiple several

Post offices

1 –­ 1 –­ –­ –­ –­ several multiple several

multiple –­ 1 –­ 6 2

Telephones 19 70 66 –­ 90 90 90 88 55 56 74 85 60 –­ 73 73 9

% of farmers

Source: Wuxixian zhengfu: Wuxi shizheng choubei chu, Wuxi nianjian, zhengzhi (Wuxi: Wuxi xian zhengfu, 1930), 47–57.

Population

Ward name and post-­1927 number

Table 1 Basic information on wards in Wuxi County, 1930

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27 –­ 14 –­ 6 7 6 6 9 32 9 9 10 –­ 8 8 –­

% of workers

41 –­ 12 –­ 4 3 4 6 13 10 8 6 20 –­ 12 13 –­

% of businessmen

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social makeup and the types of goods and ser­v ices that could be found throughout the county. The data are clearly incomplete. It is hard to believe that Kaiyuan Ward, in which the Rong family established factories, schools, and a library, had no telephones. Post office numbers may also be misleading, as some ­were simply branches in local shops. Finally, there is no information on how the different categories of farmer, worker, and businessman ­were defined. Despite these shortcomings, the data provide evidence that northern wards ­were generally poorer and perhaps less urbanized, since Tianshang, Tianxia, Huaishang, and Huaixia had the largest proportion of farmers, while those to the south of the city and along the railway line, such as Yangming and Beixia, recorded more workers or businessmen. Some wards emerged as small centers of commerce and industry in their ­ ere three silk filatures in Yangming, a sock-­ own right. For example, there w making factory and a lime factory, as well as sixty shops and two pawnshops in its chief town of Zhouxinzhen. Farther east, there ­were small-­scale silk filatures and cloth factories in Beixia, while around Dongting and Meicun, ­ ere contracted to sew decorative borders in a putting-­ farming ­house­holds w out system.14 Meicun was a bustling town that in 1935 boasted forty shops, a pawnbroker, and a primary school as well as daily steamer connections to Wuxi City and Suzhou.15 Farther north, the town of Bashiqiao was equally busy, with 120 shops and 10 companies making decorative borders, which employed women within a radius of 20 li. It is noteworthy that after the depression in sericulture, many women turned to this industry for supplementary income, mirroring the activities of ­house­holds across the county that saw more profit to be made in farming wheat than in growing mulberry bushes.16 Rural infrastructure development was crucial to the urbanization of the countryside. The newest form of transport, the automobile, appeared in Wuxi in the 1920s, and by the end of that de­cade there w ­ ere twenty vehicles available for public use as well as several private cars. The Kaiyuan Bus Company, one of the first in the county, had ser­vice to Rongxiang and nearby Plum Garden (Meiyuan), a famous local scenic spot.17 By 1935, bus ser­v ices linked Wuxi to Shanghai, Nanjing, Jiangyin, and Yixing, with most trips costing less than 1 yuan.18 The railway was also a major artery connecting Wuxi to other cities in Jiangnan and beyond, and there ­were several fast trains a day to Shanghai and Nanjing. By the 1920s, travelers used the railway extensively, while its impact on industry is beyond question. Wuxi County had

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two smaller stations, and there is some evidence that their opening also caused urbanization in the surrounding area. Certainly, postal ser­v ices to places within easy reach of the railway used this method of transport rather than the steamer.19 Despite this new infrastructure, boats and rickshaws ­were the main means of transport. Seventy-­six rickshaw companies had ser­v ices between Wuxi City and surrounding towns and villages. Most ­were fairly small, with only twenty or thirty vehicles, but some ­were larger, and the total number of rickshaws was estimated at 2,240 in 1934.20 As road networks extended into the countryside, even the remotest towns became accessible. For example, a road ran 1 li west of the village of Baojiazhuang, which was 32 li south of Wuxi City.21 Almost every major town in Wuxi was on a steamer line, and in total approximately four thousand boats of different types plied the waterways.22 Older and newer craft existed side by side. Mao Dun described what must have been a common site. Far up the bend in the canal a boat whistle broke the silence. . . . ​A small oil-­burning river boat came puffing up pompously from beyond the silk filature, tugging three larger craft in its wake. Immediately the peaceful water was agitated with waves rolling towards the banks on both sides of the canal. A peasant, poling a tiny boat, hastened to the shore and clutched a clump of reeds growing in the shallows. The waves tossed him and the little craft up and down like a see saw. The peaceful green countryside was filled with the chugging of the boat engine and the stink of its exhaust.23

Despite the distaste with which Mao Dun viewed them, diesel boats brought the sounds and smells of industrial capitalist urbanization onto the waterways of the Wuxi countryside. One interesting feature of the expansion of urban infrastructure was its impact on time mea­sure­ment, since accurate time-­keeping was just as important in regulating bus or boat ser­v ices as it was the schedule of workers in cotton mills.24 Guidebooks of Wuxi printed the times of the major bus, train, and steamer ser­v ices to and from the city. Local boats in Yanjiaqiao also left promptly each morning to Changshu and Wuxi City to be sure of getting back the same eve­ning.25 Urbanization in Wuxi did not stop at the expanding city limits, but transformed towns and villages, even as new infrastructure to connect them was being built. Much of this development was the result of investment from families such as the Tang, although as we shall see the state was to take a

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more hands-on role after 1927. However, urbanization did more than just alter the built environment. It changed the natural world itself.

Urbanizing the Natural Environment Local elites in Wuxi poured money into scenic spots such as Lake Tai and Plum Garden, which ­were packaged and sold as tourist destinations. While initial investment came from private entrepreneurs, local officials later recognized the potential of tourism. Gardens and parks ­were important urban spaces in late imperial China, while the natural world had long been shaped for religious or cultural reasons.26 Many sites, particularly those that ­were privately owned, continued to carry these meanings, but they ­were also increasingly becoming commercially exploited for tourism, a pro­cess that drove the building of new infrastructure and led to a variety of new uses. This meant that while local guidebooks and tourist magazines praised the beauty of the natural environment, it was also packaged within a discourse that emphasized comfort and con­ve­nience, particularly when writers wished to attract travelers from Shanghai. Often little distinction was made between where the city ended and the countryside began, which reflects how urbanization was changing the way in which even the natural environment was being developed, managed, used, and represented. Perhaps the best illustration of the urbanization of nature is Plum Garden, which exhibited some of the characteristics of a late imperial private garden, while also being a tourist destination. Its origins date to 1912, when Rong Desheng bought land on a mountain to the west of Wuxi City. The following year, the plot was expanded to 150 mu, and by 1920, 3,000 trees had been planted, and several pavilions, a spring, and a school erected. The Rong family also paid for the construction of Kaiyuan Road, which linked the garden directly to the city, was later widened and resurfaced, and was a boon to local tourism.27 The garden was certainly a haven of tranquility. Entering the gate, visitors ­were greeted by a large stone with the characters for Meiyuan written on it, with Washing Heart Spring bubbling away to the right while the sounds of children studying in the elementary school wafted in from the left. Walking forward, the visitor entered a square surrounded by thousands of plum trees, before passing over a bridge to the Sky Heart Platform, which offered a 360-­degree view.28 Rong Desheng appreciated the refuge that the garden offered from hectic urban life; he said, “Travelers come to the countryside, where the mountains are peaceful, and the

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water is clean. Those who have been in the city a long time will find their minds enlightened.”29 For the Rong family, the garden was also a private place. In 1923, a family villa was built, complete with stunning views, guest rooms, a bath­house, and dining area, and in 1930 the brothers constructed a tower in memory of their parents.30 However, Plum Garden was more than just a private retreat, since high-­ profile visitors to the city ­were entertained there. In 1921 the second meeting of the Jiangsu Society was convened amid the plum trees. Established by Zhang Jian to promote self-­government, the society had held its inaugural meeting the previous year in Nantong. If this, as Qin Shao suggests, aimed to showcase the city, which by then was in decline, then its second meeting did much the same for Wuxi.31 On 10 March, Rong Desheng welcomed 160 officials and businessmen to Wuxi, and the following day they ­were taken to the conference hall in Meiyuan. The garden had been specially decked out for the meeting, with electric lights hung from the plum trees, and the river police provided four boat patrols to ensure the security of delegates. Rong Desheng and other local gentry used the occasion to show off Wuxi’s commercial, industrial, and natural highlights. On the morning of 12 March, groups of delegates visited schools, experimental farms, the sports stadium, silk filatures, cotton factories, and printers. Later in the afternoon, they w ­ ere given a tour of Huishan and Lake Tai before a farewell dinner in the Maoxin Cotton Factory.32 Among the resolutions passed at the meeting ­were those urging the province to establish self-­government institutions and begin land and population surveys, as well as a request to set up a provincial road building committee.33 Holding the meeting of the Jiangsu Society at Plum Garden made it both physically and discursively part of Wuxi City. While the Rong family used the garden for its own purposes, it was also open to the public. The Lake Tai Hotel was built in 1926 in partnership with Zhang Deqing, the director of the New World Hotel in Wuxi. Its ten rooms copied the style of another hotel in the heart of Shanghai’s International Settlement, and it also hosted Chinese and Western restaurants, a bar, meeting room, baths, and four cars for the use of guests.34 A map of the garden depicts toilet facilities, another restaurant, bandstand, and tearoom, and a telephone linked it to a tourist office at the train station in Wuxi City.35 It is not difficult to imagine visitors disembarking the train from Shanghai, entering the tourist office to book a room in the hotel, or table at the restaurant, and waiting for a car to whisk them away to the garden, and, as we shall now see, some travelers did just that.

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Wuxi in Guidebooks and Travel Writing Many Wuxi guidebooks ­were published during the Republican era, and visitors to the city wrote articles describing their impressions. Such writing has a long tradition in China and forms a rich genre that historians have used to understand urban culture in earlier periods.36 Twentieth-­century guidebook writers emphasized the transformation of the county as a ­whole. In doing so, they described the extent to which commercialization of tourist sites and connection of them to the city through the development of rural infrastructure was urbanizing the natural environment. In this, Wuxi was no different from other cities in the region. Hangzhou and places of natural beauty, such as Huangshan, ­were advertised as weekend trips for the new professional classes in Shanghai. In the pro­cess, the ancient was rebranded, and where tradition did not exist, sometimes it was simply invented. Meanwhile, the natural landscape, which had inspired poets for centuries and was now more accessible than ever, was presented in a sanitized form.37 Discussing Huangshan, Miriam Gross has described this repackaging as being linked to a superior urban modernity. Although she is essentially correct, she fails to distinguish what is specifically urban about describing flora and fauna using the Linnaean system of classification or photographing it instead of painting it. Indeed, Huangshan only became a viable tourist destination, at least in the minds of the new professional classes in Shanghai, because of improved infrastructure and the building of a scenic area. The mountain was not linked to a superior urban modernity but was, in fact, being altered by urbanization.38 In Wuxi, urbanization similarly redefined the relationship between the natural world and the built environment. Guidebooks played up Wuxi’s new regional importance. For example, Wuxi: Lake Tai (Wuxi: Taihu) stated: “Industry in Wuxi is very developed. Apart from Shanghai, there is no other city to match it in the southeast. On arrival at Wuxi, you see chimneys as thick as a forest, and factories and ware­ houses lined up close. Meanwhile, the rumble of the machines continues day and night.”39 Even the Anti-­Japanese War of Re­sis­tance could not kill the enthusiasm for travel, and in 1948 the China Travel Ser­v ice published a guide to the city. Having noted that Wuxi had a long history and was the destination of choice for many travelers, it continued, “Historically, in ancient times Suzhou had a much better environment than Wuxi, and the city was also much larger. Because of this, Suzhou should have expanded far more than Wuxi. However, this has not been the case. Modern Wuxi has rapidly become the most important city in the southeast industrial region. As for

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Suzhou! When it comes to national industry, it cannot catch up with Wuxi.” 40 Having emphasized Wuxi’s regional importance, guidebooks began to pick out places of interest for the discerning traveler. These included factories, hotels, restaurants, and ancient monuments, as well as sites of natural beauty such as Lake Tai. No temple, bridge, or pavilion was too small, and all ­were part of an urbanizing Wuxi, a place that was increasingly accessible, comfortable, and yet still beautiful. I draw information primarily from three sources. Published in 1935, Wuxi Overview (Wuxi gailan) was actually a survey and was sometimes referred to as the second yearbook of the city, the first one having been published in 1930. Perhaps the most detailed guidebook was Guide to Wuxi (Wuxi daoyou). Published in 1935 by a local travel agent, it was divided into thirteen sections, which covered tourist attractions and gave information on the population, transport, education, hotels, and local produce. The final guidebook is Wuxi: Taihu, mentioned above. Each publication had sections on Hui­ shan, the city, lakes, and ancient monuments. The two guidebooks also had suggestions for one-, two-, and three-day tours of Wuxi. The one-­day tour, which began at nine in the morning and, the guides suggested, could be taken by boat, rickshaw, or car, began at Chongan Temple and headed towards Lake Tai, taking in Huishan and Meiyuan, among other gardens, before returning to the city at six in the eve­ning. For the two-­day tour, the author of Guide to Wuxi advised visiting the central elementary school before continuing out into the countryside. Meanwhile, the writers of Wuxi: Taihu felt that a trip to the caves of Yixing was appropriate. The three-­day tours merely added an extra garden or two to the itinerary.41 For those who did not have time for a tour or wanted to travel in­de­pen­ dently, the guidebooks listed a number of important sites, and the city’s garden was something that no visitor could miss. In the late imperial period, it had been a flower garden but now also featured a small hill, with a pool at the top, its banks lined with tea plants. In addition, there was a new grassy area with flowerbeds and eight pavilions, which during the summer ­were full of visitors drinking cold tea. Worthy of note north of the city walls was the garden built by Yang Hanxi, complete with its sports stadium. Meanwhile, in the middle of Beitang Canal stood Yellow Port Hill (Huangbudun), which was less than half a mu in size and topped with a small pillar that was burned down in 1921, but rebuilt several years later by Tang Baoqian. Clearly, Wuxi’s local industrialists ­were not wholly pragmatic and inscribed their artistic tastes on the city’s landscape. Wuxi also boasted its fair share of ancient monuments, most important of which was Chongan Temple. The

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shorter Wuxi: Taihu merely noted its origins in the Tang Dynasty and the presence of Buddhist images. The other guides went into more detail, explaining how part of the temple had been converted to a school at the end of the Qing, with a shop opened in another hall. A small food market was a later addition, which had recently been expanded. Of course, temples in China had long had connections to commerce and education, but by the Republican era, only four halls ­were set aside for images of Buddhist gods. Another important site in the city was the Donglin Academy, which had produced generations of scholars. It traced its history back to the Song Dynasty, had been destroyed and rebuilt numerous times, and now served as the county’s number two elementary school.42 Having spent time in the city, visitors ­were encouraged to travel to Lake Tai, which had long been associated with Wuxi’s prosperity but was now directly connected to it by Kaiyuan Road and Trea­sure World Bridge (Baojieqiao). This spanned the smaller Five-­Li Lake (Wuli hu), linked Li Garden (Li yuan) with Sea Turtle Head Island (Yuantouzhu), and was an important part of a proposed land route that was envisioned to encircle Lake Tai and Five-­Li Lake. Completed in 1934, and paid for by Rong Desheng, it was 1,500 meters long, cost 60,000 yuan, and was constructed by one hundred workers over a period of six months. It was, claimed the author of Guide to Wuxi, the longest bridge in southeast China.43 The shores of Lake Tai ­were lined with temples, gardens, pavilions, and parks, but a destination of choice for the guidebooks and many visitors was Sea Turtle Head Island, the gateway to Lake Tai. So named because of its shape, the island was actually a peninsula stretching into the lake. In 1918 at a cost of 2,000 yuan Yang Hanxi bought 60 mu of land, planted an orchard, and on top of the peninsula constructed a light­house and small guest­house for travelers to rest in. Halfway down was Flower God Temple (Huashen miao), while at the bottom a small jetty jutted out into the lake. A short walk brought visitors to a pavilion offering wonderful views, and half a li to the south was a small spring, where the Yang family shrine had been constructed. Nearby was Guangfu Temple, built on land donated by Yang Hanxi in 1924, with funds from several other prominent local families as well. Four years later, a pavilion was constructed behind the temple, offering another scenic panorama.44 All this investment drove the urbanization of the shores of Lake Tai. Building roads, light­houses, and temples often made new use of long-­standing structures, while the natural world became ever more accessible and sanitized. Guidebooks then packaged the ­whole in one big bundle and called it Wuxi, often mak-

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ing it hard to see where the expanding city ended and the urbanizing countryside began. Nature, of course, retained its attraction, and Lake Tai inspired the imagination. In 1924, friends invited the writer Cheng Fangwu to visit, because they wanted him to see the true essence of Jiangnan. They hired a small boat, and Cheng described the scene in glowing terms. “When we left the shore of the lake we felt that we had also left the modern world and entered an amazing realm. We ­were filled with a desire, but had no idea where it had come from. In a flash of an eye, we found ourselves immersed in a world of water. The bank we had just left and the temple on it ­were already far in the distance and we ­were between the water and the sky.” 45 Some years later, Yu Dafu also visited Wuxi, and as he hastily left the city stayed the night at the Lake Tai Hotel in Plum Garden. He was awoken early by the chiming of a monastery bell, whereupon, “I quietly slipped out of the back door of the hotel and climbed to the highest point in Plum Garden. To the south was Lake Tai, but I couldn’t make out its shape. However, I felt that the space in that direction was like countless silver threads and that the lake surface was reflecting the bright moonlight back in silver arrows.” 46 Both writers place the water at the center of their descriptions, and it was primarily the natural environment that they came to see. However to enjoy its beauty, they used new transport connections and had to pass through Wuxi City. Neither writer missed the tensions in the relationship between the built and natural environments. Cheng Fangwu complained of the filth of Shanghai but thanked James Watt for inventing the steam engine because it could whisk him away to the countryside. He described the rails cutting the world in half and the electricity wires undulating outside the windows, and on arrival in Wuxi he was speechless at its size. Cheng arrived a little later than planned, because he had been out drinking with friends the night before and missed the early train, so they took a car to the banks of the lake, where the scenery made him nostalgic for his hometown.47 Yu Dafu was similarly sentimental but was not prepared to rough it in the countryside. Despite waxing lyrical about sedan chairs and a boat that would take him straight to the lake, it was in the back seat of a bus that, he says, “My heart felt like it was already at the lakeside.” 48 Clearly, even those who sought the solace of the natural world appreciated the new infrastructure that made their journey more comfortable. They, like the industrialists who constructed the roads and bridges, ­were not alone in understanding that change had come to Wuxi County. Farmers ­were also seeing the results of urbanization in their fields and homes.

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Daily Life in an Urbanizing Countryside Throughout the countryside, new ways of living and working brought some of the sights, sounds, smells, and tastes of the city out into villages and fields. The following description of how urbanization was changing the built environment and material culture that defined everyday horizons is drawn from a variety of economic and social surveys of the Wuxi countryside and supplemented by Fei Xiaotong’s anthropological study of Kaixiangong. This village was south of Lake Tai, but farmers engaged in the same mix of rice, grain, and sericulture as their counterparts in Wuxi, while the village boasted a silk filature.49 Of course, we must be careful not to transplant the experiences of those living south of Lake Tai to its northern shore, but the detail of Fei’s work still makes it an invaluable source for helping us to understand the daily lives of farmers across the region.

Work in the Countryside Farmers in Wuxi had a wide variety of occupations, many of which took place in the home. This was already a point of difference with the city, where, in factories at least, the workplace was beginning to split from domestic space, a phenomenon that appears to be consistent with the development of industrial capitalism around the world.50 In Wuxi, the main sideline was sericulture, and the production pro­cess had long shaped the physical, social, and cultural spaces of the ­house­hold. Every spring for six weeks, silkworms dominated farmers’ lives. The doors of the ­house ­were closed to outsiders, local government was suspended, and schools shut down. This not only served to reduce the risk of infection but also meant that all members of the family ­were available to help.51 Rearing silkworms was best done under controlled conditions, and specific areas within the ­house, or, if possible, ­whole rooms, ­were set aside for the purpose. Where farmsteads had workshops or out­houses, it is likely that one was devoted to sericulture, but even in the ­houses of poorer families, partitions ­were put up, candles and stoves prepared to heat the room, and paper pasted on walls and windows to keep out the flies and light. This partitioning also prevented noxious odors and other harmful influences, which traditionally included loud noises, from affecting the feeding pro­cess.52 Division of space also benefitted the occupants of the ­house, as the worms took up room and, at the end of their growth cycle, ­were very noisy. After one month, the worms ­were placed on straw stacks, where they metamor-

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phosed into cocoons from which the silk could be drawn and reeled.53 Of course, by the Republican period, reeling and weaving ­were increasingly mechanized, but silkworm rearing in the spring and, increasingly, in late summer turned the home into a workshop. The new century brought new ideas on hygiene and innovations in production techniques that altered the spaces in which sericulture was practiced. Some of these changes ­were driven by demands for better-­quality cocoons to compete with the Japa­nese silk industry, whose suppliers had already adopted improved eggs. The government played a crucial role in financing the establishment of laboratories for egg breeding in Wuxi in the 1920s. All was not smooth sailing, however, as the new eggs suffered from quality problems.54 Ideas of cleanliness and temperature control also met with a mixed reception but had a huge impact on the home, as Fei Xiaotong recognized. “[T]he worms are removed to the private ­house­hold and each ­house­hold raises its own worms separately. Before removal, the private ­houses are disinfected under instructions given by the teaching centre.”55 Despite the problems, the use of science to re­orient space towards increased production emulated, albeit in a rural setting, some of the sights, sounds, and smells of ­ ere even then springing up across the countryside. A the factories, which w similar change can be seen with work in the decorative border industry, which was centered in Bashiqiao. The first company was set up in 1916, and the industry flourished, providing work for many women laid off from silk filatures after the Great Depression. In the eve­ning, when women ­were hard at work, the lights shone like stars, much of the illumination probably emanating from kerosene lamps, while some workers may have used sewing machines, which ­were also becoming increasingly common in Wuxi.56 In addition to penetrating the farm­house, industrial technology was beginning to transform agricultural production. Rice was planted and transplanted by hand, and foot-­powered waterwheels, of which there w ­ ere twenty-­ one in Caozhuang Village in the north of Wuxi County, ­were still used for irrigation.57 This simple piece of technology had been a feature of the Jiangnan landscape for centuries but was rapidly being replaced with motorized pumps, which by the 1930s accounted for the majority of irrigation in Kaiyuan Ward and over 80 percent in the town of Lishe.58 Clearly, not all families could afford the new machines, but many poorer laborers probably came into contact with them while working on neighboring farms. They could also be hired from landlords or richer farmers, and groups of ­house­holds or ­whole villages established cooperatives to buy machines for general use. This gave even the poorest farmers access to new technology

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and illustrates how long-­established social practices ­were adapting to changing circumstances. Poor tenants had borrowed seed and fertilizer from their landlords for years, and it was no different with irrigation.59 For instance, in the town of Meicun, hiring an 18-­horsepower pump to irrigate 1 mu of land cost between 1.2 yuan and 1.5 yuan, although the price ­rose in 1935 because of low rainfall.60 The situation was similar in the villages of Sunxiang and Zhuangqian, where pumps ­were hired from richer farmers and landlords who could afford them.61 As rural surveyors ­were fond of pointing out, this may have been exploitative, but it does not detract from the fact that new technology was spreading throughout the countryside. The co-op was more equitable. Of the three pumps in Lishe, one was owned outright, the second by a co-op of landlords and richer farmers, and the third by a group of farmers themselves. As in Meicun, Sunxiang, and Zhuangqian, the pumps could also be hired, and the price was 1.6 yuan–2 yuan.62 Fei recorded some re­sis­tance to the new technology in Kaixiangong, as farmers preferred working on the old pumps to paying the fee and standing idle. One unfortunate soul even gambled away his life savings with all his extra leisure time.63 This suggests that the arrival of new technology was having an effect on the social life of villages. In Kaixiangong, the ­whole village, including the women, had collective responsibility for irrigation, and this apparently worked against introduction of the pumps.64 Elsewhere, they caused other problems. In Tianxia Ward, two thousand families farmed several thousand mu along the Guanzhuangheng River. Previously, irrigation had made it difficult for boats to navigate, and after the introduction of the new pumps, the water level fell further, and they ­were now stranded. This development inspired the local authorities to dredge the river so that it was deep enough for even the shallow-­bottomed boats that plied the Jiangnan waterways.65

Domestic Life in the Countryside Just as working life in the villages was beginning to be transformed by new products and technology with which many people living in the city ­were already comfortable, so was domestic life. Houses varied in size and in the number of rooms. In Kaiyuan Ward, each family occupied on average 2.74 rooms, although some farther north in Caozhuang Village had as many as seven. Across the county, dwellings ­were mostly pingfang, and surveyors recorded over eigh­teen thousand in Kaiyuan alone.66 Since they also predominated in Wuxi City, this suggests that there was significant architectural

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continuity between the city and the countryside. Peeking inside, we can see that the spaces in which domestic everyday life was practiced ­were also beginning to become increasingly similar. Typical Jiangnan ­houses had one floor, although richer families might have a second story, which was often used for storage of grain or rice. Academia Sinica surveyors in 1929 and Japa­nese working for the South Manchurian Railway Company after 1937 both drew elaborate floor plans, which, while probably overly simplistic, showed specific areas for storage of agricultural materials and other products, and furniture such as beds and tables certainly existed. Most ­houses lacked windows and so ­were quite dark and probably smoky, and pigs, sheep, or chickens often lived in the back.67 The kitchen was normally the most important room in the ­house and was marked out by the presence of water and stored food. Surveyors did not record shrines to the stove god, but this deity was ubiquitous across China. He played an important part in the lives of farmers and in Wuxi was worshipped twice in the sixth month of the Lunar New Year and once on his birthday in the eighth month, not to mention other major holidays.68 The kitchen was certainly an important practical and spiritual place, something that changed in the city, where families often rented just one room, and workers ate their meals by the side of the street or in the dormitory. While they may have burned incense at local temples, we do not know whether the stove god remained important to those living in the city, particularly since, in the countryside, together with images of ancestors and grave sites, the deity was very much symbolic of family and home. More work on the intersection between migration, urbanization, and pop­u­lar religion is required to understand whether farmers worshipped differently when they moved to the city. Surveyors paid attention to the new material culture beginning to penetrate the rural home. Of course, the use to which such articles ­were put reflected the needs of those living in small towns and villages.69 An excellent example of this is electric flashlights, the number of which increased from six to twenty-­six in eleven villages between 1929 and 1936.70 In areas without electricity, their use is understandable, but farmers also preferred them to lanterns because they believed they ­were less likely to attract the attention of passing bandits.71 Apart from purchasing such items themselves, people living in the countryside probably came into contact with new innovations in two ways. The first was on trips to neighbors or towns and villages. Other than to look for work, markets, temple fairs, and special occasions such as marriage of a daughter ­were all good excuses to leave the village. Second, many new products ­were brought directly to the home in the

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bags of peddlers. Fei Xiaotong described how hawkers sold sweets and toiletries for women and thus appealed to a par­tic­u­lar demographic in Kaixiangong.72 Equally, as explained in chapter 1, female silk filature workers in Wuxi City ­were no strangers to makeup. Survey data also provides some information on clothing. For example, 167 pairs of rubber-­soled shoes ­were recorded in the two villages of Caozhuang and Shaoxiang in 1957 but only 18 pairs in 1936. Given that these villages ­were among the poorest in the county, it can be expected that farmers in richer villages may have had more access to this kind of footwear.73 Rubber-­soled shoes lasted longer and ­were waterproof, which made them pop­u­lar among workers in Shanghai, who preferred them to straw sandals.74 Farmers may have understood the benefit of this new product, but there is no evidence that its adoption was widespread before 1937. This was probably because of their higher price, which also limited hot water flasks and watches to richer farmers. In 1929 there ­were seven watches in the same eleven villages that boasted electric flashlights, a number that increased to thirteen in 1936. There was just 1 flask in 1929 and 21 in 1936, although by 1957 there ­were 263 flasks.75 Interestingly, the spread of material culture from the city to the countryside may have continued into the Maoist period. The spread of these small everyday ­house­hold items into towns and villages completes my exploration of how urbanization was transforming the spaces in which people went about their daily lives in the countryside in Wuxi in the first half of the twentieth century. Just as in the city, newly rich industrial families invested in factories, shops, and infrastructure, and this drove urbanization in towns and villages as the built environment increasingly resembled the urban landscape. Beyond this, the natural world was repackaged for tourists and oriented physically and discursively towards the city. Finally, rural work and domestic life, while certainly not the same as in factories or dormitories, was beginning to change because of the impact of new technology and the spread of material culture normally associated with an urban lifestyle. In chapters 1 and 2, I have concentrated on how industrial capitalism drove urbanization and how Wuxi entrepreneurial elites ­were responsible for its actualization. This meant that by the 1920s, Wuxi City had overtaken Nantong to become the most prosperous in the Lower Yangtze Delta, and the countryside was changing as a consequence. In what follows, I turn to the role of the expanding Chinese developmental state in further promoting and managing urbanization. -1— 0— +1—

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Local Elites and the State Managing Wuxi during the Warlord Era

Urbanization involves management as well as construction, because this is one of the ways in which the built environment is imbued with meaning. Wuxi’s commercial and industrial elites, like those in other cities, played an important part in urban management, and this brought them into contact with the Chinese state. The developmental state in China remained weak throughout the Beiyang period, and it was not until after 1927 that the priorities of the center really began to be inscribed on the Chinese landscape. Despite the weakness of official bureaucracy and the legal apparatus that underlay it, and the ability of warlords to impose their will seemingly without hindrance, the state was an important presence in the early twentieth century. Local elites navigated, subverted, and, on occasion, replaced its institutions, but the state gradually acquired the capacity to shape urbanization. This chapter explores the interaction between local elites and the state during the warlord era. Yang Hanxi and other entrepreneurs attempted to create a commercial settlement (shangbu) in Wuxi in the early 1920s. This was a zone of limited municipal autonomy set up in the hope that it would lead to further urban expansion and ensure the continued prosperity of the city. Although the zone failed to accomplish these goals, local elites recognized how the re­orientation of Wuxi towards the global industrial economy was key to urbanization and sought to use nationally applicable regulations to attract further investment. However, the weakness of the Beiyang Government and the monopolization of official positions in Wuxi by local industrialists meant that the state’s regulatory apparatus largely served their ends. If local government in Wuxi was weak during times of peace, then it proved all the more so during the Jiangsu-­Zhejiang War in 1924–1925. Wuxi

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was threatened on three occasions, most notably in January and February 1925. During these moments of crisis, social organizations such as the militia and the Red Cross temporarily replaced official institutions to ensure the safety of the city and its people.

The Beiyang State and Urban Expansion: The Commercial Settlement Dating back to the first de­cade of the twentieth century, commercial settlements ­were promoted by the central government as an indigenous response to the perceived threat of treaty ports. They ­were zones of autonomy, where foreign companies ­were allowed to invest but where control remained with Chinese officials and businessmen. According to regulations passed by the central government in April 1899, their managers had various powers, including establishing construction bureaus, levying land taxes, and managing road building.1 Perhaps the most successful settlement was in Jinan, which was founded in 1906 and within five years boasted offices of British American Tobacco, the Deutsch-­Asiatische Bank, and the Mitsui Trading Company as well as many smaller Chinese businesses. Officials recognized the importance of infrastructure and built roads, improved postal ser­v ices, and later added electricity and telephone networks.2 Elsewhere, the settlements ­were not as successful in attracting foreign investment, but they proved pop­u­lar, and by 1911 there ­were thirty-­six across the country, rising to fifty-­t wo by 1924.3 Interestingly, and probably because they date from the final years of the nineteenth century, the regulations on commercial settlements did not emphasize the idea of self-­government. This discourse drove reformers in cities across China and was particularly important in Nantong, where the Tongzhou Local Self-­Government Council and Directorate was established in 1908, although its responsibilities ­were later incorporated into the county administration. Wuxi had a chamber of commerce, militia, educational association, and other voluntary organizations. Many date from the first de­ cade of the twentieth century, but as yet we know little about how far their members ­were motivated by ideas of self-­government.4 After 1927, ideas of self-­government repackaged in the form of official rule ­were central to further attempts to create municipal autonomy. However, in the early 1920s, although self-­government was mentioned by those who believed that the Yang family had too much power, the establishment of the Wuxi Commercial Settlement was motivated largely by a desire for continued urbanization.

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Although the settlement was first suggested in 1913, it was not until the summer of 1922 that Rong Desheng convened a meeting of several of the city’s major figures, including Wang Kexun, the head of the chamber of commerce, and silk magnate Xue Nanming, who was also the head of the city public office (gongsuo), a subcounty-­level unit of administration.5 Interestingly, the county magistrate was not present at this or any other meeting connected with the settlement, perhaps because it was a municipal rather than a county matter, and so the public office was the proper department to deal with the application. Either way, the meeting provoked a storm of debate in the local press. Xue Mingjian was a vocal advocate of the scheme. He applauded the work of Zhang Jian in Nantong but argued that residents of Wuxi could easily score a victory over their northern neighbor. Moreover, Nantong was not the only regional competition, as officials in Jiangyin and Wujin ­were drawing up plans for a road to link the two cities. If built, trade between north and south Jiangsu would no longer pass through Wuxi, and the city would cease to be an important transportation hub. As if this ­were not bad enough, natural disasters and regional instability had disrupted the supply of raw materials to Wuxi factories, which threatened further industrial development. If municipal government, commerce, and education ­were not reformed, the city would be in danger of becoming a second Suzhou, a city that Xue felt was in decline.6 Xue Mingjian went on to outline several proposals for urban expansion and management. The city wall should be demolished, which would leave the new commercial settlement administration free to build two ring roads, trunk roads to Jiangyin, Changshu, and Yixing, while major rivers would be dredged to improve water transport. These connections would entice entrepreneurs to the city to open new factories. Meanwhile, restaurants, hotels, and movie theaters would flourish, some of them ten times as large as New World or the Wuxi Hotel. The city’s scenery was not forgotten, and development was planned for Five-­Li Lake and Huishan. Houses would be built on the mountain, together with a new road and a tramway to carry people up to the peak, which would be festooned with lanterns on the Lunar New Year and resemble Hong Kong.7 Many of these ideas are similar to those put forward by Rong Desheng in 1912, only now they ­were part of a proposal to create a zone of urban autonomy that would give entrepreneurial elites more freedom to shape the expansion of the city. Not everyone agreed with Xue Mingjian. Some feared that opening the port might indeed attract foreign investment but that this could lead to a rise in land prices and wages, which might cause the city to lose its comparative

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advantage over Shanghai. Additionally, the resulting population increase would put pressure on the municipal ser­v ices and contribute to a decline in living standards.8 Another argument was that opening commercial settlements was beneficial if countries ­were strong and able to take advantage of the increased commerce. However, in China treaty ports had favored foreign companies, and although it was not proposed to develop such a settlement in Wuxi, foreign rather than domestic firms would most likely reap the benefit. Finally, there ­were also concerns that an increase in the population of the city would bring with it an increase in crime and prostitution.9 Despite these objections, the central government in Beijing accepted the plans for the settlement. After some discussion among local organizations, such as the county chamber of commerce, the education committee, and the city public office, Yang Weiyun was nominated as the manager of the Commercial Settlement Bureau. On 12 October 1922 the provincial government, which was then under the control of the Jiangsu warlord Qi Xieyuan, received word that the central government had accepted his appointment.10 Some sections of the community ­were still unhappy, as shown by a series of letters that appeared in a local newspaper. A feeling had already developed that Yang Weiyun, who was then working at the Ministry of Finance in Beijing, was inexperienced in local administration.11 Indeed, Tao He argued that Yang Hanxi would be more suitable because of his experience in local affairs. Bei Shi expressed support for Yang Weiyun, but both argued that there had been insufficient public consultation. Bei Shi questioned the need for the settlement and went on to argue that appointing either Yang Weiyun or Yang Hanxi was not in the spirit of self-­government, because this allowed one family to remain dominant.12 Despite these objections, the decision had been made. Yang Weiyun took up the post but returned to Beijing shortly after leaving day-­to-­day management to his nephew Yang Hanxi. Control of the settlement was therefore in the hands of the Yang family, and its headquarters ­were eventually moved to Guangqin Road, which was, of course, the property of Yang Hanxi.13 While the Yang family led the commercial settlement, there was also a management team and a Settlement Discussion Committee, which met only three times, twice in January 1923 and once in August. At the first meeting, a provisional list of regulations was drawn up and submitted to the provincial government, which passed them on to the Ministry of Interior for approval. The Commercial Settlement Bureau had the power to plan and regulate construction, collect rents on land and property, establish a police force, and collect taxes.14 This gave Yang Hanxi real power although demarcating

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the settlement’s area brought him into conflict with local officials. The initial plan was a grand vision of urban expansion encompassing an area of nearly 10 square miles north of Beizhakou. However, there ­were complaints that it was too large to be financially viable and that there had been insufficient consultation and a county assembly should be held.15 In a rare mention of self-­government, one editorial called for a public meeting, and even criticized the Yang family, saying that the settlement “was established to be of great benefit to the city and not to support the needs of one person.”16 A further problem concerned misunderstandings in Jingyun Ward. At a public meeting on 31 August, local people ­were confused as to the size of the settlement, so a letter from the Settlement Bureau was sent to the Jingyun public office explaining that it was to be reduced in size. Those with property and tombs within the proposed settlement ­were worried that they would be confiscated, so a second letter explained that if land ­were bought for infrastructure construction, it would be in accordance with the law on land usage, which would set the price according to a committee. This was clearly a controversial issue, perhaps because, as was acknowledged, urban expansion could lead to an increase in land prices. For example, twenty years of development around the north and east gates of the city had caused a doubling of prices during that time.17 Despite these disputes, the new settlement was approved by both the provincial government and the Ministry of Interior.18 As before, it was to be located to the north of the city walls, stretching west to encompass Hui­ shan and eastward past the railway line. Since its southern section was already commercially developed, it was proposed that factories be built farther north, while residential housing was to be expanded to the west. There ­were also plans for the improvement of water transport and roads to Jiang­ yin and Yixing to increase trade.19 Few of these ideas made it off the drawing board, because from the start the settlement was beset with funding problems. The Settlement Bureau was unable to make preparations for collecting land taxes until July 1924, because of continuing delays in mapping out the borders.20 A proposal to use the Boxer indemnity, compensation paid by China to the eight-nation alliance after its defeat in 1901, was dismissed because Great Britain and the United States had earmarked the money for education and public welfare. Even though the Yang family dominated settlement management, it was also impractical for the family to fund the cost of development privately. Then in December 1922, the provincial government agreed to provide an initial amount of 5,000 yuan and 2,500 a month thereafter, a sum quickly found to be insufficient, forcing managers to

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invest their own money in the project. Yang Weiyun contributed 600 yuan a month, members of the settlement assembly such as Wang Kexun 120 a month, and secretaries and other staff lower amounts. Nevertheless, the settlement never had a stable financial footing, and when the provincial government ceased its support in 1924, what little work had been done ground to a halt. Between December 1922 and February 1924, total income from various sources was 13,000 yuan. Of this, 5,000 yuan was used for road construction and repair and 1,000 yuan to set up the police force. The remaining money paid for three secondary roads off Guangqin Road, as well as street lighting in the area.21 Much of this work was on land already owned by Yang Hanxi, and he clearly benefitted from these improvements. There is not enough evidence to assert definitively whether he deliberately diverted settlement funds into his own private schemes or whether he was helped in this endeavor by his relative in Beijing, Yang Weiyun. After all, it made sense to invest in Guangqin Road, which was in the heart of Wuxi’s new commercial and industrial district. Regardless of whether Yang benefitted because of deliberate corruption or simple manipulation of central government policy, locals in Wuxi recognized the potential dangers of having one family control the settlement. It illustrates not only the weakness of the Beiyang Government at a local level but also that the state was recognized as a source of power and that central policy initiatives could be used to foster further urban expansion. Even as money for the settlement dried up in early 1924, war was about to engulf the province, and although it was not abolished until the Nationalist Government came to power in 1927, it existed in name only. War, when it came, posed very different challenges for Wuxi elites and local officials.

Wuxi during the Jiangsu-­Zhejiang War Arthur Waldron has described the impact of the Jiangsu-­Zhejiang War on China as a ­whole. He argues that local authorities in cities across the Lower Yangtze Delta had little power to protect their inhabitants and that only the Shanghai Municipal Council, sheltered by extraterritoriality, was able to defend the citizens of the International Settlement.22 Meanwhile, in Beijing influential gentry and merchants allied with the chief of police and other security forces to form a Metropolitan Peace Preservation Association. As the forces of Feng Yuxiang, who by now had betrayed his former allies to become part of the Manchurian-based Fengtian faction, withdrew and the government collapsed in the winter of 1925–1926, this or­g a­ni­za­tion took

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charge of preparing the city for defense, distributing aid, and collecting money from businesses to pay soldiers. It was eventually co-­opted by a new alliance of warlords led by the Manchurian warlord Zhang Zuolin, but local elites made important contributions to the management of municipal affairs during this period.23 The situation in Wuxi was similar to that in Beijing. The city was threatened three times and besieged in January 1925. On each occasion, local officials proved somewhat powerless, and during the siege Qi Xieyuan replaced the county magistrate with someone more amenable. As the apparatus of the state began to disintegrate, an alliance of industrialists and local police kept order and distributed relief while also collecting money to pay soldiers. At this time of crisis, the same men who only two years before had been pushing for the destruction of the city walls and the expansion of the urban area ­were now found sheltering behind them, while the rapidly developing commercial and industrial heartland to the north was looted by undisciplined troops. Clearly, urban morphology played its part in mediating the effects of war. We know about the impact of the Jiangsu-­Zhejiang War on Wuxi because of three diary accounts, the most detailed written by Xue Mingjian. Fighting between Qi Xieyuan and Lu Yongxiang first broke out in the autumn of 1924, and although it was concentrated just outside Shanghai, trains, trucks, and boats ­were commandeered across the region, while people suffered from looting or the fear of being pressed into military ser­v ice.24 Throughout the conflict, Xue Mingjian attended local government meetings and was an eyewitness to discussions on managing the crisis. The following January, as Qi Xieyuan’s disorderly rabble descended on the city, he spent much of his time ensuring the safety of workers in the Shenxin Number Three Cotton Mill but was also party to negotiations between local residents and the warlord.25 His account is supplemented by Hou Hongjian’s The Record of the Wuxi Military Disaster (Wuxi bingzai ji). It overlaps with Xue’s at times, and it is likely that he was also an eyewitness to events. He had founded several schools in the city and later became an education inspector in Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Henan Provinces.26 We know nothing of the third author, Feng Tianggong, who wrote History of the War in Wuxi (Wuxi zhanshi), which is more sympathetic to Lu Yongxiang’s forces and provides much of the detail that we have on the city’s recovery after the siege; this suggests that he may have been traveling with the Zhejiang commander. —-1 —0 —+1

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Autumn 1924

Fighting between the Jiangsu and Zhejiang forces broke out on 3 September, but throughout late August, soldiers from the Sixth and Nineteenth National Army Divisions passed through Wuxi City. The county magistrate, Feng Zupei, received demands for boats to transport troops as well as a request from Qi Xieyuan for 160,000 yuan. In response, members of the county assembly, heads of the Wuxi Chamber of Commerce, Farmers’ Association, Education Association, and other major organizations met to form a Peace Association. It was led by Yang Hanxi, who for some time had been head of the local militia.27 Established by a group of money changers in the late nineteenth century as a sports society, the Peace Association was reformulated into a militia during the 1911 revolution. Over the next ten years, it grew rapidly into thirty branches throughout the city and the surrounding countryside, which together ­were capable of mobilizing over a thousand men. It was also institutionalized, its constitution and regulations a rare example of early Republican notions of self-­government in Wuxi.28 Yang Hanxi and the militia ­were to prove key to the defense of Wuxi City the following January, but that autumn there ­were regular patrols, and shops ­were asked to prepare oil lamps in the event of power cuts. The militia was aided in its task by an or­ga­ni­za­tion called the Local Preservation Committee, which or­ga­nized checkpoints throughout the city. Meanwhile, neighboring towns and districts mobilized their own self-­defense forces. A military police unit was established, and the river police ­were given responsibility for patrolling the waterways. Guns ­were distributed on 14 September, and an inspection was conducted early the following month. Fortunately, in Wuxi City such preparations ­were unnecessary, but bandits and soldiers roamed the countryside at will, and the militia saw action. For example, on 16 September a small division fought off a group of bandits threatening Yanjia­ qiao.29 The plethora of organizations set up to protect Wuxi speaks of a lack of central planning, and although the county magistrate was present at the meeting that set up the Peace Association, he did not take direct responsibility for municipal affairs during the crisis. Instead, relief work was left to local elites. Indeed, the Wuxi branch of the Red Cross was established on 27 August to respond to the threat of war. Led by Xue Mingjian, among others, treatment centers, ambulances, and rescue teams ­were quickly formed. The first relief team was sent to Yixing on 10 September, and it returned two days later with seventy-­four wounded soldiers. This was followed with additional trips to neighboring cities, and as more refugees began to arrive

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in Wuxi, the society found itself under pressure to ­house them, refusing to register new arrivals after 11 October.30 The absence of the county magistrate from direct involvement in these activities is telling, but, in all fairness, he was busy dealing with a demanding warlord. Throughout September and October, troops passed through the city, and Feng Zupei asked the head of the railway station to set up a temporary office there to pro­cess them, while another was established in the New World Hotel. Meanwhile on 25 August, he convened a meeting of business associations in the chamber of commerce headquarters to discuss raising the 160,000 yuan that Qi Xieyuan had demanded to support the war. The following day, many requests ­were made for food, and so Feng ordered the head of the tax office, Xu Jinghua, to purchase 10,000 shi of rice for the army.31 This very much set the pattern for the rest of the autumn, one in which Feng played the role of a mediator between the demands of the military and the city’s ability to meet them. While requests for vehicles ­were frequent, his biggest headache was satisfying Qi’s voracious appetite for money and grain. After the initial delivery of rice, things went quiet, but on 26 September, Feng and Xu Jinghua personally took several hundred dan of rice to the frontline at Kunshan. Three days later, 70,000 yuan of the 160,000 yuan Qi had requested to support his troops was delivered, and afterward Qi made an outrageous request for a bond for 5 million yuan. In response, Feng promised a further 70,000 yuan within five days, most of which was sent to Kunshan shortly afterward. This was later followed by 30,000 yuan after the Zhejiang forces had capitulated.32 Concluding his account of a war that lasted seventy-­eight days, Xue Ming­ jian identified three distinct periods: preparation, the fighting itself, and recovery, although he wrote little about this final phase.33 During the fighting, the county magistrate’s primary role was dealing with the demands of the warlord. While members of the county assembly helped with local defense, many of these people ­were part of the new industrial elite, instead of just government officials. This meant that the work of actually managing the problems that the war caused within the city was very much left to social organizations. Such a pattern was to be even more evident the following year. January 1925

Under pressure from the Zhejiang warlord Lu Yongxiang, Qi Xieyuan retreated from Nanjing eastward towards Shanghai, the first of his troops

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arriving by rail in Wuxi on 18 January. The Wujin magistrate sent a tele­ gram warning of the warlord’s retreat, but it arrived too late, and although Yang Hanxi hurriedly called a meeting of the heads of the militia, there was no one to meet the soldiers, and they began looting shops near Tongyun­ qiao. The police hurriedly closed the north gates of the city, but three soldiers had slipped through and robbed a tobacco store and bank before they ­were apprehended. Troops continued to pour into Wuxi, and although the old city center was now safe, factories, hotels, restaurants, and teashops to the north, not to mention the railway station itself, ­were all vulnerable. In the first few hours of the siege, many premises ­were plundered, including the New World and Wuxi Hotels, and people fled in terror. 34 Several of Qi Xieyuan’s commanders had now arrived, and they demanded 150,000 yuan from the new magistrate Lin Xuancai, otherwise they “would not take responsibility for the peace of the city.”35 In response, magistrate Lin convened a meeting at seven that eve­ning. Among those present, whether in an official or private capacity, ­were Xue Nanming, Yang Hanxi, Wang Kexun, Rong Desheng, and Tang Baoqian. It was agreed that 50,000 yuan would be borrowed from five banks to pay Qi’s troops. Meanwhile, as the police outside the city walls reported continuing violence, Yang Hanxi or­ga­nized his militia into nine detachments. One was responsible for security within the walls, three ­were assigned to Beitang, Sanliqiao, and other areas to the north, while the rest ­were given the re­ ere also three mobile patrols, one within maining gates of the city. There w the walls and two outside. The militia saw action on the first night of the siege, and as the sound of shooting reverberated throughout Wuxi, and fires raged unchecked to the north, the first and fourth detachments fell back to defending the gates and captured seven of Qi’s soldiers.36 Meanwhile, the county magistrate and other local notables took on the same roles as the previous autumn. As before, the magistrate attempted to satisfy Qi Xieyuan’s seemingly voracious appetite for money, leaving the actual defense of the city to Yang Hanxi and his militia. On the afternoon of the nineteenth, Qi arrived to take command of his troops. By now, approximately ten thousand soldiers had descended on the city. “There was no shop that had not been robbed, and no ­house that had not been searched. The suburbs and surrounding towns and villages for 20 li had all been plundered.”37 In an attempt to stop the violence, Lin and Yang negotiated with Qi’s forces throughout the night, aided by a personal connection between Wuxi resident Song Jingyan, who had studied at a military academy in Japan with one of the Jiangsu commanders. As a result,

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12,000 yuan was delivered to Qi’s troops, who agreed to withdraw north beyond Yangqiao, leaving the area south to Yang’s militia.38 Despite this agreement, those responsible for the defense of Wuxi ­were not about to rest easy. The city public office was directed to hire workers to fortify the gates and water gates with bricks and earth to add an extra line of defense to the electric fences outside. These proved effective, killing a soldier that eve­ning outside the north gate, but they ­were indiscriminate, and tragically a hairdresser and a dog also met their end there.39 With Yang taking charge of the defense of the city, the magistrate was free to deal with the demands of Qi’s troops. At a meeting of the city’s major public associations and financiers, Lin reported that each day the army required 200 shi of rice, fifty sacks of flour, and other foodstuffs, not to mention 30,000 yuan. The militia collected rice and flour from shops around the city, 10,000 yuan was borrowed from money changers, who set the rate of conversion between copper and silver, and that eve­ning Song Jingyan delivered both goods and cash to Qi’s headquarters.40 This was to be Lin’s last act as magistrate, because he was replaced with the former head of the tax department, Xu Jinghua, whom Qi may very well have met the previous autumn when he visited Kunshan with the former magistrate, Feng. His appointment was opposed by Wuxi locals, but, as Hou Hongjian noted, they really had no choice. Having replaced the magistrate, Qi also demanded that Song Jingyan take over as police chief, but he refused, arguing that no one in the city had the authority to appoint him.41 As darkness descended, the sound of gunfire and the smell of burning filled the air once more, and Wuxi found itself under the nominal control of a magistrate who would turn out to be little more than a lackey, a stark reminder of how the whims of the warlord could render the official institutions of the Chinese state largely powerless. The priorities of the new magistrate ­were revealed on the afternoon of the following day. When presented with the seal of the city, he immediately requested that the gates be opened to Qi’s forces. Meanwhile, Yang Hanxi and Qian Jihou, the new head of the city public office, who had spent much of the preceding de­cade sitting on county and provincial assemblies, convened a meeting of representatives of social organizations.42 Three main items ­were on the agenda. First, since the Zhenhua Power Station was no longer able to supply electricity, it was agreed that the Shenxin Number Three Mill should take on this task. Second, where it was necessary for people to pass through the city walls, they should enter and leave through the west gate, and finally further loans should be sought from the city’s banks.

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Beyond this, further steps ­were taken to protect Wuxi. In addition to the militia, which patrolled around the clock, a self-­defense force was on the streets during the day, while the fire brigade was on duty at night.43 The militia was still active outside the walls, although by now the detachments had fallen back to defend the gates, leaving the riches to the north entirely to the unruly soldiers. Interestingly, a one-­time payment from the militia of 2,000 yuan to the commander of the warlord’s division stationed along Beidajie up to Sanliqiao seemed to satisfy his troops, and this area emerged from the siege relatively unscathed.44 All this unrest had forced many people from their homes, and the Wuxi branch of the Red Cross was very busy. Its new head was the local entrepreneur Hua Wenchuan, who had made a fortune in the flour business in the closing years of the nineteenth century before investing in a steamer company with Rong Desheng and Yang Hanxi just the previous year. Although he had sat on the Wuxi Chamber of Commerce and been involved in other charities in the city, he held no official government position.45 Because the siege had cut the city in two, the Red Cross was split. Outside the city walls, operations ­were centered at a local hospital, and several thousand refugees ­were sheltered in ten centers, while others ­were shipped to Shanghai or Tangkou. Inside the city walls, there ­were three centers: one for women and children in a ware­house and two others in silk filatures.46 On 21 January the new magistrate officially arrived in the city, and his words and actions confirm that he was little more than Qi’s puppet. Although local officials and businessmen ­were not exactly enthusiastic about Xu’s appointment, he was given a respectful welcome. Hua Wenchuan greeted him, saying, “We place the life of the ­whole city entirely in the hands of the new county head.” At this, the assembled company fell silent, and many cried. Xu replied, “I am carry­ing out the orders of Qi, the commander in chief. These are only out of absolute necessity, and I ask for the help of each of the local gentry.” 47 Xu then retired to a side room with Hua Wenchuan, Qian Jihou, and Yang Hanxi, where they talked for just over an hour. It was arranged that despite Xu’s request, the gates would not be opened, the county office would move temporarily outside the city walls, and a new police chief, Song Zhentao, was appointed. On being asked whether Qi’s forces still intended to enter the city, Xu replied that the situation would be reviewed in three days.48 His visit emphasizes the po­liti­cal divisions that the walls and closed gates of the city had made physically manifest. Outside, although the magistrate had nominal authority, he was no longer acting in the best in-

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terests of the city. Inside, a co­ali­tion of local industrialists filled the power vacuum, although city officials retained some responsibilities. The following day brought no respite, as Xu demanded a further 300,000 yuan to be paid within two days. Yang Hanxi and Qian Jihou gathered the city’s financiers together once more, and that afternoon as the sleet fell from the sky, they passed through the gates of the city accompanied by Song Zhentao to deliver 20,000 yuan to Qi’s representatives. They also presented a letter from three hundred Wuxi residents complaining of the violence. In response, Qi summoned two of his officers and berated them. That eve­ning, he requested that the magistrate hold a meeting of the various self-­defense forces, and it was decided that patrols would be split between the militia and both the river and regular police forces. Additionally, those wishing to pass through the city gates now required a permit from the new head of police, and passage was limited to a few hours each morning and afternoon.49 Qi Xieyuan at least claimed to be acting in the interests of the city, but, under threat from the swiftly advancing Zhejiang troops, he demanded more money. Throughout the siege, the front line between the two armies moved steadily eastward, and on the morning of 23 January it reached Changzhou, and Fengtian troops ­were spotted approaching Wuxi City through Kaiyuan Ward. The sound of artillery fire gave people hope that the siege would soon be lifted, but they ­were also afraid that if the two armies fought over Wuxi, many would die.50 Despite Qi’s orders and the mobilization of troops to meet the oncoming threat, looting outside the walls continued. The commander of troops along Beidajie demanded another 1,000 yuan but was posted to the front line shortly after its delivery and, so, was unable to offer continued protection. Meanwhile, Red Cross workers arrived from Shanghai bringing clothes and food and transported a thousand refugees from the shelters outside the city walls. On hearing this, many people inside the walls stormed the west gate, demanding to leave, but it remained closed.51 By now, conditions inside ­were becoming desperate. In addition to the constant rattle of gunfire and the smell of burning buildings, shortages ­were beginning to make themselves felt. The price of rice had been rising since the start of the siege, and there ­were now reports of people going hungry.52 In this deteriorating situation, Qi Xieyuan made one last attempt to extract money from Wuxi. At 7 in the morning on 25 January, the warlord and his adjutant, Li Yanyu, wrote to Wuxi elites, asking for a meeting. Reading ­ ere apprehensive, and so Song Zhentao was asked to the letter, they w

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prepare a sedan chair to convey Li to the city, where a meal and a sauna awaited him. At the meeting, Li began proceedings, saying: “Qi has been governor of Jiangsu for seven years and has borne every burden on behalf of the people. He apologizes profusely for the previous Jiangsu-­Zhejiang War. Now he has been forced to take up arms again and apologizes once more to Wuxi. Fighting is close at hand, and he needs economic assistance, or military strength cannot be assured.”53 He then asked that the 150,000 yuan that had been demanded when Qi’s troops first arrived in the city be provided, as well as requesting an extra 50,000 yuan. Hua Wenchuan answered that this was unfair but agreed to discuss the situation with Magistrate Xu, who had accompanied Li to the city. Representatives of financial institutions pointed out the difficulty of raising so much money and asked Xu if they could have a few days to prepare, but he simply referred them to Qi Xieyuan. Hearing this, Li replied that he had to leave the city with an answer and warned of dire consequences if the money was not forthcoming. Wuxi elites expressed shock at his reply but ­were left with no choice and agreed to pay 30,000 yuan that day and the rest the next day. Xu and Li then suddenly raised the demand to 100,000 yuan, at which Xu was reminded that he had only been magistrate for one day and that the city had limited funds. Despite the best intentions, only 10,000 yuan could be raised at such short notice, and Song Zhentao tried to present it to the magistrate that afternoon. He initially refused to accept so small a sum, and, so, Song implored Li, who reluctantly took the money.54 This request for more funds is at odds with Qi’s scolding of his officers two days before. He may, indeed, have been sincere in wishing to lessen violence in the city, and he would not have been the first warlord to be unable to control his troops. However, at the same time he was also busy fighting a war, and like warlord armies across the country, his soldiers needed feeding and paying. On the morning of 26 January, the Fengtian soldiers broke through and advanced along Huishan and Kaiyuan Roads, while to the west Qi’s troops struggled to board trains. Qi may indeed have mistaken the Wuxi militia for an advance guard of the enemy troops, as Waldron claims, but either way he fled the city ignominiously on foot, eventually finding a boat to Suzhou, where he boarded a train for Shanghai. At eleven that morning, the white flag of surrender was flown, and the city waited to see what the new warlord army would bring.55 At first, it proved somewhat difficult to establish contact. When Yang Hanxi left the city walls with a small contingent of militia, he was nearly mistaken for the enemy by Fengtian troops, and it was only the speedy intervention of police that cleared up the misunder-

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standing.56 However, by eight in the eve­ning, the Fengtian commander, Zhang Zongchang, had arrived in Wuxi, and he was met by Yang Hanxi, Qian Jihou, Song Zhentao, and the former magistrate, Feng Zupei. Zhang laid out three priorities: opening up the city, mopping up the remaining enemy troops, and the recovery of commerce and industry.57 First, the city had to cope with a new army, and although the Fengtian force did no more damage, troops still needed to be managed and paid. Meanwhile, many people had been displaced from their homes and factories and shops stripped of goods and machinery. The formal structures of the state ­were quickly restored, but local elites also worked hard to revive the city’s fortunes. On 27 January, Yang, Qian, Song, and Feng went to pay their respects to the Fengtian commanders. They agreed that the north gate of the city would be opened and arranged for a contingent of soldiers and Wuxi military police to jointly staff the checkpoint. The head of the Money Changers Business Association asked that soldiers be prevented from entering shops and ­houses without permission. Finally, Lin Xuancai was reappointed as Wuxi magistrate.58 No sooner had he resumed his post than 60,000 yuan was requested to pay soldiers, on top of an urgent demand for 1,000 yuan to pay for pursuing the remnants of Qi’s troops, who by now ­were looting residents across the countryside.59 Then, that very eve­ning, just as Lin was chairing a meeting of local elites, Fengtian army representatives demanded food. This raised a storm of protest from the assembled company, but after much discussion, it was decided that money reserved for the payment of national taxes should be used and that to solve the immediate difficulty 10,000 yuan from militia funds could be made available.60 The following morning, Wuxi elites wrote to Provincial Governor Han Guojun asking him for aid. On 1 February, he replied that other than the money already requested, no more funds should be given to support the troops. The next day, 40,000 yuan was paid, and an appeal sent to the Wuxi Native Place Society in Shanghai (WNPSS) for the remainder. However, two days later, a Wuxi migrant in Nanjing replied that the provincial governor had successfully negotiated with the Fengtian forces, and this final payment was unnecessary.61 Now that the siege was over, Wuxi officials and elites felt able to take advantage of regional networks, and, as we shall see in chapter 6, they ­were of great help to the city throughout the 1930s. With the immediate problem of paying for the military solved, local officials and industrialists turned their attention to reviving commerce and industry. This occurred within the context of the recovery of a regional and

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national economy that had been suffering from the impact of war since the summer of the previous year. These losses, though severe, ­were only temporary because Jiangnan in par­tic­u­lar was still benefitting from a period of rapid economic growth.62 Fighting between the two armies had mercifully been confined to the outskirts of the city, but directly outside the walls Wuxi’s commercial and industrial heart had been hit hard. One report from 2 February gives a sense of the destruction. “The roof of New World and the windows at the street corner right in front of the Qiansheng Silk Factory have all been completely smashed by bullets.” 63 Nor had Yang Hanxi’s property escaped: on “Guangqin Road there was no ­house that had not been robbed. Some ­houses had the door closed with a sign that they had been robbed, while other ­houses had no door to close. The walls had holes in them and the workers ­were moving their goods on to boats and preparing to flee.” 64 Clearly, the arrival of the Fengtian forces and the opening of the city did little to lessen people’s anxiety, and after normal train ser­v ice resumed, 30,000 tickets ­were sold in one week.65 On 8 February, the Thirty-­Second Brigade of Lu Yongxiang’s army, commanded by Bi Shenfang, arrived in Wuxi and occupied the city for three months. As they did with previous occupying forces, Wuxi residents had to foot the bill, which eventually came to 50,000 yuan, although after discussions with the provincial government, it was agreed that this could be paid with money from the silk tax.66 Hua ordered shops to reopen, and special trains ­were added to bring coal and other raw materials for the factories. Within a month, much of the commercial life of the city had returned to normal, and the chamber of commerce agreed that accounts could be settled on 1 March, instead of on New Year’s eve, as was the norm.67 Meanwhile, a Society for Recovery after the War was established. The head of the chamber of commerce, Wang Kexun, was appointed as its director, and the society surveyed the damage, arranged for rice to be distributed to the poor at a reduced price, and dealt with claims for compensation.68 The rapid recovery of Wuxi City from the nine-­day siege is a testament to the resilience of its population and the work of both local elites and government officials. Indeed, that autumn, when Sun Chuanfang occupied Nanjing on behalf of Zhang Zuolin, and war flared up a third time, the county magistrate took a more active role in or­ga­niz­ing the militia, while Song Zhentao, who was still head of police, managed the smooth transport of the troops as they passed through Wuxi.69 Perhaps local officials had learned from previous experience. In any case, commercial and industrial elites responsible for the expansion of the city and the construction of rural infrastructure

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­ ere also involved in the management of municipal affairs. Their relationw ship with the state demonstrates that the Beiyang Government could and sometimes did provide a workable administrative apparatus and legitimacy for local officials. In the case of the commercial settlement, official institutions ­were used to promote development of the city and illustrate the extent to which local elites recognized how much Wuxi had urbanized in recent years. The Beiyang Government, like others in China, was weak and could easily be manipulated or bypassed altogether. Beyond this, constant fighting between different warlord armies presented the state with a crisis that it was simply not equipped to deal with. If the state could be ignored or bypassed during the warlord era, this was not the case after 1927, when the Nationalist Government gained increasing power to shape urbanization in Wuxi, although periodic crises presented it with new challenges.

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Abolish the County to Establish the City (Fei xian wei shi)

In 1929, the head of the Wuxi County government, Sun Zuji, wrote to the Jiangsu Provincial Ministry of Civil Affairs to argue for an autonomous municipal administration with jurisdiction over the ­whole county. He and other local officials believed that the county had now urbanized to such an extent that it warranted administrative status as a city. Indeed, Wuxi was the only city in the province to have a Municipal Administration Bureau, although its purview was narrow. Additionally, 900,000 people lived in the county, five times the 200,000 needed for the formation of an in­de­pen­dent municipality. Moreover, Wuxi was a commercial and industrial metropolis with over 120,000 workers, and its factories extended 10 li from the city walls in all directions. Business was flourishing as trades such as rice and silk built on their long histories of prosperity. Communications ­were extensive, and it was easy to travel to all the largest towns by steamer in just a few hours, while the imminent construction of a telephone network would connect the city and countryside ever closer together. Finally, the area covered by some cities in other parts of the world already exceeded that of many counties in China, so there was no reason a municipal government’s jurisdictional authority could not extend beyond the city limits. This was reflected in the idea of the garden city, and Wuxi had many scenic spots such as Huishan and Lake Tai, which made its construction possible. For all these reasons, Sun argued, it made sense to abolish the county to establish the city.1 The first step along this path was the establishment of the Wuxi Municipal Planning Department (Wuxi Shizheng Choubei Chu, hereafter, WMPD). This chapter describes how local officials saw the 1928 City Or­ga­ni­za­tion Law as an opportunity to establish an in­de­pen­dent municipal government that would give them power over urban expansion and management. With

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this law, the Nationalist Government recognized how urbanization was changing the country and created an administrative spatial ordering of society that supported urban development. Of course, China had long been divided into provinces, counties, and subcounty divisions, allowing the state to collect tax, or­ga­nize defense, and manage social problems.2 In the twentieth century this administrative hierarchy was being reor­ga­nized so as to redefine the relationship between city and countryside while also establishing central power over the locality, as the promise of local autonomy enshrined in the principles of self-­government gave way to those of the technocratically managed developmental state. Local officials in Wuxi used this new legal framework to establish an in­ de­pen­dent municipal government in 1929, and although this new administration had the power to manage the continuing urbanization of the city, it was also beholden to a developmental discourse derived from the ideas of Sun Yatsen. At the same time, government reports and correspondence reveal just how much oversight the provincial government had over the day-­ to-­day running of the city. As we shall see in chapter 5, this autonomy was short-­lived, and the municipality was quickly subsumed within the county once more. This meant that throughout the 1930s, the developmental priorities of the state drove urbanization in the city and the countryside, as county and subcounty administrative divisions came under increasingly direct control of the province. Wuxi City may have lost autonomy, but the po­ liti­cal spatial reordering of society that oriented the rural-­urban continuum towards the city was complete.

Early Attempts to Create Municipal Government The history of attempts to create a new legal framework for the or­ga­ni­za­ tion of counties, cities, and other po­liti­cal units dates back to the late Qing and gradually grew out of a series of reforms beginning in 1898.3 Initially the responsibilities of municipal governments ­were set out in laws on self-­ government passed in 1905, which left control in the hands of local gentry.4 The Regulations on Local Self-­Government in Cities, Towns, and Districts (Chengzhenxiang difang zizhi zhangcheng) followed in 1909. The late imperial hierarchy of prefectures ( fu), departments (zhou), subprefectures (ting), and counties (xian) was maintained, and cities could exist at any level. Some distinction was made between settlements with a population of over 50,000, which ­were labeled towns (zhen), and those of a smaller size, which ­were categorized as district (xiang). Beyond this, the regulations established

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the scope of self-­government, with elected assemblies and appointed mayors undertaking a range of responsibilities, including education, health care, urban development, and charity work.5 After the revolution of 1911, it took several years for the Beiyang Government to issue a new set of national laws, but provincial and municipal governments passed a ­whole series of regulations, some of them even devised by warlords.6 In Jiangsu, provisional rules on the or­ga­ni­za­tion of cities and districts ­were passed in 1911 and amended twice over the following two years. Settlements with populations of over 50,000 ­were designated as cities and given some autonomy.7 In practice, however, as Dong Xiujia and other experts on urban administration later noted, local gentry took the lead in municipal governance, often to the detriment of those cities involved. Moreover, many cities with populations of over 50,000, even if they ­were not treaty ports, had developed commerce and industry, and therefore required different management systems from smaller settlements directly under the jurisdiction of the county.8 In 1921, the City Self-­Government Law (shi zizhi fa) designated special cities (tebie shi) and ordinary cities (putong shi). Special cities ­were under direct control of the Ministry of Interior, while settlements with over 10,000 people could become ordinary cities and fell within the purview of the provincial government. Although only Qingdao applied for status as a special city, and officials in Guangzhou and elsewhere set up their own arrangements, later commentators saw in this the origins of the legal framework underlying urban administration in the Nanjing De­cade.9 During the early Republican era, central, local, and municipal governments constructed separate regulatory environments that reflected the rapid pace of urbanization and gave officials power to manage it. For the most part, such regulations carried little weight, and it was not until 1927 that an effective legal apparatus was established. This was based on the thought of Sun Yatsen, which was clear about the role of self-­government in national development but somewhat vague on urban administration. Article 18 of the Fundamentals of National Reconstruction stated that, “the county is the unit of self-­government. The province is where the center and the county communicate.”10 In an article on the relationship between Sun’s Three People’s Principles and municipal administration, Jiang Xiuqiu noted that although the municipality was not specifically mentioned, because Sun’s principles applied to the county, which, of course, could easily contain the municipality, then they applied to urban administration as well. Moreover, Chiang Kaishek had later argued that the municipality should be the site of local administration during the period

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of po­liti­cal tutelage.11 Although Sun did not identify cities as specific sites of self-­government, elsewhere in his writings they appear as nodes in national programs of infrastructure development, such as roads, railways, ports, and electrical networks.12 The Nationalist Government evidently co-­opted Sun’s developmental discourse to justify its own state-­building initiatives. Local officials in Wuxi repeated it almost verbatim, and although such ideas had direct influence on urbanization in the new capital, Nanjing, they ­were also inscribed on the bricks and mortar of cities across the country.13

The City Or­ga­ni­za­tion Law of 1928 Although he did not mention it, it is clear from Sun Zuji’s discussion of the projected population size of his proposed county-­w ide urban administrative area that he was referring to the City Or­ga­ni­za­tion Law of 1928, which stated that for cities to come under the direct jurisdiction of the provincial government instead of being subordinate to the county, they had to have a population of over two hundred thousand people. Beyond this, as in previous regulations, the law defined the responsibilities of the municipality, which included surveys, public welfare, urban infrastructure of all kinds, public health, entertainment, education, and culture. Moreover, where there was uncertainty about the city boundaries or if there ­were plans to extend them, local officials could apply to the provincial government for arbitration. Later regulations allowed natural conditions, the extent of industry and commerce, population, and future construction plans to be taken into account when deciding whether a settlement could have urban designation.14 A supplement to the new law published in August 1928 and a Ministry of Interior manual the following year set out the responsibilities of municipal governments in greater detail. Roads, as the arteries of the city, ­were particularly important. They should be between 10 feet and 20 feet in width, and any widening should allow for pedestrian traffic. Guidelines even stipulated materials to be used in construction as well as emphasizing the importance of educating people about the need for infrastructure development and of paying compensation to those whose homes or businesses ­were demolished in order to reduce local opposition.15 These sentiments had informed urbanization in China for over two de­cades, but this was the first time that the central government published such detailed plans. They also covered the safe disposal of trash, rules on public and private toilets and bath­houses, diagrams on water filtration methods, the importance of gardens to the urban environment, and the role of a variety of social

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organizations, from charities to co-­ops and old people’s homes. There was also recognition that nascent urban systems required management. For example, a disease outbreak in one city should be controlled at the provincial level to stop it from spreading.16 Beyond this, the state now recognized that it had to take a more active role in urban administration precisely because the country’s cities ­were developing so quickly. It was believed that the period of po­liti­cal tutelage was likely to be followed by an increase in the pace of urbanization, and the proportion of the national population living in cities with over 100,000 people was projected to grow to 20 percent within ten years.17 This posed a challenge, which the Ministry of Interior recognized. “This ministry feels that the most pressing responsibilities of municipal government are first to improve the ability of police to ensure social stability, second to complete preliminary drinking water engineering as a basis for health, third to register property rights to increase financial income, fourth to manage ­house­hold surveys and personal registration to promote self-­government and fifth to come up with municipal plans, road systems and construction guidelines.”18 An article some years later in the journal of the Academia Sinica also noted the relationship between industrialization and rapid urbanization, the pressures it put on the city, and the necessity for government intervention. Of course, the 1928 law had its critics, and some questioned just how much power it really gave the state to manage individual cities.19 Nevertheless, the Nationalist Government was now officially acknowledging what Rong Desheng and Xue Mingjian already knew. Industrial urbanization in the early twentieth century was changing the nature of cities, and this required the state to take an ever-greater role in their management, something that it was capable of doing in Wuxi.

The Wuxi Municipal Planning Department and Urban Expansion The WMPD came into existence on 1 August 1929. It was one of ten similar agencies established across the country, which is an indication of the national scope of the law. Others included those in the neighboring city of ­Suzhou, Yantai in Shandong, Kaifeng in Henan, and Nanning in Guangxi.20 Prior to its establishment, urban management had been the responsibility of the Wuxi Municipal Administration Bureau. It worked within the county government, and although there are few reports of conflict between the municipality and the county, their simultaneous operation points to a ­jurisdictional overlap. Nonetheless, both institutions existed within an

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a­ dministrative chain that stretched from the locality to the center. The Jiangsu Provincial Ministry of Civil Affairs gave formal approval for the establishment of the WMPD on 17 July 1929, and in November of that year the Temporary Or­g an­i­za­tional Outline was approved by the Ministry of Interior, which, having identified Wuxi as one of over twenty cities nationwide that deserved autonomy, stated that the WMPD had been set up as a transitory or­ga­ni­za­tion to prepare for the establishment of Wuxi as an ordinary city.21 It was composed of a central office supported by finance, public works, and social affairs divisions, which together had a wide range of responsibilities that included surveying all aspects of the city, management of construction projects, urban planning, and public health.22 For the most part, power was transferred smoothly from the Municipal Administration Bureau. For example, the Engineering Office simply handed over details of two hundred building licenses to the new Public Works Division.23 As head of the WMPD, Sun Zuji had the job of picking his staff, although they had to be approved by the provincial government.24 Of the thirty-­eight personnel chosen, all of whom ­were men, most ­were well educated and had extensive experience working in government, business, schools, and universities. Although entrepreneurs such as Yang Hanxi, Xue Nanming, and the Rong brothers, who had been at the forefront of municipal affairs before 1927, ­were not without talent, Sun gathered a group of professionals with specialized knowledge, although whether this was because of his personal connections and motivations or the result of provincial oversight is hard to say. Sun himself was a graduate of Dongwu University in Suzhou and had worked at the Jiangsu Provincial Ministry of Civil Affairs before becoming Wuxi County governor. The secretary of the WMPD, You Weidong, hailed from Jiading, and, after graduating with a degree in law from Peking University, worked as a newspaper editor and secondary school teacher before taking up posts in the provincial and Wuxi County governments. Division heads and workers ­were similarly well qualified. Zhu Shigui, the head of the Public Works Division, had studied engineering in Japan and then worked in several companies, before taking up a post in the Suzhou Public Works Division. The head of the Social Affairs Division, Li Guanjie, had taught at universities in Shanghai before being appointed, and most finance personnel ­were former tax collectors.25 There is not enough evidence to trace all the personal connections of officials in the various divisions of the WMPD, but their experience, and the absence of rich industrialists who had monopolized positions during the Beiyang era, suggests that local government became more professionalized under the Nationalists.

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The establishment of the WMPD gave local officials the opportunity to wax lyrical on urbanization in Wuxi and connect the transformation of the city to national discourses. Writing in the introduction to the first WMPD’s monthly report, Sun pointed to the increasing pace of urbanization in China and emphasized the importance of cities to national development, before welcoming the provincial government’s decision to establish the WMPD, which reflected the latest international trends. Sun Yatsen had said that human development went through three stages: “the first was taking action without knowledge, the second was taking action to acquire knowledge and the third was taking action based on knowledge.”26 Municipal government was just entering the third stage and so, the first job of the new administration would be to conduct surveys before improving the urban environment and the lives of the people living in it.27 Such sentiments ­were echoed by Yan Enzuo, who had studied urban administration at Columbia University and was sent by the provincial Ministry of Civil Affairs to inspect the WMPD.28 Wuxi was already an industrial city, and its people recognized the importance of this sector to national development. However, lack of revenue and planning had hampered its expansion. The establishment of the WMPD would solve this problem, improve people’s livelihoods, and ensure that the entire city embarked on a path of managed development.29 The formation of the WMPD also gave local officials the opportunity to draw up urban plans. These programs, like that of the commercial settlement in 1923, envisaged expansion of the urban area. Moreover, like Xue Mingjian several years earlier, the new local officials believed that municipal autonomy was the key to continued urbanization and increased prosperity.30 The Public Works Division set out these plans in detail. They defined the city limits in their broadest terms and introduced zoning. Government administration should be centered within the walls and industry expanded along the Grand Canal to take advantage of good transport links. The commercial area, which already included Huishan Town, would extend along provincial roads. At the same time, worker housing should be concentrated in the north of the city, while around Huishan and Lake Tai developers could take advantage of the environment offered by fishing, boating, and flower gardens to create pleasant residential neighborhoods.31 Commenting on these plans several months later, Yan Enzuo recognized that urban change involved both redevelopment and expansion when he wrote: “Wuxi is an old city and cannot be completely rebuilt. Within the existing urban area,

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Figure 4 ​Plans for Wuxi City Development, 1929. Source: Wuxi Shizheng 3 (1 December 1929), (n.p.).

it can only be improved, while at the same time new construction should not follow old bad practice.”32 He also noted that expanding the central administrative area would improve transport within the city walls and advised that ­wholesale commerce be concentrated in Beitang, while retail should extend from Guangdong Road to Dashiqiao for the con­ve­nience of residents. Beyond this, factories along the city’s waterways should be restricted in size and the expansion of commerce, industry, and housing to Huishan Town should be managed carefully to take advantage of the scenery and allow for the development of tourism. Finally, citing the garden city movement as a model, he advocated the development of satellite cities on vacant land to the north, south, and east. The resulting arrangement, which is shown in the map in Figure 4, clearly demarcated the city into different zones but also

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allowed planners to envisage incorporating the already urbanizing tourist spots into the expanding city.33

Urban Expansion: Huishan Park and Wuxi as a Garden City During its short existence, the WMPD had neither the time nor the finances to implement all its plans for urban expansion, but the transformation of Huishan Park was a project that made it off the drawing board. Huishan had long been connected to Wuxi City. Since the Song Dynasty, it had been an important religious site, with several temples and many graves, which made it a focal point of city activity during the Tomb-­Sweeping (also called Pure Brightness, or Qingming) Festival.34 On 6 April 1929, the roads west of the city ­were packed with vehicles as families took food to the graves of their departed relatives, and the prices of a trip by rickshaw or sedan chair increased. Around lunchtime, an accident brought traffic to a halt, and as tempers flared fights broke out. Despite the congestion, the peaks of the mountain ­were very crowded, teashops did a roaring trade, and enterprising young men set up gambling tables.35 As we have seen, Huishan was on the Wuxi tourist route, and Yu Dafu climbed it in search of temples and clear blue sky. He wrote, “Looking east, scattered beyond the pagoda on Xishan, are countless ­houses in Wuxi City and the smoke rising high above the factories. However, rays of sun slant down, and it is as if a little weariness has been added to the morning’s scene. Looking downwards to the southeast, the mulberry bushes are as dense as a forest. Moreover, cars are traveling on the road that looks like a white thread. The least we can say is that this view can awaken our dead senses.”36 Local officials did not share Yu Dafu’s disapproval of the urban landscape and wanted to make Huishan part of the expanding city. Initially set in motion by the county government, the renovation of Huishan Park was taken over by the WMPD. Like most aspects of urban planning after 1927, park development was centrally directed. Ministry of Interior guidelines stipulated that each city have at least one park to give residents a clean space to revive both body and soul.37 Chairing a county government meeting, Sun Zuji said that although the park within the city walls already provided some entertainment, Wuxi was now so large that a second was needed, and the renovation of an abandoned ancestral hall provided the perfect opportunity to add to the public space of the city.38 A planning committee for Huishan Park was set up in May 1929. Chaired by Sun, it allocated 1,000 yuan to rebuilding and a further 150 yuan a month for park management and on

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19 May submitted its plans to the provincial government for approval. Municipal officials argued that during the period of po­liti­cal tutelage, parks should be used for the promotion of public health and morality rather than for more traditional private and aesthetic pursuits. They complained that the ancestral hall had been in a state of disrepair for many years and was of no apparent use to the local population, concluding that Huishan was a scenic spot that attracted many travelers, the number of which would only increase with the garden’s renovation. The provincial government gave its consent to the plans but delegated responsibility for the garden’s construction to the municipal government.39 This meant that even though the garden was outside the city limits, it was firmly within the jurisdiction of the WMPD. Officials worked hard to link the old garden directly to the city by overseeing the construction of roads to and through the park and drew up detailed plans for its redevelopment. After 3,000 yuan was raised, a French urban planner hired as con­sul­tant, and in November the contracts for Huishan Park Road, which ran from an intersection with Tonghui Road directly to the garden, w ­ ere put out for tender.40 Work began the following spring and was completed within one month along the road’s 1,800-­foot length. Meanwhile, Huishanbang Road, which ran alongside a stream within the park, was widened to 12 feet and paved along its 1,000-­foot length, while twelve drainage ditches ­were dug.41 The head of nearby Huishan Town also requested that roads and bridges be repaired to improve communications between it and the city proper.42 The later establishment of the Huishan Scenery Committee, which numbered Rong Zongjing among its members, confirms the importance of the park to Wuxi City’s expansion.43 No record exists of the committee’s meeting, but further plans drawn up by the Public Works Division survive that describe the park as a famous scenic spot in an open space attached to Wuxi City. Because there had been visitors to the site for hundreds of years, in terms of culture, commerce, and industry, it was part of the developing urban area. Recommendations for further improvement included road widening, planting of trees and flowers to improve the scenery, and construction of a tea­house for tourists.44 We do not know whether further work took place, but Huishan remained an important tourist destination and symbol of the city throughout the 1930s. Its development in 1929 illustrates that the WMPD had jurisdiction beyond the city limits and that it was acting with official approval and according to a centrally mandated legal framework.

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Management of the Urban Landscape In addition to drawing up plans for Wuxi City’s expansion, the municipal government had responsibility for construction and management of the urban fabric. In the early summer of 1929, the Wuxi Municipal Administration Bureau published thirty-­six regulations on building work, complete with numerous subclauses as well as additional guidelines for specific projects such as road widening. Among them ­were standard mea­sure­ments, procedures for issuing building licenses, fees and compensation to be paid to third parties, and regulations to improve fire safety. After the establishment of the WMPD, the regulations continued to apply to all public and private construction projects.45 Municipal officials certainly believed that the rules made for a better city. As one WMPD report put it, “each public and private construction project in the city is unevenly matched. So in order to ensure protection from the dangers of fire, con­ve­nient transport, suitable hygiene, and security protection, the former Wuxi Municipal Administration Bureau formulated construction regulations, which we are amending so that people living in the city will adhere to them.” 46 Despite these sentiments, officials complained that regulations ­were not followed, and the WMPD later clarified the license application pro­cess, setting out exactly which information should be included.47 Whether this had an impact is hard to say, but between August 1929 and the following January, 1,520 requests ­were made for building licenses, and 1,367 projects ­were given the go-­ahead, although over 300 licenses ­were later revoked. Licenses ­were granted for over 2,200 one-­story ­houses and some 1,400 multistory dwellings, while over 2,200 enclosing walls or embankments ­were built for various purposes, in addition to 400 other projects. Because the number of projects was significantly more than the number of licenses granted, some of them ­were probably quite substantial. Interestingly, 2,870 yuan was received in bribes. The practice was discouraged, and the amounts collected fell as time went on, but the bribes ­were marked as income, so they may have been accepted by individual officials and then turned over to the WMPD.48 This does not mean that the municipal government was without blemish, but it suggests that officials ­were more conscientious than Yang Hanxi may have been several years earlier in his management of the commercial settlement. In any case, construction was clearly proceeding rapidly in Wuxi. Sadly, none of the plans submitted to the department have survived, but rec­ords of disputes and letters to the county and provincial governments

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provide evidence of the problems that local officials and Wuxi residents faced during construction. Individuals and companies came to the local authorities with a variety of complaints, and the petitions attest to the increasing power that the municipal authority had acquired to manage public and private space on a micro-­scale, while pointing to its legitimacy in the eyes of residents. This is not to say that there ­were no protests against the state’s intervention or that the discourse governing municipal improvement was accepted ­wholesale. However, there can be no doubt that, working within central guidelines and under provincial direction, the WMPD controlled the construction and management of the built environment to a greater extent than had previous municipal administrations. Moreover, some projects went beyond the already-­expanding city limits, illustrating how, jurisdictionally speaking, the WMPD had control over an ever-­w ider area. Many land disputes ­were grievances directed at businesses. For example, in August 1929 the WMPD received complaints that the Yangfuxing Mill was encroaching on a road and was also a danger to public health. In response, officials wrote to the county Public Security Bureau (PSB), asking it to investigate.49 Municipal officials sometimes relied on the county police for help, although there is no evidence of conflict between the two administrations in this regard. And indeed, why would there be? After all, the county and the municipality often had the same agenda. The WMPD had its own staff, however, and in response to a separate complaint from Zhang Xipan later in the year, it ordered that a factory building, which had encroached on a road, be demolished.50 Meanwhile, when the Xinyuchang Coal-­ Selling Business repaired the wall marking out its property, there was grumbling that it had not been done according to the original plans, so officials threatened to revoke the license if changes ­were not made.51 Individuals also had problems with their neighbors. In one petition, Gao Zhongjun asked the WMPD not to grant building licenses to the own­ers of straw shacks that had suddenly appeared on land next to Huanshanqiao. He claimed that they ­were trying to defraud him of his land rights and produced a contract as evidence. In response, officials temporarily suspended handing out permits until the dispute was solved.52 In another case, Hu Jiechang was one of several people who accused two men surnamed Xu and Zhang for rebuilding a wall without authorization, and the municipal government demanded that they present their case within three days. Xu argued that the wall had always encroached on the street, that the WMPD had no jurisdiction, and Hu Jiechang had no reason to demolish it. The case was held over for further investigation.53 You Huiji also complained that Wang

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Genhe’s recent construction project had encroached on his land, and so the WMPD sent a letter to the local branch of the PSB to temporarily rescind his building license while the dispute was investigated.54 Some disagreements involved a number of people, and in at least one case, a ­whole community. Xu Jinfu, acting on behalf of a group of Wuxi residents, described how, before 1927, some fifty ­house­holds had produced plans to build a road 60 feet long from Entan Street to Xiatang Street just outside the south gate. He cited the importance of transportation in the welfare of the people and, with the funds in place, requested a license for the work. The WMPD replied that not all families in the neighborhood had given their consent and invited interested parties to the department’s offices for public discussion.55 Of course, businesses could also appeal to the WMPD. In November 1929, a fire broke out next to the Yongda Silk Cocoon Ware­house, and ten straw shacks ­were burned to the ground. Appealing directly to municipal officials, the own­ers praised the dedication of the fire brigade, which had limited the damage, but questioned why even though the WMPD had designated this area as a commercial zone, the straw shacks ­were allowed to detract from the appearance of the city. The petition concluded by requesting that police officers be sent to the area to prevent shacks from being reconstructed, and the WMPD acted accordingly.56 Public institutions ­were also required to abide by construction regulations. For example, the head of the Ningshao Native Place Society in Wuxi, Tao Jize, complained that a petition by You Chunquan concerning disputed land had caused the WMPD to temporarily revoke the construction license for a new headquarters. Tao argued that this case only affected a small part of the building work and asked that the society be allowed to continue with the rest of the project, since the native place society was responsible for workers’ losses. In addition to writing to the WMPD, he also wrote to the local police department and the county government, which may point to confusion over which body was responsible, although he could have been attempting to garner more support. There is no record of any resolution to the case.57 The control that the municipal government acquired over the public and private urban fabric extended to licensing and taxing the behavior of the city’s inhabitants. Importantly, this allowed the WMPD to derive revenue from them, which could then be plowed back into public ser­v ices. The ability of the state to collect taxes is an indication of its power, an issue that has received much attention from scholars, although mostly with regard to the countryside. County and municipal governments also had the right to

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tax their citizens, and in the case of prostitution in Suzhou, they introduced new urban tax regimes.58 What follows is not a detailed account of the finances of either the WMPD or the Wuxi County government but, instead, concentrates on how new taxes and regulations tied local initiatives more closely to national directives. Transport infrastructure connected different spaces together and was often managed by the WMPD, although individual roads or waterways went beyond the city limits. Municipal officials issued licenses to boat companies operating out of Wuxi City and worked with the local shipping association. It requested that they be granted to companies based in towns and villages across the county and asked the WMPD to prohibit businesses from operating without them.59 In one case, Zhu Zhangshou, a member of the association, petitioned the municipality to help him resolve a dispute in the countryside. Shuangmiaozhen was 20 li north of Wuxi City, but its prosperity had been affected by the development of neighboring Qianqiao, which had better transport links. Despite this, Zhu wrote, two boat companies offered ser­v ice to Wuxi City, his own and that run by Mao Wenrong and Xu Chaohe. Business had declined to such a point that both ­were in debt and found it difficult to pay their taxes. Zhu had previously brought a lawsuit against the rival company and appealed to the county government, but to little effect, and he was in danger of going bankrupt. He turned to the WMPD because he understood that it had the power to revoke shipping licenses, which he asked it to do in the case of Mao’s business, in order to safeguard the future of shipping in this area of the county.60 Although no record exists of the opinions of county officials, and there is no evidence that WMPD personnel went against the county in this matter, it is a clear illustration of how, administratively speaking, the municipality was seen as an or­ga­ni­za­ tion that had jurisdiction extending beyond the city boundary. The WMPD’s authority was more clearly defined within the city limits. Like most cities in Republican China, Wuxi was awash with rickshaws, which caused authorities all manner of problems. Initially, the municipal government directed police to check whether rickshaws, sedan chairs, and bicycles had registered for a license and paid the fee, the money from which would then be used to support the electrical company and the postal ser­v ice.61 At successive meetings, personnel from the Finance and Public Works Divisions discussed the issue, and it was eventually decided that all operators should present themselves with their vehicles to ensure that they conformed to provincial government construction bureau guidelines with respect to style. Officials complained that the 1,500 rickshaws in the city ­were in a

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terrible state, the uniforms of their own­ers ­were torn, and congested streets and bad weather only added to the sorry sight. The WMPD wrote to the provincial construction ministry requesting the power to grant more licenses and received permission for an additional 300 licenses, which together would net some 20,000 yuan, money that was earmarked for road improvement. The response was certainly quick: within two weeks of the day that licenses went on sale, eight companies had bought them, with three purchasing licenses for thirty vehicles.62 The WMPD found a second money-­making opportunity in the regulation of advertising. Ministry of Interior guidelines stipulated that newspapers, advertisements, announcements, and posters be confined to public bulletin boards. Given that in many Chinese cities it is still common to find glass cases displaying the daily newspaper, the control of all types of signs and symbols in the urban environment in the 1930s can perhaps be seen as setting a pre­ce­dent for later developments. Central guidelines ­were extremely detailed, stipulating length and height of these bulletin boards, the colors in which they should be painted, and their location. They even included diagrams for different types of bulletin boards to display advertisements, newspapers, or posters.63 A Jiangsu provincial government order concerning the management of the appearance of the urban built environment cited these guidelines in delegating responsibility to local authorities. Responding to this, the Wuxi County government lamented that only Yangming Ward had reported on the state of signs and advertisements and gave other local officials across the county three days in which to reply. Later, the WMPD set out in explicit detail the places in Wuxi City where bulletin boards ­were permitted, as well as their size, which was later printed in the Wuxi Yearbook.64 They covered all the major streets inside the city walls, Beitang and Beidajie, and even the walls themselves, as the very stones of the city ­were now a highly commercialized space. At one point, the Wuxi Advertising Society even tried to rent the entire city wall.65 Having adapted central guidelines to the Wuxi urban environment, the municipal authority began clearing the streets of unauthorized notices and levying taxes on those that remained. In doing so, rules on advertising ­were enfolded into a wider discourse that emphasized health and hygiene. A campaign to clean up the city was conducted between 16 and 21 May 1929. After this date, any signs or advertisements outside the designated areas that ­were not removed within five days would incur a 5-­y uan fine, while cases for notices ­were constructed in accordance with the Ministry of Interior’s plans.66 Municipal authorities also took advantage of the campaign to

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remove stalls, tools, trash, signs, and other obstructions that cluttered the sidewalks of the city and obstructed pedestrian traffic.67 The beginning of the campaign was marked by a pro­cession, which county governor Sun Zuji and representatives of the PSB all attended, and guidelines on behavior, such as disposal of trash, drinking, smoking, and disease prevention, ­were published.68 Later in the year, the WMPD set up the Wuxi Advertising Tax Department to collect taxes. Details of only one dispute exist. In December 1929 officials discussed reports that cigarette advertising had been painted on many walls in the city. Since the period for payment of the tax had not yet passed, it was decided to let the matter drop, and it was not brought up again, suggesting that the company involved duly paid up.69 The new municipal government continued to stress the importance of maintaining the quality of the urban environment, and in September it issued a public notice telling local shop­keep­ers to remove obstructions within ten days or face the prospect of a fine.70 Sanctions ­were not the only method of keeping the streets clean, as the following month the Social Affairs Division hired seventy-­four people to sweep them and empty over 200 trash bins. Dotted throughout the city, they ­were of a standard size and made of concrete, illustrating how ideas and policies on urban beauty and hygiene ­were manifested in changes to the built environment.71

The End of the WMPD On 31 March 1930, on the order of the provincial government, the WMPD was abolished, and by the end of that year its sister organizations around the country had also been disbanded.72 The reason for this is unclear, but the County Or­ga­ni­za­tion Law of 1928 stipulated that administrative units below the county ­were to be governed by public offices, and in July 1929, Wuxi City was designated the Number One Public Office for the county. WMPD officials noted that the province found two separate municipal-­level organizations confusing. However, they also referred to the new City Or­ ga­ni­za­tion Law, which came into effect in May 1930. Under this, Wuxi no longer qualified as a municipal administration distinct from the county because its population did not exceed 300,000.73 Wuxi officials responded to the decision to abolish the WMPD by petitioning for its reor­ga­ni­za­tion into a Municipal Management Council. Sun Zuji even went so far as to phone the head of the Ministry of Civil Affairs in Nanjing but was told that its dissolution had been settled. The WMPD’s responsibilities ­were handed back

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to the county government, and Sun vowed that major construction work, such as the building of Huishan Park Road, would continue.74 In any case, Wuxi City and the surrounding countryside remained under the jurisdiction of the county, and two new county and city self-­government laws in 1934 confirmed that settlements with a population of over 300,000 ­were deemed cities and subordinate to the province, with larger cities retaining some autonomy. Meanwhile, smaller cities remained under the jurisdiction of the county.75 The closure of the WMPD marked the end of attempts to establish municipal autonomy in Wuxi. For over a de­cade, local industrialists and officials had believed that the best way to ensure the city’s continued urbanization and prosperity was to strive for municipal in­de­pen­dence and had taken advantage of, first, central laws on commercial settlements and, then, changes to administrative divisions to form urban administrations. Under the Nationalist Government, they had some success, but after 1930 urban administration in all but the largest cities in China was once more subsumed within the county. This is important for two reasons. First, in denying all but the largest municipalities autonomy, the state asserted its control over rapidly growing cities in China. Second, just as they had been for centuries, the urban and the rural ­were now part of the same nationally applicable spatial administration, albeit one oriented towards the city. As we shall now see, this gave the developmental state the power to urbanize the countryside.

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The Nationalist State and Rural Infrastructure

On 20 February 1930, Sun Zuji opened the first executive council meeting of the Wuxi County government. A Ministry of Interior order two years earlier had decreed that all counties hold such meetings, but it had taken several months for local officials to comply, and in March 1929 the provincial government sent them a gentle reminder.1 So in September, Sun informed the Jiangsu Ministry of Civil Affairs that the meeting would be held the following spring, and in January 1930 the plans ­were duly dispatched to the provincial government.2 Thirty-­four delegates attended the meeting, including the secretary and two department heads of the county government, the secretary and head of the Public Works Division of the WMPD, the head of police, heads of all seventeen wards, and important local figures such as Rong Zongjing.3 At the opening ceremony, they listened to a speech from Sun Zuji, in which he described the role of the county in national reconstruction in words that reflected the ideas of Sun Yatsen. “We all know that the county is the area in which self-­government is to be implemented. During this period of po­liti­cal tutelage, I feel that the county is particularly important. . . . ​ Po­liti­cal tutelage has three foundations; the social base, the economic base and the educational base. If this base is not solid at the county level, it is not possible to implement po­liti­cal tutelage.” 4 Over three days, delegates discussed eighty-­four separate issues, including thirty-­two plans for building works, and nineteen addressing self-­ government, while the remainder focused on education and finance.5 One proposal concerned the de­mo­li­tion of Wuxi’s city wall and the building of a ring road. In the minds of local officials, the wall was a barrier to transport and commerce, and its removal would facilitate further urban expansion, despite concerns over defense. Nonetheless, it was decided that

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because the WMPD had previously published plans for de­mo­li­tion, this issue fell within its powers. Another proposal concerned registration of shops and other businesses, and again it was decided to leave this to the WMPD.6 Outside the city, Rong suggested that district and village roads be repaired. Ward heads ­were ordered to provide reports on local infrastructure and ­were made responsible for road inspection and fund-­raising, although money from the county was also available.7 Other proposals included provision for orphans across the county, the establishment of more police stations in towns and villages, and the promotion of sericulture reform.8 The first executive meeting of the Wuxi County government highlights how, after the dissolution of the WMPD, the county administration drove urbanization in the city and the countryside. It also reflects the central government’s focus on national reconstruction and provides further evidence of how far ideas of self-­government had been superseded by direct state management. This chapter investigates urbanization in the 1930s. I describe how the Number One Public Office continued many of the policies of the WMPD, while the county government drove urbanization through the construction of the Wuxi-­Jiangyin Road. Moving farther into the countryside, I look at irrigation works and the provision of flood relief in 1931 and argue that, although far from perfect, local officials ­were able to push through new initiatives. Finally, I turn to electricity generation, which was deemed far too important to leave in the hands of private companies and was taken under state control at the provincial level. First, however, it is important to understand how the developing legal framework on county administration confirmed the spatial orientation of Chinese society towards the city and, at the same time, allowed the center to increase its control over the locality.

The Gongsuo System and Its Responsibilities The legal framework surrounding rural administration developed in tandem with that of cities, because the law on local self-­government in cities, towns, and villages passed in 1909 applied to settlements of all sizes. Village supervisors and councils ­were given the same responsibilities as their urban counterparts, including the promotion of education, health, road construction, commerce, and agricultural reform. A de­cade later, the county or­ga­ni­za­tion law mapped out a similar range of responsibilities and stated that the county government should manage projects that covered the county as a w ­ hole or that w ­ ere too extensive for city and village governments to take on themselves.9 The Nationalists promulgated the 1928 County Or­ga­ni­za­tion

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Law, which subordinated the county to the province, and gave it a range of financial, public order, construction, and educational responsibilities. Further down the administrative list, settlements with over one hundred ­house­holds ­were designated as towns or cities, although they had no autonomy.10 Commentators discussed how this new law fulfilled Sun Yatsen’s requirement that the county be the site of self-­government. An article in Eastern Miscellany (Dongfang zazhi) noted that in Jiangsu and Zhejiang, the central government was bringing the countryside into its administrative purview. It argued that subcounty administrative units, such as wards and districts, ­were self-­government units because of their councils, some in­de­pen­dent revenue, and range of responsibilities and that in counties with as many as a million people, it was only right that there should be several levels of administration. Other scholars found this confusing and noted the possibility of tension among the county, city, and province.11 In any case, administration in Wuxi City and surrounding towns and villages was now unified under the county. The County Or­ga­ni­za­tion Law of 1928 gave government officials a framework within which they defined their respective powers and responsibilities. Jiangsu was divided into six hundred wards with some 18,000 districts and over 230,000 villages, which gave great scope for the expansion of public offices. Wuxi alone had 536 public offices dotted around the countryside.12 The establishment of local government was closely supervised at the provincial level. In May 1929, Sun Zuji attended a meeting of the Jiangsu Ministry of Civil Affairs together with the county, city, and PSB heads from nineteen other counties, where it was decided to set up public offices in line with central government regulations. Two months later, the county government announced the formation of seventeen wards in Wuxi, which would replace the former districts. It decreed that before the end of September each have its own public office and that the system of self-­government be fully implemented by February 1930.13 So, in September 1929, Sun Zuji announced detailed regulations for the establishment of self-­government. In total, fifty-­eight articles with numerous clauses gave public offices a wide range of responsibilities, including building or repairing roads, bridges, and dikes and dredging of rivers but extended as well to establishing militia and fire ser­vices, health and hygiene, and provision of relief for the young, old, poor, and sick. It is striking how little distinction was made between the city and the countryside. This is not to say that there was no recognition of differences along the rural-­urban continuum, as town and village public offices ­were put in charge of education,

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cooperatives, land registration and disputes, forestry, sericulture, fishing, and other aspects of agricultural production, not to mention reform of what ­were deemed outdated customs.14 The range of policies discussed at the first executive committee meeting of the county government reflected this wide authority. Throughout the rest of the Nanjing De­cade, it oversaw the urbanization of Wuxi City and surrounding towns and villages, although day-­to-­day management was often left to local officials.

Wuxi City: The Number One Public Office Although the county government continued to have direct control over most aspects of urban administration, the Number One Public Office took over some municipal duties. It was composed of three sections, a headquarters, an or­gan­i­za­tional section, and an editing department, each of which had a variety of responsibilities, such as training of personnel, holding meetings, and carry­ing out ­house­hold and land surveys.15 Soon afterward, the geographic area of the office’s activities was defined and subdivisions created. Although this should have been a simple pro­cess, it was difficult to apply the new administrative structure to the urban landscape. According to provincial government guidelines, there should be no more than 50 towns in a ward-­level public office, and each town had to have at least 600 h ­ ouse­holds. Because the total area of the Number One Public Office contained 30,000 ­house­holds, some rearrangement was required, and in August 1929, the heads of the former self-­government committee met at a tea­house in Wuxi to resolve the problem. Initially, it was decided to or­ga­nize the city into six towns, but their number was later increased to take into account the large population and expanding urban area, an indication of how the administrative jurisdiction of the city continued changing to match its physical growth.16 The activities of the Number One Public Office ­were recorded in a series of reports published for a short period in the mid-1930s, which reveal remarkable continuity with the WMPD. Local officials remained concerned about the physical appearance of the city, for both aesthetic and health reasons. In the autumn of 1935, although the late imperial baojia system of local administration with one hundred families in a bao and ten in a jia, which had been been re-­introduced by Chiang Kaishek, was being used for street cleaning and trash collection, the county government asked public office officials and the local PSB to inspect trash bins in the city.17 Detailed forms ­were printed, but there is no evidence that the survey was carried out, and garbage collection remained an issue. On a visit to Wuxi, the Committee

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for the Promotion of the New Life Movement stressed the importance of cleanliness and exhorted local officials and the police to encourage residents to clean the inside and outside of their homes and shops and verify that hot water sellers ­were not using polluted water.18 Industrial neighborhoods proved to be a par­tic­u­lar problem, and in April 1936 shop­keep­ers north of the city walls complained that paper and dyeing factories ­were polluting the river and affecting the quality of drinking water. This prompted a meeting of local government leaders, which was attended by shop­keep­ers, representatives from factories, and the PSB, all of whom agreed to search for a solution to the problem.19 Other municipal projects included regulation of stalls in food markets, use of the advertising tax to repair bulletin boards, and administration of public wells.20 In addition to managing the urban fabric, the public office took responsibility for war preparations. In 1936, officials ­were given the task of ensuring that ­house­holds blacked out their windows to help protect against aerial attack, and the following month baojia heads lit lanterns to announce a practice of these aerial defensive mea­sures. Meanwhile, the county government asked local officials to report back on plans to protect wells and reservoirs, followed by two months of military training that summer.21 Preparations continued right up to the invasion in August 1937. Local officials built air raid shelters from steel and concrete for government personnel, and as the bombs began to rain down on roads and railway lines, dugouts w ­ ere also constructed in towns and villages in which travelers could take shelter.22 It is unclear whether it was the county government or the Number One Public Office that undertook the air-­defense work on the eve of the invasion, and air raid shelters ­were mostly crude affairs that offered little protection. However, the Public Office certainly took over responsibility for a wide variety of activities that all fell well within the purview of municipal governance. Moreover, these reflected the changing priorities of central government, which reacted to the wider international situation as the Japa­nese threat intensified.

Public Offices in the Countryside: A Range of Responsibilities Officials in towns and villages saw themselves as part of the national bureaucracy and engaged in the same developmental project as the central government. In the thirteenth ward, formerly known as Xin`an district, they invoked Sun Yatsen, stating, “we have drafted an outline for administrative standards. Abiding by this, we will improve, eradicate obstacles, and

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strive hard for construction. Completing the business of tutorial government will bring about the reality of government for the people.”23 Infrastructure was a priority, and five major road projects ­were identified as key to local development. The longest began at the Grand Canal and wound along the border of Yangming Ward, through Xinan Town before eventually intersecting with the Wuxi-­Jiangyin Road. Other responsibilities included surveying and registering people and land, establishing police stations and militia, and banning opium, gambling, and other so-­called feudal customs. Health and hygiene activities mirrored those of the city through the improvement of public buildings, basic sanitation, and trash collection but also reflected the problems of the countryside as mosquitoes ­were identified as a par­tic­u­lar target, presumably because of concerns over malaria. Beyond this, local officials also had responsibility for the introduction of new seed varieties, pest control, sericulture improvement, and forests.24 A diary from the eighth ward provides insight into the day-­to-­day life of local government. We know nothing about who wrote the diary, which summarizes the office’s activity over the first two months of its existence, but its appearance in the “received-­documents section” of the county government reports suggests that it was penned by an official from the ward itself. 15 August: Took over administrative responsibilities from former Huaixia city. 24 August: Liao Kaisheng from the Academia Sinica social science research institute Wuxi village economy survey group arrived at the public office to request help in surveying the rural economy. 28 August: Over one hundred local gentry attended the first discussion meeting, at which the boundaries of districts and townships ­were determined, and district and township heads and assistants chosen. 5 September: Petitioned the county government to establish a branch of the police. 10 September: Investigation of case number 555, Big Sword Society bandits. 11 September: Announcement that it is prohibited to hang clothes out in the sun to dry, in order to tidy up the appearance of towns and villages. 16 September: Attendance at WMPD Main Road Consultation Meeting. Attendance at county government event commemorating Sun Yatsen. 17 September: Construction of four bulletin boards for advertisements and one large bulletin board at the parking lot. 18 September: Helped the Construction Bureau to mark out Wuxi-­Changshu Road.

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25 September: Announcement of methods for protecting against boring insects and pasting of these announcements in twenty-­eight districts and townships. Report to county government concerning food surplus or deficit. 30 September: Construction of this town’s street lighting.25

Some diary entries, particularly those on advertising and street appearance, clearly demonstrate that the state shaped urbanization in towns and villages in the same way as in the city. However, the specificity of local circumstances also determined government activity, as officials worked to address long-­ standing problems such as banditry, food supply, and the need for agricultural reform. In any case, just as individual families funded development in towns such as Yanjiaqiao, the expanding state bureaucracy was also a catalyst for urbanization. Nowhere is this more evident than in large infrastructure projects.

The County and the Public Offices Working Together: Rural Infrastructure Development The Nationalists prioritized infrastructure, but it was local government that actually implemented many projects, albeit under provincial supervision. In May 1929, in accordance with the County Or­ga­ni­za­tion Law, the provincial government announced the regulations and responsibilities for county construction bureaus, which included road and bridge building and repair as well as electricity generation and telephone networks.26 Infrastructure by its very nature links cities, towns, and villages and is a vector for urbanization and often homogenization. Indeed, the head of the Wuxi County Construction Bureau complained to the provincial Ministry of Transport that there ­were no common standard mea­sure­ments for building work and that recently constructed district-­level roads had been too narrow. Zhenjiang and Suzhou both had such guidelines, and within the city, the WMPD managed construction. He proposed that the En­glish foot be adopted as the standard length across the county and that construction advisors be appointed to each public office.27 Officials ­were instructed to choose one or two people with relevant experience for the role, and by the end of October 1929 every ward in Wuxi had complied with the request. Most had some government experience or had worked in education, construction, or business. For example, Yu Jing in Yangming was formerly an engineer in a road-­building company, while farther south in Taibo Ward, Zou Jingheng had studied

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sericulture in Japan before returning to Wuxi to serve as committee member on the Farmers’ Association.28 In addition to setting standards and facilitating the appointment of professional advisors, the county government licensed and managed construction. As with urban projects, builders had to present their plans to local officials, who then arranged for an inspection. Those applying for a license had to provide the names of the client and firm carry­ing out the work, the project’s location, extent, materials, and length of time required for its completion.29 Projects ­were governed by a stringent set of building regulations that had as many as forty-­three separate articles with numerous subclauses. They stipulated that ultimate responsibility rested with the County Construction Bureau, but that this was delegated to individual public offices. They also included limits on how far construction should impinge on public spaces such as roads and rivers as well as private homes. Moreover, they designated which materials should be used, such as prohibiting wood for chimneys, limited the number of straw shacks that could be built in one place, and set standards for fire safety and hygiene. Finally, they stipulated fees for construction licenses, which ranged from 5 jiao for the simplest one-­ story h ­ ouse to 100 yuan for a cotton or flour mill. Regulations for road construction ­were equally specific, stipulating the width of different road types and designating the materials to be used.30 The rules hide some of the complications of building in the countryside, which, given the multitude of competing interests and the sometimes dire economic situation, was rarely without problems. Nevertheless, they reveal a concerted effort by local officials to bring the rural built environment into line with its urban counterpart. Examples of road building and the management of irrigation demonstrate that local officials did more than just pay them lip ser­v ice. Constructing the Countryside: The Wuxi-­Jiangyin Road

As we saw in chapters 1 and 2, privately funded road-­building projects ­were common in Wuxi, but after 1927 they became a priority for the state and ­were vectors of urbanization. Indeed, a new road could radically transform the local geography. The story of the building of the Wuxi-­Jiangyin Road, or Xideng Road, as it was often known, exemplifies these trends. Appropriately, it begins with Sun Yatsen, who on a visit to Jiangyin in 1912 envisioned a connection between the Shanghai-­Nanjing highway and counties north of the Yangtze River. It took a de­cade for gentry from both counties to draw up plans, and funds ­were obtained from the provincial government for a

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survey.31 However, it was only with the establishment of the Nationalist Government and its emphasis on rural infrastructure that finally “the will of Sun Yatsen, which had not been realized, could now help to develop this city’s agriculture, industry and commerce.”32 In 1929, the Wuxi County government submitted its plans for the southern section of the road to the provincial government. It was to run from Beizhakou and wind its way gradually northward to the border with Jiangyin, cross several rivers, and involve the de­mo­li­tion of the Ding pagoda. The work was put out for tender, and ten companies bid for the right to build the first two sections of the road, with the contract awarded to the Hengji Engineering Institute, which offered the lowest price and had the most experience.33 Before ground could be broken, the line of the road had to be set, and so a new survey was commissioned in December 1928. The length of the southern section of the road was just over 8 miles, which was to be broken into shorter sections to spread the cost. The danger of flooding meant that the road had to be raised to 16 feet above sea level, with earth for the embankment coming from the surrounding fields.34 This proved to be rather prescient, because during a flood in 1931 the Wuxi section of the road remained unaffected while the Jiangyin section, which had no such protection, was badly damaged.35 Road width was set at 23 feet, with half a meter either side for pavement. Because heavy traffic was expected, bridges ­were constructed of steel with concrete pillars, the longest over 33 feet, while where the road went through low-­lying land, pumps ­were used to drain existing water and culverts built to allow run-­off onto surrounding fields.36 On 3 April 1929, Sun Zuji joined government officials and the heads of Qingcheng, Xin`an, Tianshang, and Tianxia wards in a ground-­breaking ceremony at Beizhakou. Also attending ­were members of the chamber of commerce and representatives from schools, co-­ops, factories, and the police. In their speeches, Sun and the head of the Wuxi Construction Bureau, Yao Dixin, praised the road because of the benefits it would bring to commerce in Jiangyin and Wuxi.37 With the ground broken, building work proceeded apace. By 20 May, the first two sections of the road base had been completed, and with the contract for the third and fourth sections signed, it was estimated that initial work on them would be finished in June.38 In August, the County Construction Bureau drew up regulations governing the bidding pro­ cess for bridges, together with a detailed description of the work to be undertaken, and this was all submitted to the provincial government for approval.39 By the beginning of December, the road surface and drainage ditches had been completed and work on the eleven bridges begun. In

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August 1930, the first cars to travel along it ­were festooned with flags in an elaborate opening ceremony.40 The road clearly had a huge impact on the natural environment, but it also provoked opposition from local farmers. On 4 May 1929, the Jiangsu provincial government issued an order to local officials in districts and towns, urging them to ensure that farmers did not uproot the poles marking the line of the road.41 The problem stemmed from confusion about the actual path it was to take. Yao Dixin had already complained that farmers living between the 112th and 135th marker poles ­were obstructing building work and intimidating staff. They believed that the poles marking the central line of the road, which had been placed for surveying purposes, ­were the actual course of the road. Yao admitted that farmers lacked engineering knowledge and that the difference between the central line and the course of the road should be explained.42 Local authorities responded to the protests over the Wuxi-­Jiangyin Road with a two-­pronged approach. At the end of April, Yao worked with the local People’s Education Promotional Office to or­ga­nize a Road Construction Preparation Committee meeting, which was attended by officials from Tianshang and Tianxia Wards as well as primary school teachers and representatives from rural co-­ops and youth associations. Because the road went through several villages, three groups ­were sent out into the countryside, composed primarily of schoolteachers, to explain the purpose of road building. The stick to this carrot was the deployment of two armed police along the line of the road to stop any further damage.43 Of course, not everyone protested the disruption, as evidenced by the compensation paid for movement of tombs, which amounted to 5 yuan for each reburial and a further 2 yuan per coffin. By 20 May, just over 1,000 yuan had been paid out, which paid for around 150 tombs to be moved.44 Given the importance of grave sites to Chinese families, there may well have been some grumbling about this, but the lack of appearance in the historical record suggests that most people accepted the money. However, there ­were still concerns that building work would continue to be disrupted. In August 1929, Yao asked local officials to fine those caught damaging either the road surface or the drains and ditches alongside them.45 Nor did problems stop after the road was completed. In the spring of 1934 and 1935, over 140,000 trees ­were planted along the road, but farmers complained that they ­were blocking the sunlight to their fields, and many ­were chopped down.46 The building of the Wuxi-­Jiangyin Road transformed the natural environment, while bringing discourses of national development out into the fields.

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Moreover, the improvement to transport encouraged economic development, even though constant repairs to the poor road surface forced county authorities to make repeated requests to the provincial government for funds.47 Thus the road’s completion was the catalyst for further urbanization, which provides a departure point for an investigation of some of Skinner’s thoughts on the relationship among cities, towns, and villages. He argued that as marketing systems immediately adjacent to major cities ­were integrated into transport infrastructure networks, smaller towns and villages went into decline, because farming ­house­holds had better access to the city or to the intermediate market town, and they came to rely on imported goods rather than purely the products of their own ­house­hold and neighbors in the village. This occurred because the higher-­level central places offered products at lower prices than smaller settlements.48 Development in Wuxi County offers conflicting evidence for this. On the one hand, some settlements along the Wuxi-­Jiangyin Road declined in the way predicted by Skinner’s theory. On the other, the road proved to be the catalyst for further infrastructure expansion, while local officials sometimes worked with businessmen to bring new municipal ser­v ices to the countryside. The map in Figure 5 depicts the road system in Tianxia Ward. The fate of the town of Tangtou accords with Skinner’s theory. It was the first bus stop on the road from Wuxi City to Jiangyin and boasted forty shops selling basic goods as well as a small factory making sauce and pickles, but easy access to the city prevented commercial development.49 A similar fate befell Yandai, a small town along the Wuxi-­Yixing Road. With a population of over 1,000, it had been a bustling place. However, “In this town, which is less than 10 li from the city, and at this time when the agricultural economy is collapsing, it is difficult to do as one wishes. Moreover, the con­ve­nience of transport in this area means that people pass through ­here on the way to other towns. For example, rickshaws on the Wuxi-­Yixing Road can be hired at any time, while on the river the Xiyun steamer runs twice daily. For these reasons, people living in this neighborhood set off on their journeys to the city and back.”50 While shops in Tangtou and Yandai may have lost customers to the city, their developmental picture is complicated by the growth of municipal ser­vices. Both had telephones and post offices, and Tangtou’s peculiar situation necessitated the establishment of a PSB branch to deal with the rise in robbery caused by the opening of the road to Jiangyin.51 The impact of infrastructure development on urbanization can also be seen in Liutanqiao, Maoxiangjie, and Andili, all slightly west of Tangtou. The first two towns ­were just a short rickshaw ­ride from Wuxi City, so there

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Figure 5 ​Tianxia Ward, 1936. Source: Wuxixian di wu qu Tianxia zizhi cujin hui, Tianxia shi gailan.

­ ere only a few shops selling basic necessities, although there ­were also some w small restaurants, breweries, grocers, and Chinese medicine shops. People living in and around these two towns clearly inhabited an increasingly urbanizing environment and ­were unlikely to be strangers to the city. Moreover, both towns had fire fighters, and Maoxiangjie boasted a telephone that was used by neighboring farmers. Eco­nom­ically, then, neither Liutanqiao nor Maoxiangjie seems to have benefited from infrastructure changes, although new municipal ser­v ices arrived. Andili was a little different. Here, the presence of a rice mill and sock factory ensured that although there ­were no new shops, at least the town did not go into decline.52 The building of the Wuxi-­Jiangyin Road also affected towns farther afield. Residents of Hsiao Chi just north of the county border in Jiangyin ­were now

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only a forty-­minute bus ­ride from Wuxi, and according to one survey this caused emigration, particularly of young women, who left to find work or perhaps even to find husbands.53 We do not know whether the new road also increased emigration from towns and villages in Wuxi County, but it clearly had a large impact on the area and is an excellent example of how local factors mediated the effects of far-­order historical pro­cesses. The towns closest to Wuxi City declined eco­nom­ically in accordance with Skinner’s theory, although other factors, such as the opening of a factory, offered some respite. However, urbanization was manifested in more than just commercial and industrial development, as infrastructure joined settlements ever closer together in a regional geography that was now firmly oriented toward the city. Managing the Countryside: Irrigation and Flood Relief

After road building, irrigation was the largest county-­r un infrastructure project in the Wuxi countryside. The involvement of the state in water management is nothing new in Chinese history, but during the Nanjing De­cade the central government once more acquired the power to manage local construction projects.54 Some large irrigation works, such as the one on the Huai River, ­were administered directly by officials in Nanjing, but smaller projects ­were the responsibility of county governments, which even before 1927 had begun to take direct control. Moreover, while the state in peripheral areas such as the Huangyun region in north China had fewer resources and faced greater opposition from local village heads and other entrenched interests, in Wuxi County officials had some success in managing irrigation.55 In taking responsibility for directing dike repair, surveys, drainage, and the like, the state introduced new building methods and technology into the countryside. Moreover, the response of public offices to the 1931 flooding of the county illustrates that although there ­were problems, the government was able to manage relief and recovery efforts. Surveying the sorry state of irrigation works in 1929, local officials complained that the combination of poor government in the late Qing combined with frequent conflict had raised the risk of flooding. More recently, the rise in steamer traffic and the building of concrete wharves had narrowed rivers, and dilapidated bridges also hampered transport. In Wuxi, three major rivers ­were capable of carry­ing the largest steamers; the Grand Canal, the Wuxi-­Jiangyin River, and the Liangxi River. The most important of them was the Wuxi-­Jiangyin River, which connected Lake Tai to the Yangtze. This

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artery had silted up and was impassable in autumn and winter, which affected deliveries of coal to Wuxi’s factories and export of goods to northern Jiangsu and, claimed officials, put local producers at a disadvantage in competing against cheap Japa­nese imports.56 Fixing the problems along the river was a large job, and costs ­were estimated at 2,600 yuan for surveying, over 200,000 yuan for dredging, and 39,000 yuan for demolishing ­houses and other obstructions. The money was to come from the land tax, which was estimated at 1 jiao, 7 fen, per mu of land. Spread over four years, this amounted to an increase of only 4 fen per year and would bring immediate benefits in the form of reduced flooding. Despite the detailed plans, work proceeded slowly. On 5 September 1929, the county government rented a steamer from the Lake Tai Irrigation Committee and began to dredge the Liangxi River, beginning outside the west gate of the city. By the middle of the following January, less than half the work had been carried out, and a shortage of funds prevented bridge repair.57 All this was too little, too late. In the autumn of 1931, Wuxi suffered from the floods that devastated northern Jiangsu. The area was certainly no stranger to natural disaster, but the deluge that year was particularly severe, forcing hundreds of thousands to flee to Wuhan.58 One observer in Wuxi described the floods as “an extraordinary disaster not seen for many years” and “so tragic that words cannot describe it.”59 Altogether 280,000 mu ­were inundated, with total losses estimated at 5 million yuan. Low-­lying land in the north was most severely affected, particularly in Qingcheng and Wanan Wards. A survey team led by personnel at the Agricultural Bank of China and a former County Construction Bureau chief blamed the flooding on a lack of dike repair. It noted that large-scale work was carried out every five years on the Furong Dike, which protected 108,000 mu of land and that, for this reason, the area had survived relatively unscathed. Similarly, a portion of rental payments was siphoned off for regular work on the Yangjia dike in southwestern Qingcheng that had protected 19,000 mu in an otherwise devastated part of the county. The use of mechanical bailing machines and construction of drainage ditches had also helped prevent flooding in these areas.60 According to the survey, a total of 1,438,820 feet of dikes needed repair, many of the smaller dikes should be joined to create a more effective defense, and locks and drainage ditches had to be built. The total cost was estimated at 356,596 yuan, and in order to help pay for the work in Wuxi as well as elsewhere, the central government had stopped all non-­essential

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engineering projects, while new regulations on construction mandated that pumps be sent to the affected districts and public offices draft farmers in to work. Indeed, in the worst-­a ffected areas, draining water paid between 100 yuan and 200 yuan, suggesting that for many farmers this was a vital source of income to replace that from destroyed crops.61 The Wuxi County government asked local officials to report on the progress of the cleanup and appealed for financial help from Wuxi migrants.62 Officials had already amassed 100,000 yuan, half from the Wuxi Flood Relief Committee and the rest from money originally allocated for road building in 1930 and 1931, while mechanisms ­were in place to accept private donations and impose a 5 jiao per mu land tax on those farmers capable of paying.63 While the extent of private donations is unclear, of the 50,000 yuan that made up the Wuxi Flood Relief Committee’s funds, at least 2,000 yuan came from the migrant community in Shanghai, who gave over 7,000 yuan to flood relief efforts around the province.64 Some work was undertaken. In Kaiyuan Ward the county government supervised the repair of the Shuanghe, Shimen, and Huangjia dikes, while in the more severely affected Wanan, a Dike Repair Committee oversaw work across the ward. Within three months, the height of most dikes had been raised 1.5 feet above the previous year’s watermark, and many ­were also widened to make them stronger.65 Despite these mea­sures, problems continued in the Wuxi countryside, presenting local officials with yet more challenges. In late January 1932, the Japa­nese bombed Shanghai, which dealt a serious blow to the city’s economy and only added to Jiangnan’s woes.66 On 27 April, the provincial government ordered county officials to report on the local economy and exhorted them to prioritize security, provide relief to farmers, and promote recovery of agriculture and industry.67 This prompted flurries of activity in public offices across Wuxi, and the resulting descriptions confirm the impact of the flooding and illustrate that local officials ­were able to take mea­sures to tackle some of the problems. Apart from Huaishang and Huaixia, which ­were quiet or already had well-­ established militia and police forces, other wards ­were in various states of turmoil.68 For example, in Jingyun most districts and towns had already established militia, and although they complained of old uniforms and a lack of weapons, a night patrol was somewhat effective at reducing crime.69 Meanwhile, Jiang Zhizhong, the head of Beishang, grumbled that the ward had not really recovered from the disruption of 1927, and rice robberies had increased since the floods. Although there was a police station in the area, he

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had applied to establish another branch in the north of the ward, after which he hoped things would improve.70 With the security situation in hand, the most immediate task was to distribute relief to those hit hardest by the disasters. Most wards provided some food aid, with donations often coming from local elites, but figures only exist for Kaiyuan, where 80 shi of rice was distributed, in addition to 2,000 yuan.71 Beyond the need to provide immediate assistance, officials also understood that agriculture was in a severe depression. One of the biggest problems was the low availability of credit, and many public offices asked the Agricultural Bank of China to increase loans, but in Xinan this was dismissed as “throwing a cup of water onto a blazing fire.”72 Back in Beishang, Jiang Zhizhong arranged for the bank to set up a fund to allow farmers to borrow money for diesel oil to use in bailing machines. Another major source of credit was the pawnshop, but since the war business had been slow and business hours cut, so Jiang asked that these be extended. He also tried to get credit societies to delay the date for settling accounts from the Dragon Boat Festival in May until November and reduced rent from 2 dou of rice per mu to 1.5 dou.73 Some of these initiatives ­were emulated elsewhere, as local officials reported investment in improved farming methods such as better fertilizer and continued innovations in sericulture.74 It wasn’t only farming that was affected, as officials complained the war had disrupted marketing systems, leading to the closure of factories and shops across the countryside, with a corresponding loss of jobs. In many areas, handicrafts ­were seen as the solution, and officials in Beixia suggested that the unemployed try their hands at darning socks. In other districts, weaving, a long-­practiced agricultural sideline, was encouraged, especially for unemployed women who would normally be working at silk filatures in Wuxi City.75 Some public office personnel even took it upon themselves to set up job centers to augment the recruitment agents scattered in tea­houses and temples across the county.76 Finally, local government concern extended to opium and gambling. Interestingly, officials in Kaiyuan supported Ding Fulian, a member of the local gentry who had opened an opium addiction treatment center. In 1932 it was already treating a hundred patients, and more money was provided for its expansion. Ding had set up an entire treatment regime, because after his patients left the center, many of them entered a halfway ­house that provided work in ­gardens.77 Nationalist-­era Wuxi local officials ­were much more effective in responding to the problems created by the 1931 floods and the 1932 bombing of Shanghai than their pre­de­ces­sors during the Jiangsu-­Zhejiang War. Of course,

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circumstances differed, but the state was gaining the ability to manage the impact of crises on both the built environment and people’s lives. Beyond this, local officials across the Wuxi countryside ­were now busy shaping urbanization. The state set the agenda, enforced regulations, and provided help when problems emerged. For the most part, state-­sponsored urbanization was conducted through the county bureaucracy, but some projects ­were simply too large for county governments to manage alone.

Bypassing the County: Electricity Generation Where infrastructure crossed county or, at times, provincial boundaries, it came under the direct control of higher levels of government. One such project was the management of Lake Tai, which sometimes involved the governments of both Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces, but in concluding this chapter, I leave irrigation matters and turn to electricity generation. The history of electricity provision to Wuxi shows how the city became incorporated into an emerging regional infrastructure system that linked it not only to surrounding towns and villages but also to neighboring cities. Moreover, it provides further evidence of how infrastructure development was at first largely undertaken by private companies but was then often brought under government control. Electricity provision in Wuxi dates back to 1910, when several industrialists, including Xue Nanming, invested 60,000 yuan in 6 mu of land outside Guangfu Gate and established the Yaoming Electric Lighting Company. Initial output was only 300 kilowatts, but over the next de­cade the customer base grew steadily, and further investment was made in electricity pylons and power lines.78 Meanwhile, a few miles to the northeast, in the neighboring county of Wujin a Sino-­German joint venture known as the Zhenhua Electricity Company constructed the Qishuyan Power Station, which was named after a neighboring town, and it began supplying electricity to the two counties.79 In Wuxi, demand continued to increase, and in 1924 a contract was signed between Zhenhua and Yaoming, which turned Yao­ ming into a distribution company, and it began to invest heavily in supplying the rapidly growing industrial center north of the city walls, while signing a contract with the city public office to improve street lighting. This arrangement certainly benefitted Wuxi as total power production increased, but the following year Zhenhua, seeing a chance for expansion, began to build its own distribution infrastructure. Directors of Yaoming argued that, according to the original agreement with the central government signed in

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1910, only they had the right to build infrastructure for 10 li outside Wuxi City. The dispute escalated, and by the summer of 1925 Zhenhua had made arrangements with the city to build its own power lines. It rumbled on for two more years and was resolved only after officials from the Ministry of Transport amalgamated the two businesses and established the Yongxing Electricity Company in early 1928.80 Interestingly, it was the city public office, rather than the county government, that entered into contracts with the private electricity companies, and this points to the extent to which electricity provision was initially an urban phenomenon. However, by 1927 power cuts had begun to affect commerce and industry. One occurred in Wuxi during the Mid-­Autumn (Zhongqiu) Festival in 1928, and although shop­keep­ers turned to oil lamps and candles until electricity was restored, its failure later in the eve­ning caused a further loss of business; by the time the lights finally came on at midnight, most people had already gone to bed.81 It was at this point that commercial elites requested the provincial government take over management of electricity provision. So, in October of that year, the Qishuyan Power Station passed into state control, and shareholders in Zhenhua and Yao­ ming ­were paid compensation.82 State management did not immediately solve the problem of electricity supply. On 31 October 1929, there was yet another power cut, and inquiries from the police ­were met with a curt response that electricians could not be sent out at night, and there ­were complaints to the WMPD.83 Discussions between the municipal authorities and managers of the power station lasted for two months and concluded with a set of regulations setting out each side’s responsibilities. Officials agreed to pay for the Qishuyan Power Station to repair and expand the city’s electricity infrastructure out of municipal taxes, but it would have to fix problems promptly.84 This agreement proved to be one of the last but certainly the most enduring acts of the WMPD. Five years later, the power station had a dedicated manager and workmen to ensure street lighting in the city.85 The state invested in other areas of electricity provision. New equipment increased power generation capacity, while a high-­ voltage line was built along the railway to Wuxi. Pylons stood at a height of 40 to 46 feet, although where necessary the cables ­were buried. This made for a total of just over 50 miles of line, which formed the main conduit for a network that covered much of northwestern Wuxi County.86 Electricity infrastructure left a mark on the countryside that was as visible as road building. Pylons and high-­voltage lines cut across fields, and in 1937 land was purchased for further expansion of the power station. In accordance

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with the land law, the plans for the building and rates of compensation to be paid ­were copied to the Ministry of Interior and the Wuxi County land office. The Japa­nese invasion ended the project, but the Qishuyan Power Station survived the occupation and earned money from renting out land.87 The expansion of electricity infrastructure across Wuxi highlights the central themes of this and previous chapters. In the early twentieth century, urbanization in Wuxi City and the surrounding countryside was driven by local elites. The state was not entirely without power during this period, but it was really after 1927 that the Nationalist Government established a centralized bureaucratic and regulatory apparatus capable of driving and shaping the urbanization of China’s cities, towns, and villages. This rested on ideas of self-­government and infrastructure construction that, through the writings of Sun Yatsen, became part of the underlying discourse on a developmental state that both wanted to and was capable of interfering in local affairs. The story of the Qishuyan Power Station also points to another aspect of urbanization that I have touched on but not explored in detail—­ namely, how Wuxi was becoming part of an emerging urban system that linked cities, towns, and villages across the region and beyond. This forms the subject of chapter 6.

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A Connected City Native Place Societies, Migration, and Disaster Relief

As Wuxi became the most important regional city in the Lower Yangtze Delta, it was increasingly connected to the wider urban system. In the early twentieth century, increased outward migration led to the establishment of native place societies in Nanjing, Shanghai, and Suzhou. They projected the image of the city as “Little Shanghai” while also contributing to the wider social, economic, and po­liti­cal life of the region. In doing so, they sometimes worked with the state and other social organizations to solve problems that affected individual migrants as well as mitigate the impact of regional and national disasters on Wuxi. Studying how native place societies connected Wuxi to the Lower Yangtze Delta highlights how urbanization as a total societal transformation acts on levels of scale above the city as well as below. In China, native place societies have long connected cities and regions. In Jiangnan, until the Taiping Rebellion they ­were more prevalent in Suzhou than Shanghai, where they later flourished as the treaty port developed.1 No longer are native place networks seen as hindering the formation of coherent urban identities. Instead, disparate sojourning communities coalesced to contribute to the life of the city to which they migrated.2 This is not to deny the importance of a link to the native place, but, rather than being retrogressive, the translocal nature of the societies meant that they reflected not just the “native” identity of the home city, which in our case is Wuxi, but also the “locational” identity of the host city, be it Nanjing, Shanghai, or Suzhou.3 The part that societies played in the life of the cities in which they ­were established is therefore now acknowledged. However, research on native place societies rarely addresses how they w ­ ere part of urban systems, contributing to the life of the host city, the home city that provided the migrants in the first place, and sometimes the region and

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nation as a ­whole. An exception is Bryna Goodman, who recognizes how societies in Shanghai provided aid to flood-­stricken Ningbo and Shantou during the early 1920s but concentrates on their relationship with the host city and through this the nation under a new regulatory environment created by the Nationalists.4 I agree that native place societies worked with municipal authorities in their host cities and helped their migrant communities. However, they remained important to the native place and during times of crisis ­were mobilized to provide aid to Wuxi. In doing so, they worked under provincial or national government direction, although during particularly serious crises such as the Japa­nese invasion of 1937, the machinery of the Nationalist Government proved somewhat inadequate. During such periods, Wuxi officials took advantage of the regional urban network and ­were able to mobilize a wide range of po­liti­cal and social connections to solve problems that ­were beyond the capacity of the municipality. This chapter begins with how the establishment of native place societies in Nanjing, Shanghai, and Suzhou reflects Wuxi’s emergence as an important regional city. I then demonstrate how they helped individual migrants and thus contributed to the life of the host city as well as, where necessary, providing a link back home. Finally, I describe how they ­were part of a wider network of po­liti­cal and social institutions that formed the basis of Wuxi’s peacetime prosperity and ­were mobilized to help the city and its wider community during natural disasters and war.

The Wuxi Migrant Community in the Lower Yangtze Delta Wuxi native place societies emerged gradually as migrants coalesced into communities. These grew larger in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as more people left Wuxi in search of new economic opportunities in rapidly developing neighboring cities and ­were formalized in the establishment of native place societies. Shanghai boasted the largest migrant community. The 5,163 members of the Wuxi Native Place Society in Shanghai whose occupations are known, which constituted approximately 5 percent of the migrant community in the city, worked in seventy-­one separate professions. By far the most common was ironworking, with 741 people, followed by the restaurant business, with 344 employees. Other sectors in which Wuxi migrants featured prominently ­were publishing and book-selling businesses, hotels, cotton and flour mills, retailing, and butchers.5 The only data on the gender of

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migrants to the metropolis come from a list of refugees who escaped Shanghai in August and September 1937 and therefore must be treated with caution. However, the WNPSS helped 16,688 men, 8,209 women, and 1,197 children leave the city during this period.6 The fact that most female migrants to Shanghai worked in the textile industry and ­were predominantly from north Jiangsu probably explains the gender imbalance. The Wuxi migrant community in Suzhou mirrored that of its larger sister farther east. In 1924, 1,067 members of the Wuxi Native Place Society ­were in Suzhou (referred to ­here as the WNPSZ to distinguish it from the  one in Shanghai). As in Shanghai, the iron industry was the largest employer, with eighty-­nine members. Forty-­nine people listed their profession as simply “business,” and other pop­u­lar employment included tourism, eye care, smelting, and restaurants. The thirty-­t wo people registered as working in tourism reflect the importance of this sector to the Suzhou economy. In addition to those working in these more common areas, there ­were four government officials, two detectives, and a gynecologist. The range of professions illustrates that the migrant community in Suzhou was just as diverse as that in Shanghai, while the preponderance of laborers in the iron industry suggests that some may have been working in branches of larger companies based in the neighboring metropolis. Family and native place connections probably played just as important a role in linking migrants in Suzhou as they did elsewhere. In the iron industry, seven people shared the same surname and the same native place. For example, Yan Keding, Yan Pensheng, and Yan Zi`an all hailed from Luoshe and so may have been relatives. This is almost certainly the case with Wei Huangen and Wei Huanxiang, whose given name had one character in common in addition to having the same surname (which would indicate that they ­were of the same generation and may have been brothers). Among those working as opticians ­were three men with the surname Ding from Luoshe and three men named Yu from Nanqiaozhen. The flour industry boasted two members of the Rong family among others, and four men named Zhang from Yuqizhen ­were in tourism.7 Beyond this, Luoshe and Yuqizhen stand out as providing more than their fair share of migrants to Suzhou, suggesting that connections between these villages and the city ­were particularly strong. The membership of the Wuxi Native Place Society in Nanjing (WNPSN) reflected the city’s status as China’s new capital. Twenty-­eight of the original 279 members worked at Zhongyang and Jinling Universities, 21 for the national government, and 10 for the provincial government, and a further

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twenty-­five ­were in the military. Of the rest, ninety-­t wo ­were engaged in commerce, many for branches of companies whose headquarters ­were in Wuxi and Shanghai. Most of these businesses ­were in the commercial district of Xiaguan, because in Nanjing as elsewhere, migrants from the same place tended to flock together.8

The Formation of Native Place Societies Wuxi Native Place Society in Shanghai

The plethora of native place societies in Shanghai reflects the rise to prominence of the treaty port and the importance of its links to the hinterland. By the early 1940s, an estimated 117 ­were in the metropolis, nearly half from cities and towns in Jiangsu. The forerunner of the WNPSS, the Xijin Gongsuo, was founded in 1888. As with other such organizations, its primary function was to provide burial ser­v ices in the city, but in the early 1920s it was reinvented as a native place society and began to take on a wider range of roles.9 The Wuxi Native Place Society for Travelers in Shanghai (Wuxi Lühu Tongxianghui), the or­ga­ni­za­tion’s full name, was founded on 16 March 1924. The previous September eigh­teen groups had recruited members to the society, one representing each of the seventeen wards in Wuxi, and a managerial body to oversee the work. The following month, letters ­were sent out to 6,200 people announcing the establishment of a drafting committee, which then chose the council members. Among the society’s illustrious leaders ­were Ding Fubao and Rong Zongjing.10 The Rong family was involved in all three organizations discussed in this chapter, and although it would be going too far to say that they ­were simply extensions of this powerful lineage, its support certainly contributed to their prestige. The constitution of the society established its main functions and rules of membership. Expressed in familial terms, the main aim of the society was to “create a stable or­ga­ni­za­tion based on emotional connections to benefit each person from Wuxi.”11 Membership was open only to men over the age of twenty-­one who lived or worked in Shanghai and ­were introduced by two existing members. Once admitted, members ­were expected to conduct themselves honestly and could be expelled if imprisoned or for failure to pay the yearly fee of 1 yuan, although in practice it sometimes proved hard to collect.12 In addition to fostering emotional ties, the society aimed to: “Promote education, encourage commerce, conduct a yearly survey of the circumstances of the Wuxi community in Shanghai, accommodate trav-

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elers, introduce business, assist in legal affairs, engage in charity work, which is to be limited to those public groups from Wuxi that are in Shanghai, and promote public health.”13 The WNPSS was more successful at some of these activities than others, and circumstances often presented unexpected challenges, but the society’s work brought it into contact with many different organizations in Shanghai and beyond. The society’s journal, published from 1924 to 1933 and revived again in 1936, was its mouthpiece. WNPSS activities took up much of the space, including council meetings, festival banquets, reports on the night school and the savings society, and help given to individual migrants. Interestingly, large member donations ­were always recorded. These donations ­were often for relief purposes, but money was also provided to build the new headquarters of the society, on Qipu Road just north of Suzhou Creek in Hongkou. It cost 45,000 yuan, of which 35,000 yuan was raised from members, with the rest borrowed from the flood relief fund.14 Donors’ names ­were printed in the journal, and in a manner similar to one for those who supported the construction of ancestral temples, a more permanent record was kept of members’ generosity. All those who gave over 500 yuan not only received a bronze plaque but had their photo displayed in the hall of the headquarters. Some donors ­were quite generous. Rong Zongjing gave 5,000 yuan, sixteen members donated between 1,000 yuan and 2,000 yuan, and a further ten gave more than 500,000 yuan.15 The society recognized high-­profile members in other ways and often used them as examples for the migrant community as a ­whole. For instance, the author of an article on the history of the Rong enterprises praised the scale of the business and urged migrants to follow in the family’s footsteps.16 News from home also took up several pages in each issue. For most of the Republican period, at least two daily newspapers ­were published in Wuxi, but there is no evidence that they ever reached Shanghai in great numbers, so for many migrants, other than personal contacts, the journal was probably their main source of news from home. Article topics included personnel changes in the municipal government, surveys of businesses, reports of road building, descriptions of travel to local scenic spots, and even poetry written by people from Wuxi. Finally, in an ­indication of how translocality now stretched across the regional urban system, reports ­were also written on the activities of new native place societies in Nanjing, Suzhou, and Zhenjiang. In this way, the journal reflected the multiple facets of the WNPSS, highlighting the personal, the institutional, and the translocal.

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Wuxi Native Place Societies in Nanjing and Suzhou

The Wuxi migrant community in Nanjing was small and newly established but reflected the status of the city as China’s new capital. By contrast, in Beijing, native place societies declined markedly after 1927 as the city lost po­liti­cal influence.17 Although people from Wuxi had doubtless lived in Nanjing for centuries, migrants did not start establishing institutions until 1919, when thirty students from the Nanjing Advanced Normal School and the River and Ocean Engineering Institute set up a society. They met twice a year in a temple to perform opera or sing songs, while other groups congregated in tea­houses around the city. The catalyst for the growth of the migrant community and the establishment of the native place society was the declaration of Nanjing as China’s capital, which brought Wuxi inhabitants to the city to work in the army and government.18 In the spring of 1928, preparatory meetings drafted the constitution, sought permission for the creation of the society from both the Ministry of Interior and the local PSB, and recruited members.19 Then on 10 June 1928, 105 people met in the science auditorium at Zhongyang University to mark the official establishment of the WNPSN. The chairman noted the recent wave of migrants to the city and hoped the society would be able to emulate the success of its counterpart in Shanghai.20 As with the WNPSS, it is the journal of the society that best reveals how it wished to be perceived. Writing separately in May and October 1931, two directors, Fan Wanghu and Zhong Bao, both criticized those who saw native place connections as feudal and tinged with selfish sentiments. On the contrary, they argued, they ­were of benefit to society, and Zhong Bao highlighted their contribution to national stability.21 Alluding to Sun Yatsen, he claimed that native place and lineage connections ­were the foundation for national recovery and concluded that everyone should “bring forth their spirit and make joint efforts to guide all members to work towards the improvement of Wuxi society and that from this national prosperity will follow.”22 Similar sentiments surrounding the place of native place societies in the region and the nation at large informed discussions about the building of the WNPSN headquarters. Its construction was a priority for the society, and members called on Wuxi inhabitants from across Jiangnan for help. In 1928, Rong Desheng donated 5 mu of land opposite Zhongyang University, and contributions ­were requested. The building opened two years later, and over 200 people, including Rong Desheng and Yang Hanxi, attended the ceremony.23 Its completion confirms the close personal

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connections that existed between members of the Wuxi community across the region and their wish to construct a physical symbol of their city in China’s new capital. Similar importance was attached to the building of the WNPSZ headquarters, which, it was argued, would form a solid foundation for the growth of the society in Suzhou.24 After an abortive attempt to establish a society in the city in the early 1920s, preparations began again in the autumn of 1932. The opening meeting was held the following May, and, as in Nanjing, the society was registered with the county government.25 Members ­were asked to donate money for the headquarters, and the society even rented a local movie theater for the day for a fundraising event.26 Its constitution highlighted the importance of emotional ties among members of the Wuxi migrant community in Suzhou but, perhaps reflecting changes over the preceding de­cade, membership was not limited to men, although introductions ­were still required.27 In all three cities, then, the establishment of native place societies reflected the newfound prosperity of Wuxi, which migrant communities worked to project into the host city even as they maintained links with their native place.

The Native Place Society and the Individual: The Migrant Community An investigation into how migrants perceived and used their native place societies highlights how their translocal nature linked individuals and Wuxi City into the regional urban system. Moreover, even in something as simple as helping a lost migrant return home, these social organizations interacted with municipal and county governments. A dispute between You Yingchuan and Gu Hanfei, both from the town of Fangqiao in Wuxi County, involved the WNPSS acting as an intermediary between two members of the migrant community whose disagreement occurred in Shanghai but who then turned to the authorities back in Wuxi. You had owned a sesame oil shop on the docks in Shanghai for thirty years. Gu rented three rooms from him, while also borrowing money to set up his own shop. The debt should have been repaid over five years, so unsurprisingly in the sixth year You asked for the money back. Gu refused and hid the goods in his shop to stop them from being seized in lieu of repayment, prompting You Yingchuan to ask a relative, You Gengyun, to mediate the dispute. Terms of repayment ­were agreed on and the goods entrusted to a neighbor to look after. All appeared to be well, but Gu Hanfei sued You

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Yingchuan in the Wuxi County court, which harmed his reputation and caused him to lose business.28 When the issue was put before the society, its executive director, Rong Zongjing, sent a letter to the Wuxi County government attesting to You Yingchuan’s good character. He wrote, “You Yingchuan is old and abides by the law, while being honest and considerate. The Wuxi community in Shanghai all knows this.”29 Both parties returned to Shanghai for arbitration, where each continued to plead his case. Whether You Yingchuan ever received his money and regained his reputation is unclear, but he certainly placed great trust in the society to act in his interest. Its intercession, with several letters sent to the Wuxi County government signed by Rong, illustrates clearly that the WNPSS acted as a mediator between two members as well as interceding on behalf of You with the authorities in Shanghai and Wuxi. The WNPSS was especially active in helping its members and other migrants return to Wuxi when they ran into trouble. In July 1936, sixteen-­year-­ old Zhou Zhaodi was working at a silk filature in Wuxi when she was sold by her colleague to a brothel just southwest of Great World in Shanghai, where the narrow lanes ­housed establishments offering many dubious pleasures. Fortunately, a neighbor alerted her parents, who, with the help of a lawyer, secured her safe return. All was not well, however, as she later claimed that her legal father, Zhang Jinbao, was only her stepfather and that he had previously sold her to become the child bride of Liu Gensheng, who lived on Xinzha Road in Shanghai. In fact, she was studying dancing and, under the name Chen Meimei, had gone to the Lidu Dancing Club, where she was again forced into prostitution.30 In this way Zhou, through a mixture of bad luck and dishonesty, was shuffled back and forth from Shanghai to Wuxi, from silk filature to one form of prostitution or another. Her story does not end ­here, though, as she escaped and turned to the lawyer who had helped her the first time, but he refused to do so again because she was not of legal age. Meanwhile, she had contracted syphilis, and it was at this point that she appealed to the WNPSS for help, whereupon she came into contact with unfamiliar spaces and institutions in the city. The society sent her to the Shanghai Third People’s Hospital for treatment and contacted her stepfather. His reply throws further light on the complications in Zhou Zhaodi’s life that contributed to her migration experience. According to him, Zhou’s mother was Zhou Xushi, who had taken a second husband, named Tan, with whom she had a son, Tan Jinsheng. The stepbrother took a disliking to his stepsister, and after his father died, he forced her to go with him to Shanghai and made her work in a brothel. She was

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brought back to Wuxi, whereupon Tan Jinsheng introduced her to Liu Gensheng to become a child bride, and it was believed that she was living with him in Wuxi. Zhang Jinbao closed the letter by stating that he had already left Zhou Xushi and that since his stepdaughter no longer wished to be associated with him, the matter was out of his hands.31 We do not know whether Zhou was sold to Liu Gensheng as she claimed, or introduced by her stepbrother, and her eventual fate remains unknown. Nonetheless, these events in her life occurred within a complicated web of social and institutional translocal relationships across two cities. Zhou Zhaodi was tragically betrayed by her family, but many who found work in Shanghai did so through middlemen, who could be just as dishonest. Guo Wangshi’s family was little different from many others. She lived in Dongting with her two younger sons, after her husband and eldest son had died. A man claiming to work for an ironworks in Hongkou promised her youn­gest son, Jiang Genbao, that as an apprentice in Shanghai he would have clothes and an allowance of 10 yuan per year, and so he left for the big city.32 After a few months, winter arrived, and nothing had been heard from ­Jiang, so Guo went to Shanghai, taking warm clothes for her son with her. On her arrival in the city, she was robbed, but luckily a passerby directed her to the WNPSS headquarters. Staff gave her money to return home and inquired about her son, but he was never found.33 Guo was doubly unlucky in encountering an unscrupulous labor contractor and being robbed in Shanghai, but the intervention of a passerby, who seemed aware that a person from Wuxi could find help at the native place society, demonstrates how it was viewed as a projection of Wuxi identity in the metropolis. Guo Wangshi was far from the only Wuxi migrant to find herself at sea in a strange city, and the police picked up their fair share of lost souls. Zhong Zhaodi, a thirteen-­year-­old girl from Tianzhuqiao in Wuxi County, went to Shanghai with a neighbor’s wife and their son to work at the Dajing Silk Filature. In this, she was no different from hundreds of other young girls, but she had not been in the city three days when she went for a walk and lost her way. A police officer sent her to the headquarters of the Women’s and Children’s Aid Society, from where she was transferred to the WNPSS, where she stayed until her father sent someone to bring her home.34 The transfer of Zhong Zhaodi to the society is no surprise, considering that the Women’s and Children’s Aid Society had previously donated money to it as a refugee center set up during the Jiangsu-­Zhejiang War.35 In this case, the native place society was one of three urban institutions that the young girl passed through on her way home.

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Institutional contacts are similarly evident in the final example, which begins on a train. “Zhu Bo’ang from Wuxi came to Shanghai. On the same train w ­ ere a man and woman acting suspiciously, so he went forward to question them, but they avoided answering. After getting off the train, he followed them in secret to the corner of Huaxing Lane, where they entered a tavern. So he called for the police, who surprisingly caught them together in the same room.”36 The intervention of the amateur detective Zhu Bo’ang provides an interesting twist to the case in which Wu Xiaowu seduced her colleague Gao Xiaomei away from her job in the Zhenyi Silk Filature. Zhu’s sleuthing offers clues as to Gao’s experience on what may have been her first visit to the metropolis. From the couple’s behavior on the train, it can be deduced that she was not entirely happy during the journey. Moreover, Zhu’s stealthy pursuit through the streets of Shanghai suggests they walked, a journey that took them from the bustling north train station past the factories and workshops packed with straw shacks and the distinctive Shanghai stone portal (shikumen) ­houses to the tavern where Wu Xiaowu was arrested. As for Gao Xiaomei, the WNPSS sent her to stay at the Xinpu Foundling Home, which was run by Catholics, whose conditions ­were suggested by its high mortality rate in 1929 of 80 percent of the occupants.37 Fortunately her stay was short, as her brother quickly arrived from Wuxi to take her home. It is hard to imagine that failed migration experiences ­were confined to journeys to Shanghai, but there are none recorded in the pages of the WNPSN journal and few from Suzhou. In June 1933, the local police picked up Song Xueliang, who was running bare-­chested through the streets of the city. When they realized that he was mentally unstable and from Wuxi, they took him to the native place society, which located his father. He reported that the boy was normally locked up but that he had escaped and fled to Suzhou to find a friend.38 A second case concerned the wife of Pu Yinda, who was lured by Zhang Shimo to Suzhou, where she was found by the police working as a prostitute in one of the city’s hotels. After seeing a report in the local newspaper, her husband arrived to take her back to Suzhou, but Zhang Shimo refused to allow her to return, and it was at this point that Pu asked a friend and member of the WNPSZ to request that the society intercede with the police. The head of the society wrote a letter stating that Pu should be re­united with his wife and that Zhang was a criminal, who had broken up a family.39 Unfortunately, there is no information on the resolution to this case. In these examples, acting as translocal organizations, native place societies in Shanghai and Suzhou represented and aided members of their

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respective communities, while also interacting with state and social organizations across Jiangnan. These institutional connections ­were to prove particularly important to the wider Wuxi community and the home city during times of crisis.

Disaster Relief: Tongxianghui, the State, and Social Organizations During periods of flooding or war, native place societies managed the movement of money and people around the Lower Yangtze Delta, while working closely with other charities and the provincial and national government to provide aid. The 1931 Flooding of Wuxi

The Wuxi County government was helped in its efforts to cope with the 1931 floods by the wider migrant community, which responded quickly. In Shanghai, two WNPSS council meetings in August established the Temporary Disaster Relief Association, which began soliciting donations. Little was known about the extent of the damage, so council member Cai Jiansan was sent to Wuxi. Over ten days in the city, he contacted local charities and or­ga­nized survey teams to visit the afflicted areas. Meanwhile, Wuxi officials sent letters to the WNPSS asking for help.40 Throughout late August and early September, donations flooded in, and 1,000 yuan was quickly sent back to Wuxi. In total, the society received more than 7,000 yuan, of which 4,000 yuan was sent to either the Wuxi Flood Relief Committee or local charities. The money came in the form of over 400 separate donations from individuals and businesses, and the response was so good that after the crisis the WNPSS had 2,000 yuan left over for future disasters.41 In Nanjing, there was much less activity, and the society merely collected donations from members and passed them on to the Wuxi County government, but migrants ­were still concerned about the situation back home.42 Interestingly, the WNPSS responded not just to appeals from Wuxi but to provincial and national requests, as directors recognized other areas in Jiangsu ­were also in need of assistance. An appeal to donors in early September played up regional connections, since “[I]t doesn’t matter if it’s near or far; all the counties near the river in Jiangsu have been severely flooded and are in urgent need of assistance.” 43 Wuxi officials complained that more money had gone to flood relief in other counties than to Wuxi itself and

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argued that now that the survey of submerged districts had been completed and the extent of the cleanup operation was clear, more money would be needed. It was certainly forthcoming, as a further 2,000 yuan was eventually sent to Wuxi for dike repair.44 Despite these complaints, there is no evidence that the WNPSS donation to the Jiangsu Provincial Flood Relief Society had a detrimental impact on Wuxi. In fact, aid went beyond the provincial boundary, as the National Government Flood Relief Council asked the native place society to set up a clothing collection center. Flooding had affected “countrymen” in more than ten provinces, and social organizations ­were being asked to contribute as the government asked “each large charity to ­wholeheartedly extend aid.” 45 A council meeting assented to this request without opposition and fifty-­four sets of clothing ­were collected, many from members of the society.46 The Wuxi Flood Relief Committee was disbanded in 1932, but problems remained across the countryside.47 To help those still affected by the disaster, the local Nationalist party office together with the county government set up another relief association. Little is known about its activities, but in the summer of 1932 the provincial government announced its dissolution, probably because of corruption.48 This prompted an outcry from Wuxi officials and the wider community, many of whom sent letters of complaint to the provincial government. Wuxi businessman Gu Binsheng travelled to Nanjing, where he contacted the WNPSN, while Xue Mingjian went to Shanghai. Yang Hanxi also sent letters of complaint. The result of this was a three-­ pronged protest, with members of the societies in Nanjing and Shanghai acting in tandem with Wuxi elites. The directors of the WNPSS wrote to the head of the provincial government, outlining the serious impact of the floods on Wuxi and the shortage of rice in the countryside. Such sentiments ­were mirrored in a letter to the WNPSN, which members of the Relief Society and Yang Hanxi asked to be forwarded to the government.49 In addition to the correspondence, a delegation was sent from Wuxi, including Gu Binsheng and Gao Jiansi, the latter acting on behalf of Xue Mingjian. It put its case to the head of the provincial government and officials at the administrative, construction, commerce, and finance ministries, but they remained unmoved.50 Despite failing to convince the provincial government to reverse its decision, throughout the dispute the wider Wuxi migrant community, and their representative societies acted as a translocal network providing economic and po­liti­cal aid to the home city. Moreover, the impact of the 1931 floods on Wuxi and Jiangnan demanded a provincial-­level response, and the Chinese state was somewhat effective at managing the WNPSS’s

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involvement in the relief effort. This was not necessarily the case with some of the other crises that beset the region. The 1932 Bombing of Shanghai

The Japa­nese bombing of Shanghai in January 1932 was one of the first times that warfare was waged from the air on a major city anywhere in the world. Although Wuxi City was not directly affected, it became the destination of choice for thousands of refugees, some of whom ­were returning home. They ­were aided by the WNPSS, which worked with municipal authorities, charities, other native place societies, and religious organizations to provide shelter and transport.51 The outbreak of bombing in Zhabei on 29 January mobilized the WNPSS into action, as Wuxi refugees began crossing Suzhou Creek. Indeed, since the society’s headquarters was itself in the warzone, council members had trouble finding refugee centers and turned to the Red Swastika Society for aid. This was the charitable arm of the Society of the Way, a Buddhist sect of dubious legality, which by the 1930s had outgrown its underground links to become a large national charity.52 It had first worked with the WNPSS during the Northern Expedition, when Chiang Kaishek led the Nationalists to power in China over two years between 1926 and 1928. In early 1927, major road and rail networks between Shanghai and the interior of the country ­were blocked, and this forced the WNPSS and the Society of the Way to arrange transport via the Yangtze, although there was no torrent of refugees on that occasion.53 This long-­standing relationship meant that WNPSS members had no qualms about entrusting 2,000 yuan to the charity to establish and manage refugee centers on its behalf. On 5 February, notices ­were posted at the WNPSS headquarters and the Wuxi and Liangxi Hotels, both run by Wuxi migrants, directing refugees to the Red Swastika Society shelters in the International Settlement.54 Meanwhile, on 23 February representatives of the society also attended a meeting in Shanghai of the United Office of Native Place Societies, to which it had reported its actions over the previous three weeks. This or­ga­ni­za­tion worked under the direction of the Shanghai War Zone Provisional Refugee Relief Committee, a body that brought together wealthy businessmen, charities, and members of the municipal government to deal with the crisis.55 It is unclear how many Wuxi refugees received aid. WNPSS reports estimated that ten thousand people ­were in need, some in shelters set up by the War Zone Provisional Refugee Relief Committee, and others in Red

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Swastika Society centers, although some may not have been from Wuxi.56 However, we know that the WNPSS returned three thousand people to the city, a pro­cess that required further collaboration with both the Red Swastika Society and the Shanghai War Zone Provisional Refugee Relief Committee, which or­ga­nized free boat tickets for refugees. The Red Swastika ­ ere sent back on 13, Society quickly hired a boat and batches of refugees w 16, and 19 February.57 At that point, the charity ran out of money, and the WNPSS was forced to make alternative arrangements, calling upon the United Office of Native Place Societies for help in interceding with boat companies. Although there is no direct evidence that the Shanghai War Zone Provisional Refugee Relief Committee was involved directly with the WNPSS over this, that or­ga­ni­za­tion had already written to the Shipping Association on 3  February, complaining that individual companies ­were raising the price of tickets, and it was later able to or­ga­nize free transport along the Yangtze.58 So, when the WNPSS requested assistance on 23 February, it was able to obtain free boat tickets and pay individual companies later.59 Meanwhile Wuxi was inundated with refugees, a problem that the authorities ­were ill equipped to deal with. Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, Yang Hanxi, again taking an or­gan­i­za­tional role in a time of crisis, held a meeting at the Wuxi Chamber of Commerce, at which the Wuxi National Salvation Society Relief Committee was established, composed of local officials and charities such as the Wuxi branch of the Red Swastika Society.60 Initially, there ­were few problems, particularly as the first three thousand refugees who passed through the hands of the Red Swastika Society ­were accompanied by 2,000 yuan in relief funds sent from Shanghai. However, by the middle of February, the deluge was overwhelming the city. Not only did the Red Swastika Society continue to send refugees, but many arrived of their own accord, and crowds ­were reported stranded outside the railway station.61 The situation became so serious that the Wuxi branch of the Red Swastika Society asked its headquarters to have the Shanghai authorities stop sending refugees to counties outside Jiangsu through Wuxi.62 There is no evidence that these appeals had any effect, but by the end of February the number of refugees in the city began to fall, and life in the city and the region slowly began to return to normal. However, five years later, the Japa­nese returned to Shanghai, and this time war engulfed the entire country. The WNPSS responded to this invasion much as it had to the 1932 bombing, acting as one link in a chain of social and state organizations that highlight the interconnectedness of the regional urban system.

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The Japa­nese Invasion of 1937

The WNPSS responded quickly to the outbreak of war in Shanghai on 13 August 1937. The following day, it rented a building as a temporary headquarters in the International Settlement, because its old base on Qipu Road was at the center of the conflict. A Relief Council was quickly established and divided into eight sections responsible for refugee shelter, food, first aid, burial ser­vices, and repatriation.63 The society certainly made use of its links to the Shanghai business community and collected over 16,000 yuan between August and November. Much of this came as small individual gifts, although some came from organizations such as the Shanghai Ironworkers Trade Association, which gave 1,000 yuan.64 This money allowed the society to set up five shelters with a combined capacity of 5,000 refugees. Like many others in Shanghai, they ­were designed to be short-­term dwellings while repatriation was arranged. This work began on 16 August, and until the end of that month between 500 and 1,000 arrived daily from across the city. The flood dwindled to a trickle, and at the end of September responsibility for housing the few refugees who had not been returned was passed to the Shanghai Federation of Charities. In total, some 26,000 men, women, and children passed through the shelters, which is a not insignificant number, given that an estimated 100,000 people from Wuxi lived in Shanghai.65 Having reached the relative safety of the shelters, refugees still had to be transported out of the warzone. The WNPSS acquired passes for 60 small private boat operators, which together shipped nearly 20,000 refugees, most of them in small batches of 30 to 50 people.66 The Red Swastika Society was once again a vital partner in this operation, as it helped to arrange and staff the convoys. Three members of the WNPSS ­were sent from Shanghai to Wuxi to or­ga­nize renting boats. They met with representatives of the Red Swastika Society and began the return trip to Shanghai by steamer, towing seven boats behind them under threat from enemy bombers. On 25 August, they arrived safely in Shanghai, but loading refugees was delayed by twenty-­ four hours as the steamer company tried to increase the price of tickets. The local government settled the dispute, and so the following morning 1,588 refugees ­were loaded onto a convoy that had grown to 13 boats. It passed several army checkpoints before arriving in Wuxi, where the refugees ­were pro­cessed and sent to shelters in the city. A second convoy composed of 14 boats with 1,850 refugees set off from Shanghai on 29 August, and this trip also proceeded without incident. As before, the experience was an uncomfortable one, because in addition to army checkpoints and the threat from

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Japa­nese planes, the refugees encountered bodies floating in Suzhou Creek.67 ­ ere but one way to leave Shanghai in the autumn of 1937. These convoys w The railway was still operating in mid-­August, as thousands congregated at the North Station, anxious to board a train for Nanjing, while even at the end of October, the Wuxi Branch of the Red Swastika Society reported people arriving daily.68 Moreover, the multiple organizations involved in the return of refugees meant that members of the Wuxi community ­were just as likely to find themselves among the 35,000 displaced people that the Shanghai Municipal Relief Committee helped to get to Hangzhou, Ningbo, Wuxi, and Xuzhou.69 Many of those who had been displaced merely passed through Wuxi on their way home, and the city once more stood out as a transport hub in refugee shipment, a rather tragic counterpart to its prewar role as a regional industrial center. The scale of the crisis required a national response. In September, the central government established the Emergency Refugee Relief Commission. Its headquarters ­were in Nanjing, with branches at the provincial, municipal, and county level across China. Officials from different offices of the state bureaucracy, including the Executive Yuan, the executive branch of the government, and the Ministries of Finance, Transport, Social Affairs, and Railways ­were appointed to the commission, while local government personnel liaised with police and charities to or­ga­nize relief efforts. They ­were charged with several major responsibilities, including shelter and transport of refugees, provision of food, clothing, and other necessities, as well as their protection. Refugees could be put to work if they ­were deemed capable or allowed to join the military if they so wished. At this early stage of the war, there was little funding allocated for refugee relief from Nanjing, and it was up to provinces and cities to find money from their own bud­gets.70 These guidelines show how the center delegated management of relief to local government and indicate that Wuxi authorities had the responsibility to shelter refugees. Despite the regulations, there is no evidence that officials in Wuxi took an active part in refugee relief, although local government departments ­were reor­ga­nized to handle military affairs such as air defense, conscription, and provision of food to the troops.71 Elsewhere in China, this was not the case, and despite severe obstacles and massive numbers of people, the authorities ­were often effective at pro­cessing, sheltering, and resettling refugees in the first few months of the war.72 We can only speculate as to why the government in Wuxi did not become directly involved in refugee relief. A preoccupation with military matters is understandable since Wuxi was close

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to Shanghai and for a short time in mid-­November was on the frontlines. This was later recognized by a WNPSS journal editorial, which noted that “since the government was concerned with military matters, it did not take responsibility for refugee relief and resettlement.” This meant that “the relief of refugees who have suffered from the loss of their homes should be undertaken by social organizations and philanthropic individuals.”73 It is also possible that local officials did not have the necessary expertise, while men such as Yang Hanxi certainly had a great deal of experience working with charities during times of conflict. In such circumstances, the Red Swastika Society took control of much of the task of pro­cessing refugees. The total number of people passing through the city is hard to gauge, however, the society claimed that 30,384 people entered its shelters between 17 August and 30 September, 27,982 of whom ­were sent home.74 The Chinese Foreign Relief Association of Wuxi, about which I have been able to find no information other than the fact of its existence, estimated that 32,346 people had been sent to the city between the middle of August and the middle of October, 3,831 of whom remained in long-­term shelter in Wuxi.75 Given the constant stream of refugees, these figures are likely to be an underestimate. A daily record of the activities of the Wuxi branch of the Red Swastika Society during the first three weeks of October, when by all accounts the exodus from Shanghai had peaked, describes the flow of people through Wuxi and their movement to other cities in the region. This is depicted in Table 2. Refugees arrived in Wuxi using every mode of transport available, while many spaces in the city itself ­were given over to housing them. At least two temples ­were turned into shelters, while another was set up in a cocoon brokers outside the south gate.76 In most cases, refugees ­were returned to their homes via other cities, and those leaving in­de­pen­dently ­were most likely Wuxi County residents returning to the countryside and able to arrange their own transport. In 1937, as in 1932, the WNPSS worked with charities and the municipal government in Shanghai to manage the movement of refugees out of the stricken city. In Wuxi, however, local officials either could not or did not wish to deal with the problem and left it to social organizations. In any case, the story of the wider Wuxi migrant community and the native place societies they established demonstrates how urbanization bound the city ever more tightly into a regional urban system. The rapid development of the Lower Yangtze Delta caused increased migration, which led to the formation of native place societies. These translocal societies managed the problems of individual migrants and, in doing so, worked with the state and other

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337 (Taicang branch of Red Swastika Society), 54 (In­de­pen­dently) 93 (In­de­pen­dently) 37 (In­de­pen­dently) 1,200 (Shanghai City Aid Council), 283 (returned straight home) 287 (In­de­pen­dently) 82 (In­de­pen­dently) 93 (In­de­pen­dently) 107 (In­de­pen­dently) 80 (In­de­pen­dently) 290 (Taicang branch of Red Swastika Society), 18 (Returned home directly) 1200 (Wuxian Red Cross) 128 (In­de­pen­dently) 218 (In­de­pen­dently) 112 (In­de­pen­dently) 143 ( Wuxian Red Cross) 56 (Qingpu Red Cross), 48 (In­de­pen­dently)

29 (Provincial Aid Council), 33 (In­de­pen­dently) 1,200 (Shanghai City Aid Council), 339 (In­de­pen­dently) 900 (Shanghai City Aid Council)

455 (Single Batch), 83 (In­de­pen­dently)

46

Number arriving via boat and train

3 17 7 55 36 49 0 7 121 0 0

29 (Huzhou) 0 0 208 (Changzhou, Danyang, Jiangyin, Nanjing, Zhenjiang) 213 (Jiangyin, Piaoyang, Tongzhou, Yixing)

20 4 113

345

0

47 8

137 34

Number returned of their own accord

106 (Huzhou, Jiangyin, Nantong) 639 (Danyang, Nanjing, Wujin, Zhenjiang) 148 (Huzhou, Jiangyin, Tongzhou) 15 (Huzhou) 0 0

0 0 63 (Hangzhou, Huzhou, Piaoyang, Yixing)

100 (Haimen, Jiangyin, Nantong via boat), 1,396 (Danyang, Nanjing, Wujin, Zhenjiang, via train) 17 (Hangzhou, Huzhou)

156 (Jiangyin), 30 (Huzhou) 794 ( Changzhou, Danyang, Nanjing, Zhenjiang), 150 (Haimen, Tongzhou) 0 0

Number sent to their native places

Source: “Shijie hongshizihui Wuxi fenhui jiuji gongzuo jianbao shi yue,” in Changtai banchu he Changzhou, Suzhou, Wuxi fenhui jiuji gongzuo baogao (SMA Q120-4-422), 56–69.

16 17 18 19 20

10 11 12 13 14 15

7 8 9

6

5

3 4

1 2

Date

Table 2 Number of refugees passing through Wuxi City, October 1937

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organizations in both the home and host cities. When disaster struck, they ­were one of a number of institutions that provided aid to cities across the region. At times, such aid was managed by the Nationalist Government, but some crises proved too much for local officials, whether in Shanghai, Wuxi, or elsewhere. Although the Chinese state appears weak, we should not judge it too harshly, since governments the world over have often proved in­effec­ tive in the face of natural disasters or war. Indeed, as we shall now see, the successful recovery of Wuxi under the Japa­nese occupation owed in part to the rapid revival of the same state structures that had driven urbanization during the Nanjing De­cade. It was their survival as well as the hard work of local elites with experience in urban management that ensured that, within a few short months, Wuxi came back to life, despite the devastation across the county.

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Threads of Silk Economic Recovery in Occupied Wuxi

In April 1939, Helen Scally posted a letter to her friends and relatives in the United States. A missionary who had first arrived in China just before the outbreak of the Anti-­Japanese War of Re­sis­tance, she had spent some time in Suzhou and Shanghai and had a brief furlough in Korea before being posted to Wuxi in the autumn of 1938. She described the city under the Japa­nese occupation. [Wuxi] is a town (?) of about 200,000 Chinese, several hundred Japa­nese soldiers (brief transients we’d like to believe), and fourteen Americans. . . . ​ It is surrounded by a high brick wall with great iron gates which are securely locked every night—­and sometimes during the day, as well, during these unsettled times when the Japa­nese sentries get ner­vous because of the activities of the many Chinese guerillas scattered all over this area. Our property is in the suburb (?) outside the South Gate. Recently about three hundred guerillas, so we are told, set fire to a large silk factory not far from us because the factory was being run in co-­operation with the Japa­nese. . . . ​ It is said that the “occupied” territory along the coast and railroads are ruled by the Japa­nese in the daytime and by the guerillas at night.1

Helen’s description indicates that, despite suffering from one of the most devastating invasions of the twentieth century, Wuxi recovered something of its prewar prosperity. The existence of the silk factory points to the revival of an industry that had been the bedrock of Wuxi’s development for so long. High walls, iron gates, and the location of Helen’s ­house in what she described as a suburb highlight how the urban fabric of the city was rebuilt. Finally, the locked gates, guerrilla attacks, and Japa­nese soldiers

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remind us that the city and the region as a ­whole ­were under enemy occupation. Each of the final three chapters of this book takes one of these themes as its subject. In them, I argue that, just as before 1937, industrialization and the developmental state continued to drive urbanization but that this now occurred within the context of the Japa­nese invasion and occupation. Although it is important not to underestimate the impact this had on Chinese society, as with the conflicts and natural disasters discussed in earlier chapters, they did not derail existing trajectories of change but ­were other mediating factors in their spatial manifestation in the city and the countryside. Researching this period poses many challenges, and although no historical source is completely objective, biases are often particularly prominent when expressed in times of conflict. This is especially true for the commonplace actions of the Chinese, which are the subject of these final chapters and are sometimes difficult to discern amid the tumult. It is partly for this reason that I do not dwell on the horrors that Japa­nese perpetrated on Chinese, something that has received much attention from scholars around the world.2 Instead, I am primarily concerned with how the Japa­nese occupation affected the everyday lives of Chinese as they sought to rebuild Wuxi. In view of this focus, a note on sources is appropriate. Archival rec­ords from Wuxi provide valuable insights into how Chinese local officials and residents dealt with the Japa­nese occupation. There is little criticism of the Japa­nese in these documents, but pacification agents, Japa­nese civilians tasked with the responsibility of restoring local government and the army, are mentioned when they ­were involved with rebuilding, and their absence in many of the sources strongly suggests there ­were tasks in which Chinese took the lead. I have also relied on a local newspaper, New Wuxi Daily (Xinxi ribao), which, apart from a two-­month hiatus in the autumn of 1938, was published continuously from January of that year until 1942. Established by the Self-­Government Committee (SGC), a group of Chinese local elites who ran the city between January and June 1938, it reported news and official announcements and was subject to Japa­nese censorship. Despite this, it contains a wealth of information on the activities of local officials, the silk industry, and the rebuilding of the city and provides rare insight into the first few months of the occupation. Japa­nese appear even less on its pages than in archival sources, although their occasional presence suggests that they ­were not as successful at fading into the background as Timothy Brook argues was the case in Jiading.3 Nonetheless, archival reports, newspaper sources, and Chinese and Japa­nese survey data

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provide strong evidence that it was Chinese who ­were primarily responsible for the rapid recovery and continuing urbanization of Wuxi. This certainly limited the extent to which the Japa­nese ­were able to monopolize regional industry, and as we shall see in chapter 8, Chinese officials ­were also sometimes able to intercede on behalf of locals in the face of enemy demands. To tell this story, I begin with the threads of silk that for de­cades had connected farming ­house­holds to the international economy. Torn during the invasion, they ­were rapidly woven anew in the first few months of 1938 and once more linked Wuxi to Shanghai. The city enjoyed a brief war­time boom, and Chinese and foreign firms had space to operate in the International Settlement, which remained free of Japa­nese occupation until the outbreak of the Asia-­Pacific War in 1941. Silk filatures and other industries continued to source their raw materials from the Lower Yangtze Delta, and this aided the recovery of the wider region. The Japa­nese established the Central China Development Company (CCDC) in 1938, which eventually acquired some control over Jiangnan’s major industries and infrastructure. Chinese producers ­were forced to sell their products at low prices to the CCDC, and trading restrictions made selling directly to foreign companies in the International Settlement dangerous. However, although economic activity across the region as a ­whole never returned to prewar levels, in the early years of the occupation the Lower Yangtze Delta experienced some prosperity.4 The Wuxi silk industry recovered as part of the Japa­nese war­time empire that, at its height, had a population of over 300 million people.5 However, it did so in a way that limited Japa­nese control. In the first few months of 1938, Chinese producers and local officials promoted sericulture. This meant that in the autumn of that year, when the Central China Sericulture Company (CCSC) was established to secure a monopoly over the industry, Japa­nese ­were only ever able to buy from cocoon brokers instead of farming ­house­holds directly. The CCSC consistently paid less than market price for its cocoons, so despite the risk, there was a healthy profit to be made from smuggling directly into the International Settlement. Profits ­were also to be made in the handicraft silk industry, which, despite the growth of large silk filatures in Shanghai and Wuxi, had prospered throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.6 During the war, handicraft production expanded in scale and became mechanized. This gave rise to a new industry of ­house­hold silk filatures. Although the quality of their silk was lower than that of either the CCSC-­or foreign-­owned filatures in Shanghai, they

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flourished in 1939 and 1940. Springing up around the county, they ­were a key part of the war­time urban fabric, carry­ing technology to remote towns and villages and providing employment for many women who before the invasion had worked in silk filatures in the city. As with the war­time movement of industry to peripheral areas in Zhejiang to avoid the Japa­nese threat, ­house­hold filatures drove the urbanization of the countryside.7 This reassessment of the history of the Wuxi silk industry strongly suggests that the first months of Japa­nese occupation should be characterized as more than simple economic plunder.8 There can be no doubt that the devastation of the invasion and the military’s seizure and control of industrial infrastructure had a massive impact on the regional economy, and it never recovered to prewar levels of production. However, exploring how local officials and Wuxi residents worked hard to get the silk industry back on its feet demonstrates that the economy recovered in the first few months of 1938 before the Japa­nese had time to establish systems of control. This limited the power of the Japa­nese to establish a total monopoly later in the occupation. Before turning to war­time urbanization, however, it is worth pausing briefly to dwell on the destruction of the city during those few tragic months in the autumn and winter of 1937.

The Invasion After encountering fierce re­sis­tance during the Battle of Shanghai, the Japa­ nese troops broke through the Chinese line at the end of October, and they advanced towards the war­time capital, Nanjing. Throughout, Japa­nese planes targeted major prewar sites of urban development such as factories, commercial centers, and transport hubs.9 Wuxi did not escape unscathed. The city was heavily bombed, and although the few remaining defenders closed the gates and blocked rivers with sandbags, on 25 November the Japa­nese blew a hole through the south gate and advanced up the main street in tanks.10 The invading army then engaged in the tragically familiar activities of arson, slaughter, and rape. Afterward, one Japa­nese soldier wrote, “the sky over Wuxi was filled with swirling clouds of black smoke that obscured the sun. . . . ​The flames leapt from intersection to intersection and from neighborhood to neighborhood until they burned themselves out.”11 Despite the brutality of the invasion, devastation was limited to specific locations in the city and the countryside. Local reporters and surveyors all described Wuxi’s former flourishing commercial and industrial district north of the city walls as burned to ash.12 However, not everything was obliter-

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ated. Eight out of thirteen silk cocoon ware­houses ­were destroyed or suffered heavy damage, with most of the remainder controlled by the Japa­nese army. Enemy soldiers w ­ ere also in charge of eigh­teen grain ware­houses, with the other twelve either burned or emptied by robbers. Of twenty-­three cotton spinning and weaving factories, ten suffered heavy damage or ­were totally destroyed, while six of twenty-­four silk filatures ­were also burned to the ground, with the rest suffering partial damage or occupied by the Japa­nese.13 No other cities in the region had anything like the industrial infrastructure of Shanghai or Wuxi, but in both Changzhou and Suzhou, some silk-­weaving factories and cotton mills survived intact, although soldiers often seized machinery and produce.14 Meanwhile, in the Wuxi countryside some towns and villages suffered terribly from the invasion, but others emerged relatively unscathed. This was because Japa­nese troops attacked Wuxi City from two directions, moving along the Shanghai-­Nanjing Road, which entered the county from Changshu to the northeast and along the railway line from Suzhou. After Wuxi was occupied, troops ­were sent along the Wuxi-­Jiangyin Road to prevent Chinese reinforcements from arriving.15 Of course, banditry and the rapid proliferation of anti-­Japanese guerrilla forces, many of which later became incorporated into the New Fourth Army, also affected agricultural production. However, enough of the prewar economic base survived for local officials, entrepreneurs, and farming ­house­holds to start rebuilding.

The Recovery of the Silk Industry Spring 1938: The Chinese at the Helm

Before the invasion, the silk industry in Wuxi had been slowly emerging from the slump caused by the Great Depression. Revival of international demand continued into the first half of 1940 and drove postwar growth. Raw silk exports from Shanghai dropped by over half in 1938 to 1.2 million pounds but had recovered to more than their 1937 level the following year and throughout 1939 and 1940 totaled more than 5.5 million pounds.16 The decline in 1938 is to be expected, but the invasion did not stop either farmers or officials in Wuxi from working to revive the industry as quickly as possible. For de­cades, this industry had kept the wolf from the door of thousands of families across the countryside, and the spring silkworm season followed quickly on the heels of the Japa­nese army as it left Wuxi to advance westward.

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The close involvement of local and then provincial-­level officials in the promotion of sericulture demonstrates that economic recovery was far from a top-­down Japanese-­managed pro­cess. There ­were certainly personnel problems at the local level, and the Japa­nese presence should never be forgotten, but if, as Timothy Brook has argued, Chinese ­were actively involved in the creation of puppet governments from the start, it follows that they ­were just as important to the re-­establishment of the local bureaucracy.17 I explore this in more detail in chapter 8, which describes how local officials rebuilt the urban fabric and rural infrastructure. Similarly, an explanation of how the Wuxi silk industry recovered should take heed of the actions of farming ­house­holds, local entrepreneurs, and officials, as well as the regulatory framework within which they worked. In March 1938, the SGC or­ga­nized a meeting of the Silk Filature Society, the Silkworm Cocoon Society, and the Silkworm Egg Society, and it was agreed that representatives of these three organizations should present a report within a month.18 Two days later, an or­ga­ni­za­tion was established to manage the revival of sericulture, but there is some confusion about its name: Surveyors refer to the Sericulture Direction Office (Canye Zhidaosuo, renamed the Canye Zhidao Banshichu after the establishment of the county government in June 1938, although this translates to much the same thing). However, the local newspaper refers to a Sericulture Improvement Direction Office (Canye Gaijin Zhidaosuo).19 Since both sources note that the provincial government appointed the same new director in June, we can conclude that they are talking about the same or­ga­ni­za­tion, which I refer to as the Sericulture Direction Office. Its leader was Qian Fenggao, the head of the Silk Filature Society. Born in 1888, he helped found the Yuchang Silk Filature in 1909 and went on to work in the industry for the rest of his life as well as holding positions in local and provincial government. Like Yang Hanxi, he had also spent a short time in Japan, which probably made him a logical choice for Japa­nese pacification agents as well.20 A meeting some days later began to shed light on the state of the silk industry after the invasion. Twenty-­eight of the thirty-­four egg breederies had survived, but concerns ­were raised at the rising price of silkworm egg cards. Despite this, representatives of the breederies asked the SGC to consider allowing exports to neighboring counties.21 Meanwhile, the Sericulture ­Direction Office set up several branches across Wuxi, including one in Dongting, even though the town had been all but burned to the ground during the invasion. On 9 April, a meeting was held to commemorate the commencement of work and was attended by local government officials, although

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apparently not by Japa­nese pacification agents. Those who attended discussed the importance of temperature control and disease prevention and decided on the location of rural branches.22 The Sericulture Direction Office continued to manage the industry. In mid-­April, it asked the SGC to ban the sale of unlicensed egg cards, and by the beginning of May over 15,000 ­house­holds had registered to engage in sericulture. Interestingly, their location confirms the spatially differentiated impact of the invasion. For example, northwest of the city in Beixia, Huais­ ere registered. hang, and Huaixia, fewer than 500 ­house­holds per ward w This compared with over 1,500 in Taibo and nearly 2,000 in Yangming, which, being south of the city, ­were relatively untouched by the violence.23 Figures on cocoon production in the spring of 1938 differ, with local newspaper reports putting it at between 50 percent and 70 percent of the previous year, while the Wuxi branch of the Japa­nese army’s Special Ser­v ices Department recorded 43,410 dan, compared to 44,060 dan in 1936.24 The true total is probably closer to the Chinese figure, but given the scale of devastation only four months earlier, the recovery of sericulture in Wuxi was remarkably rapid. Much of the credit for this must go to local officials, not to mention the farmers. After being nurtured, silkworm cocoons ­were sold to brokers, the next link in the supply chain. The Sericulture Direction Office was closely involved in their or­ga­ni­za­tion and in early May contacted local public offices and the Cocoon Brokers’ Association asking for a report on losses of buildings and equipment.25 Two weeks later, it petitioned the SGC to agree to regulations governing registration, which stipulated that brokers had to provide their names and addresses, a description of equipment, and the number of cocoons pro­cessed and pay a fee to branch offices. They ­were also required to pay a cocoon improvement fee of 3 yuan per dan of dried cocoons, which was passed on to the SGC and was an important source of revenue in the early months of the occupation.26 Registration ceased on 27 May, with the Sericulture Direction Office reporting 109 brokers, although a Japa­nese army survey put the figure at 114, down from 210 the previous spring.27 There is no evidence that either the Japa­nese army or pacification agents ­were directly involved in registration, and, after the establishment of the CCSC, it tried to control the industry through price controls, although this was delegated to the new Ministry of Commerce. In 1938 prices ­were set at the 1935 level of 21 yuan per dan of fresh cocoons, which was the lowest price ever recorded in Wuxi.28 The Japa­nese failed to keep the price down throughout the occupation, as the continuously buoyant market for silk combined

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with multiple sales channels to drive up prices at which ­house­holds could sell their cocoons. Indeed, in the summer of 1938, they ­were already fetching between 25 yuan and 35 yuan per dan.29 The lack of direct Japa­nese involvement in the revival of sericulture between March and May 1938 meant that after they established the CCSC, they ­were faced with a complex marketing system, managed by Chinese local officials. It was this that was to limit the extent to which the Japa­nese ­were able to monopolize the silk industry. Summer 1938: Early Japa­nese Involvement

The Japa­nese did not hold any of the threads of silk until cocoons began to be funneled into Wuxi filatures in the early summer of 1938, and from the outset the international environment proved important. In Japan, the Japa­ nese Central Silk Society was concerned about competition and in December 1937 recommended strict controls over the Chinese silk industry. The result was the formation of the Sino-­Japanese Silk Corporation in the first week of April 1938, which within a few months was re-­organized into the CCSC.30 Meanwhile, in Wuxi it was proving difficult to reopen silk filatures. Destruction of property had been exacerbated by Xue Shouxuan’s flight to the United States and the collapse of his monopoly over silk production. Instead, the Japa­nese turned to Zhang Zizhen, the son of Zhang Kuibo, who for a few short weeks in December 1937 had been the head of the SGC. Before the invasion, Zhang Zizhen had managed the Yuantaifeng Silk Filature, and now he returned to the city from the relatively peaceful village of Nanfangquan to take charge of the Huimin Silk Filature Company alongside Qian Fenggao.31 The formation of this company reveals some of the problems that Wuxi industrialists faced when trying to work with the Japa­nese. Although in some cases working for a Japa­nese company during the occupation may point to active collaboration, it should also be seen as highlighting how these Chinese industrialists wanted to get the city back on its feet as quickly as possible. Archival and newspaper sources in Wuxi first mention the Japa­nese in connection with the silk industry in May 1938. Shirasawa Shigeru, the head of the Japanese Pacification Team, met with local officials and managers of silk filatures. He announced that eight Japa­nese with relevant experience would arrive in the city within a few days to inspect the factories and envisaged that three or four filatures would open under Japa­nese management. In fact, by the end of May, when the Huimin Silk Filature Company

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was formally established, five filatures ­were open in Wuxi.32 A Chinese report written on the silk industry a few years later valued it at 300,000 yuan, with 51 percent of the investment coming from the Japa­nese, while Chinese provided the remainder, although Chinese factories and machinery had already been confiscated. Although the head of the company was Japa­nese, Chinese managed the individual factories. Over the next three months, a further three filatures ­were reopened, and together they heated up some 2,500 cauldrons and gave 7,500 workers jobs.33 The Huimin Silk Filature Company marked the return of industrial silk production to Wuxi City, but there ­were problems with the cocoon supply, something that would plague the CCSC throughout its existence. Figures on production and the use of cocoons dating from the summer of 1938 may not be reliable, but they indicate the general trend. Of the 14,969 dan of dried cocoons that the 114 cocoon brokers bought that spring, 6,100 dan ­were sent to silk filatures in the International Settlement and 369 ­were used by individual ­house­holds, leaving the rest for the Huimin Silk Filature Company.34 From the start, the Japa­nese never had complete control over cocoon purchasing, because from that first spring silkworm season in 1938, they faced competition from ­house­hold filatures across Wuxi as well as factories in the International Settlement. By the end of 1938, forty-­five silk filatures ­were operating in unoccupied Shanghai, and they ­were hungry for cocoons.35 That spring, representatives of foreign firms ­were seen in Wuxi trying to buy cocoons, and although movement around the region gradually became easier, guerrilla activity in the countryside and taxation of commodities made smuggling lucrative.36 During the invasion, Yuan Duanfu, a former cocoon purchaser for the Yongtai Silk Filature, fled to Hetangqiao in Jiangyin, where farmers ­were drying and storing cocoons. Meanwhile, the manager of Jardine’s silk filatures, Zhu Jing`an, was on the lookout for raw materials. So the two men, who had worked together before the invasion, began to supply cocoons for filatures in Shanghai. Yuan was responsible for shipping them to a port in Changshu and established brokers in Zhangjingqiao, north of Wuxi City on the border of Jiangyin and out of the way of Japa­nese troops. Indeed, so remote was this town that it later became a base for Chinese guerrillas. In the spring of 1938, approximately 1,000 sacks of cocoons, each weighing 60 jin, ­were collected from neighboring farmers and shipped through Jiangyin to Changshu, where they ­were transferred to a boat flying the British flag, which was supposedly safe from Japa­nese attacks. Business flourished, and within a few short weeks, Yuan was running twenty brokers on the Wuxi-­Jiangyin

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border, while Jardine’s was able to set up a temporary office and ware­house in Changshu. In all, 20,000 sacks of dried cocoons ­were shipped to Shanghai along this route during the spring of 1938.37 Smuggling remained a major source of cocoons for foreign filatures and a thorn in the side of the Japa­ nese in their attempts to establish a monopoly over Jiangnan silk production that was not stopped until the qingxiang campaigns three years later. The figures for cocoon sales for the spring of 1938 record that ­house­hold filatures bought a paltry 369 dan of cocoons. Given the extent of devastation in Wuxi, it is not surprising that it took a few months for what was essentially a brand new industry to become established. House­holds in the countryside may not have been able to increase the scale of their production and set up filatures in the first few months of the occupation, but in the city it was a different matter. In the spring of 1938, there w ­ ere ten such filatures, and by the autumn their number rapidly expanded to between forty and fifty. Concentrated around the south gate, most comprised just six or seven reeling machines and a few workers. They ­were so pop­u­lar that the price of a reeling machine increased from 25 yuan to 40 yuan within a month, while their need for fuel to heat cauldrons resulted in a shortage throughout the city and necessitated the burning of cocoon husks. Considering that profits ­were as high as 270 yuan per dan, it is not surprising that ­house­hold filatures prospered.38 As one commentator remarked, they “are a new flourishing type of commerce in the city. Established on a shoestring, they provide stable employment to those who have lost their jobs.39 Comparatively low cocoon production in 1938, smuggling, and the low prices at which the Japa­nese attempted to buy cocoons left Wuxi filatures short of raw materials. In May the Sino-­Japanese Silk Corporation responded by trying to prevent dried cocoons from being exported from the county.40 A further problem was the army’s control over ware­houses, which not only prevented silk filatures from buying stored cocoons but tied up commodities that banks, companies, and individuals ­were storing as collateral for loans. In January 1938, an employee of the Wuxi branch of the Shanghai Commercial Savings Bank reported that the army had seized cocoons, cotton, and a variety of other commodities held in several ware­houses across the city. The following month, the SGC began negotiations but was not even allowed into ware­houses to inspect what goods remained after the invasion.41 Talks continued, and in May SGC officials, pacification agents, and representatives of thirteen ware­houses agreed that dried cocoons could be sold only to the Sino-­Japanese Silk Corporation, unless they ­were collateral for loans, in which case the army should return them.42

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Problems continued over the summer, and in some cases cocoons ­were simply confiscated. For example, over three days at the end of June, soldiers walked into the Hongren Ware­house and seized nearly 5,000 sacks of dried cocoons, although they ­were kind enough to draw up a list of what they had taken. Among the companies to lose stock was the Yongtai Silk Filature in Shanghai.43 The following month, Wang Yingji wrote to the county government stating that in the autumn of 1937 he had bought over 800 sacks of dried cocoons and deposited them in the ware­house of the Agricultural Bank of China. During the invasion, he fled Jiangsu, incurring great hardship and expense throughout his temporary exile. When he returned to Wuxi to sell his cocoons, he discovered that the ware­house had been occupied by the army. He asked the county magistrate to intercede on his behalf and help him recover half his stock.44 Wang was far from the only person whose goods ­were seized, and the municipal authorities received similar requests from rice mill own­ers to help them recover their goods, some of which ­were eventually returned.45 The situation also improved for the Shanghai Commercial Savings Bank, which began to ship its goods to Shanghai in May, although many cocoons had already been confiscated by the Japa­nese army.46 It is clear from these examples that the army engaged in some plunder, and this was in part responsible for difficulties newly established silk filatures faced in securing cocoons. However, to characterize the first months of the occupation in this way as a w ­ hole obscures the very real progress that Chinese officials achieved in the countryside supporting sericulture. By May 1938, when the first silk filatures reopened, so well entrenched was this marketing system that it made no sense for the Japa­nese to expend limited resources on interfering directly with sericulture.

The Wuxi Silk Industry, 1938–1941 The Central China Sericulture Company

The CCSC was established in August 1938 with a total capitalization of 8 million yuan, of which 2 million yuan was made up of Chinese plants and the rest cash from Japa­nese companies. The CCSC’s remit was to control silk production and prevent Chinese competition with Japan.47 It tried to establish a monopoly through a system of direct management and licensing of cocoon brokers and setting purchase prices for cocoons. Individual brokers, regardless of whether they ­were controlled directly by the CCSC or merely licensed to provide it with cocoons, sold them to both company

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and ­house­hold filatures, which ­were also registered with the Chinese authorities. CCSC filatures simply reeled the silk and shipped it to Shanghai, where it was mostly exported, while ­house­hold filatures w ­ ere allowed to sell only to approved buyers, also normally in Shanghai.48 This system increased the flow of cocoons to CCSC filatures, and their number in Wuxi ­rose to twelve in 1939. At its height, the war­time silk industry employed 20,000 people in the city, although its revival was short-­ lived, as one filature closed in 1940 and a further eight closed between October and December 1941.49 However, the recovery was regional in scope, as there ­were twenty CCSC filatures in Jiangsu and Zhejiang in 1939 and twenty-­four in 1940. Production was 17,276 pieces of raw silk in 1939, rising to 26,448 in 1940 but falling to 15,298 pieces in 1941 and 6,953 pieces in 1942.50 Most of the CCSC silk was then exported, and from 1938 to 1940 over 90 percent went to the United States, with much of the remainder finding its way to En­gland. After 1941, the ban on silk exports to the United States caused the significantly reduced amount of CCSC silk to be exported to India. However, further decline led the company to dissolve in May 1943, although there was a brief attempt to revive the silk industry the following year.51 These figures illustrate that although more stringent Japa­nese control of the regional economy may have had some impact on the silk industry, its death knell was sounded by the outbreak of the war in the Pacific. Indeed, the bombing of Pearl Harbor in December 1941 marked the end of Shanghai’s war­time boom, because the  U.S. embargo on exports from Japanese-­ controlled territories killed off much of the market for Chinese-­made products, and the silk industry in Japan also suffered.52 Between the autumn of 1938 and the winter of 1941 the CCSC was a major purchaser of cocoons, but it was only partly responsible for the industry’s revival. In the Wuxi countryside, Chinese authorities continued to take the lead in managing sericulture and cocoon broker registration, and even as the 1938 spring silkworm season ended, they ­were already making plans for the autumn. In early June, the Sericulture Direction Office proposed an expansion of its work with ­house­holds to improve cocoon quality.53 Meanwhile, the newly established provincial government published guidelines on methods of egg rearing and inspection of disease rates and announced a ban on imports of eggs from outside the province.54 The result of this was that by the end of August, the Sericulture Direction Office had seven permanent branches across the Wuxi countryside and employed over a hundred people.55 Each was normally responsible for between 150 and 200 ­house­holds, and during the autumn silkworm season a further 50 to 70 temporary

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branches ­were added, stretching from Nanfangquan in the south to Bashiqiao in the northeast.56 Provincial direction of sericulture continued into 1939, and the following spring 90 temporary branches ­were added to what had now become 8 permanent branches, which together employed nearly 500 people.57 That December, the head of the Jiangsu Ministry of Construction applauded the role of the provincial government in reviving the industry. He urged personnel to help ­house­holds repair and improve equipment over the winter months and fertilize mulberry bushes. The provincial government also ­demanded reports of mulberry bush acreage, the number of ­house­holds engaging in sericulture, and total cocoon production over the year.58 The following spring, the Wuxi County Construction Bureau agreed to apply provincial rules for sericulture production and produced lists of officials working across the county. In March, licenses ­were granted to those wishing to engage in sericulture, reports ­were sent to the provincial government, and that autumn temporary branches ­were again established across the county.59 Interestingly, there is no record of the continuation of this policy into 1941, although as the industry declined, it was increasingly returned to Chinese management.60 It is clear that throughout the occupation, Wuxi officials ­were in charge of sericulture registration and such reform as there was. Furthermore, guidelines and licensing presented no hindrance to continued recovery of production, and the number of brokers also grew rapidly to pro­cess the deluge of cocoons destined for silk filatures, whether CCSC controlled or not. Cocoon brokers ­were either run directly by the CCSC or in­de­pen­dent and under license to sell to the Japa­nese. In the autumn of 1938, eighty CCSC brokers pro­cessed 7,290 dan of cocoons, and  15,950 dan passed through 164 in­de­pen­dent brokers.61 Figures differ for spring 1939, with Chinese surveys recording between 314 and 350 brokers across the occupied area in central China as a ­whole. By contrast, the CCSC itself esti­ ere 374 brokers, increasing to 744 the following year, before mated there w falling to 337 in 1941, although the number of them ­rose again in 1942.62 Of the 374 brokers operating across Jiangnan in 1939, 295 ­were in Wuxi, the majority contracted to the CCSC, leaving only 37 as completely in­de­pen­ dent operations.63 The CCSC clearly had more control over cocoon brokers than over sericulture in the countryside, but Chinese authorities ­were also involved in the registration pro­cess, and the provincial government derived some tax revenue from them, although in practice it proved difficult to collect.64

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Regardless of whether individual brokers ­were registered, the price at which they sold cocoons to the CCSC was set by the Chinese authorities, although this was done at the behest of the Japa­nese. The Cocoon Price Consultation Committee (Jianjia Pingyi Weiyuanhui) was composed of local and national officials, representatives from the CCSC, and members of the Japa­ nese army.65 Throughout the occupation, the CCSC paid less than market price. For example, in the spring of 1939, it bought cocoons at between 47 yuan and 65 yuan per dan, rising to 230 yuan the following year for cocoons from non-­improved eggs.66 Meanwhile, the market price of cocoons for 1939 was 100 yuan and increased fourfold the following year.67 The main demand-­ side reason for this was the continuing buoyancy of silk prices, but complaints about high mulberry leaf prices in 1939 and 1940 also point to a shortage of raw materials.68 Mulberry leaf production had been declining since the Great Depression, and where land had not been converted back to rice or wheat, farmers invested less of their labor in the crop.69 Although other more direct factors, such as the destruction of mulberry trees during the invasion, ­were also likely to have reduced output, this long-­term change in land usage is important. Indeed, the extent of the recovery in sericulture after the invasion is illustrated by the fact that 1939 and 1940 ­were the only years between 1929 and 1949 when farmers invested more labor on mulberry leaf production than rice, although even this could not prevent prices from rising.70 This disparity between Japanese-­imposed prices and those commanded elsewhere led to an explosion of unauthorized selling, creating tensions with the CCSC, which came to a head in 1941. That spring, the cold weather affected sericulture, and there ­were reports that cocoon production was 30 percent lower than in the previous year.71 At the same time, the number of brokers massively increased. In 1941, 200 supplied directly to the CCSC while a further 100 ­were registered with the Chinese Government. However, approximately 1,000 underground brokers ­were operating across the countryside, mainly in areas that ­were not beset with guerrilla or bandit activity. This made the scramble for cocoons particularly fierce.72 Throughout the spring of 1941, prices ­rose quickly. According to Japa­nese figures, 1 dan of improved fresh cocoons cost between 150 yuan and 228 yuan, and at the end of May the local newspaper reported prices of up to 180 yuan.73 In some parts of the county, particularly in the south, where production was strong, prices remained at this level, but elsewhere they ­rose rapidly, and by the first week of June had reached 260 yuan. The situation with dried cocoons was

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even more pronounced and was made worse by the increasing number of ­house­holds prepared to dry their own in the search for higher profits.74 High demand caused the price to rise above what the CCSC was prepared to pay, which created problems for registered brokers. Before the sericulture season started, they had issued IOUs to farming ­house­holds in an effort to secure supply. The CCSC was prepared to pay cocoon brokers only between 1,050 yuan and 1,100 yuan per dan of dried cocoons depending on their quality. This price was insufficient for them to meet their debts, and they demanded 1,100 yuan or 1,200 yuan per dan. The CCSC believed that because brokers had arbitrarily raised their prices, they had to bear the cost and refused to pay, which resulted in protests from farming ­house­holds. Upon hearing this, representatives of the brokers traveled to the headquarters of the CCSC in Shanghai, but no resolution to the dispute was found, and even the intercession of the local authorities in Wuxi could not resolve the conflict.75 The situation in the Wuxi countryside in 1941 illustrates the extent to which a market in sericulture limited Japa­nese control over this industry, as foreign and Chinese-­owned enterprises in the International Settlement and the rapidly expanding ­house­hold filature industry continued to compete with the CCSC for cocoons. According to Japa­nese surveyors, total dried cocoon production in Wuxi in the spring of 1939 was 25,000 dan. Of this, 18,000 dan was taken up by CCSC filatures in Wuxi, 3,000 dan by ­house­hold filatures, 2,000 dan went straight to filatures in Shanghai, and the rest went to guerrillas.76 This means that Wuxi brokers sold only 70 percent of their stock to the CCSC, and this pattern was repeated across the occupied area of central China, where the company never purchased more than 50 percent of the cocoons.77 Indeed, statistics from thirteen counties supplying Wuxi filatures record that 65,450 dan of cocoons ­were produced in the spring of 1939, of which 28,450 dan (45 percent) went to CCSC filatures in Wuxi, 6,500 dan (10 percent) to ­house­hold filatures in the county, and 9,800 dan (15 percent) to filatures in the International Settlement, leaving 20,700 dan (30 percent) for guerrillas.78 The figures reflect the geo­graph­i­cal limits of Japa­nese control. In the counties of Wujin and Danyang, for instance, the CCSC bought nearly 70 percent of dried cocoons, with the rest purchased by ­house­hold filatures or smuggled to Shanghai. In Jiangyin, perhaps because the county was on the Yangtze, making it easier to avoid Japa­nese travel restrictions, 5,000 dan of the 7,800 dan of dried cocoons produced there went to filatures in the International Settlement. Other parts of Jiangnan ­were guerrilla territory.

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In Liyang, directly east of Lake Tai, guerrillas bought all 10,000 dan of cocoons from the spring harvest.79 This description of the war­time silk industry demonstrates that Japa­nese control was limited in two main ways. First, Chinese authorities ­were responsible for the recovery and regulation of sericulture and cocoon brokers throughout the occupation. The second reason was closely connected to this and concerns the failure of price controls. Quite simply, the existence of buyers other than the CCSC ensured that the market price remained above what the company was willing to pay, and until the qingxiang campaigns in 1941, neither the Japa­nese military nor the Chinese civilian authorities had the power to stop smuggling to Shanghai or selling to ­house­hold filatures. This gave rise to a ­whole new industry. House­hold Filatures and Rural Industrialization

In 1939 and 1940, ­house­hold filatures spread rapidly across the Wuxi countryside, but handicraft silk production continued. In July 1939 the “Provisional Method for the Ministry of Commerce to Manage the Handicraft Silk Trade” (Shiyebu guanli shougong zhisiye zanxing banfa) was announced. It stipulated that all operations using more than three cauldrons had to apply for a license, that only Chinese could operate them, and that unless producers had special permission, they could not export their silk. Unsurprisingly, it remained small in scale, because operations with more than twenty cauldrons or that had any mechanical equipment ­were specifically not covered under these regulations. A 1941 survey confirms the continued existence of handicraft silk production. It recorded 6,000 wooden silk-­reeling machines in 3,000 ­house­holds around Tangtou. Clearly, these small-­scale producers ­were able to find a market for their admittedly rough silk.80 Many producers increased the scale of their production, and in June 1940, Wang Jingwei’s Reor­ga­nized Government passed the Provisional Regulations for the Ministry of Commerce to Manage Small-­Scale Silk Filatures (Gongshangbu guanli xiaoxing zhisi gongchang zanxing guize). The fact that regulations designed specifically to manage ­house­hold filatures ­were now required attests to the rapidity of their expansion. The regulations noted that most filatures used old-­style wooden silk-­reeling machines but allowed for investment in new equipment, provided that individual silk filatures had fewer than twenty cauldrons. Groups of investors ­were allowed to set up only one filature, and the total number of cauldrons in ­house­hold filatures in any one province could not surpass those in CCSC factories. Filatures

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­ ere permitted to purchase only a small number of cocoons, ­were prevented w from exporting silk themselves, and had to apply for transport licenses from the local army headquarters to ship silk to weaving factories. The Wang Jingwei Government also stipulated that they should not pay more than the agreed price for cocoons.81 Despite these restrictions, the number of ­house­hold filatures grew rapidly through 1939 and 1940, although because not all filatures registered with the provincial government, some ­were very short-­lived, and because parts of the county remained inaccessible, figures are unreliable. Japa­nese surveyors investigated 141 filatures in 1940, 117 of which ­were registered with the county government, leaving 24 unregistered. They estimated that 179 filatures had not been surveyed, of which 139 ­were registered, making for a total of 320 in Wuxi.82 As their numbers grew, they became more or­ga­nized. A House­hold Silk Filature Association was established, although it did little beyond enforcing official guidelines. At packed annual meetings in 1939 and 1940, its leaders warned against buying cocoons at anything above the price agreed with the CCSC.83 As this industry grew, ­house­hold filatures came to define the war­time urbanizing landscape in Wuxi. In the city, they ­were clustered around the south gate, with a few to the east and west, but, unlike before the war, there was almost no development to the north.84 The addition of this new industry to Wuxi’s industrial fabric did not please everyone. In 1940, complaints arose that a ­house­hold filature was polluting the area in front of a school. After an investigation by local police, it was told that only if all waste was removed from the site would its license be renewed. This prompted the local magistrate to threaten to revoke licenses from other filatures that w ­ ere 85 a threat to public health and safety. Outside the city, they proliferated. The map depicts their distribution throughout the countryside and shows a slight preponderance towards the south of the city, where cocoons ­were of a higher quality and fetched a higher price. The map shown in Figure 6, which was compiled by Japa­nese surveyors, is probably incomplete because of the difficulty of accessing those parts of the county controlled by guerrillas. In some areas, the new industry was so prolific that it radically altered the look and feel of towns and villages. Despite government regulations that barred individuals from owning more than one filature, it was common. In the town of Anzhen, Zhang Enshen set up a filature with thirty-­t wo looms in 1938, but guerrilla activity forced its closure soon afterward, so he moved operations to the city, where over the next few years, in partnership with different entrepreneurs, he

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Figure 6 ​Map of Wuxi County with known clusters of ­house­hold filatures. Source: ­Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha, Chōsabu, Mushaku kōgyō jittai chōsa hōkokusho, 52.

established five separate filatures, all with more than the regulation twenty looms. Meanwhile, the smuggler Yuan Duanfu opened several filatures and hired former Yongtai workers to run them.86 Rural filatures tended to be cruder affairs than their urban counterparts but ­were generally larger. Of the ninety filatures surveyed in the city, sixty had fewer than twenty cauldrons and only seven had more than fifty, but in the countryside, of the four filatures surveyed, three had between fifty and a hundred cauldrons.87 The production pro­cess was simple, and the silk produced was of inferior quality. In both the city and the countryside, tiger stoves ­were more likely to be used to heat the cauldrons, although electricity was common in both areas.88 House­hold filatures quickly became a major employer of women in par­tic­u­lar, although there ­were children, some as young as eleven: 7,241 women worked in the ninety filatures surveyed in the city and 789 in the four that Japa­nese ­were able to inspect in the countryside. Many of those women employed at rural filatures had probably worked in Wuxi City before the war, and the ­house­hold filature industry now offered them a way of using their skills. Wages ­were generally higher

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than at CCSC-­run factories, which was doubtless an incentive to stay in the villages. It is interesting to speculate that some may have done so out of a patriotic wish not to work for the Japa­nese, but there is no evidence to support this. We know a little about life in the filatures. Employees lived in segregated dormitories, w ­ ere provided with food, and worked both day and night shifts. Days ­were typically twelve hours long with two breaks.89 While we cannot be sure that all filatures ran on such a regular timetable, clearly their expansion not only carried skills and technology into the countryside but brought with it the rhythms of urban factory life. Silk was not the only industry to recover in Wuxi. Cotton, flour, and rice mills, ironworks, and a host of other factories reopened. The course of revival was never smooth, but during the occupation, the city regained its prewar identity as the largest regional industrial center outside Shanghai. However, for three years after the invasion, just as it had been before, silk remained the key industry in the city. Even amid the Japa­nese attempt to establish a monopoly on production, travel restrictions, and problems with mulberry leaf supply, links to international markets via Shanghai provided the context in which the industry recovered. Exploring how Chinese officials took responsibility for its early revival and how this prevented the Japa­nese from having total control over cocoon purchasing also exposes the limits of occupation. It was in the space at the bottom of the supply chain that ­house­hold filatures flourished in Wuxi, and this meant that industrialization continued to drive urbanization in the countryside. Of course, this occurred against the background of the Japa­nese invasion and occupation, but it did not derail what was now an unstoppable force. Such continuity also characterized the rebuilding of the urban fabric and rural infrastructure.

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The Utility of Rubble Rebuilding the City and the Countryside

In the summer of 1941, just as the economic recovery was beginning to feel like a paper tiger and the qingxiang campaigns ­were beginning, Wei Sheke, the head of the Wuxi Construction Bureau, remained optimistic. The population of the county had almost recovered its prewar level of 1 million, and Wei believed that this meant “when it comes to administration, although there is no city in name, there is one in fact.”1 In saying this, he was referring to the dissolution of the Wuxi Municipal Planning Department over a de­cade before. He recognized that the WMPD had made great strides in urban development, but it had failed to nurture the level of consciousness necessary for the inhabitants of the city to become urban citizens. For this reason, Wuxi, unlike Nanjing, Shanghai, and Wuhan, had not been given in­de­pen­dent municipal status. However, Wuxi’s recovery gave Wei hope that, with concrete plans for further expansion—­including road construction, building of a work­house, public graves, running water and other municipal ser­v ices, as well as further urban zoning—­the city could finally gain autonomy.2 Wei’s sentiments echo those of Rong Desheng, Xue Mingjian, and Sun Zuji before the Japa­nese invasion. In this chapter, I argue that Chinese local officials ­were responsible for the rebuilding, continued development, and management of the urban fabric and rural infrastructure. They ­were motivated by prewar discourses surrounding the role of the developmental state in the urbanization of China and worked within a regulatory framework that continued provincial oversight of local affairs. Of course, they also faced the reality of Japa­nese occupation, but enemy troops and pacification agents rarely concerned themselves directly with the minutiae of building ­houses or roads. Exceptions ­were made for projects that had military value, which

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drove the construction of rural communications infrastructure. Investigating war­time urbanization not only reveals continuities with the prewar era but highlights the limited nature of enemy control over the Lower Yangtze Delta. We still know remarkably little about the impact of the occupation on the politics and society of Jiangnan, and although some general accounts are available on Japa­nese investment in regional transport infrastructure, outside Shanghai and Nanjing, few detailed descriptions have been written on how individual cities ­were rebuilt.3 The growing literature on Chinese puppet regimes focuses on collaboration and state-­building and highlights continuities with prewar trends, but for the most part, it does not investigate the actions of local officials.4 The work of Timothy Brook and Pan Min is an exception to this, and both scholars argue that the state had some power at the local level, although even where Chinese officials did not have to defer to Japa­nese interests, the legacy of the invasion, age, inexperience, or just plain corruption or laziness meant that they ­were often in­effec­tive.5 I build on this work and argue that not only ­were Chinese local officials in Wuxi adept at managing the rebuilding of their city but they w ­ ere also able to implement prewar plans for expansion. This continuity is not as surprising as it may seem at first glance. After all, as Brook points out, people in Jiangnan “pursued livelihoods, paid taxes, raised and schooled their children, and worked within the institutions and regulations of the occupation state much as they had done under the Republican state.” 6

The Revival of Local Government in Wuxi Like economic recovery, the revival of state institutions in the immediate aftermath of the invasion occurred predominantly at the local level. Japa­ nese set up Peace Maintenance Committees, which ­were gradually replaced with Self-­Government Committees—ad hoc creations, headed and staffed by former Beiyang and Nationalist officials as well as a variety of other local elites.7 An effective central administration emerged only after the collaborationist Great Way (Dadao) Government in Shanghai, which had been established on 5 December 1937, was replaced with the Reformed Government, led by Liang Hongzhi a former Beiyang official, which was set up in Nanjing on 28 March 1938.8 This government quickly began to assert itself over the region. The puppet Jiangsu provincial government was established in Suzhou on 23 May, headed by the former Beiyang official Chen Zimin, and was followed by administrations in Zhejiang and Anhui. Below the

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provincial level, SGCs ­were replaced with public offices, and after a brief dalliance with abolishing wards and having only towns and villages below the county, the prewar system of local administration was revived. Magistrates presided over a bureaucracy that had responsibility for construction, education, and finance, among other things, while the Great People’s Association (Damin hui), a propaganda or­ga­ni­za­tion run out of the Ministry of Interior, attempted to garner support for the new regime with propaganda based loosely on Sun Yatsen’s ideas.9 Wang Jingwei’s Reor­ga­nized National Government based in Nanjing replaced the Reformed Government in March 1940. Wang was influenced by Sun and espoused pan-­Asian anti-­Western imperialism mixed with notions of modernity and constitutionalism.10 This ideological consistency at the top was matched by administrative continuity at the local level, as the prewar bureaucracy was restored in full, with county governors replacing magistrates. Indeed, in 1941 and 1942 amendments to the 1930 city and county or­ga­ni­za­tion laws confirmed the status of Nanjing and Shanghai as special cities. Just as before the invasion, they ­were supposed to have self-­government organizations, although they never materialized. Meanwhile, county governors ­were given a number of responsibilities, ranging from ­house­hold registration (hukou) surveys to reforming local customs, although they ­were answerable to the province.11 It took time for the new central government to establish its authority, and the pro­cess of transition from one administration to another did not always run smoothly. Some local elites ­were reluctant to give up power that they had gained as members of SGCs, and after the creation of the Reor­ga­ nized National Government, many also attempted to resist directives from above. In 1939, the puppet Jiangsu provincial government still had control over only twenty-­five counties, and although after the establishment of the Reor­ga­nized National Government this number increased to forty-­one, it was still below the prewar figure of sixty-­one. Where effective government was established, it was often difficult to find members of the local elite willing to take the lead, especially after five county heads ­were assassinated between October 1939 and December 1940 alone, and lower-­level personnel ­were often incompetent and corrupt.12 Wuxi certainly suffered from some of these problems—­for instance, a county magistrate was assassinated in the spring of 1940. However, the speed with which the city recovered supports the argument that the Chinese collaborationist state was effective and legitimate.

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The Japa­nese invasion devastated the urban fabric of Wuxi, but it is worth reiterating that the effects of arson, bombing, and looting ­were most severe north of the city walls. After the invasion, officials, businessmen, and local notables who had not fled ­were faced with a daunting task in getting the city back on its feet. The first few months of 1938 ­were crucial in setting the trajectory for the rest of the occupation, and the experience that many local officials had in municipal government before the war may be the reason that Wuxi recovered more rapidly than neighboring cities. Locals actually entered into negotiations with the Japa­nese army before Shirasawa Shigeru, the head of the Japa­nese Pacification Team, arrived on the scene on 7 December. He was to stay in Wuxi until February the following year, when he was replaced by Nimura Minoru.13 Meanwhile, the SGC was formed on 10 December and initially led by Yang Weizhang, a member of the local elite, although he was quickly replaced with Yang Hanxi.14 Over the next six months, Yang Hanxi used his prewar experience in governing the city in times of crisis to good effect. He eventually became an official in Wang Jingwei’s government and, because of his war­time activities, was later branded as a collaborator and died in Taiwan in 1960.15 In January 1938, he was joined by other local notables and businessmen, one of whom was Qin Lianggong, whom the provincial government would appoint as Wuxi magistrate a few months later.16 In Wuxi, the local bureaucracy was re-­established before the Reformed Government was formed, and in January the SGC published an outline of its or­ga­ni­za­tion and responsibilities. Other than the executive council, it had bureaus of social affairs, finance, and public works and controlled the police. Its responsibilities therefore covered everything from ­house­hold registration surveys to cleaning the streets and managing agricultural production.17 Unfortunately, there is no record of the discussions that presumably occurred between Yang Hanxi and Shirasawa Shigeru, but the delegation of such a wide range of responsibilities to local Chinese officials was entirely in keeping with the outline for pacification work, which envisaged SGCs taking over the minutiae of local administration on behalf of the Japa­ nese.18 Beginning with the very early days of the occupation, pacification agents gave Chinese officials both legitimacy and space within which to govern. This would have been impossible without the acquiescence of the people of Wuxi, but they also recognized the SGC and then the county magistrate as legitimate authorities and realized that officials had some power to address problems and intercede on their behalf with the enemy.

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After its establishment, the SGC set about or­ga­niz­ing local bureaucracy. Regulations published on 4 January 1938 stipulated that public offices would be revived, and two weeks later the former ward heads who had not fled westward ­were invited to a meeting in Wuxi.19 By mid-­February, local government was up and running. For example, officials in Jingyun, Beixia, and Yangming submitted a list of township heads to the SGC for its approval. Then, across Jingyun, officials ­were ordered to bury the remains of people and animals and hand over weapons to the Japa­nese army.20 In March, the Number One Public Office, whose assistant head was Silk Filature Association leader Qian Fenggao, held its first meeting, in the same office that it had occupied before the war. Officials discussed clearing rivers in the city and improving the quality of drinking water.21 Local bureaucracy continued to expand throughout the rest of the year. In addition to the wards, there ­were 18 public offices in the city, while in the countryside there ­were over 400 village-­level offices, each staffed by 2 officials.22 They gradually became incorporated into the provincial bureaucracy. On 1 June 1938, Wuxi native Qin Lianggong, formerly an official in the Beiyang Government, was appointed county magistrate. Despite some administrative changes, transfer of power proceeded smoothly.23 Three weeks after his appointment, Qin attended a ceremony to mark the establishment of the new government. While the event was obviously stage-­managed, it confirms the importance of prewar discourses and promoted peaceful coexistence with the Japa­nese. Both the five-­colored flag of the Chinese Republic and the Japa­nese flag flew beside the stage. Next to Qin sat Shirasawa Shigeru, representatives of the Japa­nese army and military police, other Wuxi government personnel, managers from the Huimin Silk Filature Company, and several officials from neighboring cities. After bowing three times to the Chinese national flag, Qin noted that Wuxi was a larger city than the capital Nanjing but smaller than Shanghai and that before the war it had been very developed. The invasion caused great destruction, but the provincial government had appointed a county head whose job it was to “promote commerce to create work, protect farmers and repair schools, save money to use for construction, and not tax too heavily in times of disaster.”24 The representative of the provincial government echoed these sentiments and highlighted the importance of the county in the wider administrative bureaucracy. Meanwhile, Shirasawa Shigeru praised the SGC and committed his office to working with the new administration in Wuxi’s continued recovery.25

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Qin was the first of several Wuxi County magistrates under the Japa­ nese occupation. Like him, they identified closely with the city’s prewar identity and had the authority to carry on urban redevelopment as they saw fit, although the Reformed Government gradually reconstructed a regulatory framework that reduced county-­level autonomy. The spatial jurisdiction of public offices in cities, towns, and villages did not change, and the appointment of officials at the township ( fang) and village (cun) levels was confirmed.26 This made local officials subordinate to the province. An order to Chen Zhanru and Qian Fenggao, the heads of the Number One Public Office, provides more detail on the powers of the county government and illustrates that, as before the war, its authority over the construction and management of the built environment applied to the city and the countryside. The magistrate’s responsibilities included surveying and repairing dikes, the removal of fences and other military fortifications from transport routes, provided they ­were no longer required, as well as the survey and repair of dilapidated ­houses, bridges, and other structures. Telegraph and telephone systems ­were seen as especially important, and magistrates had to report to the province on the condition of communications infrastructure. The powers granted to local officials by the Reformed Government went beyond simple reconstruction and included supporting agricultural recovery and extending loans to small businesses.27

War­time Urbanization in Wuxi City Streets and Houses

SGC officials began the tasks of cleaning up and rebuilding the city almost as soon as they ­were appointed, and by the time guidelines came down from the provincial level, reconstruction was well under way. In the first week of January 1938, workers began cleaning rubble north of the city walls, and over a month later six boats ­were still carry­ing it out of the city.28 Even before the cleanup was over, construction began, although at first some of it was temporary. For example, the SGC built a wooden bridge in the south of the city, which was followed by a temporary market selling everyday items around Chongan Temple.29 The revival of commerce presented a headache for local authorities. In May, the heads of the four townships within the city walls wrote to the SGC concerning Dashiqiao. Since the destruction of Beizhakou and Beidajie, many shops and businesses had congregated around

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the bridge, but its current dilapidated state hampered the recovery of commerce.30 Soon afterward, the SGC sent surveyors to assess the job and decided simply to replace the old bridge. The contract was put out for tender in June, and then construction began the following month and was completed in November, at a cost of 3,500 yuan.31 Meanwhile, local authorities took advantage of the destruction to undertake prewar plans for road building that had been impossible in the congested city. As recently as the spring of 1937, proposals had been made to widen the road from Dashiqiao north towards Beidajie, but the numerous ­houses packed tightly together made this impossible. In March 1938, SGC officials conducted a survey of the area and made their recommendations, but bids w ­ ere not invited for the project until June and work began the following month.32 Fuxing Road, which ran from the center of the city northward, was widened to 26 feet and resurfaced with paving slabs from Jinshan, while a sewer was built alongside with a drain approximately every 300 feet. The road crossed several rivers, but bridges could not be lowered because that would prevent boats from passing underneath, so ­whole sections ­were raised to make the road flatter and more con­ve­nient for traffic. The project, which included a paved area outside the old north gate, cost 13,000 yuan and was finished by the end of October. Other roads north of the city walls ­were widened throughout the autumn and winter of 1938, and ­houses and shops sprang up alongside, testifying to the speedy revival of what had become Wuxi’s commercial and industrial heart.33 The county government sought to impose standards on construction. Noting that similar rules had existed before the war, a Road-­Widening Committee was set up, and in November 1938 construction guidelines ­were published and a list of roads in and around the city stipulating their ideal widths was also submitted to the county government. The most important, which included Tonghui Road and Huishan Park Road, ­were to be 50 feet wide, while short lanes ­were to be much narrower.34 The county government under Wang Jingwei continued to pay attention to road building, and in the autumn of 1941 a Road Maintenance Committee was overseeing no fewer than twenty projects throughout the city.35 There is no evidence that this was connected to an earlier Road-­Widening Committee. Indeed, county construction bureau reports reveal that repairs to bridges, roads, and drainage systems in the city continued throughout 1940, although it is not always clear whether these ­were post-­invasion repairs, necessitated by new military activity, or needed because of general wear and tear. For example, in the first three months of 1940, the road from the corner of

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Houqijie to Beizhakou was repaved, and a drainage channel was dug along its entire length.36 Two major projects ­were the de­mo­li­tion of the northern moon gate and the completion of the ring road. Both had received government attention before the war as part of a grander plan to demolish the city wall. The moon gate was a crescent-­shaped section of wall that fanned outward to enclose the north gate and provide extra protection. Its destruction was first brought up in May 1938 as part of the redevelopment plan for the north of the city. The following month, the project was given priority over further rebuilding, and by the beginning of July it had been demolished.37 This paved the way for a new gate, which was certainly a strong fortification. It was 23 feet high, 20 feet deep, built of concrete, and flanked on either side by a gate­ house and police station.38 Although there is no evidence that the Japa­nese had any input into the design, it was certainly used to great effect when the city was deemed to be at threat. The completion of the ring road also marked the war­time culmination of pre-­invasion plans. A map of the road system in the city published by the WMPD in 1929 illustrates two sections of completed road. The first ran from the railway station southeast, terminating just before the south gate, and there was a second shorter section southwest of the city.39 No further work was undertaken until after the invasion, when tenders for two new sections of road, which completed the circuit from the west gate to the north, ­were put out in May 1940, and by September of that year, both had been completed. Lack of money hampered further building work, and discussions ­were held with local elites on whether they would be prepared to donate funds.40 As Wuxi began to recover, people returned in droves. Statistics are unreliable and estimates differ, but one Chinese survey put the population of the county at 620,000 in 1938, rising to 740,000 the following year, which was still below the prewar total of 900,000. By contrast, the Japa­nese surveyors estimated that the urban population in 1939 was between 200,000 and 250,000, an increase they attributed to an influx of refugees.41 In any case, Wuxi’s population increased rapidly in 1938 and 1939, doubtless because the revival of commerce and industry once more offered job opportunities to farmers who needed to supplement their income. Indeed, of the 8,850 workers in CCSC silk filatures in 1939, over 70 percent came from Wuxi City or surrounding towns and villages, with many of the rest from Jiangbei.42 The flood of people created an urgent need for housing, and so in January 1938 the SGC put out a call for engineers and stipulated that those wishing to undertake construction apply for a building license.43 As the year

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went on, rebuilding gathered pace. Construction peaked within the city walls in April, and then later that year the pace of rebuilding around Beizhakou and Beidajie matched that of road repair. Most of the ­houses ­were two-­story dwellings with a shop in the front and living quarters at the back and above, and their similarity to prewar structures demonstrates that the invasion had little impact on everyday architecture.44 However, rebuilding was not without its problems, a major one being unlicensed construction as edifices ­were rising from the ashes unplanned, and the police ­were called in to investigate.45 Nor did the situation improve under the county government. In June, two local officials complained that before the invasion straw shacks w ­ ere common on and under bridges and that, despite regulations, they continued to blight the landscape. Many had been destroyed in the invasion, and what was in fact public land needed to be kept clear for people to draw water from the river. Only stalls selling grain and other foodstuffs ­were allowed in these areas, and they had to apply to local officials for permission to be constructed.46 Haphazard building continued into 1939, and even the publication of some 140 clauses of provincial government building regulations, which covered both road and ­house repair, seemed to have little effect, as straw shacks continued to proliferate, presenting a fire risk.47 This caused disaster for one family. Pan Genxiao lived with his wife, son, and daughter in the midst of several hundred straw shacks in the shadow of the Fusheng Ware­house near Sanliqiao. One eve­ning in December 1938, he took his son to see a play, and his wife paid a call on a neighbor, leaving their three-­year-­old daughter, A Nan, asleep at home. She awoke suddenly and, in her fear at not seeing her parents, knocked over an oil lamp in front of the bed. The fire spread, engulfing neighboring shacks and over 100 burned to the ground; poor A Nan died in the blaze.48 However, even such a tragedy did little to stop unlicensed building, and the following month, the county authorities had to tear down three illegally erected structures.49 Buildings that had survived the invasion intact also presented a problem for the authorities. In January 1938, SGC council members decided that tenants had three months to return to their homes or landlords would be free to rent out rooms to whomever they wished. This still left the small matter of what to do about unpaid back rent, as many tenants ­were in arrears. To avoid having to settle numerous disputes, the SGC suspended all rent payments from November 1937 to February 1938, but problems continued.50 In January 1939, an editorial in the local newspaper reported that rebuilding north of the city walls had also caused rent disputes. Some

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former tenants, believing that it would be many years before the area recovered, had moved into the center of the city and on their return ­were faced with increased rents. Where properties had remained empty, rents for new tenants ­were also now higher, and other landlords, smelling an opportunity to make a profit, ­were trying to renegotiate their contracts.51 In response, county officials petitioned the provincial government, which supported the SGC’s original policy, although even after this there ­were further disputes.52 Another legacy of the invasion was empty ­houses, which, if they had not become attractive to squatters, ­were rapidly falling into disrepair, as people stole glass, wood, and other materials. In October 1938, the provincial government ordered county magistrates to draw up a list of unoccupied ­houses and prepare plans to protect them from further decay.53 In fact, in Wuxi very few ­houses stood empty. Although some had certainly suffered from destruction during the invasion or looting over the following months, many ­were occupied, occasionally by Japa­nese soldiers.54 Sources do not reveal what the county government did with these lists, but it is clear that even where the invasion did not result in the destruction of property, the flight and then return of much of the city’s population created innumerable headaches for Wuxi officials. Municipal Ser­vices

As before the war, the jurisdiction of local authorities included provision of municipal ser­vices. In carry­ing out this work, Chinese officials sometimes reacted directly to requests from urban residents, who saw them as representing the legitimate government. One area in which municipal officials ­were particularly active was the provision of street lighting. Power generation was initially the responsibility of the Japa­nese army, which wanted electricity to be restored as soon as possible. Because the Qishuyan Power Station, which was in the countryside, was inaccessible, perhaps because of continued fighting, workers ­were sent to the Lixin Factory, which was repaired on 5 February. Even with the Japa­nese army controlling supply, the SGC was able to announce prices and regulations for private customers, and by the end of 1938, it had registered over 6,000 users.55 Meanwhile, streetlights cast their glow over Wuxi’s nightlife once more, although before March a curfew of six in the eve­ning kept shoppers at home. Then, on 12 March, rules ­were relaxed, and the lights ­were turned on between six and nine at night.56

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By the time responsibility for electricity generation had been handed over to the Central China Water and Electricity Company in May 1938, the Qishuyan Power Station had been fixed, although the army continued to have a say in supply, as evidenced by the provincial government’s request to the Special Ser­v ices Department in Suzhou that the Wuxi plant be allowed to supply power to factories in Changshu and Jiangyin.57 In Wuxi City, however, it was the SGC and then the county magistrate to which residents complained about the state of street lighting. On 27 May 1938, six township officials within the city wrote a letter to the SGC about how the lack of illumination in Nanli to the south of the city walls was hampering the revival of commerce in the area, and concerns ­were also raised about safety at night.58 Although the SGC promised to fix the lights, after two months work had still not begun, prompting officials to write a second letter, in which they forcefully expressed their concerns about commerce and security. “Now business in the area is becoming more prosperous by the day, and it is summer, so the weather is getting hotter. Since many ­houses ­were destroyed in the invasion, at night people are sleeping in the streets. . . . ​The lack of street lighting means that it is dark, and bad things can suddenly occur. . . . ​Since the invasion, the town head and local businessmen have been concerned with comforting the people, revitalizing commerce, protecting society, and eliminating robbery. So it is necessary that street lighting be quickly restored.”59 In reply, the county magistrate promised to send workers to repair the lights, and the work evidently took place because no more letters w ­ ere sent from township heads in this part of the city.60 It was not only outlying areas of the city that had problems. Later in the year, officials complained that the street lighting north of the city wall had failed after one month, and major thoroughfares such as Beizhakou and streets around Sanliqiao ­were still in darkness. In response, Qin Lianggong promised to ask the Japa­nese to provide light bulbs.61 County construction bureau reports for 1940 and 1941 say nothing about street lighting, suggesting that for the most part the city was adequately lighted. However, residents in Nanyangli, a narrow alleyway just inside Guangfu Gate, did not agree, and in November 1940 they complained that fear of being mugged in the dark kept them indoors at night. Before the invasion, the authorities had provided them with a lamp, which brought them great comfort, and now they wanted officials to replace it.62 There was no reply to their request, but they clearly recognized that the Chinese authorities had the power to help them.

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Street lighting was not the only municipal ser­v ice for which Chinese officials ­were responsible. There had long been concerns over the provision of clean water, and in the aftermath of the invasion, with rubble blocking many of the city’s rivers and dead bodies floating in the water, concerns began to surface about outbreaks of cholera. Indeed, the first cases w ­ ere reported in February 1938, and SGC personnel ­were vaccinated, although sufficient vaccine for the wider population was not available. Instead, people ­were urged not to drink dirty water from the river and, in the absence of working public wells, to use private ones.63 Two weeks later, the repair of the Lixin Factory meant that the four public wells, which all ran on electricity, w ­ ere able to resume operation, and the SGC published regulations on their use. The wells ­were to be managed by public office heads, who would appoint someone to take charge of selling the water. The price was one wen per bucket, and water was available from six in the morning until six at night. Residents ­were asked to line up patiently and ­were forbidden to operate the pumps themselves. Local authorities also worked to dig new wells, and within a year, the number had doubled to eight.64 However, not everyone paid their dues. Qian Zhongliang, who ran the Number Two Well, complained that Japa­nese living near the county court ­were drawing five large buckets of water a day and that the electricity to run the pump cost 2.5 yuan, so he petitioned the Wuxi magistrate to ask the Japa­nese army for the money.65 Qian’s experience mirrors that of many people in the city throughout the early years of the war. Local officials and Wuxi residents faced a variety of problems due to the invasion and the impositions of occupation. However, rebuilding of the bricks and mortar of the city went hand-­in-­hand with revival of its commerce and industry. As before the war, management of the urban fabric was the responsibility of local officials, acting within a regulatory framework that was re-­imposed by successive Chinese provincial and national governments. At times, Chinese and Japa­nese interests ­were very much in tandem, and although this may seem surprising, it should be remembered that neither side had much to be gained from presiding over cholera-­ridden cities with vast numbers of disease victims. However, Chinese ­were far more than passive actors in urban renewal. Instead, they occupied a space in which prewar discourses surrounding urban development guided rebuilding and expansion. In this, they ­were given legitimacy by Japa­ nese civilian and military personnel as well as Wuxi residents and often proved effective intermediaries between the two sides. This meant that, far

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from being derailed by the Japa­nese invasion and occupation, urbanization in the city continued after 1937.

War­time Urbanization in the Wuxi Countryside Transport and Communications

There is little evidence that the SGC was directly involved with the rebuilding of major roads in the countryside, although it sent workers to repair the Wuxi-­Jiangyin Road in April 1938, only to have Chinese guerrillas periodically blow it up again over the next two years.66 At the same time, concerns ­were expressed about the city’s links to its hinterland. Local officials complained about the state of four bridges just south of the city. Jiejingqiao and Rihuiqiao spanned canals stretching to Suzhou and Changshu, while Nanxinqiao and Yudaiqiao ­were both on important arteries out to the countryside, so concerns emerged that their dilapidated state would endanger traffic.67 Repair of rural infrastructure really got under way in September that year when, in accordance with provincial regulations, a survey of the Wuxi-­ Shanghai, Wuxi-­Suzhou and Wuxi-­Jiangyin Roads was undertaken.68 Eleven bridges on the Wuxi-­Shanghai Road had been completely destroyed, so the following month local officials from towns and villages along the route ­were ordered to Wuxi City for a meeting at which it was agreed that the county government should ask the Japa­nese army for permission to conduct repairs. Meanwhile, concern was expressed over bandits and guerrillas, and officials ­were urged to take protective mea­sures.69 Work was certainly slow, although the Japa­nese army provided some assistance and promised to provide materials for the repair of two bridges in the spring of 1940. One reason for this slowness may have been lack of money, in view of the fact that officials complained about the total cost of replacing the twenty-­two wooden bridges along the Wuxi section of road with more sturdy concrete structures, 17,000 yuan, a burden that would have to be borne by farmers.70 Perhaps the most important transport artery to the Japa­nese was the railway line, and any work had to receive their permission. Ser­v ice for civilians resumed in April 1938, with two trains a day to Shanghai and one to Nanjing, although luggage was limited and travel required a special pass.71 The Japa­nese ­were clearly concerned about attacks on this critical piece of infrastructure. In February 1938, the army rather than the SGC or pacification agents asked anyone with previous experience on the railways to report to the station for work and offered a reward for information on the

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perpetrators of attacks.72 Such concern continued throughout the occupation. In October 1938, local officials wanted to fix a bridge near Dongqi Station and clear rubble from the river under the bridge, but they needed to obtain a certificate from the army before the work could proceed. After they received it, four boats and thirty workers ­were permitted access to the area, and the repaired bridge improved transport into Nanli.73 Further work was carried out a few months later. On 9 February 1939, the garrison at the station called a meeting of local officials and demanded that all trees within 30 feet of the railway line be cut down and electricity pylons erected and that the local population pay for the privilege. Additionally, they complained that anti-­Japanese slogans had been seen in the town and so random checks had to be conducted. Local officials moaned to the county government that there was no money for erecting the electricity pylons and requested a loan, which was duly forthcoming.74 The importance to the military of communications is also evidenced by government appeals to stop the destruction of telephone lines. Telephone infrastructure, which had been extensive before the war, suffered during the invasion, but enough survived to connect some shops in January 1938. Continued recovery was slow, however. In April, the head of the telephone company, Yang Renqian, complained about robbery of poles and lines that had not been destroyed in the invasion, particularly in Tianshang and Tianxia Wards. SGC head Yang Hanxi, who also happened to be Renqian’s father, responded by emphasizing the importance to the Japa­nese army of communications and urged local officials and police forces to do their utmost to protect telephone infrastructure. Posters ­were even distributed to towns and villages in an effort to stop the thefts.75 The situation did not improve, and, in September, Shirasawa Shigeru also issued an order concerning telephones, the telegraph, and electric lighting, in which he blamed the thefts on “ignorant country people.”76 There is no more information on the revival of the telephone network in Wuxi, but long-­distance ser­v ices to Shanghai and other cities came under the jurisdiction of the Central China Water and Electricity Company, which by April 1939 had offices in Suzhou, Zhenjiang, Nanjing, and Hangzhou, among other cities in the region.77 As infrastructure was rebuilt and then expanded, Wuxi City was gradually reconnected to its hinterland and the wider urban system. Of course, towns and villages ­were not always the safest or most welcoming places. Travelers faced restrictions on movement, potholes in roads, and dilapidated bridges, as well as the ever-­present threat from bandits and guerrillas. However, Chinese officials in Wuxi at all levels of government worked to repair

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infrastructure. In doing so, they sometimes had to seek permission from the Japa­nese, and it was rarely denied. Indeed, at times, the Japa­nese presence acted as a catalyst for further infrastructure development, as the expansion of military technology intersected with continued urbanization of the countryside. However, water management, which had been an important vector of prewar urbanization, was left almost entirely to Chinese. Water Management and War­time Urbanization

Discussion of river management remained focused on prewar discourses on the relationship between transport, urbanization, commercial prosperity, and cleanliness. Work clearing rivers and canals was undertaken almost entirely by the Chinese authorities, probably because the Japa­nese army did not consider water an important transport artery for military purposes. Exploring the legacy of the invasion on water courses across Wuxi, as well as the reaction to the impact of Chiang Kaishek’s flooding of the Yellow River in 1938, a desperate attempt to stop the Japa­nese army’s advance in Henan Province, also provides further evidence of the efficient working of local government in towns and villages. As noted above, both Chinese and Japa­nese had concerns about cholera, and, throughout January and February, the SGC sent burial teams to dredge rivers and remove corpses.78 In addition to this gruesome legacy of the invasion, fighting left rivers and canals strewn with rubble, and in April local officials embarked on a project to clean up and widen the rivers in the city, which would remove any remaining corpses, ammunition, and other military hardware and rid them of trash. By the end of the month, the main river running north to south through the city had been drained, and some ammunition had been handed in to the local government, with no corpses remaining. Meanwhile, work had begun on draining the river running east to west.79 Concern about the state of rivers this early in the occupation also extended to the countryside. For example, Bodugang was a small jetty to the south of the city on a branch of the Grand Canal, which gave access to Dongting, Meicun, Tangkou, and Suzhou. Local officials reported that damage to the railway during the invasion had blocked access to the city via the river and that the river had become polluted and was a danger to human health. In response, the SGC sent a surveyor to investigate.80 There is no information on whether any work was undertaken, but the appeal for help clearly demonstrates that prewar discourses surrounding water management survived the invasion.

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Unlike the floods of 1931 discussed in chapter 5, Chiang Kaishek’s destruction of levees along the Yellow River and the resulting floods in the summer of 1938 did not directly affect Wuxi. However, the response of the provincial authorities was very similar as they turned their thoughts to flood prevention. In February 1939, a Wuxi County government order noted the impact of the previous year’s floods on some areas of Jiangsu and emphasized that water management was both a provincial and a national problem. It went on to refer to the role of local officials in directing farming ­house­holds to carry out flood prevention work and cited provincial guidelines indicating that this should proceed during the agricultural slack season. They stated that each county should have a water management council composed of local officials and people with knowledge of irrigation, which should be responsible for surveys and bud­gets, and that while the work of dike repair and dredging rivers should be done by the farmers themselves, county authorities should oversee it. This was quickly followed by further regulations that county governments report the required work to provincial officials.81 The following February, an Irrigation Council was established with responsibility for rivers and lakes across the province. Private work was prohibited and, in an example of interministerial cooperation, county officials ­were asked to report on water management to the Construction and Finance Ministries as well as the Ministry of Interior.82 Significantly, the change of government a month later brought no alteration to the central management of irrigation. In February 1941, the Jiangsu Provincial Construction Ministry exhorted county governments to follow the 1935 rules on water management, identified this work as being in the national interest, and suggested the agricultural slack season as the best time to dredge rivers.83 The example of townships 581 and 591 provides more evidence for the continuity of regulatory oversight. In May 1938, local officials reported that two rivers ­were silted up, the riverbed had risen, and boats of all types, including those used for pumping water, could not get through. Moreover, in the hot summer, the water was becoming extremely polluted and was not even suitable for irrigating the fields, much less for drinking. One river, Gangqiaobang, ran half a li from the Grand Canal to Bao`an Temple, while the other, Yonglinxiangbang, ran half a li from Bodugang to Bao`an Temple. There ­were plans to use a boat with a mechanical pump to irrigate several thousand mu of fields along the banks of the two rivers, which would be of great benefit to farmers. Moreover, this would remove stagnant water, making it safe to drink from. Responding positively, the SGC agreed to

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send surveyors to investigate.84 However, two years later newly appointed township officials wrote to the county governor, complaining once more that the high riverbed was causing problems. Citing Jiangsu provincial government order number 509 that counties ­were to be responsible for dredging rivers, they noted that officials in Qingcheng had successfully conducted a ­ ere again requesting help survey and fixed problems. For this reason, they w dredging the river and also wanted to have two bridges repaired that had been destroyed in the interim.85 Although there is no evidence that the work was ever carried out, the appeals illustrate that Chinese authorities ­were seen as responsible for irrigation. There can be no doubt that local officials in both the city and the countryside encountered many problems when trying to rebuild and further urbanize Wuxi. The county had just experienced a devastating invasion, and the continuing Japa­nese presence hampered recovery efforts. Despite this, ­ ere Wuxi arose anew from the ashes of war. Houses ­were rebuilt, roads w widened, and telephones and streetlights ­were repaired. Much of this was due to the tenacity of local officials, who worked to further expand the city limits and revive the complex web of infrastructure connections to the immediate countryside and the wider region, which had been so important to Wuxi’s development into Jiangnan’s preeminent industrial center. Throughout this pro­cess, they stood as the representatives of the Chinese inhabitants of the city, which sometimes brought them into conflict with the Japa­ nese authorities. However, for the most part Chinese ­were allowed to pursue their construction projects unhindered, and it is clear that urbanization continued throughout the occupation. Nevertheless, Wuxi was a county under enemy control, and the Japa­nese had the power to project themselves spatially, a theme that is the subject of this book’s final chapter.

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A Militarized Environment Japa­nese Impact on Daily Life

Chinese in the Lower Yangtze Delta managed many aspects of their daily lives largely free of direct Japa­nese interference, but the region was still under enemy occupation. This meant that the Japa­nese army and sometimes the Chinese collaborationist government used military technologies and infrastructure to project the reality of occupation in multiple ways to buildings, roads, city walls, and other physical spaces. Such strategies w ­ ere not confined to the city but extended to the countryside, particularly during the qingxiang campaigns. In addition to forming a context in which the continuing impact of economic and po­liti­cal drivers of urbanization must be considered, the occupation also directly shaped the construction and management of the built environment. Just as with the invasion, the direct impact of the occupation on Wuxi County was differentiated spatially and temporally. Although the Japa­nese may have been content to let Chinese rebuild and manage the urban fabric and rural infrastructure, they w ­ ere perfectly capable of imposing themselves very directly and forcefully on different spaces when it suited them. To demonstrate this, I explore the Japa­nese lockdown of Wuxi after the assassination of the county magistrate, Yang Shoutong, in 1940 and the competing meanings of his funeral. The murder brought Japa­nese soldiers and Chinese security forces onto the streets to check identity papers and interfere in normal daily routines, and the city took on a more militarized air. However, the funeral of the magistrate was a complex affair, as Chinese and Japa­ nese officials projected the meaning of occupation to Wuxi’s citizens, even as the city’s identity was reaffirmed in ways that reflected long established discourses of urban development.

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I then turn to the qingxiang campaigns in the Wuxi countryside, which ­ ere believed to be necessary because the establishment of New Fourth w Army bases in the second half of 1938 allowed guerrillas to harass the enemy, destroy military infrastructure, and even assassinate local officials and other alleged collaborators. It is not my intention to give a detailed military history of the actions of guerrilla forces between 1938 and 1941, after which the New Fourth Army was forced to retreat north of the Yangtze.1 Instead, as in Hebei during the Three-­A ll Policy, which was a Japa­nese retaliation to the Communist-­led Hundred Regiments Offensive in December 1940, I argue that the qingxiang campaigns brought the infrastructure of war to the countryside.2 For a short time, this extension of the physical and discursive impact of the occupation was so profound that Wuxi City ceased to be the center of po­liti­cal activity; rather, it focused on the small town of Anzhen, the headquarters of the second campaign. It could never replace the city as the locus of development, but its importance to the campaign required new infrastructure and, so, drove the urbanization of parts of the Wuxi countryside.

The Assassination of Yang Shoutong On the afternoon of 9 January 1940, the Wuxi County magistrate, Yang Shoutong, left his office in the city center. He was sixty-­three years old, having been born in Wuxi and educated in Shanghai before spending two years studying chemistry and physics at a Tokyo college and then returning to enter the Hanlin Academy, the institution of elite scholars who advised the Chinese emperor. Following the 1911 revolution, Yang briefly held posts in the army and the Finance Ministry before leaving government to work in business in Tianjin and Wuxi. After the invasion, he was a member of both the SGC and a director of the CCSC, before becoming a county magistrate.3 As such, Yang was a Wuxi local working for his city while, at the same time, being a member of the Reformed Government and a symbol of Japa­nese occupation. Therefore, his assassination at 4 p.m. on that fateful afternoon in January became an event that resonated with the Chinese and Japa­nese authorities as well as the people of Wuxi and the wider region. Moreover, the reaction of the Japa­nese army to his death indicates how the physical spaces of the city ­were used to control the lives of its inhabitants during the occupation. Yang was shot in his car shortly after leaving his office and died in hospital soon afterward. The authorities quickly closed the city gates, declared

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martial law, and released a statement saying that, in order to protect Wuxi residents, the Japa­nese army had directed the police to check ­house­hold registration papers and search for the killers.4 No one was allowed to enter or leave the city. The head of the Wuxi police force, who was attending a conference in Suzhou, was unable to return, and two representatives sent by the provincial governor, Chen Zemin, to help the county secretary, who had taken temporary charge of local government, ­were also delayed. Even the head of the Central China Area Army’s Special Ser­v ices Department in Suzhou, who was dispatched to Wuxi to conduct the investigation into the assassination personally, did not arrive until two days later.5 Nor did the closure of the gates affect only the movement of high officials: even postal carriers ­were denied permits, so their letters ­were stored at a branch office on the outskirts of the city.6 Despite the best efforts of the local authorities, which included the promise of a 1,000 yuan reward to the police officer for the successful capture of the perpetrators, little progress was made in the case. So on 12 January, the Japa­nese ordered the cessation of all transport in and out of the city and the closure of all shops. Registration papers ­were checked, and police officers took away for further interrogation those whose documents ­were suspicious.7 Wuxi’s gates remained closed for two more days, causing continuing problems in postal delivery, and the contents of letters ­were censored more than usual.8 These operations eventually bore some fruit, as one of the suspects was captured on 14 January, and Guangfu Gate and the South Gate ­were opened the following day but only for women and children. Normal business had not yet resumed, and rice was becoming scarce, prompting the family of the deceased magistrate to call for the city to be opened.9 Meanwhile, outside the walls, checkpoints on major roads and bridges formed a circle around the city, and it was not until the morning of the sixteenth that the county government, acting on direct instructions of the Special Ser­v ices Department, gave permission for women and children under the age of twelve to pass through.10 By this time, a total of five suspects had been captured and several guns recovered. The city gradually began to return to normal, as hotels, restaurants, shops, and tea­houses ­were allowed to reopen, and mail ser­v ice resumed, although the authorities retained the power to stop people at will and permits for travel ­were required.11 There is no information on either the identity or the fate of the alleged killers, and they are not the focus of our story. Instead, it is the spaces of the city that command our attention, because it was through them that the militarized atmosphere of occupation was manifested. The closure of the

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city gates, police checkpoints on roads and bridges, and even the shops and restaurants bereft of customers ­were all very obvious signs that something was amiss. Meanwhile, restrictions on movement, particularly within the city walls, temporarily cut off the connectedness so essential to Wuxi’s vitality. All this created an oppressive atmosphere, which played out in decreasing rice stocks, prompting the call from Yang’s family for the city to be reopened. Beyond this, the assassination gave rise to a wave of sympathy for his relatives. Although the portrayal of this and the descriptions of Yang’s funeral, which both appear on the pages of the local newspaper, are inevitably inflected with pro-­Japanese sentiment, they demonstrate how Wuxi officials, gentry, and ordinary citizens appropriated the event to emphasize the city’s identity and their own sense of community. Yang Shoutong was survived by his wife, three sons, and two daughters, who almost immediately began to receive visits and letters of condolence. For example, on 11 January the head of the Special Ser­v ices Department, representatives from the provincial government, and the head of the Ministry of Interior, as well as many prominent Wuxi locals, visited the magis­ ouse to pay their respects to the grieving family.12 Although it is trate’s h difficult to be certain of their motivation, many locals must have felt genuinely grief-­stricken at Yang’s death, because he had long played a part in the life of the city, and to some he was probably a personal friend. Japa­nese and perhaps some Chinese officials ­were more likely to have been seeking po­ liti­cal capital from their visits. Messages of condolence included tele­grams from the head of the CCSC in Shanghai, the head of the Central China Tele­ gram Company, and one from Tokyo, perhaps an old Japa­nese friend of Yang’s.13 We know only the names of those who sent their condolences, and there is no way to trace their relationship to the dead magistrate and his family, but it is difficult to believe that all the messages ­were po­liti­cally motivated, and at least some must have expressed genuine sympathy. The same is not true for the memorial ser­v ice, which, unlike the private funeral, was public and arranged by Chinese and Japa­nese authorities. On 16 January, a Funeral Management Committee, composed of officials from the Japa­nese army, members of Yang’s family, and over thirty local officials and gentry, was established.14 At a meeting several days later, it was decided to hold the memorial ser­v ice on 5 February in the city’s garden. The county government set aside between 500 yuan and 1,000 yuan and money for a memorial tablet to be erected either in the garden or outside the north gate was donated by local people and the Japa­nese army.15 After a second meeting the day before the ceremony, all was set.

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The memorial ser­v ice began with some music, and then a flag, presumably of the Chinese Republic, was lowered to half-­mast. The assembled company bowed three times to an image of Yang, and, after a minute’s silence, the county secretary, who was also head of the Funeral Management Committee, gave a speech. This was followed by a few brief words from representatives of the organizations attending. In a nod to the current order, Japa­nese army officials went first, then members of the central and provincial government, and finally representatives from other organizations outside Wuxi. Other speakers included heads of local schools and members of Yang’s family.16 A special commemorative issue of New Wuxi Daily was published, and reports of speeches during the ser­vice highlight two main themes. First, the Chinese and the Japa­nese should work together to create a Greater East Asian Co-­prosperity Sphere, a concept that underlay Japan’s imperial ambitions. Such an idea had been promulgated in Wuxi since the beginning of the occupation, particularly during festivals such as those held to commemorate the invasion of Shanghai in 1937, which ­were not complete without the pageantry of flags, pro­cessions, and speeches.17 Second, they emphasized Yang’s role as county magistrate and Wuxi resident. The head of the Wuxi branch of the Special Ser­v ices Department highlighted Yang’s connection with Japan and his time there as a student. He had initially been concerned that Yang might be too old but praised his hard work, saying that “because of the earnest requests of local gentry, and considering the utter misery of the people, which was impossible to bear, without hesitation, he took these difficulties on himself . . . ​and strived to make Sino-­Japanese cooperation a reality, and construct the East Asian New Order.”18 In contrast, county secretary Tang focused on Yang’s contribution to municipal life, proclaiming that he was a “morally upright scholar,” who since his appointment as county magistrate had continued his pre­de­ces­sor’s work and “brought great benefit to his native place.”19 He went on to note that his assassination was a terrible event, and, in a nod to the realities of occupation and echoing earlier sentiments expressed in a report back to the provincial government two weeks before, conceded that it was fortunate the Japa­nese army had been able to help capture the killers.20 The sentiments of local officials went far beyond support for the Japa­nese and demonstrate a real pride in the city’s identity. There is every reason to believe the words of what was probably a fictional primary school student who was attributed with having written in the pages of the local newspaper, “Ah, for such a good local official to be killed by evil people really breaks my heart. During the five months that magistrate Yang was in office he showed the people of this

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city great kindness. So on hearing this terrible news, women and children, shop­keep­ers and pedestrians, all ­were united in sorrow.”21

The Qingxiang Campaigns In 1941 and 1942, many living in the Wuxi countryside experienced the harsh realities of the Japa­nese occupation in the form of the qingxiang campaigns. Indeed, for some villagers this may have been the first time that they ever found themselves at the wrong end of an enemy soldier’s bayonet, ­were stopped at a checkpoint, or hurriedly stepped out the way of a speeding motorcycle. The campaigns affected much of southern and central Jiangsu and ­were conducted in Wuxi on three occasions between the summer of 1941 and the following spring. They ­were motivated by several factors. The Japa­ nese wished to expand their military control over the region and rid the countryside of guerrillas, not to mention increase their economic extractive capacity. Meanwhile, Wang Jingwei saw an opportunity to gain prestige for his regime and increase his military effectiveness. As a result, he adopted Chiang Kaishek’s model of three parts military to seven parts po­ liti­cal that had been used in attacks against CCP base areas before 1937.22 At a meeting held in the city park in July 1941 to announce the first campaign, the Wuxi County governor alluded to its dual nature, saying “security should be foremost in qingxiang work and is now most important. When the security situation has been settled, the economic problems will naturally resolve themselves.”23 Although there may be some doubt as to the sincerity of these claims, from the point of view of the Japa­nese in par­tic­u­lar, security had been an ongoing issue. Understanding the extent of banditry and guerrilla activity does nothing to justify the campaigns but demonstrates that war­time urbanization was not a homogeneous countywide pro­cess. Instead, some towns and villages recovered within the context of failed Japa­ nese attempts to establish a monopoly over economic production and ­were incorporated into the Chinese collaborationist state from the first days of the occupation. Elsewhere, high levels of banditry or Communist control meant that further military intervention was required to bring a semblance of order.

Military Qingxiang, the New Fourth Army, and Bandits The Japa­nese invasion certainly increased violence throughout Jiangnan, as gangsters, unemployed youth, former Nationalist soldiers, and CCP

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members roamed at will through towns and villages with little official leadership and a surfeit of arms.24 In Wuxi, or­ga­ni­za­tion of militia was common, and some of these later developed into guerrilla groups. There ­were several thousand guerrillas around the town of Meicun and more in Anzhen and farther north in the town of Zhangjingqiao.25 Over the next two years, many of these groups came under the direct command of the New Fourth Army, which established its own bureaucratic structures below the county government across southern and central Jiangsu, provided a market for farming ­house­holds looking to sell cocoons, and imposed taxes on rural produce.26 However, much of the threat to the occupation was military. Guerrillas of all types attacked a variety of targets, including shops, factories, government, or military headquarters and, of course, infrastructure. There is no comprehensive list of these attacks in the early years of the occupation, but the provincial government received reports of fifteen cases in Wuxi between 11 and 31 October 1939, fourteen between 1 and 20 November, and thirteen between 20 January and 20 February 1940, although no one was caught in any of these cases. They ­were not confined to the countryside, as at least one urban silk filature was burned to the ground, and the Japa­nese often locked the city gates at night.27 Several attacks ­were or­ga­nized from Meicun. The largest was on a Japa­ nese base at the Hushuguan train station just a few miles east on the border between Suzhou and Wuxi counties. Li Guanyu, a former female primary schoolteacher in the town, and Zhou Daming, a Yan`an comrade, ­were chosen to lead the assault. They took a boat to the town and, with the help of an old colleague of Li Guanyu, w ­ ere able to reconnoiter the target and obtain plans of the base. On a rainy night in June 1939, the guerrillas set off. They approached the town from three sides, and over the course of thirty minutes, twenty Japa­nese soldiers w ­ ere killed or injured, and the railway ­ ere not nearly as daring. For examand bridges damaged.28 Most attacks w ple, on 5 October 1939, four or five people broke into the store of an armed police unit in Rongxiang and stole a gun and over 300 bullets. Just a few days later, three men ­were involved in an altercation with Japa­nese troops at a rice broker’s in Beitang and escaped into the fields north of Sanliqiao with 2,000 yuan. Then, at the end of the month, five or six armed men slipped into the city and attacked the checkpoint along the Wuxi-­Jiangyin Road. Despite spraying bullets in all directions, they managed to kill only an owner of a food stall before fleeing to the countryside.29 The New Fourth Army was a constant thorn in the side of the Japa­nese, and skirmishes occurred in the summer of 1941. On 8  July some 500

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guerrillas fought with Japa­nese troops in the town of Daqiangmen south of the city and ­were forced to retreat northeast.30 Neither was the fighting confined to the countryside. Retreating guerrillas paused briefly near Tingziqiao, while in Beitang an altercation actually took place between two Chinese detachments when the tenth division of the army and the eleventh unit of the security forces mistook each other for the enemy. Both the Japa­nese army and the Wuxi County government ­were called in to mediate between them, and, fortunately, the misunderstanding was cleared up before anyone was killed.31 From the point of view of the Japa­nese, the qingxiang campaigns ­were a military success. Figures for August 1941 list over 77 Chinese killed, 1,357 captured, and 883 who surrendered. Items seized included 293 rifles, 6 light machine guns, 353 military uniforms, 3 cars, and 13 boats. These losses are set against the deaths of only five Japa­nese soldiers and just a few injuries among Wang’s troops.32 Although renewed conflict with the Nationalists was also partly to blame, the campaigns helped to end the New Fourth Army’s presence south of the Yangtze.

The Second Qingxiang Campaign The second qingxiang campaign was announced on 9 September 1941, and personnel ­were sent to Suzhou for training. Then on 21  September, Cao Xiang, who was appointed Wuxi County governor the following year, returned to the city and took over the management of the five sectors that constituted the special area (tebie qu). Its geo­graph­i­cal limits ­were mapped out, and the central headquarters was established in the town of Anzhen, which also became the site of the Blockade Affairs Office (Fengsuo Shichu). Meetings of each sector head and township and village level officials ­were quickly held. According to later surveys, the area covered by the second qingxiang campaign encompassed 102 districts and townships, 923 bao, 9,254 jia, and a population of 413,045, which comprised almost half of Wuxi County.33 Cao Xiang was not responsible to the Wuxi County government, but to the Qingxiang Committee Headquarters, which was based in Suzhou. Below him was a government bureaucracy consisting of township and village public offices, baojia heads, and police and other security forces, which had various powers and responsibilities, including the ability to tax the local population, create police forces, institute health reform, and support commerce and reconstruction. Local officials ­were often replaced and entirely new posts created, and although not all appointees ­were

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dedicated personnel, a machinery of government bypassing the county administration was established.34 The formation of this new bureaucracy in Anzhen drove urbanization in the countryside even as it brought the militarized atmosphere of occupation to towns and villages. In chapter 3, I argued that the expansion of the state caused urbanization, and on occasion this was precipitated by the establishment of new public offices. For example, in 1929 a new office was set up in Bashiqiao, making it the po­liti­cal center of Tianxia Ward. In the words of the author of a local survey, “all those wishing to consult on affairs of local government have to congregate ­here. It was far from the road, which was felt to be incon­ve­nient, and so it was proposed to build a new road. Everyone was of the same mind.”35 Anzhen, as the headquarters of the second qingxiang campaign in Wuxi, also became a po­liti­cal center, which had a similar impact on the area, which I divide into physical, regulatory, and discursive effects. In each case, some policies created an explicitly militarized environment, reflecting the reality of occupation, while others fit into longer-­term trends of urbanization. Physical Environment

The demarcation of the special area for the second qingxiang campaign, which is apparent in Figure 7, involved tearing up the natural, administrative, commercial, and communications maps of the region. Its most obvious manifestation was the physical barrier that marked the area’s borders, and plans ­were made to run barbed wire fences south of the railway line and west of the Wuxi-­Jiangyin Road. They ran into problems, and so each sector was ordered to map its own borders, which w ­ ere then passed to the county government for it to transfer jurisdiction over to the Special Area Committee in Anzhen after the provincial government had cast its eye over the plans. Within the special area as a ­whole, subdivisions also followed roads or waterways.36 Physical alterations did not stop at barbed wire and electric fences, as regulations stipulated that pillboxes and observation platforms had to be constructed. One platform was built within each area encompassed by the number of ­house­holds making up one bao, and unless they ­were built on top of a hill, regulations stipulated a height of between 23 and 33 feet to command a good view of the surrounding countryside. In the fifth sector, there was no town with fewer than four platforms. Tangkou had eight and Fangqiao thirteen,

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Figure 7 ​Map of the special area in Wuxi during the second qingxiang campaign. Source: “Wuxi diqu di erqi qingxiang gongzuo jinzhang zhuangkuang,” 298.

but they ­were often crudely constructed, with straw roofs that gave little protection against the wind and rain.37 In addition to being observed from above, residents could be stopped at pillboxes and guard­houses dotted around the countryside. For example, during the first campaign in July 1941, ten Japa­nese troops set up a checkpoint at the village of Zhoujiaqiao. They built a pillbox and an inspection point, blocked the road with a bamboo fence, began checking papers, and searching those who passed by.38 Chinese and Japa­nese soldiers ­were therefore a constant presence within the blockaded area, and although there is no detailed information on how many villages ­were occupied in Wuxi, in the neighboring Suchangtai region there could be between 300 and 500 soldiers in major towns but as few as three to five in some villages. They often conducted house-­to-­house searches and interviews, and, according to one Communist cadre, if the suspect did not look like a farmer or was not known to anyone in the village, he was beaten.

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Additionally, in a war­time counterpart to the steamers described by Mao Dun, motorboats and motorcycles noisily patrolled the rivers and roads of Jiangnan.39 Not all changes to the physical environment of the special area ­were so militarily oriented, particularly in the town of Anzhen, which now had to play host to the machinery of government bureaucracy. Four major roads ran through the special area, including sections of the Wuxi-­Shanghai Road and the Wuxi-­Jiangyin Road. The section of the Wuxi-­Shanghai Road from Zhoushanbang, which was 11 miles long, was deemed of special importance, and in late October the heads of the first and fourth sectors ­were ordered to send engineers out to manage rebuilding, while the Japa­nese army and the River Management Bureau ­were contacted concerning repairs to one of the bridges. The Wuxi-­Jiangyin Road was also repaired, with local farmers paying for the privilege, and two other roads that had all but reverted to fields since the invasion ­were repaved, becoming accessible to rickshaws once more. Building roads was insufficient to ensure regular ser­v ices to the town, and complaints ­were raised that since the imposition of the blockade, all road and water traffic into the special area had ceased, which made getting to Anzhen incon­ve­nient. The Central China Railway Company was ordered to commence bus ser­v ice between Wuxi City and Anzhen, while a local steamer company ran one boat a day to Suzhou.40 Beyond Anzhen, a communications network stretched across the special area. Transit stations ­were set up every few miles, and bicycles brought in to send messages between individual towns and villages more quickly. Rules stipulated that messages be transmitted up or down the chain from the village to the special area headquarters and then to Suzhou, if necessary. Each station was staffed and required to transfer a message along to the next link in the chain within ten minutes of receiving it.41 The map in Figure 8 illustrates the position of all the points in the communications network and the distances between them. For example, to get from Anzhen to Dongting, it was necessary to go through five stations, each 2 to 3 li apart. Because it took twenty to thirty minutes to travel between each stop, the entire distance could be covered in less than two hours.42 Together with the observation platforms, pillboxes, bamboo fences, barbed wire, and other infrastructure necessitated by the qiangxiang campaigns, it is easy to see that the communications network created an environment that projected the reality of occupation onto the physical spaces of the countryside.

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Figure 8 ​Map of communications network in Wuxi special area with distances between stations in li. Source: “Wuxi tebie qu gongshu chuandi gongwen tongxun zhan fenbu tu,” Wuxi Municipal Archives ML1-5-167.

Regulatory Environment

The qingxiang campaign’s focus on banditry brought with it new rules to govern people’s lives, announced on 24 September, and a special office for ­ hole artheir implementation in Anzhen.43 The regulations criminalized w eas of activity and ­were passed by the Qingxiang Council of Wang Jingwei’s government, instead of the Japa­nese. Crimes carry­ing a sentence of death included armed robbery, murder, and kidnap and rape of women as well as damaging fortifications and any type of vehicle or transport infrastructure, and stealing military hardware, such as medicine or weapons.44 There are no statistics on the number of people who ­were executed, and, of course, many crimes ­were much less serious. For example, during the first two weeks of October, thirty-­one people ­were jailed throughout the special area, serving a total of 214 days for stealing grain.45 These additional criminals required the construction of new jails, which merely added to the militarization of the built environment in the coun-

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tryside and sometimes involved altering the use of old buildings. In one town, the Wang family ancestral temple was converted into a jail. Work began at the beginning of October, and, despite complaints about the lack of funds, within a week three prisons capable of holding eighty inmates had been ­ ere up to the job. A letter to Cao Xiang complained built.46 However, not all w that because of the haste with which it had been constructed, one prison was ugly and unsuitable. Moreover, it was staffed by only one secretary and an administrative police officer instead of a ­whole unit. The police officer could not possibly be expected to stay awake all night, and for this reason several cases of grain had been stolen in the area. In response, three people ­were immediately dispatched to staff the jail. This may have reflected a more widespread problem, as sector heads complained to Cao Xiang that there was a general lack of personnel at the local level.47 Regulations also affected the movement of people, prompting the introduction of a ­whole new classification system to manage it. To apply for a “good person’s pass” (liangminzheng), an individual had to file an application with the baojia head. The application was then forwarded to the local public office, which was the final arbiter on whether the applicant was eligible. Having received permission, the would-be traveler still had to register at one of the main checkpoints, where the Japa­nese conducted a further investigation.48 Despite these restrictions, there was plenty of movement. The number of people recorded as entering and leaving the blockaded areas in Jiangyin, Kunshan, Suzhou, and Wuxi ­rose from 66,576 in July to 1,008,485 in October.49 In Wuxi itself, those issued with “good person’s passes” in November numbered 41,000 in both the first and second sectors, 32,000 in the third sector, 31,000 in the fourth, and 44,000 in the fifth sector.50 At nearly 200,000, this would have been 20 percent of the passes issued for the entire second qingxiang campaign according to the October figures and suggests that the movement of people increased over time. This may reflect growing familiarity with the new system. What­ever the reason, although the qingxiang campaigns certainly hampered movement around Jiangnan, they did not halt it altogether. Moreover, not all this movement was out of the blockaded areas, as 216,114 people ­were recorded as returning to their homes, including 35,654 in Wuxi.51 What these figures do not show is the reasons that people ­were moving. The autumn campaign took place during harvest time, so many ­were probably farmers returning from jobs in the city or traveling from village to village looking for short-­term work. Indeed, Japa­nese surveyors recorded how farming ­house­holds in Kaiyuan continued to rely heavily on supple-

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mentary income from family members who had entered the rural and urban labor markets. Although they do not say whether the large number of family members working in Shanghai had migrated before the war, the agricultural labor market certainly continued to provide employment opportunities, and the movement of people during the qingxiang campaigns suggests that they merely disrupted but did not destroy the normal patterns of temporary and permanent migration that had been so important to the prosperity of the region for so many years.52 It was not just the flow of people that was interrupted by the campaigns. On 20 October 1941, the Blockade Affairs Office of the Qingxiang Committee ordered each Special Area Office to implement the same regulations governing the inspection and transport of goods that had applied during the first campaign.53 Some products, such as machinery, gunpowder, and certain medicines, which all had military applications, could not be moved at all. Others could be transported into and out of the blockaded areas, but licenses ­were required and a transit tax imposed. The list was long and included matches, alcohol, tobacco, ethanol, salt, and flour.54 The Kafkaesque application pro­cess had been introduced for the first campaign, and although the officials in charge moved from Shanghai to Suzhou, it remained an impediment to trade. Those wishing to transport goods to Shanghai had to send separate licenses for production and shipping to the Qingxiang Supervisory Office in Suzhou, where they ­were passed on to Japa­nese officials and an institution called the Number Seven Shanghai Accounts Office. Applications to ship goods to other parts of occupied central China did not have to go through this last stage, but everyone had to report in person to the Special Area Office to pick up the licenses.55 The major impact of these regulations was to create shortages of many daily goods and increase the prices of those that remained. Despite the best efforts of local officials, prices had been rising slowly throughout the occupation. For example, 1 shi of rice in September 1938 was 9.1 yuan, but by the following July it had risen to over 16 yuan, while one bag of flour ­rose from 3.8 yuan to 4.4 yuan over the same period. However, in the second half of 1938 a wide array of goods was still available in Wuxi, including many different types of foodstuffs, cloth, matches, oil, and hardware.56 The impact of the campaigns was to exacerbate these trends. Inside the blockaded area the price of rice ­rose steadily throughout 1941 from just over 80 yuan per shi in January to 120 yuan in October.57 Although some of this rise can be attributed to general war­time inflation, local officials complained that during July and August, prices increased as much as fourfold.58 Officials re-

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Table 3 Prices in the special area before and after the blockade Product name

Price before blockade/yuan

Price after blockade/yuan

Soybean oil Oil Sugar Matches Soap Salt Soy sauce Wine Tea Coarse cloth Fine cloth Rice Wheat Flour

175 48 180 192 47 52 30 54 220 80 72 80 70 53

215 52 210 220 54 64 36 58 250 92 84 92 88 62

justify

justify

justify

justify

justify

justify

.

Source: “Wuxi tebiequ di yiqu ge xiangzhen wuzi zhuangkuang diaocha biao, minguo sanshi nian jiuyue zhi shiyue xi,” WMA ML1-4-1392.

sponded by commissioning surveys into the economy of the blockaded zones. Table 3 lists the prices of basic goods before and after the imposition of the blockade from the fourth sector around Anzhen. They ­were all imported from Wuxi City and ­were recorded as being insufficient for the population of the area, meaning that shortages existed, while goods that ­were available for purchase had increased in price. The restrictions on commerce also had an impact on Wuxi City. Whether claims that it was the New Fourth Army that managed to stop goods from getting into the city in 1941 are true or not, anecdotal evidence suggests that prices ­were also rising for urban residents.59 Local businesses complained to the county governor that the price of fuel had increased and profits ­were falling. These seem to have had little effect as two weeks later, the Fuel Business Association again complained that boats carry­ing fuel had been stopped from entering Wuxi City and asked for police protection.60 Things did not get much better as the closure of transport routes to northern Jiangsu prevented wheat from being shipped into the city, and flour mills reported a shortage of supplies in October.61 Clearly, stringent regulations on movement of people and goods during the qingxiang campaigns, which mirrored the blockade of the city after the assassination of Yang Shoutong, had a detrimental impact on the connections between city, town, and village

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that ­were both a cause and consequence of urbanization. However, at the same time, the extension of such a regulatory environment to the countryside not only reflected the reality of living under occupation but also exposed people to a war­time state machinery that increasingly sought to impose itself on the physical, social, and, as we shall now see, discursive spaces that they inhabited. Discursive Environment

Just as the memorial ser­vice surrounding the death of magistrate Yang provided the Japa­nese with an opportunity to promote their Greater East Asian Co-­prosperity Sphere, so the qingxiang campaigns extended this to the countryside. At the beginning of the second campaign, a Book for the Masses (Minzhongshu), which is more of a short pamphlet than a book, was published. The anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China on 10 October (called Double Ten Day) provided a perfect opportunity for dissemination of the multiple meanings incorporated into the campaigns, and celebrations ­were or­ga­nized in many towns across the special area. They included a large public meeting in Anzhen, which was attended by a thousand people who listened as the Book for the Masses was read out.62 It is difficult to know how the audience responded to this reading; the book contains the same mix of discursive elements that ­were present in the memorial ser­v ice for Yang Shoutong. It began like many prewar surveys and guidebooks by focusing on Wuxi’s regional importance. “Dear countrymen, now the work of cleaning the countryside has begun in Wuxi. Everyone knows that Wuxi County is the most important county in the Shanghai-­Nanjing area with developed commerce and industry, a large population, and a high level of culture.” However, it continued, the invasion had brought with it great suffering, particularly in the countryside, where “the rampaging of bandits and the extortion of ruffians makes you catch your breath at the extent of the devastation.” In such difficult circumstances, it was up to the government to take the lead in establishing security and leading recovery. “The object of the qingxiang campaign is to establish law and order and improve the national economy, because if law and order gradually deteriorates then the national economy also cannot be improved.” The book then turned to the campaign in Wuxi, which it admitted would cause all sorts of temporary problems, such as disruption to production and distribution of goods as well as transport. After mentioning but downplaying the help from Japa­nese forces in pursuing

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Communist guerrillas, the book emphasized po­liti­cal aspects of the campaign before concluding, “We hope you will all quickly stand up, that everyone will stand up together to help complete the great task of cleaning the countryside, and create the basis for one hundred years of peace and a glorious future for China.” 63 Read to an audience in a small town, where national flags ­were doubtless hanging, this document connected the people of Anzhen to national and global events. Although the relationship between their war­time trials, the prosperity that they ­were being promised, and wider Japa­nese imperial ambitions was not as explicit as in the speech given by the head of the Japa­ nese Special Ser­v ices Department at Yang’s memorial ser­v ice over a year before, the local and the national ­were still entwined. If, as I argued in chapter 5, the urbanization of the countryside includes the increased ability of the state to project its discourses onto physical spaces through road building and other infrastructure development, then the Double Ten Day meeting in Anzhen can also be seen in this light—­except that this time the messages conveyed did more than merely link Anzhen to a sociospatial shift that privileged the city. They also carried with them promises of prosperity within a new East Asian order. The ending of the second qingxiang campaign was marked by a visit from an official delegation, led by Wang Jingwei. Arriving by train from Nanjing on the morning of 3 December, Wang was greeted by representatives from the local government and many commercial, media, and civic organizations. Crowds cheered him as he disembarked from the train, many holding flags to welcome him to the city. After a short trip to Jiangyin, he returned to Wuxi and stayed one night in the city before traveling out to Anzhen the following morning and then on to Changshu.64 No description of his visit to Anzhen exists, but it is difficult to believe that Cao Xiang and other local officials would not have arranged a welcoming party, with all its pomp and propaganda. Wang’s visit illustrates the extent to which the location of the qingxiang campaigns caused the center of the county to shift from Wuxi to Anzhen. This is not to say that the city ceased to be important, that commerce and industry shut down, that trains no longer stopped at the station and factories closed their gates. Rather, for nearly half a million people living in the special area, Anzhen, not Wuxi City, became the locus of activity, and this in turn drove the urbanization of the county. —-1 —0 —+1

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Just a few short days after Wang Jingwei’s visit to Wuxi, the Japa­nese bombed Pearl Harbor. The outbreak of war in the Asia-­Pacific severed the remaining links between Jiangnan and the international economy and precipitated the region’s decline. Although Wang’s government slowly acquired more control over occupied China, continuing Japa­nese demands for rice, wheat, and other products, particularly after the launching of Operation Ichigō, which was a Japa­nese army attempt to open a land route to French Indochina in 1944, rising prices and then hyperinflation combined to bring about a complete collapse of the economy. The population of Wuxi certainly suffered, with one resident complaining that only prostitution prospered amid the slump.1 Peace brought little respite, and despite the best efforts of the Nationalist government, towards the end of the 1940s hyperinflation returned to blight the Lower Yangtze Delta once more. Even amid these trials, urbanization continued. In October 1945, the first meeting of the Demobilization Committee was held. Members recognized that years of occupation had taken their toll on Wuxi. Problems included economic decline, physical destruction, widespread banditry, prostitution, and gambling. In addition to stressing the importance of improving people’s morality, the committee recommended the restoration of county government, promotion of culture and education, reform of agriculture, and building of transport infrastructure.2 Meanwhile, Rong Desheng, whose postwar views on the future of Wuxi ­were discussed in the introduction to this book, was not the only member of the city’s elite to be hopeful about the future. Writing just after the end of the war, Xue Mingjian recognized the importance of continued urbanization on a regional scale. He requested central government help in the recovery effort and argued that, with this

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support, the people of Jiangnan could “complete the industrial zone in the area below the Yangtze River, and after this the natural environment of Wuxi and Jiangyin will be altered and commerce and industry will emerge on a large scale. . . . ​Then not only will Wuxi have a reputation as the Little Shanghai, but it could become a great world port.”3 Revival was well under way. The Shenxin Number Three Cotton Mill had restarted operations, and production increased in 1947. In the same year, Rong founded Jiangnan University southwest of the city, and this was followed by the construction of the Kaiyuan Machinery Factory, which expanded until it was taken over by the Communist Government in 1952.4 The postwar urbanization of Wuxi occurred in rapidly changing domestic and international circumstances, as first civil war and then the 1949 Communist victory brought significant changes to systems of production, po­liti­cal structures, and social or­ga­ni­ za­tion. Urbanization in the second half of the twentieth century continued to transform Wuxi, the Lower Yangtze Delta, and China as a ­whole. In this conclusion, I review the central theme of my book, before addressing whether Wuxi was representative of other parts of China and comparing China’s experience with urbanization to that in other countries.

Urbanization and Chinese History In the first half of the twentieth century, urbanization transformed China. Urbanization is far more than simple growth in the number and size of cities. Throughout this book, I have concentrated on its manifestation in the construction and management of physical spaces along the rural-­urban continuum. During the early Republican period, when the state was relatively weak, urbanization was pursued mainly by commercial and industrial elites, who took advantage of the spread of global industrial capitalism into China to establish multisectoral business empires and invest in infrastructure in Wuxi City and surrounding towns and villages. After 1927 urbanization was driven by a developmental state with increasing power over localities, which despite all the problems of policy implementation and the devastation caused by one of the most destructive invasions of the twentieth century, ­were able to shape the way in which the built environment was constructed and managed. This interplay between urbanization and wider historical forces caused a shift in the orientation of the rural-­urban continuum away from the countryside and towards the city and created the basis for the emergence of the urbanized society that we see in China today.

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Urbanization transformed Wuxi County. The city expanded physically, administratively and discursively, and it was often hard to say where the urban ended and the rural began. Moreover, as an ever increasing number of people moved to the city in search of economic opportunities, it grew in population as well as size. This embedded Wuxi more firmly in its hinterland, even as the growth of migrant communities in other cities linked it to the increasingly interconnected regional urban system. In the countryside, urbanization brought some of the environments, experiences, meanings, and spaces seen as exemplifying the city in the first half of the twentieth century to towns, villages, fields, and farm­houses. The urbanization of Wuxi continued through times of crisis as well as calm, and this was particularly the case during the Anti-­Japanese War of Re­sis­tance. As the legacy of the invasion gave way to the pressures of occupation, the recovery of the economy and the built environment in the city and the countryside was influenced but not dominated by the Japa­nese occupation. Instead, Wuxi local elites and the institutions of the state emerged once more to drive urbanization, although, of course, the Japa­nese had the power to impose themselves very directly on the population when they felt threatened. Just as urbanization did not cease during the Anti-­Japanese War of Re­ sis­tance, neither was it derailed by the civil war and Communist Revolution. Its continuation throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-­first century is bringing about one of the greatest transformations in human history, as the world’s most populous nation has become its newest urbanized society. In Wuxi, it is difficult not to wonder at Rong Desheng’s and Xue Mingjian’s prescience when they wrote of a future urban region. At the time of writing, Guangfu Gate, opened up to provide access to the train station, now stands as a mere monument at the end of a short street of bars and clubs styled after the Nanjing 1912 district in China’s former capital. The city has expanded south to Lake Tai, west to Huishan, and gobbled up neighboring towns and villages such as Anzhen, the center of the second qingxiang campaign. High-­speed rail now whisks passengers to Shanghai in under an hour, and, as one stares out of the windows of gleaming white trains departing from vast cavernous stations, it is difficult to see any greenery, apart from a few lonely heavily farmed fields, that provides material evidence of the existence of the countryside amid the factories and skyscrapers that mark the cities of Suzhou and Kunshan. Contemporary urbanization in Wuxi, the wider region and the country as a ­whole, is being driven by the same historical forces as in the first half of the twentieth century. The spread of global capitalism to China in the reform era, a state that remains

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committed to urban development, and the largest peacetime migration of humanity from the countryside to the city mean that the orientation of the rural-­urban continuum towards the city that occurred in the first half of the twentieth century has continued to drive urbanization.

Wuxi and the Lower Yangtze Delta as Representative of China During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Wuxi became the largest commercial and industrial city in China outside the treaty ports. Its proximity to Shanghai, and its location in the heart of what for centuries had been the country’s most commercially prosperous region, ­were key factors in this transformation. However, not all cities in China ­were blessed with Wuxi’s advantages, and in such a large country, regional differences are vast. This makes it important to ask in what respect urbanization in Wuxi was unique. The story set out in these pages obviously has some distinctive features but shares similarities with the situation in other regions of China, particularly on its eastern coast. While never approaching Shanghai in size or importance, other treaty ports, such as Dalian and Tianjin, became centers of commerce, finance, and industry in their own right, linking China to the outside world. This, in turn, oriented their hinterlands towards the coast, although, in the case of southern China, maritime trade had long driven regional development. Not everywhere benefited from China’s integration into the global industrial economy, and some regions declined quite dramatically, but Wuxi’s experience was far from unique, and the prosperity of the Lower Yangtze Delta was emulated elsewhere. This suggests that, during the first half of the twentieth century, urbanization occurred first and fastest in the east, a pattern of development that is characteristic of the reform era, although treaty ports and commercial settlements have been replaced with special economic zones as nodes linking China to the global economy. Discussing the urbanization of China’s coast leaves vast tracts of the country unaccounted for, and there can be no doubt that some regions changed very little during the first half of the twentieth century. However, the rise of centers of commerce, industry, and po­liti­cal power, such as Chongqing or Lanzhou during the war, also meant that hinterlands ­were urbanizing. More work is required to link the particularities of urbanization in western China to general trends. It may be that during the Republican era, the impact of industrialization and the power of the developmental state was greatest on parts of the coast and that it took the war against

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the Japa­nese to urbanize the interior. If so, then this may help to explain how the shift in the orientation of the rural-­urban continuum towards the city resulted in a remarkable uniformity of urban landscape after 1949, although, of course, priorities of socialist planners must also be taken into account.

Chinese Urbanization and Urban History Urbanization describes how societies change spatially and temporally. It is never an entirely in­de­pen­dent variable but, rather, a way of explaining how the impact of large historical forces is manifested at different scales. Whether we seek to understand the transformation of China since the end of the Qing Dynasty through an analytical lens of modernity, industrialization, nation formation, revolution, state development, or a combination of these factors and more, explaining their impact in space as well as time is very difficult because of the sheer size of the country, the number of people involved, and the rapid sequence of so many transformative historical events. Throughout this book, I have focused on urbanization as a variable that mediated the impact of industrial capitalism and the emergence of the developmental state on Chinese society. In doing so, I have deliberately avoided using modernity as a primary analytic. This is because I believe that the manner in which the global discourse of an emerging rural-­urban gap during periods of industrialization was manifested in China has influenced historical scholarship to the point that urbanization has been somewhat de-­emphasized as an explanatory variable. Despite this, it is important to remember that my analysis does not invalidate the application of modernity, or indeed any other analytic, to China. Indeed, to the extent that modernity encompasses industrialization and the rise of the nation-­state, not to mention a host of significant social and cultural changes, to use the language of Lefebvre, it is perhaps the farthest-­order causal factor. However, its effects are still mediated by urbanization, since they differ in space as well as time. The per­sis­tence of the influence of the rural-­urban gap discourse on the historiography of China is perhaps one of the most distinctive features of Chinese urban history, although comparison of the history of this discourse with other parts of the world would be fruitful. There are certainly features peculiar to China’s experience of urbanization, but dating its emergence as an urbanized society to the end of the nineteenth century and seeing this story as part of industrialization and state-­development opens the door for comparative studies. This is because urbanization was not just the result

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of semicolonialism but caused by the country’s increasing incorporation into global historical pro­cesses. Globalization has a longer history, but, particularly after the industrial revolution, cities across the world with their increasingly similar urban fabrics, industrial production pro­cesses, heightened levels of consumption, style and taste, po­liti­cal structures seeking to mold residents into citizens, and social organizations and relationships that are less oriented around the family have increasingly come to resemble one another. The emergence of a truly global urbanized society in the twenty-­first century challenges us as historians to search for common causes wherever they may appear. This is not to deny the specificity of local case studies. Rather, it is to admit that the same historical forces may be common features of what appear to be ostensibly very different stories of urban development. China’s integration into increasingly globalizing trajectories of historical change, and indeed its increasingly prominent position within them, is one of the most important developments of the twenty-­first century. Although the history of these global interactions goes back hundreds of years, the first half of the twentieth century marked an important stage, because it was the period when the rural-­urban continuum, which for centuries had been oriented towards the countryside, shifted to become firmly oriented towards the city. Understanding how the city and the countryside in Wuxi urbanized during this period ultimately tells us much about the impact of wider historical forces on China and provides clues as to their continued effects on the region, the country as a ­whole, and the world at large.

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Character List

This list does not include names of books that appear in the bibliography and well-­known names such as Shanghai or Chiang Kaishek. Changzhou ​常州 Chengdu ​成都 “Chengzhenxiang difang zizhi zhangcheng” (Regulations on Local Self-­Government in Cities, Towns, and Districts) ​城鎮鄉 地方自治章程 Chen Hansheng ​陳翰笙 Chen Meimei ​陳妹妹 Chen Zemin ​陳則民 Chen Zhanru ​陳湛如 Chongan (Temple) ​崇安 cun (village) ​村 Dadao (Government) ​大道 Dajing (Silk Filature) ​大經 Dalian ​大連 Damin hui ​大民會 dan ​擔 dan ​石 (also pronounced shi) Danyang ​丹陽 Daqiangmen ​大牆門 Daqingmenkou ​大慶門口 Dasheng (Cotton Mill) ​大生 Da Shijie (entertainment center) ​大世界 Dashiqiao ​大市橋 Ding (Pagoda) ​丁 Ding Fubao ​丁福保 Ding Fulian ​丁福憐 Donglin (Academy) ​東林 Dongqi (Station) ​東旂 Dongting ​東亭 Dongwu (University) ​東吳

A Nan ​阿南 Andili ​岸低里 Anhui ​ 安徽 Anzhen ​安鎮 bang (clique) ​帮 Bao`an (Temple) ​保安 baojia (system of family registration) ​保甲 Baojiazhuang ​ 鮑家莊 Baojieqiao ​寶界橋 Baoxing (Flour Mill, Rice Mill) ​保興 Bashiqiao ​八士橋 Beidajie ​ 北大街 Beishang ​北上 Bei Shi ​悲士 Beitang ​北塘 Beixia ​北下 Beiyang ​北洋 Beizhakou ​北柵口 Bi Shenfang ​畢莘舫 Bodugang ​伯瀆港 Cai Jiansan ​蔡兼三 Canye Gaijin Zhidaosuo (Sericulture Improvement Direction Office) ​蠶業改 進指導所 Canye Zhidao Banshichu (Sericulture Direction Office) ​蠶業指導辦事處 Canye Zhidaosuo (Sericulture Direction Office) ​ 蠶業指導所 Cao Xiang ​曹湘 Caozhuang ​ 曹庄 Changshu ​ 常熟

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Dong Xiujia ​董修甲 Dongze ​ 東澤 dou ​斗 Entan (Street) ​恩潭 fang (township) ​坊 Fangqiao ​方橋 Fan Wanghu ​范望湖 fei xian wei shi (abolish the county to establish the city) ​非縣為市 Fengfudun ​ 鳳阜墩 Fengsuo Shichu (Blockade Affairs Office)  ​封鎖事處 奉天 Fengtian ​ Feng Yuxiang ​馮玉祥 Feng Zupei ​馮祖培 fu (prefecture) ​府 富安 Fu’an ​ Fufeng (Mill) ​阜丰 Furong (Dike) ​芙蓉 Fusheng (Ware­house) ​復生 Fuxin (Mill) ​福新 Fuxing (Road) ​復興 Gangqiaobang ​扛橋浜 Gao Jiansi ​高踐四 Gao Xiaomei ​高小妹 Gao Zhongjun ​高仲均 Gongshangbu guanli xiaoxing zhisi gongchang zanxing guize (Provisional Regulations for the Ministry of Commerce to Manage Small-­Scale Silk 工商部管理小型制絲工場暫 Filatures) ​ 行規則 gongsuo (public office) ​公所 Guangfu (Temple, Gate) ​光復 Guangqin (Cotton Mill, Soap Factory, Silk Filature, Flour Mill) ​廣勤 Guangxi ​廣西 Guangzhou ​廣州 guanzhi (official rule) ​管治 Guanzhuangheng ​觀莊橫 Gu Binsheng ​顧彬生 Gu Hanfei ​顧翰飛 Guo Wangshi ​過王氏 Haimen ​海門 hang (broker) ​行 Han Guojun ​韓國鈞 Hangzhou ​杭州 Hanlin (Academy) ​翰林 Hebei ​ 河北 Henan ​ 河南 Hengji (Engineering Institute) ​恆記

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Hetangqiao ​河塘橋 Hongkou ​ 虹口 Hongren (Ware­house) ​宏仁 Houqiao ​后橋 Houqijie ​後祁街 Huai (River) ​淮 Huaishang ​ 壞上 Huaixia ​ 壞下 黃埠墩 Huangbudun ​ Huangjia (Dike) ​黃家 Huangniqiao ​黃泥橋 Huangshan ​黃山 Huanshanqiao ​歡善橋 Huashenmiao ​花神廟 Hua Wenchuan ​華文川 Huaxing (Lane) ​華興 Hubei ​湖北 Hudi ​ 胡棣 Huimin (Silk Filature Company) ​惠民 Huishan ​ 惠山 Huishanbang (Road) ​惠山浜 Hu Jiechang ​胡介昌 hukou (house­hold registration) ​戶口 Hushuguan ​ 滸墅關 Huzhou ​ 湖州 Jiading ​嘉定 Jiangbei ​江北 Jiang Genbao ​蔣根寶 Jiangnan ​江南 Jiangsu ​江苏 Jiangxi  江西 Jiangyin ​江陰 Jiang Zhizhong ​蔣執中 Jianjia Pingyi Weiyuanhui (Cocoon Price Consultation Committee) ​繭價評議委 員會 Jiejingqiao ​界涇橋 jin ​斤 Jinan ​濟南 Jinfeng (Silk Filature) ​錦丰 Jingyun ​景雲 Jinji (Silk Filature) ​錦記 Jinling (University) ​金陵 Jinshan ​金山 Jiufeng (Flour Mill) ​九丰 Kaifeng ​ 開封 Kaihua ​開化 Kaiyuan ​ 開源 Kunshan ​崑山 laodong zizhiqu (worker self-­government district) ​ 勞動自治區

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C h a r a ct e r L i s t

laohuzao (tiger stove) ​老虎灶 li ​里 Liang Hongzhi ​梁鴻志 liangminzheng (“good person’s pass”)  ​良民證 Liangxi (River) ​梁溪 Li Guanjie ​李冠傑 Li Guanyu ​李關玉 Li Hongzhang ​李鸿章 Lin Xuancai ​林軒材 Lishe ​裡社 Liu Gensheng ​劉根生 Liutanqiao ​劉潭橋 Lixin (Factory) ​麗新 Liyang ​溧陽 Li Yanyu ​李延玉 Li Yuan ​蠡園 Luoshe ​洛社 Lu Yongxiang ​路甬祥 Mao Wenrong ​毛文榮 Maoxiangjie ​毛巷街 Maoxin (Flour Mill) ​茂新 Meicun ​ 梅村 Meiyuan (Plum Garden) ​梅園 Minzhongshu (Book for the Masses) ​民眾書 mu ​亩 Nanli ​ 南里 Nanfangquan ​南方泉 Nanning ​ 南寧 Nanqiaozhen ​南橋鎮 Nantong ​南通 Nanxinqiao ​南新橋 Nanyan ​南延 Nanyangli ​南陽里 Nimura Minoru ​二村穰氏 Ningshao (Native Place Society) ​寧紹 Ningbo ​寧波 Pan Genxiao ​潘根小 Piaoyang ​漂陽 pingfang (one-­story ­houses with white walls and black-­tiled roofs) ​平方 Puren (Hospital) ​普仁 putong shi (ordinary city) ​普通市 Pu Yinda ​浦殷大 Qian Fenggao ​錢風高 Qian Jihou ​錢基厚 Qian Jingsheng ​錢鏡生 Qianqiao ​錢橋 Qiansheng (Silk Filature) ​乾生 Qian Zhongliang ​錢仲良 qianzhuang (old-­style bank) ​錢莊

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Qingcheng ​青城 Qingdao ​青島 Qingfeng (Cotton Mill) ​慶丰 qingxiang (clean the countryside) ​清乡 Qin Lianggong ​秦亮工 qipao (Chinese-­style dress) ​旗袍 Qipu (Road) ​七浦 Qishuyan (Power Station) ​戚墅堰 Qi Xieyuan ​齊燮元 Rihuiqiao ​日暉橋 Rong Desheng ​荣德生 Rongguang (Cotton Shop) ​榮廣 Rongxiang ​荣香 Rong Yaoguang ​榮耀光 Rong Yaoliang ​榮耀亮 Rong Zongjing ​榮宗敬 Ruiyu (Ironworks) ​瑞裕 Runfeng (Vegetable Oil Pro­cessing Factory) ​ 润丰 Sange Modeng Nüxing (Three Modern Women) ​三个摩登女性 Sanliqiao ​三里桥 Shandong ​山东 shangbu (commercial settlement) ​商埠 Shantou ​ 山頭 Shaoxiang ​邵巷 Shaoxing ​绍兴 Shenchang (Ironworks) ​升昌 Shenxin (Company) ​申新 shi (city) ​市 shikumen (stone portal) ​石库門 Shimen (Dike) ​石門 Shirasawa Shigeru ​白澤茂氏 Shitangwan ​石塘灣 Shiyebu guanli shougong zhisiye zanxing banfa (Provisional Method for the Ministry of Commerce to Manage the Handicraft Silk Trade) ​實業部管理手工制絲業暫行 辦法 Shiye jihua (Industrial Plan) ​事業計畫 Shi zizhi fa (City self-­government law) ​ 市自治法 Shuanghe (Dike) ​雙河 Shuangmiaozhen  雙廟鎮 Song Jingyan ​宋靜延 Song Xueliang ​宋學良 Song Zhentao ​宋鎮濤 Suchangtai ​蘇常太 Sun Chuanfang ​孫傳芳 Sunxiang ​孫巷 Suzhou ​蘇州

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Sun Zuji ​孫祖基 Taibo ​ 泰伯 Tai hu ​太湖 太平 Taiping ​ Tang Baoqian ​唐保謙 Tangkou ​ 湯口 塘頭 Tangtou ​ Tangzha ​唐閘 Tang Ziliang  唐子良 Tan Jinsheng ​談金生 Tao He ​韜盒 Tao Jize ​陶繼澤 tebie qu (special area) ​特別區 tebie shi (special city) ​特別市 Tianjin ​ 天津 Tianshang ​天上 Tianxia ​天下 Tianzhuqiao ​天主橋 ting (subprefecture) ​廳 Tingziqiao ​亭字橋 Tonghui (Road) ​通惠 tongxianghui (native place society) ​ 同鄉會 Tongyunqiao ​通運橋 Tongzhou ​ 通州 Wanan ​萬安 Wang Genhe ​王根和 Wang Jingwei ​汪精衛 Wang Kexun ​王克循 Wang Yingji ​王映記 Wei Huan`gen ​衛煥根 Wei Huanxiang ​衛煥祥 Wei Sheke ​違設科 wen (copper cash) ​文 Wujin ​武進 Wuli hu ​五里湖 Wu Xiaowu ​吳小五 Wuxi Lühu Tongxianghui (Wuxi Native Place Society for Travelers in Shanghai) ​ 無錫旅滬同鄉會 Wuxi Shizheng Choubei Chu (Wuxi Municipal Planning Department) ​無錫 市政籌備處 Xiaguan ​下關 xian (county) ​縣 xiang (district) ​鄉 Xiao Shanghai ​小上海 Xiao Wuxi ​小無錫 Xiatang (Street) ​下塘 Xideng (Road) ​錫澄

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Xijin (chamber of commerce and native place society) ​錫金 (無錫 and ​金匱 Wuxi and Jinkiu) Xinan ​新安 Xinpu (Foundling home) ​新普 Xingye (Silk Company) ​興業 Xinyuchang (a coal-­selling business) ​新裕昌 Xinzha (Road) ​新閘 Xishan ​錫山 Xu Chaohe ​徐朝合 Xue Mingjian ​薛明劍 Xue Nanming ​薛南明 Xue Shouxuan ​薛壽萱 Xu Jinfu ​徐金福 Xu Jinghua ​徐景華 Xuzhou ​徐州 Yan`an ​延安 Yandai ​ 嚴埭 Yan Enzuo ​嚴恩柞 Yangfuxing (Mill) ​楊復興 Yang Hanxi ​楊韩西 Yangjia (Dike) ​楊家 Yangming ​揚明 Yangqiao ​洋橋 Yang Renqian ​楊仞千 Yang Shoutong ​楊壽桐 Yang Weiyun ​楊味运 Yang Weizhang ​楊蔚章 Yanjiaqiao ​嚴家橋 Yan Keding ​嚴克定 Yan Pensheng ​嚴盆生 Yanqiao ​堰橋 烟台 Yantai ​ Yan Zi`an ​嚴子安 Yao Dixin ​姚涤新 Yaoming (Electric Lighting Company) ​耀明 yilou yidi (one story, one base) ​一樓一底 Yixing ​宜興 Yiyuan (Ware­house and Rice Mill) ​益源 yizhuang (charity hall) ​義莊 Yongda (Silk Cocoon Ware­house) ​永大 Yonglinxiangbang ​湧林巷浜 Yongtai (Silk Filature) ​永泰 Yongxing (Electricity Company) ​永興 You Chunquan ​沋春泉 You Gengyun ​沋耕雲 You Huiji ​尤匯記 You Weidong ​沋維棟 You Yingchuan ​沋映泉 Yuan Duanfu ​袁端甫

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C h a r a ct e r L i s t

Yuantaifeng (Silk Filature) ​原泰丰 Yuanxiaojie (Lantern Festival) ​元宵節 Yuchang (Silk Filature) ​裕昌 Yudaiqiao ​玉帶橋 Yu Jing ​郁鏡 Yukang (Cotton Mill) ​豫康 Yuqizhen ​玉祁鎮 Zhabei ​閘北 Zhang Deqing ​張德卿 Zhang Enshen ​張恩深 Zhang Jian ​張謇 Zhang Jinbao ​張金寶 Zhangjingqiao ​張涇橋 Zhang Kuibo ​張揆伯 Zhang Shimo ​張士謨 Zhangshe ​張舍 Zhang Xipan ​張細盤 Zhang Zizhen ​張子振 Zhang Zongchang ​張宗昌 Zhang Zuolin ​張作霖 Zhejiang ​浙江 zhen (town) ​镇 Zhenhua (Power Station, Electricity 震華 Company) ​

191

镇江 Zhenjiang ​ Zhenxin (Cotton Factory) ​振新 Zhenyi (Silk Filature) ​振藝 Zhili ​直隸 Zhong Bao ​仲寶 Zhongnan (Movie Theater) ​中南 Zhongsheng (Movie Theater) ​中生 Zhongyang (University) ​中央 Zhong Zhaodi ​鐘招弟 zhou (department) ​州 Zhou Daming ​周達明 Zhoujiaqiao ​周家橋 Zhoushanbang ​周山浜 Zhou Shunqing ​周舜卿 Zhouxinzhen ​周新鎮 Zhou Xushi ​周徐氏 Zhou Zhaodi ​周招弟 Zhuangqian ​莊前 Zhu Bo’ang ​朱伯昂 Zhu Jing`an ​朱靜庵 Zhu Shigui ​朱士圭 Zhu Zhangshou ​朱長壽 zizhi (self-­government) ​自治 Zou Jingheng ​鄒景衡

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Notes

Abbreviations The following abbreviations are used in the notes: JPA SMA WMA WXLJK WXLK WXSZ WXZGB

Jiangsu Provincial Archives Shanghai Municipal Archives Wuxi Municipal Archives Wuxi lüjing tongxianghui huikan Wuxi lükan Wuxi shizheng Wuxixian zheng gongbao

Introduction 1. Rong Desheng, “Wuxi zhi jianglai” [The future of Wuxi], in Rong Desheng wenji [Collected works of Rong Desheng], ed. Shanghai daxue, Jiangnan daxue (lenong shiliao) zhengli yanjiu xiaozu xuanbian [Shanghai and Jiangnan University Team for the Study and Collation of Agricultural Historical Materials] (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2002), 225–228. 2. Rong Desheng, “Tan jianshe da Wuxi” [Speaking of constructing a larger Wuxi], in Shanghai daxue et al., Rong Desheng wenji, 496. 3. Ibid., 494–495. 4. John Friedman, China’s Urban Transition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 36–37. 5. Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin, Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructures, Technological Mobilities and the Urban Condition (London: Routledge, 2001), 39–89; Edward Soja, Postmetropolis: Critical Studies of Cities and Regions (London: Blackwell, 2000), 77. For an introduction to the urbanization of Eu­rope, see Andrew Lees and Lynn Hollen Lees, Cities and the Making of Modern Eu­rope, 1750–1814 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 6. For an excellent summary of the literature on urbanization in late imperial China, see Fei Si-­yen, Negotiating Urban Space: Urbanization and Late Ming Nanjing (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009), 10–24; for individual cities, see, for example, Antonia Finnane, Speaking of Yangzhou: A Chinese City, 1550–1850 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia

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Center, 2004); Michael Marmé, Suzhou: Where the Goods of All the Provinces Converge (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005). 7. I use the term “paradigm” in the same sense as Carolyn Cartier to describe a historiographical position so dominant that its articulation is taken up by scholars not specifically addressing it in their work. See Carolyn Cartier, “Origins and Evolution of a Geo­g raph­i­cal Idea: The Macroregion in China,” Modern China 28, no. 1 (January 2002): 107–112. 8. Raymond Williams, The Country and the City (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975). 9. David Matless, Landscape and En­glishness (London: Reaktion Books, 1998); Jeremy Brown, City Versus Countryside in Mao’s China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Martin King Whyte, ed., One Country, Two Societies: Rural-­Urban In­e­qual­ity in Contemporary China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). 10. For discussions of literary views of the rural-­u rban distinction, see Han Xiaorong, Chinese Discourses on the Peasant, 1900–1949 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005); David Faure and Tao Tao Liu, “Introduction,” in their Town and Country in China: Identity and Perception (Oxford: Palgrave, 2002), 1–15; Lu Hanchao, Beyond the Neon Lights: Everyday Shanghai in the Early Twentieth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 3–12. 11. Susan Mann, “Urbanization and Historical Change in China,” Modern China 10, no. 1 (January 1984): 86–107. 12. David Strand, “ ‘A High Place Is No Better than a Low Place’: The City in the Making of Modern China,” in Becoming Chinese: Passages to Modernity and Beyond, ed. Yeh Wen-­Hsin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 104. 13. Joseph W. Esherick, “Modernity and Nation in the Chinese City,” in his Remaking the Chinese City: Modernity and National Identity, 1900–1950 (Honolulu: University of Hawai`i Press, 2000), 2–12. 14. Peter J. Carroll, Between Heaven and Modernity: Reconstructing Suzhou, 1895–1937 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006); Qin Shao, Culturing Modernity: The Nantong Model, 1890–1930 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004); Michael Tsin, Nation, Governance, and Modernity in China: Canton, 1900–1927 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Wang Di, Street Culture in Chengdu: Public Space, Urban Commoners, and Local Politics, 1870–1930 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003). 15. Lu, Beyond the Neon Lights, 13. 16. Ibid., 15–16. 17. Lu Hanchao, “Away from Nanking Road: Small Stores and Neighborhood Life in Modern Shanghai,” Journal of Asian Studies 54, no. 1 (February 1995): 96–99. 18. Leo Ou-­fan Lee, Shanghai Modern: The Flowering of a New Urban Culture in China, 1930– 1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999); Xiong Yuezhi, “Xiangcunli de dushi yu dushili de xiangcun—­lun jindai Shanghai minzhong wenhua tedian” [Cities in villages and villages in cities—­debating points of modern Shanghai pop­u­lar culture], Shilin [Historical Review] 2 (2006); Yeh Wen-­Hsin, Shanghai Splendor: Economic Sentiments and the Making of Modern China, 1843–1949 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); Meng Yue, Shanghai and the Edges of Empires (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006). 19. Henrietta Harrison, “Village Identity in Rural North China: A Sense of Place in the Diary of Liu Dapeng,” in Faure and Liu, Town and Country in China, 85–106; Lu Hanchao, “Small-­ Town China: A Historical Perspective on Rural-­Urban Relations,” in Whyte, One Country, Two Societies, 32–35, 40–47. 20. For discussions of state involvement in the rural economy among high-­level officials, see Margherita Zanasi, Saving the Nation: Economic Modernity in Republican China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 53–78. For discussions of the actions of reformers themselves, see Guy S. Alitto, The Last Confucian: Liang Shu-­ming and the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Charles Hayford, To the People: James Yen and Village China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Kate Merkel-­Hess, “Acting out Reform:

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Theater and Village in the Republican Rural Reconstruction Movement,” Twentieth-­Century China 37, no. 2 (May 2012): 161–180; idem, “A New People: Rural Modernity in Republican China” (PhD diss., University of California–­Irvine, 2009). 21. Fei, Negotiating Urban Space, 20. 22. Lu, “Small-­Town China,” 49. 23. H. J. Dyos, “Agenda for Urban Historians,” in his The Study of Urban History (London: Edward Arnold, 1968), 9. 24. Charles Tilly, “What Good Is Urban History?” Journal of Urban History 22, no. 6 (September 1996): 710. 25. Henri Lefebvre, “The Specificity of the City,” in his Writings on Cities, trans. Eleonore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 100–101. 26. G. William Skinner, “Cities and the Hierarchy of Urban Systems,” in The City in Late Imperial China, ed. G. William Skinner and Hugh R. Baker (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1977), 344–345. 27. Cartier, “Origins and Evolution of a Geo­g raph­i­cal Idea,” 81. 28. Carolyn Cartier, Globalizing South China (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001). 29. Kenneth Pomeranz, The Making of a Hinterland: State, Society, and Economy in Inland North China, 1853–1937 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 30. Henri Lefebvre, “Industrialization and Urbanization,” in his Writings on Cities, 69–71. For a concise summary of the relationship between capitalism and urbanization, see R. J. Holton, Cities, Capitalism and Civilization (London: Routledge, 2007). 31. There is a wealth of literature on Jiangnan in the Ming and Qing Dynasties. For a description of the embeddedness of cities in the region, see Mark Elvin, “Market Towns and Waterways: The County of Shang-­hai from 1480 to 1910,” in Skinner, The City in Late Imperial China, 441–474; Marmé, Suzhou, 127–153; William T. Rowe, “Introduction: City and Region in the Lower Yangzi,” in Cities of Jiangnan in Late Imperial China, ed. Linda Cooke Johnson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), 10–13. For a good survey of the literature in Chinese, see Ren Fang, Zhongguo shizhen de lishi yanjiu yu fangfa [Methods and studies in the history of Chinese cities and towns] (Beijing: Shangwu yinshu guan, 2010), 5–40. Two recent works not covered in this review are An Tao, Zhongxin yu bianyuan: Mingqing yilai jiangnan shizhen jingji shehui zhuanxing yanjiu yi Jinshan xian shi zhen wei zhongxin de kaocha [Center and periphery: Studies in the economic and social transformation of cities and towns in Jiangnan during the Ming and Qing with a focus on cities and towns in Jinshan County] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2010); Luo Jing, Jiangnan shizhen wangluo yu jiaowangli: Yi chengze jingji, shehui bianqian wei zhongxin (1368–1950) [Networks and contacts between the cities and towns of Jiangnan focusing on the flourishing economy and social changes, 1368–1950] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2010). For comparisons with Western Eu­rope and global connections, see Timothy Brook, Vermeer’s Hat: The Seventeenth Century and the Dawn of the Global World (London: Profile Books, 2009); Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Eu­rope, and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton University Press, 2000). 32. Loren Brandt, Commercialization and Agricultural Development: Central and Eastern China, 1870–1937 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); David Faure, The Rural Economy of Pre-­Liberation China: Trade Expansion and Peasant Livelihood in Jiangsu and Guangdong, 1870– 1937 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Philip C. Huang, The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 117–143. 33. Lynda S. Bell, One Industry, Two Chinas: Silk Filatures and Peasant-­Family Production in Wuxi County, 1895–1937 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Kathy le Mons Walker, Chinese Modernity and the Peasant Path: Semicolonialism in the Northern Yangzi Delta (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999). 34. G. William Skinner, “Regional Urbanization in Nineteenth-­Century China,” in Skinner and Baker, The City in Late Imperial China, 228; Carroll, Between Heaven and Modernity; Christian

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Henriot, Shanghai 1927–1937: Municipal Power, Locality and Modernization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); William G. Skinner, “Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China: Part II,” Journal of Asian Studies 24, no. 2 (February 1965): 213; Kristin Eileen Stapleton, Civilizing Chengdu: Chinese Urban Reform, 1895–1937 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000); David Strand, Rickshaw Beijing: City People and Politics in the 1920s (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). 35. Sherman Cochran, Encountering Chinese Networks: Western, Japa­nese, and Chinese Corporations in China, 1880–1937 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 44–69; Frank Dikötter, Exotic Commodities: Modern Objects and Everyday Life in China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006); Linda Grove, A Chinese Economic Revolution: Rural Entrepreneurship in the Twentieth Century (Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006). 36. Qin, Culturing Modernity, 30–31, 55–76, 106–126; Elizabeth Köll, From Cotton Mill to Business Empire: The Emergence of Regional Enterprises in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2003), 55–122. 37. Liang Bozhi, “Wuxi fengguang qiyi” [Wuxi scenery part 1], Hanxie zhoukan [Weekly Journal of Sweat and Blood] 4, no. 24 (17 June 1935): 390; Thomas G. Rawski, Economic Growth in Prewar China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 81; “Wuhu Xiao Shanghai” [Alas for Little Shanghai], Wuxi ribao [Wuxi Daily] (24 October 1918). 38. Zhongping Chen, Modern China’s Network Revolution: Chambers of Commerce and Sociopo­ liti­cal Change in the Early Twentieth Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011); Joseph W. Esherick and Mary Backus Rankin, ed., Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Mary Backus Rankin, Elite Activism and Po­liti­cal Transformation in China, Zhejiang Province, 1865–1911 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986); R. Keith Schoppa, Chinese Elites and Po­liti­cal Change: Zhejiang Province in the Early Twentieth Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982). 39. William C. Kirby, “Engineering China: Birth of the Developmental State, 1928–1937,” in Yeh, Becoming Chinese, 138. 40. Strand, “ ‘A High Place Is No Better than a Low Place,’ ” 114. 41. Zwia Lipkin, Useless to the State: “Social Problems” and Social Engineering in Nationalist Nanjing, 1927–1937 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University East Asia Center, 2006); Ruth Rogaski, Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-­Port China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Tsin, Nation, Governance and Modernity in China. 42. Kirby, “Engineering China,” 145–146. 43. Katherine Bernhardt, Rents, Taxes, and Peasant Re­s is­tance: The Lower Yangzi Region, 1840–1950 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 189–220; Prasenjit Duara, Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900–1942 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988); Huaiyin Li, Village Governance in North China, 1875–1936 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005); Rebecca Nedostup, Superstitious Regimes: Religion and the Politics of Chinese Modernity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009); Pomeranz, The Making of a Hinterland, 238–265. 44. For the debate on administrative definitions of the city, see Carroll, Between Heaven and Modernity, 14–17; Stapleton, Civilizing Chengdu, 229–237. The importance of the province and its relationship with other levels of government are dealt with in John Fitzgerald, “The Province in History,” in his Rethinking China’s Provinces, (London: Routledge, 2002), 1–41; Philip Kuhn, “The Development of Local Government,” in The Cambridge History of China, Volume 13: Republican China, 1912–1949, Part 2, ed. John K. Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 345–352; Elizabeth J. Remick, Building Local States: China during the Republican and Post-­Mao Eras (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004), 12– 13; Julia Strauss, “The Evolution of Republican Government,” China Quarterly, no. 150 (June 1997): 350.

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45. Stapleton, Civilizing Chengdu, 181–216; Strand, Rickshaw Beijing, 198–221. Works that bridge the divide include Lee, Shanghai Modern; Frederic Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, 1927–1937 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Yeh, Shanghai Splendor. 46. See, for example, Stephen R. MacKinnon, Wuhan, 1938: War, Refugees, and the Making of Modern China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008); Lee McIsaac, “The City as Nation: Creating a War­time Capital in Chongqing,” in Esherick, Remaking the Chinese City, 174–191; Edna Tow, “The Great Bombing of Chongqing and the Anti-­Japanese War, 1937–1945,” in The Battle for China: Essays on the Military History of the Sino-­Japanese War of 1937–1945, ed. Mark Peattie, Edward Drea, and Hans van de Ven (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 256–282; Yeh Wen-­Hsin, ed., War­t ime Shanghai (London: Routledge, 1998); Yeh Wen-­Hsin and Christian Henriot, eds., In the Shadow of the Rising Sun: Shanghai under Japa­nese Occupation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 47. Gregor Benton, New Fourth Army: Communist Re­s is­tance along the Yangtze and the Huai, 1938–1941 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Chen Yung-fa, Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 1937–1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Micah S. Muscolino, “Refugees, Land Reclamation, and Militarized Landscapes in War­time China: Huanglongshan, Shaanxi, 1937–45,” Journal of Asian Studies 69, no. 2 (May 2010): 453–478. 48. See, for example, Diana Lary and Stephen MacKinnon, eds., Scars of War: The Impact of Warfare on Modern China (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2001); Stephen R. MacKinnon, Diana Lary, and Ezra F. Vogel, China at War: Regions of China, 1937–45 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007); Rana Mitter, China’s War with Japan 1937–1945: The Struggle for Survival (London: Allen Lane, 2013); R. Keith Schoppa, In a Sea of Bitterness: Refugees during the Sino-­Japanese War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). 49. Brown, City versus Countryside in Mao’s China; Thomas J. Campanella, The Concrete Dragon: China’s Urban Revolution and What It Means for the World (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ton Architectural Press, 2008); Jacob Eyferth, Eating Rice from Bamboo Roots: The Social History of a Community of Handicraft Papermakers in Rural Sichuan, 1920–2000 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard East Asian Monographs, 2009); James Z. Gao, The Communist Takeover of Hangzhou: The Transformation of City and Cadre (Honolulu: University of Hawai`i Press, 2004).

Chapter 1: The “Little Shanghai” 1. Qin, Culturing Modernity, 214–228; Köll, From Cotton Mill to Business Empire, 55–122, 211–250; Carroll, Between Heaven and Modernity, 32–39, 48; Yu Xiaobo, Bijiao yu shenshi: “Nantong moshi” yu “Wuxi moshi” yanjiu [Comparison and examination: Studying in the Nantong and Wuxi models] (Hefei: Anhui jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001), 210–213. 2. Bell, One Industry, Two Chinas, 17–21, 50–61, 90–96; Cochran, Encountering Chinese Networks, 117–146; Rankin, Elite Activism and Po­liti­cal Transformation in China; Schoppa, Chinese Elites and Po­liti­cal Change. 3. See, for example, David Bray, Social Space and Governance in Urban China: The Danwei System from Origins to Reform (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005); Mark Frazier, The Making of the Chinese Industrial Workplace: State, Revolution and Labor Management (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Emily Honig, Sisters and Strangers: Women in the Shanghai Cotton Mills, 1919–1949 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986); Lu, Beyond Neon Lights; Wang, Street Culture in Chengdu; Elizabeth Perry, Shanghai on Strike: The Politics of Chinese Labor (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993). 4. Wang Yiya, “Wuxi dushi dili zhi yanjiu” [Research on the geography of Wuxi City], Dili xuebao [Journal of the Geo­g raph­i­cal Society of China] 2, no. 3 (1935): 32–33.

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5. Chou Meizhen and Wu Zhongzhen, “Shilun Wuxi mishi de xingcheng he fazhan” [Discussing the form and development of Wuxi’s rice market], in Wuxi jindai jingji fazhan shi lun [Discussions on the history of the development of the modern economy in Wuxi], ed. Li Zufa and Mao Jiaqi (Wuxi: Qiye guanli chubanshe, 1988), 231; Wang Gengtang and Tang Keke, eds., Wuxi jindai jingji shi [History of the modern Wuxi economy] (Beijing: Xuefan chubanshe, 1993), 28. For shi and other mea­sure words, see the list of Weights and Mea­sures. 6. Bell, One Industry, Two Chinas, 40–41; Lillian Li, China’s Silk Trade: Traditional Industry in the Modern World, 1842–1937 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1981), 46–57; Huang, The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta, 44–46; Wang and Tang, Wuxi jindai jingji shi, 29. 7. Wang and Tang, Wuxi jindai jingji shi, 24–27. 8. Wuxishi liangshiju [Wuxi City Grain Bureau], ed., Wuxi liangshi zhi [Wuxi grain guide] (Jilin: Jilin kexue yishu chubanshe, 1990), 25; Zhang Fengming and Hu Shoukang, “Kangzhan qian Wuxi zui fanrong de shangye shikou Beidajie” [North street, Wuxi’s most prosperous commercial junction before the war], in Wuxi wenshi ziliao, dishiliuji [Wuxi cultural historical materials, vol. 16], ed. Wuxishi zhengxie weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui [Wuxi City Po­liti­cal Consultative Committee, Historical and Cultural Materials Research Committee] (Wuxi: Wuxixian renmin yinshua chang, 1987), 111. 9. The description of Shanghai in such terms refers to the titles of two recent volumes: Nara Dillon and Jean C. Oi, eds., At the Crossroads of Empires: Middlemen, Social Networks, and State-­ Building in Republican Shanghai (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008); Meng, Shanghai and the Edges of Empires. 10. Linda Cooke Johnson, Shanghai from Market Town to Treaty Port, 1074–1858 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 221. 11. Antonia Finnane, “The Origins of Prejudice: The Malintegration of Subei in Late Imperial China,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 35, no. 2 (1993); Ma Xueqiang, “Jindai Shanghai chengzhan zhong de ‘Jiangnan yinsu’ ” [The ‘Jiangnan factor’ in the growth of modern Shanghai], Shilin [Historical Review] 3 (2003): 45; Marmé, Suzhou, 19; Meng, Shanghai and the Edges of Empires, xvii–­x ix. 12. Li, China’s Silk Trade, 74–76. 13. Bell, One Industry, Two Chinas, 49–50; Li, China’s Silk Trade, 158–159. 14. Bell, One Industry, Two Chinas, 50 and 180. 15. Ibid., 93–97, 157; Wang and Tang, Wuxi jindai jingji shi, 71. 16. Bell, One Industry, Two Chinas, 55 and 64; Li, China’s Silk Trade, 177 and 179. 17. “Zhang Enshen, Gu Su’re, Lü Huantai interview (1981),” in Jindai Wuxi cansiye ziliao xuanji [Selected materials in the modern Wuxi silk industry], ed. Gao Jingyue and Yan Xuexi (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1987), 95. 18. Bell, One Industry, Two Chinas, 91; Wang and Tang, Wuxi jindai jingji shi, 69–70. 19. Bell, One Industry, Two Chinas, 52; Qian Zhonghan, “Zhou Shunqing: Wo guo jindai gongshangye zibenjia daibiao renwu zhiyi” [Zhou Shunqing: A representative of my country’s industrial and commercial capitalists], in Gao and Yan, Jindai Wuxi cansiye ziliao xuanji, 32–34; Wang Jingyu, “Zhongguo jindai gongye shi ziliao di er ji” [Historical materials of China’s modern industry, vol. 2]: 952, in ibid., 36; Wuxi shi fangzhi gongyeju [Wuxi city, textile industry department], ed., “Wuxi saosi gongye shi” [History of the Wuxi silk reeling industry], in ibid., 33. 20. Bell, One Industry, Two Chinas, 53; “Yongtai sichang ziliao pianduan” [Passages from materials in the Yongtai Silk Filature], in Gao and Yan, Jindai Wuxi cansiye ziliao xuanji, 44. 21. Qian Yaoxing, “Xueshi siye ziben jituan zhi xingshuai” [The rise and decline of the silk enterprises of the Xue family], in Li and Mao, Wuxi jindai jingji fazhan shilun, 71–72; “Yongtai sichang ziliao pianduan,” 49. 22. Bell, One Industry, Two Chinas, 160–178; Qian, “Xueshi siye ziben jituan zhi xing­ shuai,” 73.

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23. Wang and Tang, Wuxi jindai jingji shi, 77–79. 24. Ibid., 84, 120–121. 25. Rong Jingben and Rong Mianren, eds., Liangxi Rongshi jiazushi [History of the Rong family of Wuxi] (Beijing: Zhongyang bianyi chubanshe, 1995), 27–30. 26. Cochran, Encountering Chinese Networks, 117–121; Rong and Rong, Liangxi Rongshi jiazushi, 45–46. 27. Cochran, Encountering Chinese Networks, 121–124. 28. Wang and Tang, Wuxi jindai jingji shi, 62. 29. Cochran, Encountering Chinese Networks, 127–129. 30. Chen Hansheng, Xue Muqiao, and Qin Qingfang, eds., “Jiefang qianhou Wuxi, Baoding nongcun jingji 1929 nian zhi 1957” [The village economy in Wuxi and Baoding before and after liberation, 1929 to 1957], Zhongguo nongye hezuo shi ziliao [Historical Materials on Chinese Agricultural Cooperatives] 2 (1988): 33; Li, China’s Silk Trade, 140, table 24. 31. Liao Meizhen and Wu Zhongchen, “Shilun Wuxi mishi de xingcheng he fazhan” [Debating the development and circumstances of Wuxi’s rice market], in Li and Mao, Wuxi jindai jingji fazhan shi lun, 233; Wuxishi liangshiju, Wuxi liangshi zhi, 26. 32. Shehui jingji diaocha suo [Institute of Social and Economic Research], Wuxi mishi diaocha [Survey of the Wuxi rice market] (Shanghai: Shehui jingji diaocha suo, 1935), 2. 33. Brandt, Commercialization and Agricultural Development, 20–25; Chou and Wu, “Shilun Wuxi mishi de xingcheng he fazhan,” 235. 34. Shehui jingji diaocha suo, Wuxi mishi diaocha, 3, 10. 35. Ibid., 12–13; “Wuxi zhi michan diaocha” [Survey of rice production in Wuxi], Gongshang banyuekan [Biweekly Journal of Commerce and Industry] 15 (1930): 17. 36. Shehui jingji diaocha suo, Wuxi mishi diaocha, 14, 18–19. 37. Wuxishi liangshiju, Wuxi liangshi zhi, 92. 38. Shehui jingji diaocha suo, Wuxi mishi diaocha, 21. 39. Tomoko Shiroyama, China during the Great Depression: Market, State and the World Economy, 1929–1937 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008), 77. 40. Shehui jingji diaocha suo, Wuxi mishi diaocha, 24. 41. Wuxishi liangshiju, Wuxi liangshi zhi, 92–93. 42. Zhao Yongliang and Cai Zengji, Wuxi wangzu yu mingren zhuanji [Biographies of important people and families of Wuxi] (Harbin: Heilongjiang renmin chubanshe, 2003), 214. 43. “Wuxi gongchangqu qidi wusheng” [There is no sound from the chimneys in the Wuxi industrial area], Laodong jibao [Worker’s Quarterly] 2 (1934): 174. 44. Zhao and Cai, Wuxi wangzu yu mingren zhuanji, 214–217. 45. “Wuxixian gongchang zhonglei ji dizhi biao” [List of types and addresses of factories in Wuxi County], Wuxixian zheng gongbao (hereafter, WXZGB) [Wuxi County Government Report] 4 (1 June 1929), diaocha [survey], 1–8; Hua Hongtao, ed., Wuxi gailan [Wuxi overview] (Wuxi: Wuxi xian zhengfu, 1935), gongye [industry], 1–2. 46. Hua, Wuxi gailan, gongye, 1–2. 47. Wuxixian zhengfu: Wuxi shizheng choubei chu [Wuxi County Government: Wuxi Municipal Planning Department], Wuxi nianjian [Wuxi yearbook] (Wuxi: Wuxixian zhengfu, 1930), gongye [industry], 23–24. 48. Xue Mingjian, “Wuxi laogong gaikuang diaocha” [Conditions of Wuxi laborers], in Wuxi wenshi ziliao, di shiwu ji, 21–22. 49. Wuxixian zhengfu, Wuxi nianjian, shangye [commerce], 1–59. 50. Zhang and Hu, “Kangzhan qian Wuxi zui fanrong de shangye shikou Beidajie,” 113 and 120–121. 51. Wuxixian zhengfu, Wuxi nianjian, shangye, 58–59, and gongyi [public welfare], 23–24. 52. “Da Shijie youyi xin xun” [New news from the Great World Entertainment Center], Xin Wuxi [New Wuxi] (3 August 1936); “Guai shou qiuyulong” [A strange beast: The armadillo],

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Xin Wuxi (7 July 1936); “Da Shijie da dachushou” [A great fight at Great World], Xin Wuxi (31 August 1936). 53. Cheng Jihua, ed., Zhongguo dianying fazhanshi [A history of the development of Chinese cinema], 2 vols. (Beijing: Zhongguo dianying chubanshe, 1963), 1:251–252; Shenbao [Shanghai News] (29 December 1932), benbu zengkan [supplement], 8; Xin Wuxi (30 January 1933). 54. “All Quiet on the Western Front,” http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0020629/ [accessed 16 July 2013]; Xin Wuxi (3 June 1931). 55. Wang Shuhuai, Zhongguo xiandaihua de quyu yanji: Jiangsu sheng, 1860–1916 [Studies in Chinese regional modernization, Jiangsu Province, 1860–1916] (Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History, 1984), 487; Wuxixian zhengfu, Wuxi nianjian, renkou [population], 1; Wang, “Wuxi dushi dili zhi yanjiu,” 1. 56. Skinner, “Regional Urbanization in Nineteenth-­Century China,” 229; Wang, Zhongguo xiandaihua de quyu yanjiu, 491; Lu, Beyond the Neon Lights, 26–27. 57. Chen Hansheng, “Gongyehua yu Wuxi de nongcun fuye” [Industrialization and agricultural sidelines in Wuxi], Nü qingnian yuekan [Young Women’s Monthly Journal] 10, no. 4 (1931): 71. 58. Chi Zihua, Nongmingong yu jindai shehui bianqian [Agricultural laborers and changes in modern society] (Hefei: Anhui renmin chubanshe, 2006), 50, table 3–1. 59. Chen et al., Jiefang qianhou Wuxi, 41, tables 37 and 38. 60. Xue Muqiao, “Jiangnan nongcun cuiluo de yige suoying” [Epitome of a backward Jiangnan village], in Xue Muqiao xueshulun zhu zi xuanji [Self-­selected works of Xue Muqiao], ed. Yun Peng and Bai Guangjie (Beijing: Shifan xueyuan chubanshe, 1992), 13. 61. Xue Mingjian, “Wuxi laogong gaikuang diaocha,” 20–23. 62. Tong Jiashan, “Wuxi gongren jiating zhi yanjiu” [Research into Wuxi worker families], in Minguo shiqi shehui diaocha congbian: Chengshi (laoggong) shenghuo juan shangxia [Collection of Republican-­era social surveys city (worker) life], 2 vols., ed. Li Wenhai (Fuzhou: Fuzhou jiaoyu chubanshe, 2005), 2:667. 63. Wuxixian zhengfu, Wuxi nianjian, zhengzhi [politics], 47; Chi, Nongmingong yu jindai shehui bianqian, 109, table 5–5; Shiyebu tongji zhang bangongchu [Ministry of Commerce, Statistics Bureau], ed., Wuxi gongren shenghuofei ji zhinan [Wuxi workers’ cost of living and its index number] (Nanjing: Shiyebu tongji tekan, 1935), 9. 64. Chi, Nongmingong yu jindai shehui bianqian, 109, table 5–5. 65. Skinner, “Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China, Part II,” 221. 66. Bell, One Industry, Two Chinas, 121–130. 67. C. M. Chiao, Warren S. Thompson, and D. T. Chen, eds., An Experiment in the Registration of Vital Statistics in China (Oxford, OH: Scripps Foundation for Research in Population Problems, 1938), 64–65; Tong, “Wuxi gongren jiating zhi yanjiu,” 667. 68. Myron Cohen, “Lineage Or­g a­ni­za­tion in East China,” in his Kinship, Contract, Community and State: Anthropological Perspectives on China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 211; David Faure, Emperor and Ancestor: State and Lineage in South China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 366–367; James Watson, “Anthropological Overview: The Development of Chinese Descent Groups,” in Kinship Or­ga­ni­za­t ion in Late Imperial China 1000– 1940, ed. Patricia Buckley Ebrey and James L. Watson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 279. 69. Chen Hansheng, Landlord and Peasant in China: A Study of the Agrarian Crisis in South China (Westport, CT: Hyperion Press, 1973), 31; Jerry Dennerline, “Marriage, Adoption, and Charity in the Development of Lineages in Wu-­sih from Sung to Ch`ing,” in Ebrey and Watson, Kinship Or­ga­ni­za­t ion in Late Imperial China, 190. 70. Dennerline, “Marriage, Adoption and Charity,” 186. 71. “Wuxixian Tangkou zhen yizhuang tian qingkuang diaocha” [Survey of charitable estate land in Tangkou Town in Wuxi County], in Jiangsu sheng nongcun diaocha [Jiangsu agri-

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cultural survey], ed. Huadongjun zhengweiyuanhui tudi gaige weiyuanhui [East China Army Po­liti­cal Committee Land Reform Committee] (Huadongjun zhengweiyuanhui tudi gaige weiyuanhui, 1952), 262. 72. Perry, Shanghai on Strike, 48–55; Honig, Sisters and Stangers, 120–131; Frazier, The Making of the Chinese Industrial Workplace, 46–50. 73. Xue, “Wuxi laogong gaikuang diaocha,” 21. 74. Rong Esheng, “Wuxi Shenxin sanchang zhigong chongtu jilu” [Record of the worker dispute in the Shenxin Number Three Factory], in Rong Desheng yu qiye jingying guanli [Rong Desheng and commercial management], 2 vols., ed. Shanghai daxue, Jiangnan daxue (lenong shiliao) zhengli yanjiu xiaozu xuanbian [Shanghai University, Jiangnan University Team for the Study and Collation of Agricultural Historical Materials] (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2004), 2:677–679. 75. Honig, Sisters and Strangers, 140–148; Köll, From Cotton Mill to Business Empire, 81–122; Perry, Shanghai on Strike, 136–141 and 168–170. 76. Frazier, The Making of the Chinese Industrial Workplace, 57–59; Shenxin zong guanlichu [Shenxin managing director’s department], “Shenxin disan fangzhi gongsi laogong zizhiqu gaikuang” [Overview of workers self-­r ule area of the Shenxin Number Three Weaving Company], in ibid., 2:740–741; “Xue Mingjian ji Shenxin sanchang laogong zizhiqu” [Xue Mingjian remembers the labor self-­r ule district in the Shenxin Number Three Factory], in Shanghai daxue et al., Rong Desheng yu qiye jingying guanli, 2:726–727. 77. “Shenxin disan fangzhi chang jiben qingkuang” [The basic situation at the Shenxin Number Three Cotton Factory], in Shanghai daxue et al., Rong Desheng yu qiye jingying guanli, 2:643. 78. “Mantan Shenxin san chang” [Random chats on the Shenxin Number Three Factory], in ibid., 2:645 and 661; Shenxin zong guanlichu, “Shenxin disan fangzhi gongsi laogong zizhiqu gaikuang,” in ibid., 2:745 and 749; Yu Zhi, “Canguan Wuxi Yongtai sichang xinchang huigong shiye jilue” [A sketch of attending the labor kindness institution in the new factory in the Wuxi Yongtai Silk Filature], Nü qingnian yuekan (October 1931): 67. 79. Shenxin zong guanlichu, “Shenxin disan fangzhi gongsi laogong zizhiqu gaikuang,” 747–748. 80. “Mantan Shenxin san chang,” 2:662; Shenxin zong guanlichu, “Shenxin disan fangzhi gongsi laogong zizhiqu gaikuang,” 2:746–747. 81. “Mantan Shenxin san chang,” 2:656 and 661; “Shenxin disan fangzhi chang jiben qingkuang,” 2:644. 82. “Xin Wuxi 23 Jul. 1936,” in Shanghai Daxue et al., Rong Desheng yu qiye jingying guanli, 2:737; “Xin Wuxi 14 Jan. 1937,” in ibid., 2:738; Yu, “Canguan Wuxi Yongtai sichang xinchang huigong shiye jilue,” 67. 83. “Zuojin gongyou duiwu” [Visiting the worker groups], Shenghuo [Life] 6, no. 8 (August 1931): 715. 84. Bryna Goodman, “The Vocational Woman and the Elusiveness of ‘Personhood’ in Early Republican China,” in Gender in Motion: Divisions of Labor and Cultural Change in Late Imperial and Modern China, ed. Bryna Goodman and Wendy Larson (Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 271. 85. Zhu Bangxing, Hu Linge, and Xu Sheng, ed., Shanghai chanye yu Shanghai zhigong [Shanghai industry and Shanghai workers] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1984), 86 and 102. 86. Honig, Sisters and Strangers, 108. 87. Shiyebu tongji zhang bangongchu, Wuxi gongren shenghuofei ji zhinan, 32, table 31. 88. Simon Yang and L. K. Tao, eds., A Study of the Standard of Living of Working Families in Shanghai (Beiping: Institute of Social Research, 1931), 60–64; Xiao Ying, “Wuxi de gongchang nügong” [Women workers in Wuxi factories], Nüshengshe banyuekan [The biweekly journal of the women’s voice of society] 2, no. 8 (1934): 10; “Zuojin gongyou duiwu,” 715; Xue Mingjian, “Gongchang zhuzhong laogong shiye yu ben shen zhi guanxi” [Factory emphasizes the

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connection between labor institutions and self-­interest], in Shanghai daxue et al., Rong Desheng yu qiye jingying guanli, 2:824; City Government of Greater Shanghai, Bureau of Social Affairs, Standard of Living of Shanghai Laborers (Shanghai: Bureau of Social Affairs, 1934), 140–141. 89. Gongshang banyuekan [Biweekly Journal of Commerce] 4, no. 17 (1 September 1932), in Gao and Yan, Jindai Wuxi cansiye ziliao xuanji, 499; Wang, “Wuxi dushi dili zhi yanjiu,” 38. 90. Wuxixian zhengfu, Wuxi nianjian, gongyi, 1. 91. Lu, Beyond the Neon Lights, 263; Ma Luji, “Jiu Shanghai de jiantou dian” [Recruitment agencies in old Shanghai], in Shanghai shehui daguan [The grand sites of Shanghai society], ed. Shi Fukang (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 2000): 171. 92. “Laohuzao zhu fawei” [The owner of a tiger stove throws his weight about], Xin Wuxi (22 April 1936); “Laohuzao zhu tu zha miao shu” [The devious art of the cheating plans of the tiger stove own­ers], Xin Wuxi (20 March 1936); “Laohuzao zhi jinxi guan” [A view of tiger stoves now and in the past], Xin Wuxi (8 February 1930). 93. Shiyebu tongji zhang bangongchu, Wuxi gongren shenghuofei, 27, table 23. 94. City Government of Greater Shanghai, Bureau of Social Affairs, Standard of Living of Shanghai Laborers, 111–114; Shiyebu tongji zhang bangongchu, Wuxi gongren shenghuofei, 29, table 26. 95. Qian Jibo, “Wuxi fengsu zhi” [Gazetteer of Wuxi customs], in Liangxi jihen: Wuxi jindai fengtu youlan zhezuo jilu [Footprints of bridges and brooks: selected works on visits to Wuxi’s modern scenery], ed. Wang Yaoyuan, Jiang Guoliang, and Tang Keke (Wuxi: Fangzhi chubanshe, 2006), 210. 96. “Fei linian guan shengzhong zhi difang fangwu” [Local defense against the call to abolish the Lunar New Year], Xin Wuxi (25 January 1930). 97. Qian, “Wuxi fengsu zhi,” 209. 98. “Zhongqiu jie zhi shehui jing” [The Mid-­Autumn Festival is the mirror of society], Xin Wuxi (16 September 1932). 99. Xin Wuxi (30 January 1933). 100. “Zhongqiu jiajie yu diandeng” [The happy Mid-­Autumn Festival and electric lights], Xin Wuxi (29 September 1928).

Chapter 2: Wuxi Elites and Infrastructure 1. Shen Gong and Wu Weizheng, “Yanjiaqiao de dihuo huanjing tedian he xingzheng jianzhi yange” [Evolution of the administration and environmental characteristics of the Yanjiaqiao area], in Xiaozhen chunqiu—­Wuxi Yanjiaqiao shihua [Spring and autumn in a small town—­Oral history of Wuxi’s Yanjiaqiao], ed. Li Shuxun (Beijing: Fangzhi chubanshe, 2004), 14–15; Cheng Minhui, “Yanjiaqiao jiaotong yunshu de bianqian” [Changes in transport in Yanjiaqiao], in ibid., 316–317; Li Shuxun and Shen Chong, “Shizu qunti—­cong Yangutangzhou dao banbu bai jia xing” [Lineage groups—­f rom Yan, Gu, Yang, and Zhou to half a hundred surnames], in ibid. 2. You Xuemin and Tang Keke, “Shangye ziben xiang gongye ziben de zhuanhua: Wuxi liangtang ziben jituan pouxi” [The shift from commercial capitalism to industrial capitalism: an analysis of the commercial enterprises of the two Tangs of Wuxi], in Li and Mao, Wuxi jindai jingji fazhan shilun, 83. 3. Huang Houji, “Wuxi minzu zibenjia Tang Baoqian fuzi jingying gongshangye jianshi” [A brief history of the management of the Tang Baoqian father-­a nd-­son enterprise], in Wuxi wenshiziliao, di siji [Wuxi historical and cultural materials, vol. 4], ed. Jiangsusheng Wuxishi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui [Jiangsu Province Wuxi City Committee Historical and Cultural Materials Research Committee] (Wuxi: Wuxi ribao yinshua chang, 1982), 62;

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You and Tang, “Shangye ziben xiang gongye ziben de zhuanhua: Wuxi liangtang ziben jituan pouxi,” 84. 4. Huang, “Wuxi minzu zibenjia Tang Baoqian fuzi jingying gongshangye jianshi,” 64–65. 5. Ibid., 66–68, 72; You and Tang, “Shangye ziben xiang gongye ziben de zhuanhua: Wuxi liangtang ziben jituan pouxi,” 84; Wu Weizhong, “Zhongguo jindai minzu gongshangye xian qu zhe zhiyi: zai Yanjiaqiao fajia chuangye de Tangshi jiazu” [An early example of modern Chinese family industrial and commercial development: The Tang family starts a company in Yanjiaqiao], in Li, Xiaozhen chunqiu, 113. 6. Huang, “Wuxi minzu zibenjia Tang Baoqian fuzi jingying gongshangye jianshi,” 70. 7. Wei Zhongji, “Beiyao, zhongyao, nanyao” [North kiln, middle kiln, and south kiln], in Li, Xiaozhen chunqiu, 57. 8. Cheng Honghui and Cheng Jizhong, “Yu xiaozhen gongrong de Chengshi jiazu” [Concerning the flourishing Cheng family in the small town], in Li, Xiaozhen chunqiu, 142. 9. Li Mingyao, “Jiangnan shuixiang wenhu guzhen” [An ancient town among Jiangnan’s rivers and lakes], in Li, Xiaozhen chunqiu, 11–12. 10. Li, “Jiangnan shuixiang wenhu guzhen,” 12; Li Shuxun, “Dingcheng shiqi de shizhen shangye” [City’s commerce during the time of great prosperity], in Li, Xiaozhen chunqiu, 68–86. 11. Wu Yangzhen and Cheng Jizhong, “Nanhuoye gaikuang” [Circumstances of the southern goods business], in Li, Xiaozhen chunqiu, 87. 12. Li and Shen, “Shizu qunti,” 9. 13. Wuxixian zhengfu, Wuxi nianjian, renkou, 1–2. 14. Wuxixian zhengfu, Wuxi nianjian, zhengzhi, 48, 52–53. 15. Ni Yangru, “Wuxi Meicunzhen ji qi fujin de nongcun” [Meicun Town, Wuxi, and its neighboring villages], Dongfang zazhi [Eastern Miscellany] 32, no. 2 (1935). 16. Wuxixian di wu qu Tianxia zizhi cujin hui [Wuxi County Fifth Ward Tianxia Self-­ Government Promotion Society], ed., Tianxia shi gailan [Overview of Tianxia] (1936), 11 and 81; Wuxixian zhengfu, Wuxi nianjian, nongye [agriculture], 1; Zhu Yunquan, ed., Jiangsu Wuxixian nongmin jingji diaocha diyiji, disiqu [The first collation of the Jiangsu Wuxi County farmers economic survey, 4th District] (Jiangsu sheng nongmin yinghang jingji chubanshe, 1931), 68. 17. Wuxixian zhengfu, Wuxi nianjian, jiaotong [transport], 18–19. 18. Hua, Wuxi gailan, shangye, 6–7. 19. Wuxixian zhengfu, Wuxi nianjian, jiaotong, 1–3, 73. 20. Ibid., 19–25; Xue, “Wuxi laogong gaikuang diaocha,” 22. 21. Sun Dongcheng, “Nongcun diaocha shilu: Wuxi Baojiazhuang” [A true record of an agricultural survey: Baojia village in Wuxi], Mingri zhi Jiangsu [Tomorrow’s Jiangsu] 2, no. 1 (1930): 5. 22. Wuxixian zhengfu, Wuxi nianjian, jiaotong. 23. Mao Dun, “Spring Silkworms,” in Chinese Civilization: A Sourcebook, ed. Patricia Buckley Ebrey (New York: Free Press, 1993), 311. 24. Ding Xianyong, “Xinshi jiaotong yu shenghuo zhong de shijian: yi jindai jiangnan wei li” [The new style of transport and time in life: An example from modern Jiangnan], Shilin 4 (2005): 109. 25. Hua, Wuxi gailan, jiaotong, 2–3 and 6–7; Cheng, “Yanjiaqiao jiaotong yunshu de bianqian,” 317. 26. Finnane, Speaking of Yangzhou, 199–203; Wu Renshu, “Jiangnan yuanlin yu chengshi shehui—­m ingqing Suzhou yuanlin de shehui shi fenxi” [The gardens of Jiangnan and urbanization—­a nalysis of social history of gardens in Ming and Qing Suzhou], Zhongyang yanjiu yuan jindai shi yanjiu suo jikan [Collected papers of Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica], vol. 61 (September 2008). 27. “Rong Desheng xiansheng ji Meiyuan” [Rong Desheng remembers Plum Garden], in Rong Desheng yu shehui gongyi shiye [Rong Desheng and social welfare activities], ed. Shanghai daxue

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zhengli yanjiu xiaozu [Shanghai University Collation Research Society] (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2004), 219–221; “Xin Wuxi, qiri eryue yijiuerliunian” [New Wuxi, 7 February 1926], in ibid., 7. 28. Xue Mingjian, “Meiyuan zhinan” [Guide to Plum Garden], in Wang et al., Liangxi jihen, 157. 29. “Rong Desheng xiansheng ji Meiyuan,” 221. 30. Xue, “Meiyuan zhinan,” 159. 31. Qin, Culturing Modernity, 45. 32. “Xin Wuxi, wuri sanyue yijiueryinian” [New Wuxi, 5 March 1921], in Shanghai daxue et al., Rong Desheng yu shehui gongyi shiye, 241–242. 33. “Xin Wuxi shiyiri sanyue yijiueryinian” [New Wuxi, 11 March 1921], in ibid., 243–244. 34. “Xin Wuxi, shi’erri shi’eryue yijiu’erliunian” [New Wuxi, 12 December 1926], in ibid., 246; “Xin Wuxi, shiri shiyiyue yijiu’erliunian” [New Wuxi, 10 November 1926], in ibid., 246; Xue, “Meiyuan zhinan,” 159. 35. “Yijiusan’ernian Meiyuan pingmian tu” [Map of Plum Garden in 1932], in Shanghai daxue et al., Rong Desheng yu shehui gongyi shiye, 229. 36. Fei, Negotiating Urban Space, 124–125; Finnane, Speaking of Yangzhou, 176–188. 37. Wang Liping, “Tourism and Spatial Change in Hangzhou, 1911–1927,” in Esherick, Remaking the Chinese City, 117–119; Miriam Gross, “Flights of Fancy from a Sedan Chair: Marketing Tourism in Republican China, 1927–1937,” Twentieth-­Century China 36, no. 2 (July 2011): 134–140. 38. Gross, “Flights of Fancy from a Sedan Chair,” 135–137. 39. Jinghu huhang tong tielu guanliju [Management office of the Shanghai-­Nanjing and Shanghai-­Hangzhou Railway], Wuxi: Taihu [Wuxi: Lake Tai] (Shanghai: Lianglu Shanghai diyiyingyesuo, 1935), 4. 40. Zhongguo lüxingshe [China Travel Ser­v ice], “Wuxi daoyou” [Guide to Wuxi], in Wang et al., Liangxi jihen, 70. 41. Rui Linyang, Wuxi daoyou [Wuxi guidebook] (Wuxi: Wuxi daoyoushe, 1935), 58–60; Jinghu huhang tong tielu guanliju, Wuxi: Taihu, 29. 42. Rui, Wuxi daoyou, 40–41; Hua, Wuxi gailan, 10–11; Jinghu huhang tong tielu guanliju, Wuxi: Taihu, 15. 43. Rui, Wuxi daoyou, 35; Hua, Wuxi gailan, 10; Jinghu huhang tong tielu guanliju, Wuxi: Taihu, 11; “Baojieqiao luocheng ji” [Record of the construction of Trea­sure World Bridge], in Shanghai daxue et al., Rong Desheng yu shehui gongyi shiye, 390–392. 44. Rui, Wuxi daoyou, 36–37; Hua, Wuxi gailan, 9; Jinghu huhang tong tielu guanliju, Wuxi: Taihu, 10–11; Zhao and Cai, Wuxi wangzu yu mingren zhuanji, 227–228. 45. Cheng Fangwu, “Taihu jiyou” [A record of a trip to Lake Tai], in Wang et al., Liangxi jihen, 265. 46. Yu Dafu, “Ganshang de xinglü” [The sentimental traveler], in Wang et al., Liangxi jihen, 276. 47. Cheng, “Taihu jiyou,” 262–266. 48. Yu, “Ganshang de xinglü,” 272. 49. Fei Xiaotong, Peasant Life in China: A Field Study of Country life in the Yangtze Valley (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1939), 13–17, 197–235, 249–254. 50. Christena E. Nippert-­Eng, Home and Work: Negotiating Boundaries through Everyday Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 18–24. 51. Julie Broadwin, “Intertwining Threads: Silkworm Goddesses, Sericulture Workers and Reformers in Jiangnan, 1880s–1930s” (PhD diss., University of California, San Diego, 1999), 39–41; Li, China’s Silk Trade, 19. 52. Broadwin, “Intertwining Threads,” 42–45; Fei, Peasant Life in China, 60. 53. Li, China’s Silk Trade, 19–20.

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54. Bell, One Industry, Two Chinas, 137–139, 145–152. 55. Fei, Peasant Life in China, 215. 56. Wuxixian di wu qu Tianxia zizhi cujin hui, Tianxia shi gailan, 81; Dikötter, Exotic Commodities, 119. 57. Jiangsusheng Wuxi (shi) xian nongcun jingji dianxing diaocha fenhu kapian, Caozhuang [Jiangsu Province Wuxi County village economy case study ­house­hold cards, Caozhuang Village] (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Institute of Economics, 1958, internal publication). 58. Chen et al., Jiefang qianhou Wuxi, Baoding nongcun jingji, 8; Xue, Jiangnan nongcun cuiluo de yige suoying, 12; Zhu, Jiangsu Wuxixian nongmin jingji diaocha, 89. 59. Robert Ash, Land Tenure in Pre-­Revolutionary China: Kiangsu Provice in the 1920s and 30s (London: Contemporary Chinese Institute SOAS, 1976), 27, table  16; Wei Jianxiong, “Wuxi sange nongcun di nongye jingying diaocha” [Survey of agricultural management in three villages in Wuxi], Zhongguo nongcun [Chinese Agriculture] 1, no. 9 (1 June 1935): 58–59. 60. Ni, “Wuxi Meicun zhen ji qi fujin de nongcun,” 91. 61. Wei, “Wuxi sange nongcun di nongye jingying diaocha,” 58. 62. Xue, “Jiangnan nongcun cuiluo de yige suoyin,” 12. 63. Fei, Peasant Life in China, 161–162. 64. Ibid., 172–173. 65. Wuxixian di wu qu Tianxia zizhi cujin hui, Tianxia shi gailan, 53. 66. Jiangsusheng Wuxi (shi) xian nongcun jingji dianxing diaocha fenhu kapian, Caozhuang; Zhu, Jiangsu Wuxixian nongmin jingji diaocha, 25–26. 67. Chen et al., Jiefang qianhou Wuxi, 52; Minami Manshü tetsudō kabushiki kaisha, Shanhai jimusho chōsashitsu [South Manchurian Railway Company, Shanghai Research Office], Kōsoshō Mushakuken nōson jittai chōsa hōkokusho [A report on an investigation of rural conditions in Wuxi County] (Shanghai: Minami Manshū tetsudō kabishiki kaisha, Shanhai jimusho chōsashitsu, 1941), 142. 68. Fei, Peasant Life in China, 99–102; Qian, “Wuxi fengsu zhi,” 212 and 214. 69. Dikötter, Exotic Commodities, 11. 70. Chen et al., Jiefang qianhou Wuxi, 49. 71. Carl Crow, Four Hundred Million Customers (London: H. Hamilton, 1937), 309n1; Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1946), 74–75. 72. Fei, Peasant Life in China, 246–247. 73. Chen et al., Jiefang qianhou Wuxi, 48. 74. Zhu et al., Shanghai chanye, 655. 75. Chen et al., Jiefang qianhou Wuxi, 49.

Chapter 3: Local Elites and the State 1. Yang Tianhong, “Jindai Zhongguo zikai shangbu yanjiu shulun” [Discussion of studies into self-­opened commercial settlements in modern China], Sichuan shifan daxue xuebao (shehui kexue ban) [Journal of Sichuan Normal University (social science edition)] 28, no. 6 (November 2001): 88. 2. David D. Buck, Urban Change in China: Politics and Development in Tsinan, Shantung, 1890– 1949 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), 51–54. 3. Liang Minsu and Yuan Yuan, “Minchu Wuxi zikai shangbu tanxi” [Investigation into the self-­opened settlement in early Republican Wuxi], Jiangxi guangbo dianshi daxue xuebao [Journal of Jiangxi Tele­v i­sion Broadcasting University] no. 4 (2007): 43; Yang, “Jindai Zhongguo zikai shangbu yanjiu shulun,” 88–89. 4. Schoppa, Chinese Elites and Po­liti­cal Change, 83–86, 100–102, 115–119; Qin, Culturing Modernity, 27–30; Chen, Modern China’s Network Revolution, 85 and 133; Tang Keke and Jiang Weixin,

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“Jindai Wuxi shangtuan de xingzhi ji shehui gongneng” [Nature and social functions of modern Wuxi militia], Jiangnan daxue xuebao (renwen shehuikexue ban) [Jiangnan University Journal (humanities and social sciences edition)] 3, no. 3 (June 2005): 54–55. 5. “Kaipi shangbu zhi yunniang” [Exploratory discussions on establishing the commercial settlement], Xin Wuxi (9 September 1922). 6. Xue Mingjian, “Wuxi gaijin zhi chuyi—­kaipi shangbu wenti” [My opinion concerning the improvement of Wuxi—­problems with opening a commercial settlement], in Xue Mingjian wenji [Collected works of Xue Mingjian], 2 vols., ed. Wuxishi shizhi bangongshi 无锡市史志办公室 [Wuxi gazetteer office] (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 2005), 2:619–620. 7. Ibid., 620–624. 8. Qian Qingdong, “Wuxi xingban shangbu lun” [Discussing Wuxi opening a commercial settlement], in Rong Desheng yu xing xueyu cai [Rong Desheng nurtures education to produce talent], 2 vols., ed. Shanghai daxue, Jiangnan daxue (lenong shiliao) zhengli yanjiu xiaozu xuanbian [Shanghai and Jiangnan University Team for the Study and Collation of Agricultural Historical Materials] (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2003), 1:214–215; Cheng Bing, “Ershi niandai Wuxi choushe shangbu shi lüe” [Outline of the history of the construction of the commercial settlement in Wuxi in the 1920s], in Wuxi chengshi jianshe [Wuxi city construction], ed. Jiangsusheng zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, Wuxi shi jianshe weiyuanhui, Wuxi shi zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui [Jiangsu Provincial People’s Po­liti­cal Consultative Conference Historical and Cultural Materials Committee, Wuxi City Construction Committee and Wuxi City People’s Po­liti­cal Consultative Conference Historical and Cultural Materials Committee] (Nanjing: Jiangsusheng zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, 1996): 46. 9. Zhu Jinshou, “Wuxi xingban shangbu lun” [Discussing Wuxi opening a commercial settlement], in Shanghai daxue et al., Rong Desheng yu xing xueyu cai, 1:216–217; Chen Canming, “Wuxi xingban shangbu lun” [Discussing Wuxi opening a commercial settlement], in Shanghai daxue et al., Rong Desheng yu xing xueyu cai, 1:217–218. 10. “Kaibu jinxing zhi zuijin xiuxi” [Recent news concerning establishing the settlement], Xibao [Wuxi Newspaper] (15  October 1922); “Qing pai Yang Shounan wei Wuxi shangbu duban you” [Concerning the appointment of Yang Shounan as the manager of the Wuxi commercial settlement], October 1922, Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History archives, 03–17–013–01–001. 11. “Wuxi Kaibu zhi shangque” [Discussing establishing the Wuxi settlement], Xibao (11 October 1922); “Kaibu zhi pingyi” [Assessment of establishing the settlement], Xin Wuxi (12 October 1922). 12. “Kaibu jinxing zhi zuijin xiuxi”; “Kaibu wenti zhi shangque” [Discussion of problems with establishing the settlement], Xibao (17 October 1922); “Kaibu wenti zhi shangque” [Discussion of problems with establishing the settlement], Xibao (18 October 1922). 13. Cheng, “Ershi niandai Wuxi choushe shangbu shi lüe,” 48; “Shangbuju zuo yi qianyi” [Commercial Settlement Bureau already relocated yesterday], Xin Wuxi (12 May 1924). 14. Cheng, “Ershi niandai Wuxi choushe shangbu shi lüe,” 49; “Jiangsu sheng zi song Wuxi shangbu zanxing zhangcheng shang shu tuoxie zi qing he fu banli you” [Jiangsu province discusses and submits Wuxi Commercial Settlement provisional regulations, but is asked to reconsider them again], April 1923, Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History Archives 03– 17–013–01–004; “Wuxi shangbu zhangcheng guanyu sifa quan zhi guiding he yu xian xing faling xiang fuzi” [Examination of Wuxi Commercial Settlement regulations concerning rules for judicial authority and check to see if this order is in accordance with them], Sifa gongbao [Judicial Review] 180 (1923): 33–37. 15. “Shangbu hua jie zhi zhuzhang fenqi” [Differing opinions on demarcating the borders of the commercial settlement], Xibao (30 July 1923); “Shangbu ju ganban hua jie zhi jihua” [Commercial Settlement Bureau hurries to complete plan for demarcation of borders], Xibao (31 July 1923).

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16. “Yizaishenmi zhi shangbuju” [The unfathomable Commercial Settlement Bureau], ­Xibao (2 August 1923). 17. “Shangbuju fu Sixiang gongsuo shu” [Commercial Settlement Bureau replies to letter from Sixiang public office], Xin Wuxi (2 October 1923); “Shangbuju fu Sixiang gongsuo shu xu” [Commercial Settlement Bureau replies to letter from Sixiang public office continued], Xin Wuxi (3 October 1923). 18. Cheng, “Ershi niandai Wuxi choushe shangbu shi lüe,” 51–52; “Jiangsu dujun gongshu, Jiangsu sheng zhang gongshu zi di 981 hao” [Jiangsu military governor and Jiangsu provincial head proclamation number 981], Jiangsu sheng gongbao [Jiangsu Province Report] 3361 (1923): 10. 19. “Song Wuxi shangbu kanding jiezhi tu shuo ge yifen qing bei an bing qing tongzhi ge guo zhu jing gongshi” [Concerning Wuxi Commercial Settlement survey of site and request for each part to prepare case and request to inform ambassadors from each country stationed in Beijing], May 1924, Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History Archives 03–17–013–01–009. 20. “Shangbuju zhi jinxing guan” [Observing the progress of the Commercial Settlement Bureau], Xin Wuxi (26 June 1924); Shangbuju zhi jinxing guan er” [Observing the progress of the Commercial Settlement Bureau part 2], Xin Wuxi (1 July 1924). 21. Cheng, “Ershi niandai Wuxi choushe shangbu shi lüe,” 54–55. 22. Arthur Waldron, From War to Nationalism: China’s Turning Point, 1924–1925 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 143–145. 23. Strand, Rickshaw Beijing, 200–217. 24. For a military history of the conflict, see Waldron, From War to Nationalism, 76–90. 25. “Jiazi suimu Jiangzhe zai zhan wei cheng fa dianji” [Record of tele­g rams sent at the end of the first year of the Chinese sixty-­year cycle (spring 1925) when the re-­emergence of the Jiangsu-­Zhejiang War again threatened the city], in Wuxishi shizhi bangongshi, Xue Mingjian wen ji, 2:704. 26. Zhao Yongliang, ed., Wuxi mingren cidian [Dictionary of famous people in Wuxi] (Nanjing: Nanjing daxue chubanshe, 1989), 132. 27. Xue Mingjian, “Jiazi qiuji Jiangzhe chu zhan liangxi fenghe ji” [Record of the autumn of the first year of the Chinese sixty-­year cycle (autumn 1924) when the Jiangsu-­Zhejiang war first broke out and Wuxi was in a panic], in Wuxishi shizhi bangongshi, Xue mingjian wen ji, 2:663–670. 28. Yang Hanxi, “Xuyan” [Preface], in Wuxi shangtuan zhangcheng guize huikan [Collection of Wuxi Chamber of Commerce rules and regulations], by Wang Ruchong (1920), 1–2; Xu Yihe, “Wuxi shangtuan shiwei” [The ­whole story of the Wuxi militia], in Wuxishi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui, Wuxi wenshi ziliao, di shiwuji, 50–51. 29. Xue, “Jiazi qiujie Jiangzhe chu zhan liangxi fenghe ji,” 2:665–672; Feng Tiannong, Wuxi zhanshi [History of the war in Wuxi] (Wuxi: Wuxi dayin wuju, 1925), 3. 30. Xue, “Jiazi qiujie Jiangzhe chu zhan liangxi fenghe ji,” 2:667–668, 672–677. 31. Ibid., 2:665–667. 32. Ibid., 2:675–679. 33. Ibid., 2:680. 34. Hou Hongjian, Wuxi bingzai ji [Record of the Wuxi military disaster] (1924), 4–5; Xue, Jiazi qiujie Jiangzhe chu zhan liangxi fenghe ji, 2:682; “Gucheng bariji, 2” [An eight-­day diary of an isolated city, part 2], Xin Wuxi (22 February 1925). 35. Hou, Wuxi bingzai ji, 6. 36. Ibid., 6–8; Xue, Jiazi qiujie Jiangzhe chu zhan liangxi fenghe ji, 2:682–683. 37. Xue Mingjian, “Jiazi suimu Jiangzhe zai zhan xishan bingzai ji” [Record of when Jiangsu and Zhejiang again fought in Wuxi at the end of the year of the sixty-year cycle], in Wuxishi shizhi bangongshi, Xue Mingjian wenji, 2:684. 38. Hou, Wuxi bingzai ji, 9.

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39. Xue, Jiazi suimu Jiangzhe zai zhan xishan bingzai ji, 2:685. 40. Ibid., 2:684–685; Hou, Wuxi bingzai ji, 12–13. 41. Xue, Jiazi suimu Jiangzhe zai zhan xishan bingzai ji, 2:686; Hou, Wuxi bingzai ji, 14; Feng, Wuxi zhanshi, 9, 45–46. 42. Zhao Yongliang and Cai Zengji, Bainian Wuxi mingren pu [List of famous Wuxi people in one hundred years] (Nantong: Xinhua chubanshe, 2005), 16. 43. Xue, Jiazi suimu Jiangzhe zai zhan xishan bingzai ji, 2:687; Hou, Wuxi bingzai ji, 16–17. 44. Hou, Wuxi bingzai ji, 16. 45. Zhao and Cai, Bainian Wuxi mingren pu, 87. 46. Feng, Wuxi zhanshi, 13; Xue, Jiazi suimu Jiangzhe zai zhan xishan bingzai ji, 2:688. 47. Ibid., 2:689. 48. Xue, Jiazi suimu Jiangzhe zai zhan xishan bingzai ji, 2:689–690; Hou, Wuxi bingzai ji, 19–22. 49. Hou, Wuxi bingzai ji, 27–29; Xue, Jiazi suimu Jiangzhe zai zhan xishan bingzai ji, 2:​ 691–692. 50. Xue, Jiazi suimu Jiangzhe zai zhan xishan bingzai ji, 2:693; Hou, Wuxi bingzai ji, 31, 34. 51. Xue, Jiazi suimu Jiangzhe zai zhan xishan bingzai ji, 2:693–694; Hou, Wuxi bingzai ji, ­32–33; “Gucheng bariji 8” [An eight-­day diary of an isolated city, part 8], Xin Wuxi (28 February 1925). 52. “Gucheng bariji 4” [An eight-­day diary of an isolated city, part 4], Xin Wuxi (24 February 1925); “Gucheng bariji 6” [An eight-­day diary of an isolated city, part 6], Xin Wuxi (26 February 1925); Hou, Wuxi bingzai ji, 17. 53. Xue, Jiazi suimu Jiangzhe zai zhan xishan bingzai ji, 2:695. 54. Ibid., 2:695–696; Hou, Wuxi bingzai ji, 38–39. 55. Xue, Jiazi suimu Jiangzhe zai zhan xishan bingzai ji, 2:697; Hou, Wuxi bingzai ji, 42; Waldron, From War to Nationalism, 235. 56. Xue, Jiazi suimu Jiangzhe zai zhan xishan bingzai ji, 2:698. 57. Ibid., 2:698; Hou, Wuxi bingzai ji, 44. 58. Xue, Jiazi suimu Jiangzhe zai zhan xishan bingzai ji, 2:699; Hou, Wuxi bingzai ji, 44–47. 59. Xue, Jiazi suimu Jiangzhe zai zhan xishan bingzai ji, 2:700. 60. Hou, Wuxi bingzai ji, 48–49. 61. Xue, Jiazi suimu Jiangzhe zai zhan xishan bingzai ji, 2:700–702; Hou, Wuxi bingzai ji, 55–56. 62. Waldron, From War to Nationalism, 120. 63. Hou, Wuxi bingzai ji, 55. 64. Ibid. 65. Feng, Wuxi zhanshi, 53. 66. Hou, Wuxi bingzai ji, 59–60. 67. Feng, Wuxi zhanshi, 54–55. 68. Ibid., 64–65. 69. Waldron, From War to Nationalism, 255; Xue Mingjian, “Yichou Jiangzhe san ci zhanzheng Wuxi guo bingji” [Record of the fighting in Wuxi during the third Jiangsu-­Zhejiang War in the second year of the Chinese sixty-­year cycle (Autumn 1925)], in Wuxishi shizhi bangongshi, Xue mingjian wenji, 2:713–716.

Chapter 4: Abolish the County to Establish the City 1. “Chen minzhengting qing sheli Wuxi shizheng choubeichu” [Requesting Ministry of Civil Affairs to establish the Wuxi Municipal Planning Department], WXZGB 9 (21 July 1929), shizheng [municipal government], 1–2. 2. Ren, Zhongguo shizhen de lishi yanjiu yu fangfa, 198–202; Skinner, “Cities and the Hierarchy of Urban Systems,” 301–344.

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3. Shi Mingzheng, Zouxiang jindaihua de Beijingcheng: Chengshi jianshe yu shehui biange [Beijing toward modernization: Urban construction and social change] (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1995), 27–32; Kristin Eileen Stapleton, “Warfare and Modern Urban Administration in Chinese Cities,” in Cities in Motion: Interior, Coast, and Diaspora in Transnational China, ed. Sherman Cochran, David Strand, and Yeh Wen-­Hsin (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies, 2007), 55–57; Zhao Ke, Shizheng gaige yu chengshi fazhan [Reform of municipal government and urban development] (Beijing: Zhongguo dabaike quanshu chubanshe, 2004), 125–145. 4. Pan Rushu, “Zuijin ershi nian zhi Zhongguo shizheng shang” [Chinese municipal government in the past twenty years, part 1], Qinghua zhoukan [Qinghua Weekly] 89, no. 35 (1931): 672; Zhang Zhendong, “Zhongguo xianxing shizhi zhi fenxi” [Analysis of the current urban system in China], Shizheng qikan [Journal of Municipal Government] 1 (1934). 5. “Chengzhenxiang difang zizhi zhangcheng 1909 nian 1 yue 18 ri” [Regulations on local self-­government in cities, towns and districts, 18 January 1909], in Jindai Zhongguo difang zizhifa chongshu [Reprint of local self-­government laws in modern China], ed. Wang Jianxue (Beijing: Falü chubanshe, 2011), 31–40. 6. For a complete list of these laws, see Wang, Jindai Zhongguo difang zizhifa chongshu. 7. “Jiangsusheng zanxing shixiangzhi, 1911 nian 10 yue” [Provisional or­g a­ni­za­tion of cities and districts in Jiangsu Province, October 1911], in ibid., 390–399. 8. Dong Xiujia, Xun haizheng shiqi Jiangsu shizhi zhi shangque [Proposed municipal charter for Jiangsu] (Shanghai: Qingnian xiehui shubao bu, 1928), 3–4; Pan, “Zuijin ershi nian zhi Zhongguo shizheng shang,” 673–674. 9. “Shi zizhi zhi” [Or­g a­ni­za­tion of city self-­government], in Wang, Jindai Zhongguo difang zizhifa chongshu, 115; Pan, “Zuijin ershi nian zhi Zhongguo shizheng shang,” 692, 699. 10. Sun Yatsen, Jianguo dagang [Fundamentals of national reconstruction] (Shanghai: Xin shidai jiaoyu shi, 1927). 11. Jiang Xiaoqiu, “Zai sanmin zhuyi xia de shizheng wenti” [Problems of municipal planning in the Three People’s Principles], in Shizheng quanshu [A complete book of urban administration], ed. Lu Danlin (Shanghai: Zhonghua quanguo daolu xiehui, 1928), 55–56. 12. Sun Yatsen, The International Development of China (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1922), 7, 14–17, 30–39, 56–66, 78–88, 218–219. 13. Henriot, Shanghai, 175–177; Kirby, “Engineering China, 1928–1937”; Charles D. Musgrove, China’s Contested Capital: Architecture, Ritual, and Response in Nanjing (Honolulu: University of Hawai`i Press, 2013); Stapleton, Civilizing Chengdu, 232; Carroll, Between Heaven and Modernity, 83. 14. “Guomin zhengfu gongbu zhi shi zuzhi fa 1928 nian 7 yue 3 ri” [Published city or­g a­ni­ za­tion law of the Republican Government 3 July 1928], in Zhonghua minguo shi dang’an ziliao huibian diwuji, diyibian zhengzhi ( yi) [Collection of archival historical materials of the Republic of China, number 5, first collection, politics (I)], ed. Zhongguo di’er lishi danganguan [Number Two Historical Archives of China] (Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 1994), 82; “Sheng shi xian kanjie tiaolie” [Regulations for surveying the borders of the province, city and county], 20 June 1930, Jiangsu Provincial Archives (hereafter, JPA) 5–30–158. 15. Neizhengbu [Ministry of Interior], “Shizheng gangyao” [Municipal government outline] August 1928, JPA 5–30–178. 16. Dong, Jiangsu shizhi zhi shangque, 9; Neizhengbu, “Shizheng gangyao.” 17. Neizhengbu [Ministry of Interior], ed., Zujin shizheng jihua shu [Plans to promote municipal government] (1929), 3. 18. Ibid., 5. 19. Jiang Kangli, “Guanyu cujin shi xingzheng de jige genben yuanze” [Concerning the promotion of several fundamental principles in urban administration], Shehui kexue congkan [Social Science Series] no. 2 (1934): 272; Pan Rushu, “Zuijin ershi nian zhi Zhongguo shizheng xia”

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[Chinese municipal government in the past twenty years, part 2], Qinghua zhoukan 89, no. 35 (1931): 870. 20. Zhao, Shizheng gaige yu chengshi fazhan, 200–201. 21. “Wuxi shizheng choubeichu zuzhi dagang” [Outline of the or­ga­ni­za­tion of the Wuxi Municipal Planning Department], Jiangsusheng zhengfu gongbao [Jiangsu provincial government report] 290 (18 November 1929), minzheng [civil affairs], 1; Neizhengbu, Zujin shizheng jihua shu, 4. 22. “Wuxi shizheng choubeichu gongzuo jihua dagang” [Outline of Wuxi Municipal Planning Department work plan], Wuxi shizheng (hereafter, WXSZ) [Journal of Wuxi Municipal Planning] 1 (1 October 1929): 23–29. 23. “Shi you chen xian zhengfu wei shizheng gongchengchu ye yi jieshu yijiao shizheng choubeichu jieban” [Concerning request to the county government that the Municipal Engineering Department’s work has ceased and transferred to the Municipal Planning Department], WXZGB 12 (21 August 1929), jianshe [construction], 1; “Han xianzhengfu wei zhuanlai xian jiansheju yijiao yukuan shouzhi jisuanshudan ju niancun bu zhao shu he shoufuqingcha zhao” [To county government construction division concerning transfer of remaining funds, receipt of account books, and investigation of income], WXSZ 1: 37; “Han xian gonganju wei hanzhi paiyuan jieshou weisheng shiyi you” [To county public security bureau concerning sending personnel to take responsibility for health matters], WXSZ 1: 38–39. 24. “Wuxi shizheng choubeichu zuzhi dagang,” 2. 25. “Wuxi shizheng choubeichu gongzuo renyuan yi lanbiao” [List of Wuxi Municipal Planning Department workers], WXSZ 1, (n.p). 26. Sun Zuji, “Fakan ci” [Words on publication], WXSZ 1: 1. 27. Ibid. 28. “Di shi’erci chuwu huiyi jilu shiyue shiwuri” [Twelfth department meeting, 15 October], WXSZ 3 (1 December 1929): 103; Yan Enzuo, “Duiyu huafen xin Wuxi shiqu zhi wo jian” [Concerning what I have seen regarding the new Wuxi City district], WXSZ 2 (1 November 1929): 3; Zhao, Shizheng gaige yu chengshi fazhan, 76. 29. Yan Enzuo, “Wo duiyu Wuxi jianshe shi de ganxiang he xiwang” [My feelings and hopes for the construction of Wuxi City], WXSZ 3: 1–2. 30. “Wuxixian shiba niandu shizheng jihua dagang” [Outline plan for Wuxi County administration in 1929], WXZGB 8 (11 August 1929), 1–22. 31. Gongwuke [Public Works Division], “Huafen shiqu jihua” [Plans for city zoning], WXSZ 1: 30. 32. Yan, “Duiyu huafen xin Wuxi shiqu zhi wo jian,” 3. 33. Ibid., 3–6. 34. Hua, Wuxi gailan, 2–3; Qian, “Wuxi fengsu zhi,” 211. 35. “Qingming ri zhi Huishan huaxu lu” [Record of snippets from Tomb-­Sweeping Day on Huishan], Xin Wuxi (6 April 1929). 36. Yu, “Ganshang de xinglü,” 275. 37. Neizhengbu, “Shizheng gangyao.” 38. “Xianzhengfu dijiuci jinian zhouji lüe” [County government ninth weekly meeting summary], WXZGB 6 (21 June 1929), jishi [rec­ords of affairs], 1. 39. “Huishan gongyuan choubeiweiyuanhui diyici huiyilu” [Record of the first meeting of the Huishan Park Planning Committee], WXZGB 4 (1 June 1929), huiyi lu [rec­ords of meetings], 3–4. 40. “Di liu ci chuwu huiyi jilu, jiuyue sanri” [Sixth department meeting, 3  September], WXSZ 2: 93; “Di shi‘er ci chuwu huiyi jilu, shiyue shiwuri” [Twelfth department meeting, 15 October], WXSZ 3: 103; “Di shiliuci chuwu huiyijilu” [Sixteenth department meeting, 13 November], WXSZ 3: 109.

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41. “Wuxi shizheng choubeichu gongwuke shishi gongcheng baogao (shibanian bayue zhi shijiunian sanyue)” [Wuxi Municipal Planning Department Public Works Division engineering report (August 1929 to March 1930)], WXSZ 6 (March 1930): 55–56. 42. “Di sanshiyi ci chuwu huiyi jilu eryue ershiwuri” [Thirty-­fi rst department meeting, 25 February], WXSZ 6: 83. 43. “Di shici chuwu huiyi jilu shiyue yiri” [Tenth department meeting, 1  October], WXSZ 2: 98. 44. “Zhengli huishan fengjing jihua” [Plans to manage Huishan scenery], WXSZ 6: 39–41. 45. “Wuxishi jianzhu zhangcheng” [Wuxi city construction regulations], WXZGB 6, shizheng, 1–7; “Wei bugao quan shiminzhong ru zai benshi quhuo nei yu gong jianzao wulun gongsi jihua ji shimin fangzhi jun zhaozhang lai chu qingban zhizhao fang zhun donggong you” [Proclamation to all urban residents who wish to engage in construction in the city, no matter if it’s a public or private or­g a­ni­za­tion, or residences, all must apply to this department for a license to start work], WXSZ 1: 45. 46. “Cheng Jiangsusheng minzhengting wei xiuding qudi jianzhu zhangcheng” [Petition to Jiangsu Provincial Ministry of Civil Affairs concerning revising construction licensing rules], WXSZ 2: 41. 47. Gongwuke [Public Works Office], “Qudi jianshe jihua” [Plans for prohibiting construction], WXSZ 3: 134. 48. “Gongwuke qudigu banli jianzhu zhizhao baogao” [Report of management of building licenses by public works office prohibition section], WXSZ 4 (1 January 1930): 77–78. 49. “Juchengren Chen Zhenyuan, Gao Yuanying Chen Qizi deng” [Petitioners Chen Zhenyuan, Gao Yuanying and Chen Qizi], WXSZ 1: 45. 50. “Juchengren Zhan Xipan” [Petitioner Zhan Xipan], WXSZ 2: 46. 51. “Juchengren Xin Yuchang meihao” [Petitioner Xin Yuchang coal shop], WXSZ 2: 46. 52. “Juchengren Gao Zhongjun” [Petitioner Gao Zhongjun], WXSZ 1: 46–47. 53. “Juchengren Hu Jiechang deng” [Petitioner Hu Jiechang and others], WXSZ 2: 42; “Juchengren Xu Ziying” [Petitioner Xu Ziying], WXSZ 2: 43. 54. “Juchengren You Huiji” [Petitioner You Huiji], WXSZ 3: 101. 55. “Juchengren Xu Jinfu deng” [Petitioner Xu Jinfu and others], WXSZ 1: 49. 56. “Han gonganfenju, han qing pai jing qudi Yongda jianzhan fujin cici fenhui caopeng yilü mu xu zaixing dagai yi du hou huan” [Letter to branch of the Public Security Bureau concerning request to send policemen to prohibit rebuilding of straw shacks next to Yongda Cocoon Ware­house after they ­were destroyed by fire], WXSZ 3: 87. 57. “Juchengren Ningshao lüxi tongxianghui huizhang Tao Jize” [Petitioner Tao Jize, head of the Ningbo and Shaoxing Native Place Society in Wuxi], WXSZ 2: 47, 49. 58. Duara, Culture Power and the State; Li, Village Governance in North China; Remick, Building Local States; Peter J. Carroll, “The Place of Prostitution in Early Twentieth-­Century Suzhou,” Urban History 38, no. 3 (December 2011); 413–436. 59. “Juchengren Wuxi chuanye gonghui banchuanye shiwusuo” [Petitioner Office of Boat Management, Wuxi Shipping Association], WXSZ 2: 45; “Juchengren Wuxi banchuanye shiwusuo” [Petitioner Office of the Wuxi Shipping Association], WXSZ 2: 47. 60. “Juchengren Wuxi chuanye gonghui banchuanye shiwusuo, banchuan hu Zhu Zhangshou deng” [Petitioner Office of Boat Management, Wuxi Shipping Association, and boat owner Zhu Zhangshou], WXSZ 1: 48–49. 61. “Han gonganju wei qingzhuan chisuo shu duiyu wuzhao cheliang yanxing qudi” [Letter to Public Security Bureau concerning request to prohibit unlicensed vehicles], WXSZ 1: 36. 62. “Di erci chuwuhuiyi jilu, shibanian bayue bari” [Second department meeting, 8 August 1929], WXSZ 1: 102; “Di sanci chuwuhuiyi jilu, bayue shisiri” [Third department meeting, 14  August], WXSZ 1: 103; Gongwuke [Public Works Office], “Zhengli ben shi renlicheliang”

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[Managing this city’s rickshaws], WXSZ 2: 163; “Cheng jiansheting” [Petition to the Construction Bureau], WXSZ 3: 77–78. 63. Neizhengbu, “Shizheng gangyao.” 64. “Cheng xian zhengfu chenbao zhengli shirong qingxing” [Petition to the county government to report on the circumstances regarding city appearance], WXZGB 4, shizheng, 1–2; “Wuxishi guiding zhangtie guanggao biaoyu lan yilan biao” [Overview of regulations for posting adverts and signs in Wuxi City], in Wuxixian zhengfu, Wuxi nianjian, gongyong [public ser­ vices], 7–11. 65. “Di ershiliuci chuwu huiyi jilu, yiyue ershiyiri” [Twenty-­sixth department meeting, 21 January], WXSZ 5 (1 February 1930): 86. 66. “Gonghan ge jiguan tuanti juban qingbi yundong” [Letter to each or­ga­ni­za­tion and group on holding of campaign to clean the walls], WXZGB 4, shizheng, 8; “Wuxixian qingbi yundong banfa” [Methods for the campaign to clean the walls for Wuxi County], WXZGB 4, shizheng, 9. 67. “Gonghan xian gonganju wei zhengli malu liangpang renxingdao qing chi shu zunban” [Public announcement to the county Public Security Bureau concerning the management according to the rules of sidewalks on both sides of the road], WXZGB 4, shizheng, 9; “Zhengli malu liangpang renxingdao guize” [Regulations on management of sidewalks on both sides of the road], WXZGB 4, shizheng, 9. 68. “Zuo ri juxing weisheng yundong dahui” [Yesterday a health campaign meeting was held], Xin Wuxi (16 May 1929). 69. “Juchengren Wuxi guanggao shui jizhengchu zhuren Hu Danbing” [Petitioner Hu Danbing, head of the Wuxi Advertising Tax Department], WXSZ 2: 51; “Di shijiu ci chuwu huiyi jilu” [Nineteenth department meeting], WXSZ 3: 102. 70. “Wei bugao ge shangdian yi xian che qu kujie zhaopai ji leisi guanggao” [Announcement that all shops should remove bulletin boards and similar adverts that encroach on the road according to regulations], WXSZ 2: 53. 71. “Wuxishi qingdao gaikuangbiao” [Chart of Wuxi City street cleaning situation], WXSZ 2: 114. 72. Zhao, Shizheng gaige yu chengshi fazhan, 200–201. 73. “Shizheng tanlun weiyuanhui di si ci huiyi jilu” [Record of the fourth meeting of the Urban Administration Discussion Committee], WXSZ: 91; “Shi zuzhi fa, 1930 nian 5 yue 20 ri” [City Or­g a­n i­za­tion Law, 20  May 1930], in Wang, Jindai Zhongguo difang zizhifa chongshu, 222–234. 74. “Shichu jiesu hou guanli wenti” [Management problems after the closure of the city department], Xin Wuxi (30 March 1930); “Shizheng choubeichu ren wei xiankuang” [The current situation with regard to maintaining the Municipal Planning Council], Xin Wuxi (1 April 1930). 75. “Shi zizhi fa minguo ershisan nian, shi‘er yue ershiyi ri” [City self-­government law, 21 December 1934], in Wang, Jindai Zhongguo difang zizhifa chongshu, 270–275; “Xian zizhi fa minguo ershisan nian, shi’er yue ershiyi ri” [County self-­government law, 21 December 1934], in ibid., 263–268.

Chapter 5: The Nationalist State and Rural Infrastructure 1. “Jiangsu sheng minzhengting xunling banfa xian xingzheng huiyi guicheng lingchi zunzhao wen” [Jiangsu Province Ministry of Civil Affairs issues rules for the county civil affairs committee meetings], WXZGB 25/26 (15 March 1930), gongdu [public announcements], 1. 2. “Wuxixian zhengfu cheng mingzhengting wei zunling dingqi zhaoji xian xingzheng huiyi niju guize jinqi jianhe bei an wen” [Wuxi County government submission concerning Ministry of Civil Affairs orders on the date of the civil affairs committee meeting and whether this follows regulations], WXZGB 25/26, 2–3; “Wuxixian zhengfu cheng minzhengting wei cheng-

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song xian xingzheng huiyi banshe xize yusuanshu ji huiyuan mingdan yangqi jianhe bei an wen” [Wuxi County government submission concerning the Ministry of Civil Affairs order that county civil affairs committee meeting plans, bud­get, and list of delegates should be provided], WXZGB 25/26, 3. 3. “Wuxixian di yici xian xingzheng huiyi chuxi renyuan yilan biao” [Overview list of delegates at first Wuxi County Civil Affairs Committee meeting], WXZGB 25/26, huiyuan timing [names of delegates], 1–2. 4. “Zhuxi Sun xianzhang zhi kaihui ci” [Opening remarks of chairman county governor Sun], WXZGB 25/26, kaimu dianli [opening ceremony], 1–2. 5. Ibid. 6. “Wuxixian di yici xian xingzheng huiyi huiyuan ti’an yilan biao” [Overview list of members’ proposals at the first Wuxi County Civil Affairs Committee meeting], WXZGB 25/26, huiyuan ti’an [member proposals], 22–23, 26–27; Wuxixian zhengfu, Wuxi nianjian, jianshe, 69. 7. “Wuxixian di yici xian xingzheng huiyi dierri dahui jilu” [Record of second day of general meeting of Wuxi County Civil Affairs Committee meeting], WXZGB 25/26, dahui jilu [Record of general meeting], 5. 8. “Wuxixian di yici xian xingzheng huiyi fenzu ti’an shencha weiyuanhui shencha baogao” [Report of the proposal investigation committee of the first Wuxi County Civil Affairs Committee meeting], WXZGB 25/26, shencha baogao [investigation report], 13–14, 18. 9. “Chengzhenxiang difang zizhi zhangcheng 1909 nian 1 yue 18 ri,” 31–32; “Xian zizhi fa, 1919 nian 9 yue 7 ri” [County self-­government law, 7 September 1919], in Wang, Jindai Zhongguo difang zizhifa chongshu, 103. 10. “Guomin zhengfu gongbu xian zuzhifa ling, 1928 nian 9 yue 15 ri” [Published county or­g a­ni­za­tion law of the Republican Government, 15 September 1928], in Zhongguo di’er lishi danganguan, Zhonghua minguo shi dang’an ziliao huibian diwuqi, diyibian zhengzhi ( yi), 87–93. 11. Jin Wucheng, “Xian shi zizhi zuzhi wenti” [Problems in the or­g a­ni­za­tion of county and city self-­government], in Wang, Jindai Zhongguo difang zizhifa chongshu, 240–243; Pan, “Zuijin ershi nian zhi Zhongguo shizheng xia,” 878–879. 12. Cheng Guofu, Jiangsusheng zheng shuyao (Minguo nianernian shiyue zhi nianwunian jiu­ yue) [Outline of Jiangsu Provincial Government (October 1931–­September 1936)] (Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1983), minzheng [civil affairs], 24; Wuxixian zhengfu, Wuxi nianjian, zhengzhi, 47. 13. “Jiangsusheng minzhengting shuzhenghuiyi ben xian ti’an” [This county’s proposals at Jiangsu Provincial Ministry of Civil Affairs meeting of governments], WXZGB 4, tezai [special report], 1–3; “Wuxixian shibaniandu shizheng jihua dagang” [Outline of plans for Wuxi administration in 1929], WXZGB 8 (11 July 1929), tezai, 2. 14. “Wu ji xiangzhen zizhi shixiang linshi banfa shishi ximu” [Detailed temporary regulations for the implementation of self-­government at ward, district, and township level], WXZGB 14 (15 September 1929), minzheng, 2. 15. “Wuxixian diyiqu qugongsuo zuzhi dagang” [Or­gan­i­za­tional outline of the Wuxi County Number One Public Office], WXZGB 16/17 (1 November 1929), laijian [documents received], 1–6. 16. “Wuxixian diyiqu qugongsuo gongzuo gaikuang” [Work situation of the Wuxi County Number One Public Office], WXZGB 20 (16 December 1929), laijian, 1–7. 17. “Wuxixian diyiqu gongsuo di qishiyi quwu huiyi jilu” [71st meeting of Wuxi County Number One Public Office], Wuxixian diyiqu zhenggongbao [Wuxi County Number One Ward Government Report] 9 (November 1935): 1; “Wuxixian diyiqu gongsuo tonggao, di yiwujiu hao” [Wuxi County Number One Public Office announcement 159], Wuxixian diyiqu zhenggongbao 9, 12. 18. “Wuxixian diyiqu gongsuo di qishiliu quwu huiyi jilu” [76th meeting of Wuxi County Number One Public office], Wuxixian diyiqu zhenggongbao 14 (April 1936): 2–3; “Wuxixian diyiqu qu gongsuo bugao di erhao” [Wuxi County Number One Public Office announcement number two], Wuxixian diyiqu zhenggongbao 14, 9.

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19. “Qingjie beiqu hedao huiyi jilu” [Record of committee to clean river in the north area], Wuxixian diyiqu zhenggongbao 14, 3. 20. “Wuxixian diyiqu gongsuo di qishi quwu huiyi jilu” [70th meeting of Wuxi County Number One Public Office], Wuxixian diyiqu zhenggongbao 8 (October 1935): 2; “Wuxixian diyiqu gongsuo di qishi quwu huiyi jilu”; “Wuxixian diyiqu gongsuo di qishi‘er quwu huiyi jilu” [72nd meeting of Wuxi County Number One Public Office], Wuxixian diyiqu zhenggongbao 10 (December 1935): 2. 21. “Wuxixian diyiqu gongsuo di qishisan quwu huiyi jilu” [73rd meeting of Wuxi County Number One Public Office], Wuxixian diyiqu zhenggongbao 11 (January 1936): 1; “Wuxixian diyiqu gongsuo di qishisi quwu huiyi jilu” [74th meeting of Wuxi County Number One Public Office], Wuxixian diyiqu zhenggongbao 12 (February 1936): 2–3; “Wuxixian diyiqu gongsuo linshi quwu huiyi jilu” [Record of Wuxi County Number One Public Office temporary committee meeting], Wuxixian diyiqu zhenggongbao 15 (May 1936): 2. 22. Qin Songshe, “Lunxian qianxi de Wuxi” [The eve of the occupation of Wuxi], in Jinian kangri zhanzheng shengli sishi zhounian teji [Special collection commemorating the fortieth anniversary of victory in the Anti-­Japanese War of Re­sis­tance], ed. Wuxishi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui [Wuxi City Executive Council Historical and Cultural Materials Research Council] (Wuxi: Wuxixian renmin yinshuachang, 1985), 64–65; Jiangsusheng ge xian kangzhan chuqi gongzuo shikuang jiyao [Record of the work of each county in Jiangsu Province at the start of the War of Re­sis­tance Against Japan], JPA M2-­甲-98, 34. 23. “Wuxixian di shisanqu quzheng shishi jihua dagang” [Outline of the implementation of policy in thirteenth ward of Wuxi county], WXZGB 15 (1 October 1929), laijian, 1. 24. Ibid., 1–5. 25. “Wuxixian di baqu qugongsuo gongzuo riji baogao” [Diary of work of the public office of Wuxi County eighth ward], WXZGB 15, laijian, 9–11. 26. “Jiangsusheng xianjiansheju zuzhi tiaolie” [Guidelines for county construction offices in Jiangsu Province], WXZGB 7 (1 August 1929), jianshe, 1–2. 27. “Chen jiansheting wei zun ling ling ni qudi ge xiangqu jianzhu ji tuokuang jiedao liang xiang zanxing zhancheng bing fu chenbian geng qingxing qi” [Request to Ministry of Construction regarding provisional regulations on road widening and construction prohibition in each district and ward, and provision for their amendment], WXZGB, 16/17, jianshe, 8–9. 28. “Chen jiansheting wei fenwei ge xiangqu yiwu jianshe zhidaoyuan shan ju luli qu fenbiao zhuantong fuwu xize qi bei an you” [Request to Ministry of Construction concerning the obligation to copy the details of each ward and district construction leader, and transfer them to this ministry], WXZGB 16/17, jianshe, 9–10; “Wuxixian gequ yiwu jianshe zhidaoyuan luli qufenbiao” [List of details of construction leaders in each ward in Wuxi County], WXZGB 18/19 (1 December 1929), jianshe, 9–10. 29. “Wuxixian ge xiangqu lingfa jianzhu zhizhao shunxu zhang” [Procedure for issuing construction licenses in Wuxi wards and districts], WXZGB 16/17, zhuanzai [transferred documents], 24–25. 30. “Wuxixian jiansheju qudi ge xiangqu jianzhu zanxing zhangcheng” [Wuxi County Construction Office provisional regulations for construction licenses in each ward and district], WXZGB 16/17, zhuanzai, 16–21; “Wuxixian jiansheju tuokuang ge xiangqu jiedao zanxing zhancheng” [Wuxi County Construction Office provisional regulations for road widening in each ward and district], WXZGB 16/17, zhuanzai, 21–24. 31. “Wuxixian ni zhu daolu jihuashu” [Plans for road construction in Wuxi County], WXZGB 2 tezai, 4; Sun Weiqing, “Xideng gonglu yange” [History of the Wuxi-­Jiangyin Road], in Wuxi wenshi ziliao, di shiwuji [Wuxi historical and cultural materials, vol. 15], ed. Jiangsusheng Wuxishi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui [Jiangsu Province Wuxi City Committee His-

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torical and Cultural Materials Research Committee] (Wuxi: Wuxixian renmin yinshua chang, 1986), 133. 32. “Xinzhu xideng gonglu nanduan ji” [Record of constructing the southern section of the Wuxi-­Jiangyin Road], WXZGB 3 (21 May 1929), jianshe, 3. 33. “Wuxixian ni zhu daolu jihuashu,” 4; “Xinzhu xideng gonglu nanduan ji,” 6. 34. Ibid., 4. 35. Sun, “Xideng gonglu yange,” 136. 36. “Xinzhu xideng gonglu nanduan ji,” 4–9. 37. “Xinzhu xideng gonglu nanduan ji fu” [Record of constructing the southern section of the Wuxi-­Jiangyin Road, continued], WXZGB 4, jianshe, 1–2. 38. Ibid., 3. 39. “Cheng jiansheting wei chengsong xideng gonglu nanduan qiaozai gongcheng toupiao zhangcheng shigong xize” [Petition to construction ministry concerning rules for engineers to bid for the contract for bridges on the southern section of the Wuxi-­Jiangyin Road], WXZGB 11, jianshe, 2. 40. “Bugao xideng gonglu nanduan qiaozai yu benyue san ri tongshi xingzhu you” [Announcement that on the third of this month construction on the bridges of the southern section of the Wuxi-­Jiangyin Road will begin], WXZGB 18, jianshe, 1; “Jianshe ju liangnian yilai zhi huigu” [Recalling two years of the construction office], WXZGB 22 (16 January 1930), tezai, 6; Sun, “Xideng gonglu yange,” 134. 41. “Bugao jinzhi yiba zhongxin bang” [Announcement prohibiting the movement of stakes marking the central line], WXZGB 3, jianshe, 2. 42. “Bugao xideng lu kaigong xiangmin ru you huaiyi jin ke chengsu bude jizong zunao” [Announcement that if people have problems with work along the Wuxi-Jiangyin Road they should send rapid petitions and not gather to protest], WXZGB 3, jianshe, 1–2. 43. Xideng gonglu zhulu yundong de guangda xuanchuang” [Campaign to publicize the building of the Wuxi-­Jiangyin Road], Xin Wuxi (20 April 1929). 44. “Xinzhu xideng gonglu nanduan ji fu,” 3. 45. “Xian zhengfu bugao baohu xideng gonglu” [County government announces protection of Wuxi-­Jiangyin Road], WXZGB 13, jianshe, 1–2. 46. Sun, “Xideng gonglu yange,” 138. 47. Ibid., 137–138. 48. Skinner, “Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China: Part II,” 215. 49. Wuxixian di wu qu Tianxia zizhi cujin hui, Tianxia shi gailan, 8. 50. Ibid., 7. 51. Ibid., 38. 52. Ibid., 9–10. 53. Chiao et al., An Experiment in the Registration of Vital Statistics in China, 64. 54. Peter C. Perdue, Exhausting the Earth: State and Peasant in Hunan, 1500–1850 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Council on East Asian Studies, 1987). 55. David Allen Pietz, Engineering the State: The Huai River and Reconstruction in Nationalist China, 1927–1937 (London: Routledge, 2002), 46; Pomeranz, The Making of a Hinterland, 238–265; Schoppa, Chinese Elites and Po­liti­cal Change, 90–91. 56. “Wuxixian zhengli shuidao chubu jihuashu” [Preliminary plans for the management of irrigation in Wuxi County], WXZGB 1, tezai, 12–14. 57. “Jiansheju liangnian yilai zhi huigu,” 8. 58. MacKinnon, Wuhan, 1938, 14. 59. Wuxi Lühu tongxianghui [Wuxi Native Place Society in Shanghai], Wuxi lühu tongxianghui shizhou jinian ce [Wuxi Native Place Society tenth anniversary commemoration volume] (December 1933), Shanghai Municipal Archives (hereafter SMA) Y4–1–288, 72.

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60. “Wuxixian xiuzhu wei’an gongcheng jihua gaiyao” [Outline of engineering plans to repair dikes in Wuxi County], WXZGB 64 (15 December 1931), tezai, 1–3. 61. “Shuizai diaochatuan diaocha xiangqu shuizai hou zhi shiji dayi” [Overview of the plans of the flood investigation committee’s survey of the flooded area], Wuxi Lükan [Journal of the Wuxi Native Place Society] (hereafter, WXLK) 150 (September 1931): 21. 62. “Wuxixian xiuzhu wei’an gongcheng jihua gaiyao” [Outline of engineering plans to repair dikes in Wuxi County], WXZGB 67 (1 February 1932), tezai, 1–6. 63. Ibid., 6–7. 64. “Benhui banli shuizai qiuji jingguo qingxing” [This society’s management of flood relief], in Wuxi lühu tongxianghui, Wuxi lühu tongxianghui shizhou jinian ce, 74–75. 65. “Chengwei zunling chaming shengchan pohuai qingxing shouni huifu jihuashu jubao yangqi” [Concerning investigation of the situation with regard to damaged production and plans for recovery] (13 June 1932), Wuxi Municipal Archives (hereafter, WMA), ML1–4–1489; “Chengfu huifu pohuai shengchan jihua yangqi” [Report on the plans for the recovery of damaged production] (24 June 1932), WMA ML1–4–1489. 66. Donald Jordan, China’s Trial by Fire: The Shanghai War of 1932 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), 195–198. 67. “Jiangsusheng zhengfu xunling eryisiyiyijiu hao” [Jiangsu Provincial Government order number 214119] (27 April 1932), WMA ML1–4–1489. 68. “Chengwei zunling jufu benqu duiyu difang baowei xiangchen yanmi suoyou shengchan bing wu sunhuai yangqi” [Concerning the order that this ward should strictly defend all production that hasn’t been damaged] (17  May 1932), WMA ML1–4–1489; “Cheng yijian wei chengfu jingnei shengchan qingxing bing wei pohuai huifu jihua” [Petition concerning plans for recovery of production that hasn’t been damaged in this ward] (9  June 1932), WMA ML1–4–1489. 69. “Chengwei zunling niju suijing lüyan huifu shengchan jihua yangqi” [Concerning order to pacify the villages and support recovery of production] (13 May 1932), WMA ML1–4–1489. 70. “Chengbao benqu huifu shengchan ji jiuji nongmin jihuashu” [Report on this ward’s plans to support the recovery of production and aid to farmers] (12 June 1932), WMA ML1–4–1489. 71. “Chengwei zunling chaming shengchan pohuai qingxing shouni huifu jihuashu jubao yangqi.” 72. “Cheng yijian wei niyi jiuji renmin shengchan shiye jihua qi” [Petition concerning plans to support the recovery of commerce and production] (25 June 1932), WMA ML1–4–1489. 73. “Chengbao benqu huifu shengchan ji jiuji nongmin jihuashu.” 74. “Chengbao huifu shengchan jihua qi” [Report on plans to support the recovery of production] (12 June 1932), WMA ML1–4–1489; “Wei zunling chaming jingnei shengchan pohuai qingxing bing shouni huifu jihua you” [Concerning order that investigation of damage to production should occur and plans for recovery in this ward should be made] (1 June 1932), WMA ML1–4–1489; “Cheng yijian wei niyi jiuji renmin shengchan shiye jihua qi.” 75. “Chengwei zunling chaming shengchan pohuai qingxing shouni huifu jihuashu jubao yangqi”; “Cheng yijian wei chengfu jingnei shengchan qingxing bing wei pohuai huifu jihua”; “Cheng yijian wei niyi jiuji renmin shengchan shiye jihua qi.” 76. “Chengwei zunling chaming shengchan pohuai qingxing shouni huifu jihuashu jubao yangqi”; “Chengbao huifu shengchan jihua qi.” 77. “Chengwei zunling chaming shengchan pohuai qingxing shouni huifu jihuashu jubao yangqi.” 78. Jiang Xianji, “Yaoming diandeng gongsi shiwei” [History of the Yaoming Electric Light Factory], in Wuxi wenshi ziliao, di wuji [Wuxi cultural and historical materials, vol. 5], ed. Jiangsusheng Wuxishi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui [Jiangsu Province Wuxi City Council Historical and Cultural Materials Committee] (Wuxi: Wuxishi jiaoyu yinshua chang, 1983), 13–15.

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79. Qishuyan dianchang jianshe weiyuanhui shiye baogao di er hao [Qishuyan Power Station Construction Committee report of affairs, number 2] (1934), 1. 80. Jiang, “Yaoming diandeng gongsi shiwei,” 17–22. 81. “Zhongqiu jiajie yu diandeng.” 82. Qishuyan dianchang, 1; Jiang, “Yaoming diandeng gongsi shiwei,” 24. 83. “Han Qishuyan dianchang qing cong su chi jiang xiuli ludeng you” [The Qishuyan Electricity Company is invited to quickly send workers to fix street lighting], WXSZ 3: 89. 84. “Di shisanci chuwu huiyi jilu, shiyue ershierri” [Thirteenth department meeting, 22 October], WXSZ 3: 104–105; “Di ershierci chuwu huiyi jilu, shi’eryue ershisiri” [Twenty-­second department meeting, 24 December], WXSZ 4: 105–106; “Gongbu quanshi ludeng xieding tiaojian” [Announcement of the agreement of the regulations for the city’s street lighting], WXSZ 5: 110. 85. Qishuyan dianchang, 15. 86. Ibid., 6–7. 87. “Wuxixian dizhengju gonggao zhengzi di ba hao” [Wuxi County Land Administration Office public announcement number 8] (23 June 1937), JPA 1042-­已-21; “Wuxi Xinan qu san er yi tu Mupaiwei cun shengming shu” [Wuxi Xinan Ward 321 section Mupaiwei Village announcement] (7 March 1941), JPA 1042-­已-21.

Chapter 6: A Connected City 1. Johnson, Shanghai from Market Town to Treaty Port, 16; Paolo Santangelo, “Urban Society in Late Imperial Suzhou,” in Johnson, Cities of Jiangnan in Late Imperial China, 92–94. 2. For an overview of earlier scholarship on native place societies in En­glish and Chinese, see Richard Belsky, Localities at the Center: Native Place, Space, and Power in Late Imperial Beijing (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2005), 7–17. 3. William Rowe, Hankow: Commerce and Culture in a Chinese City, 1796–1889 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1984), 250. 4. Bryna Goodman, Native Place, City, and Nation: Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai, 1853–1937 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 219–220, 240–248, 281–304. 5. Wuxi lühu tongxianghui [Wuxi Native Place Society], ed., Wuxi lühu tongxianghui di yijie huiyuan minglu fu Wuxi lühu tongxianghui zhangchen [First list of members of the Wuxi Native Place Society, with a supplement of the Wuxi Native Place Society constitution] (1923). 6. “Shourong gu gongzuo gaikuang” [Overview of refugee center section], WXLK 177 (1 May 1939): 7. 7. “Wuxi lüsu tongxianghui huiyuanlu” [List of members in the Wuxi Native Place Society in Suzhou], Wuxi lüsu tongxianghui niankan [Yearly Journal of the Wuxi Native Place Society in Suzhou] (May 1934). 8. “Huiyuan lu” [Record of members], Wuxi lüjing tongxianghui huikan [Journal of the Wuxi Native Place Society in Nanjing] (hereafter WXLJK) (November 1928): 27–34. 9. For descriptions of the number and range of activities of tongxianghui in Shanghai, see Guo Xuyin, Lao Shanghai de tongxiang tuanti [Native place organizations in old Shanghai] (Shanghai: Wenhui chubanshe, 2003), 91–106; Goodman, Native Place, City and Nation, 224–239. 10. “San yue shiliuri benhui zhengshi chengli” [This society is formally established on 16 March], in Wuxi Lühu tongxianghui, Wuxi lühu tongxianghui shizhou jinian ce, 1. 11. “Benhui zhangchen” [This society’s constitution], in Wuxi Lühu tongxianghui, Wuxi lühu tongxianghui shizhou jinian ce, 3. 12. Ibid., 4; “Wuxi lühu tongxianghui diwujie huiyuan dahui baogao” [Report of fifth meeting of members of the Wuxi Native Place Society in Shanghai], WXLK 156 (August–­October 1932): 1–2. 13. “Benhui zhangchen,” 4.

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14. “Wuxi lühu tongxianghui disanjie huiyuan dahui baogao” [Report of third meeting of members of the Wuxi Native Place Society in Shanghai], WXLK 118 (November 1926): 1. 15. “Wuxi lühu tongxianghui ying xuan zhaopian xingshi biao” [List of names the Wuxi ­Native Place Society in Shanghai should hang], WXLK 116 (September 1926): 10–11. 16. “Rongshi kunzhong chuangye shi” [History of the founding of the Rong brothers’ business], WXLK 134 (January 1929): 11. 17. Belsky, Localities at the Center, 253–255. 18. “Benhui zhi guoqu, xianzai yu jianglai” [This society’s past, present and future], ­W XLJK 11 (15 November 1933): 1. 19. Xu Qingqi, “Benhui chengli zhi jingguo ji xiankuang” [The pro­cess and current situation of the establishment of this society], WXLJK (November 1928): 1–2; “Wuxi lüjing tongxianghui faqi ren huiyi jilu” [Record of founding meeting of the Wuxi Native Place Society in Nanjing], WXLJK (November 1928): 7. 20. “Wuxi lüjing tongxianghui chengli dahui jilu” [Record of general assembly of Wuxi Native Place Society in Nanjing], WXLJK (November 1928): 9. 21. Fan Wanghu, “Duiyu tongxianghui ying you de renshi” [What should be known about native place societies], WXLJK 2 (15 May 1931): 2; Zhong Bao, “Tongxianghui” [Native place societies], WXLJK 8 (15 November 1931): 1. 22. Zhong, “Tongxianghui,” 2. 23. “Shiyue, ershiyiri qiujie dahui jilu” [Record of autumn general assembly meeting, 21 October], WXLJK (November 1928): 12–13; “Xishan yiguan luocheng” [Construction completed of the Xishan Hall], WXLJK 2: 4. 24. Xiao Shaowen, “Zuzhi tongxianghui zhi yiyi ji jianglai” [The meaning and future of the native place society], Wuxi lüsu tongxianghui niankan, 7–8. 25. “Wuxi lüsu tongxianghui choubei jingguo bing xiang yi dang mingming zhi youlai” [The origins of the preparation of the Wuxi Native Place Society in Suzhou and the designation of its headquarters], ibid., 5; “Cheng xianzhengfu dangzhenghui bei an you” [Petition to the county government and the party management committee], ibid., 15. 26. “Chengbao jiazuo gongyuan dianyingyuan choukuan chongzuo huisuo jianzhufei yongqing bei an you” [Request to borrow the garden cinema for fundraising event for construction fees for the society’s headquarters], ibid., 20. 27. “Wuxi lüsu tongxianghui zhangcheng” [Constitution of the Wuxi Native Place Society in Suzhou], ibid., 9–11. 28. “Huiyuan You Yingchuan yu Gu Hanfei qianzhai jiaobu an ge wenjian” [Documents in the case of the debt dispute between members You Yingchuan and Gu Hanfei], WXLK 126 (August 1927): 10. 29. Ibid., 12. 30. “Jiuji mitu gaoyang hou de ganxiang” [Feelings after aiding errant lambs], WXLK 176 (July 1937): 10. 31. Ibid. 32. “Xiangfu xun er bu huo” [Country woman seeks her son without success], WXLK 119 (December 1926): 12. 33. Ibid. 34. “Milu nühai gei ling” [Lost girl given aid], WXLK 116: 22. 35. “Jingmu Jiangzhe zhan guo xihu liang di fangwei jiuji shourong ge fei baogao” [Report into costs of aid and protection of Wuxi and Shanghai in the Jiangsu-­Zhejiang War], in Wuxi lühu tongxianghui, Wuxi lühu tongxianghui shizhou jinian ce, 19. 36. “Bei guai nüzi Gao xiaojie you hui gei zi qian song fan xi” [The society gives money to send the abducted girl Gao to Wuxi], WXLK 134 (January 1929): 4. 37. Janet Yi-­chun Chen, “Guilty of Indigence: The Urban Poor in China, 1900–1949” (PhD diss., Yale University, 2005), 147.

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38. “Hansong Shenjingbing yiren Song Xueliang huijieyou” [Returning the mad Wuxi person Song Xueliang home], Wuxi lüsu tongxianghui niankan, 65. 39. “Huiyuan Hu Jinlu baoqing jiuji tongxiang Pu Yinda zhi qi Zhoushi bei ren xiangjian you” [Member Hu Jinlu petitions on behalf of fellow urban resident Pu Yinda, whose wife has been lured away], ibid., 66. 40. “Liandu huiyi jishi” [Record of general meeting], WXLK 149 (July–­August 1931): 22–23; “Bayue ershiqi ri xu kai liandu huiyi” [27 August: Continuing the joint session], in Wuxi Lühu tongxianghui, Wuxi lühu tongxianghui shizhou jinian ce, 72; “Wuxi shuizai chouzhenhui laidian” [Tele­g ram from the Wuxi Flood Relief Committee], WXLK 150 (September 1931): 1–2. 41. “Benhui banli shuizai qiuji jingguo qingxing” [This society’s management of flood relief], in Wuxi lühu tongxianghui, Wuxi lühu tongxianghui shizhou jinian ce, 74–75; “Wuxi lühu tongxianghui jingmu Jiangsu shuizai yizhen ji Wuxi shiwu, liu, qi qu shuizaizhen kuan xingming sunshu kailie zai zuo” [List of people from the Wuxi Native Place Society in Shanghai who have donated to the Jiangsu Flood Relief Society and the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth wards in Wuxi is recorded on the left], WXLK 150: 7–12. 42. “Huiwu jiyao” [Minutes of member meeting], WXLJK 5 (September 1931): 2–3. 43. “Xuzhi musun zhu jun han” [Writing again to honored donors], WXLK 150: 4. 44. “Wuxi shuizai chouzhenhui zhi ben hui dai dian” [Wuxi Flood Relief Committee to this society], WXLK 151 (October 1931): 1; “Benhui banli shuizai qiuji jingguo qingxing” [This society’s management of flood relief], in Wuxi Lühu tongxianghui, Wuxi lühu tongxianghui shizhou jinian ce, 74–75. 45. “Guomin zhengfu jiuji shuizai weiyuanhui laidian” [Tele­g ram from Flood Relief Council of Nationalist Government], WXLK 150: 2. 46. “Ben hui zhi guomin zhengfu jiuji shuizai weiyuanhui han” [This society to Flood Relief Council of Nationalist Government], WXLK 151: 2. 47. “Wuxi shuizai chouzhenhui jiesu” [Wuxi Flood Relief Committee dissolves], WXLK 152 (November–­December 1931): 8–9. 48. “Jiuhuanghui jiesan zhi hou zhi sheng xun” [News from the province after the dissolution of the Relief Association], WXLK 155 (June–­July 1932): 29. 49. “Lishizhang han Jiangsu sheng zhengfu Gu zhuxi” [Council head to chairman Gu of the Jiangsu Provincial Government], WXLK 155: 2; “Jiuhuanghui jiesanhou zhi huyu” [Appeal after the dissolution of the Relief Association], WXLK 155: 27–28. 50. “Si daibiao jinsheng qing Gu shiwang” [The disappointment of four representatives after their petition to provincial chairman Gu], WXLK 155: 28–29. 51. For a description of refugee relief throughout the city, see Nara Dillon, “The Politics of Philanthropy: Social Networks and Refugee Relief in Shanghai, 1932–1949,” in Dillon and Oi, At the Crossroads of Empires, 181–185. 52. Nedostup, Superstitious Regimes, 29, 61–64. 53. “Zuzhi dengxi hongshizihui lianhe banshichu zhi jingguo” [Experiences of the establishment of the United Office of the Jiangyin and Wuxi Red Swastika Society], WXLK 122 (March 1927), 6. 54. “Wuxi lühu tongxianghui ying jiu binan tongxiang baogao” [Report on the Wuxi Native Place Society’s management of refugees from Wuxi], WXLK 153 (January–­March 1932): 1; “Fen zhi Wuxi luguan liangxi luguan han” [Letter to Wuxi Hotel and Liangxi Hotel], WXLK 153: 5. 55. Shanghai zhanqu nanmin linshi jiujihui [Shanghai Temporary Committee for the Management of Refugees], Shanghai zhanqu nanmin linshi jiujihui gongzuo baogaoshu [Report into the work of the Shanghai Temporary Committee for the Management of Refugees] (Shanghai), 2; “Shanghai zhanqu nanmin linshi jiujihui fu she lühu ge tongxianghui lianhe banshichu kai liandu huiyi yi an” [Shanghai War Zone Provisional Refugee Relief Committee establishes United Office of Native Place Societies in Shanghai and holds general meeting], WXLK 153: 7–8; Dillon, “The Politics of Philanthropy,” 182.

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56. “Wuxi lühu tongxianghui ceng she shourongsuo jiuji nanmin” [Wuxi Native Place Society in Shanghai establishes refugee centers to aid refugees], WXLK 153: 15–16. 57. “Wuxi lühu tongxianghui ying jiu binan tongxiang baogao” [Report on the Wuxi Native Place Society’s management of refugees], WXLK 153: 1. 58. “Hanzhao shangju neihe fenju wei xunwen youwu zhangjia qingshi bing qing quxiao jian fuwen” [Letter to the business bureau’s shipping association branch asking whether the rising price of tickets can be stopped], in Shanghai zhanqu nanmin linshi jiujihui, Shanghai zhanqu nanmin linshi jiujihui gongzuo baogaoshu, gongdu [public documents section], 5–6. 59. “Wuxi lühu tongxianghui guan jiu binan tongxiang baogao” [Report of Wuxi Native Place Society’s management of aid to refugees], WXLK 153: 1; “Fu lühu ge tongxianghui lianhe banshichu han” [Reply to United Office of Native Place Societies in Shanghai], WXLK 153: 8. 60. “Wuxi guonan weiyuanhui laihan” [Letter from Wuxi National Salvation Society Relief Committee], WXLK 153: 9–10; “Guonan shengzhong jiguan tuanti zhaoji jinji huiyi” [National Salvation Society Relief Committee and other organizations hold emergency meeting], Xin Wuxi (1 February 1932). 61. “Guonanhui dianqing Yue fang chubing yuanhu” [National Salvation Society Relief Committee requests Guangzhou to dispatch force to aid Shanghai], Xin Wuxi (14  February 1932). 62. “Dian hu hongwanhui” [Tele­g ram to Red Swastika Society], WXLK 153: 18. 63. “Benhui shigeyue jiuji gongzuo jianbao” [Summary report of this society’s ten-month relief work], WXLK 177 (1 May 1939): 3–4. 64. “Caiwu weiyuanhui erliu niandu baogaoshu” [Report of the Finance Committee for 1937], WXLK 177: 25; “Ding Chou jiujihui qingchan” [Detailed list of donations collected by Ding Chou of Aid Society], WXLK 177: 19–24. 65. Ibid., 7–10. 66. “Jiaotonggu gongzuo baogao” [Report of the work of the Transport Section], WXLK 177: 12. 67. “Di er ci fu lu jieyin nanmin de baogao” [Report of the second expedition to Shanghai to meet refugees], in Shijie hongshizihui Changtai banchu he Changzhou, Suzhou, Wuxi fenhui jiuji gongzuo jianbao, 1933–1937 [The Relief Work Report of the Branch Offices of the Changzhou, Suzhou and Wuxi International Swastika Society and the Changzhou/Taicang Headquarters], 1933–1937 SMA, Q120–4–422, 2–3. 68. “Traffic on the Railway Disrupted,” North China Herald (18 August 1937); “Shijie hongshizihui Wuxi fenhui jiuji gongzuo jianbao shi yue” [Summary report of the relief work of the Wuxi Branch of the International Red Swastika Society (October)], in Shijie hongshizihui Changtai banchu he Changzhou, 54–68. 69. “Refugees Repatriated,” North China Herald (1 September 1937). 70. “Feichang shiqi jiuji nanmin banfa dagang” [Outline for management of emergency refugee relief], in Shanghaishi shehuiju youguan feichang shiqi jiuji nanmin banfa dagang ji ge tongxianghui chenqing zuzhi jiuji weiyuan bei an [Shanghai City Bureau of Social Affairs concerning the outline for emergency refugee relief and native place societies requesting to or­g a­nize relief], SMA, Q6–18–277. 71. Qin, “Lunxian qianxi de Wuxi,” 63–64. 72. Toby Lincoln, “Fleeing from Firestorms: Government, Cities, Native Place Associations and Refugees in the Anti-­Japanese War of Re­sis­tance,” Urban History 38, no. 3 (2011): 441–445 and 451–455; Schoppa, In a Sea of Bitterness, 34–48. 73. “Guanyu jiuji gongzuo ying xing zhuyi de shishi yu yijian” [Opinions and facts that should be noted concerning aid work], WXLK 177, 1. 74. “Shijie hongshizihui Wuxi fenhui jiuji gongzuo jianbao,” 54. 75. “Appeal for Funds,” North China Herald (24 November 1937). 76. “Shijie hongshizihui Wuxi fenhui jiuji gongzuo jianbao shi yue,” 65.

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Chapter 7: Threads of Silk 1. “Helen Scally to friends” (Wusih [Wuxi], China, 6 April 1939), Personal Papers Margaret Mary Rue and Elizabeth Helmhold, record group 8, box 73, Yale University Divinity School Library. 2. Diana Lary, The Chinese People at War: Human Suffering and Social Transformation, 1937– 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); for a summary of recent Chinese scholarship on the war, see Parks M. Coble, “China’s ‘New Remembering’ of the Anti-­Japanese War of Re­sis­tance 1937–1945,” China Quarterly no. 190 (June 2007): 394–410. Two recent works that summarize the literature on the Nanjing Massacre are Joshua A. Fogel, The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, ed., The Nanking Atrocity, 1937–38: Complicating the Picture (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007). 3. Timothy Brook, Collaboration: Japa­nese Agents and Local Elites in War­t ime China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 79. 4. Robert W. Barnett, Economic Shanghai: Hostage to Politics, 1937–1941 (New York: International Secretariat Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941); Parks Coble, Chinese Capitalists in Japan’s New Order: The Occupied Lower Yangzi, 1937–1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 19–28, 49–66; Christian Henriot, “Shanghai Industries under the Japa­nese Occupation: Bombs, Boom, and Bust (1937–1945),” in Yeh and Henriot, In the Shadow of the Rising Sun, 17–45; Huang Meizhen, Riwei dui huazhong lunxian qu jingji de lüeduo yu tongzhi [The Japa­nese puppet government’s plundering and management of the central China occupied area] (Beijing: Shehui kexueyuan wenxian chubanshe, 2005), 312–400. 5. Peter Duus, “Japan’s War­time Empire: Problems and Issues,” in The Japa­nese War­time Empire, 1931–1945, ed. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie (Prince­ton, NJ: Prince­ ton University Press, 1996), xii. 6. Bell, One Industry, Two Chinas, 46–49. 7. Schoppa, In a Sea of Bitterness, 220–223, 228–238. 8. Brook, Collaboration, 115–119; Coble, Chinese Capitalists, 39–45. 9. Marvin Williamson, “The Military Dimension, 1937–1941,” in China’s Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937–1945, ed. James C. Hsiung and Steven I. Levine (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 144. There are many accounts of the violence of the Japa­nese invasion of the Lower Yangtze Delta. See, for example, Katsuichi Honda, trans. Karen Sandness, The Nanjing Massacre: A Japa­nese Journalist Confronts Japan’s National Shame (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999); Shanghaishi danganguan [Shanghai Municipal Archives], ed., Riben zai Huazhong jingji lüeduo shiliao 1937–1945 [Historical materials on the Japa­nese economic plundering in China 1937–1945] (Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, 2005); H. J. Timperley, What War Means: The Japa­ nese Terror in China, a Documentary Record (London: Victor Gollancz, 1938). 10. Qin, “Lunxian qianxi de Wuxi,” 72; “Xijin le Wuxi renmin de xie” [Inhaling to the utmost the blood of Wuxi people], Minzu shengming [Life of the Nation] 7 (1938). 11. Honda, The Nanjing Massacre, 78–79. 12. Yao Dieyi and Feng Zhicheng, eds., Wuxixian xingzheng zhuangkuang diaocha baogaoshu [Survey report on the administration of Wuxi County] (n.p., 1939), 1; “Shiyebu tepaiyuan jinghuxian guancha baogao” [Commerce Department special commissioners observation report of the Shanghai-­Nanjing line], Shiye yuekan [Commerce Monthly] (June 1938): 155; “Tuokuan daolu zuyi fangrong shangshi” [Widen roads to encourage flourishing commerce], Xinxi ribao [New Wuxi Daily] (18 March 1938). 13. “Shiyebu tepaiyuan jinghuxian jiancha baogao,” 155–159. 14. Ibid., 149–151, 163–165. 15. Zhang Baifeng and Zhuang Jianping, eds., Kangri zhanzheng: zhengmian zhanchang yu dihou zhanchang di er juan shang [The Anti-­Japanese War of Re­sis­tance: The frontline battlefield

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and the rear battlefield, vol. 2, part 1] (Chengdu: Sichuan daxue chubanshe, 1997), 282. For a map of troop movements, see Wu Yuexing, Zhongguo kangri zhanzheng shi ditu ji [A map record of the history of China’s War of Re­sis­tance against Japan] (Beijing: Zhongguo ditu chubanshe, 1989), 93. 16. Barnett, Economic Shanghai, 99. 17. Timothy Brook, “The Creation of the Reformed Government in Central China, 1938,” in Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932–1945: The Limits of Accommodation, ed. David P. Barrett and Larry N. Shyu (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 79–101. 18. “Guanyu nongmin shengchan” [Concerning agricultural production], Xinxi ribao (23 March 1938). 19. Tai Biangong, Yinian lai zhi xin Wuxi [One year in new Wuxi] (Wuxi: Weixin wenhua yanjiushe, 1938), 123; Yao and Feng, Wuxixian xingzheng zhuangkuang diaocha, 31; “Benhui shehuiban jianshe canye gaijin zhidaosuo” [The Social Affairs Office of this society establishes a Sericulture Improvement Direction Office], Xinxi ribao (26 March 1938). 20. “Benhui shehuiban jianshe canye gaijin zhidaosuo”; Zhao and Cai, Bainian Wuxi mingren pu, 128. 21. “Tanlun huayi zhongjia wenti” [Discussing the problem of unifying egg prices], Xinxi ribao (1 April 1938); “Shiyebu tepaiyuan jinghuxian jiancha baogao,” 152–154. 22. “Canye zhidaosuo juxing zhidaoyuan chufa dianli” [Ceremony to mark members of the Sericulture Direction Office setting out], Xinxi ribao (10 April 1938). 23. “Canye gaijin zhidaosuo qieshi qudi sizhi canzhong” [Sericulture Direction Office earnestly prohibits private production of silkworm eggs], Xinxi ribao (22 April 1938); “Ge qu cuiqing zhidao gaikuang” [Circumstances of direction of hastening hatching of silkworms in each ward], Xinxi ribao (4 May 1938). 24. “Banli canhang guanye dengji” [Managing the registration of cocoon brokers], Xinxi ribao (22 May 1938); Tai, Yinian lai zhi xin Wuxi, 130. 25. “Sixiang jianhang zhi shebei” [Equipment in cocoon brokers across the county], Xinxi ribao (7 May 1938). 26. “Banli jianhang guanye dengji” [Or­g a­niz­ing cocoon broker management registration], Xinxi ribao (22 May 1938); “Huoshou canye gaijin fei jiaotong yaodao yanmi chanyan” [Strict checking of major transport routes to collect silkworm improvement fee], Xinxi ribao (26 May 1938). 27. Tai, Yinian lai zhi xin Wuxi, 130; “Canye gaijin zhidaosuo banli jianhang dengji” [Sericulture Direction Office manages cocoon broker registration], Xinxi ribao (29 May 1938). 28. “Huazhong cansi gongsi kongzhi jianjia de fangfa” [Method by which Central China Sericulture Company controls cocoon prices], in Gao and Yan, Jindai Wuxi cansiye ziliao xuanji, 409. 29. “Chunjian shouhuo bacheng qiang” [Spring cocoon harvest is eighty percent or better], Xinxi ribao (6 June 1938). Newspaper articles and surveys do not always specify what currency they are using, fabi issued by the government in Chongqing, Japa­nese yen, military script, or, after January 1941, the new currency issued by Wang Jingwei’s government. Since the exchange rate between the fabi and this new currency was equal until 1942, this lack of clarity in many of the sources isn’t much of an issue. Unless otherwise stated, it is reasonable to assume that the currency quoted is fabi, since that was the most widely accepted. For a brief description of currency issues, see Coble, Chinese Capitalists, 91–94. 30. Chen Tsu-yu, Jindai Zhongguo de jixie saosi gongye, 1860–1945 [The silk industry of modern China, 1860–1945] (Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1989), 116; Gu Guoda and Wang Zhaorong, Riben qinhua shiqi dui Zhongguo cansiye de tongzhi yu ziyuan lüeduo [The plundering and government of China’s silk industry during the period of Japa­nese invasion] (Hangzhou: Zhejiang daxue chubanshe, 2010), 99–100; “Wuxi Huimin gongsi jianli jingguo”

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[Establishment of the Wuxi Huimin Company], in Gao and Yan, Jindai Wuxi cansiye ziliao xuanji, 385–386. 31. “Wuxi Huimin gongsi jianli jingguo,” 385–387. 32. “Sichangye fugong youwang jueding yuanze jiji jingxing” [Hope that the silk filature industry will recover to former prosperity], Xinxi ribao (8 May 1938); “Jueding gongtong sheli Huimin zhisi gongsi” [Decision to jointly establish Huimin Manufactured Silk Company], Xinxi ribao (31 May 1938). 33. Ji Mingwei, “Huazhong cansi gongsi tongzhi xia de jiangzhe cansi ye” [The Jiangsu and Zhejiang silk industry under the governance of the Central China Sericulture Company], Caizheng pinglun [Financial Critique] 1 (1941): 112; Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha, Chōsabu [South Manchurian Railway Company, Research Department], Mushaku kōgyō jittai chōsa hōkokusho [Report on industrial conditions in Wuxi County] (Shanghai: Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha, Shanhai jimusho chōsashitsu, 1940), 117. 34. “1938–1943 nian canjian shiji shougou jiage” [Prices of silkworm cocoons from 1938–1943], in Gao and Yan, Jindai Wuxi cansiye ziliao xuanji, 411; Tai, Yinian lai zhi xin Wuxi, 130. 35. Barnett, Economic Shanghai, 96. 36. “Cha shu jiu zhang ganjian jian zheng gaijin fei san yuan” [Improvement tax of three yuan imposed on old frames of dried cocoons], Xinxi ribao (20 May 1938); “Shanghai shangye chuxu yinghang Wuxi fenhang jingli yuebao” [Shanghai Commercial Savings Bank Wuxi branch manager’s monthly report] (April 1938), SMA Q275–1-382. 37. Ding Wanghu, “Kangzhan chuqi Wuxi nongcun linghu canjian yunxiao gaikuang” [The situation regarding transport of silkworm cocoons from Wuxi villages during the early period of the Anti-­Japanese War of Re­sis­tance], in Gao and Yan, Jindai Wuxi cansiye ziliao xuanji, 413–415. 38. “Sijian jie zhi xin qushi xiaoxing sichang boran xingqi” [New trends in the world of silk cocoons: small-scale silk filatures are energetically flourishing], Xinxi ribao (22 July 1938); “Jiating zhisishe xingqi de jingguo he guimo” [The establishment and scope of the ­house­hold silk manufacturing society], in Gao and Yan, Jindai Wuxi cansiye ziliao xuanji, 433. 39. “Sijian jie zhi xin qushi xiaoxing sichang boran xingqi.” 40. “Shanghai shangye chuxu yinghang Wuxi fenhang jingli yuebao” (May 1938), SMA Q275–1–382. 41. “Shanghai shangye chuxu yinghang Wuxi fenhang jingli yuebao” (January 1938 and February 1938), SMA Q275–1–382. 42. “Ge zhandui cun ganjian zuo jing kaihui jueding zai yi jingnei liutong yunyong” [Yesterday at a meeting of all ware­houses in which dried cocoons are stored it was decided they should be used within the city], Xinxi ribao (25 May 1938). 43. “Wei chengbao yiliangchang tiqu ganjian shuliang you” [Report on the amount of dried cocoons taken by the clothing and food factory] (26 June 1938), WMA ML1–4–37. 44. “Wei cunzhan ganjian wei ri yijiu qingqiu zhuanshang jun tewubu ji yiliangchang tixu shangjian bishi ken su guihan you” [Concerning the transfer of the request about the stored dried cocoons to the army’s Special Ser­v ices Department and the clothing and food factory to show sympathy for our hardship in order that they should quickly be returned] (26 June 1938), WMA ML1–4–37. 45. “Yiliangchang tongzhi zhunxu fahuai mabao xiaomai nianmichang xuke fuye” [The clothing and food factory allows return of wheat and other crops so that rice milling factories can restart work], Xinxi ribao (9 June 1938). 46. “Shanghai shangye chuxu yinghang Wuxi fenhang jingli yuebao” (May 1938), SMA Q275–1–382. 47. Ji, “Huazhong cansi gongsi tongzhi xia de jiangzhe cansi ye,” 112; “Huazhong cansi gufen youxian gongsi zhuyao gudong touzi tongji biao” [List of shareholders in Central China

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Sericulture Joint Stock Limited Company], in Gao and Yan, Jindai Wuxi cansiye ziliao xuanji, 391–392; Coble, Chinese Capitalists, 60. 48. “Huazhong cansi gongsi tongzhi canjian gouxiao luxian tu” [Chart of cocoon buying and selling by Central China Sericulture Company], in Gao and Yan, Jindai Wuxi cansiye ziliao xuanji, 416. 49. Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha, Chōsabu, Mushaku kōgyō jittai chōsa hōkokusho, 142–143; Ji, “Huazhong cansi gongsi tongzhi xia de jiangzhe cansi ye,” 115. 50. “Huazhong cansi gongsi kongzhi de sichang linnian shengchan qingkuang tongjibiao” [Production statistics of those silk filatures under Central China Sericulture Company control], in Gao and Yan, Jindai Wuxi cansiye ziliao xuanji, 422. 51. “Huazhong cansi gongsi shengsi shuchu guobie fenbi” [List of countries that Central China Sericulture Company exports silk to], in Gao and Yan, Jindai Wuxi cansiye ziliao xuanji, 424; Gu and Wang, Riben qinhua shiqi dui Zhongguo cansiye de tongzhi yu ziyuan lüeduo, 105–107. 52. Chen, Jindai Zhongguo de jixie saosi gongye, 153–155; Coble, Chinese Capitalists, 29; Henriot, “Shanghai Industries under the Japa­nese Occupation”; Huang, Riwei dui huazhong lunxian qu jingji de lüeduo yu tongzhi, 56. 53. “Canye gaijin zhidaosuo xu ban canye qiuqi gongzuo” [The Sericulture Direction Office continues to manage the autumn sericulture season], Xinxi ribao (11 June 1938). 54. “Xunling ge zhidaoyuan jiajin zhidao ge di canhu” [Order that each direction official should intensify supervision of ­house­holds engaging in sericulture], Xinxi ribao (25 August 1938); “Jiangsusheng canye qudisuo zuzhi dagang” [Jiangsu Provincial Sericulture Licensing Or­g a­ ni­za­tion outline], in Jiangsusheng gongbao xinnin tekan [Jiangsu Province report New Year special issue], jiansheting fagui [Ministry of Construction, regulations section] (1939): 2, JPA 1001-甲-350. 55. “Canye zhidao gongzuo jinzhang xiangqu zhidaosuo didian jueding” [The work of the Sericulture Direction Office is intense and the location of ward branches is decided], Xinxi ribao (22 August 1938). 56. “Minguo ershiqi nian qiuqi gexian canye zhidao gaikuang biao” [List of sericulture management in each county in autumn of 1938], in Jiangsusheng gongbao xinnian tekan; Tai, Yinian lai zhi xin Wuxi, 123–127. 57. “Huazhong gongsi jingmi kaolu chunqi shoujian banfa” [The Central China Sericulture Company carefully considers the method for collecting spring cocoons], Xinxi ribao (25 April 1939). 58. “Jiangsu jiansheting xunling, jianzi di liusiliuba hao” [Jiangsu Province Construction Ministry order number 6468], Jiangsusheng gongbao [Jiangsu Provincial Report] 81 (18 December 1939), 18. 59. “Wuxixian gongshu ershijiu nian yiyuefen jiansheju fen zhongyao gongzuo baogao” [Wuxi County Government Construction Office report of important works, January 1940], WMA ML1–4–503; “Wuxixian gongshu ershijiu nian eryuefen jiansheju fen zhongyao gongzuo baogao” [Wuxi County Government Construction Office report of important works, February 1940], WMA ML1–4–503; “Wuxixian gongshu ershijiu nian sanyuefen jiansheju fen zhongyao gongzuo baogao” [Wuxi County Government Construction Office report of important works, March 1940], WMA ML1–4-503; “Wuxixian gongshu ershijiu nian jiuyuefen jiansheju fen zhongyao gongzuo baogao” [Wuxi County Government Construction Office report of important works, September 1940], WMA ML1–4–503. 60. Huang, Riwei dui huazhong lunxian qu jingji de lüeduo yu tongzhi, 396. 61. Tai, Yinian lai zhi xin Wuxi, 129. 62. “Huazhong canye gongsi zai Wuxi dengdi linian kongzhi kaiye de jianhang shu” [Number of cocoon brokers controlled by the Central China Sericulture Company in Wuxi and other areas], in Gao and Yan, Jindai Wuxi cansiye ziliao xuanji, 409; Huazhong cansi gufen youxian gongsi [Central China Sericulture Company], Huazhong jianhang gaikuang [Situation of cocoon

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brokers in central China] (1941); Ji, “Huazhong cansi gongsi tongzhi xia de jiangzhe cansi ye,” 117. 63. Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha, Chōsabu, Mushaku kōgyō jittai chōsa hōkokusho, 142–143; Ji, “Huazhong cansi gongsi tongzhi xia de jiangzhe cansi ye,” 149. 64. “Canye zhidao gongzuo jinzhang xiangqu zhidaosuo didian jueding”; “Susheng ganjian guanye zhuanshui dingding zhancheng sheju qizheng” [Jiangsu Province dry cocoon management tax rules formulated and department opened], Xinxi ribao (5 June 1939). 65. Gu and Wang, Riben qinhua shiqi dui Zhongguo cansiye de tongzhi yu ziyuan lüeduo, 114; Ji, “Huazhong cansi gongsi tongzhi xia de jiangzhe cansi ye,” 114. 66. “1939–1943 nian jianjia pingyi weiyuanhui gongding de jianjia” [Cocoon prices from 1939– 1943 decided by the Cocoon Price Discussion Committee], in Gao and Yan, Jindai Wuxi cansiye ziliao xuanji, 410; “Sixiang jianhang jun yi kaiping nanlu chuang kongqian gaojia” [Cocoon brokers across the county have already opened for business and prices in the south are unpre­ce­ dentedly high], Xinxi ribao (1 June 1940). For an explanation of the way in which silkworm eggs ­were improved, see Bell, One Industry, Two Chinas, 133–134. 67. “Gelu jianhang yijie yongchao jia you tigao” [Cocoon brokers have opened in a great tide and the price is rising], Xinxi ribao (5 June 1939); “Sixiang jianhang jun yi kaiping nanlu chuang kongqian gaojia.” 68. “Chuncan shang cu shengzhong yipian ye gui zhi sheng” [The sound of a bag of expensive leaves on the frames on which the spring silkworm crop is growing], Xinxi ribao (30 May 1939); “Sixiang jianhang jun yi kaiping nanlu chuang kongqian gaojia.” 69. For an explanation of the relationship between cocoon prices, rice prices and farmer’s labor, see Zhang Li, Fei pinghenghua yu bu pingheng—­cong Wuxi jindai nongcun jingji fazhan kan zhongguo jindai nongcun jingji de zhuanxing (1840–1949) [Not equal and not becoming equal—­Looking at the transformation of the economy of China’s modern villages through the development of Wuxi’s modern village economy] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2010), 206–221. 70. Ibid., 207 and 210. 71. “Jianxun zhuanshun jijie chuncan zao bangye yi shang cu” [The cocoons have already been moved in the blink of an eye and the spring silkworms have already gone on their frames], Xinxi ribao (21 May 1941). 72. Ji, “Huazhong cansi gongsi tongzhi xia de jiangzhe cansi ye,” 123; “Jianxun zhuanshun jijie chuncan zao bangye yi shang cu.” 73. “1939–1943 nian jianjia pingyi weiyuanhui gongding de jianjia”; “Jianhang jiehou kaiping” [Cocoon brokers open], Xinxi ribao (30 May 1941). 74. “Jianhang kaiping hou chengxiang shouhuo gaikuang” [Circumstances of sale in the city and the countryside after the opening of cocoon brokers], Xinxi ribao (5 June 1941). 75. Ji, “Huazhong cansi gongsi tongzhi xia de jiangzhe cansi ye,” 123. 76. Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha, Chōsabu, Mushaku kōgyō jittai chōsa hōkokusho, 789–791. 77. “Jiating zhisishe yuanliao jian de laiyuan” [The source of cocoons for the ­house­hold silk filature society], in Gao and Yan, Jindai Wuxi cansiye ziliao xuanji, 441; Huang, Riwei dui huazhong lunxian qu jingji de lüeduo yu tongzhi, 392. 78. Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha, Chōsabu, Mushaku kōgyō jittai chōsa hōkokusho, 792. 79. Ibid., 791. 80. “Shiyebu guanli shougong zhisiye zanxing banfa” [Ministry of Commerce provisional method for management of hand manufactured silk industry], in Gao and Yan, Jindai Wuxi cansiye ziliao xuanji, 429–430; Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha, Chōsabu, Mushaku kōgyō jittai chōsa hōkokusho, 158; “Wuxi nongcun yu sixiangye” [Wuxi villages and the silk industry], Zhengzhi yuekan [Monthly Journal of Politics] 2, no. 1 (10 July 1941): 145.

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81. “Gongshangbu guanli xiaoxing zhisi gongchang zanxing guize” [Industrial and Commercial Ministry provisional regulations for the management of small-scale silk filatures], in Gao and Yan, Jindai Wuxi cansiye ziliao xuanji, 430–432. 82. Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha, Chōsabu, Mushaku kōgyō jittai chōsa hōkokusho, 159. 83. “Sixiang canshi yao sun nanlu ding yiri kaiping” [News from sericulture across the county: the south has already opened], Xinxi ribao (31 May 1939); “Zhisiye jianhangye lianri kai huiyuan dahui” [The silk manufacturing industry and cocoon broker industry hold meetings on successive days], Xinxi ribao (28 May 1940). 84. Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha, Chōsabu, Mushaku kōgyō jittai chōsa hōkokusho, 57. 85. “Chengnei kaishe sichang ying yu yilü qudi” [All silk filatures in the city should be prohibited], Xinxi ribao (18 April 1940). 86. “Jiating zhisishi xingqi de jingguo he guomo” [The scale and history of the prosperous ­house­hold silk filature society], in Gao and Yan, Jindai Wuxi cansiye ziliao xuanji, 433–438. 87. Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha, Chōsabu, Mushaku kōgyō jittai chōsa hōkokusho, 173. 88. Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha, Chōsabu, Mushaku kōgyō jittai chōsa hōkokusho, 174–175; “Jiating zhisishi xingqi de jingguo he guomo.” 89. Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha, Chōsabu, Mushaku kōgyō jittai chōsa hōkokusho, 184, 188, 192–194.

Chapter 8: The Utility of Rubble 1. Wei Sheke, Duiyu Wuxi shizheng gaijin yijian [Thoughts on improving Wuxi municipal government] (June 1941), WMA ML1–4–1508. 2. Ibid. 3. Coble, Chinese Capitalists, 54–57; Huang, Riwei dui huazhong lunxian qu jingji de lüeduo yu tongzhi, 297–311. 4. David P. Barrett, “The Wang Jingwei Regime, 1940–1945: Continuities and Disjunctures with Nationalist China,” in Barrett and Shyu, Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 102–115; John Hunter Boyle, China and Japan at War, 1937–1945: The Politics of Collaboration (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1972); Yu Zidao, Cao Zhenwei, Shi Yuanhua, and Zhang Yun, eds., Wang­ wei zhengquan quan shi [Complete history of the puppet regime of Wang Jingwei], 2 vols. (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2006). 5. Brook, Collaboration; Pan Min, Jiangsu riwei jiceng zhengquan yanjiu, 1937–1945 [Studies on local politics in Jiangsu under the Japa­nese puppet regime, 1937–1945] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2006), 47–115. 6. Timothy Brook, “Occupation State Building,” in MacKinnon, Lary, and Vogel, China at War, 40. 7. Brook, Collaboration, 32–61; Pan, Jiangsu riwei jiceng zhengquan yanjiu, 50–51. 8. Timothy Brook, “The Great Way Government of Shanghai,” in Yeh and Henriot, In the Shadow of the Rising Sun, 157–186; Brook, “The Creation of the Reformed Government in Central China, 1938,” 79–81, 86–99. 9. Yu et al., Wangwei zhengquan quan shi, 139; Pan, Jiangsu riwei jiceng zhengquan yanjiu, 56–57, 62; Brook, “Occupation State Building,” 30–32, 34–39. 10. Barrett, “The Wang Jingwei Regime, 1940–1945,” 103; Yu et al., Wangwei zhengquan quan shi, 584–592. 11. Yu et al., Wangwei zhengquan quan shi, 529–533, 536–539.

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12. Brook, “Occupation State Building,” 32–33; Pan, Jiangsu riwei jiceng zhengquan yanjiu, 59–60. 13. “Shirasawa banzhang jinri lixi Minoru banzhang li xi jieshi” [Today head Shirasawa leaves Wuxi and is replaced by head Minoru], Xinxi ribao (1 February 1939). 14. Yao and Feng, Wuxixian xingzheng zhuangkuang diaocha baogaoshu, 1; Tai, Yinian lai zhi xin Wuxi, 2–3. 15. Zhao and Cai, Bainian Wuxi mingren ci, 111. 16. Tai, Yinian lai zhi xin Wuxi, 9. 17. “Huifu zhixu anding renmin” [Recovering order to bring peace to the people], Xinxi ribao (18 January 1938). 18. Brook, Collaboration, 37–41; Pan, Jiangsu riwei jiceng zhengquan yanjiu, 57. 19. “Ben yi shiqi shixiang jiang huifu tu dong shijiazhi” [This city’s seventeen towns and districts will be revived and supervised by the baojia system], Xinxi ribao (21 January 1938). 20. “Xiangzhen zhangfu quanbu fabiao xin zhengquan pu ji quanyi” [List of township and district heads and assistants published as new government has jurisdiction over the ­whole city], Xinxi ribao (15 February 1938); “Jingyunshi yaoxun Yang quzhang nuli zhi an qu zizhi zhi tuijin guan” [News from Jingyun: In order to promote security county head Yang inspects self-­ government in the area], Xinxi ribao (19 February 1938). 21. “Chengqu qugongsuo chengli jinri zhaokai diyi ci quanqu xiangzhen zhang huiyi” [Public Offices in the city are established and today the first meeting of township and district officials was held], Xinxi ribao (12 March 1938). 22. Yao and Feng, Wuxixian xingzheng zhuangkuang diaocha baogaoshu, 2. 23. “Zizhi weiyuanhui banli jiesu Qin zhishi jinri jieren” [The Executive Council of the Self-­ Government Committee concludes its activities and today magistrate Qin takes up his post], Xinxi ribao (1 June 1938); “Qin zhishi zhang zuori jie yinshi shi” [Yesterday magistrate Qin took over his responsibilities], Xinxi ribao (2 June 1938). 24. “Rihua renshi jiji yitang Qin zhishi jiuzhi dianli shengkuang” [Chinese and Japa­nese officials come together under one roof to attend the grand ceremony to celebrate magistrate Qin taking up office], Xinxi ribao (21 June 1938). 25. Ibid. 26. “Jiangsusheng ge xian chengxiang zuzhi zanxing zhangcheng” [Provisional regulations for county, city and district or­g a­ni­za­tion in Jiangsu Province], in Jiangsusheng gongbao xinnian tekan, minzhengting fagui [Ministry of Civil Affairs regulations section], 12–13. 27. “Wuxixian gongshu xunling zidi sanjiuling hao” [Wuxi County Governor Instruction, No. 390] (25 July 1938), WMA ML1–4–307. 28. “Pai fu qingsao beili jiedao” [Porters sent to clear streets in northern area], Xinxi ribao (6 January 1938); “Qingchu jiedao laji tuiji chengwai” [Clearing rubbish in the street and pushing it out of the city], Xinxi ribao (26 February 1938). 29. “Jianzhu muqiao tongxing qiche” [Constructing a wooden bridge for cars], Xinxi ribao (1 January 1938); “Jiri chengli linshi shangchang” [Temporary market is established on this day], Xinxi ribao (3 January 1938); “Chengshi zhi zuijin xianxiang” [Recent appearance of the city], Xinxi ribao (17 January 1938). 30. “Chengwei shuzhen deng ni qing gaijian dashiqiao wei xinshi qiaoliang yibian jiaotong er xing shangshi yangqi” [Concerning township plans for Big Market Bridge to be rebuilt as a new style bridge in order that transport and commerce should flourish] (17 May 1938), WMA ML1–4–424. 31. Yao and Feng, Wuxixian xingzheng zhuangkuang diaocha baogaoshu, 33; Tai, Yinian lai zhi xin Wuxi, 47: “Tuokuang nanbei ganlu gaijian dashiqiao” [Widening the main north-­south road and rebuilding Big Market Bridge], Xinxi ribao (7 July 1938).

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32. Tai, Yinian lai zhi xin Wuxi, 41; “Zizhi weiyuanhui choubei tuokuang chengqu jiedao” [Executive Council of the Self Government Committee plans to widen roads in the city], Xinxi ribao (18 March 1938). 33. Yao and Feng, Wuxixian xingzheng zhuangkuang diaocha baogaoshu, 33; Tai, Yinian lai zhi xin Wuxi, 41–42. 34. “Tuokuang chengqu jiedao zhuo kuodu zhiding zhangcheng” [Considering rules for widening in order to open up the roads], Xinxi ribao (11 November 1938); “Xian shu dingding yilanbiao chengqu jiedao dengji” [Outline road standards for city roads agreed by county magistrate], Xinxi ribao (14 November 1938). 35. “Wuxixian zhengfu sanshinian jiuyuefen jiansheju fen zhongyao gongzuo baogao” [Report of important work of Wuxi County Government Construction Office in September 1941], WMA ML1–4–505; “Wuxixian zhengfu sanshinian shiyuefen jiansheju fen zhongyao gongzuo baogao” [Report of important work of Wuxi County Government Construction Office in October 1941], WMA ML1–4–505. 36. “Wuxixian gongshu ershijiu nian yiyuefen jiansheju fen zhongyao gongzuo baogao”; “Wuxixian gongshu ershijiu nian eryuefen jiansheju fen zhongyao gongzuo baogao”; “Wuxi­ xian gongshu ershijiu nian sanyuefen jiansheju fen zhongyao gongzuo baogao.” 37. “Bingshi yihou guihua xin jianshe chaichu bei yuecheng” [Plans for new construction after the invasion and de­mo­li­tion of the north moon gate], Xinxi ribao (3 May 1938); “Gaijian furongqiao chubu gongcheng yi gao wanyi” [First stages in rebuilding Lotus Bridge already complete], Xinxi ribao (2 July 1938). 38. Tai, Yinian lai zhi xin Wuxi, 44–45. 39. “Wuxi shizhengqu ganlu jihua tu” [Plan of main roads in Wuxi urban area], WXSZ 5: n.p. 40. “Jianzhu huancheng lu gongcheng diyiqi shigong xize” [Rules for building work for first section of the ring road], Xinxi ribao (19 May 1940); “Wuxixian zhengfu sanshinian jiuyuefen jiansheju fen zhongyao gongzuo baogao”; “Wuxixian zhengfu sanshinian shiyuefen jiansheju fen zhongyao gongzuo baogao.” 41. Yao and Feng, Wuxixian xingzheng zhuangkuang diaocha baogaoshu, 5–6; Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha, Chōsabu, Mushaku kōgyō jittai chōsa hōkokusho, 620. 42. Ibid., 124, 131–132. 43. “Zizhihui zheng chi shirong jianzhu fangwu zhaozhang lingzhao” [Self-­G overnment Committee manages city appearance and according to regulations those building ­houses should have licenses], Xinxi ribao (20 January 1938). 44. Tai, Yinian lai zhi xin Wuxi, 38–40. 45. “Zizhihui gongwuke yancha qudi weizhang jianzhu” [Self-­Government Committee Office of Public Works inspects unlicensed construction], Xinxi ribao (25 March 1938). 46. “Chengwei qiaomian jianzhu zu’ai jiaotong qiaoxia gongdi duo bei qinzhan zhuo ni qudi banfa yangqi” [Concerning how construction on bridges obstructs transport and methods for prohibiting construction on open land underneath them] (18 June 1938), WMA ML1–4–424. 47. Jiangsusheng gongbao xinnian tekan, jiansheting dashiji [Ministry of Construction diary section], 6. 48. “Beimen xiao sanliqiao pijiangbang da huozai shao caopeng yibai ershi jia” [Fire burns 120 straw shacks by Pijiang Stream near Three Mile Bridge outside the north gate], Xinxi ribao (11 December 1938). 49. “Beitang shouquan buzu ge hu xiangwei quanbu chaiquan” [Property rights in Beitang are insufficient and ­house­holds do not yet have de­mo­li­tion rights], Xinxi ribao (7  January 1939). 50. Yao and Feng, Wuxixian xingzheng zhuangkuang diaocha, 12–13; “Yuan cheng zuren ren you youxian quan” [Original tenants still have priority rights], Xinxi ribao (26 January 1938).

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51. “Zuwu jiufeng pingyi” [Discussing rental disputes], Xinxi ribao (17 January 1939). 52. “Shifang zuhu weite yuanyi” [City’s tenants maintain their original position], Xinxi ribao (10 March 1939). “Fangzu jiufen baojing qing yan” [Rent dispute reported to police who investigate], Xinxi ribao (25 October 1939). 53. “Jiangsu minzhengting xunling zidi qi hao” [Jiangsu Provincial Ministry of Civil Affairs order number 7] (5 October 1938), WMA ML1–4–1490. 54. “Wuxixian jingchaju chengzhong fenju diyiqu zhong yifang kongwu diaochabiao” [List of empty ­houses in Wuxi County police office city center branch first ward first administrative area], WMA ML1–4–1490; “Wuxixian jingchaju chengzhong fenju diyiqu zhong erfang kongwu diaochabiao” [List of empty ­houses in Wuxi County police office city center branch first ward second administrative area], WMA ML1–4–1490; “Wuxixian jingchaju chengzhong fenju diyiqu zhong sanfang kongwu diaochabiao” [List of empty ­houses in Wuxi County police office city center branch first ward third administrative area], WMA ML1–4–1490; “Wuxixian jingchaju chengzhong fenju diyiqu zhong sifang kongwu diaochabiao” [List of empty ­houses in Wuxi County police office city center branch first ward fourth administrative area], WMA ML1–4–1490. 55. “Benyi diandeng buri tongdian” [Within a few days, lights in this city will have electricity], Xinxi ribao (11 January 1938); “Diandeng zhongfang guangming youqi mingri xiangxing shiche fadian” [The period during which electric lights will be lit is limited and tomorrow they will be tested], Xinxi ribao (5 February 1938); Yao and Feng, Wuxixian xingzheng zhuangkuang diaocha, 30. 56. “Guiding ludeng kaixi shijian” [Rules for period for turning electric lights on and off], Xinxi ribao (12 March 1938). 57. Huang, Riwei dui huazhong lunxian qu jingji de lüeduo yu tongzhi, 385; Jiangsusheng gongbao xinnian tekan, jiansheting dashiji, 12. 58. “Chengwei nanshi jian xing ludeng ying su huifu yangqi” [Concerning south city’s request to quickly repair streetlights] (27 May 1938), WMA ML1–4–307. 59. “Chengwei qingqiu zhuan cheng huifu nanli ludeng yangqi” [Petition to transfer request to repair streetlights along Nanli Road] (25 July 1938), WMA ML1–4–307. 60. Ibid. 61. “Chengwei huifu ludeng yili jiaotong yangqi” [Petition to repair streetlights in order to facilitate transport] (12 September 1938), WMA ML1–4–307. 62. “Chengwei juqing zhuancheng yangqi” [Request concerning the transferred petition] (26 November 1940), WMA ML1–4–308. 63. “Hezhong yinliao pu qie ji yi kaifang ziliubing” [Drinking water in the river is not clean and self-­flowing well should be urgently re-­opened], Xinxi ribao (16 February 1938). 64. Yao and Feng, Wuxixian xingzheng zhuangkuang diaocha, 30; “Zhuoqu shuijia” [Determining water rates], Xinxi ribao (25 February 1938). 65. “Chengwei huangjun xuyong ziliubing shui ken qing buzhu mada dianli fei yangqi” [Petition that the imperial army should pay the electric motor fees for the use of water from the self-­flowing well] (25 June 1938), WMA ML1–4–307. 66. “Zizhihui gongwuke xiuli Xideng lu lumian” [Self-Government Committee Public Works Office repairs the surface of the Wuxi-­Jiangyin Road], Xinxi ribao (19 April 1938); “Xian gongshu xunling zuzhi xideng gonglu aihucun” [County magistrate orders that protection unit be established along the Wuxi-­Jiangyin Road], Xinxi ribao (28 October 1939); “Xideng lu qiaoliang bei fei chaihui buhuo renfan anqing mingliao” [Bridges along the Wuxi-­Jiangyin Road have been destroyed by bandits and this is the situation with regard to capturing the criminals], Xinxi ribao (25 September 1940). 67. “Weicheng qing xiuli qiaoliang yili jiaotong er mian weixian you” [Petition concerning request to repair bridges to facilitate transport and avoid danger] (7  April 1938), WMA ML1–4–424.

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68. “Wuxixian gongshu xunling, jianzi di 637 hao” [Wuxi County Government construction order number 637] (26 September 1940), WMA ML1–4–425. 69. “Wuxixian gongshu xunling, jianzi di 851 hao” [Wuxi County Government construction order number 851] (11 October 1939), WMA ML1–4–425. 70. “Wuxixian gongshu ershijiu nian eryuefen jiansheju fen zhongyao gongzuo baogao”; “Xianshu fuxing xidi jianshe jiji chouzhu huaicheng malu” [County Government revives construction in Wuxi and prepares to build ring road], Xinxi ribao (25 May 1940). 71. “Wang tielu jiaotong kaishi tongxing keche” [Rail transport begins to carry passenger cars], Xinxi ribao (12 April 1938). 72. “Yiqian lutie yuangong ke xiang kaojin chezhan pohuai tielu zhe yanban” [Those former workers on the railway should report to the railway station to manage destruction of the railway], Xinxi ribao (12 February 1938). 73. “Chengwei qian cheng kaijun yiwubahao tielu qiao xia hedao ji xiuli Dongshouqiao muqiao yi an qijin weifeng zhiling jin zai xu ken yangqi” [Petition concerning previous petition to deepen the road underneath railway bridge number 158 and repair the wooden bridge at Dongshouqiao. No orders have yet been received and so request is being made again] (October 1938), WMA ML1–4–386; “Chengwei tielu qiaoxia hedao zuse gu gonglao guji yongfei shenju yangqi” [Petition concerning fees for workers to clear obstructions from road underneath the railway bridge] (21 October 1938), WMA ML1–4–386. 74. “Chengwei feng youjun mian yu chai zhanzhuang jian diandeng quexiao cailiao dengyou yaodian shiguan” [Petition concerning order from Friendly Army that parts of station should be demolished and concerns over lack of funds for construction of electric lighting] (10 February 1939), WMA ML1–4–308. 75. “Wuxixian zizhi weiyuanhui xunling, jianzi di 2730 hao” [Wuxi County Self-­Government Committee construction order number 2730] (16 April 1938), WMA ML1–4–307. 76. “Wuxixian gongshu xunling, jianzi di 390 hao” [Wuxi County Government construction order number 390] (16 September 1938), WMA ML1–4–307. 77. Yao and Feng, Wuxixian xingzheng zhuangkuang diaocha, 30. 78. “Heshui wuzhuo yinliao buqie faxian liuxing xingbing” [River water is muddy, drinking water is not clean and cholera has been discovered], Xinxi ribao (14 February 1938).; “Dashiqiao hezhong faxian fushi” [Floating corpses discovered in the river near Big Market Bridge], Xinxi ribao (22 February 1938). 79. “Gongwuke niding kaijun chenghe shishi banfa” [Public Works Office prepares to implement plans for dredging city rivers], Xinxi ribao (2 April 1938); “Nanbei ganhe xing jiang kaiju” [Main north-­south river will be dredged], Xinxi ribao (21 April 1938). 80. “Chengwei hedao zuse qing zhu an cheng shefa liutong jie xing shangye er li weisheng you” [Petition concerning river obstructions and request to attempt to clear them to revive commerce and promote hygiene] (7 April 1938), WMA ML1–4–386. 81. “Jiangsusheng ge xian juban nongxi shuili gongcheng shishi dagang” [Outline of what each county in Jiangsu Province should do to manage irrigation during agricultural slack season] (1939), WMA ML1–4–386; “Wuxixian gongshu xunling, jianzi di 4219 hao” [Wuxi County Government construction order number 4219] (2  March  1939), WMA ML1–4–386. 82. “Wuxixian zhengfu xunling caizi di 1068” [Wuxi County Government finance order 1068] (5 February 1940), WMA ML1–4–387. 83. “Wuxixian zhengfu xunling jianzi di 510 hao” [Wuxi County Government construction order number 510] (12 February 1941), WMA ML1–4–387. 84. “Chengwei lianming qingqiu kaijun hedao yangqi jianhe fu zhun zhuan cheng yili guangai er zhong minyin you” [Joint petition to request dredging of river which will in addition benefit irrigation and drinking water] (28 May 1938), WMA ML1–4–386.

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85. “Chengwei lianming zaixing qingqiu kaijun hedao huifu hongqiao xinqiao liang zuo yangqi” [Joint petition concerning repeated request to dredge river and repair Red Bridge and the New Bridge] (1 April 1940), WMA ML1–4–387.

Chapter 9: A Militarized Environment 1. Benton, New Fourth Army; Chen, Making Revolution. 2. Yang Kuisong, “Nationalist and Communist Guerrilla Warfare in North China,” in Peattie et al., The Battle for China, 321–322. 3. “Qianri xiawu sishiban Yang zhishi yu la yun ming” [The other day at 4:30 in the afternoon, magistrate Yang was stabbed to death], Xinxi ribao (11 January 1940) “Heyi guanmin mianhui xunde kai Yanggu zhishi zhuiyihui” [All the city’s officials hold a memorial ceremony to commemorate the merits of the deceased magistrate Yang], Xinxi ribao (30 January 1940). 4. “Qianri xiawu sishiban Yang zhishi yu la yun ming.” 5. “Jiangsusheng zhengfu kuaiyou daidian, 35” [Jiangsu Provincial Government emergency tele­g ram, 35] (10 January 1940), WMA ML1–1–2; “Yang zhishi yu la yunming hou shengwei zuo li xi checha” [After the stabbing to death of magistrate Yang, provincial officials arrived yesterday to conduct an investigation], Xinxi ribao (12 January 40); “Jingchaju wei la Yang an xuanshang tong jizheng xiong” [The police station offers a reward for capture of the assassin in the case of the stabbing of Yang], Xinxi ribao (12 January 1940). 6. “To H. H. Holland, Esquire, Director of Posts, Nanking, 11 January 1940,” JPA 1032–2–210. 7. “Jingchaju wei la Yang an xuanshang tong jizheng xiong”; “Chengnei jiaotong zuo wanquan jinzhi sousuo la Yang an xiongfan” [Yesterday transport within the city was completely prohibited to search for Yang’s killers], Xinxi ribao (13 January 1940); “To H. H. Holland, Esquire, Director of Posts, Nanking, 12 January 1940,” JPA 1032-2-210. 8. “To H. H. Holland, Esquire, Director of Posts, Nanking, 15 January 1940,” JPA 1032–2–210. 9. Ibid.; “Jinri shangwu bashiqi chengguan kaifang yibufen” [At eight this morning the  closed city was partially opened], Xinxi ribao (15  January 1940); “Yang zhishi bei la an  cheng wan jun chi shu ji xiong” [Orders to the army to maintain order and capture the  killers in the case of the assassination of magistrate Yang], Xinxi ribao (16  January 1940). 10. “Chengguan jiaotong ren wei yuanzhuang chengwai jingbei xian yi chexiao” [Transport within the closed city returns to its previous state and the line of garrisons outside the city is removed], Xinxi ribao (16 January 1940). 11. “Chengguan jiaotong quanbu huifu ping xianmin deng zhunxu churu” [The closed city is completely open and residents with papers may enter and leave], Xinxi ribao (17 January 1940); “Yang gu zhishi bei juji an zheng fanxiong qi jun yi buhuo” [Killers and their weapons captured in the case of the killing of deceased magistrate Yang], Xinxi ribao (31 January 1940); “To H. H. Holland, Esquire, Director of Posts, Nanking, 17 January 1940,” JPA 1032–2–210. 12. “Qianri xiawu sishiban Yang zhishi yu la yun ming”; “Zuori zhongri zhangguan fenwang Yangzhai weiyan” [Yesterday Chinese and Japa­nese officials went to Yang’s ­house to offer their condolences], Xinxi ribao (12 January 1940). 13. “Chengnei jiaotong zuo wanquan jinzhi sousuo la Yang an xiongfan.” 14. “Banli Yang gu zhishi sangwu zuzhi zhisang weiyuanhui” [A Funeral Management Committee is established to arrange the funeral of the deceased magistrate Yang], Xinxi ribao (16 January 1940). 15. “Yang gu zhishi dingqi shedian gongyuan nei zhaokai zhuidaohui” [Date for memorial ser­v ice in the park for deceased magistrate Yang is fixed], Xinxi ribao (20 January 1940).

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16. “Zhaodaihui zhixu dan” [Order of ceremonies of the memorial ser­vice], Xinxi ribao (5 February 1940). 17. “Gongyuan nei tonggengting qian gengsheng jinian dahui shengkuang” [In front of the heaven pavilion in the garden a ceremony of memory and rebirth is held], Xinxi ribao (14 August 1938); “Zhiji zhongri zhenwang jiangshi jinian bayisan zhounian” [To commemorate Chinese and Japa­nese troops who died in battle, officers and soldiers hold an 8/13 memorial ser­ vice], Xinxi ribao (14 August 1940). 18. “Zhuinian gu Yang zhishi” [Remembering the deceased magistrate Yang], Xinxi ribao (5 February 1940). 19. “Yang gu zhishi zhuidao dahui zhuxi zhici” [Speech of the chairman of the memorial ser­v ice for the deceased magistrate Yang], Xinxi ribao (5 February 1940). 20. “Yang gu zhishi zhuidao dahui zhuxi zhici”; “Ling Wuxixian gongshu mishu zhan dai xianwu Tang Yong” [Order that Wuxi County secretary Tang Yong temporarily take over county activities] (January 1940), WMA ML1–1–2. 21. “Duo Yang xianzhang” [Lamenting county head Yang], Xinxi ribao (5 February 1940). 22. Pan, Jiangsu riwei jiceng zhengquan yanjiu, 30–31; Barrett, “The Wang Jingwei Regime,” 107. 23. “Wuxi minzhong xiezhu qingxiang gongzuo lianhehui zuori juxing chengli dahui” [The federation for Wuxi inhabitants to help with qingxiang work holds a meeting to commemorate its establishment], Xinxi ribao (13 July 1941). 24. Benton, New Fourth Army, 325–326. 25. “Xijin le Wuxi renmin de xie,” 11; Chen Zhenbai, “Kangri zhanzheng shiqi de liunian youji shenghuo” [Six years of guerrilla life during the Anti-­Japanese War of Re­sis­tance], in Jiangsusheng Wuxishi weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui, Wuxi wenshi ziliao, di siji, 36, 39–41. 26. Benton, New Fourth Army, 336–337; Chen, Making Revolution, 223–258. 27. “Tongji dao’an yi fan biao, ershiba nian shiyue shiyiri qi zhi shiyue sanshiyiri zhi” [List of warrants for arrest in robbery cases, 11  October to 31  October 1939], Jiangsusheng gongbao [Jiangsu Province Report] 76 (13 November 1939), 13–28; “Tongji dao’an yi fan biao, ershijiu nian yi yue ershi ri qi zhi er yue ershi ri zhi” [List of warrants for arrest in robbery cases, 20 January to 20 February 1940], Jiangsusheng gongbao 95 (8 April 1940), 11–12; “Helen Scally to friends.” 28. Shi Guanghua, “Jiangnan kangri yiyongjun dongjin jishi” [Record of eastern movements of courageous forces in southern Jiangsu], in Jinian kangri zhanzheng shengli wushi zhounian (zhuanji) [Commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of victory in the War of Re­sis­tance against the Japa­nese (excerpts)] ed. Wuxixian zhengxie weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui [Wuxi County Po­liti­cal Consultative Committee Cultural Historical Materials Committee] (Wuxi: Jiangnan daxue wenhua jingji fazhan gongsi, 1995), 13–16. 29. “Tongji dao’an yi fan biao, ershiba nian shiyue shiyiri qi zhi shiyue sanshiyiri zhi.” 30. “Dishi shi canjia qingxiang budui jiao mei Xinan [Jiangkang] youfei” [The tenth division joins the qingxiang forces in destroying guerrillas outside the south gate of Wuxi], Qingxiang ribao [Qingxiang Daily] (11 July 1941). 31. “Xinan deng xiang fei gong xiang jisu qing” [Continuing cleaning of the guerrillas in wards to the south of Wuxi], Qingxiang ribao (18 July 1941); “Wei chengbao dishi shi qingxiangtuan xunluodui yu tegong jingwei di shiyi dadui duishi dengsheng wuhui jing diao chu hou ye yi shuangfang liangjie qi jianzhun you” [Report that after soldiers from the tenth qingxiang patrol division and the eleventh special forces unit mistakenly fought each other, both sides reached a negotiated settlement] (25 August 1941), WMA ML1–4–1595. 32. “Wuxi diqu di’erqi qingxiang gongzuo jinzhang zhuangkuang” [Progress made in the second period of qingxiang work in the first Wuxi area], in Riben diguo zhuyi qinhua dang’an ziliao xuanbian: Riwang de qingxiang [Selected materials of the Japa­nese imperialist invasion of

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China: Japa­nese and Wang Jingwei Government qingxiang campaigns], ed. Zhongyang ­danganguan, Zhongguo di’er lishi danganguan, Jilinsheng shehui kexue yuan [Central Chinese Archives, Number Two Archives, Jilin Provincial Academy of Social Sciences] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju chuban, 1995), 291–295. 33. “Jinjiang ben shu jiuyue ershiyi ri qi zhi ershiqi ri zhi qingxiang gongzuo zhaiyao baogao” [Summary report of qingxiang work conducted by this office 21 September to 27 September], WMA ML1–5–167; “Benyi qingxiang tequ gongshu ding ershiri chengli” [The special area qingxiang headquarters in this city is opened on 20th], Xinxi ribao (15 September 1941); “Benyi tuizhan qingxiang tequ gongshu ji fengsuo banshichu mingri tongshi chengli” [This city announces the qingxiang special area headquarters and the Blockade Office will be established tomorrow], Xinxi ribao (23 September 1941). 34. “Wuxi diqu di’erqi qingxiang gongzuo jinzhang zhuangkuang,” 301; Pan, Jiangsu Riwei jiceng zhengquan yanjiu, 34–40, 128–141, 168–170; Chang Liu, Peasants and Revolution in Rural China: Rural Po­liti­cal Change in the North China Plain and the Yangzi Delta, 1850–1949 (London: Routledge, 2007), 160–161. 35. Wuxixian di wu qu Tianxia zizhi cujin hui, Tianxia shi gailan, 48. 36. “Wuxi tebiequ gongshu gongzuo baogaoshu, 9/24–11/13” [Wuxi Special Area Headquarters office report, 24 September to 13 November], WMA ML1–5–167; Tan Nonglin, “Jiangnan fan qingxiang douzheng de jingyan jiaoxun—­zai suzhong sanfenqu silingbu ying yishang ganbu huishang de baogao” [Lessons drawn from the battle to oppose cleaning the countryside in Jiangnan—­report of se­nior cadre meetings in the third area headquarters of central Jiangsu], in Sunan kangri genjudi [Base areas in south Jiangsu during the Anti-­Japanese War of Re­sis­tance], ed. Zhonggong Jiangsusheng wei dangshi gongzuo weiyuanhui, Jiangsu sheng danganguan [Chinese Communist Party, Jiangsu Provincial Committee, Party History Work Council, Jiangsu Provincial Archives] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1987), 157–158. 37. “Wuxi tebiequ gongshu gongzuo baogaoshu, 9/24–11/13”; “Erwu liangqu jianzhu liaowangtai shuliang tongji biao” [List of observation platforms constructed in second and fifth sectors], WMA ML1–5–167. 38. “Riwei zai Dengxiyu yanxian gong zhu liba sheka de zui’e huodong” [Illegal activities of establishing bamboo fences in the Dengxiyu area in occupied China], in Zhongyang danganguan et al., Riben diguo zhuyi qinhua dang’an ziliao xuanbian, 474. 39. Tan, “Jiangnan fan qingxiang douzheng de jingyan,” 158–159. 40. “Wuxi tebiequ gongshu gongzuo baogaoshu, 9/24–11/13”; “Tebiequ gongshu zhaokai qingxiang lianluo huiyi” [Special Area Headquarters convenes qingxiang contact meeting], Xinxi ribao (28 November 1941). 41. Wuxi tebiequ gongshu gongzuo baogaoshu, 9/24–11/13”; “Wuxi tebie qu gongshu chuandi gongwen zanxing banfa” [Wuxi Special Area Headquarters provisional method for transmitting documents], WMA ML1–5–167. 42. “Wuxi tebiequ gongshu tongxun zhan chuandi gongwen shixian biao” [List of time limits for transmission of documents between communications stations and Wuxi Special Area headquarters], WMA ML1–5–167. 43. “Jinjiang ben shu jiuyue ershiyi ri qi zhi ershiqi ri zhi qingxiang gongzuo zhaiyao baogao”; “Qingxiang weiyuanhui, Wuxixian tebie qu gongshu gongzuo zhaiyao baogaoshu.” 44. “Qingxiang weiyuanhui shenli qingxiang quyu daofei anjian zanxing banfa” [Provisional methods for the qingxiang committee to hear bandit cases in the qingxiang area], WMA ML1–2–581. 45. “Wuxi tebiequ gongshu kanshousuo minguo sanshinian shiyue yiri zhi shibari fan yin liao biao” [List of people in Wuxi Special Area Headquarters guard­houses because of stealing rice, 1 October to 18 October 1941], WMA ML1–2–745.

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46. “Keyuan Fan jinchen, mingguo sanshinian shiyue bari” [Request from official Fan, 8 October 1941], WMA ML1–2–745. 47. “Keyuan Fan jincheng, shiyue shisanri” [Request from official Fan, 13 October], WMA ML1–2–745; “Benyi tebiequ gongshu zhaokai dierci quzhang huiyi” [This city’s Special Area Headquarters holds the second sector head meeting], Xinxi ribao (23 October 1941). 48. “Qingxiang diqu gemin chujin banfa” [Methods for leaving and entering the qingxiang area], WMA ML1–4–1594. 49. “Qingxiang weiyuanhui gongzuo baogao jielu 1941 nian 11 yue” [Report into the qingxiang committee’s work, November 1941], in Zhongyang dang‘anguan et al., Riben diguo zhuyi qinhua dang’an ziliao xuanbian, 336. 50. “Wuxi diqu dierqi qingxiang gongzuo jinzhang zhuangkuang” [Progress made in the second period of qingxiang work in the first Wuxi area], in Riben diguo zhuyi qinhua dangan ziliao xuanbian: riwang de qingxiang [Selected materials of the Japa­nese Imperialist Invasion of China: Japa­nese and Wang Jing­wei Government qingxiang campaigns] eds., Zhongyang dangan guan, zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan, jilinsheng shehui kexue yuan [Central Chinese Archives, Number Two Archives, Jilin Provincial Academy of Social Sciences] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju chuban, 1995), 296. 51. “Qingxiang weiyuanhui gongzuo baogao jielu,” 337. 52. Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha, Shanhai jimusho chōsashitsu, Kōsoshō Mushakuken nōson jittai chōsa hōkokushu, 88–100. 53. “Ling Wuxi tebiequ gongshu, sanshinian shiyue shiqiri” [Order to the Wuxi Special Area Headquarters, 17 October 1941], WMA ML1–4–1392. 54. “Qingxiang diqu wuzi tongzhi ji yunxiao guanli zanxing banfa” [Provisional method for managing governance and transport of material goods in the qingxiang area], WMA ML 1–4–1392. 55. “Wuxi diqu di erqi qingxiang gongzuo jinzhang zhuangkuang,” 301–302; “Qingxiang diqu wuzi ban churu shouxu xiuzheng banfa” [Method for amending the formalities for moving goods into and out of the qingxiang area], WMA ML 1–4–1392. 56. Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha, Shanhai jimusho chōsashitsu, Mushaku kōgyō jittai chōsa hōkokushu, 753–756. 57. “Ben tebie qu ge qu mijia zhuyue tongji biao” [Chart of monthly rice prices in this special area], WMA ML 1–4–1392. 58. “Wuxi diqu di erqi qingxiang gongzuo jinzhang zhuangkuang,” 302. 59. Chen, “Kangri zhanzheng shiqi de liunian youji shenghuo,” 55. 60. “Qingxiang qijian jiaotong zuge xinchai wucong laicheng” [Barriers to transport during the period of qingxiang means there is no way firewood can get to the city], Xinxi ribao (5 August 1941); “Kaihang mei yu zu’ai chaichuan wufa rucheng” [Boats carry­ing fuel are blockaded and have no way to enter the city], Xinxi ribao (22 August 1941); “Wuxixian diyiqu quzhang Chen Zhanru, minguo sanshinian qiyue shiwuri” [From Chen Zhanru, head of the first sector of Wuxi County, 15 July 1941], WMA ML1–4–1595. 61. “Tielu yibei xidenglu yidong hua wei erqi qingxiang diqu” [North of the railway line and east of the Wuxi-Jiangyin Road is marked as the area of the second qingxiang campaign], Xinxi ribao (7 October 1941). 62. “Qingxiang weiyuanhui, Wuxixian tebie qu gongshu gongzuo zhaiyao baogaoshu.” 63. Gao Wuxi minzhongshu [Wuxi book for the masses], WMA ML1–5–167. 64. “Wang weiyuan zhang li Xi xunshi relie huanying zhi chengkuang” [The warm welcome given to council head Wang on his inspection of Wuxi], Xinxi ribao (7 December 1941).

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Conclusion 1. Hsi-­sheng Ch’i, “The Military Dimension, 1942–1945,” in Hsiung and Levine, China’s Bitter Victory, 162–165; Coble, Chinese Capitalists, 77–97; Hua Hongxi, “Wuxi zai shuishen huo re zhong” [Wuxi in the depth of water and the heat of the fire], Dagong [Great Public] (1945). 2. Wu Meiyi, “Fuyuan weiyuanhui zhi yiyi yu shimin” [The meaning and mission of the Demobilization Committee], WXZGB fu no. 1 (1945), 7–11. 3. “Jianshe xin Wuxi zhi weiyi tujing” [The only way to construct a new Wuxi], in Wuxi shizhi bangongshi, Xue Mingjian wenji, 2:944. 4. Coble, Chinese Capitalists, 132; “Sili Jiangnan daxue jianshi” [Brief history of the private Jiangnan University] in Shanghai daxue et al., Rong Desheng yu xing xueyu cai, 2:641–644; “Kaiyuan jiqi chang dashiji” [Record of Kaiyuan Machinery Factory], in Shanghai daxue et al., Rong Desheng yu qiye jingying guanli, 1:586–593.

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Bibliography

Note: Items from the archival collections, government reports, newspapers and journals listed below are cited individually in the notes but do not have separate bibliographic entries.

Archival collections Jiangsu Provincial Archives Personal papers Margaret Mary Rue and Elizabeth Helmhold, record group 8, box 73, Yale University Divinity School Library Shanghai Municipal Archives Wuxi Municipal Archives Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History archives

Government reports, journals, and newspapers Jiangsusheng gongbao 江蘇省公報 [Jiangsu Provincial Report] Jiangsusheng zhengfu gongbao 江蘇省政府公報 [Jiangsu Provincial Government Report] North China Herald Qingxiang ribao 清鄉日報 [Qingxiang Daily] Shenbao 申報 [Shanghai Times] Wuxi lüjing tongxianghui huikan 無錫旅京同鄉會會刊 [Journal of the Wuxi Native Place Society in Nanjing] Wuxi lükan 無錫旅刊 [Journal of the Wuxi Native Place Society in Shanghai] Wuxi lüsu tongxianghui niankan 無錫旅蘇同鄉會年刊 [Yearly Journal of the Wuxi Native Place Society in Suzhou] Wuxi shizheng 無錫市政 [Journal of Wuxi Municipal Planning] Wuxixian diyiqu zheng gongbao 無錫縣第一區政公報 [Wuxi County Number One Ward Government Report] Wuxixian zheng gongbao 無錫縣政公報 [Wuxi County Government Report] Xibao 錫報 [Wuxi Newspaper] Xin Wuxi 新無錫 [New Wuxi] Xinxi ribao 新錫日報 [New Wuxi Daily]

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Index

Carroll, Peter, 12 Cartier, Carolyn, 9 Central China Development Company, 129 Central China Railway Company, 173 Central China Sericulture Company, 129, 133–135, 137–143, 145, 153, 164, 166 Central China Telegram Company, 166 Central China Water and Electricity Company, 156, 159 Changshu: cocoons, 135–136; electricity, 156; Japanese invasion, 131; transport connections, 57, 158; Yanjiaqiao, 38–39, 43; Wang Jingwei, 179 Changzhou, 2, 21, 31, 67, 125, 131 checkpoint: Jiangsu-Zhejiang War, 62, 69; Japanese occupation, 165–166, 168–169, 172, 175; refugees, 122 Chengdu, 10, 17 Chen Hansheng, 29 Chiang Kaishek, 74, 92, 120, 160–161, 168 children: education, 33, 44, 147; Japanese occupation, 165; lineages, 31; refugees, 66, 110, 122; silk filature, 30, 144; Spring Festival, 36 Chongan Temple, 1, 35, 47, 151 City Organization Law, 72–73, 75–76, 87, 148 Cochran, Sherman, 22 cocoon broker, 18, 20–22, 124, 129, 135, 137–142 cocoon warehouse, 84, 131 Columbia University, 78 commercial settlement, 55, 56–60, 71, 78, 82, 88, 183 Communist Revolution, 181–182

Academia Sinica, 29, 53, 76, 94 Agricultural Bank of China, 102, 104, 137 Andili, 99–100 Anhui, 18, 23, 147 Anti-Japanese War of Resistance, 13, 38, 46, 127, 182 Anzhen: household silk filature, 143: population, 40–41; qingxiang campaign, 164, 169–171, 173–174, 177–179, 182 Asia-Pacific War, 129, 180 bandit, 94, 140, 158–160, 178 banditry, 95, 131, 168, 174, 180 Bank of China, 24–25 baojia, 92–93, 170–171, 175. See also household registration Baoxing Flour Mill, 22 Baoxing Rice Mill, 24 Bashiqiao, 24, 40–42, 51, 139, 171 Beidajie, 28, 35, 66–67, 86, 151–152, 154 Beijing, 10–11, 19, 58, 60–61, 113 Beishang, 41, 103–104 Beitang, 23, 47, 64, 79, 86, 169–170 Beixia, 41–42, 104, 133, 150 Beiyang Government, 11, 55–56, 60, 71, 74, 150 Beizhakou, 23, 59, 97, 151, 153–154, 156 Bell, Lynda, 10, 30 Blockade Affairs Office, 170, 176 Brook, Timothy, 128, 132, 147 Bodugang, 160–161 Cao Xiang, 170, 175, 179 Caozhuang, 51–52, 54

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Communist New Fourth Army, 14, 131, 164, 169–170, 177 company: Bashiqiao, 51; boat, 85; electricity, 85; steamer, 66, 122, 173; Xue Nanming, 21; Xue Shouxuan, 21; Zhou Shunqing, 20–21 cotton, 10–11, 18, 20, 24, 27, 136, 145 cotton merchant, 20, 22 cotton mills: construction license, 96; Japanese invasion, 131; Jiangsu Society, 45; migration, 30, 109; Rong family, 17; urban morphology, 24, 26; workers, 34, 43 County Organization Law, 87, 90–91, 95, 148 Dasheng Cotton Mill, 10–11 Dashiqiao, 79, 151, 152 Dennerline, Jerry, 31 Donglin Academy, 48 Dongting, 41–42, 116, 132, 160, 173 Dongwu University, 77 Dyos, H. J., 8 elites: aid, 104; commercial settlement, 55, 57; electricity, 106; native place society, 119; Self-Government Committee, 128, 148–149; silk, 20; urbanization, 2, 10–11, 25, 44, 54, 107, 153, 181–182; urban administration, 3, 11–13, 147; war, 14–15, 60–71, 126 entrepreneurs: commercial settlement, 55, 57; industrialization, 1, 25, 54; postwar reconstruction, 131–132; silk industry, 143; tourism, 44; urban administration, 77; Yanjiaqiao, 38 farm, 23, 38, 45, 51 farming, 10, 104 farming household. See farmer farmhouse, 11, 50–51, 182 farmstead. See farmhouse farmer: cotton, 18; daily life, 15, 50, 53–54; irrigation, 103, 161; migration, 30–32, 153, 175–176; motorized irrigation pump, 51–52, 104, 161; protest, 21; rice, 23–24; silk industry, 18, 20, 50–51, 129, 131, 133, 135, 140–141, 169; stove god, 53; survey, 41–42; urbanization, 3, 5, 7–8, 30, 38, 49, 99; Wuxi-Jiangyin Road, 98, 173; war, 131, 150, 158, 172 Farmers’ Association, 62, 96

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Fei Xiaotong, 50–51, 54 Fengtian Army, 60, 67–70 Feng Yuxiang, 60 Feng Zupei, 62–63, 69 Five-Li, Lake, 48, 57 Fu‘an, 41 Fufeng Mill, 22 Fuxin Mill, 22 gambling, 80, 94, 104, 180 Goodman, Bryna, 109 grain: broker, 22; Japanese occupation, 131, 154; Jiangsu-Zhejiang War, 63; Kaixiangong, 50; qingxiang campaign, 174–175; storage, 53; World War I, 21 Grand Canal, 19, 24, 78, 94, 101, 160 Great Depression, 20, 22–23, 26, 51, 131, 140 Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere, 167, 178 Great People’s Association, 148 Great Way Government, 147 Great World: Shanghai, 115; Wuxi, 29, 35 Gross, Miriam, 46 Guangfu Gate, 105, 156, 165, 182 Guangfu Temple, 48 Guangqin Cotton Mill, 25 Guangqin Flour Mill, 25 Guangqin Road, 25, 58, 60, 70 Guangqin Silk Filature, 25 Guangqin Soap Factory, 25 guerrillas: postwar reconstruction, 131, 158–159; qingxiang campaign, 14, 164, 168–170, 179; silk industry, 140–143; smuggling, 135; warfare, 13, 127 handicrafts, 19, 104 handicraft silk industry, 129, 142 Hangzhou, 9, 12, 19, 39, 46, 123, 125, 159 Hebei, 9, 164 Henan, 61, 76, 160 Hong Kong, 57 Hongkou, 112, 116 household registration, 76, 148–149, 165. See also baojia Huaishang, 41–42, 103, 133 Huaixia, 41–42, 94, 103, 133 Huimin Silk Filature Company, 134–135, 150 Huishan: clay, 18–19, 26; commercial settlement, 59; Jiangsu Society, 45; residential zone 1, 57, 78–79, 182; tourism, 47, 72, 80–81

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Huishanbang Road, 81 Huishan Park Road, 81, 88, 152 Huishan Road, 68 Huishan Scenery Committee, 81 Huishan Town, 19, 26, 78–79, 81 imperialism, 5, 148 India, 23, 138 industrial capitalism: factory work, 50; historical process, 8; urbanization, 3, 9–11, 21, 38, 54, 181, 184; Wuxi City, 2, 17 industrialists: electricity, 105; Japanese occupation, 134; Jiangsu-Zhejiang War, 61, 67 69; Shanghai, 20; urban administration, 55, 57; urbanization, 1, 15, 25, 47, 49, 88 industrialization: household silk filatures, 142; migration, 29–30; Nantong, 11; urbanization, 8, 10, 76, 126, 145, 183–184; Wuxi City, 26, 32 infrastructure: administration of, 56, 90, 95, 132, 146, 151, 162; Central China Development Company, 129; commercial settlement, 59; City Organization Law, 75; electricity, 105–107; elite investment in, 11, 25, 37, 70, 181; guerilla attacks on, 169; irrigation, 101; military, 16, 130, 158–160, 163; qingxiang campaign, 164, 173–174; rural, 38, 42–44, 54, 145, 147, 158; Skinner, William G., 99, 101; Sun Yatsen, 12, 75, 94, 97; tourism, 46, 49; urbanization, 2–4, 36, 95, 99–100, 131, 179–180; Wuxi Municipal Planning Department, 85; Zhang Jian, 10 Japan: Chinese wartime administration, 140, 147, 149, 151, 157, 159, 162–163, 166, 167; Chinese wartime economy, 16, 132, 134, 136–138, 140; qingxiang campaign, 168–169, 179; study in, 25, 64, 77, 96, 132; war with, 12–13, 38, 46, 127, 130, 182 Japanese Army: assassination of Yang Shoutong, 163–168; control over the silk industry, 136–137, 143; military action, 130, 131, 149, 180; Second Qingxiang Campaign, 170, 173; Special Services Department, 133; wartime administration, 128–129, 140, 150; wartime public services, 155–160 Jardine, Matheson, and Company, 135–136 Jiading, 77, 128

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Jiangnan: economy, 17, 19, 31, 70, 180; flooding, 119; Japanese occupation, 129, 136, 139, 141, 147, 168, 173, 175; migration, 31–32; native place society, 108, 113, 118; scenery, 49, 51; urbanization, 4, 19, 23, 29, 42, 52, 162, 181; war, 14, 103. See also Lower Yangtze Delta Jiangnan University, 181 Jiangsu:economy, 22–23, 39, 57, 102, 138; electricity, 105–107; flooding, 102, 118, 161; migration, 30, 35, 110–111, 119; New Fourth Army, 169; qingxiang campaign, 168, 177; refugees, 121, 137; urbanization, 2, 19, 74, 86, 91, 98 Jiangsu Army, 62–63, 65 Jiangsu Construction Ministry, 139 Jiangsu Ministry of Civil Affairs, 72, 77, 89, 91 Jiangsu Provincial Puppet Government, 147–148, 161–162 Jiangsu Provincial Flood Relief Society, 119 Jiangsu Society, 45 Jiangsu-Zhejiang War, 14–15, 25, 55, 60–71, 104, 116 Jiangxi, 18, 61 Jiangyin: commercial settlement, 57, 59; electricity, 156; qingxiang campaign, 175; refugees 125; Spring Festival, 36; smuggling, 135, 141; transport connections 38, 42, 181; Wang Jingwei, 179 Jinan, 56 Jingyun, 41, 59, 103, 150 Jiufeng Flour Mill, 39 Kaiyuan Bus Company, 42 Kaiyuan Machinery Factory, 181 Kaiyuan Road, 44, 48, 68 Kaiyuan Ward, 22, 41–42, 51–52, 67, 103–104, 176 Kirby, William, 11 Kunshan, 63, 65, 175, 182 laborer, 17–18, 30, 51, 110. See also worker Lake Tai: guerillas, 142; irrigation, 105; Jiangsu Society, 45; Kaixiangong, 50; residential zone, 1, 78; tin, 18; tourism, 44, 46–49, 72; urbanization, 182; Yangtze River, 101 Lake Tai Hotel, 45, 49 Lake Tai Irrigation Committee, 102 landlord, 20, 24, 51–52, 154–155 Lefebvre, Henri, 8–9, 184

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Li Hongzhang, 21 lineages, 31, 111, 113 Lin Xuancai, 64, 69 Liutanqiao, 99–100 Lower Yangtze Delta: Japanese occupation, 13, 129, 147, 163, 180; migration, 32, 37; native place society, 108–109, 118; urbanization, 7, 9, 13, 54, 124, 181, 183. See also Jiangnan Lu Hanchao, 6–7 Lu Yongxiang, 61, 63, 70 Luoshe, 24, 40–41, 110 Maoxiangjie, 99–100 Maoxin Flour Mill, 22 Meicun, 42, 52, 160, 169 merchant, 18, 20, 23, 60, 23 migration: native place society, 108, 117, 124; peasant immizeration, 10; qingxiang campaign 176; stove god, 53; urbanization, 183; Wuxi City, 15, 29–32; Zhou Zhaodi, 115 militia: Jiangsu-Zhejiang War, 56, 62, 64–70; Second Qiangxiang Campaign, 169; urban administration, 36, 91, 94, 103 Ming Dynasty, 9, 18 modernity, 4–7, 14, 46, 148, 184 mulberry bush, 20, 23, 42, 80, 139 mulberry leaf, 140, 145 Nanfangquan, 24, 40–41, 134, 139 Nanjing: irrigation, 101; Japanese invasion, 130–131; Jiangsu–Zhejiang War, 63, 69–70; Nationalist Government, 11, 123; native place society, 15, 108–114, 118–119; Reformed Government, 147; refugees, 123, 125; Reorganized Government, 148; transport, 38, 42, 158; urbanization, 1–2, 19, 75, 87, 146–147, 150 Nanjing Decade, 15, 74, 92, 101, 126 Nanjing Road, 6, 28 nation-state, 8, 184 Nantong: commercial settlement, 56–57; elites, 13, 17; Jiangsu Society, 45; migration, 31, 37; refugees, 125; urbanization, 10–11, 19, 26, 54; war, 13 Nationalist Government: City Organization Law, 90; commercial settlement, 60; flooding, 119; native place society, 109, 126; local officials, 77, 104, 147; official rule, 11; infrastructure, 95; qingxiang

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campaign, 180; Sun Yatsen, 12, 75, 97; urbanization, 2, 13, 25, 71, 73, 76, 88, 107; Xue Shouxuan, 21 native place society, 15, 84, 108–109, 111–114, 116–120, 124–125 Ningbo, 31–32, 109, 123 Number One Public Office, 87, 90, 92–93, 150, 151 opium, 94, 104 pacification agents, 128, 132–133, 136, 146, 149, 158 Pan Min, 147 Peking University, 77 pingfang, 34, 39, 52 Plum Garden, 42, 44–45, 49 Pomeranz, Kenneth, 9 public office, administration of, 87, 91–96, 133, 148, 150–151, 157, 170–171, 175; commercial settlement, 57–59; electricity, 105–106; flooding, 101, 103–104; Jiangsu-Zhejiang War, 65 Qian Fenggao, 132, 134, 150–151 Qian Jihou, 65–67, 69 qianzhuang, 22 Qin Lianggong, 149–150, 156 Qing Dynasty, 6, 11, 17–18, 184 Qingcheng, 41, 97, 102, 162 Qingfeng Cotton Mill, 21, 25, 39 qingxiang campaign: Japanese occupation, 14, 16, 168; New Fourth Army, 164; Second Qingxiang Campaign, 170–179; smuggling, 136, 142; urbanization,146, 163, 182 Qishuyan Power Station, 105–107, 155–156 Qi Xieyuan, 58, 61–64, 67–68 Red Cross, 56, 62, 66–67, 125 Red Swastika Society, 120–125 Reformed Government, 147–149, 151, 164 refugees, 62, 66–67, 116, 120–125, 153 Reorganized National Government, 142, 148. See also Wang Jingwei: government rice: assasination of Yang Shoutong, 165–166; broker, 19, 22–24, 39, 169; farming, 50–51, 53, 140, 180; floods, 103–104, 119; JiangsuZhejiang War, 63, 65, 67, 70; mill, 24, 26, 39, 100, 137; Second Qingxiang Campaign, 176–177; warehouse, 24

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Rong Desheng: business partnership, 24; commercial settlement, 57; JiangsuZhejiang War, 64, 66; Lake Tai, 48; native place society, 113; Plum Garden, 44–45; Shenxin, 22; urbanization, 1–2, 22, 76, 146, 180, 182 Rongxiang, 22, 42, 169 Rong Zongjing, 22, 81, 89, 111–112, 115 rural administration, 90–92, 94 rural industrialization, 10–11, 142–145 rural infrastructure: elite investment, 38, 70; local officials, 132, 146; Nationalist government, 95, 97; urbanization, 42, 46, 70, 89, 145, 147; wartime reconstruction, 158–160, 163 rural modernity, 5–7 rural reconstruction, 5–6, 12 rural silk industry, 20, 133, 142–145, 169 rural-to-urban migration, 29–31, 176 rural-urban continuum: daily life, 11, 38; self-government, 91; urbanization, 4, 7–8, 13, 18, 73,181, 183–185 rural-urban gap, 4–6, 184 rural urbanization, 2, 5, 7–9, 15, 51, 52, 53–54 Sanliqiao, 24, 39, 64, 66, 154, 156, 169 self-government: commercial settlement, 56, 58–59; elites, 11; Nationalist government, 73, 76, 90–91, 107; Sun Yatsen, 74–75, 89, 91; Wuxi militia, 62; Zhang Jian, 45 Self Government Committee, 92, 128, 132–134, 136, 148–159, 161, 164 sericulture: decorative border industry, 42; farmers, 50–51; postwar recovery, 129, 132–134, 137–142; public offices, 92, 94–95; reform, 90, 104 Sericulture Direction Office, 132–133, 138 Sericulture Improvement Direction Office, 132 Shandong, 9, 18, 76 Shanghai, 29, 34–35, 44, 46, 49, 54; economy, 1–2, 10–11, 15, 19, 23, 37–38, 46, 58, 129, 131, 135–138, 141–142, 145, 176, 178, 183; infrastructure, 39, 42, 45, 96, 131, 147, 158–159, 173, 182; Japanese invasion, 103–104, 130, 167; Jiangsu–Zhejiang War, 61, 63, 66–68; migration, 29–32, 103, 176; modernity, 5–6; native place society, 15, 108–126; Shanghai Commercial Savings Bank, 136–137 Shenxin Company, 22

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Shenxin Number Three Cotton Mill, 22–23, 26, 32–33, 61, 65, 181 shipping, 19, 85, 135, 176 silk filatures: cocoon brokers, 18; decorative border industry, 51; guerillas, 127, 169; Jiangsu Society, 45; Kaixiangong, 50; refugees, 66; rural development, 42–43; Shanghai, 20, 22, 135; wartime recovery, 129, 131 134, 136–137, 139; workers, 30, 54, 104, 130, 153; Wuxi, 20–21, 24–26; Zhou Zhaodi, 115 silk industry: Central China Sericulture Company, 138; continuum, 10–11, 20; Japanese, 51, 138; Japanese occupation, 14–15, 128–132, 134–136, 142, 145; urbanization, 21, 72 silk reeling, 16, 51, 138, 142 silk tax, 70 silk trade, 18–19, 27–28, 39, 133, 138, 140, 143 silk weaving, 18, 131 silkworm, 20, 50–51, 131, 135, 138 silkworm cocoon: Central China Sericulture Company, 129; New Fourth Army, 169; sericulture, 51; silk industry continuum, 20; Tang Baoqian, 39; urban daily life, 36; warehouse, 24; wartime recovery, 133–142, 145; Xue Shouxuan, 21 Silkworm Cocoon Society, 132 silkworm egg, 21, 51, 132–133, 138, 140 Silkworm Egg Society, 132 Sino-Japanese Silk Corporation, 134, 136 Skinner, William G., 9–10, 29, 30 Song Jingyan, 64–65 Song Zhentao, 66–70 South Manchurian Railway Company, 53 state: administrative divisions, 73; city organization law, 76; collaborationist, 147–148, 168; county government, 15, 90; developmental, 2, 54–55, 73, 88, 128, 146, 181, 183–184; electricity, 90, 106–107; elites, 55, 71; flooding, 119; irrigation, 101, 105; Jiangsu-Zhejiang War, 15, 61, 65, 69, 71; municipal autonomy, 15; native place society, 108, 118, 124; peasant immizeration, 10; refugees, 121, 123; road building, 96; rural-urban continuum, 4; Sun Yatsen, 75; urbanization, 3, 8, 11–13, 43, 60, 76, 88, 95, 171, 179, 181–183; war, 13–14, 178; Wuxi Municipal Planning Department, 83–84 Strand, David, 5, 12

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Sun Yatsen: developmental state, 11, 73; Great People’s Association, 148; native place society, 113; self-government, 74, 89, 91, 107; Wuxi-Jiangyin Road, 96–97; Wuxi Municipal Planning Department, 78; Xin`an, 93 Sun Zuji, 72, 75, 77, 80, 87, 89, 91, 97, 146 Suzhou: Japanese Special Services Department, 156, 165; Jiangsu-Zhejiang War, 68; migration, 30–31, 110; native place society, 15, 108–110, 112–114, 117; puppet Jiangsu provincial government, 147; qingxiang campaign, 169–170, 173, 175–176; urbanization, 2, 9–11, 13, 17, 19, 39, 42, 46–47, 57, 76, 85, 95, 131, 158–160, 182 Taibo, 41, 95, 133 Taiping Rebellion, 9–10, 14, 18–19, 22–23, 39, 108 Tang Baoqian, 39, 47, 64 Tangkou, 24, 31, 40–41, 66, 160, 171 Tangtou, 99, 142 tax: advertising, 86–87, 93; boat companies, 85; cocoon broker, 139; collection, 12, 58, 73; electricity, 106; Jiangsu-Zhejiang War, 69–70; land, 56, 59, 102–103; New Fourth Army, 169; postwar reconstruction, 150; prostitute, 85; Second Qingxiang Campaign, 170; smuggling, 135; transit, 20, 176; Wuxi Municipal Planning Department, 77, 84; Xu Jinghua, 63, 65 tenants, 52, 154–155 Tianjin, 21, 31, 34, 164, 183 Tianshang, 41–42, 97, 98, 159 Tianxia, 41–42, 52, 97–100, 159, 171 tiger stove, 33, 35, 144 Tilly, Charles, 8 Tingziqiao, 21, 170 towns: administrative division, 73, 90–92, 148, 151; air defense, 93; cocoons, 20; cocoon brokers, 20; county government, 90, 92; developmental state, 93; economic development, 9–10; electricity, 105; household silk filatures, 130, 143; infrastructure, 43, 95, 159; irrigation, 160; Jiangsu–Zhejiang War, 62, 64; material culture, 53–54; migration, 30–31, 153; native place society, 111; qingxiang campaign, 168–169, 171–173, 178; roads, 43, 98; rice brokers, 24; Skinner,

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William G., 99–101; transport connections, 72, 85; urbanization, 2–3, 5, 15, 38, 95, 107, 181–182; urban modernity, 6; war, 103, 131, 158 trade: cotton, 18; maritime, 183; rice, 23–24; qingxiang campaign, 176; Shanghai, 19; silk 18; Skinner, William G., 9; Spring Festival, 36; Taiping Rebellion, 19; Tomb sweeping festival, 80; Wuxi, 57, 59 treaty ports, 2, 5, 15, 17, 34, 56, 58, 74, 183 United States, 29, 59, 127, 134, 138 urban administration: City Organization Law, 75–76; City Self-Government law, 74; commercial settlement, 57–60; County Organization Law, 90–91; developmental state, 12–13; elites 55, 126; Number One Public Office, 92–93; wartime reconstruction, 151, 157, 163; Wuxi County Government, 89–90; Wuxi Municipal Planning Department, 72, 77–80, 87–88, 146 urban daily life, 31–37, 44, 54, 145, 177 urban historians, 8, 10, 12 urban in late imperial China, 7, 9–10, 19, 44, 466 urban infrastructure: City Organization Law, 75; elites, 2, 15, 37, 181; time, 43; wartime reconstruction, 132, 145–146, 163; Yang Hanxi, 25–26; Zhang Jian, 10 urban landscape: elites 11, 54; industry 23; Number One Public Office, 92; public festivals, 35; urbanization, 36, 184; Yu Dafu, 80 urban migration, 5, 7, 15, 17–18, 29–32, 116, 176 urban modernity, 5–7, 46 urban population, 153 urban system: City Organization Law, 76; electricity, 107; infrastructure, 12, 159; late imperial China, 4, 10; migration, 182; native place society, 108, 112, 114, 121, 124; Wuxi, 15 urban silk industry, 20–21, 144, 169 urban warfare, 14, 16, 130, 149 urbanization: commercial settlement, 55–60; economy, 9–11; historical process, 3–4, 8–9, 128, 183–185; migration, 29–32, 53; modernity, 5–7; native place society, 108, 124; natural environment, 44, 46, 48–49; rural infrastructure, 42–44, 95–96, 99,

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101; rural-urban relationship, 4–5, 7–9, 184; state, 11–13, 55, 71, 73–76, 105, 107, 126, 146; war, 13–15, 147, 151, 158, 160, 162–164, 168, 171, 178–180; Wuxi, 2–3, 15–18, 20–21, 37, 40, 50, 54, 78, 88, 90, 92, 95, 129–130, 145, 181–182; Yanjiaqiao, 38–40 villages: administrative division, 90–92, 148, 151; air defense, 93; cocoons, 20; cocoon brokers, 20; county government, 90; daily life, 33, 50; developmental state, 93; economic development, 9–10; electricity, 105; infrastructure, 43, 95, 159; irrigation, 160; household silk filatures, 130, 143, 145; Jiangsu-Zhejiang War, 64; material culture, 53–54; migration, 10, 30–32, 110, 153; motorized irrigation pumps, 51–52; qingxiang campaign, 168–169, 171–173; rice brokers, 22; roads, 98; rural-urban gap, 6; Skinner, William G., 99–101; transport connections, 43, 85; urbanization, 2–3, 15, 38, 95, 107, 181–182; urban modernity, 4–5; war, 131, 158 Walker, Kathy le Mons, 10 Wanan, 41, 102–103 Wang Jingwei, 142, 168, 179–180 Wang Jingwei Government, 143, 148–149, 152, 174. See also Reorganized National Government Wang Kexun, 57, 60, 64, 70 Weber, Max, 4 wheat, 22, 24, 39, 42, 140, 177, 180 workers: brick and tile making, 18–19; daily life, 15, 29, 35, 43, 53–54; Dasheng Cotton Mill, 10; decorative border industry, 51; Jiangsu-Zhejiang War, 65, 70; migration, 15, 30–32; native place society, 84; postwar reconstruction, 151, 155–156, 158–159; Red Cross, 67; rice mills, 24; rural-urban gap, 5; Shenxin Number Three Cotton Mill, 32–34, 61; silk industry, 135–136, 153; Treasure World Bridge, 48; urbanization, 3; Wuxi County, 42; Wuxi City, 26–27, 41, 72, 77; Yanjiaqiao, 39; Yang Hanxi, 25; Yongtai Silk Filature, 21, 144. See also laborers World War I, 17, 20–22 Wuhan, 102 Wujin, 57, 64, 105, 125, 141

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Wuxi Chamber of Commerce, 21, 56–58, 62–63, 66–67, 97, 121 Wuxi City: administration of, 2, 17, 41, 73, 82, 87–88, 91–92, 156, 164, 179; bulletin boards, 86–8; daily life in, 32–37, 54, 177; electricity generation, 105–107 flour mill, 22; Huishan park, 80–81; JiangsuZhejiang War, 62–71; industrialization of, 2, 17, 20, 24–26, 38, 54; migration, 29, 30; Plum Garden, 44–45; pingfang, 52; rice, 23; refugee, 125; silk filature, 20–21, 104, 135, 144, 153; transport connections, 38, 42, 43, 49, 85, 99, 101, 158, 173, 177; urban system, 114, 159; urbanization, 107, 181; warfare, 120, 131 Wuxi City Public Office, 57–58, 65, 105, 106 Wuxi County: administration of, 41, 72, 77, 85, 89–90, 151; cocoon broker, 20; electricity pylon, 106; irrigation, 51, 101–104, 161; Japanese occupation, 163; migration, 30; native place society, 114–116, 118–120; refugees, 124; Second Qingxiang Campaign, 170, 178; transport, 42; urbanization 2, 16, 21, 38, 49, 99–101, 182; Zhou Shunqing, 20 Wuxi County Construction Bureau, 95–97, 102, 139, 146, 152 Wuxi County Government: construction, 96, 152; County Organization Law, 90–91; eighth ward, 94–95; electricity, 106; first executive council meeting, 89–90, 92; flooding 119, 161; Huishan, 81; irrigation, 102–103; Japanese occupation, 137, 151, 154–155, 158–159, 170; land dispute, 84; migration, 29; native place society, 114–115, 118; Number One Public Office, 92–93; qingxiang campaign, 170–171; sericulture, 132, 169; silk filatures, 143; Sun Zuji, 72; tax, 85–86; urbanization, 26, 180; Wuxi-Jiangyin Road, 97; Wuxi Municipal Administration Bureau, 76; Wuxi Municipal Planning Department, 77, 88; Yang Shoutong, 165–166 Wuxi Flood Relief Committee, 103, 118 Wuxi Hotel, 57, 64, 120 Wuxi-Jiangyin Road, 90, 94, 96, 98–101, 131, 158, 169, 171, 173 Wuxi Municipal Administration Bureau, 76, 82

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Wuxi Municipal Planning Department: bulletin boards, 86–87; construction license, 82; disputes, 83–84; dissolution of 87–88; electricity, 106; establishment of, 76–78; Huishan Park, 80–81; Number One Public Office, 92; rickshaws, 85–86; roads, 95, 153; urbanization, 72, 89–90, 146 Wuxi Native Place Society in Nanjing, 110, 113, 117, 119 Wuxi Native Place Society in Shanghai, 69, 109–122, 124 Wuxi Native Place Society in Suzhou, 110, 114, 117 Wuxi Number One Public Office, 90, 92–93, 150–151 Wuxi Pacification Team, 134, 149 Wuxi Public Security Bureau, 83–84, 87, 92–93 Wuxi Public Works Division, 77–78, 81, 85, 89 Wuxi-Shanghai Road, 158, 173 Wuxi Telephone Company, 25, 159 Xijin Chamber of Commerce, 21 Xijin Gongsuo, 111 Xinan, 41, 94, 104 Xishan, 1, 18, 36, 80 Xue Mingjian: commercial settlement, 57; flooding, 119; housing, 34; Jiangsu-Zhejiang War, 61–63; Shenxin Number Three Cotton Mill, 32–34; urbanization, 76, 78, 146, 180, 182; workers, 26–27, 30, 35

Xue Nanming, 20–21, 25, 57, 64, 77, 105 Xue Shouxuan, 21, 134 Xu Jinghua, 63, 65 Yangfuxing Mill, 83 Yang Hanxi: commercial settlement, 55, 58, 60; Jiangsu-Zhejiang War, 62, 64–70; refugee, 121, 124; Self Government Committee, 149, 159; urbanization, 25–26 39, 47–48, 55, 58, 77, 82; Wuxi Native Place Society in Nanjing, 113, 119 Yangming, 41–42, 86, 94–95, 133, 150 Yang Shoutong, 163–168, 178 Yangtze River, 96, 101, 120–121, 141, 164, 170, 181 Yang Weiyun, 58, 60 Yanjiaqiao, 38–40, 43, 62, 95 Yaoming Electric Lighting Company, 105 Yixing, 42, 47, 57, 59, 62, 125 Yiyuan Warehouse and Rice Mill, 39 Yongtai Silk Filature, 21, 32–33, 135, 137, 144 Yongxing Electricity Company, 106 Yuchang Silk Filature, 21, 132 Yukang Cotton Mill, 21, 25 Zhang Jian, 10–11, 17, 45, 57 Zhangjingqiao, 40–41, 135, 169 Zhang Zuolin, 61, 70 Zhejiang, 18, 23, 91, 105, 130, 138, 147 Zhenhua Electricity Company, 105 Zhenjiang, 19, 21, 31–32, 95, 112, 125, 159 Zhaongyang University, 113

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About the Author

Toby Lincoln is a historian of urbanization in China. His research explores the rural-­urban relationship, the impact of war on cities, and the history of urban planning. He is currently a lecturer in modern Chinese urban history at the Center for Urban History, University of Leicester.

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Production Notes for Lincoln | Urbanizing China in War and Peace Jacket design by Julie Matsuo-Chun Display type in Calibri and text type in FreightText Composition by Westchester Publishing Ser­v ices Printing and binding by Sheridan Books, Inc. Printed on 60 lb. House White Opaque, 466 ppi.

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